PROTECTING THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

 Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDr77-00432R000100360004-4
Friday,A?gar?14,19 5 THE WASHINGTON. POST
Soviet Envoy EX Ep1oits
Y-Tioeeial to The Washington Past alp ar,u~~. s,,. ~~
revolution; nobody wanted
t: -LISBON, April 2 -The to help us because we' were ?
:most, successful diplomat in a right-wing colonialist die
...-Portugal today is Arnold L tatorship. Now that we are dent Richard Nixon on the
Kalinin, 45, the dapper new- freeing the colonies and try- Azores Islands last summer.
:ltireed Soviet ambassador ing to create a pluralistic Officers at the meeting agents
.
who. moves discreetly amid ' democracy, nobody wants to said the original friendly At present Kalinin is look-
headlines stressing Mos- help us because we're left-, communique, implying.mas- ing for an embassy res-
cow's support and sympathy wing. We can only conclude sive U.S. aid, was withdrawn dence to match the elegant
for the Portuguese revolu- that the sad truth is that no- . following the general's pri- "palacos" of the Western
tio.b? - body really wants to help vate talk with Nixon. No ambassadors.
~. Ambassador Kalinin's task Portugal because it is Portu- , other Portuguese official Whatever Moseotujs long-
has been made easy by U.S. gal." - was present at this conver- term strategy' may be, Kali-
and North Atlantic Alliance This-bitterness extends. to sation. Nixon's interpreter nin has played his role with
hostility toward the 'ruling the United States in particu- . acted as translator and Spi- professional discretion. He
Ieftv'ing military, who have lar and NATO in general. nola never disclosed the has invited -key Armed
made it clear that they can- President Costa Gomes and content of the discussion to Forces Movement officers to
not govern Portugal withoutPremier Vasco dos Santos the Cabinet. visit Moscow, congratulated
sharing power with the Por Gonclaves have assured Car- Spinola told an. aide, ' how- . the ruling military after put-,
tuguese Communist Party, lucci and ambassadors from ever, that he had corrected . ting down last month's at-
nor free the country's'colo- other NATO countries that a number, of American mis? tepted coup, and made no.
'
s tense
nies without the interna- Portugal fully intends to re conceptions on the revolu? waves in Portugal
tional cooperation of the main an active and, loyal tion conveyed by the em- Cold War atmosphere. He
Communist world. bassy in Lisbon, giving the speaks Portugese with a
In the mini-Cold war rag- NATO .member despite its impression that the' general Cuban Spanish accent.
revolutionary process. had been highly critical of ing over Portugal, the posi- In an interview with Sen. Significantly, his best
former h Scott. Ambsador friend in Lisbon 'is the Cu-
tion of the bright and affa-
Edwardrooke Mass.
i
isthe U.S. ambassador, Frank the
er ?l' ..1......; L.. I..,,,...? ..a., premie expresssesed dis-
Caducei, `""? may that the United States.
} difficult, if not impossible, and NATO question Portu-
*-by continuing NATO maneu;, gal's commitment to the
...viers off the cdast of Portu- Western alliance. Both the
;'gal and by the statements of nresident' and the premier
U.S. Secretary of State
Henry A..Kissinger. Recently
Kissinger contradicted the
essence of ?a Carlucci speech
in which he had expressed a
Unlike Carlucci. the So- th most ac-
viet ambassador has good tive in Portugal: Moscow,
revolutionary credentials. fact, may well os using
Moscow supported the Por- Cuba as a model for Portu-
tuguese Communist Party I gal even though Western,,
throughout 50 years of per- diplomats insisted that the
secution under the dictator- "Kremlin doesn't want the
ship. A lawyer by edcation, responsibility of carrying
Kalinin served in Cuba be- this country."
fore becoming the Soviet
Union's first ambassador to ? The stakes are much big-
.measure of unders4g mined, Kalinin, like the Por- Portugal. He arrived last ger, than the tiny Iberian
for the idealism of the he of offs- to g uese Communists, has' spring, and almost at once country of 9 million. They
cers who deposed Portugal's not made NATO an issue. Portugal began to trade include the future of Portu-
rightist dictatorship last The Soviet ambassador re- with Russia and Communist gal's former African empire.
year. gave Carlucci as- Europe. ~.s, well as the pattern of'
about portedly
While nobody talks
Soviet KGB agents using Ka- surances-, during an informal __ Kalinin and his delegation . Communist power in south-
A........: ~ of spurs 25 rtintmmnfs mnvnrl ern Europe.
into a modern, six-story When asked about the
apartment building a block danger of a confrontation
away from Communist x'ith the West over the in-
Party headquarters in Lis- j 'rearing Soviet influence in
bon. Indications are that he strategic Portugal and its
has been careful to avoid `ormer African colonies, a
conspicuous contact with .Soviet diplomat replied:
Communist Party Secretary 'It's happening all over the
General Alvaro Cunhal, a irorld. Are you afraid?"
Moscow protege who ad-
heres to the Soviet ideologi Pravda Criticizes -
cal n, Most Soviet embasssy per NATO on Portugal'
sonnel speak excellent Pol Agence France-Presse
tuguese, -receive visitors pa Moscow, April 3 - The
litely, often offer them col Soviet Communist Party
fee or Vodka in a secoru daily Pravda, today accused
floor waiting rom. The So- NATO of interfering in Por-
viets have also opened a con tuguese internal affairs.
sulate, it commercial mission ? The newspaper quoted the
and a merchant marine of- . 'deputy commander of
fice for tourist, cargo and - NATO's Lisbonbased com-
fishing vessels which have mand as saying: "NATO is
been docking in Portugal essentially an organization
a Costa Games,are frankly
warning that the country. since last summer. directed against Commu-
y
a
distressed
en
I
ll th
ti
n a
ere are an es
- . nism and since the Commit.
was headed for a Commu-
forcing cing
them m
to
strengthen
g fist takeover. These officers mated 80 Soviet officials in fists are participating in the
~'ortugat s ties with h the 50- Lisbon, plus a reside t Tass
,. charged that the ~ turning government we have taken
vid
in tth ens West cis swill ngo to point of relations with the scorresp ourcesondent to that among the logical. necessary mess:
tire.
United States was Spmola's ~h es"
help us so- long as Washing- Appro4 tFWr44Lle ?20bli'8/Ot3 e
ton remains aloof." 4333 00100360004ZI
Carlucci'S image has been -email, auaL trt~ar vrr aaa~ uv tarred with allegations that signs on Portugal other than
he is a top CIA operative as-. to expand contacts and in-
signed to, destabilize Portu- fluence as in other -NATO
countries.
gal and reverse the socialist yet there is no question
thrust of the revolution. - . , that Moscow is carefully
In the past week, while,, moving into the power vac-
the Soviet Union won ?ap- uum caused by the loss of
plause from the labor minis- influence and prestige dur-
ing its long association with
ter following his week-long the deposed dictatorship and
visit to Moscow, arranged by its apparent support for
Kalinin, the U.S. ambassa-
dor was reduced to defend- Gen. Antonio de Spinola.
ing himself against sensa- Spinola's hostility to his for-
tionai CIA charges.. The em-' mgr revolutionary associates
Y`lti "r " According to senior-mod-
carries penalties for insult- grate officers, the United
ing foreign diplomats. States and NATO appeared
Ruling military moder. prepared. to help Portugal
ates, among them senior- ad-
visers of President Francisco president last September,
d
in fact, have repeatedly
tried to allay NATO fears,
but without any apparent
success.
 Approved. For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360004-4
I I'll 6-b lia . 1 Vf i
mericans
By SY
DNEY H. SCHANBERG policy under a Communist government once the war is over,
Cambodia, being a-country blessed with rich agricultural
PHNOM PENH-The spectacle of the Americans being land and a relatively small out evacuated from Cambodia--with helicopters dropping from y tion, can be revived with-
sap any major
reconstruction on pro program as would be ,neces the
an i ev skies and stony-faced Marines armed to the dropping
pro- Mekong De
tatting the dsto evacuees from nothing, with curious and sary in Delta can feed cant feed thenation. In South Vihting stops
t th,
crowds-of .^,ambodians watching another American spectacle and the e land; can be tillerp~ation if the fighting stops
they did not understand and with Embassy homes being ran_",'
'sacked by military police immediately after the officials' .A Different Asia
departure-is perhaps a fair epitaph for American policy in Both countries can expect economic aid from China and
Indochina, or at least in Cambodia. the Soviet Union
who ma
,
y compete against each other for
After five years of helping a feudal government it scorned ' , the dominant influence. It is also not unima that ?~_
and fighting a war it knew wad 'der certain ginable
nas nothing to show for it except a sad evacuation in which
the Ambassador carried out the American flag in one hand
-and his Samsonite suitcase in the other.
There are. however, a million Camb
di
o
ans. killed or
wounded (one seventh of the Population), hundreds of thou-.
sands of refugees living in shanties, a devastated country-
side, children dying of
t
?:__ ___
s
rv
3 April 1975
-NEW YORK TIMES
-- a~ ,nruugn the United Na.
floes, the United States might continue humanitarian aid.
"The world changes fast these days," said an American Fin.
bassy official here the
othe
d
;
'
r
ay
We
ll be back here. It may
take a
couple of years, but we'll be back."
A
.
merican troops came to Indochina because of what Pres-
ident Eisenhower first called the "domino theory." The.
the6ry. was revived recently by President Ford, and while,
some political leaders in Th di
-._- . ._
ed
e
e
I
d
la
r
"? ~ nten
u=e runencans had good i
an active insurgency in their northern dis-
t's Cam o
'fl;
ec
t ;sa i.-=u:.. 4u?= =e.-.cans nten- tricts, no one else in Southeast Asia seems to. Some govern-:
because from the beginning, by Washington's own . admis-, ments, such as that of 'Maiaysia, believe that regional .,
beta its fromy had nothing to do with Cambodians. It had stability will be promoted if the Indochina states under Com-ts .,
to do with trying to distract and deflect the North Vietnam- munof or, thea lot an Nations join the present Associa-
`ese long enough to remove American troops from Vietnam.' ; Lion Southeast Asian Nations known as 'ASEAN.
And after that was done, in 1973, the Phnom Penh Govern-, so Sa farme critics of American p nine ula will la I beco becoa have gone as,to meet became an albatross that Washington did not know, e once the that
Americans c have gone. me a virtual
how to dispose of. So yesterday the Americans went home. wishfulpolemics, for t s difficult to predict with any des-
Many people have asked, over the long years of the Indo- gree of confidence what Indochina will be like under Com.
china war, what the consequences of American withdrawal ' munism. '
from this peninsula will be.
Secretary of ' Defense Schlesinger has said flatly-and. exmSome ple,Ia a hoping,th tithe insurgent leaders will Cambodiansbe more conscious for.
Secretary of State Kissinger obliquely-that Indochina is of nationalist than Communist, which would mean a future
no significant strategic or political importance to American. government would reflect more the
: interests. Its only importance, they have said, is in whether Khmer character tha
gentle and flexible
the rest of the wo
ld
h
il
r
n t
w
e rigid outlook of Hanoi nr Peking
l interpret an American withdrawal But regardless of t1i.'f;-f
from the region as a failur
'
e of Washington
s credibility in
failing to honor commitments.
,But these concepts mean nothing to the ordinary people
of. Indochina and it' is difficult to imagine how their lives
could be anythin
b
b
_ __ .. ..
g
ut
ette
?=,.n. at,-we or these governments,
the solutions that will be worked out will be essentially
Asian. American ideas never stuck here because they were
alien notions' with time frames that demanded results in
months, not generations. ?
th
- -
f
v
failure -- ...,..,,1 o
,vit 'h s'to a-
e=n, not paternal lion or
inv
colonialism. The Americans brought them planes and Napalm' better not rtobe supporting Asian rwars. olved, it has *to be
and B-52 raids, not schools and roads and medical programs.: It is difficult to forget such scenes as an American mill-not to whi h$Awill replace thetAmerican clents b can be expeced to Vietnamese-offirpr
from the Alabama countryside slapping his
be benevn1Pnt Al
ad
--_,.
re
i
y in
14 VV1UfC11Ut! in Ina:
a
reas held by the Communist-led Cambodian insurgents that'
life is hard and inflexible, everything that C
b
am
not, odians are.
And
The Insurgents have committed several village massacres ' . Off officer
ath other te the embassy was telling some newsmen about military
In their present offensive, and the Americans have predicted, successful' government operation. "They killed 22 on the
a "bloodbath" when the rebels take over. On the other hand, ground," he said zestfully, with a smile, "and that's pretty
Government -troops who recently emerged from a besieged _ nice." This military officer is not a raving sadist-and is in
provincial town southwest of Phnom Penh reported matter- . ? fact a rather, civilized man in his other interests. But killing
of-factly that they had cooked and eaten the bodies of dead People is not "pretty, and it will be nice when Americans
insurgents when they ran shorted food and that they had get out of the killing business in Indochina.
grown to enjoy it,
Wars nourish brutality and sadism, and sometimes certain'
Sydney N. Schonberg, a New York Times correspopdent
people are executed by the victors but it would be tender- p g the
~.who ha: been on war in C'
4' .
a. chGse to
boos to. forecast such abnormal behayior,. as a. national stay in Phnom Penh when other Americanstwere, ev cuated
ingty calling him "my little ti er "ne Dada and condescend-
The Vietnamese officer;
who had a.Doctorate in Philoso
h
f
y
p
rom
- ?T-Appfwed- Fo:-.Re4 se 2Q01/Q8/08 : CIA^-RDP77-00432R000100360004-4
~St-
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RlhP77=00432R000100360004-4
WASHINGTON POST
18 April. 1975
The Refugee Str?ateg y: `A Fnb'ricatian I
The Post has printed another
"vicious fabrication" in T. D. Allman's
allegation that the U. S. deliberately
followed a "refugee strategy" in Viet-
nam. At a time when you're calling for
an end to mutual recriminations, why
revive this old canard that U. S. policy'
"always has rested on the deliberate
production of refugees"?
The massive refugee - flow was a
ragic but unplanned consequence of
the way the war was fought-on both
sides. True, our firepower created ref-
ugees but were the Tet offensive, the
1972 Easter offensive, and the present
cataclysm (long after. all U. S. troops
had left) the product of U. S. strategy?
And the fact that almost all refugees
fled to the government side has long
frustrated those who would have us be-
lieve that only U.S. shoring up of our
puppet governments was what frus-
trated ' popular preference for the
other side.
,Allman's citations of USAID, Gen-
eral Westmoreland, and -myself are
grossly misleading. ' Of course, we
sought to attrit the VC population
base; control and support of the people
is what the war was all about. But the
way we sought to do it was by bringing
security and economic revival to the
countryside, not by forcing the farm-
drs into the cities. Forced draft urbani-
zation was never part of our policy, re-
gardless of what Professor Hunting-
ton wrote (and as I told him at the
time). In fact, once the tide turned our
way in 1969-71 after Hanoi's Tet offen-
sive was crushed, refugees began re-
turning to the countryside.
The Pentagon Papers contain every
secret policy directive issued from
Washington from 1950 through 1968.
Find me a single one that called for
"depopulating the countryside." We
made many mistakes in Vietnam, but
this was not one of them.
R,. W. Komer,
(former chief Pacification
adviser to the GVN. 1967-68)
0
How can a reader commend you for
publishing such a needed, thoughtful,
and balanced editorial as yours on
1 "The Evacuation of Vietnam" on April
11, when next to it you place such a
-blatantly Hanoi-biased bit of propa-
ganda as the article by T. D. Allman
on "The Refugee Strategy"? Since my_.
WASHINGTON STAR
14 April 1975
name was. mentioned in the latter,
which I look upon as a piece of
shoddy, yellow journalism not worthy
of your pages, I feel that I must re-
spond to it since you saw fit to display,
it prominently. .
The Allman piece is so filled with
artful "disinformation" that I will
limit myself only to the part in it ref-
erring to myself and the implications
he draws from this. I trust that other
Americans will respond to his calumny
about them.
Allman credits me with stampeding
a million Vietnamese to i,ee from
North to South Vietnam 20 years ago.
Perhaps I should feel fiattered that
anyone should believe that I have such
persuasive powers. Instead, I am angry
at his implied belittling of the intelli.
gence and strong character of the Viet-
namese people.' There were far deeper,
more profound reasons for the flight
of these huge masses of the Vietnam-
ese people 20 years ago than a few
words that any foreigner among them
could say. The same holds true for the
great exodus from Vietnamese homes
we are seeing today.
The Vietnamese have deep roots in
their- homes. Anyone who has lived
among them cannot help but be struck
by the closeness with which they hold
their ancestors. Any uprooting from
their ancestral homes is a climactic ex-
perience, a separation from a most
meaningful and cherished part of their
lives. Only great fear, terror about
harm to a family can cause a Vietnam-
ese family to move away from what is
so dear to it. Today, as they did 20
years ago, the Vietnamese refugees are
not fleeing from possible bombing by
Americans. There were no American
bombers then. There are none today.
These Vietnamese are fleeing from
Communist rule. This rule is an expe-
rience that the Vietnamese have seen
at first hand. After 30 years of war,
they are deaf to propaganda from any
side. They judge only from what they
have seen for themselves. And they're
running away from the Communists,
not towards them.
Admittedly, the leaders in Hanoi
must feel a great loss of face that th.2ir
,behavior towards the Vietnamese peo-
ple has caused so many to flee from
them when given the chance. I can un-
Magazine Says Tie u
Tried to Ship Gold Bars
NEW YORK (UPI) --
South Vietnamese govern-
ment officials tried unsuc-
cessfully to persuade a
Swiss charter.-airline to fly
$73 million worth of gold
bullion from Saigon to
Switzerln'nd, Timc Maga-
zine reports.
Time said the Saigon off i
air, a charter line affiliated
with Swissair, if it would
airlift "some personal be-
longings" of South Viet-
namese President Nguyen
Van Thieu and Cambodian
President Lon Nol.
The Magazine reported
that Balair refused when it
learned the cargo was 16
tons of gold, on the grounds
derstand 'why ! they have lackeys pro-
vide alibis for them in the Western
press. The great flight today, as 2?
years ago, is taking place in front of
the whole world, not behind the bam-
boo curtain of their authoritarian rule
where what is seen and heard is under
their control.
In the face of military victories, to-
day's reaction of the Vietnamese peo-
ple must be an excruciating humilia-
tion to those who claim to lead the
people. The recoiling reaction of 'the
masses of Vietnamese people under-
scores the falseness of the self-ap-
pointed position of the Politburo in
Hanoi and the leadership of the Lao
Dong Party as spokesmen for the peo-
ple. Self-appointed? The Vietnamese
people have had little or no say in
picking such spokesmen in the con-
trolled and rigged elections of North
Vietnam. Nor can the Vietnamese peo-
ple believe that this Communist lead-
ership stands for any values recog.
nized as being Vietnamese. A foreign
ideology and organization of society
are being forced upon them by a deter-
mined group of "true believers". Or
does Mr. Allman, or anyone else, actu:
ally think that Marx and Lenin, with
their ideas and systems of control, are
Vietnamese in origin?
The Vietnamese might appear to be
hapless in the face of the overwhelm
ing tragedy overtaking them, but they
are not stupid. They might well turn
upon Americans for deserting them in
the agony of their desperate hour of
need. Yet, this cannot be translated as
meaning that they welcome Commu-
nist. rule, . as Mr. Allman implies. It as-
tounds me that he tried to sell so
shoddy an argument to Americans. Af-
ter all. most of us are the descendants
ourse.ves of refugees and, slaves. W;'
know how great is the longing for indi-
vidual liberty. among those who don't,
ha: e it.
Give us honest' information as we try
.o determine what hest to do at this
mold, n, o_ h;story. We are close to our
2U1th ann e:sary as a nation' Help u
,'..be . true to the principles towards
which v e have su'iven.
Alexandria.
that such a weight in a con-
centrated space . would
cause dangerous weight
and balance problems. The
airline also was concerned
that the bullion might be
part of the official reserves
of the two countries. The
gold is apparently still in
Saigon, Time said.
E. G. Lansdale,
Mai. Geu., U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
Approved For Release 2001/08/01? CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360004-4
 NEW YORK TIMES
17 April 1975
'I ASSERTS IAN
S FAILED SAIGON'
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360004=4
ays"Commitments on Aid.
Were Not Met, Creating
a `Tragic Situation'
By PHILIP SHABECOFF
Special to The Neew York ,Imes
WASHINGTON, April 16-
President Ford said today that
the failure of the United States
'to, meet its commitments to
Saigon had created "this pres-
o
e
a
e Pu
ic
I
ent tragic situations" in South I While nat mentioning Con- Nixon and members of hed is ain d-
yiPth ministration and affirm Mr. Ford also indicated that
gress, the President used some he would not make the Nixon-
Responding to questions at, of the strongest language he, private communications, froml'Thieu letters nuhlir saving that
'
.American'Society of Newspaper. what he said was the American
Editors, the President compared failure to keep its commitments
to South Vietnam.
the United States behavior to-~ "For just a relatively small
ward its South Vietnamese ally additional commitment in eco
unfavorably with what he cha- nomic and military aid,, rela-
racterized as the fidelity of tively small compared to the
Moscow and Peking to Hanoi. .$150-billion that we spent, that
He said that this country had at the last 'minute of the last
promised Saigon when the quarter 'we don't make that
special. effort and now we are
Paris peace accords were signed faced with this human: tragedy.
in January, 1973, that it would It just makes. me sick every
supply replacement war ma-. day I hear about it, rear?,, about
feria) to South Vietnam. He t. ant see ii..'.
said he assumed that the Soviet `More. Commitment'
Union and China had made Mr. Ford said that even now
similar commitments to North he was "absolutely convinced"
Vietnam. .:! that if Congress made avail-
"It appears that they have able soon the $722-million he,
Maintained that commitment," had requested for military aid
to Snit=on. " ` the Snnth Viat-
TheWashington Star
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
- In Saigon, President Nguyen Van
Thieu was refusing to sign the cease-
fire agreement which Henry A. Kis-
singer had worked out with North
Vietnam's Le Duc Tho.
'After turning back the
: F
Communists' Easter 1972 offensive
with the help of American air power,
Thieu did not want to agree to politi-
cal arrangements that would give
the Viet Cong a foothold in the Saigon
government or military arrange-
ments for North Vietnamese troops
to remain in the south.
But in Washington, the adminis-
tration of then-President Richard M.
Nixon felt itself under pressure.
The American people were tired of
the war. They wanted U. S. troops
home and prisoners back from North
Vietnam. The 1972 presidential elec-
Indochina but did not bind the In the question-and-answer
United States to provide the ,session today, Mr: Ford said
arms. v *~~ ,* that he had personally revieweda
had entered into a "moral ~com- Thieu "and 1' can assure yore
Vietnamese arms and ammuni-I.of those communications that.
ion. He said that this com-I,was different from what was.
.statements by former President Not t
B
M
d
bl
The private communications
said the same as the public
statements, the aide said.
The aide cited three public
document that he described as
the basis for the moral com-
mitment. One was a United
State-South Vietnamese com-
munique issued at San Clem-
e con-
ente, Calif., on April 3, 1973.HHvention, the President said that
in which Mr. Nixon "affirmedlthe United States would con-
that the United State,,, for its:itinue to supply military and
part, expected to continue, in ,economic aid to countries
rdance with its Coustitu- l around the world.
tional processes, to supply the ' But he said that such aid was
Republic of Vietnam with the not intended for the "contain-
material for its defense con- ment of Communism." It was,
sistent with the agreement on he said, for "a furtherance of
ending the was,"- that is, the the policy of the United States
Paris accord. aimed at our security and the
The communique and the two maintenance of peace on a glo-
other documents cited-a tran- bal basis."
Kissinger, then Nixon's assistant
for national security affairs,
recognized this in promising that
"peace is at hand" even while Thieu
was obstructing an agreement.
TO OBTAIN what would for
Americans be peace,-even if not for
the Vietnamese, intensive efforts
were made to get Thieu to -go along
with a cease-fire agreement.
These efforts, according to Viet-
namese officials, took several forms.
There was a combination of threats
to withdraw, even without Thieu's
acquiescence if necessary, promises
of massive, supplies of military
equipment to beef up the South Viet-
namese armed forces, , and assur-
ances of continued American sup-
port.
These assurances have now
become controversial. Sen. Henry M:
Jackson, D-Wash., said Tuesday
there were "secret agreements" be-
tween the United States and South
Vietnam. The White House said yes-
terday there had been "private ex-
changes" along the same lines as
public assurances.
Nixon sent letters - which might
be termed either secret or private,
for they were not disclosed at the
time - to Thieu with the assurances.
They were taken by, Kissinger's
then-deputy, Gen, Alexander M.
Haig Jr., because Thieu had come to
distrust Kissinger.
These were, the Vietnamese felt;'
pretty much take-it-or-leave-it
assurances, because the American
intention to disengage was clear.
What is not clear even now is just
how explicit the assurances were.
BASICALLY, official sources indi-
cate, they amounted. to pleas by
Nixon for Thieu to trust him to main-
tain a tough policy. This left the
situation somewhat fuzzy, at best.
It seemed to some observers to be
Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360004-4.
the President' said. "Unfortu- namese could' stabilize the mill-
nately the United States did tary situation' in South Viet-
knot carry out its commitment ""A White House' aide, asked
J in the supplying of military later' to identify the specific
p
n
ore
gn
hardware and economic aid to' commitments the President was icy issued on May 3
197
I
,
South Vietnam." I talking -_ about, said that the
'refer chiefly to a generalized)
"I wish we had," he con United States had made no United States response to a vm
I
k
f
rant u.
we tau, this - - -- ? -_.,.,.," _
in
i
arms to. South Vietnam. He they contain no reference to a
resent tra
ic situation in South
p
g
, also said that the Paris. peace specific level of military al
Vietnam wo
ld
t h
u
no
ave
,occurred."
Then, referring to a question
about the 'estimated $1.5-billion
in aid to Hanoi from Moscow
and Peking, the President added:
"I don't think we can blame
the Soviet Union and the Peo-1
pie's Republic of China in this'
case. If we' had done with our
allies what we promised, I think
script of a news conference-. o?'
March 15,' 1973, and President
`-
Nixon'ss re
ort o
pall-i
f
i
it is not the
usual custom fora
correspondence between heads
of states, as I understand it,i
to be released."
.Senator Henry M. Jackson,,
Democrat of . Washington,'.
,charged' last week that the:
United States had made secret
agreements with South Vietnam.
Answering questions from a
panel of five editors at th
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :-CIA-R~P77.00432R000100360004-4
a typical Kissinger solution to a agreement." vigorously if the North
sticky problem -- to leave the dif- - But did such warnings, Vietnamese Communists
ficult details fuzzy and hope that the and the assurances, specifi. resumed their aggression
situation would work itself out in the cally envisage renewed and brazenly violated the
future. But this time it felt apart. American military actions Paris agreement."
~.. X71..4..--.f TL- .c.._?._
h
H
d
t
e "1111.c
ouse
eclined
o uts- House would' neither con-
close the terms of the assurances WASHINGTON also
fi
rm or deny it yesterday. pledged "sufficient eco-
yesterday. Instead, .it cited several
Th
Vi
e
etnamese thought it nomic and military aid" for
statements by-Nixon which repeated '
did.
bli
l
i
l
7
h
y
n ear
y 19
pu
c
3 t
e assurances
No one said at the time that the
assurances had already been given
privately. The fact that Nixon was
firming up the private messages ' by
going public with them was unspeci-
fied. -
In his tough anti-Communist role,
Nixon said on March 15, 1973, almost
two months after the Paris
agreement was signed, that
"I would only suggest that,
based on my actions over
the past four years, that the
'North Vietnamese should
not lightly disregard"
`American expressions of
concern over cease-fire
NIXON TOLD Congress
May 3, 1973, that "we have
told Hanoi, privately and
publicly, that we will not
.tolerate violations of the
possible use in ? Vietnam
ever since the cease-fire.
But, as the White House
pointed out yesterday, Con-
gress in 1973 "ruled out the
possibility of American
military reaction to viola-
tions of the agreement."
THE PUBLICIZED part
of the American commit-
ment at the time of the sup-
posed cease-fire was a one-
for-one replacement of
South Vietnamese military
equipment. This was ant
controversial in early 1973,.
seeming in Washington to
be a relatively reasonable
price for ' the expected'
peace.
But "replacements on the
'one for one' basis have not
been made with regard to
the damaged or lost equip-
ment, tanks and artillery
pieces," Thieu complained-.
This was true even before
the massive South Viet
namese losses on recent
weeks' panicky territorial
losses. --
~ i ; ,~ ... '~t~TT7 ...