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June 11, 1975
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25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9- ? CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 12 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS EAST ASIA 13 JUNE 1975 PAGE 1 27 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9- ta1WAsrtPrrToN POST .77;faer 21;19.n. . . _ fte..,.:White:i1oicse -Ind night .te-k paaiett the.'report given to 0,.:Pcirdsby the Commission on CIA Adt-1 r;Aelti41,1:it.hin the United States which. Ford establiS,ted Ian. 4 by ex- f,=; :ioliti-Ve'cirder and which was headed kIj Vice President Rockefelier: pod- Vslotoiag is the ','Summary of Findings; r-Certfclusions and Recommendations" colitairied in Chapter 3 of the +e?:#4 -SUMMARY OF CIIARGE., sAND FINDINGS ?s. Tie initial public charges were ,that tile CIA's domestics activities had insj Volved:, ? .11 ,lArgescale spying, on? American at-liens in the United States by, the: CIA,. -Whose ? responsibility is foreign:4 intelligence: - sso,s -.,:; 2; Keeping doSsiers on- large ,num-S .iers "of American citizens. -t3S-4iming these activities at sAmerise cala-W -Who have expressed ,thein is. .410,cl:tient with varjeus :goverment'% I? 11111:0-co ca 'gee 011h.Ci0111 entlY supplemented by others including , 'allegations that the CIA: ' Hid intercepted and. opened per icdar mail' in the United States fer 28- years; ? e: i -:,e0 Had infiltrated domestic dissident , , s grpuns" and otherwise intervened hae 'Omestie polities; -?so.,1-1ad engaged inifiegaL wiretap,, inti.break-ins; and, ? Had improperly assisted other government agencies/ ' In addition, assertions have been -made ostensibly linking the CIA to - the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. . sIt .became clear from the public' 'reaction - to these charges that the- sperecy in which the agency necessarily' Operates, combined with the allege- lions of wrongdoing, 'had contributed te widespread public misunderstanding .of the, agency's actual practices: detailed analysis of the facts has convinced the commission that the great Majority of the CIA's domestic activities comply with its statutory.. 'authority. , . ..-Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its iiistary, the CIA has engaged in some aCtisdties that should be criticized and 'not Permitted to happen again-both? , in light' of the limits imposed on the sagency by law and as a matter of pub- lic policy. ". Some of these activities, were Initi- ated or ordered by Presidents, either Some of them fall within the doubt-, qui area between responsibilities dele; '#ated to the, CIA by Congre-ss and the- 'NetiOrial Security Council on the one. hand and activities specifically pechib.. ited to the agency on the other. , Some of them were plainly unlawful' and' constituted improper- invasions 'upon 'the rights of Americans. 's The agency's own Appnovadikffikr R Undertaken for the most part in,I973 directly or indirectly., s trid.1974, have gone far to terminate the -activities upon which this investi- gation has focused. The recommenda- tions of the commission are designed .to clarify' areas' of doubt Concerning. Ilk agency's authority, to strengthen The -agency's structure, and to guard against recurrences of these inipropri- ,Cties? s. '.f " .4?121'B THE CIA'S Rein'. ? - AND AUTHORITY .st s ? Findings ':The Central'Inteliigence Agency was ? -established by the National Security aket,ef 1947 as the nation's first corn-: Arehensive peacetime foreign ihtelli- gerice service. The objective was to provide the President with coordinat- ed intelligence, which the cpuntry. ,tacked prior to the attack on Pearl ,Irarhofs , ? e The Director of Central Intelligence repiial directly to the President. The reeeives its 'policy direction and guid,ance from the National Security Council, composed of the President, the Vice President end the eeeretsries :734 State' and Defense. ? The statute directs the CIA to cor?:: ?elate, evaluate, and disseminate intel- ligence obtained from United . States 'intelligence agencies, and to perform (eXtich Other functions related to intel- ligenCe as the National Security Coun- ,eiis directs. Recognizing that the CIA' -OUR' be dealing with sensitive, secret Materials; Congress made the Director Of Central Intelligence responsible for :protecting intelligence sources' and ? Methods from unauthorized disclosure. At the same time, Congress sought to 'aSstire the American public that it APIs not establishing a secret polire e;vhich wOuld threaten the civil liber- ties of' Americans. It specifically -for?- ?bade the CIA from exercising."police, -subpoena, or law-enforcement Apowers `or internal security- functions.", The CIA was not to replace the Federal _Bureau of Investigation in conducting doniestio activities to investigate crime er -internal subversion.. -1 .Although Congress contemplated that the focus of the CIA would be on fors .eign intelligence, it, understood that *Stime' of its activities would be core: ducted;within the United States. The CIA necessarily ;maintains its head- :quarters?here, procures logistical sup- port, recruits and trains etnnloyees, tests :equipments and 'conducts other -clomestie? activities in support pf- its, Jereign intelligence mission. It makes 'necessary investigations in the United 1States' to' maintain the security-, of its: 'facilities and personnel. ?' ? 7,-..Aciditional1ys it has been understOod, !from the beginning that the (1-1A is' ;permitted- to coiled foreign cenee---tbat is, informntion. concerning .foreign capabilities, intentions, and ac-. -tivities?from,American citizens within iThis country by ovsrt means. ? sc'Determining the legal propriebr of e I GOws290141111089: 0144R D erff-G9432 ?ciuu.e.s.tbe application of the la to ,tlie 4.;.! ? te,) particular fact?. involved. This tisk -volveS consideration of 'more than- the National 'Security Act and the direc- tives of the National Sectirity?Council; ,.constitutional and 'other statutory pro-. visions also circumscribe' the dOmestic activities of the CIA. Among the' ap- plicable constitutional proYisions-are the ;First Amendment, protecting *free- .dom ,of speech, of the press, and of Peaceable assembly; and .the Fourth Amendment, prohibiting unreasonable ...searches and seizures.-Among the stat- .ntory provisions are those which limit' 'zilch, activities as electronic eaves- dropping and interception of the malls. ?? The precise scope of many of these statutory and, constitutional provisions -is not easily stated. The National Se- curity Act in particular was drafted in broad terms-in order to nrovideflexi- bilitsfor 'the CIA to adapt to changing' ,intelligence needs... Such critical phrases as , "internal security funcs 'lions" are left undefined. The mean-. ? ing of the director's. responsibility to: prf.itcat intc1iiccc 53UrC::::: and. meth..., 1; ads. from unauthorized disclosure has, also been a subject of uncertainty. -...The Word ."foreign", appears nowhere in the statutory grant of authority, though it has always :been understood that the CIA'S thi.ssion 'is limited to? matters related to foreign intelligence. This. apparent ?statutory ambiguity, though not posing problems in, prac- tice, has troubled members of the pub- lic who read. the statute without having the benefit of the legislative history and the instruction ,s to the CIA from the.National? Security council. ? ? ?.. . Conclusions The evidence within the scope of this 'inquiry does ? not 'indicate that fundamental rewriting of the National Security Act is either necessary- o,r. appropriate.- ? The evidence does demonstrate the need for some statutory and admin- istrative clarification of the role and function of the agency. Ambiguities have been Partially responsible for some, though not all, of the agency's deviations within the -United States from its assigned mis- 'sion. In some cases reasonable persons will differ as to the lawfulness of the -activity; in others, the absence of clear 'guidelines as to its antherits- deprived' '.the agency of .a means of resisting. :pressures to engage in. activities whichl now appear to us improper. ? Greater public awareness of the; ? limits of the CIA's domestic authority: ,woulch'do much to reassurestho Amersl lean people., .? . The requisite ,clarification can best, 'be, accomplished ,,a) threisch a .pesiiic amendment clarifying 'the. National': Seeurity Act provi&lon' hich (10111-'1 eates the permissible -scope of CIA' activities, as set forth in recommenda-. tion 1, and (b) through ? issuance of an fgther limiting do- the CIA, a* .set,, ? ,111, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010070008-9 Vr- ? 'forth in recanarnesidation - . . Recommendation (1) Section 403 of the National Security , .Act of 1947 s.hould be .amended in the form set forth in Appendix. III. to this 'report. These amendments, in um-- marY, would: ? , a. Make explicit . that the CIA's ace tivities must be related to foreign in- telligence. ? ? ' ? b. Clarify the responsibility of the, ..CIA; to :protect intelligence sources . and 'methods from unauthorized dis- closure, (The agency would he respon- sible for protecting against unauthor- ized disclosures: within the CIA, and .it -would be responsible for providing. guidance and teehnical assistance to other agency and department heads in prOtecting ? against unauthorized dis- closures within 'their own agencies and :departments.) . ? .. c. Confirm publicly the CIA's exist-. ing authority to collect foreign intel- ligence. from. willing sources within the . United States and; except as specified ? .by: the. President in a .published ex- ecutive order, prohibit the CIA from' collection - efforts within the United States directed. at securing fpreign. in- 'teiligence ? from unknowing American citizens. ? ? . ? faRecommendation (2) 'The President .,should by executive' Order. prohibit the CIA from the col- lection :of information about the dom- estic activities of United States (whether by. overt or . covert :Means), the evaluation, correlation, and i dissemination of analyses or re- ports about such activities, and the stersge of Such' infoionatien, with CY.- eeptions for the following categories of persons or activities: . ",.? . a. Persons -presently or formerly 'of- filiated, or being considered for affilia- tion, with the,. CIA, directly or . or ? others 'who require , clear- ance by ,the- CIA .to . receive classified information; , Persons - Persons or activities that pose ,a. -clear'. threat to CIA 'facilities ? or per- sonnel, provided .that. proper coordina- tion with 'the, FBI. is ? accomplished; .. ? ct Persons suspected of eSpionage or .other illegal activities relating to for- eign' intelligence, provided that proper coordination With ..the FBI is &Tom- ?plished. ? ? ? , Information -which is received in- cidental to appropriate CIA .activities may be' transmitted to an agency with appropriate jurisdictiois including law 'enforcement agencies. ? ' ? Collection of information from nor- mal library spurces such as newspa.:i .pei.s, books, magazines and other such' documents is not to be affected by this order. S. Inforrnation currently being main-: tined which is inconsistent with the order -should be destroyed at the con-' elusion of the current congressional : investigations or as soon thereafter as permitted by law. The CIA should periodically screen ;Its files and eliminate all Material in- :consistent with the order. ' - The order should be. issued after consultation with the National Secu- rity Council, the ?Attorney General, ? 'and the Directbr of Central Intelli- genc-e. AnY.modifinatieneef the order 'Would' be permitted only through. amendmerts, ' C. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE CIA -? lo External Controls '. ? . Findings 't ? The CIA Is subject to supervision; And control by various executive ageno 7Ciei -and by the 'Congress:','?' 'Congress has eStablished special pro-' cedures for review of the CIA and its., secret budget within four small sub- . committees. Historically, these subcom- mittees have been composed of mem- doers of ?Congress with many other de-- :mends on their time. The CIA has not? as a . general rule received detailed scrutiny' by the Congress. ? ? ' The principal bodies within the exec-- utive branch performing. a supervisory or cOntrol function are ' the National. Security Council, which gives the CIA. its policy.direction and control; the Of of Managernent and' Budget, which .reviews the CIA's budget in much. the same fashion as it reviews budgets .of other government agencies: and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advid sory Board, 'which is composed of dis- tinguished citizens, serving part-time, ,in a general advisory function fpr the President on the quality of the gather; ing and interpretation ? of intelligence. -None of these agencies has the spe- cific- responsibility of overseeing the CIA ?1:5 determine whether its 'activities are proper,' ' ? The Department of Justice also exer- cises an- oversight role, through its. "power to initiate prosecutions for crim- inal misconduct. Tor a period of oyer 20 years, however, an agreement ete isted between,the Department of Jus- tice and the CIA providing that the 'agency -was to investigate allegations of crimes. by CIA employees or agents which involved government money or property or might involve operational 'set laity. If, following the- investig.a- tion, the agency determined that there was no reasonable basis to believe a crime had been committed, or that op- erational security aspects. precluded prosecution, the case was not referred -to the Department of Justice? ? - The 'cominission has found nothing'. to indicate-that the CIA. abused. the . foisction given it by the agreement.. The agreement, however, involved the agency directly in forbidden law, en- forcement .aetivities, and represented. an abdication by the Department of Justice of its statutory responsibilities,- ?, Conclusions ? , Some 'improvement in the congres- sional oversight system would be help..., ful. -The problem of -.providing ade- ? qu,ate oversight and control while , maintaining essential security is Met- eaSily resolved. Several knowledgeable'. witnesses pornted to the Joint Commit- tee on Atomic Energy as an appromin ate model- for congressional oves-sight -of the agency. That committee has bad an excellent record of providing effece tive oversight while avoiding. breaches'. of security-in a highly sensitive area. One of the underlying causes of the'. problems confronting the CIA arises' .out of the pervading atmosphere of se-- crecy in which its activities have been conducted in the past. ? One aspect -of this has been .the secrecy of the budget. A new body is needed to provide oversight of the agency within the ex- ecutive branch Because of the need to preserve security, the CIA iS not sub- jea to the usual constraints of -audit, judicial review; publicity or open cone gressio.nal budget review and over- sight. ,Consequently, its operations re.- quire additional external control.- The authority 'assigned the job of superviS- ing the CIA must be gives sufficient power ,and significance to assure ?the public of effective supervision. . ; The situation whereby the agency determined whether its own employees would be' prosecuted must not be pere- *dotted to re :Am Beeorn' mendation (3) . ?The President should recommend to Congress the establishment of. a Joint Committee 6n Intelligence . to assume the oversight ible currently played by the Armed Services Committees... Recommendation (4) . Congress should give careful consid-t eration to the question -whether the . budget of the CIA should not, 'at. least to some extent, be made public, partic- ularly in view of the provisions of Arti- cle I. Section 9, Clause 7 of the Consti-, tution. ? Recommendation () ' . a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board -should be exisanded to include over-, . sight of the CIA. This expanded over?.- 'sight board should be composed of dise tingtxish.ed citizens with varying back-' grounds and experience. It should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a ?full-time staff appropri- ate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA should include: ., I. Assessing compliance by the CIA, .with its statutory authority. . . 2. Assessing the quality of foreign Intelligence collection. e ? 3. Assessing the, quality of foreign, intelligence estimates. , ? ? 4. Assessing othe quality of the or- ganization of the CIA. 5. Assessing the quality of the man- agement of the CIA. 6. Making recommendations with respect' to the above subjects to the, President and- the Director of Central Intelligente, . and, where appropriate, the Attorney General. . p. 'inc board should have access ? all information in the CIA. It SiviSuld ;be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and actiVities on its ? own initiative. ? c. The inspector general of the-CIA , should be authorized to report directly ? to, the board, after having notified the Director of Central Intelligence, in, cases he deerhs appropriate. ? II? ' - Recommendation (6) ?. The Department of Justice and the fis CIA. should establish written guide7. lines for the handling of reports of criminal violations by. employees , of ?the agency or relatingeto its affairs. . These guidelines should require that the criminal. investigation and the -de-, ? cision whether to prosecute be made by- the Department of Justice; after Consideration of agency views regard- ing the impact of prosecution on the national , security. The agency should be permitted to conduct such investi- .rations as it requires to- determine whether its operations have been jeop- ardized. The agency should scrupu- lously avoid exercise- of the prosecu- . torial function. 2. internal Controls* Findings ? The director's duties in administer- ing the intelligence community, han- dling relations with other components of the government, and passing on broad questions of policy. lreve him little time for day-to-day supervision of the agency. Past studies have noted" ? the need for the director to delegate. 'greater responsibility for the adminis-. ,tration of tb agency to the Deputy' Director of Central intelligence. e. In recent,years, the position of dep- uty director has been occupied by a .high-ranking military officer, with re- sponsibilities for maintaining liaison with the Department of Defense, fos- tering the agency's relationship with' a the military'eervices, and providing top, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043214000100370008-9 es. ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 euv ymanagement with .necessary perienee and skill in understanding. particular intelligence requirements of the military. Generally soeaking, the, deputy directors of central intelligence' .have not been heavily engaged in ad- ministration of the agency. a ...Mitch of the four directorates within,. the -CIA?I-operations, intelligence, ad: -ministration; and science and technol- ogy is- is. headed by a. deputy ?director who .reports to the Director and Dep-- .uty'?Director of Central Intelligence.: These four deputies, together with cerd -Limn other top agency officials such :as' the .eomptroller, form the Agency Man- agement Committee, which makes': many of ?the adminietrative and man- agement decisions affecting more thanj one directorate. Outside the chain of command; the primary internal mechanism far keep-7 ing the agency within , bounds As the 'inspector general. The size' of. this of- flee was recently .shartly reduced, and its,previous practice of making regular, revieVes of various agency departments .waseterminated. At the present time,i -the activities of the office are almost. entirely ? concerned with coordinating' agency responses to ? the various in-" vestigating .bodies, and with various: types of employee .grievances. . The office of general counsel has 'on' 'occasion played an important role in- -preventing or terminating agency ac; ?tivities in violation of law, but many of the questionable or uniawfuhactivi- ties. discussed in this report were not brought to the attention of this office.. A ,certain parochialism may have re- suited from the feat that attorneys in the office have little' or no legal exnerid encili. outside thc ..igency. It. is in:nen tent that the Agency receive the best ? possible legal adviee on the Often dif-. ficult and unusual situations whichC confront it.,, . Conclusions . e. ? In the final analysis, t h proper' functioning of the agency must de: - pend in large part on the character 'of.. theDirector of Central Intelligence. ? . The best assurance against misuse , of the agency lies in the appointment to that position of persons with the ?judgment, courage, and ihdependence _ to resist Improper pressure and impor- tuning, whether from the White House, within the agency or elsewhere, ? Compartmentation within the agency, although certainly appropriate for se- curity reasons, h a s sometimes been carried ? to extremes which -prevent -pioper supervision and control. ea , The agency must rely on the disci- pline and integrity of the men and -women it employs. Many of. the activid ties we have found to be improper On unlawful Were in fact questioned by lower-level employees. Bringing such .situations to the attention of upper -levels of management is one of the pur- poses of a system in internal control.. - Recommendation .(7) h ai Persons appointed to the position Of Director of Central Intelligence shonict be individuals of stature, in- dependence, and integrity. In making :this appointment, consideration should be ,given to individuals from outside' the career service of the CIA, although promotion from within should. not be. barred. lxperience in intelligence serv- ice is not necessarily aiDrarecitealte for the position: management and admin- istrative skills are at least as important as the technical expertise which can always be found in an able deputy. ,b. Although the director serves at (f3 ? 'a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should be re- constituted to provide for two such. deputies, in addition to the four heads of the agency's directorates. One de- puty would act as the administrative officer, freeing the director from day- to-day manageinent dutica. The other deputy should be a military officer, serving 'the' functions of fostering re- lations with the military and providing' the agency with technical expertise or, military intelligence requirements; ? b. The advice and consent of the -Senate -should be required for ?the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence: . Atecorrimendation (9) ? .. a. The inspector general should 'be upgraded to a status equivalent to that of the deputy directors in charge -of the four directorates within the CIA. ? ? ( b. The Office of InspectorGeneral should be staffed by outstanding, ex- perienced officers from both inside and- outside the CIA, with ability to under-- stand the -various branches of thei agency. ? . ? ? c. The inspector general's .dutieS with respect to domestic CIA activities .should include periodic reviews of tall offices within the United States.' He. Should examine each ?office for corn-, pliance, witht qTA. authority and reg- :Illations as well as for the" effective- ness *of their programs In implement- ing, policy, objectives. - , ? d. The inspector general 'should in-- InOestigate all these reports from em- pi eyees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute. -itt. The tespctiter general ahauld be" given complete !access' to all informs.; Aon in, the CIA relevant to his ? re:' -views. ? , Ari effective Inspector general's . office will require a larger staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified personnel: ' g. Inspector general reports should lie provided to the National Security; Council and the recommended .execu- dive oversight body. The inspector gen- ieral should have--the authority, when, he deems it appropriate, after notify- ing the Director of Central Intern-- gence to consult with the executive, oversight body. on any CIA' activity. (see Recommendation 5). -Recommendation (10) a. The director should review' the: composition and operation & the .0f: tied of General Counsel and the Vest, gree to whieth this office. is Consulted :to determine whether. the agency is -receiving adequate legal assistance' and representation -in view of current , requirements. . _ b.- ConSideration should be given to' .measures which would strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources-- including, * among other things, (1) occasionally departing from the existing practice of hiring lawyers' from within the agency to bring in seasoned lawyers from private prace tice as well as to hire law school grad- uates without prior CIA experience; ? (2) occasionally assigning agency lawe. .yers to serve a tour of duty elsewhere in the government to expand their experienced(3) enCouraging lawyers participate in outside ptofessional ac- tivities. ? Recommendation (11) ? To a degree consistent with the -need for security, the CIA should be the pleasure of the Prestedent, no dikiei- encouraged to provide for increased gence Agency approved commence:- - t s serve i, F Release129104i0S1080t pAORDPUFAQ432ROIDOI Nameoe-gork mail intercept or hould n titilPFAVga th ' eutaide etetierienc-e late the hcy at all levels. ai : itfecannaienclation (12) Omrk.. a. The agency should issue detailed - guidelines for its employees further specifying those activities within the United, Ste tes which inns, permitted' . and these which mie prohibited by. ' statute, e-seenti*,.re cz-e?r:s, and NSC .land DCI directives. ? b. These guidelines shottici also set hforth the standards which govern CIA d activities and the general types ?of ac- ? ,tivities which are permitted and pro- hibited. ? They should, among .other things, specify that: 6 Clandestine collection of Intel/ie. gen.ce :directed against United States citizens which is prohibited except as pecifically permitted by law or Dub- ': -.1ished executive ord:sr. 6 Unlawful methods or activities are 'prohibited. a Prior approval of the DCI shall ? be required for any aeavities which may raise questions of compliance with the law or with agency' regula- -ions. ? ? c. The guidelines shoala also pro- vide that employees with laCermatiorn On possibly impforier zeti7ities tn. bring it promptly to the Ltte.."..ntion of the Director of Central latelligenCd' ,,or the inspector general. ?ill. SIGNIFICANT AREAS . OF ? INVESTIGATION Introduction - ' Domestic activities of the CIA rais- ? ing :substantial questions of compli- ance with the law have been. closely. examined by the commission to' deter- mine the context in which they were ' siert:ire:hid. the pre:inure of' the times, I the relationship of the activity to the agency's, foreign intelligence assign- ment and- to, other CIA activities, the co .used to authorize and eon-. duct the activity, and.-the extent and effect of the activity. In describing and assessing each :such activity, it has been necessary to _consider both that, activity's relation- ? ship?to the legitiniate-national security -needs of the nation and the .threat .such antivities might pose to individual rights of Americans and to a society .founded on the need 'for government, as well as private citizens, to obey the 'law. , ? , - ' ? ? The CIA's Mail Intercepts Findings ? s. At the time the' CIA came into being; one of the highest national intelligence priorities was to gain an understanding of the Soviet Union and its worldwide ectivities Affecting our national secure ity. ? e- . In this-context,' the CIA began in 1952 ta. program of surveying mail be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through a New York postal facility. In 1953 it began open-, ing some a this mail. The program, was expanded over the following two decades and ultimately invoi"Ved the 'Opening of many letters and the anal- ysis of envelopes, or "covers," of ia great many more letters. r? .The New York mail intercept was designed to attempt to identify-persons within the United States who-., were cooperating with the Soviet Union and, its intelligence forces Ori harm. the United States. It was also intended to :determine technical- communications 'procedures and mail' censorship tech- niques used ,by the Soviets. The .13irectod of the Central Intelli- more than 10 years. the directorates and to bring persona in 1952. During the ensuing years. so 3 far as the record 'shows, Postmasters Approved For Release 2001/08/08': CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 'General Sumrnerrield, Day; and Blount- ;were infOrmed of the program in vary- ' ing degrees, as was Attorney General. ,Mitchell. S i rice 1953, the FBI was aware of this program and received '57,000 items' from it. ;? ,.? ' ? A 1962 CIA memorandum indicates' -the agency was aware that the mail ' openings would be viewed as violating federal criminal -laws prohibiting ob- -strUction or delay of the-mails. ? In the last years before 'the termination of this program, out. of 4,350,000 Items of mail sent to and .from the .Slie :viet Union, the New York intereept ?amined the outside of 2,300,000 of these .Items, photographed 33,000 envelopes, and opened 13,700. ? ? .?? ,4 The mail intercept, was terminated In 1973 when the chief postal inspector refused' to allow Its continuation with- out ,an up-to-date high-level approval.; ? The CIA also ran much smaller mail Intercepts .f o r brief periods hI San Francisco between 1969. and 1971: and .in the territory of HaWail -during 1954. and 1955. For a short period in 1957e mail in transit between foreign coun- tries. was intercepted in New Orleans' ? - Conclusions , *While -in- operation. the CIA's domes- tic mail opening peograms were unlaw- ful. United States statutes specifically; forbid opening the mail. ' - S The mail' Openings also raise .cohsti- tutional questions under the Fourtl} Amendment guarantees against unrea- -sonable search,' and the scope of the New York project pose's possible :diffi- culties With the First Amendment rights of speech and press. ? ? e; Meil. cover operations "(examining and: copying of envelopes only) 'arc legal- when carried out in compliance with postal regulations, on a limited: and selective basis involving- Matters national- security; The New York. . mail ihtercept did- not meet . these criteria. ? ? The *tire. and decree-of assistance, . given ? bY the CIA to the FBI th the New _York mail project indieate :that. The CIA's primary purpose eventually. ,became participation with the FBI,-in internal, security functions. According- ly, the .CIA's participation was pr?. ehibited under the. National Security,: ?Act.e.. ? - ? - - Recommendation (13) a, The President should instruct the.' Director of Central Intelligence that ? the CIA ifi? not to engage again hi do- einestic mail openings except with ex- press statutory authority in time of dwarn(See also Recommendation 23).el b. The President -should instruct-the? Director of Central Intelligence that moi/ cover examinations -are to.. be in comnliance with postal regulations:. :they are to be undertaken only in .fur- ..theranee of the CIA's legitimate ectivi- ;ties and -then only on a limited. and *selected basis clearly involving mat-; 2. Intelligence Community ? Coordination ;ters of national security.- ? Findin . . As a result of growing domestic dis- order, the Department of Justice, start- 'Pig in 1967 at the direction of Attorney' General Ramsey Clark, coordinated a series of seeret units and interagency , groups in an effort to collate and eval-: !vete ?intelligepoe relating to these -events. These efforts COntinued until 1973.? ? The 'interagency committees were designed for 'analytic and not opera- tional purposes. They were created as 'a result of White House pressUre 'which began in 1307, bactue the FB$ performed only limited evaluation and lAnalySie of the liforitatibri ifebIlected? (on these -events. The stated purpose of -CIA!si participation was to supply rele- vant foreign intelligence and to furs mish advice on evaluation techniques. ' The CIA was reluctant to become' ',unduly involved in these committees, which'-had problems Of domestic un- rest as their principal forcus. It repeat- tedly refused to assign full-time per7 sonnet to any: or them. The most active of the committees ewas the Intellig,ence Evaluation Staff, --which met :train January, 1971, to May; ' 1973. A -CIA liaison officer attended' rover 100 weekly meetings' of the staff, ,some of which concerned drafts of re- 'ports which ,had no foreign aspects. .}Witch, the: exception of one instance, ;there is no evidence that he acted in Any capacity other than -as an adviser on foreign intelligence, and, to some ,degree, as an editor. ; ? ' On one occasion the CIA liaison off!- or appears to have caused a CIA agent to gather domestic information which was reported to the Intelligence, ,Evaluation Staff. d The commission found no evidence' ;of other activities by the CIA that were conducted on behalf of the. De- partment of Justice groups except for 'the supplying of appropriate foreign Intelligence and advice on evaluation techniques. Conclusions. The statutory. prohibition'on Internal- security functions does' not preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelli- gence or advice ott evaluatien tecimi- emes to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation organizations' having some uoinestic aspects. The statute was in- tended tn promote coordination, not tompartmentation of intelligence be- , tween governmental departments. ' e The attendance of the CIA liaison fficer at over 100 meetings of the Intel-' ligence Evaluation Staff, some of them' . concerned wholly with domestic *mats , ten, neverthelesss created at least the -'appearance of impropriety. The Direc- ?tor of Central Intelligence was well ad- vised to' approach such participation reluctantly. ? - . - The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance which he directed an agent to gather domestic informa- tion within the United States which was 'reported' to the Intelligence Eval- :nation. Staff.-? ? - Much of te.problem`stemmed from the absence in government of any or- ganization capable of adequately one- .lyzing intelligence collected by ? the FBI on matters; outside the purvieW e ? ? ? ? en. ? 'Recommendation.. ? s. A capability stfoidd be developed within the FBI, or elsewhere in the De- . partment of Justice, to evaluate, ana- ,lyze, and coordinate intelligence and 'counterintelligence collected by the FBI concerning espionage, terrorism, dind other related matters ? of internal security. . b. The CIA should restrict its parti. 'nation in any joint intelligence com- mittees to foreign intelligence mat- ters. c. The FBI should be encouraged to tontintie to look to the CIA for such foreign intelligence and counterinteh ligence as is relevant to FBI needs. ? .Special Operations Group?"Operation - ? CHAOS" ?? Findings The late 'Saes and early i97.0s were marked. by widespread violence,' and civil disorders. Demonstrations, marches and protest assemblies were ;frequent in a number of cities, Many ,;universities and college Campuses.?be-, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 came places of disruption and 'unrestl= -Government facilities were picketeci - and sometimes invaded. Threats of- bombing and bombing 'incidents ?cense med: frequently. din Washington and other major cities, apecial security measures had to he instituted.te 'con- trol the access to public buildings. ? Responding to presidential requests made in the face of growing domestic 'disorder, the Director of Central Intel,, ligence in August, 1967,' established a.: Special Operations Group within the CIA to collect, coordinate, .evaluate on the extent of foreign - fluence on domestic dissidence. ? The group's activities, which later -came :to , be known' as Orieratien 'CHAOS, led the CIA to collect infor- mation on dissident Americans from. CIA field stations oversea.4 and froth. 'the FBI. e ? Although the stated purpose *of. the -operation was 'to determine whether .there 'were any . foreign contacts' with/ American dissident groups, it resulted In the accumulation of' considerable ma- terial on domestic dissidents and their activities. d? During six years; the operation com- piled some 13,000 different files,' in- tludin-g files on 7,200 American citi- tens. The documents in these files finiV related materials included the names More than 30,000 persons and organ- izations, which were entered into A -computerized index. ? ?': This information 'was kept closely guarded within the CIA. Using this ire ? formation, 'personnel of the, group pre-. pared 3,500 memoranda for internal, use;-3,000 memoranda for dissemina- tion to the FBI; and .37 rnernoranda -for distribution to White 'House and other top level officials in the gov- ernment. .The staff assigned to the operation was steadily enlarged in response to repeated presidential requests for ad- ditional information, -ultimately reach- ing a maximum of 52 in 1971. Because ,of excessive isolations the operation was substantially insulated frorinmean- Ingful review within the agency, in- icluding review by the Counterintelli:' genceOtaff--of which the eperation, Was technically a part.' n Commencing in late 1069, Operation' CHAOS. used a number of agents to' 'collect intelligence abroad on -any ford .eign- connections With American dies0 dent groups. In order tti have suffi- l'cient "cover" for these agents, the op-- ,eratiou recruited persons from domes- : stiC, dissident groups or secruited others and instructed them to. associate. with such groups in this country:. ? - ,. 'Most of the operation's reeruits'seCie-'-, itOt directed.. to collectinformation do-'? ?Mestically on American:dissidents. On. a. number of occaesions, however; such': Information. was reported by the re- nits while they 'were developing sident credentials in the United States,' And the *information' was 'retained in ite files er.the operation. On three Oc? casions, an agent of the operation was speCificaily directed to collect domes, tic intelligenee. . 'No evidence was fourid- that any Op: -eration CHAOS agent used or was di: ?rected by the agency to. use electronic surveillance, wiretaps or breaksins the United States against-any dissident individual or group. ? Activity of the operation deCieased substantially by mid-1972, The opera- tion was formally terminated in March 1974. . ; ? -Cenclu.sionn 8ome domestic activities of Opera- tion CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the Cals'e statutory authority; even though ? : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . Abe-declared' Mission 'cf gathering ind telligence. abreadeeas to foreign Influ- ence on domestic dissident ,activities was proper. .Most signficantly, the operation be _came a repository for large quantities of information on the domestic activi- ties of American citizens. This infor- mation Was derived principallinfrom FE; reports or from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA, and, much of it was not 'directly - related to the question of the existence of foreign connections. It was probably necessary--for the 'CIA to accumulate an information- base on domestic dissident activities in 'order to assess fairly whether the ac- tivities had foreign- connections. Thd FBI would collect information but would not evaluate it. But the accumu- lation Of domestic data in the opera- tion exceeded What was- reasonably re: quired to make such an assessment and wee thus improper. .:" The use of agents of the operation on three occasions to gather informa- tion ' within the -United States on strictly domestic matters was beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the in- telligence disseminations and ' those portions of a major study prepared by the agency which dealt with purely do-, .niestic matters were improper., Tire isolation of Operation. CHAOS within the CIA and its independence -from supervision by the regular chain of command within the clandestine service made ,it possible for the activi- ties of the operation to stray over the bounds of the agency's authority with- -out the knowledge of senior officials. The abeence of any regelar review of these activities prevented timely 'cor- rection of such missteps as did occur. - Recommendation (15) .. t a. Presidents should refrain from di- recting the i CIA to perform what are -essentially internal security tasks.' 1 b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to- involve it. again in such improper activities. - de. The agency should guard against: allowing any companent (like the Spe- . cial Operations Group) to become so self-contained and _isolated from top leadership that regular ?Supervision ,and review -are lost. , ? , ? d. The 'files of thp CHAOS project which have no foreign intelligence' 'value should be destroyed by the agency at the conclusion of the current= congresSional investigations, or as soon - thereafter as permittea by law. :\ el. Protection Of. the Agency Against. Threats orViolence-- 7.1e, on ? Office of Security, Findings . The CIA was not immune from the ,threats of-violence and disruption dur- ing the period of domestic unrest be:, teen 1967 and 1972. The Office of Se- curity was charged throughout this pe- riod with the responsibility of ensur-, tag te continued functioning, of the' The office therefore, from? 1967 to 1.970, had its field officers collect infor- mation, from published materials, latv 'enforcement authorities, other. agen- ;cies and college officials 13e !ore tcruiters were- Sent to seme. campusea.'; 1,Monitoring' and communications guip-? -"port was' provided to reel ei+e tishen- trouble was expected. ? ? s ? The office was also responsible; with. the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for a program from Feb- ruary, 1967, to December, 1968, which at first monitored, but later infiltrated, dissident organizationApilitoatlifisr Re ton, D.C. area to determine if the groups planned' any aCtivitica against cf.A of other goverment installations:: -At no time were more than 1.; perk, sons performing these tasks, and they performed them on a part-time basis.- The-project was terminated when the Washington Metropolitan Police De partment developed its -own intellie; gence capability. ? w - In December, 1967, the office began, a continuing study of dissident activity ' in the United States, using information from published and -other voluntary knowledgeable sources. The office,' produced weekly si,tueticin information. reports analyzing dissider-t activities and nroviding calendars -Of future events. ? Calendars were given to the. Secret Service, but the CIA. made no other disseminations; outside the" agency. About 500 to 800 files.ewere maintained on dissenting organizations and individuals. Thousands of names. in the files were indexed: Report puha; 'cation was ended in late 1972, and the entire. project was ended in 1973. ? ? Conclusions. ? -'1 - The program under which the Office of Security rendered assistance to agency recruiters on college 'campuses was justified, as an- exercise of the' agency's responsibility to protect its own 'personnel and operations. Such support activities were not undertaken for the purpose of protecting the'faciii- ties or operations .of other governmen- tal agencies, or to maintain public' or der or enforce laws. -The-agency sholild not infiltrate a dissident group- for security purposes unless there is a clear danger to arency installations, operations or per. 'sonnet, and investigative coverage of the threat by the FBI and local law en- forcement- authorities is inadequate.' The ageney's infiltration- of dissident groups in the Washington area Went far- heYond steps necessary to protect the agency's.own facilities, personnel and. operations, and therefore ex- ceeded the CIA's statutory authority. - 'In addition, the agency undertooltIo protect ether government departments and agencies ? a police function pro- hibited to it by statute. Intelligence activity directed toward learning from what sources a demestfe dissident group receives its financia. upport within the United States, and hew much income it has, is no part of the authorized security operations of the agency. Neither is it in function of the: agency to compile records onnwho at- tends peaceful meetings of such dissi- dent groups, or what each speaker has' to say (unless it relates to disruptive, violent' activity which may be di-, :reeted against the agency). . a The agency's actions in contributing. funds, photographing people, activities and ears, and following people home were unreasonable -under the circum-. stances and therefore exceeded thei ,CIA's authority/. With certain exceptions', the pro- ? gram Under -wihich the Off ie of Secu- rity (without infiltration) gathered, or: ganiaed and analyzed information: 'about dissident groups for purposea of ..secerity was within ihe CIA's author- ity. a. The accumulation of reference files on dissident organizations and their-- leaders was appropriate both to evalue ate the risks -posed to the agency and, to develop an understanding of dissi- dent groups and their differences for security clearance purposes. But the accumulation of information on &Imes- :tic activities went beyond what was re-, - ea ? e ? 'Emenitmendation The 'CIA should not infiltrate died- dent groups cr other organizations al Americans in the absence of a vqitten. .-c3.etermirention by the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence that such action iee necesaavy to meet a clear danger to agency facilities, operations, or pereca- nel and that adequate coverage by law enfnrcernent agencies-is unavailable. Feeconortendation (17) ? ? All files or. individuals acremnulated bynthe Office of Security in the pro- gram relating' to dissidents should. lae identified, and, except where necessary .for a legitimate foreign intelligence ac- tivity, be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional investiga- tions, or as .soon thereafter as permit- ted by v . . 5 Other Inestigatiens by the Office en: Security ? 171.. CIJErc,'y CLEARIINCi INYESTZGATIONS CF PROSPECTIVE EirflanOYEES ? AND OPERATIVES? 4indinits and Conclueione ? The Office of Security roiitinely cons duets ,standard security investigations of persons seeking affiliation with the - agency, n doing so, the office is per- forming the necessary function of ? screening, persons to ? whom it will make available classified ?information. Such investigations are necessary, and no improprieties were) found in connec- tion with them. B. INVESTIGATIONS OF POSS - BREACHES OF SECURITY e I. Persons Investigated 2.indings it LE: The Office of Secuerite ii zne been culled upon on a number of occasions- to investigate specific .allegations that intelligence Seurces and methods were threatened by unauthorized disclostnes. The commission's inquiry concentrated on those investigations which used in- vestigative means intruding 'on' thee privacy of the subjects, including phys- ical 'and electronic surveillance, un- authorized entry, mail covers and in- tercepts, a n d ? reviews of individual. federal tax returns. ? . The Verge majority of these inVesti- gations were directed at persons affili- ated with the agency ? such as "em- ployees, former employees, and defec- tors and other foreign nationals used by the' agency as intelligence sources.. A few investigations involving intru- sions on personal privacy were direct- ed at subjects with no relationship to the agency. The commission has found no. evidence that any such investiga- tions were directed against any con- gressman, judge, or other public of- ficial. Five were- directed against news-' men, in , an effort to determine their ,sources of leaked classified informa- tion; and nine were direCted against 'other United States citizens. The CIA's investigations of newsmen to determine their sources of classified Information stemmed frczn pressures from the White House and were partly a result of the FBI's unwillingness to 'undertake such Investigations. The FBI refused to proceed withcot an ad- ..vaiice opinion that the Justice Depart- ment would prosectite ifta case were deVeloped. ? - ? t fonclusione nIhvestigations of allegations ?againsit agency einployees and operatives are 'a reasonable exercise of the director's statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthor-, quired by the agency's legitimate secu- lzed disclosure if the investigations are 941/01ne!tilAW5c0f itle0432Fitelba ? e director in the rit S u c h' investiga- rkea%' P ,exercise of his unrevie.wable authority Approved For Release 2001/08 ? to terminate the ereelloYment of 'any' agency employee: They are proper mid; less their, principal purpose becomes law enforcement or the. maintenance. ,of internal security. . The director's responsibility, to pro- tect intelligence sources and' methods -is not so broad as t6? permit investiga- tions of persons havingto relationship whatever with the agency.. The' CIA has no authority to investigate news 'men simply because they have pub= lished leaked classified ?information. -Investigations by the CIA- should be limited to persons presently or former-. Iy affiliated with the agency, directly or indirectly., Recommendation (18) ? a. The. Director of Central 'Intelli- gence Should' issue clear guidelines set- ting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in conducting its own Investigation of individuals presently. or formerly affiliated with it. ? b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investigations of such persons only, when the Didecter of Central, Intelligence first .determines 'that the investigation is necessary to protect intelligence sourees and meth- ods the disclosure of which might Elie danger. the national security. ? c. Such investigations must be cos, ordinated with the FBI. whenever' sub- stantial-evidence suggesting espionage -or violation of a federal criminal state Lite is discovered. ', Recommendation (19) ? a. 'In' cases involving serious or con-' tinuing -security ?violations, s deter-, ?mined by the security committee of the United' States Intelligence Board, the ecernelttce elnedet des settinrised to recommend in writing to the Direc- tor of Centre]. Intelligence (with a copy, to the National Security Council) that the case. be referred to the FBI for further investigation; under proce- dures to be developed by the,Attorney ,General.' db. These procedues should include a requirement that the FBI,accept such referrals without regard to whether a , favorable prosecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA should not 'engage in such further in- vestigations., ..'? . Recommendation (20) The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence community should conduct periodic reviews of all 'classified material originating within those .departments. or agencies, with a 'view to declassifying as Much of that ,material as possible. The 'purpose of such review would be to assure the yublic that it has access to all informa'- stion that should properly be disclosed. . Recommendation 121) 'The commission endorses legislation, 'dr'afted with appropriate safeguards of the constitutional rights of all af- fected individuals, which .would make. .It a criminal offense for employees or former employees of the CIA wilfully to divulge to any unauthorized person classified' 'information pertaining to foreign intelligence or the collection thereof :obtained during the course of 'their emPloymont. . . ? - 2. Investigative Techniques Findings' ? . 'Evc,n, an; tzventiatiOn CIA's authority must be conducted by. 'lawful meant.. Some of the rest In- vestigations by the Office of Security. within' the. United 'State ? 'were .con-' ducted 'by means which were invalid at the time. Others might have been lawful when, conducted, but .would be P77-00432R000100370008-9 Some investigations involved physi- cal surveillance of the individuals con- tcerned, possibly in conjunction with other methods of investigatien. The. last instance 'of physical surveillance by the agency within the United States occurred in 1973. 'd The investigation disclosed the d the do- -mestic use 01 32 wiretaps, the last in 71965; 32 instances Of bugging, the lest :in 1968; and 12 break-ins, the last in 1971s. None of these activities were con- ducted under a judicial warrant, and only one' with ;the written approval of the Attorney General. Information from the income tak -records of 16 persons was .obtained from the Internal Revenue Service by the CIA in order to help determine whether the, taxpayer was a security 'iisk with possible connections to for- eign. groups: The CIA did not employ the existing statutory and regulatory procedures for obtaining such records from the IRS. e In 91 instances, mail covers (the pho- tographing tof the front and back of an, envelope) were employed, and is 12 instances letters were intereeptee 'and opened. t ? ' , The state efethe CIA : records on, these activities is such that it is often, difficult to determine why, the In- vestigation occurred in the first place,: Who authoriz the special coverage, and what the results were. Although there was testimony that tthese activ-- ities were frequently known to the Director of Central Intelligence, and sometimes to. the Attorney General, tir? files often are Insufficient to coil- firm such information. - - ate et, 4, _ COiletUACJAIA' The use of physical surveillance is not unlawful unless it 'reaches 'the point of harassment. The unauthor- dzed entries- described were illegal when conducted and. would be illegal if conducted today. Likewise, the.,re- view of- individuals' federal tax re-' turns and the interception and open-, ing of mail violated specific stAutes and regulations prohibiting sueh con- duct. -?? Since the constinational and tory constraints constraints applicable to the Use .of 'electronic eavesdropping (bugs and Wiretaps) have been evolving over the years, the cominission deems it im- practical to apply those changing standards on a case-by-case basis. The commission does believe that while spme of the instances of electronic eavesdropping ,were proper when co- ducted,' many were not. To be lawful today, such activities would require at least the written approval of ,the Attorney Genesal on the basis of a finding that the national security :is 'involved and that the case ,bas signif- icant foreign connections. ? ? , Recommendation (22), The CIA should not undertake phys- ical surveillance (defined as system- atic observation) of agency employees, contractors or related personnel with- in the United States without first ob- taining written approval of the Di- rector of Central Intelligence. . Recommendation (23) , in the United States and Its pos- sessions, the CIA, should not intercept wire or oral:communications or oth- erwise engage in activities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law enforcement agency. Responsi- bility for such, activities belongs . with the FBI. ? Recommendation (24) The CIA should strictly adhere to established 'legal procedures govern. SC'eese... to iederal incatue tea"; In-' formation. ' ? Recommendation (2,5) ? CIA investigation, records shonjo.' show that each Investigation was duly authorized., and by. whom, and should clearly set ferth the fattual basis for, undertaking the, investigation and :the. results of' the investigation. s C. HANDLING OF DEFECTORS , , ? -Findings 1 . The .Office oft Security is charged with 'providing security for persons' who have defected to the United. States. Generally a defector can. be Processed and plac ed into society' in a few months, but one' defector was. involuntarily confined at a' CIA, instai-i lation for three years. He was held -in solitary confinement under spartan living conditions. The CIA maintained the long confinement ? because of doubts about the bona fides of the defector. This confinement was ap-' proved by the Director of Central In- telligence: and the FBI, -Attorney General, United States Intelligence Board and selected members of gen- gress were aware to .some extenrof the confinement. In one other case a' defector wag physically abused; 'the, Director of Central . Intelligence disa charged the employee involved. . . 'Conclusions eth ' Such treatinent of individuals by an agency of the United States is unlaw- ful. The Director of Central Intelli- gence .and the inspector general must he alert to prevent repetitions. . . 6, Involvement of the-CIA in Improper Activities for the White House . 'Findings '..,,During 1971, at the 'request of Yarj-- ? ?Gil5 Inernt'Ol',.; of the White :Muse staff; the CIA provided alias docuinents and disguise material, a tape recorder, camera, film and film processing to E. Howard Hunt. 'It also prepared a psje chological profile of Dr, Daniel Elise . ? ?SOme of this equipment was later. .used without the knowledge of the 'CIA -in ,connection with various im- proper activities, including the entry into' the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding,' ,Ellsberas psychiatrist. Some members of the CIA's 'Medical. staff who participated in the prepara- tion of the Ellsberg.profile knew that one of its purposes was .to support a public attack on' Ellsberg. Except for this fact, the investigation has dis- closed no evidence that thetCIA knew' or had reason to know that the aSsise tame it, gave would be used tfor proper purposes. ' , President Nixon?and his staff aLs.o in- sisted in this period that the CIA turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the Lebanon landingse. the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban. 'missile cri- ,sis, and?the I/tett-lap war. The reqnest was made on the ground that. these ? files were needed by the President in the performance of his duties, but the record shows the purpose,. undisclosed to thret-CIA,:WaS, to serve the President's. personal political,en s. est ItaThie ethurniisiori. ha alsii iMioStigated: 'the*rionsettof?the ClAhtschthe ihvesti- tatidne efellOwingethe ..,Watergate stsstSeBe'gilihitig. in 'June l972. the.Crki ,r.eceiyeclarions 'requests*. for. infOrnia;,, ?tkon,azdi4istance in connertiontwitht, these investigatihns. In ? a .eiumber, of instencestOitf ,.resporlses ? Were; ,either .incomplete SOn 'delayed : and ? some,. Ina-- terials that may; otwmati not have :con.- tained?relevant, information were de- stroyed..Th e commission. feelsthat *this . conduct reflects poor judgment on the l- 6 part ofi;the,CI.A.IUt it has?.fotind Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000111)0370008-9 ? f-Y1, .1- ? tr. e , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . evidence tbatt the'CIA:participatednin rarer Wrtergate break-in or in Ahe- post-, by,. the nWhite, 7."intr.5...?? ? " - ' ' Canclusiens":-??,.., . "Pr a"- :the assistance? recpiested. White iIouseJitkeitiding,.,,Ilie: ii-fd' sg.'uis e the.--. Ca to- " arid ?the pschological profll3 rt. Elisberg,--:.was not' related to the ? per'', thelageneY'. int ell igenee furcton.i ' and was- 't...her'eforkiraproper.:, etnidence has been ta'sZiesed.,. how-: exeept ..D.S wftb't,131.1ilierg :profile, that:::,the CA. knew er'ishad reason to know that P'-ksistance would be used in connecn _tiara _With .. imp re per a eti vi ti es: No r- -any.evidence been eisclosed indicating that the CIA:.Particinatecl?in the plan- ?ning or carrying- out ? of .-either tile- Fielding or'' Watergate: brealoins. The' apparently. was :unaware of the bre91-.ins until they were reported in ' tie mcd!n. - ? ? .The-ren?ord does 'show, hrswever, that Individuals ? !in -the agency -?:;failed;., Comply with ?the normal control :pro- cedures in, proviciing assistance to:"E. Howard. :kr,unti.,,It also shows that the agency's failure to eboperatefullywn ongoing . investigations- Watergate was inconsistent,. with?its obligations. 4-7 .? . -'Finally, ? the - commission concludes: that-the requests-f or . assistance by 'the White 'Hous reflect a 'pattern' for ac- tual and attempted misuse of, the CIA by .the Nixoa adndaistration. t 6 Z.: .? ?' laecommenrlation (26, ? - , ? a.A sing,te exclusive high-level .eliannel should ? be 'established for transmisSion Of White HOnse.Staff requests to the CIA. This- channel should run.betwe.eri;an..,officer...of.,,th,e Na tiori al Security Conneil4 staff., desig- nated by the President 'and the.ofirce of the director or his deputy. ?. b. All agency officers and emPloyees should be instructed' that'any? direc- tion or request reaching thetn directly .and out of -regularly -established ?chan- riers' should' be immediately reported to the Director of Central intelligence. ? 1. Domestic Activities of the Director. , -.-? ? - - ? ate of Operations..:, _ '-findings and. support Id I its '???1?4:SlionSibility z' f6r the' collection of foreign. intelligence :and ..conduct of iwort onerations-aver-: 'seas, ? the CIA's Directorate:. of. Opera- :tions engages in a variety of activities within the United States. .. . A. OVERT COLLECTION ,FOREIGN .INTELLIGENCE THE UNITED ' One division 'of Alie;...pirecitiollat4": 9peratibns Igzace ovithinthe, United :S.tate.S.'Xrorn ..,xeside kits, ,businessfirmS,'.."-aricl'?fother ifga n ;in t willing!, to i,":assist.,-.; the . ;openly. )ay Poffieers., Who identify; 'thein-`, 'selves 'as CIA emPlOyees...Such.,source.s.. -^"nrornation zre not Conwenst.tedn '" ? ? COnnection. with' lhese,.dellectien 'iriafe415.1,,450*,!)0.4-.(aO yithr!-,..tihese?, voluntary-- source .?,..azierIhei....,:te:snIts' of ..1a.1.7.ieciel-ain.:aigeneyn.. /fa m 0,--?cheekt? 'coll ctiod efforts: have.: .,,.been";almostexcl,uSively .confined to ,oforeign*:edenbniici. political;latilitaryn. - , ,COitunerktingin.?/9-6 . ? .ries. This creates a_ri?s1 retlf _ .a-Cti'vitieS:::,of ".the,..0,11$1 ftrtign Re leafs* 2/1001L/PWAiitWOk . other legal requirements. The agency 7 YaridnoPeratiOnal. -.61SSidents', 2i,:d.',IdiSsident..;.E.:roups.":" kith ongir ixts ws on foreign".- backan.on nd inf o?rination, :do.: irreStin.;d1Silderits1: ..ivaS??.c...1soCollected. ?atween , t ivity ;avec or pa tern?ing orDneration. CFk'OS ? 4:tined:and- transalitteci;".to''other.'ipart the.: Info rmation al-. on 5- eallsnibe,cweero. .-,Hemisphere..(inchatie,g-n.ithe'-?:- United, States): arid:twnt:,other,.catinta.'.es..- The -information waslfliimited-.' to names,. ?-tele-phonelzranikers, -andnlo6ations. of , . . 'callers,-and.'recipients..It noCin-". .-!OlOde...t6,kontent. '?of:_sthd,-.con.Versa7.. on,* 'Isos: cc cas ionally; -;re cerves ..reporfS,conCerning. criminal tiyity within the United. States. PUrsu- an* to written' relulations,?the- source ?or' .a --report of :the 1-information -re-' calved ? is. referred to the .appropriate. ? laenftircernent ? ?????? r ',The _CIA's efforts to.:colleet?fOreign .intelligeuCe froth .residerits of ? .the: - 'United States Willing' to assist the CIA... are ?.e 'valid- and necessary- element of ? ,itresponsibillty,ONOt .onlynclo; these isersonS.,. proVide?' a ?large ? reservoir. of- forCian 'they/are by, far rii-ost." accessible- source of'. such, ..inforniation:? ? _ ? _ division's ' ? On Arnerican. citizens .and firms. representing'aetual . potential sources -information "constitute- a neceSsary part.."-OfZits'?le itir_eate intellfgeace." They donne; --P.Pear cellect.ion or...commun.ic auCn, :4; .. %embarrassing, ,or tenwtiu,e,.rn 'formation about .-Arrierican:CittienS:L. . ? Th division's efforts, 'with' few excep- tions, have been Confined to legitimate .topies:,.. ..? '-The collection of, informatihnf:with ? .respect to American. dissident groups. exceeded .legitimate 'foreign .;intelli- gence collection .and. was beyond ..the proper scope of CIA. activity.. This im- propriety was recognized in some of the _division's own .memoranda. commission was -unable to-dis-.. cover, any specific purpose for.tbe.-col?., lection of telephone toll call. informa, tion or any use 'of that information by, the agency. In the: 'aWence of a valid purpose, such collection is improper., B. PROVISION ADCONTROL . OF' .. COVER FOR -CIA:, PERSONINEL3.,...'. tngagee'f,in..Clatidest. 'tine foreign intellrgnc,aiiritfcs can-' not travel, orf.nerforiro:their :duties ..openly as agency cmploy,rieSit,..,Accord- ingly; ;',Virttially;.. all CIA sprving., abroad ,and ;niany in' the United States .assume- "coVer!''SS em- ployees,ofanother government agency or of coroniercial enterprise. CIA in. :valvement;. in :' certain activities, such :as research. and. development projects, :.are also . sometimes , conducted,' under. , ' ? CIA's: cover a rrangebi eat" ? ave.-. es- ! sential:40 the:;.CIA'si performance . of ..its;-?iforeigriAntelligence. Mission.: The .inVestigatiori. has...dclosed .'no listances ?,in.? which domestic aspects of COVer arrangements involv. led.,'any.:.'violations of fly 'dpfhitin,, .htnr,ever; 'cover accer- sitates an element of deception which must ?-be practiced kvithirf.the' United ?ftates within foreign coryi,-. :recognizes, this ? risk.. It tics,- installed r'eantrols under, which coiter arrange- r - trrnemsnaren,Closel,y.,supervised m pt Itp-* 1:51.1-C.. able ? pr.EATTNG Pr. : A In.:7 , :CIA; LIS es prepriet-z:;'?(.--.1-0,,-,11--'_ provid?,c?-.)ver and arform 'istrative . without, Pttril.lutipn 'to .the agency. Most, of the large "onerat- ing.proprietcries,--prim.criiy: have been liquiclated',..and ite remain- der. engage:in activities cfiering, little, ? or no .competition . to 'private enter:, !,.? ;.. . ? , ? The :only, remaining large: proprie- tary activity isa complex of financial companies with' assets of apPaoximz'te- ly S20 million, that:enables the agency to administer. certain sensitive trusts), . annuities, e.crOws;:ins.urance arrange- ments, and other,: benefits', and ,pay7'. 7ments provided to officers or contract employees 'without attribution to. CIA.. . The remaining small operatin.g. pro- prietaries, generally iving fewer: than ,-1.0 employees': each, Lake sionat- ..triburielle?:purch...n. . ses. c..0.11r,merit and supp? . ? '; ?E*cept".'as 'diseussed connection With. ',"the ? Office';of ' Security' . . . the cdriintiSsion" has' foUi.e. no ? :?ekddencii. that anY'proPrictaries have been vied' for operationS against 'American' cid; .?criS ? or. investigation of ? their activi-' ties. All of them appear to be subject. tO. close supervision :and multiple R.; 'niacial controls within the agency: .L DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACTS , oigrix FOREIGN NATIONALS : In connection with- the IA's foreign intelligence responsibilitie., ? it seeks ,to deyoldp, contacts with foreign na-, tiorials ' within ? the United States. American citizens voluntarily assist in developing-these. contacts. As far as the commission can' find,, these activi- ties .have not involved coercive meth- -, These activities appear to be. direct- eiktireiy. to' the .production of for-. ? !eign:intelligence and to be . within the atithority,:of. the .CIA.. We . found no ? .eVideace 'that any of theseactivities. have, been directed against American, ? .1;.:,ASSISTANCE IN NARCOTICS . ,,CONTROL ?. ? ? . ? The ..1)irectorate. of the Operations provides.. foreign intelligence support to' the government's efforts to central the:floW of narcotics and other danger-, 'o?i driles.intO.:this" country. The CIA. ,-4iordinates t',clandestine intelligence. Collection .oVerseas and provides .oth- er*.goVerament agencies., with foreign intelligence .on :drug . traffic. ;;;;;:FronOthe .beginning of such efforts' in 1969; the/CIA Director and- other officials have7instructed employees 'to .Make;',,gather ,informa=. ori eric,a ns traffick, ;ing 'in -:drugs.' If: such information is obtained, 'incidentally,- it is -:trazirint led ? tO".;lasii.,enforceinerit- :..;Concerns that the: CIA's narcotics- related, intelligence activities may in- volve-the., agency in .law enforcement or' other:-, actions directed against ;American citizens. thus apPear_unwar.-. ? ..:-..Beginning in.. the. 'fall of 719.13, .the directorate monitored conversations between :the United. States and Lath 'America in an effort to identify nar, .Cotics. traffickers.. Three months after the program began, the general coils sel of. the CIA was ',consulted. He it,. 32ROOnleedlgael.0a3onled Oit -w4ilkasaitinn' thieediLroteglryah wa t-termi!, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 e? ? Th.Ls:nionitoring, although a 'Source' of Valuable :information for enforce-- merit. officials, was a` violation' of a ,statute of ithe 'United States," Continu- ation of the eoperation fo? over three' months' without the knowledge of the: ,:Office _of: the General C'oensel_ demone strat:the ivied for ireproVed internal Conattltation.,-. (Set:: ,'Recommendation 16.)=.-te!..fe=;?'. '113. ??Dente:Olic Aetivitiesof thi.4 Direct?. t` Seance and Tethnology ? and. Conclusions ?7:.'iThe CIA's- .Directorate of ? Science 'and Technology performs a variety of 'research and .development and ,opera- ..tionalensUpport esfilnctions for the agency'b:eforeign intelligence .mission eNlany nofenthese activities ? are per-, -formed Wthe...eUnited Statis 'and in cooneratione with priVate , corn- :panies.. A. few of-these zeetivitiest were . . 'improPer.'s or questionable. et ez-? -:--As part of a_prog?am to test the' in, fluence-of 'drugs on humans;,- research includedtthe adminestration of LSD to. persons 'who were unaware that they were-being tested.- This was- clearly legal. ..:One ,person died in ,I953,? elver ? ; entlereas a. result.. In ii)63 following the, inspeetor, general's discovery of: ethes e_events, new stringent Criteria:. twerejasued ,prohibiting'-drug....teating;, .-13T-the CIA- pa unknowing pereorls. All' :dreg. testing programs evvere.. ended ? 1967 77'1 7 ;rt. ,Iti:the,p-roCess" 'of testing monitoring _entilpinent for, 'use overseas, .the 'CIA.. - -haliOverheard 'conversations between ;1-Aineticans. /The names of the speak- era :1-4i-ere- net ?identified:',.the 'contents conversations were not ? dis seininated. :All 'recordings . were dee atroyed when testing 'was,. concluded.: "Such teotingshoeld:: ebt behdireeted" 'against_ unsuspecting persons in the -United .States. Most of-' the testing' inideetaken by tife ?agericy Could easily" haVe been Perfernied using only agene. cy%PerSonnel and with the full' knowl- - ?.edge `Of .1thoSe- whose .cenversationss: _were *being -reeorded. This the pre-, sent agency practice.::, . ? ilOther actiVities ofr this 'directorate include the 'manufacture of ; alias ere-. dentials ? for use by CIA employees and- agents?Alias Credentials . are nec- essary to, facilitate CIA clandestine operations,7buf the_ strictest controls 'anctaceouritability mut be maintained 'OVerhthe use of such documents. Re.,, cent gaidelines established by the 'Deputy Direetor for Operetionis to con- trol the use of alias documentation 'appear ,adequate to prevent ;1,1sttse ? ha the future. est As part: of another ,progrann photo- graphs taken, by CIA aerial: photom- phy equipment are provided to civilian 'agencies of,thp goi4erpment. Such pho-: tographs- are; used to assess:natural disasters, 'conduct 'route surveys anis:. forest" inventories, and detect crop blight. Permitting civilian use of aerial photography .systems - is -.proper. The 'economy of ?operating but one aerial, photography program :dictates the Use- of these photographs fqr appropriate ? '4eivi1ian: purposes. -se ' ? e ehe -s Recommendation (27) - -In accordance with its'present guide; lines, the. CIA 'should not: again en- gage in the?testing of dregs P:n nnsus- 'pecting persona.", !nee : ? . Recoenuendation (23) _ 'Testing of equipment fer monitoring conversations should . not involve un- suspecting ,persons living' within the United States. ' , . e ? s?I : Recommendation (29) A civilian agency committee should Approved For he re-established to oversee the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography' in .orde.r to avoid any concerns over the improper, domestic use of a CIA- developed system. 9.,C1A Relationships With Other . Federnl, State, and Local Agencies CIA operations touch the interest of rnacy other agencies. The CIA, like other agencies of the government, fre- quently has occasion to give or receive assistance from ?other agencies. This investigation has concentrated on thcee relationships which raise' substantial questions under the CIA's -legislative mandate. `tlittg4 ;00lielis'S'" ?-i Fir, an s. . A 'A! FEDERAL BURETI'``.'d-' . ? ? e_ ? eni..4- OF INVESTIGATION', Te 11 The FBIt counterintelligence' Cpera- tens ' often have positive 'intelligence, ramifications. Likewise; legitimate do"; reestic CIA activities occasionally crossc the path of FBI investigations, ::Daily liaison is"therefore necessary be-kV/Ten the two egencies. Much routine information is passed 'back and ,forth. Occasionally joint op- erations are, conducted.' The relation- ship between the agencies has,' how- ever, nqt been -uniformly, satisfactory over the years. Formal liaison was cut cif from February, 1970, to November, 1972, but relationships have improved in recent years. .The relationship between the bui and the FBI needs to be clarified and : ontlined in detail in Order to ? ensure that the needs of national security 'are _Met without creating conflicts or gaps :of jurisdiction. ,. , ? , , :* 'Reconiniendation (30) ? The Director of Central Intelligence end the Director- of ,the FBI should prepare and submit for approval by-the National Security Council a detailed -agreement 'setting forth-the jet- risdic:, tion of eaCh' agency and providing-fon effective liaiion with 'respect to , all wrnettees of mutual concern. This agree- ment Shoelt-h 'be consistent nvith the :provisions of law and -kith other -ap- plicable,regontertexidatione. of- this re., Port.t? E. NARCOTICS ?LAVV-4.:- ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES e imung in -late :1970,_ the CIA as.: 'Mated the 'Bureau of Narcotics "'and 'Dangerous Drugs' to -uncover possible corruption within ..that organization; The :CIA used one of its proprietary, companies, to recruit agents for BNDD and. ,gave t them. short -instructional- courses. Over 21/2 years, the, CIA ,'e Cruited 19 agents for the BNI3D. The preject :was terminated in 1973, ;':,The,director was correct in , his 'Wit:ten:directive terminating the projj ect2 The CIA's participation in Jaw ent Comment activities in the course or these 'activities was forbidden by ALS lstatute: The director and the inspector. general should be alert to prevenfin- volvement of the agency in;pirni.lar en- : terprises in the-future. . n' ? C. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE h t For more than 20 years, the CIAi throngh ? a ?Proprietary conducted a schooLlon for,eign police and ? security officersein the United States 'under the auspices of 'the, Agency fon; International ,DeVelopment ? of :the De- 'pertinent of ,:'.State. The proprietary also sold arnalle amotintfie of. Licensed- firearms arid 'police -equipment to the foreign-officers and their departments., 'eThe CIA's-activities in providing ed- ,'-ucational programs fon foreign police-- were not improper under the agency's -other Significant domestic impact': -Engagiree in the firearms hOsiness, ...was a oqiesetionahle. activity. ferea .gov?? '-ernrnent intelligence_eagencye It should.. not -he .renez-led ? ? ' , rt...4.,1 LNG RIN-4T.M.A'S FROM, 7 ; P i E AGENCIES , le fen., eteieg of LOW, at the request, 'Ci the White House, ? the-CIA con? tributed i7.3'ift55.68 for payment. of St2- ? !tionery and other costs for replies to persons who -wrote the President after' the invasion of ,Camboditht' . ? - . en.This , use, Of CIA fends fOr:,ii .'pnr?-? ..pase. unrelated to intelligence is im- proper. Steps phould .be taken. to en- :-sure against any repetition of: suele - .- h?Eh 'STATE' AND LOCAL gpucE - ,;';',The -CIA -handles -a- variety' of rou- 'drip security mattera through liaison With local police departments. In ad-. dition, it training courses -from -1966 to 1973 to-United States police': -officers on a variety of law enforce- 'inent ? techniques; 'and. has frequently supplied --equipment to State and. local :police.' tv ' " -" :'? In general,, the coordination and co-. ?peed:ion between state and local, law- enforcement agencies and the CIA has , exemplary, based upon.a! desire -to facilitate:their respective legitimate :airns .and- goals.; , : . t? Most of the .asistance rendered to state and local 'law: enforcement agen- cies - by the:pIA has .been . no more than -an,effort, te 'share with law en- forcement authorities the 'benefits of.. :new . methods, techniques, and equip- --rent developed or used by thersagencY. --elan. a 'few occae,icne, however, the agency'- has inaproperly become in- valved' in ..actual .police ? operations. .Thus,. despite a generalhrule 'against providing' manpower to local: police forces, the CIA, has lent men, 'along with ? radio equipped vehicles, foe the ;Washington Metropolitan Police De- partment. to . help. -monitor antiwar .demOnStrations.. It helped.. the same, department stirveil a ',police informer. -It also -Provided an . interpreter to the -FairfalC. County;,(Virgiitia) Police De- pgaatirtomzsi. to,. aid in a,-,eriene In Compliance with the spirit of a recent' act' ,Congress, the CIA ter-. 'rninated all- but _routine' assistance to. 'state ehd. local law enforcement' agen- - cies in 1973. Such, assistance is ? now, _being ,provided state and locaragen- cies by the .FBI. There. is 'no impro- priety in the' CIA's furnishing the FBI- with information on new technical de-' '.yeloptnents which tnay be useful to lo- cal law enforcement.. For 'several Years the CIA?has given -gratuities to. local police officers who' had; been helpful to the agency.' Any. such Practice should be terminated. ? ? The CIA has also received assistance from local police forces. Aside from routine 'matters, officers from such forces have occasionally assisted the Office of Security in the conduct of investigations. The CIA has occasion- ally obtained police badges and other iadgeennttisf.ica!ion? for. use. as cover :for its ? Except for one occasion When soma ? local police assisted the CIA In un- authorized entry. 'the assistance re- ; ceived by-the CIA from state and local law enfoccemeatauthorities was prop- er. The use. of police identification as a means of providing cover, evhile not :-strictly ,speaking a violation of the agency's statutory 'authority as long as ;statute; Although the: 'school- was '?-ton-;? no police function. is performed, is a dueted the.. ? U nit e d States ? practice subject to misunderstanding through a 'CIA, proprietary, it had no and. shduld beaveidede ? ? - Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043r000100370008-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . r Traieez ? SY.Irl- nee, r. ? American Citizens d- Findings . , ? r..2;16,,,rfraeltr inforniation is prt1S:int? 'of' an intelligence cgener:. Cid......anainteins a number of 'files-. an'd oine',iege ? that inclpde. biographical information on Americans, e _ aeparld'of -its normal 'process of f.ndeging '?pairies and ?information 'of ?fcreign". intelligence' interest, the -Di- ?rdeterat6 'of -Operations .hae indeed. sans:7,033,000 names c.f all nationali- ties. An estimated.115,000 of these are kelieveri tr." be American citizens. ? ihWhere a person is believed to .be of' .rbscilsly continuing intelligence, inter- est,' files to collect information -as ?ree Oseived are opened. An estimated 57,000 'out Of a total of '750,000 such files cong? cern -American citizens. For the Most' .part" the 'names of Americans appead in indicee.' and,*fileS 'ectead ar tentiel ? sources' of information or as' kistagice 'to 'the -CIA: In :addition to ? These flies, files on some 7,200' Ameri- can citizens', relating primarily to their, domestic' activities, were, as 'already. stated, - compiled within' 'the -Direc: tarots, 'of Operations as Part of Opens ation CHAOS. ? nod " ? e- a The . Directorate of Administration ;maintains a riiimber of files on persons' s. . ' ? ? ' ?' who have 'been issociated with the CIA.- -These files are Maintained for ? Security, persdnnel, training, medical and, payroll purposes. :Yery? few are ',maintained on person&:unaware that. they-have relationship' with the CIAa 'He veveihthe Office of Seeurity.main; Mined 'Vas onST. AmeriCan :citizens as.: awe:ate:I' with ? airssiclesit groups who.. ,were never, affiliated. with the, agency :because .they-were Considered a threat ::to the. Physical. _security of agency fa-' aellities" and. employees... These files owere also. maintained; in part, for use in future security clearande deter, ? minations. Dissemination! of .security ,files is 'restricted. latpersons with an .,operational' need, for .them. ?? a, The Office of Legislative Counsel -,Maintains files- -concerning its rela- ntionshiPs:WitheOngressmen.; ? ?- ? ? . Conclusions 1.? "'Although maintenance ,o most of ? the indices; files,' and records of the "agency has been necessary and proper,: the standards applied bY the agency at 'some -points dtiring its 'history have permitted ? 'the: accumulation and in- dexing of Materiels' not needed for legitimate intelligence or *security. pur- poses.. Included ,in this .category.' are many 'of the files' reIated? to- Opera: flan CHAOS and the activities of the. Officetf:of Security-econcerning diss dent- grouaie.ded,.dst;:? ; Constantevigilanceby'the ;agency -is essential ? ton prevent the collection of in2ormation on United States- citiwni *hicb,is..not needed for prosier genoe activities. The, executive order -recommended by the ' commissi on (Bee-,o . ? omrnendation 2) Will. ensure purging of nonessential or, .improper materials files',- f?dsed.l.etillegatiens. oncerning the. Th., Assessinatien of President Kennedyd Numerous' _allegations - have,' .been gnadeathat?the CIA participated .in the 'assassination.. of President John '; F. Kennedy., The commission staff invea- -tigated these allegatiqns. On the basis' of the staff's . investigation; . the corn- mission concludes that there' is' no IVASF-TINGI:ON POST. 12 June 1975 ? spionage' and. Th-e is excerpted from. titer CIA report of the Rockcfelics? anoviania. sion. ? '? . During the period of the commis- sion's inquiry, there have been public allegations that a democracy dpes not' need an 'intelligence apparatus. The commission does not. share this view. Intelligence is informationi. gathered for policymakers -in government which illuminates the range of choices avail) able to' them and enables them to exercise judgment. Good intelligence will not necessarily lead to wise policy choices. But without sound intelli- gence, national' policy decisions, and actions cannot effectively respond to . actual conditiOns and reflect the best:' national interest or adequately protect -our national security. - Intelligence gathering involves col- lecting information about other coun- tries' military capabilities, subversive activities, economic: conditions, poli- tical developments,, scientific and tech- nological progress, and social activities and conditions. The raw information must be' evaluated to determine its reliability and relevance, and must then be analyzed. The finarproducts--called "finished intelligence" ? are distrib- ute d to the President and the-political. military and other governmental lend era according to their needs. Intelligence gathering has changed rapidly and radically since the advent of the CIA in 1947. The increased compleXity -of international political, economic, and military arrangements, the increased -destructiveness of the weapons of modern warfare and the advent of electronic methods of sur- veillance -have altered and enlarged the needs for sophisticated intelli- gence. Intelligence agencies have had to rely more and more on scientific and technological developments to help meet these needs. . Despite the increasing complexity and significance of intelligence in national policymaking, it is also im- portant to understand its limits. Not all information -is reliable, even when the most highly refined intelligence4 methods are used to collect it. Nor .can any intelligence system ensure that its current estimates of another' country's intentions or future capa- cities are accurate or will not be outrun by unforeseen events. There. are limits to accurate forecasting, and the use of deception by our adver- saries or the, penetration of our intels ligence services increases the possi-- bility that intelligence predictions may prove to be wrong. Nevertheless, informed decision-making is impossi- ble without an intelligence system adequately protected from penetration. ' Therefore, a vital part of any intelli- gence service is an effective counter- intelligence, program, directed teward ? protecting out own intelligence system and ascertaining the netivitiea of' foreign intelligence services, such as, espionage, sabotage and , subversion, and toward minimizing- or counter- acting the effectiveness a t hese credible _evidence . of ? CIA involve' activities. theats- . * ? _ 0 a- t5 , & .'zens. But we cannot ignore the invasion of the privacy and security rights of -Americans by foreign countries or their agents. This is the other side of the coin?and it merits attention here in the interest of perspective. , - Witnessea ? with. respoesibilities .for counterintelligence have told the com- mission that the United States remains the principal intelligence target of the Communist bloc. The Communists invest large sums of money,' personnel and sophisticated technology in collecting information? Within the United States?on our mili- tary capabilities, our weapons systems, our defense etructure and our social divisions. The Communists seek to pene- trate our intelligence services, to com- promise our law enforcement 'agencies and to recruit as their agents United States citizens holding senzitiVe govern- . men and industry jobs. In addition, it ' is a common practice in Communist bloc' ? countries to inspect and open mail com- ing from or going to the United States. In an open society such as ours, the !intelligence opportunities for our ad- versaries are immeasurably greater than. they are for us in their closed societies. Our society must remain an open one, with our tracititional freedoms unim- paired. But when the intelligence activ- ities of other .countries are flourishing on the free environment, we afford them, it is all the more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of the CIA and- our other intelligence agencies, as well as the domestic nun- oterintelligence activities of the FBI, be given the support necessary to protect 'our national security and to shield the privacy and eights of American citis .zens from foreign intrusion. . Thecommission has received estimates, .that Communist bloc intelligence forces currently4a number well over 500,000 worldwide. - The number of Communist govern- ment offieials in the United States has tripled Since 1960, and. is still increas- ing. Nearly 2,000 of them are now in this country--and a significant percent- 'age of them have been identified las members of intelligence or security -agencies. Conservative estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence of- ficers among the remaining officials 'raise the level to over 40 per cent. ? In addition to, sending increasing num- bers of their citizens to this country openly; many of whom have been trained , in espionage. Communist bloc countries also piace considerable emphasis on the . training, provision of false identification and- dispatching of "illegal" agents ? that is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been systematically devel- oped which enables them to live in the United States as American citizens or resident aliens without our knowlecigenf their true origins. While making large-scale use of. hu- man intelligence sources, the Communist ,Countries also appear to have developed electronic collection of *intelligence to an extraordinary degree of technology ,and sophistication for use in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world, and we believe. that these coun- . tries can monitor and record thousands . This commission- is devoted to anal ? . , aka glegkolati orp3Torre a t ions. Amer- 77-00 , Approved ForRkileasve21001108108 011A the interest of protecting the privacy seriously disturbed at the real possibility ? a rig t o e uneasy if riot end Ft Amity rights cit American citi- Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 - ,(1,1???? rr -e? a ,rei 1 %..0111%. 1 A. W141.? 11 June 1975 Triumph and Deleit: The C.I.A. Record JOILN M. CROWD-SON Special to The New 'York Times - WASHINGTON, June 10?Thel Central Intelligence. Agency. that bewildering mixture of espionage' and sabotage, is fon the most part held firmly below the surface of public conscious- ness by the national security statutes. which prevent the slightest disclosure a its size, shape or intentions. ? Periodically, however, one of the mooring lines frays and breaks and sends a part of the agency bobbing into full view, generally to the embar- rassment of the C.I.A. and the rest of the Government as well. - The most recent such unin- tended revelations are the news , accounts'of the C.I.A.'s involve- ment in undercover surveil- lance &Unities at home and assassination plots abroad, ac- counts that led to the just-com- pleted inquiry of the Rockefel- ler Commission, whose final report was issued today. Kennedy Words Recalled ? The sting that the C.I.A. will doubtless feel from the commis- sion's findings, however, is by no means unique in its 28-year history. President Kennedy un- derscored that point on Nov. 28, 1961, when he told an au- elence of C.I.A. employes with a touch of sympathy in his enice, "'Sour SUCCCISSCS arc un- heralded?your failures trum- peted." There have been many of both since 1947, when the C.I.A. was established by the National Security Act as the nation's clearinghouse for in- formation obtained from around the world, by ()Vert and covert means. The informa- tion, was needed by the highly specialized agencies of th eFe- deral Government. Mr. . Kennedy's remarks, however, had a special poig- nancy, for they came seven months after the failure, loudly trumpeted, of the most ambiti- ous operation then conceived by the intelligenc ageency-eth invasion of Cuba by a ragtag band of exiled anti-Castro Cu- bans who were set ashore at dawn on April 15, 1961, on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs. In May of the previous year, an American high-altitude re- connaissanc aircraft called the. ? U:2 was brought down over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet heart, land. Admission Put Off But although the plane, which had been photographing Rus- sian military installations, was flown by a civilian pilot under contract to the C.I.A., the agen, cy managed to avoid a public- admission of its operational role in the affair until . more e than three years later. . In the years before the Bay of ? Pigs debacle; the C.I.A., its various divisions and sections hidden away in an unprepos- sessing collection of Govern- ment buildings, was able to maintain an almost invisible presence in Washington. free from both scandal and honor. ? Little was written about the agency, either with or without its blessing. Its top -officials were known to and courted by a select group of Washing- :ton: reporters, ? but .the tidbits the agency handed out, which usually illuminated develop- intents in the Communist world, were rarely attributed publicly to their true source, r ? In the early' cold-war years, it was believed that the nation !needed. a single system that could ...collect and . evaluate ,peacetline intelligence from a ivariety of sources and ? dean. iat the same time, with. the !increasingly aggressive ',Corn- imunist intelligence services?if I necessary; on their own terms, Th.e .C.LA.'s teak, it was ge- nerally conceded, was one thati needed doing, and its well-bred; and Ivtnedticated officials were: left almOst without supervision. to do it in their own way..1 " ? A New Headquarters Ie 10C1. the yere of the! Cuban. invasion, the ; C.I.A. moved lock, stock. and cloak into what was?for a.; semise- cret agency?unusually 'visible, futuristic glass - and -.concrete headquarters in Langley, Va., across the Potomac River from the Capital. : ; ? ? Perhaps as in outgrowth of those two events?one rein- toreing the agency's . public identity and the other calling its judgment into question?the; comfortable, if . claudestine, niche that the C.I.A. had carved out for. itself became a topic Cf erewing interest and inquiry.? c Since its inception. in: 47, the agency had been ...accused almost daily of. propping ? up foreign political parties, inter- fering with foreign elections and inspiring bribery, bomb- ings, kidnappings and murders in countrieS around the globe. . Iji many instances, the char- ges were merely the unfounded euspiciops of the Cd.A.'s adver- saries; in ? others, they, were subsequently proved true. any case, they were invariably dismissed as unworthy of a response. But as the hoStility between the West and East that had marked the nineteen-fifties be- gan to fade, so did the public's acceptance of the .C.I.A. and its epeointed mission of , guard- ing: against the Communist per-, :that their' Personal and business .activi- 'ties which they discuss rreely over the telephone could be recorded and ana- iyzed by agents of foreign powers. This raise a the real specter that se- lected American users of telephones are potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their actions, or even lead in some cases to . recruitment as espionage agents.. - ; 20, ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 By the mid-nineteen ' the first .hazy outlines had be- gun . to emerge of the C.I.A.'s . 'nterconnections with some of; institutions in this country and! the major political and sociall abroad. Then came the disclo- sures that the C.I.A., or ati least its emissaries and its un- accounted-for dollars, had i, the two intervening decades! seemin,gly permeated' every fa- cet of Amerlean life?business, finance, journalism, academia, local -government, unions and even the arts. cf subversion abroad, these dis- Unlike most of the charges closures were substantiated. The C.I.A., it was learned,. -had arranged with Michigan State. University to provide "deep cover" support for agen- cy operatives in Vietnam dur- ing the previous decade. Through a maze of private foundations of varying degrees. of legitimacy, it had helped to fund the activities of th'd Natienal Student Association, the-American Newspaper Guild,' the respected literary magazine; Encounter and, scores of other; 'enterprises, %respectable. and .du- bious alike. . ? 1 Accounts emerged of the . . C.I.A.'s agreements With Amen- can multinational corporations that .had sometimes allowed age.ncy? o.perativestn pose eS their employe.: end innre caftan involved the exchange of ? eco- nomic and even political intel- ligence between agency. offi- eials and widely traveled busi- ness executives. - - :What was net known at -the time, but was discovered later, was that some three dozen American journalists stationed , abroad were employed by the C.I.A... as undercover infor- mants, and that the agency was training the members 4,f a -dozen local police forces in this 'country in the handling ef explosives ,and detection of wiretaps; ? - ? ? ? Allegations Confirmed Meanwhile, some of the. alle- gations ? of :C.I.A. - interference in the affairs of &her nations were being leimported or con- firmed." ? ? . ? In 1965; ..example, he NEW YORK TIMES June 1975 Report of C.I.A. Panel Goes on Sale in Capital . Special to 1:171-e-:::;c: 'Zeck Times ? W.ASFIlhIGTON, June 11? Copies of the report of the.' :Rockefeller commission* on ?Central Intelligence Agency activities \ in the United, States made public yester- day, WeOL on sale here today ' at the Government Printing Office bookstore. The pri,lt- ing office said copies would soon be available in Federate abookstores in. 17 other mejor iState ? 'lei-pent:Ile-ill. 'finally-eliad rodthceded e truth of a five-rear- charge by Lee Kuan Yew, ,the Prime Minister of Singa- pore, that e C.I.A. *agent had offered him a $3.3-million bribe IC) COVEZ' ri_eensurecastudi agency (nee-anion in that court Some of the less well-publi- cized discleseres, such as th., expendittuce previously denied by the C.I.A. of several hundred million dollars to support th anti - Communist propagandiz ing of Radio'Irree Europe an., Radio -Liberty, were oversha 'by the revelation tha, the agency had waged a covert muitimiiiioh dollar effort to-de stroy the effectiveness o' Chile's Marxist President, Sal vador Allende Gossens. The ,C.I.A.'s involvement in the Vietnam war resulted i Operation Phoenix, inspired In the C.I.A. and put into effec by the South Vietnamese Army It resulted in the deaths o more than 20,000 "suspected' members of the "Vietcong in frastrecture" ?and allegedly i ;the torture of others. t ? Antiwar Demonstrations It was a domestic adjunc to the Vietnam war, the publi, (demonstrations- of oppositior that periodically arose in mos of: the nation's major cities ,that was largely responsibt, for. the scrutiny that the C.I.A has undergone by the Rockefel ler? Commission and that wi be continued by two Congres taaaai onrnrr4;i C-4,,,t ? ? The C.I.A., ,the commissioi reported today, inserted it' operatives and informants int, domestic antiwar groups are maintained an "excessive' number of dossiers?mere that 7,000?on persons whom it be lieved were associated :vitt political dissidents? foreig- pon-ers or both.. ' The Rockefeller Commission also investigated, but did no publicly report on, what ma prove, to be the greatest ember rassment in the C.I.A.'s histo ?the now apparently substan ?tiated reports that the agene attempted to murder Premie Fidel Castro of Cuba and no sibly other foreign leaders. .A? Senate investigating ? corn mittee, ? --headed by. Senato Frank Church, Democrat of Ida ho, is-inquiring into that topit ' . ' ? ??? . The 299-page, sine:lel- spaced report, weich sells for $2.85, can be obtained by sending a chack payable to the Superintendent of Docu- ments, die Government ? Printing Office, Washington,. D.C.., 20420. . The printing office.. said -that 26,383 copies of the re- eport id been relined, Wi,030. .of them for public consump- tion: 10,00o for the et.1 n, commission itself, and the remainder for libraries throughout the country. ? 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . "LL 'ETP2ETTCITTRNT A Jt, nattrrTT3,SDAIr -JUNE 12, 1975 ':REVIEW OUTLOOK 31.Eatelligenee A public auc:it of the CIA was de- sirable and overdue; few people be- lieve any longer that the work of any government agency is so sensitive that its general performance should be exempt from public scrutiny. - But those findings of the Rocke- feller Commission that have been made public are only interesting and useful; they are not . shocking and appalling. Considering the web- spinning propensities of espionage, CIA professionals have displayed ,considerable reluctance to stray out- side their legal turf and. when they have *done so it has usually been be- cause of White House pressures. Pre-audit speculations suggesting a -gumshoe agency gone wild are now revealed to have been mainly mole- hills. That knowledge will be useful In" clarifying the CIA's role and, most importantly, emphasizing the need for the CIA and FBI to coordinate their responsibilities. Nothing about the Rockefeller report suggests, however, that the CIA's specific operations should be put in a fish- bowl where its effectiveness in gath- ering intelligence would be ham- pered. As AraiS Control chief Fred C. Ikle says in a speech quoted else- where on this page today, effective intelligence gathering will become ever more vital, not less so, in the years just ahead. It can be argued with considera- ble power that those CIA misdeeds uncovered in the Rockefeller report stemmed primarily from too little intelligence, not too much. The CIA's CHAOS operations, which in-; 'volved it in illegal domestic spying,, derived from fears by both Presi--. dents Johnson and Nixon that U.S. anti-war dissidents were being aided and encouraged by foreign powers.: At a time when campus buildings' were being bombed and burned, central cities were aflame and na- tional leaders wek-e being threatened with physical violence, should it be any surprise that an American Pres- ident would want intelligence infor- mation? It should not, and the fears of both Presiclen.s that they were , not getting sufficient intelligence no doubt explains why the CIA was? given an assignment that would nor-' _ melly and legally be the exclusive job of the FBI. As the Rockefeller report shows, CIA Director HcIsns nonetheless warned President Nixon ,1969 that such work was outside the. agency's charter. . But the circumstances surround- ing the formation of CHAOS dcitions trate the importance of good intelli- gence. As it happened the CIA could find no evidence of foreign incite- ment of U.S. domestic disorders. Good intelligence tells a President what is not true, SS i;sor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP70432R000100370008-9 true. In the civil disorders of the ana the CIA - 12(10s and early 1970s, ethe fact that an intelligence agency could reas- sure national leaders, that there was no. foreign ? intervention probabls acted as a protection to American civil. liberties, rather than a threat. These are, of course, even more serious possibilities for presidential miscalculations in a nuclear age, as Mr. Ikle suggests. Given. the poten- tial effects of such miscalculations it is absolutely vital that the President net .be planed in a position' wherehe is making decisions based on fears, rumors or hunches. . Other doubtful activities, of the CIA no doubt can be, and, in fact, have been, tightened up through procedural processes. But surely it will come as no surprise to . cans, or to the Russian KGB, that the CIA for some years routinely ...scanned mail between the U.S. and .C.cmmuniss countries. Or that it con- ducted wiretaps and other forms .of *nee-veillerice- on its own employes as part of its internal security. proce- dures. , We still don't knew of course, 'what role the CIA played ill alleged assassination plots overseas. While this issue may be far more serious, it's idle to discuss such matters on the slender knowledge presently available. ? It is not idle, however, to say that the CIA's' intelligence services are vital and, to be effective, many of the procedures will have to remain secret. The Rockefeller Commission 'as:snort suggests that as long as Americans trust their Presidents they probably can trust the CIA. And Presidents get public scrutiny almost daily,. Notable and Quotable Fred C. Ikle, director of the U.S. . Arms Control and Disarmament '? Agency, in a speech to the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council Tuesday night: One aspect of the flow of information from the government to the public greatly worries me. This is that we have yet to learn hov.? and where to draw the line in ftblatiab o c ills of soott.,,,. uo fall to draw "...Ito line properly, if ?;-c cannot rr. tam the privacy of certain intelligence ac- tivities, our arms control efforts will be- come paralyzed. If we cannot find a way to protect our .legitimate Intelligence opera- tions, *e will jeopardize future SALT and other arms control agreements. Today's arms control agreements ac- knowledge a situation of partial trust. We have enough trust to make a contract with our adversaries, but not enough to rely on the contract without monitoring compli- ance. Our ability to negotiate significant agreements depends on our ability to ver- ify those agreements are being kept. Arms control, if we want to be serious about it, is a deadly serious business. It concerns matters of life and death for the ? nation. It ties us to a potential adversary with immense power, the sternest inteinal controls, and a pervasive system of ,se- crecy. To have meaningful and reliable 'arms control, we have to know what the 'other side is doing. And we cannot find out simply by asking. We must have reliable, intelligence operations, and we need opera- tions that can be kept secret. Yes, secret;; because unrestrained publicity, would pro- vide a road map for deception or counter- measures. thus rendering arms control verification well nigh Impossible. It is simply a fact of life that the effec- ti-7ene5o of certnin procedures to monitor arms control depends on their being un- known to those who are being monitored. We cannot inform the party whose conduct we wish to verify of each and every step we take to check Its compliance. This is particularly true of procedure to judge the ? ; reliability of arms control agreements: - t At this time, our intelligence services ; are under severe public scrutiny. Unques- tionably, a democratic nation is wise to ; monitor carefully every facet of its govern- ? ment operations, particularly those that cannot be conducted in Mil public view. ; Ar i it goes without saying that all bur gov- ; ernment agencies?including the intelli- gence services?roust operate within the ' But the current rash of publicity and leaks is soinething that goes way beyond our tradition of openness and the public's right to know. Of course, we all can delight , in a good spy story. And the temptation must be strong today to publish titillating accounts of delicate intelligence operations and to be the first in going public. I be- lieve, however, the American public will not long feel entertained by indiscretions that disals?g our national intelligence capa- bility. . This' capability, built up over many years, has permitted our government to assess the military effort of our potential adversaries so that we could meet threats realistically. And It has made it .possible for us to move forward with arms control agreements on which we could rely. Now this capability might be wrecked by irre- sponsible public disclosure. Whether our adversary receives such information from a paid spy, or reads it in a self-serving book or A well-meaning newspaper?the end result is the same. Our lawmakers; I am sure, will have the widest public support in drawing a dis- criminating line between legitimate se- crecy and irresponsible concealment, be- tween mischievous disclosure and the openness democratic societies must have. I am sure the American people will sup- port?indeed deniand?adherence to a code of ethics, or where needed a code of law,. that protects both the nation's standards of decency and its safety. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . _ 1?TEVI YORK TTME 12 June 1975 ,e OttMa WiethI Major Reorganization . Fy CLIFTON DANIEL Spesdal to The New York Times , , .. is widely regarded as -a?Cool professional and a good soldier, think he should take retirement in stride. ? ? Of the seven directors the C.I.A. has had in its 28 years, only he and Mr. Helms have been intelligence professionals; unless . Allen W. Dulles, who was director for eight years and spent 14 of his 411/2 work- ing years in intelligence, is also counted as a career man. ' Choosing an outsider, as a director, and limiting his term to' 10 years, would be one of Iseveral:meaSures recommended iby the Rockefeller commission to reform the C.I.A. and bring, it under stricter control. 1 3n, Recommendations 1 Among the 30 rtcomrnenda- tions of the Rockefeller com- mission were the following: - com- mission were should establish a. joint committee on intel- ?ligence to assume oversight-of the C.I.A. now extrcised by the Armed Services. com- mittees. . ? qCongress, should consider making the C.I.A. budget pub- i lic,. at least -to some 'extent, to eemnlv with the Constitu- subject Pi Itter in117"-lart," Mr- then. which requires that public Nessen said, "and I would look txpenditures be published. - for quick action." -, ? 41The functions of the Pres- ;. ;Officials examining the Rock- idea's Foreign Intelligence Ad- efeller commission recammene visory Board, a body of distin- dations today fould them more guished citizens with- no pow- ers, should be expanded to in- clude oversight of .the C.I.A., and it should have a full-time chairman and staff. . ... . With those changes in the oversight structure, the C.I.A. should become more accotln- table to outside agencies, and less a power unto itself offi, cials said. . However, the Rockefeller commission also proposed ma- jor changes in the , internal structure of the intelligence agency. In addition to favoring and independent director with a 10-year maximum term, the commission recommended the following: -- , . ? , taInstead of one deputy direc- tor, who is always a high-rank- ing military officer, the agency should :have two. One would act as administrative officer; the other would be a military officer. : . - . qThe inspectpr general of. the C.I.A., now Dr. Donald Frank Chamberlain, should be inquiry. On the contrary, since upgraded .in status and given , becoming director in 1973, Mr. -Colby has been terminating va- tiouS Of those activities. Presumably, he will remain ?ineoffice at least until the pend- Congressional 'investiga- ',bons 'of the intelligence corn- -munity are concluded. Then, according to a man familiar :with the Rockefeller commis- Sion's intentions,, a new direc- tor will be sought. . .?"After all this," he said. .1`when we start out again, we /iad better start with a new :man. , Friends of Mr. ColbY? .who WASHINGTON, June 11?A1-' ready zensured by the Rockee feller commission for some "plainly unlawful" acts, the Central Intelligence Agency now faces a major eeorganiza- lion?if the commission's rec- ommendations are fully imple- mented., President F.ord has apparently not decided which recommen- dations he will adopt and how he will implement them, but he made it ? known today that he favors prompt action on them. Ron Nessen, the President's ,Press secretary, said that Mr. Ford was sending a memoran- dum, to the secretaries of State, 'Defense and the TreaSury and the Director of Central Intel- ligence asking for comment on the ? recommendations. The President wants replies "as 'icon as possible," Mr. Nessen said, "in a matter of weeks at least." ' With the replies in hand, Mr. Ford will decide which recommendations he can apply, ,administratively and, which would ? require Congressional petion. "The-President considers the drastic than they appeared at first glance yesterday, wrapped 'as they. were in the lawyerly- llanguage . . the commissiOn's, report. . Among other things, the next ?Director. of Central Intelligence very prob'ably will not be a Career intelligence cffice,r, ? as the present: director, William X:e.Colbee? is and one former, edirector, ,is Helms, was: nn.Recornniendation number eieven ,of' the Rockefeller corn- (mission said that, in the selec- etion of C.I.A. directors, neon- ?sideration - should be given to ?individuals outside the career ,service Cf the C.I A.. althouph 'promotion from within should not be barred:"... Colby"s Future . e: -There was no general expec, :.tation here* that Mr. Colby 'would be dismissed. He bears -no direct personal responsibili- nty, for the improper domestic 4ctivities of' the C.I.A. that led the Rockefeller sommission's a larger staff and greater re- sponsibilities. His duties would include the investigation of re-, poets from employes that the agency was violating the law. The Rockefeller commission's eel:4)ft disclosed that recently, when the C.I.A. was coming undei attack for improper prac- tices, the professional staff - of the :nspectem general's office had been cut from 14 to fivee gThe office of the agency's general counsel should be strengthened by occasionally bringing in outside lawyers, oc- casionally assigning agency. P.ALTI MORE S UN 12 June 1975 ? nteiligence nien 'rive mixed re By HENRY L. eemeinrr Washington Bureau of The sun Washington ? The reaction of the intelligence community yesterday to the Rockefeller commission report ranged from dismay to a judgment that it: findings had been fair to the Central Intelligence Agency. From the CIA itself, the offi- cial reaction was silence. CIA employees said privately the agency could not comment pub- licly while investigations by two congressional committees are still under way. Still privately, other agency sources spoke of reduced mor- ale, dwindling contacts with foreign intelligence services, and growing distrust on the part of agents abroad. They at- tributed these trends to the im- pact of the Rockefeller com- mission report and fears that the agency no longer can keep its secrets. plummeted and the 'agency's foreign. contacts have been damaged. - "It will take a long time to turn it around,? he said. - But . high officials of :the agency were said -to have found the commission's findings to be fair, under the' circumstances. This was the public reaction of the recently organized Associa- tion of Retired Intelligence Of- ficers. The group was formed specifically to counter what it regards as misconceptions about the agency. , David Phillips, former chief of CIA Latin American opera- tions, now spokesman for the association,, said the report "disposes of some allegations and considerable speculation concerning CIA and its .actiyi- ties. "Many of the organization's ? However, a group of retired unique problems are highlight- or resigned intelligence officers ed," Mr. Phillips said, "and CIA said the report on CIA domestic mistakes, including errors of operations was "fair and objecT judgment and cx. ace tive." ? . ? ' aired. Much of this is put into The report concluded that a the perspective of earlier years when times and needs may well have been different in many critical respects." He warned, however, that investigators should tread care- fully in their approach to the agency's overseas operations. Exposure of contacts and meth- ods, he said, could cripple or de- stroy essential activities abroad. series of CIA domestic activi- ties in the past?all discontin- ued?had been "plainly unlaw- ful" and recommended a series of reforms. ? The bleakest reaction came from a career intelligence spe- cialist. In his judgment, jour- nalists had overreacted to the specifics of wrongdoing with the result that CIA morale hits the Governmept, and encourag- ing C.I.A. lawyers to participate in outside professional activi- . ties.: ? a This -last set of recommenda- tions suggested that the com- mission thought that C.I.A: law- yers were out of contact with their own profession. 'The commission's report dis- ? closed that for 27 years the agency had only one general counsel, Lawrence Houston. He -retired last June 29. - The reorganization proposed by the Rockefeller commission *was not the most drastic propo- sal considered, C. Douglas Din Hon, vice chairman of the corn- , mission, disclosed today. , : Mr. Dillon, a former Secretary of the Treasury, said in a tele, phone "r.versaticn from Ne3v_ York that the commission had tan:ed ahotrt cutting the' agency in two, -separating its intel- ligence-gathering and analyz- ing functions from its opera- tional arm. "The commission just didn't think that would be wise," he lawyers to work elsewhere in said. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP : 77-06432R000100370008-9 112 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ? NEW YoRiz: TIMES 12 June 1975 ? ? ,1 ? ?1,,, ? ? ..` ...? ? "- . 4 Iiiouiry alie ecornrnen.ctations ea Ey?317.,7rOT,V-2..IP. M. HERSH . -SpeCial LC; The York T4rxe3 a WASHINGTON; June 11?The officiel who provided much of the basii information for the initial account in ,The New -York Times of domestic spying last Deceinher. ?praised the Rockefeller commission today fcr compiling what he termed on "exhaustive" report on the, Central Intelligence Agency's illegal activities. : But the source, Who spoke only under the ,continued gua- rantee of anonymity, criticized the ccminission's recommenda, tions as being too weak and not providing, for explicit statu- tory'idt* ith appro- priate puriishinent?for future! wrongdoing. ' . ? ' I The official, who has had 'direct access to highly classi- fied intelligence ,information, -estimated that 90 per cent, or more of the allegations he knew about had been described lathe commission's report. "I was kind of shocked :by the -details," he said. "I didn't think the commission would turn out that much detail." ' ? Spying on Congressmen . One conspicuous omission, he said, dealt-with the C.I.A.'s domestic spying on members of Congress. The x Rockefeller commission -report made no menden? of such files, et:he:ton William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, -told a House subcommittee last March 5 that files on at least four present and former members of Congress were maintained by the C.I.A.' s -special domestic counterintelligence unit. One such file showed' that ethe agency had maintained a dossier on Representative Bella S. Abzug, Democrat of Manhat- tan, since 1953-17 years be- fore she was elected to Con- gress?and had illegally opened some of her mail. Mr. Colby- further testified, that "a number" of the. dories- tic counterintelligence files had, been destroyed, an assertion' that also was omitted from the Rockefeller commission's report. i: Other sources with some in, ilependent knowledge of the domestic spying activities sub- sequently noted in telephone interviews 'that the commis- sion's report did not Mention the destruction In late 1974i of between 150 and 200 C.I.A. domestic files on black dis- sidents, nearly all., of which included photographs of some kind. No Cover-up Seen Sources -close to the ROcke.; feller conirnisSion conceded that such information had not been included in the final re- port, but emphasized?as one put it?that there was no evidence that this was an at- tempt to hide anything. "A lot of files on blacks were not destroyed," one source said. "It would be a mistake," another source said, "to put rac s -w on say that the ones [files] that were destroyed were the hot ones." "We found everything that was humanly possible on that operation." he added. -In effect agreeing with that statement, The Times's basic 'intelligence source predicted that the Senate Select Commit- !tee on Intelligence, whose chairman is ? Senator Frank :Church, Democrat of Idaho, 'would be unable to significant- ly advance the commission's findings?at least in the area lof illegal domestic activities. "They're nice enough people," he said of ,the staff members of 'the Senate committee, "hut not substantial enough to handle this." Intensive Interviewing any -further information about domestic spying, the source said, would have to result from intensive personal interviewing of C.I.A. domestic operatives who -may not have officially reported all of their activities. The Times's source attacked the 30 recommendatj Rockefeller commission a's be- ing totally inadequate. "There are too many recom- mendations that say that the C.I.A., the President and the director [for the' C.I.A.1.`shOuld not' do things without imposing criminal sanctions," he said. "We need criminal sanctions to hold the bureaucracy in line." the ' source . continued "Times have a way of chang- ing2nd world views chanoe.lhy name! in The Times's ac- , , 7 Without criminal ?sanctions, it's' count, and added: "I fear that oeaselble that conditions couldithe jcernalist has been the vice- arise which would involve acti-itini .of what we in the intei- yities like those now being crHligence trade call a fabricator." ticized. Don't forget, justifica-, .- ? No Evidence Found . tions change with the times." ' Soules close to the Rocke- . End to Further Inquiries 'feller commission said that. de- The, source concluded the ine spite repeated checks, they had terview with what amounted been unable to find any 'do- to a plea for an end totfurthericumentary- evidence' of such un- inquiries.- "It's- time to .returni der cover C.I.A. activities in to normal for ? the C.I.A.," he New -York City. The former said. "This h-as been upsettipg C.I.A. 'agent identified himself even. more ,so for the analytical as having worked for the a.gen- types than the covert types cy's domestic operations divi- [in the agency]." . sioni there. , . He added that many C.I.A. - In a telephone interview this morning, the former C.I.A. operative?who depicted New York City as "a big training ground" for undercover agents ?expressed skepticism that a filll account of all the -C.I.A.'s domestic activities would _ever he compiled. ' "It's so easy to ecover up," analysts, those ,who research data. and prepare intelligence estimates, "were deeply disap- pointed to find out that their agency, which they. have re- spect. for, was involved in this kind of a thing." , ? The Rockefeller commission he said. _ 'You're never.. going report also did not deal with to find out what really hap- the allegations, as published pened; all the details and all by The New York Times last the people involved will never Dec. 29, ? ? ? came out. domestic operative who said "They'll clean up their shop he had conducted break-ins, a little but in 10 or 20 years wiretap operations and other it'll start agiain," he added. illegal activities while investit "It's ail so cyclical.' gating antiwar groups .tai I -awl ? The former. C.I.A. ? raaro-has York City in the late ninzteen- Irefused thus far to aaree to sixties on,: early oo-ataan,sev,? discuss his activitieS wiiis mem- enties. In Congressional testimony last February, Mr. Colby said the agency had been unable ? to identify the ? former -C.I.A.. man, who was not identified hers at the Rockefeler commis- sion or the Senate committee headed by Mr. Church. - CERISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 June 1975 ? CIA and indivickial __Beyond all the necessary laws and guide- lines, the Rockefeller commission zeroes in on . the. bottom-line need for integrity in CIA employees and the contribution such integrity ? has already made to reform. "Many of the Activities we have found to be improper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower- level employees," says the commission. It rightly urges that such voices be heard on up the line. These recommendations come at a time when Congress is considering valuable legis- lation to protect federal employees from - department harassment or retaliation when they speak out in public. Such speaking out - often follows a failure to be listened to within an agency. integnty C'7 - 'CIA employees also Ought to be protected in this regard, while observing their special responsibilities in preserving legitimate se- crecy. There has been some questioning of the ' Rockefeller recommendation that it be made a ? criminal offense for employees or former employees to disclose "classified" informae tion. Here a criterion in the proposed legislation could be useful. It protects employees in disclosing inforrriation to which citizens are entitled under the Freedom of Information Act. This act has provisions for determining the legitimacy of "classified" labels. Surely employees of the Public, no less than members. Of the public itself, should have all the rights specified in,the Freedom of,Inforniaticii A. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-Ii6P77-00432R000100370008-9 Approved For.Relase 2091/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 WASHINGTON POST 11 June 1975 .; ? ,?? ' ? s Pselawrence l'eleya: ? s. west:test= ?est SZA:f Vir?tr ? ? ? "EV his. own account, Rich- t -M. isl'eirns was present at :the Central Intelligence ?`,Agency. "from the day its. floors onened"in ? By -the-'account of: t17,' Il.oekefeller-cemmissionts ?in-? situene into- CIA ? domestic' ace 'Helms was'. also something of a Johnny-on-? the-spet'Wben the. CIA was .t"nvOlving itself in a variety f. activities.. that the corn-4 Inission-d.esCribes ..either improper nt? simply; Illegal, '.i.-"Heltna ? and? 'CIA... Director DUIles on May '17; l954e met.; with ? Postmaster Plenerale. Arthur S?tantner- continuation of a;:pregratit "-under Whieh CA was oponingmail oming.;-frariae:.andegeingte- the SovietilJnionrs:r ; "According to Helms!' con- temporaneous. memorandum of .the .meeting;" - the ?Rockee ;feller ? ?" cornmissi on . report said, "Dulles' described., the importance of"; the maiL prpe ferany.andasked that 11-he ? ale lowed tc5-'.7continue: No ? itorreaPpearse4oehavesheens friadeof ?.'COVert?.;.-maileenen HelmSethen 41, was chief ftf operations:- in the- Plans? pirectorate'of CIA; moving- up? the -hureaucratie ladder appeinted .The reetor.Forpentrale,,,-Intelli=?:": tericieea-SpOSition' he-held: Irani 196,ituti41,-.1.973..eseLee:::: ??? is-eTheee'romtnieSioii:e; report._ Does- net-tree-elle Imeeriseeto', the top. He -.Simply appears periodically.:; : , ? ; He is criticized bY ".the tom.mission at one point: for l'poor judgment" for de-. troying tapes --and- docii- Trrents within days of receiv- ing ? a .request from Senate. Majority Leader Mike "Mans- field in January, 1973, not to -destrny any material that might have some relevance' to the. Watergate investiga-. tion. ? ? But Helms is not criti; ? cized often in the report, ?al- though it finds fault with? variety of CIA activities: s. , ? After . describing. ? how Helena and.. then CIA Executive Director William . ? E.. Colbyhdldup transmittal' of .evidence 'from .7th e CIA to the ? Watergate. :Prosecutors Untile January; 173, the ? :port asSertat...`eThe: agency:is. .subject tri-rierwits.,?criticism. for ,this.notidtice.;.: sidti?iSserte(ethat"ethe? CIA's, dornestic aii- op eni n g. ? ? pro, granas, unlawful." That ?'?'-prri:gram" e. Continued through' ,the': ? Eisenhower ad Thi nistrati , after being ':?i, " instituteciein" 1952, arid was not terminated- Until:1973e kr', In 136r;Dulles end Reims; then the-deptit- director-for" plans, mete.With the new. PostmastereGeneral,' ward Day,cetii- ? inform him that mail *as bel.t.'g Opened, e Ten -yeaelateri.:1-1eIrneOise then CIA ilrect-ot;' Met; sen.:" arately with, :Postmaster General .Wititen ;VI: Blount and AttaineY" General JOhn? N. MitchelL "to discuss, the Mail project". according: to: the reporte'Neither objected: to2ite said i. when the::CosinniSsion.? rport e: to Operation Chabs.,e4:JpreciaP"operationse bFe. the, CIA to 'aoilect-nrid evaluate. information, on, -foreign on taCts with. American dissie denti-?-edIehnii role is'cen- tral.ep:ses"; ''epesPite.::e"Xeittist.rieknowl:?:.,-a.Sept.- 8;-26 memo taf..."statutory- and,sde- -factoesesjaeoecriptign ea-art.. agetleY; eedemes tic: - rnolve- ments" in connection with the 'super-secret Operation, Chaos, Helms eit other tithes indicated thet he was aware the Cie'. had 'gone. heYorid " the limit.- ? . ? , - .Heirris sent a -report pre- Pared by the CIA, entitled "Restless Youth," to special presidential assistant for na- tional security affairs Walt W. Rostow, on Sept. 4,1968,, analyzing student revolu- tionary movements. , -"Yau -will," Helms wrote in a cover memo to RoStow,? "of course, he 'aware of the peculiar sensitivity which at- taches to the fact that the CIA has prepared a report -on student activities:- both. ..itere and abroad.". ee. e ;iive'sneenths later Helms ,.."senVeq.,-!:anothereee; COPY of Restless. Youth to Henry' AiLlrXissingerstheti:President -;NistOtil,Sz'staSsisfanCe :for, eita4. 'This- is an:. area net within' the 'charter of this- -...agencere. so I need not eme hasize how eXtremeiy- "Sem- sitiveethis.rnakes the paper' Helms wrote Kieeirtger; "SheitleenYone lenrit of its:: existence ???rottld -:-Prome most _7114:1 concerned." Thee.' State Department in a f: statement night.' that.' the- section e of "Restless .Youth" 'dealing with radical students -in America 'is only 12 pages out ei a totel of 234 and that "there is -no' indication in this section that it la derived from surveillance or- any, sensitive' ee,,urcee . or -meth- ods." ? ' ' Kissinger has'.. -denied denied -knowledge of domeatic Intel- ligence gathering activities Approved For Release 2001/08/08: ese's by the CIA. ? Helms' memo, the" state- ment said, did not indicate that the information in the -report "- resulted . from , ? "unusual or illegal investiga- tive-activities" and it was "assumed- that Director ,Helms'.. cautionary note was ?directed at emphasizing that it was' net. within the Agen- cy's, charter to ..."de analyses on ::Aieerican student. aCtivi- tiez,,i rather than any itnpli- _cation that the analysiSeit- se:Le was based on illegal or improper investigative activ- ities." Hehns :?rejected one '-at- tempt by the CIA to. ue dts agents: to collect informa- tion on domestic dissidents, known as !Project One," ac- tordi.ngto the report. But a Second.i program,. e:called "Project . Two," :involved !`agentsebservations, of do- inestic;activities," according to the report, and these ob- servations were turned over to "Chatite ? ? ?,?? :eass a ? -i'esult, tlie report said ;'a linnted euanitity of: intelligence on domestic.r.dis- ,?sident was;e:col-:- lected and -disseminated. Director helms etestfied .thatr,"-hesWas not aware 10:- this Collection and dissemi; nation,". the report said. , " Chaos: used three'ag,ents to gather information on -do- mestic racilcal activities- din-- ing-.13heL,..period:efrone.;.1.989'4: e through5,1971,eicdoeding s7". to the refrort. "Helms-"teStfied: 'that haswas-not aware of the- d-omtac use ???:"Ihesee dgente',7:7.tirie rei5Ort said. e e. er-Even within the CIAshossie Chaos was a controver--:: NEW YORK TIMES 5 June 1975 CIA. ROLE CHARGED IN LEBANON'S STRIFE ? spedal to The New York Times. BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 4? . Palestinian guerrilla leaders nad their Lebaoe5es leftist sup- porters have accused the United 'States Central Intelligence -Agency of providing arms, mu- nitions and directives to the right-wing Phalatigist party, made up of Christians. More than 300 people have been killed in fighting between the Phalangist militia and Pa- lestinian guerrillas since April 13. . ke-,441% s Nes" sial oper-ation. In:Dee:either; 1977, in response to internal criticism of ? the program, Trelnas stated' in a memo,- "Cho Is a legitimate emu- .ter intelligenee function. cf -the agency and cannot be stopped siniply -; because some members of the organ- ization do not like this "acdv- ity." . .? -In dealing with the Water. ? gate affair, tile- corneae-es-len - report broadly summarized previously known informa- tion" and concluded that it found no evidence that the CIA- either - pard,cipated in or knesir in adyan-ces of the Watergate breaknin ?- or the break-in at -thee offices of trist: - : , y , "The cornmissioti, ers the agency's ?:4elay of nearly a .yearein...instituting such an investigatiOn, (of n possible CIie :Watergate break:in)" the agencyee failure promptly to :disclose relevant: informe- tien. in, its possession; 'and ? . the agency's destruction-- of Someematerials ' which' rcar have 'Contained relevant in- formation to .,.-.reflect, poor judgment and to. be: eubj ect to eriticism." 1 ? esee _ Although this criticiim is -directed at "the CIA. by' the sconimiskon; the narrative of the report shows that all, of, . ? _ .,thelactiOnS . failure's !.criti- cized .2were- in Helths" con- troL. ? - - 4.?? ? e - e, ? There' was, :heavy fire early today in the Chia neighborhood. Sporadic sniper fire continued through the day, causing ten- sion in the capital, Many Palestinian a.nd Lebanese leftists believe that -the Plialangist militia has received guns and munitions through a Lebarjese military air base and the small port of Jtmeye, north of Beirut. . ? Kemal Jurriblatt, a 'Socialist ; leader who is On e to the So- viet Embassy here, said at a , hews conference: - "From our intelligence, it art- pears that the Phalangists are in rapport. with the Israelis and have received. directives, arms and ammunition through the ? cc...LA.", . CIA-RDP77-00432R00M00370008-9. 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . `.711.1.INGTON STAR 71. June /975 ' 411%, IV t't: 'est .7a.mes Vtlekeesen ' , tea:angle:15ts star :7;?iet ? ? Cf: all the it!rbr over the ing ni the release of the .-Reckcfeller commission re-, CIA's domestic ctiviZ!es' and eeciSion not to publish 1;z ?findings on allegations ezif -agency drivolvement in (GV erseas. assassi- natiem plots; the report 7..,rn:.lents nothing in the wry ,,,;.?triti a 1 r eve! a7" ? , .? ? ? ? ? *???? ... the post-Watergate ? ? a., :this 'immediately trig- ters:snspicions of, a - cover- "tst-s,.''stisoicions that were 07,voiced by the conserv- ..itatiVe,-establishment nature :OF the panel, some of whose c'tnembers had had previous ....ties with the:' intelligence -clornmunity. ? ? .. V There is a political rule of. . , fihutrib;.- hoWever, that- ?.the mac " t difficult problems are; reierrel ? to n sympathetic nt.pettei. ,dent Ford issued no, guide- lines ori helpful hints, ? the. 7, report appeart it, walk the - 'fine line, that he obvieutly.. wantcd To conduct ? .an :investigation that 'at least `sippears.satiSfactory but not ,one that would impair .the. CIA. , a a ? 1; ALONG WITH its find- , ? Ings of - 'wrongdoings, the Contains: ? judicious recommendations' for im- proved:congressional over- 'sight and nadministratiVe *reforms that would 'prevent ? Such 'wrongdoing in , the ,?future.',.' Even though' all ? the commission's major' find- ings confirm -reports n al- ready in the press, the sys- Ana ywis ttmatic snooping, ' opening of mail and compiling of 15 ,41 g ? , . . . dossiers on Arne:lain citi- zens,. most of whom were engaged in anti-war et. civil *rights activities, is . staggering. as tetitline,d ejn.. tthe rePort.,' ? It ? describes ::21-Year . program .of. surveillance in which at least an estimated. .130,000 pleces?of mail to .and fraM. the:Soviet Union were opened and a seven- year program .of spying on Americans' in whichfiles Were. opened on 13,000 peo- ple ,and ? organizatiens ? and, index records t kept ? on another 300,000ie:e.. e The name: of this ? proe gram, begun. in 1967 at the inSistence't of' President .Lyndon ...Be, Johnson,, tells something .about the Cold 'War mentality:., "Operation 'CHAOS,' . was its name, which, calls to Mind , the, ,sinister "KAOS". agents in the:.:,television coraedy seriesi!!Get Smart!",,e REPORT reletio tells of '32 illegal domestic wire- ?taps, .32' electronic bug- gings,? and:12 burglaries by the CIA. By comparison, CIA Director William Colby tOldi la . Senate e'Committee last January that there had been 'files opened On.10,000 American' citizens and only five .breakiins arid , 21 ..tele- phone Yana:a ; '..One :barrier 'to any ,Possie ble 'cover-ti ei?: is , that Presi- dent....FOrd ,is7'.turning? over , the )80:page ':chapter ? 'on assassination plots: and the material, Oh. :which it .is, based to the special Senate. committee athat e?iS :., also investigating: .the Under,the chairmanship of Frank Church of 'Idaho, a liberal Democrat and foe of the Vietnam war, the panel is not likely to whitewash, the agency.. .. : .? Church tyesteeday. BALTIMORE .SUN . 12 June 1975 eteat ataattal el k Zt, - .characterizede?die ? cummis- elan neer; as "limited -in scope" end. sad:: the z?ecorn-- raendations. did not go far enough. ? ,?"What is needed is prohibitirais in the law with penalties attached to. violations of the law," he said in an interview on pub- lic television. . ? . /FORD'S DECISION to give the assassination material to the committee 'inspired ? some cynical speculation that the Kenne- dy and Johnson administra- tions. were involved in the assassination plots and that Ford Would probably ? be' just as' happy to let the Democratic-controlled Sen- ate committee reveal this. ' It also dismayed ? some conservatives such -as. Seri. . James Allen,' ,D-Ala, . who grumbled that the Congress's record for leaks 'Ford. might ,"just as well have put it on national tole-. vision." - . ? - His. refusal to publicize. .the potentially embarrass- ing assassination allega- tions pleased other con- servatives, however, many of whom in his party are restive under the Ford- Rockefeller leadership and are looking for an excuse to support someone like- for- mer California Gov. Ronald Reagan. ? :SUCH TACTICS would be terribly risky in the post- Wastergate era; -however, particularly with such a potentially , explesive . sub- ject.' ? Some ,observers, moreover, doubt that Ford is capable of planning and ,executing such a maneu- ,VertiAt any rate, there is also a strong suspicion that some of the plots had their inception in the Eisenhower administration. ? . ? . CIA could h ve read o Washington (AP)?While the Central Intelligence Agency se, cretly tested Lysergic Acid Die- , thylamide?LSD---in the 1950's, , dozens of the nation's doctors were busily performing similar research and publishing the re- sults in public journals. Anyone could have walked into a medical library and read them. But the espionage agency Appr etEiFtit 2i001t0 searcn to o something that was ethically forbidden Of doc- tors: To; find out ,what would happen if the mind-altering drug were given to, an unsus- pecting subject. The flocketiter commission report on the agency released Tuesday briefly described the LSD tests, noting that one per- son committed suicide several days after having an adverse reaction to a dose of LSD ad- ministered without his itrel- : CIA-RDP77-0043 "There is little doubt what diC-1 'L (S ever eriathdrat -.t cerripli- eit:TTi. that eiteinate: ow " ttelte one eaeieitineettive: Anotheia 5outhern- thouglq tie ,change of r.ziLr,als cr ris.ring the cbaatcr a:; atioatioinations over .the, wer..--kend showed 'that the acIrniniration still- a knack for fouling up, -ilhich the 1..opular Mayaguez reficc.: operation hoc,. ? "7r.s a mists.kc rat to re- lease' the had r.tuff your- call'," says o-..e veteran 1-Zepublican poi. "In this day and age opie think of toe many reasons why you didn't," ? ? . . ? One reason ECrtle people are thinking et is that- the commission's investigation, which it didn't have time to complete, would suffer by comparison to the ? one Church's cnrnrnittep js ex- SOME SOURCES at. the White House were critical . of Rockefeller because of the commission's failure to advise the President until two or three 'weeks ago that it was limiting its investi- gazion of ,the alleged assas- sination . plots to . their dornesticimplications.-: 4 .. The .: commission . mem-. - tiers defended their, work) however, and attributed the -absence of new?revelations to an aggressive press. "I think we made as? careful a study as we could," said C. Douglas Dillon,- the New York investment banker who served in both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. '"We couldn't find anything that amounted to anything that the press had not already fcund out." te5ts the CIA was doing with LSD was both unethical and, unnec- essary," Solernon Snyder, Kr.- fessor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Dniaersitv.andta veter- an LW researcher, said yestei- day. ? Dr. Snyder and other psychi- atrists who were involved in re- search with the psychedelic drug in the 1950's said yester- day that the scientific litera- t e,soLttiggioiesa& full of re- M WL,1 lfvvrth humans taking the drug. Approved For Release 200f/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 No intelligence agency can do its job effectively unless it can keep its operations secret. hat's why the investigative hysteria in Washington is so dangerous for U.S. security. d times, perhaps even six times, greate i than the U.S. will have in its order o battle-10 to 12 million pounds for th oilly tv,-0 million for the U.S ? Weights and numbers in these mogul ;:tudes far surpass anything needed for ? defensive strategy Of deterrence. Ho d0C3 the U.S.S.R. intend to use thi power, cnce it materializes? This is i question for which the. President, th, ? Secretaries of State and Defense, an 1 the Congress must look to the CIA tt ' provide an answer. No other institUtio is equipped to give one. ? But the tilt of the .military balance only one of the uncertainties, and no necessarily the most dangerous one, thz !-eeset American prospects. During tlu . , past several years, the CIA, by reasor - ? cf the tightening interdependence o .? nations, has been drawn deeply into ecr nomic analysis and estimating. Effort by producing nations to cartelize trad in basic commodities, the political re alignments in groping evolution arour the Persian Gulf, the strategic role to assigned to the oceans of petrodollars the contest for national or bloc advau tage?all bulk increasingly large in th CIA's purview. This has ha.ppened because the ecJ the President, one sharp enough to corn- :1 i.nomic events abroad have come to bea' mend a summary alert. ? so crucially on national decisions affee ing foreign policy, and because the mio uscule intelligence mechanisms availabi in State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agr culture could not begin to handle the jot In the view of William E. Colby, ti Director of the CIA, "It is becoming impoiAtant to our national security ?1-, watch the machinations of foreign cal _ t But no one by Charles J. V. Murphy. In the hangman's atmosphere that ' currently envelops the immediate pros- pects of the Central Intelligence Agency, an important point has been strangely overlooked. Why was this agency, so rich in intellectual talent, once full of ?n, ' now gravely wounded, created in the , first place ? The all-but-forgotten answer is that the CIA was brought into existence by Congress in 1947, at President Truman's request, for the straightforward purpose of preventing another such shocking lapse of vigilance as the one that made possible the disaster at Pearl Harbor, six years earlier. An inquiry by a joint committee of. Congress Congress that lasted through seven re- crimination-laden months, from No- vember, 1945, to May, 1946, elicited the embarrassing revelation that all the es- sential intelligence exposing Japan's preparations for war, even the departure of the .Tapanese fleet, had come into American hands befcre the attack. The failure to perceive what was in the mak- , ing was found, in hindsight, te have re- sulted from the fact that no agency in the government had ever been charged . with pulling such intelligence together.l The fateful political and military + clues, in jigsaw pieces, had all been col- , lected by the State, War, and Navy de- partments, each in its own parochial 'in- terest, in the form of radio intercepts, diplomatic dispatches, and routine mill- aryintelligencereports. ' office or per= had the authority, cz duty, to make a grand assessment for A question of Soviet intentions What makes the existing situation strange is that the primary task laid upon the CIA eighteen years ago?to be the watchman of national security?has never been more urgent than it is today. For example, the Soviet Union has in advanced development, even partly in tels as to follow Soviet or Chinese. deployment, the most powerful array of sue development." strategic nuclear weapons that the mill- , tary technologies have so far produced. The three spotlights Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, I Yet, at an hour when the government' a professional strategic-weapons'analyst need for objective, sophisticated, timel:' not given to exaggeration, describes the and many-faceted intelligence cou array as "quite awesome." It includes scarcely be more acute, the CIA is four third-generation land-based ICBM danger of being scattered to the fot prototypes, plus a fifth that has lately winds. Three full-bore investigatior appeared on the test range; a bigger and into the agency's philosophy and opel faster missile-armed submarine; and a ations are in progress in Washingtoi supersonic bomber having an intercon- When they have finished their probina tinental capability. Four of the five every consequential activity since ICBM's and the 1,500-mile submarine- founding, even the most sensitive, wil launched missile have all been MIRVed have been brought into the open by on ?fitted, that is, with from four to eight panel or the other. independently targetable warheads. ?A presidential commission, seven pr, If the dePloymenti of these weapons vete citizens under the chairmanship o should proceed to the some 2,400 ICBM !Vice President Rockefeller, is to rends launchers sanctioned by the SALT a report this month, after an inquir agrez:ments of 1972 and 1974, and if the Ithat begnn arly in ..Tanualy and sum U.S. stands on the weapons it now has in moned just about every senior CIA place, the Russians can be expected to officer, active and retired, into its chum end up, four or five years hence, with a ,bers for questioning. The Senate Selec superiority in nuclear throw-weight five ',Committee on Intelligence, under the Approved For Rarlease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 . cinairmanaleip of Democrat Frank . Obarch ef Idaho, inns started out on a traeted., no-holds-barred inquiry into centroveleial aspect and incident 12ne ageney'e cznaien. .I.:3r--T:.!rarn oat and 12!:'.1relilla. of S;:.7.:;:y--ftV C.. -7.:=1.C.b siati! nes ambled by Cheareh cleanly signal that the '.e.rate's 1.311P.17F.: Of the show is likely to be en the boards i'Ve months. Nor will tleet tine end of the ordeal. A corn- nPnion House select Committee under eeepnesenitative Lucien N. Nedzi, Demo- ctat from Michienein no ices (-..nivish and . isolationist than Church, is to parallel an untrammeled exploration of the CIA's - operations with a horizon-filling loch into all the federal intelligence activi- ties. including those of the FEL Eelcre the curiein is rung down en all this, the CIA will be the only national intelligence service on earth stripped of its secrets. For anyone who recalls the mood in Washington when the agency wan being put together some three dee- Lien, ago, such an outcome is almost past . believing. From the start, President Truman, Congress, and the executive departments most directly involved in foreign policy?State and Defense? ' e.acre all agreed that its .worl: should never suffer much public exposure. The agency's authority and functions were deliberately left vague in the en- abling legislation, and the specific tasks laid upon it by the National Security Council were kept under tight classifica- tion. Congressional knowledge and sanc- tion of its operations were limited to. several oversight panels consisting of, all together, a dozen or so senior mem- bers of -the Armed Services and Appro- priations committees in both Houses. Until lately, the overseeing was re- spectful and trusting, but it did go on all along. The late Richard Russell of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the most influ- ential man in Congress in national se- curity matters, long refused to have . William Fulbright, chairman of the , Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on his panel, because he considered Ful- ? bright a blabbermouth. Now that protection, that immunity, has been demolished. And the strangest thing Of all is that the blowing of the agency's cover was largely brought on by a dubious piece of journalism?the long, report in the New ,York Times of December 22 that the agency during the Nixon years, "directly violating its char- ter, conducted narnassivd'illegei domestic, intelligence operation" against individ- uals and groups who disagreed with the Administration's policies in Vietnam and other matters. Six months of investi- gation have pretty well established that these charges were greatlAnyogvesated a rcir After tha ?deal - Director Colby, to he sure, helpeei to whip up the storm with his too-ready admission that his " had countenanced certain "illegal" activities. He failed to Make it sufficiently clear at the outset just .what the mistakes were, and that what had been done was in any case done .on presidential authority. Whether misdemeanors or something worse, providing a measure of support for the Watergate break-in and in the Daniel Ellsberg affair was certainly im- proper and unwise. (In each case, a top official of the CIA authorized the sup- port, but reluctantly.). The deplorable outcome, in any case, was to generate a suspiciousness in Congress and an up- roar in the liberal press that have forced . the CIA further into the open than is good for a secret state mechanism. It now - has no choice but to stand in the dock while its role and mission are examined. "The big problem," Representative Nedzi says, "is determining the role of secret institutions in a free, democratic society." But that is only one problem beside Other problems. We should also be asking ourselves whether the U.S. can remain "a free, democratic society" ssithout the kind of secret organization that the CIA has to be in order to do its job effectively.. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the ordeal of investigations and hearings and reorganizations will leave the CIA weakened and its operations curtailed. The agency's main business is collecting and ? analyzing what in the trade is called "high-level positive for- eign intelligence"?information con- cerning the actions and intentions of other states that bear, for-'-ill or other- wise, on the American situation. That function, including available clandestine techniques for enriching the harvest, especially of a political and military na- ture, is not likely to be taken from the Agency, although the sharing of the -product between the executive and legis- lative branches is certain to be broad- ened, not without risk, perhaps foolishly. But the functions that have kept the CIA in hot water at home while it has prosecuted the Cold War abroad?clan- destine activities ranging from classical espionage and counterintelligence oper- ations to political actions aimed at thwarting hostile developments in other countries?are plainly marked for per- emptory amputation. . . The leakiest vessels in town In fact, the CIA, for all practical pur- poses, is already out of the covert poli- tical action business under a prohibition imposed in the last hours of the Ninety- third Congress by a little-noticed amend- 1 a little-known California Deme,crat, P. resentative Leo Ryan. The new law ice- bids the President to use funds appro.: priatcd to the CIA 'Zoe any operntion abroad (except fon collecting informa- tion) without justifyina the in'eended use in a detailed reper.!, to Conainees---- including specifically, :the seventeen- member Senate Foreign rieia.tions Com- mittee and the tliirty-lour-niareher House Foreign Affairs Committee. 'Iles two bodies are esteemed by the 1.717e.eik.)- ington. press corps es the leakiest "ns- sels in town.. . No President in his right mind would enter into such a transaction. Disclosure would almost certainly doom any secret enterprise; and bring embarrassment to whatever foreign movement the U.S. government wished to help. The CIA has been unique arnong na- tional intelligence organizations in that .it is subject to legislative oversight and lays out its -operations before members of Congress when it asks for fundo. In Britain, MI6, the agency's counter- part on the clandestine side, is lodged discreetly and impenetrably inside the Foreign Office and serves the Prime Minister directly. Parliament through tthe generations has tolerated the sepa- rateness on the practical grounds that certain necessary state business is most usefully pursued in secrecy. Yet, in spite of the potential weakness in the CIA's armor, friendly intelligence services have for a quarter of a century worked trustingly with its officers, and indeed vied with one another for a special re- lationship, admiring as many did the CIA's unmatched technical resources and the lagh quality of its people. A business dependent on trust Now that relationship has been shaken ?not because of a loss of confidence in the agency itself, but rather because in the eyes a foreign intelligence estab- lishments the CIA is no longer permitted to keep its secrets from Congress and the press. A recently retired senior CIA intelligence officer, who had intimate con- tact with all the major non-Communist services and still remains in touch with them, finds that many of his old friends are reluctant to work with the agency. "These people are worried and scared," he said. "Our business is tremendously dependent on trust. If they have some- thing sensitive, they're loath to share it : with us, lest it come out that they had been involved." Colby himself, shahen hy the recoiling of the CIA's foreign collaborators, is- sued a warning at a congressional hear- ing that "the almost hysterical excite- ment" about the CIA could jeopardize its effectiveness. The wonderment and i4;tar:iyhoagos 4erAg_kbigiaillak:43ffotratthyobralqed in friendly for- Approved For Release2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 eign capitals by the compulsive undress- ing of the CIA was vividly expressed, by a diplomat experienced in this Work when he exclaimed, aghast, "You Ameri- csins don't have a country over there., 'You have a huge church." The Administration might have been expected to try to block the Ryan amend- ment, but instead let it slip through Con- gress without serious 'challenge on the floor. The reasoning behind the inaction was .blatantly political. Given the mood of Congress, the loss of American zest for foreign involvements, and the un- cloaking of the agency's role in Chile and other' countries, the decision at the White House was that an arm's-length stance would most become the President until the Rockefeller Commission issued its verdict. In President Ford's defense, it should be said that he does not have enough fingers to plug all the leaks in the dike. The CIA has an excess of troubles these days. It is a victim of, among other things, the Pervasive mistrust of govern- ment secrecy. Watergate, along with all its other bad consequences, tipped the balance in the contentious issue of the government's right to secrets. Some peo- plo apparently believe that the govern- = et has no right to any secrets, a view that, if it prevails; will be fatal to the function of intelligence. One result of the heightened suspicion of secrecy was the amending of the Freedom of Information Act. Under the amendments passed in the final weeks of the Ninety-third Congress, any fed- eral body, even the CIA, must respond to any request for a classified document. If the response is negative, the govern- ment can be compelled to justify its grounds for refusal in court. In original intent, the law was meant to prod the government into letting scholars and journalists look into classi- fied files no longer deserving of asecurity lock. But the language of the law, if al- lowed to stand, could open thafiles of the, CIA to the public. Several teSt..cases are now before the courts. Fenced in by the Forty Cornmittae The CIA has also been a casualty of detente. Henry Kissinger's objective throughout the six and a half years that he has been. guiding U.S. foreign policy has been to convince the Russians, and the Chinese too, that the Cold "War was finished as far as the U.S. was concerned. Curtailing the CIA's covert interven- tions has been one way of getting - the lfiessage to Moscow and Peking. Kissinger was able to bring about this curtailment in his capacity as the Presi- dent's deputy in the transactions of the National Security Council, to which the CIA is generally responsible, and, most . . . directly, in h's ehairreenehin t Forty Committee. This committee takes its curious name from the number cu a top-secret NSC memo stipulating its re- sponsibilities,.one of which is to set the metes and bounds of the covert activities. , . . - :How far the CIA's political activities abroad have Shrunk can be judged from its ? inaction in Portugal, in a kind of situation where in the past its talents would have been resolutely brought into play. After , the military takeover in April, 1974, it gradually became appar- ent that the Communists dominated the Armed Forces Movement. The only prac- tical way for Portugal's NATO. partners to prevent a Communist takeover was to foster, discreetly, a coalition of the Con- servative moderates and the Socialists under the Socialist leader Mario Soares. -But Secretary Kissinger was loath to .commit the CIA to such a campaign, it its 'role be exposed and the outcry in Congress and the press against CIA meddling in the politics of other coun- tries be redoubled. When Europeans fi- nally mustered the resolve to fill the vacuum and set about rallying support around Soares, it was too late. An inspiration at State 'Until the advent of the Ad- ministration, the clandestine side of the CIA was the ascendant side, under an of- ficial with the bland title Deputy Direc- tor for Plans. His Directorate of Plans managed some' 7,000 people, or about two-fifths of the CIA's total 'force of about 17,000 (now somewhat fewer as a result of firings, early retirements, and attrition), and consumed about half of the agency's budget of some $600 million a year. The resources at his disposal in- cluded several highly professional air services, of which.Air America has been the most publicized.; various paramili- tary organizations now in 'skeletal sta- tus; a superb -worldwide comimmica- tions system; and some hundreds of -of- -eficers'attached to or working out from some 'fourscore 'stations abroad, mostly In enibassies and consulates. When the CIA was set up in 1947, it was ill equipped for the war Of ,vVits that covert political action demands. Its only going resources :it the start were the straightforward intelligence-collecting and counterintelligence functions that it had been able to salvage from the demo- bilized Office of Strategic, Services. The mechanism for :countering the Communist political subversion then epi- demic in Europe was the inspiration of the policy-planning staff of the State De- partment. Basically, the intentewas to provide the U.S. government with a co- vert instrument for funnelingiunds into non-Communist political organizations. _ ;?,-_,..7.-nals and the cr- garaztion of public n1eo,tings and dem- onstrations, all toward. the end of making sure that Europe's rtill feeble parlia- mentary proc..,esse not paralred 1:Ccf Coraiounion-t. The and a resourceful vs.-.7,sz an. of 055 service in the asz.:Trblod the basic machinery of the CIA.'s political-action sele-ices behind a fau2de called the Office of Policy Coordination. His ketadquar- ters v,,as in a group of -orefab structures belonging to the new agency, situated along th4,,, reflecting, that strotches in front of the Lincoln Memorial, The CIA provided him with funds, but he looked th the State 1)::-..partznent and the Pentagon for guidance ar.d. targets. He did the work. they wanted done but could rot er not do I.Urnselves, The Zt111;31C for votas This was the period; 1947-50, that witnescee. the Soviet subjection of Ru- mania ned Czechoslovakia and the strug- gle to save Italy, Greece, even France and West Germany, from going Commu- nist. Wiener's organization, spiritedly , supported by the CIA's expanding Intel- ligence and counterintelligence services, played a telling, perhaps even decisi, .), role in the defeat of the Communists in the Italian elections of 1948 and in the Greek elections of the early 1950's. Considering the stakes, the expendi- tures were modest, only a few million dollars in each operation. And the ex- perience was valuable in the education of the small, elite body of political-action tacticians whom Wisner recruited- -a good many lawyers, with a sprinkling of -eftnornists, historians, bankers, and journalists. ' In 1950, General Walter Bedell Smith, .Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Staff, was made director of the agency. He . soon decided to bring Whiner's opera- ' tions-under his direct control, alongside .cov.ert intelligence. He put Wisner in .charge of both functions, which gaye -rise to -the Directorate of Plans, but Wisner continued, as before, to take -guidance from -the White House in all 'covert political action. After Smith came .Allen Dulles, who took over in 1952, in the early months of the Eisenhower Administration. In- tuitive and bold, Dulles had penetrated the German Foreign Office during World War II while in charge of OSS opera- tions in Europe. While still Smith's deputy at the CIA,' he had broadened the political-action siervicee to -meet tin. Cam- . monist covert war in new sectors: the European labor movements and student and youth organizations. ? The CIA has 2.1bad image these days, partly because so-much of the commen- - Such- funds -werit:mostlylor-the support ? tary Abut; t the agency has been hostile or Approveaor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 nninfoerned, and to some minds anything dcea F. ::119 at least faintly sinister. But there certainly was nothing sinister au t the CIA's pelitical actions. There t:es; been a cloak of secrecy sometimes, ta Ise sure, but never e. deer. When the fz1 story cesnce out, it will ;)e. clear that Lha rassch-numored plot to kill' Fidel Centro back in the early 1960's was not Latched by the CIA. - To a large ex-tent, the "dirty tricks" in political action have consisted. cf ef- farts to.counter Soviet activities by re- cruiting intellectuals, mostly from the -universities, training them in parlia- mentary tactics; end dispatching them abroad to duel with KGB "agents of in- fluence" and. their dupes at various in- ternational congresses and conferences. The CIA presence was there by invita- tion of the host countries. The shared - purpose was to keep the KGB and the Inca? Communist apparatus from turn- ing these meetings into anti-American, . anti-NATO demonstrations, and foment- ing disorder in friendly societies. - Gloria Steinem, now a leader in the women's liberation movement and edi- to2 of Ms.. magazine, worked with the CIA in helping to organize some of the volunteers who attended the World youth Festivals in Vienna in 1959 and Helsinki in 11.62.. The CIA people, zhe later explained, "wanted to do what we ! wanted to do?present a healthy, diverse :view of the United States."' ? The CIA has involved itself in some ' dangerous and violent operations, of course. It has proved itself to be pretty good, for example, at conducting small- scale warfare. In the ruin of. the Ameri- can intervention in Vietnam, and with the CIA's world role and mission in dan- ger of irrational truncation, it is impor- tant to recall the effectiveness of the agency's paramilitary operations in In- dochina. The successes proved to be only temporary, as matters turned out, but the disasters that overwhelmed them were not of the CIA's making. The CIA's small-war intervention in Laos, beginning in the early 1960's, was a highly effective enterprise. It consisted Mostly of supplying Meo tribesmen with rifles, some artillery, air resupply, pay (a few dollars a rnanth), and communi- cations, together with training and ad- ministrative support that never engaged more than a few hundred CIA people at any one time. After ten Years of marehing and countermarching. the battle lines were about where they were when the agency first set about organizing the a/leo tribes- men. Only after South Vietnam and Cambodia fell were the Communists able to prevail in Lacs. The so-called secret war there, not really.secret at all, took the lives of eight CIA men, and cost Approved For R about 1 iniftion a week hi the last years. A te.,Iter in'ey inVin:harn ? . CIA?guerrilla-warfare specialists also operated cffective17.7 :in Vietnam in the early 130's. In these years the director of the CIA was John Me-Con e, a ben man as as admired at the agency fon his acumen as Dulles had been for his verve and style. Looking back, MeCone regrets that the U.S. did not stick to doing things the CIA's way in Vietnam. "In 111.61-62," he recalls, "we had sound Plan?an exnerienced military as- sistance group in Saigon and the begin- nings of a covert U.S.-d keeled operation calculated to teach the Vietnamese how to arm for and fight a guerrilla war. The aim was to keep the Diem government afloat without carnmitting sizabie . ground forces. Sure, that part of it waa covert, but no more so than the Ccmmn- nist force already in the field. "I remain convinced that if the CIA had been left to develop that strategy, . with the Pentagon's help, the Vietcong would have been held at bay, and Hanoi's Soviet and Chinese suppliers would never have let the action escalate on any- thing like the scale that the increasing direct American military intervention brought on. The war might still be going on, on a small scale, in the ccuntayside, but the United States would have es- caped a massive failure." ee Win oneslose one in Chile On the political-action side, McCone points with pride at the CIA's handling of Marxist Salvador Allende's first serious challenge in Chile, in 1964. "As early as 1962," he says, "President Ken- nedy had decided in the National Secur- ity Council that the agency should see to it that Castro's agitators did not take Chile into the Communist camp under Allende's banner. In 1964 that decision was confirmed by President Johnson. "A sounding indicated that Allende might well slip in. Our effort was cen- tered on promoting in public discussion the proposition that it was in the com- mon interest of the Christian Democrats and the other non-Communist parties to come together against a Communist par- ty heavily financed by Cuba and the Soviet Woe. That was all the political action amounted to. Nothing more. A handful of intelligence officers experi- enced in political organization, frugal expenditure; and a good case." That time the CIA succeeded. Six years later, however, when Allende made his next bid; the attentioi. .if the White House WAS occupied elsewhere. The CIA's covert political function was on the way out. Suddenly, in early Septem- ber, 1970, the State Department awak- ened to the fact that Allende had emerged in first place in the presidential electian, with 36 percent of the -popular vote to just under :7,5 percent for .the Conservative candidate and not quitri percent for the Chrisan Democrat. Iss- asmuch as no cari aasejceitv, the choice was thr!:;:',-22 '.;;L:to thi.; ture. With barely seven weeks left lielf.ore the was to vote, the National See.urlias Council et:dared the CIA to head off: Allende, if it cateld, by whiepirig !up sentiment in friendly journals for an - anti-Communist coalition. But the bugle sounded too late. McCone defends covert action suell, as the CIA took in Chile as a valid means of '. defending national interests. "Where situations favor covert action, the Pres- ident must consider cuch action, and the Congress -must tolerate it, provided le Is in direct support of a declared national policy. Covert action is a rational al- ternative to an overt response, as in Viet- nam, that can turn costly, unavailing, and humiliating. Covert action is a use- ful, even indispensable means of self- defense. As the agency has employed this method in many Situations, it was the only way of making the voice of reason heard in foreign places." Today the CIA's capacity for covert action is in shards, at least temporarily. And the responsibility does act He with Congress alone. When James Schles- inger, now Secretary of Defense, moved into the CIA directorship ,in January, 1973, he had an unmistakable commis- sion to dismantle the Directorate of ? Plans, among other things. ! Schlesinger succeeded Richard Helms, a wartime OSS officer who had risen in that n"band of brothers". under Dulles and Wisner to become Deputy Director for Plans in 1962 and director of the agency in 1966. President Nixon's men pushed Helms aside because of his re- fusal to let the agency be used as a shield for the Watergate break-in. His abrupt departure, to be Ambassador to Iran, was taken inside the agency as a signal that the old guard of profession- als was in for a change. A hand-carried letter The grapevine was right, as it should be in any intelligence service worth its salt. A force reduction on the order of 7 percent was executed at once, produc- ing the dismissal, resignation, or early retirement of about 1,000 people. The cuts fell most deeply on the Directorate of Plans, where the senior layer was all but peeled off. Among the most prominent casualties: were officers who had come put of the OSS, and had spent their careers in Plans, alongside Helms. Two senior of- ficers were given a hand-carried letter in the morning, notifying them that their elease!2.p4l1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 Approved For Rele services would no longer be required.? after the clOse of that day's business. The counterintelligence service?the ? test by far in the non-Communist world and the binding element for many of the, others.--was cut in half. Three senior ers cult in disgust after their chief,, Jarnr_.=s Angleton, was let go. All in all, the share of the agency budget going into clandeatine services was severely compressed. To Schlesinger, the depar- ? ture of the' "old boys" was no occasion for weeping; to him, they were "relics of the Cold War." ? ? The Directorate of Plans was renamed' the Directorate for Operations. To take, charge of it Schlesinger promoted Wil- liam Colby, a Princeton man who, like Helms and Wisner, came into the agency from the OSS and had passed his whole career on the clandestine side. For nye years (1962767) he was chief of the Far ; East Division, and fon three years (1968-71) he ran with skill and resolu-. Iution the. controversial Phoenix plan , aimed at uprooting . the Communists, from villages in South Vietnam. ? The man who came In from the cold ' The ascent of a veteran black-side man to be head of what was left of the old Directorate of Plans?and later to be head of the shrunken CIA?was not. 2.3 Odd as it loolcecl. Caby l-tad COrtie in. from the cold. He had perceived that de- tente had altered the role of the CIA. He had also come to realize that, given the mood of Congress, the indifference of the press to the strategic value of intelli- gence, and the American people's mount- ing aversion to foreign involvements, the clandestine side had become so nerable as to make it all but ineffective. Colby, then, is resigned to the pros? - pect that the CIA will change into some- thing different from the CIA he worked in for so many years. "Just tell us in the intelligence business what the nation wants and does not want," he said at a congressional hearing, "and we will do our best to satisfy it." He is too knowledgeable and serious a' man, however, to be willing to see the capability for clandestine political action struck down entirely. The President, he says, must be left with a mechanism that in certain situations will allow him "a choice between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines." But even that remnant is in jeopardy, unless the Presi- dent is prepared to fight Congress for it. If the black hide should be extirpated, ? or transferred elsewhere, the agency wouldn't be without work. Two crucial functions are not in dispute: the collec- tion a intelligence information and the analysis of what is collected. Within the collecting process, the CIA conducts ? three different programs electrohic sus.- veillance (listening in on electronic Approved For ase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 emissions of all sorts) ; photographic reconnaissance utilizing satellites and the high-flying LT-2 and SR-71 aircraft; and tile collection of intelligence, both covert and overt, by people. Lookino into a cleseti sociely McCone always held that the anaiyti- cal process, leading to the drafting of the National Estimates from the grist brought to the mill at Langley, Virginia, was the agency's most important (and least .appreciated) function; Spying by means of high technology has had the ef- fect of legitimizing the clandestine side of the collection process, and has given the analysts More hard intelligence to work with than ever came from human spies alone. In combination with over- the-horizon radar and electronic tech- niques for monitoring alien communisa- tions, the spying satellites supply the only reliable and comprehensive means for looking down into a closed society and listening in on seine of the business , being transacted there. . Cameras and film have improved to the 'point where by some accounts something on the ground only a foot or so in length can be identified in a picture taken 100 miles above. The interpretive techniques have also gained in sureness. The photo interpreters are able to determine with- is these "W7_. can se that on a certain date the Teussians ersetly 1,618 ICFM's deployed. We ? almost absolutely sure of the number ? 3-31it?krowing what is in place is orn that 21.114,dy.. jected,cn ths magnffiers at the Nation Photographic Interpretation Center r southeast Washington can't tell t?,_ photo interpreters ilcr-.7 many weapon of that type are to be deployed and wile or the charactcristion .cf the follow-o weapon no doubt already in preparatio under concealing roofs. All that is hie den inside Russian heads, and is aece tamable only by the clandestine method now in disrepute?the gleanings of a agent, the secrets spilled by a defect?. :ari-vem.r3 over Cola The CIA's functioning in the Cuba missile crisis in the autumn of 196 during McCone's stewardship, illustrate both, the value Of high-in-the-sky sur veillance and the value of down-on-the ground covert intelligence. McCone, engineer by training,. found the nel technology of intelligence fascinating "Technology," in his words, "gives in telligence a new cutting edge." But he also put a high value on clandestine in telligence, and was willing to spen in narrow to the physical dime"-, money cn the chance a getting it. sions and technical characteristics of In the summer and early fall of 1962 the new Soviet weaponry as it comes into the CIA collected from agents in Cub: view?submarines and warships being some 1,300 reports of Russian missile' assembled on the ways, prototype tac- being moved about the island. State De tical aircraft being taxied on the tarmac, partment Sovietologists, however, toli' . rocket engines firing up in the test beds, Kennedy that it would not accord witi- radar dishes under construction. the Soviet mentality to put offensive nu ? The CIA does not do all this demand- clear weapons into another country. ing work alone. It flies the satellites in MaCone was persuaded that Khrush chest would try to do something to offset partnership with the Air Force, which provides and launches them. The cam- the American success with its ICBM's eras and film, together with the inter- and his conviction crystallized as a re pretation of the pictures, are 'the re- suit of the information being fed to MI6 sponsibility of the CIA. The Defense and CIA contacts by Colonel Oleg Pen Department's National Security Agencykovsky, a member of the Soviet Stet has done a first-class job in monitoring Scientific Committee. Penkovsky was at- the telemetry broadcast by Soviet mi tached to the Soviet equivalent of th s- American Joint Chiefs of Staff; he knev quences of Soviet technicians on the 1 sues on test flights, and the drill se- when weapons were scheduled for de- missile ranges. gployment, and was able to pass along From the data accumulated by these Iword that for some reason only a small n and other means, the CIA and its col- umber of the only Soviet ICBM in ad- laborators are able, in the case of a vanced development, the huge SS-6, were Soviet rocket, for example, to come up to be released to the ready forces. with a fair estimate of its performance. in the meantime, a heavy ship move- ? They can determine the rate of accelera- merit out of the Black Sea was being tion, burning interval, exhaust temper- tracked into Cuba. It was much too large ? ature, instant of cutoff, Fpeed, trajec- to be explained away as economic aid. tory, the havior in trajectory, even The Soviet embassy in Washington had be acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. was giv- the payload; an"! the 1,cm...racy 1:71- in g some antiaircraft missiles to Castro pact. It's a masterly exercise. Colby believes that with high-technol- for defenzive purposes, but McCune ogy surveillance so far advanced, "we asked himself in Cuba' unless they had some- himself why the Russians wanted i , ? could drop all the covert political opera- SAM thing to hide. tions and the country would stand." He McCone persevered, and in October offers an example of how precise the Rase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432AbtfiSiiitbiO0NI-Ving President Ken- Approved For Release 2001/08108: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ? neily to authorize U-2 photographic fiigLts over Cuba. The photographs taken the f!rst three days revealed the con- off numerous missile sit, Each r.!;.s7:,'d ar.171,7;ular "trar;sold'al" :form in the positioning. of .the rocket lains.chers. From documents Penkovsky halgivnn then, the CIA men at once rrovniscd ft arrangement as standard fc the and SS-5's with the Red Arrn.- in Europe. The E.S-41 had a range of alout 1,200 miles, and the SS-5 about 2,z00. From Cuba, they could reach most of the cities in the U.S. By then, the photo interpreters had been able to fix-the total number of So- viet ICBM's, in the operational forces at about seventy, only a fraction of what the U.E. Strategic Air Force had in place. There .was no doubt then that the ? balance Icy with the U.S. McCon.e said so, and 17:onnedy had this knowledge when he decided to move to a showdown. Ciir:E;a.; With the new capabilities in high-tech- nology O. urveillr.nce., and the increased, reliiince on theia, the Cfr. has p.,issed into its third nz-c. period v.-as the first. It emphasized clan- destine political action, but it also brought clang all the: pioneering techni- cal apparatus. The McCone-Helms per- 1.9,51-73, was the second age. Tech- nology came to command the rna.Sor as-. sets, but the black side was given strong Sti'port. The Schlesinger-Colby metes-. sion introduced the third age, bringing on a withering away of the clandestine side, and an almost complete dependence on technology, together with analysis drawing mostly on open printed matter an cl!.pion-tatic rcp.orting. Is the nation thereby made more vul- nerable? For policing the hazy SALT covenants, in the face of the Soviet re- fusal to allow on-the-zround inspzictior the U.S., and the whole non-Corm-au:11s world for that matter, must look primer Ey to. photographic s atdlites. A camera 7.'ecord oTiiy what is ern view, it is posciLis to tool or bind cm render eef the ry?_:?;..E:;:riE now in pace The Russians could make it much mar difficult for us %;e comprehend thei rocket telemetry, and there is some enu picion that they have undertaken t do so. Their submarine pens have bee, roofed over. There are even disturbi, indications that they are edging past th proscriptions placed upon antiballisti systems by raising the power of t radar S in place and testing what coo/ be experimental ABh1 warheads fr antiaircraft launchers. The meaning of all this is not den But the pattern is worrisome. It supple the best of reasons for keeping reckles hands in Congress off the CIA. EN How Our Man in Tehran Brought Down a Demagogue It may be instructive for Americans to be reminded, after tne grand-scale squandering of lives, prestige, and wealth in Indochina, that another U.S. government, only a generation back, was capable of exercising power and influence deftly and un.r.ib.trusively in a potentially dPrAning in emotional situa- tion, and achieving success at a very moderate coat. The CIA exercised power that way in Iran in 1953. The performance was a gem in the art of clandestine political action. The CIA task in Iran, laid upon it by President Eisenhower in the National Security Council, was to unhorse -a rabble- rousing politician, Mohammed Mossedegh, memorable other- wise for an uncontrollable impulse to public weeping, who had maneuvered his way into the premiership two years earlier. Mossedegh had expelled the British, seized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.'s refinery at Abadan and nationalized its properties. ? A British boycott failed to bring Mossedegh around. He plotted with the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, to overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet Union. To the Kremlin it was an attractive, if nettlesome, prospect, promising access to oil supplies and to the waters of the Persian Gulf. To head off the danger that Iran would become a Soviet ally, if not satellite, Allen Dulles of the CIA dispatched to Tehran ! his Middle East operations chief, thirty-seven-year-old Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of T.R. He entered upon his mission under a cover that stayed on. Roosevelt's plan, which the Shah ap- proved and in which the British were to be invisible partners, THE. WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, May 30. 1975 I? CIA DEFENDERS rally to protect the' spy agency from its critics. Rockefeller's special investigating 'corn- I, mission, 10 its early-June report, will defend ! ?the CIA's oft-attacked covert operations. Director Colby goes public with a series of !speeches asserting the need for covert activ- ity. Ford associates ridicule a proposal to Irequire that secret : operations have the Fireederot's.- wr1itt.41. apprcval advance briefing of 50 legislators. Officials warn of ecrigvcssional Icals.; as we:1 ascliplvalatil -stories if a _presidentially approved opera., called for the Iranian Army to seize Tehran, arrest the usurpa and install a new Premier. In mid-August, through bad luck, the enterprise failed. A attempt to arrest Mossedegh misfired. The Shah fled to Born and shrieking mobs roamed through the capital. In Washin ton, Eisenhower's counselors urged the abandonment of a to gamble; but Alien Duiles ;,r.Q:skteri that Ro,,,eveit be given head. From a private house, never showing himself, workh through half a dozen junior CIA officers and a small numb of Iranian intelligence officers, Roosevelt succeeded within week in steeling the Palace Guard in Tehran for action, a ? whipping up sentiment against Mossedegh in the press, amo the merchants, and in the bazaars. Once the army mov Mossedegh's strength melted away. The Shah returned to palace, triumphant. Roosevelt left Tehran as inconspicuou as he had arrived. The enterprise cost the U.S. little more tb his modest salary (about 0.2,000 a year) and his travel penses, plus an advance to the Shah's bodyguard of "a few te of thousands" of dollars for back pay, a debt that the Sb quickly repaid. , ? The Iran operation supplied the CIA Directorate of P1 with a useful model. "The lesson was," as one official recen put it, "that a clandestine outfit need not take open comma of a coup, or revolution. The intelligent way to control eve is to recruit the right people, drill them carefully,, and man ver them into the right spots." 1. 'don ihou'id -blow up. ? ? -.? ''- ?,-! ,i? ? -; . Administration leaders hope to persuade Congress, after its current inquiries, to set up a permanent joint committee on intelli-. genes. It would monitor CIA activities but limit the danger of leaks. Officials complain that CIA -men now shy away from taking strong positions for fear of. leaks. . ? Ford's .teammates, along with' conserva- tives Goldwater and Tower, praise Sen. Church's CIA probe for a "responsible" ap- proach-so far. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4aaP77-0043214000100370008-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 WASHINGTON STAR 9 June 1975 - 'tee dine-tee ite , ei ? Dy Jeremiah O'Leary eleass Star Staff Writer WILLIAMSBURG Three miles west of Virginia's colonial capital on Route 143 toward Richmond, the only entrance to Camp Peary resembles the main gate of any U.S. military reservation with its guard shack, an armed M.P. and a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire. The sign at the threshold reads: "Armed Forces Experimental Train- ing Activity. Department of Defense. Camp Peary." There is nothing to indicate a super-secret function, but Camp Peary is a great deal more than it seems to be. Since 1951, this '10,000-acre tract of woodland and marsh an the banks, of the York River has been the principal training center for the CIA. The 50,000 residents of York and James City counties and the 10,000 inhabitants of Williamsburg have only the dimmest notion of what goes on inside Camp Peary. The eight re- tired generals and admirals who live at nearby Queen's Lake are close enough to hear gunfire and to see planes landing and taking off at the mile-long runway at ,Camp Peary bet they do not ask questions. . , Williamsburg's weekly, the Vir- hgtaia Gazette, tettpgeari Camp paegy as the CIA's training base three years ago using second-hand acs !counts but no reporter from that paper or any other is known to have- set foot in the camp until I did re- cently. That is because the listed public relations officer is also Camp Peary's security officer. , MUCH OP WHAT has been written about the CIA's activities at Camp Peary emerged only in the past several years and nearly all of it consists of disclosures from a hand- ful of former CIA officers who are disillusioned with the agency or ac- tively antagonistic toward it. The writings and statements of men like Philip Agee, Joe Maggio, Victor Marchetti, John L. Marks and Pat- rick J. McGarvey revealed much about what the CIA was doing at Camp Peary, but these sources disa- greed among themselves on some specifics of the activities at the CIA's West Point. , ? 'Marchetti and McGarvey both, however, linked Camp Peary with CIA assassination plans, including Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam. Marchetti said a number of contract employes trained at Peary for the counter-terror program that he said accounted for 40,000 dead Viet Cong infiltrators. . ? McG arvey, of Upper Marlboro, Md., said one of Camp Peary's mis- sions was training in "neutralization' of an infrastructure," to which he added,' "Essentially, that's, saying you're killing people.". ? ? - ? ? CAMP PEARY was well enough 'known when it came into being in 1942 as a training camp for World ?War H Navy Sea Bees. Three times the size of. Williams- burg, Camp Peary encompassed a large portion of Bruton District in- York County, including Magruder Village, Carter's Creek, Bigler Mill Pond and yet today the place does. not appear on maps of the historic region. ? There also are two 17th Century structures at Camp Peary that are erroneously remembeded in Willi.' arnsburg as the Porto Bello Mansion. ? Boarded up and numbered as all military base buildings are, the two buildings were actually the customs houses for the colonial governors when Williamsburg was a port. for shipping on the York and James rivers. ? Nearly 70,000 sailors trained at Camp Peary until the state of Virgin- ia acquired the site for a game pre- serve' and reforestation project in 1948. When the camp became the CIA's covert training center during the Korean conflict, it effectively vanished from the public view. The very isolation of Camp Peary, which is closed to the public and.cices not encourage visitors, has trans- formed the place into a dream world for conservationists and nature- lovers. Herds of deer are so tame that they wander fearlessy on the lawns and show up for daily handouts from the kitthens of CIA wives. In one late afternoon visit,. I saw beaver, muskrats,'ground-hogs, foxes, wild turkeys and every variety Of bird common or rare to these lati- tudes. ? CAMP PEARY today has a small permanent cadre of less than 20 in- structors and their families, the MP contingent, some maintenance per- sonnel including a fire department,. and a fluctuating student population in several courses of varying length that probably does not exceed 150. In ? all, the population of Camp Peary Li, placed at about 300. There, is a training course for newly hired officers entering train- Ping (presently the training class has about 35 JOT's: average age, the late twenties.) There is also a Basic Operations Course; an Advanced Operations Course and periodically there are senior seminars for veteran officers and mid-career courses somewhat like the periodic re-train- ing courses known as "in-service" to' the FBI at Quantico, Va. If assassination ever was a part of iCIA training, agency officers say every employe including those at , Peary have now been' requited to submit a signed statement to Colby ;tatting whether the-j have ever. 'known of or been involved in any dis- cussion or plaillor an assassination. Ai PEARY today, the men and women are trained in the use of small arms, including 9 mm pistols and Swedish submachine guns, but it is denied that assassination has any Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77_430432R000100370008-9 part in the curriculum. It is acknowl- edged that there are escape and eva- sion tests, with trainees trying to evade "capture"; some close-corn- ;bat work in simulated villages and in border-crossing ? in which trainees get a workout trying to penetrate a ? frontier system like that along the Iron Curtain. ? For parachute training or heavy ' Weapons work, the CIA's people go to places like Ft. Benning and FL Bragg. "This is a place like Benning or Parris Island," said one experienced source. "We teach self-defense,. unarmed combat and the like. Flat and heel of the hand, not fists cr ka- rate. There's a lot of work in the gym and we have good rifle and pistol ranges." . . THE EMPHASIS, they say at Peary, is now on self-protection be- cause of the growing incidence of terrorism around the world with Americans as targets. There is a course at Peary on the protection of CIA officers' homes and a sophist-. caned ,,,,?; .;,4..,,. course that in- volves curiaus means of erashiag into and evading other autos simu- lating terrorist roadblocks. This' course was so interesting to King Hussein that he arranged for one just like it in Jordan. There are no more foreign nation- als training at Peary. The last non- U.S. personnel to train there Were members of the bodyguard of the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi stett5ents were at Peary when the King was slain and promptly went home to Riyadh. . ? But Camp Peary is no longer: exclusively for use of the CIA, either. There are now a small number of State Department officers on student status and soon there is expected to be a quantum 'expansion. It is reli- ably reported that the Defense Intel- ligence Agency, which once trained personnel at Ft. Holabird in Balti- more and now uses Ft, Huachuca, ?Ariz., will soon shift its training -Operations to Camp Peary. ? MOST OF THE students live in. modern brick barracks, a BOQ (Bachelor Officers Quarters) for the men and WOQ for the women train- ees. There is a small but well-ap- pointed club, stamped from the mold of officers' clubs all over the United States, complete with swimming pool. The permanent staff has mod- est ranch-style houses for which they, pay $135 a month. There are some older homes here that existed before, Peary leccarrie a naval trainie ; base: and some of the childless couples and married M.P.s ;lie in these. ? Only bare concrete floors, now beginning to sprout saplings in the cracks, remain of the World War II wooden barracks used the Sea Bees and many of these areas are nearly ? 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-IRDP77-00432R00-0100370008-9 ? hiddenty the iitvinrbrush.- " ? At least two of the old farm houses, ? . especially remodeled inside and with scenic views of the 2iver and lakeso are set aside for VIP visitors. Colby' is A periodic vis:tor T4ibers he wants to get away from his weekly grind and his publicly listed Bethesda home telephone. Former CIA Director' 'James R; Schlesinger, now secretary or defense and nominal landlord of.. ;Camp Peary, i3 ?a dedicated bird- ? 'watcher and often comes ,to the .reservation to pursue his hobby. ? . It is reported but unverified that, !certain key members of Congress also are permitted to use Camp .Peary as. a vacation spot because. of. WASHINGTON POST ? 12 Jtni 1975,.., it arnlieleri fishing and liunthoe'2. and absolute isolation. It is also rc- pooted that Peary is used by the CIA as a "safe house" for defectors co others. ? . ? se The -;CIA ccsatinues to send is trainees into outside communities co training enIssions. Right now, the exercises in tailing, surveillance, ce- -cret meetings and !nessage drops are being conducted in and around Richmond department stores. with, .instructors watching ? and marking, 'the as they work againsf, veterans sent down from-Washington 'to test their skill at the requirements of espionage. on the streets. ? IN ThE PAST, the dazette,eclitori- Ihy'TE DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION to a relatively brief VV and unobtrusive passage in the Rockefeller com- mission report which is reprinted elsewhere on this page todsy. Entitled .Chapter 2, "The Need for Intelligence," it the a consideration that is easy to overlook in the insh to judge the CIA's misdeeds, The CIA's past exC,esses and misdeeds are critically important. But so is this country's need for an effective intelligence sys- tem. This need is not rooted in outdated and excessive apprehensions, but in an appreciation of contemporary reality: the world, is 'complex and fast-changing, 'and some- nations in it are hostile to our own. The proper purpose of the extraordinary purgative exercise now.. being direated at the CIA?of which the Rockefeller .commission report is a part?is to ensure that, without aS- saulting citizens' rights, policy .makers will continue to have the inforination and analysis they need_ to make ,decisions. This .is basic. ? ? ' ? ? , ? Now, while a much greater proportion of this inf or- platen could be made public and thereby shared and' tested in timely fashion, it nonetheless remains neces- sary .in our view that much of the collection and analysis of it. must be done on a discreet, that is to say, secret, basis. We shape and execute domestic policy in the open, or, we should, on the presumption that all of us have the nation's 'best interests at heart. But in the formulation of national security 'piney it would be foolish, to ignore that some of those who would observe the. policy-making process have interests in conflict with'?our own. That is the rationale for some secrecy in this area. For a news- paper to accept this rationale even while it does its daily darndest to unlock official secrets is merely a necessary 'fact Of life in a society. trying at once to be faithful to its highest domestic values, and to survive in an often- hostile international environment. Citizens must, we be- . lieve; accept both requirements as legitimate and hon. _arable, any took Urnbrasse at Camp Peary ess -the presumption that it was a train- ing ground for assassination and sur- veillance. The paper called on. the- . .Virginia senators ad Rep. Thomas N. Downing, D-Va, in whose district canos5 is loczted, to investigaw. and put a step to kali.. ? ? ':'Downing said he has had a blanket, invitation from ,. CIA . headquarters' :Since make an inch-by-inth) examination of Camp Peary whenev. er he wishes. He said he had been as- sured by the CIA that there neve' ? was any training at Camp Peary in assassination or with mini-nukes and added, "I think that's. probably ,true." trr Weal fence' It must be understood that nations?arid, especially, but not exclusively, those which are our adversaries? commonly try to penetrate or confound each other's intelligence systems: This makes it essential to iirotect one's own system by erecting defenses that coma under the name of counter-intelligence. The Rockefeller, com- mission report shows the danger here:. some activities undertaken in the name or form of counter-intelligence led the CIA outside its charter and outside the law. It is Wrong, however, to label any effort to establish guide- lines for counter-intelligence procedures?procedures which unavoidably take place on domestic soil?as astep which legitimizes domestic "spying." Hard discussion is needed on the report's proposals that the CIA be per- mited to collect information on employees and, in co- ordination with the FBI, on persons posing a "clear threat" to its facilities or personnel and on "persons ? suspected of espionage or 'other illegal activities relating ,,to foreign intelligence." This discussipn must proceed from a double awareness of past pitfalls and continuing o. counter-intelligence needs. The -commission notes, for instance,- that some Corn- munist countries "can" monitor Americans' private phone conservations by the thousand; this makes some Americans "potentially subject" to blackmail. That a foreign power "can" tap an American's phone does not excuse the CM from actually having done So. It is one. of this country's proudest boasts that, at its best, it holds itself to standards that it expects ne other' country to meet. But it would 'be frivolous to proceed from there to conclude that the large intelligence effort which, say, Russia 'has mounted in this country can safely be ignored. In the drive to ensure that the CIA is cleansed of its ex- ceises and improprieties,, its legitimate functions must not be. impaired. - ? . ? ...., ? THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER 3 May 1975 ? .? NO Intelligence easti for Federalists Sir,?In ? the Guardian (114 that. it has received CIA 'money' 2) you quoted Mr Body, MP for might cause great 'damage to.' ;1Iolland-with?Boston, as saying. the Federal Trust and adversely. 'that "the Federal Trust has affect its sources of donation, reeeiet; great tleai of ..:tottey and income?Yours, etc, ? from the _CIA." . (Sir) John Foster, . This statement is cunipletelY Chairman of Trate, untrue. The Federal Trust has ? Federal Trust for Education' never received any money from 'and Research,- - the CIA in any shape or form. 12a Maddox Street, Such an allegation to the effect, London WI. ?. . ?? , NATIONAL REVIV 6 JUNE 1975 ES Signs of .the times: A lecture agent has advised David Phillips, the CIA man who has resigned from the Agency to undertake its defense, that whereas ' eon expect to make from $5,000 to ' $10,000 a year on lectures defending the Agency, he could make between $50,000 and 100,000 a year attacking ? it. Approved For Release 2001/08L83: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 )2 NEW YORK 11,.7'1.71rs 1975 yfted'Por Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ? ? ?,..? ? ' Optation aos , ? ? ..Instead of the whithviash that many critics had pre-'e dieted, the Rockefeller Commission's report on the mestin activities of the,: Central Intelligence Agency: a. trenchant, :Actual, and plain-spoken dactiment, it presents an apt:ailing picture of '.illegal and impropen, zclions conducted against American citizens in a wide . range of activities andover a long period of time., ? The National security Act of 1947 establishing the C.I.A. ex-plicitly,forbade'the agency from exercising any, "police, subpoena, .cr law-enforcement powers or in- ternallsecunity functions." Althougt. the word "foreign" is nowhere used in thee statute, it was clearly understood that the, C.I.A. was to engage cnly in-collecting.;foreign; Intelligence. , . . Yet -when domestic turmoil began to develop in thet mid sixties in. Campus demonstrations, rebelliqnsein thei black 'Slums and the. v.iidespread protest moireinent .against the Vietnam war, the. 'CIA. under Richard' Heints'. reSponded to the pressure.? feoin President Johnson to investigate domestic dissidents in the hope of finding ? embarrassing links te Communist countries. . NO such' links were ever found, but the White Honsee, pressure to purstie this ai'll-o-the-WiSp greatly intensi- fied during the first four years o2 the Nixon Administra- tion. It would be laughable 'if. it were not sinister that' -the .code name, for this wholly illegal investiga- tive project was "Operation Chaos." ? . - It ishorrifying to learn that the CIA. had under:C.6\7-er ? contacts monitor the meeting's of grOups such as the. ;Southern Christian Leadership Conference and. the _Washingtdri Urban League. It, maintained files on nearly a thousand organizations. By August, 1973, when C.I.A. :Director Colby virtually ,rialted this project; "tho paper' trail left by Operation Chaos included soniewhere in the area ..of"..13000. Tiles on. -subjectS !arid individuals," the report-discloses. Linked to this was a. computer system' containing an,index. .of over 300,000 names and organize,' ' tions, almost . all of them of United States, citizens and :organizations unconnected with espionage. Mr. Helms and the high officials of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations with ;whom he dealt were well-' . aware that they were breaking the law. Thus, in submit? e.. ting to Henry Kissinger a report on ."Restless Youth," .Mr., Helms wrote in a covering memorandum early in 1969 that a section on American students Was "extremely; -sensitive" -because the whole area was 'outside, the,: agency's charter. ?? t For twenty years beginning in '1953, the.0e14.- veyed mail between this country and the 'Soviet .Union,', opening several thousand letters each year. This, too;i? was in clear violation of the law and'wasfinally haltede at the insistence of the Chief Postal Inspectore' ; Like the Federal Bureau of. Investigation ? under the late .J. Edgar Hoover; thp 'C.I.A. ire selected instances, engaged: in wiretapping and burgIary?sometimes on its own and sometimes in collaboration with the - What emerges from this report's account of Operation,: Chaos .a.nd of mail interception., wiretapping' and Other misconduct is the picture of an embryonic police state. the press disclosures that forced this Presidentially di- rected inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission and the - further investigations to .come by the Senate and committee- have served to- alert the nation to: a develope, ment profoundly dangerous to constitutional democracy... e it ? C.I.A. Reform. The revelations in the Rockefellenreport clemonstratei': 'the unwisdoni of freeing the Central intelligepce Agent7I from all the, normal legal' and institutional , procedures that 'serveto review and restrain the. exercise of power, by ordinary government agencies. The law' establishing: the CIA. placed total reliance upon pie good judgmenite ' 24' , , :of the. President and the C.I.A. director. Even at the ,outset, in the Truman and2EisinhOwe...4?:. Administrations and under the canny leadership of Allen Dulles; this reliance proved inSufficient to prevent some. iliegal activities such as the extensive mail interception:, program.. Under later, ,Pretidents this control systerri(: totally faired. , . , The recommendations of the Rockefeller COmmisalai",' soundzs- far as they go, largely add up to imposing the restraints that help control other bureaucracies/it urges that Congress seriously Consider Making budget "at least to some extent" a matter at public.?i knowledge, instead of concealing 't--as is now done? in fictitious items listed in various departmental budget.: , Quite apart from all the obvious dangers such loose,, ,practice presents, it does not even seem to meet the explicit requirements of the Constitution. The agency has not only been largely irmnune from' the inquiries of the General Accounting Office, Congress's investigatory arm, but also-has felt free to mislead th& Office of Management and Budget, the President's agent for fiscal control. Amending the law and exectitive orders to make it clear that the C.I.A. can no longer esc:ape, ? normal budgetary control; would do much, all by itself- to uncover and perhaps prevent the expenditure of large sums of Money on illegal operations. o The C.I.A. has traditionally had an understandingwith the Attorney ,General that the agency would investigate any criminal charges against ;its own employes and riot refer them to-the Justice Department. The commission is right to urge that this "gentleman's agreement" be :abrogated and that the Justice Department reassumeits ,proper prosetutorial role. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board nand -the Congression?: supervisory committees have all tailcd in. their trust. Had they been vigilant and aggres: slve the shocking misdeeds now being exposed could! never have Occurred or would soon lave been curbed: The commission wisely recommends that the power of the, advisory board be strengthened and that Congress it long last establish a joint committee on intelligenne., but, not too much reliance can be placed on either, ,of these reforms. esr - - In this dangerous world, the UnitedfStates tntst' have -a well-run agency, tb gather intermation about foreign nation's, especially _those that may have hostile designs.' The,c,Xcessei.and aberrationPof' the CIA. do not erase that necessity nor do they cancel out the useful work !the, agency has performed atitimes in assessing various international situations. . The ehallerige to President Ford and to .Congress is to devise institutions ,.and prOcedures Strong enough and supple enOtighto enable the C.I.A.*to _perform its essen-, 'tat overseas tasks without simultaneously swirling out CoritrOl:',.and becoming a' covert menace to the very, ,..freedoms it is, supposed to be. protecting. * . sassmacion Blot lie best way to avr.Oid- suspicions of, a. cover-up- not to .'coyer up.ePreSident iFerd's explanations for withholding those portions of the Rockefeller Corn-. nfision's report concerning allegation of political assas ?sination.s. Only compound the Injury .already inflicted 'by massive leaks and innuendo on' this sordid' issue. It no excuse to say,: as, theePresident :did, that the ? stt6j.ebt "extremely 'sensitive." Indeed it is, which'', -is :Why a full and, authoritative statement is the !only, e.,;n4y-ta':nrevent letlf,truths? and gossip from acquiring a life- and credibility of their ,own: For the _President `;simply to refcr,, darkly to Unspecitied incidents of the ast:, fifteen .cOr. twenty year" is in itself' a Veiled .iiirlietnient susceptible to misuse for partisan political. .purposes. -?:. The President personally broadeneckr...tht . Rockefeller. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100870008-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ? WASHINGTON P3i 11 June 1975 " Controversial', Acts Muhl. to -stem ltratiter Ti e e By William Greider Sy4ellinstto.n Pos4 Staff Writer ???? :The Rockefeller commis- ,sion's report on the Central' ..Intelligence Agency's do- mestic ? Misdeeds sidesteps Some 0 -crucial, questions _about who's to blame and will probably provoke new debate over how to control the secret agency. . ' The. investigation compiled and analyzed a mountain of ? previously secret data, made public yesterday, on the do- mestic activities which got :file. CIA, in trouble last win- ; ;ter when they were first re- vealed. The commission cair-s,' . eludes that many of these? spying on. political . dissi- dents,' mail ? openings,-keep- ing 'secret files on"Ainerican '.eitizens?went beyond the proper lirnits of the CIA's charter,. if not beyond the raw Itself. ? t But the findings.get fuzzy ;when it .comes to resolving the conflicting testimony of - hien-,officials ever who au- thorized these enterprises.; 'Jrhe blame falls More on the system, less on individuals,- :some' of whom are still' in ; gOvernment. In *short, the,, the report did not answer the., , question: who is lying? . Secdnd, while, the commis- sion recommends that Wide variety of CIA' practWil ees, from burglary to ma, Opening, should be permae nently forbidden, its recom- Mendations for "reforms!' may also be read -as legiti- mizing some Of the CIA's con:. .troversial surveillance activ- ities inside the , United ? States. s The eight-member ? comn mission, chaired by .the Vice President, ,? was born six; months ago amid wide- spread skepticism:- because, its membership was domi- ;naked by cold warriors long. :associated with the "intelli-: gence community." Now that the commisison's, report is public, questions seem likely to continue. The commission proposed. amendments to the Nation- al, Security', Act of ; 1947 to , eliminate "ambiguities" abopt what-the CIA can and Neivs Auttysts cannot do, but the eigtifica- tions in some ''cases'. might actually ;strengthen t h e. agency's ability to- partici- pate;.in domestic ' security" cases. ' ' 'The prOpesed.arneridments,I. .for instance, would say .'ex .plieitlY what many , people 'assumed was already k in the- Jeweethat the CIA activities' .imust'-concentrate' ? ? eign intelligence" only.' Yet . 'they would also grant teh': ageocy explicit 'authority, ? "for -providing guidance and .technical assistance' to tithee 'agency a n d department :heads in protecting. against -unauthorized . disclosures. ',within their own. agencies; Tend 'departments." ;.. ;Language stieh ' ae, "guidance 'and technical ,as- : sistance" ie 7 subject- to, stretching ;when a. bureauc: racy seeks to expand its role. Would "technical ;Stie sistance" Cover the red wig, , and spy camera which the CIA-. provided to the ?White' House '"plumbers"? ''Could the CIA- assign undercover .agents-for:"guidance" to an-, other federal agency that is -chasing domestic .suspects?::. ? ?? ,Likewise, the commission called on President Ford to ,issue' an' executive order de- fining, more narroWly. what ; domestic surveillance activi- 'ties the CIA can properly' undertake on American' citi- eerie: It is: at .least arguable that: the propdsed might authorize some of the very spying on ;domestic po=0 litical dissidents which 'pro-. yoked the current contro- versy. ? The exeeutive; order, for. instance, .would permit Sur;;; veillance on anyone. associ- ated with the CIA, past or. presente for security pure poses. ? That* means the agency could birddog author and ex-agency 'official Victor- -Marchetti, which it edid .in .a71.., ' ? se: . :Coniniission's assignment', le include,y?,the reports United, States: :involvement ,through C.LA .in the uglyi business oi'piotting ef forc!grt What-4 ever fact' the c.ommission's inquiry established should now be .made public, along with whatever additional material emerges from the independent inveStigations ,now being made by two Congressional committees. In the absence of such disclosure, Mr. Ford's state, ment that "I am totally opposed to political more fatuous assassinar Directors of CIA Since 107 Since its formation in 1947, the Central intelligence 'AgencY has been headed by: , - ? Rear .Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoettet,, 11947 to 1950. ;: Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, 1950 to 1953. Alien W. Dulles, 1953 to 1961. ? John A. McCone, 1961 to 1966. 0 Richard M. Helms, 1966 to 1973. '7! James R.. Schlesinger, 1973 (two months). ? 'William E. Colby, 1973 to present. , The 'agency would be per- mitted to collect informa- tion, secretly or otherwise, 'on any "person or activities"4 ;that pose a clear threat .to ::ClAe facilities ? "Provided- 'that proper coordir tion with' the 'PRT.. is aeeerne pneetenee .'nene ,einnee- mine if an individual or.or- ganization is ? a threat?. The dire c tcir: 'of central intelli-. s t . That is the same rationale that the CIA used to justify . 'placing at least- 12 infiltrae -tors in, Washington area an-- t _ iwar groups-7Women's4.. Strike for Peace, the Wash- ington' Peace Center, Con- gress on Racial Equality and, the Student Nonviolent Co- Ordinating 'Committee,' among others: Those partic- ular activities went too far,' the commission concluded,. ;but the basic rationale was, accepted , ; ',"The CIA thOuld not 'trate dissident "'groups Or; other organizations of Americans," the commission ? ,said, "in the absence of a' :written determination by, -the director of central intel- ligence that such action . is . neceSiary to meet a clear 'danger to agency facilities. 'operations or personnel and, that adequate coverage by, law enforcement agencies is. unavailable.' . ? ? ? ? . If you turn. that proposal,' .;inside out, it says the CIA: can infilerate those Political ,groups. if its director says okay and the FBI isn't ; ci6lng job?wnich is ap; :proiximately the situation' which government officials :claimed in 1967 when that surveillance was begun. , The proposed executive Order 'would also allow the ; other illegal activities relat- ing to foreign intelligence," provided again that it coor- dinates' its operation with :the FBI. in the past, while the limits were vague and ill-de- fined; the general assurhp- wes that the FBI had 'sole jurisdiction for investi- gating espionage cases. This ?new language could be inter- :preted as actually expanding the': CIA's" right to earobe these matters [while still barring it from law-enforce- ment functions]. Further, the 'commisSion endorsed the CIA's efforts to get new legislation impoeing penalties on any of its em- ployees, past or present, who 'divulge classified informa; tion. ? ? , Specific questions of?whet exactly happened inside the government which led to the string of improper activities are also only partially an- swered; by the commission's final report." ' ? The cornmission conclude ed, as former CIA 'Director RIchard M. Helms has in- sisted, 'that the intelligence; agency was: under consid-:' erable pressure from' two, Presidents?Lyndon B. John- son and'. Richard M. Nixon?' to pursue investigations; or domestic peace groups and their possible links with foreign governments.. Beyond, that g en er a?I f re m ?work, - the .report .begged more specific clues-. -lions about which White' .House officials Odd which" CIA' officials what to dn. Helms, according to the re- port, elternately resisted pressures to get into domes- tic spying and then launched .spying projects. Helms kept these activities super-secret, even 'from top officials of tio .CIA to investiedga n," is n reassn WOO 1 00MOSIt9 ? Yet 'he ,testified WWI- Release 2001108/08txeslitteRID.F677 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001Q0370008-9 -that' -he Was 'Unaware that' this collection aimed at'. "foreign collection data".? had strayed substantially into the 'forbidden area of. .4onlestie politics. , Did Helms 'really know what was happening r:r did. his subordinates, run wild? The commission blamed the 'misstep" on the structure, ..not the individuals involved:. WASHINGTON POST 12.. June 1975 ? ..,C160frettiOd , _ ?. ? 'list .:Of Central intent- "tence t Agency directors publithed in yesterdssy's'Vesh- ingtonn Post; the name e of F. Reborn. "Jr., who headed the" agency from ,1e65 1.0 Was. .inadyertently, WASHINGTON STAR 11 June 1975 jus/L id G AMA. "RR% A a LIM) i lit H:ot By Leslie Oelsner New York Times News Service 1.. The Roltefeller commis- sion says the Justice De- ? partment "abdicated its statutory duties" for more' than 20 years through a se- - cret agreement in which it :gave the CIA the power to ? decide whether or not to prosecute, criminal charges involving agency employes. ? The commission charged ? in the report made public ? yesterday that the agree- ment "involved the agency directly in forbidden law. enforcement activities" in violation of the law that created the cm and limited' its powers. But the commission said 'it had found "no evidence" that the CIA "abused" the prosecutorial decision turn- ed over to it by the Justice , Department. THE AGREEMENT was ended in January, when the department "directed that cases with a potential for tcriminai prosecution be. t referred to it for considera-' thin," the report said. , ? But the commission call- ed for new guidelines, ir writing, requiring that both ,the criminal investigation ? and the decision of whether or not to prosecute be made by the Justice Department:" . A Justice Department spokesman, in confirming last night that there was such an agreement, spiairjrb 26 CMISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 June 1975 nnInn nvishoe governmen 1 ets -Writing in "The Invisible Government" , years ago, authors David Wise and Thomas Ross noted that the intelligence community :had achieved "a quasi-independent status and 'power of its own" and that "the public, the .,President, and the Congress must support steps' to control the intelligence establish- ment, to place cheeks on its power, and to make it truly accountable." . _ With the release of the Rockefeller commis- sion's findings on the Central Intelligence Agency, that message is even more relevant today. ? It is pointless to argue whether the CIA's indiscretions and illegalities were "massive."- The fact remains that the agency spied upon thousands of Americans for many years, infiltrated domestic groups, monitored phone calls and private mail in the United States, and tested drugs on unknowing human guinea pigs . . all in violatiorfof its 1917.charter. Much of the blame must be placed on former presidents who misused the CIA, sometimes for. purely political purposes, and congres- sional oversight committees more interested in maintaining -dertability" than getting 'at. the facts. The cold-war thinking that led to these circumstances within the U.S. in- telligence community is perhaps under- standable, but it in no way justifies the degree to which laws were broken and power abused. ? The Rockefeller commission did a good job in reviewing and interpreting CIA files, but much more needs to be done. Congressman James V Stanton, who will head the new House investigative subcommittee, correctly described the report as "a starting mark." It 'remains for the two congressional committees to delve further into the CIA's past perfor- -mance. ? 2?. ? More important than probing the agency's ...history, however, and absolutely essential to - reestablishing its credibility, will be the steps taken to prevent future illegality and abuse. The commission report recemmends that the CIA charter be changed to emphasize its proper role in matters of foreign security, that executive and' joint congressional branch. oversight committees be established, that the agency's budget be made at least partially" public, and that the CIA cease from maintain- ? ing files on Americans. Any Citeet director, the . _ report rightly states, must be a person with "judgment, courage, and independence to . resist improper pressures." ,, . ? '7 'And the Reckefeller commission gets to the heart of what has caused the recent furor when it introduces a passage on investiga- tive techniques and their misuse with this es- - sential declaration: "Even an investigation within the CIA's authority must be conducted by lawful means." Aiding accountability in this regard would be the commission's recom- mendation that the CIA record who has 'authorized each investigation, why, and with what results. As we have stated before, it is time for a thorough study of the CIA with a view to an. overall restatement of its mandate andBine- tions, including, for example, whether the subversion of foreign governments is ever an acceptabte CIA activity. In today's world, there remains a very real need for the sometimes unpleasant work of an- - intedigence gathering and analysis agency of 'enevernment Put what has"0 ,d is did not know whether it had been a "slip" and a mistake by department officials or "a tacit agreement." The spokesman, Robert Havell, also said it was his ? "understanding" that a :whole. series of attorneys general during the 20-year ? life of the agreement had :not, been told of, it. SEVERAL previous , attorneys, general, includ- ing Herbert Brownell Jr., , who held, the post at the I ? time the agreement began, said in interviews earlier in ? the day that they had no recollection of any such agreement. ? The spokesman said, too, that as far as the Justice Department knew, no 'CIA employe had been prose- tcuted during 'the entire 20 years ? apparentlyathee ;cause of the agreement. The Rockefeller commis- sion stated that in 1954, the CIA "pointed out" to the Justice Department that "in many cases involving CIA, prosecution would re- quire public disclosure of ? siti r hltkititigt3 now so greatly needed is principled leadership and responsible monitoring. Some activities may have to remain covert, but the CIA must relinquish some of its independence in favor of. accountability. _ As CIA director William Colby himself has ? said, the intelligence profession in the United States "must be. . . conducted on American principles and. . must be more open and.: responsive to our public than the intelligence . activities ohother nations." ? said. "But? subsequently, the director of the CIA sent a letter to either the attor- ? ..ney general or the deputy attorney general saying, "This is how it will work and 'we will do it this way ? the ;investigations ? unless we hear to the contrary." ; "AND !".:,0 FAR as we can 'determine," ha went on, "the letter went unanswer- ;ed. So that procedure went 1 of till January of this :year." He added: "So far as We ,know, no one was prose- cuted during that time." The Justice Department'', ."responded," the commis- sion said, that the agency should itself ? investigate "allegations affecting its operations" and "not refer ? the case to the Department . of Justi ce. " HAVELL, the Justice spokesman, gave a some- what different account. "We found out, about the agreement," he said; "in' December. of 1974," when CIA* Director William E. Colby "mentioned the agreement when he was over here conferring with people" in the wake of the exposures about the CIA in the New York Times. ? "The best we can deter- mine," he said, "was the CIA director or the general counsel (of the CIA) in 1954 met with the deputy attor- ree.y gsaetal (William P. -Rogers) and they discussed how to deal witn that sec- tion of Title 18" that re- quires the agency head to report crimes committed The CIA was created by the National Security Act of 1947. The act's statement of the CIA's powers and duties includes the following proviso after the list of powers: ? "Provided, that the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law en- forcement powers, or inter- nal security functions." Presumably, this is the language that led to the Rockefeller commission's by their employes to the conclusion that the secret attorney general. . agreement had "involved 7 CIA"ThiPratiOQPittleDtPt003T001a8m9y directly in for- ' ercie-o :nt me meeting, -. ne :bidden. law enfurcement al-. . tivities.", ..., ,nt Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 Kiii.irilaniGTOAT POST ?31/147, 1975 . ? 40/RE4 7/7) . - T3OR THE nr.sT TIME in 30, years.7 .L ti?Goneezess ia addressing itseifi ,to the cueetion of what role it can. or should play irt the secret intelli- geace operation of the Executive 'Branch. Up to now its oversight corn- ; raittee3 have either 'been passive recipi- ents of . CIA secrete and FBI progress'. reports or .avid investigators of pub- licized covert action operations. The nroble,zrz is' riotthe past tut the future_ It shoule: not be too much of !a challenge for he Special Commit- , 1 tees now at work to come up with ! satisfactory post-mortems regarding., ! the charges against the CIA. What will be difficult for the Senate and , 'House Inteiligerce Committees to , handle is the basic long-term issue: How far can a permanent commit- tee of the, Congress play a construc- tive future role in guiding, control- Jing or second-guessing the White ;House in running its secret business? , What can Congress do beyond control- , ling, the size and organization of the SS ccerenunity through ita appropriations power? What, price will the nation pay for congressional., ?intervention into America's secret in- telligence activities' . at home or abroad?.. ? The answers to these questions are , likely to be different for each cat& gory of secret operations with .which ,the Congress may wish to concern it- self. These cover a broad range?in the case of CIA alone from covert action (Paramilitary,, propaganda and polit- ' ical) to espionage and counter- espionage. Each type of 'operation ; varies in the degree of secrecy with which it is carried out and therefore the degree to which it can Or should evade oversight. At one end of the spectrum are such "noisy" paramili- ' tary actions as the Bay of Pigs or the . ,1"secret army" operation in Laos. At the other encLeare quiet intelligence operations?an American agent within a Moscow ministry or a KGB officer ? working for the CIA in a Soviet em- ? .bassy in Asia. In cases like these the -slightest hint, inside or outside the committee rooms of Congress, can de- stroy the operation. Another' pertinent element affect- ing the. question of congressional ac- cess' is .the fact that these three main tyPes of operations ? action, Intel- ligence and counterintelligence ? are, generated within the Executive in; tsharply different ways. 1 Covert political action operations like the anti-Allende program in Chile: are ? the most accessible to congres- sional scrutiny. action projects as- signed to the CIA are generated at the 'White House level and require a formal policy decision at the National Security Council level (the Forty Corn- Approved For , on ri aenet- " oly mittea).. Suet decisions are on the bureaucratic record. Tbat record may be hidden, but history -has shown that it is almost impossible for the ..A...mer- lean government to cart3r.ont- a large- scale secret action without 'that 2etiC12 being exposed by Co ngreA' u,r the press. _. _-_ ____-______.. ...,-__?_.;,.?_--...- ___ The Executive is unlikely to disregard this fact of life even if tempted to in- tervene secretly in the Persian Gulf or in the shaky.Eoethern tier of NATO. A. precise curb .on the Presideni.'s freedom in using his "third arm" to -achieve foreign policy aims has. re- -cently -been added by Congress in an amendment to the Foreign Aid Act. He must now inform Congress of any on-going -. non-intelligence operation -- .abkoad'?vhich he considers to be in t144afional interest. ',, ' Granted that this 'or any future presi- dent is unlikely to disregard -this re- quirement for lerge-scale actions, ordinary political action on a small scale is bound to, Jae-Lain within kas_ - discretion. . - Congress and the public tend to 1, equate political action with coups, cam- . ter-coups and secret funding of election ..___ . .. _.. . .._ _ " campaigns, but the day-to-day COre -Of ! 'secret political action, both for the CIA and the KGB, is the maintenance of confidential contacts with high-level 'a government officials, politicians, and i labor leaders around the globe. i' IThese persons may be straightforward intelligence agents supplying informa- tion, yet the simple fact that they are. 1 committing espionage for the U.S. gives, them a bias, in .favor of the , I American interest as they pursue their ; 7n-orinal political or governmeot Careers. But the principal so-called'agents of influence" are men who do not spy. for the CIA, but .who for personal t or - career reasons, and often without the, --payment of money, Will act to further American foreign policy aims in their country. They may he bankers, indus- trialists, media executives or senior military officers as well as politicians . and labor leaders of the right or the left The only requirement is that they! be in a position to exert personal in- fluence of 'one kind or another in their own societies. . .. . It is this ground-level of Politica/ action that cannot, and should notolte - open to name-by-name scrutiny by a congressional eommittee. It makes no : sense for an. oversight, committee to second-guess the State Department or the CIA, on -who shovIdeor should not. a be on the list of secret political con--I ' tarts, for it h;:a nothing to contribute i , in the way of expertise or political! 1 judgment., Here, at the agent level, I e, i the Congress cannot oversee the Execu- .tive's conduct any more than it can ; - By E.crey RfC 1A Blank Wall' . ? ? CONGRESS moves its overi, VV sight function from 'political; 'actio-n operations to sacret. intclIigenec ; work abroad, it faces similar, 'if not.; ' greater, limitations. .4-'..n1-1 here it musi. ? deal with the programs of three federal' agencies: the CIA, the Defense Intel-1 ; ligence Agency and the National Secur- ity Agency. ? . The requtrernents for foreign intel- ligence, both open and secret, are.: 'generated within the intelligence corn, yr:unity as a whole. The main priorities' are set by the White House .and the: Departments of State and Denmse directly or through the analysts within' the various intelligence staffs through- out the government. These information ;objectives come out of. the strategic' land' tactical concerns of the diplomatic! and Military policy-makers and reflect their needs. The only function of in- telligence is to serve those needs. Congreee ? is not :et,- incoPabfae! ;"everseeing" the seeret intelligence! 'operations of the CIA or the DIA de.' signed to satisfy these requirements; but it. can be argued that- secret for- eign intelligence operations are none, of Congress' business This is an axiom in the European democracies.. What Congress can do is to determine how , much money is to be spent on foreign intelligence collection?and not much :more. ? Thiaa does nett mean that Congress rcannot be .infarmecf about foreign' in- telligence collection. It can be briefed,, on the priority intelligence 'targets; on the kinds of information being sought by what means and ozi the year's per- formance vis-a-vis those targets by the CIA, DL4. and NSA. Yet these brief- ings will naturally reflect the Execu- tive's estimates of its own perfor- mance?and the Congress. is bound to . . accept this self-evaluation, for' It will have no basis for questioning these judgments'. Not-cran Congress ride herd on indi- vidual intelligence' operations, how- ever politically sensitive. It is up to the Exec:Wye to decide whether the recruitment of a high-level agent in Moscow will affect detente adversely, or whether the penetration of a friend- ly Foreign , Office is justified by the information' to be gathered weighed against possible embarrassment if the operation comes to light. Only in such-large-scale technical Intelligence Operations as the 1.1-2 and the Glomar Explorer affairs can Con- gress justifiably demand some degree of prior consent. It is conceivable that a standing committee might. send .a handful of investigators into the halls stipulate the open contacts maintained our TA0 rttl8Wel1lk15P77004311460CFMOTAIIMIDIA to ferret old RatV _ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00370008-9 lees expen'sive? intelligence operations. to which they cie their bosses =tight take exception, but the less in security tvould leti?dly? be repaid by any- im; provernents ?in the quality 'of intellio gcnce ecitection. - ? The same Wall faces Congress : in oiserseeing the collection of conn munications . intelligence by the. Na- tionat Security Aeency. The electronic monitoring of foreign civilian and mill- laity traffic and the cryptographic anal- ysis of foreign coded messages are - the sensitive sectors of an nation's Intelligence effort As an ultra-secret element of the Washington intelli- gence community, NSA cannetthe. ex- amined or monitcred from the outside' ? by Congress or by other elements of the ? Executive. ? Congress can impose-arbitrary limit.: , . . . on the NSA budget, the number of Its . overseas monitoring stations or the size of its Fort Meade headquarters, but it canitot judge NSit's efficiency or use- - fulness. It can, oi course:get an evalu- : ation of the NSA "product" by query- ing the "consumers," but that again will be an Executive 'judgment it can- not examine .critically... Maximum Security ? . rOUNTERINTELLIGENCE . opera- ? tions abroad are even More impen- etrable to oversight or control. They are, to start with, almost. completely self-generated, .for they normally arise out-of the actions of 'other intelligenee Services?a KGB officer cultivates the -society of an American Embassy clerk, or a local citizen walks into the Em- ? bassy to announce that he is a,Soviet agent and wants to work for the Amer-. leans. In short, a CIA station reacts AO events. Only in the rarer . cases of shaping a recruitment Attempt direct- ed at a presumably susceptible Soviet ior East European intelligence officer. does a station take the initiative. There is no policy level in Washing- ten at which a congressional commit- ? tee Can grapple with these operations, Nor can the Maximum security re- quired to conduct them against a vigi- lant hostile service be ? compromised without degrading or destroying, item. Once the need to knew is extended to Congress and counterintelligence files are .scanned for the names ef targets and agents, the counter effort becomes, a farce. ! The same restrictions apply. to, the counterintelligence work of the FBI. !against foreign intelligence operations Iwithin the U.S. Domestic counterintelligence work against American citizens is, forth- nately, much mere easily, controlled: ? , by tile Congress. The political intelli- genie targets"of the FBI are generated i by instructions from FBI headquarters i to its field offices. Whether or not any! FBI counterintelligence peagrata ex- ceeds the proper limits of the policies: laid down by the Department of Jess' tics, or the Attorney General is: ex-. eeeding his legal authority, can be - determined by an examination of those instructions. . ? ? - ? '?-. Congress, as- a whole also has the authorityto define what erganiziitione in-American society are a threat to the nation's. internal security. It can re- strict, or blot out, any list of "subver- sive" organizations.... ft ? can bar the sur.veillance-ni any American not erie ended in susriect-crintiretle actMt It; can '''restrict within exceedingly pre...! 'else limits the right of any federal agency to; tap a telephone or examinei : a bank account. ?.? A Frail Instrument oriONGRESS MAY AND hopefully intwill take whatever legislative-or:LC-- thins it can, but tightening the. laws not remove public concerns about- ."domestifs, spying." The people and: the press are on jealous guard against. our overzealous guardians, be they the FBI or the CIA, in the police or the Pentagon. The search for- illegal? ? euzveillance, wire-tapping, . room:butte:, break-ins and improper files has. . :lately become almost daily preoccu- pation of the press and the President land the Congress have responded with ; vigor to the public's demand for the :facts?but again these are, facts of the past I'. What can. a standing oversight come reitteedo tck Prnt futurecal*4a,cds;', ? The question is not one. Of .the lat-e ; or agency directives, but of the con- . duct of persons . or units. in. the federal -government who wilfully or ignorantly violate the law or exCeed the Waits of their bureaucratic chant ters. Can a committee reach into the more, secret recesses of the, White' House or the federal security'bureaus ? cracy to detect in, advance and fore- stall illegal actions against American 1 citizens? ?-? :: ? Congress is -a frail instrument to rely : upon. for this demanding task. Thenere : erations of the White House plumbers, the Pentagon's wholesale. compilation of dossiers of American civilians, the FBI's ? extensive program of investigasi tion and harassment of American dissi-i -- _dents, the. CIA's. participation Ini - several. incidents of. domestic surveil-1 lance?all eluded.the,attention of Cern! gress while. they were- going on -Ant oversight .committee tan. review over-I . all expenditures, scan policy instruc- tions and put -searching,. questions to . senior ? officials. It .cannot detect fractions of policy or law -by errant: federal officials in Los' Angeles, New ! -York, or Washington. . A New Overseer ? ' ? rpHEItE 1S A ?praetical solution,. one.' 'which is coming into xogue t other sectors of our society. It is to approaciethe pro.blein frorr. _ .-up rather than from the top down. !, A counterintelligence ombudemani. is Washington could well serve aetthe! evezseer of our guardiSais. He. ehouldi : Lea man of cha.zacter and experience., widl-lziovr.7, figure-with an estzhlisheel. reoi:tation--semeone IE, Pio f. SDiAlUti DaE31 or. Watergate arrc. Re would xe, quire only a. small staff of invostiga- tcws and A well-publicize.d address and telepborke number.- . The crr.buclsman, or his staff,: would no available to any federal employek in the .White House ox-ha any. intelli- gence or Investigative agenny who has reason to suppose that he, tis ly)ss or his zgenry are carrying oat actic; that are improper or illegal. ?i? ? Thia--syotera .would permit a.: lov;iy" clerk or a presidential appointee, dis- creetly and without throat of'reicribik. .tion, to blow the whistle on what of- fends sense of -legality. He, can make his complaint in the full confi- denca that he will be taken seriously. and his charges investigated. ? ,. The ombudsman offers the same op- portunity to any- American citizen: whose rights tire violated by" a federal - intelligence agency. The improper tar- gets of , domestic investigation or 'ha- rassment have a right to be heard, and at no cost to them.' Crank complaints are inevitable, but a bright investigator' can winnow these out without wasting time. , ? An ombudsman this could tecriz under the authority OF the Senate? Judiciary Committee or of A !Joint, Committee on Intelligence-;--ii one were to be set up: ?? ? ? Why 'an ombudsman?and lieta'con- gressional. committee? . Both the man in a classified' job' and the put-upon citizen, are much more likely to trust a known individual than an anonymous committee of part-time metrpers. Leaks to the press generally are not addressed to the Management of 'a newspaper, but to a known jour- nalist of proven discretion. The com- plainants will also knoei their Charges will not be caught up in the maelstrom .of politics and publicity-prone legisla- tors, for an . apolitical ombudsman? and only such a person?can act with- out regard for what party occupies the White House or runs the committee. The current politicking regarding "domestic spying" is too conspicuoue ? to, be missed by anyone. - e Obviously, the problem 'does not lend itself easily to foolproof'sclutioni, there -frequently being a basic contra- diction between .the nation's need to 'act secretly and the' public's need to rnow. But if internal security matters. are. to bekept out of politics and yet properly policed, a neutral cmhudsman may well be the best mechanism. It is ani experiment worth trying, and Congress can make the experiment at little expense or risk. 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 _ 74, , Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 (INTE.PITATIONAL -=11..T.1 ON ) 2 J-Li:74E 1975 g t\sr PinP- -,Elet re Is t.! Foe :;s5 years, Da.Vid Atlee Phillips -served as a CIA agent in more than half a dozen Latin American nations. When he resigned three weeks ago to form a group called the Association of Retired intelli- g. ence Officers, Phillips, 52, was chief of the CIA's Latin American operations, a -post he occupied at the time the Allende government was overthrown in Chile.. Last week, Phillips discussed the CIA's pant roles and present troubles with NEy.'SWEEK'S Andrew Nagorski. Below, thhalr eneneesa.tsion: ....... ? =GORSKI: Your new organization is rather unique. What is its purpose? PHILLIPS: Right now the CIA is at the center of a great controversy. There's no question that we have a public-relations problem of some magnitude. That can't be handled from within. The institution ? is not geared for it. And so I decided to try and do it from. outside. O. Cinen the past record of CIA covert financing, how can anybody be sure that your organization isn't a CIA front? A. No one can "be absolutely sure excent for William Colby [the director of the rill.; and me and my wife. But chasm the intense scrutiny that we're under now in Congress, it's inconceivable for anyone to think .that Mr. Colby and I would try to fool Congress. ?0. The CIA spent millions of dollars to :."destabilize- Chile. Doesn't that make the U.S. at least indirectly responsible for the coup and the murder of Allende? A. Any involvement, you must say truthfully, has some effect. But the CIA was not behind the strikes that led to the " coup that toppled Allende and was not in contact with the coup plotters. . Q. What, then, was the CIA role in Chile? A. It was in a way the same sort of thing that happened in Western Europe after the war. NVe were preserving certain democratic -sectors. It was keeping some people who looked like they were about., to go down in the very bad situation that was going on in Chile in a position to be able to stay in business until the elec- tions. I don't want to go beyond that. Ch But isn't that a brush-off? A. Not at all. I'm simply saying that when I went to work for the U.S. Govern- ? ment as an intelligence officer I signed a secrecy agreement that I must honor. 0. Did the CIA have prior knowledge of the coup? A. Yes, Weird. ? Q. And did it do ani.,,thing to notify Allende? A. On many occasions over a periocl,of months we heard that there was going to be a coup or there wasn't going to be one. So the question never arose as to wheth- er we were going to adyise him. 0. On what ground can the blatant interference in domestic affairs that the CIA seemed to be involved in in Chile be justified by a country that claims to represent democracy? A.I was an intelligence operator and a professional and I was not involved in policymaking. So I'm not the man to ask those questions. C. ut after 25 years in the agency you , presently alive and living :n Ielawsna. 0. Was there any link between the assassination attempts. on Castro and the assassination of Kennedy? A. To my knowledge, no, and I'm convinced that I'm right The reason is that when Lee Harvey Oswald went to Mexico during that famous trip, my-job was to know what was going on in and around the Cuban Embassy, and I am convinced that he was reburied by the Cubans and went back to Dallas alone. He also approached the Soviets and I think they both thought he was a rather strange man and sent him on his way. 0. What do you see as the effect of the current investigations of the CIA? Photos by Robert IL McElroy?Newsweek Phillips: 'The CIA right now is the most open intelligence agency in the world' really have no feelings one way or another? . A. Yes, I don But I just retired so anything that I might come up with right now would not really be objective. I will only tell you this: I am absolutely con- vinced that at this time major covert actions are not necessary or justified in Latin America. That's the reason why, during my tenure of the last two years, the few things that were going on were quickly terminated. . ? . 0. How many times did the CM attempt to assassinate Castro? h A. Oh, no! As I said before, I have a secrecy agreement. 0. But will you agree that the CIA has been invoked in assassination attempts -on foreign leaders? A. In 25 years, many of them spent Working . with Cuban matters, I have never known of anyone within the agen- cy planning or discussing assassination ofa foreign leader?never. But there's no question that there's something there ? that I didn't know about. The one thing .1* do know for sure is that Fidel Castro is . ? A. I see them as positive. I have no philosophical problems at all with the idea that we should be so thoroughly investigated. In this country now, given the wavy things are after Watergate, there is nothing less that will do. ? 0.1s there a danger of the CIA becom- ing too open an institution? . ? A. Yes, but there is no other way. The -CIA right now is the most open intelli- gence agency in the world. ? ? 0. Some people suggest that the U.S. would-be better off without a CIA. . A. That's just beyond my comprehen- sion. I've found in 25 years that the world is still a pretty difficult place and there are certain jobs to be clone. In the area that I know about, in Latin America, it's also true that we have the duty to know what other people are doing. Over the last five years more than SO Soviets have been expelled from ten Latin American countries. We have the responsibility of knowing what they're up to. Incidental- ly. in that last five years not one CIA officer has been expelled from Latin America, despite all the headlines. ? 29 Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 e. ? K7.7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 LONDON TIMES ?S June 1975 ? .Newspaper lawyers and journalists attempt to persuade senators to redraft stringent new i legislaton governing ,? ;. . ? y; American press bargains to preserve I4:t(s sekvom F.t?OM Fred Emery Washington, June 4 News organizations in the United States are we ing to have deleted a part of a pro- posed law that is tantamount to an cfficial secrets act. Lawyers for several lerge newspapers -as well as members of a reporters' committee are having a meeting today with staff members of at least three : liberal senators. , The newspaper representa- tives find unacceptable sections , of the Act relating to espionage ; and the theft of Government Isecrets. ? The leading .senator involved i in the talks s Senator Birch Bayh, one of the co-sponsors of ; the new criminal code drafted i under Senator John McClellan, chairman of the judiciary sub- . conarnittee on criminal laws It is now. being said that Mr Bayh sponsored the code only on the understanding that he could have his amendments accepted later. Civil libertarians who object to other provisions of the pro- posed code such as a return to capital punishment, had been counting on the "First Amend- ment Mafia" as press defenders are called, to sabotage the Bill. . Reports of the press "doing - a "deal" to achieve new laws that it can live with, are taus- ing rapid rethinking. What the House of Representatives might do with its companion Bill is another matter. , The whole issue is?a.n explo- sive one. Any attempt to re- strict the public's right to know can, in the end, be counted on to raise a howl. The howl is, of course, not universal. The recent refusal by the Supreme Court to allow Mr Victor Marchetti to break his contract ?with the ? Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA) and pub- .lish all the facts he wants to, has not been taken -up as a cru- sade. . ? - ? A more fascinating constitu- tional point is that Mr John Marks, his co-author of the book The Cult of Intelligence, .has been similarly gagged. The Supreme Court justices' 'think- ing on the matter has not been revealed, but it is apparent that Mr Marks, who had . no contract with the CIA, saw his First Amendment freedoms "tainted" by association with Mr Marchetti. But what is being opposed in the. proposed new law affects everyday news. If its ROLLING' ,STONE 19 JUNE 1975 CAPITOL CHATTER ? , ? We may have given up our embassy in Cambodia but we haven't relinquished our prop- aganda options. Early last month a new radio station, calling itself the Voice of the Future Nation and claiming to represent the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Communists), suddenly began broadcasting in Cambodian from a candies-. tine site. It was not, however, on the frequency which the. Khmer Rouge revolutionaries used for their broadcasts in the past. One of its first news reports: that several of the 'traitors" of the Lou Nol regime, includ- ing former Premier Long Bo- set and General Lon Non, younger brother of the former president, had been beheaded. Sounded reasonable enough but Le Monde correspondent Patrice de Beer saw both Lon Non and Long Boret laughing and chatting with soldiers at the Ministry of Information in I'hnom Penh alier their al- leged execution. Someone was apparently in a hurry to get the word out that the former Phnom Penh government leaders had been executed, even if it wasn't true. Longtime observers of Amer- lean involvement in Indochina believe this is the latest in a long line of "black" (covert) radio stations operated by the CIA in Indochina. Historical- ly, these "black" broadcasts have been used to make revo- lutionaries seem more extreme than they actually were, by go- ing well to the left of the ac- tual content of Communist broadcasts. Meanwhile, ex-CIA agent Victor Marchetti, (coauthor of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence) is warning' that the upcoming CIA investiga- tion by Congress is going to *force the agency to turn its employees into public rela- tions agents. Marchetti warned that the agency will mount a massive publicity campaign; including tested measures of "disinformation" to confuse and discredit CIA opponents. ? . "It's now or never for us ' and the CIA," Marchetti cau- tioned. "If Congress does not conduct a thorough investiga- tion and place sonic vety tight ? controls on the CIA, we aren't ; ever going to get another chance." *** One of the CIA's newest lines ? 8. *isiIttc-t hiittitm 7fOrlD8 9 provisions were to be taken literally-, it is doubtful whether those who reported the CIA's recovery of the Soviet sub- marine or the alleged CIA planning of assassinations of foreign leaders could , have escaped prosecution. It might have been risky, too, to report explanations of the Pentagon Budget, unless officially authorized. Congressional sources pleaded that they were not trying to " get " at the press, only those who leaked information. The receipt of a leaked secret by a newcpaperrnan was ea being made an offence.. This eliminated the notion of "stolen" goods, which is, in any case, strenuously argued here as the United States Government possesses .no copy-- right. However, a newspaperman's subsequent communication of a leaked secret?showing it to his editor, for example?even without its being published. would have become a crime. There were to have been two offences: of "disclosing" and " mishandling " what for the first time is being re t'efined as "national defence informa- tion ". The law would have LO1VDON TIMES 27 May 1975 ' applied to ? all who had ? eve been "in authorized poss sion " ? and the unauthorize would have been guilty if the refused promptly to return th information (if-in the form of document) to those empowere to reclaim it. The definition of "tiationa defence information" alarrae the ,reporters' ? committee. / included "military capability o the United States or of a associate nation . . . milita planning , weapons develop :tient . . intelligence opera times, activities, plans, estimates analyses . . . and intelligenc with regard to a f oreie pcwer ". Another offence proposed i the Bill was simply: that of " dis closing classified Information In essence, it would hay punished the leaker, not th recipient, who is ? 'express' exempted. Most people, even ? thos working for the press, agre that espionage laws shoul have bite. But Senatot t? McClellan's drafters, trying ensure that there will not be re-play by budding Danie Ellshergso evidently went tot far. negations of CIA ey for Europe cause genie By a? Staff Reporter r. Mr David Steel, Liberal MP, Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peeleles, , and vice-president of Britain in Europe, has dismissed allega- tions that ? pro-European youth 'organizations had received fin; .ancial backing from the Ameri- can Central Intelligence' Agency as "a sigh of the sheer despera- tion in the anti-Market cam- .paign . . Referring to allegations by Mr Richard Body, Conservative -Ml' for Holland with Boston, Mr Steel: said at a youth press_ conference in London yesterday that Mr Body had "latched on to 20-year-old- allegations about CIA finance of European youth campaigns-" and tried to .relate thent to the present referendum campaign. Mr Steel added: ? Tin Britain in Europe organiza- tion was founded only a few months ago. We shall be publish- ? ing our finances in full, as we are obliged-to under the Referendum ' Act, and it will be seen that not one penny of -our income has derived from CIA sources.. Of' business is selling tickets for rock concerts. Employees at the CA's Langley, Virginia, headquarters-can take advan- tage of one of Washington's unique fringe benefits by buy- ing their tickets at a top-secret rity Agency's Civilian?Welfare Ticketron outlet administered Fund at the NSA's Fort by the CIA's. Employee Achy- George Meade, Maryland, of- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 Mr Body has been picking up ye ancient political fag ends whi therefore taste very nasty. MG of the people on the platform th morning were toddlers at the tir. these reports refer to, so even every one of the far-fetched asse tions were true they are total irrelevant to our " Yes " ca paign. Similar allegations about Cl finance 'fer pro-EEC you movements were made In t .current issue of Time Out. The Britain in Europe can phign' claims that most o organized youth wish to stay i Europe, and there were eigh representatives of youth mov ments on the Press conferenc platform. They included M Tony Kerpel, national chairma of the Young Conservatives Mr David Cockroft, organizin secretary of the Young Euro pean Left; Mr Simon Ilebditch the international vice-rhairma of the Young Liberals; and h Colin Maltby, chairman of the Federation of Conservativ Students. mum about the -whole matter ?an internal memo gives in- structions that there is to be "no publicity" about the CIA outlet or a similar one admin- istered by the National Seco- - 30 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 NEW YORK TIMES .11 June 1975 Report:.?triam 4? t ',:LYCLI'TONDANEL iisses to Thr Nyv York TIons VshaSIIDiGTON, June 10?For 'nearly six. months this town hss been hung upon one word ? relating to the domestic activi- ties of the Central Intelligence ?igeney. The word is "massive.? ? ?, If the Rockefel- ?,ete ? ler . commission, :a ? ?' which investigated ? Analysis the C.I.A.'s domes.; ? - tic operations, did ant e , nothing else in its ? ? report, Which was released to- day, it should hayedisposed of that hang-up. Nowhere in its report did. the ,coscsnission use the term mas- ? sive, either, in confirmation or 'denial, although that word was the one used in the original newspaper report of illegal do- mestic activities, which led di- rectly to the establishment of the commission. - t That first report, written by Seymour M. Hersh, appeared In The New Yeti: Times. ham E. Colby, Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, responded di- rectly to it in his -appearance . !before . the Senate ApPropria- tions subcommittee on intel- rlfgenc.e the .following January i? deny," he -said: "the charge in The New York Tithes of Dec. 22, 1974, that 'the Cen- tral Intelligeece Agency, direct-, . violating- its charter,. .con-1 ducted massive illegal domestic operations. . . " r.Vice president -Rockefeller, hhairmana Of the Presidential commission, and his vice chair- hien, Douglas C. .Dillon,. both followed the Colby line in sub- :sequent comments on their 'in- vestigation of the C.I.A. They ;.said they cou; i not accept the !word massive. roNo piroseeutions Recalled ?? - ,,During that time, the report said, there was an agreement between the Justice Depart- ment and the C.I.A. "providing that the agency was to investi- gate crimes by C.I.A. employes of agents which involved Government money or property or might involve operational ,security." It was left to the C.I.A. to decide whether any :of its employes should be prosecuted for such offenses. g. One man who has known 'the C.I.A. for most of its 28 ' years could not recall today - a. aSSlV e a single peoserention against a C.I.A. agent?a remarkable re- cord for an organization with 15,003 or more employes. ? Yet, the report by the Rocke- feller Commission contained many examples of clearly ille- gal actions by the agency. In one case, a foreign defector was "held in solitary confine- ment under Spartan living con- ditions" for three years. That 'would be a clear violation of the rights of habeas corpus land due process, which apply to, aliens as .well as citizens in the United States. - As for murden?that is, as- sassination plots ? against foreign leaders, with which the agency has been charged?the Rockefeller commission said nothing. It undertook an inqui- ry because of the public furor, "but time id not permit a full Investigation," its report said, and ? its evidence was simply turned over to President Ford, who intends in turn to give it to the Department of Justice and to congressional 'com- mittees. the President had raised the issue 'initially. On. Thursday, Jan. 16, he gave a lunch at the White House for-group that had entertained him previously, as Vice President, at lunch in New York the group included the publishersof The New York Times. Arthur Ocns Sulzberger, and the ? newspaper's principal editors. ? On that occasion in January, so far as one can recall; 'the President for the first time used the word "assassinations" in a discussion with newsmen on the activities of the C.I.A. The President's manner was grave, his tone was hushed. . . Exactly what he said, al- though it was of the gravest import, was never reported. That part Of the conversation was off the record, and, after an unsuccessful effort to have it put on the record, The New York Times respected the Pres- ident's confidence. But the substance of his re- marks began to leak out, and in six weeks they were being heard on the CBS Television Evening News and elsewhere. Various sources reported that the President had made these points. gine C.I.A. as an institution was needed to protect the se. Stetes and abet:Id not be de- sire:x.1 47For ,that rea.soe, he had picked- e. commission te investi- gate charges against the CIA. that could be relied upon to understand ari. respect, the agency's national defense role. lgThe charges against the C.I.A. were that it had illegally engaged in activities against Americans inside the United States, in violation of its char- ter from Congress. The Rocke- feller commission was therefore limited to investigating the agency's domestic activities. If the commission should wander into the foreign field, it would stumble upon all kinds of activities, including assassin- ations?and it was then and only then that the trigger word was used.. There was no discussion, ho elaboration. ciThere was nothing to he gained by opening the Pando- ra's box of assassinations. It would only lead to futile recri- minations. Well-meaning people in the past had ordered activities that seemed right and proper at the time, but might seem' wrong and improper in the light of new circumstances. The new generation should not pass judgment on the old. nl'hose were the themes of President Ford's concerti . in January, after he had read the charges against the C.I.A. and had a briefing 'on them from William -Es Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, a briefing that included some informationi on assassinations. Expression of Confidence Those were the Seine themes sounded last night at the Pres- ident's news conference in the White House Rose Garden. There he announced his inten- tion to release the Rockefeller commission's report on the C.I.A.s domestic activities and to send the commission's infor- mation on assassinations to the Justice Department and to the Congressional committees vestigating the intelligence community. Mr. Ford said, "It remains my deepest conviction that the C.I.A. and other units of the intelligence community are vi- tal to the survival of this cout- curity interests of the United nntry." Liesore;e7g -17ds...--Tc7rif?id.7?"-Ence, in the Rotkefelier ccrawksiszt members, he responded to a question about whether Viche President Rockefeller had . em- ? barrassed him- in conducting the investigation by saying, "The Vice President and I un- derstoo-d each other perfectly." Again and again he empha- ? sized, by using the word "domestic", that the corn:7ns.. sion was supposed to investi- gate only the activities of the C.I.A. inside the United States. He even absolved the corn-. mission of the charges against the agency by, saying that he - himself had "suggested that- the commission undertake an' investigation of any domestic involvement in . political assase sinations." . . ? President Ford did nht ex- plain, nor was he ask0 to, explain, the nuance involved, in the use of the term "domes- tic" involvement. Presumably, he was thinking of the recruit- ment of rnafia gunmen or other hirelings in this country to commit assassinations abroad. The President was particular- ly emphatic in his disinclination. to pass judgment on the acts of his predecessors. . - "I think historians will make those judgments better than. anybody in i975, including.; muself," ? Mr. Ford said. For that reason he cautioned the. House and Senate committees* that would receive the assassin-, ation evidence "to use the ut- most prudence in how they handle the material." In particular, President Ford was as pains to disavow any intention of 'discrediting the possible candidacy .of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat Massachusetts, for the Pres- idency by casting reflections on his brother, the late Pres- ident Kennedy, whose role in alleged plots against Cuban' Premier Fidel Castro has been. publicly discussed lately. In brief, for six months Pres- ident Ford has not changed his tune. He has been nothing. if not consistent. As consistent and loyal as he may have been, however, the case against the C.I.A. is now out of his hands and Mr. Rockefeller's; it may be in har- sher hands than theirs. WASHINGTON POST (PARADt) 1 JUNE 1975 the former .CIA member whose book, ..."Insidet7ne Company?aCIA Diary," has proved so. troublesome to the agency, has been lactUri=F in England on his CIA ? ? experiences. Agee's book, published. abroad but not in this country, reveals names and places, mostly in Latin SPY America where he worked for the intelligence ser-: vice. His literary revela- tions in the form of a diary have caused the CIA a good deal of anguish and anger. CIA chief William Colby is determined to -prevent Agee's book frem being published in the U.S. It is available, how- ever, in Canada and Eng- land, and except to those Of the intelligence com- munity, It is mostly dull. ? Last April. Agee lectured at the London School of - Economics, as the adver- tisement below announces.- 'ANNOUNCEMENTS - ? . P111'1.;14' -: ? Author of I'Nsinr, - THE COMi'A.NY ? ? ?a CIA diary.. ? Will speak at - the old theatre ? London School of Econotplcs.-'1 ? lioughton St.. Aldwych. W.C,2, , FRIDAY.. Aor11 18. 7-30 p.n. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 rar24Em . 9 JUNE .1975 ' [De!eted ? Because U.S. statutes designed to pre- vent the disclosure of state secrets are - deemed too vague, such sensitive Feder- ? al f.1 :lei es as the departnients of State mar Defense arid the Cent-al Intelli- gem) Agency have keg written their ' owe rales. They require employees- to. sign agreements that they will not di- ? yuige classified information they may learn about in the Cc urse of their work. For many years there was no protest to this arrangement But then three years ago, a onetime CIA administrator named Victor Marchetti challenged both the .system and the specific agreement he nimself had signed as a condition cf his employment. Marchetti is the co-author of a hook titled "The CIA and the Cult of . intelligence." He contended that the agreement he signed violated the First ; Amendment by abridging his rights to ! speak or publish. Last week the Supreme Court indicated thet the government's power to e:efeace Marchetti's agreement may be constitutionally valid. In fourteen years with the CIA. Mar- chetti rase to become exeev tive assistant to the deputy director?and was privy to , a, great deal of classified information. When he decided to publish his book in, the Spring of 1972, the CIA cited the , secrecy agreement and won a Federal- court injunction requiring Marchetti to 7 submit his manuscript for censorship. The CIA deleted 339 passages. then . agreed to trim the total to 168. But Marchetti, collaborator John D. Marks . and publiSher Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., . went back to court_ and won tne right to , restore all but '26 of the excisions. ! On appeal, Judge Clement F. Hayns-1 worth of the Fourth Circuit restored the deletions to the 1C3 desired by the CIA. He found that Marchetti had "effectively relinquished" his First Amendment !. rights "by his execution of the secrecy agreement and hit entry into the confi- dential relationship." ?? At that point last summer, Marchetti's book was pub- lished?with blank spaces where the deleted material would have appeared. ' But Marchetti wants to write more and his lawyers next appealed to the Su- preme Court. They argued that Marchet- ti's case marks "the first case in the nation's history" in which an author "is perpetually required ... to submit his books and articles ... for censorship.' Test: But the High Court decided to let the Haynsworth decision stand, possibly because the Marchetti case is now sched- uled to be heard again in the district court to determine if the newly amended Freedom of Information Act forces:relax:- atien of the classification rules. Mar- chetti may not be the only potential litigant. A book by former CIA agent Philip Agee has already appeared in England. where the agency cannot reach him legally. If it is published in the U.S., yet another test of the government's right to forbid disclosure of classified material may be on the docket ? --Jou:ow IC FOOTUCKvirth DIANE C.AMPER tn Washington ? CPELCAGG 11 juNE Jerall terHorst TO IvAsizINGT0N?The unsuccessful plot to oust Rep: Lucien Nodal ID., Mich.l as chairman of the. Select Committee on Intelligence has little to do. with the charge that he is a CIA patsy but very ; much to do with a power play by a few - Democrats with political and ideological ? motives. One certain result is that the House panel, already months behind schedule because of .backstage bickering, now stands to lose whatever credibility still remains for its inquiry. Convinced over the.weekerid that they would lose badly, the insurgents corn, premised. Nedzi will name a subcom- mittee to deal with the CIA. aspects of the probe. The cover story for the power grab is that Nadel, in his regular capacity head of the Armed Services subcom- mittee on 'intelligence, .learned about CIA involvement in assassination plans - and domestic surveillance more than a year ago and did not immediately "go : public" with his knowledge or call for a full-scale congressional inquiry. BY SITTING on that information. say hi:. Democratic accusers, he has a -conflict of interests" in his special capacity now as chairman of the Select Committee that the House set up in January to look into unauthorized proj- ects of the CIA, FBI, IRS. and other., intelligence-gathering agencies. What's really at stake, however, is something else. It is indicative of the fact that if it hadn't been for this ex- cuse, the oust-Nedzi band would have found another reason to further -their own interests on the panel. Rep. Robert -Giaimo ED., Conni? a ringleader of the cabal, is in line to be chairman if Nedzi leaves via resigna- tion: or House vote. Rated one of the . most effective, if unpredictably anti-es- tablishment New England lawmakers. Giaime has more seniority than NedZi. He was disappointed, when gpeake:r Carl Albert did not hand him the gavel. THE WASHINGTON POST 10 JUNE 1975 By Jack Andersen . and Les Whitton I ? Church for President ? Sup-i .porters of Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) are frustrated over hisl refusal to enter his name in the; presidential sweepstakea, He; has forbidden them from seek- ing the Democratic presidential; :nomination in his behalf as long ?.as he is running the Senate in- vcstigation of the CIA and FBI. ? i Church has told them firmly ithat he doesn't want to mix pres- sai4 lie woult1 quit. if Nedzi - stays -on, but flow tie wii rcroztin.. The ether theec pushieg, for Nodal ware Represeatatives James V. Stanton lOhlol and two ultra-liborals and. long-tirne allies of the" Nlichigaa Democrat?Michael Harrineton 1.1\laas.1 and Ronald Dellums What gotten Nedal ;inta trout:114i, ; apparently, is his reicsal to allow the ; committee's inquiry to turn into a epee- tacular veadetta against the nation's : intelligence-gathering agencies. What, ria'nes the CIA patsy . charge against islz,(3?,i so transparent is that it is not a new revelation 17,y any means. As far back as last December, CIA Director William Colby had testified ; publicly before the Senate Armed Serv- lees Committee that Nedzi was among the regular group of CIA :overseers. to whom information on past activities had been provided. That was all on the record at the time that Albert designat- ed Nedzi :as chairman, and the. House voted its approval in January. By raiz- ing it now, the dump-Nedzi group clear- ly shows its ulterior motives. INDEF.!), WHEN Oa, etarlr-Nedzi : group move?: inie the open last week, "Nedzi already had placed on the agen- da, two weeks from now, a full airing of alleged CIA involvement in assassi- nation plots. Nedzi was prepared, to tell the panel what he had been told and ? also to let them. quiz Colby directly. His position is that as a CIA overseer Lit was his duty to make sure that ha- proper activities no longer were going an,- and to consider safeguards against any rectrrence?not merely to conduct splashy hearings -into long past histo- ry." . What's at stake now, however, goes ! beyond Nedzi's personal integrity or that of his accusers. The integrity of the committee's eventual findings has now - been irreparably damaged. Mversal Pros UnclicaIII idential politics in any way with the investigation. Yet he contin- ues to stir enthusiasm for his candidacy in the attitudes he expresses toward government In condemning CTA assissinaa tion plots, for example, he de- clared strongly: "The notion ,that we must mimic the Commu- nists and abandon our princi- ples (is) ... an abomination." ? Then he added enaphatlearly:1 "Ours is not a wicked country, and we cannot abide a wickedj government." ? ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ClgRDP77-00432R000100370008-9 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD1577-00432R00a100370008-9 ', (7, ru..rrtz? t' ? ? ? hold-inn the 350-pane doe- tiraent aioft for reporters to :.;ef!, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller last week ? prepare.f. to deliver to the White Housc Es correnaission's report on the alleged fanpreeeriatiee and machinations of the CIA. "We've done a good job, I think," . said Reciesfeller. "There's been no stone untamed, there's no punches pulled." Then the Vice President gave a brief; synopsis of the report on the agency, ? which his eight-man panel had been preparing for the past five months: "There nee things that have been done that are he contradiction to the statutes, but hi cee-aparieon to the total ECM] ef- fort., they are not major." That tantalizing glimpse of the ea- gerly awaited report's contents was all - that was vouchsafed the public. Ac- cepting the volume four days later, Pres- ident ?Jerald Ford took the report home for what he cailed a "long weekend's reading.- Later, White House sources indicated that Ford would probably mike the report public this week. Domestic Spying. Initially, Rocke- feller and his panel were commissioned by Ford to look into allegations about domestic spying--made principally by New York Times Reporter Seymour xlerch?that the CIA had conducted a , massive domestic intelligence operation in the U.S. during the late '60s and ear- ly '70s against antiwar activists and dis- sidents. If so. this was seemingly a vi- olation of the agency's charter that banned -internal security functions." But as Rockefeller's investigation went on, other stories appeared in the press linking the CIA to assassination . 'plots against Cuba's Fidel Castro, the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo (killed May 30, 1961) and Viet Nam's Ngo Dinh Diem (shot to death Nov. 2, 1963). In March Ford directed Rocke- feller to investigate such charges. The Rockefeller Commission also looked into the recurring speculation that Castro had tried to gain revenge for the CIA's attempts on his life by us- ing Lee Harvey Oswald to kill John F. ? Kennedy. Like the Warren Commis-... sion, the Rockefeller group concluded that there was no credible indication of any such conspiracy behind Kennedy's death and Oswald acted alone. The document delivered last week by Rockefeller contained nothing about any assassinations of foreign leaders. In explanation, Rockefeller said that his coeunission did not have eneegh time to look into the allegations thoroughly. Said the Vice President: -We didn't feel we could come to a conclusion on par- , tie! information." ? As explained by Presidential Coun- sel Philip :Buchan, the White House li- aison with the commission, the mem- bees found that the study of the assassinations "wan almost a bottomless subject. If they v,ere to go into the whole thing, it would have taken more . time and resources than they had." The group could have asked for an exten- sion and a larger staff, but the mem- bers clearly had no stomach for dig- ging deeper into those affairs of the CIA. On Monday afternoon, four days before the report was delivered, the com- mission voted unanimously not to in- clude any material on the foreign as- sassinations. However, the White House has opted to hand over the commis- sion's tentative research on the subject to the Senate's special eleven-man com- mittee, ? chaired by Senator Frank Church, that is vigorously probing all U.S. intelligence activities. Misused Powers, As for the CIA's domestic transgressions, the commission reportedly absolved the agency of much blame, noting that Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon drove the CIA to overstep its bounds. Johnson had ? ohsve belief that foreign money and influence must have bean behind the students' revolt and the antiwar movement. Nixon also prodded the CIA to misuse its powers and spy on dissent- ers. The commission called for tighter controls on White House ?access to ;he agency and tighter congressional over sight of its operations. Just how poorly Congress has been performing its ,task of monitoring the CIA- came to light last week in an in- cident involving Democratic Congress- man Lucien Nedzi, the chairman of one House committee that supposedly watches over the CIA. The New York Times reported that Nedzi had been briefed more than a year ago by the agency about its involvement in assas- sination plans and domestic espionage and he had done 'nothing whatsoever about the matter. Particularly. Nedii did not mention it when he was made chair- man of the special committee created by the House in February to investigate charges that the CIA had violated its stat- utes?.a seeming conflict of interest. When Nedzi did not deny that he had known about the CIA's shadowy ac- tivities ail along, five of his six Dem- ocratic colleagues on the investigating committee hotly called for his resigna- tion as chairman. If Nedzi does not go quietly this week, his fellow Democrats on the committee made it plain that if The Momo Cain Connection and The story of the CIA's efforts to en- mission: kill Castro. For help, Giancana list Mafia aid in assassinateag Cuba's Fidel Castro continues to unfold. In 1960, during the waning months of Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, TIME has learned that the agency went to ; Momo Salvatore ("Sam") Giancana, a high-ranking Mafia don who ruled Chi- cago's gangland with a bloody hand. The Approved F9i Reit4sP1011410t9081:trA3R1312717110:0432RODOW037 _ turned to one of the most nimble an conniving figures in the Mafia: Richard Cain, who had been the Mafia's agent in the enemy camp: a detective on Chi- cago's police force. Among his other accomplishments, Cain spoke Spanish fluently. With the consent of the CIA, intelligence sources f?'? - V.4 C:47 41, ? E. neceesary, they would force el-lot:se vote to get him cut. With ;.s.:tadzi's committee inca.pc', tated and the Paeckefellet? Commission's report handed in., the job of puersuizg the investigation of the a2aa was left in. the hands of the Senate c.:(1remkte,--, T Tr, der Church, a liberal Democrat from Idaho who may run foe his oartre oomination in 1076, the coot- mittee has been zealously holding pri- vate hearings since May 15. After the Rockefeller Commission handed in its report, Church accused it of ducking the assassination isstre. As to the Vice Pres- ident's claim that the CIA was not guilty of "major" nor, Church norjiy dared: "I don't regard murder plots as a`minor' matter." Church has bard evidence for his harsh statement. During his three ap- pearances before the Senate committee ?more than ten hours at the witness , table?CIA Director William. Colby said, according to intelligence sources, that 'the agency had worked with Chicago 'gangsters on Plans to kill Castro. In one case, the .hit man was to have been a Cuban army major who was close to the Cuban leader. The allotted fee for the job: S150,000. (For another example, .? see box.) An Aleom:nation. To .find cut p-ior about the assassination plots, particulan- ? ly who authorized them, Church will de- vote the rest of this month to closed- door hearings on the subject. Not only does Church plan to recall Colby and .other CIA officials, past and present, but 1 he will call the Mafia's John Roselli, who. reportedly was signed up by the CIA to direct some of the schemes to assassi- nate Castro. Church also plans to ques- tion Rgbert Maheu, the onetime FBI agent and aide to Howard Hughes, who is said .to have 'recruited Roselli for the CIA. "Ours is not a 'wicked country, and we cannot abide a wicked government," says Church. He prefers to talk not of "assassinations" but of "murder?a sim- pler, clearer term." Says he: "The U.S. cannot involve itself in any way in mur- der. The notion that we must mimic the Communists and abandon our princi- ples [is] an abomination." When it draws up its final report on the CIA, Church's Senate committee will face the same dilemma in proposing so- lutions that Nelson Rockefeller outlined when his commission began its study in January: "We must have an intelligence capability, which is essential to our se- curity as a nation, without offending our liberties as a people." Spanish-speaking toughs on the Windy City's West Side. Some of the hoodlums were sent to Miami and Central Amer- ica for training in commando tactics. ' Exactly what the Mafta reagers ac- complished against Cuba is stW unclear. Some intelligence officials doubt that a single guerrilla from Chicago ever set foot ori the island. For his part, Cain later was to boast how he had led hit- and-run raids on Cuban power stations. U.S. sources sa that the CIA spent iirn the operation, (111 LIt7 ? Approved For Telma -216A08/011k9K-OpP7T-7-22141311S9p1AVOD08-9 12 June 1975 10 Jure 1975 while Giancana laid out 1390,060 of the Mob's own funds for 'Cain's expenses. 'When some Mafia officials objected to the paj.ments, Giancana contended that the funds should. be considered as "ice" (protectioninoney). What did Gianc:tnn. get for his in- ve..-tment? In Oc.tobe7 1960, the CIA did hint a favor that was beyond the pur- view cf the agency. Giancana was fum- ing because his girl friend, Singer Phyl- lis McGuire, was interested in Come- dian Dan Rowan. The cta arranged for burglars to break into Rowan's hotel room in Las Vegas and search for ev- idence that might cool the romance. But in 1964, for all the ice he had carefully laid away, Giancana seemed to get no special treatment from the ? Government. Haled before a federal grand jury looking into. the Mafia's af- fairs in Chicago, Giancana refused to. talk and served twelve months in jail for contempt of court. Released in 1966, the don moved to Mexico for a while but is now back in Chicago. ? Cain had been forced to quit the Chi- cago ?!..,olice in 1960 after he was caught spying on Mayor Daley's conunissioner of investigations. Incredibly, he was hired in 1962 by Cook County 'Sheriff Richard Ogilvie (who was to become Il- linois' Governor six years later). Resum- ing his role as a spy for the Mob, Cain was fired by Ogilvie for his shenanigans in 1964. Finally, in 1968, Cain was jailed for his part in a Mafia operation. 11.e.? leased in 1971, he became the Still ab- sent ,-,lanc.,:na's man in chi, go. There, on Dec. 20, 1973, two men' wearing ski masks and carrying walkie- talkies surprised hlin in Rose's Sand- wich Shop, a sleazy restaurant that had ? color stills from The Godfather on one i wall. One man held a 12-gauge shotgun . under Califs chin and blew the ? head off the man whose quarry had once been Fidel Castro. NEW YORK TIMES 30 May 1975 HO'w, tc'.) Run 'the. t? I A To the Editor:' ? Some. sense and niuch nonsense "a15'-' O pear in the .presS concerning the Ceti-- ' tral Intelligence Agency. secrecy which intelligence requires breeds fee 'and suspicion. If . there have 'indeed: ",been abuses, they must be corrected atthe?source. ? We need not expect . find 007's under our 1164 nor, should' :see 'the . .aS in American., K.o.)Ei., with all that Sheba cempariso*'' implies.' ' So lone as We have ..dangerons. verSariea, we Must provide onrseiveif with, a oak: defense: establishment In telligence is its vital adjunct.' without which this nation and its allies . mud' deploy military and diplomatic re- sources in ignorance of the. enemyik means and intentions. ? , What is needed is a C.I.A. which /IX' one has ever heard of except at .a bu- reau of xperts?no scandals,;.: hefty, nol riskse--a silent, elite civdi 1?seryice as dedicated, as the profttesionalg. ? ? military branches. This is. surely what, tIthe Agency has.sought to achieve. It is, . the duty of . the Administration, the". National' Security Council, the Con; !Iress .and v1r. Colby to preserve? ,supervise -and ,,se ,the , sophisticate< OCTOR DISPUTES KyNNEDy REPORT ? t ? ci! 4 p Tr .. ? ? Says Pa Misstated Vieis on Press iden-es.' Slaying' ? PrITSBURI-I, June Dr. Cyril Wecht, saying that his views of President Kennedy's_ murder were distorted by the Rockefeller commission, wants the comniission to 'release, a' transcriProthis statements. "If that transcript shows in any way i, have withdrawn dr revised my: thoughts 'of the Warren Report, "I'll eat the transcript on steps of the White 'House," said-Wr. Wecht, a for- ensic'pathologist who ? is the, coroner of Allegheny County. The Central Intelligence' Agency- report sought to put to rest all of the theories sure rounding the circumstances of President Kennedy's death, in- cluding claims ?that more than On..; gunman was involved and that Mr. Kennedy has beei. struck by bullets from two directions. The report said it had found no such ,evidence. Dr: .Wecht denies the State- ment by the report that he "testified that the available evidence all points to the Pres- ident being struck by two bul- lets coming from the rear, and that nostippozt can be foond for theories which postulate gunmen to the front or right 'front of the presidential car." Dr. Wecht said that was a : '"flagrant" misrepresentation of 1what he told a commission I torney, Robert Olsen, in a fi- lhotir interview on May 7.. 1 He said he still maintained that at least two gunmen were involved in the plot and that Lee Harvey Oswald alone could not have inflicted all the wounds sustained by Mr. Ken:' nedy and :forrner goy. John B. Connally of Texas. "Believe me, I hammered thiS point and made it perfectly ? clear," Dr. Wecht said. "It is utterly reprehensible and; de-. ispicable but? also a great come lpliment that they would. eon.; 'cider my testimony that much of a threat." ? ? He said he had first become suspicious of the Rockefeller. commission's objectivity when ;David Belin was appointed ex-.i lecotive director. Mr. ge.lin had; !been chief legal; couriseI for the; 'Warren Commission. non, ,4 . Prcsfdent Ford held ?G press conference vecter- clay in the Rose Garden ct the White Rouse and closed' he will -make pubtic :today the major portion of the Rockefeller commission. ,report on domestic activi- ties of the Central intelli- gence Agency. Foliar:in his prepared statement on. the stools of the 7cport. Or, Friday the "Commis- sion on CIA Activities With- in the 'United States" pre- sented its report to me. I read the report this week- end, and have dceided it should be made, available to the public. It will be released tomorrow. I thank the Vice President And the other. members of the commission and their staff. It :will be obvious to all those who .read the report that the commission has done an extensive job of looking into the allegations that the CIA exceeded its authority by conducting do- meatic operationa in viola- tion of its statute. rend- ing of Eil.^ revert leed,= rue :10 the conclusion that the panel has been fair, frank and bal- anced. I will ask the Attorney General to study all ma- terials gathered by the com- mission on any matter to de- termine whethett any action should be undertaken against any individuals. I am asking each of the federal agencies and (*part- merits affected by the report to study its recommenda- tions and to report back to me with their comments on the report In aaldition to investigat- ing the original allegations Of improper domestic activi- ties 1,)y 4the CIA, the commis- sion. at. my request, subse- quently looked into allega- tion* eencerning. possible do- mestic! involvement in as- sps,Sizo tion. :Wmitpts, Th (!4[0111-!tion It a s. reported' that it did not complete every e.spect of that investl- resources of the agency with supreme, wisdom, Skill and restraint if it is to, serve the needs for which it was, created. LAWRENCE H. McGmt, 1101,v...York,.May,21; 1975t- /34 fmtion, have developed coneernin these allf.?jationf! have bee turned ? ai.-er -to rae ID. class fied fora:. - F,;ecense thc- of assassination allegatio .is incomplete : and .becaus the allegations involve e tremely sensitive. matters, have decided that it is noti the national interest to mal public materials relating these allegations at this tim However, under procedtar that serve the nation 'Interest, I will make oval note to the Senate at HOUSe select cornmittc these materials together wi other related materials the executive branch. I know that the membe of the 'Congress involv will exercise utmost pr dance in. handling such I formation. As I have stated p. violas-1y, I am opposed political assassinations. Th administration has not a: will not use such means instruments of nation poll's:a Hee:ever, in fairies- none of us should jump conclueions as to events VI may have occurred in t past. After I have furth studied the recommen, tions of the commission. will order or submit to Congress the necessary in sures to insure that the telligence community fu. tions in a way designed protect th e constitutio- rights of all Americans. It remains my deep n- sonal conviction that CIA and other units of t intelligence community vital to the survival of country. As we take t steps necessary to insure t proper functioning of t intelligence community, must also be certain ti the United States mainta I he, inteili.;ence cz.pabi' rccez:t:ary fur the tuti p teCtiOr. of, our national int estfL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010030008-9" NEW YORK TIMES 11 June 1975 1 -t:../4"'-?7"'', -.AA- .t, ka OM DP n SOil or - A ,, .4. ) ' ? Lion .... On tap Of this.veri- - 7.!ar7antarfal!iI. NAUGHTON table mountain of material .1.1.7eds/ tn The New Y.TrIc Ttmts . WASHINGTON, June 10?Thel Rockefeller commission .repotin on domestic a activities of the: Central Intelligence Agency, in.!: ;sued today by the White House, stated that the agency illegally assembled a "veritable moun- tain" of files on American citiz- ens and groups "apparently un- 1connected with espionage." ' ? The commission's' 299-page report affirmed in virtually eve- ry respect an account in The New York Times last Dec. 22 cf a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation against the antiwar movement and oth- er dissident groups in the Unit- ed States." . ;.The report stated that "Oper- ation CHAOS" the agency? title of a secret program con- ducted between 1967 and late I973?and some other C.I.A. activities "wereplainly illegal and constituted improper inva- sions of? the right of Ameri- cans." The commission said it was convinced, however, that "the. great ?majority of the C.I.A s? domestic ? activities e.omply with its stautory au- thority." ? ? . ? - According to the report, "The piaaer trial left by Operation 'CHAOS" alone contained about '13,0'30 files . on subjects and ,, . individuals and produced a individuals ' and produced a computerized index of the names of more than 300,000 United States citizens and or- ganizations. The. commission called for "the drawing of reasonable lines" between the conflicting goals of individual rights and collective national security. Its report was, with few excep- tions, worded in carefully mut- ed terms that encouraged the continuation of a vigorous pur- suit of intelligence within clear legal limits. .. ? But the bulk of the report's scattered conclusions was a confirmation of the allegations contained in the Dec. 22, 1974, news' account in The Times by 'Seymour M. Hersh. . The commission was established by President Ford ore Jan. 4 to inquire into those and subse- quent ? published . charges against the agency. What follows is a comparison of the central ele,nents of the Dec. 22 news account and ex- cerpts from the various sec- . . tions of the commission's find-/ lags that bear on the original allegations: ? FILES ON CiTIZENS ? NEWS ACCOUNT: "An ex- Itensive investigation . . . has established that intelligence Ffites ,on at least 10,000 Amer- icon citizens were maintained by a special unit of the C.I.A." ? . COMMISSION: 'The paper. ,trail left by Operation CHAOS included somewhere in 'the ! atea of 13,00() files on sub- jects and individuals (iriclud-. Ang approximately 7,200 per-? sonality or '201 files); over ? 11,000 memoranda, reports . and letters from the F.B.I.; and almost 3,500 memonanda. for internal-use:11y the owprove r a s a computer system cone 'taming an index of over 300,- 000 names and organizations which, with few exceptions, - were of United States citizens , and organizations apparently. ? unconnected with espionage." "Approximately 500 to SCO files were created on dissent- ing organizations and on in- dividuals [in a separate effort ? by the ,C.I.A. Office of Secu- rity]. The chief of the special branch 'guessed' that some- where between 12,000 and 16,000 names were indexed to these files." 4 - ILLEGAL METHODS' ,1 :NEWS ACCOUNT: "Sources said a cheek of the C.I.A.'s *domestic files . produced evie dence of dozens of other illegal activities by members 'of' the C.I.A. inside the United States; beginning in the nineteen-fif- ties, including break-ins, wire- tapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail." COMMISSION: "The com- mission's inquiry ' concen- trated on these investigations . [of news leaks by .the Office of Security] which used in- vestigative means intruding on the privacy.of the subjects, including physical and elec- tronic surveillance, unauthor- ized entry, mail cove'rs -and: . intercepts, enci reviews of las, dividuals of individual Fede. eral tax returns." - .. ? . : "Five [of these investigas tions] were directed against newsmen, in an effort to de- termine their ? sources of leaked classified information, and nine were directed against other'United States citizens." "Even an investigation 'Within the C.I.A.'s authority must be conducted by lawful means.* . . . The investiga- tion disclosed the domestic use of 32 wiretaps, the last .in 1965; 32 instances of bug- ging, the last in 1968; and I2. break-ins, break-ins, the last in 1971. 'None of these activities was conducted under a judicial warrant, and only one with. the written approval of the 'Attorney General." . "For a period of approxi- . - mately six months, corn- mencing in the fall of 1973, ? the directorate [of opera- tions] monitored telephone' cenverSaticns between the United States and Latin America in an effort to iden- tify foreign drug traffickers . . e the monitoring of tele- 'phone calls, while a source of -valuable information for 'enforcement officials, was a violation of a statute of the United States." . .? "An intercept project in - New York City was the most extensive of [four] C.I.A. mail . Operations, and lasted for 20 gears. [It] had expanded by 1959 to include the open- ing of over ? 13.000 letters a year . . . in the last full year of its operation, the New York mail intercept han- dled approximately 4,350,000 items of mail and examined the outside of over 2,300,- rRHicesheeTtlaidtro ccoun, an ta?e, .na graphs were taken ? - the. .eateriors of- approximately 33,000 items. Some - 8,700 items ? were opened :and the ,contents analyzed." "While in operation, the C.I.A.'s domestic mail 'open- ing programs were tuilaw- fn . SHADOWING CITIZENS n -NEWS ACCOUNT: "The C.I.A. authorized agents to follow participants in anti- war and other. demonstra- tions:" - ?? ? COMMISSION: "In- somen instances, the agency- identi- fied leaders or speakers at a meeting [of dissidents] by photographing their automo- ? biles and checking registraa eon records. In other, caseke it .folloWed them home in' or- des' toldentify them through ,the city directory. .Photo-- graphs were also 'taken at: . several major demonstrations in the Washington area and at protest activities *in the vicinity of theWhite House." _ . . INFILTRATING DISSIDENTS NEWS ACCOUNT: "The C.I.A. also set 'up a network of ine formants who wee ordeed - to penetrate antiwar groups." COMMISSION: "[A- project of the Office'of Security] was initially aimed at monitoring public demonstrations which rector; nf .Centeel ,tr.te.ingence might develop into picketing 49731..beagn' to ? crack. down on of agency buildings. Almost the. elks; operations' e from the outset, however, it ? '',''fCOMMISSION:'"Ai part of .149 4'4 ea 6'1 Cl I 14) Fin di 6,- 'The Office of Leg- . islative* Counsel Maintains Congressional . files for use in its iegiciative .tiaisore clu- *ties . ..-geneially, these files. 'contain the following types of documents: Correspondence' between the member and the C.I.A., excerpts from the Congressional Record dealing with the ?? member, constitti- ?-ent employment or personnel requests forwarded to the agency by the member, short , biographies and political de- t .sariptionS of the member and ? copies of all foreign cables - containing the name of the, me...Tiber _ [Althritiah the cormniSsion report is silent on dissident a files- kept'- one members of l; 'eCongress, William E: 'Colby, the Director of Central. Inten ., . , ligence, has testified that -belt ? names of four, preSent orf ? . former members of Cosigressel -including "at least a tioup:e" eantiwar members,: nverefesin ? files.] - -e-N VI . FILES: DESTR0'0.11.4'. NEWS A.CCOUNT:4"Sbrnt' sources also reported tfiat there was ;'..widespread papeidteshred fit ding the agency shortly after ilcuneitilefeeSchlesingerathet,di became a project for placing 'assets' in suitable organiza- tions in order. to obtain in- formation concerning in-? tended demonstrations di- rected at !C.I.A. properties., ('Asset' is a term used by the C.I.A. to refer to agents or informantts other than em- ployes.)" "By late June, 1967; the, agency sought to obtain whatever ?information it could regarding the sources and amounts of income of each of the infiltrated or- ganizations. One 'infiltrator was sent to' dissident rallies in New York, Philadelphia and Balitmisre. One was. called upon to maintain a continuous check on the movements and activities of certain prominent dissident leaders whenever they ar- rived in Washington, D. C.- infiltrators were charged from time to time with ob- a program to test the:tint-Jul ince of drugs on, humans, re- -searclr included the adrninis- tzation' of LSD to persons 'who were unaware that they t were being tested. 'This was clearly illegal. One erson died in 1053, apparetiq as a s result" ? - yet.. _sen"Unforttinately, lira- "Red records of the testing conducted in these drug pro- -grams are now available. All the records concerning the program were ordered de- : stroyed in 1973, including a Atatal of 152 separate files." e Collecticn ;of t: [Data on -"telephoned calls-"befvfeen. :Americans and' -tt'flathers -; 'abroad] *as tiermina.tedttin May,. 1I73 ? and 'the FtC.F.X.*C-' :claims' that 'all: information obtained by the agency Inas been ':destroyed." - ede ;eat -.e SECRET UNIrtem' ? NEWS ACCOUNT:a "I'vIpst,Of taming specific information LheF.Idoniestic-,sitrveillariCeq!and: on individuals, groups or nmeaccIateetion' of !dontstie.-in-; planned demonstrations." teiligeiii:e was conducted, the MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ; sourcmgsaidn, by onettot the NEWS ACCOUNT: "At lenst most clandestine in. _the one avowedly antiwar member Uritted:States intelligenee-arn- of Congress was among those mwnity,-the Special Operations placed under surveillance by Branch of Counterintelligence." the C.I.A., the sources ,said. Other members of Congress were said to be included in the COMMISSION: "The _C.I.A., upon the instruc ion of the ? Director' of Central Intel!!- C.I.A.'s dossiers, on dissident gence, esta.blishde within the 'Araeric:74." countaririteThgenee Malt a : special operations group in _august, 1967, to collect; co- ? ord.inate, evaluate and-report , on foreign contacts,' ? with American dissidents,'" le The group's ? activities eilater] came to be known as :Opera- tion CHAOS." at, : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100876668e5ensitivity ofa?.1.the 35. COMMISSION: "The. com- 1 mlasion diseoaered no evi- dence suggesting that any of these investigations [involv- ing physical and electronic surveillance] were directed at ! any Congressman, judge or 'other public official." Approved For-Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037000879 BALTIMORE SUN 1.2 June 1975 Eginen3. Furgurson ? ? TISOTSi'l ancW_Alitaar . Washington. To a newspaperman, there might seem only one side to the issue of the censored chapter in the Rockefeller commission's CIA report: the alleged assassination plots involved were official mat- ters financed by the taxpayers, and therefore they are the peo- ple's business.- - That is the rationale for disclo- sure, not only of a cabinet mem- ber's financial holdings but PASO of the most sensitive intradepart- mental conversations. And if the information is not forthcoming voluntarily or through official in- vestigators, then it is the news- man' io deto to siphon it out. ? 0 But there is another side, that isf the government professionals. who must analyze and recom- -mend policy, and plan for eventu- alities that may never take place. Their point of view clearly is self serving, but there is a reasonable case to be made that it also serves the ntiblic. That rosition-in srainisei eat by John flyisasetteis, Jr? a 44- year-old career diplomat, in the current issue of the Foreign Eery- NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 11 JUNE 1975 PUTTING THINGS IN FOCUS . - "Will candor survive the stnhe Leg ship of state?" he asks. Ha seems to doubt its . Sylvester maintains that "can- dor within the government is at least as important for our country as government candor with the people, Good decisions in govern- ment depend on accurate and frank efficial reporting and straightforward use of expertise." 9 ? 51 Daniel Ellsberg's leaking of the Pentagon papers, among many other recent examples, en- cited civilian insistence that the government be more forthcoming with the public. But the response within government is to be still more inhibited. Sylvester says. He compares this accurately to the days of the political hunt for scapegoats after the fall of China a quarter century ago. For- eign service officers learned then, he recalls, "that their reporting might soon end un in the public re:ere. and thee' a-dvitsaitly be politically propitious and dis- creet." The multitude of leaks lately has brought back that atti- tude,-carried to further extremes.. . Sylvester says this is "wide- 'spread and deleterious to the worhing of responsible govern- ment." It causes "blander, more cautious official reporting. . . in- creasingly, supposedly analytical classified reports are written more like press releases." - The attest sensitive memoran-1 da are distributed less widely, he continues, and often are dispensed ,with in favor of telephone calls. As a result, subordinates too fre- quently are inadequately or erro- neously informed, and able to of- fer less useful aid to their seniors. an. The diplomat suggests that be- fore senior officials can be confi- dent that secrets will remain so, "at least one case of unauthorized disclosure of confidential infor- mation Will have to result In pub- lic'penalties rather than fame and fortune." ? On reading that, ? he public might he grateful for his maces. ?len that "the dividing line , tween what should or should not be secret ? is at best fuzzy, and one's view will inevitably depend ' on whether ene's seat is in or on of authority." ' Sitting outside., yet coneraiser ating slightly -with him, we wil -add that the occasional disdosur of classified information woul not seem such a disaster if th ? public were more sophisticate about it. 0 0 For one thing, the existence o contingency plans to do seeming! putrageous things does not nem that those missions are serious' contemplated. There are plans fo every contingency that can be fin agined at the Pentagon, the Stat Department or the CIA, just i case, and the thinkers there woul not be earning their pay if the ' .did not devise them. The press, course, is repeatedly guilty o making contingency plans see the equivalent of accomplishe facts. But as for the gap in the CIA report, the way for the geTere- 411,44t? 1.40 99VUU letWASL 114101 auuw, assassination plots?coritingeney or otherwise?is not by ex post facto censorship. It is by prior and total abstinence. ? ? -?The supposedly mountainous "domestic surveillance" program which some media folk and politicians ascribed to the Central Intelligence Agency turns out to have been overblown considerably in the - That is' the conclusion_ drawn by the presidential corn- mission which delved into the allegations:? And it has facts and figures to hack_ its assess:. rnent. The CIA does not emerge with a clean bill of health. The probers, headed by Vice Presi- dent Nelson _Rockefeller found that the cloak-and-dagger boys did indulge in some illegal or Sen Church dubious capers. . , . But their transgression suchas bugging, wire-tapping, and opening letters?hard- ly were on a massive scale. A number of the illicit or questionable activities operation was ' deen so great that, during one. field , survey in November,- 1972, -even the staff of the C.I.A.'s Inspector General was :pre- tcluded from reviewing CHAOS . files or discussin its specific operations." "There is no ind!intion that the C.I.A.'s general coun- i Se! was ever cOnsulted. about .the propriety of Operation , CHAOS activities." ? "Some domestic actfvities, of Operation CHAOS unlaw- fully exceeded the ? statutory authority." Approved For Release 2001/08/0 _ ',`!CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 occurred many years ago and have long since beei discontinued. - : ? Nonetheless, Rockefeller & Co. did recommend some reforms?in the shape of new legislation, executive orders or administrative impreements ?? to better define the agency's area of operations and see that it sticks to it. ;.? But it also emphasized?as President Gerald R. Ford did in his Monday night press conference?that the CIA remains a vital organ in the nation's defense, and that it must have sufficient scope and freedom from prying eyes to permit it to carry out its function effectively. Let's never lose sight of that overriding necessity. As for the- --'MURDER PLOT' CHARGES that have been flung at the CIA, the Rockefeller commis- sion kioked into them, but its investigation was incom- plete and inconclusive. 'At Mr. Ford's direction, the ma- terial it gathered will be given to the Justice Department and two Congressional committees, including the Senate group headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho). Exactly where that trail will lead, or what will de- velop, rio one can safely predict at this time. In the circumstances, most Americans would be well advised to heed another bit of advice Mr. Ford gave: Don't leap to conclusions, or make hasty judgments on :the basis of rumors, leaks and specujation. _ ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 POST 10 ara(1 1975 Joseph Kraft ore. t A fatal flaw shadowed the Rockefel- ler corerrission on the Central Intern- dgence.? Ager.e.y from its first days. Not :that a fix was in to whitewash the egeney and smear past Democratic, Presidents, as some seem to believe. On the contrary, President Ford paid ? too much attention to persons in the press 'and television determined to blacken the intelligence community. As *a result, he gave the wrong mandate ? to the wrong commission, and he is stuck With a report which only proves .the need for more serious inquiry.' The starting point was a story 'in The New York Times which asserted that the CIA had undertaken massive domestic surveillance in violation of congressional proscriptions against such activity inside the United States. , Without apparently realizing it, Presi- dent Ford accepted that diagnosis as the heart of whatever might be wrong In the intelligence community. , He established a commission domi- nated by persons with broad political and foreign policy experience. To these practical men, he gave the narrow man- date of looking into activities by the CIA "within the United 'States which rise to violations of the charter." As staff director he visited upon the corn- erdssior.tavid 3e14o, lawyer ighIy sensitive to moral questions who had served Mr. Ford on the commission in- vestigating the assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy. ? Within a week the Rockefeller com- mission received from the CIA the so- called inspector general's report ? an account of various CIA transactions 'prepared in response to questions from - a former director, James Schlesinger. There were deletions in the inspector ? general's report, and the commission speedily determined that the deletions dealt wtih the matter of assassinations. BALTIMORE SUN 4 June 1975 ..Fidom of Inf?rmati?n be due to plain old bureaucratic desire for se- crecy. The reason Congress enacted the new amend- ments was that the FBI and other agencies found ways to thwart the spirit of the original Freedom of Information Act while staying within the letter of the law. Congress is required to review the adminis- tration of the new act next March. Then it can de- cide how much new help the government needs, it any, and whether changes in the law are needed. The real problem in public access to government information is not that a burdee has been impeeed on some officials, but that some officials are still keeping the public in the dark about the public's business. Conscientious bureaucrats who want to publicize information covered by the Preedom of formation Act are often prevented from doing so by 'superiors. These so-called "whistle blowers" are in', the tradition of Ernest Fitrzereld, who. made ro9.te cost overruns on the CA, and was fired, and Dr. jacqueiine Veerett, wo pliblieiZet.1 suppressed su- ?Ies linking cyclamates to cancer, and was punielsed . by the Food and Drug Administration. Legislation pending before the Senate would make it less likely that conscientious efforts to publicize public infor- mation would lead to penalties. It deserves to be en- ? acted. , Approved For ReIgase.20 1108/-08 :--CIA-RDP47-004-32Reeeteeanow-9-7---77? lath At first the commission was disposed to exclude that issue from considera- tion on the grounds that it had noth- ing to do with domestic surveillance. But President Ford himself, in an ap- parent effort to put the assassination question out of bounds, mentioned it to a group of visiting editors. In re- sponse to the resulting howl, Mr. Ford then included the assassination item on the 'corn-mission's agenda. The Win- mission delegated Mr. Belin to look into the issue of whether the assassina- tions had anything to do with domestic actions by the CIA. - Mr. Belin plunged into the assaesi- nation question with zest ,and largely? on his own. Because they had domestic implications, lie went deep into charges ? that the Kennedy administration had plotted to.assassinate Fidel Castro of ? Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the Do- minican ,Republic. Because they had no domestic associations, he went much less deeply into charges regarding as- sassinations of President Diem of South Vietnam and President Lu- mumba of the Congo. - Meanwhile the commisaion bowled along. Vice President Rockefeller, not fidny cognizant of Mr. Belin's work, indicated the report wonld show no C reat violatiaret eil the chatter by the CIA.. He and his staff indicated that the full report would be turned over to the President and then made public as a matter of course. But the White House legal staff was aware of , Mr. Belin's work. It was clearly not definitive and to them it looked to. raise more questions than it -answered about a highly emotional subject. So they :raised the issue with. the commission, and eventually worked out the compromise whereby only the report on domestic surveillance be- comes public at this time. '- Attorney General Levi complained recently that the new Freedom of Information Act amendments had created terrible administrative burdens on the .Department of Justice, particularly the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation. The amendments took effect three months ago, and immediately the number of requests to inspect files jumped some 40-fold. There have been increased requests at other agencies, too. The Internal Revenue Service, the Central Intent- fent..? Agency, the Securities and Exchange Corn- mistion, the Food and Drug Administration, to name those feeling the greatest pressure. In many cases the agencies cannot do the job properly without more help and more money. In which case, the money ;hould be forthcoming from the Congress. This newspaper strongly sup- ported the enlargement of the Freedom of Informa- tion Act. It would alsi; supped, whatever increased cests Fre reeeSsary to make the law werk. So would Congress, we are sure. However, the time to deter- mine just how great a burden the new law creates is not now but after the law has been in effect for long- er than three months. Some of the burden may be due to increased demands for information, but some ee- What all this iiroves is that domestio eurveillance is not the heart of what is wrong withthe intelligence commu- nity. On the contrary, domestic surveil- lance and the assassinations both come from a larger, parent problem. ' The basic fact is that the intelligence community was born and given M- crease during the. period of intense. celd war. The struggle against intern tional comenamism looked to many' people like a do-or-die affair. Within that context it seemed legitimate to. read the mail of American citizens sus- pected of helping, the enemy, and to take extreme measures against heads of foreign governments thought to be ? helping the enemy, and to take extreme measures against heads of foreign governments. . ? Now, however, the struggle against communism has given way to detente. Far from playing dirty tricks on the reds, the chief intelligence' function is to monitor _compliance with various agreements in arms control and other areas. The North-South struggle has replaced the East-West struggle in in- tensity, and a major intelligence re- quirement is for better information on nolitical and economic events in, the ende.raeveloped world.' intelligeace e(yriilnunity has not; ' adjusted Well to these changes. Hencei the continued eold-war zealotry of so. many intelligence operatives; hence the failure of the correct -CIA estimates on, Vietnam to get through at the top; hence the constant fight between the analysts t? and the dirty-trick artists, and between; the military and civilian ? specialists. The task ahead is to accomplish the ? 'adjustment The best that can be said - for the Rockefeller. report is that it points in taitat ? direction. . ?0 1975, Field Euterprises.-711e.:? 137 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 THE NEW YORK .TIME,`THURSbAY,:TUNE Li; 1975. ? ' . .,... . , , . . cuth.Vietnam Reds' Piesoed 7hell' 1? re . v.3 ports; he disappeered. Actually& _ ? i e ? . , ,, sit is now known, he- and his " ''' tread. to The Sem V,rk T)ro'es ' 1.-1 4.:11ir ,Fi.ORA LEWIS .. for Negotiated End .,, entourage were returned:tosthe .: palace for 48 hours, thee men: pet in one room and the wornwettt PARIS, June 11?As the. Mirth ; Vietnamese forces pressed ever closer to Saigon, the South Vietnamese Corn-. muniste Provisional ' Revolu-- tionary Government . asked France to arrange negotiations with ever' more urgency, ac- cording to authoritative French sources. Inform:khan on. the politics of the approaching end of the war and some of its aftermath has' now become available here: According to the. French, the Vietnamese Communists be- came certain that they were :winning the war after the fall of Ban Me Thuot on March 10. ? However, still uneasy about the timetable and the cost in lives, ? they, were expecting to be un- able to move into Saigon be- fore late summer and possibly only after a ferocious battle. There were; the 'sources here are convinced, three possibil- ities from the Communist point of view. The first was- to get President Nguyen Van Thief.' replaced by a senior Saigon personality who would nego-- tiate a coalition with the Pro- vincial Revolutionary-- Govern- ment, possibly the former De- fense Minister, Gen. Tran Van Don. - After the fall of Hue, that was discarded as unnecessary. Then the second possibility, was considered, to insist on replac- ing Mr. Thieu with a personal- ity of the "third force" who had been 'in contact with the. Provincial Revolutionary Gov- ernment, such as Gen. Duong. Van Minh, and negotiating a' government with him. . The third possibility was straight military victory, and the second idea was also dis-' 'carded as this third possibility, Seemed more and more easily within Hanoi's early reach. ? e Fear of Being Eclipsed '- The Provisional Revolution- ary- Government preferred ne- gotiations for fear of :being eclipsed and left powerless by the North Vietnamese if the war ended with the entry of Hanoi's troops in the southern capital and without any agrees tnent, according to evidence here. . That is ? what did happen. The new information is that the Provisional. Revolutionary Government now has virtually Xtothing' to say in the South. Saigon is being run by a North Vietnamese military committee whose head, though southern- ?er by birth? wears the North Vietnamese Army uniform and beayart of Hanoi's team., ? , On only two ceremonial oc- being "like Hitler iis his bunker, 4casions has the known Provis- talking about imaginary divie tonal Revolutionary Govern- signs." , !tient' leadership' appeared in He turned ower over t h. . Saigon since the take-over, and vice.presidentP, Tr - o is Tran Van Huonge, then- it disappeared from view. r - . . a The ministers who figure on the !who lasted a week and then! Provisional Revolutionary Gov- !handed' over to General Minh ernment's'cabinet list have not By . that 'time, there was no.; taken over -the-Saigon Gtivern- !longer 'any question of negOtias ment departments, which func- Itions, .Which might ? have been tion with unknown or invisible !possible some weeks--earlier North Vietnamese Communist 1 On .the day Ambassador Mar- heads. ? - - . !tin left 'Saigon,: by helicopter iit- Le Dunn, the head 'Of thetlf min the American 'Embassy:, !party, has been shuttling. hese compound,. he went to pay a; formal .fareaVell, call on Ambas- sador:Merillon, whose embassy was around the block. - The . American Ambassador tween Hanoi and Saigon an, a Small Ilyushin jet. ? _According to the information,' all . officials with whom- the French Ambassador, Jean-Marie: presented' ..the French Ambas- Merillon, who has since left, seder with a pagoda statue aS idealt after the take-over were: a . farewell present, and took ;northerners who_ did not . give: his leave. , . their ?,.,... , . , A little after 4 that afternoon. I nartin,- I ? es-as . Merillon the sen- Ambassador ' Martin' h"rded i - his helicopter. But the lift con- tort French diplomat in Vietnam, L ources said. He told the South tinued until 8 o'clock the next who argued with' Mr. Thieu morning. - sources that he should leave, the Witnesses in . the, French 'Vietnamese President that it compound next door --could was the only way to save a watch as the Americans rose ,vast .number of hetes in Saigon floor - by floor - through, their and probably' Mr. Thieu's own Embassy to reach the helicopter platform, and the Vietnamese ? throng pushed after them, kept a floor behind by the Marines. ' Hanel Taniti'Enter lire. , ? . ? Even after the unexpectedly rapid advance of North Viet- namese. troops had made the -fall of Saigon a foregone con- elusion, Mr. Thieu insisted on Shortly after' the last heli-4` fighting to the bitter . end. copter -took off,. guards shoot- French. diplomatic. reports say. ing to . keep more refugees he argued that he could estab- from trying to clamber aboard lish an enclave. in Saigon- and or ride its skids, an American the Mekong Delta and negotiate turned up with his suitcase. It later, from a better position.? was too late. He was sheltered, The United States Ambassa- in the. French Embassy for, a d6r, Graham A. Martin,, was so while, and eventually, sent preoccupied with organizing hoe. ? By that time, the first North the American evacuation in the. Vietnamese tanks were moving last few days of Mr. Thieus, down Hal Trung Street, past Government that,, he did not the side entrante of the French take part in such exchanges, on their way to the the information indicates. The ? Presidential ? Palace. The lead French reports said Mr. Martin' delayed arranging evacuation tank was firing its cannon to Mr eight to ten days beyond ea e way 'Washington's Wishes .and then - Otherwise, there was no 'barely had time to work it out s righting as they entered Saigon. Gen. Minh was awaiting them Generels Advise Departure In the palace. He was taket However, the French believe I nfk, inssi Jeep, to .the: radio staa that the Central Intelligence Agency mission in Saigon, which rejected Mr. Martin's persistent optimism evensas the situation was crumbling, dig help persuade Mr. Thieu to. leave. , ??? On th-e nieht before Mr/11114 'finally, agreed to go, his gets.; erels, headed by the chief of the general staff, Cau Van Vieni told him it was' the only waY: to save Saigon. More than one Vietnamese described Mr. Thieu to diplomats in ,those days as 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/0-8.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 :'in: another. Then he was . bome. s ? ' A few days later, commifni- cations with the outside world were cut. :Apart from, the French Vas- . haSsyswhere.there are still 153 people with .`a. tenuous radio link abroad, the only Western diplomats left in Saigon are a oBelgian, and a Swiss, without -Staffs or communications. ! The Polish and Hungarian ''..delegations to the International ? Control. Commission remained, sbut, the report said they- were confined to their quarters ex- cept when they too were ad- mitted to the 'two"victory ceremonials. and their tele- phones have been cut. A Soviet mission that had been accred- ited to the Provisional Revolu- tionary Government in Lee Ninh before the final offensive, was -evacuated to' Hanoi. NoSov;eie .c-hes 'elin:o- triatiO.haire 'been permitted' to -cOme to Saigon. --The.' conclusion- of informed sources here, is.. that Hanoi, is now 'ih no -hurry, .to decide how . , to .deal with Saigonpolitically, arid that ?there' may be a long delay e in. setting-. up a. - new South Vietnamese .Government, if, ever that.isedone.e. e; ? The view. in .Paris ? is -' that Hanoi' has :now decided Seto maintain direct control, a step Ithat' the . sources said. was "bmind to, come sooner' or la- :ter" =but that they think carne much - sooner than Hanoi. +Planned or than might have been the case. - . 'Ambassador Martin's argu- ments for refusing to urge -President Thieu to leave earlier when the', French, at least; sthought a negotiated-end was still possible, were that Mr. Thieu's departure would pro- -yoke wild panic and chaotic.. collapse in Saigon. ? So far as, the French know, his instructiOns from Washing- ton were vague during this per- iod and such 'decisions were 1..eft; to this,diseretiore ? th ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037a008-9 CUP:ROI/1M MAiir,,N; ?rD 26 ray 1975 MARTIN woorAdicorr Romen? Catholic Church ix ' ? eoute V ittnain;' long in the forefront of the fight against . . cemmunisme is now attempting ? the radical readjustment neces- sary if it is to survive. But it is split between left ? and: right-wings, who ? - are. already quarrelling' over two itrottez, or rather 'personalities. As _soon as communications are zest:A-et!, Rome will be faced witti difficult ..problems here. The leftwing Catholic groups ,called for the immediate resig- nation of Mgr Henri Lemaitre, a Belgian. priest who is the apostolic delegate to South Vie- tnam, and of Mgr Nguyen Van Thuan, Deputy Archbishop of 'Saigon, a nephew of Diem, and a staunch antitC'emmunist. These various groups have com- bined to send a letter to the Pepe asking for the removal of theae two men if they don't voluntarily resign. . ' One letter to the apostolic delegate. couched, in Com- munist-style lance 'age, bluntly' ht.:I.:used him . of having "dragged the -Church into a policy of collusion With: the American imperialists and their valet Thieu,' and ?otf having itftirtively tried to impose an? anti-C?ommurrist bishop on Saigon." /3-3, this it meant the appointment earlier this month of 'Mgr Thuan, who has the right if succession should the present Archbishop of Saigon, Mgr Nguyen Van Binh, resign or die. It ended by demanding that Mgr Len:Aare resign and -leave Vietnam "immediately on , receipt of this, letter." ? One of the leading figures of the Catholic Loft is Father. Huarnh Cong Mirth,. who has a parish on the outskirts of Saigon, and who,. it now appears, - ran a clandestine group called the Movement of Ca.tholics.for the People. Father Minh, -a serious, bearded, young ? men, !Mho never wears clerical robes exeept when saying mass and signals his priesthood only by a small gold cross pinned to his vAtilite shirt, says his group is ".a movement of cons- oientisation, not a. pressure group." , The movement. emerged from underground ealstence ca the (hay before the Pall of Saigon .intd has 'since cid meetings and , produced ,o magazines which welcome e liberation and speak of the eed for Catholics to help in' riding socialism in Vietnam. ? Father Minh is not a Cotn- unist, or if he is, he is e- ery good actor. Ire says: "I' hall always be a Catholic: all always be' tied to the warn and to :dome. But our atholic life here in Vietnam ust change: We have been a mall, privileged, and favoured miraOrityn Now we rnteet -help in the work of building socia- lism "Our starting point is our Christian ideals and the start- ing point of the Communists is different but we can co-exist and work together. They expect religions to wither away so they see no reason for, combatting us unless we combat them." Father Minh claims ? that North Vietnam's 'attitude to its own e 'C at h oil c s t changed markedly when they saw, priests and 'Catholic laity taking an active part in the. defence of the North against bombing and when they found, after reluc- tantly recruiting Catholics into the army, that they made excel-' lent soldiers and did not hack patriotism. " But, Father Minh says, these first few weeks could be of vital importance for the, future of. Catholicism in Vietnam.. The liberationeof Saigon and South Vietnam -as immediately wel- comed by manY bishops and priests, teeinaise some with, strong anti-Corritilnist records., 'The- Archhishbp of Saigon: Issued a pastoral letter,. as did the Archbishop of Hue, and the Bishop of Dalat. Others, like. the Bishop of koritum, the last' French ',Bishop in Indo-China, have apparently remained* Silent ' , But generally the initial' response 'awas' such as to give the Communists no cause for, ? suspicion. One well known anti- Communist priest organised an immediate festival for his entire parish. including non- Catholics and the NLF soldiers ' camped nearby, killing, three 'beef cattle and two pigs. He explained to an' amused congre- gation that since 'the young men of the 'parish no longer, had to pay bribes to evade mili- tary service he expected their families 'to hand Over a similar amount to- pay for the feast. , - The NLF soldiers joined in the laughter, but the 'new auth-. oritles could be forgiven for dismissing the Catholic wel- come as superficial. The whole, history of Catholicism in. Viet- nam is inextricably intermin- gled first with French colonia, lism, and then with anti-Corn- animist nationalism. The Diem lobby in the United States 'was , virtually started by a Catholic social democrat. Joseph But- tinger, who dater became a historian of . Vietnam. Diem 'was, of course, backed bsr. Cardinal Spellman. During the ' French wax in Indo-China the, Cathelie areas were the back- hone,of resistance to the Viet- minh and that contintiee tfe be the case in South Vietnam. ? The officer corps of the lold Vietnameae National Army was heavily Catholic, and Catholics continued to he represented out ; of au proportion. to their actual. numbers?about 9 per cent ? of the total population of South Vietnam--both , in the army and. in the bureaucracy 'e.fteh Diem. . Catholics have not only been prominent in support of the southern, regimes, including' that of Thieu, who was a Catho- lic but they have also been prominent in new anti- Communist initiatives.' One such was. the' Nhan Xa (Revo- lutionary - Social Humanist Party); a descendant of Diem's party,, the Can Lao. Mgr Thuau was associated with 'both, pare ticularly the latter; formed in 1966 to created a real' altert.14- the Communists. ? Irt The same line of succei- sion of anti-Communist -Catholic opposition groups was Father Tran Huu Thanh's Anti-Corrup- tion Movement which emerged late last year and forced a few reforms on the Thieu Govern- ment. Father Th?anh .is still here, at the Redenaptorist Church in ? Northern Saigon Father- Thant). says: "I am still an ? anti-Communist But under the 'new circumstances the Church must pursue a policy of careful. cooperation. Then I think. it will viable." He considers it foolish to "try to appease'? the authorities' by demonstrating against 'Lemaitre and Thuan. "Let matters take their course. the apostolic dele- gate in Hanoi after 1954 left after one year, a decent intei- val. Rome does not need Oa be told its business by. a bunch of young priests. Father Minh.. on the other hand, argues ? that "this is a very delicate moment for ?the Church in South Vietnam. The new Government does not want to get into a quarrel with the Church. But if Catholics persist in opposition then naturally something will happen. Lemaitre and Thuan must go." Whether they do or not, the 'Church in Vietnam obviously faces a difficult period. -Father Minh Cis' right in saying that 39 the rhafority of bishops and ether senior 'priests are anti- Communist right-wingers. For instance, 'of Saigon's 400 r priests, perhaps io are known h as "rightists"' hut they Include h all 11 deans and meet other Church dignitaries. Southern Catholica may benefit from a certain detente that 'has developed recently bet- .ween Hanoi and the Vatican. Southern. priests who have given confession to Catholic soldiers frona the North are amazed at how "old fashioned" they are. Some of the restrictions ca the Church in North Vietnam, which virtually. locked it aaay from world Catholic develop- ments for 20 years, are now apparently being lifted. South- ern Catholics, the majority of Vietnam's Catholics, may there- fore now benefit from Hanoi's experience with tie smaller community in the North And its ? understanding of new develop- ments in Catholic thought' ra.rtietilealy in the- third world churches. "I am not a pessimist," Father Minh says. The Church has survived in the North. We Catholics of the Left now have .a chance to try to educate the Catholic- born- ! mu.nity as a whole to work with ' the Communists, even to build socialism with ,them." One la reminded of the Catholic chaplain Lam- pedusa's? The Leopard, reassur- ing, his master that the Church I would always stand with the nobility. And if Mother, Church had to abandon the nobility, The Leopard ? snapped, would she not do so instantly, and would she net be wholly justified in doing so? Nevertheless, there are clearly difficult times ahead for the Church in Vietnam ? .difficult times that it will no doubt survive but in a much different form. ? ' ? '' ' gia;sLataaamitaaaaievaearamiaateaseas ' Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .-Q1A1 4'4 fra Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 1,CNDON ODSMV 25 May 197$ on ju in ef ?.4s, ? from MARK FRANKLAND in Bangkok "-!THE American defeat in 'Indo-China has forced the ruLing class of Thailand to look at reality, and it is .,,scar,cd by what it sees. Until recently, this country was seemingly one of the _happiest and most promising ree.2 American; clients in Asia. _'-Today, the most popular .guessing game in Bangkok is how long it will be before it ,goes Communist. ? Even allowing for the ,exaggeration in any predic- - tion made at 'this moment of .uncertainty in Asian history, ?. the -queasy feeling here is of .great concern to South-east eAsia.. Thailand is the key, to ' :the rest of the region. ere This is partly a matter of geography, for it lies between .Burma and Malaysia and the now Communist States of ,41-tdo-Oh?ina. But it is even -emotes a question of examole,, Lar i.E Thailand v?ith it" '- t -natural resources, with the .most revered monarchy in -Asia (and possibly the world) and. a Buddhist religion in .-,which almost all Thais take epart, cannot resist the Com- .:munists? what hope is there ;for countries with few or -none of these advantages? The Thais have every :reason to be confused: con- sider the news they were .having to digest this week- :.end. Vietnam.'s Army may not ;be at .the door, but its diplo- mats are already in Bangkok, 'dragon-like with indignation that Thailand let America -use it as a rear area through,- out the Indo-China war. ? A : Hanoi delegation is : ostensibly here to discuss the "-establishment of diplomatic relations, but its immediate- ,' purpose is to frighten, the: Thais into closing down-. the- American military bases-. There was also disconcert- ing news from the rest of. , Indo-China. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge had lust oceue pied the temple of Pine Vibran, which sits on the. That '',border and is believed: bse , many:Thais to belong to Thai- land.. The Laotians, . whom Thais used to regard. as ;laughable poor relations, were. showing great aplomb in eas- ing out USAID. the?Amerieen -foreign aid: organisation, that -once can .Laos like a second. :Government. Any -Thai who wanted to know what his Government ;Svae going to do about the 'Americans in Thailand could only scratch his -head.. The -.Mayaguee affair and the _ violent speeches made during :the demonstrations against , T)--7 - the US Embassy here seemed to make it impossible for the Government-' to wriggle out of its already public commit- ment to close the American bases by next 'March. Yet the Government was plainly- worried about the effects of a pullout. The Americans spend e lot of money and employ 'a 'lot of Thais. Senior Army officers own much of the land around the bases and do very well out of the bars and brothels that have been built there. ? There was more evidence; too, of the _radicalisation of Thai domestic politics that began. with the overthrow of the military oligarchy in 1973. Strikers armed with steel pipes, the favourite .weapon of Japanese student revolu- tionaries,, had closed down the Dusit Than, an extrava- gant new Bangkok 'notei that might have been designed by Busby Berkeley for one of his Hollywood spectaculars, and where guests spend more in a day than a Thai coolie earns in a month.. A member of ?the Gevern- ment said it was the fault of outside agitators.. The head of the- hotel workers' union replied it. was a simple matter of workers fighting . unjust. capitalists. . The confusion of. ordinary. Thais may be judged by some disarming remarks: the other day by the university profes- sor who was an unwilling caretaker , Prime , Minister from the time of the generals' overthrow to the installation of the present elected Govern- ment this year. Life. as Pre- mier- had been -so difficult,. he said, that he- sometimes used to hide away in .a sump- tuous layatory in-Government Hbuse that- had been, built for the State visit of Qneen- Elizabeth: What there could well. be -in. Thailand Is a -very for- midable Communist revolt in which the emergence of a- CoMmunist Indo-China would be a factor?as- an example and :source of supplies and training?but far from the most important one:. . ? e Both foreign diplomats and Thais believe that the condi- ?tions for- such an insurgency already?exist. ,Therens. greet - inequality, even by Asian standards, which foreign aid and investments have helped to increase and which the pnlincians,.albeit now demo- cratically elected,' seem un- willing or unable to do much about.,. Cohefent Mariist thinking - is,. catching On the student -and workers' organi- sations which were set up after the overthrow of the generals.. The peasant farm- ers on the great fertile plains, that are the envy of the rest of South-East Asia, are fail- ing into the hands of money- lenders, The only easy scfurre of credit, and so are no more, master of their land, even when they ,still have legal title to it. .. '- Power and Wealth are con- centrated in Bangkok, where the woes of the previnces are too often ignored. ?- And if the Government does promise redress, . corruption.- in the Civil 'Service,. the Army and the.. police is. so great that men of influence can usually deflect any decision that affects- their 'interests. . .. The-beginning of an insurg- ency have of course been present, for a decade. in -the border areas where- zere Thai, minorities live: moun- tain; tribes in the North, Viet- namese .and Laotians in the North-East and Malays in the South. .In spite of American counter-insurgency advice and equipment, and Thai Army operations (sometimes. be- cause of them) the revolt has grown steadily, if unspectacu, lady. , It is still manageable,' but' it does offer- a base to Thai Communists with their, eyes on the Thai. heartlands. Not all this is apparent to the-people in. power in Bang- kok, at least not to the point of taking actions ? -that diminish their position and privileges. But the shaming of the Americans- lin Indo- China has started to open Thai eyes: to the Americans' failure to. help: Thailand, too, on to a better course of: development The. Thais are.. Too,king into, all the' agreements- they have with die Aratricane: and find only signed- with the' then .USe Secretary di' State, Dean Rusk, that Offers- con- crete -support, end: that, is in. the event of a foreign inva- sion of Thailand?the . least probable of the dangers, fac- ing the country. T.TEw r, T.; T.7 ris e e, c":3-c 12 Jume 1.97 . . . -Thus thee Thais' are boey? trYing: to. 'soothe .the ,Vietna- .emeie,. while huildifbie ;their main, new bridge to .Peking. But the thief. danger- Li within: a political and social system that may break under pressin ,of ;is, n snaking. Unless the Government can do something about that, both. Thailand. and much Of South- Asia is in trouble. 1 Regime inCariibodfa Charges 3 Nations gept lier Backward .n. -7:BANGKOK, Thailand, June 11 (Reuters)---Cambodia's new Gbvernment today blamed France, Japan and the United states for the 'country's eco- nomic backwardness. .? In a commentary monitored here, the Phnom Penh radio -declared: "The old and new aggressors have caused the weakness of cur country. If there had been no foreign at- tacks, Cambodia would have become a powerful country?' - :It accused France, which 'governed Cambodia as n -protectorate for 90 years until 1953, of having prevented devel- opment of weaving and hand- crafts industries. The old and new colonialists, the radio said, "wanted to keep our country in a colonial. situa- tion. They stole our raw mater- ials to ship them to their own, ? countries." :The radio accused the "Sa- The radio accused the ".Tap- anese fascists, then the United done the cenne ""'''''' tO ace Cambodia from developing and of bringing their own goods to Cambodia to compete with 'local products. - . onIt accused the ousted gov- ernment of Marshal Lon Na!, which seized power in a coup on March, 1970, against Prince Norodom Sihanouk, of having sold Cambodia out to the Amer- jeanisnce the Communist -take- over last April 17, the''chief aim had been "to make Cambo- dia a country with modern, powerful agriculture," the com- mentary said, adding: . - "After -that we will be able to transform our farming coun- try into a country that is also industrial." . n i ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 DVOAPISMISIMer..921ML4S116*-7.. . lerror ??? - ' Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037b008-gt' or ea fears. ea, el eee III a.lions disbanded 4.1'w renege on conlitlitmerat ? nose Peter Hazelleurst -? O Tokyojune.1.. . In Spite of strong warnings . ?that : the, United States... will ' teivenee if- - North Korea , ' launchee an attack ? against the South,- the- regime in Seoul hate ? 'hours'. private- fears . that ? the ' United-, Nations peace-keeping force -might :soon be dissolved and Congress might back away from, its military- commitments in rhe future.' .7 These, fears were -outlined to -The .Times today by one of PreSident,-, Park 'Chung Bee's ? confidantes; *_Mr Park . Joon Iiyueeeheirman. of the, ?poliey, planni-ng committee of the .rul- ing ;?? Democratic, Republican .Part-ea. ; ". ? ; He also -claimed that :Waste, ington?-? has deliberately ? kept the .South Korean Air Force naincier: strength in the 'past : because-American leaders were convinced ? that Seoul- ,might launch a strike against ? the North and 'endanger the policy of detente with China , and:the Seviet? Union. .:,,?Expressing ---South', . Korea's most immediate, fear,' Mr Park said in: Tokyo that his- Govern- ' ment 'believes 'that- events in Indo-China might encourage many, non-aligned: nations, to support ? North Korea during the-forthcoming session of the United -Nations General: Assem- bly. H We fear that resolutions :supporting North -Korea and calling for the Withdrawal of the United Nations!, forces in . the South will be passed by a majority for the first time dur- ing. the session of the United Nations General Assem- bly. -"In the past our resolution calling on the Security Council to make alternative arrange- ments to substitute the United Nations Command was passed, but it looks as though two con- flicting resolutions will go through this time. It is going to present the General Assem- bly with an embarrassineesitua- ,_ tion. "However, ? the communist resolution in the Assembly will not have any legal or political meaning because the Security Council is responsible for the United Nations forces in Korea. But it will mean' that the North will win a majority in- the General Assembly for the first time in history and it will give them propaganda value", Mr Park said. He said that iv spite of firm security *pacts with China and the Soviet. Union, North Korea had been invited to join the . block -of non-aligned nations. Mr Park admitted . that the ? Foreign Ministry .were toying with the idea " of requesting non-aligned nations admit-'.' South Korea:' as a eath en' " This woUld demon- strate how absurd North Korea's claim is", be- added: Describing the United :Nations General Assembly as the "absurdity of-modern times", Mr Park said-- that the South would claim, in future,' that the body does not have the power to come to, decisions on the Korean issue: ' ' "Issues-in the `' General Assembly are . no longer decided on merit. ?They are decided on the 'basis of ? whether- a country-' is allied with the United States, and we fear many Third World nations ? will vote against us simply because they oppose ' the United States-.Middle - East Policy"; he said? ? "We- are not going to let our fate be 'decided .by the United Nations General - Assem- bly in future and we' will maii-e tarn that the Security Council is responsible for peace-keep- ing arrangements on: the. Korean peninsula. ? ":But, quite frankly; we are "16re-or -less*resigned that the UN'"-----and will be dissolVed within the next few years. This does not mean that the United States forces will go; but the withdrawal of the United Nations forces will demoralize our people", Mr Park said. " (At present the - United Nations forces in Korea consist of i38,000 American troops and a small symbolic force of troops representing other members of the command, in- cluding a contingent of approx- imately 20 British officers and Mr Park said the regime is convinced that if the North launches an attack it will not come in the form of a conven- tional military offensive across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). "What we are afraid of is that they will infiltrate guerrillas into the South by sea, air and through tunnels under the DMZ in an attempt to foment an uprising against President Park's government. "Our troops can counter an attack across the DMZ. Our morale is high and we are con- fident we can beat the North in conventional ware if we con- tinue to receive military equip- ment. However, we know they have 80,000 specially trained guerrillas who could be sent into civilian areas in the rear." Mr Park, who is visiting Japan to discuss security arrangements in East Asia, said warnings that the United States would intervene if the North attacks the South "appears to have given the communists something to think about.' ' ? - we ?are still peSsitaisten about just how- long the co6 sensus in the-. United- States will last. The ??? promises are - better than nothing and we have -no other choice- but -to remain silent. But we a-re tin- easy. N , "The-ruling' party in .:se.ert- ington does not have a work- ing majority, ? the -Democrats are divided and our necurity pact is not as streng as the one which binds Nato.- To be. quite honest we are., scared to make moves to ame-nd the pa-et- because we ? have ? fears that detrimental clauses might . be written in to . make matters weese." Harking back to the trauma- tic shock of the collapse of Indo-China, Mr Park - said: "For us it's an awful situation. , Vietnam was given enough promises but they still lost. Everyone in the, United States, is saying that American troops must not be involved in another war in Asia: And why should they? "We have told them 'that' we wit fight by ourselves if they give us enough arms .*But they won't. They say - :eon have enough. Frankly 1 think it's a stupid policy. If they modern- ize our army and give ustime to train our soldiers with new equipment we can -fight.' If they wait it will be another. repetition of Vietnam." e Echoing the resentment of the armed forces, Mr Park said that - the ? Americans :delibera- tely refused to build up South Korea's air force in .recent years to correct the imbalance in air power .on the peninsula. (The -North is reported to be equipped with more than 600 fighter-bombers as compared with 210 obsolete American jet fighters in the South.). In an indication that the two allies have clashed sharply over the issue, 'Mr Park said Washington bac: refused to modernize the air force in the past on the groted that 'Ameri- can air power vas available. "But the trieh is that the 'Americans refud to give us the equipment because --they feared that the\ South might attack the Nona and endanger their policy of 'd?nte with China and the Soviet Union in recent years. That's nonsense. " First it was, the' Administr- ation and now .we have fears that Congress eiglit stand in the way. The level\ of supply was so low two yeats ago that we were forced to 'look else- where for arms and tpend our much-needed foreign exchange ? on equipment. The Americans - I ; think, they realiae taw .we did not like it at-the line but e-ere correct-". Mr Park, Aid. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RD"P77-004-32R000100370008-9 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 1'71*.LnINGTON POST 12 June 1975 Rowlind Et;ais'-a'na'R-6b'ert Pir6talz ? eTh ba U.? Par. SEOUle--;?President Park Chung Hee, vowing to fight for the last inch -of land even if U.S. forges leave Korea, told us South Korea could and would develae its own nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is with- drawn, In one of his rare interviews, the Korean strong man also declared he would hot relax tough internal tee- eurity measures ?while the military threat from 'North Korea lasts. Recog- nizing that restoration of full civil liberties would help him in the U.S. !?Congress, he insisted such relaxation could' make ienrea another "Vietnam and therefore gave no hope for ,major enange. 'Thus, Gen, ..i?ark is set apart from other ?East Asian leaders traumatized by the Indochina debacle and looking; for eaccommotiation with the rising Communist tide. Facing the gun bar- rels of the North Korean garrison state, Park relies heavily on his 'U.S. alliance. But he will not appease American critics by actions he says Would weaken security and is Pre-, pared to go it alone if necessary: Park gave responsive, often blunt answers for nearly two 'hours in his -Office at the Blue House?his first areetien, with A foreign reporter in eight' nuniths. Small to the paint of frailty, the 57-yeanold professional sol.- dies in his 15th year of rule seemed in excellent health and supremely eon- lident the course be follows is correct. While declaring his own faith in of- 'tidal U.S. reaffirmations- of support for , ''South Korea, Park told us, "There were and still are quite a number of Kor- :bans doubting the commitment of the United States" since the fall of Viet- 'nem. What if those doubts are well founded? ' "Even Without assistance, one people are determined to fight to the last man and not to concede an? inch of our territory." . He. next confirmed for the first time that South Korea, if abendoned by the U.S., would go nuclear. "We lave thea capability," the 'president said, but are not developing it and are honoring the nuclear non-proliferation . 'treaty. Then he bluntly added: "If the 'U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be re- 'mewed, we have to start developing 9 lnfIexibiIIb7T, our nuclear capability to save our- selves." ? ' The nuclear umbrella and eirpower compeise the major U.S. deterrent to a Communist attack, but Park also argued the U.S. 2d infantry division here plays "an' essential role in deter- ring , attack." , If American gr o un d troops were removed, "the enemy will be inclined to make a miscalculation" and "American word would carry far less credibility." Chuckling, Park said the U.S. soldiers play the role of full- back in eoccer football as a last line of -defense.. In other words, the 2d ? division would not be in the heart of , ground combat. . As for his May 13 decree banning in- ternal dissent, the president -said that otherwise "we might become another Vietnam." Is there hope for relaxa- tion? "It depends on the actions of the North Koreans. If the threat from the North Koreans is reduced, we should be able to relax security measures. If it is heightened, we would have to take tighter, restrictions. There la no ,other way." Park seemed to fully appreciate the difficulty his crackdown causes him in ashington, calling it "one of my big- gest headaches." Many America'e would say "very nice" (Park, speaking 'in Korean, used the. English words ? "very nice") if students were allowed - to demonstrate. But, he added,' that would undermine security and make the nation vulnerable to Communist attack. , Park cited three examples of de- mocracies curtailing civil liberties me der extraordinary conditions: Canada's crackdown on Quebec separatests, Gen. de Gaulle's authoritarian measures during the Algerian crisis and US. in- ternment (in "concentration camps," said Park) of Nisei Japanese during World War II. Granting that human rights are abridged in South Korea; said the president, Americans should note there is "no trace of human' rights" in North Korea. Other Park pronouncements:' ? ? Provocation: If instead of a front- al attack North Korea makes a prove- Cation by attacking South Korea's five sleall western coastal islands, retalia- tion against North Korean rear areas "would play into the hands of the .. 42 Communietsee Instead, the islands, -? nestled along the Norih Korean coat, should be made "invulnerable" to et- ? tack. e " Airpower: Combined - U.S. and South Korean airpower is in "pre- carious balance" .with North Korea's. But since "there is no guarantee that ? Americans will remain ? in Korea for- ever," South Korea needs more of its ? own planes. te Four-power pect: The plan by op- , position leaders here for the U.S., Soviet Uraion, China and Japan to guarantee Korean peace is "highly un- realistic." Great power guarantees did not work In Indochina and would "not he backed by any strength" in Korea. Park Chung Hee is clearly not. in- nlined toward new arrangements in - handling his menacing northern neigh- bor. His insistence on harsh internal .security measures, his appeal for con- ' tinued U.S. military presence here and - his determination to survive?even to ' ? the point of going nuclear?if the ' Americans leave are all linked to an Iron resolve that Korea shall not be- come a domino. That rescilve, rare in nervous East Asia after Vietnam, may more than compensate for the aggra- ' hvatteee? eaeeed U.S. officials by ?ark's - ; , , - ? n ? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONTIR 30 MAY 1975 ? 'U.S.' stilt most powerful despite Vietnam, Heath says Salt Lake City "Former British Prime Minister Edwar Heath said recently that despite its defeat in Vietnam the United States was still the mos powerful and influential nation in the world, Speaking at the commencement exercises of Westminster College here, Mr. Heath said. . "Don't be deluded by the charge that South- east Asia is the failing of America. What is failing is not America, but an illusion: That the postwar strategy of the containment of communism has . . . universal application." ,ANOWSZAMIOIMSOIN.1111,11. ? --e- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003700D8-9 ? 10.11:Xi '!:$4