THE GRIM ALTERNATIVE TO SECRET DIPLOMACY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 30, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 16
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
NEAR EAST
FAR EAST
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
15 October 1974
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Destroy after?backgrounder
has served it purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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LONDON TIMES
30 September 1974
Lord Chalfont
11:1=ZraZZEZZIReeltX55:0111X,arriCag
The grim alternative to secret diplomacy
There have been two fairly pre-:
"dictable reactions to the dis-
closures of the role of the
American Central Intelligence
Agency in the fall of the
Allende government in Chile.
Some people have expressed a
sense of great outrage and? '
anger at the interference of the
Americans in the internal poli-
tical affairs of a foreign coun-
try; others have argued that the
only fault to be found with the
CIA's action Was that "it came
in with too little and too late ".
The uproar which has surroun-
ded the affair has some pro-
found implications; not only for
! American foreign policy, but
also for the whole structure of
international relations.
? It is, of course, possible to
argue that the nation ? state
power game is intrinsically cor-
rupt and degrading. The whole
apparatus of diplomacy is re-
garded by some of the more
starry eyed internationalists as
superfluous and obstructive;
people, they say with more pas-
sion than logic, should be
allowed to speak to other people
without the intervention of am-
bassadors,
It would indeed be an en-
chanted world if nations could
be persuaded to place the uni-
v.ersal good before the narrow
interests of their own people.
They do not, however, do so.
We live in a jungle of nation-.
states in which governments
pursue their national interests
with every means at their dis-
posal, including, if the occasion
demands, armed force.
It is in this context that the
function of secret diplomacy
must be considered. It is, as
matters stand, quite acceptable
for one country to attempt to
influence the policies of
another, if it believes that it
can advance its own legitimate
interests by doing so. Respect-
able atnbasSadors of unassail-
able probity daily expend
substantial sums of money in
this very process. Most people
would wish to draw the line at
-the use or threat of force, or at
direct intervention in the politi-
cal affairs of another country;
but these are very difficult lines
to draw. One of the functions of
diplomacy is to convince the
Government of a foreign power
that if it pursues policies which
are congenial, economic and
political, benefits may follow ;
and that if it does not, it will
receive the diplomatic equiva-
lent of a kick in the teeth.
The suggestion that a certain
course of action " might have
a serious effect on the relations
between our two countries" is
a polite but unmistakable
threat ; and the promise of
economic aid is almost invari-
ably a discreet but equally
unmistakable bribe.
It can be argued, and indeed ?
has been, that the activities of
the CIA in Chile were no more
? than a manifestation, in a some-
what dramatic form, of this kind
of secret diplomacy. The argu-
? ment, in its simplest form, goes
something like this. America? ,
buys, at prevailing market
? prices, the materials it-requires
to sustain its highly techno-
logical- economy, from a variety
of countries all over the world. '
If it sees one of those coon- ?
!' tries coming under communist
domination, it has a duty to its
people to ensure the continued
supply of its essential raw
materials. AS a communist
government Might terminate
that supply, the United States
is entitled to do something to
prevent it from coming to
power, or, at any rate, from
remaining in power too long.
As the- use or threat of force
. is inconceivable, it has to rely
?; upon secret diplomacy ; and the
; use of American agents and
money in ? pursuit of that
; diplomacy is entirely defensible.
So far the argument is a
persuasive one, and, by the
standards of modern inter-
national relations relatively ;
,;?respectable. It is .only when the..
? Central ..Intelligence Agency,
gets in on the act that the
picture starts to break up. The
world of " intelligence " is a
squalid and nasty world (indeed
; there are sensitive souls in this;
-country who will sue you for.
libel if you -even suggest that
they once belonged to ? it). Its
: activities cover a wide spec-; ?
trum from the collection of
documents in barrack latrines ?
. to the discreet assassination of
.uncooperative politicians. So it-
is important to be clear, as far
as possible, about exactly what-!
the CIA was up. to in Chile.
The official version is that it
dispersed funds with the excht-_
sive aim of keeping opposition,
to the Chilean government
alive, at a time when Allende;
was seeking to 'destroy it. It
is no secret that substantial CIA'
.,funds went to newspapers and
radio stations ; and the claim'
.of those who defend the action.,
of the American administration
is that they were designed to
!'ensure that there was a measure,
of democratic control over
an ? increasingly authoritarian
government.
Any suggestion that the CIA
actually tool- part in the
military coup which led to the
? -laath of All,:nde and the in.:tal?
lation of the right-wing govern- ,
ment are strenuously denied.
Critics of the administration,
-however, may be forgiven for;
displaying a certain scepticism.
? The record of the agency in.-7 -
the more aggressive,. forms ot ,
secret service woric,--known in
the macabre imagery of the
Russian secret service as. " wet.
- affairs "?is a lurid one ; and .
there is now a vigorous cam-
paign in the United States to
- investigate the Whole affair and
disclose in detail the activities ;
of the CIA in Chile.. One -
:possible outcome of such an
? inquiry might be the political '
destruction of Dr Kissinger,
who, as Secretary of State, is
considered to. be primarily ,
responsible for United States ?
policy in Chile and, in particu-
clar, for the operations Of the
.CIA there.
ft would he as well for ;:hose
who may now be rubbing their.
. hands at the prospect. of
another Watergate and of swift
retribution for yet ? another
batch of ruthless American
hatchetrnen, to ponder some of
? the deeper 'implications.
? One of the ? factors which
should be kept. clearly in mind
is the activity of the KGB the
Soviet equivalent of .the Central
Intelligence Agency. It is an
organization as pervasive and
ruthless as any secret service '
in the 'world.. One of its princi-
pal aims is the .subversion of
the political institutions of the
West ; and those who now con-
demn Dr Kissinger and` the
State Department should not
ignore the fact that the Allende
government received nearly
?200m from the Soviet Union
:in contrast to the ?2m the CIA
.is alleged to have ,spent on the
. opposition.
If there should now be, as a
result of an inquiry into the
events in Chile, a full disclosure
of the methods, contacts and
sources of the CIA in Latin
America, it will undoubtedly be
regarded as a victory for the
open society. As Louis Reren
pointed out in his article on
Victor Marchetti's The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence (Sept-
ember S. . The Times) secret
agencies in any country.are un-
easy partners for democratic
Fovernments and the idea of
individual liberty. - There is a
real danger. that if democracy
uses the methods of its enemies
it may destroy the very free,
darn which it is concerned to
preserve.
Yet, if the United States is
.debarred from access to some
of the less attractive instru-
ments of secret diplomacy,
while its enemies, unhampered
by the pressures of puhlic
opinion,. continue to use them
the power . structure of tile
. world might he gradually but
irreversibly changed ; and the
change is not likely to be one
to delight those who believe in
an open society.
artn Times Newspapers Ltd 1974
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29 floptoither 1974
The K. G. B. Fl
Tricks
Flnenciel intervention to eupport prosSovint ere. ,
:mite is oldreetabliahed practice but deem not li@COS?
By ROBERT CONQUEST sarily go through the IC.0,13. channele, since plied.
celly every other Soviet channel is secret to,
Communiat prestige have log been so funded; 'The'
LONDON?kcent revelations' about the Central details of subventions to the Italian Communist
Intelligenee 'Agency'n activitien in Chile and else. , party, comparable tions by it
where raise groat rival, ap,ain via Prague, were established 20 Years
o the queetion of the netu
s re end extent. ego, Reentry there hove been other examples !n-
the Soviets' Committee for Government
acs the eluding the discovery by Mexican officials in 1008,
rnment Security. In
fact there is a good deal of knowledeo available, not
'from the Soviet press' or Government, but from vie.
tims or intended victims who found out the hard way,
' The KGB, is not simply a Soviet mirror.image of
the W.A. (or even of the CIA. plus the Federal
13iireau'of Investigation). One difference was demon.'
etrated a couple of weeks ago when Pravda an.,
nounced the award? on his 70th birthday, of the
Order of the October revolution to Semyon Ignatiev
'Who was 'Stalin's last heed of the organization 'and
who was responsible for, among other things the
n y raziliatia in 1072, of seem; of thousands of
,dollars conceeled in the, teepee of party officials
returning from Moscow, The Colombians, in 1008,
Intercepted a $100,000 aubsidy to terrorists, by the
- ?
, And when it comes to such matters as coups and
plots, the last three years alone haw seen the
organization of the 1,1i Sabry plot against the regime'
Benet (1971); , the plot against Gen. Gaafer,
al.Nlmeiry in the Sudan (1071); the organization;
arming and training of guerrillas, for which five
Soviet diplomats were expelled from 'Medco (1971). .
notorious doctors' plot purge. Yuri Andropov, the'
'current 'K.G.B, chief, got the Order of Lenin and the a plot in Rumania (1972); plots in Bolivia an
,a
la for which Soviet diplomats and others were
title Hero of Socialist Labor earlier, after a speech ? expelled (1972); a plot in Tunisia with the same re-
in which President Nikolai Podgorny praised his sults (1972)e.the recently discovered plot in Yugo.,
"strengthening and' improving'this important sector slavia. There, on Sept. 12, Marshal Tito referred
at 'State activity."
publicly to a case that had been brewing for some.
The sort of fears about the 'C.I.A. that have arisen months and which involved the arrest and forth.
in the United States, have no parallel in Soviet con- coming trial of an 'underground "Stalinist" grouping,
cerns about the K.G.B. which relied on help from "abroad" and whose lead-
'The C.I.A. and the K.G.B. also differ in size and.ers are old S,oviet nominees and K.G.B. contacts,
resources.' Perhaps 6 of every 10. Soviet diplomats The fact that some .of these occurred in Corn-.
? ?
and other representatives abroad are K.G.B.person- Anunist, countries was no phenomenon: Earlier ex-
nel; those not directly employed must also help out .amplet included the Soviet-sponiored "Natolin" plot
'when called upon. ',against WIadyslaw Gomulka in 1956, and Admiral'
Teme Seiko's conspiracy in Albania in 1964. They
even extended to Cuba where, in 1968, several Soviet
diplomats and 'others were denounced arid expelled
for organizing and' supporting an attempt to seize
power.
In 1971, the British expelled 105 members of the
Soviet Embassy staff. Espionage figured largely in
the British Government's explanation for its action,
:but it was also established that British intelligence
had discovered plans for sabotage, not only of mili-
tary installations but also of such things as water
supplies.
. The British incident was by no means a lone ex-
ample. Since 1960, at least 380 Soviet diploinats
have been expelled from their posts in 40 countries
on all six continents. Oddly enough, men expelled
by one country frequently turn up?without even a
name change?in neighboring capitals. ? -
Not that operations are always conducted through
embassies. Sometimes the route is more direct. That
was the case with arms supplied to the Provisional
faction of the Irish Republican Army, several tons
of which, en route from Prague to the Ulster ter-
rorists, were seized at Amsterdam in October, 1971...
WASHINGTON POST
06 October 1974 .
Chilean Editor De tiles
Receiving CIA Funds
United Press Internstioual
Chilean editor denied in
a letter made public yester-
day that his newspaper re-
ceived funds from the CIA !
during the three-year govern-
merit of President Salvador!
Allende.
Rene Silva, editor of Mer-
curio of Santiago, made the
denial in, a letter to the Inter-.
American Press Asso-ciation.
Mercurio has been mentioned
as the recipient of clandostino
funds in Washington report.
Later, of course, differences between Premier Fidel
'Castro and Moscow were largely accommodated, and
the Cuban secret service has been largely financed
by Moscow for operations in South America, just as
the Czechoslovak equivalent is the K.G.B.'s favored
auxiliary in Western Europe. In the case of Chile,
where the C.I.A.'s conduct is' now under attack, it
was through their Cuban subordinates that the
K.G.B. directed the training of guerrillas. Their own
direct operations in Chile were largely of the cash-,
and-organization type. In that, at least, there ap-
parently is a parallel with the C.I.A.
Robert Conquest is an author of books on the Soviet
Union, 'including "Power and,P obey in the U.S.S.R."
President. Ford said funds!
went to threatened opposition
parties and press.
"Although I don't participate
in the financial s;de of the
company," Silva wrote, "I am
certain that its incomes have
legitimate and normal origins,
they are known nil and con-
trolled by the legal authorities
of the country:' Silva said the
Allende. government had at-
tempted?but failed?to nrove
charges of CIA backing for
Mercurio.
In Santiago, Gen, Augusto!
Pinochet, president of the
military junta, said policy
changes in Chile's state of i,ne
ternal war that were recoin
mended by Sen. Edward Ken-
nedy were "unacceptable com-
ing from a foreign politician.",
Pinochet's comment on the'
Kennedy suggestions, which'
the senator said would en-
couraafe support for bilateral
cooperation if adopted, ap-
peared in publication of cor-
respondence between the two
men. last May. Kennedy asked
that constitutional- guarantees
and civil courts be reinstated.
Pinoc'net replied that Ken-
nedy's suggestions were a clear
demonstration of "imperialist
mentality."
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New Statesman 27 September 1974
Laurence Stern
114111111=1,1112131111112111111MaiR11111141111115MI
What's Good for America . . .
1102111111MILIMMIBIIIII161111811111.11NE,
An off-hand remark by Henry Kissinger,
recorded in the secret minutes of a 27 June
1970 meeting of the National Security Coun-
cil's 'committee of 40' tells us all we need
to know about the Washington political
climate in which the the CIA interventions
in Chile were hatched. 'I don't see why we
need to stand by and watch a country go
communist due to the irresponsibility of its
own people,' the architect of the American
d?nte policy declared some two months
before Chileans would vote for their new
president. It was this meeting which pro-
duced the authorisation for a 'modest' pro-
gramme of political espionage ? a mere
$400,000 worth ? against Salvador Allende.
At other such meetings, also chaired by
Kissinger, the rest of some $8m. in black
funds was targeted at the leader of Chile's
Leftist coalition. This was the amount which
was reportedly acknowledged by CIA direc-
tor William E. Colby in testimony delivered
to an executive session of the House of
Representatives sub-committee on intelli-
gence oversight. Estimates by other gov-
ernment officials familiar with US covert
operations in Chile during the past decade
?are considerably higher.
This runs counter to the popular notion
of the CIA as an unguided missile, a run-
away espionage apparatus blithely toppling
governments and installing reactionary
juntas in capitals around the world beyond
the control of its superiors. The truth is far
more sinister. In Chile, in Cuba, in Guate-
mala, in Greece, in Vietnam, in the Congo
and in Laos the CIA was operating under
a direct presidential charter in a framework
of executive authority insulated by thick
? wraps of official secrecy from control by
any other sector of national leadership. It.
is, in every sense, a king's army commanded
by the President through his National
Security Adviser.
- President Ford's defence last week of the
, CIA's covert intervention against a lawfully
elected government in Santiago as 'in the
best interests of the people of Chile' was in
the tradition of kingly Hubris. Mr Ford, at
heart a man of touching humility, put him-
self in this instance beyond the restraints
of logic, historical accuracy and good sense.
? His justification for the CIA-financed
programme of political and economic espi-
onage against the Allende. government ?
that it planned in its inception to destroy
opposition newspapers, radio and television
media as well as political parties ? echoes
against the gruesome silence today of the
closed newspaper plants and political party
headquarters in Chile. While Allende was
- not able to accomplish the evil designs
imputed to him by President Ford and Secre-
tary of State Kissinger during three years
in power, the junta which replaced him
managed to do it all within 24 hours.
Senator Walter F. Mondale of Minne-
sota bitterly inquired whether the CIA is
now engaged in any covert programmes
designed to reopen the newspapers, radio'
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stations, political parties and even the
National Congress which were padlocked by
Chile's new rulers. If the present Administra-
tion in Washington is so concerned about
the maintenance of political liberties in
Chile, how can it.continue to shovel minions
of dollars in economic assistance to the men
who have brought an unprecedented dark
age of repression to Chile? Why is the same
US ? influence in the World Bank, the
Export-Import bank and the Inter-American
? Development Bank, which was used to cut
Chile's credit lifeline during the Allende
years, now being applied to restore it?
There are many here ? including members
in good standing of the Henry Kissinger
appreciation society ? who are being
forced to the conclusion that Washington
was less interested in political freedom
in Chile than in supplanting the Allende
government with one which would adopt a ,
more 'reasonable' policy in dealing with the
US transnational corporations. It is these
corporate interests in Chile which were, for
all practical purposes, defined by the Nixon-
Kissinger foreign policy to be at one with
the national interest. 'National interest' was
the shibboleth which lay at the heart of the
worst deceptions of the Watergate scandals.
That President Ford should invoke it in
justifying CIA efforts to sabotage a consti-
tutional government in Chile demonstrates
how thin a lesson Watergate has been.
The Chile revelations have now rekindled
the debate over the CIA and what should
be done to bring it to heel. Legislation has
been introduced to establish a joint congres-
sional oversight committee to replace the
hand-picked review sub-committees which
have through the years served as Congres-
sional claques for the CIA. The traditional
attitude towards the CIA overseership on
Capitol Hill was unforgettably articulated by
Senator John Stennis, senior Senate watch-
dog of the agency: 'Spying is spying . . . you
have to make up your mind that you are
going to have an intelligence agency and
protect it as such, and shut your eyes some,
and take what is coming.'
It has been a customary practice in the
orchestration of covert action programmes
within the '40 committee' and the CIA to
prepare cover stories not only for the press -
and public but for Congress as well. And so
congressional oversight has amounted to
little More than the blindfolder leading the'.
blind. The CIA director, William E. Colby, ?
has announced a new policy of public can-
dour for his appearances before Congress:
he will not lie about clandestine operations
hereafter; he will simply refuse to talk
about them.
Realistically speaking, any overhaul in
the congressional oversight syStem will re-
sult either in more legislators being taken
into camp or more bent testimony by the
CIA, Assistant Secretaries of State and
Kissinger as well. As long as the agency is
provided a charter for operations to evict,
install or harass governments, it will have to
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which is the watchword of clandestine
? activity.
Another approach, which in the reformist
spirit of the moment has gained at least
debating-hall respectability, is abolition of
covert action programmes and confining the
role of the CIA to intelligence collection ?
its original charter,
Such a policy would cendone quiet Peng-
tration but prescribe the noisy climax, It is
a position which can be persuasively argued
in the light of the, results of most covert
WASHINGTON POST
07 October 1974
operations that have surfaced over the past
decade or so. They range across a spectrum
of accomplishment from the dubious to the
disastrous in their impact on the national
interest and world opinion. .
The CIA maintains that it buries its suc-
cesses and that, is why we don't hear of
them. Perhaps we may be forgiven for sus-
pecting that this, too, might be a cover
story.
? Washington
The Senate and the CIA:
ITHE HOT AND HEAVY protests which followed
disclosure of , the ?CIA's subversion in Chile have
produced an official affirmation of "dirty tricks" of
unprecedented scope and explicitness. Mr. Ford reacted,
two weeks ago not only by acknowledging an American
'role in the overthrow of the Allende government. but
by. declaring his readiness to take future "actions in
the .intelligence field." No American President had
previously, either defended a particular operation or
justified such operations as g whole. To be sure, it was
not the substance of what Mr. Ford said but his public
statement of it that was new. It is not surprising that
a,President would support established presidential pol-
icy. But the response, of Congress is something else
again ?
We print on this 'page today excerpts from a histori-
cal Senate debate of last Wednesday, "historical" because
it marks the first time that either house of Congress
has 'conducted an* open debate and openly voted on
whether the United States should engage in secret
foreign operations in peacetime, intelligence gathering
aside. A leading student of the CIA, Harry Howe
Ransom, wrote recently that "one searches in vain in
the public records. . . for any evidence of congressional
intent or acquiescence to assign the functions of foreign
political action or subversion to the CIA." The "search"
can now end. Last Wednesday the Senate considered
an amendment 'by Sen. James Abourezk ,(D-S.D.) to end
dirty tricks completely. The amendment was swarnped,
68 to 17.
? ?
. The CIA and its supporters can now claim?fairly,
vv,e ? believe?that for the first time the agency has a
congressional mandate, if only from one louse, for
covert operations. No longer - can CIA operations be
regarded as an unauthorized presidential 'habit or cold-
war carryover. Though only briefly and ?without hear-
ings or committee recommendations, the Senate did join
the debate and express its judgment. It was, moreover,
a:judgment we happen to share. As we have said, given
American interests and global uncertainties, the United
States should not deny itself the CIA option in all
circumstances.
We think, nonetheless, that Mr. Abourezk performed
a service by forcing a vote on an issue from which
most legislators have traditionally averted their eyes.
The senator was under no illusion that his amendment
would win. But he wished to make the Senate accept
accountability for CIA operations and to establish the
issue 10 one deserving regular review. If the CIA can
now claim a new mandate for covert operations, then
senator t must now be ready publicly to justify their
own stands. The furor over CIA activity in Chile, the
Watergate disclosure that the CIA is not immune from
political usage, the fading of the congressional tradi-
tionalists who have protected the CIA from critical
congressional scrutiny?all these factors have opened
up the issue in a major way. Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.),
one of the leading traditionalists,, remarked on the
change last Wednesday. "It is not an easy job that I have
had on this matter," he said. "I will not relate the,
incidents that have come up. It was my duty, and that
was it. After all, we are working for the same country."
Just what the new attitude personified by Sen. Abour-
ezk will finally lead to is, of course, uncertain. It is
noteworthy, however, that since the Chile affair became
known, the administration has been conducting a kind
of preemptive retreat by offering certain concessions
to Congress on "oversight." Its latest move is to promise
timely briefings on operations to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, as well as to the oversight committee
of the Armed Services Committee. This broadens the
circle of those who can offer the CIA their advice on
operations, though the agency still does not ask for
legislators' consent. It also broadens the circle of those
whom the CIA can swear to secrecy. A legislator so
sworn, who finds himself opposed to a proposed opera-
tion, will still face the intolerable choice of breaking his
oath or swallowing his best judgment.
We do not think there is a good way to square the
circle: to have effective public oversight of secret
operations. It is a humbling contradiction for a demo-
cratic society. Sen. Abourezk's answer?to abolish secret ,
operations and to meet all foreign threats openly and
publicly or not at all?has the virtue of consistency but,
in our view, falls short in terms of policy. The portions
of the debate published here today indicate, if nothing
else, just how difficult the issue is.
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WASHINGTON POST
07 October 1974
The 'Covert perations, Debate,
The following are excerpts from the Senate debate of Oct. 2 on an
amendment to the foreign aid bill which would have ordered the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency immediately to halt .all covert operations not
.-related to intelligence. The 'amendment was defeated, 68 to 17. This
marked the first time either house of Congress had dein; ted and voted
on this issue.
Sen. James. Abourezie (D-S.H.): This
amendment will, if enacted, abolish all
clandestine or covert operations by the
Central Intelligence Agency. s
I believe very strongly that we must
have an intelligence-gathering organi-
zation and I believe the CIA and our
defense intelligence agencies do an ade-
quate job in this respect.
We have every right to defend our-
selves from foreign attack and that
right includes intelligence gathering to
protect our security.
But there is no justification in our
legal, moral, or religious principles for ?
operations of a U.S. agency which re-
sult in assassinations, sabotage, politi-
cal disruptions, or other meddling in
another country's internal affairs, all
in the name of the American people. It
amounts to nothing more than an arm
of the U.S. government conducting a
secret war without either the approval
of Cengress or the knowledge of the
American people.
I want to remind the Senate that the -
present director of the CIA, Williain -
Colby, said a couple of weeks ago that
while he preferred to retain the clan-
destine or covert services, the Capitol
would not fall if it were abolished.
He also said that there was not any
? activity going, on anywhere in the?
at this time that required the '
use of clandestine activity.
e ?
Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho): I have
? decided to vote for this amendment,
but I do so with the expectation' that it
will not pass.
The intrusion of the CIA into the in-
ternal political affairs of Chile for the
purpose of subverting and bringing
down the elected government of that
country is an episode that I find both
? unsavory and unprincipled and in di-
rect contradiction of the traditional
principles for which this country has
? stood.
I think the fact this has now come to
light demonstrates that the covert ac-
tivities of the CIA are presently un-
der no effective restraint. -'
I would hope that it will be possible
to establish, either through a joint
committee or by some other means,
adequate congressional surveillance
over the activities of the CIA, in or-
der to avoid in the future such un-
seemly interference with the rights of
other peoples. If so, then we ?vill have
solved this problem without having to
. outlaw covert activity outright.
I can envision situations in which
the national security of the' United
- States, or the survival of the republic,
or the avoidance of nuclear war, would
have such overriding importance as to t
. _
countries, contrary to Our treaties, con-
trary to the principles of international
law, and contrary to the historic role
played by the United States in world af-
fairs.
Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.):
It involves, as see it, too important a
matter of public policy to be made
summarily here On the floor of the
Senate.
This amendment was not presented
to the. committee. It has not had hear-
ings, even though the whole subject of
.. the Central Intelligence operations
has, here and there in the committees
of Congress, been looked at.
It is my judgment that the Central
Intelligence Agency needs to be care-
fullyexa.mined and that a whole set of
new directives deed to be' evolved, but
tinder what circumstances the CIA
-should be allowed to continue to en-
gage iri covert operations *abroad is a
legitimate and timely question.
I have offered repeatedly a resolu-
tion for a joint committee on national
security that would represent both.
bodies of the Congress; that would rep-
resent leadership in Congress as well
as those who are not in leadership
positions; members from the -Foreign
Relations Committee, Armed Services,
Appropriations; members from the
Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and
Appropriations Committees as Well as
those appointed by the Chair and the
Speaker, ,to oversee the entire opera-
tion of our national security apparatus.
I believe it is needed. ?
?
Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.): I have'
had some responsibility in the Senate
for a good number of years with refer-
ence to the CIA activities. Frankly, I
have been more interested in the mili-
tary part, the surveillance over, that,
and the very highly valuable informa-
tion that they have brought us.
I have talked to many senators
about this. I have not found a single
one, except the author of this amend-
ment?and there are others?who
firmly believe that we ought to abolish
covert actions and have no capacity in
that field.
I say it is a dangerous thing to do.
This surveillance is quite a problem,
members of the Senate. We have had
t up for many, many angles. As an in-
dividual senator, I am ready and willing
o just get out of the picture. 1 do not ,
vant to run the thing, so to speak. But
s chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, which has primary juris-
iction here, I am not going to be put
ht, nor run over, either. I do not
I
a
, o
hink anyone wants td do that..
ustify covert activity.
. But none of those factors was Ipres- . 0
Se
ent in the Chilean case and none of n. Barry Goldwater (Iteerize: If
we destroy our right to engage in cov-
those factors has been present in pre- ?
ivious eases which later came to light, ert activitY altogether hy the adop-
wherein the CIA has -undertaken to cov-
ertly 'subvert the gepeppvtevtacbFottuReleM121:301AR39,0go.CIAIRDEMB110432R
would even prevent us from going to
war?I think we would be making a
very grave mistake.
I do not support everything that the
CIA has done. On the other hand, I do
not know everything it has done, and I
do not think we necessarily have to
-know. I think this would be dangerous.
I cite the example of a member of
the House of Representatives who hap-
pened to have seen, so he says, a -page
of testiinony. We do not know whether .
he saw that testimony or not. But on
this one statement, in which, in my '
opinion, he violated his pledge to. se- -
crecy, the whole CIA has come under
criticism. I do not believe it is fair of
this body to accept the hearsay words
of a man who divulged classified mate-
rial.
So, I hope we will defeat this amend-
ment and defeat it soundly. I think I
am safe in saying that the chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services, to- .
gether with the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, would be
willing to institute proper hearings, at
which time we could hear all argu-
ments for and against the operation of
our intelligence collecting agencies.
Sen. Clifford Case (R-101.J.): If I may
express my 'own view about covert ac-
tivities, it is that they all should be re-
garded as wrong. There ought not to
be an institutionalization of them,
even to the extent that we have now.
I do not think that a committee is the
answer. We have a committee down-
town, a Committee of 40, which is sup-
posed to review this matter and advise .
the President; and he acts on their ad-
vice in most cases, I understand.
We have a committee here, when it
meets. I am not complaining that it
does not meet more often, because I do
not think a committee is the answer.
Once we get into an institutionalize- ,
tion of this kind of thing, we begin to
make it respectable, and that I do not
like. There ought to be a general rule
against it, with a general understand=
ing of the American -people that on oc-
casion the President has to act in vio-
lation of the law, if you will?our law,
other laws?and take action in the in-
terest of a country, in great emer-
gency. This I think he does at his own
peril and subject to being either sup-
ported or turned down by the country,
after the fact. I think this is about as
close as we can came to any statement
about how this matter ought to be han-
dled.
I would, of course, consider any 'pro-
posal made for procedural reform
here, but I want to state now that I do
not think any such thing' is possible be-
cause of the nature of the animal with
which we are dealing.
Sen. Howard. Baker (R-Tenne: The
thing that really disturbs and dis-
tresses me is that I am not sure in my
mind that any of us have any way to
know whether or not covert operations
'are being properly conducted, or con-
ducted at all, or for what purpose.
I do not think there is a man in the
legislative part of the .government who
really knows what is going on in the
intelligence community, and I am ter-
ribly upset about it. I am afraid of this
0?42110/011' or t.he first time, I
, z e atortal career I am
5
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5
? frightened. I am generally 'frightened
? of the unknown.
I have proposed, with 32, co-sponsors
In the Senate, to create a special Joint? ,
ComMittee on 'Intelligence Oversight.
Through such a committee, I hope re
. will know. We do not know today, so ;
itle with great reluctance that I will
'vote against this amendment,
?
. Mr. Abourezk: I have just ? heard'
? some of the most incredible arguments
I have heard in my life, arguments in
favor of continued breaking , and viola-
tion of the laws of the United States
and of other countries, promoted by'
the agents of the Central Intelligence 4.
Agency.
? ? I do not know why anybody in Con-,
? gress or in this country 'wants to fl-
? nance a secret army?and that Is ex-
? actly what the CIA has been?a secret.
army going around fighting unde-
clared wars, without the knowledge of?;
any of us in Congress until it is too
late, without the knowledge of any-
body in the country until it is too late.
It seems to me that the arguments in
? favor of having covert operations
whicti, can at some points break the
law have as little validity as the argu-
ment that we ought to maintain a
Overt operation permanently. I
that because, if this 'country is ever in_
danger of atack or under threat from
4nother country, we have a right to
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 October 1974
Winds of change
declare war and to operate under' the
rules of warfare that we have agreed
to in the various Geneva Conventions,
in which I am convinced we would
then be legally operating in the man-
ner that the CIA is no* operating.
?
Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (It-ore.): TO
me, it is transparently olnqous that
the CIA's covert operations, under-4
taken in Chile to "destabilize" the Al-
lende government, were in violation of
these commitments of , international
law. At the very least, such operations
compromise the sincerity of our
loudly proclaimed desire for world
peace and world freedom, I think we .
ought to address ourselves to the le-
gal obligations this nation has under-
taken when it has affixed its signature
to these various statements and these
various charters.
That is why I feel that the amend-
ment offered by the senator from
South Dakota really does not go far
enough. I should like to see.it go far-
ther, to put this Senate on record that
we totally and completely oppose any
involvement whatsoever in covert act- :
ivity. That does not deny the gathering -
of information and intelligence, but in-
dicates the refusal of this Senate to
permit-the CIA to go beyond gathering
intelligence into an action of covert ac-
tivity.
Sen.'Stuart Symington (D-Mo.): I am
in great sympathy with much of this '
thinking of the senator from South Da-
kota?but I agree with the able 'sena-
tor from Minnesota. I do not believe
' this is the way it should be done..
What should be done is the estab-
lishment of a joint committee of the
Committee on Foreign Relations and.
the Committee on Armed Services?
and I have so presented to thedistin-
guished chairman of the Armed Serv- '
ices Committee for many years. We.
have a strange dichotomy here.
In every country of the world, the
head of the CIA reports to the ambas-
? sador. That has been true ever since
? the issuance of the so-called Kennedy ."
? Letter. But when information comes
, back here, whereas the State Depart. ..4.
? meat aupervises ambassadors, the .
, Armed Services Committee supervises
- the CIA.
This situation should be corrected, s
and I believe it will be corrected. On
: the other hand, I do not think this is
? the bill where it should be considered.
-Inasmuch as 95 per cent or more of '
the work of the CIA has to do with ;
countries with which we are not at"
war, normally at least some of the mat:,
ters of the CIA should come under the
? Foreign Relations Committee, it is-
clear that the Foreign Relations Conv-.-
mittee should at least have some Inter-
est in reviewing the work of the 'Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
CIA cloak'and dadder
By William H. Stringer
? A short While after the Communist
regime of Jacob? Arbenz was over-
thrown in Guatemala, with some help
from the United States Central In-
telligence Agency, the United Fruit
Company took a group of newsmen on
a junket to Central America. I was
one of the newsmen. There, among
the mountains and the volcanos, we
saw banana plantations, palm oil
? plantings, experimental farms, all
? maintained by the United Fruit Com-
pany. We were brought home on a
spic-and- span boat full of bananas.
My conclusion, at that point, was
that if Arbenz aimed at upsetting this
? setup, he was doing Guatemala a
major disservice. And that it was a
"good thing" that the CIA had helped
? to get rid of this Communist regime.
(Particularly since it was close to the
Panama Canal.)
Still, of course, the U.S. was, by
? means of the CIA, interfering with
Central American politics.
Later, when in the Philippines,. I
heard numerous individuals, both of-
ficials and laymen, lament that Ra-
mon Magsaysay had been killed when
? his airplane hit a mountain. He was a
man of great promise, a leader who
could have done much to set the
Philippines on a clear road to demo-
cratic self-government. That the CIA
had helped Magsaysay and helped in
putting down the threat of the Com-
munist Huk guerrillas seemed to me a
worthwhile contribution to Asian
peace.
Was the U.S. Interfering in Philip-
pine affairs?
Then there was Iranian Premier
Mohammed Mossadegh. He was a
wily individual who took to his bed
and wept when affairs went wrong.
He nationalized the Iranian oil in-
dustry and he threatened to over-
throw the Shah. He was abruptly
ousted from office, with assistance,
apparently, from the CIA.
Should the CIA have left well
enough alone and let things take their
course?
Each individual must make up his
own mind about such matters. What I
am saying is that the CIA's record is
hardly one of repeated failures.
? Now what about Chile and the end of
the Allende regime? I know a lady in'
Chile who, speaking for the middle-
class point of view, declares that
Chile could not have settled down to
solid government so long as Allende
was seeking constantly to nudge it
into communism. Of course, neither
she nor most Chileans expected that
the overthrow of Allende would be
accompanied by harsh repressive
measures.
What is at issue here is whether, at
all times, the CIA must eschew covert
operations. CIA director William E,
Colby recently said that the CIA could
abandon every kind of covert action,
without "a major impact on our
current activities, or the current
Security of the United States."
Is this actually so? There is an "old.
boy network," the Coinmittee of 40,.
long-experienced 'American officials
who believe it to be worthwhile to
retain the CIA's capacity for covert
activities. These people believe they
are aware of the basic interests of the
U.S., and that there are times when
covert "interference" can help. ,
Director Colby has moved to reduce
covert actions and to focus more of
the CIA's activities back to its origi-
nal mission, which is the gathering ef
Intelligence. This is probably wise.
What is not so clear is whether
Congress, which is notoriously loose-
jawed when it comes to a question of
keeping one's mouth shut, should be
given any more control of the CIA
than it now has. Every attempt in the
past few years to give Congress more
effective supervision of the CIA has
been voted down.
Crosby S. Noyes writes in the
Washington Star: "There are a good
many areas in the world today where
the future of democratic government
hangs in precarious balance and
where action ? or lack of action ? by
the United States could well be deci-
sive."
There could be situations where we
certainly would not want to send In,
the marines. Nor do we want our
potential opponents to indulge in a lot
of shoving around, with impunity.
This leaves a very occasional situ-
ation where covert action is advis-
able.
6
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4Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340605-5 *
NEW YORK . TIMES
07 October 1974:
Cont.
oiling Secret Operations
By Harry Rositzke
MIDDLEBURG, Va.?The dramatic
and divisive issue of secret operations
abroad has again been raised by the
recent exposures of the United States
role in Chile. These operations have
been challenged as an illegal and im-
moral form of diplomacy impermissible
in .an open society. They have been
derided as antiquated holdovers from
the cold war, and have been de-
? nounced as acts of the executive not
open to Congressional or popular
judgment.
The basie questions raised are
simple: What, if any, secret operations
should the United States carry out
abroad? Who is to control them? ?
With Harry S. Truman's assignment
to the Central Intelligence Agency in
1948 of a charter for secret-action op-
erations, in addition to its espionage
and counterespionage missions, suc-
cessive Administrations have without
? exception used their secret arm of
Government to achieve foreign policy
objectives for which they could not, or
would not, openly use the resources of
the State and Defense Departments.
Two main types of action. opera-
tions, political and paramilitary, vary
in method, scale and degree of secrecy.
The most expensive, conspicuous
and flagrantly illegal are paramilitary
operations. During the early stages of
the cold war, they were directed
against the Soviet orbit itself, many in
support of ? resistance groups in the
Baltic countries, the Ukraine, Poland
and Albania, and after the Korean
war in northern China. ?
In the nineteen-fifties, 'President'
Dwight
Dwight D, Eisenhower approved sup-
port for the Indonesian rebels against
President Sukarno and authorized _the
invasion of Guatemala to prevent the
? introduction of Soviet arms into the
. Western Hemisphere. ?
He left to his successor,' John F.
Kennedy, the legacy of paramilitary
action, which resulted in disaster
against Premier Fidel Castro's regime.
WASHINGTON POST
04 October 1974
After the Bay of Pigs, the C.LA.'s
paramilitary capability was concen-
trated almost exclusively in Indochina.
? Political-action operations?secret
support of foreign leaders, political
parties and labor unions, and the
preparation of coups and countercoups
?have been carried out under the
aegis of every postwar President.
Under Mr. Truman, the anti-Commu-
nist fight focused on Europe, starting
with substantial open and secret sup-
port for Italy's democratic forces to
stave off a Communist victory in the
1948 elections. Mr. Eisenhower's main
political-action' moves were in the
Middle East, both with backdoor
diplomacy in the Arab countries and
the unseating of the regime of Mo-
hammed Mossadegh in Iran.
? A C.LA, political-action role was an
intrinsic part of Mr. Kennedy's coun-
terinsurgency program, which waS
carried on by Lyndon B. Johnson and
Richard M. Nixon. The Alliance for
Progress in Latin America entailed
support for friendly governments in
countering domestic. insurgencies as
well as action against regimes sym-
pathetic to Havana or Moscow.
In friendly countries, the C.I.A.
trained and equipped national police
and security organs to deal on their
own with active insurgencies, mainly
in Bolivia and Venezuela, but on a
smaller scale in other countries as well.
In countries such as, Ecuador or Brazil,.
which were willing or eager to recog-
nize Mr.. Castro's Cuba, it helped to
weaken or replace regimes.
Chile's place in . this over-simple
paradigm is unique. In a society with
a solid democratic tradition, a "friend-
ly!' Government not facing a domestic
insurgency was replaced in a free elec-
tion by an "unfriendly"' coalition of
parties enjoying strong financial and
political support from Moscow and
Havana. Secret political action was
called upon to supplement American
policy both before and after the elec-
tion of Dr. 'Salvador Allende Gossens
as 'President in 1970. ?
Although the legal and moral issues
involved in interfering in the affairs'of
"sit and participate in the ac-
ill Leaders tivities" of the panel.
? '? I The subcommittee and its*
counterpart in the House exist
join S mate 'to keep a congressional watch
on CIA activities and spend-
,
? ?
CIA Paniel ing. The two are the only;
groups in Congress that are
? told exactly how much money
the CIA spends. But neither
subcommittee submits reports,
?
The Senate oversight sub. and their activities are almost
committee on the Central In- as secret as the CA itself. '
telligence Agency as ex- Stennis' announcement
panded yesterday to include, came after the ? Senate ac-
the Senate's two party leaders., eepted Wednesday a foreign
Sen. Johri C. Stennis (D? aid bill amendment, offered
Miss.), chairman of the Armed by liberals, that would have
Services CIA subcommittee, banned secret CIA activities
said Democratic leader Mike abroad unless the President
Mansfield of Montana and Re-, himself declared them to be in
publican leader Hugh Scott of the interest of national secu-
United Press International
Pennsylvania had aareed .tco-
Approvea roetRelease 2001/08/08 : C A-RDP77-00432
7
other countries may never be settled '
to the satisfaction of the Congress, the
news media or the public, there are
some steps President Ford can take ,
now to reduce the confusion, and pos-
sibly the debate, about American
secret operations abroad.
A first simple step would be to -
transfer the responsibility for secret
paramilitary operations to the Defense
Department. Never totally, secret,
demanding complex logistic support,
they do not belong in a secret civilian
agency.
Political contacts ranging from
senior government officials to labor
leaders are a natural element in any
secret intelligence service. If such con-
tacts are nsed for action purposes,
they can normally be kept secret?
short of coups or high-level leaks.
There will be occasions, even in a
world of d?nte, when the executive
will decide that secret political action
is required.
The President can most effectively
appease some critics by inviting
selected representatives of Congress
to sit with the National Security Coun-
cil when it considers secret-action
proposals. What Congress needs are _I
previews?not more post-mortems.
Harry Rositzhe worked in secret oper-
ations for 27 years with the Office of
Strategic Services and the Central ?
Intelligence Agency before his retire:
ment in 1970.
.1.5,11.01111????111???11.
BALTIMORE SUN
4 October 1974
Ex-spy tilts with, CIA, I
- London (Reuter)?A former
United States spy turned
Marxist, ' Philip Agee, yester-
day moved to embarrass -the
Central Intelligence Agency by
making public a list said to be'
.the agency's operatives in '
Mexico.
? A book by Mr. Agee, to be
*published here in January,
tells of his work with the CIA '
in- Latin America up to the
time he resigned, disillusioned,
in 1969.
. Yesterday he told a press
.conference held above a Fleet
'street pub that he wanted to;
expose CIA officers and drivei
them out of the countries]
where they operated.
He said his list of agency'
personnel in Mexico, under
Richard Sampson, a station
chief, was drawn up recently
"by comrades who I trained to
follow the comings and goings
of the CIA."
The 39-year-old writer, who
now lives in southwest Eng-
land, painted the agency as the
"secret political police of'
i
American capitalism and the
broirobf3e48661g
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974
U.S. Ought to Suspend
Covert iActivities Abroad
BY. DAVID WISE
When Soviet party chief Leonid :set forth in the law, was to pull ,
Brezhnev was in Washington in 1973 together, the intelligence informa-
for a summit 'meeting, Richard Nix-, Von that the President needs td.
'make decisions,in the field of foreign
on introduced him to a short, thin'
man with grajenk black hair,' iharP policy. There is nothing in the law '
'features and very cold blue eyes be- about overthrowing governments;'.
hind glasses rimmed in fIesh-colored there is language, however, permit-
plastic frames. ting the CIA to perform such "other
Brezhnev stared for. a moment at functions" as the NSC may direct.
'
William E. Colby, director ' of the Under. this _umbrella clause, the
'CIA has engaged in its global 'ciiity
Day. id Wise is the coauthor of "The ?tricks, manipulated the politics of
Invisible Government," a critical study other countries, directed a secret
war in Lees, funneled millions of
of the CIA, and of "The Espionage ?
dollars through foundation conduits
Establishment." ,His latest bpok is
The Politics of Lying." ? ?
groups, dropped agenti by pare-
established a secret base at Camp
Hale, Colo., nearly 10,000 feet high
in the Rockies, and there trained
Tibetan geereillas.to return to their
homeland to fight against the CM.
nose Communists. CIA covert opera-
tors later claimed that some of the
? ' Tibetans trained in Colorado helped
'the Dalai Lama to escape to India in
'
1959.
Into
into student, academic and, labor'
Central Intelligence Agency, and
alked:"Is he a dangerous man?" '
Colby replied soothingly: "The
more we ? know of each other, the
safer we both will be."The answer was disarming,' but it
also was consistent with the CIA's
current strategy of emphasizing its
information, intelligence-gathering,
and analytic functions, and down-
playing its covert operations or
'dirty ?tricks'
The CIA does indeed collect
foreign intelligence. But its Director-
ate of Operations?which Colby for-
merly headed?also conducts secret
political operations. around the
globe. These have ranged from pay-
'merits to foreign political leaders
and attempts to rig elections, to
overthrowing governments and pa-
ramilitary invasions. CIA-backed
coups have sometimes resulted in
the assassination of the political
leaders who are overthrown. At
times, the CIA has even operated its
own air force, army and navy.
Increasingly, these secret opera-
tions have come. under criticism, in
and out of Congress. Covert activi-
ties have focused public attention on
the question of whether the United
'States has the right to intervene se-
cretly in the internal affairs of other
nations. And secret operations have
raised basic questions about the role
of an intelligence agency in a demo-
tracy?
Recent disclosures that the CIA,
apparently with the approval of high
officials of the Nixon _Administra-
tion. 1,S ja Chile to
destabilize" the Marxist govern-
ment of Salvador .Allende have in-
creased demands for either an end to
such secret political operations, or
tighter control by Congress over
CIA, or both.
The CIA. was created in 19-47...ii?'
vari
Chute .in ous countries and.
served as the clandestine arm of the
U.S.? foreign policy.
?
A partial list of such covert opera- ,
tions includes the following:
Burma: In the 1950's the CIA *fi-
nanced approximately 12,000 Chi-
nese Nationalist troops who fled to.
Burma as the Communists took over.
mainland China in .1949. The CIA's
troops, discovering poppies to be
more profitable than politics, soon
be h involved.lyin e opi-
um trade.
China: In the early 1950's;the in-
telligence agency air-dropped agents
Into the People's Republic of China.
Two CIA men, John T. Downey and
Richard Fecteau, were.eaptured and
spent 20 years in Chinese prisons be-
fore they were released.
Philippines: Also in the early
? .
1950's, the CIA backed Ramon Mag.
saysay's campaign against the Com-
munist Huk guerrillas.
Iran: In 1953,. the CIA overthrew
the gaveinment or Premier Mo-!
hammed -Mossadegh, who had na-
tionalized the Iranian oil industry.
?The coup was led by CIA agent Ker-*
nit "Kim" Roosevelt, grandson of
President Theodore Roosevelt. The
operation kept the ? shah in Tower,
and in its wake, American oil compa-
nies were permitted into Iran.
_ Guatemala: In 1954, the CIA top-
pled the Communist-dominated
'government of President Jacob? Ar-
benz Guzman of Guatemala with the,
help of a CIA air force of old World
War II , fighter planes. President
Eisenhower later confirmed that he
had.approveq.tt!e CIA operation.-
'Indonesia: In 1958:with a secret
air force of B-26 bombers the CIA
backed Indonesian rebels against the,
government of President Sukarno.
One of the CIA oilot Allen Lw
, re
the successor to the Office of Strafe-I tu
gin Services (OSS). The same legisla-
ton created the National Security r,
Council. The purpose of the CIA, as
8
nee Pope, was shot down and cap-
red; he was freed in 1962 through
e intervention of Robert F. Ken-
edy.
Tibet: In the late 1950's, the CIA
Cuba: In 1061, a brigade of Cuban
, exiles trained by the CIA on a coffee
plantation in Guatemala invaded
Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to overthrow the
govern rr et of Fidel Castro. More
than 2.)0 of the invaders died on the
beaches and almost 1,200 were cap-
tured in President Kennedy's worst
foreign policy disaster.
Vietnam: In 1963, the CIA worked
Closely With the South Vietnamese ?
generals who carried out the coup
against President Ngo Dinh Diem,
who was killed. In Vietnam, the CIA -
also created the Phoenix program,
which killed 20,587 Vietcong during
the period William Colby headed it,
between 1968 and 1971.
Bolivia: In 1967, a. team of. CIA
operatives was sent to Bolivia,
where they helped to track down.Er-
nesto "Che" Guevara, former aide to
Castro: Guevara was captured ? and
? killed. '-?
?
j The rationale for all such covert
CIA operations is that they are justi-
fied and necessary to protect Ameri-
can national security. A secret five-
man government committee, known
.over the years by various names and
currently as the Forty Committee,
has the responsibility of approving
covert operations in advance. At pre-
sent, the chairman of the committee
is Secretary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer., Its other members are Un-
dersecretary of State for Political Af-
fairs Joseph J. Sisco; William P. Cle-
ments, Jr., the deputy ,secretary of
defense; Air Force 'Gen. George S
Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
,of Staff, and Colby.
The extent to which. thc Forty
Committee controls secret CIA oper-
ations .remains 'uncertain for the
very reason that the committee, like
the -CIA itself, operates in great se-
crecy. In any event; .what control
does exist is within the executive
branch; the Forty Committee does
not include any members of Con- ?
gress in its ranks. Nor, as far as .can:
be determined, does the. CIA discuss
its covert operations to any signifi-
cant extent with the four shadowy
House and Senate subcommittees
that supposedly monitor CIA acitivi:-
ties. In the case of Chile, various Ex-
ecutive branch witnesses assured
congressional committees that the
United States had not 'intervened.
against Allende. -
In an era of cold war, secret inter- -
vention in other countries might
have seemed justified to many
Americans. They do not appear justi- ?
fied today. There is no moral or legal
basis for covert operations?the 1947
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act does not specifically authorize
them?and such intervention vio-
lates. the charter of the United Na-
tions, Which the United States is
pledged to respect.
Moreover. the Constitution gives
Congress the war power;-secret oper-
ations involving paramilitary action
and the overthrow of governments
are clearly the equivalent of unde-
LONDON TIMES
2 October 1974
dared war and, on their face, uncon-
stitutiona I.
The price of secret operations is
too high in a democracy that rests on
the consent of the governed. Often,
the government has lied to protect
covert CIA activities. Such 'official
lying has eroded confidence in our
national leaders and the American
system of government
A dangerous
gamble by the junta
ruling Chile
There was a good deal of irony
about President Ford's recent
Justification of the activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency
in Chile. The CIA had been
? authorized to intervene, he said,
because of the threat to the
Opposition news media. and the
opposition parties under Presi-
dent Allende. But Mr Ford did
not mention the fate of the news
, media and the parties under the
present military regime which,
unlike that of President Allende,
has Simply suppressed all oppo-
sition.
The fact is that the CIA was
throwing its weight, once again,
on the side of the right-wing
? elements in Latin America?
those which opposed the social-
ist experiment of the Unidad
popular government, regardless
. of the fact that it had been con-
?gtitutionally elected. This inter-
vention is not likely to have
- .been decisive (the CIA, after all,
- failed in its original objective
of preventing the election of Dr
Allende). But it must have
helped.
?
The most interesting, question
now is where the Chilean mill-.
tary regime -is heading. It was
not, after all, a typical Latin
American takeover last year.
The Chilean armed forces have
not made a habit of taking. over
the government of the country,
? and they only, moved last year
? after a period, of some hesita-
tion:
Once they had taken the
plunge, however, they sur-
prised almost everyone by the
? thoroughness and ruthlessness
with which they acted?and still
continue to act. They were not
a government of transition, they
? said, but intended to re-shape
Chile's - national life. They
.decided that Marxism was the
enemy, and that it must be
rooted out. But they went even
further than that, and now
blame the country's political
parties for virtually? all the
? troubles of this century.
They have shown no urgency
at all about handing power
back to civilians. When they
- first took over, they appointed
a special committee to write a
new constitution?one that
would exclude Marxist parties.
But members of the committee
say that it may take another
year, or even two, to complete
their work, and General
Augusto Pinochet, the head of
state, has said that it may take
the junta 20 years to achieve
its goals.
The junta's philosophy was
set out with some vigour in a
long speech which General
Pinochet made on September
11, the first anniversary of the
military coup.
The present "recess" of the
political parties would have to
continue for several years
more, he said. It could only be
lifted when "a new generation
of Chileans, formed healthy
civic and patriotic habits, and
inspired by an authentic
national feeling, can assume the
direction of public life ".
General Pinochet showed
nothing but ' defiance towards
criticism of the military regime
from abroad. "It is one of the
most infamous campaigns," he ?
said, "though well financed and
orchestrated, that has been
directed . against a country in
modern times. It has one single .
origin?international commun-
ism."
The fact of the matter; he
said, was that Chile offered
lessons from which other
countries could learn. The
military takeover was "the
culmination of the greatest
defeat that communism has
suffered in the world in the past
30 years.
This is the way that Chile's
military rulers think today, and
one wonders if the CIA is
. pleased with them.
Many of the junta's support-
ers would in fact like to see
an easing of the military grip.
Some such easing is regularly
said to be imminent, and there
is talk, for instance, of releasing
political prisoners.
In the long run, the future of
the Military regime will de-
pend on its success in handling
the economy. Many members
of the middle class remember
the shortages and queues of the
Allende period, and are glad
to see things returning to
normal for them. But things are
not bright for everyone and, by
their violent tactics, the mili-
tary men are taking a gamble.
If ever there was a reaction
against them, it too could be
violent.
Peter Strafford
? It is high time that the CIA put
'away its cloak and dagger and
packed up its bag of deadly tricks.
The CIA should be confined to gath-
ering intelligence overseas. Pres-
ident Ford, Secretary Kissinger and
their successors should conduct a
foreign policy that is visible and ac-
countable to the American people.
THE OBSERVER, London
29 September 1974
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9
from WALTER SCHWARZ
NEW DEUR, 28 September
INDIAN fears of subver-
sion by the CIA, rudely re-
awakened by disclosure of
the American role in the
overthrow of Allende in
Chile, are now embodied in
a Bill to check the flow of
secret foreiga funds into
India. .
The Foreign Contributions
(Regulation) Bill puts a check
on politicians, officials and
journalists. But there are
fears that the measure may
backfire.
While controlling the inflow
of secret money could prove
to be impossible, church
leaders, trade unionists and
journalists fear that the
Governm.ent may use its new
powers to curtail their free-
dom.
Mrs Gandhi, the Prime
Minister, was reported as
telling a party meeting re-
cently that the disclosures
over Chile were highly rele-
vant to India, and that 'some
countries' were 'still cap-
able' of interfering in India.
Her main expressed fear,
based on 1967 disclosures
about CIA money in
foundations and institutions
' throughout the world, is that
Washington may try to limit
the degree of socialism to be
allowed in India. But a
deeper,, unspoken fear may
be that the US will oppose
India's attempts to consoli-
date its hegemony on the
sub-continent.
After the Chile disclosures
in Washington, the American
Ambassador here, Mr Patrick
Moynihan, cabled Dr. Kissin-
ger saying: 'Mrs Gandhi
does not think we accept her
regime. She thinks we are
a profoundly selfish and
cynical counter-revolutionary
power.'
The cable concluded that
because of these fears Mrs
Gandhi 'will, accordingly,
proceed to develop nuclear
weapons and a missile deli-
very system?preaching non-
violence all the way.'
R861511363f4t0ftir Ca.The
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from all Indian parties after
disclosures that American
money had influenced both
Government and Opposition
candidates in the 1967, elec-
tions. These in turn led to
a mass of fresh disclosures
of Soviet money in friendship
socieles, youth groups, stu-
dent organisations and trade
unions, and American money
in foundations.
A leaked Indian intollik
&nee report showed that all
parties, including the ruling
Congress, got money from
dubious sources. ?
It was also revealed that
some newspapers and joie.-
nalist received disguised
bribes, either in cash or in
the ferm, of inflated payments
for advertisements or bulk;
buying of copies that wore
never printed..
' Under the new Bill, Parlia.
TIME, SIPUMBER 30, 1974
mentary candidates, journa.
lists, officials and MPs will
be absolutely forbidden to
accept foreign ' contribte
tions '?money, gifts or hos-
pitality.
Organisations of apoliti-
cal nature but not being
political. parties' will have to
seek Government permission
before accepting similar
, benefits. Associations such
as churches will have to sub.
mit detailed accounts of
foreign remittances,
A clause which hen boon
described', as sinister by
critics of the Bill gives the
Government power to extend
,the Bill's categories to in-
clude 'any person,' and to
exempt any body r choose&
A writer in the Indian
Express says this is 'nothing
short of dispensing power.'
Penalties range up to five
INTELLIGENCE/COVER STORY
years' imprisonment.
Indian journalists writing
for foreign newspapers will
not be affected, because pay.
manta by way of salary or re-
muneration are exempted
from the Bill's provistons.
But some journalists fear
that the Government could
abuse its powers under the
Bill to discriminate between
writers it likes and those it
does not. '
Church and trade union
leaders are reported to be
worried that the Bill might
open the door to harassment.
The fear in especially alive in
predominantly Christian
areas with, active resistance
movements, like Nagaland,
where the Church Is closely
identified with the people.
Trade unions also fear f718.
'The Bill was
originally , meant te control
the CIA. But when the civil
servants of the Homo Min.
istry got to drafting it, it
turned out to be directed
mainly against Communist
money,' complained a left.
wing critic. But the Bill
seems to be directed impar-
tially at the CIA and the
KGB.
The most plausible fear
? expressed is that the Bill's
declared objectives will prove
unenforceable, while it will
enable officialdom to harass
opponents and critics.
Perhaps, after all, Mrs
Gandhi's best guarantee
whist CIA subversion was
given in Dr Kissinger's pro-
mise to her last week?that
'1f she sent him the name of
any American in India inter-
fering in politics, he we'll&
have him out of India within
24 hours.' , ? ?
The CIA: Time to Come In from the Cold
OUCS1/011: "Under what international
law do we have a right to attempt to de-
stabilize the constitutionally elected gov-
ernment of another country?"
Answer: "I am not going to pass judg-
ment on whether it is permitted or au-
thorized under international law. It is a
recognized fact that historically as well
as presently, such actions are taken in
the best interest of the countries involved."
That blunt response by President
Gerald Ford at his press conference last
week was either remarkably careless or
remarkably candid. It left the troubling
impression, which the Administration
afterward did nothing to dispel, that the
U.S. feels free to subvert another gov-
ernment whenever it suits American
policy. In an era of detente with the So-
viet Union and improving relations with
China, Ford's words seemed to repre-
sent an anachronistic, cold-war view of
national security reminiscent of the
1950s. Complained Democratic Senator
Frank Church of Idaho with consider-
able hyperbole: "[It is] tantamount to
saying that we respect no law save the
law of the jungle."
The question on "destabili7ing" for-
eign governments followed Ford's con-
firmation that the Nixon Administra-
tion had authorized the Central
Intelligence Agency to wage an $8 mil-
'lion campaign in 1970-73 to aid oppo-
nents of Chilean President Salvador
Allende's Marxist government (see box
page 21). Until last week, members of
both the Nixon and Ford Administra-
tions had flatly denied that the U.S. had
been involved in undermining Allende's
regime. They continue to insist that the
CIA was not responsible for the 1973
coup that left Allende dead and a re-
pressive right-wing junta in his place.
Congressmen were outraged by the
news that they had once again been mis-
led by the Executive Branch. More im-
portant, disclosure of the Chile opera-
tion helped focus and intensify the
debate in Congress and the nation over
the CM: Has the agency gone too far in,
recent years? Should it be barred from
interfering in other countries' domestic
affairs? Where it has erred, was the CIA
out of control or was the White House
at fault for misdirecting and misusing
the agency? Should it be more tightly su-
pervised, and if so, by whom? In ad-
dition, the controversy spotlighted the
fundamental dilemma posed by an open,
democratic society using covert activity
?the "dirty tricks" or "black" side of in-
telligence organizations?as an instru-
ment of foreign policy.
At the center of the storm was Wil-
liam Egan Colby, 54, the CIA's director
for the past year. Shrewd and capable,
Colby has sought from the day he took
office as director to channel more of the
CIA'S efforts into the gathering, evalu-
ation and analysis of information and
less into'covert actions?the "operation-
al" side of the intelligence business. Says
?he: "The CIA's cloak-and-dagger days
have ended."
Certain Actions. But obviously, not
quite. It was Colby who oversaw the last
months of the CIA activity in Chile as
the agency's deputy director for oper-
ations in 1973, though this operation ap-
parently ended shortly after he became
director. But it was also Colby who dis-
closed details of the covert action to a
closed hearing of the House Armed Ser-
vices Subcommittee on Intelligence last
April 22. A summary of his testimony
was leaked to the press two weeks ago.
By the time Ford met with the press,
C,olby's revelations were more than a
week old; the President had been briefed
by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and doubtless was ready to field report-
els' questions. Said Ford: "Our Govern-
ment, like other governments, does take
certain actions in the intelligence field
to help implement foreign policy and
protect national security. I am informed
reliably that Communist nations spend
vastly more money than we do for the
same kind of purposes."
Since so much had already leaked
out, Ford perhaps had no choice but to
make an admission. But his statement
seemed to set no or few limits on clan-
destine intervention in another country.
A somewhat sharper but still highly flex-
ible limit was set afterward by Kissin-
ger. He told TIME: "A democracy can
engage in clandestine operations only
with restraint, and only in circumstanc-
es in which it can say to itself in good
conscience that this is the only way to
achieve vital objectives."
Moreover, there was an unsettlingly
disingenuous quality to Ford's words.
Was the intent of the Chilean opera-
tion really to preserve freedom of the
press and opposition political parties, as
he insisted, or simply to undermine
Allende? In this context, it is worth not-
ing that after the coup, the U.S. did not
object when the new military regime.
banned all political parties and shut
down all opposition publications.
There were other disquieting notes
in the statement. Ford described the op-
eration as being "in the best interest of
the people of Chile"?a throwback to
an America-knows-what's-best-for-you
? line of years past that was particularly
offensive to many countries. In addition,
Ford did not make the small but cru-
cial distinction between intelligence
gathering and covert operations, which
led some critics to suspect that he was
not wholly familiar with the subject.
Misled Congress. There was a de-
gree of ingenuousness, perhaps even hy-
pocrisy, in much of the indignation,
since the CIA is widely known to have
carried out Chile-style operations else-
where before. What galled Congress and
many other U.S. and foreign leaders was
the fact that members of the Nixon Ad-
ministration had repeatedly misled Con-
gress about the Chile operation. At his
confirmation last year as Secretary of
State, Kissinger assured the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee that since
1970, the U.S. had done nothing in Chile
except try to "strengthen the democratic
political parties"?although critics ar-
gue that fostering strikes and demon-
strations amounted to a lot more than
that. During another hearing, then CIA
Director Richard Helms was asked if
the CIA had passed money to Allende's
political opponents. Helms' response:
"No, sir." Former Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin American Affairs
Charles A. Meyer, former Ambassador
to Chile Edward Korry and other Ad-
10
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? ministration officials gave similar testi-
mony, though they may not have known
about the operation.
The revelations, and Ford's confir-
mation of them, stunned many in Con-
gress. "Unbelievable," declared Demo-
cratic Senator Walter F. Mondale Of
Minnesota. 'Unsavory and unprinci-
pled," said Church. Democratic Senator
Stuart Symington said that the disclo-
sure "certainly does not coincide with
the testimony that this committee [For-
eign Relations] has received." The com-
mittee launched a review of the testi-
mony and a probe into the Chilean
affair.
Anxious to heal the rift with Con-
gress, Ford and Kissinger briefed nine
senior Congressmen at breakfast the
next day on Chile and covert affairs in
general. Later, ata previously scheduled
hearing on detente, Kissinger reiterated .
before the Senate Forel= Relations
COmmittee that the intent of the CIA op-.
eration in Chile was merely to keep the
Allende opposition alive and "not to de-
stabilize or subvert" his government.
Kissinger also conducted two separate
briefings at the Senate. Still, Congress.
? was neither convinced.nor mollified. As
the week progressed, growing numbers
of Representatives and Senators 'called
for an all-out review of the CIA,
; The affair served to confirm all the
worst suspicions about the CR and its
exaggerated image as a vast conspiracy.
Reaction abroad ranged from incredu-
lity to dismay. The London Times called
the revelations "a bitter draught- for
those ho regard the U.S. as "sometimes
.clumsy, often misunderstood, but fun.
damentally honorable in its conduct of
international affairs.- West Gernian's
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung predict-
ed that -the disconcerting naivete with
which President Ford enunciated his se-
cret service philosophy" would have a
"provocative" effect.
Grave Decadence.. That was the
case in the capitals of the so-called Third
. World. From New Delhi. U.S. Ambas-
sador Daniel Patrick Moynihan angrily
cabled the State Department that he had
assured Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
that the CIA had not been involved in the
Chilean coup. Now, he said, she won-
dered whether India might not be next.
Many Latin Americans shrugged: the
episode seemed to confirm their suspi-
cions that the CIA invariably is behind
the continent's frequent upheavals?po-
litical and otherwise. ?
Some cynical foreigri reaction was
not so much concerned with the CIA ac-
tivities themselves as with their becom-
ing known. Said a former President of
Argentina: -If you ask me as. an Ar-
gentine, the CIA intervention .in Chile
was w holly illegal interference in the
sovereignty of another state. If you ask
me to see it from the point of view of an
American, the fact that Senators and
Congressmen can interfere with the na-
tional security interests of the country
for poli:ical motives indicates a grave
decadence in the system."
The uproar recalled two earlier CIA
fias.Z.Cs: the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961
and he revelacion in 1967 that the agen-
cy fcr years had partly funded and ma-
nipulated the National Student Associ-
ation and dozens of business, labor,
religious and cultural groups. Both flaps
o?ers'nadc)wecl the positive servietei gat
? Approved r OT R
the et.k had rendered before; there were
demands for greater restraint by the CIA
and elOser control by the Executive
Branch. but no real changes came.
'The Chilean affair, however, poten-
tially more lasting impact, for the
agency has already been badly bruised
by the Watergate scandals. Says Mich-
igan Representative Lucien Nedzi,
chairman of a House committee that
oversees the agency: "I don't believe that
the CIA will ever he what it was before."
Agency officials have admitted that
? despite laws against domestic CIA ac-
tivity, they supplied one of the Wake
House "plumbers." former CIA Employ-
. ee E. Howard Hunt, with bogus iden-
tification papers, a wig, a speech-alter-
ation device, and a camera in a tobacco
pouch. In addition, the agency provid-
ed the White House with a psychological
profile of Daniel ElLsberg,
Political Police. Much to the agen-
cy's discomfiture, criticism has come
from disillusioned former CIA employ-
ees. For two years, the agency struggled
in court to. stop publication of The CIA
and the Cult a:I-Intelligence, whose prin-
cipal author is ex-CIA Officer Victor
Marchetti. rhe book accused the agen-
cy of using outmoded cold war methods
? and urged that it be prohibited from in-
tervening in other nations' affairs under
? any circumstances (TIME. April 22).
Another critical book. Inside the
Company: A Diary, will be pub-
lished in London this January. In it Au-
thor Philip Agee, -.Tho, after twelve years
of undercover exploits for the CIA in Lat-
in America, switched to the side of the
leftist revolutionaries he had been hired
to defeat, calls the CIA "the secret po-
litical police of American capitalism"
On the contrary, CIA directors have
maintained since the agency's founding
27 years ago last week that clandestine.
actions constitute only a small part of
CIA activities. Indeed, over the yea.-s, the
agency is provided a huge volume of
reliable analysis and intelligence data
that has served in part as the basis for
U.S. defense and foreign policies. But
Marchetti reports that the CIA devotes
two-thirds of its annual budget (which
totals around $750 million) and some
60% to 70% of its estimated 5,000
overseas employees to clandestine
operations.
That evidently was not the intent of
Congress in creating the CIA and giving
it almost complete autonomy to safe-
guard its secrecy. Originally the agen-
cy's principal task was to gather intel-
ligence and keep the Government
informed about other countries, partic-
ularly the Communist nations.
That mission was incorporated sym-
bolically into the cuk's seal: an eagle sig- .
nifying strength and alertness, and a
compass rose representing the collection
of intelligence data from all over the
world. But as the cold war grew, so did
the scope of the CIA's duties. The law
provided that in addition to collecting
information, the CIA was .to perform
such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national se-
curity as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct." Under
that directive, the CIA actively began try-
ing to penetrate and even roll back the
Bamboo and Iron Curtains, and to coun-
ter Communist influence in other coun-
eigfidt200190-1008'c.liCti-RIDPV7 ASO
pro-American political parties and in-
dividuals, covert propaganda, economic
sabotage and paramilitary operations. -
Under Cover. In theory, at least,
the station chiefs who head CIA offices
overseas operate under the cover of some
innocuous-sounding embassy job such as
attache or special assistant. In practice,
some chiefs are well known and some re-
main under deep cover, depending on
the nature of the country. In London,
for example, practically anyone who is
interested can learn the identity of the
CIA station chief; his arrival was even
disclosed in the Manchester Guardian.
- In Saigon, the station chiefs identity is
well known but, by tacit agreement, nev-
er publicized by reporters. In politically
turbulent countries, the identity of the
station chief is a closely guarded secret.
Warns one U.S. ambassador in South
America: "If he is named, he will have
to be recalled or his life won't be worth
a nickel."
The extent of their duties also var-
ies widely. In Hong Kong and Taiwan,
the CIA operatives are all ears but no
hands, their activities confined to mon-
itoring radio broadcasts from the main-
land, interviewing refugees and other in-
formation gathering.
By his own less than impartial ac-
count, Agee's main function for the CIA
was to recruit agents in Latin America.
In nearly every case, he says, the lure
was money. He describes the CIA meth-
od of snaring an agent: "You start out
by giving him money for his organiza-
tion?lots of it?knowing that he will
' eventually take some for himself. When
he gets dependent on it, you move in."
Once hooked, the recruit is given a lie
detector test to discover his weaknesses.
Continues Agee: "Then it all hangs out.
He can go on serving you as a spy for -
the rest of his life."
Americans usually learn of the agen-
cy's covert actions only when they fail
so spectacularly that they cannot be kept
secret. Examples: the U-2 incident in
1960, when. the Soviets shot down the
spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Pow-
ers; the CIA-directed invasion of Cuba
in 1961; the Chilean operation. Over the
years, there were successes for the CIA
as well: the 1953 coup that deposed Pre-
mier Mohammed Mossadegh (who had
nationalized a British-owned oil compa-
ny and was believed to be in league with
Iran's Communist Party) and kept pro-
American Shah Mohammed Reza Pah-
lavi on the throne of Iran; the 1954 rev-
olution that overthrew the Communist-
dominated government of President
Jacob? Arbenz in Guatemala. The CIA
has been suspected of participating in
the 1967 military coup in Greece, the
capture and killing in 1967 of Cuban
Revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia,
and the 1970 overthrow of Prince No-
rodom Sihanouk of Cambodia.
The CIA was deeply involved in the
war in Southeast Asia. Starting in 1962,
it organized and equipped an army in
Laos to fight the Communist Pathet Lao.
The army, which grew to 30,000 men,
costs the U.S. at least $300 million a
year, but Colby credits it with having
prevented a Communist takeover.
Prison Camps. The chief justifica-
tion for CIA operations is that the other
side is doing the same?and more. Com-
munist powers have an advantage over
Western democracies. Communist par-
41i2fkooto toodjimeiel5fism Moscow or
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other Communist centers (although in
recent years many have become more
Independent) but take the guise of local
political movements. Moreover, Com-
munist dictatorships without inquisitive
legislatures or press can organize and
finance secret operations In other coun-
tries in a way that no open society can, :
Unlike American leaders, Communist
leaders never acknowledge such activ-
ities. The Soviet Union's KGB, headed
by Yuri Andropov, regularly rims what .
the Russian bureaucrats call aktivniye
' meropriyatiye (literal translation: active '
measures). The KGB's budget is un-
known, but it has about 300,000 employ-
? ees, many of them assigned to domestic "
duties like operating the vast network
of prison camps. Overseas, a majority
? of the Soviet embassy personnel are KGB .
officers.
As with the CIA, the KGB's failures
are better known than its successes. The '
? .lorganization apparently no longer corn-
iinits political assassinations abroad, but
it does try to subvert or overthrow un-
friendly governments?as in the Congo
(now Zaire) in 1963 and Ghana in 1966. ,
? In Mexico, authorities uncovered a KGB- ,
onsored guerrilla group in 1971. Just
?Ep
t week officials in Belgrade disclosed :
unsuccessful Soviet attempt to set up ,
I
,a. pro-Moscow underground party in Yu-
;goslavia. Moreover, the KGB's Disinfor-
mation Department tries tO sow suspi-
cion abroad by circulating false ru-
mors and forged documents. A case in
point: the KGB campaign now going on
to convince Indians that American ex-
change scholars and Peace Corps vol-
unteers are actually CIA agents.
COm.mtmist China's equivalent of
the CIA and KGB is so secret that the Chi-
nese are believed not to even have a
name for it. Among Western Sinologists,
it is known as the Chinese Intelligence
Service and is believed to,be part of the
foreign. ministry's information depart-
ment. The service's primary job is to sift
intelligence data from members of Chi-
nese embassies and overseas news cor-
respondents, who act as secret agents.
The Chinese Communist Party, howev-
er, does funnel funds to revolutionary
groups abroad, particularly in Asia and
Africa. From time to time, Chinese co-
ver...operations also have failed spectac-
ularly. In 1965, Indonesia reacted to
China's attempt to sponsor a revolution
in the. archipelago by butchering tens
Of thousands of Communists.
? Phoenix Program. Few men un-
derstand better these clashes of anon-
ymous armies on darkling plains or are
More practiced in the covert arts than
the CIA's William Colby, who has spent
most of his adult years in the world of
spies. Son of a career Army colonel, he
is a Princeton graduate who worked for
the Office of Strategic Services during
World War II. In 1943 he parachuted
into France to join a Resistance .outfit.
Later. he headed a unit that was dropped
into Norway to sabotage a railway line.
Mustered out as a major. Colby
earned a law degree from Columbia. Ile
practiced law in New York until the Ko-
rean War, when he joined the successor
organization to the OSS, the CIA. After
serving in Stockholm and Rome. he was
named CIA station chief in Saigon in
1959. Three years later he became chief
of the CIA's Far East division in NVaSh..-
ington. lie returned to Saigon in 19'6S
tO take charge or the pacificatiOn effort.
Oich included the notorious Phoenix
pt,,grarn. By 1971, Phoenia had eau,,ed
the deaths of 20,587 Viet Cong mem.
bers and sympathizers, according to Col-
by's own count. He explains, however,
that when he took over, a year after the
prograin began, he "Laid Sum on cap-
turing rather than killing." In discussing
the victims, he claims that "87% were
killed by regular military in skirmishes."
To all outward appearances, Colby
is unsuited for dirty tricks. "I'd call him
an enlightened cold warrior," says a CIA'
officer. "But remember that this busi-
ness is cold." In 1971, Colby went back ;
to the CIA labyrinth in Langley, Va.
His private life-style matches his
professional modesty. Father of four (a
'fifth child died last year), he lives in-
conspicuously in an unpretentious house
in suburban Maryland. He does not
smoke, drinks only are occasional gin-
and-tonic or glass of Wine, and is a de-
vout Catholic. His favorite recreations
are Sailing and bicycling..
Since taking over as director, Colby
has tried to reform the CIA's operations
and rehabilitate its reputation. To woo
support, he has made a point of being
more open and' candid than his prede-
cessors. He has in effect undertaken a
'task that to many seerns'self-contradic-
tory: to be open about operations that
by definition must be secret. Who ever -
heard of an espionage chief being pub-
licly accountable? So far this year, Colby
and other CIA officials have testified be-
fore IS congressional committees on 30
occasions. Colby estimates that he has
talked with 132 reporters in the last year,
though rarely for quotation.
Ile has also made more public
speeches than any previous CIA direc-
tor. Recently, for example, he agreed to
sneak at a conference on the CIA and co-
vert actions, which was sponsored in
Washington, D C., by the Center for Na-
tional Security Studies. When associates
warned that he would be up against a
stacked. deck, Colby shrugged: "There's
nothing wrong with accountability."
The conference was dominated by crit-
ics like ElLsberg, who harangued Colby
for 20 minutes. and Fred Branfman of
the Indochina Resource Center. who ac-
cused the director of telling "outrageous
lies." Colby kept his temper.
With Colby's encouragement. elev-
en agency analysts, wearing lapel tags
labeled CIA. attended the recent Chica-
go convention of the American Polit-
ical Science Association. Explains Gary
Foster, the agency's coordinator for ac-
ademic relations: "We wanted to dem:.
onstrate that we are a functioning, bona
fide research organization." in addition.
Colby has permitted the agency's an-
alysts to publish articles in scholarly and
popular journals under their own names
and CIA titles. At the same time, how-
ever, Colby has lobbied in Coogress for
a bill that would make unauthorized dis-
closures of CIA acthities by past and pre-
sent employees a criminal offense. The
bill is now bottled up in committee. If it
is enacted, ex-CIA employees like Mar-
chetti and Agee would risk jail for ex-
posing the agency's secrets.
An Appendage. Abuse all, Colby
has taken steps to reduce covert actions
and direct more of the CIA's energies
back to its original mission of
intetli-
12
gence gathering. Spies still have a role
in the modern CIA, but the U.S. now de.
pends less on men and more on satel-
lites, high-al titude reconnaissance air-
craft like the SR-71. and equipment that
Intercepts rival nations' secret cornmu-
nications. Such technical advances
make the CIA highly successful in col-
lecting military and other strategic
information.
Even so, Kissinger complained
throughout Nixon's first term that CIA
assessments of the state of the world,
which were prepared by the agency's
Board of National Estimates, were un-
focused and useless for policymaking.
Last year. Colby abolished the twelve-
?
member board and replaced it with ex-
perts cosigned to a country or region.
Now they periodically make concrete
recommendations through Colby to the
National Security Council. The result
has been to make the CIA in its intel-
ligence work less of a semiautonomous
think tank and more of an appendage
of the NSC and the White House.
Many skeptics view Colby's green-
ing of the CIA, his assurances of reform'
and restraint (see interview page 18) as
deceptive. They think these steps are de-
signed merely to enable "the firm" (as
it is sometimes known) to carry on busi-
ness as usual. But Colby clearly realizes
that he faces a serious questioning of the
agency's purposes and function, which
is closely related to America's view of
its own role in the world.
In the postwar era, covert action
seemed eminently justifiable on the
grounds that the U.S. was in a mortal
struggle with the Communist world.
Now that the cold war has abated and
Communism is no longer a monolith,
many scholars, diplomats and congres-.
sional leaders favor ending the ciA's co-
vert operations altogether, leaving it an
intelligence-gathering agency. -
No Secret. The reasons are both
moral and practical. Says Richard N.
Gardner, an international-law specialist
at Columbia University: "Dirty tricks
have always been immoral and illegal.
Now they also have outlived their use-
fulness." Former Ambassador to the So-
viet Union George Kerman disapproves
of covert operations as "improper and
undesirable." But he also disapproves for
pragmatic reasons: "The fact that we
can't keep them secret is reason enough
to desist." U.C.L.A. Soviet Specialist Ro-
man Kollcowicz argues: "The track rec-
ord is deplorable. By and large, these
operations have been a series of disas-
ters." Adds Eugene Skolnikoff, director
of M.I.T.'s Center for International
Studies: "The resulting scandals provide
grist for attacks on the U.S., retroactive-
ly validate charges?true or false?that
the U.S. makes a habit of overthrowing
governments, and even exacerbate do-
mestic distrust of public officials."
Last week Democratic Senator
James M. Abourezk of South Dakota
sponsored legislation that would prohib-
it the CIA from "assassination, sabotage,
political disruption or other meddling in
a nation's internal affairs, without the
approval of Congress or the knowledge
of the American people." That propos-
al is unlikely to be enacted because most
Congressmen believe that restricting the
CIA would unwisely limit the President's
freedom of action.
Further, says William Bundy, for-
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mer CIA officer and now editor of F
eign Affairs: "The last thing in the wo
that is ever going to disappear is So
covert activities of a political nature.
say d?nte stops them is grossly naiv
Thus Bundy argues that the U.S. sho
not be precluded from covert actio
but should not use such actions as
tensively as in the 1950s. Bowdoin C
lege Provost Olin Robinson, an auth
ity on intelligence organizations
democratic societies, agrees: "Unl
you've got a cast of world characters wrt
are willing to play by a certain set
rules, you're going to have covert o
erations." In other words, the CIA sho
be left the capacity for covert action b
forbidden to use it except in tightly
stricted circumstances.
Colby himself believes that mo
stress on intelligence gathering w
make it less likely that various situatio
will develop into crises; the occasio
where covert action might be consider
would thus be reduced. But he ma
tains that to prohibit the CIA from co
ducting any covert actions would "lea
us with nothing between a diplomat
protest and sending in the Marines."
Ideas vary about what limits shou
be set. Harry Howe Ransom, profess
of political science and an intelligen
specialist at Vanderbilt University, be
heves that "covert operations represe
an act just short of war. If we use them
it should be where acts of war would oth
erwise be necessary." Ransom woul
permit covert actions only when U.S. se
curity is clearly in jeopardy. Willia
T.R. Fox, professor of international re
lations at Columbia University, woul
additionally permit them "to undo th
spread of Hitler and other like govern
ments," Dean Harvey Picker of Colum
bia's School of International Affairs
would allow clandestine operations t
prevent nuclear war. As Senator Churc
points out, however, the "national se-
curity considerations must be compel
ling" for covert action to be justified. Fo
his part, Colby declines to say under
what precise circumstances he would fa-
vor covert action.
Many critics who concede the need
for covert action in some cases never-
theless propose two other reforms: 1)
separating intelligence gathering from
covert operations and 2) tighter control.
Most experts doubt that "dirty
tricks" can be separated from intelli-
gence gathering. Explains Richard Bis-
or-
sell, onetime head of CM covert oper-
rid ations: "The gathering of informationwet inevitably edges over into more active
To functions, simply becaUse the process of
e."? making covert contacts with high-rank-
uld ing officials of other nations givesthe
.fl5 U.S. influence in them." To eliminate
ex- that problem, the U.S. could run two
ol- separate agencies. Bissell claims that
or- this idea was found to be impractical
in by both Britain and Germany in World
ess War II because agents kept "running
ho .into each other.".
of The case for closer surveillance is
P- much stronger. Says Kolkowicz: "En-
uld trusting covert operations to a secretive
ut agency, lacking effective supervision
re- amounts to leaving policy to faceless bu-
reaucrats whose judgment is question-
re able." Although somewhat exaggerated,
ill his warning reflects widespread concern,
ns ? that the CIA may be too independent.
ns The CIA takes its orders from the
ed 40 Committee, which has existed under
in- various names since 1948. It screens ev-
n- ery proposal for clandestine activity.
ye Chaired by Kissinger, the committee is
le made up of Colby, Deputy Secretary of
State Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec-
Id retary of Defense William P. Clements
or Jr., and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
ce General George S. Brown. In his book,
- Marchetti describes the committee as a
nt rubber stamp that is predisposed to give
, the CIA what it Wants. But others say
- that the committee frequently rejects or
d orders revision of CIA proposals. More-
- over, recommendations for major covert
m actions like the Chile operation require
- presidential approval.
Congress's supervision Of the CIA is
e inadequate; in some respects, it is a
- myth. A Senate subcommittee headed
_ by conservative Democrat John Stennis
of Mississippi meets irregularly and has
o almost no staff Member Symington
h complains that, from the U-2 incident
to the Chile a flair, the subcommittee has
- known less about CIA activities than the
r cress. A !louse sulx:ornmittec chaired
by liberal Democrat Neclzi meets more
crien. but he looks on his responsibility.
?as making a determination as to N% hetli-
er or not the Cr.- has aeied legally, after
or during the 1.ct.' 1 litts no one in Con-
gress h now s in advance about potential-
ly 'controversial CIA operations. Corn-
pains Dentociatic Representative Mi-
chael J. Harrington of Massachusetts:
-There is a s!ial;ed inclination in Cone
gress toward noninvolvement, superim-
TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974
90?104
Director Colby on the Record
In a rare on-the-record interview
with TIME Correspondent Strobe Tat-
. bolt, Director William Colby defended
the CIA against its critics, ranged over
the current functions of the agency, and
discussed future prospects. Highlights:
Why does the CIA intervene in oth-
eractions' internal affairs?
I'm not saying we're engaged in a
;-campaign to bring democracy to the
t world. That's not what the U.S. Gov-
ernment expects from this agency.
We're expected. to . carry out U.S. pol-
icy. Over the years, we've helped dem-
ocratic forces rather broadly. In those
cases where we have got involved with
1 military regimes,
"e did WairtiO&Elurbr
I. was a greater danger from some place
else. I don't think we've toppled dem-
erratic regimes, and I don't think we.
did so in Chile. First, we didn't bring
about the coup, and second, the Allen-
de regime was not democratic. Granted
the military regime is riot democratic,
? .. I don't think a Communist regime is
? democratic.
. Our program in Chile was to sus-
tain the democratic forces against the
Allende political forces, which were sup-
pressing various democratic elements in
a variety of ways?harassing radio sta-
tions; harassing some parts of the press
and some political groups. We looked
forward to the .democratic forces com-
ing to power in the elections of 1976. .
Release 2001/08/08 :1SIA-RDP77-0
posed on a poem of deference toward
the E.xecutiVe Branch. If the Executive
is in the lo you have got to put the
Congress in there too?and firmly."
More than 200 times in the past two
decades. Congressmen have sponsored
bills and resolutions calling for more ef-
fective supervision of the CIA. At least
twice. Congress has voted on such leg-
islation, and both times the bills were.
soundly defeated. Last week Republican
Senators I toward Hi Baker jr. of Ten-
nessee and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. of Con-
necticut made another . attempt. Their
bill would create a committee of House
and Senate members to supervise and
regulate the CIA and all other members
of the U.S. intelligence committee.
Possible Leaks. Its chances of pas-
sage are rated better than even, because
of the storm over the CIA and because
the bill was referred to reform-minded -
Sam Ervin's Government Operations
Committee. But the bill may yet be de-
feated. Even many members of Congress
'believe that they should not he entrust-
ed with CIA secrets because of possible
leaks. The alternative is to keep Con-
gress uninformed, which seernS equally
unacceptable.
W-hatever the degree to which Con-.
gress can be informed?and even crit-
ics of the CIA concede that it is tricky
for legislators to be in on the decision-
making of an espionage agency?there
is a clear necessity for Congress to hold
the Executive more accountable for
what the CIA does.
To some extent, the dilemma over
the CIA has to do with an American need
to have it both ways: the U.S. wants to
be (and to see itself as) a morally re-
sponsible country and yet function as a ?
great power in an immoral world. As
Bovedoin's Robinson puts it, "There is
an inevitable tension between an orga-
nization like the c1;k and a democratic
society. From time to time there will be
pulling back when the organization may
have gone too far." The U.S. has reached
such a point with the revelations about
its actions in Chile. which, on balance,
are hard to justify. While it cannot rule
out covert operations in all circumstanc-
es. the nation must remember that it has
better and stronger weapons to rely on:
its economic and technological weight,
its diplomacy, its cultural impact and
?though tarnished?its freedom:
To. what extent had Communist
forces intervened in Chile?
Castro spent about a month down
there in the late spring of 1973. There
were a lot of extremist exiles in Chile
from other countries in Latin America.
There was a lot of assistance going into
Chile from Cuba and other Communist
sources. There are indications that there
was some Soviet activity. They were put-
ting Some money in, as well as hard-
ware of various sorts. This was a pro-
gram to support an eventual takeover
in what I would call a nondemocratic
fashion---suppressing the opposition and
extending Communist influence else-
where in the hemisphere.
0432R000100340005-5
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Will the CIA continue to mount co- '
vert operations?
? The CtA has three major functions:
science and technological work, analy-
sis. and the clandestine collection of in- ?
telligence. Now there's been a fourth re- ?
sponsibility, and that is positively
influencing a situation through political
or paramilitary means. That's the one
that goes up and down depending on na-
tional policy. Right now it's way down.
The degree of our involvement in co-
vert activities reflects the kind of world
we live in. If it's a world where two su-
perpowers are peering over the fence at
each other, then it's a matter of con-
cern when a hostile political group is
about to take over a country. But if it's '
a world in which we've worked out a re-
lationship of reasonable restraint, or
d?nte, with the other superpowers,
then it won't matter to us who runs one ,
of these countries in a far-flung area.
Of course, something very close to us
1night still be important for political or
security reasons. There may still be cer-
tain situations where U.S. interests
?and I don't mean corporate interests.
but fundamental political interests?can
be adversely affected. In some of those
iL.ases it would be appropriate to take
,^me modest action such as establishing
.relationship with somebody who needs
?ithe help. But I stress: it's not now our
Government's policy to engage in these
sicuatiens around the world.
How is a covert operation started?
We follow the traffic with the em-
bassy_ We follow the political attitudes
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
3 October 1974
that vee have toward that country. We
generate a specific suggestion in the light
et whet we think would be national
policy. We don't do anything without
approval.
Sometimes we get the specific sug-
gestion from the outside?from an am-
tassadcr, from the State Department or
frcm the National Security Council staff.
They'll say: 'Why don't you guys do so
. and so?" We have the technicians here
'.silo decide what is possible and what is
not. It's the same sort of thing you get
%AA military activity. Flow you land
troupe on a hostile shore is not devel-
oped in the White House. The Joint
Chiefs develop a proposal. Then if the
White House approves it, you go ahead.
But I want to emphasize that we're
talking about a very small number of Co.
vert actions. Policy is generated at the ?
.NSC, not here,
Tr
John Chamberlain
THE CIA, WHICH was.. started by
President Harry Truman to counter the
wiles of the Soviet "spywar" aparat-
chiks in promoting international sub-
version, may have had its successes (in
Guatemala, for example), but, insofar
as the American public can judge from
the part of the iceberg that shows above
the water, it has never been noteworthy
for its ability to carry off i really ira-
portant covert operation. It messed
things up in Albania; in Indonesia, and
at ?the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. ?
But now we are being told, by jour-
nalists who never minded its failures,
that it has accomplished something ter-
rible by its success in "destabilizing"
the regime of Marxist President Salva-
dor Mar-de i5 Chile.
I find this an odd commentary on the
journalists involved. If you are a
patriotic American who remembers that
we once meant business about keeping
European powers from obtaining sinis-
ter beachheads in the Western Hemi-
sphere, you might think that the CL9.,
??? at long last, merits a little public praise.
But if this is the way you do happen
to think, it merely labels you as a moss-
back who still believes there was a good
reason for the Monroe Doctrine.
WHAT THE anti-CIA claque is try-
ing to tell us is that the day of the Mon-
roe Doctrine has gone forever. It is no
longer our business to give help to Latin
Americans who want to fight back
. : - ? . .....
What would you regard as a suc-
cessful covert action?
Laos. It was considered important
to the U.S. that a country remain friend-
ly and not be taken over by hostile forc-
es. Rather than use our military force
or an enormous political effort, you try
to influence some key people and key po-
litical groups. The Laos operation cost
substantial amounts but was cheap com-
pared with other ways of doing business.
We were not involved in the 1967 coup
in Greece or in the coup in Chile last
year.
Should the o; era tional side of the
CIA be separated from intelligence
gathering?
That proposal stems from the Bay
of Pigs. The problem there was that we
didn't let the analysts hi on the act. Now
senior levels of the analyst community
are aware of covert activities and have
a chance to comment. In the early years
of the agency, we tried conducting in-
telligence and action operations through
two separate units, but they kept get-
ting in each,othees way.
What alternatives to covert opera-
tions are possible for the CIA?
We could not?and did not?con-
duct the SALT negotiations and reach a
SALT agreement until after our intelli-
gence techniques had improved to the
degree that we could tell whether the So-
viets e ere going to abide by the agree-
ments. On a number of occasions, we
have identified a situation that was get-
ting very sour in some country or be-
tween two countries. By reporting the
facts and our assessment, we generated
diplomatic action so that the trouble we
predicted did not happen. For instance,
peace arrangements might have broken
down, but because of our intelligence,
negotiations saved the situation.
In the future this sort of intelligence
Will help our country in negotiations and
diplomatic relationships. As a result, we
will be less likely to get into screaming
crises, and there will be less need for co-
vert action. It will be the increasing re-
sponsibility of the CIA to give our lead-
ers the knowledge necessary to move
inttia dire situation and defuse it.
e CIA success a surprise
failure
against Marxist cocspiracies dominated
by Moscow or Peking whose aims are
to close in on the United States and the
Panama Canal from the southern part
of the hemisphere.
The New York Time's Tom Wicker
tells us that it is -nonsense to believe
the Allende government was anything
other than legit, It did not try, so
Wicker insists, 20 destroy opposition
parties or newspapers. An innocent of
innocents, Wicker has never read the
late Garet Garrett on the subject of
"revolution within the forms."
Senor Allende, a Marxist ntho came to
power as a minority president with no
real mandate to push Chile into Com-
munism, had necessarily to proceed by
working "within the forms." He had
almost succeeded in his policy of eating
out -the substance of his opposition by
closing in on their methods .of earning
their livelihoods. The middle class and
the Chilean trade unions reacted just
in time to save their necks.
If the CIA really managed to give
ponderable aid to Chilean believers in
individual freedom in a :fight against
Marxist collectivism, then all honor it.
But who, in the present Washington cli-
mate, can distinguish between a good
covert' operation aimed at sustaining
our friends in the outer world .ancia bad
covert operation undertaken against
Americans at home?:- Everything has
been confused by Watergate, with the
effect that we are now being rendered
helpless against the continuing Marxist
. campaign to ? isolate Western Europe
and the U. S. and take over the world.
: Ed Hunter, the astute editor of a little
magazine called Tactics, has recently
? reminded us of the CIA's long history of
failure. Because it could not cope with
superior Communist espionage, it sent
men to their deaths in Albania and at
the Bay of Pigs. - - . -
Skipping over the CIA's, one -great
success in Guatemala, Hunter lists what
he calls "Watergate-ITT" as another
CIA bungling. We didn't act on the ITT
offer to fend off Allende in the first
place. The Reds, he says, pulled off a
prcpaeandist ten-strike when they man-
aged to link a felonious domestic Water-
gate with the ITT's wholly legitimate
concern for the fate of its properties
in Chile.
SAYS HUNTER: "Our Central In-
telligence Agency and the International
Telephone and Telegraph Company
should be rebuked for failure to act on
behalf of free peoples everywhere, where
this coincides with the survival of our
own country.
14
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TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974
Chile: A Case Study
The U.S. began its heavy investment in the political fate
of Chile in the early 1960s. President John Kennedy had met
Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democratic Party in
Chile, and decided that he was the hope of Latin America.
Frei was a man of the left, but not too far left, a man who
was not hostile to U.S. interests and just might be able to
achieve needed reform without violent revolution. When Frei.
faced Salvador Allende, a self-professed Marxist with a Com-
munist following, in the 1964 election, the U.S. made no se-
cret of where its sympathies lay.
Frei became the recipient of American political advice, en-
couragement and hefty financial aid. Between 1962 and 1965,
the U.S. gave Chile $618 million in direct economic assistance
?more per capita than any other Latin American country.
In a diary due to be published in Britain this year, former
CIA Operative Philip Agee describes how he was called upon
for assistance from his post in Montevideo in 1964: "The San-
tiago station has a really big operation going to keep Sal-
vador Allende from being elected President. He was almost
elected at the last elections in 1958, and this time nobody's tak-
ing any chances. The trouble is that the office of finance in
headquarters [Langley, Va.] couldn't get enough Chilean es-
cudos from the New York banks; so they had to set up re-
gional purchasing offices in Lima and Rio. But even these
offices can't satisfy the requirement, so we have been asked
to help." The results were gratifying. Frei won with 56% of
the vote, and the future of Chile seemed to be assured.
But from the outset, Frei ran into trouble. He was at-
tacked by the right for moving too fast and by the left for
going too slowly. Allende's Socialist Party continued to grow,
picking up defecting left-wing Christian Democrats and unit-
ing with other opposition parties. It became a case for the
CIA. A station chief had been sent to Santiago in 1964; later
the agency's presence began to multiply in preparation for
the 19.70 election, when Frei would be constitutionally barred
from seeking a second term and Allende would pose more of
a threat than before.
TIME has learned that a CIA team was posted to Chile
with orders from the National Security Council to keep the
election "fair." The agents interpreted these instructions to
mean: Stop Allende, and they asked for a whopping $20 mil-
lion to do the job. They were given $5 million and ultimately
spent less than $1. million. "You buy votes in Boston, you buy
votes in Santiago," commented a former CIA agent assigned
to the mission. But not enough votes were bought; Allende
had a substantial following. He was prevented from winning
a majority, but with only 36% of the vote he narrowly won a
three-way race that was finally decided in the Chilean Con-
gress. CIA officials in Washington were furious.
The Nixon Administration saw the Allende regime as
more of a threat than Cuba to the hemisphere. The White
House feared that Chile would serve as a base for South Amer-
ica's revolutionary left as well as a convenient outpost for the
Soviet Union. So many Marxist activists were pouring in from
Cuba, Czechoslovakia and China-that a special team of CIA
clerks was dispatched to Chile to start indexing thousands of
cards on their activities. Publicly, Henry Kissinger warned of
the domino effect in Latin America. If Communism could
find a secure berth in Chile, it would be encouraged to spread
throughout the continent. Privately, the 40 Committee, the
top-level intelligence panel headed by Kissinger, authorized
$8 million to be spent to make life even tougher for Allende
than he was making it for himself.
The extent of the CIA's involvement was revealed earlier
this month by congressional sources who had been privy to
earlier testimony by CIA Director William Colby. Further de-
tails have been supplied by other agency officials. Precisely
how much was spent by foreign Communists?principally
Moscow?to get Allende into office and then to keep him
- there is not known. Most Western intelligence experts figure
that the CIA campaign was scarcely comparable in terms of ex-
penditures or intensity. Nonetheless, the agency went further
than even many of its critics imagined.
?
For a Marxist government, the Allende regime had moved
relatively slowly toward suppressing free institutions. But the
CIA believed it was only a matter of time before all dissent
would be muffled. Approximately half the CIA funds were fun-
neled to the opposition press, notably the nation's leading
daily El Mercurio; Allende had steered government adver-
tising to the papers supporting him while encouraging news-
print prices to rise high enough to bankrupt the others. Ad-
ditional CIA funds went to opposition politicians, private
businesses and trade unions. "What we were really doing was
supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbi-
trary government," argues a CIA official. "Our target was the
middle-class groups who were working against Allende."
Covert assistance went beyond help for the democratic op-
position. The CIA infiltrated Chilean agents into the upper ech-
elon of the Socialist Party. Provocateurs were paid to make
deliberate mistakes in their
jobs, thus adding to Allende's
gross mismanagement of the
economy. CIA agents orga-
nized street demonstrations
against government policies.
As the economic crisis
deepened, the agency sup-
ported striking shopkeepers
and taxi drivers. Laundered
CIA money, reportedly chan-
neled to Santiago by way of
Christian Democratic parties
in Europe, helped finance the
Chilean truckers' 45-day
strike, one of the worst blows
to the economy. Moreover,
the strikers doubtless picked
up additional CIA cash that
was floating round the coun-
try. As an intelligence official
notes, "If we give it to A, and
then A gives it to B and C
and D, in a sense it's true that
D got it. But the question is:
- Did we give it to A knowing
D would get it?"
While owning up to CIA
efforts to weaken Allende,
Colby insists: "We didn't sup-
port the coup, we didn't stim-
ulate it, we didn't bring it
about in any way. We were quite meticulous in making sure
there was no encouragement from our side." Most U.S. pol-
icymakers would have preferred that Allende be ousted in
democratic fashion at the election scheduled for 1976. That
kind of exit, they feel, would have decisively proved the bank-
ruptcy of his policies.
Clearly the CIA considers the junta to be the lesser of two
evils. Still, it rates the Chilean enterprise a failure since it
*ended in military dictatorship. Several years of dangerous,
costly and now nationally divisive intervention in another
country's internal politics might better have been avoided.
Though Soviet propaganda blames the CIA for the Chilean
coup and the death of Allende, Soviet intelligence analysts
do not give the CIA any credit. The Russians think the fault
lay with Allende himself for not being enough of a strong-
man. He temporized with constitutional processes when he
should have disregarded them. He did not follow the exam-
ple of Fidel Castro, who executed more than 1,000 of his op-
ponents whoft he came to power; 15 years later, he still rules
Cuba. Nor did the CIA have any better luck against him.
THE NEW YORE TIMES
ALLENDE'S LAST HOURS
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NEWS AMERICAN, Baltimore
29 September 1974
?
s Reiaart
More on the CIA?
By WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST JR,
Editer?in?Chief, The HearSt. Newspapers ? '
.NEW YORK?It Is unusual for this column In
dwell on the same news subject for two weeks in
a row?in this case the CIA and its Challenged
role in Chile. Exception is being made because the
left-leaning news media
have been keeping the
subject alive with a
continuing barrage of
poisonous and mislead-
ing. attacks which dis-.
turnip, not ? only the
CIA but Secretary- of
State ',Kissinger and
even the President of
the. United States.
I simply cannot
stand idly by and let
them get away with
such stuff. It damages
public Confidence in ?qr.
national security opera-
tions and in our lead-
ers. Possibly even
worse, it soft-pedals or
ignores the. sinister activities of those international
forces whose ultimate admitted goal ? despite
detente ? is the weakening and overthrow of our
political system and its influence in the world.
It would- be quite wrong to suggest that the
newspaper columnists, TV commentators and law- ?
Makers who keep hammering away at. the CIA In
self - righteous horror are Communist sympa-
thizers. The simple fact is that they and most other
self-dubbed liberals have a curious and automatic
hatred for anyone or anything committed to fight-
ing Communism. They are more anti anti-Com-
munists than anything. else.
All the same, knowingly or not, they serve the
purposes of our ideological enemies by consistently
impugning the motives of this country and its lead-
ers in the ceaseless global political struggle. The
Communists in the Kremlin- have got to be .de-
lighted that the CIA-Chile affair has been getting
so much domestic, criticism?criticism which can-
not help but weaken, the future effectiveness of the
chief U. S. agency Which keeps a constant expert
watch on them and so frequently helps to thwart
their plots.
You naturally have heard very little abput the
Communist plot to take over the Chilean govern-
ment of self-Styled "Maex'rk" President Salvador
Allende. All our liberal .press has been harping on
is the disclosure?subsequently frankly confirmed
by President Ford?that the CIA spent SS million
in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to support legally
organized groups opposed to the Allende ?regime.
This action, which had been approved by Dr. Kis-
singer, is damned by the critics as somehow un-
American, sneaky and disgraceful.,
The fact is, contrary to the impression created
by the critics, that the CIA and its expenditures
had very little to do with the bloody coup which
overthrew Dr. Allende a year ago. and in which
he died. He was deposed by filo present military
junta, acting with majority public support, because
the Communists were on the verge of taking over
a ffn.Trnt-tinnt whieh had become ever more op
preshive and less democratic.
William Randolph Hearst Jr.
Last week, In this space, it. Was told how?long.
and tons of guns and ammunition had been smug-
gled into Chile by thousands .of Communist agents
who infiltrated the country.under Allende?;soine. of
whom became his closest advisers. ;Anyone who
doubts what was being planned needs only to read.
. the ra.sk.of articles by Soviet political 'and military
experts which have been tippearing li Conirriunilt
? theoretical journals this summer .'explaining . the
? major reasons for their setback in 'Chile-.
The Kremlin-approved analysis's. aS repo'rtecl by
James Burnham in the Sept. 27 iSsud of National
Review, boils down to six factors cited as errors
to be avoided in future would-be seizurea 01 power.
NB% Burnham sums them up as followp: ;
.1. The counterrevolmlonary (fred) press was
r,ot quickly enough ?muzzled. Chile's' influentia1.
conservative? paper, El Mercurio, bicited or its
role in wrecking the Allende regime.!..i::
2: The 11.11ende government moved tea slowly
on both the political and economic fronts, thus giv-
ing the,counterrevolution time to f)repare" its forces,
3. The Chilean Communists failed to. push Al-
lende into speedy nationalization of private busicesa
without compensation-.
4. The Chilean Communists did nOt golar and
fast enough in creating grass mils. 'prganirations.
of workers and peasants under Communist control
which could act as an extralegal power ne7ara,..us.
S. The ativenturoua and. clisozganized salzu-i7e3
of farms and some factories by ultre.left, Maoists
and Trotskyists antagonized potential isymp.atli'lzers
and aroused the reactionary elements. . ?
6. Communist penetration of the armed forces;i
though considerable, was not sullicient to.deter thei
coup by the higher military echelons'. ??
Don't forget?all this is on record in the c?-;
tidal Soviet prcss. So what the CIA-did in Chila.
was virtually nothing compared with the. other side.
The upshot, unfortunately, was entailer dictatorship ?
in our kgmisphere, but at least it is not .nother ?
Communist tyranny. I
A large pert ? of the current -anti-CIA. criticism;
Crarees that the secret agency has become a kind
O f .s.:pra-government whose actions! are directed
by a !-,anclul of men withOut adequate ccztroi by
Cres. In actuality it is simply a modern ver-?
. s!?.):-! of th2 intelligence apparatus which eyery
, se:vereign nation since ancient Rome has oai to:
for its safety. Furthermore :EVERY i
i,. spends has to be approved by Cons.-ress-
ah:r recernrnendations of four of its committees.
hodies are the Senate Committees on
Fere:en Relations and Military Affairs, and their ;
te.o counterparts in the House. To members of-I
!aci-: comprise what is badly named the Congre.3--1
siona: Oversight Committee, a small group which
ree.:ie:Jes, studies and passes on the :more delicate
CA activities.
1::ius for Senate Foreign Relations. Coernrnittee:
ri-oan .f. Fulbright and s:enior member
Ciiurch to claim they didn't, really know
went on in Chile was at best apolitical pose,
Sen. Church actually came up -*ith this sane,-
z!monioui remark. "We now Iearn," the
Deimerat intoned, "that there is no 'erence
be-
z;veen American and. Soviet policy !in subverting,
foreign governments, had always thought the:
Uni:ed States stood for different principles."
That V:n.5 a lot of two-faced nonsnse..I-le kr!;.'77
clar:-07,d Well what had happened in. thile,eaz.el..i he
somFhow didn't be 112dn't done hi3 hom47,:work.
I don't mean to be too rough on the.CIA
all there are two sides to any controversy
maters look different depending on where you
For examplti, it certiinly is etsy for me; to
and sympathize with feats that We may
16
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? c!-ea..,:d a kind of gestapo or 0.11rnited,.self;
dirty tricks department. rNob-odyfo,vants
?
aut such is not the case. Unlike lits Communist
c-...r:erparts. the CIA and its actions, invariably be
to a public whose surrogates in
IL. ? thy
have
already have passed cit i them. ? tr?y
-r.ave done so without fully uncierstattding the facts,'
Is the fault of the lawmakers whoihold. the purse
. strings. -
The basic explanation for the?C4-Clille hubblitc,
it seerns to rne, is the inability orizefus:d 137 the.
-PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
2 Oct 1974
li'rPral critics to recognize Communika as.adeadiyi
centinuing threat to this nation and .its interests.
They view it instead with. .benevolence as
foeei of socialism,. dedicated to thte? V7C11-are Ca the
ie, and see any contrary view' o.r...i.icdoitY as
ret only demeaning for noble-minded Arnerican3
bet suggestive of Hitler and unllmed fascism.
Ncn....niformed fled fascism doesn't bother them,
That's their view, and they certainly are ire
to express it. ? ?
B..!: I remember Czechoslovakia. ? ? --
,
?
grees
To Tip
? ontr 1
? At the meeting, arrange'
. by )1,Nedzi, Kissinger an d?
Colliy, it was agreed to pro-i
vide i the Foreign Affairsi
Committee or any subcomel
ntittee Morgan designates(
with all intelligence-gather:
ing information "relating to
foreign affairs. Nedzi 's sub-'
committee already receives.
such information in addition
to other intelligence mate-
'
nal.
By SAUL FRIEDMAN
lnquir.yr IV ashington Barta
WASFIDIGTON ? Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director William Colby has
given members of Congress
private assurances that the
United States has ended' all
covert political operations
abroad.
And an understanding has
been reached with the ad-
ministration under which key
lawmakers are to be notified
regularly and in advance of
major intelligence-gathering
projects as well as clandes-
tine operations planned by
the super-secret "Forty Com-
mittee." -
At President Ford's urging,.
Secretary of State Henry. Kis-
singer and Colby met sec-
retly last Friday on Capitol
Hill with Reps. Edward He-
bert (D., La.), chairman of
the House Armed Services
Cr rmittee, Lucien Nedzi'
'(DI, Mich.), chairman of the
subcommittee on intelligence
operations, and Thomas E.
(Doc) Morgan (D., Pa.),
Chairman of the House For- ?
eign Affairs Cornmittee.Appr
Tighter Rein.i -
The agreement, which for
the first time will give the
Foreign Affairs Committee
advance information on CIA
operations, is designed to
give a congressional body,
with a foreign policy jurisdic-
tion closer control over CIA
ventures like those in Chile
and Greece.
Nedzi said Kissinger and
Colby specifically had agreed
to provide them the same in,
telligence information that is
in the hands of the exclusive
Forty Committee.
According to congressional.
and White House sources,,
this policy -will have the ef-
fect of limiting Kissinge.r's
personal authority to use the
CIA as an instrument of gin-
hal power politics.
The Forty Committee, -
which oversees and author-
izes covert intelligence oper-
ations, is _run by Kissinger,
who also heads the National
h'
tion to Kissinger are Joseph
Sisco; under secretary of
state for political Affairs;
William Clements, deputy
secretary of Defense; Gen.
George Brown, chairman of
the Joint Griefs of Staff, and
Colby. -
Although the CIA is sup-
posed to be largely indepen-
dent, b better supply objec-
tive intelligence data, Kis-.
singer has _dominated the
Forty Committee- and the,
agency because of his dual
rote as Secretary- or, State
and the President'S-National
security chief. And until now,
thoocommittee has -been ac-
countable to no one except
.": .
.6, .7., ?
the President.
But, President Ford, fol-
lowing a meeting with con-
gressional leaders, approved
the idea of closer cooperation:.!
between Congress and agen-
cies involved with intelli-
gence operations.
The decision to let mem-.
hers of Congress in on deci-,
sions of the Forty Commitie.e
is part of an administration
effort to blunt rising criti-
cism of the American role in
the downfall of the elected ,
governmeotin Chile and-the
subsequent assassination of
its president, Salvador. Al-
lende. -? . ? ?. - ?
Nedzi said he has been .as-
sured that tie CIA. and the ?
Secar CAP' h4008/08 : CI7RDP77-00432R00
?tY1 TA?p
_
Forty Committee no longer
are engaging in covert polizi-
zal like the One in
.And he said the CA ar.7-
soo.titin has. pledged. to
keep rnembers of Congress
-deformed- in advaoce. for the
first time on plans for major
operations, which
Toe uoderestaadiag, Nedzi
said, may afford members
the coport-izdie, to give ad-
vice and e?rierreoreelp kill some
prenc-sed prejects which they
ICC! could damage American
interasese TEte..:1-iouse Foreign
Affsies Cotathittee. includes a.
number of -lelrais who for
the fie-s-t time_will be privy to
intel?-zenceeinformadoa '
Previcts =:'..linquLeles by ?
.Necizi, who hai wrestled with ;
the proble.M. o4cocgressional
central of intelgence opera-
does since he.took over his
subco=iitteilha 1571, have
die=closed an i?rea.sed tend-
eney toward -Fake House,. ,
conerol of the CIA for its own -.,?!
? the Watergate ;
coverep and the harassment?
of Per:toe:en -papers leaker -
Deeiel Efisbero; and. in the
Chile Affair.
Platerga.teiUse ?
In -Watergate., the Presi-
dent and his teo aides sought
to use the CIA in the coV-
erup. And there was evi-
denee that Kissinger author-
ized a request to the CIA for
psychianic profile of Ells-
-berg.
In the Chile affair, the
Fort? Committee, acting on
.Kissir.zer's suggestion, au-
thorized the use: of 53 million
to e'77rrt opponeots of Al-
lende. These opconents, soon-
by the CIA, cre,ated the
climate that toppled Allende
a.nd his government.
As a result, the CIA again
has come under fire from
ceno-ressienal critics, includ-
ing Sen. Frank Church (D.,
ld'ehc), a raeldng member of
the. Seeete. Foreign Reladons
Commie:2.e, and Rep.; NU-
ch a el Harrington (D.,
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Mts3.), a member cf the
Armed SereiCes Com-
reittet whe leaked Colby's
tevimony on the Chile opera-
' .
The congressional critics,
noting that CIA iateminton
. has resulted in a military
dictatorship in Chile, again
are calling for tighter ? con-
trois of the agency. ?
Another Culprit .
But Nedzi, who at Herring-
Ma's request had gotentCor-
by's frank* teadmony,said
that the target of 'criticistn
should not be the CIA aloze.
but the Forty Committee.*
?Nej5 concerted that the
Forty. Commirtee, doe:ilea Zed
by Kissinger, has hecherie a
"super-inteiligeece ageecy,"
curity Act. of 1947.
Thus; under pressure from
congressional cridce, and
with i?Nec14. dSer-
vices
vices, :-Corernittee. Chairman
acting.. asteiritti-
ariese the.arrangtereae.nt was ;
svorlt due: for'Lcicser 'rela-
tion& hetwe the Foreign Al- '
fairs; .Ccremittee -and the in-
iot use the CIA as easily as
. has if he Ravers that ern,
gressional outsiders are
' being kept informed.
Whetdeser this new .-zr?ang,ge-
.
ment guarantees that Cca- ?
? -. ? ---- ? teillgeace gess.. 011 in fact exercise
which. unlike the ie tot Their ' which te (IA. closer'. Conn! of CIA van-
governed by the National Se- : ? stares., isgat ycssinger will . tures rerr?el. to be eth..'" I
LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974
Intrigues Before Allende Fell
BY RICHARD R. FAGENV
.? My wife and I gained first-hand eX-J
perience of American involvement in
Chilean affairs a few months after We
:arrived in Santiago in February, 1972.
e That was when, a- U.S. Foreign
Service officer--an acquaintance of
mine?got in touch with me and said
that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago .
had succeeded in infiltrating all
parties of the Popular Unity coalition,
but that it had not yet managed to
infiltrate the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left, a. group outside
'the government and critical of it. .
This U.S. official thoinght.rny uni-
versity connections?which he knew
about at first hand?might provide
links for infiltrating that group. He.
offered to change money for me on
the black market. Because of our old
association and strictly for my own in-
formation, he also. sketched the
number and. distribution of CIA
:agents masked as regular diplomats
in the. U.S. Embassy in Chile?about
one-third of the total.
I doubt that I was the only Ameri-
can citizen approached in this man-
ner. I hope I was not the only one toe.
refuse. The incident is a measure of
how blatantly the U.S. Embassy
operated during that period.
There was no question by the mid-
dle of 1972 that the Allende Govern-
ment was in serious trouble. The in-,
..--flationary spiral was twisting up-
ward, shortages of foodstuffs had
developed ? although much was
available on the black market?and
the centrist Christian Democrats, lede
by ex-President Eduardo Frei, (whom.
the United States had once actively
supported) were in open alliance with
the right-Wing National Party. Many
members of this center-right coalition
has passed in word and deed far
beyond the point of "loyal opposition."
The political and ecospomical situa-
tion was ripe for what later came to
be known as "destabilization."
In October, 1972, the massive walk-.
out of truckers, shopowners. and.
businessmen in opposition began.
Those of us living in Santiago were
amazed at the seetning ease with ?
which tens Of thousands of persons
, without visible incomee-and without
'savings because of the inflationary ,
spiral?were able to support
themselves. The dollar rate on the.
black market dropped, indicating that
fresh sources of currency were flow-
ing into the country. It was everyday
speculation in .Santiago, both on the
Right and Left, that the United States
was funding the walkouts, specula-.
tion later confirmed in the recent dis-
closures about CIA activities.
Despite political and economic dif-
ficulties, however, the government
was actually gaining support at the
polls. Much to the dismay of his op-
ponents, in the congressional elec--
tions of March, 1973, the Allende
coalition gained electoral strength,
receiving 44% of the total vote.
Ironically, this election was the ;
first step toward the military coup.:
Convinced that Allende could not be
removed constitutionatly?his cop-
Richard Page a; professor of politi-
cal science at Stanford, was in. Chile -
for 1$ months in 1972-73 as a consul-.
, tant to the Ford Foundation, and visit-
ing professor at the Latin. American
Faculty of the Social Sciences. He is
coauthor of '!Latin America- and the.
-United States: the Changing Political:
,Realities."
gressional support would have had ?
to drop below 33% for him to be im- ?
peached?the Right began to plot in
; earnest. Violence, sabotage, and a fi-
nal series of crippling strikes
wracked Chile during July and Au-
gust of 1973. The full role of the CIA:
in these events is yet to be told.
Throughout this period, the
'Chilean political' situation was fra-
gile, the economy was in trouble, ,
and class and political tensions ran-
:high. We now know that $8 to $.11
million were used covertly to sup-
port Opposition newspapers, rties
and strikers.The United States in-
? filtrated political 'parties, and, as now.
.conceded, attempted to buy votes in
order to prevent the election of Allen-
, de- '
Furthermore, because the CIA and
its friends certainly had the means to ,
change their dollars into Chilean cur-
? rency somewhere other. than at the -
Central Bank, the money pumped
,into Chile may.actually have bought
18
$40 to $50 million worth of subversive
activities and services. With a
raging black market, opposition par-
ties, newspapers, and ? operatives
could be purchased in dollars at a
very substantial discount. All of this
makes .a mockery of official claims
that the United States did nothing?in
Mr. Ford's wOrds?"but ensure that
democratic institutions and parties
survived." What Washington did do
-was put a very substantial thumb on-
the scales, tipping them against the
freely elected government of Chile.
Against the background of what
we now know of CIA involvement in
Chile, the statements by. high U.S.
Officials that "we did not participate
in the overthrow -of the Allende
. _
Government.".' are seriously
misleading. Perhaps the United
States did not participate in the plan-
ning or help in the attack on the
Presidential. palace. But as is well
.recognized .in the. American legal
system, accessories-before-the-fact
must share responsibility with. those
who actually commit the criminal act,
even though the fonmer may nOt be
',present at the scene of the crime: et
: As tragic as the events in Chile are,
..af perhaps even, more significance to
Americans is the. incredible web of
coverup, false justifications, .and
outright lies being told to the-
American people by .the highest of-
ficials of the Ford Administration. For
example, in justifying covert CIA ac-
tivities, the President has claimed
that "there was aneffort being made
.by the government of Salvador Al-
lende to destroy' opposition news
? media and to destroy opposition
political parties."
This does not reflect the true
precoup situation in Chile. Actually.
the opposition parties and
newspapers kept functioning from
1970 to 1913?and not only because
our government was pouring money
into them. In fact, one of the most sig-
nificant attempts to tamper with
.Chilean constitutionalism had occur-
red in 1970 when the CIA tried to buy
opposition votes in Congress so as to
prevent Allende from assuming the
presidency.
In all of this sorry recent history,
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the key actor and prime villain has.
?been. Secretary of State. Henry A.
.Kissinger. As head of the Forty Com-
mittee. Kissinger was the chief
architect of covert operations against
the Allende government. It was he
.who first articulated the "domino
theory" of the "threat" that .Chile
(with a population 5910,. and
wealth less than 1%, that of the Unit-
ed States) posed to this country. "I
.don't think we should delude
ourselves that an Allende takeover in
Chile would not present massive pro-
.blems for us . . Kissinger said in
- - LOS ANGELES TIMES !
6 October1974
1970.
This is the same man who just a
few weeks ago told the U.S. ambas-
sador in Chile to "cut out the politi-
cal science lectures" because the-am-
bassador brought up the question of
human rights .with members of the
junta when. he "should have been"
discussing military aid.
All .of this betrays a scenario in
which. the U.S. government?once
again?has set itself implacably
against political and economic ex-
perimentation in the Third World.
It's the spirit of :Vietnam and
President Must Bal nee
Interests, ShareT Planning
BY HAARYROSITZKE
'Rom the Bay. of Pigs to the cur-
rent Chilean case, there have been
' sporadic denunciations of the CIA's
action operations abroad?in the ,
press, in books from inside and out-
side. Washington's intelligence
establishment, and occasionally in
, Congress.
! The issue is heightened rather
than resolved by President Ford's
statement that "our government,
like other governments, does take
certain actions in the intelligence
field to help implement foreign pol-
icies and protect national security."
.. The central question: Should the.
United States employ secret means
to interfere in the affairs of other
countries? The debate is waged on
two levels?moral and pragmatic,.
For pure men ofprinciple, covert..
action is impermissable as a means,
whatever the end. Covert actions are
Harry Rositzk,e, retired after many
years in operations with the OSS and
the CIA, is the author of "U.S.S.R. To-
day."
? immoral not only because they are.
secret and therefore violate the can-
'ons of an open society, but also be-
cause by interfering in the domestic
affairs of another country they vio- .
late the U.N. Charter and the moral
and degal principles of American
? 'society.
At a more realistic level, the cri..
, Aique of secret operations addresses
itself to profit and loss: Are secret
? 'operations worth carrying out?
On the loss side are not only the
'moral objections, but the conspic-
?;lions failures of the past (the Bay of
Pigs), the sinister image of .the CIA
'abroad (the bogie of "American im-
perialism"), the compulsion of the ex-
ecutive to lie in. public and to Con- ,
gress in order to keep secret its spon-
sorship of "unofficial" actions.
(Chile), and the domestic disen-
? chantment with secrecy deepened.
by Watergate.
What are the 'entries on the profit
side?. The list of pass successes on
the public record is short President
Truman authorized large-scale offi-
_dal and unofficial support for the
democratic parties in the 1948
an elections to prevent a Communist
? victory?and the Communists lost
? President Eisenhower triggered a
coup in Tehran in 1953 to keep Iran
out of the Soviet sphere?and it still '
is. The following year he authorized.
a coup in Guatemala to prevent the?
'export of Soviet arms into the West-
ern hemisphere?and the coup.suc-
ceeded without bloodshed.
What are the secret successes? No
one knows outside the small- elite in
, the executive. .
, -Political action operations have '
:played a marginal role in American ,
'foreign policy since 1948, but the full
record is not available either to Con-
gress or the public. For a decade af-
ter World War-fl they Played a tan-
gible but minor role in the American
'effort to restore a stabilized, demo-
cratic Europe. Through its contacts
with non-Communist politicians and
government officials, with 'labor ,
_leaders and media figures, the CIA..
added its influence to that of the
State and Defense Departments in
containing the expansion of Soviet
power west of the Elbe.
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the fo-'-
cus of political operations shifted to
the Third World, the terrain chosen '
.by Moscow to weaken the 'limper-
lists." In the Near East, in sAfrica
briefly, and in Southeast Asia,
covert operations played their part
in furthering overall American ob:
jectives, however ill-conceived some
.of these objectives may appear in re-
trospect.
In Latin America the political si-
tuation became even more challeng-
ing after Castro's victory, and coun-
terinsurgency became the order of
the day for half a dozen federal
agencies. The CIA's political action
operations were aimed mainly at the
Jr?fid1A614t6ticfrieRAISOM
Approved For R
19
Watergate at work in hemispheric
politics. This scenario; in Chile as in
Vietnam, involved disregard for the
. sovereignty and rights of others, the
violation of national and international
law, dirty tricks by the CIA and other
agencies, cozying up .to .repressive
governments, and withholding vital-
information from Congress and the
American electorate.
The people of Chile and Latin
America deserve better from the
government of the United States?
and so do the American people.
supported by Moscow with money,
training and advice, at the insurgent
groups working out of Havana, and
'at the minor rash of "Chinese par-
ties" that broke out in the mid-60s.
. The evolution of purely domestic in-
surgencies and of urban terrorist
groups further broadened the chal-
lenge .to local security agencies
working in concert with the CIA.
It is a mistake to think that all CIA
operations in Latin America were
aimed at supporting right-wing Mili-
tarists. America's ultimate goal in
Chile's 1964 election, of course, was
to thwart the election of Salvador
Allende, but Washington put its
money on a reform-minded Chris-
tian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, and
actively sought the achievement of
his goals ?breaking up the domin-
ant financial oligarchy, for instance.
Indeed, as an. action action arm of.
government, the CIA: historically..
has attracted. many liberals to its .
ranks, for they saw in it a chance to
bring democratic reforms to Darts of
the world that most needed it. One
reason that the CIA now is widely
perceived as far-right is that its fail-
ures have been more publicized than
its successes, and these usually have
involved strictly anti-Communist ac-
tivities, as in -Allende's Chile.
In the new world of detente, it is
often argued, secret action opera-.-
lions are no longer needed. Detente,
however broadly defined, has not af-
fected Soviet competition on the
ideological and political front. Mos-
cow continues to exploit the re- ?
sources of its built-in political action
instruments?the Communist par-
ties abroad. It continues to export
strong anti-American propaganda orf
its own radios and news services and
by the distribution of anti-capitalist
"literature and general subsidies to
local editors and .columnists." The
KGB' continues to recruit "agents of.
influence" .
Secret political action is not the.
only antidote for secret Soviet ac-
tions, but it is one instrument. Situa-
tions are bound to arise, especially
04kiiio01:PH363008e5Near East, in.
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which the President will find a se.-
cret American action is the only ef7.
fective response. Such ? occasions
may be rare, but it would be foolish
to deprive him of the secret option. ?
Who will measure the profit. and
: loss of such operations? .
? It is a fundamental and frustriting
fact that tl pragmatic equation can:
be written only within the execu-
. Jive.. The ? broad moral-pragmatic:
issue is inevitably reduced to the
.question of controlling the action of
the executive?and here frustration.
? persists, for .there are na adequate
answers.
A Hoover-type commission on in-
telligence and secret operations can,
. at best, make broad bureaucratic
and policy recommendations. Con-
gressional oversight can ,do no more
than rubber stamp executive deci-
sions or hold dramatic post mortems.
Legislation. a "foreign intervention
? control act", for example, is impossi-
ble to write on such a rarified sub-
ject, nor can Congress or a commit-
tee vote on individual strategic oper-
ations that are to be carried out se-. ?
.c-etly.
i ?
! The burden is clearly on the Pres-
ident to resolve at least some of the
public suspicion and distrust about
? secret political actions abroad. He
can change the machinery of secret
committees to bring in a broader ad-
versary point of view in the initial
stages of secret action proposals. He
, can make. the National Security
Council as a whole responsible for fi-
nal recommendations to him. He can-
exercise his sharpest judgment on
.the possible profit and cost of each'
operation. And he is the only man
who can bring to bear a moral judg-
ment that reflects the values of the
electorate as a whole.
? ?
The President can take one further
step to _bring in the people_ He can
arrange for the participation of se-.
lect congressmen in the National Se-
curity Council's deliberations on se-
cret action proposals. ?
Who monitors the President? In.
any government, secret activities
? are peculiarly the province of the ex-
ecutive: secret negotiations, back-
door diplomacy, foreign intelligence
and' domestic security operations,
covert action operations. In a repub-
lic without an official secrets act
there is only one check on what he
does in secret?the press.?
The. adversary relationship' be-
tween the media and the executive
on official secrets may in individual
cases entail some damage to national
interests, but without private inves-
tigators, we cannot know who is
doing what to us or for us. Exposes
of the government's secret opera-
tions, whether on Cambodia or Chile,
can throw light on the acts of the
past, and provide a cautionary signal
for the decisions of tomorrow. .
WASHINGTON STAR
10 October 1974 ...
Leaks Cut
Copying
Of Cables
. By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star?Net:a Staff Writer
The State Department
"Shis week ordered a SO per-
' cent reduction in the distri-
bution.of diplomatic cables
both within the department
and to other government
agencies because of con-
cern over security leaks.
and the mounting cost of
producing up to 180,000
copies a day.
Deputy Undersecretary
for Management L. Dean
Brown said the order
, would take effect Monday.
He said he issued the order
to the departmental com-
munications center with
the approval of Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger
and will meet today with
the assistant secretaries of
state to explain the meas-
ure.
Brown said in an inter-
view that two recent leaks
of classified cables were
precipitating factors but
that the volume and cost of
the reproduction and distri-
bution of the cables also
figured in his decision. The
State Department receives
'anywhere from 2,500 to
2,800 cables a day from
embassies and consulates
around the world.
These are classified ac-
cording to content, both at
the source and on arrival
in Washington, and distri-
bution in the past has been
based on interest in all gov-
ernment agencies.
TWO SECRET cables
were leaked to the press in
September, one from
Ambassador David H. Pop-
per in Santiago, Chile, and
the other from Ambassador
Herman Eilts in Cairo.
Both leaks reportedly re-
sulted in temperamental
outbursts by Kissinger to
the extent that he
authorized his press
spokesman, Ambassador
Robert Anderson, to say
that Foreign Service offi-
cers who leak cables are a
disgrace to the service.
In turn, a number of
Ca-
reer Foreign Service offi-
cers were outraged by the
slur that could only have
been made with Kissing-
er's approval.
"Kissinger is the biggest
leaker in the building,"
said 'one career officer.
The Popper cable report-,
'ed a conversation the
ambassador had with Chi-
lean military officials,
pointing out that the
administration might ex-
perience difficulty in get-
ting congressional approv-
al for military assistance .t
to the Clailean junta. As
kale.. to The New York
Times, the cable apparent-
iy had a Kissinger re-,
sponse scribbled across it
saying, "Tell Popper to,
? knock off the political-
science lectures."
The Eilts cable referred
to a similar problem re-
garding.a portion of the
foreign-aid bill affecting
funds promised to Egypt,
by Kissinger. The reaction
on the seventh floor at the
State Department was bit-.
ter because the last thing
Kissinger wants is anyone
rocking the boat of his affa-
ble relationship with Presi-
dent Anwar Sadat.
TEAMS OF STATE De-
partment security agents
fanned out over the build-
ing after each leak but
were reportedly unable to
discover how the cables
found their way to the
press. ?
Brown said' he ordered
the reduction'in distribu-
tion of the cables, many of
which have been going to?
the White House, CIA,
Pentagon, Treasury De-
partment, Commerce De-
partment and other agen-,
cies of government on a
selective basis.
"These cables generate
huge amounts of paper,"
Brown said. "Especially
the unclassified messages
? that cover non-sensitive
subjects such as, for exam-
ple, potato production.
A number of FSOs
agreed that there is far too
much paper generated by
the cables from overseas,
but some expressed the
fear that if Brown's ax is '
wielded too ,strongly it
might isolate country desk
officers from what is going
on elsewhere in the regions
for which they are respon-
sible.
20
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FOREIGN REPORT, London
18 September 1974
Can Kissinger survive Chile?
President Ford followed Mr Henry Kissinger's advice on how to handle the
Chile debate and decided to brazen it out. In his press conference on Monday, he
argued that the use of secret funds by the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile was
justified in order to keep opposition news media ? and political parties ? alive during
the Allende period; that the CIA was not involved in the preparation of last year's
coup; and that, anyway, the Russians are spending much more on clandestine op&a-
tions than the Americans. It needed to be said; but the debate does not end there. The
process that was started by the leaking of secret testimony by Mr William Colby, the
Director of Central Intelligence, will result in a new round of congressional hearings
and, in the long run, its effects on American foreign policy could be as shattering as the
effects of the Watergate affair on domestic administration.
New hearings were expected to begin this week before the House of Representatives'
sub-committee on inter-American affairs, chaired by Mr Dante Fascell, where the
driving force is Mr Michael Harrington, a left-wing Democrat from Massachusetts
whose version of the Colby testimony (the CIA has refused to make the transcript
available) is what started the ball rolling. There are discrepancies between his account
of what was said and accounts that are privately given by those who were present;
whereas he quotes Mr Colby as saying that secret funds were used to "destabilise" the
Allende regime, for example, other sources claim that that word was never used..
These discrepancies can be resolved only, if the transcript is released or if Mr Colby
is called to testify again.
_The Fascellonb7coni.nriitte,e was scheduled to hear a, number of academic specialists
this e .r
wee, and to call some of the participants 1iip5t wcelc.; the sec9nd gronp,could
_ , _
include Mr Charles Meyer, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for inter-Arnerican
affairs, Mr Jack Kubisch, his .successor (now on his 1,Yay, to take ovcr the embassy in
? :
Athens), Mr Harry Schlaudemann, a Deputy 4.ssi?tant Secretaryformerly.in the
Santiago embassy, and Mr Edward Korry, the American ambassador in Chile during
the first 14 months of the Allende regime. .
At the same. time, Senator Frank Church, the chairman 9f the Senate sub-com-;
mittee on multinational companies, has initiated own staff, study on the possible
contradictions between what some of these officials, and MT:Kissinger, have aid in
previous statements on American involvement in Chile ? notably 'during the hearings
on the International Telephone and Telegraph corporation before his own sub-com-
mittee in 1972.? and what was disclosed in the Colby testimony. Sources close to the
senator are talking about possible perjury charges, and describe what has so far been
disclosed as only "the tip of the iceberg", suggesting that the inquiry could be 'broad-
ened out into an attack on similar operations in other Countries. ?
Senator Church is known to be anxious to set up fresh hearings hefore his attiql
sub-committee; the timing and the scope of these will largely depend on the attitude'
taken by Senator Fulbright, who has the ultimate word until next Jarmary, wheri he'
will leave his post as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr Full
bright is thought to be worried about the extent to which new hearings could turn
into a,witchhunt against Mr Kissinger, who_ has been shown to be the prime architect
of America's Chile pplicy. , . .
There are a number of very disturbing features about the Way that the Chile inquiry,
fuelled by leaks to the New York Times, is developing. These include:
(i) The possible naming of Chileans" in contact with the C14.. It is now 'widely. known that
three leading opposition papers, as well as some radio stations and opposition parties,,
Were the recipients of-CIA funds during the Allende period. It iS clear that the news.:
papers ,and radio stations-would probably ,not have Survived- the tremendous ecdnomic
pressures that the Allende' government brought to bear 'on them without outside help.;
For example, the sources?Of advertising dried Up as the state took over private firms
and refused official advertising, and prices were held artificially low while costs 'soared
in conditions of hyper-inflation. The CIA funding did not involve any measure -of
editorial control, and o'ne of the papers that benefited actually applauded the confisj
cation of American copper. companies. The aim was to keep in being a deinocratic
I;
curb on the marxist government. ' -
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The likelihood now, unfortunately, is that this rationale will be forgotten and that
.through either the hearings .or the press.,- the maines Of the recipients Of secret funds,'
and of those 'who."laundered' the money, will be made public. This could have
.devastating effects on the lives Of those concerned?' perhapi literally, since they Would'
become automatic targets for the guerrilla left. It would have 'equally dramatic
cations for American foreign policy elsewhere, since it would become plain to anyone
seeking such American support that he mightbe exposed and discredited through the
inability of the:Aineric'an Administration' to keep such matters secret. ?
(ii) The lop-sided nature of the debate. Little attention has been paid to evidenceof the
niuch greater Russiiiiand Cuban involvement in Chile during the Allende Years; the
Allende' goVeirintent was the recipient' of sdrne $620m from the Soviet. block, and the
? Cubans were deeply engaged in training and arming paramilitary .gi-chips:' And
?$estim.onY that1'6nfliets with the. nOtiOn that the Anierican'gOVernk:,..ent Warengaged,
all along, in ?trying to topple Allende has been studiously ighored by Some. major
American ? . ? L
Korry has testified for: example, that :he followed a policy of accommodation
with .Allende during the first eight months he was in power. This broke down only
when Allende himself rejected an offer that would have enabled Chile to.'Eompensite
nationalised American companies without; in effect, having- to Tay Since
compensation would haVe been Paid in.Chilean bonds guaranteed by.th.e United States
Nreasury that-mbuld have .been:.fiegotiable On the 'international market..:Even More
significantly, Mr.Korry has testified that a-representative 'of Allende aPproached the
American embassy- for 'a Secret:subsidy of $lm before the September; ?1970;:election.
Things -are more complex than. Mr. -Harrington and the New York Times: Make out.
(iii) The witchhuht against the makers of the Chile policy. It is a time-honottred 'Prineiple
that officials, do not always: own. Up to e ?erything an intelligence service is doing. But
iii: America. now' the, Statements of senior officials on Chile are. being treated in Sortie
quarters as part era Watergate-style cover-up for _which those involved (up - to and
including Mr Kissinger) should be punished. Ifperkiry ? or contempt of court ? charges
are threatened; Some of the people affected may feel that they have to tell all in order
id _defend themselves. There are a number of legal, and factual, questions to-be resolved
_before things come to that. But it may not be too soon to ask: who is the John Dean of
the Chile hearings going to: be ? ? . ? , ?
The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that, unless the American Administration
Manages to preserve the minimal' amount of secrecy indispensable to the eanduct of
foreign policy, it will lose the means to function as a great power. That, as Well as
Mr Kissinger's own survival,' s what is now At stake.
22
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WASHINGTON POST
06 October 1974
'Jack Anderson
A 200-Mile Fishing Limit
The 200-mile fishing limit, an ob-
scure issue in the 1960s, suddenly ranks
with the oil crisis and nuclear test-
ing as one of the most dangerous con-
troversies of the 1970s.
Already, gunboats have clashed on
the high seas over the fishing bounda-
ries. At stake are not only profitable
fishing catches but undersea mining
rights and the control of strategic na-
val straits.
Confidential documents show the
Pentagon is gravely worried that the
200-mile limit would close off the Gi-
bralter straits, the Bosporus and other
vital passageways to shipping. This
wduld have a "serious impact on na-
tienal security," Deputy Defense Sec-
retary William Clements has written
inn letter to selected senators.
But the 12-mile limit, an the other
hand, has opened U.S. coastal waters
to Russian and Japanese fishing boats.
This has forced the United States to
Import fish, which has added a stagger-
ing $1.3 billion to the balance of pay-
ments deficit.
_ Btisy Pentagon lobbyists, meanwhile,
are sneaking confidential briefing pa-
pers to senators who oppose the 200-
mile limit. Down in Foggy Bottom,
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
has made what appear to be badly mis-
leading statements on the controversy,
and old Senate friends are feuding
over the issue.
Simply stated, here is how the prob-
lem came up:
In 1608, a Dutch lawyer named Hugo
Grotius made a convincing case for
free fishing on the high seas. For some
330 years thereafter, boats of all lands
pursued fish virtually at will.
By 1940, the simple fishing boats
were being replaced in coastal waters
by floating factories, and the supply of
fish was dwindling. To protect its fish-
ing, Chile extended its jurisdiction 200
miles out to sea, far beyond the tradi-
NEWSWEEK
7 October 19714
tional 3-mile and 12-mile limits.
This started an international scram-
ble for fishing rights. Now 36 lands,
most of them small, poor nations, have
? laid claim to additional coastal waters
as far out as 200 miles.
Indeed, a naval battle almost broke
out between British and Icelandic war-
ships over Iceland's arbitrary 50-mile
limit. Because the United States failed
to support Iceland, NATO came within
a hair of being kicked out of its vital
Icelandic bases. More crises are likely.
The United States had held firm to
the three-mile limit until Congress ex- ?
tended the boundaries to 12 miles in
1966. The object was to bring offshore
oil within our territorial waters.
'Now. the fishing interests are press-
- .ing to push out the territorial limits '
still farther, for the U.S. share of At- ? -
lantic coast fishing has fallen from 93
per cent in 1960 to less than 50 per-
cent today. The price of fish in the
United States has soared, accordingly,
as Russian and Japanese trawlers have,
hauled in shrimp, mackerel, haddock,
halibut and herring, along the U.S.
coast.
A world el:inference on laws of the
seas, meeting this summer in Caracas,
took up the 200-mile limit. The results
have 'become a matter of enormous
controversy.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
had advised key senators in private let-
ters, for example, that the Caracas
conference made "substantial* prog-
ress." Coastal countries "will be meet-
ing again next spring with a view to-
ward concluding an agreement in
1973," Kissinger assured the senators.
But a secret Senate Commerce Corn-
rnittee memo charges that the Caracas
meeting, far from accomplishing
"substantial progress," really broke up
in disagreement. "Nations felt no de-
sire to negotiate (and) the Caracas ses-
sion failed to make as much progress
as had been hoped for," states the Sen-
THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE
ate document.
The forthcoming 1975 session,
viewed so hopefully by Kissinger, "will
be unable to deal with all the many
complex issues left unresolved," the
memo adds. Still other conferences
may have to be called and, even if in
agreement is reached, it will take the
nations "at least two to eight years to
ratify such an important and conten-
tious multilateral document."
The Senate memo estimates ?that a
, final agreement, far from Kissinger's
1975 forecast, couldn't be reached until
1980. This will be too late; the memo
warns, to save U.S. fishing.
Q. Is the Pentagon game-planning moment, it is true, the Ford Administra-
any military action against the Arab oil tion seems to believe that it can solve
producers in the Middle East?. the problem through diplomatic jaw-
A. We are not contemplating any such boning rather than military muscle. And
action of that sort. U.S. officials insist that any kind of puni-
tive action against the Arabs would be
doomed to failure. Yet if the current
strategy of verbal suasion fails, many
people believe the public mood will
shift in favor of trying harsher meas-
ures. Last week, NEWSWEEK asked a
number of government officials, military
strategists and experts on the Mideast
ctliAnn_flijoHt612e32Rtatcplb0343/4y0015,zvho have four or five
Although . Defense Secretary James
? 1-1 Schlesinger dismissed that possibility
out of hand at a press conference last
week, the fact that the subject was raised
at all was indicative of a growing con-
cern in Washington that the U.S. might
eventually decide to take drastic steps
to bring an end to the oil crisis. At the to sspecAttil Bta
Lobbyists from the White House,
Pentagon and "Commerce Department,
, meanwhile, have been swarming over
Capitol Hill to oppose the 200-mile
limit. We have obtained briefing pa-
pers prepared by the Pentagon for the
use of its lobbyists in contacting sena-
tors. . .
. One briefing paper, labeled "Talking
points . . . for use in discussions with
bipartisan leaders of Congress," sug-
gests the lobbyists assure senators that
a new world conference will settle the
matter by April., .
Another briefing paper notes that a
bill to extend the offshore :boundaries,
introduced by Sen. Warren Magnuson
(D-Wash.), "would unilaterally abro-
gate . . . the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas" and badly hamper the U.S.
Sixth and Seventh Fleets. In a lengthy; -
private letter to Magnuson, Commerce
Secretary Frederick Dent has joined in
trying to dissuade him from "pushing
the legislation at this time."
Regardless of how the issue is de-
icided?and the odds are heavily
against successful congressional action
this season?the tides and times are
running out on peaceful settlement.
More confrontations are likely on the
high seas, as ,nations with trillion-dol-
lar stakes in offshore oil, minerals and ,
fish manipulate their boundaries.
01934. United Feature Syndicate
U.S. The three most talked-about op-
tions and their implications:
Psychological Warfare
'Although it
logical warfare psycho-
aim?un-
nerving the enemy. That was clearly
the intent of the verbal salvos fired at.
the major oil-producing nations last week
by the Ford .Administration. "To under-
stand the oil poker game,- said one top
U.S. official, "you have to know xvhat the
Inst chips are in each player's stack. For
takes
has
many
forms,
basic
one
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? ars' worth of foreign exchange, the Agency is knc)wn to have mounted a
raest bet is .to shut o the oil. For th
West, which has only 60 to 90 day
worth of oil,' the final ante is not com
mercial. It's military."
. . Before that final bet is. made, how-
ever,...,44psywar" strategists cite ways in
which the .West could try to rattle the
nerves of a ?few oil sheiks with a com-
bination of propaganda. moves and eco-
nomic sanctions. With the oil producers
still heavily dependent on the devel-
oped nations for food and technology,
the West could hike prices dramatically
or declare an embargo on all such goods.
Military assistance and arms sales to the
OPEC nations could be frozen until
prices were cut. The billions of dollars
that the Arabs have invested or de-
posited in the West could be seized.
And repeated hints of possible future
military action could be dropped to feed
the fears of the oil producers that if
the West got desperate enough, it
might decide to opt for war.
Psychologica/-warfare tactics have
their shortcomings and their risks, how-
ever. They would fail overnight unless
the U.S., Japan and Western Europe
formed an unbreakable united front.
Without that, the Arabs would quickly
turn to any defectors for their needed
goods. The industrialized nations would
also have to be prepared to follow up
talk, with action. "I cannot see it work-
ing,? says British historian Walter La-
qtm4r, "unless the industrialized nations
are seen to be determined to bad: it up
with military intervention. Otherwise,
the oil producers will call the bluff."
Attempts to squeeze the oil produc-
ers could also create new problems.
Sealing off Western markets, for exam,-
ple, could send the Arabs running into
the arms of the Soviets. Or, they could
decide to retaliate and cut off all oil sup-
plies to the West. Still, the most popular
and least risky step the West could
take at the moment is some type of psy-
chological warfare: But most experts
agree that the campaign would have
to be accompanied by stringent energy
conservation measures to prove that the
industrialized nations meant business.
hill-scale covert operation in the Middle
S East?to oust Iran's anti-American Pre-
Covert Operations
The last time the Central Intelligence
mier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953?
it worked. Whether similar action to oust
balky oil sheiks would work today is
-doubtful. Even if it did, it would peril-
ously escalate the battle for oil and might
create grave new problems for the U.S.
But it is possible. ?
Agents in the pay of the West could
borrow ? a tactic from the Palestinian
guerrillas and set up terror squads to
stalk traveling Arab oil barons. "It would
be an attempt to deny to the sheiks the
pleasures their money can buv " said
one former CIA agent. "Flights overseas,
foreign residences, visits to Nice?all ,
that would be out." Assassinations?ac- '
companied by blunt hints to other Arab
leaders that they could be next?might
' be carried out. Or undercover opera-
tives could attempt to stir up riots and
protests within a country. "We could
r give the sheiks a sharp lesson by getting
the radicals in the country to cause
trouble," said an ex-CIA. man. "The
rationale behind this would be to come
back and say: 'See what could happen'."
The peril is that what could happen
would probably harm the -U.S. as much
, as the sheiks. The leaders who replaced
those now in power would undoubtedly .
be at least as nationalistic as their prede-
Icessors and equally anxious to use the oil
weapon against the West. The Soviet
Union, even if it did not threaten a
direct confrontation with the U.S. would
be in a position to expand its influence
in the Arab world. And once the news
leaked out of what the U.S. had done, '
the public uproar would be deafening.
IThus, such "dirty tricks" probably
would take second place to more dis-
creet moves?such as trying to exploit
the existing differences between nations
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in the
hope of shattering the cartel's unity.
"I believe that the cartel will break up
on inherent internal conflict," says one
high U.S. official. "But I also believe we
should do everything reasonable in our '
power to make sure it does."
cess to vital natural reiources has been
considered a casus belli. And as one top
U.S. official noted last week "If the oil-
producing nations drive the world into
depression in their greed, the West
might be forced into a desperate military
, adventure. But it would he a nightmare
?trying to pump oil for decades in the
! midst of what would amount to guerrilla
war and probable worldwide terror." Be-
yond any doubt, then, an armed attack
would have such enormous and frighten-
ing ramifications that only the imminent :
breakdown of Western society could
spur Washington to launch it.
To 1?.- meaningful, a military interven-
tion .vould have to be directed against
Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer,
and it would need to be both quick and
massive. In addition to seizing the major
oil fields, troops would have to secure
the loading facilities at Ras Tanura 125
miles away on the Persian Gulf and con-
trol the narrow Strait of Hormuz through
which tankers have to pass. The 'U.S.
would. need to mass enough airpower to !
repel a counterattack by Arab air forces
and..perhaps even land in neighboring
sheikdoins to block them from reinforcing
the Saudis. It would have to be done
with enough speed to take the oil fields
before they could be blown up. And the
initial attack would have to be Carried
out by the 82nd Airborne Division?the' ?
only U.S. tom.: trained for parachute
assaults?plus perhaps whatever allied
(and Israeli) units that could be per-
suaded to join up.
Formidable as the obstacles are, there
are some who think that the industrial-
ized nations may be in such desperate
straits as early as next spring that an in-
vasion would be thinkable. As Walter :
Laqueur put it; "There will be a call for
action as countries are hit by massive
unemployment and bankruptcy. By then
the oil producers will have become so
unpopular that even military interven-
tion may receive worldwide support."
Bu the consequences of invasion could
be catastrophic. The oil fields could be !
so badly damaged that the West would
have even less oil than it does now. The
Soviet Union might react with some mili-
tary action of its own?on the side of the
Arabs. And that could draw the two su-
perpowers into a head-on confrontaUon
61)
0,Military Intervention
Historically, depriving a nation of ac-
24
that could turn into a nuclear showdown. ?
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BALTIMORE SUN
24 September 1974
Czechs resent
By MICHAEL PARKS
Sun Staff Correspondent
Prague?Czechoslovak in-
dustrial firms, under heavy
pressure to modernize -and
automate their plants, are
covetously eyeing American
equipment but with little ex-
pectation of being able to
buy what-they want.
The firms are drawing up
extensive- shopping lists for
hundreds of millions of dol-
lars worth of advanced West-
ern equipment and technol-
? ogy, but almost all the or-
ders are expected to go to
. America's competitors.
, Czech officials say 'that
? prospects for American
machinery sales here are
? limited by a number of polit-
ical factors that the Y see as
imposed by Washington.
These include strategic
controls on exports, restric-
tions on credits, American
refusal to reduce tariffs on
Czech goods imported to the
United States and the still-'
unresolved . dispute over
American prop-ety national-
ized. by the Communist gov-
ernment here alter World
War II.
"We would' really like to
increase our trade and to
broaden it considerably, but
the United States still is
NEW YORK TIKES
25 -September 1971+
MOSCOW STEPS U
ANTI-11S.CARTOON
By KEDR1CK SMITH
sseass to The New York The
MOSCOW, Sept. 24?After
a honeymoon with the new Ad-
ministration of President Ford,
the Soviet press has embarked
on an upswing in anti-Ameet-
tan: propaganda -described by
the United State embassy as
the strongest in a year or
more.
A rash of political cartoons,
a staple of Soviet newspapers
during the cold-war years, has
again appeared. ?
Today Pravda published a
'cartoon showing a lurking,
dark - hatted, teeth - gritting
agent in dark glasses holding
up his fingers to make the ins-
tals C.I.A., which turn into the
legs of' a gain-toting, hatchet-
wielding ruler of Chile.
Yesterday, another cartoon
in the Communist party daily
showed the Cambodian leader,
Lon No!, beaten up and band-
aged from head to foot, sitting
in one hand of Uncle Sam and
prayerfully catching a silvert
Approved
playing politics, cold war
politics if you will, with
trade." Josef Keller, a senior
official of the Czech Foreign
Trade Ministry; said.
A number of American
businessmen, returning from
Czechoslovakia's annual
trade fair at Brno, were
highly critical of the Ameri-'
can government's position on
trade with Czechoslovakia.
"This is a small but highly
lucrative market, and we are
being shut out of it," the
European vice president of a
major electronics firm, said.
"All the alleged reasons don't
make much sense because
vie do the same deals with
Poland and the Soviet
Union."
The biggest current dispute
is over the settlement of the
26-year-old property claims,
totaling about $72.6 million,
for the nationalized property
of American citizens and
companies and about $7 mil-
lion for the sale of surplus
U.S. government property.
Prague agreed to pay
about $37 million, accord-
ing to unofficial reports,
but, settlement has been
blocked by a Senate amend-
ment to the trade reform bill
now pending before Con-
gress. Under the amend-
S(PF?
, ,....., kixd! ..-Lll
S.
ment, the claims would have
to be settled in full before
the US. would release 18.4
metric tons of Czech gold,
now worth about $96.8 million,
that was seized from Ger-
man troops at the end of the
war.
?
"About On same terms"
Although the amendment
has not yet come before the
whole Senate, its adoption by
a committee has both baffled
and infuriated Czechs. "Our
settlement was on about the
same terms as other Ameri-
can settlements with East
European nations?about 40
cents for every $1 claimed,
one Czech official said. "But
that is our gold that the
United States is holding, not
American gold, and to sell it
or seize it to pay these
claims is just theft."
The settlement agreement, -
which had been negotiated
by the State Department
with the Czech Foreign Min-
istry, actually was the se-
cond such agreement. The
first, concluded in 1964, was
repudiated by Washington
after being initialled here.
Mr. Keller said his govern-
ment sees settlement of the
'financial questions as the
dollar froin the other.
Last Thursday, Pravda's
main cartoon should an Israeli
suitor serenading a fat old
courtesan, who was standing
on a balcony labeled "penta-
gon" and was waving a fan
made of rockets, while the Is-
raeli !held his hat to catch any-
thing that might fall his Way.
Boston Schools a Topic
Another newspaper, Sotsia-
listiclieskaya Industriya, pub-
lished a cartoon of a little
black student in Boston being
menaced by the shadow of a
hooded Klansman with a sub-
machine gun. Izvestia, the
Government newspaper, printed
an article today on the Boston
school crisis and on racial
Problems in New York.
Soviet cartoons; especially if
printed in newspapers under
the direct control of the party's
Central Committee, are re-
garded as a barometer of the
prevailing propaganda line, It
has been a numner of months
since Pravda has run more
than a random anti-American
cartoon. . ?
The recent upsurge suggests
that the Kremlin no' longer
feels a need to avoid offending
President Ford. The attacks on
American policy in Cambodia.
and on 'area:a, repeated in coma
rnentaries, are taken by some.i
Western diplomats as signs off
-
first of seVeral trade bar-
riers to be removed.
"Two things are prevent-
ing an increase in our pur-
chases from the United
States?the first is the sys-
tem of strategic controls,
which really hamstring regu-
lar trade and seem to be
applied more rigorously in
our case than in others, and
the second is the restriction
on credits," Mr. Keller said.
"In the long run, however,
the question of what we are ?
able to sell to you is just as
important, for we want a
balanced trade, just as every
country does. If we can sell
more, we will buy more. But
that means we must be able
to sell our goods on an equal
basis with our competitors;
as it stands now, we often
pay tariffs three, four, five
or even more than they
pay."
The trade reform bill
would authorize the Presi-
dent to grant Czechoslovakia
the reduced tariffs of most-
favored-nation status, which
it had until 1951, but this
provision has been involved
with the fight over Jewish
emigration from the Soviet
Union,
Moscow's 'unhappiness -about
Mr. Ford's policies in these
areas.
There.- is no indication that
'the Kremlin's interest in detente
or in doing business with the
White House has slackened. .
The surge, of. anti-American
propaganda is part of a gener-
ally more critical treatment. of
the West in: the Soviet 'press,
West European diplomats 'ob-
serve.
'One theory Is that Moscow
now sees little prospect of early
completion of the European se-
curity conference because of
changes in Western govern-
ments and therefore sees no:
need to soften its propaganda.1
Another theory is that the
Kremlin is engaged in one of its!
periodic ideological retrench-i
rnents. On Aug. 31, the party's
Central Committee issued a de-
cree chastising the party orga-
nization in Byelorussia for
slack ideological work and
ordering it to improve the train-
ing of indoctrinators. This was
read as a decree with national
significance.
For weeks now, Soviet pro-
pagandists have played up the
bad economic' news from the
West, projecting a picture of
inflation. unemployment and
depression.
But the negative portrayal of
American society has ranged
more widely. In addition to'
standard items about the eco-
nomic slump, rising prices and
racial problems, the press has
reported that educational
standards are deteriorating be-
cause of financial problems,
that some Americans are eating
pet food and that industrial ac-
cidents and occupational dis-
eases are on the rise.
Soviet readers have also been
told that 10 million Amricans
are chronic alcoholics, that sur-
veillance of individuals and in-
vasion of privacy are an in-
creasing problem, libraries are
caught in a financial crisis,
sailors are absent without
leave in Japan, bicycle thieves
and defective motor cars are
plaguing ordinary people, the
numbers of train derailments is
rising, and more than 420,000
Americans were arrested on
marijuana charges last year.
Such items appear fairly reg-
ularly in the newspapers, but
their volume tends to rise and
fall as the Kremlin places high
or low priority on maintaining
a favorable relationship with
Washington.
Not since the controversy
over the war in Vietnam do
American officials recall such
a steady flow of anti-American
news. laut it still falls short of
cold-war levels, they say.
25
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WASHINGTON POST
10 October 1974
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
Anti-Americanism in Greece
The Greek government has quietly
withdrawn some of its top military
officers from North Altantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) headquarters in
Brussels, one more indication a ho'
? seriously the Karamanlis government
views anti-Ameican sentiment now
sweeping Greece. .
Facing the first parliamentary dee-
lion on Nov. 17 since the military coup
dietat of 1967, the new civilian govern-
ment of Prime Minister Constantine
Karamanlis is ? torn between conflict-
ing political realities.
The merest fragment of public dis-
play of pro-American sentiment could'
boomerang, giving the Greek left a
dangerous opening that Andreas Pa-
pandreou would he quick to exploit.
Karamanlis dealt with this hard politi-
cal fact by pulling Greece out of the
military organization of NATO. Now
he has followed up. by ? withdrawing
some of the 400-odd Greek officers
from their regular military billets in
Brussels, Naples and other ?. NATO
commands.
But the domestic political demands
? for anti-U.S. actions raise' the gravest
future, problems for Greece. Friend-
ship with the West, and particularly
the, U.S., is absolutely essential for
, Greece in the long run, as a glance at
the map proves. Greece is bordered by
three Communist states to the north
and by muscle-flexing Turkey on the
east.
Karamanalis and his foreign minister,
the astute George Mavros, along with
most other leading Greek politicians of
the center and right, fully understand
that fact. But despite strong pressure
ifiE ECONOMIST
28 SEP 1974
Greece and America
Six?Your article of September 7th was an
ecation:ill) sane. voice in the midst of the
ernoeonal aceusations Which the Greek press
ha a h. een klunching, against the Americans-
isiamin them for organising the Cyprus crisis
for their -own purposes. Your article not only
succeeded in showing the logical flaws of
such arbitrary accusations but also made it
clear that there is no proof whatsoever to
upport such allegations. Not surprisinalyi
a
the mass-circulation right-wing' Vradini.
when mentioning your article,- "failed" to
relt." to the essence of your viewpoint but
simply asserted that "the United States
played no part in the return of Karamartlis,
writes today the English magazine The
Economist".
The anti-American campaign was trig-
.
gered off by some violent editiorials of the
right-wing A kropolis, which being for some
time a staunch supporter of the junta was
from the U.S., they are unable to im-
pede the Move toward what looks like
a form of dangerous neutrality for fear
that the anti-American currents now
sweeping Greece would pull them un-
der... Accordingly, rational diplomacy
dictated by long-term Greek security
needs has been inundated by short-
term domestic politics. The foundation
for this was built by Washington's long
love affair with the hated, military dic-
tatorship. ,.
? A case in point was the asbolutely
futile effort by Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger last week to enlist sub
?rosa Greek support against the then-
pending congressional ban on U.S.
military assistance to Turkey. .
Conferring at his own request at the
Plaza Hotel in Manhattan last week ,
with Mavros, Kissinger explained that
? the effect of a congressionally-imposed
Turkish aid ban was predictable: it
would make. the Turks dig in their
heels against U.S. mediation efforts to
remove Turkish troops from Cyprus
and' return part of -Turkey's Cyprus
conquest to Greek Cypriots. Thus, it
was in the self-interest of Athens to
keep the U.S. on good terms with
Turkey.
Mavros was stunned, "That,"he told ?
Kissinger, "is not something for a
Greek to do."
Indeed, far from discouraging Greek
sympathizers ln the U.S. Congress
from voting against the ban on aid to
Turkey, top Greek diplomats in the
U.S. encouraged it. One active promo-
ter of the aid ban was the consul-gen-
eral in the influential Greek consulate
in San Francisco, who quietly spread
the word to friendly congressmen:
stop American aid no matter what the
impact on Cyprus.
In short, the political imperatives in
Athens on the eve of the parliamentary
election far outweigh the long-range
necessity- of gradually restoring the
Athens-Washington link. No Greek
leader caught secretly lobbying Con-
gress to vote against the Turkish aid-
ban could be elected sewer inspector
in a provincial Greek village.
The unannounced decision to, with-
draw top Greek military men from
NATO hadquarters is' simply the new-
est signal. Having heard American
pledges for over two months that Tur-
key would be glad to give up some of
it Cyprus conquest once talks started
(pledges , wholly umTdeemed), the'
Greek government continues to adver-
tise itself as anti-American.
,There is no hope that this will change
'between now and the mid-November
election, and little expectation that it
could change soon thereafter. Like-
wise, the hostilits, for Turkey so vividly
expressed in Congress over the aid-ban
threatens noliteal retaliation Ageinst
Washington there, too.
With an .outstanding IOU debt to
Russia for its acquiescence in the inva-
sion of Cyprus last July, Turkey may
find it harder than before to deny any
Soviet request for overflight privileges
in a future Middle Eastern war, partic-
ularly with the U.S. Congress so viru-
lently anti-Turkey.
As these Cyprus chickens come
, home to roost, the once-mighty U.S. is
'an impotent bystander.
19'74. Field finterprless, kno,
probably in this way trying to obtain
"patriotic" credentials. From then on every-
thing has been *blamed on the CIA and a
smear campaign has been directed against
Henry Kissinger. There is no doubt that Mr
Kissinger has committed certain blunders
during the Cyprus crisis but this does not
justify petty and crude personalnacks
against him. The CIA could also be guilty
of some of these accusations but for the time
being proof does not seem to be available,
a fact which is for the Greek press of minimal
. importance.
A similar irresponsible stand has been
adopted by Greek politicians like Professor
Papandreou, NV lib has accused Nato of pre-
pacific, (a) the overthrow of Nlakarios and
(b) the Turkish invasion (!), and by Cypriot
politicians like Dr Lyssariclea, who had no
doubt that the attempt -on his life was
.organised not only by Eolsa B but also by Nato
26
and the CIA (!). Maybe' the most blatant
example of this blind and nonsensical
anti-
Americanism can be found in the first page
of the Athens News of August 21st in a
heavily-printed "warning": "In view of the
vigorous stance over Cyprus taken by the
Greek prime minister, Mr Karamanlis, vis-
?is Nato and the United States, rumours
have begun to circulate that the CIA may
strike again. Fully aware of the methods used
by the CIA, we give warning that if a sinale
hair of Mr Karamanlis's head is touched.
we shall know who must be held responsible.".
After seven years of stagnating dictator-
ship Greece needs more than anything else
a moderate political climate, and a responsible
press, neither of which can be achieved
under this hysterical and irresponsible atmo-
sphere of anti-Americanism.?yours faith-
! fully,
/Athens ? JOHN E. Loutts
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5
WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1974
rt as]
By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer
BRUSSELS,?The contro-
versy in the United States
over Gen. Alexander M. Haig
? Jr.'s appointment as Su-
preme Allied Commander in
Europe has failed to spark
, an echo from America's al- .
lies in NATO., . ?
That does not mean there.
? hasn't been considerable ?
criticism on this side of the
Atlantic about President
Ford's selection of Haig for .
both the top NATO military'.
post ' and the command of,.
U.S. forces in Europe.
' The weight of press com-
ment In most NATO coun-
tries has been clearly unfa-
vorable. And, among offi-
cers of the American forces
stationed in Europe, the ap-
pointment has triggered a -
' clearly discernible, though'
not openly displayed, feel-
? ing of bitterness about the ;
elevation of a man regarded .
as a "political general."
But the reaction was quite::7:
different among -those who-
make the decisions in the 12 :.
. countries that participate-
with the United States in
NATO's integrated military
structure. Here at NATO
headquarters sources in the
various national delegations
say that their governments
accepted the Haig nomina-
? tion with barely a whisper
of dissent.
The sole exception was -
the Netherlands, whose gov7
ernment made it clear that
it was displeased and tried
to sound out the other Euro-
pean allies about rejecting
. Haig. In the end, though,
BALTIMORE SUN
10 Oct ober 1974
ess in
the Dutch, seeing that they
had no support, withdrew
their objections,' and Haig's
appointment sailed through
NATO's Defense Planning
Committee without incident.
The initial Dutch opposi-
tion was based on the same
consideration that has caused.
controversy in: the United
' States?namely, the conten-
tion that Haig has been coin-
- Promised by his
role in the Nixon adminis-
tration:
Dutch sources say that
they have nothing against
Haig personally and de not
mean to imply that they
think,he was involved in the
Watergate coverup. But,
they add, Foreign Minister
Max Van der Stoel feels
that Haig is so closely iden-
tified with former President
Nixon that his appointment
as supreme commander
amounts to "a 'public-rela-
tions" disaster" for NATO.
Influencing the Dutch
gover,nment is the fact that
public opiniOn in the Neth-
erlands, particularly among
young people, has grown in?
creasingly hostile to all
things military. Much of this
anti-military feeling springs
from the. Vietnam war,
which European youth"
equates with Mr. Nixon.
As a result, the Nether.'
lands government took the
position that Haig's appoint-
ment was not exactly help-
ful to its attempts to con-
vince its domestic constitu-
ency that Holland has a
onn 'CIA' kept files
on leading p liticians
By ANTHONY MURRAY , .
: Bonn Bureau of The Sun ,
.: 'Bonn?A former West Ger-
man Cabinet member revealed
'yesterday in testimony to a ment.
parliamentary panel that the He claimed the files were in
country's super-secret foreign violation of strict laws limiting
!
? intelligence branch had kept the agency to intelligence-gathb-
intimate personal files on more ering beyond Germany's bor-
than 50 domestic politicians ders. He said they were as-
and other personalities in the sembled under ? the agency's
1950's and 1960's, former chief, Gen. Reinhard
. Horst Ehmke, head 'of the Gehlen,. who headed the 'organ-
chancellory under former, ization during most of the past-
Chancellor Willy. Brandt, said:, war era under a succession of
that he learned of the dossiers ,1 Christian Democratic govern-
when he took office in 1969 and . meats
ordered their destruction. The i., Among the 54 names Mr.
Approved For Release 2001/08/0
vested interest in remaining
within NATO. Yet, while all
the other European NATO
members have essentially
the same problem, they all
steered, clear of the Dutch
effort to mount a campaign
against Haig's appointment.
NATO sources say this
? was due to a number of rea-
sons, chief among them a .
desire not to embarrass and
possibly antagonize Mr.
Ford at the Very outset of
his presidency. Therefore,
even those with reservations
-about the wisdom of the ap-
pointment apparently de-
cided that accepting Haig.
was the lesser evil.
. A secondary reason cited
by some is the fact that the
present Netherlands govern-
ment, which loomed as the
spearhead of any opposition
movement, has developed a
reputation for eccentricity
in NATO circles.
Ladler this year, Prime
Miiister Joop den Uyl's So-
cialist-led government pro-
voked the anger of its allies
by s.roposing cuts in the
Dutch forces beyond what
NATO regards as a safe
level.
While the Haig appoint-
ment as made remarkably
few w:; yes within NATO, the
story ig somewhat different
regardiag his -other job as
comminider of the 300,000
U.S. A-my, Air and Naval
personnel grouped in' the
European Command. --
Although no one will say
so publicly, Haig's appoint-
ment is clearly a bitter Dill
panel is investigating security Ehmke said were carried in
the dossiers were those of Mr.
in the West German govern-
Brandt, a Social Democrat:
party lieutenant and parlia-
mentary leader, Herbert Weh-
ner, and a 'former federal pres-
ident and Social Democratic
leader, Gustav Heinemann. .
But also included were
Christian Democrats such as
former Chancellor Kurt Georg
Kiesinger, a powerful Bavarian
politician and former defense
minister, Franz Josef Straus,
land a former party chief, Rai-
krbibtiP71?-0igidR0e0
27
for many command officers. '
mand, scheduled for Nov. 1,
His takeover of the earn-
is the most talked-about sub-
ject in U.S. officers' messes
throughout Europe, and mil-
itary sources say ,that the
sentiment, particularly ,
among professional army of-
ficers, is overwhelmingly..
hostile.
Their objection
Is ne-
scribe as being based not on
ideological grounds but on
the fact that Haig achieved
his position through service -
in the White House rather
than coming up through the
normal military channels.
? In a service where most
officers find promotion a
slow and grinding process,
there appears to be great re-
sentment over the way that
Haig, in the words of one of-
ficer, "jumped the line."
In private conversation,
these officers point out that
Haig was catapulted by Mr.
Nixon over 240 general to
four-star rank, although he
had never held a major field
command during his army
service.
This, many contend, is
grossly unfair to the num-
ber of officers who have far
greater experience and dem-
onstrated records of'
achievement in traditional
military command and staff
areas.
As a result, the tendency
is to regard the appointment
as a bad precedent harmful
to the morale of senior offi-
cers and likely to convince
younger officers that the
path to advancement lies in
politics. .
prominent businessmen jour-
nalists and others of all politi-
cal stripes.
Shortly after Mr. Ehmke's
testimony to the committee,
which is probing the circum-
stances behind the spy scandal
that toppled Mr. Brandt from
the government in May, the
Federal Intelligence Agency's
present chief, Gerhard Wessel,
watered down the charges
when he said he could not
guarantee that the files were
fisitslioddeb
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'TEE WASTIINGTON POST
Sunday, Sept,15?1974
By Jonathan C. Randal
?
?
Randal is a Washington Post corm.
spondent bead in Paris who reports
'irequently front the Middle East.'
B
E
IR
U
T
- Shootings, politicians' pri-
vate armies ,and do-nothing goy-
ornment are fast destroying what re-
mains of Lebanon's reputation as a --
deilprise calm in the topsy-turvy Middle
icately balanced island of free en-
to
East.
Pick up a newspaper?and there are
more th,an two dozen to choose from-,
and you'll find l politicians accusing
each other and/or the half' millien Pal-
?estInian residents of graft, psychiatric
disorders, subversion and other fail-
ings.
If politicians and private citizens are
-fascinated by the troubles on Cyprus?
less titan -an hour's flight time away?
their fascination gives every appearance
of being the fatal attraction the moth
feels toward the flame:
The most cursory lip service is paid
to the notion that Lebanon can ill af-
ford such trauma, if only, because of
the balance of Christians and Moslems
distributed in 17 identifiable communi-
ties. ,
But the talk is no longer of Leba-
non's political and economic miracle as
the stable entrepot and banking center
of the Middle East. Rather it is of the
seeming inevitability of a civil war
which even the considerable Levantine
gifts for compromise may prove un-
able to, prevent. ,
Somber Lebanese are once again dis-
cussing their recurring nightmare?a
carveup of Lebanon by Syria and Is-
rael. As one knowledgeable newspaper
editor lamented, "Neither Damascus
nor Tel Aviv has to pull any strings to
bring the worst about since we're do-
? ing such a splendid job* ourselves."
These telltale traces of rot and 'im-
pending disaster are as visible as the
litter in the streets and empty lots of
Beirut, where half this nation's citi-
zens live:
Mail and cable service is 'fast rival-
ing Italy's in unreliability, scarcely an
advertisement for the efficiency of
what sometimes is called the "bankers'
republic." Confirming suspicions was
-.the recent discovery of more than 5,-
000 mail 'sacks, abandoned by over-
worked postal employees.
6 Greed and real estate frenzy have
done away with alinOst every green
:space in Beirut to satisfy the oil
sheiks' penchant for safe Arab invest-
ment. Beirut's beautiful St. George's
Bay is polluted for miles on either side
of the capital.
ot, Im ending
I
? Reported Murders have jumped ,
from 27 in 1970 to 917 last year Spe-
cialists estimate their real number is
closer to 450, which, if borne out
would produce a homicide rate well
ahead of that of Washington or most
'American cities.
? Although theoretically permits are
, required for carrying handguns and
automatic weapons "are banned? the
number of arms per capita is believed.
to be among the highest in the world.
The once tiny army of 18,000 is in the.;
process of being beefed up to 34,000 by
the end of the year,' but is Outgunned
.?at least numerically?by the Pales-
tinians and various private armies
maintained by Political parties and
local warlords.
Arrests for arms offenses are ? few
and rarely lead to conviction. "What
can be done," sz...id one specialist, "if
we had to arrest .everyone? With a ?
minimum of 150,000 arms in the Coun-
? try, where would we put their'?"
Several months ago, a Bulgarian
ship landed at the nearby port 'of Jun-
ieh a cargo of 6,700 automatic weapons
?mostly AK47, the Soviet-made as-,/
sault rifle?for Christian militias.
No known attempt was made to stop
the first ? such large-scale contraband
operation'. But at a social occasion for
? his party's Youth movement, former
president Camille ;Chamoun did dis-
courage plans to present him with a
silyer-plated submachine gun. His dis-
cretion apparently was dictated by the
presence of the defense and justice
ministers at the gathering.
Nor are weapons simply for show.
Earlier this summer, 13 persons- were .
killed in a shootout at Dekouane, a
Palestinian refugee camp near Beirut,
between Palestinians and members of
a Christian militia group.
-Danger signals are flying that Beirut
May have outlived its usefulness as a
banking and service center now that the?
oil Arabs have become better educated .
and capable of investing their vastly in-
creased revenues directly in the West.
Such a warning was recently sounded
publicly by the Kuwaiti director of
planning, but the Beirut business com-
munity has seen the threat for a long
time.
Moreover, the prospect of a re-
opened Suez Canal seems destined to
hurt Beirut's prosperous trade as a
port terminal for goods trucked to Per-
sian Gulf states.
Even the local optimists have taken
to reasoning in terms of a series of lit-
28
iSOS er
?
tie or'..es rather than a single apoca-
lypdc Upheaval which would spell irre-
parable disaster.
What relative pptimism exists is
based on two events last year.
The first was the two-week Mini-war -
in May, 1973, between the Lebanese
army and the Palestinians holed up in
refugee camps ringing the capital.
- After much damage?both to ,-cal?es-
tate and to the country's reputotion
for calm?the . army learned it could
not liquidate the Palestinians. They, in
turn, appear to have abandoned any
idea of trying to take oyer the Leba-
nese government as they tried un,:sic-
cessfully to do in Jordan in 1970.
. The second event was the October
war: For the first time in a quarter
century there was some hope of an -
overall Middle East peace settlement
which would provide some kind of /la-
tienal homeland for the Pales tiniani.
Any such solution would make the
Lebanese masters once again in their.
own house and rid them of the .Mght-
mare?and the pretext?of crying over
. their inability to solve their own press-
ing domestic problems.
The Lebanese hope many, ,if not
the Palestinians would move to such a
Palestinian national homeland and the
others would cease to be members of
the armed state within a state that
their refugee camps now represent. - .
Organized, armed and motivated, the
Palestinians have provided a useful al-
ibi for the Lebanese themselves to in-
dulge in a massive arms buildup.
A "Balance of Terror" ,
6491-111E NATIONAL Rifle Association
1. would feel right at home here,"
said one longtime American resident,
"except it should be renamed the Na-
tional Submachine Gun Association
for this place."
"It's a kind of liachismo thing?hav-
ing a submaclui e' gun," he mused,
"which started N 'th the Palestinians'
parading around with their virility
symbol and then 2aught on with the
? Lebanese when hey got frustrated
about not runnin., their own affairs..
Boy, would a Freudian analyst have
fun here." Howev rr, many Lebanese
are convine. d that their best chance of
avoiding the worst may be due to the
-saturation I ,vel of weaponry.
"Face it," laid a Lebanese politician
who has sec ? t many hours preventing
local incider s from-flaring into major
conflagratioi "We may be saveth by
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the balance of terror.
,"Don't smile, because it is a bit like
the nuclear situation in that, sure, Hi-
- roshima was terrible, but it has pre-
vented world war since 1945.
"Here the Lebanese are armed, the
Palestinians are armed, the state is
armed," he said, "but so far the rapes, '
thefts, highway robberies, 'roadblocks,' ?
incidents galore haven't touched off
;the final conflagration because instinc-
tively the players don't want to lay a
hand on each other.
- "'Mind you," he said, "I don't like it -
one bit. I could go downstairs from my
office and be knocked off by some gun-
'stinger and it would cost exactly .five
' piastres?the price of a hulket."
And while Lebanese newspapers roast?
the government for its jobbery, unend-
ing scandals and inability to deal with _
the country's more obvious ? problems,
some cynics suggest that its very refusal
to come to grips with reality, may yet
prove Lebanon's salvation.
"Every one of the groups in the Leb- -
? anese human, mosaic . are represented
in the government," a diplomat ob-
? served, "even if they are obviously see-
- ond stringers because the real !aims,
or local warlords, refuse to sit in the
? same cabinet with each other."
"At least there's ? a forum and no .
group can acense any other of not have-
?-ing their hand either in the till or at -
the tiller," he added.
"Moslem Power"
? QUCH GOVERNMENTAL paralysis is
Li all the more surprising under
the reign of President Suleiman Fran?.
jieh, a tough Maronite Catholic moun-
taineer from northern Lebanon who
wap elected in 1970 for a six-year term
on a, no-nonsense law-and-order plat- .
form. ?
But Franjieh, sometimes ?described
as the Lebanese godfather for his role
. in overseeing the assassination of
seven rivals in a church in his fief of
Z.egharta, has- been ,forced to adopt a
soft line despite his personal inclina-
tions. For if the Palestinians are now
' so* weak in Lebanon that they realize
that LeVariese stability is necessary for
their own survival, Franjieh seems to
have understood?however reluctantly'
?that he cannot.afford a major show-
down either.
? Inclining Franjieh to such modem-,
tion has been the emerging demands
of the-two big Moslem groups in Leba-
non?the Sunnis and Shiites?who
long have been dominated culturally,
economically and politically by the
better educated and more Westernized
Christian minority.
Both Moslem groups are challenging
the essential order laid down in the
1920s by the French, who ran the coun-
try between the two world wars under
. a League of Nations mandate.. Un-
changed has 'been the hierarchy under
.which the powerful presidency goes to a
Maronite Catholic, the premiership to
a Sunni and the Shiites make do with
speaker of parliament. ?
Hanging on to an , eroding power
base, mindful that their relative 'edge
would be swallowed up in the sur-
rounding Moslem sea without Leba- -
non's borders, the Christians are show-
ing increasing signs of.. schizophrenia.'
Their' ,hostility to the Palestinians
',has led many Christian leaders, into
arrogant self-confidence. At times they
worry, especially since the Cyprus cri-
sis, There?they see Turkey, a Moslem
power, invading the island and the rest
,,'of the world sitting back and doing
nothing for the Christian majority-7..
. the Greek Cypriots.
The Christian Lebanese are all too
aware that they are a minority in their
own country. Yet there is an unreason-
ing belief that, as always in the past, a
Western protector will appear to save
them in the nick of time. Such was the
French role in the 19th Century. And
the United States intervened with the
Marines in 1958, so why not again?
Perhaps only in Lebanon do people be-
lieve post-Vietnam Washington would
seriously consider such a possibility.
In the face of eroding, but still
feisty, Christian leadership, "Moslem
power" has on occasions sought?un-
successfully so far?to enlist the Pales-
tinians to their cause. Although the
Palestinians do not want to water
down their revolutionary zeal by in- -
dulging in Lebanese politics, the very ?
thought has done little to allay Chris-
tian fears.
Seeking Equality
-DIM THE LATEST Moslem cry is
:1) for "participation." For the Sunnis
that means a bigger share of political
power. ,For the Shia sect the demands
are for a bigger economic stake for
the country's traditional -hewers of
wood and drawers of water who sud-
denly have realized they have become
the biggest single Lebanese commu-
nity and who -want satisfaction now. _
,Under the intelligent and effective
leadership of their religious chief,
Imam Mousse Sadre, the Shia commu-
nity, perhaps unconsciously, is: 'asking
the real questions which the Palestin-
ian presence has masked for so long.
If the Shia community goes through
with announced plans to stage a march,
on Beirut by some 209,000 to 300,000 of
its members next month, even the
most ill-informed citizen is going to
get the message.
And the message is' meaningful
equality. Of th'e top civil servants, only
14 of 85 are Shiites and of the next
highest category only 28 of 331,
scarcely an even shake for a commu-
nity representing at least a quarter of
the total population.
' 'Forced by the vicissitudes of history
into the poor, mountainous regions of
the south, east and north, the Shia are
demanding the government carry out
development projects such as irriga-
tion, modern roads and electrification,
which have been promised for years
- but never carried out.'
Many
Many thoughtful Lebanese wonder if
the Palestinian presence may not have
both an accelerating effect on poten-
tial upheaval and a decelerating effect
because the Palestinians have 'become
Topic A to the exclusion of the cotin-
try's indigenous problems.
"Our real problems may start when
the Palestinians end, up having a
homeland," one Lebanese politician
said, "when we have to face up to the
lack of institutions and infrastructure
and the truly revolutionary dangers
that represents.
, "Face it, what -kind of society is it
that does not provide free and decent
schooling, that has no real city bus sys-
tem or garbage collection worthy, of
the name, where the top income
bracket pays only 11.8 per cent in in-
come taxes, where there is no social se-
curity system?"
Or as parliamentary deputy Hussein'
Husseini recently putit, "You can find
everything' in Lebanon except the pres-
ence of the state."
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NEJE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
28 August 1974
IN? CREASING ANXIETY ABCUT CHINA IN THAILAND
"PLABPLACHAI" Alstb PEAR
When for three nights during the ;month of PUly "Chinese" unrest engulfed the
Plabplachai police station, a few commentaries pointed out a historical parallel
with the Yaowarat Street fighting in September 1945. The Plabplachai police
station is not far from Yaowarat Street which runs through the Chinese section and
where after Japan's capitulation, Chinese immigrants enthusiastically celebrated
the Allied and thus the Chinese victory. Since the occupation 1941 by Japanese
troops, Thailand had flexibly collaborated with Japan within the framework of Tokyo's
"Greater East Asian Sphere of Wealth" and consequently also was very harsh on its
Chinese immigrants. The latter gave vent to their feelings of extreme anger after
the Japanese collapse in the many day-long Yaowarat riots accompanied by rifle fire
against the Thais. During the disturbances last month, three times as many people
lost their lives than did in the street fighting a generation age.. Unlike "Yaowarat",
the direct cause for "Plabplachai" was not a political one; rather the backdrop for
the recent event was the acute yet old question whether and how the Southeast Asian
border state of Siam will be able to find a modus vivendi with its northern colossus
neighbor, China.
U.S. PROTECTION PUT CHINESE QUESTION ON BACKBURNER
Until 1946, Thailand had no diplomatic relations with China. The problem
hardly existed during the past century when the Ching dynasty crumbled; in the
earlier part of this century, the Tudinentary-interstate relationship had been
resolved by way of the establishment of a Thai tributary-legation in Peking, in
which the Thais were interested primarily for trade and economic reasons. Siam!s
? tributary relationship with China was a most informal one and different from all
other countries bordering on China. Particularly after Sun Yat-Sen's revolution
and the endless civil wars, there obtained a politically ideal situation as seen
from Bangkok'g point of view, because the splintered Chinese empire did not represent
a serious power factor on the Asian continent. Although after the end of World War I?
negotiations for diplomatic recognition were conducted in Tokyo with representatives
of Peking, they could easily be led into non-productive channels on the basis of the
arrogant Chinese demands that the; newrelationship must contain elements of the
former tributary.one. On 23 January 1946 Thailand, which cleverly had switched over
to the side of the Allies, concluded a treaty of friendship with Tshang Kai-Shek's
Kuomintang government, which then still ruled on the Chinese mainland. Only for
the past year has there been a Chinese embassy in Bangkok -- representing the ter-
ritory of the Chinese government on Taipei only.
After the American policy of the containment of Communist China had begun and
particularly after the end of the Korean War, in which a Thai contingent saw action
under the American-led U.N. Command, the Chinese question constituted no longer a
problem related to international politics for the Thai government. It was in part-
icular the ascending military dictator Sarit Thanarat who from 1957 on unequivocally
joined the ranks of the Southeast Asian allies of the United States, seeking her and
the SEATO shield's protection. Sarit's successors strengthened these policies: not
only did Thailand serve the U.S. as an important base in the Indochina War but it
became directly engaged with one division in the Vietnam war and finally with more
than twenty thousand "volunteers" in Laos. The Sino-American rapprochement, an-
nounced in the summer of 1971, immediately began to undermine confidence in the very
basis of the Thai foreign policy course. Peking's acceptance as member of the United
Nations in October of the same year furnished one of the reasons for the Thai military
rulers to justify their return to an absolute military dictatorship on 17 November
1971. This coup "from above," born out of panic, in actuality had predominently
domestic political causes and finally ended two years later in the overthrow of the
military regime and with a profound discreditation of the armed forces as a political
power factor. Nevertheless, it is prudent to recall the Thai's anxiety over China
which then was being played pp, for in the meantime this anxiety has become more of
a reality.
30
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? REBELLION CASTS A PARALYZING SHADOW.
In all? the years of dictatorship the Thai military partly due to an incompre-
hensible inefficiency, could not cope with the problem posed by the rebellion in the
Northeast and North of the country which is supported materially mainly by Hanoi ,
and politically and propagandistically mainly by China. The present civilian govern-
ment is faced with an inheritance fought with dangers: the insurrection is now to
be taken seriously and has a real? chance in the period ahead-- marked by an in-
evitable phase of inner instability of a Thai regime again experimenting with demo-
cracy -- to spread at a rapid pace into many regions. The concern of serious observers
in Bangkok can readily be noticed. At the same time many firm psychological con- -
cepts relating to the alliance with the departing Americans are being abandoned at
this very moment, adding new feelings of insecurity. At no time has China been
considered so revisionist moderate and reasonable in Southeast Asia as she has ap-
peared particularly in the commentaries of American analysts of the new course of
Nixon and Kissinger. Nevertheless, even the military in the last months of their
rule and then also the civilian government in Bangkok have accommodated themselves to
the "winds of change" and seek a modus vivendi with a China which has become stronger.
Thailand's achievements on this course are fragmentary as well as contradictory
and have not led so far to substantive political results. Bangkok's diplomatic
Irepresentation in Taipei has been cut back to what are minimum requirements of
Iprotocol. Hawever, the relationship with Peking has not gone beyond symbolic ex-
changes. Moreover, Thai governmental statements to the contrary, the Chinese govern-
ment on Taiwan still has a remarkable influence in the country: The radio broadcasts
of "Free China" are continuing from North Thailand and in that part of the country
there are still a few thousand Kuomintang troops who were pushed out of Yunnan. On
the other hand, Communist China has not reduced itszmilitary presence in the Far
northwest of Laos which fact Bangkok has consistently and exaggeratedly characterized
as a threat to Thailand . Peking keeps its options open, indeed; at the beginning
of the year it has in no way committed itself to the full abandonment of a "just
people's liberation war" in talks with Air Marshal Dawee Chullasapya. The broadcasts
of the rebels continue in full force from Yunnan to Thailand. The shadow of the
rebellion seems to retard Bangkok's rapproachment with Peking, although reliance on
the Americans is dwindling.
FEAR OF ECONOMIC DEPRESSION
Nowhere has this become more evident during the last few months than in the
case of the Decree 53, which already has became almost legendary: it is the con-
necting link in the chain of the Thai foreign and domestic political anxiety re
China. The Decree of the dictator Sarit was issued in 1959 and until this day for-
bids trade with the People's Republic of China -- which has been conducted during the
past fifteen years, nevertheless, indirectly via Hbng Kong and Singapore. Shortly
prior to its fall, the military regime had worked out a plan to abolish the Decree;
and to create a special organization in charge of trading with Peking. When the
civilian government of Sanya turned the matter over to the parliament this spring,
the latter blocked the motion under the pretext that it should be debated in closed
committee session. Since then there has been DO movement at all. It should be noted
that even the former foreign minister Thanat Khoman -- who after 1971 campaigned against
the presence of the U.S. Air Force with the industriousness of a renegate and.advo-
cated a fast recognition of Peking -- portrayed this maneuver, which continues the
trade embargo with China, as a meaningful action putting Bankok's and Peking's posi-
tions on the same level at the conference table in the future.
? The Thai's anxiety re China really comes to the fore in matters of Decree 53.
They are fearful that in the future the Chinese Communists could easily identify their
business partners in Bangkok and thus gain an enormous economic and political lever
in Thailand, which would create havoc among business people. Thus comes about the
complex situation that even Sino-Thais, who are not oriented toward Taipei, are not
favoring a liberalization of the relationship with Peking and in some instances raise
the question of the "loyalty of the Chinese" themselves. The some 170,000 stateless
of Chinese extraction living in Thailand are little interested in becoming any sort of
focal point for future economic-political lever for Peking, because they do not occupy
higher economic positions. Who then are the members of Peking's Sino-Thai Fifth Column?
Wild speculations are hardly of interest but the fact is that this question, even
though only whispered, sows a germ of dissension stronger than never before in a
society in which a meaningful, clear line between Thai and Chinese can no longer be
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WROGRADE ASSIMILATION?
The "Plabplacha" riots have brought to the surface a level of reaction not -
evident in a long time concerning suspicions of questionable "loyalty" of Thai
citizens of Chinese decent. This open suspicion is dangerous in itself for it
could set a retrograde tendency in the assimilation process into motion and even
push fully assimilated Sino-Thai into the "Chinese corner". This development is
being nourished by the "Chinese" rebellion. Underpaid Plabplachai policemen annoy
relatively well-off "Chinese" in a climate where not only politically trivial but *
economic corrupt/on &,9 present, the latter, becoming destructive over the long haul
for it create the.;',IT.o....7e5s'on of 9bodornimtion" without universal progress. It does
create endless ON;MCIC:; for Oever, competent Sino-Thi business people and increases
suspicionsCORCOKA5R-.; 8.7-MAba.1,5 a5 potential accomplices for anti-state
activities.
The freer air of the "democratic enterprise" in Bangkok though giving the
appearance of chaos to the many who are more familiar with the disciplines of dic-
tatorship -- tends to accentuate the whole process. As YLppened, for instance, in
the first balk of the you! Tiftn by Thai standards the starkly radical Thammasat stu-.
dents staged a large CNna ewi'pLbit with Mao poster, it was an upsetting new experience
in Siam. Also, with the newly regained freedom of the press, the paper 'Esin Chung
Ribao" appears in Bangkok in the Chinese language, containing articles which dis-
creetly but unmis'salcably document the beauty of the Middle Kingdom (China). On
occasion the paper uses s*,uplfied characters along the lines of the Peking model,
characters which are not used on T iwan and until now were not to be used in Thai-
land either.
DEFENSIVE REFLEXES OF THAI NATIONALISM
In November 1972, the military regime passed laws regulating foreign business
activitiee in Thailand and issued prohibitions in certain prefessional categories.
Because of a long laisser-faire policy and a resultant confusion and disorder, the
step had became necessary; yet it was interpreted as a sign of the Siamese falling
back into the old balance of power pattern. Next November the two-year "grace
period", before the laws will be enacted, will expire. In the meantime many fears
have been dispelled and many things could be "arranged" as heretofore. The rice, ?
rubber, tin and timber trades are today primarily in "Chinese" hands.
Those business circles are surprisingly little concerned about the possibility
of a new discrimination under these laws, although initially they had been inter-
preted as being anti-"Chinese". Literally interpreted, the laws do not represent
a serious danger for the Sino-Thais. They say themselves with quite a degree of
self-assurance that the times of primitive professional bans and discrimination,as
practized in the early forties by Phibul, will not come back again because there is
now the big, strong neighbor China. However, a suspicion full of resentment has come
back which ominously could turn against Sino-Thai considered fully assimilated. And
"PlabplachaP! may mean that a Siamese nationalism which feels threatened, subjectively,
by an ever-stronger China could produce more and more anti-"Chinese" defensive
reflexes.
WASHINGTON POST
02 October 1974
C57. /1Z -1
-Y)
. t His Critics9
o
]W11StS
I'
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.), sl. 0 ifirl -6 c2-7:' '1 h_ u IA), Ilii_a,,,, ,.,,,), L.,..?.
-Y7i, ;'j (ri ,-(--1)-71)
By Philip A. McCombs -
Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, Oct. 1?President
Nguyen Van Thieu, respond-
ing to increasing criticism.
told South Vietnam tonight
that it was only "Communists
or people working for the
Communists ... who say confi-
dence in me is falling."
In a two-hour televised
speech he answered his critics
by saying that he had never
engaged in personal corrup-
tion and by blaming the COM-
munists for all the ills of the
country.
At the same time the presi-
dent announced he would take
steps to liberali2e the press
censorship law and the decree
limiting political party activity
In South Vietnam?two major
areas of complaint against his
previous policies. ?
The speech, regarded here
at Thieu's most important pol-
icy address in the 20 months
since the ? Paris cease-fire
agreement, came after a
month of mounting antigovern-
ment demonstrations by Bud-
dhists, Catholic's, newspaper-
men and others. These groups
say that Thieu is corrupt and
has thwarted peace efforts,
and they criticize him for eco-
nomic hardships, political re-
pression and press censorship.
Tonight's speech touched on
nearly all of these areas, and
in each case it was the Com-
munists, not Thieu or his gov-
ernment, whd got the blame:
32
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The American Congress ,also
came in tor criticism, and
Thieu said that recent aid cuts
"are tempting the Communists
to, further aggression in South
Vietnam."
"The Communists are every-
where," he. said. "They will
cause incidents and then they
can charge. government re-:
pression." For this reason,
press freedom and other dem-
ocratic liberties must be exer-
cised within constitutional re-
straints to prevent the-Com-
munists from turning them to
their advantage, he said.
"We cannot allow a small
number of people in a small
number of papers to destroy
the struggling spirit of the sol-
diers and create discontent
among the people," Thieu
said.
Nevertheless, Thieu said he
would submit new legislation
to the National assembly. to
liberalize the press censorship
law.
Thieu said his decree plac-
ing limits on political parties
had been aimed at bolstering
a two-party system and elimi-
nating the destructive effects
of having dozens of small par-
tie's haggling at each other:
He said, however, that he
wOuld submit .legislation andi
order administratie chane'ea,
to make it, easier for parties!
to form to stimulate an at-
mosphere . of democracy . for!
NEW YORK TIMES
03 October 1974
OPPOSITION SCORES
D3FENSE BY TITIEU
Foes -Say- Speech Evades
Specifics of Corruption
By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times
: SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct.
2-;-Opposition politicians re-
acted today with ? disappoint-
ment, anger and scorn to a .pol-
icy speech delivered last night
by President Nguyen Van Thieu.
In a wide-ranging two-hour
televised talk to the nation, Mr.
Thieu said he would ease de-
crees restricting political party
activity and' press freedom,
crack down on official corrup-
tion and continue to resist corn-
monist -pressure, both, political
and military. ? ? :
'Though much of the speech
. wkis conciliatmy in tone, oppo-
sition legislators fastened on-
Mr..Thieu's frequent clispara,e-
ing comments about their moti-
vations and his reluctance to
discuss in detail specific charges
the presidontial and assembly,
elections next Year.
His own Democracy Party:
is at present the only legal:
party in the? country.
Thieu announced no plans
for further repression.-.-a pos-
sibility that political oppo-
nents had said they feared?
and his speech was generally
mild in tone. Despite this re-
action among his opposition
tonight was one of disappoint-
ment that he offered no spe-
cific ,responses to the charges
of personal corruption.
One antigovernment politi-.
Tran Van Tuyen, criti-
cized even the president's con-
ciliatory in oveS by saying,
"Thieu promised that the press
and political party laws will
be improved but what we real:,
ly need is for them to be;
cancelled."
The president did say "I1
cannot desert" the nation un-
til peace cemes. He. added,:
however, somewhat crypti-
cally. "But if the whole people
have lost confidence in me as
the Communist propaganda
says, then please let me
"He seems to be losing con- i
fidence in himself, asking the
people , for their views like
that," said an aide of opposi-
tion leader, Gen. Duong Van
(Big) Minh.'
Phu Xuan Huy, an An
Quang Bucidist and, lower
of corrtiption that have been
brought against him.
; Referendum Urged
i"President Thieu said that if
people have -no more confi-
dence in him, then let Min
know," observed Deputy Ngu-
yen Trong Nho, a member of
the Buddhist opPosition. "I
would suggest holding a nation-
wide referendum for the people
to express their 'confidence or
no-confidence."
Le Dinh Duycn, another op-
position deputy who, has been
active in a new organization
demanding greater press free-
dom, said: "Mr. Thieu repeated
the old banalities about Com-
munists, peaceniks and a re-
newed Communist offensive, to
scare the people."
Like others, Mr. Duyen took
offense at Mr. Thieu's conten-
tion that recent opposition ac-
tivity was tied to next year's
presidential and legislative elec-
tions.
Speech Denounced
Deputy Nguyen Van Binh, a
retired colonel who is a main-
stay Of the Catholic-led anticor-
ruptiOn front tiiar. initially ac-
cused Mr. Thieu of corruption,
called the discourse "the worst
speech ever."
house deputy, said tonight, "If j
Thieu wants the people to let
him know their confidence in
him, we'll let him know all
right with a few demonstra-I
tions."
, Nguyen Van Kim, another!
" deputy and a leader in the 1
Catholic Anti-Corruption
Movement, called the presi-
dent's speech "nonsense."
"Thieu showed how far his
thinking is from the people's
when he suggested that cor-
ruption is caused by the war
and the Communists."
Thieu said the Communists
will launch a countrywide gen-
eral offensive in 1975 and
warned the nation not- to be-
lieve analysts who say other-
wise.
He said that the country's
Vast economic problems and
refugee problems would not
exist if the Communists
"respected the Paris agree-
ment even without- the Na-
tional Reconciliation Council
and general elections."
The -agreement calls for;
such elections, but the talks!
for setting them up have bro-
ken down.
The president tried to un-
dercut the Catholic Anti-Cor-
ruption Movement and the
Buddhist National Reconcilia-
tion movement?two of the
strongest opposition forces
now active?by claiming a
"I honestly belie that after'
yesterday's speech, the people,
even those who admired him in
the past, have found a strange
President, distant, who does not'
understand their aspirations,
thoroughly cut off from the
people," Mr. Binh said.
, Mr. Thieu made only a cur-
sory. denial of the Catholics'
charges that he and his family
ha lined their pockets at the
public's expense. But today,
many of .his listeners gleefully
repeated- a phrase used by the
President ?"There is a little
something that has been exag-
gerated" which seemed to
concede at least minor trans-
gressions. .
"So Mr. Thieu is only lit-
tle corrupt,' remarked Deputy
Phan Xuan Huy, .of the An
Quan:b a Buddhist . faction, who
likened the talk to Richard M.
Nixon's resignation speech
"That is quite significant. A
little corruption!"
Support Meager
While opposition figures
were universally critical of the
speech, pro-Government depu?
lead role for himself both in
!fighting corruption and in try-
ing to achieve peace.
? He said the problem of
"phantom troops," who exist
on pay records but not in fact,
would be solved in one month
and that of corrupt civil serv-
ants in three months, but he
warned, "Don't believe in mir-
acles where corruption is con-
cerned."
In large portions of- thei
speech that seemed aimed atl
an American audience, Thieu;
strongly criticized the United'
States for cuttng military aid. ,
"They promised to continue it,'
not formally, but they said
it," he said.
'Otherwise, he said, he was
glad that the Americans are
gone. "They gave 'enough
blood and bones," -he , said.
"Better for them to help us to
build our own strong forces." .
Thieu said that he met with
Former President Nixon be-
fore the signing of the cease:.
fire and told him that aid
must be continued "for up to;
25 years, as-with Korea,1
France, and so n."
He also had told Mr. Nixon,1
he said, that large infusions of
aid would be needed for about
three years, and then the
amounts could taper off.
This is also the view of U.S.
Ambassador Graham Martin,
who returned here last night.
after a two-month absence,:
mostly in Washington, where]
he lobbied unsuccessfully to ;
keep Vietnam aid levels high. I
ties Were no-table for their un-
willingness- to rush to Mr.
Thieu's defense.
One prominent political fig-
ure, who is .somewhat sympa-
thetic'. to Mr. Thieu's predica-
ment; said the President
seemed -'embarrassed"..aS . he
spoke about the corruption is-
sue. - . ?
This man, who preferred to
remain' anonymous, said that
Mr. Thieu had become politi-
cally 'isolated and so instinc-
tively fell back on tired, famil-
iar arguments. "He has no
staff," he said.
"Thieu is a man who. hesi-
tates to do big things," this
man added. "And that is too
bad." ?
In the streets of Saigon, it
was hard to find anyone who
reacted favorably to the speech.
"He said he was going to
clean up the army in a month,"
commented a disabled veteran.
"Is he kidding? Then there will
be no more army next month,
then no more Government?
and ho President in three
month."
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NEW YORK TIMES
10 October 1974
5,090 CATHOLICS
PROTEST IN SEOUL
"Gathering Opposing Park's
Rule Is Largest Since '72
Martial-Law Edict
? By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times ?
' SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 6
?About 5,000 South Korean
Roman Catholics demonstrated
against President Park Chung
Hee today in the largest anti-
Government outburst since Mr.
Park declared martial law two
years ago.
The demonstration against
Mr. Park came two days after
a speech accusing him of ex-
treme infringement of human
rights Was delivered by the
opposition party leader, Kim
Young Sam. In addition, small
groups of Korean university
students, after months of fear
and apathy, have begun sit-in
fasts to dramatize their oppo-
sition to the Government.
Ford's Visit a Factor
Any of these acts would have
been punishable by death be-
fore Mr. Park lifted two emer-
gency decrees on Aug. 24. But
WASHINGTON POST
09 October 1974
President Park warnid yester-'
day that he would not tolerate
demonstrations in the streets or
demands that his. power be
curbed.
His opponents, however, are
using the scheduled visit of
President Ford here on Nov. 22
as a shield. Several adversaries
said ' they dld not think Mr.
Park would crack down on
them again, at least until after
Mr. Ford's visit, because of con-
cern about South Korea's public
Image in the United States.
Moreover, Korean political
and church leaders critical of
Mr. Park said they intended to
ask President Ford, through let-
ters, to urge Mr. Park to restore
democratic rights here. In addi-
? tion, a letter signed by 58
American Christians here is be-
ing sent to President Ford to
make the same appeal.
Today, the outdoor protest
mass attended by about 15,000
persons led to an attempt by
about one-third of the congre-
gation to, march into the street
carrying banners demanding
the restoration of basic civil
rights.
The march was led by five
bishops, including, the Most
Rev. Kim Chae Duk, who cele-
brated the mass, and the Most
Rev. Thomas Stewart, an Amer-
ican member of a missionary
order. But the Papal Nuncio,
the, Most Rev. Luigi Dossena,
left without participating in the
demonstration.
Marchers AIR Stopped
The.march from the hilltop
jeromeAlan, Cohen
_
grounds of the ? Holy Spirit'
Catholic Seminary was stopped
by husky plainclothes police-
men and helmeted riot police-
men wielding nightsticks. Sev-
eral American and Irish mis-
sionaries, invited by South
Korean priests to participate,
-were pummeled during the me-.
lee.
Policemen also tore away the !
. South Korean national flag car-
ried by several South Korean
priests: shoved many., women, I
including nuns, and later beat '
up a young man who said he,
? was trying to help direct traffic
after the rally: So ? far as is'
known, however, no arrests ,
were made.
? Nor .did the policemu; who
were equipped -with American-
made Motorola radios and
American Army gas masks, use
the American-made pepper-gas
sprayers that they -have used in
similar situations.
During a two-hour standoff,
the Catholics chanted slogans
demanding the release from ori-
son of the Most Rev. Chi Hak
Soun, other Christian clergy-
men, students and intellectuals
?totaling 179 by official count
but believed to number more
than 200. The Government alle-
ges that they conspired ih April
to overthrow it.
The. stalemate was broken
when priests and seminariams
forced open a narrow oath
through the police ranks ?Hun-
dreds of South Korean nuns
and thousands of others filed
through, many sineing a tradi-
. .
A Grim Anniversary
In South Korea
This month will mark the grim first
anniversary of the death of Prof. Tsche
Chong Kil, a Korean who spent the
years 1970-72 at -Harvard Law School.
Seoul National University, Korea's
most prestigious educational institu-
tion, had selected Tsche, a member of
its law faculty, for a highly -prized Har-
vard-Yenching Fellowship. Indeed, the
university's president had described
him as one of Korea's most promising
scholars.
Tsche was a likable, gentle person
who spent his time in Cambridge ana-
lyzing Anglo-American, and German
theories of -private international law
and being with his wife and two young
children. Like most Koreans who study
abroad with their government's per-
mission, he seldom took part in public
The writer is Director of East
Asian Legal Studies at Harvard
University.
political discussions. By criticizing the
increasingly repressive measures of
the Park regime, a few SNU law pro-
fessors had landed in serious trouble.
But Tsche concentrated on his profes-
sional interest and avoided contro-
versy except for an occasional defense
of 'harsh measures taken by his gov-
ernment in the name of anti-Commu-
nism.
Soon after Tsche returned to Seoul
in the fall of 1972, President Park
plunr.;ed the nation into crisis by de-
claring martial' law and replacing the
Constitution ,with a new charter that
permits Park's total and permanent
rule. These .events provoked peaceful
demonstrations by democratic-minded
-students, to whom Koreans have tradi-
tionally looked for leadership against
tyrants. And this in turn exposed the
students to the brutality of the ubiqui-
tous Korean . Central Intelligence
Agency.
,In one such incident just a year ago,
KCIA thugs beat up and arrested some
tional martyr's hymn?that has
' become to the anti-Government
movement here what "We Shall
Overcome" was to the Ameri-
can civil rights movement.
Fiery Sermon
The Catholics continued de-
- monstrating in small groups
outside the seminary until bus-
loads of people from all over
the country departed.
They had come for a long-
planned mass to celebrate the
Korean Holy Year. But it was
quickly apparent that the mass
woilld be turned into a strong
denunciation of the Govern-
ment Bishop Kim gave a fiery
sermon in which he addressed
to President Park, a departure
from earlier indirect references.
Bishop Kim noted that Pres-
ident Park had asked South
Koreans to sacrifice what he
called sniall freedoms to main-
tain the larger freedom from
conquest by North Korea. But,
- Bishop Kim asserted that there
was no such thing as a small
freedom or a big freedom. .
? "I answer you," he said, re-
ferring to President Park, "by
borrowing a Korean .proVerb:
No one should- wait three days
without eating anything, be-
cause he might starve before
the great feast."
Through 'Bishop Min's ser-
mon, and ,with their banners,
placards, and pamphlets. the
Catholics demanded' that Pres-.
-ident Park revise the Constitu-
tion, which gives him unlimited
power; - elimnate corruntion,
and -raise the standard of living:
SNU law students, a professor and the
associate dean. This was too much for
even Prof. Tsche, who in earlier years
hid sought to pacify student unrest.
He protested against the KCIA's ac-
tions at a meeting of the law faculty.
Shortly after class on Oct. 16, 1973,
Tsche was picked up by the KCIA. He
"Koreans sky away from
. discussing the case even in
America, for the tentacles
of the KCIA extend
throughout not only
their country but also,
our own.",
was never seen alive again. Four days
later the government announced that
Tsche had been arrested for investiga-
tion of charges of spying for North Ko-
rea and that after making a confession
he had committed suicide by jumping
out the seventh-floor window of an in-
terrogation center.
? I have no way of knowing whether
Tsche was actually a North Korean
agent. I do know that the evidently
embarrassed South Korean ? govern-
ment failed to substantiate its post-
mortem accusations with any persua-
sive evidence; nor was the confession
supposedly extracted from Tsche made
public. Moreover, South Korean
friends who 'have survived KCIA de-
34
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tention treat the report of Tsche's
"suicide" with the ? utmost skepticism,
for KCIA prisoners are said to be sub-
ject to the closest scrutiny. The fact
that Tsche's widow, a medical doctor,
was denied permission to examine his
corpse hardly inspires confidence in
what appears to have been. a hastily
contrived story.
Subsequent efforts to discover the
truth about Prof. Tsche's demise have
met a stone wall. His widow has been
insulated from outside contacts. The
Intimidation and fear that prevail in
Seoul prevent his colleagues from pur-
suing the matter. The press is muzzled,
and the legal system controlled. Ko-
reans shy away from discussing the
ease even in America, for the tentacles
of the KCIA extend throughout not
only their country but also our own.
Prof. Tsche's case is not unique. The
exquisite tortures that have become
the KCIA's hallmark have claimed
many victims. Its mindless arrogance
recognizes no bounds but power. It
kidnapped from Japan President
Park's last rival for the presidency,
Kim Dae Jung, and was about to dump
his weighted body into the sea when
pressure from the Japanese and Amer-
ican governments saved his life, at
least temporarily. Kim's offense was to
Poll 47 per cent of the vote despite
rave government-imposed handicaps
I NEW YORK TIMES
08 October 1974
.11S, ATOMIC ARMS:
sAGAIN STIR TOKYO
Weapons' Presence Aboard
Navy Ships in Japanese
Ports Is Questioned
? By FOX BUTTERFIELD
TOKYO, Oct. 7-r-A new nu-
clear controversy broke out
here today in the wake of re-
ports from Washington quoting
a retired American admiral as
having told Congress that
United States Navy ships car-
rying nuclear weapons had en-
tered Japanese ports.
Premier Kakuei anaka and
other Government leaders, in-
cluding the director of the de-
fense agency, Sadanori Yama-
naka, held a meeting at the
Premier's residence to discuss
pie reports.
[The Premier, in a request
'made through the Japanese
, Embassy in Washington, asked
the United States Government
for an ex-)lanation, United
Press tnterrational reported.]
All of Tokyo's leading news-
papers devoted much of their
front pages today to reports
saying that the retired officer.
and to alert his people to Park's plan
to abolish constitutional rule. Another
notorious case is that of Soh Sung, a
Korean student from Japan who was
horribly disfi'gured during pretrial de-
tention. Yet this is only to speak of
? "South Korean friends
who have survived KCIA
detention treat the report of
Tsche's 'suicide' with the
utmost skepticism."
Koreans who are well-known or who
have foreign friends to inquire after
them. There are countless others.
All this took place before this year's
emergency decrees that made it a capi-
tal offense for students to cut class
"without plausible excuse" and that re-
sulted in long prison sentences for
hundreds of courageous intellectuals,
Christian leaders and students whose
crime was to call for the restoration of
freedom. Thus the recent withdrawal
of those decrees in the hope of luring
President Ford to Seoul in November,
improving South Korea's prospects at
the U.N. this autumn and avoiding con-
Rear Adm. Gene Robert La-
i Rocque, had testified Sept. 10
that American warships had
not unloaded their nuclear
arms before _entering Japanese
ports.
If true,' such action would
run counter to pledges by Jar).-
anese officials that there were
no United States nuclear weap-
ons in Japan and could be con-
strued to violate the United
States-Japanese mutual secur-
ity treaty. The treaty requires
consultation before any major
changes in the equipment of
United States forces in Japan,
and the introduction of nuclear
arms is considered such. a
change.
Commanded Oklahoma ,City
Admiral LaRocque, a former
captain of the cruiser Oklahoma
City, a flagship of the Seventh
Fleet, was said to have given.
his testimony to a subcom-
mittee of the Joint Congres-
sional Committee on Atomic
Energy. The admiral retired
from the Navy in 1972.
According ? to diplomatic
sources, Japanese officials at-
tending a regular monthly ses-
sion today of the Security Con-
sultative Group, a group of
senior United States and Jap-
anese officials including the
commander of United States
forces in Japan, expressed con-
cern that nuclear weapons had
been brought into Japan.
However, the sources said,
the American officials at the
meetine rpnlied that they had
not officiPlly heard ofAdmiral
gressional reduction of military aid is
essentially cosmetic, especially when
the kangaroo courts-martial that made
a farce of Korean justice continue to
function.
Was it for this that some 33,000
Americans died in combat in Korea? Is
this "the Free World" that our military
and economic aid make possible and
that we are still pledged to defend?
People in South Korea have few illu-
sions about the kind of freedom they
would share with their brothers in the
North should Kim Il Sung forcibly re-
unify their tragically divided country.
Yet they now suffer a KCIA-military
dictatorship that uses American tanks
_to deprive them of most of their free-.
doms ostensibly to protect them from
the North.
President Ford should not go to
Seoul next month unless there is con-
vincing evidence?not merely soothing
secret assurances?that the Park re- ?
gime will significantly relax its oppres-
sion for more than the few months of
the U.N. General Assembly session. He
should in. any event make it clear to
the Korean people and the world that
the United States will henceforth re-
fuse to support tyranny of the right as
well as tyranny of the left. To do less
than this is to inflict another moral
disaster upon American foreign policy.
LaRocque's disclosure, The
American Embassy and the
United States Navy, in keeping
with long-standing policy, de-
clined comment on the reports
of the admiral's testimony.
Meanwhile, 44 members of
the 55-member crew of Japan's
first nuclear-powered ship, the
freighter Mutsu, which is at
the center of another contro-
versy. left the vessel today.
The freighter, whose re-entry
to port has been blocked by
fishermen since its reactor be-
gan leaking radiation during
trials in late August, continued
to drift in the North Pacific
off the coast of Honshu.
Stem From Wartime Bombing
All the other members of the
crew, except the captain, are
scheduled to abandon the ship
'on Wednesday, placing the
Mutsu's -future in serious
doubt.
. The nuclear controversies
are an outgrowth of the bomb-
ing of Hiroshima and Negasaki
at the close of World War II.
Almost no issue in Japanese
politics rouses more emotions.
Japan's development of nu-
clear energy, which is needed
to offset the nation's costly
reliances on imported oil, has
been thrown far behind sched-
ule by fear of radiation from
nuclear power plants.
Japanese officials were said
to fear that Admiral LaRocoue's
testimony might lead to dem-
onstrations during the visit to
i Japan of President Ford. He
? is due to arrive Nov. 18.
The only previous American
president who tried to come to
Japan, President Eisenhower,
was forced to cancel his trip
in 1960 by demonstrations
arising from opposition to re-
newal of the security treaty.
No Secret, 'U.S. Aide Says
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 ? Al-
though the Defense Department
declined to comment publicly
today on deployment of United
States warship bearing nuclear
weapons, a Pentagon official
said it was no secret that such
vessels called in foreign ports,
including Japan, with the weap-
ons on board.
The official said this was
also known ot the Government
of Japan.
The testimony that Admiral
LaRocque gave Sept. 10 was
made public yesterday by Sen-
ator Stuart Symington, Mis-
souri Democrat, who heads the
Joint Committee's subcommit-
tee on military applications.
Admiral LaRocque Who rose
to the post of assistant director
of strategic plans for the Chief
of Naval Operations before his
retirement two years ago, said
in his testimony:
"Any sl-tip that is capable of
carrying nuclear weapons car-
ries nuclear weapons. They do
not unload them when they go
into foreien ports such as ja-
pan or other countries. If they
are capable of carrying them
they normally keep them onl
board ship at all times."
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,TRE NEW YORK MRS, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1974
Vietngin Qutlook.._Still a Tunnel, Still a Light]
e, guments of either the Adminis-
Ily DAVID K. SHIPLER s tration or Congress. They are This description of Ifanol's Communist affairs. It is the oi).
. iposite of the 1954.56 period,
NNW' tom. New yegle Thee 1 COnvinced that Hanoi is deter. sraegy,widely accepted tIOW,
when the Vietminh had the
SAIOON, South Vietnam mined' to reunify Vigilant?if has led an Arntrican .diplornat structure in the country and
who dissents from the official
?.There ls a new version of not politically, as the Patlit line to postulate more North Ngo Dinh Diem had nothing."
the old light at the end of the agreement presctibes, then mill. i
Vietnamese military action if Furthermore, there Is a fun.
tunnel In Vietnam, s . II arily. They note that it has d damental fear in the Govern.
American ald is increased an
The wishful thought used to been proved conclusively by merit and the American Ernbas.
be that the North Vietnamese; the United States Army, Mn. South Vietnam makes economic
? - 'pounded by Amer-, rines, Air Force and Navy that progress. Conversely, he thinks sy that if the Vietcong were
'? lean firepower the North Vietnamese cermet that less aid would fit Hanoi's given the democratic freedom
? News would finally find be dislodged from the South, prognosis of continuing decline, guaranteed by the Paris agree-
Analysis the price too high Saigon, then, is left with only thereby inducing deferment of ment, they would resort to ter
and give .
one realistic military goal: a an all-out offensive. rorism. "Democratic free-
there is a belief continued stalemate in which "If heavy injections or aid doms?" an American offlci
that the South Vietnamese Gov- the Government clings to high- really do bring the country to scoffed. "This is a pretext. You
ernment can defend itself mil
,
ways, population ,centers - and the take-off point," he said, can't let thousands of armed
"that uarantees a military l-
. people run around with mortars
g so
lution," And Saigon cannot V.,i and machine guns."
militarily, he observed, adding Military Action Reduced
that the only chance of preserv- ' What, then; do aid cuts d-
ing a non!Communist govern- fect? The reduction in military
ment is through the political. aid has.' already prompted
mechanism of the Paris agree- Government forces to retreat
ment?democratic liberties and from some isolated outposts
open general elections, that would have been defended
A Distrustful Government .vigorously a few months ago.
"You have a government in The army has stopped firing
most of the - artillery shells it
cannot possibly see itself imple-
Saigon so distrustful that it lused to lob randomly into Com.;
menting the Paris accords," the munist-held areas. This week
the Saigon military command
diplomat said. "If . another! the
the curtailment of
regime would take over, willing, air force flights to conserve;
to take the political risk, there's fuel and ammunition. Finally,
a real hope of keeping the place
out of Communist control. the Pentagon was reported to be planning to postpone or can-
tary side."
,
I '
don't see any hope on the mill- cel delivery of many of the:
,..
F-5E jet fighters that .South
No one who knows President Vietnam has been promised.
Thieu thinks he will be forced According to military men,:
by aid cuts to open the political however, the cuts are not deep,
process to the Vietcong. Some enough to cause Saigon's quick
believe the opposite: that if he defeat.
is weakened he will be even Economic aid may still end up
less inclined to enter the paliti- at a higher level than last year,
cal arena. "I think Thieu will be but with oil and fertilizer prices'
stubborn as hell," a Western soaring, the real benefit may be
diplomat remarked. "He'll have smaller. Economists prefer to
to be physically ejected before cut projects aimed at building
there can be a political settle- industry?agricultural and in-
ment." dustrial credit banks, fertilizer
There are two basic views of plants, fish farms and the like
the reasons for the lack of po- ?before curtailing the program
litical progress since the Paris that provides foreign exchange
agreement. to permit the Government to
One holds that the President import badly needed goods.
simply wants to retain the There is widespread agree-
power he has carefully accrued ment that standards of living
$700-million and the Senate came too lucrative. ? and that he has no motive to in- will continue to decline, espe-
Foreign Relations Committee Students of Hanoi policy be-' vite the Vietcong to try to take cially for the jobless in the ur-
has voted $420-million in eco- lieve that the North Vietnamese. it from him. He is said to have ban areas, many of whom once
nomic aid. The cuts have been will do everything they can to been angered by the Paris worked for the American mill-
advocated by legislators who prevent South Vietnam's eco- agreement's political aspects tary establishment. Unemploy-
maintain that President Thieu, 'mimic development, for, it is when they were presented to ment runs about 15 per cent,
seeing American support flag- I thought, the Communist scena- him- according to the best estiinates.
ging, will have no alternative rio for victory runs something The other view?it is gener- How this will translate into p01.
but to follow the' mandate for a like this The economy worsens, ally held by American officals itical discontent is anyone's
political settlement set, forth in governmental corruption in. ?is that the Communists are guess.
the Paris cease-fire agreement, creases, soldiers and civil ser_ blocking a political settlement j "They're ? such? a resilient
Saigon is full of officials and vants cannot feed their families because they know they could ?people," a Western diplomat
analysts ? Vietnamese, Eu- and at last, perhaps with a mili. not win a,truly free election. commented. "It seems to me
ropeans and even some Amen- tary push, the revolution inun- "The Vietcong have no politi- they've got a long way to go
cans?who are not entirely dates the crumbling Saigon re. cal ward heelers, no grassroots before the mobs come out on
comfortable with the ar- gime, structure,", said an expert on' the Street." _
tarily, "take off' economically rice Ian s. This makes the
and prove to be such a going economy highly vulnerable to
concern that the North, frus. disruption by the Communists,
trated, will abandon its aggres- who can cut major roads,, de-
sive designs. stroy bridges and sabotage fac-
Another new version fames
tories erected with badly need-
from the left end of the political
spectrum: No longer is it the
expectation that with the with-
drawal of American troops and
planes, peace will come, but
rather that further cuts in
American aid ?against which
President Ford made a strong
appeal. yesterday ? will force
President Nguyen Van Thieu
to a political settlement with
? the Communists that will end
? the war. ?
. Central to these theories is a'
decade-old assumption about
the power of Washington to de-
termine the outcome of ?the
struggle' by adding or subtract-
ing assistance.
? For this fiscal year the White
House has sought $1.45-billion
in milittiry aid and $750-million
in economic aid, compared with the beginning of the American
$1.23-billion and $349-million 'build-up that helped make
'respectively last year. The Ad- j Much of the country unsafe for
ministration maintains that the farming. Last year 6.6 million
funds will prevent military de- -tons of rice were grown. in
terioration and . propel Smith Government - held parts of
Vietnam close to economic self- South ? Vietnam and 300,000
sufficiency in two or three tons had to be imported.
years, ,? I Only the fledgling shrimp and
Cuts Voted in Congress I fish industry remains- relatively
In contrast, the Senate and! immune to military attack, and.
the House of Representatives
shore-based processing plants
have cut the military aid to
could still be targets if they be-
ed foreign capital. ,
In fact, the ? key to what
Americans call South Vietnam's
ability to take off economically,
and the centerpiece of Govern-
ment economists' plans, is pre-
cisely the weakest link in the
military chain: the rural coun-
tryside, where, it is hoped,
enough food and timber can be
produced to form the basis of
substantial export ?industries
that, in turn, can generate em-
ployment and enough foreign
exchange to redress a severe
payments deficit.
Where the Conflict Is ,
The trouble is that the coun-
tryside is where the war is be-
ing .fought. South Vietnam has
not been able to export rice
since 1964, the last year before
WASHINGTON POST
05 October 1974
Canibuclia Supplies
,
A civilian airline linked to
the Central Intelligence
Agency has begun parachut-
,ing military supplies to be-
leaguered Cambodian, garri-
sons, officials in Bangkok
said.
? A spokesman there
said U.S. Air Force C-130
'transports operated by civil-
Jan crews from -Bird Air,
?headquartered in Washing-
:tont state, started supply
'flights from U Tapao Air
Base in Thailand this week.
Bird Air was expected to
take over the airlift from
, the U.S. Air Force by Oct.
,14, as part of an effort to re-
duce the U.S. military pres-
ence in Cambodia.
? In Saigon, military
sources reported that
North Vietnamese force
Overran the district town of
,Chtiongnghia in the Central
?Highlands Thursday. after
the garrison fled under a 9,-
900-round artillery barrage,
36
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NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
13 September 1974
? SOVIET "SOLIDARITY" WORDS 'VS. DEEDS
Foreign affairs reporting in the Soviet press, is decisively marked today
by the attention devoted to the first anniversary of the bloody revolution in which
the elected President Salvador Allende lost his life and which brought to power a very
harsh military regime. A bold heading on the international news page of Pravda
calls for "freedom for the Chilean patriots"; stories from numerous capital cities
report on solidarity meetings and demonstrations in support of the tyrannized Chilean
people; a caricature in the middle of the page shows a sinister looking junta-general
with a machinegun and a death emblem on his cap and in the background a stylized
"eleven" in the form of two gallows. Under the heading "The voice of the Soviet
People" an appeal of the Soviet trade unions for 'brotherly solidarity, with the heroic
Chilean workers' battle" is being published, listing also a whole string of Chile
activities in factories, universities and kolchoses. In addition, this evening
Soviet television is showing a fairly lengthly, East German-produced film also
covering events and conditions innChile.
This heavy accent on the Chilean theme in the mass media is nothing new as
far as the Soviet newspaper reader is concerned. Since September 11 a year ago
hardly a day has passed without coverage in a prominent space of cruelties by the ,
uniformed successors of Allende. It is not surprising that in thiS context, and
given the vulnerabilities, the role of the foreign influence and money of the CIA -- ?
whose activities in Chile, according to latest information from the USA, is again
raising eyebrows -- and the alleged friendship between Peking and the junta in San-
tiago are not favorably commented upon. However, despite the unrelenting barrage one
cannot help but gain the impression that the Soviet press is not really interested
in the advancement of humanitarian solidarity with the persecuted of the Pinochet
regime. The propagandizing of that cause is massive but all too calculated. The
Soviet press sees here a welcome propaganda opportunity, a highly exploitable one
without a commitment to demonstrate one's own love for justice. In this instance,
words of solidarity and concrete actions are not one and the same. Right after the -
revolution in Santiago, the real issue was to accept Chilean refugees in other countries;
the Soviet authorities displayed a most reserved attitude: they _accepted a very small
number only. Also, while Allende was alive and it was necessary to assist his governtent
which suffered from the American refusal to extend credits, Moscow acted most reservedly.
While Allende was received in the Soviet-,capital with elaborate ceremonies, the re-
quested monatary support was extended most sparingly. The shock officially expressed
over the junta's arbitrary persecutions and tortures does not sound quite convincing,
for there is after all utter silence in Soviet media about similar occurences in the
Soviet Union. It is for the latter reason that Soviet labor camp prisoners sent an
open letter to the "European Security Conference" in which it is stated: World
public opinion is shocked that (Chilean) prisoners on the (Chilean) island Dawson are
forced to build their own prison; here in our country, it is considered a normal
? activity.
Sowjetische ?Solidaritat?
wurte? und Taten
Von unserem Korresponden ten ?
R. Al. Moskau, 11. September
- Den &sten Jahrestac.7 des blutigen UmstufZes
in Chile, der dem gewalt-lten Prasidenten Salvador
:Allende das Leben kostete und em n gnadenloses?
Militarregime an die Macht brachte, gilt heute in
der Auslandsberichterstattung der Sowjetpresse
die Hauptaufmerksamkeit. Auf der internatio-
nalen Seite der 4-Prawdao fordert em n Balkentitel
?Freiheit fiir die Patrioten von Chile; Meldun-
gen aus zahlreichen Ffauptstadten berichten tiber
Solidaritiitskundgebungen_ mit dent geknechteten
chilenischen Volk, eine Karikatur zeigt mitten
auf der Seite einen fluster dreinblickenden Junta-
general mit Maschinengewehr sowie Totenkopf-
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I
S
abzeichen auf der Mtitze, dahinter zwei zur heu-
tigen Datumszahl stilisierte Galgengeriiste. Unter
der Ueberschrift (Die Stimme der sowjetischen
Oeffentlichkeitv wird ferner eine Erklarung der
sowjetischen Gewerkschaften zur abriiderlichen
Solidaritat mit dem Heldenkampf der chileni-
schen Werktatigen) veroffentlicht, daran an-
schlieBend eine laniere Liste von Chileveranstal-
tungen in Fabriken, Universitaten und Kolchosen.
Heute abend zeigt das sowjetische Femsehen
auBerdem einen langeren Film aus der DDR, der
ebenfalls den Ereignissen. und Zustanden in der
Andenrepublik gewidmet sein wird.
Filr die sowjetischen Zeitungsleser 1st
breite Aufwand, den die Massenmedien ? dem
chilenischen Thema widmen, keineswegs neu. Seit
dem vergangenen 11. September dilrfte kein Tag
verstrichen sem, an dem nicht an prontinenter
Stelle iiber Greueltaten der uniformierten Nach-
egtikikefrittit0Y2 RnalieF0031400 Mt* m
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Zusanirnenhang twat Ober die Rollo des Aus-
landskapltals, der CIA ? deren Tiitigkeit in
Chile nach neuesten Inforrnationen aus Amerika
erneut ins Zwielicht geraten ist und fiber die
angebliche Freundschaft Pekings mit der Junta
in Santiago wenig schmeichelhafte Dingo gesagt
werden, darf attgesichts der sich bietenden An
griffsfilichen nicht verwundern. Bei all diesent
pausenlosen? Trotnnielfeuer ilberwlegt indessen
der Eindruck, dad es der Sowjetpresse weniger
um die vordergrtindig hochgesplelte humanitlire
Solidarisierung mit den vOm Pinochet-Regime
?Verfolgten geht, als vielmehr urn einen will-
kommenen Propagandoanlafi, der sich ohne viel
Verbindlichkeit zur Demonstration der eigenen
Gerechtigkeitsllebe ausniitzen laBt. Solidarische
Worte und konkrete Taten vvollen in diesern
Fella nicht ohne weIteres zusarnmenpassen. Als
es nach dent Putsch in Santiago darum ging,
chlienische Richtliqge in anderen Llindern ad- '
zunehmen, nalunen die sowjetischen Behorden eine
welt reserviertere Haltung em; nur em n ganz klei-
nes Kontingent konnte in die 1.1c1SSR einreisen.
WALL S TREL T JOURNAL
3 October 1974
By ROBERT KEATLEY
WASHINGTON ? Henry Kissinger en.:
jo?s the role of diplomatic superstar and
uslially plays it to the hilt. But when he
"flies into Buenos Aires next March for a
Western Hemisphere foreign ministers'
-conference-, he may find the spotlight
pointed at someone else.
? It could be aimed at Raul Roa Garcia,
an elderly, bespectacled man, scholarly
and distinguished-looking, who also hap-
? pens to be minister of foreign relations for
Fidel Castro's Cuba. ? "
Mr. Roa's attendance isn't yet certain.
But if he does go to Buenos Aires, and it
now looks likely that he will, he will be the
first Cuban to attend such a meeting of
hemisphere countries in more than a dec-
ade. And his presence would mark the
final collapse of an American-backed pol-
icy of isolating Cuba from its Latin neigh-
bors in hopes of retarding its development
or even toppling its regime. .
It's obvious, of course, that the policy
has failed. Communist Cuba, if something
less than. an economic showpiece, has
made notable progress since- a 1970 low
point. These days, thanks to soaring sugar
prices, it even has millions to spend
abroad. Meanwhile, Havana's political re-
lations with Latin and other states grow'
warmer as it settles into bureaucratic mid-
dle age after a capricious revolutionary
*youth. There's no longer much talk about
exporting insurgency, nor fear Fidel cart
somehow lead a docile Continent into mili-
tant Marxism.
For such reasons, nine Republican Con-
gressmen months ago concluded a study of
U.S.-Cuban relations by saying it's high
time for an American policy change to- t
ward Cuba. "Action which was under- !
standable, and even right, at one time and
under one set of circumstances, may no
longer be right or even wise at another
date and- under another set of circum-
stances," they said.
And change is coming. President Ford
and Secretary Kissinger have been drop-
ping broad hints. The Organization of
American States (OAS), which voted eco-
nomic sanctions against Cuba in 1964, will
abandon them in November. Messages be-
tween Washington and Havana are being
relayed by Mexico's foreign minister, who
wants Cuba's isolation to end.
But as the pending OAS action Indi-
cates, more is involved than just the sensi-
Auch a1 s sich noch zu Lebzeiten Mendes
darum handelte, seiner durch die amerikanische
Kreditsperre bedrangten Regierung tatkrilftig
unter die Anne zu greifen, gab man slob in Mos-
kau wesentlich verschlossener, Zwar wurde
Allende in der sowjetischen Hauptstadt mit ttllem
Zeretnoniell empfangen, die orbetenen Stiltztings-
gelder aber flossen nur sehr sparlich melt Sant.
iago. Nicht gerade konsequent mud fuller die
offizielle tntrtistung fiber die von tier chileni-
schen Junta praktizierten willkilrlichen Vedo1..
gungen und Folterungen an, wenn man sic mit
dem Schweigen vergleicht, das die sowjetischen
Medien fiber nicht unahnliche Vorgange im eige-
nen Lande ausbreiten. Mit einigem Recht schrie-
ben deshalb sowjetische Lagerhilftlinge itt einem..
offenen Brief an die geuropilische Sicherheits-
konferenis: Die VVeltliffentlies,keit ist ernport,
daB man die (chilenischen) ...lefangenen auf der
(chilenischen) Inset Dm .son zwingt, fur sieh
saber eiri Geflingnis zu zimmern. Aber bei uns
wird tins ebenfalls 4.t9 normal angesehen.
? .
Cuba Rejoin the Club?
bilities of Cuba and the United States.
There are four major parties in the affair,
and change is coming- because none of tpe.
four sees much to lose by re.yersing past
policy, while all see somethingito gain.
These four are Cuba, the United States,
the OAS, and the Soviet Union?which has
been for years the main Outsider in West-
ern Hemisphere affairs in its role as
Cuba's economic supplier and political
tutor.
"
Here's a summary of the way each of
these major parties views the situation
? now, along with an explanation of why
each is ready for the change:
THE UNITED STATES: There's noi
longer much excuse for the 'U.S. to cling to.
its policy of seeking to isolate Cuba. In this ?
officially proclaimed era of detente the old
Cuba line seems increasingly anachronis-
tic. Though Richard Nixon never over-
came personal prejudices (or the influ-
ence, many believe, of his old friend, Bebe
Rebozo), Gerald Ford has no such hang-
ups. The new President is open to recon-
sideration.
That is especially so when current Cuba.
policy seems hypocritical, at best. The offi-
cial excuse for sanctions against Cuba Is
that it meddles in internal affairs of oth-
ers. Cuba trains agents and saboteurs, 3j.
Nixon contended last year in a foreign pol-
icy report, "to carry out violence against
established governments. . . . This activ-
ity continues to threaten the stability of
our hemisphere."
There's no question this once was true;
after e.11, Che Guevera, Castro's one-time
top agent, died in a quixotic effort to whip
up revolution in Bolivia. But most ana-
lysts, including many Washington. officials,
think that this stopped long ago;-..and that
Mr. Castro is trying now to get chummy
with other government chiefs.
In the meantime, new revelations show,
the United States itself has done some
meddling. The U.S. poured $3 million-plus
into Chile to finance_ the late Salvador Al-
lende's foes, While cash also has been fun-
neled into Guyana and other South Ameri-
can states, according to recent reports.
Continuing to brand Cuba as an interna-
tional renegade for its subversive ventures '
Is inconsistent, to say the least, in light of
the U.S.'s own covert activities.
But there's a more positive way to view
this country's changing Cuba policy. (The 1
new policy could consist of some, or-all Of !
the following elements: voting with the
1. OAS majority to drop the organization's
Cuba embargo the subsequent lifting of .
! the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, and
? resuming diplomatic relations with the is-
? land.)
Importantly, a friendlier U.S. policy to-
ward Cuba would remove a major irritant
? between the U.S. and its southern neigh-
Will
?
: bors. For them, as one State Department
I Official explains, America's Cuba policy
"is a symbol of Yankee interference in
! Latin affairs." Washington's pressure was
? largely responsible for the 1964 OAS sanc-
tions (only Mexico refused to participate).
And Washington has been largely responsi-
ble for keeping the sanctions in force after
many OAS members had concluded they
i were outdated. Many Latins perceive this
pressure as an American effort to dictate
their own policies.
There's something to gain economically
; as well. One guess is that high sugar
prices, up sixfold in the past year or So,
r will give Cuba perhaps $1.9 billion of hard
! currency for imports, And there are indi-
cations Mr. Castro wants to spend some in
the United States.
According to Edward Lamb, an Ohio
! businessman who recently had long talks
with Premier Castro, the Cubans still ad-
mire American technology. They want ag-
ricultural equipment, especially for han-
dling their sugar craps, and?Mr. Castro
indicated?would like to buy U.S. corn,
beans, poultry and medicines. "They've
got the wherewithal to pay for it now," Mr.
? Lamb notes. -
Finally, recognition of the Castro gov-
ernment would combine an acceptance of
reality with a furtherance of global de-
ten4e, which were two major effects of Mr.,
Nixon's China move. It wouldn't insure
that relations would become cordial. Cuba
will continue to oppose American influence
In Latin America; ending that influence
seems, in fact, to be Havana's main diplo-
matic objective. But recognition would be
, a conciliatory act fitting into broader U.S.
foreign policy. Though it would mean, ac-
cepting a Communist regime in the West-
,
ern Hemisphere, something Messrs. Nixon
and Kissinger once strongly opposed, there-
doesn't seem to be an alternative these
days.
THE SOVIET UNION: For Moscow,
38
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there are gains, plus a risk or two.
Detente remains the Russians' primary
external policy, and gaining acceptance
for Cuba by once-hostile 4rnerica is a vic-
. tory of sorts. It might also give the
U.S.S.R. more acceptability in Latin
America generally, an important, if not
high-priority, consideration. It could also
cut the cost of keeping Cuba afloat. Mos-
cow sends aid worth an estimated $340 mil-
lion annually, much of it as petroleum. If
Cuba could buy this in nearby Venezuela
?even with Soviet subsidy?it would be
cheaper than shipping oil all the way from
the Black Sea. Moreover, a trade-minded
_ _
Cuba might eventually pay back the $4.1 I
billion it owes the Soviets.
The chief risk for the Russians, of
course, is diminished influence. Henry Kis-
singer, and others believe Mr. Castro wants
looser ties with Moscow?not because of
specific difficulties but rather to give Cuba
a greater sense of independence. If this
went too far, the Soviets could experience
I a diplomatic reverse like that in Egypt a
: couple Of years ago. That's not expected,
' but the thought may cause Moscow to be a
bit cautious about a conciliation trend the
? U.S.S.R. generally encourages.
CUBA: There are gains for the Castro
regime other than decreased reliance on a
foreign power.
The major one is respectability. Many
Americans ' and some Latins have dis-
missed Fidel Castro for years as an erratic
Communist who gave beards a bad name.
Now he is about to be accepted, more or
New Statesman 13 September 1974
less fully, into the Latin Americancommit-
' nity?.whatever private reservations many
leaders still have.
However Mr.. Castro *ants more than
acceptance: he seeks Latin leadership. He
wants to ally Latin American governments
to confront the U.S. On major economic
and political issues. Within this forum, he
would like to spread his Influence in ways.
Cuban-backed guerril.las never could. That
won't make life easier for Washington but
it should mean less subversion.
Mr. Castro's speech last Saturday night
was, in all likelihood. an example of what's
ahead. He lambasted *President Ford and
the CIA for intervening in Chile, and he
blamed world inflation or. a U.S. "war bud-
get," not on high oil prices. But he didn't
veto defier ties to Washington and his two
Sunday night dinner guests?Sen. Jacob
Ja7.-its of New York. and Sen. Claiborne
Pell of Rhode Island?came away believ-
ing Mr. Castro wants "better rela.tiens
with the 'United States."
The forum of the OAS won't serve his
purposes, Mr.- Castro stresses. "We have
clearly said that we will not become mem-
bers of the .OAS again, because the OAS
has been an instrument of imperialist dom-
ination in Latin- America," ha said the
other day. But that doesn't apply to the
Buenos Aires meeting, which is not an OAS
function. "If we are invited we will go."
the Cuban leader said._ "Let there be no
doubt about that.". . .
THE. OAS:' This group of nations will
Chile and Us
The following document reached our office
a few weeks ago, and was originally pub-
lished in a Czech samizdat paper Narodni
Noviny. We reprint it with thanks to the
Committee to Defend Czechoslovak
Socialists.
Since .11 September a fascist terror has
started raging in Chile together with every-
thing that we always associate with it:
? raids, executions, arrests, killings 'while at-
tempting to escape', liquidations of the basic
freedoms of a citizen, return of land to the
landowners and of nationalised enterprises
to the capitalist owners. Honest people the
world over denounce this kind of violence.
Even Czechoslovak newspapers obligingly
grant their space to various protesting voices.
(With certain exceptions, of course. Czecho-
slovak mass media refused to grant their
space to Pavel Kohout so that he could
express his critical attitude.) Those delighted
that someone somewhere managed to give
a big kick to the communists are short
sighted. For one thing it is not only the
communists who are being kicked around in
Chile at present and for another no real
democrat can be really delighted when free-
dom is being strangled somewhere. '
Without doubt there were more demo-
cratic rights and freedom in Chile under
President Allende than there are under the
government of the military junta, for the
very fact that Allende ruled in a demo-
cratic fashion, solving his problems with
Opposition without violence and according
to the law, greatly helped the military in-
surgents to carry out their plans.
No matter how paradoxical it sounds the
USSR was in fact, in 'spite of its formal
protests over the fate of Chile, satisfied.
was the USA of cour.se. The. al
Approved For Release 200TRf8/08 : C
gain from the lifting of sanctions even if
Cuba doesn't rejoin. Argentina, for exam-
ple, recently ignored- the sanctions and
? granted Cuba a .$1.2 billion credit for Ar-
gentine goods; nearly half has already
been utilized by Havana, whose repayment
record is excellent. With those sugar prof-
its piling up, others probably sense sales
for themselves with the embargo's lifting.
But the main gain Is 'probably more a
symbolic one. Renewed relations with
Cuba would prove OAS members can do
what, they choose !Without getting Ameri-
can approval Vitt It would enhance their
self-esteem and dignity, yet not really
cause problems with the U.S.?or be un-
safe.
"I do not think that Cuba's exporting.
the. revolution." Mexican Foreign Minister
Emilie 0. Raba.sa Said recently. "And I do
not think they are invading the life of the
' sphere of other countries."
So the old isolation policy is about Over. *
The legal 'process by which the OAS will ?
abolish restrictions is under way, with the
final vote expected November 11 In Quito,
Ecuador. The United States probably won't
oppose it and, after dithering for a while,
should move tcr,restore bilateral relations
with a Cuba it previously preferred to in-
vade.
It's even possible that once Cuba re-
gains full recognition emotions will cool so
much that the country can become what
the French writer Raymond Aron once
eiid it should be: an obscure tropical die-
tatorship of no great significance to any-
one.
meticulously preserved democratic methods
in building a socialist society were a thorn
in the eye for the Soviet Union. They were
frightened that yet another socialism, a
Chilean one and, furthermore, one with a
human face, would be added to the four
already existing ones. Soon the Moscow
centre would no longer be a centre but just
one of the provinces as, after all, Lenin
predicted. - -
Not long ago Rude Pray() was upset
that a West German CDU deputy spoke of
the putsch as a 'check' as if one could
mention in, Czechoslovakia the word in-
vasion or occupation. One is allowed to
call it at the most an 'entry' or better still
'brotherly international aid'. Let's see what
else upsets the normalised Czechoslovak
press:
(1) That the local committees were
broken up (just as the workers' committees
were broken up in our country).
(2) That the junta banned lessons in
Marxism at universities (yet in our country
they went as far as liquidating all depart-
ments of Marxism-Leninism after August).
(3) That the freedom of assembly, asso-
ciation and both written and oral expres-
sion no longer exists (just try to get to-
gether the Club of Committed Non-Com-
munists again or call a demonstration on
any of the smaller squares of Prague or
try to write freely what you think into your
newspaper. Such a .notion is ludicrous in
present-day Czechoslovakia and in the
Soviet Union they lock people up in lunatic
asylums for similar demands).
(4) That in Chile just as under Hitler the
junta burns books which are inconvenient or
written by authors not appreciated by the
junta (in our country they don't burn them
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works in any, public library just ask him
to show you the list of books which had
to be discarded, taken out of circulation
or liquidated. The number of titles goes into
thousands),
(5) That in Chile Infringements of pr1.
vacy became commonplace (yet how many
Czech homes were broken into by the STB
men without a court order, how many, of
our flats are' fitted with bugging devices?).
(6) That ' 'thousands of Chileans ' from
ordinary people to well-known personalities
such as Dr Asenjo, the 1973 Nobel Prize
winner for sciences, were expelled from
their place of work or service, their only
"crime" being that they served or sided with
the progressive ideas', (In this respect the
junta has been acting clumsily, Where 0180
but in Czechoslovakia were hundreds 6f
thousands ? from national artists to
laureates, from academicians to professors,
from journalists and students to ordinary
workers ? expelled from their places for
the same things?).
(7) That the 'new rulers introduced com-
plete control over television and radio' (and
what is It like in our country? Just com-
pare what the television and radio were
like in 1968 and 1969 with what they are
like now).
WASHINGTON POST
05 October 1974 .1
7,! '
VS Envoy
To razil
ts Torture
From News Dispatches
r ? =
BRASILIA, Oct. 4?U.S. Am-
Isassador John Crimmins de-
livered a "strong protest" to
Zrazil's foreign minister today
over treatment in jail of a
former American missionary,
he 'US. embassy reported.
Frederick' Birten Morris,
'held since Monday on suspi-
cion of subversion, told a U.S.
consular officer in the north-
eastern city of Recife that he
IAA been beaten and tortured
*4th electric shocks "of high
4ntensity" an embassy spokes-
Oman said.
The spokesman said the U.S.
bonsul in Recife, Richard
iBrown, "saw bruises and con-
tusions on Morris' back, but-
t,ocks and wrists."
? The spokesman added
Morris told the consul :that
Ole had been assaulted by the
agents who hit him in the
stomach, groin and lower back
and slapped him in the face.
Morris also said that elec-
trodes had been attached at
-various times to several parts
'of his body and that he had
been subjected to electric
shocks which varied from
light, annoying pulsations to
:midden jolts of high intensity.
(8) That the junta ordered 'national work
shifts' (an analogy so perfect that even the
title corresponds),
(9) That It banned the left-wing press (it
was a long list of journals which was banned
under Husak, Let Us just remember three
which stood out: Zitrek, liaportdr snd
even the communist Polltika),
(10) That it Interferes with trade union
rights (perhaps it. would be worth it to ask
Karel Hoffman, this 'noted representative
,of the working class who never worked in
a factory, to num somewhele the rights of
our trade unionists. A' few seconds would
last him well enough),
Oh yes, in this we must agree with our
press: What goes on in Chile is indeed
fascism, Fascism is simply fascisnl, no matter
under which label It ?port 1, whether it
rages in Chile 'or fn Cnenoslovakia, That
Is why, we are at cal) with the Chilean
people and that is why we should protest,
and not only against the threat to the life ef
Luis Corvalan (who by the way praised
the occupation of our country in 1968),
for the lives of hundreds and more people
are threatened. We should underline that we
are against it no matter where in the world
it is happening. We should also be against
it in reality and we should fight it. ,
Oorris said 'he recalled, losing
. ibmsciousness on at least one
taccasion."
Crimmins met this evening
with Foreign Minister Antonio
iAzeredo da Silveira, and deli-
vered, a "strong note," the
,spOkesman said. He did not
Aisclose the note's contents.
The Brazilian Foreign Mm-
try 'had had no comment. ?
After Morris was detained
ATonday, another American
was held by authorities at
-Morris' apartment for more
than 24 hours, then released,
? ,the embassy spokesman said.
- identified the second
American as Philip Hanson,
associated with .Church World
Services.
? Hanson's hometown
Was not available.
Morris, 40, whose parents
live:in North Platte, Neb., was
being held at the 4th Army
headquarters in Recife, where
he had served as a Methodist
missionary for several years
and more recently worked as
a freelance reporter doing
work for, various American
news organizations.
The embassy spokesman said
that "as far as we know at
this moment" there are no
formal charges against Mor-
ris:
Police said Morris and a
were arre:Aed at
Morris' home. A police an-
nouncement said "highly com-
promising material" was found
at Morris' home, but did not
further' describe the material.
40
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