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December 5, 1975
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25X1A ApProvedFor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010C1380003-3 CONFIDENTIAL NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 5 DECEMBER 1975 NO. 24 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA PAGE 1 37 42 44 47 49 Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 ApProve&For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00014380003-3 Governmental Affairs NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975 $xicepts Frorl?, C.I.A. ,Study, ? amid to 'The New YoTellmes - covert activities persists: 'aid., suggest that the committee ? WASHINGTON, Dec. 4? the threat to .vital U.S. on- Following are exterpts from tional security interests a report, "Covert Action ire posed by the Presidency' of Chile, 1963-1973," prepared Salvador Allende tustify_the by the staff of ihe Senatq,: several major covert attempts Select Committee on intelli- to prevent his accession to genee: power?' Americad Presidents and their senior Numerous allegations have : advisers evidently thought so. been made about U. S. covert One rationale for covert activities in Chile during intervention in Chilean poll- 1970-73. Several of these are false; others are half-true. In most instances, the re- sponse to the allegation must be qualified: tics was spelled out by 'Hen- ry Kissinger, in his back- ground briefing to the press on Sept. 16, 1970, the day after Nixon's meeting with Was the United States Helms. He argued that an directly involved, covertly, Allende victory would be ir- in the 1973 coup in Chile? reversible within Chile, might The committee has found no affect neighboring nations evidence that, it was. How- and would pose "massive ever, the United Slates: 'problems" for the U.S. in- sought in 1970 to foment a Latin America: military coup in .Chile. After "/ have yet to meet some- 1970 it adopted a policy both body who firmly believes overt and covert, of oppo- that if Allende wins, there is sition to Allende, and it likely to be another free remained in intelligence con- election in Chile. . . . Now it tact with the Chilean mili-: is fairly easy for one to pre- tary, including officers who- tact - that if Allende wins, were participating in cop ' there is a good chance that plotting : he will establish, over a pe- Did the 17...S. provide..., nod'of years some sort of covert support to striking, I. "Communist Goternment. in truck owners or other strik--: that ease; we -would have ers during 1971-73? The 40. - one not on an island off the man Committee did net Coast [Cuba] which has not a approve any such support 'traditional relationship and ;However, the: U. S. passed inipact in Latin America, but 'money to private sector in. a, major Latin-American groups' Which supported the- cefintry you--. would have a strikers. And in at least one - Communist ' Government, "case, a small- amount' of joining for example. Argen- money was passed to tine'''. ? Perk ? ? and' Bo- the strikers' by a private sec- livia . . So I donrt think we tor organization, contrary to should delude ourselves on C.I.A. ground rules. ? an Allende, take-over would Satan Arnotmts of Money not present massive problems for us, and for the democrat- Did the U. S. provide ie forces and for pro-U.S. covert support to right-wing forces in Latin America, and, terrerist organizations during indeed to the whole Western 1970-73? The C.I.A. gave Hemisphere. 'support in 1970 to one group, 1m.-the heeds of Congress 'Whose tactics became more rests the responsibility for Violent over time. Through insuring _that the executeme have become the hallmark of ,19-71', that, group _ received branc? h. is held to full POl1' the present regime in Chile? =lair ..sunis -.of American- cal accountability for covert- On these questions corn- -monekithreugh,third. parties activities'. The record on Chil, mittee members may differ. for specific purposes. And it is inixedi-and. mated ..1r4?it.a. T. So may American eilzens. Yet as possible that money ? was :incompleteness, the committee's mandate is passed to these groups onthe - recore'reaves unan- less.to judge the past than to extreme tight from C.I.A.-- swered a number of oues recommend for the future. supported opposition political -dons. These pertain bode to Moving from; past cases to parties. . .? how forthcoming the agency future guidelines, what is im-4 The pattern: of United: was and how interested and"?portant to ncite is-that covertl States 'covert action in Chile persistent the Congressional, action has been' perceived asi is striking but not unique. It committees were. Were mem- a middle ground between dip- arose in the context not only hers of Congress, for instance, lomatic representation and. of American foreign policy, given the opportunity to ob- 2the overt use of military . but also of covert U. S. in- ject to specific pr.ojects be- force. volvement in other countries fore the projects Vere imple- In the case of Chile; that within and outside Latin merited? Did they want to? middle ground may have been Ali:retina. The scale* of C.I.A. There is also an issue of jur- far too broad. Given the involvement in -Chile as isdiction. C.I.A. and State De- costs of covert action, it unusual but hi no means partment officials have taken should be resorted to only to unpreCedented., the position that they are counter severe threats to the . authorized to reveal agency ?? national security of the Utilel Prpliminary._ Conclusions-. -*operations only to the aptpro- ed States. It is far from clear A' fundamental questioraised by the pattern of U.S. . The:Chilean experiencedoes' Chile. ??, n.% priate oversight committees. that that was the case? give serious consideration to; the possibility that lodging: the responsibility for nation-, .al estimates and, conduct of operational activities with the, same person?the-Director of Central Intelligence?creates an inherent conflict of inter- est and judgment. - When covert actions in Chile became public know!- edge, the costs were obvious. The-United States. was seen, by its covert actione.to have contradicted not only-its offi- cial declarations but its treaty commitments and prin- ciples' of long standing. At the same time it was pro- claiming a "low profile" in Latin-American relations, the U. S. Government was- seeking .to foment a coup in Chile. - This report does not at- tempt to offer a final judg- ment on the political proprie- ty; the morality, or even the electiveness of American covert activity in Chile. Did the threat posed by an Al- lende Presidency justify covert American involvement in Chile? Did it justify the specific and unusual attempt,' to foment a military coup tor. deny Allende the Presidency? In 1970, the U. sought to foster a military coup in Chile: to prevent.,Alleeders acces- sion to power ; yet offer 197 the Governinei:It?e-according?, to the testimony of its Olffej cialse-didnotengage* coUpl WaS9704441Siariai in ab4 ernation?- Or. was, the threet,:! posed: to the' national securi--.'i ty 'interests of the- United-i State&so grave that the. Gev-r emment was remiss. in riot; seeking his downfall directly: during 1970-73? What, ree sponsibility does the United States bear for' the cruelty' and political suppression that 1 NE,1 YORK TIS PANEL CLEARS CIAI OF A DIRECT ROLE IN 73 CHILE COUP But Senate Committee Staff Finds That U.S. Encouraged ' the Overthrow of Allende AID FOR PLOTS TRACED Document Says Washington Allocated $13.4 Million to an Influence-Campaign By NICHOLAS Ml. HORROCK, SDeotel to The New Voir noes WASHINGTON, Dec. 4?The staff of a Senate intelligence committee said today it had found that the United States had encouraged- the overthrow of the "democratically elected": Chilean Government of Presi- dent Salvador Allende Gossens.; It said, however, that no di- met involvement by the Cen-. tral Intelligence Agency or the American Embassy in the 1973 coup had been established. These statements were made today in a 62-page report is- sued by the staff of the Sen.; -Ate Select Committee- on. Ire 'telligence. The document contained rela- tively little, information -not made public previously, either in the committee's `report-of Nov. 20 on its inquiry into as- sassination plots against foreign leaders or in accounts published_ in the press.- Today's report was based upon executive session testi- mony: by.. C.I.A. officials. and other Government officials *ding Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger/ 'It- also reflected information froin 'some secret C.I.A., National Security Coun- cil and State Department doc- uments. . _. Parts of the report, which is titled "Covert 'Action in Chile, 1963-1973," were read into the record of a public hearing. This action came after the Adminis- tration kept officials from tes- tifying in public session on the United States actions in Chile. The United States Govern-, ment, the committee staff said,! ended a 10-year, $13.4 million effort to deny Dr. Allende power in Chile by "advocating and encourasing the overthrow" rtiii his. :democratically_ elected government. - L William Miler, the commit- tee's staff director, told thei members that the reportoq Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Uniiid-States-actiVitY in Was repeesentative of six majoi covert operations studied-dur- ing the. -ccnamittee's inveStiga-1 tion. The six operations in turn, ?fere ?2...e14VSePtatiNter of 'thou- sands' by. die ?CIA., he said -r-These ? wein- several- of the nevi efernenti in'the ----Artie Interniatieet Tel and Telegraph .Cesporatiow put $350,090.,ofits Own money into tne,.43.3iiiialli :$1;e8Kentiat 'air, tiiiii Of 1970, -' the 'Committee 'staff said, adding that it WI $250,000- to the ,carapeign. oil former President: Jorge . Ales-. saidri and $100,000 to an anti -1 Atleilcie' NAY-- The report;'' $350,000 more had come other States- businesses, Which were =rained. (1The C.I.A. was able to af- fect:the content of a Time mag- azine story in 1970, the report said,: through - !"briefings- re- quested by Time and -provided by -the Elk in Washingtort'l _ Thehrlefiage, the report said, 'resulted' i . in- a change n- basic thrust-of the. Time on. - Allende's Sept: 4 vi and, in, the tinny' glity the apckfr. ..-_ 417 lieeport said that Presidentt Richard M:Iklixon o dered-X: aterced:UP - _effete to Stop Dr: Allende in September 1970: ;the .C.LA-: covertly* chart- rieled $1.1.5 . million to. El Me- Curio, the largest daily paper in. Chile,, t- anti- Allende _ coverage 41.14 tOkeeP:thit-liaPer ' solvent. -:-..,.., ,. '-, --,.- El - Meciirinl?ziw published, committee :A:cites:nen: confinn- ' ed, by Augustine Edwards a apse friend of, Donald M. Ken- t dell, president Of Pepsi,-;;Cola pc: ,--_,,- k. , liallieTCOMinkee's-iiisassina- lion-report---it was noted that iMt., Kendall had arranged a tbreakfast. meeting, between Mr: i Edward. Mr. Kissinger and then Attorney 'General .1ohil N.. Mitchell. -- '-'-'---. : ..- .%. While the conamittee. staff re- ported that it could establish no direct operational involvement by the C.I.A. or United States Embassy in the: 1973 coop, the members agreed during a Press- brlefing,- ,to.day that die United; StitnOsour; had: "created the a i - , ,'.. 11Z -01.11* tc g `-:-P;1 AllefxWit*IlMoric e F .:-.The.i.eij*'., `:a61e0 news accounts published in The New York Mules and elsewhere in the fall of 1974 that the United States had covertly poured mil- lions of dollars into Chile, first to keep Dr. Allnde from becom- ing president and later to over- throw his 'Government The re- port set the total figure, from 1963 until 1973, at about113.4 million and said that between Dr. Allende's inauglikation. in November 1970 and his mister, the United States Government spent-over $7 million: Today's he:wing included statements and testimony by Edward M. Korry, who served as United States Ambassador in Santiago during the early Nixon years. and Ralph A. Dungan, the Ambassador between 1964 and 1967.. .! -??? 2. WASEEENGTCN POST 5 BEG 1975 Role IA Clue ..4na Was Sp6nt. on . -;.overt. Work By Laurence Stern -,washrnsq9....posi -SIMI Writer Details .of. I !'massive" campaign: of tiaridestine operations over aA0-year periOcittibinek the eleeticar- anCtheifto Overthrow thef government cif?the. late?, re revealed Siesterdaji7 try .ftZSCriateint011igence: : In a report on what'it called', an --".`extelitlyi and" coir-'? tinuotis" program of- covert ?pet-Akins' conducted during - the Kennedy, Johnson and : Nixon- administrations; the committee report estimated ? that the United States spent $13.4million in Chile between 1963 and1973. Of this amount, some $8 Million-was allocated -to, _propaganda and support of., political parties; -$4.3; million was spent to-support and in-. fluenee the- mass, media- ofCh? , Central Intelligence .Agency expenditures to one apti- ? Allende- ? newspaper; Mercurio; amounted to $1.5. million from Sept. 9;. 1971; to April lt 1972: The report also -? saki- that cm? evaluators had --candilded -7!"!that"-- El Mercurio 4.44740: znein4:: Mitts ,?uPPorted. bY,".41A .AStagYilsi? .1played 'twinoilortart rale in: 'aett.n)0 the-slitge for these0.: 114.973 military coupk."-'? Tlie'ownet of EI;mercuriai, wealthy Chilean businessman Augustin Edwards, conferred' with top officials of the Nixon, administration ? on the -a?Sept. 15, 1970 ---that President Nixon ordered the CIA to help mount a military. Coup d!etat as a means of preventing Allende's election. The report revealedthat the international Telephone and Telegraph- Corp. and other U.& -multinational firms based in Chile funneled some ? *700,000- into that country's presidential popular election in 1970- in behalf of con- servative- candidate Jorge _ ; Alessandri?Allende's . prin-. ciPal opponent. It previously had been disclosed that ITT had offered through one of its directors, former CIA Director John A. me MeCone, $1' million to thwart the Allende 'election but that the money had been declined by the agency. The actual contributions of ITT and other American companies, the report. disclosed, was given with the, CIA's advice se how to "safely channel" the money into the 1970 campaign. In con-, tributed about $350,000 of the total amount, according tO the. committee. Seri. Frank Church (D- Idaho), chairman of the in- telligence panel, estimated that the $3 million pumped. into Chile during the 1964 election would be the equivalent to an .expenditure' of $60 million in the United States?allowing for dif- ferences in population.. That, Church noted, was more than twice the reported amount spent by Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater together during the U.S. presidential campaign that year. - ? In the 1964 Chilean election, the report- revealed, more, than half of the campaign costs of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei were financed' by the -United States without Frei's knowledge. That year, as in. the previous four elec- 'tions in Chile, Allende was a candidate. The CIA spent more than $2.6-Million in- Frei's behalf in the 1964 presidential race_ - The United States did not only concern itself with presidential elections in Chile but congressional contests as well. In February, 1965, the 103 Committee, which at that -time passed on covert operations, approved $175,000, to support 22 congressional candidates in Chile selected by the U.S. ambassador and the CIA station chief, ac- cording to the report. In describing the CIA- directed propaganda to in- fluence the outcome of the 1970. election, the report cited the ease of a Time magazine article cover story that was. changed as the result of a CIA briefing. "According to CIA documents," the committee said, "the Time correspondent in Chile apparently had ac- cepted Allende's protestations of moderation and con- stitutionality at face value.. Briefings requested by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington: resulted in a. change in the basic thrust of. the Time story" on Allende's Sept. 4 popular victory. The pattern of covert financing, according_ to the. report; spread through the entire political and economic sector of Chile, encompassing trade unions, business organizations, right-wing extremist groups and farm organizations . - Funds provided by the CIA, the report said, "financed activities covering a broad 1 spectrum from propaganda .manipulation of the press to large-scale support for Chile's political parties, from public opinion polls to attempts to foment a military coup. - The report asserted that there was no evidence.the United States was "directly involved, covertly" in the 1973 coup against . Allende.. "However the United States sought, in 1970, to foment a? military coup in Chile," the committee staff concluded. "After 1970 it adopted a policy of both overt and covert op- position to Allende and it remained,. in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in the coup plotting." Similarly, the report said. that top U.S. national security advisers opposed -American funding of the truckers' strike that precipitated the final- economic-crisis of the Allende' administration, setting the stage for the Sept. 11 coup. The CIA recommended that the truck owners' strike be supported with a $25,000 grant, but the proposal was never approved. The CIA did rebuke . a Chilean cover organization that passed on $2,300 to the strikers. The CIA provided $38,500 for., the controversial right-wing: paramilitary organization Fatherland and Liberty "in an- effort to create tension and a possible pretext for in-, tervention by the Chilean, military.': The organization was publicly-calling for the armed overthrow of Allende's government. The report, based on accese, to national security documents, said that the; covert activities carried out ini Chile were apparently. not. made available to the CIA intelligence analysts responsible for preparing' National Intelligence estimates on Chile. This meant,that those U.& officials . responsible for preparing, national estimates; on Chile "appear not to have had access- to certain in- formation which could have added to.: or substantially' revised, their assessments and predictions. That flaw - - , was telling," the report said. The - committee heard testirriony yesterday from two former ambassadors to Chile,: Edward M. Korry and Ralph Dungan, as well as former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer. Korry evoked laughter from the audience when he declared that "under Ambassador Dungan and me, Chile made more social progress than any' other country in ?Latin America." Korry, in a heavily. emotional presentation, ac- cused Church and the corn- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 ApProvedFor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010Q380003-3 mittee of conducting a political "pornoflick" rather. than an objective inquiry. He- wes ambassador during thes 1970 U.S. intervention. Dungan, the ambassador from. 1964. to 1967;. described: the intervention "as we now-: see in hindsight a national? disgrace." He added,-, however, that the excesses occurred under. "imprecise'' congressiotral mandates, haphazard oversight and? money provided by Congress." The general outlines of the CIA interventions in 1964 and the 1970-1973 period have been reported in the press. What' the new committee report ;provided was precise detail! and documentary evidence. It also demonstrated,' through citation of national security documents that were for the com- mittee, that, the U.S. policy-l? making community was split4 on the 1970 interventions withi the State Department taking a! dim view of intervention and the Pentagon, White House; and the U.S. ambassador to Chile, Korry, supporting it. ? In describing the scope..111 CIA-financed propaganda activity, the report detailed' what it called a,."spoiling: Operation" against Allende's leftist coalition in 1970 that.? included production of hun- dreds of thousands of posters and leaflets; extensive press. and radio campaigning; sign, painting some 2,000 walls with. the firing, squad slogan "sit' paredon" (your wall), and conducting a terror campaign; showing large photographs or, Soviet tanks in Prague. ? In one week during the-19641 campaign, the report said, "al CIA-funded propaganda groupi produced 20 radio spots per; day in Santiago and on 44; provincial stations; 12-minutd ? news broadcasts five times, daily on three Santiagoi, stationt and 24 provincial! ? outlets; thotsands of cartoonsl and much paid press, ad-4 vertising.P ..?-. . ? WAS} NGTON POST 30 NOV 1975 Havana Report ?. . HAVANA?The nes media in Cuba so far have kept. complete silence on US. reports of CIA plots against; the life of Fidel Castro, Reuter:. reported. The findings. of the Senate intelligence committee on the subject have not 'bee' picked up by the Cuban press: and there has been no officialq . . ? . 'comment. WASHINGTON POST 2 8 NOV 1975 -i eport,?Eixcher,-,TRiattmo 54. .4, ? . - Lbw, ' janithi ? ieenglitiltatdidti-1 knar. it ait4. testifYinignikt Oath lioi'Prie- ?. .NorrYk- 1141 Senate intelligene eoroiratteis 1.17-:S:YiWvissozter , ratifired *Mee. ErisvardAalcolni &ay mtrkssa dor, recommended to made a. series of ? Seimaingly 'Washington 'a plan f6r unqualified disclaimers of $OO.O0O -effort in tthe Chilean); American intervention -in the congress to persuade certain' 1970' Chilean 1.,:pres identi 41, shifts in v.otiiig,on 24 October.', election .:: " : - 1970.- That was the date of the Chilean runoff election made necessary ? because AllendeMarch r19:the:e = falledthyjr.a majority_ in the: It tvat,,obvious'frditil thd.7histej-ical- record that we: popular election Sept. 4. did nor**` itfittY mariher.that The "Forty Committee," /ref* tedieS?hardf4hd;"that the- the government's toodecision; t making body for covert jilited States' ga.v..e.nosupport ,taanKooterodg.ndiaate,. operations, authorized that the_Viledi.;States. did not $350,000 to be spent by the 'Seek ...tri:.toistissig-4,itittiv.? Central Intelligence Agency to-. -ihtfu:-:?,tegre-,-nie-inber..4. bribe menbers of the Chilean3 tehileattleangiess,,.a4,44A congress to oppose Allende, li.oie.in-ore?asigire fops years and overturn the results of thei Trwslat ? 1 popular election:- The . money2.: was never spent, however,, , revelations of the because of fears that the CIA'.s. SepaternteliigeRce. committee complicity would leak out. ' in its assassination report list There was another major :vatiliCiintr14-dietthiS-and other' contradiction. According to: ;a0FectionsfsWpra the Senate report, Korry, - received a go-ahead front!: The--_:?cohimittee, repcirf Washington after a Sept: 144. Ofiotes, for z. example,: C 1970 National Security Council; message -Kerry sent . to, meeting to implenient what, President ,Eduard& Frei; lo was Called -the:Li:tube Gold-; a favorite i( Korry and tIlt berg" gambit to deny thdir& Anterfeask. electien to Allende.; This lair; establiihment--`:' - callet f or -the- diveiSiOn;of votes-in the Chilean Congress-.? in??..,r-,,,e.,...?.,..;,,..?. ..._, . to the candidaeye bi Jorge ',The -rriessagM- .seekitig:1 Ur. if;ran!--/a7.""pallTi'ea_riti_ AleS.sandri, a conservativel. and. aging politiCian.. who' terventi on: to deny: the- MN. , would then resign,-,leaving.thei Chilean election tn.-Salvador Allende.= said: 'Frei shoultl incumbent , hristia.it', ' know'that not 4 nut or-bolt wilii Democrat, Frei,' . conz' be allowed to reach Chil&, stitutionally- free-to- :siteceeci-; : under Allende. Once Allen* himself in the presidency: comes to power we shall do a#: (Chile's' constitution bars a. within-our power. td.condemC president from succeeding Chile: and. the' Chileams :Op; himsqlf.) ?. ' utmost : -depriiiatiiii: ' arid l In his. 1973 testimony to the i poverty, a policY-digned.fo0 subcc_ommittee ? -investigating a,'1Unigtime? ha mind tiiid41. efforts by International Celerate the hard featOrei Otkii Telephone, and Telegraph. comrttunist .:SOciety, -in- Chile Corp. to block the election. of __,:.1.,./,?:_,: .,,... ,,,. , : f- - .:-. ,,-:-??;,.zf Allende in 1970, Korry said -? Statements isshedinheharr that the United States "did not get involved in the so-called of. President Nixon- that 'the -United .States plaYed4) n '. 'A Alesshndri formula. . . " ? ar-i terventioniit role in Chile_irs5 in a 'focitnote? to. the Senate. a CIA.memo. disclosed- 1970 . also were stronklyi committee report, spelled out challenged-15y the Senate :1 -_-__ committees evidence Korry's' role in the?Alessandri ' ora; presidentially -ordered covertil "Ambassador Korry was political war -against the asked to- go direetly to socialist Allende: - " President Frei .to see if he :! formula. So- was: the testimotiy 'of- would he willing to commit' former Secretary' of State- himself to this line of action. AI William P. Rogers: hii snc,, contingency of, $250.000 was cestor; Henry A. Kissinger; approved for 'covert support- former CIA Director Richard.' of projects which- Frei or his-. M- 'Helms, former Astistanto trusted team deem im- Secretary Of State for Inter; portant.' It was further agreed Amerdean- Affairs Charles, that a propaganda campaign, Meyer and other State- be undertaken by the agency. Department spokesnrielv (CIA) te, focus on the damage - 'Meyer omment'earlier of an Allende takeover." - ? this3ce*.kalia_ve the feehrtial ;?.4 Korry said yesterday that -I 3 stand by every statement I, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 yPis?eap, "1";;N.,: :??? ve made to the committee' and to the press." He added that he will testify publicly at the committee's hearings, on "chile nfet,t_wc.ek...,_;...: The S ena te repoic iaire nevi significance to an internal ITT document that was first reported by columnist Jack Anderson. in March, 1972. It alluded to a Sept. 15, 1970, message from the State Department to Korry in Santiago. That memo, from ITT field operatives Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrelez, reported to' high executives of the firm: "The. big push has begun in Chile to assure- a congressional victory for Jorge Alessandri on October 24, as-part of what has- been dubbed the. "Alessandr0 Formu to. prevent Chilel from becoming a Communist! state. . . Late Tuesday night, (Sept. 15 ) ?Ambassador Edward, Korry- finallr received a message from the .State Department,giving him- the green light to-move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him_ maximum authority to do all possible ? short of a Dominican. Republic-type; action ? to: ;keep Allende from taking: ' ? Korr,y testified in the Senate Vttfltinalinnal-Cor porationS StibtommitteefiOuiry that! "there was nn:green light anything approximating But; he declined: to elaborate" ?'on his instructions from Washingtonon the ground that it would be improper for him; to discuss the content of an executive communication. Sept. 15, 1970, was the day,' _according . to: thez.Senate in-; tel I igence corataitteei ;that president Nbionnrdere Helm to invithieVi67-4A.:-.1114 'Promoting thiyoiip ? d'etat, in Chile.- at a: Meeting; with Kissinger and, Attorney1 GeneraljohnN. Mitchell. Other statements by leading administration officials .that appear to be contradicted by' the evidence of the Senate reportwere these:. ? r . ?Iri his 1972 foreign policy, report to Congress, President: Nixon,in a reference to Chile, said the United States deals "realistically with govern-- ments as they are? right and.: left." His administration, the! President said, pursued a. policy of "non-intervention." ?During his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Statel in September, 1973, Kissingeti said that "the CIA was heavily involved in 1964 in th_e_elec_tion,I was in a very minor way in-. volved in the 1970 election andi since then we have absolutelyl .;4 ha Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 stayed away from any coups,' Our efforts in Chile were to strengthen the democratic', political parties and give them', a basis for winning the elec.-4, tion in.1976. . . " ? ? Thomas KaramessineS, Deputy Directorfor-Plans (covert operations),, testified; to the Senate intelligenct* committee; that "Kissinge left no doubt in my mind the he was under the heaviest o pressure to .get complished and he in turn was' placing us under the heaviest of pressures to geLit ac-: Compl is hed Kara mess i n was speaking of the CIA' covert promotion of a coup b the Chilean re ili tarY 1111970:- - -=TeStifyhig before theS Senate, Foreign' Relations, Committee On March-22; 1974 Rege rs - said "TheNnitedi States government-did .rip6 engage in impr.oper,aivth ? ?Meyer.. testifyingi THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Nov. 29, 197$ the Senate MultitiatiOriag Corpora tions Subcommittee:, on Mardi 17, 1978, said: "The policy of the government, Mr, Chairman, was that -there; would be no intervention'in t political affair* Of were ConsiStetit!i-rii financed no Candidatets;',n political parties befdre artir;- Spt 8 (*da*Thrth. popular election)..: ,,the Presfaint stated' govern-.; inentY---aS :therate?. . . we were rellgiOusIV and, scrupulously adhering to thea policy of the government of the United -States . of , _nonintervention. This week '..-214eyer -said-, ruefully: "/ never. felt then nor 'now that Wasii_erjuring. or lying. The degree. to which. ffi was talking abouthat I knew-1 ? and- aholitAvhat I didn'tq know, will have to be demonstrated." Anti-Allende Campaign, U.S. vint. o Chilean May Be Linked ? By Laurence Stern Wasnington Post Staff Writer- ?,, The day President Nixon.' launched his undeclared war of covert political operations against Chile ? Sept. 15. 1970 ? there was a series of secret meetings in Washington centering on the presence of a wealthy Santiago publisher, Agustin Edwards. According to former CIA director Richard M. Helms, it was Edwards' presence in. Washington that day whichi may have "triggered", President Nixon's instructions to involve the CIA int per- miffing, a military coup d'etatl intended to prevent the election of Socialist Salvador! Allende as president of Chile.- Edwards, a conservative; who bitterly opposed Allendeo _ came to Washington in what.: one government source ? described as "a last-minute effort" to recruit U.S. support for a plan to derail Allende.'s prospects of election by the '? Chilean- Congress, on Oa. 24, 1970. - : ? 'I.-. The El Mercurio jib- blishing chain of .which Edwards was publisher and owner had received CIA subsidies since? the late 1950s, according to government sources. - Edwards gained. Presidenk Nixon's ear through thei helpful intercession. of Pep?-..: siCo' president Donald Ken- dall, a mutual .friend and. longtime political backer as' well as law client of Nixon. After Allende's election,. Edwards joined the Pepsi- Cola organization as a vice. president. Helms, in his testimony to the Senate intelligence committee, said that prior to- the White House meeting at which President Nixon called, for CIA intervention, "the. editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington, and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels here." Helms was reported to have:' been- perplexed by his structions to consult with! Kendall and" Edwards on' conditions : in: Chile. feeling seems:to:be that here he was, the director of the United'. States Central. Intelligence Agency and he was being sent by the White House to interview the head of the Pep_sizCola Co._ and a Santiago publisher," related a, well-informed associate ot Helms. - In his testimony to the Senate. intelligence com inittee, Helms. said he had thej impression that Presiden Nixon called the Sept 15, 1970k White House meeting on Chile "because of Edwards' presence in, Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening: there." I Helms' hand-written notes! from that meeting reflectedI such presidential reactions! and instructions, as these: "One-in.-ten chance, perhaps, but save CliAe?,',?;',-,;, Not: concerned risks Net involvement of. Embassyi . $10,000,080-. available,1 more if necessary . . time -jobs . . . best .men we: have . , Game plan . . Make the economy scream', .. .. 48 hours for plan of ac- tion." On the morning of Sept. 15, a footnote to the Senate in- telligence committee report noted, "At the request of. Donald Kendall, 'President of Pepsi-Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell met for breakfast with Kendall' andi Edwards. The topic of con-! versation was the political' situation' ,in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio and other anti-Allende forces." - The breakfast meeting was followed by a more formal session at the White House- . . _ cconducted by the President,' and. attended by Kissinger,: Mitchell and Helms. It was! then; as the CIA director laterl testified; that President Nixon; "came down very hard that he. wanted_ something_ done (in Chile) and he didn't much care how and and that he was: prepared to make money available. . The Senate intelligence NEW YORK TIMES 4 Dec. 1975 U.S. Intelligence Chiefs Deny Falsifying Vietnam Troop Data ? committee is now negotiating. with Nixon to hear his version- '.oltheseevents. ?CIA director William E.; 'Colby testified secretly to a- House intelligence iu13-. Committee in June, 1974, tbat the CIA spent $8-,million ini covert efforts to? prevent' Allende's election and then, undermine his government? between 1969 and197.3. WASHINGON; Dec. 3 (UPI) ?The outgoing civilian and mi- litary intelligence directors de nied ' today, :that there was a conspiracy-to downgrade Corns. munist troop-, strength in Viet- narn.before the I9,68 Tet often. sive ? .?? William E.' Colby. director of Central Intelligence, told the Hou.se. Intelligence Committee at. the C.I.A. insisted at the ti e: that the Vietcong had 500,D00 or more men, compared with a military estimate: of 292,flott Lieut. Gen. Daniel. O. Graham, who seeking early retirement as' head of the Defense Intel- ligence Agency, testified that United States military leaders were not surprised by the in- tensity of the Tet attack, which killed 2,200 Americans and de- stroyed 58 aircraft. - Both men took issue with statements by Samuel A. Adams, a former C.I.A. agent, who eold the committee in Sep- tember that the agency and the military deliberately falsi- fied Communist strength to make it appear the allies were winning the war. Mr. Colby, in prepared testi- mony, said the C.I.A. preparedr a special assessment for De- fense Secretary Robert S. Md- Namara in May 1967 that con- cluded "the over-all strength of the Communists' organized force structure in South T(fet? ? . nam is probably 580,004 range and may even by higher.1' "The-500.000 figure presented by. the in this report could be compared with - an official military number at that time of 292,000." Mr. Colby said. "I believe that these quo- tations from official C.I.A. pub- lications show clearly that the CLA. did not shrink from push- ing the case for higher figures and made no attempt to pro- duce 'politically acceptable' es- timates." Mr. Adams testified -that the Vietcong had' 600,000 troops at the time, along with 30,000 spies' in the South ,Vietnamese military, and that this fact was concealed from the public by- the C.I.A. and the military Mr. Colby and Mr. GraHam said that testimony was errone- ous and misleading. Mr. Graham, who preceded Ivr.r. Colby to the witness table, said it was estimated after the Tet offensive that the Vietcong had a .force of only 170,000 men and that not all of them could have taken part. Mr. Colby, who is continuing as C.I.A. chief until his desig- nated successor, George Bush, goes through the Senate confir- mation process, was once in charge of the agency's "Phoe- nix" program designed to wipe out Vietcong double agents and South' 'Vietnamese Zietnamese collabora- tor. 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010,038000.3-3 ApProvedsFor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.380003-3 THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY,. NOVEMBER 30; 1975 The Unmaking of a President ANTOFAGASTA, Chile? Americans suffer from. a kind of political maso- chism, that relishes depicting United States policy and its agents as a wicked, corrupt force, and relatively -recent events inn-ghileconfirm this ob- ? sessive malady: ? - A favorite legend is that Uncle Saila ,deliberately threw out- the-benevolent President Salvador Allende Gossens in 1973 while sponsoring a military coup d'etat under Gen. Augusto , Pinochet Ugarte, now chief of state. It is sometimes contended that the 'plot was engineered by C.I.A. agents who are held responsible nowadays for everything from foot-and-mouth dis- ease to famine in Bangladesh. But many argue that the two United States ambassadors to Chile. under Allende engineered events producing today's authoritarian regime. Mr. Alle-nde, whom I knew, is not - 'around- to comment_ He committed suicide during the putsch.. But I have talked?with. the Presidents, who pre- ceded and succeeded. him, Eduardo Frei Montalva and General Pinot/let About the only thing they. agree on is ; that the U.S. had nothing- to do with Allende's overthrow. n ' In Santiago Mr. Frei told me he knew both American ambassadors well during the Allende presidency: Edward Korry, who left in late 1971 at the end of Allende's-first year, and Nathaniel' -Davis, his successor. Mr. Frei didn't pretend to know what the C.I.A. was up to. Nevertheless, he argued it couldn't possibly have stirred _ up the- massive opposition to Allende _that followed a.15,000 percent rise in inflation over three- years and a 1,000 percent drop in the value bf... Chile's currency.. He said: "A-s. far asI'iave been able to find out concerning what. happened FOREIGN AFFAIRS By C. L. Sulzberger 'between 1970 and 1973, I know of no act of interventinn in internal politics by either Ambassador. !Corry. or Am- bassador Davis." - ? ??? ? As for General Pinochet, who planned and led the coup, he assured me heret "I can swear to you as a Christian that I. never had any kind of contact with anyone from the C.I.A. or with any ambassador, U.S. or otherwise. I wanted to be free of any. obligation to anybody.' ? "And of course I wanted to protect my intentions by total discretion. Why, -afterward, even my family asked what kind of help I received from the United States. I told them: Not even. good will.' In that I. am very much- dis- appointed."-: 5 ? - While General' Pinechet- has aim-' pressive credibility glif$, there it every' reason to believe this particular asser- fion. He revealed to me details. of his- coup -never before diatlosed:- These _ show that he prepared. his putsch virtually alone over a long period; taking hardly anyone into his ? confidence. "Anyone,"_ includes the C.I.A. whose principal function in Allende's day seems to have been try- ing to. help moderate democratic forces stay alive. (The agency did oppose Allende at the very start of his presi- dency and was indirectly involved in the killing of Gen. Ren?chneider in, a mysterious conspiracy just afterward. But it. was not involved- in the Pinochet coup three years later.) _ General.- Pinochet began worrying about .Communism, in '1947 when- he commanded 'small security force at a detention 'camp. He. thought -Chile ?? had reached the end of the road when Allende. was elected: in 1970. ;He be... n came known for anti-Communism but., the regime- mistakenly dismissed? an-- , other general named Pinochet and left him untouched. ? ' n ? : Thereafter he blandly concealed his. opinions -and - was subsequently- ap-i pointed,' army commander. ? He dis- cussed his intentions with only a hand- ful of high- army officers, never telling anyone in the air force, navy or con- stabulary because he.. felt these had. already been dangerously infiltrated by. pro-Allende men. ? Finally, in June, 1973, he ordered the Army War College to prepare a "genie plan" to protect internal se- curity. Each portion was drafted by separate groups.so nobody could under/ stand the project's potential signifi- cance. General Pinochet decided to act 'von' Sept. 14, -1973?four days-before- .an independence day paxasie:This would allow him ton-bring military units .into Santiago for the customary: procession. and' billet them in concentric rings- around the city. . But on Sept. 9, air force Gen. Gustavo Leigh and an 'admiral repre-- senting the navy commander, Adm.: Jose Merino, visited General Pinochet. on his daughter's_ birthday, Leigh,. Merino_ and the national police. com- mander, den. Cesar Mendoza, now- 'form the four-man ruling junta that Pinochet dominates. They asked Pino- chet to 'take action and he agreed to move up his D-day to! Sept. 11. But he never disclosed details of his opera-, tionat plan, _ ? Thus he adducei considerable _dence, that rio foreigner, diplomat or intelligence- agent knew anything about Ms.-project -ahead of time?be- cause hardly any Chilean did. On this point it is logical to believe him. , THE NEW YORK TIMES;THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975 Public's-Esteemfor 18-FOund Off-Sharply Public esteem for the Federal asked 1,515 adults, 18 *and. ol- Bureau of Investigation, always high in. earlier days, has de- clined considerably n in the last decade and particularly since 1970, the Gallup organization reported in its latest poll, is- ,sued yesterday. The polling organization said that the "highly favorable" rat- ing given. the F.ECI. in /965 by 84 percent of those inter- viewed dropped to 37 percent in the. poll conducted last was-another-drop of 19 points month. Even so, the bureau by 1973 and still another de- continued to hold the respect cline of 15 points since then, of a majority, with generally to reach the current' low mark. positive ratings ,utstripping At the same time, 80 percent negative marks by a ratio of of those questioned gave the about 5, to 1. F.B.I. plus-rating, against 16 The Gallup survey used a percent minus-ratings, with 4 10-point scale on which it percent stating no opinion. der, in more than. 300 communi- ties to -rate the F.B.I. from plus-5 to minus-5. The two top ratings, plus-5 and plus4; were counted) as "highly favorable.". The poll was- taken between Oct. 30 And Nov. 3: - The polling organization said the "highly favorable" rating had slipped 13 points, from ;.84 percent to -71 percent, be- tween 1965 and 1970. There - The 'Gallup organization -said that early disenchantment with the bureau began among youn- ger adults, especially those with a-college background, liv- ing the East. But it added that in the latest snrvey' the decline in esteem had become across-the-board, coming after such allegations of misconduct as the harassment of the Rev. Dr. Martin.Luther King Jr. prior to his assassination in 1968. A-parallel survey of the pub- Gallup organization said. lic:s regard for the Central In- telligence Agency found that the C.I.A. had scored consider- ably below the F.B.I. The poll- ing group said that 14' percent of those questiohed. had given the CI.A. a "highly favorable", rating, compared with the F.B.I.'s 37 percent. In 1973, the C.I.A. also ranked well be- hind the bureau but :still got "highly favorable" marks from 23 percent of the sample, the WASHINGTON POST- 2 DEC 1975 Bruce Retirement BRUSSELS?David K.E. Bruce, U.S. ambassador to NATO, said he will retire at the end of January?but not because of a dispute with the. White House. In a statement, Bruce, 77- , said he had_told Secretary,a. 5 State Henry* KissingeT September he wished to retire in January. He labeled asi "-utterly -? inaccurate" a! Newsweek magazine reportl that he resigned in anger alter1 learning, via leaks, that his:, job had. been offered to'i outgoing- . CIA, Director': Williana E. Onlby,....,L Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 THE NEW YORK REVIEW 13 November 1975 Someone to Watch Over You The Abuses of the _ Intelligence Agencies by The Center for National Security Studies, edited by Jerry J. Berman - and Morton H. Halperin: Center for National _Security Studies (122 Maryland Ave., NE, -Washington, DC 20002), $-2.25 - , Garry Wills _ This is a dizzying computation of all the snoopings, publicly known so far,. performed by our public servants upon their putative masters. With admirable restraint the report attempts to collect and document every instance of illegal activity undertaken by our various intelligence agencies. It gives the de- fense offered by? the agencies, the authority under which each- agency operated, and the statutes apparently infringed. It is a_ very, useful and complete handbook on official crime. We can surmise that the tally- is not complete,. since it arose from spot investigations, odd suits, and accidental-- confession. But already the count is ' almost self-defeating. The hundreds. under surveillance, the thousands photo- graphed, the hundreds of thousands filed. The "watch lists" in readiness for emergency detention. The blacks. The kids. Hit lists. Enemies. The "enemy within" is us. The deadpan recital ofit all tends to dissolve in the mind. Everett Dirksen- claimed, "A million here, a, million there-in time that adds up to ; real money." It doesn't, of- course,' That kind of addition tarns-Magically,' at some unthinkable number-into sub- - traction. We know fairly well what -we,, are-getting for $1.98. But not for forty billion. Much the same thing happens by = the thousandth wiretapping or ? break-in recorded here. . We must summon up a gratitude to E.' Howard Hunt. One or two of -hfs-. comic break-ins, complete with celebra--- tory self-photographing sessions=or.2 one intimidating "interview" with red - wig ? and voice-modulator-reminds us what all these figures really mean. The break-in at the Democratic National Committee_was small potatoes set be- side the hundreds of FBI "black- bag" ? jobs; but its very $1.98 size smuggled it izi toward the imagination past TV com- mercials and situation comedies. Water- gate, was the- sit-corn of scandals, "Haldeman and Son," your friendly garbage collectors tripping over each other's feet. - _those who -found the Nixon -tenure in office peculiarly sinister fail to notice its redeeming feature: Nixon distrusted everyone, even- J. Edgar . Hoover. Even Richard Helms. Anyone Outside his sight. He had to rely on private flunkies for everything-to con- trol demonstrations around the White 6 House (call over John Dean from the Justice Department), to conduct the war on drugs (use the scrubbed feroci- ty of Egil Krogh), to keep track of Teddy (put Tony Ulasewiez on the, trail of boiler-room girls); to draw up a- master Plan for spying on everyone- including the spies (have young -TO-m7 Huston teach J. Edgar his tricks). . \POor Huston, how he wronged the ? Director: he, thought him temiss in the? patriotic breaking of laws. He had to admit, before the Church- committee, 'that Hoover had been doing the very things he- proposed; but :Huston thought Hoover was above all that--; and Hoover had to slap down the kid for being such a simpleton. Nixon had the apparatus of a police state at his disposal, but he was too devious to use it. Right-wingers con- stantly make the Mistake of thinking that liberals live up- to their own pretensions. The pretensions give them.. license to sink down toward their' enemies' level. If you' want real and systematic perfidy, you do-'.-not get...it with Nixon, who sabotaged ? himself with a., saving gracelessness. You get it with Truman, with his tests for securi- ty risks and front organizations. Or with Kennedy, and his _harassing of socialist groups. Or with Lyndon Johnson, who warred on Black Pan- thers. (Eisenhower stepped up CIA activity abroad-a_ subject dealt with glancingly in this report, and one hope to return to in a later piece.. But Eisenhower had- little, if any, interest in nonmilitary-i.e., ideological-spying,- a taste -that made sophisticates of "intelligence" consider him soft.)? It was during Truman's time that the Attorney General's List was published, a proscription list unparalleled in our history, the basis of all later black- listings. It made a man's job fair game if he had given money to, or accepted membership- in, or attended-a meetings of, any one of hundreds of - organiza- tions branded for discrimination but- not charged with any crime. A new- public _category had been created, the- noncriminal non-American. - _ It was during Kennedy's regime that the FBI launched its "COINTELPRO" action against the Socialist Workers of America-sending letters to empl6yers, planting "disinformation" to scuttle a registered and - above-board political party. There is something touching about the FBI's own memos on this _ operation. On the one hand, the, party was flagrant. in its un-Americanism: it "has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and, national basis through"-are you ready' for the revelation of its dastardly tactics?-'"running candidates for public office." The FBI, thwarted by this openness, had to arrange a Disruption' Program (its own term) to "alert the public." Alert it to what? TO the socialist "line"? Yet the party's very offense was the public dissemination of this line. And how did the FBI___alert the public? By openly professing its . own line? No, by secret slander, anon- ymous notes, and forged provoca- tions.* That is what sinks in: through the - reading of this dreary catalogue, this -list of spy work extended_ over ? dec- ades, descending to the pettiest tricks- the sheer lawlessness of the 'activity used against legal dissemination of "un-American" ideas. The , customary defense df the intelligence agencies is that they may- have been carried away by their eagerness to capture criminals. The constable's excess is an enduring problem when dealing with a wily crook. But what we see documented here, on page after page, is . the conscious and deliberate and extensive breaking of laws by a whole series of public agencies (the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, military teams, the NSA) against people who have broken no laws, whose proscribed activities are -not' even preliminary- to ,the breaking of laws, whose real offense is not crimirial activity but disloyal thinking. Under liberal regimes, for decade after dee: ade, we have had a thought-control approach to internal surveillance. This was known; it was supported by the ; public; it was- endowed ,by the Con- gress-and even- now there is little compunction about what occurred. The reaction of a majority of Ameri- cans,- to this report, shocking as it. is; will be: So whiat? _ . - What makes thisLreactiirri. po_ssiblei : Not merely the press of a cold war or the quirks of a single senator. We have to grant; J. ?relgar one thing-he called things un-American, and Americans agreed with him, for years, emphati- cally. The rejection of Nixon (and of Watergate) has nothing to do with the more serious and dangerous spying on Americans by other Americans that has been accepted as "the American way" for decades, and maybe for centuries. Maybe it is the American way. In- 1921, Gilbert Chesterton applied for entry to America as a visiting lecturer. Ile was stunned by the ques- tions he had to answer. \Vas he an anarchist? A polygamist? Did he advo- cate the -overthrow of America by force? Ile .was applying in the after- math of the Palmer raids, but the procedures or admission had been settted for years; and they amused a man who had traveled widely without *Thanks to pretrial discovery, there is a particularly full account of the FBI, activities against the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialists- Alli- ance. All these documents will soon be published in a paperback by the Path- finder Press- (410 West St., NYC 10014; $1.95). It is no wonder that intelligence agencies -try to stay out of court Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 a Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010Q380003-3 ever -undergoing such an inquisition: "I have stood on the other side of Jordan, in the land ruled by a rude Arab chief, where the police looked so like brigands that one wondered _what the brigands looked like. But they did not ask me whether I had come to subvert the power of the Shereef; and they did not exhibit the faintest curiosity about my personal views on? the ethical basis of civil_ authority."2 Only Ainerica, the land of the free,. asked hirri- what he thought about the kind of freedom it was peddling?and, asked him not as a settler or possible immigrant, but merely as a visitor. He especially loved the idea that sub-- verters of the .nation would be docile in declaring, ahead of time, their intention to subvert. There is a na? assumption, among Americans, that everybody knows what his or her ideas on government are, and that they will declare this mental baggage whenever challenged. We make such challenges not only to visitors or prospective citizens, but to- people already certified as ,American?are they American enough? Hence , loyalty oaths, security checks, Americanism committees of the Legion, un-Ameri- can activities committees of the Con- gress, and Freedom Trains to teach Americans how to be more?American. America is not merely a country, but an Idea. An Ism. So we do not settle our Americanism by immigra- tion, by citizenship, by obedience to the law. We have to prove our Ameri- canism by recitals of a catechism about our inmost thoughts. Chesterton, being as generous as he could to this odd trait, noted a certain danger of tyranny in it but supposed that we raised an ideological test because we had not gathered ourselves together as a nation by the more gradual methods of Europe, with a racial or geographical or historical unity inbuilt by our' circumstances: "America is the only nation in. the world that is fnunded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity' in the Declaration of Independence, perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also theoretical politics and also great literature."_ Chesterton restated Lincoln's claim that this coun- try was conceived immaculately in freedom by its "dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal." It is very dangerous to derive citizen- ship from a proposition. That means that every citizen must subscribe to the proposition. And that means we must know the citizen's mode of thought in order to grant him a charter of participation in the national life. Unless we know the inner workings of his mind, we have no clear assurance of his citizenship. Living within our borders is not sufficient. Attending our` schools is not, sufficient. Even sub- mitting to our electoral process is not sufficient. - Those surprised by McCarthyite ex- cesses of the cold war had no excuse for their surprise. The readiness to clap Nisei into detention camps was not. questioned by liberals during World War II. Liberal organs of thought cried- out'against Girman-speaking citizens in World War I (and threw Karl Muck into jail without legal process). Even those. who attacked the House Un-American. Activities Committee attacked it as un- American?by that very process saying there was an American way of thinking and acting that had been violated.. Liberals did -not protest the harass- ment, the provocation, the infiltration. by illegal means of the Ku Klux Klan or various fascist organizations. Indeed, the FBI has lived many years of its red hunt by blunting criticism with the question: Do you want to be dis- armed against the fascists or the Klan? - Since Americanism is something to. be striven for daily, and to be demon-' strated on demand, there is a presump- tion that any citizen is not- American until he or she proves it. that is why politicians are introduced as "great. AMericans," or real Americans, or true Americans. There are no un-English activities committeei - or un-French committees. Why un-American? Be- cause the full protection of our laws is not given automatically. You must earn it by demonstrating a patriotic mentality. ' .. ? The:record .a this- report is a lont series of incursions on the legal rights- of"-Americans, of-men and women who were ideological. suspects' and therefore second-class citizens, Open prey to anyone with a purer ideological claim. For instance: In 1968, the Ku Klux Klan was going to hold a meeting in the conference facilities of an Alabama motel, The FBI,. as part of its general harassment of the Klan, went to the. national headquarters of the motel chain and asked that t.?Klan be denied thii .site.., The bureau also used' the IRS; a 'dummy organization of its own, 'and forged materials to discredit the Klan. What has any of this to do with 'law enforcement? Nothing at all:, It was conscious war against ideas?war not conducted openly by politicians and publicists, but secretly by our national police force. It was an ideo- logical 'Purge, in which any rneans*.were sanctified by the holiness of the cause. People were slandered, set against each other, intimidated?all with our tax dollars and without our knowledge. Laws were broken; but... by the law enforcers. A second-class citizenship, outside the law, was established for Klan members. What was done to the Klan was done even more zealously against com- munists, leftists, black activist groups, and civil rights leaders. Provocateurs were sent into organizations, to prod them into breaking laws. A 1968 memo on the New ? Left t.,set the bureau's goal: "to expose; disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of this group." The activitiei, of the group?not its illegal activities. The FBI long ago gave up the nar-row: aim of investigating crimes. It now polices the mental health of America,- trying to destroy any group it does :not-approve of. ?????? The FBI may have established the pattern for our modern ideological . policing; but this .repOrt. shows how readily all other enforcement agencies followed that lead. Military-intelligence units moved into the. area of citizen harassment very actively in .the wake of 1967's riots. The army center at Fort Holabird opened files on at least 80,000 nonmilitary citizens of the US, and spread its lists by computer to many other bases. The files were FBI-inclusive,, with material on sex lives and other private habitsfor use in ideological blackmail. Military agents were sent to- infiltrate groups that might take part in any demonstration. The center at Fort Holabird set up a code for 770 organizations, and by 1969 it was receiving 1,200 reports a month, to build up a surveillance record on, domestic activities that would outreach _even the FBI's'. This information was ordered destroyed in 1970, but a Senate investigating com- mittee found solid evidence that it still exists in various forms, thanks to the computer system that spread the infor- mation. Local police forces, when they do not cooperate with the FBI, compete with it. The FBI's war on -the Black -Panthers used -local arrests on various charges (like defective. lights on cars) to harass the Panthers and dry up their .bail fund. At times the harassment became entrapment?but who cares, since they were' Panthers. The IRS has -long been trained to get people on tax counts, when they are really wanted for something else. This practice goes back to Al Capone. We declared him a ?second-class citizen and then _found some law to put him'away with. It was Robert Kennedy's approach to "Jimmy Hoffa. The National Security Agency has added its own expensive talents to the American snooping effort. It automati4 cally plucks out of cables and radio- grams information keyed to proper names or certain words. The CIA uses citizen fronts as cover for-its foreign activities; it claims to have infiltrated student organizations to train agents for work. 'with overseas leftists. It prefers to manipulate even ftiendly types (like writers for Encounter) to maintain control over the channels of 7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 ideological exchange. The reaction of people like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to the Encounter revelations shows how we have come to expect ;ideological self-policing. The CIA was working-on the right side, wasn't it? The inappro- priateness of having a Secret police covertly run the magazine and radio , stations did- not -strike people, so long ; as the operations 'were- well run, were on our side-. Indeed, the CIA was long welcomed by liberals as a kinci_of -good FBI, an FBI of -our very oWn.:The 'good guys were doing- the 'Manipulating in this case. But Ti5f,',Souise-7--th'aiS what most of the nation has'all.alo thatight of the FBI itself. It was?the-good guys, and it was out to get the had guys. Who cared how that was done? Since they were bad guys, you could net . handle them with kid gloves. Agencies that deal with them have to destroy the law in order to save it. Un-Ameri- cans don't deserve the protection of the law, anyway. And who was un- American? We all are, until we prove different?take our loyalty oaths, sub- mit to security cheeks. Stand up and be counted. If you are .not willing to be Snapped on, manipulated, obseryed,, then you must have something, to- hide?foundation in itself for a prior assumption of un-Americanhood. The only good American, the only one who deserves to be free, is the one who puts his freedom at the disposal of our secret police system. Alas, that 'makes most- of us pretty good. Americans. ? It happened?all the?long tale of :deceit,' laid out in patterns_ in this straightforward - account?because we let it happen; in some measure; wanted it 'to happen. We had :an Axle-de-an 'proposition* we must, be :dedicated to. If the Klan did not accept .the'abstnict proposition' of human. equality, its thoughts could be persecuted, entirely aside from the enforcement of laws. And. so we 'advance the'-1984 equa- tions: freedom can only be .gtiarded by destroying privacy; only 7-secrecy can protect the open society; and :the law; must be denied those Americans who I are ? sneaky ',enough to obey-- the lawl -while thinking things we do 'not like.' Right;-Comrade? ?-? NEW YORK TIMES 2 8 NOV 1975 Anti-C.I.A. Plan Rejected - . SAN DIEGO, Nov. 27 (UPI)? The Academic Senate at the University of California's San Diego campus has rejected a resolution that would have pro- hibited Fb members from doing research for the Central Intel- ligence Agency: Fewer than half of the organization's eligible niembers,-- all- tenured faculty members, took part in the mail ballot. The vote was 232 against the motion and 152 in favor.,_ N.EW YORK TINES 1 DEC 1975 Tigers Or Jellyfish? "The time hos come to bring (the investigations of this mat- ter to an end. One year of Watergate is enough." ?Richard Nixon, Jan. 30, 1974 "It is time . . . to end the self- flagellation that has done so much harm to this nation's ca- pacity to conduct foreign policy." ?Henry Kissinger, Nov. 24,1975 By Anthony Lewis BOSTON. Nov. 30?Suppose that during the Senate Watergate investiga- tion President Nixon had directed Gov- ernment officials not to appear as . witnesses in public session. Would the Senate committee meekly have dropped its plans to question H. R. Heideman and the .others in open hearings? Would the press have let this pass without a murmur? - Of course not. Senators and editors would have been outraged. But move to 1975?from Watergate to the C.I.A., from Richard Nixon to Henry Kis- singer and Gerald Ford?and outrage is in short supply. - The Senate intelligence committee has public hearings this week on Amer- ican covert' activities in 'Chile.. But Secretary of State Kissinger has re- fused to appear, saying it would be "wholly' inappropriate" to discuss in , public "any real or purported covert operation." And President Ford in- structed C.I.A. officials not to ap- pear. The U.S. role, in upsetting the con- stitutional government of Chile is as important as Watergate on any rea- sonable scale of values. Yet there have been no loud noises from Cipitol Hill about the Ford_ Administration's pe- ABROAD AT HOME remptory refusal to take pert in what could be highly instructive hearings on the subject. And the affair has had scarcely any notice in the press. Will Senator Frank Church and his committee really stand still for a new, unilateral privilege allowing executive witnesses to decide when their appear- ance is "appropriate?" Is the committee going to forget about evidence sought from Kissinger long ago but not sup- plied? One such item is a desk calendar that might show whether C.I.A. offi- cials were truthful when they said 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000109380003-3 Kissinger never called a halt to the coup attempts begun in Chile in September, 1970. The Senate committee's seriousness will also be tested by Richard Nixon's attempts_ to set terms for his appear- ance. He says he must be questioned in California, by just two committee members, and he reserves the right to invoke "executive privilege." Two courts have already given short shrift to the notion that he retains any such privilege. He is subject to subpoena like anyone else. Is the Church com- mittee afraid to issue one? There are questions for the House of Representatives, too. Its intelligence_ committee has subpoenaed vital evi- dence on covert actions from Secretary Kissinger, and moved to hold him in contempt for failing to produce it. But there is talk that the House leader- ship plans to kill the contempt citation. Is that true? And why is the House committee's chairman, Otis Pike, not moving to extend the artificial January deadline for its work? There 'have been delays beyond the committee's control, and the deadline is now quite unrealistic. If it were lilted, Secretary Kissinger and others would have to take the House inquiry's requests for information more seriously. The press also has some questions to answer. It rises in a chorus of out- rage when a judge prohibits stories that might prejudice- the defendant in a criminal trial. But it yawns when the Secretary of State and the President try to keep the public from learning facts crucial to an understanding of the way ? America operates in the- world. Time magazine., which did hard investigating in Watergate, dismissed the Senate committee's assassination report in a page, devoting its cover to shopping. Most of the press let the subject drop after a first flurry of - stories. A week later the Washington Post began pursuing some intriguing clues in the report, such as the indica- tion that Nixon was roused to covert warfare on Chile by his friend Donald Kendall of Pepsi-Cola. Congressional investigator of co- - vert activities remarked sadly the other day: "We get all kinds of pres- sure not to do things?and almost none to go on with our job." Why are Congress and the press so much more pliant now than they were in Water- gate? One reason is a natural respect for secrecy in the nation's intelligence services, though in fact plots to mur- der foreign leaders or overthrow their governments are not "intelligence." But there is also a personal reason. Henry Kissinger is a genius at soften- ing up legislators and journalists?at co-opting them. One person on Capitol Hill said: "Every time we get close- to a nerve, we find that it leads to Kissinger. And, then, soon, we get the pressure to protect him." ApProved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001011380003-3 NEW YORK TINES 2 Dec. 1975 ROSENBERG FILES TO BE RELEASED Justice Agency and the C.I.A. Waive $35,00* in Fees WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI) ?The Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency have waived nearly -$35,000 in search fees for release- of the files on the convicted atom spies, Julius and Ethel Rosen- berg, officials said today.. ?The Justice Department said. it ?was waiving $20,458 in search fees because of the. "public interest and historic, significance" of the espionage' case. The C.I.A., meanwhile, disclosed that it waived last week its $14,155.30 fee on 953' pages of Rosenberg documents. The Rosenberg?. sons, Roberti and Michael, won a Federal court order releasing the files under the Freedom of Informa- tion' Act. But . they have been unable to 'pay the large fees for searching through the files, and 'copying them. ? t ? ? - Both. the- Federal Bureau of Investigation and the C.I.A. had said anyone seeking copies of the' ,documents ? would have to pay a copying charge of 10 cents a page. But Deputy Attor- ney General Harold R. Tyler. Jr. said he had ordered the search fee waived after receiv- ing several requests. Mr. Tyler- said, "The Rosen- berg, case is close to being unique in terms of both current public interest and .historical-. significance. . - ? "I . am convinced that my, action is in the public interest; in this particular case inasmucli as release of these re-cords benefit the general public fari more than it will any individual requester." , "In taking this- action," he, said; "I wish to affirm my belief that public examination of. these records will . demon- strate beyond reasonable doubt the integrity of the investiga- tive, prosecutorial and judicial processes as they were carried out in the Rosenberg se." - The Rosenbergs were electro- cuted in 1953 after being con- victed of passing atomic secrets.. to ? the Russians.* Their -sons.-, who use the name: Meerepok which is the name. of. their adoptive parents, had: not re- quested the waiver . but had, threatened court action' to get the. charge -removed. The waiver requests were made by Prof. Allen Weinstein, a professor of history at Smith College, and by: reporters for The Washington Star and The Washington Post. ? Mi.: Tyler ordered the F.I3-.L to make the papers available as soon as possible to all who wish. to see themm. The entir. bureau file consists of about 29,000 pages. The F.B.I. had already waivedP a charge' for the time that ex= ecutives ? spent reviewing . the documents to remove informa- tion that would encroach on the privacy of innocent persons. .inci other matter exempted by 'the Freedom of Information Act. Tyler said this charge '2ifoUld have totaled $215,000. NEdi YORK TIMES 5 Utt., 1975 ROSENBERG FILES OF CU RELEASED ? ? Growth of Soviet At-omit Research and: Reports ?v. ' Fuchs - Described 4; - ByPETERtIHSS, Special to The-NewTork rimer WASHINGTON, Dec. 4-4 initial- batch of 894.: pages Central Intelligence Agency files have been released on the 25-year-old case that sent, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to their deaths for plotting atomic spying in behalf of the Soviet Union. 'A look at the documents, releaied under the Freedom of Information Act suit brought by the Rosenbergs' two sons hoping' to clear their parents' names,..supplied.some footnote* to history today at a Rosslynct Va., C.I.A. office. r They included the following:, ? IlTwo. pages. of a study of Soviet military intelligence,. contending that the Soviet's. atomic quest started relatively unplanned; as a result of pre. World War II_ Comintern re- cruitment Of scientists for foreign Communist fronts:, By 1943, the study' said,. Soviet officers were receiving detailed informati6a.on atomic reatearcii, by their allies?England, Cana-, da and the United-States. /IA 1960 report from a source in East Germany on Dr.-Klaus Fuchs, termed in the other stue.' .dy the first :atomic spy for , the' Soviet military, 'asserting" that he carried out "extensive calculations for. a breeder reac- tor with a relatively high burn- out of about 60 percent" while in prison in Britain: ? 9A C.LA. report to the Fe; -deral ?Bureau of Investigatio dated 'May .19, 1950;., citing 'a Nail security booklet as having listed Dr. Fuchs before the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union as an "extremely clang rous ? securitV- risk" who might be used by the Russians. _ , ? -.Start of friveltigafiOns ? ? Dr: Fuchs had worked at the Los Alainos, N.M., ?atomic bomb project,- as a,,: German refngee with the British scienti- fic mission. His volunteered spy. confession led to his-. arrest in England Feb. 2, 1950; and, a 14-year prison term, and set off American investigation; that led to the Rosenberg case... Harry Gold, a Philadelphia chemist, . was -:arrested as the agent to iehom,?Dr. Fuchs_ gave information. This led to the. arrest ..of David Greenglass, a wartliffeArr?irtilichinisl., toil Alamos, for giving 'data to Mr.! Gold, Mr; Greenglass identified Julini .ROsenberg, his brother- in-law, Ethel Rosenberg;.i his sister,- as other alintacts. The"' newly released do-. cumen*showed that the C.LA.. tried=tot-tritce AnatolliC Yakov- lev, ''agOnst, whom -the- Rosen- berg_ iictictinent",-is still: out standlit es3vIr:NZold's spy sa- periot?.--TIfte agency'rePorted Mr YakCjilet,eivholeft.-tbe united Statesjittei serving *as-,Soviet vice cdristil in New York, fro 1941 tct-I948; had become vice consul in Paris. A June 29, 1962, C.I.A. report, long after the 1953 electrocu- tions of the Rosenbergs, said that the Soviet official's true name- was Yatskov, that he served in France from 1946 to 1948 as a_ scientific and technical intelligence officer, and that he then returned to the Soviet Union,- where he got' into some, unexplain troubles "because of- relatives and then wound up in an intel- ligence "illegals directorate' - chs CpBed likttfr. An April s I960;: C.I.A., do- cument said. that Dr. F?chs Jutcl recently- been appointed deputy director of the Central, Physics Institute for Nuclear, Physics in, Dresden; East Ger-- many. - , " He was termei "still- a- briP, liant scientst...dedicated cally.to cOrrununi.cm...now mat-- tied- to devout Communist seven years his senior." _.. "Fuchs is now very bitter; as a result: of his years im British prison and: has corn-I, pletely.withdrawn himself front sobial .1Contacts in. Dresden,' the repott _ ? TheJ winding Qtratia'ot.,thei investigations were indicated by l-Feb.?21, 1950, C.I.A. me- morandum to the F.131.-, report- ing that an informant whose name,,is blanked out had told or an incident- of Dr. Fuchs's last trip' to the United,- States which he "now considers im- portant"- ? "Fuchs had borrowed a hat from an accnieintance," the me- morandum - rebated. "When Fuchs- forgot it,, the acqualin- tance refused to, pick up 'the{ hat at-a certain restaurant and insisted that' it be brought over by [thef-r.blanifed,!out name]." Newly:'released d cuments here include an with Dr. J. ,Robert Oppen- heimer, director of the Los Ala- mos atomic bomb project, call- ing Dr. Fiichs's wartime "scien- tific contributiOns commendab- A March -9, 1964, me- marandum reported that in "usually ? reliable" informant, had reported that "ail the So- viet state security personnel involved in the Fuchs case -in England received awards." " Thea material was obtained by the Rosenberg sons, Michael and Robert Meeropol, who won the release yesterday of 29,000 pages of F.B.L data on the case. 9 NEW Nov.ORK TIMES 23 v 1975 CAMPUSES ASSAIL CIA'. RECRUITING Efforts to Enlist Minorities Protested at U.C.L.A. By EVERETT R. HOLIES Special to. The New Tort Times SAN DIEGO, Nov. 22?The Central Intelligence Agency's renewed efforts to recruit blacks and other minority stu- dents at large. universities has led to protest rallies and picket lines on three campuses of the University of California. Faculty members joined stu- dent demonstrators this week in San Diego, Los Angeles and Berkeley, demanding not only expulsion of on-campus agency ? l'c'ruiters but also "full disclo- sure and unznedia* cancella- ; tfon. of all-other ,assoCiatione with the agency. ? ; _Z...The7 intensified 'recruiting of ; ferialoritY? -students:- for`. foreign I Work, --ordered by 1,Wilijam E, Co1y.the -outgoing Director of 'Central Intelligence 'because Of need. for C.I.A.'S I staff ..to' reflect; the -diversity qt American: society," centered- . on ,the three, campuses, 3vher the. -agency has enountpre :Aarp hostility in the past.: The agency has nat.:changed rembuiting techniquei, a i spokesman said in Washington. "We. have about a doze !regional recruiting offices, as i before, across the, counary," he ,said. -"We place ads in college !newspapers; we work' through ?college-placement 'agencies, and *have a fair number of walk' ;Mt, The sal* as it has been ;since the inchOtion ?of the agenf.: .The spoke smarr'aid that ap- plications were "way up." I -I The most forceful !action came on the San. Diego campus Tuesday when the fa- culty Senate, with support from ithe Black Studies Third College land- tbe Center for Chicano )-Stu, dies, mailed out ballots to 700 members for a referen fclInn on severing all ties with :tlia agency, incIttding anSx fund,- activities as well as recruit; t rnivemity officials denied the iexTstence of any agency-fi-- !Inknced projects on the campu 4 Jas. A straw vote taken. at an' earlier faculty meeting showed f6pr out of-six of those attend: .ing opposed to what speakers ?Eletiounced as "this shocking invasion of the campus by an ;agency of Proven involvement an, political assassination and ;other insidious ations."' ; At Berkeley, 300 sturents and faculty _attended two rallies in :Sproul Plaza, organized; by a 'coalition of student organiza- tions that passed resohnions condemning the presence of the agency recruiters "on campus 'and demanding repudxaticnofj 'all connections with agency programs. - picket line Was set up arciund the campus placementj office where minority students1 wera,? intetyiew.ed. t2t Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 :Thurs., Nov. 27, 1975 Xoit Sitgeleg Zanies Students in Saxon Melee Face Ouster. UC San Diego Orders Probe of CIA Recruiting Fracas SAN DIEGO?Students' DIEGO?Students whq, roughed up University of California' President David Saxon during. a ,to UC Sari. Diego Tuesday face-we-I' "hie' probation: and perhaps clismrse4., university officials said Wednesday. - Saxon, who, was jostled and spat upon during a demonstration protest- ing his refusal to ban Central Intel- ligence Agency recruiting on cam- pus, said he was "both saddened and' shocked" by the incident. "I abhor the recently revealed re- prehensible activities carried out by members of that agency (CIA) in the name of 'national security," Saxon. said in a statement issued Wednesday. "But I abhor even more the vi- olence done to reasoned discussion-on the San Diego campus in the male erf:.: righteousness_ - ,,, ? , - "I refuse to acknowledge that even the most Proper ends' are served by iuchimproper means; esperially_so at positions '-' ' : $peakers at the Berkeley rat lies included State Assembly', Man _Kenneth Meade,;'several ;Professors and leadersof th Aisociated Students Council the Education Liberation.Fon he Sparticus YoUttcl---LeAu xrd the Peace- and Ireedo_ 4SY. ...: 7.- IA: -;;i': ._,Affice Is PiCketed 1:_ , t Two' rallies - were. held. 0 II* LoS Angeles campus virlie 10.01students- picketed the rd clad VolunteereService Office?, 110 up 'at the U:C.L.A. Griduatel tchool of -Management: ::for 'j job interviews. ? - Winston Doby of- the vice) rncelloes office defended the f gency recruiting `before one; Ethe meetings. .. s ,4 ,"We have to recognfze, thei iIA. is a. legitimate agenCy'; nyerned? by the San*, -emplay4 int rules asther.govem7,4 int agency ,7 htSaidr. '-, :'1?_.1 Tba. campu&protests: eruPte&I klIntriiit the ' diselosure-'iliat, administrative' 'representative* and Los the San Diego, Berkeley nd Los Angeles campuses had attended a: conference on Oct. 23 and 24 at the C.I.A.'s head- quarters in 'Langley, Va., in response to an- Aug. 23 letter from Mr. Colby to the Universi- ty of California's president, Dr David Saxon. -- . Mr. Colby asked specifically for representation from the. three-Campuses because of their heavy minority enrollments, ex- plaining that although ?the gen- eral volume and quality of applicants for C.I.A.' emplq-' ment has never been higher,' the agency was having difficulty in attracting young people from the minorities. - . 1 Members of the Faculty Sen- ate acknowledged that, what-; ' ever the outcome of their mail refenrendum, it would have no binding force on the University! administration. ' . the- university; where intellectual freedom is of central importance." Saxon said he was "ashamed" of the. "attack, on the integrity of our commiinity",-and "estecially ashamed that it wasyneCessary for me to leave in-a-police car." William McElroy, UCSD chancel- lor, said he had. ordered his vice chancellor to investigate the incident and recommend probation or possible. dismissal for the students involved. - Saxon was surrounded by jeering students Tuesday as he walked from a meeting he had agreed to on the gymnasium steps to answer questions- of students and staff. _ A campus security officer said there was no indication of trouble be- forehand but that tension mounted as Saxon answered questions about pos- sible CIA recruitment on. the campus. ? As Saxon walked away toward a classroom to address an Aracirmic - Senate meeting, his way was blocked at timesty students withlockeciarms. ? ? One student Spat at hint and one tore at his coat. Campus police formed a wedge- and ,forced- a way, through the crowd for him. One offi- cer said Saxon appeared shaken but maintained his composure , The demonstrators, chanting CIA slogans and waving signs, forced 'their way- into the room where the Academic Senate was meeting, forc- ing the session to end abruptly. . Saxon, followed by students, was guided through a side door by plain- clothes campus police who took him away in a police car. During the confrontation on the gymnasium steps, Saxon did not say. whether the CIA had recruited at. UCSD. He did say he would not set himself up as-"a moral God to others" ? and would not Interfere with the,: right of citizens to choose for them-- selves what. is moral or proper.' In reference to the CIA; he said the alPlicY was "a PerfecArlegal Zation*. ? 4gerfey, ? 1.02kostam ? ,..Faculty._ at UC - San Diego-__, Rejects Move Against CIA - Front a Titeies ? SAN DIEGO?Faculty members have-rejected a resolution calling for a halt Central Intelligence 'Agency' activities att?-_XC San Diego and a fultdisclosure of all CIA opera- , tions at University of California cam- puses, a UC San Diego spokesman an- - -nounced Saturday. ? - - The action.- camk: four days after UC San Diego students protesting the , CIA's presence on campus jeered and' spat on UC President David Satin during-an outdoor discussion of the CIA's role there. After the confrontation, a meeting between Saxon and the university's Academic Senate was disrupted by students who forced their way into the conference room, causing Saxon to be escorted off campus in a police car.' The defeated resolution was *Put to, the faculty for a mail vote after fa- ' culty critics of the CIA assailed the agency's campus minority recruit- tient program. They charged the CIA with being "at the center of the corruption of this society." 10 Approved For Release 2081/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Staff. WM.,? The controversy was fueled by dis- closures that outgoing CIA Director. William E. Colby invited administra- tors from UC San Diego, UC Berke- ley and UCLA to Washington to dis- cus the agency's recruiting needs.. Faculty and student critics of the CIA's campus involvement have sought the banning of all activities by the agency at UC schools'. ? San Diego's Academic Senate had asked Saxon to form a statewide committee to look into and make public the CIA's UC functions, and Saxon's ill-fated appearance before the body Tuesday was to discuss that request. Saxon has emphasized the agency is "a perfectly legal organization" but added he would not "interfere with the rights of citizens to choose for themselves what-is proper." UC San Diego- Chancelor William McElroy was not available for com- ment on the ballot results released Saturday but is on record as defend- ing the CIA's campus presence. ApProveciFor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 XIS angebtg Cim Sun., Nof.30,1975 An Attack on theThiversiiy- A:university is a sanctuary of the intellect. The suppression of ideas by force, even those ideas we think are fraught with death, is alien to the spirit- and 'purpose -of a. university-, where intellectual dis- caiirSe must be free from coercion. The-point would be clear enough- tO 'students of the-University of California at San _Diego had the po..* invaded the campus to stop their discussion Of: -the Central Intelligence Agency and ban their demonstration against the agency. But the attack on the integrity of the university originated within the community itself and caine frOnla minority of students who shoved their way into a classroom and forced an adjournment of an Academic Senate . meeting with University Pres- ident- David Saxon. Ten campus policemen had to form .a protective guard for Saxon to get him safely throiigh the crowd of protesting. students and had to leave the campus in a police car.- The issue was the volatile one of possible-CIA re--- cruitment on the- campus, and Saxon, before meet- ing-with the AcademirAenate, stopped to answer: questions from- the students on the steps of the? school's gymnasium. His position that the CIA was - a 'legal- organization. with a legal right to recruit on,. - campus brought a chorus of obscenities- from. the,. protesters.- One student spat at him and another" :tore at his? coat.- - Saxon - who demonstrated-hiS: Own commitment., academic freedom - by quitting- the university '-'-rather -than .Sign aloralty oath in the McCarthY era, told the-students he would not, set himself up as a "moral God to others" and would not "interfere. with the right of citizens to choose for themselves what is moral or proper." . Saxon later said, "I abhor the recently revealed :reprehensible activities" of the CIA, but he added in reference-to the protesting students, "I refuse to ac- knowledge that even the most proper- ends are - servedhy such improper means, especially so at the university where intellectual freedom is of central importance.". , ? ' . That should be the first lesson taught at-any uni-' verSity, and-ft should be reinforced by the example: -..?of those who have Jong left the universities and hold-positions of power in this society. . _ Christian Science Monitor 25 November 1975 CIA on campus Given the recent unsettling revelations of abuse of power 135, the FBI and CIA, it is understandable that some students-and fee-- ulty members at -several University-of Cal-'? ifornia branches are protesting Central In- - teiligence Agency recruiting on campus-' -While protesters certainly hare- a. right to voice their opinion, we think they tniss essential point. _ . - For too many years the FBI and CIA tended- to be staffed largely by persons of similar background. There was too little room for dissent or any questioning of the activities that- eventually got these departments into so much trouble. While there has been a recent trend to upgrade the status of women and include more minorities in government, the intelligence! agencies lagged behind and thus missed out on . _ a valuable segment of societii. - A comparison can be made- to militari- officer training programs on campus. Now that antiwar ? sentiment has died down and? many schools have divested themselves of the', research contracts which brought with them a- 'degree of financial dependence on the federal government, it is interesting to note that ROTC programs_ are enjoying renewed inter- est ? particularly among women andminor- ities. Like the military services, intelligence- agencies should, as outgoing CIA director William Colby_ recently said, _ "reflect the diversity of American society." Too, there is- no reason why departments, of government- should not have the same access to potential employees as private corporations. Having CIA representatives on campus could afford an opportunity for skeptics to probe the extent to which the agency is getting its house in order, as well as provide direct and valuable criticism to the CIA. -The rebuilding of confidence in government could well be aided by Such things as CIA recruiting on the nation's campuses. 1 THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESD'AY,-goirEMBER ZS, 1975 C.I.A. Seeks Money to Repair Leaks ByLMACHARLTON sPeeimiq Th? Kw Tort mu 1. WASHINGTON, Nov. 24? The Central Intelligence Agency, a harried homeown-- er of latc,'.,js worried about leaks?antribout cracks. in its foundatiork-wo_rn linoleum in the cafeteri& and deterior- ating curling In the parking lot. These , sant' details were disclosed in an application for 26.3 million worth of building repairs filed by the agency with the House Public WorksCommittee Nov. 3. They docinnent the condition of the $49 headquar-- - ters', completed. in 1962, that is situated on, 201 -wooded,. fenced, guarded and secluded acres .in McLean, Va., eight miles-from downtown. Wash- ington., I - _ agency spokesman, asked if IV would be possible to have photographs taken of some of the items-needing repair, laughed and said that the building was, indeed, "falling down," but that se- curity was not. No press pho- tographers have ever been allowed in, he said, and none will be now. ' The application said that the headquarters had en-: dured more thin- a normal ? burden_ of ? wear and tear. - "This facility has been in - use continuously 24 hours a day, 365 days A year for more than a 'decade," it said. Other ft Listed- The' largest single _ $2,350000-is far , tiro -0 -air' automatic fire sptinkier system, to meet- re- , vised 'Federal- fire- safety' standards. An additional $495,000- is sought to install: electrostatic precipitators on the chimney' stacks, to com- ply with environmental protection regulations. The parking lots need new, , lighting, and, in spots, new- roadways' or curbs; elevators. , require overload alarm's, and, the dining and kitchen areas, ? need- $75,000. Worth- of new: linoleum and ? "refurbish-. ment," the C.L. said. With such little extras- as $8,500 for a sewer connec- tion, $363,000 for new- heat- ing lines and $907,000 for new heating and cooling sys- tems, it all adds up to $6..3 million. The site of the headquar- ters is no secret. On several of the surrounding highways, there are signposts reading `!C.I.A.," and Suburban buses ' stop at its gates. But the buildings?there is a huge . central building plus several Much smaller ones?cannot be:, seen, The agency bought up... adjacent acreage when it was learned that there were.: plans to.., build apart- Meg buildings that would ? offer tenants an unauthor- ? ized view of the C.LA. The alteration application, which requires committee ap- proval, does give some bare facts and figures. It cost the Government $36.3 million to ? acquire the land and existing buildings; it costs $3.8 mil- lion annually for operation, maintenance and repair, and the agency estimated that the :"renovated facility" . would have a . "useful life" of 40 years. , There is, . the application said, about one million square feet of "occupiable" space. What it does not state is the number or parking spaces_ for employees, or even for visitors. The C.I.A. does not disclose how many people work for the agency, but it is unofficially estimat- ed that there are 12,000 em- ployees at the headquarters. 11 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Monday, December 1, 1975 spies co In the shadowy worldwide? struggle between intelligence arid counterintelligence agencies, the Soviet Union's KGB is expanding steadily (it now numbers an esti,' mated 300,000, sources say) even while the U. Central Intelligence Agency faces a continuing-barrage of investigations and headlines. Here is an inside look at the KGB through the eyes of veteran U.S. intelligence sources. _ By Benjamin Welles - Special to The Christian Science Mon-itor ' Washington Almost a year ago the KGB, the huge SovieT espionage conglomerate, -received- a totally unex: pected bonus in its seesaw battle with the CIA, its American rival. - CIA Director William E. Colby fired ,James Angleton, the veteran counterespionage chief, and three senior deputies in a power .struggle marked by press leaks of suspicious accuracy from the CIA's highest levels. Mr. Angleton was a veteran of 31 years who had helped detect such top KGB spies as Harold "Kim" Philby and George Blake. According to Mr. Colby's associates, Mr. Angle- ton was too Independent and too intent on expanding his authority. Moreover, it is said he had developed intimate cooperation -with Israeli in- telligence, one of the world's best, and both Mr. Colby and Henry A. Kissinger had decided to wrest this plum back for themselves. The abrupt dismissal of Mr. Angleton and his three top aides ? Raymond Rocca, Newton Miler and William Hood ? represented the loss of more than 100 years'combined experience in possibly the Approved For Release 20 e coid most secret aspect of U.S. Government operations: counterespionage. Without it there can be no true security. For the last year the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies have been reeling between internal sqUabbles, press exposes, and vice-presi- dential and congressional investigations. ? What his the KGB been doing in the meantime? "Expanding steadily," say those in a position to know. Moreover, it has been maintaining a highly professional silence. There was, for instance, no gloating over the CIA's discomfiture: The con- trolled Soviet press merely reprinted brief news extracts. KGB remains powerful A huge, rich, and powerful bureaucracy, the KGB numbers 300,000 including border police and internal security detachments. Created in the 1920s, even before the Red Army, it is the U.S.S.R.'s "senior" service and; despite various' name changes, has remained all-powerful. Its chief, Yuri Andropov, holds Politburo (Cabinet) rank. Its colleague service, the GRU, the arm of military intelligence, is smaller,defers to the KGB, and in fact is headed by an ex-KGB officer, Piotr Ivanovitch Ivashutin. Between the KGB and the CIA there is a 'fundamental difference, specialists note. The CIA is licensed by the 1947 law creating it essentially to -conduct espionage, counterespionage, and political subversion overseas ? not against Americans at home. From recent congressional exposures, how- ever, it would appear that the law has been violated. .by successive CIA directors. One of them, Richard Helms, told Congress recently they "made their -legal peace" with such-violations. -- The KGB, by contrast; is empowered both to police 200 million Soviets at home and also to carry out abroad espionage, counterespionage, dis- information and "wet affairs" (Soviet jargon for 12 01/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010938000-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 personal?Violin-et-1r: Itffiniit?WartYpett -orapies: "legals" and "illegais." * ? , The. "legals" have official cover inside em-1 itassies.trade, or airline offices, or even as Soviet; newsmen. The "illegals" are the "moles", who, korrov?,- deep and stay hidden deep in various, private guises for years iintil activated. The better., trained are virtually undetectableunless beirayectl ;by defectors, and their numbers are unknovim The UlegalSizhnwevert are easier to follow, **- ' ii Numbers rising-1n- _ *CtIficAT9,-,:intel4gence.*J,959,b4,d?O0i KGB legali outside die Soviet union* addloday haiti its eyes ort,' perhaps, 9;000. in the alone thet United Nations, Washington,.and in Soviet offices'. across the Country, there were some 300 knownT legals in 1959; today there are at least 900: "Presumably with this constant rise in numbers*: they must begetting more results," said ayestem, Ever since 1959, specialists, say, the KGB has been cooperating closely with services it has trained to high proficiency, such as the ones in: Cuba, Hungary; Romania, Czechoslovakia, and. Poland:. Each service relentlessly seeks recruits.; among its own ethnic refugees lathe The Western' intelligence - comintinity using metieulous, record,keeping such as lime-testecE passport Mardi; Can often track KGB officers-T, from post to rpost despite false names?'?even, false beards : Their operating methocisdre closeir: studied. _ . . The KGB has a-simplistic Slogan'. "Any Amer.' -icon Can be bought'," said an experienced observer.' The annual Visit of more. than 130,000 American: tourists to the-U.S.S.R. makes recruiting, easier.-,i although the KGB's main interest lies in American! officials, such as code clerks or diplomats with access to government information. College-age Americans ideologically hostile to their own administration also are sought as long-term pene-; tration agents into key government divisions such' theIBior ?=-- By rough rule_of thinti?-Weiterd intelligence Officials estimate that 44 percent of Soviet citizens abroad areen KGB aOignment.'wby scinianyt Essentially they say,-because espionage is relatively -cheap and highly Cost-effective, Its economic and' militarybenefits to the..U.S.SR arel incalculable -- and often overlooked:- By-stealing U.S. military and secrets. the U:S.S.R: can save billions otrubles,,Minpower,,. and time,: and thus concentrate It& Lhilted re-/ sources on, -keeping, military.;:'paritv_if not superiority with the U.S Without effectivejan continuing esliOnage.:(Moscow?woold fitll: gerously behind the richer and more lthi ,adiranced -tr IVELTIMORE 21 NOV _ Christ versus Castro tirashinotonitireauoil7se sun" ? ? r Washington?Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, gave his: sarcasm full rein in testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities about Gen. Edward Lansdale, a non-CIA man brought in by President Kennedy' to oversee the agency's major covert action program.,'' "I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity," Mr. Parrott said in testimony. "This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against:Castro [who' was an- . ti-Christ. . "And you.wcrald spread this word around Cuba, and then on whatever date it was, that there would be a manifesta- tion of this thing. And at that time?this is absolutely true ?and at that time just over the horizon there would be an American submarine which would surface off of Cuba and' send up some starshelLs. And this would be the manifesta- tion of the Second Coming and Castro would be over-- thrown.. . Well, some Wag called this operation... Elimi- nation by illumination." _ Approied-Por 'Release 2001/Cf8108 : Deti3tie1 Cam- etie ta thel political leaders in Washington and Moscow; sayl. the experts; to the intelligence professionals, it.' means nothing-Theirwork goes on, irrespective of; political climates. Soviet dignitaries who meet U.S.': industrialists, bankers, politicians, union leaders,:, or artists are either ? KGB. graduates or on KGB assignment.2---- - One-typical example iSAlekszoidie Shelepin whO4 -has successively headed the Young Communists (Komsomoll, the.KGR and, litterly;--.thesocallecli Soviet trade union Movement_ In this. latest role mission was to penetrate, and -destroy- th .ICFM the noncoirtinuntsk hiterriatiOnif- trad linlimmOVernenr -.:_eitensibly- Mr. Shele*n irai. retired "in dis-, -grace" after a recent- visit to-Britain where his sinister' fame led to noisy protests. But he is reported active again in the KGB "illegals'" directorate: - _ - The only effective" answer to steady KGB- expansion- is counterespionage,. say U.S. in- telligence veterani: recruiting agents already in the enemy service -.7 admittedly difficult rthough not impossible- ? or luring- defectors for their information...'- During "Cold war'1990Sand' '60s; defectionsl iiere frequent and helped the CIA-catch such-KGB, spies as Philby and Blake in Britain, and others NATO and WW ? ? ft was in-190.that the CIA's Mr. Angleton and hisli staff aicertained on the basis of defectors! reports; that Philby, the British embassy's liaison man inj Washington, was a- top KGB agent. But successive; British governments were loath tolbelievg it, wick!, not Until 1963 philby's bluff end in hiS flight to- Moscow-. Today, 25 years after his exposure," Philby is still "in," working for the KGB- controlled-press service Novostiy on U.S. and-. British developments His nemesis Mr. Angletori: on the other hand is "out:" _ Starting in the mid-1960s, however ? along withi the U.S. escalation in Vietnam? defections such. as the ones that unmasked Philby began fallingoff,,.'. and with them authoritative insightinto the KGB:: MOredver the U.S. intelligence community began squahblingwithinitself_ In. 1969 the late J.' Edgari Hoover abruptly canceled all FBI liaison with-thea CIA od counterespionage .because President John-.; ion- had refused td- defend . him publicly againsti senatorial charges that the FBI was tapping, the:: phones of U.S, senators. Mr. Hoover's pique ended telephone taps on some 2,000 ot_raore Soviet "bloc": _ personnel across the U.S. - "-Maybe it was Vietnam, or the student riots, or., the race thing or exposure journalisth or Congress, you nameit," said an experienced. inforinantii ?"but, since 4197,0-- or:a0.- we've-had. few _vaNab,,,"Tbe climate of i defectors defection liaiheen ruhred7 shouldaEGB officer Comeover to usiiciw? They'reri rtmning eadiaintelligenceivork?anyway.."r4 WASia NGT011 STAR 2 3 NOV 197 5 , Moscow Hits CIA Death Manning _ Moscow?Radio Moscovt said yesterday that CIA; plans' to assassinate foreign leaders, revealed in a; Senate report were "contrary to elementary norms of?. hunianityi.international law and morals." The reaction to the report from Radia Moscow and' 'other:Soviet news media- came on the same day that; the official press- crowed over the U.S. withdrawal of its U.N,,resolution urging amnesty for the world's po-;: !Meal - :Tass, the Soviet news agency, said the revelatiOns the ? CIA 'plots have resulted in 'sa-WaVeCifindignatiOn. from the public in the United States' and added that the assassination plots had "the approval o the White; House." , - , 13 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 1:1AsiarGTCli POST 2 DEC 1975 Richard Hdrris UV" Allen Dulles and the olitics of Three yO,eritefte:r resignation Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles was asked by iftiend if he Would have been : teMake. the heat'si during, the U-2. and Bay of Ptgs af-1: fairs?to state ptiblicly$ and falsely, that he alone had been ultimately responsible for any errors of Secret service committed in those times of crisis. "I've always felt," he replied, "that I should assume full responsibility for anything the Agency has done. I should Shield and protect the President in any way I can." Were he alive today, Dulles might . well stand before the Church Corn- mittee and solemnly swear that he had - never discussed CIA assassination plots:, Mr. Smith, who served as a junior-, intelligence analyst for the Contrail Intelligence Agency in 1967-1968,, is the author of a book. on the World War If Office- of Strategic Services. He is currently at work on a biography of Allen Dulles. . With Presidents Eisenhower. and Kennedy. Given his personal ethic as a _ public servant in seven presidential.; administrations, It is entirely, c-on-.- ceivable that he, protect' the.1 reptitatiens. of those Chi:efi-executives,,3 even ,ir it were__ personally barrassing, or to the, detriment of his.; beloved ietelligence service. But it is inconceivable that Dulles- would have hidden such sensitive state; secrets- from the President. "I am! under his orders," Dulles. would often': Say. "He is my boss." . - No plots for political- murder could., have gone forward in CIA:without a' "gentleman's agreement" between the.- CIA chief' and his ?"boeik" -.Nor iWarit Dulles one to shy away from raising the: question-with the man on high if, under extreme Circumstances, he felt the- Practice. of assassination might serre. the nationalinterest. - ? ? , He had struggled with this issue even- before he took charge of CIA. As chief of the OSS office in. Swit-' zerland' during World War II, Dullee ? Was approached by dissident Germans of the Third ReiCh, who proposed to cut; short the life of Adolf Hitler. With Washington's knowledge and approval,... he gave an encouraging wink to their , efforts. 'The plot ended, of course? in failure.. . ? _ . Reflecting, After the' war, on that he tqld an audience of the.. New York Bar Association that, iii a totalitarian state, assassination might be the only means available to over- - throw a modern tyrant. Those words werespoken.in 1947?weeks be.forethe.. LI Central Intelligence Agency came into existence. Six years later,. Dulles became its director;.:--' Early ut his regime a visitingl; West Gerniii general suggested to an assembled groupof CIA executives that: the Agency "liquidate". East Ger-' many's Communist strongman Walter. Ulbricht. An immediate objection was heard from Richard Helms, the future , CIA director, then one of Dulles' to0:, aides. POlitical murder, said Helms, : was simply not a viable practice for an: Intelligence service. But Dulles cut him., short. "Don't a' take my people toe: seriously,' he told thegeneraL "We're'. prepared to consider anything."' Others at thetable tried to suppress k grin. They knew Dulles would never! give serious thought to having Ulbrick killed; but hi was-always eager to establith the reputation, of his Agencr particularly among conspirators of the Old Worldaorsinister expediency and' derring-do'.. ; . In reality, assassitiation was &ill considered- --"counter-productive" by ' most practitioners of secret service.i When CIA overthrew the left-wingi Arbenz regime of Guatemala in 1954, extreme care was taken to insure that President Arbenz and his top advisera? should,escape unharmed, lest they, acquire political immortality throught martyrdom. ' ? .! ? 4 The question was raised anew in 1957,1 after the Suez' debacle, when, Egypt's', Nasser was Washington's bete noir or the day.:After a dinner eparty at the home of Walter- Lippmann, as the men, were segregated-for brandy and cigars, conversation turned to the "Nasser, problem." ? "Allen," said one of America's: leading foreign correspondents with; tongue-in-cheek, "can't . you find an. assassin?" DulleS' face assumed Ai, deadly. serious expression. Leant* back in a large leather chair, he struckl a match, lit his pipe, took:a few puffs,; thee replied, "Well,: first you would' need a fanatic, antaa who'd be willing:: to kill himself if-he were caught. And he. couldn't be an outsider. HO have to be an Arabi': Dulles .stoped and shook his head in apparent consternation. "it, would be very difficult to find just the right man.7. Mast of the listener i were astouricied The usualrf-discreet Mr:Dulles, having delivered a reasoned response toe.. .111,1Eai CA 31 October 1975 14 ssassina.tion 'rniiitild.jest, had shown. nus _ consideration of political ni ? It wasn't long before Fidel' Castra; outshone Nasser as leading political! villain in Washington's eyes. At President Eisenwhower's direction,. CIA worked out a plan, on the Guatemala model; for Castro's over-. throw. Theobject of the operation, as it followed a complex and confusing course of development in the year preceding the Bay of Pigs disaster, was -to provoke a general insurrection, throughout the island. Dr. Richard Bissell, then chief ofi CIA's Clandestine Services and Dullest technical alter-ego ; presented to thel director a scholarly dissertation on hoWi this political upheaval was to be atei complished, In Bissell's academie scenario, the revolt would 'receive ani enormous boost from Castro's demise:' The Cuban dictator seemed more the dynamic "evil genius" of his regime' than Guatemala's Arbenz had ever, been; his removal from the scene thus,: presented a certain grisly logic. With _ _ _ the Cuban Army. bereft of its com- mander and thoroughly' -demoralized, the.insurgents 1,vottld, in theory, have ani open field. . There was much about the finati Cuban plan, particularly the militaryl details of a half-baked 'invasion strategy, that Dulles never fully grasped. -But he did take a personal ,interest in Bissell's blueprint for; revolution. Castro's assassination was'- integral to that blueprint. Dulles un- derstood that. And when he finally gave- his nod to political murder, it could be, only because he-had himself received a green light?tacit or explicit?from Divight Eisenhower and JohnKennedy. Dulles 'might "consider ,a0thing" if he felt it would preserveand protect the imperialt ?powtr of'. the United States.. But he was too Politically astute, tom dedicated- to-American representativei government, to allow his Agency to- become a "rogue elephant,", hatching plots abroad without the sanction of the, nation's highest.elected official. Allen Dulles liked to remind his aides that he and they served at the pleasure of the President. If his CIA committed acts seen in-hindsight, as morally , reprehensible the final responsibility', must be sought in the Oval Office Colombia: The government has decided not to renew the contract of the United States-owned Summer Institute of Lirvatiistics, frequently accused of acting as an information network for the cr A. Its work will be taken over gradually by Colombian scientists. Peru's attitude towards the institute's activities is still under discussion. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 NEW YORK TIMES 2 7 ii0V 1975 Piffiab fo the Rescue . By William Safiye ? WASHINGTON?For the fun of 'pub-. licly examining the -spy. system we. have called in from the cold, ,a blown.=, cover charge must be paid: America's- much-needed intelligence community is rattled and _depressed, and finds' it difficult to function. In -White House offices, the word "Piffiab" is heard in connection with rebuilding the morale is well as the control structure. of our intelligence system. It is an extruded acronym of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: PFIAB. For years, this has been the most blue-ribbon of all the boards and com- missions that abound in Washington. Its monthly sessions . are regularly attended by a dozen of the nation's most respected citizens,- including - inventor Edward"Landl scientist Ed- ward Teller, publisher Gordon Gray, . lawyer Leo Cherne, writer Clare Booth -Luce and ex-everything George Shultz. Unfortunately, Piffiab in-the past six years has been dominated by Henry -Kissinger through Nelson ,Rockefeller, a member before becgrning Vice Presi- dent; its staff and budget are-small, its oversight .capability theteby limited,. ? The idea -now is to change all that by bringing in a few more prestigious people and giving the board much more to do. A few weeks- ago, Presi- dent Felt intended to expand the board to fifteen members, including ? 411.ane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the number two man in organized labor ind well- 'versed in C.I.A. alfairs after his serv- ice on the C.I.A. investigative -panel. 9John Connally, who had served on Piffiab twice before, resigning ? when he was indicted; in fairdess, acquittal ought to be followed by reinstatement. clEdward Bennett Williams, whose representation of unpopular clients and ownership of the embattled injury-. ridden Washington Redskins uniquely qualified him for C.I.A. involvement; like Kirkland, Williams is a Democrat ?in fact, treasurer of the party. - \ 9William J. Casey, retiring president of the-Export-Import Bank, ex-S.E.C.- head who Was one of the organizers of' allied intelligence in World-War II. White House. aides went over this list-with Henry Kissinger, who will not be criticized in this space on a national holiday. The Secretary of State had no objection to Williams, in whose box he sits to cheer the Redskins on, or to Connally, whose use of power he had come to respect in years past, but Kirkland and Casey were anathema. Mr. Kfrkland's sin was in his fierce denunciation of appeasement in the name, of detente, and his warm ap- proval'of some of Senator Scoop Jack- son's speeches; worst of all?in State's eyes?when Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, ..came to Washington, the Soviet writer was:the house guest of Lane Kirkland , and his- Wife, Elena, who- is also Un- ashamedly pro-Israel. , . Secretary Kissinger' gave no special . -.reason far opposing Mr. Casey, bnt House aides' assumed -that he cement?, bered the work. of. the Murphy Coin- mission: 017 that panel, Bill Casey was one who insisted that the National Security Adviser not also wear the hat of a Cabinet officer: . President Ford yielded to Kissinger on, Kirkland, but not on Casey, who had also been slated for Piffiab's chairmanship to replace George W. Anderson, the former Chief, of Naval Operations. The President decided to appoint Casey as. al member but to keep Admiral Anderson on as chair- - man; after the firing of James Schles- inger,. it suddenly seemed a good idea . to keep: aboard a man suspicious Of _ Soviet SALT intentions. These appointments are scheduled to ? be made. "between Peking' and Vail," In the- travel-marked White House calendar, and will dovetail with some:. far-reaching structural recommenda- . tions about the scope of Directer of Central. Intelligence's job and the de- gree of intelligence .oversight to be exercised within the executive branch. An Office of Management and Budget'i task force is now working on options about the "nature of the assignment George Bush has been nominated ,for.. This .is known as the "Option Three routine!",: Option One will he to leave the _ everything, e way, it is, with the Director of Intelligence trying to play the dual role of C.I.A. chief and over- -all intelligence-community defender (which is now impossible); Option Two-. . will be to appoint -a White House in- telligence czar (which would frighten everyone and raise an uproar); and ' Option Three (which is the one. usually chosen), to ask Congress to separate the job of director from the job of administrator of C.I.A. That's not all. -Plans call for Piffiab's- -staff to be beefed up so as' to handle,. an important new source of informa-- tion: copies of all reports by the spectors General- of the various gence agencies. Every spook knows,. how significant that would, be: Thet Inspector General's report of May 21-, 1973, was the basis for almost all the information brought out by all thesub-- sequent committees and commissions. With such changes, and despite the separate pressures of church and State, America's intelligence system can - come out of its bunker. We will better be able to know what our opponents . are doing- and how strong we need to be. On this weekend, the prospect of - having our intelligence community again doing its job?and only its job? is no small matter to be thankful for. 15 THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 29, 1975 CIA Cloak, dagger, poisoned cigars Washington, DC Which tactics are appropriate for a western democracy to use in imple- menting its foreign policy? Although proud of constitutionalism and orderly processes at home, is it entitled to fight fire with fire overseas? If the KGB, the Soviet "committee on state security", employs methods of subterfuge, decep- tion, covert intervention and even assassination to achieve its goals, does that mean that the western intelligence services must respond in kind? Difficult though they may seem to be today, those questions had self-evident answers for a generation of Americans who felt that the United States had a responsibility to go to the ramparts in the cold war and hold back the com- munists at every turn. Towards that end, and towards an ordering of the world that would comply with what were con- ceived to be vital American interests, almost anything could be justified. So it was that high government of- ficials, whispering and conniving and talking in codes with the abandon of children at play, plotted to take the lives of Mr Fidel Castro, and Patrice Lumumba who led the Congo for a short time after its independence from Belgium. Those plots and the paraphernalia for them?poison pens, tainted cigars, exploding seashells, contaminated diving suits and other playthings?were detailed last week in an interim report of' the Senate select committee on intelli- gence. Although no official of the Central Intelligence Agency could ever have been found actually holding a symbolic smoking gun, according to the report the CIA men in effect loaded the weapons and encouraged others to do the dirty work. A foreign leader did not have to be a communist or a pro- communist to get such attention from the CIA; he could have displeased Washington in some other way, or even have been a former friend. The committee said that the agency had also become involved in other plots, albeit ones originated overseas, against Rafael Trujillo, the dictator in the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam, and General Rene -Schneider, the chief of staff of the Chilean army who refused to block the accession of Salvador Allende to his country's presidency and therefore became a candidate for kidnapping by American-supported right-wing elements. Plotting was a bipartisan pastime, and the names of Presidents Eisen- hower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all emerge sullied from the committee's investigation. It is clear that assassina- tion, and other forms of intervention that stopped just short of it, were delibe- rate aspects of national policy. What is less clear is how direct and efficient the chain-of-command really was? whether presidents actually ordered deathly deeds or were spared the un- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 pleasantness of doing so by intentional vagueness and what the committee called "circumlocution" in government com- munications. Precise blame is thus dif- ficult to assign. The Senate committee, led by Mr Frank Church of Idaho, released its much-delayed report with a good deal of fanfare and emotion. As television cameras- whirred away, Mr Walter Mon- dale, a Democrat from Minnesota, said that the investigation documented that "Americans are no good at killing and lying and covering up?and I'm glad that that's the case." The White House made an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to prevent publication of the re- port, and Democrats in the Senate, during ? a secret session, blocked any vote on its release, lest the tally be too close and thereby stir doubts about the propriety of public disclosure of such delicate information. But most mem- bers of the committee remained de- fiant. "There may be temporary in- jury" from its publication, conceded Mr Richard Schweiker, "but I believe the countries of the world will recognise. that our willingness to examine our past and seek a better future openly, without flinching, is an indication of the greatness of our country." Indeed, the importance of the unusual document?peppered with codenames and embarrassing euphemisms?lay less in its substance, much of which was already widely known, than in the phenomenon of its publication. The process is, in the view of Mr Henry 'Kissinger, the secretary of state, a simple matter of "self-flagellation"; but as far as the Senate committee is concerned, it is a matter of high patriotism, a demonstration of the resilience of the system of checks-and-balances in the American system of government. "The story is sad", the committee concluded, "but this country has the strength to hear the story and to learn from it". NEW YORK TINES 2 6 NOV 1975 Plots Report Draws Attention to Helms! . - By JOHN. M. CREWDSON Special to The New York Ttmet WASHINGTON, Nov. 25?The Senate Select Intelligence-,Corn- mittee's?report on assassination, plots inspired by the Central; Intelligence Agency against. foreign leaders has served to refocus attention on the record cornpilectliy Richard M. Helms? now the-American Arnbas.sadt* to Iran,' during much of 26-year career wibr the agency. The-- principal finding cori- cerning Mr. Kelms the com- mittee's long. :report, released last ;week,. Was that, he had, failed,' while a peputy Director of the C.I.A., to inforrn?agencT nqUWhite House, superiors ,of, efforti to kill Prime Minister. l.Fld1 Casiro of Cuba,.sornething, the.' Senate ,:terined, 4gra7ve,-error in judgment." ? -R0if Hessen, the Presidential. press secretary, ' said ' fallowing the report's release that Pres- ident Ford had seen- nothing in its findings that would cause him to reconsider Mr. Helms's? ;continued service as Ambassa- dor. A State Department spokesman said today that he had seen no indication of any such reconsideration either. Mr. Helms served. for. seven years- as Director of 'Central lIntelligence, the agincy's lop post, before being named Am- bassador in-1,972. . The Rockefeller Commission, set up by President Ford earlier this year to inquire, into the 1C.I.A.'s domestic aCtivities,. cri- ticized Mr. Helms in its report last June for "poor judgment" in destroying tape recordings and ocuments that might have related to the Watergate scan- dals. The commission said the destruction was ordered after Mr. Helms had received a re- quest from Senator Mike Mans- field of Montana, the majority leader, to retain in agency files- all materials of possible rele- vance to the Watergate case. "'Some of the C.I.A.:s activities, including domestic surveillance and the assassination plots, are under study by Justice Depart- ment prosecutors, who are also, 'according to department offi- cials, examining for possible perjury some of Mr. Helms's testimony during his February 1973 confirmation hearings for the Ainbassidorial post he now hqlds. - Mr. Helms told the- Senate Foreign- Relations Committee during those hearings that the C.I.A. had never atteMpted to overthrow the Chilean Govern- ment of President Salva droAl- lende Gossens or passed money to political opponents of the Marxist leader. Testimony. About Hunt _ Mr. Helms also told the com- mittee that E. Howard Hunt Jr., nne of the convicted Water- gate conspirators, had not anain_tainecita relatiOnship With rthe?.,:c.i.A. -after Mr.-. Hunt, :s re-e tirement as a C.I.A. officer i '1970. '7' Mr.- Helms,, else said, in an- iviee to- a question; that -h could not recall whether durin,? his tenure, as director, the CIA. had been asked to become in- volved in an interagency effort to share intelligence relating to the anti-Vietnam war move- ment in the United States.- ; A`I dont recall whether we were asked," Mr. Helms, testi- fied, "but we were not in- volved, because it seemed to- m that .this was a clear viol'a-. tion of what our charter was." The National Security Act of 1947, which 'established thei C.I.A., prohibits any domestic' police or surveillance 'Junctions ' - '-'3u2st1ce .:Department lawyers are understood to-be:comparing those statements .by Mr. Helms with subsequent evidence. that Mr. Hunt received Unwitting' assistance -frOm ,the C.I.A. in the 1911. burglary of the Cali- fornia office of Daniel Ell- sberes psychiatrist, that the spent: upwards $10 million in .an effort to over-' throw the Allende Government; and, that the ?C.I.A., under M.r.v. Helms, was involved in the surveillance of' domestic dis- sidents. and -in formulating the Nixon Administration's-- aborH tive Huston- plan for broadened domestic surveillance. . One well-placed 'Justice De- parenent source, asked about it investigation of the eiridence published in the Senate pan,el's assassination report, indicated that no determination on the illegality of such plots had. yet been made, and that in Mr. Helms's particular case there Was . "no law against lying" to one's superiors in Govern- ment. The source predicted, howev- er; that Mr. Helms would 'even- tually "have to answer" for some aspects of his conduct. The Justice Department is understood to .be reluctant to; proceed with any prosecutions stemming from, the alleged. CIA. activities until lawyers there obtain conies of the testi- mony ':and*. evidence 'collected' by the Senate intelligence com- mittee, something that, Com- mittee sources' have suggested,- may not be.forthcoming. One "committee aide said to- day. however, that the panel, did intend to turn over to the department for investigation , some of .:.the conflicts in the testimony produced by in- quiry. A spokesman at the American Emiossy-- in Tehran, said last week that Mr. Helms would have "no comment" on the ' findings made in the assassina- tion report, -which included the following: _ 9That Mr.. Helms, follOWing the unsuccessful iBay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1.961, ordeied,the -reactivation e yi effortv,in.olVing derworld,,,figures? to kill Mr.!. 'Castro that had been. initiated 'j irf.Cqnjunction With:the inve4 sion.;;Mr: Helms, the panel said, did- not tell John McCone, then the Director of Central Intel- ligence, that the assassination , effort had been renewed. Mr. if IHelms was then/Deputy- Direc- tor for plans: ' I 9That - Mr. Helms rjever'' stepped forward to correct the record when, he learned in 1962" that Robert F. Kennedy, then!' I the Attorney General, had been ; misled irito believing that the-- plots against Mr. Castro!s lifc-; had ended after the Bay of 'Pigs inyasion,-, and:' that whent Mr. McCone was infOrmed by! Mr. Helms the following yeart" of the Bay of Pin assassination plot, he was not told of the, subsequent-effort in 1962. q'That Mr. Helms authorized' a C.I.A. subordinate to ap4 16 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380008-3 proach a prospective Cuban as- sassin in 1963 and represent himself as Mr. Kennedy's perso-: narreptesentative, although the Attorney General's approval "to speak his name" in such. a. fashion had, not been sought.. , The Senate report also said that Mr. Helms had failed to. inform the Warren Corrunis- sion-,-.- which investigated thei I'llurider. of President Kennedy, of, tne- Ol6ti_lon Mr. Castro's; life because the? "precise ques- tion" had not been asked. Aeter. Mr. Helms became the 17,1.A. chief In 1966, the report i?sicivhe tqlla Dean Rusk, then the Secretary of State, that _a Cuban C.I.A. operative who had expressed_a deire to kill Mr. . Castro a and to whom the agency .had offered an assas- sination - device,' had not been part of" an assassination plot. ? Finally, when President -Jobnscin asked in 1967 for a, complete:report on the C.I.A.'s involvement in attempts on Mr. Castro's life, Mr. Helms briefed the President orally on an in- ternal agency report on the ;matter but. did not mention at least- one such plot that had :taken place during Mr. John- son's Presidency. Although Mr. Helms's testi- 'ninny during his confirmation .hearings in 1973 were the only. statements thus far reported to be under examination by the Justice Department for a po- tential perjury charge, public records show that the Ambas- sador has apparently been less than. candid with congress on, other occasions. ; In May 1973, for example, !Mr Helms, recalled- from Teh- 'ran to answer questions about the CIA's involvement in the of Dr. Ellsberg's psy- chiatrist, told a House armed ?, services subcommittee that the ;C.I.A. had no authority or cap- ability to place under surveil- iance newsmen to whom sen- Isitive- national security infor- mation had been leaked. The C.I.A. later acknowl- edged, however; that it had placed five reporters who had 'been the beneficiaries of such leaks under surveillance in 1971 and 1972. ? ? ApProved"For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010Q380003-3 WAShINGTON POST 22 NOV 1975 cIA No 'Rogue Pephant7 _.? By Laurence Stein, Washington Post Staff Writer The US. - espionage! establishment was carrying out its basic' institutional role-7-though one little un- derstood by ? most Americans?in the assassination case studies' described by the Senate in- telligencecommittee report. Although in its epilogue the committee described the assassination plots as "aberrations." the mass of evidence in the 347-page report suggests that each of , the episodes took place within a firm -context of national, policy going all the way to the Oval Office. Irk. one way or another, the five assassination targets were regarded as personages inimical to U.S. national security interests. At the same t time, the tvarious ad- ministrations in the White House did not want to be saddled. with : the ?pent responsibility for thedownfall of the individual leaders or their governments. But the testimony- of wit- , nesses who were?- central ? . News Analysis- participants in the events covered by the assassination report tends to push the trail of responsibility to the door of:-. the White House. ' Richard Bissell. the Central Intelligence Agency deputy director for plans (head of the dirty tricks division) and a principal Castro assassination- plotter, told the Committee.the schemes were authorized by "highest authority'.'?by-, which he meant the President. . As Sen. Howard H.. Baker' (R-Tenn.) pointed out-in a supplementary report, Bissell testified that it would not' have. been "consonant with the operations of the CIA" to conduct operations of such extreme sensitivity without the President's knowledge and. permission. The recurrent theme in the. testimony of the upper-level CIA functionaries was that? they were acting within a framework of authority within which all their programs and schemes had an ultimate, presidential sanction. The CIA has been described as a "king's army" at the disposal of the President when he has to resort to secret action to carry out his foreign policies. And the- Senate committee, in its un- precedented detailed portrait, Approved Carl T. Rowan edneulay, December !3.l975 The Washington Star U.S. likely to continue fomenting coups abroad One of these days the Church and Pike commit- tees will drop their last bombshells about U.S. plots to assassinate foreign lead- ers and overthrow foreign governments. Once the cries of shame and outrage have faded, the American people are going to have to come to grips with a simple question: Do we want to control the ideology, determine the leadership, of foreign gov- ernmentsor do we not? I know what the public pretense is. We've endorsed a U.N. charter/and a hun- dred other ? documents pledging not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. But everyone has always known such declarations were Merely hypocritical gestures toward the kind of world that ideally ought to exist. Since World War IT it 'has been accepted as routine that the Soviet Union would spend billions of rubles, em- ploy thousands of agents, to ensure the existence of re- gimes friendly to Russia in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany; etc., and would intervene with troops where money and espionage failed. It has been accepted as part of international compe- tition that the Soviets would finance newspapers in Latin America and Africa, the Chinese would arm rebels in East Africa, the Indians would, subvert any 'of 'the upper IeVela.--,OV. the:- American espionage system_ describes an age*/ that is anything but the -"rogue, elephant" that the committee chairman. Sen. Frank Church; (D-Idaho) once suggested it. was. ? Former CIA Director; Richard M.. Helms, recalling his departure from the White' House on Sept. 15,- 1970, with President Nixon's orders to prevent the election in Chile of Salvador Allende, a Socialist,' later testified: "...If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day.." Despite titillating accounts of exploding -seashells, con- taminated diving suits and exotic' poisons that fill -the pages of the report... the un- derlying truth is that the CIA has functioned as ,a strongly hierarchical bureaucracy that owes its final, allegiance on operational matters to the For Release 2001/08/08 regime in Bangladesh that seemed even a remote threat to India. ? The U.S. contribution to this atmosphere in which there is, no such thing as an "independent" small or weak nation, and in which even the strongest are con- stantly in danger of subver- sion, has been: ? The use of billions of dollars to finance "friend- ly" labor unions, political parties, newspapers and magazines all over the world. ? The supplying of money, arms, damaging information and even man- power with which to destroy_ any person, party or politi- cal force that a handful of Americans deemed to be a "threat" to the U.S. or its power position in.the world. President Ford said in his press conference last Wednesday that he has ordered the CIA not to plan or participate in the assas- sination of any foreign lead- er. But Ford insisted that under certain circum- stances the United States must "undertake covert operations." What the President really was saying is that despite all. the idealistic Charters and joint communiques we have signed, we will go on interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Perhaps all the great powers ought to cut out the phony. baloney. Israel, the White House. _ . William, Harvey, the CIA agent put- in, charge of- recruiting underworld figures, for the Castro poison schemes, repeatedly followed this line of ; testimony: ? "I was completely con- vinced during this entire period that this operation had the full-authority of the White House. either from the President or from someone. authorized and known to be. authorized to speak for the: President." The CIA's involvement in. .covert political warfare got its ? start in the idiosyncratic relationship between the Dulles brothers during- the. Eisenhower administration. .f John Foster- Dulles, the- Secretary of-State, according to intelligence veterans of that_; era, did hot trust the State Soviet Union, the. People's Republic of China, Canada, West Germany (to name a few) will be interested in who our next presidential candidates are. All of them will drop a few subtle speeches, even sneak around a few dollars, to influence the outcome. My guess is that the American public will go along with Ford in approv- ing "covert foreign opera- tions." , The dilemma then is: how does anyone guarantee that a covert operation to deny an Allende the presidency in Chile will not lead direct- ly or indirectly to Allende's .murder? We pumped millions of, dollars and vast quantities of arms into Chile to bolster right-wing forces opposing the Marxist president Salvador Allende. Our agents encouraged and fi- nanced the coup in which Allende was killed. Do we say we engaged in "covert operations," which Ford will continue to sanction, but that he had nothing to do with the murder of Al- lende? Only shameful sophistry permits the drawing of any such line. ? The likelihood is that Americans will go on med- dling and scheming abroad. And that conniving and sub- verting will continue to mean death for a lot of for- eign leaders. And occasion- ally some of our leaders. would gall his brother, Alleri;.: the CIA director, who would deploy the clandestine ser-- vices of the CIA to the task. The tradition of CIA covert operations with its clubby, swashbuckling, secretive, panache, took firm root in the- Dulles' days. During the 1950's, the clandestine programs of the CIA were, rated within the government aS a success, primarily i'n, battling Communist mass organizations in Europe. The agency survived the humiliating fiasco of the Bay, of Pigs in 1961 to entangle. itself in a continuing series of, misadventures during the 1960's?some of them chronicled in the assassination report. ;. It had once.been a boast of Allen W. Dulles that Americans never heard of the Department bureaucracy on. CIA's., successes?only its4 :3/4:TIAVelViih-WaTiMair6380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 WASHINGTON STAP. 2 2NON/ 1975 The assassination usiness The interim report of Senator Church's select .,. committee on intelligence, "Alleged Assassina- tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders'," probably will do us harm abroad, as President Ford has said. 'It Will be "exploited.'. .to do maximum 'damage to the reputation 'and foreign policy of the United States:: , . number of senators must agree with Mr. Ford, yet they chose -not to suppress this sordid - report. Why?. ? Perhaps some of them feel that, it would be inappropriate for the United States to doctor or s embroider its official record. Amerians hive no "official" history, in the totalitarian-sense. You can't imagine a report so injurious issuing from the Kremlin or the Winter Palade, but the con- trast is not altogether unfavorable ta,American custom.. ' Even when a free- soCiety tries' hard to hide discreditable truths about the past, the effort often fails. Someone tells. So 'maybe -it is better. to have the full story, carefully told and evaluat- ed, than to have the bits and-pieces of old skele-. tons falling out of the closet one by one:. - These, however, are mainly tactical consider- ations. What we need to digest are the long-term- lesSons, which are often dull. Nothing is duller, for instance, than perspec- tive.*Assassination as an instrument of policy ? did not originate in the U. S. nor with the CIA. The exceptional' thing about the plots against' Lumumba, Allende, Castro and Trujillo' none of which panned out ? is that they were aimed at foreign leaders in "peacetime." We view it as unsporting perhaps, but not morally repugnant in quite the same way, that this country success- fully plotted-to intercept and shoot down a plane carrying the Japanese general, Yamamoto, who had commandedthe attack on Pearl Harbor. That was in "wartime." In our age, the distinc-'? tion is not always easy to make. In the years covered by the report, many of the accustomed , differences between war and peace had collaps- ed. What we have here, accordingly, isa manifes- Station of that doctrine called "globalism" -- a doctrine having at its base the notion, that vital American interests were imperiled by, a crum- bling colonlal ' order' in the Congo, or a Caribbean .dictatorship,- or the alignment of an. offshore offshore island with the communist bloc. Ameri- can interest in the world was a seamless whole. 'failures. However now that so' much Of the agency's clan- destine history has been laid bare in congressional and. execlutive investigations, the' claimdoes not stand the test of public scrutiny. 18 Globalism involved, " further, an illusion--that ? with the tight plans and tricks AT would seize history,by the throat and exert control over dis- tant events, however petty. ' / The. Senate report mast be seen not only as comment on the perils and follies of as: scalding. self-indict:dent by Congress which makes the laws and handles the money. One can't expect Congress. to rise above the prevailing standard of judgment and ethics at large, and Congress in the Fifties- and Sixties': was as much under the spell of globaliszn as the rest of us. What we can expect is that Congress rise to the prevailing level of judgment and morality, which probably would have condemn-- ed-the assassination of foreign heads! of state. Certainly Congress ought to exceed its constitu-. end.), in vigilance. One can expect Congress to' know more and do more, when it's timely, about .the secret projects of creature' agencies thaw Congreia knew or did in this period about the git". Executive secrecy was involved; but 'Con--; tress has ways of penetrating that veil when it : wishes, And'-in the present case, exposure came' tOo'long after the fact. . I?.i In a recent Columbia Journalism Reyievi afti- cle,.reprinted in. The Star last Sunday, former. Sen. Williain Fulbright had sOme wise ?bier- , vatioas about the present national mOocl.of relation and, self-flagellation: Of these, per, ') haps the wisest Was that as We 'open the Old t closets full of dusty skeletons Yle tend to dwell ; ';;Ort.the sensational facts and give "short-Shrift to" ? , ti*policy questions.", - . . , The policy questions' raised hyAie Chard '' contraittee report may be too .obvious.to nee dwelling._on. Some are questions of prciperi ? administrative procedure ?'for instance the tint, Checked capabity of a President -to overbear the '!Cautions of the professionals,. as Mr. Nixon did in his.,design against Allende. Others. are broad-- er.: Can a democracy be much good' at cloak andi dagger stuff? Do these operationt even when- they succeed, sufficiently affect events, ori, 'American- interests to justify..t he risks and, opprobrium? C.n Congress, give the CIA the dise oration it !weds and also Protect the country and' 'the country's good nartie alainst its blunders and abuses? These questioas may be dull, but3 they beat 'poisoned cigars7lit: ultimate impor-- tance. . . THE PHI LA D EL PH IA INQUIRER 25 November 1975 Government: That CIA Again It seems that the security-tight offices of the CIA are full of leaks. There are water leaks, steam leaks, 'chimney leaks and even foundation leaks. The problem was leaked out in a five-year, $6.3 million plan the CIA filed with the House Public Works Committee for renovating its 10-year-old headquarters in Langley, Va.. _ ? You can now add another abuse to the list of charges against the CIA ? abuse of the English language. The assassination report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said the CIA had a cardinal rule of never calling it murder. It mentioned such things as "stand-by assassination capability," "incapacitating," "terminating," "removing from the scene" and "altering the health" of the victims: There was 'even a consultant group called the "Health .Alteration Com- mittee." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800p-3 Suiday, Nov. 231 1975 ME InSHENGTON POST ommiss ion rr ,-aert ..,, ? , ? -George Larchter. Jr: . wangton Post staff Writer - . The most autspoke -:defender-- of the Wa'rre - - / f:Conintisition's inquiry in President Kennedy's! ,assassination said yesterder that it should be reopened. ., DavidW: Belin, who served! as. a, staff lawyer on the Warren Commission and more ? recently as executive director 'Of the' Rockefeller Com- mission, called on Congress to -order a thorough new in- vestigation in light of- widespread skepticism about, , the Warren Commission's Work' and the withholding- of: -evidence?from it: by govern.: ment offreials,andagencies. ' ' The Central,?Intelligence Agency, the FBI anththe late Attorney Genera' Robert_F.: Kennedy himself, ;Bell -protested; . in - a ?publ Statenteti:ti: ,all-- failed to) disclose -:, to :the : Warren commissiiii.'-evidence coni earning plots to assassinate lcuban Prentier Fidel-Castro. i ? Belin.? a, Dei Moines- at2i torney, also-pointed out that; the FBI has recently admittedi its failure.to disclose evidence of-threats made to the FBI by Lee- Harvey Oswald several, days before the Nov. 22, 196.V. 'assassination, of the President in DallaS, ? ' . ,Speaking out on the 12thf? anniveriary of the murder, Bella Maintained that .a new inquiry would reach the sam central conclusioit --at Oswald "killed PtoUidenCl Kennedy and (Dallas P.olice4 Officer. (-J.D,)!Iippit,' but hei said a fresh inVestigatio ? might also shed additinnalj light "on what motivate l Oswald. .- ." i - ' - i ? "Belin voiced doubt, that reopening of the inveStigation' so many years after- the/ assassination, "would disclose --... ........--- the exist-e-nCe of any foreign, conspiracy,'! but. be 4d. notl ruleAut that possibilityi Althoughlite, Warren: Cot/mission fotmcino credible evidence of "any foreign, conspiracy', he pointed out "the Warren. Commission didt not - have any informatiori concerning CIA assassination,: plans- directed against Fidel Castro and possible; ramifications of such plans." In the past; Belin has resisted, suggestions that the, investigation be reopened, on, the grounds that some wit- nesses have died and:-..the recollections of others are not likely to be as accurate now as they were in 196e. Despite- that, he said he felt. afresh, objective and independent inquiry would "greatly con- tribute toward a rebirth-of confidence and trust ...in., government." ' Belin remained silent about . the relevance of CIA- assassina tion,,...schelithig ciwyer Asks eo enin Probe ?Nen.----.COm- Commission earlier this year, iari - be ca use i of the 'secrecy:im.i pbsed by the administr.ation;o but the, Senateintelligence .committeelastWeek released eVisi broader Study, ofi-CI)! murder attempts:. and ton; ipiraties: . The- Senate report showed that .the CIA and to. a- lesser extent the 'FBI and Attorney General Kennedy were all aware of some of the efforts to kill Castro when the -Warren Commission asked for any. information bearing on whether the- ostensibly .pro- Castro Oswald might have. been part of a conspiracy.. Belin, also called for release by the CIA?as well as by. thel National: Arefilyes?oli alt information- OsWeldi and Ort?-? The Kennedy: assasaioationi Includedin thei Autopsy photograpte and r ..raywtoLEXe_sIdelli Kennetr. BALTIMORE SUN 25 Nov. 197$ mission decided to suppress because, Belin said; of "the personal family deshis of thei Kennedy family" called this:. "perhaps the worst mistake made by the com- mission." Belin said he felt -reopening; the- Warren inquiry would: serve to refute "the- most: extreme and vocal assassination critics," who, he charged, have deliberately misrepresented the overall record of evidence that the commission had before it. - Finally, Belin asked in his statement-for a review by the National' News Council or some similar forum of the news media's. continuing Coverage- of President Ken-i, nedy'sassassination. ' In any case, he maintained, that a reopening of the Warren investigation itself wbuld show how- the public can at times' .!`.he-..Mislect,01....sP.P-i sationalisni, 'dertragoguer and ' deliberate .., misrepresentationof the overall -record," eapeciallx wbew,there;,is-. insufficienh knO,Wledge Of the record. ? 1 The disclosures of the Senate intelligence committee in the past week would also appear to give the Warren Commission critics something to complain about. FBI Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams acknowledged at a Senate- hearing Wednesday that the- FBI submitted secret reports on seven Warren Commission critics to the Johnson White, House in 1966 at the request of then-White House aide Watson.' , = Included in the FBI parket,i A- dams acknowledged, was' Waffle record information undl _ _ photographs of at least one or the critics in the course of "sexual activity.", . ThO Reath of JFK. For years "conspiracy theorists" have been charging that the Warren Commission (I) in- competently failed to follow all 'leads in the John F Kennedy agnassination case, or (2) de- liberately conspired to keep the truth hidden. Last spring Senator Church responded to a new wave of sensational charges with -a promise that his committee studying the intelligence com- munity would take a new look at the assassina- tion investigation. Vice President Rockefeller said his commission conducting a similar study would take a similar look Both commission and committee had their hands full with other mat- ters and as a consequence could deal with the assasidnation only in passing But it is interest- ing to note that today the executive director of the Rockefeller Commission, David Belin, and two members of the Church Committee, Sena- tors Schweiker and Hart, have called for re- opening the investigation into the murder of John F Kennedy. These calls proceed from different perspec- tive and with different anticipation. Mr Belin, who was also assistant counsel of the Warren Commission, believes the new investigation would prove the commission came to the right conclusion: He believes a new study would res- tore public faith in government institutions and 19 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 demonstrate to the public how easily it can be misled by clever sensation-mongers. Senators. Schweiker and Hart believe the study will prove the Warren Commission did a poor job and came to the wrong conclusion. We believe that the preponderance of the ev- idence suggests that Lee Harvey Oswald . was the assassin and that he probably acted alone, or at least without the assistance of any organ- ized group or government. But it is troubling to learn from Church Committee that both the :Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency lied to the Warren Commis- sion during, its investigation?and that one member of the Commission, former C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles, was aware of that and al- lowed- his fellow inembers to be deceived. This makesit possible to believe there was a conspir- acy after the assassination. Until this is ex- plained, the conspiratorial-minded will always believe the most bizarre theories. . For a more important reason. Congress should take a new and detailed look into the Kennedy assassination. If the F.B.I. and C.I.A. could get away with lies to a special commis- sion once, they could again. Congress needs to find out how this happened and what can be done to keep it from happening again. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 THE WASECINGTON POST saftircgii; Nov 22 1925 CIA Schemes, Gadgets Would Amaze Even Ian Fleming Robert G. Kaiser Wastfin9ton Post Staff Writer The late Ian-Fleming, who invented; James Bond; the archetypal spy ofl our die; likedtOimplY that Bond was more than just it invention?that his! "license to exotic partners in espionage his remarkable gadgets were more than figments of Fleming's imagination. That hint of verisimilitude helped explain the. success of Fleming's James Bond novels. Now the Senate intelligence committee 'has demon- strated that Fleming's hints could have been stronger. It was all true. Well, nearly au true. Bond usually got his man. The' Central Intel4ence Agency agents'i exposed by the Senate comMittee: ?spies with 644 names like Qj-WIN,,, WI-ROGUE-?-:nr.Ter gottheir man. WI-ROGUEV,=(an acronymicaY ,pseudonym )..t ks "an essentially stateless soldrerof fortune . . . a, forger and ldrOfer bank robber,". .according. to*fiAternal CIA report.i Be was "a:'?i*.*Twith an unsavory ;reputation whiY0Ould try, anything :once, at least*edprding to theCIA's station officeeiOlib Congo. The CIA dispatched WI-Ro-GU to7. the Congo "after providing him with plastic surgery and a toupee so 'that_ Europeans traveling in the Congo would not recognize him," according to the Senate committee., The Agency's Africa Division had recommended him for the mission: ? "He is indeed aware of .the precepts. of right and wrong, but if he is given an assisgnment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it- out, then it is right'and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action, for its- execution without pangs of- con.5 science..." So reports the Senate Committee, quoting the _Africa.1 Division: . WI-ROGUE was in the Congo at the same time as QJ-WIN. QJ-WIN "was' a foreign citizen with a criminal background recruited in Europe," the Senate panel learned, "not. . . a maw of many scruples,' in the words of another CIA operative. These men, were "assets" of the ' Leopoldville "station", of the CIA,' though neither knew of the other's status. Then one day they met. A CIA. at inthe Congo reported on the encounter in a cable to Washington: ?"QJ-WIN, who resides same hotel as WI-ROGUE, reported WI-ROGUE smelled as though he in intel telligence) business. Station denied any info on WI-ROGUE . . QJ-WIN reported WI-ROGUE had offered him $300 per month to participate in intel net and bemember 'execution squad': When QJ-WIN said he not interested, WI-ROGUE added there would be bonuses for special jobs. Under QJ- WIN questioning,. WI-ROGUE later said he working for (America) ser- vice (i.e., CIA) . The CIA's department of gadgets, the Senate committee discovered, is called the Technical Services Division, or TSD. In 1960 TSD con- sidered a number of schemes "to undermine (Fidel) Castro's charismatic appeal (in Cuba) by sabotaging his speeches." For example: ...A scheme to spray Castro's- broadcaSting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD,_ but the scheme was rejected because the chemical wa 'unreliable . . . TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced' temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to snioke one of the cigars before delivering a speech,".. but that one also apparently did not get off the ground. The most ambitious scheme of 1960: was a plan"to destroy Castro's image as `The Beard' by dusting his shoes, with , thallium. -salts,, a strong: depilatory that would cause hisbeard..: to fall out_The depilatory was to be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it' wasanticipated Castro, would, leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined: TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals .. . But that idea was dropped, ap- parently' because- "Castro canceled: his trip: ? , (The committee retold these stories; from a report prepared, by the CIA's): inspector general.) Some of TSD's inventions failed to; work., The division produced some capsules of lethal poison for potentiali assassins who hoped to drop one of the pills into something Castro. was drinking. But "the first batch of pills prepared by. TSD . would. not 20 - ' dissolve in water." -- Another of TSp's- inventions could, never be used because of the un- witting generosity of James Donovan,.1 a New York lawyer. who negotiated the release of Cuban exiles. captured during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Someone in the CIA had 'the idea that Donovan could make a gift of a diving suit to Castro, known to enjoy deep-sea diving. According to the committee report: "The Technical Services Division bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin dieases (Madura foot)? and contaminated the breathing; apparatus with a tubercule bacillus." But Donovan, who had been, negotiating personally with Castro, subverted-this plan by giving the Cuban leader ?on his own initiative;:, without consulting Washington?a different new diving suit, untainted by. Madura foot or tuberculosis. After that, it seemed inappropriate to _ _ present Castro with a second diving suit. The Senate committee learned that the CIA has, had a committee to pass on the use of biological and chemical substances. In one CIA document it was referred to as the "Health, Alteration Committee." In 1960 the CIA's Near East Division asked the Health Alteration Com- mittee to endorse a "special operation" to "incapacitate" an Iraqi colonel who was thought to be "promoting Soviet-bloc political interests in Iraq." The committee said a "disabling operation" could be undertaken:? According to the Senate committee report, "The approved operation was to mail a- monogrammed han- dkerchief containing an in- capacitating agent to the colonel from an Asian country . The CIA informed the Senate committee that the colonel in question "suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad (an event we had nothing to do with) not very long, after our-handkerchief proposal was considered." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 1 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Sunda)", No_v.:13. 1970 THE WASHINGTON POST/ JFK and the CIA: By Robert Sam Ansa ? This is an excezpt from "They've Killed the President! - published last week by Bantam Books, Inc., c' 1975 b - Roberts Sam Anson. Anson, national political co? J) 11 Revisited -respondent for New Times magazine and a publ) television producer in New York, is a former Time co) respondent and author of "McGovern: A Biography., 1 being embarrassed, and the agency embarrassed him I not only in Cuba and in Vietnam but in the Soviet Union, where in 1963 the Russians arrested a Yale history _ professor and charged him with committing espionage against the Soviet Union. Kennedy, after receiving assurances from the agency that the professor was "clean," had personally appealed to Khrushchev to release him, and Khrushchev, as a gesture of his esteem for Kennedy, had agreed. But when the professor returned and met with Kennedy in the Oval Office, he reportedly, admitted that he had indeed been pying for the agency. Kennedy was livid. The President had already sacked CIA director Allen Dulles and his deputy, Richard-Bissell, and installed his own brother to honcho the ageners covert operations, but apparently more shake-ups were required.. His- desire to splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and - scatter it to the winds did not escape the attention of the agency. poqR HOWARD HUNT. After Watergate people were ready to blame him for just about everything, and considering his background ? spy, burglar, devotee of plots and assassinations ? it wasn'treally surprising. The cruelest charge, of course, was that he and his friend Frank Sturgis (who Hunt said wasn't all that good a friend, since they had only met in 1972, althqugh Sturgis put the beginning of their acquaintance in 1961) had been two Of the "tramps" arrested by the Dallas. police behind the grassy knoll ' shortly after the assassination. - - The accusation received considerable publicity, es- pecially after comedian Dick Gregory repeated it on national television. David Belin and the Rockefeller CIA, commission lent to-great pains to prove there was nothing to it. Belin really didn't mind the effort; indeed he was delighted, since the accusation was so patently preposterous. Photo experts were called in,. measurements taken, witnesses interviewed, and in the end the Rockefeller commission was ableto reportwhat virtually everyone knew from the beginning: whoever the "tramps" were, they were not Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis. The height was all wrong. So was the age. As a matter of fact, except to Gregory and a few others, they didn't look like Hunt and Sturgis at all. Such, however, typifies the investigation of whether the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the murder of President Kennedy. There was, there has never been, any investigation at all. The CIA was an inevitable suspect. Kennedy and the agency had long been at loggerheads. The CIA's failure' to correctly estimate the resistance of Castro's forces' at the Bay of Pigs was only one of a number of-incidents Almost on the eve of the missile ...crisis the agency:. without the President's authority, pulled off one of its patented anti-Castro capers which had at first amused Kennedy. Kennedy did not find this one funny; nor did; the Russians. , What the men from Langley did 'was sabotage a ship- ment of Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. The op- portunity presented itself in late August, 1962, when a, British freighter filled with sugar bound for Russia sail ed into San Juan harbor for repairs. The CIA managed to contaminate 14,000 of some 80,000 sacks of sugar by in'-'jecting them with an allegedly harmless substance-that would give the sugar a foul taste. The purpose was Mutt- , dermine the Russians' confidence in Cuba's chief export crop. When Kennedy found out what had happened he, warned the Russians, prevented the ship from sailing,4 and excoriated the agency for creating a "dreadful", precedent for chemical sabotage." The Russians, who were busily installing missiles in Cuba, strongly protested the incident in n series of diplomatic notes. After the missile crisis and the growing rapproche- ment with Castro and the Soviet Union, the agency. def led Kennedy's orders to turn off exile raids on the Cuban homeland?just as it had prepared to defy him at the Bay of Pigs. Before the invasion the agency prepared a plan for the operation to go forward even if Kennedy got cold feet at the last moment and tried to stop it. The President's orders had also been disobeyed in Vietnam, where, three weeks before his own death, Ngo Dinh Diem had been overthrown and murdered, ap- parently with the active complicity of the CIA. The disobedience, at whatever level, enraged the President. At the time of his death he was planning a full- scale review of the agency's activities. He did not like - THE AGENCY had grievances against the President. as well. Hunt was not the onlyCIA man to believe that Kennedy had betrayed the agency and its people at the _ _ _ _ _ _ Bay of Pigs. The bitterness was increased by what Hunt termed Kennedy's "heaping guilt on the CIA." Even John McCone, whom Kennedy had appointed to succeed Dulles and who was supposedly his ally, deeply dis- agreed with the President's moves to normalize relations with Cuba. The agency was also fearful of a whole range of Kew.; nedy initiatives that grew Out of his American Universi-, ty speech in the summer of 1963, from arms control to the banning of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons to accommodation with the Communists in Laos to the reevaluation of the entire American commitment to Southeast Asia. Shortly before his death Kennedy had approved the first withdrawal from South Vietnam of American advisers. A thousand advisers were to be call- ea home by the end of the year ? a token number perhaps, beta clear sign of where Kennedy was heading. On his return from Texas he had said he would conduct a 'full-scale policy review of U.S. relations with South. _Vietnani. One of the first moves was meeting with Am- bassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge. He and Kennedy were to have lunched at the President's Virginiaestate on-Nov. 24. CIA liked none of it. , Indeed. John Kennedy was one of the agency's op- ponents, potentially its most dangerous adversary. The CIA had a motive. It had the means. It had the experien- ce. It had the disposition. The agency could have killed him, and far better than anyone else covered its crime. But did it? If Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin (or a member of an assassination conspiracy), and if he was- still an intelligence agent (as he certainly seemed to have been during his sojourn in the Soviet Union) on Nov. 22; 1963, and if finally, he was acting with the agency's approbation when he killed Kennedy, then, of course, the answer Is self-evident. But there are a number of hurdles to cross before reaching that conclusion. It is by no means certain, in the first place, that Oswald was an assassin. Much of the evidence, along with his casual behavior immediately after the _shots were fired, points to the contrary. However cool and calculating killers are supposed to be,. it is difficult to, imagine someone who has just shot the President of the United States pausing to drink a Coke, then strolling out- side in no evident hurry, getting on a bus, getting off, 21 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 hailing a cab, offering it up to a little old lady, and finally, as the police and FBI closed in, making good his escape, which turns out to be to a local movie theater. Oswald's excuse for "fleeing" the scene of the crime- was that he thought that, because of the assassination, work would be suspended for the rest of the day. The. assumption was not illogical. Work, as it happens, was; suspended for the rest of the day, and besides Oswald 11 other workers left the Book Depository after the, assassination. There may have been a conspiracy, but it - wasn't that big. Some critics have found Oswald's going to the movie; theater suspicious, a sign perhaps that Oswald was an; intelligence agent. George O'Toole, ..a former CIA man-. who suggests that the FBI may have been- involved in Kennedy's killing (a not surprising contention, con- sidering the bureau's and the agency's mutual detestation), points out that movie theaters are a favored rendezvous for agents. Oswald's apparently having been an agent does not necessarily mean he was a CIA man. Army intelligence, in particular, has nearly as large a budget as the agency, and more than three times as many agents. Far better than the CIA, Army intelligence was in a position to know the arrangements of the President's trip to Dallas, as well as the security precautions the Secret Service was taking to ensure his safety. Chronically short- handed, the Secret Service worked with Army in- telligence as a matter of routine. ALMOST SURELY Oswald was an intelligence agent' of some sort. While in Dallas, New Orleans and Mexico City he was in close, even intimate contact with other in- telligence agents or contract employees of the CIA. On Nov. 22, however, he could just as well have been operating without the agency's sanction, or , though this seems less likely, without its prior knowledge. There are numerous instances when the CIA has lost control of its own people, and, one presumes (though the agency has yet to admit it), when one of its agents has been turn- ed Against it. Another possibility is that Oswald was "taken Over" by an extremist faction within the agency, or a group. close enough .to it tn heeNme,okOswalcl's i;oacnd.. there area number of cases when-this has hap- pened. When individual agents have acted not only con- trVy fo. Okbyders_of the.President hut .those of ,.the leadership of CIA. One longtime observer of the agency, journalist-,,graWt?McCulloch,.:says...:.! ' --.,71liat sort of thingis inevitable, given the sort of peo- ple the CIA recruits-CIA looks for guys who are bright, loop; natnrallysompetitive. Ideology does not mean nearly as much as the instinct to win. If you take one of these guYi;i:.and give him a job, Well, he's going to do it whatever ilt.takes.-Maybe there are things the agency ??.htm to Is him. he cisn'i'"--d-cikEUf he does -them- inkway. Ho* will the agency eier find. out? It's just partof -winning These guys areirained to win2.!..:, - Cuba produced that feeling in many agents, of whom Howarcillunt is merely the best known,The cause of the exiles ca:tne in time to be the cause of the Americans who worked with them; - ? THE COMING to power of Fidel Castro was a disaster not only for U.S. foreign policy, but for organized crime. The mob was anxious to see Castro removed from the scene at the earliest possible moment. So was the CIA. During the agency's planning of the Bay of Pigs inva- sion one of the sources it turned to for intelligence infor- mation on the disposition of Castro's forces was the mob, whieti at the time stiff maintained a considerable apparatus on the island. ? . . Before and after the invasicin the mob was also trying -to secure Castro's assassination, sometimes with the agency's help, sometimes without it. Frank Sturgis, who as a casino operator in Havana had lines to both the CIA and the mob, was twice approached shortly after Approved For Release 2001/08/08 22 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800p-3 the Cuban revolution by organized - crime figures. wishingto enlist him as an assassin; Sturgis declined, but reported the conversations to CIA friends in Havana. - . The CIA itself had been talking of eliminating Castro since the closing days of the Eisenhower ad- ministration, and Sturgis' report may have freshened interest in the project. A mob hit rather than an assassination by the agency itself would provide the CIA with what was known in the trade as "plausible deniability" if, as ultimately turned out, the attempt went askew. By early 1061 the agency and organized crime were deep into discussions on how best to eliminate their com- mon foe. Reports vary on how the initial contacts were made. What the stories agree on is that after protracted discussion John Roselli, the suavely vicious Mafia capo of Las Vegas, agreed to recruit a team of hit men for the CIA. All of this was unknown to all but one of the men of the Warren Commission in 1964. 'The exception was Allen Dulles, and he was hardly talking. The mob, after all, worked for him. Even now the full truth about the CIA and the mob is far from clear. What the few brief glimpses down the ?corridor have provided is chilling enough: the two- most secret and powerful organizations in America working hand and glove in a relationship so intimate that for;a11.; practical purposes there has ceased to be a distinction, between what is done in the name of intelligence Anct whar is-Clone in the narne otcrime.. Everything, even' murder, comes together under a. single heading:. national interest." _ . . ? THE MELDING together of American intelligetIce and organized crime is the key to understanding John: Kennedy's murder. Without that understanding the cOn-' spiracy is like the jumbled pieces of a puzzle, each, of them odd-shaped, impossible to connect. But lay in &at keystone and suddenly what has all seemed so bizafte for so many years makes terrifying sense..:, - One way or another all the major figurea connectectto the assassination are-also linked to the agency andlhe mob. ? ?-? There is Oswald, the apparent agent antcaLT tact with other CIA then, many of whom have their own ties to the mob. He lists as the address for his fictitares pro-Castro organization a building whose tenants:in- clude both mob and intelligence figures. After the assassination a large quantity of Oswald's literature turns up in the office of one of those tenants, Guy Banister, a private investigator employed by New Orleans crime boss Carlos Marcello and a man who-in the past worked on CIA operations. One of his close friends in New Orleans is David Ferrie, an identified agent who also works for the mob. Another reported associate is Clay Shaw, like Ferrie an identified agent.. _ After the assassination Oswald is shot to death by Jack Ruby, a man with numerous connections to Cosa Nos'ira figures, who is also involved with Cuba and Cuban ex- iles. When a story arises that Oswald has met with a prominent exile figure to plan the assassination, the man who conveniently appears to debunk it turns out to be a reported gunrunner for an agency-backed 'organization. Later, an Oswald look-alike is found to be one of the leaders of an exile organization reportedly backed by both the agency and the mob. Finally, when the pressures for a new investigation of the assassination are boiling over, the man who announ- ces he has solved the case is a district attorney who by his own admission has numerous contacts with Cosa Nostra figures. During the trial he dismisses all referen- ces to the Cosa Nostra and-fixes-blame on an odd-lot assortment of conspirators. The trial ends in farce and the prospects for a new investigation are obliterated. In the process the CIA gains sympathy. Just how many coincidences can be piled atop one Approved' For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000 100.380003-3 another before one has to wonder? One especially win- ders when the groups involved are neither Boy Scouts nor, as Jim Garrison once put it, "retired circus clowns." They are two secret violent societies whose fates are inextricably intertwined. Many things bring them together. One of them is Cuba. Another is hatredof Friday14ovember2T, 1975 Thi Vtashinipii-Star, John Kennedy. .e Few people know of their alliance, and only one is in a position to do anything about it. He has sworn that' he will. Before he can, he is murdered in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. Coincidence. stro Survived a Wave By Jeremiah O'Leary Washington Star Staff Writer " At the very moment President John F. Kennedy was shot on Nov. 22, 1963, two CIA officers were handing a specially made poison pen to a Cuban offi- cial to be used in assassi- nating Fidel Castro. That meeting with a highly placed but anti-Cas- tro Cuban official known by the CIA cryptonym of AMt LASH ? was one of at least eight plots launched by the CIA from 1960 through 1965 to kill the Cuban leader; ac- cording to the interim' re- port- of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. Testimony made public yesterday by the committee disclosed that the late De- smond Fitzgerald, head of CIA ? covert operations against Cuba, and an uni- dentified CIA case officer met AM/LASH in a foreign city to give him a ball-point pen rigged with a hypoder- ? mic needle' so fine that the victim \ would not notice its- insertion. At the meeting, probably in Mexico City, Fitzgerald recommended that the Cuban agent use a deadly commercial. poison called Blackieaf-40. The two CIA men also assured AM/LASH that the CIA would give him everything he needed, including' *4 high-powered rifle, a tele- scopic aight, a silencer and all the money he wanted to kill Castro from a distance. - ? ? ONLY WHEN Fitzgerald and the other CIA officer, left the Cuban agent did they learn that President Kennedy had been assassi- _nated by a pro-Castro ex- Marine named Lee Harvey _Oswald at the very moment . the poison device was being handed over for use against _ _ Castro. The committee ob- tained the information about this bizarre meeting from a CIA inspector general's report and inter- views conducted in 1967. The CIA plots to kill Cas- tro spanned the Eisenhow- er, Kennedy and Johnson administrations and involv- ed.CIA attempts.to use both Mafia figures and anti-Cas- tro Cubans. The means for assassinating Castro in- cluded fijj 1and offer $150,000 for Ca ' poisons and explosives and the liquidation of the Marx- ist leader was discussed openly in the highest coun- cils of the government, in- cluding the White House. The first serious plots against Castro were brewed in the CIA as early as Au- gust 1960. The committee report said Richard Bissell, deputy director of plans, authorized the two attempts to murder Castro and other Cuban leaders in the period before the 1961 Bay of Pigs hrhsion. Bissell was depu- ty director from January 1, 1959, until he was fired_ by the Kennedys in February 1962 because of the failure of the Cuban exile invasion _run by the CIA. ? The committee said, Richard Helms, ? who suc- ceeded Bissell as deputy' director and is now ambas- sador to Iran, authorized a second attempt on Castro's. life through the underworld' figures in the year after the Bay of Pigs disaster. The committee developed evi- dence that CIA Director Allen Dulles knew and ap- proved of the- first plots against Castro in 1960. The committee said there is a note in Dulles' handwriting; joining with Bissell in ap- proving a memorandum by J.C. King, then head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division. King recommend- ed "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro." mier- the anti-Castro effort BISSELL AND Col. Shef- from Edwards at Bissell's; field Edwards, director oil request.' _ the CIA Security Office, _ . testified that they were cer- Harvey's program,'. with, tam n both Dulles and his the code name of ZR/i deputy, Gen. Charles Ca- RIFLE, was then tailored, bell, knew about and au- to resume dealing with the thorized the first phase of syndicate figures for anoth- the plot involving the er attempt against Castro. underworld figures. ? Meanwhile, Helms suc- The first concrete evi- ceeded Bissell as deputy dence of the initial under- director of. plans in Febru- world operation, the corn- ary 1962 and ordered Har- raittee said, is Edwards' vey to get in touch with statement 'that Bissell Rosselli but to avoid Maheu, asked him to locate some-, and. Giancana. The poison one who could assassinate pills were, brought out Castro. Edwards said he again and Rosselli testified, called on ex-FBI agent that this time the Cubans Robert A. Maheu, later an would go after not only aide to multimillionaire Fidel but Raul Castro and Howard Hughes, to handle Che Guevara as well. the job. Maheu and one of Edwards' men agreed *to- Harvey- obtained arms. atmroach Las Vegas gam- boats and radios for the b ' g figure John Rossella_ _ Cubans but they never left Approved For Release 2001/08433: CIA-RDP77-00432R000 100380003-3 tro s assassination. Rosselli went to Miami to recruit Cubans to carry out , the contract and in the process brought in two other criminals, Sam Gian- cana, and Santos Tref- ficante. The two Mafia men recruited the Cubans while. the CIA undertook to fur- nish poison pills for them to, use in killing Castro. But Maheu and Giancana en- gaged in a keystone come dY caper by hiring a detec tive who got caught in'- stalling an illegal in a Lai Vegas room he- cause of Giancana's com- plicated love life. The FBI also picked up word that' Giancana wa's involved in a "contract" on Castro's life._ The CIA had to step in with difficulty to persuade J. Edgar Hoover and the Department of Justice to spare their Mafiosi aides from prosecution and presumably from telling everything they knew. THE 'POISON. PILLS fur- nished by the CIA finally were smuggled into Cuba just before the" Bay of Pigs invasion but the would-be Cuban assassins did not accomplish their mission- and returned the pills. Late in 1961, another CIA official, William K. Harvey, who was in.charge of a pro- gram called Executive Ac- tion for disabling fareign? leaders or assassinating them as a, last resotook lots Florida. The connection was broken off but nobody ever told the Cuban assas- sins that the $150,000 offer had been withdrawn. EARLY IN 1963, Fitzger- ald replaced Harvey and headed what was called Task FOrce W. Fitzgerald's efforts were turned to ex- ploring strange plans such as the exploding seashell' and. the contaminated div- ing suit for the Cuban lead- er. But his principal activi- ty was 'contact with AM/ LASH, who could not make uptis mind whether to kill Castro or defect. The CIA finally terminated relations. with AM/LASH_in 1965. The- committee wet far from precise about how, much of these assassination plots was known by or au- thorized at higher levels of. the government John' McCone, who succeeded' Dulles in November -1961. said he knew nothing of the; assassination plans. Helms, testified he -didn't know- whether McCone- knew or not but said McCone had never told him not to assas- sinate Castro. Bissell re- called that he and Edwards briefed Dulles and Gen. Ca- bell but that, "circumlocutious" Ian- guage was used. Edwards, according to testimony, deliberately' avoided using any "bad" words" such as asaaaainate. or kill. ? ,- THE COMMITTEE was inconclusive also about what was known by Presi-, dent Kennedy, his brother, Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy, and later by President Lyn- don B. Johnson. The Kenne- dys, after the Bay of Pigs, neyerteased in their deter- mination that Castro's regime had to be over- thrown as a menace to the U.S. and the Western Hemi- sphere. President Kennedy ordered creation of Opera- tion MONGOOSE in April? 1962, and placed it underi control of Robert Kennedyi and Gen. Maxwell Taylor:: In turn, the chief of opera- tions was. Gen. Edward; Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Ian-Wale, who had a repu-1 .tation for dealing with situations like that in Cuba.; The committee developedi testimony. that Lansdale labored ceaselessly on- plans for disrupting the, Cuban regime and that he was prodded hard by the Kennedys to produce more sabotage and infiltration. Lansdale dealt wth the, attorney general and the -White House Special Group in the months prior tn the' missile crisis of 1962 and he was in contact with Harvey and Helms at CIA on carry- ing out the many objectives of MONGOOSE. Most of the testimony agrees that the word "assassination" was not used in dialogue involving; the Kennedys, Lansdale or the White House group. But at a Special Group meeting on Aug. 10, 1962,.,someone raised the question of -liquidation of leaders." in Cuba. The testimony differs, on who- raised 'liquida- tion". Harvey testified that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara brought it. up, saying, "Shouskin't consider the elimination or, assassination of Castro?" ? , McNAMARA SAID he does not recall that. McCone and, the late Ed-. Ward R. Murroiv of USIA raised vehement objections. at the August meeting and; the matter was dropped, Nevertheless, Helms con- tinued to consider that he. had continuing authority to press on with the plots and Lansdale told Harvey to. develop a plan for "liquida- tion!' of Cuban leaders. The missile crisis, the death of Kennedy and the accession of Johnson to the White House appear to have ended the assassination plots against Castro. Helms; said .he banned assassinaw? tion, five years after he be-; came director of the'CIA in 1966. _ NEW YORK TIMES 3 Dec . 1975 Seymour HeririsVinner Of John Zenger Award The University of Arizona'S 1975 John Peter Zenger Award, has been won by Seymour M. Hersh of The New York Times for his -articles on domestic surveillance by the Central In- telligence Agency and other , investigative reporting. Mr. Hersh, a 38-year-old ;University of Chicago gradu- ate, won a 1970 Pulitzer Prize for his exclusive reporting of the My Lai massacre in Viet- NEW YORK TIMES., DECEMBER 5, 1975 Power and Corruption By Tom Wicker - No wonder the latest Gallup Poll shows a. Sharp decline in-public esteem for 'the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the. Central Intelligence Agency? from 84 percent "highly favorable" to the F.B.I. in 1965, for example, to only 37 percent today. And only 14 per-, cent of a sample of 1,515 adults were any longer, "highly favorable" to the C.I.A. These figures clearly reflect the long, dismal series of disclosures that both, agencies have abused their pow- ers, been misused by their political masters, threatened in various ways the constitutional rights of American citizens they were supposedly protect- ing, and participated in such repre- hensible schemes as murder plots against foreign leaders and character assassination plots against Americans. The latest of these unlovely dis- closures is that the F.B.L has been supplying secret dossiers, conducting illicit bugs and taps, and carrying on other 'forms of political surveillance for every President at least back to Franklin Roosevelt. That merely confirms what most critics of the security agencies have believed all along?that they were not so much evading or thwarting politi- cal control as succumbing to it. So far from operating against the wishes of Presidents and their advisers?in all Administrations of both parties in the last forty years?they were mostly doing either what they were told, or what they correctly perceived that their superiors wanted them to do. Several things need to be said abouT, this?the first of which is that, as apol- -ogists for Richard Nixon have insisted, a certain double standard of accounta- bility has been at work. Whatever Mr. Nixon's misdeeds, it is now undeniable that he was by no means the first President to order wiretaps, punitive tax investigations, political surveil-- lances of his "enemies," and the like. His critics should be careful, also, about too glibly suggesting that Mr. 'Nixon was a worse offender than his predecessors. There is ,no great dif- ference lb wiretapping the Democratic National Committee and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. In one sense, it might even be to Mr. Nixon's credit that ,he used his private "plumbers" in 1972 rather than perverting the F.B.I. as Lyndon John- son appears to have done in 1964. Nor does it seem likely that Mr. Nixon knew more of what was being done in his service than Mr. Johnson did, or President Kennedy before that. Presidents can hardly be impeached in retrospect, and that Mr. Nixon was ; The Zenger award, which consisfs of $500 and a cita- tion, is to be presented Jan. 17 at the annual convention of the Arizona Newspapers Associa- tion near Phoenix. 24 .not doing much that other Presidents had pot done?save his deliberate par- ticipation in the post-Watergate cover- up ? is not a reason' to- regard his forced resignation as unfair or unwar- ranted. Times changed, and placed Mr. Nixon in .a different public atmos-. phere, in the midst of which) more became known about the seamier side of 'his ? AdministratiOn than had been known about any before. That truth will not spare those of' us who condemned Mr. Nixon from the charge of his partisans that we were looking the other way when ear- lier Presidents were trampling over the Bill of Rights. Nor should it. But a more important point is implicit in that charge although it is not usually conceded by those who make it. It is that to a great extent such abuses of power as we are learning about are inherent in the existence of this kind of power. That is not to - apologize for efforts to drive Martin Luther King to suicide, or to poison _Patrice Lumumba; or to wiretape re-, porters to learn the' sources of Feaks,? as unfortunate aberrations or unavoid- able evils?regrettable, but just a part IN THE NATION of necessary intelligence and security, work. Most of the repellent events recently disclosed had nothing to do with real, rational intelligence or security Con- cerns. Instead, they represented self- serving political acts, the obsessive pursuits. of men corrupted by power, the capricious exercises. of that power, by _those who' had it, simply because' they did-have it. ' Thus, whatever real- problems. of Communist subversion from within and without may have threatened the United States since the 1930's, they could hardly have been greater threats to constitutional rights and individual liberty than those that came to be posed by the great security agencies, with their power to operate both in secrecy and in the name of national security, their unlimited budgets, their freedom from supervision?above all, their subservience to political masters who were enabled by the mere exist- ence of such agencies to- flout- the Constitution and the law for their own political purposes or obsessions. No one in Congress or the executive branch has even begun to face?let alone answer?the consequent philo- sophical and institutional questions: Can secret police agencies ever be made compatible with political and in- tellectual liberty? By what methods of control and accountability can they be made so? Control. by whom, ac- countability to whom? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000.8-3 Christian Science Monitor 24 November 1975 Ervvin.D. Canham - The new cover-up? Under pressure of public indignation, the special prosecutors appointed by former Pres- ident Nixon, the Ervin committee of the Senate, and the House Judiciary Committee pressed their inquiries of Watergate and its related crimes right up to the highest sources: in the Republican administration. When will public indignation force similar investigations, right to the top, of the abuses in domestic politics by the FBI ? and with the apparent knowledge if not instigation of Democratic Presidents Kennedy and John- son? Congressional probes so far have only gone part of the way. The harassment of the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. took place largely during the Kennedy adminstration, while Robert Ken- nedy was Attorney General. How much did he. and his presidential brother know about it? How much did they authorize? And at the Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in 1964, wiretapping by the FBI of Mr. King and. others seems to have been directly demanded by President Johnson. What-are the facts? ' Political use of the FBI is even, more appalling than the clumij, burglarizing of the- Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee. Beyond that event, of course, were many other developments, culminating in the effort to cover up and lie about it. - What kind of cover-up has there been of-the espionage abuses in the last two Democratic . presidencies? And- what were those abuses? -What was Lyndon Johnson's relationship to, the FBI? What role have congressional lead- ers themselves played? Is the Church corn- mittee really getting to the bottom of these matters, or is it seeking to protect Democratic - leaders? . It will be healthy to bring these matters to light, no matter how painful. Disclosure can lead to clean-up. Attention mustbe focused, as Attorney General Edward Levi is evidently focusing it, on ways of preventing FBI abuses in the future. One way will be to see that no future FBI director attains the political and personal untouchability of J. Edgar Hoover. Whatever may have been Mr. Hoover's services to his country, and many of them will not be denied, the build-up_ of dictatorial authority should never happen again. - It is now clear that the CIA internationally' and the FBI domestically were doing for years' things which are contrary to basic American principles. They were the tactics of the enemy. In the end such tactics are self- defeating. Now, to the nation's shame, they are coming to light. Are we sure they will not be repeated? Steps are being taken to draft new rules within the Justice Department and in Con- gress to render effective at last legislative oversight of how vast sums of taxpayer money are being expended for ways going far beyond intelligence-gathering to mtirder and sabo- tage. If there is any category which should be labeled un-American activities, it is in this realm Of lawless, bloody deeds. There is a madness in power. There is delusion in self-justification and self -right- eousness. It is easy to believe that deeds in a righteous cause are all themselves right. But the end does not justify the means, and usually disgraceful means do not even attain the desired end. The United States has partially awakened' Approved For Release THE BALTIMORE SUN 30 November 1975 James J. Kilpatrick r: ? Occasionally Our Leaders Must Think the Unthinkable-- Washington. Now that the dust has settled from the great CIA report, perhaps a couple of sober questions may be asked.. Was this particular report in the national inter- est? Is tyrannicide ever morally justi- fied? I would answer the first question, no, and the second question, uncertainly, yes; but on these Issues there is abundant room for reasonable-minded men to dis- agree. The questions defy easy answers. Consider, first, the report itself. It is described by the Senate Intelligence Committee, with emphasis, 33 an inter- im report. The implication is that other findings on other attempted assassina- tions are yet to come. The committee's conclusions, tentative as they are, are something less than final. What compel- ling necessity, we may inquire, demand- ed release of such an interim report? I know of none. ' Even as an interim report, the com- mittee's conclusions are remarkably in- conclusive. Descriptive words recur: Un- certain, incomplete, Insufficient, doubt- ful, speculative, unclear, conflicting.. The committee studied our govern- ment's role as to five men: Lumumba in the Congo, Castro in Cuba, Diem in Viet- nam, Schneider in Chile, and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. The findings boil down to this: In two of the cases (Lumumba and Castro), as- sassination proposals went beyond mere discussion and reached a stage of specif- ic planning. In the other three cases, there was talk only. In none of the five taws did CIA agents make an actual at- tempt. There is a "reasonable inference" that President Eisenhower authorized an assassination effort as to Lumumba, but the inference is offset by evidence to the contrary. Other presidents are .cleared. That is the sum total of 8,000 pages of testimony, thousands of hours of work by staff members, and 347 pages of an interim report. What a mountain of la- bor, one is minded to observe, to produce so small a churchmouse. For these un- certain, incomplete, and inconclusive conclusions, what price must be paid? The committee report provides a rich meal for America's detractors to feed on. By reason of this publication, the CIA's vital task will be made more diffi- cult the intelligence services of friendly from the era of disgraceful deeds but it has not yet fully clarified the record and agreed upon remedial measures. New rules on paper will_pot do it. Possibly the greatest lesson to emphasize is that presidents of the United States and those on whom they rely should be persons of integrity and character,- capable of looking into them- selves and saying of some proposal: "That just isn't done." - nations will think twice about cooperat- ing in the future. A mass of highly sensi- tive material has now been compiled in written form; it will be a miracle if this material is not leaked or stolen. It is-a-' strange exercise in national masochism( thus to flagellate ourselves before: the. World. The committee, of course, fedi, Oth. erwise. "The Committee believes -the truth about the assassination allegati'ons' should be told because democracrdew pends upon a well-informed electorate:. We reject any contention that the fads. disclosed in this report should be kepts secret because they are embarrassing to the United States."- No one can quarrel ? with the committee's abstract defenseor, the people's right to know. But do the people have a right to know everything: Do the people have a right to knowIllt" intimate, sordid details spelled out, in, this interim report? For my own part., I, deny it. The plot against Ltunurnba evoty from an apprehension, soundly based,,at - the time, that the Soviet Union, through- Lumumba, was about to take overthe Congo. Look at a map of Africa; contem- plate the consequences. The plot against: Castro evolved from the actual physicals presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba -ethe.,1 first such Communist penetration in the Al .4:J1 Western Hemisphere. ? .? The civilized mind recoils from atilt: thought of murder in cold blood. In the. two cases, this was what the CIA was plotting. The specific schemes ?deadlyp bizarre and ludicrous?both repel and fascinate the reader. Each of us may form his own judgment on presidential Involvement. "It is my personal view," says Senator Howard Baker (R., Tenn.), "that on balance the likelihood that pres- idents knew of the assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did:: not." This is a chilling business to broig: on. L ? 01: P. ? But is there no case?no case whateli.i, er ?in which tyrannicide could be justi- fied? If it had been possible to arrange the murder of Hitler in, say, 1938, and - thus to have averted the fearful consequ- ences of his madness, would this have, been a moral act? My own feeling is that, in the dangerous world we live in. our leaders must occasionally think unthink- able thoughts; and in the overriding Tie, cessity, must not flinch from doing the .? /et M unthinkable deed. 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0a432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 ZrozeitS *net FrE, Nov. 21, 197: SHUNNED BY PBS KCET to Air CIA Critique BY DICK ADLER T. Timet Staff Writer Knocking the usually lugubrious and occasionally pain- ful fund-raising antics of a public television station has become almost a national pastime. Most print critics can't resist wishing out loud for a few well-made commercials, and both Cher and Johnny Carson have taken very funny shots recently. . But in case you wonder where those membership dol- lars so lumpishly cajoled from your wallet go, take a look at a fascinating documentary called "The Rise and Fall of the CIA" on xcur this Sunday-evening at 7:10. For $850, the amount raised between an Alistair Cooke blurb and yet another smiling demand from Jean Marsh, Channel 28 has purchased exclusive local rights to an important pro- gram turned down by the networks, the PBS and most in- dependent commercial stations. "The Rise and Fall of the CIA" was originally made in three 30-minute segments byWorldin Action, the excel- lent documentary unit of England's commercial Granada Television, and aired there last June to considerable ac- claim and ratings. The programs were screened by PBS in Washington this past summer, In hopes they -would be purchased for use on the entire public network, But the' PBS screening committee objected to certain aspects of the programs, found them "fairly superficial and shallow" and claimed that they "said some questionable things about the CIA" (according to a PBS spokesman), so they were turned down. Other prospective buyers also balked; only WNEW-TV, Metromedia's New York outlet, the Dal- las public station and ECE'T have so far decided to let their viewers see the programs. PBS, of course, is entitled to make its own program- ming decisions. What is somewhat disturbing in this in,- stance is that, according to reliable sources, atileast,ttio representatives from Corp. for Public Broadcasting?the governmental agency which is designed strictly:to admin- ister . funds for PBS?were present at the screening in', Washington, and that these CPB representatives' played a role in the- rejection, Joe Dine, a CPB 'press,, official in Washington, :admits that a senior CPB programming executive and Thisassis- tant were present at a screening of mrhe Rise and Fall of . the CIA," but doesn't See any iMpropriety. "I couldn't say. categorically_ thatsthe.CPB's opinion didn't have anything:: to do with the rejection by PBS, but it wasn't an official- decision on the part of CPB not to use the programs. We don't make programming decisions," he says. 'Others ques- tion. ev_eh the ,,over-presence. of g _government agenoT.- Such as C158 at the screening of a series of programs criti- cal of another government agency. _ . . THE DE-27:37: F.EE PRESS 23 Noverfc. er 1975 THE QUESTION A Senate panel reported that the CIA instigated assassinationplots against two foreign lead- ers, and became involved in plotting that led to the death of three others. Do you think a tighter reign should be kept on CIA ac- tivities? HOW YOU VOTED NO. 76.6 percent. COMMENTS: "How?cars they remain an ? Aired. F intim En-gland CET'S-PrOgrarn 'Chief; Charles Allen, says that he first heard of the Granada programs when they were aired in England in June, and that when PBS turned them down he moved to buy the package for Channel 28. The fact that CPB may or may not have been part of the original rejection doesn't bother him. "In a sense, a turn-down by CPB might be considered the highest form of praise," Al-' len says. "It was CPB who told producer Lewis Freedman.. that a series of one-minute programs on, the BicentenniaP, wouldn't work."? The three- Granaciai'programs,.Smoothly welded into one: 75-minute unit, certainly leave' themselvesopen to a Cer- tain amount of criticism, but charges of superficiality and shallowness wouldn't immediately, seem to be among them. The research, by producers Mike Beckman, Allan Segal and their staff, appears to be prodigious. It is true that they rely for on-camera information largely on the words of disaffected former CIA employes, notably ex-deputy director Tom Braden. BUt the producers say' that current CIA officials turned -down their requests for interviews. And even allowing for an extra portion of axe-grinding ? by these disgruntled former CIA types, "The Rise and Fall of the CLAN presents such a wealth of documented infor- mation in such a cool and lucid manner that the overall indictment is impressive. Visual imagery is as important here as on-camera interviews: a- party of .retired OSS and, CIA veterans, looking mostly like- the sort of people you see at the. ball game; newsreel film of the Cuban invasion force in Miami which helped blow the project's cover and led to the Bay-of--Pigs fiasco-; -paid Vietnamese CIA agents bringing in the heads of Viet Cong prisoners bounty. Braden?a-Credible Image If there is a star in the program, it is Braden?he is the central thread which weaves the rest of the material - (from such former CIA links as E. Howard Hunt and army liaison Col, Fletcher Prouty) into a generally believ- able scenario. Braden has' the jaded, cynically wise and droopy-eyed manner of a spoiled spy, most effective when he is talking about things like "the Battle for Picasso's Mind" (the CIA's attempts: to recruit intellectuals to- its . cause, including the Secret subsidy of Britain's Encounter magazine) and the way one phone call from CIA chief Al- len Dulles to his brother John Foster Dulles helped. to win : over a recalcitrant State Department official. Unless you're an ex-agent yourself or have some other special interest in the CIA, there will be a loti of new and, perhaps startling information for you in the program. How the CIA overthrew the Moussadegh government in Iran, for example; or how much the "secret war' in Laos cost U.S taxpayers ($2 billion); or how the CIA. tipped off the U.S. Army that My Lai .was a supposed Viet Cong stronghold. . What ordinary viewers can do with such information is another question, but at least it will be there for possible future use. For that, no thanks to PBS?and many thanks to ECET for giving us the chance to-decide for ourselves what vio should know. . _ effective secret service if we make all of their activities pub- lic?" . . "We're already exposing ourselves too much to our enemies" . . . "Who would hold the reign, the Russians?" ... -I believe id functional autonomy for the CIA" ... "The whole wave of concern to expose the CIA is merely a communist plot to weaken-the U.S. security." YES, 23.4 percent COMMENTS: "Someone should be held accountable for all of these CIA atrocities" . .. "The CIA's ac- tivities should be la) percent under control of a six-man Sen- ate committee, maybe then the CIA will remain within its legal and moral boundaries'' "What kind of nation are we when we attempt to assassinate any world leader whose par- ticular phillosophy differs from that of the United States" .. . "It's a sorry state of affairs when the CIA has to stoop to murder" . . . '!The CIA should not act like the mafia." 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 BALTIMORE SUN 29 Nov. 1975 FBI, CIA. Criticized._ - Sir: The Orwellian and dread.; ful disclosures that have been re- vealed by the U.S. Senate Senate Intelligence. Committee).. investigation of the FBI and CIA's clandestine and invidious' surveillance of. Dr. Martin. Lu- ther King, Jr. and thousands of: other citizens are chilling and stultifying. Thoughtful and ra- tional citizens must be grateful to Senator Frank Church and his colleagues for their courage, persistence and sedulous efforts in ferreting out the facts in this matter. The revelations graphically dictate the need for stronger and more effective control and moni- toring of the manifold activities of the FBI and CIA by the Con- gress. Moreover, steps should be immediately taken by the Presi- dent and Congress in order to as- sure all citizens that their human and constitutional rights will not be violated by their government. ? ? The petulant and reprehensi- ble actions of J. Edgar Hoover germane to Dr. king and other citizens convey a- frightening perspective to, the -Actonian ad- monition: "Power-tends to cor- rupt and absolute power cor- rupts absolutely."- The escutch- eon of our nation has been __ tar- nished by the illegal and inhu- mane actions of the FBI and CIA. ? . -The Bicentennial, given the. grim and dispiriting Watergate. debacle and the current CIA and FBI revelations, provides a basis - for a stronger resolve to effect 'a . recrudescence of decency, civili- ty and respect for the rule of law in a free society. , Samuel L Banks. ? Baltimore. coumoa JC.IriTiNAL 1:324 R77/.77:w NO VI' 9 ER / DECEMBER 1Q75 A famous dissenter calls for a halt to media 'inquisitions' and challenges some versions of his own legend WIL1 FUL3R1 by s Heresy though it may be, I do not subscribe unquestion- ingly to the Biblical aphorism that "the truth shall make you free." A number of crucial distinctions are swept aside by an indiscriminate commitment to the truth ? the distinc- tion, for instance, between factual and philosophical truth, or between truth in the sense of disclosure and truth in the sense of insight. There are also certain useful fictions ? or "myths" ? which we invest with a kind of metaphorical truth. One of these is the fiction that "the king can do no wrong." He can, of course, and he does, and everybody knows. it. But in the course of political history it became apparent that it was useful to the cohesion and morale of society to attribute certain civic virtues to the chief of state, even when he patently lacked them. A certain dexterity is required to sustain the fiction, but it rests on a kind of social contract ? an implicit agreement among Congress, the press, and the people that some matters are better left undiscussed, not out of a desire to suppress in- formation, but in recognition, as the French writer Jean Giraudoux put it, that "there are truths which can kill a nation." What he meant, it seems, was that there are gradations of truth in a society, and that there are some truths which are more significant than others but which are also destructible. The self-confidence and cohesion of a society may be a fact, but it can be diluted or destroyed by. other facts such as the corruption or criminality of the society's leaders. Something like that may have been what Voltaire had in mind when he wrote, "There are truths which are not for all men, nor for all times." Or as Mark Twain put it, even more cogently, "Truth is the most Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-REW77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 valuable thing we have. Let us economize it." . In the last decade ? this Vietnam and Watergate decade ? we have lost our ability to "economize" the truth, That Puritan self-righteousness which is never far below the surface of American life has broken through the frail barriers of civility and restraint, and the press has been in the vanguard of the new aggressiveness, This is not to suggest in any way that the press ought to poll its punches, much less be required to do so,. on matters of political substance. ? I myself have not been particularly backward about criticizing presidents and their policies, and I am hardly likely at this late date to commend such inhibitions to others. I do nonetheless deplore the shifting of the criticism. from policies to personalities, from matters of tangible consequence to the nation as a whole to matters of personal morality of uncertain relevance to the national interest. By and large, we used to make these distinctions, while also perpetuating the useful myth that "the king can do no wrong .''- One method frequert4r., employed when: thin;s.-:. went- wrong Was 'imp} i to blame sorneone else --in- a ceremonial way. When I began publicly to criticize the Johnson Administration, first over the Dominican interven- tion in 1965, then over the escalating Vietnam war, I was at some pains to attribute the errors of judgment involved to the "president's advisers" and not to the president himself ? although I admit today that I was not wholly free of doubts about the judgment of the top man. - Our focus was different in those days from that of more recent investigations, especially Watergate, but also the current inquiries concerning the CIA. and the multinational corporations. It was sometimes evident in hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and other matters that facts were being withheld or misrepresented, but our primary concern was with the events and policies involved rather than with the individual officials who chose ? or more often were sent ? to misrepresent the administration's position. Our concern was with correcting _ mistakes rather than exposing. embarrassing, or punishing those who made them. In contrast, a new inquisitorial style has evolved, which is primarily the legacy of Watergate, although perhaps it began with :he Vietnam war. That protracted conflict gave rise to welt-justified opposition based on what seemed to me ? and still does ? a rational appreciation of the national interest. But it also set loose an emotional mistrust ? even hostility ? to government in general. Somehow the policy mistakes of certain leaders became distorted in the minds of many Americans, especially young ones, as if they had been acts of premeditated malevolence rather than failures of judgment. The leaders who took us into Vietnam and kept us there bear primary- responsibility for the loss of conne-Ince in government which their policies provoked. I am as certain today as I ever was that opposition to the Vietnam war ? including my own and that of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ? was justified and neces- sary. Nonetheless, I feel bound to recognize that those of us who criticized the war as mistaken in terms of the national interest may unwittingly have contributed to that surge of vindictive emotionalism which now seems to have taken on a virulent life of its own. he ? emotionalism has not survived without cause, to be sure. The Watergate scandals . provoked a justified wave of public indigna- tion, and. a wholly necessary drive to prevent . such abuses in the future. Moral indignation, however ? even justified moral indignation ? creanzes cer.ain problems of its own, notably the tendency of indignation, unrestrained, to become self-righteous and vindictive. Whatever the cause and antecedents, whatever too the current provb- eation,-ther fact remains that the anti-Watergate movement genera:ed a kind of inquisition psychology both on the part of the press and in the Congress. If once the press was excessivery orthodox and unques- tioning of government policy, it has now become almost sweepingly iconoclastic. If once the press showed excessive deference to government and its leaders, it has now become excessively mistrustful and even hostile. The problem is not so much the specific justification of specific investigations and exposures ? any or all may have merit ? but whether it is desirable at this stage of our affairs ? after Vietnam and I,Vate.rgate ? to sustain the barrage of scandalous revelations. Their ostensible purpose is to bring reforms, but thus far they have brought little but cynicism and di illusion. Everything revealed about the CIA or dubious campaign practices may be wholly or largely true, but 1 have come to feel of late that these are not the kind of truths we most need now; these are truths which must injure if not kill :he nation. 0,-nsider the example of the CIA. It has been obvious for yea:; that Congress was neglecting its responsibility in fg to exercise meaningful legislative oversight of the nation's intelligence activities. A few of us- tried on several occasions to persuade the Senate to establish effective oversight procedures, but we were never able to muster more than a handful of votes. Now, encouraged by an enthusiastic press, the Senate ? or at least its special investigating committee ? has swung from apathy to crusading zeal, offering up one instance after another of improper CIA activities with the apparent intent of eliciting all possible public shock and outrage. It seems to me !unnecessary at this late date to dredge up every last Igruesome detail of the CIA'S designs against the late President Allende of Chile. Perhaps it would be worth doing !? to shake people up ? if Watergate were not so recently behind us. But the American people are all too shaken up by that epic scandal, and their need and desire now are for restored stability and confidence. The Senate knows. very- well what is needed with respect .to the CIA - an effective oversight committee to monitor the agency's activities in a careful, responsible way on a continuing basis. No further revelations are required to bring this about; all that is needed is an act of Congress to create the new unit. Prodding by the press to this end would be constructive, but the new investigative journalism seems preoccupied instead with the tracking down and punishment of wrongdoers, with giving them their just deserts. . My own view is that no one should get everything he deserves ? the world: Would become a charnel house.. Looking back .on the Vietnam- war, it .riVer occurred .to me that President Johnson was guilty of anything worse than bad judgment. He misled the Congress on certain matters, and he misled me personally with respect to the Gulf of Tonkin episode in 1964. I resented that, and I am glad the deceit was exposed. But I never wished to carry the matter beyond exposure, and that only for purposes of hastening the end of the war. President Johnson and his advisers were tragically mistaken about the Vietnam xvar, but by no standard of equityor accuracy did they qualify as "war criminals." Indeed, had Mr. Johnson ended the war by 1968, I would readily have supported him as my party's candidate for reelection. Watergate, one hopes, has been consigned to the history books, but the fame and success won by the reporters who 28 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 ApProvedfor-Release 2001/08f08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-3 : ? uncovered the scandars of the Nixon administration seem to have inspired legions of envious colleagues to, seek their own fame and fortune by dredging up new scandals for the. delectation of an increasingly cynical and disillusioned public. The media have thus acquired an unwholesome fascination with the singer to the neglect of the song. The result is not* only an excess of emphasis on personalities but short shrift for significant policy questions. It is far from !. obvious, for example, that Watergate will prove to have,: been as significant for the national interest as President: . Nixon's extraordinary innovations in foreign policy. The Nixon d?nte policy was by no means 'neglected. but it certainly took second place in the news to Watergate. milady ? to take a more recent topic of interest to Congress and the press ? it strikes me as a matter of less than cosmic consequence that certain companies have paid what in some cases may be commissions, and in others more accurately bribes, to foreign. officials to ad- vance their business interests. Such laws as may have been' violated were not our own but those of foreign countries, and thus far the countries in- volved have exhibited far less indignation over these pay- ments than over their exposure by a United States Senate subcommittee. I should not have to add, I trust. that I do not advocate corporate bribery either abroad or at home; nor would I object to legislation prohibiting the practice. At the same time the subject does not strike me as de- serving of a harvest of publicity.- It disrupts our relations with te countries concerned, and what is worse, it smacks of that same moral prissiness and meddlesome impulse which helped impel us into Vietnam. Furthermore, "com- mission" payments are not unknown in government bus- Mess in the United States, .and hypocrisy is not an at- tractive =it. Even in our business dealings with Italy or Saudi Arabia, there is relevance in the lesson of Viet- nam: whatever the failings of others, we are simply not authorized ? or qualified ? to serve as the self-appointed keepers of the conscience of all mankind. A recent instance of misplaced journalistic priority, which came within my own domain, was the media's neglect of the extensive hearings on East-West d?nte held by the Foreign Relations Committee during the summer and fall of 1974. The issues involved ? the nuclear arms race and the SALT talks, economic and political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and China ? were central to our foreign policy and even to our national survival. At the same time that the media were ignoring the d?nte hearings, they gave generous coverage to the nomination of a former Nixon aide as ambassador to Spain, a matter of transient interest and limited consequence. To cite another example: the press and television gave something like saturation coverage in 1974 to Congressman Wilbur Mills's personal misfortunes; by contrast I do not re- call reading anything in the press about the highly informa- tive hearings on the Middle East, and another set on inter- national terrorism, held in the spring of that year by Con- gressman Lee Hamilton's House Foreign Affairs Subcom- mittee on the Near East and South -Asia. The crucial ingredient, it seems, is scandal ? corporate, political, or personal. Where it is present, there is news, although the event may otherwise be inconsequential. Where it is luck- ing, the event may or not be news, depending in part. to be sure, on its intrinsic importance, but hardly less on compet- ing events, the degree of controversy involved, and whether ? it involves something -new" ? new, that is, in the way of disclosure as distinguished from insight or perspective. 2 CIA-R-DP77-00432R000100380003-3 9 The national press would do well to reconsider its priorities. It has excelled in exposing wrongdoers, in alerting the public to the high crimes and peccadilloes of , persons in high places. But it has fallen short ? far short :? in its higher responsibility of public education. With an ' exception or two, such as the National Public Radio, the media convey only fragments of those public proceedings which are designed to inform the general public. A super- star can always command the attention ofthe press, even with a banality. An obscure professor can scarcely hope to, even with a striking idea, a new insight, or a Iuc simplification of a complex issue. A bombastic accusatic:,1 a groundless, irresponsible prediction, or, best of all. "leak," will usually gain a congressman or senator hia ; heart's content of publicity; a reasoned discourse, more . often than not, is destined for entombment in the Congres- sional Record. A member of the Foreign Relations Commit- tee staff suggested that the committee had made a mistake holding the 1974 d?nte hearings in public; if they had bee held in closed session and the transcripts then leaked, t1:: press would have covered them generously. We really must try to stop conducting our affairs like morality play. In a dernocracy we ought to try to think our public servants not as objects of adulation or of revilement, but as servants in the literal sense, to be lauded or censured, retained or dispensed with, according to the competence with which they db the job for which they were. hired. Bitter disillusionment with our leaders is the other side of the coin of worshipping them. If we did not expect , our leaders to be demigods, we would not be nearly as shocked by their failures and transgressions_ The press has always played up to our national tendency " to view public figures as either saints or sinners; but the practice has been intensified since Watergate. President Ford was hailed as a prince of virtue and probity when he came to office. Then he pardoned President Nixon and was instantly cast into the void, while the media resounded with heartrending cries of betrayal and disillusion. Many theories, often conspiratorial, were put forth in explanation of the Nixon pardon ? all except the most likely: that the president acted impulsively and somewhat prematurely out of simple human feeling. Secretary Kissinger, for his part, has been alternatel hailed as a miracle worker and excoriated as a Machiavel- lian schemer, if not indeed a Watergate coconspirator. I myself was criticized by some of the Kissinger-hating commentators for "selling out" by cooperating with the secretary on East-West d?nte and the Middle East. Until that time it had never occurred to me that opposition itself constituted a principle, and one which required me to alter my own long-held views on Soviet-American relations and the need for a compromise peace in the Middle East. NIv point is not that the character of our statesmen is irrelevant but that their personal qualities are relevant only , as they pertain to policy, to their accomplishments or lack of them in their capacity as public servants. Lincoln, it is said, responded to charges of alcoholism against the vic- torious General Grant by offering to send him a case of his favorite whiskey. Something of that spirit would be refresh- ing and constructive in our attitude toward our own contem- porary leaders. None of them, I strongly suspect ? includ- ing Dr. Kissinger, President Ford, and former President Nixon ? is either a saint or a devil, but a human like the rest of us, whose prover moral slot is to be found some- where in that vast space between hellfire and the gates of heaven. A free society can remain free only as long as its citizens Approved for Release 2001/08/08 : Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 exercise restraint in the practice of their freedom. This principle applies with special force to the press, because of its power and because of its necessary immunity from virtually every form of restraint except self-restraint. The media have become a fourth branch of government in every respect except for their immunity from checks and balances. This is as it should be ? there are no conceivable restraints to be placed on the press which would not be worse than its excesses. But because the press cannot and should not be restrained from outside, it bears a special responsibility for resirairting itself, and for helping to restore civility in our public affairs. or a start, journalists might try to be less thin- skinned. Every criticism of the press is not a fascist assault upon the First Amendment. One recalls, for example, that when former Vice- President Agnew criticized members of Con- gress and others, the press quite properly re- ported his remarks, taking the matter more or less in their stride. But when he criticized the media, the columnists and editorialists went into transports of outraged excitement, bleeding like hemophiliacs from the vice-president's pinpricks: More recently, since Watergate, the press has celebrated its prowess with a festival of self-congratulation, and politicians have joined with paeans of praise. The politi- cians' tributes should be taken with a grain of salt in any case ? they have seen the media's power and few are disposed to trifle with it. The real need of the press is self-examination, and a degree of open-mindedness to the criticisms which are leveled against it. Journalists bear an exceedingly important responsibility_ for keeping office holders honest; they have an equally important responsibil- ity for keeping themselves honest, and fair. I make these general criticisms of the press with some embarrassment, because during my thirty-two years in public life I was treated for the most part with understanding and generosity by the press, most particularly by the major newspapers in my home state of Arkansas. Such complaints as I have ? and I have a few ? are essentially aspects of the more general problems cited above. To my considerable personal discomfort I have found myself from time to time under journalistic examination to determine ? it would seem ? whether I was a saint or an agent of the devil_ Knowing full well that I was not the former, and daring to hope that I was not one of Satan's minions either, I have sometimes experienced a curious sense of detachment when reading-about myself, as if the subject were really someone else. In truth, I have never thought of myself as anything but a politician ? until ray recent retirement ? trying to advance the national interest, as best I understood it, while also doing my best to service ray constituency, readily if not happily compromising be- tween the two when that seemed necessary. The Arkansas press ? including the two statewide newspapers, the Gazette and the Democrat ? came closer than Others to accepting. me on those terms, reporting my often heretical views on foreign policy with reasonable objectivity while also noting my efforts on behalf of agriculture, education, and industry in Arkansas ? efforts in which I took and still take considerable personal pride. Even in my last, losing primary campaign in 1974 I was pleased and proud to have the support of the Gazette and the Democrat. The sophisticated national press ? though usually gener- ous and sometimes flattering to me personally ? has nonetheless had a tendency to pose certain rather tedious ? and in my opinion largely meaningless ? "paradoxes" about my personality and my role. Is Fulbright truly a humanitarian idealist, or a racist under the skin? An "international peace prophet," as one friendly writer re- cently put it, or "plain old Bill," regaling Arkansas rubes with talk about the price of cotton and chickens? How too, they have asked, anguishing on my behalf, can an "ur- bane" internationalist like Fulbright survive in a southern "hillbilly" state like Arkansas? But most of all my friends in the national press have pointed ? more in sorrow than in anger ? to the "paradox" of my "humanitarianism on a global scale" as against my early opposition to civil-rights ? legislation and, more recently, my dissent from aspects of our Middle East policy and my differences with the Israeli lobby in Congress. All these questions have been posed as a "moral" dilemma, in much the same way that our presidents have been viewed as either saints or sinners. What I perceive in this approach is not a genuine moral dilemma, or even art authentic paradox of personality, but another manifestation of that Puritan dogmatism which pervades our national life, including ? to a far greater degree than is recognized ? our liberal intellectual community. In the case of the eastern liberal press, the dogmatism is reinforced by arrogance ? the arrogance of people who regard themselves as duly appointed arbiters not only of the nation's style and taste but also of its morality. The "paradox" posed about me by a number of writers has never greatly impressed or interested ? me because it is not really my paradox but theirs. "How," they are asking, "can a man who shares so many of my opinions and prejudices fail so woefully to share them all?" In fact there are a few rather simple explanations to the so-called "paradoxes" in my career. While believing in the necessity of international cooperation and of the United Nations idea, I have also believed that education and economic opportunity were the best avenue to racial justice in the United States. I did not vote for civil-rights legislation prior to the late sixties for two very simple reasons: first, because I doubted its efficacy; second, because my con- stituents would not have tolerated it. I felt able to challenge some of their strong feelings on such matters as the Vietnam war; I did not feel free to go against them on the emotionally charged issue of race. And as far as the "paradox" of world ? peace as against the price of cotton is concerned, I see no conundrum at all ? I have always been interested in both. Coming finally to the "paradox" of my "urbane" internationalism as against my "provincial" Arkansas con- stituency, I take this as no more than a conceit of the eastern "establishment." It has not been my observation that the representation in Congress of New York, Massachusetts, or California has been notably more responsible, intellectual, sophisticated, or humane than that of Arkansas. I have always felt attuned, responsive, and at one with my home state, and although the voters of Arkansas decided after thirty years that they wanted a change, I have little doubt that I survived a lot longer in politics in Arkansas than lever would have in New York or Massachusetts. Rather than for my moral qualities I should prefer to be evaluated for my specific positions on specific issues, for my contributions or lack of them as a public servant. That is what counts in a democracy, or in a mature society. It matters little to the nation or to posterity whether a president or senator met some individual's or group's or newspaper's particular standard of political "purity." For my own part I do not regard myself as a fitting or even interesting subject for priestly exorcism. If my career is judged worthy of review by journalists or historians, I very much hope that it 30 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 - -Ali-proved -ForRelease_20_01/C18/_08 :__CIA-RDR77._-004_32R00010038000?-3 will be for what I contributed or failed to contribute to my country and my state. The purity or lack of it in my motives is an issue strictly between me and my Maker. cannot stress too strongly that my criticism of the press in this regard is not especially personal. Looking back over my long career ? to my many speeches on foreign policy, to the hearings, legislation, and other ? activities of the Foreign Relations Committee during my chairmanship ? I am bound to conclude that I have been treated by the press with overall fairness and generosity. It is the general practice of moral- izing to which I object, rather than the moralizing which has been directed toward me, most of which has been generous, some of which indeed has been flattering. I have been more distressed personally by what has often seemed to me an arbitrary and prejudiced standard of ''newsworthiness" in the national press, particularly as applied to the Middle East. I have noted repeatedly, for example, the quantitative disparity between the press cover- age of Palestinian guerilla attaCks within Israel and of Israeli attacks upon South Lebanon, although the loss of civilian life in the latter has almost certainly been greater. I even made a statement On the subject in the Senate in August 1974, but the statement itself was ignored, consigned to entombment in the Congressional Record. Another instance of dubious "newsworthiness" arose following my final major speech as a senator, a discussion of the Middle East at Westminster College in Missouri. The New York Times reported the main theme which was the danger of a world crisis arising out of the Arab-Israeli conflict ? with reasonable accuracy, although the headline FULBRIGHT, AT FULTON, GLOOMY ON WORLD - sug- gested that the gloom lay not so much upon the world as on the speaker. The Washington Post ? not for the first time involving a statement critical of Israel ? did not report the speech at all, although it was otherwise widely reported around the country. Some months later, by contrast, the Post found prominent place, including a picture, for an article recalling adverse comments I had made on black voting in the Arkansas Democratic primary back in 1944. Still another instance of dubious "newsworthiness" in my experience occurred in April 1971 upon the occasion of a lecture I delivered at Yale University, again concerning the Middle East. On that occasion too I was critical of Israeli policy. The New York Times and other newspapers provided fair and accurate coverage. The Washington Post did not report the speech at all, but on the following day. carried art article on the Israeli reaction to my speech, headlined ISRAELI PRESS LASHES OUT AT FULBRIGHT. Later still one of the Past' s coluainistx dr.voted a whole column of vinnat-paioh to my unreported speech. Recently, the Post may ha'. cad a change of heart as they did publish on the , op-et Taz-e of July 7, 1975 a statement of my views con- =mins the appropriate' settlement of the conflict in the Mlddie East. The ultimate test of the press's fairness is its coverage of op;r1Es of which the writers and editorialists do not ap- prove. In my own experience as a critic not of Israel itself, but of the Israeli lobby and of what has seemed to me the excessi-, e. responsiveness of the United States government to demands made upon it by the government of Israel, the press has frequently failed to meet the test of fair- ness and objectivity, tending both to an arbitrary standard of newsworthiness and to a shifting of attention from" the event to its author, from statement to motive, from sone to singer. I have in recent years been called "cranky," "crmhety," and "obsessive" about Israel and the Middle East ? by contrast, it is sometimes lamented, with my - "courageous" or "inspiring" leadership on Vietnam. All this signals to me is that the writer does not sympathize with my views and has devised an excuse to avoid reporting them. To mylnowledge the reporters who have made these personal charges have neither general psychiatric. qualifications nor specific familiarity with my state of mind. If indeed I have been "crochety" about the Middle East, it. is not Israel which has brought me to that state but journalists who have thwarted my efforts to communicate views which could,. I readily concede, be judged mistaken under dispassionate examination, but which I myself have long believed and still believe to be rational, at least arguable, and pertinent to the national interest. I have always had a good deal of admiration for Washington's overshadowed evening newspaper. The Star suffers from. the ignominy of having achieved few if. any Watergate scoops, but over the years it has demonstrated certain less flamboyant virtues, such as confining its opin- ions to its editorial page. The Star has rarely been friendly to me or my positions on foreign policy in its editorials; at the same time it has usually given fair and objective treatment to my statements and to the proceedings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Star even pub- Es-.ad a favorable review of my 1972 book, The Crippled C.'nnt, although the paper's editorial writers could hardly have zTnroved its main thrust, while the Post sought out as i!s reviewer an obscure controversialist from Pine Bluff, .L.:nsas, who had little to say about my book but a great to say about my signing of the "Southern Manifesto" in 1955 and my many personal shortcomings ea he pet= ceived them. In addition to The Washington Star and dr.: press in general in illy home state of Arkansas, I have always felt a. spezial rec_tard for the smaller, regional newspapers around the country. The steady decline in their numbers and variety is a substantial loss to the country. Few of them have scored any ?great scoops of investigative journztlism. but many of them combine a genuine regard for objectivity in the news. with a good deal of conunon sense and sound judgment in their editorials. Their principal failing in . my opinion has been an excess of deference to. the large.. national news- . papers. . - he special strength of the writers for the eaira4=---aa,a-atA smaller newspapers is journalistic "distance" tea ' ? a virtue much celebrated but rarely prac- ticed by their more famous Washington-based colleagues. The latter tend to express "dis- tance" through vituperation, but more com- monly cultivate all possible intimacy with the high officials whose activities they report. The officials in turn usually find it advantageous to respond, with the result that some of the elite of the Washington press corps have effectively made the transition from ob- servers to participants in the making of public policy. Free as their writers are from such temptations and aspirations, the smaller newspapers. seem to me, by and large, to come closer to fulfilling their journalistic obligations to report the news accurately and interpret it with personal detachment... They often seem -better able, as the historian Bernard A. Weisberger expressed it, "to-see men and events in whole and human perspective ? that is, always fallible, and not always the masters of their own -destiny. Or, in short, historically." - - __ ? . ? - commend to the press in conclusion, a renewed 31 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 awareness of its great power and commensurate responsibil- ity ? a responsibility which is all the greater for the fact - that there is no one to restrain the press except the press itself, nor should there be. After a long era of divisiveness and acrimony in our national life, we are in need of a reaffirmation of the social contract among people, govern- ment, and the media_ The essence of that contract is a measure of voluntary restraint. an implicit agreement among the major groiips and interests in our society that none will apply their powers to the fullest. For all the ingeniousness of our system of checks and balances, our ultimate protection against tyranny is the fact that we are a people who have not wished to tyrannize one another. "The WAS?: NGTON STAR 24 NOV 1975 Charles Bartlett republican form of government," wrote Herbert Spencer in 1S91, "is the highest form of government: but because of this it requires the highest type of human -nature ? a type nowhere at present existing." We have shown in times of adversity in the past that we are- capable of this "highest type of human nature." We would do well, if we can, to call it into existence once again. It. has never been needed more. 12 _ William FirIbrigia is the former United States s;arettor .lwrn Arkansas. lie was el:al.-mon of the Senate Forrriz,rn Relathars Conanittee from 1939 to 1974 and iv nolii of (morsel to tire lawf rot of Hogan and llort:s-orr in Washington. Today's morality and yesterday's; The Senate Selecr!Corn::. mittee has issued an assaSi sination report. whic,I4 should never have .been) published about acliritiesf that should never have beers, contemplated. "These deeds must not be thought' after these ways,' whisper- ed Lady Macbeth, "so it will make vs mad." Sen.. Frank Church, D-Idaho?" and, his -committee' col- leagues, confronted by the` dark deeds of three admin- istrations, chose the risks ofv stirring indignation. against the nation ,over the risk to: themselves of affronting thel public's right to know. Their report documents; the "arrogance of power" phase of American foreign policy but it has already' been discredited by the out- come in Indochina, the bril- liant perceptions of William Fulbright and a pronounced shift in the political mood. The report holds the initia- tives of an era in which the struggle was the main thing up to the judgments of an- era of which -political Literality is everything. The committee did its job thoroughly, exploring. each: CIA -fling at ,Macbethian diplomacy with such zeal-as to leave the nation no resort to the refuge of "plausible denial." Since these mar- ginal, illegal plottings gain- ed justification from the great Care that was taken to , enable t.P.S. officials to snovi clean hands, this absolute disclosure has the result Of making all these operations seem doubly ridiculous. ' The senators maintain' the nation is obliged to suf- fer the embarrasSnient. their clean-breititink., I order to securea.'moraU base for the futurertei .theory is thatakPosuie the humiliatioaAif. a fail* "mea culpat:', niakel policy-makers more caul' tious and covert operator more aware that thei machinations -must ulti- mately face the test of operi scrutiny. - But was it really necesti sary to muddy the past NA inSure conformity with'thel guidelines of theriew.rrioral- ity? The intelligence prei cept of cold war days- irQ which !` acceptable norms of hunian. ..behavioE?clog;not Need the.0 It is no secret that the Central Intelligence :Agency strayed beyond its sphere of Influence when it got into the domestic security business;- but that does not alter the fact that the United States needs the CIA. For example, it has been suspected for years that. the Russians have been pouring more into military spending than they said they were. Just how much or to what extent was not known, for the Soviets understandably, don't go around ,bragging about it. Something of substance, howevec, has come to be known; and the CIA is responsible for bringing it to light. afaity'7. re- pudiated by President Ford and CIA Directar, Colby., Congress can affect- the fikr, ture by enacting edicts against the Macbeth option; and by obliging CIA direc4 tors to forswear it on confini mation. ? Toying with the 'theory; that the CIA was an animat on the loose, the senators suggest -that full" 'disclosurei was crucial to restore disci- pline within the govern-1 ment. Their report tries tol soften its impact upon' the) records of dead Presidents) by impugning the CIA'sj chain .'of' command in thol days of derring-do. Puttin the personalities ahead the institution., was an easy choice for the senators. Ilowe!ier, it does notl make, art-honest historicat record. Protecting the chief', executive' was a crucial as- pect of these operations. The lesson of the U-Z debai cie was that President* must never be involved ir0 any.way. But While the line* of authority had to be 01,4 ,scored, the !agency's meect for ..policy guidance from the top, was implicithe TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT Johnstown, Pa. lIt Nov. 1975 1971 the Russians have been spend- ing more each year on military preparedness than has the United States: further, the CIA says that a reduction in such Soviet spending is unlikely. The importance of this information lies in the fact that the United States now knows that it cannot, or at least should not, drastically reduce its military spending in the face or continued Russian emphasis on that front. We do not, of course, know how or where the CIA got its information: but we would like to_ bet that none of us would be aware of what the Russians 37 ? .% misdeeds, Wilcnature of -these verv.,-;' - tures. The: plotters! were. after all career government officials', hardly type* who; go off on' theirawn to slay heads of staie:, , . - . "Do it. but. don't tell me, is a machination which ha. become second nature to politicians. They learn it ir coping with campaign fi-- nance laws. But just as the, Watergate burglary wasi triggered by the _Nixon; aides,who prodded Jeb Matj gruder,,, the _assassination!' -plots 'were launched: by :prnddings from the Oval -Of-i fice. Those were day's M1. which it was fashionable fori the ablest officials to re-1 spond with alacrity to their. 'feedings. of the President's; wishes. The damage of this act jaf penance may outweigh its, fruits.. But the senators are solemn in avowing that this! country "must not adopt thg, tactics of the enemy." They can be assured.arleast that the enemy wilt -not adoPti their method of conscience-, cleansing The agency has estimated that since are doing if it were not for the CIA. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100.380003-3 Approved" For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 GMIESIS Dec emb er 1975 Now, for the first time, exclusively in Genesis, an ex-CIA intelligence officer exposes the perpetrators and the victims of the bloodiest and may frightening conflict yet?the war within America's Central Intelligence Agency. The dirty little dramas played out every day in the .secrecy-shrouded offices of the CM are a time bomb, ticking steadily and inevitably toward destruction- threatening to blow the Agency apart even sooner than the catalog of dirty tricks surfacing daily in your newspaper. The author of this brutally frank, explo- sive report is an insider?who, after six years with the Agency, remains in daily furtive contact with colleagues who re- main behind to carry on the internecine corrbat. Jesse James Leaf, now manag- ing editor of this magazine, tells here the ert,re shattering and shameful story. at this moment, while Congress ahC media probe the rarefied heights of a.;=, dirty tricks?assassinations, bug gins. Wegalities of every description? ano*.'-er more dangerous war is being fougni within ,the halls of Agency head- By Jesse James Leaf quarters itself. This is a civil war which has already torn the Agency apart, re- sulted in two bloody purges and has reduced the efficiency of this once- respected organization to practically nil. It is a sorry spectacle of pettiness, bureaucratic bumbling, hypocrisy and indifference which has caused untold misery to loyal employees and irrepar- able damage to our national intelligence effort. The decline of the CIA didn't come about overnight, and it hasn't ended yet. The Agency is an organization without a heart. It has virtually ceased functioning under attacks frOm its critics and con- servative direction from within. It is torn by ideological suspicion, held back by unimaginative and frightened leader- ship. "... Co/by will be the next sacrificial lamb. . . A new generation of old boys is on the way up.. ." The. trouble stretches back to the 1960's, "a time of agonizing reappraisal" to quote a current non-cola commercial: Our national priorities were under ques- tion and under fire?Viet Nam, Cities under the torch, the moral strength of our nation enduring daily testing. First Kennedy, then Johnson and Nixon sought to defuse the explosive unrest igniting the youth in this country. The word came down to hire the dissaf- fected, to get the dissidents into the establishment?let them see how it feels to be on the frcnt line. The hope was that the ponderous machinery of government would bureaucratize them. The Central Intelligence Agency was no exception. During the 40's and 50's, CIA. recruiters had an easy time looking for the best and the brightest. The formula was simple enough?love of God, love of country. They scored in the best places, and the product was com- fortably uniform. CIA's rate of defectors, dropouts and the disgruntled was far below comparable Government agen- cies. It was a tight, happy little ship. But came the halcyon days of the 60's 33 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY This is, to ossify Hs* JESSEZ*if-AMES LEAF is siop:!:.?? if Tim U:ibsi mik ? c: CENTRAL; INTELtIGENCE :4AGENCY?! \, ? FOR and -changes were taking place?social changes the ?CIA establishment misun- derstood. In an orgy of self-confidence, it absorbed hundreds of bright, young professionals, funneling as many as 400 a year through its Career Training Program?the Agency's six-month in- tensive course where the craft of intelli- gence snares equal billing with building the mystique of CIA esprit de corps. What really- happened during this period was the setting of a time bomb? the Agency was sowing the seeds of its own destruction. They had marched blindly into new territory without taking the trouble to plot the land. They had supposed that the world outside the well-guarded gates of Agency head- quarters in McLean. Virginia, like the cloistered world inside, had not really changed. Trapped with an ideology that stood still, they paid no attention to the waves of dissent that had already washed through the Washington Civil Service Corps. At the State department, junior officers had successfully or- ganized and were effecting changes in the old-line, pin-striped ranks. HEW, Labor and HUD were all suffering and growing under the impatience of their younge,r professionals. Member de- partments of the President's Cabinet were being carried, kicking and scream- ing, into the 1970's. Not so the CIA. The incoming. recruits found an organization that was begin- ning to ossify. The gung-ho warriors who made up the OSS during World War II and the cold warriors who followed in the 50'S had become bureaucratized. The Agency, which had prided itself on its cocked hat professionalism and free- wheeling organization had become a refuge for fattening civil servants with expanding waistlines. Small men with narrow vision?empire builders, petty political infighters and gossip mongers?ruled the CIA. The games that had to be played shifted from the world stage to the smaller halls of Agency headquarters. Like old, mangy lions, they coveted their lairs?secure, workless jobs, fat pay checks, gilt- edged fringe benefits. The CIA was full of white-shirred, crew-cut, big-assed old-timers petrified that they were losing control of events, that time was overtak- ing them. The new Agency professional represented a new order they didn't understand and were therefore suspici- ous of. So they sat on them. And discontent grew. . In the Directorate of Operations (then called Plans), many of the younger case officers had trouble justifying to them- selves some of the stupid and illegal operations in which they were forced to participate. The decline in the Agency's clandestine operations abroad meant that large numbers of the younger offi- cers had to mark time, sometimes for 'years,' in dead-end clerical jobs or make-work assignments. In i'ne Directorate of Intelligence, in- coming personnel were thrown into a mire of conflicting egos, ironbound cliques and petty prejudices. Trained to be political and economic analysts, and chosen for their intelligence, ambition and initiative, they quickly became aware that the way to the top lay in keeping your mouth shut and your nose clean. And they soon !earned of an invisible "shit list" which predetermines the future of every employee at the CIA. The "list" is totally subjective and irrefut- able. Work, ability, dedication have no effect on its judgements. An ever popu- lar topic of. discussion over lunch or drinks is the "list." How far will Ed go? Well, he's a New Yorker, and pushy?no more than a 13 (GS-13, lower level supervisory). Dick?a playboy, too wild.. He's going nowhere. Neel?dull-witted, a square. He's going places. Not that being a clod is a prerequisite for promotion at CIA, but it helps. It means that Neil poses no threat, he does what he's told, won't step on anybody's toes. A non-entity. Perfect CIA supervis- ory material. The ethical bankruptcy of the CIA also took-, its toll, working against itself and alienating precisely the kind of intensely moral, self-righteous people it tried to recruit. Well-documented are the Agency operations in southeast Asia ! and other questionable activities per- formed in the name of saving the world 1 Ifrom Communism. But I'm talking about l the dirty little dramas played out every day in the offices of the CIA. During one of our bull sessions, a member of the group, a Mormon, told us that during a routine discussion with a 'personnel officer, a number of photo- graphs fell out of his 201 (personnel) file. They showed him in various stages of undress, and from all angles? 'apparently taken during his entrance physical three years before. He tried to obtain an explanation for this invasion of privacy and to have the photographs removed from his file. Unsuccessful, he was left with no alternative but to resign from an organization he felt had so little decency. I must admit that the incident was amusing?to some of us?but not to the women who were part of our coterie. The role of women in the CIA is a little-known, but particularly unsavory chapter in its history. The Agency has bowed to social pressures and stepped up its hiring of female professionals. The recruiters carefully screen- out outright libbers and potential troublemakers. The end product, the CIA professional wo- man, is almost universally ugly, silly, incompetent and, as it turns out, easy bed bait. Think about it. These were the serious girls in school. Wallflowers at dances. Studious. Unattractive. Socially and psychologically immature, they would have languished in big city singles bars, or as political science teachers at some small university, or spent their lives as housewives. But the Agency gives them new life Surrounded by their male counterpart,: in a flamboyantly one-sided male-femal, ratio, they become the office sex object: in an essentially closed 'and chauvinistic society. Sex, or its promise, become: the way to hold their jobs and then thE way up. The aging; middle class subur ban husband types who make up th supervisory levels at CIA go ape. . Of the professional women I knew i most were having affairs with other ! Agency men, not surprising given ths closed nature of the company. But these, most were cavorting with their superiors, and I can name severe, women who owe their jobs directly to steeping with their bosses or their boss- es' friends. I know of several divorces directly resulting from these liaisons. We lost respect for the people involved ancJ the Agency lost competent people who were passed over or transferred in favor of bedmates. Left in the backwash are the truly bright women who have something more to offer the government than a willing vagina. Almost without exception, they have had it made abundantly clear that their future with the Agency holds limited promise. Those in the forefront or change have either quit or remain locked in lower level jobs. With no outlet at work, and little opportunity to develop normal outside interests, they are a pool of disenchanted and bitter people at emo- tional war with the Agency. Let me stress that these relationships ' are carried on with the full knowledge of the higher-ups. it fits into the peculiar sense of CIA morality that such activity is 34 condoned so long as the men involved are part of the club?the "old boys" who run the CIA. Similar activity by any i other member of the staff is greeted with the seif-righteous indignation reserved for the morally hypocritical. This is the atmosphere those hun- dreds of impatient. idealistic profession- als who led and followed me into the CIA found. With jobs lacking challenge, ad- vancement a matter of putting in your time and wearing a clean shirt, and chaffing under the confines of an ex- tremely conservative and stagnating bureaucracy, the younger professionals grew restive. Their growing discontent, coupled with the highest dropout rate in the Agency's history (70 percent of my incoming class resigned within three years), found notice at the top. Annoyed at this unseemly display of insolence, the brass decided to squelch the growing mutiny?but "without actually endanger- ing the ideological or administrative structure ? they found so personally re- warding. This is the typical Agency reaction, the "catalyst" reaction?to en- gineer an appearance of doing some- thing without actually doing anything. It is a device Agency insiders soon learn to expect and they consequently become programmed into chronic inaction. It was decided to call an Agency-wide meeting of younger professionals to dis- cuss the state of CIA, entertain discus- sion and criticism and offer possible solutions. I think you can pinpoint the beginning of the end for the Central Intelligence Agency to that meeting held at the Agency's futuristic auditorium in Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Ap'proved' For-Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 1970. The meeting was doomed from the first. It was set up by invitation only, the invitations dispensed, of course, by the brass. Needless to say, the people who should have been there weren't. Those who did turn out, the bootlickers and chosen fair-haired boys (and girls), were _ window dressing' for the.brass. They sat through self-serving public relations, speeches, and listened to each other . ask meaningless questions. Absolutely nothing of substance was raised or solved at the meeting. The Director was satisfied that he respond- ed to demands for change and had shrewdly disarmed the budding re- volutionaries. The lackies who attended had the chance to show their faces to Richard Helms and his beaming hon- ? chos. Under the naive belief that the meeting marked a turning point in CIA employee relations, a band of young professionals organized the Junior Officers Study Group, a self-styled employee action committee patterned after similar or- ganizations in other Washington agencies?but with one major differ- ence. Where other groups, such as the one at State, were seriously trying to effect change from below, and played to' generally responsive ears, the Agency , group served to draw out the troub- lemakers for easy disposal. Of the 20 members who formed the hard core, most have left the Agency, some to better jobs in Defense, State or private industry. A handful have had curiously explosive records of promotion within the CIA. The history of the JOSG is a depres- sing chronicle of what happens when Young Turks, even castrated Young Turks, buck the established CIA authori- ty. . ? - Flushed with good intentions, they began a modest program of gentlemanly reform. "We started with a low profile," says one member of the group. "We felt - that if we made constructive recommen- dations to office chiefs, they would pay attention to us. Rather than attack the system because we were fed up with it, we took a more conservative tack than comparable employee action groups, say at State." What the group was unprepared for was the Agency's paranoid distrust of criticism and change. JOSG's first substantive action was in the area of Equal Opportunity Employ- ment. In 1970, the CIA, contrary to established procedure in other Govern- ment agencies, had no full-time Equal Opportunity Employment Officer. The group tried to obtain statistics on how many minorities were employed at CIA, but were refused the data. Representa- tives of the group appealed to Col. Red White, then Executive Director of the CIA. Despite the innocuous nature of the request. White exploded. Unable to abide this insolence, White ordered the - group to end the investigation and dis- band immediately. Group members were sh_ocked by the negative intensity of the reaction. They dropped their name and went uncter- ground, meeting.secretty and informally. Through a contact at the Office of Per- sonnei, they were able to secure the statistics, which they published as a report and distributed to every office and division chief in the Agency. The response was predictable. At the middle level, they were greeted with stony silence. The most liberal of their supervisors offered lukewarm (but clan- destine) encouragement. When copies of the memo reached the upper levels, the catalyst response was applied. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, a figurehead who serves as public image of the Agency, but who rarely dirties his hands in the day-to-day operations of the little people, was pub- licly impressed (or, more likely, was told to be impressed). With great flourish, he ordered a fulitime EOE Officer ? to be established at CIA. To this day, there has been no substantive change in the racial makeup of the Agency. . This apparent early victory buoyed the group, and it began to attract hangers- on and draw out the discontented. The Agency Suggestions Committee was re- ceiving an increasing number of radical solutions to the ills which afflicted the CIA?hiring and firing procedures, or- ganizational weaknesses, poor produc- tivity, unresponsive personnel proce- dures. As is their custom, the Committee had a difficult time deflecting the spate of suggestions it received. One of the more radical suggestions?which hap- pened to be my brainchild?was a total reorganization of the Office of Current Intelligence. It called for the elimination of several supervisors?one of whom was my boss. The Suggestions Commit- tee replied that it couldn't act on my suggestion without my first plotting out the work flow of the 300 analysts in the OCI, that is, supply productivity reports on each supervisor, map input of raw data and outflow of finished intelligence reports, and apply salary figures to output. In addition, my suggestion, which was supposed to have been confidential, found its way to my super- visor's in box. This made for a strained confrontation and assured my place on his shit list?bronzed for posterity. To- day, he is Director of OC1. Still under the critical eye of suspi- cious superiors, the Group continued to press for modest reform?establishment of a day care center, changing the dress ' code, improving_ the company magazine. The meetings and memos continued fitfully for two years until William Colby '(now Director of Central Intelligence) replaced White. Where White was bla- tantly hostile, Colby was a snake. He openly encouraged the JOSG, even invited members to working lunches in the Executive Dining Room. Privately, he quashed them at every turn. Meanwhile, employee discontent was reaching alarming proportions. Security leaks, which were virtually unknown in the past, became a roaring deiuge. Jack Anderson was receiving more classified documents than he couid count. Report- ers and columnists knew more about what went on in the Agency than insiders themselves. Viet Nam and Watergate were beginning to take their toll as well. In addition, the Agency was visibly 'falling down on the job. Operations overseas were being blown or subverted by foreign intelligence seuices, negat ?? ing whole operations. At home, mis- takes, oversights and mistaken judge- ments were effecting poiicy action deci- sions. Clearly something was wrong. The old confidence was failing. ? To his credit, Nixon correctly asses- sed the 'problem, putting the blame on the "old boys," the sludgy holdovers from earlier days. Now carrying the weight of middle age and stagnant ideology on their shoulders, the career Agency upper level had slowed to a snail's pace and worse. They were hold- ing the Agency back, keeping their fat thumbs on the younger members. When innovation and dynamism were desper- ately needed, they plodded their old rutted roads?and the Agency was suf- fering. IRealizing this, Nixon brought in a ? professional hatchetman?James Schlesinger. His job was to move in quickly, institute a purge, and move out again. This would leave the Agency lean and tough, yet protect Colby (who was next in line for the Directorship) and the rest of the upper echelon. The excuse for cleaning the Agency's house was the Government-wide Reduc- tion in Force (RIF) Program which had earlier helped Nixon justify slicing budget requests from pariah agencies i like NEW and HUD. The word came !down that 10 percent of the Agency's 17,000 employees were getting the ax. ; But Schlesinger. an overrated ad- !ministrator with the perception of an ox, never bothered to study the agency he was supposed to reform. He never un- derstood the protective mechanism so expertly constructed over the years. He was supposed to remove the deadwood, 'but what Schlesinger didn't realize was that dead wood floats to the top. By working through Colby, he put the chick- en coop in the hands of the fox. He tried to get the blood flowing again with the clots who blocked it in the first place. The purge lists were drawn up by the middle level, precisely the decaying undergrowth that should have been hauled off years before. It was like a mandate from heaven. The old boys saw the chance to secure their empires; settle old scores and eliminate those smart-assed young guys with their long hair and wise sugges- ; tions. Rather than deadwood, the 1973 1RIF (followed by a second purge in ' 1974) removed the live wires, the Agen- cy's most valuable assets?the uncon- ventional, the most innovative, the ques- tioning, the impatient. One employee 'who survived the bloodletting says that 1"Everybody with 'spark! was cut. It's no ' fun to ride the elevators anymore." (Rid- ing the elevators is a popular Agency Ipastime?a place to catch up on the latest news and gossip.) I Perhaps the saddest cases were ;those older employees who, in some distant past, crossed the wrong person. 'CIA employees work for years under the cloud of past grudges?petty people who wait for an opportunity to strike at old enemies for slights, mistakes or prejudices sometimes a decade old. One colleague, an Agency employee for 22 years, was marked by his Division Chief and forced into early retirement during the RIF. Early retirement is a ? particularly effective weapon because it 35 Approved-For-Release -2001/08/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 denies the RIFee the generous benefits available to other employees. Before he left, he waged a three month battle to save his job. He circulated the depres- sing history of Agency indifference to younger officers, writing at one point "This is what you can expect after serving your country with loyalty and dedication for a quarter of a century." The 1973 and 1974 RIFs had a traumatic effect on the CIA. They sent shock waves through the organization that are being felt today. Those who were left heard the warning loud and clear: Don't make waves, don't criticize, don't stand out. It has been downhill ever since. The depleted agency has been shaken by reassignments, reorganizations and rev- elations in the media about Watergate and other dirty tricks. There is a com- plete breakdown in morale. A new ideological split has developed?this time a cleavage along political lines. Liberal employees are shocked and disheartened by revelations implicating the CIA in the use of experimental drugs, murders and other unsavory business. The conservatives are keeping quiet and NEW YORK TIMES 1 DEC 1975 ?e?? Restoring Fait out of sight. The result is a CIA whose effectiveness as an intelligence gather- ing and interpreting agency is next to useless. Concerned over their Senate tes- timonies, the higher-ups have removed themselves from the daily operations of the Agency. Directives have come down to analysts instructing them to be esper cially alert to substantive problems suggested by incoming intelligence be- cause nobody upstairs is minding the store. Without direction, and ,vith yet another RIF threatening this year (this time di- rected mainly at tele Directorate of Oper- ations). agency people are playing it close to the vest. There is a lack of professional pride and concern in the product?the finished intelligence re- porting which is the bread and butter of the Agency. Whole branches are un- dermanned and nobody seems to give a damn. There is a "who cares" attitude prevalent today that would have been unthinkable five years ago. Employees now think of their Agency work as just a job they hold at a time when they're lucky to have a job. ' Nobody is really worried that the CIA The interest in and die skepticism about the cOnclu- sioris reached by the Warren Commission investigating; President Kennedy's assassination are greater now thairi at any time since theiteport.: was, first 'released. .BVett: Belin..."_ a former Commission lawyer arid.;.C.. Staunch: defender Of its work;- now, urges that the inquiry be reOpened. " The Most powerful arguinenta",fdr doing so come not; from any of the veteran assassination buffs,but ernergel! from the secret recesses of the.-PM.I. an -the themselves.. - _ ? *Although the C.I.A. was actively working on ways, to achieve the death of Fidel Castro-t-including arming woUld-be assassin on. the-,day of President Kennedy's, murder?Allen Dulles, thin director of C.I.A., failed to inform his fellow commission-members of-that prograrri; nor did any employee of the agency come forward with. such information. , *Having failed to inform thecommissibrk of, the anti?.; Castro plotting; the agency-also.- failed- to provide the; potentially' Significant information?.that it involved; members of 'the Mafia. *The: F.B.I. failed to inform the-commission that it had received a threatening letter from Lee Harvey, Oswald, the President's assassin, less than. a month before the President's death; and it went on? to destroy the letter. *The failure of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. to disclose these items of information increases the importance of such still unanswered questions as the extent and nature: of Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the F.B.I.; the explanation of the ease with which he was able to travel in the Soviet Union; the reason for the smoothness of . his re-entry into American life after recanting his defec- will be abolished--organizations have an institutional momentum that can't easily be stopped. And it is expert :in covering its tracks. People are pro- tected, jobs diffused, blame defocused. Colby will be the-next sacrificial Iamb. More and more "grey" types are being promoted to higher positions?faceless men who won't rock the boat, who have families to worry about, whose main concern is their pension security. A new generation of old boys is on the way up. Incoming professionals are cut from the same mold. No more chances taken with ideologues. No more boy geniuses, no more sparring with the ambitious. No more creativity, its too risky. "This new crop of youngsters," reports an old Agency hand, "looks like they all came out of the late, late show." The result is a scared, rump CIA whose intelligence product has declined and whose overseas operations are im- potent. It is an organization of people keiebing quiet, unwilling to take a chance, afraid to take a stand. And that's no way to run an intelli- gence organization. p tion to the Soviets, etc., etc., etc. . _ Mr. Belin, while continuing to believe that the Warren._ Commission's conclusions are correct, notes that many' Americans think otherwise: He suggests that a new investigation by itself will restore governmental- credi- bility. That is. hardly likely. FeW Americans were prepared a decade ago to believe in. official cover-ups and murder plOtting; yet even then. they grew increas- ingly skeptical of the Warren Commission's findings.: Having: learned to their borror all those hitherto. unthinkable revelations, their damaged faith IS be entirely repaired' by one more ? ? *- _ Nevertheless, some highly desirable, goals. are within- reach and it is essential ithat they be pursued. Much- skepticism about government in-general flows from the- belief that secret agencies of government are Unadcolint; able and out of. control and that there is an,autoinatict: reflex: in. Washington to sweep- embarrassments- under' the rug. This belief was bolstered just a fewslays ago by the Administration's frantic efforts to smother, the assassination report. Such. skepticism can only be eroded over time; but the flaws in the Warren Commission investigation offer, an excellent opportunity to begin dealing with such! issues- and to dispose of some questions about the Kennedy assassination, as well. The American system.; of self-government can hardly be deemed tribe working' effectively so long as-major questions relating to cover- ups in the investigation of a Presidential murder remain; . - unanswered. A Congressional investigation laying out, all the now- sequestered evidence and-seeking to establish the extent of the cover-ups, the reasons why they were undertaken and the identities of those responsible for them might-- help in the restoratiOn of the Government's reputation for integrity and responsibility. 36 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Ap`Proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 GENERAL DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 13 November 1975 ' MOSCOW'S FEAR OF SAKHAROV ? WILL ANY LEADING Western politician in office speak up about Russia's refusal, reported from Moscow yesterday, ? to allow Dr ANDRE! SAKHAROV to go to Oslo ta collect 'his_ Nobel Peace Prize Will Mr Wn,soN? Will President Fon? Will President GISC,ARD D'ESTA/NG? Alas, it is to be very much doubted. Yet all three, along with many other heads of Government, signed the Helsinki declara- tion, which among other things sought to promote the free movement of individuals and ideas. All have since praised it, adding solemnly that, of course, the test will be in its application. Mr WILSON even went so far as to express the opinion that, if the Helsinki agreement had been in existence at the time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia could not have taken place. Dr SAKHAROV is the leading campaigner for civil rights in Russia. His eminence_ as a scientist is such that Russia dare not Smdai, November 23, 1975 The Washington Star Why do we By Arthur Miller Detente at present is a body without a soul, but its promise is enormous if we will seize it. The fact is that the Helsinki accords bind both sides to respect elementary human rights. Why are we so powerless to speak to this issue? Is it that we fear the other side will start making noises about the race situation in Boston? The tortures in our client-state, Chile? The re-arrest under fake charges of the South Korean poet, Kim Chi Ha ? ?The answer to the dilemma is, not to sweep our own sins under the same rug as the Soviets' ? or for that matter, the sins of South Africa ? but to rise to the chal- lenge that detente implicitly raises; to open our own actions to the same measure and standard that we and the Soviets have signed and agreed to. The truth of the mat- ter is that with all our failings, we are still the freest country in the world, and if it should turn out that foreign criticism forces us to take anew and resolute look at our own injustices, why must we fear such a competition? The truth is that such criticism is going on anyway, but from the other side, not from ours, at least not openly, not as part of our relationships with repressive re- gimes. And I repeat, this super politeness, at least in part, stems from a clouded con- sience. But the Congress has the power to begin clearing that conscience by requir- ing certain minimal standards of respect for civil rights at least in, those countries whose dependence on our support is nearly total. And if you say that we cannot be held responsible for what another govern- ment does, I can only answer that we are already responsible when that government cannot exist excepting with our support. This is not a question of coming out with high-class speeches, supporting academic or intellectual freedom. We are supporting repression. We can stop doing it. And in the process we can turn to our new trading partners and say, "We meant what we signed to in the Helsinki accords; we are actively working to eradicate injustice and unfreedom within our country and in those countries dependent on us ? what are you _ suppress him or do away with him, as would happen to lesser mortals. Yet they dare not let him accept his Nobel prize because it would spotlight their weakest point, the lack of law and freedom for their citizens. The record of Western leaders on such matters is _ nota good one. President FORD originally refused to accept a visit to the White House by ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN -when he was in America, because Dr KISSINGER had advised him it would be bad for "d?nte." When he belatedly changed his mind, SOLZHENITSYN was no longer interested. Shortly before his visit to Moscow last month, President GISCARD D'ESTAING received a letter from Dr SAKHAROV urging him to intercede with Mr BREZHNEV to secure an amnesty for political prisoners in Russia. It was not even acknowledged. Why are the leaders of the West so mealy-mouthed and timorous?. It must be a source of amazement in Moscow. cut our tongues out on human rights in other countries? :doing to Carry out the obligations in regard to human rights that you signed to?" This is not interference in another country's internal affairs; it is an attempt to imple- ment a signed agreement. This article is excerpted from a state- ment American playwright Arthur Miller gave last week at a heating of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga- tions., - The question inevitably- arises as to whether we should refuse, for example, to sell wheat until the human rights provi- sions of the Helsinki accords are lived up to. I believe it would be unwise and unpro- ductive to equate so many bushels with so much liberty. Besides, enlarging com- merce not only benefits both sides materially, it is also a manifest of good will and good faith and as such can serve- as a base upon which to buildAnew forth-- rightness in, our relationships with the. Soviet world_ To again think in either/or terms at all -times and in every instance can only lead back to impotence, and on the Soviet side must lend justification to those who can see only a threat to Soviet power. in any deepening relationship with the United States_ Detente may indeed be a gesture empty of human content, but so is a letter of in- tent that precedes a binding contract. As- with such a letter, everything depends on the next steps, and we apparently have no intention of taking such steps. It is the business of the Senate and Congress to de- cide whether such steps should be taken to implement the Helsinki agreement. For example, a specific number of writers in Czechoslovakia (a country where large numbers of ?Soviet troops are stationed) is denied the right to publish their works in the Czech or Slovak lan- guages. Certain of them have had their unpublished manuscripts seized from their homes. Many, if not most, of these writers are former members of the Communist party and have never advocated a return to capitalism, nor do they now. Their chief sin is to have advocated an indigenous, independent Czech culture responsible to their own people rather than the demands of Soviet authorities. The blacklist against these writers is so broad that the regime has found it impossible to staff a literary magazine or newspaper. It should be added that even in other So- cialist countries the Czech situation is an embarrassment. In Hungary, for example, I could walk with Hungarian writers and meet with them in restaurants without a secret policeman dogging my footsteps. Not so in Prague, where a plainclothesman will take a table a few feet away, openly and brazenly warning all concerned that the regime is observing them. Czechoslov- Ida lives under a permanent state of McCarthyism from which there is no ap- peal. The situation of the Czech writers and intellectuals is not unique in a world where repression, jailing, and the outright mur- der of writers by their governments is ordinary news. But there is one respect in which they are special; they have nowhere to appeal for relief. As citizens of a Social- ist country, it is futile to look to other So- cialist states for support, and their case is ambiguous in the eyes of the European Left whose anti-capitalist stance mutes its indignation against repression in the East. In am not telling you that the Czech writers look to us for help. It is far worse than that. I believe they have long since assumed that we have decided to collabo- rate with the Soviet Union as a trading partner and that it is unrealistic for them to expect us to rock the boat. And this is why their situation is so meaningful; it has all the earmarks of the long future in which small nations especially must settle for a modicum of prosperity in exchange for which their souls will be excised, quiet- ly, remorselessly, all for a good cause, the cause of peace between the giants. 37 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 I do not believe we have to cut out our tongues in order to reassure any other country of our peaceful intentions, or that we must adopt the impotence of moral eu- nuchs so that the volume of trade may grow. The Senate and the Congress, it seems to me, have the obligation to decide whether Czech repression is in contraven- tion of the Helsinki accords. If it is, then the State Department should be instructed to ask the Soviet government what it in- tends to do about the matter as a signatory to the agreement. If, for example, the Christian Science Monitor 28 NOV 1975 existence of this blacklist is denied, the Senate can discover evidence that it in- deed exists. If the Soviet government still refuses to attempt to correct the situation ? indeed, if no concrete result comes of the whole effort ? something vital will nevertheless have been gained. The United States will have at least begun to establish before its own citizens and the world that its power exists not only to make the world safe for American busi- ness, but to hasten- the evolution of hu- manity toward a decent respect for the human person. And if such approach can Charles W. Yost Should U.S. tie aid to human rights? Washington _ One of the numerous subjects of controversy between the executive and legislative branches of our government is whether the United States should extend assistance to nations persistently violating human rights. Last year's Foreign Assistance Act included a "sense of Congress" amendment that called - on- the President, 2`excep1 in extraordinary circumstances," to reduce or deny - security assistance to "any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Since many of our regular military aid recipients, such as South Korea, the Philip- pines, Brazil, and Indonesia, have been ac- cused of violating human rights, this poses a serious dilemma for the President and Secre: tory of State. Liberals in the Congress , think the administration is evading application of the amendment. They threaten to put forward legislation reserving to Congress itself a voice in determining which countries are in viola- tion and should be denied assistance. This controversy arises from a con- frontation between two contradictory cur- rents in American foreign policy. The first is an evangelistic concern, going far back in our _history, for liberty versus oppression, democ- racy versus authoritarianism, free enterprise versus communism -- a belief-that what is good for America must be good for the rest of the world. The second current, arising in part from the same source but bent by the cold War, is the presumed need to assist any country, -what- ever the character of its government, which seems threatened by communism and whose "loss to the-free world" we beliexe might tilt bal the ance of power. The administration conceives of the latter imperative as being overriding, whereas the Congress ? reflecting the post-Vietnam pub- lic mood of skepticism about military aid in general ? sees much less need to be inhibited by strategic considerations. The-difference is aggravated by consid- erable fuzziness about just what "human rights" comprise. Most people would agree that genocide, large-scale domestic slaughter such as was practiced in Burundi and Uganda not too long ago, constitutes a gross and outrageous viola- tion of human rights. There is also widespread revulsion against systematic torture as it was practiced by the colonels' government in Greece. More difficulty arises, however, when we only lead to counter-charges against our selves, so be it. The failures of America society are known everywhere now; w can only gain by learning how others real ly see us. Perhaps our rightful pride in our freedom does need to be measured agains our injustices, and so openly as to be an elementl in the 'diplomatic process. W have nothing to hide for those with eyes to see. And if we have to take it once we dish it. out, perhaps this new necessity will help us, if only for our pride before the world, to revive that will, that insistence and faith in our capacity to make a soecity that is just to all. . attempt to equate human rights with the democratic political rights to which Amer- icans are accustomed ? free elections, free' speech, free emigration, etc. Not only communist countries but almost all "third-world" countries seriously limit the exercise of such rights. Is it appropriate for the U.S. to insist that other peoples adoptits form of government and its political liberties, even if their tradi- tions and experience have not_equipped them to do so effectively or meaningfully? Leaders of third-world _countries contend, moreover, that economic rights and freedoms ? sufficient food, health care, and employ- ment ? are far more important to- their peoples than political rights. They sometimes claim that the U.S.-- is in violation of "basic human rights" by its economic neglect of the substantial proportion of its population still living below the poverty level. Others point out that Americans are quite ready to denounce restrictions on emigration as a violation ef_hurnan rights, but have for 50 years been severely restricting immigration, which equally denies freedom of movement. This whole subject of human rights has many gray areas.. There is therefore serious doubt whether the U.S. should apply its political and economic standards to others, or wage ideological crusades of the sort it has condemned when carried-on by communist states. On the other hand, the U.S. is certainly under no obligation to provide aid, particu- larly military aid, to governments whose behavior it strongly disapproves, which en- gage, in the language of the Foreign Assis- tance Act, "in a- consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized hu- man rights." A widely, if not universally, recognized human right is the right not to be imprisoned, certainly not to be tortured, for the expression of dissident political views. There would seem to be only two or three cases where stfategic considerations are still so overriding that the U:S. should feel obliged to continue military aid to governments which display a consistent pattern of violation of human rights of this gross and internationally recognized character. In other cases the U.S. could in good conscience terminate its aid. The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States ? diplomat. ?197? Charles W. Yost 38 NEW YORK TIMES 5 Dec. 1975 SOVIET SUSPECTED OF ARMS VIOLATION U.S. Intelligence Officials Raise Questions About a NeiRadar Station By BERNARD GWERTZMAN ? Spezia: to The Nem York Times WASHINGTON Dec. 4?Amer- ican intelligence officials have reported to the Ford Adminis- tration that the Soviet Union- recently constructed a large- scale ra.dar station on the Kam- chatka Peninsula, raising new questions about possible viola- tions' of the 1972 treaty limit- ing strategic. arms. According- to -well--placed Ad- rixiMistraticA officials, the Rus- sians have built- very modern "phasedLarray radars" in the Kamchatka area of the north- eastern Soviet Union for use in testing systems of defensive weapons known as antiballistic missiles. This suspected violation a( the strategic arms agreements' is similar to the other alleged violations in that it points up the fuzziness of some aspects of the 1972 agreements. 'Current' Ranges Questioned Article Foilt of the 1972 trea- ty allowed two operational sites, in Moscow and at Grand Forks, N.D.?the latter site has subse- quently been mothballed ? and provided that in addition ABM radars could be emplaced "for development or testing within current or additionally agreed test ranges." Because this raised questions as to where each side had its "current" test ranges, the United. States delegation to the nego- tiations told the Russians on April 26, 1972, that it under- stood that the Soviet Union had only one ABM. test range, near Sarysagan in Kazakhstan, Cen- tral Asia. High-level discussions are Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000109380003-3 APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000.8-3 now under way within, the Ad-1 ministration on whether the Kamchatka radar violate the 19972 treaty on defensive mis- siles, and what to do about it. The sophisticated "phased- array radars" scan by electfonic means. The smaller, dish-shaped radars scan mechanically, and are less suited to protect against incoming missiles. Aft,: Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the retired Chief of Naval Oper- ations who was told about the Kamchatka site, told the House Select Committee on Intelli- gence this week that it was a "clear and precise" violation., Some Administration officials are not so sure. As with other alleged Soviet violations of the 1972 ABM treaty and the accompanying limited accord on offensive weapons, it is almost impossible to prove that the Russians did not technically comply with the agreements. ' Despite several charges of Soviet violations, the Adminis- tration has consistently, con- cluded that, at worst, the Soviet Union was not living up to the spirit of the agreement. Presi- dent Ford' has stated there wyre "no violations." ? A Storm in Washingten - Nevertheless, the Soviet ac- tions have created something of a political storm in Washington,' of which Kamchatka issue -isl only the latest flurry. Thursday, Dec. 4, 1975 Political conservatives such aseAdmiral Zumwalt 'bl to mean that ABM components the Russians' have -repleced candidate for the Senate in Virginia, or Senator Henry M. Jackson, an announced condi- date for the Democratic Presi- dential nomination, are .arguing that the- actions -demonstrate that the Russians cannot be trusted and that the Admin- istration was naive. - Moreover, the direct role of ? Secretary of State Henry- A. Kissinger in .negotiating -the 1972 accords and Current ef- forts to conclude , a treaty on offensive weapons is a factor. Charges about the Russians have .been turned into argu- ments that- Mr. Kissinger was deliberately closing his eyes to violations, deceiving the Prtsi- dent, Congress and. the public ?--something he vehemently 1 denies. The issue has been clouded by its complexity. Very few people can understand the tech- nfcal aspects. The Administra- tion, moreover, to protect 'its confidential diplomacy, has re-'fused to, disclose the allegationsi publicly. Thus, information is; provided,, for the most past,' he a contentious way ber`criticsi such as Admiral Zumwalt, or-, in highly, selective and incom- plete briefings eV Adrainistrae tion officials. 'We interpret the reference' in Article Four," the American' delegation to the negotiations said in April,- 1972, "to 'ad- ditionally agreed test ranges' THE WASHINGTON POST will not ocate a any o er test ranges without prior agree- ment between the governments that there will be such addi- tional ABM test ranges." Unit- ed States ABM ranges are at White Sands, N.M., and at Kwa- jalein Atoll in toe Pacific: No Soviet Yes or No - The Russians, however, did not confirm or deny the Ameri- can statement, merely replying on May 5, 1972, that "national means permitted identifying current test ranges." Presumably, the new radar in Kamchatka would be useful to monitor Soviet long-range offensive missiles that are fired regularly either from Kazak- hstan or Siberia, land in Kam- chatka or go over it and end up in the Pacific Ocean. The Saryagan range has been used in the past to monitor Soviet intermediate-rarige mis- siles fired from a test site east of Volgograd, officials said. What trouble American offi- cials-Is whether there is proof that the Russians have built a new ABM test range in Kam- chatka or whether they hey merely modernized an old one. There have` always been old- fashioned dish-shaped radars in Kamchatka; the Russians could say that it always was an ABM test range and thus permissible. It has also been charged that be 1 d t th Schlesinger Backs A Wary Detente By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger said yesterday that the United States must pursue detente "without illusion" that the Soviet Union is prepared to live peacefully with the West.- "To the contrary," Schlesinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Soviet leaders . . have indicated that-detente is itself a reflection of their growing military power, which in their interpretation-, has forced concessions from the West." A detente policy is desirable to try to reduce political tension. but "strictly on the basis of mutuality,"- he said. Schlesinger warned that "concessions grantee in order to elicit future goodwill will all in that objective." This was.Schlesinger's first public testimony since he was fired by President Ford on Nov. 2. The reasons given for his dismissal included Schlesinger's differences with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger about the conduct of detente policy. ? - - Schlesinger spoke in philosophical vein yesterday without personal recrimination, although his differences with Kissinger on approach to the Soviet. Union- were evident. Schlesinger repeated the same points yesterday afternoon in an address to the Pacem in Terris conference at the Sheraton-Park Hotel, Where he was paired against Pen- tagon critic Rep. Les. Aspin (D-Wis.). '- Before the Senate com- mittee, Schlesinger said he saw no evidence that Kissinger withheld from President Ford information about alleged Soviet violations of 1972 nuclear arms accords. Retired Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt told a House com- mittee on Tuesday that there were "gross violation's" by the Soviet Union, and that President Ford was "badly briefed" by Kissinger about them. ? Schlesinger, in response to , questions by Sen. Clifford-B. - ? Case (R-N.J.) said, "I would be -inclined, until I see evidence, to disagree." He said information about the allegations was known to only a few officials, but Nie. President was, aware of the.. alleged violations." ? e He- said the Soviet Union "clearly stretched" in- terpretations of the agreement,. exploited "am- biguities," and one action "could be interpreted as a. . . violation." Schlesinger said that was "the use of radar in an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) mode." Soviet deployment of the heavy 55-19 missile was "not a violation of the treaty," Schlesinger said, but "may 'have been a violation of the spirit of the treaty." John Trattner, a State Departme.nt spokesman speaking for Kissinger said yesterday: "We have no , evidence that there have been any violations of the SALT I agreement." Schlesinger reiterated to the Senate committee his con- their light missile, the SS-11, ,with a much larger weapon, 'the SS-19, after both sides had agreed not to convert light-mis- sile launchers into heavy ones. Two years- ago the Russians began digging - underground works identical to their missile silos, in possible violation of the treaty's irohibition against new missile silos. But the So- viet Union said the 150 to 200 new silos .were for com- mand - control centers, and American intelligence accepted that explanation. The Russians have also been accused of covering up work on submarine construction and , on mobile missile launchers, contrawning the accord. In turn, the United- States has been charged by the Rus- sians with covering up some Minuteman missile sites while new concrete was being poured. The accords called on e_ ach side not to impede the ability of the other to check on compliance. Achniral Zumwalt also charged this week that the Rus- sians had begun interfering in other waYs with American Satellites flying over the Soviet Union, bnt Administration offi- cials denied that American ca-1 rabilities had been impairede tention that the United States is endangered by the Soyiet. Union's swiftly growing military power. H& again' said that the Soviet Union by the 1980s can overtake present. U.S, advantages in numbers of nuclear warl*ads and missile accuracy. -Given the current con- - figuration of world power. he said. "it is our historic destiny to be the guardian of freedom." Several members of the generally pro-detente Foreign - Relations Committee disputed '"historic .destiny" 'theme: The sparsely attended hearing, however, .wa.s._ never. acrimonious, and ". speakers on both- sides often.--i were barely audible. Schlesinger said he agrees ? with the need "to control the wholly needless expansion of ? the strategic nuclear forces on both sides, which continue to grow without in any way augmenting security." -His prime concern, he said, is "the dwindling of American con- ventional power" which "forces us in- the direction of greater reliance on the threat of nuclear response." At the Pacem in Terris conference, Schlesinger echoed his theme that if the United States is strong enough to resist Soviet "exploitation" of detente, in- time the two nations may move toward "a live-and-let-live policy." This,- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00000380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Schlesinger said, would be -true detente." Aspin countered that the so- called "spending gap," through- which' the Soviet Union is allegedly out- distancing the United States in military expansion. "is in its Awn way as phoney as the WASiaNGTON STAR 25 NOV 1975 missile gap of the early ?i 1960S." In addition, as a result of" tension between the Soviet Union and China, Aspin said, 28 of the 31 divisions added by the Soviet Union in the last seven years "have gone to the Chinese border." Aspin maintained, "The question is not 'How much are the Russians spending?" but, "How much is enough for the -defense of this country and its vital interests?" The war of Moynihan's tongue It was inevitable that Ambassador Pat Moyni- han's blunt diplomatic style would becorhe con- troversial at the United Nations. This war of 'Moynihan's tongue, as one might call it, haS been brewing for weeks. Its intensification ? now that the British ambassador to that body has compared Mr. Moynihan to Wyatt Earp arid King Lear ? gives us yet another opportunity to express our enthusiasm and support for the _ambassador. We are aware that deft circumlocution is a more customary norm in diplomatic language. Nations having vital business to transact do not, for good -reason, 'clobber one another every day With ripe words from Roget. But what is going on at the General Assembly these days is not diplomacy. Unlike the Security Council and some of the UN's specialized agen- cies, the General Assembly has no vital business to transact. Its agenda is crowded with symbolic issues. It is not deliberative; most of the voting is done in predictable blocs. Its voting system, in which nonentities like Byelorussia have equal weight with the U. S., is the ultimate parody of the majority principle. Faute de, mieux, the General Assembly has turned more and more to theater. Its idea of a high old good time is to bring before the assembled nations a posturing blowhard like Yassir Arafat or-Idi Amin, and to ? hang upon his words as if he were a Winston Churchill or a George Washington -- or even a Solomon. Indeed, that shrewd political realist Nikita Khrushchev caught the drift of things at the UN years ago when, failing to register suffi- ciently with words, he commenced banging the .table with a shoe. The professional diplomatic community in this city and elsewhere, having a certain vested interest in quiet diplomacy, has not yet recon- ciled itself to General Assembly theater. It is reluctant to patt with the pleasure of meek sub- mission to rabid speeches and resolutions that contravene every political and social value, the Charter is supposed, to represent. This may explain why Mr. Moynihan, whose working principle is to tell the tru,th even when it hurts, has become the target of an intrigue to banish him to the decent obscurity of Harvard. : The selection of the United Kingdom's UN Ambassador, Mr. Ivor Richard, as its spearcar- rier is a bit odd, ;of course. Mr. Richard is de- scribed to us as a Labor Party politician of no special consequence, but it is remarkable that his sup6riors in London unleashed him. It must be disconcerting to Mr. Moynihan, as it is to us, to see good friends running for cover during the shootout. But we think it would be a great misfortune if Mr. Moynihan lost heart and quit, as he came near doing last Friday. The only grievance against him is that he is saying what has needed saying for years, and saying it with the bite and passion toMake himself heard even in the din of Turtle Bay. Indeed, his recent sayings do an undeserved service to the General Assembly ? a service probably recognized as such by a number of delegates who are in no position to make their silent approval clear. It is the Counsel of despair to think that the General Assembly is beyond redemption..Enjoy- ing as it does a certain importance in the world, the General Assembly should not be allowed to sink into absurdity and irrelevance. It is, if you want to put a label on it, neo-colonialism at its most condescending to take the view that since the views of some UN_ majorities are fatuous, they should be heard in timid silence. .Ambassador Moynihan takes the view that what is said and done at the General Assembly does matter ? that if its words and acts go unanswered they may give a color of respect to causes'and principles which this country funda- mentally opposes. We take the same view, and we are glad that Mr. Moynihan is there to speak for the silent millions. He should not conclude that because our friends in London are momentarily shell- shocked by the sound of eggshells popping it is time to give up and go home. And we are glad that President Ford has emphasized that view to Mr. Moynihan this week. 40 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003'80003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000_3-3 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY:- b-ECEMBER 1, 1975 Schlesinger and Kissinger ZURICH?I shall never forget, when. ? President Kennedy was assassinated, the pain we felt for 'America and the bewilderment and disillusionment , experienced by the many former soldiers in World War II and former inmates? in Soviet camps and prisons. `. It was all the worse because of the inability or the lack of desire tby the American judicial authorities to un- cover the assassins and to clear up the crime. We had the feeling that powerful, open-handed and generous America, so boundlessly partial to freedom, had been smeared in the face with dirt, and the feeling persisted. Some- thing more than respect was shaken? - it was our faith. Despite the dissimilarity of events, I had a very comparable feeling at the time of the abrupt dismissal of Secre- tary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, a man of steadfast, perceptive and brilliant mind. 'Once again,, the feeling was that America had been insulted. I realize that President Ford acted in full conformity with the Constitu- tion. But woe betide a system in which it is sufficient and expedient to govern guided only by one's personal or party's election interests. There is something higher than. jur- isdiction, and that is decency. There is something beyond juridical right, arid ? that is good sense. There should at least be decency toward one's allies. After all, the Secretary of Defense is not merely a member of the American Government. He is in fact also respon- ' sible for the defense of the entire free world. - It would have been a friendly act-- first to have received consent from the allies. As for good sense, this in- volves the way things are handled. A leap-frog succession of officials in such a post can only impair the defense of the country. (It was noted who was pleased by the dismissal). . There are rumors that the dismissal was linked to another name. It is an irony of history that the two names I almost rhyme. ? - When I was hi the. United' States last summer, I avoided direct ques--- tions from the press on assessing the.. character of Secretary of State Henry,,'.: A. Kissinger. But his present triumph,: and the blinding misinformation being spread to this day about his activities; compel me to speak out bluntly. ? Defending his policy of- unending concessions, Mr. Kissinger repeats the one and same argument almost like an ? incantation: "Let our critics point out the alternative to nuclear war!" More than anything, it is this phrase that - exposes the nature of Mr. Kissinger:, in particular, it exposes that he is 'least of all a diplomat, "Alter" in Latin means "other (of two)." An alternative is a choice be- tween two possibilities. This is a sci- entific concept, but even scientific situations often allow a much broad- er choice. But diplomacy is not a By Aleksandr I. 'Solzhenitsyn ft is ?ari of the arts I concerning the nature of man. To con-, struct diplomacy on an "alternative" is to put it on the lowest and crudest level. An art does not recognize alterna- tives within itself; it would fall apart if it developed only on the basis of two possibilities. No, in every instance art has a thousand choices. Every art has a spectrum,- a keyboard of possi- bilities. From ancient times to the present, the art of diplomacy has con-' sisted of playing on this keyboard. ? How many great diplomats of the past have won negotiations even with empty hands or backed by inadequate power, in circumstances of military weakness, conceding nothing and: pay- , ing nothing, defeating the opponent only by intellectual and psychological , means. That is diplomacy. 1 Mr. Kissinger endlessly deafens with the threat ": . but otherwise, nuclear war." He obscures the fact , that this: same nuclear war hangs equally over the -head of his oppo- nents (at least as of ft/day, until new successes by Mr. Kissinger). And in these equal circumstances, under the same threat, his opponents are always winning and he is always yielding. Let him learn something from his oprnnents?how is it that they _ operate so- successfully in the nuclear ; age? The answer would be: They'study the psychology of Mr. Kissinger. What an absurdity: The United States was the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the world. Should it because of this have become weaker, and should it because of this surrender its positions in the world? dispute not - only that Mr. Kissinger has the life experience , necessary to understand -the psychol- ogy of Communist leaders, and as a result sits- at, the negotiating table as if blindfolded. I also dispute that he is on the high diplomatic intellectual level ascribed to him._ It is not diplomacy, to, negotiate , with a preponderance of power behind L' one's back, with an abundance of material means in one's pocket, to submit to all participants in the negotiations, to pay them all off and thereby to create unbalanced and temporary grounds for transition to further concessions. The celebrated Vietnam agreement, the worst diplomatic defeat for the West in 30 years, hypocritically and very conveniently for the aggressor prepared the way for the quiet surrender of three countries - in Indochina. Is it passible that the prominent diploniat could not- see what a house of cards he was building? (The Soviet_ press, in its rage against Andrei D. Sakharov, damned his Nobel Peace Prize as "the ultimate in political pornography." The press aimed in the wrong direction and was three years too late. This abuse would have been more suitable for the Nobel Prize' shared by the aggressor and the capitulator in the Paris agreement.) A similar alarming feeling of shaki- ness is' aroused by the Middle East agreements of Mr. Kissinger (as far as I know, many Israeli leaders do not regard them any higher), although there has not been -the'-kind of open capitulation to which Vietnam -was doomed by the same pen. Mr. Kissinger does- not concede that any concessions whatsoever are being made. Thus, it appears: "The Western countries have not set a goal of _ _ ideo- logical detente" (that is, they have not./ i even tried to eradicate the coldest, aspect of the cold wars, so what is their goal?). Or as he said on Aug. 15,A 1975: "It is not we who were on the defensive in Helsinki." Three months ' have passed and we ask: If it was not , you, who was it?, The very process of surrender of world positions has the character of an avalanche. At every successive stager it becomes more difficult to hold, out and one must yield more and ,i mote. This is evident in the new i conditions across entire continents,: in the unprecedented encroachments , by the Soviet. Union in 'southwestern. Africa and In votes. in the United:I Nations. ' ' ' .- Mr. Kissinger always has an emer- gency exit available to him. He can transfer to a university to lecture to credulous youngsters about the art of diplomacy. But the Government of the United States (just as those youngsters) will have no emergency exit. There is another favorite argument _ by Mr. Kissinger: In the nuclear age, we shall not forget that peace, too, "is a moral imperative?' Yes, that is true and not only in the nuclear age (indeed, this nuclear age is an obses- sion for Mr. Kissinger) but only if -one correctly understands peace as the opposite of violence and does not ' consider Cambodian genocide and Vietnamese prison camps as the attain- ment of peace. But a peace that tolerates any ferocious forms of violence and any massive doses of it against millions of people?just so long as this does not affect us for several years yet? such a peace, alas, has no moral loftiness even in the nuclear age. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the dissi- dent Soviet writer now in exile, won- the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970. This article was translated from the Russian by Raymond H. Anderson. la Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Near East NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1975 U.S. and Lebanon: Echoes of 1958 to Moslem demands ter modifi- - - - , By JAMES M. MARKHAM cation of the requirement of Special to The New York Times Moslem-Christian balance, Mr. BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 26_ Kissinger wished Mr. Karami As would-be mediators from the "well in your effort to encour- age all concerned to show the Vatican, France and the United moderation and spirit of corn- Nations come and go, the promise that would seem to be American_ role in the Lebanese necessary if there is to be an crisis has been obscured end to the violence and the Moreover, that tole remains a sub- commencement of a process of political accommodation lead- News ject of,speculation ing to a new basis of stability Analysis and controversy with security for all your coun-I because of the trymen." overt support for Mr. Karami has been the the Prime Minister, a Moslem, champion of gradual change in and of questions about the Lebanon's political system, supplying of guns to Christians. which has the effect of giving In 1958, shortly after United States.. marines ? landed on Beirut's beaches in the midst:of a civil war, they- established liaison' witha highly disciplined a predominant role to the Christian comnfunity though it is . nawa minority. American 'officials do not hide their belief that it is partly the intransi- gence' of sortie Christian lead. Christian party called the Pha- erst including the President, lenges -Libanaises, which was thought to be the bedrock of anti-Communism in Lebanon. The Americans reportedly fur- nished the Phalangists with weapons and a radio trans- mitter. An identity of interests was created?at least in the Arab mind?that the Americans are New York to address the Unit- still living with. Times have ed Nations General Assembly. changed, though, and today the 1 .. President Franjieh and the that blocking-, reform. , Infrequent Contacts The letter is said to have outraged Mr. Franjieh, who has been irritated at the American- Government since last year, when narcotics detectives, lead- ing specially trained dogs, in- spected the higgage of his en- tourage when he arrived in hardly disguised_ official policy of the United States Govern- ment is sympathetic toward the Prime Minister, Rashid Karami, who is a centrist, and chilly toward President Suleiman Franjieh, a Christian allied with the Phalangists. Signal front ICssinger The policy was signaled on Nov. 6 in a letter from Secre- tary of State Henry A. Kissinger --conspicuously addressed to Mr. Karami, not to Mr. Franjieh, and made public by the embassy ?that said: "I want you to know that my Government very much hopes to see an end to the fighting in Lebanon and fully supports your Government in its efforts to bring this- about." Ther. in an _apparent bow Christian Science Monitor 14 December 1975 Americans Still Try to Live Down Old Phalan gist Link _ 'small town; such signals are not missed. . Though the Americans seem to' be backing Mr. Karami, their policy remain's the subject of some mystery as well as con- troversy because it is not clear whether they are arming the Phalangists or some favored faction in the Christian camp. American officials insist that their hands are clean?that the days of 1958 are over. The United Leba- non, they maintain, is that it should remain stable since in- stability endangers the much larger enterprise of Mr. Kissm- gees painstaking Middle East- ern diplomacy. If Syria and Israel were to come to blows in Lebanon, the Sinai agree- ment between the Israelis and Egyptians' and. other accords still in embryo would-be, shat- tered. This assessment is, widely accepted by European diplo- mats and others essentially sympathetic to American policy in the Middle East. Third World's Assessment Another view, sometimes voiced by third world diplo- mats, is that the Americans need the Phalangists to keep the Palestinian guerrilla move- ,.. ment preoccupied and on- the ' defensive, so it is less likely to upset Mr. Kissinger's diplomacy. Partisans of the second school of thought recall a quickly forgotten incident last July, when Representative Les, Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, American Ambassador, ,G.. Mc. pointed an accusing finger at of Murtrie Godley, see each other a Lebanese .representative Loh Industries named Sarkis infrequently. However, Kr- G. Soghanalian, *who had re- Godley is on good terms .with ceived embassy and State De- Mr and is a ? friend partment approval for the sale of Raymond Edde, a "Christian, of $25co00 worth of handguns icentrist who would like to suc-- and ammunition to unspecified ceed Mr. Franjieh next year. clients here. Mr. Soghanalian, who is A lively 'conversationalist; known' to have contacts cin Mr. Godley, in what appeared- the Lebanese right, denied that to be a series of calculated, he had- intended to sell the indiscretions, aired his- feelings iweapons to the Phalangists, the on the remains of the cocktail !Palestinians or- any of the !Igrowing private armies. None- and, dinner circuit iliejrut theless, a State Department of: Israel grows wary U.S. may desert it Accommodation with PLO urged by some By Francis Ofner Special correspondent of - The Christian Science Monitor 142 Jerusalem There is a crisis in relations between Israel and the United States. - Israelis are more apprehensive than ever about being deserted by the U.S. on the issue Of the Palestinians. _ They were alarmed when the U.S. last weekend let go through the Security Council an agreement that they, bitterly opposed because it - included an invitation to the fieral 'ailurect a repotter. that' the 2,000 Colt pistols were des- tined for "responsible elements! ?that is, Christian! elements."' That was before the factional conflict exploded into a confla- gration that has taken at least 4,000. lives and -assumed inter- national dimensions. It was also before the Sinai disengage-' ment accord and before a. , marked .evolution in official; [American- thinking on the ' 'Palestinian question, which, cUl- minated two weeks ago in the testimony Of Harold H. Saun- ders, Deputy Assistant Secreta- ry of ,State for Near Eastern and South' Asian Affairs, who, ;said: "The issue is not whether !Palestinian interests should be expressed in a. final settlement, but how. There will be no peace until, an' answer' is found." - 'Hard-Liners Have Lost Cini? This attitude, which has un, settled the Israelis, has not been lost on the Palestine Liberation Organization nor ?on other Arabs who closely fall-Ow American decisions. "I think the hard-liners have lost but," an Arab diplomat who knows- the United States ;said of -Lebanon. "I think the , Americans ? have decided to . back the mainstream rather ' than to try to profit from the divisions in Lebanon for short- term gains." "I wouldn't call:it a construc- tive attitude," he continued, "but at least it's not divisive." ' A well - placed Palestinian guerrilla echoed the theme: "We are even hearing that the. Americans are not selling guns to the Phalattists," he said. If it is a fact that the Ameri- cans are not arming the con- servatives or sanctioning indi- rect sales,- the United ?States may ' begin, to shake off the image that has stuck since 11958. But a number of skeptics remain to be convinced that it is not sanctioning gun sales here still. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to a special council debate on the Middle East scheduled for Jan. 12. They were not assuaged by the U.S. ? in a note to the Soviet Union Tuesday ? proposing a preparatory meeting, from which the PLO would be excluded, to discuss reconvening the Middle East peace conference at Geneva (as distinct from the Security Council). In any case, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko lost no time in rejecting the U.S. proposal later Tuesday. Things may well be brought to a head long before Jan. 12. Egypt has taken the initiative at the UN to have the PLO represented in the immediate Security Council debate which the Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD177-00432R000100380003-3 APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010P38000.3-3 Lebanese are seeking after Tuesday's Israeli move on the Israeli side on the 'Palestine issue. air raids on Palestinian refugee camps in Mr. Rabin, as well as his Minister of Defense, Lebanon said in Israel to be guerrilla centers. Shimon Peres, are still agaihst. any recogni- For Israelis, the key and agonizing question kion of the PLO ? even if it were first to now is: What price will the U.S. extract from recognize Israel. Israel for a U.S. veto of any future Security But contrary opinions now, are being heard Comjell resolution deemed inimical to Israel, 1a- - particularly on the PLO issue? -,A;_everai /*ulster& favor a.phai1im. of nottjon, - Israeli Foreign Ministry sources here as- They...include Justice Minister Chaim Zsdok, mune that Israel could expect an American H isim_henister Avraham Ofer, and Health_ Minister Victor Shemtov. Foreign Minister. Yigal Allon is-somewhere between Mr Rabin and this ministerial group. - - At the weekly Cabinet meeting last Sunday, it was decided to discuss the question of "new foreign policy initiatives" at one of the next meetings. Unofficially it was confirmed that 1 by "initiatives" was meant Israel's approach to the PLO. David Anable reports from the United Nations: Israel is under extreme pressure here. And now, ironically, Israel's air raids on Palestin- ian refugee camps Tuesday have precipitated , veto for a resolution that would: - I. Expressly recognize the PLO before the PLO has recognized. Israel and undertaken to live in peace with it, or 2. Impose on Israel by-force-a solution _to the Israeli-Arab dispute. , Indeed, that much emerges from a cable that President_ford sent to Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin on Dec. 2. - But the Israeli diplomats who maintain daily contacts with the State Department and the White House still expect to be asked by Washington to pay a price for a veto. - _Because of this.. somethinchas started to Garry Wills Monday, Moventber 24, 1975 the very issue against which-the raids are thought partly to have been in protest ? participation of the PLO in a Security Council debate. That had been expected Jan. 12 at the earliest, but Egypt moved Wednesday to have the PLO represented at the immediate Secu- rity Council meeting requested by Lebanon to discuss the raids. The Arab aim is to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States, not least over aoeeptance of a role for the PLO. This week the Israelis were under fire here in yet another General Assembly debate on the Middle East as well as in nearly all the Assembly's seven committees. "You can move from committee to com- mittee today," said Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog to his General Assembly au- dience,"and you will discover that this obses- sion with Israel, which has been imposed upon you, has become a mania which has by now perverted this organization into. . . a body which is rapidly losing any vestige of -cre- dibility in the eyes of decent people." The Washington Star Why U.S. should fight 'new racist crusade' Is there racism in Israel? Unquestionably. It is a na- tion made up of human beings, and one of the most persistent of the human vices is racial antagonism. There is a prejudice against Arabs within Israel's origi- nal borders, and a denial of " civil rights to those within the occupied territories. But Israel's record of ra- cial prejudice is positively angelic next to America's. Our treatment of Indians, blacks, the Nisei, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos Kees been despicable in the past and . has ?risen,-in recent years, to a level merely bad. But remember that, with only one, exception (the Nisei), our prejudice was loosed on people whowere not allied- to enemies in war time. ? , ? firaelis linve been fight- . --ingArabs;.off and on, for 30 .years,. and there is a long history of cultural, antago- nism before-that. This had -. to -affect the treatment of Arabs within the Israeli na, lion. But this treatment has been so careful that one of /the charges often made is that Israelis patronize the Arabs by demandini less them! ? or anyone wipe out the re- maining stains of racism in our country. Then' why the equivalent assault On Israel? Because the assault is not equiva- lent. The General Assembly- was dot attacking Israel for the incidental traces of rac- ism in its practice. It was attacking the very basis of the Skate of Israel's exist- ence. It was saying that Israelis had no right to the ingathering of their perse- cuted brothers within the sanctuary of Israel. The monstrous reversals in this General Assembly vote are hard to exagger- ate. Israel was founded as an asylum for the principal vietims- of racism in this century. It took its origin, in large part, as a remedy to racism at its worst. Yet for trying to escape the racism of centuries of European practice, it is now called racist. -And those great defend- ,ers of racial equality, who voted for the General Assembly resolution, are themselves renewing the very racism that led to Is- rael!s foundation. They are . prescribing a whole country not. its faults or correct- able practices, but its very reason for being. ? -In?doing this, they pros- cribe as well a whole ? people, each member of the Jewish faith no matter where he or she lives. The connection of any Jew to Is- rael's hopes will be used to - If the Geneial Assembly. were to-vote that Ameri- cans are racist, the charge would have a great deal of truth to it. But k- would be- hypocritical and irrelevant. . It would not be mounted by - ? people with records much better. It would not help us call the individual Jew a - racist, and to deny his or her civil rights in other countries. The response of Congress was entirely in order. The President spoke too soon when he said we should not even consider pulling out of the U.N. That is exactly what we must consider, ? very cautiously but very, thoroughly. Moreover, the President should order Rogers Morton to stop play- ing games with Commerce Department .information on the Arab boycott. We should make sure that our aid and - trade with other countries in no *ay lends de facto as- sistance to the racists' cam- paign against the State oft Israel. Anti-Semitism, has been in the world' a very long time; yet the shocked re- sponse to Hitler's obsceni- ties offered us hope that we would see its- demise in our. lifetime. There has been motion toward the realiza- tion of that hope ? e.g., in the way Christian churches have expunged the remains of prejudice against the . Jews from their theology and liturgies. That is why it comes as such a blow to see the force and reach of the new anti- Semitism expressed in that vote of the General Assem- bly. Whatever obstacles we can place in the path of this new-racist crusade, we are - obliged to place there, while seeking peace for all man- kind. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 43 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Africa Zn .ritgeltii Tiniet Sun, Nov. 23,1975: ui GERAth J. 1111NliEle The American withdrawal from Southeast Asia unleashed _a spate of national soul-searching. Americans began to ask themselves and their government uncomfortable but long overdue questions concerning the origin of U.S. involvement, the dyna- mics of escalation, the covert war- making powers of the executive branch, and the perception of U.S. in- terests abroad, and assured them- selves that no such venture would happen again. Yet something similar is happening again. Once again the United States Gerald Bender, former director of the UCLA Interdisciplinary project on Angola, Mozambique and Bissau, is the author of several articles and a forthcoming book on Angola, and has consulted with the State Department on the country. He lives in Los An- geles. isinvolved in a foreign civil war, this time in the newly independent Afri- can nation Angola. While publicly the State Depart- ment either denies or refuses to *com- ment on allegations of American in- volvement in Angola, the CIA has been quietly intervening. The pat- tern is familiar, but there is one ma- jor. difference: The Administration, and the CIA have not been able to hide their activities- from the Ameri- can people. Earlier this month while Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was strongly condemning the "extra-con- tinental" interference in Angola, Wil- liam Colby, the lame duck director of the CIA, and Joseph Sisco-, undersec retary of state, told_ a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee that the CIA has been covert- ly supplying two of the contending Angolan parties with rifles, machine guns, vehicles, ammunition and logis- tical support. What are the origins of the Ango- lan war, which has prevented the emergence of a unified nation and claimed between 20,000 and 30,000 lives in 1975? What are U.S. interests in the area? How did the United States become involved and why? Ethnic, racial, class, regional, and ideological differences divide the three Angolan nationalist movements ?the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Nationalist Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the Nationa- list Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In addition, an intense distrust and personal animosi- ty exist among the movements' lead- ers.- , ? . 41-t" rawn Into ngo an Conflict? 1 Each of - the movements draws most of its supporters from one of three major ethno-linguistic regions. The FNLA is located among the ap- proximately 700,000 KiKongo speak- ing peoples of the northwest; the MLA has traditionally received sup- port from the 1.3 million ICiinbundu speakers in the north-central part of the country around the capital Luan- da: and UNITA is firmly based among the more than 2 Million Ovim- htmdu in central Angola. -Angolan nationalists were never able to-form a common front during the 14- years of armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. The principal rivals have been the MPLA and FNLA, whose relative strengths vacillated throughout the colonial war as well as during the past year. At the time of the Portuguese coup in April, 1974, the FNLA was almost universally acknowledged to have the largest and best equipped army. ?he FNLA has received most of its krms and- training from Angola's northern neighbor, Zaire, whose President Mobutu apparently feels that the best means of securing his 1,300 mile borderiiitii Angela would. be to have his brother-in-law, FNLA President Holden Roberto, at the helm of government. Since 1973, the FNLA has also received considerable arms, money, and military training from the Chinese who, fearing the MPLA's growing dependence upon Russian istance, have thus extend- ed the Sino-Soviet rivalry to Angola: The MPLA turned to its foreign supporters for help in avoiding an FNLA onslaught. Russia, which had been the principal- supplier of arms and money during the long colonial struggle, enthusiastically responded along with ,Yugoslavia, Cuba, and a number of A frican countries. By late spring of this year, the fre- quent minor clashes between the two nationalist movements grew into an all-out war. By the end of September the MPLA controlled 12 of the coun- try's 16 district capitals. The third movement, UNITA, which has received the least amount of external aid and is consequently the weakest militarily, tried to stay out of the fight between the other two movements. But neutrality was possible only for so long: UNITA had to choose to fight with one group or the other to avoid being crushed by them. Ideologically, UNITA is closer to the MPLA, but now has thrown its lot in with the FNL,A. One important reason for UNITA's decision is that .the party could obtain weapons from the FNLA's patrons (e.g. Zaire, Chi- na, the CIA, France and South Afri- ca) while the Russians and other MPLA suppliers had little interest in ? arming a potential rival. Angola is at war and UNITA, above all, wants arms. For the past two months, the com- bined forces of the FNLA and UNI- TA?with, considerable help from Portuguese, South African, Rhode- ? sian and French Mercenaries (many of whom admittedly fought in Biafra) ?have dislodged the MPLA from most of the territory it held in the central and southern regions of the country. According to one State De- partment analyst, "These white troops have made the difference and turned the war around." The introduction of white mercena- ? ries into the conflict seriously esca- lated the war. In only three weeks they moved 600 miles with tanks and armored cars from Angola's southern border, They are now close to Luan- da, the MPLA stronghold, and threat ' en to provide Holden Roberto with -1 the necessary firepower to carry out his vow to "flatten the capital." To stave off this threat, Cuba and Mo- zambique- reportedly have sent be- tween 2,000 and 3,000 troops to help the MPLA defend the capital. The alliance between the FNLA and LTNITA is tenuous and destined to collapse if they ever defeat the MPLA: UNITA was initially founded in thern mid-1960s by dissident mem- bers of the FNLA, led by UNITA President Jonas Savimbi, who once , served- as. FNLA President Holden Roberto's -foreign minister. Savimbi charged at the time of his break with Roberto that the movement was dominated by one man (Roberto) and "flagrant tribalism." He has repeated . similar charges during the decade which has followed, including only a few months ago. In fact, after almost 20 years, Hold- en Roberto has, been unable. to dele- gate meaningful authority or to at- tract significant"non-Bakongo cadres. Moreover, at the outset of the coloni- al war in 1961, the principal victims of Bakongo attacks were thousands of Ovimbundu coffee plantation workers. When the FNLA assumed almost total control of northern An- gola in the fall of 1974, one of their first acts was to expell 60,000 Ovirn- - btindu working on the coffee estates. Today the tension between_ the. two groups is manifest in Huambo?the capital of the FNLA-UNITA newly Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010938000,3-3 proclaimed Popular and "Democratic- Republic of Angola?where UNITA and FNLA. soldiers have frequently been exchanging gunfire. Unless An- gola is partitioned, it is highly proba- ble that the FNLA and UNITA will meet as enemies, not allies,, on a fu- ture battlefield U.S. covert support for the FNLA and UNITA has been largely indirect and disbursed mainly- through neigh- boring Zaire. Zaire has supplied arms and equipment from its own forces which the United States has been _ re- plenishing. In fact, Zaire turned over so much materiel to the FNLA over the past 12 months that President Mobutu was forced to tell Holden Roberto in late May or early June that he could spare no more. Furth- ermore, the Chinese warned Roberto about the same time that they could promise no further military aid be- yond 1975. The Zairian and Chinese warnings to Roberto, which coincid- ed with some of the MPLA's most impressive victories, apparently wor- ried Kissinger; since it appears that U.S. covert aid to the FNLA in- creased substantially this past- sum- mer. - - In addition to using Zaire as a con- duit for covert aid, the State Depart- ment is trying to persuade Congress to agree to a more than five-fold in- crease in overt military assistance to Zaire (from.-$3.5 million to $19 mil- lion), and a three-fold increase in economic aid (from $20 to $60 mil- lion). The drop in the price of copper and the increase in the price of oil are two important factors, along with the heavy burden of the intervention in Angola, that resulted in a major eco- nomic- crisis which caused Zaire to default on over $8 million- in loans during the past two. months. U.S. firms have about $750 million invest- ed in Zaire, which could be jeopard ized if this crisis continues. Kissinger_ sees Mobutu as one of Washington's strongest allies in opposing Russian interests in Africa, and therefore he would like to help him out of_his dif- ficult economic circtunstancm_lf 'the war continues,. the United. States probably will have to assume an ever-increasing role as the supplier of military equipment. U.S. involvement in this civil war appears aimed , at preventing the MPLA from exercising power in An- gola, in the. belief that the party's ad- vocacy of socialism and its heavy de- pendence on the Soviet -Union for arms and financial support imply that it is a danger to U.S. "interests." But what are American interests in the area: Economic? Strategic? Dip- lomatic? The total value of fixed U.S. in- vestment in Angola is very small? under $70 million, the overwhelming majority of which conies from one company, Gulf Oil Corp. Ironically, and significantly, Gulf does not ap- pear to: share Kissinger's or Colby's fear of the MPLA. Saydi Mingas, the MPLA finance minister in the transi- tional government, recently re- marked in Washington that relations between- his party and Gulf were "very good." The company does-not perceive the MPLA. to constitute a greater threat to its operations than the FNLA or UNITA. The oil compa- ny is concerned abOut U.S. interVen- tiona concern which . hit - been _ quietly communicated- to the, State Department. Does the United -States have strata., gic interests in Angola? 'In: a 1970 Na-, , tional Sectuity.Council study (NSSM ? 39), Kissinger argued that the United States had no strategic interests there. Colby made it clear in his re- cent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States still perceives no strategic interests at stake in Angola. Is the United States then interested in scoring ,diplomatic victories through its Angolan involvement? Sen. Richard C. Clark (D-Iowa),'-, chairman of the Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Africa, argues that rather than bolstering American dip- lomatic efforts in Africa, we.. are alienating a number of African lead!,-, era. Moreover, Kissinger has little: support for his policy within his own _African bureau. After a thorough re, view of the Angolan situation within the State Department this past Juni:, the bureau almost unanimously rec- ommended that the United States stay out of the conflict. ? If no solid case can be made to sup- port American intervention to protect economic, strategic or diplah matic interests in Angola; why hat- the United States become involved in ? the Angolan 'tragedy? "To. stop So viet domination," Administration offi- rials argue in an accent Which has a decidedly cold war, rather than de- tente, ring to it. Unquestionably an INIPLA-clominat- ed Angola would be more sympathet- ic to the Soviet Union than to the United States. After all, the Russians gave them the means to resist Portu- guese colonialism which had been ta- citly supported by the United States. Moreover, some leaders consider _themselves marAsts, which Places -them closer to Soviet, not American,. ?perceptions of the world. But does this really spell Soviet domination? .DOes this really justify putting mil- lions of dollars worth of American weapons into the hands of other An- WASHINGTON POST 2 6 NOV 1975 45 ? -plans and white mercenaries? -.. Similar concerns were recently ex- pressed about Soviet aid and marxist rhetotjc in Guinea-Bissau and Mc:, ; zambique, but neither country -has -shown signs of Russian domination. !-In: fact, FREL1110 already:has dem, 1-enstrated its independence from the ':)..Soviet Union on. at least two impor- Aant issues in.recent months. And Idi 7:Amin 's recent rupture with Moscow ; should have put to rest the myth that Russian arms are tantamount to Russian dornination..It is a dangerous . trap to measure the politics of Afri- ? can. leaders 1,y-the source of their ; ants:Pride is a more reliable guide.: Amo erican official official has suggested that Chinese arms to . the FNLA or the flattery bestowed upon China by Holden Roberto indicates that he or his party are Maoists. -Nor has it been suggested that South African arms to -,.T.JNITA bind them to:a support- of z- apartheid.. Neither can it be argued. support. of both groups_ ::gnarantees they will be friends of the . United States . in the future. . Both ,'tJNITA's -. Savimbi and FNLA's - 'berto 'have strongly.attacked:the United States. in the past ancti;they. ? will undoubtedly dolt again -lathe future. - tiian emulating the familiar.,. '-_-??oprse of intervention and escalation ? in Vietnam, the United States-should - take A second look at Angola. If de- tente still has. any meaning, the Unit-,ed., States _ should .be e?chausting, all-_ _?_diplornatic means to reach an accOrd;', with 'the: Soviet Union to reduce thlevel of e 7,14?1C7.c.T.at-1.1Cr,,.,... than:j9Af417 ? -- ? -As long as: the- major.. powers in. Onjunction *with- dozens of secon powers pursue policies of: unilateral' intervention instead of multilateral. ,ireconciliation, any hope for peace in. Angola remains dim:. Until . the Rus- sians,.- Chinese and Americans can .? .agree-1,o end this war by proxy, the ?:carnage in Angola will continue. The ; c!essation of international interven- tion is no guarantee that Angolans will reconcile their differences, but it.: -would at least afford them the:oppor- , --tunityl to try to resolve these differ- ences at the conference table and not ? on the battlefield: ...1?_;1' : ussian 'Vietnam'? ? lMFORT-ANT political event oftheearii thetilici World iS the kremlin's burgeoning intervention 'lithe Angolan civil war. Nothing faintly like it has been ? seen- since- the .period10 years ago when the United States started sinking; deeply into the quagmire of Vietnam. ? Now _AS thei,, A great power is committing military supplies-and manpower to help a favored client in a local -struggle Lr power. Now as then, the other great power is -qoming wore or less. reluctantly to the support of the ; other side. It is, frankly, inconceivable, that the Russians will end up-putting_ half -a million men ashore in Angola. But already they seem to have furnished some hundreds of "advisers," plus tens of millions of dollars in military Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 supplies, plus a few thousand Cuban proxies to take a role in or at least near the actual battle. From a random and intermittent guerrilla conflict, the struggle in Angola..;_ has become?thanks mostly to Moscow-the- most savage war currently going on in the world. . What is behind this rampant Soviet adventurism? Why has theKremlin gone halfway to the South Poleto all but openly commit its prestige to the fortunes of a rather 'routine African politician,- the- Popular Movement's AgOstinho Neto, Who may or May not 'remain a -loyal Client when?or -if?he establishes real power?' Angola "dOes" Offer certain conventional great-power lures: a 'good Atlantic port opening on the sea lanes-'around the -Cape, oil and minerals in apparently plenteous quan- tities,' the opportunity to stick a thumb in China's eye. One wonders, though, if ' the real point of Soviet policy is not something else. Moscow perhaps sees a post-Vietnam international setting in which its own power is waxing and American power, or Americans resolve, is on the wane. Angola may be a test case to establish how much Soviet intervention the international traffic will now bear. _ Since Angola' is. important in itself, and since the Soviet performance does., isuggest '-an experiment in power- , flexing, it m,akea-- a difference -how -the- United States responds. We would not want this countrytostand idlyhy ,while the -Russians play out their imperialistic game. 'That would be an invitation to further power plays. But -we doubt the need;and correctness of getting, back into Covert '.competition with Moscow, as the United - Statesso far with uncertain results?is in fact doing in -Angola: The United States would do better to come before theInternationar community with clean hands, produce the ey_iderice of Soviet intervention, and use the means of I - diplomacy and public pressure to call on the Russians to ?! go home. Surely some members of the Third -World understand their own self-interest in discouraging great- power military interventions. Secretary of State Kissinger was entirely correct to warn the other day that Soviet intervention in Angola is inconsistent with professions of detente. Alternately, the President could consider leveling with the American people. He could, for instance, send up a message to Congress saying that it matters, for the following good strategic, economic and political reasons, which group of Angolans runs Angola, and that the United States should consider supporting a modest open program to give a little help to its friends. Why not? If the case for support cannot survive disclosure and debate, then let that be the end of it. Meanwhile, the important thing to do is to, keep the' eyes of the world sharply focused on exactly what the Russians are up to in Angola. Friday, November 21, 1975 TI-E CHRISTIAN 4CENCE MONITCL Angola: nsing East-West test Joseph C. Suddenly? the great powersare focused on Angola A yearago it was just another Porttiguese colony. _ Nov. lila begin rival supply operation& goth seem to have reached full flood by this past week. There is still the decisive military campaign ahead. The Soviet-backed MPLA forces are at the moment on the def ensive. Their main base is Luanda, but it is almost on the ruing line. Everything north of Luanda itself is in National Front/Unita hands. The northern anti-Soviet forces claim to hold even the power station which _supplies electricity to Luanda itself. On the southern front the anti-Soviet forces have had a spectacular advance up the sea coast. They have taken nearly 700 miles of coastline- and now are within 200 miles of Luanda. They think there is nothing of military importance between their present front at Porto Amboim and the outskirts of Luanda. The military prospect would seem to be for the southern forces to push on up to the Luanda area and attempt to join their north- ern allies for the encirclement of Luanda. Diplomatic observers point out that the Angola affair is a reversal of what had long been the usual pattern in such matters. Previously, American supplies moved openly to anti-Communist forces while Moscow sup- plied its clients indirectly Or clandestinely. In this case Soviet supplies have come ashore at Luanda openly. Aid to the anti-Soviet forces is unofficial; indirect, and more or less clandestine. Newsweek Magazine's correspon- dent Andrew Jaffe asked a British pilot who had flown him to Huambo from Lusaka who had hired him. He got the facetious reply, "You can say we work for MI61/2." (MI6 is British military intelligence.) The Soviets had the legalistic advantage that their clients were in control of Luanda which had been the Portuguese capital of the whole 'of Angola. Their movement has been recog- nized by most countries Which tend to vote with Moscow as being the legitimate new government of Angola. Hence they can claim to be backing the legitimists while anti-Soviet forces are backing the rival faction which as _yet does not control the old capital. - -Today, it is the cockpit of nations. Russian trucks, tanks, guns, planes, "advisers" and pilots are reported seen in Luanda, capital of the Soviet supported MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). - ? American planes are reported landing cargoes of guns at Kinshasa in neighboring Zaire. From there they are reported going to the northern- forces of the combined National Front/Unita groups which control both the northern and southern parts of Angola. British pilots are reported flying men and weapcins to the southern National Front/Unita forces. Western correspondents are getting as fast as possible to Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) which has been designated as the capital and command center for the National- Front/Unita forces. They report white troops speaking with a South African accent, Americans training_ local troops, and military equipment of American and West European. manufacture. News reports suggest that the military Supplies going to the northern anti-Soviet forces are following the same supply line-from Belgium to Kinshasa which was used during the civil warn the former Belgian Congo. Supplies to the Soviet-supported MPLA are supposed to have come by sea Supplies to the southern anti-Soviet front presumably come from and through South Africa or through Zambia: - Cuban troops are said to have arrived in Luanda The Chinese are' giving sympathetic support to the anti-Soviet side. This aligns the Chinese with both Americans and South Africans. For an explanation,pull out yot-ir map-of Africa and note that Soviet naval forces based at Luanda, or any other of the several good harbors of Angola, would be on the flank of the oil supply line which carries Persian Gulf oil to Europe. The great tankers must go around the Cape. The Suez- Canal is not deep enough. West Europe's industrial /fabric would come to a halt in a few weeks if anything ever cut off that flow of oil. _ Soviet naval forces have a protected harbor on the Somali coast at Berbera. They also enjoy harbor facilities at Conakry in Guinea. So far, they have no naval facilities on either side of the southern part of Africa. A base at Luanda would be of only marginal value to their North- Atlantic submarine patrols, but would make it possible for their surface forces to circle the African continent. This would help them in both the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. If the local communists in Portugal and Spain could drive the Americans from the Iberian peninsula, the naval balance of power in both North and South Atlantic would be altered to Moscow's advantage. For the above- reason the Western countries have obviously undertaken a substantial military supply operation to aid the - anti- Soviet factions in Angola. It would appear from reports that both sides waited only for the official Portuguese withdrawal from Angola on 116 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380093-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 East Asia WASHINGTON POST 2 3 NOV 1975 Jack Anderson The Threat in Korea - , -? - . Despite a slight cooling of tensions in Republic of China. I do not believe that Korea, the north's recklessly ambitious China is interested in a new war on the ? Kim II Sung could rekindle the Korean Korean Peninsula... War at any time. "With a longstanding invitation to visit But General Richard Stilwell, the U.S. Moscow, he has (also) attempted to visit commander in Korea, has concluded from Soviet leaders, ostensibly to persuade computer studies that he has the military them to support a move south, whereupon power to stop an invasion in its tracks. It the 'longstanding invitation was with- would take a blizzard of bombs from drawn." Guam-based B-52s, however; to do the job- Nevertheless, Murphy warns that Kim's These are the findings of ReP? Jnnn ties to the twoCommunist superpowers are Murphy, D-N.Y., who has just spent a sufficiently secure that "in the event Kim week in Korea questioning the top mrn" unilaterally invades the Republic of:ti menders and browsing through, secret Korea, China or Russia would not let North papers. He headed a congressional delegation of Korean War veterans, who - Korea be extinguished." It Murphy's view; Kim is caught in an ? returned to their old battleground to assess - economic vise and "the time is running ; the danger of a new war. ' - out." Murphy cites the apPrehensions ofti In a "Personal and Confidential" report U.S. officials, therefore, that "Kim may to House Speaker Carl Albert, the blunt- think this winter is 'now or never,' and he spoken Murphy warns tersely: "The may go for broke trying to reach Seoul." problem in the near future is that Kim II Using computers to calculate the moves Swig is essentially irrational and could available to Kim, the U.& command spark a deliberate attack with a resultant believes a push down the traditional massive military response from South central invasion routes could be stoppeion Korea." five days. Therefore, Kim's best bet, the . The US. intelligence directorate in the computers indicate, would be to, diive Pacific has a similar opinion of Kim but down the shorter, northwestern route. expresses it in more bureaucratic But the computers show that the Coin- language. "Kim is a zealous nationalist billed Korean-American forces, with the and a dedicated Communist wholly artillery firepower, tactical air support Capable of executing faulty judgements and 3-52 bombing strikes available to based on misconception," the directorate_ them, could stop the North Koreans "in has stated. "He also suffers from tunnel their tracks." _Declares- Murphy: "The command assumes North Korea could only, last from 30 to 60 days without massive aid from their Russian. and Chinese allies." , vision where the Korean peninsula is concerned, and he is not interested in global detente, which can only hinder his goal of reunification by force of arms." ? ? According to Murphy, both china and In case of a North Korean attack, 'Russia have a restraining hold upon the Stilwell is prepared for "an immediate, impetuous Kim. "It is generally known violent and successful response," and lie that since the 'shocks of Spring'?the fall ' has "supreme confidence" in the SOtith_ of Saigon and Phnom Penh?Kim_ has Korean Army which is "well trained and attempted to exploit what he perceived as fit." _ a weakening US. stanceln Asia. But Murphy is gravely alarmed over the "He went to Peking to ask for help, but- Substandard equipment, which the 'South his 'adventure was not encouraged,., Koreans are stuck with. The supplieS that there..." Murphy asserts. "Kim is looked. the U.S. left behind after the Korean War, upon as unstable by his former ally the he reports, were mostly World WaiII THE WASHINGTONPOST Thursday, Nov V, 1975 Indonesian Funding of Costly vintage and are now "woefully obsolete!' Yet 80 per cent of the military ex- penditures since 1950, he alleges,. "has been used to maintain the old equipment originally left by the U.S. forces." - The result is that "large units" of- the South Korean Army "are still equipped with the old M-1 rifles?or no rifles at all?while the North Korean Artily- is equipped with fully automatic AK-47 rifles." And half of the South Korean Air F6ree ?consists of F86-F sabrejets.. Although the North Koreans -have superior equipment, he notes that both Russia and China are withholding-their advanced arms from an indignant Reports Murphy: "Kim II Sung, ac- cording to our intelligence, has- 'com- plained bitterly' over this practice andhas been refused access to the much more advanced MIG-23, the so-called Fox-Bat, which the Russians provided the Arab nations during the 1973 Yom Kippur War._ "China has followed the same pattern as Russia and has provided the North Koreans with a lower level of military technology than it currently possesses." , Murphy calls for the US. to bring the -- South Korean Army "to parity with the- North Korean Armed Forces in terms of sophisticated weapons and weapons systems." Quoting from actual speeches, he also warns that Kim "promises to violate the truce and- start a new war if the United - States pulls out of Korea." The U.S. presence north of the Han River, Murphy therefore contends, "is the psychological Sand military obstacle that prevents North Korea from attempting an invasion of the south." ? - He urges: "The Congress should make no mistake that the relatively symbolic forces of the United States in South-Korea ? are niairitaining peace and security! 'hot only on the-peninsula, but ultimately in the WesternPacific." United Feature Syndicate. Inc. ByMartinWoollacott Space Project Stirs Criticism /L ? JAKARTA? When the S. space agency shoots ?another ex?le of theThat $1.5 billion would buy "Palapa" into orbit in July, Indonesian government's an awful lot of the little dams, Indonesia will 'share with the , fatal fondness, its critics say, roads, bridges, health centers, for illusory and gimmicky schools and small factories shortcuts to "modernity" and desperately needed by? the economic growth. impoverished peasant mass of Thus "Palaparwhich i,vill Java, 80 million people living crown a- communications at the highest agricultural improvement program density in the world. The same costing $1.5 billion has become . is true of the many smaller but a focus of controversy is welt ' only slightly better-off as pride. . communities on the outer United States, Canada and the Soviet Union the distinction or actually possessing one of those icons of modern technology, a communications satellite. One of the poorest nations in Asia is joining one of the most expensive clubs inthe world? islands from Sumatra to the Moluccas. "Instead," said an Indonesian journalist, "they are going to get President Suharto live on television, plus the facility, which none of them will ever use, of being able to telephone someone at the other end of the 'ar- chipelago." The exaggeration is pardonable-as a. means of 47 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 dramatizing the difficult choices the Indonesian government inevitably faceS. The archipelago com- munications program was conceived in the afterglow ,of the oil boom, when Indonesia thought it was going to have so much money the only problem would be how to spend it. , That Euphoria has vanished now, but the program is not ' one of those projects the government plans to scale - down or postpone, for, it is of central . political and , psychological importance to the army generals, assisted by technocrats, who have run - Indonesia since the fall of Sukarno. The very name assigned to the satellite is indicative; it refers to one of the most famous events in Javan history. Gajak Madah, prime minis ter of the Empire of Majapahit, swore an oath, it is recorded, that he would not eat white. coconut meat (palapa) until the unity of the realm was restored. That was in- the 14th cen- , tury, ? but' ramshackle medieval empires Majapahit itself lasted less than 100 years ? - are Indonesia's only real : historical claim to have existed as a' nation, rather than a as a collection of separate' societies unified only by the experience of Dutch rule. Thus "palapa" means unification, which Indonesia's rulers, despite the everyday rhetoric of speeches and propaganda, see as a task only half completed at best. In this they have good reason. In Java itself, three - separate sub-societies, each with its own language and history ?Javan, Sundan, and Maduran ? share the crowded iiland territory. Outside Java, on the 3,000 islands of the archipelago, another 11 major sub-societies, and hundreds of smaller ones, exist. , "Palapa" will carry about 3,000 simultaneous phone conversa tons and one color TV channel. The rest- of the capacity appears to have been earmarked for military use and the Ministry of Education, with some "spare." 1 this, however,, will cost "only" $150 million. The other $1.35 billion is being spent on the upgrading of conventional telecommunications ? the extension of the existing microwave system and of the telephone net in urban areas. Flop. tht_gLw er risen --pint of view, the program will do four important things." First, it will- provide swift military communications for an army still fearful of revolt, riot and rebellion. Second, it will make nationwide television broadcasting possible, leading, it is hoped, to the cultural and ideological unification of the country. Third, it will permit nationwide education television, seen as a quick way to better education in, a country where 40 per cent of the 6-to-14 -age group still receive no schooling. Finally, it will greatly improve existing telephone links between main centers while at the same time bringing into the system ? ? through the satellite ? small and distant but politically or economically important- 'communities.- But the program- faces a number of problems; ?Existing phone lines are already badly overloaded (it - costs $1,500 in bribes to-get a phone. installed) and clearly could net easily.accommodate the new traffie. - ? ?There is little TV programing and what there is is poor. ?. ?_. _ ? --:-And there how is no educational TV, although a crash program is under way to' train 1,000 producers, directors, and writers abroad.. Educational TV has not really t worked anywhere else in the underdeveloped, world,- skeptics point out, asking whys, it should work' now. in. -Indonesia. The government has great hopes-that thapromm will be, of immediate political use in ? the 1977 elections and has, a- l. vision of villagers all over Indonesia gathered around the, communal TV set to listen t&,: pre-election chats from ! President Suharto or to'absorb; the gospel of Sukarno's "fiver; principles" night after night. "It's not so laughable," said: a diplomat. "The new- ? programs will go on about' development and moderi' nization ? and, right in front;:' of you, in the shape of the very''. . TV itself, will be proof of that development." The governi-s! ment, an heir of the magical: and mystical tradition .of-r - Java, is putting its faith thisl. time in a piece of Western7: scientific magic. . The program can lasi:3 defended on rational grounds-,1; but in the end it is an ac.t`tit,L faith. , ? wAsha NGTON POST "erVIRMV, 2 4 NOV 1975 The. U.S.- Vietnam Relationship. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD Vietnam has come full circle. From regarding. that Asian land as a place where our very national destiny would be shaped, Washington has withdrawn to the view that we must first Of, all care for the welfare of the few American citizens who happen still to be there. This is a prudent policy; one Wishes it had been adopted, say, a decade earlier. It also is. showing some signs of success. - For months after the Communist triumph in April, the Vietnamese insisted they would not deal with the United States in any way until Washington acknowledged its aid commitment in the Paris accords of January, 1973. That comriunitrnent, however, was hedged on the "(an- ticipation) that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation." One government that signed it, Mr. Thieu's, no longer exists. Washitigton has, correctly, pronounced the agreement "dead"?dead as a -basis for policy and dead in terms of public support for it. By releasing nine Americans (mostly missionaries) out of the 50-odd who stayed on after April, and by accepting 1,600 Vietnamese refugees back from Guam, Vietnam demonstrates in deed if not word that it thinks the Paris accords are dead, too. The Ford administration, which had taken a rigid bargaining position, at once relaxed a bit and authorized some token private relief shipments by the American Friends Service Committee. Secretary of State Kissinger explained that there was "no obstacle to the principle of normalization" and that the United States was ready to reciprocate Vietnam's "gestures." Vietnam at once made its own response, inviting the House Select Com- . ? mittee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia to meet its representatives in Paris. This committee, set up last September under the chairmanship of Rep. G. V. Mbn- tgomery (D-Miss.), has a membership spanning the - familiar spectrum -'of American opinion on Vietnam. It seems to have successfully conveyed to the Vietnamese, however, that on the particular issue of alp' 820 _ Americans officially listed as missing in agtion in Indochina, it speaks with a single voice. 21r. Mon- tgomery is going to Paris with Mr. Kissinger's blessing?an all too rare example of congressional- executive collaboration on an important foreign policy matter._ Whatever their previous views, most Americans, we surmise, have lost their zest for engaging any of the issues still posed by Vietnam. Neither revenge nor guilt nor strategic purpose stirs more than small eddies. This makes it impossible for the Vietnamese to play on American divisions and passions, as they once did, for ends of their own. It makes it feasible, however, for a careful policy of normalization to be worked out with adequate public support. We think Vietnam would be foolish to expect a nickel's worth of American aid. But the Vietnamese still have political reasons of their own?offsetting the pressures they feel from China and Russia?to cultivate a relationship with the United States. In brief, they need us more than we need them. This is the reason one can hope the Vietnamese are coming to realize that they cannot treat the few Americans left in their country as hostages, and that all Americans share an interest in receiving what satisfaction is possible with respect to the MIAs. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800Q3-3 Aliprovet For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000103800Q3-3 Latin America WASEENGTON POST 2 7 WA WS I ? The Washingtoifgiry";Gii:Riiiiiid- , Senate Testimony Accuses Castro , By Intelligence Directorate." The and Lett Whiiiezt Despite .the balmier'. Caribbean breezes blowing between Cuba and the United States,, secret Senate 7-testirnony warns that Fidel Castro-is still trying to spread ?-hii. ' revolution.: to U.S.. territory.' The. veteran' investigator AllOnso Tarabochia, testifying ? belttrid,closed doors of _the Senate Internal Security subcortimittee, charged that_ the Cuban leader. is- collaborating with the Shviet ; KGB to undermine democracy. in?Puerto Rico. "- "Nieete than 200 Puerto Ric**etivists. have -visited' Cuha"i"jarabochia reported; ??? Ianwere trained in, ,terrorism....This number does - "'of_ include the 60 or 70 Puerto Rica is ,who traveled to Cuba he . Vencerem os Brigade.".' - This- T.brigade- has been portira.Yed as, ? fresh-faced? young_ _Americans.,? eager merely to help Cubans chop ? sugar cane. But Tarabochia testified that the Venceremos Brigade "iS controlled by the ..KGB throne the Cuban WASFIINGTON STAR 3 DEC 1975 :William F. Buckley Jr. ? DGI, as the, directerate is better known; reported directly to Castro. Selected. members of the brigade, ..according to Tarabochia, are hip deep in. Puerto Rican revolution. His tale of intrigue and sub- version, incidentally, has been -.confirmed to us by US. in- telligence Sources. , ? - "Detente and the lifting of the blockade of Cuba" may be the tune Castro is whistling, ,said Tarabochia, but ,below "the surface.., there are "no- indications that, the. Cubans _ have renounced' their policy of subversion." r ? ? Castro's main front For. Puertirititan revolution said ? Tarabochia, is .the ,Puer to - Rican _Socialist Party. One of its leaders was caught with a cache'of bombs sunk in a ,"five-foot-deep hold covered by a concrete slab located under a 'cabinet" in Puerto Rico. Exotic acids and detonation devices were found with the bombs., , In-the United States, the revolutionaries have enlisted Puerto Ricans in New York Chi,' Chicago, Philadelphia, -Albuquerque; Boston, Bridgeport and several Other ? ? cities. Although Castpo's -siren song of peace began early this ' year, one key Puerto' Rican revolutionary front was founded as late as March. Tarabochia, using elaborate charts, traced the Puerto Rican and Cuban activists to such citadels of terrorist training as North Korea. He found a trail of 16"; bombings traceable'to Puerto Rican revolutionaries in Newark, New York and, Chicago. The bombers, using; timers ranging from cheap? Tirnexes to 17-jewel watches,... hit police stations, an; Exxonl 'building,.Union Carbide and a; _bank: - ' - Directing the terror cam-J paign_for Castro and the KGB, according ,to' the secret, testimony, is Manuel Pineiro Lozada, former "dirty tricks", chief of the Cuban intelligence service. To legitimatize the cam- paign for revolution; Pineiro Lozada. has tried to bring in liberal leaders and ,has even lured some American Indian. activists. So far, however,, Tarabochia reports- that the- Puerto Rican people are firm in their destr_e_to_r_e_qt_aki_withj, ? -.-.:--_Look:who's talking, about _evils in Chil What is going on in the matter of Chile? If one 'reads the cosmopolitan 'press and views the tele-- yised /media, one would think Chile the ganglion of all social and political evils ?: of our generation. Now. _there is a great deal going" on in Chile that is unpleas- ant, and there are some things going on inChile that -are outrageous. But the fixed stare in the direction of Chile, given the circum- stances of its recent histo- ry, can-,only be compared with the outrage that swept the manipulable world when Franco executed five murderers a couple of months ago. ? The perspective is 'pro- vided by scanning the spon- .sors of a resolution carried through the United Nations General Assembly, excori- ating Chile for its denial of .human rights. These spon- , sors 'included Algeria, Bulgaria, ,Cuba,_ C.zechoslo- vakia and Poland. There 'isn't an Algerian, Bulgat- jart, Cuban, Czechoslovak or Pole. who would not con- sider as idyllic, in compari- son with his own, the life of a typical Chilean. ' We voted for that resolu- tion, but with a gesture of reluctance that becomes a great power singling out for alarm a williwaw while idnoring the typhoons in the big- and sassy parts of the - world, most conspicuously the Communist states. Ambassador-Moynihan, in his electric motion calling for world-wide amnesty fof, political prisoners, deliver- ed a' brilliant speech sin- gling out the important dis- tinctions. He quoted I Stephen Spender, who went I - to Spain during the 'civil , war to act out his con- science in protest against, Franco ? only to discover, as George Orwell did, and eventually, Arthur Koes- tler, that the other side was at least equally guilty of atrocities: s, - "It came to me," Moyni- han quoted Spender at the U.N.. "that unless I cared about every murdered child indiscriminately; I didn't really care about children being murdered at all." Thus Moynihan, quite properly,_ deplores the sup- pression of peaceable politi- cal dissent everywhere ? and asks his colleagues to meditate on one or two anomolies that don't re- ceive much attention at the U.N. ? - He pointed out that 23 of 49 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP-77-00432R000100380003-3 the co-sponsors of the usual anti-South African resolu- tion of the assembly have political prisoners of theft" own; and of course the fig- ure for Chile is comparable. He went on to say that there are, in South Africa ? which shares the general: obloquy along with Chile ? about 100 political prison- ers, so far as we know. And how do we know? Because ' ,there is a vigorous opposi- tion press in South Africa. - He quoted from the Monthly Bulletin of- the impeccable International Press-Insti- tute, whose African director recently wrote, "The un- palatable fact is ? and this is something that sticks in the' throat of every sell-re- specting African who will face it ? that there is more press freedom in South Afri- ca than in the rest of Africa put together." The press is not that free Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3 in Chile, but it is freer than in most of the countries that have criticized Chile, Moynihan progressed. How do we know what is going on inside these ,countries? Much has been made of Gen. Pinochet's refusal,to permit a U.N. "working" committee investigating human rights into Chile. "This is true," Moynihan . said. "But it is only part of the truth. The whole truth would include the fact that Amnesty International and the International Red Cross were permitted to visit Chile. Moreover, if the visit of the working group had gone through, it would have been the first time in histo- ry that any government had permitted such a visit." NEW YORK TMES 2 6 NO' 4 1975 -And then Moynihan quot- ed a letter of Prof. Milton Friedman published in the Wall .Street Journal: "On the atmosphere in Chile, it is perhaps not irrelevant that-at two universities, the Catholic University and the University of Chile, I gave talks- on 'The Fragility of Freedom,' in-which I explic- .itly-characterized the exist-. mg regime as unfree, talked about the difficulty of main- taining a free society,- the role of 'free markets and free enterprise in doing so, ' and the urgency of estab- lishing those preconditions for freedom. There- was no advance or ex post facto censorship, the audiences were large and enthusias- tic, and I received no subse- quent criticism." "More and more," Moynihan said, "the United ? Nations seems only to know of violations of human rights in countries where it is still possible to protest such violations." Causing one to ponder the question, yet again: what is it that accounts for the extraordi- nary success of the orga- nized left in training the attention of the world on the Chiles of the world ? while ignoring the Cubas. The Worst of Both Worlds -SANTIAGO, Chile ? From 1970 to Chile's Allende Government ex- perimented with a- socialist medley and ended up with chaos, bankruptcy, falling production and anarchy. Since 1973 -the Pinochet Government has held the country in leaden dictator- ship's Vise, . :?Salvador Allende Gossens, a likable politician with a record of humanitar- iakideas, was like a tubby fox, a good talker, popular with the ladies. But he simply wasn't up to the job of -control- ling left-wing extremists in his coali- tion. Revolutionists called. MIR took Matters into . their. hands,. . seizing farms, factories and 'destroying all semblances of order. :;Augusto Pinochet Ugarte is of an- ether Cut. Hefty, with slate-blue eyes and brutal mouth, he practices karate At. 50. Possessed of a hooded counten- arice,.he would .have made a fine poker pla-yer. He seized power by force and, keeps it by force; His Government is. headed by a junta of ..armed forces commanders whom-he dominates. But the. army has .bee.n outside politics for two genera- - dons (although by no means always) and is unaccustomed to civilian ad- ministration, consensus and public re- lations. So it coldly makes war?the one -thing it knows. The enemy is the peaple. This is not fascism with one mono- .lithic party And fake elections. There are no parties. It is plain old-fashioned dictatorship helped along by five secret police forces (the most in- - fapous of which is called Dina) and no inhibitions about locking up, tor- turing or even occasionally killing those suspected of opposing it. _General Pinochet told me the sit- - uition when he took over two years ago could be summed up as: "Chaos, misery, destruction.", Today it is ter- FOREIGN AFFAIRS By C. L. Sulzberger ror, unhappiness, despair. He assured me there were no convicted political prisoners in jail, only 516 "detainees waiting to be tried under the state of seige." Diplomats estimate over 4,000 are locked up and moderate opposition leaders claim the figure is even higher. The President says perhaps 2,000 people died in the 1973 fighting, but that only 100 have been killed in guer- rilla and anti-guerrilla shootouts since. The opposition believes between 10,- 000 and 15,000 have been slain or. simply -"disappeared." General Pinochet admits there is a police toughness but denies the Gov- ernment "accepts the principle of tor- ture." -Neutral observers say "sadistic and refined torture" exists. The Chris- tian Democrats- acknowledge reports abroad on torture are exaggerated but it is "frequent" despite_ protests by some army officers. The official line is that the press and education are unrestrained, That is nonsense. Education is a tragedy. Unsuitable military rectors have been appointed to all universities. Leading intellectuals were fired, others fled. Economically Chile was left a sham- bles by Mr. Allende?and remains a shambles: Unhappily, the price of the main export, copper, fell by two-thirds while the cost of oil imports soared. Up to 23 percent of the workers are unemployed. Hunger is common. It is often said the monetarist theories of Prof. Milton Friedman and his Chilean acolytes are 'the mode. However, President Pinochet told me: "The Friedman philosophy -cannot be applied effectively here although many of his suggestions to us were interest- ing." The right-wing financial establish- Del, the conservative Catholic lay or- ganization. By contrast the Catholic Church hierarchy, which opposes Opus Dei, contains a large majority against Gen- eral Pinochet. Cardinal Raul Silva En- riquez, the primate, takes a firm anti- Government position. Pinochet claims he and Cardinal Silva are "good per- sonal friends" but the Cardinal "is sur- rounded by hostile_ people." The President assured me- the his- torical personage who most influenced' him was Diego Portales, an early Chilean statesman. Strangely enough, Portales destroyed militarism, jailed independence war heroes, and institut- ionalized open opposition. , Having abruptly experienced two contrasting governmental systems, Chileans have become politically pol- arized. Destroyed on the surface,-Com- munism's infrastructure remains intact underground. Even the Christian Dem- ocrats don't demand quick elections because they see, no current alterna- tive to the detested military. What should the United States at- titude be? One cannot recommend economic sanctions, which would heighten the suffering of a hungry people. But a strong Washington posi- tion against dictatorship and torture will be of long-term help in encourag- ing eventual democracy. There is a story that Cardinal Silva warned Mr. Allende he couldn't sur-. vive unless he cut his ties with' the extreme left and that he has warned General Pinochet he can't survive unless he cuts his ties with the ex- treme right. Allende, a clever leader, wasn't strong- enough to control his zealots. Pinochet, a strong leader, isn't clever enough to control to COritiol his zealots. Meanwhile schizophrenic Chile has been eviscerated. 50 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00019.0380093-3