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March 19, 1975
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ? CIA-RDP77-00432R0001063600A-2 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. No. 6 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL WESTERN EUROPE EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL 4 April 1975 1 30 35 37 43 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010056000e12 THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1975 COLACShip Brought Up 'art of Soviet Sub Lost in 1968 but Failed to Raise Missiles HUGHES BUILT SHIP Bodies of 70 Russians Were Found in Craft and Buried at Sea By SEYMOUR HERSH sxdai to T.1-ie New Yors Times WASHINGTON, March 18--i The Central Intelligence Agency, financed the construction of a multimillion-dollar deep-sea sal- vage vessel and used it in an unsuccessful effort last sum- mer to recover hydrogen- warhead missiles and codes from a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine in the Pacific Ocean, according to high Government officials. The salvage vessel, construc- ted under disguise for the C.I.A. by Howard it. Hughes, the ec- centric billionaire industrialist, did successfully recover about one-third of the submarine, the officials said, but the portion raised from the ocean bottom did not include either the ship's missiles or its code room. . Instead, the Government of- ficials said, the C.I.A.-led expe- dition recovered the forWard section of the ship containing the bodies of more than 70 So- viet seamen and officers who went down with the vessel when it mysteriously exploded in 1968 and sank in more than three miles of water. The So- viet submariners were buried at sea in military ceremonies that were filmed 'and recorded by C.I.A. technicians. Although thousands of scien-- tists and workmen had security clearance for the program, known as Project Jennifer, the submarine salvage operation remained one of the Nixon and Ford Administrations' closest :secrets. Debate on Project The Jennifer operation had provoked extended debate in- side the United States intelli- gence community since -the C.I.A. proposal to build the sal-, vage vessel, with the coopera- tion of Mr. Hughes, first under- went high-level evaluation in the early nineteen-seventies. Critics of the program have said that the value of Atv formation that could be glbancd: from what they depict as out- moded code books and out- moded missiles did not justify either the high cost of the operation or its potential for jeopardizing the United States- Soviet detente. The program's defenders, who include William E. Colby, Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, have said that the successful recovery of the whole submarine would have been the biggest single intelligence coup in history. . They argue that even a 1968 code book would give the Govermnent's signal experts a chance to evaluate all of thb Soviet submarine communica- tions that were in existence then and perhaps for yeam before the ship sank. Recovery of the missiles also would help provide standards for judging the existing analysis of such weapons as compiled from tha precise scrutiny of aerial photo- graphs taken by satellites.. Government experts have main- tained. In recent weeks, Mr. Colby has formally requested Secreta- ry of State Kissinger for per- mission to stage another at- tempt next summer to salvage the rest of the submarine, which reportedly is lying in nearly 17,000 feet of water about 750 miles northwest of Oahu, Hawaii. Mr. Kissinger, who serves as head of the 40 Committee, the secret Government panel that reviews and finances all ,intelligence operations, sup- ported the efforts of the C.I.A. :to keep the salvage program .secret until a decision could be . made on continuing it. Pri- vately, however, he is known to have dismissed the Jennifer program as not being of suffi- cient immediacy to require' much of his personal attention.1 It was the 40 'Committee' that agreed to secretly author- ize funds to the Hughes organi- zation to subsidize construc- tion of what was to be publicly described as the world's largest deep-sea Mining ship, the Gin- mar Explorer. The vessel took its name from the first three letters in the first two words of the title of the company that operated it forklughes? Global Marine, Inc. . A New Times reporter initial-. ly learned some details of the salvage operation in late 1973, when the Glomar Explorer was conducting tests in the Atlantic Following the publication of! some information about thei operation by the Los Angeles Times last month, The New 1 York Times investigated thel matter further. The New York' Times was informed by thel C.I.A., in the course of the,. investigation, that publication' would endanger the national, security because the agency was considering an effort this summer to retrieve the remain- der of the sunken submarine and publicity would thwart any such effort. The Times decided at that time to withhold publicition until the C.I.A. either made? another effort to retrieve the submarine or decided not to o ahead with the .project. Some other publications and broadcasters also decided to. delay. . ? The Times also informed the! C.I.A. that it would publishi a comprehensive article on thei operation if it became known that others were about -to dis- close details publicly. Tonight the story of the So-; viet submarine and the salvage; effort was circulating widely1 in journalistic and Government circles in Washington. Publica- tion by one or more correspon-' dents appeared imminent, de- ? spite the efforts of the C.I.A. to convince the news- media that its secret should be kept, for the time being. ? ? - High Government officials said M r.Hughes was selected to provide the. cover needed to shield the true purpose of the vessel because of his widely publicized penchant for secre- cy, his known interest in deep- sea mining and the ? fact that his wholly owned company? the Summa Corporation?had experience in large-scale con- struction projects. In addition, the Hughes Air- craft Company also has long been involved in the construc- tion and development of space satellites for heavily classified intelligence purposes and now employs a nuQber of former high-ranking C.I.A. and military. men. Another factor behind the seLection of Mr. Hughes. the officials said, was his patrio- tism. The officials insisted that Mr. Hughes make very little money .in the construction of the Glomar Explorer. ? They also said Mr. Hughes was maintaining . title* on the. vessel only under a series of complex trust agreeinents with the C.I.A. and the Government similar to those utilized for , other proprietary "assets" of the C.I.A.. such as Air America, its subsidized airline. ? Government ofcicials ack- nowledee that much more than $250-million has been spent Ocean. He stopped his research on the matter after a request thus far o? the Glomar Explo- - P ? t lernifer with than S350-million. Senior members of the House and Senate were briefed oni the program, the officials said: although it could not be learned; which legislators were in- formed. . 1958-Model Craft Operation Jennifer was ini-I tiated shortly after the Soviet? submarine, a 1958 model of i the "I-Intel" class that was; .believed to have sailed fromi the Soviet port of Vladivostok.1 sustained a series of on-board explosions and sank while,' cruising in the Pacific. American intelligence offi- cials emphasized that the So- viet craft was found, after she. tank, through what was de- scribed as "passive" means ? that is, not from signal or other. communications inter- cepts ?and there was no chance for the United States Navy to rescue any crew mem- bers. Other sources said the Navy's sonar underwater listening de- vices apparently were able to datect the sounds of underwa- ter explosions at depths far deeper than the Soviet. Union could intercept and thus knew the specific location of the sub- marine on the ocean floor. ?During the recovery attempt last August, the official sources said, American technicians were successful in grabbing and lifting the submarine from the ocean floor and raising it about halfway to the surface?rough- ly 8,000 feet- when there was a failure in the lifting devices and part of the ship fell. One . official talked of "overpres- sure" in connection with the . failure of the lifting devices. The salvage vessel was oper- ated under subcontract for the Hughes corporation by Global Marine, Inc., of. Los Angeles, a firm known for its expertise in deep-sea operations. Government intelligence offi-. cials noted that Global Marine; has cooperated with the Soviet! Union in a series of underwater research and experimental drill-I ing operations and suggestedl that public knowledge of its involvement in the submarine; recovery operation would not only embarrass the firm but .said it might limit its future joint research ventures with the Soviet Union. A Bitter Dispute ? Complicating the issue is a bitter dispute between officials of the Navy, whose Research and Development Branch was involved in the original plan- ning to salvage the submarine, and the C.I.A., whose scieHce, and technology office deve-1 loped the concept of construct- ing the Glomar Explorer under cover. C.I. . officials insisted that ectnr ietrel6A6 novoittio : GlAiRDP470-004132R0r001130- 6000 a2on with t he Navy :11e funds authorized at more was smooth but a number ofj Approved For Release. 2001/08108 : CIA-RDP71-00432R000100360006-2 iNi"eity officials have bitterly ell; icized the salvage operation in interviews. , At one point, Government officials acknowledged, the Navy expressed some reserva- tiors. iihout. the !reality of at- summer, should it be approved, tempting to interfere with an- would be -aimed at recovering other country's sunken. vessel, . the remaining two-thirds of the bat it ultimately was decided sunken submarine. One high ?a`S. high levels in the Nixon.. official said that "there's ,not .Administration that there ver a a lot they [the Russians] can Ina legal bars to the operation. One retired Navy admiral do." "We ? have the legal ,right . . . ,who was aware of the Jennifer to pick something up off the operation while en active duty bottom." he said. !complained that the "only real Some Success Seen : intelligence [to' be obtained :from the Jennifer operation] One high-leVel member of isuiting from an analysis of the Ford Administration took exception to the description s the metallurgical stuff" re- ithe submarine's hull and van- of the operation as a failure cis internal sections. and said he had seen reports. 1 "The codes wouldn't mean which he acknowledged could that much today," the retired have, been based, describing officer said in an interview, the adventure as 50 per cent 1"even if you recovered their successful. . !code machine. They [such ma- "If the project was sold on . . !chines] have a tremendous the basis of what we're going !number of discs and circuits to get," the official added, and vou wouldn'tk now what however, "O.K., we didn:t get l combination was used." sequences. They also also suggested that, de- spite the published accounts, the Soviet ? Union still *might not realize that the Glomar Explorer's next voyage this it." . i The admiral added that even Another Informed?intelligence 1 if the codes could be broken, official said, "In terms Of the lthey would he made intelligible initial objective of the project" only .for a limited period be-' ..._ the ree . cause of what he depicted as ?the recovery of Soviet mis- a random restructuring of the sues with hydrogen warheads, various circuits and codes that the submarine:s nuclear power was compLeted by the Soviet plant and its code books?"it submarine communicators eve-, was asfailure", ry 24 hours. Another source said the pre- Burglary Revelation . liminary: review of the mates- The submarine project was ials salvaged last summer indi- first 'publicly mentioned by The cated that the Russians had Los Angeles Times on Feb. 8, significantly altered the struc- in a report stemming from a ture and design of the 1958 police, inquiry into i bizarre submarine, initially confiaurat- , burglary last June 5 at the ed to carry three itercontinen- offices of the Summa Corpora- tal missiles, and noted that . lion, the Hughes holding corn- such information could prove pans' that?in the public's eyes invaluable in disarmament es-owned the Glomar Explorer. talks. . Documents said to have been Even if only partly successful, taken from a Hughes office one high - ranking .American safe in the burglary disclosed. said, "It was a fantastic opera- that the C.I.A. had contracted tion." with the corporation to raise: The official was referring to the sunken nuclearspowered the fact that the C.I.A. was submarine, the newspaper said, able to finance the construction The report was denied at the of the Glomas Explorer and time by Paul Reeves, general to successfully initiate salvage manager of the ocean mining operations without any public ? division of Mr. Hughes's corn- inkling of the true intent of pany. . the mission. A number of offi- At least four well-informed cials who were interviewed sources have said in recent praised repeatedly the C.I.A.'s interviews that in their opinion "cover" for the mission. the initial justification for with- One former high-level C.I.A. holding publication of the story man noted that by financing no longer existed because Of the Glomar Explorer, publicly the disclosures made in The depicted as the most advanced Los Angeles Times. Until then, deep-sea mining vessel in exis- a number of past and present tence, the C.I.A. may have been high-level intelligence officials responsible for the creation of said, the Russians did not know' a new industry?deep-sea mm- that the United States had ing of mineral deposits. found and attempted to salvage, When completed in mid-1973, the submarine. ' the '36.000 ton vessel was 618 "What that story's done is feet long and more than .115 blown the iperation," one offi- feet wide, and its six motors cial said. "We can't use it were capable of providing 12,- again." ' 000 horsepower to drive the High-ranking American intel- ligence officials acknowledged In Expla- in a recent discussion that they addition, the Glomar ? rer was equipped with a 209- assumed "the Russians, picked up the [Los Angeles Angeles Times] story. The question is what are :they [the Russians] going to do about it." The intelligence officials ar- gued that further public discus- sio of the jennifer operations would amount "to rubbing the Russians' noses in it" and could lead to adverse diplomiettfpre ve foot derrick capable of lifting 800 tons and at least. three other lifts nearly as powerful., Throughout its . construction, at the Chester, Pa., yards of the Sun Shipbuilding. and Dry i, Dock Company. there were newspaper reports about the eventual deep-sea mining in's- oou'j of_the vessel as well as ul514kMetealten2t001I/G8/08 .ecreeS/?a . 'tradition of thel Hughes empire?that marked: her construction. "If all sails smoothly," The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on May 13, 1973, ,as the Glomar Explorer neared completion,. "the mystery ship may be at work next year scooping such metals as titauium, manganese, uranium, copper and nickel up out of the depths to add to the fortune of the world:s wealthiest recluse." The Government sources ack- nowledged that the C.I.A. turned to deep-sea mining as a possible cover early in 1970 because the Soviet submarine, happened to sink in an area of the Pacific noted for its extremely large deposits of va- luable manganese nodules. A 1973 study of the National Science Foundation concluded that the deposits off the Ha- waiian plateau were the most abundant within the North Pa- cific and contained the highest. values of copper and nickel.: This fact, coupled with the; heavy publicity over the Glo- mar Explorer's alleged deep-sea' mining mission, provided the "cover" needed by the C.I.A. to attempt the salvage opera- tion without Soviet knowledge and, thus, without possible So- viet interference, the sources said. They added that a key con- cern throughout the history of the secret operation was the possibility of violent interfer- ence?and possible military ac- tion?by the Russians if they happened to learn the tree nor- pose of the Glomar Explorer's mission. The ship could not operate with any military es- cort or protection, for obvious reasons, the sources noted. ? No Suspicions Raised The refusal . of the Hughes corporation to provide any de- tailed data on the workings of the Glomar Explorer and the company's order to all sub- contractors that nothing be made public during construc- tion of the vessel did not raise suspicions because of Mr. Hug- hes's known excentricism. In recent intE.4wiews, a num-, ben of senior officials of the Summa Corporation still denied knowledge of the Jennifer oper- ation and insisted the secrecy was needed to protect the in- dustrial techniques that they ,said were inherent in the ship's .construction and mode of oper- ation. In addition to the Glomar Explorer, the salvage operation required a deep-diving barge [submarine once it was brought Up from the bottom. As such, it was built to be sunk, towed and then retrieved. This capabi- lity was built into the barge to help hide the salvage subma- Tine from the possibility of inadvertent detection by Soviet satellites. ' Precisely how the Glomar I Explorer was outfitted to at- tempt the recovery of the ' downed submarine could not be learned,- nor could any, ac- curate cost estimate be made for the vessel. One official of the Summa Corporation said in an interview that the Glomar Explorer alone cost more than $100-million. Some newspaper accounts have put the price tag for the ship at 8250-million. It also could not be learned whether either of those esti- mates included the expensivs dredging and derrick equipment utilized in the salvage opera- tion. New Technology In recent interviews. high- level American intelligence offi-t cials seemed vague about the' iGlomar Explorer's potential for actually conducting deep-sea mining operations. One official. said it would "take some 'doing" for the Glomar Explorer to be "rejiggered" into s a deep-sea mining vessel. I Other officials have boasted in interviews, however, that the C.I.A. technology involved in the construction of the ship had led to breakthroughs in the feasibility of such mining. Officials also noted that: the Government was retaining thp. patent rights :stemming from any technical breakthroughs in deep sea mining techniques that resulted from the construc- tion of the Glornar Explorer and from its attempted subma- rine recovery.; It could not be learned how? and from what Treasury ac- counts?funds for the construc- tion of the vessel and other costs were appropriated by the C.I.A. and distributed to the Summa Corporations. The intel- ligence agency has long hod contractual arrangements with the Hughes' Aircraft Company and Lockheed's space and mis-* sue division for satellite work funded through the National Reconnaissance Office. This is the highly secret set up during the Kennedy Administration that?operating under cover in- side the Air Force?is respon- sible for all of the research, development. procurement and targeting of America's satellites land other aerial intelligence i programs. that was constructed in 1971 1 The N.R.O. programs are di- and 1972 by the National Steeli I ? reeled by an executive commit- and Shipbuilding Company, n tee, informally known at times San Diego and designed by as the Ex-Conlin, whose official the Lockheed Aircraft Corpora-, 'standing members include Mr. tion's Ocean Systems Division.; Colby, as Director of Central The 106-foot-wide barge, which Intelligence, and Dr. Albert C. reportedly has 15 -foot - thick Hall, now the Assistant Seem- wails to help provide ballast, tary of Defense for intelligence. :was not directly utilized in Other officials also participate the submarine salvage opera- in Ex-Comm meetings on a ? tion, Government officials said, regular but ad hoc basis, in-, although there were numerous eluding a representative of the newspaper. accounts in 1973 National Security Council and. and 19/4 saying that the barge James W. Plummer, the current played a direct role in the Under Secretary of the Air !deep:sea mining operations: I Force, who aleo serves under ilict:iLixpl:ed_, barge's byinstoelleligteulitIcee. 'National Reconnaissance Of- !cover as the director of the : kilai~77-034321R0004490360006-2 -i. s l'Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100560006-2 ALASKA SOVIET UNION CANADA Vladivostok AOR I'll PACIFIY.:"?OCLAN . . UNITED STATES CHINA PAN P -.e,,1?11s.Ja j : I !ice. A number of sources said jthat, in addition to the N.R.O.'s responsibility for aerial intel- ligence, the intelligence bureaucracy also maintains a secret office in. the ?Navy for underwater intelligence recon- naissance programs._' It was this office, some sour- ces said, that initially was re- sponsible for financing the re- search into the problem the Navy suddenly found itself fac- ing in 1968: how to recover a submarine in nearly 17,000 feet of water. ? No Competitive Bidding Because of the secrecy and the need for cover, none of the various contracts awarded to, the Summa Corporation and its subcontractors involved competitive bidding, Govern- ment sources indicated. One official said, the Government "paid the minimal overhead fee" for construction of the ship, suggesting that work was done on what is known 'as a "cost plus" contract, with the Summa Corporation getting a fixed percentage of the total construction costs. The Glomar Explorer is now undergoing repair in anticipa- tion of a second recovery effort this July in the Pacific. Officials would not say with whom in- the Hughes organiza- tion the C.I.A. initiated discus- sions about the secret project, but they specifically said that Mr.. Hughes, now living in se- lusion in the Bahamas, was not directly gotten in touch with. The officials also said no contact was initiated with A. D. Wheelon, the president of the Hughes Aircraft Compa- ny, who once was involved in the C.1.A.'s satellite recon- naissance programs. As recounted by a number of intelligence sources, the United States initiated the sub- marine recovery program only upon realizing that the Soviet Union apparently had not been able to fix the locatibn of its sunken submarine. - After the sinking was con- firmed and the location deter- mined, Navy and intelligence officials watched inAtiyrov the Russians eqnduc_tedVjWide . 13Fr ? sea search for the submarine' in the wrong area of the Paci- fic. At some point, apparently still in 1968, the Russians with- drew their trawlers and stopped the patrols, which indi- cated that the had no idea 'where the submarine had.gone down. "If the Russians knew where the sub had gone down," onej former intelligence official said,' "they would have stayed therq all the time Lon patrol]." Ship Photographed j Although the C.I.A. is knownj to have taken extensive Under- sea photographs of the sunken ship,- there is apparently some dispute .over its classification. It has been established, howev- er, that the vessel, which car- ries three missile launchers, is in the ballistic missile class. According to the 1973-74 edi-: tion of "Jane's Fighting Ships,? a standard naval reference; work, it could contain missiles: with ranges of between 350' and 650 miles. Some sources! said, however, that modifica- tions to the vessel apparently ?had blurred the Navy's ability to determine its specific classi- fication. The Government sources said that Navy engineers initially sought ineans of merely pene- trating into the ship?and not jsalvaging .it?in an effort to. obtain access to its code room and equipment, but were unab- le to develop a feasible concept because it it was in such deep water. ? The Navy eventually brought the problem to the C.I.A.'s di- rectorate of science and techno- logy, headed by Carl Duckett, .Pentagon had become eon- because senior officials in the vinced, one source said, that -the military "had gotten no place" in solving the technical problems that prevented re- covery of the submarine's codes and equipment. The concept of building a deep-sea salvage vessel under cover of the Hughes oraggani- zation reportedly caused sharp arguments inside the Nixon Ad- ministration throughout 1970 and 1971. At one point in 1971, dtForasteasei2001/0810811: deep, trouble because there were all kinds of technical problems," one source said. In, later months, there were seri-: ous cost overruns that led tol even more controversy. There were other kinds ofj problems, another source re- called. many of them revolving around official concern about the potential impact that public revelation of the secret project could have on the highly So- viet -United -States detente, which was beginning to flou- rish in the early days of the Nixon Administration. Legal Discussions And, although Government attorneys knew of 'no interna- tional law barring such salvage attempts, there was extended debate about whether the Rus- sians legally would be justified in attempting to sink the Explo- rer if they happened to stumble onto or otherwise uncover the operation. There also was some discus- sion. one source recalled, of what to do with the bodies of Soviet seamen if any were fo.und aboard the sunken sub- marine. Because of that, high officials noted, the C.I.A. made elabor- ate plans for protecting the rights, under the Geneva Con- vention, of any dead officers and men found aboard the ship. The Glomar Explorer was equipped with refrigeration ca- pacity for up to 100 bodies, and copies of the relevant So- viet and American burial man- uals were taken along. The burial ceremony, when it did take place, sources said, was conducted in both Russian and English and recorded in color by C.I.A. cameraman. One C.I.A. official said that four of the agency's deep-sea specialists who had returned to Washington after the failure to recover the whole submarine insisted on flying back to the IGIornar Explorer for the burial ceremonies. Despite the failure, the four men are. designated to receive special intelligence- awards from the Ford Adminis- tration, the official said. Prior to the actual recovery operation, other objections 100'-jj The New York Times/March 19 1975 of millions of dollars involved to learn what kind of equip- ment was being utilized byi the Soviets? Was there anyli information available that',. would have justified the opera- tion? ? ? All these points were consi- dered, one source said,. and it still was determined that. Operation Jennifer was worth-, j: while, even if its chances fort) complete success Were slintf One former White House aide', revealed the surprise inside thej Johnson Administration after!, the Israelis captured some So- viet weapons after the l9671; Arab-Israeli war. "We'd spent a lot of ? timef Making estimates [on the capa- bilities of the Soviet weaponryt that turned out not to be veryi- accurate," the former aide not- ed. The capture indicated th4: too much reliance was being placed on the practice of com-1' piling such estimates ? by the! intelligence community, he ;said. Because of this, the offi- cial added, he- believed that jthe sub -.salvaging operation; j"would have been a real coup,jj a gold mind." j "It was an operation I perso- nally would have endorsed jthe cost was right," he added. Navy Was Hot on It A former White -House aid jrecalled that in the early nine- !teen - seventies Jennifer alse!, was considered vital for the4. then pending United States' ne- gotiations with the Soviet= Union on strategic arms limita- tions talks (SALT). "We thought that if we could get hold of it [the submarineV, and dissect it," the former aidej said, "we'd have something tejj use as leverage in the negotiaeJ a tions. The Navy was really h! on it." Mr. Kissinger and- his aides., however, were reliably reported to have been enthusiastic- about the project, although as President Nixon's national se- curity adviser Mr. -Kissinger theoretically had the authority- to cut it off immediately 1 he chose to do so. ' A former Kissinger aide -re-iJ: called that "when' we first; were posed on more practical heard of it, we said, 'So what?t the aide added, CW p IRDPNe00432R000*00366LA-- "1`,,: , as it worth the hundreds n t nk we cared that muck, 3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 e'tout it." ? a , ? , ? 4. ? By late 1971 .the internal disputes inside the Nixon Admi- nfatration had been quieted and contracts were authorized for the construction of the Glomar Ea:colorer and the barge. There is some evidence that the various ship builders and subcontractors were not told the ultimate mission of the ,vessels, and believed that they were solely involved in a deep- sea mining project for the se- cretive Howard Hughes. Engineers who served aboard , the Glomar Explorer on its first itest run in July, 1973, later reported that major renovation projects were begun by Summa Corporation workmen on the hydraulic lifts and the derrick, shortly after the ship left port.i Cde Bodson, a Los Angeles! erganizer for the Marino En- gineers Benevolent Associatioh, which sought to organize the engineers aboard the Glomar Explorer, said in a recent tele- phone interview that the en- gineers "dicin'a, know what they [summer corp workmen] were doing, but we had the opinion that whatever it was, they didn't want the people at Sun ![shipbuilding yards in Chester, Pa.) to know how they were Iwiring the ship." N.L.R.B. Case Over Ship The union eventually accused Global Marine of violating the National Labor Relations Act by discharging at least 10 mem- bers of th engineering crew allegedly because they signed cards authorizing h the union to represent them. They men. were dismissed as soon as the- Glosar Explorer completed its initial test run at Long Beach, Calif., on Oct. I, 1973. The issue is still pending before the N.L.R.13.,,although a tenta- 'ive finding against-Global-Ma-1 rine was made last June. ? One clear sign that high offi- cials of Global Marine did know of the Glomar -Explorer's true mission 'came when the compa- ny refused to. put any of its senior officers on the witneis stand during the N.L.R.B. hear- ings, which were held in Los Angeles in early 1974. The com- pany refused to permit such testimony apparently in fear that attorneys for the union would ask questions -about the ship's mission. In 1973 there also were numerous newspaper accounts of the Glomar Explorer that emphasized both its mystery and its potential for revolution- izing deep-sea mining. One such account, published by The Observer in London in October, 1973, told how the Glomar Ex- plorer was beginning to mine minerals on the ocean floor near the coast of Nicaragua. The article linked that ven- ture to the fact that Mr. Hughes and his entourage had taken up residence for some months in 1972 in a hotel at ,Managua, Nicaragua. ?'A dispatch in the Washington Post in August, 1973, said that Mr. Hughes had invested $250- million in the project, which was expected to such up to 5,000 tons of minerals daily from the ocean floor. The ar-i ticle qhich quoted high officials of the. Summa Corporation not- ed that some of Mr. Hughes's luctance to invest heavily in . , deep-sea mining venture_ s veh- ,tures. unless the Government ,provided assurances of finahe cial protection in case the Unit- ed States agreed to an interna- tional treaty?now being debat- ed?that would limit or brar ifree exploitation of the Ocean NEI YORK TIMES 20 March 1975 Project Jennifer ? The Central Intelligence Agency's assignment is to further the security of the United States by learning as much as it can about the capabilities and intentions of potential foreign foes, the most powerful of which is the Soviet Union. It has been common .knowledge for many years now?at least since an American U-2 plane was shot down over Siberia fifteen years ago?that both sides use the latest technological achievements to spy on each other. Soviet and American intelligence satellites course, through the skies daily taking incredibly sharp pictures of earth 100 miles or more below. The late Premier Khrushchev once even publicly offered to exchange, Soviet spy satellite pictures for corresponding American photographs taken from space. The most effective mod- em intelligence agents are much more likely to be elec- tronic engineers than Mata Hans. It is against this background that the tale of the Glomar Explorer?the C.I.A. ship that masqueraded as the property of Howard Hughes?must be judged. The basic idea behind Project Jennifer?the code name used ?was certainly imaginative: to locate and raise from the ocean bottom three miles deep a Soviet submarine Ibet tom . United' Nat:TOWS --diy"FiF, ?ference on the law of the -sea resumed' deliberations on' that issue -and others Marchu 17 at Geneva. In July, 1974, Hughes Corpor-? ation officials were quoted-in.. The Philadelphia Inquirer as saying that the Glomar Explo- rer was "systems testing" in' the Pacific Ocean. The tests were scheduled to be completed by the end of the year, officials, said. ? ; In fact, the ;salvage vessel had began its submarine .sal- vage efforts in the Pacific Ocean in June, the Government sources said.1The precise date. of the operation's failure could not be learned, but on Aug. 17, 1974, the Honolulu Adverti- ser reported the Glomar Explo- rer's surprise visit to Honolulu. The Hawaiian newspaper. ac- counts emphasized the secrecy that surrounded the vessel, de- 'scribing it as a "mystery ship." The Glomar Explorer remained in port near Honolulu for about two weeks, disappeared for a week, reappeared. for four days and then left in early Septem- ber, according to the newspa- per. Ironically, its visit prompted an official investigation by state officials into the owner- ship of mineral rights in off- shore Hawaiian waters. According to one member of the crew, the Glomar Explo- rer did accomplish some mining. -of minerals in the waters Off Hawaii during its Pacific cruise. The crew member, who was reluctant to permit his name to be used, also insisted during a brief telephone interview that :he and his colleagues knew :nothing of an attempted sub- marine salvage effort. I .Since its failurejaat summer, Ithe Glomir Explorer htiS-been lanchored near, Long Beach. Her delay in resuming mining oper- ations has added to the vessel's public mystery, .since many shipping experts have found- it extremely unusual that such a costly shi p wouldpot b e immediately. put to work. Questions Raised A nurnber of the Government sources said they believed' that the role of the Hughes Corpora- tion in the Jennifer operation as well as the company's unu- sual inVolvement in 'many* of the Government's most sensi- tive intelligence missions raised fundamental questions. Throughout the Watergate inquiry, these sources noted, the so-called Hughes connec- tion?revolving around the fact" that E. Howard. Hunt, convicted in the Watergate burglary,. was , working for a public relations firm doing work for Mr. Hughes at the time .of the Watergate break-in in 1972?was never publicly explored. Simitariy, questions were raised about the burglary last June at the Hughes headquar- ters in Los Angeles. There were reliable reports that the thieVes sought to blackmail the Hughes organization and, apparently, the C.I.A. and other Govern- ment agencies, by offering to return the stolen documents detailing the submarine , and other secret operations- in- re- turn for al-million. ? . Intelligence officials, in inter- views here, confirmed that pay- off discussions were seriously initiated. a A county grand jury began hearings evidence into, the bur- glary and alleged blackmail at- tempt on Feb. 13, in a proceed- ing marked by extremely tight zecurity, that had sunk in 1968. After much behind-the-scenes debate, the decision to go ahead was taken; the Glomar Explorer was built and a specialized new technology was created; and then last year the attempt was made. * . * This really brilliant effort unfortunately fell short of full success, though it is still a major technological feat that a substantial portion of the sunken Soviet submarine was brought to the surface. If the full submarine could have been recovered (and it still may be), it would have been a master intelligence accomplishment. This complex and fascinating technological adventure. demonstrates that, once again, American technology has brought a hitherto inaccessible environment into the ambit of man's future activity. It also underlines the need for a ,body of appropriate international law, so that economic activity?such as the deep sea mining the Glomar Explorer was allegedly engaged in?can be car-. ried out in this new environment and future clashes of rival national interests and power can be avoided. The story is, furthermore, a useful reminder of how 'essential good intelligence is for the national security in 'a world of nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and hydrogen bomb-tipped intercontinental missiles. The C.I.A. only to be commended for this extvaordinary,.. effort ,.to carry out its essential rnission,,h Approved For Release 2901/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000106600061-2 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 March 1975 \Soviet su salv ?isclosur ?its Cli a ain t news d[g ers Security agency's indignation questioned; nuclear sub importance put in spotlight By Dana Adams Schmidt and Guy Halverson Staff correspondents of The Christian Science Monitor) Washington Chief among the questions raised here by public disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency's work with a Howard Hughes Corporation to 'salvage part of a Russian submarine is this: Do newspapers have the right to overrule CIA requests that informa- tion be kept secret? After accounts of the CIA in- volvement were spread across front pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times, despite repeated CIA requests that no publication be made, one CIA man commented: "Of course. we are outraged. How outraged can you get? Does this mean that in the final analysis the news- papers will publish anything they can get their hands on, no matter how secret or important we say it is?" At the same time, the entire episode throws a new spotlight on what? analysts see as the vital long-range importance of the nuclear submarine to both American and Russian mili- tary strategy. The salvage was performed by the Glomar Explorer, ostensibly a deep- sea mining ship, constructed by the Sum ma Corporation, controlled by industrialist Hughes. After the Navy, ,with super-sensitive sonar devices, had located the Russian sub, sunk in 1968, the Americans raised the ship , from 17,000 feet of water in July, 1974. -At 8,000 feet however, it broke and the Navy and CIA got only one-third of the sub, but without missiles or code machines. ?. According to the New York Times, a Times reporter first learned of the operation in late 1973, but ceased research after a request by CIA director William Colby in early 1974. Some information was then published by the Los Angeles Times last month; the New York Times resumed Its research. The CIA said, according to the New York Times Wednesday, that publica- tion would endanger national secu- rity, since the agency was considering an effort this summer to raise the rest of the submarine. The New York Times held up publication until the CIA made a final decision on the CIA it would publish if it felt others were about to publish. According to the Los Angeles Times, it published Wednesday be- cause the New York Times was publishing. Columnist Jack Anderson gave details on a Tuesday evening radio broadcast. The story was being widely circulated in Washington Tuesday night, even as the CIA was still asking that it be withheld. After publication of the first Penta- gon papers stories in June, 1971, the government tried to prevent further publication also on the grounds of national security. The Supreme Court ruled against the government and permitted publication to continue. While the salvage?operation might be called in some ways a failure, intelligence souces point out that important information might none- theless be gathered by studying the metallurgy, method of welding, and other features of construction. The facts that this salvage ship could be built in total secrecy, that U.S. technicians were able to find the sunken submarine, and that at least part of it could be raised was, how- ever, in itself such a remarkable achievement that some observers wondered how indignant the CIA really is about disclosure. .At a time when the agency is under WASHINGTON POST 21 March 1975 ? Nixon Had Refused " To Christen Vessel ; SAN DIEGO, March 20 (AP) ?Former President Nixon in- spected a giant barge without knowing the vessel was des- tined to salvage part of a sunken Soviet submarine, The San Diego Union reported to- day. ,Nixon inspected the 324- foot submersible barge in 1972 while on a tour of the Na- tional Steel & Shipbuilding Co. yards. where it was built, the Union said. But ? he refused an invita- tion to christen the auditor- ium-sized vessel because no one at NASSCO would tell him what it was or what it :was intendcd for, said NASSCO president john Mur- ply. ' severe criticism for quite different kinds of operations, this feat might stir admiration among most Amer- icans and serve as a reminder of the agency's wide-ranging services. It is being said by supporters of the CIA that construction of the Explorer, which cost $250 million, might even open up new economic horizons in underwater mining. Some deep-sea mining sources, however, doubt this claim, saying that other systems have been shown capable of dredging min- erals at great depths. International law The Russians are believed not to have known the location of their submarine from which 70 bodies were removed by members of the Glomar Explorer operation. While the Russians would presum- ably be annoyed at the American feat in raising part of a Russian vessel, international law experts say that once a ship is lost at sea it is fair game for whoever can find it. In other words, there would not be a legal basis for a Russian protest. For this reason the affair is not expected to damage U.S.-Soviet rela- tions or to affect detente. The U.S. relies heavily on a tripar- tite nuclear defense strategy of nu- clear-equipped submarines, land- based intercontinental missiles, and nuclear carrying B-52 and F-111 air- craft. his recent annual report, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesin- ger called the Polaris U.S. nuclear Poseidon submarine fleet the "least vulnerable element of our strategic triad." Though the Soviets are ahead of the U.S. in overall numbers of subma- rines (315 for the Soviets vs. 115 for the U.S.), the two superpowers are- roughly equal in the numbers of nuclear-powered subs (115 for the Soviets, compared with 101 for the NEW YORK TIMES 19 March 1975 Wilson Vows Inquiry on C.I.A. If It Is Linked to Britain LONDON, March 18 (Reuters) ?Prime Minister Wilson said 'today he would set up an inqui- ry into activity by the Central Intelligence Agency in Britain if there was evidence that its agents were operating in the country. , He was being questioned in Parliament about C.I.A. men said to be operating from the American Embassy in London with diplomatic immunity. One member of Parliament from the ruling Labor party had drawn a comparison with 1971 when Britain demanded the recall of 105 Soviet diplo- mats said to be involved in espionage, and asked "if be here would you demand their recall?" Mr. Wilson said that if any evidence on this came from the United States investigation salvage. So did other news media, into the agency, or in other The New York Timitepp1ate2dd1itor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000 1,0086,0006-20t hesitate to set up an independent British inquiry. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 NEW YORK TINES 21 March 1975 he Submarine Story PITTSBURGH ? More remarkable. than the raising of the sunken Russian -submarine is the reaction of the American press to the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency to suppress the story. Coming on the heels of what is widely supposed to be the press's "triumph" in the Watergate matter, the submarine case suggests how inadequate it is to curse or bless the newspapers and television in easy generalities. The extraordinary fact is that, despite all the revelations of recent years as to how Government officials . routinely erect the screen of "national security" to shield themselves from political embarrassment, the C.I.A. was able to use that pretext to pre- vent publication of the submarine story in virtually a complete roster of what is usually referred to as the "Eastern press establishment." So is the . press, as frequently charged, so swollen with self-impor- tance by the Watergate case that it is now a more aggressive power center than the Government? On the other hand, as also alleged, is the press really more aware than ever before of its function of 'disclosure, its role as a *check and balance on Govern- ment? Is The Washington Post after . all a bolder organ of "investigative journalism" than The New York Times? And when even the inimitable Jack Anderson?who forced disclosure of the submarine story?concedes that he has "withheld other stories at the behest of the C.I.A.," can it be said that to do so is in every case a derelic,: tion of journalistic duty? Or that to ."publish and be damned" should be the-unvarying rule? Several points seem worth making. All the news organizations involved appear to have made their own deci- sions to withhold what they knew of the story. That is, none seems auto- TSIMICOMMIIMIO IN THE NATION By Torn Wicker matically to have acceded to the wishes of the C.I.A., and in some cases, William E. Colby, the agency's director, apparently had to work hard to gain his objective. In the end, like? the boy at the dike, he did not have enough fingers to plug all the leaks, and the story could not be contained. Yet, all these major news organiza- tions for a time took the same atti- tude. They accepted the contention that national security was involved in the raising of an obsolete Soviet sub- marine, and they agreed to withhold publication of the story until the oper- ation either was completed or aban- doned. The unanimity of the response seems to lend support to those who, suggest that the press "establish- ment," if it is not really a conspiracy, still is so consistently of one general attitude that it is a monolith. But the nature of the response does- not sup- port those who claim that this mono- lithic press is anti-Government, anti- security, anti-conservative or "pro- leftist." Reports suggest, moreover, that most of the news organizations were determined to publish the story if anyone else did. This is a variation of the old newspaper rule-of-thumb that if something is known "off the rec- ord" it can't be published; but if some- one else publishes the same informa- tion, it is no longer "off the record." Can this be applied to "national secur- ity"? If a newspaper is withholding information in genuine fear of damag- ing the national security,' is it then justified in publishing the information just because someone else does so? e ? Does publication damage the national security less, in such an event? And. in fact, major elements of the sub- . marine story had been published, in The Los Angeles Times of Feb. 8. Mr. Anderson suggested that one reason the story. had been withheld was that the press itself was "shaken" by the fact that it had been instru- mental in forcing the resignation of Richard Nixon, and that editors were trying hard, as a result, "to prove how patriotic and responsible eve are, that we're not against the establishment, the Government, that we're not all gadflies." That is plausible, even likely. So is the concern of an editor. who is weigh- ing journalistic duty and the public's. right to know against a high claim of national security interest. Such: deci- sions are not- easily made and. no responsible person should wish tc. abandon them to abstract rules. ? Still?here was more money ($350 million) being spent on a project of dubious value than President Ford now says would "save" Cambodia, Here was an exploit that could have been? and might yet proVe?a provocation to the Soviets, without necessarily yielding vital -intelligence information. Here was a linkage between the shad- owy C.I.A. and the shadowy Howard Hughes, with the C.I.A. going to ex- traordinary lengths to suppress the story. Here, too, at a time of inter- national dispute on the law of the sea, was a clandestine enterprise that potentially could give the United States an enormous, if not exactly proper, advantage in undersea mining tech- niques. As is almost always the case with "national security" stcries, in retrospect it is hard to see how a news organization?let alone so many? could have thought such a story ought. to be withheld. NEW YORK TIMES 16 March 1975 C.I.A!s Clandestine Work Assailed at Meeting Here By DIANE HENRY. Covert political activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries have been largelyf I and.h ld be abolished, according to many of the participants at a conference here yesterday on the role of clandestine opera- tions in a democratic foreign policy. Among the 28 participants, including political scientists, historians, professors and peo- ple with experience in intel- ligence, a few advocated that laws be written to prohibit the CIA from any covert activities to intelligence gathering. ? Arthur J. Goldberg, the for- mer Supreme Court Justice and former United States Repre- sentative at the United Na- tions, found many supporters in the group when he said that only in cases where there was author of an amendment to abolish covert C.I.A. activity that was defeated last year, maintained that such opera- tions "violate our promises of who holds -the Albert Schwei- tzer chair at the university. Zygniunt Nagorski Jr, a member of the Council on For- eign Relations, defended the a "real and genuine threat to nonintervention into the inter- C.I.A. saying, "If you would the security of elle ? United nal affairs of other countries." eliminate the covert activity of States," should the CIA he per- In addition, he said, they "vie- the C.I.A. you would be taking mitted to conduct covert opera- tions. late the constitution of this country." away one of its arms." "The fact is covert activities Mr. Goldberg suggested that Senator Abourezk said that . . . must be maintained in or- high administration officials often ':undeclared wars," and ler for the C.I.A. to work," should be made to "set forth thus illegal and unconsti- said Mr. Nagorski, who like sworn testimony," on the nec- essity of any covert operation and he recommended that the President should apply his sig- nature to any orders for covert operations. Senator James Abourzk, Democrat of South Dakota, the, tutional. . . several other participants, eseel The conference, which took it was difficult to differentiate place at the City University between intelligence gathering Graduate School, is a yearly and covert operations, which eVent held by Arthur M. are often meshed in C.I.A. Schlesinger Jr., the historian, activities. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 6 Approved For Release 20.01108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.360006-2 TET YORK mas 18 March 1975 The C.I.A. nd Free peech By Tom Wicker Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks have asked the Supreme Court to over- turn an Appeals Court ruling that permitted stringent Government cen- sorship of their book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence." If the Court refuses to intervene; or sustains the Appeals Court, one of the most -extraordinary prior restraints in his- tory will have been allowed to stand, and the ability of the Government to classify and withhold information from the public will have been greatly enhanced. The case arose when Mr. Marchetti left the employ of the Central Intelli- gence Agency in 1969?after 14 years ?and began to write a book about it. C.I.A. officials learned of his plans and went into court, citing an employ- ment contract he had signed pledging himself to secrecy about what he learned while working for the C.I.A. A temporary injunction against Mr. Marchetti was confirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on 'grounds that he planned an unauthor- ized disclosure of classified informa- tion. The Government's "need for secrecy in this area," the Appeals Court said, justified this prOr restraint on publication. The result was that Mr. Marchetti and his co-author, Mr. Marks, had to Submit their manuscripts for clearance to the C.I.A., which deleted 339 por- tions of it. Subsequent negotiations reduced this number to 168 deletions, but the authors nevertheless filed suit to have the injunction?hence the de- letions?set aside. In hearings before Federal District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alex- andria, Va., the C.I.A. failed to sustain its deletions, despite testimony by four deputy directors, except in 26 in- stances and parts of two others. Meanwhile, however, the book had ap- peared with all 168 deletions repre- ented by blank spaces. Then, on Feb. 7, the Fourth Circuit overruled Judge Bryan and upheld the' Government's right to make the 168 deletions. That IN THE NATION, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 March 1975 CIA and the sub Was it stupid and wasteful? Or ;Clever and justifiable? The CIA's salvage of a part of a sunken Soviet submarine provides the stuff of movie drama. It has pushed Cambodia and the econ- omy out of the banner headlines and will undoubtedly be talked about as a mystery-story relief from the gloomy news of the day. Only intelligence experts can fully answer the above questions. But, on the face of it, the CIA was carrying out an operation well within its mandate. This is a far cry from over- throwing legitimate governments or assassinating people. It was what many voices now demand the CIA confine itself to ? gather- ing intelligence. Although Project Jennifer was unsuccessful, its avowed purpose was to obtain information about the Soviet Union's missiles and code sys- tems. If the Russians had a hance to lay hands on an American nuclear ship, can it be doubted they would jump at it? Detente, Americans should be reminded, does not end an adver- sary relationship with -ra,,,,v Both nations. engage in vigorlaus clandestine intelligence and coun- terintelligence activities. It would be negligent in the extreme if the U.S. failed to use every sensible means possible to determine So- viet strengths and intentions. Moreover, the CIA's foresight in developing such a technologically advanced vessel for intelligence purposes will be admired by many. For a long time the Glomar sified, whether or not it had been spe- cifically stamped with a classification. This effectively overrode Judge Bryan's finding that in numerous instances C.I.A. officials had officially classified information only when they found it in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript, not before; and it meant that certain general assertions?something like "the C.I.A. was active in Greece"?would be considered classified information, even though not specifically contained in any classified documents. III In several other instances, more- over, Judge Bryan had accepted Mr. Marchetti's testimony that he had ob- tained ,certain information only after he left the C.I.A.'s ernploy. But the Appeals Court ruled that if the C.I.A. ' had possessed and classified this in- formation while Mr. Marchetti worked for the agency, whether or not he was then in possession of it, he still was barred from disclosing it when he learned of it later on. Explorer, as a deep-sea, minh vessel, roamed the seas looldng for mineral nodules and no one, including the Russians, suspected its other mission. Whether or not the Jennife.. Project itself was worth the higt cost is controversial and is bound' to be studied by the congressionel panels now scrutinizing the CIA. 'It is possible the judgment was a mistaken one. But surely the 214.4 is not a total loss. Although tha cover has been blown and it canm longer be used for intelligenve gathering, it is said to have enormous spin-off value for development of resources. Of greater concern to many the role of industrialist Howari Hughes, whose name has cropped up repeatedly in connection with Watergate-related activities.. Have his various CIA ties pro- tected him from government in- vestigation of his mysterious butt ness activities? Has the CIA be financing a bonanza for him? A broader concern is that the current furor over the CIA totally discredit the agency. It if now fashionable to publicize the CIA's uglier sides and question- able judgments ? usually made with presidential approval ? buk it should not be forgottehthat the CIA has successes to its credli also. The nation needs a strong intelligence community ? and iii would be a dfsservice to the U.S. not to keep a balanced perspective on the CIA as current investi- gations of the organization ge forward. classified information. Rather, it up- held an injunction against unauthor- ized disclosure of such information, maintaining that the Government's need for secrecy and the contract Mr. Marchetti had signed overrode his First Amendment rights. In effect, the court held that there was a lifetime restraint on his ability to disclose material that fell under the court's exceptionally broad definition of classi- fied information. If that applies across the board to all the numerous Federal agencies that require such contracts of their employes?or those that may in the future?it will prove to be a major new restraint on the flow of decision is the one now being appealed Government information to the public. to the Supreme Court. If upheld, it would vastly expand, ample, based the? majority's decision the Government's' power to classify: on what he called "a presumption ot information. Appeals Court Judge Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., for ex- . restswt ivas e oorodbneli orders. the Y practicee Yet it remoafi ns classifying a oosr vr :aii eiwgsethlairletiva,sienrtnshttofoochafarrecisi elztiecxaa ett.tithiicio:Auannr.t. whatever?onlydoAit Moreover, to eua otppuvc:ten. regularity in the performance by a public official of his public duty." secrecy before Judge Bryan, its best Thus, he was able to rule that material The Appeals Court ruling apparently witnesses were in most instances subject to classific4 111161V" gliOgithelegielP.k5 and purposes, had' I n s- ti P0432Roti#1003#0006112t as when the 7 Government was obliged to prove to Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00Lp2R0001003600061L2 Federal District Judge Murray Gurfein, in 1971, that publication of the Penta- gon Papers would damage the national security, impressive official witnesses were unable to do that either. In both cases, an appeals court, hearing no witnesses at all, neverthe- less overruled the lower court and opted for Government secrecy and : .prior restraint. Once again, therefore, the Supreme Court will have to decide 'czaltc-laer the First Amendment may be so cavalierly overridten. NEW YORK TIMES 20 March 1975 SIllb Mar hie Project i Affects Big Powers, AtSea-Lawffeeting Speelel to The NeVir York Time GENEVA, March 19?The se- cret American attempt to raise a sunken Soviet nuclear subma- rine will undercut the major powers' demand at the United Nations Law of the Sea Confer- ence for the unfettered right to conduct scientific research in the oceans, a leading spokes- man for the developing coun- tries said today. "The developing countries have been arguing on the basis that espionage is the real rea- son why the major powers seek complete freedom for scientific research," Christopher W. Pinto ? of Sri Lanka said. "Now that this is confirmed, they can he, more forceful." Mr, Pinto has been playing a major role at the 137-nation, conference, which resumedl Monday. He said that the sue-1 cess of the conference, which is attempting to draft a world Icharter' to govern use of the seas and the exploitation of ,their resources would depend 'trade-off." The major power on achieving "a collection of trade-off." The major, powers reject such demands of the developing countries as prior notification research activities and participation of their na- tionals, he added. The poorer countries suspect, Mr. Pinto explained, that the great powers argue that there roust be no hindering of scienti- fic progress "simply to cover espionage activities to be car- ried out at will." The disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency's attempt to salt salvage the Soviet sub- marine in the mid.-yacific ? is "bound to complicate)the nego- tiations," he said, "but I do not think it is disastrous." NEW YORK TIMES 16 March 1975 ? Clean Sweep at C. LA.?. By James Reston , WASHINGTON?The main hope for the survival of an effective Central Intelligence Agency in the United 1States now lies in a clean sweep of its present leadership and the creation of .a powerful new joint committee of the Congress to oversee its future activities. , The first rule of the spy business is that spies, are expendable. If they "embarrass the government, they are disowned. It is a hard, sometimes un- fair, but often necessary rule, and there is no reason why it should be applied only to the spies and not to the men who give them their orders. ? The C.I.A. has not failed, but it has been caught fiddling with the liberties of private citizens and has been an embarrassment to the Government. The best way to aggravate the embar- rassment now and weaken the C.I.A. even more, is to prolong the current 1.2230130.15 WASHINGTON Investigations, retain the present lead- ers, and publicize all tha crimes of the past. Foreign espionage is an essential lant illegal activity, not to be confused with the political espionage and sabo- tage of the Watergate scandals: It is 'a form of undercover war, and the Communists are waging ii with a ven- geance now in Portugal, while the C.I.A. is virtually helpless in its pres- eent condition to prevent the subver- sion of that strategically important Country. President Ford has handled the problem as if it were a common case of government corruption. He has all the evidence he needs to change the leadership of the C.I.A. whieh has been less than candid, and overhaul the whole sprawling intelligence apparatus of the Government, and he is now in favor of a strong joint committee of Congress to supervise all intelligence activities, but he has not yet acted, a.nd for some mysterious reason Wil- liam E. Colby, the head of the C.I.A., has not had the grace to resign. Mr. Ford, when he was in Congress, was a member of the committee that Was supposed to oversee the C.I.A., and was startled to discover, when he pecame President, that the agency had participated in espionage at home and in plots to assassinate political leaders abroad. Now he says he never suspect- ed this sort of thing was going on and ? would not have approved if he had. It is easy to say that now. But during the savage conflicts of the early cold war period, it waS not so :easy. The internal struggles for polit- ical control in key strategic countries -such as West Germany, Italy, the _Middle East, and even in?Cuba often -depended on providing money for guns, newspaper presses, clandestine radio stations, propaganda periodicals, and many other things which were essential to the struggle, but could not be disclosed to the general public without disclosing them to our adver- saries and threatening the sources and even the lives of our agents. All this is coming out now: the efforts 'out of Washington to overturn. the governments of Diem in Saigon, Allende in Santiago, Castro in Cuba, and even the involvement of the C.I.A. in Watergate and other scandals, including the opening of the mail of members of Congress. The President says this sort of thing has now been stopped, but the underground war goes on, not only, in Portugal, but all over the world. Moscow has been comparatively quiet about the economic disarray in Western Europe, but it has been particularly active within the Communist appara- tus in Spain, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and the Middle East. This is not the sort of struggle that can be countered or publicized, but it also cannot be left to the C.I.A. alone or controlled by the. weak Congressional committees that have failed to supervise it effectively in the past. It was the fear of exposing the covert operations of the C.I.A. that led President Ford to appoint a "safe" committee under Vice President Rockeieller to investigate the domestic activities of the agency, but this had so little credibility in the country unil the Congress that both the House and the Senate are now launching investi- gations of the whole U.S. intelligence community on their own. In the confusion, there have even been cries to abolish the C.I.A., which make racy reading but no sense. The agency needs precise new rules limit-- ing its domestic activities. It needs close supervision by responsible and discreet legislators who know in advance of any covert operation by any intelligence agents of the Govern- ment, and it needs new leadership: On the question of the future direction of the agency, the recent habit of appointing directors from the ranks of the C.I.A. itself probably ought to be reconsidered. Men like Richard Helms, and William Colby, who have spent most of their lives in the service and atmosphere or the C.I.A., may know more about what the C.I.A. should be doing than outsiders, but they are not likely to be the best men at knowing what it should not be doing. The C.I.A. has served the nation well throughout the cold war years, and this fatt has undoubtedly been obscured because its successes can never be publicized while many of its failures are. Thus it will always be the object of suspicion, and should be, but with a new charter, a new director, and careful Congressional supervision, it can undoubtedly regain the confi- dence of the country and be allowed to get on with its essential work. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : Cl4-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360008-2 WASHINGTON STAR 20 March 1975 Q and A ? RIMY HOLS (IA S turces, e(.by Says William Colby, director of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, was interview- ed by Washington Star Staff Writer Je- remiah O'Leary. Question: Clark Clifford, who as counsel to President Truman partici- pated in writing the law which estab- lished the CIA, said recently that the ground rules need to be updated, to be renovated. Do you concur with that view? Colby: Well, I've made certain recommendations for changing our act already. A year and a half ago when I was confirmed, I suggested that we add the word "foreign" to the word "intelligence" wherever it ap- pears in our act, so it's clear it's for- eign intelligence that's the job of this agency and not domestic. I recom- mended other things to clarify exactly what the CIA ought to be able to do in the United States and what it should not be able to do in the United States. 9: That requires an act of Con- gress? A: Yes. It hasn't been passed, but there was legislation last year ? I supported it ? and I'm sure these (congressional investigating) com- mittees will get into a rather funda- mental look at some of these ques- tions. Q: Would you ever go out of the business of operating in terms of your own security within the United States, in places like New York where the U.N. is located, or in places like Miami, where there are many Cubans? A: Well, I think, in the first place, that we ought to be able to collect for- eign intelligence in America. I think we ought to collect it voluntarily from Americans, and we aught to be able to collect it from foreigners. Q: Interviewing returned travel- ers? A: That sort of thing, yes. We do a great deal of that, and there are an awful lot of Americans who very kindly help us and support us on this. We do make commitments that we won't expose them as our sources. That's going to be one of the things I'm insisting on that we not expose them in the course of these investiga- tions. And I think I've received a, very sympathetic response from Sen. Churn on this. If there's a reasona- ble basis for our withholding-au iden- tity or something, he certainly has given every indication that he will give full consideration to that. Q: IN'hat has been the ef- committees of Congress. by the press can the CIA operate effectively as ?'a clandestine service under these conditions? A: Well, it's having a hard time. We have a number of individual agents abroad who have told us that they really don't want to work for us anymore. Q: Agents? A: Foreigners, working foreigners. We have had a number of Americans who have indicated that they don't want to work with us anymore ? not employes, but Americans who have helped us in various ways. We have a number of for- eign intelligence services' that have indicated great concern about collaboration with us ? whether this will be exposed, and they will be subjected to intense criticism in their country. I think this is a very serious problem for our country. We are in the process of los- ing some of the information that otherwise we would be getting. Q: You mean that some of these other services and other individuals are no longer confident? A: They're beginning to pull back, or some of them have jast stopped working with us. And, of course, more serious end not not measurable is the number who would have agreed to work with us, but now won't agree to work with us. I have seen a couple of cases where individuals had indi- cated they thought they would work with us, and then came around here very recently and said, "I know I did agree, but I don't think I will." Q: Have your actual operations overseas been affected by the current. furor? A: Oh, yes, I think the current furor has laid a par- ticular problem on us in that people exaggerate CIA. I see that in Mexico. there was an accusation this week that we organized the excitement at the universi-, ty; which, of course, we had nothing to do with. We also have the problem that CIA is used as a shibboleth to shout about in various coun- tries around the world. And I think we have a more seri- ous problem: We have to consider carefully whether we want to help somebody and take a risk of destroy-, ing .him in the process of helping him. Because if it leaks that we helped him at this stage, we may destroy his political position entire- ly. Philip Agee which give names and a great number .of identities? ? A: Well, I think that's -absolutely unconscionable and reprehensible for an officer who served with us,' accepted our 'agreed with our activities, signed a 'very warm- and friendly letter on his resig- nation indicating that he valued highly his associa- tion with us, and that he would forever maintain the relationship as one of pride and trust, that if he could ever do anything for us he would be happy to . . I've. got an idea or so as to what. he might do. He has named every name he could think of that was anyhow associ- ated with us. There is at least one family who has been put under consider- able pressure as a result of this. A girl hounded out of school because her father's name appears in it. We have had to make rather massive changes in our situation in that area to pre- vent people being subjected to hardships because of this revelation. And the danger is that this kind of thing can go into the whole action4of various terrorist move- ments. Mr. Mitricine, as you know, was murdered in Latin America. There is a school of thought that says that was a patriotic act be- cause he was alleged to be a CIA officer. He was not a CIA officer. And I contend that that kind of a murder is t totally unjustifiable. But Mr. Agee has put a number' of people under direct' threat of exactly that thing happening to them. Q: A couple of years ago, there was a similar furor .and public investigation in- volving the agency and ITT in Chile. liThat is the truth about the agency's role in Chile? A: Well, the fact is, as l've said many times ? I don't want to talk about the details of our activity there ? CIA had nothing to do with the coup that overa threw Mr. Allende. It had nothing to do with the mili- tary at that time. We had a program of trying to sup- port and assist some of the democratic forces looking to the elections of 1976? which we hoped they would win against Mr. Allende. The fact was, however, his policies were such that he. generated so much confu- sion in the country ? not created by CIA ? that the -military did move against him. If you ask whether that was a CIA success or Rockefeller conimisWit,' estlegReledset2:110t1d0/3106kriatA4RIDP77-00632ROkito Wee the pro-; Q: Given the sfiraawx, g spy it was a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 ,gram we had in mind did not take place, which was that the democratic forces would succeed eventually through elections in Chile. Q: Was the agency aware that the Chilean armed forces intended to move when they did? A: We had certain intelli- gence coverage of it and we had a series of alerts indi- cating that it was about to happen. They key to it was whether several different forces would get together to do it, and we had several in- dications that they would on a certain date and then they didn't. And then they would on another date, and then they didn't. And then that they would in September and they did. Q: Did the junta ask the United States or the CIA whether the new regime would be recognized? ? A: They certainly did not ask the CIA, and I don't know of any other requests. Q: There have been a number of reports that you gave a verbal addendum to President Ford after sub- mitting your 50-page report involving the word "assas- sination." Did you make such a rPport? A: I think I'll let the praeniera epanir fnr himeAlf on that. He has spoken on it, and Iihink it's appropriate. Otherwise, I frankly think *that this is a subject that I would like to just stay in a total no comment position... * Q: Well, there have been a number of allegations that the agency either had knowledge or discussions involving assassinations, the ones that took place in- volving Trujillo and Lumuinba, and plans or plots involving Castro and Duvalier. What's your re- sponse to that? , A: Well, again, I really ? don't want to comment about that subject. It will be reported fully to the select committees. This is not a subject ? that I think we would do any good to the United States by talking about. Q: Can you say flatly that the CIA has never planned' -the assassination of any for- eeirtri lender? . A: Again, I just don't want to comment at all on it. 'Q: You've discounted re- ports of sweeping CIA domestic activity but the issue remains very much alive. What's likely to be the upshot of that? I think that theRktRartgiv of the intestigation will rather clearly show that: I'm right, that the program that we undertook to identi- fy foreign links with Ameri- can dissident mOvements was not a massive one, in the numbers involved; was not a domestic one, because it was basically foreign; and it wasn't illegal be- cause it was under our charter and our National Security Act. So it was nei- ther massive, illegal nor domestic. It was an intelli- gence operation. Q: A great deal of the controversy focuses on files' with the names of U.S. citi- zens. What steps have been taken, if any, to cleanse these files? A: Well, some time ago ? for the last three years ? we have been cleansing some of these records. Some of our security files, some of the other things that had material in it that really should not have been in it. We obviously cannot do that now, because the .investigations are under way and we cannot be in the position of destroying potential evidence for these investigations. But I have directed that this kind of material still be segregat- ed. And I look forward to the day after the investiga- ticras when we have one large bonfire and destroy it all. Because I don't think that we ought to have it and I think that the best disposi- tion is to get rid of it. . . Q: Under the Organiza- tion Act of 1947, is mail cover in the United States A: In my view, we should not do it. And that is why I recommended its termina- tion in 1973 and it was terminated by Dr. Schles- inger. Q: But that's not quite re- sponsive. Is it illegal under the mandate? A: Opening mail is, I be- lieve, illegal. Reading the. addresses off mail I think would depend on the author- ity of the organization in question. We're not doing it ? but I could imagine that it would be legitimate to look at the addresses of peo- ple in contact with known foreign intelligence serv- ices or something of that nature. Q: But is,a mail cover a possible subject for crimi- nal prosecution? A: I do not believe so. And I do not believe that the people who are involved even in the opening will be prosecuted. ed Fr ReWRRIARIMNP files containing the names Of Americans illegal ndei the mandate? A: No, it's not. It depends on why. As I told Mrs. " Abzug, if we were watching a foreign organization over- seas and she ran into con- tact with it and it was re- ported, I would probably have her name in the files. And we so did. We had her name for that reason. We .have coverage of foreign meetings, things like that abroad. A certain number of Russians, a certain num- ber of Frenchmen, a certain' number of something else ? and maybe five Americans will go and the names of all will come back and be card- ed and be recorded. We would not do anything with them. But in any indication of any security problem, we would pass them to the FBI. At that time, as a counter- intelligence program, we were vigorously looking to see whether any foreign countries had support or manipulation of our antiwar and various other dissident movements. We concluded after our investigations that they did not. There wasn't any substantial foreign assistance coming to this. But we did look into it to see whether that was so or not. Q: Has morale been dam- aged by the controversies? ' A: Well, I think there's a' feeling of high public criticism of a few missteps by the CIA, that if you got similar missteps by the Fish and Wildlife Servicer nobody would notice it at all. But if it's the CIA, it's big news. The low point in my mind came the other day when there was a story about the D.C. police re- porting its activities during the antiwar movement, dur- ing the disturbances here. The lead paragraph is very clear that that was a story about the police. About half- way down the page it men- tioned that the CIA had loaned the police five auto- mobiles. And on the follow- on page it mentioned that the CIA had trained about 10 or 12 people. And the two- ? column scare headline was "CIA Aid to Police," which was a tiny part of the total story. But that was the headline. The problem about our morale, really is you get some people in CIA who feel that they tried to do their duty, they followed their instructions from the' government, they did what was expected at the time, and people now say it was wrong. On the other hand, you have people in CIA-Who don't want the CIA to do anything wrong, and are quite shaken by the fact' that anything improper was done over the past 20 years. ; So, you have really the two: extremes, both of whom feel somewhat shaken by this .exposure and the attacks. Q: Have you encountered any cases in which it was necessary to discharge or seek the retirement of any employes for violating the legislative mandate? A: No. The ones I think you're thinking of is a group that retired at the end of December. The facts of that case were that Mr. Angle- ton and I had discussions ' about various things about his work. I have the highest respect for the contribution has made to counter- intelligence. I think he is an extremely fine public ser- vant. We did have some dif- fering views about different details of the matter. I determined that it was, I thought, desirable to make some changes, and / offered him another activity but said I thought it was time to put some successive leader- , ship into his responsibility- 'He had the-option of retir- ing, he took the %dim. He has agreed to stay around here a few months, he's still 'here now, helping us on the transition to the new man- agement. The two officers who worked with him ? I said I did not think they would succeed him as the chief, and they chose to re- tire. The fourth officer an- nounced his plan to retire several weeks before the event. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 7, 1975 While the Central Intelligence Agency is under the spotlight of critical expo- sue in the U.S., its counterparts in Communist countries?particularly the Soviet KGB-,-are still very busy. Known to the CIA, for example, are attemp!s by the Communist 'secret ser- vices to recruit about 400 Americans as spies in the last four years. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 10 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100360006f2 SATURDAY REVIEW 5 April 1975 What's ron ith the I Power, arrogance, and the "inside-outside" syndrome are what's wrong, says a former CIA executive who is worried about the challenge to the traditions of representative government. by Tom Braden Washington, D.C. We are gathered, four of us CIA division chiefs and deputies, in the office of our agency's director, an urbane and charming man. He is seated at his desk, puffing nervously on his pipe and asking us questions. Allen W. Dulles is fretting on this morning in the early Fifties, as, indeed, he has fretted most mornings. You can't be in the middle of building an enormous spy house, running agents into Russia and elsewhere, worrying about Joseph McCarthy, planning to overthrow a gov- ernment in Guatemala, and helping to elect another in Italy, without fretting. But on this particular morning, Dulles is due for an appearance before Sen. Richard B. Russell's Armed Services Committee, and the question he is pon- dering as he puffs on his pipe is whether to tell the senators what is making him fret. He has just spent a lot of money on buying an intelligence network, and the network has turned out to be worth- less. In fact, it's a little worse than worth- less. All that money, Dulles now sus- pects, went to the KGB. Therefore, the questions are somber, and so are the answers. At last, Dulles rises. "Well," he says, "I guess I'll have to fudge the truth a little." His eyes twinkle at the word fudge, then suddenly turn serious. He twists his slightly stooped shoulders into the old tweed topcoat and heads for the door. But he turns back. "I'll tell the truth to Dick [Russell]," he says. "I always do." Then the twinkle returns, and he adds, with a chuckle, "That is, if Dick wants to know." THE REASON I RECALL the above scene in. detail is that lately I .have been asking? myself what's wrong with?the CIA. Two committees of Congress and one from the executive branch are asking the ques- tion, too. But they are asking out of a concern for national policy. I am asking for a different reason: I once worked for the CIA. I regard the time I spent there as worthwhile duty. I look back upon the men with whom I worked as able and TO171 Braden, who knows the CIA firsthand, is a columnist for the Los Angeles Times and co-author of Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage. ? Approved For13 Kelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 honorable. So for me, the question "What's wrong with the CIA?" is both personal and poignant. . Old friends of mine have been caught " in evasions or worse. People I worked with have violated the law. Men whose ability I respected have planned opera- tions that ended in embarrassment or disaster. What's wrong with these people? What's wrong with the CIA? Ask yourself a question often enough, and sometimes the mind will respond with a memory. The memory my mind reported back is that scene in Allen Dulles's office. It seemed, at first blush, a commonplace, inconsequential epi- sode. But the more it fixed itself in my mind, the more it seemed to me that it helped to answer my question about what's wrong with the agency. Let me explain. The first thing this scene reveals is the sheer power that Dulles and his agency had. Only a man With extraordinary power could make a mistake involving a great many of the taxpayers' dollars and not have to explain it. Allen Dulles had extraordinary power. Power flowed to him and, through him, to the CIA, partly because his brother was Secretary of State, partly because his reputation as the master spy of World War II hung over him like a mysterious halo, partly because his senior partner, ship in the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell impressed the small-town lawyers of Congress. Moreover,. events helped keep power flowing. The country was fighting a shooting war in Korea and a Cold War in Western Europe, and the CIA was sole authority on the plans and potential of the real enemy. To argue against the CIA was to argue against knowledge. Only Joseph McCarthy would run such a Indeed, McCarthy unwittingly added to the power of the CIA. He attacked the agency and when, in the showdown, Dulles won, his victory vastly increased the respectability of what people then called "the cause" of anti-communism. "Don't join the book burners," Eisen- hower had said. That was the bad way to fight communising:The good way was the CIA. Pow ER WAS THE FIRST THING that went wrong with the CIA. There was to,S much of it, and it was too easy to bring to bear?on the State Departwent, on ; other government agencies, on the patri- otic businessmen of New York, and on the foundations whose directorships they occupied. The agency's power over- whelmed the Congress, the press, and therefore the people. I'm not saying that this power didn't help to win the cog War, and I believe the Cold War was a good war to win. But the power enabled the CIA to con- tinue Cold War operations 10 and 15 years after the Cold War was won. Under Allen Dupes the power was un- questioned, and after he left, the habit of not questioning remained. I remember the time I walked over to the State Department to get formal ap- proval for some CIA project involving a few hundred thousand dollars and a publication in Europe. The desk man at the State Department balked. Imagine. He balked?and at an operation de- signed to combat what I knew for cer- tain was a similar Soviet operation. I was astonished. But I didn't argue. I knew what would happen. I would report to the director, who would gethis brother on the phone: "Foster, one of your peo- ple seems to be a little less than coopera- tive." That is power. THE SECOND TRIM, that's wrong with the CIA is arrogance, and the scene I've mentioned above 'shows that, too. Allen Dulles's private joke about "fudging" was arrogant, and so was the suggestion that "Dick" might not want to know. An organization that does not have to answer for mistakes is certain to become arro- gant. It is not a cardinal sin; this fault-, and sometimes it squints toward virtue. It might be argued, for example, that only arrogant men would insist on building the U-2 spy plane within a time frame which military experts said could not be met. Yet in the days before satellite surveillance, the U-2 spy plane was the most useful means of keeping the peace. It assured this country's leaders that Rus- sia was not planning an attack. But if arrogance built the plane quickly, it also destroyed it. For surely it was arrogant to keep it flying through Soviet airspace after it was simpected that the Russians were literally zeroing in on overflying U-2s. I wonder whether the.arrogance of the CIA may not have been battlefield-re- lated?a holdover from World War II machismo and derring-do. The leaders of the agency were, almost to a man, vet- erans of OSS, the CIA's wartime prede- cessor. Take, for example, the men whose faces I now recall, standing there in the director's office. ? One had run a spy-and-operations network into Germany from German- occupied territory. Another had volun- teered to parachute into Field Marshall Kesselring's headquarters grounds with terms for his surrender. A third had Otatah.-t adr ?"Rkr'2aYRA4g Faso nevertheleas, tV2:11C:i wan 'tt se. volunteered to and to take Moreove.r, .sisey were inn- asreanen,. mere than most soldiers can be ? ressed, with the absolute necessity Approved For ReitaffNiyegge : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010n60006*-2 19 March 1975 Marquis Childs The Wil go tight on creating and perpetuating the myths that always accompanied the presence of the monster. We know the myths. They circulate throughout the land wherever there are bars and bowling alleys: that the CIA killed John Kennedy; that the CIA crip- pled George Wallace; that an unex- plained airplane crash, a big gold heist, were all the work of the CIA. These myths are ridiculous, but they will exist as long as the monster exists. The fact that millions believe the myths raises once again the old question which OSS men used to argue after the war: Can a free and open society engage in covert operations? After nearly 30 years of trial, the evi- dence ought to be in. The evidence dem- onstrates, it seems to me, that a free and open society cannot engage in covert operations?not, at any rate, in the kind of large, intricate covert operations of which the CIA has been capable. I don't argue solely from the box score. But let's look at the box score. It reveals many famous failures. Too eas- ily, they prove the point. Consider what the CIA deems its known successes: Does anybody remember Arbenz in Guate- mala? What good was achieved by the overthrow of Arbenz? Would it really have made any difference to,this country if we hadn't overthrown Arbenz? And Allende? How much good did it do the American people to overthrow Allende? How much bad? Was it essential?even granted the sticky question of succession?to keep those Greek colonels in power for so long? We used to think that it was a great triumph that the CIA kept the Shah of Iran on his throne against the onslaught of Mossadegh. Are we grateful still? The uprisings during the last phase of the Cold War, and those dead bodies in the streets of Poland, East Germany, and Hungary: to what avail? But the box score does not tell the whole story. We paid a high price for that box score. Shame and embarrass- ment is a high price. Doubt, mistrust, and fear is a high price. The public myths are a high price, and so is the guilty knowledge that we own an estab- lishment devoted to opposing the ideals we profess. IN OUR ,MIDST, we have maintained a secret instrument erected in contradiction to James Madison's injunction: "A popu- lar government without the means to popular information is a farce or a tragedy, perhaps both." As I say, the investigating committees will prop the monster up. I would suggest more radical action. I would shut it down. I would turn the overt intelligence function over to the State Department. Scholars and scientists and people who understand how the railroads run in Sri Lanka don't need to belong to the CIA in order to do their valuable work well. I would turn the paratroopers over to the army. If, at Washington. .Recipe for how to make things worse than they are: Start with a large order of paranoia, stir in with ground- less rumors and wild charges, bake with a strong infusion of CIA flavoring. In this charged atmosphere all the old suspicions about the assassinations of Presi- dent John F. Kennedy and his brother, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, are being revived. This can be put down partly to what is little better than cheap publicity-seeking by those who think it is a sure way to garner a headline. But reports from around the country show that the wildest of the rumors are tak- en seriously by those, who, given even a little rational thought, should know better. The CIA planned the assassi- nation of the two Kennedy brothers. This has taken hold not only with the crazies but among the young willing to believe anything evil about the "establishment." The commission that inves- tigated President Kennedy's assassination was headed by the late Chief Justice Earl Warren who accepted the as- signment reluctantly after arm-twisting by President Lyndon B. Johnson. Gerald R. Ford, then Republican leader in the House of Representa- tives, was a member of the commission. After sifting with a capable staff every scrap of evidence, rumor and report, including the charge that a conspiracy was involved, the commission found that Lee Harvey Oswald, the loner, was the killer who had fired on the President as he passed R rs About the by in the motorcade in Dallas. As for Robert Kennedy, witnesses saw Sirhan B. Sir- ban fire the fatal shot as the young senator passed through the anteroom of a hotel kitch- en in Los Angeles. After a lengthy trial, Sirhan was found guilty and sentenced to death. Since his conviction he has waited on death row in San Quentin pending judicial decision on the legality of the death penalty. Naturally, members of his family are ea- ger to exploit the agitation to reopen the case. There seems at times a competition to see who can swallow the biggest myth, with the Central Intelligence Agency the prime bait. In a suburb of Los Angeles, the Or- ange County Bar Association heard at a luncheon meeting Philip (Dave) Thomas de- scribe how he had carried out 22 assassinations in the Soviet Union as a CIA agent. One newspaper headline said "CIA Assassin Tells Lawyers of Ex- ploits." The speaker went on to say that to escape the KGB after his latest killing he had seized a Pan American 747, using his American Express Card, to fly him to safety. Even though the story is wildly improbable, the CIA searched its files. No such name nor anything resem- bling it came to light. No matter what is eventu- ally proved to have been wrongdoing by the CIA, the rumor-mongering is contrib- uting to the erosion of the agency's status. Many critical of the covert side ? the dirty tricks department of the CIA ? believe that its overt oper- ations, intelligence-gathering essential to Our survival to mount a secret attack upon a foe, the army is capable of doing it, and, with some changes in command structure in order to bypass bureaucracy, the army could do it as swiftly and secretly as the CIA. Under the command structure of the Depart- ment of Defense, congressional over- sight would be possible. Then, if the army got caught fielding a secret division in Laos, and if the American people did not want a secret division in Laos, the American people would know where to turn. I would turn the psychological war- riors and propagandists over to the Voice of America. Psychological warriors and propagandists probably never did belong in a secret agency. -? And, last, I would choose a very few men to run spies and such covert op- erations as the passage of money to those in other lands who cannot afford to ac- cept American support openly. But I would limit covert operations to passing money to "friendlies." I would house these spy masters and and intelligence esrsa-s-geer are Invaluable and its deem.- tion would be a severe less An organizs.tion motst re- eve in promoting the caessetoSsa acy theory of the CIA ts nie National Caucus of Labor Committees, a militant Kux- ist organization that liras the CIA with the KGB in a elant brainwashing operenesn. Members believe in a "rester plot" they must do evmetting possible to frustrate. SPeen &- story appeared in the Tash- ington Post on the caumesay- ing the CIA had declinedeetn- ment, Director Willi= E. Colby said that while he thought it was a &mastic matter and the inquiry anheald have been directed to theFBI, he was replying to say Ciat while the caucus claeges were "only twisted fantasy your circulation of tem forces CIA to deny ttai as flatly false." Once before in a tens. of , trial and tribulation the same t witches' brew of fear essL sus- picion haunted a trout:iv:,na tion. After President .thra- ham Lincoln's assassinststa in 1865 just at the end of thetsCiv- il War, the rumor paseated that his Secretary of Wte, Ed- win M. Stanton, had plegei part in a plot to murfan the President. Nothing trest,seer proved beyond the fasts that the abrasive Stanton hatenere been at odds with R.:,..tt_tnelet over the conduct of the me, Latter-day scholars have. &- missed the rumor as urat,end- ed. Hopefully we will matter from the present pltl.7.227, which is more virulese ter: that of a century ago. a:f, sea- sation-mongering is no serv- ice in our time of troub14 and I would forbid, by law, any of them from ever calling himself "di- rector." They would not Work for the CIA. Because I would abolish the name CIA. As their chief, the President should choose for a term of six years some civilian who has demonstrated staunch- ness of character and independence of mind. I would make him responsible to a joint committee of CongreSs, as well as to the President, and I would not permit him to serve more than one term. THUS, WE MIGHT get rid of power. With- out power, arrogance would not be dangerous. Thus, too, we could prevent the inside-outside syndrome, so essential to secrecy, .from making a mockery of representative government. As for the house that Allen Dulles built at Langley, we might leave it stand- ing empty, our only national monument to the value that democracy places upea the recognition and correction of a take. hi s?meMirci18ef 168isReleaveY2070V08/013nIedAc-RDIP717113(1432R0001003601166-2 Aproved For Release 2001/08/0e: ClAttalffdpeaM00100360006-2 f"M 1975 28 March 1975 ,t ' ji ? "N ), !Tian tO .cdce By ATcimista O'Leary Wasbingten Stu Stail Wnter The chief of Latin Ameri- can operations for the CIA is leaving the agency effec- tive May to organize for. vier American intelligence officers in an effort to de- fend the the organization against those who attack it. He is David A. Phillips, 52, who has been in charge of the Western Hemisphere Division for two years and is a veteran who has been CIA station chief in the Do- minican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela. Phillips re- cently informed CIA Direc- tor William E. Colby of his decision to take early re- tirement and that he intends to organize an as- sociation of retired intelligence officers from all American services. The Washington Star learned that Colby told Phillips he would rather he remain in his present job but accepted Phillips' deci- sion with good wishes when the official made clear his decision was final. Phillips told the Star he was particularly deter- mined to defend the agency as a private citizen, as he could not do while on the agency payroll, because much of the ?recent criticism of the CIA has fo- cused on his area of respon- sibility in Latin America. THE CIA has been linked with operations against the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende in Chile and allegations of assassination plots against Prime Minister Fidel Cas- tro of Cuba, the late Presi- dent Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic . and the late President Francois Duvalier of Haiti. The association of retired intelligence officers does not yet exist, but Phillips has sent an open letter under that heading to 250 former CIA officers with whom he is acquainted. The letter says in part: ''As chief of Latin Ameri- can operations, I have been deeply concerned about the decline of morale at Lang- ley (CIA headquarters) and abroad. Snow baning innu- ? 0 4 0 r(51:1E CS endo, egregious stories and charges, and even honest concerns have presented us with the basic dilemma of issuing either a general statement which reassures few but preserves security, or a comprehensive ac- counting which satisfies some but at the expense of operations and agents. "Under the circum- stances, there is little doubt that a thorough congres- sional review is the best, if not the only solution even though some leakage of sensitive details on foreign operations seems almost inevitable. A few of our older documents from the Cold War period will make for pretty heady reading today. As for our present activities, I am convinced we have no problem. "IN THE meantime, our capabilities abroad are being damaged. More and more of our agents and friends ? many of them fine people who cooperate- on the basis of ideology ? are saying thanks but no thanks. Friendly liaison services are beginning to back away from- us. The Marchettis and the Agees have the stage and only a few challenge them." Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee are former CIA agents who have written critical exposes of the agency. Phillips said he is leaving the OA because he wants to fill the gap and intends to challenge Marchetti to a series of college campus debates. He also will go on a lecture tour and do some writing to explain why the United States needs an intelligence service. Phillips said he was con- cerned that people might think he was still working for the agency when he gets started with the associa- tion's efforts. He said, "I Wish to make it absolutely clear that the CIA manage- ment has not had, and will not have, a hand officially,.' unofficially or otherwise in this organization and its ef- forts." Phillips said he will re- ceive ?15,000 a year as a re- ooviet hintstlu elpeclkil Faisal Mascot? Bureau of The SUR . Moscow?The Soviet Union Chile and in Cypras give suf. ncient Ideas as to who master- minded the crime." The American intelligencia ageficy is blamed here bot!-* for the C01:3 d'etat that ovea, 'seriously suggested last night that the U.S. Central Intelli- gence Agency had plotted the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia because of grow- ing friction between the ITIOd- threw ? the Chilean administra, ? arch and Washington over the lion of Presid-ent Salvador Ai. price of oil and terms of a lende in 1973 and the ouster Middle East settlement. The ,government newspaper lzvestia stopped 'short, how- ever, of an oraen accusation, but it left no doubt that It State, had warned in Jar.uarir believes the CIA planned and probably helped carry out Tuesday's assassination. In ,a short article headlined "Rho Fired?" /zvestia cites Last summer of .President karios from Cr,.:rust lzvestia pointedly recalie that Henry H. Kissinger, the United States Secretary elt that the U.S. might find it necessary in "extreme dreum. stances," as IZ.VeStid puts it, 15' intervene militarily in oil-arc- Arabducingsoutres. Saudi Arabia. papers in Beirut, Cairo the pap-er indicates, would be a and Rabat, Morocco, to imnli- principal target. cate the United States in the "At the end of last years' governmenta s s a . s s i n a t ion n n. e Ta ss agency, t f t alsoa Izvestia wrote last night, "the American magazine Newsweek puolished an ominous cartoon ?leaders of oil-producing coun- triesi being shot at from arouni a corner. Are these threats not becoming a reality?" Earlier, Tess had suggeste that the new King and crown prince. in Saudi Arabia were. even more pro-American thau in Faisal had ever been., has carried stories in the last two days suggesting that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved. Radio Riyadh in Saudi Ara- bia has said the assassin, a nephew of the King, was mentally deranged and acted alone. But Izvestia and Tess quote the Beirut newspaper Al Litca leaving the implication that as saying that the United States had concluded that a reduction in oil prices was "Im- possible to achieve during Faisal's lifetime" and thus de- cided to assassinate the mon- arch, who is characterized as increasingly "disappointed with American policies." The Moroccan newspaper L'Opinion is quoted as saying that the basic American deci- sion to remove the King came after the 1973 oil embargo. "There is no need to Indicate who did it. . . . The events in the United States had gained greatly from the asSassinatioia Tans also suggested that the Arabian-American Oil Com- party, known as Aramco, may have been involved in the puta- tive plot to assassinate King Faisal because of his recem actions to nationalize the firm,. These charges were In grea?! contrast, however, to the gen- erally mild Soviet comment on the collapse of Mr. Kissingern efforts to mediate a new Is, raell withdrawal from tht, Sinai Peninsula. ? " U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 31 MARCH 1975 Iii spite of the torrent of unfavorable. publicity about the Central Intelli- gence Agency, recruiting is booming. GA job applications jumped from a normal 300 weekly to 800 in January and the trend is continuing. tired employe compared with his present salary of $36,000. The association, he said, will be financed by $10 a year dues to be used for stamps, paper and similar expenses but not for sal- aries. He expects to provide for his own income through lecture fees. Approved For Release 2001108108: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 14 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 THEECONOMISTMARCH29,ig,75 Glomar Explorer Went fishing Washington. DC Plenty of people blame the press, the bearer of bad tidings, for the long string of embarrassing disclosures that has put the Central Intelligence Agency in a corner fighting for its bureaucratic life. The manner in which the true mission of that celebrated deep-sea mining ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, was disclosed last week puts the newspaper editors in a different light. Successive disclosures in the past year showed the CIA in an equivocal relationship to some of the illegalities of the Nixon Administration, meddling in the politics f Chile, indulging in domestic espion- age, and under suspicion of complicity in real or attempted foreign political assassinations.. The Glomar Explorer is -clifteeriil ease entirely. When a Soviet submarine exploded and sank in the Pacific in 1968, the American under-sea tracking system established where the wreck occurred, while the Soviet system failed to do so. Eventually the Nixon Adminis- tration approved the building of a special ship, with a huge covered satel- ate barge, which arrived on the spot :!.ast year and picked up the Soviet sub- marine from its position on the sea bed, three miles down. The operation was bizarre and financially prodigal, -2& legality gave rise tO lively argument -among the government lawyers, it in- volved deception of the public, and it involved a covert association with a financier, Mr Howard Hughes; whose relations with the Nixon Administra- tion were of arguable propriety in other ways. Still, as a genuine effort to gather foreign . military intelligence the operation did fall within the proper function of the CIA. The press handled it quite differently from the agency's alleged trespasses and indiscretions. After the Glomar Explorer sailed in 1973 from the Atlan- tic port where it was built, one or two reporters picked up hints that its mission might be something other than scraping up mineral nodules from the ocean floor, but the CIA was able to persuade their editors, as a matter of public interest, not to pursue the ques- tion. A labour dispute that broke out over the manning of the ship had some features not easily explicable in a normal commercial vessel; that drew some attention. Last summer the offices of Mr Howard Hughes's holding company in Los Angeles were broken into and quantities of its files remol, ed, including files to do with the Glomar Explorer and the company's relations with the CIA. An attempt at what is described as blackmail followed, Mr Hughes refused to pay, and last month a grand jury in Los Angeles began an investigation. By now the hints and rumours were fairly thick, and indeed the Los Angeles Times published on February 8th a version that had the Glomar Explorer searching for a sunken submarine, though in the wrong ocean. A quick intervention by the CIA got the report curtailed and moved to an inside page. Mr William Colby, the director of the CIA, got busy briefing editors, usually telling them more than they knew, explaining that the ship had not finished its job but had to return next summer t6 collect some more pieces of submarine, and appealing to their public spirit not to spoil the game. The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Star, Time, Newsweek and at least two radio and television networks had heard about it and all agreed to hold their hands, with the reservation that if others published it, they would have to. The dam broke on March 18th. On that evening the New York Times got word from Mr Jack Anderson, who continues the muck-raking column of the; laic Drew Pearson, that Mr Ander- son was going to- use the story not in his column but in his regular radio talk, and it decided that it had to go ahead and publish. Against publishing the story was the argument that the Russians did not know what those two weird vessels were doing in that spot in the Pacific; Mr Melvin Laird, who was Secretary of Defence at the time the costly project was launched, has said he would guaran- tee that they did know. Even so, it is possible to argue that knowing some- thing is, for the Soviet government, a different matter from having to take cognisance of it officially. The lessons of the U-2 affair in 1960 have not been forgotten, and hence the Administra- tion was careful not to say a word. One thing that is clear is that the Glomar Explorer will not be returning NEWSWEEK 24 MARCH 1975 COLBY COMES IN FROM THE COLD Congressional investigators looking into the CIA may , get more than they expected from their demand that spymaster William Colby turn over the report he delivered to President Ford last Christmas in Vail, Colo., on his agency's domestic operations. Colby has I told Sen. Frank Church, head of the Senate probe, that various in-house CIA task forces have from time to timci reviewed the agency's internal workings. Ile volun- teered to turn over a list of these studies to the Congressional investigators. to the spot to look for more bits of submarine. A rather valuable ship, equipped to recover objects from the deep sea-bed, looks like coming on the market, unless the circumspect Mr Hughes took the precaution of getting a first option on it. Estimates of the cost of the whole Glomar Explorer operation are in the range of $350m. Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the liberal chairman of the Senate's select committee on intelligence activi- ties; lost no time in saying that the expense was too much: "No wonder we are broke," he said. Few others are willing to join him publicly, in his judgment. There are reports that the lost Russian . submarine had a strange profile,, which might indicate a secret modernisation, making ships of its type subject to the strategic arms limitation pact, and other reports that one or- more of its torpedoes, which may have been nuclear-tipped, were re- covered. Where, if not with the CIA. Can such reports originate? Yet the CIA is also assiduously circulating the ver- sion that the submarine's missiles and its coding apparatus were not, definitely not, among the articles recovered whea a part of the wrecked ship fell back into the ocean depths. This is something the agency could be expected to say jE it were true, and also if it were not. . Intriguing, in a country that is so widely said to have succumbed to self- doubt, become disillusioned with power, and lost the feel for greatness?, is the generosity of the praise that is being heaped on the, in other respects harassed, CIA for the boldness and technical excellence of tills exercise in science fiction. What other country would think of such a project, would find the money for it and would carry it out so flawlessly? Where else are the technological resources for such an. adventure to be found? Which naval power lost the submarine from view (the Soviet Union), and which power tracked. it to its grave in the deep ocean? Good intelligence work as a guarantee. of national security and a precondition of effective arms control are celebrated by the New York Times and the Wash- ington Post, with expressions of thankful- ness that the CIA has, after all, demonstrated its pre-eminence in the work which it was legitimately called into existence to do. _ U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 24 MARCH 1975 The Central Intelligence Agency is known to feel that its secrets will be safe with only two of the three groups that are now investigating its activi- ties?the Rockefeller Commission and the Senate probers. CIA officials worry about possible leaks of sensitive mate- rial from the House panel. 15 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 ? SAGA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 - APRIL 1975 ? - ercelLee.a.veze,...es5=ermeeffeeeteasszte==eisomma anagmangs=s2r Mr. G. was .certainly not thinking of his own death as he hurried down the corridor to his hotel room in Guatemala. His mind swarmed with the details of smuggling rifles and machine guns to a band of Communist-backed re- volutionaries in Mexico. They had money to pay for weapons and wanted delivery at a secret point on Mexico's eastern coast. A fishing boat captain from Grand Isle, La., was to make the delivery. ? Mr. G. was thinking of the sizable profits he would make from the deal and barely noticed a thin, well-dressed young.man step out of a room down the hallway. The young man coughed, covering his face with a handkerchief. The two men drew abreast. "Are you. an American?" the young man asked. Mr. G. turned and his eyes widened with fright. He stared into the barrel of a eight-inch long aluminum tube. Click! A strange vapor spurted from the metal device, surrounding Mr. G.'s face. "What the hell?" he stammered, breathing the sour fumes into his lungs. He crumpled to the floor, his face turning purple. The young man placed the aluminum tube in his pocket and casually walked down the hall and stairway to the lobby. It took exactly 72 seconds for Mr. G. to die. He died just as the young man walked out into the street. Several minutes later, a hotel maid found the body and screamed her alarm. It was another 20 minutes before an ambu- lance arrived. That evening, a death certificate was prepared. Heart attack was the verdict. The examining doctors knew nothing of a colorless, odorless poison carefully sealed in a thin capsule and shot out of a hermetically sealed aluminum *tube. Bizarre poisons are seldom discussed at medical meetings. Few coroners know that such a capsule, fired no more than 24 inches from the v:ctint's face, Equipped with the latest in weaponry and gadgetry, these agents kill the enemy on order. They have even "eliminated" U.S. civilians! By Roy Norton Nesacimrimmszzoemsztrzammammtesesmnid 16 will produce almost instant death. The deadly vapors are breathed into the lungs. Arteries that carry blood to the brain are paralyzed instantly. Within seconds, the victim begins to die. Within minutes, all traces of the poisonous vapor disappear, long before an autepsy can be performed. The poison was developed in a Russian laboratory in the late i '950s and brought to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency . in 1961 when Bogdam Stashinskiy defected to the West. Stashinskiy, a trained assassin for the KGB (Kommissariat Gosudarstevnnoi Bazopasnosti or Soviet committee for State Security), knew the vapor was an effective murder weapon. He had eliminated two .anti- Soviet exile agents in West Germany before surrendering to U.S. coun- terspies. Mr. G. was just one of many victims of the poison since then. A member of the shadowy world of international manipulators, he was a clever soldier of fortune who specialized in gunrunning, dope smuggling, and political intrigue. Like his fellow entrepreneurs, he fed on revolt arid revolution.? hurrying to the werld's hottest trouble spots in order to fatten his bank balance. . The ? assassin with the de.adly aluminum tube was an iile.cal, or "black" agent in the "Plans" .section of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He is attached to "Stall D," an obscure department known inside the agency as the "Kill Squad." Equipped witn the latest in weaponry and gadgetry, these agents kill the enemy on order. Their victims are those persons considered a threat to the. national security of the U.S. In the example above, a Communist-inspired revolution south of the border would be a threat to the U.S., hence it was necessary to "eliminate" Mr. G. Members of the "Kill Squad" are the glamour boys of the CIA's 17,000-man spy organization. They are the true professionals in the back alley battles& Cold War espionage. cold-bloodedly, ? they can murder a double agent ie. Berlin, liquidate a. person who mey jeopardize U.S. security, or arrange fe:; . an assassination squad to the political leader of an unfriendly country_ ? Naturally, many of these projects are surrounded by the highest secrecy.. There are stiff penalties to prevere present, or former, agents of the CI4 from discussing their experiences. -Iv? been out of the 'Company' for two years,- remarked an ex-agent. "i-ict?-? ever, if they knew I was talking, I cc,Z:i be taken into custody without a warrare, - held indefinitely, and brought to e secret trial. More than one person has been whisked out to the 'Mansion for interrogation after they talked in public.' The "Mansion" is the CIA's top secret 65-acre private estate located a few miles from Oxford, Md., along the Chaptank River. The Mansion and grounds are protected by high, elec- trified fences, armed guards and a 'patrol of vicious German shep'nerd dogs. However, despite ail this, official secrecy, many persons in and out of the agency have become disenchanted . with the CIA. At this very moment in Washington,. D.C., a blue ribbon panel, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, is inves, tigating the organization and is prepar- ing a report for President Ford. In Egld of the fact that much has been exposed concerning the CIA's activities in =- own country and the operation ie. .unseat Salvadore Allende in Chirie? there are those who feel that the ds.-adly and frghtening results of the Squads- should also be revealed to the public. Others seek power through o!f!e.F. politics. Uke any other bureaucrats group. teere are cliques ins:cle the. D;',. Strugg:ing' for supremacy over the vas:' spy rezwc-k. Some informants weee recruited. trained, sent into the f:e'd,. and qe?ckiy became disiilus:cned by the realities of espionage. "It looks good only in the movies," remarked one source. From interviews developed over a span of many Months, considerabk data on the CIA was obtained. Despite_ the secrecy, the agency constant"e bubbles with. wild stories and fantase..: rumors; separating the fact from the fantasic was no easy task. Since 9*e information cannot be verified officiaii;e every effort has been made to insure accuracy within these limitations. My information includes: 1410 An aborted assassination eV against Fidel Castro during his visit to New York for an appearance before ties United Nations; 0 The' formation and trai,ling para-military assassination squads, staffed by Cubans; .O "Kill to protect" orders on the t.! spy plane; O Persistent rumors concerning 1.'ee possible murder of several U.S., r-7et zens; and itto Details on the latest weaponry eee gadgetry. Get Castro: Like some ando.,rt Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 Approved ForRelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 bearded demon, Fidel Castro is a satanic figure to CIA agents. "He is satan incarnate, a living reminder of the agency's failures in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs, and other fiascoes," reported a former agent. "They've tlied everything to get Castro. Nothing has worked." ? Originally, the agency was lax in determining Castro's political beliefs. A CIA briefing to President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in late 1960 reported Castro as being a "political enigma." A still secret report declared that Castro did not become a Com- munist until after the Bay of Pigs. "Prior to that time, his public statements did not reflect Marxist directions," the report stated. Nevertheless, there were those in the CIA who did not trust Castro, even in 1960. "If he walks, talks, and acts like a Communist I say he is one," a crusty CIA official declared. Others agreed and, when Castro announced his intentions to visit the United Nations, an assassination plot was formed. "A visit to the U.S. by a foreign leader is a good opportunity to obtain information," explained a former agent. "The CIA almost always maintains a hospitality suite for the American policemen assigned to guard a visiting dignitary. When the officers go off duty, they drop in for free food and drinks. We debrief them through casual questioning. Surprisingly, we often pick up important intelligence data. "When Khruschev visited the U.S., the police reported he was hitting the bottle," he said. "He was also abrupt and he treated his associates in a demeaning manner. This indicated a possible. power struggle that ended when the old boy was ousted." . Castro came to New York in .1960 and the CIA opened a hospitality suite at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Off duty policemen assigned to guard Castro were offered the finest in food and drink, served and poured by CIA agents. But the assassination plot was aborted. Why? One agent said, "there were just too many complications.", Shortly after Castro's visit to New York, the CIA Selectedseveral Cuban exiles to staff CIA-financed assassina- tion squads. "The idea was that a four-man team would return to Cuba, set up posts near Castro's headquar- ters, and kill him in a cress fire from high-powered sniper rifles equipped ? with bullets that exploded on impact. Another team was assembled to 'hit' Castro when and if he made a public appearance. Still another team was trained to blow up his office, using powerful explosives." The assassination squads were trained in the Florida Everglades, under the direction of a graduate of a WW OSS assassination school, Marine .officers, assigned to the CIA, assisted in the training. "Several squads were trained, but Castro's intelligence.men learned of our intentions," an ex-agent said. "There are rumors of at least two attempts made on Castro's life. Both failed. I don't know if this was our CIA squads or some. ordinary Cuban citizen." ? What happened to the remaining assassins? "There is always work for a man schooled in murder," concluded my informant. "At least one of these. men was at the Bay of Pigs. Later, he flew some of the old B-26 bombers for the CIA in the Congo rebellion. He got a bellyful in the Congo after being ordered to fly over native villages and indiscriminately fire on civilians. He dropped out of sight after that." ? Some critics of the CIA, particulariyi those with dispute the "Ione assassin" verdict in the death of Pres. John Kennedy, believe the CIA is responsi- ble for the murder of several world leaders. A group of independent, self- financed investigators have been sifting the facts in several assassinations for ? several years. They are concerned with what are considered similarities in the deaths of Patrice Lurnumba, Dag Hammarskjold, Sen.. Robert Kennedy, Pres. John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. "There are certain patterns in these murders to warrant further investigation," one investigator declared. Another investigator was more out-. spoken. "I am convinced that a clicUe within the Central Inteiligence Acercy, or a CIA-linked group, is responsible for several assassinations," he reported. "I just find it too incredible to believe an 'agency of the U.S. government would cold-bloodedly murder President Ken- nedy, or assassinate some of the best minds .in the modern wand simply betause the victims did not believe .in ? the Cold War." ? . However, these independent inves- tigators are not overly optimistic about the resUlts of their investigations.." If we had everything do:0 in black and white, hard evidence,. no one would belieVe it," one man concluded. The facts are few, the theories are numer- ous. The U-2 Murders: "Intel!ieence flights over unfriendly countries stetee.d as early as 1952 or 1953, using the early U-2 planes under CIA jurisdiction," a former CIA agent revealed. "The U-2 fEghts have continued to this day, despite the photographs we obtain from our 'spies in the sky.' "The U-2 planes flown over Russia were highly improved aircraft Their :range was tremendous and their altitude was quite high," he continued. "The CIA was charged with protecting these planes from any publicity and an. English civilian was 'eliminated' when he attempted to take pictures of the U-2 at Lakenheath, England. "I heard of another incident that allegedly occurred at Atsugi Airport, near Tokyo, in the fall of 1959. A Japanese teeri-ager slipped onto the base and snapped a few pictures, which he hoped to sell to newspapers or magazines. Word got back to someone and, the next evening, the teen-ager drowned himself. Naturally, I assume he had very little choice and Was probably held under the water by an agent," he concluded. Are the assassinations of civilians 17 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 cleared through channels? Rust prior approval be obtaired? "Absolutely not! An agent in the 'black' section is trained, and charged, to make his own decisions," the informant said. "An agent may be =of .contact with his superiors for long periods of time. If security is com- promised, they will remember that dead men tell no tales.. Also, a request for permission to kill indicates an agent may have slipped up somewhere along * the line. Your, superiors in the agency do not like mistakes. You do what you must do to protect the national security and you do it well. An agent (nicht request a professional assassin if he is confronted with a particularly compli? cated job. Then, the agency would send a pro or two out into the field." It was essential that the U-2 protect be protected by "kill" orders. Despite his braggart's shouts, Rus- sian Premier Nikita Khrushchev and his predecessors knew the CIA pulled .elf an important coup in the Cold War. The following information was ob- tained from a former U-2 pilot and was verified by other sources. "The U-2 was a beautiful plane," the pilot said. "There were several windows built into the bottom of the craft, designed ta .photograph enemy installations from high altitudes. This was an important function of the flights over Russia and China. "However, there was another gadget in the plane and a system of pushing b. ttons at certain points along the flight," he continued. "These buttons actIvate-d a recording device that mare'e a radar imprint on tape of the plane's flight over the Earth. We obtained a flight pattern on the tape. After processing, the radar tape . could ba locked into an atomic missile. The missile guidance system is set up to follow the exact pattern on the tape, from launching until strikedown. The missile might deviate off course, but It has to come back and seek out .the pattern on the tape. "it is a foolproof system for directing an atomic missile directly on target without missing by an inch," he said. "Once that missile is launched, nothing other than a shoot-down can stop it from hitting directly on target. Scramble systems can foul up a computer- directed missile. The typography of the Earth for several hundred miles needle be changed to stop a radar tape- directed missile. That's an impossibility so the missile is ready to hit directly en target! "When Francis Gary Powers crashed and Nikita Khrushchev discovered we had missiles homed in right on lies head, he almost went nuts," the pito: continued. "He knew there was abso- lutely nothing he could do. We've been zeroed in for years on every important target in Russia and Red China.'' Some intelligence people believe the crash of Powers's U-2 plane was no accident. "The whole thing has just never added up," the pilot concluded. "Things are never what they seem in espionage. A secretweapon is no good unless the enemy knows about it." If Powers did play such a role in a "set-up" crash inside Russia, it would Approved For be the most iicredIe eseionage.story in history, He ? Was An !dealis: Csetrai Weill- geoce Ageoe-y trainee:; are ealled siOrs, Junior Officer Trainees, during. their extensive training program. Some trainees receive underwater and jungle warfare training at a secret CIA camp in a Southern swamp. Others are given training at a CIA base located near Las Vegas, Nev. While assassination is seldom dis- cussed openly by the instructors, it is present in CIA classes by implication. A former agent told of an instructor's remarks to the class one afternoon during his training. "A U.S. citizen happened to stumble onto a base where the 'Company' was training Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion. He teak several photographs of equipment with U.S. markings on the side," the instructor said. "This was before the markings were to be removed for the actual invasion. If the photographs were published, it would have been a very serious breach of security at the Bay of Pigs. "He arrived in New York and was stopped and interrogated. Offers were made to purchase the pictures and buy him off. He was an idealist and refused to cooperate," the instructor said. "He was crossing a street when a truck veered out of control, struck, and killed him. And fellows, those pictures and negatives just plain disappeared during all the confusion." Trainees also hear of an old, grizzled desert gold prospector who unknow- ingly wandered into a restricted military area with top secret installations. "The 'Company' man knew there was a 99 percent chance the old boy would keep his mouth shut," trainees were in- formed. "But no chance could be taken. The prospector was eliminated and buried in an unmarked grave." The CIA's assassination squads that operated in Vietnam were known as the Intelligence, Coordination, and Exploita- tion unit.. Trainees were told Of ICE terrorists, trained by Special Forces and Green Berets, who had been successful in capturing, or killing, numerous Communist sympathizers. "CIA agents worked very closeiy with the Green Berets and UM- teams in Vietnam," an informant said. - Almost every ex-agent has a story involving the death of a U.S. citizen who unknowingly jeopardized national sec- urity in one way or another. These stories frequently concern someone who stumbled onto a secret military base on U.S. soil. These unsubstan- tiated tales include stories of people who wandered into a Cuban training camp operated by the CIA in the Florida Everglades. "Those nuts in there are pretty darn trigger-happy.': said an agent. "A few got into an arnument between themselves ending with a shoot-out that brought the county sheriff into the brawl. It took some real fancy footwork to keep that incident off the front pages." Mental instability, nervous break- downs, and mental aberrations with paranoid tendencies are an occupa- tional hazard for the CIA aaent. "You Release 2001/08/Cf8 : CIA-RDP77-0043 get to. be a bit paranoid if you're in this business for any length of time," admitted a former agent. "A number of agents have freaked out, chasing their wives or girl friends with knives or guns. One poor soul took an eight-inch butcher knife and decided to carve up his landlady. A larger than usual number of employees are ? arrested in Washington, D.C., or the neigntoring comi-nunities in compromising situa- tions involving morals charges. "A dubious fringe benefit is a private sanitarium," he said. "Security might be compromised if an .agent was treated by an outside psychiatrist. This sounds good, but it can backfire. A young. analyst requested to be relieved of his duties; he felt the pressure was too much. The agency did not act. Finally, James Woodbury and his wife, Dorothy, made a suicide pact and leaped off a bridge down at Great Falls, Va. Our suicide rate is much higher than that for the average population." What frightens this agent. and many others, is a nagging fear that an agent in the field may someday go berserk. "A single man with training in explosives, killing, and every type of dirty warfare could disrupt an entire metropolitan city," he said. "Some day we may wake up and find such an incident on our front pages." - Weaponry: Like their fictional coun- terparts, the management at the CIA has a fascination for sophisticated weaponry. Very few of the bizarre items in their spy arsenal conform to the Geneva Conventions regarding modern .arentaries; many are so secret that few people outside the CIA know about ? them. One diabolical device is a candidate for the 'ultimate weapon." "This is an electronic gadget that changes the role of electrical insulators and conductors," I was told. ? "An in- sulator becomes a conductor and vice versa. The device can be attached7to an automobile, a telephone, or ? an electrical appliance, and .the victim is electrocuted." At present, the device works only on a single appliance. "The labs hope to come up with a pyramiding system,' the informant said. "The device could then be attached to a point in a city's electrical system. The entire city's electrical grid would be transformed from positive-negative to negative- positive. All the. humans would be electrocuted, while the building and 2R000100360006-2 physical facilities would be unharmed: On an even deadlier side; CIA chemists have developed a new nerve gas which contalos two chemicals which are not poisonous themselves, However, when the chemicals are mixed with each other, a deadly nerve gas results. "These are common chemicals. They're stored in two separate compartments of a bottle which _breaks on impact," my source said. "This makes it easy to carry a nerve gas, without danger." Poison is a favorite weapon among the CIA's "black" agents. The most useful- poisons are those of the curare family, a CIA favorite. Crystalline curare is extremely powerful; only 0.023 grants are required to kill a person. One gadget used by agedts is a curare-. tipped dart fired from a small blowgun, which resembles a cigarette; a cigarette lighter can also be used as a powerful mechanical dart gun, shooting a poisoned dart across a room. Other weapons include the traditional silencer-equipped machine guns, pis- tols, and burp guns. These are usually equipped with custom-made ammtini- lion that explodes on impact. "What- ever the dark side of man can conceive, we have incur arsenal," a former agent said. _ "What can we conclude about the .CIA and the use of "Kill Squads"? Although a newcomer to international espionage, the Central Intelligence Agency has become one of the worlds leading?perhaps the best?intel- ligence gathering agencies. However, the baiic weakness in any spy organi- zation is that a reckless, untruthful, unscrupulous schemer makes the per- fect agent. The perfect agent can al- ways be dangerous to a democratic 'society, unless held in check. We have focused on a single aspect of the CIA; there are many achievements and several failures. Today when we are so dos* examining the CIA after seeing how the Executive Branch of government tried to?and did?use this organization, we must make sure that it car; never happen again. It's a small step from obtaining disguises to "eliminating"' the opposition. The CIA was formed to preserve the freedom of the people of the U.S.?we must never give it tha opportunity to become our master. * EDITOR & PUBLISHER 22 MARCH 1975 High court petition The U.S. Supreme Court has been petitioned to overturn an appellate court rulbg which sustained the CIA's right to suppress writings of former employees about what they learned while working for the agency. The petition for a high court hearing was made by Victor L. Marchetti and?John D. Marks, co-authors of the partly censored book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," joined by publisher Al- fred A. Knopf Inc. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 WASHINGTON POST 16 MARCH 1975 Marcheiti Appeals to High Court By John P. MacKenzie washi=tizon Po,t Staff Writer The Supreme Court was asked yesterday to decide whether the Central Intelli- gence Agency has broad power to suppress writings of former employees about what` they learned while- working for the CIA. Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks. coauthors of the ? partly censored book, "CIA and the Cult Intelli- gence," joined publisher Alfred A. Knopf. Inc.. in seek- ing a high Court hearing. The Few-tit U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals last month sustained the CIA's right to enforce its secrecy. agreement with Marchetti, a former high- ranking agency employee, and celaxed the CIA's burden ot proving that deleted passages' from the book contained clas- sified information. The low, r court eprostrated itself before the totem of na- tional security.' the petition said. "and completely ignored the compelling claims of free .speech and free press, which are guaranteed by the Consti- tution." In addition to the constitud attack, the petition chal- lenged the CIA's right to ob- tain an injunction preventing publication of the disputed passages on grounds that Con- gress had not authorized such , court orders despite the agen- cy's requests. The authors and publisher had won a significant victory last year when District Judge Albert V.. Bryan ? Jr. in Alexan- dria rejected the CIA's claim 'that more than 20(i items of in- formation had , been classified. Bryan said the agency ap- peared to classify the informa- tion on the spot when . it screened the matiuscript But the court of appeals held that information should be deemed classified if it was' -.classifiable" and appeared; anywhere on a government tleeurecrit bearina a ciassifica- 1:on s????.rop. I'ne court said there was a "presumption at regularity in performance by public officials" safeguarding' governfnent secrets, so that Ili an item could have been clas-i sified it was in fact classified.. Melvin L. Wulf and Floyd! Abrams, attorneys for the au-; thors and publisher, said thei appellate court ignored vit.; dence that government classi- ? LONDON TIKES 22 March 1975 CI1-4 cooperating with Hush secrez: service ic fi hting terr rism and subversion spite some friction By Louis Heren He is typical of the CIA's senior An American newspaper re- men, and probably would not port that Britain's Secret Intelli- know how to spy if given the gence Service is upset because opportunity. the Central Intelligence Agency The existence of the CIA ? failed to pass on ate results of station here is well known to its operations in Britain has Mr Wilson as it was to Mr Heath. been dismissed as fiction' by and previous Prime Ministers. those in a position W. know. The SIS ? station in Washington The two agencies have always is also known to the White closely cooperated with each House. Again this is standard other since the SIS helped to Practice. organize the CIA in the late Mr Wilson is also Personally forties. Moreover, it was said, acquainted with CIA men. For the CIA does? not operate in instance, Mr Chet Cooper, who Britain.? was second in command of the There is, of course, a CIA station in London, but any in- CIA's London station before formation it wanted on British becoming a special assistant to affairs would almost certainly President Johnson, was in an be available front official upstairs room in Chequers the sources. If it were not available, night the Prime Minister tried the British security services to reach an agreement with Mr could be expected to cooperate. Koss:gin, the Soviet Prime According to sources there Minister, to prolong the 'bomb- has, however, been some fric- tion between the two agencies. si-les. The first is due to antipathy Mr Cooper was there, with an between personalities, which is open line to the White House, generally unavoidable when two because Mr Wilson knew that nations cooperate, although he could trust him, there is said to be less friction The Labour motion calling on between the two intelligence the Government to declare the agencies than between. say, the resident CIA men persona non Foreign Office and the State Department. rata therefore served no put- . ? The second is Olaf th Dose' except perhaps to dis- tract attention from the visit and indeed other friendly intel- here next month of Mr Shele- ligence services, is beginning to pin, the former head of the feel that the CIA can no longer KGB. be trusted with secrets because Unbek no V.11 to those who defectors such .as Marchetti and Signed the motion, the purpose Agee are likely to publish them. of those behind the campaign There is also some apprehension may have been to discredit the that they could be revealed dur- ing the course of impending congressional investigations into the CIA. The staff of the CIA station in London includes only analysts, researchers and ad- ministrators. That is standard practice as even the defectors have made clear in their revela- tions. Mr Cord Meyer, the station chief, originally worked for a One World movement, and after- wards became expert in inter- national organizations and rela- tions, especially labour relations. lying officers do not classify everything that could be chas-i- sifted. The book has been :pub- i lished with numerous blank ; . spaces marking CIA deletions. i If the court decides to hear the case, oral argument would be in the fall. If the court re- jects the petition, the apellate? court ruling will stand. ? Approved For Release 2001/08)&8 new American Ambassador, air Elliot Richardson. Tleo main mutual interests of the CIA and the British intelli- gence and security services, apart from sharing a variety of information from third coun- tries, is the detection of for- eign spies in the upper reaches cegovernments. Another is the struggle against international terrorism. The latter obviously requires close cooperation between most friendly intelligence services, especially since the terrorisi groups have established links NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 19 MARCH 1975 with the Mafia and other crire inal elements. ,A third is. subversion. Lord Chalfont spoke about this re- newed threat in a recent detivie in the House of Lords. The Times reported last year thet the CIA was investigating sub version in Britain. It avm denied, but there is no reasoa to believe that the report was not generally correct. . The extra CIA men thea reported to be in Britain were understood to be experts skit', led in the use of advanced sur- veillance techniques. They heel come to Britain to help train members of British securily services. In the Lords debate. Lutd Chalfont said: " There were also in society a considerable nura- bet of people known in the jargon of intelligence as 'sleepers'.They did not pursue at this moment any extremist or subversive activity but when the time came would be activa- ted and do whatever they had to do to achieve their aims." The " sleepers " are said to be placed in strategic areas; such as public utilities, the docks and the various commu- nications systems, as well as elsewhere. It is said that in the event of a national emer- gency they could bring the country to a standstill. This may sound overly drama- tic, but it cannot be dismissal as a figment of the heat& imagination of Colonel Stirling and his private army. It is a danger taken quite seriously, but level-headedly, not only in Britain, but in the Uniml States and other Western countries. There is small reason to get excited about what can only be regarded as another phase of the ideological struggle that has long been evident, but it helos to explain why friendly gov- ernments want close coopera- tion between their intelligence services. Such cooperation is as es:--2,eir- tial as Interpol is in the dues-- tion of international crime. EA W?iI 612, res By JOSEPH VOLZ and FRANK VAN RIPER Washington, March 1S (News Bureau)?The Centr:'; Intelligence Agency, apparently trying to win over fres- man congressmen, invited the 75 newcomers to breakfz9-4- jin the well guarded spy shop today. But the get-acquaint:' affair fell flat when. Director William E. Colby refusli :to answer detailed questions about alleged assassinatka 'plots . Only -about 20 freshmen law- makers showed up for the breakfast at the agency's head- 'quarters in nearby Langley, Va. , Many of the freshman said they had ben -.disappointed at Colby 's reticence: . Colbyib' reportedly. gave I only one definite response during; Et hour-long session, that at times saW him managing a shoe. projector to help deliver his lec- ture.. That was when he was asked if the CIA had had any- thing to. do with the Jobs F.- Kennedy assassination. ? e director replied. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 prEELAmaxliiA .,pfpd For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 26 MARCH 1975 'PIA deserve praise hr ry SMITH HEMPSTONE WASHINGTON ? When Jack Ander- sm blew the CIA's cover on Operation Jennifer, he compromised not only a possible second attempt to raise the yes: of that Russian sub from the floor of thn Pacific but other potential simi- lar salvage operations that could have ci:ntributed to our national security. It is impossible to say what might hate been retrieved this July from the Go:f class boat that sank 750 miles off Hawaii in 1963, if only because it is not clear what precisely was salvaged last s=mer. Most CZ the reports imply that the operation recovered the forward third of the diesel-electric sub- marine containing the remains of . some of the Russian crew but neither hydrogen-warhead missiles nor coding Had a second salvage attempt, now certainly precluded by Ander- son's radio broadcast and the press re-, Ports that followed it, been successful, the resulLs certainly would have been CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 2 April 1975 drznriss ergo By the Associated Press Miami former moTtgage broker says his e7132e conces'eed. plicely mortgages which inettecl 03 million or 04 million on behalf of inhae ha beileved was the CIA, the Miami Flestsid said in recant editions. The CIA eels', it was not levolvecl in the scheme. Arnlees Castro told the Herald a story of ...nteirstete skulduggery that ended when i'sbeetereg?e license tens seized and he idea:End running to avoid people who had thae defrauded, the newrinnper said. "The CIA made me do it," Mr. Castro told the Heentd. Thst the Herald quoted a CIA spokesman as saying, "This poor guy's been taken, and it's none of our doing whatsoever. This one ain't on us, dad." The Heeald said at least the federal grand jury was investigating the fraud scheme and Mr. Castro was under in- ves....igaticn by several federal agencies. The scheme involved &settling mort- gagee by selling good ones along with forgen3 cnas to raise money fast, the newspaper said. Mr. Castro said he believed he was dealing with the CIA because one of the men involved was Antonio Yglesias, who has a long history of CIA connectlens dating back to the 1951 Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Herald said. ;lett Jen ifer . . worth the money. ? Had the salvage of. the. Golf class boat been completed in, secrecy, would it have been possible for the CIA ship : Glernar Explorer to retrieve' the 're- mains 'of the nuclear-powered Novem- ber class Russian submarine that ? is believed to have sunk off Spain in ApriV1970? Recovery of that whale- shaped boat's nuclear plant would have been an intelligence coup of the .first Order. . With the perfect vipio'n of hind- 'sight, the CIA's Critics' maintain that Project. Jennifer was both stupid since it' conceivably could damage' relations. with the Soviet. Union ? 'and wasteful. ? ? But a couple of points have to be niade: The *ration was well within the CIA's mandate: It was ? subjected to intense scrutiny within: the govern- ment, approved by' the ? "Forty Com- mittee" of the National Security Council chaired by Henry Kissinger ,and okayed by Presidents Nixon and Ford. Key congressmen including Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans- field ? and Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chair- man of the House Select Intelli- gence Committee," were briefed on Jennifer; ? . Given the continuing. Soviet arms buitu-up and the uncertainty of the Kremlin's intentions, the CIA would ?have been derelict in its duty had it , not Made the effort to' gain the intel- 'ligence sealed in the sunken sub's crushed hull. The CIA is wide open to...criticism on some matters. But, that 'members; of. Congress and' other,. people should.. attack the agenck.for 'conducting an imaginative ? project.. for, which it should be praised .show S what a topsy-turvy' world this is. Jack Anderson won the Pulitzer Prize in 1972 for revealing the Amer- ican "tilt".. toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War. "For blowing the cover on an ongoing, important and ,legitimate CIA operation, be ought to get the -.Daniel Ellsberg Award for 1975. THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY,MARCH 20, 1975 ritishM.P.'s Link 10 Attaches to C.I.A. Spee'al 0 The New York Times LONDON, March 19?Labor members of Parliament said to- night that 10 officials listed as attaches at the United States Embassy here were linked with the Central Intelligence Agency. A motion presented to the House of Commons by 34 mem- bers, most of them associated with the left wing of the gov- erning party, demanded the im- mediate expulsion of the offi- cials unless the United States Government could substantiate that they were truly diplomats. One of the signers: Dennis' Skinner', named Cord Meyer Jr. as head of the C.I.A.'s em- bassy team and said he was shortly to be withdrawn from Britain. Mr. Meyer is known to be the C.I.A. station chief in Brit- ain, although he is listed in the Foreign Office's London Diplo- matic list as "attach.." He is understood to he due for re- tirement irt August. Others Listed The motion named the other nine as: . Benjamin J. Price, John W. ; The motion th CIA ffey?.'..1 , A. Spencer Braham, William Mc- Ghee, Joseph C. Thep, Joseph P. Sherman, George Ford II and John A. Reed Jr.. Mr. Reed is listed in ? the Diplomatic List as "AttacM (political-military)" and all the others as "attach? Several have been listed in the State Department's bio- graphical records as having been "analysts" and ? "commu- nications officers." Two other signers of the mo- tion, Stanley Newens and Thomas Litterick, said they had carried out an investigation that indicated none of the 10 were employes of any United States Government agencies with legitimate interest in for- eign affairs. Mr. Neteens has often been linked with ? left-wing causes and his name frequently ap- pears on rank-and-file motions such as the one presented to- night. Mr. Littcrick has been in the Commohs only six months.; Although the motion was I signed by 34 meinbers, it is un- likely the Government will find time to debate it. 20 sayse . ?'has interfered. in the internal' affairs of Many countries and the "subversion and overthrew of governments in Guaterrink Iran, Guyana, Chile and oiler countries." ? It asks the Government to inform the United States Csat evidence exists to indicate friar the 10 accorded diplomatic credentials are associated with C.I.A. work and adds, "Unlessi this can be disproved forthwith, each must be regarded as pu-- 'sona non grata and withdrawn from Britain immediately. Prime Minister Wilson was lasted in the Commons yes,ri- iday whether he would take action against CIA. activities in this country, He replied ff.:a he was awaiting the outcome e the inquiry into the C.I.A. Mee; held in the United States zed would not hesitate to hold independent inquiry should een' . sluice be found that its hger.?.5. were operating in Britain tine?li 'diplomatic cover. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Arid! 7, 1975 AS EINC CI EEKS S Seldom has this country had greater need of an efficient intelligence service overseas. Yet, experts report: Never has the CIA been in such disarray as it is today. America's worldwide espionage appa- ratus is being shaken to its foundations by the crisis currently gripping the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. A "damage assessment" based :on in- formation froth top CIA officials and Allied intelligence authorities in Europe shows? ? Foreigners serving as secret agents are frightened that they will be exposed by leaks in Washington?which could be fatal. Result: A number of veteran spies are curtailing their activities or quitting altogether. ? Recruiting of new foreign agents overseas is falling off sharply. Some who volunteered have since changed their minds. They regard the risk as too great. ? Intelligence services in friendly countries are worried about continued collaboration. with the CIA. They are fearful that their secrets may be com- promised or their governments embarrassed. The London Times reports: "The SIS [Britain's Secret In- telligence Service], and indeed other friendly intelligence ser- vices, are beginning to feel that the CIA can no longer be trust- ed with secrets." ? American companies that in the past extended invaluable assistance to the CIA overseas now are getting cold feet. They fear that their activities in this field?for example, providing "cover" for American agents abroad?may be exposed. That could be disastrous for their for- eign enterprises. Three probes. This is only a preliminary inventory of the impact on America's overseas intelligence network of the lat- est?and most serious?crisis in the 28-year history of the CIA. The full effect will not be measurable until completion of the three separate investiga- tions that are examining the Agency's operations?one conducted by a "blue ribbon" presidential commission and the other two by Senate and House select committees. These unprecedented investigations were triggered initiallY by charges last December that the CIA had engaged in illegal domestic spyidg on a 'massive scale?mainly against groups opposing the Vietnam War, and other protest movements. The scope of the inquiries has been 21- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 steadily expanded to encompass new al- legations that have surfaced recently. One claims that Agency officials plot- ted?but did not carry out?assassina- tions of three foreign leaders. President Ford is said to have received a verbal report on these incidents from CIA Di- rector William E. Colby. Another allegation put on the agenda of the three investigating bodies: Ac- cording to Chief Postal Inspector Wil- liam J. Cotter, CIA agents for 20 years opened mail to Russia and other Com- munist countries in violation of postal laws?until he issued an ultimatum in 1973 ordering them to desist. Even the CIA's latest coup?the sal- vaging of part of a sunken Soviet missile submarine in the Pacific Ocean?is to be investigated. The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Frank Church (Dem.), of Idaho, has questioned the expenditure of a report- ed 350 million dollars on this project? which included the secret construction of an ocean-mining vessel able to lift a portion of the submarine from 3-mile- deep ocean waters. Fear of "witch hunt." The men who run the CIA now express the fear that what started as a legitimate investiga- tion into alleged wrongdoings may be turning into a witch hunt that could destroy this country's secret intelligence organization. CIA Director Colby put it bluntly: "The almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mention- ing CIA, or referring to any perfectly legitimate activity of CIA, has raised the question whether secret intelligence op- erations can be conducted by the United States." Mr. Colby is concerned not only about the damage to .America's overseas intel- ligence setup but also the devastating effect on morale and discipline at the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., across the Potomac from Washington. Most of the Agency's 16,000 employes are stationed there. Double problem. A survey indicates that morale is being affected in two ways. Among one group of CIA officials, there is dismay?and bitterness?caused by the disclosure of the Agency's in- volvement in improper, and possibly even illegal, activities. The Agency oper- ates on a tightly compartmentalized ba- sis, and this group was largely ignorant of the operations that led to the current crisis. "These people are asking bitterly how we could have done these things, how they can explain it to their children: says an official responsible for monitor- ing staff morale. They blame officials dealing with co- vert operaticins?"the dirty-tricks de- partment'?and counterintelligence for the Ageney's troubles. . Another group of CIA staff members: are demoralized?and bitter?for a dif- ferent reason. They feel that the Agency is being ' "victimized" because of the atmosphere created by Watergate. Their attitude is described by an au- thoritative source: "These men believe that they have done their duty during these years, that they have been dedicated citizens. Now they are told that they may need a lawyer." They complain that they are victims of a "time lag." In the words of one officer with a lifetime .career in intelli- gence: "We are being judged by the ethics and security needs of 1975 for actions that were considered necessary in the cold-war climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Junior officers in the CIA are asking whether they will be called upon in 1990 to explain what they are doing today." Work priority. A major problem for top CIA officials is to keep both of these groups working effectively while investi- gations unfold and new sensations are splashed in the newspapers. "You must understand how all of this is affecting the culture pattern of intelli- gence," declares a ranking officer. "Peo- ple in this business feel that they are supposed to lead secret lives, hidden away out of the glare of publicity. Imag- ine how damaging it is to morale when they read stories almost daily in their newspapers about the secret operationr of the CIA and when many of them are called to testify before congressional committees." The CIA's operations at its Langley headquarters are adversely affected in another way by the current furor. Direc- tor Colby is compelled to spend more than, half of his time defending the CIA before various investigating bodies aLlA dealing with other problems unrelated to his job of gathering and analyzing intelligence. A paper problem. Besides the de- mands of the official investigations, top CIA officials also are being forced to devote more and more time to handling requests for documents under the new Freedom of Information Act. Because of the exceedingly sensitive nature of intelligence operations, these requests must be processed by senior: officials. Mr. Colby iays that one specific re- quest would require the agency to search through and review 900,000 files_ He adds: "A good-faith attempt to comply wills the spirit of the new Freedom of Infor- mation Act will have a serious impact osin this Agency." Among CIA officials, there now is a consensus that in spite of the danger of compromising secrets, a thoroughgoing investigation is essential to restore Agen- cy morale and public confidence. It's felt that there is no other way for the Agency to make its case. A high- ranking officer who is resigning in order to organize a campaign to defend the Approved For RelaSeS2ObilfRartq :ZIAIIRDP7.7-00432R000100d60006-2 19 March ? 197 5 Vilii..41AM F. BUCKLEY CIA explains: "Snowballing innuendo, egregious sto- vies and charges, and even honest con- cerns have presented us with a basic dilemma of issuing either a general statement which reassures few but pre- serves security; or a comprehensive ac- counting which satisfies some but at the expense of operations and agents." The officer, David Phillips, chief of Latin-American operations, says that un- der the circumstances "there is little doubt that a thorough congressional re- view is the best, if not the only solution, even though some leakage of sensitive details on foreign operations seems al. most inevitable." "Wasn't illegal." Mr. Colby, the CIA Director, expresses confidence that the investigations will exonerate the Agency on the main charges leveled against it In his words: "41. think that the results of the investi- gation will rather clearly show . . . that the program that we undertook to iden. ;ify foreign links with American dissi. dent movements was not a massive one in the numbers involved, was not a do- mestic one because it was basically for- eign, and it wasn't illegal because it was under our charter and our National Se- curity Act." He maintains that all questionable do- mestic operations were terminated in 1973?after the entire staff of the CIA was invited to submit private reports directly to the Director concerning any imprope- activity of which they were aware. Whatever the ultimate outcome of the three-way investigation of the Agency, this fact is now becoming increasingly clear: America's worldwide intelligence ap- paratus will be operating under a severe handicap at a time of dangerous crisis in foreign policy. WASHINGTON POST 1 April 1975 (r/T14 -Li , 7.)-,..?)I'd: united Press Inteniatianal A panel of four professora gave the Rockefeller COMtiti- Eital omflicting testimony 3.'- terday over the best way to prevent the Central Intelli- A panel of four professors rence Agency from invading the privacy of Americans. All four agreed that some sort of agency should be cre- ated to oversee the CIA in an effort to monitor its spy activi- ties. Sonic said the monitoring effort could be conducted in- sid?, the CIA while others ar- gued, for an independent board. ? CIA has to Lie Until The Leaks et Plugged Henry L. Stimson, the former secre- ta-'y of war, is often quoted as having said, in the manner of a character in a P. G. Wodehouse novel, that "gentle- men don't read other gentlemen's mail." That observation which aborted an inchoate Central Intelligence Agency ? and left us all feeling very good about the natural aristocratic habits of our secretary of war ? may just have had something to do with failing to abort a world war ? which left us feeling very bad, particularly those who died fight- ing that war. It is only true that gentle- men don't read other gentlemen's mail in a world in which gentlemen can be counted on not to launch wars against one another. It is highly improbable, as Lincoln said in his most famous address, which is intoned but never analyzed, that self- governing republics can last, very long in the tumult of history. There are many reasons for this, but one of them is the insistence that knowledge of everything that goes on always leads to an im- provement in the general situation. It might be called the, Masters and John- son approach to political democracy. It is in very full flower at the moment, and the investigations of the activity of the Central Iatelligence Agency are a case in point. Miles Copeland, the author who was once with the CIA and still speaks and writes about it more authoritatively and engagingly than. anyone I know, has written an essay called, "Is There a CIA in Your Future?" Consider, please, a most remarkable passage in it. ". . Almost all the agency people I talked to" ? Copeland is referring to a recent visit to Washington (he now lives in London) ? "assured me unashamed- ly, almost proudly, 'Of course we are going to lie to the congressional commit- tees.' They felt that as loyal Americans they cannot do otherwise ? except in the unlikely event the members of the committees can be held accountable for their leaks, impossible in the present atmosphere. "Let me give an example. Let us sup- inged -)0 Pour The four appeared at the 12th weekly meeting of the commission, which was Cre- ated by PI e.-?itient F'ord to it,- vestigate charges of illegal do- mestic spying by the CIA and to recommend possible changes in the agency's charter to more clearly prohibit domestic activity. ? Arthur II. Miller, a Harvard law professor, said that the CIA could set up its Own board to monitor its activities. But William W. Van Al- styne, a Duke University law professor,said he did not be- lieve such a board would he. pose (I'm not saying he is, but let us suppose) that Algeria's President Boumedienne is cooperating hand in glove with the CIA in its pursuit of the terrorists who have received sanctuary or training in his country, while appeas- ing the Palestinians and his own extremists by pretending publicly that he hates us. And let us suppose that some member of Sen. Church's commit- tee asks Bill Colby, 'Mr. Colby, is it true that President Boumedienne is secretly cooperating with the CIA?' "Well, Mr. Colby will at that moment have before him three alternatives. He can say, 'Yes, Senator, that is so' ? in which case, past experience tells him, the whole world will be able to read his answer the next day in the New York Times, and either Boumedienne's coop- eration or Boumedienne himself will be finished. "Or he can say, 'Sorry, Senator, but that's top-secret information' ? with the same result, since such an answer. will be interpreted as a `yes' by the American press, the American public; the Algerian public and, of course, the members of the committee. Or he can say, 'Who? Did you say Boumedienne? My God, I never heard anything so, ridiculous!' A lie. For the good of all of us, including the congressmen who must take the blame for any leak. "Let us hope that Bill Colby lies. Our- mutual friends at the agency assure me, that he will ? or that if he doesn't, he will be finished, and that some of those who will be first in line calling for his head will be those very congressmen who were supposed to be beneficiaries of his candor." I cannot imagine a better example of the kind of thing we face. Congress, begins by failing to enact legislation that effectively punishes someone who perpetrates a leak. Can't do it, some of them say ? First Amendment. But if the First Amendment makes it impossi- ble to insist on secrecy, do you say then, Very well, the world will get on without secrecy? Try it. But first, create a gen- tlemen's world. "publicly reassuring." Edward J. Bloustein, presi- dent of Rutgers 'University, slid he also favored an indc- p,mcierit agency named by thit executive, legislative, and ju- dicial branches. The fourth witness, Dr. Or- ville .f. Brim jr., president of the Foundation for Child De- velopment, New York City, and an expert en individual pri- vacy, said he also believed in an independent body. In addition to the four pro- fessors, the commission also heard from a CTA official not named for security reasons, Int. YORK DAILY NEWS 17 MARCH 1975 DELLA & THE CIA Queens: It was most gratifying. to read that the Central Intetli- gc-nce Agency had been keeping f tabs on Rep. Bella Abzug. I hope that it is doing the same with ? every other American who thinks ? he or she has the right to deal with Commutiist-hloc nacions. In- dividual rights do not supercede ? the security of the nation BILL B. 2/ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 ?' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 8 KS .NATION 5 APRIL 1975 CIA: Can We Reale It? Can atchi g he INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary. By Philip Agee. Penguin Books, Ltd. 640 pp. 95 pence. ? ? Rep. Michael .7. Harrington Like corpses sent to the bottom of a .river, stories of CIA wrongdoing were bound to come to the surface eventually. But few critics would have predicted that so much incriminating evidence: could float to the top in just half a yeal; It has been about that long since reve- lations of CIA activity in Chile first made ? front-page news, coinciding with numer- ous articles and books attempting to penetrate the fog ? surrounding the U.S. intelligence community. Since then,, ac- counts of widespread domestic surveil- ? lance have stimulated the public's interest all the more, finally provoking the Con- gress to take action. The Central Intelligence Agency, for its part, took the counteroffensive early. When The CIA: The Cult of Intelligence was in proof, the agency had portions censored, claiming that the authors, John -Marks and Victor Marchetti, were not allowed to use certain information be- cause of the secrecy oaths they signed when they were on the inside. As a re- suit, the book was published with gaps Of white space where sensitive informa-. tion was deleted. ? Now another damning book by a. for- mer CIA agent has come out, but this one requires no filling-in of the blanks.. Unlike the Marks-Marchetti book, it couldn't be censored because the author, Philip Agee, gave the publication rights for the first edition to a British publish- ing company and does not plan to return to the United States until it is published here?which it will be, because publishers don't sign secrecy oaths. When it appears in American book- stores, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, even though it is long and detailed, will probably be as successful as it has been in the British Commonwealth. In fact, it may be for just this reason that it has succeeded. .Public curiosity ? hai -been aroused but 'far from satisfied by the limited accounts available thus fare ? To those who have followed the CIA or U.S.-Latin American politics more than casually, much of -Agee's informa- tion is at least predictable. For the ex- Michael Harlington represents the 6th Dis- trict in Massachusetts and is a member of the new House Select Committee to investi- gate intelligence operations. An outspoken critic of the intelligence community, he also serves on the House Foreign Affairs Com- mittee. Approved RRelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 tech e AM:wt. It t A111? perts, much was common knowledge. Almost since the beginning of the Repub- lic, the United States has manhandled Latin American nations, and the potential dimensions of CIA activity have been recognized since the agency was created . at the start of the cold war in 1947. What shocks us in Agee's book are the specifics. Based on the quality and quan- tity of the CIA's operations in just three Latin American nations, the worldwide possibilities are staggering. Written in diary form (though the author admits to having reconstructed his twelve-year association with "the Com- pany"), Agee traces his development from a Midwestern Catholic university through tours with Air Force intelligence at the beginning of his CIA career to specialized covert training, assignments in Ecuador,- Uruguay, Washington, D.C. and Mexico, and ultimately, to his es- trangethent from the agency. The con- cluding chapters, describing the tribu- lations .of writing the hook with CIA harassment, demonstrate the CIA's less- than-official attempts at censorship. Agee's stories of the life pf an agent run from the 'mundane to the bizarre. Hours are spent opening and reading' mall; intricate plans. are made to coerce potential informdpts. And, like .every organieetion man, Agee tells of playing golf with the boss and worrying about promotions. ' Of course, each bureaucracy has its stories to tell, but behind the anecdotes in Agee's account lies a bigger story? one of .buying and selling state officials (Agee lists four Latin American Pres- idents) and of governing governments (Agee relates the CIA's manipulation of Ecuador's political parties, press and mil- itary which resulted in the 1963 coup). ? As Agee tells it, his first years in the service were satisfying, and he worked hard. It wasn't until the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and his own *wakening to the brutality of CIA- supported governments that he began to question what he was doing. His dis- enchantment, which stemmed from as- signments such as infiltrating the Olympic Games in 1968, led him to general con- elusions about U.S. foreign policy. Even with its focus on personal history, the book illustrates fundamental dilem- naas about our foreign relations. What ought the United States to do abroad? What tenets should guide our decisions? ? Last December President Ford, in ex- plaining U.S. involvement in the so- called "destabilieation" of Salvador Allendes government in Chile, gave an answer that reflects official thinking since 1947. "Oiu government, like other goy-? - emrnents, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement for- eign policy and protect national security." At the bottom of this response is an "anything goes" mentality that fails to draw a distinction between intelligence gathering and covert intervention. Con- gress shares the blame for the repercus- sions of this thinking. Neither the House nor the Senate has seriously pondered the implications of lumping benign intel- ligence activity with aggressive subver- sion. In fact, oversight committees, by refusing over the years to askdpertinent questions about CIA operations, have not faced the fact that both exist. .ConsequentlYi CIA operations have been guided by only one rule: don't get caught. The result has been intervention such as Agee describes in Ecuador and Uruguay, neither of which poses even the remotest hemispheric threat to our "national securityd! Olin Robinson of Bowdoin College has explained the phenomenon simply: -The CIA suffers from a syndrome which might be labeled 'all dressed up and nowhere to* go.' It is an organization with extraordinary capabilities employing some of the mose' talented people in government service (the Watergate per- sonalities notwithstanding). The natural bureaucratic tendency is toward self- perpetuation, and no large organintion is likely to change its policies and opera- tions without external pressure to do so." Since Agee started his book three years ago, the serious threat to the nation's well-being posed by the existence of an heeellieea= agency that is armed for cold was has increased. It is clearly up to the Congress to put the heat on the CIA s it will not frustrate efforts for d?nte. T'33 is the only realistic approach. The ability of the United States to dictate to, the rest of the world, including Latin Aeric a, has rlitnirtished.. And it has ba- =r-tt incr=singly obvious that where tee have intervened in theP.affairs of oth-v nations, we have not necessarily here proved the quality of life for citi- zan.s but rather supported repressive reeimes such as that of the Chilean junta. With the increasing economic intertle- p=d.e--a= of nations, international' ?pie,. ion carries more weight and demauen that the United States treat its neighbor's civilly. A re-evaluation of the Central InleE- gence Agency in the light of these foreign policy considerations should be one of the main tasks of the Congressional committees that will be investigating intelligence in the coming months.. While the CIA may not be obsolete; as Agee suggests, its policies certainly are anachronistic. And there is reason to be- lieve that company men as dedicated-as Agee seems to have been will be valuable Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 the medium of expression of Seynacram Hersh of The New York Times, La:- rence Stern of The Washington Post an Jack Anderson, all of whose reports or the CIA no doubt contributed to the CongressiOnal decisions?urged there byt among others, Rep. Michael liarringtoe of Massachusetts, Sen. William Proxmirt. of Wisconsin and Sen. Frank Church or Idaho. Church, by the way, heads the, Select Committee of the Senate, where his experieisce as chairman of the For- eign Relations subcommittee on mul national corporations may come ir handy in getting to the fundamental CIA point?that it is in cahoots with hia business, which reigns, now more openly than ever, in the executive branch. he deed, the story of the -journalistic eat- posure of the role of the CIA in world affairs begins much earlier with Tke Nation's special issue devoted to that very subject, written by the veteran journalist, Fred J. Cook, and published June 24, 1961. At any rate, the Prouty and Mar- chetti-Marks books and the Phil; Agee account are different from boob .about the CIA written before 1971, when it became evident that the cold war, and its attendant devil theory of communism, were being toned down. The rationale for earlier semi-official documentaries by leaders of the agence ?Allen Dulles, who is listed as authos of The Craft of Intelligence, and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, writer of The Re,4I clA ?no longer applied, politically speaking. This gives their books, already, a nevi= ? of ancient history. And even though the same cannot be said for some other books rooted in that period?The In, visible Government by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, an ambitious and valisn). job of investigative reporting; The Secret War by Sanche de Gramont; Stewart Steven's Operation Splinter Factor, at Miles Copeland's Without Cloak or Dag- ger?the fact remains that these were done by outsiders. Whereas Prouty, Mar- chetti and Agee were CIA insiders, whose rethinking of their lives, their roles, the nature of the agency's "opera- tions," could not have occurred, in nea opinion, until big business switched the foreign policy signals. This switch else accounts for the distinction between th objectives of Marchetti and Prouty et. the one hand and Agee on the other. All three have horror stories to tei. But Prouty and Marchetti, first on tin scene with their books critical of the CIA, concentrate mainly on the won I have just placed in quotes: "opera tions." Both mention Harry Trurrierh 1963 remark: "I never had any tho'er when I set up the CIA that it wouid 'era injected into peacetime cloak-aed-daet-- operations." Marchetti gets even meat specific, using former CIA ihirecter, Richard Helms as source: "Operationl involves overthrowing foreign govene? ments, subverting elections, bribing Int- ficials and waging "secret" wars. H. goes on to make the point that "the gate scandal scandal has also opened up the C17.. to increased scrutiny." Undoubtedly has. Whether or not Watergate was onche agency gnideliees are iheuared with "fi.153a200M-it coneerne. In the meantime, rageshi tentientiete . in a usetel seed necessary reminder of the genuine hotarnese machecintschspyings 7 112C & ymisthwev?. ?? ',cal: CIA AND THE CULT OF IN- TE:womca By Victor Marchetti a-4 John Marks.-.Allred A. Knopf. pp. $8.9.5. Pc,xo: Deli Publishing re.' SECRET ThAlk;I: The CIA and its ALlies in Control of the United States tend the World. By L. Fletcher Prouty. Prentice-Hallo 496 pp. $8.95. Paper: Ba!- Irfne Books. $1.95. ? AthatM lie.e7 (GM If is aye,. as world figures of, "the eSothist camp' have recently .been sugs tatneding, that the international struggle iretstasein their way of life and ours is shifting from military cionfrontation to Ach%alogiciar competition., where does that the CIA? Under scrutiny. Report- era, book writers?some of them with dirs or associated CIA. experience?a a Presidential commission and two select Coesional committees, one from the Hotesen one the Senate, have placed the CIA in the most public position since its ereation as a super-secret, financially meamounreble, globally free-wheeling- stred-deling gang of operatives and op- ensaorsin 1947. That is to say, the Ceateal Intelligence Agency was founded on coldswat premises, assigned o beat the bad guya by hook or crook, advised that the phrase "national security" would lee employed on the highest levels to justify any damn thing that went right or wrong--expected, in short, to serve as roving agents of the policy of corporate geotaphical, expansionism which had its ateigins in are Westward-ho era of the a9tk, centusy, initiated almost as soon as the Citril. War came to an end. . 'This has to be clear: that the. CIA has finnetione-d, bankrolled by billions of pub- lie money to be sure, in behalf of pri- vate economic interests?of what used to be called simply big business. It is not made clear, however?not "per- fectly clear" perhaps I should say?in much of what has so far been written about the CIA. Exceptions, let me quickly add, can be noted. For example, material published by NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America) and by certain othertradical and liberal institutions has been informed by the CIA-big business perspective. I gather, too, that the book by the former CIA officer Philip Agee, already released in. England and also, scheduled for 'U.S. poblication here t by Straight Arroiv Books (Rolling Stene), reflects such a point of view. Agee discussed his book, Inside The Company: CIA Diary, in an interview with John Gerassi carried by a weekly Boston periodical, The Real Paper, in the issue of February 19. "f have learned over the yearse". Agee said, "that the CIA wad the government as a whole does not represent the interest of the people of the United States. Its main -function?and this is clear in our policies in Latin America, in those policies which I helped to carry out for twelve years? is to help, to represent that class of Americans who profit in Latin America . ? the rich?! There seems to be a certain logic, a logic of time and development, gov- erning the process of the production of books about the CIA. Compare, for ins stance., the political-economy - under- standing of Agee with that indicated by the authors of two earlier volumes, The CIA and the Cuts of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, and The Secret Team by L Fletcher Prouty. (Both are now available in paperback; Marchetti served as much time in the CIA as Agee, mostly in Washington; Marks was once a State Department intelligence analyst; Prouty, nine years an Air Force colonel, acted as lieison officer in procurement be- tween. the Department of Defer= and the CIA.) At one point ,Marchetti- Marks, with what I assecae to be agree- ment, quote the columnist Tom Braden, "former high-ranking CIA covert ex- pert," as saying in January 1973: "Josef Stalin's- decision to attempt conquest of Western.- Europe by manipulation, the use of ?fronts and the purchase of loy- alty turned the Agency (CIA) into a heuie of dirty nicks. It was necessary. Absolutely necessary, in my view. But it -lasted long after the necessity was gonei" Prouty takes the retrospective position that U.S. leaders (such as Harry Truman).got off on the wrong foot by automatically "reacting' to Communist strategy and tactics rather than buckling down to the formation of art affirmative, presumably democratic course of action in the post-World War II world. I have no intention of downgrading the Marchetti-Marks and Prouty books. They are valuable, instructive works, written by "insiders" who know what they're. talking about arid who finally dis- covered that they were compelled to take the risks involved in revealing CIA sub- version of democratic tenets. Further- more, both books seem to have played a part in pershading members of Congress, after almost twenty-eight years, to estab- lish special committees charged with re- sponsibility for. cheCking out CIA activi- ties at home as well as abroad. That may be somewhat less significant than,. say, the influence Tom Paine's Common Sense bad upon governmental matters but it is,- nonetheless, in -the days when nearly almighty power is attrib- uted To the electronic media, quite an 24 Iccomplishmenf forptinL Which is, also, Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 CIA 'operation," who yet knows? But the word "foreign" is omitted from the Helms-derived description of what the CIA has been up to for more than a quarter of a century, the words come pretty close to fitting as much as we eo far have learned about the Watergate affair. The Secret Team and The CM and the Cult of Intelligence, as I get their message, argue that in practicing clOak- and-dagger operations all over the world, the CIA has ruthlessly expanded its 1947 legal mandate and become a law unto !tself. It has converted, in other words, a legitimate commission to collect in- lormatioa into the kind of gangster- style activity to which Helms refers and with which many of us are now feritiliara ftrom Iran and :Guatemala in the early 1950s to Chile in 1973. Prouty and Marchetti imply that if only the CIA could be re-restricted to the gathering of intelligence, it might ? still serve a useful purpose. Agee, in his interview with erierassi, says: "If the American people could learn this [how the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile was financed chiefly. by a CIA front, the American Institute for Free Labor Development] and all the other frauds perpetrated on them by the CIA . . . I am convinced that the clamor would be so great that Congress would destroy the CIA." If, as I am speculating, the new 1971 tack in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and China caused disturbances within the CIA, it is plain that Agee's disillusiorenect has brought him to polit- ical conclusions more drastic than those of Prouty and Marchetti?and of a number of others in the Congress and in public life, who continue to envision a safer and more respectable CIA, one, so to speak, from whose hands the guns will be removed. ? But what does big business envi- sion? Well, the violent counterrevolution in Chile several years after competitive coexistence had been announced as the international aim of the United States offers a clue. As does, also, CIA en- deavors to suppress and then censor the Marchetti-Marks book?which they and their publishers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., assisted by the American Civil Liberties Union, are still fighting in the courts. The CIA and the ? Cult of Intelligence, the first book the U.S. Government ever attempted to censor by legal action be- fore publication, finally appeared with 168 spaces in the text where only the word "DELETED" is to be found. The context *makes evident that certain key deletiOns refer to Chile. On September 4, 1974, a Hersh re- port in The New York Times began: "The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has told Congress that the Nixon Administration authorized more than $8 million for covert activities by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to make it impossible for President Sal- vador Allende Gossens to govern." Could this news have been one of the "DELETED"s from Marchetti's book? I think so. Anyway, by September 16 the news had been confirmed by no less than President Ford, who, in reply to a press conference question, started out by saying, "Let me answer in general." He did so: "Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national secu- rity." He then went on to say that as he understood it there was no direct U.S. involvement. in the "coup itself' (of Sep- tember 11, 1973) but that, yes, "in a period of time, three or four years ago," an effort was made to help preserve "op- position newspapers and electronic media . . . and opposition political parties" in Chile. "I think," said the President, "this is in the best interest of the people of Chile and certainly in our own interest." Here is where background reading in Marchetti-Marks, Prouty, the Agee in- terview and, for that matter, most litera- ture on the 'CIA, comes to the aid of anyone trying to fathom the serious political complications that would cause a chief of state, administering a foreign policy of coexistence, to take on the responsibility of attempting to give war- rant to conduct that contradicts such a policy. At some point this contradiction seems to have hit formerly dedicated CIA representatives, who really believed during their company service that "na- tional security" and "our own interest" were synonymous with defense of democ- racy, on all fronts and by any means necessary, against communism .As soon as their faith was shaken, they poceeded to struggle with the contradiction by writing their own 'case histories of the CIA. " Their books furnish evidence for the rationality of their decision. But the Ford Administration, faced with the same contradiction, persists in irration- ality. No wonder the government went all-out to delete Chile references from the Marchetti-Marks book. No wonder Ford had to step (be pushed?) forward to repeat, as in an echo chamber, na- tional security nonsense to support a case ler CIA interference in Chile, once the deleted matter4came to light in re- ports by Hersh, Stern and others. The point is that Chile, at one and the same time, implied the old national security argument to have been a historical lie-- a big lie, to use the words once applied to Nazi deception of the Germans when big business in Germany sought ciomiaa- on of -world resources and people?and also thrmtened to reveal that under corer of competitive coexistence with the giants of the Socialist camp, the CIA and its masters intended to continue playing dirty tricks wherever passage, their aims being neassarily less grand than the Nazis', and their techniques more sophisticated, but both aims end techniques_ comparable in design to what Hitler's backers had lin mind. ? This substantially explains why CIA intervention in Chile, together with the more recent disclosures that the C/A was keeping tabs on thousands of US. citizens-4f deception appears to be fail- ing, better prepare plans for control? have .at . last convinced members of Canvass to investigate the agency and its works. I think it is signifleant, too, that according to a Gallup poll many people suspect the investigating coal- mission established by President Ford and chaired by Vice President. Rocke- feller. has been rushed into action to absolve and save the CIA: A plausible suspicion, no doubt; considering the con- servative character of the comm;kcieae The stage has been set, in any event, for a contest between a relatively pro- gressive Congress and a big-business- dominated executive branch oaths quer- tion of the past, present and 'future of the CIA. ? ? I am unable to find reasons- to ez.- pect the result to be its abolition, es. Stone, in typical tangy prose, recom- mended in. the February 20th issue of The New York Review of Books. Mere likely the hearings; will develop an issue which should:laave?.high priority in the Political campaigns._ of 1976, althoueh that, of course, depends .ola how plain: the issue is inade to the people by those in charge of the ? hearings, those Who report them. and those still Within the ranks of the *CIA-.-or having .conneca dons with it?who May follow the courageous trail blazed by such as Prouty, Marchetti, Marks and Agee. C] James liriggins. a former editor of the York (Pa.) Gazette and Daily, is now a five-lance journalist living in Boston and teaching journalism at Boston University. WASHINGTON STAR 20 March 1975 CIA, FBI Relay Piata on Nazis to INS The Immigration and Naturalization Service is investigating 33 cases of alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States, using information provided by the CIA and FBI, INS Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman Jr. told a House immigration subcommittee yester- day. Deputy Commissioner James Greene said the CIA and FBI were asked for information in 1373 after the immigration agency received the names of 70 to 80 persons who may have had Nazi connections. The INS found 17 were dead and no proof was found to link several others to major war crimes. 25 Approved_For Release 2001/08/08 LciA-RpF777p043R90910Q36,000q,-.2 _ 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 ?!ARCH 1975 rcksalyfei dtkeee ;! a! Vdte!Aaa Moreen, Washington director DC' ehe American Civil Liberties Union, seSS ieterviewed by Washington Star Ste "thirty Ho:croon Xerripster. Qr.:vs:then: It just has been reported that tho CIA contracted for an under- water ship with a cover story that it ? belonged to Howard Hughes. You have been sharply Critical of this ar- rangemenr_?. ',Thy? gran: The problem to me is that the executive contracted out the war- :king power to private corpora- elms. The press reports that we're training the army in Saudi Arabia. We've get a ship roaming around kose semen/ace out there. Well, good heavens, to turn a ship like that over to Howard Hughes! I should add one thing. These views are my own. There are folks in the ACLU that %mita disagree with me and on much of what E may say the ACLU. has no position. grz .say the ship was turned over tc Hughes. Wasn't the Hughes connection just a cover story to con- cea.Y. C..7a1 involvement? At How do rf know it's not turned over al ;Am? So, (CIA Director Wil- liam B.) Colby says it isn't. Who can you believe in that agency? Twenty years they've spent learning to lie. They lie by rote. Is there a difference between Hughes and the CIA? Q: Is there? Are you saying they are the same? A: It don't know. We ought to tonic ? Into Q: Do you have any indication othee than this recent situation with ..the ship that there is a connection? A: Well, certainly, certainly. (Former Hughes aide Robert) Maheu testified, according to the Washing- ton Star, in his depositions in his law- suit against Hughes that in 1960 he was asked by Hughes to form a link between the CIA and Hughes Tool. He then went further and said that he did not do thnt. Secondly. he said that he'd been working on an intelligence mission in tric, in Miami and Hughes had tried to summon him back to Los Angeles, or Las Vegas, or someplace and he refused to E;o. He did identify, the agency ? the Central Intelli- gence Agency. He wouldn't go into what he'd been working on but I think the people of this country are entitled to know. Q: But how much control does How- rd Hughes have over what this boat does? A: It have no way of knowing. I don't even know if there is a Howard Hughes. An I know is that I've got to make several assumptions about it. If there is a Howard Hughes, then I have to assume that he is either sane .or insane or something else. If I as- sume him to be sane. then I have to assume him to be the most secure person in the United States. If I as- sume him to be insane, then we have turned a very highly risky operation over to a man who is an alleged nut. Now I don't want him out there pick- ing up free hydrogen bombs, or walk- ing around with anything else or risking that my country gets into war. Now if it's not Hughes, and not Hughes' crew, and there is a risk that we may ! go to war over that ship, then that's even worse. Q: Do you believe the CIA has a right to contract with private corporations to' engage in any of the covert activities that the CIA en- gages in? A: Let me go back just a little bit. In 1%7, we were shocked when we found out the CIA was funding the Na- tional Student Association. Now I have an equal shock when I find out the CIA us funding Howard Hughes. Now when I look around at the kinds of things that have happened to Hughes that an average citizen couldn't get consideration on for the past several years: an antitrust exemp- tion for the Dunes Hotel, a tax exemption for his medi- cal foundation, non-extra- dition from the Baha- mas, great Justice De- partment efforts to keep a United States grand jury from indicting him in Neva- da. I look at that and I say to myself, "What are we paying that fellow for?" Secondly, if you have covert operations through an American corporation, where's the check on that? Who runs the war? Does Hughes run the operation, or does the CIA? Or do their iteerests merge? What hap- pens when they go off and get into trouble? Do we go out and defend them? Is it a liar contracted for by the CIA secretly, without the taxpayers' knowing where their money went, without any control at all by the executive or anybody else? That's the problem. Q: You ask some interest- ing questions. Do you know any of the answers? A: I think the questions answer themselves. I think we should investigate and find out about it. Q: Do you have any indi- cation that the Glomar Ex- plorer was engaged in any activities for the CIA other than the Russian submarine caper? A: Well, I would say with- out anyrknowledge of any- 26 thing other than the public r- documents and public records, we are putting a remarkable amount of American money into underseas ventures. 'We've got ships reaming loose, small submarines, tiny . things built by corporations over here. the Defense De- partment and every place else. And I don't really know what we're doing in the sea. All I know is that we are doing something there. I assume we are doing it undercover and the reason that we're doing it undercover is because apparently we're doing something wrong. If we're doing something right then we ought to tell everybody about it and tell them what it costs. Q: If we could get back to the Glomar Explorer. Do you know of any other cov- ? ert operations conducted by that ship? ? A: I just don't know about that. I read an article in the March 1975 American Legion Magazine. It's a per- ceptive article. It ends up saying that Hughes' ship is the only ship that's ready to go to mining underseas. If 75 percent or SO percent of the mineral wealth of the world is underseas and h.. that ship does also mine, then have we financed e ship to mine underseas am.), violate a U.N. resolution as I understand it about the ownership of the underseas. Are we in such a tremen- dous hurry in this country to give away every piece of land under the sea and on - land to private corporations to make a fortune on it? Is that ship being used as kind of a.symbol over the head of countries negotiating now on a law of the seas agree- ment over in Geneva? I don't know what other uses that ship has, but I'll tell you one thing ? if that ship was a one-time, pick-up-a- submarine kind of venture, then it 'is worse than a Spruce Gander. The same sauce for the Spruce Goose! was the sauce that got the Spruce Gander going, and that sauce is money. Q: tre'hy should the CIA be so concerned about under- seas research? A: I don't know what you do with all these nuclear submarines and. all these scientific ships and ven- tures going on. Maybe we're just in collusion with private oil companies and. private mining companies doing research for them and finding out where Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.360006-2 minerals and oil are. ? Q: You've spoken infor- mally of underseas explorer Jaques Cousteau in this context. How does he fit into this? A: As I understand, Cous- teau in November 1974 showed up in Pensacola, Fla, in his ship, The Calyp- so. He said he came or re- search into the red tide. The unfortunate part of that venture is the world's out- standing oceanographer got there at the season when the red tide isn't a problem. You go beyond that and he does say he is doing re- search on a U2 type of cam- era to be used in 1978. He's talking about electric sen- sors through the gulf, studying pollution. I didn't know that Cousteau worked for the government of the United States, but I do now. So, I can't answer the ques- tion. I just know the story's there. Q: Does the Hughes con- tract with the CIA violate any Securities and Ex- change Commission regula, tions? A: I have read some documents filed with the SEC and they don't seem to make full disclosure of this kind of transaction and this kind of operation that is going on, with respect to prospective stockholders in Global Marine, Inc. (The Hughes company that owns the Glomar Explorer.). It may very well be that in other documents they do. The ones that I've been over look to me like they merit an investigation. ., iere :?'WASHING- :t0N?(12PI)--Do our friend- ly allies spy on Americans in :the United States? ? . They often do. And we spy ;CI them in their home coun- .