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September 1, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003-70002.5 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. S SEPTEMBER 1975 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 U.S. N 1 2 - 4 1 S ) 2; WORD REPORT 25 August. 75 LGA ST THE ct: S It's now possible to piece together much of the story 1960s. He added that he had no grounds to assert that t about the Central Intelligence Agency that is being late U.S. President John F. Kennedy-and his brother, then presented to committees of Congress. U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were directly involved in the lots These committees are investigating charges that the CIA plotted assassinations of foreign - leaders, helped engineer coups to overthrow governments, spied on U.S. citizens in this country, opened and read thou- sands of private letters and listened in on private p . Senator Richard Schweiker (Rep.), of Pennsylvania, a member of the Senate Committee, has urged that the investigation of John Kennedy's 1963 assassination be re- opened because, in the Senator's view, the plots against tro provided a political motive for a possible. Cuban involvement in the Kennedy shooting, which the investiga- ivionths will elapse before the Senate and House tors did not consider. Committees,complete their inquiries-and the final Several former Kennedy aides have rejected that pol5sibil, official findings are published. Much of the testimony nay. Theodore Sorensen, a onetime Kennedy speechwriter, J has to reporters after testifying at a closed session of the as been o wen behind closed doors. Yet a substantial Senate Committee and said: "It's very clear to me that part of the disclosures has become public. President Kennedy at no time authorized, approved, con;- The following report tells what is now known of the doned or even knew of any assassination plot as an instru "case" against U:S- intelligence organizations. meat of U.S. foreia policy against a leader or any foreign ~~~ ~~~~-~~ ASSASSINATION ~k ~_~ country." Former White House aide Richard Goodwin has quoted President Kennedy as warning in 19o1 that involve- Did they CL-4 actually go out and kill--or try to kill-foreign went in foreign assassinations could bring retaliatory attacks._ leaders in` the name of the U.S. Government? This. is the According to Mr. Goodwin, the President said: "if we get biggest mystery of all into that kind of thing, we'll all be targets." The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, Lawrence R. Houston, a former general counsel for the which is investigating assassination charges, has taken all its CIA, told reporters that in 1962 he informed the,then testimony in ?ecret. But much has emerged from public -Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, about an aborted CI3 statements outside the closed hearing -room by Committee, plot with the Mafia to kill dlr. Castro: According to 11r_ members and witnesses, and from other public sources. Houston, Mr. ! ennedy gave the -impression that he was PViost of this-information concerts the charge that the CIA leaning of the plot for the first time but that he "wasn't organized repeated plots to kill Cuba's Communist Premier, terribly' perturbed about it." Mr. Houston quoted Mr. Kenne- Fidel Castro. dy as saying, If you're going to have anything to do with the One Committee witness was John Roselli, a former mem_ 1VlSen come to me first." ber of the Al Capone gang and Iona a part.of an organized- Senator Church, head of the Senate investigating commit- crime syndicate known as the Mafia_ Roselli, according to tee, said he has found no "hard evidence linking a President Committee members, testified that he was recruited by the CIA. in 1961 to kill Premier Castro, - his younger brother, Raul Castro, and the Cuban revolutionary lead- er Chz Guevara. Another witness was Robert Ma- hen, a former, top aide to billion- aire Howard Hughes and once a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent, who said he worked several years for the CIA on a retainer of $500 a month,'beiruaing in 1954. In a news conference following his testimony before the Senate Corarnittee, Mr. Maheu said he was ordered by the CIA to enlist the help of two underworld Figures to "eliminate" the Cuban leader. He identified the two underworld figures as Ioselli and the late Sam Ciancana, who was murdered re- cently in Chiczgo before he could be called' as a witness. Senator Frank Church (Dem ), of Idaho; chairman of the Committee, said there was iio reason to believe the CIA was involved in Gia na's death. . . According to Mr. MMaheu, the two men were to use their Cuban "contacts to smuggle two poison capsules into the Castro household, and, when the word was ,given, the cap- sules were to be used to kill. "But," Mr. Maheu said, "the plan was always subject to at 'go- signal which never came." Of his o rn knowledge. Premier Castro himself has said that he knew of at least a dozen serious attempts against his life by counterrevolutionary groups under CIA control Most of the attempts, he told news XP.por, r , oc a red in rrhho~ Arm ' chief Schneider Lir. r plied: "In my judg- Approvedor F~eease ZUD~1`j/08 : CIA:}RDP77-00432Rdd010~J~~1- to any of the alleged CIA assassination plots. More accusations. Besides the plots against Fidel Castro, the CIA is also accused of: ? Having had a hand in the assassination of South Viet- nam's President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, the assassination of Gen. Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, in 1961, and the killing of the Prime Minister of the former Congo, Patrice Lumtunba, also in 1961. 0 Helping to promote-the 1973 coup which resulted in the overthrow and death--either by suicide or assassination--of Chile's .Marxist President Salvador Allende, and possible involvement in a 1970 plot that resulted in the assassination of Chile's Army chief, Rene Schneider. Comparatively little has seeped out of the closed Commit- tee hearings about alleged plots in countries. other than Cuba. Senator John Tower (Rep.), of Texas, the Committed vice chairman, declared at one stage of the hearings that the panel had found no evidence of direct CIA involvement in the killing of South Vietnam's President Diem. And former White House aide Sorensen said he told the Committee that President Kennedy gave orders that the U.S. take no part in anti-Diem plots. ... I CIA officials have acknowledged giving millions of doli.trs in aid to. political parties and groups in Chile, but have denied any part in killings or coups in that country. The Senate Committee finished its hearings on the a?sassi- nation phase of its investigations on August 12, with Secre- tary of State Henry A. Kissinger as the final witness. After testifying, Secretary Kissinger told reporters , he knew of no U.S. policy or plots to assassinate any Foreign official's -or leaders anywhere during the Nixon and 1:ord Administrations in which he served. Asked specifically whether the United States bears any responsibility for the deaths of Chilean President Allende or E Approved For Release 2001/08/08,: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 ed to the subcommittee. by the CIA was that of a Thai operative of the agency who was accused in 1973 of attempt- ing to smuggle narcotics into the U.S. There were also charges of misappropriation of CIA funds and allegations of mishandling of classified documents. Some disclosures about CIA operations have come from outside the congressional hearings or federal agencies. Documents made public in a civil suit by the Socialist Workers Party showed that CIA spies practiced for overseas assignments by infiltrating and reporting on the domestic political activities of the party and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance. - AND MORE YET TO COME After months of investigations by the Rockefeller Commis- sion and by Congress, the evidence on this country's massive intelligence operations is voluminous. But the full story is yet to be told. And the final verdict on the legality or propriety of some operations is yet to come. So is a decision on what to do about regulating or restricting intelligence activities in CIA: "BEST IN ' ORLD" . Director William E. Colby sums up his defense of the CIA in these words: It may have done some things in the past which were either mistaken or wrong. But.the CIA today is the best intelligence service in the world. - .. It is the envy of the foreign nations. . . . I think we need good intelligence. I think we have got it--and I think we should continue." Charges against the CIA, Mr. Colby maintains, have been exaggerated-especially those charges of "mas- " sive domestic spying. In a report to President Ford, the intelligence chief acknowledged that in the surveillance of "dis- sident" Americans, which is known as "Operation CHAOS," the CIA some- times "may have over- stepped its bounds." But he insisted "any steps over the line in CIA's 27- year history were few and far between and, if wrong, stemmed from a misconception of the extent of CL-Vs authority." "Certainly, at this time;" the Director assured the President, "it is my firm belief that all activities of the Agency are within the limits of its authority." Assassinations. On assassination plots against for- eign leaders: l Ir. Colby has steadfastly refused to discuss publicly the specific charges that are under investigation by congressional committees. He says "I think there is WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC) 10 August 1975 7HE FAST T ' 4, The new addition to the President's Council of Eco- - nomic Advisors, Paul M*cAvoy, comes from- a- quiet little street in Ipswich, Massachusetts, where novelist agora Upolko is a neighbor. The street: Wi lla-Vain ..., . "I'm going to Nome, Alaska, to publish a CIA newsletter," cracks New York Times investigative reporter S aymosr Penh, asked about rumors he might love the Times, Ac- tually, he says he left town a couple of weeks ago to work for several months on a long-promised book on national security for Random House. He says he will then work out. of the Times' office in New York while his wife attends medical school there. the future. When the congressional committees broke off their hear- ings for an August recess, their investigations were far from finished. They will be resumed when Congress returns to work in September. - The Senate Committee, which so.far has concentrated on assassination charges, will turn to other allegations against the CIA. It will also look into the intelligence activities of other federal agencies, such as the FBI and the Defense Department. The House Committee will pursue a similar course. Then will come hearings on legislation expected to pro- pose tighter supervision of intelligence operations---and probably to limit their scope. One proposal would specifical- ly forbid assassination plots. And attempts will probably be made to force at least the figure for the total intelligence budget into the open. _ The outlook is that Congress and the White House will be embroiled in controversy over intelligence matters for months to come. Ieavn~ positive harm to the reputation of the country to go into great detail on these things." But the intelligence chief emphasizes: "Our policies today . are clear. . . . I am opposed to assassinations because I think they're wrong and because I think they frequently bring about absolutely uncontrolled and un- foreseeable results." - Over the years, Mr. Colby has related, foreigners have suggested assassinations to him, and employes of the U.S. Government have also discussed the possibili ty of assassi- nations with him. But each time, he says, he rejected the idea. In a June appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press" telecast, Ir. Colby warned that "any attempt to dis- band" the CIA "would leave our nation vulnerable in a world in which we now sit 30 minutes away from a nuclear missile aimed and cocked, in a world in which our economic resources can be throttled by hostile foreign nations." - __.r Director Colby has expressed concern that the effec- tiveness of U.S. intelligence operations may be damaged by the publicity given CIA operations in the current investigations and the curbs on CIA activities that might be imposed. This is a concern shared by many in Congress and in the Administration. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has said:-"There have been some abuses, but I consider the intelligence function of the CIA is vital for the conduct of foreign policy and I hope that the CIA will not be damaged." President Ford has given assurance that any recom- mendations he makes to tighten supervision over U.S. intelligence agencies "in no way will preclude these -intelligence. agencies from carrying out their legitimate foreign-intelligence responsibilities." THE WASH=I' CTOT STAR 18 August 1; 75 !fs,-And, Slats . . Sen Frank Church, D-Idaho, says he would disap- pove of any CIA involvement in current anti- -Communist activity in Portugal, although he feels such Covert activity may be proper. "This is a case," he said, "where a covert action bythe CIA could be said to-at least conform to our values as a country and to our professed principles." But then he added: "i can't think of anything that would help the Commu- nists more in Portugal than to have us messing in it and get exposed and then let the Communists point to the fIA for having intervened secretly in Portuguese affairs. That could keep most spies cold for awhile. ,Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAO-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 NEW YORK TIMES 31 August 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 SIGHTSEERS CAPE AT PULMIAR BARGE Huge Craft Slowly Sinks and Rises 4 Days Later Off California island . Spedai te, The 5,m, York Times CATALINA ISLAND, Calif., Aug. 30-Last Sunday- a thou sand or so vacationers on the beach at Isthmus Cove here were treated to a remarkable sight. A great covered barge, longer than a football field and re- sembling an ocean-going dirig- ible hangar, began sinking about a 'quarter of a mile off- shore. She went down so slow- ly that hours passed before she finally vanished below the sur- face. An ungainty vessel then Moved into the cove. She was)! longer than two football fields,l with a great derrick devi arising amidships. The vessel positioned herself directly over the spot where the barge! had sunk and dropped her an-i chors. For the next four days: the_ vessel perched motionlessi over the submerged barge, likel some prehistoric sea bird hatch- ing a giant egg. . The barge was the H. M. 1F3.-I, which stands for Huhes Ma- o Barge, and the ship squat- Last year the Glomar report- edly retrieved part of a sunken 'Soviet nuclear submarine from ,the bottom of the ocean 700 miles off Hawaii in a covert operaiion from the Central In- telligence Agency. The submer- gible barge is a support vessel, reportedly used to attach a gi- ant submarine-grappling claw to the Glomar from below. Until the secret mission be- came known. to March, the pub- lic had been told that the Glo- mar and her barge were a proj- ect financed by the billionaire ,Howard-R. Hughes to mine val- uable mineral nodules from thei ocean floor. rr The vessel's cloak and dagger background made the Glomar ,and her barge a subject of in-111111. .tense interest among vacation-1 This interest was heightened) .by the site of the Glomar activ-1 .ity. Isthmus Cove is one of the) two populated areas on ibis` -largely undeveloped island, which lies 26 miles off the Cali- {fornia. coast The cove isi crowded with hundreds off boats.. 'drive-in theater," said a visiting! accountant- Permanent residents here say that the latest visit is the ;barge's fifth trip to isthmus Cove in he last four years and the Glonrar's fourth. They say the barge first came _-BALTIMORE SUN 27 August 1,975 CIA not at home Philadelphia (KNI)-De- pending on your feeling about the CIA, this news may either be disturbing or relieving. The mews is that there is no one home at the Philadelphia office of the CIA. When you call the local office of the CIA (215-MA 7- 1390) a recorded message says: "This is the Central In- telligence Agency. . . and due to other commitments there. will not be a repre- sentative in this office until Tuesday, September 2." struction at a Pennsylvania shipyard. On the next four visits, the Glomar came here, too. Each time, residents say, the barge went to the same spot and submerged The Glomar moved in and perched over her for several days and then moved aside as the barge rose out of the sea- The operation is self-con- tained, providing its own power with electrical generator aboard the Glornar and a work barge named the Ore Quest. The project requires a small flotilla of auxiliary vesseLs, including :thtree tugs, several security launches, and an ashor-pulling vessel. called Me Happy Hooker. Whatever the Glomar and the submergible barge are doing, they are not mining mineral nodules. Where the barge sub- merged the depth is only 159 feet and the ocean floor is flat and sandy, Throughout the operation most of the Glom crew-re- portedly more than 100 then ,and technicians-were confined to the ship. The few allowed ashore were close-mouthed and answered vacationers questions with silence or, shrugs. Lights Up Love At night the Glomar was a blaze of lights, illuminating much of the cove. "Do you want to know what the Glomar is doing?" asked ,'Lillian White, manager of the 'lone hotel here. "FII tell you what it's doing. It is frighten- ing the buffalo away from the( isthmus. There hasn't been one _here since the Gloru.3r arrived." Catalina is the home of 500 buffalo, whose ancestors were 'left here many years ago by a movie crew that brought them! in for a Western film. Last Wednesday, the Glomar; moved to one side and during the night the barge emerged again from the ocean bottom. On Tli;hrsday night the Glomar returned to her berth in Long .Beach and the giant barge was towed off northward. During the day, a lone buf- falo appeared in the hills over- looking the cove and then went back over the crest "See him?" said Mrs. White. "He's the lookout for the herd." By afternoon some 50 buf-' IV-ASHINGTON STAR 19 August 1975 LOS ANGELES (AP) - The mystery ship Glomar Explorer, built by Howard Hughes and used in a secret CIA mission to salvage part of a sunken Russian submarine, will perform an undisclosed mission off the California coast. A spokesman for Global Marine Co., which runs the sophisticated ship, would not disclose what the new mission would be. . Meanwhile, in the first formal public assertion that the federal government owns the ship, the Justice Department announced in Washington it is seeking an injunction to prevent Los Angeles County from levy- ing a $7.5 million, tax against the vessel. The government still has not formally acknowledged the submarine-raising operation conducted by the ship for the CIA. The injunction is being sought in U.S. District Court in. Los Angeles on HUMAN EVEIITS 23 August 1075 A n grounds the ship is the property of the United States and thus not taxable by a state or any of its sub- divisions. The Los Angeles County tax assessor slapped a 25 percent fraud assessment on Hughes' Summa Corp. in June because, he said, it told him in 1974 the ship was registered in Delaware when it was in fact regis- tered in California and tax- able there. On the nature of the- upcoming mission, Taylor Hancock, a Global Marine spokesman said: "We're free to say that it (the Glomar Explorer) will be doing some experimen- tal work by the isthmus," f near Catalina Island, about 23 miles off the California coast, said Taylor Hancock. A CIA spokesman, asked for comment on the latest events affecting the Glomar Explorer, responded: "We haven't said ' diddly-squat about any of these tales." Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.), a member of t'-e Senate lnteliigence Committee, charged last .~:eek.t:`:et attempts "to protect the Kennedy name" were splitting the panel. In an obvious reference to Chairman Frank Church (D.-Idaho). Goldwater said that ''it appears efforts are being made to divorce former President John Kennedy, and his brother, Attv. Gen. Robert Kennedy. from assassination at- temott, on Fidel Castro in the early 1960s. Gold- water said he resented .impressions "that the CIA was out of control and conducting private, wars against foreign leaders without presidential au thority." From the inception of the agency in 1947,1 Goldwater said. Presidents have "directly or indi- rectly approved all actions taken by the CIA." tr How accurate are the accusations of ex-CIA agent-turned-revolutionary Socialist Philip Agee in his book, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary"? Well. Penguin Books. which brought out the edition in England, has publicly apologized in court to Tom Gavin, the general secretary of- the International FEderation of Plantation, . Agricultural -and Allied Workers in Geneva. for Agee's suggestion that his organization was under control of the CIA. Penguin has agreed to pay unspecified damages to Gavin, who brought the libel action over the book, and has promised to withdraw the libel from all future edi- tions. Approv For i lease 2001/08/08 : CIA5RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 .INSIDE THE CIA: INVESTIGATING THE INVESTIGATORS Lecture by Daniel Schorr Washington Correspondent, CBS Mews for the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies Paepcke Auditorium August 19, 1975 i Two years ago -I stood on this platform, talking about Watergate, saying, as I recall, that it would not end before 'President Nixon left the White House, It took another year for the unraveling of V-latergate to be comr,pleted_ with. r es gna- tion. But what I did not anticipate is that a year later I would be back on this platform talking about the Son of _1,iater-? gate --- the investigation of the CIA.and the rest of the intel- ligence community. I ball it "son of Watergate" because it has the same ear- marks -abuse of power when no one is looking, cover-up. when someone starts looking, panic when the looking goes too deep for the cover-up to be maintained, The CIA situation also has a direct family relationship to Watergate. The strategies and the 'Personnel. of ?Watergate came from the CIA's Ray of Pigs operation. Ater gate was covert operations turned inward. Techniques deemed acceptable for bringing down foreign enemies looked less acceptable when used to bring down domestic enemies. !,'ore simply, an unlovely flock 'ofchickens has come home to roost. a It was, in fact, Watergate which caused the first thorough- going inspection of the CIA chicken coop. Director Richard Helms, who had withheld from the FBI information about CIA's earlier help to its alumnus, Howard Hunt, which Hunt used for the break-in on Daniel Ellsber g's psychiatrist, had been shipped off to Iran early in 1973. His successor, James SchiesJer, in i Miay, 1913, called on all employees to come forward and report to the Inspector; General, or directly to him, any improprieties they knew of. They ? knew of hundreds, large and small. Within twelve. days they were compiled into a fat book, titled not 'Tae?ort on Gross Improprieties, but "Flap Potential Report." For the ,-motivation was not so much a zealous rooting, out of wr ong-doing as a prudent preparation for dealing with situations, like Howard Hunt's wig, that might come unstuck and embarrass the agency. The Flap Potential Report expanded and acquired new tit Les. she Skeletons Report" and,. finally, with that urbane 'humor which is the hallmark of the intelligence professional, it became known as "the Family Jewels." By August, x.973, when the plan had- been evo]J ed. to dis-- posd..of "the Family Jewels," Schlesinger had gone, on to greater things at the Pentagon and been succeeded by his executive director, ?illiam Colby. The plan was sim?`pl e -- a series of directives to ban henceforth all those activities that :night, if ekpcsed, cause embarrassment because ille;=:al or improper. The mass exposure of Watergate had ended the sense of immunity from exposure. One directive said: No more illegal opening of mail! Another directive said: No more assassination plots! st~~,-o~~u,~relscDovo~o2cA-'~74~~P~3~5! Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002=5 "Operation Chaos" -- the spying: on domestic dissidents --- was to be dismantled and henceforth prohibited. Also, no more experimentation with drugs on unwitting subjects. And some restrictions were imposed on detailing of CIA personnel to the White House and other government agencies. Bill Colby has expressed pride that the CIA's misdeeds .are discovered by the CIA and corrected by the CIA. if there was any sense that individuals, or the agency, might be account- able for Nast illegality,, it was not era:^ediately apparent. Helms, under oath before Congressional committees, dissembled about covert operations abroad and surveillance at home. Helms has since been under investigation by the Justice Department for possible perjury. No report on the. discovery and correction of CIA improprieties was -made in 1973 to president Nixon -- understandable since he might have used such a report in his desperate battle for self-oreservation. But President Ford wasn't told about it either until he asked -- and then not very willin`ly.. The CIA is accustomed to operate on a need, to know basis and there was apparently some uncertainty about the need of the President of the U.S. to know such unpleasant things. By and large, the public ' CIA. rumpus of 1975 was the internal CIA rumpus of 1973. Without, going into detail which might jeopardize sources, let me say that the public CIA scandal stemmed partly from a leak of the internal CIA . report which -- ironically -- was written in the. hope that the whole thing could be worked out quietly and never become public. - The public exposure came mainly in.three waves that rolled over the r=eeling-intelligence agency. First, in September 1974, covert operations, like Chile -- an issue raised by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times,. Credit-for at least an assist must 'go to Rep, Michael Harrington of Mass., who, invoking his rights under House rules, read the secret transcript of a briefing by Colby to an Armed Services subcommittee, then protested to enough other Congressional groups so. that one could be reasonably sure the story would get out. It was an issue of $11 million spent first in trying to block and later to weaken Allende in Chile, the first Marxist to come to power in a democratic election. In fairness, one must say that it was a classic Cold War operation that may look questionable from the perspective of a d6tente period. I have myself seen top secret 1970 memos discussing proposals to bribe members of the Chilean Parliament to vote against Allende -- proposals rejected not as immoral, but as probably ineffectual. But papers on covert action were never meant to be read by weak-kneed constitutionalists.. ,W1e', after all, dealing with professionals more accustomed to operating under the rules of the il.iarquis de Sade than the Marquis of Queensbury. . That controversy produced a sharp reaction 'against covert .political operations. By last December Congress was voting, that such operations ciould only be conducted in the future with the express authority of the President, and timely infon-ration to Congress. And, if .the CIA is to be belie- ed, such operations at low level anyway in a period of Detente -- have now been - practically ended.. W ich, if you -look at the current situation' in Portu,-al, may or may not b e a J good t Leh hi t~-. The covert operation issue had hardly ebbed when the second 1l?vApprove8FrrOR1e11 2 lMU1099 WK6P77s@Mg2K(y0bdL@Mt7a002 aim, 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Sy Hersh, in the New York Times. A banner headline on Sun- day, December 22. It spoke of "massive" spying and files kept on left-wing groups and anti-war protestors. This issue had a.rauch treater impact than: the issue of -llende in Chile. For this was us - Americans, and not some far away Latinos. So, President Ford asked what this was all about,' and Colby sent him a report in Vail. after Christmas that said, yes, some such things had haopened, but not massively. :?nd, for the first time, President Ford learned of the 1973 Inspector General's report. But not all of it because he had only asked about domestic s rve l1 ? For reasons not fully known, Colby then decided that he'd better level with the President a little more. 3, he called P:ir So, an January. on Ford d in the 'ti,;rh,! te. House.- and verbally briefed him on some other things that hadn't come out yet, if_ciuding .CIA involvement in assassination conspiracies, c .President Ford was. shocked; Not so shocked, h r -' or nay be becaus..otir.,,.y -- G he was so shocked --, that he agreed with Colby that she skeletons in the CIA's closet should' be kept. from public gaze. To avoid damaging the reputations of past Presidents and the current conduct of foreign affairs... that as I. understand it, was his reasoning. '_ He appointed a commission -- with Vice-President Rocke- feller as last-minute choice as chairman after Retired Judge Friendly of New York had pulled out whose members were better known for loyalty and discretion than for tearing the Joint aoart, And he- cave that commission the carefully restricted mandate of looking into CIS. domestic activ:z ties, an area where a aamage assessment indicated the worst was already out., But, 1n? reaction to the domestic spying controversy, Congress moved to launch its own investigations, with. much ''z errnandates. President Ford worried about what an unrestricted investigation would uncover; and he ;rorried aloud to some people, and his worries about what might come out helped to insure that they would come out. On Feb. 28 of tl-,i s year the third wave started rolli nT over the CIA. On that day, on the C13S Evening; Ide 'is, T reported that President Ford was concerned about assassination plots after having been briefed. Uy.Colby, on the subject. A: kw;ardly now, to keep the issue from being left or. his doorstep, President Ford asked the Rockefeller com2rission to 1,et into the subject its mandate had been devised to keep it out Q`;` 'By stretching "domestic activities" to include foreign assassination conspiracies with significant domestic recruitin ,* the Rockefeller commission .was able to take on the assassination of~Gen. Trujillo in the Dominican =republic, and the many, unsuc- c ..ssf ul at empts, some Uimes in orccrt with the Mafia, to try to get Castro of Cuba. t As the Rockefeller Comrnission prepared to issue its report in June, President Ford had another change of mind. He decides; that the chapter 1 on assassination plots let'., too many . cue stions unre-solved -- especially the chain of command to past Presidents -- for him to Want' to issue it under his aegis. So instead of trying to steal the thunder of Congress on assassinations, he passed on the thunder to the Senate Select Committee, encouraging it to get out a report on this subject as soon as possible. That Senator Church's bi-:,artisan Approved For Release 2001/0$/08: CIA-RD$QI'~OOOe3~00'Y~ do. 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-6 And so in recent weeks, in the hearing room of the Joint Atonic Corm ttee, reputed to be the securest spot on Capitol Hill; there-has been 'a strange procession of witnesses ranging from John aosselli of the Mafia to i?IcGeorge Buncly of the For! Foundation, from Robert ilaheu of Las-Vegas to Richard Goodwin of New York. . It has been possible to. trace the main assassination conspiracies from CIA officials do award and outward ?--- against Castro from 1959 and well into the Sixties, shortly before and even after the assassination of President Kennedy, raising a Question that I'll `o into later. Against Trujillo, from which the CI4 tried to pull back, but too late. Against Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, whose elimination in 1970 appeared necessary to block Allende... a plot that wasnt meant to include assassination, only kidnapping, but was botched-.- Against Lumumba in the Congo, where the CIA never decided to assassinate him, but supported his opponents who did decide to: that indigenous conspirators could tell the CIA was, jumbling up a couple of advertising slogans, "Fay now and leave the driving to us." Ambassador Helms has said. that as far as he knew the CIA was never responsible for assassinating a foreign leader. And. Senator Church called that statement "correct, but not complete." What it omits is what Richard Helms. contrived not: to know, what the CIA considers itself not responsible for, what it tried to do and failed, and the targets that did not qualify as leaders. I am-informed for example, that Iran's former Defense Minister, Bakhtiar, who had a falling out with the Shah, was killed in 1970 in exile, the CIA reportedly having provided some friendly assistance to the Iranian.secretP police in the form of surveillance to keep track. of him. But, alas poor )Bakhtiar! He'll be mentioned under covert operations, but won't make it in the Senate's assassination report for reasons that some may consider rank snobbery. Not having been..a leader, he didn't qualify for assassination. The greater difficulty, though, is tracing assassination plots from the CIA ur) ro d -- dete ,, fining what, if an~r, element there was of Pr esideritial resoonsibility. The plots spanned four Administrations -- iron the late Fisenho -her until the early Nixon. Presidents are not in the habit of lea', inr- behind rae:zos say in._-, "I want P_-?emier So-and-so rubbed out and advise of. completed action by 'close of business Friday. Helms and others of the CIA say the agency initiated nothing,-, but acted in response to Presiden_tia1 "concerns," Aides to Presidents --*ALL of them, from John Eisenhower to Henry Kissinger -- deny that the President ever ordered or -condoned an assassination.' There is a contradiction there ;which may never be fully resolved, for in the end one is left vrith subjective evaluation of incomplete evidence. When the committee was considering, the Kennedys and the Castro plots, Senator Church said that -the CIA was like "a rogue eleohant Off on a ram?,Page of its on." And Senator.Gol&rater said the CIA acted on!,, on Presidential orders. i?Iore recen_tl the subject has been Nixon and the. killing of General Schneider in Chile. r And I.hgve not seen Senators Church and Gold;-rater,. quite "reverse their positions, but Senator Church is going after Nixon tapes trying to pin do:vn- just what the ex-President .meant in 1970 when he said he wanted everything possible done to- stop Allende from coming to po:ver. There Sen. Church seers to see not a rogue elephant, but a rogue President. It may be that the question of Presidential responsibility Approved For Release. 2001/08/08 : CgA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 for assassination conspiracies may came. down to-.the judgmental matter of what, the King had in mind when he said, "Jho will.. rid. me bf this turbulent priest?". What we have so far been discussing.are activities the agency is no longer conducting, bi sinesS Sit is essentially out of since at least 1973. They are, iA, that sense, and if you pardon the macabre expression, dead issues. But there are some issues that I think you should be alerted to that are quite live -- live because they require not only judgement about the past, but action in the future. One of those problems has to do with the consequences of the.-CIA's tendency to assume that its operations were some- how? beyond the law and therefore required no accounting. "Cover," which is a tool of the intelligence trade, blended effortlessly into "cover up." The .CIA didn't want to be d ed into the Watergate scandal, so, as the record shows, Helms Cave-orders that evidence and i tnesses who knew about aid to ho:?rard Hunt before ilaterE.ate lb, ' with -,ld from the FBI. The CIA didn't want its reputation hurt, and maybe operations blo:rn, so Helms told less than the' truth about Chile, and about domestic spying. And, in the Rockefeller report you will find documentary evidence' that when the CIA -rent in for mail opening, there were written internal warnings that the activity was criminal --- not so that it should be stopped, but so that the necessary cover story should be ready in case the operation was blown. The CIA had an enormous preoccupation with what its people called "flap potential." There was one other "flap potential" the CIA covered up at a time when it might have been relevant. It never told the Warren Commission in 1964 that up until shortly before, the assassination of President Kennedy -- and even after -- it had-been n ersistently trying to kill Castro. Nor was it mentioned by commission ,,.ember Allen Dulles, who had been ,CIA director when the plots were first hatched. Even without this know?,rledg e, a secret :Marren staff report, b William Coleman (who'is now Secretary of Transportation theorized -about Castro revenge as a possible motive for Lee Harvey Oswald, who played the role of Castro defender and, according to his wife, hoped to--o to Cuba as a hero. But CIA Director John McCone and his deputy, Richard Helms, appearing before the -Viarren Co ission, questioned by a member named Rep. Gerald Ford, said they knew of no reason to suspect a oviet conspiracy, or a Cuban conspiracy. And they never mentioned the CIA's eff1orts to kill Castro. It- is important that you understand what I am saying, and especially what I am NOT saying. ' I am not saying there was 'any. indication that Oswald was put up to it by Castro, or by pro-Castro Cubans, or-- another theory of the Warren staff report --- by anti-Castro Cubans. I am only saying that, considering Osww.ald's pro-Castro activities, and the CIA's admitted surveillance -of Oswald in Mexico City, it knew that efforts to assassinate Castro might have been relevant to a' full? inquiry, and it failed to give ,,that information to the . . een accused of a great many Warren Commission. The CIA has been" things -- including involvement in the Kennedy assassination, of which there is no evidence.. Perhaps if the CIA didn't have'such oenc nt for covering up so many'things, it wouldn't get accusea of so many other things. There is another current problem, so vexing-that it is Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : Cl QRDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002=5 hardly discussed. There is a massive new capacity for electronic eavesdrop?ing that makes our anti-wiretap laws obsolete. The CIA and the super-secret rational Security Agency can almost literally pick conversations out of the air by monitoring the- micro-wave radio channels that today carry most of our long- distance and some of our local calls. The CIA did some ea-ves- random a few years ago, just testing equipment, until its.general counsel warned against it. It can also link .its tapes to a computer that will retrieve any call that has mentioned a certain name or a certain subject. It did that, for several months with all calls between the U.S. and a Latin American country as part of a narcotics investigation. But it- was stopped in that period when they started worrying about illegal activities. Is the CIA eavesdr?onJing on Americans t.Qday? Well, the Russians monitor U.S. phone calls from their embassy in Wash- -ingtbn and their installations in New York and an Francis- r.o, linked to satellites in orbit. . And the CIA keeping; track of the Russians, has developed a capacity for eavesdroppinc on Soviet ea.-esdropping. It is useful , and on occasions Con:?ressmen ha-:e been called and .?rarned that they were being overheard by the Russians. But it involves some -eavesdroppinr on Americans. And it is probably illegal. Beyond the li Inited use that is being made of this fancy new equipment, lies the ca-acity for almost unlimited eavesdropping that has far outpaced our legal protections. President Ford, without announcement, has asked Attorney General Levi to worry about it. And I suppose he is worrying about it. I suggest that maybe you should worry-about it, too. Finally, there is one other concern that !,believe warrants at ten lion. You'll recall that President Eisenhower, after his retirement, expressed his concern about the g royrth of a "defense-industrial complex." Well, there, also seems to ha e developed something that could be called an "intelli- gence-in us trial comolex.11 The cooperation takes many forms, some rather familiar., such as the use ofAlmerican companies with foreign interests to provide cover for CIA agents. and Payment of money. But it has a?Par ently gone much further towards what can only be called the joint pursuit of common objectives. When former CiA Director _HcCone, on behalf of the ITT, offered the Cif ? more than a :million dollars for an operation in. Chile that the ITT :ranted .to promote; the CIA refused it. ; But this suggests th t the. rent-an-agency idea had been broached before and pt.rhaos used before.. . The CL itself is big business. One of its wholly thcu;h secretly owned "=proprietary" companies has made a lot of money ily?n charter fli`hts, and another has lost a lot of money on }Tn? ~ ket the agency a-?:: ~1*7 4A el 1 - aren4ly being better at aol' +.1ca_Ninte11_gence. . If there is anything. the CIA. is skittish about revealing, it is how much money it gets and what it does rm it, and whether it is a money-making pr ?o p- osition.. By which I don't mean necessarily counterfeiting; the agency recently denied that it ever counterfeited dollars. But there are sins; amid all time secr h ecy, t at the CI S is like a conglorerat6 company, and at home shim- shoulders with other such companies. Are there danga .,rs_ ? ~?r don't really know until we know more about it. But we need to - know more about `?:h-Ie ther, over the years, the of enc ;T may have Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :1 IA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037000.2-5 confused corporate objectives with national objectives. When the CIA worked with the Mafia, . J. Edgar Hoover objected that a Government agency shouldn't open itself to blacks::i1 by organi ed crime. The disaffected lieutenant of Howard Hughes, Robert =,aheu, says that Hughes wanted to run a large covert operation for the CIA so that he could exact- concessions front the U.S. Government when needed. Hughes did do one rrulti- ::tillior_-dollar- operation for the CIA -- the Cloniar Explorer that tried. to raise a Soviet submarine from the Pacific. hot to -mention his publicity people, the Mullen company, who served as a CIA front.. And not to mention so-called cam- paign contributions through Bebe Rebozo to President Nixon. And.Hughes did ask'favors not only from the CIA, but other - government agencies -- when he wanted to buy an airline, or- acruire more Las Vegas hotels than the anti-trust laws allowed, or stop atomic testing in Nevada. We need to know more about the CIA., which employs more economists than the Treasury Department, as a big business and its associations with other big business. survive. And that may be true. But there are some who say we'll have to know a few more of its secrets if we are to survive. The agency may be a lot better today than it has been in the past. Born in Cold War, its had a tough time adjustin" to detente. Operated so long without accountability, it's 41 trying to adjust itself to requirements for accountability. T, is paying a heavy price for casual cover-ups of the past by.pressure now for almost total disclosure. But, as with Watergate, the chances are that things won't get better until t:-e know the worst. - Note: Not for release before delivery 8:3p p'T August 19 There are likely to be?changes and additions during delivery, but Mr. Schorr stands behind this text. JMATS EJE s 2 AUGUST 1975 'vTo.;2 CIA=.Head Says. -S'. 'hfeaten=eci bar -USSR, Whine Secretary-of State 'Henry Kissinger-was ' . touting detente last-week. and trumpeting the. forth- -Conference- summit'' in Het- r_1 sinki, U. Gen::;Vemon Wal- ters, the deputy .director of the Central I n telligence.. Agency, painted a far. less cheery ver- sion .of world: events t o jour ..nalists.?-At. a-'luncheon at the Army-Navy Club-hosted by _ the American Security Coun- of .of.. fifth on `the horizon;' They're third generation missiles, they're not anything they've just cooked up..-, "We see them building larger and more powerful submarines,.. we see? them increasing the 'number of. tanks and modernizing the tanksWe see, in other words, in'all areas a tremendous military effort being m , ade to modernize and improve the Soviet forces be- 'yond what seems to me to be necessary for either de terrence or defense..'.' _ ;Twenty years ago; said Walters,"the CIA was t6ld it was. "facing_a?ruthless and implacable enemy who is determined to destroy us byall"means in their pow --er..We must match theirdedication with ours and their 'ruthlessness with ours."' Walters 1' indicated he. didn'.t:.think things had. changed. much:, since that time.J Are we facing: that type of enemy;the one you referred to?" he was asked. "Well," said. Walters,. "I think the factors may'have changed, tint 'I don't think- the-long-term goals, have changed very much. Asked if he had noticed "any change since the so- cil, -Walters, -in- accents Simi- WALTERS-; lar'to Solzhenitsyns; tontendedvthe_United States in a "tougher: power situation than George Wash An-ton'- Continental -Army.-_-'' Valfey Forge when it -was confronted with a`superior'force of British troops. :We hope detente will work;"':he: said, "but at the: 'Same time wecan't help seeing-the Soviet Union de- ploying four new different types of ICBMs, with signs The CIA says it cannot tell all of its secrets and .Approved For Release called period''of detente," Walters replied: "I don't think so.". Asked if Americans should feel threat- I ened, the deputy CIA director put it bluntly:,-1 would feel threatened.- 2001/08/08 : CIAP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002=5 THE WASHINGTON POST Sundax, August 3i, 29;5 By Arthur N. Cox Cox, a writer and lecturer on foreign affairs, is a former official of the State Department and the CIA. His next book, "Myths of National Security-The Peril of Secret Govertsment," will be published in Septe,nbcr. HE WORD `SECURITY'," Justice "THugo L. Black wrote in the Penta- gon Papers case, "is a broad, vague gen- erality whose contours should not be In- voked to abrogate the fundamental law em- bodied. in the First Amendment. The guard- ing of military and diplomatic secrets at the' expense of informed representative govern- nt provides no r e a I security for our public." The past four yens have amply confirmed ate late justice's wisdom. The Watergate ioverup and the secret bombing of Cam- aodia both demonstrated the dangers in permitting the executive branch to define "national security" unilaterally. There is a clear need to oversee and to limit the execu-. th,e's use of "national security" for conceal- ing operations and controlling the flow of Information. The problem of executive accountability can only be resolved by Congress through meaningful legislation. And yet, despite re- cent experience, very little is being done. In 2 sense, indeed, there has been retrogres- sion. Last year government information sub- committees in both houses actually drafted Legislation and completed hearings. The pills, providing machinery to ease classifica- aan procedures and rules, got nowhere in ire face of strong executive opposition. But it least they were drafted. This year no ,egislation was written, no hearings have seen held. The sad result is that it is still passible for a President to hide behind "national security." The need for congressional action is rend- ered all the more campelling by the Supreme Court's July, 1974, decision ordering the release of the White House tapes. The un- animous decision was widely hailed, but in the rush of events, inadequate attention was paid to the fact that, for the first time in history,, the court also endowed the doctrine of executive privilege with con- stitutional grounding, most essentially iii matters of national security. The Complex Present OST SO-CALLED security information if is classified under rules laid down in executive orders issued by various Presi- dents-lioosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon. The legal authority for these orders has never been made clear, though in each , Approved case the Justice Department was apparently relying on implied constitutional powers. In any event, it is these orders which provide the basis for the classification system and for the markings.."Top Secret," "Secret" and "Confidential." There are, however, precedents for con- gressional oversight. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for coverage of sensi- tive atomic energy information under a spe- cial security classification labeled "Re- stricted Data" but goes on 'to state that. a joint congressional committee must be kept informed-fully and currently-on all mat- ters relating to development and application of atomic energy. Thus, for more than two decades, Congress has maintained oversight of information involving nuclear weapons, and there has never been a leak of "Re- stricted Data" on atomic energy from Con- gress. Congress also adopted the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, under the prodding of Rep. John Moss (D-Calif.), That law placed the burden of justifying the withholding of most types of information squarely on the executive, but it also permitted the gov- ernment to withhold any information "spe- cifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national de- fense or foreign policy." In other words, all so-called national security information was protected from public disclosure. This situation has been modified some- what. by amendments decisively passed over President Ford's veto in 1974. One amend- ment provides that a citizen or media rep- resentative may ask for release of national security information which, it could be argued, no longer need be classified or which had been improperly classified- If such. a request is denied, the amendment provides, the requestor may take the issue to court and the contested documents may be examined in camera by the court to de- termine whether they should justifiably be with held. These changes htay relax the secrecy system somewhat, but it is difficult to imagine that many judges would over- rule the executive on a question possibly involving the national security. The executive branch sees no need information- and material" is working w11, according to administration officials. The ?order, replacing a 1953 Eisenhower order, does make it harder to classify documents. It reduces the number of departments and bureaucrats entiti.?: classify documents. And it provides for dcci4?:: itication in six to 10 years, except for certain information which may remain classified for up to 30 years. In spite of these modest improvements, however, the classification bureaucracy remains vast. Rep. William S. Moorhead (D-Pa.), who, has studied the problem, has described the classification bureaucracy vividly: "There are 55,000 arms pumping up and down in government offices stamping `Confidential' on government documents; more than 18,000 government employees are wielding `Secret' stamps, and a censorship elite of nearly 3,000 bureaucrats has au- thority to stamp `Top Secret' on public records." Through the years the secrecy system has burgeoned. The federal archives report- edly now contain a billion classified docu- ments. There are more than 11,000 corpora- tions, university research centers and "think tanks" which have been cleared by the Defense Department to handle and store secret information. The management and storage of these tons of classified docu- ments costs the taxpayer hundreds of mil- lions of dollars annually. And yet expert witnesses before congressional committees including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and members of the Defense Department's Science Advisory Board-say that not mare than 10 per cent of the information should ever have been classified in the first place. But the Ford administration, following its predecessor's lead, has recommended that the classification system be protected by criminal sanctions. S-l, a bill to revise the federal criminal code, sponsored by two conservative senators,. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) and Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb-), with strong administration backing, provides severe criminal penalties, for the unlawful communication of "national defense infer mation," a new category. This would include intelligence material, various types of mili- tary information and atomic energy '-re- stricted data." For all other national secur ity information, the bill says, a person womild be "guilty of an offense if, being or having been in authorized possession or control at classified information - . , he knowingly communicates such information to a perms not-authorized to receive it." The security provisions of the bill, no before the Senate Judiciary Commkttee, ar obviously sweeping. If they are enacted not only government employees but all per sons in defense industries, universities research centers who ever had authorize access to - classified information would b subject to criminal penalties. For the firs time, the leaking of any classified ipforma tion, no matter what the degree of sensiti vity, would be a crime.' Congress Has Authority hbPiTE administration protestations, i is clear that the system of executib orders controlling secrecy ciassificati4u needs to be replaced. Too many lies, to much, waste and too little freedom of in formation have resulted from that system, further congressional action. President What is needed is congressional oversigi?' Nixon's March, 3972, order on "classifica. plus new guidelines and new machinery lion and declassification of national securit t bilitTh i a ere s For Release 2001/08/08 : -RDP77-00432ROOUT00 (MZ-'S`ouu y. Approved For Release 2001/08108 : -CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5. question that, no matter what the Justice. make the final decision in any clash be- A Fine Line Department may. argue, Congress has the tween the commission and a secret-holding t - HIS BILL once constitutional authority to set the boundar- agency. In the past, the chief executive has f passed, could provthe les, the basis for appropriate revision of the almost invariably come down on the side espionage legislation as they would apply Thus, in 1973, former Chief Justice Earl of security. Would future Presidents weigh classified, information. Section 794 of the Warren had this to say: "Whatever secrecy the arguments for freedom of information. present act makes it a crime to transmit to is to be permitted concerning governmental more carefully? There is reason to believe- foreigners without authority information records in the highest as well as in the .they wobitt For the re. he lowe l ec lons shou d to fixed by law.- -Former Justice Arthur Goldberg spoke to the point in 1972 when he told the House government information subcommittee, "1 have no doubt that Congress is authorized to enact such legislation." . It will never be possible to achieve absolute accountability 'because the execu- tive branch is responsa,ie for implementing the laws. If a Presideflt . and his assistants .want to violate laws under the cover of" secrecy they can".probably do so. But one way t6 drastically reduace the possibility of such violations would be for Congress to establish a Security Ilmformation Commis- sion,within the executhve branch. The com- mission would be composed of five distin- guished citizens, -with appropriate exper- ience, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. A major role of the commission would be to establish a new classification system based on the principle that information should not be classified without strong grounds for pro- tecting it from our adversaries, and that information should be made available to the public as soon as possible. The commission would have an attpn?af~ rt~af to ;-,,.,. IV the guidelines established by Congress were Jew-e` information should be accepted; being Except for the special exemptions, these o implemented. provide that "Top Secret" be downgraded The commission woul;:l serve as the Presi- to. "Secret" after two years and that "Se- dent's principal acviser ,on matters of free- cret" be lowered to "Confidential" after two dom of information and as an advocate with- years. But the Nixon order says that "Con- in the executive branch.for the premise that fidential" information should be declassi- essential information must be available to fied only after six years. This is not justi? Congress. The commission's chairman should liable because, the lower the classification, be a member of the National Security Coun- the stronger the case for early declassifica- cil. The commission's task would be to at- Lion. Congress should set the limit for "Con-. tempt to balance the needs of essential fidential" material to one year. This would.. secrecy and those of the public's right to make the classification time span five years- know. Clearly, the commission would not for "Top Secret," 'three years for "Secret" attempt to substitute itself for the CIA or and one year for "Confidential." Occasion. the State or Defense Departments in deal- ally there will be disputes between Congress. ings with Congress. When, however, the and the executive about continuing classifi- c ommission that owe of these agencies cation for certain information, but these. and ability were appointed as members of was significant information should be resolved by the security informa44 the security information commission. The which could safely be made available to tion commission. Congress, it would be the commission's task commission should influence a new trend in to so inform the President government toward this philosophy: When, in doubt, err on the side of freedom of in The President, of course, would have to formation rather than secrecy. 'Was Star ~, ~ s17, 1975 'Slither: to slide; gde' Funk & Wagrnalls Dictionary One good example of the obvious slanting of your news was last May's front-page article entitled, Flow Our Subs Slither Along Soviet Coastline." One never sees an arti- cle about Russian ships "slither- ing" along our coasa- and certainly 'there has been ample proof that they are patroling and observing our operations. By your efforts. to picture the CIA. the FBI and al police work in the worst possible light. one won- ders just where your allegiance lies,' All anti-war groups, demonstrators. peace marchers are made to appear as pleasant, non-violent, well-man- nered, docile persons by you. Those of us in this general area who have seen the destruction, harassment and violence of these groups know differently. As far as the police using spies to, einfitrate these groups, good for them! They are representing k the taxpayers of this country who don't want it taken over by revolutionists. ca~uac wiui 1I16eu ur views would carry some weight within the reason to believe that it is to be used to the executive, and the commission's reports to - injur of the U it d St y n e ates or to the advan- Congress would of necessity indicate wlieth tage of a foreign nation." That intent clause er the executive was adequately taking into ? has always been difficult to :prove and .account the interests of freedom of informa- should be. dropped. The language would be tion. improved if it simply provided that the un- The commission would make regular re- authorized transmission of information, clas- ports to the congressional government in- sified by law, to a representative of a foreign formation subcommittees on implementation government would be subject to criminal of the law. It would also adjudicate requests penalty. for classified information from individ- However, leaking classified information ual members of Congress. to a congressman or to the media is not Further, if Congress is to make sound espionage, nor is publication of such in- decisions about appropriations for defense . formation by a newspaper, book publisher and other national security programs, the or TV network. Yet a need exists for-some national intelligence "estimates" must be- kind of sanction against such leaks since made available to,the appropriate commit- there is information which should be held tees and subcommittees. Such estimates can secret to protect genuine considerations of be effectively "sanitized" to remove all ref- national defense. One of the difficulties erences to intelligence sources and methods, about assessing penalties is the fine line thus reducing any security risk. The com- between authorized and unauthorized dis- mission should be given the responsibility closures. of ensuring that such. estimates and other When the President, secretary of state classified information are properly guarded or other high official leaks security 'in- on Capitol Hill. formation, no questions are raised. Nor are As for current information, the time they raised when a President or cabinet limits contained in the Nixon order for member, after retirement, includes "Top the declassification of "Top Secret" and Secret" information in his published mem ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH- 5 august 1975 CIA's Weak Future Now that Clark Clifford has joined the pack of liberal knife-wielders who won't stop short of eviseeration of the CIA, we. have-the final authoritative word on the subject; We can look forward now to a weak intelligence system seen daily through glass walls, as the proposed split-up agency vainly combats-the machinations of the Soviets and the stu- pidity of sanctimonious Americans who- won't let us sully our hands with the dirty ,business necessary. to survive. Joyce Ferrell ,-.-Concord Village . . oirs. Since high ranking officials use classic fled information for political or personal advantage, it is difficult to jtatify severe penalties when lower ranking officials reveal information as a?matter of conscience. Penal- ties could include public reprimand, loss of job and loss of eligibility for future government jobs. The security information commission 'could be given responsibility for establishing and monitoring the adminis- tration of such non-criminal sanctions. Clearly, there are ^ no panaceas for cote trolling government secrecy, but if Congress enacted the measures outlined here, a long step would be taken towards establishing essential accountability. In time, public Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : Cl,1JRDP77-00432RO00100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA=RDP77-00432R000100370002=5 oul . SEPTR4B ER 1c,75 I I WAS CALLED OPERATION PBPRIA1IF THE LEADERS WERE THE TOP FOUR MEN IN THE - ' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE TARGET WAS CONTROL OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IT COULD HAPPEN HERE AND A CONTROVERSIAL EX C1A AGENT TELLS E;\ACTLY HOW By PHILIP AGEE. continued Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :t.`1A-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 S :TURI}AY REVIEW 6 Sept. 1975 The Condor's Bite by Karl E. Meyer T confess to a certain queasiness before i seeing Three Days of the Condor, the first "big" post-Watergate film; star- ring Redford, Dunaway, et al. The movie was sired by the kind of conglomerate that can turn a condor into a boiled turkey. A Paramount release, it is pre- sented by Dino de Laurentiis, produced by Stanley Schneider, and directed by Sydney Pollack, none of whom are re- nowned as political controversialists. Be- sides,,how seriously can you take Robert Redford? The answer, so far as Condor goes, is very seriously indeed. There is nothing rubbery about the bird's bite; this is, I found myself thinking, the most provoc- ative film about the corruption of Amer- ican institutions to reach the commercial screen. It asks us to believe that The Company, a.k.a. the Central Intelligence Agency, can exterminate its own em- ployees, on American soil,. and do so with every expectation of getting away with it. The film is also technically bril liant, and its performances have a rep- ertory excellence, but this I found less of a surprise than the disenthralled bru- tality of its story. The exterminats, so to speak, are CIA researchers working in a New York brownstone behind a doorplate reading "American Literary Historical Society.". One of their number is Joe Turner (Robert Redford), whose job it is to pore over foreign books to see if some obscure potboiler contains a coded mes- sage. As the film opens, Redford believes he has indeed found such a code in a third-rate novel that has been mysteri- ously translated into various exotic lan- guages. He. reports his discovery to Com- pany headquarters and, on an otherwise uneventful morning, ducks out the back door to buy lunch for his colleagues. While Redford is gone, the extermina- tors arrive-an execution squad led by a contract killer, Joubert (Max von Sydow),. who works with surgical non- chalance. Redford, lunch bag in hand, returns to find that his six co-workers are corpses. He dashes to a street tele- phone and reports the murder to Hig- gins (Cliff Robertson), the New York station chief; Redford is so rattled he nearly forgets his code name, Condor. Redford is ordered to "come in," and he reluctantly agrees to a rendezvous m ,a West Side alley on condition that as colleague whose face he knows will also be present. In the alley an attempt is made to kill Redford, and the familiar colleague, an appalled witness, is mur- dered. Ltrl _ E. _Meyer, a film buff and former Washington Post correspondent, was co- author of The Cuban Invasion, the first book None of this vivid footage will help in the next CIA recruitment campaign, and one can understand why Redford feels he must hide from his own employ- ers. He does so by abducting at gunpoint Kathy (Faye Dunaway), a photographer who lives alone in Brooklyn Heights. Using her apartment as a base, and with Kathy's half-willing assistance, Redford penetrates the labyrinth of The Company and finds why he has been marked for death. It transpires that a CIA-within-the- CIA has evolved, directed by the agen- cy's fanatic Middle East section. chief, who has been confecting his own plans for the subversion of oil-producing states. Unwittingly, Redford had stum- bled upon the book code used by this network; to forestall exposure, the sec- tion chief had, ordered the elimination of Redford's entire unit. Eventually, CIA higher-ups locate this fault in the sys- tem, and Max von Sydow is now paid to turn his. guns on the. insubordinate operative-which von Sydow does, with aplomb, in Redford's presence, and then coolly invites Redford to become a con- tract killer, too. But Redford has other plans. Instead of "coming in," he tells the story to The New York Times; when the local station chief hears this, he looks at Redford as if he were mad but recovers quickly enough with the curtain line, "But will they print it?" (The bow to The Times was not in James Grady's 1974 novel, Six Days of the Condor, on which the film was based, but makes a nice lead-in, if pat, to Redford's present . venture, which is, of course, the filming of All the President's Men, about a certain story that was printed.) I have retold the plot in some detail, even at the risk of spoiling some of the suspense, because the film raises issues of such agonizing importance. Can we believe that the CIA operates "think tanks" in New York under spurious names? Of course. Can we also accept that the CIA, on occasion, will hire gun- men to wipe out its own? Ditto, if with a little more difficulty. But finally, can we believe that CIA agents can be mur- dered in the streets of New York with only a lying item in the press, planted by presumably compliant police? Too many people would have to be implicated in. such a cover-up, too many friends and relatives would begin asking questions; we are not yet a totalitarian country. As film, Condor is more a warning than a documentary. Still, I think it a mistake to be too literal-minded. Condor is really about what can be called the diabolus ex machina; suggestively, von Sydow's CIA code name is Lucifer.. We are within a machine gone berserk-the opening cred- its are in computer printout type, and t some of the most unnerving footage is in the CIA central operations room, rem- iniscent of Kubrick's similar room in Dr. Strangelove, with John. Houseman, in a superlative brief appearance, play- ing a jaundiced Wasp version of Strange- love. The Company is run by men who are less immoral than amoral, believing that the higher needs of national security can sanction any crime, and that the worst crime is to let the outside world know this. And that I find very easy to believe: see the Rockefeller Commission, report, passim. Indeed, it is sobering to consider the prophetic paranoia of the movies. The Manchurian Candidate (1962) was about a conspiracy to assassinate a Pres-. ident, the chosen weapon being a sniper's bullet. In State of Siege (1973), the Costa-Gavras film with Yves Montand in the lead, the CIA was shown training Uruguayan police in torture techniques -and the picture was attacked for being simplistic (which it was) and inaccurate (about which I'm not so sure). Then there was The Day of the Jackal (1974), about a conspiracy to kill General de Gaulle, with a professional killer hired for the job. It now develops that the CIA was approached on just such a scheme- a.story as yet unconfirmed, and I would like to believe that even The Company is too fastidious to treat with jackals. But I wouldn't go to the stake on that. IN Condor all the elements miraculously fuse together: a tight script, superbly paced. direction, and acting of credible polish. What can happen, in a spy thriller cute politics, when the elements fail to cohere is sadly evident in The Wilby Conspiracy, a well-intended film set in apartheid-ridden South Africa. Sidney Poitier plays a black revolutionary so virtuous that we cannot believe in him; Michael Caine, his English accomplice, obviously doesn't, because Caine goes. through the motions with his tired reflex mannerisms. In fact-and this was not the intention of director Ralph Nelson- we find ourselves exulting in the villain, a South African security officer played by Nicol Williamson. The screen comes to life when Williamson leers, and it is a pity that his legendary talent, so in- frequently seen, is squandered on cine- matic kitsch. Wilby shows that high-mindedness is not enough; Condor proves that a prin- cipled film can be as compelling as Jaws. In fact, the panjandrums who run the Motion Picture Academy can be grateful for Jaws, because when it comes time to hand out the Oscars during the Bicenten- nial year-of all years-the mechanical shark may spare the Academy the em- barrassment of honoring a film that sug- gests we live in a country in which a good guy is surpassingly hard to find. 0 about the Bay of Pigs. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA33DP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 DAILY TEGRAPH., London 28 July 1975 DAVID FLOYD on Russia's "concessions" at Helsinki A FTER many long months of frustrating; negotiations West- ern statesmen are going to Helsinki . this week to sign the "Final . Act " of the European Security Conference without ? hav- ing extracted any substantial con- cession from the Russians over "Basket Three_"' Under this head. ink it was hoped that some pro- gress would be made towards im- proving the flow of people, informa- lion and ideas across th I e . ron Curtain. Now thiit the final documents to be signed are available it can be 1 seen that. even on paper, the Russians have given very little fore Helsinki. In fairness to them it must be said that neither the Soviet lead-, ers nor the men. who rule Eastern E urope ever let it be thought that they were going to open up the Communist world to Western influ- ences in the interest of " di tente ? . away. In practice things will re- main very muesli as they were be- 4 T 99 kd h-1. UU s number -of publications they will bounds to him. He. is not sup- import and make them more easily posed to approach any Soviet available to their citizens, institution or even any Soviet citi- There is no question here of a zen directly, but only through the free flow, .of information or even Press department of the Foreign of .fiction into the Communist Ministry, which carefully monitors countries_ nnr an s ,_-- his __ . y ug h i R - - - n ussia and East- ern ,Europe will cease to control very carefully what their people are allowed to read. There is little hope here that the average Soviet citizen, or Polish or Czech citizen, . :,, ... _ .. h a fails to comply with the u s11 11", , trict. rules. At the same time. Communist correspondents in the West are free to come and go and write as they please Nov th R e ussians have promised to: ?aoout the outside world to improve the .journalist's lot. Ap- or the ideas circulating there. plications for visas will be examined h t obta f ? y e rut:610- 1 o mmmatitnr about ine West Acavst ltocl.11[I will be im- gical battle bet~aen East and West would be, by travelling there and proved; access to sources of infor- must go 011, they said. And they being free to make their own con- mation will be extended; and it is tacts .Pro t "the e n efforts t up a stubb- orn I inquiries. signatories to Wes t- su m?f t h h e t n o ls v of ate r t professi Helsi ki na acti ity flow of people and ideas. dertake to facilitate tourism on an ,. will neither render , journalists It was only x-r)hen it seemed pos- individual or collective basis." liable to expulsion nor otherwise sible that their stonewalling This will make little difference penalise them., But the Soviet prevent the Helsinki "sum mit might to practice in the West where an authorities will, of course, be the .from taking place this month. and one who wishes and has the moneY` arbiters timate to what is and is not . that Mr Brezhnev's programme of can go abroad, and to a. Communist As was to be expected, the Soviet events for 19Te might be upset, country if he chooses. But Corn- concessions on--the flow of informa- that the 'Soviet negotiators ielded munist Governments do not ack- a little. The ti ad tiatorWestern- diplo- howled -e the right of their citizens noon are slight indeed. This was g not the fault of the Western neg mats gave in: anything to get it allo travel to abroad at all: they are tutors, nor perhaps even the e over and done with. only as a favour, and Soviet ones, so much as of the he sys- then usually in closely controlled tem itself. After all, even in the And yet 1Basket Three is really groups. the essence of the whole affair. The It is safe to say that those who midst of the recent Apollo-Soyuz ether "baskets " are mainly state- are . most interested in the West found "technicalr difficulties "a to ments of general principles govern- and whose minds are most open to avoid taking TV pictures which . log East-West relations; and their Western ideas will have the least would have revealed that Anoilo central political purpose, from the chance of travelling. There is no ' was twice as big as Soyuz. Tech- Soviet point of view, is to legitimise suggestion that Communist Govern- nical snags can always be found Russian domination of post-war ments will cease to select very for evading agreements. gains in Eastern Europe. Basket carefully who may have the coveted Three was to be the price the prize of a trip abroad. But for Mr Breztincv and the :`. Russians had to a fo th i p y r e r Pon- . Then there is the Soviet apparatchiki to have gacal gains. Western question of Helsinki having to If Mr Brezhnev was so anxious tit access to reliable infor- g given a little e away mation about the Com ? ing will up have the seff tem soften- to have his summit meeting- munist and countries, the principal channel for rary, the Soviet system. the ce the Russians, we are told, fought which is provided by the despatches ont all the ter,confiden will like tigers" to have it in July- and reports be all the greater, both-confidence oth in their then, it was argued, he must be respondents of news age Icies, news- :treatment of their own people and ready to make some concessions, to papers and radio and television sta- nn their relations with the subject i lower a little the bbetween tions workinn nations of Eastern Europe. East and West. barriers arn concessions ton or g Pin Communist capi- as he made? peo le who read the re- The Znc decade iv the Shrus- ults of their work realise under Union, since the re of hhru As far as the fC w of information , what 'diffi of co cult conditions they have they, has been one of consolidation. is concerned, the Western negoti to operate, and stabilisation. The hopes of ators pressed for a Greater avails d, liberalisation " raised b Khrus- y ability of Weste ai publications in . ': che' w M ~ s w avering rule have the East. While 'Communist pubis- any restrictions been for- cations are avar'~l:ble in unlimited . The - gotten, and most of those -who quantities in ail West, the entry Moscow cisrhed and nt working in pressed for political change in the p Soviet system are now silent, in Of IVestci?n news rapers, periodicals by obstacles hedged ai every side prison camps or a , and e,t books into Communist coup- formation to his obtaining any in- . ~.a psi phi e lc n the tries and tdistribution there apart from what the ss, or-- luckier ones has been tr subject their the strictest control authorities wish him to have. He drast. Jewishe migration has been and jct shin Now at Ileintrol cannot leave Moscow without et- drastically redu?re The K B has censo e the he iun s S~taes will under- mission, and half the Soviet Union dents.~ally suppressed the dissi- take to increase 41 to ,> is in any case r ne I LA! , 1~WWibvec1 orTZelease 2001/09108 : 6[A-Fk~`Pl1=004-32R-000100270002-5 erne eggs ir,. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 That is not to say that all is well with the Soviet system. Dis- content is widespread--=among re- ligious believers and intellectuals, among the non-Russian population and among the young people, for whom Communism or Marxism has no appeal.. Industry, geared to military needs. cannot satisfy con- sumer demand. Agriculture, hope- lessly inefficient. cannot feed the population without periodic pur- chases of grain from the West. But these are now the constants influence on foreign or domestic policy, and where any thought dif- ferinz from that the State thinks is c?rn~?hed." . The same can be said with equal justice of the political regimes of all the countries of Eastern Europe, which have been brought into line in the 30 years since Yalta. The latest to trv to step out of line. Czechos1ov2k;a, was taumht a brutal lesion in 19,8, since when an -un- easv calm has descended on the wdole area. Once a.pain the peg e l of Eastern 1~'? ipgrn.pd the 11"n?n cf Munch in 1g38. V2l.ta in 1045. C7echnclnvakia in 7948 and Hungary ;n 7QSR that th"v had little to hnne for from the West. With 27 .divisions stationed per- manently in Eastern Europe. and another 50 ready to move in at short notice, the . Russians are of the system, which no Soviet leader seriously hopes to remove The system has other advantages. ..As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said re-. cently in Washington: " It is a sys- tem which has no legislative organs. is without an independent Press and without an independent judici- arv, in which the people have no LONDON OBSERVER 3 Aueumt 1975 'A NECESSARY summing up of the political outcome of the Second World War' was.Mr Brezhnev'. modest definition of the main achievement of the Helsinki jamboree. In so far as the assembly of 35. nations recognised the status quo in Eastern and Central Europe, established by Russian.arms in the interest of Russian power, I suppose it is fair enough to call this a summing up of a political outcome. But neces- sary ? Certainly far from necessary to us, or to anybody else ex- cept the Russians. That it seemed very necessary :o Mr B,rezhnev we know from the way he has gone on about it for so many years. But one still has to ask why the leader of one of the greatest Powers in the world finds it at all necessary to devote so .much time and energy, and to invest so much prestige, in the realis- ation of a rather childish get- together, which neither in- creases the security of the Soviet Union (or anybody else), nor adds a millimetre to its real stature. . . Russian .motivations are always complicated- and usually obscure. ? Historians still argue about the true in- tentions of Nicholas I towards Turkey on the eve of the Crimean War. Not all. the ..secrets of all the archives yield up a firm answer-and ,,one good reason, it seems to me, is that Nicholas himself did not know what his own intentions were.from one week to the next. pr-in ahead with t e Process of political. econornic and Military in- tecratinn. It is on this ?cituation that the Het inki summit is to put The virtuous formulations in the Helsinki documents have no more relation to political reality than did the Yalta agreement which "guar- anteed " free elections in Eastern Europe or, for that matter, than has the Soviet constitution which ",guarantees " all the democr-,tic freedoms to Soviet citizens. The Western statesmen who go to Fin- land, some reluctantly, some less so, may believe they are serving the cause of " detente," whatever that is. They are certainly not serving the cause of freedom. EDWARD CRANKSHAW explains the importance of the summit for the Russians: `They long to be respectable' We are similarly in the dark about what went on in the mind of his grandson, Nicholas II, when, in 1898, he startled an unbelieving world by de- manding a grand disarmament conference, the forerunner of all others. He got his confer- ence-at The Hague. Nothing was done about disarmament, of course, but certain rules for the conduct of war came out of it. Some historians insist that Nicholas was moved by genuine idealism, in the spirit of the old Holy Alliance. Others see in it a rather des- perate attempt to stop Austria re-equipping its army with. new guns which Russia could not match. Nicholas himself would have been hard put to it to say which was right. I think the contemporary Soviet leadership is also unsure about . its immediate objectives. So historians will doubtless be arguing about Helsinki for many years to come. Was it conceived as a genuine move towards. detente, or as ?a means of strengthening the Russian hold on Eastern Europe, or both ? If the first, what can this sort of meeting achieve that is not achieved better by quiet diplomacy ? If th`e, second, how. can speech. making in Finland, strengthen a position which depends on force of arms ? My own view is that much of the drive towards Helsinki carne from a need to feel good, which was frequently a ,complicating factor in pre- revolutionary Russian states- manship, and is now surfacing again after the Stalin era,. during which the idea of good- ness did not arise. We are so familiar with the need of the English to convince them- selves of the nobility of even their shabbiest actions, that we forget that other nations may be similarly afflicted. It is a characteristic of English politicians that they often do not care what others think of them, provided they can con- vince themselves that they are acting with motives of the highest. rectitude. Russians, on the contrary, tend to be rather touchingly eager for others. to believe them, and the bigger the lie the greater the need. They long to appear respectable. Helsinki has been a sort of apotheosis for a man like .MMlr Brezhnev, who achieved high office under Stalin and man- aged to hang on to it by methods very far removed Approved For` elea' 4 z'u '$8`-: ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 from the respectable.' Sealed with red tape ?Again, Russian statesmen shave never liked untidiness. _They are great believers in the virtue of formal documents, signed and sealed by all con- cerned, and neatly done up with red tape-even if the ; documents mean very little. Russian statesmen have always, felt most powerfully, with all the passion of anarchic spirits, the need to go by the book. How much more must this apply to Russian Communists, proud custodians of the one and only book, men who assure themselves every hour of their waking day that all their actions accord with the grand theoretical design. How does -East Europe fit into this de- sign ? Certainly they are all. powerful in Eastern and Central Europe : nobody is go- ing to drive them out and they know it. But what is their authority for this indubitable power? It is all very well for them to tell themselves that they exercise no power other than their strong right arm, upon -which all fellow Communists may rely. This has come in useful in the past and doubt- less will again. But it cuts very little ice in the larger world, and the appearance of tanks in rebellious city streets does ..not immediately bring to mind an image of moral recti- tude. What Helsinki has done is bring all Europe and North America to something like a declared joint recognition of a situation only tacitly acknowledged so far. And this, I think, is as spiritually uplifting for Mr Brezhnev and his friends as it is depressing for all those Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, etc., who have found comfort in the refusal. of the West to c;ree that. current arrangements are in any way sacrosanct. Mr Brezhnev had something to say about national sover- eignty, too. ' It is only the people of each given State, and. no one else, that has the sovereign right to resolve its internal affairs and establish internal laws.' This observa- tion, said our Mr Wilson, is an important statement, which he took very seriously. But what does it mean ? Mr Wilson seemed to . think that it inhibited Russian intervention anywhere, that it meant the end of the Brezhnev doctrine, that had it been spelt out before 1965, Czechoslovakia would not have been invaded. I wonder. Russia can send troops wherever there are Communists in power and Whenever it likes, without in the least technically infring- ing national sovereignty. All it has to do is to declare that the comrades in Prague, or wherever, have appealed to Moscow for help against counter-revolution. The War, saw Pact forces may then swarm in to the rescue. I think that Mr Wilson, and all of us, will find that the 'Sunday, August 31,1975- -- . THE WASHINGTON POST .11 sovereign right Mr Brezhnev was tizinking about was the sovereign right of the Soviet Union to do what it likes with its owtt' citizens and to reject all outs5de protests. MrBrezh- nev most he free to go on using the KGB to persecute Jews for applying to leave the country,: to torture a Bukovskv slowly to death, to consign a Grigoreir.ko to a lunatic asylum, to stop ordinary Rus- sians from travelling abroad and mix: g with foreigners at home. The Berlin Wall still stands. There is nothing we can do about it, and of course it is better to have a working. re- lationship with a Russia which is at least a more civilised place than it was some years ago than cut ourselves-.oif from it entierely. But there are working a'xrangements and working arrangements. Russia has not recanted its open declaration of ideological warfare undler the banner of co-exi'stence' And ideological warfare'to tluem is not simply a matter of intellectual de- bate : it means no holds barred in strengthening sub- versive movements wherever they can be .found and con- trolled in then name of Conn- tnunism. This is unft:iendly activity, and should he seen and treated as sucl`i. In so far as Helsinki helpe d to dress up a hostile Power in a cloak of respectability, it was not only a betrayal of ithe victims of oppression, it was self. betrayal,. too. issi o' r Papers Photo - Q a e 107- MILAN. Aug. 30 (UPI) -,Corriere. is published by thel Other photographs show Kis-I An Italian weekly has pub-!newspaper Corriere della Sera singer reading -? or a hand lashed telephoto pictures of., and has a circulation of 800.-1 said to by his holding - rrem. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger looking at a ' hand- written note from President Ford, and secret documents, some of which are readable. The photographs were taken at the European summit con- ference in Helsinki last month, it said. 000. It said the photographs oranda marked "`Top Secret." were taken by Franco Rossi The magazine says they: with a 600 mm. telephoto lens from the photographers' gal- lery overlooking the confer- ence floor July 30, the opening day of the summit. Mr. Ford is shown passing a note to Kissinger which reads in part: ... Do we have to 0 Predict a "coalition" gov- ernment in Saigon within a month. 0 Describe relations be-1 tween France and North Viet- nam as "strained" ? Report Chinese "advisers" in Cambodia who seem to bed commanding C o mm u. n i s t: 6rces. In some of the photographs I play East and West in [not published Friday the text of legible] confrontation. WV hy' the documents is readable, but not amplify HOPE which all in others the reproduction is want get our, actions end atl 0 List Joan Baez and Cora unclear and the magazine sup- t that." Weiss among "peace activists" plied an Italian translation of The word "hope" was under- who turned out to welcome what they reportedly said. (lined twice as well as capital- South Vietnamese Commu- The magazine, Domenica del lized. In ists to New York. 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 the- -agreement had been signed Russian ? save it lithe: Soiriet Union failed to notify from the catastrophe of totali- firm resistance tti Communist t; the:', Urrited: States of Egyptian- tarian central planning geared expansion, hacked by the mili o ;Yom Kippur war. - of which she ;had: adr:ance knowledge. Moreover, ? any one ' who remembers how the ?tSovie?ts summoned Henry, Kissinger i, to Moscow td arrange a. cease-fire -after having refused to. go along r.with U.S.?.pleas for U.N. action- ..knows, -:that A he Russians used detente.' ,-to save the Egyptian Third Army CC~rps from destruction and 1 td'-';depr,ivel'Israel of a .deserved iilitary$ victory. To this day, the =Soviet 'r'ole in the Middle East has rbeen'destabilising, not peaceful. And.' in Vietnam? When even the Vfe'tnamese sought to persuade ;Hanoi not to go for total military war production. And make, tary means to rnaloviets' b I,* marched through the streets with pictures of Stalin!-tram seizing power over a people from whom they' just-, received barely l per cent. of the vote? Wherever there is trouble in the world' today one looks in vain .for.- a..shred of hard evidence that the Soviets are foli?viing a course of detente.. But that's rot quite true. They are following ddtente of a kind -their: kind.. Their. version of detente is- very simple:: they take. take, take and give nothing in return. Detente means we give the Soviets' sophisticated Western technolo;v-especially civilian computer technology. We also finance truck plants, nitrogen fertiliser factories, natural gas production, etc. You-- night--' think that 'a country that. needs such tech. nological assistance must at least be doing -something all right agriculturally. Not so. In addition to giving the Soviets our superior technologyo , we must also sell them food" o their people. - Western.'-workers are being called upon -to bail out the WASHINGTON POST 1 September 1975 prime acthe Commurrrst gains? Is i, purpose is not rehs-ted to the United States atteunpting to private profit. liberate Czechoslovakia, Poland, Our businessmen seem to Hungary, East Germany? Do we have an unshakable faith, in the- have political parties' in these -power of commerce to achieve countries-or in the Soviet Un- I practically every imitginabie- ion itself-that serve as instru- goal-to end war, ex,: ird jus-: mentalities-of our Government? lice, raise living strr.ndards. What we have here is a version No policy for peace-whether of the "trickle down '? theory it goes by the name of detente x else-can be sue- applied on an international. or someth] e h e e But we in the American trade. threat t to peace comes fr-mu. In union moie.nent don't buy the our era, that threat comes i" trickle down " there-v. We mainly from the Communist don't buy it at home., and we world-from its imperialistic don't see why we should buy it drive to dominate world society. abroad, It l has never worked Not accidentally, the greatest for' U.S. threat to workers' rights eman- We believe that thus cause of ate .S from the same source. social-and economic justice in- There is a peace to he had by the United States nirrst be per-.- accommodating to this threat- .sued'directly and head.-on. That's or by remoulding our institu- what the, AFL-CIO 'is in busi?.- Lions and values in its image, or I ness for. We also believe the in an image more to its liking. cause of peace must be pursued But that is not a peace in which di l rect y not 3s a hdf fll thkf ,.ope-ora.e worers o the world , can out from dubious conimerdal ? hope to advance their deepest relationships. (We might not to' aspirations for a better life. forget that Ge.rmarn? was Bri? Whatever our. Government Lair, s chief trading partner on:: may (1o. whatever our capitalists the eve of both would wars.) may do, we will not accom- The fact -is that a policy of medate to the commissars, U.S. Marketplace an Issue By Murrey 11arder Washington Fort Staff Writer Ford administration poli- cymakers now recognize that they face an ever-wid- etting are of debate over the impact of ? U.S.-Soviet de- tente on the American mar- ketplace. The demands of American longshoremen for a larger slice of jobs and money out of the grain trade with the Soviet Union is unlikely to be an isolated. phenomenon, administration officials con- cede. Nor is the crossfire from political rostrums over the cost and consequences of detente, with a presiden- tial campaign just begin- ning. In blunt terms thaf- defy the ability of official strate- gists to reply with simplistic answers, the recurring ques- tion is thrust at the administration: "What do we give away and what do we get back?" In the days when his ;crrs- tige was at its height, Scere- tary of State Henry A. Kis- singer could overwhelm most of his questioners with sophisticated, geopolitical discourse on the benefit of reducing tension with the nation's principal adversary in the nuclear age. Kissinger's return from the Middle East, with a new Egyptian-Israeli accord, can recoup part of his deflated capacity to impress Con- gress with his diplomatic skill, his associates believe. Even Kissinger enthusi- asts acknowledge, however, that the controversy about U.S.-Soviet detente policy has spread beyond the abil- ity of Kissinger or any other official to resolve. The unavoidable problem for the administration, U.S. planners agree, is that if the policy' is sustained, it will bring the United States and the Soviet Union increas- ingly complex relations that involve competing stakes for cross-interests in the Ameri- can society. That has been illustrated by the conflicting interests of the dockworkers and 1lid- dle Western farmers over the shipment of American grain to Soviet Ports. The dockworkers demand more ship-Iriidii g Work or no Bail- ings.The farriers insist that Approved For Release 2001/08/082 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 presidential language on de terference in internal af- tente. in Minneapolis, to the Le- fairs. pion, the President eau- President Ford also has tioned that while detente cautioned that if the SALT from the constant crisis and dangerous confrontation that have characterized rela- tions with the Soviet Un- ion," detente is "not a li- cense to fish in troubled waters." Soviet interference in Por- tugal drew a particular ad- monition in the President's speech, as it did in Kissing- er's address in Birmingham five days earlier. Yet, the Soviet Union, for its part, equally has warned the West against outside inter- ference in Portugal's politi- cal turmoil, with both sides citing to each other the Hel- sinki declaration on nonin. he would ask Congress for $2 billion a year more for new nuclear weaponry. This, the Russians recognize, bar- gaining-chip talk, with a pre- cedent, although nuclear arms bargaining-chips have a history of developing into weapons whether negotia- tions fail or succeed. In private, U.S. officials do not claim that the stronger language that the Ford administration is em- ploying represents any un- derlying shift in. detente strategy. On the contrary, they disavow that. Essentially, said one high official, the administration's Alonday, Sept. 1, 1975 7HE WASHINGTON POST Soviets Tall Their Gains detente language is "more skeptical, more realistic, and more conscious of the prob- lems in the relationship, rather than emphasizing what has been accom- plished." The "language of. 1972," he said, "is not going to wash in 1975" in the United States," and "the Russians themselves have to be talked to in sterner terms." One burden that the Fort administration carries in the political controversy over detente, as a result of Nixon administration hyperbole, is a public misconception that the United States threw open its technological se- crets to the Soviet Union in the shower of agreements dramatically signed in three summit meetings. That im- pression was intensified when the recent Apollo-So. yuz joint space mission was shown to be lopsidedly de- pendent on U.S. technology. In fact, the 11 U.S.-Soviet- agreements on technical co- operation, ' ranging from joint work on artificial heart research to peaceful atomic energy, housing, health, science, environment protection, transportation and other fields, are still in early stages of development. . After much bargaining over how to proceed, 140 projects in more than 60 technical fields have been planned, but most are in the exploratory phase. A knowl- edgeable American source said last week that "the rec- ord to date is uneven, and the process is slow. But there is enough on the posi. tive side to warrant contin- ued effort." By Peter Osnos cies and shortcomings. { feel really secure. Washington Post Foreign Service Did the United States lose . In the jargon of disarma- MOSCf? Aug 31 - If s r , . rope represented a "great d the Soviets c lose by Or- detente is a two-way street, psychological victory" for by what has the Soviet Union the Soviets, presumably at what they lack? The offered in exchange for ben- the expense of American in. e on efits bestowed by the United terests. The critics ri the yardstick. erd. depends ctkof dete t S n e tates? and be seen to be equa And it is a fact that Mlos- have a natural constituency 1 'the eyes of the The ns e nd d o we a w . r oes not Iend c w is jubilant this autumn in the United States because What Moscow and Wash- itself to lists. Who gives and over the results of a confer- so man ? ` J nmcricans still har- ington are negotiating in who gets in international ence that it first proposed bor vast reserves of fear and relations is exquisitely con- more than two decades ago, mistrust of the Russians. By SALT II -- the Strategic plex, no matter how easily The accord, said Pravda, .their reasoning, anything Arms Limitation Talks - is that parity. the tally may be drawn by the Communist Party ' etvs- that is not a clear American If the talks are successful, skillful speechwritars at- paper, starts "a new stage in advance is automatically . a if ' suspicions can be con- tacking or defending the ad- the relaxation of tensions setback. tro,~Ied and the theories of ministration's record in the and was a major step on the On the Soviet side, there deterrence are correct, than course of the ctyrning, elec- way to consolidating the are undoubtedly Russians a SALT agre..ment will give tion campaign. And the principles of peaceful coex- who believe that concessions the world. a g "bottom line" of detente is istence"-the sort of num- to the West - such as the ged meas- certain to be calculated as e of detente as defined oy bing Russian. rhetoric that emigration of 100,000 Jews Webster's - "a relaxation carefully here as in Wash- Americans tend to ignore. and thousands of other ml- of strained relations or ten- ington. i But senior Western diplo- norities - weakens Soviet sions (as between nations)." For example, the Euro- gnats here say such ceaseless resolve and internal con- The pact, however, will pean security accord, signed praise for the Helsinki docu- trols, fundamental elements not end competition be- at last month's summit meat, including its rigor- of Kremlin power. tween Moscow and the Nest meeting in Helsinki, has ously crafted. provisions on "There is already too lit- for international influence been attacked in the United "non-interference" in the in- tie order in Russia," a So- in, say, the Middle East, States as a "sellout" of East- ternal affairs of others, viet diplomat commented _1 Portugal or Latin America. ern Europe in which the would make it "psychologic. quite seriously recently. Detente is not peace. as the West gave Moscow its long. ally" much harder for the Finding common ground French writer, Andre Fan- sought ,recognition of post- prelim to intervene militari- for two such completely dif- tame, recently put it. cr'else World ;tsar II boundaries in ly as it did in Czechoslova- ferent societies, formulated it would be called peace. kin in 1968. on entirely different princi- How closely Moscow and exchange for some limply pies of economic life and worded Soviet affirmations `'If restraining the Soviets , Zt opera tor. are prepared to is one of the im octant ob- personal freedom, is hard cooperate beyond the nu- of go od intentions on hu- jectives of de peg"along- enough. But add to that the clear issue depends on how man-ri hlts issues. - lingering conviction among each views the advantages i time Western ambassador On the other hand, it , said "then this definitel many on each side that the for itself. Where the be- - r_right be argued by some has ,to be counted more a long-term goal of the other fits end, so does a willing- Kremlin critics that Moscow plus than a minus." is conquest, or at least domi ness to compromise. symbolically accepted a per- To cite another example nation, and the task of Early in the present stage maneirt t U.S. presence on the example building two-way confidence of Soviet-American rcla- ef the difficulties in dclin- Soviet borders in Europe irg gains: Some Americans becomes enormous. tions. Moscow signaled a and also pledged at the claimed that this summer's That is wiry detente must willingness to lot Jugs Co 10 highest political level to ;~poikti Soyuz space mission begin with the simple but Israel in substantial nurn- conduct a' more open rave undue benefit to th ultimately all-important hers if that would start the society: two tenets that vo- Soviets because they came premise that the United flow of American technol- se? Stalin would certainly m contact with technology States and the Soviet Union ogy and financial credits the- have fowiri hard to swallow. far in advance of their otvn. want to avoid a war that Kremlin regards as irnpor- Sen. Henry Jackson (D- But to Moscow the price of would lead to mutual anni tart for the Soviet Union's lvash.); a presidential aspi- wanking with the United .hilation and are willing to development. liana, has said the final act Stages was to lift the veil of set aside differences to At the I ei,.,ht of Moscow's of the Conference on Secu- secrecy from its space pro- avoid a holocaust, interest in 1973, a strbstan- rity and Cooperation in Eu gram, exposing its intrica. . Unless this notion is fully tial tdueation tax designers accepted, neither nation will to discourage emigration 30 ing doctrine of mutual de- terrence is that both super. powers must be equal in terms of nuclear strength l in Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 was dropped after ' U.S. corn-' plaints, and around 35,000 people left the country. Then in 1974 Sen. Jackson announced from a White .House podium that Moscow was, in effect, prepared to let Congress decide whether Kremlin emigration policies met American standards. Trade was the U.S. leverage. But that direct challenge to Soviet authority was too much, and the compromise collapsed. Now emigration has dropped to a relative trickle and the Russians are lining up most of their busi. ness deals elsewhere. . Russians these days say, that their eagerness to buy U.S. products, expertise and grain should have nothing to do with the way their country is run. They cite American trade and aid to and' fundamental change. tent with detente in The countries like South Korea seems improbable. United States plainly wor- and Spain to show that the I Experts believe, however, ries Moscow. Politburo United States has long dealt ? that any modification would member Boris Ponornarev with non-democratic govern- entail a fine balance be- told a group of visiting con. ments. tween Western pressure in gi,essmen recently: "We can have detente the human-rights area and a "We can conceal neither without trade. But we will combination of political, mil- our surprise nor alarm when not pay for detente with our itary, technical and cornmer- a certain circle of political system," a Communist func- cial agreements that give figures . . . keeps stub- tionary said bluntly. Moscow a vested interest in i bornly saying over and over Nevertheless, there are the deepening ties. 1 again that it is only the So- Westerners here and liber- That is the pattern of the viet Union which allegedly al-minded Russians who do past three years. They have stands to gain from the eas- believe that ' over an ex- been good years for the Rus- ing of tension." tended period there can be sians, stable and relatively The Kremlin's concern for some easing of the restric prosperous. Perhaps as a re- preserving its improving i tions on free expression that suit, Soviet publicists. from -position may mean it is sus- make {? Soviet life so. alien to Leonid - Brezhnev on down ceptible to greater demands our own-if Kremln self-as- declare their -conviction in from the United States. Thy-, surance continues to grow. detente at every opportu- imponderable is what Mos- The Soviet state today is nity. cow will do if it, starts to authoritarian. But Russia The process, say the Rus- feel the one-way street run- has been that way under. sians, should be ning the other way. czars and commissars alike, "irreversible," and -discon- DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 20 August 1975 THE H I K. MIRAGE HOW QUICKLY "the spirit of Helsinki " is being tested and found wanting. President Fono yesterday singled out Portugal as one of " some serious situations " America was ivatching, " for, indications of the Soviet attitude towards detente and co-operation in European security. On cue, Pravda, the Russian Communist party newspaper, .launched a slashing attack on interference " in Portugal's domestic affairs by leaders of " the Nato bloc." . So for all the fine words. in the Helsinki document,. there is still no common language between the democracies and expansionary Russian Communism. East Germany has : now completed the installation along '100 mines of its frontier with West Germany of 16,000 explosive booby traps. They are mounted on the eastern (i.e. East German) side of the frontier 'fence. When set off by tripwires, they unleash a spray of shrapnel over !a 30-yard range. So much for 4' free movement of populations," another of the Helsinki desiderata. Another item from yesterday's news: - the Soviet Union has shipped armoured cars, heavy machine guns, heavy mortars and bazookas to Angola. What does Pravda have to say? The . imperialist forces and their Peking allies are trying to Fortunately for the whole of the Western alliance; there: is -growing evidence of a groundswell in the United States against. further pussyfooting around with Russian expansionism ; President Foro knows this, and .is reflecting it. Iff there was 'no progress in the current strategic arms limitation negotiation with Russia, he said, he " would have no choice " but to "ask Congress for an additional two to three billion dollars for nuclear arms, on top of the $9.8 billion in the defence budget. America's maritime unions have " blacked " grain shipments to -Russia. By doing so, they are talking the languagedlussia understands, unleash a civil war in Angola." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 LOS ANGELES TIMES 25 August 1975 A high-level Kremlin official told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation earlier this month that Moscow was looking forward to "real' progress" in the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces in Europe, which resume Sept. 22 after a summer re- cess. We hope this signals a change in Russian attitude toward the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Re- duction, as they are called on the Western. side. Up to now, Soviet participation in the negotiations has been marked by bald attempts, to perpetuate the Warsaw Pact's advantage in tanks and military manpower, while narrowing or eliminating NATO's offsetting edge in sophisticated weaponry. The I~IBFR talks had their origin in congressional pressure for substantive reductions in the U.S. troop presence in. Europe. This country's NATO al- lies argued that if-there were to be American with- drawals, they should be made only in the context of a parallel reduction in Soviet forces in Central Europe. U.S. policymakers agreed, and ultimately per- suaded the Soviet Union to enter such negotiations. The sincerity of Russian participation up to now, however, is highly suspect. The Warsaw Pact nations enjoy an edge of well over 100,000 men in military manpower in the area; Communist tanks outnumber those on the. NATO side by 15,500 to 6,000. The numerical ad- vantage has, if anything, increased since the MBFR negotiations began. Since Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces out- number those of.NATO, the United States and its allies properly felt that the Communist countries should be willing to make proportionately greater reductions in the interest of balance. The Russians argued instead that numerically equal reductions Europe: Keeping Our .Guard E P should be made on each side-a formula that, if ac- cepted, would perpetuate the Russian advantage. Moscow also argued, with greater Justice, for in- clusion of European-based nuclear forces in the ne- gotiations. The proposal was resisted by the United States and its allies, but in fact concessions in this area could be made without real jeopardy to the military balance in the heart of Europe. Such concessions should be offered, if they haven't been already, in return for reductions of an acceptable magnitude in Soviet tanks and manpow- er. The United States currently has some 7,000 tacti- cal nuclear warheads in Europe; few military ex- perts seriously believe that many are needed. De- fense Secretary Schlesinger has been reported will- ing to accept the withdrawal of at least 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe. Others think up to 3,000 could safely be removed, and some experts use even larger figures. It is essential, however, that this country's NATO allies be reassured that removal of a substantial number of nuclear warheads would not upset the balance of military manpower; we trust that such reassurances are being offered in the discussions that are being held at NATO headquarters this month in preparation for resumption of the MBFR talks. It may be that the Soviet Union is confident that unilateral reductions will be made in American forces anyway, and thus will be unwilling to make any compromises whatsoever. If that turns out to be so, there will be all the more reason to suspect that the Soviet-inspired European security confer- ence, which proclaimed a new era of peace and cooperation in Europe, was a sham. 32 Approved For Release. 2001/08/08 ; CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 prestige value by the austere stand- ards of Romanian society and violate the law which prohibits Romanians, from possessing more consumer goods than their incomes would en-. able them to purchase. To crack down on bribery Presi- dent Nicolae Ceausescu.has estab- lished a special department under jurisdiction of the secret police. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, Romania has expressed no desire to actually incarcerate Western busi- nessmen. Instead, upon formal conviction on such charges as "industrial espionage" or "under- mining the economic welfare of the Romanian people," Bucharest usual- ly seeks to extract horrendous fines, bail and damage payments in lieu of imprisonment. Thus, an Austrian plastics produc- er recently had to pay $300,000 to ob- tain the release of two of his sales representatives sentenced to 10 years each in a bribery case. A WEST GERMAN manufacturer of industrial pumps has just shelled out a record $800,000 to free his sales- man who had been convicted of pay- ing a R1nomanian official $4,000 to clinch a deal. Fines . Bid damage payments range, from $15, to $25 for each day of the sentence,., the rate being variable and negotiabl't?', apparently depending on Bucharest's interest in continuing to do busine,, Is with the manufacturer or supplier ir.Wolved. Accordi jig to one reliable East- West trade- source here, more than' 100 "purcl ases" of convicted sales represent Eutives are expected this year. Although'%Bulgaria is barely on the threshold o`k big business with the West, it ton has launched a drive against bril Fery. Earlier this year a number of ts senior foreign trade officials were tried, convicted and sentenced to) terms of up to 15 years in prison. THE MO(r extensive' campaign against bribery and other foreign trade shenanigans has just been mounted by Zrugoslavia under whose worker self- ttnaragement system enterprises are free to deal with Western customers and suppliers di- rectly. " Under-the-table deals are alleged to have amounted to several hundred million dollars in recent years. THE BIGGEST CASE INVOLVES Yugoslav executives now awaiting trial in Belgrade on a catalog of charges of -fraud, embezzlement and bribery in a series of export-import deals. More than SO other company and government officials are in pretrial custody and under investigation, among them, allegedly, a deputy minister and a section chief of the ministry of foreign trade. They are suspected, according to district prosecutor Milan Simicevic, of activities that go "far beyond classical white-collar economic crime, extending into the realm of economic subversion to undermine our entire social and political sys- THOUGH FEW details have been disclosed, the es- sence of the charges in- volves the purchase of vast quantities of inferior indus-'. trial goods and consumer products abroad and their resale at usurious prices in Yugoslavia. To finance the deals, the defendants allegedly bor- rowed heavily from unsus- pecting banks and defaulted on the loans. They reported- ly -deposited profits. in numbered Swiss bank ac, counts, intending to recoup them on trips abroad. In one case, a. scrapped marine diesel engine worth $20,000 was resold in a series of profit-making transactions to its ultimate purchaser for $1.2 million. One of the key figures in the Yugoslav probe is Slobodan Todorovic, cur- rently in custody in Bel- grade's central prison after he was reportedly kidnaped from Austria by Yugoslav secret police agents. TODOROVIC WAS once a high-ranking Yugoslav executive who was fired from his post with a Bel- grade company in 1962. He left the country for Italy, then set up 30 different trading companies for ob- scure import-export and switch deals with friends and former business associ- ates in Yugoslavia. To fi- nance the purchase of im- port merchandise, they obtained loans from Yugo- slav banks which allegedly wound up in their and Todo- rovic's pockets. Todorovic is reported to be just one of scores of "free-lance" Yugoslav pur- chasing agents abroad. Some 140 are said to over- ate in Frankfurt, Germany. The majority are in the business of buying inferior goods which they resell, through a network of offi- cial` middlemen, to compa- nies at home, with everyone involved in the deals al- legedly pocketing commissions. Belgrade's prosecutor the other day described these as "crimes against the peo- ple and the state," an omi- nous hint that he may de- mand the death penalty, too. - But whatever labels the Communist governments choose to attach to under- the-table East-West deals, they do seem to prove that business is business, re- gardless of who owns the means of production of reaps the profits. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 By Henry S. Bradsber Washington Star Staff writer LISBON - The dramatic shift in the Portuguese po- litical situation which has put the Communists oaa- the defensive raises questions about the sudden ability of anti-Communists to organ- ize themselves effectively. The disciplined Por- tuguese Communist party (PCP) achieved a strung position in the 16 months since the old Lisbon regime ,fell because other political elements were disorganized and confused. But in the past month a. series of events has eroded Commu- nist power. 'They might have been separate events with sepa- rate causes. But to many observers here, there seems to'be too much coincidence, too clear a pattern in recent developments _ especially the widespread attacks on PCP offices - to be simply spontaneous occurrences. WESTERN countries interested in the fate of Portugal had been lament- ing the disarray of anti- Communist forces. Whether they helped organize those forces is not publicly known, but they have help- ed finance them, according to informed sources. Western European coun- tries had been lamenting the incoherence of anti- Communist forces in Portu- gal. It would therefore be logical to assume that they -did give them tactical ad- vice. Much has been made of Soviet influence in Portugal since the April 25, 1974,_ revolution. against the Salazar-Caetano dictator- ship. The PCP leader, Alva- ro Cunhal, came home from Thu,s& y: August 2l, 19713 long exile in Eastern Eu- rope a few days later to rouse his underground party. Responsible 'Western esti- mates of secret Soviet fi- nancing for the party since then have ranged from Si million to $3 million a month. Some of the results have been visible in a corps of full-time PCP workers, more extensive propaganda and far more wall posters. than other parties manage to pull up. , What has not been so well publicized is that Western European Social Democrat- ic parties also have been pouring money into Portu- gal. They started much later than Moscow, but in- formed sources now esti- mate the flow of money from West Germany, Scandinavia and - other areas to be greater than Soviet financing. THIS WESTERN' money, has gone primarily to sup- port the Socialist party, headed by Mario Soares. It won 38 percent of the votes in' last April's constituent assembly elections, and other moderate and centrist parties got 33 percent, while the Communists and their allies got only 18 percent. Asked about. foreign financial support, a Social- ist party spokesman said it was too sensitive to discuss. He noted that it is illegal for political parties in Portugal to receive foreign money, but he did not deny that his party was getting it. But money has. not been enough. Neither were votes. The non-Communists were unable to gain advan- tage from their popular sup- port. The Communists, ex- ploiting a foothold in the armed forces, had grabbed and held key positions in the national government and local administrations. THE ANALYSIS at the top levels.of the U.S. gov- ernment as well as in West- ern Europe was that the anti-Communists lacked the experience, organization or tactical knowledge needed to resist the skillfully organized efforts of the Communists. Leaders such as Soares were considered to be poor organizers, with- out a background of hard infighting. The Communists, on the other hand, knew exactly how their minority position could be used tactically to best advantage. But some- one needed to advise the So- cialists and other anti- Communists. The first thought that springs to mind in such a situation is that the CIA has been involved. Senior Americans - not those in the embassy here - have insisted that the CIA has been too crippled with caution by investiga- tions into its covert roles, particularly in Chile, to get involved here. Somebody needed to tell the anti-Communist ele- ments here how to pull themselves together, the U.S. officials have said, but it was not going to be a U.S. job. INTERVIEWS in West Germany a month ago turn- ed up strong bipartisan sup- port for help to the anti- Communists here. Some of this support was for action through political party channels - German Social- ists to Portuguese Social- ists, But some suggested a willingness to engage in- more covert operations. The emergence of the anti-Communist forces began last month, as offi- cials in several foreign capitals were saying that organizational help was . needed here. On July 3 the Catholic church (to which most Por-_ tuguese belong) lost its main radio station in Lisbon to the Communists after a lengthy struggle. In a coun- try with 35 percent illitera- cy, radio is a major influ- ence. The church became more militant. On July 7 the Socialist party lost its main news- paper to the Communists, and the armed forces lead- ership voted to ignore politi- cal parties. The Socialists quit the cabinet, where they had been ineffectual in the face of Communist pres- sure. SHORTLY thereafter, at- tacks on Communist offices began in small towns. More than 50 have now been sack- ed, often with. Communists shooting into angry crowds. Some observers suggest that the attacks develo. d out of local passions, with one town hearing of an at- tack elsewhere and decid- ing to imitate it. This explanation,.and the whole militancy of the anti- Communists now, seem inadequate'to other observ- ers, however. On Tuesday the Soviet party newspaper Pravda angrily denounced the at- tack on Communists here and implied that if the PCP loses its influence it will be a result of outside influ- ence. - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 WASHINGTON POST 21 August 1975 NATO Ra '. ar Pennetrated by it Rescav By Michael Getter Washington Post Foreign service BONN. Aug. 20-The dra- matic helicopter pickup of ithree East Germans inside 'Czechoslovakia last Sunday by a civilian U.S. pilot has touched doff considerable behind-the. scenes concern among Ameri- ican and NATO officials. The pilot, identified as Bart-v Meeker, 34, apparently man- aged to elude NATO radar monitoring systems that are ,!constantly focused along West ,Germany's frontiers with East - j ern Europe. probably the most heavily defended in the world. Although there were con- jilicting reports about just how :many times .Meeker made sim- ilar flights, he claims to have done it on at least two occa- sions. This means he crossed and recrossed NATO's most sensitive front lines undetect- ed at least six times. The episode has touched off an investigation about how Meeker was able to make these flights and completely elude NATO's high-po:rer radar sur- veillance network and ground border patrols. sources said. The helicopter Meeker was flying was a small one and undoubtedly he was able to fly three East Germans-two men and a.14-year-old girl- whom Meeker lifted out of Czechoslovakia in his small craft. Earlier, news agencies that interviewed Meeker by telephone in the hospital reported.: . Meeker said he had re- ceived $4.000 for each of his flights to Czechoslovakia, but denied that the ' payments were fees. "These were guarantees- in case anything would happen to me, that my family would be all right, my family to be: I'm engaged," he said. "I've noticed negative com- ments in the press that I'm simply a soldier of fortune . selling my services in each one. But what people don't realize is that each one took about two months and during these two months I Was not emnicyed, I earned no money at all." - for hip 'and -elbow wounds he suffered. when Czechoslovak guards opened fire as he was loading his passengers. Talking of the previous rescue flights, Meeker said he . had made them at this time, last year, one on Aug; 15 and the other Aug. 17. He said he had brought out four refugees on each of the 1974 flights. Meeker said that he ex- pected to lose - his license to fly in Germany, but he added: "It doesn't matter if I lose my license or not-no one will ever lend me a heli- copter again. criminal - charges will be- pressed. "I think some steps will be taken, but more of a hand-slapping nature thane of a heads-must-roll nature," he said. Meeker's lawyer ` said Meeker had returned to West Germany several. weeks ago from Isfahan, Iran, where he was training. pilot's of the shah's army. _ Meeker said that he was born in Hartford, Conn., and raised in New York City, but that his family now lives in Wakefield, R.I. His father, William - Meeker, said - he was "stunned at first" when he - heard of his son's exploits. "But after I thought about it I wasn't surprised." he said. One of the pilot's two younger brothers, Craig, said that before Barry Meeker enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1966 he had been rather apoliticaL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 low and underneath' the elec. for Americans - employed ;in tronic eyes of the radar. Dart- that area. i ing around mountain areas to Unauthorized crossing 4of elude radar would also make the borders here Is illegal detection difficult. but there were no immediate The affair raises impor- indications that Meeker tant questions for NATO - faces charges. countries that have invested Officials also indicated billions of dollars in a vari- they had no information on ety of electronic monitoring the whereabouts of the t sys ems designed to detect all kinds of activity along the frontiers with Eastern Europe. U.S. officials here say they have no information on Meeker or his whereabouts. The pilot checked out of the Traunstein City Hospital in Eavaria today and left no forwarding address. Accord- ing to a telephone operator at the hospital Meeker left with "some friends." .It is unofficially reported that Meeker has decided to sell the rights to his per- sonal story to the West Ger- man picture magazine Stern and will give no further free interviews. U.S. officials here say that the episode caught them by surprise but that they were able to determine quickly that Meeker was not an em- ployee of the CIA. Many questions were raised by his activities. Meeker reportedly was not .registered with the U.S. con- where he reportedly worked `ffi i ?i n `Prate gu eto'to vr. otestt for a West German helicop ov t protes- over r the violation of Czech ter rescue service. Registra- frontiers by Meeker's heli- tion with the consulate is copter. not mandatory. but is normal Meeker underwent surgery Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370902-5 The Washington Star Thtirtdny, August 21, 1975 State Dept. Shuffle Be R By Jeremiah O'Lqary and Roberta Hornig Washington Star Staff Writers U.S.. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James E. Akins, who has been ac- cused by his critics of being too soft on Arab oil export- ers, says he has been in- formed officially. that he will be relieved of his post Dec. 1. His replacement is part of a reshuffling of key State Department officials who .have differed over energy policy. Saudi officials say they fear Akins' removal signals a new, harder line in U.S. policy. The 48-year-old career diplomat and Arab special- ist said in an interview last night that he has been told he will be replaced after two years in Riyadh and that he does not have a new assignment. Informed sources said Akins will not get a new assignment, which is tantamount to end- in a foreign service ca- reer. According to reliable sources, Akins will be re- placed by the current ambassador to Canada, William J. Porter, also a veteran Arab specialist. In turn, Porter will be re- placed ? by Assistant Secre- tary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas Enders, these sources said. WASHINGTON POST 30 August 1975 THE OFFICIAL version of- this reshuffling is that. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger wants to send the 61-year-old Porter to Saudi Arabia because he is the leading Arabist in the State Department. Enders ostensibly is going to Otta- wa because his economic expertise would be useful in dealing with the United States' No. I trading part- ner. State Department offi- cials have declined com- ment on the diplomatic shifts. But sources close to the situation have asserted that both Akins and Enders are being removed from their crucial ttesitions in forma- tion of U.S. energy policy because of pressure tactics and State Department per- sonality clashes. Reliable sources have re- ported that Kissinger has bridled at some of Akins' reports from Saudi Arabia about the key issue of oil price policy. These sources said Kissinger has tended to blame Akins for Saudi Arabia's adherence to de- cisions by the oil-export cartel to :raise oil prices. AKINS, some sources have alleged, is a victim of the pro-Israeli lobby, which regards him as too soft on the Arabs. . Rowland Evans and Robert Novak ' e Cost Secretary of State Henry singer's latest tour cue force A. Kis- oi Mti-. eastern shuttle diplomacy has brought frowns rather than smiles to high of- ficials back in \Vashington who have this private complaint: we have paid far too much for too little. T:te source of their complaint is r,ccret aid assurances made by Dr. Kis- singer to -Israeli Ambassador Simcha signment of Porter to re- Akins said last night that place Akins means a he has been an advocate of change in U.S. policy to- moderation by Saudi Ara- ward that country. Saudi bia on oil prices and added, officials say they think the "I have told them there is change means the United no justification for a price States will take a harder' increase." He said no one . line toward Saudi Arabia has worked harder than he and other nations in the to bring peace'between Is- Organization of Petroleum rael and the Arabs. Exporting Countries now Enders, chief architect of that it appears the danger the U.S. effort to organize of a Mideast war is dimin- oil consuming nations. for, ishing. coordinated action in deal- The reaction.of the Sau- ing with the oil producing dis will be better known on nations, reportedly has col- Sept. 24 when the OPEC na- lided on policy matters with tions meet in Vienna to Under-secretary of State for discuss the next round of oil Economic Affairs Charles price increases. U.S. offi- W. Robinson. Officials fa- cials have been hoping that miliar with the situation say Saudi Arabia, the dominant that Kissinger is backing nation - in the oil cartel, Robinson in the policy would support a moderate dispute. increase of 24 cents a barrel Enders' assignment to against the expected push Canada would remove him by Iran and Algeria for an from the center stage, increase of up to $1.54 a despite the importance of barrel. commerce between the U.S. VrAETI1ER assignment and Canada. of Porter to Saudi Arabia AKINS, who is in Wash- . signals a new U.S. hard line incton on home leave, said remains to be seen. Porter, last night that "I didn't 'who speaks Arabic, has had know anything about (his experience in Iraq, Lebanon, impending replacement) Palestine, Morocco, }and until I read it in the papers Algeria. He also possesses Tuesday," when syndicated the diplomatic skill of acting columnist Joseph Kraft re- tough or bland according to ported it. Akins said he im- his instructions. mediately asked the State Akins, on the other hand, Department for an expla- possesses another kind of nation and was told to re- toughness -- he is known turn to his post in order to for being almost painfully receive Kissinger when the blunt. He once 7:.fn m'ed secretary visits Riyadh State Department c::iicials next week. that he would not rapport. The Saudi government the official administration also learned of the decision line on Vietnam it, his to replace Akins from press speeches and gave then' retnorts. Secretary of State Dean The Saudi Foreign Minis husk an unsolicited anal- ter , Prince Saud, said in ysis of 'what he thought was New York that his govern- wrong with U.S. policy in -?ment is concerned that as- ' Southeast Asia. T O cf . SS,-,IL breathtaking new aid request of $0.3 n),-11t ),n),-11t not even imagi?title. Tiather, billion for next year will surely not there is fear here that the aid promised be met, the Israelis agreed, to a Sinai Israel could an drastically distort the settlement only after a secret antler- Elideast's rriilitary power balance, that standing that they will receive more the latest Kissinger triumph will, ironi- U.S. aid than ever before--probably Bally, reduce the regions stability. between $2.5 billion and $3 billion Accordingly, ugly questions are be- Thoughtful policymal,ers here fret lug raised in offical Wahington as he good news rolls in from Jerusalem because this lavish expendituro has ` little. Even Kissinger's de- and Cairo. Did Kissinger promote a fel-t~;ht. so feudcrs concede progress on the Syrian Sinai settlement in preference to a generat alideast peace conference in Diritx in WYa shington. Although Israel's 'front is unlikely and an overall settle- 37' 1 Geneva mainly to refurbish his own Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 political standing here? Such questions, which an angry Kissinger in private attributes to "sickness" in Washington, are being raised not by fanatical Kis- singer-haters but by sober colleagues in the administration. The answer to Kissinger's motives depends on just how .likely was a new shooting war between Israel and the Arabs if there were no Sinai agree- ment. Although a few officials believe the danger was negligible, Kissinger's warning of imminent war is accepted by some of his critics. But even while granting the necessity for the latest Kissinger shuttle, there is little room for e4ultation over its cost and con- sequences. The cost became apparent about two weeks ago when Israel raised the ante on its aid request to the eye-popping $3.3 billion, including some $2 billion in U -S. military hardware. One key U.S. official told us chances of Israel's get- ting $3.3 billion are "exactly zero." But Israeli military specialists who visited here last week understand that and still are satisfied with Kissinger's un- revealed promise. Whatever the exact amount, Israel is sure to emerge from the Kissinger shuttle with immense military superi- ority in the 1lideast. Contrary to the misimpression among the U.S. public and Congress, Israel is much stronger militarily today than it was on the eve NEW YORK TIMES 31 August 1975 Mideast of the surprise Egyptian attack in ' October 1973 and could easily win a closet to a st.ccessful 1yeneva onfer- two-front war. Any extra hardware in- creases' that advantage. Consequently, just how much aid Kissinger has promised secretly be- of massive Israeli arms requests. The comes critical. If it is close to the re- $3.3 billion is no one-time proposal. Of- quested $2 billion in sophisticated ficials here fear Israel might want hardware, military experts fear it $3.5 billion to $4 billion a year into would so unbalance arms in the Mid- the next decade. East th t A b a ra states would be panick- ed. The result could be, in the short run, Arabs returning to . Moscow for arms, in the long run, war-two cala- mities Kissinger has toiled for years to avoid. Yet, Kissinger had to guarantee much of the Israeli request to avoid opposition to the Sinai settlement from Shimon Peres, Israel's hawkish mini- ster of defense. In justification, sup- porters of heavy Israeli aid say Israel is more secure and more apt to be con- ciliatory with a sophisticated arms supply assured. Past experience, however, has indi- More likely, the latest Kissinger shuttle may lead to annual repetitions That Kissinger will be returning home from this shuttle not in failure but with an initialed agreement car- ries some side benefits. It may lead, the House to reverse itself on Turkish aid. Chances for Congress' approving Hawk missiles to Jordan will be im- proved. And Henry Kissinger will seem a little more like the diplomatic. miracle-maker of yesteryear. For how long? "About one month," replies one State Department official, who sees congressional probing on grain shipments to Russia, SALT cated precisely the opposite: military agreements and CIA intervention in superiority directly proportionate to . Chile quickly pressing in on the Secre- Israeli intransigence at the bargaining table. Moreover, considering popular Israeli opposition to the Sinai conces- sions, there is no hope whatever for serious negotiations on the Syrian front.. Nor does anybody here believe the Sinai settlement leads one step Will Not o Duch for Arab Unit By JAMES M. MIARKHAM ALEXANDRIA-The interim agreement betweeii- Egypt and Israel has already become an apple of . discord in the Arab camp.. . "The inter-Arab cold war is just beginning," warns the pro-Libyan Beirut daily As Safir. Arab critics of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat fear that, a disengagement agreement in the Sinai will actually be far more than an "interim" accord; that it will effectively detach the principal Arab military power, Egypt, from the confrontation with. Israel. This, in turn, it is argued, will stall movement to a resolution of the thornier outstanding Arab busi-? mess with Israel: the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, the occupied West Bark of the Jordan River and the proclaimed "rights" of the Palestinians to a home of their own. The government-guided Egyptian press has been striving in the last-few weeks to allay these qualms. it has insisted that Mn Sadat is concluding only a military, not a political, pact with Israel; that a sec and disengagement in Sinai is but another step to- ward an over-all settlement; that Egyptian blood was not shed for purely Egyptian interests. .But Arab militants-for example, Marxists within the Palestinian movement-say that Egypt has sinned not only in Sinai. They charge that Mr. Sadat tary of State. The reason for such impermanence is that the second interim Sinai agree- ment, like the battle of Blenheim, may well be interpreted as a "famous vic- tory" purchased at great price with minimal effect. 0 1975. Field Enterprises, Inc. has totally reoriented Egypt's economic and political posture, rebuffing the Soviet Union and wooing cap- italist investors. The deeper these new interests be- come entrenched, the radicals argue, the less likely it is that Egypt would ever again go to war. There is perhaps some truth in this analysis, which predicts that Egypt will now begin to focus upon, its own long-neglected economic well-being. "What preoccupies me now is peace," Mr. Sadat. 'told a group of American Congressmen this month,- "because without peace we cannot start the major plans of reconstruction we have for our country. The Arabs' Choices This preoccupation presents the dissenting Arab- states-Syria, Libya, Iraq-and the Palestinians with tough choices. To start with, Syria and Iraq are locked in an almost obsessive feud, with Baghdad trying to out-radical Damascus to demonstrate the purity of its variety of Baathist socialism. Libya's attacks on Egyptian moderation are not at all con- sonant with the more modulated criticisms of the Syrians, the Iraqis and the middle-of-the-road Pal- estinians, who want to keep on civil terms with Cairo. Egypt does have- the support' of such financial powers as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran (which, though not an Arab state,?is becoming more'deeply erm:eshed in the region). The conservative Persian Gulf states, through subsidies to Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians, also make their influence felt.. It is President Hafez al-Assad of Syria who has consciously built a new, though unsteady, Arab co- alition to keep Egypt from backsliding. Last March, when. Secretary of State Kissinger was shuttling in these parts, the Syrians announced the formation of a military "joint command" with the Palestine Liber- ation Organization. In the intervening months, Mr. Assad rrlade overtures to his Jordanian neighbor, King Hussein, whose army had systematically elim- inated the Palestinian guerrilla movement in Jordan beginning in "Black September," 1970. Lobbied by Israeli pressure groups, the United States Congress helped the Syria-Jordanian rap- prochement by delaying an Administration request to sell Hawk ground-to-air missiles to King Hussein. By the time Mr. Kissinger shuttled in this time, the King and the Syrian President were announcing an- other "joint command." 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 The joint. command with the Jordanians (as with" the Palestinians) exists more on paper than in fact but the point is to remind Mr. Sadat that he is facing. not just a disgruntled Syria but an Arab front de- manding further Israeli withdrawals. The Egyptian press has' astutely welcomed the: Syria-Jordanian move. qtr Sadat has found that, in dealing with fellow Araaa ,.- with Israelis a positive attitude pays the most divitiends. (After the Israelis scuttled the Marc), shuttle, ne opened the Suez - Canal.) The Syrians have also been pressing a campaign to ,eel Israel from the United Nations. This dip lomatic assault gives them some leverage in dealing= with the Israelis on the Golan Heights. But it has. also led to friction with Egypt, which surfaced at the. Kampala meeting of the Organization of African Unity and, last week, at a conference of nonaligned At Kampala, the Egyptians enraged the Palestiit= fans by watering down an expulsion resolution. Mr. Sadat .has said tht; "Kampala stand" will remain WASHINGTON POST 27 August 1975 S. Rejects Libya Egypt's Position. In fact, it seems to be incorporated' in the so-called "secret clauses" of the Sinai accord. The Sinai agreement will press down on the di- vided Palestine Liberation Organization more than .on any other Arab group-with the possible except tion of Syria. The-Palestinians have been unable to halt the process of piecemeal Egyptian political con- cessions to the Israelis. Already split into radical "rejectionists and moderates like Yasir Arafat, the Palestinians. have now somehow to come to terms with Mr. Sadat. The Palestinian moderates seem inclined for the moment to attack the perfidiousness of the Ameri- cans, and the Israelis, avoiding a frontal break with the Egyptians. It is an unhappy choice for men like Mr. Arafat: A break with Egypt risks isolating them in the Arab world, but the longer they waffle, the more the radicals can undermine their hold on the organization. . James M. Markham, The New York Times bureau chief in Beirut, has been reporting on the current Middle East peace talks. - Pla*ne, . Training; United Press International The. State Departure t 1 signaled dwith " With regard to the request i.bya's m disenchantment en e to bring 56 Libyan air force Y in Aram - Ik personnel to the U.S. for train-, iied raeli affairs and turned back 5S Libyan air force personnel h in-we have cann t a Lock` eed that we cannot approve, who sought training in the the United States and blocked the ap thio:!. at this time be- United export of eight cargo planes. cause of of the current state of relations with Libya but that Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), :we shall keep this case under who had protested an applica- active review." do". by Lockheed Aircraft I The trainees were to study Corp. to train the Libyans in maintenance' of C-130 aircraft. America, disclosed the State In a letter to Aspin, Robert Department decision and J. McCloskey, assistant' secre- settlement, has intensified'sig-tary of state for congressiorisl nificantly over the past few relations, said in part: months and has been the ma- jor consideration in the for, We share your concern Fnulation of our policy toward about the efforts r attitude t - the Libyan government. ward our to reach lt. Middle East peace settlement. "AA's a result we have re-! J ibyan opposition to a setti~- : ezsed to approve the export to ment, and to moderate Ai` b' p bya of any Military related leaders who support such ; items, including, as ypu point called it a welcome shift. if, l out, eight additional C-130 air- f U.S. policy." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 THL NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY,. AUGUST 11, 197S U.S. Interest iri Southern Africa dependence," the Afro-Asian and Com- munist majority in the United Nations NASHVILLE-Americans cannot re- gard with unconcern the -worsening. situation in sub-Sahara Africa. The, United States has a vital stake in maintaining access to the vast mineral wealth of southern Africa and in the security of tine Cape sea route around Africa. Around the Cape of Good Hope move the -tankers that carry oil to fuel industries and homes in Europe and America. Unfortunately, the last year has witnessed a steady deterioration of the situation in southern Africa and in the western Indian Ocean area. -Several members of Congress have returned from a visit to Somalia in East Africa and reported on the mis site-supply base the Russians have constructed near Berbera on the Gulf cf Aden. To the south the new dictator of Mozambique, the former Portuguese overseas province, has proclaimed his nation a "People's Republic" in the Chinese-Communist style In Angola, t the former Portuguese province on the South Atlantic, all is chaos. Rival guer- rilla movements and Marxist factions battle for power in a vast land rich in oil and minerals. . - The world has been- repeatedly shocked by the brutal actions of Idi Amin, the absurd dictate of Uganda who has been aptly described as' a village tyrant. In Zambia, land was nationalized recently, indicating anew the impos- sibility of economic cooperation be- tween free-world countries and Afri can socialist regimes. Despite the appalling results of "in-._ VAIL, Colo. (UPI) - Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has heated- ly accused W. Beverly Carter, . re- moved from his post as ambassador, to Tanzania, of conducting "a per- sonal publicity campaign" and denied the diplomat was being moved out of the State Department. "I think Ambassador Carter would be better advised to deal withore- sponsible officials in the State De- partment than to deal in a personal campaign of his own." "We are trying to maintain a principle that terrorists cannot ne- gotiate with American officials," Kissinger told reporters. "We are doing this to protect thousands of Americans who could become vic- tims all over the world...." 40 I persists in trying to impose more of the same on Southwest-Africa, the enormous and territory on the South Atlantic which South Africa has 'ad-. ministered intelligently and respon. sibly since receiving it under a League of Nations mandate. The United Nations is opposed to true self-determination for the people of Southwest-Africa, which it insists on calling Namibia. Not all the news is bad, however. South Africa's policy of "detente" with the more responsible African states to the north is making substantial .headway. With success in making social and economic adjustments at home and a breakthrough to relations ,with such African countries as Ivory Coast and Liberia, South Africa is the ' strong stabilizing force on the African Continent. Meanwhile, Rhodesia con- tinues to maintain orderly, Western- style Government and wide prosper. ity, while turni:ig back the assaults of revolutionary guerrilla forces. The United States' role inside Africa is necessarily minimal. What is most important is that the United States employ its influence to sustain- re- sponsible, orderly governments and to oppose the expansion of revolu. tionary regimes. Southern Africa is the mineral treasure house of the Continent. It is very much in the national interest of the United States to maintain access to the gold, ura- nium, coal, chrome, copper, platinum and other strategic materials in the subcontinent. Access will be denied if Marxist regimes extend their sway. At the same time the United States has a special strategic interest in the Cape of Good Hope. Despite.the re- r opening of the Suez Canal, the vast bulk of the tanker traffic will con- tinue to use the Cape route. It is essential that this traffic not be in- terrupted or threatened by the grow- ing Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean. In order to protect United States security interests in the Indian Ocean, the United States is planning to de- velop limited support facilities on the small island of Diego Garcia. These facilities, while necessary now, may be inadequate to meet the needs of the 1980's. A common-sense solution for the United States would be to seek permission from South Africa to establish a missile-handling facility at the Simonstown naval base near the Cape. Representative Samuel S. Stratton, Democrat of New York, recently said that United States ships in the Indian Ocean must either go to Norfolk, Va., -'or Subic Bay in the Philippines for missile facilities comparable to those the Russians enjoy-in Somalia. And the United States is in danger of losing control over its base at Subic Bay as the Philippine Government seeks to appease Peking. Viewed over-all, the situation in and around Africa is changing very fast. The United States must make a prompt adjustment to changed political and strategic realities. If the necessary new security arrangements aren't made, Soviet and Chinese Communist imperialism will be fastened on a vast global region. Anthony Harrigan is executive vice president of the United States Indus- trial Council, a nationwide association of conservative businessmen. This is a press release offered by the council as a. newspaper column. accurate. CARTER, A BLACK, apparently incurred Kissinger's anger by violat- ing U.S. policy in dealing with ter- rorists to obtain the release of four students kidnaped in Tanzania. Kissinger was asked about reports he ordered Carter to be tra.nsfered- from the State Department to the U.S. Information Agency. "Ambassador Carter is not being transfered out of the State Depart- ment," Kissinger said. "We have avoided any statements out of the State Department" on the case and said reports- have not been fully Carter was envoy to Tanzania for three years. Last May, 19 guerrillas from the Popular Revolutionary party in Zaire kidnaped three Stan- ford University sliedents and a Dutch woman who were working at an ani- mal research station in western Tanzania. THE 'TERRORISTS, whose very existence as a revoltionary group the government of Zaire had refused to acknowledge, released one of the hostages so she could deliver to Tanzanian authorities ransom de- mands. Subsequently Carter arrang Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 By Bruce Palling SDeeial to The Washington Post PUA, Thailand-Since the collapse of the rightist fac- tion in the.Laotian govern- ment in May, more than 10,- '000 Meo tribespeople have slipped into mountainous and isolated northeastern Thailand. . Unwanted 'by the Thais, they are living. in squalor with little food. Because of their long association with U.S. efforts against the Communist forces in Laos, they are"- regarded suspi. ciously by the Communist Pathet Lao who now donli- nate the government in Vi- entiane and by the Commu- nist government In North' Vietnam. Many of the refu- gees say they are afraid to return to their Itornes in Laos. Counting other Meos and Laotians who fled into Thai. land earlier in the war, there could be as many as 30,000 refugees from Laos . now in Thailand, vastly out- numbering refugees from Cambodia and South .Viet- nam. - Observers in Laos have expressed suspicions that - the. anti-Communist That armed forces want to use the Meo as a buffer against the Pathet Lao, much as a force of Chinese troops loyal to Chiang Kai-shek was permitted to operate in northern Thailand for years as a buffer against China. According to reliable sources in Bangkok, U.S. Ambassador Charles White- house also 'thinks there is merit in - this idea. Last month the head of the Thai internal security. command, be singled out for harsh nated about 22,000 pounds of Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, paid treatment because of their rice a week. a secret visit to Mai Charim, association with AID. According to the refugees, a remote village 30 miles Recent reports from Laos, more than 30 villagers have southeast of here, where however, have not indicated . "died in the past six weeks about 5,000 refugees have -l that the Meos who remained from hunger and exhaus- settled, to evaluate the have suffered any mistreat- tion. The only ones who buffer idea. ment. have enough money to buy clans in North Vientiane Vietnamese have of re- _ At Pua, the food are those who sell their . - i1~Teos are clus- cently been saying privately tered into a school com- ceremonial silver necklaces - that such a plan would be pound where they live in and bracelets at low prices considered a serious threat. shelters they built them. to Thai traders. Certainly the Thai Foreign, selves. As I walked around By all accounts, conditions the makeshift village, old are worse at Mai Charim, Ministry wishes that all the men in the traditional color- where at least 80 Meo would go home immedi. ful Meo costume-black persons ately to avoid provoking the trousers. decorated with are said to have died of.dis- Pathet Lao-dominated gov- Patches of psychedelic wo. ,eases aggravated by malnu- erllment in Laos. ven cloth-would come up trition. Permission to visit the village was denied. The Meo are best known to my interpreter and ask: circulating in Bangkok that backed "secret war" in - While it appears that the U.S. embassy had been northeastern Laos under the there are only about.50 of providing assistance to sev- . command of Gen. Vang Pao. yang Pao's former soldiers eral thousand of Van; Pao's Not surprisingly, Vang in this, camp, the villagers former troops in northeast Pao was one of the first offi- still seemed to have faith in Thailand. The aid was sup-- cers to flee Laos in May and his ability to preserve their? posedly only for food, and he was followed by several semi-nomadic way of life reportedly has stopped. planeloads of his former with its slash-and-burn agri- Thai Foreign Minister troops. culture and opium produc- IVTaj. Gen. Chatichai Choon- Thousands of other Meos flora.- havan has visited the office fled western Laos which had The refugees told no of the U.N. High Commis- been the area of the country ? atrocity stories, but said sinner for Refugees in Ge- least affected by the war. they feared for their safety, neva, to request-aid for the About 5,000 Meos are liv- if they had remained in ing in a refugee camp in Indochinese refugees here, Pua, a tiny town. 400 miles Laos. They had seer long-es- and U.N. officials have been north of Bangkok in' Naiv tablished local officials dis- to Bangkok to study the sits - Province and less than 20 missed and replaced by un-' miles from Laos. About 1, known Pathet Lao officers, agreed agreed. The ol agency ha to solicit donations tions 700 of the refugees came and there were rumors that ' from member countries for from a large irrigation pro- the Pathet -Lao wanted to an emergency program to ject supported by the U.S. arm them to fight Thailand feed and house the refugees. Agency for International in the future. ? Senior Foreign Ministry Development in neighboring Despite stat:enlents by De- sources in Bangkok say they Sayaboury Province in Laos. fense Minister Maj. Gen. intend to resettle .all' the The 1,700 tribespeople left Pramarn Adireksarn about itos, including 3,000 to 5.- the project, with its tractors, ' the high cost to Thailand of experimental fish hatcheries supporting Indochinese ref- 000 former Van,,, Pao troops, around Mai Charim from and of ;harss apparently be- ugees, no one at Pua was re- where it is hoped that they cause they feared new fight- ceiving arjy assistance from ing and thought they might the Thai government.: Chris- will slowly drift luck into Laos. tiara World Vision has do- - 12 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432RO001007OOO2=5 NEW YORK TIMES 15 August 1975 Iiv eO .i rmes n tl ice eat The following dispatch was Their future is uncertain. written by Matt Franjola, an . Their presence is an irritant Associated Press correspond- to. already shaky Thai- ent who recently visited re- Laotian relations. And the Grote settlements in northern door to America is closed to Thailand of Men mountain them. tribesmen who fled Laos after "We were soldiers of Vang the Communist-led Pathet - Pao and the Americans," Lao took control of the coun- said one Meo leader, refer- try. ring to Gen. yang Pao, who NAM LAN, Thailand headed a mercenary army (AP)BAN Thousands moun- ; :supported by the American Central tain tribesmen who fled Laos awho Intelligence has' been Agency in the last two months are and n granted asylum in the United States. barely subsisting in the .._- _ les n g near here, ,easy, J 7 sick and in some cases starv- e ing. They walked for up to four weeks over rugged terrain only to `find themselves un- welcome in this country and not safe from Pathet Lao raiding parties even here, a day's march into Thailand. They are Meos, members of an independent primitive enemy," the Meo leader said. "If we go back we have nothing to 'eat, and they will kill us or send us off to study where we will, never return to our families." The mountain people left when the Communist-led Pathet Lao began to take control of the country in May. Some came from north- . clad, silver-bedecked women, . border that to the hill people who were on the pro-Ameri-. is only an invitation of the side of the Laotian war. - , city men far away. . Thai and Western experts Many Women and Children s estimate that 12,000 Meo But nearly half made their 1- the refugees. For the time f re ugees are living in tempo- f way on foot from around nary shelters in this area o northern Thailand, and Thai Long Tieng, the former C.I.A. medical' authorities say that miles s the tral Lf es 140* 80 per cant of of imare ' fering from malnutrition, -more than a three-week walk , malaria and. anemia. Some through the jungle-covered 18,000 more have sought sierras. Three quarters of ? ~. them ? were woman anrd .alb, ""'e Vl P tv1 . ! refugee settlement . at Pua, i BALTIMORE SUN 21 August 1975 north of here, said that more than 133 of his people had died of malaria or lack of food during the long march. In the Ban Nam Lan area, about five miles from the frontier, 5,700 refugees are virtually imprisoned in a jungle area bordered by Laos, a Tai Communist insurgent base and two rivers. Thai authorities permit only half a dozen a day to leave and walk four hours to the village cf Mae Cherim to buy essentials. Thai authorities here in Nam Province have spent $40,000 on the refugees, Gov. Sawatdi Prapanich said. Pro- vincial refugee sources said that it would cost $1,000 a day to meet the basic mini- mum needs in rice alone. "If they have no rice and die, that is their probiern," said the Governor. "We did not ask them to come. We have poor Thais who need help." The Government says that it has run out of fund for being those here who can afford' it are buying rice brought in by Thai Army helicopter at 20 per cent more than the rate in the provincial capital, but Lao Teng says in Pua that "in two weeks we.,will run out of money.' Scavenging in Jungle in silver jewelry, and Thai merchants are paying only 80. per cent of. the regular market price for it, Meo refugees said. At the Ban Nam Lan site about 2.000 refugees have enough money for two more weeks; the rest already are scavenging in the jungle., They set out daily to hunt for roots, berries and other edible plants. All stands of bamboo in the ? area ? have been scoured for edible shoots, and all the palm trees have been cut down for the small heart of palm. . "If it were not for the bamboo shoots, we would have . died already," said Muoi Ya, 36 years old. "We reed salt. We are weak and sick. Mothers cannot nurse their babies." Some rice and medical aid' has been-. donated by the Y.M.C.A. and Roman Catholic groups in the north Thailand city of Chiang Mai. But these donations have been small compared with the need. Of 100 donated sacks of rice, 23 were taken by cor- rupt- Thai officials in the jungle camp, Meo refugees say. No Thai official comment was available -on the report. 1 Thais and Westerners com- ! ing from the area in recent { weeks have made similar a reports. of ogees i Thailand, T Of all the peoples allied with America in Indo- china, none paid more dearly than the Meo hill tribesmen of the CIA "secret army" in Laos. Whole villages were decimated, sometimes by fighting and sometimes by exhaustion from incessant moving. Some villages were cut off from their lands so long that children grew up believing rice fell in bags from airplanes. Today, as tens of thousands of America's former Vietnamese clients await homes in the United States, tens of thousands of primitive Meo hill folk are in remote border areas of Thailand, where they fled as Laos was taken over by the Communists. Newsmen who have visited the Meo report they are exhausted, hungry and sick. Thai officials, who are struggling for better relations with the Pathet Lao, can ill afford much sympathy. "If they have no rice and die, that is their problem," Sawatdi Prapanich, governor of Nam province, told an Associated Press reporter. "We did not ask them to come. We have poor Thais who need help." Unlike the Vietnamese, the primitive Men, who farm by moving from hillside to hillside, cutting off the brush and cultivating each slope until it is ex- hausted, would be tittle helped by blanket admission to the United States. The office of the United Na- tions High Commissioner for Refugees is now work- ing with Thai and American authorities to ease their move into the hills of Thailand. U.S. officials say they "expect to make a substantial contribution" of cash to the arrangement. That seems the least that can be done. Estimates of the number of Meo who crossed from Laos range as high as 40,000. Even if Bangkok agrees to let them stay, provincial and local Thai officials al- ready reportedly are demanding bribes to distribute aid rice. Fellow Meo who were already living in Thailand ironically form the backbone of that coun- try's pro-Communist insurgency, so the temptation for both sides to compete for the refugees' remain- ing military-age men will be strong. The Mao are among the world's best opium raisers, and their cur- rent impoverishment assures that many will turn quickly to that illegal source of support, thereby in- viting further trcuble with the Thai authorities. The impartial auspices of the U.N. high commissioner may well be helpful in resettling the Meo refugees. But that must not become an excuse for less direct U.S. interest in tribesmen who were America's chief ally in the clandestine adventure in Laos. 143 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROO0100370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 BALTIMORE SUN 8 August 1975 n i te l /71.1 61 _F1 ..e ngues UQS . aides By CHARLES W.CORDDRY Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington-China, in gesture both interesting and puzzling to officials here, has recently tried, to sound out Ma- nila on possible Chinese use of naval and air facilities in the Philippines, where the issue of future United States base rights is soon to come to a head. .Intelligence sources who re- ported Peking's feelers saw in them some evidence that China may want to expand its mili- tary operations beyond its own borders with a potential open- ing in the Philippines. Manila and Peking established diplo- matic relations June 9. More realistically, the intel- tigence sources suggested that the Chinese-in view of Man- ila's earlier public campaign over changing the status of U.S. bases-were hedging their bets by expressing an interest in use of facilities before the Soviet Union might make such over- tures to Philippines President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Though Mr. Marcos, during the fall of South Vietnam, publicly questioned the reliabil- ity of the United States and the value of the U.S. bases, his atti- tude seems to have changed markedly, so that there is no visible expectation here of his ending the U.S. presence. What is expected, officials indicated, is the negotiation of a WASHINGTON POST 5 September 1975 I C_, hi n a more equitable administrative light cf the Vietnam outcome. arrangement, from Manila's The Chinese leaders appar- standpoint, under which the ently avoided Mr. Marcos's in- bases would be seen as Filipino quiries, officials here said, facilities on which American though they had the impression' forces operated by Philippines that the Filipino president in- permission. The United States ferred China wanted a contin- was granted the "right to retain ued American presence in the the use of the bases"-more ex- far Pacific as counterweight to tensive rights than it later got the Soviet Union. elsewhere-shortly after Filipi- Against this background, it no independence was granted in was taken as a puzzling devel- 1946. opment that a Filipino official The facilities in question are lately in Peking was asked by chiefly the big Subic Bay Naval Chou Kwan-hua, the Chinese Base, a prime repair and supply foreign minister, about the pos- area for the U.S. fleet in the sibility of China's having simi- western Pacific, and Clark Air lar access to air and naval in- Base, a key installation for the stallations. U.S. Air Force in that area. The Filipino official was re- The Pentagon would put ported to have said he would these bases very near the top of pass along the inquiry to Presi- any global priority list, now es- dent Marcos, and to have added pecially, in view of the turn to a that he personally thought a forward strategy in the Pacific "friendly power"-China based on air and naval power. -should be entitled to privi- The alternatives would be to leges similar to those of the fall back on Guam, which United Sthtes. would be regarded as unsatis- No early change in the sta- factory, or to Hawaii. tus of the U.S. bases is expect- When President Marcos was ed, officials said. They thought in Peking in .June, arranging negotiations, however, would the establishment of diplomatic start fairly soon, probably in relations after years of opposi-`October. tion to recognizing Communist i In his latest expressions, Mr. governments, he was under-;Marcos has said the United stood to have sought to learn States could continue to use the China's attitude toward the bases, which the Philippines American bases in his country. would control, to maintain "an This was after he had public- effective presence over the air- ly questioned the wisdom of re- and sea-lanes" of the western liance on the United States in Pacific. of .' br a 9 0'-C.', United Press International relations with China. which he Assistant Senate Democratic said reflected a change in his Leader Robert C. Byrd (W.Va.) i attitude of some years al:o. said yesterday his recent 10-Byrd said his personal reap- day visit convinced him that China does not harbor any ex pt'aisal was based on "the pansionist ambitions, nor does; Rifting ueeessitiea..underiying. ' n national se curity it seek.'to becoiYit?-a ivor-ld`su-lour . ow nerp7EVeg-? :: :., lwhieb, -I. believe 'is bini,,. -Byrd: also' .sx;d ? Ghi-na `nd cr eas nlV threatened' by longer considers the United .t otti ing So let power and ae States a threat to its tcrrito-;g'ressive inclinations." of the Soviet Union" and said she foresees a Russian effort to dominate North Vietnam and establish bases south of China's borders. and create dissension in Inner Mongolia aid. ,among .-:Cbinesa:. fniinorri; I es ltar.:rr?-v }ltd cAentr::?the United States need have no fear of Bed China as a threat to our own country in the rial integrity or existence as a! He . clescriheci China as'-foreseeable future or as long socialist state and that, in '.' thorout hiy distrustful of they as the Sino-Soviet rupture turn, the United States should !intentions, words, and actions jcontinues," Byrd said. not fear China as a-threat inL- "the foreseeable future ..." 4 He called for a gradual' movement toward normalizing Approved For Release,2001/08/08 : CIA,;,RDP77-00432R000100370002,5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002=5 WASHINGTON STAR 25 August 1975 The gradual pace of U.S.-Cuban rapproche- ment is quickening and it is high time for more bilateral conciliatory gestures by both govern- ments that will help bury the machete. It is almost as if Fidel Castro and Henry Kiss- inger have fallen into the rhythm of taking turns at moves that will ease the tensions of 15 years. The anti-hijack treaty was the first real ice- breaker. The July decision of the Organization of American States to terminate the mandatory isolation of Cuba removed any need or reason . for further stand-offishness between the es- tranged neighbors. It is almost silly for Havana and Washington to be taking so much time to put the official stamp on a historic inevitability. Castro has been.signaling for months that he would wel- come an end to Cuba's pariah status and a nor- malization of relations with the U.S. Kissinger, although Cuba is far from his highest priority, also has publicly stated that the U.S. is ready to discuss a new relationship any time Cuba wishes. Washington reacted to the hijack treaty by lifting the 25-mile limit on travel by Cuban diplo- mats at the United Nations and increasing their range to 250 miles - just enough to permit them to come to Washington. Then Castro gave back $2 million dollars in hijack ransom money to an .American airline and the U.S. cooed its grati- tude. Now the U.S. has taken a genuinely impor- tant step to lift some of the economic sanctions against Cuba. While it is true that the U.S. decision last week applies only to third-country sanctions and technically is not a bilateral matter with Cuba at all, there can be no question that it was a major step to dismantle the regulations that af- fect trade with Cuba. There are scores of U.S. firms with subsidiaries abroad that have been unable to sell their products to Cuba under the regulations that are now waived The practical effect of the latest decision is to WASHINGTON POST 5 September 1975 Sol 11. Lin6fvitz permit overseas branches of American firms to sell their manufactured goods in Cuba in free competition with other foreign factories. Collaterally, the U.S. decision will gratify such countries as Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Spain and others where American subsidiaries have until now been ruled out of the Cuban market. The export of American foreign-policy stric= tures via corporate foreign investment has been a sore point in these friendly countries. The U.S. also has lifted the regulation that no vessel in the Cuban trade can be refueled in an American port. This will have the salutary ef- fect of increasing the number of vessels in the world merchant fleet that can call at both Cuban and U.S. ports. . When members of Congress were told of the impending State, Department announcement of the softening of the ban on third-country trade with Cuba, they applauded the decision. So do we. Now we believe President Ford should lose .little. time in removing the barriers to direct trade between Cuba and the U.S., and initiating direct talks toward a full restoratidn of diplo- matic and economic relations: There are stumbling blocks to total rap- prochement, to be sure. There is the question of expropriated U.S. property, the status of the Guantanamo Bay naval base, the presence of basing facilities for the Soviet Union and, con-, sidering Ford's 1976 election bid, the domestic political peril of being seen as soft on Castro. The anti-Castro Cuban refugee community will make trouble on the issue. But we believe it is in the self-interest of the United States to restore trade and political rela- tionships with Cuba without delay. The continu- ation of the cold war with Cuba can no longer be justified on any grounds, now that Castro is out of the business of exporting revolution. He may not be all that lovable a leader in American eyes, but it no longer makes sense to pretend he isn't even there. What Future for the Pancc-l OAS Secretary General Orfila re- cently called the Panama Canal "the most explosive issue in Latin Ameri- ca." A lot of other concerned Latin American and U.S. leaders have for sonic time been warning us about the canal issue and what it may mean to the whole future of the hemisphere. But most Americans have not been listening-especially Congress. As though to prove how hard it has not been listening, just before the Au- gust recess the House of Representa- tives passed 24d-164 the Snyder Amendment to the State Department appropriation bill, which would have kept the State Department from even negotiating about a new Panama Canal The writer, former U.S. ambassa- dor to the Ormni:ation of_.4nierican States, is chairman of the U.S.-Latin American, Commission. treaty. Only vigorous efforts in the Senate kept that body from adopting the Byrd Amendment to the same ef- fect.. These developments came some 45 weeks after 38 senators and 126 repre- sentatives co-sponsored a resoiutina that sharply opposed the basic objec- tives of a new treaty. Obviously there must be some reason otherwise thoughtful members of Congress are lining up as they are with respect to such a potentially dangerous issue. The answer is clear enough:' Neither the administration nor those members of the Congress sup- porting a new treaty have directly re- sponded to the arguments and con- cerns of those who are opposing the treaty. Rather, they have been content Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00370002-5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5 to let the opposition build- In the ap- ' -parent expectation that once a treaty is negotiated they will be able to make their case effectively. But time is running out and opposi- tion is building- Meanwhile, Ambassa- dor Ellsworth Bunker and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack make progress toward a new treaty which may face rejection in the Senate. If that happens, we may find that the Panama Canal has become a tinderbox. It is long past time to take a hard, look at the arguments being advanced against the new treaty and to deal with them forthrightly. Good questions are being asked and they deserve re ?sponsive answers. Will the new treaty mean a, surren- der of United States sovereignty over the Canal? The simple answer is that the United States never had sovereignty. The 1903 treaty specifically gave the United States authority which it would have "if it were sovereign." Obviously, these words would not have been nec- essary if the United States were, in fact, sovereign. A new treaty which recognizes that fact and goes on from there to work out a mutually agreeable arrangement for control of the terri- tory can hardly be called a surrender of United States sovereignty. Will a new Panama Canal treaty prejudice our national security? The fact of the matter is that the greatest danger to the security of the United States would be the continuance of the present status of the canal. If there is not a new treaty, we will be running the grave risk that the canal- which is, of course, exceedingly vulner. able under any circumstances-may be damaged or destroyed by irate Panam- anians. By the same token we may find ourselves in the positon of having to defend the canal by force against a hostile population and in the face of widespread, if not universal, condem. nation. Since the new treaty will spe- cifically include provisions for a, con- tinued U.S. defense role with respect to the canal, it -is hard to see how a new treaty could be adverse to our na- tinal security. Will a new treaty weaken the United States position by exposing the canal to political instability and violence? If any course is designed to expose the canal to political instability and vi- olence, it would be an anachronistic ef- fort to maintain in effect a treaty ne- gotiated in 1903 which is no longer re- spected, which is looked upon by Pana. manians of all political persuasions as an affront to Panama's national dig- nity and. as a colonial enclave, and which is viewed throughout Latin America as the last vestige of "big ''4riday, Sept. 5,19,5 THE WASHINGTON POST I By Michael Arkus Reuter. .:.RIO DE JANEIRO-Clau- his house ill the Rio suburb dio Elias Barros, 18, left his of Sao Goncalo with his two home one evening recently to collect his brother from school in Rio'de Janeiro's plush seaside neighborhood of Copacabana. A few minutes later he lay dying in the street, shot in the back at point-blank range by a policeman, ac- cording to scores of eyewit- nesses. The policeman. de- filed the shooting. In Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest city, Ignacio Medei- ros, 22, Joao Diniz, 19. and Francisco Nogueira, 17, all students with impeccable records, left a night club in their car and tried to take a tape recorder from a friend's vehicle, apparently as a prank. Spotted by- a policeman and pursued by a patrol car, they died in a hail of bullets despite their appeals to po- lice not to shoot, according to the prosecutor's report. small children to buy cold drinks when he was picked up by police. . -Two days later he was found on a lonely stretch of road, with second-and third- degree burns over half his body, abandoned as dead by the policeman who had tor- tured him, according to the prosecutor. These three cases under- line mounting public con- cern at the countless num.. ben of accusations of beat- ings and torture made against police throughout the country. :According. to many law- abiding citizens here, it is not even the greater or lesser frequency of such oc- currences but their total ar- bitrariness that is the prime cause of concern. - This correspondent was a witness to the immediate aftermath of the death of Claudio Barros. ltubem Ferreira, 29, left - Claudio was a ;janitor in lb stick" diplomacy. Under the new treaty the United States would be able to protect its position while allowing Panama a greater responsibility in the canal's operation. Will a new treaty adversely affect U.S. commercial interests? Admittedly, the canal is important to us commercially, but obviously its eco.. nomic significance has diminished con- siderably as world commerce patterns and technolpgies of shipping have changed. Today large vessels cannot. use the canal and a major expansion of. the present capacity may be necessary -possibly a sea level canal. If the situ-_ ation remains as it is, it is hardly likely that Panama would accede to the modernization required. In order to accomplish that, there must be assur-. ance of Panamanian cooperation pre- cisely as called for in the proposed treaty. - In the light of these facts, it cer-, tainly requires no extended argument to recognize that efforts on our part to. adhere to the 1903 treaty would be both damaging to our national inter- ests and in -derogation of our hemis-. pheric objectives. By the same token the new treaty would demonstrably of- fer the prospect of increased security.; for the canal and the futherance of our common goals for the Americas. ode of- Copacaban`ars apart- ment blocks, but lived with his foster mother and 11 fos- ter brothers and sisters in the slum above the suburb. -' He survived the floods of 1966, which killed his mother and two sisters, only to be cut down himself shortly before realizing his life's ambition of entering the army. Claudio was black, his fos- ter family white. ' On the day he died, he was trying to separate one of his brothers and several other boys who were fight. ill.,. Osmar Rodriguez. one of the many eyewitnesses told this -reporter: "A police car approached and one of the policemen began clubbing Claudio's brother, Jorge. Claudio told him to stop it. The police- man called him a dirty nig- ger and grabbed hold of him, "A second policeman shouted: `Get him. Shoot him.' The policeman fired and Claudio lay in the road writhing and agonizing, for 15 minutes without the po- lice letting anyone get near," The crowd's anger was im- mediate, and they stoned the police car. Helmeted Rio police were called in and went to work clubbing and Arrested anybody they could lay hands on--including two more of Claudio's brothers. The policeman who is al- leged to have fired and his companion were also ar- rested. They said Claudio had a knife. But then they also denied shooting, claim- ing that the shot came from the crowd. . Several witnesses told journalists they saw the po- liceman take out his revol- ver, shoot, and then put in a fresh bullet. Dalva Neves, Claudio's foster mother, was a first re- fused -acinlittance to the po- lice station, only a block from the scene of the shoot- Weeping, she was finally allowed in, together with several othe rwitnesses and journalists. Inside the station, Dalva Neves said, the policeman charged with the shooting laughed in her face when she accused him of murder- ing her son. Outside, crowds began roaming the street again, shouting "murderers" and "sons of whores," smashing windows and street signs blocking traffic. More riot troops were brought in and went about their, heir work clubbing and The following dad:, a po- j lice. lieutenant said "elenien ts" had been incit- ing the crowd. Sonic of the evidence given by the eyewitnesses will not be accepted be- cause they are minors. "Apparently you are allowed to be shot dead when you are under age, but not to ,Approved For Release 200'108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5