CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Origins of CIA
The concept of central intelligence to support US national security
policies emerged during World War II. In 1940, when the fortunes of
Britain and France were at their lowest ebb, President Roosevelt sent
Colonel William Donovan, a prominent New York attorney and a Congres-
sional Medal of Honor winner, to assess the situation in Europe. He
reported that Britain would hold on. He also urged that the United States
organize immediately for global war, including the formation of a "service
of strategic information" which would combine intelligence collection and
production with action arms for propaganda and subversion.
Donovan's efforts bore fruit in the formation of the Office of Coordinator
of Information (COI) by Presidential Order on 11 July 1941 with Donovan as
Coordinator. The functions prescribed for the COI were quite similar to
those eventually enacted for CIA:
a. Collect and analyze all information and data,
which may bear upon national security;
b. To correlate such information and data, and to make
such information and data available to the President and to such
departments and agencies as the President may determine, and:
c. To carry out, when requested by the President, such
supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of
information important for national security not now available to
the Government.
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Under this simple but broad mandate, Donovan began building a
foreign intelligence service for the United States government.
Office of Strategic Services
Following the declaration of war against the Axis powers, it was
clear that there needed to be a closer link between the capabilities of
COI and the Armed Forces. On 13 June 1942, the President, as Commander-
in.-Chief, issued a military order redesignating the COI as the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) and placing it under the jurisdiction of the joint
Chiefs of Staff. The foreign information activities of COI were transferred
to a newly-created Office of War Information, -Y a predecessor of the
present United States Information Agency.
OSS was charged to:
a. Collect and analyze such strategic information
as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. Plan and operate such special services as may be
directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
OSS was forced to face a number of problems which had not faced
COI. COI had received secret, secure support in the form of funding,
contracting, and other services from the Executive Office. OSS needed
and was granted certain specific authorities on its own.
The President extended to OSS the privilege to enter into contracts
without regard to the provisions of law relating to the marking, per-
formance, amendment, or modification of contracts , " a privilege
granted earlier to the War Department, the Navy Department, and the
Maritime Commission under the first War Powers Act of 1941.
From its inception, OSS operated under two unusual rules relating
to the expenditure of government monies. One permitted latitude concerning
the purpose for which funds could be spent. The other protected OSS against
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the unauthorized disclosure of the purpose and details of certain expendi-
tures. The Director of OSS enjoyed the confidence of Congress in the
exercise of this grant of broad authority. This confidence in Donovan
was sustained in subsequent appropriation acts as the war ended in which
funds were specifically allocated for OSS.
Shortly after the creation of OSS, top officials in various elements
of the US intelligence effort began to look ahead to the shape of a foreign
intelligence service in peacetime. In October 1944, Donovan forwarded
his views to President Roosevelt in a document entitled "The Basis for a
Permanent United States Foreign Intelligence Service."
Donovan proposed a central service which would:
a. collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence on the
policy or strategic level;
b. have its own means of communication and control
over its secret operations;
c. not have any police function.
Under Donovan's plan there would be an individual rather than a
collective responsibility for national intelligence. Finally, the director
of the proposed organization would be responsible directly to the President.
The President returned the proposal to Donovan with the comment
that he had been advised that it was possible to devise a better and cheaper
intelligence system.
The President asked Donovan to continue working on a postwar
intelligence system. Nearly two years of studies and discussion followed,
during which the bulk of OSS was dismantled as part of general post-war
demobilization. In a holding action, the espionage, counter-espionage,
and support sections of OSS were transferred to the Department of the
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Army and became the Strategic Services Unit. Although there was general
agreement on the need for a central intelligence service, there was little
agreement on what it should be. There were conflicts particularly over
whether the new service should report to the joint Chiefs of Staff, the Depart-
ment of State, or the President. There was no agreement on whether the
responsibility for national intelligence should be individual or collective.
By late 1945, a growing body of opinion was arguing the necessity of
a central intelligence agency. The Congressional investigation of Pearl
Harbor revealed that there was sufficient information available in diverse
parts of the government to provide advance warning of the 7 December 1941
attack. However, no central agency or individual had the responsibility
to correlate, analyze, and report such intelligence to the President.
Central Intelligence Group
The studies and debates culminated in the issuance of a Presidential
Order on 22 January 1946 establishing a National Intelligence Authority (NIA)
and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The NIA was made up of the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Military Chief of Staff to the
President. The order directed the NIA to plan, develop, and coordinate
all Federal foreign intelligence activities. The President ordered the
formation of a Central Intelligence Group to be made up of persons and
facilities assigned from the Departments of State, Army, and Navy. The
President designated a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to direct the
CIG, to be responsible to the NIA, and to sit as a non-voting member of the
NIA.
The order fixed the DCI with clear responsibility for national intelli-
gence and established an Intelligence Advisory Board as the focal point of
the intelligence community for all functions related to national security.
The CIG and the intelligence community inherited certain assets from
the OSS-SSU. There were the war-time records; some means for procuring
both overt and secret information; basic counterespionage files; a substantial
body of knowledge about research and analysis of basic intelligence information;
skilled personnel; and working agreements with key foreign intelligence
services.
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A number of functions were transferred to CIG from wartime
agencies and from departments anticipating budget reductions in peace-
time. The nucleus of the CIG was the Strategic Services Unit which
was transferred from the Department of Army. It became the Office
of Special Operations charged with espionage and counterespionage.
With the expiration of the President's war powers, it was apparent
that Congressional authorization for the CIG was required. A comprehensive
legislative proposal was prepared covering the general guidelines of the
CIG Executive Order and requesting administrative authorities to support
an autonomous agency. For example, CIG lacked the authority to hire
personnel directly and had no independent budget.
As it happened, enabling legislation for CIA was caught up in the
drafting of the National Security Act of 1947 which aimed primarily at
unification of the military services. Provisions relating to CIA's functional
responsibilities and its structural position within the Executive Departnu nt
were included in the draft legislation submitted to Congress by President
Truman on 26 February 1947. During almost five months of deliberation,
Congress studied the CIA proposals in great depth. During a debate on the
bill in the House of Representatives, Congressman Carter Manasco (Demo-
crat, Alabama), a member of the committee which had marked up the bill,
said: "This section on central intelligence was given more study by our
sub-committee and the full committee than any other section of the bill. "
Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947 on 25 July 1947.
It was signed into law by President Truman the following day.
Central Intelligence Agency
Section 102 of the National Security Act established the positions of
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The concept of central intelligence was given formal functions and a precise
relationship within the executive branch. CIA was given a definitive charter
which not only specified the new agency's functions but also made it clear
that CIA would not trespass on the prerogatives of other departments and
agencies, including their need for departmental as opposed to national
intelligence.
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Out of respect for international law, the act does not use the
word, "espionage, " but the intent of Congress was clear, - the United
States would indeed engage in the peacetime collection of intelligence
by clandestine methods. Moreover, the term, "intelligence, " was not
given a precise statutory definition, but was understood to encompass
not only the collection and production of national intelligence but also
other activities which the President deemed to be in support of US national
security.
Therefore, the Act provides that the CIA - in practice, the DCI .. will
advise the National Security Coumil (NSC) on all foreign intelligence
activities of the US government; make recommendations to the NSC for
the coordination of such activities; correlate, evaluate, and disseminate
foreign intelligence; perform services of common concern for the intelli-
gence community; and undertake other functions and duties affecting the
national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.
This final clause was designed to permit CIA to conduct foreign
activities which the President and the NSC might find appropriate to assign
to a "secret service. " These activities have always been subordinated to
the primary task, the production of national intelligence. Moreover, they
have always been under the direct supervision of the executive branch.
The legislative history surrounding the establishment of the DCI
and CIA bespeaks overwhelming support for institutionalizing a national
foreign intelligence effort to serve the needs of the President and his senior
policy advisers. The Act also recognized the autonomous needs of the
intelligence community members for their own departmental, as opposed
to national, intelligence.
The CIA Act of 1949
On 20 June 1949, Congress enacted the CIA Act of 1949 providing
legislative authority for the administration of the Agency. The provisions
of the Act were based on the experiences of OSS and its conduct of intelli-
gence operations in the broadest sense of the word.
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Major provisions of the Act included:
a. authorization for CIA to exercise authorities in sections
of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947;
b. authority to transfer monies between CIA and other
government agencies with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget,
but without regard to limitations of appropriations from which
transferred;
c. authority to expend sums necessary to carry out CIA's
function, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary;
d. for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or
emergency nature, expenditures could be accounted for solely
on the certificate of the Director, which certificate is deemed
to be a sufficient voucher for the amount certified.
The language on certification was taken directly from appropriations
acts for the latter years of OSS and was deemed essential to protect the
secrecy of intelligence operations.
The Act of 1949 completed the creation of CIA and established its
roots in a composite of legislative action and executive orders.
The Intelligence Community
The Early Years
The National Security Act of 1947, which established the National
Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, recognized the
need:
a. to integrate national security policies
b. to coordinate foreign intelligence activities
in support of national security policies '
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The Act recognized the existence of and the need for separate
intelligence organizations in various departments and agencies. The
Act also established the Central Intelligence Agency to:
a. produce national intelligence
b. perform services of common concern
c. coordinate the intelligence community
Since the creation of a national security policy machinery, it has
been possible to identify broad policy guidelines within which the intelli-
gence community could:
a. levy intelligence requirements
b. conduct collection operations
c. produce national intelligence estimates
d. allocate material resources
The division of responsibilities among the elements of the intelligence
community are set forth in a series of National Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCID's). These are supplemented by a Director of Central
Intelligence Directives (DCID's) series.
Although the Act of 1947 stipulates CIA as the coordinating agency, in
practice this responsibility has rested with the Director of Central Intelligence
in. his capacity as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser. The
evolution of the intelligence community from an advisory to managerial entity
has depended very largely on directives from the President to the DCI and on
the propensities of the DCI to devote attention to his supervisory responsi-
bilities.
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For some years, the supervisory body of the intelligence community -
first the Intelligence Advisory Committee and later the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) - concerned itself almost exclusively with setting
national intelligence requirements and producing national intelligence
estimates. The DCI and the Board had little authority to direct collection
efforts and almost no say in the deployment of material resources by the
various departments and agencies.
During General Walter Bedell Smith's tenure as DCI (October 1950 -
February 195 3), the Korean War was the primary concern, and there was
a. prevailing sentiment that a general war with the Communist Bloc was not
unlikely. Under these circumstances, the overriding requirement for the
intelligence community was to develop information on the capabilities and
intentions of our adversaries, with special emphasis on early warning of
an enemy attack. This concern was reflected in the priority national intelli-
gence objectives list, in the national intelligence estimates produced, and
in the allocation of resources to military intelligence needs.
Also, under DCI Smith, the other members of the intelligence community
were made fully aware of the DCI's primary position and his special'relation-
ship to the President and the NSC. Smith rejected any suggestion that he was
simply the chairman of a board of directors and that the community, was thus
ruled by a consensus. This affirmation of the DCI's role came at a time when
there was strong opposition not only to the assignment of broad responsibilities
to CIA as a new agency, but also to the establishment of the DCI with power to
direct the affairs of the intelligence community.
In the 1950s, the concern over a conventional general war tended to
diminish only to be replaced by a more urgent worry about long-range striking
forces carrying nuclear warheads. At the same time, the atmosphere of
mutual deterrence lent itself to an expansion of cold-war tactics, including
subversion and wars of national liberation. DCI Allen W. Dulles was urged
on several occasions by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
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to play a more active role in coordinating the activities of the intelligence
community, but Mr. Dulles' interests lay in other directions. He was
deeply involved in the development and use of the U-2 and in the direction
of cold-war activities, a responsibility assigned to CIA by the National
Security Council.
The Impact of Reconnaissance Collection Operations
The advent of the U-2 and the following reconnaissance satellite
systems forced the intelligence community to focus its attention on four
major problems:
a. requirements
b. collection operations
c. exploitation of the intelligence product
d. allocation of resources
First, requirements reflect the needs of the intelligence analysts
and are correspondingly broad or narrow. An integral part of the U-2
program was the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee which tried to reconcile
the different requirements of the various consumers. The Air Force
was primarily interested in targetting data; the Army and the Navy had
their special interest. The Department of State and CIA were interested
in broader strategic questions, including the state of the Soviet economy
to support a crash military problem.
Second, the U-2 had operational limitations, and weather was a
critical issue. An urgent intelligence requirement could go unsatisfied
if' the aircraft lacked the range or if there was cloud cover. After the
U-2, there was a constant debate over the priority to be assigned to
wide-ranging search satellites or narrowly-focussed spotting satellites.
Both were needed.
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Third, beginning in 1960, the influx of photography threatened
to overwhelm those who would exploit it. The dramatic nature of the
new photography tended to overshadow other products, such as the
carefully-written analysis or the report from a walking mortal. The
intelligence community was almost mesmerized by pictures. The
importance of other sources was not overlooked entirely, and the
acquisition of Col. Olag Penkovsky as a source pointed up the need for
someone on the scene who could see through cloud cover, a roof, and
even into other men's minds.
Fourth, the reconnaissance satellites and the aircraft to replace
the U-2 were very expensive, and the demands of theanalysts called for
even higher-resolution photography. The cost of collecting signals
intelligence continued to soar. The intelligence community had to
husband its resources, and to allocate its resources with two objectives
in view:
a. to ensure that no critical gaps existed in
intelligence coverage
b. to eliminate unnecessary duplication.
Two steps were taken in the latter days of President Eisenhower's
administration. First was the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency
as a means of integrating the military intelligence effort which had been
divided among the separate military services. DIA became the Department
of Defense member of USIB, with representatives of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force holding the right to comment on matters within their competence.
Other board members are the intelligence chiefs from State, AEC, FBI,
NSA and CIA. Recently, the Treasury representative has become a Board
member. Second was the establishment of the National Photographic
Interpretation Center under the direct supervision of the DCI, to provide
a central facility for handling the flood of photography in a way which would
satisfy the demands of all consumers.
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Meanwhile, the United States Intelligence Board continued as the
focal point of the intelligence community and operated as an advisory
board supported by an elaborate sub-committee structure trying to
coordinate the national foreign intelligence effort. The USIB continued
to devote its attention almost entirely to the ultimate product, the national
intelligence estimates and to formulating lists of requirements.
The Role of the DCI Re-defined
Following the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, there was an
open season on the DCI and CIA. Washington was awash with schemes
to separate the operational and analytical elements of the Agency; to
abolish it as such and to distribute its functions among other governmental
agencies; to separate the DCI from CIA. The PFIAB persisted in its view
that the DCI should serve primarily as the President's principal foreign
intelligence adviser and that he control the activities of the intelligence
community through USIB. Secondarily, he should oversee the activities
of CIA but not its day-to-day operations. This managerial concept also
reflected the view that intelligence collection and production were more
important than covert cold-war activities.
Incoming DCI John A. McCone received a letter from President John F.
Kennedy on 16 January 1962 which directed the DCI to coordinate and provide
effective guidance to the total foreign intelligence effort and to maintain a
continuing review, with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned,
of the programs and activities of all US agencies engaged in foreign intelli-
gence activities with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to
avoiding undesirable duplication.
DCI McCone was the first Director to face up to the problems of
managing the intelligence community, and he took the first modest steps.
One of the first was an effort to identify the magnitude of the intelligence
community, its personnel strength, its material resources, and the nature
of its activities. Depending on which criteria were used, the intelligence
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communit approached I with an annual budget of about
the collection and processing of signals intelligence; another heavy
budget item involved reconnaissance operations.
The majority of the money and people were engaged in
Given the size of the intelligence community, the DCI's first
problem was how to satisfy the President's directive to provide coordination
and effective guidance. Beyond the directive to review programs and
activities with the heads of Agencies and Departments, the DCI had no
authority to probe into budgets and programs outside CIA. Mr. McCone
elected to concentrate his attention on those activities which were in
direct support of the DCI's responsibility for the production of national
intelligence. He identified the Board of National Estimates, the National
Reconnaissance Organization, the National Security Agency, the National
Photographic Interpretation Center, and the Air Force Technical Application
Center as national intelligence assets. He conferred with the Bureau of
the Budget, who looked to him for an over-view of the community budget
as well as CIA's activities and programs. The DCI met with Secretary
of Defense McNamara, and they agreed that an effort should be made to
streamline NSA to be more responsive to national intelligence require-
ments.
In order to carry out his role as leader of the intelligence community,
Mr. McCone named a Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs
Evaluation. This official, standing above any responsibilities in CIA, had
a. small staff responsible for reviewing all national intelligence activities
to see if they were, indeed, responsive to priority national intelligence
objectives and if the resources were adequate. At the same time, Mr. McCone
imposed a management role on USIB by tightening requirements and insisting
that collection efforts concentrate on priority tasks.
The National Reconnaissance Program, reconnaissance overflights
of denied territories by manned and unmanned vehicles, proved to be a
severe test of the DCI's efforts to establish his authority in the intelligence
community. Because of the vast amount of support required from the US
Air Force for CIA's U-2 project, the effort was regarded as a joint one.
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Informal understandings were made official in a written agreement
establishing the National Reconnaissance Office with the Under Secretary
of the Air Force as Director. With the development of reconnaissance
satellites, divergence between the Air Force and CIA increased. The
Air Force seemed determined to emphasize research and development
on a high-resolution spotting satellite, to deny CIA a role in research
and development, to fly missions without reference to USIB, and to stall
on releasing) nds for CIA programs.
DCI McCone insisted that the NRP had to be responsive to national
intelligence needs. To that end, he developed a managerial role for
USIB in validating requirements levied by the USIB Committee on Over-
head Reconnaissance, in fixing launch schedules to fit the production of
national intelligence estimates, and in making recommendations for new
satellites to satisfy the needs of the analysts. He wanted both CIA and the
Air Force to go forward with research and development, arguing that the
Agency had always shown greater initiative and imagination in the develop-
ment of the U-2, the A-12, and the first working satellite. To repose full
authority with either CIA or the Air Force would, according to DCI McCone,
leave the NRP short of fulfilling its national intelligence mission.
Mr. McCone carried his views to the highest levels of the goverment,
disagreeing with a PFIAB recommendation that the President turn the manage-
ment of the NRP over to the Department of Defense. It was decided to manage
the NRP by means of an Executive Committee, made up of the DCI, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and the Director, NRO. This arrangement had the
effect of leaving the NRP as a national intelligence asset responsive to the
guidance of the DCI and USIB.
Intelligence, Policy, and Management
During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and during the period of
growing US involvement in Southeast Asia, the intelligence community was
asked more and more to produce estimates on probable enemy reactions
to US courses of action. There was a closer link between specific policy
moves and the intelligence community's estimative processes. This had
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the effect of strengthening the direct connection between policy and
intelligence so th.t the intelligence community could be more responsive
to the needs of the policymakers. The objectivity and integrity of
national intelligence estimates were in no way threatened; the more
ready access to US policy guidelines gave the estimates a more immediate
relevance.
The refinement of priority national intelligence objectives by
USIB did not lead eo a reallocation of resources by collecting agencies
to meet national intelligence requirements. The DCI's authority stopped
short of being able to tell other departments and agencies how to deploy
their people and material resources. For example, NSA faced the
dilemma of whether to respond first to the needs expressed by the
DCI from whom it received exhortations or to the needs of the military
services from whom it received money and people.
During 1970-71, the need for more effective management and
coordination of all aspects of intelligence community activities was under
careful examination by James R. Schlesinger, then Assistant Director,
OMB. The results of this examination were reflected in the President's
November 1971 memorandum concerning "Organization and Management
of the US Foreign Intelligence Community. Citing the urgent need for
an improved intelligence product and for greater efficiency in the use of
resources allocated to intelligence, the President charged the DCI with
four major intelligence community responsibilities:
a. Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities
including tactical intelligence and the allocation of all
intelligence, resources. This would include the submission
of a consolidated intelligence program budget.
b. Producing national intelligence required by the
President and other national consumers,
c. Chairing and staffing all intelligence community
advisory boards or committees.
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d. Reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities
with budgetary constraints.
The President directed only limited formal changes. He did, however,
ask that work be directed toward the attainment of three goals:
a. A more efficient use of resources in the collection
of intelligence information.
b. A more effective assignment of functions within the
community.
c. Improvement in the quality and scope of the substantive
product.
Certain necessary conditions to help the DCI attain the President's
goals were set forth in the Presidential memorandum:
a. The DCI must delegate authority to his Deputy - as far
as possible without legislation - for the plans, programs, and
day-to-day operations of CIA, and he must assume overall
leadership of the community.
b. A more effective review of intelligence product quality
and policy must be provided to the DCI, especially by high-level
consumers of national intelligence.
c. The DCI must play a major role in the resolution of
important issues within the intelligence community.
d. The DCI should be supported by major committees of
the community with clearly defined advisory functions involving
intelligence production and requirements on the one hand and
intelligence budget and the allocation of resources on the other.
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e. Intelligence collection programs, financed and
managed primarily by DOD, must come under more effective
management and coordination with other intelligence programs.
f. NSC and DCI intelligence directives must be rewritten
to reflect these changes and others as they occur.
The intelligence community now includes three principal advisory
elements:
a. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee
which provides the DCI with substantive intelligence guidance
and evaluation of the intelligence product.
b. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee which
advises the DCI on the preparation of budgets and the allocation
of resources.
c. The United States Intelligence Board which advises
and assists the DCI in: (1) establishing priority national intelli-
gence objectives; (2) setting requirements in priority order for
meeting the objectives; (3) the production and dissemination of
national intelligence; (4) the protection of intelligence sources and
methods; and (5) the release of intelligence to foreign governments.
The DCI's personal staff to discharge his augmented responsibilities
is headed by a Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community. Intelligence
Community Staff membership is broadly representative of the community,
both military and civilian. The Staff includes:
a. A Product Review Group which maintains a dialogue
with high-level intelligence product consumers concerning their
needs and their evaluation of the Community's responsiveness
to those needs.
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b. A Community Comptroller Group which conducts
program reviews and produces a National Foreign Intelligence
Program Budget; various planning and development studies;
and provides financial analysis and data support to the DCI,
the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, and other
community elements.
c. A Program Evaluations Group which provides cross -
program analyses of major issues.
Even as the intelligence community has undergone an evolution since
its inception, so has the management of the community. Further changes
seem likely as more experience is gained. At this time, the intelligence
community has priority responsibilities for foreseeing possible technological
breakthroughs in foreign weaponry, for monitoring strategic arms limitations
treaties and related agreements, and for divining the intentions of foreign
government leaders, especially the Communists. The community has
also been assigned heavier responsibilities in the area of economic intelli-
gence and new assignments in international narcotics and terrorism.
The intelligence community has never been monolithic and never will
be. A piece of intelligence information can be interpreted quite differently
by a CIA case officer, a Department of State analyst, or by an expert in inter-
national energy questions. These differing emphases are necessary and
desirable. Some duplication in analysis, collection, and production is
valuable if duplication means the elimination of serious deficiencies in our
knowledge.
The intelligence community is well-named. It is a body with much in
common, but certain areas are private and privileged. The individual and
community needs tend to compete as well as cooperate, and a certain tension
obtains. It is the DCI's job to control that tension and see that it results in
overall benefit to US national security. Without the community, the US Govern-
ment would revert to the practices which President Truman sought to
eliminate: reliance on a disparate series of intelligence judgments from
entities with particular policy axes to grind. National intelligence attuned
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90-
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ECRETT
to national security needs is responsive and helpful; intelligence slanted
to support policy can be unresponsive and even dangerous,
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 App
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
D/yTE
TIALS.
IN4
Mr. John Maury
Legislative Counsel 7D43 HQ
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Jack:
UNCLASSIFIED I CONFIDENTIAL
Q4
Here 'tis. It has been reviewed by
for DCI/IC. I invited Steininger
to look at it, but he never did. The first
part came out of Larry Houston, who says
he'll look at the whole thing only if you want
him to.
NRP makes it SECRET. Without NRP,
however, it ain't got much flesh and blood.
Let me know what mpre I can, please.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
Appro
WC lter Elder xl 602 HQS L 9 Oct
Its 4
[CR .
ttl
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