C.I.A. SHIP BROUGHT UP PART OF SOVIET SUB LOST IN 1968 BUT FAILED TO RAISE MISSILES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 19, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ? CIA-RDP77-00432R0001063600A-2
CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 6
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
WESTERN EUROPE
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
4 April 1975
1
30
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010056000e12
THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1975
COLACShip Brought Up 'art of Soviet Sub
Lost in 1968 but Failed to Raise
Missiles
HUGHES BUILT SHIP
Bodies of 70 Russians
Were Found in Craft
and Buried at Sea
By SEYMOUR HERSH
sxdai to T.1-ie New Yors Times
WASHINGTON, March 18--i
The Central Intelligence Agency,
financed the construction of a
multimillion-dollar deep-sea sal-
vage vessel and used it in an
unsuccessful effort last sum-
mer to recover hydrogen-
warhead missiles and codes
from a sunken Soviet nuclear
submarine in the Pacific Ocean,
according to high Government
officials.
The salvage vessel, construc-
ted under disguise for the C.I.A.
by Howard it. Hughes, the ec-
centric billionaire industrialist,
did successfully recover about
one-third of the submarine, the
officials said, but the portion
raised from the ocean bottom
did not include either the
ship's missiles or its code
room. .
Instead, the Government of-
ficials said, the C.I.A.-led expe-
dition recovered the forWard
section of the ship containing
the bodies of more than 70 So-
viet seamen and officers who
went down with the vessel
when it mysteriously exploded
in 1968 and sank in more than
three miles of water. The So-
viet submariners were buried
at sea in military ceremonies
that were filmed 'and recorded
by C.I.A. technicians.
Although thousands of scien--
tists and workmen had security
clearance for the program,
known as Project Jennifer, the
submarine salvage operation
remained one of the Nixon and
Ford Administrations' closest
:secrets.
Debate on Project
The Jennifer operation had
provoked extended debate in-
side the United States intelli-
gence community since -the
C.I.A. proposal to build the sal-,
vage vessel, with the coopera-
tion of Mr. Hughes, first under-
went high-level evaluation in
the early nineteen-seventies.
Critics of the program have
said that the value of Atv
formation that could be glbancd:
from what they depict as out-
moded code books and out-
moded missiles did not justify
either the high cost of the
operation or its potential for
jeopardizing the United States-
Soviet detente.
The program's defenders, who
include William E. Colby, Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, have
said that the successful recovery
of the whole submarine would
have been the biggest single
intelligence coup in history.
. They argue that even a 1968
code book would give the
Govermnent's signal experts a
chance to evaluate all of thb
Soviet submarine communica-
tions that were in existence
then and perhaps for yeam
before the ship sank. Recovery
of the missiles also would help
provide standards for judging
the existing analysis of such
weapons as compiled from tha
precise scrutiny of aerial photo-
graphs taken by satellites..
Government experts have main-
tained.
In recent weeks, Mr. Colby
has formally requested Secreta-
ry of State Kissinger for per-
mission to stage another at-
tempt next summer to salvage
the rest of the submarine,
which reportedly is lying in
nearly 17,000 feet of water
about 750 miles northwest of
Oahu, Hawaii.
Mr. Kissinger, who serves
as head of the 40 Committee,
the secret Government panel
that reviews and finances all
,intelligence operations, sup-
ported the efforts of the C.I.A.
:to keep the salvage program
.secret until a decision could
be . made on continuing it. Pri-
vately, however, he is known
to have dismissed the Jennifer
program as not being of suffi-
cient immediacy to require'
much of his personal attention.1
It was the 40 'Committee'
that agreed to secretly author-
ize funds to the Hughes organi-
zation to subsidize construc-
tion of what was to be publicly
described as the world's largest
deep-sea Mining ship, the Gin-
mar Explorer. The vessel took
its name from the first three
letters in the first two words
of the title of the company
that operated it forklughes?
Global Marine, Inc.
. A New Times reporter initial-.
ly learned some details of the
salvage operation in late 1973,
when the Glomar Explorer was
conducting tests in the Atlantic
Following the publication of!
some information about thei
operation by the Los Angeles
Times last month, The New
1
York Times investigated thel
matter further. The New York'
Times was informed by thel
C.I.A., in the course of the,.
investigation, that publication'
would endanger the national,
security because the agency
was considering an effort this
summer to retrieve the remain-
der of the sunken submarine
and publicity would thwart any
such effort.
The Times decided at that
time to withhold publicition
until the C.I.A. either made?
another effort to retrieve the
submarine or decided not to
o ahead with the .project.
Some other publications and
broadcasters also decided to.
delay. .
? The Times also informed the!
C.I.A. that it would publishi
a comprehensive article on thei
operation if it became known
that others were about -to dis-
close details publicly.
Tonight the story of the So-;
viet submarine and the salvage;
effort was circulating widely1
in journalistic and Government
circles in Washington. Publica-
tion by one or more correspon-'
dents appeared imminent, de- ?
spite the efforts of the C.I.A.
to convince the news- media
that its secret should be kept,
for the time being. ? ? -
High Government officials
said M r.Hughes was selected
to provide the. cover needed
to shield the true purpose of
the vessel because of his widely
publicized penchant for secre-
cy, his known interest in deep-
sea mining and the ? fact that
his wholly owned company?
the Summa Corporation?had
experience in large-scale con-
struction projects.
In addition, the Hughes Air-
craft Company also has long
been involved in the construc-
tion and development of space
satellites for heavily classified
intelligence purposes and now
employs a nuQber of former
high-ranking C.I.A. and military.
men.
Another factor behind the
seLection of Mr. Hughes. the
officials said, was his patrio-
tism. The officials insisted that
Mr. Hughes make very little
money .in the construction of
the Glomar Explorer. ?
They also said Mr. Hughes
was maintaining . title* on the.
vessel only under a series of
complex trust agreeinents with
the C.I.A. and the Government
similar to those utilized for
, other proprietary "assets" of
the C.I.A.. such as Air America,
its subsidized airline.
? Government ofcicials ack-
nowledee that much more than
$250-million has been spent
Ocean. He stopped his research
on the matter after a request thus far o? the Glomar Explo-
- P ? t lernifer with
than S350-million.
Senior members of the House
and Senate were briefed oni
the program, the officials said:
although it could not be learned;
which legislators were in-
formed. .
1958-Model Craft
Operation Jennifer was ini-I
tiated shortly after the Soviet?
submarine, a 1958 model of i
the "I-Intel" class that was;
.believed to have sailed fromi
the Soviet port of Vladivostok.1
sustained a series of on-board
explosions and sank while,'
cruising in the Pacific.
American intelligence offi-
cials emphasized that the So-
viet craft was found, after she.
tank, through what was de-
scribed as "passive" means ?
that is, not from signal or
other. communications inter-
cepts ?and there was no
chance for the United States
Navy to rescue any crew mem-
bers.
Other sources said the Navy's
sonar underwater listening de-
vices apparently were able to
datect the sounds of underwa-
ter explosions at depths far
deeper than the Soviet. Union
could intercept and thus knew
the specific location of the sub-
marine on the ocean floor.
?During the recovery attempt
last August, the official sources
said, American technicians
were successful in grabbing and
lifting the submarine from the
ocean floor and raising it about
halfway to the surface?rough-
ly 8,000 feet- when there was
a failure in the lifting devices
and part of the ship fell. One .
official talked of "overpres-
sure" in connection with the .
failure of the lifting devices.
The salvage vessel was oper-
ated under subcontract for the
Hughes corporation by Global
Marine, Inc., of. Los Angeles,
a firm known for its expertise
in deep-sea operations.
Government intelligence offi-.
cials noted that Global Marine;
has cooperated with the Soviet!
Union in a series of underwater
research and experimental drill-I
ing operations and suggestedl
that public knowledge of its
involvement in the submarine;
recovery operation would not
only embarrass the firm but
.said it might limit its future
joint research ventures with
the Soviet Union.
A Bitter Dispute ?
Complicating the issue is a
bitter dispute between officials
of the Navy, whose Research
and Development Branch was
involved in the original plan-
ning to salvage the submarine,
and the C.I.A., whose scieHce,
and technology office deve-1
loped the concept of construct-
ing the Glomar Explorer under
cover.
C.I. . officials insisted that
ectnr ietrel6A6 novoittio : GlAiRDP470-004132R0r001130- 6000 a2on with t he Navy
:11e funds authorized at more was smooth but a number ofj
Approved For Release. 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP71-00432R000100360006-2
iNi"eity officials have bitterly ell;
icized the salvage operation
in interviews. ,
At one point, Government
officials acknowledged, the
Navy expressed some reserva-
tiors. iihout. the !reality of at- summer, should it be approved,
tempting to interfere with an- would be -aimed at recovering
other country's sunken. vessel, . the remaining two-thirds of the
bat it ultimately was decided sunken submarine. One high
?a`S. high levels in the Nixon.. official said that "there's ,not
.Administration that there ver a a lot they [the Russians] can
Ina legal bars to the operation.
One retired Navy admiral do."
"We ? have the legal ,right
. . .
,who was aware of the Jennifer to pick something up off the
operation while en active duty bottom." he said.
!complained that the "only real Some Success Seen
: intelligence [to' be obtained
:from the Jennifer operation] One high-leVel member of
isuiting from an analysis of the Ford Administration took exception to the description
s the metallurgical stuff" re-
ithe submarine's hull and van- of the operation as a failure
cis internal sections. and said he had seen reports.
1 "The codes wouldn't mean which he acknowledged could
that much today," the retired have, been based, describing
officer said in an interview, the adventure as 50 per cent
1"even if you recovered their successful. .
!code machine. They [such ma- "If the project was sold on
. .
!chines] have a tremendous the basis of what we're going
!number of discs and circuits to get," the official added,
and vou wouldn'tk now what
however, "O.K., we didn:t get
l combination was used."
sequences. They also also suggested that, de-
spite the published accounts,
the Soviet ? Union still *might
not realize that the Glomar
Explorer's next voyage this
it." .
i The admiral added that even Another Informed?intelligence
1 if the codes could be broken, official said, "In terms Of the
lthey would he made intelligible initial objective of the project"
only .for a limited period be-' ..._ the ree .
cause of what he depicted as ?the recovery of Soviet mis-
a random restructuring of the sues with hydrogen warheads,
various circuits and codes that the submarine:s nuclear power
was compLeted by the Soviet plant and its code books?"it
submarine communicators eve-, was asfailure",
ry 24 hours. Another source said the pre-
Burglary Revelation . liminary: review of the mates-
The submarine project was ials salvaged last summer indi-
first 'publicly mentioned by The cated that the Russians had
Los Angeles Times on Feb. 8, significantly altered the struc-
in a report stemming from a ture and design of the 1958
police, inquiry into i bizarre submarine, initially confiaurat- ,
burglary last June 5 at the ed to carry three itercontinen-
offices of the Summa Corpora- tal missiles, and noted that .
lion, the Hughes holding corn- such information could prove
pans' that?in the public's eyes invaluable in disarmament
es-owned the Glomar Explorer. talks. .
Documents said to have been Even if only partly successful,
taken from a Hughes office one high - ranking .American
safe in the burglary disclosed. said, "It was a fantastic opera-
that the C.I.A. had contracted tion."
with the corporation to raise: The official was referring to
the sunken nuclearspowered the fact that the C.I.A. was
submarine, the newspaper said, able to finance the construction
The report was denied at the of the Glomas Explorer and
time by Paul Reeves, general to successfully initiate salvage
manager of the ocean mining operations without any public
? division of Mr. Hughes's corn- inkling of the true intent of
pany. . the mission. A number of offi-
At least four well-informed cials who were interviewed
sources have said in recent praised repeatedly the C.I.A.'s
interviews that in their opinion "cover" for the mission.
the initial justification for with- One former high-level C.I.A.
holding publication of the story man noted that by financing
no longer existed because Of the Glomar Explorer, publicly
the disclosures made in The depicted as the most advanced
Los Angeles Times. Until then, deep-sea mining vessel in exis-
a number of past and present tence, the C.I.A. may have been
high-level intelligence officials responsible for the creation of
said, the Russians did not know' a new industry?deep-sea mm-
that the United States had ing of mineral deposits.
found and attempted to salvage, When completed in mid-1973,
the submarine. ' the '36.000 ton vessel was 618
"What that story's done is feet long and more than .115
blown the iperation," one offi- feet wide, and its six motors
cial said. "We can't use it were capable of providing 12,-
again." ' 000 horsepower to drive the
High-ranking American intel-
ligence officials acknowledged
In
Expla-
in a recent discussion that they addition, the Glomar ? rer was equipped with a 209-
assumed "the Russians, picked
up the [Los Angeles Angeles
Times] story. The question is
what are :they [the Russians]
going to do about it."
The intelligence officials ar-
gued that further public discus-
sio of the jennifer operations
would amount "to rubbing the
Russians' noses in it" and could
lead to adverse diplomiettfpre
ve
foot derrick capable of lifting
800 tons and at least. three
other lifts nearly as powerful.,
Throughout its . construction,
at the Chester, Pa., yards of
the Sun Shipbuilding. and Dry
i,
Dock Company. there were
newspaper reports about the
eventual deep-sea mining in's-
oou'j
of_the vessel as well as
ul514kMetealten2t001I/G8/08
.ecreeS/?a . 'tradition of thel
Hughes empire?that marked:
her construction.
"If all sails smoothly," The
Philadelphia Inquirer reported
on May 13, 1973, ,as the Glomar
Explorer neared completion,.
"the mystery ship may be at
work next year scooping such
metals as titauium, manganese,
uranium, copper and nickel up
out of the depths to add to
the fortune of the world:s
wealthiest recluse."
The Government sources ack-
nowledged that the C.I.A.
turned to deep-sea mining as
a possible cover early in 1970
because the Soviet submarine,
happened to sink in an area
of the Pacific noted for its
extremely large deposits of va-
luable manganese nodules. A
1973 study of the National
Science Foundation concluded
that the deposits off the Ha-
waiian plateau were the most
abundant within the North Pa-
cific and contained the highest.
values of copper and nickel.:
This fact, coupled with the;
heavy publicity over the Glo-
mar Explorer's alleged deep-sea'
mining mission, provided the
"cover" needed by the C.I.A.
to attempt the salvage opera-
tion without Soviet knowledge
and, thus, without possible So-
viet interference, the sources
said.
They added that a key con-
cern throughout the history of
the secret operation was the
possibility of violent interfer-
ence?and possible military ac-
tion?by the Russians if they
happened to learn the tree nor-
pose of the Glomar Explorer's
mission. The ship could not
operate with any military es-
cort or protection, for obvious
reasons, the sources noted.
? No Suspicions Raised
The refusal . of the Hughes
corporation to provide any de-
tailed data on the workings
of the Glomar Explorer and
the company's order to all sub-
contractors that nothing be
made public during construc-
tion of the vessel did not raise
suspicions because of Mr. Hug-
hes's known excentricism.
In recent intE.4wiews, a num-,
ben of senior officials of the
Summa Corporation still denied
knowledge of the Jennifer oper-
ation and insisted the secrecy
was needed to protect the in-
dustrial techniques that they
,said were inherent in the ship's
.construction and mode of oper-
ation.
In addition to the Glomar
Explorer, the salvage operation
required a deep-diving barge
[submarine once it was brought
Up from the bottom. As such,
it was built to be sunk, towed
and then retrieved. This capabi-
lity was built into the barge
to help hide the salvage subma-
Tine from the possibility of
inadvertent detection by Soviet
satellites.
' Precisely how the Glomar
I Explorer was outfitted to at-
tempt the recovery of the
' downed submarine could not
be learned,- nor could any, ac-
curate cost estimate be made
for the vessel. One official of
the Summa Corporation said
in an interview that the Glomar
Explorer alone cost more than
$100-million. Some newspaper
accounts have put the price
tag for the ship at 8250-million.
It also could not be learned
whether either of those esti-
mates included the expensivs
dredging and derrick equipment
utilized in the salvage opera-
tion.
New Technology
In recent interviews. high-
level American intelligence offi-t
cials seemed vague about the'
iGlomar Explorer's potential for
actually conducting deep-sea
mining operations. One official.
said it would "take some
'doing" for the Glomar Explorer
to be "rejiggered" into s a
deep-sea mining vessel.
I Other officials have boasted
in interviews, however, that
the C.I.A. technology involved
in the construction of the ship
had led to breakthroughs in
the feasibility of such mining.
Officials also noted that: the
Government was retaining thp.
patent rights :stemming from
any technical breakthroughs in
deep sea mining techniques
that resulted from the construc-
tion of the Glornar Explorer
and from its attempted subma-
rine recovery.;
It could not be learned how?
and from what Treasury ac-
counts?funds for the construc-
tion of the vessel and other
costs were appropriated by the
C.I.A. and distributed to the
Summa Corporations. The intel-
ligence agency has long hod
contractual arrangements with
the Hughes' Aircraft Company
and Lockheed's space and mis-*
sue division for satellite work
funded through the National
Reconnaissance Office. This is
the highly secret set up during
the Kennedy Administration
that?operating under cover in-
side the Air Force?is respon-
sible for all of the research,
development. procurement and
targeting of America's satellites
land other aerial intelligence
i programs.
that was constructed in 1971 1
The N.R.O. programs are di-
and 1972 by the National Steeli I
? reeled by an executive commit-
and Shipbuilding Company, n tee, informally known at times
San Diego and designed by as the Ex-Conlin, whose official
the Lockheed Aircraft Corpora-, 'standing members include Mr.
tion's Ocean Systems Division.; Colby, as Director of Central
The 106-foot-wide barge, which Intelligence, and Dr. Albert C.
reportedly has 15 -foot - thick Hall, now the Assistant Seem-
wails to help provide ballast,
tary of Defense for intelligence.
:was not directly utilized in Other officials also participate
the submarine salvage opera- in Ex-Comm meetings on a ?
tion, Government officials said, regular but ad hoc basis, in-,
although there were numerous eluding a representative of the
newspaper. accounts in 1973 National Security Council and.
and 19/4 saying that the barge James W. Plummer, the current
played a direct role in the Under Secretary of the Air
!deep:sea mining operations: I Force, who aleo serves under
ilict:iLixpl:ed_, barge's
byinstoelleligteulitIcee.
'National Reconnaissance Of-
!cover as the director of the
: kilai~77-034321R0004490360006-2
-i. s
l'Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100560006-2
ALASKA
SOVIET UNION
CANADA
Vladivostok
AOR I'll PACIFIY.:"?OCLAN
. .
UNITED STATES
CHINA
PAN
P
-.e,,1?11s.Ja j
: I
!ice.
A number of sources said
jthat, in addition to the N.R.O.'s
responsibility for aerial intel-
ligence, the intelligence
bureaucracy also maintains a
secret office in. the ?Navy for
underwater intelligence recon-
naissance programs._'
It was this office, some sour-
ces said, that initially was re-
sponsible for financing the re-
search into the problem the
Navy suddenly found itself fac-
ing in 1968: how to recover
a submarine in nearly 17,000
feet of water.
?
No Competitive Bidding
Because of the secrecy and
the need for cover, none of
the various contracts awarded
to, the Summa Corporation and
its subcontractors involved
competitive bidding, Govern-
ment sources indicated. One
official said, the Government
"paid the minimal overhead
fee" for construction of the
ship, suggesting that work was
done on what is known 'as
a "cost plus" contract, with
the Summa Corporation getting
a fixed percentage of the total
construction costs.
The Glomar Explorer is now
undergoing repair in anticipa-
tion of a second recovery effort
this July in the Pacific.
Officials would not say with
whom in- the Hughes organiza-
tion the C.I.A. initiated discus-
sions about the secret project,
but they specifically said that
Mr.. Hughes, now living in
se-
lusion in the Bahamas, was
not directly gotten in touch
with. The officials also said
no contact was initiated with
A. D. Wheelon, the president
of the Hughes Aircraft Compa-
ny, who once was involved
in the C.1.A.'s satellite recon-
naissance programs.
As recounted by a number
of intelligence sources, the
United States initiated the sub-
marine recovery program only
upon realizing that the Soviet
Union apparently had not been
able to fix the locatibn of its
sunken submarine.
- After the sinking was con-
firmed and the location deter-
mined, Navy and intelligence
officials watched inAtiyrov
the Russians eqnduc_tedVjWide
. 13Fr
?
sea search for the submarine'
in the wrong area of the Paci-
fic.
At some point, apparently
still in 1968, the Russians with-
drew their trawlers and
stopped the patrols, which indi-
cated that the had no idea
'where the submarine had.gone
down.
"If the Russians knew where
the sub had gone down," onej
former intelligence official said,'
"they would have stayed therq
all the time Lon patrol]."
Ship Photographed j
Although the C.I.A. is knownj
to have taken extensive Under-
sea photographs of the sunken
ship,- there is apparently some
dispute .over its classification.
It has been established, howev-
er, that the vessel, which car-
ries three missile launchers, is
in the ballistic missile class.
According to the 1973-74 edi-:
tion of "Jane's Fighting Ships,?
a standard naval reference;
work, it could contain missiles:
with ranges of between 350'
and 650 miles. Some sources!
said, however, that modifica-
tions to the vessel apparently
?had blurred the Navy's ability
to determine its specific classi-
fication.
The Government sources said
that Navy engineers initially
sought ineans of merely pene-
trating into the ship?and not
jsalvaging .it?in an effort to.
obtain access to its code room
and equipment, but were unab-
le to develop a feasible concept
because it it was in such deep
water.
? The Navy eventually brought
the problem to the C.I.A.'s di-
rectorate of science and techno-
logy, headed by Carl Duckett,
.Pentagon had become eon-
because senior officials in the
vinced, one source said, that
-the military "had gotten no
place" in solving the technical
problems that prevented re-
covery of the submarine's codes
and equipment.
The concept of building a
deep-sea salvage vessel under
cover of the Hughes oraggani-
zation reportedly caused sharp
arguments inside the Nixon Ad-
ministration throughout 1970
and 1971. At one point in 1971,
dtForasteasei2001/0810811:
deep, trouble because there
were all kinds of technical
problems," one source said. In,
later months, there were seri-:
ous cost overruns that led tol
even more controversy.
There were other kinds ofj
problems, another source re-
called. many of them revolving
around official concern about
the potential impact that public
revelation of the secret project
could have on the highly So-
viet -United -States detente,
which was beginning to flou-
rish in the early days of the
Nixon Administration.
Legal Discussions
And, although Government
attorneys knew of 'no interna-
tional law barring such salvage
attempts, there was extended
debate about whether the Rus-
sians legally would be justified
in attempting to sink the Explo-
rer if they happened to stumble
onto or otherwise uncover the
operation.
There also was some discus-
sion. one source recalled, of
what to do with the bodies
of Soviet seamen if any were
fo.und aboard the sunken sub-
marine.
Because of that, high officials
noted, the C.I.A. made elabor-
ate plans for protecting the
rights, under the Geneva Con-
vention, of any dead officers
and men found aboard the ship.
The Glomar Explorer was
equipped with refrigeration ca-
pacity for up to 100 bodies,
and copies of the relevant So-
viet and American burial man-
uals were taken along. The
burial ceremony, when it did
take place, sources said, was
conducted in both Russian and
English and recorded in color
by C.I.A. cameraman.
One C.I.A. official said that
four of the agency's deep-sea
specialists who had returned
to Washington after the failure
to recover the whole submarine
insisted on flying back to the
IGIornar Explorer for the burial
ceremonies. Despite the failure,
the four men are. designated
to receive special intelligence-
awards from the Ford Adminis-
tration, the official said.
Prior to the actual recovery
operation, other objections
100'-jj
The New York Times/March 19 1975
of millions of dollars involved
to learn what kind of equip-
ment was being utilized byi
the Soviets? Was there anyli
information available that',.
would have justified the opera-
tion? ? ?
All these points were consi-
dered, one source said,. and
it still was determined that.
Operation Jennifer was worth-, j:
while, even if its chances fort)
complete success Were slintf
One former White House aide',
revealed the surprise inside thej
Johnson Administration after!,
the Israelis captured some So-
viet weapons after the l9671;
Arab-Israeli war.
"We'd spent a lot of ? timef
Making estimates [on the capa-
bilities of the Soviet weaponryt
that turned out not to be veryi-
accurate," the former aide not-
ed.
The capture indicated th4:
too much reliance was being
placed on the practice of com-1'
piling such estimates ? by the!
intelligence community, he
;said. Because of this, the offi-
cial added, he- believed that
jthe sub -.salvaging operation;
j"would have been a real coup,jj
a gold mind."
j "It was an operation I perso-
nally would have endorsed
jthe cost was right," he added.
Navy Was Hot on It
A former White -House aid
jrecalled that in the early nine-
!teen - seventies Jennifer alse!,
was considered vital for the4.
then pending United States' ne-
gotiations with the Soviet=
Union on strategic arms limita-
tions talks (SALT).
"We thought that if we could
get hold of it [the submarineV,
and dissect it," the former aidej
said, "we'd have something tejj
use as leverage in the negotiaeJ
a
tions. The Navy was really h!
on it."
Mr. Kissinger and- his aides.,
however, were reliably reported
to have been enthusiastic-
about
the project, although as
President Nixon's national se-
curity adviser Mr. -Kissinger
theoretically had the authority-
to cut it off immediately 1
he chose to do so. '
A former Kissinger aide -re-iJ:
called that "when' we first;
were posed on more practical heard of it, we said, 'So what?t
the aide added,
CW p
IRDPNe00432R000*00366LA-- "1`,,:
, as it worth the hundreds n t nk we cared that muck,
3
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e'tout it." ? a , ? , ? 4. ?
By late 1971 .the internal
disputes inside the Nixon Admi-
nfatration had been quieted and
contracts were authorized for
the construction of the Glomar
Ea:colorer and the barge.
There is some evidence that
the various ship builders and
subcontractors were not told
the ultimate mission of the
,vessels, and believed that they
were solely involved in a deep-
sea mining project for the se-
cretive Howard Hughes.
Engineers who served aboard
, the Glomar Explorer on its first
itest run in July, 1973, later
reported that major renovation
projects were begun by Summa
Corporation workmen on the
hydraulic lifts and the derrick,
shortly after the ship left port.i
Cde Bodson, a Los Angeles!
erganizer for the Marino En-
gineers Benevolent Associatioh,
which sought to organize the
engineers aboard the Glomar
Explorer, said in a recent tele-
phone interview that the en-
gineers "dicin'a, know what they
[summer corp workmen] were
doing, but we had the opinion
that whatever it was, they
didn't want the people at Sun
![shipbuilding yards in Chester,
Pa.) to know how they were
Iwiring the ship."
N.L.R.B. Case Over Ship
The union eventually accused
Global Marine of violating the
National Labor Relations Act
by discharging at least 10 mem-
bers of th engineering crew
allegedly because they signed
cards authorizing h the union
to represent them. They men.
were dismissed as soon as the-
Glosar Explorer completed its
initial test run at Long Beach,
Calif., on Oct. I, 1973. The
issue is still pending before
the N.L.R.13.,,although a tenta-
'ive finding against-Global-Ma-1
rine was made last June.
? One clear sign that high offi-
cials of Global Marine did know
of the Glomar -Explorer's true
mission 'came when the compa-
ny refused to. put any of its
senior officers on the witneis
stand during the N.L.R.B. hear-
ings, which were held in Los
Angeles in early 1974. The com-
pany refused to permit such
testimony apparently in fear
that attorneys for the union
would ask questions -about the
ship's mission.
In 1973 there also were
numerous newspaper accounts
of the Glomar Explorer that
emphasized both its mystery
and its potential for revolution-
izing deep-sea mining. One
such account, published by The
Observer in London in October,
1973, told how the Glomar Ex-
plorer was beginning to mine
minerals on the ocean floor
near the coast of Nicaragua.
The article linked that ven-
ture to the fact that Mr. Hughes
and his entourage had taken
up residence for some months
in 1972 in a hotel at ,Managua,
Nicaragua.
?'A dispatch in the Washington
Post in August, 1973, said that
Mr. Hughes had invested $250-
million in the project, which
was expected to such up to
5,000 tons of minerals daily
from the ocean floor. The ar-i
ticle qhich quoted high officials
of the. Summa Corporation not-
ed that some of Mr. Hughes's
luctance to invest heavily in
. ,
deep-sea mining venture_ s veh-
,tures. unless the Government
,provided assurances of finahe
cial protection in case the Unit-
ed States agreed to an interna-
tional treaty?now being debat-
ed?that would limit or brar
ifree exploitation of the Ocean
NEI YORK TIMES
20 March 1975
Project Jennifer ?
The Central Intelligence Agency's assignment is to
further the security of the United States by learning
as much as it can about the capabilities and intentions
of potential foreign foes, the most powerful of which
is the Soviet Union. It has been common .knowledge
for many years now?at least since an American U-2
plane was shot down over Siberia fifteen years ago?that
both sides use the latest technological achievements to
spy on each other.
Soviet and American intelligence satellites course,
through the skies daily taking incredibly sharp pictures
of earth 100 miles or more below. The late Premier
Khrushchev once even publicly offered to exchange,
Soviet spy satellite pictures for corresponding American
photographs taken from space. The most effective mod-
em intelligence agents are much more likely to be elec-
tronic engineers than Mata Hans.
It is against this background that the tale of the
Glomar Explorer?the C.I.A. ship that masqueraded as
the property of Howard Hughes?must be judged. The
basic idea behind Project Jennifer?the code name used
?was certainly imaginative: to locate and raise from
the ocean bottom three miles deep a Soviet submarine
Ibet tom . United' Nat:TOWS --diy"FiF,
?ference on the law of the
-sea resumed' deliberations on'
that issue -and others Marchu
17 at Geneva.
In July, 1974, Hughes Corpor-?
ation officials were quoted-in..
The Philadelphia Inquirer as
saying that the Glomar Explo-
rer was "systems testing" in'
the Pacific Ocean. The tests
were scheduled to be completed
by the end of the year, officials,
said. ? ;
In fact, the ;salvage vessel
had began its submarine .sal-
vage efforts in the Pacific
Ocean in June, the Government
sources said.1The precise date.
of the operation's failure could
not be learned, but on Aug.
17, 1974, the Honolulu Adverti-
ser reported the Glomar Explo-
rer's surprise visit to Honolulu.
The Hawaiian newspaper. ac-
counts emphasized the secrecy
that surrounded the vessel, de-
'scribing it as a "mystery ship."
The Glomar Explorer remained
in port near Honolulu for about
two weeks, disappeared for a
week, reappeared. for four days
and then left in early Septem-
ber, according to the newspa-
per.
Ironically, its visit prompted
an official investigation by
state officials into the owner-
ship of mineral rights in off-
shore Hawaiian waters.
According to one member
of the crew, the Glomar Explo-
rer did accomplish some mining.
-of minerals in the waters Off
Hawaii during its Pacific cruise.
The crew member, who was
reluctant to permit his name
to be used, also insisted during
a brief telephone interview that
:he and his colleagues knew
:nothing of an attempted sub-
marine salvage effort.
I .Since its failurejaat summer,
Ithe Glomir Explorer htiS-been
lanchored near, Long Beach. Her
delay in resuming mining oper-
ations has added to the vessel's
public mystery, .since many
shipping experts have found-
it extremely unusual that such
a costly shi p wouldpot b e
immediately. put to work.
Questions Raised
A nurnber of the Government
sources said they believed' that
the role of the Hughes Corpora-
tion in the Jennifer operation
as well as the company's unu-
sual inVolvement in 'many* of
the Government's most sensi-
tive intelligence missions raised
fundamental questions.
Throughout the Watergate
inquiry, these sources noted,
the so-called Hughes connec-
tion?revolving around the fact"
that E. Howard. Hunt, convicted
in the Watergate burglary,. was ,
working for a public relations
firm doing work for Mr. Hughes
at the time .of the Watergate
break-in in 1972?was never
publicly explored.
Simitariy, questions were
raised about the burglary last
June at the Hughes headquar-
ters in Los Angeles. There were
reliable reports that the thieVes
sought to blackmail the Hughes
organization and, apparently,
the C.I.A. and other Govern-
ment agencies, by offering to
return the stolen documents
detailing the submarine , and
other secret operations- in- re-
turn for al-million. ? .
Intelligence officials, in inter-
views here, confirmed that pay-
off discussions were seriously
initiated. a
A county grand jury began
hearings evidence into, the bur-
glary and alleged blackmail at-
tempt on Feb. 13, in a proceed-
ing marked by extremely tight
zecurity,
that had sunk in 1968. After much behind-the-scenes
debate, the decision to go ahead was taken; the Glomar
Explorer was built and a specialized new technology
was created; and then last year the attempt was made.
* . *
This really brilliant effort unfortunately fell short of
full success, though it is still a major technological feat
that a substantial portion of the sunken Soviet submarine
was brought to the surface. If the full submarine could
have been recovered (and it still may be), it would have
been a master intelligence accomplishment.
This complex and fascinating technological adventure.
demonstrates that, once again, American technology
has brought a hitherto inaccessible environment into the
ambit of man's future activity. It also underlines the
need for a ,body of appropriate international law, so that
economic activity?such as the deep sea mining the
Glomar Explorer was allegedly engaged in?can be car-.
ried out in this new environment and future clashes of
rival national interests and power can be avoided.
The story is, furthermore, a useful reminder of how
'essential good intelligence is for the national security in
'a world of nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and
hydrogen bomb-tipped intercontinental missiles. The C.I.A.
only to be commended for this extvaordinary,.. effort
,.to carry out its essential rnission,,h
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 March 1975
\Soviet su salv
?isclosur ?its Cli
a ain t news d[g ers
Security agency's indignation questioned;
nuclear sub importance put in spotlight
By Dana Adams Schmidt
and Guy Halverson
Staff correspondents of
The Christian Science Monitor)
Washington
Chief among the questions raised
here by public disclosure of the
Central Intelligence Agency's work
with a Howard Hughes Corporation to
'salvage part of a Russian submarine
is this:
Do newspapers have the right to
overrule CIA requests that informa-
tion be kept secret?
After accounts of the CIA in-
volvement were spread across front
pages of the New York Times, the
Washington Post, and the Los Angeles
Times, despite repeated CIA requests
that no publication be made, one CIA
man commented:
"Of course. we are outraged. How
outraged can you get? Does this mean
that in the final analysis the news-
papers will publish anything they can
get their hands on, no matter how
secret or important we say it is?"
At the same time, the entire episode
throws a new spotlight on what?
analysts see as the vital long-range
importance of the nuclear submarine
to both American and Russian mili-
tary strategy.
The salvage was performed by the
Glomar Explorer, ostensibly a deep-
sea mining ship, constructed by the
Sum ma Corporation, controlled by
industrialist Hughes. After the Navy,
,with super-sensitive sonar devices,
had located the Russian sub, sunk in
1968, the Americans raised the ship
, from 17,000 feet of water in July, 1974.
-At 8,000 feet however, it broke and the
Navy and CIA got only one-third of the
sub, but without missiles or code
machines. ?.
According to the New York Times,
a Times reporter first learned of the
operation in late 1973, but ceased
research after a request by CIA
director William Colby in early 1974.
Some information was then published
by the Los Angeles Times last month;
the New York Times resumed Its
research.
The CIA said, according to the New
York Times Wednesday, that publica-
tion would endanger national secu-
rity, since the agency was considering
an effort this summer to raise the rest
of the submarine. The New York
Times held up publication until the
CIA made a final decision on the
CIA it would publish if it felt others
were about to publish.
According to the Los Angeles
Times, it published Wednesday be-
cause the New York Times was
publishing. Columnist Jack Anderson
gave details on a Tuesday evening
radio broadcast. The story was being
widely circulated in Washington
Tuesday night, even as the CIA was
still asking that it be withheld.
After publication of the first Penta-
gon papers stories in June, 1971, the
government tried to prevent further
publication also on the grounds of
national security. The Supreme Court
ruled against the government and
permitted publication to continue.
While the salvage?operation might
be called in some ways a failure,
intelligence souces point out that
important information might none-
theless be gathered by studying the
metallurgy, method of welding, and
other features of construction.
The facts that this salvage ship
could be built in total secrecy, that
U.S. technicians were able to find the
sunken submarine, and that at least
part of it could be raised was, how-
ever, in itself such a remarkable
achievement that some observers
wondered how indignant the CIA
really is about disclosure.
.At a time when the agency is under
WASHINGTON POST
21 March 1975
? Nixon Had Refused
" To Christen Vessel
; SAN DIEGO, March 20 (AP)
?Former President Nixon in-
spected a giant barge without
knowing the vessel was des-
tined to salvage part of a
sunken Soviet submarine, The
San Diego Union reported to-
day.
,Nixon inspected the 324-
foot submersible barge in 1972
while on a tour of the Na-
tional Steel & Shipbuilding
Co. yards. where it was built,
the Union said.
But ? he refused an invita-
tion to christen the auditor-
ium-sized vessel because no
one at NASSCO would tell
him what it was or what it
:was intendcd for, said
NASSCO president john Mur-
ply.
'
severe criticism for quite different
kinds of operations, this feat might
stir admiration among most Amer-
icans and serve as a reminder of the
agency's wide-ranging services.
It is being said by supporters of the
CIA that construction of the Explorer,
which cost $250 million, might even
open up new economic horizons in
underwater mining. Some deep-sea
mining sources, however, doubt this
claim, saying that other systems have
been shown capable of dredging min-
erals at great depths.
International law
The Russians are believed not to
have known the location of their
submarine from which 70 bodies were
removed by members of the Glomar
Explorer operation.
While the Russians would presum-
ably be annoyed at the American feat
in raising part of a Russian vessel,
international law experts say that
once a ship is lost at sea it is fair game
for whoever can find it. In other
words, there would not be a legal
basis for a Russian protest.
For this reason the affair is not
expected to damage U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions or to affect detente.
The U.S. relies heavily on a tripar-
tite nuclear defense strategy of nu-
clear-equipped submarines, land-
based intercontinental missiles, and
nuclear carrying B-52 and F-111 air-
craft. his recent annual report,
Defense Secretary James R. Schlesin-
ger called the Polaris U.S. nuclear
Poseidon submarine fleet the "least
vulnerable element of our strategic
triad."
Though the Soviets are ahead of the
U.S. in overall numbers of subma-
rines (315 for the Soviets vs. 115 for
the U.S.), the two superpowers are-
roughly equal in the numbers of
nuclear-powered subs (115 for the
Soviets, compared with 101 for the
NEW YORK TIMES
19 March 1975
Wilson Vows Inquiry on C.I.A.
If It Is Linked to Britain
LONDON, March 18 (Reuters)
?Prime Minister Wilson said
'today he would set up an inqui-
ry into activity by the Central
Intelligence Agency in Britain
if there was evidence that its
agents were operating in the
country.
, He was being questioned in
Parliament about C.I.A. men
said to be operating from the
American Embassy in London
with diplomatic immunity.
One member of Parliament
from the ruling Labor party
had drawn a comparison with
1971 when Britain demanded
the recall of 105 Soviet diplo-
mats said to be involved in
espionage, and asked "if
be here would you demand
their recall?"
Mr. Wilson said that if any
evidence on this came from
the United States investigation
salvage. So did other news media, into the agency, or in other
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1,0086,0006-20t hesitate
to set up an independent British
inquiry.
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NEW YORK TINES
21 March 1975
he Submarine Story
PITTSBURGH ? More remarkable.
than the raising of the sunken Russian
-submarine is the reaction of the
American press to the efforts of the
Central Intelligence Agency to suppress
the story. Coming on the heels of
what is widely supposed to be the
press's "triumph" in the Watergate
matter, the submarine case suggests
how inadequate it is to curse or bless
the newspapers and television in easy
generalities.
The extraordinary fact is that,
despite all the revelations of recent
years as to how Government officials
. routinely erect the screen of "national
security" to shield themselves from
political embarrassment, the C.I.A.
was able to use that pretext to pre-
vent publication of the submarine
story in virtually a complete roster of
what is usually referred to as the
"Eastern press establishment."
So is the . press, as frequently
charged, so swollen with self-impor-
tance by the Watergate case that it
is now a more aggressive power center
than the Government? On the other
hand, as also alleged, is the press
really more aware than ever before
of its function of 'disclosure, its role
as a *check and balance on Govern-
ment? Is The Washington Post after .
all a bolder organ of "investigative
journalism" than The New York Times?
And when even the inimitable Jack
Anderson?who forced disclosure of
the submarine story?concedes that
he has "withheld other stories at the
behest of the C.I.A.," can it be said
that to do so is in every case a derelic,:
tion of journalistic duty? Or that to
."publish and be damned" should be
the-unvarying rule?
Several points seem worth making.
All the news organizations involved
appear to have made their own deci-
sions to withhold what they knew of
the story. That is, none seems auto-
TSIMICOMMIIMIO
IN THE NATION
By Torn Wicker
matically to have acceded to the
wishes of the C.I.A., and in some
cases, William E. Colby, the agency's
director, apparently had to work hard
to gain his objective. In the end, like?
the boy at the dike, he did not have
enough fingers to plug all the leaks,
and the story could not be contained.
Yet, all these major news organiza-
tions for a time took the same atti-
tude. They accepted the contention
that national security was involved in
the raising of an obsolete Soviet sub-
marine, and they agreed to withhold
publication of the story until the oper-
ation either was completed or aban-
doned. The unanimity of the response
seems to lend support to those who,
suggest that the press "establish-
ment," if it is not really a conspiracy,
still is so consistently of one general
attitude that it is a monolith. But the
nature of the response does- not sup-
port those who claim that this mono-
lithic press is anti-Government, anti-
security, anti-conservative or "pro-
leftist."
Reports suggest, moreover, that
most of the news organizations were
determined to publish the story if
anyone else did. This is a variation of
the old newspaper rule-of-thumb that
if something is known "off the rec-
ord" it can't be published; but if some-
one else publishes the same informa-
tion, it is no longer "off the record."
Can this be applied to "national secur-
ity"? If a newspaper is withholding
information in genuine fear of damag-
ing the national security,' is it then
justified in publishing the information
just because someone else does so?
e ?
Does publication damage the national
security less, in such an event? And.
in fact, major elements of the sub- .
marine story had been published, in
The Los Angeles Times of Feb. 8.
Mr. Anderson suggested that one
reason the story. had been withheld
was that the press itself was "shaken"
by the fact that it had been instru-
mental in forcing the resignation of
Richard Nixon, and that editors were
trying hard, as a result, "to prove how
patriotic and responsible eve are, that
we're not against the establishment,
the Government, that we're not all
gadflies."
That is plausible, even likely. So is
the concern of an editor. who is weigh-
ing journalistic duty and the public's.
right to know against a high claim of
national security interest. Such: deci-
sions are not- easily made and. no
responsible person should wish tc.
abandon them to abstract rules. ?
Still?here was more money ($350
million) being spent on a project of
dubious value than President Ford now
says would "save" Cambodia, Here
was an exploit that could have been?
and might yet proVe?a provocation
to the Soviets, without necessarily
yielding vital -intelligence information.
Here was a linkage between the shad-
owy C.I.A. and the shadowy Howard
Hughes, with the C.I.A. going to ex-
traordinary lengths to suppress the
story. Here, too, at a time of inter-
national dispute on the law of the sea,
was a clandestine enterprise that
potentially could give the United States
an enormous, if not exactly proper,
advantage in undersea mining tech-
niques. As is almost always the case
with "national security" stcries, in
retrospect it is hard to see how a news
organization?let alone so many?
could have thought such a story ought.
to be withheld.
NEW YORK TIMES
16 March 1975
C.I.A!s Clandestine Work Assailed at Meeting Here
By DIANE HENRY.
Covert political activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency
in foreign countries have been
largelyf I and.h ld
be abolished, according to
many of the participants at a
conference here yesterday on
the role of clandestine opera-
tions in a democratic foreign
policy.
Among the 28 participants,
including political scientists,
historians, professors and peo-
ple with experience in intel-
ligence, a few advocated that
laws be written to prohibit the
CIA from any covert activities
to intelligence gathering. ?
Arthur J. Goldberg, the for-
mer Supreme Court Justice and
former United States Repre-
sentative at the United Na-
tions, found many supporters
in the group when he said that
only in cases where there was
author of an amendment to
abolish covert C.I.A. activity
that was defeated last year,
maintained that such opera-
tions "violate our promises of
who holds -the Albert Schwei-
tzer chair at the university.
Zygniunt Nagorski Jr, a
member of the Council on For-
eign Relations, defended the
a "real and genuine threat to nonintervention into the inter- C.I.A. saying, "If you would
the security of elle ? United nal affairs of other countries." eliminate the covert activity of
States," should the CIA he per- In addition, he said, they "vie- the C.I.A. you would be taking
mitted to conduct covert opera-
tions.
late the constitution of this
country."
away one of its arms."
"The fact is covert activities
Mr. Goldberg suggested that Senator Abourezk said that
. . . must be maintained in or-
high administration officials often ':undeclared wars," and ler for the C.I.A. to work,"
should be made to "set forth thus illegal and unconsti- said Mr. Nagorski, who like
sworn testimony," on the nec-
essity of any covert operation
and he recommended that the
President should apply his sig-
nature to any orders for covert
operations.
Senator James Abourzk,
Democrat of South Dakota, the,
tutional. . . several other participants, eseel
The conference, which took it was difficult to differentiate
place at the City University between intelligence gathering
Graduate School, is a yearly and covert operations, which
eVent held by Arthur M. are often meshed in C.I.A.
Schlesinger Jr., the historian, activities.
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TET YORK mas
18 March 1975
The C.I.A.
nd Free
peech
By Tom Wicker
Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
have asked the Supreme Court to over-
turn an Appeals Court ruling that
permitted stringent Government cen-
sorship of their book, "The C.I.A. and
the Cult of Intelligence." If the Court
refuses to intervene; or sustains the
Appeals Court, one of the most
-extraordinary prior restraints in his-
tory will have been allowed to stand,
and the ability of the Government to
classify and withhold information from
the public will have been greatly
enhanced.
The case arose when Mr. Marchetti
left the employ of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in 1969?after 14 years
?and began to write a book about it.
C.I.A. officials learned of his plans
and went into court, citing an employ-
ment contract he had signed pledging
himself to secrecy about what he
learned while working for the C.I.A.
A temporary injunction against Mr.
Marchetti was confirmed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on
'grounds that he planned an unauthor-
ized disclosure of classified informa-
tion. The Government's "need for
secrecy in this area," the Appeals
Court said, justified this prOr restraint
on publication.
The result was that Mr. Marchetti
and his co-author, Mr. Marks, had to
Submit their manuscripts for clearance
to the C.I.A., which deleted 339 por-
tions of it. Subsequent negotiations
reduced this number to 168 deletions,
but the authors nevertheless filed suit
to have the injunction?hence the de-
letions?set aside.
In hearings before Federal District
Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alex-
andria, Va., the C.I.A. failed to sustain
its deletions, despite testimony by four
deputy directors, except in 26 in-
stances and parts of two others.
Meanwhile, however, the book had ap-
peared with all 168 deletions repre-
ented by blank spaces. Then, on Feb. 7,
the Fourth Circuit overruled Judge
Bryan and upheld the' Government's
right to make the 168 deletions. That
IN THE NATION,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 March 1975
CIA and the sub
Was it stupid and wasteful? Or
;Clever and justifiable?
The CIA's salvage of a part of a
sunken Soviet submarine provides
the stuff of movie drama. It has
pushed Cambodia and the econ-
omy out of the banner headlines
and will undoubtedly be talked
about as a mystery-story relief
from the gloomy news of the day.
Only intelligence experts can
fully answer the above questions.
But, on the face of it, the CIA was
carrying out an operation well
within its mandate.
This is a far cry from over-
throwing legitimate governments
or assassinating people. It was
what many voices now demand
the CIA confine itself to ? gather-
ing intelligence. Although Project
Jennifer was unsuccessful, its
avowed purpose was to obtain
information about the Soviet
Union's missiles and code sys-
tems. If the Russians had a hance
to lay hands on an American
nuclear ship, can it be doubted
they would jump at it?
Detente, Americans should be
reminded, does not end an adver-
sary relationship with -ra,,,,v
Both nations. engage in vigorlaus
clandestine intelligence and coun-
terintelligence activities. It would
be negligent in the extreme if the
U.S. failed to use every sensible
means possible to determine So-
viet strengths and intentions.
Moreover, the CIA's foresight in
developing such a technologically
advanced vessel for intelligence
purposes will be admired by
many. For a long time the Glomar
sified, whether or not it had been spe-
cifically stamped with a classification.
This effectively overrode Judge Bryan's
finding that in numerous instances
C.I.A. officials had officially classified
information only when they found it
in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript,
not before; and it meant that certain
general assertions?something like "the
C.I.A. was active in Greece"?would
be considered classified information,
even though not specifically contained
in any classified documents.
III
In several other instances, more-
over, Judge Bryan had accepted Mr.
Marchetti's testimony that he had ob-
tained ,certain information only after
he left the C.I.A.'s ernploy. But the
Appeals Court ruled that if the C.I.A. '
had possessed and classified this in-
formation while Mr. Marchetti worked
for the agency, whether or not he
was then in possession of it, he still
was barred from disclosing it when
he learned of it later on.
Explorer, as a deep-sea, minh
vessel, roamed the seas looldng
for mineral nodules and no one,
including the Russians, suspected
its other mission.
Whether or not the Jennife..
Project itself was worth the higt
cost is controversial and is bound'
to be studied by the congressionel
panels now scrutinizing the CIA. 'It
is possible the judgment was a
mistaken one. But surely the 214.4
is not a total loss. Although tha
cover has been blown and it canm
longer be used for intelligenve
gathering, it is said to have
enormous spin-off value for
development of resources.
Of greater concern to many
the role of industrialist Howari
Hughes, whose name has cropped
up repeatedly in connection with
Watergate-related activities..
Have his various CIA ties pro-
tected him from government in-
vestigation of his mysterious butt
ness activities? Has the CIA be
financing a bonanza for him?
A broader concern is that the
current furor over the CIA
totally discredit the agency. It if
now fashionable to publicize the
CIA's uglier sides and question-
able judgments ? usually made
with presidential approval ? buk
it should not be forgottehthat the
CIA has successes to its credli
also. The nation needs a strong
intelligence community ? and iii
would be a dfsservice to the U.S.
not to keep a balanced perspective
on the CIA as current investi-
gations of the organization ge
forward.
classified information. Rather, it up-
held an injunction against unauthor-
ized disclosure of such information,
maintaining that the Government's
need for secrecy and the contract Mr.
Marchetti had signed overrode his
First Amendment rights. In effect, the
court held that there was a lifetime
restraint on his ability to disclose
material that fell under the court's
exceptionally broad definition of classi-
fied information. If that applies across
the board to all the numerous Federal
agencies that require such contracts
of their employes?or those that may
in the future?it will prove to be a
major new restraint on the flow of
decision is the one now being appealed
Government information to the public.
to the Supreme Court.
If upheld, it would vastly expand,
ample, based the? majority's decision
the Government's' power to classify:
on what he called "a presumption ot
information. Appeals Court Judge
Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., for ex- . restswt ivas e oorodbneli orders.
the Y practicee Yet it remoafi ns classifying a oosr vr :aii eiwgsethlairletiva,sienrtnshttofoochafarrecisi elztiecxaa ett.tithiicio:Auannr.t.
whatever?onlydoAit Moreover,
to
eua otppuvc:ten.
regularity in the performance by a
public official of his public duty." secrecy before Judge Bryan, its best
Thus, he was able to rule that material The Appeals Court ruling apparently witnesses were in most instances
subject to classific4
111161V" gliOgithelegielP.k5
and purposes, had' I
n s- ti
P0432Roti#1003#0006112t as when the
7 Government was obliged to prove to
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00Lp2R0001003600061L2
Federal District Judge Murray Gurfein,
in 1971, that publication of the Penta-
gon Papers would damage the national
security, impressive official witnesses
were unable to do that either.
In both cases, an appeals court,
hearing no witnesses at all, neverthe-
less overruled the lower court and
opted for Government secrecy and :
.prior restraint. Once again, therefore,
the Supreme Court will have to decide
'czaltc-laer the First Amendment may be
so cavalierly overridten.
NEW YORK TIMES
20 March 1975
SIllb Mar hie Project
i Affects Big Powers,
AtSea-Lawffeeting
Speelel to The NeVir York Time
GENEVA, March 19?The se-
cret American attempt to raise
a sunken Soviet nuclear subma-
rine will undercut the major
powers' demand at the United
Nations Law of the Sea Confer-
ence for the unfettered right
to conduct scientific research
in the oceans, a leading spokes-
man for the developing coun-
tries said today.
"The developing countries
have been arguing on the basis
that espionage is the real rea-
son why the major powers seek
complete freedom for scientific
research," Christopher W. Pinto ?
of Sri Lanka said. "Now that
this is confirmed, they can he,
more forceful."
Mr, Pinto has been playing
a major role at the 137-nation,
conference, which resumedl
Monday. He said that the sue-1
cess of the conference, which
is attempting to draft a world
Icharter' to govern use of the
seas and the exploitation of
,their resources would depend
'trade-off." The major power
on achieving "a collection of
trade-off." The major, powers
reject such demands of the
developing countries as prior
notification research activities
and participation of their na-
tionals, he added.
The poorer countries suspect,
Mr. Pinto explained, that the
great powers argue that there
roust be no hindering of scienti-
fic progress "simply to cover
espionage activities to be car-
ried out at will."
The disclosure of the Central
Intelligence Agency's attempt
to salt salvage the Soviet sub-
marine in the mid.-yacific ? is
"bound to complicate)the nego-
tiations," he said, "but I do
not think it is disastrous."
NEW YORK TIMES
16 March 1975 ?
Clean Sweep at C. LA.?.
By James Reston
,
WASHINGTON?The main hope for
the survival of an effective Central
Intelligence Agency in the United
1States now lies in a clean sweep of its
present leadership and the creation of
.a powerful new joint committee of the
Congress to oversee its future activities.
, The first rule of the spy business is
that spies, are expendable. If they
"embarrass the government, they are
disowned. It is a hard, sometimes un-
fair, but often necessary rule, and
there is no reason why it should be
applied only to the spies and not to
the men who give them their orders.
? The C.I.A. has not failed, but it has
been caught fiddling with the liberties
of private citizens and has been an
embarrassment to the Government.
The best way to aggravate the embar-
rassment now and weaken the C.I.A.
even more, is to prolong the current
1.2230130.15
WASHINGTON
Investigations, retain the present lead-
ers, and publicize all tha crimes of the
past.
Foreign espionage is an essential
lant illegal activity, not to be confused
with the political espionage and sabo-
tage of the Watergate scandals: It is
'a form of undercover war, and the
Communists are waging ii with a ven-
geance now in Portugal, while the
C.I.A. is virtually helpless in its pres-
eent condition to prevent the subver-
sion of that strategically important
Country.
President Ford has handled the
problem as if it were a common case
of government corruption. He has all
the evidence he needs to change the
leadership of the C.I.A. whieh has been
less than candid, and overhaul the
whole sprawling intelligence apparatus
of the Government, and he is now in
favor of a strong joint committee of
Congress to supervise all intelligence
activities, but he has not yet acted,
a.nd for some mysterious reason Wil-
liam E. Colby, the head of the C.I.A.,
has not had the grace to resign.
Mr. Ford, when he was in Congress,
was a member of the committee that
Was supposed to oversee the C.I.A.,
and was startled to discover, when he
pecame President, that the agency had
participated in espionage at home and
in plots to assassinate political leaders
abroad. Now he says he never suspect-
ed this sort of thing was going on and
? would not have approved if he had.
It is easy to say that now. But
during the savage conflicts of the
early cold war period, it waS not so
:easy. The internal struggles for polit-
ical control in key strategic countries
-such as West Germany, Italy, the
_Middle East, and even in?Cuba often
-depended on providing money for
guns, newspaper presses, clandestine
radio stations, propaganda periodicals,
and many other things which were
essential to the struggle, but could
not be disclosed to the general public
without disclosing them to our adver-
saries and threatening the sources and
even the lives of our agents.
All this is coming out now: the
efforts 'out of Washington to overturn.
the governments of Diem in Saigon,
Allende in Santiago, Castro in Cuba,
and even the involvement of the C.I.A.
in Watergate and other scandals,
including the opening of the mail of
members of Congress.
The President says this sort of
thing has now been stopped, but the
underground war goes on, not only,
in Portugal, but all over the world.
Moscow has been comparatively quiet
about the economic disarray in Western
Europe, but it has been particularly
active within the Communist appara-
tus in Spain, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia
and the Middle East.
This is not the sort of struggle that
can be countered or publicized, but
it also cannot be left to the C.I.A.
alone or controlled by the. weak
Congressional committees that have
failed to supervise it effectively in
the past.
It was the fear of exposing the
covert operations of the C.I.A. that
led President Ford to appoint a "safe"
committee under Vice President
Rockeieller to investigate the domestic
activities of the agency, but this had
so little credibility in the country unil
the Congress that both the House and
the Senate are now launching investi-
gations of the whole U.S. intelligence
community on their own.
In the confusion, there have even
been cries to abolish the C.I.A., which
make racy reading but no sense. The
agency needs precise new rules limit--
ing its domestic activities. It needs
close supervision by responsible and
discreet legislators who know in
advance of any covert operation by
any intelligence agents of the Govern-
ment, and it needs new leadership:
On the question of the future
direction of the agency, the recent
habit of appointing directors from the
ranks of the C.I.A. itself probably
ought to be reconsidered. Men like
Richard Helms, and William Colby,
who have spent most of their lives
in the service and atmosphere or the
C.I.A., may know more about what
the C.I.A. should be doing than
outsiders, but they are not likely to
be the best men at knowing what
it should not be doing.
The C.I.A. has served the nation
well throughout the cold war years,
and this fatt has undoubtedly been
obscured because its successes can
never be publicized while many of its
failures are. Thus it will always be
the object of suspicion, and should be,
but with a new charter, a new director,
and careful Congressional supervision,
it can undoubtedly regain the confi-
dence of the country and be allowed
to get on with its essential work.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360008-2
WASHINGTON STAR
20 March 1975
Q and A
?
RIMY HOLS
(IA S turces,
e(.by Says
William Colby, director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, was interview-
ed by Washington Star Staff Writer Je-
remiah O'Leary.
Question: Clark Clifford, who as
counsel to President Truman partici-
pated in writing the law which estab-
lished the CIA, said recently that the
ground rules need to be updated, to
be renovated. Do you concur with
that view?
Colby: Well, I've made certain
recommendations for changing our
act already. A year and a half ago
when I was confirmed, I suggested
that we add the word "foreign" to the
word "intelligence" wherever it ap-
pears in our act, so it's clear it's for-
eign intelligence that's the job of this
agency and not domestic. I recom-
mended other things to clarify
exactly what the CIA ought to be able
to do in the United States and what it
should not be able to do in the United
States.
9: That requires an act of Con-
gress?
A: Yes. It hasn't been passed, but
there was legislation last year ? I
supported it ? and I'm sure these
(congressional investigating) com-
mittees will get into a rather funda-
mental look at some of these ques-
tions.
Q: Would you ever go out of the
business of operating in terms of
your own security within the United
States, in places like New York
where the U.N. is located, or in
places like Miami, where there are
many Cubans?
A: Well, I think, in the first place,
that we ought to be able to collect for-
eign intelligence in America. I think
we ought to collect it voluntarily
from Americans, and we aught to be
able to collect it from foreigners.
Q: Interviewing returned travel-
ers?
A: That sort of thing, yes. We do a
great deal of that, and there are an
awful lot of Americans who very
kindly help us and support us on this.
We do make commitments that we
won't expose them as our sources.
That's going to be one of the things
I'm insisting on that we not expose
them in the course of these investiga-
tions. And I think I've received a,
very sympathetic response from Sen.
Churn on this. If there's a reasona-
ble basis for our withholding-au iden-
tity or something, he certainly has
given every indication that he will
give full consideration to that.
Q: IN'hat has been the ef-
committees of Congress. by the press
can the CIA operate effectively as
?'a clandestine service under these
conditions?
A: Well, it's having a hard time.
We have a number of individual
agents abroad who have told us that
they really don't want to work for us
anymore.
Q: Agents?
A: Foreigners, working foreigners.
We have had a number of Americans
who have indicated that they don't
want to work with us anymore ? not
employes, but Americans who have
helped us in various ways.
We have a number of for-
eign intelligence services'
that have indicated great
concern about collaboration
with us ? whether this will
be exposed, and they will be
subjected to intense
criticism in their country. I
think this is a very serious
problem for our country.
We are in the process of los-
ing some of the information
that otherwise we would be
getting.
Q: You mean that some of
these other services and
other individuals are no
longer confident?
A: They're beginning to
pull back, or some of them
have jast stopped working
with us. And, of course,
more serious end not not
measurable is the number
who would have agreed to
work with us, but now won't
agree to work with us. I
have seen a couple of cases
where individuals had indi-
cated they thought they
would work with us, and
then came around here very
recently and said, "I know I
did agree, but I don't think I
will."
Q: Have your actual
operations overseas been
affected by the current.
furor?
A: Oh, yes, I think the
current furor has laid a par-
ticular problem on us in
that people exaggerate CIA.
I see that in Mexico. there
was an accusation this
week that we organized the
excitement at the universi-,
ty; which, of course, we had
nothing to do with. We also
have the problem that CIA
is used as a shibboleth to
shout about in various coun-
tries around the world. And
I think we have a more seri-
ous problem: We have to
consider carefully whether
we want to help somebody
and take a risk of destroy-,
ing .him in the process of
helping him. Because if it
leaks that we helped him at
this stage, we may destroy
his political position entire-
ly.
Philip Agee which give
names and a great number
.of identities? ?
A: Well, I think that's
-absolutely unconscionable
and reprehensible for an
officer who served with us,'
accepted our
'agreed with our activities,
signed a 'very warm- and
friendly letter on his resig-
nation indicating that he
valued highly his associa-
tion with us, and that he
would forever maintain the
relationship as one of pride
and trust, that if he could
ever do anything for us he
would be happy to . . I've.
got an idea or so as to what.
he might do. He has named
every name he could think
of that was anyhow associ-
ated with us. There is at
least one family who has
been put under consider-
able pressure as a result of
this. A girl hounded out of
school because her father's
name appears in it. We
have had to make rather
massive changes in our
situation in that area to pre-
vent people being subjected
to hardships because of this
revelation. And the danger
is that this kind of thing can
go into the whole action4of
various terrorist move-
ments. Mr. Mitricine, as you
know, was murdered in
Latin America. There is a
school of thought that says
that was a patriotic act be-
cause he was alleged to be a
CIA officer. He was not a
CIA officer. And I contend
that that kind of a murder is
t totally unjustifiable. But
Mr. Agee has put a number'
of people under direct'
threat of exactly that thing
happening to them.
Q: A couple of years ago,
there was a similar furor
.and public investigation in-
volving the agency and ITT
in Chile. liThat is the truth
about the agency's role in
Chile?
A: Well, the fact is, as
l've said many times ? I
don't want to talk about the
details of our activity there
? CIA had nothing to do
with the coup that overa
threw Mr. Allende. It had
nothing to do with the mili-
tary at that time. We had a
program of trying to sup-
port and assist some of the
democratic forces looking
to the elections of 1976?
which we hoped they would
win against Mr. Allende.
The fact was, however, his
policies were such that he.
generated so much confu-
sion in the country ? not
created by CIA ? that the
-military did move against
him. If you ask whether
that was a CIA success or
Rockefeller conimisWit,' estlegReledset2:110t1d0/3106kriatA4RIDP77-00632ROkito
Wee the pro-;
Q: Given the sfiraawx, g spy it was a
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
,gram we had in mind did
not take place, which was
that the democratic forces
would succeed eventually
through elections in Chile.
Q: Was the agency aware
that the Chilean armed
forces intended to move
when they did?
A: We had certain intelli-
gence coverage of it and we
had a series of alerts indi-
cating that it was about to
happen. They key to it was
whether several different
forces would get together to
do it, and we had several in-
dications that they would on
a certain date and then they
didn't. And then they would
on another date, and then
they didn't. And then that
they would in September
and they did.
Q: Did the junta ask the
United States or the CIA
whether the new regime
would be recognized?
? A: They certainly did not
ask the CIA, and I don't
know of any other requests.
Q: There have been a
number of reports that you
gave a verbal addendum to
President Ford after sub-
mitting your 50-page report
involving the word "assas-
sination." Did you make
such a rPport?
A: I think I'll let the
praeniera epanir fnr himeAlf
on that. He has spoken on it,
and Iihink it's appropriate.
Otherwise, I frankly think
*that this is a subject that I
would like to just stay in a
total no comment position...
* Q: Well, there have been
a number of allegations that
the agency either had
knowledge or discussions
involving assassinations,
the ones that took place in-
volving Trujillo and
Lumuinba, and plans or
plots involving Castro and
Duvalier. What's your re-
sponse to that? ,
A: Well, again, I really
? don't want to comment
about that subject. It will be
reported fully to the select
committees. This is not a
subject ? that I think we
would do any good to the
United States by talking
about.
Q: Can you say flatly that
the CIA has never planned'
-the assassination of any for-
eeirtri lender?
. A: Again, I just don't
want to comment at all on
it.
'Q: You've discounted re-
ports of sweeping CIA
domestic activity but the
issue remains very much
alive. What's likely to be
the upshot of that?
I think that theRktRartgiv
of the intestigation will
rather clearly show that:
I'm right, that the program
that we undertook to identi-
fy foreign links with Ameri-
can dissident mOvements
was not a massive one, in
the numbers involved; was
not a domestic one, because
it was basically foreign;
and it wasn't illegal be-
cause it was under our
charter and our National
Security Act. So it was nei-
ther massive, illegal nor
domestic. It was an intelli-
gence operation.
Q: A great deal of the
controversy focuses on files'
with the names of U.S. citi-
zens. What steps have been
taken, if any, to cleanse
these files?
A: Well, some time ago ?
for the last three years ?
we have been cleansing
some of these records.
Some of our security files,
some of the other things
that had material in it that
really should not have been
in it. We obviously cannot
do that now, because the
.investigations are under
way and we cannot be in the
position of destroying
potential evidence for these
investigations. But I have
directed that this kind of
material still be segregat-
ed. And I look forward to
the day after the investiga-
ticras when we have one
large bonfire and destroy it
all. Because I don't think
that we ought to have it and
I think that the best disposi-
tion is to get rid of it. . .
Q: Under the Organiza-
tion Act of 1947, is mail
cover in the United States
A: In my view, we should
not do it. And that is why I
recommended its termina-
tion in 1973 and it was
terminated by Dr. Schles-
inger.
Q: But that's not quite re-
sponsive. Is it illegal under
the mandate?
A: Opening mail is, I be-
lieve, illegal. Reading the.
addresses off mail I think
would depend on the author-
ity of the organization in
question. We're not doing it
? but I could imagine that
it would be legitimate to
look at the addresses of peo-
ple in contact with known
foreign intelligence serv-
ices or something of that
nature.
Q: But is,a mail cover a
possible subject for crimi-
nal prosecution?
A: I do not believe so.
And I do not believe that the
people who are involved
even in the opening will be
prosecuted.
ed Fr ReWRRIARIMNP
files containing the names
Of Americans illegal ndei
the mandate?
A: No, it's not. It depends
on why. As I told Mrs. "
Abzug, if we were watching
a foreign organization over-
seas and she ran into con-
tact with it and it was re-
ported, I would probably
have her name in the files.
And we so did. We had her
name for that reason. We
.have coverage of foreign
meetings, things like that
abroad. A certain number
of Russians, a certain num-
ber of Frenchmen, a certain'
number of something else ?
and maybe five Americans
will go and the names of all
will come back and be card-
ed and be recorded. We
would not do anything with
them. But in any indication
of any security problem, we
would pass them to the FBI.
At that time, as a counter-
intelligence program, we
were vigorously looking to
see whether any foreign
countries had support or
manipulation of our antiwar
and various other dissident
movements. We concluded
after our investigations that
they did not. There wasn't
any substantial foreign
assistance coming to this.
But we did look into it to see
whether that was so or not.
Q: Has morale been dam-
aged by the controversies?
' A: Well, I think there's a'
feeling of high public
criticism of a few missteps
by the CIA, that if you got
similar missteps by the
Fish and Wildlife Servicer
nobody would notice it at
all. But if it's the CIA, it's
big news. The low point in
my mind came the other
day when there was a story
about the D.C. police re-
porting its activities during
the antiwar movement, dur-
ing the disturbances here.
The lead paragraph is very
clear that that was a story
about the police. About half-
way down the page it men-
tioned that the CIA had
loaned the police five auto-
mobiles. And on the follow-
on page it mentioned that
the CIA had trained about
10 or 12 people. And the two-
? column scare headline was
"CIA Aid to Police," which
was a tiny part of the total
story. But that was the
headline. The problem
about our morale, really is
you get some people in CIA
who feel that they tried to
do their duty, they followed
their instructions from the'
government, they did what
was expected at the time,
and people now say it was
wrong. On the other hand,
you have people in CIA-Who
don't want the CIA to do
anything wrong, and are
quite shaken by the fact'
that anything improper was
done over the past 20 years. ;
So, you have really the two:
extremes, both of whom feel
somewhat shaken by this
.exposure and the attacks.
Q: Have you encountered
any cases in which it was
necessary to discharge or
seek the retirement of any
employes for violating the
legislative mandate?
A: No. The ones I think
you're thinking of is a group
that retired at the end of
December. The facts of that
case were that Mr. Angle-
ton and I had discussions
' about various things about
his work. I have the highest
respect for the contribution
has made to counter-
intelligence. I think he is an
extremely fine public ser-
vant. We did have some dif-
fering views about different
details of the matter. I
determined that it was, I
thought, desirable to make
some changes, and / offered
him another activity but
said I thought it was time to
put some successive leader-
, ship into his responsibility-
'He had the-option of retir-
ing, he took the %dim. He
has agreed to stay around
here a few months, he's still
'here now, helping us on the
transition to the new man-
agement. The two officers
who worked with him ? I
said I did not think they
would succeed him as the
chief, and they chose to re-
tire. The fourth officer an-
nounced his plan to retire
several weeks before the
event.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 7, 1975
While the Central Intelligence Agency
is under the spotlight of critical expo-
sue in the U.S., its counterparts in
Communist countries?particularly the
Soviet KGB-,-are still very busy.
Known to the CIA, for example, are
attemp!s by the Communist 'secret ser-
vices to recruit about 400 Americans
as spies in the last four years.
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
10
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100360006f2
SATURDAY REVIEW
5 April 1975
What's ron
ith the I
Power, arrogance, and the "inside-outside" syndrome
are what's wrong, says a former CIA executive who
is worried about the challenge to the traditions of
representative government.
by Tom Braden
Washington, D.C.
We are gathered, four of us CIA
division chiefs and deputies, in the
office of our agency's director, an urbane
and charming man. He is seated at his
desk, puffing nervously on his pipe and
asking us questions.
Allen W. Dulles is fretting on this
morning in the early Fifties, as, indeed,
he has fretted most mornings. You can't
be in the middle of building an enormous
spy house, running agents into Russia
and elsewhere, worrying about Joseph
McCarthy, planning to overthrow a gov-
ernment in Guatemala, and helping to
elect another in Italy, without fretting.
But on this particular morning, Dulles
is due for an appearance before Sen.
Richard B. Russell's Armed Services
Committee, and the question he is pon-
dering as he puffs on his pipe is whether
to tell the senators what is making him
fret. He has just spent a lot of money
on buying an intelligence network, and
the network has turned out to be worth-
less. In fact, it's a little worse than worth-
less. All that money, Dulles now sus-
pects, went to the KGB.
Therefore, the questions are somber,
and so are the answers. At last, Dulles
rises. "Well," he says, "I guess I'll have
to fudge the truth a little."
His eyes twinkle at the word fudge,
then suddenly turn serious. He twists his
slightly stooped shoulders into the old
tweed topcoat and heads for the door.
But he turns back. "I'll tell the truth to
Dick [Russell]," he says. "I always do."
Then the twinkle returns, and he adds,
with a chuckle, "That is, if Dick wants
to know."
THE REASON I RECALL the above scene in.
detail is that lately I .have been asking?
myself what's wrong with?the CIA. Two
committees of Congress and one from
the executive branch are asking the ques-
tion, too. But they are asking out of a
concern for national policy. I am asking
for a different reason: I once worked for
the CIA. I regard the time I spent there
as worthwhile duty. I look back upon the
men with whom I worked as able and
TO171 Braden, who knows the CIA firsthand,
is a columnist for the Los Angeles Times
and co-author of Sub Rosa: The OSS and
American Espionage.
?
Approved For13 Kelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
honorable. So for me, the question
"What's wrong with the CIA?" is both
personal and poignant.
. Old friends of mine have been caught "
in evasions or worse. People I worked
with have violated the law. Men whose
ability I respected have planned opera-
tions that ended in embarrassment or
disaster. What's wrong with these
people? What's wrong with the CIA?
Ask yourself a question often enough,
and sometimes the mind will respond
with a memory. The memory my mind
reported back is that scene in Allen
Dulles's office. It seemed, at first blush,
a commonplace, inconsequential epi-
sode. But the more it fixed itself in my
mind, the more it seemed to me that it
helped to answer my question about
what's wrong with the agency. Let me
explain.
The first thing this scene reveals is the
sheer power that Dulles and his agency
had. Only a man With extraordinary
power could make a mistake involving a
great many of the taxpayers' dollars and
not have to explain it. Allen Dulles had
extraordinary power.
Power flowed to him and, through him,
to the CIA, partly because his brother
was Secretary of State, partly because
his reputation as the master spy of World
War II hung over him like a mysterious
halo, partly because his senior partner,
ship in the prestigious New York law
firm of Sullivan and Cromwell impressed
the small-town lawyers of Congress.
Moreover,. events helped keep power
flowing. The country was fighting a
shooting war in Korea and a Cold War
in Western Europe, and the CIA was
sole authority on the plans and potential
of the real enemy. To argue against the
CIA was to argue against knowledge.
Only Joseph McCarthy would run such a
Indeed, McCarthy unwittingly added
to the power of the CIA. He attacked
the agency and when, in the showdown,
Dulles won, his victory vastly increased
the respectability of what people then
called "the cause" of anti-communism.
"Don't join the book burners," Eisen-
hower had said. That was the bad way
to fight communising:The good way was
the CIA.
Pow ER WAS THE FIRST THING that went
wrong with the CIA. There was to,S
much of it, and it was too easy to bring
to bear?on the State Departwent, on
; other government agencies, on the patri-
otic businessmen of New York, and on
the foundations whose directorships
they occupied. The agency's power over-
whelmed the Congress, the press, and
therefore the people.
I'm not saying that this power didn't
help to win the cog War, and I believe
the Cold War was a good war to win.
But the power enabled the CIA to con-
tinue Cold War operations 10 and 15
years after the Cold War was won.
Under Allen Dupes the power was un-
questioned, and after he left, the habit
of not questioning remained.
I remember the time I walked over to
the State Department to get formal ap-
proval for some CIA project involving
a few hundred thousand dollars and a
publication in Europe. The desk man at
the State Department balked. Imagine.
He balked?and at an operation de-
signed to combat what I knew for cer-
tain was a similar Soviet operation. I was
astonished. But I didn't argue. I knew
what would happen. I would report to
the director, who would gethis brother
on the phone: "Foster, one of your peo-
ple seems to be a little less than coopera-
tive." That is power.
THE SECOND TRIM, that's wrong with
the CIA is arrogance, and the scene I've
mentioned above 'shows that, too. Allen
Dulles's private joke about "fudging"
was arrogant, and so was the suggestion
that "Dick" might not want to know. An
organization that does not have to answer
for mistakes is certain to become arro-
gant.
It is not a cardinal sin; this fault-, and
sometimes it squints toward virtue. It
might be argued, for example, that only
arrogant men would insist on building
the U-2 spy plane within a time frame
which military experts said could not
be met. Yet in the days before satellite
surveillance, the U-2 spy plane was the
most useful means of keeping the peace.
It assured this country's leaders that Rus-
sia was not planning an attack. But if
arrogance built the plane quickly, it also
destroyed it. For surely it was arrogant
to keep it flying through Soviet airspace
after it was simpected that the Russians
were literally zeroing in on overflying
U-2s.
I wonder whether the.arrogance of the
CIA may not have been battlefield-re-
lated?a holdover from World War II
machismo and derring-do. The leaders of
the agency were, almost to a man, vet-
erans of OSS, the CIA's wartime prede-
cessor. Take, for example, the men
whose faces I now recall, standing there
in the director's office.
? One had run a spy-and-operations
network into Germany from German-
occupied territory. Another had volun-
teered to parachute into Field Marshall
Kesselring's headquarters grounds with
terms for his surrender. A third had
Otatah.-t adr
?"Rkr'2aYRA4g Faso
nevertheleas,
tV2:11C:i wan
'tt se. volunteered to
and to take
Moreove.r, .sisey were inn-
asreanen,. mere than most soldiers can be
? ressed, with the absolute necessity
Approved For ReitaffNiyegge : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010n60006*-2
19 March 1975
Marquis Childs
The Wil
go tight on creating and perpetuating the
myths that always accompanied the
presence of the monster.
We know the myths. They circulate
throughout the land wherever there are
bars and bowling alleys: that the CIA
killed John Kennedy; that the CIA crip-
pled George Wallace; that an unex-
plained airplane crash, a big gold heist,
were all the work of the CIA.
These myths are ridiculous, but they
will exist as long as the monster exists.
The fact that millions believe the myths
raises once again the old question which
OSS men used to argue after the war:
Can a free and open society engage in
covert operations?
After nearly 30 years of trial, the evi-
dence ought to be in. The evidence dem-
onstrates, it seems to me, that a free and
open society cannot engage in covert
operations?not, at any rate, in the kind
of large, intricate covert operations of
which the CIA has been capable.
I don't argue solely from the box
score. But let's look at the box score. It
reveals many famous failures. Too eas-
ily, they prove the point. Consider what
the CIA deems its known successes: Does
anybody remember Arbenz in Guate-
mala? What good was achieved by the
overthrow of Arbenz? Would it really
have made any difference to,this country
if we hadn't overthrown Arbenz?
And Allende? How much good did it
do the American people to overthrow
Allende? How much bad?
Was it essential?even granted the
sticky question of succession?to keep
those Greek colonels in power for so
long?
We used to think that it was a great
triumph that the CIA kept the Shah of
Iran on his throne against the onslaught
of Mossadegh. Are we grateful still?
The uprisings during the last phase of
the Cold War, and those dead bodies in
the streets of Poland, East Germany, and
Hungary: to what avail?
But the box score does not tell the
whole story. We paid a high price for
that box score. Shame and embarrass-
ment is a high price. Doubt, mistrust,
and fear is a high price. The public
myths are a high price, and so is the
guilty knowledge that we own an estab-
lishment devoted to opposing the ideals
we profess.
IN OUR ,MIDST, we have maintained a
secret instrument erected in contradiction
to James Madison's injunction: "A popu-
lar government without the means to
popular information is a farce or a
tragedy, perhaps both."
As I say, the investigating committees
will prop the monster up. I would suggest
more radical action. I would shut it
down. I would turn the overt intelligence
function over to the State Department.
Scholars and scientists and people who
understand how the railroads run in Sri
Lanka don't need to belong to the CIA
in order to do their valuable work well.
I would turn the paratroopers over to
the army. If, at
Washington.
.Recipe for how to make
things worse than they are:
Start with a large order of
paranoia, stir in with ground-
less rumors and wild charges,
bake with a strong infusion of
CIA flavoring.
In this charged atmosphere
all the old suspicions about
the assassinations of Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy and his
brother, Senator Robert F.
Kennedy, are being revived.
This can be put down partly to
what is little better than
cheap publicity-seeking by
those who think it is a sure
way to garner a headline.
But reports from around
the country show that the
wildest of the rumors are tak-
en seriously by those, who,
given even a little rational
thought, should know better.
The CIA planned the assassi-
nation of the two Kennedy
brothers. This has taken hold
not only with the crazies but
among the young willing to
believe anything evil about
the "establishment."
The commission that inves-
tigated President Kennedy's
assassination was headed by
the late Chief Justice Earl
Warren who accepted the as-
signment reluctantly after
arm-twisting by President
Lyndon B. Johnson. Gerald R.
Ford, then Republican leader
in the House of Representa-
tives, was a member of the
commission. After sifting with
a capable staff every scrap of
evidence, rumor and report,
including the charge that a
conspiracy was involved, the
commission found that Lee
Harvey Oswald, the loner,
was the killer who had fired
on the President as he passed
R
rs About the
by in the motorcade in Dallas.
As for Robert Kennedy,
witnesses saw Sirhan B. Sir-
ban fire the fatal shot as the
young senator passed through
the anteroom of a hotel kitch-
en in Los Angeles. After a
lengthy trial, Sirhan was
found guilty and sentenced to
death. Since his conviction he
has waited on death row in
San Quentin pending judicial
decision on the legality of the
death penalty. Naturally,
members of his family are ea-
ger to exploit the agitation to
reopen the case.
There seems at times a
competition to see who can
swallow the biggest myth,
with the Central Intelligence
Agency the prime bait. In a
suburb of Los Angeles, the Or-
ange County Bar Association
heard at a luncheon meeting
Philip (Dave) Thomas de-
scribe how he had carried out
22 assassinations in the Soviet
Union as a CIA agent. One
newspaper headline said "CIA
Assassin Tells Lawyers of Ex-
ploits." The speaker went on
to say that to escape the KGB
after his latest killing he had
seized a Pan American 747,
using his American Express
Card, to fly him to safety.
Even though the story is
wildly improbable, the CIA
searched its files. No such
name nor anything resem-
bling it came to light.
No matter what is eventu-
ally proved to have been
wrongdoing by the CIA, the
rumor-mongering is contrib-
uting to the erosion of the
agency's status. Many critical
of the covert side ? the dirty
tricks department of the CIA
? believe that its overt oper-
ations, intelligence-gathering
essential to Our survival to mount a secret
attack upon a foe, the army is capable
of doing it, and, with some changes in
command structure in order to bypass
bureaucracy, the army could do it as
swiftly and secretly as the CIA. Under
the command structure of the Depart-
ment of Defense, congressional over-
sight would be possible. Then, if the army
got caught fielding a secret division in
Laos, and if the American people did
not want a secret division in Laos, the
American people would know where to
turn.
I would turn the psychological war-
riors and propagandists over to the Voice
of America. Psychological warriors and
propagandists probably never did belong
in a secret agency. -?
And, last, I would choose a very few
men to run spies and such covert op-
erations as the passage of money to those
in other lands who cannot afford to ac-
cept American support openly. But I
would limit covert operations to passing
money to "friendlies."
I would house these spy masters and
and intelligence esrsa-s-geer
are Invaluable and its deem.-
tion would be a severe less
An organizs.tion motst re-
eve in promoting the caessetoSsa
acy theory of the CIA ts nie
National Caucus of Labor
Committees, a militant Kux-
ist organization that liras the
CIA with the KGB in a elant
brainwashing operenesn.
Members believe in a "rester
plot" they must do evmetting
possible to frustrate. SPeen &-
story appeared in the Tash-
ington Post on the caumesay-
ing the CIA had declinedeetn-
ment, Director Willi= E.
Colby said that while he
thought it was a &mastic
matter and the inquiry anheald
have been directed to theFBI,
he was replying to say Ciat
while the caucus claeges
were "only twisted fantasy
your circulation of tem
forces CIA to deny ttai as
flatly false."
Once before in a tens. of ,
trial and tribulation the same t
witches' brew of fear essL sus-
picion haunted a trout:iv:,na
tion. After President .thra-
ham Lincoln's assassinststa in
1865 just at the end of thetsCiv-
il War, the rumor paseated
that his Secretary of Wte, Ed-
win M. Stanton, had plegei
part in a plot to murfan the
President. Nothing trest,seer
proved beyond the fasts that
the abrasive Stanton hatenere
been at odds with R.:,..tt_tnelet
over the conduct of the me,
Latter-day scholars have. &-
missed the rumor as urat,end-
ed.
Hopefully we will matter
from the present pltl.7.227,
which is more virulese ter:
that of a century ago. a:f, sea-
sation-mongering is no serv-
ice in our time of troub14
and I would forbid, by law, any of
them from ever calling himself "di-
rector." They would not Work for the
CIA. Because I would abolish the name
CIA.
As their chief, the President should
choose for a term of six years some
civilian who has demonstrated staunch-
ness of character and independence of
mind. I would make him responsible to
a joint committee of CongreSs, as well as
to the President, and I would not permit
him to serve more than one term.
THUS, WE MIGHT get rid of power. With-
out power, arrogance would not be
dangerous. Thus, too, we could prevent
the inside-outside syndrome, so essential
to secrecy, .from making a mockery of
representative government.
As for the house that Allen Dulles
built at Langley, we might leave it stand-
ing empty, our only national monument
to the value that democracy places upea
the recognition and correction of a
take. hi
s?meMirci18ef 168isReleaveY2070V08/013nIedAc-RDIP717113(1432R0001003601166-2
Aproved For Release 2001/08/0e: ClAttalffdpeaM00100360006-2
f"M 1975 28 March 1975
,t
'
ji ?
"N ),
!Tian tO
.cdce
By ATcimista O'Leary
Wasbingten Stu Stail Wnter
The chief of Latin Ameri-
can operations for the CIA
is leaving the agency effec-
tive May to organize for.
vier American intelligence
officers in an effort to de-
fend the the organization
against those who attack it.
He is David A. Phillips,
52, who has been in charge
of the Western Hemisphere
Division for two years and
is a veteran who has been
CIA station chief in the Do-
minican Republic, Brazil
and Venezuela. Phillips re-
cently informed CIA Direc-
tor William E. Colby of his
decision to take early re-
tirement and that he
intends to organize an as-
sociation of retired
intelligence officers from
all American services.
The Washington Star
learned that Colby told
Phillips he would rather he
remain in his present job
but accepted Phillips' deci-
sion with good wishes when
the official made clear his
decision was final.
Phillips told the Star he
was particularly deter-
mined to defend the agency
as a private citizen, as he
could not do while on the
agency payroll, because
much of the ?recent
criticism of the CIA has fo-
cused on his area of respon-
sibility in Latin America.
THE CIA has been linked
with operations against the
Marxist regime of the late
President Salvador Allende
in Chile and allegations of
assassination plots against
Prime Minister Fidel Cas-
tro of Cuba, the late Presi-
dent Rafael Trujillo of the
Dominican Republic . and
the late President Francois
Duvalier of Haiti.
The association of retired
intelligence officers does
not yet exist, but Phillips
has sent an open letter
under that heading to 250
former CIA officers with
whom he is acquainted. The
letter says in part:
''As chief of Latin Ameri-
can operations, I have been
deeply concerned about the
decline of morale at Lang-
ley (CIA headquarters) and
abroad. Snow baning innu-
?
0 4 0
r(51:1E CS
endo, egregious stories and
charges, and even honest
concerns have presented us
with the basic dilemma of
issuing either a general
statement which reassures
few but preserves security,
or a comprehensive ac-
counting which satisfies
some but at the expense of
operations and agents.
"Under the circum-
stances, there is little doubt
that a thorough congres-
sional review is the best, if
not the only solution even
though some leakage of
sensitive details on foreign
operations seems almost
inevitable. A few of our
older documents from the
Cold War period will make
for pretty heady reading
today. As for our present
activities, I am convinced
we have no problem.
"IN THE meantime, our
capabilities abroad are
being damaged. More and
more of our agents and
friends ? many of them
fine people who cooperate-
on the basis of ideology ?
are saying thanks but no
thanks. Friendly liaison
services are beginning to
back away from- us. The
Marchettis and the Agees
have the stage and only a
few challenge them."
Victor Marchetti and
Philip Agee are former CIA
agents who have written
critical exposes of the
agency.
Phillips said he is leaving
the OA because he wants to
fill the gap and intends to
challenge Marchetti to a
series of college campus
debates. He also will go on
a lecture tour and do some
writing to explain why the
United States needs an
intelligence service.
Phillips said he was con-
cerned that people might
think he was still working
for the agency when he gets
started with the associa-
tion's efforts. He said, "I
Wish to make it absolutely
clear that the CIA manage-
ment has not had, and will
not have, a hand officially,.'
unofficially or otherwise in
this organization and its ef-
forts."
Phillips said he will re-
ceive ?15,000 a year as a re-
ooviet hintstlu
elpeclkil Faisal
Mascot? Bureau of The SUR
. Moscow?The Soviet Union Chile and in Cypras give suf.
ncient Ideas as to who master-
minded the crime."
The American intelligencia
ageficy is blamed here bot!-*
for the C01:3 d'etat that ovea,
'seriously suggested last night
that the U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency had plotted the
assassination of King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia because of grow-
ing friction between the ITIOd- threw ? the Chilean administra,
? arch and Washington over the lion of Presid-ent Salvador Ai.
price of oil and terms of a lende in 1973 and the ouster
Middle East settlement.
The ,government newspaper
lzvestia stopped 'short, how-
ever, of an oraen accusation,
but it left no doubt that It
State, had warned in Jar.uarir
believes the CIA planned and
probably helped carry out
Tuesday's assassination.
In ,a short article headlined
"Rho Fired?" /zvestia cites
Last summer of .President
karios from Cr,.:rust
lzvestia pointedly recalie
that Henry H. Kissinger, the
United States Secretary elt
that the U.S. might find it
necessary in "extreme dreum.
stances," as IZ.VeStid puts it, 15'
intervene militarily in oil-arc-
Arabducingsoutres. Saudi Arabia.
papers in Beirut, Cairo
the pap-er indicates, would be a
and Rabat, Morocco, to imnli-
principal target.
cate the United States in the
"At the end of last years'
governmenta s s a . s s i n a t ion n n. e Ta ss agency, t f t alsoa Izvestia wrote last night, "the
American magazine Newsweek
puolished an ominous cartoon
?leaders of oil-producing coun-
triesi being shot at from arouni
a corner. Are these threats not
becoming a reality?"
Earlier, Tess had suggeste
that the new King and crown
prince. in Saudi Arabia were.
even more pro-American thau
in Faisal had ever been.,
has carried stories in the last
two days suggesting that the
Central Intelligence Agency
was involved.
Radio Riyadh in Saudi Ara-
bia has said the assassin, a
nephew of the King, was
mentally deranged and acted
alone.
But Izvestia and Tess quote
the Beirut newspaper Al Litca leaving the implication that
as saying that the United
States had concluded that a
reduction in oil prices was "Im-
possible to achieve during
Faisal's lifetime" and thus de-
cided to assassinate the mon-
arch, who is characterized as
increasingly "disappointed
with American policies."
The Moroccan newspaper
L'Opinion is quoted as saying
that the basic American deci-
sion to remove the King came
after the 1973 oil embargo.
"There is no need to Indicate
who did it. . . . The events in
the United States had gained
greatly from the asSassinatioia
Tans also suggested that the
Arabian-American Oil Com-
party, known as Aramco, may
have been involved in the puta-
tive plot to assassinate King
Faisal because of his recem
actions to nationalize the firm,.
These charges were In grea?!
contrast, however, to the gen-
erally mild Soviet comment on
the collapse of Mr. Kissingern
efforts to mediate a new Is,
raell withdrawal from tht,
Sinai Peninsula. ? "
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
31 MARCH 1975
Iii spite of the torrent of unfavorable.
publicity about the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, recruiting is booming.
GA job applications jumped from a
normal 300 weekly to 800 in January
and the trend is continuing.
tired employe compared
with his present salary of
$36,000. The association, he
said, will be financed by $10
a year dues to be used for
stamps, paper and similar
expenses but not for sal-
aries. He expects to provide
for his own income through
lecture fees.
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14
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THEECONOMISTMARCH29,ig,75
Glomar Explorer
Went fishing
Washington. DC
Plenty of people blame the press, the
bearer of bad tidings, for the long string
of embarrassing disclosures that has put
the Central Intelligence Agency in a
corner fighting for its bureaucratic life.
The manner in which the true mission
of that celebrated deep-sea mining
ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, was
disclosed last week puts the newspaper
editors in a different light. Successive
disclosures in the past year showed the
CIA in an equivocal relationship to
some of the illegalities of the Nixon
Administration, meddling in the politics
f Chile, indulging in domestic espion-
age, and under suspicion of complicity
in real or attempted foreign political
assassinations..
The Glomar Explorer is -clifteeriil
ease entirely. When a Soviet submarine
exploded and sank in the Pacific in
1968, the American under-sea tracking
system established where the wreck
occurred, while the Soviet system failed
to do so. Eventually the Nixon Adminis-
tration approved the building of a
special ship, with a huge covered satel-
ate barge, which arrived on the spot
:!.ast year and picked up the Soviet sub-
marine from its position on the sea
bed, three miles down. The operation
was bizarre and financially prodigal,
-2& legality gave rise tO lively argument
-among the government lawyers, it in-
volved deception of the public, and it
involved a covert association with a
financier, Mr Howard Hughes; whose
relations with the Nixon Administra-
tion were of arguable propriety in
other ways. Still, as a genuine effort to
gather foreign . military intelligence
the operation did fall within the proper
function of the CIA.
The press handled it quite differently
from the agency's alleged trespasses
and indiscretions. After the Glomar
Explorer sailed in 1973 from the Atlan-
tic port where it was built, one or two
reporters picked up hints that its
mission might be something other than
scraping up mineral nodules from the
ocean floor, but the CIA was able to
persuade their editors, as a matter of
public interest, not to pursue the ques-
tion. A labour dispute that broke out
over the manning of the ship had some
features not easily explicable in a normal
commercial vessel; that drew some
attention. Last summer the offices of
Mr Howard Hughes's holding company
in Los Angeles were broken into and
quantities of its files remol, ed, including
files to do with the Glomar Explorer and
the company's relations with the CIA.
An attempt at what is described as
blackmail followed, Mr Hughes refused
to pay, and last month a grand jury
in Los Angeles began an investigation.
By now the hints and rumours were
fairly thick, and indeed the Los Angeles
Times published on February 8th a
version that had the Glomar Explorer
searching for a sunken submarine,
though in the wrong ocean. A quick
intervention by the CIA got the report
curtailed and moved to an inside page.
Mr William Colby, the director of the
CIA, got busy briefing editors, usually
telling them more than they knew,
explaining that the ship had not finished
its job but had to return next summer t6
collect some more pieces of submarine,
and appealing to their public spirit not
to spoil the game. The New York Times,
the Washington Post, the Washington
Star, Time, Newsweek and at least
two radio and television networks had
heard about it and all agreed to hold
their hands, with the reservation that if
others published it, they would have
to. The dam broke on March 18th.
On that evening the New York Times
got word from Mr Jack Anderson, who
continues the muck-raking column of
the; laic Drew Pearson, that Mr Ander-
son was going to- use the story not in
his column but in his regular radio talk,
and it decided that it had to go ahead
and publish.
Against publishing the story was the
argument that the Russians did not
know what those two weird vessels
were doing in that spot in the Pacific;
Mr Melvin Laird, who was Secretary
of Defence at the time the costly project
was launched, has said he would guaran-
tee that they did know. Even so, it is
possible to argue that knowing some-
thing is, for the Soviet government,
a different matter from having to take
cognisance of it officially. The lessons
of the U-2 affair in 1960 have not been
forgotten, and hence the Administra-
tion was careful not to say a word.
One thing that is clear is that the
Glomar Explorer will not be returning
NEWSWEEK
24 MARCH 1975
COLBY COMES IN FROM THE COLD
Congressional investigators looking into the CIA may ,
get more than they expected from their demand that
spymaster William Colby turn over the report he
delivered to President Ford last Christmas in Vail,
Colo., on his agency's domestic operations. Colby has I
told Sen. Frank Church, head of the Senate probe, that
various in-house CIA task forces have from time to timci
reviewed the agency's internal workings. Ile volun-
teered to turn over a list of these studies to the
Congressional investigators.
to the spot to look for more bits of
submarine. A rather valuable ship,
equipped to recover objects from the
deep sea-bed, looks like coming on the
market, unless the circumspect Mr
Hughes took the precaution of getting
a first option on it. Estimates of the
cost of the whole Glomar Explorer
operation are in the range of $350m.
Senator Frank Church of Idaho,
the liberal chairman of the Senate's
select committee on intelligence activi-
ties; lost no time in saying that the
expense was too much: "No wonder
we are broke," he said. Few others are
willing to join him publicly, in his
judgment. There are reports that the
lost Russian . submarine had a strange
profile,, which might indicate a secret
modernisation, making ships of its type
subject to the strategic arms limitation
pact, and other reports that one or-
more of its torpedoes, which may
have been nuclear-tipped, were re-
covered. Where, if not with the CIA.
Can such reports originate? Yet the CIA
is also assiduously circulating the ver-
sion that the submarine's missiles and
its coding apparatus were not, definitely
not, among the articles recovered whea
a part of the wrecked ship fell back into
the ocean depths. This is something the
agency could be expected to say jE it
were true, and also if it were not.
. Intriguing, in a country that is so
widely said to have succumbed to self-
doubt, become disillusioned with power,
and lost the feel for greatness?, is the
generosity of the praise that is being
heaped on the, in other respects
harassed, CIA for the boldness and
technical excellence of tills exercise in
science fiction. What other country
would think of such a project, would
find the money for it and would carry
it out so flawlessly? Where else are the
technological resources for such an.
adventure to be found? Which naval
power lost the submarine from view
(the Soviet Union), and which power
tracked. it to its grave in the deep ocean?
Good intelligence work as a guarantee.
of national security and a precondition
of effective arms control are celebrated
by the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post, with expressions of thankful-
ness that the CIA has, after all,
demonstrated its pre-eminence in the
work which it was legitimately called
into existence to do. _
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
24 MARCH 1975
The Central Intelligence Agency is
known to feel that its secrets will be
safe with only two of the three groups
that are now investigating its activi-
ties?the Rockefeller Commission and
the Senate probers. CIA officials worry
about possible leaks of sensitive mate-
rial from the House panel.
15
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? SAGA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
- APRIL 1975
?
- ercelLee.a.veze,...es5=ermeeffeeeteasszte==eisomma
anagmangs=s2r
Mr. G. was .certainly not thinking of
his own death as he hurried down the
corridor to his hotel room in Guatemala.
His mind swarmed with the details of
smuggling rifles and machine guns to a
band of Communist-backed re-
volutionaries in Mexico. They had
money to pay for weapons and wanted
delivery at a secret point on Mexico's
eastern coast. A fishing boat captain
from Grand Isle, La., was to make the
delivery. ?
Mr. G. was thinking of the sizable
profits he would make from the deal
and barely noticed a thin, well-dressed
young.man step out of a room down the
hallway. The young man coughed,
covering his face with a handkerchief.
The two men drew abreast.
"Are you. an American?" the young
man asked.
Mr. G. turned and his eyes widened
with fright. He stared into the barrel of a
eight-inch long aluminum tube. Click! A
strange vapor spurted from the metal
device, surrounding Mr. G.'s face.
"What the hell?" he stammered,
breathing the sour fumes into his lungs.
He crumpled to the floor, his face
turning purple. The young man placed
the aluminum tube in his pocket and
casually walked down the hall and
stairway to the lobby.
It took exactly 72 seconds for Mr. G.
to die. He died just as the young man
walked out into the street. Several
minutes later, a hotel maid found the
body and screamed her alarm. It was
another 20 minutes before an ambu-
lance arrived. That evening, a death
certificate was prepared.
Heart attack was the verdict.
The examining doctors knew nothing
of a colorless, odorless poison carefully
sealed in a thin capsule and shot out of
a hermetically sealed aluminum *tube.
Bizarre poisons are seldom discussed
at medical meetings. Few coroners
know that such a capsule, fired no more
than 24 inches from the v:ctint's face,
Equipped with the latest in weaponry and
gadgetry, these agents kill the enemy
on order. They have even "eliminated"
U.S. civilians!
By Roy Norton
Nesacimrimmszzoemsztrzammammtesesmnid
16
will produce almost instant death.
The deadly vapors are breathed into
the lungs. Arteries that carry blood to
the brain are paralyzed instantly. Within
seconds, the victim begins to die.
Within minutes, all traces of the
poisonous vapor disappear, long before
an autepsy can be performed.
The poison was developed in a
Russian laboratory in the late i '950s
and brought to the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency . in 1961 when
Bogdam Stashinskiy defected to the
West. Stashinskiy, a trained assassin
for the KGB (Kommissariat
Gosudarstevnnoi Bazopasnosti or
Soviet committee for State Security),
knew the vapor was an effective murder
weapon. He had eliminated two .anti-
Soviet exile agents in West Germany
before surrendering to U.S. coun-
terspies.
Mr. G. was just one of many victims
of the poison since then. A member of
the shadowy world of international
manipulators, he was a clever soldier of
fortune who specialized in gunrunning,
dope smuggling, and political intrigue.
Like his fellow entrepreneurs, he fed on
revolt arid revolution.? hurrying to the
werld's hottest trouble spots in order to
fatten his bank balance.
. The ? assassin with the de.adly
aluminum tube was an iile.cal, or
"black" agent in the "Plans" .section of
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
He is attached to "Stall D," an obscure
department known inside the agency as
the "Kill Squad." Equipped witn the
latest in weaponry and gadgetry, these
agents kill the enemy on order. Their
victims are those persons considered a
threat to the. national security of the
U.S. In the example above, a
Communist-inspired revolution south of
the border would be a threat to the U.S.,
hence it was necessary to "eliminate"
Mr. G.
Members of the "Kill Squad" are the
glamour boys of the CIA's 17,000-man
spy organization. They are the true
professionals in the back alley battles&
Cold War espionage. cold-bloodedly,
? they can murder a double agent ie.
Berlin, liquidate a. person who mey
jeopardize U.S. security, or arrange fe:;
. an assassination squad to the
political leader of an unfriendly country_
? Naturally, many of these projects are
surrounded by the highest secrecy..
There are stiff penalties to prevere
present, or former, agents of the CI4
from discussing their experiences. -Iv?
been out of the 'Company' for two
years,- remarked an ex-agent. "i-ict?-?
ever, if they knew I was talking, I cc,Z:i
be taken into custody without a warrare, -
held indefinitely, and brought to e
secret trial. More than one person has
been whisked out to the 'Mansion for
interrogation after they talked in public.'
The "Mansion" is the CIA's top secret
65-acre private estate located a few
miles from Oxford, Md., along the
Chaptank River. The Mansion and
grounds are protected by high, elec-
trified fences, armed guards and a
'patrol of vicious German shep'nerd
dogs.
However, despite ail this, official
secrecy, many persons in and out of the
agency have become disenchanted .
with the CIA.
At this very moment in Washington,.
D.C., a blue ribbon panel, headed by
Vice President Rockefeller, is inves,
tigating the organization and is prepar-
ing a report for President Ford. In Egld
of the fact that much has been exposed
concerning the CIA's activities in =-
own country and the operation ie.
.unseat Salvadore Allende in Chirie?
there are those who feel that the ds.-adly
and frghtening results of the
Squads- should also be revealed to the
public.
Others seek power through o!f!e.F.
politics. Uke any other bureaucrats
group. teere are cliques ins:cle the. D;',.
Strugg:ing' for supremacy over the vas:'
spy rezwc-k. Some informants weee
recruited. trained, sent into the f:e'd,.
and qe?ckiy became disiilus:cned by the
realities of espionage. "It looks good
only in the movies," remarked one
source.
From interviews developed over a
span of many Months, considerabk
data on the CIA was obtained. Despite_
the secrecy, the agency constant"e
bubbles with. wild stories and fantase..:
rumors; separating the fact from the
fantasic was no easy task. Since 9*e
information cannot be verified officiaii;e
every effort has been made to insure
accuracy within these limitations.
My information includes:
1410 An aborted assassination eV
against Fidel Castro during his visit to
New York for an appearance before ties
United Nations;
0 The' formation and trai,ling
para-military assassination squads,
staffed by Cubans;
.O "Kill to protect" orders on the t.!
spy plane;
O Persistent rumors concerning 1.'ee
possible murder of several U.S., r-7et
zens; and
itto Details on the latest weaponry eee
gadgetry.
Get Castro: Like some ando.,rt
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Approved ForRelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2
bearded demon, Fidel Castro is a
satanic figure to CIA agents. "He is
satan incarnate, a living reminder of the
agency's failures in Cuba, the Bay of
Pigs, and other fiascoes," reported a
former agent. "They've tlied everything
to get Castro. Nothing has worked." ?
Originally, the agency was lax in
determining Castro's political beliefs. A
CIA briefing to President Eisenhower's
Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities in late 1960
reported Castro as being a "political
enigma." A still secret report declared
that Castro did not become a Com-
munist until after the Bay of Pigs. "Prior
to that time, his public statements did
not reflect Marxist directions," the
report stated.
Nevertheless, there were those in the
CIA who did not trust Castro, even in
1960. "If he walks, talks, and acts like a
Communist I say he is one," a crusty
CIA official declared. Others agreed
and, when Castro announced his
intentions to visit the United Nations, an
assassination plot was formed.
"A visit to the U.S. by a foreign leader
is a good opportunity to obtain
information," explained a former agent.
"The CIA almost always maintains a
hospitality suite for the American
policemen assigned to guard a visiting
dignitary. When the officers go off duty,
they drop in for free food and drinks.
We debrief them through casual
questioning. Surprisingly, we often pick
up important intelligence data.
"When Khruschev visited the U.S.,
the police reported he was hitting the
bottle," he said. "He was also abrupt
and he treated his associates in a
demeaning manner. This indicated a
possible. power struggle that ended
when the old boy was ousted."
. Castro came to New York in .1960
and the CIA opened a hospitality suite
at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Off duty
policemen assigned to guard Castro
were offered the finest in food and
drink, served and poured by CIA
agents.
But the assassination plot was
aborted. Why?
One agent said, "there were just too
many complications.",
Shortly after Castro's visit to New
York, the CIA Selectedseveral Cuban
exiles to staff CIA-financed assassina-
tion squads. "The idea was that a
four-man team would return to Cuba,
set up posts near Castro's headquar-
ters, and kill him in a cress fire from
high-powered sniper rifles equipped
? with bullets that exploded on impact.
Another team was assembled to 'hit'
Castro when and if he made a public
appearance. Still another team was
trained to blow up his office, using
powerful explosives."
The assassination squads were
trained in the Florida Everglades, under
the direction of a graduate of a WW
OSS assassination school, Marine
.officers, assigned to the CIA, assisted
in the training. "Several squads were
trained, but Castro's intelligence.men
learned of our intentions," an ex-agent
said. "There are rumors of at least two
attempts made on Castro's life. Both
failed. I don't know if this was our CIA
squads or some. ordinary Cuban
citizen." ?
What happened to the remaining
assassins? "There is always work for a
man schooled in murder," concluded
my informant. "At least one of these.
men was at the Bay of Pigs. Later, he
flew some of the old B-26 bombers for
the CIA in the Congo rebellion. He got a
bellyful in the Congo after being
ordered to fly over native villages and
indiscriminately fire on civilians. He
dropped out of sight after that." ?
Some critics of the CIA, particulariyi
those with dispute the "Ione assassin"
verdict in the death of Pres. John
Kennedy, believe the CIA is responsi-
ble for the murder of several world
leaders.
A group of independent, self-
financed investigators have been sifting
the facts in several assassinations for ?
several years. They are concerned with
what are considered similarities in the
deaths of Patrice Lurnumba, Dag
Hammarskjold, Sen.. Robert Kennedy,
Pres. John Kennedy, Martin Luther
King, Jr., and Malcolm X. "There are
certain patterns in these murders to
warrant further investigation," one
investigator declared.
Another investigator was more out-.
spoken. "I am convinced that a clicUe
within the Central Inteiligence Acercy,
or a CIA-linked group, is responsible for
several assassinations," he reported. "I
just find it too incredible to believe an
'agency of the U.S. government would
cold-bloodedly murder President Ken-
nedy, or assassinate some of the best
minds .in the modern wand simply
betause the victims did not believe .in
? the Cold War." ?
. However, these independent inves-
tigators are not overly optimistic about
the resUlts of their investigations.." If we
had everything do:0 in black and
white, hard evidence,. no one would
belieVe it," one man concluded. The
facts are few, the theories are numer-
ous.
The U-2 Murders: "Intel!ieence flights
over unfriendly countries stetee.d as early
as 1952 or 1953, using the early U-2
planes under CIA jurisdiction," a former
CIA agent revealed. "The U-2 fEghts
have continued to this day, despite the
photographs we obtain from our 'spies
in the sky.'
"The U-2 planes flown over Russia
were highly improved aircraft Their
:range was tremendous and their
altitude was quite high," he continued.
"The CIA was charged with protecting
these planes from any publicity and an.
English civilian was 'eliminated' when
he attempted to take pictures of the U-2
at Lakenheath, England.
"I heard of another incident that
allegedly occurred at Atsugi Airport,
near Tokyo, in the fall of 1959. A
Japanese teeri-ager slipped onto the
base and snapped a few pictures,
which he hoped to sell to newspapers
or magazines. Word got back to
someone and, the next evening, the
teen-ager drowned himself. Naturally, I
assume he had very little choice and
Was probably held under the water by
an agent," he concluded.
Are the assassinations of civilians
17
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cleared through channels? Rust prior
approval be obtaired?
"Absolutely not! An agent in the
'black' section is trained, and charged,
to make his own decisions," the
informant said. "An agent may be =of
.contact with his superiors for long
periods of time. If security is com-
promised, they will remember that dead
men tell no tales.. Also, a request for
permission to kill indicates an agent
may have slipped up somewhere along *
the line. Your, superiors in the agency
do not like mistakes. You do what you
must do to protect the national security
and you do it well. An agent (nicht
request a professional assassin if he is
confronted with a particularly compli?
cated job. Then, the agency would send
a pro or two out into the field."
It was essential that the U-2 protect
be protected by "kill" orders.
Despite his braggart's shouts, Rus-
sian Premier Nikita Khrushchev and his
predecessors knew the CIA pulled .elf
an important coup in the Cold War.
The following information was ob-
tained from a former U-2 pilot and was
verified by other sources. "The U-2 was
a beautiful plane," the pilot said. "There
were several windows built into the
bottom of the craft, designed ta
.photograph enemy installations from
high altitudes. This was an important
function of the flights over Russia and
China.
"However, there was another gadget
in the plane and a system of pushing
b. ttons at certain points along the
flight," he continued. "These buttons
actIvate-d a recording device that mare'e
a radar imprint on tape of the plane's
flight over the Earth. We obtained a
flight pattern on the tape. After
processing, the radar tape . could ba
locked into an atomic missile. The
missile guidance system is set up to
follow the exact pattern on the tape,
from launching until strikedown. The
missile might deviate off course, but It
has to come back and seek out .the
pattern on the tape.
"it is a foolproof system for directing
an atomic missile directly on target
without missing by an inch," he said.
"Once that missile is launched, nothing
other than a shoot-down can stop it
from hitting directly on target. Scramble
systems can foul up a computer-
directed missile. The typography of the
Earth for several hundred miles needle
be changed to stop a radar tape-
directed missile. That's an impossibility
so the missile is ready to hit directly en
target!
"When Francis Gary Powers crashed
and Nikita Khrushchev discovered we
had missiles homed in right on lies
head, he almost went nuts," the pito:
continued. "He knew there was abso-
lutely nothing he could do. We've been
zeroed in for years on every important
target in Russia and Red China.''
Some intelligence people believe the
crash of Powers's U-2 plane was no
accident. "The whole thing has just
never added up," the pilot concluded.
"Things are never what they seem in
espionage. A secretweapon is no good
unless the enemy knows about it." If
Powers did play such a role in a
"set-up" crash inside Russia, it would
Approved For
be the most iicredIe eseionage.story
in history,
He ? Was An !dealis: Csetrai Weill-
geoce Ageoe-y trainee:; are ealled
siOrs, Junior Officer Trainees, during.
their extensive training program. Some
trainees receive underwater and jungle
warfare training at a secret CIA camp in
a Southern swamp. Others are given
training at a CIA base located near Las
Vegas, Nev.
While assassination is seldom dis-
cussed openly by the instructors, it is
present in CIA classes by implication. A
former agent told of an instructor's
remarks to the class one afternoon
during his training. "A U.S. citizen
happened to stumble onto a base
where the 'Company' was training
Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion. He
teak several photographs of equipment
with U.S. markings on the side," the
instructor said. "This was before the
markings were to be removed for the
actual invasion. If the photographs
were published, it would have been a
very serious breach of security at the
Bay of Pigs.
"He arrived in New York and was
stopped and interrogated. Offers were
made to purchase the pictures and buy
him off. He was an idealist and refused
to cooperate," the instructor said. "He
was crossing a street when a truck
veered out of control, struck, and killed
him. And fellows, those pictures and
negatives just plain disappeared during
all the confusion."
Trainees also hear of an old, grizzled
desert gold prospector who unknow-
ingly wandered into a restricted military
area with top secret installations. "The
'Company' man knew there was a 99
percent chance the old boy would keep
his mouth shut," trainees were in-
formed. "But no chance could be taken.
The prospector was eliminated and
buried in an unmarked grave."
The CIA's assassination squads that
operated in Vietnam were known as the
Intelligence, Coordination, and Exploita-
tion unit.. Trainees were told Of ICE
terrorists, trained by Special Forces
and Green Berets, who had been
successful in capturing, or killing,
numerous Communist sympathizers.
"CIA agents worked very closeiy with
the Green Berets and UM- teams in
Vietnam," an informant said. -
Almost every ex-agent has a story
involving the death of a U.S. citizen who
unknowingly jeopardized national sec-
urity in one way or another. These
stories frequently concern someone
who stumbled onto a secret military
base on U.S. soil. These unsubstan-
tiated tales include stories of people
who wandered into a Cuban training
camp operated by the CIA in the Florida
Everglades. "Those nuts in there are
pretty darn trigger-happy.': said an
agent. "A few got into an arnument
between themselves ending with a
shoot-out that brought the county
sheriff into the brawl. It took some real
fancy footwork to keep that incident off
the front pages."
Mental instability, nervous break-
downs, and mental aberrations with
paranoid tendencies are an occupa-
tional hazard for the CIA aaent. "You
Release 2001/08/Cf8 : CIA-RDP77-0043
get to. be a bit paranoid if you're in this
business for any length of time,"
admitted a former agent. "A number of
agents have freaked out, chasing their
wives or girl friends with knives or guns.
One poor soul took an eight-inch
butcher knife and decided to carve up
his landlady. A larger than usual
number of employees are ? arrested in
Washington, D.C., or the neigntoring
comi-nunities in compromising situa-
tions involving morals charges.
"A dubious fringe benefit is a private
sanitarium," he said. "Security might be
compromised if an .agent was treated
by an outside psychiatrist. This sounds
good, but it can backfire. A young.
analyst requested to be relieved of his
duties; he felt the pressure was too
much. The agency did not act. Finally,
James Woodbury and his wife,
Dorothy, made a suicide pact and
leaped off a bridge down at Great Falls,
Va. Our suicide rate is much higher
than that for the average population."
What frightens this agent. and many
others, is a nagging fear that an agent
in the field may someday go berserk. "A
single man with training in explosives,
killing, and every type of dirty warfare
could disrupt an entire metropolitan
city," he said. "Some day we may wake
up and find such an incident on our
front pages." -
Weaponry: Like their fictional coun-
terparts, the management at the CIA
has a fascination for sophisticated
weaponry. Very few of the bizarre items
in their spy arsenal conform to the
Geneva Conventions regarding modern
.arentaries; many are so secret that few
people outside the CIA know about
? them.
One diabolical device is a candidate
for the 'ultimate weapon."
"This is an electronic gadget that
changes the role of electrical insulators
and conductors," I was told. ? "An in-
sulator becomes a conductor and vice
versa. The device can be attached7to
an automobile, a telephone, or ? an
electrical appliance, and .the victim is
electrocuted."
At present, the device works only on
a single appliance. "The labs hope to
come up with a pyramiding system,'
the informant said. "The device could
then be attached to a point in a city's
electrical system. The entire city's
electrical grid would be transformed
from positive-negative to negative-
positive. All the. humans would be
electrocuted, while the building and
2R000100360006-2
physical facilities would be unharmed:
On an even deadlier side; CIA
chemists have developed a new nerve
gas which contalos two chemicals
which are not poisonous themselves,
However, when the chemicals are
mixed with each other, a deadly nerve
gas results. "These are common
chemicals. They're stored in two
separate compartments of a bottle
which _breaks on impact," my source
said. "This makes it easy to carry a
nerve gas, without danger."
Poison is a favorite weapon among
the CIA's "black" agents. The most
useful- poisons are those of the curare
family, a CIA favorite. Crystalline curare
is extremely powerful; only 0.023 grants
are required to kill a person. One
gadget used by agedts is a curare-.
tipped dart fired from a small blowgun,
which resembles a cigarette; a cigarette
lighter can also be used as a powerful
mechanical dart gun, shooting a
poisoned dart across a room.
Other weapons include the traditional
silencer-equipped machine guns, pis-
tols, and burp guns. These are usually
equipped with custom-made ammtini-
lion that explodes on impact. "What-
ever the dark side of man can conceive,
we have incur arsenal," a former agent
said. _
"What can we conclude about the
.CIA and the use of "Kill Squads"?
Although a newcomer to international
espionage, the Central Intelligence
Agency has become one of the worlds
leading?perhaps the best?intel-
ligence gathering agencies. However,
the baiic weakness in any spy organi-
zation is that a reckless, untruthful,
unscrupulous schemer makes the per-
fect agent. The perfect agent can al-
ways be dangerous to a democratic
'society, unless held in check. We have
focused on a single aspect of the CIA;
there are many achievements and
several failures.
Today when we are so dos*
examining the CIA after seeing how the
Executive Branch of government tried
to?and did?use this organization, we
must make sure that it car; never
happen again. It's a small step from
obtaining disguises to "eliminating"'
the opposition. The CIA was formed to
preserve the freedom of the people of
the U.S.?we must never give it tha
opportunity to become our master. *
EDITOR & PUBLISHER
22 MARCH 1975
High court petition
The U.S. Supreme Court has been
petitioned to overturn an appellate
court rulbg which sustained the CIA's
right to suppress writings of former
employees about what they learned
while working for the agency. The
petition for a high court hearing was
made by Victor L. Marchetti and?John
D. Marks, co-authors of the partly
censored book, "CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence," joined by publisher Al-
fred A. Knopf Inc.
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WASHINGTON POST
16 MARCH 1975
Marcheiti
Appeals to
High Court
By John P. MacKenzie
washi=tizon Po,t Staff Writer
The Supreme Court was
asked yesterday to decide
whether the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has broad
power to suppress writings of
former employees about what`
they learned while- working
for the CIA.
Victor L. Marchetti and
John D. Marks. coauthors of
the ? partly censored book,
"CIA and the Cult Intelli-
gence," joined publisher
Alfred A. Knopf. Inc.. in seek-
ing a high Court hearing.
The Few-tit U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals last month
sustained the CIA's right to
enforce its secrecy. agreement
with Marchetti, a former high-
ranking agency employee, and
celaxed the CIA's burden ot
proving that deleted passages'
from the book contained clas-
sified information.
The low, r court eprostrated
itself before the totem of na-
tional security.' the petition
said. "and completely ignored
the compelling claims of free
.speech and free press, which
are guaranteed by the Consti-
tution."
In addition to the constitud
attack, the petition chal-
lenged the CIA's right to ob-
tain an injunction preventing
publication of the disputed
passages on grounds that Con-
gress had not authorized such
, court orders despite the agen-
cy's requests.
The authors and publisher
had won a significant victory
last year when District Judge
Albert V.. Bryan ? Jr. in Alexan-
dria rejected the CIA's claim
'that more than 20(i items of in-
formation had , been classified.
Bryan said the agency ap-
peared to classify the informa-
tion on the spot when . it
screened the matiuscript
But the court of appeals
held that information should
be deemed classified if it was'
-.classifiable" and appeared;
anywhere on a government
tleeurecrit bearina a ciassifica-
1:on s????.rop. I'ne court said
there was a "presumption at
regularity in performance by
public officials" safeguarding'
governfnent secrets, so that Ili
an item could have been clas-i
sified it was in fact classified..
Melvin L. Wulf and Floyd!
Abrams, attorneys for the au-;
thors and publisher, said thei
appellate court ignored vit.;
dence that government classi-
?
LONDON TIKES
22 March 1975
CI1-4 cooperating with Hush secrez:
service ic fi hting terr rism and
subversion spite some friction
By Louis Heren He is typical of the CIA's senior
An American newspaper re- men, and probably would not
port that Britain's Secret Intelli- know how to spy if given the
gence Service is upset because opportunity.
the Central Intelligence Agency The existence of the CIA ?
failed to pass on ate results of station here is well known to
its operations in Britain has Mr Wilson as it was to Mr Heath.
been dismissed as fiction' by and previous Prime Ministers.
those in a position W. know. The SIS ? station in Washington
The two agencies have always is also known to the White
closely cooperated with each House. Again this is standard
other since the SIS helped to Practice.
organize the CIA in the late Mr Wilson is also Personally
forties. Moreover, it was said, acquainted with CIA men. For
the CIA does? not operate in instance, Mr Chet Cooper, who
Britain.?
was second in command of the
There is, of course, a CIA
station in London, but any in- CIA's London station before
formation it wanted on British becoming a special assistant to
affairs would almost certainly President Johnson, was in an
be available front official upstairs room in Chequers the
sources. If it were not available, night the Prime Minister tried
the British security services to reach an agreement with Mr
could be expected to cooperate. Koss:gin, the Soviet Prime
According to sources there Minister, to prolong the 'bomb-
has, however, been some fric-
tion between the two agencies. si-les.
The first is due to antipathy Mr Cooper was there, with an
between personalities, which is open line to the White House,
generally unavoidable when two because Mr Wilson knew that
nations cooperate, although he could trust him,
there is said to be less friction The Labour motion calling on
between the two intelligence the Government to declare the
agencies than between. say, the resident CIA men persona non
Foreign Office and the State
Department. rata therefore served no put-
. ?
The second is Olaf th Dose' except perhaps to dis-
tract attention from the visit
and indeed other friendly intel- here next month of Mr Shele-
ligence services, is beginning to pin, the former head of the
feel that the CIA can no longer KGB.
be trusted with secrets because Unbek no V.11 to those who
defectors such .as Marchetti and Signed the motion, the purpose
Agee are likely to publish them. of those behind the campaign
There is also some apprehension may have been to discredit the
that they could be revealed dur-
ing the course of impending
congressional investigations into
the CIA.
The staff of the CIA station
in London includes only
analysts, researchers and ad-
ministrators. That is standard
practice as even the defectors
have made clear in their revela-
tions.
Mr Cord Meyer, the station
chief, originally worked for a
One World movement, and after-
wards became expert in inter-
national organizations and rela-
tions, especially labour relations.
lying officers do not classify
everything that could be chas-i-
sifted.
The book has been :pub- i
lished with numerous blank ;
. spaces marking CIA deletions. i
If the court decides to hear
the case, oral argument would
be in the fall. If the court re-
jects the petition, the apellate?
court ruling will stand.
?
Approved For Release 2001/08)&8
new American Ambassador, air
Elliot Richardson.
Tleo main mutual interests of
the CIA and the British intelli-
gence and security services,
apart from sharing a variety of
information from third coun-
tries, is the detection of for-
eign spies in the upper reaches
cegovernments. Another is the
struggle against international
terrorism.
The latter obviously requires
close cooperation between most
friendly intelligence services,
especially since the terrorisi
groups have established links
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
19 MARCH 1975
with the Mafia and other crire
inal elements.
,A third is. subversion. Lord
Chalfont spoke about this re-
newed threat in a recent detivie
in the House of Lords. The
Times reported last year thet
the CIA was investigating sub
version in Britain. It avm
denied, but there is no reasoa
to believe that the report was
not generally correct. .
The extra CIA men thea
reported to be in Britain were
understood to be experts skit',
led in the use of advanced sur-
veillance techniques. They heel
come to Britain to help train
members of British securily
services.
In the Lords debate. Lutd
Chalfont said: " There were also
in society a considerable nura-
bet of people known in the
jargon of intelligence as
'sleepers'.They did not pursue
at this moment any extremist
or subversive activity but when
the time came would be activa-
ted and do whatever they had
to do to achieve their aims."
The " sleepers " are said to
be placed in strategic areas;
such as public utilities, the
docks and the various commu-
nications systems, as well as
elsewhere. It is said that in
the event of a national emer-
gency they could bring the
country to a standstill.
This may sound overly drama-
tic, but it cannot be dismissal
as a figment of the heat&
imagination of Colonel Stirling
and his private army. It is a
danger taken quite seriously,
but level-headedly, not only in
Britain, but in the Uniml
States and other Western
countries.
There is small reason to get
excited about what can only be
regarded as another phase of
the ideological struggle that has
long been evident, but it helos
to explain why friendly gov-
ernments want close coopera-
tion between their intelligence
services.
Such cooperation is as es:--2,eir-
tial as Interpol is in the dues--
tion of international crime.
EA W?iI 612, res
By JOSEPH VOLZ and FRANK VAN RIPER
Washington, March 1S (News Bureau)?The Centr:';
Intelligence Agency, apparently trying to win over fres-
man congressmen, invited the 75 newcomers to breakfz9-4-
jin the well guarded spy shop today. But the get-acquaint:'
affair fell flat when. Director William E. Colby refusli
:to answer detailed questions about alleged assassinatka
'plots
. Only -about 20 freshmen law-
makers showed up for the
breakfast at the agency's head-
'quarters in nearby Langley, Va. ,
Many of the freshman said
they had ben -.disappointed at
Colby 's reticence:
.
Colbyib' reportedly. gave I only
one definite response during; Et
hour-long session, that at times
saW him managing a shoe.
projector to help deliver his lec-
ture.. That was when he was
asked if the CIA had had any-
thing to. do with the Jobs F.-
Kennedy assassination.
? e director replied.
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26 MARCH 1975
'PIA deserve
praise hr
ry SMITH HEMPSTONE
WASHINGTON ? When Jack Ander-
sm blew the CIA's cover on Operation
Jennifer, he compromised not only a
possible second attempt to raise the
yes: of that Russian sub from the floor
of thn Pacific but other potential simi-
lar salvage operations that could have
ci:ntributed to our national security.
It is impossible to say what might
hate been retrieved this July from the
Go:f class boat that sank 750 miles off
Hawaii in 1963, if only because it is not
clear what precisely was salvaged last
s=mer.
Most CZ the reports imply that the
operation recovered the
forward third of the diesel-electric sub-
marine containing the remains of
. some of the Russian crew but neither
hydrogen-warhead missiles nor coding
Had a second salvage attempt, now
certainly precluded by Ander-
son's radio broadcast and the press re-,
Ports that followed it, been successful,
the resulLs certainly would have been
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 April 1975
drznriss ergo
By the Associated Press
Miami
former moTtgage broker says his
e7132e conces'eed. plicely mortgages which
inettecl 03 million or 04 million on behalf of
inhae ha beileved was the CIA, the Miami
Flestsid said in recant editions. The CIA
eels', it was not levolvecl in the scheme.
Arnlees Castro told the Herald a story of
...nteirstete skulduggery that ended when
i'sbeetereg?e license tens seized and he
idea:End running to avoid people who had
thae defrauded, the newrinnper said.
"The CIA made me do it," Mr. Castro
told the Heentd.
Thst the Herald quoted a CIA spokesman
as saying, "This poor guy's been taken,
and it's none of our doing whatsoever.
This one ain't on us, dad."
The Heeald said at least the federal
grand jury was investigating the fraud
scheme and Mr. Castro was under in-
ves....igaticn by several federal agencies.
The scheme involved &settling mort-
gagee by selling good ones along with
forgen3 cnas to raise money fast, the
newspaper said.
Mr. Castro said he believed he was
dealing with the CIA because one of the
men involved was Antonio Yglesias, who
has a long history of CIA connectlens
dating back to the 1951 Bay of Pigs
Invasion, the Herald said.
;lett Jen ifer
. .
worth the money. ?
Had the salvage of. the. Golf class
boat been completed in, secrecy, would
it have been possible for the CIA ship :
Glernar Explorer to retrieve' the 're-
mains 'of the nuclear-powered Novem-
ber class Russian submarine that ? is
believed to have sunk off Spain in
ApriV1970? Recovery of that whale-
shaped boat's nuclear plant would
have been an intelligence coup of the
.first Order.
. With the perfect vipio'n of hind-
'sight, the CIA's Critics' maintain that
Project. Jennifer was both stupid
since it' conceivably could damage'
relations. with the Soviet. Union ?
'and wasteful. ? ?
But a couple of points have to be
niade:
The *ration was well within the
CIA's mandate: It was ? subjected to
intense scrutiny within: the govern-
ment, approved by' the ? "Forty Com-
mittee" of the National Security
Council chaired by Henry Kissinger
,and okayed by Presidents Nixon and
Ford. Key congressmen including
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans-
field ? and Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chair-
man of the House Select Intelli-
gence Committee," were briefed on
Jennifer; ?
. Given the continuing. Soviet arms
buitu-up and the uncertainty of the
Kremlin's intentions, the CIA would
?have been derelict in its duty had it
,
not Made the effort to' gain the intel-
'ligence sealed in the sunken sub's
crushed hull.
The CIA is wide open to...criticism
on some matters. But, that 'members;
of. Congress and' other,. people should..
attack the agenck.for 'conducting an
imaginative ? project.. for, which it
should be praised .show S what a
topsy-turvy' world this is.
Jack Anderson won the Pulitzer
Prize in 1972 for revealing the Amer-
ican "tilt".. toward Pakistan during
the Indo-Pakistani War. "For blowing
the cover on an ongoing, important
and ,legitimate CIA operation, be
ought to get the -.Daniel Ellsberg
Award for 1975.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY,MARCH 20, 1975
ritishM.P.'s Link 10 Attaches to C.I.A.
Spee'al 0 The New York Times
LONDON, March 19?Labor
members of Parliament said to-
night that 10 officials listed as
attaches at the United States
Embassy here were linked with
the Central Intelligence Agency.
A motion presented to the
House of Commons by 34 mem-
bers, most of them associated
with the left wing of the gov-
erning party, demanded the im-
mediate expulsion of the offi-
cials unless the United States
Government could substantiate
that they were truly diplomats.
One of the signers: Dennis'
Skinner', named Cord Meyer Jr.
as head of the C.I.A.'s em-
bassy team and said he was
shortly to be withdrawn from
Britain.
Mr. Meyer is known to be
the C.I.A. station chief in Brit-
ain, although he is listed in the
Foreign Office's London Diplo-
matic list as "attach.." He is
understood to he due for re-
tirement irt August.
Others Listed
The motion named the other
nine as: .
Benjamin J. Price, John W. ; The motion th CIA
ffey?.'..1 , A.
Spencer Braham, William Mc-
Ghee, Joseph C. Thep, Joseph
P. Sherman, George Ford II and
John A. Reed Jr.. Mr. Reed is
listed in ? the Diplomatic List
as "AttacM (political-military)"
and all the others as "attach?
Several have been listed in
the State Department's bio-
graphical records as having
been "analysts" and ? "commu-
nications officers."
Two other signers of the mo-
tion, Stanley Newens and
Thomas Litterick, said they had
carried out an investigation
that indicated none of the 10
were employes of any United
States Government agencies
with legitimate interest in for-
eign affairs.
Mr. Neteens has often been
linked with ? left-wing causes
and his name frequently ap-
pears on rank-and-file motions
such as the one presented to-
night. Mr. Littcrick has been in
the Commohs only six months.;
Although the motion was I
signed by 34 meinbers, it is un-
likely the Government will find
time to debate it.
20
sayse .
?'has interfered. in the internal'
affairs of Many countries and
the "subversion and overthrew
of governments in Guaterrink
Iran, Guyana, Chile and oiler
countries." ?
It asks the Government to
inform the United States Csat
evidence exists to indicate friar
the 10 accorded diplomatic
credentials are associated with
C.I.A. work and adds, "Unlessi
this can be disproved forthwith,
each must be regarded as pu--
'sona non grata and withdrawn
from Britain immediately.
Prime Minister Wilson was
lasted in the Commons yes,ri-
iday whether he would take
action against CIA. activities
in this country, He replied ff.:a
he was awaiting the outcome e
the inquiry into the C.I.A. Mee;
held in the United States zed
would not hesitate to hold
independent inquiry should een' .
sluice be found that its hger.?.5.
were operating in Britain tine?li
'diplomatic cover.
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Arid! 7, 1975
AS
EINC
CI
EEKS
S
Seldom has this country had greater need of an efficient
intelligence service overseas. Yet, experts report: Never has
the CIA been in such disarray as it is today.
America's worldwide espionage appa-
ratus is being shaken to its foundations
by the crisis currently gripping the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
A "damage assessment" based :on in-
formation froth top CIA officials and
Allied intelligence authorities in Europe
shows?
? Foreigners serving as secret agents
are frightened that they will be exposed
by leaks in Washington?which could be
fatal. Result: A number of veteran spies
are curtailing their activities or quitting
altogether.
? Recruiting of new foreign agents
overseas is falling off sharply. Some who
volunteered have since changed their
minds. They regard the risk as too great.
? Intelligence services in
friendly countries are worried
about continued collaboration.
with the CIA. They are fearful
that their secrets may be com-
promised or their governments
embarrassed. The London
Times reports:
"The SIS [Britain's Secret In-
telligence Service], and indeed
other friendly intelligence ser-
vices, are beginning to feel that
the CIA can no longer be trust-
ed with secrets."
? American companies that
in the past extended invaluable
assistance to the CIA overseas
now are getting cold feet. They
fear that their activities in this
field?for example, providing
"cover" for American agents
abroad?may be exposed. That
could be disastrous for their for-
eign enterprises.
Three probes. This is only a
preliminary inventory of the
impact on America's overseas
intelligence network of the lat-
est?and most serious?crisis in
the 28-year history of the CIA.
The full effect will not be
measurable until completion of
the three separate investiga-
tions that are examining the Agency's
operations?one conducted by a "blue
ribbon" presidential commission and the
other two by Senate and House select
committees.
These unprecedented investigations
were triggered initiallY by charges last
December that the CIA had engaged in
illegal domestic spyidg on a 'massive
scale?mainly against groups opposing
the Vietnam War, and other protest
movements.
The scope of the inquiries has been
21-
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steadily expanded to encompass new al-
legations that have surfaced recently.
One claims that Agency officials plot-
ted?but did not carry out?assassina-
tions of three foreign leaders. President
Ford is said to have received a verbal
report on these incidents from CIA Di-
rector William E. Colby.
Another allegation put on the agenda
of the three investigating bodies: Ac-
cording to Chief Postal Inspector Wil-
liam J. Cotter, CIA agents for 20 years
opened mail to Russia and other Com-
munist countries in violation of postal
laws?until he issued an ultimatum in
1973 ordering them to desist.
Even the CIA's latest coup?the sal-
vaging of part of a sunken Soviet missile
submarine in the Pacific Ocean?is to be
investigated.
The chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Senator
Frank Church (Dem.), of Idaho, has
questioned the expenditure of a report-
ed 350 million dollars on this project?
which included the secret construction
of an ocean-mining vessel able to lift a
portion of the submarine from 3-mile-
deep ocean waters.
Fear of "witch hunt." The men who
run the CIA now express the fear that
what started as a legitimate investiga-
tion into alleged wrongdoings may be
turning into a witch hunt that could
destroy this country's secret intelligence
organization. CIA Director Colby put it
bluntly:
"The almost hysterical excitement
that surrounds any news story mention-
ing CIA, or referring to any perfectly
legitimate activity of CIA, has raised the
question whether secret intelligence op-
erations can be conducted by the United
States."
Mr. Colby is concerned not only about
the damage to .America's overseas intel-
ligence setup but also the devastating
effect on morale and discipline at the
CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va.,
across the Potomac from Washington.
Most of the Agency's 16,000 employes
are stationed there.
Double problem. A survey indicates
that morale is being affected in two
ways.
Among one group of CIA officials,
there is dismay?and bitterness?caused
by the disclosure of the Agency's in-
volvement in improper, and possibly
even illegal, activities. The Agency oper-
ates on a tightly compartmentalized ba-
sis, and this group was largely ignorant
of the operations that led to the current
crisis.
"These people are asking bitterly how
we could have done these things, how
they can explain it to their children:
says an official responsible for monitor-
ing staff morale.
They blame officials dealing with co-
vert operaticins?"the dirty-tricks de-
partment'?and counterintelligence for
the Ageney's troubles.
. Another group of CIA staff members:
are demoralized?and bitter?for a dif-
ferent reason. They feel that the Agency
is being ' "victimized" because of the
atmosphere created by Watergate.
Their attitude is described by an au-
thoritative source:
"These men believe that they have
done their duty during these years, that
they have been dedicated citizens. Now
they are told that they may need a
lawyer."
They complain that they are victims
of a "time lag." In the words of one
officer with a lifetime .career in intelli-
gence: "We are being judged by the
ethics and security needs of 1975 for
actions that were considered necessary
in the cold-war climate of the 1950s and
1960s. Junior officers in the CIA are
asking whether they will be called upon
in 1990 to explain what they are doing
today."
Work priority. A major problem for
top CIA officials is to keep both of these
groups working effectively while investi-
gations unfold and new sensations are
splashed in the newspapers.
"You must understand how all of this
is affecting the culture pattern of intelli-
gence," declares a ranking officer. "Peo-
ple in this business feel that they are
supposed to lead secret lives, hidden
away out of the glare of publicity. Imag-
ine how damaging it is to morale when
they read stories almost daily in their
newspapers about the secret operationr
of the CIA and when many of them are
called to testify before congressional
committees."
The CIA's operations at its Langley
headquarters are adversely affected in
another way by the current furor. Direc-
tor Colby is compelled to spend more
than, half of his time defending the CIA
before various investigating bodies aLlA
dealing with other problems unrelated
to his job of gathering and analyzing
intelligence.
A paper problem. Besides the de-
mands of the official investigations, top
CIA officials also are being forced to
devote more and more time to handling
requests for documents under the new
Freedom of Information Act.
Because of the exceedingly sensitive
nature of intelligence operations, these
requests must be processed by senior:
officials.
Mr. Colby iays that one specific re-
quest would require the agency to
search through and review 900,000 files_
He adds:
"A good-faith attempt to comply wills
the spirit of the new Freedom of Infor-
mation Act will have a serious impact osin
this Agency."
Among CIA officials, there now is a
consensus that in spite of the danger of
compromising secrets, a thoroughgoing
investigation is essential to restore Agen-
cy morale and public confidence.
It's felt that there is no other way for
the Agency to make its case. A high-
ranking officer who is resigning in order
to organize a campaign to defend the
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19 March ? 197 5
Vilii..41AM F. BUCKLEY
CIA explains:
"Snowballing innuendo, egregious sto-
vies and charges, and even honest con-
cerns have presented us with a basic
dilemma of issuing either a general
statement which reassures few but pre-
serves security; or a comprehensive ac-
counting which satisfies some but at the
expense of operations and agents."
The officer, David Phillips, chief of
Latin-American operations, says that un-
der the circumstances "there is little
doubt that a thorough congressional re-
view is the best, if not the only solution,
even though some leakage of sensitive
details on foreign operations seems al.
most inevitable."
"Wasn't illegal." Mr. Colby, the CIA
Director, expresses confidence that the
investigations will exonerate the Agency
on the main charges leveled against it
In his words:
"41. think that the results of the investi-
gation will rather clearly show . . . that
the program that we undertook to iden.
;ify foreign links with American dissi.
dent movements was not a massive one
in the numbers involved, was not a do-
mestic one because it was basically for-
eign, and it wasn't illegal because it was
under our charter and our National Se-
curity Act."
He maintains that all questionable do-
mestic operations were terminated in
1973?after the entire staff of the CIA
was invited to submit private reports
directly to the Director concerning any
imprope- activity of which they were
aware.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the
three-way investigation of the Agency,
this fact is now becoming increasingly
clear:
America's worldwide intelligence ap-
paratus will be operating under a severe
handicap at a time of dangerous crisis in
foreign policy.
WASHINGTON POST
1 April 1975
(r/T14
-Li ,
7.)-,..?)I'd:
united Press Inteniatianal
A panel of four professora
gave the Rockefeller COMtiti-
Eital omflicting testimony 3.'-
terday over the best way to
prevent the Central Intelli-
A panel of four professors
rence Agency from invading
the privacy of Americans.
All four agreed that some
sort of agency should be cre-
ated to oversee the CIA in an
effort to monitor its spy activi-
ties. Sonic said the monitoring
effort could be conducted in-
sid?, the CIA while others ar-
gued, for an independent
board.
?
CIA has to Lie Until
The Leaks et Plugged
Henry L. Stimson, the former secre-
ta-'y of war, is often quoted as having
said, in the manner of a character in a
P. G. Wodehouse novel, that "gentle-
men don't read other gentlemen's
mail." That observation which aborted
an inchoate Central Intelligence Agency
? and left us all feeling very good about
the natural aristocratic habits of our
secretary of war ? may just have had
something to do with failing to abort a
world war ? which left us feeling very
bad, particularly those who died fight-
ing that war. It is only true that gentle-
men don't read other gentlemen's mail
in a world in which gentlemen can be
counted on not to launch wars against
one another.
It is highly improbable, as Lincoln
said in his most famous address, which
is intoned but never analyzed, that self-
governing republics can last, very long
in the tumult of history. There are many
reasons for this, but one of them is the
insistence that knowledge of everything
that goes on always leads to an im-
provement in the general situation. It
might be called the, Masters and John-
son approach to political democracy. It
is in very full flower at the moment, and
the investigations of the activity of the
Central Iatelligence Agency are a case
in point.
Miles Copeland, the author who was
once with the CIA and still speaks and
writes about it more authoritatively and
engagingly than. anyone I know, has
written an essay called, "Is There a
CIA in Your Future?" Consider, please,
a most remarkable passage in it.
". . Almost all the agency people I
talked to" ? Copeland is referring to a
recent visit to Washington (he now lives
in London) ? "assured me unashamed-
ly, almost proudly, 'Of course we are
going to lie to the congressional commit-
tees.' They felt that as loyal Americans
they cannot do otherwise ? except in
the unlikely event the members of the
committees can be held accountable for
their leaks, impossible in the present
atmosphere.
"Let me give an example. Let us sup-
inged -)0 Pour
The four appeared at the
12th weekly meeting of the
commission, which was Cre-
ated by PI e.-?itient F'ord to it,-
vestigate charges of illegal do-
mestic spying by the CIA and
to recommend possible changes
in the agency's charter to
more clearly prohibit domestic
activity. ?
Arthur II. Miller, a Harvard
law professor, said that the
CIA could set up its Own
board to monitor its activities.
But William W. Van Al-
styne, a Duke University law
professor,said he did not be-
lieve such a board would he.
pose (I'm not saying he is, but let us
suppose) that Algeria's President
Boumedienne is cooperating hand in
glove with the CIA in its pursuit of the
terrorists who have received sanctuary
or training in his country, while appeas-
ing the Palestinians and his own
extremists by pretending publicly that
he hates us. And let us suppose that
some member of Sen. Church's commit-
tee asks Bill Colby, 'Mr. Colby, is it true
that President Boumedienne is secretly
cooperating with the CIA?'
"Well, Mr. Colby will at that moment
have before him three alternatives. He
can say, 'Yes, Senator, that is so' ? in
which case, past experience tells him,
the whole world will be able to read his
answer the next day in the New York
Times, and either Boumedienne's coop-
eration or Boumedienne himself will be
finished.
"Or he can say, 'Sorry, Senator, but
that's top-secret information' ? with
the same result, since such an answer.
will be interpreted as a `yes' by the
American press, the American public;
the Algerian public and, of course, the
members of the committee. Or he can
say, 'Who? Did you say Boumedienne?
My God, I never heard anything so,
ridiculous!' A lie. For the good of all of
us, including the congressmen who must
take the blame for any leak.
"Let us hope that Bill Colby lies. Our-
mutual friends at the agency assure me,
that he will ? or that if he doesn't, he
will be finished, and that some of those
who will be first in line calling for his
head will be those very congressmen
who were supposed to be beneficiaries
of his candor."
I cannot imagine a better example of
the kind of thing we face. Congress,
begins by failing to enact legislation
that effectively punishes someone who
perpetrates a leak. Can't do it, some of
them say ? First Amendment. But if
the First Amendment makes it impossi-
ble to insist on secrecy, do you say then,
Very well, the world will get on without
secrecy? Try it. But first, create a gen-
tlemen's world.
"publicly reassuring."
Edward J. Bloustein, presi-
dent of Rutgers 'University,
slid he also favored an indc-
p,mcierit agency named by thit
executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial branches.
The fourth witness, Dr. Or-
ville .f. Brim jr., president of
the Foundation for Child De-
velopment, New York City, and
an expert en individual pri-
vacy, said he also believed in
an independent body.
In addition to the four pro-
fessors, the commission also
heard from a CTA official
not named for security reasons,
Int. YORK DAILY NEWS
17 MARCH 1975
DELLA & THE CIA
Queens: It was most gratifying.
to read that the Central
Intetli-
gc-nce Agency had been keeping
f tabs on Rep. Bella Abzug. I hope
that it is doing the same with
? every other American who thinks
? he or she has the right to deal
with Commutiist-hloc nacions. In-
dividual rights do not supercede
? the security of the nation
BILL B.
2/
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8 KS
.NATION
5 APRIL 1975
CIA: Can We Reale It? Can
atchi g he
INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary.
By Philip Agee. Penguin Books, Ltd.
640 pp. 95 pence.
? ?
Rep. Michael .7. Harrington
Like corpses sent to the bottom of a
.river, stories of CIA wrongdoing were
bound to come to the surface eventually.
But few critics would have predicted that
so much incriminating evidence: could
float to the top in just half a yeal;
It has been about that long since reve-
lations of CIA activity in Chile first made
? front-page news, coinciding with numer-
ous articles and books attempting to
penetrate the fog ? surrounding the U.S.
intelligence community. Since then,, ac-
counts of widespread domestic surveil-
? lance have stimulated the public's interest
all the more, finally provoking the Con-
gress to take action.
The Central Intelligence Agency, for
its part, took the counteroffensive early.
When The CIA: The Cult of Intelligence
was in proof, the agency had portions
censored, claiming that the authors, John
-Marks and Victor Marchetti, were not
allowed to use certain information be-
cause of the secrecy oaths they signed
when they were on the inside. As a re-
suit, the book was published with gaps
Of white space where sensitive informa-.
tion was deleted.
? Now another damning book by a. for-
mer CIA agent has come out, but this
one requires no filling-in of the blanks..
Unlike the Marks-Marchetti book, it
couldn't be censored because the author,
Philip Agee, gave the publication rights
for the first edition to a British publish-
ing company and does not plan to return
to the United States until it is published
here?which it will be, because publishers
don't sign secrecy oaths.
When it appears in American book-
stores, Inside the Company: CIA Diary,
even though it is long and detailed, will
probably be as successful as it has been
in the British Commonwealth. In fact, it
may be for just this reason that it has
succeeded. .Public curiosity ? hai -been
aroused but 'far from satisfied by the
limited accounts available thus fare
? To those who have followed the CIA
or U.S.-Latin American politics more
than casually, much of -Agee's informa-
tion is at least predictable. For the ex-
Michael Harlington represents the 6th Dis-
trict in Massachusetts and is a member of
the new House Select Committee to investi-
gate intelligence operations. An outspoken
critic of the intelligence community, he also
serves on the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee.
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tech e
AM:wt. It t A111?
perts, much was common knowledge.
Almost since the beginning of the Repub-
lic, the United States has manhandled
Latin American nations, and the potential
dimensions of CIA activity have been
recognized since the agency was created .
at the start of the cold war in 1947.
What shocks us in Agee's book are the
specifics. Based on the quality and quan-
tity of the CIA's operations in just three
Latin American nations, the worldwide
possibilities are staggering.
Written in diary form (though the
author admits to having reconstructed his
twelve-year association with "the Com-
pany"), Agee traces his development
from a Midwestern Catholic university
through tours with Air Force intelligence
at the beginning of his CIA career to
specialized covert training, assignments
in Ecuador,- Uruguay, Washington, D.C.
and Mexico, and ultimately, to his es-
trangethent from the agency. The con-
cluding chapters, describing the tribu-
lations .of writing the hook with CIA
harassment, demonstrate the CIA's less-
than-official attempts at censorship.
Agee's stories of the life pf an agent
run from the 'mundane to the bizarre.
Hours are spent opening and reading'
mall; intricate plans. are made to coerce
potential informdpts. And, like .every
organieetion man, Agee tells of playing
golf with the boss and worrying about
promotions.
' Of course, each bureaucracy has its
stories to tell, but behind the anecdotes
in Agee's account lies a bigger story?
one of .buying and selling state officials
(Agee lists four Latin American Pres-
idents) and of governing governments
(Agee relates the CIA's manipulation of
Ecuador's political parties, press and mil-
itary which resulted in the 1963 coup).
? As Agee tells it, his first years in the
service were satisfying, and he worked
hard. It wasn't until the U.S. intervention
in the Dominican Republic and his own
*wakening to the brutality of CIA-
supported governments that he began to
question what he was doing. His dis-
enchantment, which stemmed from as-
signments such as infiltrating the Olympic
Games in 1968, led him to general con-
elusions about U.S. foreign policy.
Even with its focus on personal history,
the book illustrates fundamental dilem-
naas about our foreign relations. What
ought the United States to do abroad?
What tenets should guide our decisions?
? Last December President Ford, in ex-
plaining U.S. involvement in the so-
called "destabilieation" of Salvador
Allendes government in Chile, gave an
answer that reflects official thinking since
1947. "Oiu government, like other goy-? -
emrnents, does take certain actions in the
intelligence field to help implement for-
eign policy and protect national security."
At the bottom of this response is an
"anything goes" mentality that fails to
draw a distinction between intelligence
gathering and covert intervention. Con-
gress shares the blame for the repercus-
sions of this thinking. Neither the House
nor the Senate has seriously pondered
the implications of lumping benign intel-
ligence activity with aggressive subver-
sion. In fact, oversight committees, by
refusing over the years to askdpertinent
questions about CIA operations, have not
faced the fact that both exist.
.ConsequentlYi CIA operations have
been guided by only one rule: don't get
caught. The result has been intervention
such as Agee describes in Ecuador and
Uruguay, neither of which poses even
the remotest hemispheric threat to our
"national securityd!
Olin Robinson of Bowdoin College has
explained the phenomenon simply: -The
CIA suffers from a syndrome which
might be labeled 'all dressed up and
nowhere to* go.' It is an organization
with extraordinary capabilities employing
some of the mose' talented people in
government service (the Watergate per-
sonalities notwithstanding). The natural
bureaucratic tendency is toward self-
perpetuation, and no large organintion
is likely to change its policies and opera-
tions without external pressure to do so."
Since Agee started his book three years
ago, the serious threat to the nation's
well-being posed by the existence of an
heeellieea= agency that is armed for cold
was has increased. It is clearly up to the
Congress to put the heat on the CIA s
it will not frustrate efforts for d?nte.
T'33 is the only realistic approach. The
ability of the United States to dictate to,
the rest of the world, including Latin
Aeric a, has rlitnirtished.. And it has ba-
=r-tt incr=singly obvious that where tee
have intervened in theP.affairs of oth-v
nations, we have not necessarily here
proved the quality of life for citi-
zan.s but rather supported repressive
reeimes such as that of the Chilean junta.
With the increasing economic intertle-
p=d.e--a= of nations, international' ?pie,.
ion carries more weight and demauen
that the United States treat its neighbor's
civilly.
A re-evaluation of the Central InleE-
gence Agency in the light of these foreign
policy considerations should be one of
the main tasks of the Congressional
committees that will be investigating
intelligence in the coming months.. While
the CIA may not be obsolete; as
Agee suggests, its policies certainly are
anachronistic. And there is reason to be-
lieve that company men as dedicated-as
Agee seems to have been will be valuable
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the medium of expression of Seynacram
Hersh of The New York Times, La:-
rence Stern of The Washington Post an
Jack Anderson, all of whose reports or
the CIA no doubt contributed to the
CongressiOnal decisions?urged there byt
among others, Rep. Michael liarringtoe
of Massachusetts, Sen. William Proxmirt.
of Wisconsin and Sen. Frank Church or
Idaho. Church, by the way, heads the,
Select Committee of the Senate, where
his experieisce as chairman of the For-
eign Relations subcommittee on mul
national corporations may come ir
handy in getting to the fundamental CIA
point?that it is in cahoots with hia
business, which reigns, now more openly
than ever, in the executive branch. he
deed, the story of the -journalistic eat-
posure of the role of the CIA in world
affairs begins much earlier with Tke
Nation's special issue devoted to that
very subject, written by the veteran
journalist, Fred J. Cook, and published
June 24, 1961.
At any rate, the Prouty and Mar-
chetti-Marks books and the Phil;
Agee account are different from boob
.about the CIA written before 1971,
when it became evident that the cold
war, and its attendant devil theory of
communism, were being toned down.
The rationale for earlier semi-official
documentaries by leaders of the agence
?Allen Dulles, who is listed as authos
of The Craft of Intelligence, and Lyman
B. Kirkpatrick, writer of The Re,4I clA
?no longer applied, politically speaking.
This gives their books, already, a nevi=
? of ancient history. And even though the
same cannot be said for some other
books rooted in that period?The In,
visible Government by David Wise and
Thomas B. Ross, an ambitious and valisn).
job of investigative reporting; The Secret
War by Sanche de Gramont; Stewart
Steven's Operation Splinter Factor, at
Miles Copeland's Without Cloak or Dag-
ger?the fact remains that these were
done by outsiders. Whereas Prouty, Mar-
chetti and Agee were CIA insiders,
whose rethinking of their lives, their
roles, the nature of the agency's "opera-
tions," could not have occurred, in nea
opinion, until big business switched the
foreign policy signals. This switch else
accounts for the distinction between th
objectives of Marchetti and Prouty et.
the one hand and Agee on the other.
All three have horror stories to tei.
But Prouty and Marchetti, first on tin
scene with their books critical of the
CIA, concentrate mainly on the won
I have just placed in quotes: "opera
tions." Both mention Harry Trurrierh
1963 remark: "I never had any tho'er
when I set up the CIA that it wouid 'era
injected into peacetime cloak-aed-daet--
operations." Marchetti gets even meat
specific, using former CIA ihirecter,
Richard Helms as source: "Operationl
involves overthrowing foreign govene?
ments, subverting elections, bribing Int-
ficials and waging "secret" wars. H. goes
on to make the point that "the
gate scandal scandal has also opened up the C17..
to increased scrutiny." Undoubtedly
has. Whether or not Watergate was
onche agency gnideliees are iheuared with
"fi.153a200M-it coneerne. In the
meantime, rageshi tentientiete . in a usetel
seed necessary reminder of the genuine
hotarnese machecintschspyings
7
112C & ymisthwev?.
??
',cal: CIA AND THE CULT OF IN-
TE:womca By Victor Marchetti
a-4 John Marks.-.Allred A. Knopf.
pp. $8.9.5. Pc,xo: Deli Publishing
re.'
SECRET ThAlk;I: The CIA and its
ALlies in Control of the United States
tend the World. By L. Fletcher Prouty.
Prentice-Hallo 496 pp. $8.95. Paper: Ba!-
Irfne Books. $1.95. ?
AthatM lie.e7 (GM
If is aye,. as world figures of, "the
eSothist camp' have recently .been sugs
tatneding, that the international struggle
iretstasein their way of life and ours is
shifting from military cionfrontation to
Ach%alogiciar competition., where does that
the CIA? Under scrutiny. Report-
era, book writers?some of them with
dirs or associated CIA. experience?a
a Presidential commission and two select
Coesional committees, one from the
Hotesen one the Senate, have placed the
CIA in the most public position since
its ereation as a super-secret, financially
meamounreble, globally free-wheeling-
stred-deling gang of operatives and op-
ensaorsin 1947. That is to say, the
Ceateal Intelligence Agency was founded
on coldswat premises, assigned o beat
the bad guya by hook or crook, advised
that the phrase "national security" would
lee employed on the highest levels to
justify any damn thing that went right
or wrong--expected, in short, to serve as
roving agents of the policy of corporate
geotaphical, expansionism which had its
ateigins in are Westward-ho era of the
a9tk, centusy, initiated almost as soon as
the Citril. War came to an end. .
'This has to be clear: that the. CIA has
finnetione-d, bankrolled by billions of pub-
lie money to be sure, in behalf of pri-
vate economic interests?of what used
to be called simply big business. It is
not made clear, however?not "per-
fectly clear" perhaps I should say?in
much of what has so far been written
about the CIA. Exceptions, let me
quickly add, can be noted. For example,
material published by NACLA (North
American Congress on Latin America)
and by certain othertradical and liberal
institutions has been informed by the
CIA-big business perspective. I gather,
too, that the book by the former CIA
officer Philip Agee, already released in.
England and also, scheduled for 'U.S.
poblication here t by Straight Arroiv
Books (Rolling Stene), reflects such a
point of view. Agee discussed his book,
Inside The Company: CIA Diary, in
an interview with John Gerassi carried
by a weekly Boston periodical, The Real
Paper, in the issue of February 19. "f
have learned over the yearse". Agee said,
"that the CIA wad the government as a
whole does not represent the interest of
the people of the United States. Its main
-function?and this is clear in our policies
in Latin America, in those policies which
I helped to carry out for twelve years?
is to help, to represent that class of
Americans who profit in Latin America
. ? the rich?!
There seems to be a certain logic,
a logic of time and development, gov-
erning the process of the production of
books about the CIA. Compare, for ins
stance., the political-economy - under-
standing of Agee with that indicated by
the authors of two earlier volumes, The
CIA and the Cuts of Intelligence by
Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks,
and The Secret Team by L Fletcher
Prouty. (Both are now available in
paperback; Marchetti served as much
time in the CIA as Agee, mostly in
Washington; Marks was once a State
Department intelligence analyst; Prouty,
nine years an Air Force colonel, acted
as lieison officer in procurement be-
tween. the Department of Defer= and
the CIA.) At one point ,Marchetti-
Marks, with what I assecae to be agree-
ment, quote the columnist Tom Braden,
"former high-ranking CIA covert ex-
pert," as saying in January 1973: "Josef
Stalin's- decision to attempt conquest of
Western.- Europe by manipulation, the
use of ?fronts and the purchase of loy-
alty turned the Agency (CIA) into a
heuie of dirty nicks. It was necessary.
Absolutely necessary, in my view. But
it -lasted long after the necessity was
gonei" Prouty takes the retrospective
position that U.S. leaders (such as Harry
Truman).got off on the wrong foot by
automatically "reacting' to Communist
strategy and tactics rather than buckling
down to the formation of art affirmative,
presumably democratic course of action
in the post-World War II world.
I have no intention of downgrading
the Marchetti-Marks and Prouty books.
They are valuable, instructive works,
written by "insiders" who know what
they're. talking about arid who finally dis-
covered that they were compelled to take
the risks involved in revealing CIA sub-
version of democratic tenets. Further-
more, both books seem to have played a
part in pershading members of Congress,
after almost twenty-eight years, to estab-
lish special committees charged with re-
sponsibility for. cheCking out CIA activi-
ties at home as well as abroad. That may
be somewhat less significant than,. say,
the influence Tom Paine's Common
Sense bad upon governmental matters
but it is,- nonetheless, in -the days
when nearly almighty power is attrib-
uted To the electronic media, quite an
24 Iccomplishmenf forptinL Which is, also,
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CIA 'operation," who yet knows? But
the word "foreign" is omitted from
the Helms-derived description of what
the CIA has been up to for more than
a quarter of a century, the words come
pretty close to fitting as much as we
eo far have learned about the Watergate
affair.
The Secret Team and The CM and
the Cult of Intelligence, as I get their
message, argue that in practicing clOak-
and-dagger operations all over the world,
the CIA has ruthlessly expanded its 1947
legal mandate and become a law unto
!tself. It has converted, in other words,
a legitimate commission to collect in-
lormatioa into the kind of gangster-
style activity to which Helms refers and
with which many of us are now feritiliara
ftrom Iran and :Guatemala in the early
1950s to Chile in 1973. Prouty and
Marchetti imply that if only the CIA
could be re-restricted to the gathering of
intelligence, it might ? still serve a useful
purpose. Agee, in his interview with
erierassi, says: "If the American people
could learn this [how the overthrow of
Salvador Allende in Chile was financed
chiefly. by a CIA front, the American
Institute for Free Labor Development]
and all the other frauds perpetrated on
them by the CIA . . . I am convinced
that the clamor would be so great that
Congress would destroy the CIA." If,
as I am speculating, the new 1971 tack
in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet
Union and China caused disturbances
within the CIA, it is plain that Agee's
disillusiorenect has brought him to polit-
ical conclusions more drastic than those
of Prouty and Marchetti?and of a
number of others in the Congress and
in public life, who continue to envision
a safer and more respectable CIA, one,
so to speak, from whose hands the guns
will be removed.
? But what does big business envi-
sion? Well, the violent counterrevolution
in Chile several years after competitive
coexistence had been announced as the
international aim of the United States
offers a clue. As does, also, CIA en-
deavors to suppress and then censor the
Marchetti-Marks book?which they and
their publishers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
assisted by the American Civil Liberties
Union, are still fighting in the courts.
The CIA and the ? Cult of Intelligence,
the first book the U.S. Government ever
attempted to censor by legal action be-
fore publication, finally appeared with
168 spaces in the text where only the
word "DELETED" is to be found. The
context *makes evident that certain key
deletiOns refer to Chile.
On September 4, 1974, a Hersh re-
port in The New York Times began:
"The director of the Central Intelligence
Agency has told Congress that the Nixon
Administration authorized more than $8
million for covert activities by the
agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973
to make it impossible for President Sal-
vador Allende Gossens to govern."
Could this news have been one of the
"DELETED"s from Marchetti's book?
I think so. Anyway, by September 16
the news had been confirmed by no less
than President Ford, who, in reply to
a press conference question, started out
by saying, "Let me answer in general."
He did so: "Our government, like other
governments, does take certain actions in
the intelligence field to help implement
foreign policy and protect national secu-
rity." He then went on to say that as he
understood it there was no direct U.S.
involvement. in the "coup itself' (of Sep-
tember 11, 1973) but that, yes, "in a
period of time, three or four years ago,"
an effort was made to help preserve "op-
position newspapers and electronic media
. . . and opposition political parties" in
Chile. "I think," said the President, "this
is in the best interest of the people of
Chile and certainly in our own interest."
Here is where background reading in
Marchetti-Marks, Prouty, the Agee in-
terview and, for that matter, most litera-
ture on the 'CIA, comes to the aid of
anyone trying to fathom the serious
political complications that would cause
a chief of state, administering a foreign
policy of coexistence, to take on the
responsibility of attempting to give war-
rant to conduct that contradicts such a
policy. At some point this contradiction
seems to have hit formerly dedicated
CIA representatives, who really believed
during their company service that "na-
tional security" and "our own interest"
were synonymous with defense of democ-
racy, on all fronts and by any means
necessary, against communism .As soon
as their faith was shaken, they poceeded
to struggle with the contradiction by
writing their own 'case histories of the
CIA. "
Their books furnish evidence for the
rationality of their decision. But the
Ford Administration, faced with the
same contradiction, persists in irration-
ality. No wonder the government went
all-out to delete Chile references from
the Marchetti-Marks book. No wonder
Ford had to step (be pushed?) forward
to repeat, as in an echo chamber, na-
tional security nonsense to support a
case ler CIA interference in Chile, once
the deleted matter4came to light in re-
ports by Hersh, Stern and others. The
point is that Chile, at one and the same
time, implied the old national security
argument to have been a historical lie--
a big lie, to use the words once applied
to Nazi deception of the Germans when
big business in Germany sought ciomiaa-
on of -world resources and people?and
also thrmtened to reveal that under
corer of competitive coexistence with
the giants of the Socialist camp, the CIA
and its masters intended to continue
playing dirty tricks wherever passage,
their aims being neassarily less grand
than the Nazis', and their techniques
more sophisticated, but both aims end
techniques_ comparable in design to what
Hitler's backers had lin mind. ?
This substantially explains why CIA
intervention in Chile, together with the
more recent disclosures that the C/A
was keeping tabs on thousands of US.
citizens-4f deception appears to be fail-
ing, better prepare plans for control?
have .at . last convinced members of
Canvass to investigate the agency and
its works. I think it is signifleant, too,
that according to a Gallup poll many
people suspect the investigating coal-
mission established by President Ford
and chaired by Vice President. Rocke-
feller. has been rushed into action to
absolve and save the CIA: A plausible
suspicion, no doubt; considering the con-
servative character of the comm;kcieae
The stage has been set, in any event,
for a contest between a relatively pro-
gressive Congress and a big-business-
dominated executive branch oaths quer-
tion of the past, present and 'future of
the CIA. ?
? I am unable to find reasons- to ez.-
pect the result to be its abolition, es.
Stone, in typical tangy prose, recom-
mended in. the February 20th issue of
The New York Review of Books. Mere
likely the hearings; will develop an issue
which should:laave?.high priority in the
Political campaigns._ of 1976, althoueh
that, of course, depends .ola how plain:
the issue is inade to the people by those
in charge of the ? hearings, those Who
report them. and those still Within the
ranks of the *CIA-.-or having .conneca
dons with it?who May follow the
courageous trail blazed by such as
Prouty, Marchetti, Marks and Agee. C]
James liriggins. a former editor of the York
(Pa.) Gazette and Daily, is now a five-lance
journalist living in Boston and teaching
journalism at Boston University.
WASHINGTON STAR
20 March 1975
CIA, FBI Relay Piata on Nazis to INS
The Immigration and Naturalization Service is
investigating 33 cases of alleged Nazi war criminals in
the United States, using information provided by the
CIA and FBI, INS Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman
Jr. told a House immigration subcommittee yester-
day.
Deputy Commissioner James Greene said the CIA
and FBI were asked for information in 1373 after the
immigration agency received the names of 70 to 80
persons who may have had Nazi connections. The INS
found 17 were dead and no proof was found to link
several others to major war crimes.
25
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?!ARCH 1975
rcksalyfei
dtkeee ;! a!
Vdte!Aaa Moreen, Washington director
DC' ehe American Civil Liberties Union,
seSS ieterviewed by Washington Star
Ste "thirty Ho:croon Xerripster.
Qr.:vs:then: It just has been reported
that tho CIA contracted for an under-
water ship with a cover story that it ?
belonged to Howard Hughes. You
have been sharply Critical of this ar-
rangemenr_?. ',Thy?
gran: The problem to me is that
the executive contracted out the war-
:king power to private corpora-
elms. The press reports that we're
training the army in Saudi Arabia.
We've get a ship roaming around
kose semen/ace out there. Well, good
heavens, to turn a ship like that over
to Howard Hughes! I should add one
thing. These views are my own.
There are folks in the ACLU that
%mita disagree with me and on much
of what E may say the ACLU. has no
position.
grz .say the ship was turned
over tc Hughes. Wasn't the Hughes
connection just a cover story to con-
cea.Y. C..7a1 involvement?
At How do rf know it's not turned
over al ;Am? So, (CIA Director Wil-
liam B.) Colby says it isn't. Who can
you believe in that agency? Twenty
years they've spent learning to lie.
They lie by rote. Is there a difference
between Hughes and the CIA?
Q: Is there? Are you saying they
are the same?
A: It don't know. We ought to tonic
? Into
Q: Do you have any indication
othee than this recent situation with
..the ship that there is a connection?
A: Well, certainly, certainly.
(Former Hughes aide Robert) Maheu
testified, according to the Washing-
ton Star, in his depositions in his law-
suit against Hughes that in 1960 he
was asked by Hughes to form a link
between the CIA and Hughes Tool.
He then went further and said that he
did not do thnt. Secondly. he said that
he'd been working on an intelligence
mission in tric, in Miami and Hughes
had tried to summon him back to Los
Angeles, or Las Vegas, or someplace
and he refused to E;o. He did identify,
the agency ? the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. He wouldn't go into
what he'd been working on but I
think the people of this country are
entitled to know.
Q: But how much control does How-
rd Hughes have over what this boat
does?
A: It have no way of knowing. I
don't even know if there is a Howard
Hughes. An I know is that I've got to
make several assumptions about it. If
there is a Howard Hughes, then I
have to assume that he is either sane
.or insane or something else. If I as-
sume him to be sane. then I have to
assume him to be the most secure
person in the United States. If I as-
sume him to be insane, then we have
turned a very highly risky operation
over to a man who is an alleged nut.
Now I don't want him out there pick-
ing up free hydrogen bombs, or walk-
ing around with anything else or
risking that my country gets into
war. Now if it's not Hughes,
and not Hughes' crew, and
there is a risk that we may !
go to war over that ship,
then that's even worse.
Q: Do you believe the
CIA has a right to contract
with private corporations to'
engage in any of the covert
activities that the CIA en-
gages in?
A: Let me go back just a
little bit. In 1%7, we were
shocked when we found out
the CIA was funding the Na-
tional Student Association.
Now I have an equal shock
when I find out the CIA us
funding Howard Hughes.
Now when I look around at
the kinds of things that
have happened to Hughes
that an average citizen
couldn't get consideration
on for the past several
years: an antitrust exemp-
tion for the Dunes Hotel, a
tax exemption for his medi-
cal foundation, non-extra-
dition from the Baha-
mas, great Justice De-
partment efforts to keep a
United States grand jury
from indicting him in Neva-
da. I look at that and I say
to myself, "What are we
paying that fellow for?"
Secondly, if you have covert
operations through an
American corporation,
where's the check on that?
Who runs the war? Does
Hughes run the operation,
or does the CIA? Or do their
iteerests merge? What hap-
pens when they go off and
get into trouble? Do we go
out and defend them? Is it a
liar contracted for by the
CIA secretly, without the
taxpayers' knowing where
their money went, without
any control at all by the
executive or anybody else?
That's the problem.
Q: You ask some interest-
ing questions. Do you know
any of the answers?
A: I think the questions
answer themselves. I think
we should investigate and
find out about it.
Q: Do you have any indi-
cation that the Glomar Ex-
plorer was engaged in any
activities for the CIA other
than the Russian submarine
caper?
A: Well, I would say with-
out anyrknowledge of any-
26
thing other than the public
r- documents and public
records, we are putting a
remarkable amount of
American money into
underseas ventures. 'We've
got ships reaming loose,
small submarines, tiny .
things built by corporations
over here. the Defense De-
partment and every place
else. And I don't really
know what we're doing in
the sea. All I know is that
we are doing something
there. I assume we are
doing it undercover and the
reason that we're doing it
undercover is because
apparently we're doing
something wrong. If we're
doing something right then
we ought to tell everybody
about it and tell them what
it costs.
Q: If we could get back to
the Glomar Explorer. Do
you know of any other cov- ?
ert operations conducted by
that ship? ?
A: I just don't know
about that. I read an article
in the March 1975 American
Legion Magazine. It's a per-
ceptive article. It ends up
saying that Hughes' ship is
the only ship that's ready to
go to mining underseas. If
75 percent or SO percent of
the mineral wealth of the
world is underseas and h..
that ship does also mine,
then have we financed e
ship to mine underseas am.),
violate a U.N. resolution as
I understand it about the
ownership of the underseas.
Are we in such a tremen-
dous hurry in this country
to give away every piece of
land under the sea and on -
land to private corporations
to make a fortune on it? Is
that ship being used as kind
of a.symbol over the head of
countries negotiating now
on a law of the seas agree-
ment over in Geneva? I
don't know what other uses
that ship has, but I'll tell
you one thing ? if that ship
was a one-time, pick-up-a-
submarine kind of venture,
then it 'is worse than a
Spruce Gander. The same
sauce for the Spruce Goose!
was the sauce that got the
Spruce Gander going, and
that sauce is money.
Q: tre'hy should the CIA be
so concerned about under-
seas research?
A: I don't know what you
do with all these nuclear
submarines and. all these
scientific ships and ven-
tures going on. Maybe
we're just in collusion with
private oil companies and.
private mining companies
doing research for them
and finding out where
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minerals and oil are. ?
Q: You've spoken infor-
mally of underseas explorer
Jaques Cousteau in this
context. How does he fit
into this?
A: As I understand, Cous-
teau in November 1974
showed up in Pensacola,
Fla, in his ship, The Calyp-
so. He said he came or re-
search into the red tide. The
unfortunate part of that
venture is the world's out-
standing oceanographer got
there at the season when
the red tide isn't a problem.
You go beyond that and he
does say he is doing re-
search on a U2 type of cam-
era to be used in 1978. He's
talking about electric sen-
sors through the gulf,
studying pollution. I didn't
know that Cousteau worked
for the government of the
United States, but I do now.
So, I can't answer the ques-
tion. I just know the story's
there.
Q: Does the Hughes con-
tract with the CIA violate
any Securities and Ex-
change Commission regula,
tions?
A: I have read some
documents filed with the
SEC and they don't seem to
make full disclosure of this
kind of transaction and this
kind of operation that is
going on, with respect to
prospective stockholders in
Global Marine, Inc. (The
Hughes company that owns
the Glomar Explorer.). It
may very well be that in
other documents they do.
The ones that I've been
over look to me like they
merit an investigation. .,
iere
:?'WASHING-
:t0N?(12PI)--Do our friend-
ly allies spy on Americans in
:the United States? ? .
They often do. And we spy
;CI them in their home coun-
.