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Approved For 'Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0 December 10, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 21021 tic energy supplies; and fourth, the establishment of Federal and State pro- grams to equitably distribute the inevit- able energy shortages that will be experi- enced for the forseeable future. The uhtted States is faced with a deepening energy crisis. Future energy shortages threaten Government and in- dustry programs to expand energy shi5= plies which are being delayed and even canceled in the face of inflation and high interest rates as well as a general deterioration in our economy. Extraordi- nary steps will be needed if we are to assure that the likelihoods of millions of citizens will not be unreasonably dis- rupted by the resultant shortages. The recent Project Independence re- port analyzes the perils of the United States preient heavy reliance on oil im- ports. The report also outlines the tough ehoiees that must be resolved by the American people. In the months ahead the Congress will review these choices. Already it is clear our actions must go beyond the voluntary energy conserva- tion measures that are being advocated by the administration. Tougher meas- ures" are going to be required. As con- sumers all of us must be prepared to ac- cept sacrifices if the problem is to be solved. Present imports of oil at inflated prices are beginning to sap our economic strength and drain our monetary re- serves. Certainly the executive branch must have the tools to cope with another en- ergy emergency as well as to stimulate new domestic energy. supplies. These au- thorities were contained in 8. 3267, the Standby Energy EfnergencY 'Authorities Act, which was -Clehatea in this body on May? 8 and 13, 1074. That measure was carefully developed over several months to reed experience gained during last winter 4 cppo on embargo. For a variety of reasons, Mr. President, including opposition by the then Nixon administration, --Senate ?action on this meastire Was cliseatinued last spring. The hill, S, 3'267, was complex in nature and its ramifiCations were widespread. At the time the legislation was respon- sive to the current energy problems. Today, Mr. President, join Senator HENRY M.,74,c,EvN gn 'all amendment in the nature, gr oe,SUbstitute for S. 3267. Amendment No. 200'6, the Standby En- ergy Authorities Act. This measure grant e the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration with discretion- ary authority to Implement mandatory energy conservation programs in order to restrain the U.S, consumption of en- ergy?principally ol/ consumption from foreign sources. azgrilent. alsQ provides contin- atti4 plang g authority for end-use ra- tioning. this" provision is to be employed only when the Preside riVdetermines that an energy shortage exists. The Congress also retains the right to veto within 15 days any proposals by the adminis- tratien to exerotse Other thpffinergy con- seivation or the ..,r eXict-ill5q. rationing authorities. AL pn visioned, mandatory energy con- serval= measureemottld be employed as the first step toward greater energy self- sufficiency. End-use rationing would be instituted only as a last resort, but even then on an equitable basis. 'Mr. President, the States have moved ahead and will continue to exercise a niajor role in our coping with our coun- try's energy problem. In fact, the States can take major credit for keeping the petroleum allocation program afloat ` during last winter's severe shortages, often filling the vacuum, while the Fed- eral regional program Was being orga- nized, and backstopping delayed Federal decisionmaking. In recognition of the vital functions to be served by State programs, the Con- gress in establishing the Federal Energy Administration directed in section 20 that special attention be given to the role of State government. Further recognition of the need for strong State leadership is provided in this amendment to S. 3267, the Standby Energy Authorities Act, which is pending on the Senate's calendar. Provision is made for State energy program and im- plementation grants and with respect to energy conservation, for State and local exemption from Federal programs, where strong programs exist. The States must assume major respon- sibility for striking a balance between the goals of environmental protection and resource development. In reality we are involved in two crises, one involving energy and the other current environ- mental policies. The success of a national energy pol- icy will be due largely to the ability of State government to develop regional energy policies. Their ability to take the energy crisis in hand, and match sup- pliers and users is essential. It is not enough to speak of national energy self-sufficiency. To the extent practicable, we also must concern our- selves with regional independence. These provisions do not address the longer term energy supply problems fac- ing our country; these programs are concerned only for equitable distribution of energy shortages. In recognition of the need to increase ? domestic energy supplies the amendment contains two major provisions: first, sec- tion 106 of the bill authorizes the Federal Energy Administrator to undertake vari- ous actions to increase domestic petro- leum supplies; and, second, the measure authorizes the FEA Administrator to preferentially allocate limited supplies of materials and equipment to energy pro- duction. This authority?section 106?is in- tended to provide increased domestic supplies of petroleum over the short-term while long term alternatives are being pursued. Four principal actions are avail- able to the PEA Administrator: First, to require existing oil fields in the private domain to operate at their maximum efficient rates of production; second, to require production in excess of maximum efficient rates from oil fields on lands in which there is a Federal interest; thrid, to require the consolidation of unitization of individual companies' production froin the same oil and gas fields, when on Federal lands, where necessary to meet national security and defense needs; and fourth, to adjust the product mix in A. 4 domestic refinery operations; fit' ucord- ante with national needs and priorities. Looking to the longer term it is neces- sary that the pending amendment also assure that the exploration for and pro- duction of new domestic petroleum sup- plies is not constrained from a lack of availability of equipment and materials. Thus the Federal Energy Administrator is authorized in section 105 to assure the availability of such supplies for this pur- pose during periods of equipment or ma- terials shortages. This provision will pro- vide industry with access to the min- ing equipment and supplies necessau to expand coal production as well as the tubular goods and drilling rigs required for the exploration and development of new domestic oil and gas supplies. Mr. President, this amendment con- tains authority in title II for the Presi- dent to formulate a, plan and establish the mechanisms to control and reduce oil imports. This program is supplement- ed by provisions in title III for the exam- ination and creation of a national stra- tegic reserve system for electric utilities, for industry, and for our country as a whole. I am aware, Mr. President, that there is some confusion and uncertanty about the extent and possible duration of the energy crisis. However, there is little doubt that an energy crisis does exist and will persist. The fact that these shortages will continue requires that we enact legislation to enable equitable dis- tribution of the available supplies to ac- commodate regional as well as national needs. This amendment provides the neces- sary back-up authorities to cope with anticipated shortages and is so titled the Standby Energy Authorities Act. It pro- vides the mechanisms to accommodate our economy and our way of life to energy shortages in an equitable manner, with minimum disruption to our eco- nomy. The provisions are based on ex- perience gained last winter during the embargo. ?? Senator BARTLETT has directed very plausible arguments to delay the action on this measure: the measure Senator JACKSON and others of the Senate, in- cluding myself, have cosponsored. How- ever, further delay would be to ignore the need for the United States to move now and then develop the means to 'cope with our long-term energy crisis. I think that the gentleman from Okla- homa can agree with me on this, that there is a necessity for an interim au- thority to cope with immediately, short- term energy supply interruptions. There is general language in this bill which would provide necessary standby authority. Now, Mr. President, I am satisfied that this measure achieves that purpose in a very practical way and I would hope for its early enactment. I supported similar legislation a year ago, and I understand that Members can disagree. In conclusion. Mr. President. it is my understanding. and / am only partially Informed that the President of the United States, tonight, is expected to ad- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 9 21022 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 10, 1974 dress himself to our country's energy Problems. I am not sure that that is to take place, but as I close I wimt the debate to reflect that the President must realize that de- cisions on this matter must not be de- layed or postponed. We must come to gripS with it in one form Cr another; hopefully with the co- operation of the administration and the support of the. American -people. Mr. BARTLEIT. Mr. Presidene, I say to the distinguished. Senator from West Virginia that I an very sorry our col- leagues did not hear his remarks, par- ticularly when Ile was reciting some of the leaders of this Nation and the tre- mendous challenges which they met, they met with action in a very forthright manner. I am reminded of another problem which faces this country and the world and that is the matter of food shortages, I am so pleased, I would say to my dis- tinguished friend from West Virginia. that this Nation is now gearing up to make every effort to maximize its efforts to provide food, as well as to encourage other nations to do liaeWise, to provide food for themselves as well as to ex- change information so that the rxisting amounts of food that exist around the world can be better utilized than they have been in the past for emergency use. But in looking at that problem, which of counse the distinguished Sena tar from West Virginia knows very well requires energy to maximize, I am concerned about approaching this problem and fighting it with only ore arm, sine that is just cutting back. I am concerned about this approach with the international cooperation agreement that we have with our friends in Europe, that if we only es chauge shortages and have the ability to work on the demand side of the equation, we are not going to be able to face up to the problem directly. This Congress must tell the people of this country that we are going to pro- vide the sufficient amounts of energy to meet the need& we are going to cut back on expeneive imports, but that we are not going to approach it with ooe arm behind the back and we are no play just into the hands of AIa countries and other nations d make ourselves more vianerable to tl in than we already have. We are going to bite the b let. We are going to make every effort a be as strong a nation as we have bee ' in the past, and to provide sufficient en Ty for this country to employ its pe le, to guarantee its safety, and to hay high standard of living. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. ROBERT C BYRD. Mr. Ph idea, suggest the absence of a quart= The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ti clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative cler rev- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Preiddent, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. TIME, LIMITATION AGREEMENT? HR. 14449 Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation on the bill, H.R. 14449? an act to provide for the mobilization of community development and assistance services and to establish a Community Action Administration in the Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare to administer such programs?of 1 hour to be equally divided between the assist- ant inajorita leader and the distinguished Republican leader or their designees; that there be a time limitation on any amendment thereto of 30 minutes; that there be a time limitation on any de- batable motion or appeal in relation thereto of 10 minutes, and that the agreement be in the usual form. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The text of the unanimous-consent agreement is as follows: U ANIMOUS-CON SENT AGREEMEN1 Ordered, That, during the consideration of 11.N.. 144.49 (Order No. 1220, an act to provide for the mobilization of community development and assistance services and to establish a Community Action Adminiatra- tion in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to administer such programs, debate on ar y amendment shall be limited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the trumager of the bill, and debate on any debat- able motion or appeal shall be limited to 19 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the bill: Provided, That in the event the maneeer of the bill 's in favor of any such amendment or motion, the time in opposi- tion thereto shall be controlled by the Minority Leader or his designee: Provided, further. That no amendment that is not ger- mane ,0 the provisions of the said bill shall be received. Ordered further, That on the question of the final passage of the said bill, debate shall be limited to 1 hour, to he equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Robert C. Byrd) and the Senator from. Michigan (Mr. Griffin) or their designees: Provided, That the said Senators, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the said b llot additional time to any g the consideration of any ndrnent, debatable motion, or appeal. Ordered further, That the vote on final passage of the bill shall occur at 10:30 a.m., Friday. December 13, 1974. TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT? S. 1988 Mr. ROBERT C. :BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation on S. 1988?a bill to ex- tend on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the United States over certain ocean areas and fish in order to protect the domestic fishing industry, and for other purposes of 1 hour, the time to be equally divided between Mr. MAGNUSON and Mr. ST.EVENS; that there be a time limitation o'a any amendment of 1 hour; a time limitation on any amendment to an amendment of 30 minutes; a time limitation on any debatable motion or appeal of 10 Minutes; and that the agree- ment be in the usual form. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The text of the unanimous-consent agreement is as folloaS: UNAN IMOUS-CONSIINT AGREET,IENT Ordered, That, on Wednesday, December 11, 1974, duriag the consideration of S. 1980 (Order No. 1233), a biL to extend on an in- terim basi3 the jurieeiction of the United States over certain ocr. an areas and fish in order to protect the domestic fishing indus- try, and for Other purposes, debate on any amendment in the first degree shall be lim- ited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the bill, debate on any amend- ment in the second degree shall be limited to 30 minutes, to he equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the author of the amendment in the first degree, and that debate on any debatable motion or appeal shall be limited to 10 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the bill: Pro- vided, That in the event the manager of the bill is in favor of any such amendment or motion, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the Minority Leader or his designee: Provided further, That no amend- ment that is not germane to the provisions of the seat, bill iall be received. Ordered further, That on the question or the final passage of the said bill, debate shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Washing- ton (Mr. Magnuson) end the Senator from Alaska (ar. stevens) : Provided, That the said Senaters, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of the sale, bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, debatable motion, or appeal. ? Ordered further, That no rolleael votes on this bill occur before e:30 p.m.. Wednesday. Oe-ember 11, 1974. UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,, ask unanimous consent that, after the leaders or their designees have been rec- ognized under the standing order tomor- row, the Senate proceed to the considera- tion of S. 1988, and if there be any rolleall votes ordered on amendments to S. 1938 or on final passage thereof, that such votes not occur until the hour of 3:30 p.m., at which time the votes then occur on the anaendments in sequence as they aae called up before the Senate. and the vote on final passage to occur immediately after the vote on such amendments. Be it provided further that upon the conclusion of debate on S. 1988, the Sen- ate proceed to the Consideration of H.R. 14449, the so-called 0E0 bill; that a vote on final passage of that bill, if a rollcall vote is ordered, not occur until the hour of 10:30 a.m. on Friday; and, provided further, that votes on amendments to the 0E0 bill may occur tomorrow at the time, of tae expiration of any such de- bate on amendments, and that paragraph 3 of rule XII be waived. Provided further, that at no later than the hour of 1:30 p.m. tomorrow the Sen- ate resume consideration of the amend- ment?I believe it is No. 17?the amend- ment in disagreement, in the conference report on the supplemental appropria- tions bill and, more specifically, the Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 941,1Degcmber 11, 19 pproVed Fo6Ratniffi 1/29Wic? 814:5R_D_F'ARRIRBOR000500410006-0 CON , proViding gall& charter and flight rental . _ service. , Thu UMI?itel.eehool was founded in 1906 by Hey. Ja1ne.S.Tr5rithe',' yoUng `Presbyterian miasiohary; .t70- e U Th CatZ 'e mountain chil- dreri,Avte :when there were few schools liAe-Oza-frce?,:FrOin ,hoarding grade school It evolved into a school, then a junior college and finally, In 1964; beeiiiiie a full four-year nondenominational, coeducational college Of liberal efts: Eaah change in cur- ricula came in response to the -slow increase of better public seho-OIS in the Ozarks and a gradual realization that a progressively higher level Of edi.ICsAion was needed as the region developed: - The scenic CatiOP_US at Point Lookout, only ' two Miles es.af ofDikaoiLi08---ntributee to the overall tourTain appeal of the Table Rock- Taneycomo area :? Ife-ading--West on Highway 76 out of Dransoznrtoday's visitor meets a partial resurrection of the former 160-acre MattheWshpft,,Steaci,at Shepherd of the Hills Varna. An oor-theater, 'defining the sec- ond larges t iateridance An. the country, ad- joins the old mill where sninmer tourists wit- neat ` nightly reenactments of.:-.C.zark family life airing "Old Matt'Sh Closer to Table Reck; on the opposite side of 16, is 1..hr?er ROW.' Cat, Sharing its site with Marvel Cav,.*:EaSe 21)`-stOry high in- teri9r is said to be the $icird largest cave in the Nation. ilvi bpll 11ty presents 19th' ? Century craftsmen and actors working in a replica of an 1880- pioneer - mining- town that includes an old,,lintype" ,photo studio as weg aa??, rArIng. 461 the exploits of former 04b, .00 -IcnOWn."6.-S? the.' "Bald snob- bers.!' ..? _ ? A hel1eeptei'ilde7priiides aerial views of Table ekenraion-bbals offer lake tours, banks witl3. distinCtive hillbilly names offer countit in-tide and the loeal reads are lined CeaP,Olesp?.Nor?leti mugetuns, .0,?taurapts, motels and Shopping cen- ers ' irYierpis z c191,1b,t fISVT4le. Hock has been a boon. t4. tl Oaar,1 together With its sister lakes' on .t4e, upper *lute River. As 1974- marches fOrWar.d. into the beginnings of anOther_ tmir10,,eappn.,' the. energy crunch will certainly rear its head in the Tri- area' of .Talge'.:4,OCic-Taxie-yodind, Shoals, An ,Fary Arnie:if tirticle in he Bran- son Beaconreported a 'telephone urvey of resorf. 0*/ieta p.Ointing to a cons sus that more 'tourists- ,i_voUld: come for full. acetions - from .shorter_distan0a?, but that t number of one and 'two-days trips would ? ecline. Since then Ig winter ga:i.pw a ice have disappeared, the dogwood; redbud nd shad- bush bloonia?haVe..Ockied, and t moment of truth. ii *Wiling' for 19'74,- End the year visitation help dete the the direction a regional economic de-ions for the near fiitUre,.. Per the long ra e future; of the Ozarkj tile very permanen of Corps -lakes ench, as Table Rock serves a man- made anclicr;amippg the economi waves of: uncertaintY.Table Rock's magne is not likely to dinainfsh In its power ? attract' visitors to southwest Missouri. : ...; ODfiairta AROUND 037 pill potter) The eCQ2IQBIc . changes occasio by the advent of '1401:Beek'Lake and t forming, of Lake Taneycorrio are portraye n an ex- cellent ,piee.c of writing in a rece Corps of Eo.gtheer!Jyp2?lication, Water s tram." traeL Assistant Ed r of the Corp? written forum for the d nssion of issues aiiPhotcoluresolVing weer resource problems. The author of this particular ar- ticle, SeymOur Reitman, presents' an Inter- esting and inter-prefivo paper on how these two projectar--.; 111040 changes produced an econoinia. !..inAstOgarks Shepherd of the Hills coup. 'ryHOili.C1pal benefactors of both Table Rnck IraIre.,04.14,1E0 Taneycorao. ? 6 Names of individuals and factors that are familiar to those of us who know the Ozarks are given due credit for their part in helping make this area.a bona fide tourist-attracting segment of our American heartland. Names like the Empire District Electric Co., builders and owners of Powersite Dam back in 1913 and the start of the now famous Rainbow trout stream?Ta.neycorno; the late Jim Owen, pioneer float-fishing major domo; the famous Ozark "johnboats" used by the float fishermen; Harold Bell Wright and Old Matt's cabin that became a best-selling novel, "Shepherd of the Hills"; Rockaway Beach, Hollister, and Forsyth?prominent Taney Court resort communities; Shell Knob; Kimberling City and John, "The Diver." And there is the growth of area banks such as Branson's two financial institutions, Peoples Bank & Trust and Security Bank. Mentioned also are the familiar names of School of the Ozarks, Silver Dollar City and Marvel Cave. This excellent piece of "ink" for the Bran- son area is a real detailed documentary that earns Reitman a congratulatory nod for good, sound reporting of the facts. It is an optoinistic piece of writing be- cause it relates facts?not fiction. Those of us who have watched the growth and the progress of the Shepherd of the Hills Country to a position of national prominence as a tourist-attracting area, can easily re-cognize by reading the article that the writer did his investigative reporting with an alert eye and ear to the influence and the impact the com- ing of TaneYcomo and Table Rock lakes to this area has really meant to economic stability and progress. Reitman's final sentence in the lengthy (and illustrated) article in "Water Spec- trum" seems to sense the continuing good future of the area when he writes: "Table Rock's magnetism is not likely to diminish in its power to attract Visitors to Southwest Missouri." Right on, Mr. Reitman, right on! CONCLT.II0 OF MORNING INESS The ACTINC4' PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded. EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1974 The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore.. The pending business is S. 1988, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 1988) to extend on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the United States over certain ocean areas and fish In order to protect the domestic fishing industry, and for other purposes. The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the bill. The Amiga PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Who yields time on the bill? Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) and I are in charge of the time on this meas- ure. I just do not know who in particular is opposed to this bill as of now. The Committee on Armed Services reported it favorably. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported it unfavorably by one vote, I think. The Committee on Com- merce also reported it favorably, I think unanimously except for two votes in op- position. So I do not know just where the organized opposition is. S S 21079 Maybe we ought to call up the State Department and have one of their people come up here and handle the opposition time. They were lobbying already this morning against the bill, which is of course their privilege. I want to make an opening statement and, by that time, I guess, we will get a few Members in the Chamber, and then we can work this out. They are bringing a statement over now from my office, so I suggest the ab- sence of a quorum. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The time to be equally divided. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, the time will be equally divided on both sides, and the clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. H.R. 8214, SENATE RESOLUTION 390, S. 2022, S. 2928, HR. 13370, AND S. 3593 PLACED UNDER "SUBJECTS ON THE TABLE" Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the follow- ing measures on the calendar be placed under the heading "Subjects on the Table": Calendar Order No. 949, H.R. 8214; Calendar No. 1075, Senate Resolu- tion 39-0; Calendar No. 1090, S. 202-2; Calendar No. 111.3, S. 2928; Calendar No. 1120, H.R. 13370; and Calendar No. 1208, S. 3953. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar Orders No. 949 and 1120 be restored to their place on the General Order Calendar. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. QUORUM CALL Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask that the time be charged equally. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the Senate has before it S. 1988 which is en- titled the "Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974." It is intended to provide the United States with fishery management?and I underline the word "management"?jurisdiction over fish within a 200-nautical-mile zone and over an anadromous species of fish, such as salmon, beyond such zone for the pur- pose of managing and conserving such fish. This assertion is necessary, because a Approved Fdr Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21080 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 ark CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11, 197j number of stocks of fish off our coasts are now either completely, or almost com- pletely, depleted or seriously threaten- ed?mainly because of foreign fishing. This aPplies to both coasts, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and to the gulf. I want to *tress that there are some People Who are concerned about this measure, because there is a possibility, they and I hope, that we can arrive at a Law of the Sea Agreement, ni the United Nations Conference to take place in Geneva in March, and I Will talk about the conference a little later. But I want to stress that this is an interim measure. It will terminate automatically at the time a proper international agreement is forthcoming from the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference and is either in force or provisionally applied. Mr. President, on June 1 of lase year, the Senate adopted the Eastland resolu- tion, Senate Concurrent ResoTinian 11. It was designed to "express a national Policy In respect to support of the U.S. fishing Industry." That measure clearly recognized the pressures from foreign fishing fleets on our adjacent resources: It also under- scored the need to act soon to protect these resources from further depletion. Perhaps more important, it recognized that Ceargress might need to take in- terim raeasures to conserve overfashed stocks and protect our fishermen. Today we are about to consider legislation which epeaks directly to this need and the stated intent of the Senate more than a year ago. My concern in this matter of conser- vation of our offshore fishery stocks be- gan long before the introduction of S. 1988. But inquiries to our Department of State have always brought the same tir- ing, tedious answer, "Wait, we will take care of it." Well, they have not taken care of it at all. May I suggest that I went to my first conference on these fishery matters 16 long years ago. Sixteen years, and still nothing has happened. In the meantime, the stocks have been depleted. Wait, wait. They are probably calling up Senators arotind here today saying, "Oh, *Malt, we will take care of it." Well, they made this same call about 16 years ago and nothing has happened. "Give us time to negotiate and obtain agreements on conservation." Now we have more of the same?"Wait." This is their standard request. Mr. President, I have used the word "wait" now about three times and I want to use it again?this is the fourth time. Wait, wait, wait. They were up at the United Nations with this problem for about 3 years, nothing happened. But they did pass a resolution up there, Mr. President, the first action they took and the only ac- tion?a resolution to adjourn the meet- ing to go to Caracas, Venezuela. Well, they Were down there and noth- ing happened. They had 100 or more Items an the agenda, but they did not pass or agree on ore. They finally agreed on another resolution to convene, to go to Geneva in March. Then after Geneva, they want to go to Vienna. That is a great seaport, Vienna; they understand fishery problems in Vienna. I do not know what will happen beyond that, but they probably will just keep on going, Now, in the meantime, I say we have to do something to prevent the de- pletion of our fish stocks. It was in the Law of the Sea prepara- tory meetings where our representatives hoped that the delegates from other na- tions might abandon the growing move- ment toward an extended economic zone in exchange for the so-called "species approach" proposal from the United States, and this Was a legitimate effort, there are things to be said on both sides of that, but it did not arrive at any result. It became increasingly evident to me that there was nothing wrong with our salesmen; they simply had the wrong product when they tried to sell the species approach. From the close of the 1973 Geneva preparatory meeting?now they are going back?we were asked to with- hold legislative action until the just- ended Caracas meeting. Mr. President, we have done a lot of waiting, more than our share. I want to point out, because we only have a half hour and I will yield to other oeople who are interested, I just want to say again that this is an interim measure and that if they arrive at some agreement In Geneva, hopefully?I would not bet on it ?but hopefully we will say, "Amen." This is simply a tem- Porary measure to protect us and our fisheries. Now, one other thing. We are entering period of unemployment. I Want to say hat the unemployment in the American lshing industry has been at 10 to 15 per- tient for a long, long time, and it will get worse unless. we send a message to 'he conference at Geneva, and unless we begin to protect our marine fisheries. The foreign harvesting fleets off our coast, however, have showed no restraint in anticipation of some kind of world or- der in the matter of jurisdiction and harvest. In fact, they have expanded. This year, for the first time, we find East Germany and Poland with substantial fisheries on the west coast. These fleets ire out to get all the fish they can, while they can, for they know that any agree- ment reached by the United Nations will be for broadened coastal nation interest and control. On July 11 of this year at the Caracas Conference, the State Department's argument of delay in support of the epecies approach came to an abrupt halt. The U.S. Special Representative of the President and U.S. Representative to the Law of the Sea Conference, Ambassador John R. Stevenson, placed the United States in alliance enth those willing to agree to some kind of 200-mile fishery urisdiction. The present position of the United States at the continuing Law of the Sea Conference is reflected in S. 1988. In act, at the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador Ste- venson said of the new U.S. position: The fishing section gives the coastal state exclusive rig,ht> for the purpose of regulat- ing fishing in the 200-mile economic zone, E object to a duty of conserve and to ensure full utilization of fishery stocks taking into zecount environmental and economic factors. He then went on to say: In substance, there IH no significant dif- ference between the objectives of S. 1988 and the United States proposal at the Conference. Mr. President, if we could assume that there might be agreement at the 1975 Law of the Sea Conference, we would still be faced with a period of years before a sufficient number of nations could ac- complish ratification. To allow our off- shore fishery stocks to continu.e under the preser t virtually unrestricted har- vesting pressure of foreign fleets for such a period if to me unthinkable. Testimony from Government witnesses advises that the United States plans to propose that any fisheries agreement achieved would be applied on a provi- sional basis. That is, it should be put into effect without waiting for the individual nations to ratify. Th.e State Department stated: Provisions application is a recognized con- cept of international law and our proposal was favorably received. May I call attention to the fact that such an action would not be much dif- ferent in effect from the interim pro- posal we have before us today in S. 1988. No one in the Congress could be more pleased than this Senator if agreement might be reached in 1975. I support world consensus on the fisheries ques- tion and feel it will mirror S. 1988. Now that a mass of the earlier argu- ments against this legislation have been laid to rea:, by the passage of time, we are told that acting unilaterally is im- proper. International lawyers view the law of the oceans OS a process of "con- tinuous ineeraction; of continuous de- mand and response," a developing system whereby unilateral claims are put for- ward, the world community weighs the claims and then such claims are either accepted cr rejected. This process of claim/counterclaim has molded the law of the sea for centuries. It is only re- cently that treaty lawmaking has been in vogue. I suggest that the interna- tional community's need for clear rules of action in the sea, will be served by passage of S. 1988. The issue is quite ,slear. We are either going to stand up for the proper man- agement and conserve don of the fishery resources off our coast or we are going to be concerned about what the world may say about us in the continuing law of the sea forum. I must cast my vote on the side of the fishery resources. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield 5 minutes? Mr. MACfNUSON. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement that I made at the hearings in Washing-. ton December 6, 1973, be placed, in the Recoire, and also the statement made at Providence, R.I., May 13, 1974, be placed in the RECORD. There being no objection. the state- ments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: S. 1988 AND 11.R. 9136, THE IN7VERIM FisnERIES ZONE EXTENSION AlSrn MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1973 (Remarks .By Senator Joins 0. PASTORE) For years, the United States has attempted to prevent the depletion of American fish Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Fatieffsfflia0p/91kBliep_Pgita0i3i0R00050041 De Comber 11, 19t3proved 0006-0 S 21081 stocks and preserve the American fishing fleet by entering into international treaties such as the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries and many bilateral treaty arrangements: Through treaties' and agreements, the 'United States attempted to persuade foreign nations to moderate their fishing efforts off the American coast, not only to help Amer-- ican fisherman, but also to prevent the ex- termination of fishing stocks. These efforts have not succeeded. With numerous treaties, including IdNAP: in force," we in New England have watched as the for- eign fishing fleet off' our shores burgeoned from a few vessels in the ,1950% to hundreds of vessels .currentlY. And Most of these for- eign vessels are inOre modern, larger and more efficient than mostof Our New England , , vessels. - The state of the American fishing fleet is a disagrace and this has been said too often for me to belabor it here except that I do want to not* that 'while the American gov- ernment has prOVfdeci Substantial subsidies for many industries, fmr too long the Ameri- can fisherman. was ignored. For- the most part, our New England 'fishing veggels are individually owned Vessels that are too small and far,' far, too' Old` to' dorn-pete With the enormous :factory ahi pS 'and mother ii'hips that crops the World'apcbans With large satel- lites, of lv'eSSOls'tO fish. off Ilew Eng- land. And even these Smeller Satellite vessels are larger and better equipped than the fish- ing boats of our New Ilrigland fishermen. huttatcheir SA thf haddock hasprac- tiOillY disapPeargritie YelloWtall flounder has 'been SerionSlidapleted and the herring and the cod are now endangered: -While we WOO ttisduathig " Management and harvest teChnkties at. the United Nations? rasiavbft*ogn fishing fleets, using elec- tronic inethods' ?rhsve been decimating our offshore reSourceS.'Frhetrine for 'watching is BecauSe,ariNiMetea,:tok6n,.driCe One Of the prond'ailInctlitgaaf fishing porta in the northWaSt Atlantic, now has a small, barely suitiving "il.Phine fleet. Hundreds of fishermen were driven from their livelihood on the sea a..a foreUn fleets virtually exter- minated the, fiedd9qk.. _ ' For Years the (aMs'ihig "-fleet' of' Gloucester, MO the 'greatest la America, struggled for survlvdi. rn Bedford, whic4, reinains-bile 'Of thi reading' fishing porta on the te.5t-C-O4t: the' viability Of a fleet and hundrOda-of Jobs' are threatened as our Stock* of yellowtail flounder are steadily diminished. In Rhode 144,44; our lislierinen have been 111070 'fortunate than the fishermenin our Meter state Of,l*s,Safehusett.s.' Fortunately in Point Judith, we hatran extremely capable group of fishermen, leir63, 346 Dykstra, who formed *bat *as, the'titSt Suce.essful and Via- ble fishernieri's, 'cOOP.eratiVe association on 'the. Eat coast, perhaps in the United states -.the Point Judith FiSherinen's, Ceoperative Association. The ro-iiit .11,11.6 cO7Ob's marketing ar- rangements, the Of the' deg- in Point Judith and, the rea.Oni:celfidneas of the fish- ermen gaVe then]. the car,i'ahility Of switching 31'01H one ,species to (nether depending on the MarkOt, and availability of the fish. It ws.S this kind Of ifeXlhility that has been a key tad whatever -SuCcess Point Judith has 40,4$h ?Sta'xiiii afloat. - :?149Od'ekarriPle.'ert-filS lithe Way in `Which Rhode rslaild'ilaharinen, geared uri-to fish offshore lobsters when techniques for profit- ably taking those stocks were developed a few years no. Rhode Island fishermen and fiShernien, kom'NeW dford were among the fiT4 to exialoit th6 offShore lObster stocks. by the Rational Marine -risheiie:s ri?rvigo indicate& tbe-re- WEIS- an' abundant stftly or offshore lobster that could toler- ate heavy fishing without being depleted. The Japanese assured us that they would not catch offshore lobsters but many of our fishermen have reported sighting Japanese vessels taking lobsters offshore. The Russians assured us they were not in- terested in taking lobster. But the massive gear they drag along the ocean bottom Scoops up everything in its path. And while we have been able to board Russian vessels for on-deck inspections, we have been pro- hibited from inspecting holds where lobsters Would be stored. It is not accidental that after a bonanza year for Point Judith fishermen in offshore lobstering in 1971, the offshore stocks were practically wiped out by the following year. Now it was not Point Judith fishermen who depleted those stocks, but rather the scores of huge Russian vessels that pounded those offshore beds with heavy equipment for months in the winter of 1971-1972. We thought we had understandings with the Japanese and the Russians but those understandings left us with scores of fisher- men .who lost thousands of dollars in invest- ments. Because after gearing up to take lobsters, they had to switch to other species after the offshore lobster stocks suffered SO under foreign pressure. The depletion of offshore lobster stocks was so severe that at Point Judith alone, off- shore landings in 1972 fell of 500,000 pounds from 1971 and preliminary indications are that the 1973 landings could be down one- third from the 1972 landings. Now I realize that a half million pounds of lobster is not a large figure when com- pared to the total lobster landings in New England or even when compared to Maine's lobster landings. I tell the story only to illustrate the point that intense foreign fishing pressures over even a short period of time can have an extensive and direct impact on our rapidly depleting marine resources. We all remember the difficulties Westport and New Bedford offshore lobstermen have encountered over the past few years with Russian vessels plowing through their sets of lobster gear tearing up hundreds of thou- sands of dollars in equipment. I am therefore happy to say that I am a cosponsor of S. 1988, a bill to extend on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the United States over certain ocean areas and fish in order to protect the domestic fishing indus- try. This bill would extend the present fish- eries zone to 197 miles which, with the 3-mile territorial limit, would give protection to fisheries for a distance of 200 miles. The rea- son for my cosponsorship is a simple one. I cannot stand by and watch the foreign com- petition harvest the fish which should be on American dining tables. My interest in this matter extends to the sport fisherman as well. It was not too long ago that I provided by way of supplemental appropriation addi- tional Coast Guard protection of our lobster fishermen who had been harassed by the Rus- sians within 200 miles of our shore. Our traditional fishing grounds off Rhode Island have been depleted. The foreign trawl- ers catch fish, bone it, and freeze it on board. They are far ahead of in in this regard. I know that there are some fishermen who would oppose this 200-mile limit. It doesn't protect the salmon fishermen on the west coast, in the northwest and Alaska. It doesn't set well with the tuna fishermen because this limit is what the Peruvians are trying to do to them now. It doesn't please the shrimp fishermen because of their high-seas shrimp fleet. However, all attempts to come to an inter- national agreement based on a biological rather than geological basis have been in- effectual. Therefore it is necessary for the United States to move unilaterally until such agree- ments can be worked out. We cannot sit and wait while our own coastal waters are being depleted by foreign trawlers of nations who are holding up negotiations. I am pleased today to hear the testimony of Jacob Dykstra, President of the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association, Inc., who is a proponent of this legislation. I am sure his views will point out the need for direct action by the United States immedi- ately. OPENING STATEMENT (By Senator JOHN 0. PASTORE) Today, the Senate Commerce Commitee's Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere continues a series of hearings we have been holding on legislation which would extend American jurisdiction over ocean fishing from the current 12-mile limit to 200 nauti- cal miles on an interim basis. We have held hearings in Washington, D.C., the state of Washington, Alaska and California. Tomor- row a field hearing will be held in Boston. I want to welcome to the bench my good friend Ted Stevens of Alaska who is co- sponsoring with me S. 1988. Senator Stevens is the senior minority member on the Oceans and Atmosphere Subcommittee and a strong supporter of a 200-mile fisheries zone. We on the Commerce Committee view field hearings such as this one as absolutely vital to a full discussion of this legislation which is the most important national fisheries is- sue now before the Congress, an issue which is vital not only to our fishermen but to all Americans. We have taken our hearings into the field because this issue is so critical and because we have to make every effort to obtain as wide a range of views as possible on the matter. It is impossible for everyone to jour- ney to Washington to testify and that's why we're here. We have scientists from the University of Rhode Island, members of the General As- sembly and representatives of sportsfisher- men's groups scheduled to testify. But we also want to hear from the com- mercial fishermen who, on a day-to-day basis, must confront the massive foreign fleets operating just off our shores. I know that the fishermen have a most articulate and capable spokesman in Jake Dykstra but if there are any fishermen here who would like to speak and who are not scheduled we would be happy to hear from you after the scheduled witnesses have finished testifying. We are sponsoring this bill for two funda- mental reasons. Because we have to protect our fleets?our fishermen who have a tradi- tion of three centuries of going out to sea and who are now losing their livelihoods by the thousands. And because we have to move quickly before breeding stocks of already seriously depleted species are endangered. Virtually every single commercially valu- able fish in the waters off New England is being rapidly depleted. You can name them? the cod, the haddock, the lobster, the At- lantic herring, the yellowtail flounder, the Atlantic mackerel, the Atlantic halibut. If anyone needs to be convinced of the im- pact made by the foreign fleets on our New England fishermen let's take a look at what has happened to Gloucester and New Bedford and Boston. Boston was once the home of one of the proudest and largest fleets on the northwest Atlantic. Now it has a tiny fishing fleet. Thousands of Boston fishermen were driven from their liveltood on the sea as foreign fleets virtually exterminated the haddock and Boston was once the biggest haddock port in the world. Gloucester was once the greatest fishing port in America. Today her fleet struggles for survival. In New Bedford, which remains one of the leading fishing ports on the east coast, the viability of a fleet and thousands Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 2102 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE December 11, 1974 of jobs are threatened as our stocks of yel- lowtail hounder steadily diminish. Now r know?an of us who are sponsoring this legislation?Senator Stevens, Senator Magnuson, we know that ultimately the so- lution to the problem of the systematic de- struction of our marine fishery resourees by overfishiiig can only Mine when the nations of the world agree to an international regu- latory regime governing the exploitaticn and the conservation of the world's fishery resources. But, w a feel very strongly that our iisher- les and Our fishermen' must be given interim protection until such international agree- ments gei) into effect. Otherwise there may be nothing left to protect. After three years of preparation, the Law of the Sea Conference will get under way in Caracas a little more than a month from now on J'one 20. What are the prospects of rapid agreement? Just two weeks ago in Washington, Kenneth Rush; the Acting Secretary of State, testi- fied before this committee? rather reluc- tantly / might odd, and only after being prodded several times by questions?that the Department of State does not expect an agreement this summer. He expressed uncertainty about obtaining an agreement by 1975. Well, it may be several years Wore deliberations are completed. And it's going to take a few more years atter that--sorne have testified as many as 10 years--before the requisite number of na- tions will ratify the treaty to implement it. So now we are talking about 1980 or 1985 or even beyond before we have a working in- ternational instrument. Now if we continue to sit on our halide, which is the position of the State Department and the 'White House, there are just not going to be enough fish left worth protecting by 1980. We have taken testimony in Washington, but I wqat to repeat Where in Providence, that by 1980 the world's fishing fleets are ex- pected tse take 100 Millicat tons of fish. Sci- entists tell us that 100 million tons is the inaelecuuie yield of fish that can be taken from the oceans of the World annually with- out doing biological harm to world breed- ing stocks. The world's fishing fleets ars now harvestin,s about 70 million tons of fish an- nually. .These are the best projections available to the National Marine Fisheries Service. But in the face of this kind of forecast, the State Department and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration neverthe- less come before us to tell us that we are making a serious mistake in considering this legislaticen. They plead with us to do nothing until the Law of the Sea Conference com- pletes its deliberations. The State Department tells us that it the United States takes unilateral action in ex- tending its fisheries zone to 200 miles the U.S. position at Caracas will he jeopardized. I am ii. direct disagreement with the De- partment of State and so are a considerable number of Senators and Congressmen. In- deed, we feel that Congressional approval of a 200-mile limit bill will strengthen the position AA our negotiators at Caracas. In fact, many observers tell us a 200-mile fish- eries zone is likely to come out of the Law of the Sea Conference anyway. We can no longer tolerate or afford delay because foreign fleets, anticipating a 200- mile zone coming out of the Law of the Sea Conferenee, are increasing their activity off our shores. Once a 200-mile fisheries zone is established they will then be able to ne- gotiate with us downward from a bigher number Of vessels because, and we all know this, a 200-mile zone will mean a gradual reduction in the number of foreign vessels. not a disappearance of all foreign vessels. There is no question that if we do not take action quickly to try to moderate for- taign fishing pressure in New England waters and in other .emericae coastal areas, some species are going to be irreversibly depleted. This is not just rhetoric because the Na- tional Marine Fisheries Service has done study after study demonstrating the decline of important New England fish stocks under ihe impact of foreign fishing fleets. I am concerned about further delay and remain skeptical about the effectiveness of international negotiation despite some heralded successes in establishing overall fishing quotas by the Laternational Commis- sion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries IICNAF) last October in Ottowa. My concerns flow from the fundamental lack of success, of ICNAF, a vehicle for in- ternational negotiation, over the past quar- ter century. Now ICNAF was established when the Northwest Atlantic.?the fishing grounds off New England, the Georges Bank and the Grand Banka?was still the richest and most preiiiic fishing grounds in the world. With ICNAF watcheeg?these great fish- ing grounds, which New Englanders fished for centuries without doing ecological damage-- the foreign fleets moved in and decimated the largest stocks of fish in the world. Not until the very existence of the haddock was imminently threatened did ICNAF take firm action late last year. But the damage to the haddock was so great that the mem- ber nations of ICNAF were forced to clamp a ban on all directed fishing for haddock. For decades the Georges Bank haddock fishery had been yielding 50,000 metric tons annually, mostly to American fishermen. This is the maximum the Georges Bank had- dock fishery could yield without sustaining biological damage. Our scientists knew this when the foreign fleets moved in in the 1960's and disrupted the balance sustained for so long by our New England fishermen. Now, from a point 30 years ago where we took 60,000 tons of haddock yearly from the Georges Bank, our fishermen have been en- jeined from going out and fishing purposely for haddock. Only accidental catches of had- dock taken while fishing for other species are permitted. ? This is not secret information. The facts and figures concerning the demise of the haddock have been developed by the Na- tional Marine Fisheries Service which has been documenting this catastrophe for 10 years now. But what did the United States do about it? Nothing! Nothing effective was done until the haddock was on the edge of extermination and it still remains to be seen if the October ICNAF agreements will work or can be enforced. I will not document what has happened to toe yellowtail founder or the herring or the cod but the tale of massive depletion of these species in the face of inaction by the United States is similar if not quite as dramatic. It is a story clearly told in the statistics and documents furnished )ne by the National Marine Fisheries Service. What I am saying is this is crisis fisheries management and totally inadequate. We have b) move before our fishes and our fishermen are on the endangered species list. And what I em saying Is that 25 years of international negotiations involving 16 countries through ICNAF has been tragically ineffective. The time for waiting for inter- national negotiations to succeed is over. That is what I am saying and that is what my celleagues such as the distinguished Senator from Alaska?who has witnessed the same esolpgical disaster occur in the waters of his sate--are saying. Let me take a moment to describe the bill. S. 1988 is an interim measure to extend the contiguous fisheries zone of the United States to protect our resources and our fishing in- dustry until agreements are reached. The bill mandates the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations as soon as possible with all for- eign governments whose vessels now fish off American coasts to regulate?mot eliminate-- foreign fishing from Ameeican coastal waters. The government would also be mandated to seek international negotiations for the ra- tional use and conservation of American fisheries resources. The bill would authorize the Seeretary of Commerce to carry out or subsidize research to improve conservation of fish and it would authorise $1 million for that purpose. Before we proceed, I want to note that my colleague Se:labor Pell, and our Congressmen Fernand St Germain and Robert 0. Tiernan have submitted statements for this hearing and I now want to introduce them int e the record. welcome you all here today and :ook for- ward to your testimony. Our first witness Mr. PASTORE. Now, Mr. President, let us understand what this is all about. No one wants to interfere with the freedom of navigation on the seas, and this is not the purpose of the bill at all. Anybody who wants to ship to the United States of America can Come here and come within the 200-mile limit and nobody is going to bother him. That is not the pur- pose at all. The purpose here is con- servation. When I was up in Rhode Island at the hearings on May 13, 1974, they showed us these slides; these fishermen showed us these slides. Here is this big Bulgarian ship, almost as big as one of our old battleships, with all kinds of equipment on board, going up and down the Rhode Island coast de- stroying our lobster pots, destroying all of our fishing nets, and we are trying to save and conserve our fishing industry. It is not alone the economics, Mr, Presi- dent; it is a question of propagation of the species. They come in here from Russia, they come in here from Japan, they come in here from Bulgaria, they come in here from all over the world. They just sweep up all of our fish. There is nothing left. The haddock is all gone and it is hard to find lobster anymore, and the few pots they have out there are being destroyed. Suit after salt is being brought; nothing is being pa:.cl, and that is what we are up against. Now we are saying here, give us a chance, give us a chance in management. We are not prohibiting anybody coming in, but what we are trying to do is to manage this in such a way that every- body can eat the fish, not alone the Bul- garians, the Russians, and Japanese. That is what this is all about, and I :hope that the Senate will go on record. There is a Imitation on this bill. It goes out of effeo; immediately upon a multi- lateral agreement. We are looking for- ward to it, tut as the manager of the bill already pointed out, the distinguished Senator from -Washington, for 12 years they have been promising a multilateral agreement and nothing has ever hap- pened. I am afraid that unless we in Con- gress take a step, nothing Is ever going to happen, 8.nd the purpose of this bill is to give them a nudge at Geneva. If we pass this bill today in the Senate I will Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 " . Approved For Release.2001/09/07 CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 December11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE guarantee that the tone in Geneva will limit and the proposed 200-mile fishery be a lot different_ thEM .i..**,:lik .Cftrft- , Wile liMit, Nothing Will change with re- . cas where ikt was_ an a? solute _dienis.1, gard to the traditional American policy failure. . . . of respecting the concept of freedom of ; 'Mr.. President, it is 'imperative that shipping on the high seas. the Congress move as expeditiously as If an international negotiated settle- possible in passing S. 1988, the Einer- ment of a 200-mile fishing zone cduld be geney Marine Fisheries Protection Act reached quickly, it would be most desir- e! 1974. -" ' ' able, but such a settlement is nowhere in ' With each passing day, the impor- sight. The long-awaited and much- tanbe of enacting this bill into law, in- heralded Law of the Sea Conference in creases. The stakes: axe net small. The Caracas has brought us no closer to this continuedeidsterice Of -the Anieriean goal. In the meantime, without effective , _ , . , . - . fishing induirry IS at stake. An industry steps to regulate the intensity of foreign that is built upon ocean fishing, one Of fishing off our shores, our fish stocks, at the oldest c,ommercial enterprises en- one time the greatest in the world, will gaged In by Americani Is directly threat- continue to decline under steadily in- ened and' little:hai lpeen,clerie to help creasing foreign fishing pressures. We onr fisliernien. 0444 the fact' that the certainly do not propose to eliminate for- warning flagihave been flying now for eign fishermen from fishing off America's nearly two deeades. It appears that the shores, but only to moderate these fishing Congress is ping 'tO' have to take the pressures somewhat. This bill would give initi.01,Ye M'id, $]..11),,K,t ould 'be a small the U.S. Government the tools to reason- step toward heIgng oin. ITShernien sin-- ably regulate, by negotiation, foreign vive under the increagligli intense pres- fishing effort, And it must be remembered sures OZ *Ave, Zpreign fishing fleets. that this is an interim measure that will Furth,prinere, ankperhaps mare criti- remain effective only until the United cal in the,lerig run, the. continued exist- States can negotiate an extended fishing awe of some Ofeits, Rest important zone with the other nations qf the world,. stocks of ocean fish,ieb. direbt. and in- This bill must be enacted into law now, minent don er,' the oceans provide one and we must immediately move to imple- ti t of the w . 1, ' Q?VaippiNant resources ment good management and conserva- 1 'a t9Qc1: w .._,P .p.a,tioii,s., OtSfie world tion policies if we do not want to see the gT,Ope: 0. he fieXt decade tO .solve the oceans of the world slowly become de- WerleV,s'problem Of rood shortages and to pleted of edible fish. 61 se;Onn .1. entain*: a t;t4e ifyijArL, nc :i ti?ue to yield 'OPt is absolutely eS,- r thank the Senator for yielding me sentiat t the time. an Undiminished _enpnlY . of feed. arid Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield protein. such time as the Senator from New Yet this IS no liiii0r-a-certainty. We Hampshire may use. . once thought the ocean47, of 'the World Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I am a would yield iob ii-Inai tons a fish an- cosponsor of this bill and am in complete nually without biological damage being accord with everything the Senator from done to fish Stckki and that this maxi- Washington and the Senator from Rhode mum.sUitainable,yield,w4d be achieved Island have said. by abotit 1060. alit' "we now find that I think that the President has been feyeriehly infenSiVe: fishing has caused misled and ill-advised concerning the biological daink09 1'4. stocks in some effect of this bill and the need for it. It area and ive?80 ilq19-niei.ecilmn_ 4git is imperative this bill be passed. 'total fish 'hary,ests wAl, opti046, to In- Therefore, as a cosponsor of the pend- ereaSe year by year by year. After tak- Ing bill, S. 1988., I wish to express my Mg fOr granted what, we thOught were strong support for this legislation, carry- the limitless reipurceos ot, the seas, we lug the short title of .the "Emergency suddenly are .sheolked ., by how limited Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974." they actually are. Mr. President, in expressing my sup- 'We want to. deprive no one of the food port for S. 1988, I am well aware that he needs; we Want to prevent no nation the President and several representatives from fishing to 'teed its hungry people. of the executive branch have communi- But we, ,n-Apsf take immediate, steps to cated their respective opposition to this conserVp oUr_ 0,41 ,,-ukppjiep. we mut iin,.- bill on the grounds that "passage could mediately begin implementing censer- seriously harm U.S. oceans and foreign vation and Ash management programs relations interests," and that our best op- t? insure that there will De Ash left in Portunity for resolution of the problems the oceanafor ou which S. 1988 addresses lies in "a corn- This grandchildren. ,bill will be e, SMalll moye in the urehensive new oceans law treaty now right direction, This ,bill would bring the being negotiated within the Third United it',I.S. .GoVernment hit() the active man,- Nations Conference on the Law of the agement of fishery. resources. The bill Sea." -WPWa: iit-148.119PP,,e-ethgr nktio-11s, to The President has further stated that rout.tbe pro less of fisheries deple- Pending such a comprehensive new ocean t on and Perhap?.. persuade them to join law treaty he "will do everything possible with the United States in conservation consistent with our present legal rights efforts., to protect the interests of U.S. fishermen The State Department 11- s testified and to preserve the threatened stocks of repeatedly at our hearings that this bill living resources off our coasts." Will damage enr foreign relations with Ur. President, I believe that the ex- respect to our open seas policy. This bill ecutive branch is sincere in its belief, does not affect the completely free move- albeit somewhat misguided, in the opin- ment of ships of any other nation be- ion el the Senator from New Hampshire, tween the U.S. 3-mile territorial sea that S. 1988 is not needed at this time. S 21083 However, Mr. President, I feel quite strongly that the contrary is true. The Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act" of 1974 is needed, and it is needed now. This leifslation was introduced al- most a year and a half ago by the dis- tinguished chairman of our. Committee on Commerce, Senator MAcKusox, along with myself and several other concerned Senators. It has received the most careful consideration not only by our Committee on Commerce, but by the Senate's Com- mittee on Foreign1iclations and by the Committee on Armed Services. Our own Committee on Commerce conducted no less than 12 days of hearings on this leg- islation and 8 days of those hearings were conducted in sites outside of Wash_ ington, D.C., in coastal areas most de- pendent upon the conservation of our fishery resources. S. 1968 was approved overwhelmingly by the members of our Committee on Commerce. It was approved on a vote of 8 to 6 by our Committee on Armed Serv- ices, and by the very narrow vote of 8 to 9 failed to be reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations. I know of few bills that have undergone the scrutiny of several committees in this fashion and survived to be considered by the full Senate. Quite frankly, Mr. President, I believe that many who have sought to oppose S. 1988 have failed to appreciate fully two very significant points. First, with S. 1988 those of us sponsoring the legisla- tion are seeking to fill a void by provid- ing some immediate national action to cOnserve valuable fishery resources off our own shores which are in danger of being seriously depleted by excessive fish- ing activities conducted by foreign na- tions. Second, as described in the very title of the bill, we seek to extend on an Interim basis this jurisdiction over fish- ery resources only to 200 nautical miles as an emergency measure to protect our domestic fishing industry. Accordingly, S. 1988 further provides? That its provisions shall expire and cease to be of any legal force and effect on such date as the Law of the Sea Treaty, or oth- er comprehensive treaty with respect to fish- ery jursdiction, which the United States has signed or is party to, shall come into force or is provisionally applied. In summary, Mr. President, we are not proposing in the Emergency Marine Fish- eries Protection Act of 1974, that we close our eyes to the international negotia- tions still underway at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. On the contrary, these international efforts have been specifically recognized. But, recognizing the time needed to de- velop an acceptable law of the sea treaty, as demonstrated by the futility of the negotiating sessions this past summer in Caracas, Venezuela, this bill seeks only to protect our economic interests as a coastal state, a concept already recog- nized and acknowledged in the current international negotiations. Finally, Mr. President, I would con- clude by observing that although my State of New Hampshire has a relatively short coastline, it, along with its sister New England States, has a fishing in- dustry of significant economic impor- tance and one which is L.,f a long-stand,- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0 S 21084 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11, 1974 mg tradition. That most important in- dustry today faces severe economic hardship, not from within our borders, but from outside in waters beyond our present fishery jurisdiction In tradition- al fishing grounds which are in danger of having their resources depleted by the activities of foreign' fishing fleets. S. 1988 is in the interest of our coastal States and in the interest of our nation if we are to be able to look to the sea as a solute of food in the future. And, Mr. President, it is for this reason and in keeping with these interests that I urge the favorable consideration of the Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974, by my colleagues in the Senate. Mr. M.AGNI.TSON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Maine. Mr. MUSKIE. / that& the dik tin- guished Senator from Washington. At the outset I compliment Senator MAGNITSON and Senator STEVENS, and the other Members of the committee, who have been pursuing this matter so dili- gently. I have had the opportunity to observe their efforts closely, both in Washington and in Caracas. And their effectiveness regarding this legislation Is a tribUte to the leadership qualities of these two Senators. Mr. President, S. 1988 is one of the most important bills to come before the Senate during this entire session of Con- gress. Slimly put, this legislation would provide the United States with manage- ment jurisdiction over fish within a 200- mile nautital zone, pending the conclu- sion of an International oceans agree- inent. The bill also provides Veda' pro- tection for anadromous epodes that are hatched in this country and then mi- grate out into the high seas before re- turning to spawn in the streams of their origin. There is an urgent need to enact this Interim legislation. Fishermen off both our east and west coasts are rapidly los- ing the livelihood of generations because as a nation we have not responded ade- quately to global developments in recent years, allowing our fishing industry to sink to a low state in our national priorities, Specifically, within the last 5 years, the fishing effort of foreign fleets off our coasts has Increased severalfold, in a way which has been so dramatically described by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE). At any given time large groups of for- eign vessels can be sighted off our shores. In fact, the world's fishing effort is now so much greater than a decade ago that stocks Oall be decimated in a season or two, a rate much faster than interna- tional negotiations are likely to impose effective regulation upon them. The situation in the Gulf of Maine is Illustrative of the gravity of the situa- tion. In 1969, Maine fishermen landed more than 54,000.000 pounds of herring In 1973, they landed 37,000,000 pound. In 1969, Maine fishermen landed more than 58,000,000 pounds of groundfish and ocean perch. Last year, they landed only 36,000,000 pounds. In 1969, Maine fisher- men landed almost 18,000 000 pounds of arldting. Last year landings of whiting in Mine dropped to 5,500,000 pounds: Similar declines in landings can be shown for other species. The simple fact is that as a result of a massive foreign fishing effort off our coasts in the last fey years, scientists have now concluded that about 25 stocks of fish are depleted or threatened with depletion. At present, the United States is party to 22 international fishing agreements ar d virtually all of the fish stocks de- pleted or threatened with depletion are subjects of these agreements. Obviously, further steps must be taken to prevent the depletion of our offshore stocks?for the sake of conserving the world's fish- eries resources as well as preserving the U.S. fishing industry. And enactment of S. 1988 is the most effective interim step that our Government can?and should-- tate to manage, regulate, and control the tasing of fish within. 200 miles of our shores. During the first week in August, along with Senators STEVENS and PELL, I at- tatded the Caracas Conference. At the time. I indicated my support for S. 1988. Reaction was predictable?that this kind of unilateral action could conceivably torpedo the Conference. Well, with respect to the Conference, let me state my own view. My first impression from visiting the Caracas meetings is that the prospects for eventually writing a new law of the sea are more promising than I expected them to be before X attended the Con- ference. But my second impression is that achieving that goal is going to take much longer than the more optimistic dc legates to the Conference would like to st ggest. After 5 years of preparatory werk, the Conference is still bogged down In preliminary matters. About 60 of the 149 nations are still trying to develop ti dr own national positions on the use ol the seas, while many of the others we widely divergent points of view. Even Ambassador Amerasinghe, the chairman of the conference, has ex- pressed public doubt about the possibili- ti..ls for progress at the conference in the near term. His colleague from Sri Lanka, C. W. Pinto, perceptively summarized the progress achieved in Caracas when he said after the meetings concluded at the end of August? Progress has been not in bringing the sides closer together, but in clearly defining where they are farthest apart. It is my own guess that it will take at least until 1976 before the nations repre- sented at the conference can work out the complex range of issues?and there a e some 90 of theta in number--that n,ust be worked out if a new law of the sea is to be written. Time and time again lit discussions with foreign diplomats in Caracas, I heard it said that "we need time to build new international law." Certainly, time is needed for ideas to mature concerning some of the more cnmplex issues the conferees are dealing with. But if we are to meserve our offshore asicks, I do not think we can afford to wait until the Law of the Sea Conference produces a treaty. For by the time this takes place, there will be precious few offshore stocks to protect. In Caracas, several foreign delegates suggested to me and the other U.S. Sena- tors attending the conference that the United States ought not to act irrespon- sibly by enacting unilateral fish legisla- tion, such as the bill before us today. If we are being asked to exercise restraint with respect to this kind of legislation, then it seemed to me not unreasonable to ask restraint in the ehortrun of those who have created the problem off our coasts?the Soviets, the Germans, the Poles, the British and the Japanese. But when I suggested this to their delegates in Caracas, X got very little positive re- sponse and sensed that few of these na- tions share our sense of urgency about the need to protect offshore fish stocks in the North Atlantic. And upon my return to this country, I was further disturbed by an increasing lack of restraint on the part of those countries which are fishing off the coast of my own State of Maine. Haddock is already an endangered species. And yet Britain is now beginning to fish for had- dock off our coasts?in complete viola- tion of the Zero quota for haddock in the North Atlantic agreed to at the recent ICNAF meetings. In addition, this summer there have been a number of incidents?and the number is Increasing?.of intrusions upon the fixed gear of our herring fishermen. These intrusions constitute nothing but wanton and apparently deliberate de- struction, leaving our fishermen with little but uncertain claims against name- less perpetrators. Where is the restraint on the part of these countries and their fishing fleets with respect to intrusions upon our coastal waters, our Continental Shelf, and our fishermen? Where is the re- straint with, respect to the incidental fishing that has not been negotiated under ICNAF?of lobster and other ground species? That incidental fishing goes on without any pretense of control under XCNAl. And no restraint is shown. So I say that the lack of restraint on the part of the great maritime powers of the world is a greater danger to the Law of the Sea Conference than this legisla- tions Now, there is a recent precedent for taking a hard-nosed attitude to protect our fishing interests. And that precedent has to do with the ICNAF agreements themselves. In June of 1973, the 17 member na- tions of the International Commission for the Nortawest Atlantic Fisheries held their annual meeting and discussed the need to limit the total fishing effort in the Northwest Atlantic. The meeting did not produce any agreement, largely be- cause this country could not get any other members to exercise restraint. But during the summer of 1973, in large part due to domestic political pressure, the U.S. Government announced that it would withdraw its membership from ICNAF if concrete progress was not made In 1973 to limit foreign fishing in the Northwest Atlantic. As a result, in Octo- ber of 1973, a special meeting of ICNAF was convened in Ottawa at which an Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 December APProved Feeallingglang&9183RDPsi.WHI8OR000500410006-0 19 S 21085 agreement was reached on an overall quota system for the fisheries off the Atlantic coast of the United-States. The quotas reached applied toboth individual species?some 54?and to the overall fish catch. For l91,4, the overall quota was set at 929,000 metric tons. For MS, the over- all quota was to be reduced to 850,000 metric tons, with the U.S. share of the total quota increasing from roughly 20 to 25 percent in 1975. And for 1976, the member nations have agreed to set an overall quota at a level consistent with maintaining the maximum sustainable yield. The difficulty with this agreement is that it is not enforceable. It is not being enforced now, nor is it enforceable against what the British are doing. And It is not having any effect at all in pro- tecting our fishermen and fish gear from deliberate sabotage and destruction of their gear. ? May I say that protecting our offshore fishery stocks is something more than a national interest. It is a global interest. If we coastal states do not take effective action to protect these stocks, who in Heaven's name is going to do so? The Russian fishing fleet? The Jap- anese fishing fleet? There is no evidence to support any such possibility. ? So I say it is proper and necessary for Congress to enactthis legislation. And whatever doubts I may have had on that score before I went to Caracas have been resolved by my attendance at that con- ference, notwithstanding the fact that I remain convinced that an enforceable international agreement on the use Of the Oceans is the best Way in the long run to stop the overfishing which threatens to ruin our fisheries resources. One final point about S. 1988. And that Is that this legislation is consistent with the U.S. position as enunciated in Ca- racas. In a major statement on July 11, Ambassador Stevenson, head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference, announced a new U.S. position on the concept of a 200-mile economic zone. At the time, he stated that? This country is prepared to accept, and indeed, would welcome general agreement on a 12-mile outer lirnit for the territorial sea and a 209-mile outer limit for the economic zone provided that it Is part of an acceptable comprehensive Package. The point is, moreover, that the new U.S. position accepts the concept of 200 miles for fishery management jurisdic- tion. It also accords with the two other fishery management proposals contained In S. 1988?that management of anad- romous species such as salmon be han- dled by the nation in whose rivers they Spawn and that managemnt of migra- tory species such as tuna be handled through international commissions. But, Mr. PresidenMis legislation dif- fers from the official U.S. position in one critical respect. It recognizes the urgency of today's situation and mandates im- mediate interim uniXteral action to reg- ulate and conserve our offshore marine resources, This is precisely the reason why I rise to support this legislation and urge its passage. Mr. President, on behalf of the distin- guished Senator from Washington (Mr. /VfAmusoN) Senator STEVENS, Senator KENNEDY, Senator PACKWOOD, Senator WEICKER, and myself, I call up my amendment which is at the desk. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The amendment will be stated. The 'assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to read the amendment. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: "SEC. 13, Secton 4 of the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 742c; 70 Stat. 1121), as amended, is further amended by adding the following new subsection: "(f) (1) The Secretary of Commerce is au- thorized, under such terms and conditions as he may prescribe by regulation to use funds appropriated under this section to , compensate owners and operators whose fish- ing vessels or gear have been destroyed or damaged by the actions of foreign fishing vessels operating in waters superjacent to the Continental Shelf of the United States as defined in the Convention of the Con- tinental Shelf. "(2) Upon receipt of an application filed by an owner or operator pursuant to this subsection after the effective date of this subsection by the owner or operator of any vessel documented or certificated under the laws of the United States as a commercial fishing vessel and after determination by the Secretary that there is reason to believe that such vessel or its gear was destroyed or damaged while under the control of such owner or operator in waters superjacent to the Continental Shelf of the United States ?by the actions of a vessel (including crew) of a foreign nation, the Secretary shall, as soon as pradticable but not later than 30 days after receipt of an application, make a non-interest-bearing loan to such owner or operator from the fisheries loan fund cre- ated under subsection (c) of this section. Any such loan, as determined by the Sec- retary, Shall be in an amount equal to the replacement value of the damaged or de- stroyed property and the market value of fish, if any, onboard such vessel and within such gear which are lost or spoiled as the result of such damage or destruction. Any such loan shall? "(A) be conditional upon the owner or operator of such damaged or destroyed prop- erty assigning to the Secretary of Com- merce any rights of such owner or operator to recover or such damages; "(B) be subject to other requirements of this section with respect to loans which are not inconsistent with this subsection; and "(C) be subject to other terms and condi- tions which the Secretary determines neces- sary for the purposes of this subsection. "(3) The Secretary of Commerce shall, within one hundred and eighty days of re- ceipt of a loan application, investigate each incident as a result of which a loan Is made pursuant to this subsection and? ",(A) if he deterthines in any such case that the destruction or damage was caused solely by a vessel (including crew) of a for- eign nation, he shall cancel repayment of such loan and refund any principal paid thereon prior to such cancellation and seek recovery from such foreign nation; ."(B) if he determines that the damage or destruction was not caused solely by a vessel (including crew) of a foreign nation or solely by the negligence or intentional actions of the owner or operator of the vessel, he shall require such owner or operator to repay such loan at a rate of interest determined by him, pursuant to subsection (b) of this sec- tion, which rate shall be retroactive to the date the loan was originally made; or "(C) if he determines that the damage or destruction was caused solely by the negli- gence or intentional actions of the owner or operator, he shall require the immediate re- payment of such loan at a rate of interest determined by him, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, which rate shall be retro- active to the date the loan was originally made. "(4) The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State shall, with the assistance of the Attorney General, take steps to collect any claim assigned to him under this subsec- tion from any foreign nation involved. Amounts collected on any such claim shall be deposited in the fisheries loan fund. "(5) This subsection shall apply with re- spect to damages or destruction of vessels or gear occurring on or after January 1, 1972. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have discussed this amendment with the dis- tinguished Senators MAGNUSON and STEVENS. Indeed, they are cosponsors of it. This amendment is designed to deal with a serious problem resulting from the increasing incursion of foreign fleets into our offshore waters?the problem of reimbursement of American fishermen for damage to their vessels or gear caused by foreign fishermen. For many years, fishermen off both the east and west coasts have suffered serious and often disastrous economic losses as a result of damage to their gear caused by foreign fishermen. There are interna- tional procedures for making claims against foreign vessels which damage or destroy fishing gear. But current pro- cedures are slow, cumbersome, and sel- dom effective, with the result that most American fishermen do not even bother going through the laborious process of filling out the necessary claims forms. And in a given case, even if the claims process is eventually successful, the in- dividual fisherman with a median income of $8,000 per year is forced to carry the financial burden of between $2,000 and $4,000 for several months or longer. This summer there were a series of in- cidents damaging the fixed gear of fish- ermen off the Maine coast. These in- cidents of wanton and apparently de- liberate destruction by West German ships left our fishermen with only the most uncertain claims against the identified perpetrators. Under the exist- ing procedures, the most likely result of recovery efforts is that nothing will happen. It is bad enough that we are allowing foreign fishermen to deplete our offshore stocks and to threaten the health of the U.S. fishing industry. We must not con- tinue to allow foreign fishing vessels to destroy the gear of American fishermen without providing adequate and imme- diate financial reimbursement for our fishermen'. The amendment I am introducing to- day is designed to meet this problem. Specifically, this legislation would require the Federal Government within 30 days to assume financial responsibility for losses to U.S. fishermen caused by for- eign vessels, pending international nego- tiations to recover the loss from the for- Approved For Release 2001/09107 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 ,? CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21.086 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE December 1.1, 1974 eign gOvernment involved. In cases where there Is reason to believe that damage or destruction did in fact occur as a ',result of foreign fishing activities, documented claims would be paid by the Secretary of Commerce in the form of a non-interest- bearing loan from. the fisheries loan fund set up under the Fish and. Wildlife Act of 1956. Congress created this fund expressly to finance or refinance the cost of purchas- ing, constructing, and equipping, main- taining, or operating commercial fishing vessels or gear. The loan would be made in an amount equal to the replacement value of the damaged or destroyed prop- erty and the market value of fish on board a, damaged or destroyed vessel or within lost, damaged, or destroyed gear. After the Secretary of Commerce has completed an investigation of the inci- dent?an investigation which must be completed within 6 months after t ae loan application has been filed?the loan would be converted to a grant if it were found that the American fisherman was not at fault. If, however, the Searetary found that the damage or destruct: on was caused by an act of God such as a storm, the non-interest-bearing loan would be converted into a loan with interest at a rate set by the Secretary. If the American fisherman were found to be at fault because of negligent or fraudulent activity, the Secretary would require the immediate repayment of `the loan at an interest rate he deemed ap- propriate and the fisherman would be subject to criminal prosecution. Govern- ment responsibility would be retroactive to January 1, 1972, since most of the serious damage done to American fisher- men's gear has been done during the past 3 years. Mr. President, I would like to add that this legislation is not only simple in its intent and construction. But if enacted, it could be administered In a straight- forward and relatively inexpensive man- ner. Nv.th the enactment of this amend- ment, 3: would not, for example, foresee the need to expand the bureaucracy or _ to set up any new administrative or- ganizations to handle claims filed by U.S. fishermen against foreign vessels I be- lieve the National Marine Fisheries Serv- ice, as presently structured, could eandle any increase In the demands made upon it as a result of this legislation. Furthermore, the $4 million currently in the fisheries loan fund should prove to be more than enough money to take care of any claims filed pursuant to this legislation. So it will not be necessary for Congress to authorize any new moneys with the *passage of this bill. Mr. President, as things stand today, most American fishermen feel the.; filing claims is hardly worth the time, money, and trouble since there is such a high probability that pursuit of the existent claims process will prove fruitless. It is imperative that the Federal Government initiate new measures to reform the claims DrOCESS. The amendment I inn of- fering today?by providing the individual fisherman with the capital he needs to get back in business while the Gavern- merit negotiates with the responsible for- eign governments for reimbursement? provides, I feel, a reasonable approach to this problem. I urge my colleagues to support this legisle, Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ap- plaud the S.,enator from Maine for this amendment, and 3: would hope that he would make me a cosponsor. In support of this amendment, I have in my office now several cases of fisher- men in my State 'mhos? gear has been damaged, whose boats have been dam- aged, whose nets he been damaged, and they have to file a claim with a: foreign government. The Russians just settled two cases in Rhode Island, and it took 2 years to do it. By that time the fishermen were almost ready to go out of business. I have another ease in my office of a fisherman who has made a claim against the Spaniards and the Russians or Japa- nese. The big question here is that we pay off when foreign governments seize our vessels down along the coast of South America, ani I think the same ought to be done up here, too. Mr. MUS:KIE. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island for his point. Mr. MAGNUSON. As the Senator from Rhode Island pointed out, there is ample precedent for this. We have helped our fishermen like this for years with the squabbles they have had off the western coast of South America. It just means that fishermen whc are damaged, little, independent people and often a family operation, cannot wait very long to get paid. This has worked out fine. The Gov- ernment has paid the claim, The Govern- ment utilmately gets the money back sooner or later, but big government can wait longer than a little fisherman. The Senator Iron Alaska and I would be glad to accept the amendment. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MUSKIE. I yield. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor the amendment. We have had some very serious prob- lems in my area. I recall once when we had the new pride of the Alaskan fish- ing fleet on the g sounds for the first time, the Viking King. A foreign trawler went across its trawl line and actually stripped the whole trawl gear out of this brand new vessel. It Was laid up for the whole season. and lost the entire season. I believe that the great problem of putting one small outfit in a position of negotiating with a foreign government, and that is really what occurs on our fishing grounds, cart only be met through the amendment that we have all cospon- sored with the Senator from Maine. Mr. President, I think this amend- ment is a very good addition to this bill. I hope in due time the whole Congress will recogn12e the validity of this ap- proach. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield for a further observation? Mr. MUSKIE. Yes. Mr. PASTORE. The State Department is opposed to the pending bill, but the State Department has no qualms at all in seeing to It that when our fishermen are arrested along the South American roast, and they are fined, we reimburse them for the fine. We deduct it from the foreign aid we give them, and we pay them the balance. Then if their boats or catches are confiscated we try to do something for them. I am saying if that is the position that we are going to be in in South America, It is abort time we began to do some- thing for our fishermen who are damaged up around New England. Mr. M13SKIE. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island for his comments. Mr. corroN. Will the Senator yield? Mr. MUSK. Yes. Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I would like to have my name added as a co- sponsor of this amendment. Mr, MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask that both the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from New Hampshire be added as cosponsors. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered. Mr. M1JSKIE. I yield to Senator PACK- WOOD, who introduced his own bill. With Se?nator KENNEDY, we combined our efforts to produce this amendment. I ex- press my eppreeiatior. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I can echo the same experiences that the Sen- ator from Maine and others have had. Within the last 6 or 8 months off Oregon we have had Russian trawlers going right over the nets of our fishing boats. We have. had the Soviet-United States Fishery Claims Board, which has failed to provide compensation to the vast ma- jority of those American fishermen who have sustained damages. We have one claim of two fishermen of Oregon over a year old, with nothing done, no finding of fault or lack of fault, nothing. If that is the situation we are going to put our fishermen in, it seems to me it is incumbent on the American Govern- ment to take some responsibility for these claims and let them argue as to whether whoever hr-mens to run over these nets is liable. I am delighted to Join with the Senator from Maine and others in cosponsoring this amendment. I regard it as vital to the protection of our fishermen's interests. Mr. President, I am extremely pleased to be able to join with Senators Meseta MAGNTISON, KENNEDN, HATFIELD, and WEIMER in sponsoring this amendment to S. 1988, the Emergency Marine Fish- eries Protection Act of 1974. Our amend- ment provides a more speedy and equita- ble procedure for the recovery of claims brought by American commercial fisher- men who have had -Weir vessels or gear damaged by foreign, fishermen. Last summer I met with four black cod fishermen from Astoria, Oreg., who pro- vide a vivid example of why this legisla- tion is so desperately needed. During the last 18 months each of these four men has lost thousands of dollars of fishing gear when Russian vessels tore out their buoys and pots. Their sit aation is not unique in Oregon. In February 1974 I conducted hearings In Coos Bay, Oreg., and received testi- mony from other fishermen complaining about harassment, intimidation, and damage to their vessels or gear by foreign fishing fleets. Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 PProved F65?Mninpf1AnRioSferjRDInWSWOR000500410006-0? S 21087 DeCember 11, 19 . , Unfortunately, Oregon fishermen have debate on the nomination of Mr. Frank found it virtually impossible to be G. Zarb. reimbursed for their claims. The prob- The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- lem finds its rodt in bureaucratic red- pore. Without objection., it is so ordered. tape, diplomatic finagling, and In the Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, end the burden is borne by the fisher- I ask unanimous consent that the dis- men. And, Mr. President, this is one net cussion on the nomination follow the our fishermen cannot handle; it is a net disposition of the nomination of Mr. of overbearing circumstances which I Conant. believe our fishermen should not have to The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- handle. pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. I am sure that other coastal Senators Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently will attest to the fact that their -fisher- said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous men have similar concerns. On the east consent, as in executive session, that my coast and on the west coast, off Coos previous consent orders with respect to Bay, Oreg., and Boothbay Harbor, Maine, 7rwrirt. 4444 ty0e,.... this Nation's commercial fishermen ha'' PRESIDENT pro tern- been mauled by foreign fishing fleets th3 pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. deplete our marine resources and thel if that were riot enough, deliver th knockout punch of gutting buoys an pots, leaving fishing gear a mangled Ines . I believe those Americans who fish o The Senate continued with the consid- our shores, who bend their bacis an eration of the bill (S. 1088) to extend on fight the sea, need a helping hand wile an interim basis the jurisdiction of the the fight of the sea switches from pur1 United States over certain ocean areas suing fish to being pursued by foreigi ahd fish in order to protect the domestic fleets. fishing industry, and for other purposes. What, we propose would simply an Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield efficiently provide loans in the amount myself such time as I may need. equal to the replacement value -of the My State has more than half of the damaged or destroyed property owner coastline of the United States and is the by the complainant. If the Secretary or great protein warehouse of this country, Commeroe determines the 'destruction,? if not of the world. We have suffered too was caused by vessels of a foreign nation, king from the marauding invaders off he is authorized to cancel repayment of Otir Coast who at one time I described as the loan. If the damage involved was not being people who used vacuum cleaners incurred by actions of a foreign vessel on the ocean for, through' their trawl- er gear. Now I think it would be more at and timely to say that they are really strip-mining the oceans, and they are doing it in a way that is absolutely be- yeind repair. We have already lost 12 species which are now in the situation of being threatened with extinction as a result of the activities of foreign fishing fleets off our coasts. We seek here a very direct approach. We seek to temporarily extend our fishing zones 200 miles, in order to declare con- servation principles that all civilized na- tions should adhere to, to be applicable to the areas off our coasts. It is a temporary solution. This approach is based upon the con- cept that all of us who support this bill, I believe, would rather have a multi- lateral, firm, permanent solution accepted by the world by consensus to protect the fisheries resources of the oceans. But it seems impossible to get the Law of the Sea Conference to recognize that no time is left for the fisheries?that there is no time to debate the navigation problem, the problem of the seabed, the width of straits. All those questions, incidentally, will not be affected by time. Only the future of the fisheries of the oceans of the world will be affected by time, and time is running out for those fisheries, so fqr as I am concerned. ell j4ve been privileged to be sent to LIMITATION OP DEBA* ON 'ki9MI-, ' ch of the Law of the Sea meetings to NATION OF FRANK G. ZARB date, since I have been in the Senate, and I share the feelings of our chairman, the Mr. ROBERT Q. BYRD. Mr. President, great ,Senator from Washington (Mr. I as nnanimous.consent, as in executive MAGNUSON) 7 in terms of the progress that session, that there be not to exceed 1 hour has not been made. We have yet to sepa- EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES ACT OF 1974 then the owner will be required ,to repay the loan- at a rake of interest determined appropriate by _the ? Secretary of Corn- thence. Finally, Mr. President, this amendment was conceived in order to put the fisher- man back into the business of fishing and out of channe swIAieh, flow with red tape and International stalemate. It is the U.S. Government wliich should deal with those nations responsible for the damage done by their fleets. The fisherman shotild he allowed to do what he knows best and what the na- tion needs most: his fishing abilities. Loans authorized by this amendment would take the fisherman out of hock and put him back at the helm where he belongs. The Senate in passing this amendment can restore that order. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr, President, I move the adoption of the amendment. The ACTING PRESIDaTT pro tern- pore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator, from. Maine, The amendment was agreed to. Mr. MUSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amend- ment was agreed to. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table. Themotion to, table was agreed to. rate the one issue that could be-solved by the world now; the only issue, as I said, that will be affected by the passage of time?that is the issue of fisheries protec- tion. I do not see how we can do other than send a very strong message to the Law of the Sea negotiators in Geneva. That mes- sage should be that we are willing to go back again in April; that we are willing once again to try to convince the nations of the world that they must stop the Vacuum cleaner mehods of the foreign fishing fleets not only off our coasts but also off the other coastlines of the world; that if they fail to do this next 'year, that this Congress will have no alernative but to act unilateraly, not on an interim basis, but permanently to extend our jurisdiction to 200 miles and to declare stiff penalties on anyone who violates the sound conservation principles that the world has now come to recognize. I had hoped we would be able to get this bill passed by Congress this year. We know now that we cannot. We now know that in the closing days of Congress, it will not pass the other body. But I urge the Members of the Senate to support this bill, to send that strong warning and message to the Law of the Sea nego- tiators: tell them we are losing patience with this group of international nego- tiators who seem to spend more time on procedure than they do on the substance of the problems before them. I mentioned to the representatives at Caracas that we had a habit in the Sen- ate that if we wanted to record our long speeches, we would do what I am going to do now, and that is to put the speeches in the RECORD and try to summarize our meaning. But they went through almost 6 weeks in Caracas, with each represent- ative of each country reading almost a 2-hour or 3-hour speech. As a conse- quence, they achieved nothing. They were no further along when they left Caracas than when they left Geneva 2 years earlier. I hope that those negotiators will know after today that we cannot await another session such as that and that they should produce a firm outcome, at least on the fisheries issue, in Geneva, when they meet there again. Mr. President, it is a pleasure to rise today in support of S. 1988, the Emer- gency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. For my State, Alaska, and for other U.S. coastal fisheries States this is the most important fisheries legislation to come before the Senate in many years. After 15 hearings here and in the field the Commerce Committee overwhelm- ingly reported this bill favorably. The Armed Services Committee held three hearings and last week also reported it favorably. The Foreign Relations Com- mittee earlier reported it by a narrow 9-8 adverse vote. As Senators know, S. 1988, sometimes called the 200-mile bill, was introduced as a deterrent to the onslaught of foreign fishing which has built-up off our shores since the end of World War IL Having exhausted their own fish resources, sev- eral foreign nations, using the most ad- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07_,. CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21088 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Decfmzber 11, 1974 vanced vessels and gear, have converged on Waters near the coasts of the 'United States and are depleting our fish one species after another. These invaders systematically strip an area of its fish, without regard to conservation practices which could guarantee a lasting supply of flah resources for the tables of the wor10. Then they proceed to another ateante do the same thing. Our hearings have established that the emergency is genuine, and that extension of our fish- eries jurisdiction to 200 miles would af- ford the protection necessary tc sustain our coastal species. Before summarizing the provisions of the bill, I would like to address some of the misunderstandings and disagree- ments it has aroused. Thee administration, at the behest of the State apartment, opposes the bill, telling us that such action in Congress upsets the delicate balance of our law of the Sea negotiations. I cannot agree. In faet, I am Convinced that the serious fisheries problems brought out in our extensive public hearings on S. 1988 re- affirraed and unified the outrage of the People of this Nation over the foreign fishing issue, and strengthened the posi- tion of our negotiators. One thing not Widely known is that this legislation does not differ In concept from the position laid before the Law of the Sea Confer- ence by the United Statesiast summer in Caracas, Venezuela. What the State De- partment objects to is not the concept of S. 1988, but the fact that it is being sought unilaterally, legislativear, and immediately, rather than internation- ally, diplomatically, and interminalbly. The Defense Departreent has joined State in opposing this bill, asserting its long-held, inflexible position that our fisheries claim could lead to armed con- frontations and would trigger, retaliatory larger claims by foreign governments? resulting iri the eviction of our nuclear detertent forces from the coastal water- ways and straits of the world. We may be assured that the members of the Armed Services Committee, the majority of whom favor S. 1988, gave full consid- eration to its strategic military implica- tions. In fact 'their committee report stated the belief that passage of S. 1988 would not significantly affect the mo- bility and survivability of U.S. fen:es. Moreover, the committee reported that passage of S. 1988 would give the Secre- tary of State sufficient leverage to work out satisfactory fishery arrangements with foreign nations without resort to armed confrontations. Many of my col- leagues will recall that similar leg elation, adding a 9-inile li.S. fisheries contiguous zone, passed the Congress and became law in 1966, and that there was neither retaliatory territorial expansion nor other negative reaction by foreign gov- ernments. Mr. President, my answer to both State and Defense is that S. 1988 would apply to fishing only, and, true to its name, it is an interim fisheries zone extension and management act which would cease to exist as soon as International fisheries conservation measures are constunniated. It is doubtful that foreign nations will sacrifice their other important diplomatic goals by overreacting to our emergency move to sustain a renewable resource so necessary to a protein hungry world. In this regard I emphasize that S. 1988 re- quires that we allow foreign fishermen to harvest whatever balance of the sus- tainable yield off eur coasts is not caught by U.S. fishermen. I do want to make clear my conviction that comprehensive law governing the oceans, including fisheries, is an impor- tant internationai objective. As an ad- viser to the U.S. law of the Sea delega- tion, I attended preparatory sessions last year in Geneva and New York, and the so-called "substan sive" sessions this sum- mer in Caracas. Regrettably, this experi- ence convinces rue the comprehensive treaty being pursued is at least 2 years away. The fact is, there are nearly 150 nations having various economic, politi- cal, and social oh eracteristics consider- ing an agenda of some 80 issues. Fish- eries, unlike the others, simply cannot wait for resolution of so many problems. A common argument against a 200- mile limit Is that enforcement would be difficult. I believe enforcement under this concept would be itrimeasurably less com- plicated than unter the present myriad of treaties establishing various sizes and shapes of zones to protect various species of fish. I am disappointed that some of those who oppose S. 1988 have spread word among the salmon fishermen a Alaska and other west coat States that the legis- lation would lead to a retaliatory increase in high seas salmon fishing by other na- tions, mainly the Japanese. Actually. S. 1988 provides for protection of anadro- mOus species such as salmon, as far as they migrate?whi Inn indeed, exceeds 200 miles offshore. Even if this were not a fundamental provision of the bill, we could assert powerful leverage on Japan by conditioning the continuation of its vitally important pollack fishery within. our 200-mile zone upon total abandon- ment of its much emaller high seas sal- mon effort. Briefly, I shall LOW outline the major provisions of the bill: Section 4 provides that the United States would, on en interim basis, exer- cise exclusive fishery management re- sponsibility and authority in a zone ex- tending, to a total of 200 miles offshore. In the case of anedromous fish this au- thority wotici be extended to the full li- mits of their migratory range. In no case would this zone extend within the terri- torial waters or fisheries zones of other nations. Highly mieratory species such as tuna are excluded nvm the provisions of this section in order to preserve the exist- ing treaties, The vest migratory range of these fish necessitates international agreement, because controls by a single nation would be inconsequential in man- aging the species. 'Phis position is shared by the U.S. fisheries article being for- warded at the Law of the Sea Conference. Section 3 pro% des that traditional foreign fishing mey be allowed only to the extent that th optimum sustainable yield cannot be harvested by U.S. citi- zens. Section 0 would establish a Marine Fisheries Management Council which would be required to submit to Congress within 2 years the elements of a marine fisheries management system to preserve and protect fish with the following ob- jectives: enhancement of the total na- tional and world food supply; improve- ment of the economic well-being of our commercial fishermen; maximum feasi- ble utilization of methods, practices and techniques that are optimal in terms of efficiency, protection of the ecosystem of which fish are a part, and conservation of stocks and species. Sectio:a 7 would require the Secretary of State to negotiate new treaties and renegotiate existing ones to achieve con- sistency with this act. Section 8 would provide that this act would neither extend nor diminish the jurisdiction of any State over any na- tural resources beneath and in the waters beyond the territorial sea of the United States. Section 9 specifies prohibitions under the act, including violations of interna- tional fishery agreements, and provides for civil penalties riot to exceed $25,000 for each day of violation; criminal pen- alties not to exceed $50,000 fine and/or 1 year imprisonment; and civil forfeit- ure of any fish or fishing gear used, in- tended far use, or acquired in violation of this section. Section 10 would empower the Secre- tary of Commerce and the Coast Guard to enforce provisions of the act; to board and inspect vessels: to arrest suspected violators: execute precesses issued by the court, and sieze fish and fishing gear found aboard any fishing vessel or sup- port vessel engaged in any activity pro- hibited ty this act. U.S. district courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising under this act. Section 11 provides that the manage- ment authority under section 4 of the act become effective 90 clays after enactment and that all, other provisions become ef- fective oa the date of enactment. The provisions of the act would expire on the date that, the Law of the Sea treaty or other comprehensive fish management and conservation treaties to which the United States is party come into force. Section, 12 authorizes appropriations of not to exceed $5,000,000 to the Secre- tary of Commerce and $13,000,000 to the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, for each of fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977. Mr. President, S. 1988 would establish a system for conserving our fish stocks while allowing a sustained harvest of desperately needed animal protein for the people of the United States and of the world. As the title indicates, this is "emergency" legislation. I respectfully urge its passage. Mr. President, I call up my amend- ment which is at the desk. The legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President. I ask Unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD. The amendment is as follows: Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/117 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 December .11, 1974 CONtlIESSIONAL RECORD?SENSATE On page 16, line 13, insert the following: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration shall take steps to verify the authenticity of the foreigncatch statistics and any other relevant data furnished for the plfzposa of this paragraph, including placing observers aboard as necessary during any fishing operations that may be authorized for foreign fishing vessels pursuant to this Act". Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have called this amendment to the attention of our chairman and the manager of the bill. - This amendment would specifically delineate the procedure to be established under section 5(d) of S. 1988. That sec- tion requires that the best available scientific information, including data compiledhy a foreign nation., be utilized in determining the allowable level of foreign fishing which may be authorized in an area where U.S. fishermen are not harvesting the full sustainable yield. Spe- cifically, my amendrn ent would authorize the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to take steps to verify the authenticity of data provided by foreign governments, including the placement of observers on foreign fishing vessels. In the case of U.S. fishing vessels, catch and catch records are available for in- sPection and verification by United States and State fishery agents when the vessels return to their home ports to dis- charge and sell their catch. Our Govern- ment is now spending a great deal of money for this purpose, to verify these catch records. Foreign vessels, on the other hand, do not land their catcht,s in U.S. ports, thus removing any opportunity for V.S. ob- servers to inspect their landings and verify the species and cateh records of their fishing operations. Under these cir- cumstances, our Gov ernment has no way of knowing the extent of their fishing op- erations and the amount of their catch by species, or otherwise, except through such data as the foreign governments choose to provide. ? It must be recognized that the catch data, and other information which for- eign governments will be furnishing.pur- suant to this section, will be intended to support their cases for the continuing operations of their fishing fleets. I point out that we do not unilaterally terminate totally their fishing rights, but we extend to them a right to continue fishing under certain circumstances and provided they stay within the available catch so far as the sustained yield con- cept is concerned. For this reason, it is highly inappro- priate and could be highly misleading to take, at face value, whatever statistical and other information they may put for- ward for this purpose. Mr. President, I urge my good friend, Vac manager of the bill, to add this amendment to this bill. MAGNtrpon Mr. President, we , have discussed this amendment. I move the adoption of the amendment. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Alaska. The amendment was agreed to. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to. Mr. MAGNUSON. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I do not know of anyone else who desires time. Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 or 3 minutes? Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield the Senator 2 minutes. That is enough for his side of the story. [Laughter] Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Alaska that there Is no point in making long speeches on this point; we may as well put our state- ments in the RECORD. However, I do feel that it is important to the Senator from California that I reflect what the view is of a significant segment of the fishing industry in my State. As some of my colleagues know, S. 1988 would have enormous impact upon the tuna fishermen in my State. It is also anticipated by some of the sports fisher- men in the southern part of the State that it would have an adverse impact on them, particularly if Mexico should de- clare a territorial jurisdiction over 200 miles of offshore water in retaliation to the decision of the United States to de- clare a 200-mile territorial jurisdiction over our coastal waters. I did hold hearings in California. I mint say that there is a division of opinion. The coastal fishermen in north- ern California are supportive of the leg- islation of the Senator from Washing- ton. They feel that they have to protect their livelihood from the trawlers from the Soviet Union and Japan. They feel very much the way the Senator from Washington expressed his viewpoint, that it is absolutely important to conserve our coastal fisheries. On the other hand, the fishermen in the central and southern parts of my State, who fish for tuna, fear that if we pass this legislation, other coastal States in Central and Latin America will do the same and will make it impossible for them to catch tuna in the future the way they have in the past. This would ad- versely effect a very important part of the protein diet which is available to Americans as a result of these fishing crews going down and catching tuna which would otherwise be unavailable. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate Cham- ber, please? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The Senate will be in order. The Senator from California will proceed. Mr. TUNNEY. I also wish to point out, Mr. President, that in my view, although I can totally understand the desire on the part of the Senator from Washing- ton and of those people who support him in his desire to protect their fisheries, and their disgust at the fact that there has not been an international agreement to protect our fisheries but it seems to me that we should wait until the Geneva S 21089 meetings are concluded this summer be- fore we take this unilateral action. I am totally aware of the fact that this legis- lation beeomes inoperative if there is a multilateral agreement reachedur ng the conference to be held in Geneva in 1975. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The Senator's time has expired. Mr. TUNNEY. May I have just 1 more minute? Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 1 more minute to the Senator from Cali- fornia. Mr. TUNNEY. I suggest that we listen to the Department of State on this issue and that we listen to the Department of Defense and recognize that it would be best to wait until the various nations of the world get together and have a chance once more to try to hammer out what has to be a most difficult agreement. We have such a conflict between coastal States and interior States, and differences of opinion between developing States and developed States as to what the law of the seas should be?not only as it relates to coastal waters, but the deep sea waters as well; as it relates to the riches that apparently exist in the coastal waters, the subsoils of the coastal waters, as well as in the deep sea. Mr. President, there is no one in the Senate who has worked harder on this legislation than the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee. Furthermore his expertise in this area is extensive. However, in this particular case, I must respectfully diverge from the chairman's position. B. -1988, Mr. President, would have enormous impact on the State of Cali- fornia. California is the base for one of the largest coastal, distant water, and sport fishing fleets in the world. Extensive consultation with represen- tatives of these groups and two days of hearings in California have convinced me of the need to oppose S. 1988 for the following six reasons: First, S. 1988 I believe may violate international law. Second, S. 1988 could endanger our global defense interests. Third, S. 1988 will seriously undermine the Law of the Sea Conference and in- crease the odds of its ultimate dissolu- tion and failure. Fourth, this legislation fails to protect our coastal fish stocks and by threaten- ing to destroy the Law of the Sea Con- ference may end the hope for meaningful protection of our coastal fisheries in the future. Fifth, it threatens the economic viabil- ity of our distant water fishing fleets by increasing the likelihood of harassment and reprisals, by foreign nations, which have already illegally seized more than 145 of our fishing boats on the high seas in the last 7 years. Finally this legislation's conservation provisions are inadequate and therefore fail to protect the long-term interests of the American consumer. In order to place this proposed legisla- tion in historical context it must be re- membered that the United States has Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21090 CONGRESSIONAL iRECORD? SENATE December 11, 1974 consistently protested the extension by merely 50 miles off its coasts?has given surveillance would require further in- other nations of fisheries jurisdiction be- the world stark we of the type of crease in the Coast Guard's operating yond the 12-mile limit as a violation of gunboat diplomacy that can be elicited funds of $47.2 million a year. International law. by unilateralism. In light of the face that S. 1988 au- When a few countries in Latin America In such an environment of accelerat- thorizes increased fielding for enforce- anilaterally extended their jurisdiction lug acrimony it is my fear that whatever merit at a much lower level-e$13 million to 200 miles there was nearly universal hope the Law of the Seas Conference has for esch of the fiscee years 1975, 1976, protest in the Senate and the Fisher.- may be extinguished. and 1977. There is 3. eason for concern man's Protection Act was paseed in order At the same time a unilateral exten- as to whether S. 1938 will afford signif- to assist our fishermen to resist what was sion under S. 1988 could come under icantly increased protection of our described as a brazen breach of interne- attack as a breach of international law coastal fishermen. :Lionel law, and practice. The Ieternational Court of At the same time our distant water For the Senate to sanction an abrupt Justice has just recently held that Ice- fishermen would be jeopardized. In and unilateral extension of our fishing land's unilateral claims were inconsistent hearings I chaired in California, it was j urisdic lion to 200 miles off our COMA with the fishing rights of the United pointed out that the tuna industry is would be seen by the rest of the world Kingdom and the Federal Republic of dependent on multinational :conserve- as a precipitous reversal of policy. 13ecre- Germany. A unilateral claim by the tion agreements. A proliferation of 200- tary of State Kissinger, underlining the United States will clearly lead a number mile exclusive- fishine zones worldwide gravity of this proposed action, has stated of nations to try to bring the United would conflict with the maintenance and in a letter to Senator FutellIntIT that? States before the International Court of extension .ef such multinational agree- Passage Of is. 1985 would be .sermus[y harm- Justice. ments. Already Ecuador, which was a ful to our foreign relations and nay effort to The U.S. Government will then be member of an international tuna man- enforce a unilaterally established 200 mize laced with an extremely agonizing deci- agement regime pulled out after urn- :fisheries zone against non-consenting nm- ;ion?either we will refuse the Court's laterally proclaiming an exclusive 200- tions would be likely to lead to contrenta- jurisdiction claiming that the unilateral mile limit. Peru simply has refused to tions . . . and would encourage a wave of claims by others which would be detrimental tccretion of nationa i. control over a 2C0- join such tuna management agreements to our overall oceans interests in naval mobil- !mile fishing zone which comprises 2,582,- on the ground that it would derogate its Uy and the movement of energy suppeies. 000 nautical square miles is strictly a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. There is I lomestic matter?o we will accept the reason to believe that Japan and other The proponents of S. 1988 have claimed :nternational Court of Justice's jurisdic- parties to tuna agreements may face that as this legislation relates solely to lion, which will threaten the immediate internal political pressure to abrogate :fishing it will not affect other aspects of outlawing of our 200-mile fishing zone as their participation if we extend our fish- oceans affairs. The State Department lug zone to 200 miles. The result would a violation of intereational law. however has stated that it is clearly in- In other words we are heading toward be chaos and confrontation. consistent with the 1958 Convention on a situation in which passage of S. 1988 Such a result could devastate the the High Seas to which the United States may threaten the prospects of progress American tuna industry and its 28.000 and 45 other nations are parties, at the Law of the Sea Conference, while employees and a payroll of over $200 They note that although S. 1988 S. 1988 itself may be found to be in con- million last year. breaches this convention in the area Of travention of international law. American consumers also would be freedom of fishing, there is no reason to We should remember that the alterna- hurt. They bought $1 billion worth of believe that other nations wil nc t use live to multinationil agreements con- canned tuna in 1973, two-thirds of U.S. our breach as an excuse to abrogate the ( erning the Law of the Sea could be a grocery shoppers purchase tuna on a 1953 convention in the sensitive areas crazy quilt of unilateral claims contin- regular mcrithly bash. The market is of freedom of overflights and freedom of - seine being propounded with the final presently gemering at a rate of 6 percent navigation. Deputy Secretary of Defense arbiter?raw force. annually. If the international tuna Clement has underlined the magnitude That force may be required should not agreements are jeopardized, we will see of this threat by stating: iie ignored, a massive escalation in the cost of If the United States, by unilateral art, ab- There is no reason to believe, for ex- canned tuna. This could add hundreds of rogates one identified freedom, we :face the ample, that the Russians, Japanese, and millions of dollars to .eur food bill and . unhappy prospect that other nations may ether major natione that fish off our weaken our balance of trade posture. claim the right unilaterally to abrogate other elentified freedoms, including the freedoms coast will acquiesce riieekly to the licens- Another serious problem with this lege er navigation and overflight . . . Military i ig requirements of S. 1988. Such pay- Islation is that the proposed mechanism mobility on and over the high seas Is de-- rients would be a de facto acceptance of for a conseevation program for our Na- pendent to a significant degree um . the main- cur unilateral claims. Therefore, it is tion's coastal fisheries is not sufficiently tenance of the freedom of the eas. These I kely that the United States would face stringent. Although the proponents of i'reedoms sanction and protect the activate!! S;iff opposition to collection of these fees. S. 1988 maintain that cur coastal fishing of our forces. Reduced International waters led closed straits, therefore threate both Foreign oppositioe to collection of stocks have been daneerotisly depleted: ;n Ille eurvivability and utility of our deter- license fees is likely to put severe strains the legislation, while attempting to limit rent. In this connection, it should be noted on the enforcement mechanisms con- foreign fishing depredations, fails to set teat over 40% of the svorld's oceans lie within ttined in S. 1988. The Coast Guard lin any immediate eneorcement proce- 200 miles of some nation's coast and that Which would have ties primary enforce- dares against overfishieg of our coastal virtually the entire operating areas of the raent responeibility imder S. 1988. litei :fishing stocks by our men fishermen. In- ignited States 6th and 7th .Fleete lie within le ritten the Commerire Committee that stead it sets up a so-cabed fisheries men- h waters. ii our fishing jurisdietion is extended to agement council to peopose a ooastal in answer to these charges t is being a 200-mile zone the coast Guard will be management regime. Under S. 1988, it .eleimed that S. 1988 is merely a "tern- soread "very, very ti Linty" and "this is could take as long as 2 years before these winery" expedient, and that by showing likely to be true without regard to the proposals ai.e promulg teed. If our fish our determination it will spur action in regulations imposed on foreign fishing stocks are so seriously threatened, such the Law of the Seas Conference. vessels, probability of violation, et a hiatus could be serior sly detrimental. I believe that the opposite result is cetera." The Coast Guard further has It is essential that ri ny legislation to more probable. If the Senate Passes this written that even under their minimum regulate coastal fishing focus on the con- legislation, a number of -nations will pens for surveillance of an extended servation of coastal feh stocks. There probably use our action as an excuse to fisheries zone this woeld require acquisi- appear to be superior alternatives to S. put forward their own extended claims. tion costs of $63.2 million to increase 1988 which would allow for more satie- Soon these conflicting claims, unsanc- their operating faellades to "6 high en- factory, evenhanded. end scientifically tioned by international law, will lend to entrance cutters, 6 lone range search air- based conservation proerams, increased, worldwide friction and inter- craft, 4 medium ranee search aircraft The 1958 Geneva Coe vention on Fish- national incidents. The so-called cod a id 10 shipboard he icopters" and that ing and Conservation of the High PoAs, war precipitated by Iceland's extension reactivation time would extend from "ii of which we are a signatory, for example. .ef its fishing zone?riot to 200 miles but to 11 months." Furthermore. this level of contains article VII which allows a na- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved Fs:5r R December .11, 197.4 CON' finn to conserve coastal fisheries. This elease 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 GRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 21001 article could apply not only to fish up to 200 miles off our shore, but to coastal fish that travel ,even further off our coasts. Also, regulations carried out in accord- ance with the 1958 Geneva Convention would have the force of international practice behind them, since the conven- tion has been signed by 33 nations. Fur- thermore, any actions and regulations under the convention must be based on solid scientific evidence and must regu- late both domestic and foreign fisher- men. It seems to me that if we decide to take Immediate action in regard to coastal fisheries the article VII approach is su- perior to S. 1988. Coastal fishery conservation which maintains our renewable fishery re- sources at a level of maximum sustain- able yield is in the best Interest of do- mestic and foreign fishermen alike. It is In the best interest of thousands em- ployed in the industry, and in the best interest of consumers who want a plenti- fu.l supply of seafoods at reasonable prices. Mr. President, Chairman MAGNUSON and the other members of the Commerce Committee have worked hard on this legislation. Nonethelcs, I believe S. 1988, as presently constituted, cannot solve our coastal fishing problems. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 4 plinntes to the Senator from Hawaii. Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise with considerable reluctance to speak in op- position to this measure because of my great admiration and great love for our Chairman, the Senator from Washing- ton. Hawaii is a State surrounded by water, and, therefore, obviously, we should be concerned about fishing. This morning, I should like to address myself not to fish- ing but to other aspects involved in this measure. I am concerned as to how this meas- ure will affect our national security. The Department of Defense has pointed out that if we should decide to adopt this measure, it will open the floodgates for other nations to adopt similar legislation, and, if this should happen, the opera- tional areas of our Sixth and Seventh Fleets would be most seriously curtailed. For example, movenient in the Caribbean would be, to some extent, halted. Move- ment in the Mediterranean would be made extremely difficult and movement In the China Sea, the Japan Sea and the Philippine Sea would be made almost im- possible. Mr. President, there is another point. If we should adopt this measure, then, if enforcement is necessary, we shall have to increase our coastal forces. Our Coast Guard would need additional equipment and manpower. We have no idea as to whatthe cost would be, but I assume that it would be in the many millions. Finally, Mr. President, many experts have suggested that this measure would be in violation of the 1058 Convention. on the High Seas. Some nations will just refuse to recognize this unilateral action on the part of the United States and will make its matter of their sovereignty to intrude upon the so-called 200-mile sovereignty of the United States. We shall have confrontations. I recall very vividly, as do my col- leagues here, the extension of 50 miles that led Iceland into an unfortunate cod war with Great Britain. I should hate to see a salmon war or a tuna war being conducted on the west coast of the United States. So, Mr. President, much as I join my chairman in making every effort to assist our fisherieS- and our fishing industry, I find that there are other elements of this measure which lead me to oppose it. I thank the Senator very much. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am happy to yield a minute to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for a conple of minutes. I am rather surprised at the position of some of our colleagues, because I know we have been all working on this partic- ular measure. I understand that the tuna fishermen are quite concerned. My dis- tinguished friend from Alaska and I at- tended the Law of the Sea Conference representing those tuna fishermen. We have their interest at heart. We have the national security interest at heart, and we have the international interest at heart. The point is, Mr. President, that every- one cries for leadership, but there is no leadership. When we try to lead and fix a point to attain, then we want to adopt the age old political approach of when in doubt do nothing, and stay in doubt all the time. What is the alternative? Are we going to continue to meet and eat and meet and eat? I ask the Senators, have they ever been to these blooming things? When will they ever end? Does anyone really contemplate an international treaty agreement, with all the various ramifications? By the time we get the economic zone idea settled, then we get the national defense question. By the time you think you have got that fit into a packaged agreement, then there squirts out the tuna problem, and about the time you think you might whip that, then the archipelago states come In; then all the other interests come in, and all the way down the line. I think we have given it a pretty good try to bring about a consensus. I think it was our own Secretary of State?I should say our Ambassador, not the Secretary of State, who at one time worked as As- sistant Secretary, John Stevenson?who announced at Caracas that the United States accepts in principle the 200-mile economic zone. I am told that at Caracas that the United States accepts in prin- ciple the 200-mile economic zone. I am - told that at Caracas that was tentatively approved by a substantial majority. I am inclined to think that is as far as it is ever going to reach. Now the dis- tinguished Senator from Washington conies alOng and says, "11aving reached that much." Mr. President, government is the art of the possible, not the im- possible. In another 10 years, that war In Iceland will repeat itself in Peru, and now northern Ecuador is beginning to be heard. So the very argument employed by my distinguished friend from Hawaii about the fishing wars is exactly what we are trying to avoid. The world is becoming smaller each day. We are running out of time. It would be delightful if we could all sit around a table and meet and eat in agreement, but lawyers have made ca- reers out of this blooming problem of the law of the sea, and I get the impres- sion when I attend one of these things that the worst thing that could happen would be if they do agree. Everyone would come along and pick out the next place, and say Geneva has good eating places and Vienna has good eating places, and on down the line. But the problem of Iceland is there, and the danger of war is imminent. I wanted to put our fisheries within the 200-mile zone, but I did not want to confuse the leadership of our distin- guished chairman, the Senator from Washington. He has brought it to a head. I think it should be brought to a head, and I think it should be passed by the Senate. If we can adopt this economic zone of 200 miles, then, working from that point, which is generally agreed upon and which would be followed by a majority of the nation states, we can work out where these warships can go. The very crowd that worries about warships traveling around and being around and in and out and everything else is the same crowd that does not want any warships in the Indian Ocean. They cannot have it both ways, Mr. President. They say, "Oh, we can't move around if you de this." Then we will have a military construction appropria- tion bill with the Diego Garcia issue, and that same crowd that is running around now will say, "Oh, don't go into the Indian Ocean." The whole ocean is much less than the 200-mile economic zone. We cannot have it both ways. We have to exercise the leadership here in Con- gress that is lacking in the administra- tion; and that is what the Senator from Washington is attempting to do this morning. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield for a ques- tion? Mr. STEVENS. lain glad to yield. Mr. PACKWOOD. Is there anything in this bill that has anything in any way to do with legal territorial waters? Mr. STEVENS. No, this is an interim extension of a conservation zone for fish- eries protection and management. Mr. PACKWOOD. It has nothing to do with freedom of navigation? Mr. STEVENS. No, it does not. It merely manages the water column and the access to the creatures of the sea within that water column. Mr. PACKWOOD. It has nothing to do with national security? Mr. STEVENS. No, it has no impact on national security considerations, and does not change the current law of the sea as far as that is concerned. Approved For Release 2001/09/07: CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21092 CON GRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11,1974 , Mr. MAGNUSON. It does have a little afraid some of our people will take guns I want to tell the Senate something, bit to do with national security in re- and take the situation into their own and I hope again the Chair will listen to verse, hands. this: If we sent an American fleet to, say, Mr. STEVENS. Yes, but the Senator is Mr. PACKWOOD I would not blame the coast of Japan, within 200 miles of talking about the military. them, the island of Japan, and started to fish, Mr. PACKWOOD. I am talking about Mr. MAGNUSON. I would not blame Japanese citizens would call their Diet in Ole military. them at all. They are all out of work, session in 24 hours end throw us out. Mr. MAGNUSON. It seems to me we Mr. PACE: WOOD. The Russians go So would Russia. What are the South would feel better if within the 200 miles aver there and teas up their nets, and American countries doing? Taking ad- our own ships operated instead of Rus- some of these days they are going to take vantage of us every time they have a sian ships off the coast of Oregon staid machineguns and go after them, chance, and I don't know why we aren't Washington, with radar equipment. Mr. MAGNUSON The Defense De- protecting our own. charting the seas along the coast. sartment says "danger of gunboat wars.- Some people fear that other nations Mr. PACKWOOD. The point I are that is an argument I cannot buy. will retaliate?retaliate for what? Japan making is that there is nothing to pre- Another is that it, would be costly to has got bigger fish to fry than the sal- vent a foreign ship from navigating with- enforce. As the Senator points out, it is mon problems with us, I will tell you in 200 miles. lust as costly to enforce the 12-mile limit that; and so has Russia. Me. MAGNUSON. No, not at all. is it is the 200. I say if we went fishing like the other Mr. PACKWOOD. The argument is The Alaskans lenottv that. Nearly every people are going fishing off the coasts made by the Defense Department and nonth there is a Russian ship they haul of these other countries, we would be the State Department that we are re fine them and let them go. It would thrown out as quickly as they could get jeopardizing our national security, and ie no more expensive to pick them up their legislative bodies assembled to pass that argument is baloney. As the Senator vithin 200 miles. a law against us and send a gunboat out has said, we may want to address our- So I cannot buy that, and get us out of there. But we sit here. selves to that some day, and maybe have Mr. President, following up this line Mr. HOLLINGS. And the State De-- a conference on it some day, but this bill of discussion right now, I want to men- partment will recommend it, has nothing to do with that. 'This bill is lion the 8-to-6 vote in the Senate Armed Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. "We cannot to stop the pillage of our fishing outside iServices Committee which rejected the touch this," they will say. They will say the 12-mile limit, and in some castes in- lSefenise Department claim. As the Sen- this is too touchy a subject, and we -can- side the 12-mile limit. etor points out, this bill has nothing to not touch this. If we do nothing, there are going to no with national security at all. Mr. :HOLLINGS. We pay the fines for be Russian ships, Polish ships, and Chin- I know this is a big argument in the our fishermen in Peru, and we will pay ese ships next year, sneaking inside the law of the Sea Conference. I do not fines for flesh* off of Ecuador, but we I2-mile limit in a fog. I now why this is so. I have been to rev- cannot get in our own When people ask, "If you extend this e ral of these confetences, I will say to Mr. MAGNUSON. We cannot get in outside the 12-mile limit, how are you my colleagues, that I do not know why our own. going to enforce it," my answer is, "It it is that an American delegation from I do not understand anyone opposing is easier, with Coast Guard cutters or the State Department with many other this bill. It only protects our fisheries. It niems in a conference will go through s plane, to catch someone penetrating has nothing to do with anything but 20 miles inside a 200-mile zone than 1 everything, and ma-ybe come to some fishing, If we can arrive at a Law of mile inside the 12-mile zone." t ood agreements. the Sea agreement, I will be the first to If we want to save these fish, they Then the last day when half of them say "Amen.' S. 1988 is A temporary piece have to lee protected, or there will lee no tell start going home they throw a fish- of legislation. ash left for anybody. It is fine to speak cries provision out in the middle of the The biggest unemployment in the about negotiating treaties, but that does floor to try to cut that up. It is an or- country almost 15 percent in my area not do us any good if we do not have a I hen, and I cannot, for the life of me, and in New England?is with fishermen, treaty covering every species. We snake t nderstand why these people do not want That is the biggest. 'With all this other a treaty for one kind of fish, and we fold t ) protect our coastal fisheries. unemployment, I do not know what our Pie next year they are taking a differ- Mr. PACKWOOD. That is our State fishermen are going to do. .ent kind of fish. Department, and tiny want us to play Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the So I hope those from the coastal States Uncle Sucker to every country around Senator yield? and the inland States will recognize the S ere. Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. critical necessity. All we are asking is Norway extends iti- zone out. We will Mr. STEVENS. The unemployment in that the fish be protected and preserved, s t here until every coastal country in the great northwest of Alaska reaches and we are not jeopardizing national t le world has extended its zones out urn- 35 percent now, in villages of the people security, freedom of the seas, or any- laterally before we act because the State who live in the worst conditions under thing else by the passage of this bill. Ltepartment does not want to step on the .American flag. They are the people s toes. ' Mr. MAGNUSON. No, not at all. The anybody who used to fish for these species in the A :Department of Defense sent up the chief Mr. MAGNUSON.nd depleted all our near waters off our shore, but the fish do of staff?what is his name? s- ocks in the meantime, not get there anymore because the great Mr. PACKWOOD. General Brown?,Another thing we have to think about. invading fleets of 'the foreign countries Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. ?to testify we do get an agreement in Geneva? come into the area, right along side, and against the fishing bill, and he came, but Rhich I doubt because I have enough ex- sometimes within the 12-mile limit, and the Armed Services Committee rejected p ,eilences with that sort of thing t,o pre- take all the fish. his arguments. d cte?it is going to take 2, 3, maybe 4 I would like to ask those people who There was a letter circulating this 3r, mrs or longer before the nations ratify oppose this because they fear retaliation, morning that I cannot understand, some it. In the meantime our fish disappear retaliation from whom? It is the Rus- of these arguments. For example, it says In the Bering Sea, the Senator from slam, the Japanese, thei Koreans, and ' It would increase the danger' of gun- Alaska will tell you, we used to have a big the Eastern European eations that are boat wars." . h ilibut fleet. Now, none, none. off our shores. Mr. PACKWOOD. Is that the letter All the ocean perch is gone off the coast I flew between Dutch Harbor and the i,igned by Senator Towers? 01 Oregon. And this it the worst salmon Pribilof Islands one time and I literally Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes, Senator Terwea Year we have ever had in all our history. stopped counting. It looked Ilk e the in- end Senator CRANSTON. "Increase the Tuna has nothing 1,o do with it. And vasion fleet off the coast of France. I clanger of gunboat wars." As a matter of ti e shrimp people?I listened to them for was trying to count those that were fact, without having a 200-mile limit, fur a long time. I hope the Chair will larger than any Alaska fishing vessels, ste will have more than gunboat wars; lieten to this. We are not doing anything There were over 100 of them, some with we well have real problems with conges- to the shrimp :people. In this bill we en- two- or three-story apastments on their Icon of ships off our coasts, and the situ- courage an agreement between coon- sterns. Some of them are year round, anon is getting to the point where I am tries on shrimp, and stay in the pack ice. Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 GRESSIONAL RECdith-25ENATE December 11, 1974 CON I do not think eVeryone understands what is going on. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. STEVENS. When they say retali- ation, retaliation from whom? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. STEVENS. I will be happy to charge it to my time, I am speaking. We have extended our jurisdiction be- fore. President Truman extended it, uni- laterally out on the Outer Continental Shelf with the Outer Continental Shelf declaration in 1948. Not only has every nation recognized the principles Presi- dent Truman declared, but they have followed it in terms of the creatures of the shelf. We extended our conservation, our contiguous zone, out 12 miles unilaterally after a series of meetings that went on for almost 14 years. We extended it 12 miles and every nation recognized our right to do so. The opponents of S. 1988 talk about the cod war. The cod war was a 50-mile extension of national jurisdiction which was brought about by an invasion of fishing nations into the waters of Ice- land. Do you know who won? They talk about the cod war, the Icelandic people won. They were the only ones who had the guts so far in the last 20 years to stand up to these nations, and they won. And we cqntinue to have the opposi- tion, and I recognize the opposition, of the tuna people and the shrimp people? our own people to S. 1988. But we took care of them when they were In trouble. We have been paying their fines, we have been getting their people and their ves- sels out of custody in Latin America. ? One of the first jobs I ever had when I became a lawyer was to help get a crew out of custody in South America that had been on a tuna boat that had been seized off the coast of South America. We have been doing this now for at least 25 years. In the meantime, we do nothing for these people who invade our shores. All we are asking is let us seize a few of the foreign vessels which violate good conservation practices and let their nations bail thein out and pay their lines. We can go on living?we have lied with South America for 20 years?despite the fact that they have seized our tuna and shrimp vessels. The strange thing is that the wealthiest fishing fleets in the ? country are the tuna and shrimp people, and they are oPposing this, which is really a relief measure to stop the inva- sion of the distant water fleets within the area of those people who cannot af- ford to go off to the shores of South ? America or Africa to fish. These are the little people who fish in almost rowboats, in long boats, in little vessels that cannot, as we say, go outside Now we can save these fish. We pro- pose to do it on the basis not of exclu- sionary' claima of national jurisdiction? we say in this bill they can continue to come within our waters so long as they recognize the principles of conservation that we declare are necessary to preserve these species of fish. If they did that down off South Amer- ica, we would not have any trouble at all. It is the South Americans who have not recognized the International Tuna Agreement. We have. I cannot under- stand the opposition but, particularly, I cannot understand the national defense argument that there is going to be re- taliation by other nations. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STEVENS. Yes. Mr. PASTORE. The purpose of this bill is not exclusion as much as it is con- servation. Mr. STEVENS. Absolutely. Mr. PASTORE. It is management in order to conserve. We actually have eliminated entirely the haddock up around New England. I mean that is all gone, and before you know it it will all be gone, and after all, in order to propagate, you have got to have fish there, and if you sweep it all out, you will have no propagation, and the time will come when all of us will have to go hungry. . All we are saying is, all we want is, an equitable, Justifiable management to make sure that we conserve these species in order that we can all eat and not ship it all to Moscow and to Peking and to the Ginza or wherever they want to bring it. Mr. STEVENS. I would just like to add to what the Senator from Rhode Island said. It is not just haddock, it is herring, mackerel, menhaden, sable fish, shrimp in the Pacific, yellow tail, flounder, hali- but, and now coming into a threat of extinction is the Alaska pallack. Did you know in 1 year alone these foreign fishing fleets took a billion pounds of Alaska pollack out of the ,Bering Sea, in the North Pacific? A bil- lion pounds, and they did it in the same year we stopped harvesting ocean mam- mals, an act we tool: in order to let the ocean mammals rebuild their stocks. What ,happened was the foreign fishing fleets came in and stole the 'ocean mam- mals feed so that today there are more ocean mammals dying of malnutrition than used to be harvested. Mr. PASTORE. How about the red herring that the State Department fished out in order to kill the bill? Mr. STEVENS. It would be nice to put them on an endangered species list. Mr. President, the Senator from South Carolina seeks recognition, and I yield to him such time as he may need in op- position to the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator has 4 minutes remaining. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to S. 1988, a bill to extend on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the United States over certain ocean areas and fish in order to protect the domestic fishing industry. My opposition to S. 1988 is based on my concern over its potential impact on U.S. national se- curity interests, a concern shared by five other members of the Armed Services Committee. Let me stress that I share the concern of the sponsors of S. 1988 that there is a requirement to protect our domestic 'S21093 fishing industry. However, because of se- curity implications and other potential difficulties, such as enforcement prob- lems, potential 'retaliatory actions and conflict with existing international law, I do not believe this is a problem that can be solved unilaterally at this time by the United States as S. 19_8_8 proposes. The protection of a nation's fishing re- sources is a subject of interest to at least all the coastal nations of the world. With the world's food resources decreasing, it is also a subject that will be of increas- ing interest to every nation of the world. Therefore, Mr. President, this is a problem which must be addressed and solved by all of the interested nations of the world. This, of course, is one of the purposes of the Third United-Na- tions Conference on the Law of the Sea. Mr. President, administration officials testified before the Senate Armed Serv- ices Committee that they expect the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to conclude a timely Oceans Law Treaty next year. The treaty would include the basic protective pro- visions of S. 1988 but would, of course, have the advantage of being accepted by the over 100 countries participating in the Conference. It would also preclude the need of each nation to take some arbitrary unilateral action which would Possibly be offensive to nations with whom we now have no direct conflict. Such arbitrary actions would almost cer- tainly impact on our own national se- curity interests. Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee reviewed S. 1988 as it might conflict with our national security in- terests. Gen. George S. Brown, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that the passage of S. 1988 at this time would be counter to the security interests of the United States. A main concern was that other nations, in response to such a unilateral action might impose more restrictive measures, such as ter- ritorial limits on their adjacent waters. General Brown pointed out that in the territorial sea, submarines are required to navigate on the surface, and in the absence of free passage through straits because of expanded territorial sea claims, we would be forced to negotiate with a particular country to transit sub- merged. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also stressed that the mobility of our general purpose forces depends upon freedom to navigate on and under the high seas and certain international straits as well as freedom to fly over the high seas and certain international straits. Therefore, he contended our Nation must be careful about taking unilateral action which might cause other coastal states to ex- pand territorial control over a greater Portion of its adjacent seas. Of course, there is no hard evidence that other coastal nations would, in fact, impose additional territorial sea claims should the Congress pass S. 1988. How- ever, I believe we should heed the collec- tive judgment of the Joint Chiefs and not approve S. 1988 at this time. In the meantime, we should give our delegation to the Conference on the Law of the Sea Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21094 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE Decoitbee 11, 1974 a full opportunity to conclude an Ccearis zention on the nigh Seas. many nations ing stocks would pass into the hands of Law Treaty next year a they tettified 'vou Id refuse .to recognize 200-mile U.S. a wide ran s ge of governments, many of cricron incotiotni s would increase as for- they expect to do. Failing to achieve thatimit which care little or nothing about en- gn nationalsn ntlad to fish. A lesser ex- treaty, it would then be appropriate to anslon---to 50 miles---led Iceland into the vironmental protection. reevaluate the requirement for S. 1988. ecent "Cod War" with Great Britain, Mr. President, supporters of S. 19881 Mr. President, other points the Sen- We hope you will join us in voting 'no" have sought to create the impression that ate should consider are: on S. 1983. 40% of the world's oceans are et their goal is to preseree fishing stocks-- First. It extends U.S. fishing jurisdic- take- as if the fishing inclustny were one sinele tion by 2 million square mild;. Enrerce- sir) eerely, differentiated whole. merit would be difficult and costly if the ALAN CRANSTON. Actually, there are three important 'OHN TOWER. United States acts unilaterally;segments a the fishing industry that Second. The fining and imprisonment The PRESIDING DraeICER. The Sen. could be seriously harmed by passage of of foreign fishermen could provoke, seri- ittor from Alaska has 3 minutes. S. 1988. ous con' rontations; Mr. STEVENS. President, what First in value is the shrimp industry, Third. Unilateral action by other na- ether time is remaining to the Senator headquartered in the Gulf 'States. An tions could folk)* and would seriously i rout Washington? estimated 19,000 people harvest approxi- impact on passage of sea and air eorces The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three mately $200 million of shrimp a year-- of the United States in key spots around minutes on the bill. 24 percent of the value of our total fish- the world; Mr. STEVENS. Does the Senator from ing catch. The richest areas are located Fourth. Efforts at the Laws of the See California seek recognition? off the coasts of Latin American court- Conferenee to get a multilateral agree - Mr. TUNNEet. I have already made my tries, especially Brash, Mexico, and ment would be endangered; s tatement in opposition, I have nothing Venezuela. Passage of S. 1988 could de- Fifth. Approval of S. 1988 would be to add to it. prive long-distance shrimp fishermen of inconsistent with current international Mr. MAGNUSON. Well, Mr. President, stock and force them te compete for urn- law as agreed at Geneva in 1958 and low much time do we have left? ited numbers of U.S. coastal shrimp. signed by the United States. The inter- The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was 3 Next comas the salmon industry of the national court recently held Iceland's minutes, it is slightly less. Pacific Northwest. In 1913, over 32,000 declaration of a 50-mile limit was not Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, PaS- 'fishermen la Alaska. Oregon, Washing- enforcible under international law, sage of S. 1988 would have several time- ton, and my own State of California and elate and harmful consequences, landed over $120 million worth of sal- Sixth. Finally, S. 1988 could endanger Some say that since the House has not mon. This represents 14 percent of the present wean passage which brings to passed a similar bill, and since S. 1983 value of al. U.S. fish landings in that the United States oil and many other will not become law this year, it does not year. vital resources we have to import. matter what the Senate does. , Mr. President, for those reasons I urge I disagree strongly. By international agreement, salmon my colleagues to oppose passage g S- The Senate, and the Senate alone,, fishing areas have been divided between 1988 at this particular time, must ratify any and all treaties negoti- the United States, Japan. and Canada. Passage of S. 1988 would probably un- ted through the Law of the Sea Con- sent Whether Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- dermine this agreement and put new fce. eer or not S. lit88 becomes sent that a letter signed by the Senator pressure on Japan to redouble its fish- tar etv, we Senate does on this bill from Texas (Mr. TOWER) and the Sena- lhat th S will have an extremely important im- tor from California (Mr. CANSTON) be ing efforts cutside the 200-mile zone. Peet. The passage of the bill in the Sen- Third in value is the tuna industry. In printed bathe RECORD. a'e would strongly imply rejection of any 1973, 9,000 tuna fishermen harvested 'There being no objection, the letter h.ternational agreement that fell short about $90 million in tuna, representing was ordered to be printed in 'the Reimen,o' its terms. about 10 percent of the total catch for as follows: Conversely, since S. 1988 will not be- that year. Most of this harvest comes U.S. Senate, come law at this time, its passage would from the waters off Latin America. Pas- Washington, P.C. DEAR COLLEAGUE: The .Senate will seamy griln nothing positive. Its sole effect sage of S. 1988 would lead to a new rash take up 8. 1988, the Fraergeacy marine would be to sabotage existing talks. of unilateral claims and multiply our Fisheries Protection Act of 1074. We are Mr. President, S. 1988 is being pro- long-standirg problems with tuna about writing to urge you to vote against this meted in the name of conservation. Bult seizures and fines. bill. conservationists are sharply divided on These three segments of the fishing in. We agree with the sponsors of the bill that ti 13 bill. dustry--shrimp, salmon, and tuna?ac- re:metal fishing stocks are severely depleted, count for 48 percent of the value of all that agreement at the Law of the Sea Con- Here is what the Sierra Club had to ference seems distant, and that the U.S. my about S. 1988 last September: fishing stocks landed by U.S. fishermen, must therefore take unilateral action to save The Sierra Club believes that S. 1988 can I want to see more eftective preserve- the fish. The real question is: what kind bi- detrimental to the emservation and pro- tion of fishing stocks, too?but not at the of unilateral action? te3tion of the living ccean resources and tiexupestrynse. of almost half of .the fishing in- S. 1988 would not necessarily save the inconsistent with international efforts to se- fish. Better legislation has been introduced etre proper conservation and environmental Mr. President, sponsors of S. 1988 say (H.R. 156.19/S. 3783) which would permit m magement of the oceans and their re- unilateral action after 6 months. S. 1988 sources it is Only an "interim" measure. calls only :or a new commission to study the The Sicrra Club feels that S. 1988 . . . But once the United States claimed a problem fer 2 years. se 'Musty jeopardizes conservation and en- -200-mile fisheries Jurisdiction, how likely S. 1988 could seriously damage national ei-onmental protection efforts, both interne- is it that any of that jurisdiction would security. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clem- Urinal and national in s3cipe, be surrendered? eats has pointed out that Other nations might retaliate by curtailing the freedoms The Sierra Club added that S. 1988 And how likely is it that other nations of navigation and overflight. Virtually the Would make it extremely difficult for the would sit idly by while the United States entire operating areae of the U.S. 6th and inernationol community to secure mini- claimed both the right to fish off their 7th fleets lie within 200 miles of ficarie mum environmental standards for the coasts and a unilaterally-imposed 200- nation's coast, protection of the living marine environ- mile fishing preserve? S. 1988 would be costly and difficult tc en- rrl' Given the close linkage between fish- Force. It would add 2,531,800 square miles to -rit the area Which the t1.s.roast Guard now That raises a conservation issue that ing and other ocean-related issues, polices with difficulty?an area elual S. 1988 totally neglects: What is to be would other countries :seriously accept to 92% of the land MASS of the United done about saving the fish off other na- the claim put forth by supporters of S. States, The Coast Guard conservatively iisti- Liens' coasts? 1988 that the bill "relates only to fish-- - mates that policing the known fishing areas es the Sierra Club points out, world- ing"? only would require $63.2 million in start-up costs and add $47.2 million to annual op- Wile unilateral "grabs" would preclude If the United States succumbs to pres- orating costs. the adoption of minimum environmental sure for unilateral action to further its Finally, S. 1988 would increase the danger standards on the basis of international own interests, other nations can be ex- of gunboat wars. It violates the 1958 Con- ag-eement. Management of coastal fish- pected to take unilateral actions to fur- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIALRDP75B00380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE ther theirs. These actions may represent deliberate retaliation, or they may simply represent a breakdown of a giant and ongoing international effort to save the seas from war and anarchy. Supporters of S. 1988 have taken the curious position that the bill "reflects current international thinking." They even go so far as to say that it Is "the kind of bill the International Court would approve." By "International Court," I take it they the International Court of Justice at the Hague. The Court does not ap- prove bills; it decides cases based on its Interpretation of international law. The weight of legal opinion that I have en- countered comes down heavily against the legality of the bill. Specifically, a uni- lateral declaration of a 20Q-mile fishery zone would violate the freedom of fishing established by the .1958 Geneva Conven- tion on Freedom of the High Seas. Legal ratification of a 200-mile fisheries zone would require international agreement of the sort now being negotiated through the Law of the Sea Conference. Supporters of the bill may argue, as they have in their "Dear Colleague" let- ter, that S. 1988 would not automatically eliminate foreign fishing within the 200- mile zone. But from the point of view of international law, that is not the point. It Is the mere extension of jurisdiction, not Its application, that is in conflict with the 1958 convention. It is particularly unfortunate that S. 1988 is being considered now, just when the United States is making progress on both bilateral arid multilateral fronts. DiSCUS81011.6 with Japan have already led to a voluntary cutback in the north- eastern Pacific and the eastern Bering Sea. Japan's annual fish catch in those waters will be reduced about 25 percent. Furthermore, Japan has agreed to bar its fishermen from some Alaskan and west coast waters during several months of the year. Negotiations are also underway with the Soviet Union and other major fish- ing nations. A new, tough enforcement program to protect the living resources of the Con- tinental Shelf went Into effect on Decem- ber 9. if foreign vessels take incidental catch while trawling for fish, they will be required to return it to the sea, or face stiff penalties. Even on the multilateral front, things are not as bad as supporters of S. 1988 would have us believe. On the one hand, they argue that agreement and ratifica- tion of a law of the sea treaty will not be achieved until 1980 and even be- yond. On the other, they cite growing International support for an interna- tionally negotiated 200-mile "economic zone." Anyone who has followed the his- tory of these talks, and who is familiar with the terms of the proposal offered by the United States in 1970, knows that we have come a long way toward agree- ment. But there is a critical difference be- tween a 200-mile economic zone, with primary, jurisdictional reserved for the coastal state based on certain Interns, tional standards, and an outright unilateral seizure. One is based on the principle of international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes; the other is not. One is both legitimate and acceptable to the world community; the other is not. One would encourage restraint and cooperation in the man- agement of ocean resources; the other would not. I have read the counter-arguments made by proponents of S. 1988, and I am not convinced. The arguments which I 'offered in a "Dear Colleague" letter, signed with the distinguished Senator from Texas, JOHN TOWER, remain valid. Briefly, they are: First, S. 1988 would not necessarily save the fish. It calls only for a new commission to study the problem for 2 years. And by extending unilateral juris- diction, it would damage the prospects for several major segments of the fish- ing industry whose interests extend beyond a U.S. zone. Second. S. 1988 could damage national security. Other nations might retaliate by curtailing the freedoms of navigation and overflight. They might not do this in specific retaliation against a 200-mile extension, but merely to assert their own interests unilaterally. S. 1988 would give them a green light. Third. S. 1988 would be difficult to enforce. Its supporters say that many nations would respect our zone and that it would be self-enforcing, at least to some extent. But to some extent it would not. Nations which would be least likely to accept a unilateral extension to 200 miles are precisely the nations that have the heaviest stake in fishing. There is a lot of difference between policing a zone which is considered legitimate, and po- licing a zone which is not. Fourth. Finally, S. 1988 would increase the danger of gunboat wars. Supporters of the bill deny this by arguing that it would not automatically eliminate all foreign fishing within the 200-mile limit. Still, if 37 foreign fishing boats entered the 200-mile zone unimpeded, and if the Coast Guard seized the 38th one, what would its government do? Senator STEN- xis, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, pointed out in his minority views on S. 1988 that? The fining and imprisonment of foreign fishermen under S. 1988 would surely be Considered by major fishing nations to be a serious provocation. Hence the risk of armed confrontation between U.S. military forces and fishing boats or escort gunboats of such nations as the U.S.S.R. and Japan could be substantial. This whole area is simply fraught with risk. To sum up, Mr. President, S. 1988 con- tributes little or nothing that is positive. Its passage now would only serve to block and sabotage and delay. And were it to become law, it would open up a wide range of dangers involving 40 percent of the world's oceans. I strongly urge a "no" vote. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, by passing the Interim Fisheries Zone Ex- tension Act, by extending our fisheries 200 miles from shore, we merely seek to S 21095 extend basic principles of conservation to the sea. Frankly, Mr. President, with- out passage, extinction of our marine re- sources is imminent. Opponents of this measure over a year ago asked the Senate to postpone our deliberation until the Law of the Sea Conference had a chance to hold its 1974 midsummer meetings in Caracas. There, we were told, through international co- operation a global accord could be reached on fisheries. Well, Mr. President, true to the pre- dictions of the able chairman of the Commerce Committee, true to my sus- picions, true to the fears of all the sponsors of this measure, the hopes for an agreement on fisheries conservation were false. No accord was reached. ? So now we are told another conference resumes in Geneva this March. Maybe we shall be satisfied then. Or perhaps in Vienna later next year. Or possibly on a return to Caracas. We just do not know, but this much I am sure of, we can no longer afford this pattern of postpone- ment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that a New York Times article de- scribing the globe-trotting adventures of the United Nations Law of the Sea Con- ferences be inserted in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. PACK WOOD. Now, I do not oppose the work of the conference. We need global cooperation on fishery conserva- tion. We need agreements on navigation rights, on the mining of the seabeds, on how best to deal with ocean pollution. Eventually we shall have them. But, "eventually," "possibly," "probably," is not reversing the severe depletion of coastal fish species we are suffering to- day?devastation documented by the National Marine Fisheries Service, as according to their statistics Oregon's catch alone in 1973 marked a 5.1 million pound decline from 1972 landings. So, we ask only that a 200-mile fisher- ies jurisdiction be implemented. We are not talking about navigation rights, a concern voiced by the Defense Depart- ment about this bill. We are not usurping the role of international discussions -(vhich has concerned the Department of State, for we have stressed time and again this is an interim measure. Upon enactment of an accord by the law of the sea conference this legislation will expire. We cannot wait for Caracas, Geneva, or Vienna. We cannot wait another 1, 2, or 3 years. If we intend to ever escape the desperate straits we now find our- selves in, we must act today to conserve our fisheries. If we are serious about sav- ing our resources, passage of this interim measure is imperative. Mr. President, before yielding the floor, I ask unanimous consent that an excellent letter to the editor of the Post, written by the Senator from Alaska, which cogently discusses many misconceptions concerning the bill, be printed in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ? 'Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21096 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL R ECORD ? SENATE Dee. 1),')ei. it, iSee elidbit2.) . Those of us Who sronsored S. 1988, the Exnaerr 1 Emergency Maxine Fisheries Protection Act oe 1974, did not do so in haste or without l Fi om the New York Times, Aug. 10, 1.0741 k aowledge of its imp) ications. The Senate ..,-/,...,si,o S re LAW C*NiPaitigilCE ENDS Wrrn , Commerce Committee has held fifteen public Iirrree AcitTEVED hearings on the legislation in coastal states cmtsess,-trEmmorms, Avg. 29 (neuters) ,? daring this session of Congress. The position The (entree -United Nations Law of the See ce` many senaters on fells issue, including Conferente, billed as one of the most 'vital nine, has been shaped by many goers of per- clebat68 la Titatarr, ended today with little sonal observations of the compounding de- , o show beyond an agreentent to meet "exile e' ruction of our fisheries resources by huge in Geneva next March. f reign fishing fleets Oa:Acidly owned pm' Optimists had expected the 10-week con- centrolled by foreign eovernments. terence to produce at least the framework of These fleets are highly efficient, as you a new world treaty to deal with ocean pollu- point out; they also ere operated without tion, fishing disputes, navigation rights mad regard to the conservatien-mana,gement prao- 1 he ownership and sharing of oil, gas anti t ces necessary eo enable fish to sustain their mineral resources in coastal will era. R )ecies. Coastal species presently in a state Dozens of the 3,000 delegates from nearly of depletion or In serious danger are haddock, 150 naticent and observer groups had already tolibut, herring, mese-laden and yellowtail left before their national -digs were lowered flounder in the Ana, .tici Alaska pollack, for the 'oat time in the sunlit court of the hake, halibut, mackerel, sablelish, shrimp towering high-rise conference complex here. end yellowtail sole in the Pacific. Foreign NO* begins the accounting to governmente fleets, which long ago fished out their own at home. Some delegates maintain that their e 'este' writers, continue to take these spe- negotiatMg powers were watered Comm by the cies off our shores with 'ant regard to the cen- Oition of the stocks. abserioetef clear- . . Many who were eiew to the i;erripneeted As an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the issues bearing on laws to control explottatiou I aw of the Sea Confer= nee, I have attended of the sees have said in private itt at camera- preliminary sessions at Geneva, Switzerland, and New York and last :summer's substantive inise on the main confrontation here between sessions in Caracas, Veeezuela. International rich and poor nations can only be achieved at the Mnisterial ? licw is the best way to bring lasting order to tee economic, navigational and environmen- Delegedion leaders say that divergent view.; te. problems of our ocee in and to our fisheries on many ,guestions have been nen-owe n d down rroblems as well. Hoe ever, such agreement in group discuesions outside the epee con- i ; two years oe more away. The future of ference debate. our fisheries is the only LOS issue which will Christepher Pinto of La/1h%, leading e t e affected by the pan age Cf time. riroup studying how to farm an authority S. 1988 was drafted 5?a an emergency C011- ,'ovcrning ineabed minerals, said: good servation meaniure pertaining to fisheries deal of progress has been made, end a sound only, It will expire on the effective date of a foundation laid for further wont." law of the Sea treaty. S. 39e8 calls for a grad- ient many feel this preliminary woe% al phase-down of foreign fishing through a should have been completed in the "United renegotiation of our e ;dating, less than ef- Nations seabed committee following the 'Met f active bilateral and raultileteral fisheries Law of dee Sea Conference in len and the agreements Vela foreign nations and through second. in 1960. en, treaties Where necessary to effectuate A corrindttee formed here to pot Nei op text; the act. It also would establish conditions of all draft articles for incorpowstion in it nder which traditions; foreign fishing could final treaty has had no drafts embeeitted is allowed to the extent that our own fish- no work to do. ermen do not harvest the sustainable yield. The goal of the conference was a treaty I cannot believe that such an approach replacing lite centuries-old conceot if "free' dom of thuseas."The projeeted treaty would will provoke retaliaticel?that is, exteneion. f territorial waters be any nations which safeguard, for future generations the once- are not planning to do so anyway. 'You will rich fishi.ng grounds now worked to near- recall that Congress acted in 1988 to extend exhaustion and threatened by pollution. cur fisheries zone to twelve miles despite The envisioned treaty was also expected ton the grave warnings from our State Depart- guard the mineral Tamen:as against specula- tient similar to those Nc, e hear today. No con- tors and to guarantee an equitable dientribu- frontations occurred atter the 1966 action. In tkai of seabed wealth. fact, the statue quo was maintained by en- But mrary were ceetain from the start that eign goveriamerits. If, o!1 the other hand, our there wan little chance of a conrensen oh e contiguous zone of twelve miles had not been treaty l'reenework sit thie gathering, the big- established and foreign fleets had operated gest interteetioned tonferente ever held, up to three miles off cur shares through re- John I. Stevenson, loading the Illitted cent years, not only would our list of im- States delegation, said yesterday thet the periled fish been more extensive but we would political will to negotiate was Viewing raalnly leve had continuous confrontations between because of a general correolotten that there ITS, and foreign vessels. would have to be further sessions. Most of the conservative organizations en- Now hopes are pinned on government-to- ' - orse S. 1088. You are government contact and negotiations be a consistent supporter f fish and wildlife conservation end in 1972 working groups 'brilbre the conference re- championed passage of the Marine Mammal sumes in Geneva. Protection Act' I recal'' one article you pub- "It's quite obvious we bane souse veer di fri- I nshed at that time demanded a full mom- cult work to do before we can orenite it. tiiii,ft,"turlum on the harvest of Pacific fur seals said Alan Beesley, deputy head of tie Ca- even though etch a moratorium would have nadian delegation, constituted unilateral action in an activity But conference observers expect that a fur- controlled by international treaty. The Ma- ther session may be needed?and is likely to rine Mammal Protection Act, as you know, be held in Vienna later next year?before any 13 now law and a partta moratorium for re- firm plata cantle made for the projected re- 5 earch purposes hes been negotiated and is turn 10 Caracas for signing a 'treaty, in. effect. Ironlcally, one of the situations that research could prove is the commonly ' Exieurr 2 held belief that more cf our seals die of mal- !nutritive 'than are harvested and the reason [From the Washington Post, Cock 26. Ll24] for this is that foreign fleets are annually Itesecnese "Conolikss eere Ms LAW' or rus harvesting more than a billion pounds of etre one of our fur seal's main foods, the Alaska I hope you will allow me to respond to your pollack. An additional irony is that while October editorial "Congress and the Law the increasing population of ocean mammals sides over these meetings from a podium 10 of the Sea." Approved For Releasea2ftfI1Y9107 w.ielteIRD1278111eitfl80RfOtkitiffoEfl0000-0age, towering over the fleets our fisheries cannot sustain the in- creased pressure from bone the foreign fleets and the additional mammal population. The only way to allow tee mammals to re- build their stocks and the fisheries to to do the same is to enact S. 1988. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President. at this time, L ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD two newspaper articles which I behave accurately re- flect the progress made at the Law of the Sea Conference this summer in Caracas. The first is from the New York Times and was written in the middle of this summer's session. The second appeared in the Washington Pcst and &scribes the closing of the session and the assess- ment of its progress by the President of the Conference. There being no objec tion, the articles were ordcred to be priated in the Rge- olio, as follcrrs: nsociacw; SLOW AT SEA 1 AW FAWLEY; MANY SPEAK PliptierldLY Or STALEMATE (By Leslie IL Gelb) Cam/teas, VENEZUELA, Aug. 2?The Parepee Central, a complex of futuristic-looking sky- scrapers deeleneel for totally self-conteineri Irving, has been inhe,lalted since late June by abontit 4,700 people e hose almost total daily coecern. is the sea niat lies nation miles beyond the mountains ale, t ring Canines. They are delegates tcei he United Nations law of tee sees conference, officials of inter- national organizations said representetivee of various economic interests ard of a number of liberation movements. The purpose of the conference is to come up by Aug. 21) with some einci of coherent, if tentative, agaement ou navigation, fishing, and sea mining, a partial pact that will have the effect of restraining it, ,tions from making individe al lanes on the sea. Then, next spring. the delegates; will meet in Vienna to turn that agreement into a ireaty. Thee' prog- ress hera is painfully Slow; many speak pri- vately on steternate. ORIGINAL The original goal of the Caracas meeting was to piOftice a di aft eionsteution for all nations. Thst treaty, it was hoped, would e.stablish 11CW territorial emits and zones of control for merino reeten 'as beyond the ter- ritorial limits, and proviee seine kind of in- ternational authorityo'er exploitation of the deep sentods. "We're moving, but el: wly," said John U. Stevenson, the head of United State dole- gntiquie "I ethereal to meet 'General Assembly goal of a treaty before the end. of 1915," said bin Stevenson's deputy, eohn Norton Moore. But while everyone here puts a good face on what is going on when speaking for the record, unofficially the participants in this third United Nations conference on the law of the seas since 1958 talk of stalemate. The votes are -there, says an American delegate, but the means for setting up a strong international authority for the deep seabeds are rot. The privete and national in- terests represented hen, seem as various and complex as the animal and plant life of the sea itself. It here are nations with coasts, landlocked nations, powerful nations and underdeveloped' nations ?all with special axe* to grind. It the roust confereece hall, a theater that has been converted to look like, a Gen- eral Assembly hall in New York, hundreds of men and women, representing 14:8 coun- tries, meet daily. They are the core of the conference, the experts: most of them have been working on law of the sea for most of their mature lives. Andres Aguilar of Venezuela, a veteran diplomat in Matters involving the sea pre- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 December .11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 21097 delegates In the rear of the great room sits This, as 'Jens Everisen, the head of the Louts B. Sohn of Harvard University, who has been occupied with sea law for 15 years. Toward the middle of the room are Joseph Warioba of Tanzania, a lawyer who has been working on the subject five years, and Alvaro de Soto, a young Peruvian diplomat whose entire career is devoted to the search for a coherent law of the seas. . Their experience and expertise are typical of most others here, as is their zeal; they meet from early morning to late evening, and they confbr while at meals. What drives these men and women is a concern that without a new law of the seas, nations will assert. more and more separate claims on fishing, on sea mining and on navigation, leading to international anarchy, new tensions and new conflicts. The president of the conference, Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, likes to refer to the hoped-for document as a state- ment of agreement, Whose language would be couched in actual treaty form, a document that would fall somewhere between a draft treaty arid a declaration of principles. One problem, a European diplomat says, is that such a statement "cannot be ham- mered out by voting; that would tear this conference apart. If a delegation feels its national interests are being outvoted," he went on, "it might simply pick up and leave. This must be done by consensus." GEOGRAPTIT A FACTOR "Tell me the exact geographical situation of a nation," an American delegate said, "and I will tell you its exact negotiating position at this Conference:" The United States, which has teamed up on some !seizes with other maritime nations such as the Soviet Union and Japan, is making proposals along the following lines: A 12-mile territorial limit as long as there is no interference with passage over and un- der stralts.-"Territorfal seas" now vary from 3 miles to as many as 200. Beyond the 12 miles, a 188-mile economic zone, each nation having exclusive rights there to submarine resources?many such projected zones are rich in oil and natural gas?but not to fish or navigation. Fisheries would operate under the principle of -full utilization: international arbiters would step in when a "host" nation was not taking a certain amount of fish from the area to determine whether other nations might use it Establishment of an international agency that would issue licenses to nations or cor- porations to mine deep seabeds. The oceans are known to contain vast stores of manga- nese nodules, from which nickel and copper can be derived. But only a few nations have the teelinological ability to do the mining. ti,rurx VARIES Unity at the conference among about 77 less developed nations varies from issue to issue. Some Latin-American states such as Peru and Ecuador simply want a 200-mile limit. But most Of them, the delegates say, look for a 12-mile 'territorial sea" with con- trol over straits and an economic zone of about 200 miles, with exclusive rights to all resources, but not control over navigation, and full international ownership and Con- trol of the deep seabeds. Still another group of about 40 nations, many of them landlocked, want to share in the resources of both the economic zone and the deep seabeds. Then there is a cluster of states like Norway and Australia that ' want full control to the limits of their con- tinental shelves. The voting procedure calls for each article to be carried by two-thirds of those present and voting, as Tong as that is a majority of all 148 nations represented here. But in each nation's proposal, agreement on any one Is- sue is tied to agreement on an other issues. Norwegian delegation, sees it, means a queer kind of juggling, in which all the balls must be in the air at the same time, long enough for all to see that their interests are being accommodated. And no nation represented here will make a fundamental concession until the others do. As an American delegate put it, "How can we wire Washington asking to make compromises when no one else around here is making any compromises?" SEA LAw CONFERENCE CLOSES IN DEADLOCK (By John Virtue) CARACAS, Aug. 29.?The third U.N. Sea-Law Conference ended in deadlock today and the conference president said there was little hope of drafting a new treaty governing the use of the sea at a follow-up spring session in Geneva. Conference President Hamilton S. Amera- singhe of Sri Lanka indicated that as many as three more sessions might be needed by the 148 participating nations to obtain a signed treaty in 1975. "There has so far been no agreement on any final text on any single subject or issue," Amerasinghe said in closing the con- ference, which ended its 10-week session deadlocked on the four key issues needed for a treaty to replace the current 17th-century sea code. "I am convinced, given the best-will in the world, it will be physically impossible for us to finish the drafting of the treaty by the end of the spring session in 1975," he said later at a press conference. Earlier this week, the conference agreed to reconvene in Geneva March 17 to May 3 and then to return to Venezuela in mid- summer for signing a treaty, if one is negotiated by then. Amerasinghe indicated, however, that another session might have to be squeezed in between Geneva and Caracas.' While most delegates said publicly that the conference had achieved the expected, they privately expressed disappointment at the slow progress and the gulf between the posi- tions of the rich industrial nations and the poor developing ones. The division between the delegations knew no ideological bounds. The United States and the Soviet Union were the leaders of the industrial nations, and China backed the aspirations of right- wing South American military dictatorships. The conference became deadlocked on four key issues: Territorial limits: the developing nations, led by Ecuador and Peru, insist on virtual sovereign control over all activities within 200 miles of their coasts. The industrial nations, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, favor giving coastal states full centrol over a 12-mile limit but opening up a further 188-mile economic zone to fishing and scien- tific research by other nations. Deep sea mining: The developing nations want preferential treatment in mining cobalt, copper nickel and other deposits through a strong international authority, which would set its own rules and decide who mined where. The industrial nations want the rules written into the treaty. Pollution control: The developing nations want mild controls for themselves and hard ones for the industrialized nations, who they say polluted while achieving their develop- ment. The industrial nations want uniform international standards. Straits passage: This is the key Soviet and U.S.? issue. Both want freedom of passage for their warships and merchant fleets through the more than 100 straits in the world. The straits nations, most of them developing ones, want control. "The No. 1 priority is the mobility of our naval and air forces and the importance of retaining our nuclear deterrent," said U.S. Special Ambassador John R. Stevenson re- cently. Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI.), here briefly for the conference, predicted that the Sen- ate would not ratify treaty that did not guarantee free passage. Stevenson, in a wind-up news conference, expressed confidence that a sea treaty could be signed in Caracas if enough hard work is done in Geneva. "There is no cause for bill- ing the conference a failurerhe said. "We certainly did not come to Caracas expecting to go back with a signed treaty," said Tanzania's J. S. Warioba, expressing the feeling of many delegates, "But we had cer- tainly come expecting to achieve more than we have." Amerasinghe cautioned the nations against taking any unilateral action before a treaty is negotiated. In this, he echoed Stevenson, who warned that any extension? of U.S. fish- ing limits by the Senate could touch off uni- lateral action by other nations. There are several bills in Congress to ex- tend the fishing limit to 200 miles, a concept officially opposed by the United States at the conference. Ecuador and Peru, the hardliners among the developing nations, claimed a 200-mile limit in 1952, touching off the "tuna war" with the United States. Some 200 U.S. fishing trawlers, most of them from San Diego, have been seized during the past 10 years in the disputed waters. The two South American nations said their claim was simply an extension of the Tru- man Doctrine, under which the United States in 1945 claimed control over the seabed re- sources of the continental shelf, which ex- tends beyond 200 miles from the coast in some parts of the Atlantic. The two Pacific nations have virtually no shelf, so they claimed a 200-mile limit instead. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague, Senator ERNEST HOLLINGS of South Carolina, is one of the genuine experts in the Congress on the oceans, the problems of our fishing in- dustry, and law of the sea. As chairman of our committee's Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere and as chair- man of the Senate's National Ocean Policy Study, he is acutely aware of the need to move now to do something about establishing a method of protecting the resources of our own waters. Senator HOLLINGS recently spelled out his views in an outstanding message delivered on October 23 before the Johns Hopkins University Ocean Policy Project Conference on Law of the Sea at Airlie House in Warrenton, Va. Sen- ator HOLLINGS and I both serve as con- gressional advisers to the U.S. Law of the Sea delegation, and I ask unanimous consent that the text of his remarks be herein printed in the RECORD and that those concerned about the oceans heed his wise advice. There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ME LAW OF TFIE SEA: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE (By Senator ERNEST F. HOLLINGS) The Ism of the sea interests of the inter- national community are not necessarily totally opposite to those of the United States, and vice versa. Those who believe that the more parochial interests of coastal nations must be ignored in devising a treaty on ocean uses suffer frdm an acute case of what I would call, "internationalist near-sighted- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21098 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE December 11, 1974 nese." An indispensable part of a university acceptable treaty on law of ,the :set, is an accommodation of -coastal nation interests. The jot, of the negotiators is to balance both more specific interests Of Ooastal nations and the broader interests Of all rattlens, broader interests Which are Sometimes re- ferred to as the "common heritage of man- kind." Without a fair balancing, there simply will be no treaty. To Flay that an eitconamo- dation of coastal nation interests is incom- patible with international interests Is to say that international interests will never be recognized in a treaty. The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference is unquestionably political. un- like the previous two Conferences, this, the most recent and most ambitious of attempts to codify ocean law, is not a purely technical taking place in a vacuum, away frcen the pressures , of general world and United Na- tions panties. X do not believe I am a pes- simist When I say that all nations attending the Lave Of the Sea Conference are, in large measure, pursuing their own self-intereets. And it is fair to say that the United States is no more fervent in this puree/it than are most other countries, In fact, it anything, the U.S. positions on ocean matters are per- haps mere balanced than many other na- tions, particularly those of some of the devel- oping nations which are flush With their own brand of strong nationalistic desires At, one time, not too long ago, the United States and a few other nations were clearly dominant in the pursuit of their national interests, in the ocean and otherwiee. Quite dramatically, the world balance has ehifted to nations which possess much-needed min- eral resources. Developing nations now have a solid majority in the United Nation.; Gen- eral Assembly, The Group of 77 proposal on Rules and Regulation" in Cominietee this summer evidences their desire ic swing the balance in favor of producing natioes, A few oil-rich nations are dictatiug exorbi- tant prices for the energy which fuels MIT society. And other producers of vital raw materials. are weighieg the possibility of price and production cartels in order to boost their infiumscm These changed wore! circumstance:I have shattered, previous conventional wisdom abept relationships between natioils Eco- nomic and technologic dominance by any single nation will soon be a thing of ths past. Control of vital resources May very well be- come the pivotal factor in deterreinieg world power in the years to come. - Put in this context, I think it is easy to SeE,, that a number of general worid issecs a al play an important role in the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference and these may have no direct relevance to the specie? question of ma in the world's oceans. With this back- ground, I hope my remarks on Law of tee Sea will be clearer. Since time prevents ens from dismissing in detail all the elements on an acceptable new of the Sea Treaty, I plan to discuss Dye of the more important issues; (I) naviga- tional freedoms; (2) the iiitermatiogel ,4:1 1,rea: (3) fisheries; (4) the continental self; and (5) ocean pollution. Tor the mutt part, the positions taken by our delegation in Caracas and elsewhere have been well-considered attempts: at balancing the varioas disparate interests and views of )our pluralistic nation. For the most peen these positions enjoy the support of Coe- gress. But there are differences of opinion on various points which Congress had de- cided to discuss'?namely the fisheries gum- tion, and 'deep sea mining for manganese modules. ft is healthy in our system for each branch of government to honestly enpress and pursue its own viewpoint. This in Why I'm here this evening. ikrAVTGAi2ONAL TIMM= Given the changing world ffirctintstancer which I have mentioned I question the wee- dem, and even the point, of placing impor- tance of military issues ahead of resource is- sues. This has definitely been the case up to now. Is it really any longer logical to sub- ordinate our resouree objectives in the oceans to our military objectives? Why, for example, do vie refuse to address the proven problem of overfishing on the basis of some tenuous fear of restricted military naviga- tional freedoms? Especially now in these times of food short:at:es and high inflation rates. It would seem to me that the question of access of resources ennui(' be given equal status with military objectives by our law of the sea negotiators. This would *fleet real world problems end recognize the fact that resources indeed are as powerful as :military weapons, perhaps more so. We have learned that It coulet be more difficult for this nation to fight an oil embargo, than it is to fight, a war. And without oil there can be go successful war. Why shouldn't our Law ef the Sea policy reflect this? I believe that the U.S. is better served by separating commercial navigational issues from purely military ones. Every nation eenefits from unrestrieted vessel transports- don on the oceans. Every coastal nation .s either a producer or a consumer of raw -naterials and fishing products. If a coastal tation were tc arbitrarily restrict the ocean transport of oft, copper, bauxite, or any other ?aw material or commercial item, every na- eon, developed or wadeveloped, which is -termed would loudly protest. It is in every ? talons' interest that he flow of trade con- ;Mite without restraint. I see no reason to eonclude that the werld will not agree on iin ocean regime which protects the innocent passage of commercial vessels through any waters, except those designated as strictly .nternal. This being se, the military desire for free or unimpeded transit should not piggyback nor confuse this commercial transit question, 'ehe military arguments should stand on I heir own merits, and rise and fall on that basis. Unimpeded tran) it rights for our mili- tary vessels should list be the sole non- riegotiable item in U.S. Law of the Sea policy. Our delegation should concentrate on the inportant resource issues. An acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty is one which, at the very least, protects the naviga- tional freedoms of commercial vessels, It thould also protect, the right of free transit ef our military vesmils in international traits. THE INTERNATTM,AL SEABED AREA After this summer's session, it would ap- ear that the most coetentious issue in the IDS negotiations is the question of the deep- Ca bed. This Is the area of the "common I eritage of mankind" iend control of its re- eturces is the basic bone of contention. The I lost critical problems seem to be three: (1) what will be the nature of the resource ex- i.loration and exploitation system; (2) what v ill be the functions and powers of the in- t ernationed organization ( the Authority) which governs activiters in this area, and ( I) what will be the nature of the decision- ) iaking process which guides the Authority. The division on these problems represents iet widest on any issue in the Conference, a Id It is fundamental. I : is the United States' v ew that the discretion of the Authority to r .gulate resource exploration should be limited. Constraints or discretion should be specifice in the treaty. The U.S. also wishes a system of licensing designed to enure that companies have tho incentive to exploit the n sources that exist. Tier developing nations, ot the other hand, the "Group of 77", would giant the Authority almost complete dis- cretion. Their desire seems to be to protect lend-based producers. :In fact, according to their view, if a company contracted to do ex- pi oratory work on seabed resources in the in- ternational area, there is no asurance that the same company will be given the op- portunity to make good on its exploratory work and be allowed to produce and sell the resources. Land-based mineral producers spoke loudly in the halls of the Barque Cen- tral of creating cartels similar to OPEC to control prices and production. Unquestionably, this eebate is of the high- est concern to the United States. I think I can safely say that Congress would not tips prove a treaty which _establishes an inter- national body with unlimited discretion to control deep, seabed mining. Only those with an extreme Sense of internationalism would approve the result. Frankly, the United States and other de- veloped countries appear headed toward eco- nomic war with producing nations over raw materials. 'This conflict is underway now and can only intensify le the near future. To allow the majority of U.N. nations to deny the U.S. access to seabed minerals critical to its well-being is unthinkable. The effect cf oil prices Is taking its toll on our society. Since the U.S. possesses the technology to develop the resources of the deep ocean, it is in a strong bargaining position. It shred(' not give it up easily. It is also in the interest of all nations that raw materials be made abundantly available. Without them, many developing nations will riot progress and the world order will be dangerously strained. Summarizing, Congress would strongly support a treaty which-- (I) ensures fair access to deepsea minerals by U.S. companies under reasonable condi- tions; (2) prevents land-based producers from controlling production; (3) does hot discourage investment nor a ntir return on such investments; (4) prevents monopoly and pollution in connection with deepsea bed activities. loss I was quite pleased this summer when Ambassador John Stevenson announced in Caracas that the United States approves, in principle, the concept of a 200-mile economic zone as part of an over-ell acceptable law of the sea treaty. As a cosponsor of Senator Magnuson's 'MIL S. 1988, to establish each a sone for fisheries management prior to an effective ocean jurisdiction treaty. I view this move as overdue. The "eoecies approach" to fisheries managements is beat laid to rest. Since our delegation noes not object to the substance of S. 1983, but basses its strong objections to the bill's Vining, there is little eisagreemene about wItee, are the beet fish- cries provision?I thine they are in the U.S proposals now. But there will continue to be eiss,greement on whether earlier implemen- tation cf these provieleine is needed. Clearly, the 200-mile Limit es the world consensus, Yet our long-distance fishing iii- torests must not be foreelosed from harvest- ing what other coastal nations cannot take ie their 200-mile zones. Access should be on a reasonable basis and without harassment, It makes no sense to allow available food resources to go to waste wings the world is so short of protein. Food should not be a weapon; and a requirement of full utiliza- tion of resources within the 200-mile zone would prevent it from being used as such. The recent decision by the International Court Of Justice in the Iceland v. Great Britain case :legitimized Use concept of pref- erential rights for coastal states in coastal fishing areas. There shoiliel be little question about the issue in the Law of the Sea. But the Court also identified the need to protect traditional fishing rights of other nations. This balance will require definition and fine tuning, The best law of the sea treaty from the standpoint al fisheries includes the follow- ing: (1) a 200-Mile fishing management Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 December 11, Ihenproved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 21099 sone; (2) a coastal nation duty to assure full utilization of available resources; (3) rec- ognition of Preferential rights for coastal nation. fishermen; (4) an accommodation of other nation's traditional fishing rights by the coastal nation; (5) as the guiding prin- ciple, the duty to conserve resources by maintaining the optimum or maximum sus- tainable yield of fish stocks. THE CONTINENTAL SIIELF It has been said that you can tell who is happy about the likely outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference by who remains quiet in a meeting such as this. If this is true, the oil companies aren't saying much?but they never do. Although this nation's romance with the oil companies is turning sour, no one disputes the fact that we need oil re- sources. With land supplies diminishing and exports expanding, we desperately need al- ternate sources. Only the continental shelf offers some real relief from the pressures caused by fuel shortages, the drain of capi- tal, and continuing inflation due to gasoline prices. Consequently, Congress supports wholeheartedly the U.S. proposal to include within our resource Jurisdiction the conti- nental shelf out to the edge of the continen- tal margin.. As we all know, the last Conference on Law of the Sea left the seaward limits of coastal state control over the continental shelf rather vague. The existing Convention on the Continental Shelf now provides coastal nations with Jurisdictions out to wherever the resources. can be developed. Set- ting the seaward limit of 'coastal nation jurisdiction at the continental margin seems to enjoY general support. Adopting of this - limit will eliminate uncertainty and help this nation move with all deliberate speed toward self-sufficiency in oil. I am somewhat skeptical about our ability to protect U.S. oil investments on other na- tion's continental shelves. Whatever the ocean treaty says, there will always be the threat of expropriation.. The stakes are sim- ply too high. We may be better off by selling oil technology to the highest bidder rather than building an entire oil production oper- ation only to have it expropriated by a for- eign nation. / am also somewhat skeptical about the concept of revenue sharing as a mandatory concept. While sharing the benefits of the deep seabed ocean resources with developing nations has great moral appeal, dangers do exist. While it may in the first instance ap- pear to be international responsibility, reve- nue sharing could lead to a reckless selfish- ness on the part of beneficiaries who might seek to control all development to satisfy their own desires. However, revenue sharing from the re- sources of the continental shelf of the United States is, in my opinion, totally unaccept- able to the Senate. The energy and economic crisis that this country finds itself in has destroyed any chance of this form of revenue sharing being ratified by the U.S. Senate. A mandatory revenue sharing requirement for continental shelf resources would preclude the flexibility we need in solving our energy and economic problems. Given the attitude of many producing nations, we cannot afford to lose our flacilaility or our control of alter- nate sources of oil or related capital re- sources. OCEAN FOLLIJTION Unfortunately, delegates at the Caracas Conference do nnt seem to be taking the need to protect our ocean environnaent very seriously. If we have learned anything from our recent interest in the ocean, it is that we must be worried about its health, Conse- quently, I believe strong environmental standards should appear where appropriate in the -treaty. Deep sea mining, oil and gas development, and tanker operations are all potentially polluting and harmful to ocean health. To prevent damage, specific standards to prevent or minimise pollution should be clear and enforceable. What should be the goal of the marine pollution provisions in the Law of the Sea Treaty? Quite simply, it should be to prevent adverse impacts on the marine environment as a result of ocean use and development. The major problem right now is tanker pollution, both accidental and operational. But because of the international nature of the tanker business, companies have been able to find havens from both safety and environmental standards. We must find alternatives to the traditional practice of relying on flag-nation enforcement. If flag-nations do not begin to conquer the problem of ocean pollution, na- tions whose coastlines and port areas are threatened should be able to take steps to solve the problem themselves. International standards for pollution pre- vention should be minimum standards. Na- tions should be able to require more stringent standards on vessels entering their ports if such are shown to be needed. This would include both vessel construction standards and permissible discharge restrictions. Sanc- tions for violations, however, should not un- duly delay any vessel but should assure that punishment is fair and swift and that laws be observed. The principal international oil pollution treaty now in existence has resulted only in seven attempts at enforcement. And this is despite the fact that oil pollution and vessel traffic have both been on the increase. Stronger enforcement measures are needed. Consequently, port-nations should be able to enforce discharge standards no matter where the violation occurs. The oceans are Interrelated and oil dumped in one part of the world may find its way to shores far away. Vessel operators must know that laws will be enforced, otherwise there is no de- terrent to cutting time by dirtying the sea. The question has been asked whether the United States should seek a pollution control zone together with a 200-mile economic zone. If the problem of oil pollution from ships is not solved, the problem may be solved by establishing such a zone. A heavily polluted 200-mile fishery zone is a benefit to no one. If vessel operators and flag states are not required to adopt and enforce measures which Will eliminate or greatly reduce the pollution of the sea, then a 200-mile pollu- tion zone will be necessary. With 95% of our imports being carried in foreign-flag vessels, the United States can only hope that Liberia or Greece will be tough. If they aren't, the U.S. will move to protect itself. SUMMARY Some have stated?in classic doomsday fashion?that if a Law of the Sea treaty is not developed disaster will result?meaning war or worse. I respectfully disagree. The Law of the Sea Conference is not a last gasp effort to maintain world peace. For this rea- son, if it does fail, nations will seek alterna- tive ocean arrangements, on a bilteral, re- gional, or multilateral basis. In fact there are a number of oceans issues which, when freed from more contentious issues, could be easily settled by separate treaties. One of the stumbling blocks to agreement In. the present deliberations is the desire of the undeveloped nations to present a unified position through the Group of 77. Getting agreement on ocean issues within a single country is extremely difficult. But achieving a single, unified position among the nearly 100 developing countries seems well nigh to impossible. As long as the developing na- tions attempt to negotiate in concert threugh the Group of 77, then agreement cannot be, reached, and the Conference will fail. If that happens, the possibility of deal- ing with developing nations on a one-to-one basis may allow for the give and take neces- sary to Make agreements on use of the sea. If ocean law is not settled by a treaty or treaties, this nation should not reject tak- ing carefully devised unilateral action. For some reason, many people seem to believe that all unilateral action is inherently bad and illegal. This is not necessarily so. The basic process of international law of the sea has been one of claim and counterclaim. That is, one nation makes a claim in the ocean to protect or advance what it believes to be its legitimate interests. The rest of the world community then evaluates this claim as to its reasonableness, then rejects or ac- cepts it. If this nation were to act unilater- ally in the ocean and its action reflects what most nations would accept, then the cause of defining international law is advanced. If a treaty cannot be agreed upon, I be- Here that this nation must seriously con- sider unilateral action?for sure on fish- eries, and perhaps on other matters as well. Granted we must be careful and sensitive if we take this route. But it is a legitimate option. If we reject this option we may suc- cumb to "internationalist near-sightedness" and be faced with even greater confusion in the ocean than now exists. MASTAL FISHERY JURISDICTION Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, as evidence of the world trend in coastal fishery jurisdiction, I bring to my col- leagues' attention a recent article which appeared in "the New York Times de- scribing the plans of the Government of Norway to control foreign fishing within 200 miles of their shores. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: NORWAY PLANS TO EXTEND FISHING LIMITS (By Terry Robards) Oslo, Nonway.?The Norwegian Govern- ment is trying to bar foreign fleets from com- mercial fishing waters off the coast. The aim is to extend control in three stages to waters 200 miles from shore. The first phase involves a ban on trawling in an area totaling 5,000 square miles, mainly off the northern coast. The internationally recognized 12-mile limit would be extended at certain key points, in some cases by up to 42 miles, and the Government hopes to have the first phase completed by Christmas. In an attempt to minimize international resistance, a broad diplomatic effort has been undertaken, involving visits by a Norwegian delegation to nine countries, among them Britain, East and West Germany and the Soviet- Union. The plan remains controver- sial, and some political leaders wonder whether a clash reminiscent of the so-called cod wars between Britain and Iceland can be averted. Jens Evensen, a Norwegian Minister With- out Portfolio who is in charge of the delega- tion, acknowledged in an interview that the waters in question had been traditional fish- ing grounds for foreign fleets. "But they have been more traditional for the Norwegian fleet," said Mr. Evensen, an expert on international maritime law who was given leave from his position as Mintister of Commerce to conduct the negotiations with other countries. He has also visited France, Denmark, Sweden, Poland and Belgium to explain the Norwegian stand. The message he carried was that cod and other fish in the Barents Sea and adjacent waters were threatened with extinction be- cause of overfishing. The catch this year will be a million tons, he said. "The experts think a maximum of 57,000 tons should be taken," he said. "It's an enormous overfishing problem." He added that trawling fleets had been driven away Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21100 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL R ECORD ? SENATE Deceiro5er 11, 1974 from Iceland, Canada, Latin America and West Africa and were now concentratiag in he Barents Sea. Mr. Eveneen mentioned Spain and Battu- al, whose fleets were inactive in Norwegian waters until this year. He said Spain's Catch t his year would total 45,000 tons, compared with 250 tons in 1973, while Portugal's catch .his year would reach 28,000 tons, compared with virtually nothing last year. "These are examples of the problems we m:te up against here," he continued. "Norway 'Las reduced its fishing from 480,000 tons to 80,000 tons at the same time." He noted that the Soviet Union, Poland, Sritain ar.d East Germany had also curtailed tieir fishing, Fishing has been one of Norway's most txtporta,nt industries for centuries. A major nortion of the nation's four million people derive their livelihood from fishing or from ttrocessing. Along the northern section of the shoreline many fishermen still operate with old- fashioned long lines nod bottom nets that end to snag on the equipment used by big toreign as well as Nowegian trawlers, So the first phase of the Government's plan is to protect the local fishermen by ex-- I-ending the 12-mile limit. The second stage involves the establish- ment of a 50-mile limit that would be re- ?evicted to the Norwegian fleet and saw FIct to Norwegian conservation measures. The third stage involves the creation of a 200-mile economic zone under Nocaeglar ,.entrOl. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, am thorougly in sympathy with and in sup- sort of the Senator from West Virginia ,n reference to the Senate rules here about the allotment of time. I knew his bill was coming up, S. 1988. 1: ?was engaged in a conference regarding an bill, trying to get it ready to be 'isrought up, and I thought I was :retina to be called. Now, Mr. Persident, this bill, S. 1988, is a bill that was referred to the Com- merce Committee, also to the Foreign Re- lations Committee, and the Armed S'erv- ices Committee. We had hearings on the bill and consideration was given to it, and a majority of the committee voted fo report the bill favorably for passage. I voted against that position. Of course. IS chairman, it was all right with me to submit it for consideration and to report the bill then. I did mention that I thought the record ought to be complete, and encouraged for the record the filing of a minority report, and I also said that I would make a few remarks because it is such a far-reaching policy involved. Mr. .President, I believe that Passage il S. 1938 at this time would be unwise. S. 1988 could adversely' affect U.S. na- tional security interests, as Well as other U.S. ocean interests, such as surface shipping and the mining of mineral re- sources on the ocean floor. S. 1988 'would be incorsistent with U.S. obligations un - der international law and 'does not, in my view, represent the most effective means of resolving U.S. fishery problems. I have a great deal of sympathy with the problem presented. Also it is a matter of judgment as to the best remedy to ap- ply. I lean toward the idea that the effec- tive remedy would almost necessarily come through multilateral action of the nations involved rather than unilateral action by us. I emphasize I do not minimize the problems of the depletionof U.S. coastal fishing stocks and the growing economic pressures on the U.S. coastal 41shing in- dustry. The State that I have the honor represent has industry there along hiese very lines. I recognize these Q.:* serious problems t sat deserve the prompt and strenuous e Torts of both Congress and the Execiss- t ye. But passage of S. 1988 at this time I do not believe is the most appropriate v ay to deal with the problem. ENFORGEMEN'T PROBLEMS S. 1988 would extend U.S. fishery juris- diction by approximately two million ivare miles. Enforeement of S. 1988 t iroughout such a large area will be dif- f cult and costly. Open defiance of US. authority within t iis vast fishery will he a temptation and could be a reality. Gyeat Britain, for ex- ample, recently defied Iceland's decla ra- t on of a 50 nautical mile fishery zone. The result was the so-called cod war in tehich various armed confrontations took r lace between vessels of Great Britain and Iceland. I illustrate merely the seriousness of t re matter. The fining and imerisonment of for- eign fishermen by the United States under the authority of S. 1988 would surely be considered Ly major fishing na- t.ons to be a serious provocation. Hence, Lae risk of armed co: ifrontation between 1('.S. military :forees and fishing boats or escort gunboats of f: Lich nations as the r.S S.R. and japan (amid be substantial. RETALIATORY MEASURES BY OTHER NATIONS The mobility of U.i. strategic and gen- eral purpose forces is well as the sur- vivability of U.S. stategic forces could Le threatened by various unilateral ac- tions of other natians in response to k . 1988. Administratien officials expressed toe fear that in response to the passage of S. 1938 other nations would act in arying degrees to prevent naval surface end submarine passage as well as mili- tary overflight of certain coastal ocean reas. If the United F. i:ates in its acknowl- edged leadership position at the Law of the Sea Conference succumbs to pres- eures for unilateral :.',ctiOn to further its own interests, other nations can naturally lie expected to take iinilateral actions in their peculiar intereets. These unilateral sctions by other natons could well take the form of expanding their territorial .,eas, or in some cases, denying unimpeded transit through straits. All the major ocean issues which are Presently before the Law of the Sea Con- erence--from fishing rights to mineral rights to territoriel jurisdiction?are elosely interrelated. Commonsense and precedent suggest that other nations would respond to S. 1988 by various rail- lateral actions. rNDERMINING A FAVORBLE LAW OF TI-IE SEA CONFERENCE Through the Law of the Sea Confer- ince, the United States is trying to estab- ish international agreement on the erucial national security concepts of un- impeded transit of straits and a narrow lefinition of territorial sea with the right to innocent passage. Narrowly defined territorial seas, that is, 12 miles or less, and the right to unimpeded transit of straits which includes submerged transit are essential to the range and mobility of the U.S. strategic submarine deterrent. More importantly, the absence , of narrowly defined territorial seas and the right to unimpeded transit of straits would result in serious constraints on surface fleet operations in such critical areas as the, Mediterranean Sea. The chief of the U.S. negotiating team at the Law of the Sea Conference, Special Ambassador John It. Stevenson, has stated: The number one prior; ty [of the U.S. at the Law of the Sea Gonfei once] is the mobil- ity of our naval and air forces and the impor- tance of detbining our noclear deterrent. Without an interne tiOnal agreement, constraints imposed by foreign nations on U.S. naval mobility could be unevenly applied by both unfriendly nations and allies to impede U.S. naval forces re- sponding to local or regional crises. The recent Cyprus and the Yam Kippur war clearly demonstrated the importance of ELS. naval mobility And unrestricted military overflight. These rights of mili- tary flexibility have never been guaran- teed in a substantial international agree- ment before now. TO strike the best overall agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference, the United States needs the flexibility and leverage that comes with having the broadest range of issues on which to negotiate. By being able to bargain with fundamental fishing and economic rights of the Law of the Sea Conference, the United States has the best opportunity to achieve an international agreement that will guarantee. comprehensively and systematically, U.S. ocean. interests af- fecting national security. INCONSISTENT WITH IN TERNATIONAL LAW A unilateral declaration of a 200 nauti- cal mile fishery zone would violate the freedom of fishing as established in the 1958 Geneva Agreement to which the United States was a signator. The Inter- national Court has recently held that Iceland's declaration of a 50 nautical mile fishery zone wee not enforceable under international law. The United States has tionsistently refused to recog- nize any territorial or fishing claims be- yond the 12-mile Uinta To be sure, fish- ing conditions have changed since 1958 and there is a growing consensus among nations for a 200 mile coastal fishery jurisdiction. But prevailing international law on freedom of fishing, however fra- gile, cannot be overturned by the unilat- eral action of a single nation. Legal justi- fication of a 200 mile fishery zone would require a multilateral expression of na- tions that could be beet achieved in the Law of the Sea Conference. RISKING OF ALL OTHER U3. OCEAN INTERESTS In addition to national security, the United Stases has a variety of other na- tional interests which could be both threatened by retaliatory actions stem- ming from S. 1988 and deprived of satis- factory resolution in the Law of the Sea Conference. U.S. interests hi the eco- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 'December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE nomic resources 'ef the ocean bottom, the commercial shipping of all types of car- goes including' oil, and the full range of fishery interests, both Coastal and dis- tant, are all at stake in the Lav of the Sea Conference. Through the bargaining of a multilateral negotiation all of these Interests can be most apPropriately bal- anced and preserved. To the extent that countries act unilaterally on one of these Issues, the chances of an overall agree- ment will become less. ? Mr. President, how much remaining time do have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Mississippi has 10 minutes re- ? maining. Mr. STENNIS. Ten minutes. I change that request, Mr. President, to 15 minutes only, so I would have 5 left. Mr. ROBERT C. :BYRD. Mr. President, if the $enator needs more time? Mr. STENNIS. I am going to use *less. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I want the Senator to be assured there is no ob- jection. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. coxcLusrox Mr. President, briefly stated, the United States is confronted with serious coastal' fishing problems. I want to em- phasize that by every means, rather than let an inference from my position here show that I was not interested or that I do not recognize these problems. By passage of S. 1088 the United States V.111 be resorting to coercion rather than Cooperation to resolve Its fishery prob- lems. I stronglY oPpOse this course of ac- :Lion. The United States should continue to seek a resolution to its fishing prob- lems in the normal course of the Law of the Sea Conference. ? , We should push and urge definite and effective multinational action and a final agreement as to a course of law binding on all parties and thus resolve these fish- ing problems. Failing in this, unilateral action by more than one nation is highly probable, and we would have to be among those that move in that direction. - Now, Mr, President, / again thank the membership for perrnitting me to use this time, particularly at this moment. I un- derstood there was nothing else pressing just now, and again I regret that I was not here when the other part of the debate took place. ? Mr. President, I yield the floor. I yield back such time as may remain. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Texas (Mr. Towss) be removed from the list of sponsors of S. 1988, a bill to extend the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States ti:o 200 nautical miles, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without objection, it is so ordered. ? Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I wish to, commend Senator MAGNUSON and the menibers of the various eorrimittees which have worked?so clillgentlY to Pr9- vide legislation for emergency relief to the American coastal fishermen. S. 1988 represents a desperately needed attempt to solve our coastal fishing problems. For the past several years, I have been urging action to halt the critical deple- tion of U.S. Coastal fishery stocks. The accelerating plight of our fishermen is emphasized by the several stocks such as haddock, herring, mackerel, and hali- but which are dangerously close to de- pletion beyond the point of self-renewal. As a source of protein, fish have tre- mendous value because it has been a renewal resource. As the world food shortage worsens, it is evermore appar- ent that the United States must prop- erly manage and conserve its fishing resources. S. 1988 is an interim measure which will take effect to preserve our coastal fisheries, and would expire automatically whenever the United States ratifies an International treaty with respect to fish- ing jurisdiction. The treaty making prog- rem has been painfully slow, and in the meanwhile the damage to American fish- ing interests continues and threatens to become irreversible. Indiscriminate fish- ing by fleets of other nations which use modern equipment that sweeps the sea clean has seriously aggravated our prob- lem. Over fishing by these fleets has be- come a principal cause of the dwindling stocks off our shores. We can wait no longer to protect the interests of our fishermen. I believe we have already waited too long to act in conserving our fishing resources. I believe S. 1988 is a reasonable approach to the serious prob- lem we are facing in managing our own living resources in our oceans and I urge immediate passage of this bill. Mr. McINTYR,E. Mr. President, I want to speak in favor of S. 1988, the Emer- gency Marine Fisheries Protection Act. The Armed Services Committee saw fit to report this measure out favorably. The committee should be commended for its positive and expeditious treat- ment. Mr. President, the serious depletion of our fisheries resources can no longer be ignored. In 960, U.S. fishermen, except for a few Canadian vessels, were the only ones fishing the George's Bank area. In 1961, Soviet ships were taking 68,000 tons from the bankS. By 1965, the Soviets were fishing as far down the east coast as Chesapeake Bay?hauling in a catch of over half a million tons?an amount far in excess of what our fishermen were taking. Scientists from the United States and other countries have recommended an allowable level of harvest, but by 1970 the catch taken by foreign fishermen reached million tons, a level far be- yond that recommended allowable level. Moreover, Mr. President, between 1960 and 1972 the U.S. share of the total catch dropped by 43.8 percent. The fishing practices of nationally owned or heavily subsidized foreign fleets, directed by national policies which Insist upon increased protein production from the seas regardless of where it ex- ists and with no heed to conservation, are intolerable. The pillaging of our . _ waters by foreign fishing vessels has forced us to become fish importers. In 1972, the United States experienced an adverse balance of payments of $1.3 bil- lion in fish and fisheries products?a 318-percent increase since 1960. ?g 21101 It must be understood that current fishing activities affect not only our level of fish stock but our future sources of food, particularly protein food, our bal- ance of payments, and our domestic fish- ing industry. During discussion of that matter be- fore the Armed Services Committee it was said that S. 1988 might be difficult to enforce. Senator Stevens assured the committee, and supported his statement with correspondence from Adm. 0. W. Siler, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, that the Coast Guard would be able to respond to any extension of fish- eries jurisdiction immediately by using our active inventory. Contingency plans are already being developed by the Coast Guard to protect an increased zone of jurisdiction. I have received various reports from New England fishermen of open con- frontation between our domestic fisher- men and those of foreign fleets. This legislation will clarify the responsibili- ties and allow able fishing levels for all fishermen and remove this potentially dangerous situation. The Coast Guard is the rightful authority to deal with these domestic coastal problems and not commercial fishermen. The Department of Defense expressed fear that this legislation would affect our freedom of overflight and free pas- sage of straits. Dr. Frank E. Carlton, president of the National Coalition for Marine Conserva- tion, has developed a paper based on an article by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced Inter- national Studies entitled "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law." I would like to quote from Dr. Carlton's article: Dr. Osgood's scholarly examination of the 121 straits listed by the Department of State that would be nationalized by a 12 mile territorial sea demonstrates that there are only 16 that could have importance and that 9 of those are either non-essential or fall within the territory of our military allies. Of the remaining 7, all but 3 either offer no significant targeting advantage or are too shallow or dangerous to approach submerged. Dr. Osgood's analysis reveals that only Gi- braltar and two Indonesian straits are stra- tegically significant areas which might be politically questionable if a 12 mile terri- torial boundary were established. For the purpose of the nuclear deterrent the entire Soviet Union can be targeted from the At- lantic and Pacific Oceans and the Arabian Sea. Dr. Osgood's studies clearly demonstrate that the physical and political necessity of free transit through international straits is not supported by objective information and should certainly not be considered a non- negotiable item inhibiting international agreement on ocean use. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that logic as well as experience indicates that the concept of innocent passage is actually re- lated to commercial vessels. If there is any real question that the passage of a warship Is not innocent, one must wonder why any nation would sign a treaty permitting un- impeded passage, or conversely how such an agreement would deter any nation from "necessary" military action against such passage? Obviously, strategic significance is related to the capacity to place missile- launching submarines in secret position, which Dr. Osgood's analysis demonstrates does not depend physically or certainly le- gally upon free "transit." Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S21101 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE December 11, 19'11p The cariMittee micluiled that the me- bilitY and surefitability of v.S. military force* would not be siginficitntly affected by the passage of S. 1988, Mr. President, considering all these things?what are we doing?', We in offi- cial canacity contintie to negeotia.te, wring our hands, ten our fishennee to be Pa- tient, ajened millions to document the drastic 'decline ed these -protein re- sourcesa-and for wba,t apingtoseS?eto save the :resource for further expliotlittos by foreign fleets? I realize that the best possible solution to clarification of our ocean law is through an agreement at the Law of the Seas Conference. From all repeats I have received, we veill be lucky to get an agreement signed and ratified IV all the member ?nations by the end of thin de- cade. obr fish resources cannot wait. This legislation represents our present riegolo position at the Luw of the Seas Conference. The estabilehment of a 200-mile coastal fisheries no has the endorsement of a majority of nations at the LAW of the Seas Confeeeace. Since this meaeure pertains Whet? fisheries, passage t4 S. 1988 should ne unclerienne our bargeining position imt rather WC- pedite itternational agreement on the princtple of a 200-mile zone. I Should 'point out that 3.6 iiatiOne have already eatended Asheny tuitedietion be- yond out present 11-mile limit. International law must be flexible. When present international ?fisheries regulations were established, the fish re- source sfination wat coradeletably differ- ent.' Today, We see etagifflosent ilucud levels of fish sits,thretened eat further by modedna technically more efficient, anal patently noncenserration oriented fish- ing practices. In these changed circum- stances, ere find we have a .a.sfrog :aced to reduce our payritents imbalance and at the seine time protecting our feture source's dt protein. S. IOU is an emergenr5r, interim, con- servation measure which will allow pro- tection of our domestic resources until such time as international agreements can be worited eat. - Mr. Preddent, in my jutftwent, It is absolttte4r imperative that we pass this noW--before it is too late. Mr, CiSlL Mr, President, S. 1908 is Intended to prevent highly efficient for- eign fishing fleets from further deplet- ing stocks of coastal fish off the shores of the United States. I know Of no one in the ?Senate, in the ? Coneresons a whole, or 4n the-country who disagrees with that obtective. un- questionably, our coastal fishermen have a legitimate grievance. Tilde livelihoods are being threatened by derdetion of the stocks of haddock and other stocks by foreign fishermen who axe.. harvesting these fish taster than stock4 tan be re- plenished. Unfortima. teiy, however, E*nate pees- age of 811988, even without similar ac- tion by the House or enactment or the bill into law, could ieenardte our best hope of affording our fieherpeen the full degree of protection then WO- , I know-of no one who ts fialnillar with the problem of foreign 'fishing off our coasts who does not agree that our obi ee- ayes could best be achieved by an inter- national agreement among all the na- tons of the world. An international effort has been un- derway for a number of years to reach jast such an agreement. As it is in any effort to merge the interests of a large number of parties, progress has been slow. Eat there has been progress. At the rube session of the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, last summer there evolved a broad con- s anus among the 14E, nations participat- lag that there shotael be an interna- tionally recognized 200-mile zone in which each coastal slate should exercise e"ronoinic jurialictior. No one expected that consensus to be formalized into a final treaty package a, Caracas. That teak faces the second ssion of the Law of he Sea Conference St heduled to begin in Cleneva in March. It a ill not be an easy task. There are more than fishing rights involved. There are mining rights, protection of the enviren- ix.ent, rights cf traneit, rights of scien- tific research, and rights of communica- tion that must be coneidered. Assembly of these matters into a final ti eaty package? at ?armlet- will require political decisions. The delegates at the Caracas conference did not have the au- thority to make politic al decisions. Those who represent the Meted States and the other nations of the world at Geneva must have that authority. I have already written to Secretary of State Kissinger that I belfeve top level negotiators must take part in the Geneva Conference and that an agreement must be reached on these issues in 1975 Even before the Caracas Conference ethers representing this and other countries have recognized that an agreement rust be reached in 1975 or it will not be reached at all. But we, by our ace ons in the Senate today, could destroy any chance of agree- ment at Geneva bele e that conference even begins. As many of you know, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted-to unfavor- ably ?L wort this legislation. t is the be- lief of the majority of that committee that this type of unilateral action by the United States will inevitably encourage other countries to make similar or broad- es claims of national jurisdiction. If history is to repeat itself, as it often does, then ithe response of other nations to this legislation is not likely to be hm- ited to comparable restrictions on fish- ing. Despite the assertions of some of us, such action could seriously damage over- all 'U.S. ocean interests, including im- portant security and energy needs. As Deputy Secretary of Defense W. P. Clem- ents, Jr., pointed out to the Foreign Re- lations Committee?and I am quoting: It the Unitedr States by unilateral set, abrogates one identified freedom, we face the unhappy prospect that other nations may claim the right untiaterally to abrogate ruttier identified freedoms, Including the free- doms of navigation and overflight. This threat to high sets freedoms is not, in our view, at an fanciful. A logical and pre.. dictable outgrowth of elpanded fisheries jur- isdiction is expanded jurisdiction over marine perlutioli Which arguably affects marine re- sources. Given the mksconeeptions in many countries on the 'pollutioi.' aspects of nucleiai powered vessels carrying uclear weapons, r, a are geiaulnely concerned that such restric- tive claims missy be advarvied, either on their own merits or for unrelvted political ends, as a direct consequence o? enactment of this Tais is in fact the history of most claims to expanded terra octal jurisdiction. Our strategic deterren', is based upon a triad of nucelar delivery systems, an essen- tiat portion of which is ;eaborne. Our get., Lkral purpose forces, desi ,.;ried to deter wf-r below the strategic nucir ar war level, MIL3t, if the deterrent is to be credible, he free to move by air and sea to those areas when) our vital interests are threatened. Military mobility on and over the -high seas is de- pendent to a significant degree on the main- tenance of the freedom of the seas. These freedoms sanction and protect the activities of our forcem. Reduced i-ternational waters and closed straits, therefore, threaten both the survivability and MAI ty of our deterrent. In this connection, it should be noted that over 10 percent of the world's oceans lie within 50 miles of same nation's coasts and that virtually the entire operating areas of the United States' Ste and 7th fleets lie within such waters. If the United States now abandons its op- position to unilateral eltims in the ocean. we will inevitably be fact d with an increas- ing number of competing retaliatory or 'un- related claims impacting adversely on na- tional security interests. If, as we expect, enactment of this legisla-lon results in ex- tended delay in the Law of the Sea negotia- tions, we will have reverted to the uncertain and dangerous procedure of shaping a new legal order for the world's ,.aiertas by the proc- ess of claim and COUnte;rtsim, act= and reaction, which hopefu:4 eventually would coalesce into customary international law. This is a dangerous waj to regulate even economic rehlions arnom states. But when the elating begin to affect the 'mobility of our strategic and general purpose forces, the risk involved in the process of challenge is much higher. To set the natio/ on this path to- ward resolution of oceami policy issues, is, in our view, both dangerots and extremely un- wise. As I said, that is a qeote from Deputy Defense Secretary W. P. Clements. The passage of this bill could also seri- ously disrupt existing relations with a number of distant water fishing nations which have iraditlonalle fished in waters off the U.S. coast. This could lead to dan- gerous confrontations, .:oarticularly with the U.S.S.R. and Japan. A similar dis- pute between Iceland anti the United Kingdom led to the no v infamous "cod war," and is still a point of serious con- tention between the two nations. It would be extremely unfortunate if the United States upset the current trend toward international cooperation and detente, when a generally accept- able international agreement is so near. To adopt S. 1988 at this time would be inconsistent with U.S. international legal obligations, particularly the 1958 Convention on the Nigh Seas which see- ducally identifies freedom of fishing as an essential element of the oversra high seas freedoms. Forty-six nations; have signed that convention and the United States has consistently opposed all ?thee unilateral claims on the basis that they are violations of intern itional law. The drastic reversal of our pesition called for In S. 1988 would seriously undermine tr,S. credibility on di future ocean issues. To me, it would be beth unreasonable and unrealistic to adopt legislation Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE which would be almost impossible to en- force. The 200-mile zone created by S. 1988 would add 2,531,800 square nautical miles to the area which the U.S. Coast Guard now polices. This represents ari area comparable to 92 percent of ,the land mass of the United States. The Coast Guard has conservatively estimated that Policing the known fishing areas only would require $63.2 million in start-up costs and would add $47.2 million to their annual operating costs. In the absence of international acceptance the cost of enforcing a 200-mile zone would be more than any conceivable benefit to U.S. fish- eries interests. ? In conclusion, I believe the wisest course for reasonable men, at this time is one of restraint, to give the U.N. Con- ference a little more time to work out an international agreement. It is hard to imagine a greater guarantee of end- less international strife than would be represented by failure of that conference. The role of congressional restraint in making this possible is absolutely critical. By using restraint at this time we will be risking nothing. Should the confer- ence fail, there will be more than enough time to take unilateral action during the next Congress. I ask unanimous consent that the let- ters from President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Commerce Dent, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, opposing passage of S. 1988, all be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the material Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Trap WHITE HOUSE, Washington, D.C., September 24, 1974. Hon. HUGH SCOTT, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR HUGH: As you know, the Senate now has before it a bill, S. 1988, which would unilaterally extend the contiguous fisheries zone of the United States from 12 to 200 Miles. I greatly appreciate your vote against reporting this bill favorably out of the For- eign Relations Committee. While I fully un- derstand the problems in protection of living resources off the United States coast which have led to the 'consideration of this legis- lation, passage could seriously harm U.S. oceans and foreign relations interests, in- cluding our fishery interests, and could pare- doxinally destroy the best opportunity we have had to definitively resolve our fisheries problems; that is by a comprehensive new oceans law treaty now being negotiated with- in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. When the new oceans law treaty is con- cluded I expect that it will offer broad pro- tection for our fisheries interests. In the meantime, you may be assured that I will do everything possible consistent with our present legal rights 'to protect the interests of United' States fishermen and to preserve the threatened stocks of living resources off our coasts. The Law of the Sea negotiations are most Important, and our nation is deeply com- mitted to their success. As such it is vitally important that the United States support the Conference in every way possible. I would, appreciate your calling the at- tention of the Senate to the strong opposi- tion of. the Executive Branch to this legisla- tion. I am sending identical letters to Mike Mansfield and John Rhodes. Sincerely, GERALD R. FORD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington, D.C., September 22, 1974. Hon. J. WILLIAM FULDRIGHT, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Foreign Rela- tions Committee recently held hearings on 5. 1988, a bill to extend unilaterally the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States from the present 12-mile limit to 200 miles. I wanted you to be aware of my view that passage of this bill would be seriously harm- ful to our foreign relations and I was pleased to learn that the Committee reported out S. 1988 with an unfavorable recommendation. I sympathize with the concern for our coastal fishermen which has motivated this legislation. However, the best protection for them and the best solution for our fisheries problems is a timely ocean law treaty. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has made substantial progress in for- mulating such a treaty and will be meeting again next spring with a view towards con- cluding an agreement in 1975. Passage of S. 1938 or similar legislation unilaterally ex- tending our jurisdiction at this time would be especially damaging to the chances of concluding a treaty. Passage of S. 1988 would hurt our relations with Japan and the Soviet Union as well as with other nations fishing off our coasts. In addition, any effort to enforce a unilaterally established 200-mile fisheries zone against non-consenting nations would be likely to lead to confrontations. Adverse reactions by foreign nations would be understandable for the United States itself has consistently pro- tested unilateral extensions of fishery juris- diction beyond 12 miles. A unilateral exten- sion by the United States now could en- courage a wave of claims by others which would be detrimental to our overall oceans intsrests, including our interests in naval mobility and the movement of energy sup- plies. I very much appreciate that a majority of' the Foreign Relatjons Committee opposed passage of S. 1988. I hope that other mem- bers of the Senate will also carefully eval- uate the foreign affairs consequences from passage of this legislation in the middle of the law of the sea negotiations. Warm regards, HENRY A. KISS/NCER. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1974. Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It is my under- standing that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will shortly take up -considera- tion of S. 1988, the Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. Accord- ingly, I am taking this opportunity to con- vey to you the views of the Department of Defense, that enactment of this legislation would have a serious adverse impact on the national security interests of the United States. ? The bill would extend the contiguous fisheries zone of the United States to a dis- tance of 200 miles from the baseline from which the US territorial sea is measured. Within this expanded zone the United States would exercise exclusive fishery manage- ment responsibility and authority, with the exception of certain highly migratory species. In addition, the bill would extend the fisheries management responsibility and authority with respect to U.S. anadromous species, beyond 200 miles, to the full extent of the migratory range of such species on the high seas. The bill asserts on behalf of the United States preferential rights to all fish within the new US contiguous zone and to US anadromous species, and provides for a method whereby foreign nations which have traditionally fished w ithin the new S, 21103 zone or for US anadromous species may, for a fee, be permitted such portions of any stock which cannot be fully harvested by US citizens. The United States is a signatory to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which specifically identifies freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and freedom of fish- ing as among the constituent elements of the overall freedom of the high seas. The proposed legislation would unilaterally abrogate, contrary in our view to US obliga- tions under that Convention, the freedom of fishing in significant portions of the high seas. The response of other nations to this legislation is not likely to be limited to com- parable restrictions on fishing. If the United States, by unilateral act, abrogates one iden- tified freedom, we face the unhappy pros- pect that other nations may claim the right unilaterally to abrogate other identified freedoms, including the freedoms of naviga- tion and overflight. This threat to high seas freedoms is not, in our view, at all fanciful. A logical and predictable outgrowth of expanded fisheries jurisdiction is expanded jurisdiction over marine pollution which arguably affects marine resources. Given the misconceptions In many countries on the "pollution" as- rects of nuclear powered vessels and vessels carrying nuclear weapons, we are genuinely concerned that such restrictive claims may be advanced, either on their own merits or for unrelated political ends, as a direct con- sequence of enactment of this legislation. This is in fact the history of most claims to expanded territorial jurisdiction. Our strategic deterrent is based upon a triad of nuclear delivery systems, an essen- tial portion of which is seaborne. Our gen- eral purpose forces, designed to deter war below the strategic nuclear war level, must, if the deterrent is to be credible, be free to move by air and sea to those areas where our vital interests are threatened. Military mobility on and over the ? high seas is de- pendent to a significant degree on the main- tenance of the freedom of the seas. These freedoms sanction and protect the activi- ties of our forces. Reduced international waters and closed straits, therefore, threaten both the survivability and utility of our deterrent. In this connection, it should be noted that over 40 percent of the world's oceans lie within 200 miles of some nation's coast and that virtually the entire operat- ing areas of the United States' 6th and 7th fleets lie within such waters. Whether the proposed legislation contains sufficient distinguishing features to remove it from the ambit of the recent Interna- tional Court of Justice decision that Ice- land's unilateral declaration of 50 mile ex- clusive fisheries zone was under the relevant circumstances illegal is not for this Depart- ment to decide. However, we do perceive that the United States would not be in a strong position to oppose by legal means, unilateral claims by foreign states restricting our naval or air mobility near their coasts. Our experience in attempting to obtain overflight clearances in Europe during the most recent Arab-Israeli conflict leads us to conclude that bilateral negotiations can- not be 'depended upon to ensure the military mobility necessary to achieve US foreign policy objectives. What this bill invites then, Is a situation wherein the United States must either acquiesce in serious erosion of - its rights to use the world's oceans, or must be prepared to forcefully assert those rights. Thus far I have focused on what I consider the short term consequences to flow from enactment of this legislation. The long term adverse consequences to our national secu- rity interests are of equal, if not greater, concern. We recognize the worldwide trend toward expanded jurisdiction by coastal states over fisheries and other economic re- sources off their coasts. One of ,the Sunda- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 21104 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE Decemtei^ 11, 1974 mental objectives of the Iltentrtenent of De- fense in the Law of the Sea negotiations undertaken with the expredi consent of the Senate extending over the last several years, has been to ensure that such expansion takes place in a multilateral context resulting let a treaty which clearly identifies the limits be- yond which such expansion may not go. As the negottetion tee progressed, we have de- veloped a degree of ecofidence that we will be able to influenee and control the limits of any expanded jurisdiction so as to protect and exclude from foreign control, those ac- tivities, facilities and operate= tSsentistl to our national security. In our judgment, enactment of the prb- posed legislation would seriously erode the prospect for a broadly based multilateral treaty putting to test the broad range of Increasingly contentious ocean issues. We base this judgment on a number of factors. Our appreciation of the criticality of the multilateral solution has led us over the years to pretest vigorously eletaally all uni- lateral extensions of coastal state jurisdic- tion, vehatewer their avowed functional par- pose. lbasetineett of the proposed legislation would be a dramatic and highly visible re- versal of past US policy. For the US to adopt unilateralism as a viable approach to omens policy prolelems at this juncture, would seri- ously tuiderout the tredibility of ITS neeotia- tors not only on the fisheries issue, but also on our bade commitment to international agreement; This unilateral seta= could re- sult in an eroskm of the Workers perception of our other essential objectives such 0,3 Un- impeded 'transit through and over straits, which we have Identified as both corner- stones of our policy and essential elements of an acceptable solution. From a substantive interest standpoint, the legislation /ends support and gives added international respectability to the poe.tions and polleies of precisely tame* states who have been most hostile to one defense Ob- jectives, and it would at the same time offend and Impose eatentenic loses on the very states wee) have most condetently supported at the Law of the Sea Conference positions we deem &merited for the protection cf our national security hatereets. Finally, we beFieve enactment of the pro- posed legiadation would Vire stibetantial aid and consort to the hard line proponent; of delay -in late Conference. It ovoid lend cre- dence and Support to their argument that the long term trend in ceean law is toward a 200 mile territorial sea, evolved through is conscious parallelism of unilateral claims. In short, the prophesy of extended delays iu law of the sea negotiations, which some argue requires the proposed legislation, will, in our vieW, become self-ftiMtng prophesy if it ts emoted. If the Butted States now abandons its opposition to unilateral claims.ixs the ocean, we will inevitably be faced with an increas- ing number of competing, retaliatory or un- related claims impacting adversely on na- tional security interests. If, es we expect, enactment of this legislation tee:Mtn !al-ex- tended delay in the Law of the Sea negotia- tions, we Will have reverted to the uncertain and dangerous procedure of shaping a new legal order for the worldh Means try the proc- ess of claim and counterciatne, actioa and reaction; which hopefully eventually would coalesce tato ceadoenary international law. This is is dangerous way to remilate even economic relations -among states. Wit when the olatitObeght to affect the mobility of our strategic _ ?Old general purpose 11,reet, 12W risk invented ea the process of challenge is roach Metier. Tis.set the tation on this path toward resolution of el= pollee lamest is, in our view, batik dangelotie and exhremely einvelee. very ihrech appretiate this eppentunity to set forth the view* of the flepartrnent of Defense noltit respect tog, WK. end egipreci- ate the consideration I am sure they will Shelf. We feel that these s teps will alleviate many of the problems facing our fishing la- w. P. CLEMENTS, Jr. dustry, and we will coutt tee to seek other avenues to resolve the problems pending THE SECRETARY ?Yr COMMERCE, inultilaterel agreement in the LOS forum. Washington, D.C., F-ptember 25, 1974. We believe it important the the U.S. not de- Hen. firefeterr 0. lefameresow, stray the existing atmosphere of serious sic- Cit airman, Committee on COmmerce, U.S. gotiation in the LOS Conic rence by our own Senate, Washington, D.O. unilateral act. In that atmosphere the De- Deka MR. CHAIRMAN: 1 wish to express my deep concern over the possible enactment of S. 1988, ii bill to exit- d unilaterally the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States from the present 12-mile limit to 200 miles. As you know from rcy testimony before your committee, we in Commerce are ex- tremely concerned over the conditi6n of many of the fisheries resources off our shores. We are aware oe the need to obtain mere adequate conservation measures which will enable us to protsct these and other valuable resources. Ws believe that the United States must he--a the authority to mana,ge fisheries and other resources within a 200-mile economic zoae and, indeed, this summer in Caracas, the United States indi- cated its eupport for s 200-mile economic zone. However, Commerce 5rmly believes that the prudent approach to the establishment of a 200-mile economic zone is through a Law of the Sea international treaty which will protect our fisheries, the entire range of in- creasingly valuable mineral resources on the ocean bottoms and, of course, provide the rights of passage essential to the national de- fense. The LOS Confers. we is underway and making progress. We believe that the United States should pursue this solution of our fisheries problems further. We think it is not is. the national Interest to isolate the fisher- ies issue as S. 1988 would do. We are convinced that a unilateral declara- tion by the Untied States of a 200-mile Syne will create very- serious problems involving oor relations with other nations of the world and could indeed jeopardize the LOS Con- ference. It would be inconsistent with our historical position concerning international hew. Such a declaration might not be hon- ored by nations fishing off our coasts, thus creating major enforecment problems and confrontations which we must be prepared to face. It could lead te abrogation by other nations of existing fisheries agreements, one or the most critical being the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, which provides protec- tion to salmon of U.S. origin. It would be a unilateral abrogation of the freedom of fish- ing as set forth in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas to which the United States is a party. It could result In unilateral claims by other nations which could go substantially beyond fisheries policiee. Apart from the ob- vious national security implications, it could effectively destroy the progress made to date toward achieving a meaningful international settlement of fisheries problems. Needless to say, enactinent of the bill would have very serious adverse effects on our ins- tant water tuna and shrimp fisheries. receive from yore and your Committee. Because of the national security, diplo- matic, and commercial transportation impli- cations, end the adverse fisheries effects men- tioned above, we are compelled to oppose the enactraent of S. 1988, and we urge you to reconsider pushing ties legislation at this time. We recognize the need for immediate milts- ores to assist cur fishermen, In that regard, we have strengthened a number of the inter- national agreements which we have with other nations to protect U.S. fisheries re- sources. We am working toward provisional application of the fisheries chapter of the Law of the Sea Convention prior to ratifica- tion by countries. We have instituted new enforcement procederee designed to protect the living resources found on our Continental partment of Commerce representatives to LOS will be instructed to press forward dil- igently to a resolution of the problems of the conference. Because of the Implications of S. 1988 to the -foreign relations of the United States, as nientioned above, I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Senator Felbright. Likewise, because of the very seri eus concern that Commerce has; that the national security of the United States riot be impaired, as we be- lieve passage of S. 1988 will do, I am also forwarding a copy of this letter to Senator Stennis. Yours sincerely, DERICK 13. DENT. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr President, the Senate has the oriportneity today to con- sider the Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. This bill would extend the fishing zone of the United States to 200 miles to provide protection to our fish and marine resources. On behalf of the fishermen of Massachusetts, I want to thank the dis- tinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator MAGNUSON for the time and effort he has out into develop- ing and guiding this legislation to the Senate floor today. From the time Sen- ator MAGNUSON first introduced the Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act, over a year and one-half ago until it reached the Senate floor today, Sena- tor MiSoNBSON has sought the views of fishermen from all over the Nation in perfecting and refining this legislation. He brought the Senate Commerce Com- mittee to the fishermen and asked for their help. Hearings were held by the Commerce Committee :n all the major fishing areas . of this country including my own State to give those who know best, the fisher- men, a chance to tell of their problems firsthand. In addition, hearings have been held by the Senate Armed Se-vices Committee and the Foreign Relationt Committee to discuss every concern expressed by my distinguished colleagues on this legisla- tion. It has bean a long road but today we have the chance to act on this legislation which will end the abuse and destruction of one of our most valuable resources, our fish stocks. Today we have the answers to the concerns exprei-sed that the leg- islation might hamper our foreign rela- tions. Today we know that the best and the only way to assure that in the future we will have fish and marine resources to share with the rest of the world is to extend the fishing zori; to 200 miles and provide a management scheem to protect, these resources. During the course of hearings On the Emergency Marine Protection Act, sev- eral facts tecame clearer to all of those interested in the prekervation of our fish and marine life: First, that several fish stocks are now in jeopardy of extinction, and that the Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE commercial fishing industu is severely threatened if the depletion of the stocks continues; Second. that present treaty arrange- ments are ineffective to stop the devasta- tion of the resources because lack of ade- quate enforcement procedures.; and Third, that immediate, interim action Is required to reverse this critical situa- ? tion while international neptiatiorts are pending. Evidence has been gathered by the committees of the Senate which esta,b- fishes that haddock, herring, mackeral, halibut, and yellow-tail flounder are dangerously close to depletion beyond the point of self-renewal. Warnings from the Department of State, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- tion, and the National Advisory Commit- tee on Oceans and Atmosphere all point to the need for immediate ?action though some disagree as to the best way to achieve the Preservation of dwindling gtocks. The Advisory Committee stated in 1972; - FI ab. resources are limited . . the poten- tial exists in the world to destro.y these re- sources, and . . if our fisheries are not in fatal trouble now, they are going to be unless something is done about conserving the rtsaurce. Off the coast of Massachusetts, during the peak fishing seasons, American fish- ermen In 75-foot vessels are competing against factory-trawlers from other na- tions that number over 200 at one timp. The fishermen of New,England have been patient. They have waited for ef- fective enforcement of existing treaty arrangernente. 'They have tirelessly ne- gotiated with other members of the In- ternational Commission for the North- West Atlantic Fisheiles since 1950 to And a way or everyone to share equitably in the fish catch and at the same time preserve and protect the fish stocks from Whitton. laMally, in October of 1973, after two decades of discussing adequate manage- 'Vent of North Atlantic resources, agree- Merit was reached on quotas which would allow some stocks to begin to replenish themselves, not this Year, but in 1976. ?&Id al the while, the talk of quotas Continued, violations by foreign fisher- men cOntinued, the stocks continued to dwindle, and the New England fisher- mea Willed in Ille4 gear- There is no one among us that does not hope that the Law of the Sea Con- terenCO will arrive at a satisfactory so- lution to the conservation of the world's fish resources, 13ut that is a complex and slow process which became even more evident at the Caracas meeting. One hundred and forty-eight nations are dis- cussing 8() ocean issues, And while we cannot hope for a quick solution to any of these complex prob- lems, the encouraging note is that based on the most recent Law of the Sea dis- cussion,, it is clear that an agreement on fish resources will be suhstantiallY the same as the legislation before you today. The Senate Armed Services Committee report concluded; ' An undeniable Momentum exists for In- ternational acceptance of a 200 nautical mile fishing jurisdiction. S. 1988 would allow the United States to lead that momentum rather than be swept up by it. The Emergency Maxine Fisheries Pro- tection Act is in substance the U.S. posi- tion for the Law of the Sea negotiations. It was encouraging to us that our repre- sentatives to the Conference arrived at this position and presented it at the Con- ference. What does not make sense is that these same distinguished experts do not view S. 1988 as assisting and en- hancing their bargaining position at the Conference. The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro- tection Act is a conservation measure; it does not extend our territorial limits; it does not affect commerce or navigation; it simply allows management of the fish resources off our coasts. The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro- tection Act does not abrogate existing treaty agreements, in fact it encourages new, effective treaties to carry out the provisions of this bill. The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro- tection Act does not supersede any in- ternational agreement reached at the Law of the Sea Conference; it is an in- terim measure designed specifically to pass out of effect as soon as the Law of the Sea Treaties are in force. Most importantly, interim extension of 4he fishing zone is the only enforceable method of protecting fish and marine resources. Since the U.S. position for the Law of the Sea Conference is a fishing zone of 200 miles, it is clear that even- tually the United States is prepared to enforce the limit. The issue is when. The Senate Commerce Committee study sug- gests that for the most part, the exten- sion of the fishing zone will be self.. enforcing since most nations agree with extended fishing zones. In addition, the large-scale foreign fleet operations, which S. 1988 is designed to control are easily seen by fishermen and the U.S. Coast Guard and surveillance presents no ?impossible problems. The most serious concern expresed by some of my Senate colleagues on the issue of extended fishery jurisdiction was that it would have a detrimental effect on our national security interests. ,It is clear that S. 1988 does not alter the legal status of any vessel on the high seas; that it does not expand out terri- torial limits; that it does not affect the navigation rights of foreign vessels off Oar coast. The Senate Armed Services Committee, after thorough study con- cluded that the claims that foreign na- tions would retaliate by imposing terri- torial or transit restrictions on our mili- tary operations to be "exaggerated and without sufficient support." Thirty-six nations have already ex- tended their fishing limits beyond 12 miles and another 25 nations have indi- cated their support for 200-mile fishing limits at the Law of the Sea Conference. It is unthinkable that these same na- tions would use S. 1988 as a precedent for restricting navigational or overflight freedoms. The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro- tection Act of 1974 is not designed to hamper relations between nations, but to foster good will among all maritime nations which participate in the world fishing industry. It is not designed to ?S21105 draw a line around our country, but to encourage a reasoned, sensible, and co- operative approach for all nations to join in the conservation of our marine resources. It is not designed to be a permanent solution to a difficult prob- lem, but a temporary measure that will assure that when all the international negotiations are finished, there will be fish and marine resources left for the world to share. By passing S. 1988, the Emergeny Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974, the Senate of the United States is asking all the nations of the world to join with us as responsible cus- todians of the ocean's resources for all generations to come. Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, it is my intention to vote in opposition to S. 1988. I am well aware of the problems currently confronting our fishing industry, and I have long supported effective measures to deal with those problems. In February of 1973 I joined with many of my Sen- ate colleagues in cosponsoring a concur- rent resolution urging that steps be taken to provide adequate protection for our coastal fisheries against excessive foreign fishing, and supporting conservation and scientific management of fisheries re- sources within U.S. territorial waters. Mr. President, though I heartily ad- mire the thought and effort which the distinguished Senator from Washington and others have devoted to this bill, it is my considered view that S. 1988 is not the best way to accomplish these ends. This bill would be detrimental to the fundamental interests of the United States in a number of ways, as the chair- man of the Armed Services Committee has so ably pointed out in his report to this body. The United States is currently negotiating, through the framework of the law of the Sea Conference, a number of closely interrelated questions. One of these is clearly the national security is- sue, that is, whether or not our naval forces will be able to continue to move freely through international waters. Also at stake are our exploration and utiliza- tion of seabed resources, commercial shipping rights, and distant as well as coastal fishing interests. Each of these issues is carefully balanced during the current negotiating period,4and if we take strong unilateral action in one area, we are likely to have to make serious and damaging concessions in others. Mr. President, I would like to address myself for a moment to one of the spe- cific issues involved in this delicately bal- anced negotiating process: the issue of distant water fishing rights. A number of my colleagues who join me in opposition to this bill have expressed the view that if this legislation is enacted we will ex- perience "retaliation" from our neighbors in Central and South America. The proponents of the bill, in turn, have asked "Retaliation from whom?"? since our chief problems with excessive foreign fishing in our coastal waters come from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Japan. I would argue, however, that "retalia- tion" is not the proper term. What we are likely to experience is not "retalia- tion" but "Imitation"?imitation of a powerful nation like the United States. which by taking this kind of action would Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 S 21106 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11, 1974 be asserting the kind of leadership role sibilities of correcting the obvious over- which other nations were likely to fi thing. However, the Commission has re- follow. peatedly failed to live up to its mandate. As this body is well aware, Mr. Pr Si- Most recently at its Ottawa meeting dent we have seen this happen before list fall, ICNAF was presented with care- when the United States `has established fully prepared scientific evidence clear- a precedent of this sort When we adopted b detailing the rap,dly declining fish a 12-mile fishing limit in 1966, our iestion stocks in the Northwest Atlantic region. caused a proliferation among other Det- 1 et the Commission responded with only tions of extended claims to territorial a 3-year program to reduce the foreign waters. In like manner, if We enact the fishing effort--a pros :ram which will not legislation before us, we can expect that even begin to reverse overfishing until others will follow our example with 1975 or 1976. Moreover, the success of similar jurisdictional claims. If nations the Ottawa agreements are contingent such as Mexico and Brazil were to fol- upon strict compliance of all member low in our footsteps and severely restrict rations. Past prece:lent unfOrtunately our abilta, to fish off their shores, many indicates that such I: ompliance has not U.S. vesz;els will be forced to abandon been forthcoming and there is no reason their traditional fishing grounds and ta believe that it will be forthcoming return to the already heavily fished gulf in the future. area. The effect of this will be twofold: ICNAF's failure to regulate these for- first, to cripple Many of the small eign fishing endeavors, coupled with the shrimpers in Our Florida fishing Indus- decline of our domestic fishing industry, try; and second, to undermine the favor- as led to genuine interest on the part of able price on seafood and shrimp which Congress in establish ng a 200-mile con- Florida currently enjoys and instead to tinguous fishing zone Such a zone would escalate that price to every consumer effect only flehing xghts and not such The question / would put to the pro- rights as navtgation, free and innocent pOnents of S. 1988 is this: if our chief passage, or other time-honored rights of problems in this area are in fact with the high sea. Morec ier, such a zone is the SovietUnion, Japan and a few other seen as only an intierim measure con- nations, why should we take this diastic tingent upon future agreements to be step which upsets our delicate negottat- 'worked out at the Ii ternational Law of lug stariee and invites imitation all over the Sea Conference. It is expected that the world? A much more realistic em- the conference will recognize the marine proach under the circumstances is that resources off our coast as our property. put forward by the distinguished Sen- Mr. President, the United States can ator from Mississippi: to negotiate hi- no longer rely on the faith of foreign na- lateral agreements directly with those tions or on the effic,,cy of international few nations involved. I urge that we pro- egreements to save its fishing resources. ceed quickly along that path and that we If we are to save the n and the men and vote noll to enact S. 198o. women who harvest them, S. 1988 must kr. noomm. Mr. President, today is be enacted. Such action will not only pro- a day for which we in-New England have 'ride needed relief for our fishermen, waited anxiously. For today the Ben- but it will assure t se Nation and the ate will finally express its will as to the world of continuing availability of one need for a 200-mile fishing limit. I am of our most vital food sources. I urge my eOnfident that this expression will be colleagues to SUPPOrl. S. 1988. favatable. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President with Of the need for this legislation there the consent of the acting majority leader, can be no doubt. Our beleaguered fishing would like to keep ;I minutes before the industry has arrived at a critical cross- vote. The Senator from Mississippi (Mr. road. Not only are the men and women SeeNurs) wants to make a statement of who make up this industry becoming the position of the Armed Services Corn- increasingly and inexorably forced out mittee, which voted for this bill. So I of business, but the very product, they 'vould like to have 3 to 5 minutes before seek is tacreasingly--and needless13,--he- the vote on the bill to allow him to be coming extinct. able to say something. This state of affairs has been brought Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well. about by the tremendous increase in the Mr. PAST()RE. Why not have third fishing efforts of foreign nations off our seeding now? cOast..I'llet 10 years ago our New England Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well, fisherMen were responsible for over 90 reading. percent Of the total catch off New Eng- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The que,s- land. Now they account for less than 45 ion is on agreeing to the committee percent. This has all but shattered our amendment in the nature of a substitute, once thriving fishing industry and even is amended. more importantly, left our fish stocks The committee amendment in the na,- seroiusly depleted. When the effects of this huge foreign effort first became clear, I, like many of my colleagues, was hopeful that the In- ternational Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries--ICN'AF--could and would resolve the growing imbalances. Created to l'protect and conserse the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic in order to take possible the maintenance of a maximum sustained catch from these fisheries," ICNAF offered real pas- 5 minutes for the proponents and not to exceed 5 minutes for the opponents of the bill before the vote occurs and that the time for the proponents be in charge of Mr. 1VLsenusosr and that the time .in opposition be under the control of the Republican leader or his designee. The PRESIDING OFFICEste. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD letters that the proponents of the bill have circulated. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: U.S. SENATE, Docember 6, 1974, Dna COLLEAGUE: A vote in the Senate on S. 1988, the "Ifinergency Marine Fisheries Pro- tection Act of 1974" may take in the near Suture, By this letter, we wish to dispel the misinformation which opponents of this much needed conservation measure have used to prevent its paesage. First of all, it is conceded by all that im- portant coal species of fish off our shores are severely depleted and that, despite 22 fishery agreements with other nations, fur- ther depletion is likely to occur if a solution to the overffehing problem is not found soon. Since agreement on and ratification of a final, effective Law of the Sea treaty will not be achieved until perhaps 1980 or later, if at ell, unilateral action by the United States to pro- tect its fisheries must be taken If the fish off our shores are to be saved. In our view, the action proposed by S. 1968 will prevent fur- ther depletlon without tremendous cost; will not seriously damage mur security inter- ests; and reflects the current views of most coastal nations. Furthermore, the bill will not create "gunt oat wars" since it does not auto- matically or totally prohibit foreign fishing in the claimed 200 mill fishing zone. S. 1988 will prevent depletion of fishery re- sources. Patterned after the United States fisheries position put forward, in the UN, Law of the Sea conierenee. S. /988 would provide this nation with SOStnagernent jurisdiction over coastal and azoadromous stocks of fish. The bill is founded on the rationale that a coastal nation has a much greater stake in protecting the fish off its shores than do long disance fishing nations whose fleets can move elsewhere if the fish difiappead. With tnanagemene authority cut to 200 miles, the U.S. will be able to control the massive for- eign fishing effort it cannot now control. S. 1988 will not damage our national secu- rity interests. Statements that other nations may, or wiil be entitled to, "retaliate" by curtailing tido freedoms of navigation and overflight are both highly speculative and without foundation. First of all, why would other coastal states which also want extended fisheries jurisdiction have any desire to "re- taliate" in any fashion? Approximately 86 coastal nations have extended their fishery limits in the ocean beyond 12 miles, the existing limit of U.S. fishery Jurisdiction. In addition., another 25 to 30 nations have in- dicated their support for a 200 mile fishery limit in the Law of the Sea Conference, Consequently, S. 1968 reflects current in- ure of a substitute, as amended, was ternational thinking on the question of fish- agreed to, cry limits. Since this bill expressly preserves The PRESMING OFFICEIC. The ques- the freedoms of navigation and overflight d relates only to fishing, it is inconceiv- tion is on the engrossment and third able that oeher nations will, or could, effec- reading of the bill. tively use S. 1988 as a precedent for restrict- The bill was ordered to be engrossed ing navigational or overflight freedoms. Fut- for a third reading and was read the third therznore, there is simply no general world support today for restricting these freedoms. time. TIME LIMITATI ON AGREEMENT In 1986, wren the UB. Congress established the present 12 mile fishery limit (over similar Mr. ROBERT C. F,YRD. Mr. President, Defense Department opposition), no "retail- I ask unanimous consent that at the ation" took place. There is no reason to ex- hour of 3:30 p.m. there be not to exceed pect it if S 1988 is passed either. Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0 December 11, 1974 ,t CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S. 1988 would not be difficult or costly to enforce. Ironically, opponents of S. 1988 argue that a 200 mile limit would be inapos- sible and extremely e:ipensive to enforce. We must point out that the United States has stated in the Law of thedSea Conference that It would accept a treaty containing a 200 mile fishery jurisdiction limit. In other words, the U.S. will be patrolling a 200 mile limit sooner or later irrespective of what happens to S 1988. Nonetheless, we believe that the Coast Guard cost estimates are ,etaggerated and that fishery areas can be successfully policed at a more reasonable cost. First, many nations will respect our zone and to the extent they do, S. 1988 will be self-enforcing. Secondly, our own fishermen will do some of the surveillance since the foreign fishing operations which hurt fish stocks the most are easily seen, large-scale fleet operations covering broad expanses of water, usually in well-known fishing areas. And lastly, the Coast Guard cost projections Ignored the use of satellites and other re- mote sensors for detection of violaters, a cheaper method of enforcement than air- craft and ships. Additional vessels and planes will be needed, but at modest levels and cer- tainly not all at once. S. 1988 will not create a "fish war" danger. It j often said that ?5.1988 will lead to con- ilict somewhat similar to the recent "cod war" between Iceland and Great 1;5rjta1.s. That conflict was created because Iceland totally prohibited foreign fishing within its claimed $0 mile zone awl refused to nego- tiate with Great Britain to accommodate English fishermen's traditional fishing rights. S. 1988 is a completely different measure. It would not eliminate automatically and totally all foreign fishing within the 200 _mile limit. In fact, all existing foreign fishing done pursuant to treaty would be main- tained. Instead, it is the intention of the bill to negotiate with other nations to reduce their effoits to levels commensurate with conservation needs, while recognizing their traditional fishing rights. With the preferen- tial rights afforded our fishermen in the bill and with management responsibility, this nation will be in a stronger bargaining posi- tion to Control the foreign effort. As we see it, S. 1988 is the kind of bill the International Court would approve. We urge you to join with us in taking this vital step toward conserving and protecting our oceans' living resources. The continued viability of one of mankind'sprimary sources of food hangs in the balance. Sincerely yours, Warren G. Magnuson, Henry M. Jackson, John 0. Pastore, Edward M, Kennedy, Ethatind S. Muskie, Ernest P. Hollings, Thomas J. McIntyre, Ted Stevens, Lowell Weicker, Bob Packwood. 17.S. SENATE, Washington, D.C.?Deeernber 6., 1974, U.S. Senate., Washington, D.C. DEAR --: As you know, the Senate Com- mittee on Armed Services last week reported favorably on S. 1988, the "Emergency Fish- eries Protection Act of 1974", which would establish a 200-mile fisheries conservation management zone off U.S. coastal shores. llle COnauerce Committee earlier reported the bill faveratily after holding 14 public hearings here in Washington and in various coastal states. Foreign Relations Oommit- tee adversely reported the bill by a close 9-8 vote. Hopefully, S. 1988 will soon be on the floor for Consideration. By all appearances, the vote would be close. Senators from coastal fisheries states, most of Whom support the bill, believe this is a measure of critical importance to the sur- vival of our fisheriea, and we urge you to Join in assuring its passage. The three corn- mittees have compiled comprehensive infor- mation confirming the high degree of de- struction inflicted on our coastal fisheries by huge foreign fishing operations. The prob- lem Is recognized by our government, which has introduced fisheries articles similar to the provisions of S. 1988 into the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. Still, our State De- partment objects to any action on the bill during the interminable deliberations of the Conference. The fundamental controversy over S. 1988 is one of timing, not concept. Having served as a. Congressional Advisor to the U.S. Law of the Sea delegation, I support, the over-all effort and believe international law govern- ing the oceans is desirable. However, I also believe fisheries is one issue that cannot wait for the achieVement of a comprehensive treaty and that a temporary, emergency con- servation management move dealing with fisheries only, such as envisioned by S. 1988, will do no harm to ongoing negotiations. Those opposing the bill have reiterated the inflexible position held through the years that any zonal expansion by the U.S. could create a threat to national security. Mem- bers of the Committee on Armed Services faced this issue squarely during three pub- lic hearings. Despite high-level military testimony, including that of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the majority of the Committee concluded that the legislation would create no particular problems to na- tional security. Armed Services Committee Report No. 93-1300 is newly available and has had little time for circulation. Conse- quently, I am attaching for your informa- tion a copy of pages 4 and 5, which discuss national security considerations and state the Committee conclusion. Please call me if you wish to discuss this important bill further. Also, I have asked Bud Walsh (4-9347) and Bud Costello (4- 1251), of the Commerce Committee majority and minority staffs respectively, to cooper- ate in any way possible to provide your staff with any additional information requested. With best wishes, Cordially, TED STEVENS, U.S. Senator. TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974 AMENDMENT NO. 2022 Mr. HELMS, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 2022, in connection with the Trade Re- form Act, which I sent to the desk yes- terday and which has been printed, be considered as having been read, to meet the requirements of rule Axil should cloture be invoked or in connection with MR. 0'70, the Trade Reform Act. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the distinguished Senator from South Caro- lina (Mr. THURMOND) be added as a co- sponsor of amendment No. 2022: The PRESIDING OF.F.LCER, Without objection, it is so ordered. COMMUNITY SERVICES ACT OF 1974 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now% resume consideration of H.R. 14449, which will be stated by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (MR. 14449) to provide for the mo- bilization of community development and assistance services and to establi?h a Corn- S 21107 munity Action Administration in the De- partment of Health, Education, and Welfare to administer such programs. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time for debate on this bill shall be limited to 1 hour equally divided between the Sena- tor from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) and the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) , or their designees, with 30 minutes on each amendment and 10 minutes on any debatable motion or ap- peal. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and I ask unanimous consent that the time not be charged to either side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. , Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING 0.F.FICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr, NELSON. Mr. President, the Committee on Labor and Public Wel- fare unanimously reported the pending bill to extend the Economic Opportunity Act programs. The bill is titled "The Head Start, Economic Opportunity, and Com- munity Partnership Act of 1974." The House passed bill, H.R. 14449, to transfer the Economic Opportunity Act programs to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 331 to 53 on May 20, 1974. The last rollcall vote on 0E0 legisla- tion in the Senate took place June 30, 1972, when the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1972 passed by a vote of 75-13. The Head Start Economic Opportu- nity, and Community Partnership Act of 1974 extends the Authorization for anti- poverty programs under the Economic Opportunity Act for 3 years?through fis- cal year 1977. These programs include Head Start, Follow Through, Commu- nity Action, Senior Opportunities and Services, Emergency Food and Medical Services, Community Economic Devel- opment programs, and Native American Programs. The Office of Economic Opportunity itself would be continued until October 1, 1975. At any time after June 30, 1975, the President may submit a Reorganiza- tion Plan proposing to transfer commu- nity action and the other remaining 0E0 programs to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, except for the Community Economic Develop- ment program which would be trans- ferred to the Department of Commerce. In accord with reorganization plan procedures, either the House or the Sen- ate could disapprove such a reorganiza- tion plan within 60 days of its transmit- tal. If the President did not submit a reorganization plan, or, if either house of Congress disapproved it, OED would be- come the Community Services Adminis- tration, which would be an independent agency in the Federal Government. The legislation extends the authoriza- tion for local initiative funding for com- munity action programs, Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 S 21108 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE December 11, 19'; The committee-reported bill would re- tain the 80 percent Federal share with respect to financial assistance to com- munity action programs. This is the same as the current law's provision setting the Vederal share at 80 percent of the pro- gram costs for corrinuniitY action pro- grams. In accord with the administration's re- quest, the committee-reported bill con- solidates the legislative authority for the Head Start and Follow Through pro- grams within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in recognition of the fact that operational responsibility for such programs has been in HEW for several years. In addition, the bill includes titles re- lating to Native American programs and research programs along" the lines re- quested by the administration. The legislation adds a new section au- thorizing a community partnership pro- gram Of incentive grants to match to these lUnds made available by State and local governments for community ac- tion programs. The pending legislation does not ear- mark funds for particular purposes. In- stead it authorizes the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary?leaving to the appropriations process any spe- cific earmarking. HoWever, it does pro- vide that, if funds appropriated for local initiative community action in excess of $330 million, then half of any each ex- cess amount should go to the new incen- tive program to match State and local contributions to community action 3C- tivities. COMMITTEE COMPROMISE The committee-reported bill is a com- promise between the views of those who support transferring OED to HEW and those who support the continuation of a separate agency for antipoverty Pro- grams. The part of the legislation which involVed the most difficult consideration was the question of where the Office of Economic Opportunity should he located organizationally. At the present time, the Offiee of Eco- nomic Opportunity retains actual opera- tional responsibility for local initiative community action programs, community economic development programs, senior opportunities and services, and emer- gency food and medical services. But most of the other programs initiated by the Office of Economic Opportunity have the past several years been spurt off un- der delegation arrangements to other departments and agencies of the Federal Government. The bill which was passed by the House of Representatives earlier this session (H.R. 14449), provides for the programs which now remain under the administra- tion of the Office of Economic Oppor- tunity to be transferred to the Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare except for the cornintmity economic de- velopment Program which the House- Passed bill would transfer to the De- PareMent of Commerce. The bill I introdUced in the Senate (S 3870) was similar to the House-passed bill in propositii tti trartafer the remain- ing 0E0 programs to W. The other major bill was introduced by Senators JAVITS and KENNEDY (S. 3798). The Javits-Kennedy bill proposed creation of a new independent agency to replace the Office of Economic Opportu- nity as the Federal Government's anti- poverty agency. A large number of people Nation have urged the Congress to sup- port the continuation of any agency within the Federal Government to serve as the focal point for antipoverty efforts. Whether or not the Office of Economic Opportunity is este Wished as a separate agency within HEW or remains as a separate agency, there should be no doubt that there is broadly felt need in this country to have a strong antipoverty agency. Aside from the question of where the antipoverty agency should be located, the other major difference between the committee-reported bill and the House- passed bill is that the bill passed by the House reduces the Federal share for lo- cal initiative community action pro- grams from 80 percent in fiscal year 1975, down to 70 percent in fiscal year 1976, and then to 60 percent in fiscal year 1977. While the purpose of the House- passed phasing town of the Federal share is to encourage State and local contributions to cemmtmity action pro- grams, the impact upon hard-pressed 'State and local governments is to impose a severe fiscal imeact at a time when the state of the economy is such as to make it particularly difficult for State and local governments to budget for new activities which they have not budgeted in the past. To a limited ee tent, some State and local government have devoted some funds to commue ity action programs. The committee-reported, bill contains a new community partnership program which seeks to encourage and reward those States and local governments which provide increased funding for community action activities in the future. Under this new incentive program, funds would be provided to assist State and local governments which enter into arrangements with community action agencies to support activities and serv- ices in addition to those which have been provided by community action agencies. In other words, these activities would be supplemental to existing com- munity action programs. NEED TO CONTINUE TNE ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS The need for the antipoverty pro- grams authorized by the Economic Op- portunity Act hat; been underscored bY support from national leaders represent- ing a variety of viewpoints. They insist that we not abandon programs that have demonstrated their effectiveness in reaching out to help solve the problems of the poor, and have urged that the Federal Govern nent continue and strengthen. these programs. The Na- tional Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity concluded that even in nor- mal times federally funded antipoverty programs "are important in urban areas and indispensable in rural areas." President Ford stated in his economic message to the Congress of October 8: I know that low-iecome and middle- income Americans have been hardest hit hr Inflation. Their budgets are most vulneralne because a larger part their income goes for the highly inflated costs of food, fuel and medical care. Food, housing, and fuel costs, together constitute 82 percent of the increase in the cost or living. But they make up a 40 percent larger chunk of the budget of the low-Income family than of the aver- age family. For the poor, as well as for others, there is little relief in sight. As of the third quarter of 1914, the Wholesale Price Index was increasing at a 28.1 per- cent annual rate, and the price of indus- trial commodities has been rising at a rate of 20.3 percent, insuring higher prices for many necessary products into the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the 'substitution effect" that serves to cushion somewhat the blow of economic distress on middle- income families simply does not function below the poverty line. As HEW econ- omist John Palmer said in a recent study on the effects of inflation: The pocr have littlo or no fie xibili-07 to adjust to job or reel income losses: if the 'demand for unskilled labor slackens there tiro no loWer-paying jobs for which they can compete. :Lf the price of low-grade cuts of beef rises, there are no lower cuts to sub- StitIltk?. COMMUNITY ACTION Although community action programs were once highly controversial, they now enjoy wide acceptance and support from State and city officials and civic leaders from all .sections of the country, reflect- ing political persuasions across- the board, from conservative to liberal. Community action agencies clearly perform a unique and essential function not only in providing services to the poor, but in reflecting the specific con- cerns of the communities they serve. Lo- cal participation and flexibility are the cornerstones of the community action program. The community action program has been successful because it has been tai- lored to the unique needs of each local community. ? There are over 900 com- munity action programs at the present time. A total of 95 of these community action programs are public agencies op- erating through the local government structure. Other conimunity action agen- cies are nonprofit private agencies which are governed by boards consisting oi public representatives and community leaders. Community action agencies have been effective in mobilizing other Federal anci local resources. Thus, community action programs operate manpower programs and receive funding through the Com- prehensive Employment and. Training Act. In addition, many community ac- tion programs operate Head Start pro- grams and receive funds directly from the Office of Child Development for carrying our Head Start programs. The committee believes that one of the most important functions of community action agencies is to initiate innovative programs. In the past? CAP's have re- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For 'Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 becember 10, .194 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE nuclear safeguards. I do, however, ex- pect that the fiscal year 1974 nuclear safeguards budget for the ATMS Control an Disarmament 4ger4 and the sue- oesSor agencies-to the AEC?the Nuclear Regulatory bomrniSsion and the Energy Research and :Development Administra- tion?will provide enough funds to assure a vigorous international safeguards effort. /t would" be, a gross perversion of the world's prtiorities to suggest that a few million dollars,ie too high a price to pay for the maintenance of world order. The ACTING rarstoENT pro tern- pore. The bill is open to further amend- ment. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question now is on agreeing to the cOmmittee amendment, as amended. The cominittee amendment, as amended, was agreed to. The ACTING mp$IDENT pro tern- pore. The question is on the engross- ment and third reading of the bin. The bill was ordere& to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time. TheACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- . pore. under the previous order, the Sen- ate will now proceed to the consideration of an, 16609, Calendar No. 1234, which the clerk will state by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill Mil. 16695) to amend Public Law 93-276 to in ease the authorization for ap- propriations to the Atomic Energy Commis- sion in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. The ACTING IRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Under the previous order, all after the enacting clause is struck, and sub- stituted therefore is the text of S. 4033, as amended by the Senate. The question is on the engrossment of the amendment and the third reading of the bill. The amendment was ordered to be en- grossed and the bill to be read a third time. The bill was read the third time. The ACTING PrtESIDENT pro tern- pore. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass? The bill (H.R. 10609) was passed. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move that the vote be reconsidered. T C. BYRD. I move to lay that on the table, The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1974 The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Under the previous order, the Sen- ate will now proceed to the considera- tion of S. 1988, which the clerk will state by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows; , A faat (S. 190) to extend on an interim ? .trae luciseliction of the United States over *tatn ocean gess and fish in order to protect the domestic fishing industry, and for other purposes. The Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on Commerce With an Approved amendment to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof: That this Act may be cited as the "Emer- gency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974". ' DECLARATION OY POLICY Sue. 2. (a) Fumnees.?The Congress finds and declares that? (1) Valuable coastal and anadromous species of fish off the shores of the United States are in danger of being seriously de- pleted by excessive fishing effort. (2) StOcks of coastal and anadromous species which inhabit waters of the 3-mile territorial sea and the existing 9-mile con- tiguous fishery zone of the United States are being depleted by foreign fishing efforts outside the 12-mile combined zone in which the United States presently possesses fishery management responsibility and authority. (3) International negotiations have so far failed to result in effective international agreements on the conservation and man- agement of threatened stocks of fish. (4) There is danger that further depletion of these fishery resources will occur before an effective general international agreement on fishery jurisdiction can be negotiated, signed., ratified, and implemented, unless emergency action is taken pending such international agreement. (b) runeoses.?It Is therefore declared to be the purpose of the Crongress in this Act? (1) to take emergency action to protect and conserve threatened stocks of fish by asserting fishery management responsibility and authority over fish in an extended con- tiguous fishery zone and over certain species of fish beyond such zone, until a general international agreement on fishery Juris- diction comes into force or is provisionally applied; ,(2) to extend, as an emergency measure, the fishery management responsibility and authority of the United States to 200 nauti- cal miles; (3) to extend, as an emergency measure, fishery management responsibility and authority of the United States over anadro- mous species of fish which spawn in and fresh OT estuarine waters of the United States; and (4) to commit the Federal Government to act to prevent further depletion, to restore depleted stocks, and to protect and conserve fish to the full extent of such emergency re- sponsibility and authority, and to provide for the identification, development, and imple- mentation within 2 years of the date of en- actment of this Act of the best practicable management system consistent with the in- terests of the Nation, the several States, and of other nations. (c) Poraex.?It is further declared to the policy of the Congress in this Act? (1) to maintain the existing territorial or other ocean Jurisdiction of the United States withOut change, for all purposes other than the protection and conservation of certain species of fish and fish in certain ocean areas pending international agreement on fishery - .Pfrisdic lion; (2) to authorize no action, activity, or assertion of jurisdiction in contravention of any existing treaty or other international agreement to which the United States is party other than that necessary to further the purposes of this Act; and (3) to authorize no impediment to or in- terference with the legal status of the high seas, except with respect to fishing to the ex- tent necessary to implement this Act. DEFINITIONS Sec. 3. As used in this Act, unless the con- text otherwise requires? (1) "anadromous species" means those species of fish which spawn in fresh or estu- arine waters of the United States but which migrate to ocean waters; S 20956 (2) "citizen of the *United States" means any person who is a citizen of the United States by birth, by naturalization or other legal Judgment, or, with respect to a cor- poration, partnership, or other association, by organization under and maintenance, after the date of enactment of this Act, in accord- ance with the laws of any State: Provided, That (A) the controlling interest therein is owned or beneficially vested in individuals who are citizens of the United States; and (B) the chairman, and not less than two- thirds of the members, of the board of di- rectors or other governing board thereof are individuals who are citizens of the United States; (3) "coastal species" means all species of fish which inhabit the waters off the coasts of the United States, other than highly migratory and anadromous species; (4) "contiguous fishery zone" means a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States within which the United Slates exer- cises exclusive fishery management and con- servation authority; (5) "controlling interest" means (A) 75 percent of the stock of any corporation, or other entity, is vested in citizens of' the United States free from any trust or fiduciary obligation in favor of any person not a citi- zen of the United States, (B) 75 percent of the voting power in such corporation, or such other entity, is vested in citizens of the United States, (C) no arrangement or con- tract exists providing that more than 25 per- cent of the voting power in such corporation., or such other entity, may be exercised in behalf of any person who is not a citizen of the United States, and. (D) by no means whatsoever is control of any interest in such corporation, or such other entity, conferred upon or permitted to be exercised by any person who is not a citizen of the United. States; (6) "fish" includes mollusks, crustaceans, marine mammals (except the polar bear, walrus, and sea otter), and all other forms of marine animal and plant life (but not in- cluding birds), and the living resources of the Continental Shelf as defined in the Act of May 20, 1964 (78 Stat. 196); (7) "fishing" means the catching, taking, harvesting, or attempted catching, taking, or harvesting of any species of fish for any pur- pose, and any activity at sea in support of such actual or attempted catching, taking, or harvesting; (8) "fishing vessel" means any vessel, boat, ship, contrivance, or other craft which is used for, equipped to be used for, or a type which is normally used for, fishing; (9) "fishing-support vessel" means any vessel, boat, ship, contrivance, or other craft which is used for, equipped to be used for, or of a type which is normally used for, aid- ing or assisting one or more fishing vessels at sea in the performance of any support ac- tivity, including, but not limited to, supply, storage, refrigeration., or processing; (10) "highly migratory species" means those species of fish which spawn and migrate during their life cycle in waters of the open ocean, including, but not limited to, tuna; (11) "optimum sustainable yield" *refers to the largest economic return consistent with the biological capabilities of the stock, as determined on the basis of all relevant economic, biological, and environmental fac- tors; ? (12) "person" includes any government or entity thereof (and a citizen of any foreign nation); (13) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce, or his delegate; (14) "State" means any of the several States, the pistriet of Columbia, the Com- monwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the territories and possessions of the United States; (15) "stock", with respect to any fish, Means a type, species, or other category capable of management as' a unit; For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 S 20956 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGIESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 10, 1974 (16) "traditional foreign fishing" means longstanding, active, and continuous fishing for a particular stock of fish by citizens orf a particular foreign nation in compliance with any applicable international fishery agree- ments and with the laws of such foreign nation; and (17) "United States", when used in a geo- graphical context, includes all State, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY SEC. 4. (a) CONTIGUOUS FISHERY ZONE.-- ( L) There is established, for the duration of this Act, a fishery zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States. The United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management responsibility and authority within this contiguous fishery zone. (2) The contiguous fishery zone has as its inner boundary the outer limits of the 'ter- ritorial sea, and as its seaward boundary a line drawn so that each point on the line Is 197 nautical miles from the inner boundary. (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the fishery management responsibil- ity and authority of the United States within the contiguous fishery zone of the United States shall not include or be construed to extend to highly migratory species, except to the eittent Stich species are not managed pursuant to bilateral Or inultilateial inter- national fishery agreements. (b) Arenatoelous Sem-ea.?The fishery management responsibility and authority of the United States with respect to ,anadro- mous species, for the duration of this Act, extends to such species wherever found throughout the migratory range of such spe- cies: Provided, That such responeibility and authority shall not extend to such species to the extent found within the territorial waters or contiguous fishery zone of any other nation. (c) OENMIAL.---The United States shall manage and conserve, and have preferential rights to, fish within the contiguous fishery zone, and With respect to anadrerrous spe- cies of fish, pursuant to the reeponsibility and authority vested in it pursuant to this section, subject to traditional foreign fishing rights as defined and recognized in accord- ance with section 5 Of this Act. (d) REGULATIONS.?The Secretary is au- thorized to promulgate such regulations in accordance with section 553 of title .3, United States Code? as are necessary to implement the purposes of this Act. The Secretary is further authorized to amend suce regula- tions in the manner originally promulgated. FOREIGN FISHING RIGHTS SEC. 5. (a) GENERAL.,--The Seers ,ary and the Secretary of state, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, may authorize fishing within the contiguous fish- ery zone of the United States, or ler mead- Toulon!! species or both, by citizens of any foreign nation, in accordance with this sec- tion, only if such nation has traditionally engaged in such fishing prior to the date of enactment a this Act. (b) PecenesoNs.?The allowable level of traditional foreign fishing shall be set upon the basis of the portion of any stook which cannot be harvested by citizens of the United States. Allowed traditional foreign fishing and fishing by citizens of the United States annually shall not, for any stock, ex- ceed the optimum sustainable yield for such stock. ( C) RECIPEOCITY.?Trad I Uonal foreign fish- ing rights shall not be recognized nursuant to this section unless any foreign nation claiming such rights demonstrates that it grants similar traditional fishing rights to citizens of the United States within the cen - tiguous fishery zone of such nation, if any exist, or with respect to anadromous species which spawn in the fresh or estuarine waters of such nations. (d) Pnoccomzes.?(1) In determining the allowable level of foreign fishing with re- spe:t to any stock, the Secretary shall utilize the best available scientiec information, in- cluding, but not limited to, catch and effort stal istics and relevant available data com- piled by any foreign nation claiming tradi- tional fishing rights. ( 1) The Secretary is authorized to estab- lish reasonable fees which shall be paid by the citizens of any foreign nation engaged In exercising foreign fishing rightds recog- nized under this section.. Such fees shall be set in an amount sufficient to reimburse the Un. ted States fcr administrative expenses inc erred pursuant to this section and for an equitable share of the management and con- seration expenses incurred by the United Stases in accordance with this Act, including the cost of regulation and enforcement. (s) Peocierriole.?Except .. as provided in the Act, it shall Ice unlawful for any person not a citizen of tee United States to own or operate a fishing vessel or fishing support veseel engaged in fishing in the contiguous fishery zone of the United States or for anadromous species of fish. MALINE FISHERIES :MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVA- TION PLANNING SEC. 6. (a) Osmerners..--It is the intent of the Congress that the following objectives be considered and included (to the extent practicable) in plans, programs, and stand- ard s for the management and conservation of marine fisheries; (1) evaluation of actual and foreseeable casts and, benefits attribut- able thereto; (2) enhancement of total na- tional and world food supply; (3) improve- ment of the economic well-being of fisher- men; (4) maximum feasible utilization' of methods, practices, and techniques that are opt,mal in terms of efficiency, protection of the ecosystem of which fish are a part, and conservation of stocks and species; and (5) effectuation of the purposes stated in section 2(b) (4) of this Act. Due consideration shall be elven to alternative methods for achiev- ing these objectives. ( FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.-- TWIT, is established a Fisheries Management Coencil (hereinafter referred to as the "Council"). The Council shall consist of 11 Ind visual members, as follows: (1) a Chairman, a qualified individual who shall be appointed by the President, by and witi the advice and consent of the Senate; (1) three Government members, who shall be the Secretary, the Secretary of the de- par .:anent in which the Coast Guard is op- erre.ing, and the 'Secretary of State, or their dule authorized representatives; and (.1) seven nongovernment members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and wite the advice and consent -of the Senate, on the following basis? ( 1.) three to be selected from a list of qualified individuals recommended by each of the regional figneries commissions or their sue :lessors, one of whom shall be a repre- semative respectively of Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico commercial fishing ef- fort s; and (.3) four to be selected from a list of qualified individuals recommended by the Nal tonal Governors Conference, at least one of whom shall be a representative of a coastal Sta ,e. As used in this paragraph, a list of quali- fied individuals shall consist of not less than three individuals for each Council member to 1 e appointed. A used in this subsection, "qualified indi- vidual" means an individual who is distin- gut tied for his knowledge and experience in fisheries management and, conservation, and who is equipped by experience, known talents, and interests to further the policy of ibis Act effectively, positively, and inde- pendently if appointed to be a member of the Board. The terms of office of the nongovern- meet members of the Council first taking otliea shall expire as designated by the Presi.- dent at the time of nomination?two at the end of the first year; two at the end of the second year; and three at the end of the third year. Th term of office of the Chairman` of the Council Shall be 3 years. Successors to members of the Council shall be appointed in the same manner as the original members and, except in the case of Government mem- bers, shall have terms of office expiring 3 years from the date of expiration of the terms for which their predecessors were appointed. Any individual appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of any term of office shall be appointed for the remainder of that term. (C) POWERS AND DUTIES.?The C011.11C11 shall? (1) engage in the preparation of a plan or plans for marine fisheriee management and conservation; (2) provide information and expert as- sistance to States and local or regional fish- eries authorities in marine fisheries man- agement and conservation; (3) adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations governing the operation of the Council and as are necessary to carry out the authority granted under this section; conduct its affairs, carry on operations, and maintain offices; appoint, fix the compen- sation, and assign the duties of such experts, agents, consultants, and other full- and part- time employee as it deems necessary or ap- propriate; (4) consult on an ongoing basis (A) with other Federal agencies and departments; (B) with officials or coastal States 'who are con- cerned with marine fisheries management and conservation planning; (0) with ap- propriate officials of other nations which are exercising traditional foreign fishing rights, through the good offices of the Secretary of State; and (D) with owners and operators of fishing vessels; (5) enter into, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U.S C. 6), such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transac- tions as may be necessary in the conduct of its functions and duties with any person (including a government entity); (6) prepare a survey of fisheries subject to the emergency conservation and man- agement authority granted to the United States by this /1ct, including, but not limited to, depleted stocks and stocks threatened with depletion; and (7) survey, study, and prepare a marine fisheries management plan setting forth the elements of a national management system to conserve and protect fish. (d) REVIEW BY Coles:Reese?The Council shall submit the marine risheries manage- ment plan adopted by the Council to the Senate Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish- eries of the E:ouse of Representatives not later than 2 years after the date of enact- ment of this Alt. The marine fisheries man- - agement plan shall be deemed approved at the end of the first' period of 180 calendar days of continuous session of Congress after such date of transmittal unless the House of Representatives and the Senate pass reso- lution in substantially the same form stat- ing that the marine fisheries management plan 18 not falored. if the House and the Senate pass resolutions of disapproval un- der this subsection, the Council shall pre- pare, determine, and adopt a revised plan. Each such revised plan shall be submitted to Congress for review pursuant to this subsection. For purposes of this section (1) continuity of cession of Congress Is broken only by an adjournment sine die; and (2) the days on a/arch either House is not in ses- sion because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the 180-day period. (e) Mrseetneeteous.?(1) The marine fish- eries management plan which is adopted Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 A OF R lease 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 Vecember 10, 1974 after,reeiew by the Congxess is not subject United States under any lawful treaty, con- ' pprove os, e CQNGRESSIONAL RECOILU ? SENATE by the Council and ,W1110,11 bearMea effective to abrogate any duty or responsibility of the to review by any court. _ vention, or other international agreement (2) The Council khan. halve le, Seel Which which is in effect on the date of enactment shall be judicially recognized. of this Act. (3) The Adminlstratorpf General Services (C) BOUNDARIES AGREEMENT.?The Secre- Shall furnish the Ceuncil with such offices, tary of State is authorized and directed to equipment, supplies, and services as he is initiate and conduct negotiations with adja- aUthorized. to. furnish to any other agency cent foreign nations to establish the bound- er instrunientalitzqf, tb,e, United States. aries of the contiguous fishery zone of the (4) A member, of the Council who is not United States in relation to any such nation. otherwise en, emplo,yee of the Federal Gov- (d) NONRECOGNITION.?It is the sense of the ernMent may _receive $300 per diem when Congress that the U.S. Government shall not recognize the limits of the contiguous fish- ery zone of any foreign nation beyond 12 nautical miles from the base line from which the territorial sea is measured, unless such nation recognizes the traditional fishing rights of citizens of the United States, if any, within any claimed extension of such zone or with respect to anadromous species, or recognizes the management of highly mi- gratory species by the appropriate existing bilateral or multilateral international fish- ery agreement,s irrespective of whether such nation is party thereto. RELATIONSHIP To STATE LAWS engaged' in the actual performance of his duties as a. member pf the Council plus re- babureernent for travel, subsistence, and ether necessary expenses incurred in the performance (?,f such duties. Eaeh member of the CO14.4c1,1 shall be authorized. such amps afeareeneeeessa,rev to enable him to ap- point__,,ez?4 CelitileetXsate an adequate qualified MUlletnne, professional staff responsible and fealaject to his contrel, but not otherwise sub- t toCo. In the Council. (1) _TERserNsenee.?The Council shall Mee- fo exist 39 days after adoption by Con.. rets or the eaerifee fieheries plan pursuant to. subsection (c1) of this section. (g) AnT,Hoerz, /mom?There are hereby atItharieed, te be appropriated for the pur- poses 'of'thia. section a sum not to exceed (111,00,000 for each of the fiscal years ending Otine ao, 1975, and June 30, 1976. NATIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENTS GENERAL.?The Secretary of eetipon the request of and in 000pera- V42 t4e Secretary, shall initiate and ldkict negotiations with any foreign ne- n Wiesielleia engaged in, or whose citizene One 'eligaged-in, fishing in the contiguous a 20957 The amount of such civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary, or his delegate, by written notice. In determining the amount of such penalty, the Secretary shall take into account the nature, circumstances, ex- tent, and gravity of the prohibited acts com- mitted and with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and such other mat- ters as justice may require. (2) Any person who is found to have com- mitted a prohibited act and against whom a civil penalty is assessed under paragraph (1) of this subsection may obtain review in the. appropriate court of appeals of the United States by filing a notice of appeal in such court within 30 days from the date of such order and by simultaneously sending a copy of such notice by certified mail to the Sec- retary. The Secretary shall promptly file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which such violation was found or such penalty imposed, as provided in sec- tion 2112 of title 28, United States Code The findings of the Secretary shall be set aside if found to be unsupported by sub- stantial evidence, as provided by section SEC. 8. Nothing in this Act shall be con- 706(2) (e) of title 5, United States Code. strued to extend the jurisdiction of any (3) If any person fails to pay an assess- State over any natural resources beneath meat of a civil penalty after it has become and in the waters beyond the territorial sea a final and unappealable order, or after the of the United States, or to diminish the in- appropriate court of appeals has entered final rtsclictkm. of any State over any natural re- judgment in favor of the Secretary, the Sec- source beneath and in the waters within the retary shall refer the matter to the Attorney territorial sea of the United States. General, who shall recover the amount as- PROHIBITED ACTS AND PENALTIES sewed in any appropriate district court of the United States. In such action, the valid- ity and appropriateness of the final order imposing the civil penalty shall not be sub- ject to review. SEC. 9. (a) PROHIBITED ACTS.?It is unlaw- ful for any person to? (1) violate any provision of this Act or , fleecy Zone of the ,U,nited_4tata4 ar for Stelatle any regulation issued under this Act, re- treart.,4us: species.. .714.0 secretary or state, garding fishery within the contiguous fish- (4) The Secretary may, in his discretion, upon the reepiest of ancteinecooperation_ with ery zone or with respect to anadromousconditions, any civil penalty which is compromise, modify, or remit, with or with- the SePretarzehall in addition initiate and _species; ,out conduct negotiations with any foreign na- (2) violate any provision of any inter- subject to imposition or which has been im- ' tion in whose ,contigtious fishery zone or national fishery agreement to which the posed under this section. equiValent economic zone citizens of the United States is party negotiated or re- (C) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.?Any person who 'Matted States are engaged in fishing or with viewed pursuant to this Act, to the extent willfully commits an act prohibited by sub- Iteepect to arzadicanoust species as to which that such agreement applies to or covers section (a) of this section shall, upon con- Mich nation ,a4Perte . Management responsi- 'fishing within the contiguous fishery zone viction, be fined not more than $50,000 or 'Why and.authpritY enrj for which-citizens of or fishing for anadromous species as defined imprisoned for no more than 1 year, or the United. State, fiela,, The purpose of such in section 4 of this Act; both. negptiations shall .iffe,to enter into interns- (3) ship, transport, purchase, sell or offer (d) CIVIL PORFEITURE.?(1) Any district Venal fishery, agreements on A bilateral or for sale, import, export, possess, control, or court of the United States shall have juris- Multilateral basis to effectuate the purposes . , . . maintain in his custody any fish taken I policy, and provisions of this Act. Such violation of paragraphs (1) or (2) of this ,' ements mar include but need not be subsection where such person knew or had ' Itreited to, apeementsto provide for tbe . reason to know that such taking was not Ineelegerteent- end QQAPerVattenUf- lawful; (1), coastal species, which are found in (4) violate any duly issued regulation un- both_ th4 ereedeeenis fishery zone of the der this Act with respect to making, keep- United 5 t a.tea. and ,the equivalent such zone ing, submitting, or furnishing to the See- or a foreign nation adjacent thereto; retary any records, reports, or other infor- (2) anadrornous species, which are found niatim; during the coupe of their migrations in (5) refuse to permit a duly authorized ocean areas subject to the fishery manage- representative of the Secretary, or of the meat responsibility and. authority of more Secretary of the department in which the than one nation; . .. Coast Guard is operating, to board a fishing - (3) highly migratory_ species which are or vessel or fishing-support vessel subject to May be covered. by international fishery his control where the purpose of such re- agreements;? and quested boarding is to inspect the catch, (4) coastal species, which are found in fishing gear, ship's log, or other records or areas subject to the fishery management re- materials; or sponsibility and authority of any foreign na- (6) fail to cooperate with a duly au- Ilion, through, measuree, which allow citizens thorized representative of the Secretary, or ' of the United States to harvest an opera- of the Secretary of the department in which priate portion of such species in accordance the Coast Guard is operating, engaged in a with traditional Unitoed States fishing rights reasonable inspection pursuant to paragraph in such areas. ?(5) of this subsection, or to resist any law- (b) lememe.?The Secretary of State shall ful arrest. review, in cooperation with the Secretary, (b) Corn, PENALTIES.?(1) Any person who each treaty, convention, and other inter- is found by the Secretary, after notice and national fishery agreements to which the an opportunity for a hearing in accordance United States is party to determine whether with section 554 of title 5, United States the provisions of such agreements are con- Code, to have committed an act prohibited eistent with the purposes, policy, and pro- by subsection (a) of this section, shall be visions of this Act. If any provision or terms liable to the United States for a civil for- of any such agreement are, not so consistent, feiture in accordnace with subsection (d) the Secretary of State shall initiate negotia- of this section and for a civil penalty. The tions to amend' such agreement: Provided, amount of the civil penalty That nothing in this Act shall be construed ceed 25 diction, upon application by the Secretary or the Attorney General, to order forfeited to the United States any fish or fishing gear, used, intended for use, or acquired by ac- tivity in violation of any provision of sub- section (a) of this section. In any such pro- ceeding, such court may at any time en- ter such restraining orders or prohibtions or take such other actions as are in the inter- est of justice, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds in connec- tion with any property subject to civil for- feiture. (2) If a judgment is entered under this subsection for the United States, the At- torney General is authorized to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited upon such terms and conditions as are in the interest of justice. All provisions of law relating to the disposition of forfeited prop- erty, the proceeds from the sale of such property, the remission or mitigation of for- feitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informants with respect to forfeitures shall apply to civil forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under this felbsection, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this section. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other person with respect to seizure, forfeiture, or dispo- sition of property under the cumstoms laws shall be performed with respect to property used, intended for use, or acquired by activ- ity in violation of any provision of subsection shall not ex- is section by such officers or other ,000 for each ay of each violation, persons as may beat &lied for that pur- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R00050041 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 20958 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE December 10, 1974 S the nomination.f former Gov. Nelson pose by the Secretary of the department in CaDER TO POSTPONE S. 4033 o which the Coast Guard is operating. INDEFINITELY Rockefeller to be Vice President of the ENFORCEMENTUnited States. SEC. 10. (9) GENERAL.?The provisions of I ask unanimous consent that S. 4033 be I have known Nelson Rockefeller for Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, this Act shall be enforced, together with indefinitely postponed. many years. I have known him in his regulations issued under this Act, by the Sec- capacity as a distinguished Governor of rotary and the Secretary of the department The ACTING I. RESIDEN Pro tern- -a great State, as a functionary of the in which the Coast Guard is operating. Such pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Republican Party, as a candidate for the re ? Republican nomination for the Presi- Secretaries may by agreement, on 5, bursable basis or otherwise. utilize the per- sonnel, services, and facilities of any other Federal agency in the performance of sixth commis rEE mErnsinG DURING dency. I know him to be a man of integ- SENATE SESSION- rity, of initiative, and of energy. I be- lieve that he will be an extraordinarily ( b ) Pow Eas.?Any person duly ai i thorized Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, good Vice President of the United States, duties. pursuant to subsection (a) of this section I ask unanimous consent that the Corn- and I commend him to my colleagues for may---mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, their support on the upcoming vote on (1) board and inspect any fishing vessel with hearings scheduled on the D-2 this day, in this Chamber, contiguous fishery zone of the United States, during the session of the Senate today. I could elaborate at some length on my or ffshing-support vessel which is within the lands in Alaska, be authorized to meet or which he .has reason to believe is fishing The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- evaluation of this man and his qualitica- for anadromous species: tions and competence to serve in the high (2) arrest any person, with or without a Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, position for which he has been chosen by pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. warrant if he has reasonable ea:Use to be- . the absence _ a uorum. the President of the United States. I can be- lieve that such person has committed an act I suggest tne Mosinee ol q point out that Nelson Rockefeller comes prohibited by section 9(a) of this Act; The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- from a distinguished American family (3) execute any warrant or other process Pore. The clerk will call the roll, whose philanthropy has extended to vir- issued by an officer or court of competent, Tie assistant legislative clerk pro- tually every section of the country. We jurisdiction; and ceeeed to call the roll. in Tennessee have a particularly fond (4) seize st1,1 fish and fishing gear found Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, recollection of the contributions of the onboard any fishing vessel or fishing-support I ask unanimous consent that the order Rockefeller fatnily to the assembling of vessel engaged in any act prohibited by sec- for the quorum call be rescinded. the Great Smoky Mountains National tion 9(a) of this Act. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- Park and the contribution to the people (c) COITRTs.?The district courts of the Pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. of the United State tion over all cases or controversies arising s by that family. United States shall have exclusive Jurisdic- I recall in 1968 when Governor Rocke- nnder this act. Such court may issue all S. :3639 PLACED UNDER "SUBJECTS feller called me on the telephone and in- warrants or other process to the extent mac- ON THE TABLE" dicated that he fully understood that he essary or appropriate. In the case of Gum, was not my Choice to be the Republican such actions may be brought and such proc- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- presidential nominee, but asked whether ess issued by the District Court of Guam; in dent, I have been notified by Mr. MoN- I would arrange for him to meet Repub- the case of the Virgin Islands, by the District DALE that there will be no intention to licans in my State to discuss his pros- Court of the Virgin Islands; and in the case proceed with the consideration of S. pects and the possibility of finding min- or American Samoa, by the District Court 3639, a bill to provide for the develop- port in the Volunteer State, which I for the District of Hawaii. The aforesaid courts shall have jurisdiction over all ac- ment and implementation programs for agreed to do. youth camp safety, during the remainder Governor Rockefeller arrived, and I to the amount in controversy or the citizen- of this session because of the impos- was privileged to introduce him to the tions brought under this Act without regard ship of the parties. sibility of getting action in the other Republican State Executive Committee DURATION OF ACT body this year. and to most of the so-called Republican l SEC. 11. (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.?The ItTOVt- ask unanimous consent that that bill establishment. I found him. to be very eions of section 4 of this Act shall become be transferred to the calendar of "Sub- generous in his appraisal of the political effective 90 days after the date of enactment jects on the Table." situation. He was tmoffended by the fact of this Act. All other provisions of this Act The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tent- that I believed that he did not have a shall become effective on the date of enact- poae. Without objection, it is so ordered. single supporter in that group. But he inent. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- felt then?and I think this is an impor- (b) TERMINATION psrs.?The provisions of dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum. tent consideration in terms of his quell- this Act shall expire and cease to he of any Th_ e ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- fications to serve as Vice President?that legal force and effect on such date as the Law of the Sea Treaty, or other comprehe:a- pore. The clerk will call the roll. it was important that the Republican sive treaty with respect to fishery jurisdic- The assistant legislative clerk pro- Party have a choice and that it should tion, which the United States has signed or ceeded to call the roll, not become a party of rigid ideology; Is party to', shall come into force or is provi- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- that it should have a free choice among :tonally applied. dent, I ask unanimous consent that the a moderate, liberal, and conservative AUTHCRLEATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS order for the quorum call be rescinded, points of view. SEC. 12. Except with respect to section 6 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. I applaud him for that, because I be- and section 9 of this Act, there me author- HerHAWAY). Without objection, it is SO neve that our two great national parties ised to be- appropriated for the purposes of ordered. should be essentially nonideOlogical and this Act to the Secretary such sums as are that they should encompass a broad necessary, not to exceed $4,000,000 for ea,clispectrum of points of view ranging from of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1975, tenDITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE the liberal to the conservative. June 30, 1076, and June 30, 1971, and to the TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE ItWits my p Coast Guard is operating such sums as are leasure then to :present Secretary of the department in which the MORNING BUSINESS Governor Rockefeller to tile Republican each necessary, not to exceed $13,000,000 for eh Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- establishment in Tennessee and to hear of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1975, dent, I ask unanimous consent that there his sincere remarks in behalf of his own June 30, 1976, and June 30, 1977. be an additional period for the transac- candidacy. tion of routine morning business, not to As a mar. who possesses a broad and . e:sceed 5 minutes, with. statements there- successful range of experience both in Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. laresident, I suggest the absence of a quorum. ill limited to 5 minutes. and out of government, former Governor The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Rockefeller should prove to be substan- pore. The clerk will call the ron, objection, it is so ordered. , tially helpful in his new role. Already a The assistant legislative clerk pro- =0 man of na1onal prominence, the Vice ceeded to call the roll. President designate has become even NOMINATION OF NELSON A. ROCKE- better known to the Members of Con- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President. FET .LFR TO BE VICE PRESIDENT gress and the American people since his I ask unanimous consent that the order THE UNITED STATES for the quoruni call be rescinded. nomination on August 20. OF ?????111???.1=1110111.=......... to r. BAKER. Mr. President, I am Mr. Rockefeller has undergone what The ACTING pore. Without 0 ? koinA34-4.kasp.Noantie9i6k7poiCIARRIN1711300.880Rbtf08VO411ittie0the ITI?St e"rileiat". Approved For Rel December 10, 197.4 ? ingly detailed examination of any Vice Presidential nominee in our Nation's history. Both the Senate and Rules Com- mittee and the House Judiciary Commit- tee have devoted a great deal of time to hearing personal teStimony from the for- mer GOvernor on the widest possible range of issues. In these public hearings, Nelson Rockefeller has responded with directness and goodlwill. ? In addition, a T6561111 of testimony has also been heara Trbin Mr. Rockefeller's supporter's ancrhis adversaries. It would 4001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75 6380R000500410006-0 ESSIONAL RECORTY.--= ATE S 20959 tion of Nelson Rockefeller's nomination to be Vice President of the United States. I thank the leadership for giving me this opportunity to make these remarks. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS this nominee has been examined as thor- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, oughly and extensively as almost any I ask unanimous consent that morning nominee in the history of the country. business be closed. This has been one of the most exten- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without sive and thorough nomination hearings objection, it is so ordered, ever held. After such scrutiny, it is clear seem that every conceivable concern re- to me that the nominee is equal to the ' lating to MS fithess to serve in the sec- ond highest office in the land has been EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES President of the United States. addressed in the public hearings and in PROTECTION ACT OF 1974 Because of the nominee's personality the press. * ' ' '- 7he Senate continued with the consid- and involvement over many years in ? I think' it is a tribute both to the Vice eration of the bill (S. 1988) to extend many aspects of public and private life, President designate and to the members on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the hearings were necessarily more de- af the &nate 11-tules Committee that his the United States over certain ocean tailed, requiring the nominee himself to notninatfoii. has been ratified unani- areas and fish in order to protect the appear personally for 22 hours. I can tnousIy:fiy- that committee. I anticipate domestic fishing industry, and for other think of no individual who could have that the favorable action by the Rules purposes. withstood such an exhaustive inquiry Committee will be upheld in an over- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, more favorably than Nelson Rockefeller. whelmi4 Vote on the Senate floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum. Nelson Rockefeller has served the So7oISPOnents of the Rockefeller The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk State of New York and the Nation for , nomination outside Congress have urged will call the roll. almost 40 years. This is clear evidence MernigiVO join them in oppOtition be- The assistant legislative clerk pro- of his executive ability and his qualiflca- cauSOn their judgment, the nominee ceeded to call the roll. tions for filling the second highest office does net- ineet some standard of ideo- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, in the land. Any man who can serve logicareaty or has not expressed agree- I ask unanimous consent that the order 15 years as the Governor of New York raent on Some specific issue deemed of for the quorum call be rescinded. certainly has the executive qualities OVerririg importance. ? NO1VIINATION OF NELSON ROCKEFELLER Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I have re- viewed the hearings and the investiga- tion of Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice President of the United States. After careful scrutiny, it is clear to me that , ' ' The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without? needed to be Vice President. Itq.01,1s, to me, however, that these are objection, it is so ordered. Throughout his years of dedicated net the "criteria that a nominee must Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unani- service to the State of New York and this meet, 1 sus*peet that, if perfect ideologi- mous consent that Arthur Kuhl and Nation, his broad range of acquired ex- cel_ c,.41:4tibility were reatired, there David Keeney of the staff of the Corn- periences uniquely qualify him for the might be as many names in contention mittee on Foreign Relations be accorded office of Vice President. as there are Members of this body. In- the privilege of the floor during the con- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- deed, PYthident Ford solicited from the sideration of the pending measure. sent that a list of some of Mr. Rocke- Mem ers of the Senate and the House, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without feller's accomplishments appear in the froniIje dovernors, and from the public, objection, it is so ordered. RECORD at this point. aut1is for filling this office. I think Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, There being no objection, the list was it i `Meant that the name of Nelson I suggest the absence of a quorum. ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as RocleIler appeared conspicuously on a The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk follows: majo ty of such lists. itklieve that we should now proceed, and pSOceed promptly, to the confirma- tion qf his nomination. I applaud the ? leadeishiP of the senate for ordering this vot is afternoon. I intend to support an4 to Vote for the confirmation of the nora*e? The qlestion remaining is a simple one: 'bees 'Nelson Rockefeller meet the qualifiatiOns for the Office of the Vice ? Presf &it?as designated in the 25th ante ? believe that an affirma- tive answer to that question is obvious. objection, it is so ordered. will call the roll. As Governor of New York: The assistant legislative clerk pro- Expanded the State Univeristy to 72 cam- deeded to call the roll. puses. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- Proposed bond issues that built new park- dent, I ask unanimous consent that the lands and state parks. Instituted the first state financing for mass order for the quorum call be rescinded. transportation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Overhauled the state's welfare system for objection, it is so ordered. the first time in 20 years. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, Increased the state police force and I ask unanimous consent that S. 1988, the through a statewide prosecutor's office bore Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection down on corruption in New York. Act of 1974, be temporarily laid aside. In medicine, he led the way for adoption The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without of a state medical care program, created the bureau of heart disease, the birth defects institute, and two new state medical schools. Mrlegidellt, I have grave reserva- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, He created job development and authori- tioos -a qu't the 25th amendment. I do I suggest the absence of a quorum. ties to provide low cost loans for business ex- Mt XelleVe that it has worked well. I The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk pansions and to induce business to locate and ...., .._ believe fritithild. be changed, if not in will call the roll, expand in low income areas. fact repedle . Notwithstanding that, I The assistant legislative clerk pro- In housing, his administration completed believe that the requirements of the 25th ceeded to call the roll, or started almost 0,000 units for low income amendinefit Which are now the law of the Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, families and el Mated discrimination in housing, employ nt, and public accommo- ? land have lieeii tally met and satisfied by I ask unanimous consent that the order dations. the teStirnorly of Nelson Rockefeller and for the quorum call be rescinded. For senior cit ns he created a state office ther Viiiiie-Sseglirefbre the Committee on The PRESIDING Ortoteri-t. Without for the aging I luding property tax reduc- tion for the el rly citizen. vital areas of concern to the and his record of hard work shments in these fields qualify ntly to be Vice President. international area: rved under President Franklin Roose- as program director for the office of Co- ordination of Inter-American Affairs. He later served as Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. O Rules and' Administration of the Senate objection, it is so ordered. and the Judiefiry Committee of the House of Representatives. I believe that former Governor Rockefeller has more ? than met the standards designated ? therAi and that his past service indi- cates his potential to be of valuable as- ? sistance to our Nation in the years ahead. It is in the best interest of the entire country, then, that I urge the confirma- ?' ? Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. LONG be recognized for not to exceed 15 min- utes to speak out of order. The PRESIDING OFFICER: objection, it is so ordered. out These are entire coun and acco his im In S 20960 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0\ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE Dece:in ber He also served as Chairman of the :Enter- American Development Cannalesion whieh in- cluded all 21 Americau Republics. In 1950 he was named Chairman c)f the International Developnaent Ativieory Booad that developed the blue print for Axnerites) foreign asalstan.ce prow ant Mr. LONG. Mr. President, it is unfor- tunate that some of our Men-leers seem so obsessed with the wealth of Mr. Rocke- feller. The assumption on the part of some is that a man can be too rich or too economically powerful to be ft for the Presidency or the Vice Presidency. I think it would be well that we focus attention on some of the man's very fine contributions to public life and in the way in which he has used his wealth for the improvement of his Nation, hie com- munity, and his neighbors. The privacy of his family has beer,. in- vaded for the purpose of completely ex- ploring his wealth. Attention should now be focused or the quality of his public life, whine is extensive. The acelemplishments of Nelson Rocke- feller are extensive and impressive. And, it goes without saying that he had a ful- filling and: highly successful career as a public servant. We would be fortunate to have Nelson Rockefeller as our Vice President. The country certainly needs a Vice President in these crucial times of domestic and economic difficulties. I hope that his confirmation can be accomplished expeditiously. TAX HAVEN ASPECTS OF AMERI- CAN-OWNED SHIPPING OPERATED UNDER THE LIBERIAN FLAG Mr. LONG. Mr. President, on Prie.ay, November 29, 1974, there appeared in the Washington Star-News a very thought- ful article by James It. Polk, discussing the tax haven aspects of American- owned shipping operated under the Li- berian flag. I would commend it to ray colleagues. It is especially significant because comes to cur attention at a time w n the Nation generally feels that the er- national oil companies have be per- mitted to make excessive profits d es- cape with little or no tax pa ent to this Government on their operties abroad. What some of us ire been hearing for many mon ow is that a great deal of so-called scene profits of the international oi Y ompanies are being sheltered in their. oreign shipping companies which ar 4:Separately char- teredi under separat ations and semi.- ate corporations in e cases. At a time when American labor is fighting for the pilvilege of a mere hand- ful of jobs on seine of the tankers bring- ing oil to America, it will arouse resent- ment to learn that the most privileged people on Earth, the internatioaal jet set and the international wet set?these who spend more time in bathing suns than they do in business cloth?are permitted by this Nation to more their money around from one tax haven to another, paying no income tax anywhere s dies any time an .American labor man One change in the tar reform\ asks for a job, repeal the exemption for overseas I have lived long enough to learn Lilat Proate and require that the earn t iere are usually twD sides to an argu- reinvested in the same f( reign operationff elude taxation. ? to ent. Nevertheless, I raust confess I have The elect of the repel, if passed, is still e. 'eat difficulty in seeing why thaw v. ho rather foggy. One staff expert on Capitol Hill o.'e privileged to export capital produced said, "I don't think moet et the members b e hard-working American labor, hiring Tully grasped it." their labor in the f -mine-stricken na- The secone pr poseS a more senous bans of Asia and A [rice at the going peril to the tax ter. A caego 'bin, backed wage paid in those countries, should not by shipping i and American shipyirds, aa some point pay some reasonable would require ? at 30 percent of the oil Ira- amount of taxes to some government Ported into s country be, carried on IT S. tankers. somewhere. Senators will be interested That b bitterly fought by American oil t,c learn that the Liberian merchant ma- compant already has passed both houses, ri tie is being eperatee out of a building d o Senate approval of a 'conference across the street from the White House. report is needed next week before They May be somewhat surprised to the eacure goes to the White House, find that the Liberian merchant marine ed abort the bill's Impact on tanker hes been represented ?;ar more effective- trations in Liberia, Lininger said, "That's lit in the White House and the State t hard to foresee. I don't see how it could helpaBut how much it will hurt eventually. I Departerient than the American me don't kn?.wt. ci ant marine. The Liberian tax operation has been The Americans who own the Lib profitable for International Bank for a eurn- rn rchant marine are people abou ber of years. Ltninger dalined to say how we should learn a great deal e. profitable, bet he did say, "Frankly, [ask unariinious consent been an extremely satisfactory and worth - de to which I refer be in.e,e in the while investment." Rreorte at this point. A financial filing by Ieternational Bank Mere being no olan , the article with the Sectirities and Exchange Commis- sion includes this statement: the RECORD, The International rrest Company of Liberia acts 88 the maritime administrator BELIPpiNG: BANK Liberia, which activity is the major source rif TAX HAVEN of its income. . . . The total income of the . Polk) International Trust Company constitutes substantial portion of the total income of all S eank has a little- ) col the foreign subsidiary hanks." oncession to operate a How much is a substantial portion'? That or Anericarnowned sine- ws:least:el nation of Liberia. isn't answered, But the total foreign income and earnings for Interhational Bank's over- the Inn. oil industry sail seas properties last year was listed at just tankers wider the flag of under $2 lignites. pe income saxes through loop_ sines of tie Atlantic. However, ties is still nos a big cut of all was ordered to be prin as follows: )0P1-10LES BEN8FIT II HERE Runs Ian (By J. Washington- known, long-te Major tax have pir.g in the Afr The giants many of t Liberia to holes on a he Afri lit -I- Hoc ing ritime admit istration of Viet sultry is run, in effect, from an r office looking eown on the White om the International Bank's build- 1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW. e International Beni: Ltd., a parent of First National Bank of Washington, Is a Is ncial chain owning most of the stock of in International Trust Co. of Liberia, Which not only handles the ship registration in that Eat-on, but also acts as tee tax colleeter. Fad T. Lininger, a p)lite, white-haired Am -rican financier who is a senior vice presi- dent of International Blink, carries a chug tite : he is also, by long- term appointment, the senior deputy maritime commissioner for Liberia. Tie International Bane subsidiary's (-en- trees to serve as the Maritime Administration in African tax shelter' in apparently lu- crative. Its income doper is on the level of shie registrations--in effeet, the bank gets e, cut of the tonnage tax i ayme.ats--and ac- counts for a substantia' piece of all the basens foreign earnings. The tax haven in Liberia exists because US law doesn't cover mirseas earnings in the 3hIpping industry by 'oreig-a-based sue- sista ries of American firma - At a result, a dozen or tore oil ram/sante) hate created foreign offsheots to own tankers regi) tered in Liberia to Ca 'ry their crude (Al the ugh seas. of International Bank's profits. The com- pany is a major owner of Financial General Bankshares, a local banking chain which con- trols the First Rational Bank of Washington. Union Trust Company, Arlington Trust Com- pany, and Clarendon Bank ee Trust, as well as the Bank of B affalo and the National Bank of Georgia. Because of the tax advantages, Ltberia, which is located on the western curve of Africa, hes the largest merrhant fleet in the World. Steel, auger and aluminum com- panies, as well as private shipping tyecrons, join the oil giants in registering vessels Under that country's Bag. The International Bank operation pro- vides the services for firms to set up foreign corporations ta Liberia, administers the maritime law teem and handles the anneal ship taxes and other assessments. "They collect It as the government's agent," Lizsinge:? said. in addition to the initial registration fee, Liberia has an ennual tax n a dime per ton on a ship's cargo capacity. However, a tanker bringing oil from the Middle East a half-dozen times a year would pay three times that amount in Ane -dean port fees alone. The big advantage is found in income taxes. Liberia doesn't tax the earnings of its ships. And there is a large loophole in the U.S. income tax. A, last count by the 7r.S, Maritime All- It works this way: If tl.ri profits which min etration, American-cc etrolled firms lied the American oil conmen lee pay their can ) et tankers flying the flag of Liberia, with foreign snipping subsidiaries are left over- another 79 such tankers eader construction, sea;;, they avoid 'U.S. taxes 'cause of a spe- T1 e tanker "Statue of Liberty" is actually eine 1962 exemption for such shipping op- a Liberian vessel, owned a 7 an American oil ere-tame. company. Sc IS the "J Pail " e Even if tee profits are breuiebt back into hi lips Oklahoma" and he "Esso Berlin:" this country, rl-ey can be sheltered by the Te proposals now peeding on Capitol foreign tai. credit. Most of the royalties le however, threaten this tainshelter_ se 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380:00660-0411 OU0bLU- - v the Middle East hiring labor under virtual slave conei- tons, while screaming loudly a,bo it sue- Yei Approved. ForRelea ? Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks In that connection, a current survey Of young pebple made by the Rand Youth Poll? which has monitored trends among those in their teens, college students and young mar- ried couples or 22 years?is worth attention. Almost thr,? in four-72 percent of the teen-agers po e4:1--regard high spending as something that' s actually good for the country. They se ci reason for stinting so long as they have means to buy. Of those 'polled, '7 ercent consider them- selves and their frien wasteful, but it does not seem to bother the ? 74 percent say the Subject of thrift is seldo eferred to in their homes or schools; 64 perc t of them do not look upon conservation an rift as matters of much importance. Such reactions are not pa cularly sur- prising when you stop to cons r that the -average annual per capita spen g among teen-agers has gone up from $278 1950 to more then $800 estimated for 1974. Eighty-six percent of the teen -a s in- cluded in the survey (which, by the wa was a nationwide sampling) feel that a h er and higher standard of living--which t define as more arid more possessions?is primary goal of the American system. sixty-three percent consider disruptions in the production of goods and dislocations in supply and demand as temporary. They do not believe there are serious shortages in the U.S. Of those interviewed, 83 percent say they have always regarded the nation's nat- ural resources as inexhaustible. - Nearly all of those surveyed know some- thing about the depression years of the '30s. But 62 percent are convinced it can never happen again. They Speak of such built-in "stabilizers" as Social Security, unemploy- ment ccapensation and insured bank ac- coUnte. rm explaining why they don't put much stock in saving money, 54 percent cite the large number of Government and private pension Systems, -profit sharing by cora- pariles and health programs as assurance that their retirement years have been comfortably provided for. Analyzing his figures, the president of the Youth Poll, Lester Rand, concluded: "Thrift as a 011ie went out of style among this nation's youth as the spending booms _of the '50s, '60s and early '70s accelerated. The old proverb, 'a penny saved is a penny earned' has been completely outmoded. "Young people easily justify their over-all wastefulnesS hY claiming that it contributes to greater consumption and therefore bene- fits the ecOlio_My as a whole." In the affluent days before the Great De- pression, a distinguished American poet, the late Conrad Aiken, wrote: All lOvely things will have an ending, All lovely things will fade and die, And youth, that's now, so bravely spending, Will beg a penny by and by. Subsequent developments gave his words the ring of prophecy at the time they were written. Now the results of the Rand Poll suggest that in the minds of many young people the prophetic verse has become hollow. They seem to be. convinced that the piper has been paid in full, and in advance. RISING CRIME RATE HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI or IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, November 19, 1974 Mr. DERWINSKI, Mr. Speaker, the public is justifiably concerned and frustrated over the rising crime rate and the difficulties that the police face in defending the innocent person from criminal- attack. During the recess, columnist Vernon Jarrett of the Chicago Tribune very properly analyzed this subject of urban crime in his penetrating article of Octo- ber 23. The column follows: You CAN'T JUSTIFY CRIME OF MURDER (By Vernon Jarrett) I don't care how poor, or how uneducated, or how ill-housed the murderer may be, society must never accept poverty or func- tional illiteracy as a justification for the willful, callous slaying of innocent people. Underscore that word "justification" be- cause what may begin as a sensitive, logical, humane explanation of -a crime-producing situation often concludes as a tacit approval of murder. ffeel deeply and resentful about that sort of confused "socioeconomic analysis" be- cause I have witnessed too many instances where the murderer is given more sympathy and understanding than his brutalized vic- tim. This is, indeed, a strange phenomenon. r an example, a black teen-age product of t ghetto can take a gun and blow a hole th the head of a black father, mother, or chi lso a product of the ghetto?anti he imme ately finds that he has friends from the u r strata of society. Not o will the brutality of his crime become mized and lost in the ozone of social ana is, the criminal may find that watchdog ci mittees may be formed to in- sist that he d others like him get fair treatment sho he be imprisoned. And more tha likely, somewhere there is a group of "conce ed citizens" who will help arrange for him t et an early parole and a speedy rehabilita n, and maybe a good job?in some insta es dtawing salaries higher than those of ual competence who never killed a fly. I'm all for fair and hu ane treatment for prisoners, and I consider abilitation pro- grams a must. I contrib to and shall continue to participate in sp al educational programs for prisoners. But I think it remarkable at I rarely find any committees formed or a programs designed to help the victim of c inal as- sault and murder. However, I have heard many re rts on the plight of parents whose chilcire were assassinated in street gang warfare; p ants of maimed child victims who didn't di mediately; those parents who didn't h ye the money to even make a daily visit to t county hospital by public transportation parents who had to borrow to buy burial space and a cheap casket, They become the statistics of urban sociol- ogy while the killer is humanized. At the same time there has been estab- lished a perverted system of assessing the seriousness of ghetto-related murders. Even in the eyes of some black spokesmen, the life of a black person murdered by a white per- son?particularly a cop?sudden becomes more valuable than a person killed by a black, By the same token, there are white citizens who become tlisturbed by the "viciousness" of a murder of a white by a black gunman but are not truly disturbed when a white truck driver is murdered by a fellow white trucker in a union strike dispute. Arid in other fuzzy minds, the seriousness of an assault depends upon the social status of the victim. I have heard self-appointed analysts of the ghetto speak lightly of crim- inal acts if the perpetrator is poor and the victim lives in a middle-class neighborhood. These distorted assessments of murder run counter to the black tradition. Despite what E 6717z the mythmakers write and say, the black tradition is one of resistance to destruction? particularly self-destruction. That resistance can be traced to a preoccupation with the threat of racial extinction which forever pre- Sented itself in a multiplicity of forms, in- cluding poverty. But since poverty, like illiteracy, was so widespread among blacks, it was not accepted as an excuse for self-destruction. As a Southern-reared black youth I recall vividly how black people reacted to death? especially untimely and senseless deaths. Blacks could accept death and rationalize Its value. But one thing they never ration- alize its value. But one thing they never ra- tionalized or forgave: murder, anybody's murder., I do not choose to reject that tradition. It is needed now more than ever. ATHLETES HONORED BY McKEESPORT GROUP HON. JOSEPH M. GAYDOS OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, November, 20, 1974 Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Speaker, each year a McKeesport organization honors select- ed individuals for their contribution to the world of sports. The testimonial, sponsored by the McKeesport Athletic Sports Association, is one? of the most popular community events in the area for it gives the stars of yesteryear an Opportunity to renew old friendships in an evening of fellowship. I was privileged to be one of the guest speakers at the 1974 banquet, sharing the program with McKessport Mayor John Pribanie; Richard Bowen, McKeesport High School football coach; Samuel R. Vidnovic and Steve Lesko, toastmasters, and Father Robert Pietrzynski, pastor of Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Natrona, Pa. Honored by M.A.S.A. for 1974 were: McKeesport National Bank Awards? Howard "Paddy" Peckman, Eugene "Lefty" Hollar, Nick Butcher and Robert Ludwick, baseball; Joe Bazzone and Chuck "Irish" McLaughlin, boxing; Wil- liam Laughlin, Vic Dietrich and Bob Ward, football; George "Ganzy" Bene- dict, Helen Gaydos Murray and Millie Gaydos Barry, all sports; Andrew Toth, umanitarian; Herman Levine, sponsor- s p; Morris "Mushy" Gerendash, pro- m r; Eddie Rack, golf; Dan Kelly, soc- cer; Duane Dowden, swimming; John "Di " Ulm, cartoonist; Bobby Lloyd and Domi 'ck "Cookie" Donato, softball; Jules ro" Micklo, organizer, and Rudy Wheato bowling. Joe 0 rcich District 15, U.S.W.A. Awards ieorge "Pete" Goshio, all sports; Sa "Apples" Clay, football; Bill Callaway, b ketball; Joe "Goofer" Vuk- manic, offici ; Russ Hoffman, football and softball; ohn Sullivan, promoter; Tom Manning, ponsor; Pete Damarsky, mushball; Sta 'Ukasik, baseball; Joe Lupo, youth recr tion; Wilburt "Webby" Klein, softball* J n "Honus" Lux, bowl- ing, and Dave Cu en, sportsman. Julius J. Lenart gh School Awards? Dave Farina, baseball and basketball; Mark Yazwa, baseball and foptball; Rich Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 ^ T 6718 Os-- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000g041008i01,'7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks November 20, 1974 Hofstetter, swimming; Joseph Gaydos Congressional Award--Elroy Face, for- mer ace relief pitcher for the Pitt.sburg Pirates; Al Duffy Daily News Baseball League Award?Neal Mechling: Merlill Granger American Legion Baseball Award--Dave Farina; Ellis Morgan Bile- cial Award?Gerella's Gorillas, fait club for Roy 'Oerella, star placement kicker for the Pittsburgh Steelers; Mike New- man McKeesport Boy's League Award? :Danny Wertz, and M.A.S.A. Golden Quill Award?Thomas D. Mansfield, Publisher of the Daily News. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure I call the athletic achievements of these gentlemen to the attention of my col- leagues in the Congress of the United States: THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFER- ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA HON. LEE METCALF OE MONTANA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES WedriesdaY, November 20, 1974 Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, as our representatives prepare for the second session of they Third United Nations Con- ference on the Law of the Sea, which convenes in Geneva on March 17, we should note that a single thread runs through preparatory meetings and the first session in Caracas this past sum- mer. That thread is that mobility of our defense forces is our No. 1 priority as we negotiate with other nations on the broad question: Who oWns, or is re- sponsible for, two-thirds of Earth, the oceans, and the land beneath? That mobility is our No. 1 priority is a matter of record. At page A30 of the Washington Post of August 30, 1974, the chief of our negotiating team, U.S. Spe- cial Ambassador John R. Stevenson; was quoted as saying: The No. I priority is the mobility of our naval and air forces and the importance of retaining our nuclear deterrent. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that this n.ewsstory be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the news story was ordered to be printed ire the RECORD, itS follows: SEA-LAW CONEEONCE CLOSES IN DEADLOCK (By John Virtue) CARACAS, August 29.?The third U.N. Sea- Law Conference ended in deadlock today and the conference president said there was little hope of drafting a new treaty governing the use of the sea at a follow-up spring session in Geneva. Conference President Hamilton S. A:sclera- singhe of Sri Lanka indicated that are many as three more sessions might be needed by the 148 participating nations to obtain a signed treaty in 1975. "There has so far been no agreement on any final text on any single subject or issue." Amerasitighe said In etc:Sing the conference, which exiled its 10-week session deadlocked on the four key issues needed for a treaty to replace the current 17th-century sea code. "I am convinced, given the best will in the world, it will be physically' Impossible for us to finish the drafting of the treaty by the enn of the spring session in 1975," he said later at a press conference. elarlier this week, the conference agreed to reconvene in Geneva Mafch 17 to May 3 mil then to return to Venezuela in midsum- me r for signing a treaty, if one is negotiated by then. Amerasinghe indicated, however, th it another session might have to be sq teezed in between Geneva and Caracas. /chile most delegates 'said publicly that th conferetece 'had achieved the expected, th ty privately expressed disappointment at th ) slow progress .and the gulf between the po talons of the rich ineuetrial nations and th 3 poor developing ones. Che devision between the delegations knew lir ideological bounds. The Unted States and the Soviet Union vet re the leaders of the industrial nations, and China backed-The aspirations of right- wi rig South. American at ilitary dictatorships. l'he conference became deadlocked on four key issues: Perritorial limits: the developing nations, led by Ecuador and Peru, insist on virtual so rereign control over all activities within 20) miles of thesr coasts. The industrial na- te ns, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, favor giving coastal states full con- Del over a 12-mile limit but opening up a fusther 138-mile economic zone to fishing as d scientific research by other nations. Deep sea mining: The developing nations went preferential treatment in mining co- belt, copper nickel and other deposits through a strong international authority, welch would set its own rules and decide wno mined where. The industrial nations wint the rules written : ito the treaty. Pollution control: The developing nations went mild contsols for I;hemselves and hard re es for the industrialised nations, who they say polluted while ach: eying their develop- ment. The industrial nations want uniform in ternational standards . Straits passage.: This is the key Soviet and U S. issue. Both want freedom of passage fcr their warships and merchant fleets D rough the more than 100 straits in the w wid. The straits nations, most of them de- veloping once, want control. "The No. 1 ptiority is the mobility of our neval and air forces arid the importance of is tabling our nuclear deterrent," said U.S, tecial Ambassador john R. Stevenson ri cently. Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), here briefly ii r the conference, pred.icted that the Senate w :mid not ratify a treaty that did not guar- a:itee free passage. Stevenson, in a wind-up news conference, espressed confidence that a sea treaty could be signed in Caracas if enough hard work Is d me in Geneva. "There is no cause for bill- is. g the conference a failure," he said. "We certainly did no:: come to Caracas ex- p ecting to go back with a signed treaty," said 7 anza.nia's J. S. Wariobe, expressing the feel- ii .g of many delegates, But we had certainly come expecting to acnietre more than we have." Amera.single cautioned the nations against ti tieing any unilateral action before a treaty it negotiated. Li thus, ie echoed Stevenson, mho warned that any e:stension of U.S. fish- ing limits by the Senate could touch off unl- it teral action by other nations. There are several bills in Congress to es- t end the fishing limit to 200 miles, a concept 0.ficially opposed by tee United States tel tie conference Ecuador and Peru, I. to hardliners among t le developing nations, claimed a 200-mile I mit in 1952, eouchints off the "tuna war" with the ITnited States. Some 200 U.S. fishing t -awlers, most of them from San Diego, have leen seised during the past 10 years in the e isputed waters. The two South Amer lean nations said their claim was simply an estension of the Tru- ian Doctrine, under which the United States in 1945 claimed control over the seabed re- sources of the continental shelf, which ex- tends beyond 200 miles from the coast in some parts of the Atlantic. The two Pacific nations have virtually no shelf, so they claimed a 200-mile limit instead. Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the De- fense Department has based at least part of its case on a claim that extension of the territorial seas would close more than 100 straits around the world to vessels vital to defense or commerce. There is evidence that this claim is questionable. The evidence is in the hearing record of the Senate Committee on Armed Services early last month on S. 1988, the bill to extend the fishery resource jurisdiction of the United-States to 200 miles. It is in a statement by Dr. Frank E. Carlton, president of the National Coali- tion for Marine Conservation, Dr. Carlton made the point that, of the straits which might be closed by a 12-mile territorial sea, only 16 "could have importance and that nine of those are either nonessential or fall within, the territory of our military allies." Dr. Carlton's statement continues: Of the remaining seven, all but three either offer no significant targeting advantage or are too shallow (Malacca) or dangerous to approach submerged (Sunda). To Dr. Carlton's statement was ap- pended a paper by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, dean, the John Hopkins School of Ad- vanced International Studies, Washing- ton, D.C., and director of the Johns Hop- kins ocean policy project. I commend Dr. Carlton's statement and Dr. Osgood's paper to my colleagues who are sincerely interested in this com- plex subject. I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the RECORD at this i There being no objection, the state- ment and paper were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as- follows: STATEMENT BY DR. FRA NR. E. CARLTON I am Dr. Frank E. Carlton, President of Use National Coalition for Marine Conserva- tion, Inc. The Coalition is a national conser- vation organization committed to the pro- motion of rational poll-tine and legislation as it affects ocean use. The purpose of this piper is to demon- strate that there are alternative views to the somewhat adamant and tntractatble opposi- tion to immediate passage of 5. 1988 ex- pressed by the Departments of State and Defense. Information for this statement is restricted to unclassified material immedi- ately available to the punlio, e.g., the SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Jane's Fighting Ships, 1973-74, Jane's Weapons System's 1972-73 and the annual Military Balances, published by the International Institute oi Strategic Studies. Specific rebuttal to certain Defense Depart- ment arguments relies heavily on a recent article by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna- tional Studios in Washington, D.C. entitled "U.S. Security Interests and Ocean Law" published in. Ocean Development and In- ternational Law, the Journal of Marine Af- fairs, Volume II, No. 1, Spring, 1974. Specific comments with regard to State Department arguments draw heavily on an article by David C. Loring entitled 'The United States- Peruvian Fisheries Dispuien which appeared In the Stanford Law Review, Volume XXIII, February, 1971. For the purposes of this dis- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extension.s of Remarks cussion, cOmments will be limited to the context of international political and stra- tegic considerations; germane fisheries is- sues will not be considered. The specific con- cern of this statement will address points previously raised by Defense and State De- partment representatives and which will un- doubtedly be reiterated before the Senate Arms Services Committee. State Department arguments may be sum- marized in four general points. Immediate passage of S. 1988 would: (1) Increase international political ten- sion, (2) Deter a successful outcome of LOSC'75, (3) Be detrimental to the long range in- terest of "all" U.S. fishery interests, and (4) Be a violation of International law, Defense Department arguments may be summarized in three basic points. Immediate passage of S. 1988 would: (1) Add to "creeping jurisdiction", (2) Cause the loss of significant sea and air mobility necessary to our defense, ? (3) Lead to an international chaos of ? unilateral action and reaction. The fundamental thrust of a rebuttal to these allegations can be expressed in three general observations: (1) the strategic necessities cited by De- fense have been vastly overstated, (2) increase in international political ten- sions, doubtful outcome of LOSC '75 and in- creasing complexity of international rela- tions are realities, already in a state of active evolution, which will probably occur in the same temporal context regardless of this (S. 1988) or other legislation enacted by the United States, and, (3) the conclusion that should follow from points "1" and "2" is that certain rigidities in our foreign policies and military attitudes have demonstrably caused the U.S. to underestimate the vital importance of do- mestic and international changes in her eco- nomic and military capacity to be a global power and to continue her position as a leader in international politics, indicating that fundamental reassessment and change in these areas is necessary to maximizing the probabilities and potentials for continued world peace. Defense Department officials have stated that 'U.S. security requires free transient through straits and the right of military overflight. It must be pointed out that the distinction is not between the terms "free" and "innocent" in so far as strategic consid- erations are concerned. In reality the rele- vant comparison must be between "free" and "secret". Defense contends that the invulner- ability of U.S. SSBN's and their indispend- able role to our defense depends on their legal right to secret passage. Dr. Osgood's scholarly examination of the 121 interna- tional straits listed by the Department of State that would be nationalized by a 12 mile territorial sea demonstrates that there are only 16 that could have importance and that nine of those are either nonessential or fall within the territory of our military allies. Of the remaining seven, all but three either offer no significant targeting advantage or are too shallow (Malaccal or dangerous to approach submerged (Sunda). Dr. Osgood's analysis reveals that only Gibraltar and two Indonesian straits, Ombai-Wetar and Lorn- bak, are strategically significant areas which might be politically questionable if a 12 mile territorial boundary were established. Pres- ent political relations with Indonesia as well as Spain and Morocco are complex and will undoubtedly become more so, but clo- sure of the Indonesian straits would not pre- vent the submerged passage of our subma- rines into the Indian Ocean. Passage through Gibraltar is only necessary to the physical Interruption of surface traffic through the Mediterranean. On a nuclear deterrent basis the entire USSR can be targeted from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Araban Sea. Approved Dr. Osgood's studies clearly demonstrate that the physical and political necessity of free transient through international straits is not supported by objective information and should certainly not be considered a non- negotiable item inhibiting international agreement on ocean use. ' Further detailed analysis of other relevant considerations: To what extent would surfoce transient impair in vulnerability of SSBN's? Would detection and destruction of United States' SSBN's after passage through straits significantly alter U.S. second strike capacity? Will the Trident system affect our need to use the international straits in question? All lead to the conclusion that the absence of "free transient" through straits would not seriously weaken the c6ntribution of U.S. SSBN fleets to our strategic nuclear deter- rent. Aside from this line of reasoning, it must be further pointed out that logic as well as experience indicates that the concept of innocent passage is actually related to com- mercial vessels on grounds of navigations safety and anti-pollution. If there is any real question that the transient of a war- ship might not be innocent, one must wonder why any nation would sign a treaty per- mitting unimpeded passage, or conversely, how such an agreement would deter any na- tion from "necessary" military action against such passage? Obviously, strategic signifi- cance is related to a capacity to place SSBN's in secret positions which Dr. Osgood's analysis demonstrates does not depend physically, or certainly legally, upon "free transient". Thus, the core of the Defense Department's posi- tion, as well as the forced extension of their argument to a fanciful relationship between a 200 mile economic zone and passage through international straits, brings grave question to bear upon the validity of their position. On the other hand, a relevant positive con- sideration is that if restrictions of innocent passage were imposed upon the world at large they would in fact work significantly greater hardships upon Russia's defensive and aggressive capacities than upon the U.S. Rational and qualified answers to the various State Department assertions with regard to the deleterious effects of immediate passage of S. 1988 have been presented before other Congressional committees and are presently available. Detailed reiteration of these specifics are therefore neither neces- sary nor appropriate; however, it is vital to point out that attitudes underlying the position of the Departments of State and Defense, which now dicate their opposition to extend jurisdictiion; manifests that same attitude and rigidity which has character- ized U.S. performance in international re- lationships for the last 25 years and which has materially contributed to the difficulties the U.S. faces today. The record of this per- formance does not inspire confidence in the ability of this country to deal wisely and fairly with regional conflicts and political confrontations. The 200 mile issue itself is an excellent example of the United State's steadfast opposition to a concept and physical reality that will shortly become the accepted world norm. The Defense De- partment's archaic and illusory attitudes to- ward the necessity of maximum mobility to maintain our defensive security and the De- partment of State's insistence to under- rate the importance of harmony with less developed coastal nations, have been re- lated to and supplied further impetus to- ward th total problem of decline in the United State's capacity to maintain a global posture as an economic and political force and its acceptance by other nations as a world leader. The clear schism between the realities of our domestic priorities and our rapidly changing international capacities and re- E 6719 sponsibilities necessitate change. The tra- ditional attitudes and methods that created the Peruvian fisheries dispute remain very much in effect to this date. In discussing the Peruvian fisheries issue David Loring states, "the background and growth of the dis- pute ... can be attributed largely to a series of mistakes by the United States." In asking the Senate Arms Committee not to support the position of the Department of Defense and State we recognize the cata- cylsmic disruption with historical precedent such an event would require. Nevertheless, a change of this order is necessary to the reality of maximizing any eventual poten- tial for continued world peace. The National Advisory Committee on Oceans and At- mosphere's third annual' report dated June 28, 1974 stated in its foreword, -"This year NACOAA worked with the consciousness that our society may well be on the threshold of a major discontinuity in human history? from a world in which natural resources such as food and energy, and . . . and the regeni- tive capacity . . . seem to exceed effective demands, we appear to be moving toward a state of affairs in which consumption and utilization of vital resources are generating new stresses and strains at home and abroad. To contain the resulted instabilities we must respond to unprecedented demands on our capacities to manage natural resources." It is my respectful contention that these considerations are more vital to our national interest than those unsupported allegations made by the Department of State and De- fense and do not, in fact, jeopardize either our international relations or our strategic defense. To the contrary, the Congress should recognize that the continued threat of pas- sage of S. 1988 has been one of the more positive and constructive forces impinging upon international negotiations on ocean use. It must remain for the Congress to forcefully counteract a long tradition of policies and practices which have demon- stratably worsened domestic and interna- tional problems. Only the Congress itself can bring the necessary forces to bear to insure the necessary changes. I earnestly entreat the committee's consideration of these alterna- tives. U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN OCEAN LAW (By Robert E. Osgood) Abstract?This paper discusses the need for reassessing U.S. security interests in the developing laws and practices concerning the use of ocean space. The nature of these secu- rity interests is identified and their impor- tance is weighed in terms of U.S. foreign pol- icy interests and the requirements for main- taining those interests. A projection is made of the international political context within which the U.S. must act over the next decade. Estimates are made of the effects of different ocean regimes on U.S. strategic nuclear in- terests and other security interests. Conclu- sions are offered concerning, from the stand- point of U.S. security interests, the desirabil- ity and feasibility of resolving various ocean jurisdictional issues by means of the pro- jected law of the sea treaty. 1. THE NEED FOR REASSESSMENT There is generally a presumption in favor of the primacy of security interests in a na- tion's foreign policy. U.S. ocean policy is no exception, but the conception of security un- derlying this policy has greatly expanded from the apparent emphasis on military mobility in the period leading to the U.S. Draft Seabeds Treaty of 1970 to include a major concern with unhampered commercial navigation in the present period before the prospective international Law of the Sea Conference in 1974. Actually, what appears to the outsider as the initial dominance of avowed military needs?particularly the need for "free transit," as opposed to merely "innocent pas- For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 E Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CO:r4GRESS101N.A L RECORD ------ 1....Ictensions of :it 41." through inte.rnetienal sit at ? aa a'S,- 'Vtq,YS 1Fit ri.e stelae stike a epieUibt6; rate of the Deteirtmeat ,st Defense ane Mee, when 1:he ferineleeem. of It el. ,:icean pol could still tie esewerfully aliected by a sj ogle f art :HEM I r rl..t itt in a kee position P7 that seat ,ite, wad tea:, ,arktical co erre ienee dig sed et:AA:vine comp:Mated is cc in testes er mil- eceurity naide, cieepeiiiee? arid LI, overshadow e more: f teatereened object:a e et: all te mdivienais mid ge ? e vibe ,ft mote inbiee1,41 in Cite 'fel Mt :ration. cif the Deaf t ecaleses :ate This ob,ective was to bring a ea::tt area of gr- a-ing i Ott ietitikei Cl ek tele. tially eleorde sonflier. ader of lasernationd law ane iieerteaStener Me:ali- t ions before it ':VaS 400 11:f ,.;e. "PIA reet re it, th6 State Department:, ehr National Secturity Ceence, eird, foe th it matter, ei tee On-, partmeet ,el De.e rise as y: ell, tie:: acilievereent of an i eterratleinal tr iate estaeliele se: .Lta ro,v? continentit Shelf 1ettestiarte aiterna- II -I tjt nietricteW,;ti u a he espeeiatisio. ocean le:sour:le, reweee, exuloiLati01.1. ear ecol1 ine. detesicier,,,ek,e, aed neer:rational regulatory inaele eery wes seen 1:13 SerVitig: Americae .kaacieikel it- Learnt rallilltaitli:ag eangenim, relativere peiteeful in era'! etivirotik=ne..t.uw fitri tiiat the narrower intereses cii Deffie were net ned at corresponding to the lie her inteireet et the Meted States OA preten ing rut era of inter- national coneiet rev:eh/1[1e art une compet- ing claims: to ocean eerreory nu reeeurces, a hapPy ice As tee proseectiv( 1::74 7.,Tat:,011S it or the Set' Conlere' C aperoar let, how- 00' '1 experte e kek,vern- some parts of the teepiented acean commenay :inside the eerie-lament ?litere come to think that this eonekieemse it:PingPi" titq/py: The feer that Drne has itself loelaid into exeess4 rely rig le pt item on free transit It rough strs its, which at not iticliepeasable Ameri:ceit eaterity WI lien /nay jeop ske th r: ! of the kind v.' eainitaar internaleieel arder that is essential to it.melea's inotelet eceen el-lane 'the prevuiti. il olieestpttotcio ii ' is that the prieciple it a Ailffiped4ki Ltttys!'' thr011:ii,,h straits as become more mi.- p( int tnen ever becsetee ehe. growing patented. threat Ito petroteunt aad eone In eer-eelI tranee. given it preemeet of 'stet- extive" interpretatioes of mit 'C': neesegffi lit '-1 teai . recasts:07er, 0 tee in tricaee pa leera of ieternationel give ami Lake tele; clierac- terizee t:he barreinher feed neskeitiA,,:iie!: proc- ess on oceen law, tut WI, Wring S. commit- ment to free trarteit etre teethe es rather than weakens the nrospece t. achievine: a useful Cr aim iffienelve :414 fl?..ar-f,,kiliVel,'Stk,F Saw of the sea treaty. Iti rrin:?,,,,stito; the cektcorne ot Vec deli- palely balanced bareatreng and eitgotiating oe law of ti le sea issues, evert the esiperts in- side the government mesa rely on teaselled lit eleelffire about the essentially elen-onies Of a ccariptex isettesti precese and feeders are at a disie,; vantage lit.htdglnp the fasternovieg state et the ga,ree. ilt't 1111 the eature ol Americart security interests at eleike tU 0001111 laW it iS tO ovorvieVr that mair al. least show tee full range of teem, Interests and sueetee some priorities among them. es lit tele attSesstneut cutM, tack at altous to classified data is mush lese leepetient than one's perepective on ihe iQiltical eignificance itt 'weIl-,trtoWtt events and d:evelopmeets open to public eetetiny. Prete thus. per iresetive have undertaten an as sesement ter U.S. se- ckery intereete at stale; in the developing laws and practices cot cerning ,the use of I,,') ean spacee Peolootes at end of a tide. Remarks November 20, 1974= The a,monat of tecluiesel detail involved in a ?:,,?ssintt the U.S. militate security intercete tIltkeierin regimes is (lisp nportionate to the nestlee importance of sere:eh?' military Cons' eels/ate:me. The 'heels g esented here coo- F-,' no to the now coavaational view that ter moot impertant se:etrity interests at ffiee.e. in the law of the era treaty are much Pt. ader than purely millaty interests. 'Inc ;cy question I wish to eteninate is wheth- er she official 0,5, posit- en may jeopardize tee broader interests in kit-tempting to pro- the narrower ones er whether, on the otleir hand, as the Lop U.S. ocean officials seitetatn, the law of the sea provisions in- ter 'led to proteet US, military intereets (at rticularly, free transile are indispensable erving the broader it k.erests (particular- 11e unimpeded passwe ef petredeurn ship- el:er,) as wee. 2, ITS OCEAN: 55(1.1h,,TY INTERCSTS 11470 U.S. security laterests la the use it e ocean were articuleted largely in terms naval inability, and the legal require- meets of mobility Were 'formulated ? largely it terms el "free -reamer through inter- reelonal straits. A. number of these straits ? kild become territotial waters permitting "innocent, passage" ror American war- e: s if, as expected, a twelve-mile terri- e al sea boiled:try were embodied in the ree,Y international law of the sea treaty that the Malted Stales MIS committed. to 1.1:ieve. Moro nereowly stele the advantage of free transit over innomkt pat-cage was de- tre sd largely in terms of the maintenance of ? terican strategic n mileter capabilities nigh the ma anountied underwater pas- of neclear-powered submarines carry- nuslear mitts lea (SO Mee) Less emptie- r Led in public etatements were three other ets :.tritts Interests: a) Most imp:okitant a' nag these was the of territorial sea boundaries. el were seen to be in danger of expand- lee far beyond twelve miles, up to 200 miles, k her the lailt enee o. Latin American t ndary claims, the assertion of anti-pol- l. kon zones (eat by Canada), and the proc- of "creeping jurisdestiene that would :ind the assertion of anti-pollution end resource-exploitation zones to claims of ? iltorlal s(ttereiglity.: Is) Seldom artietilatee in public was the de lit of military Overflight, (bo which not even IT-' ecent passage applieSi over key Interna- Iia eal straits. c) Not mentiened at all but, one must Irsdearly surmise, of some significance, was Ii a right to emplace an t-submarine listen- ! devices cm the continental shelf, 'hatever may be sand?on taetical-bu- iffiratic as well as substantive policy tunde?for the seeming priority of military ity iniereete at the time, subsequent di opmenie le the international environs les at affecting the law of the sea treaty and Aecrican ocea..ri interest e hare called for a its sseseineut or U.S. ocean security inter- ns ; In a ht:rger fratIMWC,AC. of time and cir- ieeastances. tiliS larger framework, one C1641, see that; the United States needs to use fear 'zones of wean span----the seabed, sub- 'I 1.face, surface ak.kei simetedjacent air?in (m- ese to support four kinds of functions that :hie the United Strees to sustain ins- tent domestic and foreign interests: a) The maintenance ef an adequate itt's- II to nuclear capability in relation to the capability. !hi The enairrienance ef all adequate ea- ty to project Awe/teen forces overseas in Ii ated warn.' c) The Maintenance rif adequate lateln- get ce and military serveilleace Capabilities. cl) The protection hi peacetime of U.S. et. seas, Conuneree, act. se to critical re- ere trees, and a variety of specific policy ob- jectives OVerSeaS. These functions can be regarded as com- ponents of U.S. national security insofar as they support American military security, im- portant external interests, :?ind the well alit of American citizens abroad read at home. This Is a broad and rather amorphous defieition of security, since the objects to be securecl go far beyond the territoriel integrity of the United States Itself. But the definition is in accord with the trernendottis postwar expan- sion of he AilleriCall conception of natiolial security beyond the traditional core values to encompass the security of allies, a wide range of foreign commitments and other concerns, and an internatiemal environmen- tal environment congenial to the protection of these haereete. To be sure, the nation is moving toward a more limited and selective interpretation of its securey interests in its current phase of moderate retrenchment and introVersion, particularly insofar as' these in- terests require the use of armed force. But having acquired global commitments AS the dominant counterpoise to the rival super- power, the United States is not about to re- vert to its restricted pre-World War II con- ception of national security. 3. 'FOREIGN POI. :a Coerre'ssr One's assessment of the importance of these various security functions depends, first, upon one's estimate of the impact of the changing international environment on America's vital foreign interests and on the requirements of maintaining these interests against possible threats I a them. Enough time has now passed since the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, the American with- drawal from the Vietnam war, and the rap- procbenient with China to make some reason- ably confident, although becessarily fallible, conjectures about the nature of American security policy and its international environ- ment over tile next decade. It is now clear that the foreign policy in- stituted and consolidated' by the Nixon ad- mit-listen-tem looks toward the maintenance of the (IS. position as a superpower with global interests, global political /military commitmente, and global influence, but at a moderated level of expellee and diminished direct (especially military) involvement. This posture can be described as retrench- ment without disenga,gemente Toward this end, the Mist foreign concern of the U.S. government is to orchestrate a global windy. s vim?? di of interlinked agreements and under- standings with the next strongest and poten- tially most dangerous State in the world: the USSR Diplomatically and politically, it seeks to promote this aim through approach- meat with the Peeples Republic of China, the normalization and stabilization of relations between the two Gernianys, the control of superpower competition in the less developed Third World, and the inaidation of detente from the superpowers' involvements in this area. Economically, it seeks to promote the global modus vivendi through the transfer of capital and agricultural goods to the Soviet U:teon in order to sustain a Soviet policy and regime committed to detente. Militarily, it aims to untiergird the global modus vivendi with stabilieatton of the U S.-Soviet military balance Rnd moderation of the arms competi- tion through mutually acknowledged strate- gic, parity codified in SALT and, more prob- lematically, with mutually agreed limitations on European forces, coupled with joint oppo- sition to the emergence of new independent national nuclear forces. The Nixon administration's second con- cern is to reconstruct he relations with America's major allies?the NATO countries and Japan?so as to give them a compelling interest in participating in the new detente relationships with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on somewhat re- vised terms: greater diplomatic independence and Initiative, accommodation with the United States of inerei6Sillitly Clivergent trade arid monetary interests, and increased con- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410009-0 November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks E 6721 tribution to eollectiVe defense Under con- the relative decline of American power could litical interests at stake in regional power tinning preponderant .American manage- lead to a new-multipolar era of confronta- politics they may find themselves backing ment. . tion But this is too conjectural a possibility contenders in local military actions, demon- As for the so-called Third World. of the to be the basis for changing the American strations, and even wars, in which their own largely new and poor cOuntries, which security policy outlined by the Nixon admin- military capabilities will play at least a tacit scarcely five years ago was thought to be istration. role. the decisive arena of the Cold War, the It is somewhat less conjectural, however, This trend is growing now in the Persian Nixon administration hepes to lower Amer- to postulate situations short of large-scale (or Arabian) Gulf area. Growing dependence lea's profile by leaving the welfare and se- local war in which American security inter- on Middle Eastern; oil gives the United States curity of developing countries pritnarily to ests, broadly defined, may be in jeopardy. a major material stake in an area in which their own individual and collective efforts Such situations are most likely to arise where it has had political, commercial, and strate- of self-help. Having reduced the official esti- indigenous tensions and conflicts threaten gic interests for some time.. The increased mate of the Communist (and particularly (a) the security of friendly regimes and/or capacity of a few countries to withhold sup- the Chinese) threat of military attack and (b) the unhindered supply of critical re- ply to the United States because of huge subversion ln, the Third World and having sources, particUlarly petroleum. In most of currency reserves and alternative buyers, to- raised the o these situations the protection of American official estimate of the capacity gether with the possibility that the Arab- interests would depend on the local configu- Of weak States te resist Communist control Israeli tension or the influence of radical ration of interests and power; in some on imposed from the outside, the Nixon admin- , regimes will provide the political incentive the use of force and threats of force by in- istration will rely almost entirely upon the for such withholding, constitutes a new selective use of military and economic aid digenous countries, which the United States threat to America's regional interests. Simi- would support or oppose by arms aid and to centain local Communist aggression. larly, the possibility that local rivalries in other indirect means. In rare cases, however, While reaffirM1ng its pledge to shield allies , the area?resulting, for example, in a con- one can imagine the United States more di- and other States vital to American security filet between Iraq and Iran, with radical from directrectly supporting or threatening to support aggression by nuclear States, it regimes and traditional kingdoms aligning has virtually ruled out a direct combat role friendly regimes against hostile movements themselves on opposite sides?may disrupt for U.S. forces in Local wars, that are largely and States, where such support could be ex- American access to oil poses a potential eco- insurgent or civil. The reduction of Amen- tended by military demonstrations or inter- nornic threat with such a serious impact on can military personnel by one third, the positions incurring a minimal risk of U.S. American domestic welfare as to be tante- involvement in war. reduction of general purpose forces in par- mount to a security threat. At least, these ticular, and the,. substantial Withdrawal of Thus in the Jordanian crisis of 1970 the threats are not implausible possibilities. American forces from Asia give tangible U.S. government evidently contemplated Whether America's enhanced interest in Meaning to this lowering of the American aerial intervention, not only to rescue hos- access to Middle Eastern oil will actually be military profile in the Third World, togas seized by Palestinian guerrillas and threatened depends most immediately on the Judging from official pronouncements, evacuate American civilians, but also to developing pattern of conflict and alignment America's military _ posture supporting the bolster the pro-Western Jordanian regime among the Middle Eastern and particularly Nixon-Kissinger revision of foreign policy of King Hussein against the guerrillas and the Gulf States (which control 60 per cent of will Continue te aim at maintaining stra- Syria, and, above all, deter the Soviets from the world's proven oil reserves),. on the in- taking advantage of the conflict or trigger- fluence of violent Palestinian groups, on the tegic parity with the Soviet ITnion?indeed, at nothing less than overall teclinolegical Ing a larger war, while impressing them (and capacity of radical regimes to gain and ex- - equality (while conceding to Soviet long- the Arabs) in the wake of the Egyptian mis- pand power, and on the vicissitudes of the sile crisis, with the credibility of American Arab-Israeli dispute. But the involvement of range missile forces some numerical su,peri- power in the Middle East. Actually, the quick both superpowers in the politics of the area ority) and a capacity to respond to nuclear attack with something more than massive success of the Jordanian army against El through their major "clients" and other cc- devastation, The United States_will also seek Fatah forces and Syrian tanks, combined cipients of support means that the possi- to maintain Credible conventional ,as well as ed with Israel's mobilization on the frontier, bility cannot be excluded that American mil- nuclear protection for its allies. But as coli- ns were decisive in resolving this crisis favor- itary demonstration or action would be called ably to American interests. Whether the for to protect access to oil, pared with the periods after the Korean and during the Vietnam wars, it will be far, United States would have intervened under Apart from the possibly fanciful scenarios any circumstances must remain in doubt.. of American military action to protect sup- less (if at all) concerned with maintaining But the incident illustrates the most likely plies of petroleum, some naval planners and a policy or capacity for waging large-scale role of American air, naval, and amphibious publicists define American security interests local wars, as distinguished from small-scale forces in a local crisis or war: deterring So- interventions. And, in any event, its political viet direct or indirect intervention, inducing more generally in terms of maintaining po- and material capacity to fight such wars will Soviet cooperation toward a peaceful and not litical influence and pressure in a politically Substantially decline. unfavorable resolution of the crisis, main- acceptable way through a visible naval pres- ence in areas, such as the Gulf and the In- 4. TUE INTER,TS:ATIQZTAL roLrriCaL corrrnxr taming Soviet respect for American power dian Ocean, where the United States cannot -Under what conditions can the United and will in order to prevent the Soviet Un- afford hostile control of the sea.. One need States be expected ion from seeking some regional, unilateral , to retain its position as not accept the more sweeping versions of the predominant manager of the still bipolar, advantage that would jeopardize the net-Admiral Mahan's theories of naval power, now moderated and stabilized, military bal- work of interlinked constraints in the super- powers' global modus vivendi. In addition, based on ominous but unspecified and highly ance against the Soviet Union and at the the role of American forces might be to res- improbable threats to vital lines of corn- same time retrench its capacity for limited cue or protect American civilians, to support merce, coupled with overdrawn estimates of overseas interventipn in local wars while friendly local regimes against hostile States, Soviet naval power,? in order to appreciate Maintaining a position of global influence? and to maintain in the eyes of regional the enhanced political and possibly security At the minimum, one must postulate the States the credibility of American power to significance of a far-flung U.S. naval presence continuation of U.S.-Soviet detente?that is, in an era of increasing U.S. dependence on protect American interests. The prospect of of confined competition within negotiated foreign strategic materials coupled with a coexlstenceand of compelling political and the United States actually employing its armed forces in local crises and conflicts will declining U.S. presence on foreign land. military constraints against Communist armed action, remain ambiguous; nonetheless, military Throughout the world, however, the sit- Willdemonstrations, mobilizations, and maneu- nations that are most likely to damage the these conditions prevail in the corn- vers will probably be credible enough to be United States' broad security interests this Mg decade of international politics? Prob- in ably so. The past era of intense great-power viewed by the American President as an in- presumed period of protracted detente may confrontation and crisis has more than likely dispensable instrument of policy, lest po- be those which the United States cannot af- eded, A period of great-power diplomatic tential adversaries stumble into a clash of fact by military means, directly or indi- '11 arms by underestimating his will to use rectly?indeed, situations over which it has MarieuVer in which, superpower crises, mill- force: little or no control by any means. These are OR security issues, and concern with the In any case, as new and more structured situations in which American military mo- military balance (except in the ontext of regional patterns of conflict and alignment bility, military bases, access to oil, and less arms control) diminish and recede into the seem likely to develop in some parts of the tangible security interests are damaged by background seems likely to continue for at Third World, the United States and the So- the hostile actions of the weaker and poorer least a decade. Perhaps this will be a period viet Union can be expected to remain mu- countries, actions which the United States of considerably less harmbnious great-power tunny constrained yet interested partici- for one reason or another is inhibited from relations--especially between the United pants, through military assistance and other countering by force. Or they are situations in States 4rid its major allies?than the admin- means, in the international politics of these which the conflicts among other States im- istration anticip,at.es. And perhaps in such a regions. They will, in some cases, as in the pinge on American interests incidentally period there will be a greater erosion of the Middle East, be aligned competitively with rather than by design. (Thus the "cold war" American material capacity and will to main- opposing aspirants to regional hegemony between Britain and Iceland threatened to tam n a convincing global posture than the and influence. Where one or both superpow- lead to expulsion of the NATO base from Ice- Nixon Doctrine pre-supposes. Eventually, the ens have important material as well as po- land). If the frustrations and resentments diffusion of power and interests among the of the less developed countries, no longer able world's live developed centers of power and Footnotes at end of article.- to exploit cold war competition, should be Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 E 6722 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --Extensions of Remarks Novimbcr 20, 19744 channeled toward organized harassment and pressure against the developed countries? whether for purposes of to venue, pohtical in- fluence, or just nationalist self-as tt action? the United States might find itself operating in an environment as hostile to In security as at the height of cold war corneae ation in the Third World. The ri big dependence of the 'United States and es allies on oil and other natural resources end on etraits, sees, and overflight which developing countries are able to control by either uncontested or physically established claims, makes Amer- ican commerce and military moist' ity par- ticularly vulnerable." TY les one of the pri- mary U.S. Security imperetives in this phase of history may become the achievement of mutually advantageous and acceptable work- ing relationships with coastal Stets s in the Third World. It Is apparent from thiet line of cc njecture that the situations affecting U.S. security, broadly conceived, are en more hypotheti- cal than during the height of the Cold War. Yet American security Pettey, for tis s sake of deterrence or just insurance against serious trouble, cannot prudentl s be geared only to predictable contingencies, even though it cannot afford to be geared to the werst con- tingencies Imaginable. With this cautionary note in Mind we can explore the (ma heathens of these security considerations for U.S. ocean policy. 5. U.S. seeisreeto mum EAR II,ITISSE CTS IN OCtAN 1.5W In the context of American foreign and security policy ane the inte -national environment in which it operates wr can now tender some estimates Of the effects of dif- ferent ocean regimes or the specific kinds of U.S. ocean security interests outlined at the outset. It is not sufficient to note that the United States would benefit from maxi- mum Military mobility in ocean :mace (or rilaXinnlin freedom to emplace listening de- vices on continental shelves or to conduct offshore 'electronic intelligence operations) and mitten= interference with maritime access to vital resources That is too sweep- ing a generality to be translated into laws of the sea in the real world, where one must. consider ideal objective: in the context of such operationally significant meet tions as: (0,) how likely, and by what means, are vari- ous States to impede aehievement of these objectives, (b) how would such impedence affect U.S interests, (c) to what et:tent and in what ways would cliffs rent relit), as for use of the oceans affect such impedence, and (d) how leasible and ci stly is the achieve- ment of more favorable regimes? First, let us apply thee standards of judg- ment to U.S. nuclear strategic in :erests in the use of the ocean. Here the chief con- cern is the efficacy of U S. SSBN--?-Currently the Polaris/Poseidon feet?partly because the Onset of MIRVing and improvements in missile accuracy enhance the importance of concealing missiles under the ocean and partly because the ease for free transit of international straits hes rested most con- spicuously on the puree): ted security require- ments of the U.S. underwater fleet The U.S. government maintains that the invulner- ability of SSBNe and Is ince their indispen- sable role in an adequate second-Strike force depends on their right to pass through inter- national straits (that is, straits in which there is regular internetional passage from one high seas to another) submerged and unannounced; whereas under existing law only innocent passage, which, aceording to prevailing interpretation, requires surfacing of all suleninrines, 'would be legal in straits that fall wiehin territorial bonndtries." This is a distinction that is held to be of great significance, since tender a 12-mile territorial sea boundary perhaps more than a dozen Footnotes at end of erticle. straits of possible strategic significance Would be overlaPped by foreign territorial waters. To assess the Validity and practical im- portance of this position, a number of ques- tions have to be answered: I. Which of the world's more than 100 international straits (121, according to an unofficial chart devised by the Office of the Geographer in the U.S. Department of State) that would be overlapped by territorial waters If 12-mile boundaries were agreed upon might also be important for the mobility of the U.S. Polaris and Poseidon fleet in order to reach the areas in which present strategic doctrine specifies required targets? The strategic importance of straits is a matter of judgment on which experts may differ, but stretching this category to its reasonable maxim-cure would produce, accord- ing to information provided by the same chart of the Office of the Geographer, a list of 16: Gibraltar, two Middle Eastern straits (Bab el Mandeb and Hormuz), fem. Southeast Asian straits (Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, and Ombsii-Wetar), Western Chosen strait (between South Korea and Japan), five Caribbean straits (Old Bahamas channel, Dominitia, Martinique, Saint Lucia Channel. and Saint Vincent Passage), Dover, Bering, and the Kennedy-Robeson Channels.' Nine of these straits, however, are not really essential to America's strategic capa- bility, and some would in any case fall in- side the territory of military The five Carileliean straits are not needed for transit to Polaris/Poseidon patrol sta- tions, since the Caribbean is not an essential launching area. They are not, even essential for access to the Caribbean, since there are several passages over 24 miles wide (for ex- ample, te/lone? Windard, Anegada, and Guade- loupe).* Western Chosen, the western half of the strait between Japan and the Korean pen- insula (which is divided by the Island of Tsushima), is only 23 miles wide; but Japan, if not South Korea, would presumably permit U.S. strategic warships routinely to pass through this strait to the Sea of Japan?, In any event, the eastern half of the strait, Is 25 miles wide), The real sufferer from any closure of the Korean straits would be Soviet general purpose forces, which, for example, would have to travel more than twice as far from Vladivostok to the Senke,kus by going the La Perouse route (north of Hokkaido, south of Sakhalin), thereby affecting Indian Ocean operations, China coast patrols, or submarine deployments from Nakhodkaeo Bab el Mandeb offers no significant tar- geting advantage over the Eastern Medi- terranean (and transit through the French aide of the strait would probably be avail- able anyway). If the Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) presence became oppressive there, or if Gibraltar were closed, the Red Sea could be considered an alternative de- ployment area. But nearly all targets that could be reached from there could also be reached from the Gulf. Those in areas that could not be reached from the Gulf (East- ern Europe, the Baltic Coast, and the Lenin- grad area) could be covered from the Atlan- tic. Passage through Hormuz is probably not necessary now that the shorter-range Polaris A-1 (with a 1200 nautical-mile range) and A-2 (1750 nautical miles) have been phased out in favor of the A--3 (2880 nautical miles). With Holy Loch available on the west coast of Scotland, there is no great need for SSBNs to use Dover in the English Channel. 2. In which cif the remaining straits is submerged passage physically feasible but politically unobtainable on a reliable basis? Malacca is too shallow (10-12 fathoms) and too buy for submerged passage. Sunda is barely deep enough (20 fathoms in the ap- proaches) but requires a passage of over 700 miles within a 50-fathom depth. The Bering Straits, although about 45 miles wide, are split by Dieenede and Little Diomede Islands, making each half of the straits less than 24 miles wide. But since Little Diomede belongs to the United States, submerged passage to the Arctic is not in question politically. Similarly, the narrow route to the Arctic throne :1i the Kennedy- Robeson Channels is presumably accessible by submerged passage, shire it is in Canadian waters. This leaves Gibraltar arid two Indonesian straits, Ombai-Weter and Lombok, as ,stra- tegically important straits through which the submerged passage of U.S. SSBNs is now physically and politically feasible but the use of which might be politically question- able if a 12-mile territorini boundary were established. The two Indonesian strait; are important to SSBN operations from the Indian Ocean to Guam. Without submerged passage through them, the U.S. would have to circumnavigate Australia, greatly reductiag the number of days on active patrol as opposed to transit, or double back to one of the entrances to the Timor Sea, 180 to 500 miles east, of Ombai-Wetar, which would still pass through Indonesian waters. An additional hindrance to secret passage through Indonesian waters results from Indonesia's interpretation of the archipelago principle of enclosed waters, according to which the two strategically straits are claimed to be internal rather than inter- national waters.' Although the Inceenesian government has argued that the archipelago principle does not infringe on innocent pas- sage, it requires prior notification of transit by foreign warships arid has begun to raise questions about the innocence of super- tanker passage on grounds of the danger of pollution they pose. In April of 1972, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ad- miral Moorer, declared, "We should have and must have the freedom to en through, under, and over the Malacca Stmt.". Shortly there- after, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy was reported as ovaruing, "Our armed forces will attack any foreign submarines entering territorial waters without permit. because it means a violation of Indonesia's sovereignty." lo In response to Indonesian jurisdictional claims, the United Stales maintains the international character of Indonesian straits but, according to press accounts and Indonesian sources, routinely provides prior notification of transit by sur- face ships and presumably relies on scene special bilateral navy-to-navy arrangement for submerged passage that is not incon- sistent with the requirements of concealing the details of SSBN passage from foreign intelligence.' o This is a rather contingent modus vivendi, but as long as an Indonesian government as friendly as that of Suharto is in power it satisfies America's needs. The situation in Gibraltar is more com- plicated. Although the Strait is only 11.5 miles wide and Spain claims a 6-mile terri- torial sea, its international character has been preserved by historic tradition and by the treaties of 1904 and 1912 between Britain and France and Spain securing free passage. In March, 1971, however, there were intima- tions of a more restrictive view of foreign rights of transit when Spain- and Morocco agreed to cooperate to "promote the crea- tion of Mediterranean awareness" and also agreed to consult on all matters relating to peace and security in the Mediterranean and particularly in the Strait. In June, 1972, the Spanish government announced at the United Nations that it would be useful to consider the freezing of naval forces, fol- lowed by progressive reductions, in the Medi- terranean. At the same time, it indicated that some compromise weer necessary between free transit and the rights of coastal States and suggested that such a compromise might Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 "November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks be achieved by a re-definition of the right of innocent passage. Thus Spain may have prepared the way for asserting a right to force SUblnarines passing through the Strait of Gibraltar, to surface. But whether, or not Spain chooses to assert such a right against American SSBNs will depend, under existing law,. primarily on the overall political relations between the United States and Spain. As long as U.S. submarines are based at Rota, the chances are that these political relations will permit an arrange- Ment for submerged transit of US. sub- marines through the Strait of Gibraltar. If this, is Rot leA?,thle* eveu the closure of pibralkg to unannounced submerged U.S. submarine passage would not be disastrous to America's strategic capability. After all, With the Polaris/FOSeitiOn system the entire Soviet Union can De,targeted from the At- lantic and PaCide ,OCearia and the Arabian Sea. Although there has apparently been no need for SSW/ patrols in the Iiadian Ocean, an Indian Ocean basa7-84.7, Diego Garcia? Would obviate the need to use Gibraltar or the Indonesian straits altogether. 3, To what extent would surface transit of U.S. SSJ31Ns through straits impair their invulnerability to Soviet detection, identifi- cation, and (in the event of NAT) destruc- tion? This question really subsumes several dif- ferent questions: (a) Is the Soviet capability to detect and identify Submerged U.S. $813Ns coming through straits significantly inferior to the Mine aoviet Capability with respect to sur- faced. SEl3Ns? The answer is surely "yes" (assuming, of course, that submerged transit is not an- nounced pa advance to the straits State, so as to become subject to Soviet intelligence acquisition). It is relatively easy, to detect surface passage through straits by means of Surface vessels, land observers, or, satellites, even at night. 33y far the most effective and practicable electronic surveillance of sub- merged vessels is by means of a series of hYdrophones (or sonars) connected by un- dersea cables anchored to the continental shelf, like the U.S. "Caesar" and "Colossus" system. But this device has to be, hooked up to a listening station on the shore, which Would seem to preclude the Soviet Union in- stalling it at Gibraltar or in Indonesia for the foreseeable future." Moreover, in the high traffic-density straits of Gibraltar and Lombok it Would be very difficult to single out transiting nuclear submarines from the high level of background noise. Even in the less-traveled Ombai-Wetar, possible Soviet hydrophone arrays would have to be sup- plemented by "trawlers" or towed arrays to be effective. The United States and the So- viet Union hay e developed ocean surveillance satellites, but U.S. efforts to use them to detect submerged vessels have proved im- practical for basic physical reasons that technology seems unlikely to overcome in the near future. If the Soviets were willing to assign nuclear-powered anti-submarine submarines (SSNs) to monitor the critical straits, this would somewhat enhance their submerged detection capability; but the diffi- culty that Soviet SSNs have had in shadow- ing U.S. SSBNs from bases indicates that SSNs would be ne substitute for fixed hydro- phone arrays. (b) To what extent can the Soviet Union continually locate U.S. SSBNs after passage through straits, assuming that Soviet surveil- lance deteCts and identifies these SSBNs? It is now eXtremely difficult, and promises to remain so far the indefinite future, to track submarines that have passed through straits submerged. It is virtually impossible to track all SSBNs on patrol (that is, in position to fire) ,u Open-area surveillance (from aircraft, surface ships, and satellites) will remain of limited effectiveness unless Footnotes at end of article, and until, perhaps, large parts of the ocean floor are covered with a network of bottom detection systems in communication with surface ships and aircraft. The most effec- tive ASW method in wartime is a forward barrier-control system, utilizing coordinated bottom detection devices, other sensors, at- tack submarines, and ASW aircraft. But in peacetime this system cannot prevent SSBNs from passing through the barrier and disappearing. (c) Would the Soviet capacity to destroy U.S. SSBNs which were tracked and located after detected passage through straits sig- nificantly affect the U.S. second-strike capability? This is unlikely, unless one estimates the requirements of an adequate second-strike capability very conservatively. To reduce the U.S. second-strike capability significantly, the Soviets would have to be sure of simul- taneously knocking out most of the 20 to 25 U.S. SSBNs on station at any one time. Merely a few Poseidon-carrying submarines (which will eventually comprise 31 of the 41 U.S. SSBNs), each with its 18 missiles with 10 MIRVs on each missile, could overwhelm the Soviet ABM system. Moreover, this situa- tion will last at least as long as the initial Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty limiting de- ployment of ABMs is in effect. 4. How will the prospective new Trident SSBN system affect the need to use the criti- cal straits in question? Although the amount of Congressional funding and the outcome of efforts in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to limit 'SSBN ,a are uncertain, the development of a new Underwater Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) for the so-called Trident SSBN sys- tem may produce a successor to Polaris/ Poseidon in the 1980's. The Trident subma- rine would carry 24 missiles with a range of between 4500 and 6500 nautical miles and with MIRV warheads. It would be quieter and would dive deeper and remain on sta- tion for longer periods. Deployment of the Trident system?or, for that matter, the de- velopment of ULMS on Poseidon submarines, which is planned for fiscal year 1978?would virtually obviate the dependence of the U.S. underwater .nuclear deterrent on transit of straits. Taking all these considerations into ac- count, it would seem that, even without the Trident system, the absence of a provision for free transit of international straits in a law of the sea treaty sanctioning 12-mile territorial sea boundaries, although impos- ing some hardships on the operation of the U.S. SSBN fleet, would not seriously weaken its contribution to nuclear deterrence. From the routine operational standpoint the hard- ship of having to surface submarines would fall more heavily on nuclear anti-submarine submarines (SSNs), which play an impor- tant role in the strategic nuclear equation. But despite the improved information about the numbers, direction, and location of hunter-killer submarines that surface transit would give to Soviet intelligence, this hard- ship would not really- increase the willing- ness of the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear first strike or greatly enhance the efficacy of Soviet salvos after an initial nuclear ex- change. In any event, the same require- ments of surfacing imposed on Soviet SSNs would offset the disadvantage to the U.S. underwaterd Aside from the problem of detection, how- ever, there are other operational disad- vantages to surfacing nuclear submarines in straits. Where high-density traffic occurs, as in narrow straits and around headlands, the nuclear submarine is safer both to itself and to surface shipping when it is below the surface. One reason is its huge size. An ad- vanced model such as the Lafayette is 425 feet in length, has a beam of 33 feet and a t ubmerged displacement of 8,750 tons, which r s longer than WW II destroyers and heavier s I 6723 than some World War II light cruisers. The nuclear submarine is designed to operate best when submerged, where she has greatest maneuverability and her sensors work best With a low conning tower and no super- structure to speak of, she must receive ex- ceptions to her construction standards in order to comply with light requirements for night navigation. For this reason and since much of her hull is below the surface and not visible to electronic searchers (radar), merchantmen find a submarine hard to de- tect. Moreover, a submarine's ability to travel under the surface frees her from the limita- tion of surface weather and wave motion, and any submarine is particularly vulner- able to collision loss by virtue of its small reservoir of buoyancy. The operational disadvantages of surface transit could be avoided, of course, if the United States were willing to provide littoral States with advance notification of under- water transit, providing that the critical States in question would regard underwater transit on these terms as a satisfactory ar- rangement. But this hypothesis only illus- trates that the prior issue is the importance of secret passage. When pressed to explain the necessity for free transit of straits, U.S. officials have re- ferred not only to the security of secret passage and to the safety of submerged passage but also to the prospect that, with- out an international treaty prescribing free transit, straits States might resort to "sub- jective" (that is, politically-inspired) inter- pretations of innocent passage in order to restrict the passage of U.S. warships. Thus John It. Stevenson, chief of the U.S. delega- tion to the U.N. Seabed Committee, testified before Congress that "We would not contem- plate notifying [littoral States of intention to transit straits] because if such a require- ment is introduced, there is of course ulti- mately a risk of this leading to control of transit through straits." This risk, Stevenson said, lies mostly in the future, and he cited no case in which the requirement of ad- vance notification had been used to restrict naval transit." In fact, experience indicates that the risk of restrictive interpretations of innocent passage applies largely to commercial vessels on grounds of navigational safety and anti- pollution?a point which has, until recent emphasis by the oil industry, received little attention, perhaps because of the notable reluctance of the U.S. shipping industry to pursue its considerable interests in a law of the sea treaty openly. Surely, these grounds for controlling the passage of ships offshore are not purely subjective; they are objec- tively quite important. If, on the other hand, one takes seriously the danger that littoral States will interpret innocent passage and the requirement of advance notification to deny transit of straits to American warships for purely political reasons, then one must also wonder why these States would sign a treaty prescribing unimpeded passage or be deterred by such a treaty. So much for SSBNs. What about other components of the -U.S. strategic capability? In the discussion and controversy about the need for free transit through straits the issue of overflight has been all but ignored in public statements, although the U.S. position on the law of the sea treaty--presumably for compelling strategic reasons?prescribes free transit over straits for military aircraft (there being no innocent passage for over- flight recognized in international law). According to the Triad system, U.S. strategic nuclear capability requires manned aircraft as well as SSBNs and land-based missiles. The U.S. strategic bombing force is still a sgnificant weapons system, with some dis- inct advantages of mobility and of control esponsive to political guidance. One might uppose that effective denial of military over- Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 E 6724 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks November 20, 1974,. ? flight over key straits would seriously impair the Gulf of Mexico would a broad national shelf be likely to restrict U.S. coverage. But U.S. coverage there is limited anyway, since Cuba blocks it from CONUS while the Do- minican Republic lies in the way of coverage from Puerto Rico. In any case, as noted above, since hydro- phones have to be connected to shore sta- tions (or, at great ,expense, to surface ships), the United Stets generally needs the permis- ,sion of coastal States to emplace SOSUS on their shelves, whether within or beyond the territorial boundaries claimed by these States. It should also be noted that an extension of national claims to the shelf edge probably would do more damage to Soviet acoustic in- stallations than to American. Presumably, it would be difficult to find a government be- yond. the Norwegian Sea that would consent to Soviet devices on its shelf. The same is true of Canada and of Japan (although the effect of this fact is limited by Soviet ownership of the Kuriles). The implications of SOSUS are the same even if national regimes were to encompass the continental margin, although the bottom topography near Iceland makes it difficult to determine the precise limits of the shelf, margin, rise, etc. There Is however, a third possibility if no international regime is agreed upon 1958 Continenal Shelf Con- vention states, in part, "the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring . . to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast to where the depth of the super- water admits of exploitation of the natural resources of said areas." Since the technology for exploiting all but the deepest trenches soon will be available, this could eventually lead to a delimitation of the sea- bed nearly on the basis of media lines. In this event, the United States would own most of the North Pacific seabed (although it probably would not be useful for more listening stations); the United States, effective universally-applicable law of the Canada, and the USSR would divide up the sea treaty that provided free transit through Arctic (also without much impact on senors); international straits, established a narrow the situation in the Caribbean would not be continental-shelf boundary, limited tend- greatly altered; and Norway Would own tonal sea boundaries to 12 miles, and pro- much of the seabed beneath the entrance to tected military passage through anti-poilu- the North Atlantic. tion and other zones, than under the more Finally, in estimating the impact of alter- restrictive regimes we have postulated. But na sive ocean regimes on America's military even, the most restrictive regimes we have strategic capability, one must take into anticipated would not undermine America's account the effects of extended territorial sea strategic capability on the ocean, particularly boundaries and other kinds of off-shore if the Trident 'system were operating. More- zones. These effects, of course, depend in part over, the adverse impact of reetrictive regimes upon what sort of restrictions coastal States on the totality of Soviet ocean-based etre- choose to claim and are able to enforce or tegic capabilities would be far more severe otherwise gain compliance with. Added to than on American capabilities, althongh, the proliferation of extensive off-shore tern- faced with America's greater strategic de- tonal claims, coastal States are looking pendence on the sea, U.S. iaaval leaders can- increasingly to extensive anti-pollution, not be expected to gain much consolation security, and other functional zones as a from this comparison. basis for restricting foreign navigation, both In any event, what is the most realistic military and civilian. Moreover, in the alternative to the postulated proliferation of absence of a comprehensive and near- restrictive regimes? Is it to insist on the non- universal law of the sea treaty such as the negotiability of free transit through in ter-? United States has proposed, coastal States national straits and the maximum freedom may resort to regional or local treaties?on of the seas against the restrictive inclinations the model of the Montreux Convention or a of coastal States? Or is it to concede to coastal version of the Soviet doctr:ine of "closed States somewhat more extensive control of seas"--that will severely restrict the num- straits, sea bottoms, and sea boundaries, and methods of transit by war- vshile seeking to protect the really essential Eastern Bering Strait and the Kenneth - the utility of the U.S. serategic bombing force, Robeson Channel (given Canadian compl - as a deterrent. mice). In the Atlantic, patrols could sti II In practice, however, the right to fly over press fairly far north within the 200-mile 24-mile straits doer not seem to be critical boundary around the Shetlands. In India to the utility of the U.S. strategic bomber nesian waters, a 200-mile boundary would force (as distinguished from the U.S. military not be much more restrictive than a 12-flute airlift capability), since overflight of straits boundary, since Indonesia defines its bound- is a small part of the larger pattern of over- any according to a broad archipelago doe- flight, which is evidently managed side- trine. In any case, Poseidon missiles could quately by special arrangements. where still target all the USSR from points 200 necessary, and which is physically unfeasible miles off Bangladesh and Japan and in the for most States to deny in any case." southern Norwegian Sea. The emphasis in American ocean policy on More important than ta e impact of a:- free transit under, through, or over interne: ()tractive territorial zones and special seas 011 tional straits has somewhat overshadowed S813Ns may be their impact on the integrated another official concern: that the U.S. stra- operation of fleets?such as the Sixth Fleet tegic capability may be hampered by terra. in the Mediterranean?which have strategic tonal sea boundaries or continental se. elf functions beyond providing launching plat- regimes claimed or established by coastal forms for missiles. But the strategic function States, of surface ships, apart from. their political The breadth of the continental shelf re- and psychological uses, has been drastically girne, one can infer from the published data, erctded by technological advances in attack might have some effect, on the freedom of the submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. United States to emplace passive ASW listen- Moreover, it is worth noting that coasi al ing devices, (SOSUS) on the shelf, pareic- State restrictions would have a much more ularly off the shores of foreign countries.24 adverse impact on Soviet than on American Apparently, these devices are most effective strategic mobility. If, fat example, the re- beyond the 200-meter depth and part way strictions applied to the current narrow sea down the slope of the shelfea although their boundaries were applied to 200-mile bound- effectiveness must also depend on the pe- aries, Soviet SSBNs would be restricted to culler acoustic properties of the ocean at half of the Arctic and to operations from various temperatures depths. and salinity Petrapavlosk. Submerged passage to the At- and particularly on the depth of the sound lantic would be prohibited. The Caribbean channel that focuses sound energy in deep and the southern exits from the Sea of water. Presumably, the United States.. would Japan would be closed. Soviet fleet ma- be constrained from placing SOSUS where neuvers would be correspondingly more inn- be use of the shelf were not permitted by peded than American by the proliferation of existing international law or protected by extensive restricted seas, anti-pollution a new international treaty. Therefore, one zones, and the like. might assume that an ocean regime that What, then, are the implications of all extended territorial sovereignty aver the these considerations for the protection of whole continental margin would adversely American strategic interests under alter- affect U.S. military security if SOSUS is sital native ocean regimes? Unquestionably, Amer- to America's strategic capability. ica's strategic capability with respect to the Undoubtedly, hydrophone array on the Soviet Union would be butter off under an ocean bottom are critically important to the U.S. ASW capability, whatever the strategic or other military importance of ASW may be.24 Lt. is unlikely that new techn elogy will reduce their Importance in the net five to ten years, if ever. These acoustic devices are perhaps physically vulnerable to Soviet inter- ference; but the Soviets, one may assume, are installing many of the same kind of devices and therefore have a vested interest in not interfering with them. Most develop- ing countries do not have the Capability to locate and destroy the arrays; and the United States denies, in any cave, that it has placed them off the shores of these ecu ntries, al- though their suspicions persist. Notwithstanding these facts, however, there is little reason to thihk that the utility of SOST.18 would be critically affected even by the broadest boundary of coastal hate sov- ereignty on the continental shelf. The crucial monitoring areas where SOSUS needs to be emplaced, one would judge from the pub- lished information on the submarine passage- waYs where they are most useful, are the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, the Arctic, the North Pacific, and the Caribbean. With the possible exception (albeit a key one) of Iceland enough of the northern European countries are concerned about the Soviet , , SSBN force to permit U.S. listening devices in ships of non-signatories. Assuming, then, strategic needs, whether through a law 01 the the area. Considering the extent of the shelf for the sake of analysis that more and more sea treaty that strives for universality or Off Alaska and Canada, the empls cement of coastal States will be trying to apply more through other kinds of arrangements and hydrophone arrays in the Arctic is not likely and more restrictions on foreign military agreements? to be severely restricted by a shelf conven- passage within 60 to 200-mile offshore zones We shall revert to this question after tern- tion. Between Guam, Midway, Hawaii, Alaska, and adjacent seas, what are the implications sidering America's non-strategic security and the .Aleutians, the United hates can for America's st,rategic capability? needs on the ocean. Suffice it to note here claire a significant amount of underwater real A 200-mile region that impeded Ameriean that the United States' achievement of spa- estate on which to t.emplace listening devices naval passage would have the greatest effect cial arrangements and agreements that will in the North Pacific. Whatever gaps may exist on America's strategic capability in the protect America's essential strategic) tater- in this coverage would not seem to be affected Arctic, given the premise presented here that ests?demonstrated in U.S relations not only one way or another ay extended claims to the the Mediterranean is not indispensable to with allies but also with Spain, Indonesia, continental shelf. Only in the Caribbean and America's strategic nuclear capability. But and Iran?depends on the government's -- -- even with 200-mile sea boundaries, access to ability to reach favorable bargains in the Footnotes at end of article, the Arctic would be possible through the total context of its political relations with Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006 n -_ Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 eNovember 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extevsions of Remarks , key coastal States. For this purpose the United States, even in this period of de- pendence on Middle East oil, has consider- able political, economic, and military assets. Its goad working relations with a number of locally and regionally powerful 'states mani- fests these assets. If this is a correct assess- ment, It would be a great mistake for the United States to waste political .a.ssete or pay a big price in terms of other ocean in- terests in order to achieve illusory maximum strategic advantages under a law of the sea treaty that might, in that case, be unac- ceptable to key States anyway. 6. OTHER IT.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN OCEAN t.,AW . In seeming to concentrate so heavily on the need to protect America's strategic nu- clear capability, American ocean-law officials have until recently under-rated more serious threats to U.S, security interests that im- pinge on the U.S. capability to conduct lim- ited military actions and demonstrations and to protect vital commerce and other peace- time interests, They have also underrated America's general security interest, as one of the principal maritime powers, in maintain- ing harmonious working relations with the less developed coastal States of the world. We have contended that American secu- rity interests, broadly conceived, will con- tinue to require the support?actively or passively, overtly or tacitly?of American armed forces, particularly outside the devel- oped centers of the world and most likely in the Mediterranean-Oulf-Inclian Ocean waters providing access to the Middle East. It is impossible to predict or even to assign with Much assurance an order of probability to specific scenarios in which the demonstra- tion or active use of American forces may be called for. But the conduct of foreign rela- tions is never susceptible to such precision of foresight. In general terms, nevertheless, We can. see that the revised American foreign policy outlined by the Nixon administration . requires the stabilization of a reduced but still global force posture for an indefinite period of moderated great-power competition Punctuated by continual disturbances on the ; peripheries of the developed world. This kind of force posture will continue to require great military mobility in ocean , space, but the implications of this require- ment for American interests in alternative ocean regimes are not self-evident. In the event of American direct involvement in a local war or military action, would American deployment of naval and air forces in ocean space depend on the agreed or claimed terri- torial sea boundaries of coastal States or on the national positions and international rules, whether or not sanctioned by treaty, governing passage through or over interna- tional straits? Probably not, if the conflict were regarded as sufficiently important to engage American armed forces. Similarly, if America's merchant fleet were to be directly harassed by Soviet or other ships?an un- likely contingency in the case of the Soviet . 'Union, considering its parallel interests as a . maritime power?or by its physical denial of access to resources and commerce, the United States would not be deterred by legal claims or interpretations, from taking the measures necessary to protect its vital interests. Nonetheless, the politics surrounding some local conflicts might well lead the United States to heed the objections of non-belliger- ent States to the passage of U.S. warships and aircraft through and over waters that they held to be under their jurisdiction. In general, the less _directly the United States were likely to become involved in an armed conflict and the less critical the outcome to American security interest, the more the United States government might be inclined to heed such objections. Thus if the United Footnotes at end of article. States were providing material support to a bellgerent in a local conflict?even in the case of Israel, for example?it would probably hesitate to resist either a belligerent's denial of American overflight (as in the Middle East crisis of 1973) or passage of warships and merchant ships. In incidents short of a clash of arms?as, for example, those arising from quasi-legal restrictions imposed on U.S. sea lanes providing access to oil?such denials would be particularly difficult, politically, for the United States to contravene. It is in situations like these that the kinds of restrictive territorial sea boundaries and special zones that we considered in relation to America's strategic capability can be ex- pected to exert their major impact. Thus the Imposition by littoral States of restrictions on straits, whether in the name of protecting themselves from pollution or on economic or more general grounds, is apt to be a far more important and less easily surmounted ob- stacle to naval mobility (for example, the transportation of general purpose forces in a crisis) and the shipping of oil and other re- sources than to the efficacy of America's un- derwater strategic nuclear force. If the crite- rion of security interest is stretched to include passage through straits of major eco- nomic significance (and, incidentally, traffic density), there are at least ten such straits about half of which could be controlled by States that might impose costly, inconveni- ent, and, conceivably, politically-inspired re- strictions on the passage of goods and re- sources of value to the United States.2', This kind of danger was foreshadowed by events in the Strait of Malacca a few years ago. It was a quite reasonable concern about the ecological disaster that could follow an accident to supertankers in the hazardous channels of this strait that provoked Malay- sia in July, 1969, to claim a territorial sea of 12 miles. Indonesia, which in 1957 had pro- claimed its archipelago doctrine of sover- eignty within baselines drawn around its 13,000 islands, joined Malaysia in 1970 in a treaty dividing the Strait down the middle. When the U.S. carrier Enterprise and accom- panying ships passed through the strait en- route to the Bay of Bengal during the Ban- gladesh crisis of 1972, Indonesian spokesmen reaffirmed the right of the littoral States to control such passage but reconciled this right with the American action by stating that the Commander of the Seventh Fleet had given advance notice.' s The United States thus avoided a dispute with Indonesia, but the prospect of more troublesome encoun- ters in the future had been foreshadowed. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the protection of American interests against such encounters can be secured by new international legal and organizational devices. After the Enterprise incident, the United States government proposed that "free passage" of straits in a law of the sea treaty be qualified by international stand- ards for safety to be established by the In- ter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) or some other inter- national organization and enforced, beyond the coastal State's territorial sea boundary, by the flag State or port State. 2, But Ma- laysia and Indonesia, while willing to grant controlled transit through straits and wa- ters near their shores at their discretion (al- though the United States evidently does not give either Malaysia or Singapore the ad- vance notification Indonesia claims to re- ceive), are not willing to relinquish such control to an international organization dominated by the United States; and they are even less willing to entrust enforcement of pollution and safety standards to the great maritime States who are increasingly congesting straits with huge tankers and Other commercial vessels. These political facts argue for the adop- tion of a legal position more accommodat- ing to the claimed residual sovereignty of E 6725 coastal States beyond their territorial sea boundaries. But how serious potential con- flicts between coastal and maritime States become will depend on more than success or failure in the search for a general interna- tional treaty. After all, there seems to be, even now, a modus vivendi between the United States and Indonesia that works fairly well because jurisdictional differences are not pressed to the point of codification. One gets the impression that basic political factors, such as Indonesia's determination to become the dominant Southeast Asian power, its uneasiness about expanding So- viet naval activity and Soviet alignment with India, its latent fear of Japan and re- luctance to become dependent on Japan's naval power, and its dependence on an American presence in Southeast Asia, con- solidated by American economic assistance and military aid and sales, will have more to do with an accommodation of U.S. and In- donesian ocean interests than anything that is likely to happen at a general interna- tional conference to negotiate a law of the sea treaty. Similarly, the protection of American naval and economic interests in the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf seem destined to depend far more on good relations with Iran than on a new law of the sea treaty. Indeed, Iran's drive for control of shipping in the Gulf, through which two-thirds of the non-Com- munist world's oil imports pass, tends to con- flict sivith the tenets of free navigation that the United States would like to see incor- porated into a law of the sea treaty. Thus in March, 1973, Iran was reported to be explor- ing an agreement with Oman to inspect all ships passing through the Straits of Hormuz at the entrance of the Gulf.,0 Observers of Gulf politics regard Iran's announced con- cern about the threat of pollution as second- ary to its concern about Arab governments supplying arms to Iranian rebels. Iran's in- clination to seek control of shipping in the Gulf may run counter to an ideal universal law of the sea treaty; but, considering the more than $2 billion in arms the United States has provided Iran to bolster its claim to paramountcy in the Gulf, Iran's forward policy should not be inconsistent with Amer- ica's broad security interests in the Gulf. Indeed, if the general U.S. policy of relying on Iran as a surrogate for U.S. naval power Is correct, Iranian control of the Gulf may be the condition, or at least the necessary price, of protecting U.S. interests in the Gulf. Restrictions on overflight, as on surface navigation, exert a far more serious effect on the mobility of general pupose forces in limited wars and crises short of war than on the U.S. strategic capability. In the Mediter- ranean and Gulf areas, at least, the United States evidently must count on denial of military overflight rights even by allied and other countries in which it has air bases. The result, as in the case of surface navigation, Is to enhance the importance of unimpeded passage over (as through) straits. In prac- tice, however, the problem of securing es- sential mobility by overflight is even more confined geographically. Perhaps it comes down essentially to flying over the Strait of Gibraltar. In any case, resolving this problem, like securing military transit through straits, will depend primarily on the full context of political relations with a few key States. If these relations are not favorable to unim- peded passage, the key States are not likely to sign a free transit provision because of any bargaining that takes place in a law of the sea treaty conference. If they are favor- able, the United States will probably have a better chance of arranging a satisfactory modus vivendi outside an international con- ference than of obtaining a legal guarantee through either a multilateral or bilateral treaty. Nevertheless, U.S. ocean policy-makers un- derstandably cringe from the troublesome Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 E6726 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks November 20, 1914 prospect of contriving the protection of American ocean security interests through ad hoe deals with local and regional powers. As lawyers must, they seek to rest the prcitec- tion of American ocean interests on treaty- made laws that apple as gerteralle and unam- biguously Di passible rather than on triodes vivendi based on fragile political clignments and the untidy growth of customary law. Moreover, they look upon both the threat of emerieste, ocean interests and the solution to the threat in abstract terms, consistent with the American tendency to identify the national interests with a universal order. According to this outlook, the more coastal Countries that assert control over straits claim 50-mile or 200-mile territorial boun- daries, demand special restrictioes on in- nocent passage, or otherwite constrain the use of ocean space, the more such constreents are apt to lead to encounters and clashes with the major maritime Ste tea. Consequently, in this environment American vita; interests will be tnereasingly endangered, and the Melted States will incur growing difficulties in moving air and naval unite to the sites of local clashes and crises that effete these in- terests. This equation, in the official view, raises the prospeet that, in the absence of a new universal law of the sea treaty. the United States Will have to choose between acquiescing to increasing assertions by coast- al States of jurisdictional rights that con- strict American ocean mobility ant forcefully contesting such assertions. The resort to force is typically presented as a prospect that points up the urgency of an international law of the sea treaty, as though force?at least when imposed by the strong against the weak?sa ere either obsolete or too terrible to contemplate. The generalization is pertinent but overdrawn. Not than the com- monly observed le hibitions of the most powerful States against enforcing their will on weaker States in the postwar internation- al environment are any less compelling with reapeet to the major maritime States pro- testing their interests on the ?cater'. But tire eataggerate these inhibitions if we do not recognize their contingent nature That is to say, the great powers' constraint in enforc- ing their interests against the developing countries depends on a calculus of material (and, one can argue, long-run pol tical) gain and political loss that may change with changing cenditions. Thus, the political costs of the United States forcibly protecting American tuna fishers against the claims of sovereignty by Peru always seemed excessive compared to what could be gained by such drastic meas. urea and what would be lost without them. But it is misleading to infer from this situ- ation that the United States would be equally passive in the face of some threat to a more serious economic interest or to a military security interest. British resistance to Ice- land's 50-Mile eXcluslve fishing-none claim, which led to a number of clashes between Ice- landic naval ships add British enitorts, dem- onstrates considerable British self-restraint but also shows?despite Britain's withdrawal of its warships in pursuit of a settlement-- that a maritime State will not necessarily passively accept the assertions ay a small State of tf conflicting mean regime when im- portant economic interests are at stake and cannot be secured by other means (such as by licensing arrangements, by trading mill. tary or economic aid for non-enforcement, or by gaining compensation for seize 1 ships). Where military security is involved, more- over, the maritime States have been bolder in backing their inteiests than in fishing dis- mites. The most frequent examples have oc - cured in Intelligence gathering i Taus, despite North Vietnam's claimed 12-Milo boundary, the United States acknowledged that the U.S. destroyer Maddox was only 11 miles off North Vietnam shortly before the first Gulf of Tonkin incident. The United States has not been reluctant to fly aerial intelligence mis- sions that contravene unaccepted jurisdic- tional claims over coastel waters. Since World War II there have been sev- eral cases (excluding fishing-rights inter- ventions and Cold War crises) in which mari- time powers have exercised their naval superiority to support their definition of freedom of the seas. In July, 1951, when an Egyptian corvette intercepted and damaged a British nierchantman in the Gulf of Aqaba during an attempted blockade of Israel, a British destroyer flotilla, was deployed to the Red Sea. 'Iwo weeks later Britain and Egypt reached an agreement on procedures for Brit- ish shipping in the Gulf. In February, 1957, American destroyers patrolled the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf ct Aqaba to prevent Egyptian interference with American mer- chant shipping enrol:de to Israel. On Decem- ber 13, 11,57, President Sukarno's govern- ment enunciated Indonesia's archipelago doctrine. Less than a month later, Destroyer Division 31 passed through the Lombok and Makassar Straits to reaffirm the U.S. right of innocent passage. On July 21, 1961, follow- ing a bombardment by French naval air- craft, a French cruiser-destroyer group forced the entrance to the Lake of Bizerte to lift a Tunisian blockade of the naval base and re-establish French control, Following Egyptian closing of the Straits of Tiran in May, 1967, the Sixth Fleet concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean while the Ad- miralty announced that the carrier HMS Vic- torious and other units were being kept in the Mediterranean "in readiness against any eventuality," although the threat was not carried further. On April 22, 1969, Iranian warships escorted an Iranian merchant ship from lehorrasmehahr (at the junction of the Tigris and Karun rivers just Inside the Iran- ian border) to the Persian Gulf in defiance of Iraqi threats. Apparently a similar inci- dent had occurred in 1061 in which Iran was forced to yield for lack of naval 'forces. On other occasions maritime powers have simply ignored or rejected coastal State claims against their activities. Thus the PRC Chinese routinely challenge U.S. vessels in the Lema Channel en route to Hong Kong, and the U.S. vessels routinely disregard these challenges. France enforces restricted zones around its nuctear testing site at Mururoa asoll, despite national protests. During the Algerian War, France undertook to visit and search the flagships of more than a dozen States, on some occasions as far away as the English Channel. Thus, if the jurisdictional claims of coastal States were to jeopardize American economic or security interests in the Third World, the United States would not necessarily be de- terred by immediate politica/ costs from sup- porting its ocean interests with force, par- ticularly if the clash of interests occurred out of the context of U.S-Soviet competi- tion, which is increasingly likely to be the case. If such clashes were to become con- tagious, as regular features of the interna- tional environment within which the mari- time powers have to operate, one can even Imagine some of these powers at least tacitly cooperating to enforce their conception of freedom of navigation. Then new laws of the sea would eventually be defined, over time, by the kind of military and diplomatic proc- ess that created the traditional laws, with test encounters playing a determining role. This is neither a desirable nor the most likely prospect, however. Coastal States or the maritime powers are not likely to be so intractable in the pursuit of conflicting in- terests at the expense of their parallel and common interests in maintaining the flow of commerce. Nor are the interests of coastal or maritime States likely to be so cohesive and single-minded as this prospect presupposes. Nevertheless, the prospect does adumbrate a plausible upper limit of conflict, the antici- pation of which may tend to keep the politi- cal process of customary and formal law- making within moderate bounds. Within these bounds the protection of American security interests in the ocean will depend, in the first instance, on the configuration of political interests and military power among indigenous States , hat are in a posi- tion to affect vital "inlet Man military and resource interests; secondly, on the balance of U.S.-Soviet interests tied influence as it affects the actions of these States; thirdly, upon the perceived and actual disposition of the United States to back its ocean interests with force; and, only in this total context, on the process of asserting, contesting, ac- commodating, and negotiating the modali- ties of the rights of navimation through and over offshore waters and It straits. Indeed, whether or not a satisfactory law of the sea treaty is obtained, the United States, consistent with tee current realities of international politics RS well as with the revised view of American power and interests underlying the Nixon doctrine, must depend more and more on the tworable configura- tion of interests arid power among local States rather than on direct American in- tervention, by armed fore or otherwise, to protect its security :tram eats in the use of ocean space. Insofar as the United States can affect such configurations at all, it must de- pend primarily on skill and tact in playing the politics of trade anci investment, eco- nomic and military assietance, and tradi- tional diplomacy in its dealings with the major oil-producing States and the States astride commercially a i.d militarily key straits. 7. TAIPLICATIONS FOR PH, LAW OF THE SEA TREATT From the standpoint of American security interests what conclusion,- can one draw from this analysis about the dmirability and feasi- bility of resolving by means of the projected law of the sea treaty the various jurisdic- tional issues?present mid potential?con- cerning the use of the ocean? Although American law of the sea officials have scarcely bothered to justify this comprehensive ap- proach except in the most general terms, they are moved, one can infer, by several osten- sible advantages of this approach as com- pared to reliance on exist, rig laws and modus vivendi, on separating navigational from other issues for settlement, or on seeking bi- lateral or regional treatici and arrangements. One such advantage is the practical one of uniformity. The point made by American ocean officials is that it would be excessively time-consuming, inconvet dent, and disorder- ly to make differing ad hoc arrangements with all the littoral States involved. This point is compelling as it applies to -jurisdic- tional zones and other ocean issues affecting commercial activities?e hether fishing pe- troleum and mineral exploration and exploi- tation, or merchant shipp:ng. Having to adapt these activities to a diversity of local claims, regulations, and laws could pose such prac- tical difficulties and contradictions as to im- pede commerce while leaving unresolved many sources of internal tonal litigation and conflict. If, for example. littoral States con- tinue to impose an inereasing number of more stringent requirements on the type and construction of merchant ships, on insur- ance, and on navigational taxes and tolls for ehipping, the resulting chaos of claims and arrangements could be worse than incon- venient. This kind of disad.vani age, however, is not nearly so serious as it applies to naval and air navigation for security purposes, since, if the forgoing analysis is correct, the critical prob- lems of navigation and other military uses of the ocean are neither so numerous and diverse nor so intractable to special arrange- ments as to he beyond satisfactory resolution on an ad hoc basis, if necessary. Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP751300380R000500410006-0 November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks Of course, as U.S. representatives now em- phasize, if a universal law of the sea treaty incorporating free transit could be obtained, it would be advantageous not only to Ameri- can military mobility but also to merchant shipping, in which national commercial and security interests now merge. But even so, agreement on free transit would not obviate the need for special international agreements applicable to merchant shipping. Hence, the U.S. government has (a) stressed that the "free" in "free transit" applies only to un- restricted passage through international straits rather than Oa the whole range of ac- tivities permitted on the high seas and (b) expressly stated that the problems of navi- gational safety and pollution risks in inter- naticknal straits should be resolved by sep- arate international agreements and orga- nizations.31 If the right of transit must be qualified, In any case, by recognition of the legitimate concerns of littoral States about the hazards of merchant shipping off their shores and in adjacent straits, it may be unwise to fuse the protection of this right with the right of submarines to go through straits sub- merged and unannounced. It may also be unwise to insist on the strict meaning of "free transit" if the substance of the right can be as readily protected in practice?and with less arousal pf the political sensitivities of post-colonial State,s?under the rubric of "innocent" or "unimpeded." A seccind ostenslble,advantage to the com- prehensive treaty approach to ocean law- making is that the United States would gain a bargaining advantage by intermixing the free-transit straits provision with resource provisions, such as 200-mile resource zones and revenue sharing, which are intended to give coastal States otberwise opposed or in- different to free transit an incentive to make concessions to U.S. s,ecurity interests. The Only trouble with this argument is that, in practice, the strategy may not work. Indeed, it may work Just the other way, if coastal States, observing the great importance that the United States attaches to free transit, calculate that they can extract concessions On their control 9f resource zones and the his as tbe,price of accommodating maritime - interests. It remains tO be seen which, if either, of these bargaining strategies works better. But so far, judging from the conces- sions to coastal State control of resource zones that the United States has already made, the advantage seems to lie with the coastal States. Even where these States (as in Latin America) have evidently made con- cessions to the TJ. position on free naviga- tion, they have done so, in accordance with the Latin doctrine of "patrimonial seas," at the price of American abandonment of re- strictions on exclusive resource zones (other than restrictions of dubious political feasi- bility, such as compulsory dispute settlement and security of investments). A third reason for the comprehensive ap- proach is the alleged political advantage to seeking a legal resolution of conflicting in- terests in the context of a treaty applicable to all States rather than to a few. One supposition underlying this point seems to be that weaker States will find this general multilateral context less invidious and less damaging to their national pride than entering into bilateral or regional ar- rangements with the United States, and that therefore they will find It easier to be accom- modating. The smaller States can explain their accommodations as concessions to the general international geluratuaity in which tu all parttctpate. Tile United States can avoidlhe stigma of hegemony and limit the price for compliance the smaller States may exact. A related supposition may be that in try- ing to reach bilateral or regional deals the Footnotes at end of article, United States must suffer the political em- barrassment, as well as the tactical disad- vantage, of having to satisfy the special in- terests of weaker States; whereas the United States is less vulnerable to such pressure for concessions, and concessions made to one country or regional grouping are less apt to embarrass the United States in dealing with others, if it can generalize its positions and its modes of influence in the huge multilat- eral forums of the United Nations. These kinds of political considerations are, of course, valid in some cases of diplomacy; but since they are not valid a priori and in all circumstances, only an exploration of the comprehensive approach and its alternatives could indicate whether it applies to the di- plomacy intended to protect U.S. ocean secu- rity interests. Here the evidence is quite in- complete and will probably remain so. So far, the requisite number of key coastal States have been reluctant to concede free transit in return for international controls against accidents and pollution, but the United States has nevertheless managed to protect its essential security interests. On the other hand, there is no reason to think that the United Sates would come any closer to gaining acceptance of its position through bilateral or regional deals. Therefore, it would seem that the case for including the provisions of special security concern in a law of the sea treaty depends much less, if at all, on the alleged advantage of comprehensiveness and universality than on the feasibility of persuading a large num- ber of States, including the key straits States, to accept particular provisions like free transit as consistent with their basic in- terests and sovereignty, no matter what the negotiating format may be. If the requisite States agree to free transit, it will not be because of any advantages of political ac- commodation and bargaining power inherent in the negotiating forum but because of the particular balance of interests that emerges in the total context of their relations with the United States and other maritime States. If they regard free transit as inconsistent with their interests, for whatever subjective or objective reasons, the United States would be ill-advised to make agreement on free transit the condition of accepting a treaty that might resolve the jurisdictional issues pertaining to merchant shipping and com- mercial activity, where the case for uniform- ity and universality is compelling. American security interests will suffer far more from an international environment in which unre- solved jurisdictional issues concerning re- source and anti-pollution zones engender chronic conflicts and in which coastal States impose a variety of regulations and restric- tions on commercial shipping than from in- ternational agreements on something less than free transit through international straits or, for that matter, from no additional formal agreements on straits at all. At this point, before the projected inter- national conference on the law of the sea convenes, American representatives stoutly insist that in the end, when all the rhetoric and bargaining are over and a treaty is up for final negotiation, the coastal States will generally accept free transit, because it is not contrary to their national interests and, in the case of a few countries with maritime interests, is a positive advantage. Although this estimate is shared by few close observers of international ocean parlays outside the government and is doubted by some im- portant individuals and agencies inside the government, it may turn out to be correct if the United States makes concessions to the pride and interests of enough developing countries. If official optimism about the prospect of achieving free transit is un- warranted, however, or if the price is ex- orbitant, not only U.S. security interests but the whole range of U.S. ocean interests would be best served by confining the law of the E6727 sea treaty's concern with passage through international straits to general principles of mutual maritime and coastal State interest, leaving the precise condition of transit legally ambiguous. If these conditions need to be made more precise?which is question- able?the United States can afford to delay the formulation of them until some further accommodation of the various interests of the United States and the key straits States crystallizes outside the tense environment of a huge international conference. Indeed, this may be the only course it can afford. In any event, the best alternative to protect- ing U.S. security interests in a comprehen- sive international treaty is probably not seek- ing protection through bilateral or regional treaties (where the political effort and cost promise no greater returns) but simply through modus vivendi under existing law, leavened by international agreements that meet the legitimate concern of littoral States to have a fair share of control, along with the great maritime users, over the increas- ingly congested commercial ocean lanes. The disadvantage of this policy has been exaggerated by implicit acceptance of the unexplained assumption in the official policy that there is some great advantage to getting many countries to sign an international treaty embodying free transit (assuming that they will), although a few straits States re- fuse to sign it (as even U.S. ocean officials consider likely). On the face of it, the most important objective of a treaty provision on free transit is to gain full legal recognition of the principle of unimpeded passage through straits from the few States?for mili- tary purposes, perhaps only Spain and In- donesia?that might seriously endanger American security interests by impeding pas- sage. If the U.S. position is not based on the supposition that the key straits States will subordinate their special interests, as they see them, to "world opinion", either by join- ing the multitude of signatories or by relin- quishing their claims in practice?and this would be a most unrealistic supposition?it must be based on the calculation that in the event of a show-down, the United States will be in a better position physically to resist as- sertions of control by these States, forcibly if necessary, if it can bolster its resistance with the sanction of a nearly universal treaty. There may be an element of truth in this calculation insofar as it applies to the moral courage of American statesmen; but it seems naive as it applies to the efficacy of an in- ternational treaty in either marshalling the support of coastal State signatories or gain- ing the compliance of non-signatories. Nonetheless, one could view this hypotheti- cal assumption about the psychological and political efficacy of an international treaty more hopefully if there were more reason to share the official U.S. confidence in the eventual "rationality" of a large block of coastal and less developed countries that now seem reluctant to grant free transit. Against this hopeful prospect one must weigh the danger that the United States will only aggravate the problem of reconcil- ing its interests in unemcumbered naviga- tion with the interests and pride of a large number of coastal States in controlling the use of "their" waters if it insists on obtain- ing the maximum guarantees for its inter- ests through international law. By elevating what must in essence be a set of political accommodations between the interests of the great maritime States and many coastal States into a matter of legal rights and na- tional sovereignty, the United States may only polarize the issues. On the other hand, by asking for less in law, it may get more protection for its interests in fact. For on the practical basis of day-to-day dealings, as opposed to the rhetoric of public inter- national discourse, most coastal States, in- cluding the key ones, are not necessarily opposed to granting in practice what they ? Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 E 6728 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks Noveini.ey 20, 19:4, May refuse to accept es legal prinelple. And in all anent:Sphere in which the less devel- oped coastal States do not see themselves as confronting the great maritime States in a contest of power, a contest, in which they must rely on their superior voting strength In the U.N., a number of these weaker States whose ,shipping can he hampered be re- gional rivals may (ohm to the eonclusion that they have at least as Much interest as the developed states in unencumbered navi- gation. In this "era of negotiation" and of Attleri- Can "retrenchment without disengagement" it behooves the United State to deal with all States?bnt particularly with the sensi- tive developing Saves of the Third World, who are undergoing a much-needed redefi- nition of their interest; on a more tangible and less romantic basir.--on terms of nrac- tical mutual benefit and -respect, as free as possible from ideologicaI and nationalis- tic preoccupations. There are critical limits to which the United Si ates can i isist upon codifying in the universal: writ cf interna- tional law the protection of intereete that are primarily the concern of a few great maritime States without jeopardizing both legal progress and the pelitical accommoda- tions on which such progress most rest. rocieseteres * Dean, the John': Hopkins School of Ad- vanced International Studies, Wash' .ngi iton, D.C., and Director, Johns Hopkins Ocean Policy Project. The research on this article was Made possible by a grant from. the Na- tional Science Foundation, Ocean Development. and International Law Journal, Volume 2, Number 1. Copyright 1974 by Cranes Russak & Company, Inc. 1 In this piece I have relied entirely on Unclassified material. Therefore. I cannot vouch for the acdaraey of the technical data that does not come from official published sources. Since it would be tedious and cum- bersome, I have not cited a source for every piece of data. Asids from the great abun- dance of sueh unofficial data in the daily and the technical periodical press, I have relied on a number of special publicatio as. such as the annual SIPE! Yearbook of World Arma- ments, publishd by the Stockholm Interna- tional Peace Research Institute; Jane's Fight0iii nips 1977,-74 and Jane's Weapons Systems 1972-73; and the annual Minfary Balance, published by the Intern vtional Iii- stitute of Strategic Studies. s I assume that in a general war the peace- time regimes goverr lug the use of the oceans would be irrelevane, whereas in a was' sig- nificantly limited geographically and in other respects these regimes might be ob- served to some extent. See America and the Wor/d, iTol. H: Rob- ert E. Osgood and others, Reireal from Ein- pire? The First Nixon Administration (John's Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1973), Chap ter 1. On this question, see the somewhat op- posing Views of Mare Brandon and David Schtienbauni in "Jordan: the Forgotten Crisis," Foreign Policy (Spring, 1973;,, pp, 157-81. s In 1973 more than one-third cf American oil consumption ranee from abroad and about 10 per cent from the Middle East. As- sundae the same rate of increase in U.S. de- mand, and no imposition of import restric- tions, dependence on foreign oil is generally expected to increase to 50 percent of Amer- ican consuMption and dependence on the Middle East to 50 per cent of foreign import"; in the next five to ten years, before alterna- tive sources of oil and energy could theoreti- cally alleviate this dependence Ir 1973 how- ever, only Ktrivatt rind Saudi erabta had enough foreign exchange reserves to be able to shut down production for a long period. sThe most intensive rivals in the Gulf are Iran and Iraq. Iran, having undertaken substantial military buildup wit h American as, istance, has become militarily dominant in the Gulf and shows signs of seeking to be- come an Indian Ocean power. !easels engaged its a border dispute with Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, although not aligned with either Tran or Iraq, and in the long run perhaps a :natural opponent of the former, tangibly shares the interest of Trail and the sheik- doms in opposing Soviet-supported South Yemen and the radical contenders for power Its Oman and se:sea-here, although it now seems in no danger from radical forces. Like Iron, Saudi Arabia receives American mili- tary assistance. Pakistan has strengthened its alignment with Iran and has provided mili- tary advisors to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Muscat, end Oman. India, emissions of its depend- ence on Gulf oil and irritated by Iran's ties with Pakistan, has en [tired into economic and scientific cooperation with Iraq. This pattern of relations is criss-crossed by terri- 'tonal disputes arid dynast a rivalries among the Arab Gulf kingdoms and by rivalry be- tween them arid Iran on religious and other grounds. It is linked to the Arab-Israel dis- pute by Israel's close relations with Iran, as well as by Israel's materiel dependence on the United States. Plausible. though milikely, scenarios for such an eventuality might include, for ex- ample, an American naval deployment and possible air action to deter Soviet interven- tion and support friendly regimes against Soviet-supported countries and guerillas in the event of Iranian military action against radical take-overs in the sheikdoms or Sal tdi Arabia, possibly' accompanied by a Saudi ap- pt al for American support against radicals who were threatening to disrupt supply of oil to the United States. American armed in- tervention against an anti-Israeli closure of production by Saudi Arabia seems less likely eecept in the context of countering Soviet i utervention. See, for example, Tem Engelhardt, 'The New-Half-Nelson," Far Eastern Economic Bo- lded', April 9, 1973, pp. 2511., and Cecil Brown- lee'', "Shift Forced in Military Priorities," Aviation Week, :February 26, 1973, pp. 3-F If. 9A balanced assessment of the prospect of crises and conflicts arising from Middle Fent- ern oil polities sand affecting U.S. energy in- terests appears in Robert E. Hunter, The En- ergy "Crisis- and U.S. Foreign Policy, Head- line Series, No. 216, June, 1973. On Soviet naval power and policy, see Geoffrey Jukes, The Ocean in Soviet Nasal Policy, Adelphi Papers, No. 87 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, May, 1972), and Barry M. Biechman, The Changing Soviet Navy (Washington: Brookings institution, 1973). "The opportunities and incentives for de- veloping countries to threaten U.S. invest- ments, monetary intereets, and access to nat- ural resources as levers for political pressure and harassment, are examined by Fred Beteg- sten in "The Threat from the Third World," Foreign Policy, (Summer, 1973), pp. 102-24. 'According to the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention, submarines passing through in- ternational straits "are required to navigate on the surface, and to show their flag". This ? n aunt be tantamount to advance notifica- tion. The offlisiel U.S. interpretation of in- nocent passage (in line with the Interna- tional Court of Justice's report in the 1949 Corfu Channel case that "State in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits or seas without the previous authorization of a ccalsthl State, provided that the passage is innocent"), does not con- cede that advance notice ,ef passage through territorial waters is reestartel. Advance no- tice of transit through :straits, the U.S. holds, would rurs the risk of leading to coastal- State control of tear sit. In practice, the United States evidently provides advance notice of surface ships but not submarines (efecept, perhaps, where secret bilateral ar- rangements have been agreed). " The chart, entitled "World Straits Af- fected by a 12-Mile Territorial Sea", cap- italizes 16 straits as "nemor". Of these 16 I have substituted Net; ed y -Robeson for Juan de Fuca, One of the more strikilig manifestations of the military establishment's tendency to leave nothing to chance, (ince committed to translate military interest:: into law, is the Defense Department's; el) -.',illingness to de- pead upon allied permission, as opposed to legal right, for passage through straits. But unless the U.S. Navy plane on enforcing free transit against its allies, ilie codification of free transit in international law would seem to add nothing to U.S. naval mobility in the improbable event that tee allies were un- willing to grant submerge passage. Conceivably, the consultation clause in the Security Treaty with Japan might be interpreted to require speetial permission for passage of something as conspicuous as a task force--in which case the Japanese gov- ernment might be reluctstat to risk political opposition by granting permission. But it seems unlikely that the present Japanese government would be similarly constrained from granting occasional submerged passage, unless its growing concern over Soviet mili- tary passage impelled it im apply equal re- strictions to American ships. In that ease, however, it would also oppose an interna- tional free transit agreement. is According to one interpretation, how- ever, a strait, in which. 12-mile territorial boundaries come to two miles apart will be considered as falling within territoral waters. "Significantly, the Japanese government, while agreeing with the general principle of finee transit, has been reluctant to relin- quish control of Sovet military passage through the Straits of Tsushima and Tsugaru (between Hokkaido and Lions:Mu) under the anticipated 12-mile boundary. 'In December, 1957, the Indonesian gov- ernment declared that "ail waters surround- ing, between, and linking the islands belong- ing to the State of Indonesia . . . canstitute natural parts of inland or national waters under the absolute Jurisdiction of the State of Indonesia. . . . The 12 miles of territorial waters are measured from the line connect- ing the promontory point, of the islands of the Indonesian State.." Embassy of Indonesia, Report on Indonesia (Witehington. D.C.: No- vember-December, 1957, January, 1958). Vol. 8, number 7. n Captain Edward F. Oliver. "Malacca: Dire Straits," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June, 1973) , p. 29. is The U.S. government officially denies that It has any agreement with any country to provide advance notice of the passage of war- ships through international straits. Hydrophone arrays towed by surface ships can be almost as eifective as implanted systems, but the cost is much greater. More- over, it is unlikely that towed arrays could avoid extended territorial seas off straits any better than implanted arrays. It is techni- cally possible to deploy implanted arrays at great distances from shore stations, but the need for amplifiers and tbe problem of breaks and maintenance make this option unattrac- tive. 2, Thus Secretary of Defense Laird stated on February 20, 1970, "according to our best estimates, we believe that our Polaris and Poseidon submaries at e.t.a can be considered virtually invulnerable today. With a highly concentrated effort, the Soviet Navy might be able to localize and destroy at sea one or two Polaris submarines. But the massive and expensive undertaking that would be re- quired to extend such a capability using cur- rently known techniques would take time and would certainly be evident." He added, however. "A combination of technological developments and the detision by the Soviets to undertake a world-wide ASW effort might result in some increased degree of Polaris/ Poseidon vulnerability beyond the mid- 1970's. But, as a defense planner, I would Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0 ifoventber 20, 1974, CONOR.ESSIQINAL RCORD?Extensions never guarantee the invulnerability of any strategic system beyond. the reasonably fore- seeable future, say 5-7 years." Statement be- fore joint session of Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committee, cited in SIPR1 Yearbook o/ Work! Armaments and Disarmament, 1970-71, p. 122. gg Testimony on April 10, 1973, before the Subcommittee on International Organiza- tions and Movements, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,. 92nd Con., 2nd Sess., p. 12. Stevenson and Jared Carter, of the Dept. of Defense, substantiated the risk by citing Egypt's denial as passage to a commercial ves- sel in the straits leading to the Gulf of Aqaba before the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war on the grounds that the.cargo bound to Israel was not innocent, (Egypt, however, based its con- tention