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June 21, 1973
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS. VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 39 29 JUNE 1973 Governmental Affairs ,(9e,a7A,?7 VaL,AetaSttea-Adzi ,X2-eAL-1A,ecel,e-6 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 a. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 NEW YORK TIME3 21 JUNE 1973 HITE HOUSE DATA. AND DEUS 1FFR Vi'ATERGATE Ex-Aide Said to Have Deni,ed? Nixon Information About ; Co.verrUp Until March 21 PANEL GETS 2 VERSIONS Dean Insists Before Senate Inquiry President Knew, About the Plot Earlier: ? By DAVID E. ROSENBAILIN Special tee Thr New York Tlmea WASHINGTON, June 20?A White House account of Presi- dent Nixon's conversations this year with John W. Dean 3d charges that Mr. Dean, despite constant pressure from the President, withheld front Mr. Nixon all information about White House Involvement In the Watergate burglary and cover-up until March 21. , On the other hand, a surb- mary prepared by lawyers on the Senate/Watergate commit- tee of their interrogation of Mr. Dean last Saturday containg Mr. Dean's assertion that Mr. Nixon knew earlier about the, cover-up plot. ? Much of the evidence against the President that Mr.' Dean gave the committee staff is hearsay, according to the sum- mary. But he told of some di7.' rect '.convetsations with the President in which aspects of ithe..covor-up.. had been dig- 'Fussed, U. S.-Soviet Summitry With the Senate committee .in recess for a week, the capi- 'tat had planned to devote its 'full attenUon to the United States and Soviet summitry. But details of Mr. Dean's long interview last week have been filtering into print for. Several days, amid suggestions that ? the White House and the Senate investigators, each recognizing the importance of. Mr. Dean's testimony in public. next week, *ere trying to ishape the public's attitude toward his eventual appear- ance. Much of what was contained's inent and the ? abbre in both the White Hvg Jocu- rayed IfraitietakgkeiNMICIMIRMINMOTelg18?U19"ng: count of win Dean's testimony', had come to light previously. But there were some new or more detailed allegations by Mr. Dean, a central 'figure in the Watergate case. They in- cluded the following: 41That the President, in a' conversation with Mr. Dean last September, directed an ef- fort to block a ';Watergate investigation by a House com7' mittee and urged Mr. Dean to prepare to "take care of" re- porters unfriendly to the White House. ? (Mat Charles W. Colson, a former White House special Counsel, and John D. Ehrlich- man, the former domestic ad- viser to the President, had 'sought from Mr. Nixon permis- sion to promise executive clemency to E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the Watereate con- spirators. Mr. Dean said that he had "heard this" from Mr. Colson and later this spring had a. "discussion with the President" about the clemency offer. ? clThat Mr. Dean had been ip- structed by Mr. Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, the for- mer White House chief of staff, to enlist the aid of Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in cover- ing up the Watergate con. spiracy. Mr. Dean's account was that the White House aides said that General Walters "'owed his allegiance to the, White House," but that the C.I.A. official had declined to help. ?EIThat Mr. Nixon had told Mr. Dean that the late director; of the Federal Bureau of In-1 vestigation, J. Edgar Hoover, had advised the President that he "had been bugged" in the 1968 campaign, and that Mr. Nixon believed the White House should use the information to its advantage at some point. List of Dates Released , The White House released several days ago a list of the dates on which Mr. Dean had met with Mr. Nixon. But not until the summary sent to the Senate committee became avail- able today had there been any indication of the White House version of the substance of the discussions. Papers Made Available The White House account was submitted to the Senate committee this week. It and the summary of the investigators' intervietaw with Mr. Dean, the former White House counsel, were made availabue to The New York Times by persons with access to committee documents. The White House account was five pages long and, ac- cording to Senate sources, was prepared by J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., special counsel to the Presi, stance of 18 meetings this year between the President and Mr. Dean. ? Mr. Dean And White House spokesman have agreed that there were more than 35 dis- cussions between President Nixon and his former counsel between late January and April of this year, some face-to-face, and others by telephone. Met Almost Daily From March 1 until March 23, according to the account, the President and Mr. Dean met about the Watergate affair al- most daily: In answer to questions from the President, Mr. Dean said time and again at the early meetings that there was no White House involvement in the purglary or the cover-up, the account states. But it says that Mr. .Nixon was told by Mr. Dean on March 13 that Gordon C. Strachan, then the top as: srstant to H. II. Haldeman, %lite House chief of . staff, "could be involved." 'Pe was not until March '21; the account states, that Mr. De4p "gave the President his t.170iry of what happened." 11,ffi3 told the President "that Magruder probably knew, that Mitchell possibly knew, that Strathan probably knew, that Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of the wiretaps through Strachan. that Ehrlich- man was vulnerable because of his approval of Kalmbach's funr-raising efforts, the docu- ment states. uz711,?ers Got Summary T mate committee- sum-, mar Kr. Dean's private tes- timony ? reducing his 51,4 hours of testimony last Satur- day to seven sparse and tan- talizingly vague pages of alle- gations ? was prepared by a junior staff n member and dis4 tributed to he seven commit- tee members on Monday by Samuel DCM, the chief coun- sel. ? The summary presented a vivid picture of widespread at- tempts within ?? . the ?. upper reaches of the White' House and the Committee for the Re- election of the President to cover up the magnitude of the Watergate, ease. Mr. Dean accused H. R. Hal- deman, the former White House chief of staff, of having or- dered the destruction of infor- mation obtained from the Watergate wiretap, of having Joined in planning efforts to obtain White House influence over the Republican members of the Senate investigating committee and of attempting to persuade John N. Mitchell, the former campaign director and Attorney General, to "take the heat" off other officials by assuming the blame for the Watergate break-in. Mr. Dean, according to the summary, alleged that John D. Ehrlichman, the former Presi-1 ential adviser on domestic mat- ters, had put preseure on Mr.1 Dean to "lean on" Lieut. Gen.1 Vernon A. Walters, the deputy! director of the Central Intel-1 agency in a cover-up. Accordng to the summary, IGeneral Walters "said it. would be a bad idea," but Mr. Ehrlich- man was "dissatisfied" when Mr. Dean reported the intel- ligence official's reluctance to .help. Linked to Meeting Futhermore, Mr. Dean said that Mr. Ehrlichman had in structed ?him to throw ,wire- tapping equipment "in Ethel river" after the material had been discovered In the White' House safe of E. Hoard Hunt' Jr., one of the Watergate con-, spirators. Mr. Dean was said to have linked Mr. Ehrlichman to al meeting on Feb. 10 this year at which the plans to try to under-- :mine the Senate investigations were discussed. ? Mr. Dean, according to th& isummary, is prepared to testify; to the full Senate committee) when he appears before it nextl week that Mr. Mitchell admit- ted approving the plans to bug the Democratic headquarters but said that he believed at the time that more care would be taken to assure that the par- ticipants could not be traced to the President's campaign committee. The summary contains the most serious allegations to date that Charles W. Colson, the former special counsel to the President, was involved in the Watergate conspiracy. Accord- ing to Mr. Dean's account, Mr. Colson had pressed for approv- al of the bugging plan drafted by -G. Gordon Liddy, one of the Watergate conspirators. In addition, Mr. Dean was said to have told the Senate investigators that Mr. Colson was deeply involved in nego- tiations at the White House to arrange executive clemency for Hunt and to provide $122,000 demanded by Hunt in return for silence about Watergate. Mr. Colson has insisted that he was not involved either in' the conspiracy or the attempt-1 ed cover-up. Mr. dean was said to have told the committee that he had tape recordings of a conversation in which Mr. Colson and Hunt discussed the demand for hush money. The summary of Mr. Dean's testimony also related alleged involvement by Robert C. Mardian?the former Assistant Attorney General and political counselor to the campaign committee ? in the cover-up. Mr. Dean contended that Mr.. Mardian had gone to Mr. Dean's White House office, along with lawyers for the re- election committee, to read confidential F.B.I. summaries of interrogations of White House and campaign officials. Criticism of Gray Cited Mr. Dean also said, accord- ing to the summary, that Mr. Mardian had voiced criticism of the former acting F.B.I. di- rector, L. Patrick Gray 3d, for "pushing too hard" with the Watergate investigation last .year. Mr. Dean attributedto Mr. Mardian the suggestion that the White House try to .get the Central Intelligence Agency to cooperate in a ,cover-up. , ' The Dean summary made other allegations, including the 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 Mat Lawrence F. O'Brien, then the Democratic party chairman, had been the subject , of investigation by the White' !House as early as 1970. ()That John J. Caulfield, a 'former White House and Trea- tsury Department official who has told the Senate committee he helped to set up a private Intelligence-gathering ? unit for the White House, had directed a "survey" in early 1972 of the Presidential primary campaign of Representative Paul N. Mc.; Closkey Jr., a California Repub.' lican who unsuccessfully chal- lenged Mr. Nixon in New Hamp- shire. ? . ilThat Richard A. Moore, a special counsel to the Presi-t dent, had been involved in un- successful efforts in February to persuade Mr. Mitchell to raise money for the defendants in the Watergate trial. The summary also said that Mr.' Moore .had been permitted to read the summaries of F.B.I. interviews in the Watergate case. . Details of Mr. Dean's private ,conversations with the Senate ,committee staff have been leak- ing Into print since Monday, when the committee agreed to postpone its public hearings for one week. NEW YORK TINES 27 JUNE 1973 Data Burned at Dump May Have Been Hunt's ? WASHINGTON, June 26 (UPI)?Eight cartons of doc- uments from the office of E. Howard Hunt Jr. may have been locked in the trunk of a Junked car for six months and then burned at a city dump, a Watergate witness told United Press Interna- tional today. Roy H. Sheppard, who op- erates a Washington-based delivery service, said that a woman he now believed was Hunt's wife. Dorothy, got in touch with him shortly after,. the Watergate break-in. He said that the woman , 'paid him "$500 in $100 bills' to keep the cartons in tran- sit." ? ? He locked them in the , trunk of a junked 1963 Plym- outh he kept at his home in . nearby Alexandria, Va., Mr. Sheppard said. He did not open the cartons until No- vember, 1972. . "When no one asked about .them," he said, he took them to the incinerator, "slit them . open with my knife and dumped them into the incin- erator chute." C HR ISTI AN SCIENCE lvDNITOR 22 June 1973 aterg te ? I oser: trial , y,thtruy Versions in conflict over Nixon's role By Richard L. Strout Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington Two widely conflicting and semi- official versions of President Nixon's relations to the Watergate cover-up now have emerged. They are condensations by the staff of Sen. Sam J. Ervin's committee of pre-hearing evidence, the first frotri the White House and prepared by J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., special counsel of Mr. Nixon, and the second by John W. Dean HI, former presidential counsel, based on sworn testimony which he gave the committee in executive session. The White House version presents Mr. Nixon as repeatedly asking Mr. Dean, since late February, about Watergate and repeatedly being told, until March 21, that the White House was not involved. ? The second, from Mr. Dean, postu- lates that several of the top staff at the White House knew of the progress of the unsuccessful cover-up. It also offers new, behind-the-scenes, details like blocking a proposed House com- mittee inquiry, and a reported charge? by J. Edgar "Hoover, late FBI head, that Democrats bugged Republicans in 1968. Much of the Dean testimony, sum- marized by the Ervin staff, rests on hearsay. In turn, White House spokesmen say they do not vouch for the ac- curacy of the condensation of their versions of an analysis of Nixon-Dean talks, prepared by the Ervin com- mittee. The text of the two Ervin committee summaries was made available to the press in piecemeal form while the committee is in recess during the visit of Soviet Secretary-General Leonid I. ? .Brezhnev. _ Like it or not, Washington agrees that the trial-by-publicity is going on, despite absence of formal hearings, and that the issue is historically unique, whether President Nixon did, or did not, have knowlege of the illegal Washington cover-up attempt. Dean called 'turncoat Without waiting for formal con- frontation, partisans are talc lug sides; Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R) of Pcrui:,.. IvaitLA, for example, branding ousted White House counsel Dean as a "turncoat" and "embez- zler," Mr. Dean, through his lawyer, has refused to give further preliminary executive-session testimony until the public hearings. In a separate development, the staff of Archibald Cox, special prosecutor In the Watergate case, reportedly is considering calling a new grand jury. This would hear allegations that the Nixon election organization used ille- gal pressure to force corporations with issues pending before the gov- ernment, to contribute to campaign ?funds. Funds ultimately reached more than $50 millions. Primary attention centers here on the contrast between the summary of the Dean testimony, and the analysis of the Nixon-Dean talks coming from the White House. Approach differs These clash chronologically at a few points. But the big difference is the approach: Throughout the Dean version is the basic assumption that knowledge of the cover-up attempt was wide- spread in the White House. is Throughout the White House analysis is the assumption that Mr. -Dean was keeping the truth from President Nixon, and that the latter was innocent of the cover-up. The two accounts do not really meet because they are interpretations of different matters; but they proceed on postulates which get to the heart of the issue on which Mr. Nixon's cred- ibility may ultimately rest. The White House analysis is based on the log kept on meetings and telephone conversations between Mr. Nixon and his then counsel. There was one meeting on Sept. 15 last year, and 37 meetings or phone calls since late February. ? The White House repeatedly presents Mr. Nixon as asking Mr. Dean about Watergate, and the latter assuring the President that the White ,House wasn't involved. Point withdrawn How far afield these two were is Indicated in a matter not discussed in the new chronology: Mr. Nixon told the nation, for example, that Mr. Dean had submitted a written report clearing the White House on Water- gate. Mr. Dean denied submitting such a report, and the White House withdrew the point. In the White House version of affairs (as condensed by the Ervin staff) there are repeated entries "the President asked Dean point-blank" (about Watergate) and was told no White House involvement; the Presi- dent called Dean that night (March 20) and "Dean said 'There was not a scintilla of evidence' "of White House complicity. 25681=========iganome Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 26, /973 'tift Ci;s4"ii*d?ro& -Posr rt ecounts By David S. Broder Weehinaton Poet Staff Writer In his Senate testimony yesterday, former presiden- tial counsel John W. Dean III drew a picture of a pre- election White House neu- rotically concerned with the presence of anti-Nixon dem-. onstrators and morbidly fas- cinated with gossip and in- 6 telligence about the Dem- ocratic opposition. Others who worked there .and In the Nixon campaign said In interviews yesterday that Dean's description matched" their own recollec- tions. But Patrick J. Buchanan, then and now a consultant to the President, said there had been "a real diminution of concern" by the time of which Dean was speaking, compared to the atmosphere in 1969 and early 1970. "I don't think there was paranoia," Buchanan said. Dean did not use the word "paranoia" in his testimony, but he told the Senate Watergate investigators that he found "a climate of ex- cessive concern over the pce Mimi. impact of demonstra- tors, excessive concern over leAks, an insatiable appetite for political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House staff, regard- less of the law." Dean called the break-in at Democratic headquarters? an "inevitable outgrowth" of this climate, and said it was also responsible for such ae- tions as: ? A threat by former pres-. Idential aide Dwight Chapin "to get some 'thugs' to re- move" a single demonstra- tor the President had spot- ted in Lafayette Park. ?An order by the Presi- dent, using "some rather blunt synonyms," for the Se- cret Service to remove a group of demonstrators in Akron, and a request from the President, just last March, for a speech to be drafted showing that "his opponents had employed demonstrators against him in his re-election campaign." ? A" all from Richard G. Kleindienst, then deputy at- torney general, instructing c Dean to carry from the FBI to the White House "some very important information" of a "rather sensitive nature . . . regarding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Ko- pechne," the young woman killed in an auto accident In- volving Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.). ? The dispatch from the White House to Chappaquid- dick Island, site of that cv? dent, of special inves Anthony Ulasewicz, who, Dean said John Caulfield told him, was on the scene "within six hours of the ac-. c en " and posed as a re- porter to dig out informa- tion on the case. . ? A proposal from presi- dential aide H.R. (Bob) Haldeman; rejected as too dangerous, that Kennedy be kept under surveillance 24 hours a day. ? A special investigation, of Kennedy's activities dur- ing a .24-hour stopover in Hawaii on a 1971 Far East- ern trip. ? And the delivery, dur- ing the spring of 1972, by "a top man at the Secret Serv- ice" of information regard? ing Democratic presidential contender George McGov- ern, which then White House aide Charles Colson "was very interested" in and "had ... published." White House press secre- tary Ronald Ziegler de- clined to commentS on Dean's testimony and most others mentioned by Dean were unavailable to report- ers. Jack Warner, a spokesman for the Secret Service, said it had begun an internal in- vestigation of the charges that Secret Service agent protecting McGovern were reporting back to the White ?House, at the time those charges first appeared, last November, in The New York Times. Neither then or later, he said, "have we found any- thing to bear out these elle- gations. Our investigation is continuing." Colson, in a separate in- terview, acknowledged re, ceiving the report from Dean but said he had -not ,been able to get it pub- lished, "because no one .could ever check it out." He 'saki the report concerned "a fund-raising affair McGov- ern attended in Philadel- phia, where the fellow in charge had a questionable background." Colson said Dean "just walked in with it, and never said where it came from. It's very characteristic of what Dean did throughout his tes- timony yesterday?laid off his own sins on others, and did it cleverly." Colson said he had been interviewed about the case by the Secret Service and had told them the same thing. Asked if he now be- lieved the report came from' the Secret Service, Colson said, "Well, Dean said it was from the SecretService, and the& ova *alp hite House Kennedy's press secretary, Richard Drayne, said the senator was unaware of any White House surveillance, or of the activities of Ula- sewicz at Chappaquiddick. Drayne said Kennedy told him yesterday he knew nothing of any foreign trav- els by Miss Kopechne nor of any reason why his visit to Hawaii should have been, of White House interest. The report to the White House on Kennedy's visit to Honolulu on Aug. 17, 1971, submitted by Dean to the Senate committee, is very bland. It said Kennedy held an airport press conference, left with two friends and made no public appearances except for a tennis game. "Discreet inquiry deter: mind that Kennedy used the estate (where he was staying) solely for sleeping purposes, took only his, breakfast meal at that loca- tion and quietly :visited friends at other locations on the island . . . An extensive survey of hotels, discreet cocktail lounges and other hideaways was conducted with a view towards deter- mining a covert EMK (Kennedy) visit. The results were negative," the report said. In his statement yester- day, Dean said that "it was not until I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I fully realized the' strong feelings that the President and his staff had toward antiwar demonstra- tors?and demonstrators in general." He said the White House continually sought informa- tion that would discredit the ,demonstration leaders, show that they were backed "by some foreign enemy" or had ties to some "major political figures, specifically members of the U.S. Senate, who op- posed the President's war policies." Dean said that in the late winter of 1971 "the Presi- dent happened to look out the windows of the resi- dence of the White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched out in front of Lafayette Park." He said Larry Higby, a Haldeman aide, "called me 'to his office to tell me of the President's displeasure . . . and told me that Mr. ,Haldeman said the sign had to come down." Leaving Higby's office, he met Chapin, "who said that he was going to get some 'thugs' to remove that man 08/CirFattaMDF'17404:1 with help from the Secret Service and the Park pollee,. 'persuaded the man to move, 'to the back side of the park,' "out of sight from the White 'House," Haldeman, he said, "was .delighted." Only three months ago, he said, Mr. Nixon himself told him that "as a part of the planned counter-offensive ,for dealing with the Senate Watergate investigation, the President wanted to show that his opponents ' had employed demonstrators ,against him during his re- election campaign." The problem, said Dean, was that "we never found a scintilla of viable evidence indicating that these demon- strators were part of a mas- ter plan . . . funded by the Democratic political funds, nor that they had any direct ,connection with the Mc- Govern campaign." For that reason, he said, William Ba- roody was never able to write the speech the ,Presi- dent wanted on the subject. "This was explained to Mr. Haldeman," Dean said, "but the President believed that the opposite was true." Dean's view of a White House neurotically preoccu- pied with the4hreat of dem- onstrators was contradicted by Buchanan, who had been a close adviser to Mr. Nixon . for the past seven years. "There was a great deal more apprehension here in 1969 and at the time of Cam- bodia and Kent State," he said, "than in any subse? quent period. By the time we were moving into the campaign?and certainly at- ter the May. Day demonstra- tions in 1971?there was a real diminution of concern. For one thing, every time a. demonstration occurred, it was politically helpful." Dean's Statement to the committee yesterday dif- fered in tone from his de- scription of the same situa- tion in a reports he com- posed last March, before his forced resignation from the White House. That March statement was also enterea In evidence yesterday. In both statements, Dean referred to White House dis- satisfaction with intelli- gence reports on the demon- strators. In March he said that "when Haldeman would read the reports regarding demonstrations be would ? and rightly so ? express continual dissatisfaction." 12R0001.0041/000t1'e7 evidence t)rovift said he dissuaded him and, would appear that the dem- 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 ' onstrations were well-or- chestrated' and well-fi- nanced," he wrote then, "no one could ever find hard in- formation as to who was be. hind it and what motivation might exist, other than the obvious antiwar theme." Back in Mardi, he sug- gested two reasons why the President might be rightly concerned with the demon- stration problem: "First," he sold, "it made the atmos- phere of public opinion much more difficult for the President to negotiate an honorable peace in Vietnam, and, secondly, when the gov- ernment dealt firmly with the demonstrators, we would be charged with op- pressive tactics even though the demonstrators ? were seeking to tie the govern- ment into, knots." Interviews with three for- mer White House and cam- paign aides, on the other hand, iwought support for the view of a White House ,preoccupation with security ,and polilieal espionage, which Dean described yes- terday. One former campaign aide said Dean's testimony yesterday "rang very true. We all learned that what pleased them most was a tidbit hey could pass on to -Haldeman. That would get ? you rewards. Every one of us felt the need to supply that kind of information." He recalled that hs far back its.. Mr. Nixon's 1962 . campaign for Governor of California, Haldeman, who was then the campaign man- ager and others "were so desperately afraid of letting .Nixon see any hostile dem- onstrators that we had to or- ganize groups of kids to . lock arms and keep them away." A second man, a former White House official, said, "It all goes back to his (Mr. Nixon's) problem with hav- ing the unexpected happen. 'It's part and parcel of that. His staff learns to go to any 'length to protect him from something for which he is not prepared." A third man, now also re- tired from the White House, said "I never got the feeling that Nixon himself or the lop staff guys?the ones at ? the 7:30 meeting ? were ,that upset with the demon- strators. "But I always had the feeling that the reaction ac- celerated , as it went down the chain of command, and frequently by the time it hit the third or fourth guy, it was completely out of con- 'trot. There was a lot of it with the guys who worked for Haldeman. Colson, Chip pin and tl..e deep-down un- derlings of (John) Ehrlich- man ? Boy Scout stuff." NEW YORK TIMES 26 JUNE 1973 Ex-Counsel Also Names White House Assist ants ;REcAus wARNING Declares He Told the President Episode Was 'a Cancer' h By JAMES M. NAUGHTON ? ? Special to The New York TImes WASHINGTON, June 25 John W. Dean 3d, asserting that President Nixon had failed' to heed a warning that the Watergate case was '"a cancer growing on the Presidency," ? testified today that the Presi- dent had taken part in the Watergate cover-up for as long as eight months. Mr. Dean, the dismissed White House legal counsel, told 'the Senate's investigating com- mittee that he still clung to a belief that Mr. Nixon "did not realize or appreciate at any time the implications of his in- volvement." Nonetheless, in a day-long, matter-of-fact recitation of Mr. Dean's own involvement in the Watergate cover-up and in 47 documents that he submitted to the Senate committee, he de- scribed a widespread effort to mask the extent of the con- spiracy that he said spread from the White House staff, the Committee for the Re-election of the President; the Depart- ment of Justice and, ultimately, to the oval office of the White House. 245-Page Account His head bowed as he read calmly from a 245-page pre- pared account, Mr. Dean pub- licly detailed for the first time the following allegations of Mr. Nixon's own involvement: oriThe President complimented him last September for having' helped to assure that the Gov- ernment's investigation of the Watergate case "had stopped with [G. Gordon] Liddy," One of the convicted Watergate conspirators. (11n February, the President asked him to report directly to Mr. Nixon on what he learned of the continuing investiga- tions because H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, the two senior domestic aides to the President, "were principals In the matter," and also meet- ing with Mr. Dean was taking up too much of their time. 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 ? gThe President discussed with him on March 13 the de- mands by the Watergate con- spirators for large sums of money to maintain their silence and that when Mr. Dean told. him it could cost more than $1-million, Mr. Nixon "told me that was no problem." liThe President had told him of discussions early this year with Mr. Ehrlichman and Charles W. Colson, a former Special counsel to the Presi- dent, about a promise to grant executive clemency to E. How- ard Hunt Jr., another of the Watergate defendants. liThe President directed that the Administration try to cur- tail the Senate investigation and block an attempted in- quiry into Watergate by the House Banking and Currency Committee last September. The President also ordered aides to make sure that L. Patrick Gray 3d, the former acting director of the Federal Bureau of In- vestigation, would be "pulled up short" in his testimony last spring to the Senate Judiciary Committee. tlAt? one point, in a meeting on March 21, the President discussed with his aides the possibility that the cover-up might be kept secret if John N. Mitchell, the former Attorney General and director of Mr. Nixon's re-election campaign, could be persuaded to assume publicly responsibility for the burglary and wiretapping of the Democratic headquarters at Watergate a year ago. tlAfter he (Dean) had re- solved to try to "end the mess without mortally wounding the President" by giving informa- tion to Government prosecu- tors, the President apparently tape recorded an April 15 meet- ing with him and asked a num- ber of "leading questions" in an evident effort to create a record that would "protect himself." filThe President tried to get him, in a "tense conversation" on April 16, to sign two letters of resignation that tended to Incriminate Mr. Dean, but he "looked the President squarely in the eyes and told him I would not sign the letters" or become a "White House scape- goat." On Stand 2 More Days Mr. Dean's recital to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activi- ties consumed the entire hear- ing today. Members of the com- mittee will interrogate him to- morrow and Wednesday and they plan to call Mr. Mitchell as the next witness on Thurs- day. Mr. Dean did not provide any firsthand information to link the President to prior knowl- edge of the Watergate burglary and the arrests of five men inside the Democratic National Committee offices. But he told. . in a fourth-hand account, of having been advised in Febru- ary that Mr. Haldeman had "cleared" with the President Liddy's $250,000 master plan to gather information on the Dem- ocratic opposition in the 1972 campaign. Furthermore, he said he was told last Nov. 15 by Mr. Halde- man and Mr. Ehrlichman that Mr. Nixon had decided he must obtain the resignation of Dwight L. Chapin, the former White House apopintments secretary, because of Mr. Chapin's in- volvement with Donald H. Se- gretti, the alleged director of a broad campaign of sabotage of Democratic Presidential candi- dacies. Reports Burglary Order The former White House counsel said that another aide to Mr. Ni::on, Egil Krogh Jr., had told him on March 29 that the authority for a September, 1971, burglary of the office of a psychiatrist treating Dr, Dan- iel Ellsberg had come "right out of the oval office," Mr. Dean's account was the first before the Senate com- mittee to accuse Mr. Nixon cat- egorically of involvement in the cover-up. He sat alone at the witness table, his wife, Maureen, and his lawyers seated one row behind him, to dramatize what he had said last week was the loneliness of his plight in making accusations about the President. He acknowledged to the committee?before which he appeared only after obtaining a grant of partial immunity from prostcution?that he had been involved himself in "obstruct- ing justice," arranging for "per- jured testimony" and in making personal use of $4,850 of cam- paign funds. As he began his appearance before the Senators, Mr. Dean said that he hoped that when all the facts were known "the President is forgiven." He apol- ogized for havin gto describe illegal acts of "friends" and of indidivuals he said he admired, !but he went on to recount, calmly, without passion and in ;narrative form, the involvement of several score Government and campaign officials in the Watergate case. According to Mr. Dean's tes- timony, the effort of the Nixon Administration to limit the in- vestigation of the Watergate break-in to those immediately arrested and to cover up any involvement of White House of- ficials in surveillance op- erations against the Democrat- ic National Committee and Democratic Presidential candi- dates began within two days of the June 17 break-in. Furthermore, as Mr. dean described a succession of meet- ings, the cover-up involved all those whose names have so far figured in the accounts that have dribbled out of testimony before the grand jury and in interviews with Federal prose- cutors, staff lawyers of the Senate select committee and prior testimony before that Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 ? committee. In his testimony today, Mr. Dean implicated in the cover- up Mr, Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlich- man, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Stans, Mr. Colson; Mr. Gray, Mr. Mae- dian, Mr. Petersen, Mr. Kalm- bach and a host of other of- ficials at the White House and the Committee for the Re-elec- tion of the President. i Dean's Story , This, in brief, is the story 'Mr. Dean told today of the mounting efforts, at times ap- proaching the frenetic, to pre- vent the Investigation of the Watergate episode from engulf& lag the White House: Landing in San Francisco on June 18, 1972, from Manila, Mr. Dean said, he learned of, the break-in in a call from Fred Fielding, his assistant, and im- mediately departed for Wash- ington. 1 He said that on Monday, the 19th, he had a succession of meetings and telephone con- versations with Jack Caulfield, then with the Treasury; Jeb 1Stuart Magruder deputy di- ;rector of the reelection com- mittee, who volunteered that th whole think was "all Liddy's fault:" Mr. Ehrlichman, who. told him to find out what he could; Mr. Strachan and Mr. Colson, the latter assuring him that he had "no involvement In the matter whatsoever" but expressing concern about "the contents" in the safe of E. Howard Hunt Jr.; G. Gordon Liddy, who said Mr. Magruder "had pushed him into doing it" And apologized for his men be- ing caught, and Attorney Gen- 'eral Kleindienst, who said the F.B.I. and the District of Co- lumbia police were investi- gating. The most important develop- ments on that day, he related, were (1) that Mr. Strachan said to Mr. Dean that Mr. Hal- deman had instructed him to winnow the Haldeman files of "damaging materials" such as; "Wirefax information from thei DNX" and destroy them, and (2) that Mr. Ehrlichman ordered Mr. Dean to "call Liddy to have him tell Hunt to get out of the country." and also to remove the contents of Hunt's safe.. At Mitchell's Place On the evening of the 19th or 20th, Mr. Dean said, he went to Mr. Mitchell's apartment. Mr. Mardian and Mr. Magruder were there, and Mr. Dean te- called only that there was a discussion of "how to handle the matter from a public rela- tions standpoint." At a meeting with Mr. Klein- dienst?Mr. Dean could not remember whether it iwas the 19th or the 20th?he said, "I told him that I did not know if the President was involved, but I was concerned" because if the investigation led to the. White House "the chances of re-electing the President would be severely damaged." , At this point, Mr. Dean re- lated, Mr. Kleindienst sent for 1Mr. Petersen and left the two 1 men together. "I told him 1 hadmibli,W. p where this thing mijaff 'ea,' Mr. Dean said, "lout I told him I didn't think the White House could withstand a wide-open investigation [and] I had rea- son?without being specific with him to suspect the worst." ? At mid-morning of June 20, he said, men from the Govern- ment Services Administration who had opened Hunt's safe brought the contents to him. He said the contents included a hand 'gun; a large briefcase containing electronic equip- ment; a large batch of classi- lied State Department cables from the early years of the Vietnam war, a "bogus cable" Implicating the Kennedy Ad- ministration in the fall of the Diem regime in 1963; "a num- ber of materials relating to Daniel Ellsberg," who made the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war available to the' press; "some materials relating to an investigation Hunt had conduct- ed for Colson at Chappaquid- dick," and many memoran- dums to Mr. Colson on the per- formance of the ."plumbers unit" under Egil Krogh Jr., White House aide, that had been formed on the President's 'orders to investigate leaks., Separating Documents Mr. Dean said that, on his orders, Mr. Fielding separated out' the "politically sensitive documents" which were then placed in Mr. Dean's safe. The 'briefcase was put in a locked closet in his office, he said, and the State Department docu- ments stored in an aide's of-. 'fice pending their return to the department. Later, he said, when he re- ported to Mr. Ehrlichman on the contents of Hunt's safe, Mr. Ehrlichman told him "to shred" the bogus cable, the documents relating to Dr. Ells- berg and other politically sensi- tive material, and to "deep six" the briefcase with the electronic equipment. Then, Mr. Dean testified: "I asked him what he meant by 'deep six.' He leaned back in his chair and said, You drive across the river on your way home at night, don't you?' I said yes. He said, 'Well, when you cross over the bridge on. your way home, just toss the briefcase into the river.'" Mr. Dean said that he sug- gested to Mr. Ehrlichman that he get rid of the bugging equip- ment since he also crossed the river. "He said, no thank you," said Mr. Dean. Decided Not to Obey He said he was "very trou- bled" about Mr. Ehrlichman's instruction, and Mr. Fielding shared his feeling that it would' be "an incredible action to destroy potential evidence.". Therefore, he said, he decided not to follow the instructions. . On June 21, he stated, he met with Mr. Gray, who told him the F.B.I. had traced four 'checks totaling $89,000 con- tributed by a group of wealthy Texans to a bank in Mexico City, and a $25,000 check to Kenneth Dahlberg, a Nixon middle Western fund raiser, ickdativetteitemOn from ayne n p reas. wealthy Minneapolis business- man who had been 'a long-time backer of Senator Hubert H. ,Humphrey. The total of $114,000 had turned up in the Miami bank account of Bernard L. Barker, one of the Cubans ar- rested ? in the Watergate break- in. ' Mr. Dean said that Mr. Mit- chell and Mr. Stans were con- terned that Mr. 'Andreas not be embarrassed and were wor- ried about the four Mexican checks, possibly, he said, be- cause they might have been liegel corporate contributions. Mr. Dean said that Mr. Stens had asked Hugh W. Sloan Jr., the campaign treasurer, how the money ended up in Barker's account. Mr. Sloan had ex- plained that he had given the Checks to Liddy to cash, and Liddy had evidently "used Barker to cash them." Explaining that this money was unconnected with Water- gate, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Stans, Mr. Dean said, asked him "to see if there was any- thing the White House could do to prevent this unnecessary embarrassment." Therefore, he said, he talked to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, and at their re- quest went to see Mr. Gray on June 22. Mr. Gray, he said, had one theory that- Watergate might have been "a C.I.A. operation" because of the former C.I.A. employes: in- volved and planned to talk to agency officials about it. He also, Mr. Dean said, "expressed his awarenesS of the potential problems" for the ? administra- tion in the F.B.I. investigation. Mr. Dean said that on June 23 he reported on his confer- ence with Mr. Gray to Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and, in a meeting with Mr. Mitchell, Frederick C. LaRue, an aide to Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Mardian. It was in this meeting, he said, that he first heard discussion of "the need for money to tnke care of those who were in- Volved in the break-in." ? It was at the June 23 meet- ing, he said, following his re- port that Mr. Gray believed the C.I.A. might be involved, that Mr. Mardian suggested the C.I.A. "could take care of this entire matter if they wished." Role for C.I.A. Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean said, suggested that he explore with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich- man "having the White House contact the C.I.A. for assist- ance." By this, apparently, Mr. Mitchell meant that the agency should assume responsibility for Watergate by paying those apprehended to keep silent.. Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean testified, thought Mr. Mitchell's suggestion "a good idea" and ordered Mr. Dean to explore it with Lieut. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, the C.I.A. deputy di- rector, rather than the director, Richard Helms. WASHINGTON POST 27 June 1973 Haldeman I xpects To Clear Nixon, Self NEWYORK, June 28 (AP).? Former White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman said to- day he hopes for "the chance to tell the whole story" about , Watergate and when he does it will completely ' clear the President and himself. ? Haldeman was interviewed In Newport Beach, Calif., by CBS News. He was one of those named by another for- mer White House aide, John W. Dean III, as having knowl- edge of the plan to bug the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate, and of being involved in the subsequent cover-up of White House in- volvement. Asked if he had been watch. ing the Senate Watergate Committee hearings at which Dean Is testifying, Haldeman replied, "Sure I have," but de- clined to comment specifically It and that as the facts are, fully .known?as the truth Is completely known in the case, It will be clear, legally and clear to the American people,' that, most. Importantly, the President had ,absolutey no in- volvement in the Watergate matter in any way. shape or form and absolutely no Iri- volvement in any supposed or alleged cover-up d any mat- ters relating to the Watergate. "It will also be further equally obvious that I had no Involvement of that kind, el ther in the planning or exe cution of the Watergate or in the cover-up of the Water- gate." Asked If he thought It was a "gond thing" the hearings are being aired publiclY, Halde- man replied: "Absolutely." He added that "the impnr- on Dean's charges "except In tant thing is that they be car- the proper forum." iried in their entirety. And'. He said he expected to "Have that people judge on *the basis ' that opportunity . . . in the of the totality of the informa- next few weeks," and added: lion they get rather' than on "I have confidence that Ithe basis of any little 'hit . . . will then have the chance to on any day by any one wit: CIA-R4DPIT*0430R00011-1, ? 68014 one source." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 NEW YORK TIMES 26 JUNE 1973 Dean Says White House Put a 'Friend' in C.I.A. ? By MARJORIE HUNTER ? SOretal to The New York Ti WASHINGTON, June 25 ? John W. Dean 3d testified to- day that he had been told by a top Nixon aide that the White House had put its own "good friend" into the Central Intelli- gence Agency in order to "have some influence over ? the agency." That !'good friend," Mr. Dean told the Senate Watergate committee,' is Lieut. Gen. Ver- non A. Walters, Deputy Dir-cc tor of the C.I.A. and frequent interpreter for President Nixon on foreign trips. This latest disclosure of . alleged White House efforts to involve the C.I.A. in domestic ' activities came amid increas- ing demands by Congress for tighter control over the top secret agency. Within the last few weeks, former and present officials of the C.I.A. have trooped to Capitol Hill in unprecedented numbers to he questioned for hours at a time upon the agency's role in the Watergate affair. Out of these harings by both Senate and House committees and subcommittees have come startling revelations of C.I.A. cooperation with the White House on strictly domestic ope- rations?a field that its own charter would? seemingly rule out of bounds. And out of these hearings have come equally stunning ac- counts of While House efforts to enlist C.I.A. aid in covering up the Watergate scandals. Mr. Dean's testimony today supported earlier accounts by General Walters and other C.I.A. officials of White House efforts to get the agency to shoulder the blame for the break-in at the Democratic Na4 tional Committee headquarters In the Watergate complex last June 17. At the same time, the Dean testimony appeared to shed light on what had been a pub- licly unanswered question: Why had the White House passed over Richard M. Helms, at that time Director of Central In- telligence, to negotiate almoqst' solely with his deputy on, the Watergate matter? Mr. Dean testified that, a few days after the Watergate break-in, L. Patrick Gray, then acting Director of the Federal .Bureau of Investigation, sug- gested to him that it might have been a C.I.A. operation because of the number of for- mer agency people involved. Mr. Dean said that he later told John D. Ehrlichmann, the President's domestic affairs ad- viser, of Mr. Gray's suggestion and hat Mr. Ehrlichmann told him to call the agency and ex- plore the matter. "He then told me that I should deal with General Wal- ters because he was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some in- fluence over the agency," Mr. Dean testified. Assurance for Ehrlichman Mr. Dean said he later in- formed Mk Ehrlichman that Ge eral Walters had assured him that agency involvement in the Watergate was impossible: Mr. Dean said that Mr. Ehrlichman responded by say- ing "something to the effect, that General Walters seems to have forgotten how he got where he is today." , A spokesman for the CIA, ',said that General Walters !would have no comment on the Dean testimony. j Shocked by these and other :disclosures, Congressional crit- ics and supporters alike are now calling fcir stern measures to assert firmer control over the agency. , Won House Approval Just last week, the first move to curb C.I.A. activities came with House approval of a ban on agency assistance to do- mestic law enforcement agen- cies. The Senate has not acted. The provision, sponsored by Representative Elizabeth Holtz- man, Democrat of Brooklyn, was promoted by disclosures that agency employes had been training police officers in New York City and other cities in clandestine activities. Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, the Senate majority leader, plans to renew his un- successful drive of many years ago to establish a joint Senate- House committee to oversee operations of the CIA, and .other Government intelligence agencies. 1 Senator' Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, the act- ing chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has said that he will conduct a full- scale investigation of the evolv- ing "secret charter" under which the agency has operated since its establishment 25 years ago. There are also proposals to revise ? the agency's basic law either to outlaw domestic operations specifically or to re- quire that any such domestic involvement be permitted only upon the personal request of the PreSident. The National Security Act of 1947, under which the intelli- gence agency was created, was designed to prohibit it from conducting domestic operations by stating that it "shall have no police, subpoena, law-en- forcement or internal security functions." But the act also contains two major loopholes: First, it gives the Director of Central Intelligence the respon- sibility of "protecting intelli- gence sources and methodc from unauthorized disclosure." Second. the act gives the agency authority "to perform Approved such other functions and duties relating to intelligence" as the National Security Council, an arm of the Presidency, "may from time to time direct." Furthermore, secret eXecu- tive orders, interpreting the Na- .tional Security Act, have been ,issued through the years, cre- atting what some call the 'C.I.A.'s "secret charter,"- mew the target of Senator Syming- ton's planned investigation. While earlier efforts to assert greater Congressional control over the C.I.A. were success- fully blocked by successive Ad- ministrations, the recent dis- -closures in the Watergate affair have stunned Congress. Cushman Agreed Among the disclosures were the following: gin the summer of 1971 Gen. Robert A. Cushman, at that time deputy director of the agency and now commandant of ,the Marine Corps, agreed to a White House request to supply E. Howard Hunt Jr. with a wig, false identification papers and other items later used in burg- larizing the California office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former Wi131-1INGTON POST 27 June 1973 psychiatrist. (1Scarcely weeks later, Mr. Hein* then director of the agency and now Ambassador to Iran, agreed to another White House request for preparation Of a psychological profile of Dr. Ellsberg, who was later indicted for leaking the secret Pentagon papers on American involve- 'trent in Southeast Asia. (11\4r. Helms and General Walters, the deputy director of the agency, have told of Mr. Ehrlichman, two of Presi- dent Nixon's top aides, to per- suade the agency to halt an .inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation into Nixon re- election campaign funds thatrj were channeled through a Mex- ico City hank to hide thei source. Some of these funds , were found on the persons of the men caught breaking into the Democratic National Corn:- mittee headquarters. ()General Walters also has told of efforts by Mr. Dean to get the C.I.A. involved in a futher cover-up of the Water- gate affair by asking the agency to pay ball and salaries for thhe jailed burglars. . Papers Support President )3y Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein wastanaton Post Staff WrItere Classified papers, taken, from the White House. in April by former presidential counsel John W. Dean III and released yesterday by the Senate Watergate corn, mittee, tend to support Pres- ident Nixon's May 22 state- ment that a domestic secur- ity plan authorizing wiretap- ping and break-ins was never formally implemented. The highly touted docu- ments, including eight me-. mos released in full and the sanitized version of another document, show that plans were formulated for domes- tic security in 1970, but show no implementation of , potentially illegal opera- tions. The documents show that former White House intelli- gence aide Thomas C. Ilu-' ston and Dean continued to formulate plans for domes- tic security after July 28, 1970, when Mr. Nixon said the:plans were rescinded. In testimony yesterday be- fore the Watergate commit- tee, Dean said, however, that he knew of no illegal operations that grew from the plans or from the later establishment of an Intelli- gence Evaluation Committe6 to coordinate efforts of ex- isting government intelli- gence agencies, Including the FBI. CIA, and Defense. Intelligence Agency.. In an interview yesterday, Iluston said that he contin- he knew of no operations that grew out of the plan. The Huston memos to then-White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman show that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had forced the White House to review the plan and delay implementa- tion. Huston continued to push the plan' In memos dated Aug. 5, Aug. 7 and Sept. 10, 1970, but said yesterday that the language in the memos is "optimistic," as if the plan had not been killed in hopes of getting Haldeman's sup- port, which he said he never got. In a September 18, 1970, "top secret" memo released yesterday, Dean wrote to then Attorney General John N. Mitchell to suggest "procedures to commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as pos- sible." This was about two months after the basic do- mestic intelligence plan au- thorizing wiretapping, break-ins, mail cover and de- velopment of sources on col- lege campuses had been res- cinded. In the memo Dean said that there should be no "blanket removal of restric- tions" on such illegal opera- tions as there was in the ini- tial, rejected plan. In: his testimony yesterday Dean said the memo led to the es- tablishment of a secret intel- ligence group, the Intent- ued to push for implements- genee Evaluation Commit- tion of the plan "but it died tee. It was the first step in and it had been stopped setting up a domestic intelli- July 28, 1970." He also said For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000108180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 gence operation, Dean said, but ho knew of no illegal operations that resulted. Nevertheless, Senate and Justice Department attor- neys aro investigating about 25 break-ins and additional surveillance activities to de- termine if a White House in- telligence operation using the techniques of the plan was ever implemented, ac- cording to reliable sources. The break-in and bugging By. JAMES M. NAUGHTON at the Democrats' Watergate special to The New fork Thai headquarters and the burg- ? WASHINGTON, June 26-- lary of the, office of the psy- ? John W. Dean 3d said today, chiatrist to former Penta. in a new clash with the White gan ?Papers defendant Dan- House, that President Nixon lel Ellsburg seem to fit the had misled the nation in his pattern outlined in the Intel- public statements on the Water', ligence plan. gate case, and he insisted that The Ellsberg burglary was his charges of Presidential corn- carried out in September, plicity in a Watergate cover-up 1971, by a White House in- were factual. , telligence group called the , The former White House "plumbers;" which included counsel asserted, toward the E. Howard Hunt Jr. and ,G. end of day-long cross-examina- Gordon Liddy, who, were tion by the Senate Watergate later convicted in the ,Water- gate 'conspiracy. , ? linvestigating committee, that Another of' the documents ja4r. Nixon had been, "less than released yesterday, a memo linccurate" in a May 22 denial of from Huston to the Internal. 'accurate" in the Watergate Revenue Service dated Aug. New York Times 27 June 1973 , A NEW CHALLENGE Ex-Counsel Is Firm ; Differs on Series ,) of Explanations , a. 14, * 1970. asks for a "progressive report on the?' actiVitiee of the Compliance divisions in reviewing the ,operations of ideological or- ganizations." -? In a .reply, the IRS ? said that the special service 7group had referred 26 'or7, ganizations and 43 individu- als for enforcement action, and applications for tax-ex- empt status has been denied eight organizations in the .period of about one year. The ideological organize. ' tions included groups on the political left and right, ac- cording to an IRS spokes- man. In a Sept. 21, 1970, memo to Haldeman, Huston com- plained about the IRS ?response; "You will note that the report Is long on words and short on sub- stance. Nearly 18 months ago, the President Indicated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters. I have been pres- sing IRS since that time to no avail." , ? , In the Aug. 5, 1970, memo Huston pushed for reconsid- eration of the domestic in. telligence plan by attacking" then-FBI Director Hoover: "At some point, Hoover'. has to be told who is Presi: dent. He has become totally unreasonable and his con.' duct is detrimental to our' domestic intelligence opera.. tions, "Hoover can be expected to raise the following points Hoover's objections, the plan": (opposing the plan) Njoinveerizailldtftptneryk107 meeting: `Our pres e - according o e si en a May 22 statement. 'forts are adequate.' The an'-': swer is bullshit! This is par- ticularly true with regard to. FBI campus coverage." That memo continues: "The biggest risk we could take, in my opinion, to continue to regard the vi- olence on the campus and in, the cities as ? a temporary. phenomenon . . . I believe, we are talking about the fu- ture of this country, for surely domestic violence and disorder threaten the' very fabric of our society." "For eighteen months we3 have watched people in this government ignore the Pres- ident's orders, take actions. to embarrass him, promote themselves at his expense,. and generally make his job' more difficult. It makes me. fighting mad, and what, Hoover is doing here is putting: himself above the Presi-, dent." ? ? The Huston memos also, say that Attorney General' Mitchell joined Hoover in opposing the domestic sent rity plan. The top secret memos dei:, scribing the basic intelli- gence plan were printed June 7 by The New York, Times, and later by The, Washington Post. Those documents showed: that President Nixon ap-? proved the expanded intelli- ? gence gathering plan after ? being warned by Hustoui that parts of it were "clearly Illegal" and involved "seri- ous risks" to his administrie tion if the operations ever, became known. Because or' affair. Further, in a long colloquy with Senator Joseph M. ? Mon- toya, Democrat of New Mexico:* Mr. Dean disputed each of a, Series of Presidential explana- tions of' the Watergate- bur:, glary, describing them as mis- leading, unfounded or overly "broad." Crucial Conflict Seen Mr, bean's steadfast adher- ence today to the accusations contained in the 245-page 'state- ment that he read yesterday to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities posed an immediate?and po- tentially crucial?conflict with the White House. In San Clemente, Calif., 111 nearly the same time that M. Dean was disputing a string Of Presidential statements on Wat- ergate, a spokesman at the Western White House said that Mr. Nixon would stand on the May 22 statement disavowing any participation in the plan- ning of the Watergate break-in, or the subsequent cover-up. ; His Word Against Nixon's ' Mr. 'Dean acknowledged, dur- ing rambling cross-examination by the Senate panel, 'that he was in the position of present- ing his word, as a 34-year-ol4 deposed White House lawyer, iagainst that of the President. ? But he insisted that his only motive in testifying was to end Ihis personal involvement in the cover-up and, to respond to the Committee's request for his knowledge of it. "What makes you think that your credibility is greater than that of the President, who de- 'pies what you have said?" Sen- ator Herman E. Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia, asked Mr. Dean. "Well, Senator," Mr. Dean re- plied, his elbows propped *top the felt-covered witness tible,' "I have been asked to come up here and tell the truth. I have. told it exactly the way I know It.,, Differences With Nixon ? The way Mr. Dean told it. presented clear and sharp dis- crepancies with the public' record of Mr. Nixon's Water- gate' statements, and Senator Montoya proceeded late today to explore the ,conflicts. ? ? The Senater asked Mr. Dean to appraise Mr. Nixon's state- ment, at a news conference last Aug. 29, that a "complete in- vestigation" by Mr. Dean had. cleared everyone in the White House of involvement in the June 17 break-in at the Water- gate. ? Taken literally, Mr. Dean replied, the statement that no .one employed in the White :11Vglillariltelirr2b1129:11?? 7 might have been true, but he said that the flat assertion "was a little broad." Similarly, Mr. Dean told Sen- ator Montoya that he had not provided any 'basis for the President to declare, last Oct. 5, that the. Watergate investiga- tion conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation had pursued every possible lead "to the end." Mr. Dean said that "It was true that the F.B.I. investiga- tion was extensive, but it ob- !Piously was not complete." No Report From Dean The former legal counsel to Mr. Nixon said that he was also "quite aware" that the Presi- dent had never received a re- port on Watergate from Mr., Dean when the President said, on March 17, that Mr. Dean had undertaken such an in- vestigation. The most direct rebuttal of the President by Mr. Dean occurred during Senator Mon- toya's inquiry into an April 17 assertion by Mr. Nixon that he would "condemn any attempts to cover up in this case." "Do you believe he was tell- the truth on that date?" asked Senator Montoya. ' "No sir," Mr. Dean replied crisply. * T Senator and the witness discussed for several minutes Mr. Dean's point-by-point quar- rel with the President's May Z2. statement. Mr. Dean said he' had no "first-hand knowl- edge" to rebut Mr. Nixon's dis- avowal of prior knowledge of the break-in, but he went on at great length to recount, as no had yesterday, Mr. Nixon's alleged involvement in the aover-up. A Shift on Peterson Under close questioning by ;red D. Thompson, the com- mittee's Republican counsel, !dr. Dean backed down today ,rom his suggestion yesterday that Henry E. Petersen, an As- sistant Attorney General, had lcted improperly when he was in charge of the Government's Vatergate investigation. Mr. Dean flatly declared that Ronald L. Ziegler, the White tlouSe press secretary, had not een told the truth about Watergate and thus had not aeliberately misled the media during the 10 months in which he denied any White House involvement in the case. But Mr. Dean, in response 10 interrogation, added new ;barges today of efforts with- al the Nixon Administration to use investigative agencies improperly. He testified that the White House maintained, and con- stantly updated, an "enemies list" of individuals unfriendly to the Administration. Mr. Dean promised to submit to the corn- mittee a memorandum he had written about possible uses of the list, Tax Audit for Writer He charged that after the publication in Newsday, the Long Island newspaper, of an article unfavorable to Mr. Nixon's close personal friend, C. G. Rebozo, he had received 80'00140ns that one of the authors of the article should! Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 have some problems" with the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Dean said that he had arranged for the writer, whose name he could not recall, to be sub- jected to an income tax audit. ? He stated that an official of ? the Secret Service, whom Mr. Dean did not identify, had. given him a "small intelligence :printout" alleging that Senator George McGovern, the 1972 , ,Democratic Presidential. nomi-. nee, would attend a fund. raising function in Philadelphia at which "either Communist money or former Communist. ? supporters" would be involved! He said that he passed the Item to Charles W. Colson, a former White House 'special ? counsel, who told him he ar- ranged to have it published. Mr. Dean also alleged that Frederick V. Malek, the former White House personnel admin- istrator who now is deputy di- rector of the Office of Manage- ment and Budget, had not been truthful in accounting for a background investigation con- ducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Daniel Schorr, a Washington corre- spondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System. Questions on Monologue Mr. Dean said ? as Mr. Schorr, who is reporting on the Watergate hearings, looked on ?that he had learned "after the fact" that H. R. Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff, had ordered the inves- tigation through Lawrence M. Higby, who was Mr. Haldeman deputy. Mr. Dean said that J. Edgar Hoover, then the F.B.I. director, had pursued a "wide-open" field investigation, "to the dis- may of the White House," and that Mr. Malek, "who at the time knew nothing of this,'.' subsequently explained that Mr. Schorr was under consid- eration for a key position with the Administration. The bulk of Mr. Dean's first day of questioning by the Sen- ate committee?he will return for more questions tomorrow? dealt with the credibility of his long monologue yesterday, in which he described the partici- pation of the President, the White House, the Committee for the Re-Election of the Presi- dent, the Department of Justice and assorted individuals in a "massive" Watergate cover-up. With almost stoic repose, Mr. Dean sat barely an inch away from the public address and television microphones in the hearing room, placidly replying to questions that alternately appeared to bolster or try to poke holts in his earlier testi- mony. He told Samuel Dash, the committee's Democratic chief counsel, that, in' his opinion, Mr. Haldeman would have been advistd in advance of the plans to wiretap the Democratic party offices in the Watergate office complex last year and that Mr. Haldeman "probably would have reporttd it" to the President. But Mr. Dean balked later when Mr. Dash sought to elicit his "opinion" as to 'whether Mr. N ixon had probably been advistct by aides of the cover-up at its incep- 'tion. ? The former lawyer for Presi- dent Nixon agreed with Mr. Dash's leading questions, in which the committee counsel suggested that from last Sept. 15 on. Mr. Dean had no doubt about the participation of the President in the cover-up ef- fort. Executive Clmency Cited . Mr. Dean testified yesterday that on Sept. 15 the President congratulated him on his ef- forts to guarantee that Federal Indictments in the Watergate case handed down that day had not reached any but the seven individuals first arrested. He also described yesterday a series of conversations with the President about arrange- ments fpr executive clmency for one of the Watergate defend- ants, about "silence money" to assure that the original de- fendants would not talk and about Mr. Nixon's direction of efforts to curtail Congressional, ,Government and cout investiga- tions of the case. The tone of ?Mr. Dean's per- sistent declarations today that he had told the truth was set In this exchange with Mr. Dash: Mr. Dash: I guess you are fully aware, Mr. Dean, of the gravity of the charges you have made under oath against the highest official of our land, the President of the United States. Mr. Dean: Yes, I inn. Mr. Dash: And being so aware, do you still stand on your statement? Mr. Dean: Yes, I do. Unshakeably, Mr. Dean main- tained the same position throughout the interrogation. He explained that he had waited until April 15 to begin telling what he knew to Government prosecutors because "I was hopeful the President himself would step forward and tell of his involvement in some of these things?' 'Almost Impossible Task' He said that he realized that the 47 documents he submit- ted to the Senate committee yesterday did not deal directly with his conversations with the President and that he had no evidence to support his asser- tions. "I realize," Mr. Dean stated, "it is almost an impossible task, if it is one man against the other, that I am up against, and it is not a very pleasant situation. But I can only speak what I know to be the facts and that is what I am provid- ing this committee." Some of the sharpest inter- rogation of Mr. Dean was con- ducted, after the fashion of the former prosecutor that he once was, by Mr. Thompson. Asked how he became in- volved in the cover-up, Mr. Dean said, "I was in the proc- ess before I began thinking about the process." At one point, Mr. Thompson apologized if he appeared to be "badgering you in any way" as he explored the possibility that Mr. Dean had offered his testimony in hope of gaining immunity from criminal prose- cution. "In fact," Mr. Dean said, a, NEW YORK TIMES 27 JUNE 1973 Documents Give Insight On White House Efforts By ANTHONY RIPLEY SIMC1411 to The New York Times ' WASHINGTON, June 26 --' i The documents that John W. Dean 3d submitted with his 'testimony before the Senate Watergate committee give a rare insight into the White tHouse and related 1972 Pret.i- idential campaign activities. 1 There are glimpses of Pres- idential attitudes and fears of 'news leaks and demonstrators. There are the thoughts and plaws of those who served the President. . There are conversations over the handling of campaign funds. There is the reluctance of James W. McCord Jr. to go along with part of the cover-up of Watergate. There is the penetration of Representative Paul N. McClos- key Jr.'s rival campaign. There is even the attempt to keep the Senate hearings them- selves under control and a number of other points in the still unfolded scandals. In all, Mr. Dean submitted 50 documents to back up his written testimony of 245 pages. Excerpts Given Following are excerpts from some of the documents gath- ered by Mr. Dean, who served for almost three years as Mr. Nixon's counsel until his dis- missal April 30: A memorandum from Gordon Strachan to his boss, H. R. Haldeman, then the White House chief of staff, undated and dealing with news leaks: "It would he helpful to real- ize that there are five distinct types of leaks: only some of these are deterrable. The types include: A) the August SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation bit bitingly, to Mr. Thompson,' "if I were still at the White House I would probably be feeding you the questions to' ask the person who is sitting here." Mr. Thompson retorted, "If .were here, as I am, I would have responded that I do not need questions to be fed to me from anybody." Nonetheless, it was Mr. Thompson who elicited from Mr. Dean the statement that Mr. Dean had not meant to imply yesterday that Mr. Peter- sen had acted unethically in providing information to the White House about the scope and conduct of the Govern- ment's inquiry into the Water- aate case last year.g "I know of no impropriety," Mr. Dean said of Mr. Ptersen's dealings with the White House. "I think he tried to be very fair?in dealing with the White House and that fact that we had an investigation going on in a political year, that it could result in embarrassment on Approved Far Release 2001/08/07 : ClAclinDtlOs7c-Vainii0001001 Talks] leak prompting the lie detector tests at State. The in- dividual consciously violated the law to protect his own view of national interest?non-deter- rabic; ' "B) The September SALT (accidental war agreement) leak: too many individuals (all of Congress and our NATO allies) knew and so the informa- tion is not controllable?non- deterrable; "C) The self-serving leak which ?strengthens the individ- ual policy position by acquiring public support before the final decision is made---deterrable; 'D) The ego-stroke leak Where the Individual eithec wants to see his name in print or to be known as one with influence?deterrable; "And E( the careless leak resulting from . either a slow individual with information and a foot reporter or too much liquor--deterrable." Monthly Reporting Plan The memo stated that 11 cases for "possible Haldeman action as 'Lord High Execu- tioner' to stop leaks" had been studied but that none had been acted upon. A monthly report- ing plan, ith investigations and use of politically loyal person- nel, was put into action with the approval of Mr. Haldeman. In another of the memors, a long one drawn up this year at Camp David, Mr. Dean at- tempted to review how a dom- estic intelligence program that came to disaster in the Water- gate burglary on June 17, 1972, had begun. He said officials had been very concerned about the 1972 Republican national conven- tion, fearing that it might ex- plode in violence, as had the 1968 Democratic convention. I told HRH (Mr. Haldeman) that we would push the Federal intelligence agencies to keep is informed, but I doubted if ,ve would get much better in Itelligence than we had. In Ishort, I was instructed to assist ;the re-election 'committee in preparing itself for expected 'intense demonstrations. "I discussed this matter with Mr. Hoover (the former direc- tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover) approximately ? trio date: given), and he agreed that we. would have a problem, that4 the F.B.I. would help but that the re-election committeed should develop its own capacity*. to gather such intelligence. He offered to provide names of former agents that might be of assistance but I never asked ' him for such names." Instead, the White House' developed its own campaign intelligence team headed by G. Gordon Liddy. Mr. Dean said. Liddy was convicted at the 001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 Watergate trial. Message by McCord After the Watergate burglars were caught and indicted, Mr. Dean said, McCord "was not cooperating with his lawyer" and alleged plans for blaming' the Central Intelligence Agency? , for the break-in were not work. ing. McCord sent the following message to John J. Caulfield, a. former White House aide: .? "Dear Jeck: "I'M 'softy to have to wriW you this letter but felt you had to know. 4,.? "If HelniS [Director' of Cen- tral Intelligdnce Richard Helms]. .goes and the Watergate opera., tion is laid at C.I.A.'s feet$ where it does not belong, every:, tree in the forest will fall. ? , , "It will be a scorched desert... ,The whole matter is at the precipice now. "Just pass the message that if they want it to blow, they; are on exactly the right course.' "I'm sorry that you will get; hurt in the fallout." McCloskey Incident - On Dec. 11 and 12 an "opera- political intelligence gathering scheme "penetrated' Repre- sentative McCloskey's . Wash. ington campaign headquarters, Mr. Dean memorandums show. At the time the California Republican was opposing Mr. Nixon in the Presidential' primaries. The , "operative" found little money, few volunteers and al- most everyone gone off to New 'Hampshire, according to- 'ports that went from Mr: Caul- field to Mr. Dean toJohn N. Mitchell, then the Attomek General and later campaign manager for Mr. Nixon. In late February this year, Mr. Dean prepared the Presi- dent for a meeting with Sena- tor Howard H. Baker Jr., Re- publican of Tennessee and vice chairman of the Senate Water. ,gate committee. . Among Mr. Dean's sugges- tions on a briefing paper. were to "take Baker's pulse and find Out how much he wants to help keep this from becoming a political circus. "If Baker appears to be truly. desirous of cooperating ?and the fact he is seeking guidance may so indicate?he might be told that there are matters un- related to the bugging incident per se (E. G. Segretti, Kalm- bach) that could be embarrass- ing and tarnish good people whose motives were the high- est," the memo said. ' The reference was to Donald H. Segretti, an 'alleged organ- izer of campaign sabotage whd has been indicted in Florida in connection with a forged cant- paign letter. t WASIIIZ`GTOZI POST. 28 June 197.3 Ni,xon Plans To .Answer,' _ Lard Says. Bitl David S. Broder Washington Post Staff Writer president Nixon is willi- ing to respond to "all ques- tions" 4out his role in the Watergate affair after the major wTtnesses have given their stoOes to the Senate Investigating committee, the new White House domestic counselor, Melvin R. Laird, said yesterday. In an interview with The? Washington Post, the for- Mer Defense Secretary said Mr. Nixon would not "respond to every witness" but would answer, "ques- tions, all questions . . . at a press conference, "when we get near the conclusion of the hearings." Laird said he had dis- cussed the timing of a press ;conference with the Presi- dent and "I think he's will- ing to do that . . . I don't think there will be any prob- lem with that." Laird also strongly sug- ,gested that despite his re- ,cent elevation on the White ' House staff, Ronald L. Zie- gler will be replaced as the President's principal press spokesman by his current deputy, Gerald L. Warren. "I have an appreciation for Ron's problem," Laird said. "I'm convinced he , didn't ?knowingly mislead ? (the press). But from the in- . formation I've been able to get, I think it's good to have t some other press spokesman ,for a while. r? "Sometimes people are 'caught up in a series of cir- cumstances where you have to make certain changes. And I think those changes 'will be made. I don't think 'you have to make a big an- nouncement over something' like that." Ziegler, recently desig- nated as an Assistant tp the President as well as press ,.secretary, has been under fire from press groups for providing inaccurate inform- ation to its reporters during the period of the Watergate . crime and alleged White House cover-up. . Former White House counsel John W. Dean III has testified this week that Ziegler was rehearsed by other White House staff meinbers for his press brief- trigs on Watergate and was repeatedly deniedknowl- edge of what; really had taken place. , ,Laird said Ziegler's expe- rience showed 1, that "anybody who's going to Approved FtlektbkagrAtitfoiroiP 9 every meeting." ??"I think 'that can be changed," he said, referring 'to:the shteldinrof the press secretary from vital knowl- edge. ' "I ? think Jerry (Warren) ha's tO take over that responsibility, and I hope he can. I'm not sure, 'but I hope that he can," ' ? (In San Clemente, Calif., a White House official, said that Ziegler will continue in 'his responsibilities as out- lined when Mr.' Nixon ele, vated him to the, position esSistant to the. Presiden) earlier this Month. ? (At that 'time, the Presi- dent said that Ziegler also 'would continue as press sec- retary. ("The observation that Ziegler's usefulness is im- paired is not shared by the President," the official saidl ?(He said that the Presi- *dent is contemplating a gen- eral .press, conference "at some point." But the Presi- dent has not decided when it will be, the official said.) In a wide-ranging inter- view in the ?west-wing White House office he has taken over from his resigned pre- cedessor, John D. , Ehrlich- man, Laird also said: ? He is cutting back the Domestic Council staff he Inherited from Ehrlichman and trying to shift decision- making to the Cabinet de- partments,.but running into resistance from congress- men and bureaucrats who don't want to act "unless they get White House guid- ance." ? He has asked first-term' domestic councelor 'Daniel Patrick Moynihan, now am- bassador to India, to suggest !Nays of res dving the family issittance welfare reform plan abandoned by Mr. Nixon this' year after an un- three-year three-year effort for congressional passage. :-.??? He is doubtful that the ,President's expressed : wish- to scrap controls and return to a free economy can be ac- in the face of a "very difficult" worldwide 'food shortage, but acknowl- edged that the temporary ;freeze of market prices it- self is "causing some prob- lems" of future food supply. Recalled to government service early this month in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the former Wiscon- sin ? congressman and De-i fense Secretary seemed more subdued than custom-, ary in an hour-long Inter- view. Asked about the mood of the White house and the President. Laird paused for a long moment and said: "Well, of course, this is a tough period for the Presi- dent. No question about that. Rut I have the feeling ... that morale about getting C RCP lia-66402R00040 0 1 ernint -it has improved." Laird paused again, and said: "You're talking to me In one of the most difficult weeks, as far as the past is concerned, that I can think of. But If didn't feel that we could move forward and get some of these programs working, I wouldn't be here." The new presidential ad- viser said one of the "pluses" from the Watergate, may be that "the operations o the Executive Branch will be strenghtened." "We just have to open this place (the White House) up," he said,"but it's not, easy to do. There's been a tendency on the part of people to con- centrate everything in the White House and the White' House staff. The situation has to be switched back, so the departments and the line agencies really have the staff to do the work and can carry on their consulta- tions with the governors, the mayors and the con- gressmen on their own pro- grams." Laird said that "its going 'to take a little time to change" habits, after years of centralized decision-mak- ing, because "there is a tendency among some mem- bers of Congress to like hay- ing one place to call, rather than going to the depart- ments, and there is a tend- ency on the part of some of the departments not to make a decision or specific recommendation unless they get White House guidance." To counter that habit, Laird said, he had been vis- iting a different Cabinet de- partment almost every day since taking his job. "I don't ask them to come here," he isaid. "I go there. I try to .make it clear to each of the Cabinet officers that he is going to be responsible for the department, for the peo- ple he's putting into jobs, and that they're going to be responsible to him. You can't have any Cabinet offi- cer in a position where he doesn't have complete trust and faith in the people who are working,for him." Second Laird said, he is trying to stimulate closer consultation between the de- partments and members of Congress. Laird himself has taken advantage of his privilege as gress and. has appeared on .the floor of the House se- veral times In the last three weeks, engaging in long con- ferences with former col- leagues. 80001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 NEW YORK TIMES 28 June 1973 xcerpts From Testimony by Dean Before Senate Panel Investigating Watergate ? 5pects1 Ia'Mr S1.9, York Time* ; WASHINGTON, June 27?,_ yollowing are excepts froth a 7, ;transcript of the testimony on the 14th day of hearings on ,the Watergate case today before ? the Senate Select , Committee On Presidential'. . campaign activity:c ? MORNING SESSION ? John W. Dean 3d SENATOR ERVIN: We have !two very peculiar questions which have been addressed to the committee, apparently by Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President. The first question addressed to the committee by Mr. Buz- ,hardl is this: ? ? "Did you and your counsel' 'develop a strategy for ob- ',taining immunity from prose- 'cution? What were the ele- ments, of that strategy?" On behalf of the commit-Et, 'tee, I would reply to Mr. Buzhardt that the only strat- gy we developed was to' 'pursue the course outlined by the act of Congress codified 'as Sections 6002 and 6005 of Title 18 of the United States. Code. The second question Is this ?this is to the committee? the second question is: "Didn't your strategy include delib- erate leaks of information to, the media on what you had told investigators? Maybe this is addressed to Mr. Dean, I, do not know. It is probably addressed to Dean. Well, Mr. Dean, I will ask you these questions ? well, maybe I had just better let us proceed in orderly fash- ion. am sorry I misconstrued the. question. I might state these were :just handed to me about one second before I read them and I drew the inference, ? sinee the questions were sep- arated as they were, some of 'them were addressed to the ' committee rather than the 'Witness. 'But perhaps I am 'Mistaken in that but I would 'say that the only strategy this committee, has followed ,lto secure immunity for any witness has been to pursue :the law strictly. Now, on yesterday the wit- 'ness was asked to produce some exhibits and I. just 'Wanted to ask him if he had provided them. DEAN: Yes, I did. These .are from a file that le entitled Opponents List and Political Enemies Project. ? Back to the Beginning I,. SENATOR GURNEY: We :have had a great deal of tes- faimony, 245 pages of your statement as well as the tes- timony yesterday. and Imust say it is, hard to know where ito, begin in all this. think probably the best place to ,start always is at the begin- Ihing. Would you say that it hi fair to say that Gordon Liddy's plan of hugging and ,electronic espionage really started out the whole Water- gate affair? ' --A. Well, there was an at- mosphere that might have r been Several precursors .source to that plan. The plan lavas an accident of fate !where they culminated into Mr. Liddy's pecific poposal that was presented in the 'Attorney General's office in the two meetings which oc- reurred in late January and early February. Q. But as far as the Water- gate break-in itself is con- 'cerned, it really stemmed frean Mr. Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic es- pionage, ? did it not? Now, 'Who recommended Mr. Liddy 'to' the committee to re-elect Ithe President? A. I passed on a recom- tnendation that I had received from Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitch- 'ell and he in turn, endorsed 'that recommendation and rsent him over to the re-elec- tion committee. '0 Q. Did you interview Mr. itiddy after Krogh recom- mended him to you? 1. A. Not to my recollection, .tid. I was present when he 1Was interviewed by Mr. Mitch- ell and again when he was lInterviewed by Mr. Magruder. 'Q. Did you ask any ques- itiOns about his qualifications :at that time or did Mr. Liddy 'Jost simply answer questions? A. I asked Mr. Krogh abdut ;hit qualifications at that time 'when he first mentioned him to me. And they asked ques- tions during those interviews, 'Yes. Q. Did you ever ask him ? 'What he had been doing for Mr. Krogh? Or Mr. Hunt? ,A. No. I did not. Liddy's Qualifications 'Q. Would that not be im- portant in finding out his qualifications, his previous employment? A. Well, I was told. for ?example, when I met him? when I talked to Mr. Krogh about him. I can recall Mr. 'Krogh very specifically tell- ing me that he had written some of the best legal memo- ,randurns that he had run across in a long time. He ex- 'plained that Gordon had taken some rather complex subjects .and analyzed them in a very precise way. One of these memoranda had gone in to the President and the Presi- dent had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on 'the quality ef the document ;that he had prepared. , Q. Was it under that part of his duties would he in charge of security or things like that? A. That is correct. Q. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what he had been doing in the area of security? A. I was told that he had an F.B.I., Treasury Depart- ment, law enforcement back- ground. There was not a great focus on that at that time. I knew Mr. Krogh had worked in the past 'before I came to the White House. and partially after, I was still at the White House with the demonstrator problem. Q. You never did go into what he had been doing with Krogh and Hunt? A. No, I did not. Q. The Jan. 27 meeting occurred and as I recall, you testified that the original plan ?and I do not know what the word was that you used to describe it, but? A. I think I called it a "Mission Impossible" plan. Q. Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder after this horrendous plan? A. As I recall, the only con- ,- versation I had was a very brief conversation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts off the' easel and they were preparing to leave the office when I paused in front of Mr. Mitch- ell's desk and he told me that this was certainly out of the question. Plan Caused Worries Q. well, did it worry you that this man came up with kidnapping, prostitution, mug- ging, and all the rest of it? A. Yes, sir, it did. Q. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell and Magruder as to Liddy's capability of staying on at the job? A. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to believe it and I might say that it was so far Out that there was no hope in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this. So I just as- sumed that it was going to die a natural death. Q. Now we come to the second meeting that occurred on Feb. 4. My recollection al- . so is that you testified that you were again very dis- turbed at what he was pro- posing. A. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meeting in an effort to terminate the meeting, whicht I did. Q. Well, did you have any: discussion after the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr., Magruder about his contin- uing? A. I had a direct discussion: with Mr. Liddy at that time. I might add, after the first. meeting. I had told Mr. Liddy he should destroy the charts.' After the second meeting, as we were leaving the office, I, told him that I would not dis-; cuss this with him any fur- ther, I' indicated to him that it still was not what was nec- essary, and it was a rather. ' brief discussion. I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy during much of this be- cause of the fact that he had received no guidance from anybody that I .could tell? certainly none from .me?as to what was expected of him. Q. Was what you testified that you told him that he was never to discuss this thing again with you, that if any plan was approved like this that you did not want to know atiout it? A. That is correct. ? Reported to Haldeman Q. Why did you not go back to the President and tell him about this hair-raising scheme? A. Well, I did go back, but I did not have ac- cess to the President, as I think I explained. I went to Mr. Haldeman. Q. Did you try to gain ac- cess to the President? A. Sen. ator, I did not try. I had never been into the Presi- dent or called by the Presi- dent before. My reporting channel was through Mr. Haldeman and I went hack and told what I thought was the proper reporting channel. I told him what I had seen, told him my reaction to it, told him that I thought it was unwise, unnecessary, and Mr. Haldeman agreed with me. Q. Did you ever discuss after this meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, whether this plan was going to be implemented or what- ever happened to it? A. I never heard about the plan again until. as I have testified, Mr. Liddy came into my office some time In February or March?I do not know the precise date?and told me that he could not get his plan approved. I reminded 1.0 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 him- that I was not going to ; talk ? with him about it, and , he said that he understood . and he did not talk about it. Q. Did you ever report that to the President? . A. No, I didn't, sir. Q. Now, to get back to , the break-in 'at the Water- ' gate, as I recall your testi- mony, there really wasn't anything in Watergate or , much of anything i?he activities surrounding the ? committee to re-elect the President from that Feb. 4 meeting until the Watergate Break-in. And I understand you got back from the Philip-' , pine Islands on the 18th1and ? then returned here to Wash- ? ington and went in your office on the 18th.' Then, as I recall, you said that you had received phone calls that day, and talked to a number of people--Caul; ' field, Magruder, Ehrlich- man, Strachan, Colson, Sloan, and you later called Liddy "and Kleindienst. Why all these calls if you weren't that closely associated With ? what they were doing over. there in the political field? ,? ? Investigative Office , ? A. Well, Senator, I would." Say that my 'office was one' that, one, I did have some' dealings with 'the re-election:1. committee, I did know all the parties involved. My office normally, was' asked to in'q vestigate or look into any- problem that came up, of. that nature. When. any wrongdoing was charged-ran: Administration office, for ex- , ; ample, when the grain deal came up?and I think as the Senator will recall, during the I.T.T. matter, my office had some peripheral involve-.? ment in that. And I believe ? we had some dealings with! you office on that matter.' Q. Not my office. 'I 'think we met in Senator Hruska's' office,' the Republican metn-(, bers .of the committee. A.. Well, Senator, I recall one time that Mr. Fielding and I, came lip to your office on the matter and Mr. Fielding pro- vided some material for your!? staff. Q, What does that have to do with the Watergate? A. Well, I was explaining the; . type of thing that would come to my office and my of- fice was a fire-fighting office and would get into various? Q. Did you do other fire- fighting before June 18th? A. Yes, sir. Q. At the committee' to re- elect? A. Not to my knowl- edge, no. That was the only fire I recall over there, and it ' was the biggest one. Q. Now, then, you men-, tioned in your testimony yes- terday in response to Mr.' Dash that you inherited the cover-up. Would you tell how you inherited the cover- up? , A. When I came hack to. the office on the 18th and talked to Mr. Strachan, realized that the cover-up was already in effect, in be- ing, and I realized that when, Mr. Strachan told 'me of the documents that he had de:' stroyed and Mr. Haldeman's instruction, that there cer- tainly wasn't going to be a' revelation of the White, _ House involvement in the matter. I didn't at that point in time know the potentials of the White House involve; . ment. , Early Meeting Recalled Q. Was not one of the first meetings of the cover-up held .in John Mitchell's' apartment on the 19th of June? A. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my know- day f the 19th at 8: theWhite House was a very busy day. That the calls I re- ceived from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meet- ings I had with Mr. Ehrlich- man and then again later with Mr. Colson about the safe ? were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's apartment, which I do not recall was on the 19th or 20th. I do recall a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office but I do. not recall specifically which day it was. Q. Well, what you are say- ? log is then that these several phone calls you had with all . of these people really had to do with at least the begin- nings of the cover-up, is that 'right? Well, you were 'in on it ? from the beginning, were you not? A. Yes, sir. Q. You really did not in. herit anything. You were in, on the sort of hatching of it, were you not? Who set the policy on the cover-up? , A. I do not think it was a policy set. There was just no alternative at that point ' in time. Q. Did you advise e, the President of .what was, going on? ; ;..1 A.. Senator, the first time ever talked to the President was one occasion that I re- call, before Sept.. 15th which was in late August. to the. best of my recollection, and , that certainly was not an occasion to talk to the Pres- ident about anything because 'his formet laie partners were ? in the office, Mrs. Nixon was in the office, there were sev- eral notaries or one notary ? there, some other members of the staff and it had to do with the signing of the Pres- ident's testamentary papers ia and it was?just was not a very appropriate occasion to ,' even give a whisper to the t; President that I would like to talk to him. So I must say , ? that any time between June * ??19th and Sept. 15th I had no 'conversations with the Pres- ident. and nor did I approach ,h the President at any time other than through reporting to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. , Ehrlichman. , Did Not Try to See Nixon ' Q. Do you not think as the President's_ attorney, you should have tried to go to him and warn him about what was being done? A. I , probably should have but I was assuming everything I reported to Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman was also be- jog reported to the !resident. ? Q. 'Let us go and discuss' for a moment the F.B.I. re- ports of the investigation.. Did you first go to Mr. Klein- ? dienst for these reports? A. e Right. I do not recall whether it was Mr. Kleindienst or Mr. Petersen that I first discussed ? this with. Q. Who asked you to get? :the reports? A. Initially the I request came from Mr. Mitch- ; ell and I believe that was a result of Mr. Mardian's de- sire to see the reports. Mr." e, Ehrlichman and Mr. Halde- man thought it was a good.' idea that I see the reports, and had?rat vhat point in ' time I actually raised this with either Petersen or . Kleindienst my recollection . '? is I did talk to Mr. Petersen.:, ,. about it at some time and he . suggested .1 go directly to Mr. Gray,. and I do recall dis- 'Cussing it with Mr. Gray. ; . Q. Let us get back to Mr. ..Kleindienst. Are you sure you cannot recall whether you. ever talked to him about get- ting these 302 forms? A. It is.: very possible, as I said, Sena- ? !tor, it is very possible I did. t Q. Well, do you recall if ? you talked to Mr. Petersen? 'What did you recall of that 'conversation? A. I recall he, ,suggested that I go directly .to Mr. Gray. ? Q. ?Did either Mr. Petersen or Mr. Kleindienst or any- body, according to your recol- ' lection, tell 'you that you ,1 ? could not get these F.B.I. re- ports, that the President him-, self would have to get them? A. I was told that the best way to deal with this situa- tion is go directly to Mr. Gray. ' Q. Then, you have no, .recollection that the At- torney General or Mr. Peter- sen told you that you could :not have them unless you get them through the President? A. I do not recall it, frankly.:, Conversations With Gray Q. Well, then let's go to , Mr. Gray and your converse-, ttions with him. .. A. Mr, Gray told me that be thought that I could read them in his office, I told him thought that was,awkward, and when we discussed it, ' he wanted some Assurance that this information was be- ing reported' to the President. As I recall, I gave him such an assurance. To the best of my recollec- lion Mr. Gray said to me that, after I gave him assur- ance it was going to be re- ported, that he would work something out. Now I don't recall when I first received the initial reports. I only recall* that it was after a summary report ,was pre- pared on the 21st of July, as I recall the date, and I showed that report to the people at the White House and the people at the re- 'election 'committee, that the pressure began that I let others read the raw F.B.I. reports. ? Q. Let me get back again now to the conversation with Mr. Gray. Wasn't he pretty specific with you that 4 the only reason he would turn these things over to you is because the President of . the United States requested them through you? ' A. Well, Senator, in my .dealings with Mr. Gray from the very outset was very anxious to be of any assist- ance he could. When he told me, for ex- ample, he was .traveling ,around the country a lot and I should deal with Mark Felt that to me evidenced that Mr. Gray wanted to be of as- sistance if he wasn't there I should talk to others. The same tenor was in the con- versation that he would have to check and he wanted as- surances these were going to the President, this infor- mation would go to the President. I am sure he knew very well that the President didn't want to sit down and read a stack of raw F.B.I. materials. Q. Did you ever report to ' the President what was in those 302 forms? A. There was never anything in those F.B.I. reports that I read worth reporting even to Mr. : Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlich- man. 82 F.B.I. Files ? Q. Did you ever show a ? Single one of the 82,302 files . ? to the President? Did you ever report a single informa- tion that was in those files -to the President? A. Not to my recollection, no. I may have reported the general tenor of the investi- gation which was, I might say, very vigorous. I would report that to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and as my channel of reporting. Q. Did you ever get a call' from Mr. Gray about this newspaper story about one of the reports being shown to Mr. Segretti? A. Well, I recall that when the story broke, Mr. Gray called me and asked me if that were true, and said absolutely not, that the FBI reports have never left my office and I have never showed an FBI report to Mr. Segretti which, in fact, is ? true. Q. Who did you show them to? A. Mr. Mardian was anx- ious to see them, Mr. Mitchell thought that was a good idea and also that Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson also come see them. They came to my of- fice. I recall them scanning them. The only other occa- sion I recall anybody else looking at the files is when Mr. Dick Moore who was special counsel to the Presi- dent was given those docu- ments to look at. Q. Now, as I understand it some material was turned over to the F.B.I. but certain materials were held out, is that correct? . What was turned over to Gray? A. Two envelopes containing sensi- tive political documents. Q. That was turned over at a meeting in Mr. Ehrlich- man's office, is that right? A. That is correct. You will recall I had been .instructed Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 'to "deep-six" and shred docu- ments. I had to come up in my own mind with a per- suasive argument for Mr. .Ehrlichman as to why not to "deep-six" and destroy docu- ments. Q. Now then what' trans Spired when they [the docu- ments] were turned over? ' A: As I said, I took the' 'documents and had a very brief discussion with Ehrlich- It was pretty well under- stood what the meeting was for, so it was not necessary to have any extended. dis-' cussion other than the, fact that the documents were , very politically sensitive, that ' 'as I recall, I called them , political dynamite when I raised them with Gray, that he should take custody of them, and that would be the way to handle it as ?far as the White House was con- cerned. I do not recall any discussion of telling Mr. Gray' to destroy the documents. He at that point in time, as ? I recall, placed the documents. in a small sort of briefcase ? and seemed quite willing- to take them. Spoke to Petersen Q. Did you ever ask hith again on any occasion what be had done with the docu- ments? A. After I had dis- closed this matter to Mr. Petersen, I recall that I was at luncheon at the Justice Department. This was prob- 'ably in early January. At 'that time, Mr. Gray came up to me and sort of took me by the arm and said: "John, you have got to hang tight on not disclosing these docu- ments." And? I said nothing to him. Q. Let us go to the August press conference, where the President referred to the Dean report. My understand- ing is that you indicated ,great surprise at this so- called Dean report? A. That is correct. Q. Did you ever protest to the President? A. No sir, but others I did. I talked to Mr. Mitchell about it; I talked to Mr. Moore about it; I talked to my associate, Mr. Fielding. Q. Let's turn now to the ,Sept. 15th meeting with the President and Mr. Haldeman and yourself. A. The Presi- dent asked me to sit down and told me that Bob had told him what I had been doing and he expressed appreciation for it. Q. Did you discuss the criminal cases that were coming on for trial; the civil suits that were filed by the Democrats, the Common Cause suit that had been filed by Common Cause, the Pat- man hearings? A. That is cor- rect, we did. Q. Did you discuss any as- os pects of the Watergate at t that meeting with the Presi- dent? A. Well, given the fact that h he told me I had done a good d job I assumed he had been c very pleased with what had m been going on. The fact that the Indictments, he we pleased that the indictmen had stopped at Liddy becaus the only other link into th White House was Magruder Q. Did you discuss wha Magruder knew about Water gate, the cover-up money Strachan bringing wiretap in formation into Haldeman, [or Haldeman Instructing Sta chan to destroy all of thes materials? A. No, I did not. a' roughly' five ancl it Came up ts to $4,850. put a check, e ? 'wrote a check out and put it e in, wrote it to cash, -,_ Q. Do you know this is a t 'crime, Mr. Dean? Isn't it em- ? ? bezzlement? ' A. Well, I had very clear- . - ly made, there was no in- tention oft my part never to - : account for the full amount. e,, CHARLES SHAFFER: Ex- cuse me I would like to say as counsel for Mr. Dean that, based upon the 'fact that have been discussed with Mr. Dean, if they are true, Mr. Gurney says that 'is embezzlement. I disagree with him, and I think there t are enough lawyers in the room to know what embez-1, ziement is. SENATOR GURNEY: As I recall, in the testimony there was discussion sometimes around November about a a written report that was to E be written by you on gate? A. a is correct. p t Q. Who requested that re- A port? A. It was Mr. Halde-', m s man. g , Q. Dili you ever write this , e, report? A. Yes, sir, and h have submitted that as a a document to the committee. w Q. Did ,you ever tel the th t , President about this report p or give him a copy of it? fo A. No, sir, I used my nor- th ? mai reporting channels. Clemency for McCord 171 Q. Well now how can you say that the President knew , all about these things from a simple observation by him that "Bob tells me you are,, doing a good job?" A. L was awaree of the fact that Mr. Haldeman had often made notes, Mr. Haldeman has a good memory. This was. the hottest issue that was', going in the campaign. I can't believe that the fact that we were going to contain this matter would totally escape the President's attention and, it was to me a confirmation and a compliment to me tha I had done this. Q. Did he say that "Bob ha been telling me everythin you have been doing." A. H said, "Bob has been reporting to me," something of this nafuo. Q.-I thought you said tha he said that "Bob has been telling me what a good job you have been tieing." A Well, we are quibbling ove words but I remember? A. I had tried back as early as the second meeting, I be- lieve, to tell him that felt that I was involved in an obstruction of justice, par- ticularly after he had told me that I should report to hirn and made the comment to me that . Haldeman and Ehr- lichman were principals. That stuck, in my mind so very clearly that I thought maybe he did not understand everything that I was doing. When I raised this with him, I gave him a few of the facts and he began to debate with ie about the fact that he did not think I had any legal problem based on what I WAS citing him and I, said I did. He did not vant to get into t at that time. Data on Later Meeting Q. Did you have a later rneeting ? with the President nd Mr. Haldeman and Mr. hrliohman? A. Yes sir. I went from the resident's office to a subse- uent meeting with Ehrlich- an and Haldeman and the iscussions began to focus n Mitchell coming down and aving Mitchell step forward nd if Mitchell stepped for- ard and would account for is thing, then maybe the roblems that had followed ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 look at the bank statement ,and tell the committee how 'much money you had in the checking account at that time, Mr. Dean. $1,625.12, is that not cor- 'rect.? Yet, you put in your -file where you were Iteeping the money in trust a ,check for $4,850. ?' A. That is correct. Q. Mr. Dean, we were dis- ? cussing the time lapse be- tween those meetings with the President, the last meet- ings on the 20th and 21st and 22d and your 'next corn-? .munication with him, whichl ,was April 15, as I recall. ' All of these meetings on. 'the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I un- .derstand it, they were the first meetings between what I would call perhaps the most principal people in- :volved in Watergate, at least those in the White House, to .where you were coming to serious discussion about what ought to be done and ' .all of you realized that some- thing certainly had 'to be done, and done rather fast,' ,as I understand it? ? . A. 'I would not characterize"' 'the meetings as to What had ,to oe cione. In fact, the meet- ings were, as I believe I de- scribed them in my testi- mony, very similar to many, many meetings I had oc- curred, or I had been in ear- lier where we talked about, you know, how do we deal with the Senate_committee, .the President at one point in:` the meeting picked up the 'phone and called the Attor- ney General and asked him , why. he had not been meet- ing with Senator Baker. Q. Mr. Dean, finally, be- fore wrapping up here, I would like to pin down the occasions this year prior to March 21st, the meeting with the President, when you and ?he discussed the cover-up of Watergate. A. All right. It was the meeting on the 27th [Febru- ary] that I had with the President when he told me to report directly to him. Well, also, I might add at the con- clusion of that meeting, as we were walking to the door' 'to "leave the office, he again complimented me on the fact' that I had done a good job during the campaign, that this had been the only issue that they had had, that they had tried to make something of it but they had been un- able to make anything of it and he was very compli- , mentary of my handling of the job. He then told me we have t, you know, you have got to fight back on situations , like this. And I can recall something I cannot express? in.writing, a gesture when he sort of put his fist into his .hand and said, you have just got to really keeping fight- ing back and I have got con- fidence in you that you can ? do that and this thing will not get out of hand. ? I am now at the March 13 meeting, where the matter of executive clemency and , the million dollars came up That would be the next in- stance in the sequence. At MarCh 13, there was a num- ber of unspecified demands for money that had come to' HOUSTON POST 18 June 1973 ? me through Mr. O'Brien. I had also been having conver- sations with Mr. Mitchell. So there was this general problem that was existing before the 13th of March as ' the suport money and how It was going to get there, That .is what prompted me to raise ',it with the President at the 'end of the meeting, because ? it was on my mind, and I told him that, you know, there were money problems, there was no money to pay these people and he said, "How much vill it cost?" I said, "My best estimate' ? Is a million dollars or more." He asked me who the de- mands were coming from. I i told him principally from Mr. Hunt through his attorney. At that point in time, he said something to the effect that, well, Mr. Hunt has already been given an assurance of clemency. He said, I talked to Mr. Ehrlichman about that and then Mr. Colson came and talked to me about it after he had been instructed not ' to talk to me about it. ; Q. I am just trying to shortenit up. Did you d' cuss Watergate with him at all? A. Not specifically, no. , Q. March 17. You had a meeting that day? A. Yes, that was St. Patrick's Day, and I recall the President had a green tie on and sit- ' siting in the Oval Office. He.: was very relaxed and he had his feet up on the desk and i ?was very ? the thing that stuck in my mind from that iparticular conversatibn was ' that he wondered if the Sen- ate would bite the bait that he had put out at his press Behind The Secrecy The Central Intelligence Agency has operated for 25 years without much inspection by Con- gress. The Federal Bureau of Investigation under the late J. Edgar Hoover went on for nearly a half-century without any substantial questioning in Congress. The secrecy that has shielded the two agencies from public informa- tion or criticiim has left both open to the description of being akin to secret police ? something for which America presuislably had no room. Perhaps that will now be changed. Senator Symington of Missouri says he will lead his Senate Armed Services subcommittee in a thor- ough investigation of the CIA. Representative Rndino of New Jersey, new chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, promises an in- quiry into the FBI. . The reasoning of the two men is similar. ,Revelations stemming from the Watergate af- fair indicate that both agencies were compro- mised by White House political control and could have been compromised further had Presi- conference on litigating over the question of Dean and executive privilege because he was convinced if they did you would never see any of'' the White House staff before , the Senate. Q. Then, I think it is also true, at least, according to my understanding, -that dur-?'' ing the rest of the year 1972 ' between the June,16 or was it if the 17th, the 17th, the ;day of the break-in, except . for a meeting on Sept. 15, even you have not testified to any discussions with the President about Watergate. Isn't that correct? A. That is, correct. Q. Now, then we come to the year 1973 and from what I have been able to gather in the questioning I have just finished your testimony is that on Feb. 28 you did dis- cuss this matter of obstruc- tion of justice and then you also testified to what you did here on March 13, and then, of course, we come to the meeting on March 21 when you told him most of what Watergate was all about. And the summary that I can see from the testimony, . the President of the United States certainly didn't know anything about all this busi- ness, to this one Senator:, until this thing on Feb. 28, acording to your testimony, and on March 13 but espec- ially, of course, the meeting on March, 21 where you did discuss with him at great length the Watergate and he a later press conference said that he learned about it on that date.. dent Nixon's plan to broaden the domestic in- telligence network been left in effect for a longer period. Representative Rodino says the situation re- garding potential "politicization" of the FBI is unhealthy. Senator Symington questions tha legality of a "secret charter" of presidential directives under which the CIA has long oper- ated without the knowledge of Congress, which created the CIA and the legal basis for operations. The plain fact of the matter is that Congress can hardly expect agencies it establishes to follow its legislative definitions closely, if it leaves those agencies entirely to presidential control hidden by the cloak of secrecy. Such agencies then become repositories of unchecked arbitrary power, as well as possible political ex- ploitation. They can become a danger to the rights and liberties of the people they are meant to serve. And the people should know about it. Congress has a duty to subject the CIA and FBI to an incisive review. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-R9E77-00432R000100180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 NEW YORK TIMES 28 JUNE 1973 Text of White House Analysis of Dean's Testimony efore Senate Watergate Unit Spotial to The New York Times ' WASHINGTON. June 27? Following is a draft of a - White House analysis of the testimony of John W. Dean 3d submitted to the Senate Watergate committee. today together with a series of .questions to he asked of Mr. Dean. A revised version of the draft analysis was read . at the committee's hearing today by Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii, and commented on at various points by Mr. Dean. The tran- script of the hearings, includ- ing the final version of the draft analysis and Mr. Dean's comments, was not available for publication for this edi- tion. The questions will be asked of Mr. Dean tomorrow. It is a matter of record that John Dean knew of and participated in the planning that went into the break-in at Watergate, though the ex- tent of his knowledge of that specific operation or of his approval of the plan ulti- mately adopted have not yet been established. There is no reason to doubt, however. that John Dean was the principal actor in the Water- gate cover-up, and that while. other motivations may have played a part, he had a great interest in covering up for himself. Dean came to the White House from Justice from a background of working on problems of demonstrations and intelligence. Among those working under him at the White House were Tom Hus- ton and Caulfield. Dean was, involved in discussions in 1971 about the Sandwedge Plan Caulfield proposed. Ehr- lichman was told that the original authors of the SI- million plan were Dean and Liddy. Whatever the ' fact about this, it is clear that Dean attended the meetings that led up to adoption of the Watergate plan. Dean in- troduced Mitchell (who had sponsored Dean for his White House position) to Liddy. Dean Liddy, and Magru- der met to discuss intelligence - plans of this kind on Jan. 27, 1972, and, together. with Mitchell, on some later date. Dean was not present at the final meeting on March 30 when the $250,000 pan was approved. It is not clear ' whether he was not there be- Icause he disapproved oo sim- ply because he was not in :Key Biscayne or because he 'wanted to trv to keep his siwn record clean. He is re- :ported as having said that he ,"didn't think it was appro- priate for him to be in on ;these conversations." He is Approved ;also reported to have said, at 'a meeting in Mitchell's office, that "we shouldn't discuss 'this in front of Mitchell or in :The Attorney General's of- 'flee." ' At some point during the spring Magruder phoned Dean rand asked him to talk to .Liddy to try and calm him ldown. Also on March 26, '1973, Dean told Haldeman that in the spring of 1972 he 'had told Haldeman that he. had been to two meetings at which unacceptable and out- landish ideas and intelligence : gathering had been rejected by himself and by Mitchell and that he, Dean, proposed not to attend any more such meetings. (Haldeman may be off on this date?compare Haldeman deposition). Halde- man has no personal recol- lection of Dean telling him about the meetings at the time but is "willing to accept that as a possibility." Whatever the facts may be on the matters .that are Uncertain in the spring of 1972 about Dean's knowledge or approval of the break-in, It must have been clear to Dean, as a lawyer, when he heard on June 17th of Water- gate, that he was in personal. difficulty. The Watergate af- fair was so clearly the out- growth of the discussions and plans he had been in on that he might be well be re- garded as a conspirator with regard to them. He must im- mediately have had reason to realize that his patron, Mitchell, would also be in- volved. There is some indication that Ehrlichman called Dean on June 17th to advise him, of the problem and to direct him to take charge of it for the White House. Even with- out an instruction, this would have been his responsibility, as counsel for the President, from the time of the occur- rence and he was active in that role from the moment of his return to the city a day- , or two after the break-in. On June 19th, Dean met with Liddy and learned, among other things, of the Ellsberg break-in. (that Dean met with Liddy and others Is confirmed in Magruder testimony) There was also a meeting that day by Dean with Mitchell, Strachan, Mar- dian, and Magruder to discuss a cover-up. A series of meet- ings, also including LaRue, followed throughout the summer. Dean was not merely one 'of the architects of the cover- up plan. He was also perhaps its most active participant. It was Dean who suggested to Haldeman that the F.B.I. was concerned that it might run into a C.I.A. operation, ing on behalf of Mitchell, who It was Dean, purportedly act- came to -Ehrlichman several weeks after the break-in to obtain approval for fund=rais- ing by Kalmbach for the ar- rested persons. It was Dean who reviewed the papers founed in Hunt's safe and de- clared that they were "politi- cally sensitive" and should , be given special treatment. It was Dean and Mitchell who prepared Magruder for his perjurous grand jury testimony. On Aug. 29th when Colson prepared a memorandum stating the facts as he knew them, and suggested it be sent to Silbert, it was Dean who Said: "For God's sake,destroy the memo, it impeaches Magruder." It was Dean who was the agent in some of the money dealings with the arrested persons. It was Dean who gave Caulfield instruc- tions on how he was to , handle McCord. 'Perfectly Situated' ? Throughout all of this Dean was perfectly situated to master-mind and to carry out a cover-up since, as counsel to the President and the man in charge for the White ? House, he had full access to what was happen- ing in the investigation by the F.B.I. He sat in on F.B.I. intreviews with White House witnesses and received in- vestigative reports. Dean and Ehrlichman met with Attor- ney General Kleindienst late in July. The Attorney Gen- eral described the investiga- tion and said that "it did not appear that any White House people or any high- ranking committee people were involved in the prep- aration or execution of, the. break-in." History fails to record that at that moment Dean cor- rected the Attorney General's erroneous impression by pointing out that, however innocently Mitchell, Magru- der. and Dean had all been involved in planning of oper- ations of which Watergate was an obvious derivative, or that Strachan had knowl- edge of the fruits of this kind of operation, or that all of them were suborning per- jury and otherwise seeking to conceal the facts. Dean's activity in the cover-up also made him, perhaps unwittingly, the prin- cipal author of the political and constitutional crisis that Watergate now epitomizes. It would have been embarrass- ing to the President if the true facts had become known shortly after June 17th, but it is the kind of embarrass- ment that an immensely popular President could have easily have weathered. ? The political problem has been magnified 1000-fold be- cause the truth is coming to light so belatedly; because of insinuations that the White House was a party to the ? cover-up, and, above all, be- cause the White House was led to say things about Watergate that have since been found to have been un-, ' true. These added conse- ? quences were John Dean's doing. ? Dean was responsible with- in the White House for be-, coming apprised of what had happened, From June 17th on Dean had periodic converse- tions with Ehrlichman "about t virtually every aspect of this case." Dean reported also to Haldeman and to Ziegler, to ' him he gave repeated assu- ranced that he made an "in- tensive investigation" and had found no White House involvement: Dean was "the ? foundation of the proposition , that the White House was. not involved." With the election nassed and public interest in Water- nate on the Wane. Dean may have thought that this coy-, er-up had ? been a success, although he purported to continue an ongoing investi- gation. In February, however, with the Ervin committee be- ginning its work. the Presl-? dent was concerned that all.; of the available facts be trade known. In the middle of February, 1973, Dean and Richard Moore met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman at San Cle- mente. Dean was assigned to reduce "to written form all of the detailed facts as they related both to the com- mittee to re-elect and the" White House." Dean was ? pressed continually for that statement, particularly by Haldeman, but never pro- ? duced it. QUESTIONS 1. You quote the President as saying on Feb. 27th that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were "principals" in the' Watergate matter and that therefore you could be more objective. What did you understand by this? Did you have any evidence then or now that Ehrlichman had prior knowledge of the break- in? 2. If the President was re- ferring to post June 17th events, were you not equally a "principal' as you china 1,4 For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 to have indicated to the President on Sept. 15th? ? 3. Your 245 page statement,, Is remarkable for the detail ', ? with which it recounts events and conversations occurring over a period of many . months. It is particularly re- markable in view of the fact . that you indicated that it was prepared without benefit. of notes or a daily diary. Would you describe what , ? documents were available to you in addition to those. . which have been identified as ? 1-exhibits? 4. Would you tell the com- mittee on what other sources,: ) if any, your process of recon- e,struction was based? 5. Have you always had a 'facility for recalling the dc-' "tails of conversations which l; took place many months ago? i. 6. Specifically with regard to 'the meeting of Sept. 15, ' 0.1972, were there any notes of ' f other documents that you'' !.? used to, refresh your recollec- tion? ? ? 7; Did you discuss thld: ? , meeting' with anyone at that',; , time or at any time since? ) 8. Would you again , r? state for the record your rec- ollection of that meeting,' Compare with the version , in the prepared statement tot? see if it appears either ?In-r, consistent or memorized. .+ 9. You indicated in your' testimony yesterday that yote,..: were certain after the Sept. A ' 15th meeting that the Presi- dent was fully aware of the cover-up, did .you not? 'Won Your Spurs' 10. And you further testi- . ? tied that you believed that you "had won your spurs" *) in handling the cover-up by ' Feb. 27th when you were . ,? told by the President that you , would report to him directly, , . isn't that correct? ? 11. If that was the case, ' why did you feel it necessary. on Feb. 27th to tell the Presp',- dent that you had been par- ? ticipating In a cover-up and therefore might be' charge- f..? able with obstruction of jus-, tice? ?'. 12. If, as you assume, the'r ? President was ware of the , cover-up and you had "won . your spurs," wouldn't that .? have been perfectly obvious? 13. Did you and your coun- sel develop a strategy for ob- t ? ,)taining immunity from pro- secution? What , were the elements of that strategy? - 14. Didn't your strategy , include deliberate leaks of . information to the media on :'what you had told investiga- tors and what you might be . prepared. to testify about in ' .; in the future? How were ; these contacts with the media handled? Who represented., )1you and what individual. .members of the press were contacted? Were any of the., stories or quotes attributed - to you or sources close' to: 7.; you inaccurate? If so, whati, if any steps did you take to,.; correct these stories? ? ; 15. Mr. Dean, one point of' distinction you drew in your testimony puzzles me. You ? have testified that you had' received and placed in your safe the sum Apprieed which you never turned over 'to anyone because you didn't want funds you had physical- ly handled to be used for payments to the Watergate, defendants. You also testi- fied that you called Mr. Stand, and asked him for $22,000 to make the $350,000 fund' whole, and that you had your' , deputy, Mr. Fielding, go to Mr. Stans's office, pick up? the money and later ,deliver It directly 'to Mr. Strachan? knowing ,that .$22;000 would, probably be ?used for 'pay- mens to the Watergate de- fendants. Now do you mean to imply that you think there ? Is some moral basis for this distinction, or were you just ? being cautious to protect yourself technically from -; committing the criminal of- tense of obstructing justice !"(at the expense of implicating your deputy)? : Role of Fielding ' ? 16. Mr. Dean, you have testified as to your close working relationship to your ,deputy, Mr. Fielding. It was he who' you sent to pick up the $22,000 from Mr. Stens, . he who helped you sort the documents from Mr. Hunt's safe and he who went to ' England to retrieve Mr: Young's secretary. Did Mr. Fielding know that you 'were Involved in a conspiracy' to , obstruct justice, perjure ' testimony and pay defend-: ants for their silence?.' ' 17. (If answer "no").: If. Your deputy, Mr. Fielding,. ' who worked so closely with 'you, and who carried out , some of your missions con? nected with the conspiracy, had absolutely no, knowledge "of the cover-up conspiracy, how do you so blithly assume, 12" that others on the White. ?? House staff and even the. , President did know of your: t.:conspiracy? ? ' 18. Mr. Dean, beginning in late . May and, early. June; there were a series of news- '..Paper stories reporting with '!--what you had told various" Hnvestigators as quotek sources close to you as to! / what you had said. A number, f..1 of these reports, for example the one story in The Wash- ...itigton Post of June 3, al- leged that.. you began your private meetings with the'? President either early in, the't year, or as in the case of this'!' particular story beginning on January 1st. According to your testimony today, your ' first private meeting with the President in 1973 was not until Feb. 27. Did you or did you not tell investigators \ and/or friends that you be- gan meeting with the Presi- dent personally either the first of the year or begin-. !;ning Jan. 1, and were these , stories an attempt to exag- gerate The length 'of, time which you had been daling directly with the President and by implication imparting tri him knowledge of ? the Watergate? ? ? . Leaks and Immunity 19. Mr. Dean. the number of source stories containing allegations against the Presi- _dent_ attributed directly or For Kelease 2001/08/07 indirec? tly to 'you' over the last four or five weeks have been most numerous. Do you , deny that these stories were planted in a calculated at- tempt to influence Federal o. prosecutors to believe .you had such important testimony that they should 'give you transactional immunity, from .. the crimes which you have o committed in return for your testimony against others? 20. Mr. Dean, the May 14, 1973 edition of Newsweelc ,,.carried a long article abotit you and your prospective tes- t.- this article you her of were q ,1 times and in' many Instances the quotes in that article were word-by-word identical to the testimony you have given this week. Indeed, for the most part this Newsweek article was a very 'accurate .preview summary of the., lengthy 'statement which you. detailed before this commit-. 'tee. There are, however, sev- eral very noticeable differ-. .ences. One difference is an omission from the testiniony you gave here. ' , You told this committee'. that when the President dis-, . cussed the matter of your in- vestigation of Watergate. you, did not tell him you made no", such investigation. The News- week article, however, re- ports that in your meeting with the President of March ,21, and I quote, "Dean also bore down hard. he said, on the fact that .there had never' been any .study clearing' 'white House staffers. , "Mr. Nixon replied that lie" 'had had verbal reports of , Dean's Work. but the counsel 'insisted, 'nobody asked me- - for a report. Mr. President.' he said. 'I did not go around' asking people questions in ? their offices. There was. no report.' At this point, sources quoted Dean, as 'saying that 'the President came out. of his chair' into a half crouch of astonishment and shock." ? If the Newsweek account is Correct, Mr. Dean, the President's reaction was most inconsistent with that ? to whic hyou have testified before this committee. Did you or did you not tell the President that you had never conducted an investigation, and have you made the statement previously that "the President came out of his chair into a half crouch of astonishment and shock"? Operation Sandwedge 21. Mr. Dean, did I under-' stand you to testify earlier that you had led Mr. Caul-. field to believe you were as- .sisting him in obtaining ap-' proval and funding for what he called Operation 'Sand- wedge, but that in fact you let Operation Sandwedge die a natural death? 22. If answer is affirma- tive: I call your attention to Exhibit 'No. 11 which is a memorandum for the Attor- ney General from John Dean, dated Jan. 12, 1972, and I call your attention to the first sentence of the second paragraph which says, "Open; ation Sandwedge will be in need for refunding at the : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001 1.S end of this month, so the time is quite appropriate for such a review." Mr. Dean, if you let Operation Sandwedge, die a natural death, why did you state to Mr. Mitchell that it would be in need of re- ' funding at the ned of Jan-, uary? 23. Mr. Dean, if I recall correctly you testified to this committee that it .was not your idea for Magruder's diary to be altered nor were you aware before Mr. Ma- gruder testifed before the grand jury last September that Mr. Magruder would tes- tify that the first meeting appearing' i nhis diary had been canceled, and the sec- ond meeting had been to dis- cuss election laws. On both' ' of these points your testi- mony is in direct conflict with the sworn testimony of Mr. Magruder. Are we to be- lieve that Mr. Magruder lied as to these details concern; ing you, and if that is your position, what could Mr. Magruder's motive be for lying about the details of the, manner in which Mr. Ma- gruder's perjury was con- ceived? 24. Mr. Dean, Ma- ? gruder also testified that Mr., Liddy told him that you, among others, had indicated :he would have a million dol- lars for his plans which he had been working on before 1,,he even came to the comil- ' tee. You testified, on the other hand, that you were :surprised when Mr. Liddy briefed his million dollar in- telligence plan to Mr. Mit- 'chell in your presence. To what motive do,you attribute ?Mr. Liddy' S 'report to' Mr. 'Magruder that you knew 'About his' extensive plan be- fore you saw them in Mr., :Mitcsell's office? . Meeting With Krogh 25. Mr. Dean, just prior to taking Mr. Liddy to meet Mr. Magruder in early Decem- ber,. 1972, did you and Mr. Liddy not have a meeting with Mr. Egil Krogh and did you not at that time tell Mr. Liddy he would have one mil-, lion dollars for intelligence ?gathering 'at' the committee?, . 26. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder, , testified that in March 1972? Mr. Liddy had threatened to kill Mr. Magruder and that Mr. Magruder made a deci- sion to terminate Mr. Liddy's 'employment. In this connec- tion, Mr. Magruder testified that he received a call from you encouraging him not to become personally concerned. about Mr. Liddy and not to let personal animosity get in the way of Mr. Liddy's proj- ect. Did you in March inter-. cede with Mr. Magruder on. Mr. Liddy's behalf and if so, since you have said you as- sumed Mr. Liddy's intelligence project died after your meet- ing in February, what , was the project of Mr. Liddy that you urged Mr. Magruder to give priority over his per- sonal animosities? 27. Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruler testified under oath that prior to his August 16 grand Jury appearance at a meeting 00180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 In your office, you told' him ? .that if the worst happened, "everything would he taken care of, even executive clem- ency:" Did you make such a promise of executive clem- ency to Mr. Magruder as he . testified and if so, did you have authority from anyone , else to make such an offer,, ';or was it on your own in- itiative? ?? ? ? 28. Mr. Dean, you have de- picted all others in the White House as excessively preoccu- ,pied with political intelli- glnce, use of court methods and security, and yourself as a restraining influence. on :these preoccupations. Yet, Your background, of responsi- bilities at the Justice Departv ment seems to suggest that your experience in these very, types of activities might have contributed to your being in-, ;,vited to join the White House ,staff. What precisely were ?your duties in connection, with demonstrations while you were at the Justice De- partment? 29. Immediately after you were appointed counsel . to the President, did you not take over the responsibilities of Mr. Tom Huston in con- nection with intelligence ac- tivities? 30. You did testify, did you not, that political intelligence was routed to you in the White House? Memorandum Cited 31. Mr. Dean, I believe that' you were the author of the memorandum to the Attorney General which led to the establishment of the intelli- gence evaluation committee.' ,Did you hold the first meet- ing of that committee in your office? 32. Were you not the one on the White House staff who levied requirements on. and received the reports from, the intelligence evaluation committee? ? , ? . 33. In interagency meet- ings to plan for handling , demonstrations, were you not., the White House representa- tive? 34. in .The St. Louis Post- Dispatch. of May 14, 1973,1 there is a report that you at- tempted to recruit a Depart-. ment of Interior employe, Mr. Kenneth Tapman, for under- cover work at the Democratic convention. Did you attempt to recruit Mr. Tapman, or any others for undercover work, and what prior experi- ence did you have in recruit- Ing for undercover work? 35. Mr. Dean, you have testified concerning your on : versations on three different occasions with Gen. Vernon Walters, the deputy . director of C.I.A., beginning on the 26th of June. General, Wal- ters prepared a memorandum' for the record of each of these conversations with you. In General Walter's memo- randum for the record for', your meeting with him on 26 June, you are, reported to have asked General Walters' Whether there was not some way that the Central Intelli- gence Agency could pay bail for the Watergate defend- ants, and if the men went to prison could C.I.A. find some, Iway to pay their salaries, ? while they were in jail out, of covert actions funds. In your testimony you made no' mention of asking General Walters whether the C.I.A. . could pay the Watergate de- fendants' bail or salaries while they were in prison.' Was this' an intended omis-' , sin on your part in the. in" 'Wrests of saving them, or do you deny .that you made these specitic requests ofl ? General Walters? 36. Mr. Dean, I believe you testified that on March 26th, :while you were at Camp' David, you called Mr. Mar- gulls, the attorney, for Mr. Liddy, and asked for a state- ,ment by Mr. Liddy that you, had no prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. Is that correct? ? 37. Now you also testified, did you not, that it was on March 28th that Mr. Halde- man called you to meet with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ma- -gruder and that it was at that time you became con.' victed 'you had to look out for yourself, isn't that cor- rect? 38. If you were, as you, testified, still a part of the cover-up team on March 26th, why were yo utrying to get material to absolve yourself at that point? 39. If on March 26th, after ,you, according to your testi- mony, had admitted to mak- ing payments to Watergate defendants to obstruct jus- tice, offering clemency to the' defendants to bostruct justice', and suborning perjury, you, were still actively trying to build your defense against ,having prior knowledge of the break-in. on March 26th,, doesn't this demonstrate that throughout this affairs your 'motivation was to protect yourself against the criminal charge of authorizing and directing the Watergate break-in?. , ; 40. You Stated that Me' Maroulis called -you back ort the "29th: of March' and told you he could not get you the statement you wanted from ? Mr. Liddy. Did you, record, 'either of these telephoiie versations you had with Mr,) ,Maroulis? .? 16 41. A central credibilit3.01; question is: What prompted Dean's tactics in March and/ April 1973?the desire WI have the truth told or: the ;effort to achieve immunity, from prosecution. The follow.i ing sequence of events important: ?Dean's admitted personal, connection with the, offer of. clemency to McCord in Jatf-'. uary (Dean to Caulfield toc McCord via Ulasewicz) (p.4 141). ?Dean's admitted personal, connection with Hunt's de-, mand for more money on; March 19 (Hunt .to O'Brien, to Dean). . ?Dean's meeting with the'! President on March 21-22. On any version of this meeting is was an effort to get the, President to take action on; what was becoming a per.; sonal problem for Dean. ---,McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March,23. This was, the critical break in the, cover-up. Dean learned via a, call from O'Brien. On March 25 press comments directly linked Dean with knowledge of the Watergate break-in., He called Liddy's attorney, Maroulin, on March 27th to, get a statement that he did. not have prior knowledge of: break-in. Maroulis called back on March 29th with word that he couldn't give, him a statement. This state-,. ment might have been taped.' On March ,28th and March 29th he solicited names oc criminal counsel, On. March, 30th, he decided to retaid.: Mr. Shaffer. ' Time had run out; the cov-,, er-up had come apart; 'Dean was centrally involved. He sent his lawyers to the U. S.4 attroney on Monday, April and commenced his negotia-t Lions for immunity." ' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 a Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 WASHINGTON POST 27 June 1973 ents on U.S. thering Plan Re fallowing documents, released by thitSenatii select Watergate committee yesterday,' are memos discussing a do- , mestic intelligence - gathering plan ? which included possible burglaries, wire- - taps and mail searches?that President' Nixon. said he approved in midJuly, 197p, but then rescinded on July 28, 197p, , \The plan ? was drafted at/ the Presi-.. denVs direction by a federal interagency committee, according to Thomas Charles.! Hu,ston, then a 'presidential aide, whb , Aimed up the plan and corresponded about it with varioui federal agencies : and :presidential assistant II. R. ( Bob ) ,Haldeman in a series of memos. , I ? ,. The first memo, dated July 14, 1970,4 indicates President Nixon's approval Of thei,plan,as submitted by Huston. . . July 14, 1970 TOP SECRET" ' MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUSTON'A S013.TECT: . ,Dennestic intelligence Review. "The recommendations you have' proe', posed as a result of the review have beefrapproved by the President. ' 1:Ie does not, hOwever, want to folio* the,procedure you outlined on page 4 ot,your memorandum regarding Imple- ".meztatlon. He ? would prefer that the. thing simplybe put into motion on the', basis of this approval. ? . -The formal official memoranduiri';: of course, be prepared and that ? stMuld be the device by which to carry '" ?' tealize this is contrary to your feek int as to the best way to get this done.,' ;If'Yo.0 feel very strongly that this prOt? .cticitire Won't Work you had better let:? . me' know and we'll take another stab,' at It. Otherwise let's go ahead. ? '?=4, .$ ? ' 1' H. R. HALDEMAN-, .{1n May, 1973, President Nixon, * ,firsts. informing the nation of this plsn,? said that he had rescinded it an July 28,...1970, just five days after word, to, implement it had gone out from Huston. to,, the various agencies. (The rest of the memos released tei?day by the Senate committee, how- ei;c1r, arc dated after July 28, 1970. (The first, dated Aug. 5, 1970, refers to irscheclii/cd meeting at which Halde- man was to discuss the plan with the late :FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Web Attorney General John N. Mitch. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON . ? August 5, 1970 5. ,The biggest risk we could take, in Top Secret . my opinion, is 'to &infinite to regard Haudle Via .Comint, Channels Only ' thAiblence'on the campus ard in the Eyes Only . . eitthi aS a temooraiy phen Memorandum Forut-App--11-rov--1121""nerrPbr Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDPYPV04 ence- el se ,From: Tom Charles Huston Subject: Domestic Intelligence In, anticipation of your meeting with Mr. .Hoover and the Attorney General I would like to pass on these thoughts I. More than the FBI is involved in this operation. NSA, DIA, CIA, and the ilitary services all have a great' stake a a great interest. All of these agen c 6-supported the options selected by the President. For your private infor mation, so did all the members of Mr Hoover's staff who worked orti the report t(he'd fire, them if he knew this.) which will simply go away as soon as the.Scranton Commission files its re- port, The one statement that Rennie Dayis made at HEW which I thought made sense was that the Attorney Gen- eral:was kidding himself when he said ? the;eampuses would be quiet this fall., D4Vis predicted that at least 30 wouldi 14 closed down in September. I don't Ake to make predictions, but I am not ?af all convinced, on the basis of the in- . teThgence I have seen, that we are any- way near over the hump On this prob- letfi,'and I am convinced that the p0- ',for even greater violence is praent and we have a positive oblige- tioli( to. take every .step within our? power to prevent it. 6. hoover can be expected to raise the hallowing points In yourmeeting:, ) "Our ' present efforts are -ode- qtiiite." The answer is bullshit! This is particularly true' with regard to FBI campus coverage. -.lb). "The eiiks are too great; these, folks' are going to get the President into trouble and RN had better listen to .me." The answer is that we have considered the risks, we believe they are acceptable and justified under the circumstances. We are witting to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where the se- curity'of the country is at stake. Noth- ing we propose to do has not,been, done in the past ? and in the past it was always done successfully. ? (c) "I don't have the personnel to do 'the job the President wants done." The answer Is (1) he has the people and/or (2) he can get them. (d) "I don't object to NSA condnet- ing surreptitious entry if they want , to.", The answer is that NSA doesn't have the people, can't get them, has no authority to get them, and shouldn't, have to get them. It is an FBI job. ? (Paragraph has been deleted by the Senate committee for national security !awns.) ?i3:$ We Are not getting the type of hard intelligence we need at the White Heuse. We will not get ,it until greater effort 'is made through community- wide coordination' to dig out the in- forMation by -using all the resources potentially available. It is, of course, a mater of balancing the obvious risks' ? against 'the desired results. I thought We 'balanced thee risks rather objec- tifely lir the report, and Hoover is es- ealating the risks in order to cloak his determination to continue to do busi- ness as usual; . -4:4At? some point, Hoover has to he , told; who is President. Me has become ' totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our domestic intent- I gence operations, In the ? past two weeks, he has terminated all FBI liai- sorrwith NSA, DIA, the military serv- ices, Secret Service ? everyone except the' White House, , lie terminated liai- son with?CIA in May. This is bound to have a crippling effect upon the entir community and Is contrary to his pub-- liwassurance to the President at the meeting that there was close and effec- tive. coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. It Is Important to remember that the en- tire intelligence, community knows that the Presidentmade a positive de- cision to go ahead and Hoover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he gets his way it is going to look like he Is' more .powerful than the President, He?had his say in the footnotes and RN:decided against him. That should close the ,matter and I can't under- stand why the AG is a party to reopen- Infra. All of us are going to look damn sillyln the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Ben- nett; and the military chiefs if Hoover scate,unilaterally reverse a ? Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to pre- pare and which, on its 'merits, was a first-rate, objective job. 17 (e) "If we do these things, the ' 'jackets (sic) of the press' and the , ,ACLU will find out; we can't avoid leaks." Answer: We can avoid leaklv, by using trained, trusted agents and. restricting knowledge of sensitive op- erations on a strict need to know basis. We do this on other sensitive opera. lions every day. 0) "If I have to do these things, the', Attorney General will havuto approve , them in writing," This is eit'to the AG', , but I would tell hoover that he has been instructed to do them by the President and he is to do them on that , authority, lie needn't look for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President and he doesn't need a writ- ten memo from the AG. To maintain ? 32 7AN void written com- graalit sten. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 (g), ''We don't need an Inter:Agency - .Committee on Intelligence Operntions ? because (1) we're doing fine right now ..,--good coordination, etc.?and .(2) 'there are other existing groups which can handle this assignment." The an- swer is that we are doing lousy .right ,now and there aren't other groups . ,which can do the job we have in mind' 'because: (1) they don't rheet; (2) they don't have the people on them we want ,or have some people we don't want; (3) they don't have the authority to do what we want done; (4) ultimately this new operation will replace, them; and (5), they aren't linked to the whlte lionse staff. ' There are doubtless another dozen or so specious arguments that Hoover ,will 'raise, but they wilt be of similar quality. I hope that you will be able to, convince the AG of the importance Mut necessity of getting Hoover tp go, along. We have worked for nearly a ;year to reach this point; others have worked far longer and had abandoned hope. I believe we are talking .about the future of this country, for surely domestic violence and )disorder threaten the very fabric of our society. 'Intelligence is not the cure, but it,can .provide the diagnosis that makes a .cure possible. More importantly,- it can provide us with the meam to prevent the deterioration of the situation. Per- haps lowered voices and peace in Viet- nam will defuse the tense situation ,we Lace, but I wouldn't want to reIY? on it exclusively. There is this final point. For eigh- teen months we have watched people in this government ignore the President's orders, take actions to embarrass him, promote themselves at his expense, and generally make his job more diffi- cult. It makes me fighting- mad, and what Hoover is doing here is putting 'himself above the President. If , he thought the Attorney General's advice. should be solicited, he should have , done so before the report was sent to the President. After all, Hoover was chairman of the committee and he t could have asked the AG for his corn- . .ments. 13ut no, he didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the Presi- dent would not, agree' with his foot- noted objections. He thought all he' had to do was put in a footnote and the matter was settled. He had abso- lutely no interest in the views of NSA, CIA, DTA, and the military services, and obviously he has little interest in our views, or 'apparently even in the decisions of the President. I don't see - how we can tolerate this, but being a , fatalist, if not a realist, I am pripared to accept the fact that we may.have to 4 do so. (Signed) Tom TOM CHARLES HUSTON I e4sto tifiiiinfi Convention o could becOme s the first battleground for a new wave of ? 'youthful violence. Coming just as the scheol year begins, it could :serve as a ? catalyst for widespread campus disor- ders. , I recommend that you meet .with the ,rs,Attorney, General and' secure his sup-.- i'.port for the President's decisions, that :the t)irector be informed that the deci- i sions?will stand, and ? that all ,intelli- gence agencies are to proceed to ,irn? .plement them ationce., is. (Signed) Toni t . . TOM CHARLES HUSTON' /' (The. next memo went to the Internal .k ?Revenue Service which had been asked, :,.as part of domestic intelligence plan, to reziew lhe income tax compliance of, ,'certaini,dividuals and organizations.) ? Angust 14, 1970 i, , Memorandum For: ROGER' V. BARTH- '? , Assistant to the Commissioner, IRS Subject: Ideological Organizations ? ? 'Could you give a progress report on the activities of the Compliance Divi- siona in reviewing the operatiens of Ideological Organizations? .? ' L would be interested in. knowing what' progress has been 'made; since Jury 1, 1969, when we first expressed our % interest in this matter. ? Thank you.. TOM ,CHARLES ,HUSTON MEMORANDUM ? 'THE WHITE HOUSE CONFIDENTIAL August 7, 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDE- ' MAN SUBJECT: DOMESTIC . 'INTELLI- GENCE REVIEW . Mr. Hoover has departed for the " West Coast where he plans to vacation for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems sur- roUnding our Domestic Intelligence op- erations, we will be into the ,new school year without any preparation. . The situation in Portland is begin. ninft.to look veryjeriSe?the American . September 19,1970, MEiVIORANDLIM FOR: H o no r able Torn Charles Huston ? The White, House FROM: Commissioner, of Internal - Revenue. ? In response to Our mern-orandum !, dated August 14, 1970, we have pre- pared the attached status report on the Special Service Group. I, would stress that knowledge of the existence and - operations of this- Group- should be ?.4 carefully. limited. . ? RANDOLPH W. THROWER Attachment - ' STATUS REPORT ON, ? SPECIAL SERVICE GROUP In August 1969 the Senate Commit- tee on Government 'Operations held 'open hearings on several controversial organizations including the Black Pan- ther Party, Student. National Coordi- nating ',CoMthittee; Republic of New . Africa, and, Students for Democratic Society. Information developed during ? these hearings established that various organilations; categorized as extrem- ists on the right, or left, presented problems to the Internal Revenue in the organizations were not in eompli- 'ance with Internal Revenue laws. In- formation developed in these bearings indicated that extremist organizations were receiving financial support from various sources. Some of the individu- als 'involved in the forefront of these organizations filed tax returns reflect- ing very nominal income, or did not file at all, although they were obvi-' ously expending substantial amounts of funds. ? ? Recognizing the responsibilities.'of the Internal Revenue Service to ad.' minister taxing statutes without re- gard to the social or political objec- fives of individuals or organizations, a decisien was made to establish a me- thod of accumulating and disseminat- ing information on all activist groups to Insure that the organizations and the leaders of the organizations are complying with Internal Revenue Service, functioning under the .As- sistant Commissioner (Compliance), special compliance group; Was estab-4 ,lished to receive and analvie all avail- able Information on orgartizations and1 individuals promoting extremist views and philosophies. The identification of 4 , - organizations and individuals included in the program is 'without regard to the philosophy of Political ',posture Involved; rather, it f's directed to the notoriety of the, individual or organi.,) zation and the probability of publicity that might result from their activities and the likelihood that ,this notoriety would lead to inquiries regarding their ,1 tax status. Another important consid- eration was the degree of probability,' ; that the individuals ,might be deliber..i ately avoiding their tax responsibilil tics. , The staff responsible for this Reify." ity was first designated as the Activist' Organizations Group, but it recently', was changed to "Special Service Group"to avoid any erroneous impres- sion of its objectives. The function of the Special Service Group is to obtain,, consolidate and disseminate any in- formation on individuals or organiza- tions (including' major financial spon- sors of the ? individuals or organizations) that would have tax im- plications under the Internal Revenue' laws. Liaison has been established with , all investigative and law enforcement agencies and with Senate anti House, Investigating Committees. The Group also subscribes' to various underground publications as a source of Information on matters involving taxable Income of individuals, activities of organizations having or seeking tax exempt status, and identity of individuals' or exempt . organizations providing financial sup.' .port to activist groups. In the case of "financial support" our interest is to , he able to determine that donors do not receive tax benefit from the firm- ? cial assistance where such benefit is not clearly allowable by law. As information is accumulated ? on the activities or financial support of particular organizations or taxable in- come of individuals it is referred to ? the appropriate field ?offiee of the In- ternal Revenue Service for enforce ment attion.' Field Offices may be asked to investigate the activities of ? organizations which have been held to be exempt as charitable organizations; they may be asked to investigate the income tax liability of individuals who have openly expCnded substantial sums of money without obvious means of support or they may be asked to in- vestigate alleged violations of.the fire-, arms statutes falling within the juris- diction of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearins DiVisi on. It is Important to note that' alt hough various types of information about or- ganizatiOns or individuals' is obtained by the Service from cooperating agen- cies, only that information relating to tax status is recorded and /dissemi- nated to field Offices. The ttiile . tive of the Special Service. Group Is to provide a greater degree of assurance of maximum. compliance with the In- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RIE8P77-00432R000100180001-7 I Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 ? ternal fleventie.laws bYtholte involved In extremist activities and those pro- viding financial support to these activt.: ties. ' ? , To date the efforts of the Special Service Group has been confined to :manual compilation and consolidation of information on approximately 1,025' organizations 'and 4,300 , Data on 26 organizations and 43 indi viduals has been referred to the field for enforcement action. While it is still to early to have completed many of: the field investigations, criminal inves- tigations are under way on 4 individu-" ills and 1 organization. Delinquent taX' . returns have, been obtained from 2 or-? ? ganizations with combinvl tax liability " of $29,559. On the basis of information furnished by this "group" application :for exempt status has been denied to 8 ? organizations. It is the view of officials ..? ,'of the Internal Revenue Service that ? ?this ."intelligence." activity and field enforcement is necessary to avoid alle-, gation that, extremist organizations ? nore taxing statutes with immunity. : MEMORANDUM ? ? 1 ) THE WHITE HOUSE? ? ? September 21, 1970 'MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. Haldeman SUBJECT: IRS Rz Ideoldgical Organ- ? ? izations ? ? - . am attathing a copy of a report from the IRS on. the activities of its ? . '. "Special Service Group" which is stip- posed to monitor the activities of brie;,,. ?logical, organizations [e.g.; . Jerry ?, Rubin Fund, Black Panthers; etc.] andy:;'. take! appropriate action when viola- tions. of IRS regulations turn up. You., ? will note that the report is long on", ' words and 'short on substance. Nearly 18 months ago, the President? ' indicated a desire for IRS to move-iii . against leftist organizations taking ad-., vantage of tax shelters.' I have been .4., pressing 1I3S since that time to no avail, , ? What %we cannot do in a courtroom ? , via criminal prosecutions to curtail ' the activities of some of these groups,* IRS could do by administrative ac- tion. Moreover, valuable Intelligence-7 ? ? type information could be turned up 4.? ..by 'IRS as a result of their field audits.? .? ? (signed) T H :TOM CHARLES HUSTON ? MEMORANDUM ? THE WHITE HOUSE./ ; ? August' 25, 1970, ? MEMORANDUM FOR /' H. H. NALflEMAN .' ? ? ? SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD . On Monday; August 24, the Senate' . approved the budget fb.f SACB by a vote of 44 to 28. The principal objec- ::: tion?as might .be ex6ectedL4vq/(thlit the Board has 'nothing to act tditildifY the $400,000 a. yeata budgeteft. 'Among" : those supporting .citator Prokmire in/ this atgument' ere John WilitanVi Peter Dominic tsarld Len Je atti+.4 , conservatives a In clefendiryz4the 'approprtall4Seri:, ator McClellan .At the majoriiy.. and' ? Senator? Ifrtiskiri :for the mittority . argued that the Administration intbnds. to make effectlVe use of .the Beard,' Senator. McClellan.. ,*as quite, specific.' " in his opiniadthat the current'internar, security threat requires ,,u'ornpt, and. " effective. action 'from ? the Administrti- i tion:. , , . . The appropriations measure should ?come .ciown for thovaeoatpstnel ture later this week-.111111 should now proceed to 4111 the vacancies on the .Board and give! ser-' ious consideration to the Executive.' Orderr expanding, the powers of," the .r Board. . I have recommended to Hafry Flein.: ? ming that we reappoint John Mahan hs Chairman and Otto Otepka as mettn- ber Of the Board.,Mahan is under 'the ?'; patrohage of Mike Mansfield WhSsc support Is crucial." Moreover, he is a competent enough fellow who is ai team player and will cooperAte wit# us completely. Otepka's reaPpotntritatitN strikes me as imperative. 1 / / ? ' Thece. is ?Some question .1Vhe1fer should appoint a Republican' fit Board' chairman. Normally, I wouict think so', ..? .but I believe the Unique cirEutnstances we face with tills Board suggest' other,..!.! wise. Otepka is tob controversial to be chairman', Paul O'Neal Is too im?:?-.? petuous, and John Patterson is too old. We can work Well With Mahan and I see no reason for' replacing., him as chairman. The fad that he.is a Demo- ? crat and 'close to. Mansfield; is a plus: in ?my opinioh. . 71;,. As soon as a' decision isil,'?Made on' these nominatiohsi I plan tri:ineet with John Ashbrook and. Dick Ielierd to cuss, some ? of , the legislatiVe,prriposals pending` before the HouSd., Internal. Security .Cominittee which pertain.. W.; the activities or,the. Board. Once wel get feel for what these people believe we' should 'do, we- will be in?sa position,' to re-evaluate' the alternativei. open to, *us. The point', hoWever, which' we. Peed, to keep in mind is that we' eannot.afford 'to let the Board 'sit idle oreoptent itself: with investigating. bid tine' Corenitteist fronts which are largely irrelevant to our current problem. After the bombing ht sua-: pect that the public is fully prepared to accept the' concept 'that the Federal " Governnicnt 'ought -to take an active': interest in the activities of viblent'-actitin organizations; as 'we' propOSO 'in the' Executive Order. " (Sighed)" T.' H. , TOM CHARLES HUSTON.' , I (The next memo suggests, using the'? interagency intelligence network to liege, stop airplane hijackings. '*hite .House ? aide Peter Flanagan, who. ()lien .Sei?ved,: as liaison With 'the had been detailed 'by Some higher White House official to 'deal 'with theikijacking.. , problem.) ? ? ? MEMORANDUM THE WHITE- HOUSE" ??, / I might add that we haven't seen .thing yet. If. this incident In The Mid." east poses problems, wait until..sorne:. :of our home-gtoWn fedayeen decide to, i,emulate theirpeets: . . ? (Signed) T. H..t?, TOM CHARLES HUSTON THE WHITE 110tISI?1 September 18, 1970" TOP SECRET: ? ? ? . ? THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. , Pursuant to our conversation yester, ? 1:rthiy; September 17, 1970, I sutigesCille, cfollbwing procedures to commente btir . domestic intelligence operation ati quickly as possible. , Inieragency Domestic Intelligenee4 : t Wt. A key to the entire operatien will, t.bh:thetreation of a interagenen Intel- ligence unit for both operational and , evaluation purposes. Obviously, the t 'selection ,.of persons to this unit will of vital importance to the success! Of the ritiSsion. As we discussed, the; ? selection of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several t reasons. -First, effective coordination of the different agencies, must be,tcle- veloped at an early stage through the .; establishment of the unit. Second, ;? Hoover-has indicated a strong. opposi- . tion to the creation of such a unit and,,,, to bring the Fill fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to1? , guarantee their proper and full Par-, ticipation 'in the program. Third, the , unit can 'serve to make appropriate,. ,:recommendations for, the type of in-. f?telligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe we 'agreed that it would be inappropriate "to have ;any blanket .removal of re- 1strictions; rather, the most appropriate ? f.procedure would be to decide on the.: type of intelligence we need, based on !: an, assessment of the recommendations Of this unit, and then to, proceed to /. rernOve the restraints as necessary to ? !;.obtain such intelligence,' To proceed to create the !,agency intelligence unit,' particultiely evalUation group or committee, 1 reeontritend that we t?equest the names F of four'nominees from eaCh Of the! '? inte,Ifigence agencies involved.' While thd precise composition of the unit Vary'. as we gain exerience,t I think, that two members should be/hp-. ., pointed Initially from each aceney. in 'addition :to your personal reprrisenta-? t* ? h lye .w o. should also be involved ? -? ? September 10, 19'70 ? the proceedings; Because of 'the intent MEMORANDUM'FQR H. 4., HALDE-, agency aspects of this request, it wbuld? , MAN ? ? . probably be best If the?r'equeat came I unde'rstand thaiiin the. course of: from the White liouse,ilf you agree, . Peter Flanigan's (si0 meeting on?steps,; I,,' will make such a feqbest of 'the to minimize the risk of future air hi?, .f?'6g.cricY 'heads; however, I feel that ' jackings the'queStion of increased. use essential that you wolit this 'out. of intelligence Information arose.,and,: 'with Hoover before I? ha ,.06 any deal k? Ings with him dir'ectly. r' " ? that the Bureau. Is to submit recom- mendations in 'thi's regard. . . 2. Housing. We discussed ? the ??ap.' ; It strikes me that this exercise will.. propriate housing of this operation th , ? amount to?noing more than a retrac- . and, upon' reflection, I believe kthat. Ing of the steps we' took in June to no rather than a White House :staffer look. avail. This is but one more example of, tog for suitable space, that a prefeso. ..tho crying need ?for , inter-community sional 'intelligence person should be coordination on a systematic and for... assigned 'the task of locating" such anal basis. In this area, for example, ., space., .Accordingly, I would t suggesty ? there are resources yet untapped, i.e., that a request be made that Mr. iloov-, Customs, the military services, ?er assign an agent to this task., In ton-- .which? will remain untapped so long as Inection with the housing problem,' I .Mr." Hoover runs a one-man show. ? think serious consideration must. he I don't know the extent of Peter, s, given to the appropriate Justice De- experience in intelligence matters, but. partment cover for the domestic Intel- he should be aware that paper plans .licence operation.'We diseUsSed yester-: don't always translate into effective ac.. day using IDIU as 'a cover' and as I in--I ekg'2001/08/077:' CIA-RDP77L00432R000100180001-7 1C Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 '.dicated I believe that that is a most 4ttiproprlate cover. I believe thlit it' Is: enerally felt that. IDIU s already a nar more extensive intern eneelopera-1 ? Lion than ,has been mantic) ed I, and that the IDIU operation" covet ' ',would eliminate the problin of distoy-' ering a new intelligence operation-in rthe. Department of Justice. Ilnwever,? I have, xeservations abouelhe.Person-:. nd in IDIU and 'its preseht operation, ?activities and Would 'suggest that theY - either: be given a minor function Witii41 ; in the new intelligence riPeratien 'Or' that the staff be completely removed.' (I have had only Incidental 'dealings With the personnel, '014 'than" Jim' 0. Devine, and cannot speak to their dis- ?.cretion and loyalty foe such an opera-'; ? tion..4.I do' not believe thatIJirit Devine is -tipahle of an major'poSition withint the new intelligence 'operation. How.' ?,'ever, I do believe that 'he could help. perpetuate the `cover and UM: has clenced a loyalty to you, /the ,Deputy ','and .other key 'people in the. Depart-:, Mein; ,of' Justice, despite: his strong; links with the prior.,Administration. ?would defer to your judgement, of,. course, on any recommendation:re'gard,.. ,Ing Jim Devine's continuerb presenee' WASHINGTON POST P June 1973 such an intelligence operation..... ? 3. Assistant to Attorney ben- erat'v4, ? also.distussed the need:for'yoU to have a right hand man to 'assist'.th running' this operation. It would seem that what needed is a man with adMinistratiVe? a 'sensitivity to' the iniPlieations!' ?of . the current radical ,and stibversiVe. 1 movements .within the _United State'. and preferably, some "baaground.'in 'intelligence work. To maintain the ef cover, I would think it !appropriate fort the man to have a law degree in that ? .he will he a part of the 'Department of 'Justice,. You suggested the possibil- ity of using a prosecutor who had had experience .with cases of this type; Ac-i cordingly, I have spoken with ?Harling- 1: ton ? Wood to ask him to submit the '! names of five Assistant U.S. Attorneys who have had experience: An dealing ? with demonstrations or riot type cases ,and who are mature individuals that 'might be, appropriately given a mist-, 'ti,vOassignrnnt in the Department of.. ' 'Justice; I' did .not discuss :the matter; in any further detail with Wood other , ,than to request the Submission of scme4. nominees: I would also like to suggest: ? that we request names from4.the var-1 17 atter gate Case Iei il#ers Soviets By Robert G. Kaiser WsshInston Post Staff Writer At a reception?in Moscow recently, a Soviet journalist who once lived In Washing- ton was explaining the Watergate affair to an American colleague. One thing, the Russian said, was' certain?President Nixon would survive Watergate. The American tried to ex- plain that the Situation was complicated?that , Mr. ' Nixon was in serious diffi- culty. "Well," the Russian , conceded, "I'll always re- member what Jim Garrison said. Ile said that they got Kennedy, and if another *American president ever tries to turn the .United States away from militar- ism, they'll get him too." What do Leonid I. Brezh- nev and his Soviet col- leagues really think about Watergate? The question is unanswerable, but the anec- dote about the New ?Heins district attorney who failed to prove a conspiracy to kill Kennedy gives a hint of the confusion Watergate has created in Soviet minds. For a Soviet Communist, Watergate is a bewilder- ment. Its every element con- tradicts hianxist-Leninist ide- ology. The gravity of the affair defies Soviet notions of common sense. Perhaps most important. the Soviets -seem to inter- pret a threat to President Nixon as a threat to them- selves, largely because 'they have invested so much in their new relationship with Mr. Nixon. Officially, the Soviets have made no substantive 'comment on Watergate. Or- dinary Soviet citizens?. apart from those who listen to foreign radio broadcasts ?know virtually nothing about it. Brezhnev has In- sisted publicly that he will neither exploit nor even mention Watergate in his talks this week with Presi- dent Nixon. Unofficially. Soviet jour- nalists in East Europe and elsewhere have suggested that the furor over Water- gate is the work of a right- wing conspiracy designed to frustrate Mr. Nixon's de- lente policy. One journalist In Moscow recently slam- tied his desk in mock anger and said with a stern expres- sion and a wink, "You can't do this to our Nixon!" But. what the Soviets re- ally think is a mystery. Much depends on the- repor- torial skill of Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin. who Is known in Washington at a brilliant diplomat, though no one In Washington reads the messages he dispatches' to Moscow. Dobrynin was away from his post and in Moscow when -the crucial decision was made to announce firm int6.11igence agencies involved forl, personnel that might be appropriately ;.involved in this activity or Nvito mLght ' terve as' your assistant. ?I. In summary, I 'recommend the fol., "IoWing immediate action:- " ? ?. (,.* (1) You 'meet with Hoovt, eXplain twhat must be done: and r quest hit ,nominees for the interagency. unit. " (2) You request that HooVer assign an agent.to the task of locating apPro-1 ..priate housing for the Operiitiont. .(3) I request that other involved in-' .t:elligence agencies submit !nominees' for the interagency unit. . (4) I request from the agencies names. ? of,, appropriate personnel for assign:' ment to the operation. I ? r ? 'Finally, I would suggest that. you" ?' call weekly meetings to moilitor the., :,problems'as they emerge and to make1 certain that we are moving this pro= gram Into. implementation as, quickly .as possible, (Signed John. JOHN DEAN:, 't Haldeman has suggested' ? to me that if you would like' him tO ' ? join you in a meeting with Iitiotler will be happy to do so. . ? . dates for this summit meet- ing. He didn't have an op- portunity to report from here on the signficance of then-recent events: the dis- missal of?the Ellsberg prose; cotton, L. Patrick Gray's as- sertion that he had warned President Nixon about. a Watergate cover-up, the in- dictments of John N. Mitchell and Maurice H. Stalls, and the shakeup of Mr. Nixon's Cabi- net. Despite that coincidenoc of ominous events during the second week of May, the Soviets agreed on May 12 to announce firm dates for the Brezhnev visit. Some cynics suggested at the time that the Soviet leader knew ex- actly what he was doing, and would .demand appropo, Hate gestures of apprecia- tion from Mr. Nixon in re- turn for his willingness to weather the Watergate tem- pest. This argument may tempt the cynics, but it is too sim- ple.- It seems much more likely that the Soviets sim- ply don't take the Watergate affair as seriously as many Americans. After all, the kind of behavior for which Mr. Nixon's associates are now under investigation is perfectly normal for the So- viet political police. The Russians, who are al- 'ways inclined to believe that other societies are much like their own, probably can't imagine that Water- gate-style activities aren't typical here as well. . - The Soviets are great 'ad- mirers of authority. They must find It hard to believe that the President of the United States, after an un- precedented electoral vic- tory, is believed by some to be in danger of losing his authority now. Brezhnev himself sug- gested this attitude when he was asked about Watergate on his visit to West Ger- many last month. "What do you expect." he asked, "an earthquake?" He obviously did not. The history orthe Water- gate affair also suggests that the American system of checks and balances' has some vitality, a proposition that is ideologically inadmis- sible in the Soviet Union. Ideology plays a more in- portant role in determining the Soviet view of the world than many Westerners ap- preciate. Events may prove that So- viet skepticism about the importance of Watergate was justified. But if the scandal grew worse and the President's position were threatened, the Russians would be likely to regard that the turn of events as a threat to them. The Soviets ? like Americans ? assume that they must he an impor- tant factor in important events. As they have already revealed, Soviets watching the -Watergate affair unfold tend to see a plot against themselves just below the surface. 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7- ? Approved For Release. 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001?80001-7 WASHINGTON POST 15 June .1273 Hunt Alleged Blackmait White Housel By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein WaAhington Pot Staff Writers ? '4 ; Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. effectively . . blackmailed the White. House by threatening to dis- close the involvement a ?? high Nixon administration' officials.in secret Illegal ac- tivities unless he received ? large sums of money and a ? guarantee of executive clem- ency, according to govern- ment sources. Since the Watergate ; break-in almost a year ago, . . the sources reported, Hunt.: ' has been paid more than! $200,000 to remain silent. and received repeated assur- ances of clemency. Shortly before he was to he sen- tenced in March, Hunt de- . mancied an additional $1.30,, 1000 that was never paid, the . sources said. # Investigators have estab- lished that White House and , Nixon campaign officials, in, eluding former presidential' special counsel Charles W. Colson, received at least five "messages" from Hunt' demanding money and clem- ency between June, 1972,.'? , and March, 1973, the sources t reported. Senate and Justice De- . partment investigators now believe that the acquies- ? cencc of high White House officials in the Watergate ' cover-up was in part related to their fears that Hunt . would reveal the Nixon ad- , ministration's secret opera- , tions against radicals, politi- cal opponents and the press. Testimony at the Senate ,Watergate hearings has es- stablished that an obstruc- tion of justice was contem- plated Immediately after the June 17 arrests in the Demol crats' Watergate headquar-i ters. Another factor, however, according to one source, was that "from, the beginning Hunt began blackmailing the White ? House." The source. added: ? "They (White House officials) went along . . . In fact, it is Hunt's demands and threats that make the case a clear example of ob- struction of justice. Hunt was being paid to keep quiet. It demolishes the ar- gument that . the money was just for lawyers' fees and care for the families of the defendants?' Sources said that with- out the crucial element of paid hit* silence, it would be difficult to prove obstrue- tion of justice on anyone's part in connection with pay- ments to the defendants. One source said: "It would have been embarrass- ing for It to get out that the White House was paying le- gal fees, but that's not ille- gal. The evidence that the payment (to Hunt) was for silence proves the case of obstruction." . The prosecutors in the Watergate case also have testimony from conspirator James W. McCord Jr. that he was offered money to re- main silent. Hunt, the author of more than 40 spy-and-sex novels, relayed his initial demand to the White House within days of the Watergate arrests, in- vestigative sources said, by cryptically warning: "The writer has a minuscript of a play to sell." * M. Douglas Caddy, the first attorney retained by Hunt and the other Water- gate conspirators, relayed the message to Paul O'Brien, an attorney for the President's re-election com- mittee, the sources said. in turn, O'Brien, who has told investigators he was not aware of the identity of the "writer" or the precise meaning of the message, re- layed it to John W. Dean III, then President Nixon's -White House counsel, ac- cording to the sources. At the White House, the sources said, the message about selling a manuscript or a play was clearly recog- nized as a threat from Hunt and shortly thereafter large cash disbursements began flowing to the conspirators, especially Hunt. The initial payments to H u n t, according to the sources, were made by Fred- erick C. LaRue, an aide at, the Nixon campaign com- mittee, who delivered the cash either directly to Hunt or to Hunt's present attor- ney, William 0. Bittman. Bittman, the sources said, has acknowledged to investi- gators that he received three or four sealed envelopes from LaRue for delivery to Hunt, but maintains that be did not know that the envel- opes contained money. Meanwhile, the sources said, Hunt had been assured through representatives of the Committee for the Re- election of the President that he would receive execu- tive clemency if he re- mained silent. "Hunt viewed it as similar to a CIA operation," one source observed. "If a deal blows up, everybody's taken care of." However, by the fall of 1972, Hunt "said he was damn dissatisfied with his channels to the White House ? clemency were real," an- other source reported. "So he wrote a three-page letter that he gave to Bitt- man with new demands. he upped the ante and de- manded more direct chan- nels with the White House and assurance of an execu- tive clemency." The source added: "It kicked up a crisis at the White House." At about this time, the sources reported, Hunt con- tacted then-presidential spe- cial counsel Colson, who had originally hired Hunt as a White House donsultant. Colson, according to the sources, taped the conversa- tion with Hunt to protect his own interests and has supplied the recording to in- vestigators. One source de- scribed the conversation as follows: "Hunt was very up- set and threatened to talk, making it clear in some strong, if not wild language that he had better get more attention." ' Later, at least two other threats bY Hunt were con- veyed to high White House 'officials, one of them by Bittman, who visited with Colson in the White House in December, according to investigators. As previously reported, former White House counsel Dean told investigators that Bittman approached Colson In December to say that "something had to be done"' to avoid a long jail term for Hunt. Colson then passed the re- quest along to Dean and John D Ehrlichman, then the President's top domestic adviser, who answered, "I'll check," according to ac- counts of Dean's allegations. Ehrlichman then walked into the President's Oval Of-, flee and returned with what he said was a promise of ex- ecutive clemency for Hunt, according to Dean's version of-events. Ehrlichman instructed Colson to tell Batman that "everything is ok" but not to be too specific in relaying the clemency offer, accord- ing to this account, which has been provided to the Washington Post by two sources and was initially re- ported in Newsweek maga- zine last month. Bittman has declined to comment on the matter. Hunt's final demand to the White House came on March 16, according to in- vestigators, one week before he and his co-conspirators were to be sentenced. "His wife was dead and he was going to jail. There was no one to take care of his children." one source said, and again Hunt asked for more money---$130.000, ac- cording to several sources. The demand, calling for a conspirator clea9430468ed trariMalibblaga' : galena, I NEW YORK TIMES 18 JUNE 1973 To Check on C.I.A. To the Editor: On June 7 you printed a letter fro Robert F. Drinan, Member of Congress 4th Dist. Mass., in which he calle "incredible" my statement, "... in m opinion the Congress has done a g job of checking on C.I.A. activities" (0p-Ed May 17). Father Drinan then goes on to say that he was advised that only two members of Congress knew how much money was voted for C.I.A. in 1971; and the even more misleading state- ment, "... no one in the Congress yet knows how much money the C.I.A. . spends or how it expends the amount allotted." From 1953 through 1961; as In- spector General of C.I.A. I was charged by the Director with assisting in the supervision of the Agency's work with the Congress. From 1962 until I left .the Government in 1965 as the Execu- tive Director-Comptroller, I was in charge of the preparation of the budget and its presentation to the Appropria- tions Committees. In fact, the first budget hearing I attended was with C.I.A. Director Walter Bedell Smith in 1951 when Clarence 'Cannon of Mis-- souri Was chairman. In this period covering some fifteen years C.I.A. gave to the committee a full report on its budget. In fact,- under the chairmanship of Representa- tive' George Mahon of Texas, the House Appropriations Committee ex- amined in even greater detail the amounts allotted and 'the rationale behind the expenditures. Further, mem- bers of the subcommittee were invited to examine details of the budget to whatever extent their time permitted. As far as the Armed Services Com- mittees arc concerned, there never was any question but that the C.I.A. sub- committee members could inform themselves of whatever details about C.I.A., within whatever guidelines the chairman prescribed. Thus my state- ment about the quality of the Congres- sional check on C.I.A. ? Father Drinan's letter does illustrate what I consider to be a situation, not -in the best interests of the nation: that some members of the Congress ,are not even aware of the extent of . review of C.I.A. performed by the sub- committees in Appropriations ., and Armed Services in both houses. (Prof.) LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK Jr. Brown University Providence, R. I., June 9, 1973 fees, was conveyed to White House counsel Dean, accord- ing to investigative sources. Dean "hit the ceiling" upon receiving the message, in the words of one source, and refused to provide the funds, according to several sources. "It was the beginning of the end," said one source. "By then the cover-up was falling apart." Hunt's wife, Dorothy, was killed in a Chicago plane crash in December, and Hunt pleaded guilty to all charges against him at the watergate trial in January. He is serving a 35-year provisional jail sentence. gkigisd,ai 2,0 are being pafferen lor by relatives.) _rildren Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 WASHINGTON POST 22 June 1973 rem_ ent 0 sposed Lunt t?sh Ioney By Peter Osnos waRnington Poet Staff Writer President Nixon said on tors that Dean contends March 21 that a demand the President knew about. . t from Watergate conspirator The White House account B. Howard Hunt, Jr. that he of a discussion about the be paid as much as $1 ilayment of $1 million, which It says took place on March :lion for his continued si- 6 21, deals with Hunt's demand for money. The Senate mem- orandum says that "Hunt was trying to blackmail (Presidential aide. `John D.)' Ehrlichman about Hunt's ,Prior plumber activities un- 3ess he was paid what ulti- miately might amount to $r *" was relayed by then White Mon. House counsel John W. The "plumber" reference ps ? Dean III, according to the White House memorandum, which is to the to Investigations Unit" k fet based on information sup- up in July, 1971. after plied the committee by the Oe publication of the Pen- White,Papers, to plug news House. *leaks to newspapers. Hunt The President's response, 3vas member of the unit: the memorandum states, t ? Ehrlichman has admitted' was: "How could it (the ;mowing ' that Hunt broke money) possibly he paid, What makes you think he '41nto the Los Angeles office ' lence about White House-ini- tiated intelligence opera- tions was "wrong, that it 'would not work (and) that the truth would come out anyway," according to a Senate Watergate commit- tee memorandum. The demand for money would be satisfied with that?' " The Senate Watergate ' committee memorandum Is a summary compiled from 'information supplied orally and In writing by White House officials on the Presi- dent's meetings with Dean .from April, 1972, until April, 1973. Included are 37 meet, ings or telephone conversa- tions that the White House ? says Mr. Nixon had with Dean between Feb. 27 and April 22 of this year. Dean has reportedly told Senate investigators and federal prosecutors that he discussed aspects of the Watergate cover-up with Mr. Nixon or in Mr. Nixon's presence on at least 35 occa- sions between January and April, 1973. Dean has not yet, however, made those ,allegations under oath. The White House version. of those meetings disputes Dean's by stating that he did not tell Mr. Nixon until March 21 that a number of :White House officials proba-'' %ly knew either about they :bugging in advance or par- aicipated in the cover-up. ' One of the charges report- , k,..edly made by Dean is that he Presid6nt told Dean at a Dnecting shortly before the t-sentencing of? the seven vatergnte defendants March 23 that there would ? e no problem paying $1, million to the conspirators :.for their continued silence, $I'hat money, Dean has sup- posedly told investigators, .17,vas to be in addition to $460,000 paid to the conspir- tof the psychiatrist of Daniel 11sherg, who leaked the !,Pentagon Papers to the 1)ress, but Ehrlichman did not report that break-in to police. After Dean told Mr. Nixon 4)f 'Hunt's demand, according to'the Senate memorandum, The president said it was wrong, would not work and t.he truth would come out tinyway. o Dean then said, the memo- randum continues, "that a 'Cuban group could possibly ? ?[te. used to transfer the pay- linents." No other mention of Ai. $1 million figure appears, tyl, the White House version bf the Nixon-Dean meetings. v'The memorandum; made divailable to some newspa- laers Wednesday and con- firmed as authentic yester- day by knowledgable cources, is the latest in a se- les of leaks this week con- Oerning Dean's forthcoming Yestimony before the Senate pelect committee on the Watergate affair. Dean had been scheduled to testify this week, but his appearance was put off until hext week because of the visit of Soviet Communist party General Secretary Le; Odd Brezhnev. The purpose of the leaks Cs not clear. Some are evi- dently designed to discredit Dean's testimony; others may be intended to bolster his credibility; still others may have been leaked he- alms? of internal political friction within the Senate Watergate committee itself. In any event, the general in- tention of the leaks appears to be to influence public ,inion about Dean in ad- varice of his nationally tele-'ised appearance next week. The Senate committee's memorandum about the Dean-Nixon meetings began with the committee's re- quest of White House logs of the sessions after the publication of Dean's allega- tions about what went on there. The White House turned over a seven-page listing of the dates, times and place of the meetings, along with who else was there and, in a Jew cases, what was discussed. An response to the corn- inittee's request for more detailed information, White House officials, including Leonard Garment, the pres- ent White House counsel, and J. Fred Buzhardt, the President's special counsel,' orally described the sessions fOr committee staff. .-White House officials ref- Used to comment yesterday on the substance of the Sen-, ate committee's memoran- dum, as it appeared in the press, saying it is based on the interpretation made by the Senate staff members of what Garment, Buzhardt and others told them. The memorandum begins With a meeting September 15, 1972, the date of the in- dictments of the seven Waterg a t e conspirators: "Dean reports on (Internal: Revenue Service) IRS inves- tigation of Larry (Lawrence F.) O'Brien (then the chair- man of the Democratic Party). Dean reported on Watergate indictments." (O'Brien, reacting yester- day to the disclosure that IRS was conducting an in- vestigation of him, corn-. mented: "I have been sub- jeetqd to intensive scru- tiny by the IRS since 1970 upon my return as Demo- cratic national chairman. Up to this point I had no reason td believe that the audits were on anything but the merits, now I'm not sure." (An O'Brien associate said, that O'Brien had to hire a law-yer and accountant to deal with the IRS audit and the cost to him in fees was about $10,000. The result of the audit was an adjustment upward in O'Brien's taxes of a few hundred dollars). On Feb.' 28, 1973, the mem- orandum -continues. "Presi- dent inquired of Watergate; Dean said no White House involvement." Dean added that Nixon associates men- tioned in connection with Watergate, including then special counsel Charles W. Colson and Maurice H. Stans, the Nixon campaign's chief fund-raiser, were victims of circumstance. "Dean sug- gested," according to the memorandum, "they make sure that wiretaps of previous years (other administrations) be made known." On March 1, the President was preparing for a press , conference: "Was decided the question would come up as to. why Dean was sitting, in on FBI interviews and that reason was he was con- ducting an investigation for4 ? the President. President; asked Dean to write a re-' I port. Dean was also' critical, of Gray (a reference to L. Patrick Gray III, then acting FBI director.) On Mareh 13, the memo- randum goes on, the Presi- dent again asked about the Involvement in Watergate of specific White House and campaign officials. For the first time, Dean said that Gordon Strachan, an aide to then White House chief of .staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman could have been involved. March 17: ? "Dean again suggested they bring out the 1968 bugging and President said (then Attoney General Richard) Kleindienst had ad- vised against it. Several names were discussed ea possibly subject to attack: Colson, Haldeman, Ehrhich- man, (former Attorney Gen- eral and Nixon campaign di- ;rector John N.) Mitchell and, Dean. The President asked Dean point-blank if he knew about the planned break-in in ad- vance. Dean said no, there was no actual White House involvement regardless of appearances except possibly Strachan. Dean told PreSi- sient (that deputy campaign director Jeb Stuart) Magru- der pushed (Watergate con- spirator G. Gorden) Liddy hard but that Haldeman was not involved." . March 20: "The President called Dean' that night and Dean said there was 'not a scintilla of evidence' to indi- cate White House Involve- ment and Dean suggested he., give the President a more in-depth briefing of what had transpired." , That call set the stage, according to the memoran- dum, for the meeting on March 21 when the Presi- dent first learned of the probable involvement of his close associates in the Watergate affair, It was that meeting the President was apparently referring to when on April 17 he said he had learned important new facts about the case on March 21. Two days later, Watergate conspirator James W. Mc- Cord Jr. made his cele- brated accusation before U.S. District Court Judge John J. Sirica that, perjury had been committed at the Watergate trial In January and political pressure ap- plied on the defendants to keep them silent. Following McCord's public letter, dis- closures about those in- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100120001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 volved in the Watergate in creased markedly. There had been specula., tion that it was McCord's letter that forced the White' House to confront the Watergate affair, but ac-: cording to the Senate memo- randum,,Dean finally "gave the President his theory of what had happened" on March 21 and from then on the President moved quickly, to deal With the situation. ? "lie (Dean) still said no prior June 17 White 'House knowledge," the memoran- dum states, "that Magruder' ;probably knew, that Mitch- ell probably knew that Strachan Probably knew,. that Haldeman had possibly seen the fruits of the wire- taps through Strachan, that Ehrlichman was vulnerable ? because of his approval' of (Herbert W.) Kalm- bach's (fund-ral,sing activity)., [Kalmbach was then the , President's personal lawyer!t who had allegedly raised hush money for the Water-: gate defendants], Colson had made the call to Magru- der (urging him to approve a Liddy Intelligence plait)." , Then came the discussion . , about Hunt's demand for" t more money. "Dean said Colson had talked to Hunt about executive clemency,", the memorandum gees on. "Dean said nothing of his role In regard to the cover- up money .. . This informa- tion was gone over twice,! the last time in Haldeman's f' preSepCe. ' "Later that afternoon it was tentatively decided that everyone would go to the grand jury, however, Dean, , wanted immunity. Halde- man suggested that they !write the whole thing out, and release it from the White House. Ehrlichman said there should be no ex- ecutive privilege claim and that no one should ask for immunity. The President' told them to discuss these matters with Mitchell." On March 23, the memo-. randum says, the President) told Dean to go to Camp,, ,David and on March 30' "after it became obvious'. Dean would write no report the President directed Ehrl-e? ichman to investigate." The final meeting was on' April 16: "The President. asks Dean to resign. Had' two drafts, prepared for Dean's signature. Dean de-,, manded Haldeman and Ehr1.-. ichman resign also." On April 30, the President, 'ordered Dean to submit his resignation?which Dean' did?but the two did not! meet that day. NEW YORK TIMES 22 JUNE 1973 'Hunt Said to get $72,000 After aThreat to 'Tell All' By SEYMOUR M. HERSH Special to The New York Thee WASHINGTON, June 21?E, ing the Hunt message contain- Howard Hunt Jr. received a ing the money demand. "Dean final cash payment of $72,000 in mid-March after he had warned John D. Ehrlichman that he was ready to "tell all" about the White House opera- tions against Dr. Daniel Ells- berg in 1971, sources close to the Watergate case said today. ? The warning, the sources said, was Included In a letter that Hunt sent to John W. Dean 3d,- the former White House ?counsel, for relay to Mr. Ehr- lichman, then President Nixon's domestic affairs adviser. "He said 'Pass this along to Ehrlichman,'" according to a person who has seen the mes- sage. This source added that r Hunt' who was given a pro- visional 35-year jail term on March 23 for his role in the Watergate break-in in June, 1972, demanded a payment of $72,000 for himself and $50,000 for attorney fees. A few days before the letter was sent, another source said, Hunt told a former White House official that he was planning to write a book abut Watergate unless he got more money. The Washington Post reported last week that the former Central Intelligence Agency official had received more than $200,000 at the time of his renewed request. Hunt, along with G. Gordon Liddy, the leader of the Water- gate break-in team has been linked to the attempted bur- glary of the Los Angeles office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist in September, 1971. At the time, the two men were members of a special investigations unit that was set up under Mr. Ehr- ichman inside the White House after the publication of the Pen- tagon papers in June, 1971. On Sunday, The New York Times reported that Mr. Dean was prepared to tell the Sen., ate -Watergate committee in his televised testimony that he was told that President Nixon had authorized the break-in of 'the office of Dr. Ellsbergl psychiatrist ' Mr. Dean referred indirectly to the Hunt letter in his private testimony before the ,Senate Watergate committee last Sato i ,urday. Excerpts from that tes- timony were published in The New York Times today. According to the summary. which was signed by Samuel Approv tett:treterritO tkOOP/013007 : CIA-RDP77-00432n00100180001-7 an tote ot mew- told Ehrlichman," the summary continued, "and Ehrlichman told Dean to call [former At- torney General John N.] Mit- chell." Package Delivered "f he ;summary then quoted Mr. Dean as saying that on March 21 or March 22 of this year, "Ehrlichman asked Mit- chell if Hunt's problem had been taken care of, and Mitchell said 'Yes.'" A nutnber of sources con- firmed today that on either :March 20 or March 2l?days on which key White House ad- visers were discussing Water- gate With President Nixon?a package containing $72,000 was delivered by Frederick C. La Rue to the office of William 0. Bittman, Hunt's attorney. Mr. LaRue has been identi- fied as the recipient of more than $400,000 in cash that was ultimately used to 'help to fi- nance the elaborate cover-up that began with cash payreents in late summer of last year. Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Ehr- lichman have been ,repeatedly linked to payments reportedly made to the seven Watergate ;defendants in return for their ;silence, The 'General Accounting Of- fice reported last month that at least $210,000 was raised ,last year by Herbert W. Kalm- bach, President Nixon's former personel attorney and a leading campaign fund-raiser. Investi- gators have determined that other cash was taken from a secret $350,000 campaign fund that was set up in April, 1972, in the office of H. R. Halde- man, the former White House 'chief of staff. Special Bank Account ? In August, 1972, Mr. LaRue reportedly received $70,000 in ;cash taken from the safe of Maurice H. Stans, the chairman of the Republican finance com- mittee, for payoff purposes. In November, according to the published grand jury testimony of Gordon C. Strachan, then an aide to Mr. Haldeman, the en- tire $350,000 cash fund was taken to Mr. LaRue's apart- ment. Sources close to Mr. LaRue,' lwho is now believed to be co- loperating with Federal prosecu- tors in the 'case, said -that he had since placed the unused, cover-up funds?totaling more than $112,000 ? in a special bank account. He also returned some cash to representatives of Mr. Stens, who served as the chief Republican fund-raiser in the campaign, sources said. Mr. LaRue will keep the cash in the bank, a friend said to- day, "until he finds somebody to take it back." Some sources said today that they were puzzled by the discrepancy between the $122,- 000 sought by Hunt in his mes- sage to Mr. Dean and the $72,000 that was eventually provided him. "They wouldn't dare bargain with a guy who's going to plow them out of the water," one lawyer close to the case said. The lawyer suggested that some of the cash had been "skimmed" by the participants in the payoff scheme. According to the official White House version of the meetings between the President rod Mr. Dean which was pro., %.icied to the Senate this week and also published today in?Thel New York Times, Mr. Nixon; was told of the Hunt demand on March 21. The summary quoted Mr.. Dean as stating to the Presi-. dent that "Hunt was trying to blackmail Ehrlichman about Hunt's prior plumber [the in- fromal name for the 1971 in- vestigations unit] activities un- less he was paid what, ulti- mately might amount to $1- million." The summary continued: ; "The President said how .could it possibly be paid. 'What ,makes you think he would be satisfied with that? Rie] stated .it was blackmail, that it WAS !wrong, that it would not work, 'that the truth would come out anyway." One ,1 One Justice Department offi- cial characterized Mr. Nixon's 'discussions with Mr. Dean?as described in the White House summary?as "very damaging" to the President. "The moment he heard about this," the official said, "the President Should have had Hunt arrested for blackmail." In a memorandum submitted to ,the Senate Watergate com- mittee early last month, James W. McCord Jr., another member of the Watergate team, told of a Hunt threat to a Republican lawyer in late 1972 in which he said that ho could "blow the White House out of the Water." McCord also quoted Hunt as saying at another point that he had information that could fin- peach the President Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 WASHINGTON POST ? 21 Tune 1973 c 1 re k-14 at Bremer Home' ' By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein WaAhington Posts:it:al Writern About an hour after the atterfipt to as-, ?sassinate Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace- ' last year, special presidential counsel. Charles W. Colson ordered E. Howard Hunt 'Jr. to fly immediately to Milwaukee and illegally break into the tipartment of Wallace's suspected assailant, according to . accounts of sworn testimony by Hunt. Colson told Hunt to bring back informa- tion from the apartment of the suspect, , ,Arthur H. Bremer, that might be useful in linking Bremer to left-wing political ? causes, according to the accounts of Hunt's tesilniony, Hunt, then a White House consultant,: said he never went to Milwaukee; He told. Colson he could not get there soon enough. to commit the burglary without running a; high risk of. getting caught, according to . accounts of recent testimony by ,Hunt to a j closed-door session of the Senate's Water- gate investigating committee. Colson categorically denied to The Wash- ington Post that he had ordered Hunt to.? Milwaukee for any purpose. Mint's attorney, William 0. Bittman,? confirmed on Tuesday that Hunt told Sen- ate investigators that he ? was ordered by Colson to bring back information from Milwaukee about Bremer, the 21-year-old busboy who has since been convicted in the May 15, 1972, Wallace assassination attempt. ? "There is no question;" Batman said,- "that there was testimony about that . Colson asked him (Hunt) to go to Milwau- kee and go into Bremer's apartment I don't have a clear recollection of the reason why he was to go out there. I don't' .., ? ?recall whether the word break-in was involved." Hunt, a former CIA agent,' pleaded guilty in January to: all charges against him ih, ;:the. NVatergate conspiracy': 'and is now serving a 35-year 'provisional jail sentence. Within hours of the Wal- lace assassination attempt, a' 'White House official was .asked by the Washington. Post about the Identity of the governor's attacker. Dur- :ing a subsequent converse - tion that evening, the of- ficial raised the possibility of Bremer's connection . to leftist causes and the carri .paign of Sen. George McGov- , ern, through literature found M his. apartment. ? The Associated Press, in a dispatch that May night, quoted a source close to the : investigation as saying that ,.scraps of paper found in Bremer's apartment "showed : he allied himself with 'left- wing causes.'" On the evening of the Wallace shooting, reporters -said they were able to enter c the Bremer apartment during a 1?-hour period I. Shortly after the assassina- tion attempt. 'Several said . they entered only after FBI Approved -agents had been there once and left, and that agents 's later arrived at the apart- ment again, sealed it off and thereafter refused to let. reporters enter. i ? The FBI, which ? moved Into the case immediately,. has never fully explained why Bremer's apartment was not guarded to prevent access to the apartment by' reborters. Among items found by re- porters in Bremer's untidy apartment were a Black Panther newspaper, a book depicting comic strip eharac- .t.ers performing sexual acts, a Confederate flag, some Wallace campaign liter a- ture, two boxes of bUllets . and seven targets for pistol , shooting. . According to the accounts of Hunt's sworn testimony ' to the Watergate committee, . Hunt said that after a tele- phone call from Colson or- dering him to Milwaukee, Hunt went to his home in Potomac, Md., Apparently.' In 'a second telephone conversation, ac- cording to the accounts of his testimony, Hunt told , Colson that it would take. at least four hours to reach , Milwaukee, at which time 13remer's apartment would, he staked out by the FBI? thus making a successful . burglary impossible. After. that, the sources - said, Hunt testified the mis-' sion was aborted because it ; was apparent that an illegal , entry, was clearly ble. , In denying that he asked Hunt to ,go. to Milwaukee,. Colson said it is "absolutely untrue and I'd' swear it is untrue under oath." ? : Colson. in a telephone call to The Washington Post last night, called the "charge ...: an s utterly preposterous 'one." He said he did "not be- lieve that it could be an ac- curate report of any testi- mony that the Senate com- mittee has received." ? Colson said last night that It would be irresponsible "to take that (Hunt's testimony) seriously without checking the conditions" and "great duress" under which Hunt testified?a reference to an altercation between Hunt, and his - cellmate the night before Hunt appeared be- fore the Senate committee on June 11. Hunt's attorney. Bittman, said last night that Hunt had only three houra sleep "In a day and half" before he appeared before the com- mittee and that he (Rittman) had therefore asked the For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-0043iR000100180001-7 'committee for permission to treview the record of Hunt's. "testimony and amend it later, if necessary. Bittman' ,said he and Hunt had not, yet reviewed the testimony . and that "there is always the possibility for mistakes" under what he called "the unfortunate timing of Mr. !Hunt's appearance." Colson provided .a re- porter A copy of A memo .dated dune 20, 11372, five weeks after the -Wallace 'shooting and the day that Hunt's possible involvement in the Watergate operation was first made public. In the. memo, title "memorandum for the files," Colson said: "I also talked to him (Hunt) on the telephone I he night Governor Wallace was shot simply to ask for his re- actions on what :he thought might have been the cause? of the attempted ? assassina- tion. (Hunt was known .of something of an expert of - psychological warfare and motivations when in the CIA.)" Colon said he provided a, copy of the metrui to then presidential counsel John W. Dean III on Aug. 29. In a covering memo to Dean, however, Colson said "I can- not be sure that my memory is all that precise." After checking White House logs, Colson said Tuesday that he had dinner with the President the, night of the Wallace assassination attempt and could not have talked to Hunt until after 10:45 p.m. Colson 'said it would have been wholly il- logical for him to order Hunt to Milwaukee at that hour when there were no planes and the FBI should have been swarming all over Bremer's apartment. (Hunt's testimony places the order from Colson about an hour after the 4 p.m. as- sassination attempt.) -In addition, Colson said that he was in regular con- tact that night with ANsist- lant FBI Director W. Mark Felt, urging Felt 'to insure that the FBI was on the.. case fully: "Would it have been logical for me to push' In the FBI and simultane- ously order Hunt to Milwau- kee?" Colson asked. FBI sources said that the FBI moved. immediately into the case before receiving word from the White House, hut confirmed that Colson had talked several times with Felt. The Presi- dent asked for a personal FBI briefing every :30 min- utes the evening of. May 1.5 on developments in the ease,' the?sources said. Senate soUrees said they place a different interpreta- tion on Colson's June 20, 1972, memo for the, files. One Senate attorney said, "The NVateissate had blown, S ?Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 Hunt was going to be nailed and Colson writes a memo for his files to get his ver- sion down on paper of all the other expeditions Hunt had done/for the White House." , . In the three-page Colson memo, Colson attempts gen- erally to dissociate himself from ?11u.nt's activities, in- , eluding the Watergate oper- ation. Gov. Wallace, a candidate for the Democratic presiden-, tial nomination at the time, of the attempt on his life, Nixon's chief aide in foreign affairs. ' Colson denied making the ,fire-bombing suggestion to) .Caulfield, and an associate of Colson .said such a remark might have been made as a ? "joke." Colson has acknowl-? edged attencitng a discussion among other White. House aides about the possibility of retrieving information from the Brookings Institu- tion by unspecified means. ' Last week, Jeb Stuart'MaA" , - gruder, the deputy director was shot by Bremer in a of the Nixon re-election, shopping tenter at Laurel, campaign, testified before Md.o ? the Senate committee that It has been established? ,he made "the assumption". 'that Colson knew of plans to bug the Watergate before Democratic headquarters were placed under illgal electronic surveillance. According to Magruder's testimony, Colson called 'him during February "and !asked, me in a ,sense would we get off the stick and get 'the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's plans"?a reference ?to Watergate conspirator G.' ?shooting, he became deeply Gordon Liddy. Magruder. upset anti voiced concern testified, that Colson "did that the attempt on Gov not mention . . . anything , Wallace's life might have relating to wiretapping or ; been made by someone wit espionage at that time." h ? tics to the Republican Party or the-Nixon campaign. If such a tie existed, the source said, the President Indicated it could cost hint Ind election, which was then less than six months away. , ' ' "The President was agi- >trifled and wanted the politi- cal background on Bremer,", the source said: Hunt's allegations repre- sent the third time in recent weeks that. Colson's name? has figured in reports -of. 'burglaries that purportedly 'were planned or carried out .under White House supervi- sion. In the first instance, Hunt. ,told the Watergate grand jury that, after returning; :from the 1971 break-in at ? 'the office of Daniel Ells-, ,berg's psychiatrist in Los Angeles, he went to Colson's office .with , photographs taken during the burglary. "I have something that might be of interest to ? you," Hunt testified he told Col-. son, adding: "It has to do with my activities this past weekend." . According to. Hunt's testi-i ,mony, Colson told him "I' don't want to hear anything ? , about them". and left the room. , In the other Instance, John J. Caulfield, a White !House intelligence opera= tive, told federal prosecu- tors that Colson had sug- gested to him that he bur- glarize and fire-bomb an of- fice in the Brookings Insti- tution occupied by Alorton Halperin, a friend of Ells- berg and 'a former aide to that Bremer -stalked Pres1=. dent Nixon to Canada ?titir; ing tile, President's 1972', state visit to Ottawa from April 12 to 15--a month be- fore the Wallace assassina,- "Don attempt. In his diary, Bremer contended 'that he n arrow! y missed several opportunities to shoot the President. One White House source said that when President Nixon was informed of the Magruder, added however, that Liddy only had ohe set of plans and those involved wiretapping. ? 14. In Colson's memo for the files that he said was die- , tated on June 20, 1972, he , states: . ", . Hunt nrepped by my ,office with Gordon Liddy from the (Nixon re-election) ,committee. I believe this was in February ... Both he and Liddy said that they had some elaborate proposals prepared for security'activi- ties for the committee, but they had been. unable to get approval from the Attorney General (John N. Mitchell). ' "I explained that Mitchell would soon be at the com- mittee (as campaign manager) and that they, should be persistent and see, 'him because he was the only, one who could authorize work' they would be doing. "While Liddy And Hunt were in my' office. I called: Jeb Magruder and urged ,them to resolve whatever it was that Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he had an opportunity to lis- ten to their plans. At this, point Hunt said he , wanted , -to fill me in and I said it wasn't necessary because it was of ncr concern to me, hut that I would be glad to :urge that their proposals, whatever they were, he con- sidered. ? "There was no discussion that I can recall of what it was that they were planning to do other than the fact that I have the distinct im- pression that It involved se- ctirity at the convention and tionalConvention." In an interview an associ- ate of Colson's said that de- spite Colson's realization that Hunt "came up with some very crazy ideas," Cpl; 'son had no curiosity about ,the details of the intelli- gence-gathering plan and re- 'commended its considera- tion sight-unseen: "Colson was too busy, too Involved, in other things," the associate said. Colson -and his law part- 'ner, David I. Shapiro, have been actively campaigning in recent weeks to prove that neither Colson nor President Nixon knew of the' Watergate bugging nor were they involved in the Water- gate cover-up and that both hate been unjustly accused. , According to reliable sources, Colson has several documents showing that for- mer White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman and 'others attempted to blame Colson for some Campaign espionage and sabotage. , Despite repeated charges that Colson was involved in tile Watergate and other questionable if not illegal campaign tactics, .some gov- ernment investiators, now. believe that Colson may net be charged with any law vio- lations. l'E NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY 'JUNE 23,1973 McCord Says HeAlertegC.I.A. To Scapegoat Plan in Break-1n By MAJORIE HUNTER Special to TM New York Times WASHINGTON, June 22 ? James McCord Jr. ,one of the convicted Watergate conspira- tors ,said today, that he had alerted the director of Central Intelligence last yea1 that ef- forts were being mane to get the agency to take the blame for the Watergate- break-in. , McCord said that he issued his warning in a letter to Rich- ard M. Helms, at that time director of the agency and now Ambassador to Iran. The Helms letter, he said, was one of seven that he had. sent to officials of the ageocy ;between' July 29 of last year and Jan. 5 of this year. "I felt that an attempt was being made to wrongfully lay the blame for Watergate on the C.I.A.," he said. McCord spoke as he emerged from three hours of question- ing by the House Armed Services subcommittee on In- telligence Operations, which is looking into the agency's in- affair.. , The session was closed, but both McCord and the subcom- mittee chairman, Representa- tive Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, ? confirmed that McCord had discussed the let- ters extensively during his testimony. That earliest letter, sent to Mr. Helms, was signed "Jim" but the others were unsigned, according to Mr. McCord. Asked why he had not signed the others, McCord said that be "wanted to be sure" his name would not be generally known "in case the letters got out of channels." McCord had worked as a C.I.A. agent for some 20 years before retiring several years be- ore the Watergate break-in last June 17. At the time of the Watergate affair, he was secu. rity officer for the Republican re-election committee. Officials of the agency had! told the Nedzi subcommittee; several weeks ago that letters believed to have been written by Mc-Cord had been received, but that nothing had been done about them because various persons who read them as- sumed "the other guy" would take some action. McCord said today that he had mentioned the name of his former attorney,. Gerald Alch, as being among those who had suggested to him that the agency shoulder the blame. I "I don't recall specifically if " others were mentioned In the letters," he said. McCord had testified before the Senate Watergate com- mittee in May ? that Mr. Alch had suggested to him that James Schlesinger, who suc- ceeded Mr. Helms as C.I.A. di- rector, would "go along" with a plan to have the agency say that McCord was on its pay- roll at the time of the break-in. Mr. Schlesinger later denied any knowledge of such a plan. Representative Nedzi said that McCord told the subcom- mittee today that he first sus- pected efforts to involve the C.I.A. last summer after a con- versation he had with Mrs. E Howard Hunt Jr., wife of an- other Watergate conspirator "He was vague about what she had told him," Mr. Nedzi said, "but he said it planted a definite suspicion in his mind." Mrs. Hunt was killed in the crash of an airplane over 'Chi- cago. She had $10,00 in cash in het purse at the time. The Nedzi subcommittee hopes to explore this matter further by questioning Hunt, who has been subpoenaed for questioning next Thursday. He has not appeared before any of the Congressional panels in- vestigating the Watergate af- fair. Dr. Henry Kissinger, l*ppnkrtiglift!plirivekt4nAtt Ng/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00100180001-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS Washington, 1). C, Wodnosday, Juno 20, 1973 77: By Fred Barnes Star-NMI/Staff Writer The special Senate Water- gate committee has decided to investigate the possible involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate affair. . Staff members for com- mittee, which is to resume its public hearings next week, have already begun work in preparation for calling witnesses to testify about any CIA link, sources said. ? Specifically, these steps have been taken: O The committee has re- quested the transcripts of closed-door hearings of a Senate Appropriations sub- committee which looked into the CIA matter. The subcommittee agreed yes- ? terday to provide the tran- scripts. O Committee staffers are drawing up a list of likely witnesses for the CIA probe which includes Gen. Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the agency, and Gen. Robert Cushman, his prede- cessor in that job. O A Senate Armed Serv- ices subcommittee has handed over to the Water-' gate committee a collection of classified documents which it had obtained in the course of its own CIA in- quiry. Walters and Cushnian are not included on the list of Watergate witnesses which the committee released ear- lier, nor is former CIA director Richard Helms, NEW YORK T IMES 20 JUNE 1973 COLSON CITES CALL. ON C.I.A. 'LIAISON' another potential witness. ? But the list includes sev- eral witnesses who are now 'expected to be questioned by the committee about possible CIA involvement as well as about other' Water-p gate matters. These are former acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray and one-time White House aides John W. Dean III, John L. Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, Egil Krogh, David Young and Charles Colson. Walters, Cushman and Helms have already testi- fied before one or more of the three congressional subcommittees, two in the Senate and one in the House, which have been ilooking into the CIA ques- tion in recent weeks. By MARJORIE HUNTER spevii,i to The New York Throes ?WASHINGTON, June 19? Charleg W. Colson, a former White House aide, told a Sen- ate panel today that he had personally asked John D. Ehrlichman to help E. Howard Hunt Jr. establish "liaison with the C.I.A." in the summer of 1971. Mr. Colson's testimony would seem to refute the recent denial by Mr. Ehrlichman, the former top Nixon domestic aide, that he had made any approach to the Central Intelligence Agency to ask that Hunt be given what- ever assistance he might need Approved THOUGH THE hearings have been in executive ses- sion, a series of revelations have emerged from them which have fueled specula- tion about a CIA link te the Watergate. Among other things, a memorandum written a year ago by Walters was disclosed in which he said that Haldeman, then chief of the White House staff, had ordered him to inter- fere with the FBI'S investi- gation of the Watergate case. And Cushman told the Senate Appropriations sub- committee that Ehrlichman called him in 1971- to clear the way for E. Howard Hunt to make contact with the that summer. But it supported testimony made recently by Gen. Robert E. Cuashman Jr., commandant of the United States Marine Corps. Hunt had been employed that summer by the White House as a member of a special team ? dubbed "the plumb- ers"?created to track down leaks of sensitive national security information, including the Pentagon papers detail- ing American involvement in Southeast Asia. Using a wig and various other equipment supplied to him by the C.I.A., Hunt was subsequently involved in bur- glarizing the Califorinia office of the former psychiatrist to Dr. Daniel Ellsber.g, the principal defendant in the Pentagon pa- pers trial. Hunt was also later convicted of conspiracy in the break-in at Democratic national headquar- ters in the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. Mr: Colson's testimony today appeared to deepen the mys- tery of White House efforts to involve the C.I.A. ..in domestic For Release 2001/08/07 CIA. At the time, Hunt was a? member of a special White House team?the "plum- bers"?which was assigned to track down leaks of sensi- tive national.security infor- 'nation. Later in 1971, Hunt was able to get in touch with , CIA officials, and he ob- tained equipment from them that was reportedly used in the September 1971 burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychia- trist in Los Angeles. EHRLICHMAN, however, has denied that he ever talked to Cushman about allowing Hunt access to CIA officials. The Watergate committee is expected to attempt to clear up this con- flict in testimony. Haldeman, too, has de- nied the allegation against him, saying that he never sought to have the CIA block the FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in. , Sen. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., said yesterday he has concluded from his Appropriations subcommit- tee's CIA probe that the agency has acted improper- ly in involving itself in do- mestic affairs. According to the law which established the agen- cy, the CIA is supposed to deal only in intelligence matters related to foreign affairs. McClellan said that his subcommittee has compiet- activities, both before and after the Watergate affair. During a two-hour appear- ance before the Senate Appro- priations Subcommittee on In- telligence Operations, 'Mr. Col- son testified: ? "On the 7th or possibly the 8th of July [which would have been by phone] I told Mr. -Ehr- lichman that Mr. Hunt wanted to establish liaison with the? C.I.A. as well as with other Government agencies. "The need for contact with the C.I.A. was immediate in that one of Mr. Hunt's first assignments was to interview, a Lieut. Col. Lucien Conein.' who had been a principal C.I.A. operative during the period of the Diem coup (in South Vietnam)." Previous testimony by C.I.A. officials had made no mention of Hunt's interest in Colonel Conein during his initial ef- forts to obtain assistance from the intelligence agency. General Cushman. at that time deputy director of ?the : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100 'ed its investigation for the time being, even though three witnesses?Young, Dean and Krogh?declined invitations to testify. IN THE FINAL session yesterday, the subcommit- tee questioned Colson for more than two hours. Col- -son revealed at the hearing that he had acted in 1971 to clear the way for Hunt to contact a top CIA agent. He said that he spoke to Ehrlichman about Hunt's interest in talking to the agent, Lt. Col. Lucien Co- nein. It was-unclear exactly why Hunt wanted to contact Concin, whose field of ex- pertise was South Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Senate Armed Services subcommit- tee headed by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., is con- tinuing its work on declassi- fying sonic of the secret documents it has collected during continuing probe of a possible CIA-Watergate link. And the House Armed Services ' subcommittee headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., will contin- ue its CIA hearings on Fri- day when James McCord, one of the seven convicted Watergate conspirators, will testify. ? Hunt is also a convicted conspirator. in the Water- gate scandal and is current- ly serving a 35-year term at D. C. Jail. agency, told several Congres- sional committees in recent weeks that Mr. Ehrlichman had telephoned him on July 7, 1971, to ask -that Hunt he given some assistance, at that time un- specified. General Cushman also testi- fied that Hunt had appeared at the C.I.A. headquarters on July 22 of that year to ask for "technical services" to en- able him to conduct "a very ? sensitive one-time interview; that the White House wanted! 'him to bold." General Cushman testified ?that he than supplied Hunti ?vith a wig, a small camera, a !device to alter the voice, and ifalse identification papers. He ,said, however, he had. been. 'unaware that the equipment, :wosld e used in? a burglary., Asked today if Hunt had also sought help in locating Colonel Con in?as suggested in the Colson testimony?Gen- eral Cushman replied, "I have no further' comment." 0001-7 Colonel Corwin, now a con- t6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 sultant in the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, said later today that Hunt talked, to him "some- time that summer," seeking information about Dr. Ellsberg and "asking what I might know about the Pentagon papers case." ' Colonel Conein said that he told Hunt he had had no con- tact with Dr. Ellsberg Since 1967 and knew nothing about the Pentagon papers. ' Colonel Conein was the C.I.A.'s liaison with the group of Vietnamese generals who overthrew the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam, in 1963. Mt?, Diem was killed in the coup. Colonel Conein was also part of a team, along with Dr. Ells- berg, that served as advisers to Henry Cabot Lodge when he was named Ambassador to South Vietnam. Public Disclosure Mr. Colson testified in closed session today, but his corn- ments?about asking Mr. Ehrlich- man to help establish intelli- gence agency liaison for Hunt were made public later by Senator John L. McClellan, chairman of the subcommittee investigating C.I.A. involve- ment in the Watergate affair. ' Senator McClellan noted what he termed the discrep- ancies between the Colson ?and Ehrlichman testimony over White House efforts to involve the intelligence agency. ? NEW YORK TIMES 16 JUNE 1973 British Journalist.' .Attacks'U.S. Pres; As Unfair to Nixon Special to TN Nrer 'for* Timms WASHINGTON, June 15?A British journalist accused the American press today Of failing to discharge its duty to be fair to the President" in the Watergate affair. "The press of the United States has a duty to be fairlo the President," William Rees- Mogg, editor of The Time's of London, said in a speech at the National Press Club. But the nation's press, taken together and not individually, is not dis- charging that duty, he said. The 44-year-old Mr. Rees- Mogg, tn an editorial in The Times on June 5, described the President as in the "unenviable position of being tried by his fellow countrymen in three different forums"? the Senate Watergate committee, the WEItergate grand jury and the press. Mr. Rees-Mogg accused the press of failing to give credit to Mr. Nixon for his "major contributions" in foreign af- fairs. "The press is not willing to give credit where credit. is due," he said. 4* In a question-and-answer session after his talk, Mr. Rees- Mogg said that the "role of a fair trial is even more funda- mental than a free press." - "The press cannot claim that the First Amendment ism of override on the CoffiW. tion," he said. NEW YORK TIES 15 JUNE 1973 Colson Says He Put Hunt on 1.7' .7' . Job , 4 . . , ...;Ehrlichman, former Presidential ? By E. W. KENWORTHY I interviewed Mrs. Beard. It was later reported that Mr. Hunt assistant for domestic affairs, had appeared before Mrs. Beard had had with Mr. Geneen and ?. "de "Th. NtIC lec'rk Thws ..1 in a red wig. . Mr. Merriam in Mr. Ehrlich- : WASHINGTON, June 14 ? 'Charles W. Colson? , former ? Today before the House Cam- man's office on Aug. 4, 1970. merce Subcommittee on Investi- Mr. Colson said that the White House , sepciai -counsel, gations, Mr. Colson said under "thrust" of the discussion was confirmed publicly today that questioning that Mr. Hunt had "the Administration's antitrust ,he had directed E. Howard Hunt suggested that he interview Mrs suits against I.T.T. even though :Jr. to go to Denver. in, March, Beard, and that he, Mr. Colson, they were obviously on Mr. -1972, and interview Mrs. Dita had agreed to the plan. Genecn's mind. D. Beard, Washington - lobbyist At the outset of, the hearing, for the International Telephone ? Authenticity Issue 'Central' Charles Morin, Mr. Colson 's and Telegraph ' Corporation, Mr. Colson explained that at law partner, sought to explain about her memorandum linking the time a task force investi- a promised $400,000 campaign gating the Beard memo had be- contribution with Administra- come suspicious that the An. tion help in settling an anti- derson version was "not au- trust suit. . , , ? then tic." Disclosure of that memo by Jack Anderson, the columnist, on Feb. 29, 1972, was the ocasion for the reopening of hearings by the Senate Judi ciary Committee on the nomi- nation of Richard G. Kleindienst to be Attorney Gen- eral. ? During the two months of hearings, high Administration officials denied that an out-of- Court settlement that allowed I.T.T. to retain the Hartford Fire Insurance Company in re- turn for divestiture of several other companies was related in any way to the I.T.T. pledge of up to $400,000 in support for the Republican National Convention then planned , for San Diego. 'Noble Commitment' Cited Mrs. Beard had written her superior, William R. Merriam, vice president in charge of I.T.T.' s Washington office, that "our noble commitment has gone a long way toward our negotiations on the mergerl coming out as Hal [Harold S. Geneen, I.T.T. president] wants them." After the memo was disclosed, Mrs. Beard disap- ? peared from sight for several days. She was discovered in a Denver hospital under treat- ment for a heart attack. Later her attorney there, David Flem- ing, issued a statement by her that the Anderson memo was fraudulent, although some of Its phrasing was identical to a memo she had actually writ- ten. . Last Feb. 8, Newsday reporte that Mr. Hunt, the Watergate conspirator, had gone to Denver under Mr. Colson's orders and The question Of authenticity "had become critical for the Administration," Mr. Colson said, because the memo had become "central to whether Kleindienst would be. con- firmed." Mr. Colson said he Was firmly convinced now that the Ander- son memo was not authentic. He gave as his reasons the fact that Mrs. Beard's secretary had denied typing it, that Mr. Mer- riam had never seen it, and that "the most incriminating sen- tences were non sequiturs." Later, Intertel, a concern of private investigators, said first that the Anderson -memo had not been typed on Mrs. Beard's typewriter. Intertel later said the memo had been typed on her typewriter, but that its authenticity was doubted. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had obtained the Anderson memo, which was an original copy, and stated that it had been typed on Mrs. Beard's typewriter and roughly on the date at the top, June 24, 1971, Mr. Colson told the subcom- mittee that he had seen the copy given by the Senate com- mittee to the F.B.I., and that John W. Dean 3d, the White House counsel, had shown it to him. He said he did not know how Mr. Dean had obtained it, but added that Mr. Dean was White House "liaison with the . Other Memos Discussed Mr. Colson ? was also . ques- tioned at length about several Interoffice memos:, and letters by I.T.T.. officers. to Adminis- tration offitals dealing with a 'meeting .that . he and John D. a memo he had written to Mr. Colson and Henry C. Cashen, another partner, last April 13. In that memo, Mr. Morin had suggested that they "lean" on G. Bradford Cook, then chair- man of the Securities and Ex- change Commission, but since resigned, to get him to name King Mallory as S.E.C. general counsel. Mr. Morin proposed that they solicit influence from Mr. Ehrlichman, Kenneth Cole, 'his deputy, and Jerry Jones, a White House aide in charge of recruiting for top Administra- tion posts. "This is one of the chips we really should pick up, because It is a key job in the commis- sion and one of extreme impor- tance to us in representing our clients," Mr. Morin had writ- ten. , Today Mr. Morin told the subcommittee that the memo was "a silly document" dictat- ed "off the top of my head." He said that he had no idea of "placing" a general counsel at the S.E.C. who would be be- holden to the firm, and that he was simply concerned ?to get Mr. Mallory in the post because of his qualifications for dealing with "antitrust problems" be- fore the S.E.C. ??"I, never heard the expres- sion 'pick up the chips," Mr. !Morin said. ,? "I am known for my colorful language," he said. al guess I am pretty naive about politics and the language , of politics. Perhaps this is the result of the fact that I come from Boston." Mr. Colson said that neither he nor Mr. Cashen ever did anything about the memo, al- though Mr. Colson acknowl- edged that he had written a note on the memo to Mr. Cash- en saying: "I'll call Cook if nec- estary; but I think Jerry Jones could lock this one for us." ed For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-R13W7-00432R000100180001-7 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 NEW YORK TIMES 15 JUNE 1973 Nixon Not Implicatec in the Conspiracy by- Campaign Aide By WALTER RUGABER Special to The New York Times . WASHINGTON, June 14?jet ? Stuart Magruder, the formei deputy director of President Nixon's 1972 re-election cams paign, told a first-hand story today of how he and alio. high-ranking officials had Plot- ted the bugging of the Demo. crats and then tried to covet it up. In 51/2 hours of nationally- 'televised testimony before the Senate Watergate committee, the 38-year-old Mr. Magruder confessed his own guilt and im- plicated a number of former Ad- ministration officials?includ- ing John N. Mitchell, 'John W. Dean ad and H. R. Haldeman? but not the President. Mr. Magruder said that Mr. Mitchell, a former Attorney General, and Mr. Dean, former White House counsel, had been among those who planned the Watergate bugging as part of a broader espionage campaign. He said that he told Mr. Halde- man, the President's former 'chief of staff, the full story last January. An Early Decision The cover-up et fort was de? cided on ahnost Immediately after the arrests on June 17, 1972, of five men inside the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Commit- tee, Mr. Magruder testified, and among those who knew that he would lie to authorities about the case were Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean ' and H. R. Haldemann, then the White House chief of ,staff. a Mr. Magruder said .that he had felt the President had had, no knowledge of the spying op- eration but added that he had been afraid Mr. Nixon's re- election "would be probably. negated" if the story was re- vealed. Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. . of Tennessee, the Republican vice chairman of the commit- tee, asked Mr. Magruder wheth- er the decision on concealing the truth should have been made by the President. . "Sir, I can't comment as to whether he did or did not or .was involved in it," Mr. Ma- gruder testified. "I had no deal- ings directly with the Presi- dent." The tanned witness traced ?for a closely listening. audience what he said was the develop- ment of the conspiracy. He said that at one point it included plans to kidnap radicals and Approved entice Democrats with "call girls" operating on a yacht in Miami Beach. ? He said that a principal aim in wiretapping telephones at Watergate was to cripple politi- cally Lawrence F. O'Brien, then Democratic National Chairman and a man "who could be very difficult in the coming cam- paign." ? ? Mr. Magruder, once a rising White House figure with large political ambitions, testfied readily, calmly and almost mat- ter-of-factly about the eventa that finally broke his career. Scattered through his testi- money were glimpses of the personal relatins and the stresses and conflicts that final- ly led him to tell hisstory in mid-April to the United States Attorney's office here. He said, for example, that tensions shot up on March 23 when Chief Judge John J. Sirica of the United States District Court here rad a letter from a convicted conspirator, James W. McCord. McCord has indicated that it was a picture of Mr. Magruder and his family, showing them in a relexed pose during the Wategate trial, that con- tributed to his decision to tell what he knew about higher-ups in the plot. Mr. Magruder, once reported to be badly shaken by the im- pending collapse of the cover- up, said today that he had agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy and to be- come a prosecution witness in the trial of others. - He has been granted im- munity from prosecutionon his testimony before the Senate, but this does not preclude criminal prosecution, and he told the committeetoday that "for those errors in judgment that I made, I take full re- sponsibility." As early as September, 1971, Mr. Magruder began', there were discussions with Mr. Dean on political intelligence operations. The talk began in earnest in December. when G. Gordon Liddy arrived at the Commit- tee for the Re-election of the President, he ,said. Liddy, convicted with Mc- Cord in January, was to be the Nixon organization's lawyer, but Mr. Magruder testified that Liddy and Mr. Dean and un- identified other people on the White House staff had been discussing a "broad-gauged in- telligence plan." Projects Are Described On Jan. 27, 1972, Liddy pre- sented his plan to Messrs. Mitchell, Dean and Magruder at a meeting in the then At- torney General's office at the Department of Justice, Mr Ma- gruder said. The projects included "wire- tapping, electronic surveillance and photography [of .docu- mental," Mr. Magruder said, and therewere plans "relating to the abduction of individu- als." "Mr. Liddy had a plan where! the leaders [of radical groups]' would be abducted and de- tained in a place like Mexico, and that they would -then be returned to this country at the For Release 2001/08/07: end of the convention," the Wit- ness said. There were also the call girls, and Liddy "envisioned renting a yacht in Miami and having it set up for sound and photo- graphs" during the Democratic National Convention there. All this would cost $1-mil- lion, Mr. Magruder said, and "all three of us were appalled" at the "scope and size of the project." Mr. Mitchell was said to have told Liddy to "go back to the drawing boards and come up with a more realistic plan." The "general nature" of the first Liddy plan was relayed to Gordon C. Strachan, an assist- ant to Mr. Haldeman who dealt with the President's political organization. The committee was voted to seek immunity for Mr. Strachan, but the Department of Justice has moved under the immunity statutes to delay his appear- ance on Capitol Hill for 30 days. A $500,000 Plan Mr. Magruder said that he and Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Dean, gathered?again on Feb. 4, 1972, and that Liddy presented them with a $500,000 plan, trimmed of everything but wiretapping and photography. The four menn talked over prospective "targets," the wit- ness said, and these included; the Democratic National Com- mittee headquarters, the party's' convention headquarters at thei Fountaineblew Hotel in Miami Beach and Democratic Presi- dential campaign offices. Either Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Dean?Mr: Magruder said he couldn't remember who it was ?talked about the "potential for an entry" at the offices of Hank Greenspun, publisher of the Las Vegas Sun. He was thought to have "information relating to Senator [Edmund S.] Muskie, then a leading Pres- idential contender. Samuel Dash, the commit- tee's chief counsel, asked Mr. Magruder about the object of the plan. At the time, the wit- ness said, there was concern about Mr. O'Brien. He ex- plained: 41 . I think there was a gen- eral concern that if he was al- lowed to continue as Demo- cratic National Chairman? because he was certainly their most professional, at least from our standpoint, their most pro- fessional political operator? that he could be very difficult in the coming campaign. So we had .hoped that information might discredit him." , Despite this increasing inter- est, Mr. Magruder said. Mr. Mitchell still "just didn't feel comfortable" with the plan, even at the reduced level. But Liddy was encouraged to keep trying. Sometime after the Feb. 4 meeting, Mr. Magruder testified he received a telephone call from Charles W. Colson, then special counsel to the President. '[He] called me one evening and asked me in a sense to . get off the stick and get the budget approved for Mr. Liddy's 28 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 plans, that we needed informa- tion, particularly on Mr. O'Brien,' the witness said. "He did not mention . .. anything about wiretapping or espionage at that time. On March 30, 1972, Mr. Magruder said, he, took Liddy's third proposal to Key Bascayne, Fla., and discuSsed it wit hMr. Mitchell and Frederick S. Larue, an assistant to the former At- torney General.. Liddy had cut the cost to $250,000, with the wiretapping and photography projects re- tained. No one "particularly overwhelmed," Mr. Magruder said, but he quoted Mr. Mitchell as giving his approval as follows: "Okay, let's give him a quar- ter of a million dollars, and let's see what he (Liddy] can come up with." Mr. Magruder came back to Washington "and notified the parties of Mr. Mitchell's approval." Liddy and Mr. Strachan were informed, the witness said. Mr. Mitchell has acknowl- edged that the bugging plans were presented to him at vari- ous times, but he has insisted that he disapproved them on each occasion. The former At- torney General made no corn- pent today. Mr. LaRue, a Jackson, Miss., businessman, has refused to talkk with reporters. He could not be reached today, nor could Mr. Strachan. Mr. Dean is ex- pected to testify before the Senate committee next week. , The loss of the wiretapped conversations and photographs of documents in the Demo- cratic files reached Mr. Magru- der in two packages, the first one a week or so, after the ,tap was installed in May. Mr. Mitchell was shown the illicitly gathered information at a morning meeting, Mr. Ma- ,gruder said, and the former Attorney General "reviewed the documents" and reacted las follows: I "He simply indicated that this was not satisfactory, and it was worthless and not worth the money that he [Liddy] had been paid for it. . ? There was no information relating to any of the subjects he hoped to receive...." 'Lack of Substance' Mr. Strachan came over from the White House to examine the data, Mr. Magruder said, and he, too, talked about "the lack of substance" in them. A second tap at the Water- gate worked, but the one on Mr. O'Brien's telephone did not, and early on the morning of June 17 five men under Liddy's. direction broke in again to re- pair things. Mr. Magruder was in Los An- geles when the news of the ar- rests came through later that day. He was having breakfast at the Beverly Hills Hotel, and, Liddy called to say "there had, been a problem the night before." Mr. Haldeman called the next day, Mr. Magruder said, "and asked me the basic background of the break-in and what hap- pened." The White House ad- viser said "I should get back -to Washington Immediately," Ithe witness added. 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001800014. Washington Post 17 June 1973 omestic ? Spyinbas Ettland hat Was and Is I Bureau Hurt By Watergate By Laurence Stern washinston Post Staff Writer Once upon a time the FBI bad the highest public vela-, 6 lions profile in 1?'ashington ?Its exploits celebrated on radio, television, film and the annual appearance on Capitol Hill of the late J. Edgar Hoover. But the Watergate scandal has brought egg to Its face and demoralization to its ranks. The bureau has been accused of leaking like a sieve, relaxing surveillance of domestic subversives and turning its back on the rest of the intelligence commu- nity. . Its former acting director L. Patrick Gray III, was a prime casualty of Water- gate. Ile has been heavily discredited for his role in the investigation and the subsequent White House cover-up operation. The reputation of Hoover. who was in his lifetime be- yond the reproach of Presi- dents, has been post hu- "mously muddied by Presi- dent Nixon and the revela- tions of the "Dean papers." The President's statement of May 22 strongly sug- gested That Hoover had be- come a cranky misanthrope who cut himself and the bu- reau off from the rest of the federal intelligence estab- lishment. This picture of hoover %Vag reinforced by the re- cently. published top secret memoranda of former White House internal security ad- viser Tom Charles Huston. The Huston papers per- frayed in unflattering terms the former director's sue- cessful obstruction to the controversial "1970 Intelli? , getter Plan" disclosed hy the President on :May 22. It was largely becalm, of hoover's alleeed bureau? kidationism that the President said had to sf`t the 1970 plan in motion. And it was Hoover's impositit.in to the plan's openine up the FBI's zealote-ly-euarded in- ternal security turf to other . intelligence agencies that caused President Nixon to shelve it after five days. The bureau has remained .silent in the face of its cur- rent adversities, It is bereft of the protection of Hoover. ts Role? transition in 13 months. The failing to keep abreast of bureau is anxiously awaiting the agitated domestic scene. confirrriation of its new di- It was in this climate that rector-designate, Clarence ? President Nixon set in mot- ion the 1970 plan, Which was allegedly abandoned in the face of Hoover's objections. Ensuing steps were taken by the President-?-eStahlish- meet of an inter-agency In- telligence Evaluation Com- mittee and creation of the M. Kelley, the Kansas City police chief. Acting FBI Director Wil- liam D. Buckelshaus, the bu- reau's departing temporary trustee, insists that when Kelley comes aboard the malaise in the bureau will evaporate. President's own Special In- "When Kelley is con- vestigation Unit the firmed we may he in a pnsi- Plumbers)?to operate on lion to do some talking," ? the internal security turf that was once Hoover's ex- Pahl one old bureau hand. The old boy network of elusive preserve. "The White }louse was Hoover loyalists both in the getting people with no PX. bureau and among its alumni has been severely perienee. ?My God, that man slime by the recent attacks Liddy was a wild man when and is thirsting for a chance he was in the bureau?a SU- M. rebuttal. per-klutz," groused one of "The enaree that we cut Hoover's Most, senior aides. off liaison with all other in- ..They m,i.?mateurs who telligence agencies is just were bound to get into tro- not true," said one high- time. .\?d they did." ranking FBI official. "We Relations worsened. lino- did cut out a Int of the mes- N-er cut off formal liaison seneer boy stuff?having with the Central Intelli- agents stationed in other genet, Agency in 1970 hc- agencies and serving as cause of an incident in Den- high-priced couriers. But we ver in which an FBI agent have mainttvined constant li- passed in on to an aisun wit It everyone." Operai i e I limVer iii- In 1970, when Ow troubles s:sted on knowing the iden- began in earnest for the hu- lily of the agent. The CIA real', the politic relationship reftised. between Itonver and Presi- The raueed relations he- dent Nixon seemed to be a 'wren the hurrait and the model of cordiality. Only in recent weeks, with puhlica- stidaecti in two of the Ilustrin (leen- f'11111marY dismissal ments, has it been revealed in orbiter, 197I, of tVilliam ('. Sullivan. the No. 3 man that a grim strueele was al- ready tinder way with the in the Inirratt and caul, lion- Nixon administration over , ver's most valued deputy. renreanizine and expanding ? Sullivan had insisted, pub-. the government's powers of licly and privately. on domestic surveillance to the tougher surveillance of New point of illegal entry. Left and Black Panther ac- The deeds and rhetoric of tivities, as well as of foreign sin It grotles a tho ill:1?k nationals. He openly criti- l'anthers. eAthernien? Stu- eized Hoover for preoccupy- - dents for a nemocrat.ic Ing himself with such nearly my, and the post-Catnhodia defunct groups as the Com- ferment on llw ramPll's munist Party. USA, by then were raising a high slate "I. a virtual geriatric society, alarm in the White House and the Ku Klux Klan. and Justice Department. Sullivan was a minority Hoover himself went to voice in the bureau. But he Capitol Hill with shrill den- was paid serious heed in the unciations of black activists Justice Department where and student demonstrators he had the ear of then-Atter- and their organizations. At nee General John N. Mitch- one point he proclaimed the ell and Assistant Attorney Panthers to be the leading General Robert C. Mardian, internal security threat to a -principal adviser on 'la- the nation. tional security affairs. But the underlying truth One measure of Sullivan's was that it was a new hall prior loyalty adminis. game for the bureau. one tration was his removal of for which the traditional in records of controversial na- formants and infiltration Urinal security wiretaps or- tactics did not seem to be dered by the White House, working. from the FBI to Mardian's The response at high ley- office in Justice. The former els of the justice Depart- Hoover aide let it he known Hoover to embarrass the White House. And Hoover, in one of his ; most celebrated "sudden death" reprisals' for disloy- alty, ordered the locks changed overnight in Stith. van'S office and his name re- moved front the door. After- ward, Sullivan was ap- pointed to a high Justice De- partment post, chief of nar- cotics intelligence. -Even_ after Hoover died the bureau was not wholly passive in its defense. The , nomination of Gray and his conduct of the Watergate in- vestigation touched off a form of guerrilla warfare against the administration front within the ranks of the FitiLe hieldy placed CN? (Tufty(' acknowled.:ed that FBI neents may lime been instrumental in eelline the initial Watergate revelations into public print. Ileporicrs who covered the case a C. knov?ledee the role or the gents in openite7 up the ini- tial' peepholes in the cnver- up facade some administra? etirpetclti.ifficials were trying to "it wasn't' a matter of cot- tine rancorous leaks dumped in your tap." said one Watereate reportorial specialist. "You'd have to go to them and say, \that about this or m hat about that? They'd respond, 'Yes, that's richt.' I can think of one guy in the bureau without whom we wouldn't have got- ten anywhere." - Actin:: FBI Director Ruc!:- elshaus achoowledged that pace of thi, ',Vatereate inves? "some or wyr agentq were getting net sons ahout the tieation ale. probably talked to the press. It's against hit. reau retoilat ions hut not against the law," Former While I louse dn- me?o cwirisi,101* II charged in ;T- wee con'ertissinnal testi? ninny that the burtian was, "hemorrhaette:," with leaks under Gray. The While Hrillsr, he said. "strrior.ty susperted that. Time Innen- zinc had a freely runniog lea!: at the top of Gray's staff." In the days immediately after the WW.create a rrotit s in June, 1972, romp!. While Ilttnst, 1":611,1Sol JOhn W. Dean Ill was on the phone to Gray with repeated com- plaints ;thole bureau leaks. Dean has been pictured in' Wateried testimony as a key preiiident i at opei e for insulating the White ../louse from the scaidal., rieay first arrive4 .0 ti wanyd him to sue- ' aid a rceontly re. tired senior official with the Compleat Bureaucratic ment and in the W lute more than a quarter of Infighter, and is mithottsrovediEor Releasoet2GOINe8in_7 hat 111 wiret jug its third leaders-nip ine finger at the for ThiWAGirt-QQ432a000100%01001-t the !)tire 29 ' .ien we eeame mere of Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 those speaking trips, the fr."; (went, :11)story:es from WaTh-' inglon. That's when he got the nickname, 'Two?Day Gray,' Whatever you say about ? Hoover, he never missed A day of school," Now Gray is under inves- tigation by the FBI to deter- mine what role he played in the Watergate cover-up, One of the major ironies of Wat'err.,?ate's imoact on the FBI was the apparent in- version of Hoover's reputa- tion as an obsessive anti- Communist warrior whne kicked the door clown and asked questions later. Some of Hoover's long. standing liberal critics have acclaimed him for stopping the 1971) intelligence plan with Its burglary, mailoopen- jog, hugging and wiretapping provisions, But. as one of the chief liewenants of the departed director emphasized in an Hoover had not hecome a sudden convert to civil libertarianism. "For Mr. lioover, jurisdic- tion was paramount. He felt this plan WAS whittling away at the essence of the liBt and its responsibilities. Ile didn't object to clandestine entries. We opened mail but we never talked about it or \\Tote memos. We cracked safes when we felt it was 1 case of compelling national security. Hoover's law was that you didn't get caught and bring embarrassinent on the hureau," said the vet- eran Hoover loyalist. The documents bur. glarized from a bureau of- fice at Media, Pa., in Marc?h, 1971, showed that late into 1970 the FBI was wiretap. ping .1.31;ick Panther activi- ties and trying laboriously to infiltrate the ghettos with thousands of informants. The intensity of FBI sur- veillance against black or- ganizations with the slight- est political overtones sug- gests that at least one part of the 1970 White House plan 'nay have continued in effect through the year. Rut is also n matter of widespread agreement, in and outside the bureau, that as Ifoover brooded inereas-. inely on his place jn.history, he became more fastidious about legal procedure. Bag jobs ? burglaries ? were out. So was mail snooping. Phones were tap- ped only on written authori- zation of the Attorney Gen- eral. The same with etre- tronie hugs. .conceated 'mi. ccophones.. ? "1 was very confident of Hoover In the wiretap area," says former Attorney Gen- eral Ramsey Clark. "Ho knew we'd prosecute if we found anything wrong. Hoover was protecting the bureau." But even Hoover's stow). -Thurs:, June 14, 1973 Ens' Znatird Cfmril Top-Secret Directives for CIA Role Revealed Orders From Security Council Permit Activities Not Authorized in 1947 Statute BY RUDY. ABRAMSON Times Stet/ Writer ? The controversial "en- 'skids" apparently spell out in specific terms just what authority is granted for covert operations overseas and just what the CIA can do in the 'United States? even though ,the National Security Act specifies that the agency is not. to he in- volved in intelligence acti- vities at home. Disclosures in the Watergate scandal have resulted in new concern that Congress has failed to properly oversee CIA; operations. Publication of secret White House documents last week revealed that a 1970 intelligence plan?, approved by President ,Nixon, then canceled five. days later?involved the CIA in discussions of a widespread scheme for, spying on domestic "tar-'` gets." . Though memorandums Written by White House aide Tom Charles Huston cited the cooperation of then-CIA Director Richard Helms in putting together the plan, some sources' argue that the documents . failed to show that the CIA had agreed to become :involved in the. White House operations for domestic spying. Nevertheless, a former CIA analyst who is now an 'intelligence expert on Ca- pitol Hill said, "Helms never should have partici- pated in discussions like that, and when the subject was raised he. should have walked out." According to sources fa- miliar with operations of the agency, the CIA's acti- vities in the United States include recruitment of and .assistance to students from "Third World" coun- tries attending colleges and universities. Such activities are termed "building future assets," establishing rela- tions with students who stand to become figures in government in their home 'countries. 30 WASHINGTON ? The Central Intelligence Agen- cy, precluded by Congress 26 years ago from engag- lag in domestic opera- ,tions, operates under a top - secret charter from .the President's National 'Security Council that may directly conflict with its congressional mandate. The secret charter, in the form of National Se- curity Council Intelligence 'Directives, or "enskids," is .known only to a few high- level operatives in the in- t elli gence bureaucracy and fewer, if any, mem- bers of Congress. - The "enskids" take ad- vantage of loopholes in Congress' 1047 National, Security Act to permit. CIA. actiVities not author- ized when the agency waS 'created by that statute. . "T h e secret charter," . said a congressional ex- pert on CIA operations, "is: a. curse. "We must have publicly ?confirmed what authority 'is given to the intelligence community in this coun- try." chest loyalists concede that* the bureau was not keeping step with the violent politi- cal activism in the campuses and ghettos that swept to its peak in the l903-1970 period. "We still haven't solved the Capitol bombing or the Pentagon washroom bomb- ing,'' admitted one retired senior bureau official loyal to Hoover. "We've still got fugitives from the Weather- men and SDS even though they've been on the 'Ten Most Wanted' list. We did a great jot, on the Communist. Party and the Klan. This was different." Yet even those concerns maS? have been outdistanced by events. The colleges and ghettos have quieted down. So have the styles of politi- cal protest. These are facts with which Kelley will have to reckon AS he ponders the ether revelatiom,. fit tile most trautnatic years in the bureau's history, just passed, ? It is also widely believed that the CIA infiltrates U.S. peace groups in order to gain access to countries like China, North Viet.; .nam, N or t h Korea and Cuba, ? It is fairly common. knowledge that the agen- cy also operates a,domes- tic contact service which. ,interviews Sonic Amen- cans, mainly businessmen, 'who return from abroad with potentially useful in- formal ion. Several years ago, it was disclosed that the agency, through various founda- tions and front organiza- tions, had funneled money into more than 200 domes- tic groups, chiefly the Na- tional Student Assn. ? More recently, the CIA ohas been cennected with giving training to a mini- her of police departments. Much of the domestic CIA activity is reported to be carried out from offices in downtown Washington, a block from the White' - House, rather than at the agency's headquarters at Langley, Va. - Disclosure that John D. hr 11 chman, President. Nixon's former domestic. affairs adviser, had soliCit, ed CIA assistance for men plotting the burglary of the office of Daniel Ell s- berg's psychiatrist, t r i g. gered three congressional investigations of possible 'agency involvement in the ;Watergate affair and re- .lated matters. Inquiries Ended Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), chairman of an a p p ropriations subcom- mittee, and Sen. Stuart: Symington (D-Mo.), acting' chairman of an armed scr- V ices subcommittee on 'CIA oversight, have ended .their inquiries for the time being while they consider their next step. .Closed-door hearings are still being conducted by a House armed services sub- committee beaded by Rep.. Lucien N. Nedzi ' Sen. William Proxmire : (D-Wis.), who has recent- Iv renewed efforts to get disclosure of the CIA's se-. cret budge t, Tuesday launched a campaign to obtain release of the secret "enskids" Prof. Harry Howe .Ran-, sorn of Vanderbilt Univer-i Eity, an authority on the CIA. Tuesday called for creation of a nongovern- merit, commission to carry out. a major investigation Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 44. - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 tot the enitre U.S. Intel: , ligence apparatus. ? Calling the 1970 plan ,drawn up in the Whites House "scandalous," Ran- som said in an Interview '? that a major reorganiza- tion may be called for, in- cluding changes in the au- thority of the FBI and the: , CIA. ? , A see-mingly major: question related to the - CIA. and the 1970 White ;House intelligence plan is still open. ? Outlining his Work When asked about the plan last February, CIA's Helms told the Senate :Foreign Relations Com- mittee, "I do not recall, whether we were asked,: but we were not involved because, it seemed to me,' that was a clear violation, of what our charter was.", The question was raised when the committee con- ' , sidered Helms' nomina-.:. tion to he U.S. Ambassa- dor to Iran. ? Yet last week, in the se-. .cret White House doc- uments published by the.:4 'New York Times, domes-- tic' security aide Huston, 'outlining his work on the White House domestic in-' telligence unit, said "I , went into this exercise fearful that the CIA would refuse to cooperate. In' . 'fact, Dick Helms was most ;cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling .block was ,Mr. (J. Edgar), Hoover." Development of a secret ?charter through the Na-'! tional Security Council di- rectives, Prof. Ran so m4 said, amounts to the coun- cil writing law, a situation which he partly blames on, ,Congress for not exercis- Ang stronger oversight. Ransore said he also be. lieves that the time may 'have come when the CIA's , plans division?the partment of dirty tricks' t --*"should ? have some, mat,,t, jor surgery." ? I t? He said there are legiti-q ;mate questions as to e whether release of the "en- ? ? skids" would jeopardize 1 !'.'the national security. ji "But we don't know, what the basic structure Of' t our national intelligence ' apparatus is. But the 'ene- my' probably knows, and r in the long run, disclosure 71S the. better risk. The; .fworst thing is that the, law' is being violated in se-, ?cret." Oversight of the CIA has 11een made especially diffi- rcult because there are few tstaff members to support _committees with the re- isponsibility. Over the years, commu- ;inication between the CIA 'a nd the congressional committees charged with ,oversight has been be-' tween the committee chairmen and the agency 'director. Even the agency's budg- et . is kept from all but' members of Congress. 'charged with oversight, being hidden in appropria- .tions publicly announced for other departments in the federal bureaucracy. . ? That secrecy is now bel :Ing challenged in a cit? izen's suit before the Su- preme Court. The U.S. 'Court of Appeals in Phi- ?ladelphia has ruled that, William B. , Richardson 'has the right to sue the: 'government for disclosure of how the CIA spends its budget. ??? ? ,? The Supreme /Court is due to hear arguments in October on the issue of, 'whether Richardson has ; the right to sue. The Federation of . American Scientists has 'estimated. that the United 7States',...total intelligence :budget 'runs from $4 bil- lion to $8 billion per year. .The CIA alone; it esti- 'mates, has a budget of as .much as $1 billion per !Year and a staff 'of 18,000, or 8,000 more than the De. ',partment of State. VIRGINIAN, Covington 29 May 1973 T1 Functions of The CIA / Disclosures about Central Intelligence Atency involvement in domestic espionage have given rise to a call for curtailment of CIA functions. It is being proposed that thC spy agency's operating functions be turned over to State Department and military personnel, confining the CIA to the task of evaluating and coordinating intelligence. This proposal derives weight from the fact that one of those advancing the idea is Morton H. Halperin, a former adviser to the National Security Council. He and Jeremy J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists joined in making the proposal at a New York . University conference on governmental secrecy. Their recommendations appear to focus mainly on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency abroad. 'The time has come," they argue, "for America to change its strategy from covert intervention to setting a standard on non-intervention." They rightly note that whenever an instance of CIA manipulation of affairs abroad becomes. known?and this has frequently happened?harm is done Ameri- ca's reputation and credibility. Halperin and Stone also are concerned about the intrusion of the CIA, into domestic affairs, both directly and to some extent in- directly through the use of CIA-trained per- sonnel. "The greatest presidential scandal of modern times," they say in their paper, "has arisen from the injection of covert methods, used by CIA graduates, into American so- ciety." Just what changes should be made re- mains debatable. Certainly action should not be hasty, but ought to be taken on the basis of a thoroughgoing review of past CIA activi- ties and a searching consideration of what?its future role should be. But in our judgment Congress could do well to adopt as a working principle that the policy-making function of the Central Intelligence Agency should he eliminated or at very least strictly defined am! limited. In addition, steps should he taken to force the CIA not to depart in any , way from the legal structure on involvement kin domestic affairs. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW 17 JUNE 1973 The trouble with the truth The Politics Of Lying Government by Deception, Secrecy and Power. By David Wise. 915 pp. New York: Random House. $8.95. By RICHARD HOLBROOKE Multiple Choice Question for the 1970's: The Government of the United States lies: (a) never; (b) only when it has to for reasons of national security; (c) whenever it feels like it, wheth- er or not it affects national se- curity; (d) whenever it feels like it,, to protect itself from domes- tic political embarrassment; (e) most of the time; (f) all Of the time. ? By now, many Americans would pick- one of the last two choices to the question posed above. Turned off by Vietnam and Watergate and two Presidents in a row who have had low credibility ratings (for good reason), disillusioned by recent revelations of decep- tion and even during the excit- ing 1,000 days of the Kennedy Administration, many educated people see deceit even where there is none, and trickery be- 'hind even routine announce- ments. Like the Boy Who Cried Wolf, the Government often has trouble being believed when it Is telling the truth. (Try Con- vincing people, for example, that the Peace Corps is com- pletely clean of any C.I.A. in- volvement, as I firmly believe it is; even Peace Corps staff and volunteers sometimes doubt it, although three Presidents have issued orders to this effect, and no evidence has ever emerged. to the contrary.) It was not always thus. As recently as 1960, when the United States announced that it had lost a "weather research plane" near the Turkish bor- der, most Americans accepted the official State Department explanation?until, confronted by a C.I.A. pilot alive and well in Soviet hands, President Ei- senhower admitted the decep- tion and accepted personal re- sponsibility for the U-2 spy flights. Did the President of the Unit- ed States lie? And, especially, Dwight D. Eisenhower? Ike real- ized the cost of the lie, appar- ently, for in retirement he said that "the lie we told about the U-2" wag his "greatest regret." Thirteen years after the U-2 was shot down, the trust the United States Government once had has been seriously eroded. (Who would believe that cover story today?) Disbelief and cynicism are widespread. And it is not unusual to hear some of the more cynical among us argue that lying and deception are ncithing to .get upset about. After all, as I was told recently while debating some under- graduates who were seven years old at the time of the U-2 inci- dent and who view their Govern- ment with appalling cynicism, "Everybody in the Government lies, so -why get excited?" Astounding, that one should even have to defend the propo- sition that our Government should not lie to us. Yet it has become' necessary to make the case. Anthony Lake, who re- Signed as Henery .Kissinger's assistant after the -1970 Cam- bodian "incursion" *(and who recently learned that, while Working for Kissinger, he was having his home telephone tapped for "national security reasons") has written: "The es- sential first step is for the Gov- ernment to realize that it can- not lead the public .whild mis- leading it." "The Politics of Lying" is thus a title and theme of great promise. Major national issues transcending partisan politics are at stake. The Government is using its power to classify material, as David Wise ?tor- rectly puts it, in order "tb de- prive the American people of vital information." The system that has grown up, he adds, "has played a significant role in the general expansion of Presidential power" since World War II, and he conclude that "the Government's capacity to distort information in order to preserve its own political Power is almost limitless." Unfortunately, Mr. Wise's book is not equal to the am- bitious task he has set out to accomplish. It never lives tip to the promise of its title. Anec- dote follows anecdote to shock or amuse the reader; but they do not form a coherent picture of why and when the Govern- ment chooses to lie; what it gains or loses by lying; and when and why the Hart get away with it. The complex reasons that lead official' tito public deception are not ex- plored here. The extraordinary irony of the way in which public lying creates self-deception within the executive branch (and the great costs of such self-decep- tion) is overlooked entirely. Instead, one finds a collection Of 'stories, some old, some new, some borrowed all designed to convince the readtr of what Wise himself says the reader, already knows: the Government, lies a lot. We want more than! The whys and hows of lying,. as well as its 'real costs, are only glimpsed through the 'un- even aneedotage of ? this book. As for solutions, we can all agree with Mr. Wise that "the only 'solution' to 'Government lying is to tell the truth," but .his recommendations are both brief and unrealistic. (To sug- gest, fir example, that all classified documents should be- come public after three years unless the President personally keeps them classified is simply not workable.) Too much of "The Politics of Lying" is devoted to a compen- dium Of essentially minor com- plaints about the treatment of the press by the' White House. It is a shame, because Mr. Wise is addressing one of the major problems of our times, one that is far deeper than the "credibil- ity gap." There seems little .likelihood of it diminishing, eitlitr, despite the hopeful state- ment with which the Presi- dent's Communications Direc- tor, Herb Klein, ushered in the Age of Nixon in November, INS: "Truth will be the hall- mark of the Nixon Administra- tion. . . . We feel that we will be able to eliminate any possi- bility of a credibility gap in this Administration." Credibility gap. The very phrase,, V.,hich entered our vo- cabulary only a few years ago, both identifies a colossal prob- lem for every administration, and obscures the even more important question of why Presidents, other . politicians, and bureaucrats lie. Take Water- gate, for example?a classic and staggering case of lying, apparently at every level of the Government. But why? Mr. Wise's book (which ? was fin- ished before the more recent spectacular events) does not provide us with many clues. But in the Watergate tragedy, lying must be viewed as the public front edge of a much larger failure?.a failure on the part of our leaders to believe in, and live by, the democratic principles on which our nation is supposedly based. The evidence relentlessly emerging supports this gloomy assessment; our leaders lied publicly because they were act- ing in an anti-democratic man- ner privately. In the brilliant perception of columnist Stewart Alsop, ? they were using the techniques of war, not politics. And when their private (and illegal) action began to emerge they had no recourse 'but to lie as a defense. The credibility gap, then, ? may. be viewed in a somewhat different way. The Government this, but it is not here. '32 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 a Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 has lost the confidence of many Americans because it lies; it lies because it has lost con- fidence in the values of a gen- uinely open and democratic society. Secrecy?a product of fear and a perennial sanctuary for insecure people?is the in- evitable first step in such a process. Lying, under pressure and probing from 'outsiders (usually the press and Con- gress), is, equally inevitably, the next step. The circle is vicious. Or, to use an image North Vietnamese Prime Minis- ter Phan van Dong fised 11 years ago in predicting our CHRISTIAN SCIENCE ICNITOR 26 June 1973 Vietnam nightmare, it is really a descending spiral. Much of the deception is done in the name of "national security" a traditional and usually successful justification. Over the last 28 years, and growing out of a legitimate need in World War II and the cold war to protect sensitive information, the national secur- ity umbrella has been expanded continually. Perhaps?but only perhaps?it reached its apogee on May 22, 1973 when the President of the United States invoked the national security rationale to explain and excuse a series of admittedly illegal acts taken by members of the ? White House staff?the now famous plumbers?against Am- erican citizens. In times like these, what we need is a relentless analysis of what leads politicians and of- ficials to "lie" in order to sur- vive, what is behind the de- ception, and what can be done to reduce it?if anything. "The Politics of Lying" is a title that deserves a better book. LI Richard IIolbrooke is man- aging editor of Foreign Policy.. Arab edigor comments on Nixon, Brezhnev: gate *ts effectiveness in By John K. Cooley Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Beirut, Lebanon A leading Arab commentator says that Watergate and Soviet policy have , made it impossible for President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev to deal effectively with the Middle East crisis. Muhammad Haykal, chief editor of the Cairo Daily Ai-Ahmm, bitterly criticized the Soviet Union in a com- mentary published June 22. He ac- cused Moscow of cutting its' aid to the Arabs in half, while the U.S. doubled its own help to Israel. Though its terms are more dra- matic than most other Arab reactions to the Nixon-Brezhnev, summit, Mr. Haykal's article reflects the growing Arab disenchantment with Moscow. ? Ealier a Kuwait newspaper, Al- Siyassa, expressed this by caning on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab oil states to cut down their depen- dence on both the U.S. and the Soviet Union for aid and oil markets, and take the solution of the conflict with Israel into their own hands. A Lebanese writer, Clovis Mak- soud, reported from Washington in the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar that Zionist quarters in the United States were conducting a powerful cam- paign to "submerge" the Nixon- Brezhnev summit in the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel. ' In his article, Mr. Haykal said , Watergate had reduced the ability of 'the White House to deal with the Mideast by strengthening the hand of the U.S. Congress, where Watergate had left Israel's supporters even stronger than before. This may have ended all plans for a Mideast policymaking role by Henry Kissinger who even before Watergate had been reluctant to attack the Mideast issue, Mr. Haykal added. Kissinger described (In an article in the lastest issue of the Beirut quarterly magazine, Jour- nal of Palestine Studies, U.S. political scientist and Mideast expert Malcolm Kerr writes that "Kissinger has shown no great interest in Middle Eastern problems in the past." (". . . even if Nixon as a second- term President cared nothingJor his party's loss of electoral favor, the heat and anger of public debate that a get-tough policy toward Israel would surely generate and the prospect of revolt from a Democratic Congress . . are bound to make him wonder whether he could even control, let alone justify, a controversial Middle East policy, "Dr. Kerr writes. ("What would he plan to do if Congress suddenly seized the in- itiative over his veto and voted for new arms shipments to Israel, accom- . panied by a resolution endorsing her bargaining position?" Dr. Kerr asks.) Soviet position 'neutralized' Mr. Haykal contends in his article east that while the United States knows what it wants in the Middle East, the Soviet Union does not. Israel, he says, has "neutralized" ' the Soviet position in the Mideast. If U.S. support to Israel in the past was "100 percent, it is now 200 percent," Mille if Soviet backing for the Arabs "was only 50 percent in the past, at present it is 25 percent." What Moscow does not want, Mr. Haykal says, is another Arab defeat that would destroy residual Soviet prestige in the Mideast. Moscow fears to use its strength to change the power balance, since it might dislike the results and come into confrontation with the United States. Finally, says Mr. Haykal, the U.S.S.R. does not want an "American solution," Mr. Haykal sees American strategy as aiming at keeping the cease-fire and Israeli military superi- ority; halting efforts inside and out- side the UN for a real settlement; and draining Egypt's strength and isolat- ing her. Further, writes Mr. Haykal, Wash- ington concentrates on the Persian Gulf area, which Mr. Haykal calls "the potential focus of war;" deep- ening Arab-Iranian tensions; wiping out "revolutionary centers;" telling the Arabs that Washington holds the key to the Mideast problem and offering pragmatic solutions "which are really a way of keeping the Mideast situation as it is, rather than changing it." Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 43' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 VOCE REPUBBLICANA, Rome 2-3 May1973 WATERGATE AND US THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY Frankly, it seems to us that even now, when the "Watergate Case" concerning wiretapping in America has fully exploded, even now when the eyes of the entire world are fixed on this new, ' dramati crack in American society, when the temptation to make comparisons with what is going on in our own house is quite legitimate, very few here in Italy have fully understood the profound but evident meaning and lesson that is being imparted to us by this event. By this it is meant that very few have had the courage--not to mention decency--to admit that the difference between the United States and us is this: on the one hand there is a country that is struggling for the defense, or rather the strengthening of democracy and, on the other hand, the country is a quagmire in which democracy is suffocating. And the lack of awareness of this unbridgeable difference constitutes an element--burcertainly not the only element-- of the botched democracy that we see around us whose manifestation every day and in every domain we can only note and lament. The most widespread sentiment which we hear expressed in all political and public opinion sectors is, in broad terms, as follows: political structures in America are creaking, and the !Watergate Case" is a clear demonstration that there is no true democracy; with us, however, things are even worse: scandals of this type, when they do not abort, die at birth. Political corruption in the United States exists, but it just so happens that it is denounced, even if the "system" remains what it is; with us, corruption is just as widespread (if not more so) but, as soon as it comes to light, it is enmeshed in such a tangle of competing interests as to be suffocated immediately, with the result that no one even has the satisfaction or learnjng the details. In other words, between the two failures of true democracy, ours is worse. From this derives, if one can so express it, a quantitative difference of non-qualitative democracy--or lack of democracy. Whoever says this, either in good faith or bad, has not, so far as we can see, grasped the true connection between what is happening in the U.S. and what we are witnessing in Italy. Democracy is not something that exists in the abstract and, where it does exist, does not need continuous examination, continuous checking. The democratic system is not for those who once they have obtained it need no longer think about it--that holds, for example, for dictatorships; precisely because its structure is "open" to all components, the good and the bad, democracy requires the constant surveillance of the society of which it is the expression. Democracy is always imperfect, is always a tormented dialectic game, is always running risks of involution. For this reason, Churchill's phrase is valid, that it is a bad system but that the others are worse. But, if its principal 'danger is that of being corrupted, its principal virtue is that of knowing how to-correct itself. 34 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 s Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 All this is so evident that the type of uninformed regurgitation underlying almost all Italian conunents on these events on the other side of the Atlantic seems incredible--the idea, in short, that if things are not going well in our country, they are not going much better in America. The truth is quite otherwise. At issue is not corruption, which is a human activity in every political system and . in every latitude. What is to be judged is the manner of fighting it. And here the difference between the U.S. and Italy is unbridgeable. Is it necessary to repeat that the American system is not only the Administration, is not only the White House, but is rather that particular combination of constitutional guarantees, that particular system pf political checks and balances, that type of control and of public opinion participation. The 'Watergate Case," after Vietnam, after Johnson, after the Pentagon Papers, is the umpteenth confirmation of it. What, if not "the system," has led to the dismantling of almost the entire White House general .staff, to the removal of those . whom public opinion had identified as being primarily responsible for the scandal, and to the insertion of others, like Richardson, considered "liberal"? Whence, if not out of the system, came the courage and energy to correct the system? Let us repeat, to consider that American society is now politically healthy would be to close one's eyes to reality: the scandal has revealed a profound rot reaching to Washington's political summits. But let us recognize that we are dealing with a democracy capable of defending and correcting itself with pitiless determination and rigor, without fear of the "eyes of the world." This is precisely the unique lessOn that we can draw from the event. It would be a salutary lesson, if it were heard. But given the conunents it has elicited in Italy, the American scandal does not induce many hopes. Commentators have harped on the scandalous aspects-- sacrosanct, certainly--and have underrated the gigantic effort that American society has exerted, and is exerting, to emerge from them with justice. Of such a collective effort in Italy, one sees not even a trace as regards our own affairs. Energies here are dedicated to party interests, to personal benefits, to shady relationships of currents. One navigates among scandals, still unborn or born maimed and then asphyxiated. There is, in all strata, a sense of suffocation and strangulation of true democracy, which has few positive turns. One notes the spread of a fragmented, obscure, corporatized, uncontrolled power, which is born and dies in the darkness of corridors and under- the-table negotiations. A democracy without checks and balances is not a democracy; it has neither the chance nor the capacity to correct itself that is indispensable for keeping itself vital. This is the lesson of the "Watergate Case": whoever draws other lessons from it has not understood the always more dramatic problems of our democracy or has understood them and'sPeaks only for the sake of convenience. [Ill "V\iatargte? e no[i La qualia della democra CI sembra francamente the, anche ora the 11 a ca- so Watergate a suite inter- cettazioni telefoniche In America 6 esploso in pie- no. anche ora che gll oc- chi dj tutto Ii mondo so- no Msl su questa nuova drammatica frattura delta socleta americana. anche ora the pin iegoefotIdld tentazione di fare Confron- ga ti con le cose di casa no- paese che lotta per la di- stra. ben pochi in Italia fesa (diciamo di pita: per abblano captto appleno il 11 rafforzamento) della senso prolondo eppure democrazia, dall'altro lato lampante e la lezione che c'e un pantano in cui la el vengono da questa vi- democrazia sta annegan- cenda. VoglIamo dire che do. E la mancata consape- ben pochi hanno ii corag- volezza di questa abissale glo (e ii pudore) di dire diversitiii ci sembra ele- che la differenza tra not mento non ultimo della Far giefelekst20171 /WIT : CrAdR43107709043ER0081 ene ea una parte c e un chamo intorno a not. di 35 Cu! ()gni glorni e in ogni campo registriamo e la- mentiamo le mantle- staziont. Il sentiment? p1i diffu- 60 che 51 avverte in tutti settori politic! e di opi- nione 6 grosso modo il se- guente. Le strutture pollti- che in America scricchio- 0 0 !MON 111-7caso Watergate? la dimostrazione palmare Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 che non c'e vera demo- crazia: ma da not va an- the peggio: scandal' di quest() tipo, quando non abortiscono, muoiono ap- pena natl. La corruzione politica negli Stan Unitt estste, ma capita che ven- ga denunciata, ancho se 11 sIstema ? rimano quel- l() che 6; da not In corru- alone ?ltrettanto (se non OM dllagante, ma; appena accenna a venire ella Ince 6 subito presa da tale un groviglio di interessi contrastanti ,da essere subito soffocita. Con il risultato di non a- vere neanche la soddiaa- alone di conoscerla a fon- da. Si dice in altre pro- Ie the, tra due mancanze di vera democrazia, la no- stra ?a peggiore. Ne de- riva, Sc Cost si pue dire, una diffcrenza quantitati- va di democrazla to , di rnancanza di democra- Ma), non qualitativa. Chi dice ClUeStO, in buo- na o In cattiva fede, non cl sembra .abbla colto II vero ness,o tra cid che sta succcdondo negli Stall U- nitl C cio a cul assistiamo in Italia. La democrazia non 6 qualcosa che esista in astratto e, le dove est- ste, non abbia bisogno di una continua verifica. di tin continuo controllo. Ii sistema democratico non 6 tale per cut, una volta fissato, non ci st debba pensare pi? (ele) vale. caso- t?F. mai per le dittature): pro- prio perche la sua struttu_ ra 6 -t aperta ? a tutte le component'. le buone e le cattive, della societa. di cu" 6 espressione. La de- mocrazia 6 sempre imper- fetta, e sempre un gloco dIalettico tormentato. cor- re sem pro perlcoll dl invo- luzlone. Per essa vale an- cora la frase di Churchill che C un sistema cattIvo, ma che gli,altri sono peg- giori. Ma, se II suo prin- cipale pericolo 6 di cor- rompers!, la sua princip- le virtu 6 di sapersi cor- reggere. Tutto questo 6 talmente evidente che appare in- credit:111e ouella specie di inconsapevole rigurgi- to che 6 sotteso a quasi tuttl I commenti Italiani agli avvenimenti d'oltre Atlantico: ii senso, appun- to, che se net nostro pae- se le cose vanno male, in America non vanno motto megllo. La verita 6 ben diversa. In discussione non 6 la corruzione, che C pu- re un'attivita umana in ("gni sistema politico sotto ogni latitucline. CO che va giudIcato 6 ii modo di combatterla. E qui la differenza tra gli, Stati U- nit' e e abIssale. C'e hisogno di ripetere che ii sistema americana non solo l'amministrazIone. non e solo la Casa Bian- ca, ma 6 quella partice- lare articolazione di ga- ranzie costituzlonali, quel particolare sistema di contrappesi politici, quel tipo di controllo e di par- tecipazione dell'opinione PUbblica? II ? caso Water- gate ?, dopo il Vietnam. dopo Johnson, dopo 1 ? dossler ? del Pentagon?. no 6 l'ennesima confer= Chi, so non II ? sistema ha portato alio smantella- mento di quasi tutto lo stato maggiore della Casa Bianca, alla estromissione di coloro che l'opinione pubblica aveva identificato net principal' responsabi- li dello scandalo e all'im- missione di altri, come Richardson, considerati ? liberal ?? Chi, se non 11 sistema. ha trovato II coraggio e l'energia di correggere ii sistema? Ripetiamo. ritenere con etc) che la societh ameri- cana sia politicamente sana, sarebbe chiudere ell occhl di fronte alla real - ta: lo scandalo ha rivela- to un marcio profondo at vertici politic! di Washing- ton. Ma che sla una de- mocrazia capace di difen- dersi e correggersi con spietata determinazione e rigore, senza paura per gli ? occhl del mondo ?. questo 6 precisamente la unica lezione che noi pos- slam? trarre dalla vicenda. Lezlone salutare, se fosse ascoltata. Ma pro- prio ii modo in cut da not 6 state commentato lo scandalo americano non induce a molte speranze. Si 6 insistito sugh aspetti scandalistici (sacrosanti, certamente) e si 6 sotto- valutato ii gigantesco sfor- s0 che in socleta ameri- cana ha compluto e corn- pie per uscIrno second() gliistIzIa. DI questo sforzo collettivo da not, per le case nostre, non at vede neppure un latomo. Le energie Si dedicano agli Interessi di partito, at tornaconti di parte, agll intrallazzi di corrente. Si naviga tra gli scandali, non ancora nati o natl monchl e asfittici. C'e, In tuttl gli strati, un senso di soffocamento e stran- golamento della democra- zia vera, che ha'ben scar- si risvoltt positivi. Si av- verte 11 dilagare di tin po- tere frammentato, oscuro, corporativizzato, senz a control'', che nasce e muore nel buio del coml.- dol e del negoziati sotto- banco. Una democrazia scnza contrappesi non e una democrazia: non ha Quetta possibtlIth e capa- cita di correggersi che 6 indispensabile per mante- nersi vitale. Questa 6 In lezione del ? caso Water- gates: chi ne trae altre non ha capito I problem' sempre ph1 drammatici della nostra democrazia: o Ii ha can't' e parla solo per comodo. 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 6- 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 WASHINGTON POST PARADE 17' June 1973 A SPECIAL JACK ANDERSON REPORT WASHINGTON, D.C. , resident Nixon will know enough . [ iaabout Leonid Brezhnev zo write a biography when the two leaders fi- nally sit down together at the sum- mit. Brezhnev's health? The President , will have a complete medical report. Brezhnev's temperament? A detailed psychological profile will be available. ' Brezhnev's beliefs? The President will have transcripts of private Kremlin . conversations. Intimate information Nixon even has the name of Brezh- nev's favorite masseuse. In the privacy of the Kremlin, Brezhnev confided to _Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny that he was looking forward to a rubdown from a masseuse named Olga. Ameri- can spies were listening when Pod- gorny answered, with a knowing chuckle: "Oh, ho! Olga!" In the rarefied atmosphere of inter- ? national power politics, such intimate inform' aiion can be a powerful bargain- ing chip. Thick dossiers on world leaders are compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, which gathers its information by every method, from electronic eavesdropping to routine research. The secret profile of Leonid Brezh- nev, according to those who have seen it, portrays him as an amiable, robust, hard-drinking outdoorsman. He likes to gossip about his colleagues in the Kremlin, and he engages in the con- stant bickering and backbiting that goes on behind those Byzantine walls. His private conversations are heavily laced with locker-room language. He likes to relax at a place Soviet leaders call the "Clinic" near the Kremlin. This is the Soviet equivalent of a private health Club. ' The profile also contains incidents and insights from CIA intelligence re- ports. During the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis, for example, the man Brezhnev ousted as Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, suddenly showed up at theARPAWIAF demanded to see his successor. Khrush- they loudly warned that the Czech in- vasion could turn into a disaster unless Soviet troops were pulled out at once. Brezhnev gruffly refused to see Khrush= chev and ignored his advice. A profile of Castro The profile on Fidel Castro contains a CIA report that the Kremlin has asked the Cuban dictator "to try to regain control over Latin American revolution- ary movements" and has promised to "pay all the costs involved." The CIA also reported Castro's pri- vate opinion of the Marxist regime in Chile and its leader, President Salvador Allende. Castro correctly predicted a year in advance "a breakdown in pub- lic order." This, he said, could come about at any time because the opposi- tion, especially the middle class, had lost its fear of government. Castro opined that a government must have fear if it is to control the country. "Another factor listed by Castro," continued the secret CIA report, "was the possible deterioration of Allende's health. Castro said he is worried about Allende because the latter is physically 'spent.' Castro also observed that [Chil- ean) leaders live too Well and are not undir sufficient tension to take the offensive." The CIA not only keeps Communist leaders under scrutiny; it also checks on friendly leaders. The financial difficul- ties of Costa Rica's respected President Jose Figueres, for example, were quietly relayed to Washington. The CIA quoted a family member as complaining that "all the members of the President's family are deeply concerned with fam- ily financial matters:' The CIA also gleefully reported an awkward confrontation between France's President Georges Pompidou and West Germany's Chancellor Willy Branch a few months ago. "A heated exchange took place after the Brandt- Pompidou dinner," said the CIA. A German economics official, "told Pom- ? pidou that France was profiting from and encouraging the inflation afflicting other European countries . . . Accord- ing to members of Brandt's party, Brandt stood by and visibly enjoyed Pompidou's discomfiture. Schoel lborn. supported his accusations with details which Pompidou was unable to refute." The world's two most celebrated ? women leaders, Israel's Golda Meir and ? India's Indira Gandhi, are reported by the CIA to have a long-distance feud brewing. According to the CIA account, . Mrs. Meir regards Mrs. Gandhi as "neu- tral ... on the side of Egypt," while Mrs. Gandhi sees Israel as a "warmonger." The dossiers on Arab leaders are.: loaded with CIA tidbits. Egypt's Presi- ? ? dent Anwar Sadat,' "when threatening . Israel with an all-out war, was bluffing," ? reported the CIA. Jordan's King Hussein' threatened "to go on a ghazou" unless ? he received more American aid. A gha- . zou, it was explained, "is a Bedouin , raid against neighbors for the purpose , of looting." Syria's President Hafez-al- Assad was portrayed by the CIA as an ? outspoken militant who doesn't "expect ? too much from Egyptians." Assad uses the Arabic word "Iamma" when he speaks of war with Israel. "Lamma" means "when" not "if," explained a CIA report. Spying on foreign leaders is a routine operation, involving CIA agents in the field and researchers at headquarters. Reports from diplomats and military at- tach?also go into the dossiers. If Wash- ington suddenly wants more informa- tion about a certain dignitary, say in advance of a summit meeting, he be- comes "targeted." Then the full re- sources of the clandestine agency are trained upon laying his life bare. The first step in the daily spying process is known as the "library search." Researchers routinely clip newspaper and magazine articles about foreign notables and send them into the 'CIA's "Biographic Registry" computer. As part of the "library search," field agents are asked to fill out forms on foreign leaders, which resemble job applications. To the extent possible, relatives, friends and acquaintances are casually contacted. Information is gath- ered helter-skelter, with rumor and fact' carefully noted. It is left to the experts in Washington to assemble the jigsaw pieces and make the final distinctions. Nothing taken for granted Even the most rudimentary facts, however, are not taken for granted. "In many foreign societies, the leaders mask their backgrounds as much as pos- sible," a CIA man told us. "It's not like in the 'United States where you have everything from FBI files to job applica- alttictivemo.p_7sonal history." 0 rscf9f6a..408iY1 La 1 Oihe CrAcRESE77-004V8 taartolnis mg amount of informa- 1 meg )onann Baptist Schoenborn, a ?11 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7 tion can be picked up quite legitimately ' by America's observers overseas. For ,example, a military attache in Moscow became great friends with the Soviet Defense Minister during the Khrush- chev years. While the stuffy Soviet big- wigs would shuffle about at official re- ceptions, the attache and minister would toss down vodka and swap sto- ries about their superiors. Of course, electronic eavesdropping is often used. In Belgium .a CIA opera- tive learned that the Chinese Com- munist embassy was planning to move. He quickly located the new site and rented the house next door. Bugs were placed in the new embassy before the Chinese moved in. The CIA 'picked up an earful before the bugs were eventu- ally discovered. While the field operatives are poking ;into every dark corner of the subject's life, academics back at the CIA com- pile anthropological and sociological data on the arra in which the subject grew up. This is done in the CIA's "Geographic Office." The structure of the society, its mores and customs, are depicted. Even the type of diet adds to the portrait of the person. The "Geographic Office" report on -Mao Tse-tung, for instance, noted that he traveled as a beggar through the country in his youth, seeing firsthand the poverty and corruption. This 'pro- Joundly affected the young Mao and helped ignite the revolutionary fire that caused him to help fOund the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1920's. Today, intelligence reports confirm that Mao is still the purest of revolutionaries. . Medical diagnosis The CIA also directs its agents to dredge up all possible medical informa- tion for the medical researchers to diag- nose. Once, agents tapped into wash- room pipes in one of Monte Carlo's most glamorous casinos to get a urine sample from the oil-rich King of Saudi Arabia, who was rumored to be ailing. Inside the washroom, crouched behind a commode door, an agent waited with an electronic signaling device. The King, a heavy drinker and addicted gambler, finally entered in a swirl of white robe. The agent alerted his colleague in the plumbing closet, and the nbzzle was turned on the pipe tapped into the washroom plumbing. But the greatest coup in the annals of. the CIA's medical espionage oc- curred during Nikita Khrushchey's state visit to the United States in 1959. CIA men managed to iSolate and bore tri- umphantly to the labs. the Soviet lead- er's solid waste for medical analysis. Sophisticated photographic tech- niques arealso used to observe leaders at long distance. Called "targets .of op- portunity" in CIA jargon, the photos are compared with old Ones for signs of stress, aging and disease. A blotchy skin, 38 for example, can indicate a liver prob-. lem. Through long-range observation, the CIA learned of the late Egyptian Presi- dent Nasser's heart condition and of the late Indonesian President Sukarno'S vis- its to a Viennese specialist. (Surveillance of Sukarno, incidentallY, revealed he liked his hosts to have a woman for him on state visits.) Photographic evidence Long-range photography settled a rumor, back before the Chinese-Ameni-s* can detente, whether Mao Tse-tung was sick and using a double for public ap- pearances. A photograph was taken Mao in public. By measuring the length of the earlobe and by determining that ' his facial wart was in exactly the right place, the agency certified him as genu- ine. Then by closely examining the pic- ture, CIA analysts learned that the aging leader was not critically ill as had been rumored: For all the sophisticated methods the CIA uses to gather intelligence on world leaders, however, nothing is quite .as revealing as a face-to-face meeting. More can be learned from one tough negOtiating session than from a 10,000-page report prepared by the CIA. For it's not the juicy tidbits So much as the basic attitudes that matter in the world of power politics. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-7