COLBY TELLS PUBLISHERS THAT C.I.A. IS JEOPARDIZED BY SENSATIONAL HEADLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 8, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 7 11 April 1975
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
EAST ASIA
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 THE NEW' YORK TIMES, T UESDA I, APRIL S, 1975
Colby Tells, Publishers That C.I.A.'Is jeopardized
allegations of C.I.A. involve-! ?~ ~; , s ] ?,~ ] y,~ tc
By MARTIN ARNOLD
Speetal to The New York Tides .
NEW ORLEANS, April. 7-
William E. Colby, the Director
of Central Intelligence, said to-
day' that the Central Intel=
ligence Agency was being jeo,
pardized by sensational and
unjustified headlines.
He told a group of American
newspaper publishers that his
agency and its service to the
country were being endangered'
"by its status as the nation's
No. 1 sensational lead" in
newspaper articles.
In his view, he indicated,
the C.I.A. is too often used
to give sensation to the lead,
or opening, of a news article
even when the agnecy is not
a major part of the article..
Mr. Colby, who spoke- at an
Associated Press luncheon at
the annual convention of the
American Newsaper Publishers
Association, also answered
questions.
Intelligence directors before
Mr. Colby apeared rarely at
public meetings and almost
never submitted. to questions
on the record.-
.Since the recent published
ment in domestic operations in
this country, however, Mr. Col-
iby has appeared before a.num-
ber of news-gathering organi-
zations for discussions both on
and .off, the record.
.No Cases Discussed
Mr. Colby, in his warning on~
what he saw as American in-
telligencegathering apparatus,
!declined to discuss any particu-
lar case. But he said that though
the C.I.A. was "proud of our
open society . . . we also be-
lieve lieve that this open society,
(must be protected, and that in-
Itelligence, and even secret in-1
;telligence, must play a part.in
.that protection."
Because the agency has be-1
come "the nations.No. 1 sersa-
`:tioral lead," he said, other in-
telligence agencies are "ques-
tioning our ability to keep their
work for us secret," and Ameri-
can business concerns that have
helped the C.I.A. are afraid that
their "businesses abroad [will
be] destroyed by a revelation
of their patriotic assistance to
the C.I.A,"
Foreign officials from friend-
ly governments are also wor-
WASHINGTON POST
8 April 1975
Colby Calls Operations ~Vi a1 .
By George Lardner Jr.
Waehin;ton Post Staff Writer
Central Intelligence Agency
Director William E. Colby yes-,
terday defended covert activi-`
ties and paramilitary opera-
tions abroad as an essential
part of the nation's. intelli-
gence work.
Speaking in N ,3w Orleans to
members of the Associated'
Press, Colby said such opera-
",comparatively. small propor-
tion" of the CIA's efforts, but
.he declared they still "make a
unique and important contri-
bution to the safety of our
country."
The CIA director asked for
the help of the press in pre-
serving what he called the na-
tion's "good secrets." He said
he believed, however, in expo-'
sure of. "bad secrets"-or mis-I
steps of the past-as well as
"non Seer?t: " or ;_?lot!'n facts
about ititeilr.ence which "in
the old traditiuil would have
been kept secret."
Colby did not offer any
clear. methods whereby the
press could sort out whatever
secrets it might come across,.
but he suggested at one point
that the CIA would like to be:
consulted before publication.
-:`This does allow the presen-:
tation of good reasons to write
the story so'as to protect im-
portant' secrets or even, in ex-
ceptional cases, to withhold
it," he said.
Recently, Colby was tempo-
rarily successful in urging a
number of news organizations
to withhold stories about the
CIA's raising of part of a
sunken Soviet submarine even
after the plan had been pub-
licly mentioned by the Los An-
geles Times.
Colby said that modern-day
intelligence gathering now re-
lies primarily on technological
advances in a variety of fields
from photography to electron-I
ics.
Some critics of the CIA
have cited. the same- develop-
ments in arguing that the,
agency could well afford to
abandon the more controver-
sial fields of paramilitary and
covert operations.
Clearly unwilling to . dire'
''softie thins cannot be,,,
learned by `he innui, ~ !'r-port-
er or even the spy in the sky. i
I Sources within a closed or au-
thoritarian foreign society 'cant'
-let us know its secret. in these
days of mutual vulnerability
to warfare... And there are oc-
casions in which some quiet
assistance to friends of Amer-
ica..in spnie .foreign,_country
ned about this, he said. He said
it'hat the military attachd from
a foreign. country "which our
intelligence servicemust run
lthe risk of life and death and
spend hundreds of millions of
'dollars tog obtain about his
country." .
"Sometimes the journalists
assume the story can do no
harm when, - in reality, there
are unreveale dfacts about itl
which would change the ' jour-
nalists' mind," he said.
Protection of Sources
Mr. Colby, who appeared to
be well, received by the 1,300;
(publishers and their wives, said'
That he was not asking that
i"'bad secrets' be supressed,
!and I also believe that 'non-
secrets' should be exposed."
"But I do make a plea tha
'good secrets' be respected;' he
added. ---
"I only ask," he said, "that
we Americans protect our na-
tion's sources in the same way
the journalist protects 'his."
In the question-and-answer,
period, Mr. Colby defined "good
secrets" as, for instance, the
names appearing in -a look
written about the C.I.A. byll
r^iaiilY .. u. Agcc, a f'v
can help them withstand hos=
tile internal pressures before
they become international
pressures against, the United
States." '
The CIA dilector has previ-
ously described paramilitary
operations- such as the
"secret war" in Laos-as "a
little help to a few friends." 11
Colby said he still welcomes
the current public inquiries
and debate over' the proper.
scope of the CIA's activities,,
but at the same time reiter-'
ated his fears that a "climate
of sensationalism" is jeopard-
izing the agency's operations.
He said some previously coop-
erative foreign officials have
stopped dealing with the CIA
or started to "constrict the in-
Iformation they provide, us."
11can}chile. the presidential',
tagent. The book, "Inside the
Company/C.I.A.Diary," has been
published- in England and can
now. be purchased in this
country. -
Mr. Colby denied in reply to
,a question that the, C.I.A. had
'taken part in the overthrow *of
the Government of President
Salvadore Allende- Gossens in
At another session on the
.opening day of the publishers'I
convention, William E. Simony.
Secretary of the Treasury, was
'critical of some of the ecor.omio
reporting in American news
' papers.
He.said, "Your reporters and
editorial writers must necessar-
'ily jump from crisis to crisis,
from one complex subject to
the next with little time or
space for deep analysis, and
often with little prior knowl-
edge of the subject.
He said that there had "been
marked improvement in the
past year" in the reporting. of
economic news, but still as-
serted that his "greatest con-
cern about the press today is
.they have failed to convey a
better sense of perspective for
the ;American people about the
,[economic] choices we -fface.."-
commission investigating the
CIA heard private testimony
yesterday from Ford Founda-
tion President McGeorge
Bundy, who was President
Kennedy's special assistant for
national security affairs, and
Lawrence K. White, a former
controller and executive direc-
tor of the agency.
Though he declined to dis-
cuss most of his testimony,
Bundy told . reporters
afterwards: "I was able to tell
them that I knew of no effort
to commit any' assassinations"
during the Kennedy years.
Bundy added, however, he
could not exclude the possibil-
ity that some 'officials may
have had discussions along the
lilies of "how nice it would be
if such acid such leader didn't
exist."
The commission chaired by
Vice . President Rockefelleri
spent much of the day in exec-t
utive session going over Pre-
liminary findings assembled
by its investigative star:.
U. S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT
7 APRIL 1975
While the Central Intelligence Agency
is under the spotlight of critical a rpo-
sure in the ' U.S." its counterparts in
Communist countries-particularly the
Soviet KGB-are still very busy.
Known to the CIA, for example, are
attempts by the Communist secret ser-
vices to recruit about 400 Americans
as spies in the last four years.
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 WASHINGTON POST
8 April 1975
~~~ll/?;1t ~.~ S .ll,'tp.t Ali'
~ssociaie.Praaa J `~'
firmed that the award had;' gallons that 1Angleton headed/
ldesribeci es stAngleton, once been presented to -Angleton) la spy onerarsnnn
of a massive illegal. .t:tl13U aw;i ba1U It 1vas "C0inCidence'.' l jwar diSSldCntS 1T2 the late
By uJOWN M. CREWnfir~ly gal. domestic that the r? p. .,.. L_a , t
g
n
The Distinn se him for iwtth the Soviet Union and liai:1
telligence gatherin in Federal ?utshed Intell}- long and distinguished service"I tson with the Israeli. :ntelli
g Bence Medal was prssentd to in
age counterintelligence. d 1
agencies will be seven weeks the ousted counterinteili^ence. .. An,le 't;ence service.
old tomorrow, and so far it chief by Deputy Director Lt: i ton's intelligence career span Although officially irtired,
has no staff director and no I nod more than .30 years, Angleton has continued to
Genii. unarm un Walters a, stretching back to World War! work at agency headquarters'
staff. Isma~l unannounced ceremof n,; A. at
The seven Democrats and Intelli ence.Director William lilt Langley, Va., where a.
three Republicans h E. Colby who f- When Anniat
w
r
k
me, Itral Intelli~A t?eu ~~,~~u:ueu for a day when Colby has since stated pub
WASHINGTON, April S-The eeived theb e `~gencY, re- Colby Was out of town.
-licly that Angleton left in a
rouse select committee set up award yesterday. rtcy s. lii.hes.f, The citation presented
.-Anleton to 1 policy dispute over detente
In February to investi
ate i
Prai d
e . ?
o ma
ced Angleton his to on and three oft (spokesman said lie is servin,
up the panel have met a few to, retire at the end of. last / p aides were forced by as. a consultant aiding in th
t year w is
o
"has to in-
Th s a co i ? lse c, ti
on une unable to provide close supervi-I But the Jubcommttee's re- telld
be done slowly to get tsele c? in-:
the full flavor." l' sign of the C.I.A. a Oct. 23, g Commit e
mmito ce in the,
Mr. Nedzi, is also chairman tee The intelligence subcommit-' pheaortrion hearings Octdid ot973' on its Senate, has held a t hu a.the -Tnieu;govern-
ment,' - Madam 'Thank . says:
"We are most optimistic now.J
The situation is going in - the'
direction We:were expecting. If.
Thieu..steps,- down ..we, can helps
negotiate. a peaceful settlement
and. vreate a new. government
of,,reconciliation
Sbe1 said,.mlembors.- of her
group,:who..stayed in,, Da Nang
and Hue after those 'cities fell
last month now are active in
the 'new'. administration there.
While. th6s'e developments In
the opposition movement ,. arei
Interesting: reflections, of thei
current : military situation, J t!
scexns. unlikely that- even ens
organized; unified apposition
movement could succeed new
in- dislodging President -Thieu.
So far, the opposition. has
said-it`would not resort to` vio-
lence to . get rid of Presidgnti
Thieu. However,- Mr: Tuyen
said yesterday that "if 'Thieu
refuses to be moved by: mod-i
erate means; we will be forced:.
to " use violence-a military,
coup, or -an uprising m . the'
streets."
31
By Donald Kirk
Our national leader has forecast an
"unbelievable horror show, and his
opponents have adduced opinions and
facts to show' it isn't true-that there
will not be any semblance of 'a "blood- :
bath" if Communist forces win in
Cambodia and then in Vietnam. The
dialogue resembles a shouting match
in which one man accuses the other of
lying, and neither has the final evi-
'".dente to prove his point.
Yet, in a very ;short time the
evidence may emerge--in the form of
a "bloodbath" If President Ford is
right about the consequences of Con-
gressional refusal?to provide aid for
Cambodia.
Or, if some of his critics. are. right,
;then the Khmer Rouge after having.
conclusively defeated the Cambodian
Army militarily.will seek only to install
their own peaceful rule in the central
seat of power, thus solidifying the hold
they, have already. gained over most
,.of the countryside.
Regardless of the "right" or "wrong"
of ,the bloodbath `debate, however,-one
. point emerges more clearly than any,
other-that the United, States should
seek to negotiate a surrender that will
insure, as much as is possible, no
chance of a bloodbath and, at the same
time, forestall further fighting and kill-
ing of the nonbloodbath variety.
(Since the term "bloodbath" first
came into vogue, in the Indochinese
conflict, no one seems to have applied
it to the war itself-only to the pos-
sible consequences of ending the war.)
The President, while reiterating the
--bloodbath theory, should" make the=
final concession in Cambodia by de-
claring that the United States now is
prepared not only to cut off aid but :1
to assist in the orderly transfer of
power to the Khmer Rouge.
The only reason for continuing to
proffer any aid at all should be to
shore up an interim structure in Phnom
Penh and other enclaves until com-
tdetion of the transition to Khmer
Rouge authority, The departure on
,l. r .sa L N ,i and
Premier Long Buret provide:: the per.
feet pretext, if any were needed, for,
a clear,) public offer of negotiations i
leading to surrender.
To charges that such a radical de-
parture from previous policy would
amount to "betrayal" of our "ally,"
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003&0005-3
CHRISTIAN SCIh3VCR MONITOR
the only answer can be tf?,at'we`liave' It' April 1975
no choice. The American people have lRlchard L Strout
clearly demonstrated their will, not:
only through polls but through Con-
gress as weal.
in ?e practical.
D
." se ": "?"
epart' Vvashington th
ment analyst might respo nd, is it con-'. e pipeline. Although Dr. Kissinger 2nd
ceivable that the United States can I find I must take exception to a sentence in President Ford disagree, the House Demo-
ceivaate a surrender? Would the the Monitor editorial "What kind of a people cratic caucus upheld this 189 to 49. in short,
Khmer Rouge hierarchy surrender
, ranging front we are," March 23. 1975:. has not-America's "trioraI" obligation been
the titular chief of state, Prince -"This newspaper's position is in line with the met by the' expenditure of billions of dollars
Norodom Sihanouk, residing in Peking, expressed motive of Dr. Kissinger in honoring and 55,000 lives? Who is wise enough to
to the de facto leader, Khieu Samphan a moral if not a. legal commitment to South determine the "moral" cut-off point for an
in Cambodia, consider talks of any Vietnam-' - :.: .._ -.obligation to the corrupt government- of
kind? -In view of the frequent refusal ; ::l , may misunderstand this, and perhaps I , President : Thieu, which suppresses news-
of the Khmer Rouge to negotiate at all, express it too baldly, but I cannot accept the papers,. alIegedly_,has thousands of political
the question is legitimate.. - proposition that I have a moral commitment "prisoners, and' declines to submit itself to a
One must ask, however, whether any.. . to support a war which I regard as immoral. . supervised election? "
American leader has approached the ; The argument divides itself, I think, in two: The second point is on the practical side:
backers of the Khmer Rouge, notably What,is moral 'and-what is practical. Let us the wisdom and timing of Dr. Kissinger's
the A Soviet Union and China; with a'
approach - them- in that:-order. The United a eal" editorial) su
declaration of intent to surrender. Pp y pported, March 23)-for
St
t
bl
d
a
es
un
ered USwayinto a struggle which,. . military, aid- beyond' that proposed by Con-
So far all the 'peace offers emanat
"
been ?demands 3 for e a li nave ion essentian the political-. war. in a remote area in a.-small an elementary question of what kind of a
fi htin country conducted by guerrillas and feeding " g
g g-something. the Khmer Rouge people we are, Dr. Kissinger declared.
clearly has no intention of doing so on.subversion, but a-succession of American It seems to some (though hawks may-
long as it keeps on winning. It does presidents: interpreted it as a global test disagree) that Cambodia is doomed. Perhaps
.not help to accuse the Khmer Rouge between rival ideologies where U.S. victory in we' have an obligation to re-equip President
of all manner of crimes, of seeking any.case would be easy over little brown men ? Loot Nol on his visit abroad to return to his.
to enforce dictatorial 'rule,, of failure in black pajamas but where, on the other country. and fight again,-.but how about the
to win the support of the peasantry, hand, if there were not victory, other nations wisdom of such action simply. as a cash;
many of whom have fled Khmer Rouge as far away as the Philippines'and Japan investment?
regions when they had the chance. might topple to communism like falling. And Vietnam? Compassionare aid, cer-
The reality,. regardless of the right-, dominoes, taiw, but Kissinger aid? Many volt. think
Tor wrong, is that the Khmer Roue Like. many- Americans I became gradually .: twice. The decline of Thieu's territory has
has the leadership and the weapons. convineri that. the postulates upon which we . been precipitate - from the report of the
The American obligation, at this point, entered the war were mistaken if not fanciful, ' North's capture of Kentum and Plei-ku Prov-
is not to encourage endless conflict,
ihn~iRh'T-'hnnnr t ha idealism and sii_ncrit" of ...
ces ?_? .^. ".,o"chclo"`cci .,: tort'" (M niaor
with the inevitability of more pro- ~??~?vfy?w ??~~. ".,vauwa.-
longed suffering Y PPY those who still accept them g,
and dying, b su 1 - Page I col. 8 March 19) to the stunning loss of
ing stopgap infusions of aid. The : ' `David Halberstam in his book "The Best and ~ half its territory. Anyone who heard the CBS
United -States, beyond recognizing the -The Brightest" argues-(Page 561) that Amer- eyewitness. broadcast of Bruce Dunning of
realities, must now acknowledge de- lean-leadership never grasped the idea "that . mutinous South Vietnam soldiers command-
feat, whatever the underlying causes,"this' was a revolutionary war, and that the eering an evacuation plane meant for women
and then sue for orderly surrender. ; other side held title to the revolution because and children must feel that morale has sunk:
It'is the only "way out." . of. the colonial war" :. (i.e.,' against France) low. A.dispatch to the New York Times by
Far from vainly attempting to per- ' "which had just ended." It helps explain, says Bernard. Weinraub from Saigon, March 28, _
suade Moscow and Peking to. scale ? Halberstam, "why their soldiers would fight estimates that the Communists have captured
down arms shipments or. to dissuade and die, and ours would not; why their leaders a billion dollars worth- of:abandoned U.S.
North Vietnam from relaying them to ' ;.were skillful and brave, and ours were, ine t mill
the Khmer Rouge, American officials p tart' materiel. (The artillery bombard
should admit the utter futility of any' and.corrupt. ? ?".. ',4, ;H. ment of Cambodia's capital, Phnom-Penh, is
tactic other than that of .yielding- Many will disagree with this, of course, but now reportedly being carried out more ac-'
'quickly if not gracefully. ... . . . the opinion polls seem to indicate that the curately with captured U.S. guns.) Is "Kis-
It may be the only way to prevent great mass of Americans now feel that the -- singer aid" wise as a cash investment?
.the "bloodbath" so often predicted by Vietnam adventure was a mistake, and that Speaking personally it seems unwise tome,'
Washington.. And, if applied success- - further military aid should be diminished to but I am even more bothered by being told it is
fully in Cambodia
the formula of -the limited amount voted b
C
,
y
ongress and in a moral obligati
on.
orderly but definitive surrender .,may-
.,~ .. ,. __ ;?
"
"
prove the only viable.
way out
of
South Vietnam as well. .
Donald Kirk, formerly Far East cor-
respolident for The Chicago Tribune,,
is an Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
NEW YORK TIMES
-6 April 1975
Commitment?
\Vhat, if anything, do the people and Government
of the United States now owe to the people and Govern-
ment of South Vietnam? This question does not -admit
of any easy answer, entangled as it is in considera-
tions of ethical resp(insibility. political commitment, and
strategic self-interest, as well as the ambiguities of a
shared, history between a very- powerful nation and a
very weak one. '
Beyond the clear call of human fellow feeling, there
resides the hard and complex political question of the
relationship between the United States and South Viet-
nam. The South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington
stated bitterly that the world could draw "only one
possible conclusion; ... that is, it is safer to be an ally
of the Communists,, and it looks like it is fatal to be an
ally of the United States."
At his news conference last week, President Ford
implicitly criticized the T)enmocratic-controlled Cc::" rrss
for its failure to appropriate all the funds he had re-
quested for Vietnamese military aid. Secretary of De-
fense Schlesinger meanwhile has repeatedly stated his
view that this country has a moral-though not a legal
-commitment to continue aid indefinitely to . South
Vietnam, a commitment allegedly given before Saigon
agreed to sign the Paris peace protocols in 1973.
"I think that it was strongly stated to the South
Vietnamese Government that the United States Govern
32
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100360009-3
;meet intended to see to it that the Paris accords were
indeed enforced," Secretary Schlesinger said a few
:lays ago.
It is clear that any such commitment, if it was ever
made, - has no legal basis. The- Paris accords permit
one-far-one replacement of, military equipment but.do
not obligate the United States ,to provide such help., if
Secretary of State Kissinger, he chief negotiator of
those accords, offered private assurances of aid or,
more ambitiously, intimated that the United States
would respond to North Vietnamese violations with.re-
newed bombing or' the reintroduction of ground troops,
he has never acknowledged doing so.'At.his news con-'
ference explaining the Paris agreements on Jan. 24,
1973, Mr. Kissinger said categorically: "There are'no
secret understandings:'
If such understandings ever existed the Government,. '
of South Vietnam has been on notice for more than a,..
year and a half that they would not be fulfilled. Effec-
tive Aug. 15, 1973,. the Nixon Administration accepted
a ban imposed by Congress againt further -bombing::
anywhere in Vietnam or Cambodia.'
,
That -leaves -open" the question -oft military- aid, ;vhich
has continued but on a declining basis. It has been the
position of this newspaper, particularly-'1h-view'-6f the
intensified North Vietnamese attacks of recent months.
in open violation of the Paris agreements, that. the
United States should continue to provide military aid
to South Vietnam for a definitely limited period, but
possibly. as much as the next three years. Legal- com-
mitments and diplomatic hints aside, there is always'
an implicit responsibility not to abandon a military
ally if, it has any prospect of making a go of it.
The sudden collapse of much of South Vietnam's ?
army however, makes the military aid question moot.
Poor generalship and a breakdown in morale-not an
immediate shortage of equipment and ammunition-
WASHINGTON }DST
5 April 1975
a,e
oi.ulaazcl Evans and Robert Novak
'h
the Vietnamese Collapsed
The collapse in South Vietnam. so
`stunning and unexpected in both
.Washington and Hanoi, can be traced
to disastrous interaction between Pres-
ident Nguyen Van Thieu's personali-
'ty - authoritarian, stubborn but im-
pulsive-with new military conditions.
Tor the White House to cast all
blame on congressional reduction of
f iilitary aid is propagandistic overkill,
privately admitted as such by 'expert
administration analysts. Even farther
from the truth are American doves,
-dancing on South Vietnam's grave and
proclaiming "insurgent" victory in a
"civil war" as proof of their own recti-
tude.
Undeniable demoralization caused
by diminished U.S. suppprt cannot in
itse'li c?xpIP:u units of the S?
Frog: liras Dtsratchca
prr;nic'r of the Viet- eo',i(, l of Vhuoclon'g.lie was
gong's Provisional Revolu- said to have been acct?n?-.
tionary Government ad. panieci by several officials
dressed a crowd of 4,000 per- of titc Pi'tG.
"'
sons last Sunday in a pro- he North \ 'iet~~ m e se
virncial capital seized early pe'n' it c t et', c, otiii r hum
in this year's Communist the Vietcong's yress sc=rviee,
offensive, the insurgents' said that several thousand
Liberation 'Radio claimed . `South Vietnamese . soldiers
yesterday. surrendered to the Vietcowg
Iluynlt Can [hat report.-
edly, spoke in l'huocbinh, in the coastal city of Nha-
tr??ng last week. The retort
said these included 2000
cadets from the officer`s
training school in .Nliat.rang,
Vietcong troops rc ported.
ly captured the harbor of
Danang intact, with all its
wharves and equipment in
working order, the Japanese
Communist P a r t y new pa-
per Akahata said in a dis-
patch from llanoi.
36
arty re p'oi sl ie for these so-
- called' refugees," she said,
but they: left by force.'
Mrs. Binh said an interna.
tional campaign to raise as-
sistance for the millions of
Vietnamese now living tin-
der Vietcong control had
been launched and that pri-
vate donations from AmerI-
can organizations would be
welcomed, ,. ,
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41
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA.-RDP77-00432R000-100360005-3
WASHINGTON POST
9 April 1975
Kenneth Crawford
Indochina'. Recriminations.
In a recent talk show on the public
television channel a lot of gratuitous
advice was passed out. One panelist
advised against "recriminations" in
this country when the question
becomes.- . Who lost 'Indochina? She
Afr. Crawford is a former column.
ist for Newsweek.
"Congress has said that
what is left of Cambodia
and South Vietnam under
non-Communist auspices
must be defeated quickly
to end the bloodshed of ivur."
said such recriminations would be
"divisive" Another member of the
panel warned against discussion of the
defeat in a cold-war context. He said
the cold war was passe-a relic of the
1960s, now superseded by detente.
On a subsequent news show on one
of the commercial channels Sen. Birch
Bayh (D-Ind.) said he was tired of hear-
ing Congress blamed for the rout of
government troops from the northern
provinces of South Vietnam. And Rep.
Paul McCloskey (.R-Calif.) said his first
impulse, after visiting Cambodia, was
to "string up" the American officials
responsible for dragging that little na-
tion into the war. He was so quoted,
approvingly, by one of the most monot-
onous of the hand-wringing deplorers.
It is currently fashionable to blame
Secretary of State Kissinger for the
horrors we are seeing in the television
news from Indochina. Even a national
magazine of serious and fair-minded
repute runs a cover cartoon ridiculing
the secretary for the troubles his poli-
cies are,in around the world. Yester-
day's hero becomes today's scapegoat.
It is one of our prerogatives, but one
of the least attractive when exercised,
to kick the mighty when they. are
down.
We are being invited to wallow in
self-justification and self-deception..
The national brain is being washed
clean of guilt in connection with Indo-
china, and doubtless it wants to be so
washed. Bayh may be tired of finger
pointing at Congress but his fatigue
doesn't alter the fact that Congress,
when it decreed an end to military as-
sistance' for South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, pulled the plug and 'sent them
down the drain.
True, they might have gone down
anyway eventually. But their defeat
would have been less . ignominious-
especially for us-had we stood by
them to the end, to the extent of keep-
ing military supplies flowing.
There will be recriminations. They
are unavoidable short of forbidding de-
bate. Perhaps we can learn something
from this experience, such as not to
start what we are unwilling to finish.
As for the cold gar being supersede,1
by detente, tell it to the refugees on
the roads to Saigon under North Viet-
namese rocket and artillery fire. It
might be comforting to them to know
that the explosives came from a
branch of the one big happy world
family brought together by detente.
But the troops going south refused
to stand? and fight. They abandoned
their arms. They turned out to be a
weak army. So they were not worthy
of help? This was an army out of hope
and on the run from an enemy supe-
rior in equipment and numbers and it
panicked. Panic is a disease to which
all humanity is vulnerable. We are not
immune from it. We should be slow to
judge.
We ourselves have been unkindly
judged 'by Sir Robert Thompson, Brit-
ish Asia expert and friend and admirer
of the United States, or former friend
and admirer. He writes that we have
run out on our. allies, not 'only on
South Vietnam and Cambodia, but on
Israel as well, and as result have lost
our credibility as a world power. As he
sees it:
"The American- retreat from Mos-
cow, like that of Napoleon, is begin-
ning to litter the route of corpses.
Henry Kissinger has been vainly fight- .
ing a rear-guard action with no army,
no air force, no navy and no money.
"The administration can no longer
conduct a credible foreign policy. But,
do not worry, a new policy line already
has been laid down by Congress: If
you surrender the killing will stop. It
is a clean message, to the world, of the
abject 'surrender of the United States."
Too harsh a judgment after the ex-
penditure of 50,000 American lives, na.
tional morale and billions in treasure?
Perhaps. It is part hyperbole. The
United States still has an army, an air
force, a navy and money. But Congress
has decided that none of them shall be
used further to bolster Indochina's de-
fenders militarily. That amounts to the
same thing, so far as Hanoi and
Phnom Penh are concerned, as our not
having them.
That equation may be lost for the
moment on the American public, al-
ready being assured , and reassured
that. Congress, the Congress it elected,
bears no responsibility for the deba-
cles of .nauchin'r..l:ut it i not bc~.ng
37
lost on the Thais, the Filipinos, the i-
%raelis, the Portugese and, naturally,
the Soviet and Chinese governments.
"This was an army out
of hope and on the run
from an enemy superior
in equipment and numbers
and it panicked."
Sir Robert is exactly right in his In-
terpretation of what Congress has said.
It has said that what is left of Cambo.
dia and South Vietnam under non-
Communist auspices must be defeated
quickly to end the :bloodshed of war.
Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt
might have proposed to stop American
war for the same reason-to end the
bloodshed. Fortunately for us and' for
their places in history they didn't.
It can be argued that the two situa-
tions are wholly different-that these
American heroes were fighting for.
American objectives, and winning,
whereas a succession of later Presi-
dents were fighting for no American
objective in Vietnam, and losing. Yet
Congress agreed for years that the ob
jective of American free-world leader-
ship in resistance to the spread of to-
talitarianism on the left was objective
enough that American freedom is de-
pendent to a degree on freedom else- _
where in the world.
President Ford still says it is. In his
California press conference he para-
phrased President Kennedy's inaugu-
ral address pledging American defense
of freedom anywhere. it sounded hol- -
low this time around. The President is
not only hamstrung by Congress, but
.
by a new and, presumably improved -
Congress. It is a -Congress chucked
with Democratic. neophytes determined
to "change things." Insofar as foreign
policy is concerned the change is for. .
the worse.
These first-term members :keep tell-
ing us that they-are a new breed of
forward-looking liberals:- Their central
idea is to take money away from de-
fense and spend it on welfare. They
have .all but seized control of the
House through the party caucus. That,
they say, is what they were elected to
do. Whether this is liberal statesman-
ship, or demagoguery is a nice ques-
tion.'
They would be more bearable if they
could 'refrain from wrapping them-
selves in a cloak of moral superiority
while at the same time insisting that
this country has no moral responsibil-
ity for allies it has been supporting
over the years and encouraging to
fight in their own defense. If these al-
lies must surrender, it would be better
for them to do it themselves than to
have Congress doing it for them.
Morality aside, it would be better if
Congress were not so clearly telling
the world that the Communist support-
crs are mute dt' a nd_thle aliio??= ti,:gin
the United States. And it would be
nice, too. if TV
less eager to abet the telling.
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WASHII'tGTON POST
8 April 1975
Motives for Leavin- 31zll y; COARRIe ? :
i
RIL
ar
By H. D. S. Greenway the North Vietnamese .."
c The opposite appears to
wgshircton Post Foreign ..crvice
be true. All--over the north-
SAIGON, April 7-1ti lly ern part of the country the
did they run? will to fight' vanished when
Almost like the spread of panic struck, and some Of
Conte dread disease. a :great the South Vietnamese
panic has overtaken this. -
country. Starting first in the armys best units dissolved
north. it sent hundreds of without firing a shot at the
thousands of people fleeing North Vietnamese: -When.
from their homes. leaving ? discipline was gone some
everything behind. As -it soldiers vented their rage
spread south, it infected and frustration by looting
thousands more with an all, and killing people, and
but irresistible urge to run. many refugees speak with
Why? Was it fear of. the contempt and hatred about
the venality and corruption
advancing North 'Vietnam of the Saigon government.
comet
ese-a hatred of Many central Vietnamese
communism? It is hard, to dthe Saigon govern-
imagine that staying behind detest ement. ter but ran because of their
could be of f hunger, thirst than and expo- dying fear. of the North Vietnamese
o and the uncertainty of the fu-
sure in the jungles and in ttn e and simply bee a u s e-
packed evacuation boats, or lueryone. else was running:
surviving to sleep in the There are, to be sure, edu.
streets and in wretebbed
sated people among the ref-
camps wilic-e reftl;;ces are ages who dislike the re'.
prisoners of their poverty
mentation and lack of intel-
lectual misery. Yet so rlany lectual freedom that the
n+ ,
d
There can be i~.ttie doubt
that many fear the Comm-?-
' `ally orf` s cm
II Ft5. Rni. m
to Sear the unknown rather
t s.c,. a govern-
ment, and by 10- t:.cmss
common co:-rncnt.. h,a:d
during Several cl".ys of ntsr-
viewing refugees was. ''WVe
left because everyone else
was leaving."
Thus it would appear that
~aeple's motives for leaving
their homes are too complex
to ascribe what is happening
here simply to antUcommun-
ism or people "voting with
their feet." -
President Ford said re-
cently that "the will of the
South Vietnamese people to
fight for . their freedom is
hest cv`denced by t.he- fact
that they are fleeing from
. n-
Communists demai
ers, especialL- Catholics,
chose to leave Hanoi in 1954
when the country was parti-
tioned and are now moving
again.
Two women who fled-
from Nhatrang, for example,
said they had come from
North Vietnam on a U.S.
Navy ship 21 years ago and
had come farther south
again last week on another
U.S. Navy ship. They said
they would willingly move
again because they thought
they could not stand the
Communists' intolerance for
religion.,
There are other---refugees
who feel that their class
background is not suffi-
ciently proletarian for the
LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 April 1975
Vietnam. Like
China in "940s
HONG KONG-The political and
military atmosphere in South Viet-
nam today strikingly resembles the
atmo.,l here in China in early 19-19,
when the Communists were routing
the dispirited Nationalists. Like the
South Vietnamese, the Nationalists
were disintegrating.
The People's Republic of China was
formally established in Peking on
Oct. 1, 1949. The Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government of South Viet-
nam _ could well, beat the _ Qctober-
e - n
~, .
Communists, and it was no.
ticeable that urban people -
appeared to outnumber'
country peasants in the ref-U th
ute 3 cames and makeshift ? % settlements. - the Americans were even
An 13-year-old student more- worried. Hoang Dona,
with a soft face and long for example, had worked for
mandarin fingernails, the American firm of Pa
cific Architects and Engi-' .
was afraid the North Viet-
narrv se would put him in
the army.
Yet there were others
" tie refugees who
vied about the, American
connection. He also said
that he hadn't been paid and
that if he stayed to wait for
amon,, C
could not possibly be consid- the Communists in Nha-
ered members of an exploit- trang he would never -be
jug class. An old fisherman - paid. -
i with gnarled hands and a But it was most unusual
classic Ho Chi Minh beard, for people to speak in terms
for example, spoke of his of hatred for communism or
life of poverty in Quinhon. of any political motivation
other than a' vague fear of -
Capitalism had not been - Vie Vietcong. -
kind to him, Bribes had to Most of. the people .I
be paid for nearly every. talked to gave the same re-
thing. and inflation, had sponse as Mrs. Nguyen Thi -
forced him to sell his boat Thanh, a 45-year-old widow
so that he had to work for, who fled south with nine
others. Yet he came south, children. One child was sep-
he said, because he had ?arated from their, on the
heard that'-the Communists way'and is now lost.
were cruel to people. "T ,1, 't Y., -Needy .nh y
Some people from Hue I left," she said. "I was just
mentioned that the Commu- ? afraid like all the other peo-
nists had murdered many ple. We heard rumors that
persons when they captured the government was plan.
the city in 1963, and they ning to evacuate the city,
said that those killed lad and when everybody started
not been important officials to leave I left with them. No
"
.
but unimportant people ? . exact reason.
such as the postman and
government clerks. .
Many refugees are the
wives and relatives of sol-
diers and other government
ated Hanoi in 1954, the Ge-
neva Treaty all_awed people
90 days to decide whether to
stay or move.-out. But for-
th
d so
fl
l
h
e
u
e w
o
officials, and many in. this the peop
group said they -felt that - ' these last -few weeks there
their association with the was no time to consider. any
-governnent might count
against them in the eyes of
.the North Vietnamese.
Those who had worked far-
deadline into Saigon in 1975, or could
take a little longer. But barring an-
Robert Elegant is the Times cor-
responded in Horg Kong.
other in the series of near-miracles
that preserved the infant Republic of
Vietnam for two decades, the Com-
niti nists will triumph.
Corr"nlilro cter ,' in China Ic-n,eed
a flood of recriminations that roiled.
the 1'!50s in the united States. The
mindless, vicious "anti-Communist"
crusade of Sen. Joseph McCarthy had
its roots in "our losing China."
A similar flood of recriminations for
"our losing Vietnam" is not impossi-
ble. But the profound war-weariness
of the American people could re-
strain its virulence
38
thing, and the panic ant
fear of being left behind -
was highly contagious.
Mrs. Hong Kim Chau. 42,
was making a living selling
furniture in Banmethuot
when the Communists came'
near.. .
Nonetheless, the close parallels and
the sharp divergences between the
Chinese and the Vietnamese catas-
trophes provide some answers to the
overriding question: Why do the
North Vietnamese and the Chinese
Communists fight so effectively
whi c the SCoath \ ietriaincre and the
Chinese Nationalists did so badly'''
_1:unng the remarkably close paral-
lels is the time frame. It took 22 years
from the time the Chinese Commu-
nists set out to win power till their
victory. It has been 21 years since the
Republic of. Vietnam's establishment
ignited the current round of fighting
in Indochina. Both wars, incidentally,
were, punctuated by truces_,t1tat.,
--_.-Approved-F-ot--R&ease 2AG-I-/0$/S&-C-I-A-RDP 6@ OS=
named V o 'Minh Triem, said - neers as a baker in Nha-
lie came south because he trang. He was clearly wor-
 `Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360005--:;
American negotiators' h ped ` :could?
nnrinro .. . . rr,m?orl or!n..t-.
In
a and
causes o th
t
t
.,...'. I'll ...
.....
e
. ietna.m,
wo American
wo striking force-not a congeries of
debacles are obvious, while some are wholly different. social systems and . guerrilla bands. The are conducting
-obscure. In both cases, the Commu- their. antagonistic philosophies op a modern blitzkrie against an enemy
nists possessed overwhelming deter- posed each other. who is mired down static defense
mination to-win at all costs, however ; -The Communists believed that the.
long it took. end justified any means, and they ex' of large areas and who is badly
In both cases, America's proteges erted iron discipline over both their strapped for ammunition, gasoline,
adherents and their subject funds.
were indecisive because they were populace. Only in aircraft do the South Viet-
hamstrung by widespread corruption' Their opponents. riven by factional namese have an advantage. But the
political instability, and acute eco- rivalries, . hovered indecisively be. aircraft-not quite 1,000 of all types,
nomic difficulties. In neither .case . tween the vaguely benevolent, va including transports and helicopters
could the non-Communist side muster guely self-serving-and largely out- -originally supplied to the South
even an appearance of unity. moded-Confucian authoritarianism have been eroded by at least 25%
The economic factors' were critical. they would have liked to impose and-: through normal wear and combat
In Shanghai, a year before its fall in the "democracy" demanded by both ' losses.
April, 1949, inflation was so virulent advanced domestic opinion and their The decisive factor in both Vietnam
that people dining out carried suit- allies. and China was the Communists` utter,
cases full of yuan-or a few Ameri- '4 potentially pluralistic, splintered dedication to victory. That was their
can dollars. In Saigon.a year ago, the society faced a purposefully mono- greatest advantage, and it had far-'
family of a senior (and noncorrupt) lithic society. The result was political deeper historical roots than the hash.
brigadier general on active service . and psychological chaos for the Re- ly improvised defenses of either the
elsewhere sat down to scanty meals public of China and the Republic of Chinese Nationalists or the So
of third-grade rice eked out with a Vietnam. Vietnamese.
few greens, while his children went There is at least one major differ- The foundations of the North Viet-
to school in shirts patched and re- ence between China and Vietnam- namese Communist structure were-
patched. military.
Common soldiers knew their fami- The Chinese Communist forces and laid in revolutionary the 1920s, while their strategic
lies were on the verge of starvation. were guerrillas arrayed in conven- forged r e
t-
Such backgrounds were conducive tional 'formations and primarily namese were forced to South outh to attempt pi _ to
neither to immediate courage nor to equipped with weapons captured. create both a nation and a viable de-
hopefulness for the future. In short, from the enemy. Of course, the Rus- fense in just two decades.
morale plummeted. , sians had turned large quantities of
The psychological trauma was arms over to them, along with most The internal contentiousness and
acute. The Chinese Nationalists felt of Manchuria. But they were techno- inability to unite for a common cause
their cause was hopeless after with-_ logically and, until the final stages, displayed -by both the Nationalists
dra . ral of grudging American assis- numerically inferior to the National- and the South Vietnamese were the
tance. Having enjoyed lavish Ameri- I 1st armies. - : major political reason for their defeat.
can uSS ., ..stance, the South Vietnamese The North Vietnamese forces not They had very little time to reconcile
.
were undercut by its abrupt dwin- only outnumber their opponents and. bitterly antagonistic groups, and they
dling, are much more lavishly supplied, but possessed no central purpose or polit-
Even before President Nguyen Van are actually superior technologically. ical philosophy around which to coa-
Thieu's decision to make a "strategic Their antiaircraft and antitank weap- lesce.
withdrawal" from the central high- ens, as well as their armor, are more Finally, the character of the war
., th
+L.
--
numerous and b
tt
a
e corn
e
er
collapse, the man in Saigon's streets
knew the situation was desperate. He
saw truckloads of corpses in plastic
"body bags," which were, one Saigon-
ese wrote, as numerous as during Tet
in 1968 or the 1972 full-dress ar-
American withdrawal
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 April 1975
Erwin D. Canharn
Peace beyond blame
...... b -u? L,y c-cuauuis a guerruia
ponding armament of the American.. strugaie into a
c
equipped South Vietnamese.
onventional war, the
United States won a conventional
Having devoted the two years since -victory: But that escalation and the
the cease -fire to resupply and rein- consequent change in the naturo:af-
fOrcem
he ent, the North Vietnamese the war all but insured an eventual
South Vi
t
e
namese defeat after-- the
forces are a centrally controlled,
The United States, we are frequently re-
minded, has never lost a war - until now.
The problem today is to behave like a
mature and responsible world power toward
the situation in Indo-China.
If the American people have the opportunity
pto contribute major humanitarian and eco-
nomic aid to the tragic victims of this long
war, they will undoubtedly do so generously. '
There is a heavy burden on the American
conscience, and such aid can do something to
relieve it.
The immediate problem, too, is to cofltrib-
ute if possible toward a political settlement
which will make the final rout of South
Vietnamese forces less terrible for the people
there. If the United States can do anything to
speed and support negotiations with the Hanoi
government and the Viet Cong, surely it
.should do so.
So far, when this was written, there was
,little evidence that the United States had been
39
taking any useful part in the kind of talks
which alone seem able to soften the blow of
Communist take-over. But this is a primary
If the United States is blamed around the
world as an unreliable ally, the best answer
now is to assist in whatever kind of peace-
.making is available. If this criticism is based
on Congress's decision to bar further Amer-
ican military participation - a decision taken
in 1973 - or on reluctance to appropriate more
vast sums now, it is a criticism inconsistent
with much of the world's previous opinion on
Vietnam.
Surely a considerable part of world opinion .
Thad doubted the efficacy of American in=
volvement in Vietnam for years. Certainly for,
!the last six years, most nations have yearned
for peace in Vietnam, and have been recon-
lciled in some measure to a Communist
,position in the South. It is inconsistent for
blame today to be leveled at American
,unwillingness to pour additional. military
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'resources to the rescue of the I'hieu regime.
Rather, criticism may be directed at the long-
protracted unwillingness to read the hand-
writing on the wall, and to try earlier to make
the inevitable more tolerable.
If the United States plunges into a domestic
political search for scapegoats, it will harm
The American position in the world. The
political war about the Communist victory in
mainland China ought not be repeated today.
Nor should the superhawks who believe the
United States should have atomic-bombed the
North Koreans (or the Chinese Communists)
out of existence be listened to. That kind of
escalation could only have led to greater
tragedy, perhaps worldwide.
The simple fact; it seems to me, is that those
we sought to aid in Vietnam did not have the
national force, the ideological strength, the
freedom from corruption, the total will which
their fellow-Vietnamese in the North showed
so successfully.
There is nothing so dangerous as a slippery
slope, and the United States slid down a
slippery slope into its Vietnam involvement.
The advice of Generals Eisenhower and
MacArthur - never to get drawn into a land
war on the Asian mainland - remains
fundamental.
When the final collapse comes, and there-
alter, the American people will have their
opportunity to snap out of almost 15 years of
illusion and to show the world their better
side. American willingness to help those in
distress can be almost unlimited. What op-
portunities, what circumstances will enable
these sentiments to have practical effect,
must be worked out.
To assume that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are,
going to launch into massacre may be quite
wrong. If they have half the sense they have
shown from time to time, they will try to
conciliate and unite the whole country. Un-
doubtedly many of their political and military
opponents will suffer. But beyond that, the
world - with the United States playing
whatever part it can - can strive for a true
and humane peace.
NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1975
Learning from the Past
American disengagement in Indochina and the mill-
,_tary debacle in South Vietnam and Cambodia, have
aroused fears that the United States may be entering
a new era of isolationism or- at least impotence in the
world arena. President Ford has even hinted darkly that
thnsa who cnnght. the en(I of this country's military.,
Involvement with Saigon were advocating a retreat be=
hind Fortress America.
The Army Chief of Staff says that only another half-.
billion dollars, if sent quickly' enough, will enable Saigon
. to' fight off enemy attack. General Weyand's request,
reported yesterday, recalls the last-ditch conviction of
Gen. William C: Westmoreland in 1968, that. another
206,000. American troops would do . the job in South
yitnam that twice that number had been unable. to
accomplish. Such requests for help are second-nature
from worried strategists whose defenses are crumbling;
they bear no relation to the national interests of the
United States, or to its role in the world.
..History cannot be undone; but errors committed in the
past need not jeopardize a nation's future-provided its
political leaders have the wisdom to recognize and the
strength to admit those errors. No purpose is served by
pinning familiar old labels on new and greatly different
situations.
It is not the mark of isolationism for the United
States to re-examine the validity of its role as automatic
protector of any regime that calls itself the enemy of
Communism. If the United States is to be unselective
in its reliability, as Secretary of State Kissinger Would
shave it, then this country must exercise extreme selec-
tivity in its military commitments.. , i
* m s
Great powers have often tended to. confuse their
"International obligations with an innate desire to
fashion other nations in their own image. Thus the
United States has deluded itself into, believing that the.
symbols of American democracy could automatically
turn allied forces into freedom 'fighters. Such illusions
tend to corrupt clients, as well as patrons. The risk is
compounded when the American flag is allowed to be
Identified with the power of privilege and the defense
of the status quo.'It is in this way that-the United States
has so often unwittingly forfeited its own advocacy of
social reform-to Communist propagandists.
To recognize such failures and'to come to a realistic
understanding of the limitations of American power
is not to condemn ourselves to passivity or isolationism.
There is much this country can do in honoring com-
mitments legitimately entered into to protect its vital
interests and in making common cause with those who
truly speak for their people's 'aspirations. The success
of the Marshall Plan offers ample illustration of
America's potential to use its resources and its diplo-
macy as an. effective bulwark against want and war.
Except for the remaining humanitarian task of allevi-
ating the suffering left in the war's aftermath, the book
will soon have to be closed on the tragic misreading
of the United States' role in Indochina. This has nothing
to do with isolationism nor the abrogation of a com-
mitment. It is simply the honorable recognition, at long
last, of the failure of a policy on which much blood and
treasure have been tragically expended.
~_ A 1?rQved-E,o E elea e.2Q.Q=8108 :-CIA-RDP77-8043-28880. 6@