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September 30, 1974
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 16 GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GENERAL EASTERN EUROPE WESTERN EUROPE NEAR EAST FAR EAST WESTERN HEMISPHERE 15 October 1974 1 23 25 26 28 30 37 Destroy after?backgrounder has served it purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For 'Release 2001/08/08 :'CFA--RDP77-00432R0001003400655 - LONDON TIMES 30 September 1974 Lord Chalfont 11:1=ZraZZEZZIReeltX55:0111X,arriCag The grim alternative to secret diplomacy There have been two fairly pre-: "dictable reactions to the dis- closures of the role of the American Central Intelligence Agency in the fall of the Allende government in Chile. Some people have expressed a sense of great outrage and? ' anger at the interference of the Americans in the internal poli- tical affairs of a foreign coun- try; others have argued that the only fault to be found with the CIA's action Was that "it came in with too little and too late ". The uproar which has surroun- ded the affair has some pro- found implications; not only for ! American foreign policy, but also for the whole structure of international relations. ? It is, of course, possible to argue that the nation ? state power game is intrinsically cor- rupt and degrading. The whole apparatus of diplomacy is re- garded by some of the more starry eyed internationalists as superfluous and obstructive; people, they say with more pas- sion than logic, should be allowed to speak to other people without the intervention of am- bassadors, It would indeed be an en- chanted world if nations could be persuaded to place the uni- v.ersal good before the narrow interests of their own people. They do not, however, do so. We live in a jungle of nation-. states in which governments pursue their national interests with every means at their dis- posal, including, if the occasion demands, armed force. It is in this context that the function of secret diplomacy must be considered. It is, as matters stand, quite acceptable for one country to attempt to influence the policies of another, if it believes that it can advance its own legitimate interests by doing so. Respect- able atnbasSadors of unassail- able probity daily expend substantial sums of money in this very process. Most people would wish to draw the line at -the use or threat of force, or at direct intervention in the politi- cal affairs of another country; but these are very difficult lines to draw. One of the functions of diplomacy is to convince the Government of a foreign power that if it pursues policies which are congenial, economic and political, benefits may follow ; and that if it does not, it will receive the diplomatic equiva- lent of a kick in the teeth. The suggestion that a certain course of action " might have a serious effect on the relations between our two countries" is a polite but unmistakable threat ; and the promise of economic aid is almost invari- ably a discreet but equally unmistakable bribe. It can be argued, and indeed ? has been, that the activities of the CIA in Chile were no more ? than a manifestation, in a some- what dramatic form, of this kind of secret diplomacy. The argu- ? ment, in its simplest form, goes something like this. America? , buys, at prevailing market ? prices, the materials it-requires to sustain its highly techno- logical- economy, from a variety of countries all over the world. ' If it sees one of those coon- ? !' tries coming under communist domination, it has a duty to its people to ensure the continued supply of its essential raw materials. AS a communist government Might terminate that supply, the United States is entitled to do something to prevent it from coming to power, or, at any rate, from remaining in power too long. As the- use or threat of force . is inconceivable, it has to rely ?; upon secret diplomacy ; and the ; use of American agents and money in ? pursuit of that ; diplomacy is entirely defensible. So far the argument is a persuasive one, and, by the standards of modern inter- national relations relatively ; ,;?respectable. It is .only when the.. ? Central ..Intelligence Agency, gets in on the act that the picture starts to break up. The world of " intelligence " is a squalid and nasty world (indeed ; there are sensitive souls in this; -country who will sue you for. libel if you -even suggest that they once belonged to ? it). Its : activities cover a wide spec-; ? trum from the collection of documents in barrack latrines ? . to the discreet assassination of .uncooperative politicians. So it- is important to be clear, as far as possible, about exactly what-! the CIA was up. to in Chile. The official version is that it dispersed funds with the excht-_ sive aim of keeping opposition, to the Chilean government alive, at a time when Allende; was seeking to 'destroy it. It is no secret that substantial CIA' .,funds went to newspapers and radio stations ; and the claim' .of those who defend the action., of the American administration is that they were designed to !'ensure that there was a measure, of democratic control over an ? increasingly authoritarian government. Any suggestion that the CIA actually tool- part in the military coup which led to the ? -laath of All,:nde and the in.:tal? lation of the right-wing govern- , ment are strenuously denied. Critics of the administration, -however, may be forgiven for; displaying a certain scepticism. ? The record of the agency in.-7 - the more aggressive,. forms ot , secret service woric,--known in the macabre imagery of the Russian secret service as. " wet. - affairs "?is a lurid one ; and . there is now a vigorous cam- paign in the United States to - investigate the Whole affair and disclose in detail the activities ; of the CIA in Chile.. One - :possible outcome of such an ? inquiry might be the political ' destruction of Dr Kissinger, who, as Secretary of State, is considered to. be primarily , responsible for United States ? policy in Chile and, in particu- clar, for the operations Of the .CIA there. ft would he as well for ;:hose who may now be rubbing their. . hands at the prospect. of another Watergate and of swift retribution for yet ? another batch of ruthless American hatchetrnen, to ponder some of ? the deeper 'implications. ? One of the ? factors which should be kept. clearly in mind is the activity of the KGB the Soviet equivalent of .the Central Intelligence Agency. It is an organization as pervasive and ruthless as any secret service ' in the 'world.. One of its princi- pal aims is the .subversion of the political institutions of the West ; and those who now con- demn Dr Kissinger and` the State Department should not ignore the fact that the Allende government received nearly ?200m from the Soviet Union :in contrast to the ?2m the CIA .is alleged to have ,spent on the . opposition. If there should now be, as a result of an inquiry into the events in Chile, a full disclosure of the methods, contacts and sources of the CIA in Latin America, it will undoubtedly be regarded as a victory for the open society. As Louis Reren pointed out in his article on Victor Marchetti's The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (Sept- ember S. . The Times) secret agencies in any country.are un- easy partners for democratic Fovernments and the idea of individual liberty. - There is a real danger. that if democracy uses the methods of its enemies it may destroy the very free, darn which it is concerned to preserve. Yet, if the United States is .debarred from access to some of the less attractive instru- ments of secret diplomacy, while its enemies, unhampered by the pressures of puhlic opinion,. continue to use them the power . structure of tile . world might he gradually but irreversibly changed ; and the change is not likely to be one to delight those who believe in an open society. artn Times Newspapers Ltd 1974 13121=4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R9P77-00432R000100340005-5 , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 5IDI 'X= VX140 29 floptoither 1974 The K. G. B. Fl Tricks Flnenciel intervention to eupport prosSovint ere. , :mite is oldreetabliahed practice but deem not li@COS? By ROBERT CONQUEST sarily go through the IC.0,13. channele, since plied. celly every other Soviet channel is secret to, Communiat prestige have log been so funded; 'The' LONDON?kcent revelations' about the Central details of subventions to the Italian Communist Intelligenee 'Agency'n activitien in Chile and else. , party, comparable tions by it where raise groat rival, ap,ain via Prague, were established 20 Years o the queetion of the netu s re end extent. ego, Reentry there hove been other examples !n- the Soviets' Committee for Government acs the eluding the discovery by Mexican officials in 1008, rnment Security. In fact there is a good deal of knowledeo available, not 'from the Soviet press' or Government, but from vie. tims or intended victims who found out the hard way, ' The KGB, is not simply a Soviet mirror.image of the W.A. (or even of the CIA. plus the Federal 13iireau'of Investigation). One difference was demon.' etrated a couple of weeks ago when Pravda an., nounced the award? on his 70th birthday, of the Order of the October revolution to Semyon Ignatiev 'Who was 'Stalin's last heed of the organization 'and who was responsible for, among other things the n y raziliatia in 1072, of seem; of thousands of ,dollars conceeled in the, teepee of party officials returning from Moscow, The Colombians, in 1008, Intercepted a $100,000 aubsidy to terrorists, by the - ? , And when it comes to such matters as coups and plots, the last three years alone haw seen the organization of the 1,1i Sabry plot against the regime' Benet (1971); , the plot against Gen. Gaafer, al.Nlmeiry in the Sudan (1071); the organization; arming and training of guerrillas, for which five Soviet diplomats were expelled from 'Medco (1971). . notorious doctors' plot purge. Yuri Andropov, the' 'current 'K.G.B, chief, got the Order of Lenin and the a plot in Rumania (1972); plots in Bolivia an ,a la for which Soviet diplomats and others were title Hero of Socialist Labor earlier, after a speech ? expelled (1972); a plot in Tunisia with the same re- in which President Nikolai Podgorny praised his sults (1972)e.the recently discovered plot in Yugo., "strengthening and' improving'this important sector slavia. There, on Sept. 12, Marshal Tito referred at 'State activity." publicly to a case that had been brewing for some. The sort of fears about the 'C.I.A. that have arisen months and which involved the arrest and forth. in the United States, have no parallel in Soviet con- coming trial of an 'underground "Stalinist" grouping, cerns about the K.G.B. which relied on help from "abroad" and whose lead- 'The C.I.A. and the K.G.B. also differ in size and.ers are old S,oviet nominees and K.G.B. contacts, resources.' Perhaps 6 of every 10. Soviet diplomats The fact that some .of these occurred in Corn-. ? ? and other representatives abroad are K.G.B.person- Anunist, countries was no phenomenon: Earlier ex- nel; those not directly employed must also help out .amplet included the Soviet-sponiored "Natolin" plot 'when called upon. ',against WIadyslaw Gomulka in 1956, and Admiral' Teme Seiko's conspiracy in Albania in 1964. They even extended to Cuba where, in 1968, several Soviet diplomats and 'others were denounced arid expelled for organizing and' supporting an attempt to seize power. In 1971, the British expelled 105 members of the Soviet Embassy staff. Espionage figured largely in the British Government's explanation for its action, :but it was also established that British intelligence had discovered plans for sabotage, not only of mili- tary installations but also of such things as water supplies. . The British incident was by no means a lone ex- ample. Since 1960, at least 380 Soviet diploinats have been expelled from their posts in 40 countries on all six continents. Oddly enough, men expelled by one country frequently turn up?without even a name change?in neighboring capitals. ? - Not that operations are always conducted through embassies. Sometimes the route is more direct. That was the case with arms supplied to the Provisional faction of the Irish Republican Army, several tons of which, en route from Prague to the Ulster ter- rorists, were seized at Amsterdam in October, 1971... WASHINGTON POST 06 October 1974 . Chilean Editor De tiles Receiving CIA Funds United Press Internstioual Chilean editor denied in a letter made public yester- day that his newspaper re- ceived funds from the CIA ! during the three-year govern- merit of President Salvador! Allende. Rene Silva, editor of Mer- curio of Santiago, made the denial in, a letter to the Inter-. American Press Asso-ciation. Mercurio has been mentioned as the recipient of clandostino funds in Washington report. Later, of course, differences between Premier Fidel 'Castro and Moscow were largely accommodated, and the Cuban secret service has been largely financed by Moscow for operations in South America, just as the Czechoslovak equivalent is the K.G.B.'s favored auxiliary in Western Europe. In the case of Chile, where the C.I.A.'s conduct is' now under attack, it was through their Cuban subordinates that the K.G.B. directed the training of guerrillas. Their own direct operations in Chile were largely of the cash-, and-organization type. In that, at least, there ap- parently is a parallel with the C.I.A. Robert Conquest is an author of books on the Soviet Union, 'including "Power and,P obey in the U.S.S.R." President. Ford said funds! went to threatened opposition parties and press. "Although I don't participate in the financial s;de of the company," Silva wrote, "I am certain that its incomes have legitimate and normal origins, they are known nil and con- trolled by the legal authorities of the country:' Silva said the Allende. government had at- tempted?but failed?to nrove charges of CIA backing for Mercurio. In Santiago, Gen, Augusto! Pinochet, president of the military junta, said policy changes in Chile's state of i,ne ternal war that were recoin mended by Sen. Edward Ken- nedy were "unacceptable com- ing from a foreign politician.", Pinochet's comment on the' Kennedy suggestions, which' the senator said would en- couraafe support for bilateral cooperation if adopted, ap- peared in publication of cor- respondence between the two men. last May. Kennedy asked that constitutional- guarantees and civil courts be reinstated. Pinoc'net replied that Ken- nedy's suggestions were a clear demonstration of "imperialist mentality." 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ''Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340605-5 New Statesman 27 September 1974 Laurence Stern 114111111=1,1112131111112111111MaiR11111141111115MI What's Good for America . . . 1102111111MILIMMIBIIIII161111811111.11NE, An off-hand remark by Henry Kissinger, recorded in the secret minutes of a 27 June 1970 meeting of the National Security Coun- cil's 'committee of 40' tells us all we need to know about the Washington political climate in which the the CIA interventions in Chile were hatched. 'I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people,' the architect of the American d?nte policy declared some two months before Chileans would vote for their new president. It was this meeting which pro- duced the authorisation for a 'modest' pro- gramme of political espionage ? a mere $400,000 worth ? against Salvador Allende. At other such meetings, also chaired by Kissinger, the rest of some $8m. in black funds was targeted at the leader of Chile's Leftist coalition. This was the amount which was reportedly acknowledged by CIA direc- tor William E. Colby in testimony delivered to an executive session of the House of Representatives sub-committee on intelli- gence oversight. Estimates by other gov- ernment officials familiar with US covert operations in Chile during the past decade ?are considerably higher. This runs counter to the popular notion of the CIA as an unguided missile, a run- away espionage apparatus blithely toppling governments and installing reactionary juntas in capitals around the world beyond the control of its superiors. The truth is far more sinister. In Chile, in Cuba, in Guate- mala, in Greece, in Vietnam, in the Congo and in Laos the CIA was operating under a direct presidential charter in a framework of executive authority insulated by thick ? wraps of official secrecy from control by any other sector of national leadership. It. is, in every sense, a king's army commanded by the President through his National Security Adviser. - President Ford's defence last week of the , CIA's covert intervention against a lawfully elected government in Santiago as 'in the best interests of the people of Chile' was in the tradition of kingly Hubris. Mr Ford, at heart a man of touching humility, put him- self in this instance beyond the restraints of logic, historical accuracy and good sense. ? His justification for the CIA-financed programme of political and economic espi- onage against the Allende. government ? that it planned in its inception to destroy opposition newspapers, radio and television media as well as political parties ? echoes against the gruesome silence today of the closed newspaper plants and political party headquarters in Chile. While Allende was - not able to accomplish the evil designs imputed to him by President Ford and Secre- tary of State Kissinger during three years in power, the junta which replaced him managed to do it all within 24 hours. Senator Walter F. Mondale of Minne- sota bitterly inquired whether the CIA is now engaged in any covert programmes designed to reopen the newspapers, radio' Approved For Release 2 stations, political parties and even the National Congress which were padlocked by Chile's new rulers. If the present Administra- tion in Washington is so concerned about the maintenance of political liberties in Chile, how can it.continue to shovel minions of dollars in economic assistance to the men who have brought an unprecedented dark age of repression to Chile? Why is the same US ? influence in the World Bank, the Export-Import bank and the Inter-American ? Development Bank, which was used to cut Chile's credit lifeline during the Allende years, now being applied to restore it? There are many here ? including members in good standing of the Henry Kissinger appreciation society ? who are being forced to the conclusion that Washington was less interested in political freedom in Chile than in supplanting the Allende government with one which would adopt a , more 'reasonable' policy in dealing with the US transnational corporations. It is these corporate interests in Chile which were, for all practical purposes, defined by the Nixon- Kissinger foreign policy to be at one with the national interest. 'National interest' was the shibboleth which lay at the heart of the worst deceptions of the Watergate scandals. That President Ford should invoke it in justifying CIA efforts to sabotage a consti- tutional government in Chile demonstrates how thin a lesson Watergate has been. The Chile revelations have now rekindled the debate over the CIA and what should be done to bring it to heel. Legislation has been introduced to establish a joint congres- sional oversight committee to replace the hand-picked review sub-committees which have through the years served as Congres- sional claques for the CIA. The traditional attitude towards the CIA overseership on Capitol Hill was unforgettably articulated by Senator John Stennis, senior Senate watch- dog of the agency: 'Spying is spying . . . you have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some, and take what is coming.' It has been a customary practice in the orchestration of covert action programmes within the '40 committee' and the CIA to prepare cover stories not only for the press - and public but for Congress as well. And so congressional oversight has amounted to little More than the blindfolder leading the'. blind. The CIA director, William E. Colby, ? has announced a new policy of public can- dour for his appearances before Congress: he will not lie about clandestine operations hereafter; he will simply refuse to talk about them. Realistically speaking, any overhaul in the congressional oversight syStem will re- sult either in more legislators being taken into camp or more bent testimony by the CIA, Assistant Secretaries of State and Kissinger as well. As long as the agency is provided a charter for operations to evict, install or harass governments, it will have to 001 /08/6egY: 0dleRtbil5ilit 648 lEtotleittisoo5-5 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 which is the watchword of clandestine ? activity. Another approach, which in the reformist spirit of the moment has gained at least debating-hall respectability, is abolition of covert action programmes and confining the role of the CIA to intelligence collection ? its original charter, Such a policy would cendone quiet Peng- tration but prescribe the noisy climax, It is a position which can be persuasively argued in the light of the, results of most covert WASHINGTON POST 07 October 1974 operations that have surfaced over the past decade or so. They range across a spectrum of accomplishment from the dubious to the disastrous in their impact on the national interest and world opinion. . The CIA maintains that it buries its suc- cesses and that, is why we don't hear of them. Perhaps we may be forgiven for sus- pecting that this, too, might be a cover story. ? Washington The Senate and the CIA: ITHE HOT AND HEAVY protests which followed disclosure of , the ?CIA's subversion in Chile have produced an official affirmation of "dirty tricks" of unprecedented scope and explicitness. Mr. Ford reacted, two weeks ago not only by acknowledging an American 'role in the overthrow of the Allende government. but by. declaring his readiness to take future "actions in the .intelligence field." No American President had previously, either defended a particular operation or justified such operations as g whole. To be sure, it was not the substance of what Mr. Ford said but his public statement of it that was new. It is not surprising that a,President would support established presidential pol- icy. But the response, of Congress is something else again ? We print on this 'page today excerpts from a histori- cal Senate debate of last Wednesday, "historical" because it marks the first time that either house of Congress has 'conducted an* open debate and openly voted on whether the United States should engage in secret foreign operations in peacetime, intelligence gathering aside. A leading student of the CIA, Harry Howe Ransom, wrote recently that "one searches in vain in the public records. . . for any evidence of congressional intent or acquiescence to assign the functions of foreign political action or subversion to the CIA." The "search" can now end. Last Wednesday the Senate considered an amendment 'by Sen. James Abourezk ,(D-S.D.) to end dirty tricks completely. The amendment was swarnped, 68 to 17. ? ? . The CIA and its supporters can now claim?fairly, vv,e ? believe?that for the first time the agency has a congressional mandate, if only from one louse, for covert operations. No longer - can CIA operations be regarded as an unauthorized presidential 'habit or cold- war carryover. Though only briefly and ?without hear- ings or committee recommendations, the Senate did join the debate and express its judgment. It was, moreover, a:judgment we happen to share. As we have said, given American interests and global uncertainties, the United States should not deny itself the CIA option in all circumstances. We think, nonetheless, that Mr. Abourezk performed a service by forcing a vote on an issue from which most legislators have traditionally averted their eyes. The senator was under no illusion that his amendment would win. But he wished to make the Senate accept accountability for CIA operations and to establish the issue 10 one deserving regular review. If the CIA can now claim a new mandate for covert operations, then senator t must now be ready publicly to justify their own stands. The furor over CIA activity in Chile, the Watergate disclosure that the CIA is not immune from political usage, the fading of the congressional tradi- tionalists who have protected the CIA from critical congressional scrutiny?all these factors have opened up the issue in a major way. Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), one of the leading traditionalists,, remarked on the change last Wednesday. "It is not an easy job that I have had on this matter," he said. "I will not relate the, incidents that have come up. It was my duty, and that was it. After all, we are working for the same country." Just what the new attitude personified by Sen. Abour- ezk will finally lead to is, of course, uncertain. It is noteworthy, however, that since the Chile affair became known, the administration has been conducting a kind of preemptive retreat by offering certain concessions to Congress on "oversight." Its latest move is to promise timely briefings on operations to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as to the oversight committee of the Armed Services Committee. This broadens the circle of those who can offer the CIA their advice on operations, though the agency still does not ask for legislators' consent. It also broadens the circle of those whom the CIA can swear to secrecy. A legislator so sworn, who finds himself opposed to a proposed opera- tion, will still face the intolerable choice of breaking his oath or swallowing his best judgment. We do not think there is a good way to square the circle: to have effective public oversight of secret operations. It is a humbling contradiction for a demo- cratic society. Sen. Abourezk's answer?to abolish secret , operations and to meet all foreign threats openly and publicly or not at all?has the virtue of consistency but, in our view, falls short in terms of policy. The portions of the debate published here today indicate, if nothing else, just how difficult the issue is. 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 -Approved For Releaie 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 WASHINGTON POST 07 October 1974 The 'Covert perations, Debate, The following are excerpts from the Senate debate of Oct. 2 on an amendment to the foreign aid bill which would have ordered the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency immediately to halt .all covert operations not .-related to intelligence. The 'amendment was defeated, 68 to 17. This marked the first time either house of Congress had dein; ted and voted on this issue. Sen. James. Abourezie (D-S.H.): This amendment will, if enacted, abolish all clandestine or covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency. s I believe very strongly that we must have an intelligence-gathering organi- zation and I believe the CIA and our defense intelligence agencies do an ade- quate job in this respect. We have every right to defend our- selves from foreign attack and that right includes intelligence gathering to protect our security. But there is no justification in our legal, moral, or religious principles for ? operations of a U.S. agency which re- sult in assassinations, sabotage, politi- cal disruptions, or other meddling in another country's internal affairs, all in the name of the American people. It amounts to nothing more than an arm of the U.S. government conducting a secret war without either the approval of Cengress or the knowledge of the American people. I want to remind the Senate that the - present director of the CIA, Williain - Colby, said a couple of weeks ago that while he preferred to retain the clan- destine or covert services, the Capitol would not fall if it were abolished. He also said that there was not any ? activity going, on anywhere in the? at this time that required the ' use of clandestine activity. e ? Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho): I have ? decided to vote for this amendment, but I do so with the expectation' that it will not pass. The intrusion of the CIA into the in- ternal political affairs of Chile for the purpose of subverting and bringing down the elected government of that country is an episode that I find both ? unsavory and unprincipled and in di- rect contradiction of the traditional principles for which this country has ? stood. I think the fact this has now come to light demonstrates that the covert ac- tivities of the CIA are presently un- der no effective restraint. -' I would hope that it will be possible to establish, either through a joint committee or by some other means, adequate congressional surveillance over the activities of the CIA, in or- der to avoid in the future such un- seemly interference with the rights of other peoples. If so, then we ?vill have solved this problem without having to . outlaw covert activity outright. I can envision situations in which the national security of the' United - States, or the survival of the republic, or the avoidance of nuclear war, would have such overriding importance as to t . _ countries, contrary to Our treaties, con- trary to the principles of international law, and contrary to the historic role played by the United States in world af- fairs. Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.): It involves, as see it, too important a matter of public policy to be made summarily here On the floor of the Senate. This amendment was not presented to the. committee. It has not had hear- ings, even though the whole subject of .. the Central Intelligence operations has, here and there in the committees of Congress, been looked at. It is my judgment that the Central Intelligence Agency needs to be care- fullyexa.mined and that a whole set of new directives deed to be' evolved, but tinder what circumstances the CIA -should be allowed to continue to en- gage iri covert operations *abroad is a legitimate and timely question. I have offered repeatedly a resolu- tion for a joint committee on national security that would represent both. bodies of the Congress; that would rep- resent leadership in Congress as well as those who are not in leadership positions; members from the -Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services, Appropriations; members from the Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees as Well as those appointed by the Chair and the Speaker, ,to oversee the entire opera- tion of our national security apparatus. I believe it is needed. ? ? Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.): I have' had some responsibility in the Senate for a good number of years with refer- ence to the CIA activities. Frankly, I have been more interested in the mili- tary part, the surveillance over, that, and the very highly valuable informa- tion that they have brought us. I have talked to many senators about this. I have not found a single one, except the author of this amend- ment?and there are others?who firmly believe that we ought to abolish covert actions and have no capacity in that field. I say it is a dangerous thing to do. This surveillance is quite a problem, members of the Senate. We have had t up for many, many angles. As an in- dividual senator, I am ready and willing o just get out of the picture. 1 do not , vant to run the thing, so to speak. But s chairman of the Armed Services Committee, which has primary juris- iction here, I am not going to be put ht, nor run over, either. I do not I a , o hink anyone wants td do that.. ustify covert activity. . But none of those factors was Ipres- . 0 Se ent in the Chilean case and none of n. Barry Goldwater (Iteerize: If we destroy our right to engage in cov- those factors has been present in pre- ? ivious eases which later came to light, ert activitY altogether hy the adop- wherein the CIA has -undertaken to cov- ertly 'subvert the gepeppvtevtacbFottuReleM121:301AR39,0go.CIAIRDEMB110432R would even prevent us from going to war?I think we would be making a very grave mistake. I do not support everything that the CIA has done. On the other hand, I do not know everything it has done, and I do not think we necessarily have to -know. I think this would be dangerous. I cite the example of a member of the House of Representatives who hap- pened to have seen, so he says, a -page of testiinony. We do not know whether . he saw that testimony or not. But on this one statement, in which, in my ' opinion, he violated his pledge to. se- - crecy, the whole CIA has come under criticism. I do not believe it is fair of this body to accept the hearsay words of a man who divulged classified mate- rial. So, I hope we will defeat this amend- ment and defeat it soundly. I think I am safe in saying that the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, to- . gether with the chairman of the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, would be willing to institute proper hearings, at which time we could hear all argu- ments for and against the operation of our intelligence collecting agencies. Sen. Clifford Case (R-101.J.): If I may express my 'own view about covert ac- tivities, it is that they all should be re- garded as wrong. There ought not to be an institutionalization of them, even to the extent that we have now. I do not think that a committee is the answer. We have a committee down- town, a Committee of 40, which is sup- posed to review this matter and advise . the President; and he acts on their ad- vice in most cases, I understand. We have a committee here, when it meets. I am not complaining that it does not meet more often, because I do not think a committee is the answer. Once we get into an institutionalize- , tion of this kind of thing, we begin to make it respectable, and that I do not like. There ought to be a general rule against it, with a general understand= ing of the American -people that on oc- casion the President has to act in vio- lation of the law, if you will?our law, other laws?and take action in the in- terest of a country, in great emer- gency. This I think he does at his own peril and subject to being either sup- ported or turned down by the country, after the fact. I think this is about as close as we can came to any statement about how this matter ought to be han- dled. I would, of course, consider any 'pro- posal made for procedural reform here, but I want to state now that I do not think any such thing' is possible be- cause of the nature of the animal with which we are dealing. Sen. Howard. Baker (R-Tenne: The thing that really disturbs and dis- tresses me is that I am not sure in my mind that any of us have any way to know whether or not covert operations 'are being properly conducted, or con- ducted at all, or for what purpose. I do not think there is a man in the legislative part of the .government who really knows what is going on in the intelligence community, and I am ter- ribly upset about it. I am afraid of this 0?42110/011' or t.he first time, I , z e atortal career I am 5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ? frightened. I am generally 'frightened ? of the unknown. I have proposed, with 32, co-sponsors In the Senate, to create a special Joint? , ComMittee on 'Intelligence Oversight. Through such a committee, I hope re . will know. We do not know today, so ; itle with great reluctance that I will 'vote against this amendment, ? . Mr. Abourezk: I have just ? heard' ? some of the most incredible arguments I have heard in my life, arguments in favor of continued breaking , and viola- tion of the laws of the United States and of other countries, promoted by' the agents of the Central Intelligence 4. Agency. ? ? I do not know why anybody in Con-, ? gress or in this country 'wants to fl- ? nance a secret army?and that Is ex- ? actly what the CIA has been?a secret. army going around fighting unde- clared wars, without the knowledge of?; any of us in Congress until it is too late, without the knowledge of any- body in the country until it is too late. It seems to me that the arguments in ? favor of having covert operations whicti, can at some points break the law have as little validity as the argu- ment that we ought to maintain a Overt operation permanently. I that because, if this 'country is ever in_ danger of atack or under threat from 4nother country, we have a right to CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 4 October 1974 Winds of change declare war and to operate under' the rules of warfare that we have agreed to in the various Geneva Conventions, in which I am convinced we would then be legally operating in the man- ner that the CIA is no* operating. ? Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (It-ore.): TO me, it is transparently olnqous that the CIA's covert operations, under-4 taken in Chile to "destabilize" the Al- lende government, were in violation of these commitments of , international law. At the very least, such operations compromise the sincerity of our loudly proclaimed desire for world peace and world freedom, I think we . ought to address ourselves to the le- gal obligations this nation has under- taken when it has affixed its signature to these various statements and these various charters. That is why I feel that the amend- ment offered by the senator from South Dakota really does not go far enough. I should like to go far- ther, to put this Senate on record that we totally and completely oppose any involvement whatsoever in covert act- : ivity. That does not deny the gathering - of information and intelligence, but in- dicates the refusal of this Senate to permit-the CIA to go beyond gathering intelligence into an action of covert ac- tivity. Sen.'Stuart Symington (D-Mo.): I am in great sympathy with much of this ' thinking of the senator from South Da- kota?but I agree with the able 'sena- tor from Minnesota. I do not believe ' this is the way it should be done.. What should be done is the estab- lishment of a joint committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations and. the Committee on Armed Services? and I have so presented to thedistin- guished chairman of the Armed Serv- ' ices Committee for many years. We. have a strange dichotomy here. In every country of the world, the head of the CIA reports to the ambas- ? sador. That has been true ever since ? the issuance of the so-called Kennedy ." ? Letter. But when information comes , back here, whereas the State Depart. ..4. ? meat aupervises ambassadors, the . , Armed Services Committee supervises - the CIA. This situation should be corrected, s and I believe it will be corrected. On : the other hand, I do not think this is ? the bill where it should be considered. -Inasmuch as 95 per cent or more of ' the work of the CIA has to do with ; countries with which we are not at" war, normally at least some of the mat:, ters of the CIA should come under the ? Foreign Relations Committee, it is- clear that the Foreign Relations Conv-.- mittee should at least have some Inter- est in reviewing the work of the 'Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. CIA cloak'and dadder By William H. Stringer ? A short While after the Communist regime of Jacob? Arbenz was over- thrown in Guatemala, with some help from the United States Central In- telligence Agency, the United Fruit Company took a group of newsmen on a junket to Central America. I was one of the newsmen. There, among the mountains and the volcanos, we saw banana plantations, palm oil ? plantings, experimental farms, all ? maintained by the United Fruit Com- pany. We were brought home on a spic-and- span boat full of bananas. My conclusion, at that point, was that if Arbenz aimed at upsetting this ? setup, he was doing Guatemala a major disservice. And that it was a "good thing" that the CIA had helped ? to get rid of this Communist regime. (Particularly since it was close to the Panama Canal.) Still, of course, the U.S. was, by ? means of the CIA, interfering with Central American politics. Later, when in the Philippines,. I heard numerous individuals, both of- ficials and laymen, lament that Ra- mon Magsaysay had been killed when ? his airplane hit a mountain. He was a man of great promise, a leader who could have done much to set the Philippines on a clear road to demo- cratic self-government. That the CIA had helped Magsaysay and helped in putting down the threat of the Com- munist Huk guerrillas seemed to me a worthwhile contribution to Asian peace. Was the U.S. Interfering in Philip- pine affairs? Then there was Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh. He was a wily individual who took to his bed and wept when affairs went wrong. He nationalized the Iranian oil in- dustry and he threatened to over- throw the Shah. He was abruptly ousted from office, with assistance, apparently, from the CIA. Should the CIA have left well enough alone and let things take their course? Each individual must make up his own mind about such matters. What I am saying is that the CIA's record is hardly one of repeated failures. ? Now what about Chile and the end of the Allende regime? I know a lady in' Chile who, speaking for the middle- class point of view, declares that Chile could not have settled down to solid government so long as Allende was seeking constantly to nudge it into communism. Of course, neither she nor most Chileans expected that the overthrow of Allende would be accompanied by harsh repressive measures. What is at issue here is whether, at all times, the CIA must eschew covert operations. CIA director William E, Colby recently said that the CIA could abandon every kind of covert action, without "a major impact on our current activities, or the current Security of the United States." Is this actually so? There is an "old. boy network," the Coinmittee of 40,. long-experienced 'American officials who believe it to be worthwhile to retain the CIA's capacity for covert activities. These people believe they are aware of the basic interests of the U.S., and that there are times when covert "interference" can help. , Director Colby has moved to reduce covert actions and to focus more of the CIA's activities back to its origi- nal mission, which is the gathering ef Intelligence. This is probably wise. What is not so clear is whether Congress, which is notoriously loose- jawed when it comes to a question of keeping one's mouth shut, should be given any more control of the CIA than it now has. Every attempt in the past few years to give Congress more effective supervision of the CIA has been voted down. Crosby S. Noyes writes in the Washington Star: "There are a good many areas in the world today where the future of democratic government hangs in precarious balance and where action ? or lack of action ? by the United States could well be deci- sive." There could be situations where we certainly would not want to send In, the marines. Nor do we want our potential opponents to indulge in a lot of shoving around, with impunity. This leaves a very occasional situ- ation where covert action is advis- able. 6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 4Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340605-5 * NEW YORK . TIMES 07 October 1974: Cont. oiling Secret Operations By Harry Rositzke MIDDLEBURG, Va.?The dramatic and divisive issue of secret operations abroad has again been raised by the recent exposures of the United States role in Chile. These operations have been challenged as an illegal and im- moral form of diplomacy impermissible in .an open society. They have been derided as antiquated holdovers from the cold war, and have been de- ? nounced as acts of the executive not open to Congressional or popular judgment. The basie questions raised are simple: What, if any, secret operations should the United States carry out abroad? Who is to control them? ? With Harry S. Truman's assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1948 of a charter for secret-action op- erations, in addition to its espionage and counterespionage missions, suc- cessive Administrations have without ? exception used their secret arm of Government to achieve foreign policy objectives for which they could not, or would not, openly use the resources of the State and Defense Departments. Two main types of action. opera- tions, political and paramilitary, vary in method, scale and degree of secrecy. The most expensive, conspicuous and flagrantly illegal are paramilitary operations. During the early stages of the cold war, they were directed against the Soviet orbit itself, many in support of ? resistance groups in the Baltic countries, the Ukraine, Poland and Albania, and after the Korean war in northern China. ? In the nineteen-fifties, 'President' Dwight Dwight D, Eisenhower approved sup- port for the Indonesian rebels against President Sukarno and authorized _the invasion of Guatemala to prevent the ? introduction of Soviet arms into the . Western Hemisphere. ? He left to his successor,' John F. Kennedy, the legacy of paramilitary action, which resulted in disaster against Premier Fidel Castro's regime. WASHINGTON POST 04 October 1974 After the Bay of Pigs, the C.LA.'s paramilitary capability was concen- trated almost exclusively in Indochina. ? Political-action operations?secret support of foreign leaders, political parties and labor unions, and the preparation of coups and countercoups ?have been carried out under the aegis of every postwar President. Under Mr. Truman, the anti-Commu- nist fight focused on Europe, starting with substantial open and secret sup- port for Italy's democratic forces to stave off a Communist victory in the 1948 elections. Mr. Eisenhower's main political-action' moves were in the Middle East, both with backdoor diplomacy in the Arab countries and the unseating of the regime of Mo- hammed Mossadegh in Iran. ? A C.LA, political-action role was an intrinsic part of Mr. Kennedy's coun- terinsurgency program, which waS carried on by Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. The Alliance for Progress in Latin America entailed support for friendly governments in countering domestic. insurgencies as well as action against regimes sym- pathetic to Havana or Moscow. In friendly countries, the C.I.A. trained and equipped national police and security organs to deal on their own with active insurgencies, mainly in Bolivia and Venezuela, but on a smaller scale in other countries as well. In countries such as, Ecuador or Brazil,. which were willing or eager to recog- nize Mr.. Castro's Cuba, it helped to weaken or replace regimes. Chile's place in . this over-simple paradigm is unique. In a society with a solid democratic tradition, a "friend- ly!' Government not facing a domestic insurgency was replaced in a free elec- tion by an "unfriendly"' coalition of parties enjoying strong financial and political support from Moscow and Havana. Secret political action was called upon to supplement American policy both before and after the elec- tion of Dr. 'Salvador Allende Gossens as 'President in 1970. ? Although the legal and moral issues involved in interfering in the affairs'of "sit and participate in the ac- ill Leaders tivities" of the panel. ? '? I The subcommittee and its* counterpart in the House exist join S mate 'to keep a congressional watch on CIA activities and spend- , ? ? CIA Paniel ing. The two are the only; groups in Congress that are ? told exactly how much money the CIA spends. But neither subcommittee submits reports, ? The Senate oversight sub. and their activities are almost committee on the Central In- as secret as the CA itself. ' telligence Agency as ex- Stennis' announcement panded yesterday to include, came after the ? Senate ac- the Senate's two party leaders., eepted Wednesday a foreign Sen. Johri C. Stennis (D? aid bill amendment, offered Miss.), chairman of the Armed by liberals, that would have Services CIA subcommittee, banned secret CIA activities said Democratic leader Mike abroad unless the President Mansfield of Montana and Re-, himself declared them to be in publican leader Hugh Scott of the interest of national secu- United Press International Pennsylvania had aareed .tco- Approvea roetRelease 2001/08/08 : C A-RDP77-00432 7 other countries may never be settled ' to the satisfaction of the Congress, the news media or the public, there are some steps President Ford can take , now to reduce the confusion, and pos- sibly the debate, about American secret operations abroad. A first simple step would be to - transfer the responsibility for secret paramilitary operations to the Defense Department. Never totally, secret, demanding complex logistic support, they do not belong in a secret civilian agency. Political contacts ranging from senior government officials to labor leaders are a natural element in any secret intelligence service. If such con- tacts are nsed for action purposes, they can normally be kept secret? short of coups or high-level leaks. There will be occasions, even in a world of d?nte, when the executive will decide that secret political action is required. The President can most effectively appease some critics by inviting selected representatives of Congress to sit with the National Security Coun- cil when it considers secret-action proposals. What Congress needs are _I previews?not more post-mortems. Harry Rositzhe worked in secret oper- ations for 27 years with the Office of Strategic Services and the Central ? Intelligence Agency before his retire: ment in 1970. .1.5,11.01111????111???11. BALTIMORE SUN 4 October 1974 Ex-spy tilts with, CIA, I - London (Reuter)?A former United States spy turned Marxist, ' Philip Agee, yester- day moved to embarrass -the Central Intelligence Agency by making public a list said to be' .the agency's operatives in ' Mexico. ? A book by Mr. Agee, to be *published here in January, tells of his work with the CIA ' in- Latin America up to the time he resigned, disillusioned, in 1969. . Yesterday he told a press .conference held above a Fleet 'street pub that he wanted to; expose CIA officers and drivei them out of the countries] where they operated. He said his list of agency' personnel in Mexico, under Richard Sampson, a station chief, was drawn up recently "by comrades who I trained to follow the comings and goings of the CIA." The 39-year-old writer, who now lives in southwest Eng- land, painted the agency as the "secret political police of' i American capitalism and the broirobf3e48661g wxploita- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 LOS ANGELES TIMES 6 October 1974 U.S. Ought to Suspend Covert iActivities Abroad BY. DAVID WISE When Soviet party chief Leonid :set forth in the law, was to pull , Brezhnev was in Washington in 1973 together, the intelligence informa- for a summit 'meeting, Richard Nix-, Von that the President needs td. 'make decisions,in the field of foreign on introduced him to a short, thin' man with grajenk black hair,' iharP policy. There is nothing in the law ' 'features and very cold blue eyes be- about overthrowing governments;'. hind glasses rimmed in fIesh-colored there is language, however, permit- plastic frames. ting the CIA to perform such "other Brezhnev stared for. a moment at functions" as the NSC may direct. ' William E. Colby, director ' of the Under. this _umbrella clause, the 'CIA has engaged in its global 'ciiity Day. id Wise is the coauthor of "The ?tricks, manipulated the politics of Invisible Government," a critical study other countries, directed a secret war in Lees, funneled millions of of the CIA, and of "The Espionage ? dollars through foundation conduits Establishment." ,His latest bpok is The Politics of Lying." ? ? groups, dropped agenti by pare- established a secret base at Camp Hale, Colo., nearly 10,000 feet high in the Rockies, and there trained Tibetan return to their homeland to fight against the CM. nose Communists. CIA covert opera- tors later claimed that some of the ? ' Tibetans trained in Colorado helped 'the Dalai Lama to escape to India in ' 1959. Into into student, academic and, labor' Central Intelligence Agency, and alked:"Is he a dangerous man?" ' Colby replied soothingly: "The more we ? know of each other, the safer we both will be."The answer was disarming,' but it also was consistent with the CIA's current strategy of emphasizing its information, intelligence-gathering, and analytic functions, and down- playing its covert operations or 'dirty ?tricks' The CIA does indeed collect foreign intelligence. But its Director- ate of Operations?which Colby for- merly headed?also conducts secret political operations. around the globe. These have ranged from pay- 'merits to foreign political leaders and attempts to rig elections, to overthrowing governments and pa- ramilitary invasions. CIA-backed coups have sometimes resulted in the assassination of the political leaders who are overthrown. At times, the CIA has even operated its own air force, army and navy. Increasingly, these secret opera- tions have come. under criticism, in and out of Congress. Covert activi- ties have focused public attention on the question of whether the United 'States has the right to intervene se- cretly in the internal affairs of other nations. And secret operations have raised basic questions about the role of an intelligence agency in a demo- tracy? Recent disclosures that the CIA, apparently with the approval of high officials of the Nixon _Administra- tion. 1,S ja Chile to destabilize" the Marxist govern- ment of Salvador .Allende have in- creased demands for either an end to such secret political operations, or tighter control by Congress over CIA, or both. The CIA. was created in 19-47...ii?' vari Chute .in ous countries and. served as the clandestine arm of the U.S.? foreign policy. ? A partial list of such covert opera- , tions includes the following: Burma: In the 1950's the CIA *fi- nanced approximately 12,000 Chi- nese Nationalist troops who fled to. Burma as the Communists took over. mainland China in .1949. The CIA's troops, discovering poppies to be more profitable than politics, soon be h involved.lyin e opi- um trade. China: In the early 1950's;the in- telligence agency air-dropped agents Into the People's Republic of China. Two CIA men, John T. Downey and Richard Fecteau, were.eaptured and spent 20 years in Chinese prisons be- fore they were released. Philippines: Also in the early ? . 1950's, the CIA backed Ramon Mag. saysay's campaign against the Com- munist Huk guerrillas. Iran: In 1953,. the CIA overthrew the gaveinment or Premier Mo-! hammed -Mossadegh, who had na- tionalized the Iranian oil industry. ?The coup was led by CIA agent Ker-* nit "Kim" Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The operation kept the ? shah in Tower, and in its wake, American oil compa- nies were permitted into Iran. _ Guatemala: In 1954, the CIA top- pled the Communist-dominated 'government of President Jacob? Ar- benz Guzman of Guatemala with the, help of a CIA air force of old World War II , fighter planes. President Eisenhower later confirmed that he!e CIA operation.- 'Indonesia: In 1958:with a secret air force of B-26 bombers the CIA backed Indonesian rebels against the, government of President Sukarno. One of the CIA oilot Allen Lw , re the successor to the Office of Strafe-I tu gin Services (OSS). The same legisla- ton created the National Security r, Council. The purpose of the CIA, as 8 nee Pope, was shot down and cap- red; he was freed in 1962 through e intervention of Robert F. Ken- edy. Tibet: In the late 1950's, the CIA Cuba: In 1061, a brigade of Cuban , exiles trained by the CIA on a coffee plantation in Guatemala invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in an unsuc- cessful attempt to overthrow the govern rr et of Fidel Castro. More than 2.)0 of the invaders died on the beaches and almost 1,200 were cap- tured in President Kennedy's worst foreign policy disaster. Vietnam: In 1963, the CIA worked Closely With the South Vietnamese ? generals who carried out the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was killed. In Vietnam, the CIA - also created the Phoenix program, which killed 20,587 Vietcong during the period William Colby headed it, between 1968 and 1971. Bolivia: In 1967, a. team of. CIA operatives was sent to Bolivia, where they helped to track down.Er- nesto "Che" Guevara, former aide to Castro: Guevara was captured ? and ? killed. '-? ? j The rationale for all such covert CIA operations is that they are justi- fied and necessary to protect Ameri- can national security. A secret five- man government committee, known .over the years by various names and currently as the Forty Committee, has the responsibility of approving covert operations in advance. At pre- sent, the chairman of the committee is Secretary of State Henry A. Kis- singer., Its other members are Un- dersecretary of State for Political Af- fairs Joseph J. Sisco; William P. Cle- ments, Jr., the deputy ,secretary of defense; Air Force 'Gen. George S Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs ,of Staff, and Colby. The extent to which. thc Forty Committee controls secret CIA oper- ations .remains 'uncertain for the very reason that the committee, like the -CIA itself, operates in great se- crecy. In any event; .what control does exist is within the executive branch; the Forty Committee does not include any members of Con- ? gress in its ranks. Nor, as far as .can: be determined, does the. CIA discuss its covert operations to any signifi- cant extent with the four shadowy House and Senate subcommittees that supposedly monitor CIA acitivi:- ties. In the case of Chile, various Ex- ecutive branch witnesses assured congressional committees that the United States had not 'intervened. against Allende. - In an era of cold war, secret inter- - vention in other countries might have seemed justified to many Americans. They do not appear justi- ? fied today. There is no moral or legal basis for covert operations?the 1947 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003400b5-5 act does not specifically authorize them?and such intervention vio- lates. the charter of the United Na- tions, Which the United States is pledged to respect. Moreover. the Constitution gives Congress the war power;-secret oper- ations involving paramilitary action and the overthrow of governments are clearly the equivalent of unde- LONDON TIMES 2 October 1974 dared war and, on their face, uncon- stitutiona I. The price of secret operations is too high in a democracy that rests on the consent of the governed. Often, the government has lied to protect covert CIA activities. Such 'official lying has eroded confidence in our national leaders and the American system of government A dangerous gamble by the junta ruling Chile There was a good deal of irony about President Ford's recent Justification of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile. The CIA had been ? authorized to intervene, he said, because of the threat to the Opposition news media. and the opposition parties under Presi- dent Allende. But Mr Ford did not mention the fate of the news , media and the parties under the present military regime which, unlike that of President Allende, has Simply suppressed all oppo- sition. The fact is that the CIA was throwing its weight, once again, on the side of the right-wing ? elements in Latin America? those which opposed the social- ist experiment of the Unidad popular government, regardless . of the fact that it had been con- ?gtitutionally elected. This inter- vention is not likely to have - .been decisive (the CIA, after all, - failed in its original objective of preventing the election of Dr Allende). But it must have helped. ? The most interesting, question now is where the Chilean mill-. tary regime -is heading. It was not, after all, a typical Latin American takeover last year. The Chilean armed forces have not made a habit of taking. over the government of the country, ? and they only, moved last year ? after a period, of some hesita- tion: Once they had taken the plunge, however, they sur- prised almost everyone by the ? thoroughness and ruthlessness with which they acted?and still continue to act. They were not a government of transition, they ? said, but intended to re-shape Chile's - national life. They .decided that Marxism was the enemy, and that it must be rooted out. But they went even further than that, and now blame the country's political parties for virtually? all the ? troubles of this century. They have shown no urgency at all about handing power back to civilians. When they - first took over, they appointed a special committee to write a new constitution?one that would exclude Marxist parties. But members of the committee say that it may take another year, or even two, to complete their work, and General Augusto Pinochet, the head of state, has said that it may take the junta 20 years to achieve its goals. The junta's philosophy was set out with some vigour in a long speech which General Pinochet made on September 11, the first anniversary of the military coup. The present "recess" of the political parties would have to continue for several years more, he said. It could only be lifted when "a new generation of Chileans, formed healthy civic and patriotic habits, and inspired by an authentic national feeling, can assume the direction of public life ". General Pinochet showed nothing but ' defiance towards criticism of the military regime from abroad. "It is one of the most infamous campaigns," he ? said, "though well financed and orchestrated, that has been directed . against a country in modern times. It has one single . origin?international commun- ism." The fact of the matter; he said, was that Chile offered lessons from which other countries could learn. The military takeover was "the culmination of the greatest defeat that communism has suffered in the world in the past 30 years. This is the way that Chile's military rulers think today, and one wonders if the CIA is . pleased with them. Many of the junta's support- ers would in fact like to see an easing of the military grip. Some such easing is regularly said to be imminent, and there is talk, for instance, of releasing political prisoners. In the long run, the future of the Military regime will de- pend on its success in handling the economy. Many members of the middle class remember the shortages and queues of the Allende period, and are glad to see things returning to normal for them. But things are not bright for everyone and, by their violent tactics, the mili- tary men are taking a gamble. If ever there was a reaction against them, it too could be violent. Peter Strafford ? It is high time that the CIA put 'away its cloak and dagger and packed up its bag of deadly tricks. The CIA should be confined to gath- ering intelligence overseas. Pres- ident Ford, Secretary Kissinger and their successors should conduct a foreign policy that is visible and ac- countable to the American people. THE OBSERVER, London 29 September 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043 9 from WALTER SCHWARZ NEW DEUR, 28 September INDIAN fears of subver- sion by the CIA, rudely re- awakened by disclosure of the American role in the overthrow of Allende in Chile, are now embodied in a Bill to check the flow of secret foreiga funds into India. . The Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Bill puts a check on politicians, officials and journalists. But there are fears that the measure may backfire. While controlling the inflow of secret money could prove to be impossible, church leaders, trade unionists and journalists fear that the Governm.ent may use its new powers to curtail their free- dom. Mrs Gandhi, the Prime Minister, was reported as telling a party meeting re- cently that the disclosures over Chile were highly rele- vant to India, and that 'some countries' were 'still cap- able' of interfering in India. Her main expressed fear, based on 1967 disclosures about CIA money in foundations and institutions ' throughout the world, is that Washington may try to limit the degree of socialism to be allowed in India. But a deeper,, unspoken fear may be that the US will oppose India's attempts to consoli- date its hegemony on the sub-continent. After the Chile disclosures in Washington, the American Ambassador here, Mr Patrick Moynihan, cabled Dr. Kissin- ger saying: 'Mrs Gandhi does not think we accept her regime. She thinks we are a profoundly selfish and cynical counter-revolutionary power.' The cable concluded that because of these fears Mrs Gandhi 'will, accordingly, proceed to develop nuclear weapons and a missile deli- very system?preaching non- violence all the way.' R861511363f4t0ftir Ca.The Approved F.or Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 from all Indian parties after disclosures that American money had influenced both Government and Opposition candidates in the 1967, elec- tions. These in turn led to a mass of fresh disclosures of Soviet money in friendship socieles, youth groups, stu- dent organisations and trade unions, and American money in foundations. A leaked Indian intollik &nee report showed that all parties, including the ruling Congress, got money from dubious sources. ? It was also revealed that some newspapers and joie.- nalist received disguised bribes, either in cash or in the ferm, of inflated payments for advertisements or bulk; buying of copies that wore never printed.. ' Under the new Bill, Parlia. TIME, SIPUMBER 30, 1974 mentary candidates, journa. lists, officials and MPs will be absolutely forbidden to accept foreign ' contribte tions '?money, gifts or hos- pitality. Organisations of apoliti- cal nature but not being political. parties' will have to seek Government permission before accepting similar , benefits. Associations such as churches will have to sub. mit detailed accounts of foreign remittances, A clause which hen boon described', as sinister by critics of the Bill gives the Government power to extend ,the Bill's categories to in- clude 'any person,' and to exempt any body r choose& A writer in the Indian Express says this is 'nothing short of dispensing power.' Penalties range up to five INTELLIGENCE/COVER STORY years' imprisonment. Indian journalists writing for foreign newspapers will not be affected, because pay. manta by way of salary or re- muneration are exempted from the Bill's provistons. But some journalists fear that the Government could abuse its powers under the Bill to discriminate between writers it likes and those it does not. ' Church and trade union leaders are reported to be worried that the Bill might open the door to harassment. The fear in especially alive in predominantly Christian areas with, active resistance movements, like Nagaland, where the Church Is closely identified with the people. Trade unions also fear f718. 'The Bill was originally , meant te control the CIA. But when the civil servants of the Homo Min. istry got to drafting it, it turned out to be directed mainly against Communist money,' complained a left. wing critic. But the Bill seems to be directed impar- tially at the CIA and the KGB. The most plausible fear ? expressed is that the Bill's declared objectives will prove unenforceable, while it will enable officialdom to harass opponents and critics. Perhaps, after all, Mrs Gandhi's best guarantee whist CIA subversion was given in Dr Kissinger's pro- mise to her last week?that '1f she sent him the name of any American in India inter- fering in politics, he we'll& have him out of India within 24 hours.' , ? ? The CIA: Time to Come In from the Cold OUCS1/011: "Under what international law do we have a right to attempt to de- stabilize the constitutionally elected gov- ernment of another country?" Answer: "I am not going to pass judg- ment on whether it is permitted or au- thorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of the countries involved." That blunt response by President Gerald Ford at his press conference last week was either remarkably careless or remarkably candid. It left the troubling impression, which the Administration afterward did nothing to dispel, that the U.S. feels free to subvert another gov- ernment whenever it suits American policy. In an era of detente with the So- viet Union and improving relations with China, Ford's words seemed to repre- sent an anachronistic, cold-war view of national security reminiscent of the 1950s. Complained Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho with consider- able hyperbole: "[It is] tantamount to saying that we respect no law save the law of the jungle." The question on "destabili7ing" for- eign governments followed Ford's con- firmation that the Nixon Administra- tion had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to wage an $8 mil- 'lion campaign in 1970-73 to aid oppo- nents of Chilean President Salvador Allende's Marxist government (see box page 21). Until last week, members of both the Nixon and Ford Administra- tions had flatly denied that the U.S. had been involved in undermining Allende's regime. They continue to insist that the CIA was not responsible for the 1973 coup that left Allende dead and a re- pressive right-wing junta in his place. Congressmen were outraged by the news that they had once again been mis- led by the Executive Branch. More im- portant, disclosure of the Chile opera- tion helped focus and intensify the debate in Congress and the nation over the CM: Has the agency gone too far in, recent years? Should it be barred from interfering in other countries' domestic affairs? Where it has erred, was the CIA out of control or was the White House at fault for misdirecting and misusing the agency? Should it be more tightly su- pervised, and if so, by whom? In ad- dition, the controversy spotlighted the fundamental dilemma posed by an open, democratic society using covert activity ?the "dirty tricks" or "black" side of in- telligence organizations?as an instru- ment of foreign policy. At the center of the storm was Wil- liam Egan Colby, 54, the CIA's director for the past year. Shrewd and capable, Colby has sought from the day he took office as director to channel more of the CIA'S efforts into the gathering, evalu- ation and analysis of information and less into'covert actions?the "operation- al" side of the intelligence business. Says ?he: "The CIA's cloak-and-dagger days have ended." Certain Actions. But obviously, not quite. It was Colby who oversaw the last months of the CIA activity in Chile as the agency's deputy director for oper- ations in 1973, though this operation ap- parently ended shortly after he became director. But it was also Colby who dis- closed details of the covert action to a closed hearing of the House Armed Ser- vices Subcommittee on Intelligence last April 22. A summary of his testimony was leaked to the press two weeks ago. By the time Ford met with the press, C,olby's revelations were more than a week old; the President had been briefed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and doubtless was ready to field report- els' questions. Said Ford: "Our Govern- ment, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes." Since so much had already leaked out, Ford perhaps had no choice but to make an admission. But his statement seemed to set no or few limits on clan- destine intervention in another country. A somewhat sharper but still highly flex- ible limit was set afterward by Kissin- ger. He told TIME: "A democracy can engage in clandestine operations only with restraint, and only in circumstanc- es in which it can say to itself in good conscience that this is the only way to achieve vital objectives." Moreover, there was an unsettlingly disingenuous quality to Ford's words. Was the intent of the Chilean opera- tion really to preserve freedom of the press and opposition political parties, as he insisted, or simply to undermine Allende? In this context, it is worth not- ing that after the coup, the U.S. did not object when the new military regime. banned all political parties and shut down all opposition publications. There were other disquieting notes in the statement. Ford described the op- eration as being "in the best interest of the people of Chile"?a throwback to an America-knows-what's-best-for-you ? line of years past that was particularly offensive to many countries. In addition, Ford did not make the small but cru- cial distinction between intelligence gathering and covert operations, which led some critics to suspect that he was not wholly familiar with the subject. Misled Congress. There was a de- gree of ingenuousness, perhaps even hy- pocrisy, in much of the indignation, since the CIA is widely known to have carried out Chile-style operations else- where before. What galled Congress and many other U.S. and foreign leaders was the fact that members of the Nixon Ad- ministration had repeatedly misled Con- gress about the Chile operation. At his confirmation last year as Secretary of State, Kissinger assured the Senate For- eign Relations Committee that since 1970, the U.S. had done nothing in Chile except try to "strengthen the democratic political parties"?although critics ar- gue that fostering strikes and demon- strations amounted to a lot more than that. During another hearing, then CIA Director Richard Helms was asked if the CIA had passed money to Allende's political opponents. Helms' response: "No, sir." Former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Charles A. Meyer, former Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry and other Ad- 10 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ? ministration officials gave similar testi- mony, though they may not have known about the operation. The revelations, and Ford's confir- mation of them, stunned many in Con- gress. "Unbelievable," declared Demo- cratic Senator Walter F. Mondale Of Minnesota. 'Unsavory and unprinci- pled," said Church. Democratic Senator Stuart Symington said that the disclo- sure "certainly does not coincide with the testimony that this committee [For- eign Relations] has received." The com- mittee launched a review of the testi- mony and a probe into the Chilean affair. Anxious to heal the rift with Con- gress, Ford and Kissinger briefed nine senior Congressmen at breakfast the next day on Chile and covert affairs in general. Later, ata previously scheduled hearing on detente, Kissinger reiterated . before the Senate Forel= Relations COmmittee that the intent of the CIA op-. eration in Chile was merely to keep the Allende opposition alive and "not to de- stabilize or subvert" his government. Kissinger also conducted two separate briefings at the Senate. Still, Congress. ? was neither convinced.nor mollified. As the week progressed, growing numbers of Representatives and Senators 'called for an all-out review of the CIA, ; The affair served to confirm all the worst suspicions about the CR and its exaggerated image as a vast conspiracy. Reaction abroad ranged from incredu- lity to dismay. The London Times called the revelations "a bitter draught- for those ho regard the U.S. as "sometimes .clumsy, often misunderstood, but fun. damentally honorable in its conduct of international affairs.- West Gernian's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung predict- ed that -the disconcerting naivete with which President Ford enunciated his se- cret service philosophy" would have a "provocative" effect. Grave Decadence.. That was the case in the capitals of the so-called Third . World. From New Delhi. U.S. Ambas- sador Daniel Patrick Moynihan angrily cabled the State Department that he had assured Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the CIA had not been involved in the Chilean coup. Now, he said, she won- dered whether India might not be next. Many Latin Americans shrugged: the episode seemed to confirm their suspi- cions that the CIA invariably is behind the continent's frequent upheavals?po- litical and otherwise. ? Some cynical foreigri reaction was not so much concerned with the CIA ac- tivities themselves as with their becom- ing known. Said a former President of Argentina: -If you ask me as. an Ar- gentine, the CIA intervention .in Chile was w holly illegal interference in the sovereignty of another state. If you ask me to see it from the point of view of an American, the fact that Senators and Congressmen can interfere with the na- tional security interests of the country for poli:ical motives indicates a grave decadence in the system." The uproar recalled two earlier CIA fias.Z.Cs: the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 and he revelacion in 1967 that the agen- cy fcr years had partly funded and ma- nipulated the National Student Associ- ation and dozens of business, labor, religious and cultural groups. Both flaps o?ers'nadc)wecl the positive servietei gat ? Approved r OT R the et.k had rendered before; there were demands for greater restraint by the CIA and elOser control by the Executive Branch. but no real changes came. 'The Chilean affair, however, poten- tially more lasting impact, for the agency has already been badly bruised by the Watergate scandals. Says Mich- igan Representative Lucien Nedzi, chairman of a House committee that oversees the agency: "I don't believe that the CIA will ever he what it was before." Agency officials have admitted that ? despite laws against domestic CIA ac- tivity, they supplied one of the Wake House "plumbers." former CIA Employ- . ee E. Howard Hunt, with bogus iden- tification papers, a wig, a speech-alter- ation device, and a camera in a tobacco pouch. In addition, the agency provid- ed the White House with a psychological profile of Daniel ElLsberg, Political Police. Much to the agen- cy's discomfiture, criticism has come from disillusioned former CIA employ- ees. For two years, the agency struggled in court to. stop publication of The CIA and the Cult a:I-Intelligence, whose prin- cipal author is ex-CIA Officer Victor Marchetti. rhe book accused the agen- cy of using outmoded cold war methods ? and urged that it be prohibited from in- tervening in other nations' affairs under ? any circumstances (TIME. April 22). Another critical book. Inside the Company: A Diary, will be pub- lished in London this January. In it Au- thor Philip Agee, -.Tho, after twelve years of undercover exploits for the CIA in Lat- in America, switched to the side of the leftist revolutionaries he had been hired to defeat, calls the CIA "the secret po- litical police of American capitalism" On the contrary, CIA directors have maintained since the agency's founding 27 years ago last week that clandestine. actions constitute only a small part of CIA activities. Indeed, over the yea.-s, the agency is provided a huge volume of reliable analysis and intelligence data that has served in part as the basis for U.S. defense and foreign policies. But Marchetti reports that the CIA devotes two-thirds of its annual budget (which totals around $750 million) and some 60% to 70% of its estimated 5,000 overseas employees to clandestine operations. That evidently was not the intent of Congress in creating the CIA and giving it almost complete autonomy to safe- guard its secrecy. Originally the agen- cy's principal task was to gather intel- ligence and keep the Government informed about other countries, partic- ularly the Communist nations. That mission was incorporated sym- bolically into the cuk's seal: an eagle sig- . nifying strength and alertness, and a compass rose representing the collection of intelligence data from all over the world. But as the cold war grew, so did the scope of the CIA's duties. The law provided that in addition to collecting information, the CIA was .to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national se- curity as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Under that directive, the CIA actively began try- ing to penetrate and even roll back the Bamboo and Iron Curtains, and to coun- ter Communist influence in other coun- eigfidt200190-1008'c.liCti-RIDPV7 ASO pro-American political parties and in- dividuals, covert propaganda, economic sabotage and paramilitary operations. - Under Cover. In theory, at least, the station chiefs who head CIA offices overseas operate under the cover of some innocuous-sounding embassy job such as attache or special assistant. In practice, some chiefs are well known and some re- main under deep cover, depending on the nature of the country. In London, for example, practically anyone who is interested can learn the identity of the CIA station chief; his arrival was even disclosed in the Manchester Guardian. - In Saigon, the station chiefs identity is well known but, by tacit agreement, nev- er publicized by reporters. In politically turbulent countries, the identity of the station chief is a closely guarded secret. Warns one U.S. ambassador in South America: "If he is named, he will have to be recalled or his life won't be worth a nickel." The extent of their duties also var- ies widely. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, the CIA operatives are all ears but no hands, their activities confined to mon- itoring radio broadcasts from the main- land, interviewing refugees and other in- formation gathering. By his own less than impartial ac- count, Agee's main function for the CIA was to recruit agents in Latin America. In nearly every case, he says, the lure was money. He describes the CIA meth- od of snaring an agent: "You start out by giving him money for his organiza- tion?lots of it?knowing that he will ' eventually take some for himself. When he gets dependent on it, you move in." Once hooked, the recruit is given a lie detector test to discover his weaknesses. Continues Agee: "Then it all hangs out. He can go on serving you as a spy for - the rest of his life." Americans usually learn of the agen- cy's covert actions only when they fail so spectacularly that they cannot be kept secret. Examples: the U-2 incident in 1960, when. the Soviets shot down the spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Pow- ers; the CIA-directed invasion of Cuba in 1961; the Chilean operation. Over the years, there were successes for the CIA as well: the 1953 coup that deposed Pre- mier Mohammed Mossadegh (who had nationalized a British-owned oil compa- ny and was believed to be in league with Iran's Communist Party) and kept pro- American Shah Mohammed Reza Pah- lavi on the throne of Iran; the 1954 rev- olution that overthrew the Communist- dominated government of President Jacob? Arbenz in Guatemala. The CIA has been suspected of participating in the 1967 military coup in Greece, the capture and killing in 1967 of Cuban Revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia, and the 1970 overthrow of Prince No- rodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. The CIA was deeply involved in the war in Southeast Asia. Starting in 1962, it organized and equipped an army in Laos to fight the Communist Pathet Lao. The army, which grew to 30,000 men, costs the U.S. at least $300 million a year, but Colby credits it with having prevented a Communist takeover. Prison Camps. The chief justifica- tion for CIA operations is that the other side is doing the same?and more. Com- munist powers have an advantage over Western democracies. Communist par- 41i2fkooto toodjimeiel5fism Moscow or Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 other Communist centers (although in recent years many have become more Independent) but take the guise of local political movements. Moreover, Com- munist dictatorships without inquisitive legislatures or press can organize and finance secret operations In other coun- tries in a way that no open society can, : Unlike American leaders, Communist leaders never acknowledge such activ- ities. The Soviet Union's KGB, headed by Yuri Andropov, regularly rims what . the Russian bureaucrats call aktivniye ' meropriyatiye (literal translation: active ' measures). The KGB's budget is un- known, but it has about 300,000 employ- ? ees, many of them assigned to domestic " duties like operating the vast network of prison camps. Overseas, a majority ? of the Soviet embassy personnel are KGB . officers. As with the CIA, the KGB's failures are better known than its successes. The ' ? .lorganization apparently no longer corn- iinits political assassinations abroad, but it does try to subvert or overthrow un- friendly governments?as in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1963 and Ghana in 1966. , ? In Mexico, authorities uncovered a KGB- , onsored guerrilla group in 1971. Just ?Ep t week officials in Belgrade disclosed : unsuccessful Soviet attempt to set up , I ,a. pro-Moscow underground party in Yu- ;goslavia. Moreover, the KGB's Disinfor- mation Department tries tO sow suspi- cion abroad by circulating false ru- mors and forged documents. A case in point: the KGB campaign now going on to convince Indians that American ex- change scholars and Peace Corps vol- unteers are actually CIA agents. COm.mtmist China's equivalent of the CIA and KGB is so secret that the Chi- nese are believed not to even have a name for it. Among Western Sinologists, it is known as the Chinese Intelligence Service and is believed to,be part of the foreign. ministry's information depart- ment. The service's primary job is to sift intelligence data from members of Chi- nese embassies and overseas news cor- respondents, who act as secret agents. The Chinese Communist Party, howev- er, does funnel funds to revolutionary groups abroad, particularly in Asia and Africa. From time to time, Chinese co- ver...operations also have failed spectac- ularly. In 1965, Indonesia reacted to China's attempt to sponsor a revolution in the. archipelago by butchering tens Of thousands of Communists. ? Phoenix Program. Few men un- derstand better these clashes of anon- ymous armies on darkling plains or are More practiced in the covert arts than the CIA's William Colby, who has spent most of his adult years in the world of spies. Son of a career Army colonel, he is a Princeton graduate who worked for the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. In 1943 he parachuted into France to join a Resistance .outfit. Later. he headed a unit that was dropped into Norway to sabotage a railway line. Mustered out as a major. Colby earned a law degree from Columbia. Ile practiced law in New York until the Ko- rean War, when he joined the successor organization to the OSS, the CIA. After serving in Stockholm and Rome. he was named CIA station chief in Saigon in 1959. Three years later he became chief of the CIA's Far East division in NVaSh..- ington. lie returned to Saigon in 19'6S tO take charge or the pacificatiOn effort. Oich included the notorious Phoenix pt,,grarn. By 1971, Phoenia had eau,,ed the deaths of 20,587 Viet Cong mem. bers and sympathizers, according to Col- by's own count. He explains, however, that when he took over, a year after the prograin began, he "Laid Sum on cap- turing rather than killing." In discussing the victims, he claims that "87% were killed by regular military in skirmishes." To all outward appearances, Colby is unsuited for dirty tricks. "I'd call him an enlightened cold warrior," says a CIA' officer. "But remember that this busi- ness is cold." In 1971, Colby went back ; to the CIA labyrinth in Langley, Va. His private life-style matches his professional modesty. Father of four (a 'fifth child died last year), he lives in- conspicuously in an unpretentious house in suburban Maryland. He does not smoke, drinks only are occasional gin- and-tonic or glass of Wine, and is a de- vout Catholic. His favorite recreations are Sailing and bicycling.. Since taking over as director, Colby has tried to reform the CIA's operations and rehabilitate its reputation. To woo support, he has made a point of being more open and' candid than his prede- cessors. He has in effect undertaken a 'task that to many seerns'self-contradic- tory: to be open about operations that by definition must be secret. Who ever - heard of an espionage chief being pub- licly accountable? So far this year, Colby and other CIA officials have testified be- fore IS congressional committees on 30 occasions. Colby estimates that he has talked with 132 reporters in the last year, though rarely for quotation. Ile has also made more public speeches than any previous CIA direc- tor. Recently, for example, he agreed to sneak at a conference on the CIA and co- vert actions, which was sponsored in Washington, D C., by the Center for Na- tional Security Studies. When associates warned that he would be up against a stacked. deck, Colby shrugged: "There's nothing wrong with accountability." The conference was dominated by crit- ics like ElLsberg, who harangued Colby for 20 minutes. and Fred Branfman of the Indochina Resource Center. who ac- cused the director of telling "outrageous lies." Colby kept his temper. With Colby's encouragement. elev- en agency analysts, wearing lapel tags labeled CIA. attended the recent Chica- go convention of the American Polit- ical Science Association. Explains Gary Foster, the agency's coordinator for ac- ademic relations: "We wanted to dem:. onstrate that we are a functioning, bona fide research organization." in addition. Colby has permitted the agency's an- alysts to publish articles in scholarly and popular journals under their own names and CIA titles. At the same time, how- ever, Colby has lobbied in Coogress for a bill that would make unauthorized dis- closures of CIA acthities by past and pre- sent employees a criminal offense. The bill is now bottled up in committee. If it is enacted, ex-CIA employees like Mar- chetti and Agee would risk jail for ex- posing the agency's secrets. An Appendage. Abuse all, Colby has taken steps to reduce covert actions and direct more of the CIA's energies back to its original mission of intetli- 12 gence gathering. Spies still have a role in the modern CIA, but the U.S. now de. pends less on men and more on satel- lites, high-al titude reconnaissance air- craft like the SR-71. and equipment that Intercepts rival nations' secret cornmu- nications. Such technical advances make the CIA highly successful in col- lecting military and other strategic information. Even so, Kissinger complained throughout Nixon's first term that CIA assessments of the state of the world, which were prepared by the agency's Board of National Estimates, were un- focused and useless for policymaking. Last year. Colby abolished the twelve- ? member board and replaced it with ex- perts cosigned to a country or region. Now they periodically make concrete recommendations through Colby to the National Security Council. The result has been to make the CIA in its intel- ligence work less of a semiautonomous think tank and more of an appendage of the NSC and the White House. Many skeptics view Colby's green- ing of the CIA, his assurances of reform' and restraint (see interview page 18) as deceptive. They think these steps are de- signed merely to enable "the firm" (as it is sometimes known) to carry on busi- ness as usual. But Colby clearly realizes that he faces a serious questioning of the agency's purposes and function, which is closely related to America's view of its own role in the world. In the postwar era, covert action seemed eminently justifiable on the grounds that the U.S. was in a mortal struggle with the Communist world. Now that the cold war has abated and Communism is no longer a monolith, many scholars, diplomats and congres-. sional leaders favor ending the ciA's co- vert operations altogether, leaving it an intelligence-gathering agency. - No Secret. The reasons are both moral and practical. Says Richard N. Gardner, an international-law specialist at Columbia University: "Dirty tricks have always been immoral and illegal. Now they also have outlived their use- fulness." Former Ambassador to the So- viet Union George Kerman disapproves of covert operations as "improper and undesirable." But he also disapproves for pragmatic reasons: "The fact that we can't keep them secret is reason enough to desist." U.C.L.A. Soviet Specialist Ro- man Kollcowicz argues: "The track rec- ord is deplorable. By and large, these operations have been a series of disas- ters." Adds Eugene Skolnikoff, director of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies: "The resulting scandals provide grist for attacks on the U.S., retroactive- ly validate charges?true or false?that the U.S. makes a habit of overthrowing governments, and even exacerbate do- mestic distrust of public officials." Last week Democratic Senator James M. Abourezk of South Dakota sponsored legislation that would prohib- it the CIA from "assassination, sabotage, political disruption or other meddling in a nation's internal affairs, without the approval of Congress or the knowledge of the American people." That propos- al is unlikely to be enacted because most Congressmen believe that restricting the CIA would unwisely limit the President's freedom of action. Further, says William Bundy, for- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 mer CIA officer and now editor of F eign Affairs: "The last thing in the wo that is ever going to disappear is So covert activities of a political nature. say d?nte stops them is grossly naiv Thus Bundy argues that the U.S. sho not be precluded from covert actio but should not use such actions as tensively as in the 1950s. Bowdoin C lege Provost Olin Robinson, an auth ity on intelligence organizations democratic societies, agrees: "Unl you've got a cast of world characters wrt are willing to play by a certain set rules, you're going to have covert o erations." In other words, the CIA sho be left the capacity for covert action b forbidden to use it except in tightly stricted circumstances. Colby himself believes that mo stress on intelligence gathering w make it less likely that various situatio will develop into crises; the occasio where covert action might be consider would thus be reduced. But he ma tains that to prohibit the CIA from co ducting any covert actions would "lea us with nothing between a diplomat protest and sending in the Marines." Ideas vary about what limits shou be set. Harry Howe Ransom, profess of political science and an intelligen specialist at Vanderbilt University, be heves that "covert operations represe an act just short of war. If we use them it should be where acts of war would oth erwise be necessary." Ransom woul permit covert actions only when U.S. se curity is clearly in jeopardy. Willia T.R. Fox, professor of international re lations at Columbia University, woul additionally permit them "to undo th spread of Hitler and other like govern ments," Dean Harvey Picker of Colum bia's School of International Affairs would allow clandestine operations t prevent nuclear war. As Senator Churc points out, however, the "national se- curity considerations must be compel ling" for covert action to be justified. Fo his part, Colby declines to say under what precise circumstances he would fa- vor covert action. Many critics who concede the need for covert action in some cases never- theless propose two other reforms: 1) separating intelligence gathering from covert operations and 2) tighter control. Most experts doubt that "dirty tricks" can be separated from intelli- gence gathering. Explains Richard Bis- or- sell, onetime head of CM covert oper- rid ations: "The gathering of informationwet inevitably edges over into more active To functions, simply becaUse the process of e."? making covert contacts with high-rank- uld ing officials of other nations givesthe .fl5 U.S. influence in them." To eliminate ex- that problem, the U.S. could run two ol- separate agencies. Bissell claims that or- this idea was found to be impractical in by both Britain and Germany in World ess War II because agents kept "running ho .into each other.". of The case for closer surveillance is P- much stronger. Says Kolkowicz: "En- uld trusting covert operations to a secretive ut agency, lacking effective supervision re- amounts to leaving policy to faceless bu- reaucrats whose judgment is question- re able." Although somewhat exaggerated, ill his warning reflects widespread concern, ns ? that the CIA may be too independent. ns The CIA takes its orders from the ed 40 Committee, which has existed under in- various names since 1948. It screens ev- n- ery proposal for clandestine activity. ye Chaired by Kissinger, the committee is le made up of Colby, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec- Id retary of Defense William P. Clements or Jr., and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman ce General George S. Brown. In his book, - Marchetti describes the committee as a nt rubber stamp that is predisposed to give , the CIA what it Wants. But others say - that the committee frequently rejects or d orders revision of CIA proposals. More- - over, recommendations for major covert m actions like the Chile operation require - presidential approval. Congress's supervision Of the CIA is e inadequate; in some respects, it is a - myth. A Senate subcommittee headed _ by conservative Democrat John Stennis of Mississippi meets irregularly and has o almost no staff Member Symington h complains that, from the U-2 incident to the Chile a flair, the subcommittee has - known less about CIA activities than the r cress. A !louse sulx:ornmittec chaired by liberal Democrat Neclzi meets more crien. but he looks on his responsibility. ?as making a determination as to N% hetli- er or not the Cr.- has aeied legally, after or during the 1.ct.' 1 litts no one in Con- gress h now s in advance about potential- ly 'controversial CIA operations. Corn- pains Dentociatic Representative Mi- chael J. Harrington of Massachusetts: -There is a s!ial;ed inclination in Cone gress toward noninvolvement, superim- TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974 90?104 Director Colby on the Record In a rare on-the-record interview with TIME Correspondent Strobe Tat- . bolt, Director William Colby defended the CIA against its critics, ranged over the current functions of the agency, and discussed future prospects. Highlights: Why does the CIA intervene in oth- eractions' internal affairs? I'm not saying we're engaged in a ;-campaign to bring democracy to the t world. That's not what the U.S. Gov- ernment expects from this agency. We're expected. to . carry out U.S. pol- icy. Over the years, we've helped dem- ocratic forces rather broadly. In those cases where we have got involved with 1 military regimes, "e did WairtiO&Elurbr I. was a greater danger from some place else. I don't think we've toppled dem- erratic regimes, and I don't think we. did so in Chile. First, we didn't bring about the coup, and second, the Allen- de regime was not democratic. Granted the military regime is riot democratic, ? .. I don't think a Communist regime is ? democratic. . Our program in Chile was to sus- tain the democratic forces against the Allende political forces, which were sup- pressing various democratic elements in a variety of ways?harassing radio sta- tions; harassing some parts of the press and some political groups. We looked forward to the .democratic forces com- ing to power in the elections of 1976. . Release 2001/08/08 :1SIA-RDP77-0 posed on a poem of deference toward the E.xecutiVe Branch. If the Executive is in the lo you have got to put the Congress in there too?and firmly." More than 200 times in the past two decades. Congressmen have sponsored bills and resolutions calling for more ef- fective supervision of the CIA. At least twice. Congress has voted on such leg- islation, and both times the bills were. soundly defeated. Last week Republican Senators I toward Hi Baker jr. of Ten- nessee and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. of Con- necticut made another . attempt. Their bill would create a committee of House and Senate members to supervise and regulate the CIA and all other members of the U.S. intelligence committee. Possible Leaks. Its chances of pas- sage are rated better than even, because of the storm over the CIA and because the bill was referred to reform-minded - Sam Ervin's Government Operations Committee. But the bill may yet be de- feated. Even many members of Congress 'believe that they should not he entrust- ed with CIA secrets because of possible leaks. The alternative is to keep Con- gress uninformed, which seernS equally unacceptable. W-hatever the degree to which Con-. gress can be informed?and even crit- ics of the CIA concede that it is tricky for legislators to be in on the decision- making of an espionage agency?there is a clear necessity for Congress to hold the Executive more accountable for what the CIA does. To some extent, the dilemma over the CIA has to do with an American need to have it both ways: the U.S. wants to be (and to see itself as) a morally re- sponsible country and yet function as a ? great power in an immoral world. As Bovedoin's Robinson puts it, "There is an inevitable tension between an orga- nization like the c1;k and a democratic society. From time to time there will be pulling back when the organization may have gone too far." The U.S. has reached such a point with the revelations about its actions in Chile. which, on balance, are hard to justify. While it cannot rule out covert operations in all circumstanc- es. the nation must remember that it has better and stronger weapons to rely on: its economic and technological weight, its diplomacy, its cultural impact and ?though tarnished?its freedom: To. what extent had Communist forces intervened in Chile? Castro spent about a month down there in the late spring of 1973. There were a lot of extremist exiles in Chile from other countries in Latin America. There was a lot of assistance going into Chile from Cuba and other Communist sources. There are indications that there was some Soviet activity. They were put- ting Some money in, as well as hard- ware of various sorts. This was a pro- gram to support an eventual takeover in what I would call a nondemocratic fashion---suppressing the opposition and extending Communist influence else- where in the hemisphere. 0432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Will the CIA continue to mount co- ' vert operations? ? The CtA has three major functions: science and technological work, analy- sis. and the clandestine collection of in- ? telligence. Now there's been a fourth re- ? sponsibility, and that is positively influencing a situation through political or paramilitary means. That's the one that goes up and down depending on na- tional policy. Right now it's way down. The degree of our involvement in co- vert activities reflects the kind of world we live in. If it's a world where two su- perpowers are peering over the fence at each other, then it's a matter of con- cern when a hostile political group is about to take over a country. But if it's ' a world in which we've worked out a re- lationship of reasonable restraint, or d?nte, with the other superpowers, then it won't matter to us who runs one , of these countries in a far-flung area. Of course, something very close to us 1night still be important for political or security reasons. There may still be cer- tain situations where U.S. interests ?and I don't mean corporate interests. but fundamental political interests?can be adversely affected. In some of those iL.ases it would be appropriate to take ,^me modest action such as establishing .relationship with somebody who needs ?ithe help. But I stress: it's not now our Government's policy to engage in these sicuatiens around the world. How is a covert operation started? We follow the traffic with the em- bassy_ We follow the political attitudes CHICAGO TRIBUNE 3 October 1974 that vee have toward that country. We generate a specific suggestion in the light et whet we think would be national policy. We don't do anything without approval. Sometimes we get the specific sug- gestion from the outside?from an am- tassadcr, from the State Department or frcm the National Security Council staff. They'll say: 'Why don't you guys do so . and so?" We have the technicians here '.silo decide what is possible and what is not. It's the same sort of thing you get %AA military activity. Flow you land troupe on a hostile shore is not devel- oped in the White House. The Joint Chiefs develop a proposal. Then if the White House approves it, you go ahead. But I want to emphasize that we're talking about a very small number of Co. vert actions. Policy is generated at the ? .NSC, not here, Tr John Chamberlain THE CIA, WHICH was.. started by President Harry Truman to counter the wiles of the Soviet "spywar" aparat- chiks in promoting international sub- version, may have had its successes (in Guatemala, for example), but, insofar as the American public can judge from the part of the iceberg that shows above the water, it has never been noteworthy for its ability to carry off i really ira- portant covert operation. It messed things up in Albania; in Indonesia, and at ?the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. ? But now we are being told, by jour- nalists who never minded its failures, that it has accomplished something ter- rible by its success in "destabilizing" the regime of Marxist President Salva- dor Mar-de i5 Chile. I find this an odd commentary on the journalists involved. If you are a patriotic American who remembers that we once meant business about keeping European powers from obtaining sinis- ter beachheads in the Western Hemi- sphere, you might think that the CL9., ??? at long last, merits a little public praise. But if this is the way you do happen to think, it merely labels you as a moss- back who still believes there was a good reason for the Monroe Doctrine. WHAT THE anti-CIA claque is try- ing to tell us is that the day of the Mon- roe Doctrine has gone forever. It is no longer our business to give help to Latin Americans who want to fight back . : - ? . ..... What would you regard as a suc- cessful covert action? Laos. It was considered important to the U.S. that a country remain friend- ly and not be taken over by hostile forc- es. Rather than use our military force or an enormous political effort, you try to influence some key people and key po- litical groups. The Laos operation cost substantial amounts but was cheap com- pared with other ways of doing business. We were not involved in the 1967 coup in Greece or in the coup in Chile last year. Should the o; era tional side of the CIA be separated from intelligence gathering? That proposal stems from the Bay of Pigs. The problem there was that we didn't let the analysts hi on the act. Now senior levels of the analyst community are aware of covert activities and have a chance to comment. In the early years of the agency, we tried conducting in- telligence and action operations through two separate units, but they kept get- ting in each,othees way. What alternatives to covert opera- tions are possible for the CIA? We could not?and did not?con- duct the SALT negotiations and reach a SALT agreement until after our intelli- gence techniques had improved to the degree that we could tell whether the So- viets e ere going to abide by the agree- ments. On a number of occasions, we have identified a situation that was get- ting very sour in some country or be- tween two countries. By reporting the facts and our assessment, we generated diplomatic action so that the trouble we predicted did not happen. For instance, peace arrangements might have broken down, but because of our intelligence, negotiations saved the situation. In the future this sort of intelligence Will help our country in negotiations and diplomatic relationships. As a result, we will be less likely to get into screaming crises, and there will be less need for co- vert action. It will be the increasing re- sponsibility of the CIA to give our lead- ers the knowledge necessary to move inttia dire situation and defuse it. e CIA success a surprise failure against Marxist cocspiracies dominated by Moscow or Peking whose aims are to close in on the United States and the Panama Canal from the southern part of the hemisphere. The New York Time's Tom Wicker tells us that it is -nonsense to believe the Allende government was anything other than legit, It did not try, so Wicker insists, 20 destroy opposition parties or newspapers. An innocent of innocents, Wicker has never read the late Garet Garrett on the subject of "revolution within the forms." Senor Allende, a Marxist ntho came to power as a minority president with no real mandate to push Chile into Com- munism, had necessarily to proceed by working "within the forms." He had almost succeeded in his policy of eating out -the substance of his opposition by closing in on their methods .of earning their livelihoods. The middle class and the Chilean trade unions reacted just in time to save their necks. If the CIA really managed to give ponderable aid to Chilean believers in individual freedom in a :fight against Marxist collectivism, then all honor it. But who, in the present Washington cli- mate, can distinguish between a good covert' operation aimed at sustaining our friends in the outer world .ancia bad covert operation undertaken against Americans at home?:- Everything has been confused by Watergate, with the effect that we are now being rendered helpless against the continuing Marxist . campaign to ? isolate Western Europe and the U. S. and take over the world. : Ed Hunter, the astute editor of a little magazine called Tactics, has recently ? reminded us of the CIA's long history of failure. Because it could not cope with superior Communist espionage, it sent men to their deaths in Albania and at the Bay of Pigs. - - . - Skipping over the CIA's, one -great success in Guatemala, Hunter lists what he calls "Watergate-ITT" as another CIA bungling. We didn't act on the ITT offer to fend off Allende in the first place. The Reds, he says, pulled off a prcpaeandist ten-strike when they man- aged to link a felonious domestic Water- gate with the ITT's wholly legitimate concern for the fate of its properties in Chile. SAYS HUNTER: "Our Central In- telligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Company should be rebuked for failure to act on behalf of free peoples everywhere, where this coincides with the survival of our own country. 14 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77:07432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIALRDP77-00432R000100340005-5 TIME, SEPTEMBER 30, 1974 Chile: A Case Study The U.S. began its heavy investment in the political fate of Chile in the early 1960s. President John Kennedy had met Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Chile, and decided that he was the hope of Latin America. Frei was a man of the left, but not too far left, a man who was not hostile to U.S. interests and just might be able to achieve needed reform without violent revolution. When Frei. faced Salvador Allende, a self-professed Marxist with a Com- munist following, in the 1964 election, the U.S. made no se- cret of where its sympathies lay. Frei became the recipient of American political advice, en- couragement and hefty financial aid. Between 1962 and 1965, the U.S. gave Chile $618 million in direct economic assistance ?more per capita than any other Latin American country. In a diary due to be published in Britain this year, former CIA Operative Philip Agee describes how he was called upon for assistance from his post in Montevideo in 1964: "The San- tiago station has a really big operation going to keep Sal- vador Allende from being elected President. He was almost elected at the last elections in 1958, and this time nobody's tak- ing any chances. The trouble is that the office of finance in headquarters [Langley, Va.] couldn't get enough Chilean es- cudos from the New York banks; so they had to set up re- gional purchasing offices in Lima and Rio. But even these offices can't satisfy the requirement, so we have been asked to help." The results were gratifying. Frei won with 56% of the vote, and the future of Chile seemed to be assured. But from the outset, Frei ran into trouble. He was at- tacked by the right for moving too fast and by the left for going too slowly. Allende's Socialist Party continued to grow, picking up defecting left-wing Christian Democrats and unit- ing with other opposition parties. It became a case for the CIA. A station chief had been sent to Santiago in 1964; later the agency's presence began to multiply in preparation for the 19.70 election, when Frei would be constitutionally barred from seeking a second term and Allende would pose more of a threat than before. TIME has learned that a CIA team was posted to Chile with orders from the National Security Council to keep the election "fair." The agents interpreted these instructions to mean: Stop Allende, and they asked for a whopping $20 mil- lion to do the job. They were given $5 million and ultimately spent less than $1. million. "You buy votes in Boston, you buy votes in Santiago," commented a former CIA agent assigned to the mission. But not enough votes were bought; Allende had a substantial following. He was prevented from winning a majority, but with only 36% of the vote he narrowly won a three-way race that was finally decided in the Chilean Con- gress. CIA officials in Washington were furious. The Nixon Administration saw the Allende regime as more of a threat than Cuba to the hemisphere. The White House feared that Chile would serve as a base for South Amer- ica's revolutionary left as well as a convenient outpost for the Soviet Union. So many Marxist activists were pouring in from Cuba, Czechoslovakia and China-that a special team of CIA clerks was dispatched to Chile to start indexing thousands of cards on their activities. Publicly, Henry Kissinger warned of the domino effect in Latin America. If Communism could find a secure berth in Chile, it would be encouraged to spread throughout the continent. Privately, the 40 Committee, the top-level intelligence panel headed by Kissinger, authorized $8 million to be spent to make life even tougher for Allende than he was making it for himself. The extent of the CIA's involvement was revealed earlier this month by congressional sources who had been privy to earlier testimony by CIA Director William Colby. Further de- tails have been supplied by other agency officials. Precisely how much was spent by foreign Communists?principally Moscow?to get Allende into office and then to keep him - there is not known. Most Western intelligence experts figure that the CIA campaign was scarcely comparable in terms of ex- penditures or intensity. Nonetheless, the agency went further than even many of its critics imagined. ? For a Marxist government, the Allende regime had moved relatively slowly toward suppressing free institutions. But the CIA believed it was only a matter of time before all dissent would be muffled. Approximately half the CIA funds were fun- neled to the opposition press, notably the nation's leading daily El Mercurio; Allende had steered government adver- tising to the papers supporting him while encouraging news- print prices to rise high enough to bankrupt the others. Ad- ditional CIA funds went to opposition politicians, private businesses and trade unions. "What we were really doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbi- trary government," argues a CIA official. "Our target was the middle-class groups who were working against Allende." Covert assistance went beyond help for the democratic op- position. The CIA infiltrated Chilean agents into the upper ech- elon of the Socialist Party. Provocateurs were paid to make deliberate mistakes in their jobs, thus adding to Allende's gross mismanagement of the economy. CIA agents orga- nized street demonstrations against government policies. As the economic crisis deepened, the agency sup- ported striking shopkeepers and taxi drivers. Laundered CIA money, reportedly chan- neled to Santiago by way of Christian Democratic parties in Europe, helped finance the Chilean truckers' 45-day strike, one of the worst blows to the economy. Moreover, the strikers doubtless picked up additional CIA cash that was floating round the coun- try. As an intelligence official notes, "If we give it to A, and then A gives it to B and C and D, in a sense it's true that D got it. But the question is: - Did we give it to A knowing D would get it?" While owning up to CIA efforts to weaken Allende, Colby insists: "We didn't sup- port the coup, we didn't stim- ulate it, we didn't bring it about in any way. We were quite meticulous in making sure there was no encouragement from our side." Most U.S. pol- icymakers would have preferred that Allende be ousted in democratic fashion at the election scheduled for 1976. That kind of exit, they feel, would have decisively proved the bank- ruptcy of his policies. Clearly the CIA considers the junta to be the lesser of two evils. Still, it rates the Chilean enterprise a failure since it *ended in military dictatorship. Several years of dangerous, costly and now nationally divisive intervention in another country's internal politics might better have been avoided. Though Soviet propaganda blames the CIA for the Chilean coup and the death of Allende, Soviet intelligence analysts do not give the CIA any credit. The Russians think the fault lay with Allende himself for not being enough of a strong- man. He temporized with constitutional processes when he should have disregarded them. He did not follow the exam- ple of Fidel Castro, who executed more than 1,000 of his op- ponents whoft he came to power; 15 years later, he still rules Cuba. Nor did the CIA have any better luck against him. THE NEW YORE TIMES ALLENDE'S LAST HOURS Approved For Release'2001/08/081:5CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 NEWS AMERICAN, Baltimore 29 September 1974 ? s Reiaart More on the CIA? By WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST JR, Editer?in?Chief, The HearSt. Newspapers ? ' .NEW YORK?It Is unusual for this column In dwell on the same news subject for two weeks in a row?in this case the CIA and its Challenged role in Chile. Exception is being made because the left-leaning news media have been keeping the subject alive with a continuing barrage of poisonous and mislead- ing. attacks which dis-. turnip, not ? only the CIA but Secretary- of State ',Kissinger and even the President of the. United States. I simply cannot stand idly by and let them get away with such stuff. It damages public Confidence in ?qr. national security opera- tions and in our lead- ers. Possibly even worse, it soft-pedals or ignores the. sinister activities of those international forces whose ultimate admitted goal ? despite detente ? is the weakening and overthrow of our political system and its influence in the world. It would- be quite wrong to suggest that the newspaper columnists, TV commentators and law- ? Makers who keep hammering away at. the CIA In self - righteous horror are Communist sympa- thizers. The simple fact is that they and most other self-dubbed liberals have a curious and automatic hatred for anyone or anything committed to fight- ing Communism. They are more anti anti-Com- munists than anything. else. All the same, knowingly or not, they serve the purposes of our ideological enemies by consistently impugning the motives of this country and its lead- ers in the ceaseless global political struggle. The Communists in the Kremlin- have got to be .de- lighted that the CIA-Chile affair has been getting so much domestic, criticism?criticism which can- not help but weaken, the future effectiveness of the chief U. S. agency Which keeps a constant expert watch on them and so frequently helps to thwart their plots. You naturally have heard very little abput the Communist plot to take over the Chilean govern- ment of self-Styled "Maex'rk" President Salvador Allende. All our liberal .press has been harping on is the disclosure?subsequently frankly confirmed by President Ford?that the CIA spent SS million in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to support legally organized groups opposed to the Allende ?regime. This action, which had been approved by Dr. Kis- singer, is damned by the critics as somehow un- American, sneaky and disgraceful., The fact is, contrary to the impression created by the critics, that the CIA and its expenditures had very little to do with the bloody coup which overthrew Dr. Allende a year ago. and in which he died. He was deposed by filo present military junta, acting with majority public support, because the Communists were on the verge of taking over a ffn.Trnt-tinnt whieh had become ever more op preshive and less democratic. William Randolph Hearst Jr. Last week, In this space, it. Was told how?long. and tons of guns and ammunition had been smug- gled into Chile by thousands .of Communist agents who infiltrated the country.under Allende?;soine. of whom became his closest advisers. ;Anyone who doubts what was being planned needs only to read. . the articles by Soviet political 'and military experts which have been tippearing li Conirriunilt ? theoretical journals this summer .'explaining . the ? major reasons for their setback in 'Chile-. The Kremlin-approved analysis's. aS repo'rtecl by James Burnham in the Sept. 27 iSsud of National Review, boils down to six factors cited as errors to be avoided in future would-be seizurea 01 power. NB% Burnham sums them up as followp: ; .1. The counterrevolmlonary (fred) press was r,ot quickly enough ?muzzled. Chile's' influentia1. conservative? paper, El Mercurio, bicited or its role in wrecking the Allende regime.!..i:: 2: The 11.11ende government moved tea slowly on both the political and economic fronts, thus giv- ing the,counterrevolution time to f)repare" its forces, 3. The Chilean Communists failed to. push Al- lende into speedy nationalization of private busicesa without compensation-. 4. The Chilean Communists did nOt golar and fast enough in creating grass mils. 'prganirations. of workers and peasants under Communist control which could act as an extralegal power ne7ara, S. The ativenturoua and. clisozganized salzu-i7e3 of farms and some factories by ultre.left, Maoists and Trotskyists antagonized potential isymp.atli'lzers and aroused the reactionary elements. . ? 6. Communist penetration of the armed forces;i though considerable, was not sullicient to.deter thei coup by the higher military echelons'. ?? Don't forget?all this is on record in the c?-; tidal Soviet prcss. So what the CIA-did in Chila. was virtually nothing compared with the. other side. The upshot, unfortunately, was entailer dictatorship ? in our kgmisphere, but at least it is not .nother ? Communist tyranny. I A large pert ? of the current -anti-CIA. criticism; Crarees that the secret agency has become a kind O f .s.:pra-government whose actions! are directed by a !-,anclul of men withOut adequate ccztroi by Cres. In actuality it is simply a modern ver-? . s!?.):-! of th2 intelligence apparatus which eyery , se:vereign nation since ancient Rome has oai to: for its safety. Furthermore :EVERY i i,. spends has to be approved by Cons.-ress- ah:r recernrnendations of four of its committees. hodies are the Senate Committees on Fere:en Relations and Military Affairs, and their ; te.o counterparts in the House. To members of-I !aci-: comprise what is badly named the Congre.3--1 siona: Oversight Committee, a small group which ree.:ie:Jes, studies and passes on the :more delicate CA activities. 1::ius for Senate Foreign Relations. Coernrnittee: ri-oan .f. Fulbright and s:enior member Ciiurch to claim they didn't, really know went on in Chile was at best apolitical pose, Sen. Church actually came up -*ith this sane,- z!monioui remark. "We now Iearn," the Deimerat intoned, "that there is no 'erence be- z;veen American and. Soviet policy !in subverting, foreign governments, had always thought the: Uni:ed States stood for different principles." That V:n.5 a lot of two-faced nonsnse..I-le kr!;.'77 clar:-07,d Well what had happened in. thile,eaz.el..i he somFhow didn't be 112dn't done hi3 hom47,:work. I don't mean to be too rough on the.CIA all there are two sides to any controversy maters look different depending on where you For examplti, it certiinly is etsy for me; to and sympathize with feats that We may 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ? c!-ea..,:d a kind of gestapo or 0.11rnited,.self; dirty tricks department. rNob-odyfo,vants ? aut such is not the case. Unlike lits Communist c-...r:erparts. the CIA and its actions, invariably be to a public whose surrogates in IL. ? thy have already have passed cit i them. ? tr?y -r.ave done so without fully uncierstattding the facts,' Is the fault of the lawmakers whoihold. the purse . strings. - The basic explanation for the?C4-Clille hubblitc, it seerns to rne, is the inability orizefus:d 137 the. -PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 2 Oct 1974 li'rPral critics to recognize Communika as.adeadiyi centinuing threat to this nation and .its interests. They view it instead with. .benevolence as foeei of socialism,. dedicated to thte? V7C11-are Ca the ie, and see any contrary view' o.r...i.icdoitY as ret only demeaning for noble-minded Arnerican3 bet suggestive of Hitler and unllmed fascism. Ncn....niformed fled fascism doesn't bother them, That's their view, and they certainly are ire to express it. ? ? B..!: I remember Czechoslovakia. ? ? -- , ? grees To Tip ? ontr 1 ? At the meeting, arrange' . by )1,Nedzi, Kissinger an d? Colliy, it was agreed to pro-i vide i the Foreign Affairsi Committee or any subcomel ntittee Morgan designates( with all intelligence-gather: ing information "relating to foreign affairs. Nedzi 's sub-' committee already receives. such information in addition to other intelligence mate- ' nal. By SAUL FRIEDMAN lnquir.yr IV ashington Barta WASFIDIGTON ? Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Colby has given members of Congress private assurances that the United States has ended' all covert political operations abroad. And an understanding has been reached with the ad- ministration under which key lawmakers are to be notified regularly and in advance of major intelligence-gathering projects as well as clandes- tine operations planned by the super-secret "Forty Com- mittee." - At President Ford's urging,. Secretary of State Henry. Kis- singer and Colby met sec- retly last Friday on Capitol Hill with Reps. Edward He- bert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Cr rmittee, Lucien Nedzi' '(DI, Mich.), chairman of the subcommittee on intelligence operations, and Thomas E. (Doc) Morgan (D., Pa.), Chairman of the House For- ? eign Affairs Cornmittee.Appr Tighter Rein.i - The agreement, which for the first time will give the Foreign Affairs Committee advance information on CIA operations, is designed to give a congressional body, with a foreign policy jurisdic- tion closer control over CIA ventures like those in Chile and Greece. Nedzi said Kissinger and Colby specifically had agreed to provide them the same in, telligence information that is in the hands of the exclusive Forty Committee. According to congressional. and White House sources,, this policy -will have the ef- fect of limiting Kissinge.r's personal authority to use the CIA as an instrument of gin- hal power politics. The Forty Committee, - which oversees and author- izes covert intelligence oper- ations, is _run by Kissinger, who also heads the National h' tion to Kissinger are Joseph Sisco; under secretary of state for political Affairs; William Clements, deputy secretary of Defense; Gen. George Brown, chairman of the Joint Griefs of Staff, and Colby. - Although the CIA is sup- posed to be largely indepen- dent, b better supply objec- tive intelligence data, Kis-. singer has _dominated the Forty Committee- and the, agency because of his dual rote as Secretary- or, State and the President'S-National security chief. And until now, thoocommittee has -been ac- countable to no one except .": . .6, .7., ? the President. But, President Ford, fol- lowing a meeting with con- gressional leaders, approved the idea of closer cooperation:.! between Congress and agen- cies involved with intelli- gence operations. The decision to let mem-. hers of Congress in on deci-, sions of the Forty Commitie.e is part of an administration effort to blunt rising criti- cism of the American role in the downfall of the elected , governmeotin Chile and-the subsequent assassination of its president, Salvador. Al- lende. -? . ? ?. - ? Nedzi said he has been .as- sured that tie CIA. and the ? Secar CAP' h4008/08 : CI7RDP77-00432R00 ?tY1 TA?p _ Forty Committee no longer are engaging in covert polizi- zal like the One in .And he said the CA ar.7- soo.titin has. pledged. to keep rnembers of Congress -deformed- in advaoce. for the first time on plans for major operations, which Toe uoderestaadiag, Nedzi said, may afford members the coport-izdie, to give ad- vice and e?rierreoreelp kill some prenc-sed prejects which they ICC! could damage American interasese TEte..:1-iouse Foreign Affsies Cotathittee. includes a. number of -lelrais who for the fie-s-t time_will be privy to intel?-zenceeinformadoa ' Previcts =:'..linquLeles by ? .Necizi, who hai wrestled with ; the proble.M. o4cocgressional central of intelgence opera- does since he.took over his subco=iitteilha 1571, have die=closed an i?rea.sed tend- eney toward -Fake House,. , conerol of the CIA for its own -.,?! ? the Watergate ; coverep and the harassment? of Per:toe:en -papers leaker - Deeiel Efisbero; and. in the Chile Affair. Platerga.teiUse ? In -Watergate., the Presi- dent and his teo aides sought to use the CIA in the coV- erup. And there was evi- denee that Kissinger author- ized a request to the CIA for psychianic profile of Ells- -berg. In the Chile affair, the Fort? Committee, acting on .Kissir.zer's suggestion, au- thorized the use: of 53 million to e'77rrt opponeots of Al- lende. These opconents, soon- by the CIA, cre,ated the climate that toppled Allende a.nd his government. As a result, the CIA again has come under fire from ceno-ressienal critics, includ- ing Sen. Frank Church (D., ld'ehc), a raeldng member of the. Seeete. Foreign Reladons Commie:2.e, and Rep.; NU- ch a el Harrington (D., 0100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Mts3.), a member cf the Armed SereiCes Com- reittet whe leaked Colby's tevimony on the Chile opera- ' . The congressional critics, noting that CIA iateminton . has resulted in a military dictatorship in Chile, again are calling for tighter ? con- trois of the agency. ? Another Culprit . But Nedzi, who at Herring- Ma's request had gotentCor- by's frank* teadmony,said that the target of 'criticistn should not be the CIA aloze. but the Forty Committee.* ?Nej5 concerted that the Forty. Commirtee, doe:ilea Zed by Kissinger, has hecherie a "super-inteiligeece ageecy," curity Act. of 1947. Thus; under pressure from congressional cridce, and with i?Nec14. dSer- vices vices, :-Corernittee. Chairman acting.. asteiritti- ariese the.arrangtereae.nt was ; svorlt due: for'Lcicser 'rela- tion& hetwe the Foreign Al- ' fairs; .Ccremittee -and the in- iot use the CIA as easily as . has if he Ravers that ern, gressional outsiders are ' being kept informed. Whetdeser this new .-zr?ang,ge- . ment guarantees that Cca- ? ? -. ? ---- ? teillgeace gess.. 011 in fact exercise which. unlike the ie tot Their ' which te (IA. closer'. Conn! of CIA van- governed by the National Se- : ? stares., isgat ycssinger will . tures rerr?el. to be eth..'" I LOS ANGELES TIMES 6 October 1974 Intrigues Before Allende Fell BY RICHARD R. FAGENV .? My wife and I gained first-hand eX-J perience of American involvement in Chilean affairs a few months after We :arrived in Santiago in February, 1972. e That was when, a- U.S. Foreign Service officer--an acquaintance of mine?got in touch with me and said that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago . had succeeded in infiltrating all parties of the Popular Unity coalition, but that it had not yet managed to infiltrate the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a. group outside 'the government and critical of it. . This U.S. official thoinght.rny uni- versity connections?which he knew about at first hand?might provide links for infiltrating that group. He. offered to change money for me on the black market. Because of our old association and strictly for my own in- formation, he also. sketched the number and. distribution of CIA :agents masked as regular diplomats in the. U.S. Embassy in Chile?about one-third of the total. I doubt that I was the only Ameri- can citizen approached in this man- ner. I hope I was not the only one toe. refuse. The incident is a measure of how blatantly the U.S. Embassy operated during that period. There was no question by the mid- dle of 1972 that the Allende Govern- ment was in serious trouble. The in-, ..--flationary spiral was twisting up- ward, shortages of foodstuffs had developed ? although much was available on the black market?and the centrist Christian Democrats, lede by ex-President Eduardo Frei, (whom. the United States had once actively supported) were in open alliance with the right-Wing National Party. Many members of this center-right coalition has passed in word and deed far beyond the point of "loyal opposition." The political and ecospomical situa- tion was ripe for what later came to be known as "destabilization." In October, 1972, the massive walk-. out of truckers, shopowners. and. businessmen in opposition began. Those of us living in Santiago were amazed at the seetning ease with ? which tens Of thousands of persons , without visible incomee-and without 'savings because of the inflationary , spiral?were able to support themselves. The dollar rate on the. black market dropped, indicating that fresh sources of currency were flow- ing into the country. It was everyday speculation in .Santiago, both on the Right and Left, that the United States was funding the walkouts, specula-. tion later confirmed in the recent dis- closures about CIA activities. Despite political and economic dif- ficulties, however, the government was actually gaining support at the polls. Much to the dismay of his op- ponents, in the congressional elec-- tions of March, 1973, the Allende coalition gained electoral strength, receiving 44% of the total vote. Ironically, this election was the ; first step toward the military coup.: Convinced that Allende could not be removed constitutionatly?his cop- Richard Page a; professor of politi- cal science at Stanford, was in. Chile - for 1$ months in 1972-73 as a consul-. , tant to the Ford Foundation, and visit- ing professor at the Latin. American Faculty of the Social Sciences. He is coauthor of '!Latin America- and the. -United States: the Changing Political: ,Realities." gressional support would have had ? to drop below 33% for him to be im- ? peached?the Right began to plot in ; earnest. Violence, sabotage, and a fi- nal series of crippling strikes wracked Chile during July and Au- gust of 1973. The full role of the CIA: in these events is yet to be told. Throughout this period, the 'Chilean political' situation was fra- gile, the economy was in trouble, , and class and political tensions ran- :high. We now know that $8 to $.11 million were used covertly to sup- port Opposition newspapers, rties and strikers.The United States in- ? filtrated political 'parties, and, as now. .conceded, attempted to buy votes in order to prevent the election of Allen- , de- ' Furthermore, because the CIA and its friends certainly had the means to , change their dollars into Chilean cur- ? rency somewhere other. than at the - Central Bank, the money pumped ,into Chile may.actually have bought 18 $40 to $50 million worth of subversive activities and services. With a raging black market, opposition par- ties, newspapers, and ? operatives could be purchased in dollars at a very substantial discount. All of this makes .a mockery of official claims that the United States did nothing?in Mr. Ford's wOrds?"but ensure that democratic institutions and parties survived." What Washington did do -was put a very substantial thumb on- the scales, tipping them against the freely elected government of Chile. Against the background of what we now know of CIA involvement in Chile, the statements by. high U.S. Officials that "we did not participate in the overthrow -of the Allende . _ Government.".' are seriously misleading. Perhaps the United States did not participate in the plan- ning or help in the attack on the Presidential. palace. But as is well .recognized .in the. American legal system, accessories-before-the-fact must share responsibility with. those who actually commit the criminal act, even though the fonmer may nOt be ',present at the scene of the crime: et : As tragic as the events in Chile are, perhaps even, more significance to Americans is the. incredible web of coverup, false justifications, .and outright lies being told to the- American people by .the highest of- ficials of the Ford Administration. For example, in justifying covert CIA ac- tivities, the President has claimed that "there was aneffort being made .by the government of Salvador Al- lende to destroy' opposition news ? media and to destroy opposition political parties." This does not reflect the true precoup situation in Chile. Actually. the opposition parties and newspapers kept functioning from 1970 to 1913?and not only because our government was pouring money into them. In fact, one of the most sig- nificant attempts to tamper with .Chilean constitutionalism had occur- red in 1970 when the CIA tried to buy opposition votes in Congress so as to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. In all of this sorry recent history, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 P"'"" Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 * the key actor and prime villain has. ?been. Secretary of State. Henry A. .Kissinger. As head of the Forty Com- mittee. Kissinger was the chief architect of covert operations against the Allende government. It was he .who first articulated the "domino theory" of the "threat" that .Chile (with a population 5910,. and wealth less than 1%, that of the Unit- ed States) posed to this country. "I .don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive pro- .blems for us . . Kissinger said in - - LOS ANGELES TIMES ! 6 October1974 1970. This is the same man who just a few weeks ago told the U.S. ambas- sador in Chile to "cut out the politi- cal science lectures" because the-am- bassador brought up the question of human rights .with members of the junta when. he "should have been" discussing military aid. All .of this betrays a scenario in which. the U.S. government?once again?has set itself implacably against political and economic ex- perimentation in the Third World. It's the spirit of :Vietnam and President Must Bal nee Interests, ShareT Planning BY HAARYROSITZKE 'Rom the Bay. of Pigs to the cur- rent Chilean case, there have been ' sporadic denunciations of the CIA's action operations abroad?in the , press, in books from inside and out- side. Washington's intelligence establishment, and occasionally in , Congress. ! The issue is heightened rather than resolved by President Ford's statement that "our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign pol- icies and protect national security." .. The central question: Should the. United States employ secret means to interfere in the affairs of other countries? The debate is waged on two levels?moral and pragmatic,. For pure men ofprinciple, covert.. action is impermissable as a means, whatever the end. Covert actions are Harry Rositzk,e, retired after many years in operations with the OSS and the CIA, is the author of "U.S.S.R. To- day." ? immoral not only because they are. secret and therefore violate the can- 'ons of an open society, but also be- cause by interfering in the domestic affairs of another country they vio- . late the U.N. Charter and the moral and degal principles of American ? 'society. At a more realistic level, the cri.. , Aique of secret operations addresses itself to profit and loss: Are secret ? 'operations worth carrying out? On the loss side are not only the 'moral objections, but the conspic- ?;lions failures of the past (the Bay of Pigs), the sinister image of .the CIA 'abroad (the bogie of "American im- perialism"), the compulsion of the ex- ecutive to lie in. public and to Con- , gress in order to keep secret its spon- sorship of "unofficial" actions. (Chile), and the domestic disen- ? chantment with secrecy deepened. by Watergate. What are the 'entries on the profit side?. The list of pass successes on the public record is short President Truman authorized large-scale offi- _dal and unofficial support for the democratic parties in the 1948 an elections to prevent a Communist ? victory?and the Communists lost ? President Eisenhower triggered a coup in Tehran in 1953 to keep Iran out of the Soviet sphere?and it still ' is. The following year he authorized. a coup in Guatemala to prevent the? 'export of Soviet arms into the West- ern hemisphere?and the coup.suc- ceeded without bloodshed. What are the secret successes? No one knows outside the small- elite in , the executive. . , -Political action operations have ' :played a marginal role in American , 'foreign policy since 1948, but the full record is not available either to Con- gress or the public. For a decade af- ter World War-fl they Played a tan- gible but minor role in the American 'effort to restore a stabilized, demo- cratic Europe. Through its contacts with non-Communist politicians and government officials, with 'labor , _leaders and media figures, the CIA.. added its influence to that of the State and Defense Departments in containing the expansion of Soviet power west of the Elbe. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the fo-'- cus of political operations shifted to the Third World, the terrain chosen ' .by Moscow to weaken the 'limper- lists." In the Near East, in sAfrica briefly, and in Southeast Asia, covert operations played their part in furthering overall American ob: jectives, however ill-conceived some .of these objectives may appear in re- trospect. In Latin America the political si- tuation became even more challeng- ing after Castro's victory, and coun- terinsurgency became the order of the day for half a dozen federal agencies. The CIA's political action operations were aimed mainly at the Jr?fid1A614t6ticfrieRAISOM Approved For R 19 Watergate at work in hemispheric politics. This scenario; in Chile as in Vietnam, involved disregard for the . sovereignty and rights of others, the violation of national and international law, dirty tricks by the CIA and other agencies, cozying up .to .repressive governments, and withholding vital- information from Congress and the American electorate. The people of Chile and Latin America deserve better from the government of the United States? and so do the American people. supported by Moscow with money, training and advice, at the insurgent groups working out of Havana, and 'at the minor rash of "Chinese par- ties" that broke out in the mid-60s. . The evolution of purely domestic in- surgencies and of urban terrorist groups further broadened the chal- lenge .to local security agencies working in concert with the CIA. It is a mistake to think that all CIA operations in Latin America were aimed at supporting right-wing Mili- tarists. America's ultimate goal in Chile's 1964 election, of course, was to thwart the election of Salvador Allende, but Washington put its money on a reform-minded Chris- tian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, and actively sought the achievement of his goals ?breaking up the domin- ant financial oligarchy, for instance. Indeed, as an. action action arm of. government, the CIA: historically.. has attracted. many liberals to its . ranks, for they saw in it a chance to bring democratic reforms to Darts of the world that most needed it. One reason that the CIA now is widely perceived as far-right is that its fail- ures have been more publicized than its successes, and these usually have involved strictly anti-Communist ac- tivities, as in -Allende's Chile. In the new world of detente, it is often argued, secret action opera-.- lions are no longer needed. Detente, however broadly defined, has not af- fected Soviet competition on the ideological and political front. Mos- cow continues to exploit the re- ? sources of its built-in political action instruments?the Communist par- ties abroad. It continues to export strong anti-American propaganda orf its own radios and news services and by the distribution of anti-capitalist "literature and general subsidies to local editors and .columnists." The KGB' continues to recruit "agents of. influence" . Secret political action is not the. only antidote for secret Soviet ac- tions, but it is one instrument. Situa- tions are bound to arise, especially 04kiiio01:PH363008e5Near East, in. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 which the President will find a se.- cret American action is the only ef7. fective response. Such ? occasions may be rare, but it would be foolish to deprive him of the secret option. ? Who will measure the profit. and : loss of such operations? . ? It is a fundamental and frustriting fact that tl pragmatic equation can: be written only within the execu- . Jive.. The ? broad moral-pragmatic: issue is inevitably reduced to the .question of controlling the action of the executive?and here frustration. ? persists, for .there are na adequate answers. A Hoover-type commission on in- telligence and secret operations can, . at best, make broad bureaucratic and policy recommendations. Con- gressional oversight can ,do no more than rubber stamp executive deci- sions or hold dramatic post mortems. Legislation. a "foreign intervention ? control act", for example, is impossi- ble to write on such a rarified sub- ject, nor can Congress or a commit- tee vote on individual strategic oper- ations that are to be carried out se-. ? .c-etly. i ? ! The burden is clearly on the Pres- ident to resolve at least some of the public suspicion and distrust about ? secret political actions abroad. He can change the machinery of secret committees to bring in a broader ad- versary point of view in the initial stages of secret action proposals. He , can make. the National Security Council as a whole responsible for fi- nal recommendations to him. He can- exercise his sharpest judgment on .the possible profit and cost of each' operation. And he is the only man who can bring to bear a moral judg- ment that reflects the values of the electorate as a whole. ? ? The President can take one further step to _bring in the people_ He can arrange for the participation of se-. lect congressmen in the National Se- curity Council's deliberations on se- cret action proposals. ? Who monitors the President? In. any government, secret activities ? are peculiarly the province of the ex- ecutive: secret negotiations, back- door diplomacy, foreign intelligence and' domestic security operations, covert action operations. In a repub- lic without an official secrets act there is only one check on what he does in secret?the press.? The. adversary relationship' be- tween the media and the executive on official secrets may in individual cases entail some damage to national interests, but without private inves- tigators, we cannot know who is doing what to us or for us. Exposes of the government's secret opera- tions, whether on Cambodia or Chile, can throw light on the acts of the past, and provide a cautionary signal for the decisions of tomorrow. . WASHINGTON STAR 10 October 1974 ... Leaks Cut Copying Of Cables . By Jeremiah O'Leary Star?Net:a Staff Writer The State Department "Shis week ordered a SO per- ' cent reduction in the distri- bution.of diplomatic cables both within the department and to other government agencies because of con- cern over security leaks. and the mounting cost of producing up to 180,000 copies a day. Deputy Undersecretary for Management L. Dean Brown said the order , would take effect Monday. He said he issued the order to the departmental com- munications center with the approval of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and will meet today with the assistant secretaries of state to explain the meas- ure. Brown said in an inter- view that two recent leaks of classified cables were precipitating factors but that the volume and cost of the reproduction and distri- bution of the cables also figured in his decision. The State Department receives 'anywhere from 2,500 to 2,800 cables a day from embassies and consulates around the world. These are classified ac- cording to content, both at the source and on arrival in Washington, and distri- bution in the past has been based on interest in all gov- ernment agencies. TWO SECRET cables were leaked to the press in September, one from Ambassador David H. Pop- per in Santiago, Chile, and the other from Ambassador Herman Eilts in Cairo. Both leaks reportedly re- sulted in temperamental outbursts by Kissinger to the extent that he authorized his press spokesman, Ambassador Robert Anderson, to say that Foreign Service offi- cers who leak cables are a disgrace to the service. In turn, a number of Ca- reer Foreign Service offi- cers were outraged by the slur that could only have been made with Kissing- er's approval. "Kissinger is the biggest leaker in the building," said 'one career officer. The Popper cable report-, 'ed a conversation the ambassador had with Chi- lean military officials, pointing out that the administration might ex- perience difficulty in get- ting congressional approv- al for military assistance .t to the Clailean junta. As kale.. to The New York Times, the cable apparent- iy had a Kissinger re-, sponse scribbled across it saying, "Tell Popper to, ? knock off the political- science lectures." The Eilts cable referred to a similar problem re- garding.a portion of the foreign-aid bill affecting funds promised to Egypt, by Kissinger. The reaction on the seventh floor at the State Department was bit-. ter because the last thing Kissinger wants is anyone rocking the boat of his affa- ble relationship with Presi- dent Anwar Sadat. TEAMS OF STATE De- partment security agents fanned out over the build- ing after each leak but were reportedly unable to discover how the cables found their way to the press. ? Brown said' he ordered the reduction'in distribu- tion of the cables, many of which have been going to? the White House, CIA, Pentagon, Treasury De- partment, Commerce De- partment and other agen-, cies of government on a selective basis. "These cables generate huge amounts of paper," Brown said. "Especially the unclassified messages ? that cover non-sensitive subjects such as, for exam- ple, potato production. A number of FSOs agreed that there is far too much paper generated by the cables from overseas, but some expressed the fear that if Brown's ax is ' wielded too ,strongly it might isolate country desk officers from what is going on elsewhere in the regions for which they are respon- sible. 20 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0-0611484000-5-5 FOREIGN REPORT, London 18 September 1974 Can Kissinger survive Chile? President Ford followed Mr Henry Kissinger's advice on how to handle the Chile debate and decided to brazen it out. In his press conference on Monday, he argued that the use of secret funds by the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile was justified in order to keep opposition news media ? and political parties ? alive during the Allende period; that the CIA was not involved in the preparation of last year's coup; and that, anyway, the Russians are spending much more on clandestine op&a- tions than the Americans. It needed to be said; but the debate does not end there. The process that was started by the leaking of secret testimony by Mr William Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, will result in a new round of congressional hearings and, in the long run, its effects on American foreign policy could be as shattering as the effects of the Watergate affair on domestic administration. New hearings were expected to begin this week before the House of Representatives' sub-committee on inter-American affairs, chaired by Mr Dante Fascell, where the driving force is Mr Michael Harrington, a left-wing Democrat from Massachusetts whose version of the Colby testimony (the CIA has refused to make the transcript available) is what started the ball rolling. There are discrepancies between his account of what was said and accounts that are privately given by those who were present; whereas he quotes Mr Colby as saying that secret funds were used to "destabilise" the Allende regime, for example, other sources claim that that word was never used.. These discrepancies can be resolved only, if the transcript is released or if Mr Colby is called to testify again. _The Fascellonb7coni.nriitte,e was scheduled to hear a, number of academic specialists this e .r wee, and to call some of the participants 1iip5t wcelc.; the sec9nd gronp,could _ , _ include Mr Charles Meyer, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for inter-Arnerican affairs, Mr Jack Kubisch, his .successor (now on his 1,Yay, to take ovcr the embassy in ? : Athens), Mr Harry Schlaudemann, a Deputy 4.ssi?tant the Santiago embassy, and Mr Edward Korry, the American ambassador in Chile during the first 14 months of the Allende regime. . At the same. time, Senator Frank Church, the chairman 9f the Senate sub-com-; mittee on multinational companies, has initiated own staff, study on the possible contradictions between what some of these officials, and MT:Kissinger, have aid in previous statements on American involvement in Chile ? notably 'during the hearings on the International Telephone and Telegraph corporation before his own sub-com- mittee in 1972.? and what was disclosed in the Colby testimony. Sources close to the senator are talking about possible perjury charges, and describe what has so far been disclosed as only "the tip of the iceberg", suggesting that the inquiry could be 'broad- ened out into an attack on similar operations in other Countries. ? Senator Church is known to be anxious to set up fresh hearings hefore his attiql sub-committee; the timing and the scope of these will largely depend on the attitude' taken by Senator Fulbright, who has the ultimate word until next Jarmary, wheri he' will leave his post as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr Full bright is thought to be worried about the extent to which new hearings could turn into a,witchhunt against Mr Kissinger, who_ has been shown to be the prime architect of America's Chile pplicy. , . . There are a number of very disturbing features about the Way that the Chile inquiry, fuelled by leaks to the New York Times, is developing. These include: (i) The possible naming of Chileans" in contact with the C14.. It is now 'widely. known that three leading opposition papers, as well as some radio stations and opposition parties,, Were the recipients of-CIA funds during the Allende period. It iS clear that the news.: papers ,and radio stations-would probably ,not have Survived- the tremendous ecdnomic pressures that the Allende' government brought to bear 'on them without outside help.; For example, the sources?Of advertising dried Up as the state took over private firms and refused official advertising, and prices were held artificially low while costs 'soared in conditions of hyper-inflation. The CIA funding did not involve any measure -of editorial control, and o'ne of the papers that benefited actually applauded the confisj cation of American copper. companies. The aim was to keep in being a deinocratic I; curb on the marxist government. ' - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 FIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 The likelihood now, unfortunately, is that this rationale will be forgotten and that .through either the hearings .or the press.,- the maines Of the recipients Of secret funds,' and of those 'who."laundered' the money, will be made public. This could have .devastating effects on the lives Of those concerned?' perhapi literally, since they Would' become automatic targets for the guerrilla left. It would have 'equally dramatic cations for American foreign policy elsewhere, since it would become plain to anyone seeking such American support that he mightbe exposed and discredited through the inability of the:Aineric'an Administration' to keep such matters secret. ? (ii) The lop-sided nature of the debate. Little attention has been paid to evidenceof the niuch greater Russiiiiand Cuban involvement in Chile during the Allende Years; the Allende' goVeirintent was the recipient' of sdrne $620m from the Soviet. block, and the ? Cubans were deeply engaged in training and arming paramilitary .gi-chips:' And ?$estim.onY that1'6nfliets with the. nOtiOn that the Anierican'gOVernk:,..ent Warengaged, all along, in ?trying to topple Allende has been studiously ighored by Some. major American ? . ? L Korry has testified for: example, that :he followed a policy of accommodation with .Allende during the first eight months he was in power. This broke down only when Allende himself rejected an offer that would have enabled Chile to.'Eompensite nationalised American companies without; in effect, having- to Tay Since compensation would haVe been Paid in.Chilean bonds guaranteed United States Nreasury that-mbuld have .been:.fiegotiable On the 'international market..:Even More significantly, Mr.Korry has testified that a-representative 'of Allende aPproached the American embassy- for 'a Secret:subsidy of $lm before the September; ?1970;:election. Things -are more complex than. Mr. -Harrington and the New York Times: Make out. (iii) The witchhuht against the makers of the Chile policy. It is a time-honottred 'Prineiple that officials, do not always: own. Up to e ?erything an intelligence service is doing. But iii: America. now' the, Statements of senior officials on Chile are. being treated in Sortie quarters as part era Watergate-style cover-up for _which those involved (up - to and including Mr Kissinger) should be punished. Ifperkiry ? or contempt of court ? charges are threatened; Some of the people affected may feel that they have to tell all in order id _defend themselves. There are a number of legal, and factual, questions to-be resolved _before things come to that. But it may not be too soon to ask: who is the John Dean of the Chile hearings going to: be ? ? . ? , ? The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that, unless the American Administration Manages to preserve the minimal' amount of secrecy indispensable to the eanduct of foreign policy, it will lose the means to function as a great power. That, as Well as Mr Kissinger's own survival,' s what is now At stake. 22 Approved For Release 2001/0-8/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 r Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 WASHINGTON POST 06 October 1974 'Jack Anderson A 200-Mile Fishing Limit The 200-mile fishing limit, an ob- scure issue in the 1960s, suddenly ranks with the oil crisis and nuclear test- ing as one of the most dangerous con- troversies of the 1970s. Already, gunboats have clashed on the high seas over the fishing bounda- ries. At stake are not only profitable fishing catches but undersea mining rights and the control of strategic na- val straits. Confidential documents show the Pentagon is gravely worried that the 200-mile limit would close off the Gi- bralter straits, the Bosporus and other vital passageways to shipping. This wduld have a "serious impact on na- tienal security," Deputy Defense Sec- retary William Clements has written inn letter to selected senators. But the 12-mile limit, an the other hand, has opened U.S. coastal waters to Russian and Japanese fishing boats. This has forced the United States to Import fish, which has added a stagger- ing $1.3 billion to the balance of pay- ments deficit. _ Btisy Pentagon lobbyists, meanwhile, are sneaking confidential briefing pa- pers to senators who oppose the 200- mile limit. Down in Foggy Bottom, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has made what appear to be badly mis- leading statements on the controversy, and old Senate friends are feuding over the issue. Simply stated, here is how the prob- lem came up: In 1608, a Dutch lawyer named Hugo Grotius made a convincing case for free fishing on the high seas. For some 330 years thereafter, boats of all lands pursued fish virtually at will. By 1940, the simple fishing boats were being replaced in coastal waters by floating factories, and the supply of fish was dwindling. To protect its fish- ing, Chile extended its jurisdiction 200 miles out to sea, far beyond the tradi- NEWSWEEK 7 October 19714 tional 3-mile and 12-mile limits. This started an international scram- ble for fishing rights. Now 36 lands, most of them small, poor nations, have ? laid claim to additional coastal waters as far out as 200 miles. Indeed, a naval battle almost broke out between British and Icelandic war- ships over Iceland's arbitrary 50-mile limit. Because the United States failed to support Iceland, NATO came within a hair of being kicked out of its vital Icelandic bases. More crises are likely. The United States had held firm to the three-mile limit until Congress ex- ? tended the boundaries to 12 miles in 1966. The object was to bring offshore oil within our territorial waters. 'Now. the fishing interests are press- - .ing to push out the territorial limits ' still farther, for the U.S. share of At- ? - lantic coast fishing has fallen from 93 per cent in 1960 to less than 50 per- cent today. The price of fish in the United States has soared, accordingly, as Russian and Japanese trawlers have, hauled in shrimp, mackerel, haddock, halibut and herring, along the U.S. coast. A world el:inference on laws of the seas, meeting this summer in Caracas, took up the 200-mile limit. The results have 'become a matter of enormous controversy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had advised key senators in private let- ters, for example, that the Caracas conference made "substantial* prog- ress." Coastal countries "will be meet- ing again next spring with a view to- ward concluding an agreement in 1973," Kissinger assured the senators. But a secret Senate Commerce Corn- rnittee memo charges that the Caracas meeting, far from accomplishing "substantial progress," really broke up in disagreement. "Nations felt no de- sire to negotiate (and) the Caracas ses- sion failed to make as much progress as had been hoped for," states the Sen- THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE ate document. The forthcoming 1975 session, viewed so hopefully by Kissinger, "will be unable to deal with all the many complex issues left unresolved," the memo adds. Still other conferences may have to be called and, even if in agreement is reached, it will take the nations "at least two to eight years to ratify such an important and conten- tious multilateral document." The Senate memo estimates ?that a , final agreement, far from Kissinger's 1975 forecast, couldn't be reached until 1980. This will be too late; the memo warns, to save U.S. fishing. Q. Is the Pentagon game-planning moment, it is true, the Ford Administra- any military action against the Arab oil tion seems to believe that it can solve producers in the Middle East?. the problem through diplomatic jaw- A. We are not contemplating any such boning rather than military muscle. And action of that sort. U.S. officials insist that any kind of puni- tive action against the Arabs would be doomed to failure. Yet if the current strategy of verbal suasion fails, many people believe the public mood will shift in favor of trying harsher meas- ures. Last week, NEWSWEEK asked a number of government officials, military strategists and experts on the Mideast ctliAnn_flijoHt612e32Rtatcplb0343/4y0015,zvho have four or five Although . Defense Secretary James ? 1-1 Schlesinger dismissed that possibility out of hand at a press conference last week, the fact that the subject was raised at all was indicative of a growing con- cern in Washington that the U.S. might eventually decide to take drastic steps to bring an end to the oil crisis. At the to sspecAttil Bta Lobbyists from the White House, Pentagon and "Commerce Department, , meanwhile, have been swarming over Capitol Hill to oppose the 200-mile limit. We have obtained briefing pa- pers prepared by the Pentagon for the use of its lobbyists in contacting sena- tors. . . . One briefing paper, labeled "Talking points . . . for use in discussions with bipartisan leaders of Congress," sug- gests the lobbyists assure senators that a new world conference will settle the matter by April., . Another briefing paper notes that a bill to extend the offshore :boundaries, introduced by Sen. Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), "would unilaterally abro- gate . . . the 1958 Convention on the High Seas" and badly hamper the U.S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets. In a lengthy; - private letter to Magnuson, Commerce Secretary Frederick Dent has joined in trying to dissuade him from "pushing the legislation at this time." Regardless of how the issue is de- icided?and the odds are heavily against successful congressional action this season?the tides and times are running out on peaceful settlement. More confrontations are likely on the high seas, as ,nations with trillion-dol- lar stakes in offshore oil, minerals and , fish manipulate their boundaries. 01934. United Feature Syndicate U.S. The three most talked-about op- tions and their implications: Psychological Warfare 'Although it logical warfare psycho- aim?un- nerving the enemy. That was clearly the intent of the verbal salvos fired at. the major oil-producing nations last week by the Ford .Administration. "To under- stand the oil poker game,- said one top U.S. official, "you have to know xvhat the Inst chips are in each player's stack. For takes has many forms, basic one Approve or Relea e / / Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ? ars' worth of foreign exchange, the Agency is knc)wn to have mounted a raest bet is .to shut o the oil. For th West, which has only 60 to 90 day worth of oil,' the final ante is not com mercial. It's military." . . Before that final bet is. made, how- ever,...,44psywar" strategists cite ways in which the .West could try to rattle the nerves of a ?few oil sheiks with a com- bination of propaganda. moves and eco- nomic sanctions. With the oil producers still heavily dependent on the devel- oped nations for food and technology, the West could hike prices dramatically or declare an embargo on all such goods. Military assistance and arms sales to the OPEC nations could be frozen until prices were cut. The billions of dollars that the Arabs have invested or de- posited in the West could be seized. And repeated hints of possible future military action could be dropped to feed the fears of the oil producers that if the West got desperate enough, it might decide to opt for war. Psychologica/-warfare tactics have their shortcomings and their risks, how- ever. They would fail overnight unless the U.S., Japan and Western Europe formed an unbreakable united front. Without that, the Arabs would quickly turn to any defectors for their needed goods. The industrialized nations would also have to be prepared to follow up talk, with action. "I cannot see it work- ing,? says British historian Walter La- qtm4r, "unless the industrialized nations are seen to be determined to bad: it up with military intervention. Otherwise, the oil producers will call the bluff." Attempts to squeeze the oil produc- ers could also create new problems. Sealing off Western markets, for exam,- ple, could send the Arabs running into the arms of the Soviets. Or, they could decide to retaliate and cut off all oil sup- plies to the West. Still, the most popular and least risky step the West could take at the moment is some type of psy- chological warfare: But most experts agree that the campaign would have to be accompanied by stringent energy conservation measures to prove that the industrialized nations meant business. hill-scale covert operation in the Middle S East?to oust Iran's anti-American Pre- Covert Operations The last time the Central Intelligence mier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953? it worked. Whether similar action to oust balky oil sheiks would work today is -doubtful. Even if it did, it would peril- ously escalate the battle for oil and might create grave new problems for the U.S. But it is possible. ? Agents in the pay of the West could borrow ? a tactic from the Palestinian guerrillas and set up terror squads to stalk traveling Arab oil barons. "It would be an attempt to deny to the sheiks the pleasures their money can buv " said one former CIA agent. "Flights overseas, foreign residences, visits to Nice?all , that would be out." Assassinations?ac- ' companied by blunt hints to other Arab leaders that they could be next?might ' be carried out. Or undercover opera- tives could attempt to stir up riots and protests within a country. "We could r give the sheiks a sharp lesson by getting the radicals in the country to cause trouble," said an ex-CIA. man. "The rationale behind this would be to come back and say: 'See what could happen'." The peril is that what could happen would probably harm the -U.S. as much , as the sheiks. The leaders who replaced those now in power would undoubtedly . be at least as nationalistic as their prede- Icessors and equally anxious to use the oil weapon against the West. The Soviet Union, even if it did not threaten a direct confrontation with the U.S. would be in a position to expand its influence in the Arab world. And once the news leaked out of what the U.S. had done, ' the public uproar would be deafening. IThus, such "dirty tricks" probably would take second place to more dis- creet moves?such as trying to exploit the existing differences between nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in the hope of shattering the cartel's unity. "I believe that the cartel will break up on inherent internal conflict," says one high U.S. official. "But I also believe we should do everything reasonable in our ' power to make sure it does." cess to vital natural reiources has been considered a casus belli. And as one top U.S. official noted last week "If the oil- producing nations drive the world into depression in their greed, the West might be forced into a desperate military , adventure. But it would he a nightmare ?trying to pump oil for decades in the ! midst of what would amount to guerrilla war and probable worldwide terror." Be- yond any doubt, then, an armed attack would have such enormous and frighten- ing ramifications that only the imminent : breakdown of Western society could spur Washington to launch it. To 1?.- meaningful, a military interven- tion .vould have to be directed against Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, and it would need to be both quick and massive. In addition to seizing the major oil fields, troops would have to secure the loading facilities at Ras Tanura 125 miles away on the Persian Gulf and con- trol the narrow Strait of Hormuz through which tankers have to pass. The 'U.S. would. need to mass enough airpower to ! repel a counterattack by Arab air forces and..perhaps even land in neighboring sheikdoins to block them from reinforcing the Saudis. It would have to be done with enough speed to take the oil fields before they could be blown up. And the initial attack would have to be Carried out by the 82nd Airborne Division?the' ? only U.S. tom.: trained for parachute assaults?plus perhaps whatever allied (and Israeli) units that could be per- suaded to join up. Formidable as the obstacles are, there are some who think that the industrial- ized nations may be in such desperate straits as early as next spring that an in- vasion would be thinkable. As Walter : Laqueur put it; "There will be a call for action as countries are hit by massive unemployment and bankruptcy. By then the oil producers will have become so unpopular that even military interven- tion may receive worldwide support." Bu the consequences of invasion could be catastrophic. The oil fields could be ! so badly damaged that the West would have even less oil than it does now. The Soviet Union might react with some mili- tary action of its own?on the side of the Arabs. And that could draw the two su- perpowers into a head-on confrontaUon 61) 0,Military Intervention Historically, depriving a nation of ac- 24 that could turn into a nuclear showdown. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77700432R000100340005-5 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 BALTIMORE SUN 24 September 1974 Czechs resent By MICHAEL PARKS Sun Staff Correspondent Prague?Czechoslovak in- dustrial firms, under heavy pressure to modernize -and automate their plants, are covetously eyeing American equipment but with little ex- pectation of being able to buy what-they want. The firms are drawing up extensive- shopping lists for hundreds of millions of dol- lars worth of advanced West- ern equipment and technol- ? ogy, but almost all the or- ders are expected to go to . America's competitors. , Czech officials say 'that ? prospects for American machinery sales here are ? limited by a number of polit- ical factors that the Y see as imposed by Washington. These include strategic controls on exports, restric- tions on credits, American refusal to reduce tariffs on Czech goods imported to the United States and the still-' unresolved . dispute over American prop-ety national- ized. by the Communist gov- ernment here alter World War II. "We would' really like to increase our trade and to broaden it considerably, but the United States still is NEW YORK TIKES 25 -September 1971+ MOSCOW STEPS U ANTI-11S.CARTOON By KEDR1CK SMITH sseass to The New York The MOSCOW, Sept. 24?After a honeymoon with the new Ad- ministration of President Ford, the Soviet press has embarked on an upswing in anti-Ameet- tan: propaganda -described by the United State embassy as the strongest in a year or more. A rash of political cartoons, a staple of Soviet newspapers during the cold-war years, has again appeared. ? Today Pravda published a 'cartoon showing a lurking, dark - hatted, teeth - gritting agent in dark glasses holding up his fingers to make the ins- tals C.I.A., which turn into the legs of' a gain-toting, hatchet- wielding ruler of Chile. Yesterday, another cartoon in the Communist party daily showed the Cambodian leader, Lon No!, beaten up and band- aged from head to foot, sitting in one hand of Uncle Sam and prayerfully catching a silvert Approved playing politics, cold war politics if you will, with trade." Josef Keller, a senior official of the Czech Foreign Trade Ministry; said. A number of American businessmen, returning from Czechoslovakia's annual trade fair at Brno, were highly critical of the Ameri-' can government's position on trade with Czechoslovakia. "This is a small but highly lucrative market, and we are being shut out of it," the European vice president of a major electronics firm, said. "All the alleged reasons don't make much sense because vie do the same deals with Poland and the Soviet Union." The biggest current dispute is over the settlement of the 26-year-old property claims, totaling about $72.6 million, for the nationalized property of American citizens and companies and about $7 mil- lion for the sale of surplus U.S. government property. Prague agreed to pay about $37 million, accord- ing to unofficial reports, but, settlement has been blocked by a Senate amend- ment to the trade reform bill now pending before Con- gress. Under the amend- S(PF? , ,....., kixd! ..-Lll S. ment, the claims would have to be settled in full before the US. would release 18.4 metric tons of Czech gold, now worth about $96.8 million, that was seized from Ger- man troops at the end of the war. ? "About On same terms" Although the amendment has not yet come before the whole Senate, its adoption by a committee has both baffled and infuriated Czechs. "Our settlement was on about the same terms as other Ameri- can settlements with East European nations?about 40 cents for every $1 claimed, one Czech official said. "But that is our gold that the United States is holding, not American gold, and to sell it or seize it to pay these claims is just theft." The settlement agreement, - which had been negotiated by the State Department with the Czech Foreign Min- istry, actually was the se- cond such agreement. The first, concluded in 1964, was repudiated by Washington after being initialled here. Mr. Keller said his govern- ment sees settlement of the 'financial questions as the dollar froin the other. Last Thursday, Pravda's main cartoon should an Israeli suitor serenading a fat old courtesan, who was standing on a balcony labeled "penta- gon" and was waving a fan made of rockets, while the Is- raeli !held his hat to catch any- thing that might fall his Way. Boston Schools a Topic Another newspaper, Sotsia- listiclieskaya Industriya, pub- lished a cartoon of a little black student in Boston being menaced by the shadow of a hooded Klansman with a sub- machine gun. Izvestia, the Government newspaper, printed an article today on the Boston school crisis and on racial Problems in New York. Soviet cartoons; especially if printed in newspapers under the direct control of the party's Central Committee, are re- garded as a barometer of the prevailing propaganda line, It has been a numner of months since Pravda has run more than a random anti-American cartoon. . ? The recent upsurge suggests that the Kremlin no' longer feels a need to avoid offending President Ford. The attacks on American policy in Cambodia. and on 'area:a, repeated in coma rnentaries, are taken by some.i Western diplomats as signs off - first of seVeral trade bar- riers to be removed. "Two things are prevent- ing an increase in our pur- chases from the United States?the first is the sys- tem of strategic controls, which really hamstring regu- lar trade and seem to be applied more rigorously in our case than in others, and the second is the restriction on credits," Mr. Keller said. "In the long run, however, the question of what we are ? able to sell to you is just as important, for we want a balanced trade, just as every country does. If we can sell more, we will buy more. But that means we must be able to sell our goods on an equal basis with our competitors; as it stands now, we often pay tariffs three, four, five or even more than they pay." The trade reform bill would authorize the Presi- dent to grant Czechoslovakia the reduced tariffs of most- favored-nation status, which it had until 1951, but this provision has been involved with the fight over Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, Moscow's 'unhappiness -about Mr. Ford's policies in these areas. There.- is no indication that 'the Kremlin's interest in detente or in doing business with the White House has slackened. . The surge, of. anti-American propaganda is part of a gener- ally more critical treatment. of the West in: the Soviet 'press, West European diplomats 'ob- serve. 'One theory Is that Moscow now sees little prospect of early completion of the European se- curity conference because of changes in Western govern- ments and therefore sees no: need to soften its propaganda.1 Another theory is that the Kremlin is engaged in one of its! periodic ideological retrench-i rnents. On Aug. 31, the party's Central Committee issued a de- cree chastising the party orga- nization in Byelorussia for slack ideological work and ordering it to improve the train- ing of indoctrinators. This was read as a decree with national significance. For weeks now, Soviet pro- pagandists have played up the bad economic' news from the West, projecting a picture of inflation. unemployment and depression. But the negative portrayal of American society has ranged more widely. In addition to' standard items about the eco- nomic slump, rising prices and racial problems, the press has reported that educational standards are deteriorating be- cause of financial problems, that some Americans are eating pet food and that industrial ac- cidents and occupational dis- eases are on the rise. Soviet readers have also been told that 10 million Amricans are chronic alcoholics, that sur- veillance of individuals and in- vasion of privacy are an in- creasing problem, libraries are caught in a financial crisis, sailors are absent without leave in Japan, bicycle thieves and defective motor cars are plaguing ordinary people, the numbers of train derailments is rising, and more than 420,000 Americans were arrested on marijuana charges last year. Such items appear fairly reg- ularly in the newspapers, but their volume tends to rise and fall as the Kremlin places high or low priority on maintaining a favorable relationship with Washington. Not since the controversy over the war in Vietnam do American officials recall such a steady flow of anti-American news. laut it still falls short of cold-war levels, they say. 25 For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 WASHINGTON POST 10 October 1974 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak Anti-Americanism in Greece The Greek government has quietly withdrawn some of its top military officers from North Altantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels, one more indication a ho' ? seriously the Karamanlis government views anti-Ameican sentiment now sweeping Greece. . Facing the first parliamentary dee- lion on Nov. 17 since the military coup dietat of 1967, the new civilian govern- ment of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis is ? torn between conflict- ing political realities. The merest fragment of public dis- play of pro-American sentiment could' boomerang, giving the Greek left a dangerous opening that Andreas Pa- pandreou would he quick to exploit. Karamanlis dealt with this hard politi- cal fact by pulling Greece out of the military organization of NATO. Now he has followed up. by ? withdrawing some of the 400-odd Greek officers from their regular military billets in Brussels, Naples and other ?. NATO commands. But the domestic political demands ? for anti-U.S. actions raise' the gravest future, problems for Greece. Friend- ship with the West, and particularly the, U.S., is absolutely essential for , Greece in the long run, as a glance at the map proves. Greece is bordered by three Communist states to the north and by muscle-flexing Turkey on the east. Karamanalis and his foreign minister, the astute George Mavros, along with most other leading Greek politicians of the center and right, fully understand that fact. But despite strong pressure ifiE ECONOMIST 28 SEP 1974 Greece and America Six?Your article of September 7th was an ecation:ill) sane. voice in the midst of the ernoeonal aceusations Which the Greek press ha a h. een klunching, against the Americans- isiamin them for organising the Cyprus crisis for their -own purposes. Your article not only succeeded in showing the logical flaws of such arbitrary accusations but also made it clear that there is no proof whatsoever to upport such allegations. Not surprisinalyi a the mass-circulation right-wing' Vradini. when mentioning your article,- "failed" to relt." to the essence of your viewpoint but simply asserted that "the United States played no part in the return of Karamartlis, writes today the English magazine The Economist". The anti-American campaign was trig- . gered off by some violent editiorials of the right-wing A kropolis, which being for some time a staunch supporter of the junta was from the U.S., they are unable to im- pede the Move toward what looks like a form of dangerous neutrality for fear that the anti-American currents now sweeping Greece would pull them un- der... Accordingly, rational diplomacy dictated by long-term Greek security needs has been inundated by short- term domestic politics. The foundation for this was built by Washington's long love affair with the hated, military dic- tatorship. ,. ? A case in point was the asbolutely futile effort by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last week to enlist sub ?rosa Greek support against the then- pending congressional ban on U.S. military assistance to Turkey. . Conferring at his own request at the Plaza Hotel in Manhattan last week , with Mavros, Kissinger explained that ? the effect of a congressionally-imposed Turkish aid ban was predictable: it would make. the Turks dig in their heels against U.S. mediation efforts to remove Turkish troops from Cyprus and' return part of -Turkey's Cyprus conquest to Greek Cypriots. Thus, it was in the self-interest of Athens to keep the U.S. on good terms with Turkey. Mavros was stunned, "That,"he told ? Kissinger, "is not something for a Greek to do." Indeed, far from discouraging Greek sympathizers ln the U.S. Congress from voting against the ban on aid to Turkey, top Greek diplomats in the U.S. encouraged it. One active promo- ter of the aid ban was the consul-gen- eral in the influential Greek consulate in San Francisco, who quietly spread the word to friendly congressmen: stop American aid no matter what the impact on Cyprus. In short, the political imperatives in Athens on the eve of the parliamentary election far outweigh the long-range necessity- of gradually restoring the Athens-Washington link. No Greek leader caught secretly lobbying Con- gress to vote against the Turkish aid- ban could be elected sewer inspector in a provincial Greek village. The unannounced decision to, with- draw top Greek military men from NATO hadquarters is' simply the new- est signal. Having heard American pledges for over two months that Tur- key would be glad to give up some of it Cyprus conquest once talks started (pledges , wholly umTdeemed), the' Greek government continues to adver- tise itself as anti-American. ,There is no hope that this will change 'between now and the mid-November election, and little expectation that it could change soon thereafter. Like- wise, the hostilits, for Turkey so vividly expressed in Congress over the aid-ban threatens noliteal retaliation Ageinst Washington there, too. With an .outstanding IOU debt to Russia for its acquiescence in the inva- sion of Cyprus last July, Turkey may find it harder than before to deny any Soviet request for overflight privileges in a future Middle Eastern war, partic- ularly with the U.S. Congress so viru- lently anti-Turkey. As these Cyprus chickens come , home to roost, the once-mighty U.S. is 'an impotent bystander. 19'74. Field finterprless, kno, probably in this way trying to obtain "patriotic" credentials. From then on every- thing has been *blamed on the CIA and a smear campaign has been directed against Henry Kissinger. There is no doubt that Mr Kissinger has committed certain blunders during the Cyprus crisis but this does not justify petty and crude personalnacks against him. The CIA could also be guilty of some of these accusations but for the time being proof does not seem to be available, a fact which is for the Greek press of minimal . importance. A similar irresponsible stand has been adopted by Greek politicians like Professor Papandreou, NV lib has accused Nato of pre- pacific, (a) the overthrow of Nlakarios and (b) the Turkish invasion (!), and by Cypriot politicians like Dr Lyssariclea, who had no doubt that the attempt -on his life was .organised not only by Eolsa B but also by Nato 26 and the CIA (!). Maybe' the most blatant example of this blind and nonsensical anti- Americanism can be found in the first page of the Athens News of August 21st in a heavily-printed "warning": "In view of the vigorous stance over Cyprus taken by the Greek prime minister, Mr Karamanlis, vis- ?is Nato and the United States, rumours have begun to circulate that the CIA may strike again. Fully aware of the methods used by the CIA, we give warning that if a sinale hair of Mr Karamanlis's head is touched. we shall know who must be held responsible.". After seven years of stagnating dictator- ship Greece needs more than anything else a moderate political climate, and a responsible press, neither of which can be achieved under this hysterical and irresponsible atmo- sphere of anti-Americanism.?yours faith- ! fully, /Athens ? JOHN E. Loutts Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 WASHINGTON POST 23 September 1974 rt as] By John M. Goshko Washington Post Staff Writer BRUSSELS,?The contro- versy in the United States over Gen. Alexander M. Haig ? Jr.'s appointment as Su- preme Allied Commander in Europe has failed to spark , an echo from America's al- . lies in NATO., . ? That does not mean there. ? hasn't been considerable ? criticism on this side of the Atlantic about President Ford's selection of Haig for . both the top NATO military'. post ' and the command of,. U.S. forces in Europe. ' The weight of press com- ment In most NATO coun- tries has been clearly unfa- vorable. And, among offi- cers of the American forces stationed in Europe, the ap- pointment has triggered a - ' clearly discernible, though' not openly displayed, feel- ? ing of bitterness about the ; elevation of a man regarded . as a "political general." But the reaction was quite::7: different among -those who- make the decisions in the 12 :. . countries that participate- with the United States in NATO's integrated military structure. Here at NATO headquarters sources in the various national delegations say that their governments accepted the Haig nomina- ? tion with barely a whisper of dissent. The sole exception was - the Netherlands, whose gov7 ernment made it clear that it was displeased and tried to sound out the other Euro- pean allies about rejecting . Haig. In the end, though, BALTIMORE SUN 10 Oct ober 1974 ess in the Dutch, seeing that they had no support, withdrew their objections,' and Haig's appointment sailed through NATO's Defense Planning Committee without incident. The initial Dutch opposi- tion was based on the same consideration that has caused. controversy in: the United ' States?namely, the conten- tion that Haig has been coin- - Promised by his role in the Nixon adminis- tration: Dutch sources say that they have nothing against Haig personally and de not mean to imply that they think,he was involved in the Watergate coverup. But, they add, Foreign Minister Max Van der Stoel feels that Haig is so closely iden- tified with former President Nixon that his appointment as supreme commander amounts to "a 'public-rela- tions" disaster" for NATO. Influencing the Dutch gover,nment is the fact that public opiniOn in the Neth- erlands, particularly among young people, has grown in? creasingly hostile to all things military. Much of this anti-military feeling springs from the. Vietnam war, which European youth" equates with Mr. Nixon. As a result, the Nether.' lands government took the position that Haig's appoint- ment was not exactly help- ful to its attempts to con- vince its domestic constitu- ency that Holland has a onn 'CIA' kept files on leading p liticians By ANTHONY MURRAY , . : Bonn Bureau of The Sun , .: 'Bonn?A former West Ger- man Cabinet member revealed 'yesterday in testimony to a ment. parliamentary panel that the He claimed the files were in country's super-secret foreign violation of strict laws limiting ! ? intelligence branch had kept the agency to intelligence-gathb- intimate personal files on more ering beyond Germany's bor- than 50 domestic politicians ders. He said they were as- and other personalities in the sembled under ? the agency's 1950's and 1960's, former chief, Gen. Reinhard . Horst Ehmke, head 'of the Gehlen,. who headed the 'organ- chancellory under former, ization during most of the past- Chancellor Willy. Brandt, said:, war era under a succession of that he learned of the dossiers ,1 Christian Democratic govern- when he took office in 1969 and . meats ordered their destruction. The i., Among the 54 names Mr. Approved For Release 2001/08/0 vested interest in remaining within NATO. Yet, while all the other European NATO members have essentially the same problem, they all steered, clear of the Dutch effort to mount a campaign against Haig's appointment. NATO sources say this ? was due to a number of rea- sons, chief among them a . desire not to embarrass and possibly antagonize Mr. Ford at the Very outset of his presidency. Therefore, even those with reservations -about the wisdom of the ap- pointment apparently de- cided that accepting Haig. was the lesser evil. . A secondary reason cited by some is the fact that the present Netherlands govern- ment, which loomed as the spearhead of any opposition movement, has developed a reputation for eccentricity in NATO circles. Ladler this year, Prime Miiister Joop den Uyl's So- cialist-led government pro- voked the anger of its allies by s.roposing cuts in the Dutch forces beyond what NATO regards as a safe level. While the Haig appoint- ment as made remarkably few w:; yes within NATO, the story ig somewhat different regardiag his -other job as comminider of the 300,000 U.S. A-my, Air and Naval personnel grouped in' the European Command. -- Although no one will say so publicly, Haig's appoint- ment is clearly a bitter Dill panel is investigating security Ehmke said were carried in the dossiers were those of Mr. in the West German govern- Brandt, a Social Democrat: party lieutenant and parlia- mentary leader, Herbert Weh- ner, and a 'former federal pres- ident and Social Democratic leader, Gustav Heinemann. . But also included were Christian Democrats such as former Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a powerful Bavarian politician and former defense minister, Franz Josef Straus, land a former party chief, Rai- krbibtiP71?-0igidR0e0 27 for many command officers. ' mand, scheduled for Nov. 1, His takeover of the earn- is the most talked-about sub- ject in U.S. officers' messes throughout Europe, and mil- itary sources say ,that the sentiment, particularly , among professional army of- ficers, is overwhelmingly.. hostile. Their objection Is ne- scribe as being based not on ideological grounds but on the fact that Haig achieved his position through service - in the White House rather than coming up through the normal military channels. ? In a service where most officers find promotion a slow and grinding process, there appears to be great re- sentment over the way that Haig, in the words of one of- ficer, "jumped the line." In private conversation, these officers point out that Haig was catapulted by Mr. Nixon over 240 general to four-star rank, although he had never held a major field command during his army service. This, many contend, is grossly unfair to the num- ber of officers who have far greater experience and dem- onstrated records of' achievement in traditional military command and staff areas. As a result, the tendency is to regard the appointment as a bad precedent harmful to the morale of senior offi- cers and likely to convince younger officers that the path to advancement lies in politics. . prominent businessmen jour- nalists and others of all politi- cal stripes. Shortly after Mr. Ehmke's testimony to the committee, which is probing the circum- stances behind the spy scandal that toppled Mr. Brandt from the government in May, the Federal Intelligence Agency's present chief, Gerhard Wessel, watered down the charges when he said he could not guarantee that the files were fisitslioddeb Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 'TEE WASTIINGTON POST Sunday, Sept,15?1974 By Jonathan C. Randal ? ? Randal is a Washington Post corm. spondent bead in Paris who reports 'irequently front the Middle East.' B E IR U T - Shootings, politicians' pri- vate armies ,and do-nothing goy- ornment are fast destroying what re- mains of Lebanon's reputation as a -- deilprise calm in the topsy-turvy Middle icately balanced island of free en- to East. Pick up a newspaper?and there are more th,an two dozen to choose from-, and you'll find l politicians accusing each other and/or the half' millien Pal- ?estInian residents of graft, psychiatric disorders, subversion and other fail- ings. If politicians and private citizens are -fascinated by the troubles on Cyprus? less titan -an hour's flight time away? their fascination gives every appearance of being the fatal attraction the moth feels toward the flame: The most cursory lip service is paid to the notion that Lebanon can ill af- ford such trauma, if only, because of the balance of Christians and Moslems distributed in 17 identifiable communi- ties. , But the talk is no longer of Leba- non's political and economic miracle as the stable entrepot and banking center of the Middle East. Rather it is of the seeming inevitability of a civil war which even the considerable Levantine gifts for compromise may prove un- able to, prevent. , Somber Lebanese are once again dis- cussing their recurring nightmare?a carveup of Lebanon by Syria and Is- rael. As one knowledgeable newspaper editor lamented, "Neither Damascus nor Tel Aviv has to pull any strings to bring the worst about since we're do- ? ing such a splendid job* ourselves." These telltale traces of rot and 'im- pending disaster are as visible as the litter in the streets and empty lots of Beirut, where half this nation's citi- zens live: Mail and cable service is 'fast rival- ing Italy's in unreliability, scarcely an advertisement for the efficiency of what sometimes is called the "bankers' republic." Confirming suspicions was -.the recent discovery of more than 5,- 000 mail 'sacks, abandoned by over- worked postal employees. 6 Greed and real estate frenzy have done away with alinOst every green :space in Beirut to satisfy the oil sheiks' penchant for safe Arab invest- ment. Beirut's beautiful St. George's Bay is polluted for miles on either side of the capital. ot, Im ending I ? Reported Murders have jumped , from 27 in 1970 to 917 last year Spe- cialists estimate their real number is closer to 450, which, if borne out would produce a homicide rate well ahead of that of Washington or most 'American cities. ? Although theoretically permits are , required for carrying handguns and automatic weapons "are banned? the number of arms per capita is believed. to be among the highest in the world. The once tiny army of 18,000 is in the.; process of being beefed up to 34,000 by the end of the year,' but is Outgunned .?at least numerically?by the Pales- tinians and various private armies maintained by Political parties and local warlords. Arrests for arms offenses are ? few and rarely lead to conviction. "What can be done," one specialist, "if we had to arrest .everyone? With a ? minimum of 150,000 arms in the Coun- ? try, where would we put their'?" Several months ago, a Bulgarian ship landed at the nearby port 'of Jun- ieh a cargo of 6,700 automatic weapons ?mostly AK47, the Soviet-made as-,/ sault rifle?for Christian militias. No known attempt was made to stop the first ? such large-scale contraband operation'. But at a social occasion for ? his party's Youth movement, former president Camille ;Chamoun did dis- courage plans to present him with a silyer-plated submachine gun. His dis- cretion apparently was dictated by the presence of the defense and justice ministers at the gathering. Nor are weapons simply for show. Earlier this summer, 13 persons- were . killed in a shootout at Dekouane, a Palestinian refugee camp near Beirut, between Palestinians and members of a Christian militia group. -Danger signals are flying that Beirut May have outlived its usefulness as a banking and service center now that the? oil Arabs have become better educated . and capable of investing their vastly in- creased revenues directly in the West. Such a warning was recently sounded publicly by the Kuwaiti director of planning, but the Beirut business com- munity has seen the threat for a long time. Moreover, the prospect of a re- opened Suez Canal seems destined to hurt Beirut's prosperous trade as a port terminal for goods trucked to Per- sian Gulf states. Even the local optimists have taken to reasoning in terms of a series of lit- 28 iSOS er ? tie or' rather than a single apoca- lypdc Upheaval which would spell irre- parable disaster. What relative pptimism exists is based on two events last year. The first was the two-week Mini-war - in May, 1973, between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians holed up in refugee camps ringing the capital. - After much damage?both to ,-cal?es- tate and to the country's reputotion for calm?the . army learned it could not liquidate the Palestinians. They, in turn, appear to have abandoned any idea of trying to take oyer the Leba- nese government as they tried un,:sic- cessfully to do in Jordan in 1970. . The second event was the October war: For the first time in a quarter century there was some hope of an - overall Middle East peace settlement which would provide some kind of /la- tienal homeland for the Pales tiniani. Any such solution would make the Lebanese masters once again in their. own house and rid them of the .Mght- mare?and the pretext?of crying over . their inability to solve their own press- ing domestic problems. The Lebanese hope many, ,if not the Palestinians would move to such a Palestinian national homeland and the others would cease to be members of the armed state within a state that their refugee camps now represent. - . Organized, armed and motivated, the Palestinians have provided a useful al- ibi for the Lebanese themselves to in- dulge in a massive arms buildup. A "Balance of Terror" , 6491-111E NATIONAL Rifle Association 1. would feel right at home here," said one longtime American resident, "except it should be renamed the Na- tional Submachine Gun Association for this place." "It's a kind of liachismo thing?hav- ing a submaclui e' gun," he mused, "which started N 'th the Palestinians' parading around with their virility symbol and then 2aught on with the ? Lebanese when hey got frustrated about not runnin., their own affairs.. Boy, would a Freudian analyst have fun here." Howev rr, many Lebanese are convine. d that their best chance of avoiding the worst may be due to the -saturation I ,vel of weaponry. "Face it," laid a Lebanese politician who has sec ? t many hours preventing local incider s from-flaring into major conflagratioi "We may be saveth by Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 the balance of terror. ,"Don't smile, because it is a bit like the nuclear situation in that, sure, Hi- - roshima was terrible, but it has pre- vented world war since 1945. "Here the Lebanese are armed, the Palestinians are armed, the state is armed," he said, "but so far the rapes, ' thefts, highway robberies, 'roadblocks,' ? incidents galore haven't touched off ;the final conflagration because instinc- tively the players don't want to lay a hand on each other. - "'Mind you," he said, "I don't like it - one bit. I could go downstairs from my office and be knocked off by some gun- 'stinger and it would cost exactly .five ' piastres?the price of a hulket." And while Lebanese newspapers roast? the government for its jobbery, unend- ing scandals and inability to deal with _ the country's more obvious ? problems, some cynics suggest that its very refusal to come to grips with reality, may yet prove Lebanon's salvation. "Every one of the groups in the Leb- - ? anese human, mosaic . are represented in the government," a diplomat ob- ? served, "even if they are obviously see- - ond stringers because the real !aims, or local warlords, refuse to sit in the ? same cabinet with each other." "At least there's ? a forum and no . group can acense any other of not have- ?-ing their hand either in the till or at - the tiller," he added. "Moslem Power" ? QUCH GOVERNMENTAL paralysis is Li all the more surprising under the reign of President Suleiman Fran?. jieh, a tough Maronite Catholic moun- taineer from northern Lebanon who wap elected in 1970 for a six-year term on a, no-nonsense law-and-order plat- . form. ? But Franjieh, sometimes ?described as the Lebanese godfather for his role . in overseeing the assassination of seven rivals in a church in his fief of Z.egharta, has- been ,forced to adopt a soft line despite his personal inclina- tions. For if the Palestinians are now ' so* weak in Lebanon that they realize that LeVariese stability is necessary for their own survival, Franjieh seems to have understood?however reluctantly' ?that he cannot.afford a major show- down either. ? Inclining Franjieh to such modem-, tion has been the emerging demands of the-two big Moslem groups in Leba- non?the Sunnis and Shiites?who long have been dominated culturally, economically and politically by the better educated and more Westernized Christian minority. Both Moslem groups are challenging the essential order laid down in the 1920s by the French, who ran the coun- try between the two world wars under . a League of Nations mandate.. Un- changed has 'been the hierarchy under .which the powerful presidency goes to a Maronite Catholic, the premiership to a Sunni and the Shiites make do with speaker of parliament. ? Hanging on to an , eroding power base, mindful that their relative 'edge would be swallowed up in the sur- rounding Moslem sea without Leba- - non's borders, the Christians are show- ing increasing signs of.. schizophrenia.' Their' ,hostility to the Palestinians ',has led many Christian leaders, into arrogant self-confidence. At times they worry, especially since the Cyprus cri- sis, There?they see Turkey, a Moslem power, invading the island and the rest ,,'of the world sitting back and doing nothing for the Christian majority-7.. . the Greek Cypriots. The Christian Lebanese are all too aware that they are a minority in their own country. Yet there is an unreason- ing belief that, as always in the past, a Western protector will appear to save them in the nick of time. Such was the French role in the 19th Century. And the United States intervened with the Marines in 1958, so why not again? Perhaps only in Lebanon do people be- lieve post-Vietnam Washington would seriously consider such a possibility. In the face of eroding, but still feisty, Christian leadership, "Moslem power" has on occasions sought?un- successfully so far?to enlist the Pales- tinians to their cause. Although the Palestinians do not want to water down their revolutionary zeal by in- - dulging in Lebanese politics, the very ? thought has done little to allay Chris- tian fears. Seeking Equality -DIM THE LATEST Moslem cry is :1) for "participation." For the Sunnis that means a bigger share of political power. ,For the Shia sect the demands are for a bigger economic stake for the country's traditional -hewers of wood and drawers of water who sud- denly have realized they have become the biggest single Lebanese commu- nity and who -want satisfaction now. _ ,Under the intelligent and effective leadership of their religious chief, Imam Mousse Sadre, the Shia commu- nity, perhaps unconsciously, is: 'asking the real questions which the Palestin- ian presence has masked for so long. If the Shia community goes through with announced plans to stage a march, on Beirut by some 209,000 to 300,000 of its members next month, even the most ill-informed citizen is going to get the message. And the message is' meaningful equality. Of th'e top civil servants, only 14 of 85 are Shiites and of the next highest category only 28 of 331, scarcely an even shake for a commu- nity representing at least a quarter of the total population. ' 'Forced by the vicissitudes of history into the poor, mountainous regions of the south, east and north, the Shia are demanding the government carry out development projects such as irriga- tion, modern roads and electrification, which have been promised for years - but never carried out.' Many Many thoughtful Lebanese wonder if the Palestinian presence may not have both an accelerating effect on poten- tial upheaval and a decelerating effect because the Palestinians have 'become Topic A to the exclusion of the cotin- try's indigenous problems. "Our real problems may start when the Palestinians end, up having a homeland," one Lebanese politician said, "when we have to face up to the lack of institutions and infrastructure and the truly revolutionary dangers that represents. , "Face it, what -kind of society is it that does not provide free and decent schooling, that has no real city bus sys- tem or garbage collection worthy, of the name, where the top income bracket pays only 11.8 per cent in in- come taxes, where there is no social se- curity system?" Or as parliamentary deputy Hussein' Husseini recently putit, "You can find everything' in Lebanon except the pres- ence of the state." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : 90-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 NEJE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich 28 August 1974 IN? CREASING ANXIETY ABCUT CHINA IN THAILAND "PLABPLACHAI" Alstb PEAR When for three nights during the ;month of PUly "Chinese" unrest engulfed the Plabplachai police station, a few commentaries pointed out a historical parallel with the Yaowarat Street fighting in September 1945. The Plabplachai police station is not far from Yaowarat Street which runs through the Chinese section and where after Japan's capitulation, Chinese immigrants enthusiastically celebrated the Allied and thus the Chinese victory. Since the occupation 1941 by Japanese troops, Thailand had flexibly collaborated with Japan within the framework of Tokyo's "Greater East Asian Sphere of Wealth" and consequently also was very harsh on its Chinese immigrants. The latter gave vent to their feelings of extreme anger after the Japanese collapse in the many day-long Yaowarat riots accompanied by rifle fire against the Thais. During the disturbances last month, three times as many people lost their lives than did in the street fighting a generation age.. Unlike "Yaowarat", the direct cause for "Plabplachai" was not a political one; rather the backdrop for the recent event was the acute yet old question whether and how the Southeast Asian border state of Siam will be able to find a modus vivendi with its northern colossus neighbor, China. U.S. PROTECTION PUT CHINESE QUESTION ON BACKBURNER Until 1946, Thailand had no diplomatic relations with China. The problem hardly existed during the past century when the Ching dynasty crumbled; in the earlier part of this century, the Tudinentary-interstate relationship had been resolved by way of the establishment of a Thai tributary-legation in Peking, in which the Thais were interested primarily for trade and economic reasons. Siam!s ? tributary relationship with China was a most informal one and different from all other countries bordering on China. Particularly after Sun Yat-Sen's revolution and the endless civil wars, there obtained a politically ideal situation as seen from Bangkok'g point of view, because the splintered Chinese empire did not represent a serious power factor on the Asian continent. Although after the end of World War I? negotiations for diplomatic recognition were conducted in Tokyo with representatives of Peking, they could easily be led into non-productive channels on the basis of the arrogant Chinese demands that the; newrelationship must contain elements of the former On 23 January 1946 Thailand, which cleverly had switched over to the side of the Allies, concluded a treaty of friendship with Tshang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government, which then still ruled on the Chinese mainland. Only for the past year has there been a Chinese embassy in Bangkok -- representing the ter- ritory of the Chinese government on Taipei only. After the American policy of the containment of Communist China had begun and particularly after the end of the Korean War, in which a Thai contingent saw action under the American-led U.N. Command, the Chinese question constituted no longer a problem related to international politics for the Thai government. It was in part- icular the ascending military dictator Sarit Thanarat who from 1957 on unequivocally joined the ranks of the Southeast Asian allies of the United States, seeking her and the SEATO shield's protection. Sarit's successors strengthened these policies: not only did Thailand serve the U.S. as an important base in the Indochina War but it became directly engaged with one division in the Vietnam war and finally with more than twenty thousand "volunteers" in Laos. The Sino-American rapprochement, an- nounced in the summer of 1971, immediately began to undermine confidence in the very basis of the Thai foreign policy course. Peking's acceptance as member of the United Nations in October of the same year furnished one of the reasons for the Thai military rulers to justify their return to an absolute military dictatorship on 17 November 1971. This coup "from above," born out of panic, in actuality had predominently domestic political causes and finally ended two years later in the overthrow of the military regime and with a profound discreditation of the armed forces as a political power factor. Nevertheless, it is prudent to recall the Thai's anxiety over China which then was being played pp, for in the meantime this anxiety has become more of a reality. 30 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 .e r_,_. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-8 ? REBELLION CASTS A PARALYZING SHADOW. In all? the years of dictatorship the Thai military partly due to an incompre- hensible inefficiency, could not cope with the problem posed by the rebellion in the Northeast and North of the country which is supported materially mainly by Hanoi , and politically and propagandistically mainly by China. The present civilian govern- ment is faced with an inheritance fought with dangers: the insurrection is now to be taken seriously and has a real? chance in the period ahead-- marked by an in- evitable phase of inner instability of a Thai regime again experimenting with demo- cracy -- to spread at a rapid pace into many regions. The concern of serious observers in Bangkok can readily be noticed. At the same time many firm psychological con- - cepts relating to the alliance with the departing Americans are being abandoned at this very moment, adding new feelings of insecurity. At no time has China been considered so revisionist moderate and reasonable in Southeast Asia as she has ap- peared particularly in the commentaries of American analysts of the new course of Nixon and Kissinger. Nevertheless, even the military in the last months of their rule and then also the civilian government in Bangkok have accommodated themselves to the "winds of change" and seek a modus vivendi with a China which has become stronger. Thailand's achievements on this course are fragmentary as well as contradictory and have not led so far to substantive political results. Bangkok's diplomatic Irepresentation in Taipei has been cut back to what are minimum requirements of Iprotocol. Hawever, the relationship with Peking has not gone beyond symbolic ex- changes. Moreover, Thai governmental statements to the contrary, the Chinese govern- ment on Taiwan still has a remarkable influence in the country: The radio broadcasts of "Free China" are continuing from North Thailand and in that part of the country there are still a few thousand Kuomintang troops who were pushed out of Yunnan. On the other hand, Communist China has not reduced itszmilitary presence in the Far northwest of Laos which fact Bangkok has consistently and exaggeratedly characterized as a threat to Thailand . Peking keeps its options open, indeed; at the beginning of the year it has in no way committed itself to the full abandonment of a "just people's liberation war" in talks with Air Marshal Dawee Chullasapya. The broadcasts of the rebels continue in full force from Yunnan to Thailand. The shadow of the rebellion seems to retard Bangkok's rapproachment with Peking, although reliance on the Americans is dwindling. FEAR OF ECONOMIC DEPRESSION Nowhere has this become more evident during the last few months than in the case of the Decree 53, which already has became almost legendary: it is the con- necting link in the chain of the Thai foreign and domestic political anxiety re China. The Decree of the dictator Sarit was issued in 1959 and until this day for- bids trade with the People's Republic of China -- which has been conducted during the past fifteen years, nevertheless, indirectly via Hbng Kong and Singapore. Shortly prior to its fall, the military regime had worked out a plan to abolish the Decree; and to create a special organization in charge of trading with Peking. When the civilian government of Sanya turned the matter over to the parliament this spring, the latter blocked the motion under the pretext that it should be debated in closed committee session. Since then there has been DO movement at all. It should be noted that even the former foreign minister Thanat Khoman -- who after 1971 campaigned against the presence of the U.S. Air Force with the industriousness of a renegate and.advo- cated a fast recognition of Peking -- portrayed this maneuver, which continues the trade embargo with China, as a meaningful action putting Bankok's and Peking's posi- tions on the same level at the conference table in the future. ? The Thai's anxiety re China really comes to the fore in matters of Decree 53. They are fearful that in the future the Chinese Communists could easily identify their business partners in Bangkok and thus gain an enormous economic and political lever in Thailand, which would create havoc among business people. Thus comes about the complex situation that even Sino-Thais, who are not oriented toward Taipei, are not favoring a liberalization of the relationship with Peking and in some instances raise the question of the "loyalty of the Chinese" themselves. The some 170,000 stateless of Chinese extraction living in Thailand are little interested in becoming any sort of focal point for future economic-political lever for Peking, because they do not occupy higher economic positions. Who then are the members of Peking's Sino-Thai Fifth Column? Wild speculations are hardly of interest but the fact is that this question, even though only whispered, sows a germ of dissension stronger than never before in a society in which a meaningful, clear line between Thai and Chinese can no longer be Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CR1-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 drawn. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 WROGRADE ASSIMILATION? The "Plabplacha" riots have brought to the surface a level of reaction not - evident in a long time concerning suspicions of questionable "loyalty" of Thai citizens of Chinese decent. This open suspicion is dangerous in itself for it could set a retrograde tendency in the assimilation process into motion and even push fully assimilated Sino-Thai into the "Chinese corner". This development is being nourished by the "Chinese" rebellion. Underpaid Plabplachai policemen annoy relatively well-off "Chinese" in a climate where not only politically trivial but * economic corrupt/on &,9 present, the latter, becoming destructive over the long haul for it create the.;',IT.o....7e5s'on of 9bodornimtion" without universal progress. It does create endless ON;MCIC:; for Oever, competent Sino-Thi business people and increases suspicionsCORCOKA5R-.; 8.7-MAba.1,5 a5 potential accomplices for anti-state activities. The freer air of the "democratic enterprise" in Bangkok though giving the appearance of chaos to the many who are more familiar with the disciplines of dic- tatorship -- tends to accentuate the whole process. As YLppened, for instance, in the first balk of the you! Tiftn by Thai standards the starkly radical Thammasat stu-. dents staged a large CNna ewi'pLbit with Mao poster, it was an upsetting new experience in Siam. Also, with the newly regained freedom of the press, the paper 'Esin Chung Ribao" appears in Bangkok in the Chinese language, containing articles which dis- creetly but unmis'salcably document the beauty of the Middle Kingdom (China). On occasion the paper uses s*,uplfied characters along the lines of the Peking model, characters which are not used on T iwan and until now were not to be used in Thai- land either. DEFENSIVE REFLEXES OF THAI NATIONALISM In November 1972, the military regime passed laws regulating foreign business activitiee in Thailand and issued prohibitions in certain prefessional categories. Because of a long laisser-faire policy and a resultant confusion and disorder, the step had became necessary; yet it was interpreted as a sign of the Siamese falling back into the old balance of power pattern. Next November the two-year "grace period", before the laws will be enacted, will expire. In the meantime many fears have been dispelled and many things could be "arranged" as heretofore. The rice, ? rubber, tin and timber trades are today primarily in "Chinese" hands. Those business circles are surprisingly little concerned about the possibility of a new discrimination under these laws, although initially they had been inter- preted as being anti-"Chinese". Literally interpreted, the laws do not represent a serious danger for the Sino-Thais. They say themselves with quite a degree of self-assurance that the times of primitive professional bans and discrimination,as practized in the early forties by Phibul, will not come back again because there is now the big, strong neighbor China. However, a suspicion full of resentment has come back which ominously could turn against Sino-Thai considered fully assimilated. And "PlabplachaP! may mean that a Siamese nationalism which feels threatened, subjectively, by an ever-stronger China could produce more and more anti-"Chinese" defensive reflexes. WASHINGTON POST 02 October 1974 C57. /1Z -1 -Y) . t His Critics9 o ]W11StS I' -7 .), sl. 0 ifirl -6 c2-7:' '1 h_ u IA), Ilii_a,,,, ,.,,,), L.,..?. -Y7i, ;'j (ri ,-(--1)-71) By Philip A. McCombs - Washington Post Foreign Service SAIGON, Oct. 1?President Nguyen Van Thieu, respond- ing to increasing criticism. told South Vietnam tonight that it was only "Communists or people working for the Communists ... who say confi- dence in me is falling." In a two-hour televised speech he answered his critics by saying that he had never engaged in personal corrup- tion and by blaming the COM- munists for all the ills of the country. At the same time the presi- dent announced he would take steps to liberali2e the press censorship law and the decree limiting political party activity In South Vietnam?two major areas of complaint against his previous policies. ? The speech, regarded here at Thieu's most important pol- icy address in the 20 months since the ? Paris cease-fire agreement, came after a month of mounting antigovern- ment demonstrations by Bud- dhists, Catholic's, newspaper- men and others. These groups say that Thieu is corrupt and has thwarted peace efforts, and they criticize him for eco- nomic hardships, political re- pression and press censorship. Tonight's speech touched on nearly all of these areas, and in each case it was the Com- munists, not Thieu or his gov- ernment, whd got the blame: 32 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ? 'Approved For Release'2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 The American Congress ,also came in tor criticism, and Thieu said that recent aid cuts "are tempting the Communists to, further aggression in South Vietnam." "The Communists are every- where," he. said. "They will cause incidents and then they can charge. government re-: pression." For this reason, press freedom and other dem- ocratic liberties must be exer- cised within constitutional re- straints to prevent the-Com- munists from turning them to their advantage, he said. "We cannot allow a small number of people in a small number of papers to destroy the struggling spirit of the sol- diers and create discontent among the people," Thieu said. Nevertheless, Thieu said he would submit new legislation to the National assembly. to liberalize the press censorship law. Thieu said his decree plac- ing limits on political parties had been aimed at bolstering a two-party system and elimi- nating the destructive effects of having dozens of small par- tie's haggling at each other: He said, however, that he wOuld submit .legislation andi order administratie chane'ea, to make it, easier for parties! to form to stimulate an at- mosphere . of democracy . for! NEW YORK TIMES 03 October 1974 OPPOSITION SCORES D3FENSE BY TITIEU Foes -Say- Speech Evades Specifics of Corruption By JAMES M. MARKHAM Special to The New York Times : SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 2-;-Opposition politicians re- acted today with ? disappoint- ment, anger and scorn to a .pol- icy speech delivered last night by President Nguyen Van Thieu. In a wide-ranging two-hour televised talk to the nation, Mr. Thieu said he would ease de- crees restricting political party activity and' press freedom, crack down on official corrup- tion and continue to resist corn- monist -pressure, both, political and military. ? ? : 'Though much of the speech . wkis conciliatmy in tone, oppo- sition legislators fastened on- Mr..Thieu's frequent clispara,e- ing comments about their moti- vations and his reluctance to discuss in detail specific charges the presidontial and assembly, elections next Year. His own Democracy Party: is at present the only legal: party in the? country. Thieu announced no plans for further repression.-.-a pos- sibility that political oppo- nents had said they feared? and his speech was generally mild in tone. Despite this re- action among his opposition tonight was one of disappoint- ment that he offered no spe- cific ,responses to the charges of personal corruption. One antigovernment politi-. Tran Van Tuyen, criti- cized even the president's con- ciliatory in oveS by saying, "Thieu promised that the press and political party laws will be improved but what we real:, ly need is for them to be; cancelled." The president did say "I1 cannot desert" the nation un- til peace cemes. He. added,: however, somewhat crypti- cally. "But if the whole people have lost confidence in me as the Communist propaganda says, then please let me "He seems to be losing con- i fidence in himself, asking the people , for their views like that," said an aide of opposi- tion leader, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh.' Phu Xuan Huy, an An Quang Bucidist and, lower of corrtiption that have been brought against him. ; Referendum Urged i"President Thieu said that if people have -no more confi- dence in him, then let Min know," observed Deputy Ngu- yen Trong Nho, a member of the Buddhist opPosition. "I would suggest holding a nation- wide referendum for the people to express their 'confidence or no-confidence." Le Dinh Duycn, another op- position deputy who, has been active in a new organization demanding greater press free- dom, said: "Mr. Thieu repeated the old banalities about Com- munists, peaceniks and a re- newed Communist offensive, to scare the people." Like others, Mr. Duyen took offense at Mr. Thieu's conten- tion that recent opposition ac- tivity was tied to next year's presidential and legislative elec- tions. Speech Denounced Deputy Nguyen Van Binh, a retired colonel who is a main- stay Of the Catholic-led anticor- ruptiOn front tiiar. initially ac- cused Mr. Thieu of corruption, called the discourse "the worst speech ever." house deputy, said tonight, "If j Thieu wants the people to let him know their confidence in him, we'll let him know all right with a few demonstra-I tions." , Nguyen Van Kim, another! " deputy and a leader in the 1 Catholic Anti-Corruption Movement, called the presi- dent's speech "nonsense." "Thieu showed how far his thinking is from the people's when he suggested that cor- ruption is caused by the war and the Communists." Thieu said the Communists will launch a countrywide gen- eral offensive in 1975 and warned the nation not- to be- lieve analysts who say other- wise. He said that the country's Vast economic problems and refugee problems would not exist if the Communists "respected the Paris agree- ment even without- the Na- tional Reconciliation Council and general elections." The -agreement calls for; such elections, but the talks! for setting them up have bro- ken down. The president tried to un- dercut the Catholic Anti-Cor- ruption Movement and the Buddhist National Reconcilia- tion movement?two of the strongest opposition forces now active?by claiming a "I honestly belie that after' yesterday's speech, the people, even those who admired him in the past, have found a strange President, distant, who does not' understand their aspirations, thoroughly cut off from the people," Mr. Binh said. , Mr. Thieu made only a cur- sory. denial of the Catholics' charges that he and his family ha lined their pockets at the public's expense. But today, many of .his listeners gleefully repeated- a phrase used by the President ?"There is a little something that has been exag- gerated" which seemed to concede at least minor trans- gressions. . "So Mr. Thieu is only lit- tle corrupt,' remarked Deputy Phan Xuan Huy, .of the An Quan:b a Buddhist . faction, who likened the talk to Richard M. Nixon's resignation speech "That is quite significant. A little corruption!" Support Meager While opposition figures were universally critical of the speech, pro-Government depu? lead role for himself both in !fighting corruption and in try- ing to achieve peace. ? He said the problem of "phantom troops," who exist on pay records but not in fact, would be solved in one month and that of corrupt civil serv- ants in three months, but he warned, "Don't believe in mir- acles where corruption is con- cerned." In large portions of- thei speech that seemed aimed atl an American audience, Thieu; strongly criticized the United' States for cuttng military aid. , "They promised to continue it,' not formally, but they said it," he said. 'Otherwise, he said, he was glad that the Americans are gone. "They gave 'enough blood and bones," -he , said. "Better for them to help us to build our own strong forces." . Thieu said that he met with Former President Nixon be- fore the signing of the cease:. fire and told him that aid must be continued "for up to; 25 years, as-with Korea,1 France, and so n." He also had told Mr. Nixon,1 he said, that large infusions of aid would be needed for about three years, and then the amounts could taper off. This is also the view of U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin, who returned here last night. after a two-month absence,: mostly in Washington, where] he lobbied unsuccessfully to ; keep Vietnam aid levels high. I ties Were no-table for their un- willingness- to rush to Mr. Thieu's defense. One prominent political fig- ure, who is .somewhat sympa- thetic'. to Mr. Thieu's predica- ment; said the President seemed -'embarrassed"..aS . he spoke about the corruption is- sue. - . ? This man, who preferred to remain' anonymous, said that Mr. Thieu had become politi- cally 'isolated and so instinc- tively fell back on tired, famil- iar arguments. "He has no staff," he said. "Thieu is a man who. hesi- tates to do big things," this man added. "And that is too bad." ? In the streets of Saigon, it was hard to find anyone who reacted favorably to the speech. "He said he was going to clean up the army in a month," commented a disabled veteran. "Is he kidding? Then there will be no more army next month, then no more Government? and ho President in three month." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : gyk-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 NEW YORK TIMES 10 October 1974 5,090 CATHOLICS PROTEST IN SEOUL "Gathering Opposing Park's Rule Is Largest Since '72 Martial-Law Edict ? By RICHARD HALLORAN Special to The New York Times ? ' SEOUL, South Korea, Oct. 6 ?About 5,000 South Korean Roman Catholics demonstrated against President Park Chung Hee today in the largest anti- Government outburst since Mr. Park declared martial law two years ago. The demonstration against Mr. Park came two days after a speech accusing him of ex- treme infringement of human rights Was delivered by the opposition party leader, Kim Young Sam. In addition, small groups of Korean university students, after months of fear and apathy, have begun sit-in fasts to dramatize their oppo- sition to the Government. Ford's Visit a Factor Any of these acts would have been punishable by death be- fore Mr. Park lifted two emer- gency decrees on Aug. 24. But WASHINGTON POST 09 October 1974 President Park warnid yester-' day that he would not tolerate demonstrations in the streets or demands that his. power be curbed. His opponents, however, are using the scheduled visit of President Ford here on Nov. 22 as a shield. Several adversaries said ' they dld not think Mr. Park would crack down on them again, at least until after Mr. Ford's visit, because of con- cern about South Korea's public Image in the United States. Moreover, Korean political and church leaders critical of Mr. Park said they intended to ask President Ford, through let- ters, to urge Mr. Park to restore democratic rights here. In addi- ? tion, a letter signed by 58 American Christians here is be- ing sent to President Ford to make the same appeal. Today, the outdoor protest mass attended by about 15,000 persons led to an attempt by about one-third of the congre- gation to, march into the street carrying banners demanding the restoration of basic civil rights. The march was led by five bishops, including, the Most Rev. Kim Chae Duk, who cele- brated the mass, and the Most Rev. Thomas Stewart, an Amer- ican member of a missionary order. But the Papal Nuncio, the, Most Rev. Luigi Dossena, left without participating in the demonstration. Marchers AIR Stopped The.march from the hilltop jeromeAlan, Cohen _ grounds of the ? Holy Spirit' Catholic Seminary was stopped by husky plainclothes police- men and helmeted riot police- men wielding nightsticks. Sev- eral American and Irish mis- sionaries, invited by South Korean priests to participate, -were pummeled during the me-. lee. Policemen also tore away the ! . South Korean national flag car- ried by several South Korean priests: shoved many., women, I including nuns, and later beat ' up a young man who said he, ? was trying to help direct traffic after the rally: So ? far as is' known, however, no arrests , were made. ? Nor .did the policemu; who were equipped -with American- made Motorola radios and American Army gas masks, use the American-made pepper-gas sprayers that they -have used in similar situations. During a two-hour standoff, the Catholics chanted slogans demanding the release from ori- son of the Most Rev. Chi Hak Soun, other Christian clergy- men, students and intellectuals ?totaling 179 by official count but believed to number more than 200. The Government alle- ges that they conspired ih April to overthrow it. The. stalemate was broken when priests and seminariams forced open a narrow oath through the police ranks ?Hun- dreds of South Korean nuns and thousands of others filed through, many sineing a tradi- . . A Grim Anniversary In South Korea This month will mark the grim first anniversary of the death of Prof. Tsche Chong Kil, a Korean who spent the years 1970-72 at -Harvard Law School. Seoul National University, Korea's most prestigious educational institu- tion, had selected Tsche, a member of its law faculty, for a highly -prized Har- vard-Yenching Fellowship. Indeed, the university's president had described him as one of Korea's most promising scholars. Tsche was a likable, gentle person who spent his time in Cambridge ana- lyzing Anglo-American, and German theories of -private international law and being with his wife and two young children. Like most Koreans who study abroad with their government's per- mission, he seldom took part in public The writer is Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard University. political discussions. By criticizing the increasingly repressive measures of the Park regime, a few SNU law pro- fessors had landed in serious trouble. But Tsche concentrated on his profes- sional interest and avoided contro- versy except for an occasional defense of 'harsh measures taken by his gov- ernment in the name of anti-Commu- nism. Soon after Tsche returned to Seoul in the fall of 1972, President Park plunr.;ed the nation into crisis by de- claring martial' law and replacing the Constitution ,with a new charter that permits Park's total and permanent rule. These .events provoked peaceful demonstrations by democratic-minded -students, to whom Koreans have tradi- tionally looked for leadership against tyrants. And this in turn exposed the students to the brutality of the ubiqui- tous Korean . Central Intelligence Agency. ,In one such incident just a year ago, KCIA thugs beat up and arrested some tional martyr's hymn?that has ' become to the anti-Government movement here what "We Shall Overcome" was to the Ameri- can civil rights movement. Fiery Sermon The Catholics continued de- - monstrating in small groups outside the seminary until bus- loads of people from all over the country departed. They had come for a long- planned mass to celebrate the Korean Holy Year. But it was quickly apparent that the mass woilld be turned into a strong denunciation of the Govern- ment Bishop Kim gave a fiery sermon in which he addressed to President Park, a departure from earlier indirect references. Bishop Kim noted that Pres- ident Park had asked South Koreans to sacrifice what he called sniall freedoms to main- tain the larger freedom from conquest by North Korea. But, - Bishop Kim asserted that there was no such thing as a small freedom or a big freedom. . ? "I answer you," he said, re- ferring to President Park, "by borrowing a Korean .proVerb: No one should- wait three days without eating anything, be- cause he might starve before the great feast." Through 'Bishop Min's ser- mon, and ,with their banners, placards, and pamphlets. the Catholics demanded' that Pres-. -ident Park revise the Constitu- tion, which gives him unlimited power; - elimnate corruntion, and -raise the standard of living: SNU law students, a professor and the associate dean. This was too much for even Prof. Tsche, who in earlier years hid sought to pacify student unrest. He protested against the KCIA's ac- tions at a meeting of the law faculty. Shortly after class on Oct. 16, 1973, Tsche was picked up by the KCIA. He "Koreans sky away from . discussing the case even in America, for the tentacles of the KCIA extend throughout not only their country but also, our own.", was never seen alive again. Four days later the government announced that Tsche had been arrested for investiga- tion of charges of spying for North Ko- rea and that after making a confession he had committed suicide by jumping out the seventh-floor window of an in- terrogation center. ? I have no way of knowing whether Tsche was actually a North Korean agent. I do know that the evidently embarrassed South Korean ? govern- ment failed to substantiate its post- mortem accusations with any persua- sive evidence; nor was the confession supposedly extracted from Tsche made public. Moreover, South Korean friends who 'have survived KCIA de- 34 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340065-5 tention treat the report of Tsche's "suicide" with the ? utmost skepticism, for KCIA prisoners are said to be sub- ject to the closest scrutiny. The fact that Tsche's widow, a medical doctor, was denied permission to examine his corpse hardly inspires confidence in what appears to have been. a hastily contrived story. Subsequent efforts to discover the truth about Prof. Tsche's demise have met a stone wall. His widow has been insulated from outside contacts. The Intimidation and fear that prevail in Seoul prevent his colleagues from pur- suing the matter. The press is muzzled, and the legal system controlled. Ko- reans shy away from discussing the ease even in America, for the tentacles of the KCIA extend throughout not only their country but also our own. Prof. Tsche's case is not unique. The exquisite tortures that have become the KCIA's hallmark have claimed many victims. Its mindless arrogance recognizes no bounds but power. It kidnapped from Japan President Park's last rival for the presidency, Kim Dae Jung, and was about to dump his weighted body into the sea when pressure from the Japanese and Amer- ican governments saved his life, at least temporarily. Kim's offense was to Poll 47 per cent of the vote despite rave government-imposed handicaps I NEW YORK TIMES 08 October 1974 .11S, ATOMIC ARMS: sAGAIN STIR TOKYO Weapons' Presence Aboard Navy Ships in Japanese Ports Is Questioned ? By FOX BUTTERFIELD TOKYO, Oct. 7-r-A new nu- clear controversy broke out here today in the wake of re- ports from Washington quoting a retired American admiral as having told Congress that United States Navy ships car- rying nuclear weapons had en- tered Japanese ports. Premier Kakuei anaka and other Government leaders, in- cluding the director of the de- fense agency, Sadanori Yama- naka, held a meeting at the Premier's residence to discuss pie reports. [The Premier, in a request 'made through the Japanese , Embassy in Washington, asked the United States Government for an ex-)lanation, United Press tnterrational reported.] All of Tokyo's leading news- papers devoted much of their front pages today to reports saying that the retired officer. and to alert his people to Park's plan to abolish constitutional rule. Another notorious case is that of Soh Sung, a Korean student from Japan who was horribly disfi'gured during pretrial de- tention. Yet this is only to speak of ? "South Korean friends who have survived KCIA detention treat the report of Tsche's 'suicide' with the utmost skepticism." Koreans who are well-known or who have foreign friends to inquire after them. There are countless others. All this took place before this year's emergency decrees that made it a capi- tal offense for students to cut class "without plausible excuse" and that re- sulted in long prison sentences for hundreds of courageous intellectuals, Christian leaders and students whose crime was to call for the restoration of freedom. Thus the recent withdrawal of those decrees in the hope of luring President Ford to Seoul in November, improving South Korea's prospects at the U.N. this autumn and avoiding con- Rear Adm. Gene Robert La- i Rocque, had testified Sept. 10 that American warships had not unloaded their nuclear arms before _entering Japanese ports. If true,' such action would run counter to pledges by Jar).- anese officials that there were no United States nuclear weap- ons in Japan and could be con- strued to violate the United States-Japanese mutual secur- ity treaty. The treaty requires consultation before any major changes in the equipment of United States forces in Japan, and the introduction of nuclear arms is considered such. a change. Commanded Oklahoma ,City Admiral LaRocque, a former captain of the cruiser Oklahoma City, a flagship of the Seventh Fleet, was said to have given. his testimony to a subcom- mittee of the Joint Congres- sional Committee on Atomic Energy. The admiral retired from the Navy in 1972. According ? to diplomatic sources, Japanese officials at- tending a regular monthly ses- sion today of the Security Con- sultative Group, a group of senior United States and Jap- anese officials including the commander of United States forces in Japan, expressed con- cern that nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan. However, the sources said, the American officials at the meetine rpnlied that they had not officiPlly heard ofAdmiral gressional reduction of military aid is essentially cosmetic, especially when the kangaroo courts-martial that made a farce of Korean justice continue to function. Was it for this that some 33,000 Americans died in combat in Korea? Is this "the Free World" that our military and economic aid make possible and that we are still pledged to defend? People in South Korea have few illu- sions about the kind of freedom they would share with their brothers in the North should Kim Il Sung forcibly re- unify their tragically divided country. Yet they now suffer a KCIA-military dictatorship that uses American tanks _to deprive them of most of their free-. doms ostensibly to protect them from the North. President Ford should not go to Seoul next month unless there is con- vincing evidence?not merely soothing secret assurances?that the Park re- ? gime will significantly relax its oppres- sion for more than the few months of the U.N. General Assembly session. He should in. any event make it clear to the Korean people and the world that the United States will henceforth re- fuse to support tyranny of the right as well as tyranny of the left. To do less than this is to inflict another moral disaster upon American foreign policy. LaRocque's disclosure, The American Embassy and the United States Navy, in keeping with long-standing policy, de- clined comment on the reports of the admiral's testimony. Meanwhile, 44 members of the 55-member crew of Japan's first nuclear-powered ship, the freighter Mutsu, which is at the center of another contro- versy. left the vessel today. The freighter, whose re-entry to port has been blocked by fishermen since its reactor be- gan leaking radiation during trials in late August, continued to drift in the North Pacific off the coast of Honshu. Stem From Wartime Bombing All the other members of the crew, except the captain, are scheduled to abandon the ship 'on Wednesday, placing the Mutsu's -future in serious doubt. . The nuclear controversies are an outgrowth of the bomb- ing of Hiroshima and Negasaki at the close of World War II. Almost no issue in Japanese politics rouses more emotions. Japan's development of nu- clear energy, which is needed to offset the nation's costly reliances on imported oil, has been thrown far behind sched- ule by fear of radiation from nuclear power plants. Japanese officials were said to fear that Admiral LaRocoue's testimony might lead to dem- onstrations during the visit to i Japan of President Ford. He ? is due to arrive Nov. 18. The only previous American president who tried to come to Japan, President Eisenhower, was forced to cancel his trip in 1960 by demonstrations arising from opposition to re- newal of the security treaty. No Secret, 'U.S. Aide Says Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 ? Al- though the Defense Department declined to comment publicly today on deployment of United States warship bearing nuclear weapons, a Pentagon official said it was no secret that such vessels called in foreign ports, including Japan, with the weap- ons on board. The official said this was also known ot the Government of Japan. The testimony that Admiral LaRocque gave Sept. 10 was made public yesterday by Sen- ator Stuart Symington, Mis- souri Democrat, who heads the Joint Committee's subcommit- tee on military applications. Admiral LaRocque Who rose to the post of assistant director of strategic plans for the Chief of Naval Operations before his retirement two years ago, said in his testimony: "Any sl-tip that is capable of carrying nuclear weapons car- ries nuclear weapons. They do not unload them when they go into foreien ports such as ja- pan or other countries. If they are capable of carrying them they normally keep them onl board ship at all times." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 35 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 ,TRE NEW YORK MRS, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1974 Vietngin Qutlook.._Still a Tunnel, Still a Light] e, guments of either the Adminis- Ily DAVID K. SHIPLER s tration or Congress. They are This description of Ifanol's Communist affairs. It is the oi). . iposite of the 1954.56 period, NNW' tom. New yegle Thee 1 COnvinced that Hanoi is deter. sraegy,widely accepted tIOW, when the Vietminh had the SAIOON, South Vietnam mined' to reunify Vigilant?if has led an Arntrican .diplornat structure in the country and who dissents from the official ?.There ls a new version of not politically, as the Patlit line to postulate more North Ngo Dinh Diem had nothing." the old light at the end of the agreement presctibes, then mill. i Vietnamese military action if Furthermore, there Is a fun. tunnel In Vietnam, s . II arily. They note that it has d damental fear in the Govern. American ald is increased an The wishful thought used to been proved conclusively by merit and the American Ernbas. be that the North Vietnamese; the United States Army, Mn. South Vietnam makes economic ? - 'pounded by Amer-, rines, Air Force and Navy that progress. Conversely, he thinks sy that if the Vietcong were '? lean firepower the North Vietnamese cermet that less aid would fit Hanoi's given the democratic freedom ? News would finally find be dislodged from the South, prognosis of continuing decline, guaranteed by the Paris agree- Analysis the price too high Saigon, then, is left with only thereby inducing deferment of ment, they would resort to ter and give . one realistic military goal: a an all-out offensive. rorism. "Democratic free- there is a belief continued stalemate in which "If heavy injections or aid doms?" an American offlci that the South Vietnamese Gov- the Government clings to high- really do bring the country to scoffed. "This is a pretext. You ernment can defend itself mil , ways, population ,centers - and the take-off point," he said, can't let thousands of armed "that uarantees a military l- . people run around with mortars g so lution," And Saigon cannot V.,i and machine guns." militarily, he observed, adding Military Action Reduced that the only chance of preserv- ' What, then; do aid cuts d- ing a non!Communist govern- fect? The reduction in military ment is through the political. aid has.' already prompted mechanism of the Paris agree- Government forces to retreat ment?democratic liberties and from some isolated outposts open general elections, that would have been defended A Distrustful Government .vigorously a few months ago. "You have a government in The army has stopped firing most of the - artillery shells it cannot possibly see itself imple- Saigon so distrustful that it lused to lob randomly into Com.; menting the Paris accords," the munist-held areas. This week the Saigon military command diplomat said. "If . another! the the curtailment of regime would take over, willing, air force flights to conserve; to take the political risk, there's fuel and ammunition. Finally, a real hope of keeping the place out of Communist control. the Pentagon was reported to be planning to postpone or can- tary side." , I ' don't see any hope on the mill- cel delivery of many of the: ,.. F-5E jet fighters that .South No one who knows President Vietnam has been promised. Thieu thinks he will be forced According to military men,: by aid cuts to open the political however, the cuts are not deep, process to the Vietcong. Some enough to cause Saigon's quick believe the opposite: that if he defeat. is weakened he will be even Economic aid may still end up less inclined to enter the paliti- at a higher level than last year, cal arena. "I think Thieu will be but with oil and fertilizer prices' stubborn as hell," a Western soaring, the real benefit may be diplomat remarked. "He'll have smaller. Economists prefer to to be physically ejected before cut projects aimed at building there can be a political settle- industry?agricultural and in- ment." dustrial credit banks, fertilizer There are two basic views of plants, fish farms and the like the reasons for the lack of po- ?before curtailing the program litical progress since the Paris that provides foreign exchange agreement. to permit the Government to One holds that the President import badly needed goods. simply wants to retain the There is widespread agree- power he has carefully accrued ment that standards of living $700-million and the Senate came too lucrative. ? and that he has no motive to in- will continue to decline, espe- Foreign Relations Committee Students of Hanoi policy be-' vite the Vietcong to try to take cially for the jobless in the ur- has voted $420-million in eco- lieve that the North Vietnamese. it from him. He is said to have ban areas, many of whom once nomic aid. The cuts have been will do everything they can to been angered by the Paris worked for the American mill- advocated by legislators who prevent South Vietnam's eco- agreement's political aspects tary establishment. Unemploy- maintain that President Thieu, 'mimic development, for, it is when they were presented to ment runs about 15 per cent, seeing American support flag- I thought, the Communist scena- him- according to the best estiinates. ging, will have no alternative rio for victory runs something The other view?it is gener- How this will translate into p01. but to follow the' mandate for a like this The economy worsens, ally held by American officals itical discontent is anyone's political settlement set, forth in governmental corruption in. ?is that the Communists are guess. the Paris cease-fire agreement, creases, soldiers and civil ser_ blocking a political settlement j "They're ? such? a resilient Saigon is full of officials and vants cannot feed their families because they know they could ?people," a Western diplomat analysts ? Vietnamese, Eu- and at last, perhaps with a mili. not win a,truly free election. commented. "It seems to me ropeans and even some Amen- tary push, the revolution inun- "The Vietcong have no politi- they've got a long way to go cans?who are not entirely dates the crumbling Saigon re. cal ward heelers, no grassroots before the mobs come out on comfortable with the ar- gime, structure,", said an expert on' the Street." _ tarily, "take off' economically rice Ian s. This makes the and prove to be such a going economy highly vulnerable to concern that the North, frus. disruption by the Communists, trated, will abandon its aggres- who can cut major roads,, de- sive designs. stroy bridges and sabotage fac- Another new version fames tories erected with badly need- from the left end of the political spectrum: No longer is it the expectation that with the with- drawal of American troops and planes, peace will come, but rather that further cuts in American aid ?against which President Ford made a strong appeal. yesterday ? will force President Nguyen Van Thieu to a political settlement with ? the Communists that will end ? the war. ? . Central to these theories is a' decade-old assumption about the power of Washington to de- termine the outcome of ?the struggle' by adding or subtract- ing assistance. ? For this fiscal year the White House has sought $1.45-billion in milittiry aid and $750-million in economic aid, compared with the beginning of the American $1.23-billion and $349-million 'build-up that helped make 'respectively last year. The Ad- j Much of the country unsafe for ministration maintains that the farming. Last year 6.6 million funds will prevent military de- -tons of rice were grown. in terioration and . propel Smith Government - held parts of Vietnam close to economic self- South ? Vietnam and 300,000 sufficiency in two or three tons had to be imported. years, ,? I Only the fledgling shrimp and Cuts Voted in Congress I fish industry remains- relatively In contrast, the Senate and! immune to military attack, and. the House of Representatives shore-based processing plants have cut the military aid to could still be targets if they be- ed foreign capital. , In fact, the ? key to what Americans call South Vietnam's ability to take off economically, and the centerpiece of Govern- ment economists' plans, is pre- cisely the weakest link in the military chain: the rural coun- tryside, where, it is hoped, enough food and timber can be produced to form the basis of substantial export ?industries that, in turn, can generate em- ployment and enough foreign exchange to redress a severe payments deficit. Where the Conflict Is , The trouble is that the coun- tryside is where the war is be- ing .fought. South Vietnam has not been able to export rice since 1964, the last year before WASHINGTON POST 05 October 1974 Canibuclia Supplies , A civilian airline linked to the Central Intelligence Agency has begun parachut- ,ing military supplies to be- leaguered Cambodian, garri- sons, officials in Bangkok said. ? A spokesman there said U.S. Air Force C-130 'transports operated by civil- Jan crews from -Bird Air, ?headquartered in Washing- :tont state, started supply 'flights from U Tapao Air Base in Thailand this week. Bird Air was expected to take over the airlift from , the U.S. Air Force by Oct. ,14, as part of an effort to re- duce the U.S. military pres- ence in Cambodia. ? In Saigon, military sources reported that North Vietnamese force Overran the district town of ,Chtiongnghia in the Central ?Highlands Thursday. after the garrison fled under a 9,- 900-round artillery barrage, 36 .Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich 13 September 1974 ? SOVIET "SOLIDARITY" WORDS 'VS. DEEDS Foreign affairs reporting in the Soviet press, is decisively marked today by the attention devoted to the first anniversary of the bloody revolution in which the elected President Salvador Allende lost his life and which brought to power a very harsh military regime. A bold heading on the international news page of Pravda calls for "freedom for the Chilean patriots"; stories from numerous capital cities report on solidarity meetings and demonstrations in support of the tyrannized Chilean people; a caricature in the middle of the page shows a sinister looking junta-general with a machinegun and a death emblem on his cap and in the background a stylized "eleven" in the form of two gallows. Under the heading "The voice of the Soviet People" an appeal of the Soviet trade unions for 'brotherly solidarity, with the heroic Chilean workers' battle" is being published, listing also a whole string of Chile activities in factories, universities and kolchoses. In addition, this evening Soviet television is showing a fairly lengthly, East German-produced film also covering events and conditions innChile. This heavy accent on the Chilean theme in the mass media is nothing new as far as the Soviet newspaper reader is concerned. Since September 11 a year ago hardly a day has passed without coverage in a prominent space of cruelties by the , uniformed successors of Allende. It is not surprising that in thiS context, and given the vulnerabilities, the role of the foreign influence and money of the CIA -- ? whose activities in Chile, according to latest information from the USA, is again raising eyebrows -- and the alleged friendship between Peking and the junta in San- tiago are not favorably commented upon. However, despite the unrelenting barrage one cannot help but gain the impression that the Soviet press is not really interested in the advancement of humanitarian solidarity with the persecuted of the Pinochet regime. The propagandizing of that cause is massive but all too calculated. The Soviet press sees here a welcome propaganda opportunity, a highly exploitable one without a commitment to demonstrate one's own love for justice. In this instance, words of solidarity and concrete actions are not one and the same. Right after the - revolution in Santiago, the real issue was to accept Chilean refugees in other countries; the Soviet authorities displayed a most reserved attitude: they _accepted a very small number only. Also, while Allende was alive and it was necessary to assist his governtent which suffered from the American refusal to extend credits, Moscow acted most reservedly. While Allende was received in the Soviet-,capital with elaborate ceremonies, the re- quested monatary support was extended most sparingly. The shock officially expressed over the junta's arbitrary persecutions and tortures does not sound quite convincing, for there is after all utter silence in Soviet media about similar occurences in the Soviet Union. It is for the latter reason that Soviet labor camp prisoners sent an open letter to the "European Security Conference" in which it is stated: World public opinion is shocked that (Chilean) prisoners on the (Chilean) island Dawson are forced to build their own prison; here in our country, it is considered a normal ? activity. Sowjetische ?Solidaritat? wurte? und Taten Von unserem Korresponden ten ? R. Al. Moskau, 11. September - Den &sten Jahrestac.7 des blutigen UmstufZes in Chile, der dem gewalt-lten Prasidenten Salvador :Allende das Leben kostete und em n gnadenloses? Militarregime an die Macht brachte, gilt heute in der Auslandsberichterstattung der Sowjetpresse die Hauptaufmerksamkeit. Auf der internatio- nalen Seite der 4-Prawdao fordert em n Balkentitel ?Freiheit fiir die Patrioten von Chile; Meldun- gen aus zahlreichen Ffauptstadten berichten tiber Solidaritiitskundgebungen_ mit dent geknechteten chilenischen Volk, eine Karikatur zeigt mitten auf der Seite einen fluster dreinblickenden Junta- general mit Maschinengewehr sowie Totenkopf- Approved For Release 2001/if/ I S abzeichen auf der Mtitze, dahinter zwei zur heu- tigen Datumszahl stilisierte Galgengeriiste. Unter der Ueberschrift (Die Stimme der sowjetischen Oeffentlichkeitv wird ferner eine Erklarung der sowjetischen Gewerkschaften zur abriiderlichen Solidaritat mit dem Heldenkampf der chileni- schen Werktatigen) veroffentlicht, daran an- schlieBend eine laniere Liste von Chileveranstal- tungen in Fabriken, Universitaten und Kolchosen. Heute abend zeigt das sowjetische Femsehen auBerdem einen langeren Film aus der DDR, der ebenfalls den Ereignissen. und Zustanden in der Andenrepublik gewidmet sein wird. Filr die sowjetischen Zeitungsleser 1st breite Aufwand, den die Massenmedien ? dem chilenischen Thema widmen, keineswegs neu. Seit dem vergangenen 11. September dilrfte kein Tag verstrichen sem, an dem nicht an prontinenter Stelle iiber Greueltaten der uniformierten Nach- egtikikefrittit0Y2 RnalieF0031400 Mt* m Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 Zusanirnenhang twat Ober die Rollo des Aus- landskapltals, der CIA ? deren Tiitigkeit in Chile nach neuesten Inforrnationen aus Amerika erneut ins Zwielicht geraten ist und fiber die angebliche Freundschaft Pekings mit der Junta in Santiago wenig schmeichelhafte Dingo gesagt werden, darf attgesichts der sich bietenden An griffsfilichen nicht verwundern. Bei all diesent pausenlosen? Trotnnielfeuer ilberwlegt indessen der Eindruck, dad es der Sowjetpresse weniger um die vordergrtindig hochgesplelte humanitlire Solidarisierung mit den vOm Pinochet-Regime ?Verfolgten geht, als vielmehr urn einen will- kommenen Propagandoanlafi, der sich ohne viel Verbindlichkeit zur Demonstration der eigenen Gerechtigkeitsllebe ausniitzen laBt. Solidarische Worte und konkrete Taten vvollen in diesern Fella nicht ohne weIteres zusarnmenpassen. Als es nach dent Putsch in Santiago darum ging, chlienische Richtliqge in anderen Llindern ad- ' zunehmen, nalunen die sowjetischen Behorden eine welt reserviertere Haltung em; nur em n ganz klei- nes Kontingent konnte in die 1.1c1SSR einreisen. WALL S TREL T JOURNAL 3 October 1974 By ROBERT KEATLEY WASHINGTON ? Henry Kissinger en.: jo?s the role of diplomatic superstar and uslially plays it to the hilt. But when he "flies into Buenos Aires next March for a Western Hemisphere foreign ministers' -conference-, he may find the spotlight pointed at someone else. ? It could be aimed at Raul Roa Garcia, an elderly, bespectacled man, scholarly and distinguished-looking, who also hap- ? pens to be minister of foreign relations for Fidel Castro's Cuba. ? " Mr. Roa's attendance isn't yet certain. But if he does go to Buenos Aires, and it now looks likely that he will, he will be the first Cuban to attend such a meeting of hemisphere countries in more than a dec- ade. And his presence would mark the final collapse of an American-backed pol- icy of isolating Cuba from its Latin neigh- bors in hopes of retarding its development or even toppling its regime. . It's obvious, of course, that the policy has failed. Communist Cuba, if something less than. an economic showpiece, has made notable progress since- a 1970 low point. These days, thanks to soaring sugar prices, it even has millions to spend abroad. Meanwhile, Havana's political re- lations with Latin and other states grow' warmer as it settles into bureaucratic mid- dle age after a capricious revolutionary *youth. There's no longer much talk about exporting insurgency, nor fear Fidel cart somehow lead a docile Continent into mili- tant Marxism. For such reasons, nine Republican Con- gressmen months ago concluded a study of U.S.-Cuban relations by saying it's high time for an American policy change to- t ward Cuba. "Action which was under- ! standable, and even right, at one time and under one set of circumstances, may no longer be right or even wise at another date and- under another set of circum- stances," they said. And change is coming. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have been drop- ping broad hints. The Organization of American States (OAS), which voted eco- nomic sanctions against Cuba in 1964, will abandon them in November. Messages be- tween Washington and Havana are being relayed by Mexico's foreign minister, who wants Cuba's isolation to end. But as the pending OAS action Indi- cates, more is involved than just the sensi- Auch a1 s sich noch zu Lebzeiten Mendes darum handelte, seiner durch die amerikanische Kreditsperre bedrangten Regierung tatkrilftig unter die Anne zu greifen, gab man slob in Mos- kau wesentlich verschlossener, Zwar wurde Allende in der sowjetischen Hauptstadt mit ttllem Zeretnoniell empfangen, die orbetenen Stiltztings- gelder aber flossen nur sehr sparlich melt Sant. iago. Nicht gerade konsequent mud fuller die offizielle tntrtistung fiber die von tier chileni- schen Junta praktizierten willkilrlichen Vedo1.. gungen und Folterungen an, wenn man sic mit dem Schweigen vergleicht, das die sowjetischen Medien fiber nicht unahnliche Vorgange im eige- nen Lande ausbreiten. Mit einigem Recht schrie- ben deshalb sowjetische Lagerhilftlinge itt einem.. offenen Brief an die geuropilische Sicherheits- konferenis: Die VVeltliffentlies,keit ist ernport, daB man die (chilenischen) ...lefangenen auf der (chilenischen) Inset Dm .son zwingt, fur sieh saber eiri Geflingnis zu zimmern. Aber bei uns wird tins ebenfalls 4.t9 normal angesehen. ? . Cuba Rejoin the Club? bilities of Cuba and the United States. There are four major parties in the affair, and change is coming- because none of tpe. four sees much to lose by re.yersing past policy, while all see somethingito gain. These four are Cuba, the United States, the OAS, and the Soviet Union?which has been for years the main Outsider in West- ern Hemisphere affairs in its role as Cuba's economic supplier and political tutor. " Here's a summary of the way each of these major parties views the situation ? now, along with an explanation of why each is ready for the change: THE UNITED STATES: There's noi longer much excuse for the 'U.S. to cling to. its policy of seeking to isolate Cuba. In this ? officially proclaimed era of detente the old Cuba line seems increasingly anachronis- tic. Though Richard Nixon never over- came personal prejudices (or the influ- ence, many believe, of his old friend, Bebe Rebozo), Gerald Ford has no such hang- ups. The new President is open to recon- sideration. That is especially so when current Cuba. policy seems hypocritical, at best. The offi- cial excuse for sanctions against Cuba Is that it meddles in internal affairs of oth- ers. Cuba trains agents and saboteurs, 3j. Nixon contended last year in a foreign pol- icy report, "to carry out violence against established governments. . . . This activ- ity continues to threaten the stability of our hemisphere." There's no question this once was true; after e.11, Che Guevera, Castro's one-time top agent, died in a quixotic effort to whip up revolution in Bolivia. But most ana- lysts, including many Washington. officials, think that this stopped long ago;-..and that Mr. Castro is trying now to get chummy with other government chiefs. In the meantime, new revelations show, the United States itself has done some meddling. The U.S. poured $3 million-plus into Chile to finance_ the late Salvador Al- lende's foes, While cash also has been fun- neled into Guyana and other South Ameri- can states, according to recent reports. Continuing to brand Cuba as an interna- tional renegade for its subversive ventures ' Is inconsistent, to say the least, in light of the U.S.'s own covert activities. But there's a more positive way to view this country's changing Cuba policy. (The 1 new policy could consist of some, or-all Of ! the following elements: voting with the 1. OAS majority to drop the organization's Cuba embargo the subsequent lifting of . ! the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, and ? resuming diplomatic relations with the is- ? land.) Importantly, a friendlier U.S. policy to- ward Cuba would remove a major irritant ? between the U.S. and its southern neigh- Will ? : bors. For them, as one State Department I Official explains, America's Cuba policy "is a symbol of Yankee interference in ! Latin affairs." Washington's pressure was ? largely responsible for the 1964 OAS sanc- tions (only Mexico refused to participate). And Washington has been largely responsi- ble for keeping the sanctions in force after many OAS members had concluded they i were outdated. Many Latins perceive this pressure as an American effort to dictate their own policies. There's something to gain economically ; as well. One guess is that high sugar prices, up sixfold in the past year or So, r will give Cuba perhaps $1.9 billion of hard ! currency for imports, And there are indi- cations Mr. Castro wants to spend some in the United States. According to Edward Lamb, an Ohio ! businessman who recently had long talks with Premier Castro, the Cubans still ad- mire American technology. They want ag- ricultural equipment, especially for han- dling their sugar craps, and?Mr. Castro indicated?would like to buy U.S. corn, beans, poultry and medicines. "They've got the wherewithal to pay for it now," Mr. ? Lamb notes. - Finally, recognition of the Castro gov- ernment would combine an acceptance of reality with a furtherance of global de- ten4e, which were two major effects of Mr., Nixon's China move. It wouldn't insure that relations would become cordial. Cuba will continue to oppose American influence In Latin America; ending that influence seems, in fact, to be Havana's main diplo- matic objective. But recognition would be , a conciliatory act fitting into broader U.S. foreign policy. Though it would mean, ac- cepting a Communist regime in the West- , ern Hemisphere, something Messrs. Nixon and Kissinger once strongly opposed, there- doesn't seem to be an alternative these days. THE SOVIET UNION: For Moscow, 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340605-5 there are gains, plus a risk or two. Detente remains the Russians' primary external policy, and gaining acceptance for Cuba by once-hostile 4rnerica is a vic- . tory of sorts. It might also give the U.S.S.R. more acceptability in Latin America generally, an important, if not high-priority, consideration. It could also cut the cost of keeping Cuba afloat. Mos- cow sends aid worth an estimated $340 mil- lion annually, much of it as petroleum. If Cuba could buy this in nearby Venezuela ?even with Soviet subsidy?it would be cheaper than shipping oil all the way from the Black Sea. Moreover, a trade-minded _ _ Cuba might eventually pay back the $4.1 I billion it owes the Soviets. The chief risk for the Russians, of course, is diminished influence. Henry Kis- singer, and others believe Mr. Castro wants looser ties with Moscow?not because of specific difficulties but rather to give Cuba a greater sense of independence. If this went too far, the Soviets could experience I a diplomatic reverse like that in Egypt a : couple Of years ago. That's not expected, ' but the thought may cause Moscow to be a bit cautious about a conciliation trend the ? U.S.S.R. generally encourages. CUBA: There are gains for the Castro regime other than decreased reliance on a foreign power. The major one is respectability. Many Americans ' and some Latins have dis- missed Fidel Castro for years as an erratic Communist who gave beards a bad name. Now he is about to be accepted, more or New Statesman 13 September 1974 less fully, into the Latin Americancommit- ' nity?.whatever private reservations many leaders still have. However Mr.. Castro *ants more than acceptance: he seeks Latin leadership. He wants to ally Latin American governments to confront the U.S. On major economic and political issues. Within this forum, he would like to spread his Influence in ways. Cuban-backed guerril.las never could. That won't make life easier for Washington but it should mean less subversion. Mr. Castro's speech last Saturday night was, in all likelihood. an example of what's ahead. He lambasted *President Ford and the CIA for intervening in Chile, and he blamed world inflation or. a U.S. "war bud- get," not on high oil prices. But he didn't veto defier ties to Washington and his two Sunday night dinner guests?Sen. Jacob Ja7.-its of New York. and Sen. Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island?came away believ- ing Mr. Castro wants "better rela.tiens with the 'United States." The forum of the OAS won't serve his purposes, Mr.- Castro stresses. "We have clearly said that we will not become mem- bers of the .OAS again, because the OAS has been an instrument of imperialist dom- ination in Latin- America," ha said the other day. But that doesn't apply to the Buenos Aires meeting, which is not an OAS function. "If we are invited we will go." the Cuban leader said._ "Let there be no doubt about that.". . . THE. OAS:' This group of nations will Chile and Us The following document reached our office a few weeks ago, and was originally pub- lished in a Czech samizdat paper Narodni Noviny. We reprint it with thanks to the Committee to Defend Czechoslovak Socialists. Since .11 September a fascist terror has started raging in Chile together with every- thing that we always associate with it: ? raids, executions, arrests, killings 'while at- tempting to escape', liquidations of the basic freedoms of a citizen, return of land to the landowners and of nationalised enterprises to the capitalist owners. Honest people the world over denounce this kind of violence. Even Czechoslovak newspapers obligingly grant their space to various protesting voices. (With certain exceptions, of course. Czecho- slovak mass media refused to grant their space to Pavel Kohout so that he could express his critical attitude.) Those delighted that someone somewhere managed to give a big kick to the communists are short sighted. For one thing it is not only the communists who are being kicked around in Chile at present and for another no real democrat can be really delighted when free- dom is being strangled somewhere. ' Without doubt there were more demo- cratic rights and freedom in Chile under President Allende than there are under the government of the military junta, for the very fact that Allende ruled in a demo- cratic fashion, solving his problems with Opposition without violence and according to the law, greatly helped the military in- surgents to carry out their plans. No matter how paradoxical it sounds the USSR was in fact, in 'spite of its formal protests over the fate of Chile, satisfied. was the USA of The. al Approved For Release 200TRf8/08 : C gain from the lifting of sanctions even if Cuba doesn't rejoin. Argentina, for exam- ple, recently ignored- the sanctions and ? granted Cuba a .$1.2 billion credit for Ar- gentine goods; nearly half has already been utilized by Havana, whose repayment record is excellent. With those sugar prof- its piling up, others probably sense sales for themselves with the embargo's lifting. But the main gain Is 'probably more a symbolic one. Renewed relations with Cuba would prove OAS members can do what, they choose !Without getting Ameri- can approval Vitt It would enhance their self-esteem and dignity, yet not really cause problems with the U.S.?or be un- safe. "I do not think that Cuba's exporting. the. revolution." Mexican Foreign Minister Emilie 0. Said recently. "And I do not think they are invading the life of the ' sphere of other countries." So the old isolation policy is about Over. * The legal 'process by which the OAS will ? abolish restrictions is under way, with the final vote expected November 11 In Quito, Ecuador. The United States probably won't oppose it and, after dithering for a while, should move tcr,restore bilateral relations with a Cuba it previously preferred to in- vade. It's even possible that once Cuba re- gains full recognition emotions will cool so much that the country can become what the French writer Raymond Aron once eiid it should be: an obscure tropical die- tatorship of no great significance to any- one. meticulously preserved democratic methods in building a socialist society were a thorn in the eye for the Soviet Union. They were frightened that yet another socialism, a Chilean one and, furthermore, one with a human face, would be added to the four already existing ones. Soon the Moscow centre would no longer be a centre but just one of the provinces as, after all, Lenin predicted. - - Not long ago Rude Pray() was upset that a West German CDU deputy spoke of the putsch as a 'check' as if one could mention in, Czechoslovakia the word in- vasion or occupation. One is allowed to call it at the most an 'entry' or better still 'brotherly international aid'. Let's see what else upsets the normalised Czechoslovak press: (1) That the local committees were broken up (just as the workers' committees were broken up in our country). (2) That the junta banned lessons in Marxism at universities (yet in our country they went as far as liquidating all depart- ments of Marxism-Leninism after August). (3) That the freedom of assembly, asso- ciation and both written and oral expres- sion no longer exists (just try to get to- gether the Club of Committed Non-Com- munists again or call a demonstration on any of the smaller squares of Prague or try to write freely what you think into your newspaper. Such a .notion is ludicrous in present-day Czechoslovakia and in the Soviet Union they lock people up in lunatic asylums for similar demands). (4) That in Chile just as under Hitler the junta burns books which are inconvenient or written by authors not appreciated by the junta (in our country they don't burn them PALOESP 71u-004332RO Ilt0c119 0 3461105-5vh Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5 works in any, public library just ask him to show you the list of books which had to be discarded, taken out of circulation or liquidated. The number of titles goes into thousands), (5) That in Chile Infringements of pr1. vacy became commonplace (yet how many Czech homes were broken into by the STB men without a court order, how many, of our flats are' fitted with bugging devices?). (6) That ' 'thousands of Chileans ' from ordinary people to well-known personalities such as Dr Asenjo, the 1973 Nobel Prize winner for sciences, were expelled from their place of work or service, their only "crime" being that they served or sided with the progressive ideas', (In this respect the junta has been acting clumsily, Where 0180 but in Czechoslovakia were hundreds 6f thousands ? from national artists to laureates, from academicians to professors, from journalists and students to ordinary workers ? expelled from their places for the same things?). (7) That the 'new rulers introduced com- plete control over television and radio' (and what is It like in our country? Just com- pare what the television and radio were like in 1968 and 1969 with what they are like now). WASHINGTON POST 05 October 1974 .1 7,! ' VS Envoy To razil ts Torture From News Dispatches r ? = BRASILIA, Oct. 4?U.S. Am- Isassador John Crimmins de- livered a "strong protest" to Zrazil's foreign minister today over treatment in jail of a former American missionary, he 'US. embassy reported. Frederick' Birten Morris, 'held since Monday on suspi- cion of subversion, told a U.S. consular officer in the north- eastern city of Recife that he IAA been beaten and tortured *4th electric shocks "of high 4ntensity" an embassy spokes- Oman said. The spokesman said the U.S. bonsul in Recife, Richard iBrown, "saw bruises and con- tusions on Morris' back, but- t,ocks and wrists." ? The spokesman added Morris told the consul :that Ole had been assaulted by the agents who hit him in the stomach, groin and lower back and slapped him in the face. Morris also said that elec- trodes had been attached at -various times to several parts 'of his body and that he had been subjected to electric shocks which varied from light, annoying pulsations to :midden jolts of high intensity. (8) That the junta ordered 'national work shifts' (an analogy so perfect that even the title corresponds), (9) That It banned the left-wing press (it was a long list of journals which was banned under Husak, Let Us just remember three which stood out: Zitrek, liaportdr snd even the communist Polltika), (10) That it Interferes with trade union rights (perhaps it. would be worth it to ask Karel Hoffman, this 'noted representative ,of the working class who never worked in a factory, to num somewhele the rights of our trade unionists. A' few seconds would last him well enough), Oh yes, in this we must agree with our press: What goes on in Chile is indeed fascism, Fascism is simply fascisnl, no matter under which label It ?port 1, whether it rages in Chile 'or fn Cnenoslovakia, That Is why, we are at cal) with the Chilean people and that is why we should protest, and not only against the threat to the life ef Luis Corvalan (who by the way praised the occupation of our country in 1968), for the lives of hundreds and more people are threatened. We should underline that we are against it no matter where in the world it is happening. We should also be against it in reality and we should fight it. , Oorris said 'he recalled, losing . ibmsciousness on at least one taccasion." Crimmins met this evening with Foreign Minister Antonio iAzeredo da Silveira, and deli- vered, a "strong note," the ,spOkesman said. He did not Aisclose the note's contents. The Brazilian Foreign Mm- try 'had had no comment. ? After Morris was detained ATonday, another American was held by authorities at -Morris' apartment for more than 24 hours, then released, ? ,the embassy spokesman said. - identified the second American as Philip Hanson, associated with .Church World Services. ? Hanson's hometown Was not available. Morris, 40, whose parents live:in North Platte, Neb., was being held at the 4th Army headquarters in Recife, where he had served as a Methodist missionary for several years and more recently worked as a freelance reporter doing work for, various American news organizations. The embassy spokesman said that "as far as we know at this moment" there are no formal charges against Mor- ris: Police said Morris and a were arre:Aed at Morris' home. A police an- nouncement said "highly com- promising material" was found at Morris' home, but did not further' describe the material. 40 Appriived For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340005-5