Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 25, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 10, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6.pdf9.02 MB
?Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037000-1-6 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 19 SEPTEMBER 1975 NO. 19 PAGE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA 1 28 33 35 39 44 45 LATIN AMERICA 48 25X1A Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 4pproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001L6 A2MINGTON POST C; Stptem5er 1975 Ely George Lardner Jr. ?nase.taaten Post Stalt qpr}t? . _ Deadly poisons, including might be relevant to the out) ehelifieh toxin potent enough side investigations that- werel t,.7 kill thousands of people. then getting under way. ' teeee been found in a seeret Church and Committee Vice ' ? maintained by the Cere. Chairman John G.. Tower (Be' arel fnteiligence Agency, Sex): Tex.) were quietly told of the rk Church .(D-Idaho) said stockpile several months ace). Yeeerrisy. The CIA's deputy director of eaid the CIA kept bnth, science and teehnoiogy, Carl elee ehelifish toxin and a Duckett, then conducted an in- eenellen amount of cobra house investigation thrcug.h venom "in direct contraven- one of his deputies, Sayre Ste- of presidential orders yens, and reported the find- enere than five years ago that ings to the full Senate corn- materials be destroyed. mittee last week. - eetareenliming, angel:a fee''Church said the commietee news :leaks about the nelsons, S etall , trying to determine. Cherch confirmed that his who in the CIA was responsi- enate intelligence committee Mc for blocking destinctien wouta nold pehlie hearings on tile poisons and who knew ne,xt week despite White ab, mil: the decision. FDrineir. Heitsc objections. CIA .7nreetor Richard Hele?nsej now ambassador to Iran, will, The, poisons were reportedly questaoned on that score it.iy i-,veloned for the CIA under cod ime the co7Otnittee exncutive the e m Project Netorni v during the 1950s. Church said aeseton eed-t --d " ? .e." the d'o'evxy enlight be rel "'c'rnew''etre l'"'44 " the want to the committee's assaa- CIA. a teeeision was made to sination inquiry. 'He said hei disobey the Presidential er-. hes no reason to think any of der," Church declared at, a toeirs weec ever actually breakfast meeting with report- neeee but the committee in.' era that preceded hie rows vestigating, "one particular mission"' that apparently never eame to fruition. ? In response to .a news. con- ference question, Church bed', rated he was familiar with-- but refused to comment on? an allegation that some toxin was sent to Africa to kill Con- conference. He said Colby'l ap- parent Ignorance of the cache even after becoming CIA di.; rector in 1973 suggested an' alarming "looseness of cone. mend. and eontrolowithLn the CIA . . ." Along with an inventory of other unspecified materiaes,? golese Premier, Patrice Lu- the lethal poisons were discov- enturalia in 1961. According to ered at a CIA laboratory fact'. the allegation, the shipment ity and mil under heavy did not arrive until after Lu- geaxd, Church said. He said mumbo had been asaassinated, . news reports that they were by ether means. . -found at Ft. Detrick, aide 'Church would say only that were incorrect, but he refused the committee was still inves- to say where they were discov. tigating the qdestion of pro- :Leered use of some of the poi, bred. Church said he. was singling, %on and that its findings Out the shellfish toxin and the , would be made public "in due. -cobra venom because they: eentrse." Were the o.nly items in the. The Idaho Democrat 'added .1.each,? whose retention, that the retention of the. P?i- "unquestionably contravenes".; eons, after President Nixon or- dered destruction of such. eteckpiles in 1969, raised grave . questions about internal con- trols and supervision within, warfare and ordered the de- ne CIA. Church said' CIA Director struction of the U.S. stockpile William E. Colby was appar- ently unaware of the cache un- til earlier this year when he asked agency employees to no- him - of anything AO Nixon's executive ordee, 4 , Nixon announced in Novem- ber, 1960, that the nation:. would never engage in germ ? of bacteriological weapons. A .subsequent "clarification" op the order made it clear thate the order was to apply to bac4 tepto 1 ON n ft S Ch3lre .,ck? ,?11tg(i41/ ienTT-T NEW YORK TIM'S 11 September 1975 C1AViewsonU Of Poison Repartee' By NICHOLAS Ill. HORPOCK 1 . Sp...del to The New Y+wk Times : WASHINGTON; Sept. le ? i,The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency considered "operational use" of the shellfish poison I ' kept in its laberatory, ? includ- ing making suicide pills far agents and "aggeressive ac- tions," sources familiar with the events said today. The poison, these'sources said, was kept in a laboratori of the technical services divi- sion of the C.I.A., which in 1979 was under the command of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the man who conducted LSD expert-I meats for the agency. The! Senate investigators are ex- - pected to interview Dr. Gott- . lieb in closed session later this week. " g Meanwhile, a prominent phare mocologist, Dr. Mun-loch Ritchie of Yale University, has asked the agency and the senate Committee to prevent the de- struction of the shell-fish poison on the ground that it could be extremely valuable for medi- cal research. He said the poison, was similar to a one once men- toned in the James Pond books by Ian Fleming. The 'poison, called soodtexin, as properties that make it rera and extremely veluable for re- search on such net-Yr.-us system diseases as multiple scleroSis, Dr. Ritchie said. 'agrees that the' potions shPui'S;i have been disposed of. - He also sharply disputed a report in yesterday rnorrung editions of The Washington. :Post quoting unnamed sources,' as stating the poisons were re-, tallied on grounds that they ;might be useful for expert- mental purposes. He said the shellfish toxin, .for which there is no known antidote, had been kept by the CIA in such quantities "as could kill many thousands of. people." far more than what. might be needed for any Mho-. ratorY experimentation. Church could not say whg the CI.A had the poisons de- veloped or why it kept them despite the Nixon decree, but he said he assumed they were.: meant for individual targets. "I'm not prepared to charge; today that the CIA ever in-1 tended to conduct mass bac- teriological warfare . against; foreign nations," he said, "L. ' -? br. Pitafie- said -he.belitveil the C.I.A.:3 "saxitoxin"eiwas . part of a batch prepared by the . Army at the Edgeierid Arsenal in Maryland in' the nineteen-sixties. He said that if . was one of the deadliest poisons . known.. to . mankind, but added ' ?that because- of its value tee imedical research, "it would be r. !mina' to destroy this ,m0,- 'Aerial." '. . ? . ? -- -. Pr. Ritchie contended teat ' tcereful 'controls weld'. be ..a7erlieert out to keel) the palson from misuse. He said-smite:mite which is distilled from hetes. ' clams, is similar . to tetra-- dee-rye:ire a poison made by the rpariese from puffer title. The puffer fish poison ' was men? itiened in 2renes. pond weds, Kit said. ,le After President Nina or. 'dosed the destruction of thrall,- !nal and bacteriological weapons. ,.in 1969,. following the siping of an international treaty lime iting biochernic warfare. it liecame -virtually impossible fox' medical researchers ? to obtain eaxitoxin, Dr. Ritchie said. lbe commercially manufactured Jap-; , anese poison is not as good for research, he said. . ? ? .? '': Intelligence sources .said that 'there was some 'documentary - evidence to indicate that, aver :the years the intelligence agency :"at least considered" .using the shell-fish poison. ? .The agency also maintained a supply . of cobra venom. . l'''' ? One potential use of the Shell- :fish poison, because it is one of :the fatest acting poisons, was ito make suicide pills that so United States agents might be : able to kill 'themselves - after., ? being caught, sources said. The . poison acted so swiftly, these sources said, that the agents' captors would have no time to. administer an antidote. . Other intelligence - sources,? however, said -that. there we memorandums suggesting ree ? gressive actions". in which the ? shell-fish poison could be used.' ? They. Would not ela.sorate. ' ? There were also indicatioirs that the agency ? had materials for such uses as 'disabling guard - 'doge at a foreign 'embassy with-, ? . out killing them. This would aid.i 'the agency in entering and leav- ing a premise guarded by dogs!: without the owner's knowing' ' the intrusion had, been made. The Senate Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator, ' Frank Church, Democrat efl Idaho, is. investigating ' why . these two poisons were nott destroyed' by the agency fol- lowing the Presidential order ; ? in 1969. 'According to' iatell,i-4 wince sources, though: Dr.., Gottlieb headed the divisione ' where the materials were Tee ' tained there was "no lingo& . ? lion" violated the order andi ' had them preserved. ie / Senate 'investigators. ore' " seeking to learn, intelligence. ? :sources said, whether Dr.' Gott- . lieb could shed any light on.. howthe Presidential order was . , handled at the agency. . i...;.Mr. Church,said that in add- Akin to the cobra and shell- .iefish Poisons, - the C.I.A. had hoarded . large. , quantities of would have 'to assume that the ? , other dangerous chemicals. :044Rippancoone*R0960037 r eY figure in the b r- I [Acidly targeted.'" t week. , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-0043,2R000100370001-6 WASHINGTON POST' 17 September'1975 CI AA TeriQ, Of Exotic Tearions Electric Gttn, Untraceable - Poison Pellets ; By George Lardner Jr. ? Washington Poet Staff Writer The Central Intelligence gency spent some $3 mu. on on a secret stockpile ; f deadly poisons and corn- anion weaponry such as a art gun that could kill its ictims without leaving a race, CIA Director Wil- iam Colby acknowledged esierday. Testifying, calmly in lecture- all tones, Colby told the enate intelligence commit. cc, at its first public session hat middle-level CIA. of- icials improperly stored away ome of the most deadly toxin n 1970 in defiance of an or- er by President Nixon that' uch materials be destroyed. -Top officials of the. CIA clis- overed the ;forbidden cache n an apparently long-neglected vault earlier this year. . The arsenal included not nly deadly shellfish toxin re-! ortedly capable of killing! hundreds of thousands" of eople, but also strychnine, cobra venom,, cyanide pills nd other exotic compounds such as 10. pounds of "1:12:,",a chemical that attacks the cen- tral nervous system.. Several dart guns were also found, including a .45 caliber-- sized electric gun capable Of silently firing poison pellets that would dissolve in a vic- tim before any autopsy could be perfortned. One CIA memo made-public by the Senate committee de- scribed the 'gun as "a non.- diseernible microbioindeula- tor" that could fire accurately at ranges up ?to 250 feet, Tiny pellets that could carry a half- milligrarn of poison and "Cap- able of being used in a noise- free disseminator" such as the dart gun had also been devel- oped, the Oct ob er, 1967, memo declared. The same document dis- c ose;d atdvolnerability" -study of the. -New York City sub- way- sYstem to determine "the threat of infection to subway passengers" in a .covert bio-1 ogical attack. The menio, addressed to the 1 chief of the CIA's technical! services division, added that 1 the vulnerability study prod- uced information about "meth- ods of delivery which could! be used offensively!' At one 'point during his testimony, Colby said some of the CIA's secret_ records on the development- of the poisons and incapacitating agents?known as Project Naomi?had been destroyed in November, 1972., He -also ?? said there Was a memorandum of agreement reflecting the destruction of those records between then-CIA Director Richard Helms and the chief -of the technical services divi- sion, Sidney Gottlieb. CIA special counsel Mitchell 1Rogovin said later, however, that Colby "misspoke!' Rogo- vire said there was no such memorandum and that "we have no reason to believe" that any records on Project Naomi were destroyed. ? Committee investigators ap- parently remain' skeptical. "We have evidence that there are memos which one would think shoultk exist but which no longer exist," the commit- tee's ; chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz, told reporters, ; Gottlieb, according to Rock- efeller Commission sources, was responsible for the de- struction of CIA drug-testing records, including the adminis- tration of LSD to unwitting! subjects. R.ogovin suggested that Colby may have had this ; in mind when he referred to Project Naomi. As for the memo to Helms, Rogovin -said ? !it actually came from the. j chief of the Army Chemical !Corps and simply dealt with the Army's -development of }Various ,toxins for the CIA; at 1Ft. Detrick, Md. The focal point of the testi- mony was the nearly 11 grams I?approximately half an ounce i?of shellfish toxin that was !found along with the strych- nine and other materials ! in an 8-by-10 foot storage room at the CIA's "South Labora- tory," a building near the 1State Department. Emphasizing the potency of ; the poison. Committee- Chair- man Frank Church ID-Idaho) isaid that Carl ?Duckett. head of the CIA's directorate of sci- ' ence and technology, testi- fied in executive session that ? if the 11 grams were adminis, tered orally; .- they would be 1"sufficient to kill at least 14,- 000 people." ! Oral doses. Church stressed, are also "the least efficient way" to administer the toxin. If the "sophisticated equip- ment" found along With the "toxin were used instead, he said, the half ounce would be enough to kill many more peo- ple, with estimates "-varying upwards into the hundreds of thousands.'' When President Nixon re- . 'non/teed biologic,ar Warfare the fall of 1969 and followed up on Feb. ?14, 1970, with or dors- to destroy "all. existir.e stocks of toxins" not needed for defensive research. Colhy: said high-ranking CIA officials knew that the-p' at Ft. Detrick, including, the shell-. fish toxin, should, be de- stroyed. "D i s c u-s atolls with Mr. Helms, director of central in- telligence, and Mr. " Thomas Karamessines, the depUty rector for plans in 1970, have established that both weee Aware of the requirement that such material be disposed of," Colby tesitfied. ? "They recall that clear' in , structions were given that the CIA stockpile should be de- - strayed by-the Army and that, in accordance with presider,: tial ? directives, the agency should get out Of the BW (biological warfare) business," he said. ? The former CIA scientist re- sponsible for hiding the shell- fish toxin away, Nathan Gor- don of Silver Spring, testified ; however, that he never got the word., 13.6eatedly emphasizing the expense and the effort in- volved in manufacturing the !shellfish toxin?experts say It takes tons of shellfish to produce a single gram?Gor- don made plain that the pros- pect of destroying it troubled him greatly. As head of the !tiny chemical branch of the CIA's technical services divi- sion in 1970 he said he and, his ? two colleagues in that! 1--branch decided to keep -the poison without even tolling! Gottlie b, their immediate! superior. . Under lengthy questioning' by committee members, Gott- - lieb maintained at times that Nixon's orders did not cover "chemical agents"?a category he claimed the shellfish toxin fell into. Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D- Minn.) pointed Out, however, that this conflicted with a CIA memo on Feb. 16. 1970 that Gordon admitted drafting at Gottlieb's suggestion. ? Entitled "Contingency Plan for Stockpile of !Biological: IVarfare Agents," the memo I noted that 'Nixon had just "included all toxin weapons" in calling for the destruction of bacteriological stockpiles. The document then listed '10 biological agents?such as ilia?. terials designed to bring on tuberculosis?and six "toxins," including 5.1 grams of "para- lytic shellfish poison." Gordon then warned that the CIA stockpile might be destroyed, and' said that if the agency's director ''wishes to continue this special capabil- ity," it could be transferred to a private firm in Baltimore and secretly stored "at a cost no greater than $75,000 . ? "1..7 ;. The memo, was drafted for signing by Karamessines, as head of the CIA's covert ope- rations division, and addressed to CIA Director Helms. as a proposed' contingency : plan. 'Colby, however, said an inves- tigation indicates that the memo never even got to.Kara-- rressines, ! Gordon said his immediate.? boss, Gottleib. told him to for- get the idea and said the pro, ;:gram at Ft. Detrick with the. ,sPecial operations division of ! !Army biological experts would:l . have to he ended. - ! Subsequently. however, Gor-'1; 'don said, the Army projecte ;officer .at Detrick, Charles Senseny, called him and of- fered to send him the CIA's, _five grams of shellfish toxin "for our potential use" some Gordon said he' and .his' ? two -colleagues in the tIA chemical .branch .. quietly., ? agreed. Questioned sharply about the fact that the CIA would wind up with almost 11 grams Of the toxin instead of the 5.I grams it was supposed to have, Gordon said he could only conclude that Detrick's :special operations division wanted to save the Army's stockpile ?from destruction also. He said he was unaware, l'of the double shipment Until 'this year. Sen. Church said he found iGordon's disclaimers 'of a con- flict between his actions. and 1Nixon's orders "rather astound:- Mg.' Gordon, however, voiced-, :no regrets and said he stilt, ,feels that retention of the- toxin v.-as "in the interest ? the agency's policy" of matia,' taming behavioral con Cr ol- : materials. . . CIA Director Colby said the: program with the Army fixe malty began in May, 1952, and ?? "was tied to earlier Office of Strategic Services World War. IT experience, which, included:: the development of two, dile' ferent types of agency suicide ? pills to -be- used in the event.,' of capture. and a successful operations using BW materials:. to incapacitate! a Nazi leadert temporarily." One of the. CIA's earlieStt? requirements, Colby said. Was; to find "a replacement fon the standard cyanide issued 1-' -to agents in hazardous situ- ations in 'World War U. ? He said this effort ultimately' centered on development of a small drill coated with shell? fish toxin. ? He said. however, that the 9/.11y use of the expensive.' poison was in Francis CarY Power's disatrous (1-2 flight over the Soviet Union in May. i 1960, when he "carried such a device concealed in a silver! dollar." Powers tossed away the sit= ver dollar on being : shot down, hut kept the poison! 14eTeae 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 - Fiprpved For Re1ease,2001/0 NEW YORK TIMES 18 Se tember 1975 :pin. ,"He ?cibilously. did dii6f.1 use It," Colby. said. ? . -- ? ,t,. : . Instead; the committee was told, Powers' _Russian captors; found it and tested it on.?a. .thige which died in 10. seconds'. ,Under questfoning. by Church. Colby readily agreed, h o w e v e r. that the shellfish ,toxin and other poisons develd toped u it ri e i Project Naomi, were designed for offensive t uses although he was unaware! -of any actual applications. i Excep t for the sheillishi toxin and perhaps some other' . items such as.the cobra venom,I the CIA's stockpile at Detrick! ,was apparently destroyed. The; i' cache at the CIA's South} 'Laboratory, where the toxin } . was founded, evidently tt coo ? sisted of a potpourri of items} from Detrick plus . chemical; compounds that CIA scientists; ' had "collected" and store cit away in earlier years. I ' Colby said he was not awarei of the secret cache or even of; Project Naomi until this year, hither. he asked agency em.-] ployees to bring any question-I able activities to'his attention.i Sen. Mondale said he *asl especially upset bY. the fact! that there are so few records' about the program. He said!there was no evidence that'. the National Security Council} ever autborized it and no clocu-i- mentary proof that the stock-} pile was ordered destroyed ini! 1970. e s s .11 "In short; the record's all , mess," Mondale told Colby.;1 .'Does that bother you?": 1,1 "It certainly does," the CIA!' drectur sd ai- ? ' ' ' L NEW YORK TIMES ' 18 September 1975 7. ran'sit Autko ray Says N6, Que Knew About C.I.A.' s Test A spokesman for the Transit ? Authority said- yesterday that as far as could be determined- now no one.. in ? that 'agency had any knowledge -of a secret Central intellieence. -Agency. project in .which i the .city's sub-, ways were used to test the vulnerability of esubway asyse . ?[ terns ? to" biolOgicel-warfare attack. .? A C.I.A. mensoranduradmade public during a' hearing of the 'Senate .Select Committee on Intelligence ? in Washington on Tuesday said that the test "pro- vided a means of assessing the threat of infection to subway passengers". and demonstrated how to use such an attack "offensively."AccordingAccordin ?to Congressional sources, C.I.A. officials had said tthat in the test the subways were flooded with a "harmless eamtalant" of a 'disease-carrying . gas.. No information was dis- dOsed on when or ? how the 'test was conducted. The Transit : Authority spokesman.. -said: "As - far as ,we can determine at this time.. no one here knew. of the test. We cannot Comment until we know more about WhatAp supposed to have happened. We are looking into .the mat- ter." POISORARMS BAN IS TED BY HELM Tells Panel He Gave Oral to Halt C.I.A, Job, but Did Not 'Follow Up tBy NICHOLAS -M.. HORROCK t., Special to The N'zra York Timee t-' ,a WASHINGTON,. Sept. 17----; tRichard Helms, the former Die t,-4.ector of Central Intelligence, ,told. a Senate Committee today .e.that he had issued an . oral iconernand to halt . the C.I.A.'s biochemical weapons program tend .to. destroy. its stockpiles, Aut. that he had v never fol- tiOwed no to find out if his 'torder had been carried out. l- ? - ea- He also testified that he had frever issued a written order on he matter.. ' Mr. Helms, now the Ambas- sador to Iran, went before the !Senate Select Committee on ;Intelligence accompanied by 11.ornas Karamessines, his for-. fiter deputy for ? covert opera- lions, Mr. Helm told the corn e- goatee that when he . learned %in February,' 1970, of President :Nixon's order that 'all biochemi; real weapons he destroyed, he a. n a , Mr. Karamessines agreed . ?hat the C.I.A. "had no choice tbut to comply." "We agreed t,n terminate the program," he aid. tss Mr. Karamessines? told. the , ornmittee that he and Mr. iHelma discussed the matter hwith Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the tdire.,ctor of the Technical Seined tees-Division of the C.I.A., which over-all control of the pro- . gram. Mr. Karamessines - said tthat it was his "understanding rwith Gottlieb. that all toxins in possession of the agency 'be returned to Fort Detrick ;7,or oestruction." ? lL . 2d Day of Hearings ..e.t Mr. Helms and Mr. Karames- !eines appeared as witnesses in the second day of the Senate :committee's. public ,inquiry . s,why the C.I.A., failed:??teodp e?grOy drivo deadly ' biocheinital. ' poi-.i f.(31ttS, a shellfiah toxin .and a rnpoison derived from cobra can- can, after the Presidential order iqr.O. 1970, e' The committee's counsel. T...A.O. Schwarz 3d, said that l;the committee would question Dr. Gottlieb about the poisons 0, ? nand others matters in a closed ,session on Tuesday. lie said, ehowever, that Dr. - Gottlieb's 'lawyers had "indicated" that Itheir client might invoke his ,constitutional _right wider the ,Fifth Amendment not to an- -swer questions that might tend incriminate him. - ? ? e? If Dr. Gottlieb does invoke .. tthe amendment, Mr. Schwarz said, the committee may consi- tesder whether it will, grant. him : CIA-RDP77A0432R00010637000t-.6: ,klin =nits/ 'from prosiiiititte to .7get the full story on the record. Mr. Helms-told the committee -that he knew of an 18-yeareo1dr C;.I.A, joint program with the .. Army's Biological Warfare Laboratory at Fort De- trick Md to develop biochemi- cal weapons. He said that ?he had been ,aware that the prograrn deve- -loped biochemicals and such ldeliverd systems as dart guns, ,but that he., had never ordered ,such weapons used against hu- pan beings. "I don't ever recall ,considering it, let alone author- ,izing it," he said. , Mr. Karamessines said that ,he had "no recollection of the ?actual use of any of the mater- ,ials," but acknowledged that ?if they had been used to kill ,a watchdog in- a foreign opera- ,tion he might not have been ,informed. He said that he was ,sure he had never ordered their ? used against a human being: "As Mr. Helms and others who know me are aware, I would not have continued rat the C.I.A.] if there was a re- quirement -for the killing of a human being," Mr. Karames- sines said. He has spent some 30 years in covert operations with the Office of Strategic Services and the C.I.A. Three Made Decision Mr. Helms testified that be- fore President Nixon ordered biochemical warfare weapons destroyed, he asked a National Security Council committee to study the question. Mr. Helms said, howeventthat he had not told the committee that the C.I.A. possessed such wepons, ? mainly because It was not cleared to have such informa- tion under national security standards. He also said that he had never doubted that the Pros- ident's order applied to the C.I.A. Beth Mr. Helms and Mr. Karrnessines said that they were "surprised" to learn five year later that all the rater- ials had not been destroyed. Dr. Nathn Gordon, who was in charge of biochemical mater- ii& in the Technical Services Division, testified yesterday that he and two other men in his section had decided to ese#,a, of the sheUfish toxin and the poison made from cobra venom. .. Dr, Gordon said that although he knew about the 1970 Pres- idential order, he did not regard the materials as being covered ander it. Moreover, he said, he had received no written di- rective from the C.I.A. hie- rarchy to get rid of the mater- ials. Today, Mr. Helms said that he had not issued a written order on the matter because Mr. Karamessines and Dr. Got- tlieb accepted verbal orders as "orders written in blood." He said that he felt Dr. Gottlieb and Mr. Karamessines were ,two of the most honorable men in the country, and that he never doubted that the order would tie tarried out. WASHINGTON POST 14 September 1975 Rockefeller Cites-Need for ,urveillanee NORMAN,' Okla.,: Sept.. 13 (AP)?Vice President Rocke- feller said today that attempti against, the life of President Ford show a need for tougher domestic Intelligence opera- tions by the government. Rockefeller told an airport nexvs conference in Oklahoma- City that the FBI and other, agencies authorized to gather intelligence in this country need More help: "What has happened does indicate the ' importance of having intelligence," he said. "And I thinks it's an element of the United States is review- ing CIA and the entire intelWt ger ce structure." Rockefeller, who headed the government panel that studied charges of illegal domest' c snooping by CIA, said no mas- sive violations were found and the charges are deceiving the "I think that we do see from what happened in the case of the President that it is essene tial that the FBI and the local law enforcement agencies pre- serve records of those who have been outspoken or active in efforts to undermine the *freedom of this country or de- stroy democratic society by force or to kill leaders of this :society," he said.. Rockefeller said, however,' that he , felt public officials and political' candidates should be prepared to take the risks that go with the job and that the Secret Service is do- ing all that can be done rea- sonably to protect them. Rockefeller's two days of speechmaking, handshaking fund-raising and frequent news conferences featuring local questioners were paid for by the Republican Party, as was a corresponding trip by President Ford, , ? ved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 THE NEW YORK 'TIMES; WEDkESDAY, 'SEPTEMBER 17, 1475 Mibukh the &Ned Is:P*on, the CIA. Reiiela0Ons.Briiik ' By LINDA: CHARLTON Spezia! to The Ne., York Times ? WASHINGTON, Sept. 16? Every now and then the hear- 'ing :room was ,s!,vept by ner- vous. giggles, today, as when . the, Central ?Intelligence. Agency's former top chemist said that 'all he knew about a, lethal. shellfish toxin was that he' had' been told "it's gocid stuff.", . The .chemist, Dr. :Nathan Gordon? _provoked ,another Muffled snort during the, .hearings by the Senate Select :'Committee 'on Intelligence, When he went on to talk about another C.I.A. item,, this one guaranteed to pro-, dike ,nothing" more lethal' Than "a real severe case of the tummies." Dr. Gordon 'Was not trying 'to be funny. He-Wes 'trying to explain how it :was, in ap- parent defiance of two Presi- -dential edicts, he had held onto 10.9 grams of the shell figh toxin enough to kill thousands of persons?in the ,vault of his laboratory. Dr. Gordon. a tall, stoop- ing man, with dark-rimmed spectacles and thinning hair. brushed back to curl over the? on Nervous Giggles , taken advantage of a Senate collar of his blue suit, had ? rale that allows a subpoe- naed witness to bar tele- vision or other cameras dur- ing his testimony.' SO the Senate hearing room, the-: 'same grand, marble-pillared chamber that once echoed' ? with Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr.'s declamations, was light- ed only by four heavy crystal chandeliers. Dr. Gordon, told the Sen- ate anal, yes, he had stored the shellfish toxin, which ? works by blocking the trans- mission of nervous-system Impulses. But he insisted that, he had done so because, first; he did not believe the 1969 and 1970 While Hose direc- fives applied to the C.I.A. and, second, they applied to bacteriological agents, not chemical one, anyway. - He said that he thought it important for the agency to maintain "a potential capa- bility in? behavioral materi-' els,' 'meaning the shellfish' poison and similar laboratory, triuMphs. . ? Dr. Gordon's chief, Richard. Helms, the former Director, of Central Intelligence who WASHINGTON STAR 10 September 1975 is now Ambassador to Iran; sat in a reserved seat in the: front row of the spectator section. He seemed detached'. and impassive, and he fiddled with the cardboard "re- served" sign as he listened to Dr. Gordon. During the morning, 'the, :present directOr, William E. Colby, told the committee about some of the ways the C.I.A. had devised to deliver its various poisons, including a formidable dart gun that' :his lawyer, Mitchell Rogovin, handed to the committee. 7 No Pointing "Don't--point that at me," said Senator Frank Church,' Democrat Of' Idaho, the corn-' -mittee ?chairman,. lightly but, nervously. Mr. Colby had told ? the committee that the dart 'gun fired nearly silently and was accurate at 100 meters. Ite described, but did not thave with him, such other de- - vices as a fountain-pen dart launcher and a bolt that, When placed in a machine, exudes its poison as the ma- ' chine warms in use. He had brought the dart gun at the committee's request. Mr. Golby'a? account of Why the shellfish taxin was not de- .stroyed differed from Gor- don's. The direator -said that the "retired agency ? officer" in charge?who turned out to be Dr. Gordon?had. "made . this decision based on the - fact -that the. cost and diffi- culty of isolating the shellfish toxin : were so great that it simply made no sense to de- ? stroy it, :partictilarly - when there would be ? no future source of the toxin." But he also said, that the precioua poison has been used only once+ It ;was.% the .said, 'given to the I3-2 spy plane- -pilot, Francis .Gary powers, for the 1960 flight over the _ Soviet :Union. Mr. Colby said the toxin was ma tiny poison needle concealed in a silver dollar, to provide Mr. Powers with "as optidn" in case he was shot down: He was shot . down, hut that was an otpion- he chose- not to exercise: - , By Orr Kelly Washington Star Staff Writer Agents of the FBI have been as- signed by the Justice Department to investigate possible criminal actions ,involving the operations of the Cen- ' tral Intelligence Agency. Robert Havel, spokesman for the department, said Yesterday that the ? btireau agents were first called in to probe one aspect-of the case several months ago, but he said their work had since been expanded to cover other aspects. The FBI probe is linked to the Work of a committee made up of 13 lawyers from the criminal division and three lawyers from the civil ' rights division- who are studying possible violations of the criminal laws by both the CIA and the FBI. THE WORK of the committee is ? being supervised by Kevin I. Moro- ney, a deputy assistant attorney general who has long worked with the CIA and the FBI. Also involved in - ? the probe are Dep. Atty. Gen. Harold R. Tyler Jr., and Asst. Attys. Gen. .Richard Thornburgh and J. Stanley ' Pottinger. Assignment of agents from the FBI, which is sometimes seen as a rival to the CIA, to investigate the intelligence ageney is ahighly unusual step. Until recently, the CIA even had an agreement with the Jus- tice Department that permitted agency officials -to discipline agency employes, without notifying the Jus- tice Department, even in case's in- volving possible violation of the criminal laws. Havel refused to Say what possible violations of the law were involved in the FBI's part of the investigation. HOWEVER, information made available over the last eight months, in newspaper reports, the report to President Ford by CIA Director Wil- liam Colby, the Rockefeller Report and congressional investigations has opened up the-possibility of violations of- the criminal law in the foliowing areas: ? Did Richard Helms, former CIA director and' now ambassador to Iran, commit perjury when he told a' Senate committee the CIA had net been involved in efforts to overthrow the Chilean government? ? Is ? anyone criminally responsible for the CIA's involvement in domes- tic spying? 9 Did the CIA or its agents violate the law by opening mail without a warrant? ? '4 ? Was there any violation of the law by the CIA in its reported involve- ment in assasination attempts against rulers of other countries? ? Did the CIA operate ? beyond its legal authority in other areas ? and did this involve violation of the criminal laws? ? Did high ranking officials of the government order the CIA to carry out illegal activities ? and, in the process, violate the criminal laws themselves'? The most likely areas for prosecu- tion involve the perjury laws and those covering the sanctity of the mails. On the other hand, Justice Depart- ment lawyers say, it is quite possible that the CIA, in its domestic spying efforts, overstepped its authority but' not in such a way that any individual can be held responsible, for violating the criminal laws. So far, Havel said, the lawyers in- volved in the probe have not felt the need for help from professional investigators in their investigation of possible violations of the law by the FBI or its agents. If they should need such help, Havel said, investigators from another agency would be called in. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 ApproVOO For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 -? NEW YORK TIMES 13 September 1975, President Bars House Unit r From Seeing ata By NICHOLAS Special to The :. WASHINGTON, -Sept. 12 ? President Ford ordered today ? that the House Select Commit- tee on Intelligence be cut off from all classified documents, . and he forbade Administration officials to testify before the committee on classified mat- ters. He also demanded the .return of classified material now in the committee's hands. His actions appeared to place the White House on the most serious collision course with Congress regarding ? investiga- tions of the intelligence agen- cies since the sweeping in- quiries began ?earlier this year. At the center of the dispute is the committee's decision yesterday to make public four words from a 1973 intelligence agency summary, over the ob- jection of officials of the in- telligence community. The words were made public along with about 400 others last nights but neither commit- tee members nor Government officials would identify the phrase at issue: However, authoritative sources said the four words were "and greater communications security," which were part of a list of activities taking place in ? Egypt the day the 1973 Arab- Israeli war broke out. The House committee voted 6 to 3 in a closed session yes- terday afternoon ?to disclose the four words in making pub- lic a paragraph from a Defensl Intelligence Agency secret sum-1 .mary of the activities. The summary was. prepared on Oct. 6, 1973. Mitchell Rogovin, counsel for the Director of Central In- telligence, told the closed ses- sion that the intelligence agen- cies belie.ved the words com- promised national security by revealing the "sources and ;methods" used to gather intel- Iligence. . 1 Today, in a news conference, William E. Colby, the Director ? ,of Central Intelligence, said he :believed that keeping the four 'words secret was worth risking a constitutional confrontation between the President and the House. ' The confrontation began early today. Rex E. Lee, Assis- tant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division? appeared before the committee on behalf of the President and called the publication of the words of "irreparable harm." He relayed Mr. Ford's order. M. HORROCK New YCC1C Times committee of the House that it may not continue to Operate." Mr. Lee said he believed it was up to the committee. ? Since the committee investi- gatipn covers almost entirely national security matters, Mr. Ford's ban was considered of grave import. , Later, Mr. Pike, Democrat of .Suffolk. County, told a report- er, I for one would be very isurprised if the committee votes Ito return the documents that it already has as a result of sub- poena, and I'd ? be even more isurprised if the members voted ,not to continue operation." - - Several hours after the morn- ing hearing, the C.I.A. received a subpoena from the commit- tee dated today.? Both Mr. Lee and Mr. Colby stressed that they were con- cerned as much about the com- mittee's future acts as about what had been done.' se ? When asked why' executive- branch cooperation, with the committee had been curbed, Mr. Colby said, "We're going to stop it until we can work out an arrangement where we have some assurance that there won't-be any revelations with- out our discussing it together." - 'A committee source said he felt the committee could pro- ceed with information from sources outside the Govern- ment and with leads developed , through the classified docu- ments it had already received. Court Delays Feared The committee has always had the option of going to 'court to enforce its subpoenas, but both committee members and Mr. Ford know that the time spent in court would seri- ously hamper the future of the investigation, which is schede uled to be completed by Jan. 31. '-i ; t Until the Administration made an issue of the four-word phrase, no one had paid any attention to it. The words ap- peared In this context: "Egypt [deletion] large scale mobilization exercise may be, an effort to -soothe internal problems as much as to im- prove military capabilities. Mo- bilization of some personnel, increased readiness of isolated units, and greater communica- tions security are all assessed as parts of the exercise You- tine." :. Long-time intelligence agents said that "and greater commu- nications security" would alert the Egyptians and Russians to the fact that the United States had penetrated their communi- cations and even penetrated it :when efforts were made to have greater security. If a par- ticularly sophisticated technique ;were being used to protect corn- .munications. these words would tell an intelligence analyst that the United States had intruded Representative Otis ?G. Pike, the committee chairman, re- sponded, "In other words the executive branch is tellinge the APP NEW 'Oil( TINES 11 September 1975 C. I A. Given White House Data On Ground They Be Kept Secret Spedal to The WASHINGTON, Sept. 10? Representative Otis G. Pike, chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. said late today that the Ford Adininistration was delivering materials in response to a committee subpoena, but under the condition that the docu- ments not be made public. Earlier today, in a special meeting, the -House committee voted to subpoena briefing pa- pers given to Presidents John- son and Nixon on four major international crises during their Presidencies. Included were the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and last year's military coup in Portugal.' After a series of negotiations between Mr. Pike and White House officials, the Administra- tion tonight began to deliver material relating to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Originally, Mr. Pike said, he had been promised unclassified material. Instead, he said, the Ad- ministration has sent him secret New York Times material from the National Se- curity Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which, he said,, White House officials said could not be made public. He said the question of making it public would be "negotiated" later. Meanwhile, Mr. Pike said, he planned to begin hearings to- morrow on American intelli- gence on the Arab-Israeli war. "These materials will not be read at the hearing, but ques- tions will be based upon them.' said Mr. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk. The House committee has consistently bristled at the ef- fort by the Administration to have matters handled in secret. The House hearings are ex- pected to examine the question of whether the intelligence esti- mats made by the various agencies were accurate and enabled the Presidents to prop- erly respond to the crises with which the were faced. These are the second set of publio hearings conducted by Mr.. Pike's committee. said. - But most suggested that nei- ther Egyptians nor the Soviet Union had any real doubt that United states communications spying was excellent and this 'phrase would have little conse- quence. Over-All Effect Feared Administration sources said that the White House had be-- come increasingly concerned with the 'aggressiveness of the House committee and with the effect this would have on other ;committees. When the House i committee voted yesterday to 'declassify documents "unilater- lally." one well-placed Adminis- tration source said, it raised thel :specter that other Congression- al committees might decide to j follow. suit. ? I The intelligence agencies and defense units supoly a vast amount of classified material to !Congress and have over the lyears been able to ."work out" releases of the material that did .not quote specific language or conersromi se security. "When .Mr. Pike took that on." one source. said. "he was shakine the whole tree." Mr. Pike is apparently well aware of this. During the panel's public hearing today, Mr. Pike objected to the past arrangements between, the ex- ecutive branch and Congress. "That's exactly what's wrong, Mr. Lee." he said. "For decades committees of Congress have not done their jobs and you've been loving it. You could come un here and whisper in one friendly Congressman's ear. and NEW YORK TIMES 13 September 1975 C.I.A. AIDES HELD LIABLE FOR CRIMES' WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 (UPI) The Justice Department has ruled that whatever immunity they may have enjoyed in the, past, Central Intelligence Agen- cy employes will henceforth be subject to Federal prosecution for criminal offenses just. as any Federal employe, Senator Charles H. Percy said yesterday. The Illinois Republican said he had received a letter from the Justice Department signed by Assistant Attorney General . Richard L. Thornburg stating: "The Central Intelligence Agency is . now, therefore, un- questionably bound by the same requirements as other executive branch departments and agen- cies with respect to referral of allegations of Title 18, U. S. [criminal] code, on the part of its officers and employes." . Mr. Percy said that the policy statement, approved by Attor- ney General Edward H. Levi, put an end to a recently re- vealed 1954 secret agreement between the C.I.A. and the Jus- tice Department whereby the agency handled investigations into criminal offenses of its own ?employes and their disposition. C.I.A. officials in earlier hear- ings argued that although in- telligence operations were not involved in crimes ranging from theft of Governnient property to embezzlement, the intelligence duties of the offenders mightf have been, compromised in an. open trial. -oOrcf KoPfkgealgrAtfide/108rt C4A6RDP717404,3R14606100 70001-6 5 in the mess we're in:" . ? Approved-ForNISEK Release 2Rtfi9Nthiefk-?9137-00432R000100370001-6 22 September 1975 16 September 1975 INTELLIGENCE: Four Lithe Words ? In the months since its illegal domes- tic operations were first disclosed, the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies have stoicly endured a steady drubbing from Congress and -the press?and for a time last week, it looked like more of the same. The Senate select committee led by Frank Church revealed yet another CIA misdeed: the agency had apparently .violated a direct Presidential order and 'Secretly retained a Stash of lethal poison. The Church committee's counterpart in the House quickly followed suit, releas- ing a top-secret report that found U.S. intelligence . to have been "starkly wrong in reading the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. This time, howev- er, the CIA counterattacked, accusing the House committee of releasing the kind of documents that could endanger the nation's security. ? The controversy over the missing poi- son dated to a 1970 order by Richard Nixonthat all stockpiles of material used in chemical and biological warfare be destroyed.. Despite that, a recent CIA Inventory turned up a small container of cobra venom and eleven grams of saxi- toxina nerve poison extracted from butter clams?reportedly capable of kill- ing 20,000 people. No one was quite sure What the CIA had in mind for the poison, though most agreed it was designed for individual killings (or even -suicide pills for CIA agents themselves) rather than wholesale targets. ? The broader question was whO in the. CIA had deliberately ? disobeyed the ? -President. One former agent hunched -that Nixon had secretly told the CIA to keep the toxins, but agency director William Colby conceded to Church that a violation of Presidential orders had taken place, The likelihood was that some mid-level official had done it on his own. But whether it was a subordinate or the director himself made little differ- ence, according to Church. He said? stricter outside controls were required. ? No War? lithe Senate committee hart scored against the CIA, the agency itself soon .scored against the House Commit- tee. To.prove his claim that -U.S. intelli- gence had failed to predict the 1973 ,Arab-Israeli wareRep. Otis Pike of New LYark released a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document issued, on June 6?hours after the outbreak of hostil- ities?that concluded: "Mobilization of some personnel; increased readiness of :isolated units and greater communica- tions security are all assessed as parts of the exercise routine. . . There are still no military or political indicators of Egyp- tian intentions or preparations to resume' ? hostilities with Israel." Colby charged that publication of four -Words?"and . greater communications '-seturity"e?might have jeopardized U.S. intelligence "sources . and methods," Presumably some inside line on Egyp- tian communication procedures. Pike dismissed that argument as invalid. And he was furious when the White House Sept an assistant attorney general to realaim all classified doctiments?or ex- act a standard pledge that the committee x?,ould not declassify any material with- out executive-branch approval. "That's exactly' what's wrong," stormed Pike. "For decades other committees .of Con- Four Little Words And CIA's Failures Four little words from a classified document, we were told, could endan- ger national security. Gerald Ford, who prides himself on . his even temper, threw something like a fit over them He stamped the presidential foot and said the House Select Committee on Intelligence must forthwith return to him all the classified docuinents he had so generously sent up to them. The four little words, which Were eventually disclosed by the CIA, pro- vided no enlightenment. "And great- er communications security" doesn't sound like a phrase to signal the end of western civilization or even com- plicate the life of an agent in the Balkans. But against Rep. Otis Pike, D-N.Y., the chairman of the committee, the four words were the only stones the President could throw. PIKE IS going after the wrong thing in his investigation. He is not beguiled by assassinations, poison- ings and other reprehensible covert activities. He is going for the agen- cy's throat. He is examining its very reason for being: its performance in intelligence activities. He is compiling a litany of failures in spying, which is what CIA defend- ers say it does best. -Pike has found out that their record has been lamentable: CIA failed to foretell the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the invasion of Cyprus in 1974; the coup in Portugal, the Arab oil embargo, the Indian nuclear explosion and the Tet offensive 1968: The four words that caused the commotion occur in a classified docu- ment which is called "A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report on the Intelli- gence Community's Performance Be- fore time Arab-Israeli War." The agency morosely concludes that agents of both the Defense Intern- gress have not done theirjob, and you've loved it." Not only would the panel retain the contested papers, Pike indicat- ed, but it issued a new subpoena?for Vietnam war documents?returnable this week. That seemed to prefigure a major court test. But Pike, whose committee franchise expires next January, was re- luctant to lose the time in litigation, and the intelligence community seemed fearful of setting a legal precedent for Congressional declassification The li- keliest outcome seemed to be some sort of negotiated settlement in which Con- gress would continue to probe, but more caution-sly, while the White House eon- tinned to provide- the witnesses and documents. ?SANDRA SALMANS with ANTHONY MARRO in Washington 6 gence Agency and the CIA were "simply, obviously starkly wrong." On the morning the Egyptians marched, the Watch Committee was still receiving reassurances from agents warning of nothing more seri- ous than "small-scale action." Last Thursday, in executive ses- sion, the committee members and Mitchell Rogovin, CIA Director Wil- liam E. Colby's counsel, haggled for two hours over release of the spooks' classified failures. Rogovin insisted on the deletion of 13 words, including the fateful four. By vote of 6 to 2, the committee, decided that the Ameri- can people had a right to know about "and greater communication securi- ty," which any alert ham operator could have noted at the time. IN EVERY case; Rogovin insisted that publication would "endanger sources and methods." At the committee's defiance admin- istration panicked. An emergency meeting was held in the office of White House counsel Philip M. Bu- chen. A counterattack was launched'. An assistant attorney general, Rex E. Lee, was chosen to do up to Capi- tol Hill and instruct Otis Pike in his responsibilities. It was a suicide rhission. Pike is not the kind of man who quails at the sight of a representative from the Justice Department or pales at the suggestion that he is violating House rules and the Constitution. Lee bravely spoke of the "necessary accommodation between the execu- tive and the legislative," reproved Pike for a "serious breach in the use of classified information in an improper manner." He urged, in those paragraphs Pike allowed him to complete, "a return to the traditional approach" ? "the same' way that for decades other committees.. . ." Pike landed on him. "That is what is wrong, Mr. Lee," he said, "For decades other committees of Con- gress have not done their job and you have loved it." ADVISING Congress, Pike contin- ued in the same biting tone, has meant that "the executive branch Comes up and whispers in one friend- ly congressman's ear or another friendly congressman's ear, and that :is exactly what you want to continue and this is exactly what I think has led us into the mess we are in." . By concentrating on the supposedly defensible aspect of the intelligence community's activities, Pike poses the greatest threat to CIA's contin- ued existence. He may not endanger "sources and methods." He endan- gers survival. Evil is forgivable on Capitol Hill; incompetence is not. Even the agency does not defend what Frank Church's Senate commit- tee is looking illtD. Colby and compa- ny don't mind those ex-post-facto examinations of the indefensible, and have cooperated, with an occasional show of reluctanee. But when Pike reveals they're, not even doing what they're supposed to do, he's telling CIA's darkest secret.- No wonder four words were used as an excuse to try to close down his dangerous prying. iekpproved '2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-i6 WASHINGTON POST 12 September 1975 rong' g ar net r. By then, Cline testified, "M Washington Post Staff writer staff and I had concluded tha U.S. intelligence experts hostilities probably were im 'were "starkly wrong" abont the imminence of the 1973 war in the Middle East .that led to the Arab oil boycott, .the House intelligence committee disclosed yesterday. .According to portions of a top-secret postmortem subpoe- naed from the Central Intel- ligence Agency, ' there were plenty of danger signals be- fore hostilities broke out on . Oct. 6,1973, but not a single agency in the government's in- telligence Community took -them seriously enough i to produce an official warning. The former director of one of those agencies, the State Department's Bureau of In- telligence and Research, told the committee he felt that the war, and the oil boycott it produced, could have been avoided by diplomatic efforts if the dangers had been recog- nized. Instead, even after the war had started, the so-called Watch Committee, which was set up to advise the National Security Council in, times of crisis; said it could "find no lard evidence of a major, co- . ordinated Egyptian-Syrian of- Tfensive." y before Oct. 6 "failed to turn t up any official statement from - any office or committee re- sponsible for producing fin- ished, .analytical intelligence which contributed anything resembling- a warning" as such. ' ? ? The study found that "in- stead of warnings, the Com- munity's analytical effort in effect produced reassurances . . . that the Arabs would not resort to .war, at least not deliberately." Despite the benefits of hind- sight, the report said there was' no escaping the fact that "the principal conclusions con- minent ' and drew up a draft memo to that effect. He said he asked that Kissinger be 'no- tified "that we had reached this conclusion" but learned later that night that the State Department secretariat and Kissinger's personal staff "did not want to trouble him in New York at that late hour 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening." A phone call to Kissinge might not have made muc difference at that point, Clin said, but at least it would no have been true. as has bee written, that when the secre tary went to bed that night h "was sure . . that ther cerntng the imminence of hos- by Egyptian President Anv ser Sadat. In addition, Cline salt:, under the so-called "detente. treaties, the Soviet Union was obligated to consult with .the United States on threats:: to peace. ? . Rep. Morgan F. Murphi(D- III.) said he the-eight this "a ? pretty dangerous situatiorol', "The bottom line is 4've really got a one-man show'; in foreign policy, Murphy pro- tested. He said he thought some "meddling- in Dr. tKis- singer's activities" was "long overdue." . Cline said Congress shtiiild consider legislation prohibit- - tilities reached ? and reiterated I ing the same person fromehe- e . bv those responsible for in.' ing simultaneously Secretary e telligence analysis were?quite simply, obviously, and stArkly ?wrong." wouldn't be a war." [The State Department last night disputed Cline's testi- mony, saying that Kissinger "had. grown increasingly con- cerned" in the Week preceding the war "that hostilities might break out." A State Depart- ment spokesman said Kissing- er had requested assessments of the situation "every 48 hours" from the CIA and the State Department's intelli- gence bureau that.Cline head- ed. ["During -that period the in- telligence agencies were in ? The mistaken findings and agreement that hostilities were predictions of the Watch Corn- not imminent," the spokesman anittee and other agencies said. All of their reports . . . were made public only after a closed-door committee debate predicted that there would not sprompte.d by , CIA protests. be a war." Other, more 'generalized por- "The spokesman said it was . . tons of the secret postmor- "astounding" that if ...Cline tem were released at a morre? "was in fact concerned about ing meeting. ? - ? the outbreak of war he did not ? .. The hearing also brought a take effective ,action" through . sharp attack on Secretary of available channels' to "assure State Henry. A. Kissinger, that the secretary or other liwhose penchant for secrecy responsible officials were ' was blamed for repeatedly de- warned."] ' .priving intelligence ex.perts ? Censored segments of 'the sif vital information during. "Preliminary Postmortem Re- he Nixon administration. - or of in at the port" ? on. the U.S. intelligence . tf Ray S. Cline, ? former direct- community's performance nrior to the -1973 Arab-Israeli I,State Department, said the i War were read into the public ."passion for secrecy" at the I record at the hearing by Wil- Mixon White House was so in- I liam Parmenter, chief of the tense that "senior intelligence i CIA's Office of Current Intel- officers could not find out I ligence. ? . InoW to assist our policymak- 1 The war broke out on Oct. ibeg process.'' . ' 16, 1973, when Egyptian forces [ He said he grew so discour- I crossed ' into Israeli-occupied [aged and dismayed that by the territory on the East Bank- of ' time of the Middle East crisis,Ithe Suez Canal. Syrian Mall- on the night of Oct. 5, 1973, he I try and armor attack i the decided against bothering Kis- Golan Heights the same day. iiiger, who was in New York, I- According to the study on with the newfound conclusion I the results of American spy- that fighting seemed about to ! work, however, a thorough break out. 'search of the reports issued of State and White Houseead- viser for National Security Af- fairs. Kissinger holds both The study emphasized that posts. Cline maintained That finding by noting that U.S. the only job of the President's experts had been provided NSA adviser should be a 'ort with "a plenitude of informa- of honest broker between the tion which should have sug- secretaries of State and pe- gested, at a minimum that fense, making sure the Presi- dent is getting all the faets. they take very seriously the threat of. war in the near By a vote of 6 to 3, the .COm- term." mittee decided at an executive These signs, Cline testified session yesterday afternoon to under questioning by Rep. release samples of the errone- James P. (Jim) Johnson (R- ous intelligence assessments Colo.), included Egyptian after Chairman Otis G. Pike troop movements, cancellation (D-N.Y.) complained about the of military leaves, imposition top-secret label the CIA and of tight recurity by the Egyp- other agencies wanted to keep tians, and on Oct. 4, 1973, the on them. evacuation of dependents of The CIA's Parmenter Soviet advisers from Egypt claimed that disclosure of and Syria. these mistaken predictions Emphasizing tim e Soviet could compromise "intelli- withdrawal, Cline said the Rus- gence sources and* methods," sians were given advance warn- but Pike said he found ,that ing of the attack into the Sinai incredible. NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 16 September 1975 --FOUR LITTLE -WORDS- -have provoked a serious clash between, the White Houser and the -House Intelligence Committee -over the .use of top-secret documents furnished to the panel. ? - President Ford is demanding the return of: all' the data because Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) incorporated one short passage blue-penciled by the Central Intelligence- - Agency in a report devoted to., establishing that U.S. intelligence failed to predict the Yom Kippurwar. 'In" defending the panel's -action, Pike, is on shaky, ground. Words which ? appear innocent enough to lay- men's eyes may convey considerable meaning and provide valuable information to-the operatives of another. country. . As a: matter of fact, we can see .no purpose in releas- ing verbatim excerpts from intelligence documents at all. ? The .reports ? could easily.: be paraphrased without. losing their essential -flavor. Or; as in the instant case; ? Without altering the conclusion that .:-the ? CIA. misinter- preted the signs of impending conflict in the Middle East in..1973., Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4ROP77-00432R000100370001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 LOS ANGELES TIMES 14 September 1975 ^, CIA Probe Help Help Sen. Church Enter \ 176 Race BY ROBERT L. JACKSON Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON?When 'open Sen- ate hearings on the Central Intel- ligence Agency start Tuesday,. the country may get to know a lot more 'about a boyish-looking liberal Demo-. crat named FrankChurch. ? Church. who was the nation's youngest senator when Idaho first elected him at age 32 in 1956, has more than enough work these days. e Aside from being chairman of the. Senate's long investigation into the CIA and other intelligence-gathering agencies, he is chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee that is prob- ing evidence of international bribery and payment of illegal U.S. campaign: contributions by some major defense contractors and oil companies. - . Church had begun quietly to orga- nize a drive for the Democratic pres- idential nomination last January. His sub sequent appointment to head the Senate's special committee on .intel- ligence activities forced him to call off those plans?at least temporarily. Some believe the CIA hearings and their wide televison exposure will boost him to national prominence. If -that should happen, he may rekindle ? his presidential campaign, when the panel's work concludes by next spring. ? The committee's seven-month in- vestigation so far has been conducted in closed hearings. When he finally was ready to go public, Church tried to give the coming hearings a big buildup. The effort failed. Church coyly told reporters that the first day or two would deal with "a very important subject. that has not yet come to light." But word be- an to leak out from Administration sources that he was referring to the CIA's retention of bacterial poisons, and Church was forced to provide de- :tails. 'Subsequent hearings will deal with alleged abuses . against U.S. citizens by the CIA, the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other intelligence agencies. The committee's findings on the CIA's alleged involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders will be made public in j a report. Church is not, known as a tough-skinned, hard-nosed in- vestigator. On the contrary, during his 18 years ,in the Senateehe has been regarded by some, as a bit soft, some- -"what erudite and more eager for compromise than con-. , frontation. He is cautious and deliberate. ,When he 'speaks, he t knows how his sentences will end... In briefing reporters after dozens of closed hearings by his CIA committee, Church has been precise in his remarks, yet reluctant to give sensitive de:tails. - His patience has paid off in obtaining CIA records. Al- though the White House and CIA at first resisted giving. IChurch the top-secret material he wanted, Church spent weeks working out a careful agreement for handling dif- feient files. "We think We have it all, he said, referring to records I that deal with the CIA's alleged involvement in foreign lassassination plots. In an interview, he acknowledged that there 'were gaps in the written record but said that this I was "not because anything was withheld but because the evidence simply doesn't exist in some cases." No date has been set for release of the assassination re- port. ? I "It's like writing 'War and Peace,'" Church said, refer- ring to the length of the report. "We have reviewed a vast number of documents, including National Security. .Council files, and have taken 8,000 pages of testimony i from over 100 witnesses." ? As to why the committee felt it necessary to disclose , any CIA involvement in assassination plots, Church said: . "It's an aberration, really, from the traditional American i practice in the world and our historic principles. It fell to i us to do this job because the Rockefeller commission 'would not treat it." This was a reference to the Commis- sion on CIA Activities Within the United States, a group headed by Vice President Rockefeller. Church said the report would address such questions as '!'how did it happen and who ordered it." ? 1 "Some of the conclusions we reach will have general ap- plication to the rest of the CIA investigation," he added. ? "They will deal with the command and control of the CIA" Church said in July that the panel had found no direct involvement by former Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower .and John F. Kennedy or former Atty. Gen. Robert F: Kennedy in plotting foreign assassinations. Some Republi- cans on the committee have said there is no direct :evidence to clear these officials, either. Lacking presidential direction, the CIA "may have been ' .behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage," Church suggested at that time. It was Church's early interest in foreign affairs and in questionable CIA activities in Chile that resulted in his seeking?and obtaining?the chairmanship of, this corn-I mittee. Senate Majority Leader.Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) appointed him to the job last January. Following 1972 disclosures of close ties between the 'government and the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., Church?as a member of the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee?investigated links between ITT and CIA in Chile. He did so as chairman of the subcommittee on multinational corporations, the same panel that now is investigating international payoffs by large companies. The* subcommittee?acting on evidence obtained by syndicated columnist Jack Anderean?found that MI' had . offered the CIA $1 million to prevent Marxist SalVador .Allende from gaining power in Chile. ITT had large hold- ings 'in that country. "CIA turned down the money but proceeded on its own to do the work," Church said. His subcommittee was the first to obtain testimony from a CIA agent about foreign covert operations. Church believes "a very pervasive sickness" is afflicting the United States. Among the symptoms, he said, is "con- tempt for the law" by some large corporations and- . government agencies alike. , "Big corporations ama showing contempt for the law with payoffs and bribery abroad and illegal campaign contributions at home as though regard for the law were of no concern in the board rooms," he said. Federal agencies such as the CIA, FBI and Internal Revenue Service, he said, have violated- the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens by illegal wiretaps, burglaries or surveillances. "These are the very agencies that are charged- with upholding and obeying the laws," Church said, ? Church's introduction to ethical and political questions came early. His father, the late Frank Forrester Church Sr., a political conservative who owned a sporting goods business in Boise, insisted that his son debate him on ma- jor issues of the day. "My father was deeply intereSted in politics bur he mis- trusted all politicians," Church said. "He hated (President Franklin Delano) Roosevelt with a vengeance." Young Church, a mamber of the junior high school de- bating team, made frequent. trips to the library to investi- 8 Approved Por Release- 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 Approved For Release 2001/68/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 "gate his father's statements. ? ? "I found that the other side was much more persuasive,"' he he said. "I began, to like the Democratic Party." His love for public speaking led him to enter?and win ?an American Legion national oratory contest at age 16. Critics say Church has never outgrown a foundness for the sound of his own Voice. He loves to declaim?some times even when briefing reporters on the CIA commit- tee's business. . One -speech he would like to forget, however, was his nationally televised keynote address to the 1960 Demo-- cratic National Convention?a flowery, podium-pounding oration that Church acknowledges was dreadful. "I didn't know any better," he smiles. Church's inner toughness, his friends say, was demon- strated in his little-known bOut with cancer while he was: a law student, first at, Harvard and later at Stanford, in :the late 1940s. What began as a severe pain the lower back was diag- nosed as cancer of the stomach and groin. Doctors per- formed radical surgery but told Church they could not re- move all the affected areas.,They said the 23-year-old stu- dent had only months to live. ? But a, radiologist at Stanford, in a routine review, of Church's file, decided his cancer might be receptive to X- -ray therapy:- He prescribed a treatment that would be agonizing. Church was told he would be taken "literally to the edge of death" by daily radiation treatments that' would turn his skin purple while killing the malignancy.. For several weeks he suffered severe nausea every, day after each treatment A six-footer, he went down to a ske- letal 80 pounds. -In this crisis, as in his public career, Church says he could not have made it without his wife, Bethine, his high school sweetheart whom he married in 1947. When they 'met, Bethine's father, the late Chase A. Clark, was gover- nor. of Idaho. Friends say the politically astute Mrs. Church is one of the senator's most influential advisers. ? . Church's voting record in the Senate has placed him in the liberal bloc on almost every issue except gun control. There, reflecting home-state interests,. he has fought gun legislation on grounds it would serve only "to harass sportsmen and other law-abiding citizens." Church's opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which he first expressed in a Senate speech in 1965, re- sulted largely from his service on the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee. "When I first came to the Senate I was pretty rhuch a knee-jerk liberal," he said. "It was considered unpatriotic , to oppose U.S. foreign policy. We all accepted the slogan, THE WASHINGTON STAR 12 September 1975 COM men tary James 3. Kilpatrick (WTOP TV and Radio): "A word Of encouragement is in order for. the House Ethics Committee in the matter of Michael Harrington, a congressman from Massachusetts. There had been some apprehension that the committee would quietly c, sweep the Harrington affair under the nearest riy Now it appears that on Sept. 17, after a procedur led in the complaint: against Mr. Harringtonita.S.:aleen corrected, the committee will get down to serious deliberation. The facts are not in much dispute. Last . year Mr. Harrington wanted to look at some secret ,testimony in the files of the Armed Services Commit- tee, having to do with CIA activities in Child. The com- mittee rules permit members to read such transcripts, provided they agree not to divulge the contents in any, way whatever. . . . By his own unapalogetic asser- tion, he immediately went out and dishonored the . rules. Since then,.Mr. Harrington has sought to justify his willful breach of House rules by denouncing the CIA's conduct in Chile. But the issue before the Ethics Committee is not the conduct of the CIA in Santiago, but the conduct of Mr. Harrington in Washington." 'Politics ends at the water's edge.' ? ? - "But my education began after I was appointed to the Foreign Relations Committee two years later." . Church said he was shocked to learn that "we were giv- ing $350 million, a year to rich Western European coun- tries. It was the old Uncle Sucker business." - ? ? - "I began to look more critically at military aid and other aid programs?how we often wound up arming both sides in a conflict and getting blamed by both," he said. Church recalled the early 1960s, when the United-States chiefly assisted the South Vietnamese with American ad- visers and limited aid. "I went along with it, believing that we were assisting. the Diem government to prevent the Communists from taking over," he said. But Church said he became "increasingly cynical when we began sending in our own people in large numbers." . In February, 1965, he broke with the Johnson adminis- tration in a speech that called for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. A furious President Lyndon B. Johnson zeroed in on Church's remark that. he (Church) agreed with columnist Walter Lippmann on Vietnam. Johnson told reporters he had advised Church: "The next time you want a dam in 'Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it." Church said that Mr. Johnson had never told him this, "but he probably wished that he had said it." Continuing his opposition to U.S. involvement in South- east Asia, Church was coauthor with former Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) in 1970 of the landmark legisla- tion that came to be known as the Cooper-Church amend- ment. It prohibited the use of funds for introducing com- bat troops into Cambodia and Laos. The first statutory limit of its type ever imposed by _ Congress, the Cooper-Church legislation was followed by. additional restrictions on the President's war-making pow- ers in 1971 and 1973. Church's familiarity with foreign affairs has undoubted- ly been an asset in his CIA investigation. Aside from in- vestigating U.S. links to the murders of foreign leaders, his committee has sought documents and testimony about CIA covert operations abroad. Activities abroad, however, are not likely to be dis- ? closed in the public hearings. Church and other committee members have said they do not want to impair the effec- tiveness of the CIA but only to show where reforms and improvements are needed. ? Whether Church decides to seek his p4ty's nomination for President will largely depend on ho*, well the com- mittee does its work and how the public 'perceives its ef- forts. "This investigatior.," Church says, "could be a minefield." PUBLISHERS WEEKLY 11 August 1975 A promotion campaign "in exile" has been scheduled for author Philip Agee, whose controversial "Inside the Compa- ny: CIA Diary" ($9.95) was published by Stonehill August 8. Fearing possible gov- ernment prosecution of Agee, Stonehill substituted a series of interviews, talk shows and other programs by phone from Windsor and Toronto, Canada, in- stead of the major 20-city tour previously planned for him. Agee is currently being heard in all the planned 20 cities on both radio and TV. Meanwhile, his book sold two printings of 50,000 copies before publication and now has an additional 50,000 on order, for a total of 100,000 in print. "Inside the Company: CIA Diary" is a full selection of the Saturday Review Book Club and the Library of Political and International Affairs Book Club, be- sides being used by 11 Macmillan book . clubs. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 9 Approved For Release 2001/08/0 WASHINGTON POST 19 September 1975 False in 8 Tet S By George- Washington P 'A former Central Intelli- gence Agency analyst charged yesterday that the Commu- nists' 1963 Tet offensive in South Vietnam caught 'U.S. of- ficials by ? surprise because en- emy .strength had been "deliberately downgraded" to mislead the American public.' "Although our aim was to fool the American press, the public and the Congress, we in intelligence succeeded best in fooling 'ourselves," former CIA intelligence expert Samuel A. Adams told the House intelli- gence committee. Backing up some of his charges with what he de- scribed as notes based on still secret documents, Adams said the distortions were con- doned by- a number of high- ranking officials, including former U.S. Ambassador to Vi- etnam Ellsworth Bunker, for- mer White House national se- curity adviser Walt- W. Ros- tow, former CIA Director Richard Helms, a n.d Gens. Creighton W. Abrams, Earle 0. Wheeler and William C. Westmoreland. He said they were among these "who knew there was an attempt going on-to fool the press" and thus the American public. Still battling with the White House over secret government documents relevant to its in- vestigations, the committee went ahead With yesterday's hearing as part of an effort to make the impasse as painful a.s possible for the Ford ad- ministration. ? -They're going to be aw- fully sorry before we're :done," predicted a committee 'source. "Debating an empty I - chair can be very effective," said another. "That's what we're doing." Angered by the committee's insistence' on the right to , declassify secret documents, President Ford last week de- manded the, return of all clas- sified papers that House in- vestigators have obtained so far and vowed to produce no morn government witnesses at- records unless the committee changes its position. Chairmen Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) said yesterday he was confi- dent of winning ?a court fight on the issue and added that it would have to start "relatively soon" if the committee should choose that course. But. he seemed content for the. mo- ment to rely on the pressure of public hearings. The committee's ranking Re- publican, Re-p. Robert McClory lame r rise Lardner Jr. not Staff WrIter (Ill.), was reluctant to continue yesterday's session in public after Adams .started reeount- ing the contents of various "Secret. Eyes Only" cables, but the committee voted 6 to 3 against going into executive' session. "I don't think anything the witness has revealed or is go- ing to reveal is going to jeop- ardize our operations in Viet- nam," Pike said caustically. . Chief analyst! on the Viet- cong for' seven of his 10 years . with the CIA, Adams has been highly critical of the agency' since he resigned in 1973, espe- cially over his unsuccessful ef- forts to persuade the U.S. in- telligence &immunity- to ac- cept more realistic estimates of enemy troop strength. Unlike other U. S. intelli- gence foulups, Adams said, the, astonishment over the thassiv'e nature of the Tet of- fensive "stemmed in large , meaSure from corruption in the intelligence process." U. S. military officials were so un- prepared, he said, that in the days following Tet, some 1,200 American aircraft in Vietnam were destroyed or damaged, mostly by shrapnel from artil- lery shells. The trouble, Adams said,. was that "American intelli- gence had so denigrated the :Vietcong's capabilities that we simply could not have pre- dicted the size of the Tet at- tack." - As the CIA's only full-time Vietcong analyst in 1966, Ad- ams pointed out however, that he came across documents in- ? dicating that the strength of the Communist forces in Viet- nam?then officially estimated at just under 300,000?was ac- tually twice that, or close to 600,000. By mid-1967, he said, the evidence of a much bigger enemy army was so massive that the CIA agreed with him.. Gen. Westmoreland's com- mand, however, began lobby- ing to keep the estimate below 300,000. Adams charged, be- cause it feared public reaction to higher numbers. To back up his assertions, Adams cited portions of a "Secret, Eyes Only" cable from Gen. Abrams in Saigon to Gen. Wheeler, then head of I the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on !Aug. 20, 1967. Adams said it 'frowned on ? higher troop strength estimates as "in sharp contrast to the current overall strength figure of about 299,000 ' given to the 8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 19 September 1975 . press here." ? .7 -? ? ...IV Gen. Abrams, the witness said, then suggested dropping: two categories of Vietcong i from the strength estimate. I "We have been projecting an! image of success over the ye- cent months," Abrams report- ' edly declared, adding that if the higher numbers were to , become public, "all those who have an incorrect view of the - war 'will be reinforced and the task will be more difficult." After a conference with CIA. , officials, Adams said, West- moreland's -. public relations , staff prepared a "blatantly: misleading" draft briefing for 1 .the press which was circulated among officials in Washingtonl and Saigon for comment. , Ambassador Bunker voiced his views ? on the proposed briefing with a "Secret, Eyes Only" cable to White House adviser Rostow, Adams added. He said the Bunker cable stated that telling the press that certain categories of VC !troops had been droppd from? the new enemy est im ate "seems .to me simply to invite trouble. We may end up with stories that enemy strength is !greater rather than less." -1 The press - briefings began in 1Saigon in ? November and re- porters were told that enemy strength had actually declined ! to 242,000 because of, heavyd casualties and plummeting mor-1 ? ale. Chairman Pike said hej found Adams' testimony "absolutely devastating." 'We rely on our intelligence to provide us with objective .data," Pike said. "In this case, it seems to me that political . decisions were made after which intelligence was shaped to fit the 'political decisions." I .. -.Adams also told -of a 1969 study he did with a colleague that concluded there were 30,- 000 Vietcong planted 'in the South Vietnamese government and army. By .contrast, Adams said, he knew of only one spy the United States had among the Vietcong 'before the Tet offensive. On one occasion, he said, the spy came up with what amounted to the plan for the, ITet offensive in Danang.- The information was turned over to the CIA station in Sal-' gon?which did not bother. for-, warding it to Washington? and to the Marines, who "did, pay attention," Adams said They deployed their forces so raeit that they decimated the Vietcong who attacked Dan- , ng. Among the victims was the secret agent, Adams said. "We were back down to zero after Tet," Adams said. "The. . score was 30,000 to zero." . 10 FALSE TROOP DATA IN VIETNAM CITED Ex-C.I.A. Man Quotes Secret ?apers to Show Deliberate Underrating of Vietcong By JOHN M. CREVVDSON Special to The New York Times , WASHINGTON, Sept. I8?A former Vietnam specialist for the Central Intelligence Agency today quoted to a House com- mittee from what he said were previously undisclosed military. and diplomatic cablegrams sup- porting his previous assertions of a deliberate effort to under- value the strength of Commu- nist forces in South Vietnam. Samuel A. Adams, who served for seven years, as the principal C.I.A. analyst studying the insurgents, told the com- mittee that the surprise of the Vietcong's 1968 Tel offensive had resulted largely from un- derrating the Communists' strength by as much as one- half. Mr. Adams resigned from the -C.I.A. in 1973, impugning its honesty in connection with underestimates of the size of! the insurgency. As a witness for the defense at the ePnta- gon papers trial in that year, Mr. Adams said there had been "political pressures in the mili- tary to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was." He made the same point in last May's issue of Harper's maga- zine. As evidence of his assertions, Mr. Adams included in today's testimony parts of two secret cablegrams transmitted from Saigon to Washington in the fall of 1967. He did not display copies of the documents. The first, he said, was a "secret eyes only" message sent Aug. 20 from the late Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., then the denuty American military commander in Vietnam, to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By that time, Mr. Adams told members of the Select Commit- tee in Intelligence of the House of Representatives, thre was documentary evidence that Communist strength was nearly 600,000 troops. Gneral 'Abrams's message said the ,newly found higher numbers were "in sharp con- trast to the current over-all strength figure of about 299,- 000 given to the presS here," Mr. Adams said. General Abrams "thereupon suggested dropping two eaten gories of VC from the strength estimated in order to keep it at its old level," Mr. Adams said. ."The main reason for this, he indicated, was 'press re- action,'" Mr. Adams added. Representative Otis G. Pike, the Long Island Democrat who heads the select intelligence committee, asked Mr. Adams whether a "fair ca iracteriza- lion" of his testimuny would ? Appr-FaVO-FiSFRelea-ge 2001/08/OW : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001:6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 support the inference that "in- telligence was shaped to fit de- cisions that had already been -made." "Yes, Sir," Mr. Adams ? replied softly. General Abrams's position was supported, Mr. Abrams said, by Ellsworth Bunker, then the ambassador to South Vietnam. Mr. Bunker suggested in a cablegram on Oct. 28 to Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's national security adviser, that no public mention be made of the dropping of the two cate- gories of Vietcong forces from the strength figures. "Given the overriding need to demonstrate progress in grinding down the enemy," Mr. Adams quoted Ambassador Bunker as having said, "it is essential that we do not drag too many red herrings across the trail." To make such a disclosure, the Bunker message cautioned, "seems to me simply to invite trouble. "We may end up with stories that enemy strength is greater rather than less," the ambas- sador added:-"Far better in our view is to deal with the matter orally if it arises [in hones of] forestalling many confusing and undesirable questions." , Two weeks later, Mr. Adams noted, the military told the press at a briefing in Saigon that Communist strength had actually declined to 242,000, "due to heavy casualties and plummeting morale." The Tet offensive of 1968 is one of four international crises that the Pike committee has chosen as models for its cur- rent inquiry into whether intel- lengence agencies, and princi- pally the C.I.A., were providing sufficient forewarnings to pol- icy-makers. The intelligence panel last week subpoenaed a number of secret intelligence documents dealing with official foreknowl- edge of the Tet offensive, the 1973 Middle East war, and last year's invasion of Cyprus by Turkey? all of which caught the United States off guard to some extent. After the committee made public over the C.I.A.'s objec- tions a single phrase from an intelligence summary dealing with the Arab build-up in the 1973 war, President Ford or- dered that the committee's ac- cess to further secret documents be halted. The matter is now at an impasse. The committee's- decision to go ahead with the testimony of Mr. Adams is being interpreted as an effort by Mr. Pike to dem- onstrate to the White 'House that his investigation will con- tinue with or without its assist- ance, and to put pressure on the President to provide docu- ments and witnesses to report critics of the intelligence agen- cies., Thil-nd?a;,'Se;'teinI;er 11., 1975 Crosby S. Noyes- We have tied the hands of inte ence agencies In the frenzy of Introspec- tion that always follows an attempt to kill a president, the Secret Service and the intelligence agencies in general are coming in for a good deal of predictable criticism. It is outrageous, we are -told, that a known follower - of Charles Manson was al- ? lowed to get within a couple feet of Gerald Ford. In the same way, the Warren ? Commission had some ? harsh things to say about federal agencies which had "no rundown on dangerous characters in the Dallas area in November, 1963. Well, considering the ? unmerciful beating that all the federal intelligence agencies have been subject- ed to of late, what happened was not too surprising. Domestic surveillance of dangerous characters is equated to "gestapo tac- tics" by a large part of the population. We have creat- .ed a climate in this country today in which it is a won- der that the intelligence services continue to func- tion at all. We must at least be honest with ourselves. No doubt, as Governor Brown says, there are a lot of crazy people in the country. But there are no more than the normal number. And if the danger to presidents and other prominent lead- ers seems greater than it has been in the past, we all undoubtedly deserve a share of the blame. Including, of course, the President himself. Gerald Ford has made haste to as- sure us that what happened in Sacramento "under no circumstances will prevent me from contacting the American people as I travel from one state and com- munity to another." Ford, of course, is doing no more than his predecessors have done, but with a good deal less reason. The day when a president had to expose himself to potential assas-. sins in order to contact' the people is long gone, but the tradition is more powerful than the dictates of common sense. So presidential mingling will continue, even if it is the mOst dangerously fatu- ous way that any president can spend his time. To stop exposing himself to assas- sins would be to capitulate to the threat of violence. And since that would be bad for the macho image, presi- dents and other political fig- ures presumably will keep on capitulating to violence the hard way, and the na- tion will suffer the conse- quences. It May be that the Secret Service will be able to fig- ure out more foolproof methods of protecting their man in the future and may even have a certain sanc- tion for the time being for stepping up the surveillance of the more obvious threats. But what about potential - threats to the security of the nation itself? Why at- tach such enormous impor- tance to the protection of the person of a president, when the protection of the. institutions he represents is considered a form of fas- cism by so many? Thanks to Vietnam and Watergate, we live in a time that glorifies the virtues of dissension and rebellion against authority that en- courages cjvil disobedience by groups or individuals and sometimes condones violence in a "good cause." Thanks also to Vietnam and Watergate, we live in a time in which all of the evils of the government and the society all of the frustra- tions and anger of the citi- zenry are focused on the political leaders, and espe- cially on the president. To be sure, it is one thing to preach that the system is rotten and should be de- stroyed, another to try to kill a president. But unfor- tunately, there is a perva- sive tendency among some people to make the two propositions virtually syn- onymous. Charles Manson was a product of this climate Ly- nette Fromme is a product of this climate As they say. it's just something you have to live with. THE NATIONAL REVIEW 29 August 1975 Li The CIA should have no trouble fill Ing vacancies left by disenchanted ems ployees. A spokesman for the organiza- tion says job applications tripled, in Jan 'try and have been increasing since. Lieutenant General Vernon Wal- ters, deputy director, of the CIA, re- cently told American Security Coun- cil in Washington that the U.S. was in "a tougher power situation than it has been since Valley Forge." For the first time in the nation's history, a for- eign country has the "power to destroy or seriously cripple the United States." . . . In a similar vein, Peter Deriabin, a KGB officer who defected to this country, says: "What is going on in this country is the destruction of the CIA. This is what the KGB and the GRU [Soviet Military Intelligence) have Approved For Release 2001/08/GlinteClikt-RDIUM042i2iROM Mg_0001-6 lished." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 DAILY TELEGRAPH) London 6 September 1975 _THE recent brouhaha about? ' the CIA long since reached ::the point where --:any- absurck ity could be alleged, and-, :even- believed, by - some 'people. Perhaps the view ? advanced, on- a similar occa- sion, by the official organ. of ?a . ruling Communist party -might be taken?even by the ? most purblind of the Left?as -.-narrying some -authority.- After ?Tfoting. the spread bf ? nenumours. that the C IA was re- sponsible far fires, strikes. fights and high level political plots, it . concluded: "When the sources and objectives of this kind of .` confidential ' information are Studied more closely, and when we analyse. them. more thor- oughly, it will not be difficult for us to find that-the 'CIA obsession' is being spread and encouraged in our country by" - [various enemies of the State and in particular the. "bureau- cratic" (i.e. pro-Soviet) forces]. ?"It is easy enough to. identify them and..see their intentions. Jt is perfectly well known from which circles, from which sides they stem." added Borba (Octo- ber 31, 1967) in the name of the Yugoslav Communist leadership. Cui bona? is, as Borba im- plies, a good question to ask in these circumstances; and the natural answer is alSo supported by evidence,. The KG B " information" department has been hard at work in all parts of the world: that great pur- veyor of d?nte, the Soviet Press, even lifted ? stories,- so planted, that the C IA had organised the assassination of King Faisal. In America, as President Ford lately pointed out, the campaign ? against the CIA has begun to reach the stage in which the United St-ate, alone among the Powers. is largely deprived of one or its most essential -agencies. As is customary in America, any sort of allegation - can be and is thrown about in the Press, leaked by. alleged "authorit-ative" sources, in an atmosphere in which it is impos- sible for the Ci A to work. The original attacks on it, based on tevidence which bore some rela- ttion to fact, were not very impressive. ? But when it was found that the American people still thought it all right to have a -.Secret intelligence service, all sorts of new knaveries were produced: up to and including a vast array of assassination plots, none of which ever pro- duced any aSsassinations. Similarly when it was re- vealed that the CIA had inter- vened in Chile, going to the terrible lengths of providing _ak for ru ours By ROBERT CONQUEST- - while the Communist embassies "it was- disclosed yesterday" were restricting themselves to that the CI A had, in the 1950s arming and training para-mil-i- Fsrael technological sup- tary bands. There was a great port to -help her manufacture. uproar. When it appeared that atomic bombs. That this was vile_ 110 one had been much impres- journalism emerged in the next sed, a whale new set of charges sentence. It had not been "dis- closed" at all,. it. had been aliened by an odd American. journalist writing in Penthouse. Moreover, even he had not in- - chided the suggestio f nisi pro- vided in the headlines and opening paragraph, that it was a CI A ? on the conc tnary, alleging merely that the Eisenhower Administration had so decided, a-nd had charged then CIA with the task. so bad as not to need substan- tiation were added. This appears, as Borba 'noted., to be norm-al anti-,C I A practice. cl'n this country, too, we have -seen something of an attempt to foment the hysteria com- plained of by Borba. Unsubstan- tiated, and indeed in many cases simply false, stories have crept into the lower reaches of the Press. There are officers of the American Armed Forces ? in London in connection with our Joint military defence, and the. failure of the alliance 'to neg- lect similar liaison on intelli- gence matters has been repre- sented as a terrible offence.- - One officer so engaged was denounced as a prominent ? " dirty tricks" figure: these "dirty" tricks turned out to have been the American secret sponsorship, in the post-war years when vast Russian funds were being poured into attempts to take over the student arg,a-ni- sal:dons and into mas.sine pro- paganda exercises, of non-totali- tarian students and independent intellectual magazines. Attacks on the CIA on such -silly grounds have not had much effect in this country except on professional anti- Americans,' often American themselves. It will be remembered tha-nfive or ten years ago, it emerged that Encounter had been so funded. The then screams of outrage. however, fell largely on deaf ears.- Even the Guardian re- marked -that if the CIA had supported such an independent magazine, so much the better for the CIA. Even Marxist and other socially ern-agt! con- tributors rallied strongly to Encounter's defence, as having always given the fairest forum. In the end, a tiny group of, zealots were 'shown to be the only ones to have . been impressed by the revelations. ? The present campaign, one imagines, will similarly founder on the residual sanity of the British. But it still drags on. A recent egregious example was a front page piece in the n171e; funds for opposition newspapers ,(August 21, 19(3) asserting that 12 Needless to say the Penihovse article according to the Times; went on to "disclose" (once more) many alleged CIA assassination plans?none of which, of course, had led to any action. The interesting paint, however, is that it revived an old canard about an attempt to assassinate Sukarno in the early .'60s, a story long since known to - h-ave been based on a K GM, "disinformatian" forgery car- ried out through the Csechoslo-" yak secret agencies. Since the.: Czech - expert .responsible defected a few years later, the matter is known in considerable detail. And so .it goes. Perhaps- I should say at this point that I t myself have never worked fain or been paid by the ?C I A.or any ' other intelligence organisation, and rnaq: Annssne who suggested otherwise would find themselves facing a cracking suit for darn- - ages. Why? you may ask. if I regard the CIA as a reputable, desirable and necessary organi- sation? Because it would be a falsehood told with malicious in-, tent. I did ance think, indeed, just to annoy. of starting a maga- . zine to be called Culture. Intel- lect. Art. Which reminds me that the C I A's rival on the world scene continues to oper- ate on a vast scale in this coun-. try as everywhere else, and that - one understands that there is considerable speculation at. Westminster, in connection with recent. proposals (in the interests, of " streamlining "). to an-taiga.' mate the Orders of the Garter, and the .Bath. as -to the name ? of tile first Knight of the. com- bined orders. and so openly en- titled to KGB. Approved For Release ?2-id I itigiti8': tiA4cii577-0043IRO0tit00370001 L6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.37000t-6 _ DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 6 September 1975 THE CONSPIRATORS ? ONE OF. THE sure.- signs of unbalanced judgment is an over-ready-belief some . conspiracy theory of history. Some people still, probably. think that whatever happens in.the world is.,ordained,,bylews. or Wall Street financiers oriFreemasoris or the Iike. But-they have recently been outnumbered bythose.w.hoare convinced that not a sparrow falls but it is the work of the American Central Intelligence Agency?the-:CI.A.- It iS 'probably useless to invite such people to-read .:ROBERT.-:.CONQUEST'S brilliant analysis of their condition on page 10.. Such delusions are normally based on inner disturbance which reason and ridicule are alike powerless to cure. WASHINGTON POST 18 September 1975 Kenneth Rabin:' ?. ? . Oddly enough, there is one 'country above all' 'whic the most reasonable people may be forced, however r luctantl3r, to acknowledge the power of conspiracy. Th country is not America with its C I A, but Russia with i K G B. Anyone who has read. KATKOV'S' " 1917 " TIBOR SZAMUFLY'S RussianL. Tradition "? will know the conspiratorial atmosphere in' which in Tsarist Russi the revolutionaries and the secret police alike operate Th.e heirs . of these conspirators: now. rule :Russia, and a still conspiring. No, this is not to., say that they ordai allthings7,--bn the contrary. But one thing they have me successfully achieved; This is to leave America more or le bereft -of an intelligence service of any kind while the own,--infinitely-mare-ruthlessr proliferates everywhere- Propaganda, American- tyle As one who served briefly in USIA s: - and now teaches ptiblic relations, I' was prone to linger over James Mich- ener's report on the Stanton Commis- sion (Post, June 21, 1975). The commis- sion's conclusions about American information policy abroad ("Political' officers back to State. Voice of Amer- ica set free A new agency-for cul- tural affairs, autonomous but report- ing to the Secretary of State.") are generally sane, striving towards the Mr. Rabin is an assistant professor of public relations at The American University. separation of powers seen in the Brit- ish Information Service, which is em- bassy based; the British Council, an autonomous cultural agency; and the -external service of BBC. But neither Michener's own rationale nor any prior reports of the comi-nission's work got to the core of the problem, the need for a clear governmental commitment to a distinctively American propaganda style in foreign affairs. Viewed from such a perspective, what's going on with USIA, our overt propaganda agency, is really a mirror on what's been going on recently ? vis-a-vis USIA's dark twin, the former "U.S. Bureau of Roads." . Both USIA and CIA, it should be remembered, sprang from highly suc- cessful American psychological opera- tions in World War 11?OW! and OSS, the purveyors of what one scholar called "white" and "black" propagan- da, respectively. Both agencies were charged with their current general responsibilities during the Cold War era. And, for reasons that are not en- tirely unrelated, both strayed far from the mark and are now being tinkered with. Tinkering, in this case, may not be enough. ' We must begin, I suspect, by eon-- fronting the bald truth that the idea of propaganda is felt to be somehow un.American; thus, the word is never used in public dialogue about the American government's overt or covert attempts at manipulating public opin- ion either overseas or a 3243731161/WelFor ener, for example, makes no mention of propaganda in his discussion of the proposed USIA reforms. How can we make recommendations for something whose name we refuse to utter? Since the word is used here, a defi- nition _should be attempted: Culling from the thoughts of Lippman, Lass- well, Dooh, Choukas, and Ellul, let us agree for now that propaganda is the persuasive communication com- mon to a technological or mass society and aimed by one interest in that society at various internal and exter- nal audiences to gain either passive or active compliance with the origina- tor's point of view. "White" propaganda, it follows, can be described as overt in varying de- grees. And because it is overt, it is -likely that it contains a higher degree of truth, or at least can be perceived for what it is'?distinctions that should make it more valued in a contemporary democracy. The varying degrees of overtness are encompassed by what Leonard Doob called revealed, partially-revealed and delayed-revealed propaganda. The first is the propaganda that is attrib- uted from the start?a USIA film, an institutional advertisement from an oil company. The second is the propa- ganda that is revealed to some people more completely than others ? the standard press release that a journalist corroborates but then rewrites in a standard news story for tile general public. The last is anoll..:r word for the teaser ad that promotes something over time, revealing nnste information on a step-by-step hs is The point is, it's propaganda and there's nothil as, un-American about it.. "Black" propaganda, on the other hand, is fully concealed, totally covert and attributed incorrectly, if at all. A recent example was the disclosure (Post. July 3. 1975) of "Forum World Features Ltd." as a CIA-financed press service whose cover had been com- promised. This is the propaganda we were taught to be wary of on the eve of World War IT, propaganda de- signed for use against one's enemy in .mortal combat, propaganda which has given the whole craft a tainted image and caused the need for endless eu- phemisrns?information offices, public RegkVe266I/081/08c:rdWiRDP-PP01043AR066111,68188181t119 Murrow era was the The linguistic mutations underscore the difficulty: America is compelled to propagandize but all propaganda has come to leave a bad taste in our collective mouth. Who will tell Ameri- ca's story? Can we successfully limit ' the use of "black" propaganda to sit- uations where there might be an ab- solute threat to world peace? The Stanton Commission is not the first to avoid these questions. ; Congress, itself rather opposed to propaganda, has dealt with both USIA and CIA in consistently unrealistic ways. In the case of CIA, no questions ?were asked and "black" propaganda multiplied. In the case of USIA, the wrong questions were asked and "white" propaganda was handcuffed. This occurred because all propa- ganda?"white" or "black"? is fraught with the risk of embarrassing failures. Since CIA's activities were never questioned on the Hill, its failures and excesses were left to rot in moun- tains of classified files. Since USIA's activities were constantly questioned by Congress, its failures and excesses were broadcast sufficiently enough to cause the agency to retreat from any serious attempt at innovative and sys- tematic molding of world public opin- ion. Hans Morgenthau, writing on the failure of overt American propaganda as meaningful foreign policy alter native as far back as 1960, summed up USIA's approach as "praise of one's own product and disparagement of the competitor's," a refusal to ele- vate propaganda strategy?"white' propaganda strategy, at least?to equal position with the diplomatic strategies of war, aid, trade, and such. Our overt propagandists were not in- volved in key policy decisions; it was a case of world public opinion be damned by either inattention or im- proper?in the moral sense?attention. Congressional short-sightedness to- wards USIA (VOA was treated separate- ly and somewhat less critically, it should be noted), has been paralleled, as Morgenthau implied in 1960, in the executive branch. With one notable exception?Edward R. Munrow?in choice of USIA directors and others? including Dr. Stanton?in choice of public sector advisers, American Presidents have tended to select those who would guide- the aspect of over- seas propaganda that seems most valid for, an open society, with an eye to domestic political debts rather than functional effects, indeed, most old hands at USIA (the ones who were old hands when I was there in 1967-70, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 12 September 1975 Single 'high -water 'mark- in agency staff morale. It can be contended, I think, that USIA and the "white" propaganda function in American foreign policy have arrived at their current low state by virtue of self-fulfilling proph- ecy: all propaganda is bad; decision makers who could not or would not criticize our most devious propaganda scored their oratorical points against the overt material; Presidents came to perceive USIA as just another agency for second- and third-level patronage appointments; USIA staff morale deteriorated; the agency was consulted. less and dictated to more; and our overt propaganda operations, so successful in World Wan II from the government's point of view, and perennially successful in the sense of American advertising and public relations, deteriorated in foreign affairs. It is doubtful, then, that the Stanton recommendations will have any great effect on propaganda. Some propa- gandists, may get shuffled about, but the need for a choice of an open style of propaganda as a key factor in our foreign policy remains unanswered. NEW YORK TIMES 17 September 1975 Seri te A ti-Toxin Tile Senate Select ComMittee on Intelligence is trying to find out why the Central Intelligence Agency has been storing shellfish toxin and cobra venom?"enough to- kill thousands of people", ? along with instruments' designed for their delivery, not to mention a, silent poison-dart gun that could kill without a trace. it should find out?especially in view of former President Nixon's Order for the destruction of this deadly stockpile and this country's announcement to the world that it had in fact been destroyed. It is bad enough that the United States ever engaged in the manufacture of a weapon of such indiscriminate. horror; to have retained it in a secret arsenal against the order of the Commander-in-Chief must be put down. as the most reckless kind of insubordination. Senator .'rank -Church of Idaho, the committee chairman, was mild in ascribing the episode merely to a _"looseness of Command and control within the C.I.A." It was, more like willful sabotage of the nation's proclaimed policy? all "the worse for the effect it could have on current Soviet-American negotiations to renounce all efforts t tampering with the climate as an instrument of war. Senator Church is right to hold open hearings on the subject,-contrary to the .vishes Of the AdministratiOn. Supposedly the decision tO leave these deadly poisons on hand?unguarded at that?was made by a middle- level official of the C.I.A.. WilliamT. Colby, the C.I.A.'s present director, concedes the gross violation bet finds the records too incomplete to pin down the responsibility. On whatever level the defiance of orders occurred, the public should know where and how its appointed guardians have both failed and endangered it. It is time for the C.I.A. to learn, openly and beyond further question, that it is of value to the country only as long as it subordinates itself to the public will, as expressed by elected government. . ..? estroy the Monster By Torn Wicker a The disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency hoarded :a supply Of deadly poisons in direct contraven- tion of Richard Nixon's order to "destroy such poisons in 1969 is only one more bit of evidence that this 'agency is a Frankenstein's monster that must be destroyed. ,.There are several ways 'to explain the stockpiling of shellfish toxin and cobra venom against express Presi- dential orders. First, the poisons might secretly have been ordered preserved by Mr. Nixon himself. Or the top command of the C.I.A. might have made the decision to retain them, for :reasons of its own. Finally, lower-level ,authorities within the agency might -have disobeyed their own immediate superiors and saved the poisons against some' real or imagined needs. It does not mean much that the :C.I.A. itself apparently disclosed the retention of the poisons to the investi- gating committee headed by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. It could be, of course, that the present C.I.A. command has only recently discovered the cached poisons, as is being con- tended; but given this agency's record of subterfuge, concealment and distor- tion of the record, it is just as easy to suppose that the disclosure was made only because of recent inquiries -into "C.I.A. activities, and the pos7 sibility that the truth would have been uncovered anyway.' -However the matter is viewed, few incidents could more dramatically dis- close the dangers of this many= chambered house of deceit, fear, power and secrecy. If Mr. Nixon ordered the poisons secretly preserved against his own stated policy of renouncing bacteriological warfare, then he should not have had a secret agency able and willing to do his bidding. If the agency took it upon itself to con-- travene Mr. Nixon's declared policy, it could only have done so because of the power and autonomy derived from, its ability to operate in secrecy. If lower-level officials disobeyed their own superiors as well as Mr. Nixon and stockpiled the poisons against national policy, then as Sen- ator Church has said there was an in- credible "looseness of command and control within the C.I.A."---a laxity all the more frightening because if the agency's top officials cannot control their underlings, then there is no way to impose outside political control on the agency itself. That is why the illicit stockpiling of the poisons?whatever use might have been intended for them by who- ever was responsible?is one of the more frightening disclosures about this ? shadowy agency. It is reminiscent of the report that when James Schlesin- ger, while briefly the C.I.A. director, ordered a halt to all questionable counterintelligence activities in 1973, agency security officials Increased the numbers of his bodyguards. If they feared for his safety within the agency, then what might not uncontrolled agents be capable of outside the C.I.A.? Illicit domestic spying, secret and loosely controlled experiments with drugs, connections to the underworld, plots that may or may not have been authorized to kill various foreign lead- ers, now the hoarded poisons?such abuses are the inevitable consequences of great power, essentially unchecked, cloaked in the mystique of national security, and authorized to operate in secrecy. No amount of Congressional oversight could have prevented the stockpiling of those poisons, or their possible illicit use; and whatever may yet be disclosed about the assassina- tion plots, and who may have author- ized them, it is clear that they could have been and perhaps were under- taken on the agency's own initiative. Such secret power is intolerable in an open, democratic society. Just as IN THE NATION C.I.A. "covert" technrques came to be employed in domestic politics by the White House "plumbers" under How- ard Hunt, so might eyen more danger- ous C.I.A. tactics and attitudes, spawned in the dark atmosphere of an anything-goes operation waging secret wars in the name of national security, further contaminate the national life. Enough is already known of the Church committee's findings?it is plausible to suppose that there is more to Le disclosed?to support a recom- mendation that the C.I.A. as now con- stituted be abolished. Then, its pre- sumably able and useful sections de- voted to the straight collection and analysis of intelligence could be re- organized into a su'ccessor agency un- burdened and unsullied with "covert" operations and vast secret powers to overturn governments, harass other nations, subvert or kill their leaders, and thwart their legitimate aspirations. Such powers not only have no place in a decent society; but if permitted will almost inevitably be turned against the society that grants them. ? To the extent that covert operations of some kind may be legitimate and necessary, surely an overpowering secret agency is not required to carry them out. Depending on the nature of the case, some small, efficient unit within the State Department or th military would be sufficient, and in finitely easier to control. Approved For Release 2001/08/08: Cl/21DP77-00432R000100370001-6 xi THOUSE CTOBER 1975 - ?, Approved For:Release 200/08/08ZIA-RD177=00432R000100370001-6 2341 E,. 11 HOW THE CIA HLLPED BUILD THE MOST D, ,SH , OSef5temhe( II 1973 Pe?-* ernetne:?Centrahlntelligence,-7e ? e-eAgericy-'!??and-American*.:big-e us hes sigersted the consti tkiQ?ofChjl,-'- ean-inudinS??r- Aliend Gosseis he, free- d jkiled during ne coup and ton fOeuSliig onChiie rh :Kissinger and his associates tote irChileanaffajrs:Thuswe trordexterif 'of the U ry:. -'--;,:iritiVryentienin Ojai:Sol:1th A'rnt.ene a:cah cce:intry,a.rid .the stunning. fer-c! .,..h..,4:5i:eharacteri?ed[a.S. being anS land_ ing..ei-": t'adO for tion of bLrnan rignts with the najunta'duringea;.dispussieTgenA lec- Eures kissInger :aereSsittne.arnbassader''S patch, rep or!' .the that Kissir'ge ?and the (C'St ? ..ccrelj ri"eeds such lectures '-'bereaUS.t...; he hir.-S yet t6..a.Cceprn11: y responsibility for the fact that Chile has ? come the -most brutal and repressive ctatorship this side of the Iron Curtain, a iuntry where it is a. felony-to think Marxist 'Lights, let alone act on them. What has been happening in Chile ex- eds, in fact, the worst features of modern ornmunist regimes (Cambodia under the -net- Rouge rule being a backward-sod- exception) where summary executions d massive disappearances of citizens e no longer in political vogue. Today's He is a gruesome result oAp4tIolViadif-0 gees and the CIA's clients?Chilean gener- $400,006 to help anti-Allende parties. els and admirals and their rightwing civilian For the next three years, no stone was left allies?have wrought upon one el the West- unturned by Kissinger, first to keep Allende em Hemisphere's most impressive democ- from assuming the presidency, and then to .racies. We must all accept a degree of re- destroy his government. As much as $8 mil- sponsibility for the suffering of thousands of lion, according to Colby, was earmarked Chileans tortured by their new masters, for (but not entirely spent) for the CIA to "de- ' the 7,000 Chileans who remain in political stabilize" the Allende government. The prisons, for the military kangaroo courts that Treasury Department and the Export-Import are still operating, and for the fact that, con- Bank were mobilized to deny Allende des- trary to our pre-revolution expectations, perately needed credits for the imports of Chile's economy is in absolute shambles. everything from airliners to food. The Nixon This state of affairs may explain why administration leaned heavily on interne- Chile's President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte tonal financial institutions to cut off loans to (the army's commander in chief, who led the Chile; credit lines frcm commercial United coup despite his assurances of loyalty to States banks dried up overnight. Thus the Allende until the very last day) decided whole might of the United States was early in July to prohibit a visit to Chile by the applied aaainst an impoverished nation of ten million inhabitants whose only crime was to elect freely and democratically a Socialist (not Communist) president. ? The Annericanjustification for this assault on Chile was offered by Kissinger in a background press briefing on September 16, 1970. On September 4:Allende had come in first with a 36.1 percent plurality over two other candidates (a conservative former president, Jorge Alessandri, and a ,leftist Christian Democrat, Radomiro To- pre). Since no candidate had a majority; it . became necessary to have a runoff election .in Chile's congress. Having failed to achieve Allende's defeat in September. the United States concentrated on forcing Ales- sandri's victory in the October 24 runoff (the American Embassy in Santiago had insis- tently predicted that Alessandri would win). Faced with the runoff, Kissinger, at his most cynical, offered the following rationale for American intervention: "It would not be at all illogical for the [Chilean] congress to say. 'Sixty-four per- cent of the people-did not want a Communist government. A Communist government tends to be irreversible. Therefore we are going to vote for the No. 2 man.' This is perfectly within their constitutional preroga- tives. However, the constitutional habit-has developed that Congress votes for the man who gets the highest number of votes. But then, of course. it has never happened be- fore that the man with the highest number of votes happens to represent a nondemocrat- ic party, which tends to make his election pretty irreversible. I have yet to meet some- body who firmly believes that if Allende wins there is likely to be another free elec- tion in Chile...." Let us pause here for a moment. Trans- lated into pain language, this means that the United States was arrogating to itself the , right to define fcr another nation what consti- lutes democracy and what the constitutional process in Chile should be. This, of cOurse, is a notion the United States would never tolerate if applied to itself or one of its allies. Besides. Kissinger vies cle.liberately rais- United Nations Commission on Human Rights. He may have regretted his earlier decision, in mid-1974, to let the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights tour his prison camps and take depositions from the prisoners. Last October this com- mission, a body of the Organization of American States which is not famous for being outspoken on controversial subjects, produced a devastating report describing tortures and daily violations of the most elementary human rights. Pinochet's action in barring the U.N. commission annoyed even the State De- partment, which, ever so gradually, is Mov- ing away from its nearly unquestioning sup- port of the junta. Shortly after Chile's deci- sion to keep out U.N. investigators, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll "dressed down," in the words of a U.S. official, the Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister who was in Washington that week. Such specialists as William D. Rogers, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, have also been quietly warning the junta that it may wind up as an international pariah if it per- sists in its attitudes. The State Department took an especially dim view of Pinochet's behavior because the U.S. had gone along with most of the ? OAS foreign ministers earlier this year in delaying action on the 177-page report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commis- sion pending a more up-to-date study by the U.N. panel. As matters stand now, the OAS report remains pigeonholed. Still. it should be made compulsory bedtime reading for Henry Kissinger: it might be sobering for him to absorb the nightmarish catalogue of crimes and brutalities in Chile that he .helped to set in motion. Notwithstanding his public denials of an American role in engineering the anti-Al- lende coup?denials that were later contra- dicted by sworn statements of CIA Director William E. Colby in secret testimony before congressional committees--there is no question that Kissinger was the principal mover in the campaign against the constitu- tional Allende government. After all, it was leading his audience by saying that Allen- . Kissinger who blithely remarked at a meet; de's party was "nondemocratic." Allende ing of the top-secret White House "Forty belonged to the Socialist Party, a traditional . Committee," the group presided over by one in Chile. It was allied with the Comrnu- him and responsible for all major covert in- nist Party under the Unidad Popular (Popu- telligence operations,-"I don't see why we lar Unity) coalition?just as the French So- need to stand by and watch a country go cialists had an electoral pact with French Communist due to the irresponsibility of its Communists. if one is to take Kissinger liter- own people." This was on June 27, 1970, ally, then America cannot tolerate any alli- more than two months before the Chileans ance anywhere which includes Commu- even went to the polls. That day the first fists. This "Kissinger Doctrine," which calls* funds were authorized for the CIA to start for Amer' can intervention !Pita ['Mei 661/18/0 ijaYe I AASIP1 740 4 32:Refike00 electedie gr eovveerr nvmi eedn ot ? 15 ; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004.32R000100370001-6 - the recipe for everything from subver-' made Helms and Kissinger look like liars. This was, in effect, what the CIA told the on and invasions to new Vietnams. but he evidently assumed that his testimony International Telephone and Telegraph But let us go back to Kissinger's scenario.: would' be kept secret from the public. Mem- Company's director John McCone (himself gain, it is important because it clearly set bers of the House Armed Services Commit- a former CIA director) when he asked late in e stage for the intervention and blood- tee were not expected to break a secrecy June"whether the United States intended to aths to come. To quote him further: pledge. surrounding the testimony. Her- intervene in the election to encourage the "Now it is fairly easy for one to predict rington, who is not a committee member, support of one of the caed;siatees who stood t, if Allende wins, there is a good chance was allowed to read the Colby testimony for the principles that are basic in this coun- at he will establish over a period of years after taking a similar pledge. Appalled by try." Richard M. Helms. then CIA direct me sort of Communist government. In that what he read, he asked House and Senate and a specialist in clandestine operations. ase you would have.., in a major Latin leaders to take prompt action. He was ig- told IvicCorte that the administration would merican country.... a Communist gov- noted. As Harrington tells the story, he de- mount a "minimal effort" to oppose Allende.. rnment, joining, for example, Argentina, liberately violated the pledge out of a sense This was the $400.000. hich is already deeply divided, along a of despair that the CIA's misdeeds in Chile ITT, which had over S100 million investe ng frontier, joining Peru, which has al- would never become known to the Amen- in Chile (chiefly in the local telephone co can 'public. The congressional establish- -pany); was not satisfied, however, with thi ment was unforgiving: he was bounced off "minimal effort." In a gesture of astoundin the House committee investigating intelli- effrontery, ITT offered th E.i CIA $1 million o gence and the House Ethics Committee its own corporate money to help defeat At decided to try tO censure him. lende. The offer was made at a July meetin The Chilean story becens in 1964?and this fact should remind us that Kissinger does not have a monopoly on American interven- tion and that the CIA gladly lends itseif to political subversion no matter who sits in the White House. Allende had been one of the. CIA's favorite targets for quite a few years. In 1964, he was the principal contender for the presidency against Eduardo Frei Montalva. a Christian Democrat who ran on the plat- form of "Revolution with Liberty." This was intended as a political antidote to Cuba's Fidel Castro and his penchant for trying to foster revolutions in Latin America. Chile, which was Latin America's most politically sophisticated nation, always had a strong leftist tradition. In 1958, when Jorge Alessandri won his six-year term, the leftist coalition (then knOwn as FRAP) made a good showing. In 1964. Allende, who had spent some time in Cuba as Castro's guest, was perceived in Washington as a formida- ble opponent against Frei, the Christian Democrat reformer.. Rather than support a rightist candidate, and what would be a los- ing cause, the United States cast its lot with Frei. According to subsequent testimony by Director Colby, the CIA spent $3 million in covert support of Frei's election, financing newspaper and radio publicity as Well as seeing to it that millions of escudos.. were spread around in the right places. (Some students of Chilean politics believe that the tote; amount spent by the CIA in 1954 was far in excess of the S3 million.) In the logic of American foreign policy, there was nothing wrong either with overthrowing govern- ments or helping frienc.ny ones to win power. The covert pro-Frei intervention in 1964 was authorized by Lyndon Johnson who, a year later, sent American troops to intervene in the Dominican Republic's civil war. In mid-1970, it was the Nixon administra- tion's task to insure that the "wrong" man was not elected in Chile. Kissinger's per- sonal entry into the picture took place at the June 27 meeting of the "Forty Committee," when the CIA was authorized to spend the $400,000 to back Alessandri, largely through the .financing of electoral propa- ady been heading in directions that have een difficult to deal with, and joining olivia, which has also gone in a more left- t. anti-U.S. direction, even without any of ese developments." ? Kissinger here revealed his ignorance of atm n America?her politics, cultural tradi- ons, ideological alignments, and regional valries. He overlooked Chile's traditional nsions with Peru (going back to the Pacific am in the 1870's) as well as with Argentina d 'Bolivia. He ignored the fact that these ur countries have totally different soci- ties, and that it simply did not follow that ommunism in Chile, even if it came to ass, would necessarily infect all her eighbors. In hindsight, of course, vie know at the three years of the Allende re- ime?which never, by the way, became an utright Communist dictatorship?did not ave the slightest impact on Argentina. eru. and Bolivia. To Kissinger, however, it as necessary to prepare public opinion for that he had in store for Chile. The history of covert American interven- on in Chile can be divided into two parts: e period prior to Allende's inauguration on ovember 4, 1970, and the period after- yards. In each case. both our money era. he clandestine "dirty trick's" resources he CIA were used without the knowledge pproval of the American Congress. Congress. or at least some members of.: egan learning about all this activity one. fter the fact. Although a Senate subcornme- ee ferreted out the facts about the first CiA contribut;on- to Chile sortie time beforc.= cup, congressmen were kept in the dark fp- some months afterwards about the full ex- tent of the U.S. involvement. In some cases they were simply lied to by the CIA. Ce February 7, 1973, for example, then CIA Di- rector Richard M. Helms said, "No, sir." when asked by a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee if the agency tried to ."overthrow" the Chilean govern- ment. He repeated his "no. sir reply when asked whether the CIA had "any money passed to the opponents of Allende." Late in July the CIA's general counsel acknowledged to Congress that "perjury" may have been committed in earlier agency testimony. The finger clearly was pointed at Helms. But Kissinger. too. may have per- jury problems for having denied?before a Senate committee-that there was any U.S. ganda. One may ask why so little money sure on Christian Democratic congressm involvement in the Chilean coup. a month was being authorized to beat Allende in to vote against Dr. Allende, or in any event after it happened. 1970 whereas nearly ten times as much was weaken Dr. Allende's position in case The web of official lies was first destroyed expended six years earlier. A possible ex- was elected." Here, then, we have the e when Representative Michael Harrington. a planation is that EdwardM. Korry, then the traordinary picture of the CIA conspiri Massachusetts Democrat, took it upcn him- American ambassador in Santiago, was un- with a powerful multinational corporation self last year to leak to newsmen the es- flaggingly assuring the State Department intervene in the domestic affairs of a friend Sence of secret testimony by Colby. the new that Alessandri, the rightist, would carry the country. It seems like the worst Marxist d CIA director, acknowledging that millions of day. The $400,000, then, was just a cheap rnonology come true. dollars had been funneled to Chile. Colby insurance policy. Even before Allende was toppled, t ,kheitrimittee that was already too Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDPM-00432ROINFruirsruoul-b between ITT's president. Harold S. Geneerr arrd the Cl'A's Western Hemisphere.divisio chief, William V. Broe. Helms arranged th get-together between Geneen and Broe or McCone's request. (The CIA's "old-bo netwcrk" .was obviously highly effective.. Broe, however, turned down ITT's offer t help finance United States foreign policy. # did not seem necessary. But on September 4. the news of Allende.- lection hit Washington. The adrninistratio and. ITT sprang into action. Kissinger at ready had in hand a secret study of th Chilean situation?a document known a National Security Study Memorandum-9 prepared by his staff in July?and he was ed no time. On September 15, Nixon presided over secret meeting in Chile. attended by Ki singer, Helms, and Attorney General Jch Mitchel!. It was conducted outside the "Fo ty Committee." on which the State Depa merit and the Pentagon are represente Nixon told Helms to "come up with sorrt ideas." and authorized an initial SIO milli? expenditure. The CIA understood this as "blanket authorization" to get rid of Anend On September 16, Kissingeds backgroun briefing made it clear that the United Ste would not tolerate Allende. On Septernb 18. he presided over a meeting of the "Fo Committee." and decided to let the CIA i mediately spend S350.000 on buying ant Allende congressional votes for the Octob rurioff election. It was an idea of su monumental absurdity that the CIA's men the field in Chile. told Washington that i simply would not work and that any.attemp to bribe Christian Dernocratie congress men, who held the decisive votes, could easily discovered and cause. the Unite States vast embarrassment. The vote-bu leg project thus never got off the ground On September 29, Helms instructed Bro his Western Hemisphere chief, to meet wit Ned Gerrity, an ITT vice president, to di cuss Chile. According to Gerrity's testimon before a Senate subcommittee, "Mr. Bro proposed a plan to accelerate econorm chaos in Chile as a means of putting pre ._40Itiroved,For.7R6104-0-;00,1108,1*:"ciAlRop77Hoo43.2RoOptqoro00.16- . ' g into the CIA-# involvement had asked gas grenades for a coup attempt on behalf included the cutoff Of financial assistance. is prescient geestion: "Did the members orAlessandri. Allende's runoff rival. But Ales-. The ostensible reasons for this cutoff were . the 'Forty Committee' adequately consid- sandri apparently would have no part of it. Chile's poor credit standing and Allende's r the possibility that, once having launched and the arms were returned unused. refusal to pay what United States Copper e U.S. on the road of covert intervention, After Allende's inauguraeon on? Novem- companies regarded as just compensation .her, more direct measures might become bet. 4. 1970, the new American strategy ran: for the takeover of their properties. ecessary to insure the desired result: along two parallP1 tracks. One was the : There is ample evidence that C1A-linked t ceping Allende from becoming president economic blockade to"accelerate econom- Chilean groups organized marches by Chile?" The answer, as it turned out. was ic chaos" in Chile, as the CIA's Bill Broe put housewives protesting high prices and resounding "es." Kissinger was armed it to ITT officials, and the other was plain _shortages (this had worked well in Brazil in ith the options in NSSM-97, the National subversion. known in the agency's Ian- 1964) to create social unrest and more polit- ec. urity Council staff study that gave shim guage as "covert political action." ical polarization. CIA funds are believed to e full range of interventionist steps in Kissinger. as was said later, becameNix- have been used to launch and maintain a hile?and he arid the CIA were ready to go. cn's "Chiiean Desk Officer" the had not yet crippling strike by Chilean truck owners in The ploy of buying anti-Allende votes hay- become the se.creeasy of state and acted as g been declared unworkable. the CIA and the president's special assistant for naticnal s Chilean friends turned to direct action. security affairs) in coordinating anti-Allende e congressional runoff election was ap- activities. lee was overseeing the work of a roaching and something had to be done at special Chilean task force composed of nce. A confidential communication from representatives of v-arious government agen- s Santiago office to its New York head- cies and presiding over occasional meet7 uarters said on October 16 that "unless ings of the "Forty Committee" which, as time ere is a move by dissident Chilean military wept by. kept increasing the flow of funds of ements by this time next midweek. the the CIA for anti-Allende subversion. Nixon,. onseosus ... is that Salvador Allende will of course, wholeheartedly supported thefl in the October 24 congressional runoff campaign. t asily." The CIA was sending similar re- But the official posture was sanctimo- orts to Washington. Allende was evidently niously dishonest. Thus on January 4, 1971, ware that a conspiracy by Americans was when anti-Allende activities were already in foot because he alluded in a speech that full swing. Nixon said that, although he eek to Chile "swarming" with CIA agents. didn't "welcome" Allende's election, "We What Allende might not have known was at the chosen instrument for the operation gainst him was a retired army general amed Roberto Viaux. Vieux. who had tried n abortive military move during Septem- er, was in touoh with the CIA through a roup of extreme right-wing Chilean civil- ns determined to prevent Allende's final ictory. The CIA knew that Vieux and his 'ends planned to kidnap Gen. Ren?chnei- er, then commander in chief of the Chilean rmy. and niake it appear a plct by Allen- e's supporters. The hcpe was that the Chii- an military would then be provoked into a oup leading te the cancellation of the 'run- ff election. It was a half-baked idea inas- uch as Schneider was known to be corn-, 1976." In testimony that is being disclosed nittecf to the army's political neutrality?e here publicly for the first time, Colby sae: hilean military tradition?and the leftists of "We did have an interest in groups opp.oseo niclad Popular could have no possible to Allende to help insure that [his] govern- eason to capture the general. ' ment was not successful." On October 13. the CIA informed Kissin- Economically, the American objective er of the Vieux, plot, but it was decided to was to deprive Allende of the means of rue- iscourage it. The reason was that the CIA ning a viable government. As a senior State /as involved in a parallel conspiracy with Department official told a group of visiting en. Camilo Valenzuela. a commander of university professors, the United States he Santiago garrison. in whom the agency wanted to make sure that the economic col- ad greater confidence. He. too, wanted to lapse of the Allende regime would serve to idrtap Schneider. teach the rest of Latin America that Marxism But the CIA Could not stop Vieux. On the simply cannot work. The basic formula. orning of OctOber 22. as General Schnei- then, was a combination of economic and er was entoute to his office, his car was political subversion. At the same time. locked by several vehicles. Five civilians American army, air force, and navy advisers randishing guns tried to drag ..him out of attached to the Chilean armed forces (they tors as the drop in copper prices, in addition is limousine and transfer him to another were never expelled during Allende's short to self-fulfilling prophecies by the United car. But when ' Schneider reached for his tenure) began to work quietly on their mile States. Applying economic screws to Chile. service revolver, the kidnappers panicked tary friends in Chile. While the Export-Import Washington did succeed in destabilizing and shot him lo death. Not surprisingly,Bank, for example, refused to guarantee the ' the Chilean economy even further than Al- Schneider's murder failed to produce the sale of Boeing jetliners to the Chilean na- lende'S inept team of economists had man- expected results The Chilean military corn- tional airline on the grounds that Chile's in aged to do. By mid-1973. therefore, the mend closed ranks behind the constitution- ternational credit rating was insufficient, the conditions were ripe for a coup. The right- al process and Allende was elected by the Pentagon sold 65 million of military equip- ists and the Americans persuaded most of Congress two days later?October 24. If ment to Chile?on credit. Shortly before the the military commanders that it was their anything. Schneider's death swung a num- 1973 coup, the administration indicated patriotic duty to oust the Allende regime. An bar of votes in favor of Allende. , plans to sell Chile F-5 jet fighters, also on abortive attempt, carried out without coor- ,For reasons that remain unclear, the CIA. credit. And, on at least two occasions, arms dination with other units, took place in June. , on the very day the congress was voting were secretly flown to Chile from Miami by and loyalist forces put it down easily. .' authorized agents in Chile to give the Valen- aircraft controlled by a CIA "proprietary" But on September 11, a full-fledged coup, zuela group three machineguns and tear- company. started by the navy. threw Allende out o . - Approved For ReleWeP2beifoitRilf!?6920kkiHNOW2R6thifondriMPlet about his death withi 17 1972?another "destabilizing" measure. We know from President Ford's own admis- siorr that CIA funds were turned over to anti-Allende newspapers that openly called for the Socialist president's removal. And we know that CIA money was given to anti- Allende political parties. There is no question that Chile's upper Classes and a part of the middle class were badly hurt by Allende's moves toward socialism. But nothing happened during Al- lende's nearly three years in office to war- rant Kissinger's predictions that. com- munism was really taking over in Chile. The congress, where Allende had no majority, went on functioning the entire time?and often blocked Unidad Popular' legislation. were very careful to point out that that was The press remained free. There were no the decision of the people,of Chile, and political prisoners. Oddly, some of Allen- we accepted that decis'ee.. For the Unit- : de's principal domestic political problems ed States to have intervened ... in a: free came from the extreme leftist groups out- election and to have turned it around, I think; side his coalition that tried to force his hand would have had repercussions allover Latin toward total radicalization. Some of these America that would have been far worse groups engaged in terrorism against the than what has happered in Chile." But of right, just as rightists practiced terrorism course we were intervening and we had ro against the Unidad Popular. intention of stopping. That Allende, contrary to Kissinger's As Colby (a more candid man than Kis- claims, was not attempting to establish a singer) testified in secret session before a "Communist dictatorship" was confirmed Senate subcommittee on March 12, l97. by. Of all people, a senior Defense Intelli- "Our objective was to help create conci- gence Agency (DIA) analyst during a secret tions which would make it impossible fee hearing before the House Subcommittee on Allende or Unidad Popular to succeed . . Inter-Americari Affairs on October 31, 1973, Paul F. Wanner. the DIA analyst, said that "as the internal situation deteriorated Allende disregarded Castro's advice to consolidate his gains and eliminate the op- position." And in the congressional elec- tions of March 1973, Allende emerged with greater strength in Congress and well over 40 percent of the popular vote?a marked improvement over his 1970 tally. A case obviously can be made that Al- lende grievously damaged the Chilean economy. Inflation was running around 1,000 percent a year, foreign currency re- serves were depleted, and shortages mounted. But in truth this was a combination of the Allende regime's economic incornpe- tence, and such uncontrollable external fac- Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 ours. He died inside the besieged La oneda palace, wearing a helmet and Tutching a submachine gun, an incongru- us bespectacled figure of .a middle-class hysician whose ascent to the presidency Chile had shaken faraway Washington to score. His widow and others claim he was eliberately assassinated (see page 72). he junta says he committed suicide. But hat we know for certain is that Allende and s many as 10,000 of his followers were lied in the bloodbath carried out by the ctoriouS junta. Would the coup have happened without nited States involvement? There are some ro-Allende Chileans who believe that, ooner or later, either a coup or a civil war ould have. taken place because of the Otarization of the Chilean society and the ountiriC inner pressures. But the fact re- ains that the United States did play a,role , Creating the conditions that led to the eptember revolution. And having played uch a role, the United States must share the eSponsibility for the horrors that have swept bile during the past two years. There can e no deLibt that Chilean blood and Chilean uffering are on our hands. Big Brother-like. he military has taken over education in Chit- an schools. And no end of imprisonments, ortures, and the denial of the most ele,rnE.,,n- ary forres of civil rights is in sight. In fact, inothet promised late last June that there ould be no elections in Chile so long as he arid my successor" are alive. 'Economically, the Pinochet junta did little improve Chile's situation, although one of e ?justifications for the coup was that Al- ode was leading the country to ruin. Ac- erding to the London Economist (hardly ti-spect of leftist sympathies), food prices in hilehave gone up "between ten and twen- "tidies" since the junta assumed power. flation was raging at 95 percent in the first uartet of 1975, suggesting that the rate for e year will be around 400 percent?Less an in Allende's time, but also without his egime's social, justification for it. In human terms, the price paid by the. hileans forthe "liberation" from Allende is imply horrifying. Let us examine some of he conclusions of the Inter-American ommission on +lumen Rights (whose merican representative was former Am- assador Robert F. Woodward): - ? .et'WhiIe executions by shooting without nor, trial in the application-of the so-Called awof flight' [the shooting Of escaping pris- ners) had ceased, the right to life could not e. considered adequately protected in the roceedings of War Councils, which ... re- eatedly were handing down death penal- es in circumstances. that do not satisfy the quirements of due process." 0 .`!The right to personal security had been nd was-directly and seriously violated by e practice of psychological and physical buse in the form of cruel and inhuman eatment.. .1 The useof electric shock, the reat of harm to close relatives, sexual at- eks, covering the person with a hood, lindfolding the person for weeks, etc., are asonably proven facts." "Ten months after ,the events of Sep- mber, around 5,500 persons remained. eprived of their liberty, according to fig- es supplied by some of the !Chilean cabi7 etj ministers. Many of these persons had een arrested without any charges brought gains,t them, and they continued in deten- on without being brought before the courts. . The situation was even more serious due. to the fact that the,;rawsltre, a Iso many persons regarding whom it was not known whether ? they were free or imprisoned,- or even whether they were living or dead." , (The Commission issued its report in Oc- toberl 974, but, according to reliable lomatic information, at least 1.500 persons were arrested in December 1974 and ary 1975 for no known reasons. Later in 1975, the total political prison population in Chile stood *around 7.000?and new arrests were being reported almost daily.) ? "Freedom of expression' ... None of the mass communication media are free to dis- seminate thought oreinform the public. . ." ? "Right of assembly:.This right was virtu- ? ally se:spendeci." ? * 'F;eetiom of opinion: .. . As a reF.,ult of Decree-Law .77, Marxism is generically considered as a felony. The term *Marxism' is used as though it were a label fora crime. Consequent!;.', .any individual professing Marxist ideology is considered as a crimi- nal. regardless of whether he can be shown to have actually committed acts defined- as crimes under criminal law. He can therefore be punished for 'what he is' or 'what he thinks,' regardless of 'what he does.' The commission of the same act in the same circumstances can give rise to different legal consequences depending on the per- sons who committed the act and their politi- cal ideology, without any rule of justice or reasonableness to justify such disparity." The Inter-American Commission, whose report is accompanied by pages of specific examples of human rights violations ("Pris- oner ... shows deep marksof maltreatment on the wrists, both arms, and the upper and lower back.. lacerations and scarring on the genitals, which ... can only be pro- duced by the application of electric shock. . May suffer permanent damage to the left testicle and scrotum"), was not the, only group to denounce the junta's brutality. in a report issued late in 1974, the Interna- tional Commission of Jurists charged that "forevery detainee who has been released in recent months, at least two new arrests have been made," adding that the legal sys- tem under the junta "continues to con- travene basic principles of justice accepted by civilized nations." . In May 1975, the New York Times reported, that "political detentions in the Santiago area alone were running at. about forty a week. and the Court of Appeals was still receiving s:orn statements of torture from the victims.' relatives." Also in May. the International Labor Or- ganization .said in a special study that at least 110 Chilean labor leaders may have been killed or executed during the first year of the junte's rule. The ILO said the Chilean government had confirmed that ten of them were "executed" and fourteen died while trying to escape. The junta, the ILO report added: tied to prove that the labor leaders Cieed tor reasons other than that they were "trade unionists or that they exercised trade union activities:" This political repression is directed by DINA, the national secret police, and mili- tary intelligence services. An undetermined nurnbe.r of DINA and military intelligence officers have been trained in the United States or at home under, public safety pro- grams of the Agency for International De- velopment in the years preceding the 1973 coup. It is impossible to confirm reports that others have been so traihed since the coup. ? The junta describes all the above charges as part of a Communist campaign waged by the Soviet Union to discredit the new re- gime. But both the Roman Catholic Church in Chile and, strikingly, the Pentagon's intel- ligence experts do not see it that way at all. Santiago's Raul Cardinal SilVa Henriquez has repeatedly and publicly denounced the tortures and arrests in Chile?to' no avail. - And Paul Wallner, the En's Chile Special- ist, told the, House hearing in October 1973 that the,situation of political prisoners was !"worse in Chile than in Cuba because of sheer numbers and the passage Of time." One Could go on end ;on reciting the known acts of political executions, impris; onments, and tortures in Chile since Sep- :tember 1973. There is, for example a study' prepared by a Chilean exiles' group claim- ing that by 1974, the junta's rule had pro- duced 22.048 widows and 66.667.1atherless children. Then, there is a list of 247 "assas- sins, torturers, violators, and criminals of the 'Chilean mil itaryjunta," naming officers from generals and admirals ,clown to army and police privates and civilians. One typical 'allegation reads: "Major P.... Scores of wotkers have been tortured on his orders and then assasinated without trial. For- bade the burial of bodies so that they re- emained for weeks in open fields to be de- voured by anirrials.... The body of Andres Si Iva.appeared without a head the body of Daniel Mendez had its arms' torn off:, that of Ruben Vargas was without, ears; that of See gundo Pedrero without one arm;,that of Or- lando Barriga without hands and nose; that of Rosendo Rebolledo .with one leo. torri away at its root. ..." There seems to be nO end to these tales of honor.. But all this brings us back tOthe question of American conscience. What has the Veit- ed States . government said?or done.? about the Chilean tragedy, the traged?, we helped to set in-motion? For the -ecord, both the Nixon and the Ford administrations have maintained total public silence about the junta's atrocities. The State Department protest over the U.N. Commission was made privately. With some -40,000 Chileans abroad., the best the State Department could' do nearly two years after the 1973 coup was to con- vince the Justice Department 'to ellOw 400 Chilean families to enter the United States on a case-by-case basis. This, in contrast to the more than 100,000 South Vietnamese refugees we processed almost instantly, was the extent of our humanitarianism. At a news conference on September 16: 1974, President Ford was asked why the CIA engaged in covert operations against Al- lende in Chile. His reply Summed up our government's attitude: It was done, he said; "in the best interest of the people of Chile. and certainly in our best interest." 0 In our July issue, Penthouse erroneously identified George Constantinides, a retired CIA official, as the new head of counterintel- ligence. We are-advised that this post is now held by George T. Kalaris, formerly CIA sta- tion Chief in the Philippines. The CIA never discloses the names of.its division chiefs. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R13077-00432R000100370001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08,:.CIA7RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 HUMAN EyENTS 1.3 September 1975 Secret e By ROBERT CONQUEST The KGB, the Committee of State Security, is thern most important Single institution in the Soviet Union: Its dual role is to keep the Communist party in power and to control foreign governments. Mr. Conquest, a British authority on Soviet affairs, compares the KGB with the CIA in the following article. Since the war (and up to 1975) over 500 Soviet offi- cials have been expelled from more than 40 countries... This is a truly extraordinary number, particularly when we consider it does not take into account the sudden departure of Soviet diplomats v;ilien their agents have been arrested, which does not rate as - : - "expulsion." Perhaps more remarkable still, and a reflection on the common sense and politicarcourage of the.non-: Soviet states, is the fact that over 70-of these expelled turned up later as Soviet representatives in other coun? tries. Eight of these were even expelled ? for a second' time from their new host-countries. And sNikolai Vasilyev even managed to score three expulsions, having been thrown out of France before World War IL . As such figures show, one important advantage of the huge Soviet effort is that it tends to swamp the limited security services of the other nations. In Brit- ain, over 100 diplomats and others were wandering -Arotind trying to effect espionage contacts, and it was almost beyond the ability of the Britiah services to shadow each of them all Of the time. However, the Russian effort collapsed. Partly this wal because of a useful defector, a common cause of Soviet debacles. But there was also the ineptness of most of the partici- pants in these human-wave tactics. B:itain expelled over 100 Soviet " diploniats" in a result, Any sensible country would clearly abate the nui- sance and insist on cutting down the Soviet represen- tation to a normal level. But though their efforts are a very severe distraction to MI5 in Britain and its equivalents elsewhere, nevertheless these semi-ama- teur operations are not to be taken too seriously. They usually owe their jobs to family connections in the Soviet New Class; their training m ot capacity- for espionage is limited; they blunder frequently and involve the USSR in grave diplomatic: scandals. Ex- cept as a distraction, and to the extent that very oc- casionally one may make a suitable contact And pass it along to the real professionals, they must still be regarded as a comparatively minor effort when. it comes to actual results. r: In addition to these clumsy fellows, there is a small- er nucleus of often brilliant professionals. It is be- lieved that no more than a dozen or so a year are graduated from the highly selective KGB training schools. Thcy have shown themselves capable of su- perb and extremely damaging operations like the lift- ing of the whole NATO weapon deployment from the American top security base at Orly in 1962-63. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ant) If we compare the KGB with its main opponent, the American Central Intelligence Agency, various differences emerge. It is, of course, an enormous advantage to the KGB, that them is never any question of it coming under public criticism in the USSR. :.To illustrate the difference, try to imagine recent events in the United States happening in the Soviet Union. An employe of the Soviet government hands: over secret documents to Pravda; Pravda prints them; and the man in question is tried on a minor charge and acquitted?that would be the Russian equivalent of the Daniel Ellsberg case. A member of the Supreme Soviet?the equivalent of , Michael Harrington-- discovers and prints confidential information about KGB arrangements in, say, Chile; these are printed in Pravda and lzvestia; arid the result is the KGB boss Yuri A,ndropov is forced to appear before a committee of the Supreme Soviet, to try to justify such conduct. ? It will be seen at once that the CIA operates under constraints which would be regarded as laughable to the point of lunacy in Moscow. To do the other West- ern powers justice, one should add that even in France or Britain such a public hamstringing of the essential security and intelligence services would be quite un- thinkable. And when one adds that a m'ajor alle- gation against the CIA in Chile was that it had provided funds for opposition newspapers and strike organizations? and not, as the KGB had done through. the North Korean Embassy, arms and terrorist training?one wonders what on earth is in the minds of alleged pro- Westerners ainonp, its critics. Moscow-Funded Stu- dent Radicals It may be remembered that in the early '50s free organizations Of students and others and a number of free periodicals were kept going with the aid of American secret funds. Without these, the huge sums pumped from Moscow into such ; front Organizations as the International ; UAion of Students would have received no rebuttal. Yet people now complain I even of that! Unlike the CIA, the KGB also ope- rates?and on a far vaster scale again? inside Soviet territory. While the Ameri- cans divide their intelligence activities into two autononfous bodies, the CIA and the FBI, the KGB is a highly co- ordinated organization with considera- ble overlap even between the depart- ments working at home and abroad. ? For example, a foreign diplomat (as in one case including a French ambas- sador) may be compromised sexually by : ciA-RwRoppgRaw9SIATANIA to be- 19 Approved For Release 200i108108.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001.-6 coming a- tool back home of the KGB external services. Nor would there be any of the curious jurisdictional legalisms by which the CIA is now charged with activity against American citizens while in America. How anyone with a trace of common sense can imagine that it is suitable for surveillance of- a suspect, perhaps on the briefest trip home, to cease at the airport and be handed over to a different organization unaccustomed to his habits, is a mystery. This is one of the many problems the CIA has, but which does not affect the GB. The latter is, moreover, a body aerting incomparably more political veight in its own right than its American ounterpart, with its head, Andropov, nking as a full member of the ruling olitburo. Recent allegations against the CIA ave been made by "defectors" from it, uch as Philip Agee and Victor Marchetti. Much of our knowledge of the KGB alsO omes from "defectors." But again, we nd a difference which is well worth oting. . : - KGB defectors have to -be carefully idden, given false identities and placed where their late employers cannot find them. A number of those for whom in- adequate precautions were taken have been found .dead in mysterious, and sometimes not so mysterious, circum- stances.?poisoned, shot, pushed 'out of windows. ? - - The new batch of CIA "defectors," on the other hand, live in comfort in countries allied to the United States, write their books and even have them published. in New York. The mere . thought of a KGB man settling in -Hungary, exposing his employers (let alone having his work printed in Mos- cow), does not begin to make contact with reality at any point. , In tne competition with the CIA, the KGB has many other advantages. With :lundreds of.thousands of Eastern Euro- peans entering America in the past few decades it is clearly much easier for the Soviet authorities to put in trained "il- legals," or to maintain "sleepers." In the comparatively easygoing polit- ical circumstances of the non-Commu- nist countries, there must always be a proportion of people who will simply swallow pro-Soviet views, and be at least potential Soviet agents. Besides, few countries have the huge police forces, "internal passports" and registration agents available to the Soviet security authorities. Then again, while there is no doubt that large numbers of Soviet bloc sub- jects would eagerly assist enemies of their government in any way possible, the KGB can prevent or monitor every such contact. Foreigners in the USSR are proportionally few compared with the security forces available to cope with them. From countries like the United f th ids States there are hundredo ousa of visitors to all parts of the wher ApprovedFor p Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF7-00432R000100370001-6 itis not difficult for them to be con- tacted without supervision. But Soviet' visitors abroad are limited both in theic numbers and their tested loyalty-quotient. This does not always work, as the USSR seems to be fairly unpopular even with its most loyal subjects. It is estimated that about 2,000 Americans are con- tacted overseas every year by the KGB with a -view to reeruitinent, while similar attempts on Soviet subjects are rather few. High Rate of KGB Agent Defections Few, but not negligible. And, more- over, the successful contacts of the CIA and other Western services include KGB melt themselves. For one of the vulnera- bilities of the KGB is the extraordinary high rate of defection to the West. This applies not only to minor figures, but to some of its major operators, including illegal Residents. These men, carefully selected and checked and counter-checked for highest political reliability, neverthe- less come. over at a rate which time and time again destroys whole KGB networks and gives a vast amount of information to the West. . . It should be noted, too, that this is al- most wholly one-way traffic. There have, of course, been a few occasions when high Western intelligence officials have de- fected, as with Kim Philby. But in his case, and the others, it has always been a question of an already indoctrinated Communist agent infiltrating the Western .services. In the case of the KGB men, it is of operatives who start off completely .loyal to their service arid its regime, and are subverted by exposure to truth and to liberty. ? The ways in which the CIA is now being hindered and hampered by its own people are quite astonishing. It is already much smaller, and disposes of much less re- sources, than its giant opponent. It is not Only a David fighting a Goliath, but a David additionally handicapped by a heavy ball and chain, and dazed by the occasional half-brick hurled at him by one of his alleged supporters. On the face of it, one would expect a walk-over for Goliath- KGB. The remarkable thing is, even LOS ANGET,ES TIMES 5 September 1975 Ford and CIA I read with misgiving mueh of what. President Ford said before the 57th annual convention of the Ameri- can Legion (Times, Aug. 20). espe- daily in regard to the CIA. ? No doubt any "reckless" congres- sional actions undermining the CIA's legitimate operations would be "cata- strophic," as Ford said, but is that really what Congress is trying to do? On the contrary, Congress is inves- tigating and is chiefly concerned with illegal activities, which Ford eu- phemistically referred to as being granted some terrific KGB successes, how well balanced the combatants are. As for current anti-CIA hysteria in cer- tain countries, it might be worth referring its sillier sponsors to the following analy- sis, from a source which even they might find authoritative?theofficial organ of a Communist party: "Among all the information and stone circulating in the country, especially re cently, there are many which insist tha many of our problems and difficulties ar either inspired, or directly created by th IA's activity . . . . However, whe the sources and objectives of this kind o 'confidential' information are studie more closely, and when we analyze the more thoroughly, it will not be difficul for us to find that the 'CIA obsession' i being spread and encouraged in our coun try by . . ." At this point the Belgrade-official Borb (Oct. 31, 1967) goes on to blame a van ety of enemies including, especially, pro Soviet elements. And so: there: really is a world- wide confrontation between the KGB on the one hand and the CIA and the intelligence services of the other non- Communist countries on the other. The present comparative relaxation in international tension has in no way re stilted in any relaxation of pressure by the KGB. Indeed, the larger influx o Soviet citizens and the setting up of ne Soviet consulates has given it greater oppertunities. The ussi---ifi at home and thinly spread in. the field, ha conducted largely a. defensive operation, ? even though accompanied by occasional brilliant forays into the Soviet side. On the whole, and partly as the result of the KGB's blunders, the .CIA prob- ably has ?:::e slight advantage in spite of everything. The various ?recierif successes of Russian and Communist foreign policy are in the main due to other reasons. The KGB, some of the Soviet leaders seem to feel, is not really pulling its full weight. This may have something to do with the current major attempt to destroy the CIA's effectiveness by con- centration on the attacks now being launched against it by naive (or worse elements in the U.S.A. itself. "improper." Despite the leaks and the publicity of the investigation, few of the most bitter congressional critics of the CIA would like to see the agency weakened, let alone. abol- ished. ? It may appear that the Senate com- mittee headed by Frank Church (D- Ida.) is too aggressive for the Ford Administration to handle. If so, should not part of the blame lie with Ford himself, whose Rockefeller- headed blue ribbon panel might have failed to do its homework adequately? KEN DEDLER, ? Palm Springs ApPrOved-For Reteape,2001/08/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R0001CKSWOOLORK TIMES 18 September 1975 or the Detente, detente, that's all you hear these days. The latest Member of -the detente club is our southern neighbor, Cuba. Congress- men and-Serators are working 'hard' .to establish a new relationship With Cuba. Rowever it would ap- pear that not everyone in govern- ment wants detente with Cuba. ? A shortwave and AM station in Jhonduras(Central America) ha S begun a campaign of propaganda broadcasts directed against Cuba. ? Their theme is both 'anti-communist' and eanti-Cuban'. What's so special about this HOndutran station is that its name is RADIO SWAN and in the 1960's it was owned and operated by . our own Central Intelligence Agency. ? Radio Swan was ..originally con- . structed on Swan Island in the Caribbean by Caymen Island laborers under the direction of the C.I.A. It began operation with a 50,000 watt AX transmitter on 1160KHz, and a 7,500 watt shortwave transmitter. on 6,000KHz, in September of 1960. At the. outset of operations, Radio Swan claimed to be owned by the Gibraltar Steamship .Company (who had no steamships) located at 437 5th Avenue in New York City. Later in 1960, Gibraltar moved to - 18 E. 50th Street, New York City, and shared offices with Radio Press International, a news subsidiary of a-local'Rew'York Radio station (AM). Radio Swan blew its cover dur- ing the Bay. of Pigs invasion. Radio Swan broadcasted instructions and directives to the invading CIA army. Needless to say, after that most . people realized that Radio Swan, was in reality a CIA propaganda station. After the Bay of Pigs, things began to get hot for Gibraltar Steamship in New York, so they hot footed off to Miami. Once in Miami, Gibraltar opened offices in the Langford building at 121 SE First Street. At this time they still claimed that Radio Swan was , a regular commercial shortwave sta- tion, owned and operated by Gibral- tar. Between One 7th and 15th of . . November, 1961 Radio Swan changed its name to Radio Americas. Still they continued with the anti-Castro ? and anti-communist broaddastine. -r In 1963 Gibraltar Steamship Company vanished as quickly as it appeared. It was repleced by- another C.I.A. front called Vanguard:Servie.CorPoration. Not being one of the more creative C.I.A..fronts, Vanguard kept the , old Gibraltar offices in the Lang- ford Building as well as the old Gibraltar telephone number: -Van- guard claimed that it owned Radio Americas and leased the Swan Island facilities from the Gibraltar Steamship Company. In the late 1960's Radio Americas left the air for unex- plained reasons. Vanguard also folded its tent and disappeared into oblivion. In 1971 the United States, after 100 years of 'occupy- ing Swan Island, returned it to the. Honduran Government who claimed the ownership of the island. At this time it was thought that any chance of Radio Swan/Radio Americas reap- pearing was gone. However, early this summer, Radio Swan reappeared using 1100KHz AM and 6185KHz shortwave. . They. are still on the air as of this writing with violent anti-communist programming slanted against Cuba. This 'new' Radio Swan uses the nailing address of P.O. Box 882, San Pedro Sula, Honduras. (Note that. Honduras currently owns the island.) In a letter received by noted shortwave listener Ralph Perry, Radio Swan acknowledges their former ownership by the C.I.A. but fails to state' their current 'affiliation'. In this letter, Radio Swan states, "As you know, the Communists are trying to take over LatircAmerica. We found it necessary to pet Radio Swan back on the air again in defense of?Demo- cracy and the free world". One might inquire who is the 'we' to which Radio Swan refers. Could it be that in this year of letepte, that, the C.I.A. has once again set its sights on Cuba? Certainly Radio Swan does not qualify as a 'bi-centennial' station, or does it? In any case, give a listen for them between 1AM and 6AM Chicago time on 6185 (6.185z) short- - wave. After all it could very well be your tax dollars paying for it. ? nly. Congress Itself' By Anthony Lewis WASHINGTON, Sept. 17?The Sen- ate Intelligence Committee, with its televised hearings on secret C.I.A. poisons, provides the immediate drama in Washington. But the parallel House, investigation may have a more pro-. found impact on the larger issues- raised by American 'intelligence activi- ties in recent years. The reason lies in. contrasting attitudes toward the cru- cial question of Executive secrecy. Senator Frank Church and his com- mittee have followed what an assist- ant attorney' general, with what may have been excessive candor, called the "traditional approach" to getting clas- sified documents. That is to negotiate with Executive officials about what. will be provided and promise how ,it will be handled. Representative Otis .Pike and the House committee are 'insisting on 'their. right to examine all the relevant' evi- dence on their own terms. They will make no promises on what they'will do with subpoenaed documents. Why is .that so important? One experienced person put it as follows: "On that position hangs the whole4 question of whether Congress can exercise effective oversight of -the- intelligence community in future. If a Congressional committee cannot' say, 'we want X' and get it Without negoti-; ating and promising, you open your- self to the charm and the lawyers and the whispering in the ear." What that observer, was describing was the process that has effectively protected Presidents and their intelli- gence men from serious scrutiny for a generation. Congressional curiosity, when it arose, was ,headed off by a confidential that with a friendly member, or a .whispered 'warning of , grave consequences to, our security. - To know ho wthe charm works one has only to watch Richard Helms, the ABROAD AT HOME !former C.I.A. director, testify to the- Senate committee so smoothly and smilingly, A C.I.A. employe who vio- lated orders by keeping poison fol- lowed "the human impulse to do the greater good," he said; yes, and good was self-defined--which is the essence of danger in secret activity. It was an "aberration," he added; yes, like the Bay of Pigs and Chile and the Phoenix assassination program in Vietnam. The larger point underlying the vari- ous intelligence inquiries is the need' for .accountability. Intelligence agen-- cies do need privacy, but our system requires that they be ultimately ac- countable to a detached scrutineer, which is Congress., Accountability is inconvenient to Presidents and their agents. That is why, as Congressman Pike said, the executive branch urgently wants to continue the old , charm-and-whisper Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RIDF2717-00432R000100370001-6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 WASHINGTOR POST 13 August 1975 .Meg Green field approach in dealing with Congress. It - is why President Ford has seemed so, strangely agitated over the House in- vestigation?because it might not be . subject to control. The President chose to draw the is.: sue of power with the committee over a molehill, its release of four words from a classified document. The words; "and greater communications security," stipposedly might have told someone othat,. w-e knew something about com- munications in Egypt's Army, the sub'- :ject of. the report. Why, if a private citizen had pub' lished these four words, Mr. Ford said: .it. Would be "a serious criminal ense." Do his lawyers really think a' judge and jury would convict on those' innocuous words? In any event: his. analogy is false. If. a C.I.A. director were a private citizen, he would be ,subject to different rules, too. If a horse had stripes, it would look like a , zebra. Congress is not a -private citi- zen. Mr. Ford's remark is actually ex- tremely revealing. It shows the old attitude that "the Government" means: only the executive branch; Congress is a second-class branch, which gets in. formation?and thus a share of power ?only by the executive's charity. If .461 is the attitude, nothing has been