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November 12, 1974
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25X1A Arroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400Q3-7 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 18 18 November 1974 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 23 EASTERN EUROPE 25 WESTERN EUROPE 26 NEAR EAST 28 FAR EAST 32 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 39 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Ap'roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 NEW YORK TIMES 12 November 1974 Jury Hears Tape of Nixon Ordering Limit on Inquiry ? By LESLEY OELSNER _ Special to The New York Times : WASHINGTON, Nov. 11?Parts of the three White House tape recordings that led to Richard M. Nixon's resig- nation from the Presidency were played today to the jury in the Watergate cover-up' ? , . spira..or in the case-last March,: was pardoned by ?residentl Ford on Sept. 8 for any Federal crimes he may have committed while in office. The former President has been subpoenaed ,by the prosecution and defense but whether he testifies de- pends on his health. The other defendants in the case are John N. Mitchell, the former Attorney General and director of the Nixon re-elec- tion campaign; Robert C. Mar- dian, a former Assistant Attor- ney General and political coor- dinator for the re-election com- mittee, and Kenneth Wells Parkinson, an attorney hired by the committee- after the break- in. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr- lichman have made clear that they will attempt to shift the blame for Watergate' to Mr. Nixon. Mr. Ehrlichman's chief lawyer, Williarn S. Ernes, told the jury in his opening state- ment that Mr. Nixon "deceived" and "misled" Mr. Ehrlichmari. _The testimony by General. Walters and Mr. Gray, like the tapes, was laregly a repetition' of what came out in the Senate Watergate hearings and the im- . peachment proceedings. The story, as presented to- day, began at 9:30 A.M. ? on, June 21, 1972, when Mr. Ehr- lichman spoke to Mr. Gray on the telephone. Mr. Ehrlichman, according to Mr. Gray, said that John W. Dean 3d, then a White House counsel who is now in a Fed- eral prison, was going to con- duct a Watergate inquiry for the White House. Mr. Gray, ac- cording to the testimony, was to deal directly with Mr. Dean, who was expecting a call from him. Mr. Gray told the jury that he called Mr. Dean, who re- quested a meting, held at 11:30 When a defense lawyer ob..' that morning. Mr. Dean, accord- jected to the prosecution's line ing to Mr. Gray, said that the of questioning, Mr. Neal replied: Watergate affair was "extreme- "There's no other 'way you ly sensitive" and that he would can show the agency?from the sit in on F.B.I. interviews with former President of the United White House staffmen. ,States to Haldeman and Ehr- Mr. Gray said he had told lichman to Waters to Gray? Mr. Dean at a later meeting of and that is the obstruction the various "theories" the F.B.I. [of justicel." was considering, including one "It's-the act itself," he added. that the C.I.A. might be in- Mr. Neal then repeated his volved. point: "We have a direct agen- cy from the President to Halde- man to Ehrlichman?to Halde- man and Ehrlichman?to Wal- ters to Gray." 1 After a recess, the question- ing was allowed to proceed the way Mr. Neal wished. ? Out of te presence of the jury but in open court, the chief prosecutor, Jaines F. Neal, said that the tapes and the other eVidence today proved "a direct agency" in which Mr. Nixon's "agents" obstructed justice at Mr. Nixon's order. The tapes, made public last Aug. 5, contain Mr. ,Nixon's conversations with H.R.`lialde- man, then his chief of staff and now one of the five defendants in the trial, on June 23, 1972, six days after the break-in at Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex. Tapes Often Faint They show Mr. Nixon telling Mr. Haldeman to direct officials the Central Intelligence :Agency -to tell the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Emit its inquiry into the break-in. They show that Mr. Nixon wanted the curtailment for political reasons- rather than concern over national se curity. The tapes, often faint and sometimes difficult to hear, were played in conjunction with testimony by Lieut. Gen. Ver- non A. Walters, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting head of the F. B. I. General Walters testified about getting the directive from Mr. Haldeman, in the presence of John D. Ehrlichman, then the chief White House adviser on domestic matters and now an- other of the defendants, and passing it on to Mr. Gray; Mr. Gray told of receiving it. The C.I.A. theory, according .to Mr. Gray, was considered because of the C.I.A. involve- ment of some of the Watergate burglars and because the C.I.A. was known to have complex financial arrangements. What happened in the next Mr. Nixon, who was named few days, according to the tes- an unindicted alleged co-con-, Autiony, was an attempt to keep Ap_proveo the authorities'from connectin the break-in with the Nixon re-election committee. On June 23, Mr. Nixern and Mr. Haldeman met in the Oval Office. The tape of that meet- ing, particularly difficult to, hear, shows Mr. Haldeman' talking to Mr. Nixon. He says: ? "The way to handle this now is for us to have Walters tall Pat Gray and just say, 'slay the hell out of this. This is, al; business here we don't want you to; go any fu'rther on it." Then came the sequence that has caused much controversy at the trial. Mr. Haldeman says a word that the prosecution contends is "Gemstone," the name ?d the illegal intelligence-, gathering operation that led to the break-in, and that Mr. Hal- deman's lawyers contend is something like "convention" or "dovestome." At the Haldeman' lawyers' behest, the jury was given a transcript bearing the notation "unintelligible" instead of Gemstone. ' The transcript Mr. Nixon re- leased in August contains nothing. The prosecutors then put tin a second tape of a Haldeman- Nixon conversation an hour and a half later. A Slight Delay T. ere was a slight delay when Judge John J. Sirica no- ticed that one of the jurors, Mrs. Marjorie Milbourne, did not have her earphones on. "You have to listen," he told her. She put the earset back on. In, this conversation, Mr. Nixon was more specific about the directive to be given to the C.I.A. officials. Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Nixon said, should tell the C.I.A. offi- cials "this is all involved in the Cuban thing, that it's a fiasco, and it's going to make the F.B.I. and C.I.A. look bad, and it's likely to blow the whole, uh, Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortu- nate for the C.I.A. and for the country at this time, and for foreign policy, and he just better tough it and lay it on them. Isn't that what you fl H. Yeah, that's the basis we'll do it on and just leave' it at that. P. I don't want them to get any ideas we're doing it -be- cause our concern is political." According to the testimony, the conversation was imme- diately followed by a meeting !among Mr. Haldeman, Mr. 1Ehrlichman, Mr. Walters and !Mr. Helms. As General Walters told it, 'Mr. Haldeman said "it was the President's wish" that General iWaiters inform Mr. Gray that continued investigation of cam- paign contribution checks might lead to C.I.A. assets and undercover operations in Mexico. ' Then, as both Mr. Gray and General Walters testified, the Deputy Director of the C.I.A. Went to the acting head of the F.B.I. At a' 'meeting between Mr: Gray and General Walters on 'July 6, according to testimony, 'General Walters, turned over a i !written statement saying that the C.I.A. had no, interest. The two men, 'apparently -assuming ;that Mr. Nixon was unaware of the pressure from White Hous0, ;officials, agreed that Mr. Nixed should be told,' and Mr. Grayl ordered his inquiry into the checks to be resumed, accord- ing to the testimony. ? 1 At the Senate Watergate, - hearings, Mr. Gray said that he had warned Mr. Nixon on July 6, "People on your staff are trying to mortally wound you by using the C.I.A. and the: F.B.I." - mony today. At a bench Con- ference, Mr. Neal said that he was about to question Mr. Gray 'about the, statement. Mr. Frates objected., It was agreed that the queStion would not 1),' ;asked. , I ! On direct examination. unaer, . questioning by Mr. Neal, Mr.1 ;Gray repeated his earlier testi- mony about destroying docu-', ments at the behest of Mr..; Dean and with the apparent ac- quiesence of Mr. Ehrlichman. ' On cross-examination, Mr. Frates sought to limit the ef- fect of that testimony, getting Mr. Gray to concede that Mr. Ehrlichman had not been th& one to tell Mr. Gray to halt the Watergate investigation. Mr. Neal on redirect then' sought to limit the effect of this concession. . Who had told Me. 0-ray to, limit the inquiry? The prose- lcutor asked. . ? . - . Mr. Dean, the witness replied: Who had told him to talk to Mr. Dean about Watergate? Mr: Ehrlichman, he replied. _ Thomas C. Green, William G. Hundley and Frank Strickler, all defense counsels, cross-ex- amined Mr. Gray briefly. Mr. Green and Mr. Hundley asked whether Mr. Gray had ever talked to their clients about limiting the F.B.I. investi- gation. Mr. Gray said he. had pot. Mr. Strickler elicited a state- ment from Mr. Gray contradict- ing General Walters, that Gen- eral Walters had not told him on June 23 that he had just been to the White House. Subpoena Pending Mr. Walters was not cross- examined today because of a pending subpoena for material that may be necessary for the cross-examination. Mr. Haldeman's attorneys ;disclosed this morning that on ;Friday they subpoenaed Repre- sentative Lucien N. Nedzi of 'Michigan, chairman of the House Armed Forces Com- mittee's Intelligence subcom- inittee, Calling for transcripts and other material relating to testimony and interviews be- fore the committee by Mr. Wal- ters, Richard C. Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence. and Mr. Gray in the spring of ,.9/1,,r731.. Strickler exlained the. For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Wastingian %plats 'Monday, November 11, 1974 itibpoena in court by citing 'a committee report that, he said, indicated "inconsistencies' in Mr. 'Walters's testimony on May 16, 1973, and his state- ments on May 23, 1973, "both as to omissions and changes in language." Judge Sirica said he -would ? give, the prosecution time to submit a memorandum on the subject. Then, told that a law- yer for the House subcommittee was in court, he asked what the, ? panel's position would be. The lawyer said that, under House procedures, it was a question of what the Speaker's or the full HOUse's position would be. He said that a House rule prohibited a committee's. production of information sub- mitted in executive session, and that when the Congress recon- venes on Nov. 18, the subpoena ? is to be delivered to the speak- er. The matter was left in abey- ance. In another development to. 'day, Judge Sirica denied the mistrial motions filed last week bY lawyers for Mr. Mitchel and Mr. Parkinson following the 'Government's ? disclosure that one of its supposed witnesses, William O. Rittman, a former Justice Department official, had withheld and lied about a cru- cial memorandum. The memorandum was pre-, ? pared by E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the seven original Watergate defendants, arPi de- scribed the "conimitrnents" - of 'money and Pardons that had al- legedly been offered to the sev- en men .in return for their silence about,Watergate. Attorneys for Mr. 'Mitchell and Mr. Parkinson had con- tended that they had been prej- udiced by the government's be- lated disclosure because their cross-examination of Mr. Hunt at the trial had been based on the assumption that Mr. Ritt- man was a credible witness. Judge Sirica rejected the de- fendants' arguments, saying, "This was no mischievous sur- prise sprung on one side by the others" "The Government promptly notified the defense of the new development," he said in a sev- 'en-page ruling, "and all parties have had time to prepare for the proffered admission of the new piece of evidence." Rulings Postponed Judge Sirica postponed a rul- ings on whether Mr. Hunt would be recalled to the wit- ness stand and .whether the memorandum was admissible as? evidence. The matters had not been raised in the defendants' motions, he said, and "there will be time to consider them when they do arise." Joan C. Hall, who was Charles W. Colson's secretary, testified that she ? received telephone calls in August and October of 1972 from Mr. Hunt and his wife, Dorothy. The Hunts, she said, were seeking Mr. Colson's aid, but Mr. Colson, then a White House special counsel, refused to talk to them., Mr. Hunt was indicted in September, 1972, for having helped organize the Watergate alters Recalls ove to 1 volv IA in 4 By Barry ICalb" Star?blews Staff Writer_ Deputy CIA Director Ver- non A. Walters today testi- fied that former Nixon aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. ? Ehrlichman at- tempted to involve the CIA in the FBI's Watergate investigation six days after' the Watergate arrests. Walter's testimony at the Watergate cover-up trial was in preparation for the playing of three 'June 23, 1972 tape recordings of con- versations between Halde- man and then-President Richard M. Nixon -- the recordings which ,triggered Nixoh's resignation last Au-, gusts: Haldeman 'and. Ehrlich- mairare two of the five de- fendants in the trial. WALTERS. has 'told his, story before, but not since the June 23 tapes were made public. Walters said he and then-' director Richard. Hems were summoned to ..the White House the morn- ing Of June,23 with Heide.' malt and Ehrlichman Ehrtichman's White House officte. - ? Walters said Haldeman began by saying the Water- gate case was "making a lot of noise," that Demo- crats were trying to "maximize it," and that "the investigation was lead- ing to some important peo- ple and it might get worse." ? THE TRANSCRIPT of the first June 23 tape ? which recorded a conversa- ? burglary, -and was later con- victed. He had been hired by Mr. Colson to work at the hite House. . The prosecution had said sev- eral times last week that today would be the day when the June 23 tapes were played, and that this would be the week that the prosecution got to the "important" part of the case. As a result, the courtroom and the hallway outside were liammed, One woman stood in ?line crocheting a baby's jacket Ifor a church bazaar, a "water- gate jacket," she said; a 'half- dozen young men and women arrived early with sleeping bags; lawyers queued up for the attorneys' spectator section. Johnny Cash, the singer. Who is a friend of Mr. Neal, the chief prosecutor, attended the proceedings. ? 1 tionheld before the meeting with, Helms and Walters ? shows Nixon and Haldeman exptessing concern that the FBI's investigation of some Nixon campaign checks which were routed through - Mexico ? and of another check which was not ? , might lead to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President. The transcript shows that Nikon instructed Haldeman to direct the CIA to ask the FBI not to pursue the Mexi- can investigation further. Walters said that at the meeting, Haldeman told him and Helms "It is the President's wish that Gen. Walters _go to the acting director of the FBI and di- rect him that the pursuit of the FBI investigation in Mexico . . . might uncover some operations of the - att..; ? HELMS REPLIED that he had spoken the previous - day with acting FBI Direc- tor L. Patrick Gray III "and had told him(Gray) that the agency was not in- ? volved (in the Watergate ? bugling)," Walters testi- fied. ? Walters said, however, that Haldeman was not swayed by this remark, replying, "Nevertheless, it has been decided that Gen. Walters will go" to tell Gray that the FBI's investi- gation "may uncover some assets of the CIA." ? Walters said the only part he could recall Ehrlich- man's taking in the conver- sation was to say that Wal- ters could call Gray from the White House, if he want- 2 ' i Ehrlichman's- lawyers' have contended that Ehr- jichman did not know the- :true purpose. of the June 23 ? meeting, 'and was tricked the cover-up by Nixon. ,and Haldeman that day. ? A--4- ? - ',WALTERS also recount- , ed conversations later that day :with Gray, and in the: ? following days with then- White House Counsel John . ,W. Dean III. Walters said that he met with Gray the afternoon of 'June 23 and told him that he ? 'had been instructed by the VIiite House to say that the- -FBI investigation in Mexico., ?"could uncover some covert -CIA assets for activities ? ,there." He said he told Gray he 1.vas aware that Gray had 'spoken with Helms the. .previoUs day: However,. Walters said, in view of his discussion with the White, House, he told Gray that "since the five suspects have been arrested (at the .Watergate), it would be bet-:. ? ter if the investigation tapered off there." Walters said that after his with Gray, he and - Helms called in the CIA operatives responsible for *operations. in Mexico, to 'find out if the FBI investi- gation might jeopardize - CIA activities there. He- indicated their answer was that it would not. ? IN CONVERSATIONS ?with Dean on June 26, 27 and 28, Walters said, Dean attempted to have Walters involve the CIA in the Watergate operation, even though Walters told him there was no such involve- ment. He said he finally dis- suaded Dean. On July 6, he said, he met with Gray and apparently in response to a request by Gray, said he could not write a letter saying the FBI investigation was jeopardizing CIA activities in Mexico. "and if I was asked to do so, I would re- sign." Approved For Release 2001/08708 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ? ApOroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Washington Post 7 October 1974 Brazil Papers Report.CIA Tie Reuter ? RIO DE JANEIRO, Oct. 6-- A former American Methodist' missionary, reported to have . been tortured by Brazilian se- curity police, admitted to be- ing a.1.7.S. Central Intelliganee Agency ageit. the -jornal' do Brazil newsPdPer said .here ? to- day.- The newspsaper :said Frede- rick Morris,40, who works as a part-time ''?.i.jotirriallst for . America* diuhlicationS,. made the ,confession4o;Military se- curity police who arrested him in the northeastern city of Re- 'elle Monday. A U.S: embassy 'spokesman iin Brasilia said thereport Was the first he had heard of Mor- ris' alleged links with the CIA. Friday the U.S. embassy pro- tested the reported torture of !Morris. . The American consOl in Re- cife .confirmed. bruise ? and cortusions on Morris' lower back., buttocks and wrists tch,en he visited him Thursday, the embassy announced. The Estado de ? Sao Paulo and the Diario de Brazilia said Morris had confessed to hay- ing? links with Brazilian ec- clesiastical circles and a for- eign security agency. - WASHINGTON MONTHLY November 1974 by John Marks Several times in the last few years, this magazine has suggested that the - quickest single way to improve the conduct of American foreign policy would be to get rid of the covert agents and clandestine operators in the A. In the spirit of practicing what we preach, we pr'es'en't the fol- lowing article, which tells how t6 identify a great zumber of the Agency's "secret". operators. Our. Purpose is to hasten the day when our intelligence organizations concentrate on their real work?collecting and analyzing infornzatiOn from open sources?and to cut the ground away from the James Bonds and the Gordon Liddys of the world before they get us all in any more trouble. Both the Soviet and American intelligence establishments seem to sham the obsession that the other side -is always trying -to ?bug ,them. ,Since the other side is, in fact, usually trying, our technicians and their technicians are constantly sweeping military installations and embassies to make sure no enemy, real or imagined, has succeeded. One night about ten years ago, a State 'Department security officer, prowling through the Ameri- can - embassy in Santiago, Chile, in search of communist microphones, found a listening device carefully hidden in the office of a senior "political officer." The security man, along with everyone else in the embassy, knew that this particular "political officer" was actually the Central Intelligence Agency's "station chief," or principal operative in Chile. ? Bugging his office would have indeed been a major coup for the opposition. Triumphafilik,' the security man ripped the microphone out of the wall?only to discover later that it had been installed by the CIA station chief himself. The reason the CIA office was located in the embassy?as it is in most of the other countries in the world?is that by presidential order the State Department is responsible for hiding and housing the CIA. Like the intelligence services of most.other countries, the-CIA has been unwilling to set up foreigi offices under its own name, so American embassies?and; John Marks is an associate of the center for National Security Stuches and co-author of 3 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. ApOrov_ed For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 S less frequeritly, military bases-- provide the: needed cover. State con fers respezt ability on the Agency's operatives, Idressing them up _with the same titles and calling cards that give legitimate diplomats entree into for- eign government circles. Protected by diplomatic immunity, the operatives recruit local officials as CIA agents to supply secret intelligence and, espe- cially in the Third World, to help in the Agency's manipulation of a country's internal affairs. The CIA moves its men off the diplomatic lists only in Germany, Japan, and other countries where large numbers of American soldiers are stationed. In those countries, the CIA's command post is still in the U.S. embassy, but most of the CIA personnel are under military cover. With nearly 500,000 U.S. troops scattered around the world, the CIA "units" buried among them do not attract undue attention. In contrast, it is difficult for the CIA to dwell inconspicuously within the American diplomatic corps, since more than a .quarter-.of the 5,435 employees who purportedly work for State overseas are actually. with the CIA': Ti places such aki- Argentina, Bolivia, 'Burma, and 0.-1'ana, where the Agency has special-interests and projects, there are about as many CIA operatives under cover' of substantive. embassy jobs as there are legitimate State employees. The CIA also places smaller contingents in the rank of other U.S. government agencies which operate overseas, particularly AID's police training program in Latin America. What is surprising is that the CIA even bothers to camouflage its agents, since they are still easily identifiable. Let us see why the embassy cover is so transparent: riThe CIA usually has a separate set of offices in the (embassy, often with an exotic-looking cipher lock on the outside door. In Madrid, for example, a State Department source reports that the Agency occupied the whole sixth floor of the embassy. About 30 people worked there; half were disguised as "Air Force per- sonnel" and half as State "political officers." The source says that all the local Spanish employees knew who worked one,vhat floor of the embassy and that visitors could figure out the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7. same thing. EICIA personnel usually stick to- gether. When they go to lunch or to a cocktail party or meet a plane from Washington, they are much more likely to go with each other than with legitimate diplomats. Once you have identified one, you can quickly figure out the rest. Dile CIA has a different health insurance plan from the State Depart- ment. The premium records, which are unclassified and usually available to local employees, are a dead giveaway. siThe Agency operative is taught early in training that loud background sounds interfere with bugging. You can be pretty sure the CIA man in the embassy is the one who leaves his radio on all the time. !Ironically, despite the State De- partment's total refusal to comment on anything concerning the CIA, the Department regularly publishes two documents, the Foreign Service List and the Biographic Register, which, when cross-checked, yield the names of most CIA operatives under embassy cover. Here is how it.works: America's real diplomats have insisted on one thing in dealing with the CIA: that the corps of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) remain pure. Although there are rumors of excep- tions, CIA personnel abroad are always even the cover rank of Foreign Service Reserve (F.SR) or Staff (FSS) officers?not FSO. Of course, there are some legitimate officials from flu- State Department, AID, and US!!:. 'who hold FSR and FSS ratings, ace care must:15e.taken to avoid confusing -these people with.the spooks. To winnow out the spooks, you start by looking up in the Foreign Service List the country in question, for example, China. The letters in the third 'column from the left signify the man or woman's personnel status and the number denotes his or her rank. On the China list, David Bruce is an "R-1," or Reserve Officer of class I, the highest rank. John Holdridge is a regular Foreign Service Officer (FSO) or the same gtade, and secretary Barbara Brooks is a Staff Officer, class 4. PEKIK6 MS. LIAISOK OFFICE) (CO) Veva David K E chief USW Roldridie John H des ctief UStO Jenlins Alfred les des chief USW firuts Barbara A. set McKinley Brun spec asst herd ..... sec Anderson Donald psi ca Mull Janice E. sec UIjianes R ..... .... psi off Pascoe 3 Lynn.. ........... pol cif korr,witr Herbed econ/crra off Morin Annabelle C. sec Roe'itia!ivl Frederick._ econ/crn1 off ratiban R.stert atha cif kaffers SEC Lambert ctrosirec off totes Robed toms/recoil LI 5-73 0-1 5-73 R-I 5.4 5-73 0.6 5-73 5-5 5-73 0-4 6-73 5.8 12-73 R-3 0-5 7.73 0-3 6-73 5-7 7.73 Of 4-73 0.3 4-73 5-6 5-73 R.6 2.74 54 7.73 , Morin foils gen wolf 0-6 3-72 PeferSon Robed cond/rec off R-6 7,73 ' Riley cOnd/reC off 5-5 5-73 Now Holdridge almost certainly 'can be ruled out as an operative, 'simply because he is an FSO. Not much can- be told one way or the other about FSS Brooks because, as is the case with most secretaries, the ;State Department does not publish much information about her. David Bruce might be suspect because of his "R" status, but a qujck glance at the Biographic Register, -.w.lijCh gives 'a brief curriculum vitae -of all State Department personnel, shows him to be one of the high-level political appointees who-' have "R" status because they are., not members of the regular Foreign Service. Similarly, the Register report on FSR Jenkins shows that he had a long career as an FSO -before taking on the State Depart- ment's special assignment in Peking as an FSR: Bruce, David KE-b Md 2/21/98, ret (Evangeline Bell). Princeton U AB 19. Mern Md bar. US Army 17-19, 42-45. col overseas. PRIV EXPER , priv law practice 21-26, meat State legis 24- 26. 39-42, with bank-priv bus 28-40, chief rep Arts Red Cross (England) 40-41. GOVT EXPER with Off Strategic Sers 41-45, asst sec of Corn 47-48, ECA Paris R-1 chief of mission 5/48. STATE AEP to France 5/49. Dept under sec of state 2/52, consult to sec of state 1/53. Paris R-1 poi off-US observer to Interim Con.an of EDC, also US rep toEuropeanCoal-SteelCorn- rnunity (Luxembourg) 2/53. Dept consult to sec of state 1/55. Bonn AEP to Germany 3/57- 11/59. London AEP to Great Britian 2/61-3/ 69. Dept R- I pers rep of Pres with per, rank arrib to lid US del at Paris meetings on Viet- Nam 7/70-4/71. Peking chief liaison off 3/73. ? Jenkins, Alfred leSesne-b Ga 9/14/16, ret. Emory U AB 38, Duke U MA 46. US Army 42-46 1st It. PRIV EXPER prin-supt pub schs 40-42, STATE Dent ESO unclass 6/46. Peiping Chin lang- area trainee 9/46, 0-6 11/46. Tientsin pol off 7/48, 0-5 4/49. Hong Kong chief poi sect 7/49-. Taipei tool off 7/50, 0-4 6/51. Dept 3/52. 0-3 9/54. Jidda couns, dep chief mis- sion 2/55. Dept del Nat War Coll 8/57, 0-2 2/58, dep dir Off lot SE Asian Alf 6/58, reg plan ad Bu of Far E Alf 8/59. Stockholm courts. deo chief mission 10/61. cons gen 3/62, 0-1 3/63. Dept FS insp 8/65, det Nat Security Cowie 7/66, FS insp 1/69. dir Off of Asian Communist Aft 7/70, superior honor award 71, dir for People's Rep of China, Mongolia, Hong Kong-Macao aft 2/73. Peking dep chief liaison off 4/73. Lang Ger. {v,,--Martha Lip- piatt). Note that there are no gaping holes in their career recordsAnor did either of these men serve long tours with nameless Pentagon agencies, nor did they regularly change their status from "R" to "S" to "GS" (civil service). Now, for purposes of comparison, examine the record of the CIA's man in Peldng, a "political officer" named James R. Lilley: Utley, fables R-b China Am parents 1/15/28. on. Yale .0 ,5)I.t. US Army 46-47. GOVT EX- PER anal Dent of Army 51-58, STATE Manila R-6 7/58. Dept 10/60, Ph.-Lorn Penh 9/61, R-5 3/63. Bangkok 4/63. Dept 8/64. Vientiane pol off 6/65. 10-4 5/66. 5-2 4/68. Hong Kong 5/ 68, 10-4 5/69. Dept 7/70, GS-15 fgn all off 4/71, 10-4 det lang trng FSI 7/72-4/73, Lang Fr, Rom. (w?SaUy Booth). Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : 6A-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Ap?Proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340093-7 The Foreign Service List provides another clue, in the form of diplo- mats' official assignments. Of all the jobs real State Department. representa- . 'lives perform, political reporting is generally ? considered to be the most important.. 'Although genuine ? FSRs frequently hold administrative and consular slots, they are almost never 4liven the important political jobs. So . yhere an .FSR does appear in the listing wit ,.-.a political job; it is most . likely that the CIA is _using the 'position? ;for . cover. There is an exception to this rule: ? a compara- tively few minoritygroup members who have been brought into the 'Foreign Service as Reserve 'Officers under a special program. They are found exclusively in the junior: ranks, and their biographic data is complete in the way the CIA people's is not. Finally there is another almost. certain tip-off. If an agent is listed in the Biographic Register as having been an ."analyst" for the Department of the Army (or Navy or Air Force), you can bet that he or she is ? really working for the CIA. A search of hundreds. of names found no legit- imate State Department personnel as ever having held such a job. - In an embassy -like the one in Santo Domingo, the spooks in the . ? political. section. outnumber the real j FSOS by at least seven to three: Political Section Ezyer Joel pol off R-5 7-72 Cruz ger Frederiik. A pot off R-7 9-72 Burnous James pot off 0-4 7-72 Chafin Gary E pot off Clayton Thomas pot off 0-6 R-3 8-73 5-71 Enviggins Joan H ..... pol off II-7 342 Fambrini Robert pot off S-2 6-73 Creig David N Jr pot off R-5 8-71 cue Janet sec 5-8 12-73 Markoff Stephanie set 5-8 6-73 Merriam Geraldine ?. elk-typist S-9 243 &looney Robert C__............ pot off R-6 8-72 Mmris Margaret clk-typist SIO 12-73 Pascoe Dorothy I. sec S-7 244 Cyan Doridald pot off R.8 8-73 &Whams Albert pol off 0-3 7-73 While Dondald Ryan is an "R'' in the political section, there is not sufficent data published about him to verify his status. It was by studying these docu- ments that I learned that the CIA has sent an operative, to Peking. For confirmation, I. called the State Department's ranking China expert, Acting Assistant. Secretary of State "Arthur Hummel. After I identified ?inyself a a reporter working on a magazine article and explained where I had gotten my information, Hummel shouted, "I know what you're up to and I don't want to contribute. Thank you very much!" and slammed down the phone. Another State official confirmed that the decision to send an operative to Peking was made in early 1973, bw - declared. that making. public the operative's existence could "jeopard- ize" -Chinese-American relations. Neither this official nor any of his colleagues seemed willing to consider the notion that the .U.S. government was under no obligation to assign a ? CIA man there?or anywhere else for . that matter. The first American mission to China since 1949 certainly . could have been staffed exclusively With real diplomats if Concern about - damaging relations Were so high. To have excluded the Agency from Pekin?, however, would have gone against a basic axiom of the post- World. War II foreign policy establish- ' met-it: the CIA follows the flag into American embassies. The-Chinese government-is presum- ably clever enough to identify the 'operative by sifting through the public documents available. In fact his arrival may well have been cleared with the Chinese., who probably wanted recip- rocal privileges for their .secret Service in Washington. Such are the arrange- ments the world's spooks are so fond of working out with each other?the Soviet KGB and the CIA even exchange names of intelligence ana- lysts assigned to the other's capital. Sacrificing 'State' Much to the alarm of a few high State Department. ,officials, the pro- portion of CIA to Stite personnel abroad has been steadily rising Pa recent years. The .precise figures are zealously guarded,: but several State sources confirm the trend. They cite as the main reason for this tilt toward the CIA a series of government-wide cutbacks that have hit State pro- portionately harder than the CIA. What troubles State is not, as one career diplomat put it, "the principle" that State should provide the CIA with cover. That is unquestioned, he *says. Rather, Most legitimate diplo- mats do not like being a minority within their own profession or having the rest of the world confuse them with the CIA's dirty tricksters. They generally regard themselves as working at a higher calling. While the State Department has been comparatively honest in accept- ing the personnel cuts ordered by the Johnson and Nixon administrations, two sources familiar with the CIA budget report that the Agency has done everything po(--.:1)1:: to escape the reductions. Tr- ..itionally, when out- siders?eve". eresidents?have tried to meddle ofith the Agency's personnel allot- ,ent, the CIA has resisted on "-.ttional security" grounds. And when that argument failed, the CIA resorted to bureaucratic ruses: cutting out a job and then replacing the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 person eliminated with a "contract" or "local" employee, who would not show up on the personnel roster; or sending home a clandestine support officer?a specialist in things like . renting "safe houses," "laundering" money, and installing phone taps?and then having the same work done by experts sent out from Washington on ? "temporary duty." ee? Just this spring, the State Depart- ment took official, if secret, notice of its declining presence oVerseas com- pared to the CIA elip Secretary Henry Kissinger authopzed a high- level study of State-CIA staffing. The Department's top administrator, L. Dean Brown, who had urged the study be made in the first place, gave the job to Malcolm Toon, a career diplomat ? serving as U.S. ambassador to Yugo- slavia. Toon returned to Washington to compile the top-secret report. Asking not to be named and ? Not only does the State Depart- ment provide the CIA with cover, but the Senate?and especially its Foreign Relations Committee? encourages the current practice of sending over 25 p-Ororcfetit of our "diplomatic" corps abroad under false pretenses. Every year the Foreign Relations Committee rou- tinely approves and sends to the full Senate for its advice and consent lists of "Foreign Service Reserve Officers to be consular officers and secretaries in the Diplomatic Service of the United States of America." In 1973, of the 121 namesTsubmitted by the State Department, more than 70 were CIA = operatives. According to a knowledgeable source, the com- mittee is informally told the number of CIA people on the lists but "not who they are." No senator in memory has publicly objected to being an accomplice to this cover- building for the CIA. refusing to provide the specific fig- ures, a source close to Kissinger says that Toon's report calls for a substantial reduction in the number of CIA operatives abroad under State cover. The source adds that Kissinger has not made up his mind on the issue. Kissinger has always acted very carefully where the CIA is concerned. One of his former aides notes that the Secretary has regularly treated the Agency with great deference at government meetings although he has often been privately scornful of it afterwards. In any case, Kissinger is unquestionably a believer in the need for the CIA to intervene covertly in other countries' internal affairs?he was the prime mover behind the Agency's work against Salvador Al- lende in Chile. The question of how much cover State should provide the CIA, however, is chiefly a bureau- cratic One, ang is not basic . to Kissinger's foreign policy. The Sec- retary therefore will probably not take a definite position until he sees how much opposition the CIA will le, able to stir up in the White House in the- congressional subcommittees that supposedly, oversee the Agency. ? The CIA his lost no time in launching -its counteroffensive. At a `July 19- off-therecord session with key Democratic corefessional aides, Carl Duckett, the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, complained about the reductions recommended by the Toon report. According to a source Who was present, Duckett said that even without further embassy cuts, the CIA now doesn't *have enough people overseas. CIA officials must be especially concerned about. Toon's recommenda- tions, since in countries where there are no U.S. military bases, the only alternative to embassy cover is "deep," or non-official, cover.. Ameri- can corporations operating overseas have long cooperated in making jobs available to the CIA and would probably continue to do so. Also, the Agency would.proba bly.have to make more use of smaller firms where fewer people would know of the clandestine connection. Two examples of this type are: * Robert Mullen and Company, the Washington-based public relations concern for which E. Howard Hunt worked after he left the CIA . and before the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters. Mullen pro- vided CIA operatives with cover in Stockholm, Mexico City, and Singa- pore, and in 1971 set up a subsidiary in cooperation with the CIA called Interprogres, Ltd. According to a secret Agency document released with the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment evidence, "At least two [CIA) overseas assets have tangential tasks of promoting the acceptance of this company as a Kullen subsidiary." * Psychological ASvsessitient Ass- dates, Inc., a Washington psychor logical consulting firm specializing in behavioral research- .and analysis. By the admission of- its president John Gittinger, most of the company's business since it was founded in 1957 by three ex-CIA psychologists has come from Agency contracts. The firm had two "representatives" in Hong Kong, at least until June of this year. Unless their cover is blown, com- panies of this sort and operatives who work for them Cannot be linked to the U.S. government. But the Agency has Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 NEW YORK TIMES 11 November 1974 - learned over the years that it is much more difficult and expensive to set up an Operative as a businessman (or as a ?missionary or newsman) than to put him in an embassy. As a "private" citizen, the operative is not, auto- matically exposed to the host coun- try's key officials ? and to foreign diplomats, nor does he have direct access lb the CIA communications and support facilities which are normally housed in embassies. More- over, as an ex-CIA official explains, "The deep cover guy has no mobility. He doesn't have the right passport. He is' subject to local laws and has to pay local taxes. If you try to'put him in an influential business job, you've got to go through all the arrangements with the company." ? Who Needs Gumshoes? ? Everything argues for having the intelligence agent in the embassy? everything, that is except the need to keep his existence secret. The ques- tion then becomes whether it is really that important to keep his existence secret?which, in turn,Tadepends on how important his clandestine activi- ties are. Could any rational person, after surveying the history of the last 20 years, from 'Guatemala to Cuba to Vietnam?and now Chile?contend that the CIA's clandestine activities have yielded anything but a steady stream of disaster? The time has come to abolish them. Most of the military and econozge tkntelligence we need we can get from our satellites and sensors .(which already provide nearly all our information about Russia's nuclear 'weaponry) and from reading the newspapers and the super- abundant files of open reports. As for political intelligence?which is actually an assessment of the intentions of foreign leaders?we, don't really need this kind of information from Third World Countries unless we intend to muck about in their internal affairs. With the Soviet Union or China? countries powerful enough to really. threaten our national security?timely political intelligence could be a great - help: But f6r the past 25 -years we have relied;.*Ion open sources and machine-collected intelligence beCause our agents have proven incapable of penetrating ;these closed societies. There is not enough practical benefit .gained from the CIA's espionage activities to compensate for our nation's moral and 'legal liability in, maintaining thbusands of highly trained bribers, subverters, and bur- glars overseas as "representatives" of our government. The problem of getting good, accurate, reliable in- formation from abroad is a complicat- ed one, beyond the scope of this article, but, to paraphrase Mae West, covert has nothing to do with it Approvea 'F or lielease By John D. Marks WASHINGTON?Now that President Ford has publicly asserted that the United States has a right to "de- stabilize" foreign governments, other countries might consider Whether to. permit entry to America's. agents of. subversion, operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency. , . . These people, after all, engage' in covert activities that the. Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, recently admitted would .be crimes if committed in this countrY. Why should any sovereign,. nation , stand for that sort of thing, and, more important,' what can a country do to protect itself from C.I.A. attack? Foreign governments could inform the State. Department that employes of the C.I.A. and other United States spy agencies are not welcome and must be withdrawn immediately if the United States wishes to continue dip- lornatic relations. ? Admittedly, Britain, ? Canada. andr South Africa would probably not' expel the C.I.A. because the agency' operates in these countries mainly to' exchange intelligence data and maintain close liaison. ?? ; Similarly, the Soviet Union almost certainly would not want to expel C.I.A. operatives, since the ,United States would surely retaliate' with similar 'action, breaking an unwritten rule, that both powers have a .right to spy on the other. But allied and third-world countries that have no wish to infiltrate our Government or to "destabilize" our democratic institutions?as the-C.I.A. did to Chile's?might declare rthem- selves espionage-free zones. They could make clear that their refusal to ? allow the operations of the..- C.I.A. (or -K.G.B., or any other foreign in- telligence service) should not be con- sidered an unfriendly -act.. ? - Since all C.I.A. personnel are abroad on false pretenses, finding them in' order to expel them would be a poten- tial problem but one greatly -simpli- fied by the C.I.A.'s standard procedure of sending most of its operatives abroad as bogus State Department of- ficers. Over 25 per cent of the people who are listed as working for the depart- ment overseas are actually with the C.I.A. And by cross-checking two un- classified State Department publica- tions, the Foreign Service List and the Biographic Register, most of the C.I.A. operatives, normally listed .as Foreign Service 'Reserve Officers, can be dis- tinguished from America's real diplo- mats; the Foreign Service Officers. While there are Reserve Officers who do not work for the C.I.A., those who do are conspicuous by incomplete biographic.?1. data, which usually in- cludes long service in such vague- ..;";???!."P... sounding. jobs as "Political analyst, Department of the Army." ? ? . Identifying American military-intel- ligence personnel abroad is even. easier. In countries where there are no United States forces stationed, most of them are simply ' called .defense attaches. C.I.A. operatives under "deep cover?' ?primarily as American businessmen but also as newsmen, missionaries, and - students?would be more difficult to, spot than their "diplomatic" brethren,1 but a government could handle many of these by announcing that any cor- poration knowingly concealing a C.I.A. man would he subject to expropriation. Certainly not all United States intel- ligence operatives could be discovered, but such tactics could seriously disrupt C.I.A. operations. Nevertheless, even the most determined and clever gov- ernment could probably not stop the' flow of secret- C.I.A. funds of the type that President Ford has admitted were secretly paid to Chilean Opposition leaders and newspapers. As long as there are citizens willing to accept the laundered C.I.A. funds, the agency will contrive ways to get money to them. ? For example, in Greece the C.I.A. has over the years recruited thousands of political, military, police, labor, news media, and academic figures. Now as Greece restores democracy and moves away from America's 71I-encompassing embrace, there is real fear in the Greek Government that the United States will act to stop' what Washing- ?ton policymakers perceive as a left-, ward drift. - While the Greek Government could probably identify . and . expel most of the C.I.A. operatives-60, according to one newspaper report?the many Greeks already in the C.I.A.'s employ, would remain as potential fifth colum- nists to which the agency could pro- vide assistance. Perhaps the way for Greece to rid herself of the C.I.A.'s pervasive influ- ence would be to' declare a general amnesty for all citizens who are with the agency. If genuine forgiveness were promised in return for immediate co-' operation, and stiff penalties protnised for those convicted of Staying on the C.I.A. payroll after the amnesty period, enough of the C.I.A.'s Greek contacts might provide sufficient information to enable the Government to start un- raveling the agency's extensive agent network. ' The point is that foreign govern- ments de not need to stand by idly while the C.I.A. attempts to "destab- ilize" them. John D. Marks is an Associate of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington and 'co-author, with Victor Marchetti, of "The C.I.A. and ? the Cult of Intelligence." 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 . PRESS?SCIMITAR, 'Memphis 3.5? October 1974 ? uper-Secret Agencies Are Sending Billions ering Military Information f r U.S. First of three articles . By ALAN HORTON Scripps-Howard Staff Writer ASHINGTON. ? The recent publicity about "dirty tricks" in Chile and alleged ties to the ousted military junta In Greece have magnified public belief that the Central Intelli- gence Agency...4CLALLLITIE clo a k-a Oral:ger ?-???-? operation of the U.S. govern- ment. But the fact is that at least three-fourths of the $4,000,000,- 000 to $6,000,000,000 which the United States budgets annually for intelligence goes to mili- tary agencies. The CIA, with its vast net- work of spies, secret military units and secret funds, oper- ates on an annual budget of only $750,000,000 and its full- time regular payroll includes only about 15,000 persons. The public seldom, if ever, hears about the military agencies. Actually, the spy business has become so so- phisticated that most -intelligence-gathering is now done by exotic military sensors, satellites and spy planes, although the CIA director heads the board that picks the spy targets and the CIA helps develop spy technology. ? * * * MILITARY intelligence is handled by: O The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This is an "umbrella" Outfit that analyzes data produced., by the three military intelligence commands. ? T h e National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). This is so secret its name is classified, although it has been identified publicly. It spends over $1,000,000,000 a year for spy satel- lite systems. It's part of Air Force intelligence. ? The National Security Agency (NSA). A -little-known big spender ? at least $1,000,000,- 000 a year ? its two main jobs are to intercept foreign radio and electronic signals at listening posts around the world and to keep U.S. com- munOtions secure from enemy eavesdroppers. 0?.The Army Intelligence Command, Air Force Intelligence Agency and Naval Intelli- geace Command. -These gather .much of the data used by the DIA and CIA to. estimate for- eign military capabilities. They don't use cloak- and-dagger techniques but rather modern tech- nological spies in airplanes, satellites, ships and submarines to gather information:' There are reports in intelligence circles of several other agencies, but they apparently are so secret nobody will admit they, exist, if they do. ? * * * ACTUAL appropriations for all of these ? . and for the CIA ? are secret, So the known figures have to be approximate, but it's esti- mated the military agencies budget $3,000,000,- 000 to $3,000,000,000 annually for ,a payroll of nearly 100,000. Military spying is a hush-hush 'world of ? con- verted cargo planes and ships loaded with elec- Horton 8 tronic gear, remotely piloted drone planes, high-altitude spy planes and satellites known as Big Bird, Big Ear, 647 and Vela: They carry high-resolution and infrared cameras; receiv- ers to intercept, store and relay signals; the most sophisticated sensors and computers, and Laser communications. Without those robot military spies ? Rus- sian models are less sophisticated but adequate ? no strategic arms limitation agreement would have been Possible in 1972. Neither side would have had a fool-proof way ,to watch for violations by the other. Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, impressed with satellite technology, .said recently: "It appears that U.S. photogra- phy can identify ground targets under one foot in size from 100 nautical miles in space. Fur- tnermore, certain satellites collect electronic -emissions which aid in the identification and pinpointing of targets." * * * AVIATION WEEK Magazine reported that? one infraredscanner can find pleasure boats on :the Potomac River from 600 miles up. Using such satellite sensors, U.S. experts long have spotted Russian nuclear blasts a n d rocket launches. Soon satellites will beam television pictures? of Russian objectives to U.S. photo analysts in- stantaneously. But satellites cost too much to do the entire job. Besides, half the globe is dark and a fifth covered by clouds. So electronic intelligence (ELINT) planes routinely fly near the borders of foreign countries ? especially those friendly with Russia or in the middle of potential trouble spots ? listening and recording. One such plane was downed by North Ko- rean MIGs in 1959 and another ducked into clouds over t h e Mediterranean to escape Libyan jets 18 months ago. T h e most revolutionary of the manned reconnaissance systems are the bullet-fast SR71 Blackbirds. For eight years they were so secret that Air Force spokesmen wouldn't admit they existed. * * * LAST MONTH defense officials permitted a Blackbird to compete for official international speed.records which it had been setting secretly for years. But before the Blackbird made its public appearance, all its sophisticated sensors, cameras and other gear were stripped off. No longer are Blackbirds flown over Russia and China ? although the planes' cameras can see well into both countries by flying along the borders at 80,000 feet ? but they do. fly over North Korea, North Vietnam and the Middle East when necessary. If the planes did fly over Russia, experts are confident their missile fool- ing gear would protect Blackbirds from attack. But Blackbirds have their faults, too. Rue Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ? ? cinfr thing, they cost $7,000,000 each per year ta Ope7ate and maintain, and ',ley use 12,000 gal- lons of fuel each on a normal mission. Only eight are flown regularly and 16 more are kept in storage. All of those intelligence systems and many more collect prodigious amounts of data de- scribed by the mysterious acronyms ELINT, RADINT, PHOTINT, COMINT and SIGINT for. electronic, radar, photo, communications and signal intelligence. ..,. BUT EVEN 8vit1t...all the da?a, the system is : not perfect ? analysts have iSreconceived no- tions, data is subject to. yaryipi interpretations ? and .clues are ovOooked.\ ? 1 . . - . -Both the DIAland CIA failed to predict the Egyptians and S ians would,attack Israel Oct. 6, 1973, although n.rptrospec7psignificant clues were available. ..4/ : ?,. ?? ., In 1068, defense and C1.-`, ; analysts goofed a chance to predidt the precise timing of the,Rus- sian invas:mi,of Czechoslovakia. ss ? .,,. Militaintelligence's image also has been hurt by., Army spying on civilians? now. al- legedly stopped ? and by the tendency to over- estimate enemy capabilities in order to justify multibillion-dollar U.S. weapons systems-. ' ? ? The DIA head, Army Lieutenant General ..Daniel 0. Graham? who has held. various top jobs in the CIA and DIA, asks that: the Presi- dent have faith in DIA's estimates;saying they . are now "credible." - ?-..: i-- ...'1:3-I ? , . In the meantime, much to-the chagrin of the defense intelligence establishment; the CIA will continue to prepare military threat estimates . which often are not so scary: as: those? of the ....... military. - - ITS^IS-SENTINPT., Knoxville 16 October 1974 * - THE MAN in charge of the vast Military intelligence community is Albert C. Hall, gray- ing, articulate assistant defense secretary for ? intelligence and a pioneer in missile control and .space systems. Hall's Pentagon office windows are equipped with devices to foil eavesdropping from outside, even by sophisticated instruments which meas- ure and interpret voice Vibrations on window panes. "DIA is striving to be objective," Hall said, "with the defense secretary looking. over--its - shoulders and the CIA making indeperfclent analyses. When there are differences, they are. closely scrutinized. That's healthy." He said military intelligence must improve its assessment of other nations' military train- ing, leadership, morale and tactics. ?. But he admitted there is no remedy !Or the major disadvantage of U.S. intelligende ? America's open and Russia's closed society. "They get for free what we spend millidno learn," Hall said. . ??? Before the first U.S. Trident submarine-was -under construction, the Pentagon told ,ron- gress how many missiles it would carry a'nd their range. Even the number of warheads foer missile Soon became .public knowledge. The United States, on the other hand, didn't kno-w about Russia's ne- ? Delta submarine Until one was being built. * * * NO MATTER how much America spends on intelligence, there never will be a satellite or a sensor that determines a potential enemy's in- tent, or analyzes consequences. Old-fashioned cloak-and-dagger spying is needed for. that. By-ALAN .HORTON -7.- Scripps-Kowcird Stott Writer With a budget that ?Otit-' siders-estimii 'Ais around $750 million annually - and a fullt -V payroll of 15,000, the Central Intelligence AOncy (CIA) doesn't seem like much by Federal bureaucratie standards.. . :But it"is-not likely that any other U.S. Gov-;- ernment agency- is so revered and despised, respected and feared -all- at once. That's because the CIA; while keeping 3 . . hard eye on the Soviet Union and other poten- tial U.S. adversaries, secretly plays its own "dirty tricks" to protect American interests abroad. And, despite its small budget itral payroll ? the figures are guesses because the real fig- ures are highly secret ? the CIA is bigger and more powerful than it looks. Its tentacles reach to the upper levels of industry, foreign trade, labor, finance and other power centers -through a systetri of front companies, paid consultants, contracts with private. industry and agents worldwide. TERMED BEST-PAID CIA agents are reputed to be the best-paid of Federal bureaucrats, starting at $11.600 annually, according to some sources. And sen- ior agents quickly work up to $20,000 to $36,000 a year. The (ally unforgivable sins for Approved For Release agents. according to former employes. are , homosexuality and drug addiction because they can lead to blackmail. Workers at the headquarters here call their buildings and grounds "'the .campus.?' The Second of a Series -even-story. modernistic building stands in the Middle of -a 125-acre park on a bluff on the Virginia side of the Potomac River, eight miles from the White House. Downstate, near Williamsburg. Va., is the CIA's 10,000-acre "farm." disguised as Camp Peary on the historic York River. Camp Peary is one of several bases ? from North Carolina to Nevada and frorn the Panama Canal zone to Saipan ? where CIA trainees .are taught cloak-and-dagger techniques. ? And near Tucson. Ariz., is another segment or the CIA jigsaw puzzle, the home base of Intermountain Aviation, probably still one of the many secretly owned and operated companies called "proprietaries." Intermoun- tain purports to train, supply and deliver for. est service "smoke jumpers. - ? ? To be truly secret, of course. the CIA needs its own fleet of airplanes. And' when they _are. not needed for CIA operations, why not lease them? Many CIA "proprietaries" are believed 9 2001/08/01 reitaiii3M:i64121:kob6ci 66140003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 sands, conducting milliondollar businesses and . providing. "deep covertta lor. . ,covert operations. ?? ? Basically, the CIA is divided intotwo parts analysts and clandestine operators, int lud- ,?ing both spies and dirty. tricksters. The clandestine services spend more. than half the CIe! budget. "-Analysts look ? down on the clandestine stt-a?ice operatives as "athletes and police- men." according to nne former agent. Many in ? the c'andestine services don't have much use for analysts, who don't get, their hands dirty. Fewer than 5000 CIA personnel are said to be stationed overseas, and only about 3090 are in the clandestine services. Many of those 3000 are assigned to U.S. embassies with covers as foreign aid. diplo- matic and Military officers. Others are in deep ? cover as businessmen, students and, allegedly. even missionaries.' CORPORATIONS PROVIDE COVER . In addition. there are the thousands of paid foreign agents, consultants, contractors, for- eign security police and intelligence officers -?;? often foreign politicians paid ,and trained by the CIA. A number of multinational corporations provide cover for CIA ,agents in Western Eu- rope, Latin America and the Far East. Offices in Amsterdam. Mexico City and Singapore had to be closed in a hurry recently. when one CIA front was exposed. ? Director William E. Colby. 54, who rose through . the ranks of clandestine services, . says the CIA is not conducting covert actions ?-?? dirty tricks ? anywhere in the world today. But neither he nor President Ford will foreswear covert actions in the future al- though they imply they will be used sparingly. Some lawmakers insist, along with Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), that "we can no longer measure our conduct by that of oursuppo'sed rivals-burl:1y 'standards we have set for ourselves as a nation." One former CIA agent. Philip B. Agee, said in disgust that the agency i>trapita-lism's po- lice force." And when covert actions are ex- posed that's the way it looks to the world. ? But when it coMes to a congressional vote, , . as it has several times in the last Congressmen won't outlaw covert actions-, Say- ing ,the natians, needs a third- alternative to -sirri-ple diplomacy and sending in U.S. troops. Early this month,the_ Senate did pass an amendment. outlawing covert -actions- except? those thought by the.P.resident to be crucial to, national security. But the bill was sent-back to committee. - - _?-? ? ? ?"?-?-_. ot ? ? Many congressmen. in defense.of the CIA ? and its functions, point out that the-Soviet's KGB ? the equivalent of the CIA ? has 90,000 agents abroad, seducing. suborning, spying, subverting, sabotaging and training and arm- ing guerillas. . KGB FINANCED CUBA OVERTHROW Australian intelligence soucrces say -the 'KGB has a total of 250.000 men and women devoted entirely to espionage and counteres- pionage ? foiling enemy spies. That's 10 times the total of the United States and its major allies. And no one doubts that the KGB can call on Czechslovakia, polish, East. German, Hungarian or even Cuban spies for help any time. ? . . ? Even' the most optimistie GoVternment sources doubt the FBI is able to catch even 30 per cent of Russian spies in the United-States. "The KGB financed the overthrow of Cuba," said Sen. Milton D. Young (R-N.D.), member of one of Congress' four CIA over- sight subcommittees. "And now they're doing a lot in the Middle East." Will President Ford keep the CIA from meddling in the-affairs of foreign nations? No president has been able to do that since the CIA was established in 19-17. President Harry S Truman. who was often quoted as opposing covert actions, ordered agents to Greece- to help fight Communist guerillas. and to Italy to beat the Communists at the polls. ? " ??'" ? ? . President Dwight D. Eisenhower-used the; CIA to put the Shah of Iran in power in 1953: , 'help defeat the Communist Huks in the Philip- pines in the mid-1950s; overthrow the Communist-dominated government in .- 1Guatemala in 1954. . Several CIA covert actions failed miserably': . in the Eisenhower years. ? The CIA in 1958 used B26 bombers in an' attempt to depose Sukarno in Indonesia and' not only failed but saw a CIA pilot captured and exposed to the world. ??? , _ Efforts to roll back .the Iron Curtain in Po- ?. I land. Albania-and the Ukraine also were fruitj-: less.. I U.S. SPY PLANE DOWNED It .was durink, the Eisenhower years that ;the CIA suffered its worst humiliation. t - In 1960 'Russia shot down a CIA U2 spy :plane :and captured its- pilot co focus the world's attention on that rk.re event, Russia cancelled the 1960 Eisenhower-KhrUshchev.: tsummit meeting. ? Presigent John Ft Kennedy's biggest mis-?- ? take was approving a CIA-financed and plan- ned covert action. using Cuban refugees. in a 1961 military attack on Cuba at the Bay of Pigs: ? He later ordered the CIA to eaStablish an' army of Southeast Asina mercenaries backed by a secret CIA Air America Air Force to ? fight the North Vietnamese in Laos. By the late 1960s, the Army had grown to 30,600 men. ? President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the CIA to track down Cuban reVolutionary Che 'Guevara in 1967 in Bolivia to use its secret' Air Force.to suppress a revolt in -The Congo (now Zaire) in 1964 against President Mobutu. . 'I It has . also -been' charged that Johnson . ordered the CIA -to turn over some of its B26 bombers to: Portugal in 1965 .to. help put down revolts in Portuguese African colonies, even ? though Congress banned arms exports for-use in colonial wars. ? LINKED TO GREEK MILITARY - In more recent times, President Nixon ap- proved CIA plans to fund opposition parties, newspapers and, it has been charged. strikers in Chile daring the Marxist reign of Salvador Allenda Gossens. who was killed during a mili- tary coup last year. And there are charges that the CIA had close ties to the Greek military junta recently . replaced. raising 'suspicions the CIA was con- nected somehaw to both the origtinial coup and the junta's'support for the Greek-backed coup on Cyprus earlier this year. President Nixon also asked' the CIA to. block the FBI's Watergate investigation. The ? CIA, in violation of laws prohibiting domestic spying. had provided Watergate burglar E. ? Howard Hunt with a wig. speech-altering de- vices and false credentials and prepared a? psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg who leaked the so-called Pentagon Papers, The CIA also has taken heat from a num- .ber of ether directions lately. . Some congressmen have charged director. Ctilby with seeking to develop a public image for hinaSelf and his agency, something previa Oitslyt considered taboo. Colby has said his tag'ency?should be accountable to the public,. SOME EXPECT MORE ? And Administration officials ? particularly Searetary Of State Henry A. Kissinger in re- :cent years ? continue to expect more from! CIA intelligence analysts then they have been.: able to deliver. . Military officers occasionally have criticized CIA estimates of Russian and Chi- . nese military power and have demanded a ? louder voice in judging enemy military tactics, and equipment. ? - . ? i Navy admirals . still are burning about: Colby:s recent congressional testimony that. Navy plans to improve a base on the island of: Diego. Garcia could fuel a naval arms race in: the Indian Ocean. They also believe the CIA1 does not give the Soviet Navy enough credit. 1 Complaints also are heard that the CIA; Approved For Release 2001/08)0?8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 does not hire' many blacks and has not pro- rooted women to important supervisory and 'overseas positions. . . ? It has long been .said. for?example, that the ? CIA will never use an 'American woman ? a: ? foreigner, yes ? to seduce and compromise... ? A CIA official conceded: "We perhaps; could have more wo-men in top jobs. And we've tried to recruit blacks. But We've found; that few blacks have studied foreign relations: and are interested in Us." ? BUDGET IS REVIEWED ? But it is the charge that the CIA is preoc- cupied with covert actions that has triggered : . introduction of a flurry of hills in Congress to bring the CIA under tighter congressional con-! TRE8S ?SCIMITAR,. Memphis: 17 October 1974 "717A.WAlg.4 ? trol. and: some proposals to outlaw covert actions. . ? Some 150 such bills have come and gene" - over the past 25 Years;. ? Subcommittees of the House and Senate - appropriations coriimittees?do review the intel- ligence budget including that of the CIA. And House and Senate armed -services subcommit-: ?tees, particularly that of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi' (D-Mich.), ? conduct increasingly frequent! hearings into CIA operations. "Listen," said an ex-CIA agent: "The CIA: ' is .right when it says you only hear about itsI , failures. not its 'successes. There has never been a CIA agent who defected:* Rest in Cloak Third of Three Articles By ALAN HORTON . Scripps?Howard Stcff Writer WASHINGTON. ? The cloak-and-dagger world- doesn't recopize detente. In the -intelligence community, the Cold War contin- ues. ? : s In fact, U.S. spies May have more work sseass- - today than ever before, hot be- cause the United States no longer is the sole superpower but because there also are staggering economic and po- litical . threats to American interests ? the energy crisis, worldwide inflation, interna- tional terrorists, etc. In the back of U.S. policy- makers' minds is always the nagging belief that the Russian- KGB (Committee for State Se- curity) supports such terrorists and works to undermine U.SriCcess to Mideast oil. ? * * * THERE WAS A SLIGHTLY serious ring to China's charge earlier this year that the KGB is humbling the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in "worldwide espionage and subversive activi- ties." China is in pretty good position to know. Last year, for example, the KGB was said to have backed a coup in Afghanistan. Russian spies have been caught planning sabotage in England and are now presumed to be arming the Irish Republican Army in North- ern Ireland. British intelligence is being kept busy there. Other- KGB plots were uncovered in recent years in the Sudan, Egypt, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Tunisia, Ghana and the Congo. Few doubt that Russia financed Fidel Cas- tro's overthrow of the Cuban government. * * * TODAY RUSSIA is busy arming and training ? Palestinian guerrillas with the latest:tactics and weapons including antiaircraft missiles. Israel's security forces continue to assassinate Russian- armed Arab terrorists. Thus, much of the U.S. intelligence operation must be devoted to winning friends in nonalign- ed nations in the Mideast and Latin America, a n d predicting the political and economic consequences of world events. But the CIA's main job Is to judge Russian military intentions and capabilities. ? Horton It is a tricky job because the Russians are testing four n e w powerful intercontinental ballistic Missiles and the CIA must learn the missiles' capabilities and which and how many will be deployed where. - Judging Russian tactics and intentions is extra tough because of the "closed" Soviet soci- ety and the army of Soviet counterintelligence- agents. "Monitoring detente" is the way some intel- ligence officials jokingly refer to that part of their job. Arms limitation talks depend on them, * * * BUT SEARCHING for Russia's secrets is only a part-time job. Other tasks now assigned to the CIA include: O Collecting data on international terrorist groups and, as much as possible, neutralizing them. O Protecting U. S. access to strategic materials around the world including oil and rare metals. O Keeping a close eye on the economic cli- mate worldwide and country by country. O Helping dam the flow of illegal narcotics into America from overseas. O Training and equipping the so-called Se- curity forces of friendly nations. - The CIA has on hand a bank of paid consult- ants, the top scholars at many universities and its own analysts, scholars in their own right. "_ ? And it has access to all the information gath- ered by the entire U.t. intelligence community and that of much of the Western world. * * * THE CIA HAS TIES to multinational corPo- rations, labor and financial circles, student groups, even foreign government and business officials. And CIA agents are hidden in most U.S. embassies. One can only surmise that the CIA is busy at this moment learning how the new leftist gov- ernment in Portugal will view U.S. rights to La jes air base on the Azores, a crucial way-stop' for planes en route to the Mideast. Some CIA analysts must also be asking themselves: "Will sky-high oil prices bring down Italy's next government too?" ? There may well come a day ? perhaps Approved For Release 2001/0848 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 the not-too-distant future ?when domestic at- tacks on the CIA will not involve alleged med- dlina4' in other nations, hut rather .over cozy CIA ties with multinatiohal oil companies, or international money markets. - ? After all, critics reason, the CIA may have to supply information to get a little information or help in return: Some of that.. information could provide a competitive advantage .to-a. multinational corporation. ? k AND THERE MAY BE more need for so PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER U November 1974 ,Donald-Kir C.77 et!?4 .??? ? .? ? ? ert iia Imagine this scenario';.A dissident :Syrian ? colonel 'ippi.iiabiest. .the` ?.t..-Aeorges' Hotel in Beirut. and says he can overthrow the violently and- American, Israel-hating regindeq,,fn :Damascus if you will be So" kinitfas los; put up $5 or $10 million for arriaS,:-ani-L:? inimition, and other material support. _ . . ? :You're not a total idiot-4n fact;you're ? a` Central Intelligence Agency operative as fluent in Arabic' as you are in French You check out -the:colonet tlioroly ilia you dikoyei lie' for' real.:"That behind his rather toothy; superficially--; .:suave, but nonetheless engaging' enough ? smile, he does quite honestly entertain. The dream of toppling-the gm:eminent.: of Syria, :reaching an agreement" with ? .Israel, and ? initiating a..genuinely -non-" aligned foreign.policy..`All for the good- of thy people,'Z'he'sayS, reverting now. to.-.:the French .iri which he was tutored,. asateen-ager 1 people"; indeed:. You're thinking. jour people, or at least your, stand4ng with your superiors at "the agency, is :everyone seems to rfet?the ? :cu. You excitedly' send .:lorig:scrupii-:- . .? f.lously coded messages ;outlining the terms Of th proposition,. the, backgrou n 'of the good colonel, your assessment of his chances of success in the context of 'Syrian, 'rea.lities?all the "objective" -.faC4f..inii Can muster. :71ie.;decision on what to do now rests **estimably; ivith the White House,. with Heiiry ' with. -CIA: Director William :Colby and other policy-makers . . Does the foregoing provide merely thd"cititline for the opening of. a rather banal'Jspy'dramaL.-or could it happen? DoeS?inydne -in the CIA, or in Wash- Jngtoir;'.:.:still entertain fantasies of sup- :Plyiii0earet armies, buying politicians ?'and :entire political parties, subsidizing newspapers and magazines, and other- Wfie::?influeneing:the course of history? Syria' itself 'might seem.-- to offer lewt;inaritediate Possibilities for med- dling,-.:CIA ;peratives can point with a certain pride .,:to*- some of their 'other achierenaelits.:'Y%.They did; 'after all, ..Contrilinte tOlie-dovmfall of, the Leftist vJlhd&iCljle even .4 they were not :able....,to?.preep:t his election. They did m.aintain ara al-My in in Laos that provided the only !i?al. defense ori-the ground for 'theAmerican-supported regime irk Vien- .2.t.iane:.before?:,the signing of ...the peace agreement joy."neutralizing" the Conn-. try: They did prop' up Oolonels in Greece,- 'anti-Comnatunst noliticiansin'Italy, even . a' genuine, popular hero like President ' Magsaysay in the Philippines. li-There were also some notable failures ' *that is, f;these .examples might- be :construed is ??.f `Succ-esses2" 'There was the fiascrinf Colonel's revolt in-Indo- riesia in the late 1.950s and of an elabo- rate plot against Priiice't.Norodom Sihi- -monk in.Canabodia it.. the-'early 1060s-Lto cite just a couple:of,blots on the record. Yet; . beyorid- The. knOwn .facts, the question is at the CIA has really ac- ? coniplished.: by these _activities. Are America's interests truly served by an agency that, fationa1i7es all manner, of ,f) called friendly, governments to be brought into ? line with American policy. The CIA also may be assigned that job. That's what some congressmen fear. , That's why so many bills have been- intro- '? duced to improve congressional oversight of the U.S. intelligence community. "Congres-rnust. -insist on becoming ,.a CIA observer and Consumer," as Senatop-,Stuart Symington put it. ? Over? the past 25 years, 150 tch bills hay- been introduced. None passed, -- ;_nondemocratiO, conduct In the name of pr,eserying - lines. of ? defense against CominunisatZ7Does? it matter that the Soviet Union'sPerids five or six times as --Much as.the? United States on overseas intelligence :activities? Or- does the United States lose so- much in the way :of tarnished ideals and sunken self-es- ' :teem, no t-.1.6 mention a' besmirched ? image abrdad,. as to negate any short- range gain? Intelligence types are ask- ing these questions too?and wondering whether or not the .CIA should revert ? solely to' its ori&al. function. as an in- telligence-gathering .agency and let it' -go 'at that:.. ? - ? The debate is not' theoretical. It is a matter for. practical consideration 'among. 'high-level 'officials. ? The' questiOn One .of theta asked was what would. fjou do if some colonel of- fered to .knock over the government of Syria for; 'a few inillion_dollars. The int- ? :mediate -issue seemed 'esoteric. There does not seem to have been any such . offer. The- CIA 'man on the St. Georges'. terrace isnot awaiting instructions from: Washington-:-at least on that topic'. i . ,Yet the issue beneath the question is 'relevant and topical. As of this writing . no one?no one in government, at any rate?has advanced a definite answer. There is. no real policy, no overall view on. the rights and wrongs involved.1 NEWSWEEK 4 Nov 19711. 'THE UNEASY UNDERCOVER MEN A book by a onetime Central Intelligence Agency man, soon to be published in England, has Washington's entire intelligence 'community on edge. The CIA understand- ably fears that any identification of its agents exposes, them and their families to harassment or even physical danger. And the appendix to the new book, by ex-CIA man Philip Agee, lists the actual and code names of no fewer than 432 CIA staff members, agents and "cover" operations. 12 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 SUNRAY 7.1.1\M t London 27 October 19714. , xeS"tae ? rafe?? _ C..), By Godirey Hodgson and Tra-aleervarmaeraa,-.---eiangimamMEI"'"??'"aa !P '..1// ,q,S I DON'T SEE WHY we need ane I 1' d I only put in tlirew the Chilean e?conomy let an policy as a Whole. Add. Kissinger's own words: taken in confunction with his handling of the Chilean affair, raise in no remote or , hypo- thetical form the question:? What would Kissiftger do if he thought there was imminent danger of a government in Western Europe "going Com- munist because or the irre- sponsibility of its people There is already Communist Participation in the present Government in Portugal. There is a realistic possibility of Com- munist participation in the Government of Italy and per- haps also in that of Greece? two countries where American satrate-gic interests-are far more important than in Chile Before one can even attempt to ans- wer that question.however. one must understand question.- depth and breadth of American involvement in. the Chilean tragedy. :- - to ? stand by .and watch, a qullcatirm in case some country go Communist because. r.ladman appears down there of thp irrponsibility ,of its. ,.yno, without instructions, people,Y.' .?? ? talked to somebody. I have ar2solutely no reason to suppose But Kissinger was not telling the truth, either in 1970 or in 1073, if he meant to . deny all American in v v e in e n t in Allende's fall. ' Kissinger and the Forty Committee did not stand by and do nothing. , On the contrary, from the autumn of 1970- until the spring of 1971, the United States Government, on Kis- singer's .orders, sought to destroy the Allende Govern- ment by all means short of a massive. invaSion like that top secret Forty Committee, -mounted by President Johnson charged with the overall direc-e in the Dominican Republic in tion of US intelligence gather- :1965. ing and clandestine operations: Kissinger, in fact. 'treated around the world. . Chile as a test case, or?as the The country. which Dr Kis- present director- of th..; CIA, singer, in the summer of 1970,, William Colby, reportedly told suspected of imminent " irres- ?.a committee of Congress on April 22 this veare=as a proto- ayne or laboratory experiment .to test the techniques of heavy ii 'modal investment in an to dhsered:t and bring dawn a government." It was a lecheleue that became known by ? a riemorable euphemism: " isat ion." ? 'The " experiment " in de- stabilisation took the form, not of a solo performance by the CIA, but o, a broadly orches- trated campaign in which all the resources of the US gov- ernment, short of actual mili- tary intervention, were de- ployed. Specifically, it is now clear that the US government. on Kissinger's orders, used economic pressures. diplomatic quarantine and clandestine internal interference in the effort' to bring Allende down. It made available?so the CIA director has now admit- ted to Congress?more than $S million for secret CIA meddling in Chilean politics ? Three years 'later, on scpe between 1970 and 1973. ? :n-ernment was ? overthrown Tbe .dheos iciu:)?, 11, 1973, Allende's ,n ini:titary coup. and Allende By ?vithholding loans from its The spesker was Dr Henry. Kissinger. The date was June' 27, 1970, ant the occasion was a meeting, ia the basethent.'of the West Wing of. the White House, of what might be called the most plwerful sub-com- mittee in the Western world: Kissinger was talking to the chairman of the- American Chiefs of Staff; the Under-- Secretary of State; the Deputy- Secretary of Defence; and the Director of Central Intelli- -genre. With Kissinger himself, in his capacity as President. Nixon's national security ad- viser, these five made up the ponsibility," was Chile. The Forty Committee was meeting that day to decide what line American policy ought to follow if Dr Salvador Allende were to win power at the elections that September. Allende, himself a Marxist, though also a constitu- tionalist and a parliamentarian of more than 30 years' stand- ing, was the leader of a Popular Unity coalition which included five parties, one of them the Chilean Communists. On September 16, shortly after Allende did indeed win the biggest share of the popular vote, and shortly before he- was constitutionally installed as president by an overwhelm- ing vote of both houses of the- Chilean parliament, Dr Kis- singer told a group of Mid- western journalists, in one of his famous "deep background" briefings, that the United States did not have much influence over what happened in Chi'e. ? ? . - ::. lthelf was killed. On .October own agencies, and by using its t?t Nisaineer said: " The CIA had (decisive) ? influence with in- nothing to do with the coup. to the hest of 'my knowledge into chaos?for which it then. blamed. the Chilean govern- ment. It poured in money to sup- port the Right-wing truck- owners' strike which all but? paralaysed the ? Chilean economy after October 1972. ? More than 100 Right-wing trade union leaders were flown to the US fur training and indnctrination at a special school in Virginia which is sup- ported both by the US govern- ment and by big corporations, with ? interests in Latin. America: such as ITT, United Fran. and ?W.? Fe Grace. ?-In spite of everything, -how- ever, the experiment failed. By -early 1973, there ? were signs that the Chilean 'economy might turn the corner. And in , March, 1973, in national parlia- mentary electione, Allende con- founded the CIA's predictions and increased his share of the popular vote from 36 per cent to 44 per cent.. a. It was at that point that Dr Kissinger decided to, play it rough. ?, The evidence we.- have un- covered suggests that when the Chilean armed forces moved in to overthrow, Allende in September. 1973, they did so with clandestine American help. Liaison seems .to have been supplied, not by the CIA, but by the US navy. ? In an unpublished interview before he was .inysteriously murdered in Buenos Aires this month, General Carlos Prats, non-political Defence Minister in the Allende government until he was forced out shortly before the coup, told a free- lance journalist,- Marlise Simons, that US backing ef the coup was coordinated through the American naval mission in Valparaiso. where ? the 'coup began. ? Other sources support General Prats's account-on several details, though tere. are still some questions about the degree of US nmilitary involvement. : What is more disconcerting is that Kissinger's decision to intervene surreptitiously in Chile appears on close exam- ination to have been no freak. On the contrary, it fits in with ternational agencies, including, the strategic logic of his, and the "Vorld Bank, it deliberately President Nixon's, . foreign Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100342903-7 IN THE SUMMER of 1970,. the CIA conducted its own private poll on the Chilean elections. It predicted?quite wrongly, as it turned out?that the con- servative candidate.' Jorge Ales- ? sandri, would win with 40%,. of the votes. --- ? Washington, -however, was taking no chances. Just how far the American intelligence services were prepared to go, even before Allende took . power, is suggested by the far- cical episode of the naval brass band. The Chilean embassy. in Washington was bemused to notice that the US Navy, in the first eight months of .1970, had applied for visas for no fewer than 87 officers, NCOs and civilian employees, all for the period of the Chilean elec- tion. The embassy politely queried the applications, and was told by the State Department that the visas were for members of a US Navy band which planned to tour Chile; giving concerts in a spirit of US.C.,hilean friend- ship. The Chilean diplomats couldn't help noticing just how much brass there was in the band: to be exact, three full captains, three commanders and 15 lieutenant-commanders, many of them with previous ex- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 perience of intelligence \vo The embassy theref expressed scepticism about musical nature of the ban duties, and was e prom honoured with a visit fi-em t very Senior American cifici There had been. a stupid n understanding, one of th expiained. Of course the n men were not a- baud. Th visit was connected with annual joint US-Latin Ameri manoeuvres, c o d e-nam '4. Unitas." The. Chit ea reminded their visitors ti Chilean participation in H70 _Unitas had been cancel some "'months before Ja sagged.. The officialsee-ithdre and the applications' for vi were Caneciled. ? ? Without fanfare; - howev the Navy was back -in 1973. rk. ore the d's tly wo ais. em avy air the can ed n s, tat the led w, sas er, AT 'THE JUNE- 27 meeting the Forty Committee, it w agreed that the CIA shou spend 8400,000 dollars in sr port of Allende's oppotien The. agency may have done littleotbetter than that. Thr weekshlater, on July, 21, t offieeshafethe public. relatio firm in ?SantThgo whicli w handling the AleSsandri-ra paign were burgled-within few days its financial recor were published in a Left-wit paper. They showed paymen to the Right-wing- Cathol tudenta! Federation, and middle - --class profession '7roups: nothing surprisine6 i that But they also recorde mvaterious payment - ? $600,000 from someone ident fled on the stub only a ' Charlie " Not Carlos: Ch'arii t seemed clear that there w oine large?and non-Chilean ecret paymaster. . -Three days later, Henry Ki singer ordered his staff to pr pare a paper on Chile. Th document, NSSM 97, laid ot che American options in ca Allende won. These include nutting? ? an internation queeze on the Chilean eco my, and supporting his ove hi-ow- by his opponents i Chile, on the model of U aipport for the overthrow o resident Goulart in Brazil i 964. . . ? ? On September 4, Allend uly emerged as the leader i he popular elections, by hort head. Kissinger did no ide his attitude. On Septem yer 16 he told editors in hi a ck ero tin d briefing h lunt terms: "If Allende win here is a good chance that h nil establish over a period o ears some form of Communis overnment," and that thi -ould present " massive prob ems for us." He also told the editors tha he US had little influence ore vhat happened in Chile Bu n that he was being mare than ittle disingenuous: For the ret Forty Committee had t met to diaeuss Chile again. sate on the evening of tember 15 the US ambas- or in Santiago. Ed Korry, of as Id ip- ts. a ee he ns as a ds ig ts ic to al of s C. as 1 ec us ep ad gat a message from. Washing- ton " giving him the green light to move." Ma task: keep Allende from taking power. AS THE EVIDENCE of Kissin- ger's " hard " policy in .Chile has accumulated, many people have had difficulty in squaring it with his reputation as a non-ideological " moderate and with his, on the whole, successful pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union; . Two ?clues help to resolve this apparent contradiction. The first is the correction of a widespred misunderstanding of Kissinger's, and Nixon's, foreign policy. The essence of that policy was not a reduc- tion of the American commit- ment to contain ComMunisth. On the contrary?as Nixon himself- said in an interview with this newspaper in Febru- ary 1970?it was an effort to resist a tendency fed by failure in Vietnam, to isola- The CIA was Only one of the tionism. ,It. was not ?a policy instruments for Kissinger's of withdrawal, but "a revised will. He sat at the .contians policy of involvement." Kis- of a giant console, able to singer's innovation lay only in direct now the CIA, now the the degree to which American State Department, the Treasury involvement was to be direct or the Navy Department as and visible. - ? each seethed best fitted for his enal Soviet policy as well. . gested that US hanks shouei . . ,. . , not renew credits, that Us ., THE GREEN LIGHT message companies should drag their to Ambassador Korry illumin. - feet in remitting money or ales ? another point that has shipping spare parts to Chile, been misunderstood. The and that the US should ,with- Allende government's antag? draw all technical help. Gen- 001st was not the Central een, McCone and Gerritv de- Intelligence Agency. It war cided?so they told the Senate the government of he United sub-committee?to have noth- States. ::,-- ? ? .- - - ?. - ing to do with this plan.' But Kissinger has recently been .. ....e it- is clear that the riecndon to telling sympathetic renortere -strangle the Chilean economy that most of the S11.5;.2-CStiOlIS was taken at the Forty for covert actin in cnee were Committee itself. made by the CIA But the CIA ------ h?-?-- ? - -- ? -- was under the orders of the "FROM THE VERY DAY of Forty Committee, of which our electoral*. triumph: on -Kissinger was at all times the September 4. 1970." Salvador chairman. Kissinger took..,) Allende told the United Natioes much interest in Chile one general assembiy in 1972, ." we official has told the New York have felt the effects of a large- Times, that he became " in acale external pressure against effect. the Chilean desk officer. lis Which tried to -Prevent the g g He made sure that'policv was inauguration of a overnment made in the way he and the freely elected hY the people'. : . President wanted it." to cut us off from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyse trade in our princinal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of inter- national funding." ? He was not exago.erating. The Nixon Administration tried to give the imnression that its economic blockade of Chile was a re-monse to Allende's nationalisatiun of -the US-owned c o p p e r mines. ? "Nixon and. Kissinger pro- purpOse. That was to destroy .poeedaetepVy on tiworld scale, I the constitutional government ifilsefaet;- thenidea-----ofe-ee:Viot-1 of Chile . ??? ? Itemisation," Anti-CoMmunists! ... After the Forty. Committee Nationalisation, however, came around the world were to do ? ; meeting in mid-September the as no surprise: it passed the their own fighting, backed ' CIA began to - show. a new Chilean parliament without a' wherever possible not with interest in the ambitious plans single negative vote. What was American troops, . but with which the International Tele. . controversial Ives Allende's, money, -, arms, air power, phone. and Telegraph corpora. .decisicin to offset the compensa- and, if necessary, 'selective , tion had been putting forward .tion due to the two big copper clandestine operations. , . since' the summer f?or savine companies, Anacoada and Ken- 'Ibis was ? the meaning of democracy (and its oWn invest. :necott, with a deduction for what the "Nixon Doctrine," enun? ment in the priva w tely-oned , the Chilean Goverernent regarded 1 as " excess profits," so that the elated in the spring of 1970, telephone system) in Chile. :companies would receive no corn- in the special context of South- ' Contacts between ITT and ipcnsation in the end. *? . - East Asia, but with world-wide the CIA were cosy to the point ; But that decision was not an- implications: of a confusion of identity. John flounced until September 23, " In cases . involving other McCone. former CIA director, 1119a7d1. peye ilt el:: h L-4 eGme,eorrirmome?et , types of aggression (ie non- was on the board of ITT. He weapon aeailrinsl . tine eChilean nuclear aggression) '' we shall talked to his successor, Richard. Government for months: indeed furnish military and economic Helms, and to De Kissinger. it was in the autumn of 1970 _assistance , . . But we shall The chairman of ITT. Harold that Kissinger personally chaired look ? to the nation directly Gcneen. and the senior vice- a series of meetings whose whole -threatened to . assume the president. Edward J. Gerrity, purpose, one participant has primary responsibility of met William Broe, whose. lob said, "was to ensure that Allende providing the manpower," bore the intriguing title:- wasn't going to get a penny." It was the chis sic policy of ." Cnlief of the CIA elatieirc::',, os?LiS in had poured into eighteenth-century Britain: the services (also keown as dm onaceapitnal for US firms operating 1 the 1960s. The return golden cavalry Of St George. Directorate of Pees), 'd'edes:i there doubled over the decade, And Chile was the first Hemisphere Division.", but the effect on the Chilean impartant test case. Before the Forty Cerme::: 'e economy was not so happy. The second clue is the reali- meeting, ITT seems to 1?:?' ,?Almost all the profits made by sation that Kissinger's pursuit been the suitor. MeCone ::-?3 . LS firms were. repatriated, and of detente with the S o y i e t Geneen offered to nut e ? Chilean per capita income rose mill ion dollars to deeee Allende. They were told o Kissinger, in effect, " don't us, we'll call you." Union, so far from inhibitiee the suppression of an indepen- dent. Left-wing government such as Allende's, positively demanded it. Kissinger's plans for a stable world system, and Nixon's hopes of " a generation of peace," rested, as much as on anything else, on the Soviet Union and the United States; agreeing to respect each other's1 spheres of. interest?that is what detente. means for ? his- from Plans, contacted 1-1-1 singer. Gerrity. When they met in h ? An independent Marxist York nroe propnsed ccc c': 1'- government in Chile not only orate plan for tesrer.en.,.; challenged American domino- Chilean economy in e Hon in the US spnere. By offer- bid to persuade the Cle. ing, an alternative model of perliernent to v-?te " revolution " to other Latin Allende 1 American count i h decomine rho Last-ditch )1(. ? Then. on September 22. quote the Senate sub-c mittee's report, '-for the eisd time . . . the Government tee- the initiative." Broe, the ;e: r it t teat- Among Other the e. ;,,,,e ? On eeenst Ii 1971, almost 14 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 y less than 1.a7, per annum over the second Ifalf of the decade. In 190 the US Agency . for International Development reported officlaily to Congress that its programmes in Chile had "failed dismally." In the meantime, Chile had become extraornarily (leper,- dent on the US. By- 1970 its foreign debt per head was tho second highest in the world (after only Israel's). Imports, export.c and investment u ere dominated by US corporations, and so were We more advanced sectors of th?t economy. The US Government understood the leverage this economic grip gave it. "The best way to get at Chile," wrote Kissinger's aide Arnold Nochmanoil, "is through her eennemy." ? k?, ApProved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340093-7 1 ,t-ve 71 *a er.04:4 Le{A7,!' A He21,1,2 i ef.t 1...i dee:3:on. ca -ex,-.-t-,5 pr.,:lis." . K:ssir.:4:7" .1i:inter:I'd the f.....?zt cerew. Tilo. (a t.-S. {7:werrnient anincv) 1.,:mne..1 en:xn i H:Mie's reet:.-t f-r? 321 .in:,:en ? , in loans and IZKin gu3ranteoi . '..a enable !.AN, the chilen - - national airline, to buy three Boeings., though LAN's repay- ment record was flawless.- me ? In the meantime John Connally, then Secretary of the Treasury, had already ordered US repre- sentatives on international finan- cial institutions to oppose all loans and aid to Chile. Two main institutions were involved. ? One was the Inter-American Develop- ment Bank, whose US director; responsible to Connally, was in :a position to wield a veto on loans. He used it to see that a, Chilean request for $30 million for a- petrochemical complex never even came up for a vote. Between 1959 and 1970. the IADB ?had lent Chile over $300 million: After Allende took power, the only loans made, in three years; were to two 2-light-wing univer- sities, for a total of under 812: million. ? ? ? --- The pretext ? The other was the World Bank, whose president is always. an American and whose US director is . answerable to the Secre- tary ? of the Treasury. Before 1970, the bank had lent Chile $234 million. After Allende became president, it did not so much' as Process a single loan request from Chile. - The pretext was US indignation: over the copper mines. let the aextent-of -Washington's true inter- est in the copper issue was re- vealed after the coup in 1973i In November that year Reuter's reported that Orlando Saenz, one of the juntaismmain economic advisers; had said: "Now the Government of the US considers this is a problem for the Amer- ican mining companies:" - - Since 1946 Chile, as a show- case of liberal democracy, had received $540 million in develop- ment loans. After Allende was elected, all aid was cut off. There were just two exceptions. In December 1972 the secretary of :the white-collar "greniios (Right-wing middIe-class profes- sional associations) was invited by the American Institute for Free Labor Development to enrol in a course on "advanced labour economics" at a univer- sity in Washington. Altogether 108 Chileans from the gremios and unions were trained et AIFLD's school at Front Royal, Virginia, 50 or so miles away. These were the cadres for the ; truck-owners' aid other Right- wing strikes. The other es:motion was mili- tary aid. In the fiscal year end- ing 1970, it was $800:000. In ; the year to acne-1971, it was $5.7 In 1971-2 it 'was $12.3 million. o: The pattern of aid revealed all too clearly the strategy described with brutal frankness in an IT!' memorandum in 1970: !' A more ? realistic hope among those who want to block Allende is that a swiftly-deteriorating economy will touch off a wave of violence leading to. a military ? ? ? THE ECONOMY deteriorated fast enough, and there was cer- tainly a wave of violence. It would be a mistake, of course, to attribute all Allende's troubles to American intervention. Whether you call' them reforms or revolution, the Poptdriz? Unity Government's own policie played their part in ?bringing on econ- omic crisis. ? Agriculture is an example.. In 1960, fewer than 3 per tent of the landowners owned more than 40 per cent of the land. In 1971 and 1972 more than a third of the agricultural land ? in the country changed hands as these vast holdings were split up: As 'a result food production fell by .8 per tent. in 1912, and wheat production by 16 per cent. - ; Food Shortages and rising prices squeezed the lower middle. class. They added a dimension of mass panic and anger to the ? 'tenacity with which the wealthier Chileans defended their privi- leges. None of that was created by the Americans: ? Yet into this troubled and vul- nerable country a massive weight of covert American influence was thrown, and it was thrown on the side of increasing economic chaos, and, exacerbating social violence. - "? ? Over the three- years from September 1970.. to September 1973 the Forty Committee?so William Colby, director of the. CIA, told the congressional com- mittee last April?spent at least $8. million on "destabilising" the .Allende Government. Presi- dent Ford has said that the money was used. "to; help and assist the preservation of opposi- tion papers and electronic media and to preserve Opposition poli- tical papers." Quite apart from the fact that opposition news- papers and parties continued to operate throughout the Allende period, but Were shut down imme- diately after the 1973 coup, it was a funny way to nut it. ? For the CIA money was .used to subsidise. El Mercurio, the Right-wing daily which kept up a running fusillade of scare stories throughout the Allende period, except fOr a couple of brief periods' when, it was- tem- porarily; closed for advocating armed insurrection. It was used to infiltrate almost every politi- cal party and movement in Chile. .American money also went to the extreme Right-wing para- military group, Patria y Libertad, which was formed in 1971. And it was used to finance a whole series - of demonstrations and strikes, in-...a_...crescendm; -violence. 7 ' In December 1971, there was the March of the 'Empty Pots. Five thousand women, organised by the Christian Democratic and National Parties, and including a noticeable proportion of upper middle-class ladies, many. with their maids, marched through Santiago banging cooking pots to protest against fpod shortages and the visit of Fidel Castro. Left- wing counter-demonstrations -led to rioting. In October 1972 the middle- class opposition to Allende came to another climax with the strike ? called by the Confederation of Truck Owners,- a serious matter in a country 2,300 miles long with few railways. This and a series of other bosses' strikes" lasted for a month, threw the economy into chaos, and forced Allende to bring the military into his government. There is little doubt that the strikes were financed with CIA money. ? Indeed William Colby himself, it would seem, has come close to admitting it, in what deserves , . to become a Classic exposition of the clandestine operator's technique of the "cut-out." An ? . . unnamed official, thought with good .reason in Washington to be Colby, himself,. -told Seymour Hersh f the' New York Times that the trucloowners. could well have got:. some of the agency's. d' If We give it to A and then. A gives it to B and C and D, in a Sense it's true that ID- got .it'a but the q`Oestion is: Did we give it to A knowing that p :Would get it? "eil;a: s a., .?>?-..e.? ? ? ? - -a,' ? ? ? ; is AND YET, IN SPITE of every- thing, bc, early 1973 it ivas'appmo cot to time cold-eyed watchers in Weshington that their " labora- tory 'experiment " had hot; worked. ea:. - ? . - ? s. ? . ...- Warning sign . There -we're several- warning signs. Food. supplies improved. Allende's government was streng- thened politically be bringing in several generals as Ministers? and especially by General Carlos Prats as Minister of Defence. No man .of the Left, he regarded it his professional duty to serve any constitutionally chosen govern- ment Then canie Allende's sur- prise success in the elections on March 4. Within three weeks the Forty, Committee met again, and Washington's antagonism towards Chile moved into a new phase of masked hostility. Eepecienced students of Latin American. politics have assured us that you can usually tell when there is a coup coming, because the number of CIA men in the local. US embassy under what is called. "official cover "? goes up. It may have been so elsewhere, but .in Chile what happened was the exact opposite. An official who was in the US embassy in ;Santiago at the time confirmed to us in an interview last week that in March 1973, Kissinger called off the CIA. He didn't want the agency too prom- inently associated with the coup which, from that month on, he knew was only a matter of time. Instead, the indications are that communications were left to the US Navy, The naval brass band got into the act, after all. From March on. events moved fast in Chile. The tempo of -s trikes ;- and demonstrations- against the government built up. Violence had not traditionally been a conirnonplace of Chilean politics. ? But from April on, San- tiago got used to almost daily* assassinations, riots and street- fighting between Patria y Liber- tad and government supporters. On June 29, the 2nd tank regiment mutinied and moved on La Moneda, the presidential palace. Prats personally led the loyal troops who surrounded them and put down the mutiny. In the last week in July the crisis went spinning into its final phase. The truck-owners went on strike again, followed by the taxi- drivers. Terrorism increased. And on July 26, in. mysterious circum- stances, Commander Arturo Araya, President aklaande's naval ADC. was murdered at bis -home at night. The Right-wing Press blamed Left-wing terrorists. One of Allende's. personal aides, lfow- ever, has described to us the dramatic confrontation at which, .? ? ,in Allende's preience, ;army intel-, ligence compelled the head of the Special Branch of the police to admit that Araya had been murdered by a Right-wing group, and that there bad been a con- spiracy to feed 'a false version of events to; the Press. On August 7 several hundred loyal; sailors and naval officers were arrested by naval security. :Two days later, the .heada of all four armed services (Army, Navy,: Air Force, and Carabineros, or- national police) .joined the Gov- ernment-. '' ? On August 24, General Pmts. was forced from ecoinmandl. Allende was doomed. Even before Prats finally left, the Centre and .Right in Congress 'had .joined In voting for a declaration that the ? Allende government was "illegal" and calling upon the military to take power. ? - On September 10? for the first time, workers at a Santiago fac- tory resisted an .Air Force de- tachment which had come to search for arms: Before dawn :the next morning the Navy 'occupied Valparaiso.. The coup had begun.- ? ? . . . Before it was . over.. Salvador Allende, lawyer and constitution- alist, was dead, gun in hand, in the Moneda Palace. Several thou- sand 'fellow-believers in Popular tinity.died with him elsewhere. - A THREAD of navy blue runs through the secret. 'history of Allende's downfall. One probable reason. for the murder of Com- mander Araya, we were told a former member of Allende"- staff, was that it cut Allende ob from all knowledge of what w. going on at naval headquarters For it seems to have been the thatmuch of the planning of till coup ? was done. Andit wa through the US naval mission i Valparaiso, Chile's main seapo ? and naval sbase,, that the 1.3-" government would haVe kept touch. General Prats said so in inariy words. Some two mont- after the coup, journalist Marli 4 Simons visited the exiled genera in Buenos Aires, where he wa? working as a book-keeper in . tyre factory. (He was murder,. in Buenos Aires earlier' thi- month.) . "The real co-ordination an planning for the coup," Pra said, "took 'place in Valparaiso.: That was where officers in th: conspiracy -secretly met the. If' Marine attache. And Admi , Toribio Merino, second in co? : mand of the Chilean navy an senior naval officer at Valparaisa kept close personal touch with tit; same man, . LI-Colonel Patric' Ryan, US Marine Corps. ? On September 10, ;Prats sal* the day before the coup, Merin' requested that the America; ships due. to arrive for joh manoeuvre.s, stay out of Chilen. waters, but remain on the ate, offshore. , The nominal head of the 127" naval mission in Valparaiso w ? Captain Ray E. Davis, US Na But Davis was also head of fit whole US embassy militar group,' with headquarters i. Santiago. and normally spe only :from Wednesday to Sat _ day each week in the nava mission office on the s,event floor at 749 Calle Prats ? a ironic coincidence of name. = was Ryan who was responsibr for liaison with Merino. An Merino was one of the chief con planners, and is now a mein ea of the Chilean junta. ? By coincidence we have a ta talising elimpse of the dashi. Colonel Ryan and his helpers work. Two Americans front Sa: tiago, a girl called Terry Sitno and Charles Horman, were.stra ded in Valparaiso by the eau. On the terrace of their hotel Ilk,: met a man who introduced self as hiring come to ail Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 or the third time, "to do a job or the navy." Although the hone was not working, he bowed detailed knowledge of -hat was happening. Next day they were approached y none other than Colonel Ryan, . , Who offered to-help them get back to Santiago. He boasted that , he had information on everything , that happened 2443 hours in advance and would know as soon as the road to Santiago was open. Over the next two days both Simon and Homan saw a ?good deal of Ryan and his colleagues. They talked freely about the coup, of , which they approved,' and of their own inside know- ledge. At one point they were driving *with Ryan when he was stoped at a roadblock. He pro- duced, and let Terry Simon examine, a. card identifying him by name as an officer in the Armada de Chile. * . ? ? Ilorman was later picked tip by. the _Chilean military police and disappeared. His wife, parents and Terry Simon believe the Chileans may have killed him because he knew too much about American liaison activities. Why might US naval, intelli- gence have been used for liaisbn with the Chilean conspirators? Three reasons can be suggested. One is that in the late 1960s the US Navy set up a special secret communications network , linking it with each of the navies of Latin America. the very existence of which is still classified. Using it, the US and Chilean navies could communicate directly in total secrecy; bypassing embassies and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. ? A second reason is that, as Admiral Gene La Rocque, former director of the Inter-American Defence College, told us, "re- lations between the US and-. Chilean navies have always been close." Largely this reflects 'pro- fessional admiration and common interests. But in this connection it is interesting that Colonel .Ryan boasted to Terry Simon that he had escorted a Chilean admiral on a million-dollar shop- ping expedition for naval equip- ment in the US the month before the coup. ? . ? e Above all there were the Unitas manoeuvres. Four US Navy vessels were involved: two guided missile destroyers, the USS Rich- mond K Turner and USS Tattnall, the destroyer Vesole, and the sub- marine USS Clamagore. On Sep- tember 11, having finished their joint manoeuvres with the Peru- vian Navy, they steamed south- ward to begin manoeuvres with the Chilean Navy. ? The State Department an- nounced that "on receipt of in- formation about the situation in Chile they were redirected and ordered not to go into Chilean territorial water .or ports." The ships, however, were just outside territorial waters, at the crucial period of the coup.. The manoeuvres had been planned eight months earlier, so the Chilean high command knew that US naval units would be off the coast on September 11: "Any time you have US naval forces offshore that suggests the sup- port of the United States," Admiral La Rocque pointed out, and he conceded that the date of the coup was probably chosen. at least in part, because of the scheduled manoeuvres. . Thre abortive mutiny of late June had failed because the military were divided. In Sep- tember, there were still some units loyal to Allende, but not enough to save a ? It looks as though contingency . plans were made against,. the possibility of civil' war, none the ? less. On August 22 a Communist deputy, Jorge Insunia. burst into a *night session of the Chilean parliament and demanded that it go into immediate secret ses- sion. He - had been told by President Allende,. he said, that he had been informed by Prats that Bolivian troops were deploy- ing near the frontier between Chile and Bolivia in the vicinity of the huge Anaconda' copper mine at Chuquicamata. Insunza said that Allende had told him. that Bolivia was backed by Brazil, and by the US Air ? Force. _Opposition . d.e put cheered... . ?.- , Whether any such . double insurance policy had .been taken out or not, it; seem; ..that. the military conspirators had the symbolic ,'-support of the US Navy. And if General Paats ? is to be believed, the Y also had help with Planning through the. naval mission in Valparaiso. , ? . . . KISSINGER.. never male any bones of the fact that when he was worrying about Chile, Europe was also on his mind. On September 20 this year, .Kissinger and President Ford received nine congressional leaders, to the. White House to discuss the CIA's covert opera- tions in .general as well as what the .CIA did in Chile. He reported to have expressed con- siderable concern at the prospect of Italy "going Communist," and to have said that whatever criticisms were now beieg made of the CIA, if Italy did go Com- munist, the United States would be criticised for not having done enough to save her. ? Portugal now seems to. be causing Dr Kissinger even more worry than Italy. While in Italy vet another effort is being made -to establish a Centre-Loft coali- tion' that will exclude the Com- munists from power, in Portugal the Communist Party is already in the Government. This week the Washington columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, who in the past have had excellent access to Kis- singer, revealed that the depth of Anxiety over Portugal's sharp move to the Left can be measured by the fact that the United States has Cut Portugal off .from certain highly classified military and nuclear information com- monly available to all nientbers of Nato," Portugal tks The decision, Evans and Novak saY, seems to have been taken after Alvaro Cunha!, director general of the Porte,1:ticse Com- munist Party, joined the Govern- ment. ? Our own "Jith Pi+rtuwese diplimiits confirm CC! nn. talks Pre on: Fraii.and red the presi- dont. Generai Costa uas accompani.i.d by th.? Sncialist icador. Mario Sonrcs, a kw days . 320 were apriarriitly not as eau as was generally reported. Kis- singer apparently made it clear that the US could not toleraie a Communist government in Portugal. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that there Fnii widespread rumours and reports of American covert political acti- vities in Portugal and, to .a lesser extent in Greece and evee Spain as well. The French -satirical weekly, i.e Canard Enchain& . for example', has* reported that General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, has recently visited both Portugal and Italy. The general's office confirms that lie has indeed been in Lisbon and elsewhere in Europe?en holiday. Even more titillating, for con- noisseurs of the CIA legend,. iS the news that Irving .Brown has been on the warpath again. Brown runs the European opera- tions of the AFL/CIO, the American equivalent of the TUC. In 1943 and 1949 he. played a key role in setting up "third . force" trades unions in both France and Italy. Some would say he . helped to save Western ,Europe from Communism, of' ars that he helped to split the Euro- pean Left. In .1967, he was identified in the Saturday Eve:.ing Post by a former CIA official and by the Washington Post as having ;worked' for the CIA. which than- :nelled money to anti-Communist unions through him. . Last year he ? returned to Europe after- eight years of con. cern witheAfrican .affairs, because ?he told us?George aieany, the fiercely anti-Communist head .of the AFL/CIO thought that not enough was being done, to strengthen. the.Centre in Europe. In eatly May. after the'Cae- ? tano dictatorship fell, Brown arrived in Lisbon to see what he could do to develop anti-Commu- nist Unions in Portugal. In July he travelled to Rome, where his goal' was to try to en- courage splits in the Italian trade ? union movement and stop tha trend towards .a unified, Com- munit-dominated union mo;P- ment.\ When we asked this week whether he was still working fur the CIA. he reacted wearily.- '" Why ask me? You know jus' as well As I do that if I was 7.. wouldn't tell you, and if I say I am not, then* you won't believe me. hfcwadays. if Mount Etna erupts, people say its the fault of the CIA." After what happened in Chile, ? that, too, is not perhaps alto- gether surprising. ? Washington Post 30 October 1974 The askingtonrtfferry.Go.' Roland 1. By Jack Anderso# :1 ? -CIA-Plant?Iliespite the sensi- tivity of U.S.-China relations, the Central Intelligence Agency has quietly placed an operative in the U.S. mission in Peking. He is James R. Lilley, a "politi- cal Officer" who has also served in Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos. ? This is but one of the explo- sive revelations in a soon-to-be published Washington Monthly article by investigative journal; 1st John Marks, co-author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelli- gence." Marks, now an associate of the Center for National Secu- pity Stidiei, also discIosedlhat lover a fourth of the 5,435 State 'Department employees 'who work overseas are actually un-, idercover. CIA 'agents, and the ; number is steadily rising. The ; enate Foreign Relations Com-1 mittee routinely approves the; ppointment to sensitive postt-; of Foreign Service Reserve Offi-1 ers who are in realitk CIA.' agents. Of the 121 names submit; ; ed to the committee last year, : 0 were agents, he wrote. I Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004?2R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 DAILY TEIEGRAF-ii, London 1. Novealxir 19A 11.0BERT MOSS On THE fuss about C IA involve- nitInt in Chile has died down for the 'moment in Washing- Ion, but the chances are that, when Dr Kissinger returns, [ from his present journeyings, he will find the issue still -there to- haunt him.. Gen. dropov, chief of the KG R, must be convulsed with laughter at ,the sight of so many..American Senators and newspaper editors protesting that their country has no right to pursue any sort of covert foreign policy. President Ford said the oh- !ions when, in his attempt to justify the fact that the CIA spent [S8 million to support ()p- ima:atoll parties and media under President Allende, he pointed out that the Russians were spending considerably more on such operations and tend to con- duct them far more ruthlessly. It is only necessary . to glance back oYer the past few years to see that the Russians have made a tremendous investment in in- telligence activities in the effort' to depose non - Comniunist regimes. Even in Latin America, which has always ranked low on their order of priorities, the Russians have been doing . some ? very -curious things. In March, 1971. the Mexicans expelled five KG B officers, who had been masquerading as Soviet diplomats, because they had helped 'to finance and organise a ? guerrilla group called the Re- volutionary Action Movement. A few months later. Ecuador- ex- pelled another- three llussian ? officials for their role in funding the Marxist-dominated Confed- eration of Ecuadorian Workers which had used the money to or- ganise a general strike origin- ally planned to co-ordinate with .a Left-wing coup. , In Chile, Russia's hand was obvious again, although, as in many similar cases, the Cuban , intelligence organisation. the D G I, served as Moscw's in- the implications of America's 'passion for iliseiosure" , strurnent. The D GI has now been completely colonised by the KG B. and operates under the ? close surveillance -of a KGB general in Havana. A -DGI officer, Luis Fernandez de Ofia; occupied an office next to Allende's: reading his correspon- dence and screening his visitors. -There was, it is true, a personal factor involved: he became Allende's son-in-law by marrying his daughter, " Tati," but it was more th-an a family affair.. The Continuing inquest into the Chile affair is part of the malign legacy of Watergate and the Vietnam . war. Both undermined the confidence of ninny Americans in the integ- rity of the Ad-ministration and have created an enormous bandwagon in favour of public supervision of every aspect of policy - making. They ? also created a passion for disclosure that now makes it impossible for anyone to assume that con- fidential .information will be kept confidential. One of the most dangerous aspects of the Chile, affair -is the way that the names of political. parties, newspapers and radio stations and trade' union organisations that are alleged to have received CIA funds have been bandied about. ? If public hearings go further, the next step, no doubt, would be the naming of Chileans alleged to have had some rela- tionship with the American-. Government. This would not only put them. on the death lists of the terrorist organisa- tions that have espoused the cause of "Allende the Martyr " it would discourage people in other situations who might contemplate turning to the Americans, rather than Rus- sians, for outside support. The lirnits of the C IA in- volvement in Chile have been muddled beyond recognition. During ? the first months of Allende's government, before it became apparent that the Marx- ists in it were bent on a total seizure of power, the Americans experimented With a policy of conciliation. This was largely the work of Ambassador Korry, who, for example, tried to negotiate with Allende over the nationalisation of major Alfieri- can interests, such as the big copper companies. He actually offered Allende a deal that would have enabled the Chilean Government to pay compensa- tion -with official bonds under- written by the American Treasury.. The deal, however, was rejected by Allende after it was vetoed by the leader of Yie extremist wing of the Social- ist party, Carlos ,Altamitaim- It was not the CIA funds that finally brought about the conp d'etat in September last year. ? At best, they served to keep in being a number of news- papers that would otherwise have collapsed as a result of spiralling costs, declining adver- tising and frozen prices. Without that critical voice, and without the major strikes, also partly financed by the Americans, that served to demonstrate wide- spread hostility to the regime, the Marxists in Chile would have found their road to power much. less stony. It was not in - power of the ?Americanss. ? however, to bring together the broad range of political force; that united to topple the regime:, A cynic might even say that the: conclusive proof that the cod, was not essentially the work ci& the CIA was that' it worked so smoothly. , Perhaps it "is not goott enough ?? for .Americans, or, America's allies, to conclude: that what "our" side does is justified because the "other 't side is doing the same,, or worse.: But when it is seriously pro.:: posed, as in two recent books': on the CI A, that covert opera tions should never be licensede it has to be pointed out that; this would leave a tremendous- vacuum in many areas the: Communists wmild not be slow: to exploit. The things that were.: done in Chile would have pro-.: yoked little comment if theye had been done to oppose Hitler,:. or, for that matter, the Soviet" regime (although, in the latter: case, there might have been: complaints about the threat td; detente). Yet it often seem that it is only when the Cora munists have won that peopl realise that they had been on: the way to winning. . Russia remains en expansionist power---and its chances for fur-,: them expanion, given the effects: of the oil crisis, the risinee, strength of the Marxist Left in; southern Europe and the pros- pect of a new phase of American: isolationism, are probably greatO: now than at any time since the, immediate post-1945 period. The; Americans and their allies ar ? increasingly on the defensive. The Americans exerted thein.4 selves, to a fairly minimal extent, in what was seen as an attempt to prevent Chile becoming a part of that expansionist bloc. There is no reason, in present condi- tions, why that should be regar- ded as a monstrous?or immoral ?thing to do. WASHINGTON POST 12 November 1974 Kiss* geir Stresses Need for high-Caller orei n Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that the United States "cannot rely on star performers" to develop or carry out its foreign policy - but must have a Foreign Serv- ice with a high standard of performance. Speaking to the seventh an- nual awards luncheon of the American Foreign Service As- sociation, Kissinger, who has been criticized for carrying out American diplomacy sin- glehandedly, said: "We cannot rely . .. on the possibility that someone will come along every few years to manipulate events. This can- not be done by any President or Secretary of State. What we need is a high standard of rperformance that is carried ?[,' out through the decades." The secretary ? encouraged Idissent ? "for which we bear no visible grudges" but said it must be kept within the Iservice. Once decisions are made, he said, they must be carried out with discipline characteristic of tile Foreign , Service. Kissinger bas angrily denounced "leaks," which he attributes to junior officers dissatisfied with his decisions. The United States. Kis- singer said, is passing through one of the most difficult peri- ods in world affairs, compli- 17' cated by "a very searing expe- rience" domestically. Follow- ing World War H there was a period of great ceativ- ity, he -said, in which America drew unconsciously from its own domestic experience, in effect bringing the tecnhiques of the New Deal to other coun- tries that shared the same democratic traditions. _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 30th general assembly 'EDITOR & PUBLISHER , 26 OCT 1974 IA A asks Ford to Mien y papers that got CIA money The 30th general assembly of the Inter American Pres i Association in Caracas, Venezuela last week vigorously con- demned the reported CIA "support" of the "opposition press" in Chile under the Allende regime and called on President. Ford "to clarify once and for all" the sdope of CIA intervention by naming the newspapers which accepted fitancial as- sistance of that nature. "All 'free newspapers of the Americas are justly offended by this action of CIA which casts doubts on the integrity of the hemisphere's press and makes it possible for the enemies of a free press to circulate all sorts of slanders and defamations against it," the IAPA said. The organization requested President Ford to "order the CIA to put a stop to any subsidization of newspapers or jour- nalists" and condemned, at the same time, newspapers and journalists who accepted such assistance. The IAPA action came after prolonged debate on the reports of CIA intervention in Chile and following vigorous denials by editors of El Mercurio in Santiago, El Sur WASHINGTON POST 01 November 1974 Y- in Conception, and El Rancaguino in Ran- cagua, that such payments had been made to them. The general assembly condemned ine military government of Peru for its expro- ? priation of -the independent press of Lima and declared "that government an enemy of the free press." The association deplored that some journalists and press organiza- tions in various parts of the hemisphere ? have approved the attitude of the Peruvian government. The action was taken after reports by two 1APA members who had visited Peru prior to the assembly?Guido Fernandez, editor of La Nacion of San Jose' Costa Rica, and Rafael Molina, editor of El Na- cional of Santo Domingo. They had talked to previous owners, editors and reporters as well as the government-appointed edi- tors and concluded that a free dialogue no longer exists under the "independent Marxism," as they called the new regime. Following three days of reports, IAPA: ? Condemned the absence of freedom of the press and other civil rights in Chile; ? ? Said the tyranical regime in Haiti CIA Activities: Focusing on the Wrong Issue Recent discussion of .CIA activities abroad has focused upon the Wrong is- sue. if one accepts (as one Must) that -military action can sometimes be a ra: tional step, then one must also accept that hostile , measures ? short of war (such as subversion) also are rat:anal measures._ It is illogical, therefore, to argue that the U.S. should, never, un- der any circumstances, seek to "destablize" or, in' plain words, under- mine and destroy any other govern- ment. In a world where, the activities of governments relative to each other are controlled by power and not by au- thority, virtually all seem to have some propensity to undermine some others. Arab governments undermine one another and presumably, would undermine the Israeli Government if they could. The Israelis must be pre- sumed as Well to undermine any gov- ernments they can. Bangla Desh exists, in part, because India collaborated in ? what was virtually?if not technically ?the undermining of Pakistan. And, no doubt, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. ? each would undermine the other if they had the ability to do it and to get . away with, it. The reported CIA activities are im- portant and objectionable for other reasons. ? 1. They represent hostile -Sets taken with no evidence that the implications of those acts were considered ma- turely. Accordingly, while they might? if successful?aehieve some immediate purpose, there is no evidence that they actually served the interest of the United States in the international polit- ical arena, and that they might actu- ally serve to injure that interest. 2. They represent a species Of grossly unacceptable Executive action, without any indication that that action is approved by a substantial majority in Congress and the nation: 3. Moreover; to speak of this action as within presidential prerogative?if there is such a thing?ot any other variant of presidential authority is to be technically right, but factually wrong. It is now clear that much of this action is beyond the scope of pres- idential review, in that it is contem- plated, organized, initiated, and execu- ted before the incumbent President (whichever one one means) has an ef- fective opportunity to approve or :to disapprove. . The principal issue, then, is whether de-stabilization is wise at a given time and whether it is properly authorized, controlled, conducted, and terminated when it is no longer approved or effec- tive. What we cannot wisely contemplate, in short, is 'hostile action taken with- out mature consideration, outside any framework of authoritative political .approval, on the motion of some self- initiating bureaucratic nucleus which cannot be ealled to account. ., ? Matthew Holden, Jr. Professor. Department of P,)litIcal Science, Unlveraity of Wisconsin. Madison. , . does not permit a free press; ? Protested to the government of Nica- ragua for depriving newspaper editor Ped- ro Joaquin Chamorro, La Prensa, of his civil rights and denying him an exit visa . from the country because of his published statements that his country's elections were a fraud; ? Declared that because of censorship there is no freedom of the press in Brazil; ? Denounced the lack, of a free press and the violation of human rights in Cuba and asked the Organization of American States net to lift sanctions against that country until the Castro regime has given proof it is ready to restore a free Dress ? and human rights and release political prisoners including dozens of journalists. ? Declared that the existence of govern- ment agencies which monopolize distribu- tion of governments' commercial advertis- ing constitutes a threat against a free press; ? Noted that eight publications have been shut down by the Argentine govern- ment and said the recent adoption of an anti-subversion law throws shadows on the people's right to information; ? Reported that after IAPA had ac- cused the 'government of Ecuador of re- fusing to authorize publication of a new newspaper, Extra, the government had changed its mind and expressed satisfac- tion to the President of Ecuador for that development. IAPA found that in Panama the press is owned or controlled by the government and in Paraguay there is a state of per- manent sieg,e and censorship. The association found that in Canada, Argentina, El Salvador, the United' States, Trinidad/Tobago, Barbados, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Colombia there are isolat- ed obstacles but a deep foundation to sup-- port a free press. ? Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez opened the IAPA meetings empha- sizing the importance of a free press with- in democratic systems of government. Press freedom is indispensable to the dem- ocratic system and added the "system is defeated and losing prestige in a large part of Latin America. . . . Other ban- ners are being raised up before our peo- ples which promise bread and order but not liberty. But we must not compromise liberty." In a veiled complaint against the U.S. press, the president complained that mass media in industrialized nations are failing to inform the public adequately. OTt events and issues in Latin America. "/ am aware of the fact that I am speaking to editors who have suffered exile and imprisonment but I am also aware that in their countries many citizens have been unable to express themselves because special interests have blocked them from doing so. This is a form of dominance ex- ercised by the stronger over the weaker. "The IAPA could be a powerful instru- ment for the demonstration that freedom of expression should not be compromise by special interests or ideological dogmas," the president said. 18 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 New York Times ? 27 October 19714 - By ALVIN SHUSTER,-.::. . Special tq Ttte New Yerk. Times .? -LONDON, Oct. 26--The' Brit- ish spy, as etched in fiction, is that handsome chap who wears. the right clothes, appears in the right places at the right time, carries the right weapons, - drinks martinis of the right mix and -never does anything wrong. - ? ? -- - ? In reality, what he does is a complete mystery: And the Brit- ish these days are learning far More about activities of agents of the United States Central In- telligence Agency ? -than., they could ever hope to learn. about , their, own 'espionage establish- -meat. rhe i ? The ,- -,contnoversy over the covert .operakins of' the C.I.A. has once more underscored ma- jor.: differences between the! 400- year 7 old foreign' .eintel-; ligence service here .and its! /much . younger counterpart across the Atlantic. ? ? . ? Britain's intellIgence service, , popularly known as M.L 6 and i the most legendary spy organi-i zation around, .operates underi tighter reins, with far less Mon- ey and much greater .secrecy. 'Even if it did subvert foreign ? governments, the British public would not read about it in newspapers or hear politiLians derna:nd,explanationS. ? There are no significant checks by committees of the House of Commons, no open appropriations for its activities. Books published by former agents usually deal, not with ? THE HARVARD CRIMSON 6 Nov 1974 spionage: A Mystery to Britons recentrhiStory, but with' exper- iences during World War II, when British spies Were in their. glory:- ? .. : ? , ., :-,,,, .. 1 , .../. 'Shrinking' Service - ! The government rule barring public access to. official docu- ments for 30 years?relaxed six , years ago from 50 years ;----1 means that new material -on World War H has now become available. . . "Our agents today are more' tightly controlled despite the lack of Parftmentary watch- 'ings," said one expert. "The foreign intelligence service is responsible to the Foreign Of- fice and it just doesn't run off and do things .an its, Own with- toutall-around clearance." There is some 'question any- way as to just how active the service is these gays in such "black arts" as throwing mon- ey to foreign politicians or en- gineering military coups. The general assumption .is that! covert operations of that naturej are kept to a minimum and left, more and more to the United', States, which can, 'afford fart Inuire -cla aks: a Ed daigers,- not to I :Mention expensive . satellites' 'and electronics. r For one thing, the service isl 5 limited in funds. The estimates! of its annual budget, well hid-. ,i-den in spending figures ap-i proved by Parliament, range; '! from $25-million to about $100-! 'million a year. Even the higher' !estimate ' pales in comparison i Iwith the C.I.A.'s exPenditures; which are belieVed to be-About,' Elisberg .8.4 Aniticipdted cliqpan: $750-million. 'Moreover, the British foreign intelligence -Service operates tinder a bureaucratic structure; designed to confine the seopej for free-wheeling activity. It ? does not work independently ? but reports directly to the For- eign Office, where some control is exercised by' a Permanent Under Secretary. Although the work of the two civilian Intelligence serv- iges is thus scrutinized, their directors have the right to go directly to the Prime Minister and bypass the formal chains of command. An intelligence Unlike Congressmen, Mem- bers of Parliament rarely make demands for more control over the intelligence comniunity and spern Content with the present ?system. Questions are raised ;politely on those infrequent oc- casions when the spies get in trouble ' or their tactics are revealed. ? 'The image of the intelligence service was, for example, badly' tarnished in 1956 when a Royal; Navy frogman, Cotndr. Lionel Crabb,' disappeared after diving near Soviet ships in Portsmouth, Harbor at the time of the visit', to Britain of Nikita S. Khru--1 shchev. Even then, the Govern- ment said little. The Prime Min- ister, then Sir 'Anthony Eden; , announced that it "would not be in the national interest to disclose the circumstances" of I the frogman's death. ? More recently, ? controversy ? By SETH ICUPFERBERG and RICIIARD H.P. SIA'. ? Daniel Ellsberg 'S2 'told' an off:the- which journalists agree not to publish what' record Niemdn fellows 'meeting Monday, they learn?as "a method of plugging that William E. _Colby, director' of the newsmen into the government bureaucracy and making them part of it." A Senate subcommittee learned ,last , . summer of CIA'fun'ding Of 'opposition to Allende's gOvernment, beginning in 1970, The New York ?Times reported two days after, the coup that: "senior American officials" acknowledged having advance word of it. . ? I ? But the Times reports,, did not specifically eke CIA foreknoWledge of Allende's overthrow:: And White House and State .Department officials contended that reports of the coup . did nol. reach, responsible officials until after it began. They implied that the reports were not taken seriously beCause?rumors of a coup had. been "current throughout 1973. "There ? was absolutely no way of night and describing such briefings--:-in knowing beforehand that on any of these Central Intelligence ? Agency,' has acknowledged that he "knew of the im- minence of' 'the September 1973 Chilean ,Military Coup. - ? Ellsberg* also quoted Colby as saying that "a political decision. was made not to inform" the Popular Unity government' Of Salvador Allende- Gossens. Colby's remarks came in the course of a conversation during a conference of former ciA agents,. government officials ? and journalists on the CIA and covert actions. The Center for National Security Studies sponsored the Washington conference,. which was held this September 13 and 14. ? Ellsberg Made" public his talk with the Niemans yesterday, denouncing -Colby's , off:the-record meeting with`Niernans last ;hasl_focused not on what' the; British agents are doing abroa4 ?hnt on 'what they are doingl within Britain. M.I.5, the coun- terespionage group, is believedl to. be particularly, active in - dealing , with terrorists in Northern Ireland, working! closely With Scotland Yard's Special Branch. The secrecy of it all seems, to! be generally accepted here, The l name of the head of the foreign! -intelligence brand' is published! in the British press only after it appears abroad. ' The Britisti. Public wOuld be; more likely:- 4o recognize the! name of William E. Colby, the: Director of Central Intelligence' in the United States,, than they would that of Maurice Oldfield, who-heads fo-reign intelligence operations for Britain. The name of Mr. Oldfield's prede- cessor, Sir John. Rennie, ap- peared only after his son had been arrested on a . heroin charge. , Normally, the press hero is not permitted to name the in- telligence chief, whose Working title is "C." Newspapers are subject to a so-called D-notice system, under which the. press , is notified Prior to" publication ? that' a- particular news item could violate security laws.e.e..._ "Yo can -describe one majort difference this way," said one official here. "Colby goes up to Congress to testify about what ? the C.I.A. has done. Here, if you lust publish the name of Old- field you could be in trouble." fi _ dates, including the September 11 date,-a coup' .attempt would; be made," Paul J. Hare, a State Department spokesman, said on September 14, 1973. - ....?,'The administration had been receiving rumors: of unrest in the Chilean military. for more than one year," Gerald L. Warren, . White House spokesman, told reporters that . week: "Asids,..from these rumors, the President had no advance knowledge of any specific plan for a coup.,',sb' erg saii'd Colby told him he was aware of and agreed with the "political dccision"?presumably made by theft: national security adviser Henry A.! Kissinger '50 or then president Richard M., Nixon?not to alert Allende to, the im- .pending',i'nilitary revolt; - ": ? "I said, 'Did you know the 'plans' for this coup just before it happened," Ellsberg. told the Niemans. "Colby did not appear to be mincing any words about how much they knew. A political decision was made not to tell Allende what we knew?now. - there would be no political decision if what we knew Was what we read in UPI.' . . James C. Thomson Jr., curator of the_. Nieman Fellowships, "released a* tape of- Ellsberg's talk with the Niemans yesterday' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 afternoon, after Ellsberg said his remarks , shotild heOn the public record. Ellsberg.. also said he would not have : agreed to meet with the Niemans if he had ? : realized his' , appearance would help '! "legitimize". Colby's. Ellsberg quoted Colby as saying that he . would hive "preferred" 'that the Popular Unity candidate for president of Chile lose ? the election 'scheduled for .1976: ._ . But Ellsberg said there 'vas an "un- .. ?? mistakable inference" that.. the CIA "preferred" this coup to happen than not to happen?and indeed Colby made that very, clear during the day, that he preferred the current regitne to -the past regime?' HARVARD CRIMSON 6 Nov 1974 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 16 October 1974 Mirror of opinion CIA: a new mandate , Long before the recent disclosure that the CIA had played a relatively' minor role in the overthrow of Chile's ? Marxist President Salvadore Allende, critics of the agency were forever noting that its ? secret. operation's abroad have been conducted with, neither the knowledge nor the appro- val of Congress. The charge was only partly true, for. most of the CIA's activities have been scrutinized by at least a handful of congressional leaders. And they could scarcely have remained "secret" very long if they had to be explained, debated and approved by Rep. Mike Harrington and 534 other congres- sional overseers. Now, however, Rep, Harrington . and other critics of the CIA can no longer claim that the agency is oper- ating without a congressional man- date. For in their zeal to blow the agency's cover and eliminate its I secret operations, they forced their colleagues to make a choice.between outright rejection or authorization of the CIA's covert activities. And pre- dictably, the tactic boomeranged; the CIA won the contest hands down. The issue was brought to a head in ' the Senate when Sen. James Abou- rezk, (D) South Dakota, offered an'. amendment to outlaw all the CIA's "dirty tricks" and other secret oper- ations abroad, other than intelligence gathering, in peacetime. The issue was r,Jenly debated, and when the time came for a vote the Senate rejected the amendment over-. whelmingly 6847, a margin of 4 to 1. Hence, by implication, one house of Congress has served notice that it is aware of the CIA's secret operations, and that it approves of and accepts responsibility for them. From now on it will be rather difficult for people like Rep. Harrington to complain that the Congress has been kept in the . dark and that it hasn't given the CIA a mandate for its covert activities. ? Boston Herald American 'By GEOFFREY D. GARIN and GORDON D. MOTT' Central Intelligence Agency Director "destabilize the CIA," plainly could be William Colby was briefly confronted by heard by the participants at the. Nieman demonstrators last night during an off-the- session, but apparently did nOt disrupt the record dinner meeting with this year's meeting. Neiman fellows at the Faculty Club. ? ; Daniel Ellsberg '54, who spoke to the While 150 demonstrators marched Nieman fellows Monday afternoon, was outside the Club, a delegation 'of six among the protesters. Ellsberg carried a protesters entered the building to ask placard that said "William Colby Murders Colby" to meet with the marchers and Humans and Democracy." answer questions about the CIA's role in Chile. - After an interchange between Colby, the protesters:and Nieman Curator James C. Thompson, the CIA director declined to .meet outside with the demonstrators and When the six proteiters confronted' Colby inside the Faculty Club just before the dinner began, the CIA director said he Would not come outside -because "I've been invited to a private party." ' 'Thomson then told the six protesters the -delegation rejoined the picket line. that Colby "has been doing a lot of open outside. ? talking before a lot of iiubliO gatherings,",. The protest, the largest at Harvard since adding, "He's the most open CIA director last winter's Honeywell demonstration, lasted an hour and a half and was marked by a series of chants condemning Colby and the CIA. The demonstrators walked ? directly beneath the windows of the room where Colby ate and shouted "Colby, killer" in the direction ,of the windows. The chants, which included a call to ever invented." , ? At the end of the confrontation, one demonstrator, Philip T. Aranow '69, turned to Colby and said, "You're a wonderful killer." "Thank you," Colby responded. After the six demonstrators departed, Colby said he did not mind the protest. "It's part Of life," he said. Thomson said he thought the protesters'.. request that Colby answei their questions Was "reasonable, as was his [Colby's1 response." think the Niemans- will give Colby a liat'cl time Thomson, said before the 20 dinner.... ' ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ).egiproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 - EVENING NEWS, Tokyo 10 October 1974,. THERE was once an Amen- can republic, one of whose roost illustrious founders, Tho- mas Jefferson, would have pre- ferred not to have closer trade or maritime dealings with Europe than it had with China at the time. The declaration of universal neutrality, which George Wash- ington offered his countrymen as a political testament at the end of his second term as presi- dent in 1796, was in large part --inspired by this?autarky, this re- fusal to be involved in the Old World's wicked and degrading squabbles. This is also the spirii of the Monroe Doctrine the fifth president of the United States? proclaimed on December 2, 1823 as a warning to Europe not to meddle in the Americas. One important phrase of this celebrated message deserves to be quoted: "It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties concerned to themselves in the hope that other parties pursue- the same course." Non-Interference Concept The story of how the United States rolled back the heirs of the Spanish Empire well beyond the Rio Grande, provoked Spain into an unequal combat and threw it out of Cuba and the philippines, and carved out for itself a piece of Colombian territory for building the Pana- ma Canal is today a part Of, ,history, but it illustrates the North American concept of "non-interference" (it applies only to the others) in the desti- nies of Latin America. Europe's 'brigands" always found other brigands to chal- lenge their plundering and tres- passing, so giving rise to an infernal cycle of battles and re- turn matches. But the United States intended to remain mas- ter in the closed field of the "hemisphere." There is no need to go over the "doctrines" successively en- unciated over the years and which, after the Second World War, justified American post- war interference by tacit or open reference to the liberation of Europe from under the Nazi heel. The U.S. intention then was to safeguard, not the "hemisphere," but the whole of, the "free world." Eur ope an reconstruction could not have proceeded in an atmosphere of trust in the fu- ture if this protection had not been provided. The undoubted 'debt of gratitude European countries owed the United States earned Washington the pained or servile (depending on ?CIA Operation st Interests ' By Alain Clement Le Monde Every country has its in- telligence service, and nobody minds that., But the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which grew out of the ,old OSS during the cold war, and has become sort of spies' Pentagon and headquarters for mounting 'destabilisation" operations, has acquired a re- putation all its own. Highly secretive by definition, ,the CIA is practically outside the control of Congress. In a recent interview he gave the U.S. newsmagazine Time, William Colby, the present director of the CIA, confirmed that one of the functions Of his department was -to "positively influence a situation through political and paramilitary means." But these disclosures and the recent revelations of CIA activities in Chile have not impaired the. confidence of the U.S. Congress in the most occult of American in- stitutions: on September 24, the House of Representatives defeated by 291 votes to 108 a motion seeking to prevent the CM. from interfering in the domestic affairs of for- eign states. the nation) indulgence of its al- lies for its bloody bungling: the counter-revolution in Guate- 'mala, Bay of Pigs, Marines sent to the Dominican Republic, the 'Vietnam war and so on. All these weren't especially honorable undertakings, but weren't they also the result of over-zealousness? After all, how could one reasonably hesi-, tate to choose between the U.S. cop and the Soviet commissar? Finally along came' Richard Nixon, with Henry Kissinger in tow. It was goodbye to ideo- logical crusades, swift expedi- tions and the race for planetary supremacy! Washington went back to old-fashioned realpoli-. tiking and the age-old defense of "national interests" (even if the dimension of the United States made the limit's of such interests somewhat unclear). Washington launched detente as the first step toward a "con- cert of nations" without dis- crimination, and invited all the nations of the world to build a lasting "peace structure" bene- fiting everybody. The frightening botch-up in Cambodia, Washington's irrita- tion over Europe's uncoopera- 'tive stand on logistics during the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, and the false maneuvers' over Cyprus were snags which' proved quite simply that all the bugs had not been shaken out of the new system. And now Mr. Colby discloses that things weren't that simple. As an honest man he doesn't deny that he had spread some small change around in Chile to "raise the morale" of those who opposed Allende's experiment,' even though he swears he did nothing to hasten the Chilean leader's downfall. Nor does he. deny "conducting" intelligence with the aid of the most up-to- 'date methods so as to enable U.S. diplomacy to ,know just :where it is going. CIA's Functions It's clear, of- course, that for him this diplomacy is not like any other. He admits it would' be going too far to wish to im- pose democracy in the four cor- ners of the globe, but he sees the CIA's various functions bound up by a philosophy of action. The mission he is as- signed by the government some- times calls for influencing "a situation by political or para- military means." Suggestions for action may spring from within the CIA it- self, from examination of speci- fic data. Or they may come from outside, from "an ambas- sador, from the State Depart- ment or from the National Se- curity Council staff. They'll say: 'Why don't you guys do so -and- so?" This is apparently how major policies are tackled. And indeed, why resort to intri- cate formulas when in so many places it is so much easier to buy, gull, and help change the course of "movements" which tend to develop in a direction 21 lo ? hile contrary to that desired' by American "security"? What happens to the princi- 'ple of non-interference in all this? Mr. Colby's reflections do not take him so far: The idea :that a country may have the sovereign right to self-determi- nation, even if this is at its own cost should it be mistaken, does not occur to him. Chile had gone astray and had to be helped back on the straight and narrow. "The Al- lende regime was not democra- tic." And what was even more offensive, it was based only on a minority (a number of American presidents have also been elected on minority' votes, but that is none of Chile's business). ? The last word should be left to an American journalist, Eve- rett G. Martin of the Wall Street Journal, who wrote on Septem- ber 18: "The opposition forces demonstrated time and again -through various by-elections and the 1973 congressional elections that they were the majority. It seems ,a, kind of arrogance for Washington planners to think that the Chilean majority would let its protesting voice disappear entirely from print' and from the airwaves even if established publications and stations col- lapsed by the dozens." Why. bother about this "pro- testing- voice" since it is pre- sumably. the president of the' United States who ruled that the' CIA's field operations were "in the best interests of the people of Chile"? What if France had elected Francois Mitterrand president? It is comforting to know that the "best interests of the people of France" would have been in good hands at the White House. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 _ . Approved For Release 2091/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00340003-7 ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, Caracas. 27 September 1974 . Commentary: "Venezuela and the CIA" by: Movement for Socialism (MAS) leader JOse Vicente Rangel (Text) It is silly to exaggerate the importance of the CIA and to see the CIA everywhere, but at the same time it is unforgivably naive to underestimate this organization and to see all the charges levied against it as a propaganda ploy or as an attempt to discredit an intelligence service merely because it is American. The CIA ? has too long a history to be taken lightly. The influence of the CIA should be investigated within the framework of national policy and as befits a threatened nation. Its participation in the country's politics, economy and cultural activities should be investigated. There is :.to doubt that the ? persistent U.S. threats against petroleum producing countries--of which our country is a prime target for obvious reasons?demand a serious eValuation of the situation and a review of our mechanisms for defense. The CIA has been participating in world affairs with varied success since it was created by special law during the Truman administration. It may be said that since 1947 it has been present at every major world event. It is worthwhile to note by way of reference that the CIA is very often depicted as being completely autonomous with regard to the presidency of the United States. This line of thinking attempts to portray the CIA ? as responsible for all the dirty work and as carrying out activities of which the president is hardly or very vaguely aware. In this connection it is worthwhile to cite the following excerpt from the book by Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government: "On 23 November 1963, during the first hour of his first full day in office, Johnson was taken by McGeorge Bundy?who had served as Kennedy's personel liaison with the Special Group--to the Situation Room, a small command post located in the depths of the White House basement. There, surrounded by super-secret maps, electronic equipment and communicatiors lines, the new president was briefed by the head of the Invisible ,Government, John Alex McCone, Director of the CIA and member of the Special Group. Although Johnson knew the men who headed the Invisible Government and knew about much. of their work he did not begin to understand and see the full scope of the Invisible Government's organization and secrets until that morning." ? Claude Julien states in The American Bmpire: "The CIA never makes a major decision without agreement from the president of the United States." He adds: "There is no CIA policy distinct from that of the State Department or of the White House. Eisenhower's memoirs establish without the shadow of a doubt the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government in the operations carried out against Mbssadeq in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala." But should there still be any doubt about the CIA's international activities and presidential support for them, one need only turn to the recent statements made by President Gerald Ford justifying the role of the CIA and to Kissinger's statements cynically accepting CIA intervention in the overthrow of Allende. And there is more: An AP dispatch datelined Washington, 25 Septembet, reported that the CIA had won an important victory in the U.S Congress "when the House of Representatives rejected by a vote of 291 to 108 an amendment which would prevent the CIA from spending money to subvert or destabilize the government of any foreign country." If there is a close link between the CIA and the presidency of the United States and if the congress of that nation refuses to cut off CIA funds so that it may continue operating against any foreign government, is it not then advisable that in view of the crisis which has arisen between the United. States and Venezuela, we Venezuelans should be wary of CIA activities? What is being done in this connection? Is there any program aimed at uncovering the activities of CIA agents in Venezuela? What record is being kept of the numerous personnel that service has scattered within the most varied activities of our country? This is not an attempt to create a psychosis about the CIA in Venezuela; but we would be pretty stupid if we do not open our eyes and it would be unforgivable for our government to believe that a power of this kind can be challenged with impunity. Approved For Release 2001/08/08q7CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340Q03-7 - LONDON TIMES 23 October 1974 The man-who lipped the price Ofileteiit6 In contemplating the agree- ment reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, by the terms of which the United States grants sub- stantial and very valuable unilateral trading advantages in return for a promise that the Soviet regime will take a single step in the direction of an elementary act of national decency that has been common to all civilized states for cen- turies, the first thing to note is the Byzantine nature of the ,formalities.. involved; ,because of the Soviet leaders' under- standable terror at the thought of telling even a small part of the truth to their people, the agreement ? takes the weird form of a concordat between President Ford and .Dr Kiss- inger on the one hand, and Senator Henry Jackson on the other. The unspoken premise, of course, is that Dr Kissinger was empowered by the Soviet authorities, at the end of his protracted negotiations, to offer the terms laid down in the Ford-Jackson agreement; the deal obviously included a provision that no public refer- ence to it need be made within the Soviet Union. That is a small price to pay for an agreement of so historic a nature and with such enor- mous implications; indeed, if the Soviet dictatorship keeps" the agreement, or even goes a substantial way towards doing so, the document .enshrining it deserves to rank with the Most significant statements ever made in the history of the United States, and I can envi- sage future generations of American children learning to recite its terms as they now do the Declaration of Independ- ence, the Bill of Rights or the Gettysburg Address. It is difficult to know where to start in examining this astonishing event, the true magnitude of which seems so far to have been scarcely un- derstood. I might as well begin, therefore, with a resounding salute to the man who, almost single-handed, was responsible for bringing it to its triumphant conclusion. Senator Jackson is an American politi- cian in the admirably forth- right tradition of his namesake the seventh President. He fights for his country, his State and his, own political career; he does not spare his political foes and does not ask them to ,spare him; he conceals, meta- phorically speaking, a knife in ' his boot, knuckledusters behind his back and a cosh in his hip pocket, and uses them cheer- fully whenever he thinks it necessary; and if he has .a motto it is sorely Pistol's assets ,tion that Holdfast is the only dog, my duck. Senator Jackson was deter- mined to do something about the plight of the Soviet people, and in particular about their ?inability to leave their vast prison-house, even if they promised never to return. In- stead of making indignant speeches to give himself and his hearers a feeling of 'virtue, he took the exact measure of the power which the American Constitution gives to ? a deter- mined, popular and intelligent Senator, and proceeded to use that power. The trade Bill that was to ? give Soviet Russia "most favoured nation" status in commercial dealing with the United States was desperately needed by the Soviet leaders ; more .to the .point, it was des- perately wanted by Presidents Nixon' and Ford, and by Dr Kissinger?in their case not on economic grounds, but because it- was the Soviet price for d?nte. But Henry Jackson's price was higher. It was an easing of the cruel restrictions on those who wished to leave the Soviet Union, and an end to the savage persecution of those who applied, to do so. And he organized enough of his fellow- Senators to ensure that the Bill, provided they stood their ground, would not be passed without the Soviet leaders pay- ing that price. Every kind of E.,Plawr7,,,T.M.TZ"."131 Bernard Levin IiiiEreeMtse-segeemg.testi political pressure was brought to bear on him and his sup- porters; he stood firm, and kept them no less faithful. He was told that there was no chance of Soviet agreement to so humiliating a bargain; be greeted the news with thumb to nose. The President publicly pleaded for the Bill to be passed without strings attached; . Jackson, tied the strings more tightly. . Now I do not sing Senator Jackson's praises simply because he deserves it, but becaose among the most tre- mendous implications of what has happened is its demonstra- tion that in the great debate between him and Dr, Kissinger, he was right and Dr Kissinger was wrong. The Kissinger argu- ment is that it is proper to, give the Soviet Union what her leaders want, provided that we also get what we want; the corollary to the argument is that the nature of the things they want is no concern of ours. Senator Jackson's view is more positive. It is that we can, and should, judge the Soviet Union's demands in themselves, and not simply regard them as characterless weights on the other end of the' seesaw, to be balanced by. equal weights on this; the cor- ollary to the Senator's argu- ment is that the nature of the things they want does affect the price we ask. Dr Kiss- inger's devotion to freedom is not to be doubted; hut he has maintained throughout the negotiations that it ,is useless to demand something as valu- able as internal reform from the Soviet leaders, because they simply will not concede it, and we will therefore lose the chance of getting useful external concessions. The im- portance of Senator Tackson's victory is that it shows how low have been the prices we have hitherto asked from the Soviet Union, and how much more we can now ask. ,Beyond that vital lesson, tere are others to- be learnt?. and taught. It is widely believed that Senator Jackson's campaign, and the agreement itself, concerned the fate of the Soviet Jews. That belief is mistaken; nowhere in the agreement is the word Jew mentioned, and Senator Jack- son has been scrupulously careful, throughout the battle, to make clear that he was fighting for the 'right of Soviet citizens- to leave their country if they wished4 irrespective of their religion or descent. Nothing less, after all, would have been proper ; of course the Jews have led the fight to be allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union, but only because of the historical acci- dent that they have somewhere they can go. But I doubt if more than a minority, and pos- sibly a small minority, of Soviet Jews positively want to live in Israel ; many want only to get out of the Soviet Union, and that is a feeling that is certainly not confined to Jews. The word of mouth now Immall' spreads in the Soviet Union with astonishing speed ; if the. authorities keep the agree- ment, and Jews are seen to be leaving in large numbers and, without prior suffering, there are bound to be others, per- haps ultimately millions of them, who would demand the. right that their governors have conceded. (One of the most touching, and?in its implica- tions appalling aspects of the Jewish emigration of recent years is the 'way in which Soviet citizens with remote Jewish ancestry which they have always tried to conceal . or reject because of Soviet anti-semitism, have been demanding to be, classified as Jews, in the hope that they might thus be able to get out.) That is a prospect to stretch the imagination almost to breaking point. But it also car- ries with it another, less happy, implication. What sort of response are the new, non- Jewish emigrants to receive from the West ? It may soon be that, at last, through the , courage and determination of a great American patriot anti ; humanitarian, theywill have m obtained from Russia's modern tyrants the right that even the worst of the Tsars freely accorded. Are we then to mock their right and deny their hope ? Rather let us .say, as was said to their grandfathers d Give me your tired, your poor, - Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free. The wretched reffise.of your teem- ing shore,' Send these, the homeless, tempest- tossed, to me: - I lift my lamp' beside the golden door. ' There are, of course, hori- zons still more distant. Dr Sak- harov's immediate reactien to the announcement of the agreement was to say, quite rightly, that the Soviet people will be truly free - when they can not only leave their country, but when they can leave and return at will: This is, indeed, almost a, definition of freedon, and Dr. Sakharov, bravest of the brave, is right, to demand it in those- terms.' To put it another way, there is yet another implication in the success of Senator Jackson's Campaign?that in dealing with tyrants we must harden our hearts against feeling grateful ; every concession they, Make must be used as a lever to pry open the next. - One step at a time. If this historic agreement Is kept by the Soviet authorities, I shall soon be able to greet Colonels Ovsishcher, Davidovand Alshansky, to shake the hands of Professors Voronel and - Levich, and to embrace Vladi- mir Bukovsky. And all because Senator Henry Jackson, that mastiff of freedom, bit deep and would not let go. (0 Times Newspapers Ltd 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 23 ASIXECIMErail Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 WASHINGTON POST 12 November 1974 Tad &lac issin er s Miscalculations Secretary of -State: Kissinger has ? dangerously misjudged Soviet inten- tions in the Mideast, despite ?Seeret personal warnings to 'him by. Chairman Leonid 'Brezhnev last March in Mos cow that there would be no peace in ; the Mideast if the ? United States per- sisted in "going it alo.ne" diplomati- ? catty with the 'Arabs and Israelis. At that time, ? Brezhnev accused Kissinger ot"ruses" and "trickery." The cumulative result of Kissinge- rian miscalculatiens--?-some -diplomats call it -Kissinger's "greed" in -freezing out. the Russians?is the latest crisis raising the threat of a new Arab-Ise . raeli war. Kissinger, in effect, helped to create a a situation in which the Arabs, frus- trated by the , lack of . diplomatic ? "movement" with Israel he had prom- ised them after the 1973 war, have turned again toward Moscow for politi- cal and military help. For similar rea- sons, 'a new sense of ;Unity against Is- rael emerged from the, recent Rabat ? ? summit with the all-out support?of the financially ? powerful oil-producing states. ' The Soviets, feeling vindicated, are obviously -delighted to oblige. They have been heavily rearming the Syri- ans for some time. And all indications ? are that Soviet military supplies 'will start flowing anew- to Egypt even be- fore Brezhnev. visits Cairo in January. ? Only six months after Nixon's and' - Kissinger's triumphal tour, it is Brezh- nev's turn to be hailed once more 43 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's? fa- vorite ally. President Ford's get-ac- quainted meeting , with Brezhnev . in -Vladivostok late this month might Well .be overshadowed by the gathering Mid-. east crisis: In the light of this developing situa- tion, it is. instructive to look at the' se- cret record of Soviet-American differ- ences, including Brezhnev's 1973 warn- \ . ings that an Arab-Israeli war was in the offing. A part of this record, never before made public, was presented by Brezhnev himself to a Western states- man at the Kremlin earlier this a,-Car. Even allowing for Brezhnev's self-serv- ing bent, his account is worth ponder- ing. Speaking of his conferences with Nixon three months before the min: tion of the Yam Kippur war, Brezhnev Mr. 'Settle, a former foreign corre- spondent, is now a free-lance writer, working out of Washington. recalled that "at San Clemente, I kept Nixon up almost all night on the Mid- dle East, trying to convince 'him of the need to act together, Otherwise, there would be an ex-plosion .. Nixon didn't heed my words. And there was an ex- .-plosion-inthe Middle East." We don't know Nixon's and Kissing- er's response to Brezhnev's alleged en- treaties, but American diplomacy was then singularly inactive in the Mid- east, even though the administration already had intelligence. that Egypt and Syria were preparing for war. But Brezhnev told his visitor that after- ward "Nixon wrote a letter to me say- ing he had underestimated the gravity of the problem." ? ? ? The United States and the Soviet Union did. cooperate in, a fashion in .bringing about a cease-fire.' Subse- quently, a two-day Arab-Israeli peace conference was convened in Geneva under Soviet-American co-chairman- ship, with only the' Syrians staying away. Kissinger quickly concluded, how- ever, that Geneva was the wrong fo- rtim because the negotiations would bog down in propaganda. The Soviets would also acquire a permanent pres- ence in Mideast affairs. Instead, he concentrated on military disengage- ment 'between Israel 'and Egypt and ? Syria, and then on. the "second step" of seeking Israeli pullbacks in the Sinai and the occupied West Bank through separate negotiations with Egypt and Jordan. The Russians inevitably saw it as an end-run to exclude them from Mideast diplomacy. As Brezhnev told his West- ern visitor, "I berated Kissinger here in Moscow," during the Secretary's visit late last March, "for the U.S. be- havior in the Middle East." Brezhnev said that "we had agreed at the United 'N'ations and elsewhere that the United States and the Soviet Union would work together to secure peace." But, Brezhnev, added, "then Kissinger began a series of ruses, and attempted to go it alone. . .. We must ;4 act together, or there no tran- quility in the'llichge East . . . Israel, I too, knows our strength, and wottld. want us to guarantee. It was even agreed to better relations with Israel. ; -4 Then, there was Kissinger's trickery: which is not the way to deal with . this. . ." Kissinger kept' betting that-. his lonely diplomacy would succeed, but none of the contenders Vas willing to budge toward an "interim agreement." As Arab tensions . and frustrations mounted, Kissinger's strategy began to'; disintegrate. . His hopes to minimize RusSian volvement faded as Egypt sent its fore eign minister and its army thief Of staff o 'Moscow in late October. And - at Rabat, the Arabs ended the Chances:1 for Kissinger's piecemeal negotiations !. when they recognized the Palestine .1 Liberation Organization?with which ,1 Israel refuses to deal?as the de facto-.11, power, rather than JOrdan, to govern. the West Bank and East Jerusalem in. A the future. This ruled out Israeli-Jordanian'.. talks. Parallel negotiations between Is- rael and Egypt were similarly under- cut, for Sadat lost in Rabat his free-.'''' dom to bargain separately with Israel, it despite the Egyptian President's public' endorsement of Kissinger's diplomacy ? this week.- - ' Could. Kissinger have defused the Egyptian switch back toward the So- viet fold and forestalled Rabat's back-: ing of the PLO if he had initially gone the Geneva way, despite Israel's objec- tions and Sadat's lukewarmness? - Perhaps. Moscow, after all, is a fact -. of life in the Mideast. Even to Israel, a conference deadlock would be prefera- ble to the prospects of war. The Sovi- ets might have been locked in a diplo- matic situation in which it would have been harder to rearm the Arabs and ? champion the PLO. This may be why Kissinger is now - rethinking the relative merits of Ge- neva which, as the Shah of Iran told him the other day, is better than noth- ing. But with the ascendancy of the PLO, Israel's archenemy, it may no longer be possible to construct even a diplo- matic charade in Geneva. Thus, Kis- singer may have missed a great oppor- tunity. 24 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 DAILY TELEGRAPH London 25 October -1974 - '''? NEW YORK TIMES 5 November 1974 - Soviet.- Reports Expulsion Of Two Amellean Jews Special to The New York Tintes ' : MOSCOW, Nov. 4 ? TWO American Jews have been ex - pelted from the Soviet Union for allegedly distributing Zion- ist literature, badges and ciga4 rette lighters to Jews in Soviet Georgia, the official press agency Tass reported tonight. Tass quoted the Georgian Communist party newspaper Zarya Vostoka as saying in an article today that the two Americans, identified as 'Ira Jeffner and Joel Michaels, were "hunters of souls" who had visited synagogues in Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Batumi by posing as religious Jews. The newspaper article, Tass said, showed "to what tricks foreign Zionist circles resort to agitate Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel:" ? American embassy officials, contacted here, said they were not aware of the reported ous- ter and knew nothing about the two menU involved. Tass said that Jews in Batumi had "in- dignantly reported" to Soviet authorities an attempt by the -two men to leave a bag of anti-Soviet literature" at the synagogue. THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER 1 NOVEMBER 1974 -.OLYIVPICS IN MOSCOW THAT RUSSIA SHOULD OFFER (indeed, clamour) to hold the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow is odder than it looks ht. first glance; so is the Olympiti Committee's. acceptance Nothing Wrong with the spoiling facilities, it seems, if everything promised is ready in time. More hotels are promised too, -and not without need. The thought of the existing establishments, in which at the best of times if can take an hour to get a plate of soup, coping with a million extra inmates is really petrifying. For the rest, the Russians have engaged to mend their ways utterly, at least while the Games are on. Anyone can come. Any qualified team can compete. There will be no visa troubles. Once in, visitors will apparently be free to wander where ? they will.. No baffling bureaucracy; no rudeness, unpleasant incidents or " mistaKes; " no packed audiences of soldiery.. jeering officially unfavoured teams. It all sounds too good, . to be true. Will the KGB really stand by, fuming with impotent . . rage, while a million potential wreckers and enemies of : the people pour in and wander all over the place ? - Or. will it in fact redouble its vigilance at this time of dire peril? Will visitors really be free to wander about, not: only in Moscow, but everywhere-? Will they be free to bring in with them, and to take out, whatever reading matter they please? Will they be free to make contact with ordinary Russian people, or Russians with them? Can they visit Russian homes? Will they be free to cOm-: mit with impunity such heinous, Crimes as chang-- - ing inoney unofficially, or selling' -a pair ofshoes? Will all the clamps really be off ? ? And if so, what will hapren ? If the Olympic Gaines could . help in any way to normalise the life of the poor Russian people, to allow them to rejoin the civilised world, there is a case for holding them in Moscow, not only in 1980, but as. .," . a: permanent fixture. other cruel deception Agreements governing the liberty of people ought to be precise and transparent because. the. :.people' have a ?right to know What will happen - to them. Is there ? an :agreement between Dr :-Kissinger and the Russians which foresees the -emigration of 60,000 Jews a year? 'Or is there 'only an agreement between President Ford and Senator Jackson which says the 'same thing .but ,is not acknowledged by the Russians? Ever since October 18 When the deal was stated to have been done, the Russians have been saying with increasing 'emphasis that as fao as they are concerned the deal ,never existed. Mr Brezhnev ? has said so. Various east European radio and ? television commentators have said so. Last week- the Soviet Ambassador in Paris said so. Even ...the White House has now 'begun to say so. A presidential spokesman was saying on October 21 that a statement made from the White House on October. 18?one that appeared to be per- fectly clear at the time?had been "widely mis- understood."..What are the Soviet- Jews to make of it all ? _ . The evidence ? becomes more confusing and less encouraging as time goes on. The contents ? of the deal?if such a:thing exists at.all?seemed' clear at the beginning. Senator Jackson described it as "an historic understanding in the area of ? human rights." He said that he "understood that the actual number of emigrants would rise promptly from the .1973 level and would con- tinue to rise to correspond to the .number of applicants and may therefore exceed 60,000 a year." Dr.' Kissinger's letter to Senator Jackson was not specific about numbers, nor did he say anything about historic understandings in the area of human rights. On the other hand, he did seem to say that a deal had been done. There had been "discussions with Soviet representa- tive's" who had assured the United States that emigration would be regulated from now on by specified criteria. Dr Kissinger said it was assumed that 'the application of these criteria would mean that the rate of emigration would "being to rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants." He did not say who had made the assumption?the Russian' representa- tives or the Americans. It is easy for diplomats and White House officials to find reasons for saying that in these matters vagueness is a virtue. They can say that it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviet Government to admit that someone had been interfering in internal Soviet affairs. Equally they can say that it would be unrealistic to expect Senator Jackson to let the Soviet trade agreement ? through Congress except in return for some, sort of triumphant public announcement from the White House. They can' say that all will be well in the end provided no one tries to be too precise or to penetrate what is now a quite thick bank of diplomatic fog. This may satisfy the Russians. It may even satisfy Senator Jackson.. But why should it satisfy the Soviet Jews? It is they, after all, NAio have had 'their hopes raised.. 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 LOS ANGELES TIMES 10 November 1974 ermari intelligence- PlOgued by Bunglings Spy Business Found. in a 'Desolate' State, Country Called 'Sieve' for Secrets EY JOE ALEX MORRIS JR. Times Staff Writer BONN,?The CIA may be In hot Water over Chile, 'but nowh:ere does-the spy business seem to be in such dreadful shape as in West. Germany. ? Horst Ehmke, who as a former cabinet minister had the responsibility of overseeing the Federal In- telligence Agency, recent- ly said it was in "a deso- late state." This appeared to be indirectly substanti- ated by recruiting ads the agency recently placed in West German papers, call- ing on patriotic you men to.join in .this exciting and adventurous business. In Chile, the CIA and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are accused of engaging in nasty business ? designed to overthrow President Salvatore Al- lende. But at least the. coup ? 'whoever en- ? gineered it?was success- ful. ?Here, - the accusations -against the West German' agency are not of success- ful, only dubious opera- :Lions. They include -charges of delving into the bed and booze habits of lo- cal politicians, and of pad- ding the spook network with relatives. Not to men- tion the dramatic, if dread- fully regular,, disclosures of Communist successes in. 'penetratinghigh echelons hire. If it .sounds More amus- Mg than alarming, that's the way it's always been with 'West German intel- ligence agencies. which employ about 12,000 peo- ple. But there is a serious side, too. West 'Germany is a hap- py hunting ground for Communist spies, and un- told secrets have found 'their way eastward through this Jam!, which. an American chief opera- tive here once described as "a huge sieve through which secrets easily flow." Recently, the truth of that statement has become increasingly obvious. A Communist spy, Guenter Guillaume, was arrested last April while working literally at former Chan- cellor Willy Brandt's el- bow. But there is some doubt whether enough evidence can be collected to prosecute him. The dis- closure forced Brandt to resign. ' Since then, the fur has begun to fly as pOliticians and other concerned peo- ple demanded an explana- tion how a spy could, un- detected, reach the exalted position of personal advi- ser to the Chancellor. The, investigation is still under, way on several levels, but already it has produced some startling disclosures and destroyed a few myths. The most important. of the latter concern the fa- mous "Gehlen organiza- tion," the federal intel- ligence agency run until recently by a nebulous fig- ure from the Nazi past, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen. Gehlen ran Adolf Hitler's eastern intelligence ser- . vice during the war. After- wards; the U.S. Army hap- pily took over his organi- zation, located at' Pullach near- Munich, and even-. tinily: It became the core of the new-found Federal Republic's external intel- ligence network; always with the shadowy Gehlen at the helm.. The fact that so little was known about the Gehlen organization publicly only enhanced the aura of mys- tery about it. Even the dis- closure in the early '60s that one of Gehlen's closest confidants was a Soviet spy failed to dim his , luster. - The public furore over the Guillaume affair has led to the unlocking of pre- viously tightly sealed doors. Gehlen emerges somewhat less shadowy, and .a great deal more as a man of questionable professional ethics with a propensity for feathering . the bed with his own re7 latives. The spadework is 'now in the hands of a parliamen- tary investigating commit- tee. But even beforehand, enough doubt about the true worth of Gehlen and his agents was raised to, start up a bureaucratic in- vestigation into the Geh- len organization, known by its German initials, the BND (for Bundesnachrich- tendienst or federal intel- ligence service). Some fascinating infor- mation has come to light. Although it has not been officially published, the re- port notes that among the BND employees were two of Gehlen's daughters and their husbands, the hus- band of a third daughter, Gehlen's brother, an illegi- timate daughter by a for- mer Secretary. and Geh- len's brother-in-law. Al- together, more than 100 re- latives of top END officials were hired by the ofgani- zation. Testifyinab before the committee, Ehmke further subtracted from whatever _ luster remained on the image of the Gehlen orga- nization. Ehmke revealed that he had ordered the de- struction of END dossiers on about 54 prominent West German politicians? dossiers apparently main- tained despite a strict ban on internal and domestic activity by the organiza- tion. A high official from the BND told the committee last week that there were more than 54 dossiers .on politicians. But he stressed that the great majority were started during the years when the Gehlen or- ganization was under U.S. government control. As the Americans do with the CIA and FBI, the Germ,ans have split domestic and foreign intel- iigenee operations Into two ? separate organizations, the- ; domestic under the Interior' Ministry and the foreign ; coming directly under the chancellor's office. This division of authori-q ty obviously hasn't im- proved the efficiency of. either the. END or its.- domestic counterpart', la- boriously known as the Of- fice for the Protection of the Constitution. The inep- titude of this office, which is supposed to protect West Germany against en-.. emy spies, was well illus-. trated by the Guillaume., case. . Even before Guillaume "fled" to West Germany in the mid-50s as a Commu?_. mist agent in refugee's clothing, a private organi- zation known as the Inves- tigating Committee of Free Jurist had fingered: him in Berlin for suspicious activities. .When Gull, laurne ? was:called to work in the Chancellor's office,. the heart of West German government, a routine Se- curity check was made on, him. The West Berlin author- ities?each of the II West German states has its own Office for the Protection of' the Constitution, each one more jealous of its prero- ? gatives than the next-- sent an abbreviated report on Guillaume to headquar- ters in Cologne. There it was promptly misfiled, and Guillaume came out clean. For this kind of serince,. the West Germantaxpayer shells out well over $100 million a year. This was only the start of a series of curious goings-on. Some were so unusual that the political opposition began to smell what they suspect was the biggest coverup since Sal- ly Rand put. her fans back on. The bizarre operations of the intelligence communi- ty here have been partly unclothed by the parlia- mentary investigation committee. Gehlen hasn't yet appeared, pleading il- lness, but the deputies have. looked closely at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. What they have found 26 Approved For. Release 2001/08/08 :_CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 . ? Ap.prOved ForRelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ? was a jumble of explana- tens as to what happened. none of which, quite seemed to jibe. Most of the fingers Point at the head of the office, one Guenter Nollau, a man with close links to the ruling Social Democratic Party. Nollau's office comes di- rectly under the compe- tence of the Interior Minis- try; then run by Hans-Die- trich Genscher, the cur-. rent foreign minister and Free Democratic Party leader in the coalition ca- binet. From testimony both gave to the investi- gating committee, it is ?evident that Nollau didn't inform his minister thor- oughly of the suspicions about Guillaume's spying WASHINGTON POST 5 November 1974 Victor Zorza activities. ? Nollau said he informed Genscher "as broadly as seemed necessary." Gen- scher, retorted that he got "not a full, but only a par- tial briefing" from Nollau. The two men also contra- dicted each other on whether Nollau rec- ommended that Brandt' should take Guillaume with him on a summer va- cation in Norway in 1973. The spy was the only per- sonal aide with Brandt on that trip, and it is alleged Ize had access to top secret military documents at the time. Brandt said he kept Guillaume on as his aide at the recomm endation of Noli lau, even though he thought it a bad idea. He Communists In AT Countries Repeated rumors of CIA plots to "de-stabilize" the Portuguese regime, prompt the question: What did Dr. Kis- singer mean When he said that "I don't see why we need to stand by, and watch-a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." The quotation is from the minutes of the "40 Committee" discussions in 1970 on secret operations in Chile. It is difficult to Credit the rumors from Lisbon, if only because informed opinion in Washington agrees that it would be the height of folly to prompt a coup in Portugal. But Kissinger has other ways of pursuing his objective, and some politicians in the NATO countries are worried -that he may go too far. They believe that he is trying to use NATO to manipulate the inter- nal politics of the member countries. The Communists now in the Portu- - guese government, and Communist leaders in Italy, say that they don't want to take their countries out of NATO. To advocate departure from NATO would be to give the impression of moving toward the Soviet camp and to lose public support. NATO member- ship is seen by some people as a guar- antee of democracy and thus, per- versely, as the condition under which 'their country could afford to have Communists in the government. Therefore Washington, by eounte- nancing Portugal's membership of ? NATO, may appear to be signalling Rome that Italy too could stay in has said he resigned as chancellor because of this mistake. One unanswered question is whether Gild-- laume was protected by higher-ups in the Social Democratic Party. A bigger unanswered question is- what to do about the mess in Bonn's intelligence services. Even Prof. Ehmke, the most out- spoken of the critics of the BND and a man who, as minister in the Chancel- lor's office during Brandt's _tenure in offide was re- sponsible for watching the organization, has little to say in this respect. An intelligence pool, in which all the various agen- cies would assemble their information, could .have NATO as well as have CoMmunists hi- the coalition. This is certainly not the message Washington wants to convey, and it has engaged in some elaborate behind-the-scenes maneuvering to get its point across. ' Now the meeting of the NATO De- fense Ministers comprising the Nu- clear Planning Group, which was due to be held in Rome this week, has been postponed. One reason Washington gate was that it could not disclose highly secret information to a govern- ment whose Communist members or officials might pass it back to MoscOW. . It was serving notice also on Italian politicians who favor a coalition with Communists that, ultimately, they might have to choose between such a coalition and NATO membership. Portugal's request for economic aid during President Gomes' recent visit to Washington also elicited a polite lecture from Kissinger about the diffi- culty of getting congressional aid ap- ' propriations these days, especially for countries with Communist connec- tions. Portuguese officials argue, as po- litely, that economic aid would aVert the impending massive unemployment, and the concomitant political unrest which could- push the country further to the left. By delaying the aid, and by using it as a political lever, Washing- ton may be hastening the very result it wants to prevent. Any basis for predicting the likely course of events has now been swept away by the new electoral law which increased the electorate from two mil- lion to five. Some public opinion polls taken privately in Portugal indicated a Communist vote of between l and 20 per cent, but that was before the new law. The March election will produce only a Constituent Assembly, not a new government, and therefore the chances are that the Communists will stay on in the coalition. In a country where the Catholic reli- gion and tradition count for so much, the danger is not of a massive vote for caught Guillaume at an' early stage, he suggests..., But any fusion or closer melding of the agencies' would not only be uncon- stitutional but unwise. 'Would you like to see- the CIA and the FBI under, one roof?" he asks. - The prospects, then, are.. for more fun and games the spook business here. At best, some of the more dubious and and most inef- ficient aspects of the oper- ations will be eliminated. But there seems a good, chance that West Germa-.' ny will continue to be a happy hunting ground for enemy agents and other persons such as weapons dealers who in the past used the BND as a cover for their activities. ? the -Communists which Would catapult them to power. Nor do present Com- munist tactics in Western Europe call for the use of coalitions to take over, slice by slice, the governments of which they are members. The salami tactics they once used in Eastern Europe have been replaced by" a strategy more suited to the Western democratic tradition. This may not be accepted by all Communists in all West- European countries. Some party officials obviously find it difficult to shed the habits of a lifetime. But the political climate does not favor them. What Europe's Communists now want is to convert the sizeable vote they often get in national elections into a share of government power com- ? menstirate with it. They want an op- portunity to show that the policies. they advocate are worthy of even wider support. And . they want to engage, from the inside, in all the power games and intrigues which the estab- lished political parties have practieed in seeking to dominate the political life of their countries. Non7Communists and anti-Commu- nists in the West obviously have a po- litical as well as an ideological stake in preventing such Communist domina- tion. But unless they recognize the change which has come over Western Communist parties, and adjust their own tactics accordingly, they are more likely to advance the Communists' ob- jectives than to thwart them. For the United States, and for NATO, this means evolving a new formula which would allow NATO membership of countries with Communists in their gov- ernments, rather than theatening to isolate or to east out such countries. The Soviet Union can afford to in- vade its allies. The United States can- not, and will not, and must therefore find other ways of dealing with the problem. cD 1974. Victor Zr 27 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 . " THE ECONOMIST kEMEER 9, 1974 wo noes that say yes to war The rules of the game have changed. Mr Kissinger pushed his stamina by taking in the Middle East at the tail end of his prodigious tour that began in Moscow on October 23rd, but it was vital that he should learn at first hand just how much the decisions taken at the Arab summit at Rabat last week have hardened the Arab- Israeli bargaining scene. When he was last in the Middle East, less than a month ago, it was doubtful whether his piece- meal technique of separate agreements was still feaSible; now, after Rabat, it almost certainly is not. It's that "almost" which seems to have been foremost in Mr Kissinger's mind when he landed at Cairo on Tuesday evening. His main purpose was to find out whether a separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiation could yet be salvaged from the Arab rulers' argument that bargaining for the return of the Egyptian; Syrian and Jordanian land that Israel occupied. in 1967 -should be collective and simultaneous. On Wed- nesday President Sadat said he saw no reason why the Rabat decisions should have "put any block" on the step-by- step procedures. But the Arabs are unlikely to let these procedures get very far until Israel accepts, at least in principle, the public and far more important Arab ruling that the Palestine Liberation Organisation should even- tually control the Palestine territory (the West Bank and Gaza) now occupied by Israel. There is no evidence that when Mr Kissinger visited Jerusalem on Thursday he tried to get Israel to rethink its flat refusal to treat with the PLO. Israelis, fearful that the pressure will come, were deeply concerned by President Ford's? comment at his news conference on October 29th that Israel will have to negotiate "either with Jordan or the PLO". The State Department quickly said that this was merely a slip of the tongue, but then on Wednesday a spokesman said that the phrase still stood. The huge rally in New York on Monday protesting against the PLO's participation in the UN debate on the Middle East due next week is an early warning of the domestic difficulties the American Administration ill run into if or when it starts leaning on Israel to qualify its attitude. Forestalling Mr Kissinger's arrival, Israel's prime minister, Mr Rabin, re- iterated on Tuesday his government's uncompromising rejection of the PLO as a negotiating partner. The sense of impending danger brought all his ministers and indeed all his party in what appeared to be a straight line behind him. There was not a whisper of the kind of deviation that in July had allowed Mr Aharon Yariv, the information minister and a former security chief, to suggest that negotia- tions with the PLO would be possible if the guerrilla organisation acknowledged the existence of the Jewish state and all that this implied. Mr Yariv's con- dition is of fundamental importance? and was no doubt a central issue in the long discussion that President Sadat had with Mr Arafat immediately before Mr Kissinger's arrival in Cairo. But so far Israel's official line is to reject any negotiation with the PLO, and the PLO's is to reject any acceptance of Israel. Israel's refusal to consider talks with the PLO is not unlike the Arab refusal, after the 1967 war, to consider direct talks with Israel?a negative attitude based on fear. In fact, in both instances, the question of Who negotiates with whom is less important than what is negotiated about. The PLO is reported to have delegated negotiating power to Egypt but this is basically irrelevant. The question Israel has to answer is whether it is prepared to consider NEW YORK TIMES 11 November 1974 COAST U.N. CENTER 1AD1AGED BY BUB rp Special to The New York Times LOS ANGELES, Nov. 10?A omb went off early this morn- g and caused extensive dam- age in a 'United Nations infor- Mation center bookstore in the Wilshire section of the city. No 6ne was injured. ''The Los Angeles police said that the bomb, which exploded at. 2:45 A.M. in a deserted busi-1 ness district, , had shattered! eass in several buildings. The police estimated the damage at $5.000. Shortly afterward, anony-1 in!-Ns phone calls were received by The Los Angeles Times and .1.)y radio station KFWB. ? The police said that the mes- sages, similar in content, were made by a young man who re- ferred to the bomb as "a thank- ;you note from the P.L.O. [Pal- ?estine Liberation Organization] to the United Nations." In the call to The Los :Angeles Times, the man added; "for letting them address the United Na- tions.." In closi g, the railer added Cr which , ui D-Acoa I_ ague. L u ted Nations has handing over the West Bank to an , ; independent Palestinian authority. That in turn is linked to the question of the , PLO's recognition of Israel. Mr Rabin on Tuesday repeated Mrs Meir's long-held view that there is room for two states only between the Mediter- ranean and the desert: Israel and one other. The implicationaleft by various Israeli leaders is that it is for the Arabs themselves to work out whether. the "other" state should be Palestine or Jordan. But now the chips are down, do the Israelis really Mean this? One reason for thinking that they do not, really, is that there could scarcely be a clearer call for revolution in Jordan. King Hussein, now obliged to accept that his claim to the West Bank is past history, is putting up the barricades. He has ruled out the possibility of a future confederation between Jordan and the envisaged Palestinian state (a compromise that a lot of Palestinians on both sides of the line were looking forward to); even more disconcertingly he has declared that the Palestinians in Jordan (believed to number more than half the 2m inhabitants) will soon have to stand up and be counted as Jordanians or as visiting Palestinians. The king used to be almost alone among leading Jordanians in insisting on the wider view of Jordan and its continuing responsibility to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation; he is now carrying the abandonment of this policy to its logical conclusions. So King Hussein is out of the game. The Israelis are still in it, and in the West Bank, and the PLO still seems to say no to Israel. It is an impasse that could mean war again. agreed to let' representatives of the P.L.O. 'participate in the 'General Assembly debate on the Middle East, starting Wednes- day. A police. spokesman said ?Ihere have been a number of incidents recently involving the Palestine -Liberation Organiza- tion which is opposed to the State of Israel; and the Jewish .Defense League. Several bomb scares, picketing and protest marches, have occurred, he said, but he added that this .was the first time a United Na- ,tions organization had been The Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation announced it would in- vestigate to determine if "revo- lutionari or terrorist activity" was involved. The ,bookstore, Tun by the Los Angeles chapter of the United Nations Association, is a nonprofit organization that distributes United Nations lit- erature and raises funds for United Nations organizations. "The most immediate and serious loss is the destruction of UNICEF. [United Nations international Childrens Emer- gency Fund] Christmas cards," said Dr. John Erving, president of the local ? United Nations Association. The sale of the cards benefits starving and homeless children around the world. lie said the blast de- .1:,,ved about :310,(0i) to $15,- worth of cards and U.N. calendars. - Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77,00432R000100340003-7 Apj'roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400133-7 THE ECONOMIST NO1r7AIBER 9..1974 If it has to be war If war does break out again in the Middle East neither the Israelis nor the Arabs can achieve quite the surprise the Arabs brought off last year. The Israelis, super- sensitised by their unreadiness in 1973, have overhauled their intelligence ser- vice, and are alert in their forward positions, on their radar sets and on their communications monitors. The Arabs, for their part, are keenly alive to the threat of an Israeli pre-emptive strike. And to launch a ground attack ?either side would have to build up its forces in one of the limited-force zones, which are inspected to some extent by .UN troops, and would then have to . cross .the UN buffer zone itself. It is hard to see all this happening without the other side getting some warning. _ ? But there are many ways to knock an enemy off balance: the time and place of the attack, and the size and weaponry of the attacking force, can be manipulated in unexpected ways. A boldly-executed quick strike by either side could well decide the outcome of a new conflict. To strike first has always been a good military tactic; it worked well for Israel in 1967 and for Egypt in 1973. And the 1973 fighting showed that there may now be a new kind of warfare?the snort battle of -attrition. Modern weapons have become so potent that they can kill large num- bers of men and destroy enormous quantities, of material in no time at all; the 1973 war ground up some .?800m worth of equipment in a week. This puts an even bigger premium on getting in the first blow. There is another reason why Israel in particular might decide to attack first. Time is against it. Arab money is buying an arsenal of modern equipment from the west, which could eventually find its way to the front-line countries. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have ordered large quantities of weapons recently, includ- ing supersonic fighters, air defence missiles and tanks. Against this, one lesson of the 1973 war is that conventional warfare is now in one of those periods when tech- nology, favours the defence. Many aircraft were destroyed by missiles in the 1973 fighting, and by guns after being forced into the guns' range-by the threat of the missiles. Tanks were broken up by new lightweight anti- tank missiles and by modern tank artil- lery using new kinds of ammunition. But the edge may have been taken off these novelties by now. The Israelis, who depend much more on air power than the Arabs do, now have new American electronic equipment which will go a long way towards countering the . anti-aircraft missiles, the Sam-6 especially, that did so much damage in 1973. And they should have learned that tanks must be supported by in- fantry and artillery when attacking a well-armed enemy. They certainly learned that the Arabs are good soldiers when properly led and trained. The Where the armies face each other VA Egyptian I limited_ . Israeli force zones UN forces --- - ------_-----I-ES / ' eireL6 /Damascus I ... '--ISRAELI..--../ -." Tel Aviv ..?11 JerutAanilemman...------' Port Said_L-, v C ..,?.--_------- / \ % I Eilat 1 \ ' JORDAN \ t I 7 / % I . , ...., ? r ?? SAUDI ARABIA ? Syrian limited - Israeli fforce zones UN forces o ,Gahlee 1 Arabs think so too. The trouble there is that Egypt and, even more, Syria may have forgotten the 1973 war's signal message to them: that at the end they Were losing it. If fighting starts again in the next few weeks, Israel will be relatively stronger than it was when the 1973 war began, _although perhaps .not ,by much. The United States has replaced its losses of equipment and provided some new things; it is reported that the rate of supply has been accelerated in the past few weeks. It has delivered some TV-guided "Maverick" missiles which are the sort of technical advance that could upset the lessons of the 1973 war by permitting accurate bombing at long ranges, with the planes less exposed to missiles and guns. But the central question here is whether the Americans have also given Israel laser equipment and the guided bombs that go with it. One of the major question marks, if war breaks out again, is whether the United States will be willing?or indeed able?to undertake another immense resupply operation of 1973 propor- tions. Not only are its own stocks of weapons a lot lower now, but there is a serious question whether the present Portuguese regime would permit the transport planes to refuel in the Azores. If it would not, and the other nations along the route balk as they did last time, it would be virtually impossible for the United States to give the kind of emergency transfusion of weapons it did during the fighting in 1973. Russia has also done a major re- equipping job, and Syria, like Israel, is probably better armed now than before the last war. Russia has let the Syrians have some Mig-23 "Flogger" aircraft? at least the equal of any plane Israel now has?and it has delivered more aircraft and other modern equipment to other 2.9 /.1 0 Miles ID JORDAN I Arab countries. But these deals have been kept very secret: an accurate assessment of the numerical balance of power in planes, tanks and other weapons is not possible. How the fighting might go is pure guesswork. The most likely beginning is a first strike by Israel, possibly in the Golan Heights. The Israelis would try to drive deep into Syria in an attempt to destroy the Syrian army, and perhaps take Damascus. One objective would be to prevent the Syrians using their long-range Scud missiles against Israeli cities. Since the Syrian army is probably better equipped than Egypt's, and is closer to Israel, it would make one kind of sense for Israel to attack it first, while holding the Egyptians in the south. As an immediate response to an Israeli attack, or conceivably as a first strike of their own, the Arabs might launch large-scale air strikes on Israeli oil-storage sites, and simultaneously mine Israel's deep-water ports from the air. They would lose a lot of aircraft to Israeli fighters, but this is probably the best use the Arabs could make of their air power; if it worked, it would reduce Israel's ability to fight a war to a few days. The entire Syrian army could be thrown at once into the fighting on the Golan Heights to try to stop the Israeli advance while the Egyptians attacked into Sinai, perhaps threatening the Abu Rudeis oil fields. It would be essential for the Arabs to keep the momentum up; once the front became static, the Israelis could reinforce the Syrian front rapidly. Speculating on the result may be easier than trying to foresee the action. The probability, if Israel escapes being crippled in the first few days, is that it would win in the next 10 days. It would be a bloody fortnight. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London it November 1974 ? PETER GILL;' in Da.--cci, a/-3*n.""-r-7aT;gg:irLn?i?n7ror---r India and Bangladesh which the World Food Conference considers this week. ? COMPLIMENTS spilled from the lips ;?.)f Di Kissinger' in 'India ? and Bangladesh last week as if they alone were the language of diplomacy. Yes, India was very Much a major power, and no, it ? was not often you had the privilege -- of meeting someone of the vision ? of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime Minister of Bangladesh. It is pos- . charted. In large parts of western ? India during the summer, rainfall was far below normal and crops withered. In Bangladesh and in the ? eastern Indian States of West Bengal, Assam and Orissa, the rains were far top plentiful. Crops did ? not ripen, or were washed away by floods. A depressing cycle of poor crops throughout the world in the past ? three years has led to? the most critical imbalance of demand over supply. It is this situation to which the world's food planners will address themselves this week and next in Rome. eleto s dia's cupboar sible, but on past experience ,most unlikely, that this and much more besides will mute official Indian in- dignation I'hen a CIA plot is next unearthed within ten thousand miles of New Delhi, and that the Beegalis will be constrained from burrarig down American libraries when Washington next upsets ?,Chl more important issues Dr Kissinger got nowhere.- There is, no prospect of the Indians ever viewing with sympathy the Ameri- can plan to build up the British Indian Ocean base of Diego Waroia. As for any modest American arms shipment to Pakisten, that will be immediately and automatically in- terpreted in New Delhi as an act Of appalling ill faith.' e. ? < 'Diplomacy of :tins sort is no longer the pritaity it was when Governments in the region were moving with painful deliberation to Clear up the mess left by the '1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The im- portant factor now is food. ' Left to' himself, Dr Kissinger might even have liked to "see at first hand the effects'of the famine that now grips much of eastern India and Bangladesh. . Tomorrow he addresses the opening session of the __World Food Conference in Rome, and a vision of skeletal adults and starving children would have illuminated his speech rather more than statistics, but India is embarrassed by the famine; Bangladesh much less so. It was Mrs Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, who proclaimed the country's self-sufficiency in food three years ago, and vowed never again to accept grain on the eheap from America. Later, as the gap. between basic- need's and anticipated production widened, her Government dithered about asking for help. Several million tons were bought, but still the gap widened. Now the Indians have asked the Americans and others for help,' although Dr Kissinger, in another delicete compliment, refrained from putting it quite like that. The Bengalis have yet to find such self-respect. The world, it was argued, owed them a living after the 1971 war, and the world coughed up, in the largest United Nations disaster operation ever. mounted. Since the present famine began, the begging bowl has been proferred to anyone who could help, American, European or Arab. On the face Of it, the famine in India and Bangladesh this year can he easily explained and precisely Dr Kissinger himself, with solid achievement behind him in Viet- nam, the Middle East and in detente, will be seeking to strike yet another blow for humanity. He told the Indians as much last week: "We will offer a compre- hensive programme as our contri- bution to freeing mankind from the eternal struggle for-sustenance. We will increase our production at home, so there will be more food available for shipment abroad, and we will help developing nations in, crease their own production, which is the only long-term solution to the problem." Politically unpopular Part of Dr Kissinger's plan appears to be to shame the oil producers into reducing their prices?" no nation or. bloc of nations can impose its narrow in- terests without tearing the fabric of international co-operation "? and then harness surplus oil funds to the fight against famine.. Western agricultural technology, backed by Arab funds, could well lead to increased food production in 'India and Bangladesh. Reduc- tions in the price of oil would also ease the. foreign exchange shortage facing India and Bangladesh and enable them to spend rather more money on development than on survival. There are other? sides to the famine that the diplomatic Dr Kissinger will almost certainly side-step. He may even think it too indelicate to mention that famines are caused just as much by too many, people as by too little food. India once enjoyed a fine reputa- tion for her financial and political ? commitment to .family planning, but in the past few years she has lost it, Politicians find that refer- ences to birth control win them, no votes, and may even cost them a few, so they have ahnost stopped talking about it. When the economic blizzard hit India last year, the family. plan- . ning budget was drastically cut. Indeed, the grim facts of life con- fronting India and Bangladesh seem to equire a more urgent and less sophisticated response. The Bangladesh Planning Com- mission has hinted darkly at the ? possibility of introducing commit. sory birth control. Sterilisation, compulsory abortion or ?disincen- tives for couples who err by having too many children naturally horrify. liberal Westerners, but they do. not' have to stand by and watch whole communities battered and uprooted by famine. , There are other areas in which' the Governments of India and; Bangladesh can be held respone sible for failing to guard against famine. The weather over the past few years 'has certainly been: against the farmer, but Govern- ments in planned economies have a more than usual duty to support' their rural producers. Instead, farmers in the granaries of western India have gone without fuel with; which to drive irrigation pumps and agricultural machinery. Many have also had to do without ferti- liser because the factories that should produce it are either func- tioning at well below capacity in the case of Bangladesh, not' functioning at all. In predominantly- agricultural societies, food production and dis- tribution play an abnormally large pa-rt in national politics. Govern-', ment parties, the Congress it? India and the Awami League in Bangladesh, are deeply 'enmeshed. in the politics of food and find, themselves again and again coming out in favour of the bigger farmers and the bigger merchants, who are also their biggest vote gatherers." In India, the Congress is wedded in theory to the notion of sweep- ing hind reforms, but little is ever' done about it. New Delhi regularly denounces hoarding, and does so even more fervently at a time of famine or elections, but at local and district level the biggest offenders are often Congress politicians. In Bangladesh; such corruption' and profiteering is a way of life. At a time of particular shortage and pronounced public disquiet, the Government , announced another drive against the corrupt and the profiteering, but the politicians and officials who find themselves briefly behind hers are the unlucky ones. Honest officials who try to do their jobs eon- scientioth?ly are watched like hawks by party bosses, lateanwhee the landless poor become poorer Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :?1e1A-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 _ _ Apbroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340093-7 SONDA7 TEIEGRAPH, London 27 October 197I, HE grave internal crisis threatening India -- com- ounded of food shortages, dustrial stagnation, infla- on that makes British price ises seem modest and per- asive official corruption ? as this year reawakened in Indian newspaper editors an 'most dormant instinct for ampaigning journalism. Among national papers eeking to expose Govern- en t deficiencies, he Hindustan Times of New elhi has led the way and it as now paid the penalty. eorge Verghese, 47, soft- poken editor for almost six ears, has been told to go. A Cambridge economics grad- ate, he worked briefly for the asgotv?Hercild and the Neins hronicle in London before oining the -Times of India, nother of the big four Delhi apers, shortly after indepen- ence. But it was his three years s Press secretary to Mrs. andhi, Indian Prime Minister, hat now provide the richest r.ony. Trouble began in February ten the Hindustan Times pub- shed two blistering articles temising the "pre-election weeteners " deployed by Mrs. andhi's Congress Government o win the assembly elections? Uttar Pradesh, India's largest te?" A factory her. an rrigation scheme there, a uni-. ersity everywhere, railway lines or the asking and gifts for v.erybody, all from an ??empty xchequer and in defiance of ational plans, programmes and riorities.' ..? "Whatever the result," wrote THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 9, 1974 India by PETER GILL in New Delhi ' ? Mr. Verghese in an editorial before the anticipated Congress victory, "this much is certain, India has' lost." In March he returned to the attack in two signed articles in the Sunday Supplement, now ? closed for lack of newsprint. They were closeiy, almost den- sely, argued and largely con- structive, but there were acid observations about Mrs. Gandhi. "The Prime Minister has no programme, no 1,vorld view, no grand design . . bereft of a frame. She has merely reacted to events and failed to shape them. This hes- been her tragedy. She has a mandate, but no mission." Last month the seal was set on Mr. Verghese's career when, under the withering ,.headIine "Kanchenjunga, here we come," . he dismissed as fraudulent India's official justifications for incorporating Sikkim; her tiny Himalayan protectorate, 'into the union. He called it "genteel annexa- - tion without representation," and added: "... A protectorate moving to 'freedom with India' by annexation through constitutional legerdemain." The conclusion, approvingly quoted by Peking Radio, was even- more damning: "Perhaps no need for the common man to ask for bread. He's getting' Sikkim." The man who sacked George Verghese (he is not due. to go Love is war FROM OUR INDIA CORRESPONDENT ndia's backward and notoriously cor- rupt state of Bihar was the scene of a showdown this week between its govern- ment and Jayaprakash Narayan, the ageing Gandhian leader who has been campaigning for months to oust that government from power. On Monday Mr Narayan called for a massive siege around government offices in Patna, e state capital. Large numbers of olice and para-military forces kept the emonstrators at bay but Mr Narayan imself was slightly injured. He respon- ed by calling for a one-day general until the new year) is Urishna- Kumar Birla, chairman of .the IlinduStan Times and scion of the 'mighty Birla industrial' empire in Calcutta. The Birlas. who arrived in Calcutta some 80 years ago to trade in silver and opium, now control a network of more .than 40 huge companies. Although pposition news- papers have. claimed that Mrs. Gandhi applied direct pressure on the Birlas to remove' their editor,-both Government spokes- men and Mr. Ti. K. Birla deny the charge. "I do not take orders from the Prime Minister,"' Mr. .Birla from, a deputation of Hindustan Times journalists. But Mr. Birla is _known to have political ambitions, and has twice .tried without success' for election -to -the -Indian?parlia- ment. His last attempt, in Uttar Pradesh in February. failed when Mrs.. Gandhi's Congress party refused to back him as an independent candidate for the upper house. "No one believes that George Verghese is saying all this independently," Mr. Birla is reported to have told a senior Indian journalist to whom he offered the Hindustan Times editorship. "They always involve us with these criticisms, and our posi- tion is false." ? Neither Mr. Birla not Mr. Verghese is talking publicly about the sacking, but the issue may be forced into the open strike against the "barbarous atrocities" of the police. Mr Narayan is demanding the disso- lution of the Bihar assembly as a first step towards restructuring the entire Indian political system to rid it of cor- ruption and the abuse of power. But Mrs Gandhi, who gave in to a similar demand in Gujarat last spring, has declared that she will not repeat that "mistake" under any circumstances. She realises that if she yields in Bihar she will soon be faced with the same situation in other states, especially nearby ones such as West Bengal. But there is no doubt that Mr Narayan's efforts are. winning him considerable support throughout the country as he echoes the most pressing grievances of when the Indian Press council hears complaints from Mr. Verghese's supporters. A further dispute over the publi- cation of private correspOndence :between the two men could land the laW-:courts. So for Indian editors and inde- pendent journalists, the sacking of Mr. Verghese is further evi- dence of what they regard as an insidious , official campaign to erode Press freedom in India.. In a series of adjudications this month, the Indian Press _ council has condemned State , governments for withdrawing official advertising as punish- ment for papers refusing to toe the line. The council has also pronounced on the official Indian practice of offering journalists cut-price housing and .prece- dence in obtaining telephones, scooters, and cars, yet withdraw- ing these same privileges when journalists criticise the Government. The Poona High Court had to step in last month to order the State electricity board to restore power to ?a local - newspaper group which had continued printing with the aid of a tractor engine despite official dis-, pleasure. The editor of one Bihar newspaper was murdered' by "persons unknown" after running critical articles on smuggling rackets, and the: offices of another were burnt down while, according to the: Press council, officials Stood by delighted. ; Staff at the Hindustan Times fear that the future indepen- dence of the paper has been gravely compromised by the Verghese affair. Mr. Birla has already stated privately that the next editor will have to con- sult him on all -matters of editorial policy, and the Indian government itself may be waiting in the wings, "We can't say too much or else the Government will say that Birla is running the paper badly and appoint a couple of directors to the board," said Mr. C. P. Rsmachandran, assistant editor of the Hindustan Times and chairman of a new corn- mittee to protect its indepen- dence. "Then we'd be finished." the Indian man in the street. Modelling his method of agitation on Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation against the British, Mr Narayan has called upon Bihar farmers to stop pay- ing land rent and talks, of organising a "parallel legislative assembly". But most ominous for the ruling Congress party is his bid to win over the police by calling upon demonstrators, in effect, to make love not war. Despite his denunciation of the police, he invites his supporters to fraternise with them and persuade them to change sides. Police discipline has not broken down so far but the sheer numbers of the central government's forces despatched to Bihar this week indicate that Mrs Gandhi is taking no chances. 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 NEW YORK TIMES, ,S'ATURDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1974 Montagnard Uprising Poses a Threat to Saigon Drivel ? ? By JAMES M. MARKHAM Spedat to The New York Times BAN ME THUOT, South Viet- nam, Oct. 25?An armed re- bellion of dissident montagnard tribesmen has broken out in opened .betwen them."- , Sympathy and Fear For theiepart,7many montag- narcis ,find 'themselves caught between mixed feelings of sym- pathy and fear of the rebels and nervousness about the Govern: the province of Darlac and May ment police reaction. A dee- be spreading into neighboringi ument issued in the name -of ' corners of the strategic Central the rebels charges that from . July through - September -160 Highlands. ' ' tribesmen have - been If it continues to grow; thekilled and masSacrede others uprising, which is the to captured andsubjected .to have some 500 men under savage .torture." arms, coiild imperil the Saipan Another, -dispassionate source Government's struggle against put .t.le number of montagnards the Communists in the high- 1 I arrested by the*Government at lands. Some people here believe that about 100. Some were reported- ly taken as suspects in acts of the Communists .haveeinfiltrat- ed the nascent movement. 0th- banditry and murder, others for: ers argue that a Government crackdown on the rebels is ra- pidly alienating tribesmen who are not disposed to join the in- surrection and who hate the Communists. Warning' by Official 1;:"it's going to he very bad ere," warned Y.Jut Buon To, the dynamic, 31-year-old head of ethnic minority sep.ices in The rangers have so far not the. highlands. "I don't think clashed with the lightly armed they can ever solve it with the rebels,, who have avoided direct military. It should be solved by fighting with. regular militarY the political." " . units and have devoted most of ? "I don't want. to get my their energies to whining over people, killed," he added. 'They 'villagers and- trying to stay: are ethnic minorities?they are alite.. going to. be come more minori= The montagnard revolt, which ty./1 :is 'thought to be led by a.disaf- Compounding the problems, a fected former ? civil servant. wave of brutal killings and rob- inamed Y Kpa Koi, is .not With; beries?attributed by some to out precedent. In 1964 and. the rebels, by others to bandits lagain in late 1965, montagnard who justify pillage in the name Itroops, rallying to the standard of the United Front for the IStruggle of the Oppressed Ra- ices, staged bloody rebellions ;that had to be put down with force. Grievances .Pare .Many But, until recently, the' and, most importantly, govern-1 gave their rebellion the en. ment in the highlands. . ? dorsement of Y Bharri. Enuol, Public services, particularly the principal Fulro leader. e . health and education, have. The whereabonts. of Mr. Y' been skimpily provided. Many Bham Enuol is a mystery. His montagnards, live ,in squalor, customary residence in Phnom:. with illiteracy and ? disease; Penh but some montagnards their population _growth rate ?say .he is in Indonesia, while yet another report says he is ill in France:- ? ? . "Oh, Fulro, Fulro," saidane French coffee planter, sipping a beer in Ban Me Thuot'S dingy French restaurant. ? "Before, they put it all on the backs of the Viets.. [Communists]. Now they blame the Fulros. The Fail- .ros don't need to. steal refriger- ators; they don't kill old. ladies in the middle of the streets." 'Though the rebellion began in IDarlac Province?whose popu- lation of 270,000 is estimated to be 45 per cent Vietnamese .and 55 per cent montagnard?there are signs that it has begun to spread. Occasional acts of vi- olence on the Darlac pattern have been noted in adjoining .highlands provinces. The movement's future may well 'depend on the Govern- ment's response. Nay Luett, the montagnard Minister of Ethnic Development, has so far taken a hard line. Mr. Nay Luett, who spent four years hi jail a decade ago for agitating on behalf of his people, denied on a recent claimed the rebellion in the. visit here that Fulro even ex- name of Fulro. isted. No one has a convincing ex-7 .. 'The rebellion 'has produced planation for his action., considerable anguish among Though he had headed the Dar- imontagnard leaders who are lac .chapter of a short-lived. I not unsympathetic to the griev- montagnard political organize- 19.nces that may have produced tion that succeeded Fulro after it. ? ? ? the reconciliation with Saigon ' .? "Right now there are a lot of in the late sixties, Mr. Y Kpa, ,truintagreards in the middle?, Koi was not a well-known fig- I they eannot adjust to what they ure in Fulro itself. should do," said 'Mr. Y Jut ? Some people say that he ran into double with the law over appears to be close to nothing. Moreover, the montagnm,i peoples numbering perhaps 800,000?have suffered cruelly in the war. In 1972 and 1973 alone, 150,000. montagnard? were reportedly made refugee? by the .fighting; some 70 per all, cent of a montagnards now ' !lye outside tlaeireoriginal home areas, according to one study: ; At a time of political unrest and economic stagnation throughout South Vietnam, many people here are not sur- prised to find the rnontagnards ?or, so far, the advanced Rhade tribetstirring, too. But some informed monta.g- riards find Mr. Y Kpa Koi, who is a strong-willed, little-educat- ed veteran of the French colo- nial army, a scnneWhat unlikely figure to emerge as the Che Guevara of the highlands. A;Jarai tribesman in his early. 40's, Mr. Y Kpa Koi, whose wife is R'nade, was, until late m No yernber, 1973, a senior adminis- trator in the Ban Me Thuot La-. bor Department. Then he van-. ished into the forests and pro-' their presumed sympathies with the rebels. ? At present, two battalions of Government rangers ? about' 800 men?are set-up in blocka ing positions outside montag- nard villages in Darlac Province while policemeraand militiamen check.the papers of young high- landers. of rebellion?have heightened tension between Vietnamese and the- montagnards. That word is the generic name for the Central Highlands. tribes- men who are not of the same racial origin as the Vietnarriese, .In August, when the violence iGovernment?of President Nguy- reached a peak, .about 50 len Van Thieu had succeeded in people, mostly Vietnamese civi- !mollifying most of the leaders lians, were 'reportedly killed inlof Fair?, asthe organization is highway ambushes and holdups, :known. after its initials in in remote villages in Darlac. !French, and had broiaght many Province. : 1,of them into the civilian admin- While the violence has abat-!iistration. By comparison with ed, Vietnamese traders, taxi-I :previous Vietnamese regimes, men and truck drivers are still i the Thieu Government treated terrified of the lonely roads.' the montagnards fairly well. , But the montagnard grievan- ces' are legion. Vietnamese en- trepreneurs and officials have Senior Vietnamese officials carry handguns for fear of assassination. "There had been- a certain, encroached on and stolen their Union, an understanding, be- land, often swindling the high- tween the two communities," landers with . complicated said -a French priest who has bureaucratic and legal lived in the highlands for many maneuvers. years.'--"But now a gulf. ha a Vietnamese , dominate trade Buon Soathe head of the ethnic minority sources, adding that some shady lumber deals in-1 he has been threatened several volving Chinese middlemen and, fames by Kpa Koi partisans that his idealism was colored who want him to join them. by opportunism. A few suspect "They need leaders" he said. that the Communists may have Judge Y Blieng Hmok, the had a hand in his defection, president of the montagnard Wh tev er his motivations, Mr. Y Kpa Koi gradually at- tracted a number of armed men, many of them demobi- lized irregulars who had kept the automatic rifles and gre- nade launchers that had been supplied by the departed Amer- ica. Took General's Title court here, expressed a perva- sive sadness over the racial schism brought on by the revolt and the Government's response to it. "Without the Vietnamese the montagnards cannot live," he said. "But without the montag- nards, the Vietnamese cannot work in the Central Highlands. "But now the Vietnamese do :Mr. Y Kpa Koi took the title not understand the montaa- of general and soon his troops nards and the montagnards do were displaying a letter in the not understand the Vietna- Darlac villages that purportedly mese." 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 BALTIMORE SUN 7 November 1974- Thien's removal from Vietnamese .,.ear dwind ? By ARNOLD* IL ISAACS Sun Stall Correspondent Saigon ? To the dismay of American officials, events inj South Vietnam in recent weeksj have left many Vietnamese firmly convinced that the United States is no longer sup- porting President Nguyen Van Men. Whether it is true or not ? and American diplomats argue strenuously that it is not ?the belief is Teal enough to play a significant role in the spread- ing movement to drive Mr. Thieu from office. - Sharp cutbacks in American military and economic aid this year have contributed to the widespread impression that the ,U.S. is ditching its old ally. But the most important factor was probably the resignation of former President Nixon. The Americans have sought to persuade the Vietnamese that Washington's commit- ments remained unchanged in the shift of administrations. But the Vietnamese, schooled' in a traditional culture, tend to view political events as flowing not from abstract values but from the, interplay of powerful! figures. In their eyes, Mr: 'Nixon was Mr. Thieu's patron, Iand his departure represented' a heavy blow to Mr. 'Mien. A typical comment was that of Tran Van Tuyen, opposition leader in the lower house of South Vietnam's national as- sembly. "One of the major reasons for the blossoming of these movements" ? the protests against Mr. Thieu ? "was former President Nixon's step- ping down," Mr. Tuyen said in a recent interview. "The Vietnamese consider America has been the most important supporter of Mr. Thieu, and the most enthusias- tic was Mr. Nixon," Mr. Tuyen said. "Now Mr. Nixon is gone land Mr. [Henry Ad Kissinger [Secretary of State] who is :unfriendly to Mr. Thieu, is still here." ',.Senator Vu Van. Mau, head kof the Buddhist-oriented Na- tional Reconcilatiort. Force, re-I Marked that "Mr. Thieu repre-I 'tented Mr. Nixon, but Mr.' Nixon is no longer on the polit- 1,61 scene . . . with the present difficulties it will be very diffi- cult for Mr. Thieu to -stay in office. ? ? Mr. Nixon's political gliost-1 jhaunts Mr. Thieu. in otheri !ways as well. The example of !a President resigning after los- ing the confidence, of his peo- ple was not lost on Vietnamese loppesitionists. It is not at all ;unusual. to hear Vietnamese lhopefey cite Mr. Nixon's ex-- ample in predicting that Mr. Thiel' will step down voluntar- ily Jather than risk chaos ? and Communist advances f? in the country.- They believe, this not be- cause ' they believe in Mr. Thieu's :goodwill but because they: -regard him as being, so thoroughly under the American thumb that when Washington decides it is? time for him to ? go, he will obediently ?leave office. The Nixon resignation and the decline of U.S. aid are far from the only causes of the recent wave of unrest, which sterns from much more funda- mental roots in the war-weari- ness and economic hardship of the Vietnamese population. Still, American diplomats are spending a good deal of time in trying to convince their Vietnamese contacts that U.S. policy has not changed. Last week, at the height of anti-Thieu disturbances in Sai- gon, U.S. officials in Washing- ton leaked a story that the Ford administration is consid- ering asking Congress for a supplemental $300 million in ? military aid for South Vietnam on top of the $700 million Con- gress has already approved. The story was played promi- nently in Saigon newspapers ? it was bannered in the eng- lish-language Saigon Post ? and it appeared deliberately timed to underscore American support for Mr. Thieu at a time?when he was under at- tack. lice. urged as U.S. support NEW YORK TINES 9 November 1974 44 Saigon Legislators Complain :To U.S. Congress About Thieu By DAVID K. SHIPLER Spectal to The New Ycrk Tirats . SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov, 8?A group of 44 opposi tion legislators called on the United States Congress today to use its influence to stop the repressive tactics of the South Vietnamese Government. r The legislators, all Deaputies an the lower? house of the Na- tional Assembly, issued a writ- ten appeal that denounced "be- fore domestic and international 'public opinion the Nguyen Van Thieu authorities' pilicy of bru- talizing Deputies, priests, re- porters and of the savage re- ,pression of the people." This was an apparent refer- ence to the clash 'Oct. 31 be- tween policemen and demon strators in Saigon in which about 75 civilians and police men were injured. Some of those beaten were fvlegislators. "The U. S. Government Should bear responsibility for that policy of brutalizing the Deputies and massacring the people by the Nguyen Van Tha ieu authorities, who have used U. S. aid and assistance to re- press the people." ,. Immediate Action Sought The Deputies appealed to "The U. S. Congress and parlia- Ments of freedom-living coun- tines to exert their influence to \immediately and efficiently put an end to President Nguyen' Van Thieu's repression of the Deputies and the people." ? They called for "leaders of associations, religious groups, cultural groups, intellectuals; journalists and all democracy 'and freedom-loving people in the country ani abroad to sup- port our struggle for this miser- able and repressed people." - At the same time, Tran Van president of the Saigon Bar Association, issued a statement 33 that denounced the Govern- ment for the police hehavior Oct. 31. He charged that the po lice had "committed acts of vi- olence (pushing, rock-throwing, barbed wire barricading, etc.)" The 44 deputies, part of a 156-member lower house, cline mostly from two opposition blocs?the People Social bloc. made up mostly Buddhists, and the Nationalist 'bloc, a Roman Catholic group supporting the anticorruption protests of the Rev. Tran Huu Thanh. ?????? Faith in U.S. Influence Although their appeal con- tained no reference to last, Tuesday's Democratic sweep of the United States Congressional elections, its significance can rardly have escaped them,, There is a kind of unquestioned' faith among -manp Vietnamese: that the United States Govern- ment has infinite' capacities ti influence events in Vietnam. Sime of those involved in the recent . Anti - Government' protests here rave hoped for, some sign of approval frim the- United States, Embassp Ameri- can officials have reportedly been ordered to stay far awayi from potrest groups and de monstrations, lest peiple read' great significance into their presence in the vicinity. The embassp, meanwhile, has sail nothing to alter the im- pression trat Washington con-: tinues to suppirt President Tri-1 eu as the legitimate head of state; but tre Congressional: cuts in aid this year have dilut- ed the perceived support none-' theless, and the oppinents of, President Thieu today wer& clearly hoping ti turn the pa lice violence if last week tol their advantage with -the new Congress. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 November 1974 ?Saigon aid cutbacks being felt Political impact swift? as Thieu foes rally ? By Daniel Southerland Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Saigon ? As a result of congressional cuts in American aid to South Vietnam, Sai- gon's armed forces have reduced their use of ammunition, fuel, helicop- ters, and fighter-bombers. But experts here say that the cuts have not yet markedly weakened the South Vietnamese military machine. The "real crunch," they say, may not come until early next year. "The danger point for ammunition would not be until perhaps next February," said one official, . who keeps an eye on the supply situation. But, the aid, cuts have already had their effect on local politics, and a political crunch could be coming before the military one. The cuts have helped convince many of the oppo- nents of President Thieu that the United States is slowly withdrawing NEW YORK TIMES 3 NOVEMBER 1974 U.S?,G ? ? its support for Mr. Thieu. , Their ? conviction that Mr. Thieu's position has thus grown wobbly has greatly. emboldened them. "Many Vietnamese felt that Presi- dent Nixon's fall was a real blow to Thieu," said a Western diplomat in Saigon. '"rhat plus the aid cuts in- dicated to them that Thieu was not so strong." "There are two important factors in the background to the opposition ? movement against Mr. Thieu," said ? Tran Van Tuyen, leader of a bloc.k of opposition deputies in the lower house of South Vietnam's National Assem- bly. "First there was the departure of -Mr. 'Nixon ? Thieu lost his protec- tor," he said. "Second, the U.S. Congress showed that it could withdraw aid from a repressive government." ? "These are some of the reasons why the Vietnamese press grew more courageous and began violently criti- cizing Mr. Thieu's policies," the legis- lator said. Air activity cut back On the military side, Vietnamese Air Force officers say that they have reduced their fighter-bomber mis- sions by about one third as a result of the aid cuts. The Air Force has permanently grounded about 70 of its Al Skyraider fighter-bombers. Military sources say that helicopter missions have been cut by about 45 percent in recent months. The South als In aig n Have ing f t e 60's By LESLIE H. GELB ? WASHINGTON ?From the beginning of Amer- ican involvement in Vietnam, it has not been a- , geographical abstraction and not a people and a culture .to most American leaders. And, even as the awareness of the war fades, Vietnam remains . - a landscape?or rather, an objective. "It" must not ? be taken over by the. Communists. ' Administration leaders do not usually talk about the American objective in Vietnam. That would be ? bad politics. But when they do talk, they stress ? Washington's willingness to accept any solution that , comes about through peaceful means. ? Many Administration officials ackowledge that this is mcre a hope than an objective. The reality , is that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong will ? Vietnamese Navy is planning reduc- tions in both its blue water and riverine forces. "At some point, we're going to have to reduce the consumption rate for fuel to the point where we stop - running some trucks," said one source. "There is a serious danger of our not having enough fuel to get , through the fiscal year." American staff reduced The U.S. embassy in Saigon an- ? nounced last month that as a result of ?aid reductions, the United States was cutting the jobs of some 1,300 Amer- ? ican civilians working in South Viet- nam. Most of them have been helping to maintain and repair Vietnamese . aircraft.. _ ? _ American officials said the cuts were being made so that military aid could be concentrated on "high prior- ity" items such as ammunition, fuel, ? spare parts, and medical supplies. But the officials added that even after , these cuts are made, some 500 Amer- ican technicians would continue to ; work with the Vietnamese Air Force. ' The dilemma for President Thieu, as some observers see it, is that if he cracks down too hard on his political opponents,. he will elk losing even more support from the U.S. Congress.. But if he fails to crack down hard, people may grow less and less fearful ? of coming out against him. Moreover, those who supported him might begin to feel that they were backing a loser, and that could prove dangerous for President Thieu as well. ' not abandon their dream Of liberating South Vietnam' and unifying the country, ? . . ? . The impression seems to have grown that the American objectiVe has changed. President Nguyen Van Thieu is under fire from Catholic and Buddhist - groups, and Washington seems to be doing little about it. Perhaps, some speculate, the Ford - Administration is getting ready ,tO drop President Thieu. Congress is slashing aid to Saigon, and the White House does not seem to be complaining: Per- haps, some begin to hope, Mr. Ford will quietly let the Saigon regime slip away. ? But again, the reality is otherwise. A glance at the battle between Congress and the executive over the new Foreign Aid Bill over the past two months shows how dearly the oid objective is still held. This is what happened, The Administration pro- posed a new $4-billion aid bill, including a $400- million Middle East "peace package" for Egypt," - Syria and Jordan, $250-million in additional food ? aid, almost $500-million for Cambodia, almost $150- million for Laos, and about $1-billion in economic aid to Saigon. In a separate bill, the Administration , also asked for $1.45-billion in military aid to Saigon. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved funds for the Middle East and food aid, but cut total aid to Cambodia down to $347-million, Laos ?to $100-million, and South Vietnam to $1.28-billion.. Of equal importance, the committee eliminated the President's prerogative to juggle funds from one country to another and from one account to another. The House Foreign ,s.ffeirs C.emraittee seemed headed - in the same direction. , Sensing that this v..as '.ing to a phase-out of American aid to Saigon, Secretary of State Kissinger Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 34 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 made a -critical decision. Ile would sacrifice the new ? bill with money for the Middle East, and food aid and save his flexibility on Indochina by pushing for Congres'sional continuation" of the old bill. . This decision cost Mr. Kissinger on Capitol Hill, ,but it cleminstrated the depths of his feelings about- ? the Saigon regime. Mr. Ford's own feelings on the Matter are not clear. _Together, the President and his Secretary are act- ing in other ways to sustain the "commitment". As in recent years, the bulk of the food aid, program ?will again go to Indochina. Pentagon funds will con- tinue to pay for more than 5,000 personnel in South Vietnam. The. commitment, or objective, seems to endure. . An Echo trorn. the Diem Era ,President Thieu, according to news accounts from, Vietnam, seems to be in deep trouble and has had to make concessions to lessen the effectiveness of protests over corruption and repression. Ford Ad- ministration officials maintain that Mr. Thieu is still strong and is gaining in support. The stories and the official responses have the ring of the early 1960's and the days of President Ngo Dinh Diem. What the White House might do if Mr. Thieu were actually overthrown or if he stepped down voluntarily is something leaders do not like to think about. No one mentions going back with American WASIIINGTON POST Monday, Nov.4,1974 -Viet iJiee ire on V lila ers - forces. United States action, they say, depends on. exact circumstances of Mr. Thieu's possible , removal. ? In the early 1960's,'a generil and a diplomat were dispatched to South Vietnam to study the situation.. When they returned and told their widely divergent tales, President Hennedy asked if they'had gone to . the same country. In 1974 staff members of the Senate Foreigh Re- lations and House Foreign Affairs Committees paid - separate visits to Vietnam. The House staff report concluded: "U.S. economic.' and military assistance has strengthened South Vietnam economically, militarily, and politically. ? This strength makes it unlikely that the North Viet- namese can win a military or political victory in the South in the foreseeable. future, if ever." ? The Senate staff report concluded that in the absence of a true peace settlement, "there seems to. be, at hest, little prospect of anything but a con- tinuing military struggle and, assuming that the maintenance of South Vietnam remains a U.S. policy objective, a continuing requirement for U.S. eco- nomic and military aid." ' ' Administration officials continue to quote Henry" Kissinger as saying "that to lose,.gracefully is ,still to lose." against the 'Thieu government. He said fighting broke out when seeret police tried to take microphones from the demonstrators .and broke up two altars in front of the church. He said government troops burned 10 houses in the village. The government sources said a Roman Catholic monk involv-ed in a land dispute with the goverenenent had wom- en and children lie on the road. to block troops sent to free a policeman the monk was holding as a hostage. ?_They said one of the monk's -.bodyguards fired on the po- lice, seriously wounding a po- liceman, before the police opened fire on the crowd. Meanwhile, Sen. -Vu Van Mau. leader of the Buddhist- backed National Reconcilia- tion Forces, said that at least 50 legislators have signed a petition calling , for Thieu's resignation. He. said the full: list of signers' would be pub-' lished soon. The South Vietnamese com- mand reported more than 100 casualties on, both sides in heavy fighting near Highway 1 in the central coastal province of Binhdinh. In Phnom Penh, the Cambo- dian command said 86 rebels and 3 government soldiers were killed in two days of. fighting in the Parrot's Beak region near the border with South Vietnam. rrona News-ixspat.chts SAIGON, Nov 3?An appo- iiition s.tnatOr said today that South Vietnamese police fired into a crowd of antigovern- ment demonstrators, killing one and wounding 12. Official sources said the shooting stemmed from a land dispute and- had no political overtones. A government Spokesman said the senator's ? Story was a "fabrication" aimed at slandering the gov- ernment of President Nguyen Van Thieu. The government sources said ? police fired on the crowd, killing one civilian and wounding others, after a po- liceman was shot and serious- ly wounded. Sen. Dban Van Luong said the incident occurred Satur- day in the village of Cinlitairt 70 miles northeast of here. He said six witnesses had told him about it. According to Sen. Luong's Informants, 1,000 persons had gathered near the Roman catholic church to protest 35 NEW YORK TIMES 20 October 1974 Tanaka Tries to Damp - Down Nuclear Issue, but epprts of Entry of Atom - Arms Into Japan Persist SDedal to The New York Times TOKYO, Oct. 19?The cry of "Yankee go home!" sounded once again in, Tokyo this week as Japanese demonstrators led by saffron-robed drummers and lantern-bearers marched past the Premier's office and the ? United States Embassy. . The demonstration, which in- volved about 1,600 men and women, according to the police, $, was organized by the Commu- nist party and its antinuclear affiliate, an erganizationknown as diens-vo. It ,sss 4;reeta-' against the entry into Japan of inuclear weapons aboard United; I States warships?an emotional, 'issue in this nation that still ' bears the emotional -scars- of the atomic bombing of Hiro- shima and Nagasaki. Premier Kakuei Tanaka and( his Foreign Minister, Toshio! Kimura, are vigorously trying I to damp down the issue ofl 1 American nuclear arms in la- pan before President Ford's( arrival here Nov. 18 for a four- day visit. But it refuses to go; j away as reports continue to I I circulate that the United States ihas brought nuclear weapons! into Japan, with the secret p'er-' mission of the Japanese Gov- ernrnent. Mr..Tanaka and Mr. Kimura deny that this has happened. The Premier told Japanese pro- vincial governors Wednesday - that "the Government's three- point nonnuclear policy of not manufacturing, not eossessing and. not allow- ing the entry Of nuclear weapons will. be firmly maintained." ' - Categorical Denial ,nnyr: Kimura has categorically denied the existence of any agreement permitting the Unit- ed States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan and has declared that the United States would not do so without Japa- nese Government approval. The United ?States State De- partment has been more cau- tious. When news reports of a secret "transit agreement" were published in 1971, the depart- ment categorically denied them. Now it has shifted its ground, refusing either. to confirm or deny similar reports. As a mat- ter of policy, theUnited States never confirms or denies the presence of nuclear arms any- where. The current nuclear issue divides into two parts. One in- volves the question of a pos- sible secret transit agreement allowing the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan on ships or planes tem- porarily, but not to deploy or send them into action from here. The second is whether the United States is actually bring- ing in nuclear arms under thatl agreement. The evidence that the transitl agreement exists is contained in National Security Study Memoranda written in 1969 at the direction of Henry A. Kis- singer, who was then President Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001./08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 ? ' "Richard M. Nixon's adViiet:' ot national security. .1 withdrawal of nuclear weapons: from Okinawa at the time of the island's return to Japanese ? control, the memoranda to the "transit agreement" with' the notation that it was a sen- sitive and closely held secret.1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff in- sisted that the United States in ? WASHINGTON POST 14 November 1974 Victor ZOrza' any case retain its rights to move nuclear weapons through Japan itself and extend them to Okinawa after the transfer of minis ration there. They contended that this was essen- tial to maintain the United 'States nuclear deterrent-in East I The issue of withdrawal Of ;all nuclear weapons from Old- !nawa was left unresolved and , was passed up to Presfdent ? Nixon for his personal decision. He said he would decide after all other points had been settled with the Japanese Government. In May, 1969, Mr. Kissinger wrote a National Security Deci- sion Memorandum for the Pres- ident agreeing? to open nego- tiation with Japan. Among the points in that memo were that Japan must agree to permit the 'United-States to continue using. bases on Okinawa with only slight restrictions and must ease restrictions on American. use of bases in Japan proper._ Implicit in that memorandum was a continuation of the trans- it agreement, (eo The Sino Soviet Reconciliation -Thoblind spot which causes so many officials, in Washington as well as in other capitals, to deny the significance ,of the warmer Climate between Mos- cow and Peking could cause them to miss a truly historic turn of events. The reconciliation between Russia and China that is now taking shape could be as important for the world as the Sino-Soviet conflict was when it finally emerged in the open in the early 1960s, after simmering under the snrface for several years. The halting steps toward some sOrt of reconciliation became clearly visible when Peking began to play down the danger Of war with 7.ussia more than a , year ago. The new. Peking Alogan pro- claimed that Russia was making only "a feint to the East" while threatening the West--but it was accompanied, somewhat inconsistently, by the old ac- cusations that Moscow was also Pre- paring an attack on China. Most Western analysts chose to regard Pe- ? kung's talk of an attack as significant ? and to dismiss the new theme as mere propaganda. But it was propaganda with a differ- ence. Peking was giving Moscow a choice. The Kremlin could respond to the new slogan, or ignore it. Moscow sent back a number of positive signals, but these were overlaid by the menac- ing noises generated by the continuing Peking power struggle. The reconcilia- tion with Russia is obviously a major issue in the power struggle, and the anti-Soviet noises made by the hard- line faction in the Chinese leadership were wrongly regarded in the West as a rejection of Soviet overtures by Pe, king. More recently, however, Peking's preoccupation with a sudden .Soviet at- tack on China has greatly diminished. NEW YORK TIMES 11 November 1974 CRING FORD VISIT DEBATND IR SEOUL Token Endorsement of Park's Rue Is Feared by Oppositionists By FOX BUJ ILRFIELD soma) to Tat tiev York Tunes Approved Chinese leaders have instead taken to telling foreign visitors that the Soviet Union was not going to make war on China in the near future. This Could only mean that those who last year coined the slogan about the "feint to the East" had since prevailed in the Pe- king struggle, and that the prospect of reconciliation implied' Inthe slogan a 'year ago had now become a -matter of practical politics. - The latest Chinese message of greet- ings to Moscow on the October Revolu- - tion 'anniversary, which hints at Pe-. 'king's acceptance of the Soviet offer of a non-aggression treaty, thus does not come out of the blue. The analysts who last year refused to attach any impor- tance to the early signals cannot easily switch tracks now. But higher officials who nourish Kissinger's view that a reconciliation is unlikely are taking upon themselves a major political re- sponsibility, as did the officials who told the West's leaders in the late 1950s that there was no such thing as a. Sino-Soviet conflict. Just how far official blindness can go is shown by the response which the Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Robertson made in 1959 to a series of articles which argued that Russia and China were locked in a secret struggle. Peking, he insisted, "works closely with Moscow." It was wishful thinking, he maintained, to forecast that they would allow any differences between them to outweigh "the dominant prac- tical military, political and economic advantages they derive through contin- ued close cooperation." The articles, which had argued that "friction between MoscoW and Peking is just beginning, but it may yet be- come the most significant development in the long cold war that lies ahead," were based on much the same kind of ? SEOUL; South Korea, Nov. 10 .---President Ford's forthcoming Visit here later this month has set off angry opposition from many Koreans who feel his trip amounts to approval by the United States of President Park Chung Hee's tough one-man kule. Md in a country that has long been ardently pro-Amer- ican, dependent on the United States for its very existence, Mr.' Ford's visit has roused some of the first anti-American eentiment heard here in years. In the last week alone a evidence as the -material which led me to write, more than- a year ago, that signs of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation were now becoming apparent. The fact that I was right in 1959 does not neces- sarily make me right now. But the fact that most government analysts and of- ficials were wrong then should serve as a reminder that they do not have a monopoly of wisdom, and that they could be as' wrong now as they were then. At that time officialdom refused to, accept the evidence because it did not fit in with its preconceived notion of . the Communist monolith. Dr. Kis-, singer and his associates, who have used the Sino-Soviet conflict to play off 'Moscow and Peking against each ' other, so that it became a key factor in, the structure of detente, may now be affected by similar prejudices of their, own. - The Sino-Soviet conflict helped Kle- singer to get President Nixon to Pe-' king, and it helped him to get from the. Kremlin some of the concessions on SALT which made Nixon's Moscow summit such a spectacular pre-election success. The Sino-Soviet conflict cer- tainly helped him to maneuver both sides into forcing Hanoi to negotiate, bra peace agreement. Without such negotiations detente among the great powers would have been impossible. . Kissinger publicly rejects the very notion that he could play Russia and China off against each other, but he' can hardly deny that the United States has derived great profit from their con- flict. His diplomacy suggests that he and his associates expect to derive no less advantage from it in the future." Could they have been blinded to the emerging new reality by wishful think-. ing, as their predecessors were? 1974, Victor Zorza grolip of 300 Korean Roman ' Catholic priests, about half the nation's total, called for Pres- ident Ford to "reconsider" his trip. At the same time 21 Protestant clergymen, including nine American missionaries, de- manded in a statement that Mr. Ford cancel his visit "be- cause it shows support for the Park regime, which does not have the trust of the Korean people." . One Presbyterian minister the Rev. Ho Byung Sup, was arrested by the Korean Central Intelligence, Agency for ti ying to mimeograph the statei lent. There have been other demands that President Ford meet with Opposition leaders and that he convey American concern to Mr. Park over his increasingly repressive actions. ? Source of the Vehemence The vehemence of Korean opposition to the Presidenttal , visit the first since Lyndon B. Johnson came here in 1966, stems in large measure from a Korean tradition difficult for Americans to understand. ? For as a people often forced Into subservience by their larg- er neihbors, Koreans have de- - mentality of looking For Release 200108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100346 eff-d7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400Q3-7 to others for l.:oth protection and legitimacy, In earlier cen- turies. envoys from China con- firmed- Korea's kings in their .power, and in more recent times. Koreans say, this func- tion has been transferred to the United States. . But American diplomats in- sist that Mr. Ford's visit has nothing to do with Korean politics and that therefore Mr.. Ford should not get involved in meetings with opposition fig- ures, or express concern', to President Park. As Ambassador Richard L. Sneider put in a meeting with American missionaries last week, "the American Govern- ment does not interfere in Korean domestic affairs." Instead, according to one of the participants, Mr. Sneider said that Mr. Ford "cqmes with broader purposes," to reaffirm U.S. commitments in this part of the world. If Mr. Ford did not come here, after his earlier stop in Japan, "North Korea would take this as a 'sign and might miscalculate," Mr. Sneider told the missionaries. , There are still 38,000 Ameri- can troops in South Korea, two decades after the end of the Korean war, and Washington has provided Seoul with more than $10-billion in economic and military assistance. ? Many Koreans clearly see the Visit in different terms from the efficial American view. "There is no question that inost Koreans believe President Ford is coming here 1.9 bless ,Park _Chung Hee, .it is the nat- ural assumption for us to make," explained the editor of a major newspaper. "It saddens me, because it reduces the high regard we have for the United States." One Invitation Turned Down The editor asked that his name not be used, lest he be detained by the secret police. Earlier this year 203 Koreans, including the only living former president of the country, a Catholic Bishop and Korea's best known young poet, were convicted of subversion by se- cret military courts. :`There has been speculation that Mr. Park might release some of these prisoners as a gesture of moderation in con- nection with President Ford's visit. However, a ranking Korean official said yesterday that the Government instead would release a small number Of Americans held in Korean jails as convicted criminals. . Whatever their officially stated position, there is evi- dence that some American lomats believe President Ford's visit creates a dilemma for the United States. ; A request by the Blue House, the Korean equivalent of the White House, for Mr. Ford to appear with President Park at a mass public rally was re- portedly turned down. . American officials here are also known to feel that their bands are tied in trying to in- fluence Mr. Park's conduct be- cause the United States is in a conscious phase of decreasing its involvement in other na- tions' affairs. These officials recall that 10 years ago, in a different era, Samuel D. Berger, then American Ambassador in Seoul, put pressure on Mr. Park ? PAR EASTMN ECONMIC_ REVIEW 18 October 1974 - i ideological foes woo Japan By Koji N Tokyo: The Japanese ploy of using Chi- na as a lever to bargain with the Soviet Union ? it was such strategy which saw the acquiescence of hawkish, anti- communist leaders in the establishment of formal relations with Peking ? has once again produced diplomatic over- tures. For in virtually simultaneous ac- tion, Peking and Moscow have broach- ed the subject of concluding World War H peace treaties with Tokyo. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was, quoted by Komei Party Chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri as having said, in Moscow on .October 2, that the ground for peace treaty talks would be prepared' when Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura visits the Soviet capital in De- cember or January ,and that the agree- ment could be concluded when he (Kosygin) follows this with a visit to Japan. ? - e ? The following day, Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-peng told a Japan Socialist Party delegation in Peking that a peace treaty between China and Japan 'should be formalised as soon as possible and, to this end, all obstacles should be 'overcome, the Controversial Senkaku Is- lands issue being shelved. While neither Moscow nor Peking has made an official bid for peace treaty talks to be held at Government level, Tokyo believes it is only a matter of time. Meanwhile; the Japanese Govern- ment has ? adopted a non-committal stance. Whichever way Japan jumps on the question of treaties, it is dealing with loaded issues. The Japanese are aware that the Soviets are interested in the incorpora- tion of the Asian Collective Security System in any treaty; Tokyo sees this system as an instrument designed to contain China. Japan is not willing, therefore, to be a party to a Moscow. orientated deal if China will be anta- gonised. At the other end of the scale, there is the ticklish problem of the northern ter- ritory, currently occupied by the So- viets but over which Japan claims sovereignty, which may be offered as strategic bait to induce Japan into ac- cepting the collective security concept. Japan has long claimed four islands si- tuated off the northern tip of Hokkaido. Moscow has been refuting the legiti- macy of such claims for the past eigh- teen years. The reversion of two of the islands ? Habomai and Shikotan, the and got him to hold elections.' During Mr. *Ford's one-day, stay, he is scheduled to have a two-hour meeting with Mr.! F irk at the Blue House and, akamura closest of the group to Hokkaido was promised in 1956 with a joint declara- tion about a peace treaty. But the Soviets have also claimed that the terri- torial issue has ',long been resolved." There is one school of Japanese diplo- matic thought which believes the return of the two islands would be a cheap price for Moscow to pay if such a deal ensures Japan being party to the collec- tive security philosophy. Yet another side to' any peace treaty - with the Soviet Union is Japan's possi- ble involvement in Siberian programmes for the development of cnide oil and natural gas. Japan is not, however, as enthusiastic about such a joint under- taking as it was a year ago when there was the promise of an annual supply of 25 million tons of Tyumen crude oil. Despite this Japanese cooling over the project, the Soviets still have, in the crude oil idea, a powerful negotiating card. Oil is Japan's weakest suit. - In Peking, there is the realisation that a Soviet-Japanese treaty concluded ahead of a Sino-Japanese agreement would in- evitably be used by Moscow as an anti- Chinese political weapon. It is be- cause of this, Tokyo feels, that Chi- na has even offered to forget such a burning issue as the Senkaku Islands be- sides a Peking willingness to shelve the diplomatic determination of Taiwan as regards Japanese activity. It is reasonably certain that China's crude oil offer to Japan contributed to Tokyo having second thoughts on in- volvement in Siberia. China, scheduled to supply the Japanese with 5 million tons of crude oil during 1975, told an economic delegation from Japan that it could export 10% of its crude output to Japan by 1980. That annual output is projected at 400 million tons. Since Japan views the Soviet Union as its potential No. I enemy, it is likely that a treaty with China will precede any agreement with Moscow. From the other side, a "China treaty first" move- ment might be the death knell for not only a Japan-Soviet agreement, but also for any hopes of solving territorial disputes. And, finally, there is the United States to consider. Washington's deal- ings with both China and the Soviet Union has a major bearing on Japanese policy. Japan's path might well be de- cided by American dealings with the two communist giants. !ater be a guest at a state dinner given by the Korean leader. Mr. Ford will also lunch with American troops at Camp C?el,sey near Seoul, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010034000331 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 CIA Chickens THE NEW LEADER BA Oct . 1974 i Vang ? Pao has become Chicken i Farmer Yang Pao. . . ? !? Long Cheng lies about 100 miles VIENpANE?Over the past 10 north of Vientiane, the Laotian cap- years, CIA-eMployed 1.13. opera- ital. Once dominated by the rattle tives trained, transported, supplied, of gunfire and the roar of American and advised a 15,000-man guerrilla aircraft, it currently crackles with army, composed mostly of Meo the sound of cackling chickens as tribesmen, as it fought ?pro-Corn- a result of a $25,000 CIA invest- munist Pathet :Lao and ' North ment. Some 2,560 birds, brought Vietnamese forces. In addition-, the i in batches from Bangkok every two Americans, many of them cx-Green K!wee. s, arc housed there in five spe- Berets with Vietnam combat expert- tially designed structures. After be- encc, taught the Mcos to man radar A ing raised for eight or nine weeks, ? installations that guided. ' United are sold kr a local market scrv- ? States bombers toward targets in 1 .ng several thousand Mcbs. North -Vietnam, and -sent. teams of The general, who for more than tribesmen On forays into the Pco- a decade used CIA funds not?only pie's Republic of China. Ito pay his irregular forces but also to ? The China missions, hoWeveri !build and furnish a number of lavish were brought to a halt by the 1972 ; houses for his Six wives, makes ap- Sino-Ainerican d?nte; Americani ! proximately $1,000 a pronth from bombing of North Vietnam stop.ped ;the enterprise (the average per cap- training activities were terminated last spring, in accordance with peace agreements ending this na- tion's, civil conflict. Consequently, -CIA agents, looking for a fresh field of -endeavor.' have turned . to civic action projects. Centered in Laos - Where the Meos are concentrated, cally a benevolent one, and his the new programs involve substarilp rofits are not excessive by local tial sums of money and their pur- standar(ls." in fact, the community ? pose' is plain: to retain influence, benefits because the chickens sell over an important segment of the for below-normal prices. . populace in a strategic part of the . Besides chicken-raising, the CIA country. ? has backed a cattle-breeding pro- The agency's primary contact in gram and the e5tab1ishment of farm- the area is the flamboyant general wily), 1 centers providing agricultural Vans "Pao, a 46-year-old Meo who commodities at reduced rates. Al- runs northern Laos like a feudal though th .se e projects are adminis- lord, and who is now reaping sig- terecl by the Agricultural Develop- nificant rewards from poultry rais- ment Corporation (ADC), an agen- ing, the CIA's most successful civic cy nominally under Laotian govern- pursuit. in a transformation that mcnt control, they depend upon took place at Long Cheng, the Meo ita income in Laos is $60 a year). An American: close to him is will- ing to overlook yang Pao's in- come. "At first it bothered me," he says, "but after a while you come to realize that .this is the sys- tcm?and it works. Yang Pao can be called a dictatOr, yet he is basi- American support for survival, and leader's longtime base and formerly when budgetary cutbacks in the a CIA field headquarters, General U.S. Agency for International De- velopment (to) threatened to dim- ' Six American agricultural experts at present supervise ADC.ventures. ? All are genuine civic action workers, not CIA hands. "These men are my employes in the purest sense; they have no other professional con- cerns," explains Charles Mann, who' has headed AID'S annual.$50 million pi;ogram here Since 1969. Stilt,1 when asked about the source of! ADC funds, Mann ? replies: "Nol cornme.a." As for the six experts, they preferl to ignore the question of financing. "I'm not happy about where the! money comes from," says one, "butt I am concerned With civTc develop-i ment. and I care 'a great deal about! the Meos. The source of our funds,1 and the motives behind them, mean little to mc, cornpared to what wel are doing for these people." On the other hand, Senator Ed- ward M. Kennedy, chairman of the. Senate subcommitte? on refugees.: ? feels the CIA's current approach: raises "troublingquestions."He has. long opposed the agency's use of humanitarian programs as a cover,' and recently declared: "Despite our: country's general support for the:: cease-fire .agreement and the new ? government, several indicators Sug- gest that the intent of sane of our remaining presence in Laos can only help to perpetuate old relation- . ships and the division of that coun-, try."?ARNOW ABRAMS mate or severely curtail ADC oper- ations last February, an infusion of CIA money put the organization back in business. Altogether,. the CIA 'has spent over $t00090 on its civic action undertakings. 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 - Ap%Proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340093-7 Sitoday, Nov. S, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST. . ? ' I 1 ? ?????? t ing 11 ; By Joseph Novitski Special to The Washington Post f: BOGOTA, Colombia, Nov. ;2?The diplomatic and eco- nomic wall that was built around Cuba by the United , States and its Latin Ameri- i.can allies more than 10 :years ago has begun to ..crumble under pressure ,.!from the Latin Americans. For 14 years, three U.S. '-:administrations have used -economic aid, diplomatic _pressure, military interven- tion and the CIA to enforce a political and economic em- bargo cutting Cuba off-from Latin America. Now, for the first time since Cold-War-tensions be- gan to ease, detente is being allowed into Latin America. But the Cold-War years left their mark and left Latin countries feeling more like I the colonies of an empire !: than partners in an allinace. "American economic dom- inance in this part of the 7 world exists as a matter of fact," Carlos Lleras Res- ; trepo a former president of :I Colombia, said in a recent interview. "But the Latin countries have learned, af- ter voting along to keep China out of the United Na-, tions for 20 years, that the U. S. changes its diplomatic position strictly in accord- - ance with its own interests 7 and that there is no need to "The wall isolating Cuba from its natural neighbors- and trading partners in the United States, the Carib- bean and in South America was designed to keep Fidel Castro's formula for so- cialist revolution from ? spreading through the hemi- sphere. The United States f began this isolation by cut- ting off Cuban sugar imports and all U. S. exports to the island in 1960, a year after Castro came to power, and ; by backing the abortive in- vasion at the Bay of Pigs the next year. ? t Latin American countries then helped to build the I V,;all,'slOW1Y?ana:reluctantly, . under intense U.S. pressure, with unilateral actions and collective diplomatic deci- sions taken between 1961 and 1964. Recently, many of the same countries - which : helped start the quarantine have taken the initiative to end it. Mexico originally voted against the 10-year-old col- lective decision forbidding ! trade and -diplomatic tele- ' tions and has never re- spected it. Over the last- four years. first Chile, under '..the late President Salvador ? Allende, then Peru, Argen- tina and Panama, have disre- garded the collective deci- sion and have exchanged diplomatic missions and goods with Cuba. ? Others want to follow, but decorously. So Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela, the firmest U.S. allies when the embargo was set up by the Organization of Ameri- can States, have requested that the original decision be reconsidered. Next weekend, a confer; ence of OAS delegates from - 23 countries will meet in Quito and the required two- thirds majority is expected to vote to leave each mem- ber country free to choose its own kind of relations with Cuba.. For the first time in the history of the Cuban controversy, the Unit- States, so far as Latin diplomats in three countries have been able to determine, has no clear position. "The problem is over now, said Arturo Frondizi, presi- dent of Argentina when the - United States 'under the- Kennedy administration be- gan pushing for the isola- tion of Cuba. Frodizi was one of the former presi- dents, foreign ministers and diplomats interviewed in Ar- gentina, Brazil and Colom- bia over the last two weeks on their role in resisting or ' helping the isolation of Cuba, "Now we're heading to- _ ward the full 'N reincorpora- tion of Cuba in the Latin American community," Frondizi said. "But what has changed is the relation be- tween the U.S. and Russia, not the relations with Latin .America." IShlating Cuba from Latin America failed to bring down Castro's government or force it to change course, ? as three U.S. Presidents ap- parently hoped'it would. In the view of those inter- viewed, it halted the spread of Cuban-style revolution - only when the United States was willing to intervene in Latin internal affairs. For these filen; the policy had three other effects that were predicted by public fig- ures as it was taking shape in 1961 and 1962. ? Frondizi made his predic- tions in letters to and con- versations with his friend President John F. Kennedy. -.The late Francisco Safi Tiago Dantas -of Brazil, then foreign minister, made his publicly,in speeches. First, Cuba, despite Cas- tro's vaunted nationalism, became a Soviet satellite. Frondizi, trying to head off the isolation in December 1961, warned Kennedy that it would. But the Argentine president come away with the impression that Ken- nedy was under strong do- mestic pressure to "do some- thing" about Cuba. "Imagine that Kennedy asked me, in Palm Beach, not to send my memoranda on Cuba through diplomatic channels," Frondizi said. Then, the inter-American system of defense alliances and the OAS, which had been built on the principle of self-determination for all-- member states, was strained to the breaking point. Some say it has broken down as the result of U.S. interven- tion and of internal differ- ences. ? All those interviewed as- serted that the precedent for intervention set by the 1962 decision to expel Cuba from the inter-American system opened the way for the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965' and for , 'massive CIA &Import, for opo::. position to President Al= lende, who was closely allied to Cuba. , "The U.S. became the - great judge of the fitness of governments in the hemi- sphere," said Sen. Julio C. Turbay, who argued with - the United States in favor o'f diplomatic action against- Cuba when he was Colom, bian foreign minister in 1961. "That was not what we had intended." _ . This was the second ef- fect seen by the Latins. Fi- nally, Latin domestic poli- tics became increasingly . radicalized under the pres--- sure to line up-- on the U.S. side in the Cold War. Stume bling democratic govern- ments that had favored Cuba's right to go its own way fell to military coups in Argentina in 1962, in Brazil- in 1964 and in ' Chile last year. "U.S. action in these years radicalized our internal . processes and contributed to the failure of democratic ex- peripients to change social and economic structures," Frondizi said. "I believe opposition by . our two countries to the ex- pulsion of Cuba from the in- ter-American system was one of the factors contribut- ing to the military coups in Argentina, and later, in Bra- zil," Frondizi stated. The-: ? former president added that there were, of course, strong internal political drives leading to the coups in both cases. There were also internal reasons behind subsequent coups in Bolivia and Ecua- dor. which sided with Ar- gentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile at the OAS conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 and did not vote for the U.S. resolution expelling Cuba. Ogly Mex- ico, among the countries that opposed the measure, 'has kept the same form of government since 1962. "Intervention is , bad in any event," said Carlos Lleras, president of Colom- bia from 1966 to 1973 and a staunch U.S. ally. "It is not the U.S. role to decide the fate of individual countries. But it has, and the result has been that the U.S. winds up supporting right-wing 3.9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 dictatorships in the name of anti-communism. These re- gimes are r-JPressive of hu- ? man rights and ?that gives the U.S. a verg bad image." ? In the beginning, U.S. hos- tility to Cuba also? took a more positive form. It was ' channeled into the Alliance ? for Progress, a huge, "' hemi- sphere-wide effort, under- ? written by the United ? States, to show that demo- ? cratic governments could also deal with social and economic development prob- ? lems successfully. The alliance, begun by President Kennedy in Au- gust 1961, was an instru- APproved Fol-Release 2061/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 November 197/4 Stands on food, Chile criticized By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor As Western Hemisphere foreign ministers gather in Ecuador to take up the issue of ending diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba, the United States is coming in for a new round of criticism from Latin Amer- ica. ? " In the first place, Secretary of State -Henry A. Kissinger will not attend the foreign ministers' sessions ? an ab- sence that, to many Latin Americans, Is an affront. But the criticism of the United States goes deeper than the Kissinger absence. ? The meeting in Quito, the Ecuado- rian capital, stems from a Latin 'American initiative to take a fresh look at the Cuba question: Should the government of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro be restored to hemisphe- . ric good graces? Washington is-reluctant to support the move, questioning whether Cuba has stopped exporting its revolution and meddling in the internal affairs of Latin American nations ? the rea- sons for the sanctions against Cuba in CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON.I2120 114 November 197h A US. gaffe on 913 the first place. But most Latin American govern- ments think that Cuba has stopped those practices and that relations should be re-established. Moreover, Latin Americans ask, in ? effect, who is the United States to cast a judgment about meddling in inter- nal affairs? One Latin American ambassador in Washington last week noted that it was the United States that spent millions of dollars to "destabilize" the government of the late Sqlvador Allende Gossens in Chile. ? "How can Washington talk of Cuba's export of revolution when it was engaged in exporting its concept of gnvernment to Chile, meddling in Chilean affairs, and trying to unseat a legitimate government?" this am- bassador asked. The view is widespread. Dis- closures in early September of Cen- tral Intelligence Agency activities in Chile have had a decidedly negative effect on Latin America. There is also growing Latin Amer- ican cynicism over Washington's mo- tives in the international arena. The United States came in for a scathing attack at the World Food Conference In Rome by Argentine Foreign M.in- Cuba? Latin American efforts to end diplomatic and economic sanc- tions against Cuba came within two votes of success at the Quito, EcuadOr, meeting of hemisphere foreign ministers. Guatemala and Haiti, originally lined up with the majority wanting an end to the sanctions, decided at the last min- ute to abstain from voting. There is strong hemisphere sus- picion that Washington had a hand in these two vote changes. The United States denies it, but it will take More than verbal denials to convince a growingly skeptical Latin America that all was open and aboveboard at Quito. Robert Ingersoll, head of the U.S. delegation, claimed after the vote that "we have not worked against the resolution," noting that the U.S. abstained. But many Latin Americans agree with Gon- zalo Facto, the Costa Rican for- eign minister who said the absten- tion-placed Washington "squarely with the minority" on the Cuba issue. Given the present mood in Lati America, Washi risk of becoming isolated-from its hemisphere neighbors who dis- agree with the U.S. not only on Cuba, but also on a whole range of political and economic issues. Secretary of State Henry Kis- singer's absence from the Quito session has come in for sharp criticism also. In explaining Dr. Kissinger's absence, Washington argued he was busy elsewhere and that anyway the Quito meeting was ill-timed and too hastily orga- nized. This sort of argument, however, really begs the question. Wash- ington's closest neighbors deserve Dr. Kissinger's attention. More- over: the Cuba issue itself has been on the hemisphere agenda for months. The whole affair appears yet another U.S. gaffe in Latin Amer- 'Jean bolicy. Dr. Kissinger would be well advised AO make amends by early consultations with hemi- sphere leaders. Delay in trying to undo the damage done at Quito will only make U.S. efforts in Latin America more difficult in, ister Alberto J. Vignes, who accused . the U.S. of playing politics with food. Equally strong criticism from sev- eral other Latin American delega- tions is the result of Washington's failure in recent months to consult with Latin American nations on key ? world issues, observers say. - Much of this criticism goes right to Mr. Kissinger's doorstep for, since the April conference of the Organiza- tion of American States in Atlanta, Dr. Kissinger has busied himself with other parts of the world. Rather than using his powers of diplomatic persuasion with the Latin Americans, he seems to have shoved the region onto the back burner ? or ? so runs the Latin American feeling. ? What it all boils down to is an Increasingly critical view of the United States by Latin Americans.. Such criticism is nothing new. But there had been a feeling in 1973 and "again early this year that Latin America and the United States, with Henry Kissinger displaying interest in Washington's hemispheric neigh-, bors, were on a smoother course than In the past. Such hopes appear dashed, and the Quito session may well, in the view of observers of inter-American affairs, show increasing Latin American criti- cism of the-United States. WASHINGTON POST 14 November 1974 Peru President- Lists Diplomats As CIA Agents Reuter LIMA, Nov. 13,?Peruvaian President Juan Velasco Alva-- ado said tonight that his gov- ernment had quietly expelled several CIA agents including a senior U.S. embassy official, since taking over in 1968. Answering press questions, General Velasco said: "With- out any scandal and without publicity, we invited the am- bassador of the United States to withdarw several members of the CIA from the country, including the number two at the embassy, named Siracusa, and a certain Ortiz." [Ernest V. Siracusa was dep- uty chief of mission in Peru in the late 60s and Frank V. Ortiz Jr. was supervisor of the po- litical section, according to ;State Department lists, which !show both of them subse- 1 iquently assigned to Uruguay.] nAVOrMilita kefieid-2O1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043214a00100340003-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7 NEW YORK TIMES 14 .November 1974 No Victors'. at Quito - No winners emerged from the abortive meeting of t, foreign ministers in Ecuador that failed by .two Votes to repeal the official sanctions invoked against Cuba . in 1964 by the Organization of American States. Fidel . Castro may claim a( psychological victory because . twelve of twenty-one voting delegations? favored repeal; but he cannot fail. to be disappointed that the effort fell short. of the necessary two-thirds majority. ? The most conspicuous losers were the sponsors of the repeal resolution, Costa Rica, ?Colombia and Vene- zuela, who counted on support that did not materialize. Another loser was the United 'States, whose silence throughout the Quito deliberations hardly fitted the . absent Secretary of State Kissinger's promise of a "new .dialogue" with Latin America and whose, absten- tion on the vote was widely regarded as 'abdication. of r, responsibility on a .critical ,problem. ? ? In deciding on abstention, obviously in part for ? NEW YORK TIMES 8 November 1974 Inter-American Blueprint A privately-funded commission , headed by- former Ambassador 'Sol M. Linowitz has produeed a report that could vastly improve this country's relations with Latin: America if carried out by the Administration and Con7 -gress. The great virtue of this effort is that it substitutes Specific recommendations-33 in all?for, the highflown rhetoric that has Characterized too many previous United States initiatives in the hemisphere. The recommendation that commanded the most atten- , tion because it will ,be put to an immediate test at a: meeing of American foreign ministers in Ecuador is the call for an end to the fourteen-yea' attempt to isolate .Cubain the Americas. The commission urges Washington ,to seek "a more normal" relationship with the Castro regime, to, end its own embargo on trade with Havana, and to be' willing, at. the meeting that begins in Quito today, 'to support repeal of the sanctions invoked against Cuba by the Organization of American States in 1.964. Repeal may be voted at Quito whatever Washington does; but the commission rightly fears it ? niay be the United States that is isolated in the hemisphere if it ? maintains the hardline policy. No miracles should be expected; but it is time to liquidate an ineffective policy and try to ease CUba's return to a more con- structive pattern of inter-American and international relations'. ' Of comparable importance for 'improving' this country's relaticins with its hemisphere neighbors is the commis- sion's strong support for a new and long overdue treaty under which jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone .would eventually pass to thea Republic of Panama. It is imperative for the United States to remove what the ? report calls "one of the last vestiges of Big Stick diplo- macy" under terms that insure uninterrupted use of the canal and a continuing United States role in its defense. In two other areas where decisive policy changes are critically overdue, the commission would ban unilateral United States militarii intervention in Latin America, such as that in the Dominican Republic. in 1965, and would end all covert interference in the domestic politics of other American nations such as the activities sup- ported by the C.I.A. in Chile in 1970,-73. * ? * The, commission's recommendations. on the more dra- matic inter-American prohlems?Cuba, Panama, covert . political interference-..should not obscure its detailed suggestions it r removing a host of Other irritating and Approved For Release 2001/08/08: domestic political reasons, the Ford Administration ignored the recent recommendation of the non-partisan :Commission on United States-Latin American Relations that Washington "take the initiative in seeking a more ? normal relationship with Cuba" and back repeal of the O.A.S. embargo. It also lined -up with authoritarian ? military regimes and against the hemisphere's few remaining democracies. ?? The biggest loser of all, however, is the O.A.S.'itself, whose relevance had already been sharply questioned by some member states. With some justice, the twelve who voted' for repeal called the requirement for a two - thirds majority "a procedural absurdity," and rightly branded the sanctions "anachronistic, ineffectual . and irksome." Seven members have already ignored the O.A.S. embargo to restore relations with the Castro regime. At least four more are likely to do so within a few Months. The twelve supporters of the repeal resolution correctly, asserted that its defeat at Quito ",`seriously compromises" the authority of the O.A.S. self-defeating policies and practices little known tb:iiie general public and. often the products of special-interest . lobbies. It Would, for example, eliminate the United States veto. over Inter-American Development Bank loans?a : frequent-target for. Latin-American attack?while main;. taming, the level of this country's contributions to the ? ? ? Congress is asked to repeal legislation that' tries to Mandate economic sahctions in disputes about such matters as fishing rights or the expropriation of North American properties. The report rightly says that these sanetforis are usually counterproductive; and it Makes the point that the national interest does not autornati- .cally coincide with "the perceived interest of an individ, , . Here, in sum, is a report that clothes practical idealism in common sense. It never loses sight of genuine United States interests While ruthlessly pruning away presumed or imaginary or long-outdated interests. It would be hard to produce a better blueprint .for the "new era" and "mature partnership'.' in inter-American relations that Secretary of State Kissinger has Promised. ? . ...The Missing American ft is ? a Matter of regret that Secretary of State Kissinger is. unable ,to attend what seems certain to be., the most momentous meeting of the Organization of American States since it' nearly foundered in the aftermath of the United States military intervention in the Dominican Republic, in 1965. For many Latin Americans, no hemisphere issue has more immediate importance than the question of opening thedb.or for Cuba's return to the inter-American system. This is the only item on the agenda for the meeting of American foreign ministers now getting under way in Ecuador. Mr. Kissinger favorably impressed his Latin-American counterparts when he made a special effort to open a ? dialogue with them at the United Nations a year. ago. In three subsequent' encounters, he has made progress in defining a fresh United States approach that he called "the policy of the Good Partner," arousing enthusiasm with his proposal that the American foreign 'ministers meet regularly for candid, informal discussions of pres- sing hemisphere problems. It is particularly unfortunate that his excruciating schedule of world travel forces la him to be absent at Quito. ? ' CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7