WHITE HOUSE DATA AND DEAN'S DIFFER ABOUT WATERGATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS. VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 39
29 JUNE 1973
Governmental Affairs
,(9e,a7A,?7 VaL,AetaSttea-Adzi
,X2-eAL-1A,ecel,e-6
CONFIDENTIAL
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NEW YORK TIME3
21 JUNE 1973
HITE HOUSE DATA.
AND DEUS 1FFR
Vi'ATERGATE
Ex-Aide Said to Have Deni,ed?
Nixon Information About ;
Co.verrUp Until March 21
PANEL GETS 2 VERSIONS
Dean Insists Before Senate
Inquiry President Knew,
About the Plot Earlier: ?
By DAVID E. ROSENBAILIN
Special tee Thr New York Tlmea
WASHINGTON, June 20?A
White House account of Presi-
dent Nixon's conversations
this year with John W. Dean 3d
charges that Mr. Dean, despite
constant pressure from the
President, withheld front Mr.
Nixon all information about
White House Involvement In
the Watergate burglary and
cover-up until March 21. ,
On the other hand, a surb-
mary prepared by lawyers on
the Senate/Watergate commit-
tee of their interrogation of Mr.
Dean last Saturday containg
Mr. Dean's assertion that Mr.
Nixon knew earlier about the,
cover-up plot. ?
Much of the evidence against
the President that Mr.' Dean
gave the committee staff is
hearsay, according to the sum-
mary. But he told of some di7.'
rect '.convetsations with the
President in which aspects of
ithe..covor-up.. had been dig-
'Fussed,
U. S.-Soviet Summitry
With the Senate committee
.in recess for a week, the capi-
'tat had planned to devote its
'full attenUon to the United
States and Soviet summitry.
But details of Mr. Dean's
long interview last week have
been filtering into print for.
Several days, amid suggestions
that ? the White House and
the Senate investigators, each
recognizing the importance of.
Mr. Dean's testimony in public.
next week, *ere trying to
ishape the public's attitude
toward his eventual appear-
ance.
Much of what was contained's
inent and the ? abbre
in both the White Hvg Jocu-
rayed IfraitietakgkeiNMICIMIRMINMOTelg18?U19"ng:
count of win Dean's testimony',
had come to light previously.
But there were some new or
more detailed allegations by
Mr. Dean, a central 'figure in
the Watergate case. They in-
cluded the following:
41That the President, in a'
conversation with Mr. Dean
last September, directed an ef-
fort to block a ';Watergate
investigation by a House com7'
mittee and urged Mr. Dean to
prepare to "take care of" re-
porters unfriendly to the White
House. ?
(Mat Charles W. Colson, a
former White House special
Counsel, and John D. Ehrlich-
man, the former domestic ad-
viser to the President, had
'sought from Mr. Nixon permis-
sion to promise executive
clemency to E. Howard Hunt
Jr., one of the Watereate con-
spirators. Mr. Dean said that
he had "heard this" from Mr.
Colson and later this spring
had a. "discussion with the
President" about the clemency
offer. ?
clThat Mr. Dean had been ip-
structed by Mr. Ehrlichman
and H. R. Haldeman, the for-
mer White House chief of
staff, to enlist the aid of Lieut.
Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the
deputy director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, in cover-
ing up the Watergate con.
spiracy. Mr. Dean's account
was that the White House aides
said that General Walters
"'owed his allegiance to the,
White House," but that the
C.I.A. official had declined to
help.
?EIThat Mr. Nixon had told
Mr. Dean that the late director;
of the Federal Bureau of In-1
vestigation, J. Edgar Hoover,
had advised the President that
he "had been bugged" in the
1968 campaign, and that Mr.
Nixon believed the White House
should use the information to
its advantage at some point.
List of Dates Released ,
The White House released
several days ago a list of the
dates on which Mr. Dean had
met with Mr. Nixon. But not
until the summary sent to the
Senate committee became avail-
able today had there been any
indication of the White House
version of the substance of the
discussions.
Papers Made Available
The White House account
was submitted to the Senate
committee this week. It and the
summary of the investigators'
intervietaw with Mr. Dean, the
former White House counsel,
were made availabue to The
New York Times by persons
with access to committee
documents.
The White House account
was five pages long and, ac-
cording to Senate sources, was
prepared by J. Fred Buzhardt,
Jr., special counsel to the Presi,
stance of 18 meetings this year
between the President and Mr.
Dean. ?
Mr. Dean And White House
spokesman have agreed that
there were more than 35 dis-
cussions between President
Nixon and his former counsel
between late January and April
of this year, some face-to-face,
and others by telephone.
Met Almost Daily
From March 1 until March 23,
according to the account, the
President and Mr. Dean met
about the Watergate affair al-
most daily:
In answer to questions from
the President, Mr. Dean said
time and again at the early
meetings that there was no
White House involvement in the
purglary or the cover-up, the
account states. But it says that
Mr. .Nixon was told by Mr.
Dean on March 13 that Gordon
C. Strachan, then the top as:
srstant to H. II. Haldeman,
%lite House chief of . staff,
"could be involved."
'Pe was not until March '21;
the account states, that Mr.
De4p "gave the President his
t.170iry of what happened."
11,ffi3 told the President "that
Magruder probably knew, that
Mitchell possibly knew, that
Strathan probably knew, that
Haldeman had possibly seen
the fruits of the wiretaps
through Strachan. that Ehrlich-
man was vulnerable because of
his approval of Kalmbach's
funr-raising efforts, the docu-
ment states.
uz711,?ers Got Summary
T mate committee- sum-,
mar Kr. Dean's private tes-
timony ? reducing his 51,4
hours of testimony last Satur-
day to seven sparse and tan-
talizingly vague pages of alle-
gations ? was prepared by a
junior staff n member and dis4
tributed to he seven commit-
tee members on Monday by
Samuel DCM, the chief coun-
sel. ?
The summary presented a
vivid picture of widespread at-
tempts within ?? . the ?. upper
reaches of the White' House
and the Committee for the Re-
election of the President to
cover up the magnitude of the
Watergate, ease.
Mr. Dean accused H. R. Hal-
deman, the former White House
chief of staff, of having or-
dered the destruction of infor-
mation obtained from the
Watergate wiretap, of having
Joined in planning efforts to
obtain White House influence
over the Republican members
of the Senate investigating
committee and of attempting
to persuade John N. Mitchell,
the former campaign director
and Attorney General, to "take
the heat" off other officials by
assuming the blame for the
Watergate break-in.
Mr. Dean, according to the
summary, alleged that John D.
Ehrlichman, the former Presi-1
ential adviser on domestic mat-
ters, had put preseure on Mr.1
Dean to "lean on" Lieut. Gen.1
Vernon A. Walters, the deputy!
director of the Central Intel-1
agency in a cover-up.
Accordng to the summary,
IGeneral Walters "said it. would
be a bad idea," but Mr. Ehrlich-
man was "dissatisfied" when
Mr. Dean reported the intel-
ligence official's reluctance to
.help.
Linked to Meeting
Futhermore, Mr. Dean said
that Mr. Ehrlichman had in
structed ?him to throw ,wire-
tapping equipment "in Ethel
river" after the material had
been discovered In the White'
House safe of E. Hoard Hunt'
Jr., one of the Watergate con-,
spirators.
Mr. Dean was said to have
linked Mr. Ehrlichman to al
meeting on Feb. 10 this year at
which the plans to try to under--
:mine the Senate investigations
were discussed.
? Mr. Dean, according to th&
isummary, is prepared to testify;
to the full Senate committee)
when he appears before it nextl
week that Mr. Mitchell admit-
ted approving the plans to bug
the Democratic headquarters
but said that he believed at
the time that more care would
be taken to assure that the par-
ticipants could not be traced
to the President's campaign
committee.
The summary contains the
most serious allegations to date
that Charles W. Colson, the
former special counsel to the
President, was involved in the
Watergate conspiracy. Accord-
ing to Mr. Dean's account, Mr.
Colson had pressed for approv-
al of the bugging plan drafted
by -G. Gordon Liddy, one of
the Watergate conspirators.
In addition, Mr. Dean was
said to have told the Senate
investigators that Mr. Colson
was deeply involved in nego-
tiations at the White House to
arrange executive clemency for
Hunt and to provide $122,000
demanded by Hunt in return
for silence about Watergate.
Mr. Colson has insisted that
he was not involved either in'
the conspiracy or the attempt-1
ed cover-up. Mr. dean was said
to have told the committee that
he had tape recordings of a
conversation in which Mr.
Colson and Hunt discussed the
demand for hush money.
The summary of Mr. Dean's
testimony also related alleged
involvement by Robert C.
Mardian?the former Assistant
Attorney General and political
counselor to the campaign
committee ? in the cover-up.
Mr. Dean contended that Mr..
Mardian had gone to Mr.
Dean's White House office,
along with lawyers for the re-
election committee, to read
confidential F.B.I. summaries
of interrogations of White
House and campaign officials.
Criticism of Gray Cited
Mr. Dean also said, accord-
ing to the summary, that Mr.
Mardian had voiced criticism
of the former acting F.B.I. di-
rector, L. Patrick Gray 3d, for
"pushing too hard" with the
Watergate investigation last
.year. Mr. Dean attributedto
Mr. Mardian the suggestion
that the White House try to
.get the Central Intelligence
Agency to cooperate in a
,cover-up. ,
' The Dean summary made
other allegations, including the
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Mat Lawrence F. O'Brien,
then the Democratic party
chairman, had been the subject ,
of investigation by the White'
!House as early as 1970.
()That John J. Caulfield, a
'former White House and Trea-
tsury Department official who
has told the Senate committee
he helped to set up a private
Intelligence-gathering ? unit for
the White House, had directed
a "survey" in early 1972 of the
Presidential primary campaign
of Representative Paul N. Mc.;
Closkey Jr., a California Repub.'
lican who unsuccessfully chal-
lenged Mr. Nixon in New Hamp-
shire. ? .
ilThat Richard A. Moore, a
special counsel to the Presi-t
dent, had been involved in un-
successful efforts in February
to persuade Mr. Mitchell to
raise money for the defendants
in the Watergate trial. The
summary also said that Mr.'
Moore .had been permitted to
read the summaries of F.B.I.
interviews in the Watergate
case.
. Details of Mr. Dean's private
,conversations with the Senate
,committee staff have been leak-
ing Into print since Monday,
when the committee agreed to
postpone its public hearings for
one week.
NEW YORK TINES
27 JUNE 1973
Data Burned at Dump
May Have Been Hunt's
?
WASHINGTON, June 26
(UPI)?Eight cartons of doc-
uments from the office of E.
Howard Hunt Jr. may have
been locked in the trunk of a
Junked car for six months
and then burned at a city
dump, a Watergate witness
told United Press Interna-
tional today.
Roy H. Sheppard, who op-
erates a Washington-based
delivery service, said that a
woman he now believed was
Hunt's wife. Dorothy, got in
touch with him shortly after,.
the Watergate break-in.
He said that the woman ,
'paid him "$500 in $100 bills'
to keep the cartons in tran-
sit." ?
? He locked them in the
, trunk of a junked 1963 Plym-
outh he kept at his home in .
nearby Alexandria, Va., Mr.
Sheppard said. He did not
open the cartons until No-
vember, 1972.
. "When no one asked about
.them," he said, he took them
to the incinerator, "slit them
. open with my knife and
dumped them into the incin-
erator chute."
C HR ISTI AN SCIENCE lvDNITOR
22 June 1973
aterg te
? I
oser: trial
,
y,thtruy
Versions in conflict
over Nixon's role
By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
Two widely conflicting and semi-
official versions of President Nixon's
relations to the Watergate cover-up
now have emerged.
They are condensations by the staff
of Sen. Sam J. Ervin's committee of
pre-hearing evidence, the first frotri
the White House and prepared by J.
Fred Buzhardt Jr., special counsel of
Mr. Nixon, and the second by John W.
Dean HI, former presidential counsel,
based on sworn testimony which he
gave the committee in executive
session.
The White House version presents
Mr. Nixon as repeatedly asking Mr.
Dean, since late February, about
Watergate and repeatedly being told,
until March 21, that the White House
was not involved.
? The second, from Mr. Dean, postu-
lates that several of the top staff at
the White House knew of the progress
of the unsuccessful cover-up. It also
offers new, behind-the-scenes, details
like blocking a proposed House com-
mittee inquiry, and a reported charge?
by J. Edgar "Hoover, late FBI head,
that Democrats bugged Republicans
in 1968.
Much of the Dean testimony, sum-
marized by the Ervin staff, rests on
hearsay.
In turn, White House spokesmen
say they do not vouch for the ac-
curacy of the condensation of their
versions of an analysis of Nixon-Dean
talks, prepared by the Ervin com-
mittee.
The text of the two Ervin committee
summaries was made available to
the press in piecemeal form while the
committee is in recess during the visit
of Soviet Secretary-General Leonid I. ?
.Brezhnev. _
Like it or not, Washington agrees
that the trial-by-publicity is going on,
despite absence of formal hearings,
and that the issue is historically
unique, whether President Nixon did,
or did not, have knowlege of the
illegal Washington cover-up attempt.
Dean called 'turncoat
Without waiting for formal con-
frontation, partisans are talc lug sides;
Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott
(R) of Pcrui:,.. IvaitLA, for example,
branding ousted White House counsel
Dean as a "turncoat" and "embez-
zler,"
Mr. Dean, through his lawyer, has
refused to give further preliminary
executive-session testimony until the
public hearings.
In a separate development, the staff
of Archibald Cox, special prosecutor
In the Watergate case, reportedly is
considering calling a new grand jury.
This would hear allegations that the
Nixon election organization used ille-
gal pressure to force corporations
with issues pending before the gov-
ernment, to contribute to campaign
?funds. Funds ultimately reached
more than $50 millions.
Primary attention centers here on
the contrast between the summary of
the Dean testimony, and the analysis
of the Nixon-Dean talks coming from
the White House.
Approach differs
These clash chronologically at a
few points. But the big difference is
the approach:
Throughout the Dean version is
the basic assumption that knowledge
of the cover-up attempt was wide-
spread in the White House.
is Throughout the White House
analysis is the assumption that Mr.
-Dean was keeping the truth from
President Nixon, and that the latter
was innocent of the cover-up.
The two accounts do not really meet
because they are interpretations of
different matters; but they proceed
on postulates which get to the heart of
the issue on which Mr. Nixon's cred-
ibility may ultimately rest.
The White House analysis is based
on the log kept on meetings and
telephone conversations between Mr.
Nixon and his then counsel. There was
one meeting on Sept. 15 last year, and
37 meetings or phone calls since late
February.
? The White House repeatedly
presents Mr. Nixon as asking Mr.
Dean about Watergate, and the latter
assuring the President that the White
,House wasn't involved.
Point withdrawn
How far afield these two were is
Indicated in a matter not discussed in
the new chronology: Mr. Nixon told
the nation, for example, that Mr.
Dean had submitted a written report
clearing the White House on Water-
gate. Mr. Dean denied submitting
such a report, and the White House
withdrew the point.
In the White House version of
affairs (as condensed by the Ervin
staff) there are repeated entries "the
President asked Dean point-blank"
(about Watergate) and was told no
White House involvement; the Presi-
dent called Dean that night (March
20) and "Dean said 'There was not a
scintilla of evidence' "of White House
complicity.
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26, /973 'tift Ci;s4"ii*d?ro& -Posr
rt
ecounts
By David S. Broder
Weehinaton Poet Staff Writer
In his Senate testimony
yesterday, former presiden-
tial counsel John W. Dean
III drew a picture of a pre-
election White House neu-
rotically concerned with the
presence of anti-Nixon dem-.
onstrators and morbidly fas-
cinated with gossip and in- 6
telligence about the Dem-
ocratic opposition.
Others who worked there
.and In the Nixon campaign
said In interviews yesterday
that Dean's description
matched" their own recollec-
tions.
But Patrick J. Buchanan,
then and now a consultant
to the President, said there
had been "a real diminution
of concern" by the time of
which Dean was speaking,
compared to the atmosphere
in 1969 and early 1970.
"I don't think there was
paranoia," Buchanan said.
Dean did not use the word
"paranoia" in his testimony,
but he told the Senate
Watergate investigators that
he found "a climate of ex-
cessive concern over the pce
Mimi. impact of demonstra-
tors, excessive concern over
leAks, an insatiable appetite
for political intelligence, all
coupled with a do-it-yourself
White House staff, regard-
less of the law."
Dean called the break-in
at Democratic headquarters?
an "inevitable outgrowth" of
this climate, and said it was
also responsible for such ae-
tions as:
? A threat by former pres-.
Idential aide Dwight Chapin
"to get some 'thugs' to re-
move" a single demonstra-
tor the President had spot-
ted in Lafayette Park.
?An order by the Presi-
dent, using "some rather
blunt synonyms," for the Se-
cret Service to remove a
group of demonstrators in
Akron, and a request from
the President, just last
March, for a speech to be
drafted showing that "his
opponents had employed
demonstrators against him
in his re-election campaign."
? A" all from Richard G.
Kleindienst, then deputy at-
torney general, instructing
c Dean to carry from the FBI
to the White House "some
very important information"
of a "rather sensitive nature
. . . regarding the foreign
travels of Mary Jo Ko-
pechne," the young woman
killed in an auto accident In-
volving Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D-Mass.).
? The dispatch from the
White House to Chappaquid-
dick Island, site of that cv?
dent, of special inves
Anthony Ulasewicz, who,
Dean said John Caulfield
told him, was on the scene
"within six hours of the ac-.
c en " and posed as a re-
porter to dig out informa-
tion on the case. .
? A proposal from presi-
dential aide H.R. (Bob)
Haldeman; rejected as too
dangerous, that Kennedy be
kept under surveillance 24
hours a day.
? A special investigation,
of Kennedy's activities dur-
ing a .24-hour stopover in
Hawaii on a 1971 Far East-
ern trip.
? And the delivery, dur-
ing the spring of 1972, by "a
top man at the Secret Serv-
ice" of information regard?
ing Democratic presidential
contender George McGov-
ern, which then White
House aide Charles Colson
"was very interested" in and
"had ... published."
White House press secre-
tary Ronald Ziegler de-
clined to commentS on
Dean's testimony and most
others mentioned by Dean
were unavailable to report-
ers.
Jack Warner, a spokesman
for the Secret Service, said
it had begun an internal in-
vestigation of the charges
that Secret Service agent
protecting McGovern were
reporting back to the White
?House, at the time those
charges first appeared, last
November, in The New York
Times.
Neither then or later, he
said, "have we found any-
thing to bear out these elle-
gations. Our investigation is
continuing."
Colson, in a separate in-
terview, acknowledged re,
ceiving the report from
Dean but said he had -not
,been able to get it pub-
lished, "because no one
.could ever check it out." He
'saki the report concerned "a
fund-raising affair McGov-
ern attended in Philadel-
phia, where the fellow in
charge had a questionable
background."
Colson said Dean "just
walked in with it, and never
said where it came from. It's
very characteristic of what
Dean did throughout his tes-
timony yesterday?laid off
his own sins on others, and
did it cleverly."
Colson said he had been
interviewed about the case
by the Secret Service and
had told them the same
thing. Asked if he now be-
lieved the report came from'
the Secret Service, Colson
said, "Well, Dean said it was
from the SecretService, and
the& ova *alp
hite House
Kennedy's press secretary,
Richard Drayne, said the
senator was unaware of any
White House surveillance,
or of the activities of Ula-
sewicz at Chappaquiddick.
Drayne said Kennedy told
him yesterday he knew
nothing of any foreign trav-
els by Miss Kopechne nor of
any reason why his visit to
Hawaii should have been, of
White House interest.
The report to the White
House on Kennedy's visit to
Honolulu on Aug. 17, 1971,
submitted by Dean to the
Senate committee, is very
bland.
It said Kennedy held an
airport press conference,
left with two friends and
made no public appearances
except for a tennis game.
"Discreet inquiry deter:
mind that Kennedy used
the estate (where he was
staying) solely for sleeping
purposes, took only his,
breakfast meal at that loca-
tion and quietly :visited
friends at other locations on
the island . . . An extensive
survey of hotels, discreet
cocktail lounges and other
hideaways was conducted
with a view towards deter-
mining a covert EMK
(Kennedy) visit. The results
were negative," the report
said.
In his statement yester-
day, Dean said that "it was
not until I joined the White
House staff in July of 1970
that I fully realized the'
strong feelings that the
President and his staff had
toward antiwar demonstra-
tors?and demonstrators in
general."
He said the White House
continually sought informa-
tion that would discredit the
,demonstration leaders, show
that they were backed "by
some foreign enemy" or had
ties to some "major political
figures, specifically members
of the U.S. Senate, who op-
posed the President's war
policies."
Dean said that in the late
winter of 1971 "the Presi-
dent happened to look out
the windows of the resi-
dence of the White House
and saw a lone man with a
large 10-foot sign stretched
out in front of Lafayette
Park."
He said Larry Higby, a
Haldeman aide, "called me
'to his office to tell me of
the President's displeasure
. . . and told me that Mr.
,Haldeman said the sign had
to come down."
Leaving Higby's office, he
met Chapin, "who said that
he was going to get some
'thugs' to remove that man
08/CirFattaMDF'17404:1
with help from the Secret
Service and the Park pollee,.
'persuaded the man to move,
'to the back side of the park,'
"out of sight from the White
'House,"
Haldeman, he said, "was
.delighted."
Only three months ago, he
said, Mr. Nixon himself told
him that "as a part of the
planned counter-offensive
,for dealing with the Senate
Watergate investigation, the
President wanted to show
that his opponents ' had
employed demonstrators
,against him during his re-
election campaign."
The problem, said Dean,
was that "we never found a
scintilla of viable evidence
indicating that these demon-
strators were part of a mas-
ter plan . . . funded by the
Democratic political funds,
nor that they had any direct
,connection with the Mc-
Govern campaign." For that
reason, he said, William Ba-
roody was never able to
write the speech the ,Presi-
dent wanted on the subject.
"This was explained to
Mr. Haldeman," Dean said,
"but the President believed
that the opposite was true."
Dean's view of a White
House neurotically preoccu-
pied with the4hreat of dem-
onstrators was contradicted
by Buchanan, who had been
a close adviser to Mr. Nixon
. for the past seven years.
"There was a great deal
more apprehension here in
1969 and at the time of Cam-
bodia and Kent State," he
said, "than in any subse?
quent period. By the time
we were moving into the
campaign?and certainly at-
ter the May. Day demonstra-
tions in 1971?there was a
real diminution of concern.
For one thing, every time a.
demonstration occurred, it
was politically helpful."
Dean's Statement to the
committee yesterday dif-
fered in tone from his de-
scription of the same situa-
tion in a reports he com-
posed last March, before his
forced resignation from the
White House. That March
statement was also enterea
In evidence yesterday.
In both statements, Dean
referred to White House dis-
satisfaction with intelli-
gence reports on the demon-
strators. In March he said
that "when Haldeman would
read the reports regarding
demonstrations be would ?
and rightly so ? express
continual dissatisfaction."
12R0001.0041/000t1'e7 evidence
t)rovift said he dissuaded him and, would appear that the dem-
3
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' onstrations were well-or-
chestrated' and well-fi-
nanced," he wrote then, "no
one could ever find hard in-
formation as to who was be.
hind it and what motivation
might exist, other than the
obvious antiwar theme."
Back in Mardi, he sug-
gested two reasons why the
President might be rightly
concerned with the demon-
stration problem: "First," he
sold, "it made the atmos-
phere of public opinion
much more difficult for the
President to negotiate an
honorable peace in Vietnam,
and, secondly, when the gov-
ernment dealt firmly with
the demonstrators, we
would be charged with op-
pressive tactics even though
the demonstrators ? were
seeking to tie the govern-
ment into, knots."
Interviews with three for-
mer White House and cam-
paign aides, on the other
hand, iwought support for
the view of a White House
,preoccupation with security
,and polilieal espionage,
which Dean described yes-
terday.
One former campaign
aide said Dean's testimony
yesterday "rang very true.
We all learned that what
pleased them most was a
tidbit hey could pass on to
-Haldeman. That would get
? you rewards. Every one of
us felt the need to supply
that kind of information."
He recalled that hs far
back its.. Mr. Nixon's 1962
. campaign for Governor of
California, Haldeman, who
was then the campaign man-
ager and others "were so
desperately afraid of letting
.Nixon see any hostile dem-
onstrators that we had to or-
ganize groups of kids to .
lock arms and keep them
away."
A second man, a former
White House official, said,
"It all goes back to his (Mr.
Nixon's) problem with hav-
ing the unexpected happen.
'It's part and parcel of that.
His staff learns to go to any
'length to protect him from
something for which he is
not prepared."
A third man, now also re-
tired from the White House,
said "I never got the feeling
that Nixon himself or the
lop staff guys?the ones at ?
the 7:30 meeting ? were
,that upset with the demon-
strators.
"But I always had the
feeling that the reaction ac-
celerated , as it went down
the chain of command, and
frequently by the time it hit
the third or fourth guy, it
was completely out of con-
'trot. There was a lot of it
with the guys who worked
for Haldeman. Colson, Chip
pin and tl..e deep-down un-
derlings of (John) Ehrlich-
man ? Boy Scout stuff."
NEW YORK TIMES
26 JUNE 1973
Ex-Counsel Also Names
White House Assist ants
;REcAus wARNING
Declares He Told the
President Episode
Was 'a Cancer'
h
By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
? ? Special to The New York TImes
WASHINGTON, June 25
John W. Dean 3d, asserting
that President Nixon had failed'
to heed a warning that the
Watergate case was '"a cancer
growing on the Presidency,"
? testified today that the Presi-
dent had taken part in the
Watergate cover-up for as long
as eight months.
Mr. Dean, the dismissed
White House legal counsel, told
'the Senate's investigating com-
mittee that he still clung to a
belief that Mr. Nixon "did not
realize or appreciate at any
time the implications of his in-
volvement."
Nonetheless, in a day-long,
matter-of-fact recitation of Mr.
Dean's own involvement in the
Watergate cover-up and in 47
documents that he submitted to
the Senate committee, he de-
scribed a widespread effort to
mask the extent of the con-
spiracy that he said spread
from the White House staff, the
Committee for the Re-election
of the President; the Depart-
ment of Justice and, ultimately,
to the oval office of the White
House.
245-Page Account
His head bowed as he read
calmly from a 245-page pre-
pared account, Mr. Dean pub-
licly detailed for the first time
the following allegations of Mr.
Nixon's own involvement:
oriThe President complimented
him last September for having'
helped to assure that the Gov-
ernment's investigation of the
Watergate case "had stopped
with [G. Gordon] Liddy," One
of the convicted Watergate
conspirators.
(11n February, the President
asked him to report directly to
Mr. Nixon on what he learned
of the continuing investiga-
tions because H. R. Haldeman
and John D. Ehrlichman, the
two senior domestic aides to
the President, "were principals
In the matter," and also meet-
ing with Mr. Dean was taking
up too much of their time.
4
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?
gThe President discussed
with him on March 13 the de-
mands by the Watergate con-
spirators for large sums of
money to maintain their silence
and that when Mr. Dean told.
him it could cost more than
$1-million, Mr. Nixon "told me
that was no problem."
liThe President had told him
of discussions early this year
with Mr. Ehrlichman and
Charles W. Colson, a former
Special counsel to the Presi-
dent, about a promise to grant
executive clemency to E. How-
ard Hunt Jr., another of the
Watergate defendants.
liThe President directed that
the Administration try to cur-
tail the Senate investigation
and block an attempted in-
quiry into Watergate by the
House Banking and Currency
Committee last September. The
President also ordered aides to
make sure that L. Patrick Gray
3d, the former acting director
of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, would be "pulled
up short" in his testimony last
spring to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
tlAt? one point, in a meeting
on March 21, the President
discussed with his aides the
possibility that the cover-up
might be kept secret if John N.
Mitchell, the former Attorney
General and director of Mr.
Nixon's re-election campaign,
could be persuaded to assume
publicly responsibility for the
burglary and wiretapping of
the Democratic headquarters at
Watergate a year ago.
tlAfter he (Dean) had re-
solved to try to "end the mess
without mortally wounding the
President" by giving informa-
tion to Government prosecu-
tors, the President apparently
tape recorded an April 15 meet-
ing with him and asked a num-
ber of "leading questions" in
an evident effort to create a
record that would "protect
himself."
filThe President tried to get
him, in a "tense conversation"
on April 16, to sign two letters
of resignation that tended to
Incriminate Mr. Dean, but he
"looked the President squarely
in the eyes and told him I
would not sign the letters" or
become a "White House scape-
goat."
On Stand 2 More Days
Mr. Dean's recital to the
Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activi-
ties consumed the entire hear-
ing today. Members of the com-
mittee will interrogate him to-
morrow and Wednesday and
they plan to call Mr. Mitchell
as the next witness on Thurs-
day.
Mr. Dean did not provide any
firsthand information to link
the President to prior knowl-
edge of the Watergate burglary
and the arrests of five men
inside the Democratic National
Committee offices. But he told.
. in a fourth-hand account, of
having been advised in Febru-
ary that Mr. Haldeman had
"cleared" with the President
Liddy's $250,000 master plan to
gather information on the Dem-
ocratic opposition in the 1972
campaign.
Furthermore, he said he was
told last Nov. 15 by Mr. Halde-
man and Mr. Ehrlichman that
Mr. Nixon had decided he must
obtain the resignation of Dwight
L. Chapin, the former White
House apopintments secretary,
because of Mr. Chapin's in-
volvement with Donald H. Se-
gretti, the alleged director of a
broad campaign of sabotage of
Democratic Presidential candi-
dacies.
Reports Burglary Order
The former White House
counsel said that another aide
to Mr. Ni::on, Egil Krogh Jr.,
had told him on March 29 that
the authority for a September,
1971, burglary of the office of
a psychiatrist treating Dr, Dan-
iel Ellsberg had come "right out
of the oval office,"
Mr. Dean's account was the
first before the Senate com-
mittee to accuse Mr. Nixon cat-
egorically of involvement in
the cover-up. He sat alone at
the witness table, his wife,
Maureen, and his lawyers
seated one row behind him, to
dramatize what he had said last
week was the loneliness of his
plight in making accusations
about the President.
He acknowledged to the
committee?before which he
appeared only after obtaining a
grant of partial immunity from
prostcution?that he had been
involved himself in "obstruct-
ing justice," arranging for "per-
jured testimony" and in making
personal use of $4,850 of cam-
paign funds.
As he began his appearance
before the Senators, Mr. Dean
said that he hoped that when
all the facts were known "the
President is forgiven." He apol-
ogized for havin gto describe
illegal acts of "friends" and of
indidivuals he said he admired,
!but he went on to recount,
calmly, without passion and in
;narrative form, the involvement
of several score Government
and campaign officials in the
Watergate case.
According to Mr. Dean's tes-
timony, the effort of the Nixon
Administration to limit the in-
vestigation of the Watergate
break-in to those immediately
arrested and to cover up any
involvement of White House of-
ficials in surveillance op-
erations against the Democrat-
ic National Committee and
Democratic Presidential candi-
dates began within two days of
the June 17 break-in.
Furthermore, as Mr. dean
described a succession of meet-
ings, the cover-up involved all
those whose names have so far
figured in the accounts that
have dribbled out of testimony
before the grand jury and in
interviews with Federal prose-
cutors, staff lawyers of the
Senate select committee and
prior testimony before that
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committee.
In his testimony today, Mr.
Dean implicated in the cover-
up Mr, Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlich-
man, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Stans,
Mr. Colson; Mr. Gray, Mr. Mae-
dian, Mr. Petersen, Mr. Kalm-
bach and a host of other of-
ficials at the White House and
the Committee for the Re-elec-
tion of the President.
i Dean's Story
, This, in brief, is the story
'Mr. Dean told today of the
mounting efforts, at times ap-
proaching the frenetic, to pre-
vent the Investigation of the
Watergate episode from engulf&
lag the White House:
Landing in San Francisco on
June 18, 1972, from Manila,
Mr. Dean said, he learned of,
the break-in in a call from Fred
Fielding, his assistant, and im-
mediately departed for Wash-
ington.
1 He said that on Monday, the
19th, he had a succession of
meetings and telephone con-
versations with Jack Caulfield,
then with the Treasury; Jeb
1Stuart Magruder deputy di-
;rector of the reelection com-
mittee, who volunteered that
th whole think was "all Liddy's
fault:" Mr. Ehrlichman, who.
told him to find out what he
could; Mr. Strachan and Mr.
Colson, the latter assuring him
that he had "no involvement
In the matter whatsoever" but
expressing concern about "the
contents" in the safe of E.
Howard Hunt Jr.; G. Gordon
Liddy, who said Mr. Magruder
"had pushed him into doing it"
And apologized for his men be-
ing caught, and Attorney Gen-
'eral Kleindienst, who said the
F.B.I. and the District of Co-
lumbia police were investi-
gating.
The most important develop-
ments on that day, he related,
were (1) that Mr. Strachan
said to Mr. Dean that Mr. Hal-
deman had instructed him to
winnow the Haldeman files of
"damaging materials" such as;
"Wirefax information from thei
DNX" and destroy them, and
(2) that Mr. Ehrlichman ordered
Mr. Dean to "call Liddy to have
him tell Hunt to get out of the
country." and also to remove
the contents of Hunt's safe..
At Mitchell's Place
On the evening of the 19th
or 20th, Mr. Dean said, he went
to Mr. Mitchell's apartment.
Mr. Mardian and Mr. Magruder
were there, and Mr. Dean te-
called only that there was a
discussion of "how to handle
the matter from a public rela-
tions standpoint."
At a meeting with Mr. Klein-
dienst?Mr. Dean could not
remember whether it iwas the
19th or the 20th?he said, "I
told him that I did not know
if the President was involved,
but I was concerned" because
if the investigation led to the.
White House "the chances of
re-electing the President would
be severely damaged." ,
At this point, Mr. Dean re-
lated, Mr. Kleindienst sent for
1Mr. Petersen and left the two
1 men together.
"I told him 1 hadmibli,W. p
where this thing mijaff 'ea,'
Mr. Dean said, "lout I told him
I didn't think the White House
could withstand a wide-open
investigation [and] I had rea-
son?without being specific
with him to suspect the
worst."
? At mid-morning of June 20,
he said, men from the Govern-
ment Services Administration
who had opened Hunt's safe
brought the contents to him.
He said the contents included
a hand 'gun; a large briefcase
containing electronic equip-
ment; a large batch of classi-
lied State Department cables
from the early years of the
Vietnam war, a "bogus cable"
Implicating the Kennedy Ad-
ministration in the fall of the
Diem regime in 1963; "a num-
ber of materials relating to
Daniel Ellsberg," who made the
Pentagon study of the Vietnam
war available to the' press;
"some materials relating to an
investigation Hunt had conduct-
ed for Colson at Chappaquid-
dick," and many memoran-
dums to Mr. Colson on the per-
formance of the ."plumbers
unit" under Egil Krogh Jr.,
White House aide, that had
been formed on the President's
'orders to investigate leaks.,
Separating Documents
Mr. Dean said that, on his
orders, Mr. Fielding separated
out' the "politically sensitive
documents" which were then
placed in Mr. Dean's safe. The
'briefcase was put in a locked
closet in his office, he said, and
the State Department docu-
ments stored in an aide's of-.
'fice pending their return to the
department.
Later, he said, when he re-
ported to Mr. Ehrlichman on
the contents of Hunt's safe,
Mr. Ehrlichman told him "to
shred" the bogus cable, the
documents relating to Dr. Ells-
berg and other politically sensi-
tive material, and to "deep six"
the briefcase with the electronic
equipment. Then, Mr. Dean
testified:
"I asked him what he meant
by 'deep six.' He leaned back
in his chair and said, You drive
across the river on your way
home at night, don't you?' I
said yes. He said, 'Well, when
you cross over the bridge on.
your way home, just toss the
briefcase into the river.'"
Mr. Dean said that he sug-
gested to Mr. Ehrlichman that
he get rid of the bugging equip-
ment since he also crossed the
river. "He said, no thank you,"
said Mr. Dean.
Decided Not to Obey
He said he was "very trou-
bled" about Mr. Ehrlichman's
instruction, and Mr. Fielding
shared his feeling that it would'
be "an incredible action to
destroy potential evidence.".
Therefore, he said, he decided
not to follow the instructions.
. On June 21, he stated, he
met with Mr. Gray, who told
him the F.B.I. had traced four
'checks totaling $89,000 con-
tributed by a group of wealthy
Texans to a bank in Mexico
City, and a $25,000 check to
Kenneth Dahlberg, a Nixon
middle Western fund raiser,
ickdativetteitemOn
from ayne n p reas.
wealthy Minneapolis business-
man who had been 'a long-time
backer of Senator Hubert H.
,Humphrey. The total of $114,000
had turned up in the Miami
bank account of Bernard L.
Barker, one of the Cubans ar-
rested ? in the Watergate break-
in.
' Mr. Dean said that Mr. Mit-
chell and Mr. Stans were con-
terned that Mr. 'Andreas not
be embarrassed and were wor-
ried about the four Mexican
checks, possibly, he said, be-
cause they might have been
liegel corporate contributions.
Mr. Dean said that Mr. Stens
had asked Hugh W. Sloan Jr.,
the campaign treasurer, how
the money ended up in Barker's
account. Mr. Sloan had ex-
plained that he had given the
Checks to Liddy to cash, and
Liddy had evidently "used
Barker to cash them."
Explaining that this money
was unconnected with Water-
gate, Mr. Mitchell and Mr.
Stans, Mr. Dean said, asked
him "to see if there was any-
thing the White House could
do to prevent this unnecessary
embarrassment."
Therefore, he said, he talked
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman, and at their re-
quest went to see Mr. Gray on
June 22. Mr. Gray, he said, had
one theory that- Watergate
might have been "a C.I.A.
operation" because of the
former C.I.A. employes: in-
volved and planned to talk to
agency officials about it. He
also, Mr. Dean said, "expressed
his awarenesS of the potential
problems" for the ? administra-
tion in the F.B.I. investigation.
Mr. Dean said that on June
23 he reported on his confer-
ence with Mr. Gray to Mr.
Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and,
in a meeting with Mr. Mitchell,
Frederick C. LaRue, an aide to
Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Mardian.
It was in this meeting, he said,
that he first heard discussion
of "the need for money to tnke
care of those who were in-
Volved in the break-in."
? It was at the June 23 meet-
ing, he said, following his re-
port that Mr. Gray believed the
C.I.A. might be involved, that
Mr. Mardian suggested the
C.I.A. "could take care of this
entire matter if they wished."
Role for C.I.A.
Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean said,
suggested that he explore with
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich-
man "having the White House
contact the C.I.A. for assist-
ance." By this, apparently, Mr.
Mitchell meant that the agency
should assume responsibility
for Watergate by paying those
apprehended to keep silent..
Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean
testified, thought Mr. Mitchell's
suggestion "a good idea" and
ordered Mr. Dean to explore it
with Lieut. Gen. Vernon A.
Walters, the C.I.A. deputy di-
rector, rather than the director,
Richard Helms.
WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1973
Haldeman I xpects
To Clear Nixon, Self
NEWYORK, June 28 (AP).?
Former White House chief of
staff H. R. Haldeman said to-
day he hopes for "the chance
to tell the whole story" about
, Watergate and when he does
it will completely ' clear the
President and himself.
? Haldeman was interviewed
In Newport Beach, Calif., by
CBS News. He was one of
those named by another for-
mer White House aide, John
W. Dean III, as having knowl-
edge of the plan to bug the
Democratic headquarters in
the Watergate, and of being
involved in the subsequent
cover-up of White House in-
volvement.
Asked if he had been watch.
ing the Senate Watergate
Committee hearings at which
Dean Is testifying, Haldeman
replied, "Sure I have," but de-
clined to comment specifically
It and that as the facts are,
fully .known?as the truth Is
completely known in the case,
It will be clear, legally and
clear to the American people,'
that, most. Importantly, the
President had ,absolutey no in-
volvement in the Watergate
matter in any way. shape or
form and absolutely no
Iri-
volvement in any supposed or
alleged cover-up d any mat-
ters relating to the Watergate.
"It will also be further
equally obvious that I had no
Involvement of that kind, el
ther in the planning or exe
cution of the Watergate or in
the cover-up of the Water-
gate."
Asked If he thought It was a
"gond thing" the hearings are
being aired publiclY, Halde-
man replied: "Absolutely."
He added that "the impnr-
on Dean's charges "except In tant thing is that they be car-
the proper forum."
iried in their entirety. And'.
He said he expected to "Have that people judge on *the basis
' that opportunity . . . in the of the totality of the informa-
next few weeks," and added: lion they get rather' than on
"I have confidence that Ithe basis of any little 'hit . . .
will then have the chance to on any day by any one wit:
CIA-R4DPIT*0430R00011-1, ? 68014 one source."
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NEW YORK TIMES
26 JUNE 1973
Dean Says White House
Put a 'Friend' in C.I.A.
? By MARJORIE HUNTER
? SOretal to The New York Ti
WASHINGTON, June 25 ?
John W. Dean 3d testified to-
day that he had been told by a
top Nixon aide that the White
House had put its own "good
friend" into the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in order to "have
some influence over ? the
agency."
That !'good friend," Mr.
Dean told the Senate Watergate
committee,' is Lieut. Gen. Ver-
non A. Walters, Deputy Dir-cc
tor of the C.I.A. and frequent
interpreter for President Nixon
on foreign trips.
This latest disclosure of .
alleged White House efforts to
involve the C.I.A. in domestic
' activities came amid increas-
ing demands by Congress for
tighter control over the top
secret agency.
Within the last few weeks,
former and present officials of
the C.I.A. have trooped to
Capitol Hill in unprecedented
numbers to he questioned for
hours at a time upon the
agency's role in the Watergate
affair.
Out of these harings by both
Senate and House committees
and subcommittees have come
startling revelations of C.I.A.
cooperation with the White
House on strictly domestic ope-
rations?a field that its own
charter would? seemingly rule
out of bounds.
And out of these hearings
have come equally stunning ac-
counts of While House efforts
to enlist C.I.A. aid in covering
up the Watergate scandals.
Mr. Dean's testimony today
supported earlier accounts by
General Walters and other
C.I.A. officials of White House
efforts to get the agency to
shoulder the blame for the
break-in at the Democratic Na4
tional Committee headquarters
In the Watergate complex last
June 17.
At the same time, the Dean
testimony appeared to shed
light on what had been a pub-
licly unanswered question: Why
had the White House passed
over Richard M. Helms, at that
time Director of Central In-
telligence, to negotiate almoqst'
solely with his deputy on, the
Watergate matter?
Mr. Dean testified that, a
few days after the Watergate
break-in, L. Patrick Gray, then
acting Director of the Federal
.Bureau of Investigation, sug-
gested to him that it might
have been a C.I.A. operation
because of the number of for-
mer agency people involved.
Mr. Dean said that he later
told John D. Ehrlichmann, the
President's domestic affairs ad-
viser, of Mr. Gray's suggestion
and hat Mr. Ehrlichmann told
him to call the agency and ex-
plore the matter.
"He then told me that I
should deal with General Wal-
ters because he was a good
friend of the White House and
the White House had put him
in the Deputy Director position
so they could have some in-
fluence over the agency," Mr.
Dean testified.
Assurance for Ehrlichman
Mr. Dean said he later in-
formed Mk Ehrlichman that Ge
eral Walters had assured him
that agency involvement in the
Watergate was impossible:
Mr. Dean said that Mr.
Ehrlichman responded by say-
ing "something to the effect,
that General Walters seems to
have forgotten how he got
where he is today."
, A spokesman for the CIA,
',said that General Walters
!would have no comment on the
Dean testimony.
j Shocked by these and other
:disclosures, Congressional crit-
ics and supporters alike are
now calling fcir stern measures
to assert firmer control over
the agency. ,
Won House Approval
Just last week, the first move
to curb C.I.A. activities came
with House approval of a ban
on agency assistance to do-
mestic law enforcement agen-
cies. The Senate has not acted.
The provision, sponsored by
Representative Elizabeth Holtz-
man, Democrat of Brooklyn,
was promoted by disclosures
that agency employes had been
training police officers in New
York City and other cities in
clandestine activities.
Mike Mansfield, Democrat of
Montana, the Senate majority
leader, plans to renew his un-
successful drive of many years
ago to establish a joint Senate-
House committee to oversee
operations of the CIA, and
.other Government intelligence
agencies.
1
Senator' Stuart Symington,
Democrat of Missouri, the act-
ing chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, has
said that he will conduct a full-
scale investigation of the evolv-
ing "secret charter" under
which the agency has operated
since its establishment 25 years
ago.
There are also proposals to
revise ? the agency's basic law
either to outlaw domestic
operations specifically or to re-
quire that any such domestic
involvement be permitted only
upon the personal request of
the PreSident.
The National Security Act of
1947, under which the intelli-
gence agency was created, was
designed to prohibit it from
conducting domestic operations
by stating that it "shall have
no police, subpoena, law-en-
forcement or internal security
functions."
But the act also contains two
major loopholes:
First, it gives the Director of
Central Intelligence the respon-
sibility of "protecting intelli-
gence sources and methodc
from unauthorized disclosure."
Second. the act gives the
agency authority "to perform
Approved
such other functions and duties
relating to intelligence" as the
National Security Council, an
arm of the Presidency, "may
from time to time direct."
Furthermore, secret eXecu-
tive orders, interpreting the Na-
.tional Security Act, have been
,issued through the years, cre-
atting what some call the
'C.I.A.'s "secret charter,"- mew
the target of Senator Syming-
ton's planned investigation.
While earlier efforts to assert
greater Congressional control
over the C.I.A. were success-
fully blocked by successive Ad-
ministrations, the recent dis-
-closures in the Watergate affair
have stunned Congress.
Cushman Agreed
Among the disclosures were
the following:
gin the summer of 1971 Gen.
Robert A. Cushman, at that
time deputy director of the
agency and now commandant of
,the Marine Corps, agreed to a
White House request to supply
E. Howard Hunt Jr. with a wig,
false identification papers and
other items later used in burg-
larizing the California office of
Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former
Wi131-1INGTON POST
27 June 1973
psychiatrist.
(1Scarcely weeks later, Mr.
Hein* then director of the
agency and now Ambassador to
Iran, agreed to another White
House request for preparation
Of a psychological profile of Dr.
Ellsberg, who was later indicted
for leaking the secret Pentagon
papers on American involve-
'trent in Southeast Asia.
(11\4r. Helms and General
Walters, the deputy director
of the agency, have told of
Mr. Ehrlichman, two of Presi-
dent Nixon's top aides, to per-
suade the agency to halt an
.inquiry by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation into Nixon re-
election campaign funds thatrj
were channeled through a Mex-
ico City hank to hide thei
source. Some of these funds ,
were found on the persons of
the men caught breaking into
the Democratic National Corn:-
mittee headquarters.
()General Walters also has
told of efforts by Mr. Dean to
get the C.I.A. involved in a
futher cover-up of the Water-
gate affair by asking the
agency to pay ball and salaries
for thhe jailed burglars.
. Papers Support President
)3y Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein
wastanaton Post Staff WrItere
Classified papers, taken,
from the White House. in
April by former presidential
counsel John W. Dean III
and released yesterday by
the Senate Watergate corn,
mittee, tend to support Pres-
ident Nixon's May 22 state-
ment that a domestic secur-
ity plan authorizing wiretap-
ping and break-ins was never
formally implemented.
The highly touted docu-
ments, including eight me-.
mos released in full and the
sanitized version of another
document, show that plans
were formulated for domes-
tic security in 1970, but
show no implementation of ,
potentially illegal opera-
tions.
The documents show that
former White House intelli-
gence aide Thomas C. Ilu-'
ston and Dean continued to
formulate plans for domes-
tic security after July 28,
1970, when Mr. Nixon said
the:plans were rescinded.
In testimony yesterday be-
fore the Watergate commit-
tee, Dean said, however,
that he knew of no illegal
operations that grew from
the plans or from the later
establishment of an Intelli-
gence Evaluation Committe6
to coordinate efforts of ex-
isting government intelli-
gence agencies, Including
the FBI. CIA, and Defense.
Intelligence Agency..
In an interview yesterday,
Iluston said that he contin-
he knew of no operations
that grew out of the plan.
The Huston memos to
then-White House chief of
staff H.R. Haldeman show
that FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover had forced the
White House to review the
plan and delay implementa-
tion.
Huston continued to push
the plan' In memos dated
Aug. 5, Aug. 7 and Sept. 10,
1970, but said yesterday that
the language in the memos
is "optimistic," as if the plan
had not been killed in hopes
of getting Haldeman's sup-
port, which he said he never
got.
In a September 18, 1970,
"top secret" memo released
yesterday, Dean wrote to
then Attorney General John
N. Mitchell to suggest
"procedures to commence
our domestic intelligence
operation as quickly as pos-
sible."
This was about two
months after the basic do-
mestic intelligence plan au-
thorizing wiretapping,
break-ins, mail cover and de-
velopment of sources on col-
lege campuses had been res-
cinded.
In the memo Dean said
that there should be no
"blanket removal of restric-
tions" on such illegal opera-
tions as there was in the ini-
tial, rejected plan. In: his
testimony yesterday Dean
said the memo led to the es-
tablishment of a secret intel-
ligence group, the Intent-
ued to push for implements- genee Evaluation Commit-
tion of the plan "but it died tee. It was the first step in
and it had been stopped setting up a domestic intelli-
July 28, 1970." He also said
For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000108180001-7
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
gence operation, Dean said,
but ho knew of no illegal
operations that resulted.
Nevertheless, Senate and
Justice Department attor-
neys aro investigating about
25 break-ins and additional
surveillance activities to de-
termine if a White House in-
telligence operation using
the techniques of the plan
was ever implemented, ac-
cording to reliable sources.
The break-in and bugging By. JAMES M. NAUGHTON
at the Democrats' Watergate special to The New fork Thai
headquarters and the burg- ? WASHINGTON, June 26--
lary of the, office of the psy- ? John W. Dean 3d said today,
chiatrist to former Penta. in a new clash with the White
gan ?Papers defendant Dan- House, that President Nixon
lel Ellsburg seem to fit the had misled the nation in his
pattern outlined in the Intel- public statements on the Water',
ligence plan. gate case, and he insisted that
The Ellsberg burglary was his charges of Presidential corn-
carried out in September, plicity in a Watergate cover-up
1971, by a White House in- were factual. ,
telligence group called the , The former White House
"plumbers;" which included counsel asserted, toward the
E. Howard Hunt Jr. and ,G. end of day-long cross-examina-
Gordon Liddy, who, were tion by the Senate Watergate
later convicted in the ,Water-
gate 'conspiracy. , ? linvestigating committee, that
Another of' the documents ja4r. Nixon had been, "less than
released yesterday, a memo linccurate" in a May 22 denial of
from Huston to the Internal.
'accurate"
in the Watergate
Revenue Service dated Aug.
New York Times
27 June 1973 ,
A NEW CHALLENGE
Ex-Counsel Is Firm
; Differs on Series
,) of Explanations ,
a.
14, * 1970. asks for a
"progressive report on the?'
actiVitiee of the Compliance
divisions in reviewing the
,operations of ideological or-
ganizations."
-? In a .reply, the IRS ? said
that the special service
7group had referred 26 'or7,
ganizations and 43 individu-
als for enforcement action,
and applications for tax-ex-
empt status has been denied
eight organizations in the
.period of about one year.
The ideological organize.
' tions included groups on the
political left and right, ac-
cording to an IRS spokes-
man.
In a Sept. 21, 1970, memo
to Haldeman, Huston com-
plained about the IRS
?response; "You will note
that the report Is long on
words and short on sub-
stance. Nearly 18 months
ago, the President Indicated
a desire for IRS to move
against leftist organizations
taking advantage of tax
shelters. I have been pres-
sing IRS since that time to
no avail." , ?
, In the Aug. 5, 1970, memo
Huston pushed for reconsid-
eration of the domestic in.
telligence plan by attacking"
then-FBI Director Hoover:
"At some point, Hoover'.
has to be told who is Presi:
dent. He has become totally
unreasonable and his con.'
duct is detrimental to our'
domestic intelligence opera..
tions,
"Hoover can be expected
to raise the following points Hoover's objections, the plan":
(opposing the plan) Njoinveerizailldtftptneryk107
meeting: `Our pres e - according o e si en a
May 22 statement.
'forts are adequate.' The an'-':
swer is bullshit! This is par-
ticularly true with regard to.
FBI campus coverage."
That memo continues:
"The biggest risk we
could take, in my opinion,
to continue to regard the vi-
olence on the campus and in,
the cities as ? a temporary.
phenomenon . . . I believe,
we are talking about the fu-
ture of this country, for
surely domestic violence
and disorder threaten the'
very fabric of our society."
"For eighteen months we3
have watched people in this
government ignore the Pres-
ident's orders, take actions.
to embarrass him, promote
themselves at his expense,.
and generally make his job'
more difficult. It makes me.
fighting mad, and what,
Hoover is doing here is putting:
himself above the Presi-,
dent." ? ?
The Huston memos also,
say that Attorney General'
Mitchell joined Hoover in
opposing the domestic sent
rity plan.
The top secret memos dei:,
scribing the basic intelli-
gence plan were printed
June 7 by The New York,
Times, and later by The,
Washington Post.
Those documents showed:
that President Nixon ap-?
proved the expanded intelli- ?
gence gathering plan after ?
being warned by Hustoui
that parts of it were "clearly
Illegal" and involved "seri-
ous risks" to his administrie
tion if the operations ever,
became known. Because or'
affair.
Further, in a long colloquy
with Senator Joseph M. ? Mon-
toya, Democrat of New Mexico:*
Mr. Dean disputed each of a,
Series of Presidential explana-
tions of' the Watergate- bur:,
glary, describing them as mis-
leading, unfounded or overly
"broad."
Crucial Conflict Seen
Mr, bean's steadfast adher-
ence today to the accusations
contained in the 245-page 'state-
ment that he read yesterday to
the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities
posed an immediate?and po-
tentially crucial?conflict with
the White House.
In San Clemente, Calif., 111
nearly the same time that M.
Dean was disputing a string Of
Presidential statements on Wat-
ergate, a spokesman at the
Western White House said that
Mr. Nixon would stand on the
May 22 statement disavowing
any participation in the plan-
ning of the Watergate break-in,
or the subsequent cover-up.
; His Word Against Nixon's '
Mr. 'Dean acknowledged, dur-
ing rambling cross-examination
by the Senate panel, 'that he
was in the position of present-
ing his word, as a 34-year-ol4
deposed White House lawyer,
iagainst that of the President.
? But he insisted that his only
motive in testifying was to end
Ihis personal involvement in the
cover-up and, to respond to the
Committee's request for his
knowledge of it.
"What makes you think that
your credibility is greater than
that of the President, who de-
'pies what you have said?" Sen-
ator Herman E. Talmadge,
Democrat of Georgia, asked Mr.
Dean.
"Well, Senator," Mr. Dean re-
plied, his elbows propped *top
the felt-covered witness tible,'
"I have been asked to come up
here and tell the truth. I have.
told it exactly the way I know
It.,,
Differences With Nixon
? The way Mr. Dean told it.
presented clear and sharp dis-
crepancies with the public'
record of Mr. Nixon's Water-
gate' statements, and Senator
Montoya proceeded late today
to explore the ,conflicts. ?
? The Senater asked Mr. Dean
to appraise Mr. Nixon's state-
ment, at a news conference last
Aug. 29, that a "complete in-
vestigation" by Mr. Dean had.
cleared everyone in the White
House of involvement in the
June 17 break-in at the Water-
gate. ?
Taken literally, Mr. Dean
replied, the statement that no
.one employed in the White
:11Vglillariltelirr2b1129:11??
7
might have been true, but he
said that the flat assertion
"was a little broad."
Similarly, Mr. Dean told Sen-
ator Montoya that he had not
provided any 'basis for the
President to declare, last Oct. 5,
that the. Watergate investiga-
tion conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation had
pursued every possible lead "to
the end."
Mr. Dean said that "It was
true that the F.B.I. investiga-
tion was extensive, but it ob-
!Piously was not complete."
No Report From Dean
The former legal counsel to
Mr. Nixon said that he was also
"quite aware" that the Presi-
dent had never received a re-
port on Watergate from Mr.,
Dean when the President said,
on March 17, that Mr. Dean
had undertaken such an in-
vestigation.
The most direct rebuttal of
the President by Mr. Dean
occurred during Senator Mon-
toya's inquiry into an April 17
assertion by Mr. Nixon that he
would "condemn any attempts
to cover up in this case."
"Do you believe he was tell-
the truth on that date?"
asked Senator Montoya.
' "No sir," Mr. Dean replied
crisply.
* T Senator and the witness
discussed for several minutes
Mr. Dean's point-by-point quar-
rel with the President's May
Z2. statement. Mr. Dean said
he' had no "first-hand knowl-
edge" to rebut Mr. Nixon's dis-
avowal of prior knowledge of
the break-in, but he went on
at great length to recount, as
no had yesterday, Mr. Nixon's
alleged involvement in the
aover-up.
A Shift on Peterson
Under close questioning by
;red D. Thompson, the com-
mittee's Republican counsel,
!dr. Dean backed down today
,rom his suggestion yesterday
that Henry E. Petersen, an As-
sistant Attorney General, had
lcted improperly when he was
in charge of the Government's
Vatergate investigation.
Mr. Dean flatly declared that
Ronald L. Ziegler, the White
tlouSe press secretary, had not
een told the truth about
Watergate and thus had not
aeliberately misled the media
during the 10 months in which
he denied any White House
involvement in the case.
But Mr. Dean, in response
10 interrogation, added new
;barges today of efforts with-
al the Nixon Administration
to use investigative agencies
improperly.
He testified that the White
House maintained, and con-
stantly updated, an "enemies
list" of individuals unfriendly
to the Administration. Mr. Dean
promised to submit to the corn-
mittee a memorandum he had
written about possible uses of
the list,
Tax Audit for Writer
He charged that after the
publication in Newsday, the
Long Island newspaper, of an
article unfavorable to Mr.
Nixon's close personal friend,
C. G. Rebozo, he had received
80'00140ns that one of the
authors of the article should!
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
have some problems" with the
Internal Revenue Service. Mr.
Dean said that he had arranged
for the writer, whose name he
could not recall, to be sub-
jected to an income tax audit.
? He stated that an official of
? the Secret Service, whom Mr.
Dean did not identify, had.
given him a "small intelligence
:printout" alleging that Senator
George McGovern, the 1972
, ,Democratic Presidential. nomi-.
nee, would attend a fund.
raising function in Philadelphia
at which "either Communist
money or former Communist.
? supporters" would be involved!
He said that he passed the
Item to Charles W. Colson, a
former White House 'special
? counsel, who told him he ar-
ranged to have it published.
Mr. Dean also alleged that
Frederick V. Malek, the former
White House personnel admin-
istrator who now is deputy di-
rector of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, had not been
truthful in accounting for a
background investigation con-
ducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation on Daniel
Schorr, a Washington corre-
spondent for the Columbia
Broadcasting System.
Questions on Monologue
Mr. Dean said ? as Mr.
Schorr, who is reporting on the
Watergate hearings, looked on
?that he had learned "after
the fact" that H. R. Haldeman,
the former White House chief
of staff, had ordered the inves-
tigation through Lawrence M.
Higby, who was Mr. Haldeman
deputy.
Mr. Dean said that J. Edgar
Hoover, then the F.B.I. director,
had pursued a "wide-open"
field investigation, "to the dis-
may of the White House," and
that Mr. Malek, "who at the
time knew nothing of this,'.'
subsequently explained that
Mr. Schorr was under consid-
eration for a key position with
the Administration.
The bulk of Mr. Dean's first
day of questioning by the Sen-
ate committee?he will return
for more questions tomorrow?
dealt with the credibility of his
long monologue yesterday, in
which he described the partici-
pation of the President, the
White House, the Committee
for the Re-Election of the Presi-
dent, the Department of Justice
and assorted individuals in a
"massive" Watergate cover-up.
With almost stoic repose, Mr.
Dean sat barely an inch away
from the public address and
television microphones in the
hearing room, placidly replying
to questions that alternately
appeared to bolster or try to
poke holts in his earlier testi-
mony.
He told Samuel Dash, the
committee's Democratic chief
counsel, that, in' his opinion,
Mr. Haldeman would have been
advistd in advance of the plans
to wiretap the Democratic
party offices in the Watergate
office complex last year and
that Mr. Haldeman "probably
would have reporttd it" to the
President. But Mr. Dean balked
later when Mr. Dash sought to
elicit his "opinion" as to
'whether Mr. N ixon had
probably been advistct by aides
of the cover-up at its incep-
'tion. ?
The former lawyer for Presi-
dent Nixon agreed with Mr.
Dash's leading questions, in
which the committee counsel
suggested that from last Sept.
15 on. Mr. Dean had no doubt
about the participation of the
President in the cover-up ef-
fort.
Executive Clmency Cited .
Mr. Dean testified yesterday
that on Sept. 15 the President
congratulated him on his ef-
forts to guarantee that Federal
Indictments in the Watergate
case handed down that day had
not reached any but the seven
individuals first arrested.
He also described yesterday
a series of conversations with
the President about arrange-
ments fpr executive clmency for
one of the Watergate defend-
ants, about "silence money" to
assure that the original de-
fendants would not talk and
about Mr. Nixon's direction of
efforts to curtail Congressional,
,Government and cout investiga-
tions of the case.
The tone of ?Mr. Dean's per-
sistent declarations today that
he had told the truth was set
In this exchange with Mr. Dash:
Mr. Dash: I guess you are
fully aware, Mr. Dean, of the
gravity of the charges you have
made under oath against the
highest official of our land, the
President of the United States.
Mr. Dean: Yes, I inn.
Mr. Dash: And being so
aware, do you still stand on
your statement?
Mr. Dean: Yes, I do.
Unshakeably, Mr. Dean main-
tained the same position
throughout the interrogation.
He explained that he had waited
until April 15 to begin telling
what he knew to Government
prosecutors because "I was
hopeful the President himself
would step forward and tell of
his involvement in some of
these things?'
'Almost Impossible Task'
He said that he realized that
the 47 documents he submit-
ted to the Senate committee
yesterday did not deal directly
with his conversations with the
President and that he had no
evidence to support his asser-
tions.
"I realize," Mr. Dean stated,
"it is almost an impossible
task, if it is one man against
the other, that I am up against,
and it is not a very pleasant
situation. But I can only speak
what I know to be the facts
and that is what I am provid-
ing this committee."
Some of the sharpest inter-
rogation of Mr. Dean was con-
ducted, after the fashion of the
former prosecutor that he once
was, by Mr. Thompson.
Asked how he became in-
volved in the cover-up, Mr.
Dean said, "I was in the proc-
ess before I began thinking
about the process."
At one point, Mr. Thompson
apologized if he appeared to be
"badgering you in any way"
as he explored the possibility
that Mr. Dean had offered his
testimony in hope of gaining
immunity from criminal prose-
cution.
"In fact," Mr. Dean said, a,
NEW YORK TIMES
27 JUNE 1973
Documents Give Insight
On White House Efforts
By ANTHONY RIPLEY
SIMC1411 to The New York Times
' WASHINGTON, June 26 --'
i
The documents that John W.
Dean 3d submitted with his
'testimony before the Senate
Watergate committee give a
rare insight into the White
tHouse and related 1972 Pret.i-
idential campaign activities.
1 There are glimpses of Pres-
idential attitudes and fears of
'news leaks and demonstrators.
There are the thoughts and
plaws of those who served the
President. .
There are conversations over
the handling of campaign funds.
There is the reluctance of
James W. McCord Jr. to go
along with part of the cover-up
of Watergate.
There is the penetration of
Representative Paul N. McClos-
key Jr.'s rival campaign.
There is even the attempt to
keep the Senate hearings them-
selves under control and a
number of other points in the
still unfolded scandals.
In all, Mr. Dean submitted
50 documents to back up his
written testimony of 245 pages.
Excerpts Given
Following are excerpts from
some of the documents gath-
ered by Mr. Dean, who served
for almost three years as Mr.
Nixon's counsel until his dis-
missal April 30:
A memorandum from Gordon
Strachan to his boss, H. R.
Haldeman, then the White
House chief of staff, undated
and dealing with news leaks:
"It would he helpful to real-
ize that there are five distinct
types of leaks: only some of
these are deterrable. The types
include: A) the August SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation
bit bitingly, to Mr. Thompson,'
"if I were still at the White
House I would probably be
feeding you the questions to'
ask the person who is sitting
here."
Mr. Thompson retorted, "If
.were here, as I am, I would
have responded that I do not
need questions to be fed to me
from anybody."
Nonetheless, it was Mr.
Thompson who elicited from
Mr. Dean the statement that
Mr. Dean had not meant to
imply yesterday that Mr. Peter-
sen had acted unethically in
providing information to the
White House about the scope
and conduct of the Govern-
ment's inquiry into the Water-
aate case last year.g
"I know of no impropriety,"
Mr. Dean said of Mr. Ptersen's
dealings with the White House.
"I think he tried to be very
fair?in dealing with the White
House and that fact that we
had an investigation going on
in a political year, that it could
result in embarrassment on
Approved Far Release 2001/08/07 : ClAclinDtlOs7c-Vainii0001001
Talks] leak prompting the lie
detector tests at State. The in-
dividual consciously violated
the law to protect his own view
of national interest?non-deter-
rabic;
' "B) The September SALT
(accidental war agreement)
leak: too many individuals (all
of Congress and our NATO
allies) knew and so the informa-
tion is not controllable?non-
deterrable;
"C) The self-serving leak
which ?strengthens the individ-
ual policy position by acquiring
public support before the final
decision is made---deterrable;
'D) The ego-stroke leak
Where the Individual eithec
wants to see his name in print
or to be known as one with
influence?deterrable;
"And E( the careless leak
resulting from . either a slow
individual with information and
a foot reporter or too much
liquor--deterrable."
Monthly Reporting Plan
The memo stated that 11
cases for "possible Haldeman
action as 'Lord High Execu-
tioner' to stop leaks" had been
studied but that none had been
acted upon. A monthly report-
ing plan, ith investigations and
use of politically loyal person-
nel, was put into action with
the approval of Mr. Haldeman.
In another of the memors,
a long one drawn up this year
at Camp David, Mr. Dean at-
tempted to review how a dom-
estic intelligence program that
came to disaster in the Water-
gate burglary on June 17, 1972,
had begun.
He said officials had been
very concerned about the 1972
Republican national conven-
tion, fearing that it might ex-
plode in violence, as had the
1968 Democratic convention.
I told HRH (Mr. Haldeman)
that we would push the Federal
intelligence agencies to keep
is informed, but I doubted if
,ve would get much better in
Itelligence than we had. In
Ishort, I was instructed to assist
;the re-election 'committee in
preparing itself for expected
'intense demonstrations.
"I discussed this matter with
Mr. Hoover (the former direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover)
approximately ? trio date:
given), and he agreed that we.
would have a problem, that4
the F.B.I. would help but that
the re-election committeed
should develop its own capacity*.
to gather such intelligence. He
offered to provide names of
former agents that might be
of assistance but I never asked '
him for such names."
Instead, the White House'
developed its own campaign
intelligence team headed by G.
Gordon Liddy. Mr. Dean said.
Liddy was convicted at the
001-7
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Watergate trial.
Message by McCord
After the Watergate burglars
were caught and indicted, Mr.
Dean said, McCord "was not
cooperating with his lawyer"
and alleged plans for blaming'
the Central Intelligence Agency?
, for the break-in were not work.
ing.
McCord sent the following
message to John J. Caulfield, a.
former White House aide: .?
"Dear Jeck:
"I'M 'softy to have to wriW
you this letter but felt you had
to know. 4,.?
"If HelniS [Director' of Cen-
tral Intelligdnce Richard Helms].
.goes and the Watergate opera.,
tion is laid at C.I.A.'s feet$
where it does not belong, every:,
tree in the forest will fall. ? ,
, "It will be a scorched desert...
,The whole matter is at the
precipice now.
"Just pass the message that
if they want it to blow, they;
are on exactly the right course.'
"I'm sorry that you will get;
hurt in the fallout."
McCloskey Incident -
On Dec. 11 and 12 an "opera-
political intelligence gathering
scheme "penetrated' Repre-
sentative McCloskey's . Wash.
ington campaign headquarters,
Mr. Dean memorandums show.
At the time the California
Republican was opposing Mr.
Nixon in the Presidential'
primaries.
The , "operative" found little
money, few volunteers and al-
most everyone gone off to New
'Hampshire, according to-
'ports that went from Mr: Caul-
field to Mr. Dean toJohn N.
Mitchell, then the Attomek
General and later campaign
manager for Mr. Nixon.
In late February this year,
Mr. Dean prepared the Presi-
dent for a meeting with Sena-
tor Howard H. Baker Jr., Re-
publican of Tennessee and vice
chairman of the Senate Water.
,gate committee.
. Among Mr. Dean's sugges-
tions on a briefing paper. were
to "take Baker's pulse and find
Out how much he wants to help
keep this from becoming a
political circus.
"If Baker appears to be truly.
desirous of cooperating ?and
the fact he is seeking guidance
may so indicate?he might be
told that there are matters un-
related to the bugging incident
per se (E. G. Segretti, Kalm-
bach) that could be embarrass-
ing and tarnish good people
whose motives were the high-
est," the memo said.
' The reference was to Donald
H. Segretti, an 'alleged organ-
izer of campaign sabotage whd
has been indicted in Florida in
connection with a forged cant-
paign letter. t
WASIIIZ`GTOZI POST.
28 June 197.3
Ni,xon Plans
To .Answer,'
_
Lard Says.
Bitl David S. Broder
Washington Post Staff Writer
president Nixon is willi-
ing to respond to "all ques-
tions" 4out his role in the
Watergate affair after the
major wTtnesses have given
their stoOes to the Senate
Investigating committee, the
new White House domestic
counselor, Melvin R. Laird,
said yesterday.
In an interview with The?
Washington Post, the for-
Mer Defense Secretary said
Mr. Nixon would not
"respond to every witness"
but would answer, "ques-
tions, all questions . . . at a
press conference, "when we
get near the conclusion of
the hearings."
Laird said he had dis-
cussed the timing of a press
;conference with the Presi-
dent and "I think he's will-
ing to do that . . . I don't
think there will be any prob-
lem with that."
Laird also strongly sug-
,gested that despite his re-
,cent elevation on the White
' House staff, Ronald L. Zie-
gler will be replaced as the
President's principal press
spokesman by his current
deputy, Gerald L. Warren.
"I have an appreciation
for Ron's problem," Laird
said. "I'm convinced he
, didn't ?knowingly mislead
? (the press). But from the in-
. formation I've been able to
get, I think it's good to have
t some other press spokesman
,for a while.
r? "Sometimes people are
'caught up in a series of cir-
cumstances where you have
to make certain changes.
And I think those changes
'will be made. I don't think
'you have to make a big an-
nouncement over something'
like that."
Ziegler, recently desig-
nated as an Assistant tp the
President as well as press
,.secretary, has been under
fire from press groups for
providing inaccurate inform-
ation to its reporters during
the period of the Watergate
. crime and alleged White
House cover-up.
. Former White House
counsel John W. Dean III
has testified this week that
Ziegler was rehearsed by
other White House staff
meinbers for his press brief-
trigs on Watergate and was
repeatedly deniedknowl-
edge of what; really had
taken place. ,
,Laird said Ziegler's expe-
rience showed 1, that
"anybody who's going to
Approved FtlektbkagrAtitfoiroiP
9
every meeting."
??"I think 'that can be
changed," he said, referring
'to:the shteldinrof the press
secretary from vital knowl-
edge. ' "I ? think Jerry
(Warren) ha's tO take over
that responsibility, and I
hope he can. I'm not sure,
'but I hope that he can,"
' ? (In San Clemente, Calif., a
White House official, said
that Ziegler will continue in
'his responsibilities as out-
lined when Mr.' Nixon ele,
vated him to the, position
esSistant to the. Presiden)
earlier this Month.
? (At that 'time, the Presi-
dent said that Ziegler also
'would continue as press sec-
retary.
("The observation that
Ziegler's usefulness is im-
paired is not shared by the
President," the official saidl
?(He said that the Presi-
*dent is contemplating a gen-
eral .press, conference "at
some point." But the Presi-
dent has not decided when
it will be, the official said.)
In a wide-ranging inter-
view in the ?west-wing White
House office he has taken
over from his resigned pre-
cedessor, John D. , Ehrlich-
man, Laird also said:
? He is cutting back the
Domestic Council staff he
Inherited from Ehrlichman
and trying to shift decision-
making to the Cabinet de-
partments,.but running into
resistance from congress-
men and bureaucrats who
don't want to act "unless
they get White House guid-
ance."
? He has asked first-term'
domestic councelor 'Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, now am-
bassador to India, to suggest
!Nays of res
dving the family
issittance welfare reform
plan abandoned by Mr.
Nixon this' year after an un-
three-year three-year effort
for congressional passage.
:-.??? He is doubtful that the
,President's expressed : wish-
to scrap controls and return
to a free economy can be ac-
in the face of a
"very difficult" worldwide
'food shortage, but acknowl-
edged that the temporary
;freeze of market prices it-
self is "causing some prob-
lems" of future food supply.
Recalled to government
service early this month in
the wake of the Watergate
scandal, the former Wiscon-
sin ? congressman and De-i
fense Secretary seemed
more subdued than custom-,
ary in an hour-long Inter-
view.
Asked about the mood of
the White house and the
President. Laird paused for
a long moment and said:
"Well, of course, this is a
tough period for the Presi-
dent. No question about
that. Rut I have the feeling
... that morale about getting
C RCP lia-66402R00040 0 1
ernint -it has improved."
Laird paused again, and
said: "You're talking to me
In one of the most difficult
weeks, as far as the past is
concerned, that I can think
of. But If didn't feel that
we could move forward and
get some of these programs
working, I wouldn't be
here."
The new presidential ad-
viser said one of the
"pluses" from the Watergate,
may be that "the operations
o the Executive Branch will
be strenghtened."
"We just have to open this
place (the White House) up,"
he said,"but it's not, easy to
do. There's been a tendency
on the part of people to con-
centrate everything in the
White House and the White'
House staff. The situation
has to be switched back, so
the departments and the
line agencies really have the
staff to do the work and
can carry on their consulta-
tions with the governors,
the mayors and the con-
gressmen on their own pro-
grams."
Laird said that "its going
'to take a little time to
change" habits, after years
of centralized decision-mak-
ing, because "there is a
tendency among some mem-
bers of Congress to like hay-
ing one place to call, rather
than going to the depart-
ments, and there is a tend-
ency on the part of some of
the departments not to
make a decision or specific
recommendation unless they
get White House guidance."
To counter that habit,
Laird said, he had been vis-
iting a different Cabinet de-
partment almost every day
since taking his job. "I don't
ask them to come here," he
isaid. "I go there. I try to
.make it clear to each of the
Cabinet officers that he is
going to be responsible for
the department, for the peo-
ple he's putting into jobs,
and that they're going to be
responsible to him. You
can't have any Cabinet offi-
cer in a position where he
doesn't have complete trust
and faith in the people who
are working,for him."
Second Laird said, he is
trying to stimulate closer
consultation between the de-
partments and members of
Congress.
Laird himself has taken
advantage of his privilege as
gress and. has appeared on
.the floor of the House se-
veral times In the last three
weeks, engaging in long con-
ferences with former col-
leagues.
80001-7
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
NEW YORK TIMES
28 June 1973
xcerpts From Testimony by Dean Before
Senate Panel Investigating Watergate
? 5pects1 Ia'Mr S1.9, York Time*
; WASHINGTON, June 27?,_
yollowing are excepts froth a 7,
;transcript of the testimony
on the 14th day of hearings
on ,the Watergate case today
before ? the Senate Select ,
Committee On Presidential'.
.
campaign activity:c
? MORNING
SESSION
?
John W. Dean 3d
SENATOR ERVIN: We have
!two very peculiar questions
which have been addressed to
the committee, apparently by
Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, special
counsel to the President. The
first question addressed to
the committee by Mr. Buz-
,hardl is this: ?
? "Did you and your counsel'
'develop a strategy for ob-
',taining immunity from prose-
'cution? What were the ele-
ments, of that strategy?"
On behalf of the commit-Et,
'tee, I would reply to Mr.
Buzhardt that the only strat-
gy we developed was to'
'pursue the course outlined by
the act of Congress codified
'as Sections 6002 and 6005 of
Title 18 of the United States.
Code.
The second question Is this
?this is to the committee?
the second question is: "Didn't
your strategy include delib-
erate leaks of information to,
the media on what you had
told investigators? Maybe this
is addressed to Mr. Dean, I,
do not know.
It is probably addressed to
Dean.
Well, Mr. Dean, I will ask
you these questions ? well,
maybe I had just better let
us proceed in orderly fash-
ion. am sorry I misconstrued
the. question.
I might state these were
:just handed to me about one
second before I read them
and I drew the inference,
? sinee the questions were sep-
arated as they were, some of
'them were addressed to the
' committee rather than the
'Witness. 'But perhaps I am
'Mistaken in that but I would
'say that the only strategy
this committee, has followed
,lto secure immunity for any
witness has been to pursue
:the law strictly.
Now, on yesterday the wit-
'ness was asked to produce
some exhibits and I. just
'Wanted to ask him if he had
provided them.
DEAN: Yes, I did. These
.are from a file that le entitled
Opponents List and Political
Enemies Project.
? Back to the Beginning
I,. SENATOR GURNEY: We
:have had a great deal of tes-
faimony, 245 pages of your
statement as well as the tes-
timony yesterday. and Imust
say it is, hard to know where
ito, begin in all this. think
probably the best place to
,start always is at the begin-
Ihing. Would you say that it
hi fair to say that Gordon
Liddy's plan of hugging and
,electronic espionage really
started out the whole Water-
gate affair?
' --A. Well, there was an at-
mosphere that might have
r been Several precursors
.source to that plan. The plan
lavas an accident of fate
!where they culminated into
Mr. Liddy's pecific poposal
that was presented in the
'Attorney General's office in
the two meetings which oc-
reurred in late January and
early February.
Q. But as far as the Water-
gate break-in itself is con-
'cerned, it really stemmed
frean Mr. Liddy's plan of
bugging and electronic es-
pionage, ? did it not? Now,
'Who recommended Mr. Liddy
'to' the committee to re-elect
Ithe President?
A. I passed on a recom-
tnendation that I had received
from Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitch-
'ell and he in turn, endorsed
'that recommendation and
rsent him over to the re-elec-
tion committee.
'0 Q. Did you interview Mr.
itiddy after Krogh recom-
mended him to you?
1. A. Not to my recollection,
.tid. I was present when he
1Was interviewed by Mr. Mitch-
ell and again when he was
lInterviewed by Mr. Magruder.
'Q. Did you ask any ques-
itiOns about his qualifications
:at that time or did Mr. Liddy
'Jost simply answer questions?
A. I asked Mr. Krogh abdut
;hit qualifications at that time
'when he first mentioned him
to me. And they asked ques-
tions during those interviews,
'Yes.
Q. Did you ever ask him ?
'What he had been doing for
Mr. Krogh? Or Mr. Hunt?
,A. No. I did not.
Liddy's Qualifications
'Q. Would that not be im-
portant in finding out his
qualifications, his previous
employment?
A. Well, I was told. for
?example, when I met him?
when I talked to Mr. Krogh
about him. I can recall Mr.
'Krogh very specifically tell-
ing me that he had written
some of the best legal memo-
,randurns that he had run
across in a long time. He ex-
'plained that Gordon had taken
some rather complex subjects
.and analyzed them in a very
precise way. One of these
memoranda had gone in to
the President and the Presi-
dent had complimented Mr.
Liddy through Mr. Krogh on
'the quality ef the document
;that he had prepared. ,
Q. Was it under that part
of his duties would he in
charge of security or things
like that? A. That is correct.
Q. Well, did you ask any
questions of him as to what
he had been doing in the area
of security?
A. I was told that he had
an F.B.I., Treasury Depart-
ment, law enforcement back-
ground. There was not a
great focus on that at that
time. I knew Mr. Krogh had
worked in the past 'before I
came to the White House.
and partially after, I was still
at the White House with the
demonstrator problem.
Q. You never did go into
what he had been doing with
Krogh and Hunt? A. No, I
did not.
Q. The Jan. 27 meeting
occurred and as I recall, you
testified that the original plan
?and I do not know what
the word was that you used
to describe it, but? A. I
think I called it a "Mission
Impossible" plan.
Q. Did you ever talk to
Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder
after this horrendous plan?
A. As I recall, the only con-
,- versation I had was a very
brief conversation. Mr. Liddy
was taking the charts off the'
easel and they were preparing
to leave the office when I
paused in front of Mr. Mitch-
ell's desk and he told me that
this was certainly out of the
question.
Plan Caused Worries
Q. well, did it worry you
that this man came up with
kidnapping, prostitution, mug-
ging, and all the rest of it?
A. Yes, sir, it did.
Q. But you never really
discussed it with Mitchell
and Magruder as to Liddy's
capability of staying on at
the job? A. Well, sir, you
would have had to have been
there to believe it and I
might say that it was so far
Out that there was no hope
in my mind that anyone was
ever going to approve any
plan like this. So I just as-
sumed that it was going to
die a natural death.
Q. Now we come to the
second meeting that occurred
on Feb. 4. My recollection al-
.
so is that you testified that
you were again very dis-
turbed at what he was pro-
posing. A. That is correct and
I was injecting myself into
the meeting in an effort to
terminate the meeting, whicht
I did.
Q. Well, did you have any:
discussion after the meeting
with Mr. Mitchell and Mr.,
Magruder about his contin-
uing?
A. I had a direct discussion:
with Mr. Liddy at that time.
I might add, after the first.
meeting. I had told Mr. Liddy
he should destroy the charts.'
After the second meeting, as
we were leaving the office, I,
told him that I would not dis-;
cuss this with him any fur-
ther, I' indicated to him that
it still was not what was nec-
essary, and it was a rather.
' brief discussion. I must say
I felt very sorry for Gordon
Liddy during much of this be-
cause of the fact that he had
received no guidance from
anybody that I .could tell?
certainly none from .me?as
to what was expected of him.
Q. Was what you testified
that you told him that he
was never to discuss this
thing again with you, that if
any plan was approved like
this that you did not want to
know atiout it? A. That is
correct. ?
Reported to Haldeman
Q. Why did you not go
back to the President and tell
him about this hair-raising
scheme? A. Well, I did go
back, but I did not have ac-
cess to the President, as I
think I explained. I went to
Mr. Haldeman.
Q. Did you try to gain ac-
cess to the President? A. Sen.
ator, I did not try. I had
never been into the Presi-
dent or called by the Presi-
dent before. My reporting
channel was through Mr.
Haldeman and I went hack
and told what I thought was
the proper reporting channel.
I told him what I had seen,
told him my reaction to it,
told him that I thought it was
unwise, unnecessary, and Mr.
Haldeman agreed with me.
Q. Did you ever discuss
after this meeting with Mr.
Mitchell and Mr. Magruder,
whether this plan was going
to be implemented or what-
ever happened to it?
A. I never heard about the
plan again until. as I have
testified, Mr. Liddy came
into my office some time In
February or March?I do not
know the precise date?and
told me that he could not get
his plan approved. I reminded
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him- that I was not going to
; talk ? with him about it, and
, he said that he understood
. and he did not talk about it.
Q. Did you ever report that
to the President?
. A. No, I didn't, sir.
Q. Now, to get back to
, the break-in 'at the Water- '
gate, as I recall your testi-
mony, there really wasn't
anything in Watergate or
, much of anything i?he
activities surrounding the
? committee to re-elect the
President from that Feb. 4
meeting until the Watergate
Break-in. And I understand
you got back from the Philip-'
, pine Islands on the 18th1and
? then returned here to Wash-
? ington and went in your
office on the 18th.'
Then, as I recall, you said
that you had received phone
calls that day, and talked to
a number of people--Caul; '
field, Magruder, Ehrlich-
man, Strachan, Colson, Sloan,
and you later called Liddy
"and Kleindienst. Why all
these calls if you weren't
that closely associated With
? what they were doing over.
there in the political field? ,?
?
Investigative Office ,
? A. Well, Senator, I would."
Say that my 'office was one'
that, one, I did have some'
dealings with 'the re-election:1.
committee, I did know all the
parties involved. My office
normally, was' asked to in'q
vestigate or look into any-
problem that came up, of.
that nature. When. any
wrongdoing was charged-ran:
Administration office, for ex- ,
; ample, when the grain deal
came up?and I think as the
Senator will recall, during
the I.T.T. matter, my office
had some peripheral involve-.?
ment in that. And I believe ?
we had some dealings with!
you office on that matter.'
Q. Not my office. 'I 'think
we met in Senator Hruska's'
office,' the Republican metn-(,
bers .of the committee. A..
Well, Senator, I recall one
time that Mr. Fielding and I,
came lip to your office on the
matter and Mr. Fielding pro-
vided some material for your!?
staff.
Q, What does that have to
do with the Watergate? A.
Well, I was explaining the;
. type of thing that would
come to my office and my of-
fice was a fire-fighting office
and would get into various?
Q. Did you do other
fire-
fighting before June 18th?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the committee' to re-
elect? A. Not to my knowl-
edge, no. That was the only
fire I recall over there, and it
' was the biggest one.
Q. Now, then, you men-,
tioned in your testimony yes-
terday in response to Mr.'
Dash that you inherited the
cover-up. Would you tell
how you inherited the cover-
up?
, A. When I came hack to.
the office on the 18th and
talked to Mr. Strachan,
realized that the cover-up
was already in effect, in be-
ing, and I realized that when,
Mr. Strachan told 'me of the
documents that he had de:'
stroyed and Mr. Haldeman's
instruction, that there cer-
tainly wasn't going to be a'
revelation of the White,
_ House involvement in the
matter. I didn't at that point
in time know the potentials
of the White House involve;
. ment.
, Early Meeting Recalled
Q. Was not one of the first
meetings of the cover-up held
.in John Mitchell's' apartment
on the 19th of June?
A. Senator, I would say
that the day of, to my know-
day f the 19th at
8: theWhite House was a very
busy day. That the calls I re-
ceived from Mr. Ehrlichman,
from Mr. Colson, the meet-
ings I had with Mr. Ehrlich-
man and then again later with
Mr. Colson about the safe
? were long before I went to
the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's
apartment, which I do not
recall was on the 19th or
20th. I do recall a meeting
in Mr. Mitchell's office but I
do. not recall specifically
which day it was.
Q. Well, what you are say-
?
log is then that these several
phone calls you had with all
. of these people really had to
do with at least the begin-
nings of the cover-up, is that
'right? Well, you were 'in on it
? from the beginning, were you
not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You really did not in.
herit anything. You were in,
on the sort of hatching of it,
were you not? Who set the
policy on the cover-up?
, A. I do not think it was a
policy set. There was just
no alternative at that point
' in time. Q. Did you advise
e, the President of .what was,
going on? ;
;..1 A.. Senator, the first time
ever talked to the President
was one occasion that I re-
call, before Sept.. 15th which
was in late August. to the.
best of my recollection, and
, that certainly was not an
occasion to talk to the Pres-
ident about anything because
'his formet laie partners were
? in the office, Mrs. Nixon was
in the office, there were sev-
eral notaries or one notary
? there, some other members
of the staff and it had to do
with the signing of the Pres-
ident's testamentary papers
ia and it was?just was not a
very appropriate occasion to
,' even give a whisper to the
t; President that I would like
to talk to him. So I must say
, ? that any time between June
* ??19th and Sept. 15th I had no
'conversations with the Pres-
ident. and nor did I approach
,h the President at any time
other than through reporting
to Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
, Ehrlichman.
, Did Not Try to See Nixon
' Q. Do you not think as the
President's_ attorney, you
should have tried to go to
him and warn him about
what was being done? A. I
, probably should have but I
was assuming everything I
reported to Mr. Haldeman
and Ehrlichman was also be-
jog reported to the !resident.
? Q. 'Let us go and discuss'
for a moment the F.B.I. re-
ports of the investigation..
Did you first go to Mr. Klein-
? dienst for these reports? A.
e Right. I do not recall whether
it was Mr. Kleindienst or Mr.
Petersen that I first discussed
? this with.
Q. Who asked you to get?
:the reports? A. Initially the
I request came from Mr. Mitch- ;
ell and I believe that was a
result of Mr. Mardian's de-
sire to see the reports. Mr."
e, Ehrlichman and Mr. Halde-
man thought it was a good.'
idea that I see the reports,
and had?rat vhat point in '
time I actually raised this
with either Petersen or
. Kleindienst my recollection .
'? is I did talk to Mr. Petersen.:,
,. about it at some time and he .
suggested .1 go directly to
Mr. Gray,. and I do recall dis-
'Cussing it with Mr. Gray. ;
. Q. Let us get back to Mr.
..Kleindienst. Are you sure you
cannot recall whether you.
ever talked to him about get-
ting these 302 forms? A. It is.:
very possible, as I said, Sena- ?
!tor, it is very possible I did.
t Q. Well, do you recall if
? you talked to Mr. Petersen?
'What did you recall of that
'conversation? A. I recall he,
,suggested that I go directly
.to Mr. Gray.
? Q. ?Did either Mr. Petersen
or Mr. Kleindienst or any-
body, according to your recol- '
lection, tell 'you that you ,1
? could not get these F.B.I. re-
ports, that the President him-,
self would have to get them?
A. I was told that the best
way to deal with this situa-
tion is go directly to Mr.
Gray.
' Q. Then, you have no,
.recollection that the At-
torney General or Mr. Peter-
sen told you that you could
:not have them unless you get
them through the President?
A. I do not recall it, frankly.:,
Conversations With Gray
Q. Well, then let's go to
, Mr. Gray and your converse-,
ttions with him.
.. A. Mr, Gray told me that
be thought that I could read
them in his office, I told him
thought that was,awkward,
and when we discussed it, '
he wanted some Assurance
that this information was be-
ing reported' to the President.
As I recall, I gave him such
an assurance.
To the best of my recollec-
lion Mr. Gray said to me
that, after I gave him assur-
ance it was going to be re-
ported, that he would work
something out. Now I don't
recall when I first received
the initial reports. I only
recall* that it was after a
summary report ,was pre-
pared on the 21st of July,
as I recall the date, and I
showed that report to the
people at the White House
and the people at the re-
'election 'committee, that the
pressure began that I let
others read the raw F.B.I.
reports.
? Q. Let me get back again
now to the conversation
with Mr. Gray. Wasn't he
pretty specific with you that
4
the only reason he would
turn these things over to you
is because the President of
. the United States requested
them through you?
' A. Well, Senator, in my
.dealings with Mr. Gray from
the very outset was very
anxious to be of any assist-
ance he could.
When he told me, for ex-
ample, he was .traveling
,around the country a lot and
I should deal with Mark Felt
that to me evidenced that
Mr. Gray wanted to be of as-
sistance if he wasn't there I
should talk to others. The
same tenor was in the con-
versation that he would have
to check and he wanted as-
surances these were going
to the President, this infor-
mation would go to the
President. I am sure he knew
very well that the President
didn't want to sit down and
read a stack of raw F.B.I.
materials.
Q. Did you ever report to
' the President what was in
those 302 forms? A. There
was never anything in those
F.B.I. reports that I read
worth reporting even to Mr.
: Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlich-
man.
82 F.B.I. Files ?
Q. Did you ever show a
? Single one of the 82,302 files .
? to the President? Did you
ever report a single informa-
tion that was in those files
-to the President?
A. Not to my recollection,
no. I may have reported the
general tenor of the investi-
gation which was, I might
say, very vigorous. I would
report that to Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman and as
my channel of reporting.
Q. Did you ever get a call'
from Mr. Gray about this
newspaper story about one
of the reports being shown
to Mr. Segretti?
A. Well, I recall that when
the story broke, Mr. Gray
called me and asked me if
that were true, and said
absolutely not, that the FBI
reports have never left my
office and I have never
showed an FBI report to Mr.
Segretti which, in fact, is
? true.
Q. Who did you show them
to?
A. Mr. Mardian was anx-
ious to see them, Mr. Mitchell
thought that was a good idea
and also that Mr. O'Brien and
Mr. Parkinson also come see
them. They came to my of-
fice. I recall them scanning
them. The only other occa-
sion I recall anybody else
looking at the files is when
Mr. Dick Moore who was
special counsel to the Presi-
dent was given those docu-
ments to look at.
Q. Now, as I understand
it some material was turned
over to the F.B.I. but certain
materials were held out, is
that correct? . What was
turned over to Gray? A. Two
envelopes containing sensi-
tive political documents.
Q. That was turned over at
a meeting in Mr. Ehrlich-
man's office, is that right?
A. That is correct. You will
recall I had been .instructed
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'to "deep-six" and shred docu-
ments. I had to come up in
my own mind with a per-
suasive argument for Mr.
.Ehrlichman as to why not to
"deep-six" and destroy docu-
ments.
Q. Now then what' trans
Spired when they [the docu-
ments] were turned over? '
A: As I said, I took the'
'documents and had a very
brief discussion with Ehrlich-
It was pretty well under-
stood what the meeting was
for, so it was not necessary
to have any extended. dis-'
cussion other than the, fact
that the documents were
, very politically sensitive, that '
'as I recall, I called them
, political dynamite when I
raised them with Gray, that
he should take custody of
them, and that would be the
way to handle it as ?far as
the White House was con-
cerned. I do not recall any
discussion of telling Mr. Gray'
to destroy the documents.
He at that point in time, as
? I recall, placed the documents.
in a small sort of briefcase
? and seemed quite willing- to
take them.
Spoke to Petersen
Q. Did you ever ask hith
again on any occasion what
be had done with the docu-
ments? A. After I had dis-
closed this matter to Mr.
Petersen, I recall that I was
at luncheon at the Justice
Department. This was prob-
'ably in early January. At
'that time, Mr. Gray came up
to me and sort of took me
by the arm and said: "John,
you have got to hang tight
on not disclosing these docu-
ments." And? I said nothing
to him.
Q. Let us go to the August
press conference, where the
President referred to the
Dean report. My understand-
ing is that you indicated
,great surprise at this so-
called Dean report? A. That
is correct.
Q. Did you ever protest to
the President? A. No sir, but
others I did. I talked to Mr.
Mitchell about it; I talked to
Mr. Moore about it; I talked
to my associate, Mr. Fielding.
Q. Let's turn now to the
,Sept. 15th meeting with the
President and Mr. Haldeman
and yourself. A. The Presi-
dent asked me to sit down
and told me that Bob had told
him what I had been doing
and he expressed appreciation
for it.
Q. Did you discuss the
criminal cases that were
coming on for trial; the civil
suits that were filed by the
Democrats, the Common
Cause suit that had been filed
by Common Cause, the Pat-
man hearings? A. That is cor-
rect, we did.
Q. Did you discuss any as- os
pects of the Watergate at t
that meeting with the Presi-
dent?
A. Well, given the fact that h
he told me I had done a good d
job I assumed he had been c
very pleased with what had m
been going on. The fact that
the Indictments, he we
pleased that the indictmen
had stopped at Liddy becaus
the only other link into th
White House was Magruder
Q. Did you discuss wha
Magruder knew about Water
gate, the cover-up money
Strachan bringing wiretap in
formation into Haldeman, [or
Haldeman Instructing Sta
chan to destroy all of thes
materials? A. No, I did not.
a' roughly' five ancl it Came up
ts to $4,850. put a check,
e ? 'wrote a check out and put it
e in, wrote it to cash,
-,_ Q. Do you know this is a
t 'crime, Mr. Dean? Isn't it em-
? ? bezzlement?
' A. Well, I had very clear-
.
- ly made, there was no in-
tention oft my part never to
- : account for the full amount.
e,, CHARLES SHAFFER: Ex-
cuse me I would like to
say as counsel for Mr.
Dean that, based upon the
'fact that have been discussed
with Mr. Dean, if they are
true, Mr. Gurney says that
'is embezzlement. I disagree
with him, and I think there t
are enough lawyers in the
room to know what embez-1,
ziement is.
SENATOR GURNEY: As I
recall, in the testimony there
was discussion sometimes
around November about a a
written report that was to E
be written by you on
gate? A. a is correct. p
t Q. Who requested that re- A
port? A. It was Mr. Halde-', m
s man.
g , Q. Dili you ever write this ,
e, report? A. Yes, sir, and h
have submitted that as a a
document to the committee. w
Q. Did ,you ever tel the th
t , President about this report p
or give him a copy of it? fo
A. No, sir, I used my nor- th
? mai reporting channels.
Clemency for McCord 171
Q. Well now how can you
say that the President knew ,
all about these things from a
simple observation by him
that "Bob tells me you are,,
doing a good job?"
A. L was awaree of the fact
that Mr. Haldeman had often
made notes, Mr. Haldeman
has a good memory. This was.
the hottest issue that was',
going in the campaign. I can't
believe that the fact that we
were going to contain this
matter would totally escape
the President's attention and,
it was to me a confirmation
and a compliment to me tha
I had done this.
Q. Did he say that "Bob ha
been telling me everythin
you have been doing." A. H
said, "Bob has been reporting
to me," something of this
nafuo.
Q.-I thought you said tha
he said that "Bob has been
telling me what a good job
you have been tieing." A
Well, we are quibbling ove
words but I remember?
A. I had tried back as early
as the second meeting, I be-
lieve, to tell him that felt
that I was involved in an
obstruction of justice, par-
ticularly after he had told me
that I should report to hirn
and made the comment to
me that . Haldeman and Ehr-
lichman were principals.
That stuck, in my mind so
very clearly that I thought
maybe he did not understand
everything that I was doing.
When I raised this with him,
I gave him a few of the facts
and he began to debate with
ie about the fact that he did
not think I had any legal
problem based on what I WAS
citing him and I, said I did.
He did not vant to get into
t at that time.
Data on Later Meeting
Q. Did you have a later
rneeting ? with the President
nd Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
hrliohman?
A. Yes sir. I went from the
resident's office to a subse-
uent meeting with Ehrlich-
an and Haldeman and the
iscussions began to focus
n Mitchell coming down and
aving Mitchell step forward
nd if Mitchell stepped for-
ard and would account for
is thing, then maybe the
roblems that had followed
?
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look at the bank statement
,and tell the committee how
'much money you had in the
checking account at that time,
Mr. Dean.
$1,625.12, is that not cor-
'rect.? Yet, you put in your
-file where you were Iteeping
the money in trust a ,check
for $4,850.
?' A. That is correct.
Q. Mr. Dean, we were dis- ?
cussing the time lapse be-
tween those meetings with
the President, the last meet-
ings on the 20th and 21st
and 22d and your 'next corn-?
.munication with him, whichl
,was April 15, as I recall.
' All of these meetings on.
'the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I un-
.derstand it, they were the
first meetings between what
I would call perhaps the
most principal people in-
:volved in Watergate, at least
those in the White House, to
.where you were coming to
serious discussion about
what ought to be done and '
.all of you realized that some-
thing certainly had 'to be
done, and done rather fast,'
,as I understand it? ? .
A. 'I would not characterize"'
'the meetings as to What had
,to oe cione. In fact, the meet-
ings were, as I believe I de-
scribed them in my testi-
mony, very similar to many,
many meetings I had oc-
curred, or I had been in ear-
lier where we talked about,
you know, how do we deal
with the Senate_committee,
.the President at one point in:`
the meeting picked up the
'phone and called the Attor-
ney General and asked him ,
why. he had not been meet-
ing with Senator Baker.
Q. Mr. Dean, finally, be-
fore wrapping up here, I
would like to pin down the
occasions this year prior to
March 21st, the meeting with
the President, when you and
?he discussed the cover-up of
Watergate.
A. All right. It was the
meeting on the 27th [Febru-
ary] that I had with the
President when he told me to
report directly to him. Well,
also, I might add at the con-
clusion of that meeting, as
we were walking to the door'
'to "leave the office, he again
complimented me on the fact'
that I had done a good job
during the campaign, that
this had been the only issue
that they had had, that they
had tried to make something
of it but they had been un-
able to make anything of it
and he was very compli- ,
mentary of my handling of
the job.
He then told me we have
t, you know, you have got
to fight back on situations ,
like this. And I can recall
something I cannot express?
in.writing, a gesture when he
sort of put his fist into his
.hand and said, you have just
got to really keeping fight-
ing back and I have got con-
fidence in you that you can ?
do that and this thing will
not get out of hand. ?
I am now at the March 13
meeting, where the matter
of executive clemency and ,
the million dollars came up
That would be the next in-
stance in the sequence. At
MarCh 13, there was a num-
ber of unspecified demands
for money that had come to'
HOUSTON POST
18 June 1973
?
me through Mr. O'Brien. I
had also been having conver-
sations with Mr. Mitchell.
So there was this general
problem that was existing
before the 13th of March as
' the suport money and how It
was going to get there, That
.is what prompted me to raise
',it with the President at the
'end of the meeting, because
? it was on my mind, and I told
him that, you know, there
were money problems, there
was no money to pay these
people and he said, "How
much vill it cost?"
I said, "My best estimate'
? Is a million dollars or more."
He asked me who the de-
mands were coming from. I i
told him principally from Mr.
Hunt through his attorney.
At that point in time, he said
something to the effect that,
well, Mr. Hunt has already
been given an assurance of
clemency.
He said, I talked to Mr.
Ehrlichman about that and
then Mr. Colson came and
talked to me about it after
he had been instructed not '
to talk to me about it.
; Q. I am just trying to
shortenit up. Did you d'
cuss Watergate with him at
all? A. Not specifically, no. ,
Q. March 17. You had a
meeting that day? A. Yes,
that was St. Patrick's Day,
and I recall the President
had a green tie on and sit- '
siting in the Oval Office. He.:
was very relaxed and he had
his feet up on the desk and i
?was very ? the thing that
stuck in my mind from that
iparticular conversatibn was '
that he wondered if the Sen-
ate would bite the bait that
he had put out at his press
Behind The Secrecy
The Central Intelligence Agency has operated
for 25 years without much inspection by Con-
gress. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
under the late J. Edgar Hoover went on for
nearly a half-century without any substantial
questioning in Congress. The secrecy that has
shielded the two agencies from public informa-
tion or criticiim has left both open to the
description of being akin to secret police ?
something for which America presuislably had
no room.
Perhaps that will now be changed. Senator
Symington of Missouri says he will lead his
Senate Armed Services subcommittee in a thor-
ough investigation of the CIA. Representative
Rndino of New Jersey, new chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, promises an in-
quiry into the FBI.
. The reasoning of the two men is similar.
,Revelations stemming from the Watergate af-
fair indicate that both agencies were compro-
mised by White House political control and
could have been compromised further had Presi-
conference on litigating over
the question of Dean and
executive privilege because
he was convinced if they did
you would never see any of''
the White House staff before ,
the Senate.
Q. Then, I think it is also
true, at least, according to
my understanding, -that dur-?''
ing the rest of the year 1972 '
between the June,16 or was
it if the 17th, the 17th, the
;day of the break-in, except .
for a meeting on Sept. 15,
even you have not testified
to any discussions with the
President about Watergate.
Isn't that correct? A. That is,
correct.
Q. Now, then we come to
the year 1973 and from what
I have been able to gather
in the questioning I have just
finished your testimony is
that on Feb. 28 you did dis-
cuss this matter of obstruc-
tion of justice and then you
also testified to what you
did here on March 13, and
then, of course, we come to
the meeting on March 21
when you told him most of
what Watergate was all
about. And the summary that
I can see from the testimony, .
the President of the United
States certainly didn't know
anything about all this busi-
ness, to this one Senator:,
until this thing on Feb. 28,
acording to your testimony,
and on March 13 but espec-
ially, of course, the meeting
on March, 21 where you did
discuss with him at great
length the Watergate and he
a later press conference said
that he learned about it on
that date..
dent Nixon's plan to broaden the domestic in-
telligence network been left in effect for a
longer period.
Representative Rodino says the situation re-
garding potential "politicization" of the FBI is
unhealthy. Senator Symington questions tha
legality of a "secret charter" of presidential
directives under which the CIA has long oper-
ated without the knowledge of Congress, which
created the CIA and the legal basis for
operations.
The plain fact of the matter is that Congress
can hardly expect agencies it establishes to
follow its legislative definitions closely, if it
leaves those agencies entirely to presidential
control hidden by the cloak of secrecy. Such
agencies then become repositories of unchecked
arbitrary power, as well as possible political ex-
ploitation. They can become a danger to the
rights and liberties of the people they are
meant to serve. And the people should know
about it. Congress has a duty to subject the
CIA and FBI to an incisive review.
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NEW YORK TIMES
28 JUNE 1973
Text of White House Analysis of Dean's
Testimony efore Senate Watergate Unit
Spotial to The New York Times
' WASHINGTON. June 27?
Following is a draft of a -
White House analysis of the
testimony of John W. Dean
3d submitted to the Senate
Watergate committee. today
together with a series of
.questions to he asked of Mr.
Dean. A revised version of
the draft analysis was read
. at the committee's hearing
today by Senator Daniel K.
Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii,
and commented on at various
points by Mr. Dean. The tran-
script of the hearings, includ-
ing the final version of the
draft analysis and Mr. Dean's
comments, was not available
for publication for this edi-
tion. The questions will be
asked of Mr. Dean tomorrow.
It is a matter of record
that John Dean knew of and
participated in the planning
that went into the break-in
at Watergate, though the ex-
tent of his knowledge of that
specific operation or of his
approval of the plan ulti-
mately adopted have not yet
been established. There is no
reason to doubt, however.
that John Dean was the
principal actor in the Water-
gate cover-up, and that while.
other motivations may have
played a part, he had a great
interest in covering up for
himself.
Dean came to the White
House from Justice from a
background of working on
problems of demonstrations
and intelligence. Among those
working under him at the
White House were Tom Hus-
ton and Caulfield. Dean was,
involved in discussions in
1971 about the Sandwedge
Plan Caulfield proposed. Ehr-
lichman was told that the
original authors of the SI-
million plan were Dean and
Liddy. Whatever the ' fact
about this, it is clear that
Dean attended the meetings
that led up to adoption of
the Watergate plan. Dean in-
troduced Mitchell (who had
sponsored Dean for his White
House position) to Liddy.
Dean Liddy, and Magru-
der met to discuss intelligence
- plans of this kind on Jan. 27,
1972, and, together. with
Mitchell, on some later date.
Dean was not present at the
final meeting on March 30
when the $250,000 pan was
approved. It is not clear '
whether he was not there be-
Icause he disapproved oo sim-
ply because he was not in
:Key Biscayne or because he
'wanted to trv to keep his
siwn record clean. He is re-
:ported as having said that he
,"didn't think it was appro-
priate for him to be in on
;these conversations." He is
Approved
;also reported to have said, at
'a meeting in Mitchell's office,
that "we shouldn't discuss
'this in front of Mitchell or in
:The Attorney General's of-
'flee."
' At some point during the
spring Magruder phoned Dean
rand asked him to talk to
.Liddy to try and calm him
ldown. Also on March 26,
'1973, Dean told Haldeman
that in the spring of 1972 he
'had told Haldeman that he.
had been to two meetings at
which unacceptable and out-
landish ideas and intelligence :
gathering had been rejected
by himself and by Mitchell
and that he, Dean, proposed
not to attend any more such
meetings. (Haldeman may be
off on this date?compare
Haldeman deposition). Halde-
man has no personal recol-
lection of Dean telling him
about the meetings at the
time but is "willing to accept
that as a possibility."
Whatever the facts may
be on the matters .that are
Uncertain in the spring of
1972 about Dean's knowledge
or approval of the break-in,
It must have been clear to
Dean, as a lawyer, when he
heard on June 17th of Water-
gate, that he was in personal.
difficulty. The Watergate af-
fair was so clearly the out-
growth of the discussions
and plans he had been in on
that he might be well be re-
garded as a conspirator with
regard to them. He must im-
mediately have had reason
to realize that his patron,
Mitchell, would also be in-
volved.
There is some indication
that Ehrlichman called Dean
on June 17th to advise him,
of the problem and to direct
him to take charge of it for
the White House. Even with-
out an instruction, this would
have been his responsibility,
as counsel for the President,
from the time of the occur-
rence and he was active in
that role from the moment
of his return to the city a day-
, or two after the break-in.
On June 19th, Dean met
with Liddy and learned,
among other things, of the
Ellsberg break-in. (that Dean
met with Liddy and others
Is confirmed in Magruder
testimony) There was also a
meeting that day by Dean
with Mitchell, Strachan, Mar-
dian, and Magruder to discuss
a cover-up. A series of meet-
ings, also including LaRue,
followed throughout the
summer.
Dean was not merely one
'of the architects of the cover-
up plan. He was also perhaps
its most active participant.
It was Dean who suggested
to Haldeman that the F.B.I.
was concerned that it might
run into a C.I.A. operation,
ing on behalf of Mitchell, who
It was Dean, purportedly act-
came to -Ehrlichman several
weeks after the break-in to
obtain approval for fund=rais-
ing by Kalmbach for the ar-
rested persons. It was Dean
who reviewed the papers
founed in Hunt's safe and de-
clared that they were "politi-
cally sensitive" and should
, be given special treatment.
It was Dean and Mitchell
who prepared Magruder for
his perjurous grand jury
testimony. On Aug. 29th
when Colson prepared a
memorandum stating the
facts as he knew them, and
suggested it be sent to
Silbert, it was Dean who
Said: "For God's sake,destroy
the memo, it impeaches
Magruder." It was Dean who
was the agent in some of the
money dealings with the
arrested persons. It was Dean
who gave Caulfield instruc-
tions on how he was to
, handle McCord.
'Perfectly Situated'
? Throughout all of this
Dean was perfectly situated
to master-mind and to carry
out a cover-up since, as
counsel to the President and
the man in charge for the
White ? House, he had full
access to what was happen-
ing in the investigation by
the F.B.I. He sat in on F.B.I.
intreviews with White House
witnesses and received in-
vestigative reports. Dean and
Ehrlichman met with Attor-
ney General Kleindienst late
in July. The Attorney Gen-
eral described the investiga-
tion and said that "it did
not appear that any White
House people or any high-
ranking committee people
were involved in the prep-
aration or execution of, the.
break-in."
History fails to record that
at that moment Dean cor-
rected the Attorney General's
erroneous impression by
pointing out that, however
innocently Mitchell, Magru-
der. and Dean had all been
involved in planning of oper-
ations of which Watergate
was an obvious derivative,
or that Strachan had knowl-
edge of the fruits of this
kind of operation, or that all
of them were suborning per-
jury and otherwise seeking
to conceal the facts.
Dean's activity in the
cover-up also made him,
perhaps unwittingly, the prin-
cipal author of the political
and constitutional crisis that
Watergate now epitomizes. It
would have been embarrass-
ing to the President if the
true facts had become known
shortly after June 17th, but
it is the kind of embarrass-
ment that an immensely
popular President could have
easily have weathered. ?
The political problem has
been magnified 1000-fold be-
cause the truth is coming to
light so belatedly; because of
insinuations that the White
House was a party to the
? cover-up, and, above all, be-
cause the White House was
led to say things about
Watergate that have since
been found to have been un-,
' true. These added conse- ?
quences were John Dean's
doing. ?
Dean was responsible with-
in the White House for be-,
coming apprised of what had
happened, From June 17th on
Dean had periodic converse-
tions with Ehrlichman "about t
virtually every aspect of this
case." Dean reported also to
Haldeman and to Ziegler, to '
him he gave repeated assu-
ranced that he made an "in-
tensive investigation" and
had found no White House
involvement: Dean was "the ?
foundation of the proposition ,
that the White House was.
not involved."
With the election nassed
and public interest in Water-
nate on the Wane. Dean may
have thought that this coy-,
er-up had ? been a success,
although he purported to
continue an ongoing investi-
gation. In February, however,
with the Ervin committee be-
ginning its work. the Presl-?
dent was concerned that all.;
of the available facts be
trade known.
In the middle of February,
1973, Dean and Richard
Moore met with Ehrlichman
and Haldeman at San Cle-
mente. Dean was assigned
to reduce "to written form
all of the detailed facts as
they related both to the com-
mittee to re-elect and the"
White House." Dean was ?
pressed continually for that
statement, particularly by
Haldeman, but never pro- ?
duced it.
QUESTIONS
1. You quote the President
as saying on Feb. 27th that
Haldeman and Ehrlichman
were "principals" in the'
Watergate matter and that
therefore you could be more
objective. What did you
understand by this? Did you
have any evidence then or
now that Ehrlichman had
prior knowledge of the break-
in?
2. If the President was re-
ferring to post June 17th
events, were you not equally
a "principal' as you china
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to have indicated to the
President on Sept. 15th? ?
3. Your 245 page statement,,
Is remarkable for the detail ', ?
with which it recounts events
and conversations occurring
over a period of many .
months. It is particularly re-
markable in view of the fact
. that you indicated that it
was prepared without benefit.
of notes or a daily diary.
Would you describe what ,
? documents were available to
you in addition to those.
. which have been identified as ?
1-exhibits?
4. Would you tell the com-
mittee on what other sources,:
) if any, your process of recon-
e,struction was based?
5. Have you always had a
'facility for recalling the dc-'
"tails of conversations which
l; took place many months ago?
i. 6. Specifically with regard
to 'the meeting of Sept. 15, '
0.1972, were there any notes of '
f other documents that you''
!.? used to, refresh your recollec-
tion? ? ?
7; Did you discuss thld:
? ,
meeting' with anyone at that',;
, time or at any time since?
) 8. Would you again
, r?
state for the record your rec-
ollection of that meeting,'
Compare with the version ,
in the prepared statement tot?
see if it appears either ?In-r,
consistent or memorized. .+
9. You indicated in your'
testimony yesterday that yote,..:
were certain after the Sept. A
' 15th meeting that the Presi-
dent was fully aware of the
cover-up, did .you not?
'Won Your Spurs'
10. And you further testi- .
? tied that you believed that
you "had won your spurs"
*) in handling the cover-up by
' Feb. 27th when you were .
,? told by the President that you ,
would report to him directly, ,
. isn't that correct?
? 11. If that was the case,
' why did you feel it necessary.
on Feb. 27th to tell the Presp',-
dent that you had been par-
? ticipating In a cover-up and
therefore might be' charge-
f..? able with obstruction of jus-,
tice? ?'.
12. If, as you assume, the'r
? President was ware of the ,
cover-up and you had "won
. your spurs," wouldn't that
.? have been perfectly obvious?
13. Did you and your coun-
sel develop a strategy for ob-
t ?
,)taining immunity from pro-
secution? What , were the
elements of that strategy? -
14. Didn't your strategy
, include deliberate leaks of
. information to the media on
:'what you had told investiga-
tors and what you might be
. prepared. to testify about in '
.; in the future? How were ;
these contacts with the media
handled? Who represented.,
)1you and what individual.
.members of the press were
contacted? Were any of the.,
stories or quotes attributed
- to you or sources close' to:
7.;
you inaccurate? If so, whati,
if any steps did you take to,.;
correct these stories? ? ;
15. Mr. Dean, one point of'
distinction you drew in your
testimony puzzles me. You
? have testified that you had'
received and placed in your
safe the sum Apprieed
which you never turned over
'to anyone because you didn't
want funds you had physical-
ly handled to be used for
payments to the Watergate,
defendants. You also testi-
fied that you called Mr. Stand,
and asked him for $22,000 to
make the $350,000 fund'
whole, and that you had your' ,
deputy, Mr. Fielding, go to
Mr. Stans's office, pick up?
the money and later ,deliver
It directly 'to Mr. Strachan?
knowing ,that .$22;000 would,
probably be ?used for 'pay-
mens to the Watergate de-
fendants. Now do you mean
to imply that you think there ?
Is some moral basis for this
distinction, or were you just
? being cautious to protect
yourself technically from
-; committing the criminal of-
tense of obstructing justice
!"(at the expense of implicating
your deputy)?
: Role of Fielding
' ? 16. Mr. Dean, you have
testified as to your close
working relationship to your
,deputy, Mr. Fielding. It was
he who' you sent to pick up
the $22,000 from Mr. Stens, .
he who helped you sort the
documents from Mr. Hunt's
safe and he who went to
' England to retrieve Mr:
Young's secretary. Did Mr.
Fielding know that you 'were
Involved in a conspiracy' to
, obstruct justice, perjure
' testimony and pay defend-:
ants for their silence?.'
' 17. (If answer "no").: If.
Your deputy, Mr. Fielding,.
' who worked so closely with
'you, and who carried out
, some of your missions con?
nected with the conspiracy,
had absolutely no, knowledge
"of the cover-up conspiracy,
how do you so blithly assume,
12" that others on the White.
?? House staff and even the.
, President did know of your:
t.:conspiracy? ?
' 18. Mr. Dean, beginning in
late . May and, early. June;
there were a series of news-
'..Paper stories reporting with
'!--what you had told various"
Hnvestigators as quotek
sources close to you as to! /
what you had said. A number,
f..1 of these reports, for example
the one story in The Wash-
...itigton Post of June 3,
al-
leged that.. you began your
private meetings with the'?
President either early in, the't
year, or as in the case of this'!'
particular story beginning on
January 1st. According to
your testimony today, your '
first private meeting with
the President in 1973 was not
until Feb. 27. Did you or did
you not tell investigators
\ and/or friends that you be-
gan meeting with the Presi-
dent personally either the
first of the year or begin-.
!;ning Jan. 1, and were these
, stories an attempt to exag-
gerate The length 'of, time
which you had been daling
directly with the President
and by implication imparting
tri him knowledge of ? the
Watergate? ?
? .
Leaks and Immunity
19. Mr. Dean. the number
of source stories containing
allegations against the Presi-
_dent_ attributed directly or
For Kelease 2001/08/07
indirec? tly to 'you' over the
last four or five weeks have
been most numerous. Do you
, deny that these stories were
planted in a calculated at-
tempt to influence Federal
o. prosecutors to believe .you
had such important testimony
that they should 'give you
transactional immunity, from
.. the crimes which you have
o committed in return for your
testimony against others?
20. Mr. Dean, the May 14,
1973 edition of Newsweelc
,,.carried a long article abotit
you and your prospective tes-
t.- this article you
her of
were q
,1 times and in' many Instances
the quotes in that article
were word-by-word identical
to the testimony you have
given this week. Indeed, for
the most part this Newsweek
article was a very 'accurate
.preview summary of the.,
lengthy 'statement which you.
detailed before this commit-.
'tee. There are, however, sev-
eral very noticeable differ-.
.ences. One difference is an
omission from the testiniony
you gave here. ' ,
You told this committee'.
that when the President dis-, .
cussed the matter of your in-
vestigation of Watergate. you,
did not tell him you made no",
such investigation. The News-
week article, however, re-
ports that in your meeting
with the President of March
,21, and I quote, "Dean also
bore down hard. he said, on
the fact that .there had never'
been any .study clearing'
'white House staffers.
, "Mr. Nixon replied that lie"
'had had verbal reports of
, Dean's Work. but the counsel
'insisted, 'nobody asked me-
- for a report. Mr. President.'
he said. 'I did not go around'
asking people questions in ?
their offices. There was. no
report.' At this point, sources
quoted Dean, as 'saying that
'the President came out. of
his chair' into a half crouch
of astonishment and shock."
? If the Newsweek account
is Correct, Mr. Dean, the
President's reaction was
most inconsistent with that ?
to whic hyou have testified
before this committee. Did
you or did you not tell the
President that you had never
conducted an investigation,
and have you made the
statement previously that
"the President came out of
his chair into a half crouch
of astonishment and shock"?
Operation Sandwedge
21. Mr. Dean, did I under-'
stand you to testify earlier
that you had led Mr. Caul-.
field to believe you were as-
.sisting him in obtaining ap-'
proval and funding for what
he called Operation 'Sand-
wedge, but that in fact you
let Operation Sandwedge die
a natural death?
22. If answer is affirma-
tive: I call your attention to
Exhibit 'No. 11 which is a
memorandum for the Attor-
ney General from John Dean,
dated Jan. 12, 1972, and I
call your attention to the
first sentence of the second
paragraph which says, "Open;
ation Sandwedge will be in
need for refunding at the
: CIA-RDP77-00432R0001
1.S
end of this month, so the
time is quite appropriate for
such a review." Mr. Dean, if
you let Operation Sandwedge,
die a natural death, why did
you state to Mr. Mitchell that
it would be in need of re- '
funding at the ned of Jan-,
uary?
23. Mr. Dean, if I recall
correctly you testified to this
committee that it .was not
your idea for Magruder's
diary to be altered nor were
you aware before Mr. Ma-
gruder testifed before the
grand jury last September
that Mr. Magruder would tes-
tify that the first meeting
appearing' i nhis diary had
been canceled, and the sec-
ond meeting had been to dis-
cuss election laws. On both'
' of these points your testi-
mony is in direct conflict
with the sworn testimony of
Mr. Magruder. Are we to be-
lieve that Mr. Magruder lied
as to these details concern;
ing you, and if that is your
position, what could Mr.
Magruder's motive be for
lying about the details of the,
manner in which Mr. Ma-
gruder's perjury was con-
ceived?
24. Mr. Dean, Ma-
? gruder also testified that Mr.,
Liddy told him that you,
among others, had indicated
:he would have a million dol-
lars for his plans which he
had been working on before
1,,he even came to the comil-
' tee. You testified, on the
other hand, that you were
:surprised when Mr. Liddy
briefed his million dollar in-
telligence plan to Mr. Mit-
'chell in your presence. To
what motive do,you attribute
?Mr. Liddy' S 'report to' Mr.
'Magruder that you knew
'About his' extensive plan be-
fore you saw them in Mr.,
:Mitcsell's office? .
Meeting With Krogh
25. Mr. Dean, just prior to
taking Mr. Liddy to meet Mr.
Magruder in early Decem-
ber,. 1972, did you and Mr.
Liddy not have a meeting
with Mr. Egil Krogh and did
you not at that time tell Mr.
Liddy he would have one mil-,
lion dollars for intelligence
?gathering 'at' the committee?,
. 26. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder,
, testified that in March 1972?
Mr. Liddy had threatened to
kill Mr. Magruder and that
Mr. Magruder made a deci-
sion to terminate Mr. Liddy's
'employment. In this connec-
tion, Mr. Magruder testified
that he received a call from
you encouraging him not to
become personally concerned.
about Mr. Liddy and not to
let personal animosity get in
the way of Mr. Liddy's proj-
ect. Did you in March inter-.
cede with Mr. Magruder on.
Mr. Liddy's behalf and if so,
since you have said you as-
sumed Mr. Liddy's intelligence
project died after your meet-
ing in February, what , was
the project of Mr. Liddy that
you urged Mr. Magruder to
give priority over his per-
sonal animosities?
27. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruler
testified under oath that
prior to his August 16 grand
Jury appearance at a meeting
00180001-7
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
In your office, you told' him ?
.that if the worst happened,
"everything would he taken
care of, even executive clem-
ency:" Did you make such a
promise of executive clem-
ency to Mr. Magruder as he
. testified and if so, did you
have authority from anyone
, else to make such an offer,,
';or was it on your own in-
itiative? ?? ? ?
28. Mr. Dean, you have de-
picted all others in the White
House as excessively preoccu-
,pied with political intelli-
glnce, use of court methods
and security, and yourself as
a restraining influence. on
:these preoccupations. Yet,
Your background, of responsi-
bilities at the Justice Departv
ment seems to suggest that
your experience in these very,
types of activities might have
contributed to your being in-,
;,vited to join the White House
,staff. What precisely were
?your duties in connection,
with demonstrations while
you were at the Justice De-
partment?
29. Immediately after you
were appointed counsel . to
the President, did you not
take over the responsibilities
of Mr. Tom Huston in con-
nection with intelligence ac-
tivities?
30. You did testify, did you
not, that political intelligence
was routed to you in the
White House?
Memorandum Cited
31. Mr. Dean, I believe that'
you were the author of the
memorandum to the Attorney
General which led to the
establishment of the intelli-
gence evaluation committee.'
,Did you hold the first meet-
ing of that committee in your
office?
32. Were you not the one
on the White House staff
who levied requirements on.
and received the reports from,
the intelligence evaluation
committee? ? , ?
. 33. In interagency meet-
ings to plan for handling
, demonstrations, were you not.,
the White House representa-
tive?
34. in .The St. Louis Post-
Dispatch. of May 14, 1973,1
there is a report that you at-
tempted to recruit a Depart-.
ment of Interior employe, Mr.
Kenneth Tapman, for under-
cover work at the Democratic
convention. Did you attempt
to recruit Mr. Tapman, or
any others for undercover
work, and what prior experi-
ence did you have in recruit-
Ing for undercover work?
35. Mr. Dean, you have
testified concerning your on :
versations on three different
occasions with Gen. Vernon
Walters, the deputy . director
of C.I.A., beginning on the
26th of June. General, Wal-
ters prepared a memorandum'
for the record of each of
these conversations with you.
In General Walter's memo-
randum for the record for',
your meeting with him on 26
June, you are, reported to
have asked General Walters'
Whether there was not some
way that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency could pay bail
for the Watergate defend-
ants, and if the men went to
prison could C.I.A. find some,
Iway to pay their salaries,
? while they were in jail out,
of covert actions funds. In
your testimony you made no'
mention of asking General
Walters whether the C.I.A.
. could pay the Watergate de-
fendants' bail or salaries
while they were in prison.'
Was this' an intended omis-'
, sin on your part in the. in"
'Wrests of saving them, or do
you deny .that you made
these specitic requests ofl
? General Walters?
36. Mr. Dean, I believe you
testified that on March 26th,
:while you were at Camp'
David, you called Mr. Mar-
gulls, the attorney, for Mr.
Liddy, and asked for a state-
,ment by Mr. Liddy that you,
had no prior knowledge of
the Watergate break-in. Is
that correct?
? 37. Now you also testified,
did you not, that it was on
March 28th that Mr. Halde-
man called you to meet with
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ma-
-gruder and that it was at
that time you became con.'
victed 'you had to look out
for yourself, isn't that cor-
rect?
38. If you were, as you,
testified, still a part of the
cover-up team on March 26th,
why were yo utrying to get
material to absolve yourself
at that point?
39. If on March 26th, after
,you, according to your testi-
mony, had admitted to mak-
ing payments to Watergate
defendants to obstruct jus-
tice, offering clemency to the'
defendants to bostruct justice',
and suborning perjury, you,
were still actively trying to
build your defense against
,having prior knowledge of the
break-in. on March 26th,,
doesn't this demonstrate that
throughout this affairs your
'motivation was to protect
yourself against the criminal
charge of authorizing and
directing the Watergate
break-in?. , ;
40. You Stated that Me'
Maroulis called -you back ort
the "29th: of March' and told
you he could not get you the
statement you wanted from
? Mr. Liddy. Did you, record,
'either of these telephoiie
versations you had with Mr,)
,Maroulis? .?
16
41. A central credibilit3.01;
question is: What prompted
Dean's tactics in March and/
April 1973?the desire WI
have the truth told or: the
;effort to achieve immunity,
from prosecution. The follow.i
ing sequence of events
important:
?Dean's admitted personal,
connection with the, offer of.
clemency to McCord in Jatf-'.
uary (Dean to Caulfield toc
McCord via Ulasewicz) (p.4
141).
?Dean's admitted personal,
connection with Hunt's de-,
mand for more money on;
March 19 (Hunt .to O'Brien,
to Dean).
.
?Dean's meeting with the'!
President on March 21-22. On
any version of this meeting
is was an effort to get the,
President to take action on;
what was becoming a per.;
sonal problem for Dean.
---,McCord's letter to Judge
Sirica on March,23. This was,
the critical break in the,
cover-up. Dean learned via a,
call from O'Brien. On March
25 press comments directly
linked Dean with knowledge
of the Watergate break-in.,
He called Liddy's attorney,
Maroulin, on March 27th to,
get a statement that he did.
not have prior knowledge of:
break-in. Maroulis called
back on March 29th with
word that he couldn't give,
him a statement. This state-,.
ment might have been taped.'
On March ,28th and March
29th he solicited names oc
criminal counsel, On. March,
30th, he decided to retaid.:
Mr. Shaffer. '
Time had run out; the cov-,,
er-up had come apart; 'Dean
was centrally involved. He
sent his lawyers to the U. S.4
attroney on Monday, April
and commenced his negotia-t
Lions for immunity." '
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
a
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1973
ents on U.S.
thering Plan
Re fallowing documents, released by
thitSenatii select Watergate committee
yesterday,' are memos discussing a do- ,
mestic intelligence - gathering plan ?
which included possible burglaries, wire- -
taps and mail searches?that President'
Nixon. said he approved in midJuly,
197p, but then rescinded on July 28,
197p, ,
\The plan ? was drafted at/ the Presi-..
denVs direction by a federal interagency
committee, according to Thomas Charles.!
Hu,ston, then a 'presidential aide, whb ,
Aimed up the plan and corresponded
about it with varioui federal agencies :
and :presidential assistant II. R. ( Bob )
,Haldeman in a series of memos. , I
? ,.
The first memo, dated July 14, 1970,4
indicates President Nixon's approval Of
thei,plan,as submitted by Huston.
. .
July 14, 1970
TOP SECRET" '
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUSTON'A
S013.TECT: .
,Dennestic intelligence Review.
"The recommendations you have' proe',
posed as a result of the review have
beefrapproved by the President.
' 1:Ie does not, hOwever, want to folio*
the,procedure you outlined on page 4
ot,your memorandum regarding
Imple-
".meztatlon. He ? would prefer that the.
thing simplybe put into motion on the',
basis of this approval. ?
. -The formal official memoranduiri';:
of course, be prepared and that ?
stMuld be the device by which to carry
'" ?'
tealize this is contrary to your feek
int as to the best way to get this done.,'
;If'Yo.0 feel very strongly that this prOt?
.cticitire Won't Work you had better let:?
.
me' know and we'll take another stab,'
at It. Otherwise let's go ahead. ? '?=4,
.$ ? ' 1' H. R. HALDEMAN-,
.{1n May, 1973, President Nixon, *
,firsts. informing the nation of this plsn,?
said that he had rescinded it an July
28,...1970, just five days after word, to,
implement it had gone out from Huston.
to,, the various agencies.
(The rest of the memos released
tei?day by the Senate committee, how-
ei;c1r, arc dated after July 28, 1970.
(The first, dated Aug. 5, 1970, refers
to irscheclii/cd meeting at which Halde-
man was to discuss the plan with the
late :FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and
Web Attorney General John N. Mitch.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
. ? August 5, 1970 5. ,The biggest risk we could take, in
Top Secret . my opinion, is 'to &infinite to regard
Haudle Via .Comint, Channels Only ' thAiblence'on the campus ard in the
Eyes Only . . eitthi aS a temooraiy phen
Memorandum Forut-App--11-rov--1121""nerrPbr Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDPYPV04
ence-
el se
,From: Tom Charles Huston
Subject: Domestic Intelligence
In, anticipation of your meeting with
Mr. .Hoover and the Attorney General
I would like to pass on these thoughts
I. More than the FBI is involved in
this operation. NSA, DIA, CIA, and the
ilitary services all have a great' stake
a a great interest. All of these agen
c 6-supported the options selected by
the President. For your private infor
mation, so did all the members of Mr
Hoover's staff who worked orti the report
t(he'd fire, them if he knew this.)
which will simply go away as soon as
the.Scranton Commission files its re-
port, The one statement that Rennie
Dayis made at HEW which I thought
made sense was that the Attorney Gen-
eral:was kidding himself when he said
? the;eampuses would be quiet this fall.,
D4Vis predicted that at least 30 wouldi
14 closed down in September. I don't
Ake to make predictions, but I am not
?af all convinced, on the basis of the in-
. teThgence I have seen, that we are any-
way near over the hump On this prob-
letfi,'and I am convinced that the p0-
',for even greater violence is
praent and we have a positive oblige-
tioli( to. take every .step within our?
power to prevent it.
6. hoover can be expected to raise
the hallowing points In yourmeeting:,
) "Our ' present efforts are -ode-
qtiiite." The answer is bullshit! This is
particularly true' with regard to FBI
campus coverage.
-.lb). "The eiiks are too great; these,
folks' are going to get the President
into trouble and RN had better listen
to .me." The answer is that we have
considered the risks, we believe they
are acceptable and justified under the
circumstances. We are witting to weigh
each exceptionally sensitive operation
on its merits, but the Director of the
FBI is paid to take risks where the se-
curity'of the country is at stake. Noth-
ing we propose to do has not,been,
done in the past ? and in the past it
was always done successfully. ?
(c) "I don't have the personnel to do
'the job the President wants done." The
answer Is (1) he has the people and/or
(2) he can get them.
(d) "I don't object to NSA condnet-
ing surreptitious entry if they want ,
to.", The answer is that NSA doesn't
have the people, can't get them, has no
authority to get them, and shouldn't,
have to get them. It is an FBI job. ?
(Paragraph has been deleted by the
Senate committee for national security
!awns.)
?i3:$ We Are not getting the type of
hard intelligence we need at the White
Heuse. We will not get ,it until greater
effort 'is made through community-
wide coordination' to dig out the in-
forMation by -using all the resources
potentially available. It is, of course, a
mater of balancing the obvious risks'
?
against 'the desired results. I thought
We 'balanced thee risks rather objec-
tifely lir the report, and Hoover is es-
ealating the risks in order to cloak his
determination to continue to do busi-
ness as usual; .
-4:4At? some point, Hoover has to he ,
told; who is President. Me has become '
totally unreasonable and his conduct is
detrimental to our domestic intent- I
gence operations, In the ? past two
weeks, he has terminated all FBI liai-
sorrwith NSA, DIA, the military serv-
ices, Secret Service ? everyone except
the' White House, , lie terminated liai-
son with?CIA in May. This is bound to
have a crippling effect upon the entir
community and Is contrary to his pub--
liwassurance to the President at the
meeting that there was close and effec-
tive. coordination and cooperation
within the intelligence community. It
Is Important to remember that the en-
tire intelligence, community knows
that the Presidentmade a positive de-
cision to go ahead and Hoover has now
succeeded in forcing a review. If he
gets his way it is going to look like he
Is' more .powerful than the President,
He?had his say in the footnotes and
RN:decided against him. That should
close the ,matter and I can't under-
stand why the AG is a party to reopen-
Infra. All of us are going to look damn
sillyln the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Ben-
nett; and the military chiefs if Hoover
scate,unilaterally reverse a ? Presidential
decision based on a report that many
people worked their asses off to pre-
pare and which, on its 'merits, was a
first-rate, objective job.
17
(e) "If we do these things, the '
'jackets (sic) of the press' and the ,
,ACLU will find out; we can't avoid
leaks." Answer: We can avoid leaklv,
by using trained, trusted agents and.
restricting knowledge of sensitive op-
erations on a strict need to know basis.
We do this on other sensitive opera.
lions every day.
0) "If I have to do these things, the',
Attorney General will havuto approve ,
them in writing," This is eit'to the AG', ,
but I would tell hoover that he has
been instructed to do them by the
President and he is to do them on that ,
authority, lie needn't look for a scape
goat. He has his authority from the
President and he doesn't need a writ-
ten memo from the AG. To maintain ?
32 7AN void written com-
graalit sten.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
(g), ''We don't need an Inter:Agency -
.Committee on Intelligence Operntions ?
because (1) we're doing fine right now
..,--good coordination, etc.?and .(2)
'there are other existing groups which
can handle this assignment." The an-
swer is that we are doing lousy .right
,now and there aren't other groups .
,which can do the job we have in mind'
'because: (1) they don't rheet; (2) they
don't have the people on them we want
,or have some people we don't want; (3)
they don't have the authority to do
what we want done; (4) ultimately this
new operation will replace, them; and
(5), they aren't linked to the whlte
lionse staff. '
There are doubtless another dozen
or so specious arguments that Hoover
,will 'raise, but they wilt be of similar
quality. I hope that you will be able to,
convince the AG of the importance
Mut necessity of getting Hoover tp go,
along. We have worked for nearly a
;year to reach this point; others have
worked far longer and had abandoned
hope. I believe we are talking .about
the future of this country, for surely
domestic violence and )disorder
threaten the very fabric of our society.
'Intelligence is not the cure, but it,can
.provide the diagnosis that makes a
.cure possible. More importantly,- it can
provide us with the meam to prevent
the deterioration of the situation. Per-
haps lowered voices and peace in Viet-
nam will defuse the tense situation ,we
Lace, but I wouldn't want to reIY? on it
exclusively.
There is this final point. For eigh-
teen months we have watched people in
this government ignore the President's
orders, take actions to embarrass him,
promote themselves at his expense,
and generally make his job more diffi-
cult. It makes me fighting- mad, and
what Hoover is doing here is putting
'himself above the President. If , he
thought the Attorney General's advice.
should be solicited, he should have ,
done so before the report was sent to
the President. After all, Hoover was
chairman of the committee and he t
could have asked the AG for his corn- .
.ments. 13ut no, he didn't do so for it
never occurred to him that the Presi-
dent would not, agree' with his foot-
noted objections. He thought all he'
had to do was put in a footnote and
the matter was settled. He had abso-
lutely no interest in the views of NSA,
CIA, DTA, and the military services,
and obviously he has little interest in
our views, or 'apparently even in the
decisions of the President. I don't see
- how we can tolerate this, but being a
, fatalist, if not a realist, I am pripared
to accept the fact that we may.have to
4
do so.
(Signed) Tom
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
I
e4sto
tifiiiinfi Convention o could becOme s the
first battleground for a new wave of ?
'youthful violence. Coming just as the
scheol year begins, it could :serve as a
? catalyst for widespread campus disor-
ders.
, I recommend that you meet .with the
,rs,Attorney, General and' secure his sup-.-
i'.port for the President's decisions, that
:the t)irector be informed that the deci-
i sions?will stand, and ? that all ,intelli-
gence agencies are to proceed to ,irn?
.plement them ationce.,
is. (Signed) Toni t
. . TOM CHARLES HUSTON'
/' (The. next memo went to the Internal .k
?Revenue Service which had been asked,
:,.as part of domestic intelligence plan,
to reziew lhe income tax compliance of,
,'certaini,dividuals and organizations.)
? Angust 14, 1970 i,
, Memorandum For: ROGER' V. BARTH- '?
, Assistant to the
Commissioner, IRS
Subject: Ideological Organizations
? ? 'Could you give a progress report on
the activities of the Compliance Divi-
siona in reviewing the operatiens of
Ideological Organizations? .?
' L would be interested in. knowing
what' progress has been 'made; since Jury
1, 1969, when we first expressed our
% interest in this matter.
? Thank you..
TOM ,CHARLES ,HUSTON
MEMORANDUM
? 'THE WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL
August 7, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDE-
' MAN
SUBJECT: DOMESTIC . 'INTELLI-
GENCE REVIEW
. Mr. Hoover has departed for the
" West Coast where he plans to vacation
for three weeks. If you wait until his
return to clear up the problems sur-
roUnding our Domestic Intelligence op-
erations, we will be into the ,new
school year without any preparation.
. The situation in Portland is begin.
ninft.to look veryjeriSe?the American
. September 19,1970,
MEiVIORANDLIM FOR: H o no r able
Torn Charles
Huston ?
The White,
House
FROM: Commissioner,
of Internal
-
Revenue.
?
In response to Our mern-orandum
!, dated August 14, 1970, we have pre-
pared the attached status report on the
Special Service Group. I, would stress
that knowledge of the existence and
- operations of this- Group- should be
?.4
carefully. limited. .
? RANDOLPH W. THROWER
Attachment - '
STATUS REPORT ON, ?
SPECIAL SERVICE GROUP
In August 1969 the Senate Commit-
tee on Government 'Operations held
'open hearings on several controversial
organizations including the Black Pan-
ther Party, Student. National Coordi-
nating ',CoMthittee; Republic of New
. Africa, and, Students for Democratic
Society. Information developed during
? these hearings established that various
organilations; categorized as extrem-
ists on the right, or left, presented
problems to the Internal Revenue in
the organizations were not in eompli-
'ance with Internal Revenue laws. In-
formation developed in these bearings
indicated that extremist organizations
were receiving financial support from
various sources. Some of the individu-
als 'involved in the forefront of these
organizations filed tax returns reflect-
ing very nominal income, or did not
file at all, although they were obvi-'
ously expending substantial amounts
of funds.
? ? Recognizing the responsibilities.'of
the Internal Revenue Service to ad.'
minister taxing statutes without re-
gard to the social or political objec-
fives of individuals or organizations, a
decisien was made to establish a me-
thod of accumulating and disseminat-
ing information on all activist groups
to Insure that the organizations and
the leaders of the organizations are
complying with Internal Revenue
Service, functioning under the .As-
sistant Commissioner (Compliance),
special compliance group; Was estab-4
,lished to receive and analvie all avail-
able Information on orgartizations and1
individuals promoting extremist views
and philosophies. The identification of 4
, -
organizations and individuals included
in the program is 'without regard to
the philosophy of Political ',posture
Involved; rather, it f's directed to the
notoriety of the, individual or organi.,)
zation and the probability of publicity
that might result from their activities
and the likelihood that ,this notoriety
would lead to inquiries regarding their ,1
tax status. Another important consid-
eration was the degree of probability,'
;
that the individuals ,might be deliber..i
ately avoiding their tax responsibilil
tics.
,
The staff responsible for this Reify."
ity was first designated as the Activist'
Organizations Group, but it recently',
was changed to "Special Service
Group"to avoid any erroneous impres-
sion of its objectives. The function of
the Special Service Group is to obtain,,
consolidate and disseminate any in-
formation on individuals or organiza-
tions (including' major financial spon-
sors of the ? individuals or
organizations) that would have tax im-
plications under the Internal Revenue'
laws. Liaison has been established with
, all investigative and law enforcement
agencies and with Senate anti House,
Investigating Committees. The Group
also subscribes' to various underground
publications as a source of Information
on matters involving taxable Income of
individuals, activities of organizations
having or seeking tax exempt status,
and identity of individuals' or exempt .
organizations providing financial sup.'
.port to activist groups. In the case of
"financial support" our interest is to ,
he able to determine that donors do
not receive tax benefit from the firm- ?
cial assistance where such benefit is
not clearly allowable by law.
As information is accumulated ? on
the activities or financial support of
particular organizations or taxable in-
come of individuals it is referred to
?
the appropriate field ?offiee of the In-
ternal Revenue Service for enforce
ment attion.' Field Offices may be
asked to investigate the activities of ?
organizations which have been held to
be exempt as charitable organizations;
they may be asked to investigate the
income tax liability of individuals who
have openly expCnded substantial
sums of money without obvious means
of support or they may be asked to in-
vestigate alleged violations of.the fire-,
arms statutes falling within the juris-
diction of the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearins DiVisi on.
It is Important to note that' alt hough
various types of information about or-
ganizatiOns or individuals' is obtained
by the Service from cooperating agen-
cies, only that information relating to
tax status is recorded and /dissemi-
nated to field Offices. The ttiile .
tive of the Special Service. Group Is to
provide a greater degree of assurance
of maximum. compliance with the In-
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? ternal fleventie.laws bYtholte involved
In extremist activities and those pro-
viding financial support to these activt.:
ties. ' ?
, To date the efforts of the Special
Service Group has been confined to
:manual compilation and consolidation
of information on approximately 1,025'
organizations 'and 4,300 ,
Data on 26 organizations and 43 indi
viduals has been referred to the field
for enforcement action. While it is still
to early to have completed many of:
the field investigations, criminal inves-
tigations are under way on 4 individu-"
ills and 1 organization. Delinquent taX'
. returns have, been obtained from 2 or-? ?
ganizations with combinvl tax liability
" of $29,559. On the basis of information
furnished by this "group" application
:for exempt status has been denied to 8 ?
organizations. It is the view of officials ..?
,'of the Internal Revenue Service that
? ?this ."intelligence." activity and field
enforcement is necessary to avoid alle-,
gation that, extremist organizations ?
nore taxing statutes with immunity. :
MEMORANDUM ? ?
1
) THE WHITE HOUSE? ?
? September 21, 1970
'MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. Haldeman
SUBJECT: IRS Rz Ideoldgical Organ- ? ?
izations ? ? -
. am attathing a copy of a report
from the IRS on. the activities of its ? .
'. "Special Service Group" which is stip-
posed to monitor the activities of brie;,,.
?logical, organizations [e.g.; . Jerry ?,
Rubin Fund, Black Panthers; etc.] andy:;'.
take! appropriate action when viola-
tions. of IRS regulations turn up. You.,
? will note that the report is long on", '
words and 'short on substance.
Nearly 18 months ago, the President? '
indicated a desire for IRS to move-iii .
against leftist organizations taking ad-.,
vantage of tax shelters.' I have been .4.,
pressing 1I3S since that time to no
avail, , ?
What %we cannot do in a courtroom ? ,
via criminal prosecutions to curtail '
the activities of some of these groups,*
IRS could do by administrative ac-
tion. Moreover, valuable Intelligence-7 ?
? type information could be turned up 4.?
..by 'IRS as a result of their field audits.?
.? ? (signed) T H
:TOM CHARLES HUSTON
?
MEMORANDUM
? THE WHITE HOUSE./ ;
? August' 25, 1970, ?
MEMORANDUM FOR /'
H. H. NALflEMAN .' ? ? ?
SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
CONTROL BOARD .
On Monday; August 24, the Senate'
. approved the budget fb.f SACB by a
vote of 44 to 28. The principal objec-
::: tion?as might .be ex6ectedL4vq/(thlit
the Board has 'nothing to act tditildifY
the $400,000 a. yeata budgeteft. 'Among"
: those supporting .citator Prokmire in/
this atgument' ere John WilitanVi
Peter Dominic tsarld Len Je atti+.4
, conservatives a
In clefendiryz4the 'approprtall4Seri:,
ator McClellan .At the majoriiy.. and'
? Senator? Ifrtiskiri :for the mittority
. argued that the Administration intbnds.
to make effectlVe use of .the Beard,'
Senator. McClellan.. ,*as quite, specific.'
" in his opiniadthat the current'internar,
security threat requires ,,u'ornpt, and.
" effective. action 'from ? the Administrti-
i tion:.
, ,
. .
The appropriations measure should
?come .ciown for thovaeoatpstnel
ture later this week-.111111
should now proceed to 4111 the
vacancies on the .Board and give! ser-'
ious consideration to the Executive.'
Orderr expanding, the powers of," the
.r
Board. .
I have recommended to Hafry Flein.: ?
ming that we reappoint John Mahan
hs Chairman and Otto Otepka as mettn-
ber Of the Board.,Mahan is under 'the ?';
patrohage of Mike Mansfield WhSsc
support Is crucial." Moreover, he is
a competent enough fellow who is ai
team player and will cooperAte wit#
us completely. Otepka's reaPpotntritatitN
strikes me as imperative. 1 / / ? '
Thece. is ?Some question .1Vhe1fer
should appoint a Republican' fit Board'
chairman. Normally, I wouict think so', ..?
.but I believe the Unique cirEutnstances
we face with tills Board suggest' other,..!.!
wise. Otepka is tob controversial to
be chairman', Paul O'Neal Is too im?:?-.?
petuous, and John Patterson is too old.
We can work Well With Mahan and I
see no reason for' replacing., him as
chairman. The fad that he.is a Demo- ?
crat and 'close to. Mansfield; is a plus:
in ?my opinioh. . 71;,.
As soon as a' decision isil,'?Made on'
these nominatiohsi I plan tri:ineet with
John Ashbrook and. Dick Ielierd to
cuss, some ? of , the legislatiVe,prriposals
pending` before the HouSd., Internal.
Security .Cominittee which pertain.. W.;
the activities or,the. Board. Once wel
get feel for what these people believe
we' should 'do, we- will be in?sa position,'
to re-evaluate' the alternativei. open to,
*us. The point', hoWever, which' we. Peed,
to keep in mind is that we' eannot.afford
'to let the Board 'sit idle oreoptent itself:
with investigating. bid tine' Corenitteist
fronts which are largely irrelevant to
our current problem.
After the bombing ht sua-:
pect that the public is fully prepared
to accept the' concept 'that the Federal "
Governnicnt 'ought -to take an active':
interest in the activities of viblent'-actitin
organizations; as 'we' propOSO 'in the'
Executive Order.
" (Sighed)" T.' H.
, TOM CHARLES HUSTON.'
, I
(The next memo suggests, using the'?
interagency intelligence network to liege,
stop airplane hijackings. '*hite .House ?
aide Peter Flanagan, who. ()lien .Sei?ved,:
as liaison With 'the
had been detailed 'by Some higher White
House official to 'deal 'with theikijacking..
,
problem.) ? ? ?
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE- HOUSE" ??, /
I might add that we haven't seen
.thing yet. If. this incident In The Mid."
east poses problems, wait until..sorne:.
:of our home-gtoWn fedayeen decide to,
i,emulate theirpeets:
. . ?
(Signed) T. H..t?,
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
THE WHITE 110tISI?1
September 18, 1970"
TOP SECRET: ? ? ? . ?
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. ,
Pursuant to our conversation yester, ?
1:rthiy; September 17, 1970, I sutigesCille,
cfollbwing procedures to commente btir .
domestic intelligence operation ati
quickly as possible.
,
Inieragency Domestic Intelligenee4
:
t Wt. A key to the entire operatien will,
t.bh:thetreation of a interagenen Intel-
ligence unit for both operational and ,
evaluation purposes. Obviously, the t
'selection ,.of persons to this unit will
of vital importance to the success!
Of the ritiSsion. As we discussed, the;
? selection of the personnel for this unit
is an appropriate first step for several t
reasons. -First, effective coordination
of the different agencies, must be,tcle-
veloped at an early stage through the .;
establishment of the unit. Second, ;?
Hoover-has indicated a strong. opposi-
. tion to the creation of such a unit and,,,,
to bring the Fill fully on board, this
seems an appropriate first step to1? ,
guarantee their proper and full Par-,
ticipation 'in the program. Third, the
, unit can 'serve to make appropriate,.
,:recommendations for, the type of in-.
f?telligence that should be immediately
pursued by the various agencies. In
regard to this third point, I believe we
'agreed that it would be inappropriate
"to have ;any blanket .removal of re-
1strictions; rather, the most appropriate ?
f.procedure would be to decide on the.:
type of intelligence we need, based on
!: an, assessment of the recommendations
Of this unit, and then to, proceed to /.
rernOve the restraints as necessary to ?
!;.obtain such intelligence,'
To proceed to create the
!,agency intelligence unit,' particultiely
evalUation group or committee, 1
reeontritend that we t?equest the names
F of four'nominees from eaCh Of the!
'? inte,Ifigence agencies involved.' While
thd precise composition of the unit
Vary'. as we gain exerience,t I
think, that two members should be/hp-.
., pointed Initially from each aceney. in
'addition :to your personal reprrisenta-?
t* ? h
lye .w o. should also be involved ?
-? ?
September 10, 19'70 ? the proceedings; Because of 'the intent
MEMORANDUM'FQR H. 4., HALDE-, agency aspects of this request, it wbuld?
, MAN ? ? . probably be best If the?r'equeat came
I unde'rstand thaiiin the. course of: from the White liouse,ilf you agree,
.
Peter Flanigan's (si0 meeting on?steps,; I,,' will make such a feqbest of 'the
to minimize the risk of future air hi?, .f?'6g.cricY
'heads; however, I feel that '
jackings the'queStion of increased. use essential that you wolit this 'out.
of intelligence Information arose.,and,: 'with Hoover before I? ha ,.06 any deal k?
Ings with him dir'ectly. r' " ?
that the Bureau. Is to submit recom-
mendations in 'thi's regard. . . 2. Housing. We discussed ? the ??ap.'
; It strikes me that this exercise will.. propriate housing of this operation
th ,
? amount to?noing more than a retrac- . and, upon' reflection, I believe kthat.
Ing of the steps we' took in June to no rather than a White House :staffer look.
avail. This is but one more example of, tog for suitable space, that a prefeso.
..tho crying need ?for , inter-community sional 'intelligence person should be
coordination on a systematic and for... assigned 'the task of locating" such
anal basis. In this area, for example, ., space., .Accordingly, I would t suggesty
? there are resources yet untapped, i.e., that a request be made that Mr. iloov-,
Customs, the military services, ?er assign an agent to this task., In ton--
.which? will remain untapped so long as Inection with the housing problem,' I
.Mr." Hoover runs a one-man show. ? think serious consideration must. he
I don't know the extent of Peter, s, given to the appropriate Justice De-
experience in intelligence matters, but. partment cover for the domestic Intel-
he should be aware that paper plans .licence operation.'We diseUsSed yester-:
don't always translate into effective ac.. day using IDIU as 'a cover' and as I in--I
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'.dicated I believe that that is a most
4ttiproprlate cover. I believe thlit it' Is:
enerally felt that. IDIU s already a
nar more extensive intern eneelopera-1
? Lion than ,has been mantic) ed
I, and that the IDIU operation" covet '
',would eliminate the problin of distoy-'
ering a new intelligence operation-in
rthe. Department of Justice. Ilnwever,?
I have, xeservations abouelhe.Person-:.
nd in IDIU and 'its preseht operation,
?activities and Would 'suggest that theY -
either: be given a minor function Witii41
; in the new intelligence riPeratien 'Or'
that the staff be completely removed.'
(I have had only Incidental 'dealings
With the personnel, '014 'than" Jim'
0. Devine, and cannot speak to their dis-
?.cretion and loyalty foe such an opera-';
? tion..4.I do' not believe thatIJirit Devine
is -tipahle of an major'poSition withint
the new intelligence 'operation. How.'
?,'ever, I do believe that 'he could help.
perpetuate the `cover and UM: has
clenced a loyalty to you, /the ,Deputy
','and .other key 'people in the. Depart-:,
Mein; ,of' Justice, despite: his strong;
links with the prior.,Administration.
?would defer to your judgement, of,.
course, on any recommendation:re'gard,..
,Ing Jim Devine's continuerb presenee'
WASHINGTON POST
P June 1973
such an intelligence operation..... ?
3. Assistant to Attorney ben- erat'v4,
? also.distussed the need:for'yoU to have
a right hand man to 'assist'.th running'
this operation. It would seem that what
needed is a man with adMinistratiVe?
a 'sensitivity to' the iniPlieations!'
?of . the current radical ,and stibversiVe.
1 movements .within the _United State'.
and preferably, some "baaground.'in
'intelligence work. To maintain the
ef cover, I would think it !appropriate fort
the man to have a law degree in that
? .he will he a part of the 'Department
of 'Justice,. You suggested the possibil-
ity of using a prosecutor who had had
experience .with cases of this type; Ac-i
cordingly, I have spoken with ?Harling-
1: ton ? Wood to ask him to submit the
'! names of five Assistant U.S. Attorneys
who have had experience: An dealing
? with demonstrations or riot type cases
,and who are mature individuals that
'might be, appropriately given a mist-,
'ti,vOassignrnnt in the Department of..
' 'Justice; I' did .not discuss :the matter;
in any further detail with Wood other
,
,than to request the Submission of scme4.
nominees: I would also like to suggest:
? that we request names from4.the var-1
17 atter gate Case
Iei il#ers Soviets
By Robert G. Kaiser
WsshInston Post Staff Writer
At a reception?in Moscow
recently, a Soviet journalist
who once lived In Washing-
ton was explaining the
Watergate affair to an
American colleague. One
thing, the Russian said, was'
certain?President Nixon
would survive Watergate.
The American tried to ex-
plain that the Situation was
complicated?that , Mr.
' Nixon was in serious diffi-
culty. "Well," the Russian
, conceded, "I'll always re-
member what Jim Garrison
said. Ile said that they got
Kennedy, and if another
*American president ever
tries to turn the .United
States away from militar-
ism, they'll get him too."
What do Leonid I. Brezh-
nev and his Soviet col-
leagues really think about
Watergate? The question is
unanswerable, but the anec-
dote about the New ?Heins
district attorney who failed
to prove a conspiracy to kill
Kennedy gives a hint of the
confusion Watergate has
created in Soviet minds.
For a Soviet Communist,
Watergate is a bewilder-
ment. Its every element con-
tradicts hianxist-Leninist ide-
ology. The gravity of the
affair defies Soviet notions
of common sense.
Perhaps most important.
the Soviets -seem to inter-
pret a threat to President
Nixon as a threat to them-
selves, largely because 'they
have invested so much in
their new relationship with
Mr. Nixon.
Officially, the Soviets
have made no substantive
'comment on Watergate. Or-
dinary Soviet citizens?.
apart from those who listen
to foreign radio broadcasts
?know virtually nothing
about it. Brezhnev has In-
sisted publicly that he will
neither exploit nor even
mention Watergate in his
talks this week with Presi-
dent Nixon.
Unofficially. Soviet jour-
nalists in East Europe and
elsewhere have suggested
that the furor over Water-
gate is the work of a right-
wing conspiracy designed to
frustrate Mr. Nixon's de-
lente policy. One journalist
In Moscow recently slam-
tied his desk in mock anger
and said with a stern expres-
sion and a wink, "You can't
do this to our Nixon!"
But. what the Soviets re-
ally think is a mystery.
Much depends on the- repor-
torial skill of Ambassador
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin. who
Is known in Washington at a
brilliant diplomat, though
no one In Washington reads
the messages he dispatches'
to Moscow.
Dobrynin was away from
his post and in Moscow
when -the crucial decision
was made to announce firm
int6.11igence agencies involved forl,
personnel that might be appropriately
;.involved in this activity or Nvito mLght
' terve as' your assistant. ?I.
In summary, I 'recommend the fol.,
"IoWing immediate action:- " ?
?.
(,.* (1) You 'meet with Hoovt, eXplain
twhat must be done: and r quest hit
,nominees for the interagency. unit. "
(2) You request that HooVer assign
an agent.to the task of locating apPro-1
..priate housing for the Operiitiont.
.(3) I request that other involved in-'
.t:elligence agencies submit !nominees'
for the interagency unit.
. (4) I request from the agencies names.
? of,, appropriate personnel for assign:'
ment to the operation. I ?
r
? 'Finally, I would suggest that. you"
?'
call weekly meetings to moilitor the.,
:,problems'as they emerge and to make1
certain that we are moving this pro=
gram Into. implementation as, quickly
.as possible,
(Signed John.
JOHN DEAN:, 't
Haldeman has suggested'
? to me that if you would like' him tO '
? join you in a meeting with Iitiotler
will be happy to do so. . ? .
dates for this summit meet-
ing. He didn't have an op-
portunity to report from
here on the signficance of
then-recent events: the dis-
missal of?the Ellsberg prose;
cotton, L. Patrick Gray's as-
sertion that he had warned
President Nixon about. a
Watergate cover-up, the in-
dictments of John N. Mitchell
and Maurice H. Stalls, and the
shakeup of Mr. Nixon's Cabi-
net.
Despite that coincidenoc
of ominous events during
the second week of May, the
Soviets agreed on May 12 to
announce firm dates for the
Brezhnev visit. Some cynics
suggested at the time that
the Soviet leader knew ex-
actly what he was doing,
and would .demand appropo,
Hate gestures of apprecia-
tion from Mr. Nixon in re-
turn for his willingness to
weather the Watergate tem-
pest.
This argument may tempt
the cynics, but it is too sim-
ple.- It seems much more
likely that the Soviets sim-
ply don't take the Watergate
affair as seriously as many
Americans. After all, the
kind of behavior for which
Mr. Nixon's associates are
now under investigation is
perfectly normal for the So-
viet political police.
The Russians, who are al-
'ways inclined to believe that
other societies are much
like their own, probably
can't imagine that Water-
gate-style activities aren't
typical here as well. .
-
The Soviets are great 'ad-
mirers of authority. They
must find It hard to believe
that the President of the
United States, after an un-
precedented electoral vic-
tory, is believed by some to
be in danger of losing his
authority now.
Brezhnev himself sug-
gested this attitude when he
was asked about Watergate
on his visit to West Ger-
many last month. "What do
you expect." he asked, "an
earthquake?" He obviously
did not.
The history orthe Water-
gate affair also suggests
that the American system of
checks and balances' has
some vitality, a proposition
that is ideologically inadmis-
sible in the Soviet Union.
Ideology plays a more in-
portant role in determining
the Soviet view of the world
than many Westerners ap-
preciate.
Events may prove that So-
viet skepticism about the
importance of Watergate
was justified. But if the
scandal grew worse and the
President's position were
threatened, the Russians
would be likely to regard
that the turn of events as a
threat to them. The Soviets
? like Americans ? assume
that they must he an impor-
tant factor in important
events. As they have already
revealed, Soviets watching
the -Watergate affair unfold
tend to see a plot against
themselves just below the
surface.
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WASHINGTON POST
15 June .1273
Hunt Alleged
Blackmait
White Housel
By Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein
WaAhington Pot Staff Writers ? '4 ;
Watergate conspirator E.
Howard Hunt Jr. effectively .
. blackmailed the White.
House by threatening to dis-
close the involvement a
?? high Nixon administration'
officials.in secret Illegal ac-
tivities unless he received ?
large sums of money and a
? guarantee of executive clem-
ency, according to govern-
ment sources.
Since the Watergate
; break-in almost a year ago, .
. the sources reported, Hunt.:
' has been paid more than!
$200,000 to remain silent.
and received repeated assur-
ances of clemency. Shortly
before he was to he sen-
tenced in March, Hunt de-
. mancied an additional $1.30,,
1000 that was never paid, the
. sources said.
# Investigators have estab-
lished that White House and
, Nixon campaign officials, in,
eluding former presidential'
special counsel Charles W.
Colson, received at least
five "messages" from Hunt'
demanding money and clem-
ency between June, 1972,.'?
, and March, 1973, the sources
t reported.
Senate and Justice De- .
partment investigators now
believe that the acquies- ?
cencc of high White House
officials in the Watergate '
cover-up was in part related
to their fears that Hunt .
would reveal the Nixon ad- ,
ministration's secret opera- ,
tions against radicals, politi-
cal opponents and the press.
Testimony at the Senate
,Watergate hearings has es-
stablished that an obstruc-
tion of justice was contem-
plated Immediately after the
June 17 arrests in the Demol
crats' Watergate headquar-i
ters.
Another factor, however,
according to one source, was
that "from, the beginning
Hunt began blackmailing
the White ? House." The
source. added: ?
"They (White House
officials) went along . . . In
fact, it is Hunt's demands
and threats that make the
case a clear example of ob-
struction of justice. Hunt
was being paid to keep
quiet. It demolishes the ar-
gument that . the money was
just for lawyers' fees and
care for the families of the
defendants?'
Sources said that with-
out the crucial element of
paid hit* silence, it would
be difficult to prove obstrue-
tion of justice on anyone's
part in connection with pay-
ments to the defendants.
One source said: "It
would have been embarrass-
ing for It to get out that the
White House was paying le-
gal fees, but that's not ille-
gal. The evidence that the
payment (to Hunt) was for
silence proves the case of
obstruction."
. The prosecutors in the
Watergate case also have
testimony from conspirator
James W. McCord Jr. that
he was offered money to re-
main silent.
Hunt, the author of more
than 40 spy-and-sex novels,
relayed his initial demand to
the White House within days
of the Watergate arrests, in-
vestigative sources said, by
cryptically warning: "The
writer has a minuscript of a
play to sell."
* M. Douglas Caddy, the
first attorney retained by
Hunt and the other Water-
gate conspirators, relayed
the message to Paul
O'Brien, an attorney for the
President's re-election com-
mittee, the sources said.
in turn, O'Brien, who has
told investigators he was not
aware of the identity of the
"writer" or the precise
meaning of the message, re-
layed it to John W. Dean
III, then President Nixon's
-White House counsel, ac-
cording to the sources.
At the White House, the
sources said, the message
about selling a manuscript
or a play was clearly recog-
nized as a threat from Hunt
and shortly thereafter large
cash disbursements began
flowing to the conspirators,
especially Hunt.
The initial payments to
H u n t, according to the
sources, were made by Fred-
erick C. LaRue, an aide at,
the Nixon campaign com-
mittee, who delivered the
cash either directly to Hunt
or to Hunt's present attor-
ney, William 0. Bittman.
Bittman, the sources said,
has acknowledged to investi-
gators that he received three
or four sealed envelopes
from LaRue for delivery to
Hunt, but maintains that be
did not know that the envel-
opes contained money.
Meanwhile, the sources
said, Hunt had been assured
through representatives of
the Committee for the Re-
election of the President
that he would receive execu-
tive clemency if he re-
mained silent.
"Hunt viewed it as similar
to a CIA operation," one
source observed. "If a deal
blows up, everybody's taken
care of."
However, by the fall of
1972, Hunt "said he was
damn dissatisfied with his
channels to the White House
?
clemency were real," an-
other source reported.
"So he wrote a three-page
letter that he gave to Bitt-
man with new demands.
he upped the ante and de-
manded more direct chan-
nels with the White House
and assurance of an execu-
tive clemency." The source
added: "It kicked up a crisis
at the White House."
At about this time, the
sources reported, Hunt con-
tacted then-presidential spe-
cial counsel Colson, who had
originally hired Hunt as a
White House donsultant.
Colson, according to the
sources, taped the conversa-
tion with Hunt to protect
his own interests and has
supplied the recording to in-
vestigators. One source de-
scribed the conversation as
follows: "Hunt was very up-
set and threatened to talk,
making it clear in some
strong, if not wild language
that he had better get more
attention." '
Later, at least two other
threats bY Hunt were con-
veyed to high White House
'officials, one of them by
Bittman, who visited with
Colson in the White House
in December, according to
investigators.
As previously reported,
former White House counsel
Dean told investigators that
Bittman approached Colson
In December to say that
"something had to be done"'
to avoid a long jail term for
Hunt.
Colson then passed the re-
quest along to Dean and
John D Ehrlichman, then
the President's top domestic
adviser, who answered, "I'll
check," according to ac-
counts of Dean's allegations.
Ehrlichman then walked
into the President's Oval Of-,
flee and returned with what
he said was a promise of ex-
ecutive clemency for Hunt,
according to Dean's version
of-events.
Ehrlichman instructed
Colson to tell Batman that
"everything is ok" but not to
be too specific in relaying
the clemency offer, accord-
ing to this account, which
has been provided to the
Washington Post by two
sources and was initially re-
ported in Newsweek maga-
zine last month.
Bittman has declined to
comment on the matter.
Hunt's final demand to
the White House came on
March 16, according to in-
vestigators, one week before
he and his co-conspirators
were to be sentenced.
"His wife was dead and he
was going to jail. There was
no one to take care of his
children." one source said,
and again Hunt asked for
more money---$130.000, ac-
cording to several sources.
The demand, calling for
a conspirator clea9430468ed trariMalibblaga' : galena,
I
NEW YORK TIMES
18 JUNE 1973
To Check on C.I.A.
To the Editor:
On June 7 you printed a letter fro
Robert F. Drinan, Member of Congress
4th Dist. Mass., in which he calle
"incredible" my statement, "... in m
opinion the Congress has done a g
job of checking on C.I.A. activities"
(0p-Ed May 17).
Father Drinan then goes on to say
that he was advised that only two
members of Congress knew how much
money was voted for C.I.A. in 1971;
and the even more misleading state-
ment, "... no one in the Congress yet
knows how much money the C.I.A.
. spends or how it expends the amount
allotted."
From 1953 through 1961; as In-
spector General of C.I.A. I was charged
by the Director with assisting in the
supervision of the Agency's work with
the Congress. From 1962 until I left
.the Government in 1965 as the Execu-
tive Director-Comptroller, I was in
charge of the preparation of the budget
and its presentation to the Appropria-
tions Committees. In fact, the first
budget hearing I attended was with
C.I.A. Director Walter Bedell Smith in
1951 when Clarence 'Cannon of Mis--
souri Was chairman.
In this period covering some fifteen
years C.I.A. gave to the committee a
full report on its budget. In fact,-
under the chairmanship of Representa-
tive' George Mahon of Texas, the
House Appropriations Committee ex-
amined in even greater detail the
amounts allotted and 'the rationale
behind the expenditures. Further, mem-
bers of the subcommittee were invited
to examine details of the budget to
whatever extent their time permitted.
As far as the Armed Services Com-
mittees arc concerned, there never was
any question but that the C.I.A. sub-
committee members could inform
themselves of whatever details about
C.I.A., within whatever guidelines the
chairman prescribed. Thus my state-
ment about the quality of the Congres-
sional check on C.I.A. ?
Father Drinan's letter does illustrate
what I consider to be a situation, not
-in the best interests of the nation:
that some members of the Congress
,are not even aware of the extent of .
review of C.I.A. performed by the sub-
committees in Appropriations ., and
Armed Services in both houses.
(Prof.) LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK Jr.
Brown University
Providence, R. I., June 9, 1973
fees, was conveyed to White
House counsel Dean, accord-
ing to investigative sources.
Dean "hit the ceiling"
upon receiving the message,
in the words of one source,
and refused to provide the
funds, according to several
sources.
"It was the beginning of
the end," said one source.
"By then the cover-up was
falling apart."
Hunt's wife, Dorothy, was
killed in a Chicago plane
crash in December, and
Hunt pleaded guilty to all
charges against him at the
watergate trial in January.
He is serving a 35-year
provisional jail sentence.
gkigisd,ai 2,0
are being
pafferen lor by relatives.)
_rildren
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1973
rem_ ent 0 sposed
Lunt t?sh Ioney
By Peter Osnos
waRnington Poet Staff Writer
President Nixon said on tors that Dean contends
March 21 that a demand the President knew about. .
t
from Watergate conspirator The White House account
B. Howard Hunt, Jr. that he of a discussion about the
be paid as much as $1 ilayment of $1 million, which
It says took place on March
:lion for his continued si- 6
21, deals with Hunt's demand
for money. The Senate mem-
orandum says that "Hunt
was trying to blackmail
(Presidential aide. `John D.)'
Ehrlichman about Hunt's
,Prior plumber activities un-
3ess he was paid what ulti-
miately might amount to $r
*"
was relayed by then White Mon.
House counsel John W. The "plumber" reference
ps ?
Dean III, according to the White House
memorandum, which is to the
to
Investigations Unit"
k
fet
based on information sup-
up in July, 1971. after
plied the committee by the
Oe publication of the Pen-
White,Papers, to plug news
House. *leaks to newspapers. Hunt
The President's response, 3vas member of the unit:
the memorandum states, t ? Ehrlichman has admitted'
was: "How could it (the ;mowing ' that Hunt broke
money) possibly he paid,
What makes you think he '41nto the Los Angeles office
'
lence about White House-ini-
tiated intelligence opera-
tions was "wrong, that it
'would not work (and) that
the truth would come out
anyway," according to a
Senate Watergate commit-
tee memorandum.
The demand for money
would be satisfied with
that?' "
The Senate Watergate
' committee memorandum Is
a summary compiled from
'information supplied orally
and In writing by White
House officials on the Presi-
dent's meetings with Dean
.from April, 1972, until April,
1973. Included are 37 meet,
ings or telephone conversa-
tions that the White House
? says Mr. Nixon had with
Dean between Feb. 27 and
April 22 of this year.
Dean has reportedly told
Senate investigators and
federal prosecutors that he
discussed aspects of the
Watergate cover-up with Mr.
Nixon or in Mr. Nixon's
presence on at least 35 occa-
sions between January and
April, 1973. Dean has not
yet, however, made those
,allegations under oath.
The White House version.
of those meetings disputes
Dean's by stating that he
did not tell Mr. Nixon until
March 21 that a number of
:White House officials proba-''
%ly knew either about they
:bugging in advance or par-
aicipated in the cover-up. '
One of the charges report-
,
k,..edly made by Dean is that
he Presid6nt told Dean at a
Dnecting shortly before the
t-sentencing of? the seven
vatergnte defendants
March 23 that there would
? e no problem paying $1,
million to the conspirators
:.for their continued silence,
$I'hat money, Dean has sup-
posedly told investigators,
.17,vas to be in addition to
$460,000 paid to the conspir-
tof the psychiatrist of Daniel
11sherg, who leaked the
!,Pentagon Papers to the
1)ress, but Ehrlichman did
not report that break-in to
police.
After Dean told Mr. Nixon
4)f 'Hunt's demand, according
to'the Senate memorandum,
The president said it was
wrong, would not work and
t.he truth would come out
tinyway.
o Dean then said, the memo-
randum continues, "that a
'Cuban group could possibly
?
?[te. used to transfer the pay-
linents." No other mention of
Ai. $1 million figure appears,
tyl, the White House version
bf the Nixon-Dean meetings.
v'The memorandum; made
divailable to some newspa-
laers Wednesday and con-
firmed as authentic yester-
day by knowledgable
cources, is the latest in a se-
les of leaks this week con-
Oerning Dean's forthcoming
Yestimony before the Senate
pelect committee on the
Watergate affair.
Dean had been scheduled
to testify this week, but his
appearance was put off until
hext week because of the
visit of Soviet Communist
party General Secretary Le;
Odd Brezhnev.
The purpose of the leaks
Cs not clear. Some are evi-
dently designed to discredit
Dean's testimony; others
may be intended to bolster
his credibility; still others
may have been leaked he-
alms? of internal political
friction within the Senate
Watergate committee itself.
In any event, the general in-
tention of the leaks appears
to be to influence public
,inion about Dean in ad-
varice of his nationally tele-'ised appearance next week.
The Senate committee's
memorandum about the
Dean-Nixon meetings began
with the committee's re-
quest of White House logs
of the sessions after the
publication of Dean's allega-
tions about what went on
there. The White House
turned over a seven-page
listing of the dates, times
and place of the meetings,
along with who else was
there and, in a Jew cases,
what was discussed.
An response to the corn-
inittee's request for more
detailed information, White
House officials, including
Leonard Garment, the pres-
ent White House counsel,
and J. Fred Buzhardt, the
President's special counsel,'
orally described the sessions
fOr committee staff.
.-White House officials ref-
Used to comment yesterday
on the substance of the Sen-,
ate committee's memoran-
dum, as it appeared in the
press, saying it is based on
the interpretation made by
the Senate staff members of
what Garment, Buzhardt
and others told them.
The memorandum begins
With a meeting September
15, 1972, the date of the in-
dictments of the seven
Waterg a t e conspirators:
"Dean reports on (Internal:
Revenue Service) IRS inves-
tigation of Larry (Lawrence
F.) O'Brien (then the chair-
man of the Democratic
Party). Dean reported on
Watergate indictments."
(O'Brien, reacting yester-
day to the disclosure that
IRS was conducting an in-
vestigation of him, corn-.
mented: "I have been sub-
jeetqd to intensive scru-
tiny by the IRS since 1970
upon my return as Demo-
cratic national chairman. Up
to this point I had no reason
td believe that the audits
were on anything but the
merits, now I'm not sure."
(An O'Brien associate said,
that O'Brien had to hire a
law-yer and accountant to
deal with the IRS audit and
the cost to him in fees was
about $10,000. The result of
the audit was an adjustment
upward in O'Brien's taxes of
a few hundred dollars).
On Feb.' 28, 1973, the mem-
orandum -continues. "Presi-
dent inquired of Watergate;
Dean said no White House
involvement." Dean added
that Nixon associates men-
tioned in connection with
Watergate, including then
special counsel Charles W.
Colson and Maurice H. Stans,
the Nixon campaign's chief
fund-raiser, were victims of
circumstance. "Dean sug-
gested," according to the
memorandum, "they make
sure that wiretaps of previous
years (other administrations)
be made known."
On March 1, the President
was preparing for a press
, conference: "Was decided
the question would come up
as to. why Dean was sitting,
in on FBI interviews and
that reason was he was con-
ducting an investigation for4
? the President. President;
asked Dean to write a re-'
I port. Dean was also' critical,
of Gray (a reference to L.
Patrick Gray III, then acting
FBI director.)
On Mareh 13, the memo-
randum goes on, the Presi-
dent again asked about the
Involvement in Watergate of
specific White House and
campaign officials. For the
first time, Dean said that
Gordon Strachan, an aide to
then White House chief of
.staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman
could have been involved.
March 17: ? "Dean again
suggested they bring out the
1968 bugging and President
said (then Attoney General
Richard) Kleindienst had ad-
vised against it. Several
names were discussed ea
possibly subject to attack:
Colson, Haldeman,
Ehrhich-
man, (former Attorney Gen-
eral and Nixon campaign di-
;rector John N.) Mitchell and,
Dean.
The President asked Dean
point-blank if he knew about
the planned break-in in ad-
vance. Dean said no, there
was no actual White House
involvement regardless of
appearances except possibly
Strachan. Dean told PreSi-
sient (that deputy campaign
director Jeb Stuart) Magru-
der pushed (Watergate con-
spirator G. Gorden) Liddy
hard but that Haldeman was
not involved."
. March 20: "The President
called Dean' that night and
Dean said there was 'not a
scintilla of evidence' to indi-
cate White House Involve-
ment and Dean suggested
he., give the President a
more in-depth briefing of
what had transpired."
, That call set the stage,
according to the memoran-
dum, for the meeting on
March 21 when the Presi-
dent first learned of the
probable involvement of his
close associates in the
Watergate affair, It was that
meeting the President was
apparently referring to
when on April 17 he said he
had learned important new
facts about the case on
March 21.
Two days later, Watergate
conspirator James W. Mc-
Cord Jr. made his cele-
brated accusation before
U.S. District Court Judge
John J. Sirica that, perjury
had been committed at the
Watergate trial In January
and political pressure ap-
plied on the defendants to
keep them silent. Following
McCord's public letter, dis-
closures about those in-
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
volved in the Watergate in
creased markedly.
There had been specula.,
tion that it was McCord's
letter that forced the White'
House to confront the
Watergate affair, but ac-:
cording to the Senate memo-
randum,,Dean finally "gave
the President his theory of
what had happened" on
March 21 and from then on
the President moved quickly,
to deal With the situation.
?
"lie (Dean) still said no
prior June 17 White 'House
knowledge," the memoran-
dum states, "that Magruder'
;probably knew, that Mitch-
ell probably knew that
Strachan Probably knew,.
that Haldeman had possibly
seen the fruits of the wire-
taps through Strachan, that
Ehrlichman was vulnerable
? because of his approval'
of (Herbert W.) Kalm-
bach's (fund-ral,sing activity).,
[Kalmbach was then the ,
President's personal lawyer!t
who had allegedly raised
hush money for the Water-:
gate defendants], Colson
had made the call to Magru-
der (urging him to approve
a Liddy Intelligence plait)." ,
Then came the discussion .
, about Hunt's demand for"
t more money. "Dean said
Colson had talked to Hunt
about executive clemency,",
the memorandum gees on.
"Dean said nothing of his
role In regard to the cover-
up money .. . This informa-
tion was gone over twice,!
the last time in Haldeman's
f' preSepCe.
' "Later that afternoon it
was tentatively decided that
everyone would go to the
grand jury, however, Dean,
, wanted immunity. Halde-
man suggested that they
!write the whole thing out,
and release it from the
White House. Ehrlichman
said there should be no ex-
ecutive privilege claim and
that no one should ask for
immunity. The President'
told them to discuss these
matters with Mitchell."
On March 23, the memo-.
randum says, the President)
told Dean to go to Camp,,
,David and on March 30'
"after it became obvious'.
Dean would write no report
the President directed Ehrl-e?
ichman to investigate."
The final meeting was on'
April 16: "The President.
asks Dean to resign. Had'
two drafts, prepared for
Dean's signature. Dean de-,,
manded Haldeman and Ehr1.-.
ichman resign also."
On April 30, the President,
'ordered Dean to submit his
resignation?which Dean'
did?but the two did not!
meet that day.
NEW YORK TIMES
22 JUNE 1973
'Hunt Said to get $72,000
After aThreat to 'Tell All'
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Thee
WASHINGTON, June 21?E, ing the Hunt message contain-
Howard Hunt Jr. received a ing the money demand. "Dean
final cash payment of $72,000
in mid-March after he had
warned John D. Ehrlichman
that he was ready to "tell all"
about the White House opera-
tions against Dr. Daniel Ells-
berg in 1971, sources close to
the Watergate case said today. ?
The warning, the sources
said, was Included In a letter
that Hunt sent to John W. Dean
3d,- the former White House
?counsel, for relay to Mr. Ehr-
lichman, then President Nixon's
domestic affairs adviser.
"He said 'Pass this along to
Ehrlichman,'" according to a
person who has seen the mes-
sage. This source added that
r
Hunt' who was given a pro-
visional 35-year jail term on
March 23 for his role in the
Watergate break-in in June,
1972, demanded a payment of
$72,000 for himself and $50,000
for attorney fees.
A few days before the letter
was sent, another source said,
Hunt told a former White House
official that he was planning to
write a book abut Watergate
unless he got more money. The
Washington Post reported last
week that the former Central
Intelligence Agency official had
received more than $200,000 at
the time of his renewed request.
Hunt, along with G. Gordon
Liddy, the leader of the Water-
gate break-in team has been
linked to the attempted bur-
glary of the Los Angeles office
of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist in
September, 1971. At the time,
the two men were members of
a special investigations unit
that was set up under Mr. Ehr-
ichman inside the White House
after the publication of the Pen-
tagon papers in June, 1971.
On Sunday, The New York
Times reported that Mr. Dean
was prepared to tell the Sen.,
ate -Watergate committee in
his televised testimony that he
was told that President Nixon
had authorized the break-in of
'the office of Dr. Ellsbergl
psychiatrist '
Mr. Dean referred indirectly
to the Hunt letter in his private
testimony before the ,Senate
Watergate committee last Sato
i
,urday. Excerpts from that tes-
timony were published in The
New York Times today.
According to the summary.
which was signed by Samuel
Approv tett:treterritO tkOOP/013007 : CIA-RDP77-00432n00100180001-7
an tote ot mew-
told Ehrlichman," the summary
continued, "and Ehrlichman
told Dean to call [former At-
torney General John N.] Mit-
chell."
Package Delivered
"f he ;summary then quoted
Mr. Dean as saying that on
March 21 or March 22 of this
year, "Ehrlichman asked Mit-
chell if Hunt's problem had
been taken care of, and Mitchell
said 'Yes.'"
A nutnber of sources con-
firmed today that on either
:March 20 or March 2l?days
on which key White House ad-
visers were discussing Water-
gate With President Nixon?a
package containing $72,000 was
delivered by Frederick C. La
Rue to the office of William 0.
Bittman, Hunt's attorney.
Mr. LaRue has been identi-
fied as the recipient of more
than $400,000 in cash that was
ultimately used to 'help to fi-
nance the elaborate cover-up
that began with cash payreents
in late summer of last year.
Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehr-
lichman have been ,repeatedly
linked to payments reportedly
made to the seven Watergate
;defendants in return for their
;silence,
The 'General Accounting Of-
fice reported last month that
at least $210,000 was raised
,last year by Herbert W. Kalm-
bach, President Nixon's former
personel attorney and a leading
campaign fund-raiser. Investi-
gators have determined that
other cash was taken from a
secret $350,000 campaign fund
that was set up in April, 1972,
in the office of H. R. Halde-
man, the former White House
'chief of staff.
Special Bank Account
? In August, 1972, Mr. LaRue
reportedly received $70,000 in
;cash taken from the safe of
Maurice H. Stans, the chairman
of the Republican finance com-
mittee, for payoff purposes. In
November, according to the
published grand jury testimony
of Gordon C. Strachan, then an
aide to Mr. Haldeman, the en-
tire $350,000 cash fund was
taken to Mr. LaRue's apart-
ment.
Sources close to Mr. LaRue,'
lwho is now believed to be co-
loperating with Federal prosecu-
tors in the 'case, said -that he
had since placed the unused,
cover-up funds?totaling more
than $112,000 ? in a special
bank account. He also returned
some cash to representatives
of Mr. Stens, who served as the
chief Republican fund-raiser in
the campaign, sources said.
Mr. LaRue will keep the cash
in the bank, a friend said to-
day, "until he finds somebody
to take it back."
Some sources said today
that they were puzzled by the
discrepancy between the $122,-
000 sought by Hunt in his mes-
sage to Mr. Dean and the
$72,000 that was eventually
provided him.
"They wouldn't dare bargain
with a guy who's going to plow
them out of the water," one
lawyer close to the case said.
The lawyer suggested that some
of the cash had been
"skimmed" by the participants
in the payoff scheme.
According to the official
White House version of the
meetings between the President
rod Mr. Dean which was pro.,
%.icied to the Senate this week
and also published today in?Thel
New York Times, Mr. Nixon;
was told of the Hunt demand
on March 21.
The summary quoted Mr..
Dean as stating to the Presi-.
dent that "Hunt was trying to
blackmail Ehrlichman about
Hunt's prior plumber [the in-
fromal name for the 1971 in-
vestigations unit] activities un-
less he was paid what, ulti-
mately might amount to $1-
million."
The summary continued:
; "The President said how
.could it possibly be paid. 'What
,makes you think he would be
satisfied with that? Rie] stated
.it was blackmail, that it WAS
!wrong, that it would not work,
'that the truth would come out
anyway."
One
,1 One Justice Department offi-
cial characterized Mr. Nixon's
'discussions with Mr. Dean?as
described in the White House
summary?as "very damaging"
to the President.
"The moment he heard about
this," the official said, "the
President Should have had
Hunt arrested for blackmail."
In a memorandum submitted
to ,the Senate Watergate com-
mittee early last month, James
W. McCord Jr., another member
of the Watergate team, told of
a Hunt threat to a Republican
lawyer in late 1972 in which
he said that ho could "blow the
White House out of the Water."
McCord also quoted Hunt as
saying at another point that he
had information that could fin-
peach the President
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
WASHINGTON POST
? 21 Tune 1973
c 1
re k-14 at Bremer Home' '
By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein
WaAhington Posts:it:al Writern
About an hour after the atterfipt to as-,
?sassinate Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace-
' last year, special presidential counsel.
Charles W. Colson ordered E. Howard
Hunt 'Jr. to fly immediately to Milwaukee
and illegally break into the tipartment of
Wallace's suspected assailant, according to .
accounts of sworn testimony by Hunt.
Colson told Hunt to bring back informa-
tion from the apartment of the suspect, ,
,Arthur H. Bremer, that might be useful in
linking Bremer to left-wing political ?
causes, according to the accounts of Hunt's
tesilniony,
Hunt, then a White House consultant,:
said he never went to Milwaukee; He told.
Colson he could not get there soon enough.
to commit the burglary without running a;
high risk of. getting caught, according to
. accounts of recent testimony by ,Hunt to a j
closed-door session of the Senate's Water-
gate investigating committee.
Colson categorically denied to The Wash-
ington Post that he had ordered Hunt to.?
Milwaukee for any purpose.
Mint's attorney, William 0. Bittman,?
confirmed on Tuesday that Hunt told Sen-
ate investigators that he ? was ordered by
Colson to bring back information from
Milwaukee about Bremer, the 21-year-old
busboy who has since been convicted in
the May 15, 1972, Wallace assassination
attempt.
? "There is no question;" Batman said,-
"that there was testimony about that .
Colson asked him (Hunt) to go to Milwau-
kee and go into Bremer's apartment
I don't have a clear recollection of the
reason why he was to go out there. I don't'
.., ?
?recall whether the word
break-in was involved."
Hunt, a former CIA agent,'
pleaded guilty in January to:
all charges against him ih,
;:the. NVatergate conspiracy':
'and is now serving a 35-year
'provisional jail sentence.
Within hours of the Wal-
lace assassination attempt, a'
'White House official was
.asked by the Washington.
Post about the Identity of
the governor's attacker. Dur-
:ing a subsequent converse
-
tion that evening, the
of-
ficial raised the possibility
of Bremer's connection . to
leftist causes and the carri
.paign of Sen. George McGov-
, ern, through literature found
M his. apartment.
? The Associated Press, in a
dispatch that May night,
quoted a source close to the
: investigation as saying that
,.scraps of paper found in
Bremer's apartment "showed
: he allied himself with 'left-
wing causes.'"
On the evening of the
Wallace shooting, reporters
-said
they were able to enter
c the Bremer apartment
during a 1?-hour period
I. Shortly after the assassina-
tion attempt. 'Several said
. they entered only after FBI
Approved
-agents had been there once
and left, and that agents
's later arrived at the apart-
ment again, sealed it off and
thereafter refused to let.
reporters enter.
i ? The FBI, which ? moved
Into the case immediately,.
has never fully explained
why Bremer's apartment
was not guarded to prevent
access to the apartment by'
reborters.
Among items found by re-
porters in Bremer's untidy
apartment were a Black
Panther newspaper, a book
depicting comic strip eharac-
.t.ers performing sexual acts,
a Confederate flag, some
Wallace campaign liter
a-
ture, two boxes of bUllets
. and seven targets for pistol
, shooting. .
According to the accounts
of Hunt's sworn testimony
' to the Watergate committee,
. Hunt said that after a tele-
phone call from Colson or-
dering him to Milwaukee,
Hunt went to his home in
Potomac, Md.,
Apparently.' In 'a second
telephone conversation,
ac-
cording to the accounts of
his testimony, Hunt told
, Colson that it would take. at
least four hours to reach
, Milwaukee, at which time
13remer's apartment would,
he staked out by the FBI?
thus making a successful
. burglary impossible.
After. that, the sources
- said, Hunt testified the mis-'
sion was aborted because it
; was apparent that an illegal
, entry, was clearly
ble.
, In denying that he asked
Hunt to ,go. to Milwaukee,.
Colson said it is "absolutely
untrue and I'd' swear it is
untrue under oath." ?
: Colson. in a telephone call
to The Washington Post last
night, called the "charge ...:
an s utterly preposterous
'one." He said he did "not be-
lieve that it could be an ac-
curate report of any testi-
mony that the Senate com-
mittee has received." ?
Colson said last night that
It would be irresponsible "to
take that (Hunt's testimony)
seriously without checking
the conditions" and "great
duress" under which Hunt
testified?a reference to an
altercation between Hunt,
and his - cellmate the night
before Hunt appeared be-
fore the Senate committee
on June 11.
Hunt's attorney. Bittman,
said last night that Hunt
had only three houra sleep
"In a day and half" before
he appeared before the com-
mittee and that he (Rittman)
had therefore asked the
For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-0043iR000100180001-7
'committee for permission to
treview the record of Hunt's.
"testimony and amend it
later, if necessary. Bittman'
,said he and Hunt had not,
yet reviewed the testimony .
and that "there is always
the possibility for mistakes"
under what he called "the
unfortunate timing of Mr.
!Hunt's appearance."
Colson provided .a re-
porter A copy of A memo
.dated dune 20, 11372, five
weeks after the -Wallace
'shooting and the day that
Hunt's possible involvement
in the Watergate operation
was first made public. In the.
memo, title "memorandum
for the files," Colson said:
"I also talked to him
(Hunt) on the telephone I he
night Governor Wallace was
shot simply to ask for his re-
actions on what :he thought
might have been the cause?
of the attempted ? assassina-
tion. (Hunt was known .of
something of an expert of -
psychological warfare and
motivations when in the
CIA.)"
Colon said he provided a,
copy of the metrui to then
presidential counsel John
W. Dean III on Aug. 29. In a
covering memo to Dean,
however, Colson said "I can-
not be sure that my memory
is all that precise."
After checking White
House logs, Colson said
Tuesday that he had dinner
with the President the, night
of the Wallace assassination
attempt and could not have
talked to Hunt until after
10:45 p.m. Colson 'said it
would have been wholly il-
logical for him to order
Hunt to Milwaukee at that
hour when there were no
planes and the FBI should
have been swarming all
over Bremer's apartment.
(Hunt's testimony places
the order from Colson about
an hour after the 4 p.m. as-
sassination attempt.)
-In addition, Colson said
that he was in regular con-
tact that night with ANsist-
lant FBI Director W. Mark
Felt, urging Felt 'to insure
that the FBI was on the..
case fully: "Would it have
been logical for me to push'
In the FBI and simultane-
ously order Hunt to Milwau-
kee?" Colson asked.
FBI sources said that the
FBI moved. immediately into
the case before receiving
word from the White
House, hut confirmed that
Colson had talked several
times with Felt. The Presi-
dent asked for a personal
FBI briefing every :30 min-
utes the evening of. May 1.5
on developments in the ease,'
the?sources said.
Senate soUrees said they
place a different interpreta-
tion on Colson's June 20,
1972, memo for the, files.
One Senate attorney said,
"The NVateissate had blown,
S
?Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
Hunt was going to be nailed
and Colson writes a memo
for his files to get his ver-
sion down on paper of all the
other expeditions Hunt had
done/for the White House." ,
. In the three-page Colson
memo, Colson attempts gen-
erally to dissociate himself
from ?11u.nt's activities, in- ,
eluding the Watergate oper-
ation.
Gov. Wallace, a candidate
for the Democratic presiden-,
tial nomination at the time,
of the attempt on his life,
Nixon's chief aide in foreign
affairs.
' Colson denied making the
,fire-bombing suggestion to)
.Caulfield, and an associate of
Colson .said such a remark
might have been made as a
? "joke." Colson has acknowl-?
edged attencitng a discussion
among other White. House
aides about the possibility
of retrieving information
from the Brookings Institu-
tion by unspecified means.
' Last week, Jeb Stuart'MaA"
, -
gruder, the deputy director
was shot by Bremer in a of the Nixon re-election,
shopping tenter at Laurel, campaign, testified before
Md.o ? the Senate committee that
It has been established? ,he made "the assumption".
'that Colson knew of plans to
bug the Watergate before
Democratic headquarters
were placed under illgal
electronic surveillance.
According to Magruder's
testimony, Colson called
'him during February "and
!asked, me in a ,sense would
we get off the stick and get
'the budget approved for Mr.
Liddy's plans"?a reference
?to Watergate conspirator G.'
?shooting, he became deeply Gordon Liddy. Magruder.
upset anti voiced concern testified, that Colson "did
that the attempt on Gov not mention . . . anything
,
Wallace's life might have relating to wiretapping or
;
been made by someone wit espionage at that time." h ?
tics to the Republican Party
or the-Nixon campaign.
If such a tie existed, the
source said, the President
Indicated it could cost hint
Ind election, which was then
less than six months away. ,
' ' "The President was agi-
>trifled and wanted the politi-
cal background on Bremer,",
the source said:
Hunt's allegations repre-
sent the third time in recent
weeks that. Colson's name?
has figured in reports -of.
'burglaries that purportedly
'were planned or carried out
.under White House supervi-
sion.
In the first instance, Hunt.
,told the Watergate grand
jury that, after returning;
:from the 1971 break-in at
?
'the office of Daniel Ells-,
,berg's psychiatrist in Los
Angeles, he went to Colson's
office .with , photographs
taken during the burglary.
"I have something that
might be of interest to ? you,"
Hunt testified he told Col-.
son, adding: "It has to do
with my activities this past
weekend."
. According to. Hunt's testi-i
,mony, Colson told him "I'
don't want to hear anything ?
, about them". and left the
room. ,
In the other Instance,
John J. Caulfield, a White
!House intelligence opera=
tive, told federal prosecu-
tors that Colson had sug-
gested to him that he bur-
glarize and fire-bomb an of-
fice in the Brookings Insti-
tution occupied by Alorton
Halperin, a friend of Ells-
berg and 'a former aide to
that Bremer -stalked Pres1=.
dent Nixon to Canada ?titir;
ing tile, President's 1972',
state visit to Ottawa from
April 12 to 15--a month be-
fore the Wallace assassina,-
"Don attempt. In his diary,
Bremer contended 'that he
n arrow! y missed several
opportunities to shoot the
President.
One White House source
said that when President
Nixon was informed of the
Magruder, added however,
that Liddy only had ohe set
of plans and those involved
wiretapping. ? 14.
In Colson's memo for the
files that he said was die-
, tated on June 20, 1972, he
, states:
. ", . Hunt nrepped by my
,office with Gordon Liddy
from the (Nixon re-election)
,committee. I believe this was
in February ... Both he and
Liddy said that they had
some elaborate proposals
prepared for security'activi-
ties for the committee, but
they had been. unable to get
approval from the Attorney
General (John N. Mitchell). '
"I explained that Mitchell
would soon be at the com-
mittee (as campaign
manager) and that they,
should be persistent and see,
'him because he was the only,
one who could authorize
work' they would be doing.
"While Liddy And Hunt
were in my' office. I called:
Jeb Magruder and urged
,them to resolve whatever it
was that Hunt and Liddy
wanted to do and to be sure
he had an opportunity to lis-
ten to their plans. At this,
point Hunt said he , wanted ,
-to fill me in and I said it
wasn't necessary because it
was of ncr concern to me,
hut that I would be glad to
:urge that their proposals,
whatever they were, he con-
sidered.
? "There was no discussion
that I can recall of what it
was that they were planning
to do other than the fact
that I have the distinct im-
pression that It involved se-
ctirity at the convention and
tionalConvention."
In an interview an associ-
ate of Colson's said that de-
spite Colson's realization
that Hunt "came up with
some very crazy ideas," Cpl;
'son had no curiosity about
,the details of the intelli-
gence-gathering plan and re-
'commended its considera-
tion sight-unseen:
"Colson was too busy, too
Involved, in other things,"
the associate said.
Colson -and his law part-
'ner, David I. Shapiro, have
been actively campaigning
in recent weeks to prove
that neither Colson nor
President Nixon knew of the'
Watergate bugging nor were
they involved in the Water-
gate cover-up and that both
hate been unjustly accused.
, According to reliable
sources, Colson has several
documents showing that for-
mer White House chief of
staff H. R. Haldeman and
'others attempted to blame
Colson for some Campaign
espionage and sabotage. ,
Despite repeated charges
that Colson was involved in
tile Watergate and other
questionable if not illegal
campaign tactics, .some gov-
ernment investiators, now.
believe that Colson may net
be charged with any law vio-
lations.
l'E NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY 'JUNE 23,1973
McCord Says HeAlertegC.I.A.
To Scapegoat Plan in Break-1n
By MAJORIE HUNTER
Special to TM New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 22 ?
James McCord Jr. ,one of the
convicted Watergate conspira-
tors ,said today, that he had
alerted the director of Central
Intelligence last yea1 that ef-
forts were being mane to get
the agency to take the blame
for the Watergate- break-in. ,
McCord said that he issued
his warning in a letter to Rich-
ard M. Helms, at that time
director of the agency and now
Ambassador to Iran.
The Helms letter, he said,
was one of seven that he had.
sent to officials of the ageocy
;between' July 29 of last year
and Jan. 5 of this year.
"I felt that an attempt was
being made to wrongfully lay
the blame for Watergate on
the C.I.A.," he said.
McCord spoke as he emerged
from three hours of question-
ing by the House Armed
Services subcommittee on In-
telligence Operations, which is
looking into the agency's in-
affair..
, The session was closed, but
both McCord and the subcom-
mittee chairman, Representa-
tive Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat
of Michigan, ? confirmed that
McCord had discussed the let-
ters extensively during his
testimony.
That earliest letter, sent to
Mr. Helms, was signed "Jim"
but the others were unsigned,
according to Mr. McCord.
Asked why he had not signed
the others, McCord said that
be "wanted to be sure" his
name would not be generally
known "in case the letters got
out of channels."
McCord had worked as a
C.I.A. agent for some 20 years
before retiring several years be-
ore the Watergate break-in
last June 17. At the time of the
Watergate affair, he was secu.
rity officer for the Republican
re-election committee.
Officials of the agency had!
told the Nedzi subcommittee;
several weeks ago that letters
believed to have been written
by Mc-Cord had been received,
but that nothing had been done
about them because various
persons who read them as-
sumed "the other guy" would
take some action.
McCord said today that he
had mentioned the name of his
former attorney,. Gerald Alch,
as being among those who had
suggested to him that the
agency shoulder the blame. I
"I don't recall specifically if "
others were mentioned In the
letters," he said.
McCord had testified before
the Senate Watergate com-
mittee in May ? that Mr. Alch
had suggested to him that
James Schlesinger, who suc-
ceeded Mr. Helms as C.I.A. di-
rector, would "go along" with
a plan to have the agency say
that McCord was on its pay-
roll at the time of the break-in.
Mr. Schlesinger later denied
any knowledge of such a plan.
Representative Nedzi said
that McCord told the subcom-
mittee today that he first sus-
pected efforts to involve the
C.I.A. last summer after a con-
versation he had with Mrs. E
Howard Hunt Jr., wife of an-
other Watergate conspirator
"He was vague about what
she had told him," Mr. Nedzi
said, "but he said it planted a
definite suspicion in his mind."
Mrs. Hunt was killed in the
crash of an airplane over 'Chi-
cago. She had $10,00 in cash
in het purse at the time.
The Nedzi subcommittee
hopes to explore this matter
further by questioning Hunt,
who has been subpoenaed for
questioning next Thursday. He
has not appeared before any
of the Congressional panels in-
vestigating the Watergate af-
fair.
Dr. Henry Kissinger, l*ppnkrtiglift!plirivekt4nAtt
Ng/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00100180001-7
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, 1). C, Wodnosday, Juno 20, 1973
77:
By Fred Barnes
Star-NMI/Staff Writer
The special Senate Water-
gate committee has decided
to investigate the possible
involvement of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the
Watergate affair. .
Staff members for com-
mittee, which is to resume
its public hearings next
week, have already begun
work in preparation for
calling witnesses to testify
about any CIA link, sources
said.
? Specifically, these steps
have been taken:
O The committee has re-
quested the transcripts of
closed-door hearings of a
Senate Appropriations sub-
committee which looked
into the CIA matter. The
subcommittee agreed yes-
? terday to provide the tran-
scripts.
O Committee staffers are
drawing up a list of likely
witnesses for the CIA probe
which includes Gen. Vernon
Walters, the deputy director
of the agency, and Gen.
Robert Cushman, his prede-
cessor in that job.
O A Senate Armed Serv-
ices subcommittee has
handed over to the Water-'
gate committee a collection
of classified documents
which it had obtained in the
course of its own CIA in-
quiry.
Walters and Cushnian are
not included on the list of
Watergate witnesses which
the committee released ear-
lier, nor is former CIA
director Richard Helms,
NEW YORK T IMES
20 JUNE 1973
COLSON CITES CALL.
ON C.I.A. 'LIAISON'
another potential witness.
? But the list includes sev-
eral witnesses who are now
'expected to be questioned
by the committee about
possible CIA involvement as
well as about other' Water-p
gate matters.
These are former acting
FBI director L. Patrick
Gray and one-time White
House aides John W. Dean
III, John L. Ehrlichman, H.
R. Haldeman, Egil Krogh,
David Young and Charles
Colson.
Walters, Cushman and
Helms have already testi-
fied before one or more of
the three congressional
subcommittees, two in the
Senate and one in the
House, which have been
ilooking into the CIA ques-
tion in recent weeks.
By MARJORIE HUNTER
spevii,i to The New York Throes
?WASHINGTON, June 19?
Charleg W. Colson, a former
White House aide, told a Sen-
ate panel today that he had
personally asked John D.
Ehrlichman to help E. Howard
Hunt Jr. establish "liaison with
the C.I.A." in the summer of
1971.
Mr. Colson's testimony would
seem to refute the recent denial
by Mr. Ehrlichman, the former
top Nixon domestic aide, that
he had made any approach to
the Central Intelligence Agency
to ask that Hunt be given what-
ever assistance he might need
Approved
THOUGH THE hearings
have been in executive ses-
sion, a series of revelations
have emerged from them
which have fueled specula-
tion about a CIA link te the
Watergate.
Among other things, a
memorandum written a
year ago by Walters was
disclosed in which he said
that Haldeman, then chief
of the White House staff,
had ordered him to inter-
fere with the FBI'S investi-
gation of the Watergate
case.
And Cushman told the
Senate Appropriations sub-
committee that Ehrlichman
called him in 1971- to clear
the way for E. Howard Hunt
to make contact with the
that summer.
But it supported testimony
made recently by Gen. Robert
E. Cuashman Jr., commandant
of the United States Marine
Corps.
Hunt had been employed
that summer by the White
House as a member of a special
team ? dubbed "the plumb-
ers"?created to track down
leaks of sensitive national
security information, including
the Pentagon papers detail-
ing American involvement in
Southeast Asia.
Using a wig and various
other equipment supplied to
him by the C.I.A., Hunt was
subsequently involved in bur-
glarizing the Califorinia office
of the former psychiatrist to Dr.
Daniel Ellsber.g, the principal
defendant in the Pentagon pa-
pers trial.
Hunt was also later convicted
of conspiracy in the break-in at
Democratic national headquar-
ters in the Watergate complex
on June 17, 1972.
Mr: Colson's testimony today
appeared to deepen the mys-
tery of White House efforts to
involve the C.I.A. ..in domestic
For Release 2001/08/07
CIA.
At the time, Hunt was a?
member of a special White
House team?the "plum-
bers"?which was assigned
to track down leaks of sensi-
tive national.security infor-
'nation.
Later in 1971, Hunt was
able to get in touch with
, CIA officials, and he ob-
tained equipment from
them that was reportedly
used in the September 1971
burglary of the office of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-
trist in Los Angeles.
EHRLICHMAN, however,
has denied that he ever
talked to Cushman about
allowing Hunt access to CIA
officials. The Watergate
committee is expected to
attempt to clear up this con-
flict in testimony.
Haldeman, too, has de-
nied the allegation against
him, saying that he never
sought to have the CIA
block the FBI investigation
of the Watergate break-in. ,
Sen. John L. McClellan,
D-Ark., said yesterday he
has concluded from his
Appropriations subcommit-
tee's CIA probe that the
agency has acted improper-
ly in involving itself in do-
mestic affairs.
According to the law
which established the agen-
cy, the CIA is supposed to
deal only in intelligence
matters related to foreign
affairs.
McClellan said that his
subcommittee has compiet-
activities, both before and after
the Watergate affair.
During a two-hour appear-
ance before the Senate Appro-
priations Subcommittee on In-
telligence Operations, 'Mr. Col-
son testified: ?
"On the 7th or possibly the
8th of July [which would have
been by phone] I told Mr. -Ehr-
lichman that Mr. Hunt wanted
to establish liaison with the?
C.I.A. as well as with other
Government agencies.
"The need for contact with
the C.I.A. was immediate in
that one of Mr. Hunt's first
assignments was to interview,
a Lieut. Col. Lucien Conein.'
who had been a principal
C.I.A. operative during the
period of the Diem coup (in
South Vietnam)."
Previous testimony by C.I.A.
officials had made no mention
of Hunt's interest in Colonel
Conein during his initial ef-
forts to obtain assistance from
the intelligence agency.
General Cushman. at that
time deputy director of ?the
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100
'ed its investigation for the
time being, even though
three witnesses?Young,
Dean and Krogh?declined
invitations to testify.
IN THE FINAL session
yesterday, the subcommit-
tee questioned Colson for
more than two hours. Col-
-son revealed at the hearing
that he had acted in 1971 to
clear the way for Hunt to
contact a top CIA agent.
He said that he spoke to
Ehrlichman about Hunt's
interest in talking to the
agent, Lt. Col. Lucien Co-
nein. It was-unclear exactly
why Hunt wanted to contact
Concin, whose field of ex-
pertise was South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the Senate
Armed Services subcommit-
tee headed by Sen. Stuart
Symington, D-Mo., is con-
tinuing its work on declassi-
fying sonic of the secret
documents it has collected
during continuing probe of a
possible CIA-Watergate
link.
And the House Armed
Services ' subcommittee
headed by Rep. Lucien
Nedzi, D-Mich., will contin-
ue its CIA hearings on Fri-
day when James McCord,
one of the seven convicted
Watergate conspirators,
will testify.
? Hunt is also a convicted
conspirator. in the Water-
gate scandal and is current-
ly serving a 35-year term at
D. C. Jail.
agency, told several Congres-
sional committees in recent
weeks that Mr. Ehrlichman had
telephoned him on July 7, 1971,
to ask -that Hunt he given some
assistance, at that time un-
specified.
General Cushman also testi-
fied that Hunt had appeared
at the C.I.A. headquarters on
July 22 of that year to ask
for "technical services" to en-
able him to conduct "a very
? sensitive one-time interview;
that the White House wanted!
'him to bold."
General Cushman testified
?that he than supplied Hunti
?vith a wig, a small camera, a
!device to alter the voice, and
ifalse identification papers. He
,said, however, he had. been.
'unaware that the equipment,
:wosld e used in? a burglary.,
Asked today if Hunt had
also sought help in locating
Colonel Con in?as suggested
in the Colson testimony?Gen-
eral Cushman replied, "I have
no further' comment."
0001-7
Colonel Corwin, now a con-
t6
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sultant in the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, said later today
that Hunt talked, to him "some-
time that summer," seeking
information about Dr. Ellsberg
and "asking what I might know
about the Pentagon papers
case." '
Colonel Conein said that he
told Hunt he had had no con-
tact with Dr. Ellsberg Since
1967 and knew nothing about
the Pentagon papers. '
Colonel Conein was the
C.I.A.'s liaison with the group
of Vietnamese generals who
overthrew the regime of Ngo
Dinh Diem, the President of
South Vietnam, in 1963. Mt?,
Diem was killed in the coup.
Colonel Conein was also part
of a team, along with Dr. Ells-
berg, that served as advisers
to Henry Cabot Lodge when he
was named Ambassador to
South Vietnam.
Public Disclosure
Mr. Colson testified in closed
session today, but his corn-
ments?about asking Mr. Ehrlich-
man to help establish intelli-
gence agency liaison for Hunt
were made public later by
Senator John L. McClellan,
chairman of the subcommittee
investigating C.I.A. involve-
ment in the Watergate affair.
' Senator McClellan noted
what he termed the discrep-
ancies between the Colson ?and
Ehrlichman testimony over
White House efforts to involve
the intelligence agency. ?
NEW YORK TIMES
16 JUNE 1973
British Journalist.'
.Attacks'U.S. Pres;
As Unfair to Nixon
Special to TN Nrer 'for* Timms
WASHINGTON, June 15?A
British journalist accused the
American press today Of failing
to discharge its duty to be
fair to the President" in the
Watergate affair.
"The press of the United
States has a duty to be fairlo
the President," William Rees-
Mogg, editor of The Time's of
London, said in a speech at the
National Press Club. But the
nation's press, taken together
and not individually, is not dis-
charging that duty, he said.
The 44-year-old Mr. Rees-
Mogg, tn an editorial in The
Times on June 5, described the
President as in the "unenviable
position of being tried by his
fellow countrymen in three
different forums"? the Senate
Watergate committee, the
WEItergate grand jury and the
press.
Mr. Rees-Mogg accused the
press of failing to give credit
to Mr. Nixon for his "major
contributions" in foreign af-
fairs. "The press is not willing
to give credit where credit. is
due," he said.
4*
In a question-and-answer
session after his talk, Mr. Rees-
Mogg said that the "role of a
fair trial is even more funda-
mental than a free press." -
"The press cannot claim that
the First Amendment ism
of override on the CoffiW.
tion," he said.
NEW YORK TIES
15 JUNE 1973
Colson Says He Put Hunt on 1.7' .7' . Job
, 4 . .
, ...;Ehrlichman, former Presidential
?
By E. W. KENWORTHY I interviewed Mrs. Beard. It was
later reported that Mr. Hunt assistant for domestic affairs,
had appeared before Mrs. Beard had had with Mr. Geneen and
?. "de "Th. NtIC lec'rk Thws ..1 in a red wig. . Mr. Merriam in Mr. Ehrlich-
: WASHINGTON, June 14 ?
'Charles W. Colson? , former ? Today before the House Cam- man's office on Aug. 4, 1970.
merce Subcommittee on Investi- Mr. Colson said that the
White House , sepciai -counsel, gations, Mr. Colson said under "thrust" of the discussion was
confirmed publicly today that questioning that Mr. Hunt had "the Administration's antitrust
,he had directed E. Howard Hunt suggested that he interview Mrs suits against I.T.T. even though
:Jr. to go to Denver. in, March, Beard, and that he, Mr. Colson, they were obviously on Mr.
-1972, and interview Mrs. Dita had agreed to the plan. Genecn's mind.
D. Beard, Washington - lobbyist At the outset of, the hearing,
for the International Telephone ? Authenticity Issue 'Central' Charles Morin, Mr. Colson 's
and Telegraph ' Corporation, Mr. Colson explained that at law partner, sought to explain
about her memorandum linking the time a task force investi-
a promised $400,000 campaign gating the Beard memo had be-
contribution with Administra- come suspicious that the An.
tion help in settling an anti- derson version was "not au-
trust suit. . , , ? then tic."
Disclosure of that memo by
Jack Anderson, the columnist,
on Feb. 29, 1972, was the
ocasion for the reopening of
hearings by the Senate Judi
ciary Committee on the nomi-
nation of Richard G.
Kleindienst to be Attorney Gen-
eral. ?
During the two months of
hearings, high Administration
officials denied that an out-of-
Court settlement that allowed
I.T.T. to retain the Hartford
Fire Insurance Company in re-
turn for divestiture of several
other companies was related in
any way to the I.T.T. pledge
of up to $400,000 in support
for the Republican National
Convention then planned , for
San Diego.
'Noble Commitment' Cited
Mrs. Beard had written her
superior, William R. Merriam,
vice president in charge of
I.T.T.' s Washington office, that
"our noble commitment has
gone a long way toward our
negotiations on the mergerl
coming out as Hal [Harold S.
Geneen, I.T.T. president] wants
them."
After the memo was
disclosed, Mrs. Beard disap- ?
peared from sight for several
days. She was discovered in
a Denver hospital under treat-
ment for a heart attack. Later
her attorney there, David Flem-
ing, issued a statement by her
that the Anderson memo was
fraudulent, although some of
Its phrasing was identical to
a memo she had actually writ-
ten.
. Last Feb. 8, Newsday reporte
that Mr. Hunt, the Watergate
conspirator, had gone to Denver
under Mr. Colson's orders and
The question Of authenticity
"had become critical for the
Administration," Mr. Colson
said, because the memo had
become "central to whether
Kleindienst would be. con-
firmed."
Mr. Colson said he Was firmly
convinced now that the Ander-
son memo was not authentic.
He gave as his reasons the fact
that Mrs. Beard's secretary had
denied typing it, that Mr. Mer-
riam had never seen it, and that
"the most incriminating sen-
tences were non sequiturs."
Later, Intertel, a concern of
private investigators, said first
that the Anderson -memo had
not been typed on Mrs. Beard's
typewriter. Intertel later said
the memo had been typed on
her typewriter, but that its
authenticity was doubted. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation
had obtained the Anderson
memo, which was an original
copy, and stated that it had
been typed on Mrs. Beard's
typewriter and roughly on the
date at the top, June 24, 1971,
Mr. Colson told the subcom-
mittee that he had seen the
copy given by the Senate com-
mittee to the F.B.I., and that
John W. Dean 3d, the White
House counsel, had shown it
to him. He said he did not know
how Mr. Dean had obtained it,
but added that Mr. Dean was
White House "liaison with the
. Other Memos Discussed
Mr. Colson ? was also . ques-
tioned at length about several
Interoffice memos:, and letters
by I.T.T.. officers. to Adminis-
tration offitals dealing with a
'meeting .that . he and John D.
a memo he had written to Mr.
Colson and Henry C. Cashen,
another partner, last April 13.
In that memo, Mr. Morin had
suggested that they "lean" on
G. Bradford Cook, then chair-
man of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, but since
resigned, to get him to name
King Mallory as S.E.C. general
counsel. Mr. Morin proposed
that they solicit influence from
Mr. Ehrlichman, Kenneth Cole,
'his deputy, and Jerry Jones, a
White House aide in charge of
recruiting for top Administra-
tion posts.
"This is one of the chips we
really should pick up, because
It is a key job in the commis-
sion and one of extreme impor-
tance to us in representing our
clients," Mr. Morin had writ-
ten.
, Today Mr. Morin told the
subcommittee that the memo
was "a silly document" dictat-
ed "off the top of my head."
He said that he had no idea of
"placing" a general counsel at
the S.E.C. who would be be-
holden to the firm, and that he
was simply concerned ?to get
Mr. Mallory in the post because
of his qualifications for dealing
with "antitrust problems" be-
fore the S.E.C.
??"I, never heard the expres-
sion 'pick up the chips," Mr.
!Morin said.
,? "I am known for my colorful
language," he said. al guess I
am pretty naive about politics
and the language , of politics.
Perhaps this is the result of the
fact that I come from Boston."
Mr. Colson said that neither
he nor Mr. Cashen ever did
anything about the memo, al-
though Mr. Colson acknowl-
edged that he had written a
note on the memo to Mr. Cash-
en saying: "I'll call Cook if nec-
estary; but I think Jerry Jones
could lock this one for us."
ed For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-R13W7-00432R000100180001-7
1
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NEW YORK TIMES
15 JUNE 1973
Nixon Not Implicatec
in the Conspiracy by-
Campaign Aide
By WALTER RUGABER
Special to The New York Times .
WASHINGTON, June 14?jet ?
Stuart Magruder, the formei
deputy director of President
Nixon's 1972 re-election cams
paign, told a first-hand story
today of how he and alio.
high-ranking officials had Plot-
ted the bugging of the Demo.
crats and then tried to covet
it up.
In 51/2 hours of nationally-
'televised testimony before the
Senate Watergate committee,
the 38-year-old Mr. Magruder
confessed his own guilt and im-
plicated a number of former Ad-
ministration officials?includ-
ing John N. Mitchell, 'John W.
Dean ad and H. R. Haldeman?
but not the President.
Mr. Magruder said that Mr.
Mitchell, a former Attorney
General, and Mr. Dean, former
White House counsel, had been
among those who planned the
Watergate bugging as part of
a broader espionage campaign.
He said that he told Mr. Halde-
man, the President's former
'chief of staff, the full story
last January.
An Early Decision
The cover-up et fort was de?
cided on ahnost Immediately
after the arrests on June 17,
1972, of five men inside the
Watergate headquarters of the
Democratic National Commit-
tee, Mr. Magruder testified, and
among those who knew that he
would lie to authorities about
the case were Mr. Mitchell, Mr.
Dean ' and H. R. Haldemann,
then the White House chief of
,staff. a
Mr. Magruder said .that he
had felt the President had had,
no knowledge of the spying op-
eration but added that he had
been afraid Mr. Nixon's re-
election "would be probably.
negated" if the story was re-
vealed.
Senator Howard H. Baker Jr.
. of Tennessee, the Republican
vice chairman of the commit-
tee, asked Mr. Magruder wheth-
er the decision on concealing
the truth should have been
made by the President. .
"Sir, I can't comment as to
whether he did or did not or
.was involved in it," Mr. Ma-
gruder testified. "I had no deal-
ings directly with the Presi-
dent."
The tanned witness traced
?for a closely listening. audience
what he said was the develop-
ment of the conspiracy. He said
that at one point it included
plans to kidnap radicals and
Approved
entice Democrats with "call
girls" operating on a yacht in
Miami Beach. ?
He said that a principal aim
in wiretapping telephones at
Watergate was to cripple politi-
cally Lawrence F. O'Brien, then
Democratic National Chairman
and a man "who could be very
difficult in the coming cam-
paign."
? ? Mr. Magruder, once a rising
White House figure with large
political ambitions, testfied
readily, calmly and almost mat-
ter-of-factly about the eventa
that finally broke his career.
Scattered through his testi-
money were glimpses of the
personal relatins and the
stresses and conflicts that final-
ly led him to tell hisstory in
mid-April to the United States
Attorney's office here.
He said, for example, that
tensions shot up on March 23
when Chief Judge John J. Sirica
of the United States District
Court here rad a letter from a
convicted conspirator, James
W. McCord.
McCord has indicated that it
was a picture of Mr. Magruder
and his family, showing them
in a relexed pose during the
Wategate trial, that con-
tributed to his decision to tell
what he knew about higher-ups
in the plot.
Mr. Magruder, once reported
to be badly shaken by the im-
pending collapse of the cover-
up, said today that he had
agreed to plead guilty to one
count of conspiracy and to be-
come a prosecution witness in
the trial of others.
- He has been granted im-
munity from prosecutionon his
testimony before the Senate,
but this does not preclude
criminal prosecution, and he
told the committeetoday that
"for those errors in judgment
that I made, I take full re-
sponsibility."
As early as September, 1971,
Mr. Magruder began', there were
discussions with Mr. Dean on
political intelligence operations.
The talk began in earnest in
December. when G. Gordon
Liddy arrived at the Commit-
tee for the Re-election of the
President, he ,said.
Liddy, convicted with Mc-
Cord in January, was to be the
Nixon organization's lawyer,
but Mr. Magruder testified that
Liddy and Mr. Dean and un-
identified other people on the
White House staff had been
discussing a "broad-gauged in-
telligence plan."
Projects Are Described
On Jan. 27, 1972, Liddy pre-
sented his plan to Messrs.
Mitchell, Dean and Magruder
at a meeting in the then At-
torney General's office at the
Department of Justice, Mr Ma-
gruder said.
The projects included "wire-
tapping, electronic surveillance
and photography [of .docu-
mental," Mr. Magruder said,
and therewere plans "relating
to the abduction of individu-
als."
"Mr. Liddy had a plan where!
the leaders [of radical groups]'
would be abducted and de-
tained in a place like Mexico,
and that they would -then be
returned to this country at the
For Release 2001/08/07:
end of the convention," the Wit-
ness said.
There were also the call girls,
and Liddy "envisioned renting
a yacht in Miami and having it
set up for sound and photo-
graphs" during the Democratic
National Convention there.
All this would cost $1-mil-
lion, Mr. Magruder said, and
"all three of us were appalled"
at the "scope and size of the
project." Mr. Mitchell was said
to have told Liddy to "go back
to the drawing boards and come
up with a more realistic plan."
The "general nature" of the
first Liddy plan was relayed to
Gordon C. Strachan, an assist-
ant to Mr. Haldeman who dealt
with the President's political
organization.
The committee was voted to
seek immunity for Mr. Strachan,
but the Department of Justice
has moved under the immunity
statutes to delay his appear-
ance on Capitol Hill for 30 days.
A $500,000 Plan
Mr. Magruder said that he
and Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean,
gathered?again on Feb. 4, 1972,
and that Liddy presented them
with a $500,000 plan, trimmed
of everything but wiretapping
and photography.
The four menn talked over
prospective "targets," the wit-
ness said, and these included;
the Democratic National Com-
mittee headquarters, the party's'
convention headquarters at thei
Fountaineblew Hotel in Miami
Beach and Democratic Presi-
dential campaign offices.
Either Mr. Mitchell or Mr.
Dean?Mr: Magruder said he
couldn't remember who it was
?talked about the "potential
for an entry" at the offices of
Hank Greenspun, publisher of
the Las Vegas Sun. He was
thought to have "information
relating to Senator [Edmund
S.] Muskie, then a leading Pres-
idential contender.
Samuel Dash, the commit-
tee's chief counsel, asked Mr.
Magruder about the object of
the plan. At the time, the wit-
ness said, there was concern
about Mr. O'Brien. He ex-
plained:
41 . I think there was a gen-
eral concern that if he was al-
lowed to continue as Demo-
cratic National Chairman?
because he was certainly their
most professional, at least from
our standpoint, their most pro-
fessional political operator?
that he could be very difficult
in the coming campaign. So we
had .hoped that information
might discredit him." ,
Despite this increasing inter-
est, Mr. Magruder said. Mr.
Mitchell still "just didn't feel
comfortable" with the plan,
even at the reduced level. But
Liddy was encouraged to keep
trying.
Sometime after the Feb. 4
meeting, Mr. Magruder testified
he received a telephone call
from Charles W. Colson, then
special counsel to the President.
'[He] called me one evening
and asked me in a sense to .
get off the stick and get the
budget approved for Mr. Liddy's
28
CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7
plans, that we needed informa-
tion, particularly on Mr.
O'Brien,' the witness said. "He
did not mention . .. anything
about wiretapping or espionage
at that time.
On March 30, 1972, Mr.
Magruder said, he, took Liddy's
third proposal to Key Bascayne,
Fla., and discuSsed it wit hMr.
Mitchell and Frederick S. Larue,
an assistant to the former At-
torney General..
Liddy had cut the cost to
$250,000, with the wiretapping
and photography projects re-
tained. No one "particularly
overwhelmed," Mr. Magruder
said, but he quoted Mr. Mitchell
as giving his approval as follows:
"Okay, let's give him a quar-
ter of a million dollars, and
let's see what he (Liddy] can
come up with." Mr. Magruder
came back to Washington "and
notified the parties of Mr.
Mitchell's approval." Liddy and
Mr. Strachan were informed,
the witness said.
Mr. Mitchell has acknowl-
edged that the bugging plans
were presented to him at vari-
ous times, but he has insisted
that he disapproved them on
each occasion. The former At-
torney General made no corn-
pent today.
Mr. LaRue, a Jackson, Miss.,
businessman, has refused to
talkk with reporters. He could
not be reached today, nor could
Mr. Strachan. Mr. Dean is ex-
pected to testify before the
Senate committee next week. ,
The loss of the wiretapped
conversations and photographs
of documents in the Demo-
cratic files reached Mr. Magru-
der in two packages, the first
one a week or so, after the
,tap was installed in May.
Mr. Mitchell was shown the
illicitly gathered information
at a morning meeting, Mr. Ma-
,gruder said, and the former
Attorney General "reviewed
the documents" and reacted
las follows:
I "He simply indicated that
this was not satisfactory, and
it was worthless and not worth
the money that he [Liddy] had
been paid for it. . ? There was
no information relating to any
of the subjects he hoped to
receive...."
'Lack of Substance'
Mr. Strachan came over from
the White House to examine
the data, Mr. Magruder said,
and he, too, talked about "the
lack of substance" in them.
A second tap at the Water-
gate worked, but the one on
Mr. O'Brien's telephone did not,
and early on the morning of
June 17 five men under Liddy's.
direction broke in again to re-
pair things.
Mr. Magruder was in Los An-
geles when the news of the ar-
rests came through later that
day. He was having breakfast
at the Beverly Hills Hotel, and,
Liddy called to say "there had,
been a problem the night
before."
Mr. Haldeman called the next
day, Mr. Magruder said, "and
asked me the basic background
of the break-in and what hap-
pened." The White House ad-
viser said "I should get back
-to Washington Immediately,"
Ithe witness added.
4
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Washington Post
17 June 1973
omestic ?
Spyinbas
Ettland
hat Was and Is I
Bureau Hurt
By Watergate
By Laurence Stern
washinston Post Staff Writer
Once upon a time the FBI
bad the highest public vela-, 6
lions profile in 1?'ashington
?Its exploits celebrated on
radio, television, film and
the annual appearance on
Capitol Hill of the late J.
Edgar Hoover.
But the Watergate scandal
has brought egg to Its face
and demoralization to its
ranks. The bureau has been
accused of leaking like a
sieve, relaxing surveillance
of domestic subversives and
turning its back on the rest
of the intelligence commu-
nity.
. Its former acting director
L. Patrick Gray III, was a
prime casualty of Water-
gate. Ile has been heavily
discredited for his role in
the investigation and the
subsequent White House
cover-up operation.
The reputation of Hoover.
who was in his lifetime be-
yond the reproach of Presi-
dents, has been post hu-
"mously muddied by Presi-
dent Nixon and the revela-
tions of the "Dean papers."
The President's statement
of May 22 strongly sug-
gested That Hoover had be-
come a cranky misanthrope
who cut himself and the bu-
reau off from the rest of the
federal intelligence estab-
lishment.
This picture of hoover
%Vag reinforced by the re-
cently. published top secret
memoranda of former White
House internal security ad-
viser Tom Charles Huston.
The Huston papers per-
frayed in unflattering terms
the former director's sue-
cessful obstruction to the
controversial "1970 Intelli?
, getter Plan" disclosed hy the
President on :May 22.
It was largely becalm, of
hoover's alleeed bureau?
kidationism that the
President said had to sf`t
the 1970 plan in motion. And
it was Hoover's impositit.in
to the plan's openine up the
FBI's zealote-ly-euarded in-
ternal security turf to other
. intelligence agencies that
caused President Nixon to
shelve it after five days.
The bureau has remained
.silent in the face of its cur-
rent adversities, It is bereft
of the protection of Hoover.
ts Role?
transition in 13 months. The failing to keep abreast of
bureau is anxiously awaiting the agitated domestic scene.
confirrriation of its new di- It was in this climate that
rector-designate, Clarence ? President Nixon set in mot-
ion the 1970 plan, Which was
allegedly abandoned in the
face of Hoover's objections.
Ensuing steps were taken by
the President-?-eStahlish-
meet of an inter-agency In-
telligence Evaluation Com-
mittee and creation of the
M. Kelley, the Kansas City
police chief.
Acting FBI Director Wil-
liam D. Buckelshaus, the bu-
reau's departing temporary
trustee, insists that when
Kelley comes aboard the
malaise in the bureau will
evaporate. President's own Special In-
"When Kelley is con- vestigation Unit
the
firmed we may he in a pnsi- Plumbers)?to operate
on
lion to do some talking," ? the internal security turf
that was once Hoover's ex-
Pahl one old bureau hand.
The old boy network of elusive preserve.
"The White }louse was
Hoover loyalists both in the
getting people with no PX.
bureau and among its
alumni has been severely perienee. ?My God, that man
slime by the recent attacks Liddy was a wild man when
and is thirsting for a chance he was in the bureau?a SU-
M. rebuttal. per-klutz," groused one of
"The enaree that we cut Hoover's Most, senior aides.
off liaison with all other in- ..They m,i.?mateurs who
telligence agencies is just were bound to get into tro-
not true," said one high- time. .\?d they did."
ranking FBI official. "We Relations worsened. lino-
did cut out a Int of the mes-
N-er cut off formal liaison
seneer boy stuff?having with the Central Intelli-
agents stationed in other genet, Agency in 1970 hc-
agencies and serving as cause of an incident in Den-
high-priced couriers. But we
ver in which an FBI agent
have mainttvined constant li- passed in on to an
aisun wit It everyone."
Operai i e I limVer
iii-
In 1970, when Ow troubles s:sted on knowing the iden-
began in earnest for the hu- lily of the agent. The CIA
real', the politic relationship
reftised.
between Itonver and Presi-
The raueed relations he-
dent Nixon seemed to be a
'wren the hurrait and the
model of cordiality. Only in
recent weeks, with puhlica- stidaecti
in
two of the Ilustrin (leen- f'11111marY dismissal
ments, has it been revealed in orbiter, 197I, of tVilliam
('. Sullivan. the No. 3 man
that a grim strueele was al-
ready tinder way with the in the Inirratt and caul, lion-
Nixon administration over , ver's most valued deputy.
renreanizine and expanding ? Sullivan had insisted, pub-.
the government's powers of licly and privately. on
domestic surveillance to the tougher surveillance of New
point of illegal entry. Left and Black Panther ac-
The deeds and rhetoric of tivities, as well as of foreign
sin It grotles a tho ill:1?k nationals. He openly criti-
l'anthers. eAthernien? Stu- eized Hoover for preoccupy- -
dents for a nemocrat.ic Ing himself with such nearly
my, and the post-Catnhodia defunct groups as the Com-
ferment on llw ramPll's munist Party. USA, by then
were raising a high slate "I. a virtual geriatric society,
alarm in the White House and the Ku Klux Klan.
and Justice Department. Sullivan was a minority
Hoover himself went to voice in the bureau. But he
Capitol Hill with shrill den- was paid serious heed in the
unciations of black activists Justice Department where
and student demonstrators he had the ear of then-Atter-
and their organizations. At nee General John N. Mitch-
one point he proclaimed the ell and Assistant Attorney
Panthers to be the leading General Robert C. Mardian,
internal security threat to a -principal adviser on 'la-
the nation. tional security affairs.
But the underlying truth
One measure of Sullivan's
was that it was a new hall
prior loyalty adminis.
game for the bureau. one
tration was his removal of
for which the traditional in records of controversial na-
formants and infiltration
Urinal security wiretaps or-
tactics did not seem to be
dered by the White House,
working. from the FBI to Mardian's
The response at high ley-
office in Justice. The former
els of the justice Depart-
Hoover aide let it he known
Hoover to embarrass the
White House.
And Hoover, in one of his ;
most celebrated "sudden
death" reprisals' for disloy-
alty, ordered the locks
changed overnight in Stith.
van'S office and his name re-
moved front the door. After-
ward, Sullivan was ap-
pointed to a high Justice De-
partment post, chief of nar-
cotics intelligence.
-Even_ after Hoover died
the bureau was not wholly
passive in its defense. The ,
nomination of Gray and his
conduct of the Watergate in-
vestigation touched off a
form of guerrilla warfare
against the administration
front within the ranks of the
FitiLe hieldy placed CN?
(Tufty(' acknowled.:ed that
FBI neents may lime been
instrumental in eelline the
initial Watergate revelations
into public print. Ileporicrs
who covered the case a C.
knov?ledee the role or the
gents in openite7 up the ini-
tial' peepholes in the cnver-
up facade some administra?
etirpetclti.ifficials were trying to
"it wasn't' a matter of cot-
tine rancorous leaks
dumped in your tap." said
one Watereate reportorial
specialist. "You'd have to go
to them and say, \that about
this or m hat about that?
They'd respond, 'Yes, that's
richt.' I can think of one
guy in the bureau without
whom we wouldn't have got-
ten anywhere." -
Actin:: FBI Director Ruc!:-
elshaus achoowledged that
pace of thi, ',Vatereate inves?
"some or wyr agentq were
getting net sons ahout the
tieation ale. probably talked
to the press. It's against hit.
reau retoilat ions hut not
against the law,"
Former While I louse dn-
me?o cwirisi,101*
II charged in ;T-
wee con'ertissinnal testi?
ninny that the burtian was,
"hemorrhaette:," with leaks
under Gray. The While
Hrillsr, he said. "strrior.ty
susperted that. Time Innen-
zinc had a freely runniog
lea!: at the top of Gray's
staff."
In the days immediately
after the WW.create a rrotit s
in June, 1972, romp!. While
Ilttnst, 1":611,1Sol JOhn W.
Dean Ill was on the phone
to Gray with repeated com-
plaints ;thole bureau leaks.
Dean has been pictured in'
Wateried testimony as a
key preiiident i at opei e
for insulating the White
../louse from the scaidal.,
rieay first arrive4
.0 ti wanyd him to sue-
' aid a rceontly re.
tired senior official with
the Compleat Bureaucratic ment and in the W lute more than a quarter of
Infighter, and is mithottsrovediEor Releasoet2GOINe8in_7
hat 111 wiret
jug its third leaders-nip ine finger at the for ThiWAGirt-QQ432a000100%01001-t the !)tire
29
' .ien we eeame mere of
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those speaking trips, the fr.";
(went, :11)story:es from WaTh-'
inglon. That's when he got
the nickname, 'Two?Day
Gray,' Whatever you say
about ? Hoover, he never
missed A day of school,"
Now Gray is under inves-
tigation by the FBI to deter-
mine what role he played in
the Watergate cover-up,
One of the major ironies
of Wat'err.,?ate's imoact on
the FBI was the apparent in-
version of Hoover's reputa-
tion as an obsessive anti-
Communist warrior whne
kicked the door clown and
asked questions later.
Some of Hoover's long.
standing liberal critics have
acclaimed him for stopping
the 1971) intelligence plan
with Its burglary, mailoopen-
jog, hugging and wiretapping
provisions,
But. as one of the chief
liewenants of the departed
director emphasized in an
Hoover had not
hecome a sudden convert to
civil libertarianism.
"For Mr. lioover, jurisdic-
tion was paramount. He felt
this plan WAS whittling away
at the essence of the liBt
and its responsibilities. Ile
didn't object to clandestine
entries. We opened mail but
we never talked about it or
\\Tote memos. We cracked
safes when we felt it was
1
case of compelling national
security. Hoover's law was
that you didn't get caught
and bring embarrassinent
on the hureau," said the vet-
eran Hoover loyalist.
The documents bur.
glarized from a bureau of-
fice at Media, Pa., in Marc?h,
1971, showed that late into
1970 the FBI was wiretap.
ping .1.31;ick Panther activi-
ties and trying laboriously
to infiltrate the ghettos with
thousands of informants.
The intensity of FBI sur-
veillance against black or-
ganizations with the slight-
est political overtones sug-
gests that at least one part
of the 1970 White House
plan 'nay have continued in
effect through the year.
Rut is also n matter of
widespread agreement, in
and outside the bureau, that
as Ifoover brooded inereas-.
inely on his place jn.history,
he became more fastidious
about legal procedure.
Bag jobs ? burglaries ?
were out. So was mail
snooping. Phones were tap-
ped only on written authori-
zation of the Attorney Gen-
eral. The same with etre-
tronie hugs. .conceated 'mi.
ccophones.. ?
"1 was very confident of
Hoover In the wiretap area,"
says former Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark. "Ho
knew we'd prosecute if we
found anything wrong. Hoover
was protecting the bureau."
But even Hoover's stow).
-Thurs:, June 14, 1973 Ens' Znatird Cfmril
Top-Secret Directives
for CIA Role Revealed
Orders From Security Council Permit
Activities Not Authorized in 1947 Statute
BY RUDY. ABRAMSON
Times Stet/ Writer
? The controversial "en-
'skids" apparently spell out
in specific terms just what
authority is granted for
covert operations overseas
and just what the CIA can
do in the 'United States?
even though ,the National
Security Act specifies that
the agency is not. to he in-
volved in intelligence acti-
vities at home.
Disclosures in the
Watergate scandal have
resulted in new concern
that Congress has failed to
properly oversee CIA;
operations.
Publication of secret
White House documents
last week revealed that a
1970 intelligence plan?,
approved by President
,Nixon, then canceled five.
days later?involved the
CIA in discussions of a
widespread scheme for,
spying on domestic "tar-'`
gets."
. Though memorandums
Written by White House
aide Tom Charles Huston
cited the cooperation of
then-CIA Director Richard
Helms in putting together
the plan, some sources'
argue that the documents
. failed to show that the
CIA had agreed to become
:involved in the. White
House operations for
domestic spying.
Nevertheless, a former
CIA analyst who is now an
'intelligence expert on Ca-
pitol Hill said, "Helms
never should have partici-
pated in discussions like
that, and when the subject
was raised he. should have
walked out."
According to sources fa-
miliar with operations of
the agency, the CIA's acti-
vities in the United States
include recruitment of and
.assistance to students
from "Third World" coun-
tries attending colleges
and universities.
Such activities are
termed "building future
assets," establishing rela-
tions with students who
stand to become figures in
government in their home
'countries. 30
WASHINGTON ? The
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, precluded by Congress
26 years ago from engag-
lag in domestic opera-
,tions, operates under a
top - secret charter from
.the President's National
'Security Council that may
directly conflict with its
congressional mandate.
The secret charter, in
the form of National Se-
curity Council Intelligence
'Directives, or "enskids," is
.known only to a few high-
level operatives in the in-
t elli gence bureaucracy
and fewer, if any, mem-
bers of Congress. -
The "enskids" take ad-
vantage of loopholes in
Congress' 1047 National,
Security Act to permit.
CIA. actiVities not author-
ized when the agency waS
'created by that statute. .
"T h e secret charter," .
said a congressional ex-
pert on CIA operations, "is:
a. curse.
"We must have publicly
?confirmed what authority
'is given to the intelligence
community in this coun-
try."
chest loyalists concede that*
the bureau was not keeping
step with the violent politi-
cal activism in the campuses
and ghettos that swept to its
peak in the l903-1970 period.
"We still haven't solved
the Capitol bombing or the
Pentagon washroom bomb-
ing,'' admitted one retired
senior bureau official loyal
to Hoover. "We've still got
fugitives from the Weather-
men and SDS even though
they've been on the 'Ten
Most Wanted' list. We did a
great jot, on the Communist.
Party and the Klan. This
was different."
Yet even those concerns
maS? have been outdistanced
by events. The colleges and
ghettos have quieted down.
So have the styles of politi-
cal protest.
These are facts with
which Kelley will have to
reckon AS he ponders the
ether revelatiom,. fit tile
most trautnatic years in the
bureau's history, just
passed,
? It is also widely believed
that the CIA infiltrates
U.S. peace groups in order
to gain access to countries
like China, North Viet.;
.nam, N or t h Korea and
Cuba,
? It is fairly common.
knowledge that the agen-
cy also operates a,domes-
tic contact service which.
,interviews Sonic
Amen-
cans, mainly businessmen,
'who return from abroad
with potentially useful in-
formal ion.
Several years ago, it was
disclosed that the agency,
through various founda-
tions and front organiza-
tions, had funneled money
into more than 200 domes-
tic groups, chiefly the Na-
tional Student Assn.
? More recently, the CIA
ohas been cennected with
giving training to a mini-
her of police departments.
Much of the domestic
CIA activity is reported to
be carried out from offices
in downtown Washington,
a block from the White' -
House, rather than at the
agency's headquarters at
Langley, Va.
- Disclosure that John D.
hr 11 chman, President.
Nixon's former domestic.
affairs adviser, had soliCit,
ed CIA assistance for men
plotting the burglary of
the office of Daniel Ell s-
berg's psychiatrist, t r i g.
gered three congressional
investigations of possible
'agency involvement in the
;Watergate affair and re-
.lated matters.
Inquiries Ended
Sen. John L. McClellan
(D-Ark.), chairman of an
a p p ropriations subcom-
mittee, and Sen. Stuart:
Symington (D-Mo.), acting'
chairman of an armed scr-
V ices subcommittee on
'CIA oversight, have ended
.their inquiries for the time
being while they consider
their next step.
.Closed-door hearings are
still being conducted by a
House armed services sub-
committee beaded by Rep..
Lucien N. Nedzi '
Sen. William Proxmire :
(D-Wis.), who has recent-
Iv renewed efforts to get
disclosure of the CIA's se-.
cret budge t, Tuesday
launched a campaign to
obtain release of the secret
"enskids"
Prof. Harry Howe .Ran-,
sorn of Vanderbilt Univer-i
Eity, an authority on the
CIA. Tuesday called for
creation of a nongovern-
merit, commission to carry
out. a major investigation
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tot the enitre U.S. Intel:
, ligence apparatus. ?
Calling the 1970 plan
,drawn up in the Whites
House "scandalous," Ran-
som said in an Interview
'? that a major reorganiza-
tion may be called for, in-
cluding changes in the au-
thority of the FBI and the:
, CIA. ?
, A see-mingly major:
question related to the
-
CIA. and the 1970 White
;House intelligence plan is
still open.
? Outlining his Work
When asked about the
plan last February, CIA's
Helms told the Senate
:Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, "I do not recall,
whether we were asked,:
but we were not involved
because, it seemed to me,'
that was a clear violation,
of what our charter was.",
The question was raised
when the committee con- '
, sidered Helms' nomina-.:.
tion to he U.S. Ambassa-
dor to Iran.
? Yet last week, in the se-.
.cret White House doc-
uments published by the.:4
'New York Times, domes--
tic' security aide Huston,
'outlining his work on the
White House domestic in-'
telligence unit, said "I
, went into this exercise
fearful that the CIA would
refuse to cooperate. In' .
'fact, Dick Helms was most
;cooperative and helpful,
and the only stumbling
.block was ,Mr. (J. Edgar),
Hoover."
Development of a secret
?charter through the Na-'!
tional Security Council
di-
rectives, Prof. Ran so m4
said, amounts to the coun-
cil writing law, a situation
which he partly blames on,
,Congress for not exercis-
Ang stronger oversight.
Ransore said he also be.
lieves that the time may
'have come when the CIA's
, plans division?the
partment of dirty tricks'
t --*"should ? have some, mat,,t,
jor surgery." ? I
t? He said there are legiti-q
;mate questions as to
e whether release of the "en-
?
? skids" would jeopardize 1
!'.'the national security.
ji "But we don't know,
what the basic structure Of'
t
our national intelligence
' apparatus is. But the 'ene-
my' probably knows, and
r in the long run, disclosure
71S the. better risk. The;
.fworst thing is that the, law'
is being violated in se-,
?cret."
Oversight of the CIA has
11een made especially diffi-
rcult because there are few
tstaff members to support
_committees with the re-
isponsibility.
Over the years, commu-
;inication between the CIA
'a nd the congressional
committees charged with
,oversight has been be-'
tween the committee
chairmen and the agency
'director.
Even the agency's budg-
et . is kept from all but'
members of Congress.
'charged with oversight,
being hidden in appropria-
.tions publicly announced
for other departments in
the federal bureaucracy. . ?
That secrecy is now bel
:Ing challenged in a cit?
izen's suit before the
Su-
preme Court. The U.S.
'Court of Appeals in Phi-
?ladelphia has ruled that,
William B. , Richardson
'has the right to sue the:
'government for disclosure
of how the CIA spends its
budget. ??? ? ,?
The Supreme /Court is
due to hear arguments in
October on the issue of,
'whether Richardson has
; the right to sue.
The Federation of
. American Scientists has
'estimated. that the United
7States',...total intelligence
:budget 'runs from $4 bil-
lion to $8 billion per year.
.The CIA alone; it esti-
'mates, has a budget of as
.much as $1 billion per
!Year and a staff 'of 18,000,
or 8,000 more than the De.
',partment of State.
VIRGINIAN, Covington
29 May 1973
T1 Functions of The CIA
/ Disclosures about Central Intelligence
Atency involvement in domestic espionage
have given rise to a call for curtailment of CIA
functions. It is being proposed that thC spy
agency's operating functions be turned over
to State Department and military personnel,
confining the CIA to the task of evaluating
and coordinating intelligence.
This proposal derives weight from the
fact that one of those advancing the idea is
Morton H. Halperin, a former adviser to the
National Security Council. He and Jeremy J.
Stone of the Federation of American Scientists
joined in making the proposal at a New York
. University conference on governmental
secrecy.
Their recommendations appear to focus
mainly on the role of the Central Intelligence
Agency abroad. 'The time has come," they
argue, "for America to change its strategy
from covert intervention to setting a standard
on non-intervention." They rightly note that
whenever an instance of CIA manipulation of
affairs abroad becomes. known?and this has
frequently happened?harm is done Ameri-
ca's reputation and credibility.
Halperin and Stone also are concerned
about the intrusion of the CIA, into domestic
affairs, both directly and to some extent in-
directly through the use of CIA-trained per-
sonnel. "The greatest presidential scandal of
modern times," they say in their paper, "has
arisen from the injection of covert methods,
used by CIA graduates, into American so-
ciety."
Just what changes should be made re-
mains debatable. Certainly action should not
be hasty, but ought to be taken on the basis
of a thoroughgoing review of past CIA activi-
ties and a searching consideration of what?its
future role should be. But in our judgment
Congress could do well to adopt as a working
principle that the policy-making function of
the Central Intelligence Agency should he
eliminated or at very least strictly defined
am! limited. In addition, steps should he
taken to force the CIA not to depart in any
, way from the legal structure on involvement
kin domestic affairs.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
17 JUNE 1973
The trouble with the truth
The Politics
Of Lying
Government by Deception,
Secrecy and Power.
By David Wise.
915 pp. New York:
Random House. $8.95.
By RICHARD HOLBROOKE
Multiple Choice Question for
the 1970's: The Government of
the United States lies: (a) never;
(b) only when it has to for
reasons of national security; (c)
whenever it feels like it, wheth-
er or not it affects national se-
curity; (d) whenever it feels like
it,, to protect itself from domes-
tic political embarrassment; (e)
most of the time; (f) all Of the
time. ?
By now, many Americans
would pick- one of the last
two choices to the question
posed above. Turned off by
Vietnam and Watergate and
two Presidents in a row who
have had low credibility ratings
(for good reason), disillusioned
by recent revelations of decep-
tion and even during the excit-
ing 1,000 days of the Kennedy
Administration, many educated
people see deceit even where
there is none, and trickery be-
'hind even routine announce-
ments. Like the Boy Who Cried
Wolf, the Government often has
trouble being believed when it
Is telling the truth. (Try Con-
vincing people, for example,
that the Peace Corps is com-
pletely clean of any C.I.A. in-
volvement, as I firmly believe it
is; even Peace Corps staff and
volunteers sometimes doubt it,
although three Presidents have
issued orders to this effect, and
no evidence has ever emerged.
to the contrary.)
It was not always thus. As
recently as 1960, when the
United States announced that
it had lost a "weather research
plane" near the Turkish bor-
der, most Americans accepted
the official State Department
explanation?until, confronted
by a C.I.A. pilot alive and well
in Soviet hands, President Ei-
senhower admitted the decep-
tion and accepted personal re-
sponsibility for the U-2 spy
flights.
Did the President of the Unit-
ed States lie? And, especially,
Dwight D. Eisenhower? Ike real-
ized the cost of the lie, appar-
ently, for in retirement he said
that "the lie we told about the
U-2" wag his "greatest regret."
Thirteen years after the U-2
was shot down, the trust the
United States Government once
had has been seriously eroded.
(Who would believe that cover
story today?) Disbelief and
cynicism are widespread. And
it is not unusual to hear some
of the more cynical among us
argue that lying and deception
are ncithing to .get upset about.
After all, as I was told recently
while debating some under-
graduates who were seven years
old at the time of the U-2 inci-
dent and who view their Govern-
ment with appalling cynicism,
"Everybody in the Government
lies, so -why get excited?"
Astounding, that one should
even have to defend the propo-
sition that our Government
should not lie to us. Yet it has
become' necessary to make the
case. Anthony Lake, who re-
Signed as Henery .Kissinger's
assistant after the -1970 Cam-
bodian "incursion" *(and who
recently learned that, while
Working for Kissinger, he was
having his home telephone
tapped for "national security
reasons") has written: "The es-
sential first step is for the Gov-
ernment to realize that it can-
not lead the public .whild mis-
leading it."
"The Politics of Lying" is
thus a title and theme of great
promise. Major national issues
transcending partisan politics
are at stake. The Government
is using its power to classify
material, as David Wise ?tor-
rectly puts it, in order "tb de-
prive the American people of
vital information." The system
that has grown up, he adds,
"has played a significant role
in the general expansion of
Presidential power" since World
War II, and he conclude that
"the Government's capacity to
distort information in order to
preserve its own political
Power is almost limitless."
Unfortunately, Mr. Wise's
book is not equal to the am-
bitious task he has set out to
accomplish. It never lives tip to
the promise of its title. Anec-
dote follows anecdote to shock
or amuse the reader; but they
do not form a coherent picture
of why and when the Govern-
ment chooses to lie; what it
gains or loses by lying; and
when and why the Hart get
away with it. The complex
reasons that lead official' tito
public deception are not ex-
plored here.
The extraordinary irony of
the way in which public lying
creates self-deception within
the executive branch (and the
great costs of such self-decep-
tion) is overlooked entirely.
Instead, one finds a collection
Of 'stories, some old, some new,
some borrowed all designed
to convince the readtr of what
Wise himself says the reader,
already knows: the Government,
lies a lot. We want more than!
The whys and hows of lying,.
as well as its 'real costs, are
only glimpsed through the 'un-
even aneedotage of ? this book.
As for solutions, we can all
agree with Mr. Wise that "the
only 'solution' to 'Government
lying is to tell the truth," but
.his recommendations are both
brief and unrealistic. (To sug-
gest, fir example, that all
classified documents should be-
come public after three years
unless the President personally
keeps them classified is simply
not workable.)
Too much of "The Politics of
Lying" is devoted to a compen-
dium Of essentially minor com-
plaints about the treatment of
the press by the' White House.
It is a shame, because Mr. Wise
is addressing one of the major
problems of our times, one that
is far deeper than the "credibil-
ity gap." There seems little
.likelihood of it diminishing,
eitlitr, despite the hopeful state-
ment with which the Presi-
dent's Communications Direc-
tor, Herb Klein, ushered in the
Age of Nixon in November,
INS: "Truth will be the hall-
mark of the Nixon Administra-
tion. . . . We feel that we will
be able to eliminate any possi-
bility of a credibility gap in this
Administration."
Credibility gap. The very
phrase,, V.,hich entered our vo-
cabulary only a few years ago,
both identifies a colossal prob-
lem for every administration,
and obscures the even more
important question of why
Presidents, other . politicians,
and bureaucrats lie. Take Water-
gate, for example?a classic
and staggering case of lying,
apparently at every level of the
Government. But why? Mr.
Wise's book (which ? was fin-
ished before the more recent
spectacular events) does not
provide us with many clues.
But in the Watergate tragedy,
lying must be viewed as the
public front edge of a much
larger failure?.a failure on the
part of our leaders to believe
in, and live by, the democratic
principles on which our nation
is supposedly based.
The evidence relentlessly
emerging supports this gloomy
assessment; our leaders lied
publicly because they were act-
ing in an anti-democratic man-
ner privately. In the brilliant
perception of columnist Stewart
Alsop, ? they were using the
techniques of war, not politics.
And when their private (and
illegal) action began to emerge
they had no recourse 'but to
lie as a defense.
The credibility gap, then,
? may. be viewed in a somewhat
different way. The Government
this, but it is not here.
'32
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a
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has lost the confidence of many
Americans because it lies; it
lies because it has lost con-
fidence in the values of a gen-
uinely open and democratic
society. Secrecy?a product of
fear and a perennial sanctuary
for insecure people?is the in-
evitable first step in such a
process. Lying, under pressure
and probing from 'outsiders
(usually the press and Con-
gress), is, equally inevitably,
the next step. The circle is
vicious. Or, to use an image
North Vietnamese Prime Minis-
ter Phan van Dong fised 11
years ago in predicting our
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE ICNITOR
26 June 1973
Vietnam nightmare, it is really
a descending spiral.
Much of the deception is
done in the name of "national
security" a traditional and
usually successful justification.
Over the last 28 years, and
growing out of a legitimate
need in World War II and the
cold war to protect sensitive
information, the national secur-
ity umbrella has been expanded
continually. Perhaps?but only
perhaps?it reached its apogee
on May 22, 1973 when the
President of the United States
invoked the national security
rationale to explain and excuse
a series of admittedly illegal
acts taken by members of the
? White House staff?the now
famous plumbers?against Am-
erican citizens.
In times like these, what we
need is a relentless analysis of
what leads politicians and of-
ficials to "lie" in order to sur-
vive, what is behind the de-
ception, and what can be done
to reduce it?if anything. "The
Politics of Lying" is a title that
deserves a better book. LI
Richard IIolbrooke is man-
aging editor of Foreign Policy..
Arab edigor comments on Nixon, Brezhnev:
gate *ts effectiveness in
By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Beirut, Lebanon
A leading Arab commentator says
that Watergate and Soviet policy have
, made it impossible for President
Nixon and Soviet Communist Party
leader Leonid I. Brezhnev to deal
effectively with the Middle East
crisis.
Muhammad Haykal, chief editor of
the Cairo Daily Ai-Ahmm, bitterly
criticized the Soviet Union in a com-
mentary published June 22. He ac-
cused Moscow of cutting its' aid to the
Arabs in half, while the U.S. doubled
its own help to Israel.
Though its terms are more dra-
matic than most other Arab reactions
to the Nixon-Brezhnev, summit, Mr.
Haykal's article reflects the growing
Arab disenchantment with Moscow.
? Ealier a Kuwait newspaper, Al-
Siyassa, expressed this by caning on
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab
oil states to cut down their depen-
dence on both the U.S. and the
Soviet Union for aid and oil markets,
and take the solution of the conflict
with Israel into their own hands.
A Lebanese writer, Clovis Mak-
soud, reported from Washington in
the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar that
Zionist quarters in the United States
were conducting a powerful cam-
paign to "submerge" the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit in the issue of
Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel. '
In his article, Mr. Haykal said
, Watergate had reduced the ability of
'the White House to deal with the
Mideast by strengthening the hand of
the U.S. Congress, where Watergate
had left Israel's supporters even
stronger than before.
This may have ended all plans for a
Mideast policymaking role by Henry
Kissinger who even before Watergate
had been reluctant to attack the
Mideast issue, Mr. Haykal added.
Kissinger described
(In an article in the lastest issue of
the Beirut quarterly magazine, Jour-
nal of Palestine Studies, U.S. political
scientist and Mideast expert Malcolm
Kerr writes that "Kissinger has
shown no great interest in Middle
Eastern problems in the past."
(". . . even if Nixon as a second-
term President cared nothingJor his
party's loss of electoral favor, the
heat and anger of public debate that a
get-tough policy toward Israel would
surely generate and the prospect of
revolt from a Democratic Congress
. . are bound to make him wonder
whether he could even control, let
alone justify, a controversial Middle
East policy, "Dr. Kerr writes.
("What would he plan to do if
Congress suddenly seized the in-
itiative over his veto and voted for
new arms shipments to Israel, accom-
. panied by a resolution endorsing her
bargaining position?" Dr. Kerr asks.)
Soviet position 'neutralized'
Mr. Haykal contends in his article
east
that while the United States knows
what it wants in the Middle East, the
Soviet Union does not.
Israel, he says, has "neutralized"
' the Soviet position in the Mideast. If
U.S. support to Israel in the past was
"100 percent, it is now 200 percent,"
Mille if Soviet backing for the Arabs
"was only 50 percent in the past, at
present it is 25 percent."
What Moscow does not want, Mr.
Haykal says, is another Arab defeat
that would destroy residual Soviet
prestige in the Mideast. Moscow fears
to use its strength to change the power
balance, since it might dislike the
results and come into confrontation
with the United States.
Finally, says Mr. Haykal, the
U.S.S.R. does not want an "American
solution," Mr. Haykal sees American
strategy as aiming at keeping the
cease-fire and Israeli military superi-
ority; halting efforts inside and out-
side the UN for a real settlement; and
draining Egypt's strength and isolat-
ing her.
Further, writes Mr. Haykal, Wash-
ington concentrates on the Persian
Gulf area, which Mr. Haykal calls
"the potential focus of war;" deep-
ening Arab-Iranian tensions; wiping
out "revolutionary centers;" telling
the Arabs that Washington holds the
key to the Mideast problem and
offering pragmatic solutions "which
are really a way of keeping the
Mideast situation as it is, rather than
changing it."
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VOCE REPUBBLICANA, Rome
2-3 May1973
WATERGATE AND US
THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY
Frankly, it seems to us that even now, when the "Watergate
Case" concerning wiretapping in America has fully exploded, even
now when the eyes of the entire world are fixed on this new, '
dramati crack in American society, when the temptation to make
comparisons with what is going on in our own house is quite legitimate,
very few here in Italy have fully understood the profound but evident
meaning and lesson that is being imparted to us by this event.
By this it is meant that very few have had the courage--not to mention
decency--to admit that the difference between the United States and
us is this: on the one hand there is a country that is struggling
for the defense, or rather the strengthening of democracy and, on
the other hand, the country is a quagmire in which democracy is
suffocating. And the lack of awareness of this unbridgeable
difference constitutes an element--burcertainly not the only element--
of the botched democracy that we see around us whose manifestation
every day and in every domain we can only note and lament.
The most widespread sentiment which we hear expressed in all
political and public opinion sectors is, in broad terms, as follows:
political structures in America are creaking, and the !Watergate Case"
is a clear demonstration that there is no true democracy; with us,
however, things are even worse: scandals of this type, when they
do not abort, die at birth. Political corruption in the United States
exists, but it just so happens that it is denounced, even if the
"system" remains what it is; with us, corruption is just as widespread
(if not more so) but, as soon as it comes to light, it is enmeshed in
such a tangle of competing interests as to be suffocated immediately,
with the result that no one even has the satisfaction or learnjng the
details. In other words, between the two failures of true democracy,
ours is worse. From this derives, if one can so express it, a
quantitative difference of non-qualitative democracy--or lack of
democracy.
Whoever says this, either in good faith or bad, has not, so
far as we can see, grasped the true connection between what is
happening in the U.S. and what we are witnessing in Italy. Democracy
is not something that exists in the abstract and, where it does
exist, does not need continuous examination, continuous checking.
The democratic system is not for those who once they have obtained
it need no longer think about it--that holds, for example, for
dictatorships; precisely because its structure is "open" to all
components, the good and the bad, democracy requires the constant
surveillance of the society of which it is the expression. Democracy
is always imperfect, is always a tormented dialectic game, is always
running risks of involution. For this reason, Churchill's phrase is
valid, that it is a bad system but that the others are worse. But,
if its principal 'danger is that of being corrupted, its principal virtue
is that of knowing how to-correct itself.
34
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All this is so evident that the type of uninformed regurgitation
underlying almost all Italian conunents on these events on the other
side of the Atlantic seems incredible--the idea, in short, that if
things are not going well in our country, they are not going much
better in America. The truth is quite otherwise. At issue is not
corruption, which is a human activity in every political system and .
in every latitude. What is to be judged is the manner of fighting it.
And here the difference between the U.S. and Italy is unbridgeable.
Is it necessary to repeat that the American system is not only the
Administration, is not only the White House, but is rather that
particular combination of constitutional guarantees, that particular
system pf political checks and balances, that type of control and of
public opinion participation. The 'Watergate Case," after Vietnam,
after Johnson, after the Pentagon Papers, is the umpteenth confirmation
of it. What, if not "the system," has led to the dismantling of
almost the entire White House general .staff, to the removal of those .
whom public opinion had identified as being primarily responsible for
the scandal, and to the insertion of others, like Richardson,
considered "liberal"? Whence, if not out of the system, came the
courage and energy to correct the system?
Let us repeat, to consider that American society is now
politically healthy would be to close one's eyes to reality: the
scandal has revealed a profound rot reaching to Washington's
political summits. But let us recognize that we are dealing with
a democracy capable of defending and correcting itself with pitiless
determination and rigor, without fear of the "eyes of the world."
This is precisely the unique lessOn that we can draw from the event.
It would be a salutary lesson, if it were heard. But given the
conunents it has elicited in Italy, the American scandal does not
induce many hopes. Commentators have harped on the scandalous aspects--
sacrosanct, certainly--and have underrated the gigantic effort that
American society has exerted, and is exerting, to emerge from them
with justice. Of such a collective effort in Italy, one sees not even
a trace as regards our own affairs. Energies here are dedicated to
party interests, to personal benefits, to shady relationships of currents.
One navigates among scandals, still unborn or born maimed and then
asphyxiated. There is, in all strata, a sense of suffocation and
strangulation of true democracy, which has few positive turns. One
notes the spread of a fragmented, obscure, corporatized, uncontrolled
power, which is born and dies in the darkness of corridors and under-
the-table negotiations. A democracy without checks and balances is
not a democracy; it has neither the chance nor the capacity to correct
itself that is indispensable for keeping itself vital. This is the
lesson of the "Watergate Case": whoever draws other lessons from it
has not understood the always more dramatic problems of our democracy
or has understood them and'sPeaks only for the sake of convenience.
[Ill "V\iatargte? e no[i
La qualia
della democra
CI sembra francamente
the, anche ora the 11 a ca-
so Watergate a suite inter-
cettazioni telefoniche In
America 6 esploso in pie-
no. anche ora che gll oc-
chi dj tutto Ii mondo so-
no Msl su questa nuova
drammatica frattura delta
socleta americana. anche
ora the pin iegoefotIdld
tentazione di fare Confron-
ga
ti con le cose di casa no- paese che lotta per la di-
stra. ben pochi in Italia fesa (diciamo di pita: per
abblano captto appleno il 11 rafforzamento) della
senso prolondo eppure democrazia, dall'altro lato
lampante e la lezione che c'e un pantano in cui la
el vengono da questa vi- democrazia sta annegan-
cenda. VoglIamo dire che do. E la mancata consape-
ben pochi hanno ii corag- volezza di questa abissale
glo (e ii pudore) di dire diversitiii ci sembra ele-
che la differenza tra not mento non ultimo della
Far giefelekst20171 /WIT : CrAdR43107709043ER0081
ene ea una parte c e un chamo intorno a not. di
35
Cu! ()gni glorni e in ogni
campo registriamo e la-
mentiamo le mantle-
staziont.
Il sentiment? p1i diffu-
60 che 51 avverte in tutti
settori politic! e di opi-
nione 6 grosso modo il se-
guente. Le strutture pollti-
che in America scricchio-
0 0 !MON 111-7caso Watergate?
la dimostrazione palmare
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che non c'e vera demo-
crazia: ma da not va an-
the peggio: scandal' di
quest() tipo, quando non
abortiscono, muoiono ap-
pena natl. La corruzione
politica negli Stan Unitt
estste, ma capita che ven-
ga denunciata, ancho se
11 sIstema ? rimano quel-
l() che 6; da not In corru-
alone ?ltrettanto (se
non OM dllagante, ma;
appena accenna a venire
ella Ince 6 subito presa
da tale un groviglio di
interessi contrastanti ,da
essere subito soffocita.
Con il risultato di non a-
vere neanche la soddiaa-
alone di conoscerla a fon-
da. Si dice in altre pro-
Ie the, tra due mancanze
di vera democrazia, la no-
stra ?a peggiore. Ne de-
riva, Sc Cost si pue dire,
una diffcrenza quantitati-
va di democrazla to
,
di rnancanza di democra-
Ma), non qualitativa.
Chi dice ClUeStO, in buo-
na o In cattiva fede, non
cl sembra .abbla colto II
vero ness,o tra cid che sta
succcdondo negli Stall U-
nitl C cio a cul assistiamo
in Italia. La democrazia
non 6 qualcosa che esista
in astratto e, le dove est-
ste, non abbia bisogno di
una continua verifica. di
tin continuo controllo. Ii
sistema democratico non
6 tale per cut, una volta
fissato, non ci st debba
pensare pi? (ele) vale. caso-
t?F.
mai per le dittature): pro-
prio perche la sua struttu_
ra 6 -t aperta ? a tutte le
component'. le buone e
le cattive, della societa. di
cu" 6 espressione. La de-
mocrazia 6 sempre imper-
fetta, e sempre un gloco
dIalettico tormentato. cor-
re sem pro perlcoll dl invo-
luzlone. Per essa vale an-
cora la frase di Churchill
che C un sistema cattIvo,
ma che gli,altri sono peg-
giori. Ma, se II suo prin-
cipale pericolo 6 di cor-
rompers!, la sua princip-
le virtu 6 di sapersi cor-
reggere.
Tutto questo 6 talmente
evidente che appare in-
credit:111e ouella specie
di inconsapevole rigurgi-
to che 6 sotteso a quasi
tuttl I commenti Italiani
agli avvenimenti d'oltre
Atlantico: ii senso, appun-
to, che se net nostro pae-
se le cose vanno male, in
America non vanno motto
megllo. La verita 6 ben
diversa. In discussione non
6 la corruzione, che C pu-
re un'attivita umana in
("gni sistema politico
sotto ogni latitucline. CO
che va giudIcato 6 ii modo
di combatterla. E qui la
differenza tra gli, Stati U-
nit' e e abIssale.
C'e hisogno di ripetere che
ii sistema americana non
solo l'amministrazIone.
non e solo la Casa Bian-
ca, ma 6 quella partice-
lare articolazione di ga-
ranzie costituzlonali, quel
particolare sistema di
contrappesi politici, quel
tipo di controllo e di par-
tecipazione dell'opinione
PUbblica? II ? caso Water-
gate ?, dopo il Vietnam.
dopo Johnson, dopo 1
? dossler ? del Pentagon?.
no 6 l'ennesima confer=
Chi, so non II ? sistema
ha portato alio smantella-
mento di quasi tutto lo
stato maggiore della Casa
Bianca, alla estromissione
di coloro che l'opinione
pubblica aveva identificato
net principal' responsabi-
li dello scandalo e all'im-
missione di altri, come
Richardson, considerati
? liberal ?? Chi, se non
11 sistema. ha trovato II
coraggio e l'energia di
correggere ii sistema?
Ripetiamo. ritenere con
etc) che la societh ameri-
cana sia politicamente
sana, sarebbe chiudere ell
occhl di fronte alla real -
ta: lo scandalo ha rivela-
to un marcio profondo at
vertici politic! di Washing-
ton. Ma che sla una de-
mocrazia capace di difen-
dersi e correggersi con
spietata determinazione e
rigore, senza paura per
gli ? occhl del mondo ?.
questo 6 precisamente la
unica lezione che noi pos-
slam? trarre dalla vicenda.
Lezlone salutare, se
fosse ascoltata. Ma pro-
prio ii modo in cut da not
6 state commentato lo
scandalo americano non
induce a molte speranze.
Si 6 insistito sugh aspetti
scandalistici (sacrosanti,
certamente) e si 6 sotto-
valutato ii gigantesco sfor-
s0 che in socleta ameri-
cana ha compluto e corn-
pie per uscIrno second()
gliistIzIa. DI questo sforzo
collettivo da not, per le
case nostre, non at vede
neppure un latomo. Le
energie Si dedicano agli
Interessi di partito, at
tornaconti di parte, agll
intrallazzi di corrente. Si
naviga tra gli scandali,
non ancora nati o natl
monchl e asfittici. C'e, In
tuttl gli strati, un senso
di soffocamento e stran-
golamento della democra-
zia vera, che ha'ben scar-
si risvoltt positivi. Si av-
verte 11 dilagare di tin po-
tere frammentato, oscuro,
corporativizzato, senz a
control'', che nasce e
muore nel buio del coml.-
dol e del negoziati sotto-
banco. Una democrazia
scnza contrappesi non e
una democrazia: non ha
Quetta possibtlIth e capa-
cita di correggersi che 6
indispensabile per mante-
nersi vitale. Questa 6 In
lezione del ? caso Water-
gates: chi ne trae altre
non ha capito I problem'
sempre ph1 drammatici
della nostra democrazia:
o Ii ha can't' e parla solo
per comodo.
36
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WASHINGTON POST PARADE
17' June 1973
A SPECIAL JACK ANDERSON REPORT
WASHINGTON, D.C. ,
resident Nixon will know enough .
[
iaabout Leonid Brezhnev zo write a
biography when the two leaders fi-
nally sit down together at the sum-
mit. Brezhnev's health? The President
, will have a complete medical report.
Brezhnev's temperament? A detailed
psychological profile will be available.
' Brezhnev's beliefs? The President will
have transcripts of private Kremlin
. conversations.
Intimate information
Nixon even has the name of Brezh-
nev's favorite masseuse. In the privacy
of the Kremlin, Brezhnev confided to
_Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny that
he was looking forward to a rubdown
from a masseuse named Olga. Ameri-
can spies were listening when Pod-
gorny answered, with a knowing
chuckle: "Oh, ho! Olga!"
In the rarefied atmosphere of inter-
? national power politics, such intimate
inform' aiion can be a powerful bargain-
ing chip. Thick dossiers on world
leaders are compiled by the Central
Intelligence Agency, which gathers its
information by every method, from
electronic eavesdropping to routine
research.
The secret profile of Leonid Brezh-
nev, according to those who have seen
it, portrays him as an amiable, robust,
hard-drinking outdoorsman. He likes to
gossip about his colleagues in the
Kremlin, and he engages in the con-
stant bickering and backbiting that goes
on behind those Byzantine walls. His
private conversations are heavily laced
with locker-room language. He likes to
relax at a place Soviet leaders call the
"Clinic" near the Kremlin. This is the
Soviet equivalent of a private health
Club.
' The profile also contains incidents
and insights from CIA intelligence re-
ports. During the 1968 Czechoslovakian
crisis, for example, the man Brezhnev
ousted as Premier, Nikita Khrushchev,
suddenly showed up at theARPAWIAF
demanded to see his successor. Khrush-
they loudly warned that the Czech in-
vasion could turn into a disaster unless
Soviet troops were pulled out at once.
Brezhnev gruffly refused to see Khrush=
chev and ignored his advice.
A profile of Castro
The profile on Fidel Castro contains a
CIA report that the Kremlin has asked
the Cuban dictator "to try to regain
control over Latin American revolution-
ary movements" and has promised to
"pay all the costs involved."
The CIA also reported Castro's pri-
vate opinion of the Marxist regime in
Chile and its leader, President Salvador
Allende. Castro correctly predicted a
year in advance "a breakdown in pub-
lic order." This, he said, could come
about at any time because the opposi-
tion, especially the middle class, had
lost its fear of government. Castro
opined that a government must have
fear if it is to control the country.
"Another factor listed by Castro,"
continued the secret CIA report, "was
the possible deterioration of Allende's
health. Castro said he is worried about
Allende because the latter is physically
'spent.' Castro also observed that [Chil-
ean) leaders live too Well and are not
undir sufficient tension to take the
offensive."
The CIA not only keeps Communist
leaders under scrutiny; it also checks on
friendly leaders. The financial difficul-
ties of Costa Rica's respected President
Jose Figueres, for example, were quietly
relayed to Washington. The CIA quoted
a family member as complaining that
"all the members of the President's
family are deeply concerned with fam-
ily financial matters:'
The CIA also gleefully reported
an awkward confrontation between
France's President Georges Pompidou
and West Germany's Chancellor Willy
Branch a few months ago. "A heated
exchange took place after the Brandt-
Pompidou dinner," said the CIA. A
German economics official, "told Pom-
? pidou that France was profiting from
and encouraging the inflation afflicting
other European countries . . . Accord-
ing to members of Brandt's party,
Brandt stood by and visibly enjoyed
Pompidou's discomfiture. Schoel lborn.
supported his accusations with details
which Pompidou was unable to refute."
The world's two most celebrated ?
women leaders, Israel's Golda Meir and ?
India's Indira Gandhi, are reported by
the CIA to have a long-distance feud
brewing. According to the CIA account,
. Mrs. Meir regards Mrs. Gandhi as "neu-
tral ... on the side of Egypt," while Mrs.
Gandhi sees Israel as a "warmonger."
The dossiers on Arab leaders are.:
loaded with CIA tidbits. Egypt's Presi- ? ?
dent Anwar Sadat,' "when threatening .
Israel with an all-out war, was bluffing," ?
reported the CIA. Jordan's King Hussein'
threatened "to go on a ghazou" unless ?
he received more American aid. A gha- .
zou, it was explained, "is a Bedouin
, raid against neighbors for the purpose
, of looting." Syria's President Hafez-al-
Assad was portrayed by the CIA as an ?
outspoken militant who doesn't "expect
? too much from Egyptians." Assad uses
the Arabic word "Iamma" when he
speaks of war with Israel. "Lamma"
means "when" not "if," explained a
CIA report.
Spying on foreign leaders is a routine
operation, involving CIA agents in the
field and researchers at headquarters.
Reports from diplomats and military at-
tach?also go into the dossiers. If Wash-
ington suddenly wants more informa-
tion about a certain dignitary, say in
advance of a summit meeting, he be-
comes "targeted." Then the full re-
sources of the clandestine agency are
trained upon laying his life bare.
The first step in the daily spying
process is known as the "library
search." Researchers routinely clip
newspaper and magazine articles about
foreign notables and send them into the
'CIA's "Biographic Registry" computer.
As part of the "library search," field
agents are asked to fill out forms on
foreign leaders, which resemble job
applications. To the extent possible,
relatives, friends and acquaintances are
casually contacted. Information is gath-
ered helter-skelter, with rumor and fact'
carefully noted. It is left to the experts
in Washington to assemble the jigsaw
pieces and make the final distinctions.
Nothing taken for granted
Even the most rudimentary facts,
however, are not taken for granted. "In
many foreign societies, the leaders
mask their backgrounds as much as pos-
sible," a CIA man told us. "It's not like
in the 'United States where you have
everything from FBI files to job applica-
alttictivemo.p_7sonal history."
0 rscf9f6a..408iY1 La 1 Oihe CrAcRESE77-004V8
taartolnis mg amount of informa-
1 meg )onann
Baptist Schoenborn, a ?11
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tion can be picked up quite legitimately '
by America's observers overseas. For
,example, a military attache in Moscow
became great friends with the Soviet
Defense Minister during the Khrush-
chev years. While the stuffy Soviet big-
wigs would shuffle about at official re-
ceptions, the attache and minister
would toss down vodka and swap sto-
ries about their superiors.
Of course, electronic eavesdropping
is often used. In Belgium .a CIA opera-
tive learned that the Chinese Com-
munist embassy was planning to move.
He quickly located the new site and
rented the house next door. Bugs were
placed in the new embassy before the
Chinese moved in. The CIA 'picked up
an earful before the bugs were eventu-
ally discovered.
While the field operatives are poking
;into every dark corner of the subject's
life, academics back at the CIA com-
pile anthropological and sociological
data on the arra in which the subject
grew up. This is done in the CIA's
"Geographic Office." The structure of
the society, its mores and customs, are
depicted. Even the type of diet adds to
the portrait of the person.
The "Geographic Office" report on
-Mao Tse-tung, for instance, noted that
he traveled as a beggar through the
country in his youth, seeing firsthand
the poverty and corruption. This 'pro-
Joundly affected the young Mao and
helped ignite the revolutionary fire that
caused him to help fOund the Chinese
Communist Party in the early 1920's.
Today, intelligence reports confirm that
Mao is still the purest of revolutionaries.
. Medical diagnosis
The CIA also directs its agents to
dredge up all possible medical informa-
tion for the medical researchers to diag-
nose. Once, agents tapped into wash-
room pipes in one of Monte Carlo's
most glamorous casinos to get a urine
sample from the oil-rich King of Saudi
Arabia, who was rumored to be ailing.
Inside the washroom, crouched behind
a commode door, an agent waited with
an electronic signaling device. The King,
a heavy drinker and addicted gambler,
finally entered in a swirl of white robe.
The agent alerted his colleague in the
plumbing closet, and the nbzzle was
turned on the pipe tapped into the
washroom plumbing.
But the greatest coup in the annals
of. the CIA's medical espionage oc-
curred during Nikita Khrushchey's state
visit to the United States in 1959. CIA
men managed to iSolate and bore tri-
umphantly to the labs. the Soviet lead-
er's solid waste for medical analysis.
Sophisticated photographic tech-
niques arealso used to observe leaders
at long distance. Called "targets .of op-
portunity" in CIA jargon, the photos are
compared with old Ones for signs of
stress, aging and disease. A blotchy skin,
38
for example, can indicate a liver prob-.
lem.
Through long-range observation, the
CIA learned of the late Egyptian Presi-
dent Nasser's heart condition and of the
late Indonesian President Sukarno'S vis-
its to a Viennese specialist. (Surveillance
of Sukarno, incidentallY, revealed he
liked his hosts to have a woman for him
on state visits.)
Photographic evidence
Long-range photography settled a
rumor, back before the Chinese-Ameni-s*
can detente, whether Mao Tse-tung was
sick and using a double for public ap-
pearances. A photograph was taken
Mao in public. By measuring the length
of the earlobe and by determining that '
his facial wart was in exactly the right
place, the agency certified him as genu-
ine. Then by closely examining the pic-
ture, CIA analysts learned that the aging
leader was not critically ill as had been
rumored:
For all the sophisticated methods the
CIA uses to gather intelligence on
world leaders, however, nothing is
quite .as revealing as a face-to-face
meeting. More can be learned from one
tough negOtiating session than from a
10,000-page report prepared by the
CIA. For it's not the juicy tidbits So
much as the basic attitudes that matter
in the world of power politics.
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