Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 21, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 8, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005-3.pdf6.62 MB
-Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010036DU05-T CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 7 11 April 1975 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS EAST ASIA Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005-3 THE NEW' YORK TIMES, T UESDA I, APRIL S, 1975 Colby Tells, Publishers That C.I.A.'Is jeopardized allegations of C.I.A. involve-! ?~ ~; , s ] ?,~ ] y,~ tc By MARTIN ARNOLD Speetal to The New York Tides . NEW ORLEANS, April. 7- William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, said to- day' that the Central Intel= ligence Agency was being jeo, pardized by sensational and unjustified headlines. He told a group of American newspaper publishers that his agency and its service to the country were being endangered' "by its status as the nation's No. 1 sensational lead" in newspaper articles. In his view, he indicated, the C.I.A. is too often used to give sensation to the lead, or opening, of a news article even when the agnecy is not a major part of the article.. Mr. Colby, who spoke- at an Associated Press luncheon at the annual convention of the American Newsaper Publishers Association, also answered questions. Intelligence directors before Mr. Colby apeared rarely at public meetings and almost never submitted. to questions on the record.- .Since the recent published ment in domestic operations in this country, however, Mr. Col- iby has appeared before a.num- ber of news-gathering organi- zations for discussions both on and .off, the record. .No Cases Discussed Mr. Colby, in his warning on~ what he saw as American in- telligencegathering apparatus, !declined to discuss any particu- lar case. But he said that though the C.I.A. was "proud of our open society . . . we also be- lieve lieve that this open society, (must be protected, and that in- Itelligence, and even secret in-1 ;telligence, must play a .that protection." Because the agency has be-1 come "the nations.No. 1 sersa- `:tioral lead," he said, other in- telligence agencies are "ques- tioning our ability to keep their work for us secret," and Ameri- can business concerns that have helped the C.I.A. are afraid that their "businesses abroad [will be] destroyed by a revelation of their patriotic assistance to the C.I.A," Foreign officials from friend- ly governments are also wor- WASHINGTON POST 8 April 1975 Colby Calls Operations ~Vi a1 . By George Lardner Jr. Waehin;ton Post Staff Writer Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby yes-, terday defended covert activi-` ties and paramilitary opera- tions abroad as an essential part of the nation's. intelli- gence work. Speaking in N ,3w Orleans to members of the Associated' Press, Colby said such opera- ",comparatively. small propor- tion" of the CIA's efforts, but .he declared they still "make a unique and important contri- bution to the safety of our country." The CIA director asked for the help of the press in pre- serving what he called the na- tion's "good secrets." He said he believed, however, in expo-' sure of. "bad secrets"-or mis-I steps of the past-as well as "non Seer?t: " or ;_?lot!'n facts about ititeilr.ence which "in the old traditiuil would have been kept secret." Colby did not offer any clear. methods whereby the press could sort out whatever secrets it might come across,. but he suggested at one point that the CIA would like to be: consulted before publication. -:`This does allow the presen-: tation of good reasons to write the story so'as to protect im- portant' secrets or even, in ex- ceptional cases, to withhold it," he said. Recently, Colby was tempo- rarily successful in urging a number of news organizations to withhold stories about the CIA's raising of part of a sunken Soviet submarine even after the plan had been pub- licly mentioned by the Los An- geles Times. Colby said that modern-day intelligence gathering now re- lies primarily on technological advances in a variety of fields from photography to electron-I ics. Some critics of the CIA have cited. the same- develop- ments in arguing that the, agency could well afford to abandon the more controver- sial fields of paramilitary and covert operations. Clearly unwilling to . dire' ''softie thins cannot be,,, learned by `he innui, ~ !'r-port- er or even the spy in the sky. i I Sources within a closed or au- thoritarian foreign society 'cant' -let us know its secret. in these days of mutual vulnerability to warfare... And there are oc- casions in which some quiet assistance to friends of Amer- spnie .foreign,_country ned about this, he said. He said it'hat the military attachd from a foreign. country "which our intelligence servicemust run lthe risk of life and death and spend hundreds of millions of 'dollars tog obtain about his country." . "Sometimes the journalists assume the story can do no harm when, - in reality, there are unreveale dfacts about itl which would change the ' jour- nalists' mind," he said. Protection of Sources Mr. Colby, who appeared to be well, received by the 1,300; (publishers and their wives, said' That he was not asking that i"'bad secrets' be supressed, !and I also believe that 'non- secrets' should be exposed." "But I do make a plea tha 'good secrets' be respected;' he added. --- "I only ask," he said, "that we Americans protect our na- tion's sources in the same way the journalist protects 'his." In the question-and-answer, period, Mr. Colby defined "good secrets" as, for instance, the names appearing in -a look written about the C.I.A. byll r^iaiilY .. u. Agcc, a f'v can help them withstand hos= tile internal pressures before they become international pressures against, the United States." ' The CIA dilector has previ- ously described paramilitary operations- such as the "secret war" in Laos-as "a little help to a few friends." 11 Colby said he still welcomes the current public inquiries and debate over' the proper. scope of the CIA's activities,, but at the same time reiter-' ated his fears that a "climate of sensationalism" is jeopard- izing the agency's operations. He said some previously coop- erative foreign officials have stopped dealing with the CIA or started to "constrict the in- Iformation they provide, us." 11can}chile. the presidential', tagent. The book, "Inside the Company/C.I.A.Diary," has been published- in England and can now. be purchased in this country. - Mr. Colby denied in reply to ,a question that the, C.I.A. had 'taken part in the overthrow *of the Government of President Salvadore Allende- Gossens in At another session on the .opening day of the publishers'I convention, William E. Simony. Secretary of the Treasury, was 'critical of some of the ecor.omio reporting in American news ' papers. He.said, "Your reporters and editorial writers must necessar- 'ily jump from crisis to crisis, from one complex subject to the next with little time or space for deep analysis, and often with little prior knowl- edge of the subject. He said that there had "been marked improvement in the past year" in the reporting. of economic news, but still as- serted that his "greatest con- cern about the press today is .they have failed to convey a better sense of perspective for the ;American people about the ,[economic] choices we -fface.."- commission investigating the CIA heard private testimony yesterday from Ford Founda- tion President McGeorge Bundy, who was President Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs, and Lawrence K. White, a former controller and executive direc- tor of the agency. Though he declined to dis- cuss most of his testimony, Bundy told . reporters afterwards: "I was able to tell them that I knew of no effort to commit any' assassinations" during the Kennedy years. Bundy added, however, he could not exclude the possibil- ity that some 'officials may have had discussions along the lilies of "how nice it would be if such acid such leader didn't exist." The commission chaired by Vice . President Rockefelleri spent much of the day in exec-t utive session going over Pre- liminary findings assembled by its investigative star:. U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 7 APRIL 1975 While the Central Intelligence Agency is under the spotlight of critical a rpo- sure in the ' U.S." its counterparts in Communist countries-particularly the Soviet KGB-are still very busy. Known to the CIA, for example, are attempts by the Communist secret ser- vices to recruit about 400 Americans as spies in the last four years. Approved For:Release- 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005-3 WASHINGTON POST 8 April 1975 ~~~ll/?;1t ~.~ S .ll,'tp.t Ali' ~ssociaie.Praaa J `~' firmed that the award had;' gallons that 1Angleton headed/ ldesribeci es stAngleton, once been presented to -Angleton) la spy onerarsnnn of a massive illegal. .t:tl13U aw;i ba1U It 1vas "C0inCidence'.' l jwar diSSldCntS 1T2 the late By uJOWN M. CREWnfir~ly gal. domestic that the r? p. .,.. L_a , t g n The Distinn se him for iwtth the Soviet Union and liai:1 telligence gatherin in Federal ?utshed Intell}- long and distinguished service"I tson with the Israeli. :ntelli g Bence Medal was prssentd to in age counterintelligence. d 1 agencies will be seven weeks the ousted counterinteili^ence. .. An,le 't;ence service. old tomorrow, and so far it chief by Deputy Director Lt: i ton's intelligence career span Although officially irtired, has no staff director and no I nod more than .30 years, Angleton has continued to Genii. unarm un Walters a, stretching back to World War! work at agency headquarters' staff. Isma~l unannounced ceremof n,; A. at The seven Democrats and Intelli ence.Director William lilt Langley, Va., where a. three Republicans h E. Colby who f- When Anniat w r k me, Itral Intelli~A t?eu ~~,~~u:ueu for a day when Colby has since stated pub WASHINGTON, April S-The eeived theb e `~gencY, re- Colby Was out of town. -licly that Angleton left in a rouse select committee set up award yesterday. rtcy s. lii.hes.f, The citation presented .-Anleton to 1 policy dispute over detente In February to investi ate i Prai d e . ? o ma ced Angleton his to on and three oft (spokesman said lie is servin, up the panel have met a few to, retire at the end of. last / p aides were forced by as. a consultant aiding in th t year w is o "has to in- Th s a co i ? lse c, ti on une unable to provide close supervi-I But the Jubcommttee's re- telld be done slowly to get tsele c? in-: the full flavor." l' sign of the C.I.A. a Oct. 23, g Commit e mmito ce in the, Mr. Nedzi, is also chairman tee The intelligence subcommit-' pheaortrion hearings Octdid ot973' on its Senate, has held a t hu a.the -Tnieu;govern- ment,' - Madam 'Thank . says: "We are most optimistic now.J The situation is going in - the' direction We:were expecting. If. Thieu..steps,- down ..we, can helps negotiate. a peaceful settlement and. vreate a new. government of,,reconciliation Sbe1 said,.mlembors.- of her group,:who..stayed in,, Da Nang and Hue after those 'cities fell last month now are active in the 'new'. administration there. While. th6s'e developments In the opposition movement ,. arei Interesting: reflections, of thei current : military situation, J t! scexns. unlikely that- even ens organized; unified apposition movement could succeed new in- dislodging President -Thieu. So far, the opposition. has said-it`would not resort to` vio- lence to . get rid of Presidgnti Thieu. However,- Mr: Tuyen said yesterday that "if 'Thieu refuses to be moved by: mod-i erate means; we will be forced:. to " use violence-a military, coup, or -an uprising m . the' streets." 31 By Donald Kirk Our national leader has forecast an "unbelievable horror show, and his opponents have adduced opinions and facts to show' it isn't true-that there will not be any semblance of 'a "blood- : bath" if Communist forces win in Cambodia and then in Vietnam. The dialogue resembles a shouting match in which one man accuses the other of lying, and neither has the final evi- '".dente to prove his point. Yet, in a very ;short time the evidence may emerge--in the form of a "bloodbath" If President Ford is right about the consequences of Con- gressional refusal?to provide aid for Cambodia. Or, if some of his critics. are. right, ;then the Khmer Rouge after having. conclusively defeated the Cambodian Army militarily.will seek only to install their own peaceful rule in the central seat of power, thus solidifying the hold they, have already. gained over most ,.of the countryside. Regardless of the "right" or "wrong" of ,the bloodbath `debate, however,-one . point emerges more clearly than any, other-that the United, States should seek to negotiate a surrender that will insure, as much as is possible, no chance of a bloodbath and, at the same time, forestall further fighting and kill- ing of the nonbloodbath variety. (Since the term "bloodbath" first came into vogue, in the Indochinese conflict, no one seems to have applied it to the war itself-only to the pos- sible consequences of ending the war.) The President, while reiterating the --bloodbath theory, should" make the= final concession in Cambodia by de- claring that the United States now is prepared not only to cut off aid but :1 to assist in the orderly transfer of power to the Khmer Rouge. The only reason for continuing to proffer any aid at all should be to shore up an interim structure in Phnom Penh and other enclaves until com- tdetion of the transition to Khmer Rouge authority, The departure on ,l. r .sa L N ,i and Premier Long Buret provide:: the per. feet pretext, if any were needed, for, a clear,) public offer of negotiations i leading to surrender. To charges that such a radical de- parture from previous policy would amount to "betrayal" of our "ally," Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003&0005-3 CHRISTIAN SCIh3VCR MONITOR the only answer can be tf?,at'we`liave' It' April 1975 no choice. The American people have lRlchard L Strout clearly demonstrated their will, not: only through polls but through Con- gress as weal. in ?e practical. D ." se ": "?" epart' Vvashington th ment analyst might respo nd, is it con-'. e pipeline. Although Dr. Kissinger 2nd ceivable that the United States can I find I must take exception to a sentence in President Ford disagree, the House Demo- ceivaate a surrender? Would the the Monitor editorial "What kind of a people cratic caucus upheld this 189 to 49. in short, Khmer Rouge hierarchy surrender , ranging front we are," March 23. 1975:. has not-America's "trioraI" obligation been the titular chief of state, Prince -"This newspaper's position is in line with the met by the' expenditure of billions of dollars Norodom Sihanouk, residing in Peking, expressed motive of Dr. Kissinger in honoring and 55,000 lives? Who is wise enough to to the de facto leader, Khieu Samphan a moral if not a. legal commitment to South determine the "moral" cut-off point for an in Cambodia, consider talks of any Vietnam-' - :.: .._ -.obligation to the corrupt government- of kind? -In view of the frequent refusal ; ::l , may misunderstand this, and perhaps I , President : Thieu, which suppresses news- of the Khmer Rouge to negotiate at all, express it too baldly, but I cannot accept the papers,. alIegedly_,has thousands of political the question is legitimate.. - proposition that I have a moral commitment "prisoners, and' declines to submit itself to a One must ask, however, whether any.. . to support a war which I regard as immoral. . supervised election? " American leader has approached the ; The argument divides itself, I think, in two: The second point is on the practical side: backers of the Khmer Rouge, notably What,is moral 'and-what is practical. Let us the wisdom and timing of Dr. Kissinger's the A Soviet Union and China; with a' approach - them- in that:-order. The United a eal" editorial) su declaration of intent to surrender. Pp y pported, March 23)-for St t bl d a es un ered USwayinto a struggle which,. . military, aid- beyond' that proposed by Con- So far all the 'peace offers emanat " been ?demands 3 for e a li nave ion essentian the political-. war. in a remote area in a.-small an elementary question of what kind of a fi htin country conducted by guerrillas and feeding " g g g-something. the Khmer Rouge people we are, Dr. Kissinger declared. clearly has no intention of doing so on.subversion, but a-succession of American It seems to some (though hawks may- long as it keeps on winning. It does presidents: interpreted it as a global test disagree) that Cambodia is doomed. Perhaps .not help to accuse the Khmer Rouge between rival ideologies where U.S. victory in we' have an obligation to re-equip President of all manner of crimes, of seeking would be easy over little brown men ? Loot Nol on his visit abroad to return to his. to enforce dictatorial 'rule,, of failure in black pajamas but where, on the other country. and fight again,-.but how about the to win the support of the peasantry, hand, if there were not victory, other nations wisdom of such action simply. as a cash; many of whom have fled Khmer Rouge as far away as the Philippines'and Japan investment? regions when they had the chance. might topple to communism like falling. And Vietnam? Compassionare aid, cer- The reality,. regardless of the right-, dominoes, taiw, but Kissinger aid? Many volt. think Tor wrong, is that the Khmer Roue Like. many- Americans I became gradually .: twice. The decline of Thieu's territory has has the leadership and the weapons. convineri that. the postulates upon which we . been precipitate - from the report of the The American obligation, at this point, entered the war were mistaken if not fanciful, ' North's capture of Kentum and Plei-ku Prov- is not to encourage endless conflict, ihn~iRh'T-'hnnnr t ha idealism and sii_ncrit" of ... ces ?_? .^. ".,o"chclo"`cci .,: tort'" (M niaor with the inevitability of more pro- ~??~?vfy?w ??~~. ".,vauwa.- longed suffering Y PPY those who still accept them g, and dying, b su 1 - Page I col. 8 March 19) to the stunning loss of ing stopgap infusions of aid. The : ' `David Halberstam in his book "The Best and ~ half its territory. Anyone who heard the CBS United -States, beyond recognizing the -The Brightest" argues-(Page 561) that Amer- eyewitness. broadcast of Bruce Dunning of realities, must now acknowledge de- lean-leadership never grasped the idea "that . mutinous South Vietnam soldiers command- feat, whatever the underlying causes,"this' was a revolutionary war, and that the eering an evacuation plane meant for women and then sue for orderly surrender. ; other side held title to the revolution because and children must feel that morale has sunk: It'is the only "way out." . of. the colonial war" :. (i.e.,' against France) low. A.dispatch to the New York Times by Far from vainly attempting to per- ' "which had just ended." It helps explain, says Bernard. Weinraub from Saigon, March 28, _ suade Moscow and Peking to. scale ? Halberstam, "why their soldiers would fight estimates that the Communists have captured down arms shipments or. to dissuade and die, and ours would not; why their leaders a billion dollars worth- of:abandoned U.S. North Vietnam from relaying them to ' ;.were skillful and brave, and ours were, ine t mill the Khmer Rouge, American officials p tart' materiel. (The artillery bombard should admit the utter futility of any' and.corrupt. ? ?".. ',4, ;H. ment of Cambodia's capital, Phnom-Penh, is tactic other than that of .yielding- Many will disagree with this, of course, but now reportedly being carried out more ac-' 'quickly if not gracefully. ... . . . the opinion polls seem to indicate that the curately with captured U.S. guns.) Is "Kis- It may be the only way to prevent great mass of Americans now feel that the -- singer aid" wise as a cash investment? .the "bloodbath" so often predicted by Vietnam adventure was a mistake, and that Speaking personally it seems unwise tome,' Washington.. And, if applied success- - further military aid should be diminished to but I am even more bothered by being told it is fully in Cambodia the formula of -the limited amount voted b C , y ongress and in a moral obligati on. orderly but definitive surrender .,may- .,~ .. ,. __ ;? " " prove the only viable. way out of South Vietnam as well. . Donald Kirk, formerly Far East cor- respolident for The Chicago Tribune,, is an Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. NEW YORK TIMES -6 April 1975 Commitment? \Vhat, if anything, do the people and Government of the United States now owe to the people and Govern- ment of South Vietnam? This question does not -admit of any easy answer, entangled as it is in considera- tions of ethical resp(insibility. political commitment, and strategic self-interest, as well as the ambiguities of a shared, history between a very- powerful nation and a very weak one. ' Beyond the clear call of human fellow feeling, there resides the hard and complex political question of the relationship between the United States and South Viet- nam. The South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington stated bitterly that the world could draw "only one possible conclusion; ... that is, it is safer to be an ally of the Communists,, and it looks like it is fatal to be an ally of the United States." At his news conference last week, President Ford implicitly criticized the T)enmocratic-controlled Cc::" rrss for its failure to appropriate all the funds he had re- quested for Vietnamese military aid. Secretary of De- fense Schlesinger meanwhile has repeatedly stated his view that this country has a moral-though not a legal -commitment to continue aid indefinitely to . South Vietnam, a commitment allegedly given before Saigon agreed to sign the Paris peace protocols in 1973. "I think that it was strongly stated to the South Vietnamese Government that the United States Govern 32 approved-f r Releaze-2OO1IG8/O8 : CIA-f2DP7-79oo432Rooo1-ooz6O0o5- - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100360009-3 ;meet intended to see to it that the Paris accords were indeed enforced," Secretary Schlesinger said a few :lays ago. It is clear that any such commitment, if it was ever made, - has no legal basis. The- Paris accords permit one-far-one replacement of, military equipment not obligate the United States ,to provide such help., if Secretary of State Kissinger, he chief negotiator of those accords, offered private assurances of aid or, more ambitiously, intimated that the United States would respond to North Vietnamese violations newed bombing or' the reintroduction of ground troops, he has never acknowledged doing so.'At.his news con-' ference explaining the Paris agreements on Jan. 24, 1973, Mr. Kissinger said categorically: "There are'no secret understandings:' If such understandings ever existed the Government,. ' of South Vietnam has been on notice for more than a,.. year and a half that they would not be fulfilled. Effec- tive Aug. 15, 1973,. the Nixon Administration accepted a ban imposed by Congress againt further -bombing:: anywhere in Vietnam or Cambodia.' , That -leaves -open" the question -oft military- aid, ;vhich has continued but on a declining basis. It has been the position of this newspaper, particularly-'1h-view'-6f the intensified North Vietnamese attacks of recent months. in open violation of the Paris agreements, that. the United States should continue to provide military aid to South Vietnam for a definitely limited period, but possibly. as much as the next three years. Legal- com- mitments and diplomatic hints aside, there is always' an implicit responsibility not to abandon a military ally if, it has any prospect of making a go of it. The sudden collapse of much of South Vietnam's ? army however, makes the military aid question moot. Poor generalship and a breakdown in morale-not an immediate shortage of equipment and ammunition- WASHINGTON }DST 5 April 1975 a,e oi.ulaazcl Evans and Robert Novak 'h the Vietnamese Collapsed The collapse in South Vietnam. so `stunning and unexpected in both .Washington and Hanoi, can be traced to disastrous interaction between Pres- ident Nguyen Van Thieu's personali- 'ty - authoritarian, stubborn but im- pulsive-with new military conditions. Tor the White House to cast all blame on congressional reduction of f iilitary aid is propagandistic overkill, privately admitted as such by 'expert administration analysts. Even farther from the truth are American doves, -dancing on South Vietnam's grave and proclaiming "insurgent" victory in a "civil war" as proof of their own recti- tude. Undeniable demoralization caused by diminished U.S. suppprt cannot in itse'li c?xpIP:u units of the S? Frog: liras Dtsratchca prr;nic'r of the Viet- eo',i(, l of Vhuoclon'g.lie was gong's Provisional Revolu- said to have been acct?n?-. tionary Government ad. panieci by several officials dressed a crowd of 4,000 per- of titc Pi'tG. "' sons last Sunday in a pro- he North \ 'iet~~ m e se virncial capital seized early pe'n' it c t et', c, otiii r hum in this year's Communist the Vietcong's yress sc=rviee, offensive, the insurgents' said that several thousand Liberation 'Radio claimed . `South Vietnamese . soldiers yesterday. surrendered to the Vietcowg Iluynlt Can [hat report.- edly, spoke in l'huocbinh, in the coastal city of Nha- tr??ng last week. The retort said these included 2000 cadets from the officer`s training school in .Nliat.rang, Vietcong troops rc ported. ly captured the harbor of Danang intact, with all its wharves and equipment in working order, the Japanese Communist P a r t y new pa- per Akahata said in a dis- patch from llanoi. 36 arty re p'oi sl ie for these so- - called' refugees," she said, but they: left by force.' Mrs. Binh said an interna. tional campaign to raise as- sistance for the millions of Vietnamese now living tin- der Vietcong control had been launched and that pri- vate donations from AmerI- can organizations would be welcomed, ,. , -;Approved-For Release.2001.108108-:.C.IA-R.DP77-QO432RQOQ1QQ360005,_3N 41 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA.-RDP77-00432R000-100360005-3 WASHINGTON POST 9 April 1975 Kenneth Crawford Indochina'. Recriminations. In a recent talk show on the public television channel a lot of gratuitous advice was passed out. One panelist advised against "recriminations" in this country when the question becomes.- . Who lost 'Indochina? She Afr. Crawford is a former column. ist for Newsweek. "Congress has said that what is left of Cambodia and South Vietnam under non-Communist auspices must be defeated quickly to end the bloodshed of ivur." said such recriminations would be "divisive" Another member of the panel warned against discussion of the defeat in a cold-war context. He said the cold war was passe-a relic of the 1960s, now superseded by detente. On a subsequent news show on one of the commercial channels Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) said he was tired of hear- ing Congress blamed for the rout of government troops from the northern provinces of South Vietnam. And Rep. Paul McCloskey (.R-Calif.) said his first impulse, after visiting Cambodia, was to "string up" the American officials responsible for dragging that little na- tion into the war. He was so quoted, approvingly, by one of the most monot- onous of the hand-wringing deplorers. It is currently fashionable to blame Secretary of State Kissinger for the horrors we are seeing in the television news from Indochina. Even a national magazine of serious and fair-minded repute runs a cover cartoon ridiculing the secretary for the troubles his poli- cies are,in around the world. Yester- day's hero becomes today's scapegoat. It is one of our prerogatives, but one of the least attractive when exercised, to kick the mighty when they. are down. We are being invited to wallow in self-justification and self-deception.. The national brain is being washed clean of guilt in connection with Indo- china, and doubtless it wants to be so washed. Bayh may be tired of finger pointing at Congress but his fatigue doesn't alter the fact that Congress, when it decreed an end to military as- sistance' for South Vietnam and Cam- bodia, pulled the plug and 'sent them down the drain. True, they might have gone down anyway eventually. But their defeat would have been less . ignominious- especially for us-had we stood by them to the end, to the extent of keep- ing military supplies flowing. There will be recriminations. They are unavoidable short of forbidding de- bate. Perhaps we can learn something from this experience, such as not to start what we are unwilling to finish. As for the cold gar being supersede,1 by detente, tell it to the refugees on the roads to Saigon under North Viet- namese rocket and artillery fire. It might be comforting to them to know that the explosives came from a branch of the one big happy world family brought together by detente. But the troops going south refused to stand? and fight. They abandoned their arms. They turned out to be a weak army. So they were not worthy of help? This was an army out of hope and on the run from an enemy supe- rior in equipment and numbers and it panicked. Panic is a disease to which all humanity is vulnerable. We are not immune from it. We should be slow to judge. We ourselves have been unkindly judged 'by Sir Robert Thompson, Brit- ish Asia expert and friend and admirer of the United States, or former friend and admirer. He writes that we have run out on our. allies, not 'only on South Vietnam and Cambodia, but on Israel as well, and as result have lost our credibility as a world power. As he sees it: "The American- retreat from Mos- cow, like that of Napoleon, is begin- ning to litter the route of corpses. Henry Kissinger has been vainly fight- . ing a rear-guard action with no army, no air force, no navy and no money. "The administration can no longer conduct a credible foreign policy. But, do not worry, a new policy line already has been laid down by Congress: If you surrender the killing will stop. It is a clean message, to the world, of the abject 'surrender of the United States." Too harsh a judgment after the ex- penditure of 50,000 American lives, na. tional morale and billions in treasure? Perhaps. It is part hyperbole. The United States still has an army, an air force, a navy and money. But Congress has decided that none of them shall be used further to bolster Indochina's de- fenders militarily. That amounts to the same thing, so far as Hanoi and Phnom Penh are concerned, as our not having them. That equation may be lost for the moment on the American public, al- ready being assured , and reassured that. Congress, the Congress it elected, bears no responsibility for the deba- cles of .nauchin'r..l:ut it i not 37 lost on the Thais, the Filipinos, the i- %raelis, the Portugese and, naturally, the Soviet and Chinese governments. "This was an army out of hope and on the run from an enemy superior in equipment and numbers and it panicked." Sir Robert is exactly right in his In- terpretation of what Congress has said. It has said that what is left of Cambo. dia and South Vietnam under non- Communist auspices must be defeated quickly to end the :bloodshed of war. Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt might have proposed to stop American war for the same reason-to end the bloodshed. Fortunately for us and' for their places in history they didn't. It can be argued that the two situa- tions are wholly different-that these American heroes were fighting for. American objectives, and winning, whereas a succession of later Presi- dents were fighting for no American objective in Vietnam, and losing. Yet Congress agreed for years that the ob jective of American free-world leader- ship in resistance to the spread of to- talitarianism on the left was objective enough that American freedom is de- pendent to a degree on freedom else- _ where in the world. President Ford still says it is. In his California press conference he para- phrased President Kennedy's inaugu- ral address pledging American defense of freedom anywhere. it sounded hol- - low this time around. The President is not only hamstrung by Congress, but . by a new and, presumably improved - Congress. It is a -Congress chucked with Democratic. neophytes determined to "change things." Insofar as foreign policy is concerned the change is for. . the worse. These first-term members :keep tell- ing us that they-are a new breed of forward-looking liberals:- Their central idea is to take money away from de- fense and spend it on welfare. They have .all but seized control of the House through the party caucus. That, they say, is what they were elected to do. Whether this is liberal statesman- ship, or demagoguery is a nice ques- tion.' They would be more bearable if they could 'refrain from wrapping them- selves in a cloak of moral superiority while at the same time insisting that this country has no moral responsibil- ity for allies it has been supporting over the years and encouraging to fight in their own defense. If these al- lies must surrender, it would be better for them to do it themselves than to have Congress doing it for them. Morality aside, it would be better if Congress were not so clearly telling the world that the Communist support- crs are mute dt' a nd_thle aliio??= ti,:gin the United States. And it would be nice, too. if TV less eager to abet the telling. Approved For-Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000i100360005-3 WASHII'tGTON POST 8 April 1975 Motives for Leavin- 31zll y; COARRIe ? : i RIL ar By H. D. S. Greenway the North Vietnamese .." c The opposite appears to wgshircton Post Foreign ..crvice be true. All--over the north- SAIGON, April 7-1ti lly ern part of the country the did they run? will to fight' vanished when Almost like the spread of panic struck, and some Of Conte dread disease. a :great the South Vietnamese panic has overtaken this. - country. Starting first in the armys best units dissolved north. it sent hundreds of without firing a shot at the thousands of people fleeing North Vietnamese: -When. from their homes. leaving ? discipline was gone some everything behind. As -it soldiers vented their rage spread south, it infected and frustration by looting thousands more with an all, and killing people, and but irresistible urge to run. many refugees speak with Why? Was it fear of. the contempt and hatred about the venality and corruption advancing North 'Vietnam of the Saigon government. comet ese-a hatred of Many central Vietnamese communism? It is hard, to dthe Saigon govern- imagine that staying behind detest ement. ter but ran because of their could be of f hunger, thirst than and expo- dying fear. of the North Vietnamese o and the uncertainty of the fu- sure in the jungles and in ttn e and simply bee a u s e- packed evacuation boats, or lueryone. else was running: surviving to sleep in the There are, to be sure, edu. streets and in wretebbed sated people among the ref- camps wilic-e reftl;;ces are ages who dislike the re'. prisoners of their poverty mentation and lack of intel- lectual misery. Yet so rlany lectual freedom that the n+ , d There can be i~.ttie doubt that many fear the Comm-?- ' `ally orf` s cm II Ft5. Rni. m to Sear the unknown rather t s.c,. a govern- ment, and by 10- t:.cmss common co:-rncnt.. h,a:d during Several cl".ys of ntsr- viewing refugees was. ''WVe left because everyone else was leaving." Thus it would appear that ~aeple's motives for leaving their homes are too complex to ascribe what is happening here simply to antUcommun- ism or people "voting with their feet." - President Ford said re- cently that "the will of the South Vietnamese people to fight for . their freedom is hest cv`denced by t.he- fact that they are fleeing from . n- Communists demai ers, especialL- Catholics, chose to leave Hanoi in 1954 when the country was parti- tioned and are now moving again. Two women who fled- from Nhatrang, for example, said they had come from North Vietnam on a U.S. Navy ship 21 years ago and had come farther south again last week on another U.S. Navy ship. They said they would willingly move again because they thought they could not stand the Communists' intolerance for religion., There are other---refugees who feel that their class background is not suffi- ciently proletarian for the LOS ANGELES TIMES 6 April 1975 Vietnam. Like China in "940s HONG KONG-The political and military atmosphere in South Viet- nam today strikingly resembles the atmo.,l here in China in early 19-19, when the Communists were routing the dispirited Nationalists. Like the South Vietnamese, the Nationalists were disintegrating. The People's Republic of China was formally established in Peking on Oct. 1, 1949. The Provisional Revolu- tionary Government of South Viet- nam _ could well, beat the _ Qctober- e - n ~, . Communists, and it was no. ticeable that urban people - appeared to outnumber' country peasants in the ref-U th ute 3 cames and makeshift ? % settlements. - the Americans were even An 13-year-old student more- worried. Hoang Dona, with a soft face and long for example, had worked for mandarin fingernails, the American firm of Pa cific Architects and Engi-' . was afraid the North Viet- narrv se would put him in the army. Yet there were others " tie refugees who vied about the, American connection. He also said that he hadn't been paid and that if he stayed to wait for amon,, C could not possibly be consid- the Communists in Nha- ered members of an exploit- trang he would never -be jug class. An old fisherman - paid. - i with gnarled hands and a But it was most unusual classic Ho Chi Minh beard, for people to speak in terms for example, spoke of his of hatred for communism or life of poverty in Quinhon. of any political motivation other than a' vague fear of - Capitalism had not been - Vie Vietcong. - kind to him, Bribes had to Most of. the people .I be paid for nearly every. talked to gave the same re- thing. and inflation, had sponse as Mrs. Nguyen Thi - forced him to sell his boat Thanh, a 45-year-old widow so that he had to work for, who fled south with nine others. Yet he came south, children. One child was sep- he said, because he had ?arated from their, on the heard that'-the Communists way'and is now lost. were cruel to people. "T ,1, 't Y., -Needy .nh y Some people from Hue I left," she said. "I was just mentioned that the Commu- ? afraid like all the other peo- nists had murdered many ple. We heard rumors that persons when they captured the government was plan. the city in 1963, and they ning to evacuate the city, said that those killed lad and when everybody started not been important officials to leave I left with them. No " . but unimportant people ? . exact reason. such as the postman and government clerks. . Many refugees are the wives and relatives of sol- diers and other government ated Hanoi in 1954, the Ge- neva Treaty all_awed people 90 days to decide whether to stay or move.-out. But for- th d so fl l h e u e w o officials, and many in. this the peop group said they -felt that - ' these last -few weeks there their association with the was no time to consider. any -governnent might count against them in the eyes of .the North Vietnamese. Those who had worked far- deadline into Saigon in 1975, or could take a little longer. But barring an- Robert Elegant is the Times cor- responded in Horg Kong. other in the series of near-miracles that preserved the infant Republic of Vietnam for two decades, the Com- niti nists will triumph. Corr"nlilro cter ,' in China Ic-n,eed a flood of recriminations that roiled. the 1'!50s in the united States. The mindless, vicious "anti-Communist" crusade of Sen. Joseph McCarthy had its roots in "our losing China." A similar flood of recriminations for "our losing Vietnam" is not impossi- ble. But the profound war-weariness of the American people could re- strain its virulence 38 thing, and the panic ant fear of being left behind - was highly contagious. Mrs. Hong Kim Chau. 42, was making a living selling furniture in Banmethuot when the Communists came' near.. . Nonetheless, the close parallels and the sharp divergences between the Chinese and the Vietnamese catas- trophes provide some answers to the overriding question: Why do the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists fight so effectively whi c the SCoath \ ietriaincre and the Chinese Nationalists did so badly''' _1:unng the remarkably close paral- lels is the time frame. It took 22 years from the time the Chinese Commu- nists set out to win power till their victory. It has been 21 years since the Republic of. Vietnam's establishment ignited the current round of fighting in Indochina. Both wars, incidentally, were, punctuated by truces_,t1tat., --_.-Approved-F-ot--R&ease 2AG-I-/0$/S&-C-I-A-RDP 6@ OS= named V o 'Minh Triem, said - neers as a baker in Nha- lie came south because he trang. He was clearly wor- `Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005--:; American negotiators' h ped ` :could? nnrinro .. . . rr,m?orl or!n..t-. In a and causes o th t t .,...'. I'll ... ..... e . ietna.m, wo American wo striking force-not a congeries of debacles are obvious, while some are wholly different. social systems and . guerrilla bands. The are conducting -obscure. In both cases, the Commu- their. antagonistic philosophies op a modern blitzkrie against an enemy nists possessed overwhelming deter- posed each other. who is mired down static defense mination to-win at all costs, however ; -The Communists believed that the. long it took. end justified any means, and they ex' of large areas and who is badly In both cases, America's proteges erted iron discipline over both their strapped for ammunition, gasoline, adherents and their subject funds. were indecisive because they were populace. Only in aircraft do the South Viet- hamstrung by widespread corruption' Their opponents. riven by factional namese have an advantage. But the political instability, and acute eco- rivalries, . hovered indecisively be. aircraft-not quite 1,000 of all types, nomic difficulties. In neither .case . tween the vaguely benevolent, va including transports and helicopters could the non-Communist side muster guely self-serving-and largely out- -originally supplied to the South even an appearance of unity. moded-Confucian authoritarianism have been eroded by at least 25% The economic factors' were critical. they would have liked to impose and-: through normal wear and combat In Shanghai, a year before its fall in the "democracy" demanded by both ' losses. April, 1949, inflation was so virulent advanced domestic opinion and their The decisive factor in both Vietnam that people dining out carried suit- allies. and China was the Communists` utter, cases full of yuan-or a few Ameri- '4 potentially pluralistic, splintered dedication to victory. That was their can dollars. In Saigon.a year ago, the society faced a purposefully mono- greatest advantage, and it had far-' family of a senior (and noncorrupt) lithic society. The result was political deeper historical roots than the hash. brigadier general on active service . and psychological chaos for the Re- ly improvised defenses of either the elsewhere sat down to scanty meals public of China and the Republic of Chinese Nationalists or the So of third-grade rice eked out with a Vietnam. Vietnamese. few greens, while his children went There is at least one major differ- The foundations of the North Viet- to school in shirts patched and re- ence between China and Vietnam- namese Communist structure were- patched. military. Common soldiers knew their fami- The Chinese Communist forces and laid in revolutionary the 1920s, while their strategic lies were on the verge of starvation. were guerrillas arrayed in conven- forged r e t- Such backgrounds were conducive tional 'formations and primarily namese were forced to South outh to attempt pi _ to neither to immediate courage nor to equipped with weapons captured. create both a nation and a viable de- hopefulness for the future. In short, from the enemy. Of course, the Rus- fense in just two decades. morale plummeted. , sians had turned large quantities of The psychological trauma was arms over to them, along with most The internal contentiousness and acute. The Chinese Nationalists felt of Manchuria. But they were techno- inability to unite for a common cause their cause was hopeless after with-_ logically and, until the final stages, displayed -by both the Nationalists dra . ral of grudging American assis- numerically inferior to the National- and the South Vietnamese were the tance. Having enjoyed lavish Ameri- I 1st armies. - : major political reason for their defeat. can uSS ., ..stance, the South Vietnamese The North Vietnamese forces not They had very little time to reconcile . were undercut by its abrupt dwin- only outnumber their opponents and. bitterly antagonistic groups, and they dling, are much more lavishly supplied, but possessed no central purpose or polit- Even before President Nguyen Van are actually superior technologically. ical philosophy around which to coa- Thieu's decision to make a "strategic Their antiaircraft and antitank weap- lesce. withdrawal" from the central high- ens, as well as their armor, are more Finally, the character of the war ., th +L. -- numerous and b tt a e corn e er collapse, the man in Saigon's streets knew the situation was desperate. He saw truckloads of corpses in plastic "body bags," which were, one Saigon- ese wrote, as numerous as during Tet in 1968 or the 1972 full-dress ar- American withdrawal CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 April 1975 Erwin D. Canharn Peace beyond blame ...... b -u? L,y c-cuauuis a guerruia ponding armament of the American.. strugaie into a c equipped South Vietnamese. onventional war, the United States won a conventional Having devoted the two years since -victory: But that escalation and the the cease -fire to resupply and rein- consequent change in the naturo:af- fOrcem he ent, the North Vietnamese the war all but insured an eventual South Vi t e namese defeat after-- the forces are a centrally controlled, The United States, we are frequently re- minded, has never lost a war - until now. The problem today is to behave like a mature and responsible world power toward the situation in Indo-China. If the American people have the opportunity pto contribute major humanitarian and eco- nomic aid to the tragic victims of this long war, they will undoubtedly do so generously. ' There is a heavy burden on the American conscience, and such aid can do something to relieve it. The immediate problem, too, is to cofltrib- ute if possible toward a political settlement which will make the final rout of South Vietnamese forces less terrible for the people there. If the United States can do anything to speed and support negotiations with the Hanoi government and the Viet Cong, surely it .should do so. So far, when this was written, there was ,little evidence that the United States had been 39 taking any useful part in the kind of talks which alone seem able to soften the blow of Communist take-over. But this is a primary If the United States is blamed around the world as an unreliable ally, the best answer now is to assist in whatever kind of peace- .making is available. If this criticism is based on Congress's decision to bar further Amer- ican military participation - a decision taken in 1973 - or on reluctance to appropriate more vast sums now, it is a criticism inconsistent with much of the world's previous opinion on Vietnam. Surely a considerable part of world opinion . Thad doubted the efficacy of American in= volvement in Vietnam for years. Certainly for, !the last six years, most nations have yearned for peace in Vietnam, and have been recon- lciled in some measure to a Communist ,position in the South. It is inconsistent for blame today to be leveled at American ,unwillingness to pour additional. military Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA=RDP77-004328000100360005-3. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010036.0005-3 'resources to the rescue of the I'hieu regime. Rather, criticism may be directed at the long- protracted unwillingness to read the hand- writing on the wall, and to try earlier to make the inevitable more tolerable. If the United States plunges into a domestic political search for scapegoats, it will harm The American position in the world. The political war about the Communist victory in mainland China ought not be repeated today. Nor should the superhawks who believe the United States should have atomic-bombed the North Koreans (or the Chinese Communists) out of existence be listened to. That kind of escalation could only have led to greater tragedy, perhaps worldwide. The simple fact; it seems to me, is that those we sought to aid in Vietnam did not have the national force, the ideological strength, the freedom from corruption, the total will which their fellow-Vietnamese in the North showed so successfully. There is nothing so dangerous as a slippery slope, and the United States slid down a slippery slope into its Vietnam involvement. The advice of Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur - never to get drawn into a land war on the Asian mainland - remains fundamental. When the final collapse comes, and there- alter, the American people will have their opportunity to snap out of almost 15 years of illusion and to show the world their better side. American willingness to help those in distress can be almost unlimited. What op- portunities, what circumstances will enable these sentiments to have practical effect, must be worked out. To assume that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are, going to launch into massacre may be quite wrong. If they have half the sense they have shown from time to time, they will try to conciliate and unite the whole country. Un- doubtedly many of their political and military opponents will suffer. But beyond that, the world - with the United States playing whatever part it can - can strive for a true and humane peace. NEW YORK TIMES 9 April 1975 Learning from the Past American disengagement in Indochina and the mill- ,_tary debacle in South Vietnam and Cambodia, have aroused fears that the United States may be entering a new era of isolationism or- at least impotence in the world arena. President Ford has even hinted darkly that thnsa who cnnght. the en(I of this country's military., Involvement with Saigon were advocating a retreat be= hind Fortress America. The Army Chief of Staff says that only another half-. billion dollars, if sent quickly' enough, will enable Saigon . to' fight off enemy attack. General Weyand's request, reported yesterday, recalls the last-ditch conviction of Gen. William C: Westmoreland in 1968, that. another 206,000. American troops would do . the job in South yitnam that twice that number had been unable. to accomplish. Such requests for help are second-nature from worried strategists whose defenses are crumbling; they bear no relation to the national interests of the United States, or to its role in the world. ..History cannot be undone; but errors committed in the past need not jeopardize a nation's future-provided its political leaders have the wisdom to recognize and the strength to admit those errors. No purpose is served by pinning familiar old labels on new and greatly different situations. It is not the mark of isolationism for the United States to re-examine the validity of its role as automatic protector of any regime that calls itself the enemy of Communism. If the United States is to be unselective in its reliability, as Secretary of State Kissinger Would shave it, then this country must exercise extreme selec- tivity in its military commitments.. , i * m s Great powers have often tended to. confuse their "International obligations with an innate desire to fashion other nations in their own image. Thus the United States has deluded itself into, believing that the. symbols of American democracy could automatically turn allied forces into freedom 'fighters. Such illusions tend to corrupt clients, as well as patrons. The risk is compounded when the American flag is allowed to be Identified with the power of privilege and the defense of the status quo.'It is in this way that-the United States has so often unwittingly forfeited its own advocacy of social reform-to Communist propagandists. To recognize such failures and'to come to a realistic understanding of the limitations of American power is not to condemn ourselves to passivity or isolationism. There is much this country can do in honoring com- mitments legitimately entered into to protect its vital interests and in making common cause with those who truly speak for their people's 'aspirations. The success of the Marshall Plan offers ample illustration of America's potential to use its resources and its diplo- macy as an. effective bulwark against want and war. Except for the remaining humanitarian task of allevi- ating the suffering left in the war's aftermath, the book will soon have to be closed on the tragic misreading of the United States' role in Indochina. This has nothing to do with isolationism nor the abrogation of a com- mitment. It is simply the honorable recognition, at long last, of the failure of a policy on which much blood and treasure have been tragically expended. ~_ A 1?rQved-E,o E elea e.2Q.Q=8108 :-CIA-RDP77-8043-28880. 6@