EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JAMES E. VAN ZANDT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700640015-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 28, 1962
• Content Type: OPEN

kift ZANDT
car We Vaterpoiser potential is
antage needed to tip the balance one
4y
ted? sigisasr areas' kysinadeonate rainfall
d, requires large capital
OfltlsayS. Atomic reaetion and _Other
revolu-
tIQn,arl sources of power are still largely
eXperiSsiental._ _Superficially, at least these
facts -asSjal tospoint to sizable fUture markets
OVerSealVf or 1:r.S. coal it present trends to-
Ward higher productivity and lower, prices
cOntinue. - 3
? Bonle Veelfle trends alaroag. can besotted to
atipPort this view. Japan', coal production
has been fairly stable in regent years despite
phenomenal growth in hersgeneral economy.
In the 5 years between 1956 and 1961, for
instance, pig iron production nearly tripled
arid thermal-generated electric power consid-
erably more than triple c. During the same
Japan was ab to to increase wEster-
generated power by only 15 percent; in
Europe, West German increased steel pro-
duction 40 percent between 1956 and 1961:
France, 30 percent; 'tab, 50 percent; Sweden,
60 percent; Belgium,sst little over 10 percent;
and Great Britain,d. little less. For the
Same 5,-year period, Increases in production
Of electric power tire about 40 Percent in
West Germany, Fr:ce, and Italy; 50 percent
ha Great _Britssins. Bweden; and SO per-
cent in Belgium. In South America, steel
production rose 410 percent in Argentina
and 20 percent ig Chile, while increases in
electric power pffduction in the principal
countries range from 30 percent in Brazil
- 4nd Chile to 50 ercent in coal-rich Colom-
bia and over J percent in oil-richsvens-
tuela.
The statistic quoted above are not exact.
The purpose is o create a general impression
of growth ra, s, In, _various parts of the
sSorld, o industries that consumed
? the most coal In contrast, coal output ac-
tpally between 1956 and 1961 in
WeSteril Ens , and recorded only moderate
gains in Sou America and Japan. There
is, of course, o way of knowing how eco-
nornic foiees u. ay shift. But the present
trends-slowe costs in the United States,
rising (Leman and limitations on output
overSeSS?seem to point to a _period of rising
,
eXport op_portunities for the United 4tates.
The US. Position in Work] Affoirs
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
10,JdaroLgury4?
exasussYsvsfssia
IN THE, HOUSE OF REpHESENTATIyEB
? -k07'/CiSiji, August 27,, 1962
Mr. YAN ZANDT. Mr.. Speaker, on
Monday I had the privilege of addressing
'th,.P 17th annual VW-mention of the Na-
tional ?wiety of Public Accountants at
the Sheraton liQtel,in Philadelphia, Pa.
the reguest of the society, the subject
of my address was "The U.S. Position
in World Affairs.? Under leave to ex-
tend my remarks I am including the text
nf that address ?
.THZ U.S, ,AFFAxas_
(AddresS :lay Representative JAN= E. VAN
ZANDT, Member of Congress, 20th District
Of Pennsylvania, before the 17th National
Convention of the Public Accountants,
BherastOn. Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa., Mon-
day, Aug. 20, 1,962, 7:30 p.rn?)
-The Sadaject I have been asked to speak
oto ou ah. art stopight Is "The U.S. Position
? P." ,
very Arnesiean is aware 04_04 country's
great variety of activities in a thousand spots
around the globe.
.2005tOlt 7.&001,.
rR1SSTONAL RFRD-777-4PKINPix A6467
The newe;,siapers, 1:stslio, and television keep
'us Informed daily of American activities In
Laos, South _Vietnam, Geneva, the United
Nations?revolutions in Latin America, riots.
in Palestine,. or propaganda from Moscow.
Yes we are deeply interested in what is
going on around the world?because we are
deeply involved,
This involvement is partly by choice and
partly by circumstance.
? The circumstances of World War II left
only two great powers?the United States
and the Soviet
? Japan and Germany were defeated and
occupied.
Other European powers were drained and
exhausted by the long bitter years of war.
As the Visited States brought its boys
home, the hard realities of this new two-
power world soon became evident.
, Unless the United States exercised
strength?either militarily or economically?
as in the case of the Marshall plan the So-
viet Union would capture by force and sub-
version every free country whose affairs it
could entangle.
The United States chose to take up vigor-
ously the task that historic circumstance
had thrust upon us.
We became leader of the free world in the
struggle to maintain independence against
the threat of Soviet Russian imperialism.
Of all the roles which our country plays
in the world today?this one is the most
worthy.
I could speak to you today about our posi-
tion as a firm and loyal supporter of the
SYnited Nations._
I could speak to you about our position
of builder of the underdeveloped areas?
about our foreign aid program?and our
Alliance for Progress.
I could speak to you about our evolving
position as a partner in trade with the new
Europe?a Europe saved from Communist
chaos by its own determination and hard
work?aided by the resources the American
taxpayer provided by our Marshall plan.
I could speak of these and many other
positions of the United States in world affairs
today.
But I want to talk about one aspect of
Our position of leadership of the free world,
'Ohe very core of strength of our leadership
position?mar Military strength.
We know from bitter experience that
communisco will not hesitate to use the
force of arms in pursuit of its imperial am-
bitions.
We also lino* that freemen, armed with
'knowledge of Soviet tactics as well as with
the machines of war, will not lose their free-
dom easily.
Since the core of free world strength is
the military power of the U.S. Armed Forces,
and since Khrushchev has been making so
'Many claims lately about the size and
strength of the Soviet strategic forces, I
Would like to take this opportunity to point
out the relative balance of military power
between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
There are two reasons for my selection
of this specific ? subject to speak about on
this occasion.
First, I have firsthand knowledge of it
and, second, during the month of July Mr.
Khrushchev and other Russians did some
boasting that needs a straight answer.
My knowledge of the subject comes from
my Navy experience in the two World Wars,
and the Korean conflict.
Also from the fact that I am currently a
member of the House Committee on Armed
Services and the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy.
I think during the course of my remarks
that I will be able to show up Mr. Khru-
shohev's boasts for what they are.
I think I shall also be able to clear up
some possible question in your minds about
such things as the missile gap.
:
It is importaA in this age of the possi-
bility of nuclear catastrophe?for every citi-
zen to be aware of the realities of the mili-
tary situation.
This is another reason I thought it im-
portant to clear up any confusion created
by last month's Soviet exaggerations.
I believe it is useful to share our thinking
with our staunch allies?such as our friends
from Canada who are here with us at this
gathering.
They share equally .1n the dangers of de-
fending our freedoms.
For that reason, they ought to share equal-
ly in our evaluation of the actual military
balance of power today.
Let me begin by comparing the strategic
striking forces of the United States and the
Soviet Union.
At present we have about 85 operational
ICBM's to a reported Soviet 50-75.
In addition the United States has 128
Polaris missiles on 8 operational submarines.
We have over 600 B-52's, almost 100 B-58's,
and about 1,000 B-47's with round trip re-
fueling capabilities.
Against this the Russians have only 150
intercontinental bombers and about 400 to
800 one-way-only medium bombers.
This is all that the Russians have that
poses a direct threat to the United States
and Canada.
We have, however, in addition to all these
missiles and bombers about 100 MRBM's in
Europe.
We also have about 300 carrier-based and
1,000 land-based tactical aircraft designed
and stationed so that they could carry nu-
clear weapons into Russia.
Thus, considering only the United States
and the Soviet Union, we have an enormous-
ly overwhelming advantage in strategic nu-
clear striking power.
To partially offset this advantage the So-
viets have their huge well-equipped land
army and about 400 1V1RBM's stationed in
Eastern Europe with which to threaten our
NATO allies.
The advantage in missiles and bombers is
decidedly on the side of the United States
and is growing rapidly.
Furthermore, we and our NATO allies are
building up our conventional forces in
Europe?so that we can conduct a successful
local defense without using destructive nu-
clear weapons to do it.
Therefore, without ignoring the dangers of
the fantastically destructive weapons of to-
day, there is no need for us to be more afraid
of the Russians than they are of us.
We can be confident that our vigorous de-
fense program is keeping us ahead of the
Reds.
But what about the missile gap? Did it
ever exist?
Yes it did exist on paper but fortunately
it never materialized in fact.
The missile gap was a prediction, let us
remember, based on intelligence estimates.
These estimates showed that the Russians
were building a fleet of ICBM's.
The estimates were arrived at based on the
amount of steel alloy and the number of
specialists and so forth required to build
one of these missiles.
In addition, the estimates were based on
the total amount of steel alloy and the num-
-her of specialists that the Russians had.
Then also the experts calculated how many
missiles the Russians were capable of build-
ing over the next few years.
Compared to the number of missiles that
the United States had planned to build
over those same years, the Russians could
have had in the early 1960's a lead of as
much as 3 to 2.
This was the so-called missile gap.
The main reason it never materialized was
that Russia never built anywhere near the
number of missiles that were estimated.
2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-0
00
o 4?9,15'2 ;
A6468
Approved For R lease 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX
Her failure to do so was due perhaps to
agricultural or other internal problems
which kept her defense spending down.
At any rate, we speeded up our program,
and when the new intelligence information
came in that the Russians had not built all
their missiles?the so-called missile gap dis-
appeared.
In fact, the United States assumed a small
but growing lead in the missile field.
The same thing had happened in the early
1950's with the bomber gap and it was re-
solved in the same fashion.
It was worthwhile to take these alleged
gaps seriously.
You can imagine the dangerous situation
which could have arisen, if we had not taken
them seriously, and the Russians bad built
to their limit.
At the present time it is reported we have
a safe lead in both these categories.
That fact is a satisfying feeling for all
Americans.
Now there are two specific Russian rumors
that I would like to try to counter.
On July 17, Premier Khrushchev in an in-
terview with some American editors repeated
his earlier claims that Russia had an anti-
ICBM missile.
He boasted that the Soviet missile could
"hit a fly in space."
Our Department of Defense and other
space scientists are positive, however, that
the first successful Intercept of an ICBM by
cm antimissile missile took place 3 days later.
It was on July 20, over Kwajalein Island in
the Pacific, a U.S. Army Nike-Zeus missile
intercepted an Atlas ICBM.
So here is an anti-missile-missile gap that
Mr. Khrushchev Is trying to create in the
minds of the world.
The facts do not back him up.
Another Russian boast that took place last
month was in connection with the Soviet
Navy day celebration held in Leningrad on
July 29.
There, Russian Admiral Baikov said that
the Soviet Navy now had Polaris-type sub-
marines that could go under the pole just
like the U.S. version.
Later, in the military newspaper Red Star,
the Soviet Polaris-type striking force was
called the "shock force" of the Red navy.
Now this may well be, but if the Russians
have Polaris-type submarines that can go
under the pole, they must not be able to
make it up the Neva River to Leningrad.
They did not show up with all the other
Red navy vessels at the navy day celebra-
tion.
And only a few weeks before the Red
Star called the Polaris-type submarine fleet
the "shock force" of the Red navy, reports
came out that the Soviet Union bad just
conducted its first successful underwater
missile launch.
No wonder none of these subs showed up
at Leningrad.
If these submarines advanced from the
experimental stage to a "shock force" stage
In the matter of a few weeks, those subs must
have been cruising udder the pole or some-
where with no time to celebrate navy day.
What all these exaggerations those. I think,
is a desperate attempt by the Soviets to keep
up the false image of Russian military su-
premacy.
This exaggerated supremacy claimed the
attention of a worried world under the in-
fluence of such things as the "bomber gap"
and the missile gap.
Now that time has shown each of these
gaps to be nonexistent, the world realizes
that the United States is still way ahead of
the Russians militarily.
For one thing, the Soviet economy cannot
stand the defense expenditures needed to
surpass the U.S. effort.
And for the world to know this most cer-
tainly upsets the Soviet leaders.
In, the face of all thii Soviet bluffing and
the 'lack of facts in the false gap stories'
Am Ica faces a problem at home.
ne of our fellow citizens claim that the
UnI4ed States is behind in everything.
ey say we have become a second-rate
are alarmists and prophets of de-
featism.
ey talk about Russia's expanding econ-
cm nd now they throw in Germany,
Fra4ce, and Japan.
at they do not say or do not know is
thall the Russian expansion is based on the
between 1948 and 1853, when the So-
viet was recovering from the effects of the
Gernan invasion,
It was a recovery from a nearly mortal
blo , and not normal, healthy economic ex-
pan ion.
eh the same may be said for most Eu-
rop an countries.
,c know that Russia has not expanded
agrlIcultural production.
e know she is short of automobiles and
sac durables as refrigerators, washing ma-
chi es, and many other items.
le United States has never failed to meet
pr uction goals in either war or peace from
el Cr its farms or factories.
iese achievements should be the pride
an glory of every single American.
le of the great unsolved military prob-
len facing this country is that of organiz-
ing and equipping the NATO shield forces.
e must be able to fight and to win a local
res tance war without destroying the home-
lan9 of the ally, which we are defending
tis means in simple terms that if we use
tac ical nuclear weapons to stop a possible
Ru4aiazt thrust into Europe. they would use
tb441k, too, and soon there would be nothing
ler to defend.
lett is why our policy is now directed
to ird increasing the strength of the con-
ventionally armed defense forces there.
If the Communists tried to invade West-
e Europe and we had the number of regu-
lar Idivisiona there that we are now building
up Ito, a stout defense could be made with-
ouq the use of highly destructive nuclear
we pons.
ur policy is now directed toward keeping
thae weapons always on hand?always ready
to uze if our regular defense forces cannot
ho ?while at the same time increasing
th ir capability to do so.
the Regular Forces cannot hold?and
we must use nuclear weapons to do lt?the
d1zienslon of the war will be radically altered
fort the initiation of the use of nuclear weap-
on4 Is more than just an Increase in fire-
po 'er.
Is a firm and solemn demonstration to
thi enemy that the object which we are
de ending Is of extremely high value to us.
d his persistence in trying to gain it
ha4 raised the risks to him to a high and
gerous level.
Tile problem today, however, is that the
co4iventlonal forces in NATO are still in the
pr ess of building up to a high enough
le 1.
What we want is a choice of whether Or
n to use nuclear weapons, not a necessity
to 0 so.
this position of choice between enema-
tits is a position of strength.
ut the problem of tactical nuclear weep-
? in NATO is more complex than this.
basic decisions will have to be made with-
in the next year or two about the strategy
under which NATO forces will use these
wtaapons.
d based on this strategy, additional
prblems will have to be solved.
bur allies are demanding a greater share
in, the decisions about when, where, bow, or
if to use nuclear weapons.
pow
pert
Approved For RE
After all, if
plode in our all
Therefore, 't
command post
of NATO, whi4
nuclear weapoi
The military
complicated by
always arise wl
nations work te
I would like
thoughts ohm;
most challengl
to be overcoms
of a free and '
eat nations.
That problen
The advanc
years stagger ?
For example
landing last wt
reveal the grea
Union In probi
Frankly the)
reveal military
alien power col
of outer spec
West by antisa
Seriously lad
lot of work to
space program
even keep abre
This is the
we face.
If the West
least matches
In keeping the
the free work
haven.
I am certalt
an event?we
toward the
want.
Our basic p
this cold wai
nuclear war if
For as the
tars, philosopt
years ago 500
in all our batt
supreme excel
enemy's resist
While we
thermonuclem
so unless fore
The United
strategic sup4
Soviet Russia
many million
destroy Weste
Such an ei
obviously eats
Western sti
strong enougi
try an armed
the world.
In additio
Increased wor
Atlantic Mita:
ter of well-bel
Having ace
Soviet ethane
the captive
Irresistibly at
of free and h
Finally the
be neither sh
There are .
overcome an
road will be
Yet with tl
the present
the knowledi
of freedom,
prevail.
If it does
It is not du
part of any
0640015-2
August 28
_ _
use them, they will ix-
'backyard. ?
- de also asking more
ns In the military branch
will have control of these
_
blems-of N'A'r0 are further
wittiest problems which
11 two it more independent
ther. -
leave with you now a few
perhaps the greatest and
prbblem which will have
if we art to realize our goal
aCeful gociety of Independ-
the mastery of outer space.
In this field in the last 5
e imagination.
successful orbiting and
of iheyusslan cosmonauts
tiVarices made by the Soviet
tinter space. -
Russian accomplishments
ger which could arise if an
take and Maintain control
while denying its use to the
trite mifelles or other means.
and gentlemen?we have a
o in the development of our
We are to forge ahead .or
of the Soviets.
of the vexing problem
this space race or at
Is, we will be successful
et-Union from threatening
from an invulnerable space
you will agree that in such
I have taken a long step
of International society we
blern centers on how to win
?Without having a thermo-
bk.
eldest of all Chinese
mill-
,Stln 'Ts& said almost 2,500
:C., -"To fight and conquer
Is not -supreme excellence?
nee obests in breaking the
'ce Without fighting."
e ready today to, light a
"Air 'we' have no wish to do
to it by the Russians.
tates with its overwhelming
orlty would put an end to
Ut she in turn would kill
Of our _ people and perhaps
Europe completely.
?
ng
to the cold war would
no one.
ter/ is to remain militarily
SO that. the U.S.S.R. will not
roNer_ in the free parts of
y economic cooperation and
trade, we hope to make the
e a'Strcing and thriving cen-
and freedom.
/dished this objective, the
system would break down as
tions of Eastern Europe are
acted to the Western example
py prosperity.
oad to this ideal solution will
nor easy.
y 'problems to be met and
he twists and turns in the
t011ildence that the facts of
tab Tailadee give -Us, and
that lajatory is on ?the side
h Clod's help, our 'cause shall
prevail, let us make certain
from lack of effort on the
e of us.
lease 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000
40D16-