MR. HERBERT, FROM THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030013-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 137
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 10, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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93n CONGRESS 1 HOTTSE OF REPRESENTAXIYM
2d Session
fi
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEA,R 1975, FOR MILITARY
PROCUREMENT; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; STRENGTHS FOR
ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY COMPONENTS, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AND RESERVE COMPONENTS;
MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
MAY 10, 1974.?Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. HEBERT, from the Committee on Armed Services,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTIN G VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 14592]
The iCommittee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975
for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test
and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized
personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected
Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian
personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military
training student loads and for other purposes, having considered the
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend
that the bill do pass.
(I)
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PIMPOSE
This bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1975 for (a)
major procurement, and (b) research, development, test and eval-
uation by the Department of Defense;
(2) Authorize the, personnel strength for each of the active
duty components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1975;
(3) Authorize the personnel strength for the Selected Reserve
of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal
year 1975;
(4) Authorize the civilian personnel strength for the Depart-
ment of Defense for fiscal. year 1975;
(5) Authorize annual average mil :4 ary training student loads
for each of the active and Reserve components of the Armed
Forces for fiscal year 1975;
(6) Continue the, authority for military assistance for South
Vietnam within the funding of the Department of Defense, sub-
ject to a dollar limitation, with provisions for segregating such
authorized appropriations in a singh fund; and
(7) Establish United States policy with respect to use of
nuclear power in major combatant vessels of the U.S. Navy.
The bill provides specific authorizations for appropriations
totaling $22,642,963,090. This includes $13,641;300,000 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles,
torpedoes and other weapons; and $9,001,663,000 for research,
development, test and evaluation.
14592---A CLEAN BILL
H.R. 14592 is a clean bill superseding 11.R. 12564 on which hearings
were held.
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CONTENTS
Page
Purpose
11
H.R. 14592?A clean bill
II
Summary of major committee revisions in Defense Department request
1
Funding authorizations
1
Strength authorizations
1
Language changes
2
Cost totals
2
Relationship of authorization to total appropriation
3
Nature of committee procedures
5
Committee observations
5
U.S. military commitments to Europe
5
Nuclear Navy
6
Tank procurement
8
Title I?Procurement
9
Discussion of major weapons procurement programs
T-34
9
F-14A
10
A-10
11
E-3A. (AWACS)
12
F-15
13
F-111
14
C-141 modification
15
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
15
A-7D
16
Lance
17
Minuteman
17
Sparrow
18
TOW
19
Dragon
19
Harpoon
19
Shrike
20
Phoenix
20
Trident
21
Nuclear frigates
22
Patrol frigates
22
Ships and craft for Vietnam
23
M60A1 medium tank
23
Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle
24
Armored personnel carrier
25
Review of additional weapons procurement authorized in Title I
25
Aircraft
25
Missiles
29
Ship construction and conversion: Navy
32
Tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes and other weapons
33
Title II?Research. Development, Test, and Evaluation
35
Authorization requested
36
Summary of committee recommendations
37
General discussion
37
Duplication of effort within the services
38
The Department of Defense "selecting out" process
38
Inaccurate cost reporting
38
Responsiveness
39
System planning
39
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Title II?Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation--Continued
Adjustments to fiscal year 1975 research and development authoriza-
Page
tion request recommended by House Armed Services Committee____
40
Committee action on selected subjects in the RDT&E authorization
request
48
RDT&E fiscal year 1975 programs with excess funds
43
Committee rationale for other reductions
43
Advanced forward area air defense system
43
Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS)
44
Clothing, equipment, and packaging technology
44
Food technology
44
Cannon-launched guided projectile
45
Advanced ballistic missile defense system
45
Site defense
45
Surface-to-air missile development (SAM-D)
46
Aegis
46
Fighter prototype
47
Fleet ballistic missile defense
47
Sidewinder (AIM 9L)
47
Air-launched air-to-air missile system (Agile)
47
Close-in weapon system (Phalanx)
18
U.S.S. Hip Pocket
48
The air combat fighter
48
SLBM radar warning system
49
Advanced air-to-air technology
49
Advanced ballistic reentry system
49
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
50
Technical support to OSD/OJCS
50
Defense agencies
51
Special considerations
51
Naval gunfire
51
Trident
52
Binary chemical munitions
52
Surface effect ships
53
Summary by budget activity
53
Brief description of the fiscal year 1975 RET&E budget activities____
54
1. Military sciences
54
2. Aircraft and related equipment_
54
3. Missiles and related equipment_
55
4. Military astronautics and related equipment
57
5. Ships, small craft, and related equipment
58
6. Ordnance, combat vehicles, and rela ted equipment
59
7. Other equipment
61
8. Programwide management and support
62
Title III?Active forces
63
Army active-duty strength
63
Navy active-duty strength
64
Air Force active-duty strength
64
The all-volunteer force
65
Year-to-date recruiting results by service_
65
Enlistments by source
65
Total military strength by service
65
Non-prior service enlistments, men and wpmen, by service
66
Mental groupings: High school graduates_
66
April objectives
67
Reserve components
67
Committee comment
68
Title IV?Reserve forces
69
Uncertainty in DOD Reserve strength estimates
69
Committee additions
71
Army Reserve
71
Naval Reserve
72
Air National Guard
72
Equipment for the Reserve
74
Changes in Reserve structure
75
Action required to meet congressional intent
75
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Title V?Civilian personnel
77
Authorizations recommended
78
Views of Manpower Subcommittee, Post Office and Civil Service
Committee
79
Title VI?Military training student loads
81
USAFI
83
Trainee discharge program
84
Professional development education
84
Centralized management control
84
Title VII?General provisions
85
Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)
85
Committee changes
85
Program justification
85
General background
88
MASF request requiring specific authorization in accordance with
section 138 of Title 10, United States Code
89
Committee recommendation on MASF
90
Committee position
90
Fiscal data
90
Fiscal year 1975 cost
90
Five-year cost projection
90
Departmental data
91
Additional, supplemental and dissenting views:
Additional views of Hon. Otis G. Pike
97
Supplemental views of Hon. Robert L. Leggett
99
Dissenting views of Hon. Les Aspin
111
Dissenting views of Hon. Ronald V. Dellums
113
Additional views of Hon. Patricia Schroeder
118
Changes in existing law
119
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR COMMITTEE REVISIONS IN
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REQUEST
The committee made numerous changes in the dollar authorizations
and other authorities requested by the Department of Defense. The
revisions are discussed in detail throughout this report. Following is
a summary of the major changes made by the committee:
FUNDING ATJTIIORIZ ATIONS
AWACS. The procurement authorization requested for the E-3A
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), $515.4 million, is
reduced to $257.7 million. The request was to provide for purchase of
12 aircraft. The authorization allotted would allow purchase of up
to 6 aircraft.
C-141 stretchout. The procurement authorization request of $50
million for the stretched version of the C-141 aircraft is denied.
CRAF program. The procurement authorization request for $132.9
million for the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program is re-
duced to $25 million.
Patrol gunboats. The procurement authorization request for $14.3
million for 2 patrol gunboats to be furnished to the South Vietnamese
Navy is denied.
Naval craft. A request for $9.2 million for 45 naval craft to be
furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy is denied.
Dragon. The procurement authorization request of $106.3 million
for procurement of the Dragon missile for the Army is reduced to
$86.5 million with the concurrence of the Army.
ARSV and armored personnel carrier. The procurement authori-
zation request of $25.3 million for 35 Armored Reconnaissance- Scout
.Vehicles (ARSV) is denied; and the procurement authorization re-
quest of $9.4 million for the M-113A1 armored personnel carrier is
increased to $24 million, an increase of $14.6 million, and an addi-
tional authorization of $2.3 million is provided for procurement of
additional modification kits for the Vulcan 20min air-defense gun
system. These changes, resulting in a net reduction of $8.4 million in
Army procurement authorizations, are made with the concurrence of
the Army.
Research, development, test and evaluation. The authorization
request of $9,325,039,000 for RDT&E is reduced to $9,001,663,000, a
reduction of $323,376,000.
STRENGTII AUTHORIZATIONS
Air Force active-duty strength. The active-duty personnel strength
request for the Department of the Air Force of 630,345 is reduced to
627,535, a reduction of 2,810.
(1)
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Army National Guard. The Selected Reserve strength of the Army
National Guard is increased from the Lumber requested, 379,848, to
408,000 an increase of 28,152.
Air National Guard. The Selected Reserve strength of the Army
National Guard is increased from the number requested, 89,128, to
95,000, an increase of 5,872.
Army Reserve. The Selected Reserve strength of the Army Reserve
is increased from the number requested, 215,842, to 225,000, an increase
of 9,158.
Naval Reserve. The Selected Reserve strength of the Naval Reserve
is increased from the number requested, 107,526, to 117,000, an increase
of 9,474.
Marine Corps Reserve. The Selected Reserve strength of the
Marine Corps Reserve is increased from the number requested, 36,703,
to 38,000, an increase of 1,297.
Civilian personnel strength. The authorized strength for civilian
personnel for the Department of Defense is reduced from 1,027,327, the
total requested, to 1,012,327, a reduction of 15,000. The reductions are
to be allocated among the services by the Department of Defense.
LANGUAGE CHANGES
Southeast Asia funding. The authority provided in the general
provisions for the continuation of the limitation on military assistance
to South Vietnam under the Military Assistance Service Funded pro-
gram (MASF), subject to dollar limitation, has been extensively re-
vised to require the administration of such authorization as a separate
fund and to require improved accounting and auditing procedures.
The authorization for expenditure requested under the program by
the Department of Defense of $1,600,000,000 is reduced to $1,400,000-
000, a reduction of $200 million.
Nuclear Navy. A new title is added to the bill to establish as the
policy of the United States the requirement that future construction
of naval combatant vessels for the Navy shall be nuclear powered.
COST TOTALS
The total dollar authorization recommended by the committee, in
this bill, $22,642,963,000, is $487,176,000 below the amount requested
by the Department of Defense.
The following table compares the amounts authorized for fiscal year
1974 and the amounts requested by the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 1975 and the amounts recommended by the committee in
H.R. 14592:
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COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZATIONS REQUESTED BY DOD FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 WITH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
IN FISCAL YEAR 1974 AND COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975
lIn thousands of dollars]
Appro-
Requested Authorized priated Requested
fiscal year fiscal year fiscal year fiscal year Committee
1974 1974 1974 1975 recommends
Procurement:
Aircraft:
Army 181, 000 181,000 138, 400 339, 500 8335, 000
Navy and Marine Corps 2, 958, 300 2,958, 300 2, 722, 200 2, 960, 600 2,964, 100
Air Force 2, 912, 800 2, 739, 100 2, 720, 400 3, 496, 600 3, 391, 400
Total, aircraft 6, 052, 100 5, 878, 400 5, 581, 000 6, 796, 700 6, 690, 500
Missiles:
Army 599, 900 574, 200 525, 100 459, 200 439, 400
Navy -----------------680, 200 680, 200 579, 700 620, 600 620, 600
Marine Corps 32, 300 32, 300 4 32, 600 76, 000 76, 000
Air Force 1, 573, 200 1, 573, 200 1, 393, 300 1, 610, 800 1, 610, 800
Total, missiles 2, 885, 600 2, 859, 900 2, 530, 700 2, 766, 600 2, 746, 800
Naval vessels 3, 901, 800 3,788, 200 3, 468, 100 3, 562, 600 3, 539, 100
Tracked combat vehicles:
Army 201, 700 193, 300 188, 800 331, 900 321, 200
Marine Corps 46,200 46, 200 45, 200 80, 100 74, 200
Total, tracked combat vehicles 247, 900 239, 500 234, 000 412, 000 395, 400
Torpedoes: Navy 219, 900 219, 900 200, 768 187,700 187, 700
Other weapons:
Army 51, 300 44, 700 40, 500 53,400 55, 700
Navy 41, 900 41,900 28, 751 25, 600 25, 600
Marine Corps 700 700 700 500 500
Total, other weapons 93, 900 87, 300 69, 951 79, 500 81, 800
Total, procurement 13, 401, 200 13, 073, 200 12, 084, 519 13, 805, 100 13, 641, 300
Research, development, test and evaluation:
Army 2, 108, 700 2, 031, 686 1, 912, 100 1, 985, 976 1, 878, 397
Navy a 2, 711, 700 4 2, 675, 300 1 2, 654, 405 2 3, 264, 503 '3, 153, 006
Air Force 3, 212, 500 3, 110, 811 a 3, 042, 000 3, 518, 860 3, 459, 760
Defense agencies a 525, 500 a 504, 000 a 482, 500 8 555, 700 7 510, 500
Total, R.D.T. & E 8, 557, 900 8, 321, 797 8, 091, 005 9, 325, 039 9, 001, 663
Total, procurement and R.D.T. & E 21, 959, 100 21, 394, 997 20, 175, 524 23, 130, 139 22, 642, 963
Includes $2,600,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. authorization.
2 Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency program.
a Includes $24,600,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
4 Appropriated amount includes $300,000 in minor reprograming for spare parts and miscellaneous items.
a Appropriated amount includes $7,200,000 authorized in the procurement account.
Includes $27,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
Includes $25,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
a Reduction results from $4.5 million transfer to R.D.T. & E. authorization from procurement authorization of Cobra/Tow
helicopter.
RELATIONSHIP OF AUTHORIZATION TO TOTAL
APPROPRIATION
The $22,642,963,000 authorized for appropriation in the present bill
is only a part of the $90,9747292,000 in budget authority requested by
the President for the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1975.
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The appropriations categories covered by authorization in the pres-
ent. bill are those for major procurement and research, development,
test and evaluation. Authorizations of specific dollar amounts for
personnel are not carried in the present legislation. However, the
legislation authorizes the strength levels for the active-duty military
components, for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense and
for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components; and these
authorizations, therefore, govern the appropriation requirements for
major personnel and operation and maintenance expenditures.
Military construction is authorized in separate legislation.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION BILL
SUMMARY BY MAJOR WEAPOh CATEGORY
fin thousands of dollatsi
Weapon category
Total amount Committee
of request for
fis;:al year 1975 Net change
programs from request Recommended
Aircraft
6, 796, 790
-106,200
6, 690, 500
Missiles
2, 766, 600
-19,800
2, 746, 800
Naval vessels
3, 562, 600
-23, 500
3, 539, 100
Tracked combat vehicles
412, 000
-16,600
395, 400
Torpedoes
187, 700
None
187, 700
Other weapons
79, 500
+2, 300
81, 800
Procurement Total
13, 805, 100
-163,900
13, 641,300
R.D.T. & E
I 9, 325, 039
-323,376
5 9,001,663
Grand Total
23, 130, 139
-487, 176
22, 642, 963
I Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency programs, and $27,000,000 for the activities of tie Director of Test and Evalua-
tion, Defense.
51 ncludes $2,570,000 for foreign currency programs, and $25,000,000 for the activities of tie Director of Test and Evalua-
tion, Defense.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION BILL-SUMMARY, BY DEPARTMENT
tin thousands of dolla
Army
Navy and
Marine Corps
Air
Force
Defense
agencies
Grand totals
Authorization requested:
Procurement
R.D.T. & E
1,
1,
184,
985,
000
976
7,513,
5 3,264,
700
5)3
5,
3,
107,
518,
400
860
3555,
(I)
700
13,
9,
805,
325,
100
039
Total requested
Committee recommends:
Procurement
R.D.T. & E
3,
169,
976
10, 778,
203
8,626,
260
555,
700
23,
130,
139
1,
1,
151,
878,
300
397
7,487,
5 3, 153,
800
016
5,
3,
002,
459,
200
960
510,
(I)
500
13,641,
9, 001,
300
663
Total recommended
3,
029,
697
10, 640,
8)6
8,
461,
960
510,
500
22,
642,
963
Net changes:
Procurement
-32,700
-25,9)0
-105,200
(I)
-163,800
R.D.T. & E
-107,579
-111,4)7
-59, 100
-45,200
-323,376
Total changes
-140,279
-137, 397
-164,300
-45,200
-487, 176
I Not available.
Includes $2,570,000 for foreign currency program.
3 Includes $27,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense,
4 Includes $25,000,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
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NATURE OF COMMITTEE PROCEDURES
The Committee on Armed Services conducted extensive hearings on
all phases of the present bill, commencing hearings on February 7 and
voting to report the bill on May 7.
In addition to 14 hearing days by the full committee, which in-
cluded a general review of military posture and detailed consideration
of aircraft and missile procurement, other sections of the bill were
reviewed in detail by subcommittees as follows:
Subcommittee No. 1 conducted 20 days of hearings on Title II, re-
search, development, test and evaluation authorizations.
Subcommittee No. 2 conducted 21 days of hearings on Titles III,
IV, V and VI of the bill, the authorizations for personnel strengths
of the active-duty military force, the Reserve force, civilian personnel
of the Department of Defense and military student. training loads.
Subcommittee No. 3 conducted 12 days of hearings on that part of
Title I relating to authorization for naval ship construction.
The committee and subcommittee hearings on the bill fill four
volumes.
COMMITTEE OBSERVATIONS
U. S. military commitments to Europe
The committee reminds the House that on April 8 the committee,
pursuant to section 301 (c) of Public Law 93-155, transmitted a report
on U.S. military commitments to Europe. The report was approved
by the committee by a vote of 32-5.
Section 301 (c) of Public Law 93-155 was the section added to last
year's procurement authorization bill on the House floor by the Peyser
amendment which required a study on "the advisability of maintain-
ing our present military commitment to Europe in view of the current
economic and military situation in Europe."
The committee would remind the House that in acting on H.R. 14592
it should keep in mind this principal point raised in the earlier report:
The question for the House is substantially different this year than
last year because major actions have been taken to delineate the policy
with regard to deployment of forces in Europe. The two major actions
? in this regard were the adoption of the Jackson-Nunn amendment to
Public Law 93-155 and the commencement of MBFR negotiations in
Vienna, which included the submission of a unified position by the
NATO allies.
(1) In adopting the Jackson-Nunn amendment, the Congress set
as policy that the allies have 18 months to offset the balance-of-
payments deficit of the United States as a result of its deployment of
forces in Europe. If such offset is not accomplished, then beginning
6 months thereafter the United States will begin to reduce its forces
? by a percentage, equal to the percentage by which the balance of pay-
ments is not offset.
In adopting Jackson-Nunn as the law of the land, the Congress has
made a commitment. to the NATO allies that they will have an oppor-
tunity to meet the balance-of-payments requirement before we reduce
our forces.
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To withdraw such forces at this time prior to a determination of
whether or not the allies can meet the requirements of Jackson-Nunn
would be a capricious act by the United States.
Information available to the committee gained in the study con-
ducted pursuant to the Peyser amendment and updated in recent
hearings with the Assistant Secretary c-f State on the German Offset
Agreement provide encouraging indications that through a combina-
tion of the German Offset Agreement and other purchases by other
NATO allies, the European partners would be able to meet the require-
ments of Jackson-Nunn. It must be emphasized, however, that a pre-
cise determination of the balance-of-payments deficit, which by law
must be made by the Department of Commerce, cannot be made until
the close of fiscal year 1974, and, therefore, determination of whether
the requirements of Jackson-Nunn can be completely met by the allies
cannot be determined until sometime thereafter.
(2) At the time of last year's Hous?, consideration of the annual
authorization legislation, the MBFR negotiations were still a hope.
They are now a reality. Negotiations commenced in Vienna in October
1973. The NATO allies have submitted a substantive proposal for
mutual reduction of forces, the first phase of which calls for reductions
to be made entirely from forces of the United States and the Soviet
Union. It should not be lost on Members of the House that this allied
proposal, therefore, carries an agreement by the European partners
of NATO for a reduction of U.S. forces, in context of MBFR, with-
out any reduction of their own forces. In joining with its allies in sub--
mission of substantive proposals at the Vienna talks, where the
Warsaw Pact has also submitted substantive proposals, the United
States has made a commitment to give such negotiations a reasonable
time- to work. A unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces at this stage
would be an abrogation of our commitment and would undercut the
negotiations in Vienna and in the process would undercut our allies
and the position they have taken at considerable U.S. urging. As was
said in the report submitted to the House on Apri]. 8, "MBFR is the
litmus test of detente, and the impact of undercutting negotiations
would extend beyond European security."
Your committee believes that the U.S. has a great responsibility not
to undermine the MBFR talks. The committee, therefore, urges Mem-
bers of the House. to remember these twin policy commitments the
U.S. has made in considering any effort to change our European
deployments at this time. As the committee's earlier report, stated,
unilateral reductions at this time "would be a capricious action and
would not be worthy of the United States."
Nuclear Navy
Ever since the Congress found it necessary to fund the reactor for
the NAUTILUS, the world's first nuclear submarine, with Atomic
Energy funds, the Congress has had to drag the Navy and the Depart-
ment of Defense into the nuclear era.
It .was at congressional insistence that the Polaris fleet of ballistic
missile submarines was created. Congressional action changed a con-
ventionally powered frigate into a nuclear-powered frigate in 1961 to
construct the TRUXTUN. Every nuclear frigate since then?DLGN's
38 through 42?has been constructed only after the Congress mandated
their construction.
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Notwithstanding the great success of the nuclear-powered carrier
ENTERPRISE, the then Secretary of Defense returned to conven-
tional power for the follow-on JOHN F. KENNEDY and AMERI-
CAN over the strong objections of the Congress. The latest carriers,
the NIMITZ, EISENHOWER and VINSON, are all nuclear
powered.
The use of nuclear power on submarines and other naval ships thus
resulted from the initiative of the Congress and their introduction
would have been long delayed if the Congress had not taken the initia-
tive. It is perhaps true that in no other area has the Congress pro-
vided such clear leadership in weapons decisionmaking as in the
introduction of nuclear power to naval forces.
It can be equally said that in no other area has the initiative of Con-
gress proven to be profoundly correct. Given the present problems of
our Navy, even with the nuclear capability that it does have and
facing as it does the awesome increase in naval capability of the Soviet
Union?the details of which have been enunciated to the House, by
this committee on numerous occasions in the past?one shudders to
think of what the state of our naval forces would be today without
the actions initiated by the Congress on nuclear submarines and sur-
face ships.
The advantages of nuclear power for naval craft that have been ex-
pounded by the Congress in the past have proven to be true beyond a
shadow of a doubt in any military sense. The operational advantage
of nuclear power is undisputed. The only arguments of any possible
substance against the use of nuclear power for sonic time have been
on economic grounds. Your committee has long held that those eco-
nomic arguments were unreliable and were not sufficient to outweigh
the operational advantages of nuclear power. But the question is now
moot. The oil crisis resulting from the October War in the Middle
East and the resulting dramatic increase in the cost of oil have made
meaningless scraps of paper out of all those vast and impressive com-
pilations of comparative cost statistics produced so laboriously in the
Pentagon.
Notwithstanding this overwhelming weight of evidence, the com-
mittee was appalled to learn that renewed consideration was being
given within the Departmnt of Defense to a conventionally powered
carrier for the Navy in future budget programs as well as diesel pow-
ered submarines and conventional power for a new class of destroyers.
The advantages of a nuclear fleet compared to ships tied to a black
oil train are so strong as to be incontrovertible and have been delineated
for the House on a number of occasions in the past by this committee.
It is unnecessary to take time for a detailed discussion here. Nuclear
power has proved itself over the past 20 years. Since the first nuclear
ships were commissioned in September 1954 and with over 100 nuclear
submarines and 6 nuclear surface ships in commission, no nuclear-
powered vessel has ever had to abort a mission in all of that time
because of failure in a nuclear propulsion system.
The Committee on Armed Services, in view of the above considera-
tions, believes that it is time for the Congress to take the leadership
once more in setting naval policy and to put an end to the continuous
struggling within the Department of Defense on nuclear propulsion
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8
systems. Your committee recommends, therefore, the addition of a
new title to the bill, Title VIII, to establish as the policy of the
United States that the strike forces of the U.S. Navy will be modern-
ized by the construction of nuclear-powered major combatant vessels
and to assure an adequate industrial base for such policy. Essentially,
this title would require that all new first-line combatant vessels will
be nuclear powered.
Title VIII defines major combatant vessels as all submarines, both
missile and attack; all ships that run with an aircraft carrier task
force including the carrier and all of its escorts; and all strike forces
which operate independently where high-speed operations will be of
significant military value.
Title VIII requires the Secretary of Defense to submit written plans
for the nuclear Navy to the Congress with the annual submission
of the budget and requires further that no nonnuclear-powered first-
line strike ships may be requested from Congress unless and until the
President advises the Congress that construction of nuclear-powered
vessels would not be in the national interest. Such a report from the
President would have to include for the consideration by Congress an
alternate program of nuclear-powered ships with appropriate design,
cost and schedule information.
Tank procurement
The committee would like to express irs concern as to the limitations
on the capabilities of the Armed Forces and the military procurement
industry to produce conventional weapons systems at the rate neces-
sary to meet fully our long-range requirements.
The committee is particularly concerned about the level of procure-
ment of tanks for the Army and Marine Corps. A great deal of money
has been spent in past years on the R&D of follow-on tanks, in some
cases on programs which have been terrible failures. At the same time
we have in our inventory a tank which is the equal. of any operating
in the world today but have failed to produce this tank in numbers
anywhere approaching the tank production of the Soviet Union. The
October War in the Middle East provided frightening evidence of
the willingness and the ability of the Soviets to supply tanks to their
allies at an incredible rate. The U.S. policy decision to supply tanks
to Israel diminished our own tank inventory. Even so, the Israelis
havefl not received tanks in the quantity they desire.
The committee would like to repeat here a statement made in the
report of the special subcommittee of this committee which visited
the Middle East following the October War:
What the Soviets gave the Arabs was not sophistication,
but proliferation. It was the vast number of weapons pro-
vided the Arabs rather than any exceptional technical capa-
bility that took a toll.
It is important to ask ourselves what the lesson is for our
military. In a confrontation of equal tactical, technical and
fighting ability, at what point does a great advantage in
quantity overcome an advantage in quality?
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We have continued to develop technically superior con-
ventional weapons (although these developments have some-
times met with great resistance) but we have not supplied
U.S. forces with conventional weapons in quantities matching
Soviet forces. If the decision is made to resupply the Israeli
forces at anywhere near the number they request and those
supplies are taken out of inventory, the U.S. forces could end
up with shortages in some areas of conventional weapons.
Perhaps the United States has concentrated so heavily in de-
veloping weapons for the future that not enough effort has
been given to producing already adequate systems.
The committee reminds the House that in Central Europe the War-
saw Pact has an advantage over NATO in tanks of approximately
21/2 to 1. Elsewhere in this report the committee has also expressed
its concern about the substantial deficit in tank inventories for the
Reserve forces.
At present there is only one producer of tanks in the United States
for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and the present rate of pro-
duction is 30 tanks a month, or 360 a year.
In addition, there is only one remaining willing supplier of the
traversing turret.
The FY 1975 procurement authorization for the 11/160A1 tank is
based not on the true requirements of the Army, but on the estimated
rate of production that the assembly line can deliver. Efforts are
underway to increase the production rate, but the time required to
provide a substantial increase is of great concern to the committee.
And even when the production rate is increased according to the pres-
ent plans of the Army, the replenishment capabilities would still be
inferior to those of the Soviets.
The committee believes, therefore, that both the Army and the De-
partment of Defense have to give a great deal of thought to the pro-
duction needs for the tanks currently in our inventory and for other
conventional weapons systems whose needs might prove critical on
tomorrow's battlefield. As part of this reexamination, the committee
believes that consideration should be given to developing additional
sources for the production of tanks and possibly other systems.
TITLE I?PROCUREMENT
DISCUSSION OF MAJOR WEAPONS PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
T-34
The Navy request for $3.5 million to modify two T-34B aircraft
to the T-34C configuration was discussed at length by the committee.
The committee was advised that the cost of new T-34C aircraft was
within two percent of the cost to modify older T-34 aircraft.
According to information received by the committee, the service
request for $3.5 million to modify two T-34B aircraft was brought on
by the conference report in the authorization bill for fiscal year 1974
directing a review of total defense pilot requirements and training
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rates together with assets available to meet pilot training require-
ments prior to submitting a request for additional training aircraft.
It is obvious that this hiatus in training aircraft procurement was
an outgrowth of the T-2C/T-38 training aircraft issue that resulted
in termination of T-2C procurement in fiscal year 1974.
Both the T-2C and the T-38 are costly jet training aircraft and
the committee felt that the language .11. the conference report was
j
intended to apply to these expensive et training aircraft. The. T-34C
is a small, propeller-powered training aircraft, not in any way com-
petitive with jet training aircraft such as the T-2C or T--,38. In addi-
tion, the committee was advised that the O&M cost per hour for the
T-34C is $90, while the O&M cost per hour of the T-2C and the T-38
is $413. Therefore, the committee felt the prohibition of further pro-
curement of jet training aircraft applied to the costly jet trainers
discussed at the conference and not to inexpensive small propeller
aircraft.
The proposed modification of the T-34B to T-34C configuration is
extensive. New components include the engine, propeller, wing, land-
ing gear, avionics and oxygen system which are available from in-
production sources. Due to the extensiveness of the T-34B to T-34C
configuration, disassembly and handling costs cause the price of a
T-34C acquired by modification to be within two percent of the cost
of a new production T-34C. Further, procurement of only two aircraft
in fiscal year 1975 would result in a costly break in the T-34C pro-
duction line while awaiting fiscal year 1976 contract implementation.
Therefore, the service request for $3.5 million to modify two T-34B
aircraft to T-34C configuration would be a more expensive method to
acquire T-J34C aircraft than is new procurement.
The T-34C aircraft will replace the T-34B and the T-228 trainer
aircraft. Both the T-34B and the T-28 are over 18 years old. An
investment in a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for both
aircraft will be required if operated beyond fiscal year 1977. This
costly SLEP for these two aircraft, which will extend service life
for only five years, can be avoided by initiating T-34C procurement
in fiscal year 1975 ?and continuing production into fiscal year 1977.
The House Armed Services Committee believes it is much more cost
effective to procure new aircraft and, therefore, recommend procure-
ment of 18 T-34C trainer aircraft at a cost of $7.0 million.
For the first time in several years, the F-14 aircraft procurement
request was not the center of controversy in the committee. The com-
mittee was advised that production deliveries are on schedule and
the program is presently within cost.
Information furnished the committee indicated that in 1973 the
F-14 air superiority fighter, by virtue of its superlative flight charac-
teristics and successfully demonstrated capability as a weapon system,
established new standards for fighter effectiveness, versatility and air-
crew safety. Of major significance in 1973 was the conclusive evidence
that the Variable Geometry Wing (-MTV) of the F-14 added new
and most noteworthy dimensions in the realm of fighter aviation safety
and effectiveness. This feature provides optimum lift configuration
throughout the flight envelope.
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Further, the F-14 weapon control system and PHOENIX missile
in 1973 demonstrated capabilities unprecedented in the annals of
aviation:
Longest range fighter detection of fighter-size targets to date;
Longest range fighter launched air-to-air missile firings to date;
First fighter to demonstrate automatic detection and tracking
of multiple targets;
First fighter to demonstrate multiple, near-simultaneous firing
of missiles against multiple airborne targets.
These events, coupled with an outstanding PHOENIX firing score
(90 percent) from the F-14, fulfilled the far-reaching performance
requirements defined by the Navy during the conceptual stage of the
F-14.
Therefore, the committee recommends the procurement of 50
F-14As, in the amount of $639.3 million, together with advance pro-
curement, in the amount of $70 million, and initial spares, in the
amount of $35.2 million.
A-10
The Air Force request, in the procurement account, for the A-10
aircraft was $173.8 million. $140.3 million is for the procurement of 26
aircraft; $28.9 million is for advance procurement; and $4.6 million is
for initial spares.
At the conclusion of the "flyoff" between the A-9 and A-10 proto-
types, a contract was awarded by the Air Force to Fairchild-Republic,
manufacturer of the A-10, for the full scale development and manu-
facture of ten development and test aircraft. In addition, the con-
tract includes an option to produce 18 production aircraft. That con-
tract was awarded in March 1973.
The Air Force reported to the committee that since the contract
was awarded, there have been some very significant program mile-
stones. The Air Force has added 150 flight evaluation hours to the
prior 328 hours that were accomplished during the prototype phase;
they have completed the prototype testing of the drag reduction on
the wing slat; the GAU-8 gun has not only been fired on a ground
mockup, but is now being successfully fired in flight, with no adverse
effects on the aircraft or the pilot. Additionally, the TF34-100 engine
has experienced 675 problem-free hours of operation.
During the hearings, the Air Force advised the committee that the
"flyoff", requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, was in
progress between the A-10 and the A-7; and that a report of the re-
sults of that "flyoff" would be before the Congress by the 15th of June.
After receiving the Air Force budget request, the committee was in-
formed that "the AF plans to initiate procurement of the first 26 pro-
duction aircraft and 4 additional RDT&E aircraft with a 1 July 1974
release of funds under the Continuing Resolution Authority". The
committee was concerned about the authority for such action. Under
? questioning by the Chairman, the Air Force witness explained it defi-
nitely "is the intent of the Air Force after successful completion of the
flyoff, to ask the Congress, through letters to the chairmen of the
four committees involved, for permission to apply long-lead money,
$30 million, as early as possible to exercise our option.'
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The, committee unanimously agreed to recommend. approval of the
A-10 -request in the Air Force budget, subject to a favorable decision
for the A-10 in the flyoff competition with the A-7. Therefore, the
money authorized in the bill will be available for the A-10 only if
that aircraft wins the fly-off competition for the close support role.
E?SA (ATV ACS)
The authorization requested by the Air Force in their fiscal year
1975 budget for the E-3A (AWACS) was $769.5 million, of which
$494.4 million was requested for procurement; $21.0 million was re-
quested for advance procurement; and $34.4 million for initial spares.
The R.D.T. & E. portion of the AWACS is $219.7 million. The number
of aircraft requested in the fiscal year 1974 program was 12.
The General Accounting Office began a study hi the, fall of 1973 to
evaluate the latest rationale for AWACS and to assess_the Air Force's
plans for using this "elevated platform" for surveillance, command,
communications and control. According to the GAO report, "the Sec-
retary of Defense transferred AWACS from the Strategic Forces to
the. General Purpose/Tactical." This transfer was in line with other
steps reducing the strategic air defense mission, apparently on the
assumption ,by DOD that an enemy attack on the United States is
likely to come via missile rather than bombers. Further, according to
the GAO, this transfer in roles made AWACS' cost- affeetiveness cal-
culations and findings about the tactical role obsolete and therefore
GAO says AWACS must now be reconfigured to satisfy a more de-
manding tactical mission.
Even though the Air Force does not agree, GA() says the tactical
mission to which the AWACS is to be assigned is much more complex
and requires additional highly sophisticated electronics and a self-
defense system. According to the GAO, none of these will be available
for operational flight testing prior to the decision to go ahead with
the production schedude. Information furnished the committee indi-
cated. that this decision date is December 1974..
The Air Force states that ground testing results can be extrapolated
with high confidence to airborne system results on the basis of their
similarity to the ground/flight relationship of the I3rassboard Pro-
gram. Thus, by December 1974, the necessary testing for performance,
capability and capacity for Block I will have been accomplished in
sufficient depth so that all of the information necessary for sound
decisionmaking will be available. Therefore, the Air Force states that
in December 1974 the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council III
(DSARC III) would review AWACS to decide whether full produc-
tion for Block I (first production buy) should .be approved. By that
time, each subsystem will have been thoroughly tested. And, on the
basis of test performance to date, the Air Force has full confidence
that 0-o,ahead will be given.
Th Air Force further states that the true mission of the AWACS
from the outset was both strategic and tactical, and that allegations to
the contrary by the GAO are exaggerated regarding the change from
strategic purposes to tactical purposes.
The committee, is somewhat at a loss to understand the reasoning
behind the Air Force contract for the development of the AWACS
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system. Along with the original development contract, there were
included certain production options, the first of which must be exer-
cised in December 171. However, the option agreed to by the Air
Force requires that they must buy not less than 12 aircraft nor more
than 50 aircraft per year. The Air Force agreed to this, in the face of
a proposed program of a total of only 34 aircraft. Any proposals by
the Air Force to buy less than 12 aircraft in any given year must be
renegotiated.
At the present time, only one aircraft is flying. Three other aircraft
have been authorized for test and evaluation, but as yet have not begun
flight tests. The Air Force, under its present contract, is not required
to make a production decision until the, completion of DSARC III
in December 1974, at which time sufficient test data should be avail-
able on which to base a production decision. However, they are asking
the Congress to make that decision now without sufficient facts and
test information.
The committee, because of the fact that there has been little or no
demonstration of the capability of AWACS to properly manage the
tactical air situation in a high-density combat environment, such as is
expected to be encountered in Europe, is reluctant to authorize the
12 aircraft program as requested. Even in view of the necessity for
renegotiation, the committee is wary of authorizing the full Air Force
request until the R&D program is further along and the additional
equipment required to be integrated for the tactical role has been
sufficiently tested to prove its effectiveness.
Therefore, the committee recommends approval of only six AWACS
aircraft, in amount of $257.7 million which includes advance procure-
ment, in the amount of 810.5 million. Initial spares, in the amount
of $34.4 million; and R&D funds, in the amount of $219.7 million
were also authorized. The committee's objections are not so much to
the need for the system but rather the degree of concurrent develop-
ment and production which the Air Force has contracted for.
F-15
To date the F-15 flight test program has been an outstanding suc-
cess. To date, fifteen F-15 aircraft, including two two-place models
have accrued over 1770 hours in 1775 separate flights. Since first flight
in July 1972, the F-15 has flown throughout the design flight envelope,
and has exceeded the combat altitude and maximum mach number
for which it was designed. These two points are well in excess of
60,000 ft. altitude and twice the speed of sound. Test pilots attest to
its superior handling qualities and remarkable agility and acceleration.
The pulse doppler radar system has already demonstrated search and
track ranges in excess of the development specifications. It can dis-
tinguish targets from background clutter, and through computer proc-
essing of the radar information, permits the pilot to detect and track
airborne targets regardless of their altitude. Successful weapons sub-
systems testing has been accomplished, including airborne firings of
the M-61 20mm cannon, and the AIM-7F and AIM-9E air-to-air
missiles.
The Pratt & Whitney F-100 engine has completed all endurance
qualification testing and production configured engines are being flown
in the test aircraft.
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The airframe has completed the required four lifetimes of fatigue
testing. Approximately 99 percent of all air vehicle equipment compo-
nents requiring qualification have completed testing.
The following Demonstration Milestones have been accomplished
during fiscal year 1974:
One (1) G Flight Envelope.
Fatigue Test--Four Lifetimes.
Air Force Summary Evaluation.
Air Force DT&E Aircraft and Equipment in Place.
Engine Military Qualification Test (MQT).
These accomplishments have provided the Air Force with a high
degree of confidence that the F-15 design is sound and that the first
production aircraft will be ready for the November 1974 introduction
into the operational force.
Therefore, the committee recommends that the budget request for
the procurement of 72 F-15s in the amount of $756.9 million be
approved.
F-111
Last year members of this committee expressed concern over the
absence of a procurement request by the Air Force of the F-111 type
aircraft for fiscal year 1974. This same concern was voiced during the
consideration of the fiscal year 1975 Authorization Bill. It is the opin-
ion of the committee that, in view of the further delay of the B-1
program, the only logical and cost-efFecC.ve solution is to maintain a
warm base of production of an aircraft which will provide the closest
possible performance capability that the B-1 was designed to achieve.
This committee is fully aware that the F-111 is not a replacement
for the B-52, as is the B-1; however, the F-111 production line is the
only active line in the free world capable of producing a strategic
bomber. Should a requirement arise for such production, the existing
line could produce FB-111Fs, or the even more capable stretched
version of this bomber, the FB-111G. Therefore, for this and the
additional reasons listed below, the committee added 12 F-111 type
aircraft to the fiscal year 1975 bill. The F-111 is a superb deep-
penetration attack aircraft that has no counterpart in capability in
our own inventory or in the inventory of any nation in the world.
In its tactical role, there is no substitute for the 17-111 ; and the com-
mittee believes failure to continue the production of these aircraft
could result in an eventual degradation of our air defense capability
if the number of F-ills falls below the desired level.
Further, the committee was advised that current pl ans contemplate
that a substantial number of the earlier F-ills be converted to elec-
tronic warfare configuration, thereby removing these aircraft from
the regular attack force for assignment and use if the need arose.
Another reason, and a very important one, for continuing the produc-
tion of the F-111 is the, fact that this airplane is the only tactical
aircraft in our inventory that is capable of performing a strategic
nuclear mission.
Therefore, the committee recommends approval of the addition of
$205.5 million for the procurement of 12 F-111 type aircraft.
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C-141 Modification
Included in the Air Force request was $50 million for a modification
to lengthen the C-141 and increase its strategic airlift capacity by
30 percent. The modification consists of lengthening the fuselage by
23'4", installation of an air refueling capability, and drag reduction
improvements. The Air Force states that this modification will im-
prove the overall performance of the C-141 by increasing the rate
of climb 300 feet per minute, increasing the service and cruise ceiling
by 1,000 feet, increasing the cruise speed by 15 knots, or increasing
the specific range by 6.5 percent at the existing cruise speeds.
In the fiscal year 1974 supplemental $40 million was requested for
engineering, prototyping, production tooling and modification of the
test article. However, even though this committee authorized the Air
Force request for this purpose, the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental has
not been finally acted on and it appears that final action will not take
place in time to complete the work necessary so that the fiscal year
1975 funds could be spent during fiscal year 1975. Air Force testimony
indicated that the funds requested in the fiscal year 1975 budget would
not be obligated until the base line configuration of the reconfigured
C-141 was established and performance was verified by flight testing.
The committee believes that even if final Congressional action on the
fiscal year 1971 Supplemental includes the requested $40 million for
prototyping, time would not permit obligation of the $50 million re-
quested in fiscal year 1975 for the modification program.
The committee, therefore, recommends approval of $6.4 million to
initiate a modification to improve navigational equipment and per-
mit the C-141 to fly transoceanic airways at optimum altitudes to con-
serve fuel; $3.5 million to incorporate visual capability in simulators,
thus enhancing pilot ground training; and $2.4 million for various
other modifications to the aircraft, but recommends denial of the $50
million for the lengthening of the C-141 until the prototypes have
been developed and the engineering and flight testing completed.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
The Air Force requested $132.9 million for the modification of
wide-bodied jets from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The air-
lift capability of these wide-bodied jets would equate to approximately
an equivalent capacity of 100 C-5 aircraft after completion of the
modifications envisioned. The committee was advised that the agree-
ment between the civilian airlines and the government to modify their
wide-bodied jets would be consummated in a legal contractual instru-
ment whereby the airlines would be able to use their modified aircraft
as cargo carriers provided that a proportionate share of the funds for
modification and cargo kits is reimbursed to the government. Other
safeguards would be included in the contract to protect the govern-
ment investment in these civilian aircraft.
The Air Force advised the committee that an informal survey with
respect to probable CRAF operators shows an offered participation
of 141 wide-bodied jets for modification. This total consists of 67
B-747s, 49 DC-10s, and 25 L-1011s.
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The $18.5 million requested in the fiscal year 1974 Supplemental was
planned to accomplish engineering, design, and tooling. This money
was denied by the House Appropriations Committee because that
committee felt that the fiscal year 1974 Department of Defense Appro-
priations Act (Public Law 93-238) did not appear to authorize the
use of CRAF funds for this purpose. The Air Force, through the office
of its General Counsel, has suggested that a specific statutory author-
ity for the GRAF modifications would be desirable, and they are seek-
ing new language in the fiscal year 1975 Appropriations Act.
This committee strongly supports the need for an adequate program
such as is envisioned in this proposal. However, it is believed that the
funds requested in the fiscal year 1975 budget cannot he obligated due
to the failure to thus far complete action on the fiscal year 1974 Sup-
plemental. Therefore, the committee recommends approval of only
$25 million of the requested $132.9 million for this program so that
the engineering, design, and tooling can be accompLished. The com-
mittee believes that the airlift capability of the CK.LVF can be dra-
matically increased when a program embodying these objectives gets
underway.
A-7D
The committee was advised that the Air Force was not requesting
A-7D procurement in the Fiscal Year 1975 budget due to higher
priorities in force structure planning. Further, the committee was
aware this decision was based on a Secretary of Defense decision to
phase out 14 flight units in Fiscal Year 75 and Fiscal Year 76 of the
Air National Guard (ANG). When that decision was announced,
many Members of Congress expressed increasing concern over the loss
of the active Air Guard units. Further concern was expressed over the
abrupt loss of the 11,726 highly skilled and trained Guardsman man-
ning these units, which could not help but have an adverse effect on
morale in other units and a severe impact on recruiting potential.
This committee reacted to these actions, by putting a floor on the
number of flying units in the ANG at 91. This, of course, precludes
the deactivation of the 14 units announced for phaseout.
Further, notice was taken of the obsolescence of the equipment in
the ANG. Testimony did reveal that some delay in the modernization
program for the Air Guard was created by a slowdown in the F-15
and A-10 procurement for the active for3es since the introduction of
these aircraft into the inventory of the active forces would make A-7s
available for the Reserve forces. However, the committee felt that
additional modernization of the ANG, which was started last year,
with the introduction of the A-7D into the ANG, should be con-
tinued; and that the ANG should have modern jet ai7craft.
The A-7D aircraft was introduced into the ANG during fiscal year
1974 from active assets and from new production aircraft. Two ANG
units (Kirtland AFB, New Mexico and. Buckley AFB, Colorado)
were converted to A-7s during fiscal year 1974 with Rickenbaeker
AGB, Ohio (formerly called Lockbourne) and McEntire AGB, South
Carolina programed to convert during fiscal year 1975. Further
ANG A-7 modernization is planned coincident with the conversion
of active force units to F-15s and A-10s. The A NG A-7 aircrews
will train to effectively employ the aircraft in a primary interdiction
role with a secondary close air support mission.
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Therefore, the committee voted to recommend 24 A-7Ds for the
exclusive use of the ANG 'and the addition of 8104.9 million to the
Air Force aircraft authorization. The $104.9 million is broken down
as follows: $77.8 million for 24 aircraft; $4.8 million for initial spares;
$13.8 million for associated ground equipment; $2.2 million for tech-
nical data; and $6.3 million for a simulator.
Lance
The bill provides $61.4 million, the amount requested, for procure-
ment of the Lance (MGM-52C missile). In addition, the bill pro-
vides $0.3 million for initial spares for a net total authorization of
$64.7 million for the system. R&D has been completed on the basic
system and no RDT&E funds are included for the system in the present
bill.
The Lance is a surface-to-surface ballistic missile system composed
of a guided missile, a self-propelled tracked transporter-loader, a
launcher, and other miscellaneous equipment. Lance is deployed at the
corps level for general nuclear fire support to corps and division forces.
The present authorization continues the level of procurement ini-
tiated two years ago to support the continued deployment of Lance
battalions in replacement for the Honest John and the Sergeant mis-
sile battalions.
The authorization provided in the bill provides for a nuclear-only
capability for the system.
The Armed Services Committee has in the past indicated its support
for a nonnuclear as well as a nuclear warhead configuration for
Lance. The committee continues to support this development. The
Army has pursued an R&D program toward developing a nonnuclear
capability for this missile.
The committee has not received the result of a cost-effectiveness
study of a nonnuclear capability conducted with the cooperation of the
Institute for Defense Analysis. The study was due prior to the con-
sideration of this bill. The committee will expect that at the latest the
results of this study will be available to it in time for consideration of
the fiscal 1976 missile procurement program, so that funding for a
nonnuclear capability can be included in next year's authorization bill
if the study indicates that such configuration would be cost-effective.
However, a reprograming request to provide funds during fiscal year
1975, if the study indicates such would be desirable, will be enter-
tained by the committee.
The committee notes that the Army has supported a nonnuclear
capability for Lance.
Commanders in Europe have also indicated to representatives of
the committee their desire for a nonnuclear capability for Lance. The
committee wishes to express to the Department of Defense its belief
that this concept has been studied endlessly and that the time has come
to stop using studies as a substitute for firm decisions.
Minuteman
The bill authorizes $615.3 million, 'the amount requested, for the
Minuteman missile program. This includes $312 million for procure-
ment, $4.4 million for initial spares, and $298.9 million for force mod-
ernization. Additionally, in Title II of the bill, there is $142.9 million
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for RDT&E, for a total authorization f or Minuteman in the legisla-
tion of $758.2 million.
The procurement program authorized :For in the bill will provide for
the procurement of 61 missiles. These 61 missiles include 21 which were
slipped to the FY 1975 program when the 1974 buy was reduced by
Congress. The missile procurement will complete the initial planned
buy of Minuteman III missiles and, in addition, provide sufficient
replacement. missiles to allow replacement of missiles which will be
used in the test program over approximately the next five years.
The FY 1975 program allows a maintaining of the Minuteman III
production line at the minimum production rate of five missiles per
month and protects an option to procure additional m:issiles in FY 1976
if required.
The force modernization authorization includes funds for the Up-
grade Silo Program, which modifies the silos and launch control facili,
ties to provide greater survival of the missiles against attack, the Corn-
mand Data Buffer Program, which provides rapid remote retargeting
capability for the Minuteman III, and basic force modernization to
modify ground electronic systems and silos to be compatible with the
Minuteman II and Minuteman III missiles.
The Minuteman III is a three stage solid propellant intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile. capable of carrying three independently targeted
vehicles.
Sparrow
The bill provides $54.9 million, the amount requested, for the pro-
curement of the SPARROW (AIM-7F:1 missiles for the Navy, and
$43.3 million, the amount requested, for the procurement of SPAR-
ROW (AIM-7F) missiles for the Air Force. In addition, the bill
provides $1.1 million for initial spares and $6.0 million for RDT&E
for a net total authorization of $62.0 million for the Navy; and $0.2
million for initial spares and $1.7 milhiomi for RDT&E for a net total
authorization of $45.2 million for the Air Force. The Navy 'acts as
procurement agent for all SPARROW procurement for itself and
the Air Force.
The Committee is deeply concerned about the cost of this program
and the projected high unit cost of the AIM-7F missile. The Navy
is in the process of establishing a second source for the production of
the SPARROW. A second source would be designed to achieve a more
competitive cost structure and to increase the availability of the
The Committee on Armed Services intends to continue to monitor
this program closely and will expect to be informed promptly of any
new developments in the program. Continued Committee support of
this procurement will depend on future developments with respect
to the cost of the missile.
The SPARROW (AIM-7F) missile is to be used in a number of
air-to-air and ship-to-air weapon systems. The AIM-7F is planned
to replace the SPARROW AIM-7E missile presently in the Air Force
and Navy inventories.
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TOT
The bill provides $107.1 million and $30.8 million, the amounts re-
quested, for the procurement of TOW missiles for the Army and
Marine Corps, respectively. In addition, the bill provides $0.5 million
for initial spares for the Marine Corps; and $10.7 million for RDT&E
for the Army; for a net total authorization of $117.8 million for the
Army and $31.3 million for the Marine Corps.
The TOW missile system is a heavy anti-tank/assault weapon con-
sisting of a launcher, a missile and various ground support equipment
required for maintenance, test and training. TOW can be man packed,
employed on the ground on a tripod or mounted on various vehicles.
After firings, missile guidance is automatic and the missile will remain
constrained to the gunner's line of sight to the target by commands
sent through a wire.
The purpose of this weapon system is to replace the 106inra Recoil ess
Rifle and to provide heavy, long-range, antitank/assault fire capability
against armored vehicles and fortified targets. The system will be con-
siderably enhanced upon completion of a night sight presently under-
going RDT&E. Due to the high performance as an antitank weapon.
the 10W missile is under a large procurement demand from other
nations. This situation is of considerable concern to the committee.
The committee wants the Army to be aware of its desire that delivery
or sale of this weapon to other nations should not interfere with meet-
ing U.S. requirements.
Dragon
The bill provides $86.5 million, a reduction of $19.8 million from
the original request of $106.3 million by the Army, and $19.8 million,
the amount requested by the Marine Corps, for the procurement of
Dragon ( XFGM-77A, XFTM-77A) missile system. In addition, the
bill provides $2.4 million and $1.1 million for initial spares for the
Army and Marine Corps, respectively, for a net authorization of $88.9
million for the Army and $20.9 million for the Marine Corps. RDT&E
funds have not been asked for Fiscal Year 1975.
The reduction of the procurement request, from $106.3 million to
$86.5 million, by the Army, is in agreement with their decision to
procure an identical number of missiles with the $86.5 million
authorized.
This is the first-year procurement request of the Dragon missile
system by the Marine C'orps. The Dragon procurement program is
managed by the Army.
The Dragon is a lightweight man-portable, day and night, all-
weather, antitank weapon system consisting of a modular missile
launcher, a tracker, and related test and training equipment. The
missile is launched and automatically guided to the target by the
tracker which issues electronic commands to the missile by wire link.
Its purpose is to provide antitank and assault fire against tanks and
hard targets such as emplaced weapons or fortifications.
Harpoon
The bill provides $78.2 million, the amount requested, for procure-
ment of the Harpoon (AGM-84A/RGM-84A) missile. In addition,
the bill provides $3.5 million for initial spares and $67.4 million for
RDT&E for a net total authorization of $149.1 million.
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The FY 1975 procurement request is to provide a first-year pro-
duction of these missiles. Approximately one-third of the number of
missiles to be procured will be utilized for operational evaluation
('OPEVAL), the remainder will be deployed as initial fleet assets.
The Harpoon is -an air-surface/subsurface-launched, all-weather
anti-ship missile, effective against enemy surface vessels. it is com-
patible with the presently-deployed Tartar, Terrier, and A SROC ship
launchers, as well as aircraft launchers. The missile is presently
planned for use aboard the and S-3 aircraft, surface vessels, and
attack submarines.
rike
The bill provides $25.4 million, the amount requested, for the pro-
curement of the. SHRIKE (AGM-4.5-6) missile for the Navy, and
$11.1 million, the amount requested, for the SHRIKE (AGM-45-9,
and AGM-45-10) missiles for the Air Force. In addition, the bill pro-
vides $0.5 million for initial spares. for a net total authorization of
$25.9 million for the Navy; and $0.2 million for initial spares, for a.
net, total authorization of $11.3 million for the Air Force.
The, Committee was concerned over the difference in procurement
unit price of these missiles between the Navy and Air Force requests,
The difference, in costs was reconciled to the satisfaction of the Com-
niittee after a clarification of the increased costs the Air Force's
SHRIKE procurement request were determined to be, associated with
a Substantial increase in capability of these models over those 'being
requested by the Navy.
The SHRTKE is a, rocket-propelled air-to-ground and surface-to-
surface missile utilized to detect and destroy ellen y radars. The pri-
mary mission is to suppress or destroy anti-aircraft systems.
The Navy request, for the older 45.4 SHRIKE series, was based on
the fact that Navy aircraft cannot use the lateriSH?RIKE models, such
as the Air Force is requesting, as it would require modification of the
aircraft. The, Navy has chosen to wait until theRA RM. missile becomes
ready for deployment. The HARM missile will blanket a threat area
considerably larger than the present SHI1IKE used by the Navy.
The SHRIKE series 45-9 and 45-10, requested by the. Air Force,
will blanket, in combination, almost, the, whole threat spectrum that the
HARM missile will be capable of covering when deployed.
Ph oenix
The bill provides $94.7 million, the amount requested, for procure-
ment of the Phoenix (ATM-54A) missile. Tn addition, the bill pro-
vides $4.8 million for initial spares, for a net total authorization of
$99.5 million. The RDT&E has been ecmpleted, and no additional
funds are requested.
The fiscal year 1975. procurement authorization for the Phoenix
missile will support both Navy and Marine Corps requirements and
continue an orderly inventory buildup to support. the operational de-
ployment of the F-14 TOMCAT aircraft. ?
The Phoenix missile is a. supersonic, all-weather, long-range, air-
to-air missile designed to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles at great
distances, in any weather and in heavy jamming environment, Six
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Phoenix missiles may be carried at one time by the F-44 aircraft.
Near simultaneous launching of all missiles against six different tar-
gets is possible.
Trident
The bill provides $1,922.8 million for the Trident program out of a
total budget requirement for the year of $2,177.5 million. The differ-
ence is in appropriation categories not subject to authorization. The
shipbuilding and conversion, Navy portion of Title I contains $1,166.8
million, with the balance of $756.0 million in RDT&E. The funds in
the procurement account will provide for the full construction of two
more Trident submarines, Nos. 2 and 3.
The -Trident submarine is the replacement for the Polaris-Poseidon
fleet. The 41 ships in our fleet ballistic missile fleet were commissioned
between December 1959 and April 1967. This means that by 1979 they
will begin to be 20 years old. These submarines have had two crews?
Blue and Gold?which take them out on patrols in turn. No other
class of vessels in our fleet are subjected to such continuous service.
These submarines were built on a crash program from the existing
attack submarine plans. The U.S. Navy has had no new design fleet
ballistic missile submarine since 1963. In the meanwhile the Soviets
have commissioned at least three classes of new missile submarines.
Indeed, the Soviets now have more nuclear powered submarines?mis-
sile and attack?than the United States.
With the longer range Trident I missile, the Trident submarine will
be able to operate in a greatly expanded ocean area?thus greatly in-
creasing the difficulty of locating it. In addition, the Trident will be
much quieter than the Polaris/Poseidon. It will also be faster and
have greatly increased capability to survive because of the newer types
of sensors it will employ and the newer technologies of shipboard
processing equipment.
Last year, after considerable debate in Congress, the Department
of Defense decided the rate of production should be two Trident sub-
marines a year and so requested. In cutting back from the earlier
plans of 3 Tridents a year to 2, the overall cost of the program has
increased by $550 million.
If this were cut back to one Trident a year, the cost would increase
another $500 million according to Adm. Hyman Rickover.
Procurement costs of system components would increase due to loss
of production effectiveness as production rates were necessarily cut
back. Shipyard costs would increase through less efficient use of capa-
bilities unique to building and testing the Trident system. Standard-
ization of parts, .components, and systems would become increasingly
difficult resulting in possible increases in life cycle costs.
The Soviet Union has a force of over 30 Yankee submarines which
are, with their 16-missile launch tubes, comparable to our 31 Poseidon
submarines. The Soviets are currently deploying even larger ballistic
missile carrying submarines which carry a new missile with a range
comparable to the Trident I missile. It is highly probable that they
will build at least 20 of these so-called Delta submarines.
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The Polaris/Poseidon force continues to be an effective deterrent,
but one that is aging. By 1985 almost alE will be '0 or more years old.
The Trident program, as presented to ( longress this year, requests a
building rate of two per year, reducing our dependence. in future years
Oil the older Polaris submarines. The proposed program would result
in 10 Trident submarines at sea by the End of 1982. Building Trident
at this rate moves toward achieving equivalency with the Soviet bal-
listic missile Delta submarine program. It is an orderly procurement
of Trident submarines, at a rate which allows us the option of timely
replacement of our current aging strategic missile submarines and of
maintaining a highly survivable submarine-based strategic missile
capability throughout this century. To do any less could eventually
jeopardize our national security.
Yuclear frigates
The bill provides $256.0 million for the guided missile nuclear
powered frigate (DLGN) program. Of this sum, $152.3 million is
for the completion of DI,GN 41, for which the Congress provided
long lead time funds last year, and $9'2.0 million in additional long
lead time, items for DLC1N 42, for which the Congress also provided
long lead time funds last year. The Department of Defense will require
full funding of the balance of the moneys needed for the construction
of IDLGrN 42 next year.
Until and unless an alternate level of construction is set by the
Congress in connection with the needs for the nuclear Navy, the com-
mittee will expect the Department of Defense to submit, at, least one
new nuclear powered guided missile frigate for construction next year.
Patrol frigate
The bill provides $436.5 million, the amount requested, for 7 ships
in the patrol frigate program. This program is designed to produce
50 ocean escort destroyers for such employment as merchant marine
convoys. These ships are designed to play an anti-submarine role in
areas of lesser risk. The patrol frigate is designed to be built for an
average of under $50 million a ship in unescalated fiscal year 1973
dollars. The lead ship is presently under construction and will be
completed in fiscal year 1977. There is no question that the Navy needs
a considerable number of smaller ocean escort destroyers.
The hearings of the committee elicited concern over the Americani-
zation of two foreign systems which ar?, to go on board the ship.
The first is the Oto Melara gun, an Italian gun which is on the ships
of many other navies. There appears to be no serious problem about
going ahead with the Americanization of this gun and indications are
the basic Oto gun can readily be installed on the patrol frigate with-
out Americanization if there are difficulties.
The second is the Mark 92 gun fire control system. This is a Dutch
design which is being Americanized by a U.S.. company. The Dutch
design is already in use in 14 other navies in 168 variations. The
Americanization seems to be progressing on time?with only a slip-
page of two weeks in one small item. There is no immediate backup
available. If the Mark 92 should not work out, there would be a one-
time cost of about $20 million to put on another fire control system.
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The committee believes the contracts for the 7 patrol frigates should
not be let until after the successful completion of the initial operating
test and evaluation of the Mark 92 system, which is consistent with
Navy plans. Therefore, the committee added a proviso to the grant of
authorization for this program, reading:
"Provided, however, That, except for necessary long lead
time items, no contract for the construction of these ships
shall be entered into until after the Secretary of the Navy
has notified the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees that the fire control system has been
satisfactorily tested; . . ."
This language will assure the Navy does what testimony indicates
it plans to do; namely, hold off on the construction contracts until
after the successful completion of the testing, and at the same time
give the Congress assurance that that testing is successful before the
contracts are entered into.
Ships and craft for Vietnam,
The authorization request included $14.3 million for 2 patrol gun-
boas to be furnished to the South Vietnamese Navy and $9.2 million
for 45 craft also to be furnished to the Vietnam Navy.
The '2 patrol gunboats were to have been part of a buy of 8 patrol
gunboats for the South Vietnam Navy with the other 6 to be provided
through the Military Assistance Program. The committee believes
that it is preferable to provide the entire lot through the Military
Assistance Program rather than splitting off part for inclusion in this
bill.
Therefore, the committee recommends that the $14.3 million for the
2 patrol gunboats and the $9.2 million for the 45 craft be eliminated
from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy program.
M60A1 Medium Tank
The bill provides $172.6 million, the amount requested by the Army,
and $52.0 million, $5.9 million less than originally requested by the
Marine Corps for the procurement of M60A1 Medium Tanks. In ad-
dition, the bill provides $2.6 million for initial spares and $6.0 million
for RDT&E for the Army; $0.6 million for initial spares for the
Marine Corps. The net total authorization for the Army and Marine
Corps programs is $181.2 million and $52.6 million, respectively.
The $5.9 million reduction to the Marine Corps authorization was
made at that service's request and involves long lead- monies no longer
required in fiscal year 1975.
The fiscal year 1975 M60A1 procurement requests have been based on
the maximum estimated rates of production that the assembly lines can
deliver, particularly since there is only one remaining willing sup-
plier?subcontractor of the traversing turret.
The M60A1 tank is a diesel powered, fully tracked, armored vehicle,
with a four man crew. The primary armament is a 105mm gun
mounted in a traversing turret. It has improved turret ballistic pro-
tection over the earlier M60 tank. Secondary armament consists of
one .50 cal. machine gun coaxially mounted in the turret cupola and a
7.62mm machine gun coaxially mounted alongside the 105mm gun.
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Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle
The Committee denied the $25.3 million originally requested by the
Army for the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle (ARSV).
The fiscal year 1975 budget request for the weapons and tracked
combat vehicles appropriation, Army, included $25.3 million for the
procurement of ARSVs to be manufac7:ured as the low-rate initial
production phase of the ARSV procurement. For the past several
months, the Army has been reexamining the requirement, for the
ARSV. Serious reservations concerning the current ARSV program
surfaced as a result of recent Mid-East War. Other areas of Army
concern prompting program examination were the continuing desire
,to reduce the number and types of vehicles in combat units, the need
to reevaluate the air and ground reconnaissance requirements and
their interrelationships, and the need to get the optimum readiness
from the limited procurement dollars available. Examples of unan-
swered questions concerning the reconnaissance vehicle requirement.
are:
(1) The requirement for a special purpose vehicle to perform scout
missions,
(2) The ability of three-man scout crew to perform their mission
on a 24-hour basis;
(3) Sensors and other devices necessary to accomplish the surveil-
lance and acquisition mission of ground reconnaissance vehicles,
(4) Air defense weaponry required for the scout, and
(5) The. most cost-effective vehicle to be employed in the scout role.
The committee concurs with the Army analysis, that the above ques-
tions and other issues surrounding the ARSV program cannot be ie-
solved prior to the scheduled milestone decision point in September
1974. At that time, a Department of Defense decision would have
permitted initiation of low-rate initial production of the. ARSV's if
authorization were included in the fiscal year 1975 procurement legisla
tion. The study, now formulated by the Army, cannot be concluded
until March 1975. The study effort will include examination of addi-
tional alternative vehicles, testing of alternative vehicles with varia-
tions of tactics and organization, examination of the role of the scout'
and current Army doctrine, and a Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis. The findings of the study will provide the basis for a deci-
sion on the future of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle
program.
In view of the time required to reexamine the basic requirement for
a scout. vehicle and reservations with the current ARSV configurations,
the Army reoriented the current ARSV program on 14 March 1974
retaining only sufficient RDT&E funding in fiscal year 1975 to com-
plete the current contracts which expire in September 1974 and to
provide for minimum testing to support the study efforts.
Because of the redirection in the .ARSV program, the $25 3 million
procurement request in fiscal year 1975 is no longer required. How-
ever, the Army proposed. that $14.6 million of the $25.3 million be
authorized and appropriated to procure additional M113A.1 Armored
Personnel Carriers in fiscal year 1975. This will permit the Army to
substitute the highly reliable M113A1 carrier for the current unre-
liable, gasoline-powered M114 Cornniand and Reconnaissance Carrier
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in those units with reconnaissance missions not destined to be equipped
with the A_RSV. The Army, after a comprehensive cost analysis' de-
termined that as an alternative to product improving the M114 addi-
tional procurement of the more reliable M113A1 would be preferable.
The committee concurs.
The Army further requested that $2.3 million of the funds deleted
from the fiscal year 1975 budget request for procurement of the A_RSV
be added to the $4.4 million requested in fiscal year 1975 for modifica-
tion of the Vulcan 20rnm air defense gun systems. A total fiscal year
1975 program of $6.7 million will accelerate the modification of both
the self-propelled and towed air defense guns permitting major im-
provements in systems reliability, availability and maintainability.
The increased fiscal year 1975 program can be implemented within
established funded delivery periods and will hasten high-priority
modification of fielded weapons systems by providing kits to modify
additional vehicles. The request for increased funding in fiscal year
1975 will reduce the funds required to complete the program in fiscal
year 1976.
The Army's proposal was approved by the committee. A net re-
duction of $10.7 million resulted in the Army's fiscal year 1975 budget
request for tracked combat vehicles and an increase of $2.3 million for
other weapons, a net reduction of $8.4 million from the combined total
of the original procurement request.
Armored Personnel Carrier
The bill provides $24.0 million, $14.6 million above the original
request, for procurement of M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers.
No additional funding is requested for initial spares ? or RDT&E.
As indicated above, because of the redirection in the Armed Recon-
naissance Scout Vehicle (ARSV) program, the $25.3 million procure-
ment request by the Army in fiscal year 1975 was found to be no longer
required. However, the Army proposed, and the committee agreed,
that $14.6 million of the $25.3 million be authorized and appropriated
to procure additional M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers in fiscal
year 1975.
The M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier is a fully tracked, light-
armored vehicle designed to provide personnel with mobility and pro-
tection against small armed fire shell fragmentation. Its primary mis-
sion is to transport mechanized infantry and combat engineer squads
in forward battle areas.
REVIEW OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZED IN TITLE I
Following is a review of the other weapons items authorized in Title
I of the bill. The dollar amounts provided by service and by func-
tional category are found in the tables appearing earlier in this report.
AIRCRAFT
ARMY AIRCRAFT
Helicopter, Attack, AH-1Q
The AH-1Q (COBRA/TONY) attack helicopter is a single engine,
single rotor, two-place helicopter. It will be armed with the anti-
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armor TOW missile and a chin turret containing a- 40mm grenade
launcher and a 7.62 mm high rate machine gun. The MI-1Q will
provide an interim anti-armor capability pending introduction of the
Advanced Attack Helicopter.
Helicopter, Cargo, CH-47C
The CH-47C cargo helicopter is a twin ermine, twin rotor heli-
copter capable of lifting 8 tons of payload. It features a straight-in
rear loading with an unobstructed 30 foot cargo rompartment and
is equipped with an external cargo hook. The CH-1TC will be used for
battlefield transportation of personnel, weapons, bulk liquids and cargo
in combat assault and logistic support roles.
Helicopter, Utility, UH-1H
The UH-1II utility helicopter is a single engine, single rotor heli-
copter capable of transporting 11 passengers or 6 litter patients. It is
the Army's primary aircraft used to provide battlefield mobility of
troops and supplies, evacuation of casualties, and command and control.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT
A-4 Skyhawk
The A-4M is a single seat high-performance carrier or land-based
jet visual attack aircraft utilized by Marine forces for close-in ground
support. The FY 1975 request of 24 aircraft continues the moderniza-
tion of the Marine Corps light attack force by replacement of older
A-4E/F's.
A-6E
The A--6 is the Navy and Marine Corps all-weather attack aircraft.
The A-GE is an improved version of the combat-proven A-GA which
has demonstrated its capabilities under the most demanding combat
conditions. This long-range, versatile, twin-jet aircraft is capable of
very. accurate navigation and, weapons delivery and its specialized elec-
tronics equipment permits it to attack targets day or night under all-
weather conditions.
The authorization is for 12 aircraft and continues a modest inven-
tory modernization program and provides for a continued production
capability.
EA-6I? Prowler
The EA-613 is the first aircraft ever built specifically for the tactical
jamming mission. It is a derivative of the A-GA attack aircraft and
carries a pilot and three electronic countermeasures operators.
The jammers are carried in modern computer controlled external
pods which radiate electromangetic energy that will degrade enemy
air defense systems, thereby enhancing mission sioxess of strike air-
craft and pilots. The authorization is to procure 6 aircraft to continue
the procurement of a tactical EW capability for each of the aircraft
carriers.
A-7E Corsair II
The A-7- is a single-seat, single-engine light jet attack aircraft pro-
viding significant improvement in range and load carrying ability
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over the A-4 which it replaces. The- combat proven A-7E is now suc-
cessfully deployed in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. It features
advanced avionics and a fully integrated ditigal weapons system which
affords quantum improvement in navigation/weapons delivery accu-
racy over the earlier A4A/B series. The authorization provides for
the procurement of 34 aircraft to continue the modernization of the -
light attack force by replacing attrited A-7A/B aircraft with new
production A-7E's.
UII-1N Iroquois
The UI-1-1N is a versatile helicopter whose primary missions are
command and control, troop transport, medical evacuation and carrier
Other missions include movement of cargo and equipment in
amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore, local base rescue,
light vertical replenishment, and search and rescue. The authorization
for 20 aircraft continues the modernization of the USMC assault heli-
copter .force.
All-1J Sea Cobra
The AH-1J is a helicopter gunship used by the Marine Corps to
provide enroute escort and protection of troop assault helicopters,
landing zone preparation immediately prior to arrival of assault
helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the assault phase,
and fire support during ground escort operations. The authorization is
to procure 20 aircraft for continued modernization of the USMC at-
tack helicopter force.
P--3U Orion
The P-3C is a long range, land-based, antisubmarine warfare air?
craft. It is also capable of 'ship surveillance and mining day and night
and in all kinds of weather. The P-3C, with a central digital com-
puter, has the data handling capacity,fiexibility and accuracy through
digital data processing, to throughly integrate appropriate sensor,
display, navigation, communication, and armament equipments. The
authorization will procure 12 aircraft.
S-3A Viking
The S-3A is a carrier-based, anti-submarine search and attack air-
craft containing the latest ASW sensors, integrated with a general
purpose, :digital computer. It is designed to employ air-to-surface mis-
siles, homing torpedoes and mines as well as conventional and nuclear
depth charges. It replaces the S-2 aircraft .and will introduce a
carrier-based capability for searching large ocean areas and will pro-
vide anti-submarine protection for naval forces and other units inde-
pendent of land bases. The authorization is for 45 aircraft to provide
cumulative assets to transition seven squadrons to the S-3A through
end of Calendar Year 1976.
E-2C Hawkeye
The E-2C is a carrier-based turbo-prop aircraft equipped with the
necessary avionics to provide our forces at sea with a modern and
vastly improved early warning, strike control and surveillance capa-
bility. The E-2C has the same basic airframe as the earlier model
E2A/B but is equipped with a new avionics suit including new radar,
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antenna and passive detection system. The authorization is to procure
6 aircraft to continue the modernizaticn of the carrier-based early
warning force.
C-9B Skytrain 11
The C-9B is a commercially-available, land-based transport capable
of carrying 90 passengers, cargo or a combination of both. These air-
craft will be utilized by both the Navy and Marine Corps and will re-
place obsolete 0-118's, C-121's and C-131's. The authorization is to
procure 7 aircraft.
CT-A9 Soberliner
The CT-39 is a commercial, light-weiiiht, twin turbo-jet capable of
carrying eight to ten passengers or equivalent weight in cargo. The
CT-39 will be assigned to Navy and Marine Fleet tactical support
squadrons in support of fleet and Marine Corps operations. The au-
thorization is to procure ti aircraft..
KC-130I? Hercules
The KC-130 is the current production C-130 aircraft equipped as
an aerial refueler and configured with a removable internal fuel tank
for additional fuel capacity. In its tanker configuration it carries
13,195 gallons of fuel With a crew of seven. The, authorization is to
provide the necessary aircraft .to modernize and sustain the aerial
refueler capability of the Marine Corps until the mid-1980's.
Amt FoncE AIRCRAFT
A-37B
The 1-3713 is a. low wing, dual control, jet attack aircraft. It is a
counter-insurgency aircraft used for destruction of surface targets
in support of ground forces. Armor plate is provided to enhance air-
craft survivability. The 29 aircraft authorized will provide the Viet-
namese Air Force (VNAF) replacements for attrition aircraft.
F-5F (International Fighter)
The F-5F is a two-seat version of the F-5E and is a twin engine
fighter/trainer which retains the esseirial combat capabilities of the
F-SE. The 28 aircraft, authorized are for the VNAF and will com-
plement the single-seat F-SE by providing the best available hard-
ware for in-country training, thus assuring efficient use of the F-SE.
0-13011 (Hercules)
This aircraft is a medium-size, tactical turboprop transport capable
of providing immediate and responsive air movement and delivery Of
combat troops and supplies directly into objective areas through air-
landing. extraction, airdrop, and other delivery techniques. The au-
thorization is for four aircraft to replace Reserve Forces aircraft
projected as replacements for YNAF losses, and a simulator for
the USAF C-130 'force.
CH-47C (Chinook)
The CH-47 is a medium transport icopter with twin T-55 engines
and dual rotor. The integral rear ramp .permits straight-in loading and
unloading. It, provides air mobility to military forces in the field by
transporting personnel, weapons, bulk liquids and other cargo in both
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combat assault and logistical support roles. The eight aircraft au-
thorized are to permit, replacement of projected VNAF. losses.
u ny (Iroquois)
The IH-1H is a low silhouette, high-performance, helicopter pow-
ered by a single T-53 gas turbine engine. It is a small troop transport
capable of carrying eleven personnel. The 77 aircraft authorized are
VNAF attrition replacement helicopters.
MISSILES
ARMY MISSILES
Improved Hawk
HAWK provides low and medium altitude, all-weather air defense
against air-supported targets in the field Army area. HAWK is a. key
element in the Army's mid-range air defense plan and reinforces the
visual acquisition capability of other forward air defense systems,
such as REDEYE and CHAPARRAL. HAWK also provides air de-
fe,nse for strategic strike force locations. Improved HAWK (MIM-
23B) has the same general mission as Basic HAWK with greatly
improved capabilities. It, has greater accuracy and range, takes less
time to react and can attack targets moving at higher speeds and
greater altitudes.
Pershing
The PERSHING missile system is a completely ground-mobile, air-
transportable, surface-to-surface, 2-stage, solid-propellant, inertially
guided ballistic missile system. The primary mission of the PER-
SHING is to provide a nuclear firing capability.
Air Defense. Command and Control System, AN/ TSQ-73
The AN/TSQ-73 is a micro-miniaturized, largely automated air
defense command and control system, mounted in a single shelter and
operated by a three-man crew. The system is carried on a five-ton
truck. The AN/TSQ-73 coordinates the air defense activities of mul-
tiple HAWK and NIKE HERCULES batteries against hostile air-
craft and exchanges target information with other services.
. Radar Test Set, AN/TPM-25
This radar test, set is used to maintain the new generation identifi-
cation friend or foe (In?) tactical prime systems AN/TPX-46 and
AN/TPX-50. The test equipment in the existing inventory severely
curtails the degree of maintenance support available for checkout of
the sophisticated circuits of the new family of interrogator equip-
ment. This radar test set will provide the additional capabilities that
are needed to support the new IFF interrogators used with the NIKE
HERCULES, HAWK, and Air Defense Command and Control
- Systems.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MISSILES
Poseidon Fleet Ballistic Missile System (110.31-73A)
The POSEIDON Fleet Ballistic Missile System is a two stage solid
propellant missile with improved accuracy, larger payload than PO-
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LAMS and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.
The POSEIDON Missile System replaces the POLARIS Missile Sys-
tem on 31 of 41 'SSBNs. The authorization of $48.0 million continues
the procurement of 'POSEIDON production support necessary to
maintain required schedules.
Sidewinder (AIM-9.W) Missile
The SIDEWINDER is an infra-red, short range air-to-air missile
carried by Navy and Marine Corps fighter ,and attack aircraft for use
against all enemy aircraft. The solid state AIM-911 is limited to rear
hemisphere attacks; however, the, incorporation of the lead bias func-
tion will move the impact forward to A more vulnerable point of the
aircraft and improve lethality capability.
SHRIKE (AGM-45A) Missile
The SHRIKE is an all-weather, supersonic, anti-radar, air-to-sur-
face and surface-to-surface guided missile. The SHRIKE is launched
and boosted on a .ballistic flight path toward its target guiding on the
radiating antenna. It can be launched from the A-4, A-6, and A.--T7
aircraft.
Condor (AGM-3A) Missile
CONDOR is a medium range, cruise missile with a conventional
warhead which utilizes electro-optical guidance. It carries a television
camera which view the area ahead of the missile. The operator ,fires
the missile and by the use Of data link communications system controls
the camera and missile remotely. He can thus search the area, locate
the target, lock the missile tracker onto the selected target and update
the missile aim point if desired to achieve a more effective impact
location. Use of this system will -allow attack aircraft to deliver: a
warhead without exposing the launch aircraft to the effective envelope
of known or predicted enemy surface-to-air defense system.
Standard MI? .(RIM-66B) Missile
The STANDARD MR (RIM-66B) missile is a supersonic missile
which incorporates advanced solid-state electronics and engineering
concepts. This missile, with a dual-thrust solid-propellant rocket
motor, is a medium range (MR), ship-launched, anti-aircraft, anti-
missile, and anti--ship weapon for destroyers, ocean escorts, patrol
craft -and cruisers. It is a follow-on to the TARTAR IT missile. The
RIM-66B version of the STANDARD MR missile is common with
the RIM-67 STANDARD ER missile except for the propulsion sys-
tems. The RIM-66B is approved for se.wice use and was first procured
in fiscal year 1966,
Standard El? (RIM-67A) Missile
The STANDARD ER (RIM-67A) missile is a supersonic missile
which incorporates advanced solid-state electronics and engineering
concepts. This missile, with a booster and sustainer, is an extended
range (ER), ship-launched, anti-aircraft weapon for frigates, cruisers
and aircraft carriers. It is used for defense against high-performance
aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and surface targets. This missile is a follow-
on to the TERRIER missile, and provides improved over-all per-
formance and reliability for the weapon system,
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,Standard S AS91 (ARAI) (11O31-66D) Missile,
The STANDARD SSM (ARM) (RGM-661)) missile provides the
Navy with a rapidly deployable; low risk, surface-launched missile
with wide-band passive homing capability against enemy shipboard
radars located either within or over-the-horizon. The "rapidly deploy-
able" and "low risk" attributes of the program are achieved by
utilization of already developed hardware from the air-launched
STANDARD ARM missile (AGM-78D-2) and the ship-launched
STANDARD Missile type 1 (BIM-66B2). This missile can be fired
from the PG Class ships using a box launcher and TARTAR ships
using the modified launch platforms.
standard Active (1?OM-66T) Missile
The STANDARD ACTIVE (RGM-66F) Missile, derived by add-
ing an ACTIVE guidance section to the basic STANDARD MIS-
SILE (SM--I), provides an over-the-horizon surface-to-surface missile
capability to the Fleet. This missile acquires and intercepts the target,
thus eliminating the present need for continuous radar illumination
of the target by the firing ship. The STANDARD ACTIVE Missile
derives _a tactical advantage because it can effectively engage hostile
ships over-the-horizon while the launch ship maintains electronic-
silence; and because of its inherent trajectory diversity, supersonic
speed and steep dive angle to the target. The STANDARD -ACTIVE
missile will be deployed in 16 classes of ships in the FY 1975-FY 1976
time frame.
Aerial Targets
The target program is designed to provide realistic presentations
of -potential threats, and is used in developing, testing and evaluat-
ing Navy missiles. Targets are also used for training and for main-
taining the skills of Navy personnel in the use of missiles and anti-
aircraft guns.
The authorization is for the recoverable BQM-34S drone which
simulates subsonic aircraft and is used in the Navy's air-to-air and
surface-to-air missile testing and training programs. Another model,
the recovarable BQM-34T, shnulates high-performance, supersonic
aircraft for air-to-air and surface-to-air missile evaluation and train-
ing requirements. The recoverable, subsonic MQM-74C, is primarily
required for anti-aircraft gunnery exercises.
Ala FORCE MISSILES
Shrike
The 'Shrike is an anti-radiation missile designed to destroy enemy
ground radars by homing on the source of the radiation. This weapon
is carried on the F-105 and F-4 aircraft. The fiscal year 1975
quantity buy continues production of missiles to support War Readi-
ness Materiel (WRM) requirements.
Maverick
The Maverick is an air-to-ground missile equipped with automatie
television homing guidance for use by the F-4DIE, A-7D, and A-10
tactical aircraft against fixed or moving hard targets such as tanks
and field fortifications.
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Target Drones
Target Drones are airborne vehicles which are used to simulate sub-
sonic and supersonic aircraft.. They are used to develop air-to-air
missile tactics, train aircrews and to test and evaluate aircraft and
missile weapon systems. The authorization provides for procurement
of the PQM-102 full scale maneuvering, after burning, non-manrated
target drone and the BOI-34A subscale turbojet propelled "Firebee"
target drone.
SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSION: NAVY
The bill provides $3539.1 million in authorization_ of appropriation
for naval ship construction and conversion.
The 28 ships authorized for construction and the 4 conversions under
the Fiscal Year 1975 program in this bill are in addition to those
already discussed.
3 Nwelear Attack Submarines (SSN)
These are additional follow-on ubmarines of the high-speed LO,.
ANGELES (SSN 688) Class. They are a key element of the Navy's
sea control forces, capable of covert offensive operations in ocean
areas under enemy air and surface control.
7 Destroyers (DD)
The SPRUANCE (DI) 963) Class destroyers provide convention-
ally-l)owered, high-speed, long-endurance, antisubmarine escort capa-
bility combined with other general purpose destroyer missions and
tasks such as naval gunfire support of operations- ashore. The ship's
primary mission will be to supplement the guided missile fleet air
defense frigates as elements of the Navy's fast carrier task forces.
1 Sea Control Ship (SCS)
This is the lead ship of a class which will provide a sea-based air
support capability where the presence of an aircraft carrier is neither
practical nor required; namely, in the lower threat open ocean areas.
The-ship will carry a mix of helicopters and vertical/short take off
and landing aircraft. Tests, directed by the Congress, to establish the
viability of the Sea Control Ship concept, have been completed and
the program is ready to proceed.
7 Patrol Frigates (PF)
This ship is the primary replacement for the many World War H
destroyers and destroyer escorts which have been retired. It is a cap-
able; economical open ()mail- surface combatant with antisubmarine,
anti-air, anti-missile and anti-surface ship weapon systems, designed
to operate in the role of protection of naval and merchant shipping in
the lower threat areas.
4 Patrol Hydrofoils (Missile) (PHM)
The anti-shipping-missile equipped patrol hydrofoil will operate
in coastal, island and narrow sea areas against much larger hostile
surface shipping. Armed with 8 HARPOON missiles (and a .76min
gun), the ship will free the larger patrol frigates and destroyer es-
corts for open ocean missions.
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1 Destroyer Tender (AD)
The destroyer tender represents a resumption of a replacement pro-
gram for aging fleet assets. The capabilities of this new ship, and
others in coming year programs, are required to support the gas tur-
bine and nuclear powered destroyers and frigates which will soon
begin coming into operation.
1 Fleet Oiler (AO)
This is the lead ship of a new class of underway replenishment oilers,
required to support fleet operations at sea.
1 Fleet Ocean Tug (T?ATF)
Designed to be manned by Military Sealift Command civil service
mariners, the T?ATF will provide open ocean towing and limited
salvage capability. This is the lead ship of a new, smaller class.
Service, Pollution Abatement and Small Craft
The request is for four non-self propelled fuel oil barges (YON),
one medium repair drydock (ARDM), and 26 ships' waste offloading
barges .(SWOB).
Conversion and Modernization
The Fiscal Year .1975 program includes four ships:
(1) Three fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSI3N) to accom-
modate the POSEIDON missile system; .
?(2) One. submarine tender (AS) to provide the. capability to
support fleet ballistic missile submarines.
TRACKED C011113AT VEMCLES, TORPEDOES AND OTHER
WEAPONS
Recovery Vehicle, Light, FT, M578
This vehicle is a lightly armored, self:propelled, full-tracked, air
transportable recovery vehicle which performs the battlefield recovery
role for tracked vehicles up to 30 tons. The M578 has a three-man
crew, a cruising range of 450 miles and mounts a .50 caliber machine
gun as its only armament.
Trainer, Turret, for MGM] (PI) Tank, M30A1
The M.30A1 is a fully functional tank turret mounted on a wheeled
stand with portions of the turret walls and top cut out to permit stu-
dent observation. The trainer is used for instructing armored person-
nel in operation, maintenance, crew duties, employment, and command
skills. All training missions can be performed by the trainer. except
firing of live ammunition. The trainer allows eight students to simul-
taneously recei Ve instruction from one instructor.
Carrier, 81mm Mortar, 31.12-5A1
The 1\11'25AI is a light, armored tracked vehicle employed as a
mobile firing base for the Rimm Mortar, 11129AL Employed by the
mechanized infantry battalion, the M-125A1 provides close-in indirect
fire support. It is capable of .fording and cross-country operations. The
M125A. I Carrier is assigned 3 per mortar platoon, infantry battalion.
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Recovery Vehicle, Medium, F T ,M88A1
The Medium Recovery Vehicle is a full-tracked, armored, medium
tank recovery vehicle with an "A" frame boom, two winches, and a
spade dozer. Its mission is to perform hoisting, winching, towing, and
bull-dozing operations in the recovery and rescue of medium tanks
and renders limited repair support.
Launcher, Incendiary, Rocket, 66mm, 31202A1
The, Army requests $2.6 million for 3,049 M202A1 rocket launchers.
This rocket launcher, which is an assembly of four symmetrically ar-
ranged 66inin tubes, replaces the old flame thrower which required
mixing, transferring, and pressurization of the fuel as well as several
pieces of ancillary support equipment. The M202A1 can be employed
against point targets up to a range of 200 meters and has a maximum
range of 700 meters against area targets such as vehicle convoys or ad-
vancing enemy troops.
Machine Gun,7 .62mm, M60
The Army requests $5.0 million for 6,000 MOO machine guns. The
MOO machine gun is a general purpose :flat trajectory 7.62min weapon
capable of providing sustained automatic fire at medium to long
ranges. It can be fired from a built-in bipod, a tripod (M122) , from the
hip or from the shoulder in a standing, sitting, or prone position. The
M60 is organic equipment to all type Army units to include combat,
combat support, and combat service support units.
Machine Gun, Cal. 50, M85
The Army requests $10.7 million for 1,682 1185 machine guns. The
M85 is a caliber .50 machine gun specifically designed to fit in the
M219 cupola of the M60 family of tanks. The weapon is used against
enemy lightly armored vehicles, aircraft, and for reconnaissance by
fire on suspected enemy targets.
Rifle, 5.56mm, M 16A1
The M16A1 is the Army's standard rifle. It is an air cooled, gas
operated rifle which can be fired from the shoulder or hip, either full
or semiautomatic,. It has an effective range of 460 meters and a maxi-
mum range of 2,653 meters.
NAVY
Torpedo MK-48
The Torpedo MK-48 has been developed to replace all submarine
launched torpedoes for both the anti-submarine and anti-ship role.
The MK-48 Torpedo Mod 1 satisfies this requirement; and was au-
thorized for full scale production in July 1971.
The FY 1975 funding request is based on phased procurement
to obtain torpedo needs in an orderly manner. The inventory objective
is based on providing an initial shipfill plus additional quantities
required to support- combat usage rates.
31o bile Target MK-30
Fleet ASW training exercises and torpedo firings are severely re-
stricted by the lack of "live" submarine services and safety restric-
tions. .Continued procurement of this sophisticated Mobile ASW
Target provides realistic training opportunities to exercise all ASW
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torpedoes, all surface ship and submarine sonars, and airborne Mag-
netic Anomaly Detection (MAD) equipment. The Mobile Target MK-
30 provides a direct and realistic substitute for "live" submarine
services.
Miniature Mobile Target
The Miniature Mobile Target (MMT) is a, small, non-sophisticated,
expendable, hand launched acoustic device developed as an open
ocean training device for sonar teams. It provides basic but cost effec-
tive training for Fleet ASW units. Its small size, low cost, ease in use,
and simplicity make it an excellent device for basic open ocean Fleet
ASW training.
The FY 1975 procurement is the initial production buy of the Mini-
ature Mobile Target. Those targets are required to meet_ Fleet open
ocean training requirements.
CAPTOR Advance Procurement, Current Year -
CAPTOR is a mine-like influenced-activated ASW Weapon system
employing a modified MK-46 Torpedo as a payload, deliverable by
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines and is designed to detect, clas-
sify, and attack advanced diesel and nuclear submarines.
Machine Gun MK-29
The MK-29 Machine Gun (20MM) will replace pre-World War II
model machine guns now in use in riverine, patrol assault craft and
auxiliary ships as primary ordnance, and as secondary ordnance in
many other ship types such as LHA, CVAN-,65, and Destroyer types.
MK-75 76MM Gun Mount
The MK-75 76MM Gun Mounts are to be installed aboard newly
constructed PHM (Patrol Hydrofoil, Guided Missile) and PF (Pa-
trol Frigate) ships. This line item provides for the procurement Of
MK-75 76MM Gun Mounts for use at Navy schools for training gun
crews to man those mounts.
MARINE CORPS
3188A1 Tank Recavery Vehicle
The fiscal year 1975 procurement of 40 vehicles is the first year of a
two-year program to replace, the M51 Tank Recovery Vehicle. The M51
will have been a Marine Corps recovery vehicle since 1955.
Improved Hawk Missile
The Improved Hawk is an Army Surface to Air Missile. System.
The authorization represents the third year procurement of a four-
year modernization program.
TITLE II?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALUATION
The following tabulation compares the amounts authorized and
appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation in fiscal
year 1974 with the amounts requested and recommended by the Com-
mittee, for fiscal year 1975.
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[In thousands of dollars]
Department
Fiscal year- -
1974 1974 1974 1975 Committee
requested authori red appropriated requested recommends
Army
2,
108,
700
1, 983,
758
1, 912,
100
1, 985,
9/6
1,
878, 397
Navy (including Marine Corps)
2,
711,
700
2,670
749
2, 654,
405 1
3, 264,
503
1 3,
153,006
Air Force
3,
212,
500
3, 034,
800
3, 042,
000
3,518,
860
3,
459, 760
Defense agencies
Total, R.D.T. & E
8,
525,
557,
000
505,
578
482,
500
2 555,
700
3
510, 500
900
8, 194,
885
8,091,
005 1
9, 325,
039
1 9,
001, 663
'Includes $2.57 million for Navy special foreign currency prograrr.
2 Includes $27 million for Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense
3 Includes $25 million for the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
fin thousands of &liars]
Fiscal year
1975 request
Committee
Committee recommen-
changes dations
Army
Navy (including Marine Corps)
Air Force
Defense Agencies
Total R.D.T. & E. authorization
1, 985, 976
1 a, 264, 503
3, 518,860
2 555, 700
-107,579
-111,497
-59,100
-45,200
1,878, 397
1 3, 153, 006
3, 459, 760
3510,500
19, 325, 039
-323,376
1 9, 001, 663
1 Includes $2.57 million for Navy Special Foreign Currency Progrin.
2 Includes $27 million for the Director of Test and Evaluation, De'ense.
3 Includes $25 million for the Director of Test and Evaluation, Deense.
AUTHORIZATION REQUESTED
The fiscal year (FY) 1975 Research, Development, Test and Evalu-
ation request for authorization totalled. $9,325,039,000.1 The fiscal year
1974 funding level was $8,091,005,000, not including the RDT&E sup-
plemental request of $217,000,000.2 The Department of Defense has
transferred to the fiscal year 1975 RDT&E account $225,000,000 for
items that appeared in other accounts in fiscal year 1974 that were
more closely allied to RDT&E. The transfer was generally in accord
with Congressional direction. The D-3partment of Defense used an
inflation or escalation factor of approximately 6 percent in generating
the fiscal year 1975 RDT&E request. Overall then, recognizing
the transfer and escalation factors, the Department of Defense, esti-
mates that the fiscal year 1975 request represents an increase of about
4 percent in real effort.
According to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
the RDT&E request in terms of buying power is commensurate, with
expenditures of the past ten-year period.
'Includes $2.57 million for Navy Special Foreign currency Program.
2 This Committee has authorized only the pay vise portion of the supplemental $108,905,-
000 of the total $217,000,000.
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11.0
10 0
9 0 _
8 0 _
Fy 75 DDLL:ARS
7 0
60 -
ACTUAL DOLLARS
5 0 -
4.0
3.0
70
1.0
o
FY 63 E4 65 . 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee recommends an authorization of $9,001,663,000 for
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. This represents a re-
duction of $323,376,000, or 3.5% of the amount requested by the De-
partment of Defense.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The FY 1975 authorization request for $9,325,039,000 is the largest
amount in actual dollars ever requested by the Department of be-
fense for RDT&E. The Committee was naturally concerned over the
magnitude of such a request. The Committee's initial question how-
ever, was not whether this was too much, but what kind of an RDT&E
program is essential to ensure our national security. Only after an-
swering this question can the cost consideration be addressed.
The Committee recognizes the importance of an effective RDT&E
program. RDT&E has established the technology base that has given
this country the edge in overall military posture. It is the foundation
of our military strength. Unlike procurement, where production rates
cart be accelerated in a time of need, the RDT&E process cannot be
compreSsed to suit the need. The translation of the technology base to
operationally deployable products requires time.
This philosophy,.howe,ver, doesn't preclude the vigilance required
by this Committee to ensure the authorization of an effective RDT&E
program at the lowest possible cost. For this reason, the Research and
Development Subcommittee examined every item in the FY 1975 re-
quest. The recommended action was based upon the merits of the
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individual programs rather than the attainment of a prescribed per-
centage reduction. The 3.5% reduction was the result, not the goal.
The Committee review of the request was comprehensive. During
the long hearings, the Committee assessed the requirements or need for
each weapon system development program, program progress, the
Department of Defense planned course of action, and the possibility
of using lower cost alternatives. The arguments concerning the con-
tinued use of the. B-52., or developing a stretched version of the FB--
111 in lieu of the costly B-1 :was again ,thoroughly assessed. The Com-
mittee considered the, results of studies conducted by the General
Accounting Office and others, and used these and other input in the
overall decisionmaking process.
The Committee concluded that new Soviet advances and develop-
ments preclude the use of less expensive but also less capable alterna-
tives in lieu of the B?I, TRIDENT, and several major strategic and
tactical systems presently being developed.
While the Committee was in concurrence with the Department of
Defense on most major weapons developments, the Committee believes
that the Department can do a better job of managing the RDT&E pro-
grams. The rationale for this belief emanates from the following
considerations.
Duplication of Effort within the ,Services
The Committee noted the numerous developments of low power neo-
dymium yag laser rangefinders/designators. The development of
guided ordnance was another example. The Army and Navy are both
developing guided projectiles. The guidance law and parameters are
virtually identical; yet there are three developments, two by the Army,
one by the Navy, for a program that could possibly use a common
round for both applications. The Navy has already demonstrated the
feasibility of doing so. There is an indication that each of the serv-
ices still prefer to pursue separate programs, often at the price of
using RDT&E dollars less effectively and less efficiently. A joint Army
and Navy development effort would have resulted in a significant cost
savings. The money saved in developing one semi-active laser seeker
rather than three with the same, performance, characteristics could
have been applied to the development of a much-needed dual-mode
seeker.
The Department of Defense "Selecting Out" Process
The Committee believes that the Department should "select out"
those programs which have shown insufficient progress for the invest-
ment, programs that are duplicative, or programs that are too costly
for the capability they will provide. For example, the Director, De-
fense Research and Engineering indicated concern in this prepared
statement over the cost and technical problems associated with the
AIM-7F missile. The projected cost has increased since his statement;
however, the Committee has not found evidence of any change, in the
program plan. While the Committee has not recommended a funding
reduction for this program in the fiscal year 1975 request, the cost/
capability factor of this missile will be closely monitored.
Inaccurate Cost Reporting
The Department of Defense cost estimates for our weapon system
development programs are too often naccurate. More frequently than
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is desirable, the Committee had to ask repeated questions to ascertain
actual system costs. The Department's escalation factors have not and
do not represent the state of the economy.
Typical escalation factors have ranged from one to six percent in
times when nearly eight percent was more representative. The Com-
mittee cannot comprehend the logic used by the Department to arrive
at the rates shown in the following table:
Escalation rates?Fiscal year
System
1972
1973
1974
1975
B-1:
R. & D
2.57
2.57
2.57
4.6
Procurement
1.94
3.4
3.3
3.3
AWACS:
R. & D
4.25
4.25
4. 25
Procurement
4.25
4.25
4.25
Minuteman:
R. & D
3.5
3.5
Procurement
3.1
3.1
The Director, Defense Research and Engineering, stated that a six
percent escalation factor was used in generating the FY 1975 RDT&E
authorization request. This is not in consonance with the examples
shown.
This inaccurate method of cost estimating conveys perpetual over-
runs to the Congress as well as the public. The Committee urges the
Department to address this concern and provide more accurate means
of estimating actual system costs prior to the submission of the fiscal
year 1976 authorization request.
Responsiveness
The Committee found the Department to be non-responsive in fol-
lowing the Congressional guidance provided in the House-Senate
Armed Services Committee Conference Report (No. 93-588) of last
year. This report called for the conduct of studies to determine the
specific requirement for the cruise missile. The results of these studies
were to be submitted to the Congress as part of the FY 1975 request.
Both the Navy and Air Force were advised of this requirement prior
to hearings and reminded durinc, the hearings of their obligation. To
date the results of these studies have not been received by this Com-
mittee. This inaction by the Departments formed the basis for the
reductions in both programs. The Committee requests that this data
be provilled within sixty days following the date of this report.
System Planning
During his appearance before the Committee, the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering was asked why the Navy was not taking
a more systems-oriented approach in their development efforts. It was
pointed out to him that twenty year-old gunfire control systems were
being installed on our newer ships, that available technology was not
being tied together to enhance the Fleet's operational capability. His
response was:
"All I can say is that it's partly an institutional problem -
and partly because it's a very difficult problem and I have no
simple answer except that I recognize, with you, the need for
doing that, doing a better job."
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The Committee expects visible signs of progress in solving this
"institutional problem" during the coming year.
These Committee comments concerning the management aspects of
the Department are intended to be constructive. The objective of this
Committee has been, and will continue to be, to work in a cooperative
spirit with the Department of Defense in an effort to ensure our na-
tion's security.
The Committee believes that the amount recommended for FY 1975
will provide adequately for the development of those weapons systems
which are needed to meet our future military requirements. It will
also provide the level of technology needed to ensure the capability to
develop future weapons systems to meet the threats posed by our
potential adversaries. The Committee recommendations are identified
in the tables that follow:
ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED By HOU sE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE
R.D.T. & E., ARMY
II n thousands of dollars]
Program element
Fiscal yea ?
1975 request
Change
Recommended
Military sciences
Aircraft and related equipment:
111,520
111,520
Utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS)
54, 060
-5,000
49, 060
Cobra TOW
+4500
4,500
Other programs approved
215 936
215,936
Total, aircraft
-
269, 496
269, 996
-500
Missiles and related equipment:
Advanced forward area air defense system
44, 666
---29, 668
15, 000
Advanced ballistic missile defense
91, 410
---26, 410
65, 000
Site defense
160, 000
-10, 000
150, 000
Cannon launched guided projectile
12, 551
-6, 256
6; 300
Surface-to-Air missile development (SAM-D)
111,211
-11,215
100, 000
Kwajalein Missile Range
84, 554
-4, 554
80,000
Other programs approved
202, 015
202, 015
Total, missiles
706, 413
-88, 103
618, 315
Military astronautics and related equipment
15, 832 _________
_
15, 832
Ordnance, combat vehicles and related equipment:
Weapons and ammunition
7,305
-1,600
5,706
Tank systems (XM-1)
68, 793
--3, 790
65, 000
Lethal chemical munitions (P.E. 64610A)
4,890
--1,994
3,000
Mechanized infantry combat vehicle (XM723) MICV
9,011
+1,700
10, 711
Vehicle rapid-fire weapon systems-Bushmaster
7,030
-2,930
4,100
Armored reconnaissance scout vehicle (XM800)
8,062
-3,762
4300
Other programs approved
158, 778
158, 778
-
Total, ordnance
263, 871
-12,276
251, 595
Other equipment:
Triservice tactical communications program
37, 273
-2,273
35, 000
Clothing, equipment, and packaging technology
2,220
+1, 500
3,720
Food technology
5, 9E6
+500
6, 486
Surveillance, target acquisition, and night systems (STAN 0)
15, 398
-2,398
13, 000
Classified program
20, 529
-4,029
16, 500
Other programs approved
481, 0E7
481, 087
Total, other equipment
562, 493
-6,700
555, 793
Programwide management and support
55, 846
55, 846
Total. Army R.D.T. & E. authorization
1.985, 936
-107,579
1, 878. 39-7
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ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE-COntinUed
R.D.T. & E., AIR FORCE
lin thousands of dollars]
Fiscal year
Program element 1975 request
Change
Recommended
Military sciences 131, 400
131, 400
Aircraft and related equipment:
Air combat fighter 36,000
-5,000
31,000
Other programs approved 1, 174, 000
1, 174, 000
Total, aircraft 1, 210, 000
-5,000
1, 205, 000
Missiles and related equipment:
Advanced ballistic reentry system 119,943
-15, 000
10 943
Advanced air-to-air weapons technology 3, 100
-3, 100
,
Air-launched cruise missile 80,000
-5,000
75, 000
Other programs approved 215, 957
215, 957
Total, missiles 419, 000
-23, 100
359, 900
Military astronautics and related equipment:
SLBM radar warning systems 8,000
-8,000
Navstar global positioning system 25, 400
-2, 500
22, 900
Other programs approved 439, 300
439, 300
Total, military astronautics 472, 700
-10, 500
462, 200
Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment:
Conventional weapons 24,900
-4, 900
20, 000
Improved aircraft gun system 9,690
-7,500
2,190
Other programs approved 122, 110
122, 110
Total, ordnance 156, 700
-12,400
144,300
Other equipment:
Conus over-the-horizon (0TH) radar system 12, 300
-2,000
10, 300
Improved capability for operational test and evaluation 11,900
-3,100
8,800
Precision emitter location strike system 25, 100
-3, 000
22, 100
Other programs approved 628, 900
628, 900
Total other equipment 678, 200
-8, 100
670, 100
Programwide management and support 450, 860
450, 860
Total, Air Force R.D.T. & E. authorization 3, 518, 860
-59, 100
3, 459, 760
R.D.T. & E., DEFENSE AGENCIES
Military sciences:
DARPA 41, 100
-2, 800
38, 300
Technical support to OSD/OJCS 18, 800
-3,800
15, 000
Total, military sciences 59, 900
-6,600
53, 300
Missiles and related equipment: DARPA 75, 000
-6,000
69, 000
Other equipment:
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 96, BOO
-8,000
88, 800
Defense Communications Agency (DCA) 31, 000
-5,000
26, 000
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) 14, 500
-2,000
12, 500
Total, DIA/NSA/DNA 233, 100
218, 000
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
-1,300
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
-3,000
National Security Agency (NSA)
-10,800
Total, other equipment 375, 400
-30,100
345, 300
Programwide management and support:
Defense Supply Agency 14,500
-500
14, 000
Director of test and evaluation, Defense 27, 000
-2,000
25, 000
Other programs approved 3,900
3,900
Total, programwide management and support 45, 400
-2,500
42, 900
Total, Department of Defense R.D.T. & E. authorization 1 9, 325, 039, 000
1 -323,376
I 9, 001, 663
1 Includes $2,570,000 for Navy special foreign currency program.
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ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1975 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORIZATION 'REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE-Continued
R.D.T. & E., NAVY
Iln thousands of dollars]
Program element
Fiscal year
1975 request
Change
Recommended
Military sciences
Aircraft and related equipment:
VFX fighter prototype
Other programs approved
Total, aircraft
Missiles and related equipment:
Fleet ballistic missile system
Sidewinder (AIM 9L)
Air-launched air-to-air missile (AGILE)
Cruise missile
1 140, 83?
1
140, 832
34, 003
315, 322
-34, 000
315, 322
349, 322
--34, 000
315, 322
46, 669
522
19, 987
44, 971
-9, 669
+5,000
-10,087
-2,500
37, 000
5, 522
42, 471
Aegis
67,012
-17,012
50,000
Close-in weapon system (Phalanx)
32, 103
-20, 000
12,100
Surface missile guidance
32, 222
-7,200
25, 022
Other programs approved
909, 092
909, 092
Total, missiles
1, 152, 575
-71, 368
1,
081, 207
Military astronautics and related equipment
38, 715
38, 716
Ships, small craft, and related equipment:
Ship development (advanced)
19,042
-3,000
16,042
Other programs approved
708,469
708, 463
Total, ships, small craft, and related equipment
727, 505
-3,000
724, 505
Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment
92,335
92, 335
Other equipment
479, 292
479, 292
Programwide management and support:
USS Hip Pocket
3, 12'0
-3, 129
Other programs approved
280, 791
280,197
Total, programwide management and support
283, 926
-3,129
280, 797
Total, Navy R.D.T. & E. authorization
1
3,264, 503
-111,497
1 3,
153, 006
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? COMMITTEE ACTION ON SELECTED SUBJECTS IN
THE R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST
R.D.T. & E. FISCAL YEAR 1975 PROGRAMS wini ExcEss FUNDS
The Committee recommends reductions totaling $67.930 million in
the programs listed below.
Analysis of available data and testing by Defense witnesses indi-
cated that these funds are excess to Fiscal Year 1975 requirements
because of incomplete data, similar efforts being accomplished in other
programs, or disparity between the planned effort and the funding
requested.
Fiscal year
1975 request
Change Recommended
Army:
Kwajalein Missile Range 84, 554 -4,554 80, 000
Weapons and ammunition 7,306 -1,600 5,706
Tank systems (XM-1) 68, 790 -3, 790 65, 000
Vehicle rapid fire weapon system-Bushmaster 7,030 -2,930 4, 100
Armed reconnaissance Scout vehicle (XM800) 8, 062 -3, 762 4, 300
Tr-service tactical communications program 37, 273 -2, 273 35, 000
Surveillance, target acquisition, and night systems (STOW)._ ...... 15, 398 -2,398 13, 000
Lethal chemical munitions 4, 994 -1,894 3,000
Unspecified reductions -4, 029
Navy:
Cruise missile 44, 971 -2, 500 42, 471
Surface missile guidance 32, 222 -7, 200 25, 022
Ship development (advanced) 19,042 -3, 000 16, 042
Air Force:
Navstar global positioning system 25,400 -2, 500 22,900
Conventional weapons 24,900 -4,900 20,000
Improved aircraft gun system 9,690 -7,500 2,190
Improved capability for operLtional test and_ evaluation 11,900 -3, 100 8,800
Precision emitter location strike system 25, 100 -3, 000 22, 100
Air launched cruise missile 80, 000 -5,000 75, 000
Conus over-the-horizon (0TH) radar system 12, 300 -2,000 10,300
COMMITTEE RATIONALE FOR OTHER REDUCTIONS
ADVANCED FORWARD AREA AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
Corrumittee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $29.668 million from the
Army's $44.668 million request.
Basis for Committee Action
The Army has defined the need for an all-weather system that could
defend adequately against aircraft attacking in non-visual conditions.
At the present time, there is not a viable threat that has an all-weather
capability. The Committee, however, concurs with the need to estab-
lish such a capability against future potential threats.
The Director, Defense Research and Engineering has expressed in-
terest in three foreign systems, the Roland, Rapier and Crotale. The
salient feature of these systems is that their research and development
phase has been completed. However, the Committee is concerned over
the difficulties encountered in previous attempts to Americanize for-
eign systems. The Army's estimate for the cost and the time required
to field any of these systems reinforces this concern. The Committee
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believes that there is American technology available that can be im-
proved to provide the performance, required in less time and at less
cost. The Chaparral with a RF seeker and a pulse doppler radar is
one possible alternative. There are others as well.
The Committee believes that the Army should explore these alterna-
tives for cost effectiveness and performance prior to system develop-
ment on a large scale basis. The concerns expressed form the basis for
the reduction in fiscal year 1975 funding.
UTILITY TA CTI CAL TR A N SPORT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UTTAS)
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $5.0 million from the
Army's $54.1 million request.
Basi,s for Committee Action
The Committee concern in this program is with the engine develop-
ment. The present Army consideration is to use the GE T-700 engine
to power both the UTTAS and the Advanced Attack _Helicopter. The
Army, however, is considering proposals for two backup engines. The
Committee questions the need to spend additional money for a backup
engine since the Army has reported good results on the baseline T-700
engine. The Committee also expressed concern over the fact that while
the AAH and the UrfAS were to use the same engine, the AAH pro-
gram has a sizable amount of money earmarked for engine develop-
ment. The amount was in excess of what the Committee believed was
required to design the inlet, support structure, gearbox and integration
of the engine into the AAH.
The Committee believed that a $5.0 million reduction in the UTTA S
program was commensurate with the fiscal year 1975 planned effort.
The Committee is also concerned over the massive number of heli-
copters in the inventory and the number of new developments and
plans an indepth review of the overall Army and Navy helicopter
program during the next year.
CLOTHING, EQUIPMENT, AND PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY
FOOD TECH NOLCGY
C ommittee Recommendation
The Committee recommends an increase of $1.500 million to the
Army request of $2.220 million for the Clothing, Equipment and
Packaging Technology program and $0.5 million to the Food Tech-
nology.
BoRi8 for Committee Action
The Committee recommends that greater effort be expended on pro-
viding the individual soldier with better protection against hostile
and hazardous environments in which he may be deployed in the fu-
ture. The Committee believes the soldier [nin be provided better pro-
tection with improved : foods, detection and protective BW/CW
equipment, body armor and protective head gear, packaging for sup-
plies to be shipped and stored, flame resistant materials for tentage
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and clothing, control and treatment of infectious diseases which are
not of public health interest in the United States, combat surgery and
treatment of severe burn injuries, means of waste disposal under field
conditions; and that means should be found to provide greater pro-
tection against the hazards of microwaves, flame, toxic substances, and
lasers.
CANNON-LAUNCHED GUIDED PROJECTILE
Commitee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $6.256 million from the
Army's request of $12.556 million.
Basis for Committee Action
The Committee concurred with the Army's need for the guided pro-
jectile. The Committee, however, is concerned over the number of de-
velopments in this area. The Army has two contractors for their par-
allel development effort. The Navy is developing a 5-inch guided
projectile. The Navy initially developed the feasibility hardware for
the Army. The Navy has also sitboted their 5-inch round to the Army
155mm configuration and demonstrated the feasibility of using a com-
mon round for both applications.
The reduction is based on an excessive level of effort for this de-
velopment. The Committee requests the Director, Defense Research
and Engineering to define funds for procurement of an adequate
number of saboted 5-inch rounds for a flyoff with the 155mm round
during this fiscal year. The Committee believes that the possibility
using a common round will more than offset this investment.
Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense System
SITE DEFENSE
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $26.4 million from the
Army's request of $91.4 million for the Advanced Ballistic Missile
Defense program and a reduction of $10 million from the Army's
request of $160 million for Site Defense.
Basis for Committee Action
The committee believes that an effective program for ballistic missile
defense consists of the admixture of research and system development.
The committee's concern relates to how much of each is required to
adequately defend our ballistic missile sites over both the near and far
term.
In light of the SALT Agreement, the Army is emphasizing in their
Advanced.Ballistic Missile Program a vigorous R&D effort instead of
the previous goal of operational site deployment. Further, the Army
has a substantial effort for site defense?the system phase.
The committee believes that a lesser technology phase than the one
proposed by the Army for fiscal year 1975 will ensure the present lead
we have in ballistic missile defense. This lead, coupled with our credible
deterrence, is the basis for this conclusion. The recommended level of
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46
funding should be adequate to exploit the technology and make new
advances in radars, optics, interceptors, as well as in phenomenology.
The site defense reduction was based on an assessment of the planned
effort for fiscal year 1975. The committee believes that the tasks de-
lineated in the Army written material reflect continuations or comple-
tions of the tasks that were in the more crucial stages of development
in fiscal year 1974. These were conducted at a significantly lower level
of funding. The committee recognizes the higher costs that will be
incurred during the later system integration phases.
Overall, the committee believes that a total fiscal year 1975 funding
level of $215 million for these two programs reflects an adequate level
of technology and system development for ballistic missile defense.
Surface-to-Air Missile Development (SAM?D)
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $11.2 million from the
Army's request for $111.2 million
Basis for Committee Action
The Army has redirected the SAM?D program to provide greater
austerity and a minimum expenditure of funds prior to flight verifica-
tion of the guidance concept. The deferral, and deletion of many efforts
during fiscal year 1975 coupled with a planned reduction in the num-
ber of missile firings form the basis for the recommended reduction.
Aegis
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $17.0 million from the
Navy's request for $67.0 million to continue development of the
AEGIS Missile System.
Basis for Committee Action
The AEGIS Surface-to-Air Missile Weapon Control System in-
cludes a phased array radar which will permit multiple target en-
gageability. It is a complex state-of-the-art system that employs 12
digital computers. The current Standard missile and improved ver-
sion of Standard both will be compatible with AEGIS. While the
Committee believes that the AEGIS will enhance the operational
capability of the Fleet, it is not convinced that the system is shipboard
operable and maintainable by ships' forces. The experience with digi-
tal fire control systems of far less complexity than AEGIS indicates.:
that this is a major consideration.
AEGIS is a 150-ton system that will not be retrofitted on present
Navy ships. It is intended for installation aboard the new DG class
ship which has not yet been approved by the Department of Defense.
Without the DG, AEGIS has limited application. The only viable can-
didate platform would be the DLG (N). The Committee believes
that no further developments of engineering development models
or major design changes should be made to the system until comple-
tion of an acceptable level of at sea testing. The Navy is encouraged
to emphasize this testing to verify the shipboard operational and
maintenance aspects of the system by ships' forces.
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Fighter Prototype
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $34.0 million
requested by the Navy to initiate the development of a lightweight
fighter aircraft.
Basis for Committee Action
The Navy was not able to present a solid argument in favor of
developing another lightweight fighter aircraft. The need to employ
an aircraft to augment the F-14 is questionable. Beyond the question
of the need, the Navy could not adequately describe the reasons why
either Air Force prototype, the YF-16 or YF-17, could not be made
carrier compatible to satisfy the requirement.
The Committee, however, is willing to consider a request next year
if the Navy can adequately demonstrate a requirement, supported by
reasons why existing lightweight fighter aircraft would not be suitable.
Fleet Ballistic Missile Defense
Comm,ittee Recommendation
The Committee recommended a reduction of $9.669 million from the
Navy's request for $46.669 million.
Basis for Committee Action
The Navy requested a $35.0 million increase for this program which
is designed to better define the error budget for the Polaris-Poseidon
systems. The program will define areas for improvement and not result
in system improvements as such.
The Committee believes that the planned effort for fiscal year 1975
does not correlate with the excessive dollar increase and should be
reduced to the stated level.
Sidewinder (AIM 9L)
(See Agile.)
AIR-LAUNCHED AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM (AGILE)
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $19.987 million
request by the Navy to continue this advanced development program.
Committee Considerations
This program Was intended to give the Navy a superior dogfight
type missile. The program has been in being since 1968. Since this
time, nearly $75 million has been spent and the Committee is not satis-
fied with the progress. The Committee believes that while Agile can
be made to perform the complexity of this thrust vector control mis-
sile will be costly. Most of the performance sought by Agile can be
acquired more easily with an aerodynamic ? version. Improvements to
sidewinder AIM-9L such as a larger gimbal angle, better seeker sensi-
tivity and others can be made to give it adequate maneuverability and
performance.
The Air Force has been unwilling to pursue the Agile concept. They
have proposed to develop CLAW, a smaller, less costly, aerodynamic
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dogfight missile. While the Committee did not concur with the Air
Force request for the reason shown in a later, section of this report,
the. Air Force had indicated that a relatively simple change could
have been made to their aerodynamic version to provide the offbore-
sight acquisition capability desired by the Navy.
The Committee recommends that. the Agile program be terminated
and that the Navy and Air Force pursie a single development for
both applications. Of the $19.987 million -deleted from the Agile me-
quest, the Committee has added $5 million to the Sidewinder program
element to initiate this development.
Close-in Weapon System (Phalanx)
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $20 million from the
$32.1 million request by the Navy for continued IRDT&E. of thiP
engineering development program.
Basis for Committee Action
CIWS was designed as a fast reaction, last ditch defense against the
anti-ship missile. An engineering prototype has been in test for
over one year. The House Appropriations Committee was not. con-
vinced of the adequacy of the tests against a replica of the intended
threat and recommended in House Report 93-662, dated November 26,
1973, the transfer of $23.2 million from the "Other Procurement,
Navy", account to the RDT&E account.
The Navy indicated that the funds would be used to procure six
additional operational suitable models. The ability of Phalanx to kill
its intended target has not been demonstrated. The Committee believes
that CIWS should be tested by Navy personnel against realistic dyna-
mic target replicas this year. If successful, the Navy should submit a
request for procurement; if not, it should be terminated.
U.S.S. Hip Pocket
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $3.129 million
requested by the Navy for this effort.
Basis for Committee Action
In the U.S.S. Hip Pocket program, the Navy installs new tech-
nology hardware aboard ship for at-sea evaluation. The Committee
believes that the Navy can use its Development Assist type tests for
such evaluation and doesn't need dedicated: funding for this purpose.
The Air Combat Fighter
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $5 million from the Air
Force request of $36 million.
Basis for Committee Action
The Committee is concerned over the Air Force plan to commence
the engineering development phase for either the YF-16 or YF-17
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lightweight fighter prototype prior to the completion of operational
evaluation. The committee believes that the operational evaluation
should be completed prior to the indicated level of engineering devel-
opment. The new funding level is intended to limit the Air Force to a
safer level of concurrency in the advanced and engineering develop-
ment phases.
SLBM Radar Warning System
Committee Recommendation
The committee recommends deletion of the entire $8.0 million Air
Force request.
Basis for Committee Action
The planned program effort for FY 1975 included the design and
system engineering for a phased array radar and software develop-
ment. The Army has conducted studies for SLBM defense in their
Ballistic Missile Program. The Army planned to continue the conduct
of these studies as part of their FY 1975 effort. The committee could
not concur with the Air Force requirement for a system of the com-
plexity they described. The need to track the stated number of targets
is questionable in light of the similar tactics that would be employed
against a fewer number. The technology to perform the SLBM task
is on the shelf if this is the type of system most suited to the task. The
committee is not convinced that another SAFEGUARD or derivative
thereof is the optimum solution.
Advanced Air-to-Air Technology
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends deletion of the entire $3.1 million from
the Air Force request.
Basis for Committee Action
The Committee does not concur in the Air Force plan to develop a
low-cost aerodynamic dogfight missile. The Committee doubts the
ability of such a missile to perform the intended mission because of the
small warhead and missile size. 'I hese factors led to the decision to
terminate the multi-billion dollar FALCON program. The Committee
recommends that the Navy and Air Force pursue a single development
of an improved SIDEWINDER (AIM 914 to satisfy their require-
ments. Five million dollars has been added to the Navy SIDE-
WINDER element to initiate this effort. (See Sidewinder, Agile
discussion.)
Advanced Ballistic Reentry System
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $15 million from the Air
Force request of $119.943 million.
Basis for Committee Action
The Committee did not concur in the requirement for a $30.0 million
increase over last year's funding level. The Committee recognized the
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added test and evaluation costs that have been added to this program ;
however, the study efforts and hardware developments planned for
FY 1975 are more closely allied to the recommended funding level.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Committee Recommendation
The committee recommends a reduction of $16.8 million from the
DA RPA request of $216.8 million.
Basis for Committee Action
The Committee was not satisfied with some of this DARPA fiscal
year 1974 progress as described in the presented written material.
The fiscal year 1975 planned effort for Material Services, for exam-
ple, is identical to the planned effort delineated in last year's author-
ization request. The committee questions the use of the $6.5 million
that was authorized and appropriated for this program in fiscal year
1974.
The committee also believes that sonie of the DARPA programs are
overlyambitions. The Automatic Programming task is a case in point.
Attempts to use 'high level computer languages, as planned in this
effort, have experienced repeated failure over the years. The committee
has not deleted the funds for this program since the DARPA has
previously demonstrated its ability to Eolve complex technological
problems; however, should this effort continue, the DARPA will be,
expected to demonstrate significant progress for the accumulated ex-
penditures during the coming year.
The DARPA reductions in each budget: activity are to be taken on
a priority basis. The DARPA is also cautioned against providing the
committee with nebulous justification for subsequent authorization
requests.
Technical Support to OSD/OJCS
Committee Recommendation
The Committee recommends a reduction of $3.8 million from the
OSDATCS of $18.8 million.
Basic for Committee Action
The Committee is concerned over the utility of the studies conducted
by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). The testimony
presented indicated that the results and conclusions of WSEG studies
have, not had significant or positive impact on the RDT&E program.
The Committee has reviewed several WSEG studies and found them
to be of high quality ; however, if they are conducted purely for
academic purposes, they are of little value to the research and develop-
ment program.
Last year the Senate Armed Services Committee requested the De-
partment to consider elimination of the, WSEG. That Committee
believed that. the WSEG functions could be assumed by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency.
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The House Armed Services Committee requests the Director, De-
fense Research and Engineering to reassess the WSEG function and
organizational position with a view toward improving effectiveness
and efficiency through consolidation.
Defense Agencies
The Committee recommends reductions in the amounts specified for
the following Defense Agencies:
Millions
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
?$5. 0
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)
?2.0
Defense Supply Agency (DSA)
?.5
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)
?3.0
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
?1. 3
National Security Agency (NSA)
?10. 8
Director, Test and Evaluation, Defense
?2. 0
Basis for Committee Action
The Committee believes that while the proposed fiscal year 1975
RDT&E program for each activity lies within the framework of
RDT&E, their efforts reflect more product improvement than RDT&E
per se. There are relatively few new initiatives presented in the fiscal
year 1975 programs. The majority of the programs are continuing
efforts from fiscal year 1974.
For the above reasons the Committee recommends retaining the fis-
cal year 1974 funding level plus a reasonable escalation factor. The
reductions are to be taken on a program priority basis.
Special Considerations
Naval Gunfire
The committee recommends that the following restrictive language
be included in the authorization act to prevent funds authorized for
this purpose from being reprogrammed to other requirements.
"of which $57,500,000 shall be available only for applica-
tion to surface naval gunnery (excluding the Close-In
Weapon System), including gun fire control systems, gun
mounts, unguided and guided ordnance, and fuzing:"
The committee has been concerned over the status of the Surface
Fleet Gun Systems. The majority of the gun systems in the present
Fleet were developed 20 or more years ago. They are being installed
on some of the Navy's newer platforms. The committee questions the
ability of the naval gun to perform its intended mission. Gun pro-
grams have been deemphasized over recent years in favor of missile
programs. The committee is not satisfied with the demonstrated prog-
ress in several gun programs for which funding has been requested.
The Mark 68 Gunfire Control System improvement program is an
example. Since the Chief of Naval Operations issued a directive in
1971 to improve the 5"/54 gun system, there has been relatively little
progress shown. The program has been faced with funding and ad-
ministrative problems that preclude the total system improvements
required to enhance its performance. Efforts have been directed
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toward improving the system's target tracking capability, but the
improved system NV111 still lack an adequate detection, designation
system required to improve its reaction time. The improved system,
until recently, was being designed around the antiquated Mark 47
Analog Computer. Within a three. year period over $1 million was
expended on this unfruitful effort. There are over 100 Mark 68 Gun-
fire Control Systems in the present Fleet. Many of these ships will
remain in the. Fleet over the foreseeable future. The committee be-
lieves that in light of the extensive population, the system's perform-
ance must be improved, or the system must be replaced.
The Surface Fleet contains many other World War II vintage gun
systems. Unfortunately, there are relatively few World War Ti vin-
tage targets left for them to encounter. Millions of dollars are spent
each year to maintain these systems for which there is no return on the
investment.. The development, of a higftweight modular fire contrOl
system is essential as a replacement for these syst2ms and will cer-
tainly improve the Navy logistic support posture; vet. the Navy has
deferred the effort after requesting funding for its initiation.
Newer technology programs, such as guided ordnance and the 8"
Major Caliber Liphtweight, Gun can prDvide a significant increase, in
the effectiveness of naval gunnery. The newer missile systems are char-
acterized by their high cost of expendables. Gun systems present.
much lower expendable costs. The. Surface Fleet requires the, combi-
nation of both missiles and guns. .integrated as a combat system, to
carry out its intended mission.
The committee believes that the lessons learned n Southeast Asia.
dictate the need for increased fire power. This belief, coupled with
the fact that the Navy has been usirm- the gun programs as a sonrce
of revenue for other requirements, is the basis for this restrictive lan-
guage. The committee; urges the Navy to take a more systems oriented
approach in both the improvement and development programs.
Trident
While the Committee did not recommend a reduction in the funding
for the Trident Missile, it, is concerned with the Navy's management
of the program. The. Committee was not satisfied with the Navy testi-
mony concerning the cost of the motors for the combined three stages
for the C---1 Missile. The Director, Research and Engineering, now
forecasts a 72% increase over the pre-award estimates. This sizable
increase in less than a one-year period leads the Committee to suspect
possible irregularities iii the procurement process. For this reason the
Committee has referred the Matter to its Investigating Subcommittee
The Navy is directed to provide the entire procurement data package,
including the original request for proposal, speoifications. evaluation
criteria, weighting factors, and all other related correspondence. doc-
umentat ion and information, to this Committee within 30 days follow-
ing the date of this report.
Binary CitenTiral Aternitions
The Committee recei Ved extensive testimony concerning RDT&E
of the binary chemical weapons. A binary munition differs from a
conventional munition in that it produces a nerve gas by combining
two nontoxic elements only after the weapon is on its way to the
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target. The Army contends that the, pacing factor in the development
of the system is the need for modernization of the chemical deterrent/
retalitory stockpile. The binary system offers the advantages of im-
proved safety during production, transportation and storage and
relaxes the requirements for high cost toxic production facilities.
The adversaries of the binary chemical munitions program contend
that continued RDT&E in this area is affecting the progress of the
arms control and disarmament negotiations. A second argument is
that binary munitions are not, in fact, a deterrent.
The Committee believes research establishing a credible, deterrent
chemical warfare capability should be continued until effective agree-
ments are reached. This recommendation is based on new advances
and developments made in this area by our potential adversaries.
Surface Effect Ships
The Committee questioned the Navy's original plan to proceed with
the development of the 2,000-ton prototype in light of the lessons
learned with the smaller craft. The. Committee concurs with the Navy's,
decision to restructure the program with emphasis on component de-
velopment and testing and the solution of engineering problems.
The Committee questioned the Navy's plan to proceed with the 2,000-
ton prototype program in light of the lessons learned with the smaller
craft. The Committee concurs with the Navy's decision to restructure
the program with emphasis on component development and testing
and the solution of engineering problems.
The Navy is requested to keep the Committee apprised of new
developments, either positive or negative, during the coming year. The
Navy is advised to inform the Committee of any plans relating to the
procurement of the 2,000-ton prototype prior to the award of contract.
SUMMARY BY BUDGET ACTIVITY
The Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation authorization
request is presented in eight budget activities as summarized below.
FISCAL YEAR 1975 R.D.T. & E. REQUEST?BY BUDGET ACTIVITY
II n thousands of dollars]
Committee recommendation
Request
Change
Amount
1. Military sciences
1 443, 652
?6, 600
437, 052
2. Aircraft and related equipment
1, 829, 318
?39,500
1, 789, 818
3. Missiles and related equipment
2, 352, 993
?188, 571
2,164, 422
4. Military astronautics and related equipment
527, 248
?10,500
516, 748
5. Ships, small craft, and related equipment
727, 505
?3,000
724, 505
6. Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment
512,906
?24,676
488, 230
7. Other equipment
2, 095, 385
?44,900
2, 050, 485
8. Programwide management and support
836, 032
?5,629
830, 403
Total R.D.T. & E
9, 325, 039
?323,376
9, 001, 663
I Includes $2,570,000 for Navy Special foreign currency program.
The following discussion highlights the FY 1975 R,DT&E program
by budget activity.
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BRIEF DESCRIPT ION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1975
E. BUDGET ACTIVITIES
I. unary cience8
This budget activity consists primarily of research and exploratory
development directed toward increasing knowledge and understand-
ing in those fields relating to long term national security needs. Ex-
ploratory development is directed toward the solution of specific
military problems, short of major development projects. The major
program under this activity, Defense Rosearch Sciences, provides for
basic research in mathematics, physics, chemistry, electronics, mate-
rials mechanics, energy conversion, atmospheric scieac,es, and other re-
lated disciplines so directed as to search out, assess and commence
active exploitation of scientific opportunities that appear to offer solu-
tions to Army, Navy, and Air Force technological needs. This budget
activity supports work conducted in universities, non-profit institu-
tions, and the in-house laboratories. The in-house laboratory independ-
ent research provides the principal means for laboratories to stimulate
original work in science and technology related to the interest of each
Service. Objectives are to initiate challenging research, capitalize on
ideas germinating out of phase with budget cycles, enhance the com-
petence of the. in-house laboratories, and attract and retain talented
and creative scientists. The output of this research oriented budget
activity has produced tangible useable products. The Army developed
new organic elastomers for longer wearing, higher temperature oil
and grease seal applications. This new seal material is being evaluated
for seals for the 17114 and UTTAS Army helicopters. In the Navy's
program, discovery was made of the first known example of a com-
pletely shear-repairable drag-reducing polymer for use in non-aqueous
systems. This breakthrough shows promise of significantly reducing
the power required for recirculating non aqueous systems such as ship-
board turbine lubricating and hydraulic oil systems.
2. Airoraf t and Related Equipment
This budget activity supports :RDT&E related to aircraft weapon
systems, subsystems, and components including exploratory develop-
ment in a wide variety of supporting technology.
The Army efforts are directed toward insuring an effective airmobile
and organic airborne fire support capability on the mid-intensity
battlefield.
Major aircraft systems developments and improvements include:
development of a new Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAR), a Heavy
Lift Helicopter (HMI), and the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft
System (UTTAS).
Supporting developments and application of new and improved
techniques are conducted in the areas of : engines and propulsion com-
ponents; firepower, avionics, survivabilty, maintainability and air
drop/aerial delivery equipment.
For the Navy and Marine Corp, this Budget Activity finances
research, development, test and evaluation related to airframes, en-
gines, airborne detection and fire control equipment, aerial targets and
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other associated equipments. Some of the more significant efforts in
fiscal year 1975 will consist of development effort on several major
aircraft types.
The major Navy programs include the F-14A high performance
fighter which will be substantially completed in fiscal year 1975. The
LAMPS III helicopter effort will continue this year with completion
of fabrication of the prototype avionics system.
To explore the potential of V/STOL aircraft for Navy use, there
are several advanced development programs underway. These include
the Thrust Augmented Wing which the Navy believes holds the most
potential for flight deck operations, and at a lower level of effort the
Lift plus Lift Cruise concept utilizing dedicated engines to assist in
the lift maneuver and a program of upgrading of the engines for the
operational AV-8N HARRIER. In fiscal year 1975 the Navy expects
to start engineering development of two CH-53E helicopter produc-
tion prototypes for delivery in early fiscal year 1976. The Navy also
planned to initiate efforts in 1975 for three new aircraft concepts, the
VFX Advanced Fighter Prototype, intended to replace the F-1 and
augment the F-11; the ITSX VTOL aircraft, itnended to replace the
SH-3 and CH-16 helicopter in the early mid-1980s; and the VCX
advanced COD aircraft which is intended to replace the C-2. The
Committee recommended deletion of all funds requested for the VFX
Advanced Fighter Prototype.
The Air Force program includes the cost for the "International
Fighter Aircraft" which will provide an air superiority capability for
South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and the other allies; the A-10
aircraft which will provide more accurate and timely fire support for
ground troops than is being provided by Current aircraft; the F-15
which is an all weather air superiority fighter capable of engaging
and destroying any known aircraft; the B-1, a long-range strategic
bomber to replace the present B-52 aircraft, whicli7will include the
latest technology to permit it to penetrate all known or contemplated
defenses; Advanced Medium STOL Transport Prototype which will
demonstrate applicable new technology for possible modernization of
the tactical airlift force in the early eighties; and the Lightweight
Fighter Prototype (Advanced and Engineering Development). The
fiscal year 1975 request also provided funding for the Aerospace,
Flight Dynamics, Biotechnology, Propulsion and Avionics Explora-
tory Development Laboratories.
3. Mi8siles and Related Equipment
Included in the Army activity is the SAFEGUARD ABM System,
Site Defense, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology
program. The purpose of this program is to provide qualitative im-
provement in ballistic missile defense technology and components to
cope with the growing spectrum of threats. Also included in this
budget activity are the funds needed to support the test and evaluation
of weapons systems conducted at Kwajalein and White Sands Missile
Ranges. These Army managed national ranges support test programs
of all services including the Army's SAFEGUARD, Air Force's
MINUTEMAN, the Navy's POLARIS at Kwajalein, and the Air
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Force's SRAM and ATHENA, NASA programs, and several Navy
tactical missiles at White Sands.
Other Army weapons programs for which significant development
funding was requested include: the surface to air missile., SAM-D,
which will replace the NIKE 11E RCI lLES and HAWK Air Defense.
Systems; development of it manportable air defense system,
STINGER, to -replace REDEYE: development of a short range
highly mobile all weather air defense missile system (SHORAD) to
fill the gap between STINGER and SA NI-D; continued development
of the, terminal homing concept which is directed toward defeating
tanks, armored personnel carriers, field :Fortifications, air defense-sites
and other point targets.
For the Navy and Marine Corps, the Fiscal Year 1975 request is in
support of three major warfare areas--Strategie, Surface., and Air
Warfare. The Strategic contains the largest single Navy program
in Fiscal Year 1975--the TRIDENT strategic weapon system. The
TRIDENT missile development efforts includes conduct of full scale
propulsion tests; continued design release and start of fabrication
and assembly of X-1 missile. Work will also be underway in the
other components of the system as well as construction of the explosive
handling wharf for the TRIDENT Weapon facility and the '.1."RL
DENT training facility.
Another strategic weapon system, the Submarine Launched Cruise
Missile, is intended to develop a strategic cruise missile designed for
launch from submarine, torpedo tubes. In Fiscal Year 1975 beginning
with the airframe, the design, testing and demonstration of hardware
items will be completed.
The related programs of FBM system, and the FBM command and
control programs will also be pursued.
There are several surface, warfare related programs in this budget,
activity?the AEGIS, HARPOON, PHALANX, and the, STAND-
ARD missiles. The AEGIS will undergo shipboard at, sea evaluation
during this year. The HARPOON anti-surface missile, will provide
surface ships, submarines, and certain aircraft with a. long-range
stand-off, all-weather, anti-ship weapon system to counter the Soviet
bloc surface navy threat. The Fiscal Year 1975 effort will concentrate
on proof of the prototype missile and launch system designs. In addi-
tion to the HARPOON, there are other air-to-surface missiles. CON
DORis intended to provide a highly accurate, long-range standoff, air-
to-surface, missile for use against, heavily defended, high value land
or sea targets. This missile is now entering Operational Evaluation.
The HARM High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile is intended as a fol-
low on of the, presently operational SHRIKE and STANDARD ARM
The STANDARD MISSILE-2 (SM-2) with its command guidance
feature. during mid-course, flight and a new receiver antenna will begin
initial operational test and evaluation during the year. The
PHALANX Close-in Weapon System is designed as a fast reaction,
last-ditch defense against low-flying, high speed anti-ship missiles
penetrating other Fleet, defensive envelopes. This system will undergo
additional testing during FY 1975.
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The Navy request included development of several other air-
launched missiles. In the air-to-air missile area there are three On going
efforts: SIDEWINDER (AIM-9L), SPARROW (AIM-7F) and the
AGILE. -
Programs in Exploratory Development advanced technology and
Mated missile developments are also carried out under this activity.
The Committee recommended deletion of all funds for the AGILE
program.
The Air Force program for fiscal year 1975 provides for the develop-
ment and test of ballistic and other missiles and related equipment.
Included are funds for MINUTEMAN, ABRES (Advanced Ballistic
Re-entry System) , the Air Launched Cruise Missile, and advanced
air-to-air weapon technology. Design and development will continue
on the MINUTEMAN Missile Performance Measurement System and
in-flight hardness assessment and ground testing will continue. The
ABRES provides for the development and test of new techniques in
re-entry systems and penetration aids for all Department of Defense
ballistic missiles.
The Committee recommended deletion of funds for advanced-air-to-
air weapon technology program.
4. Military Astronautics and Related Equipment
The Army funds under this budget activity are for: development of
new ground terminals for all Services and subsystems to increase the
efficiency and reliability of the world-wide Defense Satellite Com-
munications System (DSCS) ; development of small terminals for
tactical application in the field army, which are also compatible with
DSCS; and for investigations of navigation by satellite.
The Navy's programs are directed towards the improvement of space
technology for military purposes and the development of space vehicles
for specific military applications.
The Navy is engaged in the implementation of a satellite com-
munications program to provide essential command and control com-
munications with ships, submarines and aircraft. The Program con-
sists of (1) GAPFILLER leased satellite channels; (2)
FLTSATCOM ; (3) Super High Frequency (SHF) Shipboard Ter-
minals ? and (4) Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
Shore 'Terminals.
The two projects in the Weather Service program are directed to-
ward the development of a shipboard readout terminal capable of
receiving high resolution satellite data from the Defense Meteoro-
logical Satellite Program, an Air Force system. Readout equipment
planned for ships will provide enroute weather pictures of enormously
improved quality.
The program of Satellite Navigation consists of two efforts,
NAVSTAR GPS and Expanded TRANSIT. NAVSTAR GPS is the
Navy portion of a Joint Service Development Program to evaluate
concepts and techniques of an Advanced Satellite Global Positioning
System capable of providing very precise positioning information in
three dimensions. The Navy effort is devoted to developing technology
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satellites participating in joint service common user equipment devel-
opment and testing and to develop and space-qualifv atoll ic frequency
standards. Expanded TRANSIT programs supports the. on-gOing
TRANSIT Improvement Program by incorporation of a ranging
signal and developing modifications to submarine receivers to receive
these signals for quick fixes.
The Space Technology program will develop, launch and demon-
strate a satellite system capable of continuous, real-time. assessment/
prediction of space environment disturbance effects on ionospheric
dependent operational systems such as HF communications, HF di-
rection finding and over-the-horizon radar. Two solar radiation nioni-
toring satellites will readout into a ground station from which
on-line data processing will enable real-time transmission of space en-
vironment disturbance effects to R&D and operational users. The
Committee recommended approval of the full amount of the request.
The Air Force program for fiscal year 1975 includes costs for the
continuing development of space programs such as Defense Support,
Satellite Communications Systems, Snace Defense System, Space
Surveillance Technology, and NAVSTAR Global Positioning Sys-
tem.- The Air Force proposed a new effort, Submarine Launched Bal-
listic, Missile Radar Warning System. The committee recommended
deletion of all funds for this new program.
5. Shim, ,Sv mall Craft, and Related. .E quip-newt
For the Navy, this budget activity provides for applied research,
development, test and evaluation of ship structures and equipment.,
including propulsion, communications, navigation and surveillance
systems directly affecting ship operations. It includes the design, pro-
totype fabrication and performance evaluation of new types of ship
radars and sonars, Electronic Warfare devices, conventional propul-
sion systems and nuclear propulsion systems.
There are. several major ship development programs included in
fiscal year 1975.
The TRIDENT Submarine system will develop and deploy a new
subinarine to enhance survivability and availability of sea-based de-
terrent systems and augment or replace existing st rategic weapons sys-
tems. In fiscal year 1975 the Navy expects to complete submarine
Mockup, final hardware and software design of sonar system, ship
control station studies, missile tube protntype, Land Based Evaluation
Facility software, factory testing of Defensive Weapon System eng-,i -
'leering development model.
Related to TRIDENT is the IMPROVED SSBN. The Navy plans
in fiscal year 1975 to initiate development of the conceptual design for
a smaller and less capable SS BN than TRIDENT, as a possible coni
plenaent to the TRIDENT Submarine in providing for replacement of
the bulk of our aging SSBNs :us they are retir(d. (haracteristic's Will
draw on technology developed in TRII)ENT R&I) to maximum extent
possible.
The Surface Effects Ships?(SES) development program is aimed
at, expanding the technology to ships of ocean-going size. Phase I of
the program, fiscal year 67-73, focused upon the design, development,
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construction, and tests of two 100--tons test craft embodying different
approaches to tli,e critical technological areas of propulsion, sidewalls
and seals, lift systems, and systems for stability and control. The two
100-ton test craft were completed in fiscal year 1972 and have since
been undergoing extensive testing. Tests to date have demonstrated
the essential validity of the SES ' concept, and provided verification
of the design data base needed for proceeding to larger size ships.
The fiscal year 1975 effort will emphasize component development
and testing.
The Amphibious Assault Landing Craft Project was established
to develop an Amphibious Assault Landing Craft System which will
provide an improved capability in ship to shore and over the beach
delivery of personnel and equipment. The program has concentrated
on the design and construction of two, differently configured, air
cushion vehicles (ACV's). Funding from 1971 to 1975 was directed
toward prototype construction to specific Navy/Marine operational
requirements.
Under NATO, the United States offered to share its hydrofoil tech-
nology with other interested nations and took the initiative in plan-
ning a cooperative program to meet a common set of performance
requirements. In November 1972, a Memorandum of Understanding,
covering the Detailed Design and Lead Ship Construction stages of
the NATO PHM (Patrol Hydrofoil, Guided. Missile) Program, was
signed by Italy, Germany, and the United States. In fiscal year 1975
lead ship constructiOn will be completed.
The Advanced Ship Development project provides new ship design
for the Navy's Shipbuilding Program in response to new military
requirements. Additionally, it includes Advanced Ship Concept De-
velopment for ships not yet in the shipbuilding program and devel-
opment of in-house ship design capabilities. This project was estab-
lished to support the conceptual phase of new ship development.
New in RDT&E, Navy in FY 1975 is Ship Contract Design. This
program was formerly funded under SCN and is part of the. design
process wherein preliminary design, engineering and planning are
expanded to establish the production configuration. It provides the
basis for award of a contract for detailed design and construction of
one or more ships.
In addition to these programs there are programs which support
the development of ships and ship related systems such as propulsion
systems, shipboard Radar and Sonar, Navigation and Data processing
systems, Surface EW and ASW programs and Exploratory Develop-
ment and Advanced Technology development efforts.
6. Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
This budget activity provides for research and development of weap-
ons and vehicles. The Army program includes field artillery weapons
and ammunition, air to surface weapons except missiles, infantry
small arms and ammunition, combat vehicles including their integral
weapons and ammunition, and nuclear and non-nuclear munitions re-
quired for increased combat effectiveness. Additionally -tactical ve-
hicles both wheeled and tracked, and amphibious and ground effects
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vehicles for conducting warfare in all conditions of terrain, weather
and climate are development under this budget activity.
The principal fiscal year 1975 programs in this budget activity are
the XM-1 Tank, the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicles, the
x1V1204 Towed 105min Howitzer, the XM198 Towed 155nun Howitzer,
High Energy Lasers, and Scatterable Mines. The XIM1. will have better
armor to reduce its vulnerability and a 'better track, suspension and
powerplant will increase its cross-country mobility, speed and agility,
thus providing the Army with a superior tank. The Mechanized In-
fantry Combat Vehicle., which will replace the N1113 in selected units,
will have increased effectiveness in cross-country mobility, ballistic
protection, and improved stabilized weaponization. The range of the
new howitzers is signficantly greater than that of the weapons they
will replace.
High energy chemical lasers have the greatest energy per weight
potential of any known laser but the technology is the least advanced;
this program will address the technology of high energy chemical
lasers. The chemical weapons system under development represent a
modernization program which will insure compatibility of ebemical
munitions with the new family of artillery tubes and are intended
to replace the non-binary chemical deterrent-retaliatory stockpile nec-
essary to hte support of national policy. In the area of mines, the pri-
mary effort is developing delivery systems for a variety of mines.
Ordnance and related equipment:
NAVY (including Marine Corps) $02, 335, 000
For the Navy this Budget Activity consists of weapons systems not
including aircraft, ships or missiles which provide the Navy and
Marine Corps forces with their strike capability as well as a defensive
capability.
In FY 1975, the Navy plans to complete TECH/OPEVAL for the
ASW mine CAPTOR. CAPTOR is amine which launches a MK-4E;
torpedo against submerged submarines while rejecting surface targets.
The MK-48 Torpedo entered the production stage in FY 72. Addi-
tional tasks requirements were identified during OPEVAL and Fleet
introduction and remain to be accomplished. These efforts are sup--
ported in this Budget Activity in FY 1975.
In the Exploratory Development effort under Ordnance, efforts
are directed toward the development of the technology of undersea
weapons, including torpedoes, mines, warheads, fuzes, explosives,
propellants, guidance, fire control?systems and components.
There are three projects under Gun Systems in FY 1975. However,
the major effort is development of the Lightweight Intermediate
Caliber Gun, an extremely light weight, automatic, high rate of fire
gun system for fast patrol craft, hydrofoils, SES, and other light
displacement ships.
There are also several Fire Control Systems or improvements to fire
control systems pursued under this activity. The largest effort in FY
1975 is devoted to the 8"/55 caliber MK-71 _Lightweight Gun devel-
oped for use aboard destroyer-size ships to perform the naval gunfire
support and anti-ship missions. The Gun was designed, fabricated,
assembled and tested as a 175mm/60 caliber gun. It was converted to
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8"/55 caliber and successfully completed an Operational Evaluation
ashore. In fiscal year 1975 the Navy will conduct at-sea technical and
operational evaluations. -
Marine Corps Ordnance efforts are devoted to such programs as
LVTP4 product improvement, a shoulder-Launched Multi-purpose
Assault weapon, encapsulated flame rounds and Laser Homing
Ordnance.
The Air Force program provides for the research, development and
test of weapons and munitions. Included are funds to continue develop-
ment of the 30mm gun for air-to-ground operations. Also included are
programs to develop more effective conventional bombs fuses, dis-
pensers and weapon guidance systems. This activity also provides
funding for the Air Force Weapons and Armament Exploratory'
Development Laboratories.
7. Other Equipment
This activity provides for research, development, and evaluation of .
equipment not separately provided for under other activities. The
Army program covers cover a broad range of items including com-
munication-electronics, battlefield cover and deception, chemical war-
fare defense equipment, biological defense equipment, combat support
equipment such as night vision device, counterbattery and connter-
mortar radars, fuel cells, combat feeding, Clothing items and training
devices. Testing provides for the all important test activities of the
Army R&D program. The TRI-TAC program will develop a new
multichannel tactical communications system for the services.
Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation is an
Army program to manage all development in this high priority area;
the STANb programs consists of the development, of night vision
devices, special purpose detectors, radar and ground sensors. The
night vision program is oriented toward improving night vision
devices to enhance the soldier's effectiveness during darkness. Counter-
battery and countermortar radars are being developed to provide
timely and accurate location of hostile artillery and mortar positions.
The bulk of the Navy Exploratory Development Program is funded
in this Budget Activity. The Navy has restructured Exploratory De-
velopment (Category e.2) to be more compatible with the structures
used by Army and Air Force. As a result, the FY 1975 budget request:
includes 19 program elements for Exploratory Development (as op-
posed to 7 in FY: 1974) and Exploratory Development now appears
in 5 separate Budget. Activities with 13 in Budget Activity 7. Pre-
viously all elements were in Budget Activity 7. Exploratory Devel-
opment is conducted in such areas as Undersea Target Surveillance.
and Surface and Aerospace Target Surveillance, Logistics Tech-
nology, Energy and Environmental Protection Technology, and
Laboratory Independent Exploratory Development. -
In addition to important Advanced and Engineering Development
efforts in Undersea Surveillance and Aerospace Ocean Surveillance,
the major portion of the Navy's Oceanographic R&D program and
several Marine Corps programs are carried out under this Budget
Activity.
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The primary Air Force area funded in this activity is command
and control. For fiscal year 1975 this includes the Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) which will provide the Air Defense
and Tactical Forces with the means for detecting and. engaging enemy
aircraft. The Advanced Airborne Command Post will provide the
National Command Authority with a significantly increased capabil-
ity over the present EC-135 aircraft to command and control the
armed forces during periods of emergency. Many other development
tasks in such areas as communications; electronic countermeasures;
reconnaissance; surveillance; and traffic control approach and land-
ing are included in this budget activity. This activity also provides
funding for the Ground Electronics and Human Resources Explora-
tory Development Laboratories.
8. Progranywide Management and Support
This Activity provides for those costs of operation, management and
maintenance of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation facilities
which are not distributed directly to other activities. There is a net
increase in fiscal year 1975 over the amount budgeted for fiscal year
1974 in this Budget Activity. The primary reason for the change is the
new Defense Department uniform fund Mg policy for use at various
designated Test and Evaluation activities. The new policy directs that
all the cost of retaining and operating the T&E support activity which
could not be directly attributed to the benefiting users would be con-
solidated in a single, separately identified budget line, or program ele-
ment, aggregating groups of T&E support activities, and these indirect
costs would be financed on an institutional basis. The new policy re-
quired a re,computation by all the Services of the total costs associated
with the T&E operation, a redetermination of the distribution of these
costs to both customers and institutional funding sources and a shift-
ing of funds from various institutional support budget lines into pro-
gram (customer) budget lines?both infra- and inter-service. The
amount budgeted for Test and Evaluation Support contains funds
formerly included in other appropriations of the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force.
For the Army, this activity includes the general and administrative
RDT&E expenses at major command headquarters (except Depart-
ment of the Army Headquarters) ; operation and maintenance of se-
lected general purpose RDT&E activities; minor construction (less
than $50,000) and special purpose equipment benefiting more than one
RDT&E project; cost associated with :international cooperative re-
search and develpoment with allied nations; effort for continued im-
provement of technical information activities required for the general
support of the RDT&E program, and long-term training of Army
RDT&E civilian employees.
Some Navy programs supported under this activity are. AUTEC,
the Marine Corps Development Center, NARL Pt. Barrow, Alaska,
ASMD Test Range and the USS HIPPO CKET program.
The committee recommended deletion of all funds required for the
USS HIPPOCKET program.
For the Air Force, this activity provides for pay of civilian person-
nel, travel expenses, supplies and equipment for such installations as
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the Space and Missile Test Center, Vandenberg AFB, California;
Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, California; Armament Develop-
ment Test Center, Eglin AFB, Florida; Aeronautical Systems Divi-
sion, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Space and Missile Systems Or-
ganization, Inglewood, California; and HQ Air Force Systems Com-
mand, Andrews AFB, Maryland.
TITLE III?ACTIVE FORCES
The Department of Defense requested an authorized end strength
for active duty personnel in each component of the Armed Services
for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, as
follows:
(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 630,345.
The committee recommends the following authorized end strengths
for active duty personnel in each component of the Armed Services
for fiscal year 1975 as follows:
(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 627,535.
This represents an end strength of 2,149,313. This is 10,589 fewer
personnel than were authorized for fiscal year 1974. It is 2,810- less
than requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal 1975. To put
these figures in perspective, the recommended end strength is:
?538,000 lower than the strength at the end of fiscal year 1964,
the last pre-Vietnam year;
?1,399,000 lower than fiscal year 1968, the peak of the Vietnam
War;
?84,000 lower than the fiscal year 1974 strength requested in the
President's budget submitted to the Congress in January, 1973.
The end strength for .fiscal year 1975 marks the arrival of the "base
line force," the minimum force that the President and the Secretary
of Defense consider necessary to carry out national security objectives.
Manpower end strength levels can only he meaningful when viewed
in terms of our national security objectives established by the Presi-
dent and the Congress. Basically they are: to preserve the -United
States as a free and independent nation, to safeguard its fundamental
institutions and values, and to contribute to the security of other
nations with whom we have treaties or whose security impacts upon
our own security. -
The rationale for the committee action on the strengths recom-
mended is summarized below.
Array Active Duty Strength
With Authorization and Appropriations Committee cuts, the end
strength for the Army for fiscal year 1974 is established, at 782,000.
For fiscal year 1975 the Army has asked, and the committee has rec-
ommended, a 3,000 increase in manpower working toward a goal of
131/3 divisions in fiscal year 1975 as contrasted with a 13-division force
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in fiscal year 1974. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams
stated that his goal was 14 divisions by the end of fiscal year 1975. It
now seems apparent that this increase in combat forces is feasible and
will be a reality; due largely to effective management of the Army
structure by selective reductions in support activities.
Requirements as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff state there:
is a need for 30 divisions in the Army to operate within a margin of
safety. Today, we have 13 Active and 8 Reserves Divisions. 'This force
level has been characterized as a prudent risk. By 1980 it is the Army's
intention to have 16 divisions in the Active Force within the manning
level of 785,000. This is not to indicate that. all of the divisions will
be structured in exactly the same manner; however? the planned in--
crease of 9 maneuver battalions is evidence of an increase in our com-
bat teeth and a shortening of the support tail.
Navy Active Duty Strength
The Navy's recommended end strength is 540,380, a reduction of
approximately 10.700 from their fiscal year 1974 appropriated end
strength. This reduction occurs over a time frame during which the
total number of ..ships has increased by four, including one aircraft
carrier. This reduction is primarily in the Central Support Forces and
Individuals account. This number is the lowest in 29 years, and is the
base point from which the Navy will expand to accept the approxi-
mately 38 new ships coming into the inventory over the next five years.
It represents the Navy's estimate of the lowest acceptable manpower
level. With this authorization, the number of structure positions for
ship and squadron manning in fleet units will be 5 percent below that
specified on unit documents.
The Marine Corps request, which the committee recommends for
authorization, is 384 people more, than end fiscal year 1974. This
number is attributed to a request by the State Department to increase
embassy guards by 438.
Air Force Active Duty Strength
In the Air Force, we see the greatest change from fiscal year 1974's
end strength .figures. The service has requested a level of 630,345
people, a reduction of 15,075 from this year's end strength. This is a
self-imposed reduction of approximately 21/2 percent in end strength.
To place it in perspective, it also represents the seventh consecutive
year in which this manpower figure has declined. Air Force Tinder
Secretary Plummer testified that the, 141 of these reductions result
from headquarters cutbacks and reductions in certain additional areas,
such as a 5 percent decrease in strategic forces and a 10 percent
decrease in auxiliary forces.
The committee has recommended an authorized end strength of
627,535, a reduction of 2,810. This reduction is warranted because of
testimony presented during our hearings that, in fact, certain roles
in the strategic airlift mission could be. withdrawn from the Active
Forces and given to the Air Force Reserve, with the resultant decrease
in active personnel and an overall annual cost savings of approxi-
mately $31 million. The committee was careful to determine whether
this readjustment would cause any problem in the overall readiness
of our airlift capabilities and was convinced no such problem would
occur.
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Overall then, the Total Active Force recommended for fiscal year
1971 is 40,589 less than the Congress authorized last year.
77w All-Volunteer Force
Last year in its Report on the Authori2ation Bill, the 'Committee
stated:
There is considerable question as to whether the All-
Volunteer Force can meet the military manpower require-
ments both qualitatively and quantitatively over the critical
years ahead.
During the year that has passed since we issued that report, there
is no reason to change the opinion.
Year-to-Date Recruiting Results by Service
During the first nine months of the fiscal year the four Military
Services had achieved 93 percent of their cumulative, recruiting objec-
tives. The following table shows the year-to-date performance by
Service:
RECRUITING RESULTS?ALL SOURCES, YEAR-TO-DATE, FISCAL YEAR 1974
[In thousands]
Program
objective Percent of
July-March Actual objective
Army
159
142
89
Navy
66
65
98
Marine Corps
43
39
91
Air Force
57
57
100
Total, DOD
325
303
93
ENLISTMENTS BY SOURCE
The number of non-prior-service men enlisted was 27,050 or 95 per-
cent of the Services' March objective; the number of non-prior-service
women was 2,260 or 100 percent of the objective; and the number of
prior-service personnel was 2,420 or about 117 percent of the objective.
The following table shows the distribution of March enlistments by
source:
RECRUITING RESULTS BY SOURCE
March
February
Program Percent percent
objective Actual objective objective
Nonprior service:
Men
28, 410
27, 050
95
95
Women
2, 260
2, 260
100
91
Prior service
2,070
2,420
117
110
Total, DOD
32, 740
31, 730
97
95
TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH BY SERVICE
The total DoD military strength was about 1 percent below the
strength level planned at the end of February, as shown in the follow-
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ing table. The Navy shortfall reflects a continuing problem in strength
accounting rather than a failure to meet recruiting objectives. A total
of 8,800 enlisted losses resulted from a careful review of actual strength
on hand. The Navy is striving to make up the difference before year-
end through over-delivery against its recruiting goals:
STATUS OF MILITARY STRENGTH BY SERVICE
[In thousands]
End o February June 1974
current
Objective I Actual Shortfall Percent objective 1
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
785
561
192
673
781
55)
19?
66)
1
11
0
4
1
2
0
1
782
551
1%
645
Total DOD
2211
2,191
16
1
2,174
1 February strength objectives reflect the lowered strength objectives for the end of the fiscal year which were announced
in January and which resulted from congressional action on the fiscal year 1974 budget request. Program adjustments
were made in late January.
NON-PRIOR-SERVICE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN, Dv SERVICE
During March the Services achieved the following results against
their non-prior-service objectives for men and women:
NONPRIOR SERVICE RECRUITING RESULTS
March
Program
objective
Actuit
Percent
objective
February
percent
objective
Year to date
percent
objective
MEN
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
Total DOD
14,000
5,300
3,800
5,310
12, 190
5,250
4,240
5,370
87
99
112
101
95
87
100
106
101
95
86
97
93
100
92
28,410
27,050
WOMEN
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
1, 200
440
110
510
1, 210
430
100
510
101
98
91
100
84
97
113
100
104
107
99
99
Total DOD
2, 260
2, 250
100
91
103
MENTAL GROUPINGS : HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
In March about 91% of all non-prior-service enlistees were in Mental
Categories I through III, which are the average and above average
mental groups; only 9% were in Mental Category IV, the below-
average group. High School graduates amounted to 62% of enlist-
ments; this is unchanged from February and is more favorable than
seasonal trends.
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The data for July-March is shown in the following table along with
the March results:
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND MENTAL GROUPINGS (NONPRIOR-SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN)
High school graduates Mental Groups, I, II, Ill'
March March
Number
Percent
Year to date
(percent)
Number
Percent
Year to date
(percent)
Army
7,760
58
54
11,390
85
82
Navy
3, 420
60
71
5,480
96
97
Marine Corps
1,520
35
48
4,010
92
92
Air Force
5, 400
92
94
5,850
99
99
Total DOD
18, 100
62
65
26, 730
91
90
I Above average and average categories.
APRIL OBJECT [YES
The Services' manpower programs for April called for the follow-
ing enlistment objectives from all sources:
Army
15, 600
Navy
4,580
Marine Corps
3, 750
Air Force
5,380
Total DOD
29, 310
In addition to these program objectives the Navy is seeking 810 ex-
tended active duty reserve enlistments; 1,670 additional regular force
enlistments because of revised loss estimates, and the Marine Corps is
seeking 980 additional enlistments to offset 'previous recruiting short-
falls.
RESERVE COMPONENTS
The total selected reserve strength increased in February for the
fifth consecutive month with the two National Guard Components, and
the Air Force. Reserve showing net gains. Although non-prior-service
enlistments for all reserve components are lower than the objectives
for the year to date, the shortfalls have been partially offset by suc-
cesses in recruiting prior-service enlisted personnel :
FISCAL YEAR 1974 SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS
[In thousands]
ARNG
USAR USNR
USMCR
ANG
USAFR
DOD tote I
Authorized end strength
412.0
260. 6
116.9
39. 5
92. 5
51. 5
973. 0
Actual:
June 30, 1973
385.6
235.5
126.2
37.5
90.4
43.8
819.0
Sept. 30, 1973
384. 9
231. 5
119. 1
35. 3
90. 5
43. 3
904.6
Dec. 31 1973
392.5
227.2
119.1
33.1
92.5
46.2
910.6
Jan. 31, 1974
396.4
227.7
117.8
32.4
92.9
46.6
913.8
Feb. 28, 1974
403. 1
226.9
114.9
32. 2
93. 1
47.6
917.8
Change from previous month. _
+6.7
-.8
-2.9
-.2
+.2
+1.0
+4.0
Net short/over authorized end strength _
-8.9
-33.7
-2.0
-7.3
+. 6
-3.9
-55.2
Percent short/over
-2. 2
-12.9
-1.7
-18. 5
+. 7
-7.6
-5. 7
Unaudited preliminary reports from services.
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The current shortfall in personnel strength is presently projected
to be 10,000 for the Army, 6,000 for the Navy and 6,000 to 12,000 in
the Marine Corps. One of the reasons for this shortfall was the require-
ment that 55 percent of the new accessions into each Service were
required to be high school graduates. This posed no problem for the
Air Force and the Navy where the percentage of high school grad-
uates during the first half of Fiscal Year 1974 were 96 percent and
73 percent respectively. However, the Army was able to obtain only
54 percent and the Marine Corps 51 percent high school graduates
during the same period.
This committee is interested in seeing the quality of the Services
maintained and improved. But, we do not agree with those who urge
this 55 percent of non-prior accessions must be of high school grad-
uates in order to maintain quality. It means that the services have to
turn away non-high school graduates ,vho would make good soldiers
and. marines.
Another measurement of potential quality is by mental categories.
In Service testings, people are placed in categories I through V. Cate-
gory III represents the average with Category I being the highest
mental grouping and Category V the lowest. Category V personnel
are not permitted to join the Services._ During the first .half of Fiscal
Year 1974 89 percent of all new entrants into the Service were in
mental Categories III and above. This compares with 85 percent in
these categories in 1964, a pre-Vietnam year. By Service, the Army
has 81 percent in category III or above which is comparable to what
they were achieving in 1964. The Navy is at 97 percimt and the Marine
Corps at 95 percent both of which are above the pre-Vietnam level.
The'!Air Force has 99 percent in Category III or above which is also
above the pre-Vietnam level.
Frankly, the -committee believes the test for entry should be train-
ability rather than the completion of high school. And. the Services
have develope-dthe criteria to determine such trainability.
COMMITTEE COMMENT
Despite the shortfalls, it is still too early to predict with any degree
of accuracy the results of the effort to achieve an All-Volunteer Force.
The committee does view with some alarm, however, that the Army
and the Marine Corps continue to fall below their accession goals, par-
ticularly in the area of non-prior accessions. These shortfalls are pro-
ducing a lack of readiness in the respective Services. The condition
will bcome worse in fiscal year 1975 as the last draftees leave the serv-
ice by December, 1974.
Despite the difficulties in recruitment and the shortfalls, the commit--
tee recommends authorization of the numbers delivered to be the
minimum required in. order to permit the Services to accomplish their
assigned missions. We reject the idea of ceilings based upon our pro-
jection of their recruiting capability. The Committee applauds the
efforts of the Secretary of Defense in reducing headquarters staffing
both within the Department of Defense and the various services and
transferring the personnel to combat units so as to increase the readi-
ness of forces.
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TITLE IV?RESERVE FORCES
The committee recommends that for fiscal year 1975 the Selected
Reserve of each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces be pro-
gramed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:
(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 408,000.
(2) The Army Reserve, 225,000.
(3) The Naval Reserve 117,000.
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve,
38,000.
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 95,000.
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319.
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.
Total, Selected Reserve Force. 946,019.
This represents 22,086 more than were authorized for fiscal year
1974 and 53,953 more than were originally requested by the Depart-
ment of Defense for fiscal year 1975. However, during hearings on the
Reserve Components, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power and Reserve Affairs revised the DoD request upward by 41,734.
To put this matter in perspective, the starting point must be the
authorization request for fiscal year 1974. Congress was requested to
and did authorize the average strength for the Selected Reserve at
a figure approximately 66,000 less than was authorized for fiscal year
1973. The committee, at that time, did not believe the strengths author-
ized were adequate for mission requirements but felt there was no need
to mandate a floor for the Reserves which, we then believed, was im-
possible of accomplishment. The recruiting capability of the Guard
and Reserves has been grossly underestimated and the total in the
Selected Reserves is now 4,309 more than were authorized for fiscal
year 1971. It appears there was initial difficulty in determining the
appropriate level of strength to be authorized for the Reserve Com-
ponents for three principal reasons:.
1. The inability or reluctance of the Department of Defense
to define the specific application of the force structure reductions
proposed for the Army National Guard and Reserve;
2. The erroneous projections of attainable end fiscal year 1974
strengths and the resulting low average strengths requested for
fiscal year 1975;
3. The dichotomy between the Secretary's stated Total Force
Policy and the force structure actions which would eliminate
Guard and Reserve units while maintaining more expensive active
forces units.
Uncertainty in DoD Reserve Strength Estimates
As to the force reductions in the Army components, Defense analysts
had proposed an arbitrary strength cut of 48,000 structure spaces in
the Army National Guard and Army Reserve with no clear conception
of what units or types of units were to be eliminated. This action was
taken concurrently with the Defense Secretary's direction of a study
to determine the proper distribution of active force, Guard and Reserve
structure within the Total Force. The committee supports neither the
arbitrary aspects of this procedure nor the strategy of withholding the
details of the decision during the hearings. Furthermore, the committee
is of the opinion that, since we have not yet received a statement of
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specific units to be eliminated, we cannot respond favorably to the Sec-
retary's Army Guard and Reserve proposal. To do so would rely solely
on the personal credibility of the Defense analysts?credibility which
is questionable in view of some of the proposed alternatives such as
elimination of one division and further degradation of the already
markedly limited antiaircraft capability.
As to strength projections, the Reserve Component budget strength
requests were based to a large extent on erroneous estimates of what
Reserve strengths would be at this time without improvement in -re-
cruiting effort and capability.
The Congress has repeatedly endorsed and supported the concept
of genuine application and use of the National Guard and Reserve to
product greater effectiveness and economy in the Total Force. This
committee reaffirms its belief in this concept and applauds the Secre-
tary of Defense on his statement that Total Force is no longer a con-
cept but a firm policy. However, the committee finds disturbing evi-
dence that implementation of the Total Force Policy is inconsistent
with its stated objectives and that compliance with Congressional in-
tent in the pasage of P.L. 90-168 has been less than complete.
The proposed elimination of some of the most highly qualified units
of the Selected Reserve appears to have been a judgmental and tacti-
cal error. It is difficult to reconcile retention of units in the Active
Force and the elimination of less expensive Air National Guard units
with proved ability to accomplish the same mission with a. policy
which embodies maintaining capabiliry at less cost through effective
use of Guard and Reserve sources.
This year the original request was for a Selected Reserve Force of
892,927 or a reduction of 31,927 from that which was anthorized last
year. In a second apearance before the committee, the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs said that Dol) had
underestimated the recruiting capability in the Reserve and that if he
were building the budget today he "would request a higher level of
strength, and that level would be much closer to the theoretical tar-
get." When asked for specific recommendations based on mission re-
quirements for Reserve Components, the Secretary replied as follows:
I would put in 408,000 for the Army National Guard;
217,000 for the Army Reserve; 108,000 for the Naval Re-
serve; 38,000 for the Marine Corps Reserve; 9S,000 for the Air
National Guard; and, 53,000 for the Air Force Reserves. That
totals 9'22,000." (It should be noted this figure does not take
into consideration the 11,700 request for the. Coast Guard.)
When asked for the reasoning behind this new recommendation, the
Secretary replied:
The figure that I gave you are the theoretical manning level
requirements of the force structure. In other words, in the case
of the Army National Guard, for example, the total of TOE
structure spaces is 426,000 spaces. We man the units in.,the
Army National Guard in peacetime at an average level of 96
percent of TOE. Some units are manned at 100 percent and
some at 90 percent. The manning level determination is made
by the Army in connection with readiness requirements. The
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96 percent average figure produces an authorized manning
level of about 408,000. So we are not increasing the structure
of the Reserve Components; only building up to the man-
power levels that the structure calls for, consistent with read-
iness requirements.
The committee, accepted the revised recommendations for the Re-
serve Forces except as they pertained to the Army Reserve, Naval Re-
serve and Air National Guard. However, in a third appearance before
the committee, the Secretary again revised his previously revised
strength figures for the Air Force Reserve to that originally requested.
This change was made because of the failure in accounting procedure
to show that the Air Force Reserve was nearly 5,000 below the
strength authorized for fiscal year 1974. Thus, he believed the Air
Force Reserve would be unable to recruit the necessary personnel to
attain the 53,000 average strength that he had previously requested.
The committee agreed to recommend a strength figure of 51,319 as
originally requested by the Department of Defense.
Committee Additions.. Army Reserve
Now to look at the areas where the committee recommends strength
levels higher than the revised request:
In the Army Reserve Program where the committee increased the
numbers beyond the revised request of the Secretary, Lieutenant Gen-
eral John J. Hennessy, Chief of the Army Reserve Components, testi-
fied that the structure strength for the Army Reserves has been estab-
lished for the present time at approximately 276,000. Using the 93
percent manning figures, a figure which has been used over the past
several years, this would result in a desired strength of 260,000. This
contrasts to the committee recommendation of 225,000. There are on-
going studies both in the Army and DoD regarding the Reserve pro-
gram. In DoD, the study embraces the roles and missions of the Re-
serves in the Total Force Policy. The study will be completed in
August, 1974. Currently, an Army study indicates that revised mis-
sions to be assigned to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve
will increase the structure by 25,000 spaces.
The Secretary of Defense has proposed that those in the Civil Af-
fairs Units be transferred to a Category D status, thus entitling them
to pay only for the two weeks of training when they attend summer
camps. The committee agrees with the Secretary that a, structure of
7,000 in 53 Civil Affairs Units is excessive but disagrees that all such
members be transferred to a Category D status. We believe a more
logical solution to the problem to be retention of approximately one
half of these individuals in a Category A status and retention of ap-
proximately one half of the units. At the present time, many persons
believe that if we have another war, it will be a short one and there
won't be time to assemble and train personnel to accomplish the Civil
Affairs' functions.
Thus, we recommend 225,000 as the minimum number required for
the Army Reserves in fiscal year 1975. This contrasts to the figure of
232,951 authorized for fiscal year 1974 and to the current on-board
strength of 226,623.
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Naval Reserve
Insofar as the Naval Reserve is concerned, the committee is recom-
mending an average strength of 117,000. This is in contrast to the
119,231 authorized for fiscal year 191'4. The strength requested was
108,000. This request, as testified to by Admiral Cooper, Chief of
Naval Reserve, is insufficient to meet mission requirements. The Chief
of Naval Personnel told the subcommittee the Navy reduced the Naval
Reserve by". . . about 4,200 people . . . in order to make more funds
available to purchase . . . equipment for the readiness centers." The
additional 5,000 reduction was imposed by the Department of Defense.
Admiral Bagley Stated that the size of the Naval Reserves has now
been structured iii terms of augmentation for a Korea- or Vietnam-size
contingency rather than on requirements for World War 1I-type mo-
bilization which had been the case in the past. When questioned on re-
quirements as to whether it was a safe assumption to build our Reserve
Forces only to cope with 'a Korea or Vietnam conflict, rat-her than on a
larger conflict in which we might possibly be involved, Admiral
Cooper responded:
I think that there has to be a compromise between the two,
because We haven't got and we could not get the assets into
the Naval Reserve as we currently exist to satisfy the require-
ments of either of the two.
Then he stated that he, as Chief of the Naval Reserve, was unable to
tell the committee what the basis was for the 108,000 request but that
he would like to see a strength figure ". . . somewhere in the vicinity
of 117,000." The members of the committee were convinced that :the
108,000 requested was too low to meet mission requirements and was
based primarily on budgetary considerations. Therefore, the commit-
tee recommends a strength for the Naval Reserve in the numbers of
117,000?the approximate number now in the Naval Reserve.
Air National...Guard
The Air National Guard program is much more difficult. The orig-
inal request was based on a Secretary of Defense decision to phase out
14 flying units in fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1976 of the Air :Na-
tional Guard which had as its principal mission the Air Defense Mis-
sion in the United States.
The Secretary of Defense made this determination based on his be-
lief that the United States cannot afford to maintain significant Air
Defense Forces to defend against strategic bombers when the threat
is dominated by large numbers of strategic missiles.
The committee did not concur in this judgment.
During hearings it became obvious the Air Force did not concur.
Air Force witnesses testified that in their opinion the Air Force
does not believe there has been any substantial reduction in the Soviet
long-range bomber capability. The witness stated:
The Secretary of Defense now believes that we should
postulate a scenario which would involve only intercept and
control and warning of U.S. air space. That is to deny to any
unwarranted intruder the possibility that he could fly over
air space unimpeded. He does not postulate a scenario in
which he could expect a bomber only attack.
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But when asked whether, if. Congress phased out the interceptor units
as suggested by the Secretary, the U.S. would have the ability to insure
that no foreign bomber could fly over air space unimpeded, the Air
Force witness replied:
No, sir, we do not.
A member of the committee asked:
Then there is an inconsistency, isn't there, between what
you are required to do and what you are able to do?
The Air Force witness replied:
Yes sir. What we would look for is the retention of at least
the F-101s as an interim measure.
Recognizing the threat is a continuing one, one of the members of
the committee summarized the view of a)l when he stated:
There has been no basic change in the threat, it's just a
change in the decision.
The Under Secretary of the Air Force stated:
We are concerned over the loss of the affected Air Guard
Units. We are concerned over the abrupt loss of 11,726
highly-skilled, well-trained Guardsmen which will affect the
morale in other units and have a severe impact on recruiting
potential. . . .
A significant delay in Reserve Force modernization has
been created by a slowdown in F-15 and A-10 procurement
for the active force. This slowdown causes the retention of
F-4 and A-7 aircraft in the active force longer than previ-
ously programmed, thereby- slowing down the transfer of
these assets to the Reserve Forces causing retention of F-100
aircraft. Requirements to provide C-130 and A-37 aircraft to
the Republic of South Vietnam have also contributed to the
slowdown of reequipping Reserve Force units.
The Air Force has substantial Shortage of tactical units
including Reserve units to satisfy requirements established
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet wartime requirements, for
example, fighter attack and airlift. In finalizing the FY 75
Program and Budget we were unable to find the necessary
funds to meet all of the foregoing as well. as other priority
force requirements.
The Air Force can retain the 14 Air National Guard units
and provide interim equipment for them largely by redistri-
bution of aircraft from other Air National 'Oruard units not
deactivating. In other words, spread what we have a little
thinner. We have, not budgeted the military personnel, opera-
tions and maintenance and other funds required for the re-
tention of these units.
The best solution to the equipable needs of these units can
be found in a combination of additional A-7 and C-130 pro-
curement and an acceleration in the procurement of the F-15
and A-10 so that F-4 and A-7 aircraft can be released earlier
from the active force.
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The committee reacted to this testimony by putting a floor on the
number of flying units in the Air National Guard of the United States
at 91. Presently, there are 92 such flying units and two units which are
colocated at Van Nuys, 'California arebehig combined during the re-
mainder of this fiscal year. This, of course, precludes the Secretary of
Defense from deactivating the 5 units during fiscal year 1975 and an
additional 9 units in fiscal year 1976. The committee takes the position
that the threat has not diminished?but equally important, we cannot
afford to lose the trained and capable manpower resources which would
be caused by the phase-out of these flying units. It is beyondquestion
that we need more tactical and airlift units in the Air Force inventory.
To phase-out capable flying units because their planes are becoming
obsolete is, in our opinion', a very shortsighted viewpoint. If we retain
a neellorflying capability within the Reserve Forces, then ways must
be found to provide and preserve such a capability.
If on the other hand the Members of the House of Representatives
believe the Secretarial decision is sound, then it is our view that new
mission requirements should be assigned?and there is an on-going
study within the Air Force concerning missions which could safely be
assigned to the Air National Guard:
In mandating the retention of 91 flying units in the Air National_
Guard, the committee believes this action is consistent with the
Department of Defense's objective of increasing dependents on the
Reserve Components in implementing the All-Volunteer Force. The
committee recognizes that action will require an additional 800 to 900
civilian technicians which were not included in the original budget
request and this fact should be borne in mind when the Secretary. of
Defense allocates the 15,000 reduction in civilian end-strengths. We
further recommend that the Appropriations Committee increase the
Air Force's original budget request by approximately $15.3 million for
Operation and Maintenance and Military Personnel of the Air Na-
tional Guard and $1,097,000 for Active cost adjustments to support
these units.
Equipment for the Reserve
The committee is becoming increasingly concerned over the obso-
lescence of equipment for the Reserve Forces, particularly in aircraft
and tanks. In the aircraft area, as noted earlier in the report the Com-
mittee added to the request submitted by the Department of Defense
24A-7D aircraft for direct entry into the Air National Guard of the
United States. We will expect that next year and in years to come that
the Department of Defense, in implementing the Total Force concept
will budget for modernization of equipment in the Reserve Forces.
The committee views' with great concern, the large deficit in the
Army Guard and Army Reserve Force tank inventory. Equally alarm-
ing is the considerable time that will elapse before the shortages are
eliminated, based upon current and future production of M-60 tanks
and planning for the XM. It is the committee's understanding that
therets a significant potential gain in early operational readiness possi-
ble through modification of existing stocks of older, combat capable
M48A1 and M48A3 tanks to a M48A5 configuration. A similar conver-
sion was used by the Israeli forces wAh great success against the
Russian T-62 tank.
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The conversion provides diesel engine power, fire power upgraded
from a 90 to a 105MM gun, improved sighting equipment, modern
interoperable communications and rework, and overhaul of the other
tank components as necessary to place the whole unit in a first-class
combat serviceable condition.
The committee believes that the Department of Defense should give
careful consideration to the possibility of reprograming funds in the
fiscal year 1975 budget to modernizing existing existing tank inven-
tories in the Reserve Forces or, in the alternative, include a request in
the fiscal year 1976 budget for the substantial procurement of new
M-60 tanks for exclusive delivery to the Guard and Reserve Forces.
There are other areas of deficiency in equipment for the Reserve
Forces which the committee calls to the attention of the Secretary of
Defense?the KC-130 aircraft refuelers for the Fourth Marine Air
Wing and replacement of the 30 C-118 propeller-driven transport air-
craft by twelve more capable fan jet aircraft in the Naval Reserve.
Changes in Reserve Structure
The advent of completely volunteer input into the Reserve Com-
ponents has made it difficult to attain the basic Selected Reserve
strength manning levels authorized each year since enactment of P.L.
90-168. Reorganization and structure adjustments have become con-
fused with recruiting and strength capability for a fiscal year, giving
rise to the definite possibility that the Congress may inadvertently,
unintentionally, or unknowingly authorize a single Selected Reserve
strength number for each Component which in fact permits elimina-
tion of significant Reserve Component forces.
The comprehensive hearings and resultant enactment of P.L. 90-
168 clearly established that rignificant changes in Reserve Component
strength structure level will not be made without prior and specific
approval of the Congress. Accordingly, beginning with FY 1976, the
strength authorizations for each Reserve Component should include
the three major elements oi! (1) full TOE, (2) manning level au-
thorization, and (3) strengei estimate for the year for apropriation
purposes.
Each year the OSD request for si rength authorization should specify
all three of the pertinent numbers, and specifically address any sig-
nificant structure or unit chonges proposed for the fiscal year within
the TOE level. It is the intent of the Committee that units proposed
for inactivation be replaced with units needed but either not active or
not manned to the maximum feasible extent. Where a net reduction in
TOE strength level is proposed, there should also be provided the
identification of all units required but not manned and the specific
reasons why they are not proposed for substitution.
The provisions herein are intended to insure that the Congressional
control gains by P.L. 90-168 are not unintentionally lost.
Action Required to Meet Congressional Intent
Several actions by the Department of Defense are indicated in
order to attain compliance with the intent of Congress.
?The Secretary of each Service should assure that his Assist-
ant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs monitors and
supervises all aspects of Reserve force management including
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but not limited to manpower requirements and force structure;
personnel management and strength; plans, programs and
budgets; equipment and logistics support; facilities and construc-
tion; training, readiness and mobilization; and. management and
administration. The Assistant Secretaries would participate
actively in the policy-making role when Reserve forces matters
are under consideration, including full participation in the Re-
serve Forces Policy Board and comparable. Service committees.
It is strongly urged that each Service Assistant Secretary have a
civilian deputy assistant secretary charged exclusively with re-
sponsibility for Reserve forces matters, and it is noted that the
Secretary of Defense has previously suggested such action.
?The Chiefs of Reserve Components should be so designated
and should have in fact the authority to carry out all the respon-
sibilities now authorized by law and by current Department of
Defense Directives.
?The committee has noted on past occasions and in the testi-
mony of several Defense witnesses who are directly involved in
decisions affecting the Reserve forces a lack of attention to and
interest in the Guard and Reserve. A change in this situation is
of increasing importance as the Secretary of Defense stresses in-
Creased dependence on Guard and Reserve forces. More interest
and more concentrated high level attention is particularly im-
portant at the DoD level to insure that the Secretary of Defense
policy of reliance on Reserves leads to adequate equipping, man-
ning and training.
?There should be a return to having representatives of each of
the Guard and Reserve Components in the Reserve Affairs office
at OSD level. This is strongly urged as a means of insuring ade-
quate understanding of the variations among components as
policy matters are ? considered within OSD. The Congress has
provided in 10 U.S.C. 265, the means of accomnlishing such rep-
resentation and has further provided in this same section of law
that such representatives shall be considered as additional mem-
bers of the staff with which they ate serving, thereby precluding
any adverse impact on efforts to reduce headquarters manpower.
Response to this recommendation and others made in this sec-
tion of the report. will be evaluated by the committee as indicators
of the intent of the Secretary of Defense to implement the policy
of developing reliable Guard and Reserve forces.
The committee further directs that all of the Active Services under-
take an immediate evaluation of all mission areas for the purpose of
identifying, to this committee, mission, :Force and equipment tradeoffs
between the Active and Reserve which will offset (L) ever increasing
manpower, procurement and production costs; and (2) accelerate the
modernization of the Guard and Reserve forces by concurrent assign-
ment of new weapons and new production to the Active, Guard and
Reserve forces.
Witnesses appearing before this committee have, indicated serious
concern about the impact on operational readiness of so-called "energy
crisis" standdowns and reduced fuel allocations to the Reserve Compo-
nent forces.
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The committee is deeply concerned with the energy crisis as well
as the readiness of all of our forces. We believe, however, that the
Reserve Components may have been disproportionately penalized by
actions arbitrarily imposed by those who do not understand and did
not seek out all of the facts on reduced activity rates, flying safety and
operational readiness of these forces.
The committee recommends that the Department of Defense under-
take an immediate reevaluation of fuel requirements for the Reserve
Components which will insure adequate fuel for flying safety and
operational readiness of these forces. The committee further recom-
mends that this amount of fuel be not less than 90 percent of the
amounts programmed in the ,fiscal year 1974 budget, submitted to the
Congress in January 1973, as readjusted for force changes which have
occurred since that time. The Services are requested to identify the
amounts required to meet this recommendation and notify the
committee.
TITLE V?CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
This year, for the first time, the Committee on Armed Services
is recommending authorization of civilian personnel for the Depart-
ment of Defense. This is required by Public Law 93-155.
After extensive hearings, held jointly with the Manpower Sub-
committee of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the
Manpower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, a reduc-
tion of 15,000 is recommended in the total civilian personnel requested
by the Department of Defense, the allocation to be made by the Secre-
tary of Defense. The reduction was agreed to by both Manpower Sub-
committees and was concurred in by the Armed Services Committee.
Before presenting the recommended civilian end-strength levels, it
should be pointed out that the end-strength figures represent only
direct-hire employees, both permanent and temporary, including full-
time, part-time and intermittent employees paid from appropriated
funds, who are employed to perform military functions administered
by the Department of Defense. The following categories of civilian
employees are excluded from the strengths recommended.
(1) Employees performing civilian functions administered by
the Department of Defense, the largest of which is the Corps of
Engineers Civil Works activities. For fiscal year 1975, the esti-
mated end strength is approximately 29,000.
(2) Indirect-hire employees who are hired by the. host nation
in support of U.S. Forces stationed abroad. The estimated to be
approximately 103,000. Foreign nationals who are employed di-
rectly by the U.S. Government are classified as direct-hire and
included in our recommended end strength for civilians. Slightly
over 43,000 foreign nationals are included in this category.
(3) Employees in special employment programs for students
and disadvantaged youths, such as the Stay-in-School Campaign
and the Temporary Summer Aid Program. The approximate
strength in this program at the end of fiscal year 1973 was 22,000
but during the summer, the number of these temporary student
hi rings usually rises to a peak of about 40,000 employees.
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(4) Employees of the National Security Agency who are
ex-
cluded because employment statisties are classified information.
It should be noted also that the approximately 8,000 schoolteach-
ers in the Department of Defense Overseas School System are not in-
cluded because they serve on a nine-month basis and are not on the
Department of Defense payroll on June ;30th, the teaching period hav-
ing ended before that time.
Thus, the strength figures which are presented do not include more
than 180,000 civilian personnel who are on the Department of Defense
payroll.
The Department of Defense presented_ its request for 1,027,000 per-
sonnel on the basis that it was a reduction from 1,029,000 budgeted
for in fiscal year 1974. While this is correct, it does not tell the entire
story. In the fiscal year 1974 supplemental 19,000 additional civilian
employees were requested but this was not granted by the Congress. So,
in essence, what the DoD was requestitig was an increase of 17,000
civilian personnel rather than a decrease of 2,000. The on-board end
strength of civilians, excluding the categories mentioned above, was
slightly over 988,000 at the end of fiscal year 1973. The committee
reduced the numbers requested by 15,000?thus permitting the con-
tinuation of the civilianization program and improvements for the
readiness of the forces. The committee action takes into consideration
the reductions of civilians in the reductions of the various headquarters
both in the Department of Defense and the various Services. _
Authorizations recommended
The figures recommended for authorization of civilian end strength
are as follows: -
(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Carps,
323,529;
(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;
_ (4) The , Activities and Agencies of the Department of De-
fense (other than military departments, 75,372.
These numbers are reduced by 15,000 with the allocations to be made
by the Secretary of Defense.
Several changes were made in the larsguage in this Title from that
originally requested by the Department; of Defense. First, the pro-
vision which permits the Secretary of Defense. or the Secretary of the
military department concerned to determine "that direct substitution
of civilian personnel for military personnel s(whiehl will result 111
economy without adverse effect upon national defense. such substitu-
tion may be accomplished without regard to the numbers of civilian
personnel authorized by this subsection :" was determined by the
Armed Services Committee to be so broad as to negate the effect of
the ceilings imposed by subsection (a) of the 'I'itle. Therefore, the
language was deleted.
A language change suggested by thc Manpower Subcommittee of
the Post Office and Civil Service Committee which would permit a
civilian end strength upward or downward whenever work which has
been done by direct-hire personnel is shifted to an outside contractor
or vice versa, was included by the Armed Services Committee.
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The committee is not convinced that the establishment of civilian
end strength is necessarily the best way to control civilian employment
in the Department of Defense. In fact, we believe it can be better con-
trolled through man-year budgeted figures. But it does provide to the
Armed Services Committee a more complete picture of total manpower
requirements for the Department of Defense, thus enabling the com-
mittee to do a better job in establishing strengths for the military
services and the Department of Defense.
VIEWS OF MANPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE, POST OFFICE
AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE
The Manpower Subcommittee of the Post Office and Civil Services
Committee has asked for the opportunity to present its views on Title
V, Civilian Personnel, of this bill. The Subcommittee report follows:
The Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service of the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service had the unique
experience this year of joining with the Armed Services
Manpower Subcommittee to consider the Department of De-
fense request for Fiscal Year 1975 civilian manpower author-
izations contained in Title V, H.R. 12564. It was unique
not only from the standpoint of conducting joint hearings
with the Armed Services Subcommittee but also from the
anomalous position that the Manpower and Civil Service
Subcommittee opposes the imposition of numerical limita-
tions on civilian employment as a means of controlling costs
within the Department of Defense. The Subcommittee
strongly believes that numerical ceilings lead to false econ-
omies in the Defense budget, poor management of the civilian
workforce and encourages the proliferation of contracting
out for support services. .
The Subcommittee is very concerned with the burgeoning
costs of manpower in the Department of Defense. Through
the groundwork laid in the hearings this year, our continuing
oversight and review of manpower management and trends
in the Department of Defense and review of subsequent De-
fense manpower authorization requests, we believe that such
costs can be effectively controlled. One of our purposes this
year was to try to identify the costs of civilian manpower in
the proposed fiscal year 1975 budget and to compare those
costs to total military personnel costs and to the significant
third element of Defense manpower resources, "contracting
out" for support services. Civilian manpower costs are not
easily identified in the existing Defense budget.. We have
identified as many as twelve different "accounts" in the budget
that contain civilian manpower costs, making any kind of
comparison to military manpower costs difficult at best. We
estimate, however, that of the $85.8 billion Defense budget
outlays projected for fiscal year 1975, 17.4 percent or $14.9
billion represents civilian personnel costs and 38 percent or
$32.6 billion are for related military personnel costs. We be-
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lieve that the comparisons of the "average cost" of a soldier
to the "average cost" of a civilian presented this year do not
accurately reflect the actual costs of these categories of
personnel and are not meaningful at this point in consider-
ing authorizations requested for r.umbers of military and
civilian manpower. We intend through the coming year to
refine these cost comparison figures so that a more meaningful
relationship can be established.
A significant element in the Defense budget is the cost of
contracting for support services. The Department. of Defense
has very little accurate information on the manpower costs
of "contracting out." The best information available from the
Department is the Annual Inventory of Commercial or In-
dustrial Activities and Contract Support Services (DOD
Instruction 4100.33 of July 16, 1971'1. The Inventory for fiscal
year 1973 shows that an estimated 97,062 man-years of effort
were by contract at a cost of approximately $1.8 billion.
However, the Inventory includes only those contracts that
exceed $50,000 and does not cover all of the functions that
are performed by support service type contracts. It is the
intent of our Subcommittee to require that the Department
of Defense, develop more accurate and complete equivalent
man-year costs of contracting for support services in the com-
ing year. We believe that the Department of Defense should
establish, for both budgetary and expenditure control pur-
poses, the average cost for contractor employee; for the vari-
ous categories of civilian in-house employee, white collar,
blue collar and indirect hire; and for military personnel.
With the control and reporting nquirements contained in
this year's authorization bill, future authorizations can be
considered in relation to accurate and complete cost compari-
sons between the three major categories of manpower re-
sources, i.e., military, civilian and contractor, and that future
controls on the Defense manpower budget will be in terms
of dollars spent for each category and not rely on arbitrary
unmanageable numerical ceilings. These kinds of controls
could be easily translated to budget authority and directly
tied to the appropriations process thereby controlling the
dollars in lieu of using unreliable "average" figures for
manpower costs.
It is important to note that the ratio of civilian manpower
to the military forces has remained relatively constant over the
last ten year period. In December 1973 direct-hire civilians
comprised 31.8 percent of Defense military manpower. Based
on the requested fiscal year 1975 authorization this ratio
would increase slightly to 32.9 percent. It is also important to
note that in considering the ratio of civilian to military, the
current civilian figures include 10,000 contract technician
positions that were converted to direct-hire status, 39,000
National Guard technicians who were given Federal employee
status in fiscal year 1969 and the substitution of 92,000 civil-
ians for 114.000 military that was completed in fiscal year
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1968. The Department of Defense is currently completing a
second "civilianization" program that will substitute 39,000
civilians for 48,000 military by the end of fiscal year 1975.
We share with the Armed Services Committee the concern
over the 185,000 employees that are excluded from the re-
quested authorization, particularly the large number of indi-
rect hire employees whose functions within the Department
are substantially similar to those of direct-hire employees.
We strongly believe that the reduction of 15,000 from the re-
quested authorization should be .alaorbed within the Depart-
ment by contemplated reductions in headquarters staffs,
through normal attrition and the current vacancies that exist
in the Department. It is the intent of both of our committees
that the Department of Defense or the military departments
will not contract out for support service activities or func-
tions solely because of reduced manpower authorizations for
fiscal year 1975.
The Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service was im-
pressed with the thoroughness and comprehensive treatment
given by the service representatives in their testimony for the
joint hearings. The singular weakness in the testimony, how-
ever, related to the lack of data on manpower requirements
and cost comparisons of performing support services through
the use of military, in-house civilians and contractor person-
nel. There are some specific areas of civilian manpower man-
agement that will require further oversight activities and in-
quiries by our Subcommittee throughout the coming fiscal
year.
TITLE VI?MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS
Title VI of this bill authorizes the military training student loads
for fiscal year 1975. The term "training loads" can be defined as man-
years in a training status and should not be confused with the num-
bers of military personnel who will actually undergo formal training
during the course of the fiscal year, as most of the training programs
are for periods of considerably less than a full year. Not included
in this authorization is training performed in the field and in the fleet
in order to attain and maintain technical and combat proficiency.
The authorized military training student loads for fiscal year 1975
are:
(1) The Army, 97,638.
(2) The Navy, 71, 279.
(3) The Marine Corps, 26,262.
(4) The Air Force, 52,900.
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111.
(6) The Army Reserve, 9,673.
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536.
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,903.
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359.
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.
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The above authorized training load is 3,400 man-years above that.
requested by the Department of Defense. This increase, is in Army
Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve, and results from the increases in
Reserve strength authorized by the Committee. This increase is. pri-
marily to compensate for the anticipated influx of untrained DOTI-
prioi service personnel. However, the above authorization request,
even with appropriate adjustments due to the deletion of. ROTC and
the Health Scholarship Program, repr,-?sents an overall reduction of
approximately 20,000 man-years from last year's althorized training
load.
Justification for the President's budget. request was submitted in
the Military Manpower Training Report for .fiscal year 1975 in accord-
ancewith the requirements set forth in Public Law 9'2-436 which states,
in pertinent part:
Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Congress a written
report not later than March 1 of ea:.,h fiscal year recommend-
ing the average student load for each category of training for
each component of the Armed Forces for the next three fiscal
years and shall include in such report justification for and
explanation of the average student loads recommended.
Military training is categorized in the following manner:
(1) Recruit training includes all basic initial enlisted training for
all Services for both active and reserve components. In all services,
it represents an introduction of the new enlisted man or woman into
military life. In addition, in the Army and Marine Corps, recruits
are tnught common military skills, such as the. fundamentals of indi-
vidnal weapons and combat skills.
(2) Specialized training provides both officer and enlisted personnel
with the skills and knowledge necessary to perform specific jobs or to
operate or maintain specific pieces of equipment.
(3) Officer Acquisition training includes training programs through
which officers are procured, such as the Service Military Academies,
Officer Candidate Schools and enlisted Commissioning programs. Al-
though included in this category in last year's report, the Reserve
Officers Training Corps and Health Professions Scholarship Program
are not included inthe training load data this year as the participants
are not in active military status.
(4) Flight training provides the basic undergraduate flying skills
for pilots, navigators, and Naval Flig'nt Officer. This category does
not include the major formal advanced combat training programs
which are beyond the scope of this authorization since they are con-
ducted by and for operational combat units. However. some, flight-
related skills, such as the Air Force navigator/bombardier, electronic
warfare and survival course, are included.
(5) Professional training includes military education, graduate
education, degree completion education and professional development
courses not leading to a degree. This training is accomplished at both
and civilian ' institutions and includes : Senior Service
Schools, Staff Colleges, advanced degree programs. Department of De-
fense schools such as the Defense Systems Management School and.
professional medical training.
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The following table shows the authorized training loads for fiscal
year 1975 for each Service component for each type of training:
AVERAGE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, FISCAL YEAR 1975 BY
COMPONENT AND MAJOR TRAINING CATEGORY
Recruit
training
Officer
acquisition
training
Specialized
skill
training
Flight
training
Professional
develop-
ment
education
Total
Active forces:
Army
30, 800
5,117
54, 575
863
6,283
97, 638
Navy
16, 287
6, 828
40, 674
1, 761
5, 729
71, 279
Marine Corps
13, 339
503
9, 347
1, 036
. 2, 037
26, 262
Air Force
. 9, 706
5, 915
27, 515
3, 459
6, 305
52, 900
Subtotal, loads
70, 132
18, 363
132, 111
7,119
20, 354
248, 079
Reserve components:
Army National Guard
4,875
7,025
101
110
12,111
Army Reserve
4, 025
132
5, 123
60
233
9, 673
Naval Reserve
678
150
1,702
6
2,536
Marine Corps Reserve
2, 124
288
1, 439
52
3, 903
Air National Guard
685
3
1, 264
245
162
2, 359
Air Force Reserve
402
33
473
156
62
1, 126
Subtotal, loads
12, 789
606
17, 026
562
625
31, 708
DOD, total loads
82, 921
18, 969
149, 137
7,681
20, 979
279, 787
OFFICER ACQUISITION ENROLLEES NOT IN ACTIVE MILITARY STATUS FISCAL YEAR 1975 1
Armed Forces
professions
College ROTC scholarships
programs authorized 2
Army
33, 564
1,850
Navy
8,100
1,575
Air Force
19,260
1,575
DOD, total enrollees
60, 924
5,000
Excluded from loads shown in the table above.
2 The number of scholarships authorized is consistent with average annual enrollments shown in budget documents.
The Committee recognized, in reviewing the training area, the im-
portance of education as an inducement to young men to enter or make
a career .of military service. The importance of this incentive must not
be overlooked, even though presently the trend of incentives seems to
be almost entirely monetary. Its significance is further illustrated by
the fact that experience indicates that the use of educational incentives
attracts young people of higher average intelligence, skills, and self-
esteem than those attracted by higher pay.
USAF" ?
Last year's Congressionally-directed dismantling of the USAFI pro-
gram for budgetary reasons is viewed by the Committee as a potentially
unwise action for the above reasons. The effect of this action is exacer-
bated by information adduced in this year's hearings which indicates
that the substitute programs necessary to provide these educational
opportunities may prove more expensive than the USAFI program as
it was functioning. The fact that DoD eventually concurred in this
action leads to the conclusion that further cost effectiveness study is
warranted by the Defense Department in this area.
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Trainee Discharge Program
As it relates to the training establishment and the. investment therein,
the Committee was impressed by the implementation of the Army's
Trainee Discharge program. It represents the effective utilization of a
management tool to maximize scarce resources, yet in a manner not
detrimental to individual volunteers not fully suited for military
service. Aggressive implementation of this program in the other serv-
ices is in order.
Professional Development Education
In the area of Professional Development Education, the authoriza-
tion request, which was approved, was for an average military training
student load of approximately 20,979 manyears. Last year, a 10% re-
duction in the requested program was recommended by the Committee
and has been implemented. A further reduction of 20% occurred in
the appropriation process. While no further reductions are considered
to be warranted this year, the Committee would urge the Defense De-
partment to adjust its criteria for selection into the, fully funded.
graduate education program in order t,o give additional emphasis to
the element of the individual selectee having partially completed the
educational credits on his own prior to selection into the program. The
Committee believes that such action will result in certain economies in
allotted funds as well as insure the selection of properly motivated
personnel.
Centralioed illavagement Control
In its report on the fiscal year 1974 Authorization Bill (House Re-
port 93 4183) , the Committee expressed concern with an apparent lack
of management of Service training programs which seemed to result
from insufficient. management personnel in the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Education). At that time, the then
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
indicated that "better monitorship of training" from the Education
office was necessary in ". . . such areas as reducing -duplication of
training resources between services and eliminating training in skills
that are not being employed."
The Committee received assurances that upon completion of a study
to define specific requirements, the Offic..e of the, Deputy Secretary of
Defense (Education) would be expanded to allow for an increase in its
oversight capabilities.
The Committee is not impressed that a substantive upgrading of
this office has occurred, but rather that the capability for centralized
management control of the Services' training programs is still a prob-
lem. Dnring the hearings, it was elicited that in fact the staffing of this
office has decreased in the last year.
Further. the required Military Manpower Training Report is now
prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power and Reserve Affairs, in contrast to last year when it, was pre-
pared by those in the Education office who deal with the subject on a
full-time basis.
While hesitant to sanction further superstructure positions in the
Department of Defense, the Committee is concerned by the apparent
lack of authority, centralized direction and coordination which exists
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over the Services' disparate portions of this $6.5 billion training ex-
penditure. This is an area which may benefit from the application of
tight management techniques. The problem is apparently due to in-
adequate numbers in staffing of this office, and the significance of this
deficiency is exacerbated in the Committee's view by the budgetary
investment over which this office is tasked with exercising responsible
direction.
TITLE VII?GENERAL PROVISIONS
MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDED (MASF)
Section 701 of H.R. 14592 will provide authority for continuation
? of the Military Assistance Funded Program (MASF). This program
will provide military assistance to South Vietnam for fiscal year 1975.
The language of this section also establishes the obligational limita-
tion on the amount of such military assistance which can be provided
during fiscal year 1975.
The Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1975 proposes an
obligational limitation of $1.6 billion. However, the Committee on
Armed Services, after careful consideration of the Department's re-
quest, decided to approve a new obligational limitation of $1.4 billion
for fiscal year 1976, a reduction of $200 million, in the Department's
request.
Committee changes
The Committee on Armed Services, in addition to reducing the De-
partment's request by $200 million, also wrote new language in the
bill which changes the manner in which MASF assistance will be ad-
ministered. The new language incorporated in Section 701 requires the
establishment of a single fund for this purpose to be administered by
the Secretary of Defense, and further requires quarterly reports to the
Congress on the obligations incurred from appropriations authorized
for this program.
Finally, in establishing this single fund concept for the MASF pro-
gram, the Committee language provides "that as of June 30, 1974, un-
obligated balances previously authorized for the above purpose are
hereby repealed." Thus, the controversy which has developed over the
question of remaining unobligated balances from prior fiscal years for
the MASF program would be moot.
Program Justification
The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are lim-
ited but absolutely essential. The Government of the United States
wishes to help the Government of South Vietnam to maintain an ef-
fective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed
by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. At-
tainment of this limited objective is the key to the maintenance of sta-
ble, balanced conditions necessary to ensure peace in Indochina and
Southeast Asia. However' attainment of this objective has a vital and
strategic importance far beyond Indochina. Involved are the funda-
mental goals of our nation's foreign policy.
Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting
i
peace is possible only if there s a stable balance of power between the
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opposing sides. It is the view of the Committee on Armed Services
that a military equilibrium in that area of the world will deter new
offensives and gradually induce a general shift in priorities by the
contending forces away from war.
The post agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial
progress towards this goal. Although some fighting has continued, oil
the basis of testimony received by the Committee, it is the conviction of
the Committee that the cease fire has indeed served to significantly
dampen combat activity. Thus, the hopes of the Executive Branch,
which are shared by the members of the Committee on Armed Services,
for a stable peace in South Vietnam, are largely dependent upon the
continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.
The cease fire already has witnessed the following:
A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in
Vietnam;
Territorial and population control have changed little over the
past year (what change has been :made has been in favor of the
Government forces) ?
In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land '-'?Tab offensive
on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks
and Government reactions which still characterizes the cease-fire.
Major Communist initiatives in the past year have included:
Another land ''?Tab attack prior to the, June communique ?
The capture of strategic posts (e.g., Le, Minh border Camp
in the western highlands last fall;
An offensive in Quang Du( province which seized a dis-
trict capital;
The shelling of Bien boa air aase ;
The destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon;
Continuing attacks against all forms of transportation
and;
Terrorism against civilians.
A new North Vietnamese full-scale offensive, however, is not in-
evitable. Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious
problems both at home and in the south. These problems, together with
a strong GVN deterrent and the intern ation.al context of detente give
us hope that an offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's priorities
would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit
of the Vietnam agreement.
While the North Vietnamese have increased the conventional capa-
bility of the main forces, the cost has been great, and the Government
of Vietnam has thus far managed to turn back all their challenges in
the past year.
Combat deaths, while substantial on both sides, have declined to
the lowest level since 1965 and are dow:a 75% compared with the rate
in 1972. Some 500,000 refugees have been resettled. Virtually all pre-
cease-fire civilian detainees and POW's?at least on the GVN side?
have been released.
The balance of power which underlies the chances for peace is under
heavy pressure from North Vietnam. Hanoi is conducting a massive
military buildup in the south and repeatedly violates the cease-fire.
These activities threaten the equilibrium and consequently the whole
framework of the peace we so laboriously negotiated in Paris, for ex-
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ample: In total violation of the Paris agreement, since the cease-fire,
Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400 tanks,
150 long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000-
200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North
Vietnamese capabilities have increased 20% in combat manpower,
200% in tanks, 75% in heavy artillery and 75% in AAA. Some of this
additional equipment includes new items such as SAM-2 missiles
with 16 to 20 launchers of which most, if not all, were introduced into
the south after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on
12 airfields in the south and are completing a massive new logistics
system of all-weather three lane roads and pol pipelines.
The record of GVN's and North Vietnam's cease-fire implementation
simply does not support the argument that our assistance will only
? facilitate new "violations" by the GVN and thus undermine the cease-
fire. Throughout the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised restraint
compared with the Communists' excesses. It has observed the agree-
ment to the extent of any prudent state faced with North Vietnam's
current policy and activities in the South. Despite Hanoi's record of
violations, the GVN has limited itself to justifiable acts of self-defense.
With few exceptions, Saigon has limited its military operations to
responding to communist land grab activities and to consolidating
where its forces were present at the time of the cease-fire.
The foregoing suggests that far from exciting GVN violation of the
cease-fire, our military assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend
itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive.
South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military
and economic, is not open-ended. The next 18-24 months is an espe-
cially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes
economically viable and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be
deterred.
Provided the requisite amount of U.S. assistance is forthcoming in
the near term. the executive branch foresees a significant economic
revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies
to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these developments will reduce
the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance.
The Departmental budget for military assistance to South Vietnam
in fiscal year 1975 contemplates a program involving $1.45 billion.
Departmental representatives have assured the Committee on Armed
Services that the proposed program in no way violates the cease fire
? agreement.
The printed Committee hearings on both the Department's fiscal
year 1974 Supplemental Request and for the Department's fiscal year
1975 Authorization Request contain extensive data on the administra-
tion of the MASF program. The Committee urges that these hearings
be read by all Members of Congress since such a reading will eliminate
much of the confusion and misinformation which often occurs during
debate on the justification for the continuation of this military assist-
ance program to South Vietnam. For example, one of the more per-
tinent questions which is continually raised concerning the military
assistance program to South Vietnam is the possible alleged conflict
with Article VII of the Cease Fire Agreement, which provides for a
one-for-one replacement of weapons of the same characteristics and
properties. The answer to this question appears on page 51 of HASC
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Document 93-40, and because of its pertinency, is set out below in its
entirety:
Que8tion. Is the International Control Commission in Viet-
nam supervising the delivery of weapons and ammunition for
either side under article 7 of the cease-fire agreement which
provides for a one-for-one replacement of weapons of the
same characteristics and properties?
Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol specifies that the
International Commission of Control and Supervision
(ICCS) and the Two Party Joint Military Commission
jointly inspect the entry into South Vietnam of replacements
of war materiel permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agree-
ment. The Viet Cong has refused to permit the TP,TMC to
carry out this function, and the ICCS has taken the position
that, inspections by: it alone would not be official. The United
States and the MTN have kept records of rep7acement ship-
ments to South Vietnam and have stated their readiness to
provide a full accounting to the ICCS and to the TPJMC
whenever those bodies begin to carry out their duties with re-
spect to inspection and replacement materials for the two
sides. Hanoi on the other hand has introduced illegally into
South Vietnam vast quantities of armaments. No offer to
allow ICCS inspection of this material has ever been made.
General Background
U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, FISCAL YEARS 1966-73
Iln millions of dollsrsl
Fiscal year
Economic
assistance I
Military
assistance 2
1966
1967_
739 8
661. 5
392. 7
1, 155. 4
1968
545,5
947.3
1969 .400.6
1, 632. 3
1970
517.7
1, 432. 3
1971_
488,1
1, 526. 9
1972
504 3
1,985.0
1973
3 542.4
2, 270. 5
U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam (foreign assistance appropriation) source: Fiscal years 1966-72, report to the
Ambassador from USAID mission director, Jan. 1,1973. Fiscal year 1973 AID/Washington.
'Source: DOD report on support furnished to the Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam.
3 Estimated.
U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, FISCAL YEARS 1974-75
[In millions of dollars]
Fiscal year
Economic Military
assistance I assistance
1974 2 550 1. 126
1975 (8) 4 1. 4
I U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam (foreign assistance appropriation) source: AID/Washington. Does not include
fiscal year 1974 supplemental request.
Estimated.
3 UlliMilable?
4 As recommended by the Armed Services Committee.
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ESTIMATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED THE MILITARY FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATIONS FOR SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD
FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FISCAL YEAR 1975-PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
[In millions of dollars[
Fiscal year 1973
Fiscal year 1974
Fiscal
year
1975-
South
Vietnam
Appropriation
South
Vietnam
Korea
Laos
Total
South
Vietnam
Laos
Total
Military personnel:
Army
60. 6
56.3
20.0
136. 9
32.8
9. 6
42.4
24. 0
Navy
.1
.1
Total
60.6
56. 4
20. 0
137.0
32. 8
9.6
42.4
24.0
Operation and maintenance:
Army
555.1
60.3
117.6
733.0
266.2
26.9
293.1
304.8
Navy
42. 3
. 4
42.7
20. 2
20. 2
19. 2
Marine Corps
.2
.2
Air Force
281. 0
. 5
59. 4
340. 9
170.3
38. 0
208. 3
250, 4
Total
878.6
61.2
177.0
1, 116. 8
456.7
64.9
521.6
574.4
Procurement:
Army:
Missile
4. 3
4. 3
.4
. 4
2. 9
Weapons and TCV___
5.9
.1
.1
6.1
3.5
.2
3.7
14.4
Ammunition
736.4
03.2
819.6
65.2
65.2
400.2
Other
26.0
.2
.2
26.4
2.6
.3
2.9
56.3
Navy:
Weapons
.1
Ships
24.9
Other
3.0
3. 0
1. 8
1. 8
11. 1
Marine Corps
.2
.2
Air Force:
Aircraft
277.2
11.2
288.4
234.2
.8
235.0
245.0
Other
125. 3
35.8
161. 1
32.3
2. 2
34. 5
96. 7
Total
1, 178. 3
. 3
130. 5
1, 309. 1
340. 0
3. 5
343. 5
851.6
Summary:
Army
1, 388.3
116. 9
221. 1
1, 726.3
370. 7
37.0
407.7
802.6
Navy
45.3
. 5
45.8
22. 0
22.0
55. 3
Marine Corps
.4
.4
Air Force
683.5
.5
106.4
790.4
436.8
41.0
477.8
592.1
Total
2, 117. 5
117.9
327. 5
2, 562.9
829. 5
78. 0
907. 5
1, 450. 0
MASF REQUEST REQUIRING SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 138 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
In accordance with established practice, the procurement of aircraft,
ships, missiles, tracked combat vehicles' and certain specific weapons
systems, require annual authorization before appropriations can be
made. Those items included in the MASF program which require this
authorization are incorporated in Title I of this bill. A brief summary
of the amounts requested for authorization contained in the Depart-
ment's budget request for fiscal year 19M are set out below:
MASE request for fiscal year 1975 amounts subject to authorizationl
Amount in
Appropriation thousands
Missile Procurement, Army
$2,
900
Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army 2
14,
460
Weapons Procurement, Navy 3
100
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
24,
900
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
245,
000
Total
287,
360
1- The $287,360 represents that portion of the total MASF request included in appropria-
tions normally subject to the authorization process. The total MASF request for FY 1975
of $1,450,000 NOA and the $1,600,000 overall ceiling includes all appropriations.
a Tracked combat vehicles (11,810) ; and weapons and other combat vehicles (2,650).
3 Weapons (100).
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Committee Recommendation on MASI?
The Committee on Armed Services strongly believes that a continua-
tion of military assistance to the Government of South Vietnam is
essential to the maintenance of the military equilibrium which now
exists in South Vietnam and that a failure to continue this program,
as recommended by the Committee, will seriously jeopardize the pos-
sibility of maintaining peace in Southeast Asia, and therefore would
be contrary to our national interests.
The Committee therefore recommends that the Congress approve a
program of military assistance for South Vietnam for fiscal year 1975
in the amount of $1.4 billion.
COMMITTEE POSITION
The Committee on Armed Services, a quorum being present, ap-
proved the bill by a vote of 36 to 3.
FISCAL DATA
Fiscal year 1975 cost
If the total amounts specifically awhorized in this bill are appro-
priated, the cost of the bill would be $22,642,963,000..
Five-year cost projection
Pursuant to section 7, rule 13, of the House of Representatives, the
committee attempted to ascertain the cost of H.R. 14592 in the present
year and the five following fiscal years.
The following letter from the Department of Defense addresses
itself to this requirement:
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, 17.0 ?May 8,1974.
Hon. F. EDWARD HiBERT,
Chairman' Committee on Armed Services,,
House of Representatives.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with Section 252(b) of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (PL 91-510), indicated below
is an estimate of how the $23,130.1 milion authorization requested in
fiscal year 1975 will be expended over the fiscal year 1975-1980 period:
Fiscal year:
In millions
1975
$7, 400. 0
1976
8,600. 0
1977
3, 800. 0
1978
1, 600.0
1979
1, 000. 0
1980
730.1
The extreme uncertainty of future year Defense programs precludes
any precise estimates, but I can also provide the general estimate that
to support the forces contained in the Annual Defense Report on the
FY 1975 Budget, authorizations for p?ocurement and RDT&E in the
range of $23?$25 billion (in FY 1975 dollars) would be required for
each of the next five years.
Sincerely,
BILL CLEMENTS, Deputy.
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The committee would point out that this is an annual authorization
act and the authorizations herein provided are subject to annual re-
view and revision by the committee and the Congress. Also, the com-
mittee would remind the House that limitations on the availability of
appropriations for the categories of authorization herein provided are
normally included in appropriation legislation.
DEPARTMENTAL DATA
The legislation was requested by the Department of Defense and
is in accordance with the program of the President as is illustrated by
the correspondence set out below:
TIIE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.0 ., February 4,1974.
Hon. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: There is forwarded herewith legislation "To au-
thorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of
aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and
other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the
? Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for
each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Re-
serve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student
loads and for other purposes." This proposal is a part of the Depart-
ment of Defense legislative program for the 93d Congress, and the
Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of the
proposal would be in accord with the program of the President. This
proposal is being sent to the President of the Senate.
This proposal would provide authorization for appropriations as
needed for procurement in each of the categories of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and for other weap-
ons for each of the military departments in an amount equal to the
new obligational authority included in the President's budget for fis-
cal year 1975. In addition, the proposal would provide fund authoriza-
tion in amounts equal to the new obligational authority included in
the President's budget for fiscal year 1975 in total for each of the re-
search, development, test and evaluation appropriations for the mil-
tary departments and the defense agencies.
Title III of the proposal prescribes the end strengths for active
duty personnel of each component of the Armed Forces as required by
section 138(e) (1) of title 10, United States Code, in the number
provided for by new obligational authority in appropriations re-
quested for these components in the President's budget for fiscal year
1975.
Title IV of the proposal provides for average strengths of the Se-
lected Reserve of each Reserve component or the Armed Forces as
required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code, in the num-
ber provided for by the new obligational authority in appropriations
requested for these components in the President's budget for fiscal
year 1975.
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Title V of the proposal is responsive in the new requirements con-
tained in section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code., which requires
that beginning with fiscal year 1975, the civilian personnel end
strengths for each component of the Department of Defense be au-
thorized. Title V provides for end strengths for civilian personnel of
the Department of Defense in the, number provided for by the new
obligational authority in appropriations requested for the Depart-
ment of Defense in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975.
Language authorizing average training student loads is contained
in Title VI as required by section 138(d) of title 10, United States
Code; however, this proposal does not include, at this time, the actual
student load figures which this Department will request for fiscal year
1975. The requirement for authorization for average training student
loads was only recently enacted and fiscal year 1974 w as the first year
in which such authorization was provided. Data is now being analyzed
and developed in order to determine the fiscal year 1975 requirements.
As soon as this data is available, but not later than March 1, 1974,
when the related report is required to be submitted to the Congress,
the necessary figures will be submitted to the Congress for inclusion
in Title VI of this proposal.
This proposal would also include for fiscal year 1975 language au-
thorizing appropriations of the Department of Defense. to be made
available for the support of Vietnamese military forces. The proposed
language is substantially identical to similar provisions in prior year's
acts in its application to support for Vietnamese forces, except that
for clarity in light of recent congressional actions regarding public
safety programs, the language has been modified to make it expressly
applicable to Vietnamese military forces rather than Vietnamese
forces. To reflect the reversion of support for Laos to the Military As-
sistance Program in fiscal year 1975, references to Laos have been
deleted as have been other obsolete references which no longer reflect
the current situation.
The reporting requirements of subsection (b) of section 401 of
Public Law 89-367, as amended, are considered permanent and would
be equally applicable to this provision.
Sincerely,
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.
Enclosure.
A BILL To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes,
and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the
Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each
active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve com-
ponent of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of
Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other
purposes."
Be it enacted by the Senate a?bd House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I?PROCUREMENT
SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during
the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United
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States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked
combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons as authorized by law, in
amounts as follows:
AIRCRAFT
For aircraft: for the Army, $339,500,000; for the Navy and the
Marine Corps, $2,960,600,000; for the Air Force, $3,496,600,000.
MISSILES
For missiles: for the Army, $459,200,000; for the Navy, $620,-
600,000; for the Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the Air Force,
$1,610,800,000.
NAVAL VESSELS
For naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,562,600,000.
TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES
For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $331,900,000; for the
Marine Corps, $80,100,000.
TORPEDOES
For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the Navy,
$187,700,000.
OTHER WEAPONS
For other weapons: for the Army, $53,400,000; for the Navy,
$25,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $500,000.
TITLE II?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND
EVALUATION
SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during
the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States for research, development, test and evaluation, as authorized by
law, in amounts as follows:
For the Army, $1,985,976,000;
For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $3,264,503,000;
For the Air Force, $3,518,860,000; and
For the Defense Agencies, $555,700,000, of which $27,000,000 is
authorized for the activities of the Director of Test and Evalu-
ation, Defense.
TITLE III?ACTIVE FORCES
SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending
June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an
end strength for active duty personnel as follows:
(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 630,345.
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TITLE IV?RESERVE FORCES
SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending
June 30, 1975, the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the
Armed Forces will be programmed to attain an average strength of
not less than the following:
(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 379,848;
(2) The Army Reserve, 215,842;
(3) The Naval Reserve, 107,526;
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 36,703;
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 89,128;
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319;
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.
SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title
for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportion-
ately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized
to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are
on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal
year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units
organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component
who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory
participation in training) without their consent at any time during the
fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are re-
leased from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength
for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve compo-
nent shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength
of such units and by the total number of such individual members.
TITLE V?CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
SEC. 501(a). For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending
June 30, 1975, the Department of Defense is authorized an end
strength for civilian personnel as follows
(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps,
323,529;
(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709
(4) Activities and agencies of the Department of Defense
(other than the military departments) ,75,372.
(b). In computing the authorized end strength for civilian person-
nel there shall be included all direct-hire civilian personnel employed
to perform military functions administered by the Department of
Defense (other than those performed by the National Security
Agency) whether in permanent or temporary positions and whether
employed on a full time, part time, or intermittent basis, but excluding
special employment categories for studieats and disadvantaged youth
such as the Stay-in-School Campaign, the Temporary Summer Aid
Program and the Federal Junior Fellowship Program and personnel
participating in the Worker-Trainee Opportunity Program: Pro-
vided, That whenever the secretary of the military department con-
cerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that the direct sub-
stitution of civilian personnel for military personnel will result in
economy without adverse effect upon national defense, such substitu-
tion may be accomplished without regard to the numbers of civilian
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personnel authorized by this section: Provided further, That when a
function, power, or duty or activity is transferred or assigned to a
department or agency of the Department of Defense from a depart-
ment or agency outside of the Department of Defense or from a de-
partment or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian
personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies
of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any
increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such
transfer or assignment.
SEC. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action
is necessary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment
of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized by section
501: Provided, That the number of additional personnel authorized
to be employed pursuant to the authority of this section shall not ex-
ceed one per centum of the total number of civilian personnel au-
thorized for the Department of Defense by section 501: Provided
further, That the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Con-
gress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength pur-
suant to this authority.
TITLE VI?MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS
SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974 and ending June
30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an aver-
age military training student load as follows:
(1) The Army,
(2) The Navy,
(3) The Marine Corps,
(4) The Air Force,
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States,
(6 The Army Reserve,
(7 The Naval Reserve,
(8 The Marine Corps Reserve,
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States,
(10) The lir Force Reserve,
TITLE VII?GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 701. Subsection (a) (1) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367,
approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
" (a ) (1) Not to exceed $1,600,000,000 of the funds authorized for ap-
propriation for the use of Armed Forces of the United States under
this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their
stated purposes to support Vietnamese military forces on such terms
and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine: Provided,
That nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese military forces
in activities designed to provide military support and assistance to
the Government of Cambodia or Laos."
This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Appropriation
Authorization Act, 1975".
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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
ashington, D.0 ., February 28,1974.
Hon. F. EDWARD HEBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to Secretary Schlesinger's
letter of February 4, 1974, which forwarded legislation "To authorize
appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat -vehicles, torpedoes, and other
weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the
Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for
each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve
component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the De-
partment of Defense, and to authorize the military training student
loans and for other purposes."
As indicated in that letter, the proposed legislation did not include
the average military training student loads in section 601 which this
Department requests for fiscal year 1975. Attached is a copy of sec-
tion 601 as introduced in H.R. 12564, 98d Congress, with the average
military training student load figures inserted.
These proposed training loads will be explained and justified in the
Military Manpower Training Report which is required to be submitted
to the Congress by section 138(d) of title 10, United States Code.
Pending transmittal of the report, we note that the proposed training
loads for fiscal year 1975 exclude enrollees in college Reserve Officer's
Training Corps and Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship
programs. These enrollees are not in active military status while under-
going training (except for brief periods of annual active duty pre-
scribed for reservist participants of the Armed Forces Health Profes-
sions Scholarship program) and therefore authorization required by
section 138(d) is not, in our opinion, applicable to such enrollees. We
call this matter to your attention since this Department's request for
authorization for fiscal year 1974, the first year such authorizations
was required, inadvertently included authorization for such enrollees
and this request was reflected in the authorization provided by the
Congress.
The number of such enrollees excluded is as follows:
Sponsoring service
Armed Forces
Health
Professions
College ROTC Scholarship
program authorized
Army 33, 564 1,850
Navy 8,100 1,575
Air Force 19260 1,515
DOD total 60, 924 5, 000
Sincerely,
Enclosure.
L. NIEDERLEHNER,
Acting General Counsel.
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TITLE VI?MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS
SEc. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending
June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an
average military training student load as follows:
(1) The Army, 97,638;
(2) The Navy, 71,279;
3) The Marine Corps, 26,262;
4) The Air Force, 52,900;
5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111;
(6) The Army Reserve, 6,673;
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,403;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359;
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. OTIS G. PIKE (D., N.Y.)
THE B-1 BOMBER-A SICK PROGRAM
While we have become conditioned to massive problems and cost
overruns on many defense contracts, the B-1 is in a class by itself.
It is very difficult for any program to slip by more than one year
during one year, but the B-1 has done it. It is very difficult for any
program to increase in cost by $3.7 billion in one year, but the B-1 has
done it. It is very difficult for the cost of one single plane the only
B-1 aircraft being authorized this year, to increase in cost by over
100 per cent in one year while decreasing in capability, but the B-1
has done it.
One year ago we were told that the production decision on the B-1
bomber would be made in July 1975, and the first squadron would be
operational in December 1979. Today we are told that July 1975 has
slipped 16 months to November 1976, and December 1979 has slipped
15 months to March 1981.
One year ago we were told that the research and development cost
for the B-1 would be $2.709 billion, the procurement costs would be
$8.567 billion, and the total program would cost $11.276 billion. Today
we are told that the research and development cost for the B-1 will be
$3.5 billion. The procurement costs will be $11.5 billion, and the total
program will cost $15 billion, an increase in one year of 83.724 billion.
One year ago we were told that aircraft No. 4, which is authorized
in this bill, would be the first production aircraft and would cost $70
million. Today we are told that aircraft No. 4 will be another research
aircraft and will cost $150 million.
While the program has been slipping and the prices have been soar-
ing, the performance has been sliding. Originally the B-1 was to be
supersonic at both high altitude and low altitude. Today it is super-
sonic only at high altitude. Because of a growth in weight from
356,000 lbs., as approved, to 395,000 lbs., as now estimated, its takeoff
distance has been increased by 1,000 feet, its range has been diminished
in both its high altitude supersonic mission and its low altitude sub-
sonic mission.
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One year ago we were told that if only we would spend $473.5 million
on the program in &seal 1974, they would only need $1.102 billion this
year and in the following years to complete the research and develop-
ment.
We did cut $25 million from the program last year, but we did spend
$448.5 million on the plane. Today the carrot on the end of the stick is
further out of range than ever before. Today they tell us that despite
the 8448.5 million we spent on this program last year, even after the
$499 million they are asking for this year they will still need $1.419
billion just to complete the research and development.
All of the figures which I have cited are the Air Force's own esti-
mates and they are optimistic to the point of fantasy. For example.
over three-fourths of the cost of the B--1 bomber will be in procure-
ment rather than in research. The Pentagon and the Air Force to this
day are estimating the rate of inflation for the procurement program
at 3.3 per cent. Any rational estimate of the inflation factor would
greatly increase the cost of the program, and it is obvious to anyone
who has followed the program that the costs are being under-estimated
just so the Congress will continue to buy it.
The money which we continue to pour into this unnecessary, ill-
managed and very sick program is contributing not one iota to our
national defense. Surely there are other deserving projects which need
an can use. the half billion dollars which is this year's bite. Until the
Congress has the courage to stop wasting money on losers, we will be
contributing to America's weakness and not to its strength.
L 2i
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SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT
L. LEGGETT (D.-CALIF.) ON THE 1975 DEFENSE PRO-
CUREMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT
Our House Armed Services Committee, working with a partially
new and augmented staff, spent a full week in marking up the final
legislative bill. To do complete justice to a twenty-three billion dollar
piece of legislation would require a month of Committee debate-un-
fortunately, nobody has the time in the forty-ring Congressional
circus.
The problem of an oversight committee is how to compete with the
verve and professionalism of the Department of Defense when they
assert a position. There is no agency of government better prepared in
its testimony and presentation than Defense agencies; but considering
the size of the Defense Budget and the fact that the $90-plus billion
requested in 1975 amounts to 44 percent of all administrative income,
there is need for restraint.
As is shown on the following chart, some committees exercise more
restraint than others.
COMPARATIVE ACTION ON FISCAL YEAR 1974 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS
Defense
request
House
A.S.
Senate
A.S.
House
appro-
priations
Senate
appro-
priations
I. Procurement:
Army ACFT
22.0
22.0
15. 0
16. 0
16.0
\ Navy, Marine ACFT
219.2
219.2
101.1
153.7
113.0
AF ACFT
Army missiles
445. 0
84. 4
445.0
76. 6
15664.. 83
294.0
76. 6
27464.. 64
Navy missiles
28.6
28.6
17.0
0
0
Marine Corps missiles
22.3
22.3
22.3
22.3
22.3
Air Force missiles
39.0
39.0
22.9
39.0
27.0
NAVY SCN
24. 8
24. 8
0
0
24. 8
Army TCV
113.6
113.6
50.9
63,1
50.6
Army other
8. 2
8.2
8. 2
8.0
8.0
Total
1, 007. I
999, 3
I 458.5
658.0
582.7
II.
Raises
108. 9
108.9
108.9
54.4
108.7
R. & D
108.6
.975
0
0
0
III. MILCON
29.0
29.0
0
29.0
0
IV. MASF
20
0
2 0
0
SQ
Total
1, 253.6
1, 138. 175
712. 8
741.7
681.6
$155,800,000 to be transferred from $2,200,000,000 for Israel.
2 MASF request required no appropriation.
3 Approved bookkeeping switch freeing $266,000,000.
If the country had unlimited money, no agency would need to be
limited in spending. Since we don't have the money, we have there-
fore restricted poverty, education, health, housing and manpower
training funds. Defen8e expenditures should be no exception.
(99)
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The following chart shows the escalation of the U.S. national debt
over the past 7 years, the annual service charge on the debt that must
be paid, administrative income and the percentage of administrative
income allocated to this item.
[Dollar amounts in billions]
Year
U.S. Percentage
Nation! Service administrative service
dobt charge Income charge
1969
$367
$15.8
$143
11.0
1970
382
18.3
143
12. 7
1971
410
19.6
134
14.6
1972
437
20.6
149
13.8
1973
468
22. 8
161
14. 1
1974
486
27.8
185
15.0
1975
508
29. 1
202
14. 4
Obviously, our escalating debt, escalating service charge, and esca-
lating service charge as a percentage of income dictates and demands
moderation.
Since we spend 95 percent of all military funds spent in this hem-
isphere, and 60 percent of all military funds expended in the world,
we need constantly to review our posture in this regard.
The short chart that follows, prepared by committee counsel, shows
the action of our House Armed Services Committee in various sub-
ject areas of the pending bill.
H.R. 12564
[In thousands of dollars]
Requested
by DOD
Recommended
by committee
Procurement:
Aircraft:
Army
339, 500
335, 000
Navy and Marine Corps
2, 960, 600
2, 964, 104
Air Force
Missiles:
3, 496, 600
3,391, 400
Army
459, 200
439, 400
Navy
620, 600
620, 600
Marine Corps
76, 000
76, 000
Air Force
Naval vessels: Navy
1, 610, 800
3, 562, 600
1,610, 800
3,539, 100
Tracked combat vehicles:
Army
marine Corps
331,900
80, 100
321,200
74, 200
Torpedoes: Navy
Other weapons:
187, 700
187, 700
Army
53,400
55,700
Navy
25, 600
25, 600
Marine -Corps
500
500
Total procurement
13, 805, 100
13, 641,300
Research, development, test, and evaluation:
Army
976
397
Navy
, 115,
14,
171, 006
r1,5
Air Force
3,518, 860
3, 459, 760
Defense agencies
555, 700
510, 500
Total R.D.T. & E
9, 325, 039
9, 001, 663
Grand total
23, 130, 129
22, 642, 963
SUMMARY
Net change in procurement (title I)
-163, 800
Net change in R.D.T. & E. (title II)
-323,376
Total reduction
-487, 176
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Lest we believe that every cent in the defense budget is vital to na-
tional security, we should consider this testimony given by the Sec-
retary of Defense to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on
February 17, 1974, in response to allegations that the budget contained
$5 billion worth of padding:
"It was recognized late in calendar year 1974 that there
may be an easing of the economy and some growth in unem-
ployment and that as a consequence of that, the total figure
for the budget outlays would be relaxed. . . . If there had not
been this perception of an easing economic environment I
believe our outlays might have been a billion dollars or a bil-
lion and a half dollars less in 197,5."
In short, the Secretary had admitted to a billion or a billion and
a half WPA dollars intermixed with the national security budget.
We had further evidence of Pentagon padding in the FY 74 Sup-
plemental request, which included $108.6 million for research and
development. The Committee decided the request was not sufficiently
urgent to warrant supplemental action, and suggested the Defense De-
partment make a strong appeal for these funds in the FY 75 regular
budget if it so desired. Now we find not one word about these pro-
grams in the '75 request; the previously vital programs are no longer
vital. To me it seems the DOD sometimes means what it says and some-
times does not.
TITLE I. PROCUREMENT
A. TRIDENT SUBMARINE
The submarine-launched ballistic missile system is probably as im-
portant as the rest of ?the military establishment combined. It is
secure from detection and is expected to remain so in the foreseeable
future. Of all our weapons systems, it makes the greatest contribution
to national security, and at the same time is not provocative. By in-
creasing the range of the missile, the Trident I and Trident II sys-
tems will provide a prudent hedge against the possibility of unfore-
seen breakthroughs in Soviet anti-submarine technique.
In short, I favor the Trident concept. However, the very high
rate at which the Navy plans to build the ten ships is, in my view,
unwise.
It is not sufficient for a system to be sound in concept; it must be
reliable in operation. The Polaris submarine-launched missile sys-
tem, which had the benefit of a thorough and careful R&D program,
was perhaps the most reliable missile system ever built. The Poseidon,
which was not developed as carefully, has been somewhat less reliable
but still creditable. It would be disastrous if this trend were to con-
tinue and we were to find our underwater security dependent upon an
aquatic C-5A.
The surest way to induce unreliability, as well as cost overruns, is
to rush the program. The worst aspect of a rushed program is what
is called "concurrency": placing the system full into production while
a substantial amount of the RDT&E remains to be done.
The arguments for accelerated development are not persuasive.
1. There is no need to rush Trident into the water to meet a Soviet
threat to Polaris-Poseidon ships, since the threat does not exist. On
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the contrary, at this point we cannot even speculate on the nature
of the threat -which might develop. Thus, the sooner we construct
the ships the more we increase the possibility that they may be in-
appropriate to the threat they may eventually face. I. believe the House
Appropriations Committee was entirely correct in its rejection of the
Trident acceleration in the F'I '74 Supplemental. its report stated:
"The Committee recommends that the $24,800,000 re-
quested to accelerate Trident submarine construction from
one per year, as recommended by the Congress in fiscal year
1974, to two per year not be appropriated.
"It is the considered judgment of the Committee that with
new Navy initiatives, such as the strategic cruise submarine-
launched missile, the available options to backlit the Trident
I missile into our 10 Polaris, and 31 Poseidon submarines,
and the proposed NARWHAL submarine as a low cost op-
tion to the Trident submarine, an acceleration of the Trident
submarine construction effort cannot be justified. The Corn-
ii is also mindful of the backlog of new construction and
conversion of ships and submarines at the two large nuclear-
capable shipyards which are involved in the Trident sub-
marine program, and the problems they and many shipyards
are having in obtaining skilled labor.
"All of these factors seem to mandate a prudent and cau-
tious, but deliberate course in the construction of Trident
submarines. There must be a reasonable limit or plateau that
should be achieved in spouting merely for the sake of 'bar-
gaining chips'. The Trident submarine construction rate of
one per year as directed by Congress appears to be a sufficient
demonstration that this country has the national resolve to
niodernize and maintain our sea-based missile deterrent in
a current status technologically, without risking an escalation
or renewal of the arms race."
2. While submarines do wear out, there is no indication that a 1-per-
year Trident program will leave Polaris boats in operation longer
than would be justified by safety considerations. On the other hand, it
is undeniable that the sooner we launch the Tridents the sooner they
will wear out and the sooner we will need the next generation SSBN.
Moreover, if we buy Tridents in rapid succession they will wear out in
rapid succession, thus forcing us into excessive concurrency on the
next generation and more block obsolesance.
It is claimed that faster procurement is cheaper. This is only true if
the acceleration does not produce difficulties. In my views, it is probable
that problems, and therefore increased costs, will arise from the ac-
celerated schedule proposed by the Navy.
Therefore, I will propose an amendment to reduce the procurement
schedule to one ship per year from the Navy's proposed two.
I propose to reduce the $1,166.8 million two-ship program to $700.00
million, which would consist of last year's $627.8 million one-step
program plus a reasonable inflation allowance.
I do not propose to reduce research and development. Neither do
I propose to reduce procurement of the Trident I missile? which can
and should be retrofitted into the existing Poseidon submarines.
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B. DD-963
In additional views appended to the FY '74 report, I described the
Landing Heavy Assault (LILA) program. as "one of the worst dis-
asters in the history of American military procurement". While this
rhetoric may have been somewhat overdramatic' subsequent events
have not impugned the accuracy of the assertion. At the time of last
year's report, these five ships were two years behind schedule.
Today they are 21/2 years behind; the cost is sitting on the contract
ceiling and we can expect, before we have tilei
ships n hand, to find
the contractor rewarded for his delays by payments well above the
ceiling.
The same contractor in the same shipyard?Litton Industries in
Pascagoula, Mississippi?is building another series of ships: the thirty
large anti-submarine destroyers of the DD-963 class. This program is
clearly headed for similar or worse problems.
The new "assembly-line" method used in this shipyard has received
much publicity, but it is not the source of the problem.
The difficulty stems from the inability of the contractor to attract
sufficient quantity and quality of labor to the site of the shipyard.
Total labor force on the DD-963 program is presently 23% below
program. The problem is increasing rather than decreasing, with
10.6% attrition but only 9.9% accession between September, 1972,
and September, 1973. The shipyard today is 4000 men short and is
unable to accelerate employment.
The quality of the work force, according to the General Accounting
Office, is as substandard as the quantity. The journeyman/apprentice
ratio has been about 1.4/1, where 2/1 is considered desirable. While
this ratio has remained relatively stable, the quality of the apprentice
force has declined markedly, with the percentage having less than
one year's experience soaring from 18% in October, 1972, to 41% in
August, 1973. The contractor sees no prospects for improvement.
These are the results:
1. "Scheduling. The first two ships, DD-963 and DD-964, have been
launched on schedule. However, this has been a mere public relations
gesture, accomplished by launching them in an incomplete state. Ship
963 was launched 50% complete, in contrast to the original plan call-
ing for 75-85% completion at launch.
Whereas the original plan called for 91/2 months in which to com-
plete 20% of the work after launch, the contractor will now have to
perform 50% of the 'work in the same time period to achieve on-time
delivery. This would require working at 21/2 times the originally
expected pace. If we generously assume work at the planned pace, we
must project a 24-month schedule slippage. If we more realistically
assume work at two-thirds the planned pace, we find ourselves facing
a three-year slippage. And this is only the first of the 30 ships.
2. Cost. Program unit cost has so far kept reasonably consistent with
the general inflation. However,
a. Delays inevitably require the contract to be performed in an
inflated economy, which increases the cost to the contractor.
b. Litton is now asking for an additional $7 million per ship.
c. With only 2 of the 30 ships in the water, the Navy has already told
us it expects the cost to go to ceiling (130% of target price).
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d. A number of expensive subsystems (totaling perhaps 20% of the
cost of the ship) are to be installed after delivery. Thus, they are not
included in the systems acquisition costs. Instead, they are funded by
the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) and Operations and Mainte-
nance (O&M) budgets, which receive relatively light scrutiny and
are therefore prime 'breeding grounds :For what is known in the trade
as "contract nourishment".
3. Performance. We are not yet capable of judging the performance
of the system. However, our experience has been that late delivery and
cost overruns do not usually go hand-in-hand with satisfactory
performance.
I believe it to be a real mistake to authorize the last of the 30 ships,
thus effectively giving up the Armed Sesrvices Committee's control over
this program. A similar mistake was made on the LHA program, in
which we finished authorizing the last of the 5 ships last year, yet the
Navy has still to see its first L.H.A.
I do not propose to reduce or cancel the program. At this point, I
merely emphasize that the reasons for the difficulty?difficult location
and inadequate management?were entirely subject to the control of
the contractor at the time he made his bid. It is he, and not the tax-
payers, who should bear the burden of his inability to live up to the
contract.
According to the recent report to the Congress by the General Ac-
counting Office, the Navy and its contracting officer have made sincere
and vigorous efforts to adhere to the terms of the contract. I com-
mend them for it. It would be my intention to see that the full 30
ships will be delivered with satisfactory performance at not one cent
above the contract ceiling, and we wish to make the contractor
aware that, from all indications, the 94th. Congress will be more recep-
tive to this position than has any Congress in the recent past.
TITLE II. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Title II of H.R. 14592 is entitled Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation. Last year the Congress funded $8,091,000,000. This year
the Department of Defense escalated the request to $9,325,039,000;
a 121k percent increase. After two months of hearing our R.D.T. & E.
Subcommittee, of which I am a member, reduced this request,
$323,376,000, or 3.4 percent. There are a number of projects in this
title that can stand a further reduction in this title. We made no
substantial reduction in SAM?D, AW AC S, Site Defense or Trident.
At the appropriate time, I will offer an amendment to effect a
further percentage reduction in Research Programs. I believe, with
a three-service multi-billion dollar Research Program and with an
additional Office of Secretary of Defense umbrella program, that there
is a multi-million dollar overlap that should be curtailed.
A. SITE DEFENSE ABM
The pros and cons of antiballistic missile systems have been dis-
cussed at length in previous reports. Very briefly, I regard the Safe-
guard as ludicrously inadequate from i ts basic concept onward, and
I regard it as now self-evident that the 8 billion this system has and
will siphon out of the taxpayers' pocket is so much money down the
drain. In contrast, Site Defense FicaR34075g16?gbgbOblifeltS10013-2
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and technically capable of increasing the survivability of our fixed
base Minuteman ICBMs against a reasonably vigorous threat.
However, Site Defense operates under two handicaps:
A. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) sets a limit
of 100 interceptors, whereas many hundreds would be required before
Site Defense could add significantly to our deterrent.
B. Site Defense is incompatible with the Administration's head-
long rush for maximum ICBM accuracy. As I point out under "Dan-
gerous Nuclear Programs" later in these additional views, if we fund
the development of high accuracy, there will be no way to negotiate
the Soviets out of also deploying high accuracy warheads. They will
thus be able to use very small yields as silo-killers, which means they
will be able to use large numbers of warheads on each ICBM at low
cost. Thus, they will be able to exhaust Site Defense far more cheaply
than we could expand it. It is important to note that the same unlikely
and tragic circumstances that would permit deployment of Site
Defense?abrogation of SALT I?would almost certainly be accom-
panied by the failure Of SALT II and the consequent technological
developments that would neutralize any ABM.
Therefore, we shall move to amend the Site Defense authorization,
reducing the $160 million prototype demonstration program to a $110
million technology program.
B. SAM-1
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has wisely pointed out that, since
the United States has no technological choice but to remain vulnerable
to Soviet missiles, there is no sense spending money to defend against
bombers.
Thus, the only function of the SAM-D anti-aircraft system will
be to defend our allies. This $6 billion program makes a very expen-
sive charity item in these days of precarious economic security.
Therefore, it would be desirable for the Secretary. of Defense to
seek commitments from our allies to pay in cash a minimum of one-
half the total program cost of the system, and to include the result
of his efforts in his annual report for FY '76. If these commitments
are not in hand at the time of the report, it is my view that the pro-
gram should be abandoned.
C. DANGEROUS NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
It is natural to assume that any technological development which
offers increased military capability at relatively modest cost is a good
thing. Unfortunately, this is not always true. The present bill con-
tains four nuclear weapons programs which, while increasing our
nominal military effectiveness, give us no useful ability we would not
have already. Moreover, they would decrease national security by
increasing the probability of nuclear war.
1. Three of the programs in question are strategic:
(a) $25 million for engineering development to increase the
yield of Minuteman warheads.
(b) $32 million for maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV)
to improve the accuracy of Minuteman.
(c) $20 million for advanced research on terminal guidance
of warheads.
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The purpose of all three programs is to increase our ability to de-
stroy hard targets. These programs are sometimes presented as offer-
ing a more "humane" Way of fighting nuclear war., allowing us to at-
tack "military and industrial" targets rather than cities.
This characterization is not entirely accurate. A steel mill is an im-
pressive and imposing structure if you plan to strike it with your fiat,
but in nuclear terms it is a very soft target; we can easily destroy it
with the accuracy-yield combination found in our present Minuteman
warheads. The same is true of all Soviet factories, refineries, troop con-
centrations, tank parks, etc. The only hard targets of any significance
are missile silos.
If we wish to destroy a small number of Soviet silos as a show
of force, we can do so with our present warheads; higher accu-
racy and yield are not needed.
If we wish to develop the capability to destroy all Soviet silos,
we have to use terminal guidanoe. The problem is that such a capability
would force the Soviets to adopt a "launch on warning" policy,
emptying their silos on radar warning of a U.S. attack rather than
riding out the attack. This would neutralize our capability?even
highly accurate warheads cannot destroy a missile that isn't there--
and it would greatly increase the probability of accidental war. Even
if the Soviets for some reason did not launch on warning, our hard-
target capability would still be suicidal in that it would bring
retaliation from the Soviet missile submarine fleet.
Thus, there are no benefits and considerable losses in this program.
The Senate Research and Development Subcommittee recognized this
in killing these programs, pointing out that our goal should be to
enhance the survivability of our deterrent, not to chase the ill-defined
mirage of "counterforce capability".
Several years ago. Congress unwisely approved the development
of MIRV. Since MIRV -deployment cannot be verified without on-site
inspection, once we had tested MIRV the Soviets had no choice but
to assume we had deployed it, and we lost the opportunity to. nego-
tiate a MIRV ban. Now the Soviets have their own MIRY, there is
no way to negotiate them out of deploying it, and there. is great-7--
although in my view unwarranted?concern about its significance, The
U.S. could have avoided the entire issue by going slow on testing and
fast on negotiations; it does no one credit that we did the opposite.
The proposed warhead-improvement programs present a similar
but more serious problem. Just as MIRV deployment cannot be veri-
fied, so deployment of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified.
Worse, testing of high-accuracy warheads cannot be verified. If we
do not prohibit the development of hitzh accuracy, the Soviets will
have to assume we have achieved the ability to destroy all their silos.
They will then either abandon their fixed-base ICBMs or place them
on launch-on-warning status. Given their present truculent mood, it
seems more likely that they will choose the latter course; we will
thus have increased the probability of nuclear war and gained
nothing by doing so.
The. Pentagon has proposed that we deploy smaller, cleaner tacti-
cal nuclear weapons for use in Europe. The rationale is that our pres-
ent large, dirty weapons would cause so much collateral damage to
the surrounding friendly countryside that we would be afraid to use
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them, whereas the smaller weapons would cause less collateral dam-
age, and we could therefore resort to them more easily.
This argument rests on two assumptions:
(a) The Soviets, having only old-fashioned large dirty nuclear
weapons, will refrain from using them in retaliation because they
share our concern for collateral damage to the soil of our allies and
their enemies.
(b) Even if the Soviet also devleop small nukes, if we cross the,
nuclear firebreak first, the Soviets will not feel compelled to respond
by attacking us with weapons slightly larger, whereupon we will
counter-respond with weapons still larger, and we will very shortly
find ourselves in an all-out nuclear war.
The evidence for either of these propositions is distinguished
? by its total nonexistence. It would be the height of folly to take
any steps that would make crossing the nuclear firebreak easier. Among
all the military failures and foreign policy failures of the past twenty
years, our one shining success has been the avoidance of nuclear war.
To deliberately set out to violate this record is to take unconscionable
risks with the national security.
TITLE VII. ESCALATED VIETNAM SUPPORT PROGRAM
The Committee has approved a $1.4 billion ceiling on military aid
to Vietnam. This constitutes an increase of $100 million above the
Committee's recommendation of last year. It is almost $400 million
above the $1,009.5 million actually spent last year in military assistance
to the Thieu government.
It is an escalation of our involvement in Indochina. I do not believe
this is a policy the American people wish to pursue.
This money does not include over $183 million generated by com-
modity import programs in the Foreign Aid budget which is used
primarily for uniforms and military constructions projects. Thus, the
Committee-approved $1.4 billion would in reality give the Thieu gov-
ernment $1,583 billion, which, for practical purposes, is identical to the
$1.6 billion requested by the Defense Department for overt military
aid.
Incredibly, the evidence presented by DOD showed no change in
the level of activity in Vietnam that would justify a reversal of our
withdrawal. In fact, the casualty figures which DOD provided my
office indicate a slight drop in military activity.
COMBAT DEATHS
Year
United States
SVN
3d country
Enemy
Totals
1963
78
5, 665
20, 575
26, 318
1964
147
7,457
1
16, 785
24, 390
1965
1,369
11,243
31
35,436
48,079
1966
5, 008
11, 953
566
55, 524
73, 051
1967
9, 377
12, 716
1, 105
88, 104
111, 302
1968
14, 589
27, 915
979
181, 149
224, 632
1969
9,414
21,833
866
156,954
189,067
1970
4, 221
23, 346
704
103, 638
131,909
1971
1, 381
22, 738
526
98, 094
122, 739
1972
300
39, 587
443
131, 949
172, 279
1973
202
11,093
4
38,858
50,157
19741
10,107
38,514
48,621
Totals
46, 086
205, 653
5, 225
965, 580
1, 222, 544
1 Projection based on KIA rates of 1st 4 months.
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Coupled with this evidence of no change in activity is the report
received last year that the amount of gunfire on both sides in Viet-
nam is directly related to the amount of ammunition supplied
to the ARVN. Thus, if we are truly interested in bringing peace to
Indochina, a reduction in our military aid would seem far more ap-
propriate than an increase.
Since the most effective means the House has of making itself heard
on matters of policy is budgetary action, it is imperative that Con-
gressional ceilings on expenditures be observed to the letter.
Both the House and the Senate have made themselves very clear
on the subject of spending ceilings for this program. The House has
rejected an attempt to simply ignore the, ceiling, and the Senate has
rejected an attempt to spend $266 million miraculously discovered in
a Pentagon closet. In addition, the Committee has strengthened the
language of the requirement for reporting obligation of this money.
Taken together, I hope that these measures will prevent a recurrence
of any action by the Department of Defense, however inadvertent,
whose effect would be to obviate the intent of the Congress.
This year's MASF budget includes $86.8 million for petroleum
supplies for the Vietnamese armed forces, almost twice last year's
expenditure of $42.9 million. Military gasoline has a way of winding
up on sale to the public in Vietnam; last year we reduced those sup-
plies 20 percent in an effort to curb this black marketeering. By June
of 1973, it became apparent that commercial gasoline sales had in-
creased by almost exactly that amount. Since that time, energy re-
sources have become much harder to collie by; our own citizens and
military establishment have had to do with much less. I believe it
only fair to require the Vietnamese to do likewise.
In a recent interview in the Washington Post, former Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird commented on the war in Vietnam:
"The South Vietnamese can handle them. They have
enough pilots. It's their foot soldier3 who are important. If
there is no will, it's their own tough luck. We have done
everything that we told them we were going to do. That's
what .Vietnamization is all about. The fighting will continue
for 20 years."'
I concur with their judgment: without the Vietnamese "will", no
amount of our money will make a difference. I do not believe that the
American people want to spend 2.7 billion 2 a year for 20 years. Can
we afford that in good conscience while telling our veterans that we
cannot find $250 million per year to satisfy our "debt of honor" to
them? I believe not.
It is time we served notice that the United States Treasury is not
a bottomless grab bag for another 20 years of corruption and carnage
in Vietnani. We do not propose to cut and run" from Vietnam; a
military assistance budget of $900 million is only 10 percent below the
level we sent to Saigon last year; many of our own maitary programs
have survived far greater cuts. But if we mean to disengage from
Vietnam, if we mean to participate in a peace instead of coLinuing
war, we must continue the deescalation of military aid we began
last year.
Washington Post, May 5, Potomac Supplement, pp. 28-29.
2 $1.4 billion in direct military aid, $500 million in incremental .nilitary costs; $800
million or more in other categories.
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On this item, therefore, I propose to offer an amendment reducing
this Vietnam Aid by $500 million. If the amendment carried, the
Vietnam, assistance account for 1975, as compared to 1974, would
look like this:
FUNDS FOR U.S. PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975
tin thousands of dollars'
Fiscal year-
1974 1975
programed proposed
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Military assistance service funded (MASF):
Army:
Operations and maintenance
Procurement
Military personnel
355, 900
BO, 400
40,400
Total
476, 700
Operations and maintenance
247, 100
Procurement
278, 400
Military personnel
Air Force: Total
525, 500
Navy:
.
Operations and maintenance
19, 900
Procurement
0
Military personnel
0
Total
19,900
Total MASF
1,022, 100
900,000
Defense attache's office
Excess defense articles
Local currency purchases
35, O CT
63, 600
(I)
35, 000
(I)
Department total 2
1,120, 700
935, 000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Direct expenses
5,086
5,086
Shared administrative expenses (Department of State portion)
2,611
2,585
Total
7,697
7,672
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID)
Indochina postwar reconstruction assistance (I PR):
Technical assistance
40, 000
Humanitarian assistance
35 000
Commercial import program
190,000
Undistributed
35,000
Total
Narcotics control
300, 000
205
L
1))
Population control
750
Development loans
110, 000
Total
410, 955
602, 540
Public Law 480 shipments;
Title I
Title II
309, 027
500
182, 550
553
Total
Total
309, 527
72o;482
183, 10-3
785 743
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
U.S. Information Service, South Vietnam:
Direct costs
1,887
2,059
' Support costs
574
595
Total
2,461
2,654
Regional post equipment:
Officer (administrative servicing)
Direct costs
Saigon correspondent staff (Voice of America): Direct costs
48
41
49
39
Total
2,550
2, 747
See footnotes at end of table.
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FUNDS FOR U.S. PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975--Continued
[In thousands of dollars]
Fiscal year-
1974
programed proposed
1975
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEPARTMENT 3F JUSTICE)
Salaries, benefits, foreign allowances
Shared administration expenses (payable to Department of State)__
Operating expenses
125
20
19
125
22
20
Total
164
167
FEDERAL SUPPLY SERVICE (GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION)
Salaries and related expenses
39
0
Travel (in country)
1
0
Total
40
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Exchange stabilization fund?Assessment of South Vietnam's financial and economic de-
velopment
100
109
Total
100
109
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS)
Salaries and related expenses__
31
Administrative expenses
14
(1)
Total
45
(I)
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Salaries and other personnel expenses
281
0
Shared administrative expenses (payable to Department of State)0
57
0
Total
338
0
U.S. Government total
1,
852,
116
1,
731,
433
I Not available.
3 On Mar. 18, 1974, the Department of Defense submitted a request to have the fiscal year 1974 spending ceiling of
$1,126,000,000 for South Vietnam and Laos raised to $1,600,000,000. No breakdown is available showing the portion of
the $474,000,000 increase that would be spent In South Vietnam. The Department of Defense told us that the increase in
spending would be financed by funds appropriated but unobligated in prior years.
3 On Mar. 18, 1974, AID submitted a request for a $54,600,000 supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1974 in South
Vietnam.
The following members of the Committee concur with the foregoing
supplementary views.
RONALD V. DELLITAIS,
Member of Congress.
PATRICIA SCHROEDER,
Member of Congress.
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DISSENTING VIEWS BY HON. LES ASPIN
The problem with this Authorization bill is that it is too high.
The last few years in the House we have moved toward limiting fed-
eral spending and toward treating all federal programs equally in
holding down increases. Attesting to that is last year's vote establish-
ing a budget ceiling of 267.1 billion dollars for all federal spending
and last December's vote approving the Budget Control Act which will
eventually mandate specific ceilings on the entire federal budget.
In this year's budget many federal programs are being held down.
Listed below are some programs for which the jurisdiction has re-
mained unchanged, and figures showing the differences between what
was appropriated last year and what was requested for this year.
INCREASES IN SEVERAL FEDERAL PROGRAMS
n millions of dollars]
Fiscal year
1974 ape ro- Fiscal year Percent
priations 1975 request change
Consolidate grants for elementary/secondary education
2, 674. 4
2, 875. 5
+7.3
Drug abuse
760. 0
745. 1
?2. 0
Health services
1, 176. 0
1, 177.0
+. 0008
Biomedical research
1, 781. 0
1, 835. 0
+3.0
"LEAA
871.1
886.5
+1.8
Manpower programs
2, 451. 2
2, 578. 8
+5.2
Military procurement and R. & D
20, 162.2
23, 130. 1
+14.7
An exception to the overall trend is Military R&D and Procure-
ment. The request for Military R&D and Procurement was 14.7 per-
cent higher than last year's Appropriation. The House Armed Serv-
ices Committee, in the bill reported here, made a miniscule cut of only
2.1 percent. So, not counting transfers, the bill before us increases
spending for these defense programs by 12.6 percent over last year's
Appropriation. Other federal programs are not being increased by
such a large amount.
There is no reason why the House Armed Services Committee could
not have reduced this bill by more. After all the Appropriations Com-
mittee does it every single year.
R. & D. AND PROCUREMENT
Iln millions of dollars]
House
authorized
House
appropriated
Difference
Fiscal year:
1974
21394
20,021
?1,373
1973
20,949
19,564
?1,358
1972
21,316
20,461
?855
1971
19, 929
18, 997
?932
1970
20, 710
18, 961
?1, 749
1969
21, 625
18, 491
?3, 134
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The Appropriations Committee every year reports out a defense
bill Which is lower than the bill of the Armed Services Committee
not by cutting out any major programs but by cutting out little
amounts here and there. And those minor cuts seem to be acceptable.
No one accuses the Appropriations Committee of cutting the "bone
and the muscle" of our defense. No one gets up on the floor of the
House to offer amendments to put back in what the Appropriations
Committee took out.
The point is that if acceptable cuts can be found in the Appropria-
tions bill, acceptable cuts can be found in the Authorization bill which
is here before us. The need for reduoml federal spending is widely
accepted by the American people. The budgets for other programs
have been held down or cut -back?the :Department of Defense should
not be and need not be an exception.
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DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE RONALD V.
DELLUMS
Obviously this is one of the most important bills considered by
Congress. The size of the military bureaucracy and the amount of
money needed to supply its hardware dwarfs the wildest dream of any
non-defense agency administrator. Only the military budget is sig-
nificant enough itself to set limits to what the whole government can
do or hope to do. In fact, the, size of the military budget is the central
issue determining domestic reform.
As Secy. Schlesinger has clearly told us, this first completely post-
Indochina budget shows us what can be expected for the inaefinite
future?unless some basic assumptions are changed.
It is the first indication of what can be expected from a supposedly
peacetime government. Unfortunately, the answer is: not much. What-
ever else "peace" means for this Administration, it does not mean any
commitment to creativity in any other field besides military hardware
or to any renewed dedication to working out real problems.
At home, we see this in the fact that while every other government
agency and program is scraped to the bone, especially the human
needs programs, and forced to show "efficiency dividends" at the ex-
pense of significant accomplishment?only the military maintains its
rate of growth without any substantial savings, in fact with a growth
rate that outstrips the overall rate of inflation. -
We must realize this: in an era of tightened resources and hard
choices, we must choose either tax reform and defense cuts on the one
hand, or a helpless government facing multiplying social problems
on the other. If the defense budget is untouchable, the rest of the
government must wither away.
Abroad, we see this when we notice that detente does not mean an
end (1) to our world-wide military presence, (2) to our ability to fight
any war at any time, (3) to our dedication to keeping dictators in
power through any means necessary, or (4) to the same perception of
political and strategic realities that dominated foreign policy think-
ing twenty years ago.
So' we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is detente any different from
the cold war? Does it make any difference at all? What's the use of
it then?
I-MANPOWER LEVELS
Manpower costs comprise 56% of the military budget. This figure
does not include the. increasingly heavy burden of veterans benefits,
which the Administration never includes in its military spending fig-
ures, but which this year will be. $13.6 billion. We will undoubtedly
save some money if we end some of the unneeded and costly weapons
systems such as the atomic aircraft carrier, the B-1 bomber, the Trident
or destabilizing land-based missiles?but we will never touch the bulk
of the huge military budget until we revise our assumptions about the
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use of manpower. It is here that the Pentagon's refusal to come up with
any real "efficiency dividend" is most flagrant, as grade-creep, wasteful
support-to-combat ratios and other abuses continue. unchecked.
Yet why do we need all these men in the first place? This is the cen-
tral question, and yet in the course of the normal appropriations proc-
ess, it almost never gets asked. Last year I asked the Pentagon for the
diplomatic and military reasoning for our 600,000 troops overseas. On
the diplomatic side, I found that our level of troops abroad is in no
case determined by treaty. On the military side, I found vague, worn -
out formulas that. hadn't changed for ID years. I began to suspect that
our half-million men are, maintained all over the world at enormous
expense not from any valid strategic reason, but 8imp/y because of
bureaucratic inertia.
Events of the past few years show us that this neglect cannot con-
tinue. Our military presence is no longer a tool of foreign policy; in-
stead, foreign policy is more and more determined by the needs of our
military presence. My basic point here is that our troop commitments
were not arrived at by constitutional processes of congressional con-
trol; in fact, they represent abdication of control?over not only to the
executive, but to foreign countries as well.
First of all, there are no specific treaty obligations that force Con-
gress to approve any level of troop commitment. Exact figures for each
country are the result of executive agreements, and are not submitted to
Congress for approval. Furthermore, such figures are the result of
political foreign policy calculations?and are. not based on military
matters to which we may legitimately d.efer to military experts.
The last point is crucial. There is only one factor from which we are
forced to rely on assurances of the Pentagon: whether a force level in
a certain country is necessary or sufficient to repel the threat that is re-
sponsible for its presence overseas. Yet, in almost no case, is the Penta-
gon able to give its this assurance.
Either our forces are unnecessary or they are not sufficient. Let me
give an example of each. The South Koreans have one of the most
battle-hardened armies in the world. It has well over 600,000 people
under arms and many of these have had combat experience in Viet-
nam. The North Koreans have an army of less than a half million who
have done nothing beyond border sniping since 1953. We assume the
South Koreans will have the advantage of a defensive posture.
In other words, if any nation is relatively secure, it is South Korea.
Yet we have a ton heavy military establishment there of 40,000 troops
which add a mere 7,000 fighting men in the combat division we station
there to provide ground combat support to the South Korean forces?
although we must pay for all 40,000 men, when we count support and
command troops. If the Nixon Doctrine can be applied anywhere, it
is in Korea. Given any sense of logic, there is no justification for the
presence of these men, and we should brang them home.
An example of where troops are not sufficient is in Europe. Briefly
stated, the fact is that NATOi8 now?and long has been?vulnerable
to a Soviet conventional attack. If this basic military fact is not ac-
cepted by my colleagues, the debate on overseas troops will always re-
main out-of-focus.
The Pentagon has recently change[ its line on NATO's conven-
tional capability--surprisingly enough, when it became helpful as far
as its budget requests were concerned. However, the following facts
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115
(1) Unless the European allies are willing to make real sacrifices to
provide adequate defense, it will be impossible to structure a truly ade-
quate combat-effectiveness conventional ground force of sufficient size
to offset the superior Warsaw Pact ground forces. Yet the basic fact
is that our NATO allies have not been willing, over the last 15-20
years, to make such sacrifices.
Why do we continue to second-guess the people directly concerned,
the West European public? Surely their stake in the matter is far
greater than even our own. They are not incapable of making sac-
rifices?they simply do not perceive any fundamental threat that is not
taken care of by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Our attempts to find ways
to 'limit the damage' to the West European theater are not greatly
appreciated by the Europeans themselves.
111 (2) The Randall Report indicates that the Warsaw Pact has superi-
ority in numbers of men and armor. A recent RAND study on NATO
military policy indicates the Pact forces are also superior in numbers
of tactical aircraft, missiles, artillery and mortar tubes. In view of this
evident superiority in practically all areas of conventional contest,
how can it be said that the NATO conventional force "is not a trip-
wire"?
(3) The Department of Defense estimates that the FY 1974 balance
of payments deficit relating to NATO deployments will be approxi-
mately $2.1 billion?an increase of $600 million over the reported FY
1973 deficit.
(4) Another political factor cited by those opposing troop reduc-
tions anywhere is the mutual force reduction talks now going on in
Europe. We are told that any unilateral move anywhere will undercut
our negotiators. Although most impartial observers agree that after
almost a year of talk, all that has been accomplished is the clarification
of how diametrically opposed are the positions of the two superpowers,
we in Congress are given the line that great progress is being made,
that significant troop cuts can be expected shortly.
What exactly can we rationally expect from this very complicated
multilateral conference where most of the parties concerned are ac-
tively opposed to troop reductions? When considering this question we
should remember that the Soviet Union has no interest in expediting
the negotiations, since the longer they wait, the more intolerable will be
our irrational commitment in domestic terms, and the more damaging
to European unity will be unilateral cuts when they come.
It is the presence of the troops that will cause an acceleration of the
"unraveling" process, not a cut based on perception of the realities.
Furthermore, the Soviets are glad for an excuse to keep their occupa-
tion troops in eastern Europe under the guise of "defense".
In other words, the Mutual Force Reduction talks have not yet
gotten off dead center. How long can we allow these negotiations to
completely tie our hands in relation to military policy towards
Europe?
(5) Recent testimony by General Davison (CINCUSAEUR) rated
morale in the U.S. Seventh Army as no more than "good" and dis-
cipline?essential to effective combat readiness?as only "fair".
To sum up: if we wish to defend Europe with conventional capabili-
ties?or rather, defend ourselves in Europe, a distinction the Europe-
ans themselves understand very well?we must buckle down our belts,
tell the U.S. public to accept greater economic burdens, re-institute the
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116
draft, and get down to work. If?more rationally?we decide to accept
the West European scale of priorities, then we will cut back on our
presence there. Either way you look at it, our present position is
unsatisfactory.
Europe is not fundamental to the overall overseas manpower ques-
tion, however. We could easily cut back up to 200,000 troops without
affecting Europe and I intend to offer a floor amendment of that
nature. For all these reasons, manpower levels are the most logical
place to cut the military budget without loss of defense capability.
II-MILITARY AID TO SAIGON
This nation is a signatory to the Paris Agreements and yet we are in
serious violation of that true. Our client, General Thieu, has made a
mockery of the Paris Agreements; there is probably not an article
that Thieu has not flagrantly violated.
Nevertheless, American taxpayers are virtually the sole financial
support for Thieu. Estimates indicate that our tax dollars account for
85% of Thieu's national budget, and I would like to call attention once
again to the figures noted by our Colleague from New York, Mr. Pike,
in the floor debate on the Supplemental Aid to Vietnam, when he
pointed out that the South Vietnamese defense budget dropped from
$1.3 billion in 1971 to only $474 million budgeted for this year.
American dollars allow Thieu to continue a war t,hat took approxi-
mately 60 thousand lives last year; American dollars pay for a police
state in which thousands of Vietnamese are held political prisoner
without benefit of trial; American dollars pay for the security of a
petty dictator who refuses to allow distribution of the Paris Agree-
ments in his areas, who holds illegal elections, forbids neutralism, and
employes systematic torture.
it is a sham to say there is peace in Vietnam, and a lie to claim there
is "honor" in American policy towards that tragic nation. What honor
for us can there be when Thieu's biggest, friend also happens to be the
American Ambassador? I do not think this is the forum to deal with
all of Ambassador Martin's follies, but I would like to bring attention
to the fact that Martin himself has admitted that he is permitting out-
right American violation of the Paris Agreement. Despite legislative
mandate and terms of the Paris Agreement, in a memo printed in the
April 4, 1974 Congressional Record on Page E2117, Ambassador Mar-
tin notes that "A certain number of people in the Defense Attache
Office were retained, engaged solely on logistics assistance to the mili-
tary forces of South Vietnam." To me, that appears to be a flagrant
violation of both Congressional intent and the Paris Agreement.
Finally, let me indicate what I see occurring if huge flows of Ameri-
can military assistance continue to Tb ieu?as the General and the
Administration desire. As long as America picks up the tab for his
military operations and for his repeated violations of the Paris Agree-
ment, Thieu will continue the war. I do not think the Provisional
Revolutionary Government will allow that to happen for any pro-
longed period?and up to now, the P.R.G. has concentrated on achiev-
ing a politioal settlement based upon the Paris Agreements and has
undertaken only limited military operations. But I do not think it
realistic for us to assume that the P.R.G. and its allies would remain
so passive, if it becomes apparent that Thieu will never agree to any
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of the political components of the Paris Accords and that America
will continuously fund Thieu's aggression. Whenever that point is
reached, I think that massive fighting will break out again, and we will
be 'back to the situation of a decade ago.
Given that chance, it is conceivable that, based upon the implicit
commitment Secy. Kissinger has made, large-scale American forces
could be re-introduced in Vietnam?
Have we not learned from the past decade in Vietnam? How long
is this tragedy to continue? As long as Congress allows Thieu to mock
the Paris Agreements by his repeated offensives, by his refusing basic
human rights guaranteed by the Agreements, and by gestapo-tactics
which pervert the legal system in Vietnam, it is we who must take
the responsibility for war in Vietnam.
I do not oppose the concept of humanitarian assistance to the peo-
ple of Vietnam. But this bill provides nothing of that sort. Instead,
the American taxpayer once again assumes the burden of Thieu's
military budget. As long as we do so?and no matter what level ceil-
ing we may impose?there will be continuing war in Vietnam.
If instead, our nation is to abide by the Paris Agreements?some-
thing we have not done up to now?Congress must Insist that Thieu
live up to the terms set in Paris. I intend to offer an amendment on the
floor proposing that all military aid be suspended until we are as-
sured that Thieu is in accord with the Paris Agreements and I urge
my colleagues to support that motion.
III?SUMMARY
In simple terms, this bill continues the disastrous trend of blind
faith militarism and adventurism which has dominated policy-making
in this nation the past thirty years and which, over the past decade,
has destroyed and distorted the American economy, shattered the
political and social framework upon which our democracy was cre-
ated, and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of persons
throughout the world. There is a massive difference between what
funds should be required to provide for the common defense of our
nation and the huge defense budget upon which this measure is predi-
cated, and for that reason, I am strongly opposed to this bill.
RONALD V. DELLIMIS,
Member of Congress.
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. PATRICIA SCHROEDER
FISCAL YEAR 1975 DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION
Last year in additional views to the FY 1974 itary Procurement
bill, I expressed the opinion that improvements were necessary in our
defense budget review?a process that involves over 40% of our taxes
and invokes fundamental questions of war or peace in a nuclear age.
My opinion this year remains unchanged.
The Committee is still not enthusiastic about searching out differing
opinions from within and without the military; we still shy from over-
sight review of the programs already authorized and side-step vigor-
ous investigation of cost-overruns and waste; we still let questions
of cost-effectiveness and superior design be buried under military
goldplating and political temporizing; and we remain prone to skim
over the frightening potential that some weapons policies, urged as
necessary to preserve the peace, may instead be leading us in the op-
posite direction (as for example, the new strategic nuclear options
waved ahead by this bill) . In many cases this has been a default of
will; more often a product of the system itself.
The mood thus grows among those convinced of budget errors or
excesses that Congress can do nothing more than set more or less arti-
ficial ceilings for military spending, leaving it to the Defense Depart-
ment to reconstruct its budget accordingly. The circumstances per-
haps permit no.alternative, but the tack nonetheless seems an abdica-
tion of fundamental congressional responsibility.
Systemic reform of the defense budget process is overdue, and until
it comes no one should harbor the notion that Congress can function
in this area as it was intended.
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>
-cs
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW n
-cs
0
<
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, there is herewith printed in m
a
parallel columns the text of provisions of existing law which would be repealed or amended by the various provisions -n
of the bill as reported. 0
n
X
EXISTING LAW THE BILL AS REPORTED (D
(7
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives a)
to
of the United States of America in. Congress assembled, m
n.)
o
TITLE I?PROCUREMENT o
co
SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated o
n.)
during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces o
of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, -4
? naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other?
CC) 0
weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:
Aircraft 0
1:1
For aircraft: for the Army, $335,000,000; for the Navy
tri
and the Marine Corps, $2,964,100,000; for the Air Force, CO
$3,391,400,000, of which $104,900,000 shall be used only
for the procurement of A-7D aircraft for the Air National (.4
co
Guard of the United States.
Missiles
For missiles: for the Army, $439,400,000; for the Navy,
$620,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the
Air Force, $1,610,800,000. (.4
(.4
1&.)
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EXISTING LAW THE BILL AS REPORTED
Naval Vessels
For Naval vessels: for the Navy, $3,539,100,000, of which
sum $1,166,800,000 shall be used only for the Trident pro-
gram; $502,500,000 shall be used only for the SSN-688
nuclear attack submarine; $244,300,000 shall be used only
for the DLGN nuclear powered guided missile frigate
program; $457,100,000 shall be used only for the DD-r963
program; $142,900,000 shall be used only for the sea control
ship program; $92,300,000 shall be used only for the patrol
hydrofoil missile program; $436,500,000 shall be used only
for the patrol frigate program: Pro vided, however, That,
except for necessary long lead time items, no contract for
the construction of these ships shall be entered into until
after the Secretary of the Navy has notified the Chairmen
of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that
the fire control system has been satisfactorily tested;
$81,400,000 shall be used only for the fleet oiler;
$116,700,000 shall be used only for a destroyer tender;
$10,800,000 shall be used only for a fleet ocean tug;
$104,600,000 shall be used only for the Poseidon conversion
of the fleet ballistic-missile submarines; $18,300,000 shall
be used only for conversion of a submarine tender;
$22,000,000 shall be used only for craft; $10,400,000 shall
be used only for pollution abatement craft; $30,200,000
shall be used only for outfitting material; $30,400,000 shall
be used only for post delivery; $71,900,000 shall be used
only for escalation on prior year programs.
Z-?1.00?000/000t108?0089/dCIU-VIO LO/Z0/900Z aseeieu -10d PeACLIddV
-o
-o
Tracked Combat Vehicles
0
For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $321,200,-
o.
000 ; for the Marine Corps, $74,200,000. -n
Torpedoes
For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the
Navy, $187,700,000.
to
Other Weapons
For other weapons: for the Army, $55,700,000; for the
Navy, $25,600,000; for the Marine Corps, $500,000.
TITLE III?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, ?
AND EVALUATION
SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appro-
priated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the
Armed Forces of the United States for research, develop- 1:1
ment, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in
amounts as follows: CO
For the Army, $1,878,397,000;
For the Navy (including the Marine Corps) $3,-
153,006,000, of which $57,500,000 shall be available
only for application to surface naval gunnery (exclud-
ing the Close-In Weapon System), including gun fire
control systems gun mounts, unguided and guided
ordnance, and fuzing;
t&.)
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EXISTING LAW THE BILL AS REPORTED
For the Air Force, $3,459,760,000; and
For the defense agencies, $510,500,000, of which
$25,000,000 is authorized for the activities of the Di-
rector of Test and Evaluation Defense.
TITLE III ?ACTIVE FORCES
SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and
ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces
is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel as
follows:
(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 627,535.
TITLE IV?RESERVE FORCES
SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and
ending June 30, 1975, the Selected Reserve o each reserve
component of the Armed Forces will be programed to
attain an average strength of not less than the following:
(1) The Army National Guard of the United
States, 408,000;
(2) The Army Reserve, 225,00;
(3) The Naval Reserve 117,000;
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 38,000;
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States,
95,000;
dit
(6) The Air Force Reserve 51,319;
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.
SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401
of this title for the Air National Guard of the United
States shall include a force of not less than 91 flying units.
SEC. 403. The average strength prescribed by section
401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any reserve
component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the
total authorized strength of units organized to serve as
units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are
on active duty (other than for training) at any time dur-
ing the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual
members not in units organized to serve as units of the
Selected Reserve of such component who are on active
duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory par-
ticipation in training) without their consent at any time
during the fiscal year. Whenever such units or such indi-
vidual members are released from active duty during any
fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the
Selected Reserve of such reserve component shall be pro-
portionately increased by the total authorized strength of
such units and by the total number of such individual
members.
TITLE V?CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
SEC. 501. (a) For the fiscal year begining July 1, 1974,
and ending June 30, 1975, the Department of Defense is
authorized an end strength for civilian personnel as
follows:
(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the
Marine Corps, 323,529;
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EXISTING LAW THE BILL AS REPORTED
(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;
(4) Activities and agencies of the Department of
Defense (other than the military departments), 75,372.
(b) The end strength for civilian personnel prescribed
in subsection (a) of this section for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1975, shall be reduced by 15,000. Such reduction
shall be apportioned among the Army, Navy, Air Force
and activities and agencies of the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense shall report to Congress within
sixty days after the date of enactment of this Act on the
manner in which this reduction is to be apportioned among
the military services and the activities and agencies of the
Department of Defense. This report shall include the ra-
tionale for each reduction.
(c) In computing the authorized end strength for civil-
ian personnel there shall be included all direct-hire civilian
personnel employed to perform military functions admin-
istered by the Department of Defense (other than those
performed by the National Security Agency) whether in
permanent or temporary positions and whether employed
on a full-time, part-time, or intermittent basis, but ex-
cluding special employment categories for students and
disadvantaged youth such as the stay-in-school campaign,
the temporary summer aid program and the Federal junior
fellowship program, and personnel participating in the
worker-trainee opportunity program: Provided, That
when a function, power, or duty or activity is trans-
ferred or assigned to a department or agency of the De-
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partment of Defense from a department or agency outside 0
of the Department of Defense or from a department or <
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agency within the Department of Defense,. the civilian a
personnel end strength authorized for such departments or -n
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agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be ad- n
justed to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian per- X
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sonnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment.
(T)
Whenever the Secretary of the military department con- o)
cerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that a func-
tion, power, or duty or activity will be performed by a r..)
support services contract which had been performed by o
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direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform a mili-
tary function administered by the Department of Defense o
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or determines that a function, power, or duty or activity o
that is being performed by a support services contract will ....i
be performed by a direct-hire civilian personnel employed b*5 0
to perform a military function administered by the De- C.,71 _
partment of Defense' the civilian personnel end strength
authorized for such department or agencies of the Depart- X
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ment of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any '0
increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a ..,1
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result of such determination. The Secretary of the mill- CO
tary department concerned or the Secretary of Defense o
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shall promptly notify the Congress of any adjustment in G.)
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the authorized end strength for civilian personnel author- o
ized pursuant to this subsection. X
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SEC. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines o
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that such action is necessary in the national interest, he ..,I
may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in ex- o
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eess of the number authorized by section 501: Pnyvided, o
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EXISTING LAW THE BILL AS REPORTED
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That the number of additional personnel authorized to be
employed pursuant to the authority of this section shall
not exceed 1 per centum of the total number of civilian
personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by
section 501: Provided further, That the Secretary of De-
fense shall promptly notify the Congress of any authoriza-
tion to increase civilian personnel strength pursuant to
this authority.
TITLE VI?MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT
LOADS
SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974,
and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed
Forces is authorized an average military training siudeni,
load as follows:
(1) The Army, 97,638;
(2) The Navy, 71,279;
(3) The Marine Corps, 26,262;
(4) The Air Force, 52.900;
(5) The Army National Guard of the United
States, 12,111;
(6) The Army Reserve, 9,673;
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,903;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States,
2,359;
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.
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Approved For Release 2006/02/07
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TITLE VII GENERAL PROVISIONS
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SEC. 701. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated es
to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1975, $1,400,- a
000,000 to support Vietnamese military forces on such -n
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terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may n
determine, to ?be administered as one fund and to be X
es
obligated only upon issuance of orders by the Secretary (T)
of Defense: Provided, That as of June 30, 1974, unobli- co2)
gated balances previously authorized for the above pur- es
pose are hereby repealed: And provided further, That r..)
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nothing contained in this section shall be construed as o
authorizing the use of any such funds to support Viet- a)
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namese military forces in activities designed to provide r.)
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military support and assistance to the Government of
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Cambodia or Laos. 1??
(b) Within thirty days after the end of each quarter NI"
-40
the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees >
on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and
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of the House of Representatives, a report with respect to 0
the obligations incurred during that quarter from appro- 1:1
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priations authorized by this section. 0
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TITLE VIII?NUCLEAR NAVY o
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Sc. 801. It is the policy of the United States of America o
to modernize the strike forces of the United States Navy X
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by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant o
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vessels and to provide for an adequate industrial base for ..,i
the research, development, design, construction, operation, o
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and maintenance for such vessels. New construction major o
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TITLE 31
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CHAPTER I.?THE NATIONAL BUDGET AND AUDIT SYSTEM
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THE BUDGET
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0 ? 11. President to transmit Budget to Congress; contents
94 thereof; transmittal of supplemental summary to Con-
gress; transmittal of estimated expenditure summaries
(a) The President shall transmit to Congress during
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THE BILL AS REPORTED
combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States
Navy authorized subsequent to the date this Act becomes
law shall be nuclear powered, except as provided here-
after.
SEC. 802. DEFINITION.?For the purposes of this title,
the following definition shall apply:
Major combatant vessel (s) for the strike forces of the
United States Navy shall mean?
(a) combatant submarines for strategic and/or tac-
tical missions;
(b) combatant vessels intended to operate in com-
bat in aircraft carrier task groups (that is, aircraft
carriers and the combatants which accompany them) ;
(c) those combatant vessels designed for independ-
ent con-that, missions where essentially unlimited- high
speed endurance will be of significant military value.
SEC. 803. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to
Congress each calendar year, at the same time the Presi-
dent submits the budget to Congress under section 11 of
title 2 1, United StatesCode, a written report regarding
the application of nuclear propulsion to major combatant
vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy as
defined in section 802 of this Act. The report shall identify
contract placement dates for their construction. Further,
the report shall identify the Department of Defense plans
for construction of nuclear powered major combatant
vessels for the succeeding five years and certify whether
such plans are adequate to provide a modern striking force
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n the first fifteen days of each regular session, the Budget, for the United States Navy and to maintain the necessary -o
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a and text, and supporting detail. The Budget shall set forth <
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Supreme Court of the United States shall be transmitted 1--, 0
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to the President on or before October 15 of each year, and c..0 ? ?
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X (6) estimated receipts of the Government during the 1"
-9 ensuing fiscal year, under (1) laws existing at the time X
al the Budget is transmitted and also (2) under the revenue 0
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