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January 30, 1973
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 Eastern Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . ..?age 41 Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 44 Near East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 47 Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 55 Western Hemisphere. . . . . . . . . . Page 58 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001U00O 5 WALL STREET JOURNAL 30 January 1973 Oil .Diplomrtacy Fuel Crisis May Force'. U.S. to Reduce.Troops,. Put Pressure on Israel U.S. and Allies May Compete Bitterly ` to 'Get Supplies; ..What Role for Russians? New Task for Mr. Kissinger By ROGERT KEATLEY 'Ziaff Reporter of Tire \VALT, STREET Joun%-AL WASHINGTON-When talk here. turns to the "energy crisis," it usually dwells on domestic aspects-the price of natural gas in Texas, or perhaps a law someday requiring Detroit to make smaller auto engines. But senior government officials realize In- creasingly that there's much more to be reck. oned with. They're beginning serious study of the energy problem's International implica. tions In hopes of fending off grave 'diplomatic, military and economic troubles. At worst,,eXpcrts fear that political disputes or a shooting war in the Middle East might The huge amounts of money that Arab nations will get from selling their oil could imperil the world monetary system and spur the U.S. to neru political activity in the At uleast. .This Is the second of live stor- ies examhrfng the situation. eventually sever America's fuel-supply lines. Interior Secretary Rogers Morton warns that an Interruption of the imported-oil flow for any reason "could cause great damage to our na-. tional economy and internal and external secu- illy." More Questions Than Answers To date, the policy review involves drafting questions more than compiling answers; Henry' Kissinger's staff has just started organizing tile, paperwork and soon will float it around the State Department, Pentagon, Central Intelli- gence Agency and other concerned agencies. But some of the topics are fairly obvious, and deeply worrisonne. They include': -Mideast policy. Some ruualysty see a grow. Ing contradiction between massi.%a U.S. aid to Israel and this country's increased need for Arab oil. So far the Arab governments have. been tmwilltng or unable to use their fuel ex- ports for political blackmail, but there's doubt about how long this restraint can last. Rather than risk having. supplies cut by another Arab- Yarnell war, the study may recommend stronger U.S. efforts to settle Mideast conflicts soon. Pushing terms that the Israelis may not like much strikes some officials as wiser than letting events drift. -Monetary dangers. This year fuel Imports will account for $2.5 billion of the U.S. pay- ments deficit; experts any the not cost fit 1080 will he nt bast $10 billion. Tits drain inane thrcftetlq the dollar's utabillty,?nntl there in on. niter ti't ubleaeme? lwrnslnvrt l+cskles. Midrlrr t oil-producin; nations' will accumulate vast sums that they can't spend internally. Thrso huge cash reserves if transferred erratically, could disrupt the international monetary sys- tent far more seriously than the 1971 crisis, which forcbd the dollar's devaluation. -Defense shifts. The need to pay dearly for foreign oil could well reduce American ability to keep military forces overseas, especially in Europe. Though troop cuts are considered de- sirable by many officials anyway, U.S. strate. gists worry that money shortages may force much deeper slashes than they or American al-. lies want. In addition, the Navy now claims it needs' extra billions for destroyers to protect growing tanker fleets. Skeptics say this is merely a ploy to justify big Naval budgets and fancy sea and shore berths for admirals, but the matter is getting serious study. -Relations with allies. America's best friends, the Western European nations and Japan, need Mideast oil even more than does the U.S.; they have no significant deposits of, their, own. An era of bitter competition, fraying alliances, could ensue as fuel-short industrial powers all bid for the same petroleum. -Relations with Russia. There's big talk. these days about buying fuel from the U.S.S.R.' But some officials warn that dependence on So- viet sources could give Moscow an upper hand. in relations with the West. (Others 'say the .sales will create mutual interest in continued political stability. So far there is no clear U.S. official view.) In addition, the Kremlin is trying to extend its Mideast influence, partly by purchase of Arab oil for Russia's own use or for reexport into hard-currency markets. U.S. officials doubt this trend serves either Western or Arab interests. "Wo Should Worry" Because energy problems havcri't seemed imminent, the subject has been shoved aside regularly by Washington's national security bu- reaucracy. Lately, though, growing awareness of fuel shortages has fostered new interest in 'the international complications ahead. Thus they stand high on 1Mr. Kissinger's list of things to cope with "after Vietnam." "Suddenly we've realized we should worry, about energy problems," says a Kissinger staf- ter who is helping organize the study. "We've been pondering which matters to stress over the next four years, and this is certainly one." In fact, energy will soon be the subject of a National Security Council study memorandum. This is Mr. Kissinger's device for farming problems out' to the bureaucracy for advice and information. The responses help form pol- icy alternatives that go to Preiident Nixon for decision. The impetus for action arises from the changing rclatiorp hip between petroleum buy. era and sellers. Though some analysts claim the so-called "energy crisis" is a fraud and in. sist that huge oil reserves still exist, their or. guments are somewhat irrelevant. Whether there's it shortage or it surplus, industrialized countries find themselves facing effective do. muds for higher prices from Arab and other oil nations, which are taking over much of the industry either by outright, nationalization or by becoming partners of Western oil comps-? nits. Some experts predict Arab governments will be collecting as much as $.1o billion nn. 1111:111y In oil rr:vonucs by 1550, tip from less Min $G billion In ifib; tho Arabs nro also cx- CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 peeled to gain increased control over produc? lion and sales policies.. The U.S., willy-nilly, will contribute. heavily to Arab wealth and power. According to James Akins, the State Department's senior energy c authority, the U.S. has no short-terns alterna- i tive to buying more foreign oil; he and others agree that new domestic resources-including gas manufactured from coal or oil extracted from shale-won't conic along fast enough to ease the squeeze any time soon. By 1980, Mr. Akin: expects, U.S. oil imports may reach 15 million barrels daily, up from six million this year and only 3.2. million in 1970. What to Do? Concern over the Implications of the trend is mounting among private experts as well as government strategists. Walter Levy, a noted energy consultant, warns that "the U.S., as a major world power, simply cannot afford an ever-increasing over-dependence for its oil sup. plies ' on a handful of foreign 'countries... . Otherwise, its security in a narrow sense, as well as its prosperity and, its freedom of action in foreign-policy formulation, will be in jeop- ardy." What to do? The presidential energy mes- sage that Mr. Akins is drafting and that Mr. Nixon Is expected to send Congress next month.will stress the need for developing adds- tiorial fuel sources. But that process threatens to take two'decades or more. In the meantime, officials say, other government policies must be reexamined and perhaps modified in order to avoid the worst dangers: High on the list comes Mideast policy. Washington doesn't want to face a future choice between preserving Israel or pacifying Arab oil producers, however unlikely that pros. pect now seems. To date, militant Arabs have been unable to get oil-exporting governments to use their fuel for political pressure. Despite -much lofty talk about Arab brotherhood, even CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR .3 February 1973 s U5 war, 111 90 d abowff Pro= *9 depemden.,ID By Dana Adams Schmidt Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington The U.S. Defense Department is increas. ingly concerned about growing American dependence on oil imported from the eastern hemisphere: ' Two aspects worry the Pentagon - and the Navy in particular: ? That the U.S. won't be able to transport and protect the flow of oil it vitally needs. That means defense experts fear a shortage of tankers and of escorts to guard them. ? That the U.B. will find paying for the imported oil an intolerable burden on its balance of payments. They see the Iranians and the Arabs engaged in leap-frogging demands on the Western oil companies, the end effect of which is higher cost to the consumer. neighbors like Syria and Iraq have had a hard time agreeing on such things as proper tolls fora pipeline that carries oil from Iraq across Syria to the Mediterranean. But some Arabs' see greater unity as their wealth increases. Even conservative Saudi Arabia, which may be pocketing $20 billion an- nually by'1980, anticipates both affluence and- influence. King Faisal, a devout Moslem, ada- mantly opposes Jewish occupation of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and may yet use his oil to help got the Israelis out. Warns one White House staffer: "The question is: can we still import in the 1980s if there is no resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute by then?" It's a risk Washington may not choose to' run. The present study could advocate new ef- forts to settle the area's problems peacefully before import needs skyrocket and the U S a - . . p pears more Vulnerable. Military Issues The White House study will also ponder mil. itary issues. If oil costs rise too far, Washing. ton. may have to call home its troops from Eu. rope and 'Asia for purely fiscal reasons, upset- ting its foreign friends and eroding alliances. Questions about reordering other military priorities are also arising. 'Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy boss, al- ready sees a budget opening through which he hopes to pilot a fleet of shiny new destroyers. Claiming the U.S. will need 1,000 large civilian tankers by 1980, he concludes "their safe pas. sage will depend in large measure on our abil- ity. to deter interruption of this flow." Transla. tion: more ships and men for his Navy. He also argues that new gunboats could. conduct Mid- cast diplomacy for his State Department friends. "To the citizen of a less technologically ori- ented society," he says, "nothing is quite like ashipshape destroyer making a call." The U.S. military forces depend on im- ported oil for 60 percent of their supplies and 100 percent of the petroleum products con- sumed in Vietnam came from the Persian Gulf. Dependence now is taken for granted in the Defense Department and by the Navy. In a little-noticed speech to the Chamber of Commerce of Beckley-Raleigh in West Vir- ginia last December Adm. Elmo, R. Zumwalt laid the facts dramatically on the line: "We have roughly enough reserves bf natural gas to last 22 years and enough- petroleum for 20," he said. "In other words,, the wells of natural gas and petroleum are going to run dry within our boundaries within the life span of some here present and certainly within the life span of some of our children. The admiral explained that only about 50 percent of demand for petroleum in the U.S. would be met by domestic production by the year 1985, even if Alaskan oil were brought into the picture. "That means," he concluded, "that we are going to have to import something In the order of 12 million barrels of crude oil a day - each and every day." Admiral Zumwalt went on to state the Navy's concern for protecting the oil's move- ment, as follows: Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 n ~ ~ Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001-00001-5 e Times Entertainment Editor "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," a controversial new book charging U.S. complicity -through the 'CIA-in the drug trade, has been acquired as the basis for a new film by Richard Brooks for Columbia Pictures. The. book, written by a young Yale scholar named Alfred W. McCoy and two associates, Cath- leen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II, first came to public attention last year when it became .known that the CIA tried to dissuade Harper & Row from publishing it and 1,han demanded the opportunity to read and review the text in galley form. Despite a long rejoinder from the CIA, Harper & Row published the book in September essentially ,as written: McCoy's central thesis is that the U.S. government, inheriting the vacuum left by the de- parting French in Southeast Asia, also reluctantly customers to buy Iranian oil. But if they wished to save their special position as favored customers, they would have to turn i over their assets in Iran at an earlier date and agree to help Iran immediately to step up production from its present level of 4.5 million barrels a day to a level of 8 million barrels a day. The 8-million-barrel goal previously had been set for 1980. The Shah made no mystery of the fact that he had been incited to make these new demands by Arab oil companies' completing new agreements last December with Western oil companies. These agreements give the Arabs a 25 percent participation in the companies effective this year and , a 51 percent participation by 1983. . Minister called author The deal the Shah was talking about was worked out by the Saudi-Arabian Minister of Oil Ahmed Zaki Yamani representing Ku- wait, Qatar, and Abu Dabi as well as Saudi Arabia. Quietly watching the Iranian-Arab com- petition are the Iraqis who have nation- alized the Iraq Petroleum Company and are having a hard time selling their oil. They will have to decide now whether to press on with' their nationalization' and attempts to sell their oil to the Soviet Union and the Commu- nist bloc or whether to follow the pattern set by the Shah or that set by the other Arabs. Meanwhile, Lybya is needling all con- cerned by demanding a immediate 50 percent. share in the companies who have concessions on its territory. Only one thing is certain about the future of the oil supplied by the Arabs and Iranians = it will cost more. A barrel of Kuwaiti oil which in 1968 cost $1.68 will cost $8 by Jan. 1,. 1975. inherited the politics of poppy-growing' in the Golden Triangle of Laos, Thailand and Burma, where 70% of the world supply of illicit heroin is produced. The revenues enrich local economies and greatly enrich very high officials of Asian governments supported by the United States in its attempts to combat the spread of communism. Battle in Opium War McCoy's book is a meticulously documented look at the heroin trade worldwide, written in news- magazine rather than pedantic style and contain-' ing a few scenes which could make even "The French Connection" seem like a pale footnote. Most particularly, McCoy describes a battle in the Opium War of 1967 over a caravan of mules carrying 16 tons of opium to market. The ship- ment was destined for the commander-in-chief'of' ,the Laotian army, but two former Kuomintang generals who had been controlling the local trade routes attacked with several hundred men. Even- tually the battle involved seven jet aircraft and a company of Laotian paratroopers, who captured the booty. Brooks, fascinated by these goings-on and by the whole curious confrontation of American idealism and pragmatism with a ntttghly sordid political ronlity, will, enll his movie "ttliwei'm of Evil" and plans to shoot entirely on location. Sec and unit work on the planting of the poppies will begin in a few weeks' time. The Truth? 'Tell It' "I read an excerpt from the book in Harper's and clipped it out," Brooks says. "I read the book and was even more interested, but I' couldn't believe. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIS-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 "Since all of this oil will be coming over the surface of the world oceans, I think you can see the Navy's concern. To move this oil is going to ,require more than 1,000 tankers averaging about 17,000 tons each. Their passage will depend on our' ability to deter interruption of the flow." For this purpose the Navy is seeking a new generation of simplified low-cost frigates which .would escort the tankers as well as so- called "surface effect" ships such'as hydro- foils for which prototype money has been included in the new budget. ' Admiral Zum- walt. also has said that American aircraft carriers would be re-equipped to fly anti- submarine missions in order to protect the movement of oil and that the new nuclear submarines would be used for this purpose. The concern for rising costs of imported oil is summarized by the estimate of Defense Department experts that the cost of imported petroleum products will rise from about $2 billion in 1972 to about $20 billion in 1985. The swift escalation is explained by the fact that whereas the U.S. hitherto Imported mostly low-grade crude oils 'it now is beginning to require refined products as well as costly liquefied gas. Far higher costs seen One expert believed that the costs could run far higher than $20 billion if the Iranians and Arabs continued their leap-frogging. The most recent stage therein is a decision . by the Shah of Iran to overthrow his previous understanding that when the concessions of Western oil companies in his country expire in 1979 he would for at least 15 years make arrangements for them to continue operating oil fields and refineries and marketing the oil. Now he has told the companies that in 1979 he is taking over the oil 100 percent and that they will have to join the queue of the world's LOS. ANGELES TIMES 30 January 1973 o t ?~veiAsi . Dirties of Heroin' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 "It won't be a documentary,"? says 'Brooks. "In CHICAGO TRIBUNE ,6 February 1973 1 , ob lVic' dri,:lt ,the nature of things, I'm afraid it can't be. But it will tell the truth about an incredible situation." M c C o y testified last summer before a 'congres- sional committee about his researches into the reluc- tant complicity of Ameri- can agents with the drug traffic, which included, he W . 1.1 C .1L ;that any studio would dare to tackle material that , tough. But Columbia was interested, too. 1. said, 'I want to tell the truth' and. Stanley Schneider said, 'Tell' it.'" McCoy's book also suggests that American soli-' citation of Mafia support during the invasion of Sicily during World War 11, at a time when the or- ganization had been under severe harassment by ,the Mussolini government, gave the Mafia a power base from which it was able to enter the drug trade on, a major scale in the postwar period. McCoy, 27, will serve as a technical adviser to 'Brooks ran his production. 1?OR 1'1IE first time in the history of United States Customs. 25 agents have been dispatched overseas to gather ad- vance information so narcotics ship- ments to this country can be intercepted before disappearing into the labyrinth of Mafia distribution channels. At the same time, the CIA has be- conic increasingly active in'probing the posiible involvement of South American diplomats, police, and government of- ficials in protecting the transshipment of heroin from Southeast Asia and :!Europe to the United'States. These moves are part of an effort by President Nixon to counter the ever changing drug routes to the U. S. as American participation in the Viet Nam war 'ends and Asiatic narcotics mer? chants shift gears to meet new areas of supply and demand. PRIVATELY, AI)MiNJSTRATION of- ficials fear the: racketeers of Southeast Asia's infamous. Golden Triangle' of Laos, Thailand, and Norma may have already selected the continental United States as a new merchandising arena ! because of sharply declining sales to American forces in Viet Nam. There is evidence. same of the high grade heroin from Southeast Asia is finding its way to South America for re- lay to the United States via Florida and Tlexlco. Couple that with large amounts of European heroin and locally produced coca iine.aIready being shipped here from South America, and-the Southern Hemi- sphere assumes greater significance as,a source of danger to United States efforts to een,bat the International narcotics traffic. Exactly one year ago, this column was first to c!isclo a cnterggence of the so- called Latin American Connection, a new chug route supplementing the tra ditional French Connection from Mar- seilles directly across the Atlantic to East Co.nst and Canadian ports. The French' trade route had become drastically curtailed because of U. S. pressure. So, the Corsican and Mafia gangsters manipulating the drug racket began ship;nit)g; large amounts of iiliddlc Last heroin relined in Saul kern France to, Soulh Anuvica, for transshipment to the United Slnte.c by sea and air thru the Windward islands and ,Mexico, Thu, a new symbol was drawn on the narcotics trade maps-the Triangle of I)eath-with its base line reaching from France to Sbalh America and its apex peretr;atin^ the united . States from- Europe and Latin Ainerica. In time, another line may be added across the Pacific to mark the course. of Southeast Asian heroin into the-Tri- angle of Death. On a Latin American survey for the House Foreign Affairs Committee last month, Rep. Morgan i\l urphy of Chicago and Robert Steele of Connecticut dis- covered European heroin is also being pumped directly into the Panama Canal Zone and Vera Cruz, Mexico, for sbip. ment to the U. S. The rest finds it way thru such nations as Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay; and Colombia. Peru; Colombia, - Bolivia, Chile and, Brazil are prime producers of cocaine. In fact, South America produces 00 per cent of the world cocaine supply and 100 per cent of that used in this country, During their trip, Latin American of- ficials readily admitted to the congress- charges, the use of Air, 'America, a CIA charter carrier operating in South-' east Asia, to haul raw opi um. The charge has been;; denied. The shocking rise in ad-', diction among GIs serving in Vietnam focused atten- tion on the equally shock- ing contradiction in' U.S. postures. men there is corruption among " police and government personnel at lower levels which they are at a loss to control. PRESIDENT t iiSAEL Pasirana lion. rero of Colombia offered some hope of curbing the drug trade in his country by immediately appointing his minister of justice to coordinate a crackdown. He conceded laxity by his regime. lie also admitted his police lacked training in this field. Recently, for Ixample, vital evidence in a case involving three American drug smugglers was destroyed by presum- ably inept Colombian police. The Americans, enroute to Bogota from Florida to pick up a load of co- caine, crash landed near the Colombian capital with a cargo of empty crates-for the narcotic and ::3,600 in cash. I'OLiC -CONFISC:VI'[?;I) the cash, but burned the crates and a list of names of cocaine merchants from whom the Americans planned to buy drugs worth $500.no0?in the U. S. The smu; ;!crs were later released and demanded return of the cash-by the United Statcs ymba: y. They were: told to see the U. S. attorney in Southern Florida. wwhvre their flight had origin- ate;!. \aturalty. they didn't. In another case, local .Mexican police arc hciieveet to hate tilled off racketeer s holding' a cache of 200 pounds of co- came. ton of marijuna. and 50 kilos'of pure heroin Ix?fure :American agents and federal paiice could move In. ,1s you can' see, addicts are not tine on:;' ones?c?''rrup:ed by the bttecnational nareu:ics r.icket, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 = ~ a Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001 610 By Herbert 'Scoville j r. The writer is a fdrmer assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and deputy director of the rrHE ACCOMPLISHMENTS of "~"' , SALT I have produced a totally manta in warhead design can possibly overcome the complete Ineffectiveness new climate in which a comprehensive of the small ABM systems permitted nuclear teat ban-one covering under- by the treaty., ground as well as atmospheric explo- sions-becomes a negotiable arms con- Strategic Warheads trol measure after nearly 10 years of HE EFFECTS of the ABM treaty drifting in the doldrums. Not since T also apply to the requirements for warheads for offensive weapons. With- .1982, when Niki.ta Khrushchev made out any effective ABM to penetrate, his offer of three on-site inspections to the need for new warheads largely dis- "rify such a ban; have opportunities appears. In addition, there is no fur. for agreement been so good. ther need for testing to develop special This improved outlook, if we take warheads to withstand high-altitude nuclear explosions, since the allowed advantage of it, is particularly timely ABMs can be overwhelmed by a small since it comes just as steps are needed fraction of the existing strategic to prevent further spread of nuclear forces. weapons to additional countries. That Only for a first-strike force able to the patience of the non-nuclear-weap- destroy the enemy's missiles in their ens countries is beginning to wear than silos in there any need to design new Is shown by the overwhelming support, offensive warheads. 'I1owever, the Nations resolution in favor of a halt to; sill nuclear testing by August, 1973, the "hard target" MIRV which might pro. .tenth anniversary of the' limited test voke Soviet concerns, that we were ban treaty. In addition, there is strong seeking a first-strike capability, thus Senate support, led by Sens. Philip upsetting the present strategic bal- Hart, Edward Kennedy, Charles Ma- ance. Even for such a MIRV, an im- thins and Clifford Case, for a resolu- tion urging the President to make a re- proved. warhead with five times the newed effort to negotiate a compre- yield would be less important than po- hengive test ban and, In the ? interim, tential improvements in accuracy. .to suspend all testing immediately as Nor does the United States any long as the Russians reciprocate, longer need a "hard -target" MIRV to The limitations on strategic arms provide the flexibility to attack key agreed to in Moscow, particularly the military targets instead of cities after ABM treaty, have greatly reduced the a limited Soviet attack; this can now desires for further nuclear weapons be. achieved without further advances testing which have in the past been in Wezibfin dogign since, as a result of the major obstacle to a comprehenisive the ABM treaty, the retaliatory attack Meat ban.. With only 200 ABM intercep- no longer has to cope with large ABM tor missiles allowed each side, It Is al- defenses and can afford to direct sev- most impossible to justify further im- eral warheads at a single target. provements in the nuclear warheads A complete test ban would, on the for this purpose. The United States, other hand, increase U.S. confidence and almost certainly the Russians as that the Soviet Union was not improv- heads in order to develop a first-strike MIRV system able to destroy a large fraction of our Minuteman force. Another familiar justification for nu- , clear weapons testing has been the need to assure the continued reliabil- ity of, already developed and stock- piled weapons. Although nuclear tests have never'been carried out solely to check the proper functioning of a stockpiled weapon, it has been argued that the ability to test is necessary in case deterioration' is found by other means and corrective action Is re- quired. This Is not necessary, however, since it would always be possible to replace a warhead which had deters- orated with one of proven design. Fur- thermore, If mutual deterrence is the fundamental element In our strategic policy, as spelled out by the ADM, treaty, then any unknown decrease In reliability on both sides can only im- prove deterrence. High reliability is only necessary for a nation contemplat- ing a first strike. No aggressor could rely on the uncertain reliability of an- other nation's weapons as the means of surviving a retaliatory attack. Thus, as a result of the Moscow agreements, a strong case can be made that no further nuclear testing of strategic weapons Is required. Yet, during the past 10 years since the lim- ited test ban treaty, more than two- thirds of the U.S. tests have been relat- ' ed to strategic weapons ( systems, and indeed the highest-priority tests have fallen in this category, The Moscow agreements have thus undercut the major rationale for continued nuclear testing. Even before SALT I, Drs. Carl Waiske and John Foster of the De- fense Department testified. that they favored a comprehensive test ban pro- , vided it could be adequately verified. This Pentagon position, which Is the U.S. position at the Geneva disarma- ment talks,. is even further reinforced' by the Moscow agreements. Signals rHE BENEFITS of SALT I, however, are not limited to the weapons development part of the problem alone; tile AI3iM treaty also creates a mechanism by which the verification difficulties, for years the ostensible stumbling block to a test ban, can also be solved. Since 1963, the United States has in- sisted that on-site inspections were re- quired for adequate policing against. secret underground tests, while the So- viet Union has consistently claimed i.li~t thcigo inspections were unneces- sary. The verification provisions of the AI3M treaty afford a means' of bridging this gap. In this, and in the Interim agreement on offensive weapons, both nations agree that national technical' means of verification will be used; that neither nation will interfere with such ,Well, have nuclear weapons developed ~ ing the yields and accuracy of its war- means; and, finally, that neither will Approved For Release 2001/08/075: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 use deliberate concealment to Impede verifications. In addition, a standing consultative commission is set up to consider questions concerning compli- ance with the obligations of the agree- ment. Similar provisions, but multi-na- tional in scope, attached to a compre- hensive. test ban treaty, might satisfac-. torlly reconcile the U.S. and the Soviet points of view. . The primary problem In verifying a ban on underground tests has been the difficulty in telling apart the seismic signals from small earthquakes and ex- plosions.. Now, with greatly improved seismic methods and sophisticated com- puter, processing, it is possible to clas- sify 'almost . any detectable seismic event as an earthquake or an explo- sion. For those few small events which are detected seismically but not ' identi- fled, the. United States has In the past sought the reassurance of on-site In- spections "despite Pentagon testimony that the value of such on-site inspec- tions Is marginal at best. Today's U.S. verification techniques, however, are superior to our earlier capabilities, even combined with "the on-site inspec- tions we were seeking. Observation satellites are one . agreed method capable of providing In- creased assurance. A photographic sat- ellite scanning an. area in which an un- .Identified seismic event was detected could obtain information useful for evaluating whether the seismic" signals originated from a secret nuclear test. Most of the natural earthquake areas within the Soviet Union are remote from human activity, so that a large fraction of these unidentified events could bo clearly classified as natural cnrC; GO T:;I uri.: E FEB '1973 in origin when evidence of man-made disturbances was absent. Whenever a satellite obtained evidence of mining or drilling operations in the area where the seismic signals originated, a satisfactory explanation could be demanded through an international commission on the SALT I model. If not satisfied, the United' States could resume testing or take whatever other action it thought necessary. Evasion Techniques . SOME EXPERTS have worried that an underground test ban could be violated by use of sophisticated eva- sion techniques, such as a detonation In a large cavity. But theoretical stud-. lea show that a very large chamber, 300 feet in diameter and several thou. sand feet underground, would be re- quired to muffle the seismic signal 'of a 5-to-10-kiloton explosion sufficiently to make It undetectable. The use of such concealment techniques for even so small a test would Involve a mam- moth construction operation which would be easily visible by observation satellites. Other exotic evasion techniques have been proposed: a nuclear explo. sion could be conducted in the Immedi- ate aftermath of a large earthquake, or a series of nuclear explosions could be timed to give additive seismic signals that more nearly resemble an earth- ql%,dce than an explosion. Both of t`hesw techniques are vuinv rable to dereraton by sophisticated seismic measuring end data analysis systems. However, even if these techniques successfully hid the signals, there would be a con- siderable probability that the opera. Pressure on other- sources cited _Q, 1 77 qT! HONG KONG. Feb. 7 [Al']-- 1 1 Among the farm houses, tcne- meats, and sprawling man- sions of this colony are about 20 secret laboratories produc- ing more and more of the her- oin sold in American street corners, according to Western narcotics experts. This "Chinese Connection" is expanding as legal and dip- lomatic pressure threatens the traditional "French Connec- tion" of Turkish opium or mor- phine processed into heroin .in France and then smuggled to the United States. The U: S. Bureau- of Narcot- ics and Dangerous Drugs esti- the percentage of South- mates east Asian heroin supplying the American market has at least doubled recently, to al- most a third of. the total U. S. supply. BUT NARCOTICS agents tend to scoff at precise fig- ures. "The traffickers don't pub- lish balance sheets, so how can we know how much they are smuggling. They don't even know the overall amount themselves," says one agent. Norman Rolph, Hong Kong's tions required to carry them out would be noticed by observation satellites and challenged through the mecha. nism of the consultative commission. Finally, the use of nuclear explo- sives for peaceful purposes is now gen-? erally recognized, at least in this coun- try, to have few economic advantages and many environmental and safety "' . problems. This program, nicknamed Plowshare, has always been a road- block to a ban on nuclear tests, since it could provide an Ideal cover for dis. guised weapons testing. In fact, the greatest enthusiasts fot? Plowshare. have been the most ardent nuclear weapons developers. Now the proposed nuclear excavation of the sea-level Panama Canal has been' dropped, and the use of nuclear explo. sives for the release of natural gas is the only project being given serious study in the United States. Tests even for this' purpose are in trouble with en- vironmentalists and significant gas re- covery would require thousands of nu- clear explosions.. The Atomic Energy Commission budget for Plowshare has just been cut almost in half and no tests are planned for the next fiscal year. Considerable Interest in peaceful nuclear explosions has, unfortunately, been stimulated by U.S. propaganda in other countries, particularly Russia. India and Brazil, and could Interfere with negotiations for a comprehensive test ban if they are unduly delayed. The time has now come for the United States to take a new initiative In nego- tiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. It would be an important next step after the Moscow agreements to place some overall ceiling on qualita- tive improvements in strategic nuclear warheads. , /11 ~ i re narcotics; says: "All the: people in this business are very security and surveillance conscious. They have a, high degree of mobili- ty. The laboratories in which they refine the morphine arc everywhere, from' chicken runs to villas. They spend just a day,or two in each. ore and ers almost never tell authori- ties about their smuggling net- work. "The Mafia are pub- licity hounds compared to the Chinese," says an infor- ? then move on to another." I mant in Bangkok, the capital The opium and heroin trade ) of Thailand. in this part of the World I& "Money and fear are the almost eucluaivoty run by I. only thhigo- that Mold thls dirty nose,. and the bulk of their business together, and money trafficking is for Asian ad- is the only thing we can chip diets. Officials say there is no at it with," he adds. Indication mainland China is Thailand and Hong Kong use' exporting any of the narcotics.- a reward system based- on tile. it ARRESTED, the traffick- value of drug seizures to at- 6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 .Approved For Release, 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 t r a c t informers. In }long .rich financiers pulling the Kong, an informer can earn as 'strings from the top evade ar- much as $100,000 for a tip that rest. They carefully avoid any leads to a major seizure and " direct contact with the people handling drugs. Even when arrests. And nearly all major authorities know who they are, seizures come from such infor-' 6 no evidence can be obtained to m But generally it is only the convict them, agents say. But small fry that are caught. The NARCOTICS officials a;;rcc WASHINGTON STAR 12 February 1973 DAVID LAWRENCE Fa r-~'e aC~~Ar~ ices Probably one of the most' Reports from embassies has a right to broadcast important problems faced by and consulates in countries throughout the-world informs- the American government is, where these American pro- tior about what the policies of how to reach the populations grams are made available to this country are and the prin-, of Europe and Asia so that people behind the Iron Cur- . ciples underlying them. there might be "people to tarn indicate that they are Iis son why y people" communication. tend to widely' and well re- TRah heere Free is no Europe reason 'wh When Richard Helms, for- ceived. Peoples who are liv-' Liberty should not have been .mer director of the Central ing under a government Li Libbero should not by have private Intelligence Afency,,was tes- which excludes information. ? foundations and given finan- tifying before the Senate For-: from outside its territory wel- cial support solely by the gen- eig'n Relations Committee last. come the data they get over. eral public: Some day this week, he endorsed the contin- such devices as Radio Free er be the method turn out to the nation of both Radio Free.. Europe, Radio Liberty and may ed for out the international d Europe and Radio Liberty,? Radio Free Asia., radio programs devoted to`a which he- are well worth 'Incidentally, there is no presentation of what the Unit- the lion. l budget of m . way to cut off a radio pro- ed States is doing and what its io. He declared these mil- e had' gram entirely'from another true feelings are toward other ' been one factor in improving land, though "jamming" . peoples in the world. relations between Eastern and Western Europe. has been used to im Whnn fen Currently both Radio Free .. Behind the Iron Curtain, the number.of foreign publica- tions admitted are few, and the government dictates the contents of newspapers and magazines as well as radio and television programs. So there is no way to get any news, or views about 'what's going?on in. the world except what might be heard over the radio from other lands. ' Radio Free Europe sends information programs to Po- land, Czechoslovakia, Hunga- .ry, Romania and Bulgaria. These are transmitted 'in the languages of each of the coun- tries. Radio Liberty concen- tratcs wholly on broadcasts to the Soviet Union. These two agencies,are financed in large part by our, government, but there is. another project- known as Radio Free Asia- which is entirely a private .:organization started in 1951 by the Korean Cultural and Freedom. Foundation. It was. endorsed at the time by Gen. information' about important r.11 ape ana nawo iroeriy are happenings is conveyed to the known to be backed by the owner of a radio set, the government, and this gives chances are that it will be them an ? even more im- communicated to many other portant status in the realm persons in the neighborhood of news. For editors in foreign or in the area. Radio, indeed, countries listen to Radio Free has served a useful purpose in Europe and Radio Liberty. trying to improve the rela- and every now and then carry tions between the people of in their newspapers informa-` tion obtained from these two it th U d St t d l : e n e a es an peop es abroad. big broadcasting services. Sen. J. William Fulbright, ' The fact that the programs chairman of the Senate For- are broadcast in the Ian- eign Relations Committee, guages spoken in each of the!, asked Helms this question: nations to which they are di-. rected makes them very valu- "Are don saying that the able in the task of improving and West detente between op- relations between the Ameri- nd ast and Germany's develop- can people and peoples of oth- ments as tik policy G have been caused causer- er countries. When it is con- by pFree ve sidered that governments on by Radio dr Europe." " the Communist side engage in "I am saying it was one fat- propaganda broadcasts and tor among others," Helms in- transmit them not only into sisted. western Europe but through- During the years that these out the world, it can be in. services have been aided -by ferred that eounter-broad= means of the Central Intelli- casts from the United States' Eisenhower, and it has been gence Agency, this has been are essential if only to answer broadcasting information criticized by some members some of the misrepresenta- programs into North Korea, of Congress as an improper tions that are made about the mainland China and North activity. But actually the gov- policies of the government in Vietnam, ernment of the United States Washington. .Fighting. A New. opium War By . C. `L. Sulzberger WASHINGTON-One area of 'U.S. foreign policy rarely discussed by dip-' lomatic observers has shown consid- erable success during recent years. This is the curbing of shipment to America of hard drugs. Dope addiction remains a most dis= agreeable, worrisome blot in the Unit- ed States;' yet this cannot wholly ob-. scure achievements registered by. coordinated efforts of the' State De- partment, Treasury, C.I.A. and, F.B.I. in tracking down illegal traffic or alert. In-February, 1972, Gen. Creighton W..Abrams, commander of U.S. forces' in Vietnam (now Army Chief of Staff) FOREIGN AFFAIRS "French gangs involved in drug operations have, found increasing difficulty in getting heroin to the U. S." told me recent troop figures showed 3.7 per cent users of whom 1.6 per cent were at least temporarily cured. before being sent home. There were 2.1. per cent users of hard drugs among troops going home. "Pot is not a seri- ous problem," he added. Speaking of hard drugs, Abrams said: "There's an awful lot of money in it, And the whole drug traffic is a r0n4ruu4 snd aaphlaticatod dpcrAtton. The poppies for opium aren't grown in South Vietnam...'. All that-is done in Thailand, in Burma, in Laos, in North Vietnam, in China. The whole struc= ture of this business has to get its raw opium to certain points for distillation. The heroin that's in South Vietnam has 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 the trafficking in Southeast Asia has not been hurt or even slowed by law-enforce- meat efforts. Some believe, I however, recent large seizures are ?a promising start to a wid- ened drive. It seems doubtful any prog- ress is being mado in the most vital country of all - Burma.. . NEW YORK TIMES ,9 February 1973 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 all been. distilled, somewhere else.".., of dplurh poppies. Aug. 19-.1971 , Gen,' Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, the 'Cevdet Sunay., President of the Turkish In-the' French trade. It is generally a., well-known Cairo editor and friend .of republic, told me: "In recent months question of individual criminals seek-. Presidents Nasser.and Sadat; says, that our main problem with the United ing to make a killing. American Mafiosi. :4' when Chou 'En-lai dined with' Nasser States was opium. Washington claimed in Italy are carefully watched by Rome; in Alexandria; June 23, 1965: "One of 80 per cent of -U.S. heroin came from . until recently French criminals had a-. the, remarkable things he said that Turkish sources. It is hard to believe freer hand. night when talking about the demoral- this when one knows how many -France's anticriminal branches, under ization of the American soldiers tin' Asian countries' produce this drug." . Interior Minister Raymond, Marcellin, Indochina. was that 'some of. them' Notwithstanding, Turkey agreed` to have been cracking down, aware that are trying opium, and we are helping terminate legal opium,growing and the French youth faces the same drug ;them. We are planting the.best kinds United States sent financial aid and danger. as American' youth. Libelous of opium especially for'the American.. agricultural experts to help farmers de- rumors that the French intelligence' ;,.soldiers in Vietnam; velop substitute crops. Sunay. said: agency, S.D.E.C.E., was financing oper In his book, "The Cairo Documents," "The government did the right thing ations from drug sales have virtually- Just published this year, Heykal says in suppressing production. We are ceased since S.D.E.C.E. was quietly, Chou continued: "Do you remember aware that the United States is grati- when the West imposed opium on us? Pied. And we are too.' We don't want. '"They fought us with-opium. And we :to contribute. to, poisoning of, the are going to fight them with their own ' world's youth." weapons.. We' are going to use their . Exchange : of. information between gown methods against them. But Chou antinarcotic agents of. the' U.S. and has since indicated - to more recent those of France, Turkey, Germany, ``1nter]6butors that China does not now' =Italy and,South America has become pursue' any such deliberate, policy., ':.speedier and more complete. French ..,Whether this is because of better rela- gangs ,involved in drug operations ',tlonships with 'Washington is impos-' have found Increasing. difficulty Inget- sibie to say. ~ ting heroin to the United States di- One area where there. is certainly a' 1' rectly and have come '.to depend on direct relationship between diplomacy, ' Latin American transit shipments. i and drugs is Turkey: which, in' 1972,' No mysterious, organizations like the officially put an end to legal growing' Mafia or the Union Corse are involved HOUSTON POST 2 FEB 1973 Lltr w e ~ WASHINGTON li'I - A com- flict has broken out in the State Department over the se- riousness of drug abuse by children of American diplo- mats and other U.S. officials overseas. The controversy centers at a special mission now in Southeast Asia in connection with drug use by dependents of U.S. officials. Dr. 1 rank K. Johnson, head' of the Drug Abuse Prevention Working Group that was scheduled to arrive Thursday in Indot:csht,,_siid his mission was priniari!y echtcational - one of research and study. "There, 'aren't any r e a 1 problem.; now," htt sald. Tile working group will be check- ing into the reasons wliv tile situation seems so stable in cleaned up.by a' new director, Count Alexander de Marenches. Furthermore, the French are apply ing a, squeeze. around; Marseilles, the principal entrepot for Mediterranean hard drugs. Just after World War 11, that port became a shipping point for the American East Coast and Marseilles laboratories were developed to refine. opium rsmuggled from Turkey. Marseilles became a kind bf thieves' den during the heyday of 'the French North African 'empire.. Unemployed crooks were drawn into the American ' drug trade. when that' empire disap- - peared. . , I . ~', 'IN 7 er e S order to use this experience in the future, he added. "That's the attitude of somebody with his head in the sand;" according to an- o t h e r department official. "There have been increasing reports from all over (the world') about our kids using drugs," This source, who asked not to be identified, said some areas of* outheast Asia are particularly troublesome; he mentioned Bangkok where there was a tiro:-ret;:ted death in December involvi g an American dependent. But "we hear of problems in Europe, ton," the official continued, saying that wher- ever there are enough Arnrrl= cans to have a se!:oo1 there seems to be trouble in drugs. When asked, to document his charges, the. official said it was difficult to 'do so .for several. 'reasons: one, there really isn't any system for accumulating such reports; second, "there is a tendency to try to hide these in. cidents." The purpose of the drug mission is to find out exactly the bounds of the problem, the official said. as well as to line out so!ntions. A dep,trtntent publication last mouth said the working, ~rrntp ~'.a? urganizcti rr,- sprmsr. to ir,t reasin~ evidence o f ci r it t, ibuso prob!ens aniong adolescent dependents, at home and abroad." Another rtoparl.nlont nulit'n pointed to the need "to deal with this new and tragic, threat to our children." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 ~:;:/ l ` h fwd ?61 GUN By Henry. Kamm TEHERAN. From the air, the landscape looks as forbidding as the face of the moon. On the ground it is worse: a burning summer sun against which the tree'ess mountain slopes offer no shelt&r,? or winter storms that obliterate the winding trails with masses of snow and ice. Spring brings the "120-day wind," swirling, hot gusts that fill the pores and blind the eyes.with the fine brown sand that covers the barren mountainsides.* But the cara- vans from Afghanistan inch their way along the ridges and through the gorges every day except at the depth of winter. They carry tea, and-guns, and silks, and cigarettes, and opium. Above all, opium. Even if the pack animals-mainly sturdy' little horses of a' Mongolian strain-don't carry opium in their saddle bags, the brownish black gum which. makes men dream happy dreams also makes the caravans move. Opium wrapped ? around the bit makes the horses go at a prancy gait for days on end, without rest and with little food or drink, and to eventual death from exhaustion, to speed the smugglers' journey. The smugglers want the trip to go fast particu- larly when the cargo is opium. The faster they reach their. destination in Iran, the smaller is the risk of detection by the Imperial Iranian Gendar- merie. If the gendarmes spot the smugglers, a gun- fight will follow. The lucky ones will get away; 1 the others will die. To be wounded increases the risk of capture, and those who are captured are tried and, most often, shot by firing squads. To escape the gendarmes is not to escape danger. { Those who get away had better not lose their carg-). To return to Afghanistan without the opium, or the money or gold for it, is to face the ven- geance of the tribal leader who organised the cara- van and is responsible to the khan who owns the shipment. The smugglers' wives and 'children have remained in the chief's grip, as hostages. The risks are immense and the rewards a pit- tanec-p: rhaps $13 fdi a trip that may take as long as a month. But the poverty of the tribesmen of the Afghan border is so great, their ignorance and their bondage to their feudal overlords so com- plete, that most of Afghanistan's opium, perhaps 100 tons yearly, Is carried over the mountains to Iran, where hundreds of thousands of addicts de- pend on It. About 85 tons of. it makes it through a border where the guards are on a constant war footing. 11 FEB 1973 To deal with the problems created by an addict population that is among the largest of any coun- try, Iran has tried total permissiveness, total pro- hibition and - now - limited toleration. Under a 1969 law, Shah' Mohammed Riza Pahlevi ended prohibition, lifted a 14-year-old ban on the cultiva- tion of the opium poppy in his country and gave some official sanction to addiction by permitting 110,000card-carrying addicts to buy daily doses of opium at designated pharmacies. At the same time, the law provided Draconian pun'shment for possession or trading of illicit narcotics. Mere pos- session of 2-kilograms (4.4 pounds) of iilkcit opium or 10 grams (about one-third of an ounce) of heroin, morphine or cocaine is enough to merit the firing squad, as is trading In any quantity of narcctics. In the three years of the law's operation, about 160 smugglers and pushers have been dispatched by firing squads after rather summary military- court proceedings. Nevertheless, despite the opium- dispensing program and the harsh smuggling penal- ties, there has been no noticeable drop in either addiction or the steady flow of opium that comes across the border from Afghanistan to the east. While Iran faces some of the same enforcement dilemmas as the United States, the similarity just about ends thero. Addiction in Iran is not what 'it is in the United States, in its nature, causes or its effects; but the differences are instructive. . The American problem is heroin, as "hard" a drug as there is. The Iranian national narcotic is opium, a milder and far less addictive substance than heroin, which is the most potent concentrate of opium. The "highs" produced by heroin are much higher than those of opium, and the "lows" lower. The social problems caused by the use of heroin are correspondingly more dramatic. Iranian opium users fit into their culture, not only because they have always been part of it but also because opium is in itself less corrosive to the social fabric than heroin.' Trafficking in nar- cotics and their surreptitious use remain crimes, but they do not significantly raise the general level of criminality as they do in the United States. Opium is, comparatively, a penny habit that can be sustained Qeven by the poor, -not something that drives addicts to turn to crime to raise money. In the United States, the use of heroin leads to street crime, because the street provides a meeting place between moneyless addicts desperate for a fix and ,people with money in their pockets or shops to be held up. Most of Iran's opium users live in the impoverished countryside, where there are no stores and where rich men rarely visit with money in their pockets. While regular use of opium induces a dependence that makes persons irritable and unable to conccn- trate when' deprived and lowers general health, these decidedly negative effects are less socially disruptive In an undeveloped country than In a technolol:;ieall,y modwrn Cm'ironment, For that reason, Iron Itns been tough on Ciovornment om? ploycs who use opium. Nevertheless, in a largely agricultural country with widespread underemploy- nment, the social effects of opium use?nrc less grave. .If three laborers hired to do a job work too slowly because of their smolang habits, the bass can hire Approved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-FQDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 one or two more for the same total cost be- expensive." cause labor Is plentiful. "I pay my workers 80 riais-.. Iranian, peasants in the vil- [a little. morq than $1] a day," said the innkeeper ' lage or peasants living in the , at Tayabad, a village of high addiction on the city have eaten opium for cen- which in most developing Afghan border. "They disappear twice a,day. I know tunes-or smoked it since the countries means imitation of they go to an old lady where for 2Q riais, a day last century when the habit Western models, the use of they are allowed to come to smoke twice. They was introduced from across opium was considered a;? can't smoke in their houses because then the -wife the border with old imperial, shameful hangover of a dark, 1. and children would also want to smoke. But the India-for reasons that make Oriental past. It did not fiti v:ife rocs o""t to smoke herself." When the workers Westerners reach for an as- disappear to smoke, the innkeeper said, they pirin or a drink, and with don't are unhappy. In view of the fact that the little generally undisastrous effects. town seemed filled with underemployed men, this Opium helped men and wom- did not give him much concern. en forget their headaches and The number of addicts in Iran is a question sur- rheumatism when doctors and rounded by myth, as it Is in the United States. medicines were little known I bl nd ?o 'dad a ?r avai a e a i vi the children grew older. From the villages, the opium habit spread to the cities, to , p "Tile estimate is what rules in this domain," said crop. So strong were the pro distraction from the dreary Dr. H.-A. Azarakhsh, Director General of the Iran tests that Dr. Saleh recalled Ian Health Ministry and the country's chief rep- and unchanging routine of a life a~~ ays on the brink of receiving threatening letters nu")ci,L, lip.' nia(annJ/7 vr.,,wreu Un. esAumate or lagers had little defense. They. 200,000 to ' 300,000 opium users in his country. gave opium to their ' children ? American narcotics experts consider Dr. Azaralthsh's h hi n ; or ey were teet when t ,, f estimate modest by perhaps one-half. ill, or just cranky. It may not The 110,000 legitimate users consist of two have killed the air but it Prohibition was motivated largely, by prestige reasons., At a time of modernization with the image of an awaken-'. Ing, Westernizing Iran that the Shah'was creating. All cultivation was stopped,, over the opposition of'. many big ' landowners who. had, found the poppy a profitable period he did not leave his house without a bodyguard, but production was stopped, illegally planted fields were plowed under and 'reduced groups, whose relative strength remains one of the p availability caused use to drop certainly killed any inhibitions ,_ _-,_-?-_ Government considers selnsitive and therefore secret. The first are opium users more than 60 c years old. To be issued aard allowing them to buy .their 2 to 5 grams daily at' a designated pharmacy, they need merely cst=ihlish that they are to accus- ! ' tomed to opium that their bring a certificate- from their regular doctor stating that they should not be deprived of opium. Then they are ,examined by a commission. of three Government physicians and subjected to. laboratory tests before receiving their .permits. The fact that as . many as 110,000 addicts have been reg- istered is a strong indication .of a far greater number of opium addicts. Most habitual -users are villagers who would find it difficult to register !even if they wanted to. They have no private physicians, live out of reach of Govern- merit medical commissions and miles from any pharmacy and all means of transport. An old man I picked up 'walking along the dirt road from his own village to the next, which he said he hoped to reach in a few hours, didn't know how to close a car door,' nor indeed whether it should be closed. Asked whether peo- ple still smoked the forbidden ,substance lit his village,' he regarded the questioner suspi- '," clously and said. "Nobody uses, itrany more. Besides, It's too' Before prohibition in Iran, an estimated 1.5 million' peo- ple out of a population of 20 prosperous and high-ranking million ate or smoked opium, people always ready to try often. Afterward, two-thirds new distractions in a luxurious of the users are estimated to life that provided a surfeit of . have c!rep red out of the mar- everything. Many of the ket. These ex-users were rural homes of the Teheran upper folk who had been eating their': class used to have a well-ap homegrown product and, being pointed room to which male practically out of the money guests retired after dinner and economy, could not easily of-. from which the sweet smell of ford the imported stuff. first-rate smoking opium .soon Still, about half a million, wafted out to the ladies in ' , persons with enough cash to the drawing room. Those who support a penny habit were a liked opium entered the room tempting market .to the low for a sociable pipe or two; level, rural economies of Tur- those who didn't stayed with ? key and Afghanistan, and the ladies, very much like neither neighbor lacked for some take an after-dinner hardy and hard-up men ready brandy when the tray is to run the rugged borders. brought around and others-," ' "Success in stopping cultiva- pass it ,up. No stigma was at. ' tion was 100 per cent," Dr. tached. Similarly, most tea- Saleh said, "but illicit traffic houses used to sell opium, and ruined the program. It poured even the Iranian Parliament into this country. How the had a lounge that, while not hell can you stop the camels? an opium den, served as a People started swearing at place where deputies gathered me: 'He's ruining our 'econ- to smoke opium. "Before, if' you looked at Parliament, you saw opium addicts," said Dr. nomy. Gold goes out, opium comes in.' We couldn't en- force that part of the law. Jehanshah Saleh, a Syracuse We stopped cultivation, ' we University-educated gynecolo- gave treatment to addicts. gist who is a Senator. As Health Minister in 1955. Snieh steered a total ban on if. tia d urn wain an o um c But the Turks said, 'Your country has lots of oil, we have opium."' By 1969, angered at his pi u .. . neighbors' continued tolera- through Parliament-- with the full support of His Maj- ' tion of the growing of poppies esty, ' he adds. "Without his and illegal export of opium to support, it would have' been . impossible." 10 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Iran, the Shah braved the dis- approval of Western nations, particularly the United States, and turned the clock back- ward. He reintroduced limited cultivation of the poppy under strict supervision, and along with recognizing addiction by putting users' on main- tenance rations, he provided for an expanded voluntary treatment program-and for the threat of the firing squad for trafficking and illegal use. Now, an inexorable law of markets and comparative economic development has all but solved the problem of smuggling from Turkey into Iran-but not from Afghanis- tan. Almost overnight, the passage of the 1969 law re- duced the Turkish share of the illicit Iranian market from about half to about 5 per cent. Turkey never depended on Iran as sole market for her excellent, if illicit, opium. At the ? same time- as ' the Iranian market became less accessible-because of the border patrols-another, far more prosperous clientele be- gan to clamor for all the heroin 'it could get. What the Turkish smugglers no longer dared carry to Iran, they chan- neled into the well-established -network that buys raw opium j from the farmer, refines it to morphine base at various rustic spots in Turkey before secreting :t among less lucra- 1 tive cargoes heading toward France by ship or truck. There it is converted to heroin for delivery to the United States. Beyond this.purely commer- cial reason, experts believe I there is another justification for the ' fact that far fewer Turks will risk the death 1 penalty than Afghans. While the mountains and plains of Eastern Anatolia are unlikely to remind the traveler of the 1 American or Western Euro- I. pean countryside, they are would follow suit. But, ' no doubt because of the certainty' that Afghanistan cannot stop her poppies from making their way across the border, Iran continues legal production.. In any case, enforcement experts are convinced that it will be some years'before the stocks of narcotics hidden in Turkey will all have been channeled into the United States and the effects of the Turkish ban- if it is maintained-will be- come noticeable on the mar- ket. " Iran's present opium prob- lem is created by two classes of victims of underdevelop- ment: poor Iranian peasants. who use narcotics because nothing else has yet come along strong enough to break a tradition imposed by the hardships of their lives, and Afghan smugglers who are even poorer. These victims live in a world dominated by their own poverty; wealthy Afghan merchants who own the supplies; wealthy Iranian merchants who handle ' the distribution; the Afghan Gov- ernment, which is so weak that it surrenders to feudal chiefs control over its citizens, and the Shah's Government with its Imperial Gendarmerie, courts-martial and firing squads. "We can't really blame them from the depths of our hearts," said an Iranian who through a long-standing as- sociation with the Gendar- merie has a close acquaint- ance with Afghan smugglers. "They are serfs." The Turkmen, Pashtoon and Baluchi tribesmen of the Afghan-Iranian-Pakistani bor- der live a seminomadic life of dismal poverty under limited control of their respec- tive central governments. Nowhere is the absence of control or care more complete than in Afghanistan, where worlds apart from Afghanis- ' the King's rule extends only ' tan's poverty, which is unre- over Kabul, his capital, and lieved by even glimmers of along the major highways the hope for a better life. The United States and the Soviet Turkish smuggler has more to '-`-Union have built for him, each lose: poor as he is, he has left behind him the horizonless state that makes an Afghan risk hin life for $13, When Turkey's leaders, act- Ing under heavy American pressure, outlawed the grow- ing of poppies after last year's I harvest, they hoped that Iran for its own strategic purposes. The rest of the country be- longs to clan and tribal chiefs. Merchants In Krthttl, Kan. dahar and Herat, the prin. cipal towns, buy opium from the growers. through tribal middlemen. Eventually, most of the 100 tons of Afghan opium grown yearly finds its way to the Herat region, from 'where' the caravans set out.-- Clan leaders put together the caravans, from 10 to 20 men strong, chosen from among those over whom their rule is complete. Usually only the leader of the caravan is told about the delivery arrange- ments, whether the Iranian contact will meet them at a prearranged place or whether they are to take their cargo across the border, bury it and post guards around the spot while the leader goes to make Contact in a village or town to arrange for delivery and payment. The caravans some- times penetrate as deeply as 100 miles into Iran, in regions where people of the same . tribe live on both sides of the- border and neither Iran's nor Afghanistan's writ runs fully. The Gendarmerie patrols the nearly 500 miles of the Afghan border from 55 posts, each manned by 6 to 10 men. They walk the forbidding ter- rain between posts, looking for smugglers' tracks. Recent- ly the American advisory mis- sion, which has worked with the gendarmes since 1942, persuaded them to buy 100 Japanese cross-country motorcycles.. This mechan- ization would increase- sur- veillance of the border and speed the calling of reinforce- ments from rear areas when a caravan's tracks have been spotted. The smugglers, facing the death penalty if they are caught or the vengeance of their chiefs if they lose the opium, fight back when en- gaged during the day, usually scrambling for high ground to fire down on the gendarmes. On occasion, the troops have used mortars to dislodge the brigands. At nightfall, the smugglers break off contact and flee, sometimes back to- ward Afghanistan, sometimes deeper into Iran. Bandits often raid Iranian villages, looting or seizing hostages for ran- som, so that they need not return empty-handed to their villages. ezj-t_.: with the narcotic that its ' level of develop- ment allows it to afford: America can afford the best, heroin that is pure enough to be injected. Iran, except for a minority esti- mated at between 10,000 and 50,000 who in the last decade 'have discovered the attraction. of low-grade, "snorting" heroin, remains underdevel. oped, content. to eat or smoke opium. Iran has made handsome progress in applying some of her annual petroleum income of approximately $1.3-billion to development, and as the country advances economical= ly, Iranian opium habits will become increasingly harmful. But much progress will have to be made before the lot of the impoverished Iranian will be seriously worsened because he uses opium. He would al- ways be better off, physically and financially, if he didn't use it, but the low standard of life in the mud villages is not greatly depressed by the villagers' opium habit. Nevertheless, such men as Dr. Saleh and Dr. Azarakhsh deplore the smoking of opium because as physicians as well as patriots it pains them to see Persians on a. large scale indulge in a habit that is un- healthy. "It's like you bring up a child until he's 14 years old and then you cut his head .off," Dr. Saleh said. They are unhappy that the resumption of opium-growing. after 14 years of total ban and the official sanction of ' registered addiction seeming- ly restore some respectability to a habit they hate. In addi- tion, even though a number of new treatment centers have been opened under the Shah's program, Dr. Azarakhsh, a man given to prudent under- statement, says, "As of now, the treatment of addicts doesn't work too well." Perhaps one day Iran will reach a level of development at which few people will find opium the easiest escape route or a necessary painkiller. And perhaps some day, too, Afghanistan will provide for her people a possibility of survival free from bondage to tribal chiefs and with enough Possibilities of earning a living tO coniiitler $13 i o low ti pfiee for their liven, Does Iran offer a lesson to other countries with a major Approved For Release 2001/08/07~ICIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 addiction, problem? Perhaps only that 'strong laws and rigorous enforcement can have only minor impact while the social, economic and cul-' tural conditions that make. people turn to narcotics per- sist. if more developed coun- tries like the United States can offer a lesson to Iran, it is, perhaps, that a higher level of development does not necessarily bring a solution to the problem of addiction. It may also bring addiction to more expensive and more dangerous narcotics. 0 Teheran's swingers. ran's : you would an uncle who, One of the effects of Iran's:. experiment in opium prohi- drinks too much." bition (1955-69) remains: Illustrating the modernity The social acceptability of of his class, the. young man, the narcotic has been com- took a . sip from his whisky promised, particularly among, and soda, forbidden by the well-off and city users. Koran, and said that he and "Every family still has some- one his friends smoked only who smokes,said a foreign-educ ted member of hashish, which is easily Teheran's gilded youth. "But available but used largely by. nowadays you wouldn't ad- those who lay stack in being. t mit to an outsider that he' "with" whatever is "it" at does. We Consider, him dike the moment-H.K.' , Henry Kamm to a,, Paris-based roving correspond-' ent for The Times. WASHINGTON POST PARADE 4 Feb 1973 A SPECIAL JACK ANDERSON REPORT How Hard Drugs Are Now Reaching U. S. Cities Via South America WASHINGTON, D.C. he notorious "French Connection," which has brought a blizzard of illegal white heroin powder upon the East Coast in years past, has now been replaced by ?a "Latin American Connection." While President Nixon's crackdown on smuggling has shut down { many of the underground`'drug routes in Europe, it has opened up new smug- gling routes in Latin America. From Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and the Caribbean isles, heroin and cocaine are pouring into the country through our soft underbelly. The "Latin Ameri- can 'Connection" has also introduced daring new smuggling methnrfs Cadavers of South Americans who -died in Europe have been filled with plastic-wrapped packets of heroin be- fore being shipped home. Once they ar- rive , the heroin is removed, the body is delivered to the grieving family, and another dose of drugs is on its way to the U.S. Drugs with a telltale smell, like marijuana, have been hidden among fruits with pungent odors des- tined for U.S. Gulf ports. Cocaine grows popular Cocaine, increasingly popular In the U.S., ii back-packed across desolate Andes borders by peasants, who are scornfully called hormigas (ants) by the wealthy drug overseers. Sometimes small planes, called Mau Maus, will haul the narcotics, skipping from one air- strip to the next through Latin America 12 on into Florida in a daring game of hop- scotch. A fascinating story has been hidden under the secrecy stamp, because the government would prefer to have the public believe 'the smuggling crack- down has been a success. But the Gen- eral Accounting Office has summarized the facts for a few select Congressmen and officials,in a 152 page document so secret that each copy has been num- bered.-Because this is information the public is entitled to know, we have picked out the highlights, country by ARGENTINA-"Argentina has be- I come a significant transit point for hard narcotics destined for the United States ... cocaine is moved in ... from Bolivia in the form of .coca paste and then is refined into cocaine in Argentina. The Argentine government ... is acting against the traffickers [bull provincial police, whose jurisdiction is outside Buenos Aires, have virtually no narcotics it capabilities." BOLIVIA--"Cocaine is illegally proc- essed ?... by about 100 clandestine d , manufacturers. A portion ... is route to the United States."The U.S. is supply- ing jeeps and training to Bolivian nar-: cotics men and "will provide funds for rewards and information" in an effort to develop undercover infdrrnatits, BRAZIL.-"Brazil has the potential for becoming a major transshipment point because of its numerous harbors and airports ... There is evidence that the Amazon River is a highway for i cocaine entering the international Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES-,'All types force is undermanned, ill-trained and of narcotics flow from Europe into the ill-equipped." Caribbean and are' transshipped to the MEXICO-"Significant quantities of United Sates`. Thousands of small craft heroin and cocaine originate in or 1j not confident that a crackdown on cruise the Caribbean . waters, which transit through Mexico to the illicit U.S. ! officials involved .in drug trafficking makes it almost impossible to monitor market; Mexico continues to be the would take place." and prevent smuggling ... It is very dif- principal source of marijuana coming PERU-"Coca leaf .... is refined in ficult to control the transfer of drugs into the United States. .. Use of Mexico simple, clandestine laboratories near from ship to ship in many harbors .. ? as a transshipment' country . is in- , the coca fields and then is exported for .The Netherlands Antilles has become a creasing. ? At least 20 percent of all 1 the illegal international trade ... Peru., major hard drug transit point and .. ? heroin reaching the United States orig- -1 vian officials have indicated that they Jamaica is becoming one." Guyana may i inates or passes through Mexico 'would be receptive to a United States-'., be "used as a stopover point for planes I presently, the Mexican narcotics police Peruvian bilateral program of aid in from Paraguay." ;force is understaffed and undertrained." phasing out" this cocaine traffic. CHILE-"Chile is one of the world's PANAMA-"The crossroads of major URUGUAY-"When drug control is leading illegal manufacturers of cocaine sea and air traffic routes (and) a major' tightened in nearby countries, Uruguay U.S. officials believe the Chileans contraband and smuggling center .. , may become an important transship- are heavily involved in smuggling co- caine into the United States. Chile is believed to be an increasingly impor- tant transit point for heroin shipments from Europe to the United States ... Chilean law enforcement officials are reportedly willing to cooperate [but] the narcotics and gambling squad [of Chile] were not well trained in nar-,; 1 cotics control." . COLOMBIA-"U.S. officials state that the considerable amount of smuggling of U.S. cigarettes, radios, whiskey and other consumer goods into Colombia offers a return route for smuggling heroin and cocaine into the United States. Various means are used, includ- ing hidden landing fields and travelers on commercial airplanes." ECUADOR-"Clandestine laborato- ries in the coastal area are believed to,1 he producing cocaine and heroin shipments of narcotics from other countries pass through Ecuador on their way to the United States ... there are serious difficulties to be overcome , . . } because the national police and other governmental authorities are suscepti- .. '- ble to bribes and because the police Heroin and cocaine pass through 'ment point. Because of its internal ? security problem and .the assumption h i d f d S b oun or t e Un te { Panama tates that it is not a major transshipment [from] Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, point, it has not placed a high' priority and Colombia. .. Panamanian officials; on drug control." steps needed to control drug produc- VENEZUELA--"Venezuela has. be- lion and traffic. The U.S. mission psion also come Important as a transshipment reported that there were some indi- point for drugs from Europe en route cations that Panamanian officials and to the United States ... the transship- security agents might have been in ment of heroin and cocaine[hadbecome volved in narcotics trafficking." more visible and significant ... Vene- PARAGUAV-"A major transit area ] zuela is serviced by numerous intema for the smuggling, storage, and distribu tional airline flights; there? is a- signifi- tion of heroin from Europe ... the net-' cant volume of light-aircraft movement work established to transport American: over the country; and its land and sea cigarettes and other consumer goods to frontiers are clearly vulnerable." Paraguay for illegal transshipment to In summary; the report says Latin other countries has become the channel American governments had been indif-' for smuggling drugs into the United . ferent to the flow of drugs through their States ... Paraguay's concern about ' countries en route to the U.S. until illicit' international trafficking has in- their own youths began 'taking them. creased recently because of unfavorable ' "The use of narcotics, hallucinogens, press reports about Paraguay's role as a amphetamines and barbiturates in Latin smuggling center ... There have been ,I America ' is ' ,increasing, particularly persistent but unconfirmed rumors that a small number of high-level Paraguay- an officials are involved in drug traffick- among the young people." Concludes the secret report: 'There is increasing awareness in Latin America Committee for Narcotics Control was problem." 13 Approved'For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 LOS-ANGELES TIMES 28 January 1973.: fete : ' ' V. a ay Mandate More Fighting conciliation, if it does happen, will take some form of stalemated coex=. purely political, while others go be-, yond current politics deep into the. serted that there will be no elections' so long as Hanoi's 145,000 regular' unlikely to occur so long as the fu-, timate political movement lacks. JOHN McA1LISTER JR. Despite the buoyant.mood of opti- Isim produced;by Yesterday's. sign- ng of. the. cease-fire, agreement,.the, rospects for durable peace in Viet- am are still dim. While America's direct Invol.ve- ent. in any' continued fighting will he - possibility remains that' a U.S. Ewen before the cease-fire agree- eace yet." . And Hanoi's Le Duc. Tho had told' Paris news. conference that the po- itical struggle in the war-torn coup- ry would enter a new phase once ably, would service their govern If Saigon could not compete politi-. ears-then presumably its leaders elf-interest, ],,"resident Thieu had a ight to be -skeptical about a pro- roops in strategic locations in Soirth reserying the cease-fire, and forces aigon. to acknowledge that it is not he sovereign. government. in South letnarn but only a party to a new, rohibit any further U.S. military ]early requires the dismantling of Le Due yho,'therefore, was clearly ustified, froin?the perspective of his o agree to leave Vietnam entirely,: Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 A public policy analyst, John T. McAlister Jr. is a professor in the ;.department of engineering-economics at 'Stanford 'University. He is the a.utlcokof "Vietn.arn: Tice, Origins of Revnlntion," but he had also forced the Americ;ln, government to abandon its stanc(r.. that South',:Vietnam is ) a separate' and distinct nation -'the victim of ng : gressiori by 'a' "foreign" nation.. ' Reverting to the principles of.'the, 1954:Geneva Agreements, which no' UtS., government has ever fully ac- cepted or obeyed, 'the United States -has now-=at-least 'for the present- - .agreed that Vietnam is one country: and that - eventually it should be, governed by one.government. In a0 dition, the United States has rccog-. nized the Viet Cong as a'legitimate force-one with which Saigon must reach an accommodation and enter into a "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord," aiming for what in effect is a coalition government. It is one thing for the United States to negotiate a peaceful politi-. cal settlement for an agonizing and brutalizing war, and then withdraw from Vietnam. It is quite another thing for Saigon to live up complete- ly to the negotiated terms. The price for the return of American POWs and a negotiated cease-fire *as ob- viously high when measured against initial American objectives of an "independent South Vietnam free from attack." Americans, of course, are more than ready to pay the price. But what about Saigon? Although Saigon has failed to uphold its claim as the sole legiti- mate government in South Vietnam by either securing the necessary' 'popular support or utilizing Ameri- can firepower to punish its enemies, the goal has not been abandoned. Yet, the agreement signed yesterday by Saigon's representative Trail Van Lam, pledges Thieu's regime to hold consultations with the Viet Cong in the spirit of national recon- ciliation and concord, mutual re- t~peeL k3>iri. ifinulal >jtiii=A1Iniinn tun and to organize "free and democrat- ic general elections' under interna- tional supervision" so that the peo- ple of South Vietnam can decide their political future. There are some 'very strong rea-' sons that. these elections-like those called for in the 1054 Geneva agree- 14 guarantees and sanction by Saigon.". .If the political stalemate is to be bro- ken, then more concessions by Sai-: gon seem necessary-ones that are almost certain to lead to President Thieu's loss of his present position. of power.. Stronger reasons can be cited than simply Thieu's desire for personal power that make the prospects dim for concessions and 'reconciliation. There is little precedent in' the Viet- namese character-whether north or south, Communist or anti-Com- munist-for reconciliation. This is not because the Vietnamese are in- humane but because their traditions tell them that the single correct so- lution to social organization lies in individual ethics and governmental order. The tradition is often. called "The Mandate of Heaven," by which the Vietnamese mean that heaven has re- vealed a way that family groups can live in harmony with its will. Reconciliation and compromise are, by their very nature, anathema to the tradition of "The Mandate of, Heaven." Such gestures are admis- sions not only that one's own con- cept of social and political order- be it communism, Catholicism, Bud- dhism - is not totally correct, but that there is no single correct solu- tion for the organization of society. Amid the carnage and exhaustion of Vietnamese society, such tradi-' tions as "The Mandate of Heaven", may well die away. But if so, its pas- sage will not come soon. The past decades of Vietnamese life have b ien go h4f443 that egtebli?htad trii= ditions have proved virtually the only social anchor for the predomi- nantly rural-now almost half-refu- gee-society. Reconciliation and compromise are charar_terist.ics of "pluralist" socie- ties of Western civilization, but they are alien to traditionalist societies Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : 'CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08107: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 like Vietnam that still must deal with the "pluralist" challenges of modernization and industrialization. In "pluralist" societies, par] iamen= Lary debates and popular elections are useful means of resolving cone flicts. But in traditionalist societies like Vietnam, elections and debates are only rituals glorifying the cor- rectness of the particular regime in power-whether it be the Commu- nist one in Hanoi or the anti-Com- munist ones in Saigon-such glorifi- cation providing additional verifica- tion of."'T..`ho Mandate' of Heaven. Dr. Henry Kissinger is, of course,, to be praised for the brilliance of his negotiating skills and for the useful- ness of his formulas. for achieving 'a graceful American withdrawal from Vietnam. Neither he nor his Viet- namese counterparts, however, are capable of changing some basic cul-' tural ttterns of a people tragically caught halfway between the tradi- tional and the modern worlds.. Theirs Is a society in the midst of revolution, and this revolution will determine which way Vietnam en- ters the modern world. The solution will. be either Communist or. some 'NEW YORK.TIMES 7 February.1973 form of anticommunism, but it will not be a mixture of both unless the Vietnamese abandon their most fun- damental traditions and become a sort of "pluralist" society in the pro- ems. Such a prospect seems remote in- deed .As evidence, there came a re- port last week from Saigon, where .one of America's most experienced .scholars on Vietnam revealed the results of a field trip throughout the countryside. . "The cease-fire is unlikely to last 60 to 90 days beyond the date of American withdrawal," he observed. "So certain is Saigon over its own 'future and so Intense are the feel- ' Ings of bitterness and fear in tyre countryside that only a miracle could prevent the conflict from reoc- curing." If peace does not come and the war continues, what will America do- especially if Saigon seems thret*. .tened by military humiliation? Wil) "congressional figures equate' Sat ;`gon's difficulties with the Amerian national interest? Will there be calls to redeem the blood of American ,boys by going to Saigon's aid? Will' there by "protective reaction" raids as warnings to.Hanoi? To forestall such difficulties, the agreement signed yesterday calls for the convening within 30 days of a, major international conference 'to establish guarantees that will con: vert the cease-fire into a durable .peace. The conferees will include. Russia, China. France and Great Britain, as well as the various par ties to the negotiations. Over the next several months, thefuture of peace in Vietnam will hinge on whether this conference can develop methods for persuading' the various Vietnamese parties -to limit their struggle for power among, themselves to peaceful means. It is on these prospects for the future of'i peace in Vietnam-dim though-they, may be just now-that the hopes of Americans rest in entering the new era of. national promise and fulfill-." ment. If that era itself is to be durable;.' then perhaps we ourselves will have , to learn from the tragedy of our Vietnam 'involvement. One lesson', surely, is this: that ancient cultures like the Vietnamese share quite dif; ferent traditions from our own, and unless we take these differences into account, our own conduct toward them-even in their "defense"-i9 foredoomed to failure. Vietamn s_ Joy In Victory By Rennie Davis On Jan. 29, an American; peace dole- But the underlying perspective of gation was invited to a Paris recep- the Vietnamese we met in Paris was': WASHINGTON-Recently I met with lion by the Democratic Republic of that the accords represented a victory ?? .Mrs. Nguyen Thi. Binh. My only dis- Vietnam and the Provisional Revolu that has grown out of the success of" appointment was that every American , tionary Government of South Vietnam.: the recent spring-summer -offensive., could not share in the joy of Vietnam's It was an incredible mix of people, While every effort was made by Le ' victory. By any standards, it is in- from high officials of the French, So- Due Tho and the other Vietnamese; credible. viet, People's Republic of China and representatives to find language to A. 100-year French-American cam- other governments to ordinary people, ; give America "honor" and fig leaves ?paign, pitting the most advanced' ma like the Vietnamese taxi drivers who for their withdrawal, the United States, chines of destruction against an ancient were the guests of Xuan Thuy. What has been forced "to respect our fight nation of rice farmers has been de- struck me most was the open love for self-determination."' feated. Except for ' the generals and ' that so many different people felt' I have never seen the Vietnamese. .merchants whose lives were purchased ? and showed for the Vietnamese repre- leadership in Paris more confident of . by the American dollar, the Vietnamese sentatives, especially Mrs. Binh, whose, their strength and more hopeful for, :people today overflow with hope and ' . presence evoked a thousand embraces , their future. Mrs. Binh said, "We are ''anticipation. Every American who, and tears and smiles. strong and we will force the Saigon., "spoke out against' this : war, 'every. We' spent an afternoon with Mrs.' ' administration ?to, abide by the agree-. demonstrator' and resister and 0 anti- Binh on the eve of Vietnam's lunar ment. We are confident that the South war organizer, anyone who contributed' holiday, Tot. She thought- it sad that'. ' Vietnamese people will, be victorious.. to peace even with I the smallest ges- , . so many friends of Vietnam did not in the end.' ,'cure, can feel joy in the mutual.accom- understand the significance of their When I read about a U.S. Congress- plishment of this peace accord. victory. "Many, friends, see only the man making foolish 'declarations that Perhaps the greatest American loss difficulties that lie ahead and do not "hell will be a skating rink before I of this war.lies not in the lives, or the ? . see ' the great victory we have won," vote any foreign aid for that bunch of dollars wasted but in the endless she said. This agreement "not . only murderers," or watch the media reduce stream of ugly distortions flowing out speaks to the failure of aggression of the ending of the war to the sensation, of Washington. about the. men and wo- the United States in Vietnam, it marks of returning, a few hundred American", men and children who have defeated the failure of the global strategy of the - 'prisoners of war' without a.word of ',.America's military goliath. Even now, , United States' to stop the liberation the hundreds of thousands of Vietna- the media trumpet the official propa- struggles of peopie in many places." ' mese prisoners who remain in cells, I ganda: line .that bombs and mines feel surely the time has come for'' Mrs crushed' the powerful spring-summer ?i no. not w wish said bluntly that Saigon America to learn the hidden truth'. '.'.is offensive in' Vietnam and the Christ' illing to implement the agree- and that Saigon's leaders had about the "Vietcong." mas Hanoi-Haiphong massacre "forced" "adopted a militaristic line and line. The Vietnamese people are already` the North Vietnamese back to of repression and terror against the forgiving America for the greatest negotiations, people." atrocity. of the twentieth century and Tim ; will show the opliiiSite, Pi'esi? Particularly, sha said, Prosident ThIOu ' they nf@ pr0n10y 60 iiiost forgiving dent Nixon's"peace with honor" Is a will resist the release of over 200,000 people on the-planet.' face-saving disguise for a "Vietcong" civilian prisoners jailed and tortured Perhaps Mrs. Binh should be invited: victory. Or, as Mrs. Binh said: "Nixon during the 'war, the establishment of a to the United States. 'She or her repre- has failed. If you asked us who Is the third force as a significant group to ? , sentative would be happy to come, if winner in the war, we would like to help implement the accords and recog- Congress would have the courage to say, peace is the winner. And It is nition of the spirit of the accords hear her and demand a visa. Perhaps a true peace because it is peace 'with' calling for national reconciliation and those television and public-opinion independence " i concord. makers who blinded us.to Vietnam and Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : ~IA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 taught us hate for the "other side," inight.travel in future days to My Lai, where the P.R.G. is building a hospital for the villa a our soldiers massacred .Saigon with the life the P.R.G. offers' My Lai and the rest of South Vietnam. U Rennie Davis, an antiwar activist, has In- fact, airfields are being built in the 11 P.R.G. controlled zones that will. make i traveled widely in Vietnam. He re- it possible to compare' honestly the cently returned ,from Paris and discus-, life offered by. the U.S. Government in lions with Yuan Thuy and Mrs. Nguyen Thi niuh. NEW YORK TIMES 4 February 1973 IXON AIDES MOVE AGAINST WAR FOES Past Critics" of President's Policies Are Assailed By JOHN HERBERS Speelel to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 3-Now that a peace agreement in Vietnam has been reached, members of the Nixon Adminis- tration have undertaken 'to discredit the critics of the Pres- ident's conduct of the war and of peace negotiations. In the last week, Adminis- tration officials have charged that the criticism delayed the peace agreement, that colum- nists and commentators fabri- cated reports of disagreement between Mr. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger during the Decem- 'ber .bombing and. that the President has been 'subjected to unfair criticism. ? The charges were leveled at members of Congress, the media and officials in the Ken- ncdy.and Johnson Administra- tions, One ' of the' Administra- tion.. spokesmen applied the term "sellout brigade" to those wh6 favored an earlier, withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam and op .posed the use of saturation, bombing, mining and other activity by the United States. Mr. Nixon, at his news con- ference last Wednesday, said that "the least pleasure out of the ;"peace agreement comes from those who were the most outspoken advocates of peace, at any ' price.",. Peace Seen Delayed ?; On Thursday night, Charles W. Colson, special counsel tol the President, interviewed byl Elizabeth Drew on the Public Broadcasting' Service television network, said `that the opposi- tion to the President's conduct of the war .in Congress had delayed the negotiation of peace. If-there had been bipartisan support of what the President was doing, he said, "I think thel war would have ended much sooner than it did." "Pressed for specifics about the criticism of Mr. Nixon, Mr. Colson said that Clark Clif- ford, , President Johnson's last Secretary of Defense, was ".representative, really, of a group of people who would DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 5 February,. 1973 VIALAi AM' ?l Eva PEACE ROUND ONE of the Vietnam ",cease-.fire," after a'week in.' which the fighting flared and spread instead of subsiding, has ended more quietly. But there is no sign so far of any of the hopeful factors in the agreements showing tender shoots, and plenty,of c opfirmation for the first grim forebodings. The North Vietnamese demonstrated their ability to take the initiative. in the new situation' and, although they may have -suffered heavier losses than the Southe;4n troops, they scored more points. Now they are preparing for what could be Round Two in the shape of an assaplt on the provincial capital of Quang Tri. ,With the South, under the agreements, denied arms supplies other than replacements, its only hope of ce tain- ing the North Vietnamese forces in their " leopard-spot enclaves lies in these also being held fo the mutual restrictions. Yet, on the contrary ' supplies and reinforce- menta,alre pouring in through the -De Ilia irised one Laos lend (Cambodia fairer kith ever, cut` el~ai ly 1I ae ilt ' ' by , the " cease-fire." The International Supervisory Commission, and the military committees composed of the parties to the war, although gradually taking shape, are still bogged down ; in procedural, administrative and logistical problems. Not that anyone can imagine the Polish and Hungarian have compromised' this coun- try's position in ' Vietnam." What those people were advo- cating, Mr. Colson said, was a -"dishonorable peace." He identified four Senators- W. ' Fulbright of Arkansas, George McGovern of South Dakota, Frank Church of Idaho and Edward M. Kennedy of,.Massachusetts-as "part of the 'sellout brigade."' "I think they would have had tis leave Vietnam without regard to 'the consequences," he said. ? ? ..,Mr. Colson used the words "sell-out brigade" in an "Op-Ed column" in, The New Yorkl Times last Tuesday in which he charged that reports of differ- ences between the President and Mr. Kissinger were a "full- blown myth born in Wash- ington Georgetown cocktail .circuit that had made Mr. Kis- singer's peace efforts more dif- ficult. ;'Ronald S., Ziegler, the White House press secretary, . rein- forced Mr. Colson's argument in a long discourse with report- ers, who wanted to know if the column had the President's ap- proval. He said that Mr. Colson was speaking for himself but he sought to show that there was no evidence for high-level divi- sion on the war. Flat Stand on Kissinger "There was no difference of view on the' matter of the bomb. ing that took place, in Decem- bcr,i' Mr. Ziegler said. "I can state flatly that he [Mr.'Kissin- ger] did not oppose It." Asked if it were possible as widely'be- lieved, that Mr. Kissinger had been 'the source of the reports, Mr, Ziegler said that he could not believe anyone who so com- pletely agreed with the Presi- dent in White House meetings could spread reports of division., During the week, Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of. Arizona, distributed an unsigned, "Vietname white paper" that was reported to have originated in the Administration. Mr. Gold- water, in his accompanying let-, ter, endorsed the paper without. identifying its source. Several thousand copies were distrib- uted. - "For four agonizing years. Richard Nixon has stood vir- tually alone in the nation's cap- ital while little, petty men flayed him over American in-' volvement in Indochina," the paper said. "No President has been under more. constant and unremitting harassment." Attached to the text was a list of quotations from news- papers, columnists, commenta- hots, magazines, and Democrats in Congress to show "how wrong and how harsh were the critics when things were most difficult." members, even if they ever get out on the long, long Ho Chi-minh trail, ever being parties to discovering or denouncing any violations committed by their comrades. Meanwhile Dr KISSINGER, for whose " peace with honour " North Vietnam is showing such derision, will visit Hanoi on Friday and Peking next week. To Hanoi he will take those familiar instruments of President NIxoN's Vietn-ani policy, the carrot and the stick-now in that order. The former is as succulent as a few billion dollars can make it. Dr KISSINGER dwells on Hanoi's need for peace aid reconstruction after 20 years of war. 'He may be misunderstanding the North Vietnamese Communists if he thinks that, with victory suddenly seeming so much closer, with no public opinion or democratic qualms of conscience, they can be bought off with offers of American aid and friendship. They may be more impressed with the stick, the weight of which they have felt so recently. It would) he politically difficult for Mr NIXON to resume the bomlXiin!g, but he 'has shown that he is a determined man, titiopt.ait rlttyi trl$ dptif i~I Iafe l"t ~pdtii3ei3~ A& for Ol lna, she very much wants peaee and a fat her rapid iinmprouement in relations with America to balance Russian expansion. She would like to curb .Hanoi's upstart mini-imperialism, but could hardly be seen to be letting a Communist protege down. Dr KissINGER's next case? 16 '. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00,0100100001-5 THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 25 January 1973 Vietnam: ? peace, and conflict A ceasefire after a quarter of a century of bloody, destructive fighting in Vietnam is some- thing the whole world as well as the Vietnamese can be relieved at and grateful for. It Is not important that President Nixon called it "peace with honour" and Hanoi a "great victory" at the same time. The vital and decisive point is that the scale of fighting and killing now Is likely to be drastically reduced and that the Americans should be leaving. The Vietnamese are now left to sort things out for themselves after their tensions had been exacer- bated by ,the French, the Japanese, the French'. again, and then the Americans. The ghastliness of the war can be offset only In part by President Nixon's statement that the US was prepared to make a major effort to build a peace of reconciliation." This will not bring back to life or heal the, two and a half million Vietnamese dead and wounded, ftor can It restore homes to the millions of refugees. It will not restore trees and crops to the defoliated acres, nor will it re-create the cities, villages, and countryside turned to rubble under the rain of bombs' dropped on Indo-China (mainly on South Vietnam) since 1966.' It has been a war of wrong tactics used at the wrong time, with hideous results for Vietnam, South and North. If Dr Kissinger has brought back peace for the Americans In their time, has be done the same for the Vietnamese ? President Nixon put a sturdy face and voice on his ceasefire announce- ment. But the vague nature of the agreement- after years of fighting, bombing, and negotiating -appears In fact to have raised a smokescreen behind which the US can disappear with a minimum of dignity lost. And on the ground In Vietnam ? Unless there is an unprecedented demonstration of goodwill and resolution by all Vietnamese parties to make the published terms work, the long term prospects. .must be gloomy. The major concession that the US has obtained is that Saigon and the Vietcong will try to do their utmost to bring about the '..release, . within 90 days of the ceasefire, of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and .retained, in South Vietnam. It is easy to see how President Thieu's best efforts could be insufficient. Monday. reb.5.197.4 THE WASHINGTON POST U. n n R 11 As, Use' Thieu has issued a stern injunction to suppress by shooting, if necessary, any support for the Communists. He is keen to postpone as long as!, possible any opportunity for the Communists to `; rebuild their cadres. There is. no hurry, in his , eyes, to let the prisoners out. Nor is he in any hurry to let the refugees, If home is in a Vietcong-controlled district, or, to desist from using the apparatus of arrest and terror to hold his remaining areas in the South..i The prescribed 90 days, of course, are too short a time in which to relax the tensions and establish an :easier way of life. A beginning could be made if the will were there. Perhaps, when Vietnamese face Vietnamese on their own, it will prove nearer than seems probable. Morel than the 90 days will pass before the reality is seen. The National Council of National Reconcilia- tion looks as unpromising as it always has. Both Thieu and the Communists are determined to. canvass strength by force. Neutrals to make up the third party will be hard to find, and unanimity within the council even harder. The limited size of the ceasefire control commission (always a notional force), the continued presence of North' Vietnamese troops, and the lack of troop' regroupment areas makes more likely-the even-; tual renewal of fighting-with the commission' just 'making notes. On a wider scale, the prevention of military activity in Laos and Cam-' bodia seems fragile. The US appears still to have leeway enough to continue bombing the trails from Thailand. Will it not be warned by past experience to avoid further involvement ? The legacy of eight years of deep American Involvement in the Vietnamese war will be, fe'lt~ far beyond Vietnam. The frustration, loss of self-confidence, and fear of foreign involvement) among Americans will affect international rela- tions for the remainder of this century. President; Nixon was putting a gentle gloss on it all when he said, in his inaugural address, that America ; will no longer make every other nation's conflict its own or every other. nation's future Its: responsibility. Although Intervention In Vietnam was in the end- a disaster, Atfterica's withdrawal from world responsibility is' the world's loss. Westerners, including some American strategists, were surprised during the prolonged cease-fire negotia- tions in Phris by the North can officials have reasoned; the intended Council should pose no threat whatever to the continued rule in South Vietnam of President Nguyen Van Thieu. With the unanimity rule ule. News Analysis operating in the Council, it ? has been argued prlvately 0 1 ' inside the Nixon administra- Vietnamese insistence that ' : tion, q'hieu's regime faces the rule of unanimity must no real challenge that a. po apply in the projected three- tent.ial "coalition" govern-, segment National Council of ment may enmm'ito from the "unity," Vietnamese style National Reconciliation and ? (Paris accord. With decisions Concord for South Vietnam. requiring unanimity for ac- (.Tlac writer recevttiy re? hardly mean 'exactly the ,?..-. It is this ed m a t k i lishment here is bring reduced to an atta- clie's office of. fewer than 100 servicemen, but for the foreseeable future there will be between 5,000 and 6,000 civilians on contracts paid for by the. Defense Depart- ment, according to the latest estimat.c. These contract employees, most of whom have been here for some time, will be performing what informed sources described as "logistical, supply and train- Ing fi notions" for the South Vietnamese, intended prima- rily to assist in the mainte- nano of sophisticated U.S.- uppticcl aircraft and equip- . U.:?. officials say that the funding. of civilian techni- cians to work with South Vi- etnant's armed forces does not violate the provisions In the cease-fire agreement prohibiting' "military advis- number of retired military ers . . including technical men who have been 'around military personnel." ? The South Vietnam for years. technicians will not be sup-- Virtually all of the senior porting combat activities in' civilians in CORDS (Civil any way, the officials con- Operations and Rural Devel- tend. opment Support), the acro- The contractors will be nym for the pacification.ef- under the direction of the fort under the U.S.' Military at aches office, which, at Assistance Command, are ]cast initally, is scheduled to being kept on. take over the spacious George D. Jacobson, a re tired East" headquar- tired colonel who has been- tcrs of the dismantled U.S- the operational head of command. The ranking offi CORDS for almost two ccr, whose appointment was years, has been named. a announced by the State De- special assistant to Ambas- Eartment, is Maj. Gen. John sador Ellsworth Bunker. E. Murray. The structure of the R Murray his is staff a logistics range e and R directorate will be part, but itwill very similar to the civilian far beyond military supply side of the old pacification problems in their work. Mil-i itary sources said that about program. The scale will be half the attaches will be very different, however, watching-mainly from Sal- with teams of six to eight gon-the, activities of Com- persons covering an-average tnunist forces throughout of two provinces instead of the country and serving as the teams of 200 military liaison with the Jnterna- and civilian personnel as- t.ional Commission for Con- signed to the larger prov- trol and Supervision inces in 1969-70. The cease-fire and the de- For some of the Ameri- parture of U.S. forces has cans involved the end of the also meant a reorganization war will not even mean a of the U.S. embassy, sub- change of scenery. Albert I. stantially increasing its re- (Buck) Kotzebue, for in- sponsibilities. stance, a former army 'offi- Through a network of cer who has been the senior four consulates-three of American adviser in the Me- them newly established- kong Delta province of Ki- and the "Resettlement and enhoa for more than four Reconstruction Directorate," years, will be staying there' finitel i d y. n e the embassy will have bull- dreds of people in the field Other officials are simply monitoring political develop- being transferred to differ- ments and supervising enut locations. In a typical American-financed efforts to case, John Virgil. Swango, get South Vietnam back on another retired lieutenant its feet. colonel and one time Peoria, The constilates, located in Ill., bar owner, is leaving dif- ljanan,g, Nhatrang, Bienhoa ficult Binthclinh province to and Cantho, are to be become a ranking aide in headed by high-ranking U.S. the delta. Foreign Service officers and Many of t,h e province ,the political reporting will teams will be living In the be done by 40 Vietnamese- same compounds used by speaking FSOs just transfer- CORDS. Ground transporta- red back to South Vietnam 1 tion will be supplemented from posts around the by a beef-up contract for world, Air America, the private CIA ' The FSOs, some of whom airline that has lonig-served were less than happy about pacification and intellegence being ordered on -short no- operation in South Vietnam tier. to leave comfortable and Laos. positions and their families Private Criticism for the Hardships and uncer- The decision to set-up a t.ainty they face here, will unit within the embassy so be scattered 'around the ciosly patterned on the ap- ouutry for tours t up paratus of the war years has t to six months. Whether ther they been privately criticized by are extended or replaced de- some U.S. officials. They ponds, officials said, on how argue that the retired: mili- the situation in South Viet tarymen, in particular, iden- nam develops. tify themselves with policies Significant Innovations of the past ant are likely to The most significant inno- miss the significance of pa- litical accommodations and vation at the embassy, at, adjustments that doubtless Ic< in numerical t.crnts e ,;_ ahead for the Vietnamese. . the -ii anu it The other view is that ex- The unit will have about 250 pericnced people, whatever i staff members drawn pr ma- their h; cktprniind ~ nu1d he , ri y from the former pacift utilized in the difficult ta'an- cation program, including a 28.: sition period between war and peace. The task of the Resettlement and Reconstruc- ., tion Directorate, according to ; Jacobson, will be "to assist GVN (Government of Viet nam) officials at the lower.., levels in the non-military pro-,: grams of the. 1972-75 'corn-' munity .defense and local de- velopment plan."' This' basically means con., tanuing the existing .projects": in agriculture,'public health, land reform' and community: development as well as refu;; gee relief. The level of finan cial assistance is still to be determined by Congress.., Planning, however, Is based`. on the expectation of a major] ,and costly reconstruction of-r One important change in. the present set-tip, in keeping, with the requirements of the Paris cease-fire agreement;' is that all civilian public safe=; ty advisers who worked with:' the South Vietnamese police have been withdrawn. (It has- been quietly decided, how- ever, to leave a handful ? of the police experts in Saigon, In the revised mission, structure, the province , teams will report to the con- suls general In the four re- gions who will then 'report to Deputy' Ambassador. Charles Whitehouse and so on through the State De- partment's chain of com-::: mand. But the teams will also be working closely with the Ageltcy for Interna- tional Development head quarters in Saigon. The number of . U.S. AID i officials in South Vietnam is currently about 900, in- cluding those assigned' to :" the, R and R Directorate. Al- though only a third of what' ' it once was, the AID mission there is still three -or four times larger than other big American missions around the globe. New Officer Added Besides the addition of the consulate and the direc- torate,' the embassy has added two new offices within the political section:':. One will coordin:?te the flow of reports coming in from:, the field and the other will . serve as liaison with the ICCS. To serve the ICCS, the State Department has dis- patched officers from Its embassies In the four mem- bercountries: Canada, lllut- gary, Poland and Indonesia. The U.S. diplomat from Warsaw, for example, is a fluent Polish speaker and can keep tabs on the mood Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 of the 285-man Polish con- tingent. The Hungarian spe- cialist, it is said, is arrang- ing for delivery of Budapest newspapers. The arrival of the FSOs - they number about 50 in all-has enlivened the Sai- gon embassy, at least tempo- rarily, giving it something of the flavor of a class reun- ion, as old friends meet be- foile being sent onwards to the hinterlands. As for the other principal American agencies-the United States Information Service and the Central In- telligence Agency-they will go on about as before. USIS was converted last year from the. mammoth 'press and ,propaganda enterprise it was at the height of the war to a more conventional post. The CIA has also withdrawn some of its field staff and analysts in the past two years and has apparently bilized, officials said. sI 11 WASHINGTON STAR (The mission leadership Is will depend to a large ex- likely to change soon. Ells- . tent on the ability of U.S. , unsuccessful because Penta- worth Bunker, who has technicians to keep the gon officials are apparently served in the demanding equipment running., ! worried about the sensitive- ambassadorial Job for al- In the first place, U.S. is nearing 80 ficials directly concerned ears i t , x y s mos and is expected to leave' with the contracts insist very soon. The State depart- that the number of 5,000 to ment has proposed Graham 6,000 civilians will be gradu Martin to replace him. Mar- ally reduced as the Vietnam- tin is a former ambassador ese become more proficient to Thailand and has just in servicing themselves. completed a tour as U.S. en- Sensitive Subject voy in Italy.) In an interview last Probably the most contro- month, Wilfred J. Curley, versial aspect of the` Ameri- the civilian Defense Depart- I can presence In South Viet- ment official here in charge nam in the coming months of defense-awarded con- are the Defense Depart- ment-funded contractors. The specter has been raised by war critics of a semi- covert army of mercenaries picking tip where the regu- lar army left off. The. reality, at this stage, seems to fall short of the dangers portrayed, although it is undeniable that South Vietnam's military readiness 9 February 1973 WILLIAM F. L UCKLEYJR JA PpAn,0,FS t&e,B(0M Forgive me if it just hap- pens that I missed them, but in fact I have not seen any- thing from the Great Denun- ciators about the success of President Nixon's December bombings. I thought, for in- stance, that Gloria Emerson (of the New York Times) might rise from the cata- combs to which she repaired after the bombings resumed, in order to express a word or two of gratitude that the war is, so to speak, ended; but she has not been heard from. Perhaps she is writing a mea culpa- it.would in her case take time, notwithstanding her training in deadlines. fear that the cat has got hold of the New York Times' tongue, though the silence probably is worth it, come to think of it. James Reston, also of the Times, said that the bombing was "war by tantrum." Well, if it was, then he should medi- tate on whether strategy by tantrum is necessarily unde- sirable, inasmuch as this one clearly paid off. Anthony Lewis, also of the Times, said that Nixon, in ordering the bombing, was behaving "like a maddened tyrant." Two weeks later we had peace. Lewis would ap- pear to be obliged either to diminish his respect for Tom Wicker wrote in mid- - peace, or else increase his bombing: "Why should bomb ing a people make them want respect for maddened tyrants, to deal in good faith?" Well, no whv. didbombing a nnnnle But, my children, it is alto- make them deal in good faith? s."'" UUVIUUJ 11UW ulese UUC- Why doesn't Wicker tell us? trinaire gentlemen are going The New York Times, at to handle this sequence of about the same. period, was. events. They will in the first Place try to ignore them. If very pointed on the matter . "The American bombs . , that does not work, they will have dimmed prospects r, say that after all, the Novem- for peace in Indochina," her terms, rejected by Nixon, are not substantially different Well, in fact the' American' from the January terms, ac- bombs didn't dim, but clearly cepted by Nixon. enhanced prospects for peace The answer to that is: The in Indochina where, as a mat- people best equipped to judge ter of fact, things are at this ? the differences -- the South moment almost preternatural- ' Vietnamese - accepted the ly peaceful, by Indochinese January terms, having reject- standards. What about it? We ' ed the November terms. A tracts, said the number would go down steadily. He said that reports of an in- flux of several thousand ad- visers and technicians, as much as doubling the pres- ent number, were incorrect. "There are absolutely no in- dications of that happen- ing," he said. Efforts to interview Cur- ; ley a second time have been - supplementary point is that. the November terms were dif- ferent from the October terms. Or they will ask: "In what sense did the bombing figure at all?" The answer is: It must have figured in some way. One can understand people who say that the bomb- ing would have a negative effect, i.e., that it would hard- en the opposition of the peo- ple. Or the opposite, that it would embolden the peace party in Hanoi. Hardly that it would be without effect. As it happens, the bombing turned Le Due' Tho into a parade marshal at Nixon's inaugural. No, a sensible reading is this: Bombing, unless it is done with crushing force over a period of time sufficient to knock off critically needed lubricants of war (See "The Memoirs of Albert Speer"), doesn't do much good against firm leadership over a united country. The bombing of the early years under Lyndon Johnson was not of a charac. ter either to divide the people, or to aripplo the wor-making potential. When Richard Nixon decid- ed finally to bomb, he decided to bomb definitively, and he decided to do so at a moment when the peace group within the presidium at Hanoi was on the defensive. The doves, nature of the subject. One measure of the situa- tion, however, is that con- tractors themselves are not talking of any great windfall after the final departure of U.S. forces. Seine techni- cians say their salaries have been cut and 2ontracts sud- denly terminated. But it is an indisputable fact that for the foreseeable future there will be Ameri- cans in and around every, major South Vietnamese military installation work- ing on the helicopters, air- craft and complex communi. cations systems given the South Vietnamese by thi. United States. In other areas of South Vietnamese life, as well, Americans will go on watch- ing and prodding the Viet- namese. as we look back on it, were in the saddle in October. In No- vember, when Nixon was re- elected and did not immedi- '. ately take tough military measures, the:hawks gained.,( the ascendancy. The bombings reversed their positions. During this' period, held up to the world by Olof Palme and others of the Hieronymous Bosch ,school of U.S. diplomacy as a rebirthof?Hiroshima, Dresden ' and Ravensbruck, 1,400 North Vietnamese civilians died and twice that number were -s wounded. Would that such a sacrifice had been exacted many years ago. A half-mil-, lion North Vietnamese might'A' now be alive, not to mention hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese, and thou- sands of Americans. Dogmatic opposition to Richard Nixon (as opposed to discriminating opposition) will unquestionably be accept- ed by future epistemologists as a single greatest impedi- ment to ktlawlodg? in tho ROth century. If only fhe gentlemen would not only concede that Nixon was right, which would be the gallant thing to do; but learn from his having been' right! Wars would certainly be shorter, and almost as cer- tainly less frequent. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : c2A-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 WASHINGTON POST 8 February, 1973 CIut?Ples W. Yost IN A MONTH to be marked by Kis-' singer visits to Hanoi and Peking, the' Vice-President's tour of Southeast' Asia, the opening of an international,' .conference to guarantee the Vietnam' cease-fire agreements, and probably'. the 'application of parallel cease-fires An Lang and Cambodia, it is timely to? consider what role the United States, should plan to play in the coming dec ade throughout East Asia and the Western Pacific. A number ' of questions come to mind. Should the United States en- deavor itself to enforce the cease-fire agreements in the three Indochina states, or should it leave enforcement to the opposing parties in these coun- tries, supplemented by international machinery which cannot be expected to have strong teeth? Should the United States maintain Intact all of the various alliances, de fense pacts, commitments, bases and, military deployments which 'we have' built up over the past quarter century' throughout the area? These include' the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- tion, bilateral. defense treaties with Ja- pan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Anzus Pact with Australia and New. Zealand and substantial United States' military forces in Korea, Japan and Thailand, as well as the Seventh Fleet patrolling the coasts of East and South- east Asia. All this adds up to a still. very large American military involvement in a part of the world where the rationale for such involvement seems to have di- minished, if not disappeared, The power orginally responsible for, our involvement, Japan, is now one of! our closest friends. Communist China,' which for 20 years we perceived to be, first, an instrument of the Soviet Un ion and,. second, inveterately expan=' sionist itself, is now perceived to be" neither. - While is would be hazardous to pre- dict the more distant future, it seems reasonably certain that for some yeatrs to conic China will be preoccupied with its own domestic economic and political problems and with. its anxie- ties about the Soviet Union.'For that time at least it will pose no serious threat to its neighbors. There is likely to be for some time A continuing; zone of instability in South- cast Asia, where our prolonged and ex- cessive intervention has delayed estab- lishment of an equilibrium 'among in- digenous forces which alone could be durable. As a correspondent of The Washing- ton Post. Thomas Lippman, wrote from Saigon a few days ago, the Indochina Nixon responded by promising the So viet Union a "role" In shaping the post-war structure of power. ' Chou En-lai's objections to Russia's'y supposed attempts to "dominate" the" Lice thr.t China does not wish any such.... American-Soviet deal to be consum- mated. This is the kind of complication that was to be expected as Mr. Nixon began to shape the "balance of power" which, he believes, will maintain the peace of the world, not just of Indo- china, after the Vietnam War. Peking and Moscow are as intrigued by Mr. Nixon's balance-of-power, for- mula as everybody else. By a happy. co- incidence, some of the questions raised about it in this column last week were, promptly answered in Dr. Kissinger's TV interview with CBS. The shifting alliances which characterized the bale. ante of power in the 19th century, he explained, were not applicable in the nuclear age. - The Kremlin.will certainly be glad to have this reassurance on the eve of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking. Its ' own study of Mr. Nixon's "five-polar world," in which the United States and" the Soviet Union are to be joined as .super-powers By China, Europe and Ja- pan, has given Moscow cause for con- corn. Soviet studies now conclude that' the new "poles" are intended 'to "counter-balance" the Soviet Union and "to ease the burden of imperial- ism's struggle against socialism," that is, to help the United States to prevail over the Soviet Union.' They argue that China's, role as the "third pole" has been designed by the United States "to accord exclusively with the interests of capitalism.'! This, they believe, explains the "marked ac- tivity" of the United States in building up China's role. The Kremlin evidently does not ac- cept Mr. Nixon's assurances that he does not want, to play off. Russia against China. The balance of power does not balance-yet. But a balance of sorts was achieved by the most bril liant diplomatic operation known, to history when, Russia and China helped the United States to end the war. The men who accomplished this-in all three countries-could surely accom- plish more, and build a world struc- ture of peace, in the face of difficulties that sometimes seem insuperable. CJ 1973. Victor Zarza over primary responsibility for the se,' curity of this region-insofar as outsid-' ers need concern themselves wi:,h it at all-to international instrumentalities.' The i9=nation pilttit'ent?d on vttitl? nano meeting later this month it rather curiously and unsatisfactorily com-' posed, since only four states front the area will be present-China, North and' South Vietnam, and Indonesia. Onee of the main objectives of the conference; after doing what little it can to solidify the recent agreements, should be' to 'pass on the mandate for guaranteeing, Approved ror Release 2001/08/07: CIA-.RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 WASHINGTON POST 8 February, 1973 Victor Zorza And Power Politics. DR. KISSINGER will carry to China this month the payoff for Peking's help in settling the Vietnam war, but it looks as if Mao Tse-tung is in for a disappointment. The United States has made promises both to Peking and to Moscow. If it tries to give full satisfac. tion to either capital, the other will A year ago Mr. Nixon promised that Russia as well as China "will play a role in shaping a new structure of re- gional stability" after the war. The United States would no longer provide "the principal means of guaranteeing Asian security. But as the triangular balance proposed by Mr. Nixon began to take 'shape, both China and the So- viet Union set to work to keep the other out of the area.' Peking now complains that although China and the United States had agreed to forgo supremacy in Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union refused to give up "its attempt to dominate the area." It was trying to achieve this, said Chou En-lai, the Chinese premiere, by promoting an Asian "collective secu- rity system" designed to encircle China. - The Russians are not content. with Mr. Nixon's promise to share with them and with China the influence which the United States has exercised in the past. Tbcy seem to fear that they may be cheated out of what they believe is their due. The fears which the Kremlin was voicing so freely before Mr. Nixon's visit to Peking, and which were al- layed somewhat by his visit to Moscow, are rampant again. "Peking and Wash- ington have agreed to divide the sphere of influence in Southeast Asia between them," says Moscow radio, "at the expense of third countries," that is, of Russia. China, it says, wants the United States to remain in the area, since 'this would make it difficult for the countries of Southeast Asia to ac- quire "new allies"-such as the Soviet Union. 1 Before Mr. Nixon's trip to China, the Kremlin let it be known that it fa- vored the post-war "neutralization" of the area, which would be "guar- anteed," as Pravda put it, by the United States, China, and the' Soviet Union. This was what the Kremlin hoped to get eventually ii exchange for Its own help In settling the war. Mr. war "lasted longer and decided less than any other conflict in modern his- tory." Who wins how and when in that conflict has still to be determined. The future ambit,lens of ltanol out- side Vietnam remain uncertain, thoueii it seems doubtful that either Peking or Moscow would encourage them now. However, outside Indochina no domi- noes seem likely to fall, unless they fall of their own weight. Consequently it would be cone tent. both with the Nixon Doctrine and with United States national interest to turn 30 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 long-range security in Southeast Asia to more broadly and regionally repre-' sentative bodies. Because of the war in Vietnam and the tension between China and the United States, regional organizations in Fast Asia-both the Asian and Pa-; cific Council spanning the western Pa cific from Japan and Korea all the w.ay` to Australia and New Zealand, and the more restricted association of South- east Asian nations-have hardly ven- tured to involve themselves In the se- curity.field. Now they should be encouraged to WASHINGTON STAR 7 February 1973 do so-under the broad umbrella of the United Nations, which likewise, now that Peking is represented in New York and the Vietnam war is officially, ended, should no longer be inhibited from concerning itself with East Asia;, The presence of the U.N. Secretary- General at the ? forthcoming confer- ence, and perhaps U.N. participation in relief and reconstruction in Indochina,,; should facilitate this Involvement. This does not mean that U.S. treaty commitments should be relaxed with-. out our friends' c o n sent, or that' there should be sudden massive with- MIN Q'I Non By HENRY S. BRADSHER ~dfl1t,Q?D'~AD'Q?>1dQ?1LY~Dlit SAIGON - A spirit of peace Jul coexistence with the Com- ed to be continuing. But the munists seems to be spreading reports indicate little of the across South Vietnam. It ap- staunch rejection of Commu- parently worries President nist influences which Thieu Nguyen Van Thieu. had sought. The relaxed attitude of rec- Officials of the government onciliation that is noticeable here consider this situation among many Vietnamese has very dangerous. They had caused Thieu's government to wanted to keep the Commu- begin seeking a quick political gists quarantined in their en. agreement with the Commu. so that they nists and elections before the slaves of control could not infect the people. official anti-Communist too much. Communist posi- But Communist political work- tion is eroded When reportedly are operating When the cease-fire theoreti- ers cally went into effect 10 days several themes ago, Thieu exhorted his people Thieu which he has can seveverl them elections. a continue their struggle n One is the relative prosperity what against st he the ca Communists of South Vietnam-htanks to There called a a dangerous American aid-compared with relaxation against st a a tre treac her- ' new phase. North Vietnam. Another ous enemy, he warned. theme is stability. .. If Communists come into Dangerous Preachers your village", you should im- But his main theme always saidthem fi the has been the essentially nega- bead," e Thieg shoot suddenly " who tive one of anti-Communism sudly begin talking d in n . be a on which his leadership is Communist tone should based. If the Communists can killed immediately." erode this by preaching recon-. Tired of War ciliation and finding the people But reports . from around receptive, Thieu will be in the country say that there now trouble. seems to be a widespread de- The cease-fire agreement sire to let the hostility die. ' provides for the- Saigon gov- People are tired of war and its ernment and they Viet Cong to tensions and hatreds. "do their utmost" to agree on Some sporadic fighting con internal matters within 90 tinues to mar the cease fire, days. They are to "'organize. and. in some places the anti- free and democratic general Communist struggle is report-'.: elections.... When Thicu finally accepted the agreement two weeks ago, officials here were emphasiz- ing the difficulties of the two sides being able to agree on internal matters and holding elections. There seemed to be no hurry, since Thieu was left in control of the government for however long it took. But between Thieu's speech at the time the cease-fire 10 days ago and his Lunar New Year address to the nation six days later (last Saturday), the government's attitude seems to have changed. New Emphasis The speech last Saturday emphasized for the first time the importance of reaching a political agreement with the Viet Cong quickly, so that the way could be cleared for elec- tions. Thieu said then nb was fa- structing his special negotiator in Paris, ambassador Pham Dang Lam, to begin the pre- paratory consultations with the Viet Cong provided for in thecease -fireagreement.. These talks began Monday and were continuing today in Paris. The opening attitude was that procedural matters could be cleared up speedily. Lam told reporters later that the Viet Cong foreign minister, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, "Can come to Saigon when she likes to begin her consultations." This reversed an earlier feeling here that the potential- ly infectious Mrs. Binh and her comrades should be kept away as long as possible. The Saigon. government now sees early elections as possibly; being to its benefit, so wants to move along. What Election? This does not mean that ear- ly elections will necessarily follow. As Lam also said, pro-; cedural matters are going ' smoothly but "it might be, more difficult when fundamen- tal problems were reached." The most fundamental prob- lem is what kind of elections. Thieu has advocated a presi-,: dential race, with the winner,.: to form a cabinet which re- flects the percentage of votes polled by various factions. Thieu is conficent of winning, .a view shared by most inde- pendent observers at the pres- ent time. Knowing this, the Commu- nists want an election for a constituent assembly which would then decide what form of government South Vietnam should have. Even a relatively small Communist bloc in such an assebly could be noisily effective, and if things would not go their way at first they could try to *break up the as- sembly and have another elec- tion. That process could go on for long enough to cause those less dedicated than the Com- munists to lose their persist once. So a difficult fight over' the elections is generally expected li@t'o, And that presuniably worries the government, too, because it will take time which the Communist might be using in the countryside to try to erode Thieu's support, Approved For. Release 2001/08/07 : Cl -RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 drawals of United States forces from, areas other than Indochina. it should mean, however, that the military disen- gagement and the detente so wisely in.. itiated by President Nixon can in the near future be carried considerably further, from Korea to Taiwan to Thai- land, and that the primary duty for maintaining international peace and security in East -Asia can be placed where it belongs-in the governments of the area, their regional organiza- tions and the United Nations Security Council. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 ;WASHINGTON STAR 7 February 1973 ~, 11 r2% 17 IV V By JAMES DOYLt Star-News Stiff Writer The Indochina war is in dan- ger of? major escalation into a new "secret war" which would involvethousands of U.S. ad- visers under the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy, according to a former worker among the refugees of Laos who has made a, study of the "secret war" in that coun- try. Fred Brantman, a leading critic of American involve- ment in Indochina who has written extensively about the covert U.S. bombing of Laos,- presented a collection of 32 reports from major American newspapers at a news confer- ence yesterday, to back up his contention that the U.S. ap- pears headed for a major rein- vestment of civilian forces and paramilitary air, and ground units in Vietnam. "This is the period when a President could pull out," Branfman said, "but if these press clippings turn out to be right, then new escalation of the air war is likely. "I think it's likely to happen again... It has happened several times before in Indochina." The ? news dispatches out- lined reports that 10,000 civil- ian advisers, double the pres- ent number, under Defense Department contract will re- main. in Vietnam; that the Sai- gon government has been re- cruiting Air Force technicians in American newspaper classi- fied ads; that the access of American reporters to the scenes of incidents and battles already has been curtailed drastically, and that South Vi- etnamese officials and local police are blocking the release of political prisoners and or- deering the shooting of sus- pectcd Communists in viola- tion of the cease-fire accord. (South Vietnamese sources said however, that Saigon has, released about 20,000 military and civilian prisoners in the past few days, turning them lose on their own despite pro- visions in the cease-fire agree- ment that they be turned over to the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong, the New York Times reported Monday. Many of the articles were written before the peace agreement was signed, and some referred to plans for a continuing American presence as only contingency plans. "If President Nixon was pre- pared to allow the Vietnamese to settle their' own affairs, he would presumably back away from Vietnam while soft- pedalling his public identifica- tion with Thieu," Branfman said. If the President does allow a covert war to continue, Branf- man said, the 'history of past actions in Vietnam suggests that eventually the hidden mil- itary and paramilitary activi. ties will be supplemented by new bombing, either openly or, as in Laos in the past, in secret. "The American government simply lied about it (the bomb- ing) in Laos," Branfman said. He predicted that if President Nixon "intervenes in a covert manner in Vietnam" then the likelihood of renewed bombing there will be very high. . He said widespread publicity of such actions would effec- tively stop them, but that both the American press and the international observers would have difficulty seeing such vio- lations first hand if the Saigon government refuses them ac- cess to areas of the country, as has happened In Laos. (U.S. planes have continued BALTIMORE SUN 2 FEBRUARY 1973 re its London (Reuter)-American prisoners captured in Vietnam by Northern troops have been held in secret maximum-secu- rity camps in China, according to a Moscow-datelined report by Victor Louis in the London Evening News yesterday. Mr. Louis, a Soviet citizen with a. reputation for securing exclusive stories connected with the Communist world, said evidence had been build- ing up strongly in the Soviet .Capital that 600 Americans to bomb Communist concen- trations in Laos since the Viet- nam truce went Into effect at the request of the Laotian gov- ernment, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific said Monday.) Jerry Gordon, coordinator of the National Peace Action Co- alition who appeared at the.' same news conference, pre- dicted a "tidal wave of pro- test" would engulf the country If the bombing Is resumed in Vietnam. "That would be the last straw for many Ameri- cans," he said. Gordon said his organization would continue to protest American support of the Thieu. government and call for im- mediate and complete with- drawal from Indochina. Members plan to picket the White House on Saturday, Feb. 24, before holding a dis- cussion session on activities for the anti-war movement in the aftermath of the cease- fire. The discussion session at. the Metropolitan AME Church on M St., replaces an "anti- war convention" planned for that dat. OW's in ClItina were housed in the Chinese province of Yunan, close to the border with North Vietnam. But, says Mr. Louis, the camps were sufficiently far away from the border to foil possible United States com- mando rescue bids and to pro- tect the prisoners from the recent massive bombardment of the North carried out with B-52 bombers. The Americans were placed in typically Vietnamese condi- tions-their food, guards and even their clothes were Viet- namese-to convince them that they were still in North Viet- nam, the report said. Mr. Louis said their pres- ence in China meant the POW's could be used by. Hanoi to maximum advantage in the Paris peace talks, while it pro- vided China with a means of demonstrating solidarity with North Vietnam without direct involvement Ill ft War, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 WASHINGTON POST 7 February, 1973 Tad Szu.Ic A Time fog Rebuilding PRESIDENT Nixon said at, Ills Jan. 31 news conference that with the advent of the Vietnamese peace agreement the United States would now consider a postwar "reconstruction program" for the two Vietnams along with the rest of Indochina. This, he said, would he an incentive for the preservation of peace. Besides, as we know, postwar reconstruction of ravaged territories of allied and enemy nations alike has be- come in this century an American tra- dition. But an analysis of political,, military, economic and-quite importantly-eco- logical realities involved in such a re- TYirt writer is, a \ former diplo- -n.ntir, and foreign correspondent for the Nev tYork Times. construction effort raises major ques- tions about its feasibility in the forese- able future. The result might well be that reconstruction pledges (as distinct from the U.S. commitment to ? contin- ued aifl for' South Vietnam's economic survival) will become meaningless and lose even their psychological value as a possible comprehensive package for encouraging peace maintenance. Mr. Nixon and others have spoken of it possible comprehensive package for all Indochina. He has instructed Henry Kissinger, while he is in Hanoi this month, to discuss Indochina-wide reconstruction with the North Viet- namese. Administration officials have, even thrown around the figure of $7.5- billion as the cost of reconstruction al- though nobody here is quite sure what it means in terms of projects. For the purpose of clarity, It Is nec- essary to break. down the overall re- construction . concept Into realistic component parts. 1. Immediate problems in South Viet-' nam. The . immediate problem is to keep the Saigon economy going as much for political reasons as anything else. President Thieu, who has to main- ,tain' his 1,000,000-man army Indefi- phase of ' the power contest with the National Liberation Front if his artifi- cial economy collapses under him. Considering the military costs, the needs of the Saigon middle class (whom Thieu cannot afford to antagonize). and the urgency of social programs for an estimated 8,000,000 refugees. and other war victims, the first priority-Is budget support and stabilization. The annual tag for these expenditures may exceed $750,000,000 in U.S. funds, Witholtt it, long-range reconstruction is not 'possi- ble. 2. Reconstruction policies in. South Vietnam. Even assuming that the Saigon regime acts strongly and responsibly (i.e.. eliminates corruption and favoritism), coherent national postwar planning is virtually Impossible so long as South Vietnam remains a patchwork of areas controlled here by Saigon and there by the Communists. But the Paris accords, allowing the 160,000 North Vietnamese troops to stay in the South, may perpetuate this mind-boggling mosaic for months If not for years. It would be preposterous to expect local South Vietnamese and Communist commanders to cooperate in reconstruction' in contested areas under a stand-still ceasefire. Vietnam economic specialists believe that Thieu's ne*t pressing problem is to start moving the masses of refugees from the suffocatingly overcrowded Saigon and other cities (only 650,000 refugees are in camps) back to the countryside. Otherwise urban unem- ployment could become political dyna- mite for Thieu and a boon for the Communists. Likewise, the South's ag- ricultural economy desperately needs manpower. 3. Reconstruction policy problems. But the complications is, specialists say, that insecurity in the countryside-the "leopard spots" situation-is unlikely to draw back enough refugees, espe- cially the younger people who have tasted city life. N Another major problem, generally I overlooked' in current discussions, is the economic and ecological damage inflicted on the countryside by nine years of herbicide and defoliation practiced by the U.S. against Commu- nist-held areas in the South In crop-de- struction and forest denuding opera- tions. Thus far the extent of the eco- logical damage Is unknown except that it is considerable. The National Academy of Sciences, working on a $2,000,000 grant from the Defense Department, is expected to complete on Aug. 1 a detailed study of ecological damage in South Vietnam. Experts say that until the survey is completed, no serious planning for ag- ricultural reconstruction can be under- taken. An earlier study of damage resulting from herbicides is contained in the still- 'secret "Report on the Herbicide Policy Review." It was prepared by a U.S.' gov- ernment task force under the dirbction of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and is dated August 28, 1968-some 18 months before the use of these chemicals was suspended. The report, obtained by this writer, states, among other things, that 20 per cent of South Vietnam's forests were "treated" by herbicides and defoliants through. the and of 1967-and . many areas were sprayed repeatedly. In t'he provinces north and northwest of Saigon, 70 per cent of the timber has been af- fected. This is vital because, as the re- port stresses, "the forests of Vietnam employment ... Repeated application of defoliants in these zones could seriously retard regeneration of these forests." The wood industry is one of the most important in South Vietnam, normally employing 80,000 people. By 1968, the , herbicides war led toy the destruction ) "... post war reconstruc- tion of ravaged territories has become an American tradition .. ' around Saigon alone of 2,000,000 cubic meters of timber which compares to ' potential national annual production of 3.5-million cubic meters. Bamboo invasion resulting from for-. est-canopy defoliation may delay tree regeneration because seedlings are killed. The report estimates that 20 years will be required to restore man- groves destroyed by herbicides. In mangroves, ecological balances and the food-chain have been upset, affecting fish and birds. Rice'fields are ecologically Immune to herbicide damage, but rubber, fruit and beans are highly sensitive. The ex- tent of damage to the latter is un- known. So the gltest.ion is to what would the refugees be'returning? 4. North Vietnam. Only after Kis- singer returns from Hanoi will the ad- ministration learn whether North Viet, nam is interested in Indochina-wide co The first question is whether Hanoi would accept any U.S. or multilateral the two Vietnams. Secondly, it is un- - known under what conditions North' Vietnam would enter aid arrangements for itself; many specialists think it i would insist on reconstruction disguised; as "reparations," which probably 5. Indochina. So long as the fight- ing persists in Laos and Cambodia- and it may go on for a long time-such grandiose plans as the development of the whole Mekong River Valley basin by an international consortium are fated to remain on the drawing board. And even if all the fighting stops, who knows whether Hanoi and its Laotian and Cambodian allies desire such a program in conjunction with the Sai- In stun, postwar reconstruction in Indochina tilny long remain a dream While the tl.M, Hull pvoll tht? itttpI'Hf.- tional community are forced to concen- trate on measures to keep South Viet- nam away from the brink of economic and political catastrophe. 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 :After War arid Cease-.,ire, the South Vietnamese, Communist Groups Remain a Mystery. 1...1.... ..-,...a:.... -,.....,...Ai.--,, fn,- - I -A of ('rntrnl rnt('lli-I-.Vintnam Mr Tlinh eatA ,,fL L. By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Times Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 South Vietnam. The meeting:.gence Agency operations in would be Incredible" It Mr. was apparently attended by' South Vietnam, described Mr. Trung and General Tra were scores of delegates representing Tho as having "little political the same man because "sooner what the guerrillas said were repute or professional standing or later the N.L.F. would have "various political parties, mass among his former colleagues at to publish the lists of who is organizations, nationalities, re. the South Vietnamese bar." in the cabinet" and both would ligious and patriotic personals-! In an interview last week, have to be identified. ties from both the rural and; Tran Van Dinh, a. former dep- urban areas." - uty South Vietnamese Ambas- Yet, Mr. Dinh added, thel United States officials de- sador to the United States, Photograph in the New York scribed the coalition at the time noted that Mr. Tho led the first Times last Friday of an officer as "old wine in new bottles." anti-United States demonstra- said to be General Tra was tion in Saigon more than 20 not that of the man he had `Aggression' From North ? years ago to protest American i served with In South Vietnam. The official view of the Unit- 1support of the French. "The answer," said a United, ed States Government, as ex- "He is extremely popular States intelligence officer who pressed in a State Department with the people in South Viet- is handling Vietnam matters, White paper in 1965 and re- nain," said Mr. Dinh, a critic is that nobody knows very peatedly 'stated since, is that of the war who has been living much about these people, and the war in South Vietnam was in exile in Washington since he I don't care who's talking. We directed and financed by North left the South Vietnamese diplo- !just don't know who's in what Vietnam. United States officials matic service in 1964. "It is position or how they inter- have characterized the war as wrong to assume that he was relate, its the same thing we a product of "aggression" from just a figurehead. You Ameri- can say about the top leaders the North. cans exaggerate party affilia- of North Vietnam and the N.L.F. Some scholars argue, how- tion too much as a key to Direct Influence From Hanoi ever, that there is equally' power." persuasive eidence indicating On the other hand, a well- Most experts-critics of the that the conflict was a civil nformed intelligence expert in war and those who support it war, one that might be aided an interview, reaffirmed his be- -acknowledge that the most and abetted, but could not have lief that "there's no question significant members of the Pro- been instigated, by outsiders. that Tho has been a front guy visional Revolutionary Govern- That basic division of view for years for North Vietnam." ment are also members of the extends to the analysis, now., He added that in his view Communist party, and all agree going on, of the background of, the real 'powers in the Pro- that Hanoi exerts direct influ- the Provisional Revolutionary visional Revolutionary Govern- ence on its policies. of the mysteries of the Vietnam war has been the other side, those South Vietnamese Com- munists and nationalists who- with the support of North Viet- nam-have battled the Saigon, Government and the United States to a standstill. .' They have been called by the names Vietcong,. a phrase - pejorative, in their view- meaning Vietnamese Commu- nists, and National Liberation Front and now Provisional Rev- olutionary Government of South Vietnam. Today, with the sanction of the recently signed Vietnam peace accords, this group of guerrilla fighters controls up- ward of 30 per cent of the area of South Vietnam and is in thei process of tightening its ad-I ministrative grip in "liberated". zones. Despite its existence, the Nixon Administration has said that it will recognize the Saigon leadership of President Nguyen Van Thieu as the "sole legiti- mate government" of South. Vietnam. In a recent television interview, William H. Sullivan? a Deputy Assistant Secretaryl'joint four-member Military Corn-!,Tan Phat, and its minister of of State for East Asia and Pa-1i defense, Tran Nam Trun Both noted that what1~Mission meeting this week ins g cific Affairs , he termed the "so called" Pro- visional Revolutionary Govern- ment "does not have a capital, does not have any outwardl manifestations that make it feasible to be called a govern-, ment." Almost a Way of Life This absence of "outward manifestations"-in the West- and scholars are also closely watching the names suggested by the guerrilla radio as pos- sible members of the National Council of National Reconcilia- tion and Concord, the three- party group whose functions, according to the peace agree- ment, would revolve around the organization of general and lo- cal elections in the South as 5outhy Vietnamese guerrillas. 1 United States officials, con- United States and South( vinced that those they call Vietnamese military forces have control, Communists have looked, and bombed, in vain n, maintain that while the non-Communist members of the for the famed political and mil- itary headquarters of the guer rillas-known as COSVN, for ,Central Office of South Vietnam --'-since the early 1960s. It was then that the guerrilla. ,movement, led largely by Com-I ,coalition may have nominal au- thority, they lack real political power. One relatively well-known figure much in dispute is Ngu- yen Hull Tho, a former Saigon lawyer who has been chairman of the Central Committee of Front, described as a coalition of Communist and non-Commu-, leading official since it was set up 13 years ago. He is not a member of the Communist par- ty of South Vietnam-the Peo- were born in South Vietnam, long.served in revolutionary ac- tivities against the French and are principal leaders of the Communist party in the South. Named as a General There is some confusion over Mr. Trung, whose name has been said by some intelligence officials to be a pseudonym of Lieut Gen. Tran Van Tra, second-ranking member of the Provisional Revolutionary Gov- )ermnent, who arrived in Saigon last week to head his group's delegation to the Military Com- mission. Further research shows that in 1969 the South Vietnamese newspaper Tien Tuyen, which is published by the army, as- serted that Mr. Trung was really a Vietcong general named Tran Luong. In addition, Douglas Pike, the United States .Information Agency official who is con- sidered by many to be a lead- ing expert on the Vietcong, has written that Mr. Trung may be General Tra, "hut it is mord likely" that lie is North Viet- nam's political commissiar for all of the guerrilla. forces. 1ment, in a clandestine radio 'Plc's Revolutionary party, which !brnndanrlt, told of n convontkln is the sottthorn branch of the !n December, 1960, somewhere North Vietnam Communist par- In the jungles of Vietnam at ty - and is, therefore, widely which the Liberation Front was considered by United States ex- set up. perts to be more of a figurehead Similarly, the formation of than a palicy maker. the. Provisional Revolutionary ' Two Views of, the Man Government was announced in June, 1969, by the guerrilla radio, which described a three- The formed deputy Ambassa- dor, Mr. Dinhi, said he had served with General Tra in 1944 during the Japanese occupation In a published analysis of! and noted that he was a "for- what he termed "the faceless midable" officer who eventually Vietcong," George A. Carver.1r.,I attained high rank in North interviews that there may be more autonomy than is general- ly realized. A 'Government expert noted ,that there were three potential (clashes between the North and South Vietnamese Communists:' personality disputes, bureau-;I cratic disputes between opera- tives in the field and higher (officials and-most significant, in this official's view-"the ob= vious fact that the South has been told by the North that they're on heir own." "The North is saying that 'we'll keep supporting you," this official added, "but that ,now you must keep making the political effort by your- self.' Two leading Vietnam schol- ars, David G. Man and D. Gareth Porter, both critics ofj the war, said in separate 'in terviews that in their opinion the Communist officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Gov- ernment were aware that they had to compromise with na-. tionalist forces to achieve their go it of a complete political' victory In the Smith, Mr. Marr, a former professor of Vietnamese history at the University of California who is now director of the Washing- ton-based Indochina Resource Center, said that while Commu- nist officials would continue to play a major role, "they know it's not in their Interest" to 34 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 .(attempt, to take over the coali.I that the Communists and thel Need for Compromise Seen , "They know the special sit- uation in the South is terrible from an organizational point of view," he explained. "There's been total chaos and the class structure has been destroyed. The basic distinction in the next few years will be between the few who made a killing on .the war and those who lost everything. It's not going to be between landlord and [tenant." Mr. Porter, now a doctoral candidaate in Cornell Univer- i'have to have a do ree of s `city's Southeast Asian studies] gf ;program, suggested similarly the t ad sort nonnCommun sts.n" terms of THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 7 February 1973 Provisional Revolutionary Gov-1 to compromise with the third force"-the large group of non- Communist but anti-American people in the South. "They can't plan their strat- egy simply on the basis of dis- ciplined adherence to the move- ment;" said Mr. Porter, who has taught political science at the University of Akron; Ohio, ,has spent several years In Viet- nam doing research and has 'written widely for magazines on the war. "They know they for the same areas. The party also recognizes ?parate areas of political and military respon- sibility in, its geographic divi- sions, with central administra- tions coming from COSVN. At least two regions in the South, however, were known to be un- der the direct supervision of the North. Vietnamese high command at various times dur- ing the war, according to State Department records. The guerrilla political organi. zation, or infrastructure, is also known to operate clandestine cells in south Vietnamese cities that are otherwise believed Lobe ,under Saigon's complete control. Thailand now has the biggest- concentration of foreign-based; US forces outside Europe. T. D. ALLMAN examines their inflammatory potential. mi he mt EVER SINCE John Foster Dulles formed the South-east Asia Treaty Or-ganisatiorf in 1954, Thailand has been the -keystone of . United States efforts to impose its will on Indo-China, In Bangkok, the effort has always been rationalised as essentially defensive. In prac- tice, however, America's use of Thailand has been one of con- tinuing iniilitarv offence. With- out Thai bases, America could never have prosecuted its long secret war in Laos, used Laos to support attacks against North Vietnam, or supported mercenary bands operating in Cambodia. From Thailand, the US has also mounted Para-military and espionage activities into Burma rand China. The final; massive B-52 raids on Hanoi were ;mounted from Thai bases. Over the' last eight years, it has, been Thailand that has intervened in a Vietnam war, not the other way around. ' With the US evacuation of South Vietnam, Thailand now has the largest single concen- tration. of foreign-ba.s>ed US forces outside Europe. Much of 'South-east Asia's future now hinges on' whether- President ?Nixon will use his Thai bases, like the ones in Europe,' as a defensive deterrent or whether he will continue to use Thailand as a springboard for continuing military intervention through- m.out'the region. If US tactics In Thailand do i change, leaders ranging from Prince Sihanouk to Lee Kuan Yew - perhaps even the North Vlotnamtria Ieatlerahtp '__ mq find an American presence there_ a useful element in a peaceful, multi-polar, non ideological South-east Asia in which the US, China, Japan,, and . Russia all have a r6le to play. But if the US continues to use Thailand indefinitely as an offensive base, the result will. rye Nonetheless, Mr. Porter added, only ? the Communist party in South Vietnam has what he termed the "leadership and dis- cipline" to match the political power of President Thieu. United States experts have estimated the number of clan- destine Communist party mem- bers in the South at more than 100,000. The party structure has been described in State De- partment documents as closely paralleling at each level-from region down to village-the open political organization of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The party has Its own politi- cal geography and often uses names different from Saigon's tio'nist's, be continuing, chronic war. So far the portents are not hopeful. Chou Endai recently called on the US to end its mili- tary intervention in Laos and Cambodia,. Secret peace tanks are under way in Laos, and both` Cambodian sides are now will- ing to accept a Cambodian cease fire, if not to agree to negotiated peace. On paper, the Paris ceasefire constituted an 'unprecedented renunciation of America's Indo-China ambitions. The first article of the Paris accords pledges that America will respect " the independence,. sovereignty, unity, and terri- torial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1.954 Geneva agreements." It was US refusal to accept the .1.954 Geneva accords, and their provisions for a peaceful Vietnamese reunification that led to the foundation of SEATO, Thai- land's conversion into a US beach-head, unremitting Ameri- can pressure on Laos and Cam. bodia, and the Vietnam war itself. Military action, however, con- tinues to be much more impor- tant than diplomatic words. The intensive US bombing of Laos and Cambodia has continued in spite of the Vietnam ceasefire. With more than 80,000 military' personnel at air bases in Thai- land and in naval squadrons off the coast of Vietnam, the last US troop withdrawals * from Vietnam will not greatly diminish President Nixon's .ability to Intervene with bombs and napalm whenever events In Indo-China displease him. There is clear rriegsege in the continuing US arms ship, ments to Indo-China and Thai- land, President Nixon's pre- truce bombings of Hanoi, his statement that the US will con- tinue . to recognise only Presi- dent ' Thieu, : Vice-President ?Agnew's South-east Asia mis- sion, and continuing US mili- tary activities in Laos and Cam- bodia. The Nixon Administration, for the moment, is not so much ending the -Indo-China conflict as continuing it : by other means. 'The easiest targets for the President to keep hitting are Communist supply routes and sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, where the Paris accords oblige neither side to end its military operations immediately. Laos's and Cambodia's prob- ' lems are the products of tradi- tional Thai-Vietnamese rivalries, which have been greatly deepened by 17 years of direct US intervention. The present military divisions in both countries roughly corres- pond to the old Thai-Viet- namese spheres of influence.. Even without American involvement, both small coun- tries would have severe prob- lems with their two large neighbours. Traditional Thai and Vietna- mese intervention, of course, is distasteful in Phnom Penh and Vientiane under any circum- stances. But both past history and the-present situation make, an important point for the future : both Laos and Cam-I' bodia lack the ability to be neu, trai without great restraint op the part of Thailand and Vicfi- nam. Such restraint is i'mpossi.ir]te so long as each side's sense of Insecurity is continuou ,ly inflamed by chronic US inter-. vention. Communist Vie,trtrm cannot refrain from using its two neighbours' territory so long as the US maintains ;'the Thieu regime in South -" iet. 111101, Thitlliihti i4 t@itlfilillt t 1.0 leave the US shiitlow so for g r,s Indo-China Is the theatre of full-s7 ale war. Is here any way to break the circl(,a. ? The initiative, for the foreseeable future, will lie with an ;America that has never understood the, inherently disir'uptive effects of its efforts a to ii_~ontrol Tnd'o-China. Bit the, continuing Thai emphasis in US strt.itegic thinking has not only vastly exaggerated' North Viet-t nalm's intentions and abilities, it has a I s o amounted. to a s ;loos underestimation of; 7 hailand's own abil!idaes to fend for itself. With a* population of about ,'37 million, Thailand is nearly as populous as both Vietnams. combined. It is the moat geo- graphically, ethnically and poli-' tically united nation in South- east Asia, and one of the, richest, It has, not had a civil. war or been :sifccessfully invaded since the eighteentli century. But following Thailand's. alliance with Japan during the Second World War, Thailand found itself isolated. Subse? quent US links provided it with psychological, . financial, . and military support. Twenty-five years as America's most loyal ally, however,.. have severely limited Thailand': horizons, and isolated it. in new ways. . Recently, Thai officials have suggested that following an Indo-China settlement US troops will be withdrawn and that Thailand will follow a nen-' tralist policy. Such plans for the future, however, do nort' solve present problems. Thailand has hesitated raven to est'.abtish diplomatic relations with China. It is committed to letting the Nixon AdminCstra- tion use its territory for acts of war indefinitely, and,. its' ruling generals would lose the raison d'etre Of their r' game if Thailand's policies substantially changed. A. reunited Vietnam, and a h"11"lifi IfIl0lia}ifi0.Ht fff, merica could probably arrive at working arrangements that would free Laos and Cambodia to pick their ways out of the rubble of other people's wars... But with the political strug ,ele in Vietnam unresolved and Thailand willing to let itself. be used indefinitely for US. inter-, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : Cli DP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 'vention in Indo-China, the chances for stable ' relations among all four countries remain minimal. The American refusal to accept the provisions of the 19:54. Geneva Convention meant a generation of bad blood between Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. that the Nixon Administration's efforts to prevent: a " peace with honour" from turning into a Communist success in Vietnam may mean another, generation of war. And, this time, it may not be so easy for \Thailand to avoid an extension of Indo-China's turmoil over its own borders.:. The old maxim in Laos and. Cambodia has 'always been that, no peace there is possible until a Vietnam settlement occurs. But an even older maxim states they want. that war is a test of wills. Neither North Vietnam nor - The Paris accords' failure to America abandoned their hopes provide a political settlement of achieving antithetical for Vietnam, like the` similar futures for South Vietnam i when they signed the Paris ? inability, of the 1954 treaty, in ceasefire. And both - through time may be the much. more America's bases, in Thailand, important fact than' the and North Vietnam's bases in ceasefire bobh ,were able to Lac's and Cambodia - retain arrange. the ability to fight for what WASHINGTON POST 15 February, 1973 T he' `Post-Vietnam' Period Begins T6 watch the first prisoners arriving at Clark Field gave most Americans, we are sure, not only personal joy but the best kind of` evidence that for this country at least, the war is coming to an end. This is a feeling shared by President Nixon, who rather gratuitously chose to take the returned men's salute to their commander-in-chief as vindication of his goal of. a "peace with honor," and by those who realize that most of the returning Americans are professional military men whose particular mission, the bombing, was among the most controversial of the war. The evident vigor and cheer of most men in the first contingents released by. Hanoi and the Vietcong were cause for particular satisfaction, since many Americans had probably feared 'Mr. Nixon was right when he said in 1971 that the North Vietnamese "without question have been the most barbaric in the handling of prisoners of any nation in history." Homecoming Is sure to be an ardu- ous psychological process. But If the Americans due to be freed in forthcoming prisoner exchanges are in the same apparently good physical condition, then that will be a boon. As the North Vietnamese certainly have calculated, 'it will also bring them a politically useful measure of goodwill. The contrast of the smiling released Americans and the grim and gaunt Communist prisoners released by Saigon, could not be more sobering. The prisoners' return is, of course, only one aspect, an especially poignant one, of a range of "post-Vietnam" issues likely now to move toward the fore of American public life. Among these,are the situation of Vietnam ,veterans in general, the place of young men who chose to leave the country or otherwise avoid military service- or to desert after they were in uniform rather-than serve in Vietnam; and the separate but in a sense politically equal question of furnishing reconstruction aid to Indo. china,. including North and South Vietnam. Vietnam veterans, especially the physically and psycho- ,logically wounded, w6uld seem to command universal sympathy. Too many signs already indicate, however, that the same general attitude which led a disproportionate number of poor, less educated and black Americans to be sent to fight and die in Vietnam is affecting treatment of the survivors at home. Incredibly, for instance, even .as we prepared to celebrate the return of the POWs, the administration was proposing to reduce federal benefits for Vietnam amputees., Under congressional pressure, that plan has now been recalled by the White House. The proposal should be discarded permanently. It is hard to Imagine a more damaging and disrespectful gesture, toward our Vietnam veterans. The amnesty Issue is recognized as compelling by many Americans-those who respect the motives of young men who in conscience avoided military service and those whose prime concern Is to close the domestic divisions opened by the war. President Nixon, to be sure, has spoken. forcefully for those who believe that a respect for authority, and a respect for the men who accepted service and risked or lost their lives, rule out a policy of forgive- ness. We intend to elaborate our own views on this Issue on another occasion. For now, we would merely note that this is an issue peculiarly vulnerable to the atmosphere in which it is discussed. That atmosphere can hardly fail to soften as the cease-fire takes firmer hold and prisoners come home and veterans 'receive the care they deserve. Those who sympathize for the men who did not fight have practical political grounds as well as sound mor 4 com- pulsion for helping see to it that the men who did fight and return now fare well. Reconstruction aid to Indochina may become the most tortured issue of them all. The President has promised substantial funds but by his failure to ask Congress for the money he has called into question his own seriousness on the matter and by his general combative posture toward Congress he has compromised whatever aid ap- peal he might eventually make. Within Congress, if it ever gets to the question, a difficult alliance of con- venience may be, forced upon legislators whose, main Indochina interests are to sustain Saigon and help Hanoi respectively. We regard Indochina reconstruction as im- perative morally, essential politically for purposes of domestic healing, and equally vital diplomatically as a means of turning our involvement in Indochina into an international responsibility. It is scarcely too soon, as the prisoners begin to come home, for the President to start developing a balanced, fair and comprehensive program to deal with all the interrelated problems arising out of our long and costly entanglement in the Vietnam conflict. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001'00001-5 WASHINGTON POST 15 February, 1973 r. Edwin 0. Reischauer. The Two Vietnam. Pacts: One Endangers ' the Other ing mechanisms to enforce the cease- Assessments of the Vietnam agree- fire, still may focus enough interna- ment have varied greatly. Some see it tional attention on the combatants to discourage blatant violations, at least as a tremendous achievement of realis- for the crucial 60-day period. tic statesmanship; to others it appears The other so-called agreement is an obvious farce. Historical hindsight hardly simple,. straightforward, or will probably show it to have been ? workable: The two "South Vietnamese something of both. This is,because it Is parties" are to set up a National Coun- not a single agreement but two very cil of National Reconcilation and Con- cord, consisting of three equal seg- different ones. ments (apparently unspecified neu-, the one agreement is for the com- trals, who lack the military power base plete withdrawal of American forces of the other two, are to be the third from Vietnam and the return of Amer. segment). Operating on "the principle of unanimity," this body is to achieve its work of peaceful unification of The writer, former antbassador to Japan, it University Professor at Harvard. lean prisoners, both within a 60-day pe- riod,. during which time the four par- ticipating parties, as the agreement calls them, observe a cease-fire ? in place. This is all quite simple and straightforward. It is also probably achievable, because three of the par- ties-the United States, Hanoi, and the Vietcong-sincerely wish to see it achieved, and the fourth, Saigon, which is probably less happy about the agreement, remains so dependent on continuing material support from the United States that it apparently has felt constrained to go along. Even then, it is no simple matter to shift suddenly from years of warfare to a cease-fire, especially when no clear. military boundary separates the combatants. The shooting may never stop entirely. However, there seems to be enough will on both sides to tune the fighting down to a tolerable level, and mechanisms have been created to police the cease-fire, at least for a while. A four-party Joint Military Commission, operating only during the 60-day period, is to supervise the ex- ecution of the agreement. An Interna- tional Commission of Control and Su- pervision, consisting of something over 1,000 men from. Canada, Hungary, In- donesia and' . Poland; and an "international conference," which is to be convened within 30 days and is to include China, the Soviet union,. France, and, somewhat incongruously, I the United Kingdom, while not provid- South Vietnam within 90 days (a sig- nificant variation from the 60-day deadline for the other agreement) and is to organize "free and democratic general elections." All this is to be achieved in a country that has never had truly free and democratic elec- tions, is made. up of people who have no experience with or faith in elec- tions, and is chaotically divided be- tween two military-based regimes that have fought each other fanatically for years and still so hate each other that they refused to sign a version of the agreement that,named the other and i on a more vaguely worded version in- sisted on signing on different pages. Saigon appears to have some chance of surviving, but, if so, it would proba- bly remain beleaguered, at least for the foreseeable future. A slightly more probable outcome might be the under- mining of the Saigon regime and its eventual takeover by Hanoi. The speed of such a development, the degree of the South's autonomy, if any, and the manner 'of takeover-that is, whether it would be primarily through subver- sion or through military attack-are all quite beyond prediction. Whatever the outcome, however a divided or unified Vietnam will probably cast a heavy shadow across the independence of Laos and Cambodia but is likely to be so absorbed in its own problems as to be little threat to Thailand or other countries. Certainly It will not be con- trolled by China or any other outside power. And the useful American role in the whole region will be, as it 'al- ways should have been, not military in- volvement, but sympathetic concern and, where possible, economic and technical aid. Whether or not the two agreements -the one on American military disen- gagement and the so-called political constitute "peace with honor" is a se- mantic question that is not worth argu- ing over. The important point is that the first agreement is overwhelmingly in American and world interests and, in my judgment, is fortunately irrever- sible. There is not much profit either in discussing the historical might-have- beens. One cannot but wonder, how- ever, if this sort of American disentan- glement from our Vietnam fiasco could not have been achieved by sim- pler, less Byzantine means a long time ago. My own guess is that the essen- tials - a standstill cease-fire maitr tained long enough to permit Ameri- can withdrawal and the return of our prisoners, together with the safe ac- ceptance of such a solution by both the American public and the world in gen- eral-could have been attained at least two years earlier, if we had admitted to ourselves the obvious fact that this was indeed the only safe and possible' outcome. But this is a bit of history,' that can never be rerun. The crucial question that remains is whether we have endangered the wise and essential first agreement by wrap- ping it up with the unrealistic second one. A cease-fire for the limited pur- pose of the first agreement would have been less susceptible to disruption than the present more generalized cease-fire, ostensibly for the purposes of both agreements. The involvement of our "honor" in the domestic peace of the Indochinese states' may justify' in some minds a thoroughly unwise continued American military presence in Thailand and runs some risk of sucking us back into the military quag- mire of Indochina. Our advocacy of entirely unrealistic plans to. resolve old and bitter disputes in Vietnam by harmonious unanimity and elections and our emphasis on "great power" in- ternational conferences in settling the affairs of Indochina can only confuse the American public about Southeast Asian realities and could lead to dan-' gerous self-delusions on the part of the administration. In short, while the gos- samer of the second agreement may seem to some a helpful cloak of '. "honor," I am afraid that it is more likely to prove an embarrassingly in- . visible new suit of clothes for the em- peror, Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-~bP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001.00001-5 WASHINGTON POST 6 February, 1973 The .Role 'of the French in Helping A: N:. Spanel, founder of the Interna- "tional. 'Playtex Corporation, has ex- pressed views on national and i.nterna- tionat issues for many years through advertising. Many of these views were reasonable and well argued. His latest release, however, headlined "'The Ac. tive Participation of Our Friends" (in your issue of January 27, p. A-2), claims, significant credit for the French government in bringing about the ceasefire in Vietnam, quoting French Foreign Minister Schumann that the French role in the negotiations "could be qualified as essential" and praising that role as "little short of a miracle of diplomatic discretion." Monsieur Spanel omits, though, many relevant facts-most of which are pre- sumably unknown to most American newspaper readers. To judge France's role in the Vietnam conflict, we ought to remember that Vietnam (together with Laos and Cambodia) was the French colony of Indochina until ,World War Two, controlling the education, le- gal and civic status of several genera- tions of Vietnamese. During the war, the Japanese occupied Vietnam, without signal resistance on the part of the NEW YORK TIMES 4 February 1973 ALSOP LOOKS BACK ON CHINA STORIES Columnist Sets Accuracy in Reporting in 1950's By DAVID K. SNIPLER Np`cIa1 to The New York Tlmen WASHINGTON, Jan. 31-To a reader whose memory reach- es back a decade or so, it might have seemed as if Joseph Alsop had done a sudden about-face on the subject of Communist China. ' Writing from Washington in 1959, the columnist had de- scribed China's, agricultural communes with adjectives such as "fearful" and "hideous" and "ruthless," concluding that In pursuing their policy of "forced labor," Chinese leaders had "chosen to out-Stalin Stal- in." In December, 1972, beneath the dateline "Fei Cheng Com- mune, Yunnan Province," Mr. Alsop wrote of the "prosper- ous affairs" of a commune of "comparative wealth." "Amid the bougainvillea vines in the lovely ct tlrtyard it was all strangely sim~Ilar to a husinoas. like discussion with the man- agement of one of our large American industrial farms." Which is Alsop's Fable? Nei- ther. says the 62-year-old, col- umnist. He has not changed; China has. Everything Changed But People ".Everything in China has to Secure a Ceasefire in Southeast Asia French colonial authorities. In 1945, after the Japanese troops had beery forced to evacuate Vietnam, De Gaulle, then President of France, somehow induced the British and U.S. governments to have their navies con- voy French troops to the Far East to restore French colonial rule in Viet- nam-an attempt which ended disas- trously at Dien Bien Phu. Most former colonies gained independence since 1945 without having to fight wars against their rulers- but Vietnam and Algeria, France's ,two richest colonies, had to battle the colonial power for years, at the loss of many tens of thou- sands of lives. Spanel quotes several- statements by Pompidou and Schumann, but omits how these and other French leaders re- peatedly denounced the U.S. conduct of the war in Vietnam, bombing and min- ing of the North etc., without criticiz- ing a single time the Communists who invaded the South with most of their regular army, crossing either the "demilitarized" zone or violating the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, thus ', provoking U.S. retaliation. Even in her modest role as' host to the negotiations (a role which a dozen ,other places could 'have filled as well, probably better) the. French govern- ment leaned clearly to the Communist side, permitting Communist, anti-U.S.' and' anti-Saigon demonstrations, obvi- ously designed to exert mob,pressure,, on the negotiators. . The role of France concerning Viet- nam is therefore far from having con- firmed "the deep friendship between. the peoples of France and the United, States," as Spanel asserts at the end of his ad. But it cannot be based on falsi- fication of the historic record. Perhaps Monsieur Spanel could help to base relations between our two countries. on the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, by inducing the French . government to publish all its classi- fied documents related to . Vietnam, from colonial days to the present? (Could Dr. Ellsberg help?) HENRY C. SUTTON. Washington. changed, in truth," he wrote) Even though China might ul- from Nanking, "except the end- I become a formidable lessly resilient, hard-working and clever Chinese people. The quality of life has changed, vast ly ? for the worse for the an- cient ruling class but ,for the better for everyone else." Joseph Alsop's month-long journey through China last au- tumn was a journey of per- ceptions, and his flood of col- umns from the mainland reflect- ed much of the new warmth of the revised American image of Chint. He described 'his trip as "the most significant reportorial work 'I have ever done," and his columns, which are distribu- ted to 250 newspapers, were full of a sense of amazement and admiration at what he called "the new China." Thre produc- tive commune, the efficient tool; factory, the formerly squalid city transformed by industry,! -all were discussed in laudatory; Spent 4 Years in China Mr. Alsop spent four years In China in the nineteen-forties ardently backing Gen. Chiang Kai-shek against the Commu- nists and castigating American officials whose support for the Generalissimo seemed infirm. After the Communists took power, Mr. Alsop became known as an exponent of the contain- ment pulleyy and later an a hawk on Vietnam. Now, during an interview in his Georgetown home, Mr. Al- sop speaks of the evolution of "a significant,, even a strong, community of interests between nuclear power, he said, "Given the consequences of a successful Soviet attack against China] I'm convinced that if the danger becomes much more serious, we ought to do everything in our power, which is limited, to go to China's aid." Would he have made such a statement 15 years ago? "No, because the situation hadn't evolved, the Chinese Govern- ment hadn't evolved, and we were relatively vastly stronger. And the Soviets wouldn't have dared to do all the things you would have to expect the So- viets to do after a 'success in! China. I would have said it three years ago, four years ago -two, certainly. One's always a little slow in catching up with things." And what of his support for Chiang? "That was -28 years ago, and everybody in those days believed that Communism was a unitary phenomenon." Furthermore, he said: "If the other side had won in China, I think the chances are that "Chi-' na would appear more.prosper-1 ous than it does today . . . al- though wealth would be less ev- enly distributed, certainly." Despite Mr, Alsop's first- hand reporting of the current China, he has no doubts about the over.-all accuracy of the second-hand renor'tinft wd@ necessary by the absence of American journalists in China during the nineteen-fifties and sixties. Only a Few Surprises the United States and China Based on what he had known from the ' moment the Soviet) from the outside, he said he threat began to be serious.' was surprised by only a few things. First, ."that the after- -::ath of the second great con- vulsion-the Cultural Revolu- tion-was so relatively invis- ible." . "Then, given one's experience of other Communist govern- ments, you didn't expect it to work quite so well," he said. "Finally, there's just the plain natural physical surprise. You go to a province that literally had no industry at all and find it bulging with industry." ?Mr. Alsop said 'in one column that he kept "thinking'nervously ,of all the woolly minded West- erners who made such fools ,of themselves in Russia in the cruel thirties," and he said in an interview, speaking of the Chinese system, "I may think it works better than it does work." But he added that the Chinese did not seem eager to hide any- thing. "They seemed awfully pleased to show me what they'd done." 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001b0001-5 NEW YORK TIMES 1 February 1973 Vietnam:. A Soviet View pretensions it produced for playing the role of world policeman have come up against the reality of the national a month ago stressed that "if the two countries-the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.- really follow the course charted jointly during the Moscow negotiations, then, we think, new substantial steps devel- oping Soviet-American relations for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and for universal peace may., become possible during further cone tacts. However-and this should be emphatically stressed-much will de pend on the course of events in the.' immediate future, and, ' in particular, on the turn in the question of ending the war in Vietnam." By linking these words with the signing of the agreement on ending the war, it is not hard to find the clue to how this is to influence fur- ther prospects for development of So- viet-American relations. Of course, the work of restoring peace in Vietnam is only begun. The implementation of a just peace will depend to,a large. , extent on how unswervingly and con- sistently this agreement is put into practice by the parties. The Soviet public is not going to ' 'relax its vigilance against intrigues of reactionary forces and those unable.' to break away from the grip of the old illusions. We have always sided, with the Vietnamese brothers and friends in days of severe military tri., als. We will remain loyal to our duty MOSCOW-The agreement on end- , liberation movement that steeled itself ing the war which opens the way to in the course of decades of struggle restoration of peace in Vietnam and against French colonial rule, the Jap- .the whole of Indochina has been re- anese occupation and other invasions ceivcd in the Soviet Union, as in the and encroachments. world, with great satisfaction. The vicissitudes of the war have A war is being extinguished whose ? graphically shown how any escalation flames constantly threatened to spread of the American war effort inevitably to other areas with ensuing noncon- doomed its sponsors to further moral trollable consequences. The right of and political defeats in the eyes ,of the Vietnamese people to determine the rest of the world. And, conversely, their own destiny, without interfer- every new step along the road of once from outside, is triumphing. political realism took America nearer Expressing respect and admiration 'to honorable withdrawal from the war. for the stanchness of the forces of the That is why, I think, all the Ameri- Vietnam National Liberation Front and ? cans who considered it the wrong war of the people of the Democratic Re- at the wrong time and for the wrong ,,public of Vietnam in rebuffing the cause and who persistently sought the foreign intervention, we also note the way out along nonmilitary lines have 'important role of International soli- every reason to tell themselves now darity in 'the struggle of the patriots . that this is their victory, too. of Vietnam for the just cause. The war has had Its effect on So- Millions of words have been written viet-American relations. The greater about this war. There is no doubt that has been a turn in America from the in the future, too, historians will de- illusions of a policy of strength to rive ever new material for the assess- recognition of the political realities, ment of what has happened. the wider have opened goodwill sluices Today, however, I would like to ex- in search of more fruitful relations on press my observation only on one ? the basis of the principles of peaceful salient feature of this war. It has been coexistence. , an unusual war in the sense that it it will be recalled that the General has not been a war of one nation Secretary of the Communist Party of against another. It has been a war the Soviet Union, Central Committee, between illusion and reality. The illu- Leonid Brezhnev, somewhat more than sion of world domination. and the y WASHINGTON POST 9 February, 1973 Joseph 'Alsop in days of peaceful restoration. ; Spartak Bcglov is political commenta-' , (Food Ceasefire Sigi*..., .ON THE SURFACE, the signs in Viet- nam are far better than you might snp- pose from the reports from the scene. Two ironically comic stories and a statis- tic offer proof enough of this. The North Vietnamese' and Vietcong .groups that went from Paris to Saigon made. an odd request. of the pilot of .their special plane when they left Bang- .Ninh, on the South Vietnamese border. Nothing loath, the pilot took them in low oveP ' Tay Ninh. The ` shock and disappointment of those who looked out.. the Bi'plane's windows were far too strong to ' be concealed, 'The. pas. sengers ft'nm Marls lead, of eourao, been told that Tay Ninh, a minor pro-, vincial?capital, had already been seized by the North Vietnamese to serve as a "popular uprising," as the V.C. call the population. 'roe famous - icoparu spots" are pretty desolate, in short, and the ceasefire-round of the struggle has.. 'been won by the government in Saigon. i IT IS NOT'th'e last round, however., The intelligence suggests that all the North Vietnamese units now in Card=.`bodia may be thrown into the III Corps it-but the wrong kind of popular up- area of Sounth Vietnam to mount a mas- rising, in which the people joined furl- sive'attack in a matter of two or three ously in their town's defense against the,, months. North Vietnamese. The, failure to take 'Again, infiltration clown the Ho, Chii Tay Ninh must at least have been Minh Trail has apparently ended: but known to the Vietcong "military repre- a massive supply movement is still go-'% sentative," North Vietnamese Lt. Gen. lag on. Furthermore, most of the North'?, Tran Van Tra, when he later headed Vietnamese armed force has been trans' for Saigon. Yet he'asked to see Tay ' ferred Into the southern Laos panhan. Ninh, too. " die, In a part of the Ian Chi Minh Trail I The American chopper that, picked from which the II Corps area of South him up in the jungle circled low and Vietnam can be easily attacked. All, nient was bitter and obvious. NVA violations of the ceasefire agreement, lying to higher headquarters has long, If this Is the intention, the accord ob- tii?a had told their general they still Hehr' A , J ttikln t r is to be treated by held Tay Ninh's suburbs. Infitea(d they Hanoi like the accord obtained by Ptt3pl, were at least 10 miles away in deep dent Kennedy and Gov. Avcriil Ilarri- jungle. man in 1962-ns a scrap of paper to bo As to the statistic, it has been loudly torn up and tossed away-ns soon as con announced from Saigon that the V.C. venleut. Rut the President, is not, ready, "government. But there is was, with and North Vietnamese still hold 34 per to ho through the kind of charade the South Vietnamese government flags cent of :South Vietnam's land area. Th`i U .; f nvcrnment went tlu ou h in ion flying at almost every house. snore important fact is that they r rv In 1962, a handful of North. Viet, One reason Tay Ninh was,saved was control barely more than 5 per cent of a bt bt t.a oously parading Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RE 77-00431K0b110M1-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 past a , checkpoint, were accepted as "proof" that Hanoi was keeping,. the promise to Gov. Harriman to withdraw utterly from Laos. Now, President Nix- on is grimly determined to accept noth- ing less than literal compliance with every promise embodied in the cease- fire agreement. That is the real object of Dr. Kissinger's journey to Hanoi, and it is also an important object of his trip to Peking. THIS WILL PRESENT Hanoi with an acutely painful choice: The key clause in the ceasefire agreement is the BALTIMORE SUN 9 FEBRUARY 1973 'Manila curbs `excess' U.S. way calla 4 slow bungling' By THOMAS PEPPER Sun Staff Correspondcut. Manila-Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine sec- retary of foreign affairs and a former ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, said yesterday that Western-style democracy is not well suited to developing countries. Defending his govern- ment's imposition of martial law and the decision of Phil- ippine political leaders to re- place the American-inspired Constitution of 1935, General il:-,:min said that when West- ern-style democracy was im- planted in various developing societies, "the result was ex- cessive freedom." This was particularly true in the Philippines, he said. "While democracy may be the best 'form of govern- ment,"General Romulo said, i "it is slow, bungling and inefficient. An advanced so- ciety like the U.S. can be slow, humbling and ineffi- cient, and still continue to forge ahead." But, he continued, "in this day and age, a developing society has to develop fast. It cannot afford to bungle. Among people who never know where their next meal is coming from, free speech is a remote ideal, and cer- tainly less important than finding a means for bare .survival." General Romulo, who has been called by his military rank ever since he served as an aide to the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the World War II Philippine- American command, said he came to this view of democ- racy about two years ago, largely as a result of trips to I South Korea, Malaysia, Sin- gapore and Indonesia. Those countries, he said, have what he called a "mod- ified democracy," and each of them "is forging ahead much farther and faster than 'we. "I felt," he said, "that, there was something wrong in our trying to make a carbon copy of American de;, mocracy here." General Romulo spoke in his somewhat faded office in .a classically designed build- ing once used by the prewar' American colonial ' adminis- tration. In a reference to the old constitution and to the coun- ? On the other s!de of the balance,;; there is the prospect of none of the American aid for reconstruction that the North Vietnamese leaders have been loudly boasting about. There is also the prospect of possible pressure from China, for the Chinese more and more '? seem to lean toward insisting that Hanoi keep the promises already made. There is even the prospect that President Nix.' on may once again prove to be cruelly unpredictable. So the betting Is even, either way. . try's slam-bang, circus-style, politics, General Romulo said the Philippines "had the skeleton of democracy, but not its flesh and blood. "Politics," he said, 'be- came an industry here. The. politicians . began to think they' were the rulers. They, each had bodyguards, and we were starting to have, as Chhina had, warlords, each with an army. This was a replica of the American West, the frontier days." Part of the trend toward bodyguards and private ar- mies came, he said, from a decline in respect. for law during the wartime Japanese occupation. "Our. youth then were { taught to cheat, lie, and kill in order. to survive.. It's not easy to shake. off this moral tone. Those kids then, some of them are our leaders now." A former journalist and university president, General Romulo was a longtime ad- vocate of Westernization for' Asia. He was one of the original signers of the United Nations Charter,' and the first Asian to become presi- dent of the U.N. General Assembly. In 1947, he was chairman of a U.N.-spon- sored Conference on Free- dom 'of Information and of his past record, he said: "I have no regrets. I will still fight for freedom of speech and civil liberties. However, we must tinder- stand there are priorities in every country. We [in the Philippines] have tried to ig- nore the priorities that a developing society should im- pose on its people." "What we have needed hem," he Acid In conclusion, "is national discipline-the sane discipline that. De Gaulle instilled in the French pen, lc." one covering Cambodia and Laos, from which all "foreign troops"-including North Vietnamese-are to be with- drawn. For the North Vietnamese, that means no Cambodian bases; no Laotian babes; above all, no enormous, manpow- er-consuming supply system in Laos to keep the. Ho Chi. Minh Trail' in opera- tion. Without these crucial assets, and with the VC-NVA only controlling 5 per cent plus of the South Vietnamese population, Hanoi cannot conceivably sustain 'a serious struggle In South Viet- nam. . tr 1973. Lon Angeles Times NEW YORK TIMES 5 February 1973 ;Pope Says Vietnam Truce Is Ambiguous and Violated ROME, Feb. 4 (Reuters) -j Pope Paul VI said today that the Vietnam cease-fire was full of violations and stressed the need for justice, brotherhood and universal peace. The Pope, addressing people gathered in St. Peter's Square for his Sunday blessing, added: "Enough with war and guer- rilla warfare." Pope Paul said It was neces- sary rather to see how the datrlage to Vietnam could be repaired, and he reminded Ital- ians they could help by giving money during special coffee', tions for Vietnam in Italian Catholic churches today. The Pope lamented what he said was increasing "violence, delinquency, selfish social strug gle and tolerated outrage tol honest custom" in society,. ; Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 SOVIET NEVIS., London 23 January 1973 Published by the Press Dept. of the Soviet Embassy '" U, l,? cr"Ju 1) LJ Li ING AN ~ - ~0, V~ \71CTO1i SiflS1?ii;LYAKlN, who defected.to. the West eight years ago, barbed wire." ' has returned to the Soviet Union itterly disillusioned find lusts described in Sovietskaya Rossia his. relations with the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the anti-Soviet People's Labour concern manufacturing trucks for the army. 'Union (NTS) organisation which The. work was'hcavy, and the living operates from West Germany. conditions, sharing a room in a hostel, , Ile gives a detailed account of his both bad and expensive. experiences and supplies the names Ile left the job -- and found li?im- of the CIA agents(nnd? NTS o0'icials self on the street. The CIA, was with Whom he became involved. not interested. Ile describes the close links be- ' In the 'meantime he had met the- twcen the CIA; the NTS' And the '. family of one of the NTS leaders, anti-Soviet radio station " Radio, V. Goraclick, the publisher of Posev, Liberty." and he asked for help from the NTS. Ile not only makes It clear that They saw him as a source of Infor- the NTS draws Its Income from the matron which could be processed to ,CIA, but describes how tile. staff of make. It suitable for anti-Soviet Posev,. the NTS journal, comb the' purposes. '. , .. . . Soviet press for criticisms and com- It was planned to concoct a book plaints from readers and dress these about Shishelyakin's life in the USSR, up as reports from secret " NTS presenting him as a "political pro- agents " in the Soviet Union to tester" and a champion of "Russian impress their CIA paymasters, democracy." Shishelyakin's disillusionment with Ideas, actions and even words of 'his position as omigrd started early whiev he had no knowledge were as soon as he arrived in Frankfurt attributed to him. am-Main. I;Ic was at once Installed, and held This opened his eyes the' methods used. to concoct anti-Soviet prisoner, In a CIA flat at 45 Mendels- material and the nature of the sohnstrasse' evidence of "lack of democracy in " In the room were a small table, the USSR." two chairs, a bed and a sideboard lie tells of a meeting of Russian with dishes. In the corner was a tele- dmigres, at which the hit of the vision set and a radio. American evening was a certain Yevgeny? E, newspapers and, magazines lay on the whom NTS agents had persuaded to table. ' "flee" to ' the West. "I was left alone, and the door was This Yevgeny E has since returned locked from the outside," he says. to the Soviet Union, but at that time he was In the hands of the NTS YntiCrrO~"ati011 'leaders and was being used for their' For weeks he was ? questioned, propaganda, cross-examined and Interrogated, Prompted by them; he described asked the same questions, over and popular uprisings " he had witnessed over again, for details of his life,, about all the people he had known in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, the crew of When Shishelyakin asked him after- the ship on whfclt_he had sailed, the wards where lie had seep such,events, names of the commanders of the Yevgeny E replied:, "One has to Soviet For Eastern Flotilla and Its eat ! ships, details about the ports of Shishelyakin ;a] . so describes how Vladivostok and Nakhodka, their Posev over a long period published depth, their quays and how they material written by a certain Doris Were guarded, Ycvdokimov, who presented himself So the questioning went on. for to an NTS agent as a descendant of dct'ails about Western Siberia, where one of the Scandinavinn royal he had previously lived, of Industrial. families who was going to "trans- enterprises and their output, of labor. form the Soviet system," atones and research institutes; ]?ils unbalanced ravings were military units, schools, airfields, radio aecomnnnlAd by a bleak picture at stations, rocket Inptallntfons - even th it ti f t i i on n ua et Un on . e s he Sov 'cfncmns and hospitals. Long before the end of the qucs- This was what Interested the NTS tiot~ing, the strt made him ill, he leaders, who required only' that the slept badly and came out' In a rash. material should be strongly anti- Soviet and should include an ample When ' It finally came to an end. , isupply of such ckpressfon!: as "barred h These effusions were published under the pseudonyms ? Sergei Razumny and Ivan Ruslanqv, The' NTS,..paid Ycvdokimov over a thousand dollars for Kuzma and over 8,000, dollars for Variant of a ' Gas Chamber. . ? The latter, after being ." touched up," was broadcast In instalments by Radio Liberty.", To the CIA; ? . the . NTS claimed Ycvdokimov as a genuine Russian inlulIettuol find a writer, ills name was also on time NTS-list of secret agents in the USSR. So, too,'were the names of two old women who were relations of Ycvdn kimov. One of them was so weak 'that she could not leave her bed, but she-. had a code-name and was on the NTS pay list. There was a great scandal when this eras ? exposed and the CIA threatened to stop. financing the NTS. There was never any doubt that the , CIA. 'paid NTS salaries and financed Posev. A few years ago, when the Posev printing works were being re- equipped, the NTS leaders spread the tale that'tfic new ~ptess was paid for by gifts and r loans from NTS members, When Shishelyakin asked who had contributed, he got' the answer ; "Don't ask naive questions,. We got the money from the Americans, but keep quiet about it." / -Espiona e Shishelyakin gives the names of the "booksellers" in Munich and France %pho are responsible for dis- patching NTS material to France, jnd Finland, from Italy, Austria where it is taken'~into the USSR. NTS agents are also instructed by the CIA to present such " literature " to members of Soviet, delegations and Soviet citizens abroad, More often than note however, the pamphlets are dumped "in dustbins, and the claim is made that they have been distributed." ' The NTS, of course, does more th'ah engage In anti-Soviet propa- ganda. It also takes part in ?subvcr- sive and espionage activities. It ortAliia@a provocations against Soviet dainKatimill abroad, 'J'hia is done by.."the closed' seetion!r `yfio Nr$?reconlimends' Its people as guides and, interpreters I for Soviet delega- tions.. ' .'It is 'also' act,iOc among students. of Russian In Western countries and o Cif} got him ? jotr with U . ?pprovec For Release 2001/08/07 :CIA-RDP77-0)0328000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 WASHINGFON STAR 6 February 1973 seeks to recruit likely individuals to carry out subversive acts during visits. to the USSR. There is also . the "German- Russian Society ". In- Frankfurt-am Main, which is, strongly' anti-Soviet., The NTS maintains contacts with it and seeks recruits among the younger members. In conclusion, - Shishelyakin says that the NTS leaders are increasingly losing credibility even among their own rank and file. NEW YORK TIMES 11 February 1973 111HUNGARIANS HOPE TO REGAIN GROWN My RAYMOND H. ANDERSON Specint to The New York Times BUDAPEST, Feb. 9 - More '.than 28 years ago, as artillery of the advancing Soviet Army rumbled in the distance, a spe- cial train left Budapest for the Austrian border. Aboat'd was an. old black cask that required three keys to open. Inside was the golden Crown of St. Stephen, the sym- bol of Hungarian sovereignty "since it was presented to Stephen nearly 1,000 years ago by Pope Sylvester H. r. The crown fell into the hands of American troops near Salz- burg, Austria, in the spring of 1945,' ahd ever since has been an issue of contention between Hungary and the United States. There is expectation In Bud- apest that this may be the year Hungary recovers the Crown of St. Stephen. Relations Improve The condition imposed by -the United States for return of the crown has been a substan- tial Improvement in relations, and in the last year this ap- ppears to have been largely met. Last July Secretary of State William P. Rogers visited Duda- pest and Peter Valyi, .a Hun- garian Deputy Premier, is sched- uled to visit Washington. During the cold war and Hungary's imprisonment of Jo- zsef Cardinal Mindszenty, return of the 'crown was politically Inconceivable. it was also be- yond discussion when Cardinal Mindszenty was in asylum in the United States Embassy from 1956 until 1971. The Cardinal has opposed any move to return the crown' while Hungary is under Com- munist rule. He is reported to have proposed that it'be sent to the Vatican. - ' A year. ago President Nixon' reportedly sent' a message Jo Cardinal Mindszenty saying that the United States would safeguard the crown "for the time being." Some European diplomats here are convinced that the Valyi visit will be fol'. lowed by an announcement on Its return. Hungarian ~ officials, who talked freely before, now re- fuse to discuss the crown. Re- quests for ineetiugs with For eign Ministry' officials were .turned aside w1tb explanations WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP For most of the 1960s, the Russians appeared to be play- ing a game of catch-up with the United States in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. And where they were not ob- viously trying to match Amer- ican weapons, they were doing things that didn't make much sense to experts at .the Pentagon. Now, the Soviet Union is not only moving out on initiatives of its own but doing things - especially in its undersea strategic force - that make excellent sense' to U.S. ex- perts. Responding to the first Sovi- et Sputnik and the false mis- sile gap scare of 1960, the United States moved very rapidly in the early years of the decade. It developed and deployed a sophisticated land- based-missile, developed and deployed a fleet of invulnera- ble missile-carrying subma- rines and began to upgrade both of these weapons sys- tems. It It was not until near the end of the 1960s that the Soviet Union began to match these American developments. In some cases, the Soviet weap- ons were pretty close to car- bon copies of those of the United States. This was par- ticularly true with the Yankee class submarine which is very much like the early model Polaris subs. In other cases, the Soviets went off on what still appear to many U.S. experts to be expensive tangents. The most notable example was the de- that there were more important issues between Hungary and the United States, One such Issue is Hungary's desire to obtain most-favored- nation tariff privileges for her exports. "The crown is important to Hungary," a Foreign Ministry official said, "but there is noth- . ing further Hungary need do. The next move is up to the United States." The crown of St. Stephen acquired a mystic aura of Hungarian identity over the centuries. It was used for coronations, last in 1916 when Charles was crowned emperor of Austria-Hungary. According to an old saying, "he who holds the crown rules Hungary." Palace Search in Vain This symbolism was one rea- son for the annoyance of the ;Communist leadership that the crown was being held in the :United States, , reportedly at 'By ORR KELLY velopment of the fractional orbital bombardment system or FOBS. American scientists considered-and rejected-- the development of such a system a. decade ago and it is still not clear why the Rus- sians thought it worth the enormous expense to develop. and deploy such a weapon. In an entirely new category is what the United States calls the Delta class submarine. It is quite different from any- thing in the U.S. arsenal - and it makes excellent sense to U.S. experts. * The Delta is similar to the Yankee class submarine. But it carries 12 missiles instead of 16. The extra space-provid- ed by removal of four missile tubes makes it possible for the Delta to carry a much longer missile - with a range of something like 4,500 miles compared to about 1,300 for the missile carried by the Yankee class. ' This means the Delta class subs can be on station, their missiles aimed at targets in the United States, without passing through the gap be- tween Iceland and the Faeroe Islands into the main body of the North Atlantic. . The Delta class sub thus has some of the advantages .the United States hopes to achieve with its Trident sub- marines, the first of which will not be ready until 1978. Moreover, the Russians are probably getting these advan- tages at a substantially lower price than the 'United States., The Delta is being built in the same yards as the Yankee and appears to be a natural follow-on design, talking full advantage of the skills learned by those who built the Yankees. In contrast to what appears to be a smooth transition in the Soviet yards from the Yankee to the Delta, the con- struction of the. Trident sub- marines will be largely a fresh start. Even though the Trident will be superior, tech nologicaily, to the Delta, it' will probably also far surpass it in cost. The development of the Del- ta did not come entirely as a surprise to American experts. For several years now, it has 'been known that a long-range missile that would not fit into, existing boats was under de- velopment and it was as= sunned that, at some point, we would see the development of a new submarine. But when it did show up, it did. so with startling speed. It was not until last spring that the United - States became aware, from satellite photos, that a 12-missile submarine was being built. This was only seven or eight months before the first of the new subs put to sea. Pentagon experts fully ex- pect that we will see more such rapid,-significant techno- logical developments ? by the Soviet Union in,the next few years and that some of them will be true,' and disturbing, surprises,. Fort Knox, Ky. In the first years immediate. ,ly following World War II, the Hungarians, uncertain where the crown was, dug through the ruins of the royal palace over- looking the Danube. Only later did they learn it was in Ameri- can hands. f Children are led daily up 'stone steps inside the Neo- 'Gothic Matthias Cathedral to ,look at a reproduction, The ;tuides end every lecture with the information that the orig inal is in the United States, As a group of schoolgirls lis ..tened to the lecture this week `ft mldtll@=spell woman guard left her electric heater and ap- 'Proached a visitor. "The ori- ginal is in the 'United States, you know," she said. To a jgkinn remark that she might be guarding the original one of t.h"se clays. the woman said in German, "Plea-f! be sol kind." - It2 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-55 tE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY FEBRUARY 8, 1973 U.S. Executive Faces Trial in Hungary By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON I virtually the upper limit in of Poultry Processing Enter- snecial I 1,e New York zim~t Hungary. prises. Mr. Miklos was said to BUDAPEST, Hungary, Feb. 7 -An American business repre- sentative is expected to face a court here early next month accused of'running a flam- boyant commercial operation involving alleged bribery, gifts of new cars, bank accounts abroad for Hungarian accom- plices, black-market currency dealings and "violation of. of- ficial secrets." The American citizen, Dr. Tibor Glaz, is. described: here as the East European manager of the Ralston Purina Company. Dr. Glaz was arrested last year. About 20 Hungarians have been implicated in the case. Two are said to have committed suicide. The indictment, as published, would suggest that the affiar is an epic in chicken-feed and ,pig-feed salesmanship. . After months of what one resident-,here called "embarras- sed.silence,".the case came to light when a Budapest weekly, Hetfoi Hirek, printed an ac- count of the indictment. Hetfoi Hirek stressed that the Hungarians facing trial were "responsible officials" and that some had salaries as high as 10,000 forints a month ($370), political implications in the af- fair. On the contrary, the long silence seemed to reflect con- cern about possible disruption of a recent significant improve- ment in relations between the United States and Hungary. According to the report on the indictment, Dr. Glaz first made an arrangement with Imr Szilagyi, manager of the. Pig- Fattening and Fodder-Mixing Joint Enterprise of the Kon- doros collective farm. Car Received is Left Under the arrangement, it was said, Dr. Glaz was to pay Mr. Szilagyi a commission of 30 cents a ton upon the signing of a contract for 60,000 tons of pig-feed nutritives, or a total of $18,000, to be deposited In a West German bank. The police intervened, the report continued, before the arrangements were completed. But Mr. Szilagyi was said to have received 80,000 forints ($3,000) from a "motorcar mani pulation" as well as money fro a West German account during a,toruist trip abroad. Another Hungarian accused in the case, Laszlo Miklos, was a department head In the Trust WASHINGTON POST 14 February, 1973 can novelist Erskine Caldwell expressed indifference today to the plight of Soviet novelist Alexander ' Solzhenitsyn. "There's no law requiring a person to he a writer," he said. "If he prefers to write as he wishes to, then It's up to him to take the .consequences, that's all I can say", Caldwell added. "He lives in a society and a system of government which makes certain require- ments so he is subject to those requirements." 'Only one of Solzhenitsyn's books, "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," has been published ,here. He 'was ex- pelled from the Soviet Writers Union , In 1069 after other works eritiesl of Soviet soolety were published abroad. The action denied.him the right to earn a living here as an au- thor. have received $100 a month for "promoting" the feed sold by Dr. Glaz. Mr. Miklos also is accused of having received an automobile,as a gift and a West German bank account. More ominously, the . indict- ment charged that Mr. Miklos had drawn up for Dr. Glaz "an accurate list of the collective farms dealing with the process- ing of poultry." - This, it ap- pears, is the basis for the charge of "violation of official secrets." A state farm director, Karoly Mohacsi, was reported to have received about $1,000 from Dr. Glaz after a contract was reached to buy pig feed and a mixer. "He could have earned more -$15,000-from this deal, but he was unmasked, "Hetfoi Hirek said. "In this case, too, the usual gift of an automobile The account of the indict' ment cited other. Hungarians involved in the case and charged that one employed as a secretary, Gyula Rajos, had been helping Dr: Glaz for years in illegal sales of dollars. ght From Nowa Dispatches MOSCOW, Feb. 13-Amerf- Asked if he would follow the example of other Ameri- can writers who have offered to turn over ruble royalties to Solzhenitsyn to help his finan- cial situation, Caldwell replied: "I am willing to help writers in distress. I don't know how much he's in. I have no idea. No one has suggested that I do it so I have given it no thought or consideration." Caldwell, whose reputatiow rests on , books like "Tobacco Road" and "God's Little? Acre",. depression-era novels about 'the American South, said some 10,000 rubles (about $12,000) In royalties had accu- mulated in his account here since his last visit In 1963, "i'm Ovbrlnlided with rubles which I can't exchange and I can't take out," he said. Caldwell said this was his fifth visit to the Soviet Union. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 WASHINGTON POST 9 February, 1973 ;,BVFS Cover Is Blown; Spy Chief Resianincr By Bernard D. Nossiter Wanhin,^.ton i'or,t Forci::n Service LONDON, Feb. 8-M's four years In New York un- cover has been blown. 1:11 1939 at an advertising Britain's spy master turns agency. The next year, he out. to be Sir John Ogilvy was a British vice consul in Baltimore. He then moved Rennie, a handsome, 59-year- back to New York and the old Foreign Office official. British information services His exposure is the result during the war. of a' personal tragedy. Sir His official list of posts John's son, Charles, 25, and brings him back to London daughter-in - law Christine, for an undisclosed Foreign 23, were arrested last month Office job from 1946 to and charged with possessing 1949; then "first secretary heroin. (commercial)" at the British Sir John's name and role embassy in Washington. as head of M.I. 6 were well His sole posting in East- known . to Fleet Street de- fense and police reporters. But-under a uniquely Brit- ish system, their newspapers voluntarily. refrained from publishing this informaion. The papers, however, had Lbricfly reported the arrest of an unnamed young cou- ple on the drugs charge and had identified the man sim- ply as the soil of the 1M.1.6 chief. Stern, the German weekly magazine, followed up this clue and disclosed Sir 'John's )tame in its issue distribill.cd oil Wednesday. That released the l3rit.ish press from its obligation and the story was reported in this morning's London newspapers. Sir John either is about to or already has resigned from his post, which is offi- cially described as "deputy under secretary of state." Some newspapers here have suggested that Sir John has spent most of his professional life as a dry-as- dust commercial diplomat and was lately brought. into 119.1.6 because of. his admiuis- t.rative skills. .Knowing per- sons scoff at this. Indeed. the bare facts of his life available in the British "Who's Who" suggest a back- ground and series of cover posts to delight Ian Fleming, Graham Greene and Comp- ton MacKenzie. Sir John, an only son,. at- tended Wellington College, a "public" -that is private ---school in Berkshire. He gtudled at Italllol Collet:;e, Oxford, and then worked for ern Europe was from 1951 to 1953, when he was first sec- retary at the embassy in Warsaw. This was followed by "counsellor, Foreign Of- fice" and "head of informa- tion, research depart- ment, Foreign Office." From 1960 to 1.963, his biography simply says "Washington." He was "on loan to Civil Services Commission. during 1966." The biography does not disclose when he be- came deputy tinder secre- Inry and hors of M.l.6, al- Iltrrugh the holly I;xpre:,s said he took over as "Al" four years ago. Sir John, who lives in the fashionable Belgravia sec- tion of London, apparently was a painter of promise in his youth. Fie exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1930 and 1931 and the Paris Salon in 11932. He still lists painting as a hobby - along with "electronics," a nice suggestion of British irony. Official sources tried to discourage the ? drawing of any connection between the arrest of Charles and Sir John's resignation, stressing that the spy chief is only 11 months away from the nor- mal retirement age of 60. However, persons thor- .oughly familiar with intelli- :rr.nce procedures here said ;that the arrest of his son on .i o serious a charge maxle it jntpossible for Sir John to :continue. "There is a Cae- 'sae s wif, doctrine, you ;laa(iia'r' . ta110 lcnowledgablo nran said.. Ji'ou.r years ago,. Charles was convicted of possession of anari,ivana and fined $60, but his father's career was not affected by that inci- dent. Sir John's exposure and departure are not expected to have any' major repercus- sions on M.I.6, Sir John was too far up in the hierarchy, too remote from actual oper- atioins, to compromise any British spies in the field. Sir John will be or al- ready has been replaced by -another Foreign Office of- ficial' whose different per- sonality could affect the :tone, but not the essential 'nature of the intelligence :,gathering machine. Charae- tcrisl.ically, it works from on nondescript office building .sot far from the US em- bassy. The fact. that M.I.6 is um- the Foreign Office and Js not a separate hureauc- :racy is another major dif- :ference from American prac- tice. The British believe that, krepin;; their Spies under Foreign Oi'ficc. con- trot helps prevent I.licnt from straying off on courses of their own and embarras- sing the professional diplo- mats. The reaction in the intelli- gence community to Sir John's downfall was summed up this way: "Hard luck on the poor bastard- what a twit of a son-T'd like to kick him in the crotch." Sir John belongs to the right; crltih. He has been awarded the right decora- tions. From his picture pub- lished in the Manchester Guardian, he appears type- cast for his role. He has a distinguished, oval. face, strong chin and aquiline nose, and stares out from under slightly hooded brows. The surfacing of Sir John's name Illustrates the curious and peculiarly British ::ysfem of 1) (for 1)e- fense) notices. 1?,ssentially, 44 this is a voluntary agree, ment between media and government that tries to prevent the disclosure of material seen as harmful to. national security. Its key figure is a retired rear admiral, Kenneth Farn- hill, secretary of the De- fense, fense, Press and Broadcast- ing Committee. Newspapers,' fearful of breaching security call Farnhill, who makes. himself available around the" clock, for an opinion. The media need not follow his advice. But, in an interview, be said they have without, fail. during at least his three i months in the job and the nearly two years of his pred- ecessor. His committee consists'of four high-ranking civil serv- ants and media representa- tives-editors from national' and provincial newspapers, television executives and representatives of news- agencies. Aflcr a D-nolicc flap two t yc:ifs at;o, this group cotll-. Tied 12 guidelines covering weapons, military plans, in- telligence and other sensi, Live subjects. These guide-.t lines are bound in a 25-. page green book marked, "confidential" and 900 cop- ies are in the media's hands, Why does Britain make a. mystery of the head of M.I. (3 as well as its counterintel- ligence counterpart. M I. 5?. Ata. Farnhill, himself a former high-ranking intelli- gence official in the Defense Ministry, readily acknowl- edged that the spy chiefs' names are well known 'in the Soviet Union and else- But their anonymity is preserved, to enable them., to live as normal and .pri- vate a life as possible, spi;tt ing them bodyguards, cranks and other occupational haz- - ards of an i0vill?iflud opy chief. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 NEW YORK TIMES 9 February 1973 All Britain Learns a Top Spy `Secret' By RICHARD EDER Special to The New York Times LONDON,. Feb. 8-When Charles Tatham Ogilvie Ren- nie was remanded last week to the Old Bailey on a charge of possessing heroin, he re- ceived a privilege that almost no other adult Briton would have enjoyed. The newspa- pers did not print his name. The reason was that Mr. Rennie, who is 23 and who works as an electrician in West London, had been iden- tified in the press as the son of the head of Britain's for- eign intelligence service, pop- ularly known as M.I. 6. The' British press is not permitted. to, disclose the name of this man-whose working title "C," was transmuted to "M," for James Bond readers-nor that of the head of counter- intelligence, somtimes known as M.I.5. The ironies of the situa- tion became, fully apparent here yesterday. Stern, a West German magazine, printed C's name: ? Sir John Ogilvie Ren- nie. The Government's Press Security Committee decided that there was no point in maintaining the so-called_D Notice-a notification to edi- tors that a particular news item could: violate the secur- ity laws. And so last night and this morning the press displayed the news about Sir John with varying discretion--The Times of London tucked it away in a. tiny corner of page 2. The Daily Telegraph front-paged it, The Guardian printed a large portrait. It's No Secret The oddity about all this Is that Stern was not reveal- ing anything that could he called a secret when it used Sir John's name. Everyone with a serious professional interest in such matters- journalists, diplomats and ri- val intelligence services - knew it already. Similarly, they knew the name of his deputy, Maurice Oldfield, 'a former military intelligence officer who once. served as embassy counselor In Washington. Sir John has announced his retirement and Mr. Oldfield is mentioned as a likely candidate to head the organization, officially known as the Soerot Intelil- gence Service. Why the British Insist that such a commonly available bit of information is a secret puzzles foreigners and many Britons. They note that the identities and policies of the heads of the American Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and of many of its Western Eu- ropean equivalents are wide- ly discussed in the press in each country. British officials in charge of explaining such things were keeping their upper lips very rigid today. "What is the use of having a secret service if you aren't going to be secret about it?" was the way one put it. Chapman Pincher, who writes on defense matters for The Daily Express, de- nounced today what he termed "this absurd secret" and argued that the identi- ties of the heads of both M.I.6 and. M.I.5 should be public. The present ' system; he said, is due to the "the path- ological preoccupation of Whitehall with secrecy." In addition, he wrote, it serves to shield the heads of the service when security scan- dals-of which M.I.6 has known several-blow up. E. H. Cookridge, an author who specializes in intelli- gence topics and who is cur- rently writing a book about Sir Mansfield Cummings, founder of the British secret service's foreign operation, said that it was Sir Mansfield who began the tradition of anonymity. ' Originally a naval officer, Sir Mansfield, who died in 1923, insisted on being known simply as "0," and the initial has stuck. Officials maintain . that anonymity helps preserve the private life of Britain's intelligence chiefs. But the to everybody in his club, and is pointed out to guests, is almost as venerable as the service itself. Sir John's club is Brooks's, but White's is more traditional for M.I. 6 chiefs. ' Some Cozy Assumptions The rather cozy class as- sumptions that lie behind the notion that what is all right for members of White's or Brook's to know is a security breach when other readers of The 'inns know about It have tended to pervade M.I. 6 itself Originally both the Secret Intelligence Service and its part, the Security Service, were branches of Military In- telligence. It is from that time that the initials M.I. 6 and M.I. 5 under the Home Office, though both retain a Defense Ministry link. The traditions of M.I. 6, as put together by Sir Mansfield and more or less continued by his successors, have rested largely on what has been called brilliant amateurism. One of the earliest British spies was the poet Christo- pher Marlowe, who inflitrated British Roman Catholic exile circles in the service of the Duke of Guise in Rheims. The literary tradition was continued in modem times not only by Ian Fleming but by Graham Greene and Mal- colm Muggeridge, who joined the service during World War Jr. The talent that wartime could attract tended to drop off in peace time, however, and the improvisation often remained, but without the brilliance. The combination of impro- visation with the 'kind of camaraderie that earned' for M. I. 6 operatives the nick- name "the Friends" - the counterspies in M.I. 5, several degrees down socially, were regarded by M.I. 6 as crude policemen and were called "the Snoopers"-nearly des- troyed the service in the nine- teen fifties." A Blow to Tradition The exposure of Kim Philby, a high M.I. 6 official, as the "third man" in the Burgess- Maclean affair was king' de- layed because his colleagues simply could not credit the assertions of the Snoopers that here was a spy in their midst. The appointment in the late nineteen-fifties of Sir Dick White, head of M.I. 5, as "C" was a heavy blow to the tra- dition of the secret service. According to those who have written on the subject, pro- fessionalism was increased and some free-swinging tend- encies were curbed. The appointment of._ Sir John Rennie four years ago was another move to bring M.I. 6 into the normal chan- nels of bureaucracy. Sir John, a diplomat, was the first "C" whd enmo from outside the Intelligence community, and his background made it pos- sible for the Foreign Office to exercise more control. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100100001-5 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 February 1973 a9h U expi Prime Minister Palme blames war with Vietnam, calls. for reconstruction `channeled through UN' By Takashi Oka Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Stockholm Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden hopes for an "integrated international ef- fort," channeled if possible through the United. Nations, to aid the postwar recon- struction. of North and South Vietnam. Swe- den, he said in an interview here, would "definitely" participate in such an effort. . Outside the Prime Minister's office, fur- nished in clean-lined Swedish modern, the sky was gray, and rain drifted across the window panes. Despite the unseasonal lack of snow, It seemed a far cry from this handsome northern city, capital of one of the world's richest, most thoroughgoing welfare states, to the red dirt, the beating sun, the palm-leaf shelters, and black-trousered farmers of Vietnam. Yet Vietnam casts its long shadow across Swedish relations with the United States. "Few people are so pro-American as the Swedes," Mr. Palme says. But since the American military involvement in Vietnam began, Stockholm's official ties with Wash- ington have been as wintry as the chill winds blowing in across the Baltic Sea from Russia. What causes freeze The freeze is not of their choice, Swedes of many different shades of opinion say. Thorb-' jorn Falldin - a rugged, blue-eyed farmer from Harnosand in the north and leader of the Center Party, principal opposition to Mr. Palme's Social Democrats, characterizes Vietnam as the only problem between the United States and Sweden, and maintains that while his countrymen want good rela- tions with America, they feel they have the right to say they cannot understand Amer- ica's role in Vietnam. Posters of grieving Vietnamese mothers festoon Stockholm's' windows alongside entic- ing displays of the latest gadgets of a consumer society. Leftist' demonstrators shouting fierce slogans march up to Parlia- ment Square without disturbing youngsters briskly selling buttoms opposing "leftist ex- tremism" and showing a Swedish-American handshake. "We've sold 300,000 of these buttons," said Peter, a 'student in languages, "and Sweden has a population of only 8 million." Attitudes explained Mr. Palme, who treats his enormous prime ministerial office like a book-lined profes- sor's study, and who flings himself into -a chair to confront a visitor with the relish of a tutor confident of instant rapport with his students, explains Swedish attitudes on Viet- nam as a compound of three major factors: First, he says, comes the "human reaction against the bombing and against the up- rooting of a whole society." Second is the feeling that the Vietnam war represented the continuation of an old colo- vial war, the Americans having taken over for their own, global, anti-Communist pur. poses, the war the French had been waging to preserve their colonial empire. Third, as a small, nonaliegned nation, Sweden feels it was very much in its own interest to assert Vietnam's right to indepen- dence and self-determination free of super- power intervention. Detente between the superpowers was to be welcomed, but it. did involve a certain danger for smaller coun- tries in between - the danger that their voices would be ignored. Comparison defended Asked if he did not think that his references in a pre-Christmas broadcast comparing the American bombing of Hanoi with Guernica, Lidice, and other instances of mass slaughter were not too strong, Mr. Palme replied: "You must remember the circumstances. r The bombing had been going on for nearly a week. I had just received a telephoned report from our embassy in Hanoi about the destruction of the Bach Mai Hospital, to which Sweden had contributed equipment and medical supplies. The call came through as clearly as someone talking in the next room. So as I went on the air I was thinking of burning patients, of terror-stricken chil- dren." Repercussions noted Mr. Palme's broadcast comments caused President Nixon to ask Stockholm not to send a newly appointed ambassador to Washing- ton, and to keep the American charge d'afaires in Sweden, who had been home in the United States on holiday, from returning to his post. This situation still continues. But the Paris peace agreement now opens the possibility of a new period, both in Vietnamese history and in that of Sweden's relations with the United States. "Once this frightful war is over, I have no fear for the future of American-SWedisFt Eidtitfi6te," l