OIL DIPLOMACY FUEL CRISIS MAY FORCE U.S. TO REDUCE TROOPS, PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . ..?age 41
Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 44
Near East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 47
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 55
Western Hemisphere. . . . . . . . . . Page 58
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WALL STREET JOURNAL
30 January 1973
Oil .Diplomrtacy
Fuel Crisis May Force'.
U.S. to Reduce.Troops,.
Put Pressure on Israel
U.S. and Allies May Compete
Bitterly ` to 'Get Supplies;
..What Role for Russians?
New Task for Mr. Kissinger
By ROGERT KEATLEY
'Ziaff Reporter of Tire \VALT, STREET Joun%-AL
WASHINGTON-When talk here. turns to the
"energy crisis," it usually dwells on domestic
aspects-the price of natural gas in Texas, or
perhaps a law someday requiring Detroit to
make smaller auto engines.
But senior government officials realize In-
creasingly that there's much more to be reck.
oned with. They're beginning serious study of
the energy problem's International implica.
tions In hopes of fending off grave 'diplomatic,
military and economic troubles.
At worst,,eXpcrts fear that political disputes
or a shooting war in the Middle East might
The huge amounts of money that Arab
nations will get from selling their oil could
imperil the world monetary system and
spur the U.S. to neru political activity in
the At uleast. .This Is the second of live stor-
ies examhrfng the situation.
eventually sever America's fuel-supply lines.
Interior Secretary Rogers Morton warns that
an Interruption of the imported-oil flow for any
reason "could cause great damage to our na-.
tional economy and internal and external secu-
illy."
More Questions Than Answers
To date, the policy review involves drafting
questions more than compiling answers; Henry'
Kissinger's staff has just started organizing tile,
paperwork and soon will float it around the
State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelli-
gence Agency and other concerned agencies.
But some of the topics are fairly obvious, and
deeply worrisonne. They include':
-Mideast policy. Some ruualysty see a grow.
Ing contradiction between massi.%a U.S. aid to
Israel and this country's increased need for
Arab oil. So far the Arab governments have.
been tmwilltng or unable to use their fuel ex-
ports for political blackmail, but there's doubt
about how long this restraint can last. Rather
than risk having. supplies cut by another Arab-
Yarnell war, the study may recommend
stronger U.S. efforts to settle Mideast conflicts
soon. Pushing terms that the Israelis may not
like much strikes some officials as wiser than
letting events drift.
-Monetary dangers. This year fuel Imports
will account for $2.5 billion of the U.S. pay-
ments deficit; experts any the not cost fit 1080
will he nt bast $10 billion. Tits drain inane
thrcftetlq the dollar's utabillty,?nntl there in on.
niter ti't ubleaeme? lwrnslnvrt l+cskles. Midrlrr t
oil-producin; nations' will accumulate vast
sums that they can't spend internally. Thrso
huge cash reserves if transferred erratically,
could disrupt the international monetary sys-
tent far more seriously than the 1971 crisis,
which forcbd the dollar's devaluation.
-Defense shifts. The need to pay dearly for
foreign oil could well reduce American ability
to keep military forces overseas, especially in
Europe. Though troop cuts are considered de-
sirable by many officials anyway, U.S. strate.
gists worry that money shortages may force
much deeper slashes than they or American al-.
lies want. In addition, the Navy now claims it
needs' extra billions for destroyers to protect
growing tanker fleets. Skeptics say this is
merely a ploy to justify big Naval budgets and
fancy sea and shore berths for admirals, but
the matter is getting serious study.
-Relations with allies. America's best
friends, the Western European nations and
Japan, need Mideast oil even more than does
the U.S.; they have no significant deposits of,
their, own. An era of bitter competition, fraying
alliances, could ensue as fuel-short industrial
powers all bid for the same petroleum.
-Relations with Russia. There's big talk.
these days about buying fuel from the U.S.S.R.'
But some officials warn that dependence on So-
viet sources could give Moscow an upper hand.
in relations with the West. (Others 'say the
.sales will create mutual interest in continued
political stability. So far there is no clear U.S.
official view.) In addition, the Kremlin is
trying to extend its Mideast influence, partly
by purchase of Arab oil for Russia's own use or
for reexport into hard-currency markets. U.S.
officials doubt this trend serves either Western
or Arab interests.
"Wo Should Worry"
Because energy problems havcri't seemed
imminent, the subject has been shoved aside
regularly by Washington's national security bu-
reaucracy. Lately, though, growing awareness
of fuel shortages has fostered new interest in
'the international complications ahead. Thus
they stand high on 1Mr. Kissinger's list of things
to cope with "after Vietnam."
"Suddenly we've realized we should worry,
about energy problems," says a Kissinger staf-
ter who is helping organize the study. "We've
been pondering which matters to stress over
the next four years, and this is certainly one."
In fact, energy will soon be the subject of a
National Security Council study memorandum.
This is Mr. Kissinger's device for farming
problems out' to the bureaucracy for advice
and information. The responses help form pol-
icy alternatives that go to Preiident Nixon for
decision.
The impetus for action arises from the
changing rclatiorp hip between petroleum buy.
era and sellers. Though some analysts claim
the so-called "energy crisis" is a fraud and in.
sist that huge oil reserves still exist, their or.
guments are somewhat irrelevant. Whether
there's it shortage or it surplus, industrialized
countries find themselves facing effective do.
muds for higher prices from Arab and other
oil nations, which are taking over much of the
industry either by outright, nationalization or
by becoming partners of Western oil comps-?
nits. Some experts predict Arab governments
will be collecting as much as $.1o billion nn.
1111:111y In oil rr:vonucs by 1550, tip from less
Min $G billion In ifib; tho Arabs nro also cx-
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peeled to gain increased control over produc?
lion and sales policies..
The U.S., willy-nilly, will contribute. heavily
to Arab wealth and power. According to James
Akins, the State Department's senior energy
c authority, the U.S. has no short-terns alterna-
i tive to buying more foreign oil; he and others
agree that new domestic resources-including
gas manufactured from coal or oil extracted
from shale-won't conic along fast enough to
ease the squeeze any time soon. By 1980, Mr.
Akin: expects, U.S. oil imports may reach 15
million barrels daily, up from six million this
year and only 3.2. million in 1970.
What to Do?
Concern over the Implications of the trend is
mounting among private experts as well as
government strategists. Walter Levy, a noted
energy consultant, warns that "the U.S., as a
major world power, simply cannot afford an
ever-increasing over-dependence for its oil sup.
plies ' on a handful of foreign 'countries... .
Otherwise, its security in a narrow sense, as
well as its prosperity and, its freedom of action
in foreign-policy formulation, will be in jeop-
ardy."
What to do? The presidential energy mes-
sage that Mr. Akins is drafting and that Mr.
Nixon Is expected to send Congress next
month.will stress the need for developing adds-
tiorial fuel sources. But that process threatens
to take two'decades or more. In the meantime,
officials say, other government policies must
be reexamined and perhaps modified in order
to avoid the worst dangers:
High on the list comes Mideast policy.
Washington doesn't want to face a future
choice between preserving Israel or pacifying
Arab oil producers, however unlikely that pros.
pect now seems. To date, militant Arabs have
been unable to get oil-exporting governments
to use their fuel for political pressure. Despite
-much lofty talk about Arab brotherhood, even
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
.3 February 1973
s
U5 war,
111
90
d
abowff Pro=
*9 depemden.,ID
By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The U.S. Defense Department is increas.
ingly concerned about growing American
dependence on oil imported from the eastern
hemisphere: '
Two aspects worry the Pentagon - and the
Navy in particular:
? That the U.S. won't be able to transport
and protect the flow of oil it vitally needs.
That means defense experts fear a shortage
of tankers and of escorts to guard them.
? That the U.B. will find paying for the
imported oil an intolerable burden on its
balance of payments. They see the Iranians
and the Arabs engaged in leap-frogging
demands on the Western oil companies, the
end effect of which is higher cost to the
consumer.
neighbors like Syria and Iraq have had a hard
time agreeing on such things as proper tolls
fora pipeline that carries oil from Iraq across
Syria to the Mediterranean.
But some Arabs' see greater unity as their
wealth increases. Even conservative Saudi
Arabia, which may be pocketing $20 billion an-
nually by'1980, anticipates both affluence and-
influence. King Faisal, a devout Moslem, ada-
mantly opposes Jewish occupation of Islamic
holy places in Jerusalem and may yet use his
oil to help got the Israelis out. Warns one White
House staffer: "The question is: can we still
import in the 1980s if there is no resolution of
the Arab-Israeli dispute by then?"
It's a risk Washington may not choose to'
run. The present study could advocate new ef-
forts to settle the area's problems peacefully
before import needs skyrocket and the U
S
a
-
.
.
p
pears more Vulnerable.
Military Issues
The White House study will also ponder mil.
itary issues. If oil costs rise too far, Washing.
ton. may have to call home its troops from Eu.
rope and 'Asia for purely fiscal reasons, upset-
ting its foreign friends and eroding alliances.
Questions about reordering other military
priorities are also arising.
'Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy boss, al-
ready sees a budget opening through which he
hopes to pilot a fleet of shiny new destroyers.
Claiming the U.S. will need 1,000 large civilian
tankers by 1980, he concludes "their safe pas.
sage will depend in large measure on our abil-
ity. to deter interruption of this flow." Transla.
tion: more ships and men for his Navy. He also
argues that new gunboats could. conduct Mid-
cast diplomacy for his State Department
friends.
"To the citizen of a less technologically ori-
ented society," he says, "nothing is quite like ashipshape destroyer making a call."
The U.S. military forces depend on im-
ported oil for 60 percent of their supplies and
100 percent of the petroleum products con-
sumed in Vietnam came from the Persian
Gulf.
Dependence now is taken for granted in the
Defense Department and by the Navy. In a
little-noticed speech to the Chamber of
Commerce of Beckley-Raleigh in West Vir-
ginia last December Adm. Elmo, R. Zumwalt
laid the facts dramatically on the line:
"We have roughly enough reserves bf
natural gas to last 22 years and enough-
petroleum for 20," he said. "In other words,,
the wells of natural gas and petroleum are
going to run dry within our boundaries within
the life span of some here present and
certainly within the life span of some of our
children.
The admiral explained that only about 50
percent of demand for petroleum in the U.S.
would be met by domestic production by the
year 1985, even if Alaskan oil were brought
into the picture.
"That means," he concluded, "that we are
going to have to import something In the
order of 12 million barrels of crude oil a day
- each and every day."
Admiral Zumwalt went on to state the
Navy's concern for protecting the oil's move-
ment, as follows:
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e
Times Entertainment Editor
"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," a
controversial new book charging U.S. complicity
-through the 'CIA-in the drug trade, has been
acquired as the basis for a new film by Richard
Brooks for Columbia Pictures.
The. book, written by a young Yale scholar
named Alfred W. McCoy and two associates, Cath-
leen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II, first came
to public attention last year when it became
.known that the CIA tried to dissuade Harper &
Row from publishing it and 1,han demanded the
opportunity to read and review the text in galley
form.
Despite a long rejoinder from the CIA, Harper &
Row published the book in September essentially
,as written: McCoy's central thesis is that the U.S.
government, inheriting the vacuum left by the de-
parting French in Southeast Asia, also reluctantly
customers to buy Iranian oil. But if they
wished to save their special position as
favored customers, they would have to turn i
over their assets in Iran at an earlier date
and agree to help Iran immediately to step up
production from its present level of 4.5
million barrels a day to a level of 8 million
barrels a day. The 8-million-barrel goal
previously had been set for 1980.
The Shah made no mystery of the fact that
he had been incited to make these new
demands by Arab oil companies' completing
new agreements last December with Western
oil companies. These agreements give the
Arabs a 25 percent participation in the
companies effective this year and , a 51
percent participation by 1983. .
Minister called author
The deal the Shah was talking about was
worked out by the Saudi-Arabian Minister of
Oil Ahmed Zaki Yamani representing Ku-
wait, Qatar, and Abu Dabi as well as Saudi
Arabia.
Quietly watching the Iranian-Arab com-
petition are the Iraqis who have nation-
alized the Iraq Petroleum Company and are
having a hard time selling their oil. They will
have to decide now whether to press on with' their nationalization' and attempts to sell
their oil to the Soviet Union and the Commu-
nist bloc or whether to follow the pattern set
by the Shah or that set by the other Arabs.
Meanwhile, Lybya is needling all con-
cerned by demanding a immediate 50 percent.
share in the companies who have concessions
on its territory.
Only one thing is certain about the future of
the oil supplied by the Arabs and Iranians =
it will cost more. A barrel of Kuwaiti oil
which in 1968 cost $1.68 will cost $8 by Jan. 1,.
1975.
inherited the politics of poppy-growing' in the
Golden Triangle of Laos, Thailand and Burma,
where 70% of the world supply of illicit heroin is
produced. The revenues enrich local economies
and greatly enrich very high officials of Asian
governments supported by the United States in its
attempts to combat the spread of communism.
Battle in Opium War
McCoy's book is a meticulously documented look
at the heroin trade worldwide, written in news-
magazine rather than pedantic style and contain-'
ing a few scenes which could make even "The
French Connection" seem like a pale footnote.
Most particularly, McCoy describes a battle in
the Opium War of 1967 over a caravan of mules
carrying 16 tons of opium to market. The ship-
ment was destined for the commander-in-chief'of'
,the Laotian army, but two former Kuomintang
generals who had been controlling the local trade
routes attacked with several hundred men. Even-
tually the battle involved seven jet aircraft and a
company of Laotian paratroopers, who captured
the booty.
Brooks, fascinated by these goings-on and by
the whole curious confrontation of American
idealism and pragmatism with a ntttghly sordid
political ronlity, will, enll his movie "ttliwei'm of
Evil" and plans to shoot entirely on location. Sec
and unit work on the planting of the poppies will
begin in a few weeks' time.
The Truth? 'Tell It'
"I read an excerpt from the book in Harper's and
clipped it out," Brooks says. "I read the book and
was even more interested, but I' couldn't believe.
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"Since all of this oil will be coming over the
surface of the world oceans, I think you can
see the Navy's concern. To move this oil is
going to ,require more than 1,000 tankers
averaging about 17,000 tons each. Their
passage will depend on our' ability to deter
interruption of the flow."
For this purpose the Navy is seeking a new
generation of simplified low-cost frigates
which .would escort the tankers as well as so-
called "surface effect" ships such'as hydro-
foils for which prototype money has been
included in the new budget. ' Admiral Zum-
walt. also has said that American aircraft
carriers would be re-equipped to fly anti-
submarine missions in order to protect the
movement of oil and that the new nuclear
submarines would be used for this purpose.
The concern for rising costs of imported oil
is summarized by the estimate of Defense
Department experts that the cost of imported
petroleum products will rise from about $2
billion in 1972 to about $20 billion in 1985. The
swift escalation is explained by the fact that
whereas the U.S. hitherto Imported mostly
low-grade crude oils 'it now is beginning to
require refined products as well as costly
liquefied gas.
Far higher costs seen
One expert believed that the costs could run
far higher than $20 billion if the Iranians and
Arabs continued their leap-frogging.
The most recent stage therein is a decision .
by the Shah of Iran to overthrow his previous
understanding that when the concessions of
Western oil companies in his country expire
in 1979 he would for at least 15 years make
arrangements for them to continue operating
oil fields and refineries and marketing the oil.
Now he has told the companies that in 1979
he is taking over the oil 100 percent and that
they will have to join the queue of the world's
LOS. ANGELES TIMES
30 January 1973
o t ?~veiAsi .
Dirties of Heroin'
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"It won't be a documentary,"? says 'Brooks. "In
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
,6 February 1973
1 , ob lVic' dri,:lt
,the nature of things, I'm
afraid it can't be. But it
will tell the truth about an
incredible situation."
M c C o y testified last
summer before a 'congres-
sional committee about his
researches into the reluc-
tant complicity of Ameri-
can agents with the drug
traffic, which included, he
W . 1.1 C .1L
;that any studio would dare to tackle material that
, tough. But Columbia was interested, too. 1. said, 'I
want to tell the truth' and. Stanley Schneider said,
'Tell' it.'"
McCoy's book also suggests that American soli-'
citation of Mafia support during the invasion of
Sicily during World War 11, at a time when the or-
ganization had been under severe harassment by
,the Mussolini government, gave the Mafia a power
base from which it was able to enter the drug
trade on, a major scale in the postwar period.
McCoy, 27, will serve as a technical adviser to
'Brooks ran his production.
1?OR 1'1IE first time in the history of
United States Customs. 25 agents have
been dispatched overseas to gather ad-
vance information so narcotics ship-
ments to this country can be intercepted
before disappearing into the labyrinth of
Mafia distribution channels.
At the same time, the CIA has be-
conic increasingly active in'probing the
posiible involvement of South American
diplomats, police, and government of-
ficials in protecting the transshipment
of heroin from Southeast Asia and
:!Europe to the United'States.
These moves are part of an effort by
President Nixon to counter the ever
changing drug routes to the U. S. as
American participation in the Viet Nam
war 'ends and Asiatic narcotics mer?
chants shift gears to meet new areas of
supply and demand.
PRIVATELY, AI)MiNJSTRATION of-
ficials fear the: racketeers of Southeast
Asia's infamous. Golden Triangle' of
Laos, Thailand, and Norma may have
already selected the continental United
States as a new merchandising arena
! because of sharply declining sales to
American forces in Viet Nam.
There is evidence. same of the high
grade heroin from Southeast Asia is
finding its way to South America for re-
lay to the United States via Florida and
Tlexlco.
Couple that with large amounts of
European heroin and locally produced
coca iine.aIready being shipped here from
South America, and-the Southern Hemi-
sphere assumes greater significance as,a
source of danger to United States efforts
to een,bat the International narcotics
traffic.
Exactly one year ago, this column
was first to c!isclo a cnterggence of the so-
called Latin American Connection, a
new chug route supplementing the tra
ditional French Connection from Mar-
seilles directly across the Atlantic to
East Co.nst and Canadian ports.
The French' trade route had become
drastically curtailed because of U. S.
pressure.
So, the Corsican and Mafia gangsters
manipulating the drug racket began
ship;nit)g; large amounts of iiliddlc Last
heroin relined in Saul kern France to,
Soulh Anuvica, for transshipment to the
United Slnte.c by sea and air thru the
Windward islands and ,Mexico,
Thu, a new symbol was drawn on the
narcotics trade maps-the Triangle of
I)eath-with its base line reaching from
France to Sbalh America and its apex
peretr;atin^ the united . States from-
Europe and Latin Ainerica.
In time, another line may be added
across the Pacific to mark the course.
of Southeast Asian heroin into the-Tri-
angle of Death.
On a Latin American survey for the
House Foreign Affairs Committee last
month, Rep. Morgan i\l urphy of Chicago
and Robert Steele of Connecticut dis-
covered European heroin is also being
pumped directly into the Panama Canal
Zone and Vera Cruz, Mexico, for sbip.
ment to the U. S.
The rest finds it way thru such nations
as Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay; and
Colombia. Peru; Colombia, - Bolivia,
Chile and, Brazil are prime producers of
cocaine.
In fact, South America produces 00
per cent of the world cocaine supply and
100 per cent of that used in this country,
During their trip, Latin American of-
ficials readily admitted to the congress-
charges, the use of Air,
'America, a CIA charter
carrier operating in South-'
east Asia, to haul raw opi
um. The charge has been;;
denied.
The shocking rise in ad-',
diction among GIs serving
in Vietnam focused atten-
tion on the equally shock-
ing contradiction in' U.S.
postures.
men there is corruption among " police
and government personnel at lower
levels which they are at a loss to
control.
PRESIDENT t iiSAEL Pasirana lion.
rero of Colombia offered some hope of
curbing the drug trade in his country by
immediately appointing his minister of
justice to coordinate a crackdown. He
conceded laxity by his regime. lie also
admitted his police lacked training in
this field.
Recently, for Ixample, vital evidence
in a case involving three American drug
smugglers was destroyed by presum-
ably inept Colombian police.
The Americans, enroute to Bogota
from Florida to pick up a load of co-
caine, crash landed near the Colombian
capital with a cargo of empty crates-for
the narcotic and ::3,600 in cash.
I'OLiC -CONFISC:VI'[?;I) the cash, but
burned the crates and a list of names
of cocaine merchants from whom the
Americans planned to buy drugs worth
$500.no0?in the U. S.
The smu; ;!crs were later released
and demanded return of the cash-by the
United Statcs ymba: y. They were: told
to see the U. S. attorney in Southern
Florida. wwhvre their flight had origin-
ate;!. \aturalty. they didn't.
In another case, local .Mexican police
arc hciieveet to hate tilled off racketeer s
holding' a cache of 200 pounds of co-
came. ton of marijuna. and 50 kilos'of
pure heroin Ix?fure :American agents and
federal paiice could move In.
,1s you can' see, addicts are not tine
on:;' ones?c?''rrup:ed by the bttecnational
nareu:ics r.icket,
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By Herbert 'Scoville j r.
The writer is a fdrmer assistant director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and deputy director of the
rrHE ACCOMPLISHMENTS of "~"' ,
SALT I have produced a totally manta in warhead design can possibly
overcome the complete Ineffectiveness
new climate in which a comprehensive of the small ABM systems permitted
nuclear teat ban-one covering under- by the treaty.,
ground as well as atmospheric explo-
sions-becomes a negotiable arms con- Strategic Warheads
trol measure after nearly 10 years of HE EFFECTS of the ABM treaty
drifting in the doldrums. Not since T also apply to the requirements for
warheads for offensive weapons. With-
.1982, when Niki.ta Khrushchev made out any effective ABM to penetrate,
his offer of three on-site inspections to the need for new warheads largely dis-
"rify such a ban; have opportunities appears. In addition, there is no fur.
for agreement been so good. ther need for testing to develop special
This improved outlook, if we take warheads to withstand high-altitude
nuclear explosions, since the allowed
advantage of it, is particularly timely ABMs can be overwhelmed by a small
since it comes just as steps are needed fraction of the existing strategic
to prevent further spread of nuclear forces.
weapons to additional countries. That Only for a first-strike force able to
the patience of the non-nuclear-weap- destroy the enemy's missiles in their
ens countries is beginning to wear than silos in there any need to design new
Is shown by the overwhelming support, offensive warheads. 'I1owever, the
Nations resolution in favor of a halt to;
sill nuclear testing by August, 1973, the "hard target" MIRV which might pro.
.tenth anniversary of the' limited test voke Soviet concerns, that we were
ban treaty. In addition, there is strong seeking a first-strike capability, thus
Senate support, led by Sens. Philip upsetting the present strategic bal-
Hart, Edward Kennedy, Charles Ma- ance. Even for such a MIRV, an im-
thins and Clifford Case, for a resolu-
tion urging the President to make a re- proved. warhead with five times the
newed effort to negotiate a compre- yield would be less important than po-
hengive test ban and, In the ? interim, tential improvements in accuracy.
.to suspend all testing immediately as Nor does the United States any
long as the Russians reciprocate, longer need a "hard -target" MIRV to
The limitations on strategic arms provide the flexibility to attack key
agreed to in Moscow, particularly the military targets instead of cities after
ABM treaty, have greatly reduced the a limited Soviet attack; this can now
desires for further nuclear weapons be. achieved without further advances
testing which have in the past been in Wezibfin dogign since, as a result of
the major obstacle to a comprehenisive the ABM treaty, the retaliatory attack
Meat ban.. With only 200 ABM intercep- no longer has to cope with large ABM
tor missiles allowed each side, It Is al- defenses and can afford to direct sev-
most impossible to justify further im- eral warheads at a single target.
provements in the nuclear warheads A complete test ban would, on the
for this purpose. The United States, other hand, increase U.S. confidence
and almost certainly the Russians as that the Soviet Union was not improv-
heads in order to develop a first-strike
MIRV system able to destroy a large
fraction of our Minuteman force.
Another familiar justification for nu- ,
clear weapons testing has been the
need to assure the continued reliabil-
ity of, already developed and stock-
piled weapons. Although nuclear tests
have never'been carried out solely to
check the proper functioning of a
stockpiled weapon, it has been argued
that the ability to test is necessary in
case deterioration' is found by other
means and corrective action Is re-
quired. This Is not necessary, however,
since it would always be possible
to replace a warhead which had deters-
orated with one of proven design. Fur-
thermore, If mutual deterrence is the
fundamental element In our strategic
policy, as spelled out by the ADM,
treaty, then any unknown decrease In
reliability on both sides can only im-
prove deterrence. High reliability is
only necessary for a nation contemplat-
ing a first strike. No aggressor could
rely on the uncertain reliability of an-
other nation's weapons as the means of
surviving a retaliatory attack.
Thus, as a result of the Moscow
agreements, a strong case can be
made that no further nuclear testing
of strategic weapons Is required. Yet,
during the past 10 years since the lim-
ited test ban treaty, more than two-
thirds of the U.S. tests have been relat- '
ed to strategic weapons ( systems, and
indeed the highest-priority tests have
fallen in this category, The Moscow
agreements have thus undercut the
major rationale for continued nuclear
testing. Even before SALT I, Drs. Carl
Waiske and John Foster of the De-
fense Department testified. that they
favored a comprehensive test ban pro-
, vided it could be adequately verified.
This Pentagon position, which Is the
U.S. position at the Geneva disarma-
ment talks,. is even further reinforced'
by the Moscow agreements.
Signals
rHE BENEFITS of SALT I, however,
are not limited to the weapons
development part of the problem
alone; tile AI3iM treaty also creates a
mechanism by which the verification
difficulties, for years the ostensible
stumbling block to a test ban, can also
be solved.
Since 1963, the United States has in-
sisted that on-site inspections were re-
quired for adequate policing against.
secret underground tests, while the So-
viet Union has consistently claimed
i.li~t thcigo inspections were unneces-
sary. The verification provisions of the
AI3M treaty afford a means' of bridging
this gap. In this, and in the Interim
agreement on offensive weapons, both
nations agree that national technical'
means of verification will be used; that
neither nation will interfere with such
,Well, have nuclear weapons developed ~ ing the yields and accuracy of its war- means; and, finally, that neither will
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use deliberate concealment to Impede
verifications. In addition, a standing
consultative commission is set up to
consider questions concerning compli-
ance with the obligations of the agree-
ment. Similar provisions, but multi-na-
tional in scope, attached to a compre-
hensive. test ban treaty, might satisfac-.
torlly reconcile the U.S. and the Soviet
points of view.
. The primary problem In verifying a
ban on underground tests has been the
difficulty in telling apart the seismic
signals from small earthquakes and ex-
plosions.. Now, with greatly improved
seismic methods and sophisticated com-
puter, processing, it is possible to clas-
sify 'almost . any detectable seismic
event as an earthquake or an explo-
sion.
For those few small events which
are detected seismically but not ' identi-
fled, the. United States has In the past
sought the reassurance of on-site In-
spections "despite Pentagon testimony
that the value of such on-site inspec-
tions Is marginal at best. Today's U.S.
verification techniques, however, are
superior to our earlier capabilities,
even combined with "the on-site inspec-
tions we were seeking.
Observation satellites are one
. agreed method capable of providing In-
creased assurance. A photographic sat-
ellite scanning an. area in which an un-
.Identified seismic event was detected
could obtain information useful for
evaluating whether the seismic" signals
originated from a secret nuclear test.
Most of the natural earthquake areas
within the Soviet Union are remote
from human activity, so that a large
fraction of these unidentified events
could bo clearly classified as natural
cnrC; GO T:;I uri.:
E FEB '1973
in origin when evidence of man-made
disturbances was absent. Whenever a
satellite obtained evidence of mining
or drilling operations in the area
where the seismic signals originated,
a satisfactory explanation could be
demanded through an international
commission on the SALT I model. If
not satisfied, the United' States could
resume testing or take whatever other
action it thought necessary.
Evasion Techniques .
SOME EXPERTS have worried that
an underground test ban could be
violated by use of sophisticated eva-
sion techniques, such as a detonation
In a large cavity. But theoretical stud-.
lea show that a very large chamber,
300 feet in diameter and several thou.
sand feet underground, would be re-
quired to muffle the seismic signal 'of
a 5-to-10-kiloton explosion sufficiently
to make It undetectable. The use of
such concealment techniques for even
so small a test would Involve a mam-
moth construction operation which
would be easily visible by observation
satellites.
Other exotic evasion techniques
have been proposed: a nuclear explo.
sion could be conducted in the Immedi-
ate aftermath of a large earthquake, or
a series of nuclear explosions could be
timed to give additive seismic signals
that more nearly resemble an earth-
ql%,dce than an explosion. Both of t`hesw
techniques are vuinv rable to dereraton
by sophisticated seismic measuring
end data analysis systems. However,
even if these techniques successfully
hid the signals, there would be a con-
siderable probability that the opera.
Pressure on other- sources cited
_Q, 1 77 qT!
HONG KONG. Feb. 7 [Al']--
1
1 Among the farm houses, tcne-
meats, and sprawling man-
sions of this colony are about
20 secret laboratories produc-
ing more and more of the her-
oin sold in American street
corners, according to Western
narcotics experts.
This "Chinese Connection"
is expanding as legal and dip-
lomatic pressure threatens the
traditional "French Connec-
tion" of Turkish opium or mor-
phine processed into heroin .in
France and then smuggled to
the United States.
The U: S. Bureau- of Narcot-
ics and Dangerous Drugs esti-
the percentage of South-
mates
east Asian heroin supplying
the American market has at
least doubled recently, to al-
most a third of. the total U. S.
supply.
BUT NARCOTICS agents
tend to scoff at precise fig-
ures.
"The traffickers don't pub-
lish balance sheets, so how
can we know how much they
are smuggling. They don't
even know the overall amount
themselves," says one agent.
Norman Rolph, Hong Kong's
tions required to carry them out would
be noticed by observation satellites
and challenged through the mecha.
nism of the consultative commission.
Finally, the use of nuclear explo-
sives for peaceful purposes is now gen-?
erally recognized, at least in this coun-
try, to have few economic advantages
and many environmental and safety "' .
problems. This program, nicknamed
Plowshare, has always been a road-
block to a ban on nuclear tests, since it
could provide an Ideal cover for dis.
guised weapons testing. In fact, the
greatest enthusiasts fot? Plowshare.
have been the most ardent nuclear
weapons developers.
Now the proposed nuclear excavation
of the sea-level Panama Canal has been'
dropped, and the use of nuclear explo.
sives for the release of natural gas is
the only project being given serious
study in the United States. Tests even
for this' purpose are in trouble with en-
vironmentalists and significant gas re-
covery would require thousands of nu-
clear explosions.. The Atomic Energy
Commission budget for Plowshare has
just been cut almost in half and no
tests are planned for the next fiscal
year. Considerable Interest in peaceful
nuclear explosions has, unfortunately,
been stimulated by U.S. propaganda in
other countries, particularly Russia.
India and Brazil, and could Interfere
with negotiations for a comprehensive
test ban if they are unduly delayed.
The time has now come for the United
States to take a new initiative In nego-
tiating a comprehensive test ban
treaty. It would be an important next
step after the Moscow agreements to
place some overall ceiling on qualita-
tive improvements in strategic nuclear
warheads.
, /11
~
i re
narcotics;
says: "All the: people in this
business are very security and
surveillance conscious. They
have a, high degree of mobili-
ty. The laboratories in which
they refine the morphine arc
everywhere, from' chicken
runs to villas. They spend just
a day,or two in each. ore and
ers almost never tell authori-
ties about their smuggling net-
work. "The Mafia are pub-
licity hounds compared to
the Chinese," says an infor- ?
then move on to another." I mant in Bangkok, the capital
The opium and heroin trade ) of Thailand.
in this part of the World I& "Money and fear are the
almost eucluaivoty run by I. only thhigo- that Mold thls dirty
nose,. and the bulk of their business together, and money
trafficking is for Asian ad- is the only thing we can chip
diets. Officials say there is no at it with," he adds.
Indication mainland China is Thailand and Hong Kong use'
exporting any of the narcotics.- a reward system based- on tile.
it ARRESTED, the traffick- value of drug seizures to at-
6
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t r a c t informers. In }long .rich financiers pulling the
Kong, an informer can earn as 'strings from the top evade ar-
much as $100,000 for a tip that rest. They carefully avoid any
leads to a major seizure and " direct contact with the people
handling drugs. Even when
arrests. And nearly all major authorities know who they are,
seizures come from such infor-' 6 no evidence can be obtained to
m
But generally it is only the convict them, agents say.
But
small fry that are caught. The NARCOTICS officials a;;rcc
WASHINGTON STAR
12 February 1973
DAVID LAWRENCE
Fa r-~'e aC~~Ar~
ices
Probably one of the most' Reports from embassies has a right to broadcast
important problems faced by and consulates in countries throughout the-world informs-
the American government is, where these American pro- tior about what the policies of
how to reach the populations grams are made available to this country are and the prin-,
of Europe and Asia so that people behind the Iron Cur- . ciples underlying them.
there might be "people to tarn indicate that they are Iis son why
y
people" communication. tend to widely' and well re- TRah heere Free is no Europe reason
'wh
When Richard Helms, for- ceived. Peoples who are liv-'
Liberty should not have been
.mer director of the Central ing under a government Li Libbero should not by have
private Intelligence Afency,,was tes- which excludes information. ? foundations and given finan-
tifying before the Senate For-: from outside its territory wel- cial support solely by the gen-
eig'n Relations Committee last. come the data they get over. eral public: Some day this
week, he endorsed the contin- such devices as Radio Free er be the method
turn out to
the
nation of both Radio Free.. Europe, Radio Liberty and may
ed for out
the international
d
Europe and Radio Liberty,? Radio Free Asia., radio programs devoted to`a
which he- are well worth 'Incidentally, there is no presentation of what the Unit-
the lion. l budget of m . way to cut off a radio pro- ed States is doing and what its
io. He declared these mil-
e had'
gram entirely'from another true feelings are toward other '
been one factor in improving land, though "jamming" . peoples in the world.
relations between Eastern
and Western Europe. has been used to
im Whnn fen Currently both Radio Free
.. Behind the Iron Curtain, the
number.of foreign publica-
tions admitted are few, and
the government dictates the
contents of newspapers and
magazines as well as radio
and television programs. So
there is no way to get any
news, or views about 'what's
going?on in. the world except
what might be heard over the
radio from other lands. '
Radio Free Europe sends
information programs to Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, Hunga-
.ry, Romania and Bulgaria.
These are transmitted 'in the
languages of each of the coun-
tries. Radio Liberty concen-
tratcs wholly on broadcasts to
the Soviet Union. These two
agencies,are financed in large
part by our, government, but
there is. another project-
known as Radio Free Asia-
which is entirely a private
.:organization started in 1951
by the Korean Cultural and
Freedom. Foundation. It was.
endorsed at the time by Gen.
information' about important r.11 ape ana nawo iroeriy are
happenings is conveyed to the known to be backed by the
owner of a radio set, the government, and this gives
chances are that it will be them an ? even more im-
communicated to many other portant status in the realm
persons in the neighborhood of news. For editors in foreign
or in the area. Radio, indeed, countries listen to Radio Free
has served a useful purpose in Europe and Radio Liberty.
trying to improve the rela- and every now and then carry
tions between the people of in their newspapers informa-`
tion obtained from these two
it
th
U
d St
t
d
l
:
e
n
e
a
es an
peop
es
abroad. big broadcasting services.
Sen. J. William Fulbright, ' The fact that the programs
chairman of the Senate For- are broadcast in the Ian-
eign Relations Committee, guages spoken in each of the!,
asked Helms this question: nations to which they are di-.
rected makes them very valu-
"Are don saying that the able in the task of improving
and West detente between op- relations between the Ameri-
nd ast and Germany's develop- can people and peoples of oth-
ments as tik policy G have been caused causer- er countries. When it is con-
by pFree ve sidered that governments on
by Radio dr Europe." " the Communist side engage in
"I am saying it was one fat- propaganda broadcasts and
tor among others," Helms in- transmit them not only into
sisted. western Europe but through-
During the years that these out the world, it can be in.
services have been aided -by ferred that eounter-broad=
means of the Central Intelli- casts from the United States'
Eisenhower, and it has been gence Agency, this has been are essential if only to answer
broadcasting information criticized by some members some of the misrepresenta-
programs into North Korea, of Congress as an improper tions that are made about the
mainland China and North activity. But actually the gov- policies of the government in
Vietnam, ernment of the United States Washington.
.Fighting.
A New.
opium War
By . C. `L. Sulzberger
WASHINGTON-One area of 'U.S.
foreign policy rarely discussed by dip-'
lomatic observers has shown consid-
erable success during recent years.
This is the curbing of shipment to
America of hard drugs.
Dope addiction remains a most dis=
agreeable, worrisome blot in the Unit-
ed States;' yet this cannot wholly ob-.
scure achievements registered by.
coordinated efforts of the' State De-
partment, Treasury, C.I.A. and, F.B.I.
in tracking down illegal traffic or alert.
In-February, 1972, Gen. Creighton
W..Abrams, commander of U.S. forces'
in Vietnam (now Army Chief of Staff)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
"French gangs
involved in drug
operations have,
found increasing
difficulty in getting
heroin to the U. S."
told me recent troop figures showed
3.7 per cent users of whom 1.6 per
cent were at least temporarily cured.
before being sent home. There were 2.1.
per cent users of hard drugs among
troops going home. "Pot is not a seri-
ous problem," he added.
Speaking of hard drugs, Abrams
said: "There's an awful lot of money
in it, And the whole drug traffic is a
r0n4ruu4 snd aaphlaticatod dpcrAtton.
The poppies for opium aren't grown in
South Vietnam...'. All that-is done in
Thailand, in Burma, in Laos, in North
Vietnam, in China. The whole struc=
ture of this business has to get its raw
opium to certain points for distillation.
The heroin that's in South Vietnam has
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the trafficking in Southeast
Asia has not been hurt or
even slowed by law-enforce-
meat efforts. Some believe,
I however, recent large seizures
are ?a promising start to a wid-
ened drive.
It seems doubtful any prog-
ress is being mado in the most
vital country of all - Burma.. .
NEW YORK TIMES
,9 February 1973
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all been. distilled, somewhere else.".., of dplurh poppies. Aug. 19-.1971 , Gen,'
Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, the 'Cevdet Sunay., President of the Turkish In-the' French trade. It is generally a.,
well-known Cairo editor and friend .of republic, told me: "In recent months question of individual criminals seek-.
Presidents Nasser.and Sadat; says, that our main problem with the United ing to make a killing. American Mafiosi.
:4' when Chou 'En-lai dined with' Nasser States was opium. Washington claimed in Italy are carefully watched by Rome;
in Alexandria; June 23, 1965: "One of 80 per cent of -U.S. heroin came from . until recently French criminals had a-.
the, remarkable things he said that Turkish sources. It is hard to believe freer hand.
night when talking about the demoral- this when one knows how many -France's anticriminal branches, under
ization of the American soldiers tin' Asian countries' produce this drug." . Interior Minister Raymond, Marcellin,
Indochina. was that 'some of. them' Notwithstanding, Turkey agreed` to have been cracking down, aware that
are trying opium, and we are helping terminate legal opium,growing and the French youth faces the same drug
;them. We are planting the.best kinds United States sent financial aid and danger. as American' youth. Libelous
of opium especially for'the American.. agricultural experts to help farmers de- rumors that the French intelligence'
;,.soldiers in Vietnam; velop substitute crops. Sunay. said: agency, S.D.E.C.E., was financing oper
In his book, "The Cairo Documents," "The government did the right thing ations from drug sales have virtually-
Just published this year, Heykal says in suppressing production. We are ceased since S.D.E.C.E. was quietly,
Chou continued: "Do you remember aware that the United States is grati-
when the West imposed opium on us? Pied. And we are too.' We don't want.
'"They fought us with-opium. And we :to contribute. to, poisoning of, the
are going to fight them with their own ' world's youth."
weapons.. We' are going to use their . Exchange : of. information between
gown methods against them. But Chou antinarcotic agents of. the' U.S. and
has since indicated - to more recent those of France, Turkey, Germany,
``1nter]6butors that China does not now' =Italy and,South America has become
pursue' any such deliberate, policy., ':.speedier and more complete. French
..,Whether this is because of better rela- gangs ,involved in drug operations
',tlonships with 'Washington is impos-' have found Increasing. difficulty Inget-
sibie to say. ~ ting heroin to the United States di-
One area where there. is certainly a' 1' rectly and have come '.to depend on
direct relationship between diplomacy, ' Latin American transit shipments.
i and drugs is Turkey: which, in' 1972,' No mysterious, organizations like the
officially put an end to legal growing' Mafia or the Union Corse are involved
HOUSTON POST
2 FEB 1973
Lltr w e ~
WASHINGTON li'I - A com-
flict has broken out in the
State Department over the se-
riousness of drug abuse by
children of American diplo-
mats and other U.S. officials
overseas.
The controversy centers at
a special mission now in
Southeast Asia in connection
with drug use by dependents
of U.S. officials.
Dr. 1 rank K. Johnson, head'
of the Drug Abuse Prevention
Working Group that was
scheduled to arrive Thursday
in Indot:csht,,_siid his mission
was priniari!y echtcational -
one of research and study.
"There, 'aren't any r e a 1
problem.; now," htt sald. Tile
working group will be check-
ing into the reasons wliv tile
situation seems so stable in
cleaned up.by a' new director, Count
Alexander de Marenches.
Furthermore, the French are apply
ing a, squeeze. around; Marseilles, the
principal entrepot for Mediterranean
hard drugs. Just after World War 11,
that port became a shipping point for
the American East Coast and Marseilles
laboratories were developed to refine.
opium rsmuggled from Turkey.
Marseilles became a kind bf thieves'
den during the heyday of 'the French
North African 'empire.. Unemployed
crooks were drawn into the American '
drug trade. when that' empire disap- -
peared. . , I .
~', 'IN 7 er e S
order to use this experience
in the future, he added.
"That's the attitude of
somebody with his head in
the sand;" according to an-
o t h e r department official.
"There have been increasing
reports from all over (the
world') about our kids using
drugs,"
This source, who asked not
to be identified, said some
areas of* outheast Asia are
particularly troublesome; he
mentioned Bangkok where
there was a tiro:-ret;:ted
death in December involvi g
an American dependent.
But "we hear of problems
in Europe, ton," the official
continued, saying that wher-
ever there are enough Arnrrl=
cans to have a se!:oo1 there
seems to be trouble in drugs.
When asked, to document
his charges, the. official said
it was difficult to 'do so .for
several. 'reasons: one, there
really isn't any system for
accumulating such reports;
second, "there is a tendency
to try to hide these in.
cidents."
The purpose of the drug
mission is to find out exactly
the bounds of the problem,
the official said. as well as to
line out so!ntions.
A dep,trtntent publication
last mouth said the working,
~rrntp ~'.a? urganizcti rr,-
sprmsr. to ir,t reasin~ evidence
o f ci r it t, ibuso prob!ens
aniong adolescent dependents,
at home and abroad."
Another rtoparl.nlont nulit'n
pointed to the need "to deal
with this new and tragic,
threat to our children."
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~:;:/ l ` h fwd ?61 GUN
By Henry. Kamm
TEHERAN. From the air, the landscape looks as
forbidding as the face of the moon. On the ground
it is worse: a burning summer sun against which
the tree'ess mountain slopes offer no shelt&r,? or
winter storms that obliterate the winding trails
with masses of snow and ice. Spring brings the
"120-day wind," swirling, hot gusts that fill the
pores and blind the eyes.with the fine brown sand
that covers the barren mountainsides.* But the cara-
vans from Afghanistan inch their way along the
ridges and through the gorges every day except at
the depth of winter. They carry tea, and-guns, and
silks, and cigarettes, and opium. Above all, opium.
Even if the pack animals-mainly sturdy' little
horses of a' Mongolian strain-don't carry opium
in their saddle bags, the brownish black gum which.
makes men dream happy dreams also makes the
caravans move. Opium wrapped ? around the bit
makes the horses go at a prancy gait for days on
end, without rest and with little food or drink, and
to eventual death from exhaustion, to speed the
smugglers' journey.
The smugglers want the trip to go fast particu-
larly when the cargo is opium. The faster they
reach their. destination in Iran, the smaller is the
risk of detection by the Imperial Iranian Gendar-
merie. If the gendarmes spot the smugglers, a gun-
fight will follow. The lucky ones will get away;
1 the others will die. To be wounded increases the
risk of capture, and those who are captured are
tried and, most often, shot by firing squads.
To escape the gendarmes is not to escape danger.
{ Those who get away had better not lose their
carg-). To return to Afghanistan without the opium,
or the money or gold for it, is to face the ven-
geance of the tribal leader who organised the cara-
van and is responsible to the khan who owns the
shipment. The smugglers' wives and 'children have
remained in the chief's grip, as hostages.
The risks are immense and the rewards a pit-
tanec-p: rhaps $13 fdi a trip that may take as
long as a month. But the poverty of the tribesmen
of the Afghan border is so great, their ignorance
and their bondage to their feudal overlords so com-
plete, that most of Afghanistan's opium, perhaps
100 tons yearly, Is carried over the mountains to
Iran, where hundreds of thousands of addicts de-
pend on It. About 85 tons of. it makes it through
a border where the guards are on a constant war
footing.
11 FEB 1973
To deal with the problems created by an addict
population that is among the largest of any coun-
try, Iran has tried total permissiveness, total pro-
hibition and - now - limited toleration. Under a
1969 law, Shah' Mohammed Riza Pahlevi ended
prohibition, lifted a 14-year-old ban on the cultiva-
tion of the opium poppy in his country and gave
some official sanction to addiction by permitting
110,000card-carrying addicts to buy daily doses
of opium at designated pharmacies. At the same
time, the law provided Draconian pun'shment for
possession or trading of illicit narcotics. Mere pos-
session of 2-kilograms (4.4 pounds) of iilkcit opium
or 10 grams (about one-third of an ounce) of
heroin, morphine or cocaine is enough to merit
the firing squad, as is trading In any quantity of
narcctics.
In the three years of the law's operation, about
160 smugglers and pushers have been dispatched
by firing squads after rather summary military-
court proceedings. Nevertheless, despite the opium-
dispensing program and the harsh smuggling penal-
ties, there has been no noticeable drop in either
addiction or the steady flow of opium that comes
across the border from Afghanistan to the east.
While Iran faces some of the same enforcement
dilemmas as the United States, the similarity just
about ends thero. Addiction in Iran is not what 'it
is in the United States, in its nature, causes or its
effects; but the differences are instructive. .
The American problem is heroin, as "hard" a
drug as there is. The Iranian national narcotic is
opium, a milder and far less addictive substance
than heroin, which is the most potent concentrate
of opium. The "highs" produced by heroin are much
higher than those of opium, and the "lows" lower.
The social problems caused by the use of heroin
are correspondingly more dramatic.
Iranian opium users fit into their culture, not
only because they have always been part of it but
also because opium is in itself less corrosive to
the social fabric than heroin.' Trafficking in nar-
cotics and their surreptitious use remain crimes, but
they do not significantly raise the general level of
criminality as they do in the United States. Opium
is, comparatively, a penny habit that can be
sustained Qeven by the poor, -not something that
drives addicts to turn to crime to raise money. In
the United States, the use of heroin leads to street
crime, because the street provides a meeting place
between moneyless addicts desperate for a fix and
,people with money in their pockets or shops to
be held up. Most of Iran's opium users live in the
impoverished countryside, where there are no stores
and where rich men rarely visit with money in
their pockets.
While regular use of opium induces a dependence
that makes persons irritable and unable to conccn-
trate when' deprived and lowers general health,
these decidedly negative effects are less
socially disruptive In an undeveloped country than
In a technolol:;ieall,y modwrn Cm'ironment, For that
reason, Iron Itns been tough on Ciovornment om?
ploycs who use opium. Nevertheless, in a largely
agricultural country with widespread underemploy-
nment, the social effects of opium use?nrc less grave.
.If three laborers hired to do a job work too slowly
because of their smolang habits, the bass can hire
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one or two more for the same total cost be- expensive."
cause labor Is plentiful. "I pay my workers 80 riais-.. Iranian, peasants in the vil-
[a little. morq than $1] a day," said the innkeeper ' lage or peasants living in the
,
at Tayabad, a village of high addiction on the city have eaten opium for cen- which in most developing
Afghan border. "They disappear twice a,day. I know tunes-or smoked it since the countries means imitation of
they go to an old lady where for 2Q riais, a day last century when the habit Western models, the use of
they are allowed to come to smoke twice. They was introduced from across opium was considered a;?
can't smoke in their houses because then the -wife the border with old imperial, shameful hangover of a dark, 1.
and children would also want to smoke. But the India-for reasons that make Oriental past. It did not fiti
v:ife rocs o""t to smoke herself." When the workers Westerners reach for an as-
disappear to smoke, the innkeeper said, they pirin or a drink, and with
don't
are unhappy. In view of the fact that the little generally undisastrous effects.
town seemed filled with underemployed men, this Opium helped men and wom-
did not give him much concern. en forget their headaches and
The number of addicts in Iran is a question sur- rheumatism when doctors and
rounded by myth, as it Is in the United States. medicines were little known
I bl nd ?o 'dad a
?r avai a e
a
i vi
the children grew older.
From the villages, the opium
habit spread to the cities, to
,
p
"Tile estimate is what rules in this domain," said
crop. So strong were the pro
distraction from the dreary
Dr. H.-A. Azarakhsh, Director General of the Iran tests that Dr. Saleh recalled
Ian Health Ministry and the country's chief rep- and unchanging routine of a
life a~~ ays on the brink of receiving threatening letters
nu")ci,L, lip.' nia(annJ/7 vr.,,wreu Un. esAumate or lagers had little defense. They.
200,000 to ' 300,000 opium users in his country. gave opium to their ' children ?
American narcotics experts consider Dr. Azaralthsh's
h
hi
n ; or
ey were teet
when t
,, f estimate modest by perhaps one-half. ill, or just cranky. It may not
The 110,000 legitimate users consist of two have killed the air but it
Prohibition was motivated
largely, by prestige reasons.,
At a time of modernization
with the image of an awaken-'.
Ing, Westernizing Iran that
the Shah'was creating.
All cultivation was stopped,,
over the opposition of'. many
big ' landowners who. had,
found the poppy a profitable
period he did not leave his
house without a bodyguard,
but production was stopped,
illegally planted fields were
plowed under and 'reduced
groups, whose relative strength remains one of the p availability caused use to drop
certainly killed any inhibitions ,_ _-,_-?-_
Government considers selnsitive and therefore
secret. The first are opium users more than 60
c
years old. To be issued aard allowing them to buy
.their 2 to 5 grams daily at' a designated pharmacy,
they need merely cst=ihlish that they are to accus-
! ' tomed to opium that their
bring a certificate- from their
regular doctor stating that
they should not be deprived
of opium. Then they are
,examined by a commission. of
three Government physicians
and subjected to. laboratory
tests before receiving their
.permits.
The fact that as . many as
110,000 addicts have been reg-
istered is a strong indication
.of a far greater number of
opium addicts. Most habitual
-users are villagers who would
find it difficult to register
!even if they wanted to. They
have no private physicians,
live out of reach of Govern-
merit medical commissions
and miles from any pharmacy
and all means of transport.
An old man I picked up
'walking along the dirt road
from his own village to the
next, which he said he hoped
to reach in a few hours, didn't
know how to close a car door,'
nor indeed whether it should
be closed. Asked whether peo-
ple still smoked the forbidden
,substance lit his village,' he
regarded the questioner suspi- ',"
clously and said. "Nobody uses,
itrany more. Besides, It's too'
Before prohibition in Iran,
an estimated 1.5 million' peo-
ple out of a population of 20
prosperous and high-ranking million ate or smoked opium,
people always ready to try often. Afterward, two-thirds
new distractions in a luxurious of the users are estimated to
life that provided a surfeit of . have c!rep red out of the mar-
everything. Many of the ket. These ex-users were rural
homes of the Teheran upper folk who had been eating their':
class used to have a well-ap homegrown product and, being
pointed room to which male practically out of the money
guests retired after dinner and economy, could not easily of-.
from which the sweet smell of ford the imported stuff.
first-rate smoking opium .soon Still, about half a million,
wafted out to the ladies in ' , persons with enough cash to
the drawing room. Those who support a penny habit were a
liked opium entered the room tempting market .to the low
for a sociable pipe or two; level, rural economies of Tur-
those who didn't stayed with ? key and Afghanistan, and
the ladies, very much like neither neighbor lacked for
some take an after-dinner hardy and hard-up men ready
brandy when the tray is to run the rugged borders.
brought around and others-," ' "Success in stopping cultiva-
pass it ,up. No stigma was at. ' tion was 100 per cent," Dr.
tached. Similarly, most tea- Saleh said, "but illicit traffic
houses used to sell opium, and ruined the program. It poured
even the Iranian Parliament into this country. How the
had a lounge that, while not hell can you stop the camels?
an opium den, served as a People started swearing at
place where deputies gathered me: 'He's ruining our 'econ-
to smoke opium. "Before, if'
you looked at Parliament, you
saw opium addicts," said Dr.
nomy. Gold goes out, opium
comes in.' We couldn't en-
force that part of the law.
Jehanshah Saleh, a Syracuse We stopped cultivation, ' we
University-educated gynecolo- gave treatment to addicts.
gist who is a Senator.
As Health Minister in 1955.
Snieh steered a total ban on
if. tia d urn
wain an
o
um c
But the Turks said, 'Your
country has lots of oil, we
have opium."'
By 1969, angered at his
pi
u
.. . neighbors' continued tolera-
through Parliament-- with
the full support of His Maj- ' tion of the growing of poppies
esty, ' he adds. "Without his and illegal export of opium to
support, it would have' been .
impossible."
10
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Iran, the Shah braved the dis-
approval of Western nations,
particularly the United States,
and turned the clock back-
ward. He reintroduced limited
cultivation of the poppy under
strict supervision, and along
with recognizing addiction by
putting users' on main-
tenance rations, he provided
for an expanded voluntary
treatment program-and for
the threat of the firing squad
for trafficking and illegal use.
Now, an inexorable law of
markets and comparative
economic development has all
but solved the problem of
smuggling from Turkey into
Iran-but not from Afghanis-
tan. Almost overnight, the
passage of the 1969 law re-
duced the Turkish share of the
illicit Iranian market from
about half to about 5 per cent.
Turkey never depended on
Iran as sole market for her
excellent, if illicit, opium.
At the ? same time- as ' the
Iranian market became less
accessible-because of the
border patrols-another, far
more prosperous clientele be-
gan to clamor for all the
heroin 'it could get. What the
Turkish smugglers no longer
dared carry to Iran, they chan-
neled into the well-established
-network that buys raw opium
j from the farmer, refines it to
morphine base at various
rustic spots in Turkey before
secreting :t among less lucra-
1 tive cargoes heading toward
France by ship or truck. There
it is converted to heroin for
delivery to the United States.
Beyond this.purely commer-
cial reason, experts believe
I there is another justification
for the ' fact that far fewer
Turks will risk the death
1 penalty than Afghans. While
the mountains and plains of
Eastern Anatolia are unlikely
to remind the traveler of the
1 American or Western Euro-
I. pean countryside, they are
would follow suit. But, ' no
doubt because of the certainty'
that Afghanistan cannot stop
her poppies from making their
way across the border, Iran
continues legal production.. In
any case, enforcement experts
are convinced that it will be
some years'before the stocks
of narcotics hidden in Turkey
will all have been channeled
into the United States and the
effects of the Turkish ban-
if it is maintained-will be-
come noticeable on the mar-
ket. "
Iran's present opium prob-
lem is created by two classes
of victims of underdevelop-
ment: poor Iranian peasants.
who use narcotics because
nothing else has yet come
along strong enough to break
a tradition imposed by the
hardships of their lives, and
Afghan smugglers who are
even poorer. These victims
live in a world dominated by
their own poverty; wealthy
Afghan merchants who own
the supplies; wealthy Iranian
merchants who handle ' the
distribution; the Afghan Gov-
ernment, which is so weak
that it surrenders to feudal
chiefs control over its citizens,
and the Shah's Government
with its Imperial Gendarmerie,
courts-martial and firing
squads.
"We can't really blame
them from the depths of our
hearts," said an Iranian who
through a long-standing as-
sociation with the Gendar-
merie has a close acquaint-
ance with Afghan smugglers.
"They are serfs."
The Turkmen, Pashtoon and
Baluchi tribesmen of the
Afghan-Iranian-Pakistani bor-
der live a seminomadic life
of dismal poverty under
limited control of their respec-
tive central governments.
Nowhere is the absence of
control or care more complete
than in Afghanistan, where
worlds apart from Afghanis- ' the King's rule extends only '
tan's poverty, which is unre- over Kabul, his capital, and
lieved by even glimmers of along the major highways the
hope for a better life. The United States and the Soviet
Turkish smuggler has more to '-`-Union have built for him, each
lose: poor as he is, he has left
behind him the horizonless
state that makes an Afghan
risk hin life for $13,
When Turkey's leaders, act-
Ing under heavy American
pressure, outlawed the grow-
ing of poppies after last year's
I harvest, they hoped that Iran
for its own strategic purposes.
The rest of the country be-
longs to clan and tribal chiefs.
Merchants In Krthttl, Kan.
dahar and Herat, the prin.
cipal towns, buy opium from
the growers. through tribal
middlemen. Eventually, most
of the 100 tons of Afghan
opium grown yearly finds its
way to the Herat region, from
'where' the caravans set out.--
Clan leaders put together the
caravans, from 10 to 20 men
strong, chosen from among
those over whom their rule is
complete. Usually only the
leader of the caravan is told
about the delivery arrange-
ments, whether the Iranian
contact will meet them at a
prearranged place or whether
they are to take their cargo
across the border, bury it and
post guards around the spot
while the leader goes to make
Contact in a village or town
to arrange for delivery and
payment. The caravans some-
times penetrate as deeply as
100 miles into Iran, in regions
where people of the same
. tribe live on both sides of the-
border and neither Iran's nor
Afghanistan's writ runs fully.
The Gendarmerie patrols
the nearly 500 miles of the
Afghan border from 55 posts,
each manned by 6 to 10 men.
They walk the forbidding ter-
rain between posts, looking
for smugglers' tracks. Recent-
ly the American advisory mis-
sion, which has worked with
the gendarmes since 1942,
persuaded them to buy
100 Japanese cross-country
motorcycles.. This mechan-
ization would increase- sur-
veillance of the border and
speed the calling of reinforce-
ments from rear areas when
a caravan's tracks have been
spotted.
The smugglers, facing the
death penalty if they are
caught or the vengeance of
their chiefs if they lose the
opium, fight back when en-
gaged during the day, usually
scrambling for high ground to
fire down on the gendarmes.
On occasion, the troops have
used mortars to dislodge the
brigands. At nightfall, the
smugglers break off contact
and flee, sometimes back to-
ward Afghanistan, sometimes
deeper into Iran. Bandits often
raid Iranian villages, looting
or seizing hostages for ran-
som, so that they need not
return empty-handed to their
villages.
ezj-t_.: with the narcotic
that its ' level of develop-
ment allows it to afford:
America can afford the
best, heroin that is pure
enough to be injected. Iran,
except for a minority esti-
mated at between 10,000 and
50,000 who in the last decade
'have discovered the attraction.
of low-grade, "snorting"
heroin, remains underdevel.
oped, content. to eat or smoke
opium.
Iran has made handsome
progress in applying some of
her annual petroleum income
of approximately $1.3-billion
to development, and as the
country advances economical=
ly, Iranian opium habits will
become increasingly harmful.
But much progress will have
to be made before the lot of
the impoverished Iranian will
be seriously worsened because
he uses opium. He would al-
ways be better off, physically
and financially, if he didn't
use it, but the low standard
of life in the mud villages is
not greatly depressed by the
villagers' opium habit.
Nevertheless, such men as
Dr. Saleh and Dr. Azarakhsh
deplore the smoking of opium
because as physicians as well
as patriots it pains them to
see Persians on a. large scale
indulge in a habit that is un-
healthy. "It's like you bring
up a child until he's 14 years
old and then you cut his head
.off," Dr. Saleh said.
They are unhappy that the
resumption of opium-growing.
after 14 years of total ban
and the official sanction of '
registered addiction seeming-
ly restore some respectability
to a habit they hate. In addi-
tion, even though a number of
new treatment centers have
been opened under the Shah's
program, Dr. Azarakhsh, a
man given to prudent under-
statement, says, "As of now,
the treatment of addicts
doesn't work too well."
Perhaps one day Iran will
reach a level of development
at which few people will find
opium the easiest escape
route or a necessary painkiller.
And perhaps some day, too,
Afghanistan will provide for
her people a possibility of
survival free from bondage to
tribal chiefs and with enough
Possibilities of earning a living
tO coniiitler $13 i o low ti pfiee
for their liven,
Does Iran offer a lesson to
other countries with a major
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addiction, problem? Perhaps
only that 'strong laws and
rigorous enforcement can
have only minor impact while
the social, economic and cul-'
tural conditions that make.
people turn to narcotics per-
sist. if more developed coun-
tries like the United States
can offer a lesson to Iran, it
is, perhaps, that a higher level
of development does not
necessarily bring a solution
to the problem of addiction.
It may also bring addiction to
more expensive and more
dangerous narcotics. 0
Teheran's swingers.
ran's : you would an uncle who,
One of the effects of Iran's:.
experiment in opium prohi- drinks too much."
bition (1955-69) remains: Illustrating the modernity
The social acceptability of of his class, the. young man,
the narcotic has been com- took a . sip from his whisky
promised, particularly among, and soda, forbidden by the
well-off and city users. Koran, and said that he and
"Every family still has some-
one his friends smoked only
who smokes,said a
foreign-educ ted member of hashish, which is easily
Teheran's gilded youth. "But available but used largely by.
nowadays you wouldn't ad- those who lay stack in being.
t mit to an outsider that he' "with" whatever is "it" at
does. We Consider, him dike the moment-H.K.' ,
Henry Kamm to a,, Paris-based roving correspond-'
ent for The Times.
WASHINGTON POST PARADE
4 Feb 1973
A SPECIAL JACK ANDERSON REPORT
How Hard Drugs Are Now Reaching
U. S. Cities Via South America
WASHINGTON, D.C.
he notorious "French Connection,"
which has brought a blizzard of
illegal white heroin powder upon
the East Coast in years past, has now
been replaced by ?a "Latin American
Connection." While President Nixon's
crackdown on smuggling has shut down
{ many of the underground`'drug routes
in Europe, it has opened up new smug-
gling routes in Latin America.
From Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and
the Caribbean isles, heroin and cocaine
are pouring into the country through
our soft underbelly. The "Latin Ameri-
can 'Connection" has also introduced
daring new smuggling methnrfs
Cadavers of South Americans who
-died in Europe have been filled with
plastic-wrapped packets of heroin be-
fore being shipped home. Once they ar-
rive , the heroin is removed, the body is
delivered to the grieving family, and
another dose of drugs is on its way to
the U.S. Drugs with a telltale smell,
like marijuana, have been hidden
among fruits with pungent odors des-
tined for U.S. Gulf ports.
Cocaine grows popular
Cocaine, increasingly popular In the
U.S., ii back-packed across desolate
Andes borders by peasants, who are
scornfully called hormigas (ants) by the
wealthy drug overseers. Sometimes
small planes, called Mau Maus, will haul
the narcotics, skipping from one air-
strip to the next through Latin America
12
on into Florida in a daring game of hop-
scotch.
A fascinating story has been hidden
under the secrecy stamp, because the
government would prefer to have the
public believe 'the smuggling crack-
down has been a success. But the Gen-
eral Accounting Office has summarized
the facts for a few select Congressmen
and officials,in a 152 page document
so secret that each copy has been num-
bered.-Because this is information the
public is entitled to know, we have
picked out the highlights, country by
ARGENTINA-"Argentina has be-
I come a significant transit point for hard
narcotics destined for the United States
... cocaine is moved in ... from Bolivia
in the form of .coca paste and then is
refined into cocaine in Argentina. The
Argentine government ... is acting
against the traffickers [bull provincial
police, whose jurisdiction is outside
Buenos Aires, have virtually no narcotics
it capabilities."
BOLIVIA--"Cocaine is illegally proc-
essed ?... by about 100 clandestine
d
,
manufacturers. A portion ... is route
to the United States."The U.S. is supply-
ing jeeps and training to Bolivian nar-:
cotics men and "will provide funds for
rewards and information" in an effort to
develop undercover infdrrnatits,
BRAZIL.-"Brazil has the potential
for becoming a major transshipment
point because of its numerous harbors
and airports ... There is evidence that
the Amazon River is a highway for
i cocaine entering the international
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CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES-,'All types force is undermanned, ill-trained and
of narcotics flow from Europe into the ill-equipped."
Caribbean and are' transshipped to the MEXICO-"Significant quantities of
United Sates`. Thousands of small craft heroin and cocaine originate in or 1j not confident that a crackdown on
cruise the Caribbean . waters, which transit through Mexico to the illicit U.S. ! officials involved .in drug trafficking
makes it almost impossible to monitor market; Mexico continues to be the would take place."
and prevent smuggling ... It is very dif- principal source of marijuana coming PERU-"Coca leaf .... is refined in
ficult to control the transfer of drugs into the United States. .. Use of Mexico simple, clandestine laboratories near
from ship to ship in many harbors .. ? as a transshipment' country . is in- , the coca fields and then is exported for
.The Netherlands Antilles has become a creasing. ? At least 20 percent of all 1 the illegal international trade ... Peru.,
major hard drug transit point and .. ? heroin reaching the United States orig- -1 vian officials have indicated that they
Jamaica is becoming one." Guyana may i inates or passes through Mexico 'would be receptive to a United States-'.,
be "used as a stopover point for planes I presently, the Mexican narcotics police Peruvian bilateral program of aid in
from Paraguay." ;force is understaffed and undertrained." phasing out" this cocaine traffic.
CHILE-"Chile is one of the world's PANAMA-"The crossroads of major URUGUAY-"When drug control is
leading illegal manufacturers of cocaine sea and air traffic routes (and) a major' tightened in nearby countries, Uruguay
U.S. officials believe the Chileans contraband and smuggling center .. , may become an important transship-
are heavily involved in smuggling co-
caine into the United States. Chile is
believed to be an increasingly impor-
tant transit point for heroin shipments
from Europe to the United States ...
Chilean law enforcement officials are
reportedly willing to cooperate [but]
the narcotics and gambling squad [of
Chile] were not well trained in nar-,;
1 cotics control." .
COLOMBIA-"U.S. officials state that
the considerable amount of smuggling
of U.S. cigarettes, radios, whiskey and
other consumer goods into Colombia
offers a return route for smuggling
heroin and cocaine into the United
States. Various means are used, includ-
ing hidden landing fields and travelers
on commercial airplanes."
ECUADOR-"Clandestine laborato-
ries in the coastal area are believed to,1
he producing cocaine and heroin
shipments of narcotics from other
countries pass through Ecuador on their
way to the United States ... there are
serious difficulties to be overcome , . .
} because the national police and other
governmental authorities are suscepti-
.. '- ble to bribes and because the police
Heroin and cocaine pass through 'ment point. Because of its internal
? security problem and .the assumption
h
i
d f
d S
b
oun
or t
e Un
te
{ Panama
tates that it is not a major transshipment
[from] Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, point, it has not placed a high' priority
and Colombia. .. Panamanian officials; on drug control."
steps needed to control drug produc- VENEZUELA--"Venezuela has. be-
lion and traffic. The U.S. mission psion also come Important as a transshipment
reported that there were some indi- point for drugs from Europe en route
cations that Panamanian officials and to the United States ... the transship-
security agents might have been in ment of heroin and cocaine[hadbecome
volved in narcotics trafficking." more visible and significant ... Vene-
PARAGUAV-"A major transit area ] zuela is serviced by numerous intema
for the smuggling, storage, and distribu tional airline flights; there? is a- signifi-
tion of heroin from Europe ... the net-' cant volume of light-aircraft movement
work established to transport American: over the country; and its land and sea
cigarettes and other consumer goods to frontiers are clearly vulnerable."
Paraguay for illegal transshipment to In summary; the report says Latin
other countries has become the channel American governments had been indif-'
for smuggling drugs into the United . ferent to the flow of drugs through their
States ... Paraguay's concern about ' countries en route to the U.S. until
illicit' international trafficking has in- their own youths began 'taking them.
creased recently because of unfavorable ' "The use of narcotics, hallucinogens,
press reports about Paraguay's role as a amphetamines and barbiturates in Latin
smuggling center ... There have been ,I America ' is ' ,increasing, particularly
persistent but unconfirmed rumors that
a small number of high-level Paraguay-
an officials are involved in drug traffick-
among the young people."
Concludes the secret report: 'There
is increasing awareness in Latin America
Committee for Narcotics Control was problem."
13
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 LOS-ANGELES TIMES
28 January 1973.:
fete : ' ' V. a
ay Mandate More Fighting
conciliation, if it does happen, will
take some form of stalemated coex=.
purely political, while others go be-,
yond current politics deep into the.
serted that there will be no elections'
so long as Hanoi's 145,000 regular'
unlikely to occur so long as the fu-,
timate political movement lacks.
JOHN McA1LISTER JR.
Despite the buoyant.mood of opti-
Isim produced;by Yesterday's. sign-
ng of. the. cease-fire, agreement,.the,
rospects for durable peace in Viet-
am are still dim.
While America's direct Invol.ve-
ent. in any' continued fighting will
he - possibility remains that' a U.S.
Ewen before the cease-fire agree-
eace yet." .
And Hanoi's Le Duc. Tho had told'
Paris news. conference that the po-
itical struggle in the war-torn coup-
ry would enter a new phase once
ably, would service their govern
If Saigon could not compete politi-.
ears-then presumably its leaders
elf-interest, ],,"resident Thieu had a
ight to be -skeptical about a pro-
roops in strategic locations in Soirth
reserying the cease-fire, and forces
aigon. to acknowledge that it is not
he sovereign. government. in South
letnarn but only a party to a new,
rohibit any further U.S. military
]early requires the dismantling of
Le Due yho,'therefore, was clearly
ustified, froin?the perspective of his
o agree to leave Vietnam entirely,:
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A public policy analyst, John T.
McAlister Jr. is a professor in the
;.department of engineering-economics
at 'Stanford 'University. He is the
a.utlcokof "Vietn.arn: Tice, Origins of
Revnlntion,"
but he had also forced the Americ;ln,
government to abandon its stanc(r..
that South',:Vietnam is ) a separate'
and distinct nation -'the victim of ng
: gressiori by 'a' "foreign" nation.. '
Reverting to the principles of.'the,
1954:Geneva Agreements, which no'
UtS., government has ever fully ac-
cepted or obeyed, 'the United States
-has now-=at-least 'for the present- -
.agreed that Vietnam is one country:
and that - eventually it should be,
governed by one.government. In a0
dition, the United States has rccog-.
nized the Viet Cong as a'legitimate
force-one with which Saigon must
reach an accommodation and enter
into a "National Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord," aiming
for what in effect is a coalition
government.
It is one thing for the United
States to negotiate a peaceful politi-.
cal settlement for an agonizing and
brutalizing war, and then withdraw
from Vietnam. It is quite another
thing for Saigon to live up complete-
ly to the negotiated terms. The price
for the return of American POWs
and a negotiated cease-fire *as ob-
viously high when measured against
initial American objectives of an
"independent South Vietnam free
from attack."
Americans, of course, are more
than ready to pay the price. But
what about Saigon?
Although Saigon has failed to
uphold its claim as the sole legiti-
mate government in South Vietnam
by either securing the necessary'
'popular support or utilizing Ameri-
can firepower to punish its enemies,
the goal has not been abandoned.
Yet, the agreement signed yesterday
by Saigon's representative Trail
Van Lam, pledges Thieu's regime to
hold consultations with the Viet
Cong in the spirit of national recon-
ciliation and concord, mutual re-
t~peeL k3>iri. ifinulal >jtiii=A1Iniinn tun
and to organize "free and democrat-
ic general elections' under interna-
tional supervision" so that the peo-
ple of South Vietnam can decide
their political future.
There are some 'very strong rea-'
sons that. these elections-like those
called for in the 1054 Geneva agree- 14
guarantees and sanction by Saigon.".
.If the political stalemate is to be bro-
ken, then more concessions by Sai-:
gon seem necessary-ones that are
almost certain to lead to President
Thieu's loss of his present position.
of power..
Stronger reasons can be cited than
simply Thieu's desire for personal
power that make the prospects dim
for concessions and 'reconciliation.
There is little precedent in' the Viet-
namese character-whether north
or south, Communist or anti-Com-
munist-for reconciliation. This is
not because the Vietnamese are in-
humane but because their traditions
tell them that the single correct so-
lution to social organization lies in
individual ethics and governmental
order.
The tradition is often. called "The
Mandate of Heaven," by which the
Vietnamese mean that heaven has re-
vealed a way that family groups can
live in harmony with its will.
Reconciliation and compromise
are, by their very nature, anathema
to the tradition of "The Mandate of,
Heaven." Such gestures are admis-
sions not only that one's own con-
cept of social and political order-
be it communism, Catholicism, Bud-
dhism - is not totally correct, but
that there is no single correct solu-
tion for the organization of society.
Amid the carnage and exhaustion
of Vietnamese society, such tradi-'
tions as "The Mandate of Heaven",
may well die away. But if so, its pas-
sage will not come soon. The past
decades of Vietnamese life have
b ien go h4f443 that egtebli?htad trii=
ditions have proved virtually the
only social anchor for the predomi-
nantly rural-now almost half-refu-
gee-society.
Reconciliation and compromise are
charar_terist.ics of "pluralist" socie-
ties of Western civilization, but they
are alien to traditionalist societies
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like Vietnam that still must deal
with the "pluralist" challenges of
modernization and industrialization.
In "pluralist" societies, par] iamen=
Lary debates and popular elections
are useful means of resolving cone
flicts. But in traditionalist societies
like Vietnam, elections and debates
are only rituals glorifying the cor-
rectness of the particular regime in
power-whether it be the Commu-
nist one in Hanoi or the anti-Com-
munist ones in Saigon-such glorifi-
cation providing additional verifica-
tion of."'T..`ho Mandate' of Heaven.
Dr. Henry Kissinger is, of course,,
to be praised for the brilliance of his
negotiating skills and for the useful-
ness of his formulas. for achieving 'a
graceful American withdrawal from
Vietnam. Neither he nor his Viet-
namese counterparts, however, are
capable of changing some basic cul-'
tural ttterns of a people tragically
caught halfway between the tradi-
tional and the modern worlds..
Theirs Is a society in the midst of
revolution, and this revolution will
determine which way Vietnam en-
ters the modern world. The solution
will. be either Communist or. some
'NEW YORK.TIMES
7 February.1973
form of anticommunism, but it will
not be a mixture of both unless the
Vietnamese abandon their most fun-
damental traditions and become a
sort of "pluralist" society in the pro-
ems.
Such a prospect seems remote in-
deed .As evidence, there came a re-
port last week from Saigon, where
.one of America's most experienced
.scholars on Vietnam revealed the
results of a field trip throughout the
countryside. .
"The cease-fire is unlikely to last
60 to 90 days beyond the date of
American withdrawal," he observed.
"So certain is Saigon over its own
'future and so Intense are the feel-
' Ings of bitterness and fear in tyre
countryside that only a miracle
could prevent the conflict from reoc-
curing."
If peace does not come and the war
continues, what will America do-
especially if Saigon seems thret*.
.tened by military humiliation? Wil)
"congressional figures equate' Sat
;`gon's difficulties with the Amerian
national interest? Will there be calls
to redeem the blood of American
,boys by going to Saigon's aid? Will'
there by "protective reaction" raids
as warnings to.Hanoi?
To forestall such difficulties, the
agreement signed yesterday calls for
the convening within 30 days of a,
major international conference 'to
establish guarantees that will con:
vert the cease-fire into a durable
.peace. The conferees will include.
Russia, China. France and Great
Britain, as well as the various par
ties to the negotiations.
Over the next several months, thefuture of peace in Vietnam will
hinge on whether this conference
can develop methods for persuading'
the various Vietnamese parties -to
limit their struggle for power among,
themselves to peaceful means. It is
on these prospects for the future of'i
peace in Vietnam-dim though-they,
may be just now-that the hopes of
Americans rest in entering the new
era of. national promise and fulfill-."
ment.
If that era itself is to be durable;.'
then perhaps we ourselves will have ,
to learn from the tragedy of our
Vietnam 'involvement. One lesson',
surely, is this: that ancient cultures
like the Vietnamese share quite dif;
ferent traditions from our own, and
unless we take these differences into
account, our own conduct toward
them-even in their "defense"-i9
foredoomed to failure.
Vietamn s_ Joy In Victory
By Rennie Davis On Jan. 29, an American; peace dole- But the underlying perspective of
gation was invited to a Paris recep- the Vietnamese we met in Paris was':
WASHINGTON-Recently I met with lion by the Democratic Republic of that the accords represented a victory ??
.Mrs. Nguyen Thi. Binh. My only dis- Vietnam and the Provisional Revolu that has grown out of the success of"
appointment was that every American , tionary Government of South Vietnam.: the recent spring-summer -offensive.,
could not share in the joy of Vietnam's It was an incredible mix of people, While every effort was made by Le '
victory. By any standards, it is in- from high officials of the French, So- Due Tho and the other Vietnamese;
credible. viet, People's Republic of China and representatives to find language to
A. 100-year French-American cam- other governments to ordinary people, ; give America "honor" and fig leaves
?paign, pitting the most advanced' ma like the Vietnamese taxi drivers who for their withdrawal, the United States,
chines of destruction against an ancient were the guests of Xuan Thuy. What has been forced "to respect our fight
nation of rice farmers has been de- struck me most was the open love for self-determination."'
feated. Except for ' the generals and ' that so many different people felt' I have never seen the Vietnamese.
.merchants whose lives were purchased ? and showed for the Vietnamese repre- leadership in Paris more confident of .
by the American dollar, the Vietnamese sentatives, especially Mrs. Binh, whose, their strength and more hopeful for,
:people today overflow with hope and ' . presence evoked a thousand embraces , their future. Mrs. Binh said, "We are
''anticipation. Every American who, and tears and smiles. strong and we will force the Saigon.,
"spoke out against' this : war, 'every. We' spent an afternoon with Mrs.' ' administration ?to, abide by the agree-.
demonstrator' and resister and 0 anti- Binh on the eve of Vietnam's lunar ment. We are confident that the South
war organizer, anyone who contributed' holiday, Tot. She thought- it sad that'. ' Vietnamese people will, be victorious..
to peace even with I the smallest ges- , . so many friends of Vietnam did not in the end.'
,'cure, can feel joy in the mutual.accom- understand the significance of their When I read about a U.S. Congress-
plishment of this peace accord. victory. "Many, friends, see only the man making foolish 'declarations that
Perhaps the greatest American loss difficulties that lie ahead and do not "hell will be a skating rink before I
of this war.lies not in the lives, or the ? . see ' the great victory we have won," vote any foreign aid for that bunch of
dollars wasted but in the endless she said. This agreement "not . only murderers," or watch the media reduce
stream of ugly distortions flowing out speaks to the failure of aggression of the ending of the war to the sensation,
of Washington. about the. men and wo- the United States in Vietnam, it marks of returning, a few hundred American",
men and children who have defeated the failure of the global strategy of the - 'prisoners of war' without a.word of
',.America's military goliath. Even now, , United States' to stop the liberation the hundreds of thousands of Vietna-
the media trumpet the official propa- struggles of peopie in many places." ' mese prisoners who remain in cells, I
ganda: line .that bombs and mines feel surely the time has come for'' Mrs crushed' the powerful spring-summer ?i no. not w wish said bluntly that Saigon America to learn the hidden truth'.
'.'.is
offensive in' Vietnam and the Christ' illing to implement the agree-
and that Saigon's leaders had about the "Vietcong."
mas Hanoi-Haiphong massacre "forced" "adopted a militaristic line and line. The Vietnamese people are already`
the North Vietnamese back to of repression and terror against the forgiving America for the greatest
negotiations, people." atrocity. of the twentieth century and
Tim ; will show the opliiiSite, Pi'esi? Particularly, sha said, Prosident ThIOu ' they nf@ pr0n10y 60 iiiost forgiving
dent Nixon's"peace with honor" Is a will resist the release of over 200,000 people on the-planet.'
face-saving disguise for a "Vietcong" civilian prisoners jailed and tortured Perhaps Mrs. Binh should be invited:
victory. Or, as Mrs. Binh said: "Nixon during the 'war, the establishment of a to the United States. 'She or her repre-
has failed. If you asked us who Is the third force as a significant group to ? , sentative would be happy to come, if
winner in the war, we would like to help implement the accords and recog- Congress would have the courage to
say, peace is the winner. And It is nition of the spirit of the accords hear her and demand a visa. Perhaps
a true peace because it is peace 'with' calling for national reconciliation and those television and public-opinion
independence " i concord. makers who blinded us.to Vietnam and
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taught us hate for the "other side,"
inight.travel in future days to My Lai,
where the P.R.G. is building a hospital
for the villa a our soldiers massacred
.Saigon with the life the P.R.G. offers'
My Lai and the rest of South Vietnam.
U Rennie Davis, an antiwar activist, has
In- fact, airfields are being built in the 11
P.R.G. controlled zones that will. make i traveled widely in Vietnam. He re-
it possible to compare' honestly the cently returned ,from Paris and discus-,
life offered by. the U.S. Government in lions with Yuan Thuy and Mrs. Nguyen
Thi niuh.
NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1973
IXON AIDES MOVE
AGAINST WAR FOES
Past Critics" of President's
Policies Are Assailed
By JOHN HERBERS
Speelel to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3-Now
that a peace agreement in
Vietnam has been reached,
members of the Nixon Adminis-
tration have undertaken 'to
discredit the critics of the Pres-
ident's conduct of the war and
of peace negotiations.
In the last week, Adminis-
tration officials have charged
that the criticism delayed the
peace agreement, that colum-
nists and commentators fabri-
cated reports of disagreement
between Mr. Nixon and Henry
A. Kissinger during the Decem-
'ber .bombing and. that the
President has been 'subjected
to unfair criticism.
? The charges were leveled at
members of Congress, the
media and officials in the Ken-
ncdy.and Johnson Administra-
tions, One ' of the' Administra-
tion.. spokesmen applied the
term "sellout brigade" to
those wh6 favored an earlier,
withdrawal of United States
forces from Vietnam and op
.posed the use of saturation,
bombing, mining and other
activity by the United States.
Mr. Nixon, at his news con-
ference last Wednesday, said
that "the least pleasure out of
the ;"peace agreement comes
from those who were the most
outspoken advocates of peace,
at any ' price.",.
Peace Seen Delayed
?; On Thursday night, Charles
W. Colson, special counsel tol
the President, interviewed byl
Elizabeth Drew on the Public
Broadcasting' Service television
network, said `that the opposi-
tion to the President's conduct
of the war .in Congress had
delayed the negotiation of
peace.
If-there had been bipartisan
support of what the President
was doing, he said, "I think thel
war would have ended much
sooner than it did."
"Pressed for specifics about
the criticism of Mr. Nixon, Mr.
Colson said that Clark Clif-
ford, , President Johnson's last
Secretary of Defense, was
".representative, really, of a
group of people who would
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
5 February,. 1973
VIALAi
AM' ?l
Eva PEACE
ROUND ONE of the Vietnam ",cease-.fire," after a'week in.'
which the fighting flared and spread instead of subsiding,
has ended more quietly. But there is no sign so far of
any of the hopeful factors in the agreements showing
tender shoots, and plenty,of c opfirmation for the first grim
forebodings. The North Vietnamese demonstrated their
ability to take the initiative. in the new situation' and,
although they may have -suffered heavier losses than the
Southe;4n troops, they scored more points. Now they are
preparing for what could be Round Two in the shape of
an assaplt on the provincial capital of Quang Tri.
,With the South, under the agreements, denied arms
supplies other than replacements, its only hope of ce tain-
ing the North Vietnamese forces in their " leopard-spot
enclaves lies in these also being held fo the mutual
restrictions. Yet, on the contrary ' supplies and reinforce-
menta,alre pouring in through the -De Ilia irised one Laos
lend (Cambodia fairer kith ever, cut` el~ai ly 1I ae ilt ' ' by ,
the " cease-fire." The International Supervisory Commission,
and the military committees composed of the parties to the
war, although gradually taking shape, are still bogged down ;
in procedural, administrative and logistical problems. Not
that anyone can imagine the Polish and Hungarian
have compromised' this coun-
try's position in ' Vietnam."
What those people were advo-
cating, Mr. Colson said, was
a -"dishonorable peace."
He identified four Senators-
W. ' Fulbright of Arkansas,
George McGovern of South
Dakota, Frank Church of
Idaho and Edward M. Kennedy
of,.Massachusetts-as "part of
the 'sellout brigade."'
"I think they would have
had tis leave Vietnam without
regard to 'the consequences,"
he said. ? ?
..,Mr. Colson used the words
"sell-out brigade" in an "Op-Ed
column" in, The New Yorkl
Times last Tuesday in which he
charged that reports of differ-
ences between the President
and Mr. Kissinger were a "full-
blown myth born in Wash-
ington Georgetown cocktail
.circuit that had made Mr. Kis-
singer's peace efforts more dif-
ficult.
;'Ronald S., Ziegler, the White
House press secretary, . rein-
forced Mr. Colson's argument
in a long discourse with report-
ers, who wanted to know if the
column had the President's ap-
proval. He said that Mr. Colson
was speaking for himself but he
sought to show that there was
no evidence for high-level divi-
sion on the war.
Flat Stand on Kissinger
"There was no difference of
view on the' matter of the bomb.
ing that took place, in Decem-
bcr,i' Mr. Ziegler said. "I can
state flatly that he [Mr.'Kissin-
ger] did not oppose It." Asked
if it were possible as widely'be-
lieved, that Mr. Kissinger had
been 'the source of the reports,
Mr, Ziegler said that he could
not believe anyone who so com-
pletely agreed with the Presi-
dent in White House meetings
could spread reports of division.,
During the week, Senator
Barry Goldwater, Republican of.
Arizona, distributed an unsigned,
"Vietname white paper" that
was reported to have originated
in the Administration. Mr. Gold-
water, in his accompanying let-,
ter, endorsed the paper without.
identifying its source. Several
thousand copies were distrib-
uted. -
"For four agonizing years.
Richard Nixon has stood vir-
tually alone in the nation's cap-
ital while little, petty men
flayed him over American in-'
volvement in Indochina," the
paper said. "No President has
been under more. constant and
unremitting harassment."
Attached to the text was a
list of quotations from news-
papers, columnists, commenta-
hots, magazines, and Democrats
in Congress to show "how
wrong and how harsh were the
critics when things were most
difficult."
members, even if they ever get out on the long, long
Ho Chi-minh trail, ever being parties to discovering or
denouncing any violations committed by their comrades.
Meanwhile Dr KISSINGER, for whose " peace with
honour " North Vietnam is showing such derision, will
visit Hanoi on Friday and Peking next week. To Hanoi
he will take those familiar instruments of President NIxoN's
Vietn-ani policy, the carrot and the stick-now in that
order. The former is as succulent as a few billion dollars
can make it. Dr KISSINGER dwells on Hanoi's need for
peace aid reconstruction after 20 years of war. 'He may
be misunderstanding the North Vietnamese Communists if
he thinks that, with victory suddenly seeming so much
closer, with no public opinion or democratic qualms of
conscience, they can be bought off with offers of American
aid and friendship. They may be more impressed with the
stick, the weight of which they have felt so recently. It
would) he politically difficult for Mr NIXON to resume the
bomlXiin!g, but he 'has shown that he is a determined man,
titiopt.ait rlttyi trl$ dptif i~I Iafe l"t ~pdtii3ei3~
A& for Ol lna, she very much wants peaee and a fat her
rapid iinmprouement in relations with America to balance
Russian expansion. She would like to curb .Hanoi's upstart
mini-imperialism, but could hardly be seen to be letting
a Communist protege down. Dr KissINGER's next case?
16 '.
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THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
25 January 1973
Vietnam: ? peace, and conflict
A ceasefire after a quarter of a century of
bloody, destructive fighting in Vietnam is some-
thing the whole world as well as the Vietnamese
can be relieved at and grateful for. It Is not
important that President Nixon called it "peace
with honour" and Hanoi a "great victory" at
the same time. The vital and decisive point is
that the scale of fighting and killing now
Is likely to be drastically reduced and
that the Americans should be leaving. The
Vietnamese are now left to sort things out for
themselves after their tensions had been exacer-
bated by ,the French, the Japanese, the French'.
again, and then the Americans.
The ghastliness of the war can be offset only
In part by President Nixon's statement that the
US was prepared to make a major effort to
build a peace of reconciliation." This will not
bring back to life or heal the, two and a half
million Vietnamese dead and wounded, ftor can
It restore homes to the millions of refugees. It
will not restore trees and crops to the defoliated
acres, nor will it re-create the cities, villages, and
countryside turned to rubble under the rain of
bombs' dropped on Indo-China (mainly on South
Vietnam) since 1966.' It has been a war of
wrong tactics used at the wrong time, with
hideous results for Vietnam, South and North.
If Dr Kissinger has brought back peace for
the Americans In their time, has be done the same
for the Vietnamese ? President Nixon put a
sturdy face and voice on his ceasefire announce-
ment. But the vague nature of the agreement-
after years of fighting, bombing, and negotiating
-appears In fact to have raised a smokescreen
behind which the US can disappear with a
minimum of dignity lost.
And on the ground In Vietnam ? Unless there
is an unprecedented demonstration of goodwill
and resolution by all Vietnamese parties to make
the published terms work, the long term prospects.
.must be gloomy. The major concession that the
US has obtained is that Saigon and the Vietcong
will try to do their utmost to bring about the
'..release, . within 90 days of the ceasefire, of
Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and
.retained, in South Vietnam. It is easy to see how
President Thieu's best efforts could be insufficient.
Monday. reb.5.197.4 THE WASHINGTON POST
U. n n R 11
As, Use'
Thieu has issued a stern injunction to suppress
by shooting, if necessary, any support for the
Communists. He is keen to postpone as long as!,
possible any opportunity for the Communists to `;
rebuild their cadres. There is. no hurry, in his ,
eyes, to let the prisoners out.
Nor is he in any hurry to let the refugees,
If home is in a Vietcong-controlled district, or,
to desist from using the apparatus of arrest and
terror to hold his remaining areas in the South..i
The prescribed 90 days, of course, are too short
a time in which to relax the tensions and
establish an :easier way of life. A beginning
could be made if the will were there. Perhaps,
when Vietnamese face Vietnamese on their own,
it will prove nearer than seems probable. Morel
than the 90 days will pass before the reality is
seen.
The National Council of National Reconcilia-
tion looks as unpromising as it always has. Both
Thieu and the Communists are determined to.
canvass strength by force. Neutrals to make up
the third party will be hard to find, and unanimity
within the council even harder. The limited size
of the ceasefire control commission (always a
notional force), the continued presence of North'
Vietnamese troops, and the lack of troop'
regroupment areas makes more likely-the even-;
tual renewal of fighting-with the commission'
just 'making notes. On a wider scale, the
prevention of military activity in Laos and Cam-'
bodia seems fragile. The US appears still to have
leeway enough to continue bombing the trails
from Thailand. Will it not be warned by past
experience to avoid further involvement ?
The legacy of eight years of deep American
Involvement in the Vietnamese war will be, fe'lt~
far beyond Vietnam. The frustration, loss of
self-confidence, and fear of foreign involvement)
among Americans will affect international rela-
tions for the remainder of this century. President;
Nixon was putting a gentle gloss on it all when
he said, in his inaugural address, that America ;
will no longer make every other nation's conflict
its own or every other. nation's future Its:
responsibility. Although Intervention In Vietnam
was in the end- a disaster, Atfterica's withdrawal
from world responsibility is' the world's loss.
Westerners, including
some American strategists,
were surprised during the
prolonged cease-fire negotia-
tions in Phris by the North
can officials have reasoned;
the intended Council should
pose no threat whatever to
the continued rule in South
Vietnam of President
Nguyen Van Thieu.
With the unanimity rule
ule. News Analysis operating in the Council, it ?
has been argued prlvately
0
1
' inside the Nixon administra-
Vietnamese insistence that ' : tion, q'hieu's regime faces
the rule of unanimity must no real challenge that a. po
apply in the projected three- tent.ial "coalition" govern-,
segment National Council of ment may enmm'ito from the
"unity," Vietnamese style National Reconciliation and ? (Paris accord. With decisions
Concord for South Vietnam. requiring unanimity for ac-
(.Tlac writer recevttiy re? hardly mean 'exactly the
,?..-. It
is
this
ed
m a t
k
i
lishment here
is bring reduced to an atta-
clie's office of. fewer than
100 servicemen, but for the
foreseeable future there will
be between 5,000 and 6,000
civilians on contracts paid
for by the. Defense Depart-
ment, according to the latest
estimat.c.
These contract employees,
most of whom have been
here for some time, will be
performing what informed
sources described as
"logistical, supply and train-
Ing fi notions" for the South
Vietnamese, intended prima-
rily to assist in the mainte-
nano of sophisticated U.S.-
uppticcl aircraft and equip-
.
U.:?. officials say that the
funding. of civilian techni-
cians to work with South Vi-
etnant's armed forces does
not violate the provisions In
the cease-fire agreement
prohibiting' "military advis- number of retired military
ers . . including technical men who have been 'around
military personnel." ? The South Vietnam for years.
technicians will not be sup-- Virtually all of the senior
porting combat activities in' civilians in CORDS (Civil
any way, the officials con- Operations and Rural Devel-
tend. opment Support), the acro-
The contractors will be nym for the pacification.ef-
under the direction of the fort under the U.S.' Military
at aches office, which, at Assistance Command, are
]cast initally, is scheduled to being kept on.
take over the spacious George D. Jacobson, a re
tired East" headquar- tired colonel who has been-
tcrs of the dismantled U.S- the operational head of
command. The ranking offi CORDS for almost two
ccr, whose appointment was years, has been named. a
announced by the State De- special assistant to Ambas-
Eartment, is Maj. Gen. John sador Ellsworth Bunker.
E. Murray. The structure of the R
Murray his is staff a logistics
range e and R directorate will be
part, but itwill very similar to the civilian
far beyond military supply side of the old pacification
problems in their work. Mil-i
itary sources said that about program. The scale will be
half the attaches will be very different, however,
watching-mainly from Sal- with teams of six to eight
gon-the, activities of Com- persons covering an-average
tnunist forces throughout of two provinces instead of
the country and serving as the teams of 200 military
liaison with the Jnterna- and civilian personnel as-
t.ional Commission for Con- signed to the larger prov-
trol and Supervision inces in 1969-70.
The cease-fire and the de- For some of the Ameri-
parture of U.S. forces has cans involved the end of the
also meant a reorganization war will not even mean a
of the U.S. embassy, sub- change of scenery. Albert I.
stantially increasing its re- (Buck) Kotzebue, for in-
sponsibilities. stance, a former army 'offi-
Through a network of cer who has been the senior
four consulates-three of American adviser in the Me-
them newly established- kong Delta province of Ki-
and the "Resettlement and enhoa for more than four
Reconstruction Directorate," years, will be staying there'
finitel
i
d
y.
n
e
the embassy will have bull-
dreds of people in the field Other officials are simply
monitoring political develop- being transferred to differ-
ments and supervising enut locations. In a typical
American-financed efforts to case, John Virgil. Swango,
get South Vietnam back on another retired lieutenant
its feet. colonel and one time Peoria,
The constilates, located in Ill., bar owner, is leaving dif-
ljanan,g, Nhatrang, Bienhoa ficult Binthclinh province to
and Cantho, are to be become a ranking aide in
headed by high-ranking U.S. the delta.
Foreign Service officers and Many of t,h e province
,the political reporting will teams will be living In the
be done by 40 Vietnamese- same compounds used by
speaking FSOs just transfer- CORDS. Ground transporta-
red back to South Vietnam 1 tion will be supplemented
from posts around the by a beef-up contract for
world, Air America, the private CIA
' The FSOs, some of whom airline that has lonig-served
were less than happy about pacification and intellegence
being ordered on -short no- operation in South Vietnam
tier. to leave comfortable and Laos.
positions and their families Private Criticism
for the Hardships and uncer- The decision to set-up a
t.ainty they face here, will unit within the embassy so
be scattered 'around the ciosly patterned on the ap-
ouutry for tours t up paratus of the war years has
t
to six months. Whether ther they been privately criticized by
are extended or replaced de- some U.S. officials. They
ponds, officials said, on how argue that the retired: mili-
the situation in South Viet tarymen, in particular, iden-
nam develops. tify themselves with policies
Significant Innovations of the past ant are likely to
The most significant inno- miss the significance of pa-
litical accommodations and
vation at the embassy, at, adjustments that doubtless
Ic< in numerical t.crnts e ,;_ ahead for the Vietnamese.
. the
-ii anu it
The
other view is that ex-
The unit will have about 250 pericnced people, whatever
i
staff members drawn pr
ma- their h; cktprniind
~ nu1d he
,
ri y from the former pacift utilized in the difficult ta'an-
cation program, including a
28.:
sition period between war
and peace. The task of the
Resettlement and Reconstruc- .,
tion Directorate, according to ;
Jacobson, will be "to assist
GVN (Government of Viet
nam) officials at the lower..,
levels in the non-military pro-,:
grams of the. 1972-75 'corn-'
munity .defense and local de-
velopment plan."'
This' basically means con.,
tanuing the existing .projects":
in agriculture,'public health,
land reform' and community:
development as well as refu;;
gee relief. The level of finan
cial assistance is still to be
determined by Congress..,
Planning, however, Is based`.
on the expectation of a major]
,and costly reconstruction of-r
One important change in.
the present set-tip, in keeping,
with the requirements of the
Paris cease-fire agreement;'
is that all civilian public safe=;
ty advisers who worked with:'
the South Vietnamese police
have been withdrawn. (It has-
been quietly decided, how-
ever, to leave a handful ? of
the police experts in Saigon,
In the revised mission,
structure, the province ,
teams will report to the con-
suls general In the four re-
gions who will then 'report
to Deputy' Ambassador.
Charles Whitehouse and so
on through the State De-
partment's chain of com-:::
mand. But the teams will
also be working closely with
the Ageltcy for Interna-
tional Development head
quarters in Saigon.
The number of . U.S. AID i
officials in South Vietnam
is currently about 900, in-
cluding those assigned' to :"
the, R and R Directorate. Al-
though only a third of what' '
it once was, the AID mission
there is still three -or four
times larger than other big
American missions around
the globe.
New Officer Added
Besides the addition of
the consulate and the direc-
torate,' the embassy has
added two new offices
within the political section:':.
One will coordin:?te the flow
of reports coming in from:,
the field and the other will .
serve as liaison with the
ICCS.
To serve the ICCS, the
State Department has dis-
patched officers from Its
embassies In the four mem-
bercountries: Canada, lllut-
gary, Poland and Indonesia.
The U.S. diplomat from
Warsaw, for example, is a
fluent Polish speaker and
can keep tabs on the mood
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of the 285-man Polish con-
tingent. The Hungarian spe-
cialist, it is said, is arrang-
ing for delivery of Budapest
newspapers.
The arrival of the FSOs
- they number about 50 in
all-has enlivened the Sai-
gon embassy, at least tempo-
rarily, giving it something
of the flavor of a class reun-
ion, as old friends meet be-
foile being sent onwards to
the hinterlands.
As for the other principal
American agencies-the
United States Information
Service and the Central In-
telligence Agency-they will
go on about as before. USIS
was converted last year from
the. mammoth 'press and
,propaganda enterprise it
was at the height of the war
to a more conventional post.
The CIA has also withdrawn
some of its field staff and
analysts in the past two
years and has apparently
bilized, officials said.
sI 11
WASHINGTON STAR
(The mission leadership Is will depend to a large ex-
likely to change soon. Ells- . tent on the ability of U.S. , unsuccessful because Penta-
worth Bunker, who has technicians to keep the gon officials are apparently
served in the demanding equipment running.,
! worried about the sensitive-
ambassadorial Job for al- In the first place, U.S.
is nearing 80 ficials directly concerned
ears
i
t
,
x y
s
mos
and is expected to leave' with the contracts insist
very soon. The State depart- that the number of 5,000 to
ment has proposed Graham 6,000 civilians will be gradu
Martin to replace him. Mar- ally reduced as the Vietnam-
tin is a former ambassador ese become more proficient
to Thailand and has just in servicing themselves.
completed a tour as U.S. en- Sensitive Subject
voy in Italy.) In an interview last
Probably the most contro- month, Wilfred J. Curley,
versial aspect of the` Ameri- the civilian Defense Depart-
I can presence In South Viet- ment official here in charge
nam in the coming months of defense-awarded con-
are the Defense Depart-
ment-funded contractors.
The specter has been raised
by war critics of a semi-
covert army of mercenaries
picking tip where the regu-
lar army left off.
The. reality, at this stage,
seems to fall short of the
dangers portrayed, although
it is undeniable that South
Vietnam's military readiness
9 February 1973
WILLIAM F. L UCKLEYJR
JA
PpAn,0,FS t&e,B(0M
Forgive me if it just hap-
pens that I missed them, but
in fact I have not seen any-
thing from the Great Denun-
ciators about the success of
President Nixon's December
bombings. I thought, for in-
stance, that Gloria Emerson
(of the New York Times)
might rise from the cata-
combs to which she repaired
after the bombings resumed,
in order to express a word or
two of gratitude that the war
is, so to speak, ended; but she
has not been heard from.
Perhaps she is writing a mea
culpa- it.would in her case
take time, notwithstanding
her training in deadlines.
fear that the cat has got hold
of the New York Times'
tongue, though the silence
probably is worth it, come to
think of it.
James Reston, also of the
Times, said that the bombing
was "war by tantrum." Well,
if it was, then he should medi-
tate on whether strategy by
tantrum is necessarily unde-
sirable, inasmuch as this one
clearly paid off.
Anthony Lewis, also of the
Times, said that Nixon, in
ordering the bombing, was
behaving "like a maddened
tyrant." Two weeks later we
had peace. Lewis would ap-
pear to be obliged either to
diminish his respect for
Tom Wicker wrote in mid- - peace, or else increase his
bombing: "Why should bomb
ing a people make them want respect for maddened tyrants,
to deal in good faith?" Well, no
whv. didbombing a nnnnle But, my children, it is alto-
make them deal in good faith? s."'" UUVIUUJ 11UW ulese UUC-
Why doesn't Wicker tell us? trinaire gentlemen are going
The New York Times, at to handle this sequence of
about the same. period, was. events. They will in the first
Place try to ignore them. If
very pointed on the matter
.
"The American bombs . , that does not work, they will
have dimmed prospects r, say that after all, the Novem-
for peace in Indochina," her terms, rejected by Nixon,
are not substantially different
Well, in fact the' American' from the January terms, ac-
bombs didn't dim, but clearly cepted by Nixon.
enhanced prospects for peace The answer to that is: The
in Indochina where, as a mat- people best equipped to judge
ter of fact, things are at this ? the differences -- the South
moment almost preternatural- ' Vietnamese - accepted the
ly peaceful, by Indochinese January terms, having reject-
standards. What about it? We ' ed the November terms. A
tracts, said the number
would go down steadily. He
said that reports of an in-
flux of several thousand ad-
visers and technicians, as
much as doubling the pres-
ent number, were incorrect.
"There are absolutely no in-
dications of that happen-
ing," he said.
Efforts to interview Cur-
; ley a second time have been -
supplementary point is that.
the November terms were dif-
ferent from the October
terms.
Or they will ask: "In what
sense did the bombing figure
at all?" The answer is: It
must have figured in some
way. One can understand
people who say that the bomb-
ing would have a negative
effect, i.e., that it would hard-
en the opposition of the peo-
ple. Or the opposite, that it
would embolden the peace
party in Hanoi. Hardly that it
would be without effect. As it
happens, the bombing turned
Le Due' Tho into a parade
marshal at Nixon's inaugural.
No, a sensible reading is
this: Bombing, unless it is
done with crushing force over
a period of time sufficient to
knock off critically needed
lubricants of war (See "The
Memoirs of Albert Speer"),
doesn't do much good against
firm leadership over a united
country. The bombing of the
early years under Lyndon
Johnson was not of a charac.
ter either to divide the people,
or to aripplo the wor-making
potential.
When Richard Nixon decid-
ed finally to bomb, he decided
to bomb definitively, and he
decided to do so at a moment
when the peace group within
the presidium at Hanoi was
on the defensive. The doves,
nature of the subject.
One measure of the situa-
tion, however, is that con-
tractors themselves are not
talking of any great windfall
after the final departure of
U.S. forces. Seine techni-
cians say their salaries have
been cut and 2ontracts sud-
denly terminated.
But it is an indisputable
fact that for the foreseeable
future there will be Ameri-
cans in and around every,
major South Vietnamese
military installation work-
ing on the helicopters, air-
craft and complex communi.
cations systems given the
South Vietnamese by thi.
United States.
In other areas of South
Vietnamese life, as well,
Americans will go on watch-
ing and prodding the Viet-
namese.
as we look back on it, were in
the saddle in October. In No-
vember, when Nixon was re-
elected and did not immedi- '.
ately take tough military
measures, the:hawks gained.,(
the ascendancy.
The bombings reversed
their positions. During this'
period, held up to the world
by Olof Palme and others of
the Hieronymous Bosch
,school of U.S. diplomacy as a
rebirthof?Hiroshima, Dresden '
and Ravensbruck, 1,400 North
Vietnamese civilians died and
twice that number were -s
wounded. Would that such a
sacrifice had been exacted
many years ago. A half-mil-,
lion North Vietnamese might'A'
now be alive, not to mention
hundreds of thousands of
South Vietnamese, and thou-
sands of Americans.
Dogmatic opposition to
Richard Nixon (as opposed to
discriminating opposition)
will unquestionably be accept-
ed by future epistemologists
as a single greatest impedi-
ment to ktlawlodg? in tho ROth
century. If only fhe gentlemen
would not only concede that
Nixon was right, which would
be the gallant thing to do; but
learn from his having been' right! Wars would certainly
be shorter, and almost as cer-
tainly less frequent.
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WASHINGTON POST
8 February, 1973
CIut?Ples W. Yost
IN A MONTH to be marked by Kis-'
singer visits to Hanoi and Peking, the'
Vice-President's tour of Southeast'
Asia, the opening of an international,'
.conference to guarantee the Vietnam'
cease-fire agreements, and probably'.
the 'application of parallel cease-fires
An Lang and Cambodia, it is timely to?
consider what role the United States,
should plan to play in the coming dec
ade throughout East Asia and the
Western Pacific.
A number ' of questions come to
mind. Should the United States en-
deavor itself to enforce the cease-fire
agreements in the three Indochina
states, or should it leave enforcement
to the opposing parties in these coun-
tries, supplemented by international
machinery which cannot be expected
to have strong teeth?
Should the United States maintain
Intact all of the various alliances, de
fense pacts, commitments, bases and,
military deployments which 'we have'
built up over the past quarter century'
throughout the area? These include'
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion, bilateral. defense treaties with Ja-
pan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the
Anzus Pact with Australia and New.
Zealand and substantial United States'
military forces in Korea, Japan and
Thailand, as well as the Seventh Fleet
patrolling the coasts of East and South-
east Asia.
All this adds up to a still. very large
American military involvement in a
part of the world where the rationale
for such involvement seems to have di-
minished, if not disappeared,
The power orginally responsible for,
our involvement, Japan, is now one of!
our closest friends. Communist China,'
which for 20 years we perceived to be,
first, an instrument of the Soviet Un
ion and,. second, inveterately expan='
sionist itself, is now perceived to be"
neither.
- While is would be hazardous to pre-
dict the more distant future, it seems
reasonably certain that for some yeatrs
to conic China will be preoccupied
with its own domestic economic and
political problems and with. its anxie-
ties about the Soviet Union.'For that
time at least it will pose no serious
threat to its neighbors.
There is likely to be for some time A
continuing; zone of instability in South-
cast Asia, where our prolonged and ex-
cessive intervention has delayed estab-
lishment of an equilibrium 'among in-
digenous forces which alone could be
durable.
As a correspondent of The Washing-
ton Post. Thomas Lippman, wrote from
Saigon a few days ago, the Indochina
Nixon responded by promising the So
viet Union a "role" In shaping the
post-war structure of power.
' Chou En-lai's objections to Russia's'y
supposed attempts to "dominate" the"
Lice thr.t China does not wish any such....
American-Soviet deal to be consum-
mated. This is the kind of complication
that was to be expected as Mr. Nixon
began to shape the "balance of power"
which, he believes, will maintain the
peace of the world, not just of Indo-
china, after the Vietnam War.
Peking and Moscow are as intrigued
by Mr. Nixon's balance-of-power, for-
mula as everybody else. By a happy. co-
incidence, some of the questions raised
about it in this column last week were,
promptly answered in Dr. Kissinger's
TV interview with CBS. The shifting
alliances which characterized the bale.
ante of power in the 19th century, he
explained, were not applicable in the
nuclear age. -
The Kremlin.will certainly be glad
to have this reassurance on the eve of
Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking. Its '
own study of Mr. Nixon's "five-polar
world," in which the United States and"
the Soviet Union are to be joined as
.super-powers By China, Europe and Ja-
pan, has given Moscow cause for con-
corn. Soviet studies now conclude that'
the new "poles" are intended 'to
"counter-balance" the Soviet Union
and "to ease the burden of imperial-
ism's struggle against socialism," that
is, to help the United States to prevail
over the Soviet Union.'
They argue that China's, role as the
"third pole" has been designed by the
United States "to accord exclusively
with the interests of capitalism.'! This,
they believe, explains the "marked ac-
tivity" of the United States in building
up China's role.
The Kremlin evidently does not ac-
cept Mr. Nixon's assurances that he
does not want, to play off. Russia
against China. The balance of power
does not balance-yet. But a balance
of sorts was achieved by the most bril
liant diplomatic operation known, to
history when, Russia and China helped
the United States to end the war. The
men who accomplished this-in all
three countries-could surely accom-
plish more, and build a world struc-
ture of peace, in the face of difficulties
that sometimes seem insuperable.
CJ 1973. Victor Zarza
over primary responsibility for the se,'
curity of this region-insofar as outsid-'
ers need concern themselves wi:,h it at
all-to international instrumentalities.'
The i9=nation pilttit'ent?d on vttitl?
nano meeting later this month it rather
curiously and unsatisfactorily com-'
posed, since only four states front the
area will be present-China, North and'
South Vietnam, and Indonesia. Onee of
the main objectives of the conference;
after doing what little it can to solidify
the recent agreements, should be' to
'pass on the mandate for guaranteeing,
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WASHINGTON POST
8 February, 1973
Victor Zorza
And Power Politics.
DR. KISSINGER will carry to China
this month the payoff for Peking's
help in settling the Vietnam war, but
it looks as if Mao Tse-tung is in for a
disappointment. The United States has
made promises both to Peking and to
Moscow. If it tries to give full satisfac.
tion to either capital, the other will
A year ago Mr. Nixon promised that
Russia as well as China "will play a
role in shaping a new structure of re-
gional stability" after the war. The
United States would no longer provide
"the principal means of guaranteeing
Asian security. But as the triangular
balance proposed by Mr. Nixon began
to take 'shape, both China and the So-
viet Union set to work to keep the
other out of the area.'
Peking now complains that although
China and the United States had
agreed to forgo supremacy in Asia and
the Pacific, the Soviet Union refused
to give up "its attempt to dominate the
area." It was trying to achieve this, said
Chou En-lai, the Chinese premiere, by
promoting an Asian "collective secu-
rity system" designed to encircle
China. -
The Russians are not content. with
Mr. Nixon's promise to share with
them and with China the influence
which the United States has exercised
in the past. Tbcy seem to fear that
they may be cheated out of what they
believe is their due.
The fears which the Kremlin was
voicing so freely before Mr. Nixon's
visit to Peking, and which were al-
layed somewhat by his visit to Moscow,
are rampant again. "Peking and Wash-
ington have agreed to divide the
sphere of influence in Southeast Asia
between them," says Moscow radio, "at
the expense of third countries," that is,
of Russia. China, it says, wants the
United States to remain in the area,
since 'this would make it difficult for
the countries of Southeast Asia to ac-
quire "new allies"-such as the Soviet
Union.
1 Before Mr. Nixon's trip to China, the
Kremlin let it be known that it fa-
vored the post-war "neutralization"
of the area, which would be "guar-
anteed," as Pravda put it, by the
United States, China, and the' Soviet
Union. This was what the Kremlin
hoped to get eventually ii exchange for
Its own help In settling the war. Mr.
war "lasted longer and decided less
than any other conflict in modern his-
tory." Who wins how and when in that
conflict has still to be determined.
The future ambit,lens of ltanol out-
side Vietnam remain uncertain, thoueii
it seems doubtful that either Peking or
Moscow would encourage them now.
However, outside Indochina no domi-
noes seem likely to fall, unless they
fall of their own weight.
Consequently it would be cone tent.
both with the Nixon Doctrine and with
United States national interest to turn
30
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long-range security in Southeast Asia
to more broadly and regionally repre-'
sentative bodies.
Because of the war in Vietnam and
the tension between China and the
United States, regional organizations
in Fast Asia-both the Asian and Pa-;
cific Council spanning the western Pa
cific from Japan and Korea all the w.ay`
to Australia and New Zealand, and the
more restricted association of South-
east Asian nations-have hardly ven-
tured to involve themselves In the se-
curity.field.
Now they should be encouraged to
WASHINGTON STAR
7 February 1973
do so-under the broad umbrella of
the United Nations, which likewise,
now that Peking is represented in New
York and the Vietnam war is officially,
ended, should no longer be inhibited
from concerning itself with East Asia;,
The presence of the U.N. Secretary-
General at the ? forthcoming confer-
ence, and perhaps U.N. participation in
relief and reconstruction in Indochina,,;
should facilitate this Involvement.
This does not mean that U.S. treaty
commitments should be relaxed with-.
out our friends' c o n sent, or that'
there should be sudden massive with-
MIN
Q'I
Non
By HENRY S. BRADSHER
~dfl1t,Q?D'~AD'Q?>1dQ?1LY~Dlit
SAIGON - A spirit of peace
Jul coexistence with the Com- ed to be continuing. But the
munists seems to be spreading reports indicate little of the
across South Vietnam. It ap- staunch rejection of Commu-
parently worries President nist influences which Thieu
Nguyen Van Thieu. had sought.
The relaxed attitude of rec- Officials of the government
onciliation that is noticeable here consider this situation
among many Vietnamese has very dangerous. They had
caused Thieu's government to wanted to keep the Commu-
begin seeking a quick political gists quarantined in their en.
agreement with the Commu. so that they
nists and elections before the slaves of control could not infect the people.
official anti-Communist
too much. Communist posi- But Communist political work-
tion is eroded
When reportedly are operating
When the cease-fire theoreti- ers
cally went into effect 10 days several themes
ago, Thieu exhorted his people Thieu
which he has can seveverl them elections.
a continue their struggle n One is the relative prosperity
what against st he the ca Communists of South Vietnam-htanks to
There called a a dangerous American aid-compared with
relaxation against st a a tre treac her- '
new phase. North Vietnam. Another ous enemy, he warned. theme is stability.
.. If Communists come into Dangerous Preachers
your village", you should im- But his main theme always
saidthem fi the has been the essentially nega-
bead," e Thieg shoot
suddenly " who tive one of anti-Communism
sudly begin talking d in n . be a on which his leadership is
Communist tone should based. If the Communists can
killed immediately." erode this by preaching recon-.
Tired of War ciliation and finding the people
But reports . from around receptive, Thieu will be in
the country say that there now trouble.
seems to be a widespread de- The cease-fire agreement
sire to let the hostility die. ' provides for the- Saigon gov-
People are tired of war and its ernment and they Viet Cong to
tensions and hatreds. "do their utmost" to agree on
Some sporadic fighting con internal matters within 90
tinues to mar the cease fire, days. They are to "'organize.
and. in some places the anti- free and democratic general
Communist struggle is report-'.: elections....
When Thicu finally accepted
the agreement two weeks ago,
officials here were emphasiz-
ing the difficulties of the two
sides being able to agree on
internal matters and holding
elections. There seemed to be
no hurry, since Thieu was left
in control of the government
for however long it took.
But between Thieu's speech
at the time the cease-fire 10
days ago and his Lunar New
Year address to the nation six
days later (last Saturday), the
government's attitude seems
to have changed.
New Emphasis
The speech last Saturday
emphasized for the first time
the importance of reaching a
political agreement with the
Viet Cong quickly, so that the
way could be cleared for elec-
tions.
Thieu said then nb was fa-
structing his special negotiator
in Paris, ambassador Pham
Dang Lam, to begin the pre-
paratory consultations with
the Viet Cong provided for in
thecease -fireagreement..
These talks began Monday and
were continuing today in
Paris.
The opening attitude was
that procedural matters could
be cleared up speedily. Lam
told reporters later that the
Viet Cong foreign minister,
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, "Can
come to Saigon when she likes
to begin her consultations."
This reversed an earlier
feeling here that the potential-
ly infectious Mrs. Binh and
her comrades should be kept
away as long as possible. The
Saigon. government now sees
early elections as possibly;
being to its benefit, so wants
to move along.
What Election?
This does not mean that ear-
ly elections will necessarily
follow. As Lam also said, pro-;
cedural matters are going '
smoothly but "it might be,
more difficult when fundamen-
tal problems were reached."
The most fundamental prob-
lem is what kind of elections.
Thieu has advocated a presi-,:
dential race, with the winner,.:
to form a cabinet which re-
flects the percentage of votes
polled by various factions.
Thieu is conficent of winning,
.a view shared by most inde-
pendent observers at the pres-
ent time.
Knowing this, the Commu-
nists want an election for a
constituent assembly which
would then decide what form
of government South Vietnam
should have. Even a relatively
small Communist bloc in such
an assebly could be noisily
effective, and if things would
not go their way at first they
could try to *break up the as-
sembly and have another elec-
tion.
That process could go on for
long enough to cause those
less dedicated than the Com-
munists to lose their persist
once.
So a difficult fight over' the
elections is generally expected
li@t'o, And that presuniably
worries the government, too,
because it will take time
which the Communist might
be using in the countryside to
try to erode Thieu's support,
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drawals of United States forces from,
areas other than Indochina. it should
mean, however, that the military disen-
gagement and the detente so wisely in..
itiated by President Nixon can in the
near future be carried considerably
further, from Korea to Taiwan to Thai-
land, and that the primary duty for
maintaining international peace and
security in East -Asia can be placed
where it belongs-in the governments
of the area, their regional organiza-
tions and the United Nations Security
Council.
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;WASHINGTON STAR
7 February 1973
~, 11 r2%
17
IV
V
By JAMES DOYLt
Star-News Stiff Writer
The Indochina war is in dan-
ger of? major escalation into a
new "secret war" which would
involvethousands of U.S. ad-
visers under the leadership of
the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, according to a former
worker among the refugees of
Laos who has made a, study of
the "secret war" in that coun-
try.
Fred Brantman, a leading
critic of American involve-
ment in Indochina who has
written extensively about the
covert U.S. bombing of Laos,-
presented a collection of 32
reports from major American
newspapers at a news confer-
ence yesterday, to back up his
contention that the U.S. ap-
pears headed for a major rein-
vestment of civilian forces and
paramilitary air, and ground
units in Vietnam.
"This is the period when a
President could pull out,"
Branfman said, "but if these
press clippings turn out to be
right, then new escalation of
the air war is likely.
"I think it's likely to happen
again... It has happened several
times before in Indochina."
The ? news dispatches out-
lined reports that 10,000 civil-
ian advisers, double the pres-
ent number, under Defense
Department contract will re-
main. in Vietnam; that the Sai-
gon government has been re-
cruiting Air Force technicians
in American newspaper classi-
fied ads; that the access of
American reporters to the
scenes of incidents and battles
already has been curtailed
drastically, and that South Vi-
etnamese officials and local
police are blocking the release
of political prisoners and or-
deering the shooting of sus-
pectcd Communists in viola-
tion of the cease-fire accord.
(South Vietnamese sources
said however, that Saigon has,
released about 20,000 military
and civilian prisoners in the
past few days, turning them
lose on their own despite pro-
visions in the cease-fire agree-
ment that they be turned over
to the North Vietnamese or
the Viet Cong, the New York
Times reported Monday.
Many of the articles were
written before the peace
agreement was signed, and
some referred to plans for a
continuing American presence
as only contingency plans.
"If President Nixon was pre-
pared to allow the Vietnamese
to settle their' own affairs, he
would presumably back away
from Vietnam while soft-
pedalling his public identifica-
tion with Thieu," Branfman
said.
If the President does allow a
covert war to continue, Branf-
man said, the 'history of past
actions in Vietnam suggests
that eventually the hidden mil-
itary and paramilitary activi.
ties will be supplemented by
new bombing, either openly
or, as in Laos in the past, in
secret.
"The American government
simply lied about it (the bomb-
ing) in Laos," Branfman said.
He predicted that if President
Nixon "intervenes in a covert
manner in Vietnam" then the
likelihood of renewed bombing
there will be very high. .
He said widespread publicity
of such actions would effec-
tively stop them, but that both
the American press and the
international observers would
have difficulty seeing such vio-
lations first hand if the Saigon
government refuses them ac-
cess to areas of the country,
as has happened In Laos.
(U.S. planes have continued
BALTIMORE SUN
2 FEBRUARY 1973
re its
London (Reuter)-American
prisoners captured in Vietnam
by Northern troops have been
held in secret maximum-secu-
rity camps in China, according
to a Moscow-datelined report
by Victor Louis in the London
Evening News yesterday.
Mr. Louis, a Soviet citizen
with a. reputation for securing
exclusive stories connected
with the Communist world,
said evidence had been build-
ing up strongly in the Soviet
.Capital that 600 Americans
to bomb Communist concen-
trations in Laos since the Viet-
nam truce went Into effect at
the request of the Laotian gov-
ernment, the commander of
U.S. forces in the Pacific said
Monday.)
Jerry Gordon, coordinator of
the National Peace Action Co-
alition who appeared at the.'
same news conference, pre-
dicted a "tidal wave of pro-
test" would engulf the country
If the bombing Is resumed in
Vietnam. "That would be the
last straw for many Ameri-
cans," he said.
Gordon said his organization
would continue to protest
American support of the Thieu.
government and call for im-
mediate and complete with-
drawal from Indochina.
Members plan to picket the
White House on Saturday,
Feb. 24, before holding a dis-
cussion session on activities
for the anti-war movement in
the aftermath of the cease-
fire. The discussion session at.
the Metropolitan AME Church
on M St., replaces an "anti-
war convention" planned for
that dat.
OW's in ClItina
were housed in the Chinese
province of Yunan, close to the
border with North Vietnam.
But, says Mr. Louis, the
camps were sufficiently far
away from the border to foil
possible United States com-
mando rescue bids and to pro-
tect the prisoners from the
recent massive bombardment
of the North carried out with
B-52 bombers.
The Americans were placed
in typically Vietnamese condi-
tions-their food, guards and
even their clothes were Viet-
namese-to convince them that
they were still in North Viet-
nam, the report said.
Mr. Louis said their pres-
ence in China meant the
POW's could be used by. Hanoi
to maximum advantage in the
Paris peace talks, while it pro-
vided China with a means of
demonstrating solidarity with
North Vietnam without direct
involvement Ill ft War,
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5
WASHINGTON POST
7 February, 1973
Tad Szu.Ic
A Time fog Rebuilding
PRESIDENT Nixon said at, Ills Jan. 31
news conference that with the advent
of the Vietnamese peace agreement
the United States would now consider
a postwar "reconstruction program"
for the two Vietnams along with the
rest of Indochina. This, he said, would
he an incentive for the preservation of
peace. Besides, as we know, postwar
reconstruction of ravaged territories of
allied and enemy nations alike has be-
come in this century an American tra-
dition.
But an analysis of political,, military,
economic and-quite importantly-eco-
logical realities involved in such a re-
TYirt writer is, a \ former diplo-
-n.ntir, and foreign correspondent
for the Nev tYork Times.
construction effort raises major ques-
tions about its feasibility in the forese-
able future. The result might well be
that reconstruction pledges (as distinct
from the U.S. commitment to ? contin-
ued aifl for' South Vietnam's economic
survival) will become meaningless and
lose even their psychological value as
a possible comprehensive package for
encouraging peace maintenance.
Mr. Nixon and others have spoken of
it possible comprehensive package for
all Indochina. He has instructed
Henry Kissinger, while he is in Hanoi
this month, to discuss Indochina-wide
reconstruction with the North Viet-
namese. Administration officials have,
even thrown around the figure of $7.5-
billion as the cost of reconstruction al-
though nobody here is quite sure what
it means in terms of projects.
For the purpose of clarity, It Is nec-
essary to break. down the overall re-
construction . concept Into realistic
component parts.
1. Immediate problems in South Viet-'
nam. The . immediate problem is to
keep the Saigon economy going as
much for political reasons as anything
else. President Thieu, who has to main-
,tain' his 1,000,000-man army Indefi-
phase of ' the power contest with the
National Liberation Front if his artifi-
cial economy collapses under him.
Considering the military costs, the
needs of the Saigon middle class (whom
Thieu cannot afford to antagonize). and
the urgency of social programs for an
estimated 8,000,000 refugees. and other
war victims, the first priority-Is budget
support and stabilization. The annual
tag for these expenditures may exceed
$750,000,000 in U.S. funds, Witholtt it,
long-range reconstruction is not 'possi-
ble.
2. Reconstruction policies in. South
Vietnam. Even assuming that the Saigon
regime acts strongly and responsibly
(i.e.. eliminates corruption and
favoritism), coherent national postwar
planning is virtually Impossible so
long as South Vietnam remains a
patchwork of areas controlled here by
Saigon and there by the Communists.
But the Paris accords, allowing the
160,000 North Vietnamese troops to
stay in the South, may perpetuate this
mind-boggling mosaic for months If
not for years. It would be preposterous
to expect local South Vietnamese and
Communist commanders to cooperate
in reconstruction' in contested areas
under a stand-still ceasefire.
Vietnam economic specialists believe
that Thieu's ne*t pressing problem is
to start moving the masses of refugees
from the suffocatingly overcrowded
Saigon and other cities (only 650,000
refugees are in camps) back to the
countryside. Otherwise urban unem-
ployment could become political dyna-
mite for Thieu and a boon for the
Communists. Likewise, the South's ag-
ricultural economy desperately needs
manpower.
3. Reconstruction policy problems. But
the complications is, specialists say, that
insecurity in the countryside-the
"leopard spots" situation-is unlikely
to draw back enough refugees, espe-
cially the younger people who have
tasted city life.
N Another major problem, generally
I overlooked' in current discussions, is
the economic and ecological damage
inflicted on the countryside by nine
years of herbicide and defoliation
practiced by the U.S. against Commu-
nist-held areas in the South In crop-de-
struction and forest denuding opera-
tions. Thus far the extent of the eco-
logical damage Is unknown except that
it is considerable.
The National Academy of Sciences,
working on a $2,000,000 grant from the
Defense Department, is expected to
complete on Aug. 1 a detailed study of
ecological damage in South Vietnam.
Experts say that until the survey is
completed, no serious planning for ag-
ricultural reconstruction can be under-
taken.
An earlier study of damage resulting
from herbicides is contained in the still-
'secret "Report on the Herbicide Policy
Review." It was prepared by a U.S.' gov-
ernment task force under the dirbction
of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and is
dated August 28, 1968-some 18 months
before the use of these chemicals was
suspended.
The report, obtained by this writer,
states, among other things, that 20 per
cent of South Vietnam's forests were
"treated" by herbicides and defoliants
through. the and of 1967-and . many
areas were sprayed repeatedly. In t'he
provinces north and northwest of Saigon,
70 per cent of the timber has been af-
fected. This is vital because, as the re-
port stresses, "the forests of Vietnam
employment ... Repeated application of
defoliants in these zones could seriously
retard regeneration of these forests."
The wood industry is one of the most
important in South Vietnam, normally
employing 80,000 people. By 1968, the ,
herbicides war led toy the destruction )
"... post war reconstruc-
tion of ravaged territories
has become an
American tradition .. '
around Saigon alone of 2,000,000 cubic
meters of timber which compares to '
potential national annual production of
3.5-million cubic meters.
Bamboo invasion resulting from for-.
est-canopy defoliation may delay tree
regeneration because seedlings are
killed. The report estimates that 20
years will be required to restore man-
groves destroyed by herbicides. In
mangroves, ecological balances and the
food-chain have been upset, affecting
fish and birds.
Rice'fields are ecologically Immune
to herbicide damage, but rubber, fruit
and beans are highly sensitive. The ex-
tent of damage to the latter is un-
known.
So the gltest.ion is to what would the
refugees be'returning?
4. North Vietnam. Only after Kis-
singer returns from Hanoi will the ad-
ministration learn whether North Viet,
nam is interested in Indochina-wide co
The first question is whether Hanoi
would accept any U.S. or multilateral
the two Vietnams. Secondly, it is un- -
known under what conditions North'
Vietnam would enter aid arrangements
for itself; many specialists think it i
would insist on reconstruction disguised;
as "reparations," which probably
5. Indochina. So long as the fight-
ing persists in Laos and Cambodia-
and it may go on for a long time-such
grandiose plans as the development of
the whole Mekong River Valley basin
by an international consortium are
fated to remain on the drawing board.
And even if all the fighting stops, who
knows whether Hanoi and its Laotian
and Cambodian allies desire such a
program in conjunction with the Sai-
In stun, postwar reconstruction in
Indochina tilny long remain a dream
While the tl.M, Hull pvoll tht? itttpI'Hf.-
tional community are forced to concen-
trate on measures to keep South Viet-
nam away from the brink of economic
and political catastrophe.
33
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 :After War arid Cease-.,ire, the South Vietnamese,
Communist Groups Remain a Mystery.
1...1.... ..-,...a:.... -,.....,...Ai.--,, fn,- - I -A of ('rntrnl rnt('lli-I-.Vintnam Mr Tlinh eatA ,,fL L.
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
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South Vietnam. The meeting:.gence Agency operations in would be Incredible" It Mr.
was apparently attended by' South Vietnam, described Mr. Trung and General Tra were
scores of delegates representing Tho as having "little political the same man because "sooner
what the guerrillas said were repute or professional standing or later the N.L.F. would have
"various political parties, mass among his former colleagues at to publish the lists of who is
organizations, nationalities, re. the South Vietnamese bar." in the cabinet" and both would
ligious and patriotic personals-! In an interview last week, have to be identified.
ties from both the rural and; Tran Van Dinh, a. former dep-
urban areas." - uty South Vietnamese Ambas- Yet, Mr. Dinh added, thel
United States officials de- sador to the United States, Photograph in the New York
scribed the coalition at the time noted that Mr. Tho led the first Times last Friday of an officer
as "old wine in new bottles." anti-United States demonstra- said to be General Tra was
tion in Saigon more than 20 not that of the man he had
`Aggression' From North ? years ago to protest American i served with In South Vietnam.
The official view of the Unit- 1support of the French. "The answer," said a United,
ed States Government, as ex- "He is extremely popular States intelligence officer who
pressed in a State Department with the people in South Viet- is handling Vietnam matters,
White paper in 1965 and re- nain," said Mr. Dinh, a critic is that nobody knows very
peatedly 'stated since, is that of the war who has been living much about these people, and
the war in South Vietnam was in exile in Washington since he I don't care who's talking. We
directed and financed by North left the South Vietnamese diplo- !just don't know who's in what
Vietnam. United States officials matic service in 1964. "It is position or how they inter-
have characterized the war as wrong to assume that he was relate, its the same thing we
a product of "aggression" from just a figurehead. You Ameri- can say about the top leaders
the North. cans exaggerate party affilia- of North Vietnam and the N.L.F.
Some scholars argue, how- tion too much as a key to Direct Influence From Hanoi
ever, that there is equally' power."
persuasive eidence indicating On the other hand, a well- Most experts-critics of the
that the conflict was a civil nformed intelligence expert in war and those who support it
war, one that might be aided an interview, reaffirmed his be- -acknowledge that the most
and abetted, but could not have lief that "there's no question significant members of the Pro-
been instigated, by outsiders. that Tho has been a front guy visional Revolutionary Govern-
That basic division of view for years for North Vietnam." ment are also members of the
extends to the analysis, now., He added that in his view Communist party, and all agree
going on, of the background of, the real 'powers in the Pro- that Hanoi exerts direct influ-
the Provisional Revolutionary visional Revolutionary Govern- ence on its policies.
of the mysteries of the Vietnam
war has been the other side,
those South Vietnamese Com-
munists and nationalists who-
with the support of North Viet-
nam-have battled the Saigon,
Government and the United
States to a standstill. .'
They have been called by the
names Vietcong,. a phrase -
pejorative, in their view-
meaning Vietnamese Commu-
nists, and National Liberation
Front and now Provisional Rev-
olutionary Government of South
Vietnam.
Today, with the sanction of
the recently signed Vietnam
peace accords, this group of
guerrilla fighters controls up-
ward of 30 per cent of the area
of South Vietnam and is in thei
process of tightening its ad-I
ministrative grip in "liberated".
zones.
Despite its existence, the
Nixon Administration has said
that it will recognize the Saigon
leadership of President Nguyen
Van Thieu as the "sole legiti-
mate government" of South.
Vietnam. In a recent television
interview, William H. Sullivan?
a Deputy Assistant Secretaryl'joint four-member Military Corn-!,Tan Phat, and its minister of
of State for East Asia and Pa-1i defense, Tran Nam Trun Both
noted that what1~Mission meeting this week ins g
cific Affairs
,
he termed the "so called" Pro-
visional Revolutionary Govern-
ment "does not have a capital,
does not have any outwardl
manifestations that make it
feasible to be called a govern-,
ment."
Almost a Way of Life
This absence of "outward
manifestations"-in the West-
and scholars are also closely
watching the names suggested
by the guerrilla radio as pos-
sible members of the National
Council of National Reconcilia-
tion and Concord, the three-
party group whose functions,
according to the peace agree-
ment, would revolve around the
organization of general and lo-
cal elections in the South as
5outhy Vietnamese guerrillas. 1 United States officials, con-
United States and South( vinced that those they call
Vietnamese military forces have control, Communists have
looked, and bombed, in vain n, maintain that while the
non-Communist members of the
for the famed political and mil-
itary headquarters of the guer
rillas-known as COSVN, for
,Central Office of South Vietnam
--'-since the early 1960s.
It was then that the guerrilla.
,movement, led largely by Com-I
,coalition may have nominal au-
thority, they lack real political
power.
One relatively well-known
figure much in dispute is Ngu-
yen Hull Tho, a former Saigon
lawyer who has been chairman
of the Central Committee of
Front, described as a coalition
of Communist and non-Commu-,
leading official since it was set
up 13 years ago. He is not a
member of the Communist par-
ty of South Vietnam-the Peo-
were born in South Vietnam,
long.served in revolutionary ac-
tivities against the French and
are principal leaders of the
Communist party in the South.
Named as a General
There is some confusion over
Mr. Trung, whose name has
been said by some intelligence
officials to be a pseudonym
of Lieut Gen. Tran Van Tra,
second-ranking member of the
Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
)ermnent, who arrived in Saigon
last week to head his group's
delegation to the Military Com-
mission.
Further research shows that
in 1969 the South Vietnamese
newspaper Tien Tuyen, which
is published by the army, as-
serted that Mr. Trung was
really a Vietcong general named
Tran Luong.
In addition, Douglas Pike, the
United States .Information
Agency official who is con-
sidered by many to be a lead-
ing expert on the Vietcong, has
written that Mr. Trung may be
General Tra, "hut it is mord
likely" that lie is North Viet-
nam's political commissiar for
all of the guerrilla. forces.
1ment, in a clandestine radio 'Plc's Revolutionary party, which
!brnndanrlt, told of n convontkln is the sottthorn branch of the
!n December, 1960, somewhere North Vietnam Communist par-
In the jungles of Vietnam at ty - and is, therefore, widely
which the Liberation Front was considered by United States ex-
set up. perts to be more of a figurehead
Similarly, the formation of than a palicy maker.
the. Provisional Revolutionary ' Two Views of, the Man
Government was announced in
June, 1969, by the guerrilla
radio, which described a three-
The formed deputy Ambassa-
dor, Mr. Dinhi, said he had
served with General Tra in 1944
during the Japanese occupation
In a published analysis of! and noted that he was a "for-
what he termed "the faceless midable" officer who eventually
Vietcong," George A. Carver.1r.,I attained high rank in North
interviews that there may be
more autonomy than is general-
ly realized.
A 'Government expert noted
,that there were three potential
(clashes between the North and
South Vietnamese Communists:'
personality disputes, bureau-;I
cratic disputes between opera-
tives in the field and higher
(officials and-most significant,
in this official's view-"the ob=
vious fact that the South has
been told by the North that
they're on heir own."
"The North is saying that
'we'll keep supporting you,"
this official added, "but that
,now you must keep making
the political effort by your-
self.'
Two leading Vietnam schol-
ars, David G. Man and D.
Gareth Porter, both critics ofj
the war, said in separate 'in
terviews that in their opinion
the Communist officials of the
Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment were aware that they
had to compromise with na-.
tionalist forces to achieve their
go it of a complete political'
victory In the Smith,
Mr. Marr, a former professor
of Vietnamese history at the
University of California who is
now director of the Washing-
ton-based Indochina Resource
Center, said that while Commu-
nist officials would continue to
play a major role, "they know
it's not in their Interest" to
34
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5
.(attempt, to take over the coali.I that the Communists and thel
Need for Compromise Seen ,
"They know the special sit-
uation in the South is terrible
from an organizational point of
view," he explained. "There's
been total chaos and the class
structure has been destroyed.
The basic distinction in the
next few years will be between
the few who made a killing on
.the war and those who lost
everything. It's not going to
be between landlord and
[tenant."
Mr. Porter, now a doctoral
candidaate in Cornell Univer-
i'have to have a do ree of s
`city's Southeast Asian studies] gf
;program, suggested similarly the t ad sort nonnCommun sts.n" terms of
THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
7 February 1973
Provisional Revolutionary Gov-1
to compromise with the third
force"-the large group of non-
Communist but anti-American
people in the South.
"They can't plan their strat-
egy simply on the basis of dis-
ciplined adherence to the move-
ment;" said Mr. Porter, who
has taught political science at
the University of Akron; Ohio,
,has spent several years In Viet-
nam doing research and has
'written widely for magazines
on the war. "They know they
for the same areas. The party
also recognizes ?parate areas
of political and military respon-
sibility in, its geographic divi-
sions, with central administra-
tions coming from COSVN. At
least two regions in the South,
however, were known to be un-
der the direct supervision of
the North. Vietnamese high
command at various times dur-
ing the war, according to State
Department records.
The guerrilla political organi.
zation, or infrastructure, is also
known to operate clandestine
cells in south Vietnamese cities
that are otherwise believed Lobe
,under Saigon's complete control.
Thailand now has the biggest- concentration of foreign-based; US forces
outside Europe. T. D. ALLMAN examines their inflammatory potential.
mi he mt
EVER SINCE John Foster
Dulles formed the South-east
Asia Treaty Or-ganisatiorf in
1954, Thailand has been the
-keystone of . United States
efforts to impose its will on
Indo-China,
In Bangkok, the effort has
always been rationalised as
essentially defensive. In prac-
tice, however, America's use of
Thailand has been one of con-
tinuing iniilitarv offence. With-
out Thai bases, America could
never have prosecuted its long
secret war in Laos, used Laos
to support attacks against
North Vietnam, or supported
mercenary bands operating in
Cambodia.
From Thailand, the US has
also mounted Para-military and
espionage activities into Burma
rand China. The final; massive
B-52 raids on Hanoi were
;mounted from Thai bases. Over
the' last eight years, it has, been
Thailand that has intervened in
a Vietnam war, not the other
way around.
' With the US evacuation of
South Vietnam, Thailand now
has the largest single concen-
tration. of foreign-ba.s>ed US
forces outside Europe. Much of
'South-east Asia's future now
hinges on' whether- President
?Nixon will use his Thai bases,
like the ones in Europe,' as a
defensive deterrent or whether
he will continue to use Thailand
as a springboard for continuing
military intervention through-
m.out'the region.
If US tactics In Thailand do
i change, leaders ranging from
Prince Sihanouk to Lee Kuan
Yew - perhaps even the North
Vlotnamtria Ieatlerahtp '__ mq
find an American presence
there_ a useful element in a
peaceful, multi-polar, non
ideological South-east Asia in
which the US, China, Japan,,
and . Russia all have a r6le to
play. But if the US continues to
use Thailand indefinitely as an
offensive base, the result will.
rye
Nonetheless, Mr. Porter added,
only ? the Communist party in
South Vietnam has what he
termed the "leadership and dis-
cipline" to match the political
power of President Thieu.
United States experts have
estimated the number of clan-
destine Communist party mem-
bers in the South at more than
100,000. The party structure
has been described in State De-
partment documents as closely
paralleling at each level-from
region down to village-the
open political organization of
the Provisional Revolutionary
Government.
The party has Its own politi-
cal geography and often uses
names different from Saigon's
tio'nist's,
be continuing, chronic war.
So far the portents are not
hopeful. Chou Endai recently
called on the US to end its mili-
tary intervention in Laos and
Cambodia,. Secret peace tanks are
under way in Laos, and both`
Cambodian sides are now will-
ing to accept a Cambodian
cease fire, if not to agree to
negotiated peace.
On paper, the Paris ceasefire
constituted an 'unprecedented
renunciation of America's
Indo-China ambitions. The first
article of the Paris accords
pledges that America will
respect " the independence,.
sovereignty, unity, and terri-
torial integrity of Vietnam as
recognised by the 1.954 Geneva
agreements." It was US refusal
to accept the .1.954 Geneva
accords, and their provisions
for a peaceful Vietnamese
reunification that led to the
foundation of SEATO, Thai-
land's conversion into a US
beach-head, unremitting Ameri-
can pressure on Laos and Cam.
bodia, and the Vietnam war
itself.
Military action, however, con-
tinues to be much more impor-
tant than diplomatic words. The
intensive US bombing of Laos
and Cambodia has continued in
spite of the Vietnam ceasefire.
With more than 80,000 military'
personnel at air bases in Thai-
land and in naval squadrons off
the coast of Vietnam, the last
US troop withdrawals * from
Vietnam will not greatly
diminish President Nixon's
.ability to Intervene with bombs
and napalm whenever events In
Indo-China displease him.
There is clear rriegsege in
the continuing US arms ship,
ments to Indo-China and Thai-
land, President Nixon's pre-
truce bombings of Hanoi, his
statement that the US will con-
tinue . to recognise only Presi-
dent ' Thieu, : Vice-President
?Agnew's South-east Asia mis-
sion, and continuing US mili-
tary activities in Laos and Cam-
bodia.
The Nixon Administration,
for the moment, is not so much
ending the -Indo-China conflict
as continuing it : by other
means. 'The easiest targets for
the President to keep hitting
are Communist supply routes
and sanctuaries in Laos and
Cambodia, where the Paris
accords oblige neither side to
end its military operations
immediately.
Laos's and Cambodia's prob- '
lems are the products of tradi-
tional Thai-Vietnamese
rivalries, which have been
greatly deepened by 17 years of
direct US intervention. The
present military divisions in
both countries roughly corres-
pond to the old Thai-Viet-
namese spheres of influence..
Even without American
involvement, both small coun-
tries would have severe prob-
lems with their two large
neighbours.
Traditional Thai and Vietna-
mese intervention, of course, is
distasteful in Phnom Penh and
Vientiane under any circum-
stances. But both past history
and the-present situation make,
an important point for the
future : both Laos and Cam-I'
bodia lack the ability to be neu,
trai without great restraint op
the part of Thailand and Vicfi-
nam.
Such restraint is i'mpossi.ir]te
so long as each side's sense of
Insecurity is continuou ,ly
inflamed by chronic US inter-.
vention. Communist Vie,trtrm
cannot refrain from using its
two neighbours' territory so
long as the US maintains ;'the
Thieu regime in South -" iet.
111101, Thitlliihti i4 t@itlfilillt t 1.0
leave the US shiitlow so for g r,s
Indo-China Is the theatre of
full-s7 ale war.
Is here any way to break the
circl(,a. ? The initiative, for the
foreseeable future, will lie with
an ;America that has never
understood the, inherently
disir'uptive effects of its efforts
a
to ii_~ontrol Tnd'o-China. Bit the,
continuing Thai emphasis in US
strt.itegic thinking has not only
vastly exaggerated' North Viet-t
nalm's intentions and abilities,
it has a I s o amounted. to a
s ;loos underestimation of;
7 hailand's own abil!idaes to fend
for itself.
With a* population of about
,'37 million, Thailand is nearly
as populous as both Vietnams.
combined. It is the moat geo-
graphically, ethnically and poli-'
tically united nation in South-
east Asia, and one of the,
richest, It has, not had a civil.
war or been :sifccessfully invaded
since the eighteentli century.
But following Thailand's.
alliance with Japan during the
Second World War, Thailand
found itself isolated. Subse?
quent US links provided it with
psychological, . financial, . and
military support. Twenty-five
years as America's most loyal
ally, however,.. have severely
limited Thailand': horizons, and
isolated it. in new ways. .
Recently, Thai officials have
suggested that following an
Indo-China settlement US
troops will be withdrawn and
that Thailand will follow a nen-'
tralist policy. Such plans for
the future, however, do nort'
solve present problems.
Thailand has hesitated raven
to est'.abtish diplomatic relations
with China. It is committed to
letting the Nixon AdminCstra-
tion use its territory for acts
of war indefinitely, and,. its'
ruling generals would lose the
raison d'etre Of their r' game if
Thailand's policies substantially
changed.
A. reunited Vietnam, and a
h"11"lifi IfIl0lia}ifi0.Ht fff,
merica could probably arrive
at working arrangements that
would free Laos and Cambodia
to pick their ways out of the
rubble of other people's wars...
But with the political strug
,ele in Vietnam unresolved and
Thailand willing to let itself. be
used indefinitely for US. inter-,
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'vention in Indo-China, the
chances for stable ' relations
among all four countries
remain minimal. The American
refusal to accept the provisions
of the 19:54. Geneva Convention
meant a generation of bad
blood between Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, and Thailand.
that the Nixon Administration's
efforts to prevent: a " peace
with honour" from turning
into a Communist success in
Vietnam may mean another,
generation of war. And, this
time, it may not be so easy for
\Thailand to avoid an extension
of Indo-China's turmoil over its
own borders.:.
The old maxim in Laos and.
Cambodia has 'always been that,
no peace there is possible until
a Vietnam settlement occurs.
But an even older maxim states they want.
that war is a test of wills.
Neither North Vietnam nor - The Paris accords' failure to
America abandoned their hopes provide a political settlement
of achieving antithetical for Vietnam, like the` similar
futures for South Vietnam i
when they signed the Paris ? inability, of the 1954 treaty, in
ceasefire. And both - through time may be the much. more
America's bases, in Thailand, important fact than' the
and North Vietnam's bases in ceasefire bobh ,were able to
Lac's and Cambodia - retain arrange.
the ability to fight for what
WASHINGTON POST
15 February, 1973
T he' `Post-Vietnam' Period Begins
T6 watch the first prisoners arriving at Clark Field gave
most Americans, we are sure, not only personal joy but
the best kind of` evidence that for this country at least,
the war is coming to an end. This is a feeling shared by
President Nixon, who rather gratuitously chose to take
the returned men's salute to their commander-in-chief as
vindication of his goal of. a "peace with honor," and by
those who realize that most of the returning Americans
are professional military men whose particular mission,
the bombing, was among the most controversial of the
war.
The evident vigor and cheer of most men in the first
contingents released by. Hanoi and the Vietcong were
cause for particular satisfaction, since many Americans
had probably feared 'Mr. Nixon was right when he said
in 1971 that the North Vietnamese "without question have
been the most barbaric in the handling of prisoners of
any nation in history." Homecoming Is sure to be an ardu-
ous psychological process. But If the Americans due to be
freed in forthcoming prisoner exchanges are in the same
apparently good physical condition, then that will be a
boon. As the North Vietnamese certainly have calculated,
'it will also bring them a politically useful measure of
goodwill. The contrast of the smiling released Americans
and the grim and gaunt Communist prisoners released by
Saigon, could not be more sobering.
The prisoners' return is, of course, only one aspect, an
especially poignant one, of a range of "post-Vietnam"
issues likely now to move toward the fore of American
public life. Among these,are the situation of Vietnam
,veterans in general, the place of young men who chose
to leave the country or otherwise avoid military service-
or to desert after they were in uniform rather-than serve
in Vietnam; and the separate but in a sense politically
equal question of furnishing reconstruction aid to Indo.
china,. including North and South Vietnam.
Vietnam veterans, especially the physically and psycho-
,logically wounded, w6uld seem to command universal
sympathy. Too many signs already indicate, however, that
the same general attitude which led a disproportionate
number of poor, less educated and black Americans to
be sent to fight and die in Vietnam is affecting treatment
of the survivors at home. Incredibly, for instance, even
.as we prepared to celebrate the return of the POWs, the
administration was proposing to reduce federal benefits
for Vietnam amputees., Under congressional pressure,
that plan has now been recalled by the White House.
The proposal should be discarded permanently. It is hard
to Imagine a more damaging and disrespectful gesture,
toward our Vietnam veterans.
The amnesty Issue is recognized as compelling by many
Americans-those who respect the motives of young men
who in conscience avoided military service and those
whose prime concern Is to close the domestic divisions
opened by the war. President Nixon, to be sure, has
spoken. forcefully for those who believe that a respect for
authority, and a respect for the men who accepted service
and risked or lost their lives, rule out a policy of forgive-
ness. We intend to elaborate our own views on this Issue
on another occasion. For now, we would merely note that
this is an issue peculiarly vulnerable to the atmosphere
in which it is discussed. That atmosphere can hardly fail
to soften as the cease-fire takes firmer hold and prisoners
come home and veterans 'receive the care they deserve.
Those who sympathize for the men who did not fight have
practical political grounds as well as sound mor 4 com-
pulsion for helping see to it that the men who did fight
and return now fare well.
Reconstruction aid to Indochina may become the most
tortured issue of them all. The President has promised
substantial funds but by his failure to ask Congress for
the money he has called into question his own seriousness
on the matter and by his general combative posture
toward Congress he has compromised whatever aid ap-
peal he might eventually make. Within Congress, if it
ever gets to the question, a difficult alliance of con-
venience may be, forced upon legislators whose, main
Indochina interests are to sustain Saigon and help Hanoi
respectively. We regard Indochina reconstruction as im-
perative morally, essential politically for purposes of
domestic healing, and equally vital diplomatically as a
means of turning our involvement in Indochina into an
international responsibility.
It is scarcely too soon, as the prisoners begin to come
home, for the President to start developing a balanced,
fair and comprehensive program to deal with all the
interrelated problems arising out of our long and costly
entanglement in the Vietnam conflict.
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WASHINGTON POST
15 February, 1973
r.
Edwin 0. Reischauer.
The Two Vietnam. Pacts:
One Endangers ' the Other
ing mechanisms to enforce the cease-
Assessments of the Vietnam agree- fire, still may focus enough interna-
ment have varied greatly. Some see it tional attention on the combatants to
discourage blatant violations, at least
as a tremendous achievement of realis- for the crucial 60-day period.
tic statesmanship; to others it appears The other so-called agreement is
an obvious farce. Historical hindsight hardly simple,. straightforward, or
will probably show it to have been ? workable: The two "South Vietnamese
something of both. This is,because it Is parties" are to set up a National Coun-
not a single agreement but two very cil of National Reconcilation and Con-
cord, consisting of three equal seg-
different ones. ments (apparently unspecified neu-,
the one agreement is for the com- trals, who lack the military power base
plete withdrawal of American forces of the other two, are to be the third
from Vietnam and the return of Amer. segment). Operating on "the principle
of unanimity," this body is to achieve
its work of peaceful unification of
The writer, former antbassador
to Japan, it University Professor
at Harvard.
lean prisoners, both within a 60-day pe-
riod,. during which time the four par-
ticipating parties, as the agreement
calls them, observe a cease-fire ? in
place. This is all quite simple and
straightforward. It is also probably
achievable, because three of the par-
ties-the United States, Hanoi, and the
Vietcong-sincerely wish to see it
achieved, and the fourth, Saigon,
which is probably less happy about the
agreement, remains so dependent on
continuing material support from the
United States that it apparently has
felt constrained to go along.
Even then, it is no simple matter to
shift suddenly from years of warfare
to a cease-fire, especially when no
clear. military boundary separates the
combatants. The shooting may never
stop entirely. However, there seems to
be enough will on both sides to tune
the fighting down to a tolerable level,
and mechanisms have been created to
police the cease-fire, at least for a
while. A four-party Joint Military
Commission, operating only during the
60-day period, is to supervise the ex-
ecution of the agreement. An Interna-
tional Commission of Control and Su-
pervision, consisting of something over
1,000 men from. Canada, Hungary, In-
donesia and' . Poland; and an
"international conference," which is to
be convened within 30 days and is to
include China, the Soviet union,.
France, and, somewhat incongruously,
I the United Kingdom, while not provid-
South Vietnam within 90 days (a sig-
nificant variation from the 60-day
deadline for the other agreement) and
is to organize "free and democratic
general elections." All this is to be
achieved in a country that has never
had truly free and democratic elec-
tions, is made. up of people who have
no experience with or faith in elec-
tions, and is chaotically divided be-
tween two military-based regimes that
have fought each other fanatically for
years and still so hate each other that
they refused to sign a version of the
agreement that,named the other and i
on a more vaguely worded version in-
sisted on signing on different pages.
Saigon appears to have some chance
of surviving, but, if so, it would proba-
bly remain beleaguered, at least for
the foreseeable future. A slightly more
probable outcome might be the under-
mining of the Saigon regime and its
eventual takeover by Hanoi. The speed
of such a development, the degree of
the South's autonomy, if any, and the
manner 'of takeover-that is, whether
it would be primarily through subver-
sion or through military attack-are
all quite beyond prediction. Whatever
the outcome, however a divided or
unified Vietnam will probably cast a
heavy shadow across the independence
of Laos and Cambodia but is likely to
be so absorbed in its own problems as
to be little threat to Thailand or other
countries. Certainly It will not be con-
trolled by China or any other outside
power. And the useful American role
in the whole region will be, as it 'al-
ways should have been, not military in-
volvement, but sympathetic concern
and, where possible, economic and
technical aid.
Whether or not the two agreements
-the one on American military disen-
gagement and the so-called political
constitute "peace with honor" is a se-
mantic question that is not worth argu-
ing over. The important point is that
the first agreement is overwhelmingly
in American and world interests and,
in my judgment, is fortunately irrever-
sible. There is not much profit either
in discussing the historical might-have-
beens. One cannot but wonder, how-
ever, if this sort of American disentan-
glement from our Vietnam fiasco
could not have been achieved by sim-
pler, less Byzantine means a long time
ago. My own guess is that the essen-
tials - a standstill cease-fire maitr
tained long enough to permit Ameri-
can withdrawal and the return of our
prisoners, together with the safe ac-
ceptance of such a solution by both the
American public and the world in gen-
eral-could have been attained at least
two years earlier, if we had admitted
to ourselves the obvious fact that this
was indeed the only safe and possible'
outcome. But this is a bit of history,'
that can never be rerun.
The crucial question that remains is
whether we have endangered the wise
and essential first agreement by wrap-
ping it up with the unrealistic second
one. A cease-fire for the limited pur-
pose of the first agreement would have
been less susceptible to disruption
than the present more generalized
cease-fire, ostensibly for the purposes
of both agreements. The involvement
of our "honor" in the domestic peace
of the Indochinese states' may justify'
in some minds a thoroughly unwise
continued American military presence
in Thailand and runs some risk of
sucking us back into the military quag-
mire of Indochina. Our advocacy of
entirely unrealistic plans to. resolve
old and bitter disputes in Vietnam by
harmonious unanimity and elections
and our emphasis on "great power" in-
ternational conferences in settling the
affairs of Indochina can only confuse
the American public about Southeast
Asian realities and could lead to dan-'
gerous self-delusions on the part of the
administration. In short, while the gos-
samer of the second agreement may
seem to some a helpful cloak of '.
"honor," I am afraid that it is more
likely to prove an embarrassingly in- .
visible new suit of clothes for the em-
peror,
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WASHINGTON POST
6 February, 1973
The .Role 'of the French in Helping
A: N:. Spanel, founder of the Interna-
"tional. 'Playtex Corporation, has ex-
pressed views on national and i.nterna-
tionat issues for many years through
advertising. Many of these views were
reasonable and well argued. His latest
release, however, headlined "'The Ac.
tive Participation of Our Friends" (in
your issue of January 27, p. A-2),
claims, significant credit for the
French government in bringing about
the ceasefire in Vietnam, quoting
French Foreign Minister Schumann
that the French role in the negotiations
"could be qualified as essential" and
praising that role as "little short of a
miracle of diplomatic discretion."
Monsieur Spanel omits, though, many
relevant facts-most of which are pre-
sumably unknown to most American
newspaper readers. To judge France's
role in the Vietnam conflict, we ought
to remember that Vietnam (together
with Laos and Cambodia) was the
French colony of Indochina until ,World
War Two, controlling the education, le-
gal and civic status of several genera-
tions of Vietnamese. During the war,
the Japanese occupied Vietnam, without
signal resistance on the part of the
NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1973
ALSOP LOOKS BACK
ON CHINA STORIES
Columnist Sets Accuracy in
Reporting in 1950's
By DAVID K. SNIPLER
Np`cIa1 to The New York Tlmen
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31-To
a reader whose memory reach-
es back a decade or so, it might
have seemed as if Joseph Alsop
had done a sudden about-face
on the subject of Communist
China. '
Writing from Washington in
1959, the columnist had de-
scribed China's, agricultural
communes with adjectives such
as "fearful" and "hideous" and
"ruthless," concluding that In
pursuing their policy of
"forced labor," Chinese leaders
had "chosen to out-Stalin Stal-
in."
In December, 1972, beneath
the dateline "Fei Cheng Com-
mune, Yunnan Province," Mr.
Alsop wrote of the "prosper-
ous affairs" of a commune of
"comparative wealth." "Amid
the bougainvillea vines in the
lovely ct tlrtyard it was all
strangely sim~Ilar to a husinoas.
like discussion with the man-
agement of one of our large
American industrial farms."
Which is Alsop's Fable? Nei-
ther. says the 62-year-old, col-
umnist. He has not changed;
China has.
Everything Changed But People
".Everything in China has
to Secure a Ceasefire in Southeast Asia
French colonial authorities.
In 1945, after the Japanese troops
had beery forced to evacuate Vietnam,
De Gaulle, then President of France,
somehow induced the British and U.S.
governments to have their navies con-
voy French troops to the Far East to
restore French colonial rule in Viet-
nam-an attempt which ended disas-
trously at Dien Bien Phu. Most former
colonies gained independence since
1945 without having to fight wars
against their rulers- but Vietnam and
Algeria, France's ,two richest colonies,
had to battle the colonial power for
years, at the loss of many tens of thou-
sands of lives.
Spanel quotes several- statements by
Pompidou and Schumann, but omits
how these and other French leaders re-
peatedly denounced the U.S. conduct of
the war in Vietnam, bombing and min-
ing of the North etc., without criticiz-
ing a single time the Communists who
invaded the South with most of their
regular army, crossing either the
"demilitarized" zone or violating the
neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, thus ',
provoking U.S. retaliation.
Even in her modest role as' host to
the negotiations (a role which a dozen
,other places could 'have filled as well,
probably better) the. French govern-
ment leaned clearly to the Communist
side, permitting Communist, anti-U.S.'
and' anti-Saigon demonstrations, obvi-
ously designed to exert mob,pressure,,
on the negotiators. .
The role of France concerning Viet-
nam is therefore far from having con-
firmed "the deep friendship between.
the peoples of France and the United,
States," as Spanel asserts at the end of
his ad. But it cannot be based on falsi-
fication of the historic record. Perhaps
Monsieur Spanel could help to base
relations between our two countries. on
the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, by inducing the French .
government to publish all its classi-
fied documents related to . Vietnam,
from colonial days to the present?
(Could Dr. Ellsberg help?)
HENRY C. SUTTON.
Washington.
changed, in truth," he wrote) Even though China might ul-
from Nanking, "except the end- I become a formidable
lessly resilient, hard-working
and clever Chinese people. The
quality of life has changed, vast
ly ? for the worse for the an-
cient ruling class but ,for the
better for everyone else."
Joseph Alsop's month-long
journey through China last au-
tumn was a journey of per-
ceptions, and his flood of col-
umns from the mainland reflect-
ed much of the new warmth of
the revised American image of
Chint.
He described 'his trip as "the
most significant reportorial
work 'I have ever done," and
his columns, which are distribu-
ted to 250 newspapers, were full
of a sense of amazement and
admiration at what he called
"the new China." Thre produc-
tive commune, the efficient tool;
factory, the formerly squalid
city transformed by industry,!
-all were discussed in laudatory;
Spent 4 Years in China
Mr. Alsop spent four years
In China in the nineteen-forties
ardently backing Gen. Chiang
Kai-shek against the Commu-
nists and castigating American
officials whose support for the
Generalissimo seemed infirm.
After the Communists took
power, Mr. Alsop became known
as an exponent of the contain-
ment pulleyy and later an a
hawk on Vietnam.
Now, during an interview in
his Georgetown home, Mr. Al-
sop speaks of the evolution of
"a significant,, even a strong,
community of interests between
nuclear power, he said, "Given
the consequences of a successful
Soviet attack against China]
I'm convinced that if the danger
becomes much more serious, we
ought to do everything in our
power, which is limited, to
go to China's aid."
Would he have made such a
statement 15 years ago? "No,
because the situation hadn't
evolved, the Chinese Govern-
ment hadn't evolved, and we
were relatively vastly stronger.
And the Soviets wouldn't have
dared to do all the things you
would have to expect the So-
viets to do after a 'success in!
China. I would have said it
three years ago, four years ago
-two, certainly. One's always
a little slow in catching up
with things."
And what of his support for
Chiang? "That was -28 years
ago, and everybody in those
days believed that Communism
was a unitary phenomenon."
Furthermore, he said: "If the
other side had won in China, I
think the chances are that "Chi-'
na would appear more.prosper-1
ous than it does today . . . al-
though wealth would be less ev-
enly distributed, certainly."
Despite Mr, Alsop's first-
hand reporting of the current
China, he has no doubts about
the over.-all accuracy of the
second-hand renor'tinft wd@
necessary by the absence of
American journalists in China
during the nineteen-fifties and
sixties.
Only a Few Surprises
the United States and China Based on what he had known
from the ' moment the Soviet) from the outside, he said he
threat began to be serious.' was surprised by only a few
things. First, ."that the after-
-::ath of the second great con-
vulsion-the Cultural Revolu-
tion-was so relatively invis-
ible." .
"Then, given one's experience
of other Communist govern-
ments, you didn't expect it to
work quite so well," he said.
"Finally, there's just the plain
natural physical surprise. You
go to a province that literally
had no industry at all and
find it bulging with industry."
?Mr. Alsop said 'in one column
that he kept "thinking'nervously
,of all the woolly minded West-
erners who made such fools
,of themselves in Russia in the
cruel thirties," and he said in
an interview, speaking of the
Chinese system, "I may think it
works better than it does work."
But he added that the Chinese
did not seem eager to hide any-
thing. "They seemed awfully
pleased to show me what they'd
done."
38
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NEW YORK TIMES
1 February 1973
Vietnam:. A Soviet View
pretensions it produced for playing the
role of world policeman have come
up against the reality of the national
a month ago stressed that "if the two
countries-the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.-
really follow the course charted jointly
during the Moscow negotiations, then,
we think, new substantial steps devel-
oping Soviet-American relations for the
benefit of the peoples of the two
countries and for universal peace may.,
become possible during further cone
tacts. However-and this should be
emphatically stressed-much will de
pend on the course of events in the.'
immediate future, and, ' in particular,
on the turn in the question of ending
the war in Vietnam."
By linking these words with the
signing of the agreement on ending
the war, it is not hard to find the
clue to how this is to influence fur-
ther prospects for development of So-
viet-American relations. Of course, the
work of restoring peace in Vietnam
is only begun. The implementation of
a just peace will depend to,a large. ,
extent on how unswervingly and con-
sistently this agreement is put into
practice by the parties.
The Soviet public is not going to '
'relax its vigilance against intrigues of
reactionary forces and those unable.'
to break away from the grip of the
old illusions. We have always sided,
with the Vietnamese brothers and
friends in days of severe military tri.,
als. We will remain loyal to our duty
MOSCOW-The agreement on end- , liberation movement that steeled itself
ing the war which opens the way to in the course of decades of struggle
restoration of peace in Vietnam and against French colonial rule, the Jap-
.the whole of Indochina has been re- anese occupation and other invasions
ceivcd in the Soviet Union, as in the and encroachments.
world, with great satisfaction. The vicissitudes of the war have
A war is being extinguished whose ? graphically shown how any escalation
flames constantly threatened to spread of the American war effort inevitably
to other areas with ensuing noncon- doomed its sponsors to further moral
trollable consequences. The right of and political defeats in the eyes ,of
the Vietnamese people to determine the rest of the world. And, conversely,
their own destiny, without interfer- every new step along the road of
once from outside, is triumphing. political realism took America nearer
Expressing respect and admiration 'to honorable withdrawal from the war.
for the stanchness of the forces of the That is why, I think, all the Ameri-
Vietnam National Liberation Front and ? cans who considered it the wrong war
of the people of the Democratic Re- at the wrong time and for the wrong
,,public of Vietnam in rebuffing the cause and who persistently sought the
foreign intervention, we also note the way out along nonmilitary lines have
'important role of International soli- every reason to tell themselves now
darity in 'the struggle of the patriots . that this is their victory, too.
of Vietnam for the just cause. The war has had Its effect on So-
Millions of words have been written viet-American relations. The greater
about this war. There is no doubt that has been a turn in America from the
in the future, too, historians will de- illusions of a policy of strength to
rive ever new material for the assess- recognition of the political realities,
ment of what has happened. the wider have opened goodwill sluices
Today, however, I would like to ex- in search of more fruitful relations on
press my observation only on one ? the basis of the principles of peaceful
salient feature of this war. It has been coexistence. ,
an unusual war in the sense that it it will be recalled that the General
has not been a war of one nation Secretary of the Communist Party of
against another. It has been a war the Soviet Union, Central Committee,
between illusion and reality. The illu- Leonid Brezhnev, somewhat more than
sion of world domination. and the
y WASHINGTON POST
9 February, 1973
Joseph 'Alsop
in days of peaceful restoration. ;
Spartak Bcglov is political commenta-' ,
(Food Ceasefire Sigi*...,
.ON THE SURFACE, the signs in Viet-
nam are far better than you might snp-
pose from the reports from the scene.
Two ironically comic stories and a statis-
tic offer proof enough of this.
The North Vietnamese' and Vietcong
.groups that went from Paris to Saigon
made. an odd request. of the pilot of
.their special plane when they left Bang-
.Ninh, on the South Vietnamese border.
Nothing loath, the pilot took them
in low oveP ' Tay Ninh. The ` shock and
disappointment of those who looked
out.. the Bi'plane's windows were far
too strong to ' be concealed, 'The. pas.
sengers ft'nm Marls lead, of eourao,
been told that Tay Ninh, a minor pro-,
vincial?capital, had already been seized
by the North Vietnamese to serve as
a "popular uprising," as the V.C. call
the population. 'roe famous - icoparu
spots" are pretty desolate, in short, and
the ceasefire-round of the struggle has..
'been won by the government in Saigon. i
IT IS NOT'th'e last round, however.,
The intelligence suggests that all the
North Vietnamese units now in Card=.`bodia may be thrown into the III Corps
it-but the wrong kind of popular up- area of Sounth Vietnam to mount a mas-
rising, in which the people joined furl- sive'attack in a matter of two or three
ously in their town's defense against the,, months.
North Vietnamese. The, failure to take 'Again, infiltration clown the Ho, Chii
Tay Ninh must at least have been Minh Trail has apparently ended: but
known to the Vietcong "military repre- a massive supply movement is still go-'%
sentative," North Vietnamese Lt. Gen. lag on. Furthermore, most of the North'?,
Tran Van Tra, when he later headed Vietnamese armed force has been trans'
for Saigon. Yet he'asked to see Tay ' ferred Into the southern Laos panhan.
Ninh, too. " die, In a part of the Ian Chi Minh Trail I
The American chopper that, picked from which the II Corps area of South
him up in the jungle circled low and Vietnam can be easily attacked. All,
nient was bitter and obvious. NVA violations of the ceasefire agreement,
lying to higher headquarters has long, If this Is the intention, the accord ob-
tii?a had told their general they still Hehr' A , J ttikln t r is to be treated by
held Tay Ninh's suburbs. Infitea(d they Hanoi like the accord obtained by Ptt3pl,
were at least 10 miles away in deep dent Kennedy and Gov. Avcriil Ilarri-
jungle. man in 1962-ns a scrap of paper to bo
As to the statistic, it has been loudly torn up and tossed away-ns soon as con
announced from Saigon that the V.C. venleut. Rut the President, is not, ready,
"government. But there is was, with and North Vietnamese still hold 34 per to ho through the kind of charade the
South Vietnamese government flags cent of :South Vietnam's land area. Th`i U .; f nvcrnment went tlu ou h in ion
flying at almost every house. snore important fact is that they r rv In 1962, a handful of North. Viet,
One reason Tay Ninh was,saved was control barely more than 5 per cent of a bt bt t.a oously parading
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past a , checkpoint, were accepted as
"proof" that Hanoi was keeping,. the
promise to Gov. Harriman to withdraw
utterly from Laos. Now, President Nix-
on is grimly determined to accept noth-
ing less than literal compliance with
every promise embodied in the cease-
fire agreement. That is the real object
of Dr. Kissinger's journey to Hanoi, and
it is also an important object of his trip
to Peking.
THIS WILL PRESENT Hanoi with
an acutely painful choice: The key
clause in the ceasefire agreement is the
BALTIMORE SUN
9 FEBRUARY 1973
'Manila curbs `excess'
U.S. way calla
4 slow bungling'
By THOMAS PEPPER
Sun Staff Correspondcut.
Manila-Gen. Carlos P.
Romulo, the Philippine sec-
retary of foreign affairs and
a former ambassador to the
United States and the United
Nations, said yesterday that
Western-style democracy is
not well suited to developing
countries.
Defending his govern-
ment's imposition of martial
law and the decision of Phil-
ippine political leaders to re-
place the American-inspired
Constitution of 1935, General
il:-,:min said that when West-
ern-style democracy was im-
planted in various developing
societies, "the result was ex-
cessive freedom."
This was particularly true
in the Philippines, he said.
"While democracy may be
the best 'form of govern-
ment,"General Romulo said,
i "it is slow, bungling and
inefficient. An advanced so-
ciety like the U.S. can be
slow, humbling and ineffi-
cient, and still continue to
forge ahead."
But, he continued, "in this
day and age, a developing
society has to develop fast.
It cannot afford to bungle.
Among people who never
know where their next meal
is coming from, free speech
is a remote ideal, and cer-
tainly less important than
finding a means for bare
.survival."
General Romulo, who has
been called by his military
rank ever since he served as
an aide to the late Gen.
Douglas MacArthur in the
World War II Philippine-
American command, said he
came to this view of democ-
racy about two years ago,
largely as a result of trips to I
South Korea, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore and Indonesia.
Those countries, he said,
have what he called a "mod-
ified democracy," and each
of them "is forging ahead
much farther and faster than
'we.
"I felt," he said, "that,
there was something wrong
in our trying to make a
carbon copy of American de;,
mocracy here."
General Romulo spoke in
his somewhat faded office in
.a classically designed build-
ing once used by the prewar'
American colonial ' adminis-
tration.
In a reference to the old
constitution and to the coun- ?
On the other s!de of the balance,;;
there is the prospect of none of the
American aid for reconstruction that the
North Vietnamese leaders have been
loudly boasting about. There is also the
prospect of possible pressure from
China, for the Chinese more and more '?
seem to lean toward insisting that Hanoi
keep the promises already made. There
is even the prospect that President Nix.'
on may once again prove to be cruelly
unpredictable. So the betting Is even,
either way. .
try's slam-bang, circus-style,
politics, General Romulo
said the Philippines "had the
skeleton of democracy, but
not its flesh and blood.
"Politics," he said, 'be-
came an industry here. The.
politicians . began to think
they' were the rulers. They,
each had bodyguards, and
we were starting to have, as
Chhina had, warlords, each
with an army. This was a
replica of the American
West, the frontier days."
Part of the trend toward
bodyguards and private ar-
mies came, he said, from a
decline in respect. for law
during the wartime Japanese
occupation.
"Our. youth then were {
taught to cheat, lie, and kill
in order. to survive.. It's not
easy to shake. off this moral
tone. Those kids then, some
of them are our leaders
now."
A former journalist and
university president, General
Romulo was a longtime ad-
vocate of Westernization for'
Asia. He was one of the
original signers of the United
Nations Charter,' and the
first Asian to become presi-
dent of the U.N. General
Assembly. In 1947, he was
chairman of a U.N.-spon-
sored Conference on Free-
dom 'of Information and of
his past record, he said:
"I have no regrets. I will
still fight for freedom of
speech and civil liberties.
However, we must tinder-
stand there are priorities in
every country. We [in the
Philippines] have tried to ig-
nore the priorities that a
developing society should im-
pose on its people."
"What we have needed
hem," he Acid In conclusion,
"is national discipline-the
sane discipline that. De
Gaulle instilled in the French
pen, lc."
one covering Cambodia and Laos, from
which all "foreign troops"-including
North Vietnamese-are to be with-
drawn. For the North Vietnamese, that
means no Cambodian bases; no Laotian
babes; above all, no enormous, manpow-
er-consuming supply system in Laos to
keep the. Ho Chi. Minh Trail' in opera-
tion. Without these crucial assets, and
with the VC-NVA only controlling 5
per cent plus of the South Vietnamese
population, Hanoi cannot conceivably
sustain 'a serious struggle In South Viet-
nam. .
tr 1973. Lon Angeles Times
NEW YORK TIMES
5 February 1973
;Pope Says Vietnam Truce
Is Ambiguous and Violated
ROME, Feb. 4 (Reuters) -j
Pope Paul VI said today that
the Vietnam cease-fire was full
of violations and stressed the
need for justice, brotherhood
and universal peace.
The Pope, addressing people
gathered in St. Peter's Square
for his Sunday blessing, added:
"Enough with war and guer-
rilla warfare."
Pope Paul said It was neces-
sary rather to see how the
datrlage to Vietnam could be
repaired, and he reminded Ital-
ians they could help by giving
money during special coffee',
tions for Vietnam in Italian
Catholic churches today.
The Pope lamented what he
said was increasing "violence,
delinquency, selfish social strug
gle and tolerated outrage tol
honest custom" in society,. ;
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SOVIET NEVIS., London
23 January 1973
Published by the Press Dept.
of the Soviet Embassy
'" U, l,? cr"Ju 1) LJ Li
ING
AN ~ - ~0, V~
\71CTO1i SiflS1?ii;LYAKlN, who defected.to. the West eight years ago, barbed wire."
'
has returned to the Soviet Union
itterly disillusioned find lusts
described in Sovietskaya Rossia his. relations with the United States
Central Intelligence Agency and
the anti-Soviet People's Labour concern manufacturing trucks for the
army.
'Union (NTS) organisation which The. work was'hcavy, and the living
operates from West Germany. conditions, sharing a room in a hostel, ,
Ile gives a detailed account of his both bad and expensive.
experiences and supplies the names Ile left the job -- and found li?im-
of the CIA agents(nnd? NTS o0'icials self on the street. The CIA, was
with Whom he became involved. not interested.
Ile describes the close links be- ' In the 'meantime he had met the-
twcen the CIA; the NTS' And the '. family of one of the NTS leaders,
anti-Soviet radio station " Radio, V. Goraclick, the publisher of Posev,
Liberty." and he asked for help from the NTS.
Ile not only makes It clear that They saw him as a source of Infor-
the NTS draws Its Income from the matron which could be processed to
,CIA, but describes how tile. staff of make. It suitable for anti-Soviet
Posev,. the NTS journal, comb the' purposes. '. , .. . .
Soviet press for criticisms and com- It was planned to concoct a book
plaints from readers and dress these about Shishelyakin's life in the USSR,
up as reports from secret " NTS presenting him as a "political pro-
agents " in the Soviet Union to tester" and a champion of "Russian
impress their CIA paymasters, democracy."
Shishelyakin's disillusionment with Ideas, actions and even words of
'his position as omigrd started early whiev he had no knowledge were
as soon as he arrived in Frankfurt attributed to him.
am-Main.
I;Ic was at once Installed, and held This opened his eyes the'
methods used. to concoct anti-Soviet
prisoner, In a CIA flat at 45 Mendels- material and the nature of the
sohnstrasse' evidence of "lack of democracy in
" In the room were a small table, the USSR."
two chairs, a bed and a sideboard lie tells of a meeting of Russian
with dishes. In the corner was a tele- dmigres, at which the hit of the
vision set and a radio. American evening was a certain Yevgeny? E,
newspapers and, magazines lay on the whom NTS agents had persuaded to
table. ' "flee" to ' the West.
"I was left alone, and the door was This Yevgeny E has since returned
locked from the outside," he says. to the Soviet Union, but at that time
he was In the hands of the NTS
YntiCrrO~"ati011 'leaders and was being used for their'
For weeks he was ? questioned, propaganda,
cross-examined and Interrogated, Prompted by them; he described
asked the same questions, over and popular uprisings " he had witnessed
over again, for details of his life,,
about all the people he had known in the Soviet Union.
In the Soviet Union, the crew of When Shishelyakin asked him after-
the ship on whfclt_he had sailed, the wards where lie had seep such,events,
names of the commanders of the Yevgeny E replied:, "One has to
Soviet For Eastern Flotilla and Its eat !
ships, details about the ports of Shishelyakin ;a] . so describes how
Vladivostok and Nakhodka, their Posev over a long period published
depth, their quays and how they material written by a certain Doris
Were guarded, Ycvdokimov, who presented himself
So the questioning went on. for to an NTS agent as a descendant of
dct'ails about Western Siberia, where one of the Scandinavinn royal
he had previously lived, of Industrial. families who was going to "trans-
enterprises and their output, of labor. form the Soviet system,"
atones and research institutes; ]?ils unbalanced ravings were
military units, schools, airfields, radio aecomnnnlAd by a bleak picture at
stations, rocket Inptallntfons - even th
it
ti
f
t
i
i
on
n
ua
et Un
on
.
e s
he Sov
'cfncmns and hospitals.
Long before the end of the qucs- This was what Interested the NTS
tiot~ing, the strt made him ill, he leaders, who required only' that the
slept badly and came out' In a rash. material should be strongly anti-
Soviet and should include an ample
When ' It finally came to an end. , isupply of such ckpressfon!: as "barred
h
These effusions were published
under the pseudonyms ? Sergei
Razumny and Ivan Ruslanqv,
The' NTS,..paid Ycvdokimov over a
thousand dollars for Kuzma and over
8,000, dollars for Variant of a ' Gas
Chamber. . ?
The latter, after being ." touched
up," was broadcast In instalments by
Radio Liberty.",
To the CIA; ? . the . NTS claimed
Ycvdokimov as a genuine Russian
inlulIettuol find a writer, ills name
was also on time NTS-list of secret
agents in the USSR.
So, too,'were the names of two old
women who were relations of Ycvdn
kimov. One of them was so weak
'that she could not leave her bed,
but she-. had a code-name and was
on the NTS pay list.
There was a great scandal when
this eras ? exposed and the CIA
threatened to stop. financing the NTS.
There was never any doubt that
the , CIA. 'paid NTS salaries and
financed Posev.
A few years ago, when the Posev
printing works were being re-
equipped, the NTS leaders spread
the tale that'tfic new ~ptess was paid
for by gifts and r loans from NTS
members,
When Shishelyakin asked who had
contributed, he got' the answer ;
"Don't ask naive questions,. We
got the money from the Americans,
but keep quiet about it." /
-Espiona e
Shishelyakin gives the names of
the "booksellers" in Munich and
France %pho are responsible for dis-
patching NTS material to France,
jnd Finland, from
Italy, Austria
where it is taken'~into the USSR.
NTS agents are also instructed by
the CIA to present such " literature "
to members of Soviet, delegations and
Soviet citizens abroad, More often
than note however, the pamphlets are
dumped "in dustbins, and the claim
is made that they have been
distributed." '
The NTS, of course, does more
th'ah engage In anti-Soviet propa-
ganda. It also takes part in ?subvcr-
sive and espionage activities.
It ortAliia@a provocations against
Soviet dainKatimill abroad, 'J'hia is
done by.."the closed' seetion!r `yfio
Nr$?reconlimends' Its people as guides
and, interpreters I for Soviet delega-
tions.. '
.'It is 'also' act,iOc among students.
of Russian In Western countries and
o Cif} got him ? jotr with U .
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WASHINGFON STAR
6 February 1973
seeks to recruit likely individuals to
carry out subversive acts during visits.
to the USSR.
There is also . the "German-
Russian Society ". In- Frankfurt-am
Main, which is, strongly' anti-Soviet.,
The NTS maintains contacts with it
and seeks recruits among the younger
members.
In conclusion, - Shishelyakin says
that the NTS leaders are increasingly
losing credibility even among their
own rank and file.
NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1973
111HUNGARIANS HOPE
TO REGAIN GROWN
My RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Specint to The New York Times
BUDAPEST, Feb. 9 - More
'.than 28 years ago, as artillery
of the advancing Soviet Army
rumbled in the distance, a spe-
cial train left Budapest for
the Austrian border.
Aboat'd was an. old black
cask that required three keys
to open. Inside was the golden
Crown of St. Stephen, the sym-
bol of Hungarian sovereignty
"since it was presented to
Stephen nearly 1,000 years ago
by Pope Sylvester H.
r. The crown fell into the hands
of American troops near Salz-
burg, Austria, in the spring of
1945,' ahd ever since has
been an issue of contention
between Hungary and the
United States.
There is expectation In Bud-
apest that this may be the year
Hungary recovers the Crown of
St. Stephen.
Relations Improve
The condition imposed by
-the United States for return of
the crown has been a substan-
tial Improvement in relations,
and in the last year this ap-
ppears to have been largely met.
Last July Secretary of State
William P. Rogers visited Duda-
pest and Peter Valyi, .a Hun-
garian Deputy Premier, is sched-
uled to visit Washington.
During the cold war and
Hungary's imprisonment of Jo-
zsef Cardinal Mindszenty, return
of the 'crown was politically
Inconceivable. it was also be-
yond discussion when Cardinal
Mindszenty was in asylum in
the United States Embassy from
1956 until 1971.
The Cardinal has opposed
any move to return the crown'
while Hungary is under Com-
munist rule. He is reported to
have proposed that it'be sent
to the Vatican. - '
A year. ago President Nixon'
reportedly sent' a message Jo
Cardinal Mindszenty saying
that the United States would
safeguard the crown "for the
time being." Some European
diplomats here are convinced
that the Valyi visit will be fol'.
lowed by an announcement on
Its return.
Hungarian ~ officials, who
talked freely before, now re-
fuse to discuss the crown. Re-
quests for ineetiugs with For
eign Ministry' officials were
.turned aside w1tb explanations
WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP
For most of the 1960s, the
Russians appeared to be play-
ing a game of catch-up with
the United States in the field
of strategic nuclear weapons.
And where they were not ob-
viously trying to match Amer-
ican weapons, they were
doing things that didn't make
much sense to experts at .the
Pentagon.
Now, the Soviet Union is not
only moving out on initiatives
of its own but doing things -
especially in its undersea
strategic force - that make
excellent sense' to U.S. ex-
perts.
Responding to the first Sovi-
et Sputnik and the false mis-
sile gap scare of 1960, the
United States moved very
rapidly in the early years of
the decade. It developed and
deployed a sophisticated land-
based-missile, developed and
deployed a fleet of invulnera-
ble missile-carrying subma-
rines and began to upgrade
both of these weapons sys-
tems.
It
It was not until near the end
of the 1960s that the Soviet
Union began to match these
American developments. In
some cases, the Soviet weap-
ons were pretty close to car-
bon copies of those of the
United States. This was par-
ticularly true with the Yankee
class submarine which is very
much like the early model
Polaris subs.
In other cases, the Soviets
went off on what still appear
to many U.S. experts to be
expensive tangents. The most
notable example was the de-
that there were more important
issues between Hungary and
the United States,
One such Issue is Hungary's
desire to obtain most-favored-
nation tariff privileges for her
exports.
"The crown is important to
Hungary," a Foreign Ministry
official said, "but there is noth-
. ing further Hungary need do.
The next move is up to the
United States."
The crown of St. Stephen
acquired a mystic aura of
Hungarian identity over the
centuries. It was used for
coronations, last in 1916 when
Charles was crowned emperor
of Austria-Hungary. According
to an old saying, "he who holds
the crown rules Hungary."
Palace Search in Vain
This symbolism was one rea-
son for the annoyance of the
;Communist leadership that the
crown was being held in the
:United States, , reportedly at
'By ORR KELLY
velopment of the fractional
orbital bombardment system
or FOBS. American scientists
considered-and rejected--
the development of such a
system a. decade ago and it is
still not clear why the Rus-
sians thought it worth the
enormous expense to develop.
and deploy such a weapon.
In an entirely new category
is what the United States calls
the Delta class submarine. It
is quite different from any-
thing in the U.S. arsenal -
and it makes excellent sense
to U.S. experts.
*
The Delta is similar to the
Yankee class submarine. But
it carries 12 missiles instead
of 16. The extra space-provid-
ed by removal of four missile
tubes makes it possible for the
Delta to carry a much longer
missile - with a range of
something like 4,500 miles
compared to about 1,300 for
the missile carried by the
Yankee class. '
This means the Delta class
subs can be on station, their
missiles aimed at targets in
the United States, without
passing through the gap be-
tween Iceland and the Faeroe
Islands into the main body of
the North Atlantic.
. The Delta class sub thus
has some of the advantages
.the United States hopes to
achieve with its Trident sub-
marines, the first of which
will not be ready until 1978.
Moreover, the Russians are
probably getting these advan-
tages at a substantially lower
price than the 'United States.,
The Delta is being built in the
same yards as the Yankee
and appears to be a natural
follow-on design, talking full
advantage of the skills
learned by those who built the
Yankees.
In contrast to what appears
to be a smooth transition in
the Soviet yards from the
Yankee to the Delta, the con-
struction of the. Trident sub-
marines will be largely a
fresh start. Even though the
Trident will be superior, tech
nologicaily, to the Delta, it'
will probably also far surpass
it in cost.
The development of the Del-
ta did not come entirely as a
surprise to American experts.
For several years now, it has
'been known that a long-range
missile that would not fit into,
existing boats was under de-
velopment and it was as=
sunned that, at some point, we
would see the development of
a new submarine.
But when it did show up, it
did. so with startling speed. It
was not until last spring that
the United - States became
aware, from satellite photos,
that a 12-missile submarine
was being built. This was only
seven or eight months before
the first of the new subs put to
sea.
Pentagon experts fully ex-
pect that we will see more
such rapid,-significant techno-
logical developments ? by the
Soviet Union in,the next few
years and that some of them
will be true,' and disturbing,
surprises,.
Fort Knox, Ky.
In the first years immediate.
,ly following World War II, the
Hungarians, uncertain where
the crown was, dug through the
ruins of the royal palace over-
looking the Danube. Only later
did they learn it was in Ameri-
can hands.
f Children are led daily up
'stone steps inside the Neo-
'Gothic Matthias Cathedral to
,look at a reproduction, The
;tuides end every lecture with
the information that the orig
inal is in the United States,
As a group of schoolgirls lis
..tened to the lecture this week
`ft mldtll@=spell woman guard
left her electric heater and ap-
'Proached a visitor. "The ori-
ginal is in the 'United States,
you know," she said.
To a jgkinn remark that she
might be guarding the original
one of t.h"se clays. the woman
said in German, "Plea-f! be sol
kind."
- It2
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tE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY FEBRUARY 8, 1973
U.S. Executive Faces Trial in Hungary
By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON I virtually the upper limit in of Poultry Processing Enter-
snecial I 1,e New York zim~t Hungary. prises. Mr. Miklos was said to
BUDAPEST, Hungary, Feb. 7
-An American business repre-
sentative is expected to face a
court here early next month
accused of'running a flam-
boyant commercial operation
involving alleged bribery, gifts
of new cars, bank accounts
abroad for Hungarian accom-
plices, black-market currency
dealings and "violation of. of-
ficial secrets."
The American citizen, Dr.
Tibor Glaz, is. described: here
as the East European manager
of the Ralston Purina Company.
Dr. Glaz was arrested last
year. About 20 Hungarians
have been implicated in the
case. Two are said to have
committed suicide.
The indictment, as published,
would suggest that the affiar
is an epic in chicken-feed and
,pig-feed salesmanship. .
After months of what one
resident-,here called "embarras-
sed.silence,".the case came to
light when a Budapest weekly,
Hetfoi Hirek, printed an ac-
count of the indictment.
Hetfoi Hirek stressed that the
Hungarians facing trial were
"responsible officials" and that
some had salaries as high as
10,000 forints a month ($370),
political implications in the af-
fair. On the contrary, the long
silence seemed to reflect con-
cern about possible disruption
of a recent significant improve-
ment in relations between the
United States and Hungary.
According to the report on
the indictment, Dr. Glaz first
made an arrangement with Imr
Szilagyi, manager of the. Pig-
Fattening and Fodder-Mixing
Joint Enterprise of the Kon-
doros collective farm.
Car Received is Left
Under the arrangement, it
was said, Dr. Glaz was to pay
Mr. Szilagyi a commission of
30 cents a ton upon the signing
of a contract for 60,000 tons
of pig-feed nutritives, or a total
of $18,000, to be deposited In
a West German bank.
The police intervened, the
report continued, before the
arrangements were completed.
But Mr. Szilagyi was said to
have received 80,000 forints
($3,000) from a "motorcar mani
pulation" as well as money fro
a West German account during
a,toruist trip abroad.
Another Hungarian accused
in the case, Laszlo Miklos, was
a department head In the Trust
WASHINGTON POST
14 February, 1973
can novelist Erskine Caldwell
expressed indifference today
to the plight of Soviet novelist
Alexander ' Solzhenitsyn.
"There's no law requiring a
person to he a writer," he said.
"If he prefers to write as he
wishes to, then It's up to him
to take the .consequences,
that's all I can say", Caldwell
added. "He lives in a society
and a system of government
which makes certain require-
ments so he is subject to those
requirements."
'Only one of Solzhenitsyn's
books, "One Day in the Life of
Ivan Denisovich," has been
published ,here. He 'was ex-
pelled from the Soviet Writers
Union , In 1069 after other
works eritiesl of Soviet soolety
were published abroad. The
action denied.him the right to
earn a living here as an au-
thor.
have received $100 a month for
"promoting" the feed sold by
Dr. Glaz. Mr. Miklos also is
accused of having received an
automobile,as a gift and a West
German bank account.
More ominously, the . indict-
ment charged that Mr. Miklos
had drawn up for Dr. Glaz "an
accurate list of the collective
farms dealing with the process-
ing of poultry." - This, it ap-
pears, is the basis for the
charge of "violation of official
secrets."
A state farm director, Karoly
Mohacsi, was reported to have
received about $1,000 from Dr.
Glaz after a contract was
reached to buy pig feed and a
mixer.
"He could have earned more
-$15,000-from this deal, but
he was unmasked, "Hetfoi
Hirek said. "In this case, too,
the usual gift of an automobile
The account of the indict'
ment cited other. Hungarians
involved in the case and
charged that one employed as
a secretary, Gyula Rajos, had
been helping Dr: Glaz for years
in illegal sales of dollars.
ght
From Nowa Dispatches
MOSCOW, Feb. 13-Amerf- Asked if he would follow
the example of other Ameri-
can writers who have offered
to turn over ruble royalties to
Solzhenitsyn to help his finan-
cial situation, Caldwell
replied:
"I am willing to help writers
in distress. I don't know how
much he's in. I have no idea.
No one has suggested that I
do it so I have given it no
thought or consideration."
Caldwell, whose reputatiow
rests on , books like "Tobacco
Road" and "God's Little?
Acre",. depression-era novels
about 'the American South,
said some 10,000 rubles (about
$12,000) In royalties had accu-
mulated in his account here
since his last visit In 1963,
"i'm Ovbrlnlided with rubles
which I can't exchange and I
can't take out," he said.
Caldwell said this was his
fifth visit to the Soviet Union.
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WASHINGTON POST
9 February, 1973
;,BVFS Cover Is Blown;
Spy Chief Resianincr
By Bernard D. Nossiter
Wanhin,^.ton i'or,t Forci::n Service
LONDON, Feb. 8-M's four years In New York un-
cover has been blown. 1:11 1939 at an advertising
Britain's spy master turns agency. The next year, he
out. to be Sir John Ogilvy was a British vice consul in
Baltimore. He then moved
Rennie, a handsome, 59-year- back to New York and the
old Foreign Office official. British information services
His exposure is the result during the war.
of a' personal tragedy. Sir His official list of posts
John's son, Charles, 25, and brings him back to London
daughter-in - law Christine, for an undisclosed Foreign
23, were arrested last month Office job from 1946 to
and charged with possessing 1949; then "first secretary
heroin. (commercial)" at the British
Sir John's name and role embassy in Washington.
as head of M.I. 6 were well His sole posting in East-
known . to Fleet Street de-
fense and police reporters.
But-under a uniquely Brit-
ish system, their newspapers
voluntarily. refrained from
publishing this informaion.
The papers, however, had
Lbricfly reported the arrest
of an unnamed young cou-
ple on the drugs charge and
had identified the man sim-
ply as the soil of the 1M.1.6
chief. Stern, the German
weekly magazine, followed
up this clue and disclosed
Sir 'John's )tame in its issue
distribill.cd oil Wednesday.
That released the l3rit.ish
press from its obligation
and the story was reported
in this morning's London
newspapers.
Sir John either is about to
or already has resigned
from his post, which is offi-
cially described as "deputy
under secretary of state."
Some newspapers here
have suggested that Sir
John has spent most of his
professional life as a dry-as-
dust commercial diplomat
and was lately brought. into
119.1.6 because of. his admiuis-
t.rative skills. .Knowing per-
sons scoff at this. Indeed.
the bare facts of his life
available in the British
"Who's Who" suggest a back-
ground and series of cover
posts to delight Ian Fleming,
Graham Greene and Comp-
ton MacKenzie.
Sir John, an only son,. at-
tended Wellington College,
a "public" -that is private
---school in Berkshire. He
gtudled at Italllol Collet:;e,
Oxford, and then worked for
ern Europe was from 1951 to
1953, when he was first sec-
retary at the embassy in
Warsaw. This was followed
by "counsellor, Foreign Of-
fice" and "head of informa-
tion, research depart-
ment, Foreign Office." From
1960 to 1.963, his biography
simply says "Washington."
He was "on loan to Civil
Services Commission. during
1966." The biography does
not disclose when he be-
came deputy tinder secre-
Inry and hors of M.l.6, al-
Iltrrugh the holly I;xpre:,s
said he took over as "Al"
four years ago.
Sir John, who lives in the
fashionable Belgravia sec-
tion of London, apparently
was a painter of promise in
his youth. Fie exhibited at
the Royal Academy in 1930
and 1931 and the Paris
Salon in 11932. He still lists
painting as a hobby - along
with "electronics," a nice
suggestion of British irony.
Official sources tried to
discourage the ? drawing of
any connection between the
arrest of Charles and Sir
John's resignation, stressing
that the spy chief is only 11
months away from the nor-
mal retirement age of 60.
However, persons thor-
.oughly familiar with intelli-
:rr.nce procedures here said
;that the arrest of his son on
.i o serious a charge maxle it
jntpossible for Sir John to
:continue. "There is a Cae-
'sae s wif, doctrine, you
;laa(iia'r' . ta110 lcnowledgablo
nran said..
Ji'ou.r years ago,. Charles
was convicted of possession
of anari,ivana and fined $60,
but his father's career was
not affected by that inci-
dent.
Sir John's exposure and
departure are not expected
to have any' major repercus-
sions on M.I.6, Sir John was
too far up in the hierarchy,
too remote from actual oper-
atioins, to compromise any
British spies in the field.
Sir John will be or al-
ready has been replaced by
-another Foreign Office of-
ficial' whose different per-
sonality could affect the
:tone, but not the essential
'nature of the intelligence
:,gathering machine. Charae-
tcrisl.ically, it works from
on nondescript office building
.sot far from the US em-
bassy.
The fact. that M.I.6 is
um- the Foreign Office and
Js not a separate hureauc-
:racy is another major dif-
:ference from American prac-
tice. The British believe
that, krepin;; their Spies
under Foreign Oi'ficc. con-
trot helps prevent I.licnt
from straying off on courses
of their own and embarras-
sing the professional diplo-
mats.
The reaction in the intelli-
gence community to Sir
John's downfall was
summed up this way: "Hard
luck on the poor bastard-
what a twit of a son-T'd
like to kick him in the
crotch."
Sir John belongs to the
right; crltih. He has been
awarded the right decora-
tions.
From his picture pub-
lished in the Manchester
Guardian, he appears type-
cast for his role. He has a
distinguished, oval. face,
strong chin and aquiline
nose, and stares out from
under slightly hooded
brows.
The surfacing of Sir
John's name Illustrates the
curious and peculiarly
British ::ysfem of 1) (for 1)e-
fense) notices. 1?,ssentially,
44
this is a voluntary agree,
ment between media and
government that tries to
prevent the disclosure of
material seen as harmful to.
national security.
Its key figure is a retired
rear admiral, Kenneth Farn-
hill, secretary of the De-
fense, fense, Press and Broadcast-
ing Committee. Newspapers,'
fearful of breaching security
call Farnhill, who makes.
himself available around the"
clock, for an opinion. The
media need not follow his
advice. But, in an interview,
be said they have without,
fail. during at least his three i
months in the job and the
nearly two years of his pred-
ecessor.
His committee consists'of
four high-ranking civil serv-
ants and media representa-
tives-editors from national'
and provincial newspapers,
television executives and
representatives of news-
agencies.
Aflcr a D-nolicc flap two t
yc:ifs at;o, this group cotll-.
Tied 12 guidelines covering
weapons, military plans, in-
telligence and other sensi,
Live subjects. These guide-.t
lines are bound in a 25-.
page green book marked,
"confidential" and 900 cop-
ies are in the media's hands,
Why does Britain make a.
mystery of the head of M.I.
(3 as well as its counterintel-
ligence counterpart. M I. 5?.
Ata. Farnhill, himself a
former high-ranking intelli-
gence official in the Defense
Ministry, readily acknowl-
edged that the spy chiefs'
names are well known 'in
the Soviet Union and else-
But their anonymity is
preserved, to enable them.,
to live as normal and .pri-
vate a life as possible, spi;tt
ing them bodyguards, cranks
and other occupational haz- -
ards of an i0vill?iflud opy
chief.
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NEW YORK TIMES
9 February 1973
All Britain Learns a Top Spy `Secret'
By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times
LONDON,. Feb. 8-When
Charles Tatham Ogilvie Ren-
nie was remanded last week
to the Old Bailey on a charge
of possessing heroin, he re-
ceived a privilege that almost
no other adult Briton would
have enjoyed. The newspa-
pers did not print his name.
The reason was that Mr.
Rennie, who is 23 and who
works as an electrician in
West London, had been iden-
tified in the press as the son
of the head of Britain's for-
eign intelligence service, pop-
ularly known as M.I. 6. The'
British press is not permitted.
to, disclose the name of this
man-whose working title
"C," was transmuted to "M,"
for James Bond readers-nor
that of the head of counter-
intelligence, somtimes known
as M.I.5.
The ironies of the situa-
tion became, fully apparent
here yesterday. Stern, a West
German magazine, printed C's
name: ? Sir John Ogilvie Ren-
nie. The Government's Press
Security Committee decided
that there was no point in
maintaining the so-called_D
Notice-a notification to edi-
tors that a particular news
item could: violate the secur-
ity laws.
And so last night and this
morning the press displayed
the news about Sir John with
varying discretion--The Times
of London tucked it away in
a. tiny corner of page 2. The
Daily Telegraph front-paged
it, The Guardian printed a
large portrait.
It's No Secret
The oddity about all this
Is that Stern was not reveal-
ing anything that could he
called a secret when it used
Sir John's name. Everyone
with a serious professional
interest in such matters-
journalists, diplomats and ri-
val intelligence services -
knew it already.
Similarly, they knew the
name of his deputy, Maurice
Oldfield, 'a former military
intelligence officer who once.
served as embassy counselor
In Washington. Sir John has
announced his retirement and
Mr. Oldfield is mentioned as
a likely candidate to head
the organization, officially
known as the Soerot Intelil-
gence Service.
Why the British Insist that
such a commonly available
bit of information is a secret
puzzles foreigners and many
Britons. They note that the
identities and policies of the
heads of the American Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and
of many of its Western Eu-
ropean equivalents are wide-
ly discussed in the press in
each country.
British officials in charge
of explaining such things
were keeping their upper lips
very rigid today. "What is
the use of having a secret
service if you aren't going
to be secret about it?" was
the way one put it.
Chapman Pincher, who
writes on defense matters
for The Daily Express, de-
nounced today what he
termed "this absurd secret"
and argued that the identi-
ties of the heads of both
M.I.6 and. M.I.5 should be
public.
The present ' system; he
said, is due to the "the path-
ological preoccupation of
Whitehall with secrecy." In
addition, he wrote, it serves
to shield the heads of the
service when security scan-
dals-of which M.I.6 has
known several-blow up.
E. H. Cookridge, an author
who specializes in intelli-
gence topics and who is cur-
rently writing a book about
Sir Mansfield Cummings,
founder of the British secret
service's foreign operation,
said that it was Sir Mansfield
who began the tradition of
anonymity. '
Originally a naval officer,
Sir Mansfield, who died in
1923, insisted on being
known simply as "0," and
the initial has stuck.
Officials maintain . that
anonymity helps preserve
the private life of Britain's
intelligence chiefs. But the
to everybody in his club,
and is pointed out to guests,
is almost as venerable as
the service itself. Sir John's
club is Brooks's, but White's
is more traditional for M.I.
6 chiefs. '
Some Cozy Assumptions
The rather cozy class as-
sumptions that lie behind the
notion that what is all right
for members of White's or
Brook's to know is a security
breach when other readers of
The 'inns know about It
have tended to pervade M.I. 6
itself
Originally both the Secret
Intelligence Service and its
part, the Security Service,
were branches of Military In-
telligence. It is from that
time that the initials M.I. 6
and M.I. 5 under the Home
Office, though both retain a
Defense Ministry link.
The traditions of M.I. 6, as
put together by Sir Mansfield
and more or less continued
by his successors, have rested
largely on what has been
called brilliant amateurism.
One of the earliest British
spies was the poet Christo-
pher Marlowe, who inflitrated
British Roman Catholic exile
circles in the service of the
Duke of Guise in Rheims.
The literary tradition was
continued in modem times
not only by Ian Fleming but
by Graham Greene and Mal-
colm Muggeridge, who joined
the service during World War
Jr. The talent that wartime
could attract tended to drop
off in peace time, however,
and the improvisation often
remained, but without the
brilliance.
The combination of impro-
visation with the 'kind of
camaraderie that earned' for
M. I. 6 operatives the nick-
name "the Friends" - the
counterspies in M.I. 5, several
degrees down socially, were
regarded by M.I. 6 as crude
policemen and were called
"the Snoopers"-nearly des-
troyed the service in the nine-
teen fifties."
A Blow to Tradition
The exposure of Kim Philby,
a high M.I. 6 official, as the
"third man" in the Burgess-
Maclean affair was king' de-
layed because his colleagues
simply could not credit the
assertions of the Snoopers
that here was a spy in their
midst.
The appointment in the late
nineteen-fifties of Sir Dick
White, head of M.I. 5, as "C"
was a heavy blow to the tra-
dition of the secret service.
According to those who have
written on the subject, pro-
fessionalism was increased
and some free-swinging tend-
encies were curbed.
The appointment of._ Sir
John Rennie four years ago
was another move to bring
M.I. 6 into the normal chan-
nels of bureaucracy. Sir John,
a diplomat, was the first "C"
whd enmo from outside the
Intelligence community, and
his background made it pos-
sible for the Foreign Office
to exercise more control.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 February 1973
a9h U
expi
Prime Minister Palme blames war with Vietnam,
calls. for reconstruction `channeled through UN'
By Takashi Oka
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Stockholm
Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden
hopes for an "integrated international ef-
fort," channeled if possible through the
United. Nations, to aid the postwar recon-
struction. of North and South Vietnam. Swe-
den, he said in an interview here, would
"definitely" participate in such an effort. .
Outside the Prime Minister's office, fur-
nished in clean-lined Swedish modern, the
sky was gray, and rain drifted across the
window panes. Despite the unseasonal lack of
snow, It seemed a far cry from this handsome
northern city, capital of one of the world's
richest, most thoroughgoing welfare states,
to the red dirt, the beating sun, the palm-leaf
shelters, and black-trousered farmers of
Vietnam.
Yet Vietnam casts its long shadow across
Swedish relations with the United States.
"Few people are so pro-American as the
Swedes," Mr. Palme says. But since the
American military involvement in Vietnam
began, Stockholm's official ties with Wash-
ington have been as wintry as the chill winds
blowing in across the Baltic Sea from Russia.
What causes freeze
The freeze is not of their choice, Swedes of
many different shades of opinion say. Thorb-'
jorn Falldin - a rugged, blue-eyed farmer
from Harnosand in the north and leader of the
Center Party, principal opposition to Mr.
Palme's Social Democrats, characterizes
Vietnam as the only problem between the
United States and Sweden, and maintains
that while his countrymen want good rela-
tions with America, they feel they have the
right to say they cannot understand Amer-
ica's role in Vietnam.
Posters of grieving Vietnamese mothers
festoon Stockholm's' windows alongside entic-
ing displays of the latest gadgets of a
consumer society. Leftist' demonstrators
shouting fierce slogans march up to Parlia-
ment Square without disturbing youngsters
briskly selling buttoms opposing "leftist ex-
tremism" and showing a Swedish-American
handshake. "We've sold 300,000 of these
buttons," said Peter, a 'student in languages,
"and Sweden has a population of only 8
million."
Attitudes explained
Mr. Palme, who treats his enormous prime
ministerial office like a book-lined profes-
sor's study, and who flings himself into -a
chair to confront a visitor with the relish of a
tutor confident of instant rapport with his
students, explains Swedish attitudes on Viet-
nam as a compound of three major factors:
First, he says, comes the "human reaction
against the bombing and against the up-
rooting of a whole society."
Second is the feeling that the Vietnam war
represented the continuation of an old colo-
vial war, the Americans having taken over
for their own, global, anti-Communist pur.
poses, the war the French had been waging to
preserve their colonial empire.
Third, as a small, nonaliegned nation,
Sweden feels it was very much in its own
interest to assert Vietnam's right to indepen-
dence and self-determination free of super-
power intervention. Detente between the
superpowers was to be welcomed, but it. did
involve a certain danger for smaller coun-
tries in between - the danger that their
voices would be ignored.
Comparison defended
Asked if he did not think that his references
in a pre-Christmas broadcast comparing the
American bombing of Hanoi with Guernica,
Lidice, and other instances of mass slaughter
were not too strong, Mr. Palme replied:
"You must remember the circumstances. r
The bombing had been going on for nearly a
week. I had just received a telephoned report
from our embassy in Hanoi about the
destruction of the Bach Mai Hospital, to
which Sweden had contributed equipment
and medical supplies. The call came through
as clearly as someone talking in the next
room. So as I went on the air I was thinking of
burning patients, of terror-stricken chil-
dren."
Repercussions noted
Mr. Palme's broadcast comments caused
President Nixon to ask Stockholm not to send
a newly appointed ambassador to Washing-
ton, and to keep the American charge
d'afaires in Sweden, who had been home in
the United States on holiday, from returning
to his post. This situation still continues.
But the Paris peace agreement now opens
the possibility of a new period, both in
Vietnamese history and in that of Sweden's
relations with the United States. "Once this
frightful war is over, I have no fear for the
future of American-SWedisFt Eidtitfi6te," l