THE STATE DEPARTMENT DENIES PRE-ELECTION DECEPTION OVER AID TO UGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

c--#-? ?
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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 25
8 JANUARY 1973
Governmental Affairs.0 .
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Destroy after backgrounder
25X1A has served its purpose or within
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CONFIDENTIAL
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ernimental Aorepsomm
Annairs
WASHINGTON POST
18 December 1972
!The Suite Department Denies Pre-Election Deception Orer Aid 10 Uganda
Jim Hoagland's article on Nov. 19
charged that the Department of State
? deliberately deceived the American
pnblieregardirig.U.S. policy in Uganda
?. as part of the American Presidential
' campaign.
This charge ig; as totally unfounded
..and unfair as it is serious.
It is so serious in our system of gov-
ernment that we regret you did not
have suffieient concern for the facts as
to check the allegation with us before
L printing the article. I was disinayed
' when, after the department denied the
charge publicly the following day, your
? newspaper ran an 'article which, while
? it accurately described the policy we
have consistently followed, made no et-
fort to reflect that denial. That, in my
view, is unfair journalism.
The events in Uganda have pre-
sented this government with several
? difficult problems.
? Individual Americans and institu-
tions in this country have been active
In Uganda for many years, as educa-
tors, missionaries, and technicians.
; When Uganda achieved its independ-
ence, these activities were supple-
mented by official technical assistance,
? Including both Peace Corps and AID
, 'activities. These programs were under-
taken , to further East African eco-
nomic cooperation, to help in the de-
velopment of Makerere University, one
.of Africa's oldest and finest, and to as-
sist the people of Uganda. Whatever
? . the political circumstances may be,
one does not lightly suspend or termi-
nate such help. ? '
' On Sept. 11, Gen. Amin ,sent his tele-
-gram to Secretary General Kurt Wal-
? dheim of the United Nations with its
references to Hitler and the Jewish
people. This naturally and understand-
WASHINGTON POST
4 JANUARY 19 7 3
?."' ? ? .
,Departures
Continue at
White House
By Carroll Kilpatrick
? and Lou Cannon
?
Washington Post Staff Writers
The exodus of high ranking
plixon administration officials
continued yesterday, led by
Gerard C. Smith, who headed
the American delegation at the
!Strategic Arms Limitation
'Talks with the Russians over
the last four years, and Phil-
lip V. Sanchez, director of the
Office of Economic Opportu-
nity.
The resignation of Smith
was confirmed by the Reuter
news agency, who spoke with
ably provoked a strong moral reaction
in this country, as in the Department
of State. if ? followed other actions in '
Uganda such as the abrupt expulsion
of the Asians, the arrest and disap-
pearance of some of the lay intellectu-
als, harassment of Americans, and ver-
bal attacks against the United States
which had already attracted notice and
awakened concern in this country.
At the same time Uganda was expe-
riencing not only serious internal
problems but also the attempted inva-
sion by political exiles in Tanzania.
- Tension was high in the country and
the safety of U.S. citizens in Uganda,
numbering over 1,000, were judged to
? be in some jeopardy. Their, safety was
and always is the U.S. government's
first preoccupation. We were certain
that any abrupt or seemingly hostile
action on our part would increase this
? threat.
On Sept. 14 the department's spokes-
man, Charles Bray, was asked for our
? reaction to Gen. Amin's telegram and.
subsequently during his briefing, for
U.S. intentions with respect to aid pro-
grams to Uganda. He replied that in
the circumstances?the expulsion of
the Asians, the harassment of Ameri-
cans, and Gen. Amin's telegram to Mr.
Waldheim?we did not contemplate
signing new loan agreement at this
time. He noted that technical assist-
ance would continue.
Mr. Bray had asked the Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs just be-
ffore his noon briefing that day if we
were going to sign the loan which was ?
then under negotiation and had been
told that we certainly could not sign it
, under the existing circumstances, i.e.,
harassment of Americans, expulsion of
Asians, the telegram to Mr. Waldheim.
In retrospect, and as this thought
was conveyed at the noon briefing, it
was interpreted by reporters present
Ice with the 'Atomic
Commission in 1950.
Sanchez' resignation, it was
learned, soon will be accepted.
One of two second-line ap-
pointees is in line to succeed
Sanchez. Administration
sources identified them as
Nicholas Craw, director of re-
cruitment at Action, and How-
ard Phillips, the program re-
view director of 0E0.
Craw was in charge of man-
power and training at Volun-
teers in Service to America
(VISTA) when that volunteer
program was part of 0E0, and
was formerly director of open
ations for Project Hope, the
hospital ship. Phillips was an
unsuccessful Republican can-
didate for , Congress from
Massachusetts in 1970.
Mr. Nixon's chief science ad-
viser and the government's
chief labor mediator also are
Mrs. Smith in Washington. resigning to return to private
She said her husbana is re- life, it was announced yester--
turning to private Me. He is day-
a former New York lawyerj J. Curtis Counts, 57, director
who began government serv-I of the Federal Mediation and
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Energy
to mean that we were holding up the:
signing solely to signal our political,
displeasure with -Gen. Amin's tel.
gram. We were holding up the signing
solely to signal (Mr political displeaq
ure with Gen. Amin's telegram. wie
were shocked by the telegram. Ile
facts, which had perhaps not been
made sufficiently clear to Mr. Bray but
which he subsequently noted in his
briefing on Sept'. 19, however, were
that the loan was not yet ready for
signing and that we had made no final
decision regarding ? its disposition. ,
Mindful of the delicate circumstances
in Uganda and of the possible impact
there of the interpretation being given.'
the 'noon briefing, we authorized Am-
bassador Melady to inform Gen. Amiti
of the circumstances surrounding the
loan, which I have just described. ? ?
Recognizing that these events had
left some. uncertainty regarding our
position on these various Matters, the
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ,
took the occasion of a call on him by
the Ugandan Minister of Finance on ;
Sept. 28 to inform him that the circum-
stances surrounding events in Uganda, .;
including the harassment and arrest'
of our citizens (since ended) and the
expressed attitudes of Ugandan lead-
ers on matters of deep concern to
Americans would not permit us to go
forward with the signature of the loan
at that time. This remains our position.
There will he no change in our posi-
tion, moreover, without appropriate
consultation with the Congress and a
full evaluation of the state of our rela-,
lions with Uganda and of Ugandan. at-
titudes toward us and our citizens:
Those are the facts of the matter,
They do not support a charge of decen-
lion. Your correspondent erred hi mak-
ing it.
ROBERT J. AleCLOSKEY,
Deputy Assistant SecretarY
? ? for Press Relations
U. S. Department of state.
Washington
Conciliation Service; was of- I
fered the post .of under secre-
tary of labor, but turned it
down to retureto private life.
He is an old ?,friend of the
President.
Edward E. David, 47, science
adviser to the President and
director of the Office of Sci-
ence and Technology since
1970, also is leaving the gov-
ernment, the White House
said.
The Defense Department
confirmed reports that two
top civilians?John S. Foster
Jr., director of defense re?
search and engineering, and
headed the farm division of
the President's re-election
campaign last year. Erwin is
now deputy under secretary of
agriculture for rural develop-
ment: Knebel is general coun-
sel of the Small Business Ad-
minisl ration.
David denied report that
he is leaving because of un-
happiness over the role his
office has been able to play
in the scientific field.
"I'm not leaving with any
sense of disappointment ? at
all," he said,
Federal expenditures on ci-
vilian research and develop'
Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant ment now exceed expendi-
secretary for public affairs, , tures on military research
are leaving. ?' and development, he ? said.
That waft tlift 01101'101 1,110 Petial:
dent gave him when he an
-
pointed him 28 months ago,
David said.
David is to become execu-
tive vice president and three-
to)- of Gould, Inc., a Chicago
manufacturer of electrical, el-
ectronic and automotive parts.
And on Capitol Hill, sources;
told United Press Interna-
tional that three top Agricul-
ture Department officials
would be named shortly: Clay-
ten E. Yeutter and William Er-
win?to be assistant secretaries,
and John A. Knebel to be gen-
eral counsel.
Yeutter, a Nebraskan, Counts has played a leading
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role in settling some major
SI I' kr s since lie has headed
the Mediation ant! Concilia-
tion Service.
Counts declined to say what
he expected to do in the fu-
ture.
In other announcements,
the President:
? Accepted the resignation
of Tom Lilley as a director of
HINDUSTAN TIMES
5 December 1972 ?
RECENTLY, following a re-
ference to the subject by
Mr Z. A. Bhutto, when diplo-
mats and newsmen tried to
assess U.S. thinking on the issue
of resumption of arms aid to
Pakistan, they were unable to
make what could be described
I even as a moderately accurate
appraisal. Their bafflement was
typical of ? the difficulties they
have encountered here in recent
years and which should persist
for another four years.
Not merely on the subject of
supply of arms to Pakistan but
on other, often less controversial,
Issues one finds the Nixon Ad-
ministration excessively, almost
pathologically, secretive. Mr
Johnson was known to hold his'
cardspretty close to his chest
but, by comparison to his sticces-
sor, his Administration could
claim to have had the openness
of a market place.
When he chose his Cabinet four
'years ago, Mr Nixon introduced
? 1t3 members at a specially tele-
vised function and presented
; them as a group of remarkable,
; "extra-dimension" personalities
who would be entrusted with
:considerable autonomous power.
;In a matter of weeks, however,
,most of them became faceless
persons and remembering the
names of the "Nixon Dozen," as
they were called, become a fav-
ourite party game in Washington.
Presidential Rchuffs
Most of them counted for little
:In the decision making processes
that Mr Nixon estiblished. One
of them, the Interior Secretary,
was so distressed over having no
role to play that he wrote a
letter of protest to. his boss . and
was prorriptly dismissed. Anomer,
: the Housing Secretary, got his
1 audience with Mr Nixon in the
:fourth year of his appointment
and only when he had a politi-
cally sensitive report to make and
threatened to go to the Press
with it if he were not ushered
Into the Presidential presence.
Yet another, who at the time of
his appointment was considered
as a leader with a future, re-
signed his cabinet post and join-
ed the White House staff, In the
he Export-import Mink, effee.!
live at the end of 1072.
? Accepted the resignation
of Charles A. Meyer as assist-
ant secretary of state for in-
ter-American affairs. From
1939 until he became assistant
secretary in 1969, Meyer was
with Sears, Roebuck & Co.
? Accepted the resignation
of Kenneth Franzheim II as
ambassador In New enlant1,1
Wemieril. Sinnott, 111.11 hint While noose staff stove 1909,
' Z
Tonga. I will become general counsel
for the Council on interna-
tional Economic l'olicy,
headed by Peter M. Flanigan.:
? Announced that Gordon
York attorney and plans to re C. Strachan, a White House
turn to private practice. staff member since 1970,
? Announced that Jonathan. would join the staff of the
C. Rose ft member of the U.S. Informaiton Agency. '
? Accepted the resignation
of John R. Stevenson as legal
adviser to the State Depart-
ment. He is a former New
esiire For Secrecy
Krishan Bhatia writes from Washington
hope of saving that future, but
in reality only to slide further
into oblivion.
Real power has rested In the
hands of individuals, not even
half a dozen in 'number, in the-
White House and most of them
have shared Mr Nixon's over-
whelming, compelling desire for
secrecy. Barring Dr Henry Kis-
singer who at least did not ob-
ject to a certain measure of so-
cial limelight, ? these Presidential
advisers have assiduously courted
anonymity and have remained?
by choice, of course?as "faceless"
as the cabinet members. They .
almost never speak to the Press
or the diplomats or , even attend
social functions.
Other Influences
Two of Mr Nixon's senior .ad-
visers, whose personal influence
and power equals that of Dr
Kissinger, are Mr H. R. Haldeman
and Mr John Ehrlichman. After
four years of their powerful exis-
tence in the U.S. capital, they
could probably walk through a
crowd of diplomats and journal-
ists without being recognised. Mr
Haldeman has appeared on tele-
vision only once. (Or may be it
was Mr Ehrlichmant) The name
of another important Nixon aide
came to light recently when the
Press was investigating alleged
political espionage by the Repub-
licans and it was discovered that
he had been on the White House
staff for over three years without
his name appearing even on the
private White House . telephone
directory.
Because the number of persons
_nvolved in decision-making is so
small and because they tend to
prefer dark corners, the dissemi-
nation of information is in the
nature of a miserable trickle.
When a decision is finally reach-
ed, it has to be made public, but
how that particular resolve was
made and what considerations
weighed with the Administration
is seldom known. Prior inkling of
any important decision, particu-
larly if it is sensitive and con-
troversial, is, in the circumstances,
'virtually impossible. If and when
Mr Nixon decides to resume sup-
ply of arms to Pakistan, the pub-
lic?and the Secretary of State,
Mr William Rogers?will learn of
IL more or less simultaneously.
How and why that decision is
taken will probably remain a
secret between the President and
Dr Kissinger.
This secrecy apart, what makes
assessment of the Administra-
tion's approach to any issue ex-
ceedingly difficult is the fact that
it lacks any firm "moral moor-
ings". In the case of every gov-
ernment, here or elsewhere, there
is always a sizable gap between
Its public professions and real
actions. In defence of national
or party or even certain personal
Interests, a government would
sometimes deviate markedly from
the principles by which it claims
to stand. Yet, usually there is a
limit beyond which it will not
go. After studying its actions and
declarations for a few months,
observers are usually able to
prescribe the outer limits to
which a government will go in
pursuit of selfish objectives. But
the Nixon administration has
foxed even seasoned students of
government and diplomacy. What
it would do in a particular situas
tion would be a hazardous guess
to make.
Devious Manner
How far it may go for how
little was , demonstrated last
month when President Amin of
Uganda publicly praised Hitler
for what he did to the Jews. Mr
Nixon was by then entirely as-
sured of a landslide? victory in
the elections. Yet he was not
?averse to taking away a few more
votes from Senator McGovern by
exploiting what the Ugandan dic-
tator had said. In Washington,
therefore, the official spokesman
promptly announced that U.S.
economic aid to. Uganda was
being held back as a mark of
displeasure over the Amin. utter-
ance. But even as Jewish hearts
were being mellowed, the U.S.
ambassador in Uganda was direct.
ed to privately assure President
Amin that aid was on its way
and that the official spokesinan
had spoken out of turn. He was
also urged to keep this assurance
private but he declined to oblige.
His disclosure made Nixon watch-
2
ers wonder why the Administra-
tion should act in this devious
manner when the Jewish votes it
could bring the President were
not really needed and when U.S.
interests in Uganda were far from
vital.
Again, last year, Mr Nixon per-
sonally assured Mrs Gandhi that
a solution of the conflict between
the two wings of Pakistan was
within sight and that the U.S.
had been permitted to meet
Sheikh Mujib In jail when, in
reality, all that had happened
was that President Yahya Khan
had grudgingly permitted a U.S.
embassy representative to meet
Sheikh Mujib's , lawyer. Even a
committed Republican like Mr
Kenneth Keating was disturbed
by the obvious lack of truth In
the official claim and sent a
coded message of protest from
Delhi.
Buoyant Spirit
Apparently, the Administration
plays this game as readily with
its own people as with foreigners.
Last month, Dr Kissinger publicly
announced that Peace in Vietnam
"is at hand". For the first time
In four years he allowed his
voice to be recorded for tele-
vision and radio broadcasts. The
announcement roused tremendous
optimism. Wives of American war
prisoners who had previously
sharply criticised and often even
booed Mr Nixon were so cheered
by the disclosure that at their
?
annual meeting in Washington
they gave Mr Nixon a standing,
tearful ovation. The spectacle of
their buoyant spirit carried tens
of thousand of other Americans,
too, behind Mr Nixon. The im-
portance of the peace news push-
ed allegations of corruption
against the Republicans off the
front pages just when the public
was beginning to get agitated
about the matter. After the elec-
tion however, the White House
stated that Dr Kissinger had
"overstated" the situation and
that peace was farther than
everyone had been led to be-
lieve.
Watching the Nixon Adminis-
tration for another four years
promises to be a fascinating but
frustrating experience.
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BALTIMORE SUN
21 December 1972
Nixonis spre ding
Foreign Service
brains around
By GILBEET A.
Washington Bur
Washington ? Frank C. Car-
lucci's new appointment to the
No. 2 slot in the Department of
Health, Education and Wel-
fare makes him the "star per-
former" in a program to
spread the State Department's
brainpower around the govern-
ment.
Mr. Carlucci, who is moving
from the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, belongs to
the nation's elite corps of 3,279
Foreign Service officers, of
whom 1,385 are based in Wash-
ington.
Agnew, Kissinger aides
Today, 120 of these work
outside the State Department
in other government agencies.
Their assignments stretch
from the White House to the '
National Bicentennial Comis- '
sion, from the Justice Depart-
ment to the Council on .Envi-
ronmental Quality, from the
Interior Department to the
Conference on the Industrial
World Ahead.
Vice President Agnew has
one Foreign Service officer in
his office. Henry A. Kissinger
has three on his personal staff.
And half the foreign affairs
professionals on the National
Security Council are Foreign
Service officers.
Explaining the outside de-
mand for Foreign Service offi-
cer's, Robert T. (Ted) Curran,
the State Department's deputy
director of personnel for man-
agement, said:
"I believe there is quite a
market for the type of back-
ground the FSO's present to
the federal administration.
They are carefully selected. It
is a very competitive service.
People in it tend to do well. I
think they are a desirable
commodity."
LEWTIIWAITE
can of 7'he Sun
his desire to return to the ,
State Department eventually.
Whether the trend toward
temporarily assigning middle-
rank and senior officers to
other departments continues ?
there are 20 more Foreign
Service officers with outside
jobs this year than in 1970 ?
will depend on President Nix-
on's reorganization plans and
departmental budgets.
Stole Department prospect
Ile added, "Frank Carlucci
Is our star performer."
According to one of his close
colleagues, Mr, Carlucci Was
In line for a top State Depart-
ment appointment before being
named under secretary of
State Department officials
deny that the program is used
to discipline any officers or to
dump "dead wood." And they
claim that outside experience
is an added qualification for
promotion. ?
Career boost questioned .
Stanley Carpenter, on loan
for the last year as deputy
assistant secretary of interior
for territorial affairs, ques-
tioned whether departmental
assignment helped a Foreign
Service career.
But he added, "I frankly feel
more FSO's should be sent to
other departments. My own
feeling is that the future of the
Foreign Service really lies in
doing this sort of thing.
"It is the Foreign Service of
the United States, not neces-
sarily of the State Depart-
ment."
Another Foreign Service offi-
cer, currently on outside as-
signment, said of his tempo-
rary transfer, "Emotions are
never clean and simple. There
were some regrets [about
moving], but' certainly not in
the same way I would have
had them 10 years ago.
"There has been some re-
luctance in the department to
take outside assignment, but
there is not as much now as
there was. Morale is so badi
The Stale Department is a
rather place al, the inn-
meat. ;411110 are rather pleased
to leave the building."
The low morale has various
causes, but two of theth are
(molly Ideutified ns Or, Moak,.
ger's overriding influence on
major foreign policy and con-
slant efforts to reduce expendi-
health, education and welfare. ture ? and thus jobs ? over-
He still makes no secret of i seas.
WASHINGTON STAR
21 December 1972
aper Gives oWt/
\egt J apes
? By BARRY KALB
Star?IsIesvs Staff Writer
The Los Angeles Times to-,
day gave U.S. District Court
here tape recordings of an in-
terview in the Watergate bug-
ging case after the subject of
the interview agreed.
The newspaper's action
frees its Washington bureau
chief, John F. Lawrence, of a
contemp citation issued by the
judge in the Watergate case
after Lawrence refused to turn
over its recording of the inter-
view.
Until today's surprise move,
it had appeared that the case,
considered a test of the court's
contempt powers and the
newspaper's 1st . Amendment
rights, would go to the Su-
preme Court.
Surrender of the tape re-
cordings was approved by
Alfred C. Baldwin III, who
says he participated in the
bugging last summer of Demo-
cratic National headquarters,
and followed almost exactly
the course suggested yester-
day by Judge Harold Leven-
thal of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals.
Lawrende was held in con-
tempt of court and ordered to
jail by Chief U.S. District
Court Judge John J. Sirica on
? Tuesday after the Times bu-
reau chief refused to obey an
order directing him to turn the,
tapes over to the defense.
The Court of Appeals yester-
day refused to delay jailing of
. Lawrence beyond a brief per!-
, ,od allowed the Times to take
an appeal to 'the Supreme
Court. The Times bureau chief
spent over two hours in a
courthouse lockup on Tuesday
after refusing Sirica's order.
He was freed after an appeal
was taken to the appellate
court.
The contempt finding
against Lawrence now is ex-
/ pected to be dismissed.
As a pre-trial conference in
the Watergate case began this
morning, Asst. U.S. Atty. Earl
J. Silbert antionnced I hat '
lowing yesterday's Court of
Appeals hearing, he had, as
Leventhal had suggested,
called Baldwin in Connecticut
Ito see If the iiiterView'aiib
jeet would voluntarily tiEW4to to
disclosure of the tapes' con-
tents.
The prosecutor told Sirica
that Baldwin, through his law-
yers, had agreed to release of
the tapes. They were handed
over later to one of the judge's
law clerks.
The Times had refused to
turn over the tapes on the
grounds that Baldwin granted
the interview after being as-
sured that only parts of the
interview authorized by him
would be published, with the
rest kept confidential.
The only condition set by
Baldwin, in agreeing to re-
lease of the tapes, Silbert said,
was that voices on the tapes
other than his own be erased
and not made public.
In a telegram sent to Jack
Nelson and Ronald J. Ostrow,
the two Times reporters who
conducted the interview, Bald-,
win's attorneys, John V. Cassi-
dento and Robert C. Mirto,
said yesterday:
"On Mr. Baldwin's behalf
we are requesting that you
withdraw your opposition to
the subpoena and that you
agree to the submission of the
tapes . . . we appreciate the
fact that both of you, as re-
porters for the Los Angeles
Times, have steadfastly honor-
ed your agreement of confi-
dentiality.'.'
The defense in the Water-
gate:.'ace wants the tapes in
order to study Baldwin's full
statement and possibly'attack
his credibility when Baldwin
takes the stand for the prose-
cution.
Baldwin said in the inter-
view that he took part in the
bugging of Democratic Nation-'
al Committee headquarters as
an employe of the Nixon re-
election committee. He impli-
cated some of the seven de-
fendants is the case, who in-
clude James McCord Jr., for-
mer chief security officer of
the Nixon re-election unit, E.
Howard Hunt Jr., a former
White House consultant, and
G. Gordon Liddy, former re-
election committee treasurer.
Sirica said after today's de-
velopment that he would ac-
cept the tapes and keep them
locked in a courthouse safe
until the trial.
"I'm very happy to see that
this minter's hem settled to
the sal Marl ion of all part les,"
the judge said. Ile added Hutt
he was "very sorry" that he
had had to eider Lawrence
WWI tip,
Silica said that oat the prep,
er time" he will rule that Law-
rence has purged himself of
contempt.
Nelson told reporters that he
felt the outcome had been
proper under the circum-
stances, but he said that the
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larger qusioen of whether a
reporter can be forced to turn
over confidential notes or
tapes has still not been an-
swered.
"I don't think we particular-
NEW YORK TIMES
4 January 1973
ly won our point, but I don't
think under the circumstances
we could have done anything
but turn the tapes over," Nel-
son said,
Defense Sees Constitutional Test
As Ellsberg-Russo Trial Starts
By MARTIN ARNOLD
special to The New York Timee
LOS ANGELES, Jan. 3
the modern, almost antiseptic
Federal Building downtown
here, thousands of miles from
Vietnam, the final act of the
Pentagon papers case began
to unfold today with the start
of jury selection in the trial of
aniel Ellsberg and Anthony
J. Russo Jr. They are accused
of espionage.
The incidents leading to the
revelations of secret documents
can sometimes be as intriguing
as docments themselves, and
the trial is expected to be filled
with thriller-story talcs of
documents clandestinely copied
and distributed, of people hid-
ing away and of F.13.l, stake-
outs in the dead of night. !
But more important than
these mystery story ingredients
are the legal issues involved,
and their implications. Many
lawyers see the trial of Dr.
Ellsberg and Mr. Russo as a
major test of the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution, of the
Government's authority over
information and of the public's
access to that information.
security -classification proce-
dures.
And although it is not direct-
ly part of the Ellsberg-Russo
trial, in the background is the
fact that when the papers were
made public, a newspaper of
general circulation, The Times,
for the first time in the coun-
try's history, was restrained by
prior court order from publish-
mg articles.
Ruling by High Court
This restraint was lifted by
the Supreme Court, in a 6-to-3
finding, but that ruling left im-
portant questions unresolved,
questions that could in part
be cleared up as a result of
this trial.
The Times case drew sepa-
rate opinions from all nine jus-
tices, leaving freedom of the
press rights under the First
Amendment somewhat blurred.
The Court did say that the
Government had not met the
"heavy burden" of proving
enough damage to the national
defense as balanced against a
crack in the First Amendment
to allow prior restraints.
However, the Court gave the
Government the' right to prose-
cute The Times after the ar-
ticles were published. And this
right left the issue of "national
Nonetheless, the Government defense" obscure.
has refused to concede that The drama and constitutional
such broad constitutional issues ?questions that are part of the
are involved in this trial. For Pentagon papers case focus on
even though the decision to two men, Dr. Ellsberg and Mr.
prosecute Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo.
Dr. Ellsberg, 41 years old, a
Russo was made at the highest former research associate at
levels of the Justice Depart-- the Massachusetts Institute of
ment, the Government is con-
tending that the issues are very
narrow indeed?that, in fact,
two men have committed pre-
cise crimes for which they are
being tried and that no basic
constitutional precedents are in-
volved in the courtroom pro-
ceedings.
The Pentagon papers, a top-
study of America's involve-
ment in Indochina through four
Presidential Administrations,
were first made public on June
13, 1971, in The New York
Times.
' Since then, the papers have
become embroiled in the public
debate over the Vietnam war,
Old have precipitated other de-
Nth OVer the obligation of the
Government to keep Its emu
stituency honestly informed.
Indeed, the publication of the
papers has led to reviews with-
in the Nixon Administration
and Congress of the nation's
Technology, is charged with 12
counts of espionage, theft and
conspiracy in the Pentagon
papers case. If convicted on all
counts he could receive 115
years in prison.
Mr. Russo, 36, an aeronauti-
cal engineer and economist, is
charged with three counts of
espionage, theft and conspiracy
and could receive 35 years in
prison.
There are also two alleged
co-conspirators ? Miss Lynda
Sinay, a Los Angeles advertis-
ing woman, and Vu Van Thai,
a former South Vietnamese
Ambassador to the United
States. Neither was indicted.
FOCUS of Indictments
The Indictment-6 Wild main-
ly eti BOW OP, Ellsberg copied
the Pentagon papers while he
was employed at the Rand Cor-
poration in nearby Santa
Monica, but they do not go into
the question of how the papers!
were- finally made public. (The
corporation does considerable
work for the Defense Depart
meat and had two copies.)
The 15 counts in the indict
ments cover the period between
March 1, 1969, and Sept. 30,
1970?nine months to more
than two years before tin
papers were first made pi:blic
by The Times.
They say that Dr. Ellsberg.
during that period, first took
many of the heavy Pentagon
papers volumes out of the Rand
Corporation offices in Wash-
ington and transported them to
Los Angeles. The first cross-
country trip, with 10 volumes
of the 47-volume study, is said
to have been made on March 4,
1969, and a second with eight
more volumes on Aug. 29, 1969.
the Government during the
trial.
The six counts allege viola-
tion of Title 18, section 641, of
?I the Code, which involves the
embezzlement and theft of Gov-
ernment property.
? The final eight counts involve
unauthorized possession and
reception of the Pentagon pa-
pers in violation of three sub.
divisions of Title IS, section
' 793, of the Code,, which per-
tains to espionage and censor-
ship, most particularly the.
gathering, transmitting or
losing of defense information.
The subdivisions have to do
with receiving and obtaining
information about the national
defense, whether they are docu-
ments or blueprints, photo-
graphs or sketches, and copy-
ing and distributing them to un-
authorized persons.
Maze of Issues
Details of Allegations
The allegations are that Dr.
Ellsberg, who by the nature of
his position was authorized to
have access to the papers, took
the volumes, and other related
material he had obtained from
the Rand Corporation in Santa
Monica, to Miss Sinay's adver-
tising 'office at .8101 Melrose
Avenue here and, along with
Miss Sinay and Mr. Russo,
copied them on Oct. 4, 1969.
Neither Miss Sinay nor Mr.
Russo nor later Mr, Thai Was
authorized to haVe or see the
papers.
Mr. Thai, who came to op-
pose the war in Vietnam, was
alleged to have entered into a
conspiracy with Dr. Ellsberg in
the spring of 1969 to reveal to
the public the classified papers,
and the Government contends
that it has found his finger-
prints on several of the pages
of the Pentagon papers.
The first count charges that
in violation of Title 18, section
371, of the United States Code
Annotated, Dr. Ellsberg and Mr.
Russo conspired against the
Federal Government to: "Ob-
tain and caused to be obtained
classified Government docu-
ments relating to the national
defense . . . The documents
would be communicated de-
livered and transmitted to de-
fendants and others, none of
whom would be authorized to
receive them."
That is the conspiracy
charge.
The next six counts involve
specific acts of stealing, con-
cealing and receiving stolen
Government property?includ-
ing nine volumes of the Penta-
gon papers, a 1968 memoran-
dum from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff about Vietnam and a
case study of the 1954 Geneva
Conference on, Indochina.
trio We
in these counts were among the
18 that Dr. Ellsberg allegedly
transported across the country,
and why only these nine are
mentioned in these counts will i
presumably be made clear by
If the charges in the indict-
ments sound cut and dried, the
maze of legal 'and constitution-
al issues underneath Is not, and
because of that the Ellsberg-
Russo case could become one
of the most extraordinary trials
in an era of spectacular court-
room encounters.
The Government alleges, for
instance, the Dr. Ellsberg had
illegal possession of documents
"relating to the national de-
fense." This means that the
Government must prove that
the documents are, in fact, re-
lated to the "national defense,"
not merely classified top secret.
In the case of the Govern-
ment against The Times, the
issue of "national defense" was
resolved only insofar as it was
related to the freedom of the
press issue. The Court said The
Times could print the papers
because they did not imperil
the national defense enough to
justify the unprecedented step
of prior restraint.
But the Court did not define
"national defense," and it did
ay that perhaps, in a different
action, the Government could
prove that making the material
public did imperil the national
defense enough to make pos-
sible criminal convictions at a
later date, after the papers
were published.
So the Ellsberg-Russo trial
could involve expert testimony
from high officials of this and
previous Administrations on
just that point?what imperils
the national defense.
Furthermore, the espionage
statute requires that the de-
fendants must have knowingly
acted "against the best inter-
ests of the United States" and
any arturrient rivet the liatibril.S
f tirr(2141
the defense an opportunity to
discuss foreign policy, lawyers
point out.
Dr. Ellsberg, for example, is
prepared to argue that releas-
ng the Pentagon papers was;
the best thing he could havel
4
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5t,
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done for the nation.
His argument here is that he
performed a public service by
providing the nation with in-
formation that it should have
about the conduct of the war in
Vietnam and of American for-
eign policy.
All of this, of course. tends
to obscure the ,cry real con-
stitutional issues, particularly
the crucial First Amendment
Implications of the case.
Many constitutional lawyers
believe, for instance, that con-
viction of Dr. Ellsberg and Mr.
,Russo would set legal preced-
ents that could give the Gov-
ernment a greater degree of
control over Information than
has ever before existed.
1_ .There are several reasons for
'this conclusion. The first is that
'the Ellsberg-Russo trial is, in
essence, the Government's first
.iattempt at imprisoning a per-
son who "leaked" information
Ito the. public. That is, Dr. Ells-
berg has admitted being the
'source of the Pentagon papers
that appeared in the news
media.
And while it is not the stated
purpose of prosecuting Dr. Ells-
berg, many constitutional au-
thorities believe that successful
use of the espionage laws
against persons who have made
information available to the
public could have a deadly ef-
fect on others who might have
Information they believe should
be made public. Such a develop-
ment could give the Govern-
ment unprecedented authority
to conceal embarrassing facts.
In a separate case involving
the Pentagon papers, a Fed-
eral grand jury in Boston in-
vestigated how The New York
Time 5; and other media obtained
the papers. That grand jury
was discharged shortly after
Thanksgiving, without having
handed down any indictments.
A spokesman for the United
States Attorney's office in Bos-
ton said no final decision
would be made on whether a
new grand jury should be im-
paneled until after the Ellsberg-
Russo trial. The office had said
j that the 'Boston ? jury was dis-
missed to avoid any conflict
,with the prosecution of crimi-
nal charges against Dr. Ells-
berg.
How to keep Government se-
crets, has always been a pro-
found dilemma for the nation,
since the First Amendment says:
"Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press? "
Consequently, Congress has
made several unsuccessful at-
tempts to pass official secrets
acts that would make it a crime
to disclose or publish any in:.
formation classified as .secret.
? However, with very few ex-
ceptions, these attempts have
never succeeded for two rea-
sons: many CongreaSnien be-
lieved finally that such laws
would have questionable valid-
ity under the First Amendment,
and they feared that such laws
would allow Presidential Ad-
ministrations to hide their mis-
takes simply by stamping them
"classified."
Approved F
The exception to this has that Dr. Ellsberg stole the Pen-
been the Espionage Act, which tagon papers to make copies of
outlaws the release of secret them but also that while he
codes, disclosure by a Govern- had them he deprived the Gov-
merit employe of information ernment?defrauded it, in fact
to a foreign agent and the ?of teir use.
release of atomic information. Furthermore, the Government
None of this is alleged against contends that while there may
Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo. be no official secrets act, it is
But the Espionage Act also
indeed the lawful function of
contains a broad, catch-all pro-
'Million against disclosure of Government to classify certain
documents as "top secret."
"any information relating to The defense does not concede
that Dr. Ellsberg stole the docu-
ments. It argues that he had
Government clearance to see
the papers, which he had helped
to write, and that removing
them fthm the Rand Corpora-
tion, copying them and then
not pass on information to for- returning them did not consti-
eign agents who are charged lute theft.
under that provision of the act. The defense argues further
that since Congress did not
pass an official secrets 'act, the
Government is in effect asking
the judge and jury to make law
concerning classified docu-
ments, something that Congress
has steadfastly refused to do.
Indeed, there is no statute
that gives the Executive Branch
of Government the right , to
establish its system of classi-
fying information with such
labels as "top secret."
The classification system
rests, instead, on executive
orders, not Congressional ac-
tion. Violators of the system
have not suffered criminal
prosecution, only administra-
jobs.
So if the two men are con-
victed, and the conviction is
sustained through the Supreme
Court, it could mean that mak-
ing public classified information
would have been declared a
crime, even though no .statute
makes it a crime.
It could also mean that the
Government would not be re-
quired to show that the act of
passing information was in-
tended to do' injury or to help
a foreign power, as the espion-
age laws now require.
Prof Melville B. Nimmer of
the University of California at
Los Angeles Law School, a
leading authority on the First
Amendment, has/ said: "The
Government s charge appears Government will have an offi-
to imply that it owned the in- cial secrets act. which covers
formation contained in the, not only official secrets but
papers, and that Dr. Ellsberg any all information the
stole and criminally converted Government has."
that information for his own There is, .of course, another
use when he copied it. This 'side to this question. In 1789,
raises the point that if the Gov- for instance, Congress enacted
ernment can own and control a statute authorizing the heads
information rather than the of executive departments to
paper it is printed on, the prescribe "regulations" for the
Government could suppress governing of the department,
any embarrassing reports or including "the custody, use and
studies without regard to ,the papers and propety obtaining
national defense. , preservation of the ,records,
to
In this, as in other points of
Wit"
h.ether that will pertain to
the indictments, the Govern-
ment has refused to speculatei the Pentagon papers case will
be determined finally by the
about broader constitutional
judge's charge to the jury and
Issues and precedents that may the jury's decision.
be set by this trial, Instead, it The defense contends that
has stuck to the Much narrower
low that two particular men the 1780 statute Merely pork
tains to the Internal operations
of an executive branch depart-
ment, not to broader issues
such as security. ? ?
tinder the statute the regu-
national defense" by a person
lwlio "has reason to believe [it]
could be used to the injury of
the United States or the advan-
tage of any foreign nation."
Dr. Ellsberg- and Mr. Russo
are the first persons who did
There are two,more charges
against the defendants that
have never been made by the
Government in any previous
case, and both also raise pro-
found constitutional issues. '
The first is that Dr. Ellsberg
and Mr. Russo conspired to
"defraud the United States" by
"impairing, obstructing, and
defeating its governmental
function of controlling dissemi-
nation of classified Government
studies, reports, memorandums
and communications."
If upheld, this 'could allow
the Government to invoke
general federal anticonspiracy
statutes against, for example,
Government officials and
newsmen who work together
to make public information
marked "classified" ? even
though Congress has never
made it a crime to make such
material public.
Secondly, and perhaps even
more far-reaching in the view
of some constitutional authori-
ties, the charging 'Of Dr. Ells-
berg and Mr. Russo under the
general Federal statutes involv-
ing theft.
Dr. Ellsberg, for example,
apparently never intended to
keep a Government copy of the
Pentagon papers. Rather, he
made a copy and returned the
original.
Thus, in this context, the
have committed particular
crimes and that whatever hap-
pens to them in the end will
set no future precedents for
Government prosecutions. "glens, including executive It is is also the contention. ders, have the force of law,
of the Government not only;
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many legal authorities believe.
Furthermore, the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966 pro-
vides exemptions for nine
board categories of informa-
tion, including the exemption
for "matters ,that are'.... specl.
fically required by the execti-
tive to be kept secret in th6
interest of national defense
or foreign policy." And it will
be argued that in providing
exemptions, the right of the
'executive to impose secrecy is
'explicit.
l In the end, this question might
turn on what the jury perceives
to be the meaning of the words
"national defense."
One of the main defense con-
tentions will 'be that the infor-
mation contained in the Penta-
gon papers?as distinct from
the physical papers themselves
?was long in the public do-
main; that all the information
in the papers had been the sub-
,ject of newspaper and magazine
articles, of books and of
speechei by officials in various
Administrations.
Dr. Ellsberg is not contending
that the documents themselves,
which include numerous secret
Government memorandums, had
been made public, but that the
general' sweep of the informa-
tion they contain was already
known and that the documents
merely served to support that
knowledge.
And the defense will argue
that if this is so, and since the,
Government 'does not have a
copyright on information, how
can Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo
be tried for releasing informa-?
lion that was already public?
It is, a practicing Los An-
geles ' lawyer who is not con-
nected with the trial said re-
cently, ' "the most interesting
case I've ever heard of?there
are so many great constitu-
tional, issues, so many obscure
points of law.
"The defense has two really
tough jobs, to defend ,the case
in court and build a good rec-
ord for appeals, because so
much is going to depend on the
!judge's charge to the jury at the
lend of the trial," he said.
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WASHINGTON POST
22 December 1972
Schlesinger to Get
Hel s' Post at CIA
. By Carroll Kilpatrick
Watiliington ro. fiLar f Writer
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Dec.
21?President Nixon today
confirmed reports that he will
/nominate James R. Schle-
singer, chairman of the At-
omic Energy Commission, to
be the next director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Richard M. Helms, who has
been director since 1966 and
an official of the agency since
1947, will be nominated ambas-
sador to Iran.
The President worked at his
residence here today and con-
ferred ?vith inchiding'
nal tonal seri irl ty Iv set.
Henry A. k issinger, by tele.
phone, White I louse press sec-
retary Ronald L. Ziegler said.
In Washington, it was
learned that Mr. Nixon is ex-
pected to nominate Under See-
rotary Joseph N. Irwin, the
No. 2 man at the State Depart-
ment, as ambassador to
France.
It was understood that nom-
ination of the 59-year-old Ir-
win will be made this week.
He would replace Arthur K.
'Watson, former IBM executive
who has resigned.
The White House already
has announced that Irwin?
previously described as slated
for "a high-level ambassado-
rial post"?will be succeeded
at State by Kenneth Rush-,
who now is deputy defense
secretary.
Early Friday the President
and Kissinger will meet here
with Gen. Alexander M. Haig
NEW YORK TIMES
22 December 72
jr., deputy national security"
adviser and designated to be
vice chief of staff of the
Army, who will report on his
brief trip this week to South
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand. ,
Ziegler refused to comment
on reports from Saigon that
the President had in effect de-
livered an ultimatum to both
Saigon and Hanoi.
The reports said that the
President warned Hanoi it
could expect continued and in-
tensified bombing if it refused
In accept a negotiated settle-
mein and told Saigon to stop
making pence propiisais that
make it more difficult to
reach a settlement.
Significantly, Ziegler did
not deny the reports. Rather,
he branded them a "rumor"
and said he would not com-
ment on rumors.
When a reporter asked if it
was the word "ultimatum"
that bothered him, he again
declined to comment. If the
reports had been entirely
without foundation he almost
certainly would have said so.
Haig left Bangkok today..
Kissinger flew here with the
President on Wednesday and
Is scheduled to leave some-
time this weekend to spend
Christmas with his children.
Reporters have repeatedly
asked Ziegler this week why
the President has not deliv-
ered a report to the nation on
the breakdown of the peace
negotiations. The report Kis-
A.E.C. Chief to Replace
Helms as C.1. A. Director
Schlesinger, 43, Chosen
Intelligence Official
-- to Be Envoy to Iran
telligence.
He said also that he would
nominate the current director,
Richard Helms, to be Ambassa-
dor to Iran.
Mr. Helms's departure from
the C.I.A. was described as a
By JACK ROSENTHAL retirement, consistent with his
1 Special tome New York Tilted feeling that he, like other C.I.A.
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Dec. 21 officials, should retire at age
?president Nixon said today1160. 14e will be 60 in AViarch.
fissripp, wh la ehaian
o rm of Me, MA RIS was being forced
that he would nominate Jetties ILI There had ban
ehii
the Atomic Energy Commission, out of his cob.
singer gave last Saturday is:
all the administration has
dent Nov. 20 that CTA re.
say about the failure at Paris,,
quired all senior officials to
Ziegler said.
retire at age 60 and that he be-
"'re h"" been 11(1 public lieved no exception should be
hints, predictions or specula- made for him, Ziegler said,
Lions from White House or;i. Helms will be 60 on March 30.
cials on what may happen. in Mr. Nixon is "totally satis-
fied" with Helms' work, Zieg-
ler said.
The President requested,
Helms to stay in the govern-
ment and offered him the am-
bassadorship to Iran, Ziegler
said. Joseph S. Farland, who
has been ambassador to Iran
since May, will be reassigned'
to "another important post,"
Ziegler said.
Helms is a native of St.
Davids, Pa., and a graduate of
College. After a brief
Iii of her announcements, hoeIn nen,,,nnnem he en.
Ziegler said that the .President tried I he Navy shortly after
had accepted the resignation Pearl Harbor and served with
of David M. Abshire as assist. the wartime predecessor a
CIA, the Office of Strategic
ant secretary of state for con-
Services. President Johnson
gressional ? relations.. He re- promoted him from CIA's (lop-
signed to return to George- uty directorship to director in
town University as director of 1966.
its Center for International. Schlesinger, who will be 44
in February, is 'regarded as
Studies, Ziegler said,
one of the more able adminis-
Ziegler said no decision had trators in the government. He
been made as to whether act- is a native of New York City
ing FBI Director L. Patrick and was graduated from Har-
Gray III would be nominated Yard in 1950 summa cum
to be director. He also said .no laude. He also received his
decision had been made on a master's and doctorate do.
replacement for Schlesinger' grecs from Harvard. .
at the Atomic Energy Commis.' He taught for eight years at
si?Ziliegler vigorously denied then joined the Ii.and Corp. as
the University of Virginia and
the future. However, Ziegler
has repeated almost daily that
the United States is prepared
to resume the talks at any
time. The United States be-
lieves a settlement can be
, reached if Hanoi adopts a con-
structive attitude, he has said.
The administration is pursu-
ing "every avenue" to reach
an accord, Ziegler said.
published reports that Helms' director of strategic studies.
was leaving under pressure Schlesinger is a Republican
and that the White House was and no relation of Arthur M.
dissatisfied with sonic of Sehelsinger jr., who served in
Helms' work. the White House during the
Helms informed the Presi- Kennedy Administration.
to affirm the President's appre-
ciation for Mr. Helms's 30 years
of public service and for the
fact. that it will continue. At
the same time, the departure
from the C.I.A. is touched with
symbolic overtones.
In the opinion of knowledge-
able officials, it means the end
of an era of professional intel-
ligence operatives and the be-
ginning of an era of systems
management. Mr. Helms, who
once interviewed Hitler, as a
reporter, epitomizes a genera-
tion that developed its exper-
tise during World War It and
subsequently,
1119 k=34,A, WI100 01)01014d in
June, 1966, he was the first
careerist to become D.C.I.?Di-
to be Director of Central In- The White House took pains ,rector of Central Intelligence.
6
Mr. Schlesinger, by contrast,
is a 43-year-old economist and
political scientist schooled in
strategic studies, systems analy-
sis, and defense spending. The
author of a detailed report on
the intelligence community for
Mr. Nixon last year, he is ex-
pected to take over at the C.I.A.
1as soon as he is confirmed by
the Senate.
Both the Helms and Schles-
inger appointments had been
forecast.
No successor was named to
the A.E.C. chairmanship, which
Mr. Schlesinger has held since
Altati4t` 16111 Dkiftife titer be
WI Winn rill ilia Prtipq
anagernen and Budget, eon,
centrating on national security
and international affairs.
Cost Isst Noted
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100040001-2
That experience, coupled with
the Administration's apparent"
interest in the cost and redun-
dancy of intelligence programs,,
led a close student of C.I.A.. tol
suggest. today that what Mr.
Nixon now wanted was "more
cloak for the buck."
Details about "the agency,"
as the C.I.A. is known in the,
Government, are classified. But'
it is thought to have a budget
of more than $750-million a
year and more than 10,000
employes. Most are involved
In intelligence ?technical as-
seSsment, analysis and esti-
mates.
A "plans division" conducts
clandestine operations, such as
the abortive Bay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba in 1961. Mr.
Helms once directed this di-
vision, but not at the time of
the Cuban invasion.
WASHINGTON STAR
21 December 1972
His new assignment is to al
country whose leader was
strongly assisted, according to
wide belief, by a clandestine
C.I.A. operation in 1953. The
agency was reputed to have
had a role in the overthrow
of Mohammed Mossadegh, then
premier, permitting the Shah of
Iran to reassert his control.
If confirmed by the Senate,
Mr. Helms will succeed Joseph
S Farland who has been Am-
bassador to Iran since May.
The White House said today
that he would return to Wash-
ington and be reassigned to
another post.
According to a private
source, the outgoing Deputy
Secretary of State, John N. Ir-
win, is Mr. Nixon's choice to
become Ambassador to France.
The position has been vacant
JAMES SCHLESINGER
ew
Late in 1971 James R.
Schlesinger, his wife, Rachel,
And two of their children made
,headlines by roaming around
:a- 'barren, uninhabited
island?Amchitka, in the Aleu-
tian chain off Alaska's coast.
.1,4,They were not there to pur-
aue Schlesinger's hobby:
bir&watching. Their mission
(Was to prove to skeptics that it
was safe to inhabit an area
'where the U.S. government
had just exploded the largest
underground nuclear blast,
known as "Project Cannikin."
...A determined man who acts
out his convictions, the
4-year-old native of New York
:City. now moves into another
Controversial area, b ut one
that produces few headlines:
Intelligence network.
- -Chosen by President Nixon
today to succeed Richard M.
Helms as direct or of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agene y,
Schlesinger will be giving up
the post of chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission.
In taking the intelligence ition, Schlesinger will have
trt opportunity to act out some
of his own conclusions about
the way that job should be
run.
His first job in the Nixon-,
adininistration ? assistant
director of the Budget Bureau
(later during his tenure re-
homed the Office of Manage-
'silent and Budget)?led to pri-
mary responsioility for reor-
ganization of the intelligence
Apparatus of the federal gov-
t-nment.
Accomplished in 1971 the
changes streamlined budget-
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f,tE
ing procedures and, more im-
portantly concentrated the
process of coordinating and
assessing intelligence data in
the hands of presidential ad-
viser Henry A. Kissinger and
his aides in the White House.
The reorganization gave the
director of Central Intelligente
full budgeting responsibility
for all of the intelligence serv-
ices?enhanced authority
which Schlesinger himself pre-
sumably now inherits.
Created Post
Perhaps by coincidence, a
former colleague of Schlesin-
ger's at the Rand Corp. "think
'tank" in California?Andrew
M. Marshall?is the member
of Kissinger's National Securi-
ty Council staff moSt con-
cerned with coordinating intel-
ligence matters.
Marshall's post, as head of
the "Net, Assessment Group,"
within the NSC staff, was cre-
ated by Schlesinger's reorgani-
zation plan.
Schlesinger had joined the
Nixon administration in Feb-
ruary 1969, primarily as a
budget-watcher. His main as-
signment was to oversee the
Pentagon's budgeting proce-
dures, during a period when
military spending was easing
off the massive levels of the
Vietnam woes peak yoara.
Is reputed to have shown the
Pentagon in one year how to
trim $5 billion out of its budg-
et.
Although much of his profes-
sional and governmental life
seems to have involved nation-
al security in one way or an-
I
since-
the departure in early
November of Arthur K. Wat-
son, who is Mr. Irwin's brother-
in-law.
In the first news briefing of
the President's week-long
Christmas trip here, Ronald L.
Ziegler, the White House press
secretary, also dealt with the
following appointments topics:
ciMr. Nixon has accepted
"with very special regret" the
resignation of David M. Ab-
shire as Assistant Secretary of
State for Congressional Rela-
tions. Mr. 'Abshire will become
chiarman of the Georgetown
University. Center for Strategic
and International Studies on
Jan. 9.
9ISpeculation about the direc-
torship of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation should be dis-
counted for the time being Mr.
Ziegler said. One newspaper
the
other, he also has a reputation
for being sensitive about envi-
ronmental issues.
, Ecology Stand Tested
His friends recall that;
among his other activities
within the government, he per-
suaded the administration to
reverse itself and to allow the
Taos Indians to keep their
sacred Blue Lake lands in
New Mexico.
The chairmanship ? of AEC
tested his devotion to ecology.
Although environmental orga-
nizations strongly criticized
his full support for the Am-
chitka atomic blast, they have
praised his stand on the so-
called Calvert Cliffs case.
Pressed by the atomic ener-
gy industry to appeal a federal
court decision ordering the
AEC to act much more ag-
gressively to protect the envi-
ronment, Schlesinger refused,
choosing to obey the court.
The chairman also has taken
the position that it is not ap-
propriate for the AEC to pro-
mote atomic energy, or to esti-
mate how much nuclear power
the nation will need. Instead;
It has been his policy to have
the agency develop energy op-
tions that the public may de-
cide to use as It wittheo.
Trained as an economist,
Schlesinger was graduated
summa cum laude from Har-
vard in 1950. After a year's
travel in Europe on a fellow-
ship, he returned to Harvard
1 to take a doctorate in econom-
has reported that Acting Direc-
tor L. Patrick Gray will be
formally nominated, another
has said he would not be, and
a third has been in between,
Mr. Ziegler said. The fact is,
he continued, that no decision
has been made.
Another vacancy arose in
Washington today with the
resignation of John P. Olsson
after 20 months as deputy un-
der secretary of transportation
to return to private business.
Mr. Helma's new position
comes after 30 years in Intelli-
gence work. After graduation
from Williams College, he be-
came a United Press corre-
spondent in Germany from
1935 to 1937. Until 1942, when
he was commissioned as a Navyi
1
officer, he was in newspaper
advertising.
ics
Taught at Virginia
After, that, he taught eco-
nomics at the University of
Virginia, and began concen-
trating on the budgetary side
of national security and de-
fense policy. He wrote a book
titled "The Political Economy
of National Security."
In part as a result of the
book's favorable notice among
experts in the national securi-
ty field, Schlesinger was of-
fered the job at Rand in Santa
Monica which carried out
much of the defense establish-
ment's computer-based analy-
sts of defense systems.
While at Rand, Schlesinger
headed a study of nuclear
arms proliferation, and
worked on a study of the role
of "systems analysis" in polit-
ical decision-making. That
work brought him to the atten-
tion of the Nixon administra-
tion's new budget staff in the
early days after the Presi-
dent's inauguration,
During their time in Wash-
ington, the Schlesingers have
avoidcd ihueh of the city's so-
cial WO, kilitlailidOP la twin to
dislike cocktail parties.
He is a Republican and a
Lutheran.
Mrs. Schlesinger, the former
Rachel Mellinger, is a gradu-
ate of Radcliffe, They have
eight children?four daughters
and four sons.
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NEW YORK TIMES
22 December 72
- A Discreet Nominee.
James Rodney Schlesinger
By LINDA CHARLTON
Special to The New Ybrk Times ?
WASHINGTON, Dec. 21? to broaden its concern to take
? James Rodney Schlesinger,
' whose expected nomination
as the new head of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency was
announced by the White
House today, received consid-
erable public attention as the
Atomic Energy Commission
chairman who took his wife
and two of his
. children along to
witness the con-
troversial detona- energy to the Budget Bureau
tion of a hydrogen and directed a nuclear-prolif-
bomb in the Aleu- eration study commissioned
tion Islands. by the Federal Government.
But that incident, in No- Born in New York
vember, 1971, about four
months after he became chair-
Mr. Schlesinger was born
man of the commission, was
in New York on Feb. 15, 1929,
one of the less startling ac-
tions of his tenure.
Faced with trying to recon-
cile the opposing interests of
conservationists and advo-
cates of nuclear energy, Mr.
Schlesinger began by indicat-
ing that he was no longer go-
? ing to take the traditioaal
A.E.C. position of champion-
ing the rights of nuclear
energy above all others, in-
cluding those of citizens.
This he did by deciding,
on taking office, not to ap-
peal a Federal court decision
requiring the commission to
be responsive to questions on
the location of nuclear power
plants and their effects on
.the environment.
Man
In the
News
in the entire energy area.
Before heading the commis-
sion, Mr. Schlesinger was as-
sistant director of the Office
of Management and Budget.
He joined the Nixon Adminis-
tration in 1969 after working
for the Rand Corporation as
director of strategic studies.
During his years at Rand, he
was a consultant on atomic
' Public Interest Stressed
Not long after this, he told
representatives of the nuclear
industry that the commission
"exists to serve the public in-
terest," not that of the in-
dustry.
During his 17 months as
chairman of the commission,
he has also undertaken a
drastic reorganization of its
structure ? cutting back on
high-level staff and creating
a new "assistant general man-
ager for environmental and
safety affairs." .
While the 43-year-old Mr.
Schlesinger has, made no se-
cret of his advocacy of nu-
'clear energy as a power
source, he says that the skep-
tics have a right to be heard.
In a magazine interview, he
urged "getting away from the
attitude, to wit, that atoms
are beautiful. .7.,
"IlItitorleolly, thin
)if!
"Sul, In fact, atoms may or
may not he useful, lepemling
on the circumstances."
Ile urged the commission
He graduated summa cum
laude and was elected to Phi
Beta Kappa.
He also won a prize of
$2,400 that, underwrote a
year's travel in western Eu-
rope and parts of Africa and
Asia. "I learned that the
world was a very complicated
place," he said, "and that the
narrow discipline of econom-
ics gave aliarrow insight into
the social life of man.
He returned to Harvard for
his master's and doctorate
degrees and in 1954 married
Rachel Mellinger, who was
then at Radcliffe.' They have
four sons and four daughters
and live in Alexandria, Va.
They moved on to the Uni-
versity of Virginia, where Mr.
Schlesinger taught economics
for six years except for a
six-month leave of absence
to teach at the Naval War
College in Newport, R. I. He
wrote a book, "The Political
Economy of National Secur-
ity" and it was this that at-
tracted the -attention of, and
a job offer from the Rand
Corporation.
Mr. Schlesinger is de-
scribed as an unpretentious,
plain-living man who wears
off - the - bargain - rack suits,
drives a retirement-age , car,
enjoys bird-watching and
reading Lutheran "Theology
and writes his own policy,
speeches.
For all his articulateness,
the normally frank Mr.
Schlesinger has demonstrated
recently that he can keep
his mouth shut. Speculation
that he would be named to
the intelligence agency has
swhilon through Wash.,
1110.11 Milee the beginning Of
the month, but. he has been
as discreet as any C.I.A.
operative 'of fact or fiction.
WASHINGTON STAR
21 December 1972
tate Aides in Val
Choke of Helms.
By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer
The White House apparently
bypassed normal channels
when it informed the Iranian
government that Richard M.
Helms, outgoing director of
the Central Intelligence
Agency, would be the next
U.S. ambassador in Tehran.
Iranian specialists at the
State Department have indi-
cated their office was totally
uninformed as recently as yes-
terday about Helms' nomina-
tion, Yet it is understood the
Iranian government was in-
formed of the choice through
less bureaucratic channels as
long as three weeks ago.
Bypassing the bureaucracy
in obtaining compliance from
a foreign ministry to an am-
bassadorial appointment from
outside the career foreign
service is not that rare an oc-
currence. But Foreign Service
veterans are noticing some un-
usual aspects to the Helms'
nomination.
First is the generally recog-
nized fact that the CIA has
acquired a largely mythical
but highly potent reputation in
much of the underdeveloped
Third World as an agent of
"U.S. imperialism" and an in-
stigator of political intrigue.
Second is the historical fact
that the origins of this reputa-
tion. lie in the CIA's spectacu-
larly successful 1953 coup
d'etat in Iran which, under the
direction of Kermit Roosevelt,
unseated the anti-Western pre-
mier, Mohammed Mossadegh,
and reinstalled the present
shah, Reza Pahlevi, as ruler.
WASHINGTON POST
.23 November 1972
; Soviets Accuse CIA
Of 'Heroin Policy'
MOSCOW, Nov. 22 (UPD---
. The Soviet newspaper Liter-
ary Gazette accused the U.S
Central lntellittenee
(tI A) today of providing her-
oin to dissident groups In
rope,
The CIA -policy of heroin"
has been under way for five
8
Third is the circumstance
that Helms, from 1952 to 1962,
was deputy director of plans
at the CIA?the division re-
sponsible for planning and
carrying out clandestine opera-
tions like the Iranian coup.
Helms headed the division
from 1962 to 1966, when he
became CIA director.
Foreign Service sources in-
dicated a belief that these.
facts and circumstance could
explain the otherwise baffling
delay in the public announce-
ment by the White House of its
weeks old decision to send .
Helms to Tehran.
Given the widespread im-
pact of the shah's CIA-backed
coup on Iran's immediate .
neighbors in the Middle East, .
the Soviet Union and the Indi-
an peninsula, Helms' nomina-
tion can scarcely have been
received with equanimity even
at nearly 20 years' distance.
Despite a carefully nurtured
public image of peace, pro-
gress and prosperity, Iran in
recent years has had to deal
with an ugly and persistent
problem of internal security.
Dissident groups drawn in
part from the Kurdish; Arab
and tribal minorities in the
country and encouraged by a
hostile radical government in
neighboring Iraq have kept Sa-
vak, the Iranian secret police,
busy.
Within the past two years
members of the shahs family ,
have been the target of at
least one kidnap attempt, and
the U.S. embassy has been the
target of sabotage and assassi-
nation plots.
years in Italy, West Germany
and France, the newspaper
said. "In almost every big
town, in universities and clubs
..for young people, the CIA in-
stalls its opium agents (very
. often t hey're pret ty girls)
Amtilit! the not flit ifil
f II s. Plventitally some of
the dissident S iiveimie
Mils," I he paper said, nod
"al. this stage the CIA starts
its Ideological infiltration Of
their minds.
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misTi,rmk
1 January 1973
THE CIA'S NEW
SUPERSP9OK
he change had been Jumored for
? nearly a month, making it perhaps.
the worst ?kept. secret in the history of
the nation's super-secret Central In-
Itelligence Agency. But this hardly
lessened the impact of President Nix-
on's announcement last week that he
Intends to replace veteran CIA direc-
tor Richard Helms with a relative
? newcomer to intelligence, James R.
Schlesinger, the tweedy economist
%vim now serves as chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission. For
Helms, 59, it means ,a late start on a
new career: Mr. Nixon will nordinate
him to be ambassador to Iran. For
the agency, it means the end of an ?
era, the passing of control from an old
crew of World War II cloak.and-clag-
ger professionals to a new breed of
cost-conscious systems managers who
promise more spook for the buck. ? ?
Schlesinger, 43, may never have
broken an enemy, code or parachuted
behind the lines, but he has precisely
the qualifications President Nixon was
looking for in his top intelligence
agent. A bird-watching, pipe-smoking
perfectionist with three degrees. from
Harvard, he directed strategic studies.
at the Rand Corporation before sign-
on at the White House Oflirenf
Management and Budget in 19(19. At
CHRISTIAN SCIENC
2 January 1973
OMB, Schlesinger rode herd on mili-
tary and international affairs?includ-
ing the nation's various intelligence
budgets. Nanied to head the AEC in
1971, he showed his colors as an ad-
ministrqor by increasing efficiency
and tuning up the commission's con-
cern with public safety and environ-
mental protection. Confronted with a
. public Controversy over the hazards
of the Amchitka H 'bomb test in No-
vember 1971, Schlesinger took his
wife' and two of his eight children to
?witness?the blast on an isolated Aleu-
tian island. ?
As the new, director of Central In-
telligence, Schlesinger will control not
only the shadowy CIA operations but
, the entire $6 billion U.S. military.
civilian intelligence complex?an ar-
rangement he himself had proposed
more than a, year ago in a special re-
port' commissioned by the President.
The goal was typically Nixonian:
greater efficiency in place of what the
President felt were too many over-
lapping "collection efforts" in the field
and too many conflicting analyses pre-
sented to the White House. Whether
too much management may actually
handicap the nation's intelligence op-'
eration?limiting the number of view-
points on ticklish foreign situations--;
'remains to be seen, but Schlesinger is
going in with a powerful mandate to
trim back and lighten up.
'Devoted': Helms was given the
same mandate last year. But the
courtly OSS veteran, one of the foun-
E MONITOR
A shadow over CIA .
We are uneasy about the change of
leadership at the Central Intelligence
Agency in Washington, not because we
have doubts about the integrity of the
new man, but because we have doubts
about the propriety of the reasons for
pushing out the old.
Had there been a vacancy at CIA we
would have said that James Schlesin-
ger's qualifications for the job were
m pressi ye.
What disturbs us is that a vacancy was
created when there were excellent rea-
sons for not having one.
Richard Helms is 59 years of age. He
has been in the American intelligence
business since 1942. He has been director
of the CIA since 1966. He is in excellent
physical health. He is the first profes-
sional CIA- intelligence officer to reach
the directorship. His appointment was a
plus for morale at the agency. It was
reassuring that a professional in-
telligence man had been given the job. It
was evidence that politics would be kept
out of intelligence gathering and eval-
uation. Continuation of his service as
director would have been further reas-
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? ?
ders of the CIA in 1947, remained
more involved with traditional intelli-
gence processing than with budget
cutting. That sense of priorities, plus ;
the fact that he was a Democratic ap-
pointee with a host of Democratic
friends, made his departure almost in
evitable. The White House put the
least political face on it explaining :
that Helms was reaching. the CIA'4
standard retirement age (60) id
March and praising him for "e*treme.
, ly able and devoted service.". Moro
than that, the President encouraged
. Helms to remain in governMent servi ? ?
ice with the assignment to Iran.
Transforming a master: spy into a
diplomat is a matter of some delicacy;
of course, particularly since ?Hchrisi
was head of the CIA s "dirty -tricks1
.division back in 1953 wlnki it playcd
a key role in overthrowing former
Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossa-
degh.. But the appointment was
cleared personally with the Shah of
Iran, who indicated that his country
would be flattered to have such a
VIP; and diplomatic experts surmised
that the U.S.S.R. was sophisticated
enough to realize that having . Helms
so near one of its borders constituted
no real escalation of U.S. espionage
efforts. Helms himself has little fear
of James Bondian reprisals., kidnaping.
ot liquidation. "I certainly don't intend
to live the rest of my Wel In liidiug,'!.
he tells friends, "lust because I used
to work for (11(.3 CIA,"
? I
surance that politics would not get mixed
up with intelligence because Mr. Helms
Is totally nonpolitical.
He was so nonpolitical that on more
than one Occasion he 'presented to the
White House intelligence evaluations
which cut straight across the political
line of the Nixon administration at the
moment. When Pentagon and White
House were calling for a stepped-up
ABM program on the ground of high
estimates of Russian intentions, Mr.
Helms simply put in the CIA estimates
which were modest, and' confirmed by
later events.
We do not know that he was pushed out
of CIA (to be shipped to Iran as Am-
bassador) because he offended politi-
cians at White House and Pentagon. We
do know that his intelligence estimates
were untarnished by political apple-pol-
ishing.
There are two jobs in Washington
which must at all times be above suspi-
cion of political interference. CIA is one
and the FBI is the other. Partisanship In
either job would be most darigeriiiii.
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WASHINGTON POST
26 December 1972
,r
The Change at CM
There are such strict limits to what is knowable about
,the Central Intelligence Agency and its workings that '
?any discussion of Mr. Helms' departure from the direc-
torship and Mr. Schlesinger's appointment to replace
him must necessarily rest on a comparatively small store
of information. Even sO, one .or two things are plain.
And chief among these is the fact, evident from what
is known about the two men themselves, that one highly .
qualified and eminently capable official is being re- ?
placed by another.
Richard Helms has spent most of his professional life
in intelligence work, and he has acquired a reputation
among those qualified to judge, as a man of great hon-
esty and tough-mindedness. The term "tough-minded"
,In? this connection can only summon forth imaginary
;zither music for some people and visions of grown men
running around endlessly shoving each other under
trains. But Mr. Helms?Lunflappable, personally disin-
Aerested, and beyond the reach of political or ideological
pressures where his judgment is concerned?earned his
;reputation for tough-mindedness in an intellectual
- -sense... As Agency Director, he has been far less a public'
-figure or celebrity than some of his predecessors?Allen
Dulles, for example, or John McCone?evidently prefer-.
'ring to maintain a certain becoming obscurity. He has
..worked very effectively with some of his overseers on
he Hill. And, if the leaked (not by CIA) material, such
a.s the Pentagon Papers, that has been appearing in the
'Press is any guide, he and his Agency have also served
.' their executive branch leaders with some distinction.
One gets the impression that from the presumed efficacy
WASHINGTON STAR
26 December 1972
CHARLES BARTLETT
ehran ci LP7k1 Post
It was probably not a merry.
Christmas for the American-
ologists in the Kremlin who
were kept at their desks by
their masters' demand to
know why President Nixon LS
sending his intelligence chief.
Richard Helms, to be ambas-
sador to Iran.
Intelligence is the nerve
center of the Soviet system
and the White House move
will inevitably put the com-
rades into a spin. Their con-
jectures on Helms' reassign-
ment are certain to be laced
with conspiratorial intrigues
and suspicions that Nixon has
dark plans for deeper med-
dling near the under-belly of
the Soviet Union.
The Muscovites would in-
telligently brush aside most
of White House press secre-
tary Ron Ziegler's explana-
? lion that Helms had asked to
retire as CIA director because
Ho wAa* awn,hOtA AO to=
tlrement age of 60. Helms Is
a man who keeps, fit with
daily stints on an indoor track
at the CIA and he is lean,
healthy and young - minded
enough to qualify easily for
an exemption to stay at his
job.
The Soviet experts also
would be correct in brushing
aside published speculation
that Helms fell out of favor
or disappointed the President
with the quality of his per-
formance as the government's
chief intelligence officer. He
has not always told the ad-
ministration what it wanted
to hear but his record of dis-
cretion?in the men he sent
abroad, in his intelligence as-
sessments and in his dealings
with Congress ? is widely
judged to have been remark-
ably solid.
Possibly his greatest feat
has been to hold the confi-
dence and credibility of Con-
gress through a period in
which the executive branch ,
wa lattii with deep miateust
on foreign policy. It also was
a time when the CIA's chief
defenders on the Hill, domi-
of bombing the North Vietnamese to the presumed neces-
sity of responding to every wild surmise of what the I
Russians were up to in nuclear weapons. development,
Mr. Helms has offered a practical, dispassionate and
rigorously honest?if not always popular?view.
That the Congress will be pushing for some greater
degree of responsiveness from the CIA in the coming
session seems pretty certain. And there also is at least
a chance that internal bureaucratic difficulties at the
Agency will require some managerial rearrangements.
In a way, solely because he comes to CIA from outside
(not from up the ranks), James Schlesinger inay be
specially suited to take on both. But he has other quail.
fciations. At the Rand Corporation in California, Mr.
Schlesinger did analytic work that gave him more than
a passing familiarity with the intelligence estimating
' business. At the Budget Bureau?as it was then known
?in the early days of the Nixon administration he
proved himself a very astute, not to say downright cold-
eyed, scrutinizer of military budget requests. His brief
term at the AEC was notable in several respects. Mr.
Schlesinger bucked the pressure of the atomic energy
establishment to insist that. the AEC take note of and
respond to the claims of its ecological critics.. And he
attempted to push the agency back from its political role
toward the more disinterested service role it was meant
in the first place to fulfill. He, like Mr. Helms, is
demonstrably a man of talent, dedication and impressive
intellect. We should have been content to see them ?
stay on in their present jobs. But if Mr. Helms Is to
leave the Central Intelligence Agency, we think Mr.
Schlesinger is a first class choice to replace him.
f 110115m7
neering men like Sen. Rich-
ard Russell, D-Ga., and Rep.
Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., were
passing from the scene.
Actually the agency gained
respect in a period when it
easily might have fallen vic-
tim to the popular mood be-
cause Helms held tautly to
his professional role. Once he
persuaded skeptics that he
was not a man who would
play partisan games, he was
able to head off those sena-
tors who were bent on shrink-
ing the CIA's cloak so they
could have a better look at
what was going on.
Ironically, the events which
led to Helms' replacement
were launched many months
ago by James Schlesinger,
the Rand analyst Who has
agreed, reportedly with great
reluctance, to take Helms'
job. As the Budget bureau
specialist on defense,. Sala.
Inger was asked to study how
the government's intelligence
needs could be accomplished
more economically.
This is not a small problem
10
for a pinched government.
Intelligence costs run about
$3.5 billion a year and the up-
ward pressures on that
spending level grow more in-
tense as inflation bites into
the dollar. Schlesinger's study
concluded that the director of
central intelligence would
have to reach out beyond his
agency to perform budget sur-
gery in the overlapping areas
of Pentagon intelligence.
Helms was handed this task
with an unreassuring fanfare ,
at the White House. He de-
clined to move his office into
the Budget Bureau and held
as closely as he could to his
old activities as an intelli-
gence officer. This was ra-
tional prudence because an
abrupt move to chop the Pen-
tagon's intelligence budget
would stir many enemies and
perhaps 'shatter the working
alliance he had forged on the
Hill. Some believe he decided
to postpone any strong moves
until the elections were over.
But the President, pinched
by fiscal pressOest etliiie to
itn impatient conclusion tiwit
the job will have to be done
by a non-career man who will
play the bull in the china shop
more cheerfully. He turned
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to Schlesinger 'tvho is tough,
savvy and disposed to seek
his future outside of govern-
ment, perhaps as a university
head. He is taking a role that
promises to be as bruising as
any in government.
Very well, the Russians will
say, but why Iran? The fact
is there are few, significant
nations to which an ex-CIA
director, even with Helms'
charm, could go as ambassa-
dor without stirring mass
protests. Iran is one and the
Shah, reportedly delighted to
draw an envoy who is close
to the President, will be cer-
tain to insure that Helms is
well received.
WASHINGTON POST
29 December 1972
Chalmers M. Roberts
Helms', the Shah and the CIA
THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the
fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran
as the American ambassador 20 years
after the agency he now heads organ-
ized and directed the overthrow of the
regime then in power in Teheran. The
tale is worth recounting if only be-
cause of the changes in two decades
which have affected the Central Intel-
ligence Agency as well as American
foreign policy.
Helms first went to Work at the CIA
in 1947 and he came up to his present
post as director through what is gener-
ally called the "department of ? dirty
tricks." However, there is nothing on
the public record to show that he per-
sonally had a hand in the overthrow of
the Communist backed and/or ori-
ented regime of Premier Mohammed
Mossadegh in 1953, an action that re-
turned the Shah to his throne. One can
only guess at the wry smile that must
have come to the Shah's face when he
first heard that President Nixon was
proposing to send the CIA's top man
to be the American envoy.
The Iranian'affair, and a similar
CIA action in Guatemala the following
year, are looked upon by old hands at
the agency as high points of a sort in
the Cold War years. David Wise and
Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian
story in their book, "The Invisible Gov-
ernment," and the CIA boss at the
time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public
after he left the government that the
United States had had a hand in what
occurred.
IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet
Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who con-
fused Westerners with his habits of
.weeping in public and running govern-
ment business from his bed, national-
ized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refin-
ery. The West boycotted Iranian oil
and the country was thrown into crisis.
Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and
Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Com-
munist party, to bolster his hand. The
British and Americans decided he had
to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi
to replace him. The man who stage-
managed the job on the spot was Ker-
mit "Kim" ilotmOvelt (who also bad a
hand In some fancy goIngsoon In
,Egypt), grandson of TR. and seventh
cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washing-
tonian in private business.
Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran
and set up underground headquarters.
A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New
' Jersey state police, had become famous
during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping
case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the
Shah's police force and he and Roose-
velt joined in the 1953 operation. The
Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named
Zaheldi as Premier but .Mossadegh ar-
rested the officer who brought the bad
news. The Teheran streets filled with
rioters and a scared Shah fled first to
Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles
flew to Rome to confer with him. Roo.
sevelt ordered the Shah's backers into
the streets, the leftists were arrested
by the army and the Shah returned in
triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In
time a new international oil consor-
tium took over Anglo-Iranian which
operates to this day,though the Shah
has squeezed more and more revenue
from the Westerners.
In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intel-
ligence," published after he left CIA,
Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran
and Guatemala it "became clear" that
a Communist state was in the making,
"support from outside was given to
loyal anti-Communist elements." In a
1965 NBC television documentary on
"The Science of Spying" Dulles said:
"The government of Mossadegh, if you
recall history, was overthrown by the
action of the Shah. Now, that we en-
couraged the .Shah to take that action
I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an
ex-CIA operative in the Middle East,
wrote in his book, "The Game of
Nations," that the Iranian derring-do
was called "Operation Ajax." He cred-
ited Roosevelt with "almost single-
handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces
on to the streets of Teheran" and su-
pervising "their riots so as to oust"
Mossadegh.
TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms
will go after he leaves the CIA is a sta-
ble,, well armed and well oil-financed
regime under the Shah's command
which has mended its fences with Mos-
cow without hurting its close relation-
ship with Washington. The shah has
taken full advantage of the changes in
East-West relations from the Cold War
to today's milder climate.
While Iran and Guatemala were the
high pointti Overt ?IA 001t1 Wor 00.
tivity, there were plenty of other suc- '
cessful enterprises that fell short of
changing government regimes. Today
the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of
Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has
withdrawn from such large scale af-
fairs as Iran, save for its continuing
major role in the no longer "secret
war in Laos." The climate of today
would not permit the United States to
repeat the Iranian operation, or so one
assumes with the reservation that '
President Nixon (who was Vice Presi-
dent at the time of Iran) loves sur-
prises.
The climate of 1953, however, was
very different and must be taken into
account in any judgment. Moscow
then was fishing in a great many
troubled waters and among them was
Iran. It was probably true, as Allen.
Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that
"at no time has the CIA engaged in
any political activity or any intelli-
gence that was not approved, at the
highest level." It was all part of a'
deadly "game of nations." Richard Bis- ?
sell, who ran the U-2 program and the
Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV
show about the morality of CIA activi-
ties. "I think," he replied, that "the
morality of . . . shall we call it for
short, cold war .. . is so infinitely eas-
ier than the morality of almost any
kind of hot war that I never encoun-
tered this as a serious problem."
?PERHAPS the philosophy of the.
Cold War years and the CIA role were
best put by Dulles in a letter that he
wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his
then forthcoming book had appeared
in Harper's and I had suggested to hint
some further revelations he might in-
clude in the book. He wrote about ad-.
ditions he was making: "This includes'
more on Iran and Guatemala and the
problems of policy in action when
there begins to be evidence that a
country is slipping and Communist
take-overis threatened. We can't wait
for an engraved invitation to come and
Ore aid."
There is a story, too, that Winston
Churchill was so pleased by the opera-
tion in Iran that he proferred the
George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But
the CIA wouldn't let him accept the
decoration. So Churchill commented to
Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have
served under you" in such an opera-
tion. That remark, Roosevelt is said to
have replied/ Wag beam- than the tikes
ration,
Helms doubtless would be the last to
say so out loud but I can imagine his
reflecting that, If It hadn't been for
what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the
others,did In 1953, he would not have
the chance to present his credentials
to a Shah still on the peacock throne
ill 3973.
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WASHINGTON POST
16 December 1972
Tom lirttil Pit
flemc7;ing e Fr in the CIA
Had to Be a Tersoppr DecialerA
THIS CITY'S BEST wisecracker pro-
posed last summer to Soviet Ambassa-
dor Anatolly Dobrynin that he make
himself available AS a replacement for
Sen. Thomas Eagleton on the Demo-
cratic ticket. "Mr. Dobrynin," he said
In mock seriousness, "you would not
be fooled by briefings from the De-
fense Department about the strength
of U.S. weapons. You would know."
I would not argue?even in the same
vein?that Richard Helms, whom Mr.
' Nixon recently deposed as director
of the Central Intelligence Agency,
knows more about Soviet weapons
than leaders in the Kremlin. But it is a
demonstrable fact that he knows more
about them than the Defense Depart-
ment does. Helms was right, a couple ,
of years ago, when the question of
whether or not to build an ABM sys-
tem was being argued in the Senate?
and Melvin Laird, and his research
chief, John Foster, were wrong.
Laird told the President that the So.
viets were going for a first-strike cepa.
billty with the development of the
huge SS-9s. ,He prected they would'
'build them at the rate of 50 or 60 a
year. By 1974, he suggested, the Soviet
Union, possessed of 500 SS-9s, would
be ready to call the tune.
1T WAS A FiticulTENING medic
-
tion but it happencd?perhaps by coin,:
cidence?to come at the time when
President Nixon was trying to con-
vince the U.S. Senate to embark upon
an ABM system. Laird's predictions Pt.
tell neatly with the arguments Mr. Niro
, ores men were making on' Capitol Hill.
No doubt, the President was pleased to
have them.
In this context, the word frdm,
Helms cannot have been pleasing.:
Helms said the Soviet Union was not
going for a? first strike; it would not
build SS-Os at the rate of 50 or 60 per.
year; it would not, reach the level ;of.
500.
As it turned 'out, Helms was right and
Laird and Fosterwere wrong. The S?i
viet Union built 34 more SS-9s and then'
stopped at 310;. the balance of terror
preserves the peace; nothing suggests
that it can be disrupted by 1974.
I HAVE SINCE thought that Helms:
displayed courage in sticking to his
view in the face of formidable .opposie
tion and his superior's ? obvious predi.
lection for it. So I was disturbed when
Ilearned Helms was to be dismissed
6 of
. . . ha knows more
about Soviet weapons
than the Defense
Department does."
chief of CIA and more disturbed when
I consider the possible reasons for hid'
dismissal.. , ? ../
Perhaps an admission for the record
should be entered at this - point:, I..
served for some years :as an associate
DAILY WORLD 5 New York (Communist)
-- 7 DEC 1972
Reachih,
own.
This is the top of Nixon's centralization of con-
trol. It extends not only to economic matters and'
foreign affairs but to other areas as well, including..
the FBI and CIA. Nixon already has his own man-in.
the post of Director of the FBI. Patrick Gray, and
.will be able to place his own man in the CIA be-
cause of the 'resignation of Richard M. Helms as
director (Washington Star-News. Dec. 4
. But, in addition: Nixon is overseeing the appoint-
nent of second _level officials in governmental .de-
partMents. His operative for this' work is Frederic
Malek; who heads a special office in the White lime
'established for this purpose. In the past the Depart-
ment Secretary and, or heads were 'able to arrange
then own teams. but now Nialek has the job of pass-
ing on suggestions, finding persons and approving or
not approving persons for open posts.
. These are the so-called drafters of policy, inno-
vators. the nuts and bolts men who make the ma-
chinery turn. Eugene V. Risher,. in United Press
of Helms' in the agency. I learned to
respect his quiet pragmatism, to ad4
mire his ability and his human decency
and to stand In absolute awe of his un.:
canny ability to avoid having anything
to do with those programs of the era.
which in retrospect should clearly,
have been handled by the army, the
navy or Ringling Brothers Circus.
Nevertheless, I find myself hoping
that Mr. Nixon doesn't like Helms at
all. For it is easier to live with this
thought than with the suspicion that
Mr. Nixon doesn't like the intelligence..
which Helms has been giving him.
Consider, for example, the following:
? That thousands of North Vietnam.
esc agents hold jobs in the South Viet-
namese government. '
? That the Cambodian invasion will'
not halt infiltration.
? That the enemy headquarters 0.
COSVN is not where the Department
of Defense thinks it is. ,
, ? That the South Vietnamese army
will not perform well in Laos.
? ? That the bombing will not, cause
-
North Vietnam to sue for peace,
? That mining Haiphong Harbor Vent.
not cut off supplies.
These cannot have been welcome'
..views at the White House. But the im-
portant thing Is that they were amt.,
rate views. So I hope 1,110 decision to,'
dismiss Helms was not ideological: The
CIA is one of the places in government',
which ought not to be asked to Come!
up with something better.
C 1972, Les Angelea Times
International's Washington Window Dec. tie said
these people have in the past meant "frustration
and anguish to Richard Nixon... Ile has thought long
.and hard about how he can make them more re-
sponsive to his wishes" i my emphasis ? C.K.
Ile concluded: "The suspicion persists that the
President does not want any more new concepts.
He already knows what he wants to do with his next
few; years in office and is trying to' find the people
to carry out his wishes."
That is a fair summing up. With the exception
that it leaves out the all-important element of U.S.
imperialisin and its wishes and plans. Nixon is carry-
ing out his wishes and at the same time the wishes
and plans of U.S. imperialism.
There is no imaginative change in that. it is more
of the' same ? but, as was noted. with a shifted orien-
tation and greater concentration of state power on
behalf of U.S. imperialism's aims:
12
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THE BOSTON GLOBE
Dec 1972
Impending CTA
It would be easier to evaluate the
partially "confirmed" rumor that
-:?ftichard M. Helms is about to bow
? pressure to resign as Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency if
?
one were able to get some kind of
fix on the CIA itself. The virtually
?
?
impenetrable Secrecy that surrounds
? :.every phase of CIA activities, how-
ever, reduces one to an evaluation of
such extraneous but. relevant facts
..as are available, and there is?no ex-
? pess of comfort in any of these.
it is disconcerting to learn, for
; example, that the background of Mr.
:flelms's dissatisfaction (or president
Nixon's dissatisfaction with him)
nincludes disputes with both Henry
'."KiSsinger, Mr. Nixon's 'foreign policy
adviser, and Melvin Laird, the retir-
:?ing Secretary of Defense.
Mr: Laird's quarrel with Mr.
Helms reportedly stems from their
disagreement in 1969 when Mr. Laird
insisted that the Soviets were
neuvering to attain a "first-strike
'Capability" against the US and Mr.
Helms insisted that Moscow had in
no way shifted from its traditional
e emphasis on defense. That we .are all
- here may not prove conclusive-
ly that Mr. Laird was wrong and Mr.
Helms was right, but we ARE still
here.
, ?;?. His dispute with Mr. Kissinger, or
vice versa, was predictable a year ago
when Mr. Nixon set up an intelli-
gence committee within the National
",.Seenrily Council and made Mr. Xis-
'singer its head. Whether Mr. Nixon is
perhaps giving Mr. Kissinger ? too
'much Uuthority and is spreading him
too thin would be a subjective judg-
ment incapable, for now at least, of
objective proof.
? But the reputed Kissinger objec-
tion that Mr. Ilelms,"was not sup--
'porting the Administratibn" in coin-
'mittee councils raises an interesting
question. The CIA director's chief
:junction, one would think, is not to
bloodletting?
, 10 ?
support the Administration or Dr.
Kissinger either when the facts as he ?
knows them dictate otherwise.. His
job is to let?the facts fall where they
may.
Mr. Nixon spoke highly. of Mr..
Helms just year ago when. he an-
nounced that Mr. Helms would as-
sume "enhanced leadership" in plan-
ning; reviewing, coordinating and
evaluating all intelligence programs
and activies. By most estimates, he.
had earned the accolade. ,
? .For one thing, he had both the
wisdom and the courage to. oppose
the CIA's disastrous attempt to in-
vade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in ,
1961, opposing not only the then CIA
hierarchy but also the admirals and
generals ;in. the Pentagon. President
Kennedy. thereafter was as leery of
Pentagon-counsel as Mr. Helms had
been. "If it wasn't for the Bay of
Pigs, I might have sent Marines into
Laos in 1961; as a lot of people
around here. wanted me to do."
; Mr. ?Helms showed his perspicac-
ity also in 1967 when Air Force in-
telligence insisted that bombing
would bring North Vietnam to its
?
kness, and Mr. Helms said that it
would unite the North Vietnamese
and firin up their resolve to fight to
the death if necessary. Lyndon John- '
?son could have saved his Presidency
and the war could have been ended
long ago -if the White ,House had
listened to the facts of the situation
rather than the politics of it.
One does not lightly endorse a
secret police agency even when, as
in the ?case 'of the CIA under Mr..
Helms, "we d6 not target on Amer- ?
ican citizens." But so long as super-
spies are one of the facts of inter-
national life, one rests somewhat
more comfortably when the top spy, ?
so far as one is able to judge, is
competent and conscientious and
sticks to the hard facts without
bending to political; winds. ;
CHICAGO, ILL?
)1EWS
DEC 9 1972
; `Will Nixan,.rule,,C,t A.:
with firmer hand?'
That small item the other
day about ' Richard Helms
; being relieved of his job as
head of the Central In-
telligence Agency whets the
appetite for more information. ,
; The agency is placed now
under the State Department's
? wing by President Richard
Nixon. Does that mean that
there will be stricter surveil-
' lance of CIA activities? Does it
imean that some authority. Will ?
have the power to tell the CIA ?
. ;where to head in when it tries.
to bring on national disasters?
with its spying and assassinat-
ing as heretofore? Or what
does it mean?
The account of activities of
both friend and foe in Vietnam
? by Frances Fitzgerald makes
;it rather plain why French and ?
'American warring in that;trag-
Ac land has been such a. com-
plete failure. Westerners, both ?
'French and American, have
made assm?ptions about those
people that were unrealistic
; and they were too myopic to
know it. For us who watch, it
?would have saved this country. ;
billions in money, .millions of ;
lives, and that blackened im-
;-age We now. have the world
? over if the CIA as well as the
,D ef ense Department were
.Made completely responsible
to the people to begin with. This
silencing treatment we re-
reeived about "the necessity for
7'. not letting the enemy know
, what you were doing in offense
' or .detense" was the gimmick
: used to betray and. defraud us,
.the citikens and taxpayers.
,still think the CIA should
be investigated by Congress.
Legal matters aside, there are.
aspects of CIA action that get
reported occasionally which
; are amoral, immoral, and so-
cially eisastrous and these
? should bo stopped.
; LeVAN
fast Chicago, Ind.
?
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THE. VILLAGE VOICE
7 Dec 1972
Debriefing the press: --'
'Exclusive to the CIA'
by William Worthy
In April 1961, a few days after
the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at
that time the director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, met in
off-the-record session with the
American Society of Newspaper
Editors at their annual conven-
tion.
Given the Cuba intelligence, by
then obviously faulty, that had en-
tered into Washington's rosy ad-
vance calculations, he inevitably
was pressed to tell: "Just what
are the sources of the CIA's infor-
mation about other countries?"
One source, Dulles replied, was
U. S. foreign correspondents who
are "debriefed" by the CIA on
their return home. The usual
practice is to hole up in a hotel
room for several days of intense
interrogation.
Much of the debriefing, I've
learned over the years, is agreed
to freely and willingly by individu-
al newsnieh untroubled by the
riewsmen abroad came at the
world's image of them as spies. In
time of the 1955 Afro-Asian
summit conference at Bandung,
Indonesia. Through Washington
sources (including Marquis
Childs of the St. Louis Post
Dispatch 1, Cli f f Mackay, then edi-
tor of the Baltimore Afro-
American, discovered?and- told'
me?that the government was
planning to send at least one
black correspondent to "cover"
the historic gathering.
The "conduit" for the expense
money and "fee" was the director
memory: "I'm one step ahead of
,you, Bill. President Sukarno, and
The Indonesian government know
all about this, and they are phrtic:
ularly incensed at having a man
of color sent to spy in their
gatherer, differed with brother country." ?
Foster Dulles, the Calvinist diplo- Cold-war readiness to "cooper-
mat about the wisdom of the self:, ate" with spy agencies, whether
defeating travel bans. motivated by quick and easy
Years later, I learned that the money (I've often wondered if
U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest-, under-the-counter CIA payments
who twice came to my hotel to
have to be reported on income tax.
.
demand (unsuccessfully) my ieturns!) or spurred by a miscon-
c
passport as I transited Hungaryeived patriotism, had its pre-
en route home from China in 1957 cedent in World War I and in the
was, in fact, a CIA agent revolutionary-counterrevolu-
operating under a Foreign Ser- tionary aftermath. In the summer
vice cover. During a subsequent of 1920 Walter Lippman!), his
lecture tour, I met socially in wife, and tharles Merz published
Kansas City a man who had in the New Republic an exhaus-?
served his Army tour of duty in Live survey of how the New York
mufti, on detached service in Times had reported the first two
North Africa and elsewhere with years of the Russian revolution.
They found that on 91 occasions?
the National Security Agency. Out
of curiosity I asked him what an average of twice a week?
would be the "premium" price for Times dispatches out of Riga,
L
a newsman's debriefing on out-of- Latvia, buttressed by editorials,
?
bounds China. He thought for a had "informed" readers that the
moment and then replied: "Oh, revolution had either collapsed or
about $10,000." Out of the CIA's was about to collapse, while at the
petty cash drawer. same time Constituting a "mortal
' My first awareness of the CIA's menace" to non-Communist
E
special use of minority-group Europe. Lipprnann and his as-
sociates attributed the misleading
coverage to a number of factors.
Especially cited in the survey
were the transcending win-the-
war .and anti-Bolshevik passions
of Times personnel, as well as
"undue intimacy" w:th Western
intelligence agencies.
After 1959, when Fidel Castro
came to power after having
ousted the corrupt pro-American
Batista regime, Miami became a
modern-day Riga: a wild rumor
factory from where Castro's
"death" and imminent overthrow
were repeatedly reported for sev-
eral years. Both in that city of ex-
patriates and also in Havana,
"undue intimacy" with the CIA
caused most North American re-
porters covering the Cuban revo-
lution to echo and to parrot of-
ficial U. S. optimism about the
Bay of Pigs invasion.
In the summer of 1961, on my
fourth visit to that revolutionary
island, a Ministry of Telecom-
munications official told me of a
not untypical incident shortly
before the invasion. Through mer-
cenaries and through thoroughly
discredited Batistianos, the CIA
was masterminding extensive
sabotage inside Cuba?a policy
at least one case, as admitted to
me by the. Latin-American spe-
cialist on one of our mass-circula-
tion weekly newsmagazines, the
debriefing took- place very reluc-
tantly after his initial refusal to
cooperate was vetoed by his supe-
riors. But depending on the par-
ticular foreign crises or obses-
sions at the moment, some of the
eager sessions with the CIA
debriefers bring' handsome re-
muneration. Anyone recently re-
turned from the erupted Philip-
pines can probably name his
price.
Despite its great power and its
general unaccountability, the CIA
dreads exposes. Perhaps because
1 a "prickly rebel" family repu-
tation stretching over three gen-
erations, the CIA has never
approached me about any of the
48 countries I have visited,
including four (China, Hungary,
Cuba, and North Vietnam) that
had been placed off-limits by the
State Department. But the secret
agency showed intense interest in
my travels to those "verboten')
lands. In fact in those dark days;
Eric Sevareid once told me that
, Allen Dulles,. the intelligence
of a "moderate" New York-based
national organization, supported
by many big corporations, that
has long worked against employ-
ment discrimination. The CIA
cash was paSseJ to the organiza-
tion's direetor by a highly placed
Eisenhower arlinintsfration of-
ficial overseeing Latin-American
affairs who later became gover-
nor of a populous Middle Atlantic
state, and whose brothers and
family foundation have long been
heavy contributors to the job op-
portunity organization.
Because of the serious implica-
tions for a press supposedly free
of governmental ties; I relayed,
this information to the American
Civil Liberties Union. I also told'
Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip
Randolph's union associates in
I the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's re- .
sponse has always stuck in my
children in their classrooms an
women where they shop..
On one such occasion a born
went off at 9.08 p. in. Five minute
earlier, at 9.03 p. m., an ambitiou
U. S. wire-service corresponden
filed an l'urgent press" dispatc
from the Western Union , tele
printer in his bureau office, re-
porting the explosion that, awk-
wardly for him, came five min-
utes after the CIA's schedule
time. When that corresponden
and most of his U. S. colleague
were locked up for ,a week or Lw
during the CIA-directed Bay o
Pigs invasion and were then ex
pelled, many U. S. editorial writ
ers were predictably indignant.
Except perhaps in Washingto
itself and in the United Nation
delegates' lounge, the CIA'
department on journalism
probably busier abroad than wit,
newsmen at home. In 1961, durin
a televised interview, Waite
Lippmann referred casually t
the CIA's bribing of foreigi
newsmen (editors as well., as lb
working press), especially at th
time of critical elections. All ove
the world governments and politi
cal leaders, in power and in op
position, can usually name thci
journalistic compatriots who at
known to be or strongly suspecte
of being on the CIA's bountifu
payroll. I believe it was Leo
Trotsky who once observed tha
anyone who engages in in
telligence work is always \n-
covered sooner or later.
? Even neutralist countrie
learned to become distrustful o
U. S. newsmen. In early 1967,
Prince Norodom Sihanouk ex-
pelled a black reporter after 'just
24 hours. In an official statement
the Ministry of Information al-
leged that he "is known to be not
only a journalist but also an agent
of the CIA." In a number of Afro-
Asian countries, entry visas for U.
S. correspondents, particularly if
on a first visit, can be approved
only by the prime minister or
other high official.
As recently as a generation ago.
it would have been unthinkable
for most U. S: editors, publishers,
newscasters, and reporters to ac-
quiesce in intalligence de-
briefings, not to mention less
"passive" operations. What Ed
Murrow denounced as the cold-
war concept of press and universi-
ty as instruments of foreign pone)
had not yet spread over the land.
doomed to failure not only In the years before the Second
, '
because anti-Castro endeavors World War, if any governmen
lacked a popular base, but also agent had dared to solicit the co
, operation of a William Allen
because kindergartens, depart-
ment stores during shopping
hours, and similar public places
were among the targets being
bombed. In no country does one
mobilize mass support by killing
14
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White at the Emporia Gazette or
a Robert Maynard Hutchins at the
University of Chicago, the rebuff
would have been as explosive as
the retort to the CIA five or six
years ago by the president of the
',New Mexico School of -Mines.
Describing himself as a "fun-
damentalist" on fidelity to intel-
.
:.lectual freedom and on adherence
to professional codes, he told me
of his having been asked by the
CIA to alert the agency whenever
any of his faculty members were
. about to t:?avel abroad "so that we
can ask them to keep their eyes
open." "You people . ought to be
put in jail," he spat at the agent..
?"YOU have no right to involve aca-
.demics and innocent people in
your dirty business." To his disap-
pointment, however, not everyone
on his teaching staff saw it his
way. At the next faculty meeting,
when he related the conversation,
some of the professors missed the
underlying principle by asking:
"Well, what's wrong with the
CI A's proposition?" .
? At Harvard, during our 1956-7
Nieman Fellowship year, New
York Times correspondent Tony
Lewis and I were told by an an-
thropologist that during
'at the State Department at the,
height of the cold war, she had
been horrified to find herself
reading CIA transcripts of the'
debriefing of academics upon
:their return home from foreign
"scholarly" .trips. She had com-
plained to the Social ? Science
Research Council, but , at that
time was unable to get that pro-.
tigious body to denounce the prac- ;
lice.
But now the times?and the all-
important intellectual climate=
have changed, thanks in large
part to a new image of the govern-
ment after its eye-opening crimes
and disasters in Indochina and
elsewhere. Today, to at least
some degree, a goodly number of
the most respectable spokesmen
for establishment journalism are
fighting the government's insis-
tence on turning newsmen into ex-
tensions of the police and prosecu-
tion apparatus.
? Under the sobering impact of
dismaying troubles ahead, the
older, tradition of this country is
re-asserting itself, Far fewer of us
are still living in the fool's para-
dise of the Eisenhower-Kennedy
years. In the mass media and on
the campuses the "fun-
damentalists" may never become
?
a majority. They don't have to.
They are again "raising a stan-
dard to which all honorable men
may repair.', 4 ?
THE NEW YORT TIMES SATURDAY DECEMBER 30, 1972
Marchetti v. United States
By Kenneth McCormick
The ray of hope of reassertion and
protection of our rights of free speech
'and press?which' niany had"whorthe-
Supreme Court ruled against restrain-
ing publication Of the Pentagon Papers
?has faded.
While many civil ? libertarians ? have
pointed out the dangers of sanctioning
even temporary prior restraints,' as
was (Dine by some of the Justices in
the Pentagon Papers opinienS; a 'sub-
sequent case, in Which the Siipreme
Court has just denied. review, raises
the specter of Government censorship
to a far, greater degree?Marchetti v.
United ;States. .
' April, 1972, the Government in-
stituted. legal proceedings against'
Victor L. Marchetti, a former...CIA.
'agent; by- obtaining a temporary
re-
straining order from the United States
District Court for the' Eastern District ?
'of Virginia. The ' temporary order,
'which later became a preliminary and'
permanent injunction, requires Mar-
chetti to submit to the C.I.A., thirty
stays_in. advance _oLrelease,...all writ-
ings, even fictional, which relate or
purport to relate to intelligence, intel-
ligence activities, or intelligence
sources and methods. 'The C.I.A. may,,
forbid disclosure of any information,.
which it has classified and which has
not been placed in the public domain
by prior disclosure. The basis of this
broad injunction 'was a secrecy agree-
/neva Signed by Marchetti in 1955
when he began working for the CIA.
The decision of the District 'Court
was affirmed, with .slight mddification,
by the 'Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. It is that oninon which now
stands by 'reason of the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari.
Although the 'Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' opinion does allude to the im-
portance of the First Amendment, it
allows the C.I.A. full discretion to pre-
vent the publication of any material
which is "classified" and not' in the
public domain. The ruling means that
once material has been stamped "clas-
sified," ,no court may look .behind that
stamp to determine whether or not it
is-reasonable?let alone necessary.
In effect, it purports to allow the
executive branch unfettered discretion
in determining what information can
be withheld from the public. 'It im-
poses no requirement. that .some need
for secrecy exists. ; ? ,
While a? traditional view of the First
Aniendment would impose a firm man-
date against any prior restraint by the
Government, it cannot be denied that
some judicial inroads have been made
on this doctrine. A recent example is,
of course, the Pentagon Papers case
where there was a temporary period
of restraint to enable the judiciary,
at Various levels including the Supreme
Court, to determine whether or not
dissemination of, the publications
would be harmful to the -nation: In
the Marchetti case, however, the de-
cision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
'allows prior restraint by the execu-
tive branch without meaningful WI.
cial review.
Moreover, by holding that the courts
may .not leek behind the goverhitifeit
label of "classified," the Fourth Circuit.,
would abrogate the important role of
the judiciary to protect the First
Amendment rights of the people. To,'
allow the executive branch such uni-
lateral determination not only under-
mines the very purpose of the First
Amendment but it serves to weaken
the whole concept of responsible gov-
ernment so vital in a democracy.
While it is difficult to?attribute ally-
concrete reason to the denial of re-
view by the Supreme Court, one can
hope that the determining factor was
that no attempt to restrain publication
of specific material had been made.
In its brief to the Supreme Court,'
the 'Government argued that the issue
of prior restraint as posed by the
Marchetti' situation was' now only
"academic." It emphasized that Mar-
chetti had not yet submitted any pro-
posed publication to the' C.I.A. and
that the C.I.A. had not denied approval
for publication of any material. To that'
extent, the Marchetti case can be dis-
tinguished factually from the govern-
ment's action to restrain publication
of the Pentagon Papers.
Should Marchetti proceed with his
writing and should the C.I.A. order the
deletion of certain materials prior to
publication, the Supreme Court justices
could still determine that judicial re-
view of the appropriateness of such
deletions is required.
Kenneth McCormick is senior consuit,
lug othiee, of P000lotioy, ?
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WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1972
fin41., ad Taste,
Disclosures
Cbt
The Myth and the Madness
By Patrick J. McGarvey
Saturday Review. 210 pp. $6.95
By THOMAS B. ROSS
NOTHING WOULD better serve the
American people in their current stage
of cynicism, paranoia and fear of re-
pression than an honest book from in-
side the CIA. There have been a number
of competent books by outsiders and a
number of cover stories by insiders,
notably Allen Dulles's The Craft of In-
teffige.nce and Lyman Kirkpatrick's The
Real CIA. But no one yet has .success-
fully shed the eloa!;-. as he turned in his
dagger. Victor Marchetti, who rose to the
top suite of the CIA only to quit in dis-
illtisionment, is trying to publish a book
about his expericnc. But the lower
courts have upheld tlie ar,ency's demand
that it be sin yr(.:..c.ft and there is no
guarantee that the Niipreme Court, which
ruled so narrowly in the case. of The
New York Times and The Washington
? THOMAS B. ROSS, Washington bureau
chief of The Chicago :tin-Times, is co-
author of The InriMce Government.
Post, will. extend the 'First Amendment
to an ex-CIA operative.
Into the breach comes Patrick J. Mc-
Garvey, a former intelligence officer of
14 years' service in the military, the CIA
and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The fact sthat .he has gotten into print
might suggest that the CIA feels it has
nothing to fear from him. And certain
deletions in the advance-proofs indicate
a degree of censorship or at least self-
censorship. (Hold the page to the light,
and you can read through the inked
crossovers?a familiar process recalling
the Pentagon's decision to publish a
censored version of the Pentagon Paper
after the full text was in print. Foreign
agents come see what we really think is
sensitive.)-
.
But McGarvey's book, though flawed?
almost fatally so?by bad writing, bad
taste and bad logic, contains several
startling disclosures, allegations and hor-
ror stories: how the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended a retaliatory air strike
against the Israeli . naval base that
launched the attack on the U.S. intelli-
gence ship Liberty in the 1967 Middle'
East war; how CIA agents obtained a
sample of King Farouk's urine from the
men's room of a gambling casino in
Monte Carlo; how an investigation of
the Pueblo fiasco turned up 'the fact
that the Air Force had been flying a
routine reconnaissance, mission over Al-
bania for 12 years, without purpose and
*without authorization; how a leper col-
ony in' North Vietnam was bombed on
the advice of the CIA that it was an
army .headquarters; and how CIA psy-
chologists rewarded Vietcong defectors
by. subjecting them to ghoulish experi--
melds in which they were exposed to
rapid changes in color, light and tem-
perature.
MeGarvey also lodges serious allega-
tions against a number of important in-
dividuals and institutions. He contends
that Richard M. Helms made his way to
the top of the CIA by .systematically de-
stroying his competitors: Ray Cline, for-
mer deputy director for intelligence and
now head of .the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research;
Admiral Rufus Taylor, 'Helms's former
deputy; and Admiral William (Red) Ray-
born, his predecessor. "I thought for a
time When I was director of the 'CIA,"
McGarvey quotes Rayborn as telling
him, "that I might be assassinated by
my deputy."
McGarvey also accuses Helms' of blunt-
ing the investigative spirit of the major
newspapers and /magazines by taking
their correspondents to lunch and keep-
ing them happy with periodic leaks about
other matters and other agencies.
16
Ile alleges further that Congress has
given the CIA a veto over which senators
and representatives are to be seated on
the subcommittees that are supposed to
serve as watchdogs on the agency's activ-
ities.
Against the obvious implication of
many of his citations, McGarvey's thesis
is that the crucial problem with the CIA
is mismanagement, not an excess of
power and secrecy or a lack of account-
ability. ?
"CIA is not a ten-foot ogre," he writes.'
"It is merely a human institution badly
In need of change. CIA is not the invisi-
ble government. Rather, it is a tired old ?
whore that no one has the heart to take
off the street."
Too much intelligence is collected, Mc-
Garvey argues, and toe little is properly
analyzed. There is less danger in the
CIA's excursions into sabotage and sub-
version, he contends, than in the insati-
able electronic search that put the U-2,
the Liberty and the Pueblo in extremis.
His recommendations for change are
rather forlorn. He concedes that Con-
gress has abdicated its responsibility, the
so-called oversight committees sitting
mute through I [elms's annual "lantern
slide show," wilfully ignorant of how
much is being spent on Intelligence and,
wire, never informed before or after
the fact about covert operations. Yet
McGarvey's cure is the weary old recom-
mendation: write your congressman ?
the one, perhaps, who is telling Helms
he'd rather not know what's going on
lest he have to assume responsibility.
I.fear we must await a more compel-
ling book before the establishment is
moved to reform itself. The Supreme
Court willing, Marchetti may provide it
for .us. It does not seem too much to
ask that he be able to use his CIA expt.,
rience to inform the people, when the
three ex-CIA agents of the Watergate
bust-in (or were they, too, just on loan
for the campaign?) ? can apply their
ragency-imparted expertise to subvert
the political process of a supposedly free
nation.
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WASHINGTON STAR
2 7 PFC 112
[s
WILLIAMSBUGR, Va. (AP)
? Is Camp Peary, a hush-hush
Department of Defense instal-
lation in York County, Va., ac-
tually a training camp for the
Central Intelligence Agency?
The Virginia Gazette, a
weekly newspaper published
not far from the camp says it
Is, basing its claim principally
on an interview with an ex-
CIA agent turned novelist.
Two reporters for the Ga-
zette contend in an article for
the weekly that the CIA uses
Peary to train teams of assas-
sins, guerrillas, foreign merce-
naries ? and special warfare
agents, and to test exotic new
weapons.
C44
ii
They wrote that they were
not permitted to enter the
camp property and received
crisp "no comments" when
they posed questions to offi-
cials there.
Maggio the Source
Nearly all their information
apparently came from former
CIA man Joe Maggio, who
wrote a novel ? "Company
Man" ? which mentioned a
"Camp Perry" at which he
said tactical nuclear weapons
were tested.
The Gazette reported that
Maggio said from his home in
Coral Gables, Fla., that the
"Camp Perry" in his novel in
'try
EDITOR & PUBLISHER
2 DEC "1:972
Court's ruling
could restrain
secrecy stories
By Luther Huston
Reporters who write "inside" stories
about the operations of government intel-
ligence agencies could find themselves in
trouble because of a Federal Court of
Appeals ruling in the cage of Victor L.
Marchetti.
Marchetti signed a secrecy oath, which
is required of all CIA employees, when he
went to work for the agency 14 years ago.
He resigned in 1969 and wanted to write
a book about the CIA and arranged with a
publisher to publish it. His years with
CIA gave him 'access to many of the agen-
cy's secrets.
When the CIA learned of his plans for
a book, it sought an injunction against
publication, claiming the secrecy provision
of his contract. applied. Opposing issuanee
of a restraining order, Marchetti claimed
an injunction would infringe his First
Amendment rights. ?
? Judge Albert V, Bryan, in U.S. District
Court, Alexandria, Va.,- rejected the
First Amendment argument, held that it
was a question of Contract law, and issued
ci[okrn
1111
raA?
actuality was V,irginia's Camp
Peary, taken over by the De-
partment of Defense 21 years
ago. ?
The newspaper said it was
told by Maggio that he was at
Camp Peary for three months
in 1966, enrolled in a "special
intelligence tradecraf course"
given CIA recruits.
It said Maggio said in the
interview that the "training
methods and techniques cov-
ered by the CIA" at Camp
Peary included "assassination
training, demolition training,
parachute training, courses in
wiretapping and intelligence-
gathering, and experiments
with special weapons for use
In the field, including what
Maggio labeled as 'mini-
nuclear bombs."
'Disneyland of War'
The Gazette quoted Maggio
as saying, "I'm sure if you
had a blue ribbon committee
go in there, they'd find a
whole new world ? a Disney-
land of war."
The Gazette quoted him as
saying "the information con-
tained on Camp Peary in the
novel is factual."
Among other weapons the
Gazette quoted Maggio as say-
ing are being tested at Camp
Peary were a laser beam
weapon used to capse bodily
detee^ration within 24 hours,
experimental f or mulas of
drugs such as LSD, and a vari-
ety of chemical warfare mate-
rials.
"Some day, somewhere,"
the Gazette said it was told by
Maggio in a taped telephone
interview, "that base is going
to have a catastrophe ? some
Dr. Strangelove explosion that
really is going to rock that
area."
, a permanent injunction. Marchetti took
. the case to the Fourth Circuit Court of
A ppeals.
Appeal to Ifilyncsworth
In an opinion written by Chief Judge
Clement F. Haynesworth, the appellate
court affirmed Bryan's decision, holding
that the CIA's contract with Marchetti,
including the secrecy provision, was legal
and constitutional. The appeals court,
however, modified the injunction to make
it reach only to classified information,
inapplicable to information that is unclas-
sified or that has been officially disclosed.'
Haynesworth wrote that, although the
upon information that is not classified and
has been officially made public, the court
First Amendment precluded restraint
in the case before it, was "concert-led with
secret information touching upon the na-
tional defense and the conduct of foreign
affairs, acquired by Marchetti in a posi-
tion of ? trust and confidence," and the
, First Amendment argument flid not ap-
I P13%
Although the Marchetti ease involved
only, a book, the ruiiig could conceivably
be invoked by the government in any sub-
sequent case ? involving publication of
stories purporting to relate secret activi-
ties of a government agency. The Supreme
Court, conceivably, might be ? asked to
reconcile its ruling in the Pentagon Pa-
pers case that prior restraint on publica-
tion was unconstitutional with the lower .
court judgments in the Marchetti ? case.
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.P.KOERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTER
Dec 1972
? THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNI TY: TIME FOR REVIEW?
, The intelligence community, and its-budget, pose,many arenries such additional sirvices of common Concern aS,
?
problems of traditional concern- to-the Federation? of Amer-! the National Security Council determines cart be more
lean Scientists: governmental ' reform, morality, proper' effectively accomplished centrally; ?
use of high technology, and defense expenditures. in the "Pcrform such other functions and duties related to
last quarter century, intelligence agencies. have prolifer- ? intelligence affecting the .national Security as the Na-
The United States has estnblished an agency which: (tonal Security Council may from time w time dirdct.'!.
goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, inter- (italics added) ? , t
fcrcs in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology ' ?
These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence
suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy
collection but they arc also used, to justify clandestine po-
has been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 being lin ..
eal operations. However, overthrowing governments.
spent for intelligence might well be termed' the. largest.. ?
secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are cer-
uunrcviewed" part of the defense budget.
' tainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence
Twenty-five years after the: passage of the' National Sc-' agencies" nor arc they duties . "related to intelligence."
entity Act?of 1947, it seems a:--good time.to. consider:the Someday a court may rule thaf.political activities are not ?
problems posed by these developments.- . authorized..
? Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding In any case, at the urging of Alien Dulles, the National
significance in its international politicarimpact, is the Di- ? Security Council issned a cecret.directive (NSC 10/2) in
rectorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine politi, '1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds?
cal operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in provided they.were secret and small enough to be pausibiy
tlik newsletter, More .and, more, informed observers oyes- ?deniable by the Government. .
tion whether clandestine political operations ought to be. Even this authority has been exceeded since several in-
continued on a "business, as usual" basis. In the absence possible-to-deny operation's have .been undertaken':
iii
of an investigation, a 'secret bureaucracy?which' started U-2 flifht, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the
in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and Laotian War, and so on. , ?
which grew in the CIA during a cold war-,--may simply
The National Security Act, gave the 'CIA no "police
continue to practice a questionable trade. ?
subpoena, law enforcement powers, or ,internal security
Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not: only* functions -..." But another secret Executive Branch docti-
abroad but at home, where they are encouraged- only too ment evidently did give the CIA authority to engai:s in
easily.. And is not interference. the. affairs of other domestic operations related to Its job. It was under t;iis
nations wrong? authority that such organizations as foundations, educa-
tional org,anizations, and private voluntary groups were
Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum,
involved.with the CIA at the time of the National Student
one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D.. Association revelations (1966).?
I.asswell. wrote a comprehensive and prop,hetie book,
The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the
"National Security and Individual Freedom:" He.-Warned "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably em-
nf the "insidious .menace" that a continuing 'crisis might phasize' the intelligence, rather than the manipuian
"undermine and eventually-destroy- free institutions:" We function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrase., 1...it
would see,, he predicted: 'pressure for- defense expendi, gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the de-
lures, expansion and centralization of Government. with-. siiability of knowing as much as' possible, But its instincts
holding of information, generalisuspicion, an undermining oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home,
of press and public opinion, :a weakening, of political And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may-
parties, a decline of the Congress; and, of the' courts: begin to he tolerated at home: how many 'elections can
''.:Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems imorder to, be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last
is,?:examine our institutions, goals and standards, . Which election showed such a degeneration of traditional Ameri?
responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify. can standards.
today? D The. present Director of Central, Intelligence, Richard
Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an
The National.Security Act of 1947 created the-Central
image .of CIA that will not. offend. In a r
or ecelt speech, %e
Intelligence Agency and, pave it overall responsibility for
; laid:
coordinating ,the intelligence activities of the-several rele?:. ?
.
%quit government departments and ap,encies interested- in ?1 "The same objectivity which 'makes us useful to out
?
slick matters, Today, a quarter century- later, CIA is re?'. government and our' country leaves u uncomfortably
ported to have a budget of about MO-million 10 $1." , ? aware of our ambiguous place in it.. . We propos'e tr
billion and a staff of Perhaps 18,000 people, or about'
adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.'
!Loot) more than the Department. of State! (This ad..; Even construed narrowly,-this ino easy job, and adapt.
vantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdcOarimenidi inr clandestine political operations It) American idcalri may
meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed. well be quite impossible. .
to fully prepare ornot be able to assign a suitable person.). At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy pm
' ? serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces:
The National 'Security Act-authorized CIA to: ' ? !.
one piece would conduct operations and the other woulc;
"perform for the benefit of the existing hitelligence just collect intelligence. The dangers were only ton evidt.?nt
? . . . .
18
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to Kennedy of !citing operations be conducted by those
?who were accumulating the inforthation. Allen Dulles in-
sisted on a united operation, arguing that separation ;wouls;
.'be inefficient and disruptive. But there are many argu-
ments on both sides and. the ? Issue deserves continuir.
`consideration: . . .
particular, there is something to he :said (Sr decidin;",
:now not to let Mr. Helms be succeeded by another Dep-
uty Director for .Plans (i.e. clandestine. operations), This
would otherwise. tend to institutionalize the notion am:
CIA .Itself Is run by the organizers Of clandestine ;:.tivitics
'lather than by those who do technical intelligence. .11-.Jecn,
rols much lo be sold for a tradition of bringing in out-
lidtis to manage
I The unprecedented secrecy concerning CIA's budget'
also deserves .re-examinatiOn. Ills being argued, in a cid....
nit suit, that It is unconstitutional to, hide the appropria4:'!?
lions of CIA in the budgets of other departments because'
the Conniption. provides,. inArticle I,, Seetim9, Clause.
.
. -oth
?! ? ,
No MonCY shall be drawn from the Treasury butt
consequence of approptiations made by law; mi 4.01
J.. regular Statement and' Arco wit of the' Receipts.' andi
? Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
front tittle fo time, (italics added). ? ?
Not only the CIA expenditures but the distorted budget',
reports of other agencies' would seem .to violate this pre.:
yision. The petitioners call for a functional 'breakdoWn;
showing general categories of uses' of CIA funds arid a
breakdown by nation showing :where funds have been
spent. , ?
Certainly, there is little Justification for hiding the WWI:
figure of CIA expenditures from the public and Abe Con.'
;vas. Thin figure reveals less to any potential encniy than
the size of the Defense Department budget?whIcii. we'
freely reveal. Releasing at lenst this overall figure ,woult!)
make unnecessary the hiding of the CIA budget In: tither
ageqcy budgets. This would stop qn authorization ? and;
appittpriation procedure -which Systematically and ,peren...
nially misleads Congress end the public. ' ? 4
? ??
? ?:. ? .:. ."
Pioblems Posed by Clandestine ..? , .
? ?? Politico! Operations Abroad ?? ? , ? ?
???
? CIA's four divisions concern themselves with. Support.',:
ScienCe and Technology," intelligence, and Plans. Press:
reports suggest that the ;personnel 'In ? these divisions: ?
-number, respectively, 6,000, 4,009, 1?000. and 6,000; t
the Intelligence Division examines open and secret data
and prepares economic, social, and political reports oe?
. ?
situations. '
? ?
It is in the Plan Division thnt elnnelestine operations nre!.
undertaken, Former .Deputy DirectOrs for Plans 'hnvot??
been: Allen Dulles, Prank Wisner, Richard Bisset and.
air 1962, Richard lielms?.-now the'alrector,of the.Cf0V
'
./ ? ' Does the'CIA Pressure Presidents?
The most dramatic clandestine riperntions'obvlotisly''::
have the approval of the President; Rut as any bureaucrat ?
knows, it can be hard for the President to ,say ? "no" In;? ?:
emoloyees with (Immune ideas :that are deeply, felt.
, 4 The U-2 and Bay of Pigs operations?both under the :
guidance of Richard Bisset?tenni this phenomenon. 'In.?:
both cases, the President ( first Eisenhower,?then Kennedy)? .
went ;Ion with thc ;gnu. rcluctnntly. In both eases, the
?
?
Itself. '' ?
In the case of the U-2, President Eisenhower.. recoiled
. saying: If one of these planes is ?shot down, this thing is ?
going to be.on My head. I'm going to catch hell. The world'.
Lie in a mess." fie often asked the CIA: What happens, -
??.if you're caught? They would say ? It hasn't happened yelp;
.+
. .
But it was obvious that it 'would happen eventually. In.;?
' decd. two ychs .after the 1960 crash, it was an agreed mill.
; tary estimate that Russian rockets Could U-2s at 68.00(b.,
feet. And it Was known. that these U7.2s could ,flare out.'
? At? what point would CIA itself have had the seif.control;
t t h ? ).
. ? ? :
?
Are the,RePercussintisIVerth It?
We teas ed a great deal from' the U-2 flights. though.
?135 of much less direct significance to our security anti.,
tranquility than is commonly (relict/ed. The last U-2 flights, ?
still had not found any Soviet missiles other than. test ve.'
hides, But the inforitintinn was tOO secret to be used even
though it was known to the Russians. home, ? missild
gap was.still a popular fent based, on and .paper,
calculations of "capabilities" ,ratherAhan..'Intentions .ot
direct , knowledie? 8veptually,:?Ilid
? ? ?
SPIRIT OFOSS LIVES 'ON
"The. CIA," writes OSS reteriti Francis Miller, "in-
herited from Donovan his lopsided and mischievous
preoccupation with actin!' and the ilay of Pigs ?vas
one of the results of that legacy." CIA men, like their .1
,OSS predecessors, have keen Imaginative, free-niieel-??:I?
hag, riggressive, mid often',nuire knowiedgc.?: I
aisle than their Stale Department rolleagites.
Nice. the atm of I) o is ov o it ' s orpuuization, Cl,
?"spooks". abroad still resist headquarters !'interter.
mice In their sictivilies. :?
? R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of Amer-
Ica's First Central Intelligence Agency, University
California Press, 1972, pg. 362,
'
. . .?
hopeful summit conference iA'190U and thus perpctuatcd
dangerous tensions. Yet this:was CIA's greatest clandestine -
success! ? ? ? , ? '
In the case of the Bay of "Pigs operation. the disaster, ,win
complete. CIA supporters of the plan became its advoi:ato
and pressed it upon President Kennedy, According
sonic reports, they even led him to believe that ?the E'sen?
bower Administration lind given the plan a go-ahead Irons ,
which disengagement would Ire embarrassing. Once the
Invasion started, they pressall for more American involve-
ment. The plan itself .wasi. in retrospect, ludicrously ill. ;
conceived. Despite the pioximity Of Cuba, intelligence
about the likelihood of thrinecessary uprising was far too
optimistic.
This failure had repercussiOns as well, It left' the Prcsi- ,
dent feeling insecure and afiaid that the Soviets thought
him weak for not following: through. It left the Soviets
fearing an invasion of Cuba 1#1 due eoursc. The stage was .
set for the missile crisis. Some belici9e that U.S. involve-
timid in Vietnam was also encouraged by Kennedy's feat
of being seen as too weak.' ?. ?
Clandestine political operntions obvioulily have far.
reaching political consequences no one can predict.
1
? . Is the Burden of Secrecy'Ino Great?.
2 The CIA recently brought suit agnInst Victor Marshetti,
a former employee, for not submitting to them for clear-
ance a' work of fiction. about spying op&atiuns. It is cvi-
of,AI.! XI Crl': CIA feared disaosurcs about ciandcsline
. ,
era lions or methods. The result was a ."prior restraint"
. ?
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order without precedent in which Marshetti is precluded.
from publishing anything about CIA, fiction or not, with..
out letting CIA clear it. Thus a dangerous precedent
against the traditional freedom of :American press and
publishing is now in the courts as a direct result. of Gov-
ernment efforts to act abroad in ways which cannot be
discussed at home. This is a clear example of the state-
ment written by James Madison to Thomas Jefferson.
(May 13. 1798); "Perhaps it is a universal truth that the
toss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions,
again.st danger, real or pretended. from abroad."
Must We Manipulate the Underdeveloped World?
For.ihe clandestine (Plans) side of CIA. a large insti-
tutionalized budget now sees little future in the developed
world. In the developed free world, the stability of Gov-
ernments now makes politictil operations unnecessary. In
the ("minimillsi developed w?Orld, these political operations
tire largely impossible. Indeed, even intelligence collection
by traditional techniques seems to have been relatively
.unsuccessful. ? ,
, The penetration of 'CIA by the Soviet spy. is
Said to have left CIA with a total net negative balance of
effectiveness for,the years up to 1951. It completely de-
stroyed the .CIA's first "Bay of Pigs"?that effort to over-
throw the Albanian Government in 1949 which cost the
lives of 300 hien. . 4
.1. The only really Important clandestine Soviet source of
'Information .knOwil. ptibliely was Pankofsky. The publie
literature roally:shows only one other?triumph in penetrat-
ing Soviet secrecy with spies: the obtaining of a copy of the
.secretspecch. by Khrushchcv denouncing Stalin. ,llut this
smelt was being widely circulated to cadre airril Eastern
8uropean sources. Allen Dulles. on television,..ntled this:
"one of the main?coups of the time I was fat CIA)."
Compared
'Compared .to the Soviet Union, the underdevelopOdi..,
world looks caSy to penetrate and manipulate. The
ernments arc relatively unstable and the ? societies
vide more scope for agents and their maneuvers. Vhiie the.'
underdeveloped world lends itself better to clandestine
operations, these operations arc much harder to justify.
We arc not at war?usually, TIO1 even at cold war?
with the countries in the underdeveloped world. And they
rarely if ever pose n direct threat to us. whether or not
they trade or otherwise consort with Communists. Today. :
fewer and fewer Americans see the entire world as a??
$11-flute between the forces of dark and light?a struggle:,
in which we must influence every corner of the ?globe...
? In tacit agreement with this, CIA Director Helms
rc-
ccntiy said: ? ? t ? ?
'America's intelligence assets (sic),. however, do ?not
exist solely because of the Soviet and Chinese threat.?
or against the contingency of a new global conflict. The'
? United States, as a world power, either, is involved
or may with little warning find itself involved in a wide
range and variety of problems which require a broad
and detailed base of foreign intelligence for the policy.
? makers." .; .
Thus, where the Office' of Strategic _Services (OSS) of
World War II was justified by a hot War; and the CIA by
a cold war, the present justification for intelligence activi-
ties in the, underdeveloped world springs ever more only
from, Aincrica's.role as a "great power."
Moreover, the word "assets" above is significant. If in-,
formation were all that were at issue, a strong case could
be madc for getting needed inforniation when you need it,
through open sources, embassies and reconnaissance, But
if clandestine political manipulation is at issue, then one
requires long-standing penetration of institutions of all
kinds and a great deal of otherwise unimportant info;nation necessary to plan and hide local maneuvers.
. .
? .
? Political Control of Agents in the Field
Because political operations pre. so sensitive and, po-
tentially so explosive, it is imperative that the agents be
under strict control. But is this really possible? To each
foreign movement of one kind or another?no matter how
distasteful?CIA will assign various operatives, if only to'
gp) information. In the process, these operatives muse
ingratiate themselves with the .moverrient. And since they
are operating in a context in which subtle signals -arc the
it is inevitable that they will often signal the move-
pient that the United States likes it, or might support it. .
Indeed, the agents themselves may think they are cor-
rectly interpreting U.S. policy?or what they think it
should be?in delicate maneuvers which they control.
What, for example, did it mean.When CIA ag,ents told
Cambodian plotters that they would do "everything possi:
he to help if a toup were mounted. (See Philadelphia
Inquirer, April 6, 1972, "CIA Role Bared in Sihanouk,
Ouster.")
No one who has ever tried to control a bureaucracy
will .be insensitive to .the problems to which these' situa-?
tirins give rise. These problems would be dramatically
diminished, however, if CIA were restricted to information,
gathering and were known to be. The movements would
then cease to look to CIA for policy signals.
AlternativeControls on CIA ?
.1
What alternative positions, might be considered toward
CIA involvement abroad? There aro these alternative:pos-
sibilities: . ?
I. Prohibit CIA operations .and agettis/rom the under. ?
developed world: 'This would:have the adVantage
AGENTS LIKE FREEDOM OF ACTION
Writing after the war of his negotiations for the sur-
render of the German forces in North Italy, Dulles
cautiously suggested:. "An intelligence officer in the
field is supposed to keep his home office informed
of what he is doing. That is quite true, but with some
reservations, us. he may overdo it. If, for. example,
he tells too much or asks too often for Instructions.
he is likely to get sonic he doesn't relish, and what is ?
worse, he may well find headquarters trying to take
. over the whole conduct of the operation. Only a man
on the spot can really pass judgment on the details
ns contrasted with the policy decisions, which, of.
course, belong to the boss at headquarters." Dulles
added, "It has always nmazed me bow desk personnel
thousands of miles away seem to ncquirc wisdom and
special knowledge about local field conditions which
they assume goes deeper than that available to the
man on the spot." Almost without exception, Dulles
and other OSS otter:dors feared the burden of a high-
level decision that might cramp their freedom of
action. ?
L.-- R. Harris Smith. OSS The Secret History of Amer-
ica's Hrs.( Central 1ntelligence? Agency, University al
California Press, 1972; pg. 9.
tecting America's reputation?and that of its citizens doing
:business there?from the constant miasma of suspicion
of CIA involvement in the Interpol affairs of other coun-
tries. Open sources wouldcontinve to supply the U:S. with
80% of its intcItig?6 Vtittht ifitelligetie
410'01011W Wt4tid could tic CeliPPigti yat
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officials through embassies. 'This policy would enforce the' There is the Phoenix program involving widespread asses.
sination of "Vietcong agents"?manyi of which, it is re.
. now-questionable supremacy of the State Department in
dealing with the Nations involved. ? . , , ported, were simply the victims of internal Vietnamese
rivalries. Some years ago, the New York Times quoted one
- Arguments -against this policy include these: (ho arca?.?
:it too important to U.S. interests to permit stieh . with_ i of the hest informed men in Washington as having asserted
i
I that "when we catch one of them fan enemy agent), 11
drawal and the credibility of die withdrawal would be
diard to establish, at least in the short nm. ? ; 'becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and 'we ,
. . ' ' do it with no holds barred."' ., ? !
? 2: Perntit covert activities in the underdeveloped world i . There is also this disturbing quotation from Victor '
' only for information, not manipulation: This policy would: wir
marchetti, formerly executive, assistant to the Mputki,
' 'prevent the fixing of elections, the purchasC of legislators,' Director of CIA: . ? .
'private wars, the overthrow of governments, and i
t would! . ? , . . .
go a long way toward protecting the U.S. reputation fold ,! "The director would comeback from the White House
? non-interfcrence in the, affairs- of other countries. One:''... and shake his head end say 'The President is very, very
'.
'might, for example, adopt the rule Suggested ! by' Harry ' .. ?upset about ? . We agreed the the only solution
, .,
! ? was _____. Put of course that's impossible, s mpossiole, we can. t
Howe Ransom that secret political operations could he ;
? be responsible for a thing like that.'
used only as an alternative to overt military action in 'a ' :!: 'The second man would say the same thing to the third i
situation that presented a direct threat to U.S. security. man, and on down throubli the station chief in some
' Of course, the mere existencd of a covert capability for . ..? country until somebody went 'out and-- and
? !espionage would leave the U:S: with a capability for : .? nobody was responsible; '..(P.arade?Magazinc,'Qui(ting
! . the CIA," by Henry Allen.) ?? '?
manipuletion; the same agents That arc secretly providing , . ?
' information could secretly try to influence events: But thew ". : Problems of Clandestine Domesticr Operetions
. ,is still a large gap between buying "assets" for one purpose.i? After, the 1966 revelations' that the Central Intelligence
and for the other. -' : ' , - - ., '.: Agency had been financing the' National:Student Associa..
?
Also, large scale operations, would not be conducted:: (ion, a variety of front organizations land conduits were
. . under this rule. According to some reports, the Committee, ! unravelled which totaled about 250. The CIA gave its
chaired by . General Maxwell Taylor, that reviewed the money directly to foundations which, in turn, passed theO .
Bay of Pigs episode, recoMmended to President Kennedy ' secret funds along to specific CIA-approved groups. org,an-??
,
(who apparently agreed) that !the CIA be limited to opera. izations and study projects. These, in turn. often,supliorted
' 'licit's requiring military equipment no larger or more individuals. The organiiations included National Utica-
; complex than side arms?weapons which could bc carried ' lion Association, Afriettn-AMericen Institute, Anicrican
? 'by individuals. ?
. ,0 Newspaper ?Guild, International DeVelopment Foundation,
3. Require that relevant representatives of Congress be 'and many others. ? .
! . Consulted before any clandestine operations, beyond those , The way in which Mae organizations were controlled
,;required for intelligence collection, orc 'undertaken: It is ' was subtle and sophisticated in a fashion .apparcntly char.
. an unresolved dispute, between the Executive and Legis- ' actcristic of many clandestine CIA. operations., Thus,
. Wive. Drenches, whether and when the 'Executive Branch , while distinguished participants in the Congress' tot' Cul-
may underteke operations affecting U.S. 'foreign policy tural Freedom and editors of its .magazine. Encounter, evi-
without consulting Congress. it a clandestine, political dandy believed that' the organizations were . doing. only
. operation Is important enough to take rhe always high what came naturally, the CIA .official who' set the entire
',Asks of exposure', it should be important enough to consult . Covert program in motion, Thomas W. Braden, saw it this.
Congress. These consultations cap produce a new per-, way:
?
spective on the problem?which,can be ali important. Thl.: ? . ??
',.. "We had placed one egent in a Europe-based organizn:
,.
' Chairman of the Senate Foreign Itelations?Conunittee was. .,: (ion of intellectuals called the Congress for Cultural
i oric of the few who predicted accurately the priliticareon- ';, ' Freedom. Another Agent became an editor ? of En-
,'? sequences of the nay of Pigs operation.
.1Ir . -,. . ' counter. The writs could not .only propose :anti.Conyi;
4. Require that the ambassador be adv:344 of covert ! , munist programs to the official:leaders of the organixa.
1
t operations In the nation to which he. is accredited, Monitor .. :.. lions but they could also suggest Ways' end went to
i;
compliance with Congressional oversight: Under the Kee- i ' : solve the inevitable budgetary problents, Why not See .
.netly Administration, after the Bay' of Pigs, 6 IcIter wtnit:. if the,nceded money could bq obtained from "American
.1 to rill embassies affirming the authority of the Am orbessed );
.? foundations"? (Saturday Evenbig: Post 5 / 20 / 1967'
q over the representatives of C.I.A. But this authority: is 1.: !
Speaking Out, page 2) ' s.
'i variously interpreted and might be periodically clarified . . I ?
, ..... . ?
and Strengthened. One method of policing the order would '' President Johnson' appointed a :panel headed by then.
I involve occasional visits by Congressmen or Congressional, :
., Undersecretary of State Nicholas dcB. Katzenbach to
review this aspect of CIA ?merlons. The Other panel
? staff who would quiz the Ambassador to be sure that lie
1 ' members were HEW Secretary' John Gardner (a former,
knew at least. as much as did they about locel ,covert .
-,) OSS employee) and CIA Director' fielms. The panel was
3 activities. Another control would require that Assistant.. '
r Secretaries of State knew about the covert activities in their .. to study the relationship between CIA and those "educa-
tional and private voluntary organizations" which operate.'
'$ region. In all these cases:, political oversight and political
)
abroad and to recciminend means to help assure that such perspective would be injected into operations that would . .
. ? organizations could "play their proper and vital role."
..,
I otherwise be largely controlled by an intelligence point Of - I ..,. view. . ? ? .rne Panel redommenclations wcre as follows:
, .. .? ?
:
., . ., ?, ... , ..;,c,- ? ? ..
? .?, :.? -, :s..- I. It should bc. the policy of ;ihe,United States Govern-
, . Improper Use of Force, . . : ,
?1?::. meat that no Federal agency shall provide any covert
:/r One morally and politically important imperative seems.,:?,,,., financial assistance or support, ? direct or indirect, to
I dear; Adopt and announce a firm rule against murder or.';', any of the nation's ,cducatiortiiii or private voluntary .
itorittre. There are repeated and persistent reports that this ?; .. organizatioriii? . . , - 1
? ? % I 3 ? t
A Me does not exist. There was the murder by a green berati ,), ?
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CIA BECOMING A BURDEN?
Mlle Institutionni forms of politicid control
nppenr effective mid sufficient, it Is really (lie sviil of
'(he polideal officials who must 'exert Control that is
Important and that has most ,often been lacking..
Even when the control is tight rind effective, I. more
important question may concern the extent to which
CIA information and policy judgments affect political .
decisions in foreign affairs. .
Whether or not political control is being exercised. .
the more serious question is whether time very exist- ?
owe of an efficient CIA ernist;s the U.S. Government ?
to rely too notch on clandestine and illicit nclivities,
hack-alley tactics, subversion nad what is known in
?Metal jargon as "dirty tricks."
Finally regardless of the fads, the CIA's reputation
In the world is so horrendous and its role in events
so exaggerated flint it Is becoming a burden on Airier-
kiln foreign policy rather, than the secret weapon it
was intended to be.
.0?The New York' Times, April 25, 1966
2. The Government should prnmptly develop and estab-
lish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds
? openly for overseas activities Or organizations which arc
? adjudged deserving, in th.:.) national interest, of public
support.
On March 29, 1967, President'iohnson said he ac-
cepted point 1 and directed all Government agencies to
implement it fully. I-1c said he would give "serious con-
sideration" to point 2 but apparently never implemented it.
When these operations were first proposed by Braden,
Allen Dulles had commented favorably on them, noting:
?Thero is no doubt in my mind that we are losing the cold
war." Twenty years later, though we arc nolonger in any
risk of "losing the cold mar," some would like to continue
despite the regulations. ?
At least one influential forrher CIA official's thinking
was simply to move to deeper cover. And sympathy for
-- this approach probably goes very deeply into the so-called
"Establishment." For example, when the National Student,.
Association scandal broke, those who ran tit: liberal, now'
defunct, Look Magazine, were so iticensed at general ex-
pressions of outrage that they wrote their first editorial in
thirty years(1) defending the students. In such an atmos-
phere one must expect liberal' (much less conservative)
foundations and banks to cooperate whole-licartedly with
the CIA whatever the cover.
In any case, what could stieli deeper cover be? In l'oe
first place, commercial establishments or profit-making
organizations are exempt from the ban. Hence, svith ot
without the acquiescence of the Officials of the company.
!CIA agents might be placed in strategic. positions. H
possible also that organizations which seemed to be volun?
tary were actually, incorporated in such a way as to /IN
profit-making, Othcr possibilities nelude enriching Indi.,
victuals by throwing business their way and having !hest..
individuals support suitable philanthropic enterprises.
To the extent that these_arrangementsmwich voluntar)
'organizations, they pose the sante problems whichsreatec
the distress in 19(m6. in short, the policy approved ill Presi?
dent Johnson was sensible when it proscribed "tiVrecf ot
indirect" support. Moreover, in' the coining gencration.:we
can expect n continuation of the existing trend toward
whistle-blowing. The CIA's reputation and its ability in,
keep secrets can be expected to decline. Even the most .
`7,tiiirect"'support may eventually become known. ?
?
All of these deep cover arrangements are made much
easier by the intelligence community's so-tailed "alumni
association." These arc persons who arc knowo, to. the,.
community through past service and, who arc willing to
turn a quiet hand or give a confidential favor, Sometimes,
much more is involved, Examples from the past include
these. A high official of CIA's predecessor?the Oflice
of Strategic Services (OSS)?becosnes head of the CIA-
financed National Committee for a Free Europe, Another
becomes an official of the CIA-funded American. Friends
of the Middle East, A Deputy Director of State Depart-
ment Intelligence becomes President of Operations and
Policy Research, Inc., a CIA conduit which financed
"studies". of Latin American electoral processes. (This
official is simultaneously well placed to 'arrange studies,
of elections as the Director of ,(he American Political
Science Association!).
Thus, i. large and growing domestic network of perions
trained in dissembling, distortion, and human nuinipula.-
tion, may be growiqg in our country. And the use of these
kinds of skills may also be growing more acceptable.
During the Republican campaign for President, a memo-
randum went out to Republican college organizers Welt
urged them to arrange a mock election and gave _what
seemed to be pointed hints about how to manipulate' the
election.
This kind of thing produces a suspicion and paranoia.
that divides Americans from one another. It makes them.
.ask -questions .about their associates, colleagues, secre-
taries and acquaintances'?questions that are destroetive
of the casual and trusting atmosphere traditional in Amer-
ica. (Already, mibclievable numbers of persons Acem to
assume that their phones are tapped find their mail read.)
As 'lie public sense of cold war dissipates; the American
distaste for secret organizations can be expected to-grow.
The occasional disclosure of- any "dirty trick" or political
panipulation sponsored by CIA will certainly deepen thi$
sense of unease, lo the end, as now, miiny of the best ant,
most sophisticated colleee graduates will not be willing
to work for the CIA. And professional consultants will he
discouraged -as well. The result can change the charadem
of the Agency in such a way as to further threaten Ameri?
can values,
. One method. in the American tradition, for keeping CIA
honest would he a public-interest organization of alumni
of the intelligence community (and those who are serviced
-by intelligence in the Government). This public interest
group would, as dn so many others, offer its testimony to
Congress on mailers of interest to it?in this case, Hoc!.
ligenc?. The testimony niight be given in public or in exec-
utive session, as appropriate; And Constructive suggestions
and criticisms could he'rnade. ?
Such an organization wank!' have a credibility*and au-
thority that no other group 611 have and a general knowl-
edge of The relevant intelligence problems facing the nation,
and public, it goes without saying that no one in this
organization, or communicating. with it, would violate
laws, or oaths, associated with' classified information. The
Federation of AmeriCan Scientists' strategic weapons coin!
mittec is an example of the feasibility .and ?legitintaq
by which a group of persons,. well grounded in stra-
tegic arms problems can, without violating 'any rules con.:
cerning such informatien, make infermed and useful policy
pronouncements. Marty persons consulted in the prepara-.
don of this neWSletter .endased suggestinn ?
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? CIA CHANGING PERSONALITY?
There nre stilt Sensitive, progressive men in the CIA.,
but they nre becoming scarcer by the moment. The
Agency's career (minces no, longer corns from the Phi
Alvin ranks of Harvard, Yale, or Berkeley. The
..Agettey Is widely regarded on college campuses as
? the principal syndic)t of nit that Is wrong with our
nation. "For the world as a sibille,". wrote A mold
Tnyillice recently., "the CIA has now become the?
? bogey that corimmilistit has been for America. Wher,
ever there is trouble, violence. suffering. Irngedy, the
rest of its are now quick In suspect* the CIA 'has a,
hand in it." fhiilinii ot colleae stitilents and yonng?
prnlessintials. tht? future "potter elite" ol
States, ivaild ',veep( Mal judgment.
-7- R. Harris Smith, OSS The Secret History of Artser
lea's Ficit Central Intelligence Agency, Uttiver.tity o!
? California Pres.i. 1972, pg. 382.
'is? !coed which cannot he et:Mu:tied it) a reasonable length
Of lime and is therefore Wasted. New intellit$enee means
;;,. ?have; become avnilable, and have been incorporated
' into the program Avithenit offsetting reductions in old,.
procedures; ; ? ' ? , ? . ? ? ? ?
In, July.' 1970,:the'Pfnel Chaitinan .pt the Wile
. MIL SYMINGTON. As n longtime member of the
? C iiii induce On Foreign Rd:16nm, as an. ml line mem-
ber of the Appropriatimis fommitlee rind the 'rank- ,
ing Member of Armed Senices, I restlectfitily plead
; with my colleagues in allow Me to receiye hi executive
session' eitaigh intelligence infornintion to in Min ?
form no intelligent, judgment on inntterOnliieli so
. vitally affect our stymity; find so 1 cam vide/ lit cont.
miller and on (be floor of the Settale on the liaSIs or,
the fads. There have been several eases where'll,:
twee not been able to do that in flue past. In my;
opinion, this lack of dissentinnted InfOrnintion has
cost the country a great deal of treasure and. a num*
?lier of American lives.
?. /mom Congressional Record-Senate
? ' ? November 23, 1971, S-19325
Iii any case, as the distaste for CIA .grows, CIA has a ?
moral obligation to stay out of the lives of those who do.'
not wish to be tarnished by association with Ii. In. vine .?
?country, it is reported; CIA put funds into the bank de- ,
Report on Defense ()coalmen' nroblems Gilbert Fitz
? -
!posits of a politieal party without its knowledge. But whaV.
hugh, fold a press coal:mite! "I believe that the Pentaeon
this were discovered! Obviously. CIA could lightly risk
. suffers from lob nmeli intelligence. They can't use what..
the reputations. of persons it wanted to use, or manipulate.
by trying to help them secretly. they eet because there is so much collected. It would .'
,
,? ? ? TWO SOURCES OF POSSIBLE WASTE .'"I"'m be better ,that they didn't have it because it's '?-
? difficult .! .to find out what's inipnriant.'", Ile went on to..: Defense intelligence Agency (WA):
suggest diffusion of responsibility, too much detail' work.*.
? The Army. Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies
and too little' looking ahead in the five-to-fifteen yeat.i
, provided such Parochial and biased intelligence estimates
In the late fifties that they were removed in 1961 from .the .range.,
. . ? '
United States 'Intelligence Board (USW) and replaced by . National Security eigctrryThISA): ?
In 1952. a Presidential dircetive-set. tip the National
,a new supervisory organization: Ow Defense Intelligence ..
Security. Agency as n separate *agency' inside the Defense
Agency (DIA). MA's job wak?to .coordinate all of the.
Department. NSA's ,basic duties are to break 'codes of
Defense Department's intelligence resour:el .and analyses.
Allen Dtilles*had feared that CIA and DIA Might become ?
other Naiions" in. maiirtiin the security of U.S. codes, and
rivals and competitors apparently. this has become the ? '
to perform intelligence functions with regard to eiceirome
case. i . ?
and radar emissions, etc. In 1956, it had 9,000 employees.'
' Today. it is thought to have .15,000 and a ,budget well over
. ? ?
By 1964. DIA had: merged the intelligence publica- a billion.
?
lions of the armed services into publications. of its own: ? ? ? ? ?
In August 1972, an apparently well-informed former
launched a "Daily Digest" that competed with the CIA'
employee
"Central Intelligence Bulletin:- supplanted 1-2. the in. of NSA Wrote a' long memoir for Ramparts
.e:trine. The article summarized the nutitor claims
'i
telligence staff of th Ma
e Joint' replaced the service:. ,_ - . .
y saying,: . . .
? in providing "order of battle", information and had has. cr
.; ? ?
... NSA knows the call signs of every Soviet airplane !
fealty reduced the services to the role of collecting ? mass ?
? the numbers on the side of each plane, the name of die
? intelligence.
? ? pita in command:' the precise longitude and latitude ot
? A number of informed observers have nevertheles$ every nuclear submarine:* the whereabouts of nearly,
suggested that DIA serves no useful purpose and Alia( in .ercry Soviet VW; the location' of every Soviet missile
functions could well be taken over 'hy CIA. Others. witl ? base; every army division, battalion and comp:my?as'.
Pentagon experience. have noted that there is no way t ' weaponry. commander and deployment.' Routinely the
prevent the military services' from having intelligence NSA monitors all Soviet military, diplomatic and corn.
branches and?that being the 'case?DIA is necessary te mercial radio traffic, ineluding.Soviet Air Defense,
sit on them and coordinate their conclusions: In any case. . tical Air, and.KG11 forces. (It was the'NSA that found
? Che Guevara in Bolivia through radio communications
contrast to CIA's reputation for competent normal4
intercept and analysis.) .NSA cryptologic experts seek
disinterested analysis,. DIA and the Intelligence service5
;? In break every Soviet code and do to with remakable ?
, . .
? pose real questions of redundancy, waste, service ? bias. ?success. Soviet scrambler and computer-generated ?sig- ?
and Indicicncy;
nals being nearly as vulnerable as ordinary voice and ?
; Both of the Appropriations Committees of Congress manual morse radio transmissions. Interception if
arc convinced that ihcrejs such ,waste in Defense De. Soviet radar signals enables the NSA to gunge quite pre..'
pariment Intelligence. ? In 1971, the House Committee ? cicely the effectiveness or Soviet Air Defense units;
reported: ? , Methods have ken devised ;In "fingerprint" ,cycry..,
The committee feels that the intelligence operation of wed in radio tranSmisslats and distinguish
the Department of Defense has grown beyond the actual them from the voice of every other operator, The
, needs ?j the De?,ototeto mos is now tetchily ;in to. ? ? Acency's Electronic Intellirenec Teams Ave
cais31,11,! of intercepting tiny electronic signal transmitted
nitywhere in the world mitt,' tfont of 'COO
iolefet'OtO Identify thug transmitter and ohs's.'
leallv reconstruct it. Finally, after having shown 'the
%;te anti sensitivity of the Agenev's big ears, it is rontost
? surveillant% to point out that NSA monitors and records t
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ordinate shine ot th sen
e l' iii resimlees of the Pepartment.
Itctilmdltiley is the watelovotil in many Intelligence lip..
? crations: Tlic same information i sonelst mid tilmdopi
'hy various means and by various orgaitirittions, Co.
?ordination is ,Icss effective than it should be. Far more
..1 material Is collected than is essential. Materinl is col.
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, every trans-A tlantie telephone call."
A July 16, New York Tinict"report noted that "Cg-
tensive independent checking in Washington with sources.
;
in . and out of Governntent who .were familiar with Inc
tettirence matters has resulted ' in the corroboration of
many of (the article's.] revelations:. Expert' had denied.'
however. the plausibility of the. assertion that the scinhisti.i
clued codes of the Soviet Union had been broken. 0
*CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE:
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY' ? . ?
In each I louse of Congress, die Armed Services told the,
Appropriations Committees have subcommittee thnt is
supposed, in principle; to oversee .CIA. .In the I:louse...of
Representatives, even' the il3MCS of the...Appropriations
subcommittee members' are seeret.4it Alid?-Seitate,,the .rive ,
senior members of th!:, Appropriatfons Committee:Am a.
WHAT DRIVES INTELLIGENCE?.
We Are going (crime. to fake n harder-look .at Intel-
ligence requirements, because they drive. the' Intelli-
gence process. fo so dolug they creak demands for
resources. Thi2re is a. tendency for requirements--
once staled?In admire immortality:
One requirements question. we 101 ask ourselves is:
olielher we should maintain a world-oide data base,
collected. in advance; as insurance against the con-
tingency that we may need some of this data in a par-.
ticolar situation. :quell of this information can be
acquired on very short .notice by reconnaissance
means:As for the remainder, we are going to have In
accept the risk of not ino lug complete informatiohl.
on some parts of the world. We haven't enough re- .
sources to cover ever-silting: and the high priority
missions have first call on what we do have:
? Hon. Robert F. Froehlke,,Snecial Assistant 10 the .
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, /um, 9, 197/
before nefense Appropriations Subcommittee, lionve
I, of. Representatives.
subcommittee on 'Intelligence Operations. . ?
The Subcommitee of Armed Services on CIA has not.
met for at least two years?although Senator Symington,'
?a member of the subcommittee, has sought to secure such
a meeting. In '1971, Senator Stennis and Senator- Ellen-
der?tben the Chairmen of the full Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees (as well as of their CIA sub-
committees) said they knew nothing about the CIA-
financed war in Laos?surely CIA's biggest operation:!f
(Congressional Record, November 2, 1971. pg. S19521 i
i
SI9530.) . .
NEW YORK TINES
19 December 72
Downgrading the U.N.
? The above title appeared over an editorial on this page
last week, commenting on President Nixon's removal of
George Bush as United States Ambassador to the United
Nations in order to make him Chairman of the Republi-
can National Committee. We repeat it with sorrow, as a
headline comment on Mr. Nixon's nomination of John A.
Scali to replace Mr. Busp at Turtle Bay.
Mr. Scali was known; as a shrewd, aggressive foreign
affairs reporter for The Associated Press and the Ameri-
can Broadcasting Company:. As an unofficial liaison
between State Department and Soviet Embassy in Wash-
ington, he played a useful role in the defusing of
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. But his only official
diplomatic experience has come as a White House con-
The Congressmen .,are understandably reluctant even
:o know about intelligence operation. Without publicity,
Ind public support, there is a limit to their influence over
'he events about which they hear. And if they cannot
appeal to their constituency, the sknowledge?of secrets only
makes them vulnerable to tlic flietir that they leaked a
secret or mishandled their respOnsibilities. ?
Approximately 150 resolutions have been. offered in
the .Congress to control the CIA and/or other intelligence.
functions. The most common resolution has Failed for a ?'
Joint Committee on intelligence, and ...there is much *to be
said for it. Such a renewal of Congressional authority to !
review such matters might strengthen Congressional over- .
tight.
Two more recent 'efforts, both sponsored by Senator
Stuart Symington, have tried different tacks. One resolu-
tion called for a Select Committee on the Coordination Of
U.S. Government activities abroad:* such a committee
. would have authority over CIA and DOD foreign activities
in particular. Another approach called for limiting the
.U.S. intelligence expenditures of all kinds to $4 billion.'
Senator Clifford Case ? ( Rep., Ni.) has sought to control.
.The .CIA by offering resolutions that simply apply to "any
agency of the U.S. Government." These resolutions em
body existing restraints on DOD which CIA was circum-
venting: c.g. he sought .to prevent expenditure of funds
for training Cambodian military.forces, In short., Senator
Case is emphasizing the fact th4 CIA is a statutorily de-.
? signed agency. which Congress,' empowered. and which
Congress can Control. ! ; ? ?
Congress has not only given the Executive Manch a'
blank check to do intelligence but it has not even insisted
; on seeing the results. The National Security Act of 1947 ?
requires CIA to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relat-o.
,..ing to the national security am! proyble for the appropriate
.? dissemination of .s ii c is intelligence within tile govern-
..nrent . . ." (italics added); As tar as the legislative branch
Of "government" is concerned, this ,has not been done.
? On July 17, 1972, the Foreign 'Relations Committee re-
ported out an amendment (S. 2224), to the National
:corky Act explicitly requiring the CIA to "inform fully
?.and currently, by means of regular :and special reports"
,the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services
of both Houses and to make special reports in response ?
..to their requests. The Committee. proposal. sponsoteo by':
? Senator?John Sherman Cooper, put special emphasis upon
The, existing precedent whereby .the Joint Atomic Energy
:Committee gets: special 'reports .from POD .on atomic.
.eqcrgy i,t?gcncc AnformatIon, (1, ;.1.'
sultant for twenty months, during which he ,made
arrangements for the television coverage of Mr. Nixon's
spectacular trip to China and accompanied the President
to the Soviet Union.
There is little in Mr. Scali's experience to suggest he
is qualified to fill a position once held with distinction
by Adlai E. Stevenson, Arthur J. Goldberg and Warren
R. Austin. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and
Johnson were all guilty of overbuilding and overselling
the U.N. ambassadorship as a Cabinet-level job virtually
on a par with that of Secretary of State. Stripped of the
hyperbole, however, it remains by a wide margin the
most important of United States ambassadorial posts.
Whatever Mr. Nixon's intent, the naming of Mr. Scali
compounds the downgrading of the United Nations that
began with word that Mr. Bush would leAve.the ambassa-
dorship to come to tho altt thu tleatig
24
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NEW YORK TIMES
18 December 72
Watch o a the Media
By Herbert Mitgang
More than five years after the Free-
dom of Information Act became
Federal law, it is still difficult for
journalists, historians and researchers
to obtain information freely. The idea
behind the law was to take the rubber
stamp marked "Confidential" out of
the hands of bureaucrats and open up
public records, opinions and policies
of Federal agencies to public scrutiny.
It hasn't worked that way.
When President Johnson signed the
bill, he declared that it struck a proper
balance, between Government con-
fidentiality and the people's right to
know. In actual practice, it has taken
court actions to gain access to Gov-
ernment records. An effort is finally
being made to declassify the tons of
documents by the Interagency Classii
fication Review Committee, under the
chairmanship ,of former Ambassador
John Eisenhower. This historical sur-
vey will take years.
But more than mere documents
are involved. There is a matter of the
negative tone in Washington.
The White House and its large com-
munications staff have lengthened the
distance between executive branch,
Congress and the public. Of course,
every Administration has instinctively
applied cosmetics to its public face,
but this is the first one operating for
a full term under the mandate of the
Freedom of Information Act, The Je-
suit is that official information
especially if it appears to brush the
Administration's robes unfavorably ?
is not communicated but excommuni-
cated.
The other day Senator Symington
of Missouri, a former Air Force Secre-
tary who has been questioning the
wisdom of the President's B-52- foreign
policy in Southeast Asia, said: "I would
hope that during this session of Con-
gress everything possible is done to
eliminate unnecessary secrecy especi-
ally as in most cases this practice has
nothing to do with the security of the
United States and, in fact, actually
operates against that security."
This point was underscored before
the House Subcommittee on Freedom
of Information by Rear Mm. Gene R.
La Rocque, a former Mediterranean
fleet commander who since retiring
has headed the independent Center for
Defense Information. Admiral La
Rocque said that Pentagon classifica-
tion was designed to keep facts from
civilians in the State and Defense
Departments and that some Congress'-
men were considered "bad security
risks" because they shared informa-
tion with the public.
Reputable historians trying to un-
earth facts often encounter Catch-22
conditions. The Authors League of
America and its members have resisted
those bureaucrats offering "coopera-
tion" on condition that manuscripts
be checked and approved before book Herbert. Mitgang is a member of the
ing and Urban Development has
denied requests for information about
slum housing appraisals. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture turned down the
consumer-oriented Center for the
Study of Responsive Law in Washing-
ton when it asked for research mate-
rials about pesticide safety.
The unprecedented attempt by the
Administration to block publication
of the Pentagon Papers, a historical
study of the Vietnam war, took place
despite the Freedom of Information
Act, not to mention the First Amend-
ment. And the Justice Department is
still diverting its "war on crime"
energies to the hot pursuit of scholars
who had the temerity to share their
knowledge of the real war with the
public. Such Government activities
not only defy the intent of the Free-
dom of Information Act; they serve
as warnings to journalists, professors,
librarians and others whose fortunes
fall within the line of vision ?
budgetary, perhaps punitive? of the
Federal Government.
The executive branch's battery of
with
media
watchmen
are
busiest
broadcasting because of its 'franchises
and large audiences. At least one
White House aide, eyes glued to the
news programs on the 'commercial
networks, grades reporters as for or
against the President. In one case that
sent a chill- through network news-
rooms, a correspondent received a
personal communication from a highly
placed Administration official ques-
tioning his patriotism after he had
reported from North Vietnam. Good
news (meaning good for the Ad-
ministration) gets a call or a letter of
praise.
The major pressure on the commer-
cial and public stations originates from
the White House Office of Telecom-
munications Policy, whose director
has made it clear that controversial
subjects in the great documentary
tradition should be avoided. The same
viewpoint has. been /echoed by the
President's new head of the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting, which
finances major programs on educa-
tional s.tations. This Government cor-
pot'ation is now engaged in a battle
to downgrade the Public Broadcasting
Service, its creative and interconnect-
ing arm responsible for serious news
shows.
Long before there was a Freedom
of Information Act, Henry David
Thoreau was jailed for speaking out
and defying the Government's role in
the Mexican war, last century's Viet-
nam, "A very few men serve the State
with their consciences," he wrote,
."and they are commonly treated as
enemies by it." Grand juries, sub-
poenas and even Government jailers
will be unable to overpower today's
men of conscience.
publication. The Department of lions- editorial board of The Times.
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NEW YORK TIMES
,17 December 72
77
fl
R_ichacdson,Called
Liberal by Soviets
Venter
MOSCOW, Dec. 15 ? Thel
Soviet foreign affairs maga-I
zinc New Time today wel-,
Corned the appointment of El-
liot Richardson as U.S. de-
fense secretary, describing
him as a man of "moderate
liberal trend".
The desenpuon contrasted
with the standard Soviet prop-
aganda reference to his prede-
cessor, Melvin Laird, as being
among the , "hawks" of Wash-
ington.
But the magazine warned
that the Pentagon, tradition-
ally a chief target of Soviet
propaganda, had not turned
into a "house of doves'. over-
night. "Its multi-billion dollar
budget is not likely to be re-
duced," the weekly's New York'
correspondent reported.
However, Western observers
here saw today's relativelY,
friendly presentation of
Richardson to the Soviet
reader, as symptomatic of the
new climate between the
superpowers following Presi-
dent Nixon's Moscow summit
last, May,
New Times said Lai rd's de-
parture "confirms the failure
of Washington's policy [of
negotiating] from a position
of strength.' It shows the
obvious fact that the enforced
change of military course in
the new conditions requires
new leaders."
It said neither Richardson,
nor the new secretary of
Health Education and Wel-
fare, Caspar Weinberger, nor
the new director of the Office
pf Management and Budget,
!toy Ash, coold he called,
'This eiretimstance is espy-
' eially remarkable concerning
Richardson, who is to head the
gigantic military machine of
the Defense Ministry" New
Times said.
But it cautioned that. Ii ich-
a rdson would have a counter-
balance in his deputy, "the
Texas multimillionaire and oil
magnate AVilliam ' Clements,"
Whom it. called a "frank con-
servative,"
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
DECEMBER 16, 1972
An Interview with Oriana Fallaci
ISSINGER
In his White House office, November 4, Henry Kissinger
talked with the distinguished Italian journalist, Oriana
Fallaci, and his remarkable taped conversation with her,
reprinted in full here, first appeared in the magazine L'Eu-
ropeo. "Why I agreed to it," Mr.: Kissinger later com-
mented, "I'll never know."
The Editors
Fallaci: I wonder what your feelings are, these last few
days, Dr. Kissinger. I wonder if you too are disappointed,
like us, like most of the world. Are you disappointed, Dr.
Kissinger.?
Kissinger: Disappointed? Why? VVhat has liaripened,
within the last few days, to disappoint me?
Q: Something unpleasant, Dr. Kissinger: although you
said that peace was "within reach," and although you
confirmed that an agreement with the North Vietnamese
had been drawn up, peace has not conic. The war goes on
as before, and worse than before.
A: There will be peace. We're determined to obtain it
and we shall have it. It will come within a few weeks
or even less, i.e. immediately following the resumption
of negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the final
agreement: This is what I said ten ,days ago and I re-
peat it. Yes, we'll have peace within a reasonable pe-
riod if Hanoi accepts another meeting before signing
the agreement, a meeting to define the details, and if
they accept it in the same spirit and with the same
attitude adopted in October. Those "ifs" are the only
uncertainty of the last few days. An uncertainty, how-
ever; that I refuse even to consider; you are giving in
to panic, and one shouldn't panic in cases like this.
Nor succumb to impatience. The fact is that . Well,
we've been conducting these negotiations for months,
and you newspaper people wouldn't take them seri-
ously. You kept on saying they wouldn't end in any-
thing concrete. Then, suddenly, you proclaimed that
peace was already around the corner, and now, finally,
you say the negotiations have failed. That way you
take our temperature every day, four tient% it dity, thit
you take it from Hanoi's point of view. 'And ... please
take note, I understand Hanoi's point of view. The
North Vietnamese wanted us to sign on October 31: a
proposition that was reasonable and unreasonable at
the same time and . . . No, I don't want to engage in
polemics on this subject.
Q: But had you actually engaged to sign on October 31?
A: I say and repeat that they were the ones who in-
sisted on this date and that, to avoid an abstract de-
bate about dates that seemed in fact merely theoretical
at the time, we replied that we'd make every effort to
conclude the negotiations within October. 31. But it.
was always clear, to us at least, that we wouldn't be
able to sign an agreement until the last details had
been discussed. We couldn't be expected to respect a
date merely because, in good faith, we had promised
to exert every effort to do so. So where does that put
us? At the point where those details still need to be
discussed and a further meeting is indispensable.
They say it isn't indispensable, that it isn't even neces-
sary. I.maintain it is indispensable and that it will take
place. It will take place as soon as the North Vietnam-
ese summon me to Paris. But this is only November 4,
today is November 4, and I can quite understand the
North Vietnamese not wishing to resume negotiations
just a few days after the date on which they had asked
us to sign. I can understand this adjournment on their
part. But it isn't, conceivable, to me at least, that they
should refuse to agree to .a further meeting. Especially
now, when we have already covered ninety percent of
the road and are near our destination. No, I'm not dis-
appointed. I should be, certainly, were Hanoi to break
the agreement, were Hanoi to refuse to discuss any
alterations. But, no, I can't believe it. I can't even sus-
pect that we've come so far only to fail on a matter of
prestige, of procedures, of dates, of nuances.
Q.: And yet, it looks as if they've really stiffened, Dr.
Kissinger. They've reverted to a harsh vocabulary, they've
proffered serious, almost insulting charges against you . . .
A: .0h, that doesn't mean a thing. It's happened be-
fore and we've never paid any attention. I'd say that
serious charges, even insults, are part of a normal pic-
ture. Essentially, notlilagiiii Eliiihned:
Octtibor 31, nitice, that is, we've calmed down here,
you keep on asking me whether the patient is ill. But
I can discover no illness. And I really believe things
will fall out more or less as I claim. Peace, I repeat, will
come within a matter of weeks after talks are resumed;
26
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i not within a. matter of months. Within a matter of'.
weeks.''
?
.Q: But when will talks be resumed? That's the point.
?
A: Whenever Le Duc Tho wants to meet me. I'm here,
'waiting. But without any anxiety, believe me. For.
'God's Sake! Before, two or three weeks used to elapse: ,
ilbetweSn each meeting! I don't see why we should get;
; .the Wind up now if we have to wait a, few days. The::
, 'on y r ason for the nervous tension that has seized;
?y91 al is that people are Wondering: "Will talks really
be re4itned?" When you were cynical and didn't be-i
lie1.7e anything would happen, you didn't notice time; ?
p,assing. :You were over-pessimistic at the beginning,:
::and oVen;optimistic after my press conference, and;
noW you're over-pessimistic again. You refuse to real-'.
; izd that everything is proceeding as! always thought' .
i.it would from the moment I declared that peace was at:
hand. 11 calculated it would take a couple 9f weeks
then, if I'm not mistaken. Bu l? even if it were to' take'
inore .1; , Enough,. I don't want to talk of Vietnam any:
more. I can't afford to at the present time. Every word!.
titterhrnakes the headlines. At the end Of November,i ;
perhaps , . , Look, why cldn't we meet again at the end
Fitif November?
,
Q: Because it's more 'interesting now, Dr. Kissinger. Be-r
Cause Thieu, for instance, defied you to talk. Please read;
this cutting from The New York Times. It carries Thieu's:
words: "Why don't you ask Kissinger what issues wel
differ on, what points! refuse to accept?"
AlLet me see it . . . Oh! No, I shan't answer him.
shan't respond to his invitation.,
Q: He's already given' his own answer, Dr. Kissinger.
He' S already told the world that the disagreement' stems
I ?
from the fact that, according to the terms accepted by you,
the North Vietnamese troops will remain in South Viet-
nam. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe you'll ever be able to
win over Thieu? Do you think the United States will be
compelled to sign a separate treaty with Hanoi? ,
would prefer to dine with Le Duc Tho?.
?? ! I
'A: I can't, can't . . don't want to answer ,tha
question. , , ,
Q: Can you answer this question then: did you like le De.
,Tho?
?
,? 'A: Yes. I found in him a man deeply dedicated. to hi'
:cause, very' serious, very strong, and alw'ays:courteous
; Sometimes, :too, very hard; d ficlut t com
;
terms with, in fact. But this is something 'vettiliiiny.
H..respected in him. Yes, I feel great respect for Le Di,
Tho. Of course, we met on strictly professi mol!ternis
but I believe,' I believe I could feel a certa'i softenim
the background. It's a fact, for instance, tl at at time.
even managed. to crack a joke together. e said tha
.,,one day I might go to lecture qn international relations
at Hanoi University and that he would Co ne to Hari
-yard to lecture on Marxism-Leninism. We I,!1 shoulct
;!say:our rapport was good. ?
; ?
Q: Would you say 'the same of hien? ;
. ? :1 ? ?
A; I had a good rapport with Thieu too, at Inst.'s,:
.;
Q: Exactly, at first. The South Vietnamese -slid this tim
,you didn't greet each other like the best of friends.
',iv What did they say? .
!'.
I
A: Don't ask me that. I have to stick to what I said in
public ten days ago. I cannot, I must not consider a
hypothesis that I don't believe will materialize, a .hy-
, pothesis that must not materialize. All I can tell you is
,that we are determined to make peace, and that we
; will make it within as short a delay as possible, after,
' my: next meeting with Le Duc Tho. Thieu may say
what he likes. It's his business.
! Q: Dr. Kissinger, if I put a pistol to your. head and en-
joined you to choose between a dinner with Mien and ,a.
"'dinner with Le Due Tim . . . which- would you choose? ?
I,
A: That's a question I Cant answer'. ' .
; - ? ? ;
(a What Were to answer it 'saying like to think you
? ??
. ,
,
: Q: Ye. Would you deny it, Dr. Kissinger?
A: Well of course we had and still have our own points .
, ; Let's say Thieu and I greeted each other lik lies. 1
.; of view', and not 'necessarily the same poiit ts of view
,aI4
,
Dr, Kissinger, it is now obVious that Thieti, is a harder
nut to crack than formerly thought. As regards Thieu, do
you feel you've achieved, as much as you could or'do you
,.
,? hope to' do something more? In one wo ?d: are yoit
optimistic as regards the Thiell problem?
? A: Yes, I do feel optimistic! I've still got so nettling td
do! Lots to do! I have by no means finished, we havd
. ;by no means 'finished! And I don't feel pbwerlegs.
don't feel discouraged. Norat all. I feel prei4ared, con-
fident. Optimistic. Even if I can't speak of Thieu, evert
?,. if I can't tell you what we're doing at this point in the
, .';negotiations, that doesn't mean that I'm about to lose
! confidence in my ability to tie everythingI ! up within
the delay I've mentioned. That's whyiseless for
Thieu to ask you journalists to make me list the points
we disagree' about. It's so useless that his Ilea doesn't
even irritate me. Besides, I'm not one of those peopld
that allow themselves to lw swayed by diet
1. Emotions are of no use, Least of all are the
in helping one to attain peace.
..!
emotions,
of any iisti
;
I
'
'.Q: But the.dying, those that may die, are in a hurry, Dr .
Kissinger. Theye.Was!a dreadful picture in thip morning'S
. .
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papers: a picture of a very young Vietcong who died two
days after October 31. There was also a horrifying news.
item: about the twenty-two Americans shot down in their
helicopter by a Vietcong grenade three dais after October
31. And while you condemn haste,. the American Depart-
ment of Defense is sending fresh arms- and munitions to
Thieu. Hanoi is doing-the same:
A: That was unavoidable. It always happens before a
cease-fire. Don't you remember the maneuvers in the.
Middle East at the. time of the cease-fire? They lasted
for two years, to say the least. You know, the fact that
we're sending Saigon arms and that Hanoi is sending
arms to the North Vietnamese-quartered' in South Viet-
nam means nothing. Nothing. Nothing. And don't
make me talk of Vietnam any more, please.
Q: Won't you even talk of the fact that, according to some,
the agreement you and Nixon have accepted is, to all prac-
tical purposes, an act of surrender to Hanoi?
A: That's absurd! It's absurd to say that President
Nixon, a President who, towards the Soviet Union and
Communist China, and on the eve of his own election
has taken up a stance of assistance and defense as
regards South Vietnam against what he considered a
North Vietnamese invasion . . . it's absurd to think
that such a President could surrender to Hanoi. And
why should he surrender now? What we have done is
not a surrender. What we have done is give South
Vietnam an opportunity to survive under conditions
that are, today, political rather than military. It is now
up to the South Vietnamese to win the political con-
test awaiting them, as we have always maintained. If
you compare the agreement we have accepted with
our proposals of May 8 last, you will see that it's
almost the same thing. There are no great differences
between what we proposed last May and what the
draft of the accepted agreement contains. We haven't
added new clauses, we haven't made new concessions.
I totally and absolutely reject the opinion of a "sur-
render." But that's really enough about Vietnam
now. Let's talk of Machiavelli, Cicero, anything except
Vietnam.
Q: Let's talk of war, Dr. Kissinger. You're not a pacifist,
are you? (
A: No, I really don't think I am. Even if I respect gen-
uine pacifists, I don't agree with any pacifist and espe-
cially with half-and-half pacifists: you know, those
that are pacifists one way and anything but the other.
The only pacifists I agree to talk to are those that bear
the consequences of non-violence right to the end: but
even to them I talk willingly Merely to tell them that
they will be crushed by the will of those that are strong
and that their pacifism can lead to nothing but hor.
hIc skiiitilmt, War is it maimitraetitm Ws something
depending on prevailing conditions. The war against.
'Hitler; for instance, was a necessary one. By that I
don't mean that war is necessary as such; that natiols
have to wage war to preserve their :virility. What' I
mean is that there are certain principle's for which
nations must be ready to fight.
Q: And what can you tell me about the war in Vietnam,
Dr. Kissinger? You have never been against it, have you? ?
A: How could I be? Even before I occupied the position
I occupy today. . . . No, I have never been against the
war in Vietnam.
Q: But don't you think [Arthur] Schlesinger is right when
he says that all the war in Vietnam has managed to prove .
is that half a million Americans,.with all their technology, .
were unable to defeatpoorly armed men dressed in black
pajamas?
A: That's a different problem. If it is a problem whether
the war in Vietnam was necessary, a, just war, rather
than. . . Opinions of that kind depend on the position ,
one takes up when the country is already caught up in
the war and all there remains is to devise a method to
extricate it. After all, my, our part has been to reduce
increasingly America's involvement in the war, and
then terminate the war. Eventually, history will judge,,
who achieved most: whether those who merely criti-
cized or we who tried to reduce the war and then
ended it. Yes, judgment belongs to posterity. When a..
country is involved in a war, it's not enough to say:
we must put a stop to it. One must end it wisely. And
that's very different from stating that we were right to
start the war.
Q: But, Dr. Kissinger, don't you think it was a useless war?
A: I may agree. But don't forget the reason why we
started that war was to prevent the North gobbling up
the South, to enable the South to hold on to its terri-
tory. Of course, by that I don't mean that we had no
other aim; it was something more as well. But today I
am not in a position to judge whether the war in Viet-
nam was a just one or not, whether it was useful or
useless for us to become involved in it. But are we still
talking of Vietnam?
Q: Yes, and, still concerning Vietnam, do you think you
might say that these negotiations have been and are the
most important undertaking in your career, or even in
your life?
A: The most difficult undertaking. Often, too, the most
painful. But maybe it isn't right to describe them as
the most difficult undertaking: it LS entiee accurate to
say that they have been the most paitifiii ittitleetaking.
Because they involved me erfidkiiMaY? N'Ai4 WI/ firs-.
machine Chios %ON a difficult task from an intellec-
tual point of view, but not emotionally difficult. Peace
in Vietnam, on the other hand, has been an emotion-
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'ally difficult task. As for describing those negotiations
!: as the most important thing I've ever done. . . No, what
I wanted to achieve wasn't merely peace in Vietnam: it
. was three, things. This agreement, the rapprochement.
with China and a new relationship with the Soviet
,
Union. I have always attached great imporiance to the,
:problem of a new relationship with the Soviet Union.. -
II'No leis, I might say, than to the rapprochement with
'}Chin?nd the end of the war in Vietnam.
1(2i A d you've done it. You succeeded ivith China, you
icurcee Icdwith Russia, yoit almost succeeded with peace:
frilliie nam. So, at this point, Dr. Kissinget, 01 ask you the,
. ,
''sai,neuestion I asked the astronauts when they, were fly-?
I
!hing to theAloon: "What next? What wilryou do after tIt, '
; MoOttA what more can youldo than your astronaut's job?"
.. 1 ' f
iilAi ! Oh:! And what did the astronauts answer?
Q: TO question bewildered them, and they answered:;
"We'd see.. I don't know."
A: Neither do I. I really don't know what I'll do after-
ward. However, unlike the astronauts, I'm not be-;
; lwildered. I've always found so many things to do in
I. life mid, I'm certain that when I leave this job'. .
Of course, I'll need some time to recuperate, .a decom-
pression period; one can't be in the position I now:
- occupy, then leave it and begin something else at;
'Once. However, once decompressed, I'm certain of;
finding a worthwhile job. I don't want to think about;
It noW. It could influence my. . my work. We are liv-;
ling in such a revolutionary period that to plan one's';
life, nowadays, is to revert to a Victorian middle-class
mentality..
9: Would you go back to teaching at Harvard?
A: I might. But it's very, very unlikely. There are more,
'interesting things. And if, after all the experience I've
acquired, I'm unable to keep on leading an interesting
life, it will be my own fault entirely. Besides, I've by,
! no means decided to give up this job yet. You know,
enjOy it very mach.
Q: Naturally. Power is always seductive. Dr. Kissinger, to
what extent does power fascinate you? Try to be sincere.
!A: I will be. You see, when one wields power, and
when one has it for a long time, one ends up thinking
one has a right to it. I'm sure that when I leave this job
!I shall feel the lack of power. However, power as an
instrument in its own right has no fascination for me.
1 don't wake up every morning exclaiming by God,
isn't it extraordinary that I am able to dispose of a
plane, that 'a car with a driver waits at my door? Who
would have thought it possible? No, I'm not interested
in such reflections. And if I do happen to entertain
them, they certainly never become acleterminating
'factor. What interests me is what one can achieve with
,l power. Splendid things, believe me. . . However, it 4
1 ,
not the craving for power that has spurred me on tO
take this job. If you examine my'political Past, you will
;
, discover that President Nixon couldn't have been inr
H. cluded in my plans. I've been against him in three
.elections.
? ? ? '
' Q: I know. You' even once declared that .Nixon "wasn'i '
. !
. ? . ..
. suited to be President.", Does this fact ever make rule I
, embarrassment in.Nixon's presence,..Dr.
A: I don't remember the exact words I Ma) hate use(
?,l-against, Nixon. I presume that is more': or lesswhat
? !, must have said, since the phrase is consta tly :quote(
between inverted commas. However, if :I ail say it, it'
a proof that 'Nixon was not included in inyI plahs for
?,: rise to power. As for feeling embarrassatent'? in hii
presence. .. No, I didn't know him, that's all. My atti-
,
!tude towards him was the conventional highbrow one
that's all. I was wrong. President Nixon has show
great -strength, great skill. In summoning me to, hi.
I. side, too. I had never met him'when he offered me Mil
job. I was astonished. After all, he was acqu, inted with
; the unfriendly and unsympathetic : attitud I had ail
ways assumed towards him.'Yes indeed, lie showec
great courage in turning to me.
Q: He made a good deal, Dr. Kissinget'. Except for ai
charge people proffer against you today, tlat you ar
Nixon's mental nurse.
? A: It is an utterly senseless charge. We mustn't forget
!! that, before he ever met me, President Nixon had been
very active in matters of foreign policy.. It had always
':been his consuming interest. Even before he waS
elected it was obvious that foreign policy mattered
greatly to him. He has very clear ideas on t le subject.;
He is a strong character. Besides, a weakling would
'inever have been twice nominated presidential candi-
date, would never have survived in politics for scii,
long. You can think what you like of President Nixoni:
but one thing is certain: you don't become President:
of the United States twice running becolise you're'
! another man's tool. Such interpretations or- romalltid
! and unjust.
I
9: You're very fond of him, Dr. Kissinger, aren't your 1
, A: I have great respect for him.
Q: Dr. Kissinger, people say you don't care allout Nixon.,
.They say all you care about is the job you are doing. They1
say you'd have done it under any president.
A: I on the other hand, am not at all so sure I could
have done what I've done with him with another pres-
ident. Such a special relationship, I mean the relation-;
ship between the President and me, always depends!
on the style of both men. In other words, I don't know
many leaders, and I've met several, who would have,
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the courage to send their aide to Peking without tell-
ing anyone. I don't know many leaders who would
entrust to their aide the task of negotiating with the
North Vietnamese, informing only .a tiny group of
people of the initiative. Really, some things depend
on the type of president. What I've done was acheived
because he made it possible for me to do it.
Q: And yet, you have been an adviser to other presidents
too, presidents who were Nixon's opponents, in fact. I
mean Kennedy, Johnson.
A: My position towards all presidents has always been
the same: I let them decide whether they wanted
my opinion or not. When they asked for it, I gave it
to them, telling them all, indiscriminately; what I
thought. I was never concerned with what party they
belonged to. I answered Kennedy's, .Johnson's and
Nixon's questions with the same independenCe. I gave
them the 'same advice. There was some difficulty in
'Kennedy's case, true. In fact, people usually state that
I disagreed with him. Well, yes, it was my fault, in
substance. I was much too immature at the time. More-
over, I was only a part-time adviser; one can't hope to
influence a president's day-to-day politics if -one only
meets him twice a week while there-are others-who-see
him every day. I mean that in Kennedy's and John-
son's time I was never in a comparable position .to the
one I now enjoy with Nixon.
.Q: Not Machiavellian by,any chance, Dr. Kissinger?
A: No, not at all. Why? ?
Q: Oh, only that, listening to you, one sometimes won-
ders not how much you have influenced the President of
the United States, but to what extent you have been in-
fluenced by Machiavelli.
A: To none whatever. There is really very little of
Machiavelli's one can accept or use in the contempo-
rary world. The one thing I find interesting in Machia-
velli is his estimate of the Prince's will. Interesting,
but not such as to influence me. If you want to know
, who has influenced me most, I'll answer with two
philosophers' names: Spinoza and Kant. Which makes
it all the more peculiar that you choose to associateme
with Machiavelli. Most people associate me -with-Met-
ternich. And that is childish. My only connection with
Metternich is a book I wrote: it was to be the first'
volume in a lengthy study of the construction and dis-
integration of international order in the nineteenth
century. The series was to cover the whole period up
to the first world war, that's all. There can be nothing
in common between me and Metternich. He was chan-
cellor and foreign minister at a time when it took three
weeks to travel from Central Europe to the ends of -the
continent. He was chancellor and foreign minister at a
time when wars were conducted by professional sol-
diers and diplomacy was in the hands of the aristoc-
racy. How can one compare such conditions with the
ones prevailing in today's world, a world where
there is no homogeneous group. of leaders, no homo-
geneous internal situation and no homogeneous cul-
tural background? 1
Q: But, Dr. Kissinger, how do you explain your incredible
superstar status, how do you explain the fact that you
have became almost more famous and popular than a pres-
ident? Have you any theories?
A: Yes, but I won't tell you what they are. Because they
don't coincide with the common theory. Intelligence,
for instance. Intelligence is not all that important in
the exercise of power,. and is often, in point of fact,
useless. Just as a leader doesn't need intelligence, a
man in my job doesn't need too much of it either. My
theory -is quite different, but, I repeat, I won't tell you
what it is. Why should 1, while I'm still in the middle
of my jobTInstead, you tell me yours. I'm sure you too
have some theory on the reasons for my popularity.
Q: I'm not sure, Dr. Kissinger. I'm looking for a theory in
this interview. But I haven't found one yet. I expect the
root of all lies .in success. What I mean is, like a chess
player you've made two or three clever moves. China,
first of all. People admire a chess player who makes away
with his opponent's king. ?
A: Yes, China was an important element in the me-
chanics of my success. And yet, that isn't the main
point. The main point. . . Well, why not? I'll tell you.
What do I care after all? The main point stems from the
fact that I've always acted alone: Americans admire
that enormously. Americans admire the cowboy lead7:
ing the caravan alone astride his horse, the cowboy ?
entering a village or city alone on his horse. Without '
even a pistol, maybe, because he doesn't gel in for '
shooting. He acts, that's all: aiming at the right spot at ?
the right time. A Wild West tale, if you like.
Q: I see. You see yourself as a kind of Henry Fonda, un-
armed and ready to fight with his bare fists for honest
ideals. Solitary, brave.
A: Not necessarily brave. This cowboy doesn't need
courage. It's enough that he be alone, that he show
others how he enters the village alone and does every-
thing on his own. This romantic, surprising character
suits me, because being alone has always been part of
my style, or of my technique if you prefer. Independ-
ence too. Yes, that's very important to me and in me.
And, finally, conviction. I am always convinced of the
necessity of whatever I'm doing. And people feel that,
believe in it. And I attach great importance to being
believed: when one persuades or conquers someone,
onemustn't deceive them. Nor can one do everything
by calculation alone. Some believe I carefully plan
whatever consequences on the public one of my initia-
tives or efforts may have. They believe that is a con-
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' stant preoccupation of mine. On the contrary,,. the
.I'consequences of my actions, I mean public opinion's
r verdict, have, never worried me. I'm not asking for,
popularity, I'm not seeking it. In fact, if. yon really
!.: want to know, I care nothing for popularity. I'm not at
all afraid Of losing my public support, I can afford to::
11: ?
,ay ;what I think. I am ,referring to what is genuine in .
me. II I let myself be perturbed by public reaction, if I
!i; acted merely on the basis of a calculated technique,''
?shou!cl dchieve nothing. Take actors, for instance, the
really gooti ones don't rely on mere technique. They
also fcillovf .their feelings when they play a part. Like
Me, they are' genuine. I don't mean to say that all this
will' last forever. In fact, it may evaporate as quickly as:
1: it came But for the time being it's there. ; !' ? ?
. , ,!, ? ' ?
fact, in case of Le Duc Tho, as with Mao Tse-tunv
and thou En-lai, I believe my playboy reputation has"
been and still is useful, because it has helped ancl
'helps to reassure people, to show them rni ! not a ,
:museum piece. In any case, my frivolous. reputation
..;: amuses me.
(2; 'And to think I believed it undesert;ed, a putoit act ;I
1 ?
' ?' rather than the truth.
A; Well, it's 'partly overdone, of course. But it's
!?.:
let's admit it, true: What counts is not how trt
,
or how much time I devote to women. What co
to what extent women are part of my life, a central pr,'
occupation.
occupation. Well, they aren't that at all. To me women 1!
?
I :
! ? ? . .
; Q: Are you trying to tell me, Dr. Kissinger, that you're a :
pontaneotis person? Heavens: if I'm not to think of Ma-..
' chlayelli, the first type my mind associates y9u with is
; a' mathematician, someone who is almost spasmodically,:
&JIc I I atidl dontrolled. I may be mistaken, but I; believe' 1
, !
I ru're a very cold man, Dr. Kissinger. ' ? ! . ' ?
. ;
. ; . .
A: In tactics, not in strategy. In fact, I believe in human
relations More than in ideas. I make use of ideas, but
. I need human relations, as I've shown in my work.' '
, After all,' didn't what has happened to me happen by
chance? FOr God's sake, I was a totally unknown pro-:
fessor, wasn't I? How could I possibly tell myself:
?Now I'm going to fix things so as to become an in- '
? ternational celebrity"? It would have been pure folly: ,
I, wanted to be where the action is, true, but I never
paid a price to get there. I never made any concessions.
I have always been guided by spontaneous decisions.
One might retort: then it happed because it had to,,
happen. That's what people always say when things.'
:have happened. One never hears it said of things that
haven't happened; nobody has ever written the his-
tory of things that haven't happened. In a sense, how-,
ever, I am a fatalist. I believe in fate. True, I believe
one mustfight to attain a goal. But I also believe there
are ;limits to the fight a man may engage in to reach
his gpalt
; Q: Another thing, Dr. Kissinger: how do you reconcile,the
tremendous responsibilities you have shouldered with the
frivolous reputation you enjoy? How can you succeed in
being taken seriously by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-mai and
Le Due Tho on one hand and be judged a carefree Don Juan
or even playboy on the other? Doesn't it embarrass you?
A: Not at all. Why should it embarrass me when I go
off to negotiate with Le Duc Tho? When I'm talking to
Le Duc Tho, I know how to behave with Le Dc Tho,
and when I'm with a girl, I know how to behave with
a girl. Besides, Le Duc Tho isn't agreeing to negotiate
with me because I'm an example of all, the moral vir=
Weft, He agrees to negotiate with me because he wants;
certain things from me as I do from him, As a matter of ?
'art. y,
e if, is .1
ints is ;
are no more than a pastime, a hobby. Nobody devotes, !
too much time to a hobby: Moreover, my engageme,nt
book is there to show I only devote a limited portion of '!
my time to them. What's more, I often prefer to visit
my two children. I still see them often, although I4,ss
frequently than before. As a rule I spend Chrii4tmas,
other holidays and several weeks in summer with
,them, and I go to Boston once a month to see them. !
You probably know I've been divorced for several ;
years. No, being divorced doesn't bother me. The fact
? that I don't live with my children doesn't give me any
guilt complexes. Since my marriage was through, and
not owing to any fault on either side, there as no! 1:
reason not to divorce. Besides, I'm much closer to ni)i; !
children now than when I was their mother's hu band. ;
,I'm also Much happier in their company now.
Q: Are you against marriage, Dr. Kissinger?
?
A: No. The problem of marriage for or again4t is a
dilemma that can be solved as a question of pripciple.
:I might marry again ... oh, yes, I might. However!, ypu
know, for a serious person like me, after all, it is very
difficult to co-exist with someone else and to survive
such co-existence. The relationship between a Woman'
and a man of my type is unavoidably very cotinplex.
:One must be cautious. Oh, how 'hard it is for me to
;explain these things. I'm not a person that usually
;confides in journalists.
Q: So I gather, Dr. Kissinger. I've never interviewed any-
one that evaded close questions and definitions like You,
anyone that defended themselves as strenuously as you ?
from attempts to penetrate their personality. Are y9u shy,
by any chance, Dr. Kissinger?
'A: Yes, I am rather. On the other hand, however, 11 ?
.? 'believe I'm fairly well balanced. You see, there are' i
,those that describe me as a mysterious, tormented char-I !
acter, and others who see me as a merry guy always' ;
smiling, always laughing. Both; these images aiv un-ft
true. I'm neither the one nor the other: I'm. . NO, 1
' 1"hit tall yott what I am; I'll haver tall anyone.
Copyright Rizzfli Press ,ervice-L'Europeo 1972
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NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 72
?..'3hrevitiness of KiSSiD
By C. L. Sulzberger
dS ,
? PARIS?Numerous wor are -ap-
plied to groups of differing species
including a school of fish, an ostenta-
tion of peacocks, a pride of lions," a'
swarm of bees and, a shrewdness of
apes. In considering the contemporary
Kissinger Phenomenon?which' exists
in other countries beSideS the United
States?I have decided that perhaps'
the most apt word applicable to this
particular species is shrewdness; not
because they are in any way; apish but
they have to be unusually astute.
Henry Kissinger, who gives his
name to this form of super-counsellor,
is not the first in American history.
Before him there came such Presi-
-dentist advisers as Colonel HouSe (for
Wilson), Harry Hopkins (for Roose-
velt), Mac Bundy (for Kennedy) and
Walt Rostow (for Johnson). In ?the
autumn of 1948, when it seemed cer-
tain Dewey would be elected U.S. Presi-
dent, I asked his principal foreign af-
fairs expert, John Foster Dune% wheth-..
er he would be Secretary. of State.
. "I haven't yet decided," said Dulles
with beguiling absence of modesty..
,He wasn't certain whether he Wanted
the job. He might prefer, a position,.
like House or Hopkins who had"muCh'
more fun." Dulles complained tile sec-
retary Was. too tied up with political ,
Maneuvers. In the event,' Truman de-
feated Dewey and Dulles had. to wait
four years for EisenhoWer's victory.
He solved his, problem by becoming
Secretary of State and serving as his
own 'Kissinger..
Henry Kissinger has proven to be
the outstanding Kissinger in American
' eximrience n ad aka) :11e. Outstanding
NEW YORK TIMES
27 December 72
international "Kissinger." But, in vary-
ing degrees and with differing opera-
tional methods,. other Kissingers are
active abroad.
A.M. Aleksandrov, assistant to the
General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist party,
is.Brezhnev's Kissinger.. Aleksandrov, a
quiet; cautious man who speaks good
English and adequate French, is at-
tached to the Russian boss's office
and, handles important policy matters.
He ,travels with Brezhnev and plays a
key. role in. many ,negotiations.
Gen. Aharon Yariv, former chief of
Israeli intelligence, is. now. said to be
, .Golda Meir.',s Kissinger. He is a slender,
fit, cool officer, unemotional and Objec-
tive. Egon Bahr, a, short, square, 50-
. year-old. German. civil servant, with
long thin nose,,,mouSe-colored hair and
brown eyes, is the equivalent of Willy
Brandt's KiSsiriger. A former journal-
:1st; he is renowned for his discretion.
SOMC people callInin "the fox .in the
chancery." "
Brandt told me: .!'There. is one big
difference between 'our type of govern-
ment and yours. I have a Cabinet in
a different sense than Nixon.' While ?
I make decisions on the general -lines:
of foreign policy; my, Foreign Minister,
(Scheel,, who also heads the. Liberal.
party in Brandt's coalition) is still re-
sponsible for policy vis-?is Parlia-
ment.
"Bahr gets only ad hoc . tasks.. And
there is stronger .coordination between .
his work and the Foreign Ministry than
is the practice in the U.S.A. Kissinger
deals with all your foreign policy. Bahr..
is more my. ambassador at large. First
he worked on negotiations with Mos-
-P-erse-r-
cow. Then on Berlin and relations with
the 'G.D.R. (East Germany). So it is
really different. But I suppose Bahr
might, be called the nearest thing I
have to a Kissinger."
The English Kissinger?or. the near-
est equivalent?is Sir Burke St. John.
Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet. Trend
.is a tali, pale, white-haired man with
glasses. He graduated from Oxford
where he' studied 'the Classics and,
after entering the Civil Service, worked
.for the Education :Ministry, then, the?
Treasury. His particular role will be
,discussed 4.1 more detail later.
French President Pompidou likewise.
,has his Kissinger, a short,. thin,, subtle
and highly intelligent man of 51 named
Michel Jobert. Under the Fifth Repub-
lic eStablished by de Gaulle, the Presi- ?
dent has great executive power. There-
fore the Secretary-General .of the Elysee
Palace (Presidential ..residence). has .1
enormous influctic,e although he is' rare7-I
ly ?4411 known to the Public.
?? ,Wlien Etienne Burin de Roziers
(now:French Ambassador,to the Com-,
mon Market) was de Gaulle's S. ecre-
tary-General, he was' .perhaPS the
second most important man in' Franee.
although few people were aware of
this. The same might now be said of
Jobert.
Although, apart from stenographers,
.he has only two full-time staff mem-
?bers and all told there are only fifteen,
including experts on monetary matters,
internal affairs and foreign policy, his
scope is in some ways even larger than
Henry Kissinger's: This and similar
comparisons will be discussed in sub.-
sequent column.
A Shrewdness of Kissingers: II
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS ?Not even the Kissingers
of this world are entirely sitrc just
who are full members of their climb.
Thus I have been told at various times
by one or another of this select estab-
lishment that Frau Katharina Focke,
charming expert on Western Europe,
is really Chancellor Brandt's Kissinger
or that Robert Temple Armstrong,
principal private secretary to the Prime
Minister, is really Mr. Heath's Kis-
singer. In neither case is this correct:.
Dr. Focke, now a Cabinet member
but who recently adorned the Chan-
cellor's office, is the daughter of a
famous German journalist and advised
on .European matters. Mr. Armstrong,
a charming old Etonian who Werke at
the prime Minister's right hund and is
an.expert on finance, is not the near-.
est British equivalent to Henry Kis-
singer. The original of the species con-
siders Egon Bahr and Sir Burke Trend
as his German and British peers.
Confusion arises because it is im-
possible to have 'a genuine Kissinger
in a parliamentary system of govern-
ment. Mr. Brandt explained to me he
must always deal the Foreign Ministry
into diplomatic games because the Min-
ister, Walter Scheel, also heads the
Liberal (E.D.P.) party, whose minority
coalition participation keeps Brandt
Chancellor.
Therefore, Mr. Brandt says he can
only use Mr. Bahr as a special agent on
an ad hoc basis and not as a full-
fledged Kissinger. That would risk
splitting the coalition. Even with this
limitation, there is irritation in the
Foreign Ministry because of Bahr's role
and a feeling that at times the ministry
is insufficiently informed.
Mr. Brandt also emulates President
sytiteril af ihniteneiitS
apart from Bahr. Horst Ehmke, Mints
-
ter without Portfolio, has been a
trouble-shooter doing something like
the White House jobs of Messrs. Halde-
man and Ehrlichman. Herbert Wehner,
Social Democratic floor leader in the
Bundestag, serves as an idea man for
32
the Chancellor.
A somewhat comparable situation
exists in England. Sir Burke Trend is
the closest thing to a Kissinger. When
Henry Kissinger himself goes to Lon-
don and wants to talk with an alter-
ego he consults Sir Burke. Under the
British.governing system Mr. Kissinger
knows that whatever he confides to
Mr. Trend goes to the Prime Minister
himself, not just the Foreign Secretary.
However, no genuine Kissinger
would be tolerated by the English -
Cabinet, which would resign if there
were one, or by Parliament, which
would raise hell. On two occasions
when a Prime Minister tried to use the
Kissinger formula ?during the 1938
appeasement of littler and ripripg the
I956 Suez c011ahofatifin withFfRiikie
and ifirfull---,-thoro were explosions of
wrath after the news eventually,
leaked.
As Cabinet secretary, Mr. Trend is in
charge of assembling the views of all
ministers concerned with any problem
and, if possible, with compiling op-
tions for Prime Ministerial decisions.
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But Trend is a nonparty civil servant.
He was just as loyal to Harold Wilson
as he is to EdWard Heath. When Mr.
Nixon and Mr. Heath have a personal
summit, Messrs. Trend and Kissinger
first work out the approximate agenda.
In France, where the position of
President is nearer to that of Mr. Nix-
on than the position of Prime Minister
in England or Chancellor in Germany,
Michel Jobert has an easier time and
less inhibited authority than his
. equivalents in London and Bonn.
Mr. Jobcrt is immensely intelligent
and hard working. He often looks tired,
rarely emerges in Paris society, is
frequently called to the Elysee even
on Sundays. He takes an annual one-
month holiday but returns to Paris
every week. Although he has one
weak arm, he plays a determined game
of tennis, likes to paddle a kayak and
is a passionate gardener.
Mr. Jobert is in charge of everything
that passes the President's desk; for-
eign policy only occupies about a third
of his time. His job is to coordinate,
and to get the proper experts working'
on any problem that arises. ,
, When U.S. Ambassador Watson
(recently resigned) arranged Mr. Nix-
on's Azores meeting with Mr. Pompi-
dou, the entire matter was handled be-
tween the White House and the Elysee;
with Watson and Jobert discussing the
details. Neither the State Department
nor the Quai d'Orsay knew about it
until the program had been settled.
Nobody in France's executive branch
has any complexes about not dealing
with the Foreign Ministry. President
. Pompidou, like General de Gaulle, con-
siders diplomacy and defense "reserved
domains" which the Elyse? runs. Mau-
-rice Schumann, head of the Quai
d'Orsay, has no more ultimeas
ity than William Rogers, Lord of
Foggy Bottom. Each is hoist by hiS
own Kissinger.
NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 72
A. Shrewdness
Of Kissingers: III
Sulzberger
PARIS?Henry, the;:proto-Kissinger,
s CAM to his' job: -with an': analytical ,
'brain, a brilliant 'reputation as a- Har-
yard prefessor and considerable polit-
ical experience: He worked for a while .
:with President -Kennedy :but quit be-
'cause he disagreed over, General de
Gaulle..Then he became'. Nelson Rocke-
feller's foreign, policy expert. -Itocke-
'feller recommended. him to ?resident
Nixon.- ?
Mr. Kissinger arriVect at the White
House at an appropriate moment.
Washington, which had experimented
with Presidential agents before., was
even more ready' for the formula be- ,
'-cause the bureaucracy had become?.so
?swollen. Mc Kissinger soon realized
that one of his functions would be to
drive this hureaucraCy, ',above all the
State Department,: against its' inclina-
tions. ? , : ?
' He 'saw that all around the World
foreign policy -was in ?the process of
Moving from foreign ministries to" the
office of the chief of government. What
was occurring in the United States
,was part part Of a global
? Mr. Kissinger originally regarded his
primary function as that of eliciting
options from various Government ex-
perts and presenting these for Mr.
Nixon's choice. The job grew as these
options dealt with increasingly im-
portant matters and Mr. Kissinger be-
came a roving ,negotiator.
, ? The growth of his influence inevi-
tably produced frictien with the State
Department. He; had no desire to quar-
rel with Secretary Rogers, an old friend
,of Mr. Nixon, , whereas Mr. Kissinger
was a German-Jewish immigrant with
a foreign accent who had previously
.been linked to Mr. Nixon's rivals.
But conflict :was: inescapable, ? Cabi-
net Secretaries tend to. be spokesmen
for their own bureaucracies rather than
Presidential ?spekesmen to their bu-
reaucracies : Nor did. the State Depart-
ment like Mr. Kissinger dominating
policy questions. ? ?
:Mr. Kissinger contended he didn't
formulate: policy but: only forced the
President to come up with alternatives
'on a day-to-day basis as problems
arose. Mr. Nixon had his own 'coherent
philosophy on foreign affairs and didn't
intend to he anyone's rubber stamp.
. The White Hotise-developed' a new
kind of blueprint for long-term policy.
This was featured in 1972 by the Pres-
!ideatial trip to 'Peking, which was re-
garded by Mr. Nixon as a bifurcation
in the road, and 'to Moscow, which was,
regarded aS a historical landmark. The
Chinese option was held as essential
to Americas Soviet policy.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
:This Conception heavily influenced
the US. attitude during the India.'
Pakistan war. China supported ,Paki-
stan -and felt that if the United 'States
reacted against Soviet-backed Indiajas
it did ineffectually), Peking could ex-
pect American, reaction should China -
be attacked. ? , ? ,
Washington also reckoned: Moscow ?
would get wrong ideas if it felt the.
U.S. was-too weak to react at all for'
-its 'ally, Pakistan. So the nuclear car-
rier Enterprise was sent to, the Bay ,
of Bengal as a token warning that
India shouldn't attack West Pakistan. ,7
It was also believed this would dis-
courage Egyptian President Sadat
from carrying out his promise to start '
another round of Palestine War.
These calculations were part of a
global concept of American policy.
They didnot seek Indian enmity nor:
did they reckon on sudden ChineSe
delay. Washington continued to regard ?
Japan as its permanent ally- in the ,
Pacific and saw China-continuing as'An
opponent.
These decisions, when taken togeth-
er, may be regarded as a kind of cli-
max in the -Presidential method of ;
policymaking and cannot yet be as.'
sessed. Notwithstanding, in many ways ,
the Kissinger approach has proven its
value?ultimately depending on wheth-
er it can wind down the: Vietnam war.,
- It was the judgment of the Kissinger
office?more than a year before the.:
event?that Moscow would pull its im-
mense military -establishment out of
Egypt. It was the Kissinger office:
that cooled a potential crisis with Mos-
cow about a submarine base in Cien-
fuegos, Cuba. It now seeks to jar;
policymakers into reckoning what may
happen to Yugoslavia when President
Tito dies.
Mr. Kissinger has become an inter-
national figure. The Atsembly of West-
ern European Union recently discussed
"the very particular manner in which
United States foreign policy, is con-
ducted. by Dr. Henry Kissinger,"
adding: "On more than one occasion
there has been evidence that Dr. Kis-
singer's own conduct of foreign affairs,
has been independent of the State De-
partment, which may not always have
been kept informed."
The- point, is there is nothing tin,
constitutional about it. That is simply
the way Mr. Nixon', who is charged
with making policy, wants to work.
ExecutiVe. diplemacy is practiced in-
creasingly in other countries. The
grumbling heard in Foggy Bottom is
by no means unfamiliar in other twen-
tieth-century capitals,
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WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1972
Rowland 14:17an5 and Robert, Novak,
Factor in Cabinet-Making:
A Possible Kissinger-Connally Clash
PRESIDENT NIXON has confided
to political intimates that one reason
he did not press John B. Connally to
become Secretary of State was his con-
cern that Connally could never work
harmoniously with Dr. Henry Kis-
singer, Mr. Nixon's top foreign policy
aide.
As Mr. Nixon views it, a clash of
powerful personalities, both skilled in
the underworld wars of competing bu-
reaucracies, would inevitably break
out if Connally took over the State De-
partment while Kissinger remained in
charge of the National Security Coun-
cil machinery.
Mr. Nixon gave the matter much
thought last fall, when William P. Rog-
ers, a victim of repeated humiliations
as Secretary of State, was prepared to
resign beginning Mr. Nixon's ECCOMI
term. Rogers then changed his mind
about leaving, partly because of last
fall's flurry of press criticism. White
House aides now believe Rogers will
stay no longer than one more year. .
Kissinger is also believed to be plan-
ning his departure around the end of ,
1973, although developments abroad
could change that tentative timetable.
He has informed colleagues at Har-
vard, which gave him an unprece-
dented four-year leave of absence with
full proterthm of tenure, that he does
not plan to vet urn.
Thus, I he grand entrance on the dip-
lomatic scene of the former Demo-
cratic governor of Texas may occur
early in 1974 as the possible spring-
board for a switch in party registration
and a run for the Republican presiden-
tial nomination. This is precisely the
Connally scenario expected by some
Nixon-wise White House aides.
A footnote: Kissinger's grand strat-
egy of a peaceful world in which the
U.S. controls the balance of world
power contradicts- COMIally's chauvin-
WASHINGTON POST
1 JANUARY 1973
Kit;si cr
gerti ShunS
L9 1{4'11
By .lane Denison
'United Prv,, lnir rim tional ?
Despite clamors in Congress
to find out what. is going on in
Vietnam and the Paris peace
talks, Secretary of State Wil-
liam P. Rogers and presiden-
tial adviser Henry A. Kis-
singer have refused to testify
on Capitol Hitt this week.
istic goat of a world dominated by the
U.S., from trade to monetary relation-
ships to military power.
The irony of the 'reform drive
against the congressional seniority sys-
tem is that its only possible victim is
one of the reformers' favorite commit-
tee chairmen: Rep. Wright Patman,
the 79-year-old populist from Texas.
After much agitation,, the reformers
now seem likely to subject every coin-
mittee chairman to formal endorse-
ment by the House Democratic caucus.
The only chairman who might fail that
test is Palman, whose age, erratic be-
havior and autocratic methods as
chairman of the Banking Committee
will generate opposition votes in the.
caucus.
However, that's not at all what the
outside reformers have in mind. They
are not so much interested in purging
erratic, autocratic, old committee
chairman as in dumping conservative
chairmen. Thus, the recent broadside
by Common Cause against the senior-
ity system 'does not include Patman in
its rogues' gallery of high-handed com-
mittee chairmen. The reason: Officious
though he is, Patman s year-around
vendetta against the banking industry
fits the Common Cause line.
Conservative Rep. W. R. (Bob) Poaite
of Texas is no winner of House popu-
larity contests and will receive sonic
"no" votes for retention as agriculture
committee chairman. Some doves will
vote to remove Rep. F. Edward Hebert.
of Louisiana, personally popular but
'hawkish, as armed services committee
chairman. A few southerners might op-
pose Rep. Charles Diggs of Michigan, a
black man, to become the new chair-
man of the District of Columbia com-
mittee.
But only the vote on Patman will be
close, and even he probably will sur-
vive.
A footnote: the post of house ma-
jority whip (No. 3 in the Democratic
hierarchy), now appointive by the
speaker, would become elective by the
caucus where it not for the aggressive
campaign for whip being waged by lib-
eral Rep. Phillip Burton of California.
Even old-line establishment Demo-
crats believe that since the whip's job
has become a stepping-stone to
speaker, it should be made elective.
But they don't want 'Burton on the
leadership escalator and would feel in -
comparably safer with Speaker Carl
Albert's presumed appointment, Cali-
fornia Rep. John McFall. They would
relent, however, if they were certain
that the caucus would elect a less pas-
sionate liberal than Burton ? say Rep.
Morris Udall of Arizona.
C.4.9
The otherwise unfathomable selec-
tion of Texas politician Anne Arm-
strong, co-chairman of the Republican
National Committee, to begome a Cabi-
net-level counselor to President Nixon
was a hurried .move to head off criti-
cism from women.
A coalition of women's groups was
about to blast Mr. Nixon for failing to
include any women in the second-term
Cabinet, when the White House bur,
riedly turned to a stunned Mrs. Arm-
strong. Though Mrs. Armstrong is an
effective party politician, nobody
claims she has the background for a
job originally designed for the estima-
ble Dr. Arthur Burns, now chairman .of
the Federal reserve Board.
OD 1972, Publishers-Hall Syndicate
Their refusals, it was to defer the meeting for a also had declined to appear
learned yesterday, were given, short while," State Depart.- , before the commit Lees. Ile has
to the chairmen of the Senate' I ment spokesman Charles W. regularly declined invitations
Foreign Relations and House I Bray said yesterday. to testify before Congress, eit-
Eoreiroi Affairs committees "The secretary does wish to inn "executive privilege."
shortly after the White House keep the Congress as fully in- Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-
Saturday announced a halt to :for ned 'as possible and after Ark.1, chairman of the Senate
tie! heavy bombing of the Ha- Congress reconvenes he will Foreign Relations Committee,
noi-Daiphoug area and the im- he in touch." i4aid he was disappointed but
pending resumption of peace The committees had invited not surprised.
negotiations with North Viet- , Rogers and Kissinger at the' "I'm very sorry that they
nam :tan. 8, i height of the 12-day bombing didn't, feel free to meet with
VjeW of the imminent re- ! blitz to appear on Tuesday, i the committee and talk about
the present sit union." he said
in an interview. "But that's
not unusual. They (the
,admioistration) haven't, been
disposed to consult with the
incwal of the negotiations, the the day before the 9.(1 Con-
secretary does not cansider it gress convenes.
I would be appropriate !to meet d Though there was no official
with I he committees next , White House announcement,
week and believes it would be Informed ad mt nisb ion
l more useful to the committees,i sources said that Kissinger t 'Congress for some Wm',"
. .
34
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.04
Rat
WASHINGTON STAR
10 December 1972
11
By JAMES J. WADSWORTH
and JO POMERANCE
The SALT arms control agreement is a
step in the direction of a more secure world.
But the arms race is not over.
Indeed, while President Nixon has char-
acterized the SALT agreements as signifying
a "new era of mutually agreed restraint," he
at the same time ordered full speed ahead on
new strategic weapons systems. It becomes
all the more important, therefore, that the
United States and the Soviet Union press for-
ward on negogiations on a comprehensive
test ban?the measure which, above all,
would signify that the superpewers are se-
rious about halting the arms race.
' ONE OF THE arguments used by op-
ponents of a comprehensive test ban agree-
ment among the nuclear powers is that it
would eliminate the testing of nuclear de-
vices for peaceful purposes.
This opposition is based on the scientific-
ally valid point that these tests could not be
permitted since they might be used for weap-
ons development to circumvent a test ban
agreement. It Is contended that a total test
ban would, therefore, force the termination
of the highly touted U.S. Plowshare Program.
But the fact is that the once promised
boon to man of peaceful nuclear explosions
may be a dangerous and perhaps worthless
activity.
There have been two types of industrial
applications of peaceful nuclear explosions.
One is for large-scale excavation proj-
? ects, such as forming new harbors, the con-
struction of canals and the creation of passes
through mountain ranges for railroad and
highway routes.
The second is designed to fracture large
volumes of rock underground ,for the purpose
of recovering natural resources, particularly
natural gas and oil from shale deposits.
Other underground applications are for
the creation of underground storage facilities
for fuels and waste disposal and the pos-
sible stimulation of geothermal heat sources
for electric power production.
After several years of experience it is
doubtful that any of these applications has
proved to be practical.
The United States has halted develop-
meat of devices for excavation. There have
been no tests since 1970. In that same year '
a government commission concluded that a
peaceful explosion for creating a new canal
across the Isthmus of Panama was neither
technically feasible nor politically acceptable.
The tests conducted through 1970 showed
that while radioactive emissions from these
testa had been redueedi 41110i WA? h fill a
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problem.
Fallout presents not only environmental
and safety hazards but a political risk as
well. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963
prohibits any nuclear blast that causes radio-
active debris to drift beyond the territorial
limits of the nation conducting the explosion.
This is apparently a condition that cannot be
guaranteed with the excavation type of peace-
ful explosion. Other excavation projects
once considered and now cancelled include a
harbor excavation at Carle Keraudren, Austra-
lia, and plans to blast a railroad pass through
mountainous terrain in the U.S.
The Plowshare device for the recovery
of oil, gas and other natural resources has
also been unproductive. The list of projects
proposed and later cancelled is long. These
include Project Sloop?a plan to recover cop-
per ore; Projects Bronco and Utah?both
designed for oil shale recovery, and Projects
Wagon Wheel and WASP?for natural gas
stimulation.
Of all these plans and programs promoted
over the years only a gas stimulation program
in the Rocky Mountains is now funded by the
Atomic Energy Commission.
There are three problems associated with
the concept of natural gas recovery by nu-
clear explosion?economic, technical and en-
vironmental. The program can be economic-
ally viable only if the price of natural gas
increases considerably over the present mar-
ket. To reduce the radiation received by con-
sumers, the gas from the nuclear-stimulated
well must be diluted with gas from other
sources at least tenfold before being shipped, i
a requirement that many experts consider
impractical.
The full program for gas recovery calls
for the detonation of 4,000 nuclear devices of
1000 kilotons each in 1,000 wells over a 20-
year period. The regions where the explosions
are to take place?Colorado, Utah, New Mexi-
co, Wyoming and Arizona?contain areas of
high natural rock stress. It has not been
established that these nuclear blasts won't
cause earthquakes.
PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS can also
cause the proliferation of nuclear weapons
capability. Several near-nuclear powers, such
as India, Israel, Japan and even less tech-
nically sophisticated nations such as Brazil,
are understandably interested in whatever
benefits may be produced by the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
But any nation could conceivably test
nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful-
uses programs requiring nuclear explosions..
And who can be sure that any nation might
not attempt to develop nuclear weapons to
meet a rot or irjpu1OFR. iq lig 134iii7:
ity oiti3ifiliPPR 414'114001141 prestige
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and power.
The evidence is persuasive that the Plow-
share programs may be more trouble than
they are worth. The excavation program has
been hailed without achieving technically
suitable devices for application. Nor have
ways been found to overcome the safety,
political and international problems.
On balance, the entire program is simply
not promising enough to impede the complet-
ion of a total nucleai test ban. No provision
for continued Plowshare device development
should be contained in a test ban agreement
since the chances of weapons application are
too high and the potential benefits of these
devices as peaceful explosions are lbw.
UNTIL THE BENEFITS of peaceful nu-
clear explosion are conclusively established,
the nuclear powers should declare a mora-
torium on these explosions as part of a com-
prehensive ban on all .tests.A careful evalu-
ation could be conducted by an international
-authority, perhaps the International Atomic
Agency, to ?determine under what conditions
peaceful explosions could be conducted in the
future, if at all.
Now that the American people have given
President Nixon the "four more years" he
wanted, he should move forward to negoti-
ate a ban on all nuclear tests.
The name of the Plowshare program was,
of course,inspired by a Biblical passage from
Isaiah, "They shall beat their swords into
plowshares, and their spears into prunning
hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against
'nation, neither shall they learn war any
more." The true spirit of that ancient admon-
ition can best be realized by not allowing our
modern-day Plowshare to stand in the way
of the pursuit of peace.
* 0 0 0
Mr. Wadsworth was the chief U.S. nego-
tiator at the Geneva disarmament conferences
in the late 1950s and early 60s. Mrs. Pomer-
ance is a consultant to the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on
arms control and international organization.
NEW 31011C TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1972
Press Curbs Stir Fleet Street
legal restraints than their col:
Search at Magazine leagues in the yJnited States.
There is no wraten constitu-
.
Poses New Issue tion, for example, containing
provisions for freedom of the,
on Freedoms
By ALVIN SHUSTER
Spedal to The New York Times
, LONDON, Dec. 25?Some four
.'weeks ago, at 10:30 in the
:morning, two Scotland Yard
!men walked into the offices of
ithe obscure Railway Gazette, a
monthly publication with a cir-
culation of 12,000. After pro-
ducing a search warrant, they
proceeded to spend nearly three
hours opening filing cabinets
and desks for clues concerning
a leak of a Government docu-
ment on proposed changes in
the country's railway network.
The incident is stirring a
national controversy and rais-
ing new questions about the
'relationship between the Gov-
ernment and the press. Mem-
bers of Parliament and the press
,described the search as a sinis-
ter blow to the freedom of the
press. And Richard Hope, the
Gazette's editor, charged last
week that his telephone had.
been bugged by the police. !
The dispute, which has in-'
volved Prime Minister Heath'
in parliamentary exchanges, i.c!
the latest in a series focusing
on Fleet Street, Britain's publish-.
Ing district. The Sunday Times!
of London, which printed the
rail report, was recently stopped
by a court from publishing a
definitive article on (he deform-
ing drug, thalidomide. oni
ground it might influence
gothitions for settlement or n,
mill foe tltuttages by the drug's
victims,
. Stringent Legal Restraints I
British - editors, of course,
recognize that they operate
under much more stringent
years ago, for example, Sylves-
ter Bolam, editor of The Daily
Mirror, went to jail for three
months for articles on a pend-
ing murder trial. Nine years
press. ! ago, two reporters, Reg Foster
Accordingly, newsmen 'here and Brendan Mulholland, went
often look with envy at the to prison for refusing to reveal
freedom enjoyed by American their news sources to an offi, I
reporters, despite recent court .cial inquiry into a spy ring.
decisions against the press in The dispute over the Gazette ;
the United States. Libel laws, raid, which Mr. Heath defended I
the rules of contempt, the
claims of parliamentary privi-
lege and the laws covering
secrets are all much tougher
in Britain.
The case of Wiliam T. Farr;
the Los Angeles journalist now
in jail for refusing to reveal
his sources, dramatically illus-
trates the differences. During
the Charles. Manson murder
trial in 1970,. Mr. Farr wrote
in an article that one of' the
Manson "family" had confessed
to a plan to kill Richard Burton,
Elizabeth Taylor and Frank
Sinatra. Mr. Farr then refused
to reveal who had told him.
In Britain. Mr. Farr or his
editor would probably have
been arrested' within an hour
after that article appeared on
the streets, not necessarily to
be questioned on his sources,
but on the grounds- that his
report was prejudicial to the
defendants and hence was in
contempt of court. Reporters
here may report only what is
said at a trial, and may not
go beyond it.
No Protection for Newsman
If Mr. Farr had been called
before a court here to reveal
his sources, there would have
been no doubt, about: the nut.
route. Ite would either talk or
go to 011, There is no legal
preertleitt to prolet'l it newsman
who asserts that his informa-
tion, was given in confidence.!
The press here 'has learned'
Twenty
from bitter experience the
limits on its scope. l
in the House of Commons, also
underscores the restraints on
newsmen. So few Government
documents get out. without a
minister's approval that the
circulation of one stirs a huge
inquiry.
"There are so ninny classified
documents floating around in
Washington that nobody pays
any attention any more, unless
it is really.big," said one editor
here. "One document floats1
around here?an innocuous one;
at that?and they call in- Scot-
land Yard, produce search war-
rants and' touch' off a major
controversy."
Eyes on the United States
Against this background of
their own problems, British
editors are viewing with ex-
treme interest the events in
the United States after the
Supreme Court decision hold-
ing that the First Amendment
did not exempt journalists from
the obligation to testify before
grand juries whether or not
they were protecting their
sources.
"We regret what we see go-
ing on there," said Anthony
Howard, a former Washington
correspondent and now the
editor of The New Statettitum,
"I've always Mt: It was far
easier to be a reporter in
Washington than in London."
"Small things illustrated it
all for me,". he went on. "Take
that State Department book
with all the home phone mini-
hers of every official. Try and
36
call a 'Foreign Office man- out-
side the press office at night
or on the weekend. You'll never
get his number.
"Another example is the
budget. You actually get briefed
on, the thing before it's an-
nounced. A Chancellor of the
Exchequer whispers an innocent
word about the budget before
he speaks in the House and,
he's out of a job."
Other newsmen who have,
worked both sides of the Atlan-
tic agree. Here, for example, a
reporter usually has trouble
getting into any Government
building, from the Ministry of
Newsmen Have Far
Moro Restrictions
Than in U.S.
Defense to the Department of
Environment, without a specific
appointment with an official.
"British officials remain espe-
cially secretive, and particularly
sensitive to the idea that any-
thing that they say or do might
be discussed by the public that
they are supposed to serve,"
said Joe Rogaly of The Finan-
cial Times. "Anyone who has
lived and worked in America
knows the difference: it is like
night and day."
The reluctance of British of-
ficials to speak frankly to the
press is backed by strong legal
powers, particularly the 60-
year-old Official Secrets Act,
which guards the Government
from overzealous newsmen. Un-
like laws in the United States,
the act makes no distinction
between security inforination
and other Cinvernmelit dOcu
meets,
hi the etuterift of the itiqoiry
Into the rail report, for ex-
ample, Harold 1.:vtim:, the editor
of The Sunday Times, seas also
visited by policemen who sug-
gested that he might face pro-
secution under the Secrets
Law. Calling the inquiry al
"sinister farce," The Sunday'
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Times said it was intolerable:
that the raids should follow
Publication of a document that
has "no relevance whatever to
national security."
Secrecy Even About Trees
lAs it now stands, the
Secrets Law makes it a crime
to publish anything at all from
official documents of. any de-
partment, unless its release has
been authorized. Charles Win-
tour, the editor of The Evening
Standard, who has long cam-
paigned . for changes in the
law, has often noted that even
would be an official secret.
Even gardeners working for the
Government must sign a pledge
under the act.
There is no doubt among
editors on Fleet Street, for ex-
ample, that they would have
been promptly jailed if they
had published anything resem-
bling the Pentagon papers.
The Government is now con-
sidering changes in the Secrets
Law to permit a larger flow of
information, but editors remain
doubtful that any new legisla-
tion would make life easier for
them
the number .of trees blown The severe libel laws are also
I down in a park during a gale a constant source of restraint
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
on newsmen here, who again
cite the relative freedom of
American newsmen to say just
about what they wish about
public officials.
It is much easier to collect
under British law, and public
figures and others often win
large damages
Such laws have had a par-
ticularly inhibiting effect on
the press in investigative re-
porting, for example, on corrup-
tion involving officials. A news-
paper would rarely accuse an
official of wrongdoing unless
the police decided to move
against the offender.
Another crucial distinction
between the two countries,
often cited by editors here, is
that reporters generally have
far less status than they do
in the. United States. The re,:.
sult is an inbred mistrust of
the press on the part of many
senior officials.'
If a government minister is
known to be friendly with re-
porters, he is somehow regarded
as rather odd. Journalists in
general, as one editor Put it,
"are not the types ministers
feel they would normally have
down for the weekend!'
2? 7?
DAVID FAIRIIALL and LUELLA PICK on Europe's latest East/West talks
? .A..11 11
L
some American congressmen 34-motion European Security
THE; paradox about Mutual
and Balanced Force
Reductions?a piece of dip-
lomatic jargon as irritating as
SALT is appealing?is that
although nearly everyone in
NATO wants to talk about
them, the prospect of the
talks actually succeeding
makes a lot of people dis-
tinctly 'nervous.
This nervousness is concen-
trated,. as one would expect.
among the M Lary men
rather than the politicians.
And It is based on the simple
arithmetical fad, that. if you
have two numners, one bigger
than the other by a certain
ratio, reducing each of them
by the same absoiute amount
Increases the ratio.
It happens that all the
.obvious, numerical indicators
by whichsone might compare
the military strength of NATO
with that of the Warsaw Pact
in .Northern and Central
Europe?manpower, divisions,
tanks,' or aircraft?show a
heavy advantage for the
Eastern Block., And the same
is true to a lesser extent
even if one compares toe
NATO forces with the Soviet
Union on its own. For
example, the Institute of
Strategic Studies' count of
main battle tanks on these
fronts shows that NATO has
0,000 and the Warsaw Pact
10,000 (of which 10,000 are
Russian).
Such crude comparisons, of
course, may give only the
vaguest idea of the true
. military balance in a
'particular area. But
unfortunately that is not the
point. The SALT negotiations
have demonstrated over the
past two and a half years how
'difficult it is to escape, in.
this sort of bargaining, from
simply counting the number
of roughly . comparable
objects on each side. Quanta-
"7\
77 fr-1 rr-714--.\? 74) fc--1 9 A-
'13 tt.)v a
still objected to the
discrepancy,
If one does use straight
arithmetical comparisons
balanced " has to mean
" proportional," which imme-
diately gives the Warsaw
Pact negotiators something to
complain about, however
unreasonably. And that is
just a start. If one talks in
terms of proportional with-
drawals of, say, American and
Russian troops from Central
Europe. one. tot would be pull-
ing back a fv?v hundred miles
to their bases in the Soviet
Union while the others were
airlifted 3,000 miles across
the North Atlantic.
NATO commanders are
already worried by the com-
Parative weakness of their
conventional forces and what
they regard as complacency
among some members of the
alliance. As. soon as they
start trying to think what
MUT might actually mean,
they get even more worried.
They fear that the end result
might be a lopsided dis-
armament which left NATO
simultaneously less able to
defend herself and less con-
vinced of the:. need. to do so.
Yet they have to admit that
if such negotiations . could
eventually prompt some
measure of real disarmament,
as opposed to in shuffling
the military pieces around, or
even just help to build mutual
confidence in each other's
peaceful intentions, they
should be worth trying. Even
such a small thing as an agree-
ment to tell the other side
about major troop movements
in advance would be useful.
THE Finns can breathe a
sigh of relief and, for a
month, relax their internal
security arrangements. The
preparatory talks for a con-
tive differences were allowed ference on European Security
for in SALT to some extent; and cooperation have been
for example when the Ameri- recessed, and many of the
'cans agreed to allow the visiting diplomatic firemen,
Russians a higher number of who ,came to help their
missile launchers because Ambassadors, are leaving for
many Of their own 'were fitted home.
with Olitlilint independently They . leayt, without any
tattiimpo warneotis, tirni Octston on the proposed
Conference. The NATO coun-
tries only agreed to conic to
Helsinki after years of pres-
sure from the Communist
block and even if the con-
ference is convened this sum-
mer they are determined to '
get a carefully worded
agenda that will not prevent
them from bringing up ques-
tions of freer flow of people
and information.
? The preparatory talks have
made little headway beyond
eStablishing reasonably good
.relations., Rumania sought to
assert its independence of the
Warsaw Pact, and to ensure
that neither these consulta- ?
' lions, nor the sr.'eurity con-
ference itself, would be con-
ducted on a block to block
basis. The NATO countries
and the 'Warsaw block say
they accept this premise. Per-
haps the most interesting
phenomenon of this ? initial
phase has been the degree to
which the. nine members of
- the enlarged EEC have man-
aged to cooperate.
In the past few days the
conference representatives
began to work at the organisa-
tional asPect of the main con-
ference. This subject will lie
resumed, along with, detailed
examination of the agenda in
mid-January. So far, there is
agreement that. the confer-
mice should be held in three
stage:, opening with a Foreign
Ministers' meeting, then break-
ing up into working commis-
sions, and concluding with an-
other high-level meeting. But
they have not yet decided how
many commissions there
should be.
Quite a few gaps will have
to be bridged before agree-
ment can be reached on an
agenda for the security con-
ference, The Russians want
to put all the emphasis on
a declaration or principles
guiding relations between
European States in the hope.
that this will establish the
status quo in Europe. And
with the establialiment of a
they would like to back Ith,hios
permanent uftdy,
Western countries seeflu 'soy
ust Itoting nut or the deelara-
lion of principles, but intend
to use other conference
agenda items to work towards
breaking down existing
barriers.
They want to talk about
expanding East-West trade
? and other exchanges. They
oppose the idea of a per-
reanent organisation on the
grounds that this could lead
to unwarranted interference
in internal affairs. On ,the
other hand, they want
fidence building " measures,
such as mutual ? advance
notice of troop movements. ?
Russia, as well as most.
NATO countries, are agreed
that questions of military.
security should best be dis-
cussed at the Mutual
Balanced Force Reduction
negotiations which will be
conducted in . parallel.
Rumania, as well as some of
the smaller Western coun-
tries,' would prefer the
security conference to
negotiate on military ques-
tions. But they will not get
their way. . Switzerland,
assuming its traditional rele
of neutral' and mediator, is
suggesting the security con-.
ference should set up a
mechanism for settling dis-
putes between European
States. There is a great deal
more to discuss when the Hel-
sinki talks resume on
January 15.
1
WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1972
Charges by IPI
ZURICH?The Interna-
tional Press Institute in its
annual review accused the
U.S. government of trying to
"chip away" at press free-
dom through the threat and ;
use of court action. It said: ;
"The intention . Ili .
make the itourriallsit iti
readardli rdf the fiiP4 ling
thopolAin tiovvonEi wilpvt
confrnotod by a reporter
asking for them.. . ."
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NEW. REPUBLIC
16 December 1972
There a Way to Eradicate the Opium Poppy?
?
The ?Heroin Supply Problem, ?
? by Peter J. O0crnibene
. -
There's no business like the illicit drug bUsiness,.
, Peasants harvest by hand the poppy fields of Asia to
collect the raw opium which they sell for $12 to $32 a
kilogram, depending on its quality. A simple chemical
process converts 10 kilograms of opium into a kilo-
gram, of heroin which can bring retail, sales on the
streets of New York of a quarter of a million dollars.
With. illicit opium production estimated to be in excess
of a million kilograms a year, the heroin trade has a
$25 billion a year potential, roughly the annual sales
of General Motors and more than the gross national
product of Switzerland. Most illicit opium is thought
witio enter the international market.
Heroin'. traffic has been supported by legitimate
American businesses which supply the products used
.to distribute the drug. Two years ago the House Select
Committee on Crime documented one corporation's
sales of small (11/2 inches square) "glassine" envelopes
to a stationery store in Harlem. They are sometimes
used by stamp collectors but more often used as heroin
bags. Of the company's 1969 production of 152 million
of these envelopes, 140 million were sold to New York
City businesses. The Harlem stationery store probably
did noCsell the 52 million it bought to. philatelists.
Quinine hydrochloride and mannite are two of the
materials used to "cut" or dilute pure heroin. A typical
formula might be three ounces of marmite and two
tablespoons of quinine lo an ounce of heroin. Quinine
of course has a legitimate use as an anti-malarial drug,
.and mannite has been used as a children's laxative.
Crime committee 'investigators found Ailinine. .and
marmite readily purchasable (at high prices) in several
New York drugstores. One Harlem pharmacy' has sold
40,000 ounces of quinine, buying it for $3 an ounce
and selling it for up In $35, Ivhile also moving an in-
credible four tons of mannite at $5 a pound. Malaria
and constipation have little to do with these sales.
Stopping the sale of glassine envelopes might have
a temporarily disruptive effect on the heroin 'trade, but.
other means of packaging, such as gelatin capsules/
can take their place. 'Quinine and marmite could be
replaced by other diluents such as lactose and dex-
!rose. To present an obstacle to drug trafficking one
must eliminate the source 'Of supply.
The war against the supply of heroin has so far been
more a series of skirmishes than an alkout offensive;
but it has had its suceesses. The Cabinet Committee
on International Narcotics Control reported in Septem-
38
ber that worldwide seizures of heroin and ,morphine
base had increased from 7.3 tons. in 1970 to 21.6 tons in
1971; 1972 seizures were said to be running at twice
those of :last year. Turkey limited cultivation of the
opium poppy to four provinces this year and will ban
it altogether next year. Paraguay extradited to the
United States a man alleged to have headed 'an opera-
tion which smuggled three to six tops of.heroin into
the US, but the cabinet committee did not report that,
his ring had been put out of business. Th'ailand, staged.
a well-publicized but allegedlY phony burning of
thousands of pounds of opium.
Progress will probably continue to be measured by
such episodes, but incremental steps can be counter-
acted. Higher prices for raw opium could turn sub-
stantial amounts now retained for local Consumption
into international traffic. The governments of Burma,
Thailand and Laos have no control over the so-called
"Golden Triangle" where most of the world's illicit
opium is now grown. Similar situations obtain in
Afghanistan and Pakistan which produce about 12
Percent of the world supply of illicit opium. The cabi-
net committee estimates it costs about $4000 to set up
a "laboratory" which can process 100 kilograms of
heroin a week. Even if we succeed in ,getting those
nations, suclv as Paraguay, which are used as trans-
shipment points to stop their heroin traffic, labora-
tories could he quickly set lir ill ow remote Asian
areas where opium is .grown, and new channels of
distribution ?"direct from factory to you" 7- could be
established. By the time we catch on to the changed
pattern, a new one might have replaced it. It hap-
pened before when we thought the key to controlling
heroin was the Turkey-Marseilles-New York route: the
so-called French connection. Now most of the illicit
opium is grown in the Golden Triangle. If the com-
mittee's estimate for heroin seizures in 1972 is correct,
officials will have succeeded in capturing four percent
of the world's illicit opium crop.
In spite of the magnitude of the heroin supply prob-
lem, the step-up in heroin seizures has apparently had
some effect. The price of heroin on the street has gone
up while the purity has gone down; undercover agents
have reported difficulty in purchasing the drug. Nek
son Gross, the State Department's senior adviser On
internotIoned noreottes mattpr5, lelieveb that A "gli011.
age of drugs, will then tend to drive addicts into treat-
ment; as well as prevent them from addicting others
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who might be tempted to experimeht %yith the drug."
There seems to be some truth in Gross', statement: the
number of heroin; users in treatment ',has increased
appreciably in the past year. But there is a darker view.
The addict who has. been feeding his $40 or $50 a day.
habit by crime may increase his criminal activities to
cover the. higher costs of getting heroin:Some might:
turn to ;barbiturates or other drugs. More might seek
a drug rehabilitation program; such as methadone,
maintehance, only to stave 'off the pain of withdrawal,:
until street heroin becomes available at cheaper prices.:
Dick Gregory used to say: "If a twelve-yean-old kid
ini Chicago can find a dope pusher, why can't the
cops?" Now he talks about nine-year-olds on heroin.
Sometimes ?police arrest heroin pushers only to find
their hard work frustrated by other elements of the
criminal justice system. Take the matter of bail. In the
southern (judicial) district of New York during the
1960s, there were 121 bail forfeitures, and 77 of them
were by persons facing narcotics charges. These 77
. forfeited bails totaled $836,200. Even a drastic increase
in bail for persons arrested as narcotics couriers? has
?
had little effect. US attorney told the House Select
Committee on Crime that bails for South American
couriers had gone higher than $100,000. but that "every
South American that's been arrested in the past three.
years 0967-70] . . . who has posted cash bail, and I
can't think of anyone who has done anything but post
cash bail, every single one of them is a fugitive:" .
The law enforcement problem cannot be laid en-
tirely on .the doorstep of the courts however. The
Knapp Commission hearings in Ne* York found that
some police officers there were being paid off by drug
traffickers, an odious alliance that has led to a complete
breakdown in law enforcement in some Communities.
One resident told the House committee about police
pay-offs in his South Bronx neighborhood:
You see a squad car come up. You know. where the?
building is so you see a squad car come up.. One .
of them will get out of the car and go in the base-
ment, go in the hallway, or go in the back of the
store and they will stand there talking for a while
and then come back and get in the car-and this is 6
regular routine all the way down.... You under-
stand, like there is three shifts. Every shift must
. get his pay,. no one shift for the whole term, the
whole 24 hours. There is three shift changes .
A woman from the same community described whot
happens when heroin activity is reported to the police:
1
We have seen people buy and sell the dope. We
have seen them' bring the dcipe in. We call the
police department. They ask your name, .phone
number; and what apartment you are in.l... In the
, meantime if you go around police headquarters
you will find my name there about 50,900 times.
called and they ask your name. FirsCI [wouldn't
tell the,m. They tell the addicts somehow. They
come to your house and do things to you. They
. push your door in, and they beat your children. up ?
or they give your children a needle. !' ?
1
In April the Justice Department established a "her-
oin hotline": a toll-free number (800-368-5363) which
citizens can call from anywhere in the United States?to
report suspected narcotics traffic. withotlt revealing
?1 their own identity. Although 33,000 phone calls were
received in its first three-and-a-half months of opera-. ?
tion, only 5200 were considered "serious calls." These....
calls, in turn, led to the arrest .of 14 p. erscins .and the:.
,seizure of four-and-a-half kilograms of !marijuana,
'3300 doses. of LSD but only two gram's of.heroin. The ?
.Justice Department has awarded 'a Madison Avenue
firm a $124,000 contract to publicize the hotline.
' "Once the opium poppy is .cut and the opium gum
is diverted to the illicit market and processed into her-
oin," concludes one General Accounting Office study,
."it is a formidable task to prevent the herOin from en-
tering the United State's." The Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs and the Customs. Bureau have made
? modest increases in their worldwide strength, and
diplomatic efforts are being made to induce other;
governments to cooperate in eradicating illicit opium.
cultivation. These efforts, unfortunately, have so far
been unsuccessful because' the governments of Burma,
Thailand and Laos, for example, cannot 'control the
Golden Triangle' where remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's
defeated ? army rule the opium trade like "warlords"
(to use one government official's characterization).
If the US is to face up to the magnitude of the heroin -
supply problem, it will have to realize the limits of the
conventional methods it is now using and consider
some unconventional ones. If American reconnais-
sance satellites can pinpoint the location of Russian
missiles, might they nOt also be able to locate opium
fields? If the governments responsible for opium-
growing areas.cannot control them, the United States
might be able to assist these nations with its tech-. .
nology and resources. We used defoliants- and other ?
chemical agents* to destroy trees in Vietnam; perhaps .
that same technology might be used to destroy the
opium Poppy. The heroin supply is too, vast to ,be
controlled by ordinary intiana?
?
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THE r.coNoiviisT DECF:1111117.R 23, 1972
e--77ti
I) r(7')(7.: -c;
that wasn't.
The Russians, as well as Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese,
had better look at the consequences of more war in Vietnam
There is no reason that a liberal should accept why the
two Vietnams ought to be reunited until it has been,
shown that a majority of the people in both of them, or
at least of those in the south, wish it to be so. Until
that 'happens, a liberal would add, South Vietnam should
have a government of its own based on some sort of
reasonably accurate measurement of the preferences of the
South Vietnamese. Most people in the west would accept
those principles, as principles ; after all, it is what they
say about that other divided nation, Germany, and they
would be outraged if one half of Germany sent its army
into the other half in order to insist on putting its own
preferred sort of government into power there. The
difference in 'Vietnam is the reluctance of so many people
to apply these principles as the necessary test of the terms
on which the war is ended. It was imprecision in applying
this test that lcd Mr Kissinger to say on October 26th
that "peace is at hand," when it turns out that it was
not. The same imprecision is now making many bone-
weary people say that he should nevertheless embrace in
December the consequences of what he let his eye slide
over too easily in October:
. By sending his bombers back north of the 20th parallel
this week, and losing quite a lot of them, President Nixon
has reverted to the argument of force to end the war.
He is using the means at his disposal, as the North Viet-
namese used the means at their disposal when they sent
their army over the 1 7 th parallel in the spring. They
employed the firepower carried by their army ; he is using
the? firepower of his air force. The pictures from An
Loc and Quang Tri show that there is not much difference
between them in what they do to the places where the
artillery shells or the bombs fall. But there is a fundamen-
tal difference, and it should be recognised, between the
purposes for which Mr Nixon and the North Vietnamese
politburo are using the different sorts of power available
to them. Mr Nixon is using the argument of force to try
to get the North Vietnamese to agree that the next
government of South Vietnam should be chosen by a more
or less violence-free election. 'rite North Vietnamese are
using their sort of force to try to insist that that govern-
ment should itself be the product of the further violence
which they and their friends in the south would bring
to bear after a nominal eensetirc. These are the two very
different meanings that lay concealed beneath the skin of
the agreement that seemed So close in October.
? Mr Kissinger, and those who hoped he was right, had
their eyes fixed on the passage in clause 4 of the agree-
ment which said that "the internal matters" of South
Vietnam were to be settled between "the two South
Vietnamese . parties." By saying that, North Vietnam
, seemed to be renouncing its own claim to decide what
should happen in the south ; and if the North Vietnamese.
kept out of it all there was little doubt that .the ndry-
cominunists would win a large majority in the election.
Presided 'linen has long been offering to hold after the
ceasefire: It is true, of course, that clause i of the agree-
40
matt paid due respect to the unity of Vietnam. But it
was hoped that that was the equivalent of the letter the
west Germans have sent to the east Germans about
Germanl unity, a form'al but at the moment non-operative
reminder of their right to bring the subject up again later
on. If North Vietnam carried out its promise (clause
'7) to withdraw its troops from Laos and. Cambodia, and
if its men in South ,Vietnam had a real team of truce
supervisors watching over them, it seemed that the North
Vietnamese army could be more or less neutralised. And
? from 1965 onwards the removal of the North Vietnamese
intervention has been the main argtirnent used to justify,
the American intervention.
That was the pattern Henry Kissinger thought he saw
in the agreement, but Le Due Tho plainly saw a different
one. It ,has been known for some time?from Cosvn-6,
the document the communist headquarters issued in mid- ,
September?that the Vietcong has been telling its men to '
organise undercover squads for a campaign of "tyrant,
elimination, abduction and assassination" after the cease- ,
fire. Mr Thietes army and police force could probably
cope with that if North Vietnam's 14 regular divisions'
really did stay out of the war. But the sort of inter- ,
national inspection system the North Vietnamese turn out',
to have been calling for makes it highly unlikely that they ,
ever intended tp stay out of it. They apparently proposed -
a total of 250 men for the whole of Indochina, only half
of whom would actually be allowed to travel around the
countryside, and even those few would have had to rely
for, transport on the people they wanted to inspect.. ,
Two states in one nation
11 would be a bad joke, if. the old control commission
set up in 1954 had not stopped people laughing about
supervisors 'who supervise nothing. Such a handful cot
inspectors could not possibly know what ,General Giap's
men were doing in South .Vietnam, let alone check that
they had got out of LAOS and Cambodia. This is not the
proposal of men who, in the Guardian's bland phrase on*
Wednesday, " know that they . . cannot win." It seems
only too likely that North Vietnam's leadtrs wanted
nobody watching their' army while ,it pursued its own
definition of victory in the south after the last Americans
had left. The question of the supervisory force is not .in
itself the one last decision that Mr Kissinger says the.
North Vietnamese still have to take. 'That decision is to
leave the politics of the south to the southerners, within
' the procedures already agreed to in October 1. but the
powers of the supervisors arc a decisively important t4st
of,' whether North Vietnam is really ready for that. I
What Mr Nixon is still trying to get is the Vietnamese
version of what lick nrtintic hnstdati4(1 for in tlermaily i
the acceptance by North Vietnarreg leaders that there
are 1.` two states within one nation." The INorth
narnese went part of the way to accepting that in October,
when they dropped the idea that the United States should"
remove Mr Thicu front power, and put a coalition goveht-
ment in his place, before they would agree to a ceasefire.
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i
But they will still be evading the central isst:te. so long as .
they refuse to accept any real limitations o i what' th irl
1
army can do after a ceasefire. Perhaps they are trying toi
take advanlage 9f the difficult moment Mr Nixon I as
created for himself just before Christmas, by allOw4ig,
the expectations of peaCe to outrun reality and the wiVes
and mothers to think that the American prisoners were
as good as home. Perhaps ? they believe that 'the newt
Senate, with two more Democrats in it, I will cut off
funds for the war. But they know that, if that 'does noti
happen, Mr Nixon is pretty well free, from Political con-
straints at home until 1974 or 1975, when he will w;!.nt,
to start making his preparations for Ameriea's? bicent6-,
ary ; and although he is not going to make it his polic.y,
to bomb them back into the stone age?that :brutal pliriise
'used years ago. by one foolish American general, and; so
often put into other Americans' mouths since. then-1h,
,can cause a great deal of damage to No th Vietnam. ,
:They have their calculations to make.
'The Brezhnev calculation . I
,So do the Russians. What happens now, will be a.
:measure of, whether there really is a nest 4-elationship..
between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is
Russian-supplied missiles, and Russian training in using
'thcm, that shot down six B-52s by Thursday ; since
the B-52s seemed almost invulnerable until . recently, it
' is even, passible that the equipment which brought them
down was scut into North Vie00011 (hiring the two-
month halt of bombing north of II e 20th iparallel, 11 is
almost certainly Russian oil pumped in over the Chinese
border that keeps North Vietnam's war machine in action,:
? ... There is assumed to be a tacit understaiOing between'
. Mr Nixon and Mr Brezhnev. If the United States provides
the help that Russia needs to overcome tl.e inefficiencyi
of its economy, and underwrites the politi al division of
Europe, the assumption is that the Soviet U . ion will help,'
among other things, to end the Vietnam War in a way
compatible with Mr Nixon's definition of peace with
honour. It is hard to imagine Mr Nixon quietly proceeding.
with his part of that understanding if the Russians
continue to help the North Vietnamese to make the other
part impossible: if the centrepiece of Mr Nixon's second.
term ? has , to be a choice between continued war in
Vietnam and the acceptance of defeat. That is not how
Mr Nixon wanted his next four years to be. The Vietnam
war stretches out its consequences into many parts of the
world. That is why it has been so long and terrible a war,
. and why it is so difficult to end; and .why iMr Brezhnev,
: on reflection, may not choose to use it as r rug to whip.
: from undgr Mr Nixon's feet.
;
, NEW YORK TIMES
4 January 1973
Congress Demands Peace
Whatever 'its impact on the negotiating position. of
the other side, it is now clear that President Nixon's
- 12-day aerial blitz against North! Vietnam has had a.
backlash at home that Cannot but affect the American; -
bargaining stance.' When Henry Kissinger returns to thq
Paris talks, he will have, in addition to Presidents Nixoti
and Thieu, an aroused Congress looking over his shoulder.
Republican Senator Saxbe's prediction last week that ,
"all hell is going to break loose" unless the President
changes course in Indochina appears to be sustained by '
the angry mood in which Congress has convened. The
Democratic majority in both houses ha S gone on record
demanding an immediate end to American involvement
'in the Vietnam conflict. Leaders in both houses have.,
warned that unless a settlement is speedily negotiated
?by Inauguration Day on Jan. 20, accsording to Senator..
Fulbright?Congress will move to cut off further funds '
for the war effort.
Even members of his own party are faltering in their
support of the President's policy. Senator Percy of.'..:
Illinois could not muster more than a 16- to - 10 vote
among Republican Senators in support of Mr. Nixon's .'
efforts "to end the tragic conflict in Indochina no*
through a negro hi Id settlement," Senator Saxbe, whOse,
defection was early and notable, spoke for many In kith
parties when he cited the indignation of "the average
upright American who's had enough.''
It is beyond dispute that, as Administration spokesmen ?
have taken pains to point out, this ugly division. 'does-.
not offer the !most favorable basis for American partict-
pationjn the, coming negotiations. The ',fault, however,...'
does not lie with the critics whose patience has been:,,.
tried beyond endurance through four long years: It rests;i
rather with a President who has sacrificed his most.:?
precious bargaining asset?the confidence and ?support';\
of a free people?by arrogantly disregarding the Coil-
guess and ordering military actions that have horrified ,
the civilized world.
Mr. Nixon can regain the unity and self-respect this, ?/
nation .desperately needs by abandoning the dangerous'-, ?
illusion that negotiation through terror is the sane
as negotiating from strength and by sending Mr. Kissin-
ger to Paris with instructions to seek an accord that
will guarantee the speedy safe return of American troops ,
and prisoners from Vietnam. This fundamental objective.
has the support of all Americans. It appears to be within ?
reach today, just as it was apparently within reach last .
October when Mr. Kissinger proclaimed that peace was -
"at hand."
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NEW .YORK TIMES
3 January 1973
A Last ,oduiobling- Scene
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS?When President Nixon re-
ceived French Foreign Minister Mau-
rice Schumann last September he said
he wanted to end the Indochina war
before his reinauguration (which he
already expected) in order to wipe
clean the diplomatic slate for major
negotiations with Western Europe and
Japan.
There now seems to be some chance
that this desire may be realized. Con-
tacts between American and North
Vietnamese delegations have resumed
nt whin i: "c.c.:gun:1W"
and the iCissingor-i_g
begin again Monday.
If there is any logic to the situation
?which may at times be doubted?
new pressures favor an end to the
fighting, at least for U.S. involvement
Whether there will be a total halt to ,
the purely Indochinese and purely po-
litical civil war (involving. three coun-
tries) is less probable.
Washington is certainly eager to get
out of the conflict. Now that the Sai-
gon Government has been given an
impressive arsenal of ground weapons
and tactical aircraft, the White. House
clearly assumes the South Vietnamese .
should be able to look after themselves
. for a considerable time to come.
Moreover, merciless bombing of the
North during the December aerial of-
fensive that followed interruption of
Paris negotiations has undoubtedly
curbed the possibility of any serious
resumption of the Hanoi offensive so
frequently bruited as a possibility.
Indications are that both Moscow
and Peking .he been active in trying
to encourage a settlement although it
is not easy for either capital to indi-
cate anything other than full endorse-
ment of the North Vietnamese and
Vietcong. France, which has little
power in the area involved but more
experience than anyone else, has add-
ed its own diplomatic wisdom.
From the American viewpoint, Mr.
Nixon is eager to start a new foreign
chapter which will prove far ? more
important when regarded by future his-
torians, focusing on the primordial
areas of Europe and Japan that can
tilt the power balance in this multi-
polar world.
He also knows an angry Congress is
about to assemble on his doorstep, a
Congress in which both houses are
dominated by his opponents. These leg-
islators have been incited by hostile
official opinion abroad where a "reli-
gion" of unconditional peace has been
widely expressed, most shrilly in Swe-
den.
And, although polls indicate Amer-
Approved
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ican public opinion is so far less exer-
cised, the influence of important and
adverse newspaper criticism, when
taken up and echoed by Congress, may
veil change this situation if a settle-
ment isn't swiftly arranged. All ob-
jectivo factors therefore indicate a
speedy formula is likely to be agreed
upon in Paris and even truculent and.
suspicious Saigon seems aware that
this is inescapable.
thi-,-,ritir? Indochina r.onflizt
kitirmg Nur
-
II after Japan occupied what was then
a French colony. Vichy French, Gaul-
list French, Japanese, ;Chinese and
small groups of Vietnamese were all
involved before Tokyo surrendered in
August, 1945. That same month the
Vietcong's predecessor, Vietminh occu-
pied administrative buildings and pro-
claimed a republic.
The French struck back and a series
of negotiations occurred at Dalat, Viet-
nam, and at Fontainebleau in 1946
but, after the struggle renewed that
December, massive bloodshed set in.
It hasn't ceased yet. The Indochina
conflict has tarnished every participant.
In January, I qo, napalm was used
as a weapon for the first time in his-
tory?by the Frqnch. When (after the
1954 defeat at ?Dienbienphu and the
Geneva Accords) France withdrew,
there was a surcease of only seven
years before flip United States, at first
tentatively, mOVed in. The Americans
used more napalm plus, for the first
time, six-engined jet bombers, laser
bombs and new types of delayed-ac-
tion mines.
Hanoi's generals, With Soviet aid,
built up the greatest antiaircraft artil-
lery ever seen and developed remark-
able improvements in the tactics of
revolutionary warfare. And what both
North and South Vietnamese did to
trr 'Jr% :th-;IW-
clittIng and deiiberate terror, beggars
description.
Now, just as a quarter of a million
French troops departed in 1954-5, the
last of more than half a million
American troops are clearly on their
way out, leaving the Vietnamese to
each other's mercy, which is not re-
nowned for tenderness.
Whether, months or years hence,
there will be a ;renewed war for that
unification which has been denied to
Ireland, Palestine, Germany, India and
Korea, no one can predict. But this
week the last quibbling scene of a sor-
did Southeast Asian tragedy began.
DAILY. TELEGRAPH, London.
19 December 1972.
7774-74 rl'INA 1,7ii7 tr7 'FP A f7.4
ILALifti 01:2,1 .a LOLA 1.1
WRITING YESTERDAY in a leader xvhich, like the rest of
The Daily Telegraph and for reasons beyond our control,
was seen only by our Northern readers, we emphasised that
the final Vietnam peace agreement must close all loopholes
against abuse. Evidently this is what President NIXON is
determined to do, rather than to bow to the storm against
him with which his domestic adversaries are seeking
revenge for their election failure. By making. one of their
main complaints the fact that the 500 American prisoners
will not now be home for Christmas, and by accusing Dr
KISSINGER of bad faith rather than the devious and
secretive Communists, they arc once again playing Hanoi's
game.. Hanoi tried to double-cross Mr NIXON into signing
just before the elections. They are now doing the same
with regard to the Christmas deadline. It is sad that the
prisoners ? Will - not be home. But it would be in1initel3i
worse if, after the Americans and South Vietnamese have .
sacrificed so much, the Communists should be allowed to
gain at the conference what they failed to gain in battle.
Mr NIXON is once again being true to his pledge not
to allow this to happen. , While still leaving all doors open
for negotiations, he has resumed the bombing deep into
the North which he stopped two months ago to imprbve?
the atmosphere. In the South the intensity of the fighting
continues to grow, as does the weight Of American bombing
on North Vietnamese reinforcements and supplies, which
ate now flowing on a great scale. Dr KISSINGER Was right'
to accuse Hanoi of planning to launch a major offensive -
under cover of a cease-fire.
Mr NIXON'S enemies are blaming President Tatty- for
the deadlock. But the differences between Mr N/koN and
Mr THIEU should not be exaggerated. Mr Thicu's toughness
in resisting American pressure has vastly enhanced his
already considerable stature as a national leader, and
also that Southern patriotism Which, throughout; has been
one of America's main objectives
42
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WE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1972
Hanoi Pressing Its Charge That
3 JANUARY 1973 "
WASHINGTON POST
a11.0i. Sit ys
U.S. Snagged'Talks
POWs Ask
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Tittles
WASHINGTON, Dec. 28 ?
North Vietnam has undertaken
an effort to convince Ameri-
cans and others that the Viet-
nam negotiations broke down
in Paris not because of its re-
calcitrance, as charged by
Washington, but because the
United States made new de-
mands that reopened the entire
scope of the negotiations.
According to Hanoi's account,
!Henry A. Kissinger sought ma-
jor changes in at least five
'areas of the draft agreement
reached in October, and this
produced counterdemands by
North Vietnam and the ac-
knowledged impasse.
? Hanoi has also nsserted that
Mr. Kissinger, the chief Ameri-
can negotiator and President
Nixon's adviser on national se-
curity, said at the Paris talks
on Nov. 24 and 25 that the
President would launch heavy
bombing raids over North Viet-
nam if the United States pro-
posals were not accepted.
Several Channels Used
North Vietnam's rationale for
the collapse of the negotiations,
and the stepped-up Amierican
bombing, is being made known
through several channels. Xuan
Thuy, the chief Hanoi delegate
to the regular, semipublic Paris
talks, provided a public explan-
ation when he appeared last
Sunday on the American Broad-
casting Company program
"Issues and Answers.'
Additional amplification has
been given to Tom Hayden, a
leading antiwar activist, and
David Livingston, a New York
labor leader who opposes the
war, by Hanoi officials in Paris
in recent days. The Americans
have relayed these views to
The New York Times in sepa-
rate interviews.
Hanpi's arguments occasion-
ally parallel the official Ameri-
can explanation given by Mr.
Kissinger at a news conference
on Dec. 16; but they are more
often at odds with his remarks. c
The North Vietnamese i
sources said that Mr. Kissinger a
made the following substantive P
proposals, which, they said, d
would have changed the agree- P
ment drastically if they had t
, been accepted.
NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS e
The Hanoi officials said that t
Mr. Kissinger, claiming to be t
speaking for Saigon, indirectly
raised the issue of withdrawal t
of North Vietnamese troops ed
from South Vietnam. For in- th
stance, Mr. Thuy said, "Kissin- in
ger insisted that there should Ii
be some phrase, some sentence S
in the agreement, implying the
total withdrawal of North Viet-
namese forces."
North Vietnam has always
refused to acknowledge the
145,000 troops it is said to have
in South Vietnam, and Mr.
Kissinger said on Dec. 16 that
although Saigon might want a
total withdrawal, that was not
the American position. The
United States, Mr. Kissinger
said, wanted language, how-
ever, that would "make clear
that the two parts of Vietnam
would live in peace with each
other."
VIETCONG RECOGNITION
Hanoi claimed that the origi
nal draft accord called fo
formal recognition of the Pro
visional Revolutionary Govern
ment, or Vietcong, as one o
the two political forces in
South Vietnam after a settle
=ire
But the Hanoi officials said
that Mr. Kissinger wanted to
eliminate any mention of the
Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment. They said that he
was trying to get language in
which only the Saigon Govern-
ment would be recognized as a
legitimate force in South Viet-
nam. This issue has not been
discussed by the United States
in public, and Hanoi did not
provide specific examples.
"I
NATIONAL COUNCIL ROLE
The original draft accord
called for the establishment of a
Council for National 'Reconcili-
ation and Concord, with repre-
sentatives from Saigon, the
Vietcong and neutralists par-
ticipating.
The Hanoi officials said that
because of Saigon's concern,
Mr. Kissinger wanted to reduce
the importance of this council.
They said that the original
agreement provided that the
council would be organized on
a national and a local level,
but that Mr. Kissinger, in the
latest talks, wanted to elimi-
nate the lower levels of the
council.
Mr. Thuy said that the origi-
nal accord had set up the coun-
il as a body to oversee "the
mplementation of the signed
greements, of the cease-fire, of
reserving the peace, and of
eciding the modalities and
rocedures for the general eleo-
ions and to organize the elec-
ions." He said that in the lat-
st talks, Mr. Kissinger wanted
he council only to organize
he general elections.
Mr. Kissinger, in discussing
he council, said that the Unit-
States wanted to make sure
at the group could not be
terpreted as a disguised coa-
tion government, to which
aigon objects.
SUPERVISORY FORCE
Mr. Kissinger said at his news
conference that Hanoi's propo-
sal for an international super-
visory force was inadequate to
maintain the cease-fire since it
would allow only 250 inspec-
tors instead of the 5,000 sought
by the United States. The North
Vietnamese sources said that
the American plan would im-
pinge on the right of Vietna-
mese to conduct their own af-
fairs. Hanoi insisted that it
would live up to the cease-
fire provisions , and rejected
'American claims that it was
preparing to violate the cease-
fire.
Mr. Hayden said that the
North Vietnamese had assert-
ed that the military provisions
of the 1954 Indochina agree-
ment had been carried out with-
out violation even tough the
International supervisory force
had been limited to 350 men.
American officials have assert-
ed that in October, Hanoi agreed
to the 5,000-man force. Hanoi,
however, has not acknowledged
this.
? PRISONERS
The original accord called for
the release of American prison-
ers of war within 60 days, pa-
rallel with the withdrawal of
American forces from South
Vietnam. It called for the re-
lease of political prisoners in
South Vietnam within 90 days,
Hanoi said. Mr. Thuy said that
at the latest talks Mr. Kissinger
had made the release of politi-
cal prisoners ? mostly Viet-
cong?contingent upon the with
drawal of North Vietnamese
forces."
American officials have:iruli-
cated in recent days that Hano-
oi, in retaliaticm made a new
proposal linking the rele4o of
American prisoners to the re-
lease of political prisoners.:
Tell of Bombing Threat
The Hanoi sources insisted
that Mr. Kissinger had threat-
ened them with renewed; and
heavier bombing similar to
what is now going on if the
American proposals were: not
accepted. That is why, Mr.
Thuy said, children were evac-
uated from Hanoi on Dec. 3,
before the breakdown ir( the
talks.
End of ar
TOKYO, Jan. 2 (AP)
North Vietnam Said today
that 30 American prisoners of
war, including 20 crewmen
from 13-52 bombers . downed
recently, have issued a Joint
statement urging the U.S:'
Congress to try to help end'
the Vietnam war.
The official Vietnam News'
Agency broadcast. the text of
the statement and the names
of I he 30 POWs. Hanoi had re-
ported the capture of all them'
previously.
? The statement recalled the
remark made in late October
gw _Henry Kissinger, President
Nixon's adviser for national
security, that "peace is at
hand" in Vietnam.
"But," the statement contin-
ued, "now the war is more
; fierce than ever before, and
American lives are in grave
jeopardy from the round-the-
clock attacks. This contradie?
tion compels us to add our
voices to the public opinion In
' our country. Whether we have
been detained for a few days
or several years; it is impor-
tant that you hear us.
"We strongly appeal to the
members of Congress to exer-
cise all your legal and moral
power to bring about peace."
Included among the 30
POWs, were Lt. (j.g.) Joseph
E. Kernan, of Washington,
D.C., and Capt. Marion A.
Marshall, of Hyattsville, Md.
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WASHINGTON POST
4 JANUARY 1973
Joseph, N7r--
Mr. Nixon's Decision
'Compromised' Dr. Kissinger..
? IS HE the little Dutch boy, finger in
the dike stemming the tide of disaster?
,Or is he just a good German lending a
cover of respectability to whatever
' monstrous policy President Nixon is
pleased to pursue?
Those questions now have to be
'raised explicity about Henry Kissinger.
For since the 12 days of murder-bomb-
ing against North Vietnam, the an-
swer is not clear.
It used to be. For most of the past
four years, Dr. Kissinger has been an
undoubted force for good.
A supreme example is the accord
with Russia in the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks or SALT. President Nixon
entered office hostile to an agreement.
limiting defensive missiles, or ABMs,
which had been projected by the John-
son administration.
As late as January inn, Mr. Nixon
was moving toward full development
of an American ABM?a step that
would have precluded any limit on ei-
ther offensive or defensive missiles.
.But Dr. Kissinger organized within the
administration a process of analysis
which showed that an effective ABM
could not be built. By the same means
he demonstrated that it would be pos-
sible to monitor any secret Soviet
moves to develop a full-scale ABM
.system.
The upshot was not that Dr. Kis-
singer changed the President's mind.
What he did was build a track along
which the President was able to move
toward what eventually became the
Moscow agreements on arms limita-
tion.
Apart from such activities, Dr. Kis-
singer acted as a bridge to foreign
leaders not easy for President Nixon
to approach. In that. respect, the clas-
sic example is Premier Chou en-Lai of
China.
From, his first encounter with Chou,
Dr. Kissinger sensed as not many
Americans could sense?how much ab-
stract principle mattered to the Chi-
nese Communists. On that Inisis he
was able to eut a deal whereby this
country acknowledged a set of prince
'pies that pointed to an eventual rever-
sion of Formosa to China.
On Vietnam Dr, Kissinger has been
at all times the chief proponent inside
the administration for a political set-
tlement ? "The Don Quixote," as he
once put it, "of negotiations." At the
end, when a negotiated settlement
seemed possible after years of effort,
Dr. Kissinger not surprisingly became
euphoric. He overestimated, and over-
stated In public, the easiness of bring-
ing President Nguyen Van Thicu of
South Vietnam to support the agree-
ment worked out with Hanoi.
Even so the agreement he worked
out was the best one possible. It se-
cured the return of American prison-
ers and gave the Saigon Government a
very good shot at survival. By estate
"Ming a rei'dtutteitetion program,
?
gave Hanoi a powerful incentive to
abide by the ceasefire.
Moreover, Dr. Kissinger was not the
only one who believed that peace was
"at hand." The President thought so
too, and said as much publicly on a pre-
electoral swing through Kentucky.
Subsequently President Thieu and
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker reached
the President with the argument that
Hanoi was going to break the ceasefire
as soon as the Americans withdrew
from Vietnam. When American efforts
to tighten the agreement yielded only
counterclaims from Hanoi; Mr. Nixon
broke off the talks. He launched the 12
days of murder-bombing to give Hanoi
a foretaste of what would happen if in
fact the Communists did break the
ceasefire,
Dr. Kissinger may have opposed the
murder-bombing. But he certainly did
not. put everything he had into the
fight against what is probably the
worst step taken by the United States
In the memory of most Americans. On
the contrary, several members of the
Kissinger staff felt free to advocate
the bombing and to knock the original
agreement worked out by Dr. Kis-
singer.
Furthermore, Dr. Kissinger did net
organize a canvass of the rest of the
government. As it turns out, there was
significant opposition to the bombing
inside . the Defense Department, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central In-
telligence Agency and the State De-
partment.
Despite all this, Dr. Kissinger re-
mains perhaps the only instrument for
effective foreign policy available to
President Nixon. But he has been eom?
-
promised and everybody in town knows
it. Unless he gets a new mandate from
- the President ? the kind of mandate
he 'can. only get by being made Secre-
tary of State?he Rhould probably re-
sign in the next year.
ei 1973, Puhillthern-liall Syndic:an
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
20 December 1972
weir must
The strategy now adopted by
President. Nixon in Vietnam is
:horrifying. Heavy bombing has been
resumed against targets throughout
North Vietnam, including some in
and around Hanoi and Haiphong.
At Ihe same time naval guns are
born rd big the coast of Vietnam
including targets along its entire
length, according to the US Navy's.
statement yesterday. What good will
all this do ? Nothing is likely to. be
achieved that can remotely Justify
the death and destruction now '
being wrought by American guns
and bombs. That the Vietcong and:
North Vietnamese 'have resumed
thoir? offensive operations in parts
of the South is deplorable,, too, but
the political reasoning behind it is
more intelligible and the devasta- ?
tion less frightful than that caused.
by massive air and til'a bombe rd-
nneits. For the wretched people of
North and South the war is being
resumed in all its misery and terror.
Does President Nixon really
believe that he can bludgeon- the
North Vietnamese back to the con-
ference- table ? Rather the reverse'
will happen. They are likely to
break off diplomatic contact and dig.
in .for months more of siege. They ?
are tired of the war, of course, and
by now they must know that they
themselves cannot win. The Tet
offensive failed in 1963 and the
Spring Offensive this year also
failed. This year neither Hue nor
any other major town OPcit y in the
South captured, although the
en :1q,k.U.1.
.11
Communists gained ground.. Al-
though they believe that time is on
. their side they have repeatedly
failed to achieve a decis;ve victory,
Everyone on lp recognise that
this is a war that cannot be won,
except at an intolerable cost. ?
The proper course for President
Nixon when Dr Kissinger's negotia-
tions had to be broken off?if they .
had to be, which remains unclear=
was to resume only limited military
activity. In truth, unduly heavy
bombing had already beendaunched
in the past few weeks. after the
Presidential election but before the'
negotiations were ended. That was ,
wrong, and the strategy now is
worse, rt is the action or a man
blinded by fery? or incapahle of
Seeing lite consequences of what he
is doing. Does Mr Nixon want to go
down in history as one of the most
in and bloodthirsty of
American Presidents ? Has he any,
concept of how he will end the
war ? For end it he must. To
unleash the bombing again with full
ferocity is a grave error even from
his own viewpoint. Far from
strengthening the American bar-
gaining position, it will convince .
many people inside and Outside the
United States that unconditional
Withdrawal is now the only course.
The President ought to be left in
no? doubt that his action is wholly
abhorrent,
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NEW YORK TIMES
27 December 72
Power
Without
Pity
By James Reston
WASHINGTON, Dec. 26?President
Nixon has sent the bombers over
North Vietnam again, but it is hard
to see how this air war can go on
for long at the present rate.
In the first place, there are not that
many legitimate , military targets in
North Vietnam and the cost to the
United States of the present offensive
is also rising steeply. North Vietnam
claims to have shot down eight B-52's
and one F-4 fighter-bomber since the
Christmas recess, and the U.S. com-
mand acknowledges the loss of eight-
een aircraft and seventy flyers since
heavy raids began on Dec. 18.
Second, the President no longer has
the excuse that this heaviest bom-
bardment of the war is essential to
stop an enemy offensive. The White
House spokesman, Ronald Ziegler,
linked the air raids to the threat of
another Communist drive but no evi-
dence of this was ever produced and
the plain fact is that nobody, believed
him. He has since given up this part
of his charade.
Third, the President has mounted
this aerial war while the Congress was
in Christmas recess and has never ,
offered a single word of explanation
as to why it was necessary or what it
was intended to achieve.
The result is that he has left the
Impression that he is bombing, not
as a necessary instrument of war but
as a brutal weapon of negotiation,
and that he feels free to turn the
bombing on or off as he pleases.
For the last two years, the Senate
of the United States has tried to get
some control of the President's power
to fight the war as he likes, and al-
ways it has failed because a majority
simply would not withhold funds from
WASHINGTON
a Commander in Chief in the middle
of a battle; but the situation is differ-
ent now.
He is not in the middle of a battle
but in the middle of a negotiation and
is insisting on using the same wea-
pons of war to compel the enemy to
accept terms that have never even
been made clear to the American
people.
Also, the excuse given by Or. Henry
Kissinger is that the war is going on
because the Communists elumged the
truce terms, though the impression he
left with French officials and others
in Paris was that Saigon caused the ?
impasse by insisting on sovereignty
over all of South Vietnam, including
territory the United States was will-
ing to leave in the hands of the North
Vietnamese.
Ever since October of 1970, the U.S.
has said it was prepared to arrange
a cease-fire in place, without demand-
ing that the North Vietnamese with-
draw their troops from the South. The
military and political aspects of the
truce were to be separated: there
would be a military cease-fire, the re-
turn of U.S. prisoners, and later on
negotiation between the Vietnamese
themselves about the political future
of Vietnam.
But now the U.S. is deeply involved
in the political future of the country
and is complaining that the North
Vietnamese want to "intervene" in the
affairs of South Vietnam. What did
Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger think the
North Vietnamese would be doing with
troops in South Vietnam when they
agreed to leave them there in the first
place?
This tangle over who ruined the
peace at hand, however, is not the
immediate question. Nobody had
signed anything, and everybody prob-
ably had second thoughts When it
came to the point of decision. The
interesting thing is how the President
reacted to all this, using power with-
out pity, without consultation and
without any personal explanation.
If this is how Mr. Nixon interprets
the mandate of his election, we had
better know it now, for even in the
.long and shameful record of the Viet-
nam war we have never seen such
power used with so little provocation.
This is war by tantrum, and it is
worse than the Cambodian and Lao-
tian invasions, for Mr. Nixon had at
least a strategic .purpose in those
offensives, and back then he ex-
plained what he thought he was doing.
Now, Mr. Ziegler merely says "we
are not going to allow the peace talks
to be used as a cover for another
offensive." If there's not an offensive,
he merely suggests there might be
one. If you're going to bomb North
Vietnam, of course you have to blame
North Vietnam for wrecking the
talks; and if you're asked about South
Vietnam's part in the wreck, you can't
discuss "questions of substance."
Maybe none of this is surprising.
The war has corrupted everything
else, and is now corrupting the Amer-
ican democratic process, not for the
first time. The trouble is that this
sort of thing is bound to produce an
ugly confrontation with the Congress
when the members come back early
in the new year if there is not a lull
in the bombing and a return to the
negotiating table by that time.
Violence of this intensity for such
ambiguous reasons cannot help but
produce trouble on the Hill, if not a
constitutional crisis, and even more
violence in the streets. This was not
what Mr. Nixon had planned for the
beginning of his second term, but he
has treated the Congress and the
people with contempt and even made
a mockery of the Christmas spirit in
the process..
NEW YORK TIMES
22 December 72
Terror From the Skies
Asked whether civilian centers would not inevitably
be hit during the resumed massive air .assault on North
Vietnam, a Pentagon spokesman replied: "No. We don't
strike civilian targets." He then amended his comment
to say: "We do not target civilian targets."
The difference is crucial.
The big B-52 bombers that are being used for the first
time over the heavily populated Hanoi-Haiphong area
are not precision weapons. Normally they operate in
flights of three that lay down a pattern of bombs-20
tons to a plane? which scatter over an area more than
half a mile wide and more than a mile and a half long.
Even if the "targets" were strictly military, a great
deal more than military would inevitably be caught up
in such sweeping devastation, especially in a blitz that
in the first two days alone is estimated to have dropped
20,000 tons of explosives?the equivalent of the Hiro-
shima bomb. Imagine what would happen to New York
or any other American city if a comparable enemy
force were unleashed to attack such targets on the
Pentagon's authorized list as rail yards, ship yards,
command and control facilities, warehouse and trans-
shipment areas, communications facilities, vehicle-repair ?
facilities, power plants, railway bridges, railroad rolling
stock, truck parks, air bases, air-defense radars and gun
and missile sights.
It requires no horror stories from Hanoi radio to
deduce that the destruction and human suffering must
be very extensive indeed. And to what end?
Officials in Washington and Saigon have suggested
that the raids are intended to disrupt a Communist offen-
sive. But military men in Saigon say they have seen no
indication that the North Vietnamese are preparing for
such a strike.
Administration spokesmen have also reported that
this brutal assault is intended to convey, to North
Vietnamese leaders President Nixon's displeasure over
Hanoi's intransigence at the Paris peace talks. Only last
week, however, a responsible American official in Paris
indicated that the impasse centered on President Thieu's
insistence, backed by President Nixon, that any agree-
ment specifically recognize Saigon's authority over all
of South Vietnam. This amounts to a demand that the
Communists acknowledge a defeat they have not suf-
fered on the battlefield.
No matter who is to blame for the breakdown in talks,
this massive, indiscriminate use of the United States
overwhelming aerial might to try to impose an American
solution to Vietnam's political problems is terrorism on
an unprecedented scale, a retreat from diplomacy which
this nation would be the first and loudest to condemn
if it were practiced by any other major power. In the
name of conscience and country, Americans must now
speak out for sanity in Washington and peace in Indo-
china.
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19 December 1972
Margitis Childf;
Congress Moving to Seize the Initiative for Peace
. ALREADY taking shape following
the disastrous failure of the cease fire
negotiation is a determination in Con-
gress to seize the initiative for peace.
This conies out of a growing conviction
that the. White House now has no way
? Out of the tanelcd web that Henry A.
? Kissinger so painfully delineated.
The gloss of optimism he put 04 cne
sorry record of failed intentions and
- the haunting, humiliating 'mernory of
"Peace is at hand" rates as hardly more
than cosmetics. To think that Hanoi
will now negotiate on Washington's
terms is the same kind of wishful
dream stuff of a decade oI tragedy and
frustration dressed up in ignorant pre-
; dictions of light at the end of the tun-
nel and victory just around the corner'.
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans-
field has been steadfast in supporting
past attempts to use the power of the
purse to shut down the war. Three
times the Senate voted to out off funds
for Vietnam after a date certain and
three times the House rejected the
Senate resolution.
THIS has the highest priority for
Mansfield today and he is determined
in the new Congress to try once again
to. compel the Administration to end
? the war and bring the remaining
American troops home. As pest efforts
have shown that is easier said. than
done. But the shock and total disillu-
sion over what had been heralded, in
late October as imminent success gives
it a new urgency. ?
Those considering this coin-so sug-
gest that privately it might even be
welcome to President Nixon. If Con-
gress look the initiative out of his
hands he could say to President
Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon and to
the small right wing fringe here at
home that he had no option but to
move out. The consequences would fall
on Congress and not on the chief
executive. .
This is on the assumption that
Thietes stubborn fear for his own fu-
ture is the root cause of the failure.
Despite Kissinger's kind words about?
compassion and understanding it is
evident that Thiett worked his own
form of blackmail to undermine the
negotiation. Part of that blackmail has
been the vilification of Kissinger over
the Saigon radio in Hitlerite terms.
IF AN)) 'WHEN Congress gets down
to still one more attempt to bring an
end of the shooting the charge will
inevitably arise that this is certain to
prolong the conflict. Every effort to
get a negotiated peace during the past
two years has drawn this same charge.
It was raised against Sen. George Mc-
Govern in the campaign when he prom-
ised to end. the war,. bring home the
troops and the American prisoners im-
mediately after his inauguration, inci-
dentally even his principal foreign
policy advisers who are convinced that
"peace is at hand" was part of a
planned deception on the eve of the
election feel that it made no essential
. difference in the outcome. They con-
sider it to have been a kind of insur-
ance against the use of the war issue,
by the Democrats and an extra push
toward a landslide.
In light of what, has now happened
this is singularly unimportant. What
matters is that the war, goes on with
the massive bombing of the north
adding thousands to the toll of dead
and injured. These, of course, are
"natives" and apparently in the Ameri-
can conscience count for nothing. By
one caleulation four tons of bombs fell
every minute night and day during the
latest round of Kissinger-Le Due Tho
talks.
This will not bring an end to the
war. It will not compel Hanoi to return
to the bargaining table. That has been ,
amply proved in the past. The North
Vietnamese have the will and the ca-
pacity to conduct an underground war '
for an indefinite time terrible though '
the cost may be.
Hanoi has just signed a new military-
economic agreement with the Soviet
Union. This will mean something in
the ability to continue the war. If the
United States goes to even further
lengths to shut off Haiphong Harbor
and bomb the land entries, the hopeful
Nixon overture to Moscow will be in
jeopardy. That is a measure of what
Thieu's demand for victory, and it is
no less than that, can cost.
0 1972, United Posture Bindle/as
NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 72
'We Lust Tell the President'
WASHINGTON?Can we Scientists
'meet in Washington and ignore the
fact that our national Administration
is launching' from this city the most
massive air attacks in history? It is
launching those .attacks against con-
' centrated centers of civilian popula-
tion, while blandly-announcing lists of
military targets that under these cir-
cumstances insult the intelligence of
every thinking person. North victithm
luridly contains military !argots; and a
I3-52 bombing pattern one anti one-
half miles long by one-half mile broad,
dropped from an altitude of :;0,000
feet, cannot pick out targets. Yet such
bombings are now crisscrossing some
of the most densely populated cities
in the world, in an unprecedented orgy
of killing and destruction that hor-
rific people everywhere as Guer-
nica, Coventry and Dresden inu-;e hor-
rifled -them. 'And all in our name.
As scientists we bear a special re-
sponsibility. Explain as we will?that
science is not technology; that most of
us do not make proximity fuses, 13-52
bomb sights and all the sophisticated
super-weaponry of electronic battle-
fields?we have also too often claimed
that our science is the ultiMate source
of all such advance technology, Indeed
in World War IT, which we could re- ,
gard- With some justice as a war of
defense, we were ready to help design
the prototypes of much of the tech-
nological arsenal being used now,
? against one of .the ,smallest and poor-
est of nations?a nation that offers .
so little in the way of military targets.
This arsenal 'is now destroying nature
itself in Indochina, the land, the trees,
the stock annuals, depriving it, poor ,
1)0()pit'of their- 1101110, fields, means of
livelihood and very lives. ?
Can we meet, to talk of nature as
our Government is destroying nature?.
As though' that .were not going on,
directed from this very place? ?
7
Just year ago, as ? we met in 11/
Philadelphia?the city '? of brotherly 'L
love?Our President ordered the re- 'S
sumption of mass bombing of North 1)
Vietnam, which had been halted in .1*
1968, Beginning the Sunday morning .1
after Christmas, Dec. 260 and continu- . "
log, until 'Dec. 3l?,s we met-1,000
hoMbing sorties were flown over North
Vietnam, We know now that bombing of
has continued ever since; and now as ? I)
we meet again in another Christmas ? ?Ig,
season, it is being enormously in-
tensified. A.
?
Is our science to serve life, or Ri
death? This planet that is in our care og
?this environment that concerns us
so seriously?can we talk of ways to
foster and preserve it here while wan-
tonly destroying it there?
We must speak out, as. Americans,
as scientists, against this outrageous
misuse of the fruits of science. for
death and destruction.
We must tell the President where
ve stand. Let us insist, on an Mime-
hate end to thohombing. let its InSitil.
hat, the cease-fire we were told he
vas virtually ready to sign last Oct. 25
c signed now.
This statement was prepared for the
, American Association for the Advance.
nent of Science, and signed by these.
embers: Dr. George Wald, Nobel
aureate, Harvard University; Dr.
alvador Luria, Nobel Latireate,
r. Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Nobel Lau-
cafe, Marine Biology Laboratory,
Vood's Hole; Dr. Everett Mendelsohn,
'cc president A.A.A.S.: Dr.. John
dsalle, Professor of Biochemistry,
coward; hr, W. PetifrtitinP
r. YAurtitiiiijigirY.Galjlsitilotine,r8PitrYofeosfsorMoTtiaitoT
y, Yale University; Dr e Arthur
esting, Director of. the Herbicide
ssessment Commission, A.A.A.S.; Dr.
chard Lcwohlin, Professor of Blot-
y, University of Chicago.
46
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WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1972
The Story. of Vietnam: An Instant Editorial
-"I fully expect [Only) six.more months of hard fight-
'Mg." Genera/ Navarre, French Commander-in-Chief, Jan.
2, 1054.
? "With a little more training the Vietnamese Army will
be the equal of any other army ." Secretary of the
,
Army Wilbur Brucker, Dec. 18, 1955.
:.."The American aid program in Vietnam has proved
an' enormous success?one of the major.: victories of
,.American policy." Gen. J. W. O'Daniel, Official Military
JAide to Vietnam, Jan. 8 1961.
"Every quantitative measurement shows we're winning
' the war. . . U.S. aid to Vietnam has reached a peak and
start to level off." Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara, 1962.
"The South Vietnamese should achieve victory in three
years . . I am confident the Vietnamese are going to
win the war. 1.1'110 Vietcong] face inevitable defeat."
.Adtn, harry D. Felt, U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific
.Forces, Jan. 12, 1963.
, "The corner has definitely been turned toward victory
In South Vietnam." Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary
of Defense; March 8, 1961.
"The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their
own battle, fighting well." Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
April, 1963. '
"South Vietnam is on RS way to victory." Frederick
E. Nolting, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, June 12,
1963.
? "I feel we shall achieve victory in 1964." Tram Van
Dong, South Vietnamese general, Oct. 1, 1963.
"Secretary McNamara and General [Maxwell] Taylor
reported their judgment that the: major part of the U.S.
military task can be completed by the end of 1965."1
White House. statement, Oct. 2, 1963.
? ' ? "Victory . . . is just months away, and the reduction
of American advisers can begin any time now. I can
safely say the end of the war is in sight." Gen. Paul
Harkins, Commander of the Military Assistance Com-
mand in Saigon, Oct. 31, 1963. ?
? '!I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese
must fight. I don't believe we can take On that combat
task for them.' Secretary McNamara, Feb. 3, 1964.
"The United States still hopes to withdraw its troops
from South Vietnam by the end of 1965.'"Secretary
Namara, Feb. 10, 1964.
. -"The Vietnamese . . themselves can handle this
problem primarily with their own effort." SeCretary.
Risk, Feb. 24, 1964.
'''We are not 'about to. send American boys 9,000 ot.,
10,000 miles from home to do what Asian boys .ought to
he doing for themselves." President Lyndon Johnson,
Oct. 21, 1964.
.:..""We have stopped losing the war." Secretary McNa- ?
? mara, October 1965.
q expect . . . the war .to .achieve very sensational
results in 1967." Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador
to South Vietnam) Jan. 9, 1967.
"We, have succeeded in attaining our objectives."
Gen. William Westmoreland, U.S. field commander in
Vietnam, July 13, 1967.
"We have reached an important point when the end
.?
begins to come into view . . . the enemy's hopes are
bankrupt." Gen. Westmoreland,' Nov. 21, 1967..
"We have never been In a better relative position."
Gen. Westmoreland, April 10, 1968. ?
"[the enemy's] situation is deteriorating rather rap-
Idly." Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, White House aide, On.
?
nary 1969.
,
"We have certainly turned the corner in the war.".
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, July 23, 1969. ?
"I will say confidently that looking ahead just three
years, this war will be over. It will be over on a basis
. which will promote lasting peace in the Pacific." Pres. ?
dent Richard Nixon, Oct. 12, 1969.
"This action [the invasion of Cambodia] is a decisive ?
? move." President Richard Nixon, May 9, 1970.
, "General Abrams tells me that in both Laos and Cam-
bodia his evaluation after three weeks of fighting Is
that?to use his terms?the South Vietnamese can hack
it, and they can give an even better account of themselves '
than the North Vietnamese units. This means that our
withdrawal program, our Vietnamization program, Is a
success . . ." President Richard Nixon, March 4, 1971.
"Peace Is at hand." Dr. Henry Kissinger, Oct. 26, 1972.
"We have agreed on the, major principles that I laid .
down in ?my ,speech to the nation of May 8: We have
agreed that there will be a ceasefire, we have agreed
that our prisoners of war will be returned and that the
missing in action will be accounted for, and we have
agreed that the people of South Victnam shall have the., ?
right to determine their- own future without having a
Communist government or a coalition government
posed upon them against their will.
"There are still some details that I am Insisting be
worked out and nailed down because I want this not
to be a temporary peace. I want, and I know you want
it?to be a lasting peace. But I can say to you with com-
plete Confidence tonight that we will soon reach agree-
ment on all the issues and. bring this long and difficult
war to an end." President Nixon, Nov. 6, 1972.
"The United States and North Vietnam are locked in
? . a 'fundamental' impasse over whether they are negotiat-
? ing an 'armistice' or 'peace,' Henry A. Kissinger ac-
knowledged yesterday." From The Washington Post, Dec.
; 17, 1972.
? "Waves of American warplanes, including a record
? number of almost 100 13-52 heavy bombers, pounded
? North Vietnam's heartland around Hanoi and Haiphong
? yesterday and .today in the heaviest air raids of the
Vietnam War." From The Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1972...
"Hundreds of U.S. fighter-bombers launched intensi-
fied attacks yesterday on North Vietnamese air defense
sites in an all-out attempt to cut down the number of .
13-52 heavy bombers and their 6-man crews being shot
? down by surface-to-air missiles." From The Washington,
? Post, Dec. 30, .1972.
"The President has asked me to announde that nego-
tiations between Dr. Kissinger and special adviser Le
Due Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy will be resumed in
Paris on Jan. 8. Technical talk? between the experts will
be resumed Jan. 2. . . . Prilb Pkggideht hag ordered, all
bombing will be discontinued aboVe th 20th infii1141
as long ng gerioti h0A6114ti6iig ai i4ai WW1 agraill
Worot, Wh itow opMetnonalt, Poo, 80, 072,
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WASHINGTON PO:ST
27 December .1972
Stewart Alsop
After the ombino-b, hat's Next If
the Communists Refuse to Negotiate?
,WHAT IS MR. NIXON going to do
now? Nuke Hanoi? Hit the dikes?' Or
just go on bombing North Vietnam
till hell freezes over?
,These ...questions .are being asked ?
rather gloatingly, in a tone implying:
little man, what -now? They are being
asked as though they were questions
Without an answer. And yet there is a
perfectly sensible answer, and Mr. Nix-
on luts already given it,
few tveel before l OM ion; he
was 11SkOd Al it it C10114.-111.0 press
conference what would happen, if the
Communists refused to negotiate -a
settlement. His answer:
:"As far as the future. is concerned,
We ,believe that .our training program
for -the South Vietnamese, not only
oh the ground but in the air, has gone
forward so successfully ..that if the
enemy still refuses to negotiate, then
the South Vietnamese will be able to
undertake ? the total defense of their
country."
IF THAT ANSWER was valid then,
it is more valid now. The South Viet-
namese have been re-equipped ? with
tanks, aircraft and other weaponry
on a crash basis in anticipation of the
tease-fire that never happened. More
inmortant, President Thieu now has.
fOr the first time a real political base.
He has built this .new base by the
simple- expedient of thumbing his nose
at :the United States, and thus appeal-
ing 'to the nationalism and .xenophobia
of, his 'people.
,Again and again, Thicu has reiterat-
ed the same. theme: "The Republic of
Vietnam has ... the sole right to solve
the war. Any solution must come from -
the right Of self-determination of
South Vietnam and only South Viet-
nam. And so, on. The sensible answer
to., the ' little-man-what-now? question ,
I s to take President Thieu at his word,
If 1rd" when it ,becomes clear that -
there is no hepe thr?negotiating a "just
arri uscitlement of the war.
ThaVare t hose who think that. is
clear _ already. There arc even those
- (including this writer) -who think it
? has been clear from the very begin-
ning. Obviously, it would be fine if
Henry Kissinger could negotiate a set-
tlement that was, in President. Nix-
on's phrase 'right for South Vietnam
right for North Vietnam, and right for
us." Obviously, it was worth trying
to negotiate such a settlement. Ob-
viously, if the thing could be done,
Henry Kissinger was the man to do
it. But could the thing really be done?
'TO PUT ? THE QUESTION another
? way: ? Are there really 'words in the
dictionary that would insure a genuine
and lasting settlement ,of the endless,
hateful mar? If the answer to that
question is -"yes," are they words that
.a self-respecting American President
could -put his : name to? And if the
?answer to that question is "yes" are
they words that the men in Hanoi and
Saigon, who -hate each others' very
guts, could put their name to? And it
the answer to that question is "yes,".
.would the words have any real mean-
ing at all?
A sentence from lienry Kissinger's
sad ?prei:s ?iint,.rimet. or Dee. it; sug-
gests the answer to the LINI, question,
At the end of October, he said, "it
? became apparent that there was in
-preparation a massive . Communist
effort to launch an attack throughout
South' Vietnam to begin several days
before the cease-fire would have been
?declared, and to continue for some
"weeks after the cease-fire came into
being."
The Communists, in short, were pre-
-paring to cheat on the Whole Kissinger-
'Tho agreement, and on a "massive"
scale. .To cheat on ,agreements with
"the imperialists .and their running
dogs" is a' Communist imperative sanc-
tified in the Leninist holy books. No
Communists have obeyed this impera-
tive more assiduously than the Hanoi
Communists. So what would all those
words that Mr. Special Adviser Kissin-
ger and Mr. Special Adviser Le Due
Tho (they thus address each other)
have wrangled about so interminably
, really be worth?
There is a. two-word answer: "Our
-prisoners." In listing the "main prin-
ciples that the President has always
enunciated as being part of the Ameri-
can position," Henry Kissinger listed
."unconditional -release of American
prisoners" first:Getting the prisoners
back is what the whole elaborate cha-
rade has mostly been about.
THE PRISONERS are the Commu-
nists' chief .bargaining counter: Indeed,
they are just about their only bargain-
.
-lug' counter vis-a-vis the United States.
The North Vietnamese can do a lot of
things to. hurt the South Vietnamese,
but they can do only one thing to hurt
this country?they can refuse to re-
lease- the prisoners.
The North Vietnamese are, of course,
perfectly aware of the bargaining pow-
er the prisoners provide. They have
repeatedly offered a simple deal. We
-Americans can have our prisoners
back, they have said in effect, if we
agree to halt all logistic support for
South Vietnam, thus cutting off the
South Vietnamese at the knees and
insuring a Communist take-over in
Saigon. Not only George McGovern,
but all the Democratic presidential
hopefuls, except Henry Jackson, were
willing to make this deal. President
Nixon has repeatedly denounced it-
48
with good reason?as 'a "betrayal." He
cannot now make such a deal, even if
he wanted to, which he doesn't.
Then what can he do? His own an-
swer for the moment seems to be:.
. bomb the bejesus out of North Viet-
nam. It is conceivable, of course, that
this may turn out to be an adequate
answer, that the negotiations wilt start
again and lead to can agreed settlement.
leery Kis:tinge'. is satil in believe that
I here is at, least. a riti tin chance of melt
an out come, anti Henry issinger is
no fool.
But if there is no such outcome, the
President surely cannot go on bomb-
ing the bejesus out of North Vietnam
forever. To do so would make the
United States look like a bully and a
brute and, what is more, an ineffective
bully and brute. If the bombing goes
' on much longer, the Senate is sure to
pass another "date- certain" withdrawal
amendment and this time the House
seems likely to go along.
IN SHORT, with every day that.
passes without a negotiated settlement,
the President's real options are nar-
rowing. They are narrowing down to'
the one remaining course, embodied
in the answer he gave at that San:,
Clemente press conference.
If the South Vietnamese "undertake
the total defense of their country,"
there is no guarantee that they will be
able to defend it, even with generous
American logistic support. There is no
.guarantee either that our prisoners
will be released. But at least the Presi-
dent will be able with justice to claim
that he has done everything possible
to free our prisoners, short of betrayal
of a small ally, and that he has done
everything possible to give that ally a"
"reasonable chance" to defend itself.
There would he one added advantage. '
The United States would not be re-
sponsible for the failure of a settle-
ment that is sure to fail.
Copyright Newsweek, Inc., January, 1973
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WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1972 ,
Charles W. 17:?st
Renewed Bombing: A Threat to Detente.
IN WRITING a year-end retro-
spective of international relations dur-
ing 1972 it had been my expectation to
express real jubilation at what seemed
to me a banner year. It had been a
banner year, moreover, despite serious
hazards which had at critical moments
jeopardized each one of its major ac-
complishments.
From the United States' point of
, view, the outstanding achievements
were the opening of the door to China,
after so many years in which we our-
selves had kept it shut, and the com-
mencement of a new era in relations
with the Soviet Union, after so many
years of cold war and almost unmiti-
gated hostility. That both of these
were achieved was a tribute to the
boldness and realism of the Nixon ad-
ministration -which, in these respects
at least, was prepared to admit that
old dogmas and delusions were dead.
Yet each was at the last moment sub-
jected to stresses from our side and
preserved primarily by the tolerance
or prudence of others.
The President's epoch-making visit
to China in February was placed in
hazard by the United States' effort in
the previous U.N. General Assembly to
push through a "two China" resolution
which, if successful, would have made
us responsible for once again exclud-
ing the Peoples Republic from the
United Nations. Fortunately we were
saved from this blunder by the defeat
of our resolution by an Assembly ma-
jority which included most of our clos-
est friends.
Similarly, the President's equally
momentous visit to Moscow in May
was called in question by his decision
to mine Haiphong harbor and resume
the bombing of North Vietnam, a di-
rect affront both to the interests and
prestige of the Soviet Union. Fortu-
nately, again we were saved by the over-
riding interest of the Soviets in the
summit and their decision to swath:ivy
the affront and proceed with the meet-
ing, which firoved an extraordinary
SUCCESS.
The achievements of the year were
not by any means limited to United
States' relations with the Communist
great powers. Prime Minister Heath
triumphantly brought Britain into the
Common Market. Chancellor Willy
Brandt resolutely carried through his
"Reaction of most of our
allies . . . makes clear that
our title to leadership of the
'free world' is tarnished
with each bomb that falls?'
ostpolitik, decently 'buried the cold
war in Central Europe and won his
greatest electoral victory on this plat-
form.
In consequence of these auspicious
developments, preparations for a Euro-
pean 6ecurity Conference are well un-
der way, parallel negotiations concern-
ing mutual force reductions in Europe
are about to begin, and the second
phase of the strategic arms talks be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union has started. There seemed every
justification, therefore, for hailing 1972,
not perhaps as ushering in "a genera-
tion of peace," but at least as having
removed some of the artificial obsta-
cles to collaboration among all the
great powers in coping with the real
problems of the real world.
UNFORTUNATELY, these achieve-
ments, actual and potential, have been
thrown into hazard at the end of the
year by the cruel and foolish resump-
tion of the bombing of North Vietnam.
The detente with the Soviet Union and
China removes the only convincing rea-
son for United States' concern with a
Vietnamese war, which was originally
? ?
conceived of as an instrument of thCir
expansion.
One can therefore say that rarely in
history has so much been risked for so
little, as by the belated revival of the
war risking that very detente and all, it,
holds. Seriously as the Soviets and
Chinese need and want mutually prof-
itable relations with the United States,
there are limits to what they can toter-
ate in the way of abuse of one of their
allies. Brezhnev issued a clear warning
to this effect last week, and so did the
Chinese. The outraged reaction of
many of our allies, moreover, makes
clear that our title to leadership of the
"free world" is more profoundly tar-
nished with each bomb that falls. ?
There seems to be an almost irresist-
ible inclination among American presi-
dents who win landslide electoral vic-
tories, to what Stalin called "giddiness
from success." After Roosevelt's tri-
umph in 1936, he attempted his "court-
packing" and "purge," both of which
failed miserably and might have ended
his political career in deep disappoint-
ment but for the coming of the war.
Johnson, within a few months of his
1964 victory, involved us so deeply and
-divisively in Vietnam that he soon.
squandered the decisive majority he
had won. Hubris has been the greatest
curse of captains, kings and presidents
since human history began.
So one must, most regretfully, end
one's assessment of 1972, which had
seemed certain to be so positive, with
a sombre question mark. We can only
pray at this Christmas season that re-
sponsible men in Washington and Viet-
nam will quickly come to their senses,
will resume with cooler heads the friv-
olously aborted negotiations, and will
bring them to a rapid and successful
conclusion. If they do, 1972 may still
go down in history as marking the end
of one era and the beginning of a Very
different one, more rational, more con-
structive, and more humane.
. ?
Corqrleht 1972, Charles W. Yost
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WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1972
Michael Allen
... and a
azard to an Unweakening People
HANOI?It is Christmas Eve, and
In an hour Joan Baez and I will con-
duct a Christmas service. Afterwards,
there will be Mass at the cathedral
The writer is Assistant Dean
of the Yale Divinity School. His
account of the bombing of North
Vietnam was written for News-
day.
and then a party. It could be beautiful
tonight. But the last six days have
been horrible.
Monday afternoon, we walked
around Hanoi among the thousands
of bicycles that crowd the streets.
Children everywhere were smiling at
us, playing in the streets of what still
looks like a lovely French city.
Then, Monday night, the bombs fell.
No one expected them. I stood on
the balcony with the French reporter,
watching tracer bullets and an occa-
sional rocket cut across the sky.
Then, to the north, the sky grew
red and smoke billowed against a full
moon. Then the sky grew red to the
west and I heard the sound of jets
overhead. My own fear mounted and
the Frenchman led me to the shelter.
The sirens sounded again and again
as wave after wave of bombers passed
over. But the worst was around 5 a.m.,
when I was sure the hotel was next.
TUESDAY, we saw the first pilots
captured during last week's bombing,
apparently still in a state of shock.
One had bandages around his head.
They looked so confused, hurt and lost.
We were no longer anonymous to them
nor they to us.
Since then, the Vietnamese have
shown us no more. They don't want to
humiliate us, they say, and I believe
them.
Afterwards, we saw the first site?
the little village of Noc, west of the
central city. Little shacks and rice pad-
dies were .all blown to bits and the
ruins were still smoking from the fire.
People were wandering about aim-
lessly, picking up their few belongings.
I found it terrible and very painful to
see. Bombs fell again that night and
through Friday.
Wednesday, we saw 12 POWs. A.
bomb had fallen next to the camp and
the ceilings of their rooms had caved
in. I think they were as seared as we
were. Joan and I conducted a brief
Christmas service, took their names
and promised to call their families.
? But the worst was Friday, when we
saw Bach-Mai Hospital?Hanes largest
?totally destroyed. There were unex-
ploded bombs here and there, . and
people were working to uncover the
shelters where victims were still trap-
ped. Some of the workers could hear
their cries.
A Vietnamese man, helmet on his
head, passed by. He had a notebook
over his face to hide his tears. I was
crying too. '
THE CHIEF DOCTOR talked to us
in a voice touched with hysteria. No
one will say how many died in the
raid, but I am sure there were many.
We saw collapsed buildings, rubble
everywhere, enormous bomb craters?
some enlarging those from a previous
raid this fall. And everywhere little
groups of people standing, their faces
blank with pain.
Most of the principal services in
Hanoi are gone. There is almost no
electricity for the city. The railroad
station has been destroyed and the air-
port is only semi-operational.
That afternoon we saw the village
of Anduong. A housing project built
in the '50s for working people was
totally destroyed.
I saw an old man standing in the
ruins of his house, putting on his coat
and taking it off again endlessly, as
if the ritual act could recreate his
past. There were impassive faces but
also many tears.
NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 72
Red Cross Ends Some Vietnam Visits
Friday night was supposed to be
our going-away party, but it was in-
terrupted by the bombers and we fin-
ished it in the shelter, packed in like
sardines. Joan sang freedom songs
and two Vietnamese women sang folk
songs among a ragtag group of Vietna-
mese and foreigners. We 'couldn't hear
the bombs atave the music.
So life goes on here. The streets
still are full of bicycles and the chil-
dren still smile as we four Americans
pass by.
But many people are being evacu-
ated. They say everything of any Stra-
tegic worth has long since gone,
There are only the people, and' I
see no signs of weakening. They say
they have fought for independence for
1,000 years and they won't stop now.
This afternoon I visited the Domini-
can Church. They are putting up deco-
rations for Mass tonight,' Chinese 'lan-
terns and light bulbs. What little elec-
tricity there is here is going for church
decoration.
Over the altar a freshly painted sign
in latin, "God has made His dwelling
with men."
They say not as many people as
usual will come tonight, but they will
say Mass with or without bombs. 'We
will be there, too.
Special to The NeW York Times
GENEVA, Dec. 28?The Inter-
national Committee of the Red
Cross has suspended indefinite-
ly the visits it had been making
to political prisoners_ in South
Vietnam.
The suspension was decided
upon because the South Viet-
namese authorities have denied
the Red Cross delegates the
right to see the prisoners in the
absence of all witnesses, a
spokesman for the all-Swiss
committee said today.
However, Red Cross visits to
prisoners of war in South Viet-
nam continue in the normal
way as provided in the 1949
Geneva conventions on the pro-
tection of war victims, the
spokesman said.
The prisons in which civilians
are held are officially called
"re-education centers." Because
the term "political prisoner" is
frowned upon by the authori-
ties, the Red Cross refers to
the inmates only as persons
held "because of the events" in
South Vietnam.
Red Cross delegates had
been visiting the national cen-
ters in Saigon and in the
provinces on an irregular basis
for a number of years, the
spokesman said.
Occasional Private Talks
No general authorization for
private talks with the prisoners
was ever granted, but occa-
sionally such discussions with-
out witnesses were permitted by
the official in charge of a pro-
vincial center. ?
The Red Cross source said
that he did not know how many
in South Vietnam but that it
was estimated that there Were
22,000 in the centers that, the
committee's delegates vi:sitel
last year. ?
The visits were continual un-
til last August in the hope:that
the authorities in Saigon would
eventually grant the authoriza-
tion to see the prisoners with-
out witnesses as provided for
n the Geneva convention (heal-
ing specifically with civilian
war victims.
But after making another ap-
peal for such an authorization
the Red Cross decided against
pursuing the visits without it.
"We felt that if the prisoners
could not speak freely in the
absence of witnesses we could
not determine precisely what the
prisons' conditions were like,"
political prisoners there were the Red Crotts,2215Lsnman gald.
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NEW YORK TIMES
26 December 72
Issue and Debate
Efficacy of the Bombing of North Vietnam
By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
special to The New York Time,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 25?
The resumption of sustained
bombing by the United States
throughout North Vietnam
has revived the debate here
and abroad over the, efficacy
of the bombing strategy. ,
Does the bombing of mili-
tary and industrial targets
significantly hamper the ca-
pacity of North Vietnam to
fight the war? Does it pre-
vent the movement of North
Vietnamese troops and sup-
plies into the South? Does
it make the Hanoi Govern-
ment more willing to nego-
tiate or concede, or does it
strengthen resistance and de-
termination to pursue the
war?
If there are military and
diplomatic benefits from the
bombing, do they justify the
civilian casualties? What
were the provocations that
triggered the latest cam-
paign? Are the current raids
different, in magnitude or in
terms of the targets assault-
ed, from those of the past?
Is it immoral, in time of war,
for a large nation that it-
self is not under attack to
drop bombs on a small nation
? that has no offensive capaci-
ty in the air?
r These are the questions
that provide the meat. of the
debate, although, clearly,
only the North Vietnamese
know precisely how badly
the country, its people and
? its military system have been
and are being hurt by the
bombing.
The Background
,Early in the morning of
Feb. 7, 1965, on orders from
? President Lyndon B. Johnson,
49 carrier-based fighter
planes bombed and strafed
barracks, and staging areas
of Vietcong guerrillas near
Dong Hoi, just north of the
border between North and
South Vietnam. Once before
?in August, 1964?there had
been a day of raids on the
North, in *retaliation for al-
leged attacks on American
ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
But the 1965 strikes, follow=
ing several guerrilla attacks
on major American installa-
tions in South Vietnam, were
the first involving carefully
planned, concerted raids
north of the border.
President Johnson declared.
that they represented a lim-
ited response to "provoca-
tions ordered and directed by
the Hanoi regime" and did
not mean a widening of the
war. Nonetheless, these first
sorties marked a major turn-
ing point in the Indochina
conflict.
In May the United States
stopped bombing the North
for a week in an effort to
elicit peace feelers, but there
was no response, so the
bombing resumed. In Decem-
ber, 1965, a 37-day pause
began as Mr. Johnson pur-
sued a "peace offensive."
Bombardment of the North
was resumed on Jan. 31,
1966, because, according to
Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, the only response
from Hanoi had been "nega-
tive, harsh and unyielding."'
Mr. Johnson pledged that
only lines of supply and
other military targets would
be bombed. As justification
he asserted, "Those who di-
rect and supply the aggres-
sion have no claim to immu-
nity from military reply."
The bombing continued
unabated for nearly three
years. By 1967 the United
States was flying about 300
planes a day over the North.
In that year, according to
the Air Force, 250 planes of
all services were shot down.
In September, 1967, Pres-
ident Johnson, speaking in
San Antonio, announced that
Hanoi had been , told the
month before that the United
States would stop the bomb-
ing of the N.orth "when this
will lead promptly to pro-
ductive discussions." ?
Mr. Johnson startled the
nation on March 31, 1968,
by announcing that he would
not run for re-election. He'
also declared that he had
ordered a halt in all bom-
bardment north of the 20th
Parallel, where more than 90
per cent of the North Viet-
namese live.
Seven months later, a
week before the President-
ial election, Mr. Johnson.
ended all bombing of the
North. He said he believed
the action would lead to a
peaceful settlement.
In the first year of the
Nixon Administration, the
Government acknowledged
only occasional incidents of
"suppressive fire" by small
numbers of planes against
antiaircraft installations in
North Vietnam that threat-
ened American reconnaiss-
ance aircraft.
But in May, 1970, follow-
ing the movement of Ameri-
can troops into Cambodia,
e United Statesconducted
a series of heavy raids on
supply dumps and other tar-
gets north of the Demilitariz-
ed zone. The raids were de-
scribed as "protective reac-
tion." Similar attacks con-
tinued over the next two t
rears.
In April, 1972, in response t
to a North Vietnamese of- L
fensive, the rule of protec- n
five reaction was officially
lifted and intensive bombing
resumed throughout the
North. For the first time B-
52's were used extensively
and, for the first time since
1968. Hanoi and Haiphong
were attacked.
The Hanoi government as
serted, and visiting Ameni
can newsmen confirmed. tha
civilian as well as militar
targets were damaged. Hano
maintained that the Ameri
can planes were deliberately
bombing dikes, a charge tha
the United States repeatedly
denied.
The Nixon Administration
gave three principal reasons
for the resumption. It was
necessary, officials said, to
choke off the movement of
men and supplies into the
South, to help Saigon's
forces demonstrate that they
could stem the most serious
enemy attack in more than
four years and to provide
a new bargaining chip to ob-
tain concessions from Hanoi.
President Nixon warned in
May that the heavy bombing
would continue, but he
pledged to stop it when
Hanoi agreed to a cease-fire.
and a return of American
prisoners. The bombing was
essential if a "genuine peace"
was to be obtained, the
President said, and it was
necessary? to support ? the
dwindling American ground
troops.
On Oct. 25, with peace
negotiations at a delicate
stage, the President ordered
a bombing halt beyond the
20th Parallel as a sign of
good faith. The pause lasted
until Dec. 18.
In the eight years of the
air war, the United States
has dropped more than seven
million tons of bombs on
Indochina, more than three
times the tonnage in World
War II..
Through the end of No-
vember 1,056 American
planes had been shot down
by the
Vietnamese.
Nearly all of the more than
430 prisoners of war in the ,
North were ...airmen, as were
most of the more than 1,200
men listed as missing.
Current Bombing
On Dec. 18 waves of Amer-
ican B-52's began the heavi-
est raids of the war on North
Vietnam. The strikes, which
continued unabated until a
Christmas halt, followed the
breakdown in peace negotia-
ions between Henry A, His-
lager, President Nixon's na-
lonal security adviser, and
e Due Tho, Hanoi's special
egotiator.
Administration off dais.;
have said that Pres'dent
Nixon ordered the raids he.:
cause he felt Hanoi was stalk'
ing at the peace negotiations,
They said that he had stis;??
pencled raids north of the
20th Parallel in return for
Hanoi's "goodwill" in Octo-
ber and had reinstated full-
- scale bombing?after the talks
- broke down. There has been
t? no explanation for the mas-
Y sive scale of the bombing.
It was the first time that
? B-52's, which carry a. crew of ?
six or seven, had been used ,
t so extensively, and many
military experts believed that .,
It represented a shift in
strategy.
? The planes carry 20 to 30
tons of bombs and drop them
from a height of five to seven
miles in a 'pattern roughly
half a mile wide and a mile .
and a half long. Pinpoint
bombing is conducted by'
fighter-bombers.
According to some reports,
as many as 500 plane, more,
than 100 of them 11,52's.,!..:
were being sent over the :
North each day. Such figures
were discounted by the Pen-;
tabon spokesman, Jerry W.
? Friedheim, who would char-
acterize the level of bombing
only as "a very major effort."
Some reports from Saigon
suggested that 20,000 tons
of munitions?the equivalent
of the atomic bomb used on
Hiroshima ? had been
dropped in the first two days.,
United States officials said
That some targets in the.?
Hanoi and Haiphong regions
were attacked for the first
time. The official North Viet-
namese press agency report-
ed attacks on the Gia Lam
area, where the Honoi air-
port is situated.
The Defense Department
insisted that civilian areas
were not on the target list,
t
included "such categories as
rail yards, shipyards, coin,
mand and control facilities,
warehouse and transshipment
areas, communications facili-
ties, vehicle-repair facilities,,.
power plants, railway bridges,
railroad rolling stock, truck '
parks, MIG bases, air-de-
fense radars, and pm and
? missile sites."
Tess, the official Soviet
press agency, reported, how-
ever, that the American raids
had caused "heavy civilian
casualties" and had detitrOyed
'thousands of hoiilds." Tho
Ta?g Cortnotidtitit tepOtt64
that bombs repeatedly fill!
"On densely poolittod hlnais
tittnotsi anti fn-11141914" Or
1141101,
? though they might be hit b
accident, and it dismissed
suggestions that the United
States was involved in "ter
ror bombing."
Mr. Friedheim asserted tha
the military targets being hi
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The Hanoi rad, asserted
that thousands were killed
and wounded from Dec. .18
to 24.
The Justification
The objectives to be gained
from bombing North Vietnam
have varied over the course
of the war. As a staff study
for the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee noted ear-
lier this year, there have
been five principal objec-
tives:
9To reduce the movement
of men and supplies into
South Vietnam.
9To make North Vietnam
, pay a high cost for support-
ing the war in the South.
9To break the will of North
Vietnam.
To force the North Viet-
namese to make concessions
in the peace negotiations.
41To strengthen morale in,
? South Vietnam and the Unit-
ed States.
As public justification for
the action, the Government
nas generally given military
reasons?the first two listed
above. However, officials of
both the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations have ac-
knowledged privately that
diplomatic and political con-
siderations were as import-
ant as, if not more important
than, the military oncs.
Explanations of the current
campaign fit this pattern. The
official spokesmen in Wash-
ington -- Ronald L. Ziegler
at the White House and Mr.
Friedhelm at the Pentagon ?
? have maintained that this
phase is a military necessity.
Official spokesmen in Saigon
. have also made that point.
In individual interviews, how-
ever, top Government. and .
military officials as well as
lower-ranking analysts have
acknowledged that the basic
reasons are diplomatic and
political.
Mr. Ziegler has not deviat-
ed from his statement on Dec.
IS that "we are not going
to allow the peace talks to
be used as a cover for an-
other offensive." There was
grave danger of such an of-
fensive, he maintained, add-
ing that "the President will
continue to order any action
he deems necessary by air
or by sea to prevent any
build-up he sees in the
South.",
At the .same time top Ad-
ministration officials de-
clared that the resumption of
heavy bombing was primarily
a result of Hanoi's lack of
? seriousness at the Paris ne-
gotiations.
One official said that the
bombing served the purpose
of showing American anger
at what Mr. Nixon regarded
as Hanoi's delaying tactics.
Knowledgeable sources here'
believe that, by intensifying
the bombing, President Nixon,
hoped to show Hanoi that he
could take the political heat
at home and abroad. He was
also trying to indicate, they
believe, that he was willing
to discard any past restric-
tions on targets. Some ex-
perts said that by using
B-52's, Mr. Nixon was im-
plicitly threatening antiper-
sonnel bombing as well.
Administration officials are
willing to concede that the
American bombing of Indo-
china has not always been
effective. But that, they said,
was because of the restric-
tions set by the Johnson Ad-
ministration.
Administration officials are
convinced that the heavy
bombing of last spring?to-
gether with the President's
trips to Moscow and Peking
?led directly to the more
productive negotiations in
the fall.
On the one hand, accord-
ing to this argument, Hanoi
feared a lack of support from
its chief allies and, on the
other, it was being badly
hurt. Those factors almost
produced a, peace agreement
in October, the officials be-
lieve.
By fall American bombs
had knocked out about 70
per cent of North Vietnam's
power-generating facilities
and the major bridges on the
rail lines from China. Those
facilities were being rebuilt
in recent weeks, according
to military intelligence, and
the United States hopes to
destroy them again.
The Opposition.
Since the outset of the
bombing eight years ago, the
strategy has engendered stiff
? --
.opposition. Many opponents
have argued that it is a futile
' tactic that it has not and
will -never accomplish either
its political or its military
? objectives. Others have ar-
gued that, 'regardless of ef-
fect ix;eness, it. is immoral to
wreak devastation on a small
country.
An early as 1967 a group
of leading Government-
oriented scientists, under the
auspices of the Institute for
Defense Analyses, concluded
that "the U. S. bombing of
.North Vietnam has had ?no
measurable effect on Hanoi's
ability to mount and support
military operations in the
South."
As to the question whether
the bombing.could break the
will of the Vietnamese peo-
ple, the study declared:
"The expectation that bomb-
ing would erode the deter-
mination of Hanoi and its
people clearly overestimated
the persuasive and disruptive
effects of the bombing and,
correspondingly, undcrest
male the tenacity and recu-
perative capabilities of the
North Vietnamese."
The study went on to cite
"the fact well-documented in
the historical and social
scientific literature that a di-
rect frontal attack on a so-
ciety tends to strengthen the
social fabric" and "to im-
prove /he determination of
both the leadership and the
populace to fight back."
In the Johnson Administra-
tion, proposals to bomb the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas
were repeatedly rejected. The
Pentagon papers make clear
that the principal reason was
the expectation of heavy civ-
ilian casualties.
The critics of the bomb-
ing contend that it is pre-
nosterous for the Govern-
ment to assert that only mili-
tary targets are scheduled
when vast tonnages are being
dropped from great heights
on extensive areas.
? A leading Congressional op-
ponent of the bombing, Sen-
ator Mike Mansfield of Mon-
tana, the Democratic leader,
declared at a news confer-
ence Wednesday:
'The bombing tactic is
eight years old. It has not
produced results in the past.
It will not lead to a rational,
peaceful settlement now. It
is the 'Stone Age' strategy
being used in a war almost
unanimously recognized in
this nation as a 'mistaken'
one. It is a raw power play
with human lives, American
and others, and, as such, it
is abhorrent."
Senator Harold E. Hughes,
Democrat of Iowa, said in an
interview that the bombing
was futile and immoral.
"It is unbelievable savagery
that we have unleashed in
this holy season," he de-
clared. "The only thing I can
compare it with is the sav-
agery at Hiroshima and Nag-
asaki."
52
Asked whether he would
approve of the bombing if
it could be proved effective
in bringing concessions from
Hanoi, the Senator said:
"I cannot imagine the holo-
caust that the bombing must
be causing. There can be
no victory in this kind of
war."
The critics of the bombing
argue, furthermore, that
American airmen are being
killed and made prisoner and
that the lives of priconers en-
dangered. .
The staff study for the Sen- ?
ate committee concluded
that "throughout the war,
the results of the bombing of
North Vietnam have con-
sistently fallen far short of
the claims made for it."
"Compared to the damage
to U.S. prestige and the in-
ternal division created by the
bombing policy, its meager
gains must be seriously
questioned," the study
asserted.
NEW YORK TIMES
22 December 72
It
French.
Comment
PARIS?There was a time not very
long ago when one Guernica, while
not actually provoking an offensive
against barbarity, caused nausea in
the West when the West discovered
it was capable of the worst against
mankind. It was already a caso of air-
planes massacring a civilian popula-
tion, a case of airplanes dispatched
by a foreign power to support dic-
tatorship.
? Since then, perversion has made
headway. Today it has reached a new
high in a North Vietnam covered with
"big cemeteries under the moonlight."
A hundred B-52's and hundreds of
fighter-bombers unleashed night and
day on the network of tightly knit'
webs of Delta villages?it is hard to
Imagine what this represents in terror,
In blind murders, In atrocious physical
and psychological Mutilations.
? The fact that the center of Hanoi
has not been?or not yet been?anni-
hilated is not reassuring: the heart of
the capital which has long been evacu-
ated has less population left than the
immediate suburbs and the country-
side, which is swarming with peasants,
and also with children, with old peo-
ple, with the inactive population from
the cities dispersed among straw huts.
To cover this dense crowd of civil-
fans with a carpet of bombs is perhaps
not to exterminate a people, but it is
to undertake a succession of localized
exterminations. It is to put to sword
and fire the houses and the huts, the
hospitals, the schools, the shops and
the cooperatives.
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The American leadership believes
that the era of contempt which they
have entered without troubled con-
science will be succeeded by the era
of surrender or their adversaries. But
the latter have toughness of mind be-
cause they have the intelligence which
grows from pride. These people who
call the Americans "the Huns of the
Twentieth Century" have just pub-
lished, in French, a very polished an-
thology of their most ancient poems.
But Mr. Nixon, on the other hand,
is right: he, is right in believing that
hospital, hut and rice field must be
destroyed, because it is from there as
much as from military command posts
that the resistance draws its ideals
and its men. Mr. Nixon is translating
this reality into his own language as
"Communist offensive."
If he dared go to the very end of
his logic, he should now bomb Saigon.
A priest there has just let it be known
that for the past ten days hundreds or
prisoners have gone on &hunger strike
at the capital's Chi Hoe prison. They
Are "politicals," picked up in the street
by General Thieies policemen or jailed
because they are wrong-thinking Cath-
olic or students disgusted with the dic-
tatorship. They have dared ask for the
freedom of their. people and for the
end of the massacres.
Perpetually in search of victory, Mr.
Nixon is thus led to give harder and
harder blows everywhere because his
enemies are everywhere. In the view
of many he still is given the benefit
of tentative explanations or of justifi-
cations, because he has been re-elected
and because the United States is not a
totalitarian country. But may one not
question 'one's self about the exact'
value of those liberal mechanisms
which have been bypassed, betrayed
as they have been by the logic of an
imperial system and deviated from
their original meaning to permit such
abomination, the crushing of a small
country that could well have been
spared promotion to the rank of martyr?
This commentary appeared in yester-
day's editions of Le Monde. Transla-
tion by the Paris bureau of The Tunes,
WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1972
Victor Zorza
e ?
Communists atchip.g Nixon'.
TO See If They Trust Him
REPORTS of a 'Nixon-Kissinger rift
have upset the White House; which has
denied, them, publicly. ? PrivatelY,
sources inside the Nixon administra-
tion have \said that they are worried
about "damage to Kissinger's eredibil-
ity" as a negotiator. "A prime point of
concern," according to The Washington
Post's Murrey Mercier, "is said to be
what the North Vietnamese may con-
clude from these reports.". . ? e. -
But the damage to Kissinger'.S credi-
bility could be far greater than that. It
could extend to his dealings With the
Russians and the Chinese and tie Mr.'
Nixon's own grand design* for an "era
of negotiation '-and for the "generation ?
of peace!' that was to crown his second
term. . ? . . ?
The Kremlin as Well as. Pellinghave
been watching Mr.. Nixon's negotiating
strategy in order to determine how. far ?
they could trust him. :If they decide
that he has gone back on his own word
in the Paris talks, or on Kissinger's, .
they will be less likely to enter into
agreements with the United. ?States
which might expose. them to similar
risks.
THIS COLUMN has sometimes tried
to analyze the administration's foreign -
policy from the 'standpoint. of its for-
eign adversaries, in the belief that a
better understanding of both sides' at-
titudes may be acquired thereby.,
When the Paris impasse Is viewed
from this angle,, there is no doubt that
powerful elements in all the Commu-
nist capitals are 'now' claiming it AS
proof of groSs .deception by the White
House. The hawks 'in Moscow and Pe-
rking were . only narrowly defeated in
the infighting that preceded Mr.'
Nixon's summit visits. But defeats in
Communist power struggles are never
as conclusive as they seem.
The hawks argued, to judge from the
evidence between the lines of the Com-
munist press, that Mr. Nixon was not
to he trusted?not just on Vietnam,
but on all the other issues which, to
them, involve the very survival of the ,
Communist system. The doves, on the
other hand, maintained that the Com-
munist concessions on strategic arms
limitation, on trade and aid, on politi-
cal issues, were paid for by' American
concessions as well as by promises of ?
future benefits. But now the. hawks
, would claim that Soviet and Chinese
agreements with the United States'.
. might.be similarly broken, and Amen-'
can promises reneged upon ? !whenever- '
,Mr. Nixon decides that a little more ?
preSsuro, another turn 'of the ? screw,:
might get' him better. terms than he,,
'had originally obtained.*
If the -administration is really con-
cerned at the.dasnage done to ?KisSin-
g'er'? credibility by prees specidatlott, of
. : the kind. Which 'appeared in this
utnn last week, the remedy is in its. ;
?. own hands. What the column sug-
gested was that an attempt to look at
the Paris breakdown through the eyes,
of Hanoi would lead the ,Communists
to conclude that the agreement negoti-,,
'a ted by. Kissinger had .been disowned
by Mr. Nixon. The fuss noW made by.''
administration sources about the effect.-
of such an analysis on Kissinger's cred-
ibility Suggests that the analysis is cor-
rect; even in the administration's own ?
. view, in attributing this line of reason-
ing to the Communists. The adminis-
tration can*, only prove the. Communist
hawks wrong by reverting to a. less.'
warlike posture.
THE DAMAGE, whieh is ',of the ad-,
ministration's own making, cannot be '
. undone- by .denouncing press specula,
'Ulan about it as Irresponsible. Where a
government restricts the amount of .
publicly available information, for ..
what may sometimes be. good reasons
of its own, it is the proper function of'
the press.to speculate. ? ' ?
Where major. issues Of War and
peace are concerned, the speculative
reconstruction of the other side's
thought' processes is more necessary
than ever, even-if it should appear to
reflect badly .on one's own 'side's mo- 7
tives. It is an , essential part of the ,
search for an understanding of what is ,
happening in the world, and why.
American governments have too often
;neglected this process, but this is no,.
reason why the press should eschew it.;.
Indeed, ip',an Increasingly Interde?
pendent world of Great' Powers en-
gaged in the process of secret diplo-
macy, an insight into the policies of
any one government will 'have to be
sought more and more often in the
shadows it casts on other countries.
? r?
0 1972 Victor Zoiza,
53
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WASHINGTON POST
28 December 1972
Terror Borabinoo- in the Name of Peace
-How did we get in a few short weeks from a prospect
for peace that "you can bank on," in the Presidents
werds, to the most, savage and senseless act of war ever-
-,visited, over a scant 10 days, by one sovereign people
"'upon another? And perhaps more to the point, what is
:the 'logic and where are the lessons of history. that 'say
can run?this reel backwardafter a time and proceed
:.from terror bombing to "peace"?that there Is, in other
words, some rational cause and effect here, running ei-
ther way?
The sad, hard answer is that while there are few con
*-
elusive lessons from history in this matter, the supposed
"logic" of proceeding from bargaining to bombing rind
hnek to bargaining, in tinN name or peace, has been fun-
dainenial to tills Vliquani stran-ey or "limited.
,wsr" hy "graduated response" over more than .eight
years and two administrations. In the beginning, it was
accepted, with precious little protest, by Democrats and
'llepublicans'alike; and it was quietly acquie'sced in by a
gOod many of the people who now talk of "genocide" and
"war crimes" and of the intolerable "immorality" of our
:current policy.
That we recite this background is hr no Way to sug-
gest that we think :Mr. Nixon is somehow mandated to.
continue to compound past follies. On. the contrary, hav-
ing 'promised us so many times to -end this war within
'his first four years and having failed so dismally,, for all
,that he might have learned from recent history, he is
Under greater obligation than any of his predecessors.
were to re-evaluate the mission, to reassess our capabili-
ties; to recognize our limitations?and to change our
strategy. But the change that is needed is not likely to
be encouraged by denouncing the horror now unfolding.
In the skies over North Vietnam as something entirely
new and different and essentially Nixonlan. If this strat-
egy is contrary to all we hold sacred, it would seem to
follow that in some measure it always was. In short, we
are not going to find it easy to work our way out of a
10-year-old war effort that has demonstrably failed of
its early high hopes unless we are prepared to begin by
admitting that this is so; that we are all caught up,.
in one degree or another, with the responsibility for a.
war plan gone horribly wrong; that this country under-
took an enterprise it could. not .handle, at least In any
tithe frame and at any expenditure oflives-and resources
worthy of the objective; and that it would be the mark
of a big power to cut our losses and settle for the only
reasonable outcome that we now must know could ever-
have been realistically expected.
We should begin, in other words, not simply by shout-
ing about the immorality of what we are now doing, but
by first acknowledging the tragic impracticality of what
.we set out to do, and the enormity of the 'miscalculations
and misjudgments that have been made, however hon-
,eStly, from the very start. For only from this admission
can 'we proceed rationally to deal with the monumental
contradiction in the administration's current strategy.
The contradiction begins with the adininistration's seem-
ing,insistence on a fully-enforceable, guaranteed settle-
ment of the war on the old, familiar, original terms?
"freedom" and "independence" and "enduring peace"
for 'South Vietnam; anything seriously short of that,
Mr. Nixon would have us believe, would be abject sur-
render, the abandonment of an ally, and a "stain upon
the honor' .of the- United States.
Leaving aside the cliches which have conic to be so
inevitable a part of every serious presentation of our
policy, there are two things t.ragically wrong about this
statement of our aims, and the first is that such objec-
tives are demonstrably unobtainable. The violent and
embittered conflict that has engulfed Indochina for sev-
eral decades Is not going to hn "settled" by any pier(' of
paper that Dr. Henry Kissinger (-mild conceivably OW-
mulct() both North and initIu Vietnam to sign. That. Is
the loud lesson of the collapse of the last peace plan; it
asked too much of a situation which can only be resolved
in ambiguity. Such is the conflict of purpose on both
sides, in fact, that it can fairly be said that in negotiat-
ing a "settlement" we are in fact merely writing the
rules of engagement for a continuing struggle for control
of South Vietnam by other less openly military means.
So we are not talking about "peace," and still less
about "abandoning art ally," for there can be no resolu-
tion of the fighting which will not present each side both
with risks and with opportunities of losing?or winning
?in large measure what each has been fighting for. To
pretend that we are doing otherwise?that we are mak-
ing "enduring peace" by carpet-bombing our way across
downtown Hamel with 52s?is to practice yet one more
cruel deception upon an American public already cruelly
deceived. It is, in brief, to compound what is perhaps the
real immorality of this administration's policy?the con-
tinuing readiness to dissemble; to talk of "military tar-
gets" when what we are hitting 'are residential centers
and hospitals and commercial airports; to speak of our
dedication to the return of our POWs and our missing
in action even while we add more than 70 to their num-
ber in little more than a week.
We think the American people could face the truth'of
how little there is we can really count on accomplishing
in Vietnam?if they were to hear it from the President.
But we have not heard from the President?not since
"peace was at hand." Instead, we have heard from sur-
rogates and spokesmen and military headquarters, cryp-
tically; about the loss of men and aircraft and the al-
leged military significance of the raids. It is from others,
around the world, that we hear about the havoc our
bombers are wreaking on innocent civilians with the'
heaviest aerial onslaught of this or any other war. All
this we are presumably doing to redeem the "honor of
America" and this is the second part of what's wrong
?
and contradictory?about the President's bombing pol-
icy. For it is hard to envisage any settlement that we
could realistically hope to negotiate which could justify
the effort now being expended to achieve it or wash
away the stains on this country's honor of the past 10
days.
54
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WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1972
Vile
By Victor Cohn
Wilshington Post Staff Writer
The American Association
for the Advancement of Sci-
ence urged Congress yester-
day to begin a full-scale study
of the long-range effects of
U.S. bombs, chemicals and
other advance weapons on the
land and people of Vietnam.
In another "emergency" res-
olution, the large scientific or-
ganization's legislative council
overwhelmingly condemned
U.S. actions in Vietnam, and
urged immediate withdrawal
of all U.S. forces from Viet-
nam, Laos and Cambodia.
It was the first time antiwar
forces have been able to get
such a resolution through the
largely middle-of-the-road
group, a federation of 300 sci-
entific bodies who have a total
of 7 million members.
By an amendment offered
by Lewis M. Branscomb, re-
search director of IBM, the
group deleted clauses oppos-
ing U.S. military participation
in Thailand. "We're there by
treaty, and I'm not sure that
the situation parallels" that in
the other countries'said Brans-
comb, who until recently
headed the National Bureau of
Standards. He favored the re-
mainder of the resolution.
The study of Vietnamese
war damage was urged in a
resolution stating that both
scientists and the public de-
serve a full assessment of all
that "American science" has
done in Vietnam, "construc-
tive as well as destructi've."
"We have done some con-
structive forestry, built high-
ways and some hospitals and
medical care," said Professor
E. W. Pfeiffer of the Univer-
sity of Montana, one of the ac-
tion's sponsors. "But the dam-
we've done far outweighs
Giese."
Dr. Leonard Rieser, vice
cpreFident of Dartmouth Col-
Qs' T
2.1.) LTUICL
lege and AAAS presiden
starting in January, said, "We
need a body like the U.S
Atomic Bomb Casualty Com
mission, which studied the
long-range effects of the Hiro
shima and Nagasaki bombings
after World War II.
"Unless Congress sets up
such a study, we'll never
know" the truth about many
allegations?for example the
charge that U.S. chemicals
have begun to cause genetic
mutations and consequent
malformations in Vietnamese
children, he said.
Also, he said, such a study is
vital if the United States is to
help rehabilitate Vietnam in-
telligently?a goal that Presi-
dent Nixon has endorsed, ac-
cording to reports of .U.S.-
North Vietnamese peace talks.
Specifically, the AAS coun-
cil backed a bill proposed by
Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.)
and Rep. Gilbert Gude (R-Md.)
calling on President Nixon to
ask the National Academy of
Sciences to determine both
the war's ecological effects
and "effective ways and
means of rectifying" them.
It called for assessment of
the results of "aerial bombing,
including so-called carpte
bombing," of wide use of "CS"
gas and of bulldozing large
areas of land with "Rome
plows," a defoliation method
sometimes called more de-
structive than chemicals.
Every government depart-
ment would have to give the
science academy any informa-
tion it said it needed, accord-
ing to the Nelson-Gude bill,
and there would have to be a
"final" report within six
months.
But AAAS proponents of a
Vietnam study envision this
first report as only a start on
the kind of long-range obser-
vations that the federally fi-
nanced Atomic Bomb Casualty
rco-ed.
Commission has made in Ja-
pan, observing cancers and
other delayed results of the A-
bombs.
The AAAS council has some
550 members, but only 175
were present yesterday. The
vote on the anti-Vietnam war
resolution was 80 to 41, with
many abstentions. These in-
cluded those of the presiding
officers, including Dr. Glenn
T. Seaborg, until recently At-
omic Energy Commission
chairman.
? The council also voted to
pare down its size to make it
less unwieldy, and to give ma-
jor power to the NNNS's some,
150,000 direct dues-paying
Members, rather than to the
federated organizations. These
groups will still be repre
sented through broad sections
representing scientific disci-
plines such as physics and
chemistry.
Despite a plea from Dr. Gar-
land Allan of Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis, the coun-
cil 'refused to assure future
space to the anti-establish-
ment Scientists and Engineers
for Social and Political Action.
Eight SESPA members were
arresttd Wednesday after ref-
using to take down an unau-
thorized exhibit table.
But the table stood yester-
day in a new area provided by
the AAAS, and some AAAS
leaders indicated that they
will be willing to provide such
space again rather than face
disorders and arrests. SESPA
members said they intend to
continut "orderly protest"
against uses of science for war
and oppression, and will reap-'
pear at future AAAS sessions.
The organization ended its
annual meeting here. It will
reconvene in Mexico City in
late June for a largely inter-
American session.
BALTIMORE SUN
4 January 1973
Hanoi hospital to get aid,
Paris (Reuter)?The Rev.
Daniel J. Berrigan yesterday
informed the North Vietnam-
ese delegation to the Paris
peace talks that $250,000 had
been raised in the United
States to help reconstruct Bach
Mai Hospital, hit during the
recent United States bombing
of Hanoi.
The money was raised by
the U.S. Medical Aid Commit-
tee for Indochina.
(A French government
spokesman said earlier yester-
day that France would set
aside $400,000 this year to mod-
ti?
ernize and re-equip St. Paul
Hospital in Hanoi to replace
installations destroyed in re-
cent U.S. bombing raids.)
Father Berrigan, on parole
after serving a prison term for
helping to burn draft files in
Catonsville, said he also told
the Hanoi emissaries he would
continue to oppose the war.
Father Berrigan told a group
of newsmen that he was very
skeptical about the impending
resumption of peace talks be-
tween the U.S. presidential
envoy, Henry A. Kissinger and
North Vietnam's Le Due Tho.
?
BALTIMORE SUN
4 January 1973
studcd
raiSe Viet flags
Dacca, Bangladesh (Renter)
?Left-wing students yesterday
burned an effigy of President
Nixon in this Bangladesh capi-
tal, and ran up the flags of
North Vietnam and South Viet-
nam's Provisional Revolution-
ary Government (the Viet
Cong) atop the United States
Information Agency's library
building.
Members of a break-away
faction of the Bangladesh Stu-
dents League joined the pro-
Moscow Bangladesh Students
Union to stage the demonstra-
tion in the city center.
Earlier yesterday, demon-
strators belonging to the regu-
lar, pro-government Bangla-
desh Students League ran-
sacked the office of Dacca Uni-
versity's central students
union.
Yesterday's violence?as
well as protest marches and
political meetings?came 48
hours after two civilians were
shot to death and six others
wounded In clashes with stu-
dents who were demonstratind
over the U.S. bombing of
North Vietnam.
erngan says
"We are profoundly skeptical
because we have been tricked
so many times in the past," he
said. "We have been had, in
the old American sense."
Father Berrigan, who is on
his way to Britain to attend a
seminary in Huddersfield,
added: "For all sorts of com-
plicated reasons, I believe it is
impossible for President
Nixon, the generals and high
administration officials to re-
nounce Vietnam to the Viet-
namese. They cannot bear
that."
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 December 10.72
.,......?
.11DEZILI
971,-Tigrri
Enevy 1:21:1L1c33 ED(2.1a12.1..,"
By Daniel Southerland
Staff correpondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Go Cong, Vietnam
The Saigon government has lost. estabi.-? -
lished a new politicill party here, but many of
- its member&-are nolquite sure? what it:is-all_
about.
, "We were told to go to i. meeting at the
OoVince capital," said alarrner Who claimed
to be a member of the.new,,Democracy Patty
"We shouted some slogans-, and then they let
us go home." , ? ?
The farmer didn't.seem to.'fmnd the slogan-
shouting too much. But he was-at-a loss to
explain What its-purpose-was;
, Democracy Party organizers say the-panty.
is intended ta lead a "political" struggle'
against the --Communists once there is a-
Cease-fire.. They claim to have already
recruited some 2-00,000 'Members. A' national
'party convention. is to be- held
in mi-d-
February.
Organizers- in Go Cong. Province to the
south of.Saigon-claim to have brought in more
than 10,000 recruits: Go Cong-is the party's
pilot province for the-Mekong-Delta.
In some, of the province'& hamlets, it'
appears_ that just about-every male 'over:the
age of 18. was expected: by government
authorities to? join the new party., Many
appear to regard joining-as sirnply-one_mere
way of. staying on- the right. Ode of the
government. Some apparently fear that if
they do not join, they will,have trouble getting
official licenses, residence permits, And other
legal papers from the-government..
A mason in the province capital explained
how he came to join the party.
"Some government cadres. came around
and asked me to fill out application forms,"
he said. "So I filled them out."
"Everybody has to join," he. said. "It's by
order of the government. If you -don't join,
you might have trouble with the govern-
ment."
In one hamlet, each house was flying not
only the government flag but. also the new
party flag, which consists of a red star on-a
yellow backround.
Hamlet residents said they were ordered
by local authorities to buy the party flag,
which cost 200 piasters (about 50 cents) each.
Party leaders said the flag is supposed to
demonstrate the "anti-Communist spirit."
"The North Vietnarne.se flag has a red
background with a yellow star," said one of
the party's leaders. "So we chose the opposite
? a yellow background with a red.star."
Party leaders insist that they want to co-
exist peacefully with other anti-Communist
parties, and that they want to encourage the
development of a two-party system. But the
people who seem to be complaining the most
in Co Cong 'thou t the formation of the 1101%*
party An' 11101111Yr:I of :111?)(11CV pt,litIC:11
C1110t1 Na (Iona list Movement
(I`NNI).
?
HINDU-S--TAN TIMES
7 December 1972
[1.
orilr a wy Off life
0
a fs-_?
goi
From George Hindustan Times Corresponedrat
HONG KONG: The question of Vietcong campaigns conducted by
tens- of thousands of political the Saigon and U.S. authoritios
prisoners- in South. Vietnam may under such names as "Phoenix"
become a- major bone of conten-, and "Rural Pacification."
tion in the tortuous negotiations
Torture of course Is a vray a
-for 'ceasefire and immediately life In these prisons. Often the
, . t
thereafter, according to political task of "controlling" the inmates
There were reports this week
that American pressure on North
Vietnamese negotiators for some
:sort of agreement on the with-
' drawn' of North Vietnamese fight-
ers from the South contributed to
the- impasse which first developed
in Paris. North Vietnam does not
admit to any of its regular troops
being in the South. The reports
implied that Hanoi would make
a, concessional gesture provided
the U.S. ' agreed to get prisoners
In South Vietnam released.
Western reaction to this Idea
was that Hanoi would withdraw
Its own men from the South if
"communist sympathisers" now
kept in prison in the South are
freed so- that the latter- can play
a crucial role in the post-cease??
fire political struggle.
No detailed or authentic Infor-
mation on the prisoners in South
Vietnam is available. But the
exposure two years ago of the
secret- of . the infamous "Tiger
cages-complete with blood curdl-
ing photographs in American
media?showed. that the prison re??
gime under the Saigon: Govern.
as particularly cruel on '
Accordingt
there are t'i -a communist
"1117f1;
I ore than 1,000 pu 1 a
and secret prisons- in. the South
detaining about three lakh per-
sons. Large numbers of them wel
-rounded up during various anti.
sources.
Th h
and-d over to regular cral
prisoners serving long sentences.
The worst is when Inc dents break
1 out ,in a prison camp or another.
On such occasions, the authorities
even throw grenades Into prison
cages killing whoever is around
or unleash police dogs on them.
In some major prisons, ouch as
Thuc Due in Ma Dinh province,
as many as 150 persons are packed
Into a yard, 50 square yards, with
no special toilet facilities. These
have come to be known as "pig
sties" and "stables,"
A prisoner is allowed only bat
a litre of water a day?for drink-
ing and washing combined. T'hesst
conditions are believed to have
made paralysis, beriberi, dysen-
tery, TB and psychosis common '
diseases in the prisons.
The number of regular cam.
muniat cadres taken prisoner is
believed to be smell. Tho bull;
of the prisoners were taken in on
suspicion of being sympathisers
In operations such as eliminating
an entire village and taking all
inhabitants prisoner. Analysts
believe that the experience they
have gone through will have made
them confirmed commuists by tlso
time their get out?if they got owl
at all. Ikeleased in any political
settlement that may rventually
emerge, there people are consider.
ed likely to become politically
significant conic time or the other,
it is anti-Communist and usually
---iasic government policies. But
(7, say that many of their followers
2-4coereed into joining the govern-
,
There is.little they camidato resist since the
full weight of -the Saigon administration from
L.
President Nguyen Van Thieu down to the
proVince'and district chiefs is behind the new
party. Key members of the new party are
government administrators.
Despite all the government machinery that
the new party has at its disposal, however,
most independent political observers in Sai-
gon are doubtful that meaningful support for
a nationwide government party can be
developed at this late date. What some anti-
Communist, politicians fear is that govern-
ment pressure tactics may- further alienate-
some people from the government even-while
formally 'adding their names to party mem-
bership-lists.
So far; the amount of pressure being
applied, to prospective members of the new
party has varied greatly from one province to
another. In some p1-01111CM the government
provitioe chiefs have been WilllnQ to tolerate
noninvolvement by members of already
existing parties. Mit in other provinces, it
nopears hail villal:e chterm tisk helm: sacked
111114 fall to join,
56
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NEW YORK TIMES
211- December 72
State Department Urges End
Of Pentagon Role in Pacification
By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York'Thneo
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23?The
State Department has recom-
mended the virtual elimination
of the Defense Department's
role in pacification efforts in
South Vietnam.
The proposal, according to
officials here, is ,aimed at es-
tablishing civilian control over
major United States social and
economic programs. The long-
dominant military role in run-
ning purely civilian and hu-
manitarian programs has been
the target of frequent criticism
within the Administration and
in Congress. The Pentagon and
the intelligence agencies have
been Acersrni of often distort-
ing the plograms Mto opora-
tions with military objectives.
' The change would be ac-
complished, the State Depart-
ment said, through a transfer
to the civilian Administration
for International Development
of the program to assist war
victims in South Vietnam.
The bulk of this program is
currently managed by the
War Victims Directorate of an
agency under the Pentagon's
control known as CORDS; for
Civilian Operations Rural De-
velopment Support. Heretofore,
this agency, whose chief is
directly subordinate to the
United States military com-
mand in Saigon, has been res-
ponsible for most of the paci-
fication efforts.
Parallel to the Vietnamiza-
tion program, which gradually
switched combat responsibili-
ties from American to South
Vietnamese forces, pacification
was dimed at securing the Sai-
gon Government's hold over
rural populations through oper-
ations ranging from care of re-
fugees and resettlement to the
training of the Vietnamese na-
tional police and the joint anti-
Vietcong program known as
Operation Phoenix. The war
v;ctims' program, however, is
currently the major operation
of CORDS, as most of the other
pacification ventures have col-
lapsed since the start of the
North Vietnamese offensive in
the South last March 30.
Based on Inspection Tour
The State Department said
that long-range rehabilitation
programs 'are more compatible
with the development aims of
A.I.D. than with CORDS, which
Is a sport-term agency."
The recommendation to trans-
fer the refugee program to ci-
vilian control was contained in
an internal departmental docu-
ment sent on Dec. 6 by An-
thony Faunce, the acting in-
spector general of foreign as-
sistance, to John A. Hannah,
; the aid administrator. The doc-
ument is based on a lengthy
report by a team of foreign as-
sistance inspectors who visited
Vietnam during the fall.
Mr. Faunce is a senior State
Department official who is di-
rectly responsible to Secretary.
of State William P. Rogers. His
office supervises all United
States aid programs, which Mr.
Hannah administers.
Administration officials said
that the National Security
Council would make the final
decision to recommend the
transfer of the program.
The 33-page report which
concentrated almost entirely on
the refugees in South Vietnam,
said: The United States should
support long-term physical and
economic rehabilitation of war,
victims, including displaced
persons, war widows, orphans
and the physically and mentally
handicapped."
"It will simply not be enough
to help rebuild the Vietnamese
economy," the report added.
"This alone is not sufficient to
restore the social fabric."
South Vietnamese Criticized
The report was highly critical
of the performance of South
Vietnamese officials running
the refugee programs in con-
junction with the United States,
urging the removal of "corrupt
administrators" and charging
South Vietnamese "sloppiness
in administration."
The inspectors accused some
South Vietnamese officials of
the Social Welfare Ministry of
falsifying name lists of refugees
to steal commodities.
The inspectors said that on
the basis of a count by the Sai-
gon Government 1.2 million new
refugees had been created by
the fighting in South Vietnam
between March 30 and Nov. 23.
The number of refugees is not
precisely known but the report
said that last June the United
States and South Vietnam were
preparing plans to care for 1.5
million refugees. According to
the Senate subcommittee on
refugees the total may be close
to two million, including some
200,000 living in areas under
Communist control.
, The inspectors said they
found that since March 30,
when responsibility for relief
resettlement and return-to-vil-
lage programs was between
CORDS and AID, that opera-
tions were characterized by
"confusion and lack of coordi-
nation."
"This lack of coordination
and duplication of effort be-
tween AID and CORDS, which
is an old story, must be cor-
rected as soon as possible," the
report said. "We believe that in
any case the war victims pro-
gram could probably be more
efficiently administered and
that its long-range responsibil-
ities would be better protected
if the War Victims Directorate
were transferred now to AID."
NEW YORK TIMES
29 December 72
Cambodian Confession
As the aerial blitz against North Vietnam continues
In full fury, the American people have been treated to
another sordid glimpse of what they are getting for the
continuing high investment in lives, money and national
honor throughout Indochina.
The United States-backed Government of Cambodiahas
acknowledged that because of corruption by military..
commanders and other "irregularities," it has paid cial-
aries to as many as 100,000 nonexistent soldiers. he
misappropriated funds for this phantom army have.cpme
almost exclusively from a $300-million American aid
program that President Nixon once called "probably the .
best investment in foreign assistance that the United
States has made in my lifetime."
The President to the contrary notwithstanding, there
Is nothing remarkably new in the latest .disclosure from
Phnom Penh, except perhaps the surprising candor of
a regime that has long shared with its neighbors in
Vientiane and Saigon a reputation for corr.,3tion,
Only last month, a Times correspondent on the scene.
described Cambodia as a place where "the sons of gen-
erals drive Alfa Romeos and Cougar fastbacks . . . the ,
governor of a province is known to sell ammunition and ,
drugs to the enemy . . . other Government officials can
be seen selling automatic rifles and uniforms to wealthy
merchants, who in turn sell them to both sides .. . low-
salaried colonels?some accused of pocketing the pay-
rolls of their units?build luxury villas here in tie
capital and rent them to Americans for $700 a month."
Is it any wonder that since Mr. Nixon threw American
support?including briefly? American troops?behind
a new anti-Communist military regime in early 1970,
Communist forces have overrun three-quarters of Cam-
bodian soil and ,the indigenous resistance movement has
expanded from a force of about 3,000 to an estimated
30,000?
Meanwhile, most of the country's towns and cities
have been heavily damaged or destroyed either by allied
?bombs or by Communist shells, or both, and up to one-
third of the seven million population has been rendered
homeless. Neither the newly affluent generals nor the
American Government has shown 'serious concern for
these hapless refugees, caught up in a conflict that is
beyond their understanding.
And all this goes on while the Administration weighs
plans for an eighteen -month freeze of Federal housing ?
construction and other "economy" cuts in programs to
aid America's own disadvantaged. Some day perhaps the
President will explain who at home or abroad is being
helped by the extension of this war without end.
57
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WASHINGTON POST
. 1 JANUARY 1973
Thieu TLJsin
To uild His Panv
Jr
y Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service
GOCONG, South Vietnam,
Dec. 31?President Thieu is
openly using soldiers, civil
servants, and publicly owned
equipment, including materi-
als paid for by the United
States, to promote the devel-
opment of his new political
party.
The party, known as Dan
Chu or the Democracy Party,
Is theoretically an independ-
ent organization with volun-
tary membership and no for-
mal connections with the pres-
ident. But it represents a ma-
jor part of his effort to soli-
dify his personal grip on the
country and its people in an-
ticipation of a postwar politi-
cal struggle.
, The party's organizers
have been at work for more
than a year, but stepped up
the pace sharply in late Octo-
ber, when a peace settlement
that would legitimize a Com-
munist presence in South Vi-
etnam became a real possibil-
ity.
Thieu has used the delay in
reaching a peace agreement to I
move on several levels to en-
trench himself in office. The
chief public and ostensibly
non-governmental move has
, been the unveiling of the
party, which has opened chap-
ters around the country
though it has largely avoided
scrutiny from foreigners by
postponing its debut in Sai-
gon.
. The chapter here in Gocong, I
a sleepy delta province capital
30 miles south of Saigon, is
one of the most fully organ-
ized, and no attempt is being
Made to hide the extensive
use of public resources and
government personnel in its
development.
The staff at the party's tem- I
porary office in a. Buddhist I
temple consists of four civil
servants three young men
from province headquarters
assigned by the province chief
to work at, the party office,
and a ?voinon front the
Agricultural Development !W-
renn. Printing and typing of
party documents and letters
are done in government of
flees on government equip-
ment. .?
The Party's permanent Go-
cong headquarters is being
constructed a few blocks away
by a platoon of army engi-
neers, using American-sup-
plied equipment and imported
Korean cement paid for by
U.S. aid funds. The site is pub-
licly owned land next to pro-
vince police headquarters.
There are 2,673 names on
the party's current Gocong
province membership list.
Among them are 459 police
men and 1,134 teachers, agr
cultural development officials
and other civil servants. Ac
cording to party ehairma
Nguyen Minh-Huan, the roste_
comprises all public employ
ees in the province.
In addition, Huan said a le
gal ban on partisan politics by
military officers has been
partly circumvented with gov-
ernment approval to permit
officers assigned to non-mill
tary duties to join the party.
He called them "civilian offi-
cers."
He said there are about 50
such officers in Gocong, a mi-
nor and generally peaceful
province where the govern-
ment's military presence is
minimal. There are several
thousand of them around the
country, according to other
sources.
Huan said he was one of
about 30 persons recruited for
;the party by the Gocong pro-
vince chief and that the appli-
cation forms filled out by all
Ithe members were being kept,
at province 'headquarters byl
one of the province chief's as-
sistants?a lieutenant colonel
who foiled to app.ear at his of-
fice after being informed by
telephone that reporters wore
wailing to se him..
The ability of the party's or-
ganizers to command lids kind
of
vP.N19,Tiil AIMIA 111V.YjAPOkt
ficials ilustrates the .extent to
which Thieu already controls
the machinery of government.
All province chiefs, or mili-
tary governors, are appointed
by Thieu to their lucrative
and ? powerful positions, and
they in turn control the lower
levels of government down to
I he remotest hamlet?includ-
ing jobs, government services,
essential personal documents,
awl security operations.
It comes as no surprise to
Vietnamese or Americans here
that ',17.1ileu would take advan-
tage of his position to promote
the development of his party.
It was expected that there
would be pressure on govern-
ment workers to join and that
some public money would he
used for party activities.
Political parties have not
traditionally been. a dominant
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100040001-2
WASHINGTON POST
3 JANUARY 1.973
t.-
Held Set: to 1.419i1
lease of Dissidenis'
Arencr torn nee-ri,si.:
rAti,1S Jan 2?Two French- prisoners was rain:pant.- the
naidr, released last week after two men said,
2y'Ors in a Saigon jail said A favorite Of Saigon. Jailers,
liev`f:10(ttlY that South Viet- was "the plane trip," dangling
11"111"!Ie alit built les were re- the prisoner in mid.air by his
elasciifying Political Prisoners wrist and working him over
as 1-.1promon criminals to avoid
woo coms. Ii'ne prisoners also
- rel,casiog them When a cease-
ft eiimes into force.
Jpanlrierre Dehris and An-
', dra Illeoras, who were impris-
"J ot4d :.for raising a Vietcong
n flag-;iii Saigon in .hily 1970,
saiil-that South Vietnamese of-
.
ficioisi were making false ree-
ord.;:ind documents to keep
these -prisoners in jail.
aalitical and criminal pris-.
on4r:s Were now being -mixed,
thoy. Mid a press conference
beit,e,-,Three days ? before they
weve ?freed, they witnessed a
nias ':deportation of political
prisnners from Saigon's Chi
Ch'oa?lail to the notorios'pe-
nal settlement of Poula Con-
d "
extinguished eigaretti:s on,
prisoners' bodies, they said.
Although they themselves
had been beaten with iron
bars and bicycle chains when
first arrested, they said, they
had never been tortured.
The two young men said
they had presumed they would
be released, since ,otherwise
"they would have been embar-
rassing witnesses to what IS
to follow.",
They also attributed their
release to the campaign on
their behalf by the French
"Secours Populaire7 (Popular
Aid) organization. and claimed
that they were not aw?qe ,of
, any steps taken by the French
'.:lis is a sign that the lion"- government to obtaill. their re-
datien of prisoners is about to lease.
begiu," they said. Sixteen stu- However. official sources
dents who went on a hunger said here tonight the release
strike .Dec. 10 to protest the of the two imprisoned men
conditions of their detention was due mainly to "repeated'
were among the prisoners and insistent" demands by
shipped out, they said. French government represent-
Torture against political atives'in Sdigon.?
force in Vietnamese political
life because there is none that
has nationwide membership
and influence, and the exist-
ing parties have been suhordi-
nio tp, ke,giwtal. and religious
interesits.
Last, week, however,Thieu
issued a decree that is in-
tended to change that. Under
the new law, electoral politics
in Vietnam will be dominated
by large, national political
parties?and if only the De-
mocracy Party is able to meet
the new law's membership
criteria and is eligible to run
candidates, that would leave
Thieu in an even stronger pos-
ition than now.
"We're not asking to partici-
pate in Thien's government,"
an opnosi i i on party leader
said wistfully the other day.
"We just want to be left alone
to compete equally. How can
we compete with this?"
It will be difficult, if not :im-
possible, for any opposition
iparty to compete with the De-
mocracy Party, if its perform!
ante here is any indication.
Huan, the party chairman, a
61-year-old schoolt.eacher, said
58
he joined because "the prov-
ince chief himself came into
my home and invited me to at-
tend the meeting. I am a sup-
porter of Thieu and an anti.-
Communist. It would have
been very difficult to refuse."
As party chairman for-Go-
cong, he said, he has sought
out "all the people I know per-
sonally" to explain the party's
purposes to them and per-
suade them to join. "Nobody
has refused," he said.
There is still a debate
within the U.S. Mission in Sai-
gon over what Thieu's likely
political moves will be in the
event of a cease-fire.
Basically the arginnent Is
brhypcn Most, whq iwilevo he
will "move. 10 the--
broaden the base or Ills gov-
ernment, rept:tablbli contact
with the opposition, liberalize
some of his potitical
and those who believe he will'.
"move to the right"?fm-ther
hat-den his uncompromising
rinti-Collinittnist, tin rails(
stand and exclude from the
councils of power all those
whose agreement with hint Is
less than total.
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WASHINGTON POST
14 December 1972
C
araidisTiCi
For Peace Siuk)side
By Martin
iminesemer
PIINOM PENH?The wide-
spread hopes of instant-
peace fostered among Cam-
bodians by 1-lenry Kissing-
er's magical aura and their
!own government's pro-
nouncements have ? now
largely subsided.
? They have been replaced,
at least among educated
people, by the glum realiza-
tion that Cambodia is fur-
ther away from even a lim-
ited settlement than any Of !
News Analysis
?
the other countires of indo-
China. For even if a cease-
fire were to extend to Cam-
bodia it is difficult to see
what kind of political follow-
up there could possibly be.
The mood of pessimism
deepened with recent Com-
munist military successes.
For a time the. Communists
had closed four of the coun-
try's six main railroads and
were threatening the other
two. They crowned their
teniporary dominance with
the destruction of a heavily
escorted convoy and conse-
quent butchery of the gov-
ernment troops and a num-
ber of women and children,
the soldiers' dependents.
President Lon Nol has
given his new prime minis-
ter, Hang Thun Hak, a brief
to arrange talks with the
other side at the local level.
Officially all that is on offer
is service in the govern-
ment, army or re-settlement
?on the land. According to
rumor, there may also have
been some vague sugges-
Lons of a "place in political
life,"
The official government
line has always been that if
the North Vietnamese with-
drew. Khmers?as the Cam-
'b odians are historically
known?would soon settle
their differences amicably.
Since it is unlikely that all
Vietnamese will withdraw
and since it is reluctant-
ly conceded that there ID
such a thing as a dedicated
Khmer Communist, the ac-
tual government strategy is
to try to make little local
settlements with the less
committed Khmer dissi-
dents.
It is recognized that a
"hard corn" Will be left,
Westorn diplomats who
share the Cambodian goy-
0011:1C0t
Oil II
eminent view suggest that
"over time" the Cambodian
army will be able to get the
better of these units. ?
The government's plan is
thus essentially to bring
about the capitulation . of
some hostile units and. to de-
stroy the others, a plan for
continuing the war rather
than ending it. It is based
on the hope that the major-
ity of Nmtil Viol IlaltleSe
units, advisers and support
per.soimel will indeed de-
part, or at least, even if they
stay on Cambodian terri-
tory, will cease to intervene
in a major way in the Cam-
hod i a n war.
It ignores the signs over
recent months that the
Khmer dissidents are in-
creasing in number, now to
an ? estmiated 30,000-35,000,
and in combat effectiveness
while the Cambodian army
.doesn't seem to be getting
significantly better. It ig-
nores, too, the possibility
that there may soon be a
major reduction in Ameri-
can supplies of arms and
equipment, even if the
United States provides
straight cash for arms pur-
chases to circumvent any re-
striction in a cease-fire
agreement on direct supply.
One Khmer opposition
party member commented:
"Lon Nol isn't interested in
any settlement. He tells
Hang Thun Hak to get some
talks going hut he wohl let
him offer anything that the
other side would accept."
Other critics of Lou Nol
who take the same view
would like to see him re-
placed, somehow, by a more
honest and less lackadaisical
government.
What would the other side
accept.? The answer seems to
be that, like the Phnom
Penh government, it too is
opposed to a settlement.
Exiled Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk has, of course, al-
ready announced his opposi-
tion loudly and vociferously
in Peking. But he speaks
only for the Sihanoukists
among the dissidents, if he.
speaks for them.
However, in this case he
may well be voicing the
common attitude, The
Khmer dissiderila Make OD
it 11111NOW and complicated
alliance and its complica-
NEW YORK TIMES
28 December 72
One-Third of Army
In Cambodia Found.
To Be Nonexistent
By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
SoeciAl In Sc 1rw York !Ours
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia,
Dec. 27?The Cambodian Gov-
ernment acknowledged today
that, because of corruption by
military commanders and other
"irregularities," it has "at
times" paid salaries to as many
as 100,000 nonexistent soldiers.
The Government said that it
had sometimes met payrolls of
300;000 troops even though it
has now found that the actual
number of Men in the army is
about 200,000. These "phan-
tom" troops?a creation of
false payrolls submitted by
unit commanders ? represent
the most widespread form of
corruption in Cambodia and
have become the focus of bit-
ter popular complaint.
A private in the Cambodian
Army receives about $20 a
'month, so 100,000 "phantom"
privates would put $2-million a
month into the pockets of com-
manders. Virtually all of this
'money comes through United
States aid, which will total
about 5300-million this year.
The information about Cam-
bodia's inflated army was dis-
closed by the Information Min-
ister, Keam Relit, at a news
!cenference.
The Government has men-
"
tioned the problem of corrup-
tion in general terms before,
but has never discussed it with
-such candor and in such detail.
The Information Minister said
the Government had almost
completed a payroll survey of
the Army and had so far found
only 180.000 real soldiers on
tions are further corn-
pounded by the policy dif-
ferences among Peking,
Hanoi, and Moscow.
"If they tried to get to-
gether a national leadership
that could negotiate with
Phnom Penh," one informed
student of their affairs here
/ said, "they would bring into
the open so many problems
and differences within their
own ranks, it just wouldn't
be worth it for them at this
stage."
Others would argue that
there is no need to go into
the internal problems of the
Khmer Rouge, one of three
major rebel groups, to con-
skler a settlement. Commu-
nists and ? noyt-commpnists
#11110, Old Wiling 1460itti
ttnintliPti Went oft into the
jungle with the atm of ul-
timately seizing power In
Cam 1)OdiO.
duty. He said this survey
would he finished by the end
of this month.
The Minister said that at
present the number of soldiers
"on' paper" was 220,000, having
been reduced recently from the
paper high of 300,000.
The Government of President
Lon Nol is reportedly under
heavy pressure from the United
States, its principal benefactor,
to crack down on the military
corruption and improve the
performance of the Cambodian
armed forces. There were re
ports, not confirmed ? officially,
.that ? this was one of the mes-
'sages conveyed to. President
Lon Nol by Gen. Alexander M.
Haig Jr., President Nixon's rep-,
resentative during his ...brief
visit to Phnom Penh last wecic.
There have also been unof-
ficial reports that men from the
American Embassy's large mili-
tary aid team are assisting and
overseeing the Cambodians in
the current army payroll check.
False payrolls are but one of
the methods of military corrup-
tion here. Military supplies,
from uniforms to medicines,
often find their way to the
open market?and sometimes
into enemyhands.
There is no doubt that the
Government's awareness of the
seriousness of the corruption
probTeirrilia?? increased., But the
Government has not taken a
punitive approach toward the
perpetrators, and reports of cor-
ruption continue.
Just two days ago, a local
newspaper reported that, in one
largely "phantom" unit, the
commander?because he feared
his false payroll was about to
be exposed?suddenly reported
that 733 'men had deserted over
the past month out of the unit's
supposed total of 1,100.
Other newspapers reported
this Week that $1-million in
uniforms provided through
American aid had been un-
accounted for !since iast year.
The Government has charged
a few unit commanders with
falsifying payrolls and has
jailed them pending trial, but
officials acknowledge privately
that this only scratches the
surface of the problem. Some
officials say that if every guilty
commander was put behind
bars, the army would lose the
bulk of its leadership and would
disintegrate. .
.? The Information Minister said
the Government was attacking
the problem "not., by suppres-
.i
son but through prevention
and . education." Asked later
why the Government had not
adopted a policy of stern pun-
ishment, he said: "The Khmer
mentality does not depend on
whether or not you punish ? a
person. That's why we have
chosen education and preven-
tion first. But if we ? have to
punish, we will punish, because
It has been preStribed by law."
The Minister k!, the Govern-
ment w' rc1y alining it
an a60 rtg.
ular..ORR?: fiAt k7,!8ierithiii the
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THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washimiten, D. C., Wrdriecriny, December 13, 1972
Au
?
Td17] c
By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star?News
BANGKOK ? "The flying is
non-military; in other words,
civilian flying. You are flying
for the U.S. government, that
is government agencies such
as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc.
While these agencies may be
under CIA direction, you don't
know and you don't care. The
government agencies direct
the routings and schedulings,
your company provides the
technical know-how and you
fly the airplane."
Thus an unnamed American
pilot describes "civilian
? flying" in Southeast Asia for
Air America and the lesser
known Continental Air Serv-
ices ? both private companies
on contract to the U.S. govern-
ment. The pilot's comments
are part of a confidential,
16-page brochure available at
certain Air Force personnel of-
fices. It is shown to Air Force
pilots interested in flying for
one of the companies upon
completing their military serv-
ice.
TKO brochure lists no author
or publisher, but it offers an-
illuminating view into the in-
ternal operations of Air Amer-
ica, which has played a cru-
cial role in the Indochina war
theater since the 1950s. Air
America, along with the other
companies, has airlifted
troops, refugees, CIA agents,
American politicians, war ma-
terial, food and occasionally
prisoners all over Southeast
Asia.
Extravagant Salaries
The brochure, dated June 29,
? 1972, boasts that Air America
ranked as one of the most
profitable corporation in the
United States in 1969, a year
when most of the world's air-
lines lost heavily. Air Ameri-
ca's customer is the U.S.
government.
It employs about 436 pilots,
according to the pamphlet, of
?
which 384 are working in
Southeast Asia. The center of
Air America's operation is
Laos, where the presence of
military or military-related
personnel is prohibited by the
much-abused Geneva Confer-
ence of 1962.
Air America's profits are
high despite the somewhat ex-
travagant salaries it pays for
flying personnel. According to
the report, a pilot with 11
years experience, flying a
UH-34D helicopter based at
Udorn air base in Thailand an
, average of 100 hours monthly,
will take home $51,525. All sal-
aries are tax free.
A newly hired pilot flying a
C-7 Caribou transport based in
Vientiane, averaging 100 hours
flying time monthly, would
earn a minimum $29,442. The
U.S. commercial pilot average
Is $24,000.
Also available to Air Ameri-
ca personnel, in addition to a
liberal expense account, is life
and medical insurance, two-
weeks leave, tickets on other
airlines at 20 percent normal
cost, PX and government
mailing privileges and educa-
tional allowances for depend-
ents. Many Air America pilots
are retired military men re-
ceiving military pensions.
'Good' Investment
Americans can also become
"air freight specialists", com-
monly called kickers. Their
job is to push cargo out over
drop zones. Salary is
$1,600-$1,800 per month. Quali-
fications: American citizen-
ship, air borne training, expe-
rience with the U.S. Air Force
preferred.
Air America, Inc., is owned
by a private aviation invest-
ment concern called the Pacif-
ic Corp. Dunn and Brad-
street's investment directory
places its assets in the $10-$50
million category, and rates it
"good" as an investment risk.
Air America itself employs al- .1
Ili'; . _: ? l'") ?
together about 8,000 persons,
ranking in size just below Na-
tional Airlines and above most
? of the smaller U.S. domestic
airlines.
Formerly called Civil Air
Transport (CAT), Air America
was organized after World
War II by General Claire
Chennault, commander of the
American fighter squadrons in
Burma and China known as
the Flying Tigers. CAT played
a major role in post-war China
supplying Nationalist troops.
CAT also supplied the French
during their phase of the war
in Indochina.
Air America is commonly
considered an arm of the CIA.
In Laos, the CIA for the past
10 years or more has main-
tained an army of hill tribe-
men, mainly Thai and Lao
mercenaries. Most of the air
supply and transport needs for
this army have been handled
by Air America.,
Military Assistance
Though the brochure does
net mention opium explicitly,
it hints at the subject of con-
traband:
"Although flights mainly
serve U.S. official personnel
movement and native officials
and civilians, you sometimes
?engage in the movement of
friendly troops, or of enemy
captives; or in the transport of
cargo much more potent than
rice and beans! There's a war
going on. Use your imagina-
tion!"
Air America works hand-
in-hand with the U.S. Air
Force. At Udorn air base in
Thailand, Air Force mechan-
ics repair the airline's trans-
ports and helicopters, many of
them unmarked. The Air
Force has reportedly leased
giant C130 transports when the
planes were needed for opera-
tions in Laos. In the section on
Air America's benefits, the
brochure lists in addition to
normal home and sick leave:
"Military leave will be grant-
ed appropriately" ? an appar-
ent acknowledgement that
there are military people
working directly with Air
America.
One should not conclude,
however, that the salaries, ex-
citement and tax advantages
mean that Air America pilots
60
d P1ot
ki Asa.
hope the war will continue. As
the brochure's author notes in
a typed postscript:
"Foreign aid situation un-
clear pending outcome mill- '
tary situation in RVN (Repub-
lic of Vietnam), but it looks as
if we'll finish the war (and
peace terms favorable for our
side); if so, it is expected that .?
a boom among contract opera-
tors will result when imple-
mented, due to inevitable re-
habilitation and reconstruction
'aid in wartorn areas... . Job
'market highly competitive and
you'll need all the help you
can get."
According to Pacific News
Service, the following men sit
in the Air America board of
directors:
Samuel Randolph Walker ?
chairman of the board of Wm.
C. Walker's Son, New York;
director of Equitable Life As-
surance Society; member of
Federal City Council, Wash-
Ingtan, D.C.; member of Ac-
tion Council for Better Cities,
'Urban America, Inc., and life
trustee, Columbia University.
William A. Reed ? chair-
man of the board of Simpson
Timber Co.; chairman of the
'board, ' Simpson Lee Paper
Co.; director of Crown Simp-
son Timber Co.; director of
'Seattle First National Bank;
director of General Insurance
Co.; director of Boeing Co.;
director of Pacific Car Found-
ry Co.; director of Northern
Pacific Railroad; director of
'Stanford Research Institute.
Arthur Berry Richardson ?
foreign service officer in Rus-
sia, China and England from
1914 to 1936; chairman of the
board of Cheeseborough
'Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961;
director of United Hospital
Fund, New York; trustee of
Lenox Hill Hospital.
James Barr Ames ? law
partner in Ropes & Gray, Bos-.
ton; director of Air Asia Co.,
Ltd., director of International
'Student Association; member,
Cambridge Civic Association
and trustee of Mt. Auburn
Hospital..
(Copyright, 1972.'
Dispatch News Service International)
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NEW YORK TIMES
23 December 72
Laos Drug Curb Hailed
But Outflow Continues
By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Ttmes .
VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 22? in hard narcotics were made il-
legal in Laos, authorities here
have confiscated 602 kilograms
of opium and 30 kilograms of
heroin, United States Ambassa-
dor G. McMurtrie Godley said
in a speech today.
Meantime, the Laotian Gov-
ernment has been purchasing
opium grOwn by farmers so as
to reduce the .hardship to them
of changing crops.
But the Government price for
opium is Only about onc-fifth
the price on the open
market in Laos, and the latter
price is rising. Consequently,
officials say there is evidence
that, if anything, farmers. in
some areas are increasing pro-
duction to take advantage of
the high price.
Dens Continue To Flourish
Opium dens continue to
flourish here because under the
new law?although production,
sale and possession of hard
drugs are illegal?it is not il-
legal to operate opium dens or
Royal Laotian Air Force were consume drugs.
being used to fly narcotics from . Consequently, police are
given considerable flexibility in
Luang Prahang and other air-
fields to delivery points in
neighboring countries.
A large proportion of the
Opium derivatives such as heroin
reaching the American mar-
ket originate in a remote wilder-
ness known as the "golden tri-
angle," where the borders of
Thailand, Laos and Burma meet.
Laos Is Transfer Point
As part of a recently initiated
campaign by the United States
and Laotian Governments to
crack down on narcotics traf-
fic in and through Laos, Pre-
mier Souvafina Phourna and
the American Ambassador
opened a new addict detoxifica-
tion:center here today.
Laotian and American offi-
cials delivered speeches hailing
the results of the .anti-nar-
eoties drive and predicted that
the situation would inipmve.
nut sources Involved in the
enforcement of a year old an ti-
narcotics law said that this
year's illicit Laotian opium
crop, slated to be harvested in
February, was likely to be large.
The sources said that although
there had been successes in
intercepting the flow of opium
and .heroin from the Laotian
hinterlands to the American
market, smugglers were find-
ing new routes.
'One source said that com-
bat and transport planes of the
deciding whether to crack down
on a given opium den or not.
There has been sharp criti-
cism, both from some Laotians
and some Anieric.an officials
working here of the emphasis
the United States has lately
placed on the suppression of
opium in Laos.
"The flares are fundamen-
tally cops with a very specific
While most of the raw job," one American. here said.
opium probably conies from Bur- adding:
"They are concerned mainly
with enforcement and not with
the economic and political ef-
fects their work produces.
When they make Meo or Yao
tribesmen angry with their
sometimes heavy-handed ap-
proach to these things, it may
be hurting our other efforts
to keep these tribesmen on our
side and not with the Com-
munists. The situation in north-
west .Laos is dangerous enough
as it is without extra antago-
nizing of the tribes."
?Enforcement officials hope
that narcotics passing .through
Laos will .be steadily ? reduced,
but they acknowledge that the
smugglers involved are experts,
generally a step or two, ahead
of them. -
One enforcement official said:
"The ?old days when Corsican
adventurers flew a fleet of light
planes from Laos to deliver
their stuff around Indochina
are over. Now the big dealers
seem to be relying on military
aviation, and that is very much
harder to control. We 'hope
military police will cut the
traffic . down, but you can
imagine the problem, having to
check every T-28 fighter before
it takes off on a mission." .
And then, referring to a Balti-
more Federal Court case re-
ported on last week, he added:
"And when you hear that heroin
has been shipped to the States
inside the bodies of G.I.'s killed
in action, you know you're up
against . periple who will ? stop
t elease 2001/0
ma and northern Thailand, La-
os is a traditional transship-
ment area for smugglers send-
ing drugs through Thailand to
Singapore, Hong Kong and oth-
er major ports.
" In Laos herself it is believed
" that somewhere between 10
and 30 tons of opium are
grown each year. The manu-
facture of heroin requires about
20 pounds of opium for each
round of heroin.
? , During the height of Amer-
ican .ground combat participa-
tion in South Vietnam, most of
the heroin reaching American
soldiers in that country is be-
lieved to have been manufac-
tured * at a jungle refinery
called Hoy Tay in the vicinity
of the Laotian border village of
Ban Houei said.
This refinery was discovered
by anti-narcotics agents after
it had been dosed down and
demolished by its operators. ,
Two full-time narcotics
agents of the Bureau of Nar-
.cotics and Dangerous Drugs,
as well as American customs,
civil and military police advis-
ers, are currently working in
Laos, and more are on the way
here.
Paradoxically, narcotics ex-
perts say, the success achieved
,in recent months in blocking
narcotics traffics between the
royal capital of Luang Prapang
and Vietiane has apparently
provided an incentive to poppy
farmers to grow more opium.
Since September 17, 1971,
when produetititi Of traf
THE WASHINGTON POST Sorardny, Dec, 30, 1972
Dealers
mg? Dope
Tr? /I-1'7777'