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December 16, 2016
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December 17, 2004
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August 28, 1962
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kift ZANDT car We Vaterpoiser potential is antage needed to tip the balance one 4y ted? sigisasr areas' kysinadeonate rainfall d, requires large capital OfltlsayS. Atomic reaetion and _Other revolu- tIQn,arl sources of power are still largely eXperiSsiental._ _Superficially, at least these facts -asSjal tospoint to sizable fUture markets OVerSealVf or 1:r.S. coal it present trends to- Ward higher productivity and lower, prices cOntinue. - 3 ? Bonle Veelfle trends alaroag. can besotted to atipPort this view. Japan', coal production has been fairly stable in regent years despite phenomenal growth in hersgeneral economy. In the 5 years between 1956 and 1961, for instance, pig iron production nearly tripled arid thermal-generated electric power consid- erably more than triple c. During the same Japan was ab to to increase wEster- generated power by only 15 percent; in Europe, West German increased steel pro- duction 40 percent between 1956 and 1961: France, 30 percent; 'tab, 50 percent; Sweden, 60 percent; Belgium,sst little over 10 percent; and Great Britain,d. little less. For the Same 5,-year period, Increases in production Of electric power tire about 40 Percent in West Germany, Fr:ce, and Italy; 50 percent ha Great _Britssins. Bweden; and SO per- cent in Belgium. In South America, steel production rose 410 percent in Argentina and 20 percent ig Chile, while increases in electric power pffduction in the principal countries range from 30 percent in Brazil - 4nd Chile to 50 ercent in coal-rich Colom- bia and over J percent in oil-richsvens- tuela. The statistic quoted above are not exact. The purpose is o create a general impression of growth ra, s, In, _various parts of the sSorld, o industries that consumed ? the most coal In contrast, coal output ac- tpally between 1956 and 1961 in WeSteril Ens , and recorded only moderate gains in Sou America and Japan. There is, of course, o way of knowing how eco- nornic foiees u. ay shift. But the present trends-slowe costs in the United States, rising (Leman and limitations on output overSeSS?seem to point to a _period of rising , eXport op_portunities for the United 4tates. The US. Position in Work] Affoirs EXTENSION OF REMARKS 10,JdaroLgury4? exasussYsvsfssia IN THE, HOUSE OF REpHESENTATIyEB ? -k07'/CiSiji, August 27,, 1962 Mr. YAN ZANDT. Mr.. Speaker, on Monday I had the privilege of addressing 'th,.P 17th annual VW-mention of the Na- tional ?wiety of Public Accountants at the Sheraton liQtel,in Philadelphia, Pa. the reguest of the society, the subject of my address was "The U.S. Position in World Affairs.? Under leave to ex- tend my remarks I am including the text nf that address ? .THZ U.S, ,AFFAxas_ (AddresS :lay Representative JAN= E. VAN ZANDT, Member of Congress, 20th District Of Pennsylvania, before the 17th National Convention of the Public Accountants, BherastOn. Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa., Mon- day, Aug. 20, 1,962, 7:30 p.rn?) -The Sadaject I have been asked to speak oto ou ah. art stopight Is "The U.S. Position ? P." , very Arnesiean is aware 04_04 country's great variety of activities in a thousand spots around the globe. .2005tOlt 7.&001,. rR1SSTONAL RFRD-777-4PKINPix A6467 The newe;,siapers, 1:stslio, and television keep 'us Informed daily of American activities In Laos, South _Vietnam, Geneva, the United Nations?revolutions in Latin America, riots. in Palestine,. or propaganda from Moscow. Yes we are deeply interested in what is going on around the world?because we are deeply involved, This involvement is partly by choice and partly by circumstance. ? The circumstances of World War II left only two great powers?the United States and the Soviet ? Japan and Germany were defeated and occupied. Other European powers were drained and exhausted by the long bitter years of war. As the Visited States brought its boys home, the hard realities of this new two- power world soon became evident. , Unless the United States exercised strength?either militarily or economically? as in the case of the Marshall plan the So- viet Union would capture by force and sub- version every free country whose affairs it could entangle. The United States chose to take up vigor- ously the task that historic circumstance had thrust upon us. We became leader of the free world in the struggle to maintain independence against the threat of Soviet Russian imperialism. Of all the roles which our country plays in the world today?this one is the most worthy. I could speak to you today about our posi- tion as a firm and loyal supporter of the SYnited Nations._ I could speak to you about our position of builder of the underdeveloped areas? about our foreign aid program?and our Alliance for Progress. I could speak to you about our evolving position as a partner in trade with the new Europe?a Europe saved from Communist chaos by its own determination and hard work?aided by the resources the American taxpayer provided by our Marshall plan. I could speak of these and many other positions of the United States in world affairs today. But I want to talk about one aspect of Our position of leadership of the free world, 'Ohe very core of strength of our leadership position?mar Military strength. We know from bitter experience that communisco will not hesitate to use the force of arms in pursuit of its imperial am- bitions. We also lino* that freemen, armed with 'knowledge of Soviet tactics as well as with the machines of war, will not lose their free- dom easily. Since the core of free world strength is the military power of the U.S. Armed Forces, and since Khrushchev has been making so 'Many claims lately about the size and strength of the Soviet strategic forces, I Would like to take this opportunity to point out the relative balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union. There are two reasons for my selection of this specific ? subject to speak about on this occasion. First, I have firsthand knowledge of it and, second, during the month of July Mr. Khrushchev and other Russians did some boasting that needs a straight answer. My knowledge of the subject comes from my Navy experience in the two World Wars, and the Korean conflict. Also from the fact that I am currently a member of the House Committee on Armed Services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I think during the course of my remarks that I will be able to show up Mr. Khru- shohev's boasts for what they are. I think I shall also be able to clear up some possible question in your minds about such things as the missile gap. : It is importaA in this age of the possi- bility of nuclear catastrophe?for every citi- zen to be aware of the realities of the mili- tary situation. This is another reason I thought it im- portant to clear up any confusion created by last month's Soviet exaggerations. I believe it is useful to share our thinking with our staunch allies?such as our friends from Canada who are here with us at this gathering. They share equally .1n the dangers of de- fending our freedoms. For that reason, they ought to share equal- ly in our evaluation of the actual military balance of power today. Let me begin by comparing the strategic striking forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. At present we have about 85 operational ICBM's to a reported Soviet 50-75. In addition the United States has 128 Polaris missiles on 8 operational submarines. We have over 600 B-52's, almost 100 B-58's, and about 1,000 B-47's with round trip re- fueling capabilities. Against this the Russians have only 150 intercontinental bombers and about 400 to 800 one-way-only medium bombers. This is all that the Russians have that poses a direct threat to the United States and Canada. We have, however, in addition to all these missiles and bombers about 100 MRBM's in Europe. We also have about 300 carrier-based and 1,000 land-based tactical aircraft designed and stationed so that they could carry nu- clear weapons into Russia. Thus, considering only the United States and the Soviet Union, we have an enormous- ly overwhelming advantage in strategic nu- clear striking power. To partially offset this advantage the So- viets have their huge well-equipped land army and about 400 1V1RBM's stationed in Eastern Europe with which to threaten our NATO allies. The advantage in missiles and bombers is decidedly on the side of the United States and is growing rapidly. Furthermore, we and our NATO allies are building up our conventional forces in Europe?so that we can conduct a successful local defense without using destructive nu- clear weapons to do it. Therefore, without ignoring the dangers of the fantastically destructive weapons of to- day, there is no need for us to be more afraid of the Russians than they are of us. We can be confident that our vigorous de- fense program is keeping us ahead of the Reds. But what about the missile gap? Did it ever exist? Yes it did exist on paper but fortunately it never materialized in fact. The missile gap was a prediction, let us remember, based on intelligence estimates. These estimates showed that the Russians were building a fleet of ICBM's. The estimates were arrived at based on the amount of steel alloy and the number of specialists and so forth required to build one of these missiles. In addition, the estimates were based on the total amount of steel alloy and the num- -her of specialists that the Russians had. Then also the experts calculated how many missiles the Russians were capable of build- ing over the next few years. Compared to the number of missiles that the United States had planned to build over those same years, the Russians could have had in the early 1960's a lead of as much as 3 to 2. This was the so-called missile gap. The main reason it never materialized was that Russia never built anywhere near the number of missiles that were estimated. 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-0 00 o 4?9,15'2 ; A6468 Approved For R lease 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX Her failure to do so was due perhaps to agricultural or other internal problems which kept her defense spending down. At any rate, we speeded up our program, and when the new intelligence information came in that the Russians had not built all their missiles?the so-called missile gap dis- appeared. In fact, the United States assumed a small but growing lead in the missile field. The same thing had happened in the early 1950's with the bomber gap and it was re- solved in the same fashion. It was worthwhile to take these alleged gaps seriously. You can imagine the dangerous situation which could have arisen, if we had not taken them seriously, and the Russians bad built to their limit. At the present time it is reported we have a safe lead in both these categories. That fact is a satisfying feeling for all Americans. Now there are two specific Russian rumors that I would like to try to counter. On July 17, Premier Khrushchev in an in- terview with some American editors repeated his earlier claims that Russia had an anti- ICBM missile. He boasted that the Soviet missile could "hit a fly in space." Our Department of Defense and other space scientists are positive, however, that the first successful Intercept of an ICBM by cm antimissile missile took place 3 days later. It was on July 20, over Kwajalein Island in the Pacific, a U.S. Army Nike-Zeus missile intercepted an Atlas ICBM. So here is an anti-missile-missile gap that Mr. Khrushchev Is trying to create in the minds of the world. The facts do not back him up. Another Russian boast that took place last month was in connection with the Soviet Navy day celebration held in Leningrad on July 29. There, Russian Admiral Baikov said that the Soviet Navy now had Polaris-type sub- marines that could go under the pole just like the U.S. version. Later, in the military newspaper Red Star, the Soviet Polaris-type striking force was called the "shock force" of the Red navy. Now this may well be, but if the Russians have Polaris-type submarines that can go under the pole, they must not be able to make it up the Neva River to Leningrad. They did not show up with all the other Red navy vessels at the navy day celebra- tion. And only a few weeks before the Red Star called the Polaris-type submarine fleet the "shock force" of the Red navy, reports came out that the Soviet Union bad just conducted its first successful underwater missile launch. No wonder none of these subs showed up at Leningrad. If these submarines advanced from the experimental stage to a "shock force" stage In the matter of a few weeks, those subs must have been cruising udder the pole or some- where with no time to celebrate navy day. What all these exaggerations those. I think, is a desperate attempt by the Soviets to keep up the false image of Russian military su- premacy. This exaggerated supremacy claimed the attention of a worried world under the in- fluence of such things as the "bomber gap" and the missile gap. Now that time has shown each of these gaps to be nonexistent, the world realizes that the United States is still way ahead of the Russians militarily. For one thing, the Soviet economy cannot stand the defense expenditures needed to surpass the U.S. effort. And for the world to know this most cer- tainly upsets the Soviet leaders. In, the face of all thii Soviet bluffing and the 'lack of facts in the false gap stories' Am Ica faces a problem at home. ne of our fellow citizens claim that the UnI4ed States is behind in everything. ey say we have become a second-rate are alarmists and prophets of de- featism. ey talk about Russia's expanding econ- cm nd now they throw in Germany, Fra4ce, and Japan. at they do not say or do not know is thall the Russian expansion is based on the between 1948 and 1853, when the So- viet was recovering from the effects of the Gernan invasion, It was a recovery from a nearly mortal blo , and not normal, healthy economic ex- pan ion. eh the same may be said for most Eu- rop an countries. ,c know that Russia has not expanded agrlIcultural production. e know she is short of automobiles and sac durables as refrigerators, washing ma- chi es, and many other items. le United States has never failed to meet pr uction goals in either war or peace from el Cr its farms or factories. iese achievements should be the pride an glory of every single American. le of the great unsolved military prob- len facing this country is that of organiz- ing and equipping the NATO shield forces. e must be able to fight and to win a local res tance war without destroying the home- lan9 of the ally, which we are defending tis means in simple terms that if we use tac ical nuclear weapons to stop a possible Ru4aiazt thrust into Europe. they would use tb441k, too, and soon there would be nothing ler to defend. lett is why our policy is now directed to ird increasing the strength of the con- ventionally armed defense forces there. If the Communists tried to invade West- e Europe and we had the number of regu- lar Idivisiona there that we are now building up Ito, a stout defense could be made with- ouq the use of highly destructive nuclear we pons. ur policy is now directed toward keeping thae weapons always on hand?always ready to uze if our regular defense forces cannot ho ?while at the same time increasing th ir capability to do so. the Regular Forces cannot hold?and we must use nuclear weapons to do lt?the d1zienslon of the war will be radically altered fort the initiation of the use of nuclear weap- on4 Is more than just an Increase in fire- po 'er. Is a firm and solemn demonstration to thi enemy that the object which we are de ending Is of extremely high value to us. d his persistence in trying to gain it ha4 raised the risks to him to a high and gerous level. Tile problem today, however, is that the co4iventlonal forces in NATO are still in the pr ess of building up to a high enough le 1. What we want is a choice of whether Or n to use nuclear weapons, not a necessity to 0 so. this position of choice between enema- tits is a position of strength. ut the problem of tactical nuclear weep- ? in NATO is more complex than this. basic decisions will have to be made with- in the next year or two about the strategy under which NATO forces will use these wtaapons. d based on this strategy, additional prblems will have to be solved. bur allies are demanding a greater share in, the decisions about when, where, bow, or if to use nuclear weapons. pow pert Approved For RE After all, if plode in our all Therefore, 't command post of NATO, whi4 nuclear weapoi The military complicated by always arise wl nations work te I would like thoughts ohm; most challengl to be overcoms of a free and ' eat nations. That problen The advanc years stagger ? For example landing last wt reveal the grea Union In probi Frankly the) reveal military alien power col of outer spec West by antisa Seriously lad lot of work to space program even keep abre This is the we face. If the West least matches In keeping the the free work haven. I am certalt an event?we toward the want. Our basic p this cold wai nuclear war if For as the tars, philosopt years ago 500 in all our batt supreme excel enemy's resist While we thermonuclem so unless fore The United strategic sup4 Soviet Russia many million destroy Weste Such an ei obviously eats Western sti strong enougi try an armed the world. In additio Increased wor Atlantic Mita: ter of well-bel Having ace Soviet ethane the captive Irresistibly at of free and h Finally the be neither sh There are . overcome an road will be Yet with tl the present the knowledi of freedom, prevail. If it does It is not du part of any 0640015-2 August 28 _ _ use them, they will ix- 'backyard. ? - de also asking more ns In the military branch will have control of these _ blems-of N'A'r0 are further wittiest problems which 11 two it more independent ther. - leave with you now a few perhaps the greatest and prbblem which will have if we art to realize our goal aCeful gociety of Independ- the mastery of outer space. In this field in the last 5 e imagination. successful orbiting and of iheyusslan cosmonauts tiVarices made by the Soviet tinter space. - Russian accomplishments ger which could arise if an take and Maintain control while denying its use to the trite mifelles or other means. and gentlemen?we have a o in the development of our We are to forge ahead .or of the Soviets. of the vexing problem this space race or at Is, we will be successful et-Union from threatening from an invulnerable space you will agree that in such I have taken a long step of International society we blern centers on how to win ?Without having a thermo- bk. eldest of all Chinese mill- ,Stln 'Ts& said almost 2,500 :C., -"To fight and conquer Is not -supreme excellence? nee obests in breaking the 'ce Without fighting." e ready today to, light a "Air 'we' have no wish to do to it by the Russians. tates with its overwhelming orlty would put an end to Ut she in turn would kill Of our _ people and perhaps Europe completely. ? ng to the cold war would no one. ter/ is to remain militarily SO that. the U.S.S.R. will not roNer_ in the free parts of y economic cooperation and trade, we hope to make the e a'Strcing and thriving cen- and freedom. /dished this objective, the system would break down as tions of Eastern Europe are acted to the Western example py prosperity. oad to this ideal solution will nor easy. y 'problems to be met and he twists and turns in the t011ildence that the facts of tab Tailadee give -Us, and that lajatory is on ?the side h Clod's help, our 'cause shall prevail, let us make certain from lack of effort on the e of us. lease 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000 40D16-