Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 20, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 2, 1973
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6.pdf7.12 MB
approved For Release 2001/08/07-: CIA-RDP777-0O432R000100288001-=6- CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 49 19 NOVEMBER 1973 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 NEAR EAST 21 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 36 25X1A Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFNDENTlAL Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 L NEW YORK TIMES 2 November 1973 Rpedel io 1fie New York Vines ; ~~ ... . _ ?? .. .. ~' i ' ' ? ??t WASHINGTON, Nov. 1--i on Vice-Presidential Nomination, r xc rpts From Transcript, of Ford's Testimony .at'Hearing Following are -excerpts f ronti My thoughts have been j't nd cri' le th Governme t" a I m n e a ,at a saint, and Im . a transcript o testimon to- da h Repentative G?raid :mixedrride'"in the, confi? sure I' ,have done things I 'in hi Bence which President Ni xon Might. have done better or R. Ford, Republican of Michi- an who is President Nixon's has'shown for me and deep,, 'differently or not at all. I. I g an that . apparently have also left undone things: l ? ;nominee for. Vice President,;a it is shared' by hundreds of f the old 1 I'im Rules and Administration: ' o iends and . col- personay osecision to,, llf hi d Cline said Kissinger and retire Monday, the day Kis-4. he had discussed the future 'singer left for the Middle, of I & R since the new sec- East. Word was relayed to: retary of. State assumed. the secretary, Cline said'" charge and termed the talks, and he has since sent , Kis-r inconclusive. But he denied singer a message giving his to eliminate I & R , - o r - to, JEREMIAH O'LEARYt 16 = Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77=00432R000100280001-6 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100290001-6 THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY 1 November 1973 THE CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY: by Roger Morris The Red-Headed League attempts to alter or altogether sup- press reports to Washington unfovor- able to Nigeii i, including eyewitness ,accounts of Nigerian atrocities. iDissent, according :?2 many accounts, was severely punislw', NNby unfavorable "Tell Madamn Ghandhi how lucky In the summer of 1'967, after aperformance ratings. she is," Lyndon Johnson called after a sequence of political intrigues and' There was visib{e irn;:.?ion with 'startled Indian ambassador as he left a tribal massacres, civil war broke Out the embassy back in Nashington, White House meeting in 1968. "She's between Nigeria and its secessionist: where Nigerian policy`was`,-ided by got to ambassadors workin' for Eastern Region, which became Biafra. her... you here and Bowles but When Biafra collapsed more than two there." years later, hundreds of thousands Not that the President doubted the were dead, he vast majority from national loyalty of Chester Bowles or starvation caused when Nigeria block- the U. S. embassy in India. But the aded rebel-held territory. The war was' to Lagos to discover why the cm- Johnson sarcasm, an epitaph on years essentially a battle forpower be'twcen,bassy's intelligence was so different of bureaucratic battles, struck at a post-colonial elites. Neither side from all accounts of the war in the complex problem in the bureaucratic- would subordinate its political or, media and from other governments. politics of foreign policy. military goals to relieve the?enormous But those efforts soon gave way to.a Charged to understand and inter human cost. weary resignation and State's own pret the views of other governnlcnts, Under both Presidents Johnson;growing reluctance to offend victor- U. S. diplomats are sometimes drawn and Nixon, United States policyious, Nigeria as Biafra's collapse be- on by career or conviction-bv the toward the conflict was a combination came ininlinent. }peculiarly insular culture of their of political neutrality, including an To the end, the Lagos mission bureaucracy-to defend or at least. arms embargo, and a major commit- resisted the awful reality of Biafra's acquiesce in those views. Ensnared in ment, over S100 million, to the inter- starvation, refusing to support tile; a parochial view of the national inter national relief efforts operating on: presentation by Nigerian relief est, some officials come to resist; both sides. Behind the relief policyjauthorities of vital scientific data on almost instinctively any policy that was an extraordinary outpouring of I the famine developed by U. S. public j they deal with the wrong way. The congressional support across the poll-I public, Congress, the White House, diplomats align their interests with can religious relief' gencies were duped by 13iafran propaganda or else; absurd, sometimes tragic. the International Committee of the port int client, the Lagos embassy; t E R l i d C d va e . ross an severa pr e uro- largely followed'its'ovin foreign policy Cliency has become a major occupational disease of modern Amer- can relief groups. Tor the duration of the war. ican diplomacy. Although many There were disputes in Washington American diplomats refuse to yield to over whether the U. S. should play in Our Friends the Enemy impulse, even at the expense of intermediary role in trying to end the ? Y their careers, cliency influences much conflict, but no apparent question Cliency is seldom so' bizarre of of what the United States flocs or, that the United States should make concentrated as the Lagos example. does not do in the world-front its sonic humanitarian response to the More often, missions inflict 'their bias failure to speak out against genocide starving children of the Nigerian civil through long battles of bureaucratic in -Africa to the multiple tragedies of war. Or so it seemed. In the United attrition. And nowhere have the cam- Vietnam. And it has taken a heavy toll States embassy (in Lagos, ardentlypaigns been longer than on.the South on government-in honesty and objec- committed ? to its Nigerian clients, it Asian Subcontinent, where India and tivity, in time and energy sapped by was a different world. 'Pakistan--and the United States enl- bureaucratic conflict, in idealism, in Only weeks after the outbreak of bassies in'. each country-are historic` enormous human costs abtoad that the war, the ? wife of an American rivals. mightAhave been lessened, and in the. embassy official in Lagos startled her "We need a modern tank here. You further erosion of public trust in Nigerian dinner guests with a toast to know what the enemy has." The foreign policy. "the destruction of Biafra." When speaker was a United, States military-1 numberless Biafran children. dying of attache talking to a visitor to'Pakistagi Roger Morris, who has wore in the S7ate, protein deficiency, their hair turned in 1967.' It wasn't the American,: epartnienl and Nahnnal Securi-r Council rust color, became symbols to the embassy that needed modern armor, Senate, is writinga book about humanitarian ,world of the war's wanton suffering, but the Pakistani Army; the "e4enly," roblcnts in foreign policy. United States embassy officers in of course, was India. Some months{ L b l 1 17 ST a gos som er y explained to visitors later, an equally earnest Air Forcq. that the clever rebels had found an obscure' zed-haired tribe, starved:. its infants and put them on display.;,; The, mission's zeal was not allays so overt. Sources that served in the lagos . embassy during the. early mon0h5 of the war recall a pervasive suspicion in the form of ,official restrictions on the contacts of junior officers lest they acquire rebel syilt- pathies. Officials -tell of recurrent career officers who had serve, in the country earlier. Letters, then \; rcial visitors, were sent to urge more "-., tll- plete reporting. Oiie source rec:\1?: that the CIA even sent an-investigatc,'~ Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 attache used home leave in Washin- way himself at tinges, and if only he due). The ton to warn a' White House aide had posed that same question " o'initiatd a f a " uno fci lly that he believed the Washington, he plight hive been taken ment ro around ~~'Kashmir. This-, time the iiiakeis. As ."it was,- his beleaguered, thing,"-ex enem P ki y was a stan selfrighteou cliy tdd t .-senceneo pro-!we were Frequently, the United States mis- yoke the very forces in Washington lie lti "' icu es ., sions in both countries seem to have hoped to. disarm. 'After reading the the letter b li " " e eved there were alo i ibl fo Dlhid h senemesn caesrme anearing in real respo Washin to t N ' g n- ew Delhi mission person Bol he iitd df of th!6 wes spreeensee 71111 when the United States began to arm Indians,' ndians, LBJ seems to have become that men Rawalpindi when congressional pros-' Indian reforms, leis embassy ~rever thousand sure fo~ced a United States arms would. And whatever the merits of f genre o , embargo against Pakistan during the the issue, he was probably right. solution' 1965 'tl I d' ,] wai tJ. S, embassy in Burundi oint letter to the gouern- several- members of the corps. "It was a lotvkcy aincd one witness, "siying mother official remen166red as "tactful... and it get no May 25, amid evid'gncc omen, and children }were r'dered at the rate f a a day, in what one in' elii- er called: Burundi's ` ' final Thomas Melady routil'lcly wI I 11 la, and more per- left the c'Q ntnnrnily in 104,7 Al--# On the 196 1 decision was made, the - "" `"a"b" ? to 'speak United States embassy in Pakistan The reluctance of an American seen, liis urged our government to circumvent diplomat to break with his client can clients p the embargo by selling the Pakistanis be less a matter of the size and remorse United States-made tanks' from some importance of the country than of the followed third country_ This device, predictably official's personal investment. In 1969, when th enou h h g was anat ema to the Anmen Th Mldb ,-omaseay, a non-career amas-1 silently t. can embassy in India. sador but an author of books on were dill But the same mission in New Delhi Africa, was appointed ambassador to-`motives,; which saw the wisdom of denying Burundi, a, tiny and obscure Central Melady's,, Pakistani, generals their weapons in African state with a history of savage rclationsl 1967 found no reason at all to recolll- tribal disputes between he'Tutsi the several s , c s. mend withholding food aid.as a means dominant minority, and ttic I-tutu, Mclady, it turned out. need not f persuading a venal Indian bureau- %vIlo made up 85 per cent of the have worried so much, that the State racy to sustain lon, overdue agri- country's population but had been Department would react against the .ultiiral reforms. This and other dis- effectively denied political and eco-''genocide. The Department's African )rtes between the mission and Wash- nomic ., power. The Tutsi's chronic !bureau seems to have been equally ngton, leaving 1'residcnt. Johnson to worry was that the United States 'worried if he had -an ambassador to would take sides with the suppressed worried about client- African time their states. ndia, illustrate the pernicious char, Motu. "Painfully aware of what. had own, '1111o11g the o the r this cter of elency. !The Organization of African Unity Chester Bowles was tlleii on his brought down his predecessort; as (OAU) refused to take actio on crone tour as ambassador in Dellii.? one of his collca~ues put it, Mclady R set about'energetically to overcome n early casualty of -the Washington his client's fears. urcaucracy under -President Ken- "He told them 'ever, chance lie edy,. he was to prove the most', .who gtunanc policy-maker of the.glitteriii~ got,+, remembered an o "that' lot. s"earlier e'xherience in Coll-' lead A4clady s telegrams, that' thel press and tine' executive branch, United States was absolutely impartial Bowles had observed the anti-Indian as betwee'li Tu.tsi and HtitU, that .their prejudice , that donniinated parts . of relations were their own affair, and he the government. To his New Delhi ia'ipparently-got through to them.", United States-Burundi relations appointment, sy several sources, were never better. Then suddenly in Bowles brought~an abiding determina- May, 1972, the country was plunged tion to shield U.. S.-Indian relations from the, biases experienced. Former into a frenzy of killing, with the Tutsi aides'say Bowles. was often privately regime presiding over systematic mur- n Burundi, all its members haunted by their own problems of tribalism and sensitive to any precedent for outside interference in the continent. Thee OAU Council of Ministers, in fact, sent the Burundian regime a message in June, 1972, which amounted to support of the repression. Once the Africans had reacted, the U. S. State Department had its policy. Though the United States pur- chased the bulk of Burundi's coffee, which accounts for 65 per cent of the country's export earnings, American bureaucrats dismissed out of ]land a proposal to suspend the coffee trade. th i he b li lo i at ngton n t c ey Ira shh nb It"` )'ids to C ere i te e t ii Indi d St t it ,r 1 a ,w es n s s, e a Un cials renle more important than any single clash corpses ' pa, thatmi ght resurrect old hostilities... ~ the ?;.,ht , U oun to s lik La os hi ,,lea t , n e g s . ,, outsde the i i ' imagining antagonl snl Bowles was 1101. Those Con ressional distaste W t hi g ng on. it as was clef? LBJ recall Mel neut alit I di ' f y n a r or s and Dean Rusk fell into.annual rages embassy o when Madame Gandhi sent birthday the f"irst cables to Ho Clii Minlt. "I-low long can Depa tmen you. kick a' cow in the udders and still, Departngen expect it to give milk?" Rusk oncejtured naafi and asked with Georgian earthiness in an; upon the eyes only" telegram to Bowles, necessity Bowles must have felt the sa18 shed" (as ntinue the,,slaughter. Ofli- in this," said a policy-maker, "we'd be nber trucks loaded with creamed by every country in Africa sing the U. S. embassy in for butting into an African state's build for bull-dozed graves internal affairs. We don't have an capital. interest in Burundi that justifies tak- dy late at 'light. in his reasoning officials ignored an internal , fice temporrizing in sending Department legal meniorandum point- -afraid that the State under international law and treaties i n ti would somehow "over- the face of human rights abuses, `destroy his carefully nur- (These were "a reality not just theca. , ionship. Melady impressed retical language," the memo sal~'l "ti ' ~ B i urun an reg me le ,? ~ rltr I21ar, i intiy for a new assignment or to`t)ganda. He was Meyer. Lit on the horror Iii had; r`access" to his Burundian, e P umably still intact. I the; nd internal division. that in the Stale Department U. S. government stood by -oughout the carnage, (herd einces over some individual but little doubt about He wouldn't sacrifice the ie'd built up," concluder] * , ' I tjr e ndi policy is dc.cumcnted I>(or, /'uising, KY: '714' U. -S. ppt~ Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CI - - `Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001002$0001-6 "The bAU didn't see it that way,-!'much else, is obviously Vietnam. In a. reforip of that bureaucracy. said an official. "If the African! sense, it was a return to the medieval It nourishes, like other dub ow ,countries don't want to get involved, practice of cliency. A country can do practices, in the guild mentality of th where do we get off putting our nose; no more for its client states, after all, State ;`Department, in an claborat in,"',demanded another U. S. diplo than tight their wars for them. But to career system that rewards caution mat.,4The U. S. simply has no real the bureaucracies in Washington and,compliance, and evasion lvliitc indignation and that's not enough." was often only another arena for the environnlcnt where advance depends Looking back on the Biafran,.jousting of power and interests. "They on cotlforming to habit, it is 'perhaps tragedy, a ranking State Department could accept more easily a complete the most common habit of all. officer, made a similar judgment: "N.ly reversal of objectives or grand strate- Cliency seems almost in(lcreli't it regret is that there was such emotion gig design than a revision of their own the: psychology and sociology o generated in this country... today we roles," reflected a veteran of the;diploniatjc?.rvork,?abioacl. The Britisl have strained relations with one fifth bureaucratic battles both in Washing- used to mourn the victims of thi of Africa because of the focus on ton and Sai on. '' g parochialism as being too long On th relief... " For that official and ? Behind the lines and sometimes on? East." State D'epartmcant.dcsk,.orficei~ ' others ill the State Department s them were the endless jurisdictional now call it "localitis," certaihthat i regional bureaus, relations smooth or 1disputes-CIA operatives, generals,, afflicts only their colleagues in ?th stained with an entire region can be' deputy ambassadors, AID adnlinis "field." ' the daily reality of work, much as one, trators, each with Vietnamese clients. The malady probably begins witi client government can absorb the on whom he was somehow dependent allegiance of an embassy abroad. The` for success, each suspicious that his hungry children come and go from colleagues would expand their domain public sight: the clients are always and advance their clients at his ex- thcie. Staffed predominantly by, pense. The war, to be sure, was more Foreign Service officers bearing career' complex than this single dimension. pressures and marked by a parochial-? But the dishonesty, the zeal, the ism similar to that felt abroad, tlie' secrecy, the ambitions and fears that Department often sees its role as 'drove its on belong in large measure to protecting its clients from the special such bureaucratic politics. perils that American democracy holds for traditional diplomacy-public Cliency-in-Waiting " " naivete ( emotion over Biafra), a meddling press, an uninformed or partisan Congress. Do Biafra and Burundi mean that cliency has kept us from intervening as often as we should? Not necessar- ily,, for cliency distorts the way we make decisions more than it imposes. any clear direction on our foreign policy. We may - disagree about whether or how the U. S. should ever .intervene in cases of starvation, slaughter, or rebellion, but we should be able to agree to make those policy, choices with all the logic and clear- headedness we can muster. The State Department is not'alone in steering our foreign relations around obstacles to clear thought. The Pentagon, CIA, AID, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture all. crowd upon the scene in Washington and abroad with programs, bureaucratic preroga- tives, various clear-cut views of the national interest, and, of course, foreign clients. Added to the personal stake and convictions of career offi- cers there is a ]lost of other concerns (domestic clients) that may put a premium on access with foreign regimes-from the munitions industry to Iowa farmers to ITT di-id Wall Street. To business or bureaucracy trail lines of interest from nearly every corner of the world, at once an index , . of our colossal power yet a mass of' Clency seems both a cause and.cers who' ho arc assigned to clientless potential inhibitions on the indepen- effect of the larger malaise enveloping duties like 'legal affairs know that the dent and principled use of that power. the State Department and Foreign promotion.` system of. the ? f~oreigil The extreme -example of the inter- Service. Controlling. its abuses prob- Service follows' bureaucratic. power ;play of bureaucracy and cliency, as of ably begins with the long-needed andrthat it rarely rewards such."nla 19 or2001/08/07 ? CI -R IlP77-004-12R0001002$ OB 01-6 the need to rationalize against th realities of foreign' strvice, whateve the venue. While Henry Kissi-iger flit dramatically from Georgetown t Peking, most American diploitiats in hundred-'other capitals are locked ii tedious, obscure, and rarely meaning fill work. And people who spend nios of their adult lives 'dealing with other bureaucrats in remote places 'te-ld t persuade ; themselves, sooner or later that dealing with other'bureaucrats it remote ? illaces is pretty important I lie most dependable clients for all From there it's a short step to 'th these purposes are not always actually added conviction that. good relation in power. But subtle intervention, .a with a particular reginic, arc, or ougli kind of cliency-in-waiting, can help' to be anyway, urgent national bust put them there. Indonesia and Chile ness. . are cases in point. Economic Pressure : In any event, to be without liv on left-wing regimes, coupled with a clients, right or left, in or near power steady relationship with the colonels is often . to be bureaucraticr-lly 1111 in the wings, helped to produce less potent either in a mission abroad or in troublesome client regimes in both Washington. American officials countries, albeit again at a cost in assigned to forgotten arenas like the human rights enormous in Indonesia UN are seldom a bureaucratic match and yet to be counted in Chile. for their colleagues wliose'clients are Ideology certainly. plays a role in actual governments with the real these decisions, which are customarily power. Special State Department made in the White House. But offices responsible for international bureaucrats may also find anti-Marxist law, environmental matters, refugees, dictators, especially the 'efficient or population control may create an martial variety, easier to deal with as organizational illusion of authority, clients than unruly democrats like the but none acts without the veto of the hidians., _ regional bureaus, whose clients goner- the few consistent exceptions to The assistant legal advisor who cliency-our relations with the USSR.!wrote the unheeded mcnlorandunl'on U. S. diplomats in Moscow and on the human rights during 'the murders in Soviet desk in / Foggy . Bottom are` Burundi personally carried a copy to expected to be habitually aloof from-each policy-pinker in the African their clients. In this they are unlike all bureau, skepticil ' that it would ever their colleagues except, perhaps, those reach them by.* regular staff clianliiels. in South Africa. The Russian attitude At the time, however, the legal ad- may all be changing, however, with visor's office, was ie er asked/ to prc- the latest detente. One wonders what pare an opinion on whether events in new clients we may acquire when Burundi constituted a violation of Chase Manhattan invests in Siberia. human rights. Moreovetr career bffi- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 ginal" work. "Did you ever know any major burdens of career foreign ser- some the absurdities and distor- official,". _ asked a young diplomat,' vice.is to protect U. S. relit il: :: ; 1.1 tiosis o .State's efforts to protect (heir "whose carter has been advan &l be- other regimes from. the cX:'::. clients Piave-been further confirmedil in cause he spoke out- for human rights?" Washington, ` That l5crspcctivc. too, their ae0umulation of power in (tic Bureaucratic and career inte!rests;;can be personal as well as bureau- White House. r, reinforce:, this sense of priorities. if]c atic. Who indeed is the expert,on The answer to the many probleiPis there is,. direct official involveiiieiit' the scene? Who, alter All, spends his of clicatcy surely starts with the opcn- with the ,co?unt,ry,,. such as an 'aid life defending the national interest,on ing of the foreign policy Process- or arms 'or arms sales, there may these frontiers? The view of Washiaig- much jr, the habits of government rc naturally' develop close working r4la- ton as'ignoriint and distracted, as the tinder l~hallengc donmestically. And.of tionships with the recipients: Some source ot. i)erhaps dangerous meddling the many reforms that would mean individual 'careers and -bureaucratic for transient reasons, can give the for the Foreign Service, the most vital prestige '.become inevitably linked to'career officialdom of a U. S. embassy are genuine provision for internal the "success" of programs which, in ?a common zeal, sometimes a. fervid dissent and a wider exposure of turn,' mar depend on U. S. influence sense of, mission, in representing the American diplomats to their own with, th foreign' regime. For the position of another government soci ;ty. i American`' mission. as a whole, thesdy ? There l are also human commit- Diplomacy can be a career litruly programs?epresent a tangible invest- mcnts nb -institutional factor. quite open to talent, its ranks refreshed at meat of time and reputation, a call on explains an intense loyalty, some all levels by the infusion of short-term Washington's resources; and thus diplomat cultivate for a country or, officers from outside government, rther proof of the mission's?impor- region, a atching of personalities and men and women chosen precisely for lance-all bureaucratic\'assets to be views that may leave an American their independence and unorthodox nurtured and protected, and all official f ling more comfortable with and critical views of policy. Those -assuming continuing cooperation from.a Pakista ! general than with many of. who represent' America in the, world the clients. his own o,lleagues, the prejudices and could usefully spend at least half their Even without major programs to.emotionsIreieased by being witness,to' careers in the country that pays their dispense and husband,, American pus-:dramatic events such as civil wars. salaries, in more than token positions sions in most countries are likely to Any of these influences may, blur on congressional staffs, on news- acquire a strong collective tendency that criti, al boundary between the papers, in what State Department host government. U. S. diplomats of is right, d the bureaucratic or pri- "the real world" of people and per: every rank depend on the regime and vate interests of American officials spectives beyond the encapsulated the elites around it for much of the abroad.. worlds of embassies and bureaus: information and influence by whicli Then, too,' thq Department of But none of this is new. These their performance is measured. It is State a d its officers are still steps are endlessly discussed, and the what the Foreign Service prizes as peculiarly isolated among, the 'great outlook for real change is still bleak. "access,"'the ability to hear and to be agencies `government. The problem Foreign Service officers know that their pseudo-elitism, their parochial- heard, - which many career officers is not on that diplomats spend years . regard as the essence of their profess out of the, country: Even, in Washing- ism, their penchant for cliency are all sion. . ton they eldom encounter the people a malignant waste of individual talent To that end, American diplomats' they are s !pposed to represent. Nearly and of the Department's potential may cultivate their contacts literally every otl ?r bureaucracy must face role. Their reaction is too often a day and night. In many countries their some p blic constituency-welfare weary cynicism. Foreign Service universe is peopled largely by distinct mothers at I-IEW, rent strikers at reform may resemble nothing so much groups-politicians who are sensitive HUD, tru hers at Transportation. And as the reforms of tsarist Russia- agreed necessary for survival, much to slight or, interference, landowners nearly e cry other bureaucracy has h eralded, never quite taken before it who abhor economic reform, police felt recei, fly the cleansing light of who see conspiracy, and not the least, exposure '"t the era of public interest was too late. authority and . grow impatient with ern by in ~tia and default, in camera,I that an honest and sophisticated democracies. Over a desk or at a. unaccoun, able except to bureaucratic cliency-as a sensitive appreciation of J__ TT n 1, -f- of A:..1.. the importance of these citizens (a Yet, it iically,State may also be macy. No government, However will- rctlectton of his own), their ardor,-the bure crac with the ful, can rationally dispense with that .. .. . . . , y greatest observation and i r.... n4.. ..... l t ....e f n e e o ;- all in this incendiary age. realities which may be-scarcely appre- interest. I rein Service officers are ciated in distant Washington, though free of th hub programs and special But only the career service can they loom large from Athens to' perform that essential role with Y domestic Otcrests that so often freeze integrity, unafraid of career or bureau- Jakarta, from Rio to Lagos. their colic igues in other agencies. That distance from Washington it is ironic too that clionc as a cratic loss. Only they can ensure that U. S. nussion abroad its strong- Y the real clients of American foreign gives a product (! this isolation, has onl1 policy are the people beyond govern- est single impulse toward identifying served to; deepen the eclipse of the menus-people at home and abroad with the interests of-its hosts.,A!nong.State Deli artment . in the making of cos diplomats .who escort junketing con-foreign . p Wicy. Presidents watching who must pay the flesh-and-blood gressmen and watch the steady'shrink costs of our decisions. age of their aid appropriations. 'who see departments recurrently placed under the direction of a new set of "amateurs" and' ever hostage to poli- tics ' or,fickle ' public moods, there grows;-tltc conviction 'that one of.the 20 Approved For Release 2001 : CIA= - - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001002800O1-6' ND-W,-_VORK TMS 13 November 1973 "Tracing U.S.-Allied Clash: wi- alludes.- T railed '_ vents . `:Basic. Divergence on. Middle East Crisis and Kissinger's Way of Doing Business Among Factors. Alienating Europeans By FLORA LEWIS special toThe r ew York Times WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 washington, he was said to Misunderstandings, lack of in have been angered and frus- :fformation and a basic diver- bated. ` ence in perceptions of the pia-. The Secretary was particu- g plarly irritated, according to tire of the Middle East crisis led American officials, that Britain to the recent' sharp public riftI and . France did not support .between europe and the. United the United States in opposing 'States, according to American the Soviet Union's attempt to include American and Russian and allied diplomats. t the international o s A series of interviews, on. what caused the United States' to riticize the allies publicly for the 'position they took .during the crisis has disclosed that the personality of. Secretary. of State Kissinger and the diplo- matic history of the past two years vier important factors. . There were also underlying changes in, circumstance. that developed in recent years that were not adequately weighedor even noticed, the diplomats said. These include heavy Eu- ropean dependence on Arab oil supplies, the quantity and so- phistication of ' weapons sup- plied to the Arabs by the Rus- sians and the Arabs' une- ected ability to mount an ef- ective joint diplomatic cam-. paign. .,They knew exactly where to go and where to put the pres- sure in each capital," an Ameri- can official said of the Arabs. A Matter of Method The serious new strains on Atlantic relations also flowed from factors not directly con- cerned with the war and the arabs' oil weapon, stemming more directly from the way the ,United States and Europe have been conducting . their dip- lomatic exchanges. The officials said that a few ,days after the war began on Oct. .6 the United States, as- sessment shifted from viewing it as an Arab-Israeli confront- ation to discerning evidence of a Soviet attempt to change the .trategic balance in the Middle East. European officials, how. evgr, continued to see it as a local war. American ' sources concede that the United States made little effort to explain its view to its allies. Mr. Kissinger was said to have felt that the allies should have understood the im- port of the Soviet effort. When they did not irtdependently reach the same conclusion as in r op emergency force created to help, keep the cease-fire. 'A message from the Soviet; Communist leader. Leonid I.' Brezhnev, on Oct. 24 suggested that the United States and the Soviet 'Union send troops and that the Russians would act alone if Washington refused. That message and reported in- telligence that-the Russians had taken preparatory measures for a quick airlift of troops were the. reason given the world- wide American military alert on Oct. 25. Alert Explained Belatedly It was only after the alert had been put into effect and Washington was sure Moscow knew about It that a rejection of the Soviet proposal was sent .to Mr. Brezhnev (high-ranking State Department officials do not know whether the hot line was used). The allies were not informed until afterward, and then only sketchily. "Things were moving too fast, there wasn't time to give them all the details," an official ex- plained. He conceded that the State Department had facilities to reach allied heads of govern= "diet-American agreements at' 'deeper and broader than the' ,specific points announced. Perceptions of Ddtente The theme of American dip- lomats' comments about the 'European allies could be put this way; "We've told them it isn't so, and they should know better, but it's true that our ;rhetoric and style created an aura of something bigger which may have led to assumption." - In hindsight some Americans now believe those assumptions could. have been the basis for the difference between the American and European per- ceptions of what was going on in the Middle East. The Euro- peans could have supposed that some. eleemnts underlying dd-. tente meant that the Russinas would not really try to upset the strategic balance, as Washington came - to believe they were doing. In any event, when Mewed from Washington, Mr. Kissin- ger's annoyance seems to have been aroused more by this difference in viewpoint than by the reaction of various allies to the United States crash program of military sup- ply to Israel. - He was already short-tem- pered about allied behavior, State Department officials say, because of the difficulties in, getting an agreed response to his proposal for a "New At lantic charter" last April. That proposal, made without prior consultation, surprised and up 'set the allies: ' w Reportedly Mr. Kissinger,' Alt the basis of his contacts with foreign envoys and leaders in .the previous six months, had ;expected a quick favorable re- sponse. . Embassies Were' Hampered Officials at the State De- partment felt that,- this was another example of how dif. ficulties.had resulted fr61n the, decline in the department's tra- ditional I role in,? important ? di- plomacy and Vie- consequen , deterioration in ti'.e ability off embassies to inform, Washing. ton effectively ?` One phrase. in Mr. Kissin= ger's April speech that partlcu?i larly piqued the allies, especial- .ly President Pohipidou, wad !'< reference to Europe's ."regional 'interests" in' contrast'to the "global" responsibilities of ' the United States.. The phrase "regional Inter- ests," included in ..the State Department's rebuke of the EU- ropean allies- last week, was taken to mean that Mr.. Kiss singer resented' the way the Europeans, had chided him about this and wanted them to know he felt that events had proved him right. "One of Kissinger's basic precepts," a source said, "is that the United States.must not be taken for granted and must show that'it will react to what it considers lack of understand- ing of its interests. He wanted to make sure that 'was known publicly.'' CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 NOVEMBER 1973 Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Egypt ambassador to U.S. Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal brings' to his post as ambassador ofEgypt of an old, well-to-do, upper class' .Egyptian family, the erudition of , ,a Harvard professor, a lively.. liking for things American, and a dauntless persistence in pursuit' of his diplomatic objectives. He was ambassador here be- fore Egypt broke relations dur-. Ing the Six-Day 1967 war, and stayed on as head of the "Egyp- tian Interests Section," which' was technically part of the In- dian Embassy, until the summer ment in time of crisis that,could of 1972. easily have been utilized. But He and his beautiful wife will. it was a one-man show, accord- be in a sense coming home to hing to the officials at the' State their, many diplomatic and Department, so that could not American friends. Their daugh-' be done. ter` Nahed Is expected back as, The allies were bewildered student at the Georgetown Uni- and angered by the lack of in - versity School of Foreign Service formation at the time of the where she was enrolled In 1972. alert because they felt directly Dr. Ghorbal, who got his mas? involved in the crisis.' They said "the United States never tars 'and doctors degrees from made it clear to them just what Harvard in 1948 and '49, Is very. the Moscow-Washington argu- Western in his approach to. his ment on ' troops was really. job. Unlike some of his ral? ,.about. colleagues, he does not wait for Inevitably', any period of in- tense American-Soviet- diplo- macy fans European suspicions. ' " His small, elegant, quick-mov- Moreover, there has been a Ing figure was a familiar sight on widespread tendency in- the Capitol Hill and on the campuses - wake of thg two meetings be- of universities to which he read- tween Mr. Brezhnev and Presi- dent Nixon to suppose that So- ! fly made himself available as a, 1. r l dec are { . 22 Approved-For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-004328.00016&280001-6 .n Hermann Frederick Eilts,J J.S. ambassador to Egypt .1 A big man who usually wears syspenders and has a Teutonic. air about him, the new Ameri-,4 can ambassador,designate to; Cairo combines the qualities otl scholar and diplomat. German-born Hermann Fred, Brick Ellis is thorough, serious,: and extremely conscientious; he { Is a foreign service officer with a, sharp eye for detail. "A' professional's profes-A sional," comments one State De. partment official. , r Almost all his life has been devoted to a study of the Arab', world. He speaks fluent Arabic and French and Is the author of, 'many articles on such scholarly: subjects as the first Omani mis? j slop to the United States In'the, early 19th century. Mr. Eilts has spent the bulk of his diplomatic career in the Middle East, serving in Tehran,; Jidda, Aden, Baghdad, and Trl-; poll. From 1965 to 1971 he was j ambassador to Saudi Arabia. A co-worker who served wl$' him in Riyahd says he is qpj afraid to talk frankly but always polite. He is sled patios in dealing with complex prob,l lams - a trait that should stag4 him In good stead in ?a sensitly l post.. :f :'. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 11 November 1973 USINATO DISPUTESTILL,UNRESOLVED E rop ns Feel Rift Over Mideast", Underscores ... .Chronic Differences By; CRAIG R. WHITNEY Spe~dal to The New York Mmes BONN, Nov. 10-Despite a'! week of soothing,by American officials ,eager to heat' the wounds opened in the Atlantic (alliance by : the. Middle East gar, European ?and;.Amert should ` be remain far apart. Many European.' diplomats fare privately surprised at the. Nixon Administration for' say.'l ing publicly that it was dis-1 appointed in its partners in; the North Atlantic Treaty Or ganization for .not taking a common stand with the Y nited? States when the Middle East crisis was at its peak. : They; are surprised, the diplomats say. because they' were never asked to,do' that.' Criticism of, members of the; alliance for not acceding to: suggestions made'In the'North Atlantic" Councll ' was' irksome,: NATO diplomats say, because. NATO is a. defensive allianc' designed 'to..protect' 'all 'of Its* members::against the threat,of, armed.`.attack' by the: Soviet Union` and' its 'allies in Europe) or' North 'Ainerica. Mideast *Not, in the Picture The .Middle East,. the tutu= peatls'`argue, was never meant be included.. ' Europe' vs. Superpowers 'Of.' what use would.be a' confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over the Middle East?" a, German source, said.',, "The alliance,'" said another; "is not !.'Just an instrument, of American foreign policy." L .. European diplomats and of- ficials in Bonn, ,Paris, Brussels, and' The Hague ? insist, there fore, that the Middle East crisis, rather than creating ?a new ' rift. between the United States and Europe; merely,un-' covered an old .' and ' chronic rifs. The crisis confirmed Euro- pean. views that, in ;a pinch,, they still do not, count. for much against the two super 'powers. It also caused some ;stirrings toward greater Euro- pean unity, ' independent of the United States. The declaration last Tuesday in ;Brussels of a common European position on the Middle East was a sign of this an another was agree- ment between the nine foreign ministers of the European Economic Community for a Common Market summit meet- ing Dec. 14 and 15. I During the Middle East crisis each party to the disagreement, complained about lack of coop- eration on the part of 'the other. Here In Europe,'officials feel that if they overreacted,, so did Washington. Europeans point to the fact that, in some instances, what Nixon Admin-. istration officials said in public, about European allies contra:, dieted what they said in pri- vate. The Nixon Letter to Brandt In Bonn, ? West German offi- cials point out that on Nov. 2 President Nixon sent a -letter to Chancellor Willy Brandt that, they say, recognized the basic problem very , clearly... This leaves the Germans wondering why, earlier, they were excori- ated publicly by Mr. Nixon and ,Secretary of State Kissinger. In his letter to Mr. Brandt, classified "secret,' Mr. Nixon says that the President recog- nized that there was, no obligation to reach a common alliance position' on the Middle. 'East, since the Europeans have different Interests from, the American interests there. Simply put-and Mr.- Nixon went on to make this explicit- Europe gets most of. its oil' from the Middle East, the United States does not, and the Europeans cannot be expected to alienate their supplers by joining a United States position backing Israel. Mr. Nixon noted, however, that "the Interests of the alli- ance as a whole" were;involved. He said, "I do not believe we can draw such a fine line when the U.S.S.R., was and is so deep- ly involved" in the Middle East. "If the U.S.S.R. learns that it can exploit the Middle' East to separate the United States from' its European allies," he said, the consequences can be disastrous and not only in Europe. "The alliance," the.. letter said, -"cannot operate on a double standard" with Europe pursuing its own 'separate pol- icy toward the Soviet Union and the United States another. But he conceded that there had been a "lack of adequate and .timely coordination, produced ,by the rush of events," and promised "to move substantive- ly in this direction." The Worldwide U. S. Alert From the European point of view, the United States raised a number of false issues in public criticisms that preceded this secret letter designed, as Mr., Nixon put it, "to ,put this incident behind us.", For In- stance: AMERICAN COMPLAINT - The United States got luke- warm backing from its Euro- pean allies when it put its forces on worldwide alert Oct. 25-'against the threat of Soviet intervention in the Middle East. EUROPEAN VIEW - The United States put Its forces on alert first and didn't inform Its. allies until :at least three (hours-longer, some say-later about the decision and the rea- sons. for it. Now American offi- cials seem to have more under standing about European imta- tion about not being consulted first. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, . at a NATO meeting at The Hague last week, made a' "formal commitment" to better' consul-i tation in the future, according to his Dutch opposite ' number, Henk Vredeling. Most, allies' told the United States that It could not use European bases for transfers of supplies to Israel. made it known that she would not answer "yes" if asked for such permission. West Ger- many, where the bulk of the American armed forces in Europe is stationed, knew that transfers were being made from bases on Its territory, German officials say, and let it 'pass In silence until after the Oct. 22 cease-fire. Then West Germany became angry --only, it says, because it was not, kept informed of further arms shipments that used less- than-discreet methods, such as loading Israeli freighters with arms at Bremerhaven. The Americans never asked the French for permission td 'fly over France and also in the .case' of - Italy, officially, the question of United States over= flight was never raised. Italy he ped, however, by providing oil for the Sixth Fleet, which 'is based there. And Washing- ton could hardly have been surprised by the refusals of Greece and Spain to let the Americans use bases and ports for. support to Israel since they had long followed a pol- icy of staying ' out of Middle East conflict. Both Greece and Spain, nevertheless, appeared to have tolerated American operations` from. the bases, (which were, in fact, part of the support operation to Israel. All this may sound disin-' 'genuous and self-serving to American ears. In Brussels Tuesday the Common Market ministers took a stand that could not have pleased the United States at all: It called for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and foil a recog- nition of the rights of Pales- tinians, two concessions to 'Arab' demands that most Euro- peans who were present recog- nized for what they were. Dutch Reversed Stand Bonn's* acceptance of the Brussels declaration has been privately criticized by some members of the Brandt Govern- ment as a shameful retreat from ,as Germany's special relationship with Israel. Mr. Brandt, apparently reacting, said in a speech yesterday that West Germany and Israel still have special ties resulting from the Nazi persecution of the Jews and he denied that West Germany-. was "hiding behind Europe." ? As a Dutch journalist In The .Hague noted, : the :Dutch. by joining in the declaration, re- versed the position that had 'cost them their oil. Two weeks )earlier .they had called for the .22 !qrabs to withdraw to ' their '1967 cease-fire positions, which are a long way from the bor- ders, and had been rewarded' ,by a total Arab oil-supply boy. 1 ott. -' J Europeans do not like to be Id to' but many admit to a ertain cravenness in their be- avior toward the entire Mid- dle East war. This isireflected also in . domestic politics in Britain and West Germany, where Opposition parties are critizing the governments for' letting the United States down' Ina pinch.. . .; The West German-United. States . disagreement was the most public 'and spectacular, but the Germans, at least, seem determined now to discount Its significance. Much of It, on' both sides, appears in. hind- sight to signify mostly nothing but the chronic European- American problem of too little consultation from the Ameri- can problem of too little con- sultation from the American side on critical decisions. How Bonn-U.S. Rift Grew According to well-informed German and American officials here, much' of the problem erose from a combination of the pace of events in Washington and the Middle East and iver- ;reaction by Bonn and t' , sh- Ington to one another's.act.t ns. These officials say that it was not until Oct. 23, a d ',i after the United Nations' cease, ? fire resolution was . to have taken effect, tht West Ger- many asked the United States not to ship arms from depots ,here or deny American over- flight to the Middle East. -A week earlier, at an Oct. 16 meet- ing between Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Martin J. Hillenbrand, the United States Ambassador, called at Mr. Hil- lenbrand's request, West Ger- many is said to have raised no objections to what were then incomplete reports about Amer- ican supply movements to .Is- rael. But between the 16th and the 23d, after the cease-fire reso= lution, "the Arabs began to put heavy pressure on the Germans with oil," as one source puts It. The Bonn Government has not confirmed that that was the reason. After the cease-fire on Oct. 23, Paul Frank, a high For- 'eign Ministry official, called in Ambassador Aillenbrand to ask' for clarification of unofficial reports that American arms were still being shipped to Israel from United States Army piers as Bremerhaven and to request that this stop. Mr. Hil- lenbrand said his information was incomplete and he would; have to seek guidance 'from) Washington. The next day, Mr. Hillen-, brand was out of town. When a newspaper, in Bremerhaven eported that shipments were' still -going on, and in Israeli ships, Mr. Frank called In the Ambassador's deputy, Frank E. 'Cash, and :reiterated the dew man. Mr. Cash still had no answer from Washington.. Then - through what the 'Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6` Bonn Government says was a 'mistake"---the Foreign 'Minis try issue4'to the press a strong statement publicizing the whole business) and demanding a. stop to it. Friday, Oct. 26, Washington ' blem up: There were strong ? words about the Germans! and the other Euro-' peans by. Dr. Schlesinger, the, State Department spokesman, Robert 'J. McCloskey, and President,' Nixon. What particularly baffled the Germans and other NATO al- lies was ;Dr. Schlesinger's im Piled threat to withdraw.Amer- ican troops - unilaterally from Europe, on the eve of force- reduction talks with the Soviet Union. They opened in Vienna on Oct. 30. "What is wrong with this man Schlesinger?" a German official asked the other day. "Is it that he's new in his job and doesn't know what he's doing?" Schlesinger Sees NATO Aides Dr. Schlesingcri'who, became Secretary of Defense this year,, went to The Hague last week and apparently sought to soothe: the hard feelings of fellow de- fense ministers who were there for.a meeting on nuclear plan- ning. Mr. Schlesinger said.later 'iri 'Washington. that "a ~cgmmon imders,tanding" had been reached with the West German Defense Minister, Georg Lebe. :It apparently, provided that Is- raeli ships would not be used to transfer arms to Israel in a crisis.- What is clear now in Europe is that only a settlement be- tween the warring parties in .the Mideast will serve European interests. If -there. is no settle. ment, and Europeans start "freezing to death," they most probably will blame the Arabs or.the Isrealis-not the Ameri- cans. If there is a settlement, achieved through American mediation, the recent flap in the alliance may be. hard to remem- ber a few months from now. 23 -Appreved-?Gr-Relea-se-20-01108/07_rCIARnP77- o4S ROO0100280001-6 WASHINGTON STAR 2 November 1973 CARL T. ROWAN Is NA mingr Apart, ''Has the North Atlantic Only in a grave crisis (if Arab forces to initiate a war Treaty Organizatio h n grown t en) will there be any auto- which, they hope, would moribund sapped of its i a i , v - m t c solidarity where all tality by "detente" and the will say, "We conquer to- diverging national interests gether, or we die together." of its members? Western European lead- That question took on dis- ers probably figured it was quieting importance during not in their interest to in- the recent Arab-Israeli war- cur the wrath and retribu- fare when' West European tion of the Arab countries leaders seemed to leave by helping the United States President Nixon alone to to rearm Israel. That, our twist in the winds of con- NATO friends probably frontation. assumed, would be the sur- It was clear in-his press est way to freeze to death - conference last week that this winter, or next, or the M r. Nixon was almost as angry at his NATO allies as he was at the press. He vol- unteered the acid comment that Western Europeans "would have frozen to death this winter" had he not pressured the Soviet Union into joining in the promotion of a cease-fire. Mr. Nixon was angered by the fact that European allies would not grant land- n was needed to restrain the ing or overflight rights for 1972, or eight times as much Russians? Did they have . U.S. aircraft carrying arms as the United States Half of d " . some oubts about the ra- to Israel. And when it ap- the 5.5 billion barrels ex- tionality't of the U.S. action, peared that the United ported by the Arabs went to and fear that the United States and the Soviet Union Western Europe. States might really start were going eyeball-to-eye- Obviously, then, our throwing nuclear bombs ball again, leaders of most NATO allies are more care- around? NATO countries struck tim- ful about making enemies of ' Whatever they thought, ' id "We're not in that mess" the Arabs than Mr. Nixon Mr. Nixon now has the' postures. feels hp na,t~ a.. ~.,. t...-_i ._ _- sons in this, and the United that by 1980 half the oil we Western Europe canscarce-,, States would do well to dis- consume will come from the ly argue with any certainty cern them lest !we go on for Middle East). that milder action would another quarter of a 'centu- Not that our NATO allies have worked as well. t'y putting troops and other are necessarily naive about The diplomats are out" ] vital resources into Western what the Soviet Union. is up now with their baling wire- Europe on the assumption to. Eugene V. Rostow, ster, and Band-aids, trying tot that they ale the cement for ling professor of law at Yale heal this rift in the North a powerful anti-Soviet al- University and former un- Atlantic alliance. But that liance. dersecretary of State for may not be so easy. We just The recent Western Euro- way recently: put it this ly may have seen evidence that i pean cop-out simply illus- "Utilizing the Arab sense finally NATO, like SEATO, trates anew that each of the of grievance against- the and CENTO, is merely the' -NATO countries is going to existence of Israel as a cat- bureaucratic shell of at' look after its own vital in. alyst,, the Soviets have great idea that is now well; is.. terest first and for t i d ra ne and supplied the, past its time . conflict with all the Arab nations, and thus transform the Middle East and the 'Near East into -a Soviet. camp, outflanking NATO, and controlling space and. oil supplies vital to the`, economies and the defense; of Europe, the United States and'Japan. .n If our NATO allies believe' this to be the Soviet strate4 gy whey did they t ll ,. no ra y. year after. behind Mr. Nixon when he' If you think that Arab oil - put U S for . . ces on alert by is important to the United way of warning the Rus- States, with our growing sians not to intervene mill c energy crisis, think of what tarily? Surely they don't; it means to Western Eu- want the Soviets to 'control' rope. The United States got this oil by virtue of a mili-, 360 million barrels of oil tary strike! from the Arab countries in - Did the Europeans be-! 1972, or 5.8 percent of the lieve that the brinksman-' total U.S. consumption. ship employed by Mr. Nixon Western Europe got 2.75 bil- was far in excess of what lion barrels of Arab -oil i ; MISUNDERSTANDING BLAMED e Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-6 WA.$HINGTON STAR 9 November 1973 By George Sherman OFFICIALS and foreign star-News Staff Writer diplomats here, looking. "'We certainly made a' ;almost three weeks of cri-y God awful mess of it" - so sis, acknowledge that 'a', . " said ope insider,:in, an un "'perception' grew ~ perception gap" guarded moment, about. ,within the -alliance about] American handling. of.. what was happening in the NATO alli@s during the re-", `Middle, East. cent Middle East war. ? , "At first,' we handled 'it, He and others speak of ,realtively calmly as the. the U.S. government's emo-; fourth round in the Israeli- ; tional accusations against , Arab feud," said one Amer-- its European partners for. 1can official. "Certainly it' 'separating themselves from was seen as a test of Soviet- :American peace efforts.; )American detente, but that -' Whether Secretary of State meant testing whether Mos-It Henry A. Kissinger actually cow : and Washington could used "disgust" to describe swiftly bring an end to the ,his d-isenchpntment with fighting. NATO at a closed-door "At that early point, the briefing on Capitol Hill 10 European position was not days ago, that word aptly. of great concern to the Unit-' ,,sums up the Nixon adminis- ed States. rtration's reaction -at? the ' "How could we be upset !height of the crisis. with many European decla-- So serious is the concern rations of neutrality, or the 'over the consequences now British embargo on arms" that, , Defense :Secretary, shipments to the area, James R. Schlesinger and continued the official,' 'Kissinger, have, set up as ..when we ourselves were :special high-level working holding off on 'arms resup- .group to sort out what went*, ply 'to Isreal and pressuring` wrong and which "proce=, the'Russians to do the same, dures" must be corrected. with the Arabs." In short,, ,' -Today the 'public wordsl he said, the common accept-; have become much softer., ance of Israeli. invincibility, Rallying of transAtlantic since 1967 supporte the lux-? Yanks has become the.orderc ury of Western division over; tactics to follow in this lat- .of the-day: Embarrassed' 'eat war. diplomats and American THE EUROPEANS made officials speak of "misun-' full use of that luxury.; derstanding" now over- From the outset they made 'come. Schlesinger returned, no secret that the oil weap last night from, 'a NATO on of the Arabs had great meeting at The Hague, power. Since Western Eu- ,,Netherlands, with assure rope depends upon the Med ances that there now ap- iterranean and Persian Gulf, pears to be "an understand-, oil fields for between 70 and -ing among the allies of U.S; 80 percent of its fuel, gov objectives in the Middle ernments'quickly used neu- East. Schlesinger empha- trality in the "local con- sized that his meetings "un- flict" to preserve that flow; derscored the need for dos- of oil. ter consultations" between gut the initial estimate on' the allies. both sides of the Atlantic' But behind the scenes is 'about what would happen in: 'the realization that the the war soon proved.false.' 'Middle East crisis produced. Not only did Egypt and Syr-, ,the biggest rift in the 24- is show unexpected prowess year history of the alliance. on :the battlefield, straining By the time President Nix-' Israeli sources to the hilt, ,on suddenly ordered the ,but' the Russians also worldwide alert of Ameri- ' showed by Oct. 10 that they, `can.forces the night of Oct. were moving to replenish ?24-25, a virtual communica- Egyptian and Syrian weap-'. -tions breakdown existed ons in an emergency air and between Washington and its sea lift. chief European allies. - ' ' By the end of the war'st To be sure, events had first week, American offi vials say, the United States moved swiftly - too swiftly was convinced that the- ;for consultation - since the Russians were out to upset outbreak of the war on Oct,` the military balance in the, 24 Middle East. Here is where that per ception.gap first becamel evident. Persuasion having failed, Nixon responded in .kind to the Russians. On. Oct. 14, he began the Ameri-' can resupply, of Israel. BUT THE West Europe- ans, were still left with the.. first assessment. Two days -later the American repre- sentative to NATO, Donald .Rumsfeld,' went into the; NATO council in Brussels' with a whole new analysis, ,of the East-West ' stakes in' what had previously been at local war.. '',It was. a tough state- 'merit," said one official familiar with the American q message. "We told our al- lies that we wanted to show; the, Soviet Union detente is- a two-way street. We told', them that. the whole of. Western security was now `involved, since the Soviets Union was aiming for a' strategic victory in the ,Middle East." The European govern-, meats were taken aback., "They had no preparation; for, this assessment," said' the official. And Rumsfeld's suggestion that Europe join with the United States in 1cooling relations with the, , Soviet Union, its Eastern; 'European allies and Yugo-% slavia,- which had permit-'; ted Soviet overflights to the Middle East - fell on' deaf i cars. But at this stage different European governments had different reactions toward quietly helping the Ameri-.j can airlift to Israel. The. Western Germans, for in ;stance? agreed "to close their eyes" to the airlifting' of M60 tanks, aboard giant C5A air transports from among the 2,000-tank stock pile the Americans keep in Germany. THE PORTUGUESE also' agreed to the use of the .American air base in the' Azores as a staging area.; 'That guaranteed the smooth air transport of Phantom F4 fighter-bombers from the. United States to Israel with- refueling in the air and hops' from the aircraft carriers' ,John F. Kennedy and'. Franklin D. Roosevelt near Gibraltar and farther east in the Mediterranean. Greece also made no move, -to.'cu;tail American 6th Fleet operations out of Ath-, 'i ens. But the British, according to informed sources, re- fused -to allow any Ameri .base at Akrotiri on Cyprus. ,In the past, this base has.1 been used for refueling the ,secret Mach3 SR71 high- flying reconnaissance plane, the successor for the' U2, used to photograph bat-1 ,tle lines and weapons de` ployment in the Sinai and; along the Suez Canal. Furthermore, Spain .which does not. recognize' Israel - refused any Amer- ican use of the $500 million: ,lAmerican air bases there.1 'Spain, Italy and Britain also refused to allow any overf-? light to and from Israel. + `l France, which left fhe? integrated NATO structure ;'seven years ago and has a well-established pro-Arab' tradition, was written off 1 from the outset, say offs vials. In the other cases, the, United States made no for-i mal requests or protests, because Washington was`, given to understand in ad ; vance there would be no] cooperation. ON THE diplomatic front,' Britain - previously the; closest U.S. a, I - upset; Washington during the first 10 days of hostilities. Kissin-) ger approached British' Ambassador Lord Cromeri to have Britain present, al '.cease-fire resolution in the U.N. Security Council. Kis-1 singer assured the British! that the proposal had Soviet' support. But the British govern-) ti ment, according to in-'. formed sources, checked' with Egypt and Syria at the' U.N. only to discover at that, time of Arab triumph that they were in no mood for a' cease-fire. Therefore, the' British, according to these; sources, spurned the Kissin- ger request. Today Ameri-, can officials say that wasi probably "a sound tactic not to be labeled an "Ameri-! can fall guy." All of these European disagreements were kept carefully quiet. But they, festered beneath the sur-; face. The perception gap, grew broader. To Kissinger,' Schlesinger and other' 'American principals, say, officials, the Europeans'; seemed to be acting out the' somber picture drawn in; , Kissinger's "Year of Eu-i Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 t 7t Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 rope" speech last April 23. In Washington the crisis. !seemed to threaten to achieve -Soviet strategic. gains in an area vital to the security of the Western au ante. Oil and the "soft un- derbelly" of Europe were at' stake. Yet Europe was. pursuing "narrow regional' interests." In his April 23 speech, Kissinger had warned that the alliance "cannot hold, togethers if each country or, region asserts its autonomy. whenever it is to its bene? fit." BUT IN EUROPE, says diplomats here, the percep-. Lion was quite different. The `Nixon administration ap-, peared to never treat its, Western European allies as more than a footnote to the ,main diplomacy with the Russians. Kissinger spent all his time hammering out; ,a deal with Moscow, they say. For example, his sud- den and unexplained visit to the Soviet capital Oct. 20 to work out a cease-fire reso-lution. Not until Nov. 2 - well after the climax of the crisis did the secretary of State meet here with European ambassadors to analyze what had happened and. explain American unhappi mess with the allies. "We simply were not giv-' en information earlier to' judge the seriousness of the, Soviet threat," said one sen- ,ior diplomat. "It is true that the Kissin-, ger style is to keep his cards close to the vest," acknowledged an American official. For instance, depu- ty Secretary of State Ken- neth Rush, former ambas- ysador to Germany and for- :finer deputy Defense Secre ;tary, was not delegated the' 'authority to inform allied ambassadors here'about' ,what was happening in the' spectrum of'American di- plomacy. NEXT CAME the shock of the worldwide alert. of American forces the night of Oct. 24-25 in response to a still-secret letter of -Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev: allegedly threatening to in-; tervene in the Middle East. European diplomats agree, that the action, Nixon felt; was imperative. allowed no ?.time for consultation across, thh Atlantic. But they maintained the 'President failed to use the time he did have in the ear-. ly hours of Thursday to give personal explanations to. key European leaders about what he had done and why. Telephone calls to British Prime Minister Edward Heath, West German Chan-: ' cellor Willy Brandt and .French President Georges Pompidou would have made a great difference, said one' observer. "It would have; -.enabled those leaders to tell] :their cabinets and parlia- ments that they knew exact- ly what the President was. doing and why. As it was, ; the alert 'came out of no- where when the United. States and the Soviet Union' had seemed to be working matters out in the Middle, UNFLATTERING com i parisons are being drawn with the way President' Kennedy handled the Cuban ' missile cris by sending spe-; cial envoys to allies in Eu- rope. While the Cuban crisis. f was an actual confront a-'." ' tion, and one where Kenne- dy had more time to act and' prepare later moves, critics '.nevertheless maintain that in the Mideast case, too, the President could have gained understanding by simply telling his allies what he was up to. To this day the exact tim- ing of the decision for the alert is a matter of some 'confusion in Washington. Officials explain that a? worldwide alert is a compli- cated affair. It is in fact a series of orders to various American units, and In this case the putting together of the whole' package took :place. over a three-hour pe- riod from midnight to 3 a.m. But no U.S..official has yet' .explained why the Presi- dent - who first approved ,the idea of warning the- 'Russians and later ap- proved the whole alert package -- could not have .telephoned his allies during this three-hour period. IRONICALLY, when the administration's simmering frustration with Europe came into the open, the Germans were the target. At first they had quietly cooperated in the airlift. But when a German news- paper in Bremerhaven, the .Nordsee Zeitung, discov- ered that American tanks were being loaded in the port there aboard an Israeli freighter a day, after the first cease-fire on Oct. 22, -the German foreign minis- try called on the United States to halt this violation of German "neutrality." Later it turned out, that the public statement was a bureaucratic mistake. Ac- cording to diplomatic' sources, the spokesman of the German Foreign Minis- try had been handed a "guidance" paper on how to answer the flood of inquir- ies about the loading in Bremerhaven. By I ccifient, however, this guidance' paper was stamped as a press release and its frank` language released for publi-;, cation. By that time they loaded Israeli ship had! ,sailed - s one had before it I but a third freighter wash. denied entry to Bremerhav-' en. On Friday, Oct. 26, the'!' Immediate crisis with Mos' cow passed but the split with Germany was now outs in the open. The President,1 the State Department and! Schlesinger publicly chase tized Europe for its lack of support. To the dismay of the Germans, Schlesinger; openly suggested that he` United States might have to "review" whether the Unit-I ed States and West Germa-1 ny still have identical viewsi about American forces and, supplies kept in'Germany. Today that implied threat to the American commit- ment in Europe is seen more as a measure of irrita-~{ tion with the perfection of( the alliance than as a prac- tical alternative for the fu-" ture. Schlesinger and Kis- singer have said privately .and publicly that NATOt remains a cornerstone ofJ American foreign policy:. But the Mideast war has) shown that unity between the two sides of the Atlantic' can no longer be, taken for granted in the age of supe power detente. BALTIMORE SUN 5 November 1973 ussia shift". tOwar d a. eo ' BY MICHAEL PARKS Dloecoio,Bureau of The,, Sun Moscow-Despite the con- frontation ' with the United States brought - on , by the Arab-Israeli war,' the Sdviet' Union appears to remain strongly committed to detente as the basis for its relations with the West. But Moscow is.serving notice that its implementation of that policy is changing because of its experiences with Washing- ton In the last month. The ' Kremliht already has anges a rea y--a Nixon administration, now pub- cow has preferred to deal with )3rezhnev, the Soviet Commu- few policy declarations and nu- Iicly described here as oppor- West European estates individu- nist party leader .who ;has I merous smaller !indicators of tunistic, corrupt and perfi- ally and has prized its special linked his political fortunes to ithe' now trend. ' dious, and. Is seeking broader relationship -with Washington; detente, probably now finds -1, For example, ? a top Soviet contacts In the U.S. above all else.; .. ' (himself under new restraints, I begun divorcing itself from the west detente. Until now Mos- eved-For Release-2-09 DP77-0- This probably will weaken the Nixon administration's bar-. gaining position with the Soviets euly more realistic-view of Those' who. have , warned leadership. I the role' of domestic politics in against going too far too fast Moscow also apparently, has' the formulation of foreign pol-'.with ' the United States now dectdt:d to broaden the base of ;icy in the West. ' most probably' will renew their detente with more extensive ( 'This. is likely 'to lead' to : declarations that "peaceful co- dealings with Western Europe; greater Soviet involvement in 'existence does not end the im- not' only on regional matters,lhe domestic affairs of the placable confrontation between but on questions, involving'United Slates and other West- the two systems.". other areas, such as the Mid-, ern countries, for example by I The basic direction of Soviet die East. lobbying among politicians and foreign policy will remain the Europe then would serve as a signs, rather than relying only check on its American ally and upon' . agreements with the The Soviet Union now takes awhile the position of his critics same, Moscow is saying, but ,there will be 'changes in the way it- is put into practice. There have' been some signs 'of those- ch l ? d Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROO0100280001-6 Izvestia, the Soviet govern- mentaries in the Soviet press ment newspaper,, arta'-.,eu the in the' lost week on Mo. Nix- Nixon administration,. accusing, What was political problems, the' it of blackmail in its decision s to a k Congress not to consider! seamy corruption in his admin- reduced tariffs for:: the Soviet istration .,and on the prospect; Union when it'" takes up - the mentioned for the first time omnibus trade bill shortly. ' Friday, that he might be im opening of the negotiations'onj tr* reductions in Central Eu- rope. Whether these adjustments will satisfy Mr. Brezhnev's do- mmic critics, whose opposi- tio ; had grown fairly strong evon before 'the Middle East war, Is an open question. During the fighting, the a rupt changes in the Kremlin's position indicated -to many dip- lomats and other observers here that the leadership coali-' tion was' having difficult: working 'out a policy. At first Moscow held aloof from the fighting, then, pushed by, the. military establishment,, it became involved in a heavy quences and sen Washmgtorl an even starker messagd about the danger of prolongedi fighting. The Soviet Union very early had characterized the war as a). test of detente-that . is a test' of the foreign policy that Mr.1 Brezhnev has identified him=' "Different questions" director 'of the important Insti- self with-and the. Kremlin tute of World Economy and saw .that policy failing. "There is no connection be- International Relations, told a ' Moscow apparently feels,thatt tween these two different ques-, Moscow television audience this policy was saved and' will tions," Izvestia said in a com- last night that America's Euro- survive-but with changes. mentary. 'Calculations, if they pean allies had played an im- Its version ' of detente most really. exist in official Washing-, portant role in checking the likely will be even more' com-1 ton,' to' use, the question of 'United States' actions during; petitive now' that it has cowl foreign ' trade relations fors the Middle East crisis. , i eluded that Washington cannot, some unseemly political pur-< , Weekend commentaries in' be expected to act with ration-I poses are fully inconsistent."Pravda suggest that the Krem-' ality+ or even in close tandem But- Soviet commentators, On now .is willing to deal with' with it on crisis situations. I following the line adopted by' Western 'Europe as a group,) Detente, in the Soviet view ) WASHINGTON POST 9 November (1973 r; f U.S. Alert , i. The Soviet Union and Australia both criticized the ',A i ? United states for, placing its armed forces on worldwide: alert during the Middle East' crisis. A Washington dispatch by the official (Soviet news agency, Tass, suggested that the House decis on to over-: J< ride President IIixon's veto of the war-powers bill had ' been influenced by the alert. The Soviet press has previously published reports1 that the alert was called to -s divert attention from Mr. f: Nixon's domestic difficul.l ties. In Canberra, 'Australian i Prime Minister Gough Whi= ' tlam said he believed that President Nixon had called the alert "for domestic Amer.. iican consumption." , lives,, but Moscow now has a., clearer, more modest appre-1 ciation of 'what it can and` cannot'do, and the Kremlin is, 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432RO0010028bOQ1-6. ? thus putting not only the ccedi- grounded, they continue, 'on foreign affairs' specialist, corn bility of Moscow but ajso of "the broadly based desires of tenting on Mosgow television 'Mr. Brezhnev himself in doubt. the American and Soviet peo- last night, said that the Ameri- ,It does not augur well for pie to -live in peace and-friend- ,.and on a series of for- can military alert during, the relations between our countries lship" war probably' was due to Pres- or between,'the two leaders," a. mal agreements, note just in ident Nixon 's domestic political well-placed Soviet' citizen told political:. understandings be- ' problems. It was the first time an American last week: "We any Soviet official had even must be- able to. believe 'and) Thitween s leaders. renewed distrust of hinted at this. I rely on each other and in turns Western political leaders has \T{le alert, the commentator" be believed by the world as, a been underscored by the large whole." , ' volume of reports and com- 41thout foundation." Pravda, the' Comrpunist party newspa- per. described. it earlier yester- day'as having "led to an artifi- cial fanfling of emotions with the spreading of fantastic alle- gations about the Soviet Un- GAilG~.LGVI ! I'4 "' GVIIUIWCU,i----- --??-----??-??- .- ???- -.- ,four months a o saw Mr. turned against the Arabs, ands on- g "the attempt to scare the Union had been taken up, Con-' 'Soviet Union has-beena com- : gress either would.` have re-IBrezhnev walking arm in arm i then switched ' once "again to' :plete fiasco." - ' ? fused to approve such conces-:with Mr. Nixon. ' deliver Israel an ultimatum - - --- .. Ivisit here last week warning of "grave conse- - __- It d These commentaries retire- sions or would have 'cmidi With the ?L' aO L. 'I UV V ac4 acaucl a "Ou aucupI. U: ? ? - - ---? - ---- I "But_ as it should' have keen. this maneuver, knowing that if This-has come as' s shock to I self. dramatically" to search for sessment of the relations be- from tine boviec union. tsut cow inaugurated its policy Hof ;t\veen Moscow and Washing- apparently they were angered SuWith inaugurated Western counterbalancing the United ton. when the White (louse linked w Europe, officials and commen- the move to the Middle East' tators continue to speak of thel war, making it appear that insuring that the 'gyrations of such concessions depended onone will not upset its policy of , I "the "tremendous tremendous responsibility" possibilities and " Soviet compromises there. detente. VPVePI1V Primairnv de ut p y iinsuring world peace, but there is a more modest appraisal of what the two can do and the relationship that has been de- veloped. between them. t J Soviet officials have shown .particular alarm about the failure of the Nixon adminis- tration. to keep its promises, first on Israeli observance of a .cease-fire and later on secur- ing congressional approval. for ztrade concessions: ' ' Mr. Brezhnev 10 days ago, something it, previously, had r,. Mr. Brezhnev indicated that continue to 'emphasize ; Mos- ( feared and refused ' to do, in Gaining., Israeli, ' compiian, e,' .The `)relations,,', should be by Soviet diplonlats at ', the. tehte to strengthen its position. he felt President 'Nixon had cow's desire 'for better rela- order to 'keep detente on an failed to fulfill his part of the tions with the United States even keel. This view also was cease-fire agreement by ob-'and other Western countries. expressed in Vienna' last week Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001Q0280001-6 WASII'INGTON STAR 2 Noy,v -ber 1973 Spain but Effect of US. Bases By Richard Scott Mowrer Seeds! to The star-News MADID - A casualty of the Middle East war. could turn out ',o be the American bases in Spain. For although they are 2, 000 miles from the area of conflict the air and naval installations here have come under the cross-fire of conflicting Spanish-Ameri- can interests. This has im- , 'paired their usefulness, a fact certain to be weighed when the time comes to de- cide whether 'to extend be- yond 1975, or terminate, `rushed to Lebanon the in- stallations here served as staging areas for the move- ment of supplies eastward. Spanish official sources recall that '"more than 1,000 U.S. aircraft crossed over Spain in 24 hours." At the time of the six-day war in 1967 the bases were used in the evacuation of American families .from hostile Arab lands. According to the American embassy here the United States did not request per- mission to use the bases in connection with' the airlift- .ing of supplies to Israel so ,the question never arose. Presumably the Spain based USAF tankers for in- ,flight refuelling played no .part in the air-lift. THE FACT REMAINS that Franco has drawn a gradually tightening noose ,of restrictions around the $400 million naval installa. tion and air bases the Amer- America's 20-year-old mili- tary partnership with Spain. . aid-for-bases deal signed in] Uncertainty about the ?1953. Spanish bases stems from` At first they were defined' these contradictions: as "joint" bases although w Spain wholeheartedly, as far as operations were supports the Arab cause' concerned the bases were against Israel whereas the almost entirely American. United States is committed' Later they became "facili- . to Israel's survival. Spain ties" which the U.S. Navy has never recognized the and Air Force were allowed Jewish state, the only eoun- 'to use subject to Spanish try, in Western Europe not consent. to do so. In 1970 the bases agree- ments Shortly after the latest were renegotiated. outbreak of Arab-Israeli I The then minister of For-I hostilities Gen. Francisco. eign Affairs, Gregorio Lo- Franco let it be knowrr.that ' ,,pez Bravo, was able to say he would not permit' the , afterwards that the new American-manned bases -accords "have ended the here to be used in connec- understanding whereby tion with the Middle East U.S. forces could utilize war "at any time, in any areas and installations on way, directly or indirectly." Spanish soil with no other ?O The prohibition is hard to obligation than to communi- reconcile with the fact that rate their intentions with the operational scope of the the maximum urgency." American military presence in Spain extends the full RECENTLY THE Span- length of the Mediterra- ish government stressed nean. I that the "sole" function of Torrejon, 14 miles from the bases deal with America Madrid, is the headquarters is to counter threats or at- of the U.S. 16th Air Force tacks against the security of which commands units in 'the West. Whether Soviet- Turkey, Greece and Italy as American confrontations in well as Spain. Apart from the Middle East constitute a serving as an overseas base ' threat to Western security for American nuclear sub- so far has not been fully put marines Rota, near Cadiz, to the test. 'is an important logistics Behind Spain's expanding and communications relay curtailment of American point between the United utilization of the bases are States and the eastern Med- these motives: iterranean. One of its func- i A-very keen wish to stay tions is to replenish the U.S. on good terms with the Ar- 6th Fleet at sea wherever itI abs. One reason for this is ,may be, including the Mid- oil. Another is the need to die East area. fend off Arab pressures on Spain to give up its African IN OTHER MOMENTS of possessions. crisis the four American air w Discontent with the Amer- bases and the big naval ican relationship, which is complex in Spain played regarded as too one-sided. useful back-up roles. In 19581 ,when.U.S. Marines were NEW YORK TIMES 11 November 1973 NAVAL. FORCES IRK SOUTHERNEUROPE Mediterranean Holds 300 Warships, Causing Anxiety About. Nuclear Arms By PAUL HOFMANN . . Special to The New York nines ATHENS, Nov. 10-At least 300 warships are.-concentrated in the Mediterranean these days, and the people living around, the crowded sea-and their governments-are, in- creasingly anguished by all this display of naval power. The gray vessels with .their. gun turrets, missile 'launchers, aircraft and electronics. masts belong to -the United State Sixth Fleet, the growing Soviet Mediterranean fleet' 'and the navies of the coastal nations. On, any given day some 2,000 merchant . ships 'are also be- tween Gibraltar .and the Bos- porus. Since the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war last month, 'they .are navigating, ,with particular: caution be- cause of the many warships. The nuclear warheads that are presumed to be aboard some of the United States and Soviet craft make the situation even snore: ominous for the Med- iterranean region, which has seen the rise andrluln of civili- zation since, the dawn of his- tbry. It is hardly surpirsing, therefore, that proposals to bar extraneous warships and, above all, nuclear weapons are being discu' sed from Spain to Turkey and from Algeria to Yugoslavia. Neutralization Suggested "When a Greek Government spokesman was asked at a press briefing about the feel- ings in official quarters about the armadas Just outside . ter- ritorial waters, he mentione neutralization of the Mediter- ranean. The spokesman, Under Secretary Spyros Zpurnatzis, recalling that a former Spanish Foreign Minister, Gregorio L6pez Bravo, had made a pro- posal to neutralize this sea, observed that this clearly re- guired international and bilat- eral accords. He did not sound convinced that Washington and Moscow would agree illy the foreseeable future to withdraw.their naval forces from the Mediterranean. The governments of the other coastal states are known to assume that they have to. live with the superpowers' navies within aircraft and missile ` range for a long time. :experts here and in Rome 28 ,,'even prt.'dl6t i - further Increase ins naval strength in the Medi- terranean pex9 year, when the '!first Soviet_ aircraft carrier is to pass . thrbugh ., the' Dar- danelies. ' At present' the power bale t ance favors the Sixth Fleet; ,althou about 60 It hathanwthe ships.. fleet, which has about 90. The three American carriers In the` Mediterranean make all the dif- ference; the Soviet Navy has :none, and it lost Its shore-based air cover when Egypt asked th Russians to leave last year. ?? Resistance About Bases Resigned though the coastal' 'states may be to the situation, .they have been unready to concede bases. The Greek Premier, Spyros Markezinis, for one, came out publicly 'against an accord that l granted the Sixth Fleet home- port rights at Eleusis, near Athens,. early this year, before he became Premier. He does not appear to have changed his mind about the advis, bility of an. American naval Ares ~.oce in ,Greek waters, and there i.? talk here that he may -propost. to shift the United States bases remote spots. Other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,' among them Italy, have also become cagey about providing facilities to the Sixth Fleet. The 'Arabs' oil. diplomacy 'has Pon- tributed to making the Medi- terranean a less. hospitable place for American naval power than it used to be. ' Theoretically, the Sixth Fleet '--like the Soviet fleet-is self- sustaining, but it makes. a great difference if a fleet has local supply support. The Sixth Fleet has. far more friendly seaports than do the Soviet, warships. . ?Those Poor Guys' Those poor guys over there," an officer aboard an American aircraft carrier said, pointing to a Soviet destroyer a few miles -away. "Our sailors ' do get shore leave." . " e Soviet sailors and naval infantry i,.ast live very ascetic lives,, he added. "Their vessels are crammed with elec- tronic thegear hardly listen eve~r in have us, chance of feeling firm soil under their feet before they get home. Egypt and Syria let Soviet war- ships into their seaports only sparingly." : Shore leave may be impor- tant, but fleet commanders worry even more about logistic support and resupply. With the posture of the United States allies in the Mediterranean stiffening, the Sixth Fleet may 'be confronted with new prob- lems. One is fuel. The fleet Is gobbling up 10,000 barrels a day, most of it supplied by re- fineries In Italy and Greece. Arab pressure on the two countries and the general shortage may reduce the flow !equiring supply by tanker Approved Por-Rete'a-se-2001/08/ - - 00010028 001=6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77=00432R000100280001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 10 November 1973 Atlantic `Partnership' The crisis in the Western allianceiset off by the Mideast war throws an ironic light on the draft text of the new. "Atlantic Charter" submitted by the United States to its European allies on Sept. 29, and published in The Times on Friday. Tile. charter, a declaration of agreed principles for' adoption at a proposed Western summit meeting this winter, is sought by President Nixon and Secretary Kis singe` as part of an effort to revitalize the trans-Atlantic ; partnership. It is supposed to cap the wide-ranging dis-; . cussiots set in motion for that purpose in this so-called' "Year tyf Europe." Europe's initial draft declaration was criticized as: "very thin" by a State Department note which accompa-i nied the American version of September 29. The essence of- the American revisions was summed up in that note's insistence that the charter must "reflect better the reali- ties of our common concerns and our intention to deal meaningfully with them on a common basis." One week later, when the Mideast burst Into flames,. this solemn American recommitment to the alliance was virtually ignored by Washington. Without significant con, sultation, the United States plunged 'into a unilateral effort to deal with this overriding "common concern;' the Mideast, as if it were a. purely American-and American-Soviet-problem. Yet despite long-standing differences with some Euro pean governments over Mideast tactics, there was noth- ing the United States did during the 18-day war, from the decision to re-supply Israel to the Kissinger-Brezhnev cease-fire formula, that need have been impeded by fully informing and even "consulting" the NATO allies. Con- sultation in an emergency does not mean that action, must be delayed until agreed decisions are reached. During last month's Mideast war President Nixon put Europe at risk by an escalatory move that placed Ameri. can nuclear and conventional forces in Europe as well as the United States on an alert, without informing the NATO allies beforehand to enable them, if they agreed. on the danger, to alert their forces as well. All blame for the angry quarrel in October between the United States and its NATO allies does not, of course, rest on Washington's shoulder's. But the United States cannot expect West Europe to accept the risks of an oil cut-off unless it makes realistic energy-sharing proposals. The United States with less than 6 per cent of the. world's population consumes almost one-third of its oil. It con-. sumes more than twice as much energy per capita as Its richest NATO allies. Unless Washington proposes to cut back consumption and share supplies for essential needs, equitably with its allies (including Japan) in the event of a serious crisis, it is unrealistic to attempt to achieve a. common Mideast policy. What applies to the Mideast applies even more to all the issues of trade, money,' defense and arms control in Europe that have strained the Atlantic partnership in creasingly in recent years. Common action by the Atlan- tic allies in the common interest is essential in all these fields and it could be advanced by. a strongly-worded. "Atlantic Declaration of Principles," . But if the increasingly 'powerful Common Market countries are to agree to consult Washington before 'taking decisions that can damage the United States, Washington must demonstrate In action as well as wards that consultation Is a two-way street. LONDON TINES, 7 November 1973 Personal view by 1ehard Crossrnan 1 in the Foreign Office are well content 'Three weeks ago I roused quite tions with the Arabs. Indeed,! a flurry by ascribing the behavi- they can now claim that the our of the Government in the neutrality- Sir Alec announceo. Arab-Israeli war to the control at the beginning of the war hag' of British Middle Eastern policy by now their n actransf rmed by a rabists tight little Foreign Office. macy, into a positive pro., A To judge by some of the letters Arab posture. Mr Peter Walkeri1 I got there is a solid phalanx of was able on Monday to reaffirm Times readers who welcome this to the House of Commons that, state of affairs. They feel that Britain-which is now classed as: we just cannot afford to get a friendly nation by Arab. mixed up in anything which spokesmen - " has received' would incur the enmity of the assurances to which we attach oil shaikhs of the Persian Gulf: great value from certain of then instead we should follow the Arab oil producers that our French example and deliber- supplies will be maintained ". ately cultivate the friendship of Arabs Meanwhile, however, the Arab .states. into which Nato has fallen, have No one can accuse Sir Alec decided to pick off its members Douglas-Home of not doing his one by one. The Dutch were level best to put this policy into 'selected as the first victims, and: effect. But is it proving success- the Dutch Government wasp ful ? To answer this question we compelled as a first measure to' must recall the events of the past forbid all motoring last Sunday., ,month. In retrospect we can see Next day the Foreign Minister that Sir Alec's decision to deny appealed to his colleagues in the: the Israelis the spares and EEC to act in the spirit of the i ammunition for their Centurion Community and organize roller- tanks came at the height of the tive resistance to this economic' military crisis caused by the blockade. After six hours' talks.. i ik b Ara preempt ve str e. It was touch and go whether the Syrian Army would pour down from the Golan Heights into Galilee and the Egyptians achieve a break- through to the Mitla Pass. The Israelis were already short of ammunition and if the Ameri- cans had not begun their immense airlift at once they would have been in serious peril. Since Sir Alec has assured us- that the preservation of Israel. is one of his main concerns, we the Foreign Ministers decided, to disregard him, and Sir Aleci led the way in emphasizing that there could be no question of Britain, which is relatively very well placed, diverting any sup- plies to Holland. Instead, the EEC 'Ministers would concern themselves with -? peace settle- ment in the Middy,. East-though what on earth they were going to do about it was not made clear. Here again our Arabist can I s , must assume that he decided'to suppose, be content. At the cost rely on Mr Nixon to supply arms of deepening the disunity in the to Israel while himself currying west and bringing the whole idea favour with the Arabs, by deny- of a European Community into ing his Nato ally the use of the contempt, we have given the. huge British base in Cyprus for Arabs still further evidence of transit purposes.. When he the price we are prepared to pay treated the Americans in this for their friendship, way he was in quite good com- Remembering Sir Alec's past, pany. M Pompidou and Herr some friends of Israel are talk, Brandt did the same for the ing about appeasement and com- same reasons ; and they all then paring his surrender to that of proceeded to complain bitterly Munich. But, there is no com. that they were not consulted parison between the two situa. when Mr Nixon ordered the tions. Then we faced a real nuclear alert in order to deter threat of war by a powerful the Russians from flying troops nation, Now we face the crudest. into Egypt. Since then, there has form of economic blackmail been an exchange of insults be- applied by a motley collection t*een the western capitals and of weak, divided and corrupt at the time when our strength -governments. Rather than call most depended on our unity, the Arab bluff at the risk of Nato has been in total disarray. suffering a period of acute oil Nevertheless. the Arabists at shortage, we are prepared to the Foreign Office feel well con- split Nato and disintegrate the tent. A breach of faith with .European Community. Appease- Israel and a split in Nato is, in ment is far too complimentary a their eyes a price well worth pay. word with which to describe jag in order to seize an oppor- such a policy. ,tunity to improve British rela- 29 Approved-Eor_Release 2001108107 ? CIA-RDP77-004328 000 100280001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000106280001-6 WASH4GTON POST 13 Noyember 1973 ? osepn, Am & bs or." PAR-.The failure of Western 'Su-, rope in~,the latest Mideast crisis is par- ticularly striking to me in. view of a visit I have just made to Cairo. For the' Europeans paid oil blackmail in a vial ?ble way bound. to inspire further Arab demands. They also, excluded themselves en?': :?tirely from the diplomacy of ceasefire.' and. possible settlement.. So the Mid-' -east crisis provides. a case study in,' 'world arena." The paying'of'oil blackmail waai es-' pecially evident in the resolution put Out by the nine European Common ?Market countries a week ago.. Among other things, the nine gave the wet mitten to .Holland. which, for the same noble reasons.th,at Inspired the Dutch .wartime resistance. to the Nazis, had, refused; to pay oil blackmail. In ?a, Sharp break with the community spirit' of the. Common Market,. the other eight refused to make bits of their own oil stocks available to compensate, for, Arab retribution against the Dutch: Before that the Europeans. had di- vorced themselves, entirely from the. American effort to match Soviet sup- plies to the Arab states with assistance' to Israel. Except for Portugal, all the NATO countries denied overflight; rights.to?the planes of the American airlift. Britain even refused to allow ,AmOrlcan reconnaissance planes to use, ler Mediterranean bases. The Arabs, not surprisingly, ' inter. preted'the European reaction as an ex" THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 10, 1973 rom .; o .re ds., 'reported in Cairo--quite, falsely' I, found out here In' Paris where the ,'weather has been fine--that Europe' was .in the ? grip of. a cold spell. The Common Market resolution was seen as a mere ' apple-polishing device. "The.f Europeans,', one official close to Presi- ?'dent Anwar Sadat of 'Egypt told 'me,; "are running around. trying to collect`: good' conduct ?ceftiftcatca from us.". Given that attitude it is hard- to be lieve .the oil weapon will not be used to extract still further concessions. ? Since the Europeans had -played no- part ,in containing the Russian push,' moreover, there was no opening for. them,in, the . d plomatic follow-through.. President Sad at and Secretary of State. .Henry Kissinger tied up their deal on. a ceasefire a d future peace confer. ence without even keeping the Europe- ans informed. About the only conces- sion to form was ' a dinner invitation extended to f tir leading European am- -baisadors for he final banquet offered Jo Dr; Kissinger in Cairo. Since the'E ropeans were totally in- nocent of w at was going on they '.could barely ven make conversation. 'As-one of th 'European ambassadors said of the oc asion. "The compaOy in- eluded 10 Egyptians, five AmericSfiS .and four Eur pean imbeciles" The absenc f the Europeans from the Mideast c ne ;la perhaps not i-o tragic. But getting The Europeans tb ' play a more responsible role In other matters I9 Important. Sb It is useful to FROM OUR LEVA i CORRESPONDENT In most of th Arab capitals he is visiting this week Mr yyssinger has been to some: extent talkin rto the converted. It is unfortunate 4at his formidable per-' suasive pow 4 are not being used to convert. thos Arab leaders who reject the ceasefire, ho reject peace negotia- tions and wl q are convinced that the Israelis under; i hiand only the language of in comman and Jordan Libya, Sout although thei of Algeria, K ' v in Morocco, Tunisia, it the leaders of Iraq, Yemen and maybe, stand is less intransigent, raft and Saudi Arabia.. The no-ne ptiation ? block has been concentrating 1 s efforts on stiffening the' resolve of P lsident Assad of Syria, who reluctan 1,+ accepted the ceasefire only because Egypt already had. (The meeting between him and President. Sadat of Egypt, which had to be held on the neutral ground of far-distant Kuwait, was a distinctly frosty en- counter.) In rejecting a ceasefire and negotiations these leaders are responding to the majority sentiment in Arab public opinion and the, surge of Arab unity ,which has found Arab' soldiers, oilmen and diplomats joining in a big Arab ' shove aimed not at talking with Israel but at defeating it. The ceasefire is unpopular because it left both sides in a mutually unsatis- factory political and military situation. The Israelis mind losing territory but don't really want to acquire any more in Egypt and Syria, which is what happened. Although the Arabs don't mind losing territory they do want to' regain what they lost in 1967, which did' not happen. What, they ask, are the long-term advantages Israel could gain if, after a breakdown of the ceasefire, it went on and captured Damascus,. Horns and Hama and was advancing on Aleppo? Or if it captured Mansura and Tanta and was driving on Cairo? So much the worse for the Israelis if they did get themselves into such a situation, they say. A peace emerging from such an Israeli victory would be a disaster for Israel. This Arab attitude recalls the saying of the American general in the second world war: "They've got us surrounded, the poor bastards." . A second reason why the ceasefire is unpopular is the belief that Israel cheated after a previous ceasefire in 1948 when it seized Eilat during a truce over the protests of Glubb Pasha but with the connivance of the United Nations mediator, Ralph Bunche. And the United Nations was never able to 30 1 - B1a~kn~iI:' ask what went wrong in the Mideast. The answer, j believe, Is that Europe is belatedly paying the price of Gen- eral de Gaulle. At the general's Insist- ,ence progress toward joining political 'institutions was arrested In favor of a Europe of individual states. Inevitably, these states now jockey for posi.' tion one against another--whether In, dealing with the Mideast or, the Soviet, Union.. , . Moreover, the fight -to get by the. French veto exhausted British interest In the European community. Prime- Minister Edward heath has to ^ek im-' mediate dividends from Europe. To, have as a first c nsequence of the new, association an oil, shortage and ration- Ing would have, made joining Europe: look like, a total failure. So Mr. Heath has been under the strongest pressure to pay'any price for till the Arabs de. What all this suggests Is that It does' no good simply to lecture the Europe- ans on their responsibilities. The right American tactic Is'to begin anew the slow painful and dull work of fostering European unity. That `'responsibility, should 'be felt with particular keen- ness by Secretary of State Henry Kis- singer.-For after all he played no small part in lending . respectability to the Gaullist 'follies which. have done so, much to reduce Europe. to;its? present pitiable condition. t t 0, 1073. Plaid $ntargrlaesi Ytie. get Israel to go back to the old ceasefire line. Exactly the same thing, the Arabs argue, happened after October 22nd, with the result that the Arabs, especially the military men, once again feel the dangerous frustration of not having been defeated in a fair fight. The hard- liners know that on this particular issue they can make a strong appeal to the Egyptian army over President Sadat's head. A third reason for the unpopularity of Egypt's conciliatory line is the general feeling that President Sadat has gone too far in making. up to the United States.' For him to say that his army was, in effect, defeated by America but' to add that American' diplomacy is being Con- structive, and then to go on to restore diplomatic relations with Washington, seems a betrayal of the Arab dignity regained on the field of battle. It is not' difficult to understand why Mr Sadat should not want to go to an Arab summit. He knows that one of the reasons why President Boumedienne of Algeria is calling for a meeting is to stiffen his backbone. And he realises that most of his colleagues, who did. their bit in the struggle, will be in a reproachful or even critical mood. Even if Mr Kissinger delivers the goods and gets the ceasefire to stick, this strong, uncompromising, Arab block against negotiations is going to make its weight felt during the talking. ease 2l 011O - 0 1 00280001-6 Apprgved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 Ronald Butt Europe ploughs its furrow'', for peace I +nothing .like a concerted Euro- pean policy on the Middle East, and the absence of such a policy was a so rce of worry to pro-, Europeanoin Britain and of gibes. from the aiiti-Europeans. Here American )connexion, both in policy forniulation in respect of the Middle East and, more ,broadly and dangerously, over defence policy generally. The Euro-American defence concert ,appeared dangerously strained- -and yet the Europeans them- selves had no unified policy with which to compensate. This argument, even before this week, produced some curious illogicalities. Mr Harold Wilson, for example, has re- peatedly and bitterly charged the British Government with following a policy which was in. sufficiently pro-Israel and was 'motivated by our closer - con-. nexion with the French in the' EEC context. At the same time, .be has castigated the British Government for having let Britain become vulnerable to the US military alert which was itself the consequence of America's committed pro-Israel policy. Yet, if Britain had gone along step-by-step in support of. this policy, as Mr Wilson wanted, there would have been little chance of disengaging from any military gestures the Americans chose to make-or indeed, of establishing, as the Brussels declaration has done, that there does exist a respectable position on Middle East po'icy which is not committed totally to one side, as the American, or to the ather, as the Russian. ? Now that the Europeans have, if belatedly, established some- thing like a concerted policy, this in turn is bitterly attacked by those whose opinion, which often seems to border on fanatic :ism, is that only those who are totally in support of Israel's every demand and every policy position are to escape the deadly charge of being against her. In some of those who have attacked Tuesday's declaration by the 'Foreign Ministers, there does, of course, lurk the prejudice of ,hostility in principle (tn which they are perfectly entitled- though the fact ought to be made clear) to British membership of She EEC and to any first step towards Community policy- making. The main burden of complaint is, however, twofold. First, there is tfie charge that the rest of the Community is said to have leaned on Holland and therefore (the logic of this is curious) to have failed to exhibit Commun- ity solidarity. This is easily answered. When the Dutch fell foul of the Arab oil states, there existed no common European policy such as has since been formulated. Is it therefore sug-. gested that when that common policy was eventually devised, it should have been dictated by the temporary position of difficulty in which one member state had got itself beforehand? The idea that European unity is to be meashred by the willingness of seven or eight members to adjust their policy to the acci- dental position already previ- ously arrived at by one or two has only to be stated for its absurdity to. be obvious. Of course, if the Arab coun- tries were to persist in putting pressure on Holland now that the Europeans have stated their policy, and if oil sanctions were turned against other members of the. Community who then aided Holland with supplies, Holland would have to he sup.+ ported by the entire EEC; come what might. But there is no evidence that the Arabs will adopt any such line. Behind the scenes, there is now intense acti- vity to change the Arab attitude to Holland and there are. no grounds for -supposing it will fail. Would it really have been preferred for the Europeaq Community to make a gesture of defiance against the Arab states which did nothing practical to help Holland but merely risked the rest of Europe's oil ? The second charge is that the 'Europeans have yielded to blackmail and that the Arabs will now apply pressure more. firmly each time they feel it pays. But this assumes that the Arab states are going to be have much more irrationally than they show any signs of doing, and that they are going gratuitously to offend their European customers-who now offer them the only hope of a middle way which falls short Of total reliance on Russia. Those who push this point have to answer the question: do they really want to see European in- dustry (and specifically British industry at this crucial moment) brought to a halt for the sake of a gesture? Perhaps some do. but surely most would only take the risk if the need were really great. the oil danger, real though tha. is. It is a policy based on Ulh Resolution 242-for instance, in respect of the territorieis acquired by Israel In the SW Day War-and on the elabori>a- tion of that policy in the Foreign Secretary's Harrogate speech of November, 1970, which acknow- ledged the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Yet this last point is one feature of Tuesdays declaration which has annoyed Israel. Another is the call for a return to the ceasefire lines of October 22. Adherence to such a long.. standing policy is hardly surren- der to blackmail, and it would be odd to abandon it just be- cause it now brings the added' NEW YORK TIMES 13 November 1973 FRENCH CRITICIZ U., S' SOVIET. ROLE Cabinet Aide Asserts Brutal', Mideast Crisis Puts Ability. to Keep the Peace in Doubt BY NAN ROBERTSON Special to The New York Time, PARIS, Nov. 12-In the strongest official denunciation of Soviet-American accords yet head in western Europe,' France's, Foreign Minister said . "today that the "brutal crises"; in the Middle East confirmedl his Government's doubts about the superpowers' capacities to keep peace. The minister,. Michel Jobert, told Parliament in a major for., eign-policy speech that under- standing between the United States and the Soviet Union had not prevented war.. [The chief American nego- tiator will resume discussions '' in Brussels Tuesday with Atlantic alliance representa- tives on declarations designed, to strengthen relations be- tween the United States and Western Europe. Further ne- gotiations will follow '. in Copenhagen with the Euro- pean Common Market.] It is not. Analogies with t~ The French Foreign, Minister Munich are misleading for two, said, the Americans and the reasons. First, there is no ques- Russians could reach results) tion of weakening on the comJ mitment to safeguard Israel's only by using' "pressures and vital interests. The only ques- -threats" aimed not just at Israel quired indefinitely and pas- } Mr. Jobert described West- that to accept every policy that the Israeli Government, in ern Europe meantime as being Its own wisdom, seeks to estab- "treated like a nonperson, lash as vital to its interest-even Ihumiliated all along the line," such policies as the acquisition, while the Soviet Uhion and the of territories which, far from safeguarding Israel's peace, United States delivered vast have actually provoked another arms supplies to their warring war. clients and then pursued secret What happend in Brussels 19 negotiatidns . toward a -cease- that the Europeans have adopted fire. a policy which Britain has long' ? The consequences of this advocated and which pre-dated veritable, condominium" ren- -- -Approved-For Re ;benefit of avolding'more triiiible The European declaration this .week has probably facilitated Dr Kissinger's task, not only In Cairo but even in Israel wijere it Is now understood what can, and cannot be expected fitomi Europe in future. The war Pasl given the opportunity of ivork.i Ing for it pr ?e that Jests. I In: these circumstances, It can'not~ be in Israel's real interest fee,' ite well-wishers in the West to give) the Impression that they will support the more extreme Israeli demands, even at a risk of a, future conflict which rally,{"{ could endanger Israel's a ist.1 ence, and perhaps the peace or the world. rlei&f T:urope'.'helpless: `;luring the crisis, the, Foreign Minister declared. He* added that it had also made Israel and the Arabs "directly dependent. on their protectors." The Foreign Minister called' the cease-fire precarious, sketching out a situation in 'which both the Israelis and the Egyptians had the "illusion" that each was obtaining satis- factory results. Mr. Jobert warned the United States that it was ignoring the fact, that Europe was in the .yery center of the "second battle" of the Middle East war-the struggle for Arab -oil, 'Upon which the Continent de - ,perately depends. Faced with the superpower. 'understandings, he said, Europe ,should 'untiringly pursue' European union. But he can- ,ceded, that it was nowhere 'close to political union, which he said was,. a condition for a common defense. Consequently, he went on, ,that defense must include tiie United States as a continuing partner in the Atlantic alliance. He specifically referred to the American military role when he 'called for "the presence qnd the' engagement of the United States in Europe." In ? the coming disarmament 'and East-West round of talks, the Foreign Minister said, agreements must not be con- cluded between the great pow- ers that would leave Europe ,unprotected-a way of saying; at the mercy of the Soviet Union: He declared himself, opi posed to any attitude that, "under cover of detente, and disarmament,". would in reality "sacrifice Europe's autonomy and mortgage its' future" Mr. Jobert's speech was con- tradictory on occasion. ? He began by scolding the United States in the harshest terms yet for leaving Fiance arid, Europe. out- in the cold during: ,the Middle East crisis. He. continued by pleading eloquent= ' ly for continued t American military involvement in Europe, `despite the fact that France is still technically independent of I the Atlantic' alliance's military structure. Finally, he added plaintively. that France should remember to deepen her cooperation-in 1 the'. economic field-with the Soviet Union. 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 WASHINGTON POST 3November 1973 .['.srael ;Escalated Raid Targets' By George C. Wilson fished. Sat `asserted thy' bombing of the home had been 'deliberate. as part of Israel's terror campaign. It Washington Post Staff Writer ' LATAKIA, Syria, Nov. 12'' "All our efforts have been f-Aff on-the-spot examina-' to raise our standard of liv- Iooked'to me like an ovev,., shoot of the target. There - ug, !luau. said, toward ,was no alea-wide combing. tion tf.;life bombing damage' building up the economy, in that residential section.': in th s' port city and else: "It's very sad to see What, Azig Shahood, a Baath where ip Syria shows that; you've been building for 10 Party chairman in Latakia/ Israel sharply escalated Mid; years blown up like this." said four ,persons were; 'east warfare this time and Continued Imadi: "Any skilled and. 80 wounded in Put- her,own ? industries in. military force has to have; the October rids. This num line for bombing if fighting an economic base. Israeli, her could not be verified.: is ever renewed. . " ' tried to 'destroy our' prod-i But his figures indicate that' Oil storage tanks blasted: uction machinery so we cane! Israel concentrated its fire. apart by ombs and shells; a not afford to. back our' on 'the oil storage center demolish~~ggd wood factory;'I army." I. and associated facilities, not and a bombed-out refinery With the cooperation of on civilian areas exec to the new dimension Israel i added to the warfare be !tween Arabs and Jews in the Mideast. Given the action=reaction nature of modern warfare, it pis virtually certain that Arab countries will seek the weapons to respond in kind-, in the future. The only real, question in, this regard is' nomic base. Greek and a Japanese ship] whether the Soviet Union. I came away from the sur- were damaged in the Israeli will continue its restraint in, vey with these conclusions: Iraids, according to the party, .not supplying Arab nations" ? The Israeli bombing dis? !leaders. They said no Soviet, with offensive weapons. rupted but did not paralyze! Iships were in the port of La. i So far, to the distress of: the Syrian economy. takia during the war. some Arab leaders, Russia' ? The bombing was fairly' Two roads run south front has stressed defense rather: accurate and aimed. against Latakia toward the Golanw, than offense in deciding" industrial targets ' rather fighting front where armsf 'what arms shall go to Syria than centers of population. . !landed at the port would be , and Egypt. The Soviet an-, ? Enough bombs missed taken. The parallel roads swer to the American F4 their targets to kill a limited cross the big North Riven ,Phantom fighter bomber,, number of civilians, proba-'- -about three miles outsideh. for example, was not other. bly uniting rather than dis' eLatakia. One of the bridges; offensive bombers, but a piriting the Syrian public' t'over that river had been hit! strengthened and mobile air against Israel. -by bombs, but the bridge defense. Starting in Latakia In. the; ,parallel' to It was intact. And' while there have, north, Seria's biggest port, I Bomb craters dotted the. been threats from Egypt: saw petroleum tanks at the* .;river bank by the. missed that surface-to-surface mis water's edge which had been- bridge, indicating that Is- siles will wing into Israeli blown up by bombs and, ;'raeli pilots had tried to cities, the evidence suggests punctured by shells fired knock out the link. Moscow has held a tight from ships at sea. The Syr-; The U.S. Air . Force and rein on such weapons. tan manager of the tank' ,,Navy dropped thousands of Even so, Israeli ports like ' farm said 10 out of tl1ie 24, -,tons of bombs on, North VP :Haifa and industries like storage tanks. had been de-: ? etnamese bridges in an at. Aerospace. Works in Tel stroyed. That appeared to be :tempt to break transporta4 Aviv are indeed in hostage ? an accurate count. He esti-, tion links, or what the mill= to Arab and soviet military mated damage at $3.5? mil-I tary calls lines of communi- strategy from now on as a lion. ' cation. This could have been result of this "first strike",' The bomb craters among though iitteappears the well, at-; at Syria's industrial base. In the storage tanks were big,. 'tempt to break the bridge the 1967 war, Israel concen- looking as if they were cre-- trated Its bombing on Syr ated by 750 pound or 1,000-i 'links failed. Ian air fields and made no' ' pound bombs. The manager , On the south ' side of the' :comparable effort to knock, said most of the 100 workers: Latakia bridges is the ply4, 111 apart the Industrial base. at the storage complex had' :wood factory Sat manages. Mohamed Imadi, Syria s, !left before the bombs fell,(' Its manufacturing sheds' ,urban minister of economy' : declaring one workman was have indeed been obliter- and chief,architect of the wounded In the raids. 'aced, with the iron beams nation's economic develop- Adjacent to the tank farm ;that used to support the ment plan, contended In an } is a huge masonry building, root twisted out of shape. 'Interview that Israel's Octo- that manufactured soap, ac- , . They know this is a civil- ber bombing campaign was Z cording to Abdel Kader Sal, ,Ian wood.factory, Sai said ? a premeditated effort to as he pulled up in front of ; chief com merce for Syr keep Syria from closing Its the undamaged executive of- technological s s Baath Party in Latakia. gap with Is- Bue me plant, surrounded fice adjacent to it. He said'. rael. by high barbed wire, could :there were 200 working ,in "They.wanted to destroy well have been a stori4ge the factory at the time of our economy completely," f ;lit i t the raids but they fled toy Imadi charged. "Unfortu- area or m art' equ pnien safety. hate!", they copied every- the Soviet Union deliyyerect 'to Syria by, sea. The tiuiid= t Sat put the civilian casual- thing you did in Vietnam." ing had been hit but not de;' ,ties as one person killed on' He estimated that Israeli molished. , the bridge, four killed on a bombers inflicted $500 mil- About a half mile from bus near the bridge during. lion worth of damage on the raid and 16 wounded on, -Syria's fledgling economic the petroleum storage farm, the bus and in nearby fields. base In the short war. A, private home was demutli IYNciaring he was basing 32 his information on. eyewit-' h~ti accounts ' firO h factory; employes, Sal said two Is- taeli planes fired rockets at,,, -the factory and raked the .street with ' machine-gun' 'fire. An Egyptian, who said' "he. saw two rockets' fired' lfto : the factory _ machlne; slop, claimed that the Is- raeli . planes dropped antis ,personnel bombs in the field, ,next to the ? factory "to kill; ?the workers." The same witness said the factory was demolished by 'those two rockets. But the' damage looked too massive to come from just two rock. :.eta. Also, the holes in the 'roof and metal piping were! 'of various sizes. ' A possibility which could,, `not be verified was that the ,Syrian military had turned' 'the big sheds of the Arab' 'Company for'Wood Industry! -into a storage area for mill ,tart' equipment moving to. ward the front. It would have made sense to storm 'such arms south 'of the, :;bridge's. The extensive dam. age thus could have come in part from Soviet explosives fblowing up inside the sheds,! c Having said that, it will be, .recalled that the 'American; "military contended that Hal" ;not stored arms in civilian; ,facilities and thus were le.', .gitimate bombing targets ) ,This rationale was severely? criticized. Israel, by bom 4 bing the plywood factory, is t thus vulnerable to the same' type of criticism. ' The -Syrian port of Tartus,; south of Latakia in a pictur- I esque Mediterranean set-i 'tang, was raided Oct. 7 by 12.: Israeli planes, a few hellcol5 ters and some. ships, accord-i }ing to Ahmed Hassan, chair that; of the Ba ath Party,, there. He said 12' of the 28 oi storage tanks' in ' Baniyasi and eight 'of the 12 tanks in Tartus were destroyed bye 'the' air and sea raids. Bani?' yas is the, terminus. for the' ?30-inch pipeline that -takes' oil. out of Iraq's Kirkuk, oil' `''fields. { That oil, as 'well ? as that; stored in Tartus, is for ex- port and. thus not a legit'-h mate military target h1 Syria, according to Syrian- economic minister Imadi) 'and other officials. "They? fcut the oil supply that was' .going to Europe," Imadi said' of the bombing of Baniyas; 'and Tartus.: Hassan said the civilian" bombing casualties totaled' 'three' wounded at the Bani `yas storage field and three' I?killed ' and 12 wounded at" Tartus. He said the Israeli helicopters concentrated 'their fire gainst Baniyas, just north of Tartus. Again, the government of-' ificial's estimate of the dam age was In line with the vial ,ble evidence. His easilalty Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 utives in which of course had a' 4Latakia argued that the porn .vested interest, this corre-, storage tanks. hold refined spondent examined the' fuels for, Syria's . civilian bomb damage at the ports of economy and thus did not Latakia and Tartus; ' at the' constitute a legitimate inili~ plywood factory outside La,, Etary target. But that point Is takia, and at the refinery; and power plant at Hom;.' . They said Israeli helicop ters fired at targets In the Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100200001-6 WASHINGTON STAR figures also' indicated thaf' the bombing and shooting: twere directed against the. ' petroldltm facilities, not cI .vilian ireas in the crowded, Port town of Tartus. w,he i asked how much": the boipbfng and shelling in-, terfe d with port, activity,. ,Hassan,'said, "not at all." He. said Syrian forces drove off Is- raeli ships before they could; ?; inflict'z major damage, add.: ing that a Soviet cargo ship was hits in Tartus during the' ' raids. ? Homs Is the site of Eco-1 nomic Minister Imadi's {'pride and joy - a refinery' and electrical generating; plant that he counted on to :pull Syria up to a new pla. teau of prosperity. His, 6 dream is for a petrochemi?! cal industry which, starting with the Homs refinery, would be an economic tonlo'' for all of Syria. :.Already, he said, through, such. modern facilities asi' J hose.. at Homs, . Syria in-s creased-its national incomes by record amounts in ? thei t last few years - an 11.3 per; cent raise between 1970 and: 21971 and 13.3 per cent be-, '_tween 1971 and 1972. This, growth, Imadi added, has, '.pushed up per'capita incomej sin Syria by 9 per cent. , " ', ' Today, however, a good" .'part of this dream at Homs' `lies in rubble. Supervisors 'at the Homs refinery said 40' r_~er cent of the connected.. refinery and power plant were destroyed in Israeli, bombing raids of Oct. 9. The shattered buildings twisted piping, collapsed storage tanks and general, ruin at, the Homs complex' makes that estimate credi- ble. Bath Party officials ' i>' .Homs estimated damage at $35 million for the refinery and $15 million for the power plant. 'Both facilities are only one year old. The civilian casualties' from the raid-,, they said,: ? were 12 people kaled at the refinery and four at the. electrical 'plant. Another 50 People. at both sites were A Czechoslovak compan+ built the Hoins complex' .covering 10,000 square yards; and will now work to re-?i ;pair it. Mallouk estimatedi,~ the repair job will take' one. In front the 'entrance` gate to the 'Homs refinery there is an iron bomb casing 'on display. Plant executives' ''said eight 500 pound bomb's 'fell on the complex In the first day's raid and 15 in the. second. They added that 20 of the 80 storage tanks were destroyed. The fire burned. for eight days, they said. .} Imadl said richer Arab na-. tlons - he did not disclose 'which 'ones - will pay ,'at.' 1ftgotion" of the $500 milliotl,, 1November 1973 Oro% ..and the ' east ' An important side-effect of Ameri- : generally bitter news conference Fri .can involvement in the Middle East da i h y n g t Pit Nixo tdh ..nurne te oil crisis is the acute embarrassment of argument around, saying Europe . the North Atlantic Treaty Organza-, "would havg frozen to death this win-4 .lion. The problem needs top-level at- ter" without the Mideast settlement: tention to avoid a severe wrenching of that 'American policy seeks to pro- the 24-year-old alliance, mot e . The United States has pretty well ? The rift has pointed up the disparity gone it alone in its noliev of su l in pp y g balan th Mi u to ce e deast Conflict. It, ? between that country ^ ' and its Soviet- - also reveals some basic disagree- supported Arab o pponents both to ments on th llt ,eoyay to be expected .t ensure Israel's survival and to t promo e among NATO allid es an on American) an eventual settlement. The crunch freedom to shift Europe-based equip- b :came whpn_ in the latest A ra ?.? -wuuac spots e1Se- war, the Russians mounted a resupply` ' where, even to such a contiguous zone ,effort for the Arab side and Washing- as the Mideast. Russia's role there as) ton decided it ,must do the same for Arab sponsor and would-be oil broker Israel. can hardly be of no consequence to This produced 'a public scramble by NATO. oid - Blame in the current. misunderstan- ide ntification with ,.the American ac ding surely belongs on both sides, with Lion and even, in the view of some U.S. Washington still subject to reproach ;officials, to hinder it. Only Portugal for failure to communicate and con- permitted overflight and landing by ' suit, especially on the near-confronta- Israel-bound supply planes and fight tion ' with Moscow that provoked our ors. West Germany made a public fuss" military alert last Thursday. But the over the discovery of American tanks seeming desertion by our European ti ' being loaded aboard Israeli ships .. at partners could produce enough Ameri- Bremerhaven. Turkey and Greece,: can resentment to hasten the with-,'1 among the countries warning our drawal of substantial American forces ,planes off, reportedly permitted Soviet ' from Europe. There is important con- overflights (which Greece denied in gressional sentiment for doing this, its case). and the administration now, is restudy- The spectacle of' our NATO allies ing our NATO deployment especially treating us like lepers caused deep with a view to our flexibility in using hurt in. Washington, even after giving , . men and equipment wherever needed., Lam.......-__~ ~ (lisp wairrhi. to th e l i e l _-? a __ an14- obviously needs avoid,. giving offense to the Arabs and intense medication, and it is too bad 'ieonardizincr the mninr nni-t -r+u,.:....:i . uac ucocaJaty seas aeon snown this supplies. Defense Secretary, Schlesin- painfully as an unwanted highlight of .ger and-State Department spokesman ' M Ni ' " r xon s Year of Euro" It i .pe.s McCloskey voiced unprecedented crit- ' ? worth taking a moment to reflect that icism of our. NATO .partners, and the ' the Atlantic partnership still is vital to President eoinzaz t d bi r en e tte ly athis thif ,e securty o all 'of us. ,,"cost to repair Syria's lnd(sT? trial damages from the war; Thus, ,in yet another Irony. of the Mideast. American' ;dollars which buy oil from 'the Arabs will be used iq' .part to rebuild buildings that American bombs have, knocked down,' 33' ppr 1_ fi_ . ? i. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001Q0280001-6 WASHINGTON POST 12 November 1973 I The News Business Reporting,.. the' Mideast War Inustratlons by David Gunderson lead Egyptian position, he could not" have been closer than 91 miles from El- { i en~?j~S 1 Arish. I could have datelined my dis- 1.~ patch "On The Road To Cairo" with as much justice as his "On The Road To.J' . rnaid D. Nossiter j;..qrq pl - Tisht erir"sg a war In progress. Nothing and no one is worthy of much belief and a reporter's own senses-sight, smell ited use. Three weeks of reporting from the Israeli side Ieft me more con- vinced than ever that journalism is much like firing a mortar. To get any- where near the target, you must first overshoot, then undershoot and hope- i troops we e the briefer who said Israe fully come close on the third roundL the briefing became much less precise.. In c?P, Town- others were not. y-,VV: uLULtCS oas sat s. ? ..... .~ o-- --- "big picture" or move out by press bus' mine the Oct. 22 line and censors perpetual state of war and Its unwill. or rented car for a limited glimpse of a would not permit mention of Israeli Ingness to help the enemy Is perfectly, fighting front. Both were splendidly troops beyond the perimeter of the understandable. No one could- quarrel,, unsatisfactory. town of Suez. with the Israeli refusal to identify To stay in Tel Aviv meant digesting, Going to,the front was just as frus- unit strengths and military objectives. the Israeli press, reading Israeli mill- trating for different reasons. The mils- But some of the censor's reasoning was ! ,t tary communiques, listening to the ra- 'tary. acted like a combined Jewish strange. On the canal front, a pleasant dio, intervie*ing harassed officials a mother-father toward foreign corre- , young commander of an artillery bat reporter or his friends had known in spondents and threw up a series of ob- tery told me that he would have to stacles in'depth to keep reporters from' move his 155s soon, that the Egyptians &16- -+ -1 -'Knva all nttvindinv the nightly briefing by an Israeli officer- js a superb exercise in controlled commu- 4,-nication. Out of this, something resem- bling a coherent account of what was r i' , tary briefer spoke- glowingly each for an issue that closed three days a posing rs. Me s governmen an a night of Egyptian bridges across the ter the second cease-fire, delivered a ? stern critic of the government's con- ~' Suez Canal that Israeli planes were de- ' graphic account of his hair raising es- duct of the war. The Israeli regime ~'. .4r..a.inu ru1an41PQe1v The number cape from death on "the road to El Ar- had no interest in building him up. - poIn the war's opening days, the mill- where a newsmagazine man, writing leader of Likud, the chief coalition op . Z M i ' t d e.~ Mr. Nooer, The_ Post's correspond- J this sto n t in lived u J f-o..-i) an outside Israeli censorship.' El Arish." Among the most potent barriers .to truth is Israeli censorship. All coVy , must be scrutinized and what is passed through is often capricious One corre-'; spondent was allowed to give an unof,,, ficial estimate of Israeli casualties at the start of the third week; another us- ing the same numbers was not. Some ' t e became politically sensitive material, correspondents were permitted to quo l k I the point of contact. A few carefully . were "finding the range. He pointed to selected "pool" reporters were given a crater 50 yards away and said three access, but they were exceptions. The of his men had been wounded there. least comfortable but most believable The story seemed innocent enough and way to look at a front is to attach your-, I made a paragraph of it. But the cent self to a company or battalion in the sor wiped it out. "We mustn't let the line. Repeated requests for such per- enemy know how effective their guns f " he told me sternly. or are, sarily partisan to an enormous degree mission were steadily turned down and reflected, neither more nor less non-Israeli correspondents. The censorship is supposed to be' tti than a nation at war wanted its friends So, one did the next best thing and purely military and all political com- 1 and enemies to know. traveled by private car or Israeli-or- ment should, in principle, pass. But in The careful reporter heavily laced ganized bus to points a few miles be- a garrison state the two are hopelessly ?_,j his copy. with "according to Israeli .'. hind the front, within artillery and intertwined and the censor serves the sources" and "the military claimed". strafing range of Arab arms, but no state's interest. For days after Gent Ar- and "a spokesman asserted." Even so, closer. In other words, correspondents iel? Sharon was known both in Israel he knew he was dispatching a one- took risks they thought were necessary and abroad as the leader of the dating sided version of events that may or to perform their craft for only the, Israeli assault on the West Bank, his may not have happened, afforded by, most limited returns. name could not be mentioned in dis. people with the deepest vested interest In the absence of fact and sense, patches from Tel Aviv. Finally, the --survival-in confusing the other side some colleagues inei"itably drew on ' censors permitted reporters to say that and enlisting maximum American sup- 'their Imaginations. My favorite comes Sharon was- "one of the commanders." rt from the Egyptian side of the line, Sharon, of course, happens to be the have, been its only virtue. It was neces-, the fourth day did the authorities con- I, By chance, El Arish, a scruffy Arab, cede that the Russian pontoon bridges town in the Sinai is a place I know at could be rebuilt in an hour or less. The first hand. I spex t much of the sixth suggestion that all Egyptian forces on 'the Israeli side of the canal had been cut off was patently misleading. As a tary information were given, a thor ough shaking. Toward the end of the war, a crucial point was and Is how far Israeli forces ~, ? on the Egyptian side of the canal had improved their positions between the first cease-fire on Oct. 22 and the sec- ond on Oct. 24. At the briefing of Oct. ' 23, the spokesman gleefully boasted of gains-.a sweep south below Suez, pen- ;' etration inside the town of Suez and. the like. But in a day or so, when this ,,day of the war driving in and out of that cheerless village, trying to evade Israeli checkpoints and get closer to the action. El Arish, In fact, is 96 miles from the Suez Canal and, with some luck, we finally suceeded in getting a long way past it. We. drove down the El Arish road 81 miles before we were finally halted, just behind the Israeli artillery, in range of the Egyptians, but a good 10 miles from the frontmost Egyptian armor. Recall that this was Day. Six, a point of maximum Arab advance. If my news- magazine colleague writing after the end of hostilities had reached the' very Again, I wanted to make the point in' a dispatch five days after the second cease-fire that Israeli distaste for ' Washington's restraints must be tem- f pered by the country's dependence on the United States for arms. This, I ' wrote, would serve as a check on, any fresh adventures. To underline the point, I wrote of a remark Moshe Dayan had made to the Israeli cabinet. The defense minister reportedly told his colleagues, "If we get ammunition from them in the morning and shoot It off in the afternoon, we can't very well afford to quarrel." But the censor wasn't I having any and the anecdote was killed. The lamp excuse was, "We must not let the *tg ems know we are short of ammunl- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 28 October 1973 I hdia A Need for teip, but Is :"It Wanted? ss i NEW DELHI-This is the festive Diwali season, when the Goddess Lak shmi is supposed to slip into homes in northern and western India and magi- cally bestow prosperity for the new ;year. It is traditional to gamble-- ' trusting in Lakshmi's good luck-and Nearly 40 per cent of the population, 220 million people, live below the pov erty level, earning less than forty dollars a year. Mrs. Gandhi's stated aim is "garibi hatao"--abglishing poverty. At India's current stage of development, Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers have decided that the path to social revolution with- in a democratic framework lies in a modified form of socialism that seeks to increase state control over the econ- omy and to decrease dependence on foreign capital. "We shall evolve our own type of socialism," Mrs. Gandhi has said. "We do not want to be the carbon copy of another country." This restrictive policy has negated foreign investment through controls, taxation and licensing, and most Western embassies privately discour- age businessmen from opening com- panies here. Though American private investment in India has reached about $300-million, most of it involves com- panies who moved in about ten years taxes and Government disinterest and because of tf leir uncertainty over the possibilities pf nationalization. The adva4tages that some Indians; see in increased investment is that,' with shared profits and controls, out- siders can assist the nation with capi- tal, technology and expertise. To mod erate economists here, the experience of West Germany and especially Japan4 is especially embarrassing. West Ger- many and Japan, shattered after the: war, welcomed foreign Investment and aid, and are. now economically power- ful. India, on the other hand, flounders twenty-six years after Independence and is still immersed in ideological de- bates about whether or not to liber-1 alize licensing laws. , . t To some of Mrs. Gandhi's militant,/ advisers and supporters, an influx of ,' foreign investment would clearly open., the gates to "exploitation," primarily by American companies. The fact that the Soviet Union has sought out Amer- ican investment is either ignored and'h brushed aside. Also ignored is the fact a to close one's accounts and books in order to start anew after the holiday. The Indian government has not . quite decided to gamble on new poli- cies and start anew. But it is appropri- ate that the holiday festival is coming at a moment when Prime Minister In- dira Gandhi and an array of socialist advisers, businessmen, commentators 'and politicians are discussing funda- pental shifts in the nation's economic and development policies. The focus of the debate rests essen- tially on how to get India out of her financial rut. Mrs. Gandhi, herself, has conceded that 1973 is the most diffi- cult year in India's twenty-six year history. "We need a financial wizard," she has said: "We do need an entirely new approach." Within the past two weeks, Mrs. Gandhi has talked with her advisers about the possibility of seeking out foreign investment and easing the cur- rent policy of controls and licenses. Numerous, critics have said that the squeeze on foreign companies. and major industries here, coupled with labor indiscipline, poor planning, a grinding bureaucracy and "ideological rigidities," have soured the Indian economy. The nation's economic growth rate is near zero. Wholesale prices have climbed more than 20 per cent in the past year, and production declined in the first quarter of 1973. The popula- tion is increasing on an average of 13 million people a year. In the 1961-71 decade, the percentage increase in the population was 24.6, and by the end of the century there will probably be one billion Indians. Despite huge in- vestments in agriculture, food produc- tion hag not increased as much as was hoped, and still depends heavily 4 ' r ago. that General Motors and other -multi- One American businessman with, g. national giants are not pleading to major company, asked to describe his come to India. experience here, repeated one word: The bluntest, and most widely i "kafkaesque." He told a rambling saga of license delays, bribery attempts by shared, criticism of the form of Mrs. , officials, mismanagement and labor Ghandhi's struggle to uplift the nation, harrassment. "There's a skilled labor . is that the Government is simply fear-? force and there's talent here," he said, ful of taking the steps necessary to! "but it's a nightmare." distribute land, to bring trade union Total private foreign investment in discipline and to end corruption. India is about $2-billion dollars, and Prof. V. M. Dandekar, a prominent has declined in recent, years.. American economist and author, , says that India investment in India follows that of has "socialist slogans without socialist- Britain, Britain, whose businessmen have more discipline. "If the pbwer of the poor masses than $800-million dollars invested are to be attended to, the power. base ' here. Other nations with major private of the government must change." investment are West Germany, Japan And Era Sezhiyan, a widely respected and Italy. legislative leader of the regional party Ground rules for foreign investment from the southern state of Tamil Nadu, are somewhat fuzzy. India has opened Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K. her doors to high technology industry, or Dravidian Progressive Federation), 4 such as electronics, as well as to busi- has said: . "There has so far been no nesses who want to ship goods to earnest attempt to identify the causes' India that could be used for exports. of poverty, to assess the extent and' This may include textile piece goods enormity of the problem in the .coup- for clothing exports, or spare parts . try, to estimate the resources available' I for making radios here and then' ship- to meet the challenges, to chalk out a" ping them abroad. India usually de- detailed program with realizable tar-'i mands a 40 per cent "equity limita- gets in terms of time and benefits." tion" or ceiling on foreign ownership,/ to the slogan of 'Garibi hatao.' " . ' 'and does not welcome investment on Mrs. Indira' Gandhi, he said, consumer goods, such as toothpaste. the strength and the popular support What some economists here are in ample measure . . . It is not took. urging is that India loosen her policy late, even now to redeem the pledges 4 ; on foreign investment and cut red given to the people, to give a meaning. tape, especially in the technology in- to the slogan -of 'garibi hatao.' ' dustries that have b n reluctant to BERNARD WEINRAUB .ti 35 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280001-6 J'J~~_IL;Jdlju I-1-IF-161 WASHINGTON POST 21 October 1973 ?: imprisonments in Chile because a civil aA seek before the military coup when`' vas aua. d t er e io anion o f th C h e i l ean baly takeover that occurred on Septi. -~ By SzulC economic situation, was among the agen- 11. For political reasons, It preferred,, Szulc is a Washington writer and a des counseling the White House to re- a gradual destruction from within of former foreign correspondent. His., lat- buff Allende's attempts to work out a the Chilean economy so that the Al- settlement. . on the compensations to be lende regime would collapse of its own est book is "Compulsive Spy: The Strange paid for naionalized American property- weight.. The CIA's role, It appeared, , Career of E. Howard Hunt . and a renegotiation of Chile's $1.7 bil, was to help quicken this process. !:. AS THE United States, through.! lion debt to the United States.' Under, questioning by Rep. Michael . i - the Central Intelligence Agency ., -events that led to the bloody coup d'etat In Chile last Sept. 11? . ' ;._ } Actual involvement. in.' the military. , revolution that ousted the late. President Salvador. Allende Gossens, a '.Socialist,' has been roundly denied by .the Nixon d i i a A a m n stration nd the CI in p arti l cu , n i a l th a, e Bay of. Pigs, L aos and so on Argentina, Bolivia and Peru might fol- "accurately an overall assessment of deep suspicions have persisted that I' low this example. deterioration"'and that with the Chilean the ' agency, operating under., White For the next three years, the U.S. navy pushing for a coup; it was only a ,t the elections and await . , r ' d a e a run-o vo ff t e port the food because their deficit was But given the CIA's track record in . in Congress. Kissinger said then that if F such that over the long term they had overthrowing- or attempting to over- Allende -were confirmed, a Communist - j'no base for it." Elsewhere in his testa-, throw foreign governments-Iran, Guate- regime would emerge in Chile and that '. mony Colby said that the CIA reported e e scene since Allende's election in 1970. to the "Allende government-Washing- ''that "our assessment was it might be than an innocent observer of the Chilean lines. One was the denial of all credits But Colby also told the subcommitt agen sa a u sc oo the v ew + pression }`s four times the official San- . r.. The Nixon administration's firm', re- that "it was tot in our Interest to have tiago figures but that the United States.' 'fusel to, help Chile, oven on' humans- ' the military take over in Chile. It In effect, condones mass- executions and . ifuian:gratmda,' was, empbaslud? About, would have been better had Allende ' CIA's estimate of the_, number of vie-- ft clone contacts with the Chilean military ; nv~ _ -V r- ib - __- -.-t- ican Studies Association. + Stu taus: of ..the military. government's. re- ' after Allende's election: F id th t K bi h t k i cu y ounc po cy was ,l a way to confirm, many of these suspi- nomic situation when Allende himself that it is consistent with the feeling it ,;~ cions. It did so in secret testimony on was bogging down in vast mismanage- Is not In the United States Interest to Oct. 11 before the House Subcommittee ment of his own. The other line was' ' promote it." He made this comment l on litter-American Affairs by its di- the supportive CIA activity to accelerate + after Rep. Charles W. Whalen (R-Ohio) rector, Willian"E. Colby, and Frederick the economic crisis and thereby encour- asked Colby whether he agreed : with Dixon Davis, a senior official in the ? age domestic opposition to Allende's earlier testimony by Jack Kubisch, the 'agency's Office of Current Intelligence. Marxist Popular Unity. government ' `assistant secretary of state for Inter- The transcript., of. the testimony was coalition. - t American affairs, that the administra? made availablg to this writer by sources in the ? intelligence community.. T., The only' 0epftth1-'16 '066,' ?ah Fin Oon, believed that "it would be adverse eredits was the said of military equip-' I ` to our own United States Interest if the This extensive testimony touches government of Chile were overthrown" principally on the CIA's own and very meet to the Chilean armed forced!-; '+ extensive covert role in Chilean poll- This theme was further developed in inclading tlia decision last June b , ta; a letter on Oct. 8 from Richard A. Fagen, ? tics, but It also helps In understanding 61ell` mile 'F-5E jet fighter planes professor of political gcience at Stan- and reconstructing the administration's presumably to signal United States eup- ford University, to Sen. J. William Ful- basic policy of bringing about Allende's port for the military. Colby's testimony:! "bright, chairman of the Senate Foreign fall one way or another- a 54's well as other. information shliwe .. '' Relations Committee, reporting on a .,._ ! ._ . _, meeting between Kubikch and a group ..ay. 5V, '3' ..'1L 14LUer bur- J, ton- even blocked loans by international Ytnfortuhate If a *coup took place. The prisingly if most reluctantly, went quite ! institutions-to aggravate Chile's eco- National Se rit C il li Approved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP77-004~2F'000100280 . 00.1-6 Yet, even Colby warned that the junta. `uIuru yywu uaalwagun rcquaaz Zur may "overdo" repression. tP credits to buy 300,000 tons of wheat Colby's and Davis' testimony, in parts here at a 4me when the Chileans had; unclear and contradictory, offered a run out of `foreign. eurreney, and bread between Allende's election In 1970 and On Oct. '5, however, the new military th t 11 S i e ep coup rang ng from the . "nanafi?afinn" of nil 41,. mein! nh;t.e,a junta was granted '$24.5 million in position press and other groups to here- {The department's Bureau of . Inter-'~ tofore unsuspected Agency involvement American Affairs reportedly believed in financial negotiations between Wash- ;(that such a gesture was premature and early 1973 when the Chileans were des- All "Umfortuuaate" Coup perately seekin g an a comm d ti . c o a on There are indications that the CIA, h DARADOXICALLY, Washington had'?, No-Help Policy 1 testified that the CIA's "appreciation" of the Chilean economy was that "it CTUALLY, the basic U.S. posture was on a declining plane on the eco-11 toward Allende was. set -forth by ' nomic ground in terms of internal eio-, Henry A. Kissinger, hen the White' nomic problems - inflation, with 320 9 House special assistant for national se- 1 pp,eer cent inflation in one year, the close { corny affairs, at'a background briefing ' us'e of the copper mines, and so forth, for the press in Chicago on Sept. 16,1970 , , -. t' your total foreign deficit was more 12 days after Allende won a plurality in than the need for It. They couldn't im- Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100280b01-6? -- au.... L ,niu it, au0U1 in any way.. , ' " "" ?'?? `??" ,.v ua ?u..uer. Lua We obviously had some "intelligence He then became engaged in this ex- assurance he will not be revealed, which change coverage over the various moves being with Harrington:. . ' an be dangerous In some countrieb, it made but we were quite meticulous in COLBY: That does' go precisely on' cot4ld have been very dangerous for, hmaking sure there wag no indication of to what we were operating and what those in Chile the protection of ,'-,'encouragement from our side." our operations were. I would prefer to Colby also insisted that the CIA was leave that out of this particular re-.' that relationship, fiduciary relationsliip,fi is not involved with the port . ? . with 'the Individual, requires that 'I 4 preceded the very restrictive of that kind of' infor- 1, by Chilean truckers that t preceded the HARRINGTON: I think we grave run mation." coup. exactly into what makes this & .purpose. But pressed by Rep. Harrington; Colby less kind of exercise Then the following dialogue dove l? w didn't aunnnr+ it e,--tart' coup_ We ; maintained, claiming that the secrecy ?' texts, Colby said: ta n yCIA had no connection with the ' y ith 4.1k whether this effort was au.bsequehtly maintained such contacts in social con~?l ? coup itself tt a ommr ee at a meeting in June, a = can i i Brake clear statement that cer- 1970. Colby however refused to as Asked by Harrington whether the CIA. { Tlip sat one point Colb said that ' I , election. This was authorized by the, ' with dhileans opposed to 'Allende.''w p y 40 C e m some of it contradictory, r ar fie $4 0,000 to support anti-, orations in Chile, Colby said he, "would under vigor- a tt ."a t ' . _ . . "??- - - -- a "It. ? --- .~~....~ u.acLu eu Ludt. Me Gill Discussing the CIA's intelligence op. :-siderable amount of, new Information had a 1 d 0 over the years In Chile with various funding hrldcooperati6h amont groupi groups.-In some cases this was approved o with similar outlooks in other Latin by the National Security Council and It American 'countries. This Is true with has ? meant, some assistance to them regard tomost of those governments' That has, not fallen into the category l I was not thinking so mach of we are talking about here - the turbu. companiesPor firms so much as groups,1 lence or the mlliary coup." organizations of businessmen, chambers i "No Indication" of Support In previous testimony before a Sen- of commerce, and' that kind of thing ("DOLBY'S TESTIMONY on the CIA's 'ate subcommittee. former CIA Director served'his entire term taking the na- - tiop and the Chilean people into com- ' ple`tq and total ruin. Only then would the lull discrediting of socialism have takep place. Only then would people' hav gotten' the message that socialism cioejn't work. What has happened has, cop.fused this lesson." ? ? acknowledged that the CIA may have COLBY: If I might comment, the pre, oped: I'ascictad anr+,{,. ? .,.LL ? - ,, - Ohm I have said that the I Bence coverage of most of 'them, Let's ,CIA did not assist the trucking strike. HARRINGTON: And we end up with put it that way. I I .. 11 f, r a situation such as at Sept. 11 because 0, and more e HARRINGTON: I think it's a broader, , you have a cozy arrangement. FASCELL: Is that standard operat- ; and intentionally hrnarlar mina- ; M ___ . reaso s b ".,.a tL wo L vnuuur finis e to assume atrations. :The following discussion : type of operation is that it" is a covert.. that the Agency has penetrated' all of"1 ensued: operation and that the United States .1 - the political parties in Chile? r?. HARRINGTON: Did the CIA, directly hand is not to show. For that reason , f. COLBY: I wish I `could !ay yes. 'Ia or indirectly, assist these . demonstra- we in the executive branch restrict any cannot assure you all, because we 'get tions through the use of subsidiaries of knowledge of this type of '.operation Into some splinters.. ? ' ' '.United States corporations in Brazil or very severely and conduct procedures . i FASCELL:, Major? other Latin American countries? so that very few people learn of any , COL ? COLBY: I' think we have an intelll? type of operation of this nature BY I a es or Brazilian corporations, Colby ? ' we would try to get an inside picture of ' Scope of that question. and Davis gave equivocal answers to what is,going on there. I can think of HARRIN'GTON: I make specific ref- - the subcommittee. Colby said, "I am ' a lot of countries where we really don't erence to two, one in . the October pe not sure." Davis said, "I have no evi- . spend much time worrying about their riod of 1972 and one in' March of 1973. ' deuce as to that," -but Colby interrupted , Political Parties. I spend much of my'.i COLBY: I would rather not answer the, him to remark that `;I wouldn't exclude , time worrying about . penetrating the' 4 it. Frankly, I don't know of any. How- t Communist Party of the Soviet Union. ,,,question than give you an assurance and ever, I could not say it didn't' happen." ' - + be wrong, ' frankly. I would'rather not. The Economic Role r If we did, I don't want to be in a post- Subcommittee members . pursued at'' ' ?tion of saying we didn't. But If we some length the NE OF THE MOST intriguing 'dis. didn't, I really don't mind saying I by American corporations in the Chilean closures made by Colby in his tes. won't reply because it doesn't hurt. But coup because of previous disclosures; + timony was that the CIA is actively en- .1 that the International Telephone and gaged in econ mic negotiations between,' I don't want to be in a position of giv Telegraph Corp. had offered the CIA ? the United States and foreign coun.- ing you a false answer. Therefore, r . $.1 million in 1970 to. Prevent Allende's tries. This has not been generally known 1 think I better just not answer that, al- election and subsequently proposed a s -here, but Colby told the subcommittee + though I frankly don't 'know the an- detailed plan to plw ge Chile into eco- '. '? that "we would normally contribute to ewer to that quesion right here as I nomic chaos. (a) negotiating team." it here. Rep. Dante B. Fascell. (D-Fla.), tide He said that "we would by to pro-l' b anti-Allende forces by United to the United States' decision-making,v COLBY: I' am not quite sure- of the St t Lion-any of the demonstrations that 'Corporate Cooperation arq referred. to in,the course of this COLBY: It depends on the country..-; "A Covert Operation"' -j1HOUGH COLBY consistently re- j, fused to tell the subcommittee whether the CIA's operations in Chile ,had been authorized by the "40 Com- mittee," the top secret 'group headed by Kissinger in the National Security Council that approves clandestine In- - telligence operations, be admitted that ,'.."we have had ... various relationships su committee chairman, raised the ques. 1 vide them intelligence as backdrop for }. tion of Involvement by . Brazilian or their negotiations and sometimes help ~;i other Latin, American ? corporations' ! ' them with appreciation of the prob-. many of them "subsidiaries of United ' lem - .. We follow the day-to-day prog- States firms, because of'reports that the ' - ress in. negotiations. If it's an import- anti-Allende moves 'were 'widely coor- : ?? ant economic negotiation, like (Treas-,i dinated. Speaking for the ,CIA, Davis': ury) Secretary Shultz over In Nairobi replied: - and places like that, we would be in- "There Is some evidence of coopers- ' formed of what they are doing and try Lion between business groups in Brazil to help them" and Chile. However, this Is a small share In the context of the Chilean-Amer- 'I of the financial support. Most of the can negotiations before the coup, the4 support was Internal. There is som ?, 71CIA's Davis - said, that-,.!we, did.:beya Approved For Release- 2 7.0043 Rnnnino . 0Di1-6 FA SCELL: Is it n l ' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100180001-6 .''some quite' reliable ieporting-'~ at the possibly execute. tim? indicating that the Russians were ad sing Allende to put his i$lationsa "Communist Party chief Luis Cor- support At home and endure' a 'bath'" 1 vvi the United States in order; valan is being or will be tried for press abed, .in order to consolidate ' - if riota to`lettle compensation, at least ta;reach .treason. He may well be sentenced to their hold,? on the country and finish soi0e sort of accommodation. 'whicb'~ death regardless of the effect on intern the job of rooting out Marxist influ.1, *41d. ease the strain between the two national opinion," Colby said. This In- ence." eouitries. There were reports in licat-,j formation led to this excjiange: a~ if, , I1 that, unlike the Cubans, they ' vere