Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 21, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 4, 1974
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030058-3.pdf8.97 MB
Approved For R~ 1 3~ 1 C i 5 . 9 0700030058-3 J u n e 4, 194 9 9614 The motion to lay on the table was agred to. AMENPMENT? NO, 1378 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now pro- ceed to the consideration of amendment No. 1378, by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), which the clerk will report. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read the amendment. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD. The amendment is as follows: On page 17, between lines 20 and 21, insert a new section as follows: Svc. 703. Notwithstanding any other pro- vision of law, no funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used for the purpose of carrying out research, testing, and/or evaluation of poisonous gases, radio- active materials, poisonous chemicals, bio- logical, or chemical warfare agents upon dogs. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time for debate on this amendment shall be lim- ited to 30 minutes, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of the amendment and the manager of Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield myself such time as I may need. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will be in order. Senators will take their seats or retire to the cloakroom for their conversations. The Senator will not proceed until the Senate is in order. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I discussed this amendment yesterday. I want .to be sure that the Department of Defense and its related departments or agencies do not engage in the use of dogs for carrying out research, testing, and evaluation of poisonous gases, radioac- tive materials, poisonous chemicals, bio- logical or chemical warfare agents. That is the whole purpose of this amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate is not in order. The Senator from _.Minnesota is entitled to be heard. The Chair asks the indulgence of Senators. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, be- cause I want to make sure that this amendment is specific and is directed to- ward the Department of Defense, as it relates to the use of dogs in the testing of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, poisonous chemicals, and biological or germ warfare agents. I want to change my amendment very simply, by making sure that it applies directly to this act. Therefore, on line 2 I would say: No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be used for the purpose of carrying out research, testing .. . I so modify the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator that inasmuch as the yeas and nays have been ordered, Unanimous consent is required. W. HUMP IIIREY. I ask unanimous consent. _ OFFICER. Is there The PP objection? Thebhair'hears none, and it is so ordered. The modified amendment is as follows: -On page 17, between lines 20 and 21, insert mentation program. My amendment a new section as follows: gives it that direction. It prohibits the SEC. 703. Notwithstanding any other pro- use of dogs in all such deadly and Cruel vision of law, no funds appropriated pursuant experimentation. to this Act may be used for the purpose of Mr. President, I find the poison gas carrying out research, testing, and/or evalua- tion of poisonous gases, radioactive materials, experiments by the DOD on dogs-on poisonous chemicals, biological, or chemical man's best friend-reprehensible. warfare agents upon dogs. It is one thing to do legitimate medi- Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the cal research on rats and rabbits, but it purpose of that is for clarity. We are is quite another thing to use dogs, to not trying in this proposal to move in use beagle puppies, in the tasting of on the National Science Foundation, in poisonous nerve gas and radioactive ma- its normal research work, or the Depart- terial and other deadly agents of war- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare. fare. I wonder what the arguments are I want to remind my colleagues in the against this particular proposal. The ar- Senate of the moving words of Senator - In the Sen guments are, of course, that if the Hum- George ate in Gthe. late Vest, 1800' who s to served 1903: phrey_amendment, known as the beagle The one absolutely unselashfriend that amendment, passes, it will restrict re- man can have in this selfish world, the one search, and it'will complicate the prob- that never deserts him, the one that never lems of the Department of Defense on proves ungrateful or treacherous, is his ascertaining how much, for example, an dog ... He will kiss the hand that has no individual or man can take in a sub- food to offer.... When all other friends marine; how much bad air; how much desert, he remains. polluted air. I Introduce this amendment not only Mr. President, I say all of that is not to protect our dogs, which are so close relevant because if the Department of to our hearts, but also with earnest con- Defense wants to make tests as to the cern for the provisions of the Geneva effect of poisonous gases, radioactive ma- Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the terials, poisonous chemicals, biological, use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other or germ warfare agents, there are plenty gases, in war, and the use of bacteriolog- of other animals.they could use such as ical methods of warfare. rates and mice. I am the author of Senate Resolution I do not believe any Member of this 48 which calls for the Senate to support body wants to see the Department of a broad interpretation of the Geneva Defense advertise, as it has recently, for protocol. In so doing my resolution rec- 450 beagle puppies for the purpose of ommends that the United States be will- testing poisonous gases, radioactive ma- ing, on the basis of reciprocity, to re- terials, poisonous chemicals, biological frain from the use in war of all toxic or germ warfare agents. chemical weapons whether directed I, for one, am trying to save the De- against man, animals, or plants. partment of Defense from a little more The amendment which we are consid- bad publicity. I hope they were mistaken ering today is in the context of my con- in that original advertisement. This cern that we prohibit the development amendment really is the result of con- and use of all chemical and biological versations I have had with the distin- weapons whether directed against man guished Senator from Washington (Mr. or man's best friend. MAGNUSON), who long has been interested The DOD currently is testing poisonous in this kind of legislation. The Senator gases on beagles and it will continue to from Washington was not on the floor do so unless we prohibit such a heartless yesterday when I proposed this amend- practice. ment, so I ask unanimous consent that Senators have been calling the Depart- his name be added as a principal co- meat of Defense, editors have been writ- sponsor of the amendment, along with ing editorials, doctors have been pro- the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), testing, but the Department of Defense nd the Senator from West Virginia (Ml`. a just goes willy-nilly on its way with its RANDOLPH). deadly research on dogs. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without As I indicated earlier, the U.S. Army's objection, it is so ordered. Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland currently Mr. HUMPHREY. These Senators all is advertising for 450 beagle puppies to have given serious consideration to this be used to test poisonous chemicals and proposal. gases. We must stop the appalling suf- Mr. President, the amendment before fering' which the dogs must experience us addresses the question of the cruel in these DOD experiments. testing by the Department of Defense if my colleagues were able to read of poisonous gases, germ warfare agents, the scientific description of some of these nerve gas, biological warfare agents, experiments from the American Hygiene poisonous chemicals, and radioactive ma- Journal, which appeared in the RECORD terials on dogs. As I pointed out to my colleagues late yesterday, I am sure they will want to yesterday afternoon upon introduction of stop these devastatingly cruel experi- this amendment, the military branches ments by supporting my amendment. I have. been insensitive to the hue and urge its adoption. cry In this country against their con- Mr. President, before anything further tinued use of dogs in test gas programs. Is said about it, there is not one bit of The DOD has used dogs extensively and necessary research that would be in- currently is using dogs in the evaluation hibited by this amendment. Not one bit of the toxicity and disabling nature of of research has to be done on dogs in poisonous gas. The DOD needs some di- connection with poisonous gases, radio- rection in its use of dogs in an expert- active materials, poisonous chemicals, Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75?0038OR000700030058-3 ne 4, .1974' Approved For CONGRESSIONALORECORD P SENATE 8000700030058-3 S 9n/~ .- S VI.ei In summary our -foreign intelligence Our problem with the removing of the Mr. President, I am prepared to yield service arises out of an act of Congress Russian missiles. from Cuba posed a real back the remainder of my time, if the and all of its activities are clorly ecru- Critical situation. What was not gen- opposition is prepared to yield back its tinized by a number of 1=epr6entative rally known at that time was that a time. members of both the Senate and the high ranking Russian G.R.U. intelligence Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am House of Representatives. This is how agent named Oleg Penkovsk:, had turned glad to yield . back the remainder of my we have resolved the *balarice._between against the Communists, and he was time. the needs of an open society= and the supplying information, quite accurate as Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield back the re.- needs for a secret foreign intelligence it turned out, as to how far the Russians mainder of my time. service. I certainly do not t k that would go. If anyone wants to read some- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. this is the time to unbalance the situa- thing interesting on intelligence opera- HASKELL). All remaining time having; tion as I am confident enactment of the dons. The,Penkovsky Paper:, is the most been yielded back, the question is on proposed amendment would do. interesting book on the subject I have agreeing to the amendment -(No. 1369; Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank ever read. of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. the Senator. I am sorry I do pot have I know there is great interest in the PROXMIRE). more time, but I am glad to yield a min- ute to the Senator from Virginia. Mr. WILLIAM L. SCOTT. Mr. Presi- dent, I merely want to Join with my col- leagues on the Armed Services Commit tee in opposing this amendment We are all proud of the open society of Which we are a part, but there Is a time ,when we must keep some of our, intelligence se- cret, and I would urge my colleagues, in the interest of the country, to defeat this amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time does the opposition have remaining? I might have misunderstood the Chair., The PRESIDING OFFICER. The op- position has 9 minutes. The proponents have 54. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota. Mr. YOt7NG. 11r. President, I rise to oppose the amendment. I see no objection to every Member of the Senate kno ing exactly how much money is spent for intelligence, and Sen- ators can -get that information- now if they want-It. It cannot be made public though, But as one who has served for many years on this five-memlr Sub- committee on Intelligence Appropria, tions and Oversight I can see great dan- ger in, having to -publicize the an3ount of money that can be spent forinteiligence purposes. Let me give a good example- During World War II, President Roosevelt spent some $4.5 billion, as nearly as I m able to ascertain, to develop the atomic bomb. That was probably the best kept secret this country ever had. It was a good thing It was, because'; the Germans had the know-how._ and if they had knpwa we were developing. an atomic bomb , they . could probably have developed pne be- I just cannot understand how Mem- fore us. I understand only five or six bests of the Senate could be afraid of a Members of Congress knew of that de- little knowledge of a little information on velopment, Even Vice President Truman the basis of which inquiry could priv- did not ,know it -until he became Presi- ately be made, so we could see whether dent. If the bomb had not worked, Presi- or not these enormous slims are being dent Roosevelt might have been subject spent wisely. Now we do not know wheth- to impeachment for spending so much er it is $1 billion, $5 billion, $10 billion, money without being authorized to do or what it Is. We do not knew whether 80. the amount is .going up or down. It has Also, during World War II, a German been indicated by the chairman of the named Richard Sorge ,became a Russian Appropriations Committee that the Communist spy.{ He found out from amount has been fairly stable, and per- Japan that they had no Intention of hags' has declined in the last year or attacking Russia, but were going to move so. This is very useful to know. It seems south, and as a result, the Russians were to-me, that we have a right to know able to remove their crack troops from how much !is involved and a duty to the Far East and win the war against know, and a duty to act on the infor- Germany. mation. public knowing . everything possible, but On this question, the Yeah and nays I.think there are some thing; that should have been ordered, and the clerk will be kept secret for our own security. call the roll. Mr. STENNIS. That is a fine state- The assistant legislative clerk called ment. the roll. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, since Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce this is my amendment, I prefer that the that the Senator from California (Mr. apposition make whatever statements CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas: they want to make. I intend to speak only (Mr. FULERIGHT), the Senator from another minute or so, and then I shall Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from yield back the remainder of my time, Kentucky (Mr. HunnLEeTON) the Sell-- which is 54 minutes. ator from Hawaii (Mr. INouYE), the Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, If the Senator from Massachusetts Mr. KEN-- Senator will conclude in 1 minute, I will NEDY), the Senator from Utah (Mr. yield back the rest of my time right now, Moss), the Senator from Alabama (Mr and that will conclude the debate. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Cali- Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, with fornia (Mr. TunrrEY) are fecessarily all deference to, my colleagues, I think absent. this amendment has been very badly mis- I also announce that the Senator from interpreted. It would not give away any Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is absent be- secrete or expose any of the i;ecret work- cause of illness. hies of the CIA. All it would do Is provide Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the one overall figure, of what our irltelli- Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) ggnce operations in total cost, and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. There has been not one example dur- PACKWOOD) are necessarily absent. ing the debate of how this figure could The result was announced-yeas 33, do us any damage; not one. Flow it would nays 55, as follows: help the Russians is beyond me. If they [No. 224 Leg.] inquire as to what the figure means, ob- YNAS-s3 l y s th u vi e no y g t n a swer. o e B u t M em- bers of the Senate or the House of Rep- resentatives, on the basis of this figure, cguld inquire if the total is increasing or decreasing, or determine whether they think it is too big or too small. I point out that it might very well be too .small. .Finally, Mr. President, this proposal is not based on something that came from my mind, by any means. This is based on the recommendation of a bi- partisan committee of Democrats and Republicans, headed by the majority leader and the minority leader, who rec- ommended that the release of this lim- ited information will be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support of our intelligence operations Abourezk Hatfield Muskie Baker Hathaway Nelson Bayh Hughes Pell Case Javits Pro Xoire Church Magnuson Randolph Clark Mansfield Ribteoff Cook Mathias Schweiker Eagleton McGovern Stafford Gravel Metcalf Stevenson Hart Metaenbaum Weleker Haskell Mondale Williams NAYS-55 Aiken Dole McClure Allen Domenici McGee Bartlett Dominick McIntyre Beall Eastland Montoya Bennett Ervin Nunn Bentsen Fannin Pastore Bible Fong Pearson Biden 'Goldwater Percy Brock Griffis Roth Brooke Gurney Scott, Hugh Buckley Hansen Scott, William L. Byrd, Hollings Stennis Harry F.. Jr. Hruska Stevens By, Robert C. Humphrey Taft Cannon Jackson Talmadge Chiles Johnston Thurmond Curtis McClellan Young NOT VOTING-12 Bellmon Huddieston Packwood Cranston Inouye Sparkman Fuibright Kennedy Symington Hartke Moss Tunney So Mr. PROXMIRE'S amendi nt (No.. 1369) was rejected. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected. Mr. McINTYRE. I move to lay that Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 'S9612 Approved L%M1LJ@?MM :gd"75QWp00700030058-3EJune 4, 19 ices Committee of the Senate, the Appro- priations Committee of the Senate, the Armed Services Committee of the House, the Appropriations Committee of the House. So there is nothing hidden. It is disclosed. It just not disclosed to any- body. If any particular Senator wants this information, he can get it from these committees on a classified basis. It,should be classified. This information should not be made, public. Those who passed a law of Congress in 1949, I think, were very far-sighted when they pro- vided that such information would not be made public. I do not know of any objection that has been made to-the way these four committees have handled this informa- tion. So far as I know, the four commit- tees in, Congress have done a good job handling this information. If we reveal this information to the public generally it will simply aid our enemies. We cannot get around that. There is no doubt about it. It will reveal the size of our activities that the CIA is engaged in. It will reveal not only the size but also the trends, because some year it may go up, some year it may go down. Then, that wile indicate to our enemies what we are doing. It will indi- cate whether we are increasing our in- telligence activiiies; whether we are re- ducing our intelligence activities. 'Men the effort will be made to know where, In what country. Another thing : In dealing with foreign nations this could be a sensitive matter. Our relations could be affected because if we make this information available then there is going to be the desire on the part of somebody to know how much of it is being spent in this country, how much is being spent in that country. This is a sensitive question that might bring about some ill will in our foreign relations. No country in the world reveals this information to the public. Why should we do it in the United States? Why should we tell our enemies the size of our ex- penditures in collecting information which we need to preserve this form of government and protect the people of the United States. This would be an opening wedge for intelligence details. Once . the total amount is revealed there will be the strenuous effort to collect the details. There will be a strenuous effort to col- lect the sources of information, the methods of collecting information, who is engaged in this, and how they go about it. Further, I know of no clamor from the public. If the Senator from Wisconsin knows of any clamor from the public to divulge 'figures here that will hurt our country and help the enemy, I do not know about it. Mr. President, I may say, further, that it has been referred to here that Dr. Schlesinger does not seem to object to the amendment, and that Mr. Colby does not object to, it.1 believe the Senator from Wisconsin made some such state- ment. At any rate, during the course of the hearing on his nomination to be Sec- retary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger did make the ilti~tement, but the Senator from Wisconsin did not give the entire statement. I want to give some of the rest of it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's time has expired. Mr. THURMOND. These are his words. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am virtually out of time, but I yield 1 min- ute to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger stated: I would lean against it. But I think that it could be done. The problem that you get into, you see, as you well know, Senator, is that it would be just a free floating figure, unsupported and unsupportable in public, with nobody except the members of the Oversight Committees or members of the Armed Services Committee and Appropria- tion Committees who would know the de- tails. Those are circumstances which under certain conditions would elicit the strong tendency for a flat 10 percent, 20 percent, 60 percent, 100 percent, cut in intelligence ac- tivities because there is an identifiable tar- get with no broad understanding of what the components are and it is that aspect that I think concerns me. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's time has expired. Mr. THURMOND. I may say in clos- ing that we do have an open,society. Mr. STENNIS. I yield one-half minute to the Senator to conclude. Mr. THURMOND. We do have an open society, but there are some things that have to be kept secret, and this is one of those things. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona for 2 minutes. Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Sena- tor. I want to express my deep concern about this amendment. I think it is ex- tremely dangerous, and it should be de- feated. It is dangerous because it starts a precedent. It is a precedent that I do not know exists any place else in the world, and I do not know that it even exists in this country. If this amendment is voted on fav- orably today, we can rest assured that within a year or two, the demand will be made to break the figures down so that we will know where every cent is going. In military operations there is noth- ing that approaches intelligence. The estimate of the situation that is made by every man in any battle he has ever en- gaged in is headed by intelligence of the enemy forces. If the enemy knows what we know about their forces, then this in- telligence becomes valueless. Mr. President, I see no need for this amendment. Any Senator can attend briefings by the CIA if he is cleared for top secret. Any Senator can get the fig- ures that we are talking about by ask- ing for them. If we make them public I think we are asking for trouble. We have had imposed an us an almost impossible task of espionage with respect to the Soviet Union, while they have a very easy time of it in the United States. I do not want to make that any easier. I hope that the Senate will say "no" to this very ill-advised amendment. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Nevada. Mr. CANNON. I thank the chairman for yielding to me. I must say that I am in complete ac- cord with the statement just made by Senator GOLDWATER. I cannot think of anything more unwise or anything that could possibly be more harmful to our Government than to let this amendment be agreed to, providing for full and free information to people from whom we would like to keep that information. I certainly am in favor of full dis- closure on matters that ought to be of public interest and ought to be disclosed to the public. I have supported that con- cept continuously over the years. But I think that disclosure of the intelligence budget would, over the years, by virtue of the trends that were discovered, and which that would disclose, would cer- tainly provide valuable assistance to our adversaries. I think that if we were to provide that type of information, then we might just as well discontinue the type of ac- tivities that we are trying to continue to keep this country informed of for the benefit of the people who reside here. I hope that the Senate will defeat this amendment overwhelmingly. I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Washing- ton. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I do not feel that this proposal really meets our national interest. It is true that a for- eign intelligence service like the CIA must operate more openly in our society than any other similar service in any other democracy in the world. Let us look at the facts: Last year the new Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, appeared before the Senate Armed Services Com- mittee and gave extensive testimony in public. I know of no other democratic society in which this would occur. It has been mentioned here earlier, Mr. President, that the head of MI-6, which is British Intelligence, is known only to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. That is how close they keep that in- formation. The functions and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency are fully prescribed in statute. I know of no other democratic society in which this has been done. Finally, the appropriations for CIA are subject to a process which intimately in- volves four committees of the Congress who are aware of and approve the de- tails of its programs. The proposal before us is designed to contribute to a more informed public. But how can the public be really in- formed unless the details of CIA's pro- grams are also spelled out? Yet, if we did so, I can guarantee that we will be pro- viding what is necessary for our potential adversaries to neutralize the methods which we must use in order to obtain information about closed societies. The paradox of the situation is re- flected in the fact that recently some journalists were jailed in Sweden-cer- tainly not a closed society-for merely mentioning that Sweden has an intelli- gence service. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 - une 4, 1974 Approved For URES pnp, ( RRI0~J 000700030055-3 S9611, ness of much of our most impprtant work ties of the agency designated to perform familiar, and of- which it had been fully ap- in the field ofirit~elligence. its foreign intelligence mission. In the prised during this and previous sessions. The PRESIDING OFP'IC The Sen-. process of working out legislation for * * ator's 2 minutes have expire CIA, it, was necessary to somewhat The appropriation and the activity had Mr. STENNIS. I yield mys f 1 minute change ,the procedures foliowect in the been approved and recommended by the more. case of the more normal Federal agency. Bureau of the Budget and, like all military I -oppose the amendmentbecause it This wag particularly true in connection aegendituthe and oparaterns, was under the the would give our adversary, nor and in the with provisions concerning the author:,- Armed Fore Co the United States, for wi;o m future, the working tools, a ueprint, to zation and appropriation of funds. all members of the subcommittee have the a degree, of our activities that have. al- Public revelation in these areas would highest regard and in whose military capaity ready proved to be so valu le and are alert potential adversaries to programs, they have the utmost confidence. proving themselves more v able, in a needs, and accomplishments. This know::- The question immediately arises as to the way, as each year comes and jioes. edge could be used against our Nation's authority of the subcommittee to recomm.nd So I hope the Senate will t only de- interest to offset the value of intelligence P for u e purposes, a a pr pri e failure feat this amendment but, tth all due collected or to-neutralize the sources and deference my friend divulge to the House and the country the to to do sby a la e th d d , rg me o s use . Justifications warranting the expenditure ,find vote. I will be glad to be relijved of my The 1949 CIA Act permits the alloca,- all details connected with the item at the responsibilities in this field it-the Senate tion of sums for the CIA to carry out time it was under consideration on the floor. wants to adopt a new system. its activities without publicly revealing The answer of the subcommittee Is-ab- I yield to the Senator from Youth Caro- the secret purpose to which such funds solute and unavoidable military necessity, ling. may be Put. fundamental nationial defense. Mr. President, how many Minutes do Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- we have left? sent that section 6 of that act be printed This appropriation, and its purpose, is jus. The PRESIDING OFFER. The at this point in my remarks. tified by honored and established precedecnt. Senator has 30 minutes left. There, being no objection, the sectia:n This subcommittee, including the same per-sonnel with of Mr. STENNIS. I yield 12 minutes to the was ordered to be printed in the RECORID, who have si the exception the two commit- Senator m - from South Carolina as follOWS: tee ho have which for re something like s 3 same years rc~s Pre- - Mr. THURMOND. Mr. Pretent, I rise Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of vided in the annual appropriation bills a sure In opposition to the amendnent by the the foreign intelligence activities of the which finally totaled more than $2 billion senior Senator from Wisconsif. The pro- United States and in order further to imple- for the original atomic bomb. Session alter posal has the lure of simplict , but con- ment the proviso of section 403(d) (3) cif session the money was provided, and the sub- sequences that run deep, and ggainst our this titie'that the Director of Central Intel- committee visited Oak Ridge where the work Nation's fundamental interes. It Con- ligence shall be responsible for protecting was in progress without any Member of he tains the promise of fundamental inters the public intelligence sources and methods from un- House with the exception of the Speaker authorized disclosure, the Agency shall be Of the House being aware of this tremendous while preserving the essentlalecurity of exempted. from the provisions of section 654 project or the expenditure of the money. .ic. our foreign intelligence Cap ilities. In of Title to and the provisions of any other cording to the testimony of all military eu-, fact, I believe it would serve oth inter- law whichh require the publication or die- thorities that bomb ended the War and sa,red ests poorly. closure of, the organization, functions, names, the lives of not less than half a million men ploy--- -- -- t-e Agency: --vid employe-- nations - s to possess int the That the intentions and capabilities of adver- rector in of furtherance the Bureau of of this the e section, Budget et shall Di- saries. General Washington Wrote one make no reports to the Congress in connec- of his intelligence chiefs, 7Col. Elias tion with the Agency under section 947 (b 1 Dayton: of Title 5. The necessity of procuring good intelli- Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as a gence is apparent and need not-be further -matter of fact, the arrangements worked urged-all that remains for meeto add, is, out are completely responsive to the ma- that you keep the whole matter ps secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Sucggss depends jor elements of the Federal budgetary In most Enterprizes of the kind, Bald for want systems. Changes from the norm are de.- of it, they are generally defeats .1, however signed to provide a reasonably controlled well planned and promising a fav ?rable issue. environment so as to protect and Preserve That was the statement t our first the sources and methods which neces. Commander in Chief, the first,,President. sarily must be resorted to in collecting The tragic experience of Peal Harbor foreign intelligence. taught us a number of paint lessons. As a matter of fact, I know that the In the 1947 National Security Act the budget of CIA is scrutinized with great Congress took a giant step toward as- care. suring that executive action dr inaction Similar procedures have been used in the international field would be based .over the years to fund other governmen.. upon the best information. avajlable. In- tal activities of an extremely sensitive sofar as it is possible for the Congress to nature when the public interest would no duct of essentially an executive responsi- bility the National Security Ut of 1947 provided the authority needed for an effective foreign intelligence ,establish- ment. The CIA Act of 1949 provided addi- tional administrative authorsf for CIA and provided for its funding.2'lie fund- ing of CIA was particularly ,important from the point of view of Congress since it establishes the second of the two prin- cipal relationships between arexecutive branch agency and the Congress-legis- lation and appropriations. I believe that our Nation is unique in the attention Its legislature has given to specifying and circumscribing the activi- be served through the use of more com?? mon explicit procedures. Examples of this include the Manhattap project for the development of the atomic bomb and the development of the U-2 airplane. On May 10, 1960, following the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union, the chair- man of tale House Appropriations Com- mittee, Clarence Cannon, explained that: The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided. under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress. Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the sub. committee in charge of the appropriation was that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggre. gated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that pur. posse. And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident. The world has always recognized the re- markable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authori?? tartan dictatorship. We have here demonstrated. conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruth- less and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization. The CIA Is held tightly accountable within the executive and legislative bodies. There maybe disagreement as to whom the Members should be or mere particularly what committee they should be from In the Congress, but I think su'h disagreements can only be resolved ors the basis of giving priority to the special constitutional roles of the Congress-Lie appropriation of funds-the enactment: of legislation-and the oversight of leg- islation already enacted. It Is difficult to perceive how enlarging a somewhat small group into a somewhat large group would assure that these congressional respon- sibilities are being fulfilled. Clearly ,in- formation on the activities of the C9:A. should not be displayed in a public arena. To do so would defeat our national interest. Mr. President, I simply want to say that four committees of Congress now r.- ceive this information-the Armed Seri- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 S9610 Approved FoC graSBI IDREC bP78 '96R000760030058JJne 4, 19 74 This argument today is' not prompted by the CIA. I have not mentioned this matter to the CIA. I do not have one scintilla of line about them, or a tele- phone call, a meeting, or anything else. Those of us who have been in touch with the problem have a feeling about it. As the Senator from Arkansas said, we are not speaking for a committee, or a de- partment, a director, an employee, or anything else. This is a problem concern- ing our national security that has jammed us right to the question of na- tional survival. That is why we stand here year after year standing firm on this position. It may sound apologetic, but it is not apologetic. It goes as far as it can to explain to the membership and to the American people the problem we are up against, and how this problem is handled; and, as much as we can, the reason for handling it that way-at the same time showing the proper respect for every Member of this body and for tinguished Senators who have yet to briefings by the CIA direct to our full speak in opposition to the amendment- committee. I have not heard one, single, solitary, real, But going back over the years, every hypothetical, or imaginary example of year this matter has been scrupulously how any damage is going to be done to the gone into because. of the special nature United States of America. How is this in- and because we had this extraordinary formation going to be used against us? I responsibility. I remember asking Dep- have heard nothing on that score. I have uty Secretary of Defense Packard when heard generalizations as to what might he was here 3 years ago to look into this happen if we were to release informa- matter from his viewpoint, and he did tion not called for by this amendment. that. That does not make any sense. Because Now, we are talking about a good many we provide the overall total figure for in- different groups that are connected with telligence does not mean we are going to the intelligence effort. The Senator from tell anything about the CIA. Wisconsin asked for something specific. My point is that if this amendment is To start with, the Soviets know almost wrong, the burden of proof certainly is on everything about everything we are those'who would say it is wrong; because doing by merely going to the bookstore what we are doing is simply providing or to the newsstand. They get all of that the taxpayer what they are entitled to laid out before them, almost everything; know, information on where their money and we get nothing. Wo do not know any- goes. If we are not going to disclose this, thing much about what they are doing. the burden of proof certainly should be That is what makes it necessary for us to on the side of those who say we should have such a vast intelligence-gathering insist on secrecy and not provide dis- activity which is worldwide. We have to closure. carry a great deal of the load, the major- So I say that proof has been lacking ity of the load for the free world. I am and I see no examples at all of any dam- talking about.the money load. But we do age this could do. not have anything to start with. The Mr. President, I reserve the remainder Soviets have everything, almost. of my time. If they are given this new information Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how then certain deductions could be made much time remains in opposition to the about how much. of the budget is going amendment? for these different activities and the first The PRESIDING OFFICER. The op- things we know calculations are made position has 45 minutes remaining. and they come pretty close to being cor- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield rect as to how much is spent by the mili- myself 10 minutes. , tary, how much is spent in the civilian The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- area how much is spent on satellites, and ator from Mississippi is recognized. how much is spent by the CIA itself and Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have where. Following a series of deductions said in this Chamber before and I repeat and inferences based on all the informa- now that it is not fun being on this com- tion they already have from us, from the mittee that looks into the money that newspapers, and from the newsstands, goes into intelligence. I say that after they will be able to make fairly good cal- years of service on the Committee on culations. Armed Services and the last 5 years as Specifically I wish to point out one chairman of that committee matter. Senators remember the incident This idea of not having had any sur- of the U-2 having been shot down. Re- veillance and Congress having failed to member that landing that was made. We go into it, those statements are just un- later had that gentleman before our founded because they are made on facts committee. President Eisenhower was that have been told to some Senators that President then. He said: are not correct. I am to blame if any blame is to be t attached. ma b u tter I do not like to go into this In the formative days men like former Senator Russell of Georgia, former Sen- ator Ellender of Louisiana, and former Senator Smith of Maine were Members of this body, and they were some of the personalities involved. I have served with them, as has the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG), who is still serving. Also the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN) is here. He already has spoken. It is a mistake to say that the Com- mittee on Armed Services in the year 1970-71 held no meetings on this mat- ter. Every Item in the CIA budget in those years was gone over by members of the committee and the capable staff members, and checked in and checked out. I remember that in January of 1973 we' had a full briefing before the full coniinittee by the CIA, and the budget committee on the CIA had meetings, and went had d meetings this year, in 1974, we that have over the budget; and we had the taxpayer who contributes as much as one thin dime to the cause involved. Now, what, about the CIA itself. The Senator from Wisconsin has offered a valuable amendment with respect to the basic CIA law, and it has been accepted. I commend him highly for the amend- ment. We had a bill I had introduced in my committee. We have not yet had a chance to have hearings on that bill. There are some of its provisions that I am delighted to see added as a part of this bill. They are relevant and will be helpful. For many years I, along with other Senators, have gone over every single major item in the'CIA budget. On my responsibility to my colleagues, they in CIA keep a clean house. They have had a conservative operation dollar- wise and have accounted for the money in a splendid way. That has been true without exception. There has been no great spillage of money or great extrava- gances, and not one bit of scandal or odor of any kind. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's 10 minutes have expired. Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 2 more minutes. In connection with the expenditure of that intelligence money. There are other agencies involved, as we all know. The military services have already been men- tioned. The Defense Department itself has a certain intelligence agency at- tached to it. So when I say these matters have been gone over, I mean all of it, but our Armed Services Committee is the so-called par- ent committee of this direct CIA money. I am not here to praise anyone, but I tell you, Mr. President, that moneywise for years and years the CIA has been conservatively operated and has had a firm hand and a clean house and a clean record with reference to the handling of the taxpayers' money. I hope that in a moment of frustra- tion-and I do not blame any Senator That U-2 venture saved our Treasury billions and billions of dollars, in my judgment, and I am familiar with the facts. If we had not been carrying on an activity such as that we would have been totally in the dark with respect to what we knew about the extensive missile work, the silos that they had, and a great many other -things that could be named. There is a specific illustration. Some might say, "Go on and develop what is happening now." I cannot do that; I cannot go on. That is one of the things that can be brought out. I have talked to Senators in the cloakroom and largely have satisfied them with respect to the matters we have talked about, with respect to these programs, and this money, and how we hold back the actual ounts for reasons I have already ll d ar am o given, and other reasons that could be tern is not overturned here on the floor given. I know this has been a good debate of the Senate on an amendment which, and I have never seen a debate where I if it becomes- law and is carried out, was so certain no single speaker was would, as its practical effect, virtually speaking for any agency. destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effective- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 June 4, I97Approved For R GRgO AI,gM; B0 X0700030058-3 S%09 House Appropriations: Mahon, Whitten, Mr. STENNIS. I the Senator es> lylnshall, and cederbez yield i right for me to do that. But I wish it House Arme services: Nedai, H6bert, Price, additional minute. were possible and consistent with the Fisher, r!n eArends, ansi d BQb Wtleon. Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, this best interests of our country to disclose Mr has been a burden to me. I have had these figures on the front pages of the President, as Ihave pointed out, Senators in good conscience, in good press, on television and radio, s3 that we are servants of this bQay and of the faith-dedicated, loyal., patriotic Amerl- everybody would know. I believe, how- House. If it Is desired that,his matter be cans--come to me and seek this informa- ever, that the Senator agrees with me not handled this way, the enate should tion. I Would like to give it to them. But that that would be a bad mistake. I think: recommend a change in a law and a I am torn between the personal desire it is a mistake to start the public dis- joint supervisory committi be created. I to make them acquainted with every- closing of these matters. If you do not will support it. I will w elco rie it. I do npt thing, I know-everything I have seen like the setup, change the setup, but we care. and heard in these hearings-and the must protect our national security. But, let us bear in mind that if we are duty to help maintain and preserve our Mr. PROXMIRE. I say to the Senator to have a security intelligence agency, we national security. A security that wi,l be from Arkansas that I wholeheartedly cannot have it with national publicity effective and can be useful and can serve agree that the Senator is absolutely right on what it does, how It dogs it, and how to protect the welfare of our country. to come and ask for the Senate's decision much It spends here, or how much It I have to make that cholce. on this. spetids there. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will As I understand the Senator's re- 1 was Intrigued by the .;.statement of the Senator yield? sponse, at one time he thought that he the Senator from Wisconsin when he Mr. McCLELLAN. I will yield, but :first could release this if the Senate would said, "Let us end this ignorance." I should like to make one other corn- approve; but he has had second thoughts All right. How much is Ignorance? ment., on it, and now he feels that it might not Pirst, the total amount. You want to I think I can go this far. For the past serve the interests of the country to dis- end that ignorance? That is when you 5 years, we have held extensive hearings close this information at the present intend to put the camel's nose under the on these requests for appropriations. It time. tent. That Is the beginning. That is the has ben more than adequatesupervision Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will wedge. You say you do notyant to know with respect to expenditures; I can say the Senator yield? all the details on how the npney is spent. that. It has been on the conservative Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield. But if you get the ovarall.,figures of $1 side, I may say to the Senator, without Mr. McCLELLAN. We had Mr. Colby billion or half a billion dolle,rs or $5 bil- any reservation whatever. in and discussed this matter. I asked Mr. lion, or whatever, then howiire you going The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Colby to come down, and I asked the to know, how can you evaluate, how can ator's additional time has expired. Senator from Wisconsin and the Seaator you judge or make an intelligent judg- Mr.STENNIS. I yield the Senator 1 from California to come In and interro?? meat on whether that is too much or too additional minute. gate him and visit with him about these little, whether it is being expended wise- Mr. McCLELLAN. We cut the national things. I have done everything I possibly ly or unwisely, except when you can get defense budget. We cut this more her- can to try to find an answer to this iirob- the details? centagewise, fem. But I do not know the answer. We How? You cannot know,.. And if you The issue can simply be stated. Do we either have to do it or not do it. receive these figures and if_ you end this want to publicly disclose these figures? Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. Ignorance as to the total mount, next. Or do we want some other change, some Mr. President. I should like to :rake you will want to end the ignorance as other committee to try i;o perform these one other statement. to the different agencies adid bow it is functions? I am willing to abide by the The Senator from Arkansas hags as - spent, and through whom, it is spent. decision of the Senate. gued, as do other Senators, that the re- Next, you will want to end the ignorance. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will lease of this information, the os erall on what it is spent for. Negt, you want the Senator yield on my time? total information, is going to be of some to end the ignorance of how that intel- Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield. value to the Soviet Union, but of no ligence is procured. There 1s no end to Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield myself 2 min- value to us. That does not make any s ense It. We take, a choice. If you vote this utes, Mr. President, to ask the dist:in- at all to me. It may or may not be of any way, the Senate takes the responsibility. guished Senator from Arkansas a ques- value to the Soviet Union. Frankly, :I It is no embarrassment to ieie or to any tion. think it will be of none. There is no way other member of this committee. If this On November 15, the majority and the Soviet Union can interpret whether is the way the Senate wants to do it, that minority leaders wrote the Senator from our overall figure indicates what we are Is its responsibility. Arkansas, asking that he release all over- doing within our intelligence committee. The national security of this country all intelligence information of the kind Suppose we decrease the amount we are also is the Senate's responsibility. If this called for in the amendment. The re- spending. That may mean. that our satel- is the way the Senate wants to do it, very sponse of the distinguished Senator from lites are more effective. That may mean well. But let me say this: By ending the Arkansas, on November 20, is as follows: we have found methods that are more ignorance that the Senator speaks of. I have your letter of November 15 and efficient in gathering intelligence than that can be pursued logically to the point want you to know that I Intend to comply, relying on manpower. If we increase the as fully as possible, with the recommendation that this will not be the end,.of it. It will of the Senate Select Committee on Secret amount we are spending, it may mean the go on from here. and Coufdentiai Documents to provide the reverse. It may not mean that we are "Ignorance" is a harsh word. We have Senate with the over-an sums requested for making a greater intelligence effort. to be ignorant of many thilags in Gov- each of the various intelligence agencies, What this does is to alert the Senate ernment. If Government is going to What was the intention of the Senator of the United States-it alerts Members function in the area of national security, from Arkansas? Is his intention the sarae of Congress-so that they, in turn, can we cannot be informed at all..times about now, or has he changed his mind? get the information they should have if everything that is going on. We often in- Mr. McCLELLAN.,It was my intention they feel that a disproportionate amount form our enemiesof too much-and they and it would be my intention now, to Is being devoted to the intelligence com- can take advantage of it. release those figures If it would not munity-as to whether they feel it is too If you are going to end all their alleged jeopardize. our national security. I do much or too little. Ignorance, you are going to vjid national not want to withhold them. I would like As the letter from Senator HUGH Scorn security. Where do we stop? It you do not to give the Senator everything I know. and Senator MArrsFrar.n pointed out, the like the ad hoc committees, do what the But this is not my responsibility. I am purpose of this is to maintain the nec- distinguished Senator from. Minnesota not the committee. I would have no right essary support for our intelligence opera- has suggested: Create another commit- to come here and spread these matters tions, not to tear them down. Not to tees which you will have confidence. on the floor of the Senate without the diminish our effort, but so that we can Crete.another committee;. name the approvtl of the committee. reinforce it and do so wisely and Intelli- Peoliile you w311'trust to oversee. Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is abso- gently. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The lutely right. One more point. With all the deb;ate Senator's 8 minutes have expired. Mr. McCLELLAN. It would not be we have heard-and I challenge the dis- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 S 9608 Approved FoE8"g4 1U JJ0J'EL'Uf&E7 ENA, 8000700030058 nC 4, ate: The greatest threat to the security of this Nation is the secrecy that we our- selves place on these events. It will be from the inside, not from the outside. We talk about the numbers of missiles, we talk about the numbers of warheads, we talk about the numbers of subma- rines, we talk about the numbers of air- planes, and all of these things; but when each can destroy the Earth, then how much is enough? The threat will come from losing con- trol on the inside. If maintaining that control requires an ounce of risk, then I think we should be prepared to take that ounce of risk in at least letting us see publicly and the people see publicly whether we are spending $3 billion, $7 billion, or $90 billion, and how we are concealing it and hiding it, and if we are protecting ourselves from the inside as well as from the outside. I think that ounce of risk, if it exists, is worth taking, and I thank the dis- tinguished Senator from Wisconsin for yielding. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HUGHES. I yield. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I re- spect this good man the Senator from Iowa, who is one of the great men of the Senate, a great spirit and a great in- spiration to me, and I really regret that on occasions like this one has to dis- agree with a friend so dear and precious, but I want to say to the Senator that while this argument is moving and I think. filled with much truth, we can control any possibility of secrecy or of coverup by establishing within the in- struments of the Congress the necessary machinery for the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. We have executive sessions in this Congress. We have them in the Foreign Relations Committee and we have them in the Armed Services Committee, and we do not permit those executive ses- sions to become public. Maybe that is a mistake. But I, over long years of serv- ice here, have felt that some of these sessions are necessary. I feel there is a tendency to try to make too much secret and too much ex- ecutive. This is why I have proposed that we have a joint committee on national security of the House of Representatives and the Senate. We have an ad hoc com- mittee on this matter of the intelligence operations of our Government, and on that ad hoc committe serve some of the finest Members of this body. I know what good men they are. I am confident that they are as concerned about the security of this country inside and out- side as any of us. I find them philo- sophically the kind of Senators who would be able to cross-examine anyone. And while I cannot help but agree with the Senator from Iowa that one of our great threats is from within, particularly from the moral erosion that is taking place in our society, not only now but over the years, I do not underestimate the threat from without. Furthermore, good intelligence permits us to do a better fob in terms of our national security expenditures and op- erations, not necessarily increasing them but reducing them, and I believe I heard today from the chairman of the Com- mittee on Appropriations that the funds for intelligence operations have been reduced. I happen to believe that we have the power in Congress to set up whatever kind of method or supervisory system we need so that we do not let the execu- tive branch run rampant. But, under our system, we put a great deal of trust and faith in the President. I know that this is a difficult time to discuss that, because of the events of recent months, but I do say to you, Mr. President, that we have a man in that high office, the President of the United States, who has the prime responsibility for these re- quirements of intelligence and national security and if we do not have the right man there, then it our fault, because we elected him. We can establish all kinds of systems, elections, and campaign reform, and say that we do a better job, but I happen to believe that we should proceed with great caution when it comes to this busi- ness of, really, opening up and exposing, because I think of what would be the inevitable result of our intelligence op- erations. Mr. President, I regret to have to say this, because I would like very much from my own political point of view to say to the contrary, but from the point of view of my conscience, I speak as did the Senator from Iowa. Is it not a wonderful thing in this body that two of us can be- lieve so differently and can be as sincere in our point of view? I greatly respect the Senator from Iowa, and if his point of view prevails, I think it will prevail in large measure, because of our great respect for him. Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distin- guished Senator from Minnesota. I am ready, willing, and I hope able to join him, and I hope the chairman of all of the committees, to find out what they are doing. This would be the appropriate moment, the time, and the day to find out. Let us make sure, instead of an ad hoc oversight or a minimum oversight, that there is some. sort of bearing and adequate responsibility on that oversight and in carrying it out. Although we do not have enough time, I agree that an occasional session here is useful so that the youngest and the newest Members can get available information in relation to- these activities so that they would know something about them. Again, I say that this is no risk com- pared to the risk of darkness. A little bit of light at this moment might help us all in the years to follow. Mr. PROXMIRE. I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES). He has hit the target exacly on this issue. The greatest danger we face is from within, I agree. We have seen what-has happened to the intelli- gence community. But I want to tell the Senator from Iowa that I tried to get the most practical and limiting amendment that I could get. I discussed the amend- ment recommended by the majority and minority leaders, written to the chair- man of the Appropriations Committee, and it was agreed, after a study by the 1974 Senate Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, that the Senate should be provided with all of the infor- mation requested for intelligence. They believed that the release of this limited information would be useful to the Sen- ate in maintaining the necessary support for intelligence operations. All I do is provide the overall figures. The commit- tee consists of Senators MANSFIELD, PAS- TORE, HUGHES, CLARK, GRAVEL, JAVITS, HATFIELD, GURNEY, and COOK. Their re- port recommended this procedure. That is all. It certainly does not go so far as breaking it down as. to what the CIA and the DIA spend. The leaders concluded that if we get this overall information, we will be in a better position to dis- charge our duties and responsibilities to the people. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and I yield the floor. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN). The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAS- KELL). The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 8 minutes. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I am reluctant to speak on this issue, because of the position I occupy as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on In- telligence Operations. By reason of that position as chairman of that subcommit- tee, I have the duty of oversight over the CIA. I am reluctant to speak on these mat- ters because-I do not relish nor do I cherish nor do I take pride in the fact- that I may have access to information that I cannot share with my colleagues. I would wish it were practical. I wish it were a proper thing to do-to disclose every bit of information that I have been able to obtain from time to time respect- ing the activities of the CIA, what it does, its methods of procuring information, how it spends its money, and the results that it achieves. I would prefer to do that. The subcommittees who have this responsibility are ad hoc committees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee of both the Senate and House. We are instrumentali- ties of the Senate, of the Congress, and so created where we are serving as your agent, as your tool, to achieve the super- vision that is possible and necessary. We are charged with the responsibility to see that this work is carried on, and to rec- ommend the proper appropriations therefor. If these subcommittees-and there are 22 members on them. Ten are from the Senate-five are from the Appropriations Committee and five are from the Armed Services Committee, who are privy to this information that is withheld for security reasons from the public. The committee members are: INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEES Senate Appropriations: McClellan, Stennis, Pastore, Young, and Hruska. Senate Armed Services: Stennis, Syming- ton, Jackson, Thurmond, and Dominick. Mr. President, there are 12 members of the Armed 'Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee of the. House of Representatives. The House Committee members are: Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030058-3 JIcne 4, 197 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE if yod really want to`iindout' what is Rung in America, you don't have to do re- se th; just ask anybody an& he will give you a full hour's dissertation. lllr. PROXMIRE. We have a pretty g system. 1 r. HUMPHREY. Do ngt misutnder- stalid me. .Mr_ PROXMIRE. It worn well. It is' open and free. Mr. HUMPHREY. I thin this open- nets is our strength. I think a society has to have that openness. But I think there- are some things in family life that are private, that do not aid a good family 1! one starts exposing it all. L think there are some t ings, may I say, in public life called national security, particularly when it comes to intelli- gence-gathering: It is a nasty business, and the Senator knows It a'id I know it, and, of course, it makes good headlines, it makes, good stories it mes good fic- tion; it makes good TV. Bit there is a point, I think, where we have to ask our- selves, "]Jo I dare go this fair," and that is all the Senatorfrom_Minnesota is do ing I really do not intend to get so in- volved in tits debate, but t feel a very deep obligation, about this. I think that 1 owt it to this body to at lelst tell what my- experience has been, even though f had no direct responsibility. 1 only served as Vice President, but l ha-ppen to be- lieve that this agency is 96 important that we ought to make sure within the confines of Congress that wg know what it is doing, and set up the Instruments ail men we can trust. We trust one another in this body on the basis of censorship o each other., One 'thing I plead for in the Senate is more trust other than our running to get the heaines. More loves more aifec- tion in this body; that is what this coun try really needs today. What I worry about is that somehow or other we feel we tar trust each other here. I happen to nink-and I useone Senator, the Senatot,from Rhode Island-who is as much igiterested in cutting the defense budget the Sena- tor rdim Mi nesota. I wan to see that budget reasonable, and I want to see it trimmed. By the way, the committee did cut it, It cut it so much tha some of us who thought we were going to cut it feel that they beat us to it. It is my j4dgment that we have got to trust somebody. I think what we are doing here is trusting somebody. Ir. McCLELLAN. I might say that at- the same tingle we cut the defense budg- et, we also out this budget more than we did the defense budget. I will just say that much for the record. Mr. HUMPHREY. There we are. I be- lieve -we have to have some place in this body where there are some of most deli- cate things involved where we can put our trust. When we find that trust has been violated, we can remove people from those iositions. -i do not believe I have any more to add. and be redundant. I' save partic- ipated in this debate becalue I feel we. have got tobe very, very careful. I wel- come the initiative of the Senator from Wisconsin, because it gives us a chance to really explore what we are doing. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Iowa such time as he may require. Mr. STENNIS. Before he does that, will the Senator yield to me to ask how much time we have remaining, those in opposition to the amendment? Mr. ?ROI IIRE.1',yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Those in opposition have 54 minutes remaining. Mr. STENNIS. Fifty-four minutes; what about the` proponents? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pro- ponents of the amendment have 72 min- utes r mg. Mr. ; ROXtvIIRE. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Iowa such time as he may require. Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distin- guisheo Senator from Wisconsin. Mr. president, the distinguished Sen- ator from Minnesota has six guests wait- ing in the dining room. He has assured me he is not walking out on my disser- tation here today. I assure him that he is free to go. I value his friendship and integrity beyond anything he could pos- sibly know. The debate I have listened to so far seems to carry an implieation that this amendment is a threat to the internal workings of the CIA and the intelligence gathering community of America around the world, and thereby a threat to 1 he security of the United States of America. The .amendment is very simple, Mr. President. It would list publicly the ceil- ing or the total amounts of money spent in the Intelligence gathering community. One of the greatest threats to any country, and particularly a country that has great military strength, is not from the outside or from its foreign enemies, it Is from the inside, from secrecy and interior deterioration. The greatest threat of all is when we begin to lose control and not know what is happening, and when we begin to give large sums of money to mechanizations and machines that have no bureaucratic control over them. The Senator says, trust. Yes, we trust and we love. But we know from reading history that governments have destroyed themselves when they no longer had knowledge of what was happening, and when the interior started breaking down. I am not half as concerned, in today's world, about the future of America based on exterior threat as I am about what is happening Inside this country and what can happen inside this country unless we are completely open, with every ounce of communications we can have with the people of this country. If thereby there is some little risk to the, world, with the risks we are already living with, I say it is not too high a price to pay. What is the role of the CIA? As far as I know, I know nothing. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and I know Nothing. I could get suchinforma- tion, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, given to me privately. It would be given. But as far as 1: know, there is no Member of the Senate, no Member of Congre,ps, and no member of the ad- S 9607 ministration, including the President of the United States, who knows precisely and exactly what the CIA is doing in every incident. We do know they are involved, as the Senator from Minnesota has said, in a nasty business. They are involved in a nasty business in a lot of areas of the world, and that nasty business is sup- posedly directed at proteing the free- dom of the people of the country and. our friends in "the free world. But no one has the certainty to know precisely what everyone is doing, or even where they are doing It from= time to time. But that is not what we are asking for today. Not at all. All of this debate that I have been listening to, though relevant to the overall intelligence community, which is certainly involvedln the security and freedom of the people of the free world, not just in ous country but that of the people of other countries, has no re- lationship to the risk involved in giving the people of this country a glimpse of light in telling them what the total cost. is involved in the intelligence activities of this country throughouthe world. We doo not know that amount, but we do know it is in the billions of dollars. I listened to the chairman of the Sen- ate Appropriations "Committee say did not even want to know, because he was afraid he might talk in his sleep some- time and thereby disclose it to someone. He made that statement on the floor of the Senate. Mr. President, we are asking just for a thread of light into what may be not only our greatest source c#f security, but has the potential to be our greatest threat, without the dbservation `and light and without the security that we our- selves as publicly elected officials can place upon those who have the capacity together with the reStrainb--and if goers is any evidence that we have applied, as elected officials, the responsibility of re- straint I am unaware of it. I am not say- ing there are misdeeds or there are wrongs. I am saying none of us know whether we are right or wrong. If we know, I would like toknow it is and how much he knows, even an individual Sen- ator, if he Is asked for enough ahead, to know what geundwork is--being laic: for the capacity to draw the threads of the armaments of this country into entangle- ments. We have wrestled for years with the problem of the CIA. We do not know. We are uninformed. The oversight that is done apparently is not carried out either mechanically or intelligently. We have not had the capacity or responsi- bility to know even when we were given information whether it was right, or wrong, or what was happening. .Mr. President, one of the great Senators of our time has :been the dis- tinguished Senator from Minnesota. He is, as he called himself, o, liberal, who has said, "Let us show the public every- thing, let us give them all the informa- tion." I respect his debate today in saying the public should not have this infor- mation, that It is a threat to our se- curity. But, Mr. Preside, I leave this thought with the Members of the Sen- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 S9606 Approved Fore.Eig?8/g7kf&-?BP75$ff000700030058-June 4, 1974 would not get up on the floor of the Sen- ate and ask how much higher or lower the figures are for this year as compared to last year? Knowing the Senator from Wisconsin, he would be the first in the Senate to do so. Mr. PROXMIRE. Would that not be good? What would be wrong with that? Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can re- veal what he knows. Mr. PROXMIRE. I do not have to re- veal it. I can ask about it. Mr. PASTORE. What am I supposed to do? I cannot tell the Senator; so the Sen- ator goes out and says, "Senator PASTORE would not tell me." Mr. PROXMIRE. No. But the Senator from Rhode Island and other Senators know about it. Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can find it out privately, but he does not want to find it out privately. He wants to tell the world about it. Mr. PROXMIRE. I think the world ought to know the overall figures. Mr. PASTORE. Does the Senator mean Russia should know? Mr. PROXMIRE. Right. Mr. PASTORE. My goodness, I quit. Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator say that it would have been in our na- tional interest in World War II if Frank- lin Delano Roosevelt had published how much money was invested in the atomic bomb? Mr. PROXMIRE. Of course not. My amendment would not require it. Mr. HUMPHREY. I realize whenever we get into any element that is called secrecy here it is suspect. We are deal- ing with national security, and one has got to trust somebody. We have a way at least of checking here a little bit, and that check is with the ad hoc committee. If that committee does not meet often enough, I suggest we submit an amend- ment requiring the committee to meet monthly or to meet quarterly for what- ever time is necessary. That is what we need to do. I happen to believe that we need a Joint Committee on National Security in Congress, that is going to have general supervision of the CIA, consisting of the top people of Congress, just as we have a National Security Council. I proposed it repeatedly. I proposed a Joint Committee on National Security, in which the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives would have particular responsibility in the field of national security. But my point is, and I think the Sena- tor from Rhode Island is so right, the minute we publicize all these intelligence figures, the inevitable followthrough is a debate in this body as to what it is for, it will be in every journal and every tabloid. It will be all over. It will not serve the public interest. If we could get the Soviet Union and the Chinese to walk to the altar with the rest of us, confess our sins, live a pure life, and pledge ourselves to peace and love, then I would let them know every- thing about what was going on. But, frankly, they will not do it. I believe in detente. No Senator has worked harder for arms control; no Senator has worked for more open com- mittees. But there is a point where we have to stop, at least in my judgment. I know the Senator can make a bril- liant argument and a moving, emotional argument, that we ought to have all these figures right out in the open, and if we can-have assurance that is all we are go- ing to do, that is all it would lead to. Even that would be a risk, but perhaps one that we could take. But just as surely as we are in this body today debating whether or not we ought to have a release of the figure, next year it will be whether it is too big or too little, and then it will be what is in it. Then when we start to say what is 'in-it, we are going to have to expose ex- actly what we have been doing in order to gain information; for example, years ago as to where the Soviet Union was building its nuclear subs and the kind of nuclear subs they were. I saw that ma- terial in 1965-how far they were along, what their scientific progress was. I do not think it would serve the public in- terest for all of that information to have .been laid out. It would have destroyed our intelligence gathering completely. I wonder how many Senators realize the unbelievable torture that a number of our Central Intelligence agents go through in order to get information that is vital to the Nation's national security. It is because I feel this strongly that I make this statement, although it runs counter to much of my so-called ideolog- ical philosophy. One advantage I have had-and I am not going to be a parti- san around the Senate when it comes to national security-is to sit on the other end of the line. I am here to tell the Sen- ate, that if we start to tinker with the intelligence services of this country, we do it at our peril. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, Iyield. Mr. PROXMIRE. Could not the same argument the Senator is making be made with much more force with respect to our Defense budget? We debate on the floor of the Senate, we have open public hear- ings, we publish a great deal about our missiles, about our submarines, about our most advanced and complex planes. This does give great information to the Soviet Union. I am not asking about anything of that nature with respect to intelli- gence. This would not even reveal how much we provide for the CIA. All I am saying is that the taxpayer is entitled to know how much of the bil- lions of dollars he contributes in taxes goes for intelligence operations overall. Then he can, through his Representa- tives, determine to some extent whether we spend any kind of effort and interest and concern with whether or not that money is wisely spent.' That is all the amendment does. Mr. HUMPHREY. I think I understand fully the Senator's honorable, legitimate purpose. I really am not opposed to that legitimate purpose. The problem is it is sort of like loose string on a ball of twine, so to speak, that starts to unravel. Now, indeed, we tell the whole world about practically everything we are doing. As Gunnar Myrdal, the great Swedish soei---1 ologist, once said about the United States: try. Other than that, I do not relish the job; I am not trying to keep this away from the American people. I am con- cerned and interested because that is the only way we can behave in a crazy world, and it is a crazy world. Mr. HUMPHREY. And it is going to continue that way for some time, regret- tably. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. I yield. Mr. JACKSON. And what if the fol- lowing year the CIA found it necessary to ask for more money? Then we would have the same problem. They would want to know what they are engaged in now that they were not engaged in in the past. We could not allow the publication of the figures without that sticking out like a sore thumb, Mr. PASTORE. You cannot win. Mr. JACKSON. You cannot win either way. Mr. HUMPHREY. It is a no-win prop- osition. Mr. JACKSON. I commend the Sen- ator from Minnesota and the Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, as long as the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Minnesota have the floor, I would like to ask them some questions. Mr. PASTORE. I yield. Mr. PROXMIRE. I ask the Senator if it is not true that the amendment does not require, the revealing of information or any figure about the CIA, but simply the total national intelligence overall figure, including the CIA, the DIA, the Army and Navy Intelligence, all together. It is not an anti-CIA amendment. What this amendment would do is tell us whether we are spending $1 billion, $5 billion, $10 billion. It would give us some -notion of how important this is in terms of resources and would mean we could have some attention given to these agen- cies, attention we do not have now. The fact is, as the Senator frim Mis- souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) said, that in 1970 the CIA oversight committee of the Sen- ate Armed Services Committee met twice. In 1971 there were no meetings. In 1972' it met once. When it does meet, what does it accomplish? It does not keep a record. No staff is present. Only Senators are present. We know that without a staff or a transcript, a hear- ing like that cannot be very useful. When we have some knowledge of what this amount is, whether it is $6 billion, $7 billion, or $10 billion, we have some interest or pressure on this. Not be- ' ing on the oversight committee, one would be entitled to ask about it, so one would be inclined to be better informed. It seems to me we will function far bet- ter. That is all the amendment is in- tended to do. Mr. PASTORS. When the Senator says there is no record kept, that is true, but there is an obvious reason for that. The staff is there. The Senators are there. We sit there for hours, listening, and we have a very eme Lute scrutiny of the items that are Is the Senator telling me that if the entire figure is revealed, at some time he Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Ju w 4, 1.9 `. G NGRESSIONAL RECORD - -- SENATE Energy, the Committee Appropri tions, and on the ad hoc committee which I referred-where ey show ys the evidence they have. Bjthey do not disclose how they spend r4oney to pro- vide this information. Oncee'the Russians, or even the Chinese Comm istS find olt our national security cane damaged. And it is just to satisfy a *ttle bit of oar emotional rebellion that t justified on the grounds that an ages y has made some mistakes. Can we th"ow away the security of the country? That is what it means to me. I have sat down with thej?enator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROxnnRE)_ the Senator from California (Mr. CRAN@TON), to find a solution, and I have sat dawn with My. Colby, who is a great American. He said, "Please do not do this. If, you want to make my job easier, please do not do this." I cannot sit there ter that ad- monition and exhortati r and turn around and say, "Mr. Copy, I do net believe what you have to ,nay." If I be- lieVed that for 1 minute,-1 would say, "You ought to give up your job." I know the CIA got mixed up in Viet- nam. Many got mixed up in Vietnam. I condemned it. Do not forget, I was G(%4 error of my State when the bomb fell ,9n Hiroshima, on August 6, 1945. A few days after that a second atomic bomb fell,on Nagasaki. Frankly, I have not slept-so well since then thinking about the horror that can be visited upon mankind f this thing ever lets go. I would lope that the CIA is not a provocative agency but a pro- tective agency; that it is there to pro- tect American security anff the Amerj,- can people. The minute we disbelieve that we should do away wth it entirely. I repeat again that as kQug as we live in this kind of a world, where tomorrow we do not know where we will be, where the Russians now are try tg to achieve parity with us; where we live been told categorically; without any question of doubt, that what they are; doing is be- cause they do not want to duffer the hu- miliation of Cuba again-that is what this is all about, and that is why they are coming along, hell,ber for election, augmenting their military; strength. Look at the deal we made on SALT 1. They can have over 60 missile firing nuclear subs; we have one a little more tharr40 of this type of sulgnarine. They have about 1,700 land-based missiles; we have slightly over 1,000. When anyone stands u2 and says to me, "Oh, they are not going so fast," that person is not going to the briefings. One does not find that inaormation on the floor of the Senate. He has to go to the secret briefings. There_ one sees the statistics, the facts. I can.tell Senators that after they have done so they will be frightened as to what ouid happen to this world if one act of-madness lets this thing go off . And so I say to my _distipguished col- le am from Wisconsin, ancjrall those who ag 'ee with him, I sympathize with his feed. I realize the fact ,that the CIA h' done some things wrong---perhaps toe maw things wrong-b rt let us cor- reet it. Let us put the brakes on. Let us admonish the committee that Is fa charge to do its Job. But in the narn3 of truth, in the name of protecting this Nation against an assault, in the name of protecting the American people and their future, let us rely on the special com- mittees that do their job, and if any Member of the Senate really wants to find out what the total amount is, I think in private he should be told. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr.'PASPORE. I yield.. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I rise to commend the Senator from Rhode Island and to associate myself fully with his comments. The Ser.ator pointed out very properly that the Central Intelli- gence Agency has in the past engaged in activities that have been looked upon by certain Members of the Congress as un- desirable; but I want to make it clear that every one of those activities had been ordered by a President. The Cen- tral Intelligence Agency does not just engage in activities for the love of work. I know that the Central Intelligence Agency, during the Kennedy years and the Johnson years, was engaged in ac- tivities in Laos- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Rhode Island has expired. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator may re- quire. Mr. PASTORE. Five more minutes. Mr. HUMPHREY. There were Mem- bers of Congress who knew full well what we were doing, but at the time we thought we were doing the right thing. Hindsight is so marvelous, is it not? We see so much better after the fact. Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is possibly the most important agency in this Government. By and large, it is made up of people who are com- petent, able, and who have served this country well and faithfully. To be sure, there 'are times when it has engaged in activities, as we have said, that are looked upon with suspicion; but I think it would be folly for us ?,o publicize all of its activities, to publicize the amounts it receives, particularly when there are ways and means within this body and within the other body of Congress to supervise it and to keep a check rein upon it. The Soviet Union does not tell us what they spend in intelligence, or even in subversion, and they are not about ready to. The only way we have any chance of knowing what they are doing Is through agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency-not alone, but that agency is, without a doubt, the prime instrurr..ent of this Government for the gathering of intelligence. I was visiting earlier, here with our distinguished friend and colleague from Washington-and I know this to be a fact, of course-and discussed, the ::act that there is only one person in the Brit- ish Government who knows who the di- rector of intelligence is and to whom that director reports-just one, and that is the Prime Minister. In most countries that Is the case. In the Republic of France and in the. Federal Republic of Germany it is the case. S 9605 Presently we are on a binge in. h::,; country about every aspect of govern- ment. Everything is suspect. Well, Mr. President, you have got to call a halt to, something. You cannot just start to dis- mantle the structure because of the transgressions, or alleged transgres3ionb, of a few. I think that the Senator from 1hode Island stated it so succinctly and ,.o of- fectively that all I can do is just add my amen to it; but I had the privilege of serving on the National Security Co ancil, and I want to tell my colleagues that the Central Intelligence Agency was the most accurate and effective instrument of Government for that council. Its reports were most accurate, and bad we for. owed the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency in many areas, we would have been better off, but at least it was there. I know the Senator from Wisconsin is going to say he is not going to-lnterfere with them, and that is true, but the figure will be out there, and right away there will be some of my political per-? suasion, who are labeled "liberals," who are going to say, "Well, look at how :much money they are spending on spying. Look at how much money they are spending on gathering information which is un- necessary. Look at what they are going to do on counterfore activities or clan- destine military activities." If the Congress does not want it, to engage in clandestine activities, all : t has to do is legislate it-they will obey the law. But the trouble around here is that we like to put the blame on a lot of other people when we do not have the guts to legislate what we ought to be legislating. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HIIMPHREY. I yield Mr. PASTORE. Talking about the amendment, It sounds so harmless to say, "All we want is the overall figure." When we discussed this with Mr. Colby and asked him, "What is wrong with the overall figure?" he told us, "There is a, lot wrong with it, because if ypu choose to cut the figure down at some time, pri- vately and secretly, and I have to live with-it, nobody knows what is done, but if you do It publicly, then the Russians and the Chinese Communist will know we are doing less, and that might let them become more audacious. They might think we are letting our guard down. It will have repercussions." This came from the lips of an expert. in the area, and it makes sense. If I thought giving the overall .igure would be the answer to our problems. I would go along with it,, because, after all, it could be argued, "Well, we arc not giving the details," but, as the expert said, if we give the, overall figure, what does it mean? If anybody thinks we are spending too much,_he will want to know where we are spending it. If we are spending too little, he wlM want to know what we are doing. These are not rnat-? ters that we can discuss before the pub- lic for the public. It does not make any difference to me personally. I am interested in my family. I am interested in my grandchildren, I want them,to live is a safe country. I do not want them to live in on unsafe coun.- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 S 9604 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00 OR000700030058-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA E June 4, 1974 gence in order to assure that this sensitive information might not be made available to any foreign government. Nevertheless, the Of- fice of Management and Budget exercises its responsibility to review CIA funding in the same detail that it reviews the budget re- quests of any other executive branch agency. The specific amounts of the agency's ap- proved appropriation request and the identi- fication of the appropriation estimates in the President's annual Budget, within which these amounts are included, are formally _ provided by the Director of OMB to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appro- priations Committees; similarly, the Director is informed'by them of the determination of the CIA budget, and OMB approval of the transfer of funds to CIA is based upon this decision. Within the limits of this arrangement made necessary by security requirements, I wish to respond fully to the questions raised in your letter. 1. The authority under which OMB ap- proves the transfer of funds to CIA for its approved budget is Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 USC 403f). To our knowledge, no other authority isnow or ever has been used by OMB for this purpose. As in the case of other executive agencies, CIA receives other funds under provisions of the so-called Econ- omy Act (31 USC 686), which permits the purchase of supplies or services by one agency from another when it is more economical to do so. The magnitude of these transactions Is reported to the appropriate committees and to OMB, but no formal OMB approval is re- quired. 2. Except for possible Economy Act trans- actions, no funds have been transferred to the CIA from any of the agencies falling under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. 3: The transfer of funds to CIA under Section 5 of the CIA Act is accomplished by the issuance of Treasury documents rou- tinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers, pur- suant to that Act, are approved by OMB. 4. Information concerning the transfer of these funds to CIA is available to members of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees concerned with CIA matters. 5. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB for transfer to CIA are limited to amounts notified to OMB by the Chairmen of the- Senate and House Appro- priations Committees. The specific appro- priation accounts from which the funds will be transferred are also determined by this process. Obligations by CIA, subsequent to the transfer, are further controlled by OMB through the apportionment process. 6. The funding of CIA through a single publicly. identifiable appropriation could re- sult in the disclosure of information detri- mental to the agency's sensitive foreign in- telligence operations, as I understand the Director of Central Intelligence has indicated to members of the Congress on several oc- casions. I trust that the above information is re- sponsive to, your needs. Roy L. Asa, Director. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without , objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 5 or -10 minutes? Mr. STENNIS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, what I have to say will not take 10 minutes. I must recognize the sincerity and the motive-I might say the noble motive- on the part of the sponsors of this amendment and what they are trying to accomplish. As a matter of fact, I do not think any matter has disturbed Members who are charged with this responsibility more than this matter, with respect to the ramifications and the complexities that are involved in this kind of situa- tion. I would pray for the day in this world when nations could live as neighbors, when people could live as brothers, when we would not have to have an atomic bomb or a missile or a nuclear submarine, that we could live in peace and tranquil- ity, and that we would not even need a Central Intelligence Agency. But the world is not made that way. The history within my lifetime has proved pretty much that unless a nation is on its guard, as we had to be in 1962 at" the time of the Cuban crisis, it could lose its birthright. Now, what are we talking about here? We are talking about the Central Intelli- gence Agency. I have been connected with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy almost as long as I have been in the Senate. Day in and day out we sit be- hind closed doors in a room that has been debugged because of what is told, what is given to the committee, and what is listened to. Only the members of that committee are privy to what goes on, ex- cept, of course, that the courtesy is ren- dered on a need-to-know basis to Mem- bers of Congress if they make a request that they need to know. The same goes for the Central Intelligence Agency. I daresay if any Senator really wants to know how much we spend for intelli- gence, he could find out. But then they would have to reveal what they spend it for. They might not be able to publish the information, and why should they? What would it accomplish? I do not know the men and women up in that Press Gallery. For all I know, there may be a newspaperman there from Moscow. We live in a free society, and what we say on the floor of the Senate goes all over the world. It is a public record. That is the way we live. We are an open society. If we tell the Russians what they have to know, will they tell us what they have? I will eat anyone's hat on the Capitol steps if that happens. Do Senators know what Khrushchev said when he came here and met with Mr. Dulles, of the Central Intelligence` Agen- cy, for the first time? He said, "You know, your country and my country could save a lot of money if we could get together." Do Senators know what he meant by that? He meant by that that they are spying on us and we have to spy on them. That can be said publicly, because that is what this is all about. We have to know what they are doing, so we can know what we have to do in order to guarantee the security of our own country. So we cannot come out here and tell the whole world, "We spent $1 billion or $2 billion for the Central Intelligence Agency." What does that mean to any- one else, except that perhaps some people think they are spending too much. And the minute the question is asked where they are spending it we are in serious trouble. So what happens to your children and my children, Mr President? What hap- pens to you when you go home tonight? What happens tomorrow? What hap- pens to the security of our country? Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes, I would like to tell the public everything it is possible to tell them. I believe in that. I have been in public life continually for 40 years. I believe in the right of the " public to know. But I certainly would not come to the floor of the Senate and tell you, Mr. President, how to put to- gether an atom bomb. I would not tell you that. I would not tell you how far our nuclear subs are able to travel; I would not tell you how we can detect an enemy sub; and I would not tell you how they might detect ours.' I would not- tell you that. Why would I not tell-you that? I would not tell you that because the minute I told you that I would jeopardize the future of your children. I do not relish the responsibility on this ad hoc committee. I happen to be on it. We sit there for hours and hours, day in and day out. It is not a pleasant job, but it is a job that was assigned to me and I have to do it. If anyone wants my job on that particular committee I will give it to him tomorrow. But it has been assigned to me and I have to do it. I repeat again that I realize the mo- tive behind this measure. I think a lot of people are a little disturbed over some things that CIA has done. That needs to be investigated, and that is our job, and we are doing it every day. But as the Senator from Minnesota has said on this floor a hundred times : Please do not throw out the, baby with the bath water. That is the point. In our attempt to catch that one mouse, are we going to burn down the barn? We can- not an d must not burn down the barn. So we come out here and say, "This is the amount of money we are spending." Very well; after it has been said, then what? Someone else says, "You are spending too much." In order to prove that too much is not being spent, state- ments have to be made as to where it is being spent, what we are doing. The big question is, can we afford to tell them what we are doing? I have been in many committee meet- ings-the Joint Committee on Atomic The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time? Mr. THURMOND. The time to be equally divided between both sides. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 June 4, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 9603 But we go much further than that. We lay out that budget in great detail. We break It down by component and by unction. We then talk about each indi- tidual weapon. When will it be ready? low much will it cost? What does it look in a technical sense? of course, this detailed information is ,tillable to the U.S.S.R. But long ago, a alecision was made that in our open so- ?=dety it was better to know the facts and ride herd on the Defense Department than to accept the intangible fear of cunemy knowledge. in fact, many American strategists naive argued that the size of the U.S. tniiitary budget and the characteristics is f our overwhelming nuclear force should he made public in order to reinforce the psychology of deterence. The enemy will not be deterred unless he truly believes the United States has these weapons. The same goes for the intelligence budget. It is a form of deterrence for the potential adversary to know that we will z:ontinue to spend sizeable funds for in- telligence. They will be less inclined to tring some surprise. Of course it should be quickly said that ft;e only figure we would be releasing is the single number representing the com- t-fined intelligence budget. Not a break- town. Just the overall figure. Now just what would this tell our ad- scrsaries? They would not know if it all 'aunt to the CIA, or DIA. Whether the :t:SA. spent most of the money, or the Air three. flow about yearly fluctuations? Say for cxampie, that the budget went up 10 ercent in 1 year. What what they con- dude? That manpower was more expen- we? That the CIA was spending more 'irr Laos? That the DIA had bought a ::yew computer division? That NSA was liming more people? They would know ;nothing. Listen to what former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger told Senator HARRY BYRD, JR., during his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense: think it (speaking of releasing selected intelligence budget data) might be an ac- niptable procedure, Senator, to indicate the total figure of the national intelligence pro- ;;rams. I would not personally advocate it, but 1L may be an acceptable procedure ... There iF the feeling that it might be wise to give the gross figure. I have come to share that feeling at least in this time frame, but that Ales not say that is not a possibility. ;Senator BYRD specifically asked: There would be no security reasons why it iiouid not be done? Dr. Schlesinger replied: "or the gross figure, I think that; the secur- ity concerns are minimal. The component 1i Aires, I would be more concerned about but for the gross national intelligence program fi:!Ires I think we could live with that on a security basis, yes. Remember that this was the Director t: Central Intelligence testifying, the Irian who then was the CIA Director. He is now the Secretary of Defense. This is exactly what the amendment before the Senate provides. When the same question was put to William E. Colby during his confirmation hearings to be Director of Central In- telligence, he replied: I would propose to leave '.that question, Mr. Chairman, in the hands of the Congressa to decide . . . We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the Ameri- can society, and the American constitutional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the American peo- ple a great deal more than might be con- venient from the narrow Intelligence point of view. Mr. Colby's two points should be kept in mind. First, he left it up to Congress. Second, he said we have to run our in- telligence agencies in a democratic en- vironment. Both of these points argue for supporting this amendment. After he was confirmed, Mr. Cclby started having a change of heart. It is interesting to note how opinions change during and after confirmation hearings. Now Mr. Colby argues against releas- ing even the aggregate total of the in- telligence community budget. nuring the confirmation, he said, I would favor a greater degree of exposure of what we are doing (p. 18). Now he says he does not think it would be a good idea. Mr. Colby further explained why he opposes such a course of action. Quoting from a February 22, letter, Mr. Colby says: I am still concerned that public disclosure of total intelligence figures on an annual basis would lead to pressures for further public explanation of the programs for which monies were appropriated. that is the real reason for not releasing the budget. It will allow Con- f,ress to start doing it,, job. Questions will be asked. There will be pressure on the oversight committees to very closely review that budget and justify it thor- oughly, so that they in -urn could come back to Congress and say we are getting our money's worth. There is something very healthy about responding to public pressure---even :for the intelligence community. The question must be asked of every person who says that the release of this total budget will endanger national security. How will it do so? Why (lid Secretary Schlesinger say it would not? Give some examples, hypothetical if desired of how such disclosure would work against us. How is the total intel- ligence budget figure different from the total military budget? Is it more im- raortant than a $100 billion defense budget? Are the Armed Services Coln- inittees violating security by reviewing the Defense budget in public? These questions need answering by those that support continued secrecy of the intelligence budget. I hope answers are forthcoming. Mr. President, this amendment is the most restrained attempt to introduce fiscal integrity to the intelligence com- munity. It is written to take into co:a- sideration the possibility of security problems. It only calls for the release of the total figure. It is time we found out just how large that budget Is. It will not impinge on 'icurity considerations. It is a long overdue step toward re- asserting the right of Congress to inquire into the money it appropriates. We have operated in the dark too long. T invite attention, Mr. President. Lo the fact that the Senate Select Commit- tee on Secret and Confidential Docu- ments, the cochairmen of which were the majority leader and theminority leader.. Senators MANSFIELD and HUGH SCOTT? made the recommendation which it em- bodied in the amendment I am nresenn;- ing to the Senate today and on whic:l1 we will vote a little later. I hope that the Members; of the Senate will recognize that this is a matter that has been studied by the select comniii.- tee; that they did make this recom- mendation; that the present Secr.ftarv of Defense, who was formerly Dir??ctor, and the present CIA Director, whe.a his nomination was being confirmed--bolli at the time of the confirmation of their nominations-indicated that the dam- age, if any, would be minimal and tl' i t they saw strong arguments in favor of releasing the total. figure. They could live with that, provided there was rio breakdown of the components. Mr. President, I reserve the remaind? i' of my time, and I yield the floor. EXHIRrT 1 US. SE;vATE, COMMITi.'EE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, D.C., April 8, if'74 Hon. Roy M. Asia, Director, Office of Management and l?sdnr', Washington, D.C. DEAR Ma. Asn Under the authority cf tie 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act, th,, CIA is authorized to transfer funds to and re cei'. L~. funds from other Government agencies sut - ject to the approval of your office. Thin -? thority is granted without regard to ocher provisions of law. Would you please provide answers to Ljw following questions dealing with this era, - tice, 1. Is there any other authority for iiai transfer or receipt of funds otter than 11 0,,- 1949 CIA Act, Section 6? If so, where ? 2. As Chairman of the HUD, Space, Scie=:,ce, Veterans and Independent Agencies Stibeorn - mittee of the Senate Appropriations Con;- mittee, I request you to make known to Inc if any of the funds appropriated under ni jurisdiction have been transferred to or ex-- pended by or on behalf of the CIA? 3. Will you please describe the which funds are transferred from one appro- priation account to use by the CIA? 4. What members of Congress are made aware of this practice in terms of the a flow of funds? 5. What restrictions are placed on It; transfer or expenditure of funds? 6. Why cannot the CIA budget be fu:iic ; in a single appropriation.. bill? I would appreciate an early answer to I-hn- questions since hearings axe currently fir. progress. Sincerely, WILLIAM POOXMIRE. U S. Senator- EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESS-. _ _ _ . DENT, OFFICE OF MANS CEMENT AND BUDGET, Washington, D.C., April 29, 19'4 Hon, WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Se;Iatc, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR PRoxMIRE: This responc s to your letter of April 8, 1974, in which you pose several questions regarding the fundin o;' the Central Intelligence Agency. As you know, extraordinary measures have been taken by both the Congress and the executive branch to protect the Sens:.tive foreign intelligence operations in which the CIA engages. With respect to the budget, 'it-= formation relating to CIA's funding has been classified by the Director of Central Intalll- Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Jwne , 197 Approved Fo C Release Rffi 71- F&IMP75 l$ff000700030058-3 House conferees, even if it did not sur- vive the conference, we would be at least pinpointing something that needs to be emphasized in this day and age, because one day we will have to convert from war to peace, prayerfully and hopefully. The big question is, How do we do it? Do we just sit back and say, "Well, we will just wait and see what the Govern- ment is going to do about it"? With reference to the Rhode Island situation, we tried to go down and see the President for a long time and we could not do it. We were told the day before the order came out cutting our installations. Only the day before did we know it. I tried to find out from Mr. Kissinger. I tried to find out from Mel- vin Laird. I tried to find out from Ad- miral Zumwalt. I tried to find out from the President. None of them told us what was going to happen to Rhode Island. We never knew of it until the axe came down and chopped off our economic head. I say that is disgraceful. I repeat, we are not over the agony yet. Mr. President, I am very amenable to this amendment. for the reasons I have stated. I realize this is not the complete answer. I realize it may not survive the conference. But surely the Senate ought to express its sentiment. It is not going to affect my State a great deal. It may affect one or two plants. Perhaps we can reconvert them without Federal help. But the time has come when we have to think about these things in advance, and not, after the fact, get up on the floor and propose to extend unemployment compensation, and have a silly retraining-for-jobs pro- gram, without knowing what jobs they are going to give these people after they are trained. This is something that has to be done in advance. I would hope such a proposal would receive serious consideration. I can say this as one who has depended on the Pentagon and the Defense Department. I am one who has. not always agreed with the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN) with reference to some of the cuts he wanted to make in de- fense. I have been on the side of the Sen- ator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) more than I have been on the side of the Senator from South Da- kota, but this proposal ought to be given serious consideration, and I am going to vote for it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. I appreciate very much the problem Rhode -Island had at a time when I was not active. Iread about it in the news- papers, and it had my interest, and I remember the vigor with which the Senator from Rhode Island and his col- league opposed it. They did everything anyone could do to try to alleviate that situation. But with all deference to my friends, I do not believe such an amend- ment on this bill is a solution to the problem. I think, legislative-wise, it would be better to take the route that all far-reaching legislation should take. I think, a full development of all the facts to give the Congress a choice among alternatives, if it has alternatives before it, is the best way to do it. I hope we can keep this bill a military authorization bill, as I explained before, and get it into law as soon as we can, and pave the way for appropriations. I know that if the authorization commit- tees do not meet those time demands, our work is going to be brushed aside. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The, time of the Senator has expired. Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 1 addi- tional minute. And the appropriations will be made whether there is an?authorization or not, and we will be helpless to do anything about it. I think we do render a service-I am sure my colleagues agree-through these authorization bills. So let us keep it what it is to begin with-an authorization bill for military hardware and manpower for the en- suing year. Mr. President, I yield the floor. I will yield anytime any Senator wishes. Otherwise I am willing to yield back the time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Mississippi has 12 minutes re- maining. The Senator from South Dakota has 5 minutes remaining. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, so far as we are concerned on this side, we are willing to yield back our time if the Senator from South Dakota is so willing. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, under those circumstances, I am willing to yield back the remainder time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendments num- bered 1347 by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN). The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN- NEDY), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Cali- fornia (Mr. TUNNEY) are necessarily ab- sent. I also announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) Is absent be- cause of illness. Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr: BROOK) , the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK- wooD), and the Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) are necessarily absent. The result was announced-yeas 27, nays 55, as follows: S 9601 [No. 223 Leg.] YEAS-27 Aboure2k Humphrey Mondale Bayh Jackson Montoya Biden Long Muskie Brooke Magnuson Nelson Church Mansfield Pastore Clark Mathias Pell Gravel McGovern Ribicoff Hatfield McIntyre Schweiker Hughes Metcalf Williams NAYS-55 Aiken Dole Metzenbaum Allen Domenici Nunn Baker Dominick Pearson Bartlett Eagleton Percy Beall Eastland Proxmire Bennett Ervin Randolph Bentsen Fannin Scott, Hugh Bible Fong Scott, Buckley Goldwater William L. Burdick Griffin Stafford Byrd, Gurney Stennis Harry IF., Jr. Hansen Stevens Byrd, Robert C. Haskell Stevenson Cannon Helms Taft Case Hollings Talmadge Chiles Hruska Thurmond Cook Johnston Tower Cotton McClellan Weicker Curtis McClure Young NOT VOTING-18 Belimon Hathaway Moss Brock Huddleston Packwood Cranston Inouye Roth Fulbright Javits Sparkman Hart Kennedy Symington Hartke McGee Tunney So Mr. MCGOVERN's amendment (No. 1347) was rejected. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected. Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was AMENDMENT NO. 1369 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABOUREZK). Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the con- sideration of the amendment (No. 1369) offered by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: At the appropriate place in the bill in- sert a new section as follows: SEC. -. On or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence 'shall submit an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the budget, transmitted to the Congress pursuant to section 201 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 V.S.C. 11), for the national intelligence pro- gram for the next succeeding fiscal year. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on this amendment shall be limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the mover of the amendment and the manager of the bill, with 30 minutes on any amendment in the second degree. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, be- fore I yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, which I shall do in a moment, I would like to call the atten- tion of the Senate, while some Senators are still on the floor, to the fact that what this amendment does is provide a Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Iu: i? I, :11 :m part of what has been requested by Sen- ators SCOTT and MANSFIELD of Senator MCCLELLAN when they wrote him last November, and what, in my judgment, Senator MCCLELLAN said then he would like to do if he can. I shall just read that letter, and then leave the matter in the hands of the Senator from Mississippi. This is the letter dated November 15, 1973, signed by the majority and minor- i.y leaders: A- q'o-chairmen of the Senate Select Com- rnittee on Secret and Confidential Docu- rucnts, we wish to call your attention to one of the major recommendation.; which our Committee made with respect to the opera- l ons of the various intelligence agency. specifically, it was agreed that the Senate should be provided with the over-all sums requested for each agency. We believe that the release of this limited Information will be useful to the Senate in maintaining the necessary support for our intelligence Oper- ations. We do wish to reiterate that the Commit- ;ooe did not recommend the disclosure of any particular intelligence activity or any other such detailed matters, which continue to re- uiain. and properly so, under your jurisdic- i,,on. 1. have talked with the majority leader this morning, and he said it was his con- struction that that would mean the over- all figure would be made available pub- licly. The response of Senator MCCLELLAN dated November 20, was as follows: DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of Novem- i;er 15 and want you to know that I intend to comply, as fully as possible, with the rec- ommendation of the Senate Select Commit- on Secret and Confidential Documents to provide the Senate with the over-ail sums 3fequested for each of the various intelligence a gencies. Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment which I am offering now is to provide that the overall figure for the intelligence community as a whole, not broken down but the overall figure, would be made available, so that the tax- nayers of this country would have some idea of how much, how many billions of dollars-and it is billions of dollars- are going for intelligence efforts by our Government. Now, Mr. President, I yield to the Sen- ,tor from Mississippi- Mr. STENNIS. On my time. Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi. Mr, STENNIS. I thank the Senator. V take 2 minutes of my time first to em- phasize to Senators present the over- whelming importance of this amend- rai.ent and the far-reaching effect it would have if passed and enacted into law. When we disclose-and I speak as one who, for years, has had to take care of a lot of keeping up with this problem- and it is no fun-if we disclose the amount of money spent on this effort, which includes the CIA, then we give to our adversaries all over the world, present and future, a true index as to what our activities are. There are de- ductions that can be made from our fig- iares which could lead them along the oath of information which would be priceless to them to know. Tue, we are an open society and, so jar, we have been able to carry on an intelligence pre ;ram effectively which has been worth to us billions and billions and billions of dollars in savings. But, if we are going to abandon the idea of keeping these figures from being dis- closed, then, in my humble opinion, we might as well abolish the agency. It would be like saying, in effect, that we do not want this secret intelligence a.:?ter all, that we do not need it, and that we will abandon it. We will pay an awfti price for that. I am familiar with the CIA budget. I can satisfy most any Senator in the cloakroom, talking to him some about this, but I will publicly say that it is a clean budget and they have justified many times over the expenditure of the money. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi. Mr. President, how much does the United States spend each year on the intelligence budget? Except for a small handful of Senators and Congressmen, nobody knows, at least in this country. My amendment would end this ignor- ance and allow the Congress to reassert its fiscal control over the largest budget currently unavailable to public or con- gressional scrutiny. The amendment requires that on or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an un- classified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds re- quested in the budget for the national intelligence program for the next suc- ceeding fiscal year. It is as simple as that. Each year the Director of Central Intelligence adds up the combined budgets Cf the intelligence community and supplies that figure to Congress in an unclassified form. No longer would we be operating in darkness. For the firs'; time we would have hard budgetary facts. Granted, it would only be one figure each year, but that is enough to tell us the relative size of that budget. At present, we do nos know if the na- tional intelligence program budget is $1 billion of $10 billion. We do not know if it went up 200 percent ,his year, or vient down 10 percent. We simply do not know and the consequence of our ignorance is twofold. First, the intelligence community es- capes effective congressional control. Second, Congress is systematically de- ceived as to the size of other civilian 'budgets. How does that come about? It comes about because the intelli- gence budgets, particularly the CIA, are hidden in other budgets that pass through the legislative process. There is intelligence money in this bill before us today. I don't know how much. Only the Oversight Committee members know that. There are funds in other budgets. It is quite possible that even some of the chairmen of these subcommittees do not know that their budgets contain intelli- gence funds. The authority for thLs sleight of rand resides in the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, section 6 (50 USC 403f). Section 6 states that the CIA if. au- thorized to transfer to and receive from other Government agencies any money approved by the Bureau of the Budget authorized under the National Security Act of 1947. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the transfer of funds to CIA under section 6 of the CIA Act is accomplished by the issuance of Treas.-. ury documents routinely used fo-- the transfer of funds from one Government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers are approved by OMB. The funds approved for transfer to CIA by OMB are limited to amounts notified to OIUMB by the chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Com - mittees. The specific appropriations ac- counts from which the funds will be transferred are also determined by to is process. Obligations after the transfer are further controlled by OMB through the apportionment process. In other words, only two men il the entire Congress of the United state:; control the process by which the CIA is funded. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that my correspondence with Roy L. Ash, Director of OMB be printed in the RECORD. There is an error in Mr. Ash's reply that should be noted. Where the letter refers to section 5, it should read section 6. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit. 2.) Mr. PROXMIRE. As chairman of the HOD, Space, Science, Veterans Appro- priations Subcommittee, I became in- terested in whether or not there were in- telligence funds in my $21 billion budget. I checked with OMB and was tole that except for possible Economy Act transac- tions, no funds have been transferred to the CIA from any of the agencies fall- ing under the jurisdiction of the HUD, Space, Science, Veterans and Independ- ent Agencies Subcommittee. I urge other subcommittee and committee cha.rine'n to make the same inquiries. THE SECURITY ISSUE This sleight of hand aside, the major question each of us has to answer before voting on this amendment is "Will the public release of this aggregate budget in any way compromise our national se- curity?" If it can be shown that it will not, then this amendment should be passed. I intend to show that it will not c:orri- promise our security, in any w iy. First, let its apply a little common sense to the problem of security. Would anyone charge that the Senate Armed Services Committee is endangering ou r national security by publishing the total amount of the Defense budget? Would anyone claim that the Secretary cf De- fense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have violated security when they testify be- fore Congress in open session and when they peak across the country and ue the total amount of the defense budget in public? Of course not. That would be utterly ridiculous. The total amount of the budg- et is not a security problem. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75130038 68000700030058-3 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -HOUSE May 20', 1974 passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table. A similar House bill (H.R. 13685) - was laid on the table. CALL OF THE HOUSE Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum Is not present. The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present. Without objection, a call of the House was ordered. There was no objection. The can was taken by electronic de- vice, and the following Members failed to respond: [Roll No. 2291 Anderson, Calif.Ford, Moorhead, Calif. Andrews, NO. William D. Moorhead, Pa. Ashbrook Fountain Morgan Badillo Gaydos Moss Bafalis Gettys Murphy, Ill. Barrett Giaimo Murphy, N.Y. Bell Gibbons Nedzi Biaggi Goldwater Nelsen Biester Goodling Nix Blatnik Grasso Parris Boland Gray Peyser Bolling Green, Oreg. Podell Brademas Green, Pa. Pritchard Branco Griffiths @ule Broomfield Gunter Rangel Brotzman Hanna Reid Buchanan Hansen, Idaho Rinaldo Burke, Calif. Harrington Roncalio, Wyo. Burke, Fla. Hays Rooney, N.Y. Butler Heckler, Mass. Rooney, Pa. Byron Heinz Roy Carey, N.Y. ifeletoski Ruppe Carney, Ohio Hogan Satterfield Chisholm Ifolifield Scherle Clancy Huber Schneebeli Clark Hudnut Schroeder Clausen. Hunt Sebelius Don H. Ichord Shipley Clawson, Del Jarman Shoup Clay Johnson, Pa. Shuster Conyers Jones, Okla. Skubltz Corman Kluczynskt Smith, Iowa Cotter Kyros Staggers Culver Landgrebe Stanton, Daniels, Landrum J. William Dominick V. Lehman Steed Danielson Litton Steele Davis, Ga. Long. La. Steiger, Wis. Davis, S.C. Long, Md. Stubblefield Delaney Luken Teague Dennis McCloskey 'Udall Dent McCormack Vander Jagt Diggs McKinney Veysey Dingell McSpadden Vigorito Donohue Macdonald Waldie Dorn Madigan Ware Dulski Mann Widnall Eckhardt Maraziti Williams Eilberg Matsunaga Wyatt Eshleman Mayne Wydler Findley' Milford Wyman Fish Mink Yatron Fisher Mitchell, Md. Young, Ga. Flood Mollohan Young, S.C. Flowers The SPEAKER. On this roilcall 274 Members have recorded their presence by electronic device, a quorum. By unanimous consent, further pro- ceedings under the call were dispensed with. USDA DELAYS FLEMING KEY ANI- MAL IMPORT CENTER PLANNING (Mr. MELCHER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his re- marks and Include extraneous matter.) Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Speaker, although directed by action of the 92d Congress to build an Import quarantine center to im- port European breeds of cattle and other livestock at Fleming Key off the coast of Florida, the Department of Agriculture has failed to start the plans and design of the facilities. Congress appropriated $300,000 for de- sign and planning in fiscal year 1973. The Department advises me: The design criteria have been completed. Architectural-engineering firms have been evaluated and ranked in order of prefer9nce by a review board. But-the Department then equivocates by saying that they do not intend to ex- pand the $300,000 appropriation for de- sign and planning until construction funds are available. For the current fiscal year appropria- tions the conference committee of the Agriculture Appropriations Committee asked that the request.for funds for the Fleming Key Animal Import Center be made in the routine way through the President's budget rather than asking for the funds outside the normal budgetary process. That was not done. Now the De- partment position is that this quarantine center should be financed through pri- vate sources. Whether it Is private or Government funds that pay the bill for this needed fa- cility I would strongly urge the Depart- ment to get right on the Job of design and planning the installation, which usually takes a year, so that when the funds are available construction can start. Further delay only stalls what is an obvious need for the U.S. livestock in- dustry. Also the stall defies the will of Congress in directing that the $300,000 appropriated be used for the purpose of planning and it's obvious that the De- partment has wasted a year or more in defiance of the directive of Congress. (Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to address the House for I minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.) .[Mr. WOLFF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Ex- tensions of Remarks.] (Mr. VANIK asked and was given per- mission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.) -[Mr. VANIK addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Ex- tensions of Rem-arks.] MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1975 Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, by direc- tion of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1112 and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the resolution as follows: H. RES. 1112 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of air- craft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the De- partment of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed four hours, to be equally di- vided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule by titles instead of by sections. At the conclu- sion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit. The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN) is recognized for 1 hour. (Mr. MADDEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. MARTIN) pending which I yield my- self such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, last week the House Rules Committee held hearings on the 1975 military authorization legislation and re- ported out an open rule with 4 hours of general debate-House Resolution 1112 Chairman HEBERT and other members of the Armed Services Committee testi- fied at.length regarding the important features of this legislation, after months of extended hearings of recorded testi- mony from the heads of the various armed services, Members of Congress, et cetera. This legislation reported by the Armed Services Committee provides for appro- priation authorization of $22,642,963,000. The total authorization includes $13,- 641,000 for procurement of aircraft, mis- siles, naval vessels, tracked combat ve- hicles, torpedoes, and other weapons.. The sum of $9,001,663,000 is authorized for research, development, testing, and evaluation. After the hearings were completed, the Armed Services Committee reduced the total amount of this authorization by $487 million. The total amount of the authorization is $1.2 billion above the 1974 authorization. The total authorization also includes $1,400,000,000 for the military assistance service funded program, providing for military assistance to South Vietnam. The Armed Services committee re- duced the requested airborns warning and control system authorization from $515.4 million to $257.7 million, This re- duction included authorizing 6 instead of 12 aircraft. The committee denied the request of $50 million for the stretched version of the C-141 aircraft. The request of $132.9 million for the civilian reserve air fleet program was re- duced to $25 million. The procurement authorization re- quest for $14.3 million for two patrol Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 `U~, ? 'v a . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE i; n''t a party to the subcontract. The xecutive communication points out that he propoi amendments would afford s ?ol,ection t , those subcontractors, espe- ,ially when tl ley are small businessmen wfin might oti rwise suffer from un- -cessary finanefiiei losses when perform- Srlg as subcontracts and material sun-s on Governnii it contracts.. The _Ienerai Services AftinistrFa,tion also l aced that it does not b"'eve that the bill aaouid result in any incre ed cost to the ovcrnment. The only possible cost d; ould be an indirect one iced on the i"35sibility that private surety ftnipames crr,uid increase their bond prei ums to reflect the added exposure to thIllo pay- ai,ut of interest and attorneys' in oie event a subcontractor enforce is a:rime contractor's bid would reflect t !~ =greased premiums, if any. 'i;~ frolic y of protecting subcontractors as ,;ribodied in the Miller Act. It, is recom- 'ionded that the bill be considered i,vorably. (Mr. MOORHEAD of California, asked ;and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) tVlr. MOORHEAD of California. Mr. pecker, when Congress first passed the iialler Act in 1935. its primary objective a.ct was perforn d, within 1 year ?.'ter the labor was: erformed or the ma- terials supplied. Il`enacting this law, the Congress embrd a public policy of ?- rotecting sul )retractors working on z;overnment otihstruction contracts. But. whilthe intent of the original i 311er Act 1clear, as a practical matter i:lie remed+ provided has all too often h"en illu iy, Frequently, the cost of liti- =,ation isrProhibitively high, when com- i~ aced vAth the amount which may be re- eoveredf. So. in many instances. there e istsva basic economic disincentive for bi?ingiing such suits. Also, either through a lsfik of legal advice or pressure from l;ltsf prime contractor, a subcontractor -i'ten enters into an arrangement where- -()1 I N.C., and the Cross Cimh N,:tionai Grasslands in Texas in of fo-mart President Lyndon B..30 n. There being no objWnnt the Clerk read the bill, as follo in, H. 885 Pc it enacted b , o e Senat,' and Mci - c Representatives. th r: Un tf d Statf e c onservation Corps (i nter, rrowood Civilian Conserva:- hnson Civilian Conservation t;orr _- and the Cross Timbers Nation:.'. sties, Texas, is redesignated as the 'Lys:. B. Johnson National Grassland or record of the United Staites in whici. re_ erence is made to the Arrowood Civilian Conn - servation Corps Center or to the Cross Tim ber:, National Grasslands shall be held and considered to be a reference to the Lyadoi B. Johnson Civilian Conservations Corps Cex7- ter and the Lyndon B. John-on Net,onri; (,a..:-, ssl ands, respectively. The bill was ordered to be engressin and lead a third time, was read the thirc time, and passed, and a motion to re^s,. and other re- Sorurces AWACS has also degionstrated a ca- pability to detect and track surface ships mod to provide real tinge information to ski see er commanders n making timely decisions concerning force deployment and employment. 'f'hrt3bgh use of "IFT, AWACS can monitor the location and status of friendly ships.-Non-l" targets >s uld easily be identtted as unknown or hostile. This infor~.i ation could be made available to seror commanders, thereby enhancing t:ie capability to vec- tor friendly naval and air forces for re- connaissance, and for attack enemy vessels. $li short, the inherent mobility and flexibility of the AWACS would offer the capability to perform a number of im- portant functions in any future con- tiogency, and, thereby, could greatly en- hance the overall effectiveness of U.S. forces in future co:nfllcts-not only in air battles but also in combined arms battles. This increase in effectiveness would help to offset expected future growth in the capabilities of enerrT gen- eral purpose forces. Moreover, P.WACS could function in support of friendly in- digenous forces. This could enable friend- ly nations to make greater `contributions to'their own defense by increasing the effectiveness of their aid` and surface forces. Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Cali- fornia (Mr. LEGGETT). (Mr. LEGGETT F.sked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairmary I in- tend to offer amendments tomorrow in a. number of subject areas. First, per- haps, I should point out that it large part of this bill, as in previous years. I concur with. A large number of the cuts that were made by the committee 1like- wise concur with, particularly the reduc- tions that were recommended by the committee on the AWAC system on the order of $250 million. I think that was well thought out. I think that program can well afford to be slowed down and we should know where we are going with it. Obviously, it is a tactical program, as the committee report wisely points out, that particular aspect of AWACS should be better thought out. The C-141 stretch out program and the- CRAF program likewise have been either abated or slowed down. It :is a lit- tie difficult to figure out exactly where we are in these programs, since they were also Included in the authorization sup- plemental and the supplemental appro- priation bills. We do not have the re- sults of either of those conferences to date, but hopefully we can take eonsid- erable testimony on both of thesle two bjeet matters. On the CRAP program modi,ication we are talking about making a nose May 20, loader out of the Boeing 747's and the Lockheed 1011's and the DC-10's; rip- ping out all of the interiors ant. putting in a new hinge in the front section. I;iv- ing them a tank ramp. Obviously, spending $7 million per ve - hicle and perhaps $800 million or $1 billion on these programs-requ;ses con- siderable thought and should not comie up in a supplemental. It requi_,es more testimony than we have before our com- mittee, so I think we were wise in slow- ing that program down. The other program that I will talk about in the couple of minutes I have remaining is the MASF program, the military assistance service funded pro- gram for Vietnam. I do intend:, with a number of my colleagues from a. num- ber of committees, to offer an amend- ment tomorrow to reduce that program from the $1.6 billion recommended by the Pentagon, the $1.4 billion. recom- mended by the House committ3e, down to a $900 million level. The $90) million level, I think, Is reasonable. It does not pull the rug out from under the allies that we have in Southeast Asia. It Jr $900 million for military assistaance and will be combined with about $900 milliear of economic assistance and will provide a total program of about $1.8 billion for the 1975 fiscal year, which compares to about $1.8 billion for the current ilsca.1 year. So. we are sot escalating that pro- gram at all. It allows for a one--half" bil- lion dollar reduction in the Vietnam program for the 1975 fiscal year. We will have some reasons In addition to these I have o-.itllned. Mr. Chairman, I also intend to offer an amendment with regard to the 'Iii- dent submarine system. I have already complimented my colleague from Flor- ida, Mr. BENNETT, on the method by which the Sea Power Subcommittee has made its recommendations. How ever, the last time we had appropriations ap- proved by conterence on the Trident program, we agreed to a one ship pro- gram for fiscal year 1975, and awe should keep with that schedule. Mr. Chairman, today we begin con- sideration of the military proc:u.rennent authorization bill for fiscal 1975. As the action an the fiscal 1974 supplemental bill indicates, not all committee,; dealing with the defense budget view it in the same light: -COMPARATIVE ACTION ON FISCAL YEAR 1974 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL A{D APPROPRIATIONS BILLS Defense request House A.S. Senate 6S A. uau~ ayprn- Rri>Aions &ma appro- griafeons Defense request A.S. AS. priations :;eraale priations 1. Procurement: Amny'ACFT 22 0 22 0 3. l 16 0 Army -------- r -------- 8.2 8.t 8.2 8.0 to . y Made.ACFT __ 219:2 . 214.2 101 1 . 7 IS 3 . Total----------------- 1007.1 999.3 1458.5 658.1 532.7 445.0 445.0 15{.8 294.0 244.4 Anny misuses -_ 84.4 7%.6 6 ?.3 76.6 76.6 n_ssftes 28.6 28.6 1 Raises --------.- 08-1 1 108:9 108.9 54.4 IQ&, Corps miss ff45 me 22.3 22.3 22.3 22 3 3 22 1 5 0 F owee missiles 39.0 .0 22.9 . 39.0 . 27.0 111. MILCON---- _. --_------ 29.0 29.1 0 29.1 - 0 NAVY SCN -- -- - 24.9 3. 24 8 IV MASF aO a- Q0 0 55 --- ----- - - AEfny TCV 113 6 113 6 50 9 63 1 . 50 6 . ------- ------------- ---?- - -------- -_ ----- . . . . . :112.8 74L 7 6IL& t155 809,000 to be transferred from $2,200,000,000 far Israel. $MAS' oequest required no apprgi iabon. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 May 20, 1,974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 4029 If the country had unlimited money, Lest we believe that every cent in the no agency would need to be limited in defense budget is vital to national secu- spending. Since we don't have the money,, rity, we should consider this testimony we have therefore restricted poverty, ed- given by the Secretary of Defense to the ucation, health, housing and manpower Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on training funds. Defense expenditures February 17, 1974, in response to allega- should be no exception. tions that the budget contained $5 billion The following chart shows the escala- worth of padding: tion of the U.S. national debt over the It was recognized late in calendar year past 7 years, the annual service charge 1974 that there may be an easing of the on the debt that must be paid, adminis- economy and some growth in unemploy- trative income and the percentage of ad- ment and that as a consequence of that, ministrative income allocated to this the total figure for the budget outlays item: would be relaxed. . . . If there had not JDollar amounts in billionsl been this perception of an easing eco- Year National debt Service charge U.S. adminis- trative income Per- centage service charge $367 X $15.8 $143 11.0 1970----------? 382 18.3 143 12.7 1971____________ 410 19.6 134 14.6 ------- 437 20.6 149 13.8 1973------------ 468 22.8 161 14:1 1974 ------------ 486 27.8 185 15.0 1975____________ 508 29.1 202 14.4 Obviously, our escalating debt, esca- lating service charge, and escalating service charge as a percentage of income dictates and demaiids moderation. Since we spend 95 percent of all mili- tary funds spent in this hemisphere, and 60 percent of all military funds ex- pended in the world, we need constantly to review our posture in this regard. The short chart that follows, prepared by committee counsel, shows the action of our House Armed Services Commit- tee in various subject areas of the pend- ing bill: H.R. 12564 [In thousands of dptlarsi nomio environment I believe our outlays might have been a billion dollars or a billion and a half dollars less in 1975. In short, the Secretary had admitted to a billion or a billion and a half WPA dol- lars intermixed with the national secu- rity budget. We had further evidence of Pentagon padding in the fiscal year 1974 supple- mental request, which included $108.6 million for research and development. The committee decided the request was not sufficiently urgent to warrant sup- plemental action, and suggested the De- fense Department make a strong appeal for these funds in the fiscal year 1975 regular budget if it so desired. Now we find not one word about these programs in the 1975 request; the previously vital programs are no longer vital. To me it seems the DOD sometimes means what it says and sometimes does not. TITLE I. PROCUREMENT A. TRIDENT SUBMARINE The submarine-launched ballistic mis- sale system is probably as important as the rest of the military establishment combined. It is secure from detection and is expected to remain so in the foresee- able future. Of all our weapons systems, Requested Recommended it makes the greatest contribution to by DOD by committee national security, and at the same time Procurement: Aircraft: Army__________________ 339,500 335, 000 Navy and Marine Corps- 2,960,600 2,964,100 AirForce -------------- 3,496,600 3,391,400 Missiles: 459 200 Army 400 439 __________________ , Navy------------------ 620,600 , 620, 600 Marine Corps ----------- 76,000 76, 000 AirForce. __.--------- _ 1,610,800 1,610,800 Naval vessels: Navy-_____-_ 3, 562,600 3, 539,100 Tracked combat vehicles: Army__________________ 331,900 321, 200 Marine Corps ----------- 80,100 74,200 Torpedoes: Navy ----- _---__ 187,700 187, 700 Other weapons: Army__________________ 53,400 55,700 Navy------------------ 25,600 25,600 Marine Corps ----------- 500 500 Total procurement.--- 13,805,100 13, 641, 300 Research, development, test and evaiuation; Army ---------------------- 1,985,976 1,878,397 Navy______________________ 13,264,503 13, 153,006 Air Force__________________ 3,518,860 3,459,760 Defense agencies------- -- 555, 700 510, 500 SUMMARY Net change in procurement (title I)- - - - --- -163,800 U in R.D.T.&E. (titleil)------------- -323,376 is not provocative. By increasing the range of the missile, the Trident I and Trident II systems will provide a prudent hedge against the possibility of unfore- seen breakthroughs in Soviet anti- submarine technique. In short, I favor the Trident concept. However, the very high rate at which the Navy plans to build the 10 ships is, in my view, unwise. It is not sufficient for a system to be sound in concept; it must be reliable in operation. The Polaris submarine- launched missile system, which had the benefit of a thorough and careful R. and D. program, was perhaps the most re- liable missile system ever built. The Po- seidon, which was not developed as care- fully, has been somewhat less reliable but still creditable. It would be disastrous if this trend were to continue and we pendent upon an aquatic C-5A. The surest way to induce unreliability, as well as cost overruns, is to rush the program. The worst aspect of a rushed program is what is called "concurrency": placing the system full into production while a substantial amount of R.D.T. & E. remains to be done. The arguments for accelerated devel- opment are not persuasive. First. There is no need to rush Trident into the water to meet a Soviet threat to Polaris-Poseidon ships, since the threat does not exist. On the contrary, at this point we cannot even speculate on the nature of the threat which might develop. Thus, the sooner we construct the ships the more we increase the pos- sibility that they may be inappropriate to the threat they may eventually face. I believe the House Appropriations Com- mittee was entirely correct in its rejec- tion of the Trident acceleration in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental. Its report stated: The Committee recommends that the $24,- 800,000 requested to accelerate Trident sub- marine construction from one per year, as recommended by the Congress in fiscal year 1974, to two per year not be appropriated. It is the considered judgment of the Com- mittee that with new Navy initiatives, such as the strategic cruise submarine-launched missile, the available options to backfit the Trident I missile into our 10 Polaris, and 31 Poseidon submarines, and the proposed NARWHAL submarine as a low cost option to the Trident submarine, an acceleration of the Trident submarine construction effort cannot be justified. The Committee is also mindful of the backlog of new construction and conversion of ships and submarines at the two large nuclear-oapable shipyards which are involved in the Trident subma- rine program, and the problems they and many shipyards are having in obtaining skilled labor. All of these factors seem to mandate a prudent and cautious, but deliberate course in the construction of Trident submarines. There must be a reasonable limit or plateau that should be achieved in spending merely for the sake of "bargaining chips." The Tri- dent submarine construction rate of one per year as directed by Congress appears to be a sufficient demonstration that this country has the national resolve to modernize and maintain our sea-based missile deterrent and a current status technologically, without risking an escalation or renewal of the arms race. Second. While submarines do wear out, there is no indication that a 1-per- year Trident program will leave Polaris boats In operation longer than would be justified by safety considerations. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the sooner we launch the Tridents the sooner thay will wear out and the sooner we will need the next generation SSBN. Moreover, if we buy Tridents in rapid succession they will wear out in rapid succession, thus forcing us into excessive concurrency on the next generation and more block obsolescence. It is claimed that faster procurement is cheaper. This is only true if the accel- eration does not produce difficulties. In my views, it is probable that problems, and therefore increased costs, will arise from the accelerated schedule proposed by the Navy. Therefore, I will propose an amend- ment to reduce the procurement sched- ule to one ship per year from the Navy's proposed two. I propose to reduce the $1,166.8 million two-ship program to $700 million, which would consist of last year's $627.8 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 114030 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE May 2', 197-4- million one-step progral# plus a reason- we more realistically assume work at base Minuteman ICBM's against a yea- able inflation allowance.' two=thirds of the planned pace, we find sonable vigorous threat I do not propose to reduce research and ourselves facing a 3-year slippage. And However, site defense operate; u:n(ier development. Neither F I propose to this is only the first of the 30 ships. two handicaps: reduce procurement of" the Trident I Second. Cost: Program unit cost has so The ` Strategic Arms Limitation missile, which can a ad should be far ' kept .reasonably consistent wl,h the Treaty-SALT-sets a limit of 100 inter- retrofitted into the existing Poseidon general inflation. However- ceptors whereas many hundred:; would submarines. Delays inevitably require the contract be required before Site Defense cc+uld add In additional views i pended to' the to be performed in an inflated economy, significantly to our deterrent. fiscal year 1974 report, described the which increases the cost to the con- Site defense is incompatible N4?i th the landing heavy assault -LHA-program tractor. administration's-headlong rush for maxi- as "one of the worst disinters in the his- Litton Is now asking for an addtional mum ICBM accuracy. As I point out un- tory of American miita procurement." $7 1nillioif per ship. der "Dangerous Nuclear Programs" later While this rhetoric mayDave been softie- With Only 2 of the 30 ships in the in these additional views, if we fund the what overdramatic, subsequent events water, the Navy has already tole! us it development of high accuracy, there will have not impugned the :accuracy of the expects the cost to go to ceiling-130 be no way to negotiate the Sovie -s out of assertion. At the time o8 last year's re- percent of target price. also deploying high accuracy warheads. number of expensive subsystems- They will thus be able to use very small port, thesefive ships were 2 years behind A schedule. Today they ale 21y2 years be totaling perhaps 20 percent of the cost yields as silo-killers which means they hind; the cost is sittirigon the contract of the ship-are to be installed after de- will be able to use large numbers of war- ceiling and we can a )ect, before we livery. Thus, they are not included in the heads on each BM at low cost. Thus, have the ships in handle to find the con- systems acquisition costs. Instead, they they will-be able to exhaust site defense tractor rewarded for his delays by pay- are funded by the other procurement, fax more cheaply than we could expand ments well above the oiling. Navy-OPN-and operations and main- it. It is important to note that the same The same contractor i the same ship- tenance-O. & M.-budgets, which :receive unlikely and tragic egrcumstances that yard-Litton Industries in Pascagoula., relatively light scrutiny and are there- would permit deploynnt of site defense Miss.-is building another series of fore prime breeding grounds for what is abrogation of SALT I-would almost ships: the 30 large arisubmarine de- known in the trade as "contract nour- certainly be accompanied by the failure stroyers of the DD-963 class. This pro- ishment" of SALT II and the consequent t+echno- gram is clearly headed for similar or 't'hird. Performance: We are not yet logical developments that would neutral- worse problems. capable "bf judging the performance of ize any ADM. The new "assembly-Ihhe" method used the system. However, our experience has Therefore, we shall move to amend the in this shipyard has received much pub- been thatlate delivery and cost overruns site defense authorization, reducing the licity, but it is not the source of the do. not usually go hand in hand with $160 million prototype demor~stratiop problem. satisfactory performance. program to a $110 Million technology The difficulty stems from the Inability I believe it to be a real mistake to au- program. of the contractor, to 4ttract suff.c ent thorize the last of the 30 ships, thus ef- B. SAX-n quantity and quality of-labor to the site festively giving up the Armed cervices Secretary of Defense Schies iger has of the shipyard. Total labor force on the Committee's control over this program. has wisely pointed out that, since the DD-963 program ispreeently 29 percent A sine lar mistake was made on the LHA United States has no technological choice below program. The problem is increas- program, in which we finished author- but to remain vulnerable to Soviet mis- ing rather than decreasi.g, with 10.6 per- }zing the last of the five ships last year, siles, there is no sense spending money to cent attrition but onlym 9.9 percent ac- yet the Navy has still to see its first LHA. defend against bombers. cession between Sept ,nber 1972, and I do not propose to reduce or cancel Thus, the only function of the SAM-D, September 1973. The shipyard today is the program. At this point, I mere ly em- anti-aircraft system will be to defend our 4,000 men short and is enable to acceler- pliasize that the reasons for the diffi- allies. This $6 billion program makes a ate employment. culty-difficult location and inadequate very expensive charity item in these day.-- The quality of the work force, accord- m nagernent-were entirely subject to of precarious economic security. lug to the General Accounting Office, is the control of the contractor. at the time Therefore, it would be desirab:ie for the as substandard as the quantity. The he made his bid. It is he, and not the tax- Secretary of Defense to seek conxmit- journeymen;apprentice'` ratio has been palyera, who should bear the burden of his ments from our allies to pay is cash a about 1.4-1, where 2-1 7 is considered de- inability to live up to the contract. minimum of one-half the total program sirable. While' this ratio has remained According to the recent report to the cost of the system, and to include the relatively stable, the quality of the ap- Congress by the General Accounting of- result of his efforts In his annual report prentice force has declined markedly, fide, the Navy and its contracting officer for fiscal year 1976.-If these commit- with the percentage hiving less than 1 have made sincere and vigorous efforts ments are not In hand at the time o ' adhere to the terms of the contract. I the report, it is my view that the pro- year's experience soar* from 18 percent to in October 1972, to 41 percent in August commend them for It. it would be my in- gram should be abandoned. .1973. The contractors Silo prospects for teztion to see that the full 30 ships will c. DANGEROVO NUCLEAR FROCdAus improvement. be delivered with satisfactory perform- It is natural to assume that id ,markedly in., will look back on the action they have size for over the last 10 years,The World recommended as an important turning War II ships, destroyers in particular, point in the naval history of the United that were the mainstay of off~~rr Navy for, States. , so many years have readbep-the enc. of Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield their useful life. To replace them with 6 minutes to the gentleman from New large, multipurpose, "abe to fight any- York (Mr. PIKE). where" destroyers in the glimbers re- (Mr. PIKE asked and was given per- quired to adequately coversthe thou- mission to revise and extend his r(- sands upon thousands of m+es of vital marks.) sealanes in time of war wo$d be pro- Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in hibitively expensive. support of H.R. 14592, but, I-do not wart Th N k s t h l f e avy ` a a en cogni nce o t e to give the ixs ression that I rise in sup- fact that, when combined, with the newer port of everything contained -14-4 11 1" escort ships that we nov live or will have during the next 10 25 years, relatively small, less eapesve ships could be designed and -coxtructed to adequately defend our sealanes in all but the most hostile of the i orl potential war Zones where our cagier 4ask forces and other highly sophisticate ships are designed to il,~ht. And mist i>pportantly, the Patrol Frigate can be co tructed in the numbers that we require can afford- able price. The Navy has devoted alias st 3 years of concentrated study. analy is and de- sign effort to determine es ac the right combination of weapons and,-sensors to provide the required force eectiveness at a minimum cost. Taking v advantage of modern computers . they evaluated ever 300 combinations of h, propul- sion, weapons; and sensors b ore deckl- g am. w not ing on the patrol frigate as tl a most ef- . go into that in detail at the present fective in meeting our rated It is an time. The minority views on this sub- austere ship design to provid iaximum it are on liege 97 of the committee required capability at least cpst. It is a report. I was_. encouraged. to hear the ship which will 811 a major Portion of the chairman of the Research and Develop. void brought bout by the re ement of ment Subcommittee, the gentleman from our World War II destroyers., Illinois (Mr. PRICE) did concede in his It should be noted, also, the the Navy own remarks today that it is in fact a has been equally diligent in ,,,developing seek program. a shipbuilding program designed to pre- Mr. Chairman, I would like to address vent gross cost overruns.The lips "de- myself bgriefly today to the larger prob-? signed to cost" and the "Aesi~n to cost" lem of getting facts out of the Pentagon, principles will be adhd to in Its I have not brought my lunch here planned production. koday in this package, but I have brought In summary, the patrol frig t,e is a well an altimeter. This particular altimeter conceived program, carefully tailored to costs $1,000, and that Is not. a bad buy provide capabilities vital to the protec- for an altimeter, except that thispartic- tion of the sea lanes of the wgr rii _essen- ular altimeter does not work. It wt .wily tial to the United States itp puce and In does not work, but it cannot be repaironed, war. it is a ". nonsense" shig designed It has on it a red tag which says , , to provide nias3mum et act eness at "W for Ground 'Use Only. Not Te least cost. It is a ship, we catt build in 'Be Instal ed on Aircraft." the numbers that we need. It is a ship we I would submit that an altimeter which connot afford not to build? cannot tae thst2iied on an aircraft is not Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, Field such Inuc h of a bargain. Not only did It cost time as be may consume to the gentle- 41MO sitting , of ontthe there are shelves at shat ands throe man from C radfl on an Air Force ( Mr A>i]pcsxaoNG) . every facility, and they just cannot be installed as important as those we faced at this A NA'' I thank the gem- on aircraft, because they do not work. time last year. Last year we bad what we tdemaai fpr y` The Air Force investigated this I rise to congratulate procalled the Peyser amendment. It was the ci irman of curenient What did they find? They added to an amendment which made an the Seapower Subcommittee and the found that the manufacturer was sneak- attempt to reduce our commitments ,;o ranking member for their leadership In into the factory at night during the 33ATO. Tice Peywer amendment called for bringing before the committee and be- testing process and adjusting the alum- a study of our forces in Europe, and with Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 n . .. 14502. I think we have done some very useful things in this bill. I am particularly im- Pressed with the work of the Subcom- mittee on Manpower. Any time we can increase the proportion of enlisted mesa to officers, that is real progress toward a more effective fighting military. Any time we can decrease the proportion of generals and admirals to combat troops, that, too, is real progress. I would like to say at this time I think among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that General Abrams in particu- lar is committed to the goal of making a fighting Army rather than a parade Army. I think he is doing everything he can. in this regard and should be com- mended,and encouraged. Tomoyrow I will offer an amendment to out out the B--1 pro r I ill May 20', 1974 titers while they were being tested. Did they cancel the contract? Oh, no, they did not cancel the contract. The Govern- ment inspector found that, In the testing facility there was a tube running off from the vacuum and pressure testing mech- anism, right into the wall of the facility, so that no matter whether the altimeter really worked or not, it Would indicate that the altimeter worked. So, did theycancel the procurement,? No, they did not cancel the procurement. There was just unadulterated fraud in this procurement of these altimeters, and finally the Air Force, because they did not work, canceled It for nondelivery. But they continue to buy other altimeters from the same corporation. Now, can we Set the investigation re- ports? No. We . cannot, because, for in- stance, I have tried to et the OS1 report. They have let me look at it, but I could not keep it. I pointed out to them the Freedom of Information Act which we passed, and the Freedom of Information Act says that when an investigation is completed we can get the facts. Well, what do they-say? Although he investigations say on the face of them that they are completed, the case is closed, they say, "We have not com- pleted the investigation." I say, "Why have you not completed the investigation?" They say, "We have not completed the investigation because you, Congressman PnCE, asked a question If I had not asked for the information., in other words, I could have it. 'But, in view of the fact that I have asked :'or the information, they are still investi- gating it, and, accordingly, we eamtc t Set it. Now, this is true throughout this whole procurement business. The B-1 program increased in cost; by 0 million a month every month in the last year-increased. And we can- amt get the uli-to-date selected acqui;i-- tici reports not only on the 13--1 progra;n, but on any program. We have not gotten a selected acquisition -report in the sub.. committee dated more recently than last December 3L We do not know what the B-1 costs today. They know over in tat Pentagons. They are cot taming tree truth. They know that they are acccl- crating the price at an estimated infla- tion rate of only 3.3 percent a year. This is fantasy, and we ought to at least insist on the truth from the Pesa- tagon. - The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gan- tleman has expired. Mr. WHITETIGRST. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL). (Mr. RANDALL asl d and was given permission to revise and extend his rie- marks.) Mr. RANIDAL. Mr. Chairman, to- morrow this committee will be faced with some amendments that will be bit May 20, 19 74 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 the mandate that the Committee on Armed Services make a report effective April 1 on its study. But there have been some important intervening events. I wish there were more Members on the floor who were not members of the Com- mittee on Armed Services who could lis- ten to this brief discussion. Following the Peyser amendment came the Jacks on-Nunn amendment. That said that in the period ending in 18 months-12 months from last November and an additional 6 months, which would expire next May-that if there is a defi- cit In our balance of payments because of deployment of air troops and our al- lies do not make up that deficit, then there should be a withdrawal of forces by the percentage which fell short of full offset by air allies. Thus Jackson-Nunn is one difference this year. As one who was privileged to serve as chairman of the ad hoc committee, that we have a very excellent chance of meeting Jack- _.son-Nunn on time. There is no indica- tion that we will fail. There has been another event which has already, been alluded to. That is the MBFR. The subcommittee visited Vienna, arid we found there something that we had never seen before. There was com- plete unity among our allies in agreeing on what forces we should reduce and, on the contrary there was _no footdragging and no delays at all by the Russians. The committee reports to you here to- day that there is a good chance that that conference can succeed. We are not cer- tain of the reasons for it. Maybe it is be- cause the Russians are anxious to have our credits and our technology. Maybe they think more of the concept of detente than we realize, but they have indicated a willingness to move forward. How does this apply to the debate and the amendments which will be offered tomorrow? There will be two amend- mejits offered tomorrow, and maybe more. One will be simply to the effect that there are going to be 200,000 troops brought home from overseas. We do not know yet whether they are to be brought home or discharged. The other one would be a little bit different. It will say about 100,000 troops phased out, apparently brought home. Of course, at the appropriate time the Armed Services Committee will attempt to show there will really be no saving. in any other field besides military hard- ware or to any renewed dedication to working out real problems. At home, we see this in the fact that while every other Government agency and program is scraped to the bone, es- pecially the human needs programs, and forced to show "efficiency dividends" at the expense of significant accomplish- ment only the military maintains its rate of growth without any substantial sav- ings, in fact with a growth rate that out- strips the overall rate of inflation. We must realize this: In an era of tightened resources and hard choices, we must choose either tax reform and de- fense cuts on the one hand, or a help- less Government facing multiplying so- cial problems on the other. If the De- fense budget is untouchable, the rest of the Government must wither away. Abroad, we see this when we notice that detente does not mean an end, first, to our worldwide military presence; second, to our ability to fight any way at any time; third, to our dedication to keeping dictators in power though any means necessary; and fourth, to the same perception of political and strategic realities that dominated foreign policy thinking 20 years ago. So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is detente any different from the cold war? Does it make any difference at all? What is the use of it then?" OVERSEA TROOP LEVELS Manpower costs comprise 55 percent of the military budget. This figure does not include the increasingly heavy bur- den of veterans' benefits, which the ad- ministration never includes in its mili- tary spending figures, but which this year will be $13.6 billion. We will un- doubtedly save some money if we end some of the unneeded and costly weap- ons systems such as the atomic aircraft carrier, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine or the destabilizing land- based missiles-but we will never touch the bulk of the huge military budget until we revise our assumptions about the use of manpower. It is here that the Pentagon's refusal to come up with any real "efficiency dividend" Is most flagrant. For these reasons, I shall offer an amendment that will substantially cut end-strength, and mandate that the cuts. be taken overseas. Exact location of the oversea cuts will be left to the Pentagon. We now have 492,000 troops scattered all over the world. My amendment will charged. But for those who are brought dream of any nondefense agency admin- cut 198,100 from this total. This decrease home and try to find a place to house istrator. Only the military budget is sig- could easily be accomodated without any them, there will be no saving. In fact, it nificant enough itself to set limits to reduction in real commitment, because will cost more to keep them in this coun- what the whole Government can do or of the inefficient structure of the over- try than if they remain in the NATO hope to do. In fact, the size of the mill- sea troops as reflected in crowded head- area in the Federal Republic of Ger- tart' budget is the central issue deter- quarters, wasteful support-to-combat many. ming domestic reform. ratios, and disruptive rotation policies. But let me get back on the track in the As Secretary Schlesinger has clearly These are the key questions we want to limited time I have remaining and say told us, this first completely post-Indo- ask: to the Members that the real seriousness china budget shows what to expect for Is it possible to have a real peacetime of, this whole thing is that if we approve the indefinite future unless some basic budget? Can the Government get its job any amendment to call home our troops assumptions are changed. done without raising taxes? then ourNation,can very well become a It is the first indication of what can be Do we need to maintained a worldwide spectacle in the eyes of the world for expected from a supposedly peacetime military manpower presence? acting capriciously. We will allow our- Government. Unfortunately, the answer Can we really end the arms race by selves to be held up to the justified crit- is: "Not much." Whatever else "peace" the method proposed by the 'Pentagon, icism of all the world. In effect we will means for this administration, it does that is, new technological leaps in have sale yes we passed the Jackson- not mean any commitment to creativity weaponry? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Nunn amendment. Our allies are meet- ing Jackson-Nunn but we are bringing our troops home anyhow. The Federal Republic of Germany made the best offset agreement that has ever been made in all of the years there has been an agreement. At the moment just about everything is going our way. In spite of their problems this year, the oil crisis, and all of the other prob- lems, our allies have, nevertheless, come up with the best offset agreement of any year. So if we do a turnaround here tomorrow and happen to adopt one of these amendments for withdrawal, or any variation of them, then we are say- ing to our allies and to the world in ef- fect: We did not mean what we said by Jackson-Nunn, and we do not mean any- thing we are saying or doing in Vienna at MBFR. We have Secretary Resor, former Secretary of the Army, heading the nego- tiations over at Vienna. He came over here to make a report 2 or 3 weeks ago. We had a chance to visit with him. There was no diminution in his optimism. It is unexpected and unanticipated the cooperation we are getting from the War- saw Pact at this time in Vienna. Sure, we have a long, tedious time ahead at MBFR. It Is going to be a lot of work yet, but the prize or the objective is the important thing, and that is to get a reduction-a balanced reduction of forces without diminishing our security. For the first time we appear to have a breakthrough. Think how foolhardy, how almost stupid it would be if we ap- prove any of these amendments tomor- row. It simply would mean we will have pulled the rug out from under our people. We might as well say to them: "Just pack your bags and come on home." So I suggest to the Members they should think long and hard before they support either of these amendments which will be offered tomorrow. Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Cali- fornia (Mr. DELLUMS). (Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, ob- viously this is one of the most important bills considered by Congress. The size of the military bureaucracy and the amount of money needed to supply it with hardware far exceeds the wildest Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 1114040 Finally, does this budge] really serve the Interests and the segurity of the The answer to the. fl question a "no." In simple terms, this ill continues the disastrous trend ofs bl d faith miii, tarism and adventurislr( which has dominated policymakilig IV this Nati(M and which, over the past decade, has de- stroyed and distorted the A,erican econ; omy, shattered the politigi and social framework upon which or democracy was created, and killed #nd maned hundreds of thousands of rsons. There is ;a massive difference ltween what reason, I am strongly oppod to the bill in its present form. MILITARY AID TO SA,.ON This Nation is a signator to the Paris agreements and yet we aae in serious violation of that true. Our, client, Gen- eras Thieu, has made a mQckery of the Pttrfs agreefnents; there is;probably not cONGR~SSIQNAL RECORD - ]SOUSE tragic nation. What honor for us can therebe when Thrieu's biggest friend also lxappens to be the American Ambas- sadorbb I do not think this is :the fo>.'um to deal with all of Ambassador Martin's follies but'I would like to bring atten- tion to the fact that Martin himself has admitted that he is permitting outright American violation of the Paris agree- ment. Despite legislative malidate and terms' of the Paris agreement, In a mem- orandum printed in the April 4, 1974, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on page E2117, Ambassador Martin notes that- A certain number of people in the Defense Attache Office were retained, engaged solely on logistics assistance to the military forces of South Vietnam. To me, that appears to be a flagrant violation of both congressional intent and ti~{{e Pars agreement. Fin9,lly, let me indicate what I see oc- curring if huge flows of American mili- tary assistance continue to Thieu-as the general and the administration desire. As long as America picks up the tab for his military operations and for his re- violated. peated violations of the Palls agree- xpayers are menu; Thieu will continue the war. I do liievertlieless, American 1I t virtually the sole financial, support for not think the Provisional Revolutionary Thieu, Estimates indicate that our tax Government will allow that to happen dollars account for 85 perc it of Thleu',s for any prolonged period-and up to now, national budget, and I would like to call the PRG has concentrated based the attention once again to the gores noted Paris is agreements a saand d upon the by our cone nd has undertaken ague from Net York (MI'. only limited military operations. But I PIKE) in the floor debate on thesup- do not think it realistic for us to assume pie mental aid to Vietnam when he that the PRG and its allies would re- po1lzted out that the Sout Vietnamese main so passive, if It becomes apparent defense budget dropped frogs $1.3 billion that Thieu will never agree to any of in 1971 to only $474 mlllion rudgeted for the political components of the Paris thi$ year. accords and that America will continu- Americandollars allow ieu to con ously fund, Thieu's aggression. When- tinlie a way, that took applximately 60 ever that point is reached, I think that thousand lives,last year; American dot- massive fighting will break out again. lars pay for a police state in-which thou- and we will be back to the situation of a sands of Vietnamese are held political decade ago. prisoner without benefit of al; Ameri- Given that chance, It is conceiva':ale Can dollars pay for the secuy of a petty that, based upon the implicit commit- dictator who refuses to all ow -distribution inept Secretary Kissinger has made, of the Paris agreements ip his areas, large-scale American forces could be re- who holds Illegal elections, 2orbids neu- introduced in Vietnam. tredism, and employs systengtic torture,,. Have we not learned from the past It is a sham to say them is peace in decade, in Vietnam? How long Is this Vietnam, and a lie to cl there is tragedy to continue? As long as Con- "honor- in American policy ward that gress allows_Thieu to mock the Paris May .2 0, 19 74 agreements by his repeated offensives, by his refusing basic human rights gulran? teed by the agreements, and by gestapo tactics which pervert the legal systoni in Vietnam, it is we who must take the re- sponsibility for war in Vietnam. I do not oppose the concept of human- itarian assistance to the people of Viet- nam. But this bill provides nothing of that sort. Instead, the American tax- payer once again assumes the burden of Thieu's military budget. As long as we do so-and no matter what level ceiling we may impose-there will be continuing war in Vietnam. If instead, our Nation is to abide by the Paris agreements--something, we have not done up to now-Congress must insist that Thieu live up to the terms set in Paris. I intend to_offeran amendment on the floor proposing that all military aid be suspended until we are asi,ured. that Thieu is in accord with the Paris agreements and I urge my colleagues to support that motion. This is a serious issue, but not one ap- parently critical enough though for the Armed Services Committee to devote ma- jor analysis and attention. Proper legis- lative oversight of Executive activities is, of course, the very key to our system of government-particularly now in an era of gross Executive misuse of power. It is thus with considerable dismay that I found that the committee report's lan- guage justifying military aid to Sr,igon contains outright plagiarism of unsub- stantiated and thoroughly inaccurate Executive testimony. I have discovered that the committee's justification is not only misleading, loaded with inaccuracies, and in many cases totally untrue, but it is, in fact, copied almost word-for-word from testi- mony given by a Pentagon spokesman to the committee on March 26, 1974. The following comparison of testimony given by Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Direc- tor, Security Assistance Plans and Policy Formulation, to the committee on pages 893-895 of its hearings with the language of the committee report shows that the committee has simply copied the pre- pared statement of General Caldwell and then presented it as a summary of committee findings: A COMPARISON BETWEEN Hou4 ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON 11ISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY SPOIR.ESMAN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMTFVE REPORT ON TESTIMONNT BY MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CALDWELL, MnrrARY PROCUREMENT AUTE1 IZATIONS FOR, DEPARr'MENT.OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR, SECURITY FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF FOR SCI 'TH VIETNAM, ASSISTANCE PLANS POLICY, MARCH 26, 1974, MAY 10, 1974, PAGES 85-90 PAGES.893-895 The objectives of our militay assistance to South Vietnam are limited, but absolutely essential. [The Government cL the United_ States wishes] to help the GQvernmellt of_ South Vietnam to maintain ofifective mll- itary, deterrent in the face of" he consider able threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of,Vietnam. At- tainment of this limited objective is the key to the maintenance of stable balanced condi- tions necessary to ensure pelyce in Indo- chilia and'Soutleast Asia. However, attp;in- meat of this objective has a vital and stra- tegic importance far beyond Idochina. In- volved are the fundamental goals of our nation's foreign policy. General CALDWELL. Mr. Chairman, and dis- tenguislied members of this committee: The objectives of our military assistance to South Vietnam are limited but absolutely essential. We seek to help the GVN to main- tain an effective military deterrent in the face of the considerable threat posed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of this limited ob- jective is key to the maintenance of stable, balanced conditions necessary to Insure peace In, Indochina and Southeast Asia. How- ever, attainment of this objective has a vital and strategic Importance far beyond Indo- china. Involved are the fundamental goals of our foreign policy. PENTi-GON COMMENTS Paragraphs I-2-The available evidence does not indicate that our military assistance is helping to "ensure peace". There were well over 1,000,000 war victims in South Vietnam alone last year-perhaps more than in the rest of the world combined for 1973. (50,152 military dead and over 100,000 military wounded, according to GVN official statistics; 15,000 civilian dead, 70,000 civilian wounded, and 818,000 refugees, according to the U S. Senate Subcommitteeon Refugees.) Not only does our military assistance fuel this continuing war, but it shows no hope of stabilizing. Thus last year $1.009 billion in MASF funds was allocated to the GVN; In FY 75, however, the Administration req.lest was set at $1.8 billion, an Increase of 42%. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 May 20, 19 74 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 4041 A COMPARISON BETWEEN HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON SPOKESMAN-Continued Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possi- ble only if there is a stable balance of power between the opposing sides. It is the view of the Committee on +rmed Services that a military equilibrium in that area of the world will deter new offensives and gradually induce a (general) shift in priorities (by the contending forces) away from war. "The post agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress toward this goal. (Although) some fighting has contin- ued, on the basis of testimony received by the Committee, it is the conviction of the Committee that the cease fire has indeed served to significantly dampen combat ac- tivity.. Thus, the hopes of the Executive Branch, which are shared by the members of the Committee on Armed Services, for a stable peace in South Vietnam, are largely dependent upon the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. The cease fire already has witnessed the following: -"A rough but tenuous balance of forces thus far prevails in Vietnam; . Territorial and population control have changed little .over the past year (what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces); In the area of military operations, Hanoi's land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and, Government reactions which still character- izes the cease-fire.. Major Conunu.fiist Initia- tives in the past year have included: Another land .grab attack prior to the June communique; The capture of strategic posts (e.g., Le Minh border Camp) in the western highlands last fall; An offensive in Quang Due province which seized a district capital; The shelling of Bien Hoa airbase; The destruction of a major civilian fuel depot near Saigon; Continuing attacks against all forms of transportation and; . Terrorism against civilians. A new North Vietnamese full-scale offen- sive, however, is It inevitable, Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious problems both at home and in the south. These problems, together with a strong GVN deterrent and the international con- text of detente give us hope that an offen- sive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's prior- ities, would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit of the Viet- nom agreement. Events in Vietnam over the past year have taught us that a lasting peace is possible only if there is a stable balance of power between the opposing sides. A military equilibrium will, we believe, deter new offen- sives and gradually induce a shift in priori- ties away from war. The post-agreement period in Vietnam has recorded substantial progress toward this goal. While fighting has continued, we believe that the cease-fire has served to dampen. combat activity. Our hopes for a more stable peace are dependent on the continued ability of the South Vietnamese to defend them- selves. Nor does it offer any hope of deterring pos- sible offensives by the other side, which was neither deterred from a'1968 offensive by 550,000 U.S. ground troops or a 1972 offensive by a massive U.S. bornbing campaign. Clearly, the only way of achieving our ob- jective of "lasting peace" is implementation of the Paris Agreement; there are numerous indications, however, that the GVN still re- fuses to recognize the PRG (See the N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1973; The Economist, Feb. 16, 1974) and test its offer to engage in politi- cal settlement. Under these circumstances, the Adminis- tration's present MASF program offers little hope of encouraging peace and seems only to be leading to more war. Paragraph 3-All evidence indicates that it is not our arming the GVN that has served to. "dampen combat activity", but rather a Communist decision in 1973 tl at it is in their interests to try for a political solution to the conflict and emphasize reconstruction. (See U.S. Embassy analysis of Document No. 113, Vietnam-Documents and Research Notes; N.Y. Times, January 23, 1973; "Hanoi Puts Rebuilding Ahead of Victory"; Balti- more Sun, April 16, 1974.) Paragraph 4-This shocking admission that "what change has been made has been The cease-fire already has witnessed the in favor of Government forces" indicates following: that the GVN may well be using our military A rough but tenuous balance of forces assistance to take land from the other side. thus far prevails in Vietnam; This has been also suggested by numerous Territorial and population control have newspaper reports, for example one which changed little over the past year-what reported that "In the past month, military change has been made has been in favor of officials say, almost 20 square miles of for- the Government forces; merly Communist-held territory have been In the area of military operations, Hanoi's seized by South Vietnamese troops driving land grab offensive on the eve of the Paris westward from Highway 1.. . ." (Wash. Post, agreement set a pattern of NVA attacks and September 30, 1973.) government reactions which still character- This fact indicates that while the com- izes the cease-fire. Major Communist initia- munist attacks listed did occur, the GVN is tives in the past year have included: another not entirely blameless. land grab attack prior to the June communi-' Indeed, the consensus of opinion indicates que; the capture of strategic posts, for ex- that at the very least both sides have en- ample, Le Minh Border Camp in the western gaged in violations of the military ceasefire, Highlands last fall; an offensive in Quang thus making it difficult to attribute primary Due Province which seized a district capital; blame to either side for a specific military the shelling of Bien Hoa Airbase; the destruc- incident. tion of a major civilian fuel depot near Senate Foreign Relations Committee in- Saigon; continuing attacks against all forms vestigators, for example, have reported that of transportation; and terrorism against Saigon forces "have encroached on territory civilians. considered predominately under Communist A new North Vietnamese full-scale offen- sive, however, is not inevitable. Hanoi is keeping its option open but, is encountering serious problems both at home and in the South, These problems, together with a strong GVN deterrent and the international context of detente give us hope that an offensive can be avoided. A shift in Hanoi's priorities would then make possible a serious accommodation within the spirit of the Viet- namagreement. control, and in MR III they have been even more aggressive in military operations. ("Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," April 1923, p. 35) And, until the GVN at least tests the other side's offer to compete for power politically by recognizing the PRG and allowing demo- cratic liberties guaranteed by Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, the GVN may have to take the political responsibility for the mili- tary breakdown. Paragraph 5-As long as the PRG is out- lawed from the political arena, another of- fensive is unlikely in the, short-term but inevitable in the long-term. The notion that the Communists are encountering more problems now than five years ago when fac- ing 550,000 American ground troops or 11/2 years ago when facing hundreds of U.S. bombing raids daily does not make sense. "International detente" did not stop an offensive in 1972, nor is -likely to preclude a future one. There is every reason to be- lieve that build up the GVN's army can only increase its capacity to provoke attacks, while doing nothing to prevent defeat. The GVN Is offering the other side no choice at this point but surrender, and the experience of the past 25 years indicates that this simply will not happen. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 1-14042 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 20, 19 74 HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT ON FISCAL . YEAR 1975 MASF PROPOSAL AND TESTIMONY BY PENTAGON While the North VietnamesVhave increased the conventional capability of the mai'n forces, the cost has been great, and the Government of Vietnam has thus far man- aged to turn back all their challenges In the past year. Combat deaths, while substantial on both sides, have declined to the lowest level erode 1965 and are down 75% compared with the rate in 1972. Some 500,000 refugees have been resettled. Virtually all pre-cease-fire civilian detainees and POW's-at least on the GVN side-have been released. The balance of power which underlies the chances for peace is under heavy pressure from North Vietnam. Hanoiis conducting a massive military buildup ins the south and repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These ac- tivities threaten the equilibftum and confge- quently the whole framework of the peace we so laboriously negotiated in Paris, for ex- ample: in total violation of the Paris Agree- ment, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infil- trated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400 tanks, 150 long-range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000-200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Vietnnannase capabilities have increased 20% in combat manpower, 200% in tanks, 75% in hefty artillery and 75% in AAA. Some of this additional equip- ment includes new items such as SAM-2 missiles with 18 to 20 lai$chers of which most, if not all, were introduced into the south after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the south and are completing a massive new logistics system of all-weather three lane roads and pop pipelines. While the North Vietnamese have Increased the conventional capability of the retain forces, the cost has been great, and the Gov- ernment of Vietnam has thus far managed to turn back all their challenges in the past year. Combat deaths, while substantial on both sides, have declined to the lowest level since 1965 and are down 75 percent compared with the rate in 1972, Some 500,000 refugees have been resettled. Virtually all pre-cease.-fire civilian detainees and POW's-at least on the GVN side-have been released. The balance of power which underlies the chances for peace is under heavy pressure from North Vietnam. Hanoi is conducting a r)iassive military buildup in the South and repeatedly violates the cease-fire. These ac- tivities threaten the equilibrium and conse- quently the whole framework' of the peace we so laboriously negotiated in Paris. For example: In total violation of the Paris agreement, since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400-plus tanks, 150-plus long- range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns, and 150,000-200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. Since the cease-fire, North Viet- namese capabilities have increased 20 per- cent in combat manpower, 200 percent in combat manpower, 200 percent In tan:csa, 75 percent In heavy artillery, and 75 percent in AAA. Some of this additional equipment in- cludes new items such as SAM-2 missiles with 16 or 20 launchers of which most, it not all, were introduced into the South after the cease-fire. The Communists are also working on 12 airfields in the South and are complet- ing a massive new logistics system of all- weather, two lane roads and POL pipelines. Paragraph 6-Since the "enemy offensives" long predicted by U.S. and GVN officials have simply not materialized since the cease- fire, it is fundamentally inaccurate to claim that the GVN has "turned back all their challenges." Paragraph 7-The Pentagon neglects, to note that the 818,000 new refugees reported by the U.S. Senate Refugee Subcommittee are more than in any year of the war except 1966 (906,000) and 1972 (1,320,000). The Refugee Subcommittee also notes that many of those "resettled" have actually been sim- ply shifted to economically unviable land so the GVNcan claim new territory. in viola- tion of Article 11 of the Paris Agreement which permits "freedom of movement'. The Senate Appropriations Committee repoorted on December 19, 1973, that "reliable and objective sources suggest that there are be- tween 40,000 and 60,000 political prisoners being held." Since the ceasefire, however, the GVN has - only released, by its own official count, 5,081 "civilian detainees" to the: other side, leaving tens of_thousands still in jail. The U.S. Embassy in Saigon, moreover, has admitted not visiting the prisons since the ceasefire. (Gong. Record, April 29, 1974, 86421.) Thus American officials do nct have sufficient evidence to make the svueeping generalization that the GVN has released all pre-ceasefire civilian detainees. Paragraph 8-The evidence suggests that there has been no shift in the military bal- ance of power in South Vietnam since the Parts Agreement in favor of Hanoi. Al ;hough. there is no way of knowing the real figure of replacement troops, the 70,000 figure '.s more than offset by the 40-50,000 troops reported to have left South Vietnam to returr. North during this period. (Los Angeles Times, Feb- ruary 13, 1974), and the 50,000 op more "NVN/PRG" reported killed. Moreover, Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee Staff reported the CIA estimate to be 142,000 North Veitnamese troops in South Vietnam as of April 15, 1973. (See "Tt,ailland, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam: April 1973", p. 36.) Since then there has been no change. Official U.S. sources put the figure at 138,000 In December, 1973. U.S. News and World Report, December 17, 1973; Chicago Daily News, December 19, 1973.) More re- cently the estimate was put at between 140,000 and 150,000 (N.Y. Times, May 6, 1974). Moreover, USSAG headquarters reported that nearly all 400 tanks referred to actually came into South Vietnam before the cease- fire deadline. (See "Thailand, Lao;., Cam- bodia and Vietnam," pp. 36-37.) The argu- ment can also be made that the relatively small number since South since then may well fit the "one for one" provision of the Agreement, as may also be true for the artil- lery pieces. [As for AAA and SAME, the build- up since the ceasefire could well lie a re- sponse to the heavy bombing of PRO zones which has been going on Since the beginning of the ceasefire. Such defensive mewmres, In any event, hardly "threaten the equil ibrium" as much as the refusal of the GVN to com- pete for power politically with it; adver- saries.] Paragraph 9-The record shows 7rectsely the contrary. An American official has been quoted as saying that "after we cut down the ammo suply, we found that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1, but the overall total was tb at much lower." (Washington Post, June 4, 1973) . Vir- tually every western newsman to have visited PRO zones since the ceasefire has reported random shelling of villages by ARVIN forces (See, for example, New York Times, Feb. 18 and 19, 1914; CBS News, Nov. 14, and I.S. 1973). Returning staff aides from a GVN. sponsored trip In April, 1974, have reported that American officials say the GVN is vast- The record of GVN's and'North Vietnam's cease-fire implementation itimply does not support the argument that our assistance will only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN and thus undermine the cee-fire. Through out the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised restraint compared with the Communists' excesses. It has observed he agreement to the extent of any prudent state faced with North Vietnam's current policy and activities in the South. Despite Hanol's record of vio- lations, the GVN has limited itself to justi- fiable acts of self-defense. With few excep- tions, Saigon has limited its military opera- tions to responding to communist land grab The record of GVN's and North Vietnam's cease-fire implementation simply does not support the argument that our assistance will only facilitate new "violations" by the GVN and'thus undermine the cease-fire. Through- out the cease-fire period, Saigon has exercised restraint compared with the. Communists' excesses. It has observed the 'agreement to the extent of any prudent state faced with North Vietnam's current policy and activities in the South. Despite Hanoi's record of violations, the GVN has limited Itself to justifiable acts of self-defense. With few exceptions, Saigon has 'limited Its military,, to responding Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 May 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE SPOKESMAN-Continued - activities and to consolidating where its to Communist land grabs activities and to forces were present at the time of the cease- consolidating where its forces were present fire. at the time of the cease-fire. The foregoing suggests that far from excit- ing GVN violation of the cease-fire, our mili- tary assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive. South Viet- nam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military and economic, is not open- ended. The next 18-24 months is an espe- cially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes economically viable and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be deterred. Provided the requisite amount of U.S. as- sistance is forthcoming in the near term, the executive branch foresees a signflcant eco- nomic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hopefully, these develop- ments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance. The Departmental budget for military assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975 contemplates a program involving $1.45 billion. Departmental representatives have assured the. Committee on Armed Services that the proposed program in no way vio- lates the cease fire agreement. The printed Committee hearings on both the Department's fiscal year 1974 Supple- mental Request and for the Department's fiscal year 1975 Authorization Request con- tain extensive data on the administration of the MASF program. The Committee urges that these hearings be read by all Members of Congress since such a reading will elimi- nate much of the confusion and misinfor- mation which often occurs during debate on the justification for the continuation of this military assistance program to South Viet- nam For example, one of the more pertinent questions which is, continually raised con- cerning the military assistance program to South Vietnam is the possible alleged conflict with Article VII of the Cease Fire Agreement, which provides for a one-for-one replace- The foregoing suggests that far from exist- ing new GVN "violations" of the cease-fire, our military assistance is tailored to enable Saigon to defend itself against Communist pressure while deterring a major offensive. South Vietnam's need for substantial U.S. assistance, both military and economic, is not open ended. The next 18-24 months is an especially critical period which will determine whether Saigon becomes economically viable and and whether a North Vietnamese attack can be deterred. Provided the requisite amount of U.S. as- sistance is forthcoming in the near term, we forsee a significant economic revival in the South and the chance that Hanoi will shift its energies to more peaceful pursuits. Hope- fully, these developments will reduce the need in subsequent years for heavy American assistance. It is an honor and privilege to appear be- fore you today in support of the request for a $1.6 billion overall authorization and re- lated program of $1.45 million in fiscal year 1975 for the military forces of South Viet- nam. The proposed program in no way vio- lates the cease-fire agreement. Ing considerable ammunition and could get by on fax less of what they are now consum- ing. U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin recently reported in a cable that it was only after "U.S. Imposed constraints" that the use of American-supplied ammunition dropped at a rate of 20 to 50 percent. The most striking indication of lavish ARVN use of ammunition is the fact that despite the Congressional refusal of $474 million in a supplemental ammunition re- quest, the Pentagon recently reported that the ARVN has survived and is not in the "dire straits" that Assistant Secretary Clem- ents predicted it would be if the supple- mental ammunition request was refused. Paragraphs 10-11-All available evidence directly contradicts the notion that there is' the slightest possiblity that Saigon can be- come either economically or military viable in the next 18-24 months. An official World Bank Study Mission recently reported that ". .'net aid required in 1980 will still be on the order of $770 mil- lion a year.... it seems probable that Viet- nam is at least a medium 'long haul' case as far as foreign aid is concerned. . as a purely arithmetical exercise . by 1990 the external resources gap would close by about $300 million to about $450 million." (Current Economic Position and Prospects of the Re- public of Vietnam", January 28, 1974, p. 34.) As long as the GVN continues to refuse to allow refugees to return to their villages, even if in PRG zones-thus maintaining un- productive islands of millions of people, as long as it does not reduce its 1.1 million man army, 120,000 man police force, and 350,000 civil servants,. moreover, there is little reason to believe that the GVN can become economi- cally viable. In 1973, for example, the GVN exported only $56 million, while importing $795 mil- lion. There is no foreseeable way this huge balance of payments deficit can be altered until there is peace. Indeed, the reverse is likely to be true, as the cost of maintaining the GVN's war machine rises for the U.S. taxpayer due to inflation. Thus, although ARVN casualities were down from 39,587 in 1972 to 11,093 in 1973, the costs of maintaining the ARVN for the U.S. taxpayer did not decrease at all. Ac- cording to official AID statistics supplied Congresswoman Bella Abzug on February 20, 1974, U.S. Military aid in CY 1972 was $2.382 billion and in CY 1973 was $2.270 billion. Secretary Kissinger himself as much as acknowledged that our commitment to the GVN is open-ended, when he stated in a March 25 letter to Senator Kennedy that "we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed." Paragraphs 12-14-If Committee members actually do read the hearings for the FY 74 supplemental and FY 75 authorization they will discover that the DOD not only provides no evidence for any of its major assertions, but even admits this on page 900: "The de- termination of a ceasefire violation is ex- ceedingly difficult. . . . As a result, we do not have truly independent sources for in- formation of this kind." Indeed, this fact makes the numerous newspaper reports of GVN ceasefire violations by western .corre- spondents all the more credible The question of whether the Administra- tion is violating the "one for one" clause is not at all answered by the insertion from page 51 of the hearings, which in fact states that no one, not even the ICCS, is aware of what the Administration has channeled into South Vietnam. Given the fact that the Administration has admitted. replacing the F5A with the F5E, an entirely different aircraft, the weight of the evidence would seem to indicate that the Administration is not honoring the "one Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3 H 4044 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 20, 19 744 merit of weapons of the same taracteristics and properties. The anew to this question appears on page 51 of RASC Document 93- 40, and because of its pertinency, is set out bela" in its entirety: Question. Is the International Control. Commission in Vietnam super?tsing the de- livery of weapons and amn unition for either side under article 7 of the ceeace-fire agree- ment which provides for a one-for-one re- placement of weapons of the same character- istics and properties? Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol spe- cifies that the International Commission of Control and supervision (ICCSI and the-Two Party Joint Military Commission jointly in- spect the entry into South Vietnam of re- placements of war materiel permitted trader Article 7 of the Paris Agreerxsent, The Viet Cong has refused to perfltt the TPJMC to carry out this function, and the ICCS has taken the position that inspections by it alone would not be official. The United States and the RVN have kept records of replace- ment shipments to South Vietnam and have stated their readiness to provide a full ae- counting to the ICCS and to the TPJMC whenever- those bodies begin to carry out their duties with respect to Inspection sari replacement materials for the two sides. Hanoi on the other hand has introduced illegally into South Vietnam vast quantities of armaments. No offer to allow' IOC$ inspec- tion of this material has ever been made. That the committee would just copy word for word Executive testimony and present ft as the recommendations of Congress Is shocking enough, in and of itself. It also represents a surprising de- gree-of slovenliness and shoddiness. And it raises the question of the very need for a staff. Why should taxpayers fund hearings, hire a staff, pay for the print- ing of public reports if the committee is going to merely mindlessly and slavishly reproduce Executive testimony? The real issues raised by the report, however, go far deeper. Is our only function to rubber-stamp Executive actions? Are We to avoid tak- ing Public witnesses more seriously, do- ing some of our own investigative work, integrating testimony by executive offi- cials with that of other observers in an attempt to come up with the truth? What do we need the Congress for, if it is sim- ply to endorse Executive pronounce- ments, no matter how untrue or tenden- tious. The fact that the committee would plagiarize Executive testimony, falsely presenting it as independent conclusions based on an impartial and thorough analysis of the subject goes to the very heart of our democratic system. It rep- resents an unconstitutional erosion of congressional powers, arid is symbolic of our headlong progress toward an execu- tive dictatorship in this country. For, at the heart of the matter, there is not only plagiarism, but more impor- tantly, indifference to the truth and to for one" portion of the Agreer nt. The c wa- mittee report, moreover, also fails to rote that the Administration is now proposing an even more blatant violation of the Paris Agreement for FY 75; introduction of 28 new F5Fs. Most importantly, however, is the failure of the Pentagon to provide a rationale for its provision of $521.6 million in FY 74 and $574 million in FY 75 for Operations and Maintenance, and $42.4 million in FY 74 and $24 million in FY 75 for personnel. It seems clear that neither of these cate- gories fit the provision of Article VII of the Paris Agreement permitting only "one for one" replacement, and Article IV by which the U.S. agreed-not to "continue its military involvement or intervene in the intirnal affairs of South Vietnam." Most shockingly, the Committee also fails to note that the DOD's own definition of what is allowed under Article VII also pre- cludes Operation and Maintenance and Per- sonnel. "The Executive r)rauch would be lim- ited to furnishing only armaments, Muni- tions, and war materials. . Those words (were) defined by the DOD for the purpose of complying with the peace agreeaaent," DOD lawyer Forman has testified (Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 74 Aix hori- zation hearings, Part 8, p. 5906). Given such massive violations o' the Agreement, the Administration Would be better-advised to observe Article VII :'ether than making empty offers to allow iaispec.. tion of records, particularly when res?onsi- bility for the failure`of the Two-Party JN1C may lie as much with the GVN as its opponent. our responsibility. The Caldwell testi- mony is replete with factual errors, and is indeed little more than blatant propa- ganda misrepresented as serious analysis. I believe that there are few more criti- cal matters facing our Nation than ex- posing the kind of congressional indif- ference to responsibility represented by this report. I further believe that the House has an obligation to reject entirely both the suggestion oi' giving $1.4 billion to the Thieu regime this year and the half-baked rationale presented for it. Despite what the Pentagon and its friends in Saigon would want us to hear and to read, there is quite another side of the situation in Vietnam. Because the committee has not allowed us a full range of material before we vote on this criti- cal issue, I would now like to insert in the REcoRo important testimony given to the committee and other materials available to it which present a broad perspective on the existing situation. The materials follow: TOWARD PEaPETVAL WAR OR A POSETBLE PEACE (Testimony of Guy Gran) The Military Assistance Service ;Funded (MASF) program is the principal overt and legislated channel through which the United States sends military aid to the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) and to the Royal Lao- tian government. For FY 74 this program now has a ceiling of $1.126 billion of which $1.022.1 billion for the RVNN. In the sup- plemental bill under cxiisideration the Nixon ceiling by $474 million, using pipeline funds, to restore precisely the amount cut by Con- gress from the original request. It would be well at the onset to consider that the MASF monies are only a part of the direct and indirect military aid to the govern- ment in Saigon. Additional military Support results from all of the plasters generated by $295 million of commodities under tl^ a Food for Peace. program and some if not most of the piasters from the c.$200m. Commodity Import Program. Additional aid iF being channeled through excess defense articles, piaster purchases, and military service money.' There is no reason to believe that three decades of covert CIA activities in Indochina, squandering both their own and DOD resources, with and without legal au- thority or, Congressional knowledge, has come to a halt in FY 74. Finally, the RVN benefits from the American military pres- ence elsewhere in Southeast Asia. An early FY 74 estimate of such costs was $1.1 billion. A recent UPI report contained a DOD esti- mate that the sum of- DOD activities in Southeast Asia would cost $3.4 billion this fiscal year? The investment of another $474 million re- quires judgments about political, military and legal realities in Indochina. It also neces- sitates judgments about the integrity of in- formaton concerning such issues released by the Executive branch. I shall argue that the basic political and military arguments ad- vanced on behalf of this level of aid are. not supported by empirical evidence. A major portion of the MASF program is not in keep- ing with the legal provisions of ,he Paris Agreement. The relevant informatiorr re- leased by the Executive is deliberately dis- torted and incomplete. In sum, our policies Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030058-3