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November 21, 1975
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25X1A ?Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800Q42._ ? CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 21 NOVEMBER 1975 NO. 23 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. PAGE 1 30 38 40 42 44 48 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1975. Td-al 1-v 7 7---"N PyrT7 1.4 t 1:A LS Pr VIW IT ;,:7 A / No Evidence That U. Actions Resulted in Deaths Is Found By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK - seethe to The ter; York Times WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?A bipartisan, select committee of the Senate reported today that officials of the United States Government instigated assassi- nation plots against two foreign leaders and became embroiled in plotting that led to the. deaths Of three others. Fidel Castro of Cuba and Pa- trice Lumumba of the Congo; now Zaire, were the leaders who were targets of plots said to have been initiated by offi- cials in Washington. The three others were Ngo Dinh Diem of 'South Vietnam, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Re- public and Gen. Rend Schneider. of Chile. IOf the five, all except Prime. Minister Castro, were assassi- nated, but the committee?the Select Committee to Study Gov- ? ernmental Operations?found no evidence that any foreign leader was killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States. ? It was the first time that a .formal Government investiga- tion established that assassina- tion had become part of United States foreign policy. Several Congressional sources said it was the only instance, except after a military defeat, in which a modern nation had formally acknowledged such behavior. New Details Disclosed The plots that were cited in the document were sketched-in reports attributed to intelli- gence and other Government sources in The New York Times and other publications over the last seven months, but there was a vast amount of new de- tail. The committee disclosed that a wide !range of Federal officials involved themselves in plots such as hiring Mafia mem- bers and making secret atms deliveeies to Chilean military officers. The .committce's 347-page '!report, made public today over the strong opposition of Presi- dent Ford and after four hours of closed debate on the Senate floor in which the Senate re- fused to vote arid thus per- mitted the committee to decide on its release, made these other points: cit was unable 'to establish that any former United States President had directly. ordered the killing of a foreign leader. But it said that "whether or not the President in fact knew about the assassination plots, Iand even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full dis- closure. it still follows that the! President should have known about the plots." ?1t said the plans to kill Mr. Lumumba and Prime Minister. Castro were initiated and fur- thered by the Central Intelli- gence Agency. PIt found that American offi- cials ',encouraged or were privy to" coups .d'dtat that resulted !in the deaths of -General Tru- jillo, President Diem and Gen- eral Schneider, chief of Chile's ?.general staff. cit found that in the plot to kill Mr. Lumumba "there was a . reasonable inference" that President- Eisenhower might have authorized the operation. This conclusion was based in part on testimony by a former official who recalled that Presi- dent Eisenhower had appeared to order the death at a Nation- al Security Council meeting in 1960. The report established that Allen Dulles. former C.I.A. director, had ordered Mr. Lu- mumba killed. - Plt disclosed for the first time that on the day President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Nov. 22, 1963, the C.I.A. was equipping a dissident offi- cial in the Castro Government with a ball point pen containing a hypodermic needle to poison the Cuban leader. It revealed further that this coincided with a meeting of a special envoy of President Kennedy with Mr. Castro in an effort to improve relations between Cuba and the United States. 'Pit disclosed that ranking Government officials diseussedi and may have authorized, thel ei:ahlishment within the C.I.A.! of a "generalized assas.imationi capability," adding that during these diseussion,; "the conceptt of assassination was not af- firmatively'. disavowed." cit sharply condemned the! APProv40,;VOLN8r640446/8 ? /4,-,31 ta 771 ,!3- ,L47 3 Ld br?z ? icy and disclosed that the C.I.A. had used Mafia figures in the Castro plot and had em- ployed two European soldiers of fortune with criminal rec-- ords in the plot against Mr., Lumumba. ?The spectacle of the Gov- ernment cc. sorting with crim- inal elements destroys respect ? for government and law and undermines the viability of?de- mocratic institutions," it con- cluded. Sharpest Criticism The committee saved its harshest language for the con- cept that the United States ;should ever have utilized as- sassination as a tool. It said: "We condemn the use of as- -sassination as a tool of foreign (policy. Aside from pragmatic -arguments against the use of .assassination supplied to the committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert ,operationse we find that assas- sination violates _moral pre- "cepts. fundamental to our way of life." ?? Not satisfied that future ad- ministrations would eschew the use of assassinations, as Presi- dent Ford has done, the com- mittee said it would submit a! bill to make it unlawful for anyone "subject to the juris- diction of the United States" to conspire, attempt to, or kill a foreign leader. The proposed ,legislation will specifically cov- er government officials acting -under orders, the committee said. Late yesterday President Ford made a final effort to halt publication 1):? se??ig personal letters to ..enate leaders. He told them he opposed the re- lease of information of alleged! assassinations plots for thei same reasons he cited in lettersl to committee members 15 days ago. "Public release of these of- ficial materials and information will do grievous damage to our country." the President said in his earlier letter. "It would be exploited by foreign nations and groups hostile to the Unit- !ed States in a manner designed to do maximum damage to the reputation and foreign policy ? of the United States." The Senate apparently spurned this argument and re- fused to order the alteration or suppression of the committee's ? report. In doing so, it also re- jected a last-minute appeal by William E. Colby, the Director of ? Central Intelligence. who. asked that. the names of some 13 individuals, some of them ak-iiiigiao402.46Aeio from possible acts of violence. The 12 names were scattered among dozens of others throughout the report's 347 pages. and it appeared impos- sible for the casual reader to distinguish they names charac- terized by Mr. Colby as esoe- cially sensitive from any of the others. ? A Potential Assassin ? The report .? more than .120,000 words of text. distilled from '60 days of hearings, the testimony of some 75 witnesses and 8,000 pages of transcript ? was pungent in its detail and its depiction of- the men involved .in the plots and their moods. ?? In the Lumumba plot, for in- stance, one of the potential as-, sassins, code-named WI/1 ROGUE, is described by a C.I.A. official this way: "He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if be is given an assignment which .may' be morally wrong in the eyes' of the world, but necessary because his case of- ficer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appro- priate action for its execution without pangs of conscience." Almost no fantasy of spy movies was a tactical impos- sibility in these dark covert battles, the report confirms. The planning against Mr. Cas- tro, for instance, contemplated poisoned cigars, poison sea shells and poison pills. - Individual officials of govern- ment in three Administrations came under criticism or ques- tion in the report. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his deputy in the White House in 1970, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., were contradicted by C.I.A. officials on parts of their testimony on Chile. In one instance, Mr. Kissin- ger had said that the Nixon Administration's policy of en- couraging military coups d'etat in Chile ended in the fall of 1970. Testimony by Thomas Karamessines. the C.I.A. official in charge of the Chile plotting, contradicted this. He told the committee that "as far as he knew" this effort to foment an uprising never ended. . The committee stated that although the Nixon Administra- tion never ordered the C.I.A. to !kill General Schneider, Presi- dent Nixon had ordered a scale, unsuccessful 2ffort to pie-vent Salvador Allende Gas- sens of Chile, a Min.xist. frcml 03800042 1 : Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : cIA-RpP77-00432R000100380004-2 THE NEW ?ORK TIMES. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21. 1975 'Synecdoche' Looms Large in the Jeport ever taking office as President. . Richard Helms, then the C.I.A. director, told the com- mittee that "this was a pretty all-inclusive order.. . . If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was this clay." The committee did not inter- view former President Nixon prior to this report, but it has said that it expects to. More confusion about men and motives was found in the committee's investigation of the. Castro plotting. It criticized the late Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General, for not 'condemning assassination as a technique and the use of un- derworld elemettts by Govern- ment agencies when he learned some details of these matters in May, 1962. But it also said that there was not evidence that either he ,or his brother, President Ken- nedy, had ever ordered an as- sassination attempt. It criticized Mr. Helms, Rich- ard Bissell, director of covert actions in the early 19130's, and several middle-level C.I.A. offi- cials for either misleading their superiors or not being fully can- did with them. Helms Held Not Candid , At one point, the committee called the withholding of infor- mation from Presidents Eisen- hower and Kennedy "inexcus- able." At another point it found "unpersuasive" Mr. Helms's ex- planations of why he had not been candid with then C.I.A. director John McCone. ? Among those that the C.I.A. officials ailed to inform about their plots against Prime Min- ister Castro, the report said, were the members of the War- ren Commission, which was investigating President. Kenne- dy's death. The committee said ,that even Mr. Dulles, who was la member of the commission land knew about early Castro plots, did not inform his fellow ;commission members. The commission did not spare the policy makers from criti- cism. It disclosed that early in 1961, McGeorge Bundy, then President Kennedy's assistant for national security affairs, learned about development of the capability to assassinate. "Bundy raised no objection," the report said, quoting Mr. Bissell's sworn testimony. In a footnote the committee said: "Bundy, as the national secu- rity adviser to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave mat-- ter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error." Striang Rejection The report was strong and unrelenting in stating the rea- sons. both nractical and moral, that it rejected assassination as a techniaue. "The witnesses who testified before the committee uniformly condemned assassination," the report said. "They denounced it as 'immoral. described it as impractical, and 'reminded mei that an open society. more; /thany any other, is particularly vulnerable to the risk that its, 'own leaders mav be assassin- ated.. As President. Kennedy ee,` ' By RICHARD D. LYONS. Spee!sl to Tile New York Times WASHINGTON, Nov. 20? A potential fad word, synec- doche, emerged today from the Senate intelligence com- mittee's report on alleged as- sassination plots. The word is the name for a rhetorical shortcut n which a complicated situation is referred to as briefly as pos- sible, sometimes leading to misunderstandings about ex- actly what is meant. As an example, on Page 265 of its report, the commit- tee cites the phrase "dispos- ing of Castro." which may mean either killing the Cuban leader or dislodging his re- gime. The point is that the phrase can mean different things to different people. ? Meeting Described , _ Synecdoche also may be used in the reverse, with a longer phrase taking the place of one that is shorter. One example cited was "doing something about Cas- tro," which could he taken to mean killing him. As the committee report indicated, the use of synec- doche ? it is pronounced "sin-NECK-doe-key" ? com- plicated the unraveling of who said what to whom be- cause of the ambiguities in- herent in the rhetorical tech- nique. As an ominous example Inortedly?said. 'We can't- atet. ;into that kind of thine, or we. would all be trageted.'" The committee provided thel ;most new information in jt cdesceintion of the plot to kill IMr. Ttimomba. It related bow' ',teen', concerned the United ,ea; t hi; emergence in i ithf> '-?,r clays of the Belgian; ineee,), t-te ey,s. the Eisenhower' "?rlre'nIsteation felt, a threat ofl almeet. the same marmitude as? :me Castro becanse his leader- thin tee.n losing valuable Central African resources to Communist influences. At one point, moreover, the report quotes an official who believed that Mr. Lumumba was insane. In August, 1960, Mr. Dulles ordered the killing of Mr. Lu- mumba. It was pursued later, ,although Mr. Lumumba was out of power, because the agency was convinced that his charismatic political qualities could spark the Congolese to support the Soviet Union. A great deal of the plotting involved how the United States would get Mr. Lumumba a way from the protection of United Nations forces and kill him. Two main methods of killing him were devised; one involved giving him a biological toxin selected from poisons stock- piled by the C.I.A. at the Army post at Fort Detrick, Md.. A substance was actually flown to Africa. hut never ad- ministered, according to the re- port. in another plan, the contemplated killing Mr. Lti- 2 --Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 of synecdoche, the report re- fers to a meeting in 1960 of a subcommittee of the National Security Council at which a reference was made to taking "direct positive ac- tion" against Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and Che Guevara, another of hisc hief aides. "The reference to 'direct positive action' is ambiguous and subject to different inter- pretations, including a sug- gestion that assassination be explored," the report states on Page 116. Officials of the Central In- telligence Agency were them- selves aware that such ambi- guities were causing prob- lems. In 1967 the agency's Insrector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, said in an inter- nal report dealing with assas- sination: "The point is that of fre- quent resort to synecdoche-- the mention of a part when the whole is to be under- stood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated refer- ences to phrases such as `disposing of Castro,' which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. "Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of 'doing something about Castro' when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind, is killing him. In ND/ YORK TIPSS 20 Nov. 1975 AGENT HELD ASSURED IN PLOTS ON CASTRO WASHINGTON, Nov. 19 (Reuters)?A Cuban agent for the Central Intelligence Agency who was a key figure in C.I.A. plots to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba was as- sured the operations had the backing of very high United States Government officials, Congressional sources said itoday. The sources said that investi- gators for the Senate Select !Committee on Intelligence had mumba with' a high-powered I rifle. The Congolese leader died early in 1961 at the hands of enemies in Katanga Province, and the report cited evidence that the C.I.A. had not had a role in his death. According to staff members who worked on the preparation of the report, "dozens. of areas are still under scrutiny or may provide leads for further in- vestigation. For instance, one said, there was a report that a svoinan friend of the late Sam Giancana, the Mafia leader who was involved ii, the plot against Mr. Casire, also an ac- quaintance; of President Ken- nedy's.. a situation wherein those speaking may not have ac- tually meant what they seemed to say or may not be snrprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted dif- ferently than was Intended." In the report, all the "nots" are italicized. McCone Memo The Senate committee's re- port noted that "differing perceptions between super- iors and their subordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context." It said that John McCone, the former C.I.A. director, wrote in a memorandum of April 14, 1967: ? "Through the years the Cu- ban problem was discussed in terms such as 'dispose of Castro,' remove Castro.' 'knock off Castro,' etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic re- gime. Terms such as the above appear in many work- ing papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stat- ed, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government." But the report went on to state that another former director, Richard Helms, "who' had considerable ex- perience as a covert opera- tor, gave precisely the oppo- site meaning to the same words, interpreting them as conveying authority for as- sassination." !discovered this in the course of inquiries they had been pur- suing for several months. According to the sources, the investigators had found that the agent, a Cuban Army colonel and senior adviser to Mr. Castro, was given the as- surance after he demanded' verification of C.I.A. assertions that the murder plots had been authorized at top Government levels. This assurance was conveyed -to the colonel by a man who said that he was representing Robert F. Kennedy, then At- torney General, at a secret meeting in Paris on Oct. 29, 1963, the sources said. The sources would not i'den- .tify the colonel, but said that ;he was now in a Cuban jail. I A spokesman for the Senate !committee refused to confirm or deny the account given by the sources. , " Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380'004-2 ? THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDA 1,, NOVEMBER 21, 197S p-fr-s, cr N - ?,1 AL "17 fi 'Specia: to The New lark Time, ? WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?Following ate the texts Of four sections of the report on alleged United States involi:einc/ t in assassination plots against for- eign leaders. It was relecIsed today by the Senate Intelligence Committee. jko Summary Findings ? and Conc'usions - 1..The Questions Presented The Committee sought to answer four broad questions: Assassination plots. ? Did United States officials instigate, attempt, aid', and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assas- sinate foreign leaders? Involvement in other Did United States officials assist foreign dis-e- sidents in a way which significantly. contributed to the killing of foreign. leaders? Authorization.?Where there was in- volvement by United States officials in assassination plots or other killings,' were such activities authorized and if so, at what levels of our Government? Communication and cootrol.?Even if not authorized in fart, were the assassi- nation activities perceived by those in- volved to be within the scope .of their lawful authority? If they were so per- ceived, was there inadequate control ex ercised by higher authorities over thefl agencies to prevent such misinterpre- tation? 2. Summary of Findings. and Conclusions ? on the Plots The Committee investigated alleged United States involvement in assassina- tion plots in five. foreign countriesd -Country CUBA Individual involved2 ' FIDEL CASTRO. CONGO (ZAIRE) PATIZICE LUMUMEA. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC..RAYAEI. TRUJILI.O, CHILE GENERAL RENE SCHNEIDER. SOUTH VIETNAM NGO DINH DIEM. 1 In addition to the plots discussed in the body of this report, the Commitee received some evidence of CA invokement hi plans to assassinate President Sukarno et' Indone- ? sla and "Papa Dori" Dtr.edier of Haiti. Former Deputy Director ? for Piens Rich ad Bissell testified that the a;sassinaton of Sukarno had been "contemplated" by the CIA, but that planning had proceeded no farther than identifying an "asset" wl om it wit.; believed might be recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indo- nesia, but according to Bissell, those arms were not intended ter assassination. 6/11/75. p. SOt Walter Eltlet, Illxmmtive Assistant to CIA Director John McCone, testified that the Director authori:-ed the CIA to furnish arms to dissidents Pianumn, ;he overthrow of Hailits dictator, Duvalier. Eider told the Committee that white the assassineion of Duvalier was not contemplated by the CIA, the arms were furnished "in beIe tthe dis- sidents.] tale what in?-;iseres were deei?ed necessary to taplare the govecornent", and it waa.realized teat Dhvalier might he killed in the course oit the (Elder, 8/13/75. p. 791 Asstetsination plots tur.ainst Ihe Cuban leadership SOMCHITV'S Rill pia t action against Raul Ci;stro Clic i.eir;iti South Vietnam Diems brmeer Nw) 'mb Slim was killed at the sante tune. us Diem ApproVed For ? - The evidence concerning each alleged assassination can be summarized as follows:, ?Pratriee Lumumba (Conga/Zaire).?n1 the Fall of 1930. two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lti- mumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early -11;51, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way inVolved in the killing. , Fidel Castro (Cuba).--United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American - underworld figures and Cubans .hostile to Castro were used in these plots, and were%provided encouragement and ma- terial support by the United States. Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic). ?Trujillo was shot by Dominican dis- sidents on May 31, 1961. From early in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the United State/ Government generally supported these dissidents. Some Government personnel were aware that the dissidents intended' to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There is con- flicting evidence concerning whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any of them were present at the scene.. Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam).? Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed. .on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese General's coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there is no evidence that American officials favored the as- sassination. Indeed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not part .of the General's pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and was car- ried out without United States involve- ment or support. General Rene Schneider (Chile).?On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died. of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in- Chief of the Array and a constitutiona- list opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende feorn assum- ing the office of President of Chile. The United States Government support- ed, and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financjal aid.' machine guns and other equipment to -carious nih airy figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA continued to ,support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the' record indicates that the Cl!. had witn- drawn active supperi. of the group which carried out he actual kisinap Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP7 attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was used in the. kidnapping. There is no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials speciiicaily anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction. \ Assassination capability (Executive ,action).?in addition to these five cases, the Committee has received evidence that ranking Government officials dis- cussed, and may have authori-ied, the establishment within the CIA of a gener- alized assassination capability. During these discussions, the concept of assas- sination was not affirmatively disa- vowed. ? Similarities and differences among the plots.?The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and 'none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from that, similarity, there were significant differ- ences among the plots: (I) Whether United States officials' ? initiated the plot, or were responding, . to requests of local dissidents for . aid. ? (2) Whether the plot was specifical- ly intended to kill a foreign leader, or whether the leader's death was a resOnably foreseeable consequence ' of an attempt to overthrow the government.. . The Castro and Lumumba cases are examples of plots conceived by United States officials to kill foreign leaders. In the Trujillo case, although the United States 'Government certainly op- posed his 'regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather. United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them, this country was implicated in the as- sassination, regardless of whether the weapons actoolly supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were only intended as symbols of support for the dissidents. The Schneider case differs -nom the Castro and Trujillo cases. The United States Government, with full knowledge that Chilean dissidents considered Gen- eral Schneider an obstacle to their pians. sought a coup and provided sup- port to the dissidents: However, even though the support .inciuded weapons, it appears that the intention of both the .dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct General Schneid- er, not to kill him. Similarly, in the Diem case, some United States officials wanted Diem removed and supported a coup to accomplish his removal, but there is no evidence that any of those officials sought the death of Diem him- self. 3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the issues of Authority and Control To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context two points must 730641tioadtdAbdW2is no doubt Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 that the United States Government op? posed the various leaders in question. Officials at the highest levels objected to the- Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed the accession of Allende to power ? in Chile would be harmful to American interests and thought of Lu- . mamba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities against the regimes in ques- tion. For example, the plots against Fidel Castro personally cannot be under- stood without considering the fully au- thorized comprehensive assaults upon. his regime, such as thsa Bay of Pigs .invasion in 1961 and Operation MON- GOOSE in 1962. Once methods of coercion and vi- olence are chosen, the probability ? of' loss of. life is aiweys present. There is, however, a significant difference between a coldblooded, targeted, intend tional killing of an individual foreign leader and other forms of intervening in the affairs of foreign nations. There- fore, the Committee has endeavored to explore as fully as possible the questions of how and why the plots happened, whether they were author-- ized, and if So, at what level. " The picture that emerges from the 'evidence is not a clear one. Thi S may .be due to the system of deniability 'and the consequent state Of the evidence which, even after our lona investigation, remains conflicting andr inconclusive. Or it may be that there were in fact' .serious shortcomings in the system of 'authorization so that an activity such as assassination could have been under- taken by an agency of the United States Government without express au- thority. The Committee finds that the system. of executive command and control was 'so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what levels assassination activity was known and .authorized.. This ? situation creates the disturbing' prospect that Government officials might have Undertaken the assassina- tion plots without it having been uncon- trovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the Presidents. It is also possible that there might have been a successful "plausible denial" 'in which Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured. Whether or .not p the respective Presidents knew of or authorized the plots, as chief executive officer of the United States, each must bear the ultimate responsibi- lity for the activities of his subordinates. The Committee makes four other ma- - jor findings. 1 The first relates to the Committee's inability to make a finding that the assassination plots were au- thorized by the Presidents or other persons above the governmental agency or agencies involved. The second ex- plains why certain officials ray have perceived that, according to their judg- ment and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The .third criticizes agency officials far fail- ing on several occasions to, disclose their plans and activites to superior authorities or for failing to do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth, criticizes. Administration ,officials for. not ruling out assassination, particularly after certain Administration officials had become aware of prior assassination plans and the establishment of a general assassination capability. 'The Committee's findings are elaborated' in Section IV, infra. There is admittedly a .tension among the findings. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it may be more important that there appeared to have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds of those persons. experienced in covert operations as dis- . - tinauished from those who were not. Words of urgency which may have meant killing to the former, may have. meant nething of the sort to the latter. While we are- critical of certain in- dividual actions, the Committee is also mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies on secrecy, com, partmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility. This system creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment are most necessary. Hence, before reviewing the evidence relating tosthe cases, we brief- ly deal with the general subject of covert action. IV. Findings and Conclusions In evaluating the evidence and arriv- ing at ,findings and conclusions the Committee has been guided by the *following standards. We believe these 'standards to be appropriate to the con- stitutional duty of a Congressional com- mittee. . I. The Committee is not' a court... Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future.. ? ? ? 2. It is necessary to he cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures to speak for them- selves, the conflicting and ambiguous .nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony. . 3. The Committee has tried to be' fair?to the persons involved in 'the events under examination, wh4le at the same time responding to a need to 'understand the facts in sufficemt rtail: to lay a basis for informed recommenda- ? tions. With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions. A. Findings ? Concerning the Plots Themselves ? 1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to . Assassinate. Fidel Castro and.. ? Patrice Lunrumba The Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiat- ed and participated in plots to assassi- nate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro. The plot to kill Lumumba wae con- ceive!l in the latter half of 1960 by 'officials of the United states Govern- ment, and quickly advanced to the point of 'sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination. . The effort to assassinate Castro began in, 1960 and continued until 1965. The 4 plans to assassinate Castro using poison Cigars, exploding seashells, and a con- taminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot ; involving underworld figures reached the .stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary 'to' send them into Cuba, procuring poten- tial assassins within Cuba, and ap- parently delivering the pills to the island itself. One 1960 episode involved a Cuban who initially had no intention of engaging in- assassination, but who finally agreed, at the suggestion of the CIA, to attempt to assassinate Raul Castro if the opportunity arose. In the AM/LASH operation, which extended from 1963 through 1965, the CIA gave active _support , and encouragement to a. Cuban whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and provided him with .the means of carrying out an 'assassination. 2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed as a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States ? The poisons intended for use against .Patrice Lumuinba were never admin- istered to' him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way 'involved in Lumumba's death at ,the hands of, his Congolese enemies. The efforts to assassinate Castro failed. 3. American Officials Encouraged ' or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider American officials clearly desired the 'overthrow of Trujillo, offered both en- couragement and guns to local dis- sidents who sought his overthrow and whose: plans included assassination. American officials also supplied those dissidents with pistols and rifles: American officials offered encourage- ment ,to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem'g, overthrow, and a CIA official . in Vietnam gave the generals money after, 'the coup had begun., However; Diem's assassination was, neither desired nor ? suggested by officials of the United States.' The record reveals that United States officials offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted . thekidnappindt' of General Rene. Schneider, but American officials did .not desire or encourage Schneider's death. Certain high officials did know, however, that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider. As Director Colby testified before .the Committee, the death of a foreign leader is a risk foreseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was in fact known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to as- sassinate Trujillo. The contemplation 'of coup leaders at one time to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government. While' the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned, to kidnap 'General Schneider, it, was not anticipated that he would be killed, although the possibility of his death should have been recognized . as a foreseeable risk of his kidnapping. 4. The Plots Occurred in a ? Cold War Atinosphe'e Perceived to Be of Crisis .Pioportions The Committee fuity appreciates the importance of eva!itiatin;.; the .assassina- tion plots in the h' conte::t whh- in which -aiey. occurred. In the preface, to this report, w described the percep- .ApprekVed,ForRelease--2001108/08::-/GIA-RDP77-004-32R000100380000 : . ? , A'S-proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 ;ion generally shared within the Unit- ed States during the depths of the Cold War, that our country faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed, although it does not justify thorn. Those involved nevertheless appeared to believe they were advancing the best interests of their country. 5. American Officials Had. Exaggerated Notions About. Their Ability- to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders Running throughout the cases consid- ered in this report vias the expectation. of American officials that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were supporting in -foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United ?States had .no such power: This , point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup irt? Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge' cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from William Bundy in response stated that "we cannot accept conclu- sion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later. . Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs; CIA Headquarters request- ed operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." ? The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government. 6. CIA Official Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in - Assassination Efforts Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had . expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens. . Foreign citizens with criminal back- grounds were also used by the CIA. in two other cases that we have re- -viewed. In the development of he Execu- tive Action capability, one foreign na- tional with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety of purpos- es, including assassination, if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case; two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo. B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots ? Themselves I. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination We condemn the use of assassination as a tool of foreign .policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Commit- tee by witnesses with extensive expe- rience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral pre- cepts fundamental to our way of life. In addition to moral considerations, there were several practical reasons. advanced for not assassinating foreign leadei . These reasons are discussed: in the section of this report. recommend- Approved. For ink a statute making assassination a crime. ? (a) Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States anti Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow .Local Governments Two of the five principal cases inves- tigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leadere (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by Ameri- can officials. Thrae of the cases (Trujil- lo, Diem, and Schneider) involved kill- ings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassi- nation was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and in the degree , the coups were motivated by United States officials. ? ? The Committee concludes that target-. ed assassinations instigated by the Unit- ed States must be prohibited. Coups involve varying degrecs of risk of assassination. The pi.iss hilt ty of assassination in coup attempts is one of, the issues to be considered in determining the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particular- ly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect. This country was created by violent revolt against a regime be4ved to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) re- ceived aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule Out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants. But passing be- yond that principle, there remain serious questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved: whether any such support should be overt : rather than covert; what tactics should be used: and how such actions should be author- ized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government. The Committee believes that its recommendations on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of covert action in general. (h) The Setting in Which the 'Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them - The Cold -War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find three prin- cipal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justified the assassination plots: First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases *studied, Castro alone posed a physical threat to the United States, but then only. during the period of the Cuban missile crisis, and assassination was not advanced by policymakers as a? possible course of action. during the . ? Second. we reject absolutely any no- tion that the United States should justi- fy its actions by the standards of totali-', tarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend ? our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending. Third, such activities almost inevitably become known. The damage to Ameri- can foreign policy, to the good vi,me and reputation of the United s.atea REfferS 21) if/ otrf c rC PA?- ti -14120 and support of our government and its foreign policy is incalculable. This last point?the undermining of the American public's confidence in its. government?is the most damaging con- sequence of all. Two documents which have been sup- plied to the Committee graohi..ehy dem- onstrate attitudes which can Lid to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend. The first document was written in 1954 by a special committee formed to advise the President on covert activi- ties. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than (those) employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of Ameri- can fair play must be reconsidered."1 'The full text of the passage is as follows: "" another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, pelltienl, and paramilitary organization far more effectiyg,? more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the eifenw. Na one should he permitted to stand in the was, of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish- ment of this mission. "Tite second consideration, it is new clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto accept. able norms of.human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long standing Amer- ican concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered." . Although those proposals did not in- volve assassinations, the attitudes un- derlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots were con, ceiVed. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117). We do not think ? that traditional American. notions of fair play peed be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well he ourselves that we injure most we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy." A second document which represents an., attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo ip- the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Pa- trice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division re- commended a particular agent ? WI/ ROGUE?because: He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appro- priate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. The Committee finds this rationaliza- tion is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation. 2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures . for Their Criminal Talents We conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figuures for their criminal talents-2 in carrying out Agency operations. In addi- tion to the corrosive effect upon our government,3 the use of underworld figures* involves the following dangers: . a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the figures in- volved in the Castro assassination operation used their involvement* with the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIA also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges brought in a foreign. tribunal. against QS/VithI. 2 Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencks, we reserve jwtgment on the use at hiny-u criminals as intormants. We are concerned 320iod9t?eadbbr2?f persons known. to Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 be actively engaged in criininal pursuits fort their expertise in carrying out criminal acts. ' The corrosive effect of dealing with un- derworld figures is graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his pro- fessional life to fighting organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating ? with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.' In May. 1962. the Attorney General iearned - that the operation?which was described to him as terminated?had involved assassina- tion. According to a CIA witness, the Attor- ney General was angered by the report and told those briefing him that be must be consulted before underworld figures were Used again. Fie did not, however, direct that underworld figures must never again be used. b. The use of persons experienced in criminal techniques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likeli- hood that criminal acts will occur.' Sometimes agents in the field are neces- sarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper activities is increased . when persons oi' criminal background are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take advantage of their criminal skills or contacts? ? c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become an un- witting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advan- tage of their association with the government to advance their -own projects and interests. d. There is a fundamental impropriety. in ,selecting persons because they are' skilled at performing deeds which the, laws of our society forbid. The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for their 'criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Jus- 'dee Brandeis in a different context Este decades ago: . Our government is the potent, the om- nipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government be- comes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law ?unto himself. To declare that in the admin-' istration of the criminal law the end justifies: the means?to declare that the Government. may commit crimes in order to secure the' conviction of the private criminal?e7ould4, bring terrible retribution. Against that per-. nicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. [Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 439 485 (1927)] e. The spectacle of the Government consorting with criminal elements de- stroys respect for government and law. and undermines the viability of demo- cratic institutions. C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Control In the -introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and ' explains those conclusions. The Committee analyzed the question - of authorization for the assassination ? activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether offi- cials in policymaking positions author, ized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee in- quired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their s'uperiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove. . No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed in this report were authorized at the highest 'levels of the government. However the record is 'unclear and serious doubt i remains concerning whether assassina- tion was authorized by the respective Presidents. Even if the plots were not; expressly authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel believed they, were acting improperly. 1. The Apparent Lack of Accountability in the Command and Control System Was Such That the Assassination Plots Could Have Been Undertaken-Without Express Authorization As emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning who authorized the assassi- nation plots. Even after our long investi- gation it is unclear whether the conflict- ing and inconclusive state . of .the evidence is due to the system of-plausi- ble deniai or there were, in fact, serious shortcomings in the system of authori- zation which made it possible for assas- sination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials above those agencieaa- lAs noted above, there? are also certain inherent limitations in the extensive record, compiled by the Committee. Many years have paSsed, several of the key figures are dead, and while we have been assured by the present Administration that all the rele-? vant evidence has been produced, it is al- ways possible that other more conclusive' material exists, but has not been found. Based on the record of our investiga- tion, the Committee finds that the sys- tem .of Executive command and con- trol was so inherently ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination activity was known and authorized. This creates the disturb- ing prospect that assassination -activity might have been undertaken by officials of the United States Government with- out its having been incontrovertibly . clear that there was explicit authoriza- tion from the President of the United States. At the same time, this ambiguity and imprecision leaves open the possibl- ity that there was a successful "plaus- ible denial" - and that a Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured. , ? ; 'Whether or not .assassination was authorized by a President of the United. States, the President as the chief execu- tive officer of the United States Govern- ment must take ultimate responsibility for major activities during his Adminis- tration. Just as these Presidents must be held accountable, however, their subordinates throughout the Govern- ment had a concomitant duty to fully disclose their plans and activities. As part of their responsibility, these Presidents had a duty to determine the nature of major activities and to prevent undesired activities from taking place. This duty was particularly com- pelling when the Presidents had reason ,to believe that major undesired activi- ties had previously occurred or were being advocated and might occur again. Whether or not the Presidents in fact knew about the assassination plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that the Presidents should have known .about the plots. This sets a demanding standard, but One the Com- mittee supports. The future. of democra- cy rests upon such accountability. 2? Findings Relating to the Level ? at 4,Vhich the Plots Wcre A(11..itt)11 (hrii;end We find that neither the President '? nor any other offisial in the United , States Government .authoriied the as-. 6 ni s aneci. to . saSsination. of Diem and his brother NW. Both the the DCI and top State Department officials did know, howev- er, that the death of Nhu, at least' at one point, had been contemplated by the coup leaders. But when the possibility that the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part- in such activity, and there is some evidence that this information was relayed to the coup leaders. (b) Schneider We. find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the as- sassination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House did know that coup leaders contemplat- ed 4 kidnapping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.. - (c) Trujillo The .Presidents and other senior offi- cials: in the Eisenhower lind Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved or condoned actions to obtain that end. The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents viewed the removal of Trujillo as criti- cal to any plans to overthrow his regime and that they intended to assassinate Trujillo if given th,e opportunity. It is uncertain precisely when officials at higher levels of government with responsibility for . formulating policy learned that the dissidents equated as- sassination with overthrow. Clearly by early May 1961 senior American offi- cials, including 'President Kennedy, knew that the dissidents intended to aSsassinate Trujillo The White House and State Department, as well as the CIA, knew that the United States had aovided the dissidents with rifles and pistols and that the dissidents had rquested machine guns which they in- tended to use in connection with an assassination effort. Thereafter, on May 16, 1961 President Kennedy ap- proved National Security Council re- commendations. that the United States not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo until it was known what government would succeed the dictator. That recom- mendation was consistent with earlier attempts initiated by the CIA to discour- age - the planned assassination and -thereby avoid potential problems from a power vacuum which might arise. After deciding to discourage the planned assassination, the .DCI directed that the machine guns not be passed to the Dominican dissidents. That policy was reconfirmed by the. State Depart- ment, the Special Group, and, in a . cable of May 29, 1961, by President Kennedy himself. The- day before the assassination, President Kennedy cabled the State Department representative in the Domi-? nican Republic that the United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination." However, the cable also stated that if the dissidents planning the imminent assassination of Trujillo succeeded, and thereby estab- lished. a provisional government, the United States would recognize and sup- port them. The: President's cable has been con- strued in several ways. One reading stresses the President's opposition to assassination "as a metier of general ? policy." Another stresses those portions of the cable which discuss pragmatic rilatsers, including the risk ? that the 'United St ,l tes involvement might be. expos'ed, and " suggests that the last note te .egrarn wa P_Pro.,vvicj to_r_Rigg.?? 20 01)08/0 4.:_:',...PIATRPR77-00432R00010038000.0 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 a chai-ge that the United States shared responsibility for the assassination. A third ? construction would be that both of the 'prior readings are correct and that they are not mutually exclusive.. However the cable is construed, its ambiguity illustrates the difficulty of seeking objectives which can only be accomplished by force?indeed, perhaps only by the assassination of a leader? and yet not wishing to take specific actions which seem abhorrent. (c1) Lumumba The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong, enough to permit a reasonable inference that . the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by .President Eisehhowe er. Nevertheless, there is enough coon- tervrtiling testimony by Eisenhower Ad-- ministration officials and enough ambi- guity and lack Of clarity in the records. of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that the President intended an assassin- ation.effort against Lumumba. Itis clear that the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, authorized an assassination plot. There is, however, no evidence of? United States involve- ment- in bringing about the death of Lumumba at the hands of Congolese authorities.. , Strong expressions of hostility toward Lumtimba from the President and his National Security Assistant, followed immediately by CIA steps in furtherance of an assassination operation against Lumumba, are part of a sequence of events that, at the least, make it appear that Dulles believed assassination was a perinissible means of complying with pressure from the President to remove Lumumba from the political scene. Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have or- dered Lumumba's assassination at ' an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authoriza-. tion: His testAmony, however, should be read in light of the fact that NSC records during this period do not make- clear 'whether or not the President or- ? dered Lumumba's assassination and the fact- that others attending those meet- ingS testified that they did not recall hearing such a Presidential order.. Richard Bissell assumed that Pres- idential authorization for assassinating Lumumba had been communicated to him by Dulles, but Bissel had no specific recollection concerning when that com- munication occurred. The impression shared by the Congo Station Officer and the DDP's Special Assistant Joseph Scheider that the President authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba was derived solely from conversations Scheider had with Bissell and Bronson Tweedy. However, the impression. thus ' held by Scheider and the Station Officer does not, in itself, establish Presidential authorization because neither Scheider nor the Station Officer had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements 'about Presidential authorization, and be- cause -Scheider may have misconstrued .Bissell's reference to "highest authority." (e) Castro There was insufficient evidence from which the Committee could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assas- sination Of Castro.. The assassination plots against Castro.' were clearly authorized at ;east through the ievel of DDP. We also find that. DCI Allen Dulles approved "thorough conaidendion" nf the "elimination" o; Castro. Rh-titer, it is also likely that: Dulles knew about and authr sized the ' actual plots that occurred nuring his tenure. Bissell and Edwards testified that they had briefed Dulles (and Cabell) on the plot involving underworld figures "circutnlocutiously," but that they were certain that he had understood that the plot involved assassination. Their testimony is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the plot to assassi- nate Lumumba which was being planned at the same time, and which also in- volved Bissell. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with Mc- . Cone and was never expressly author- ized by anyone to assassinate Castro. The only suggestion of express Pres- idential authorization for the plots against Castro Was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have in-, formed Presidents Eisenhower and Ken- nedy by circumlocution only after the assassination had been planned and was underway. The assumptions under- lying this opinion are too attenuated 'for the Committee to adopt it as a finding. First, this assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plot, a matter which is not entirely certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two 'Presidents?a course of action. which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell,' testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily as- sumes that the Presidents would under- stand from a "circumlocutious" descrip- tion that assassination was being dis- cussed. In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy, the Committee makes no find- ing implicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they served never asked them to consider assassina- tion. There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson. knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency. 3. CIA Officials Involved in the As.sascination Operations Perceived . Assassination to Have Been a Permissible Course of Action The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts testified that they had believed that their activi- ties had been fully authorized.' 'The lower level operatives, such as the AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section. since they had clear orders from their immediate superiors within the CIA. In the case of the Lumumba assassin- ation operation, Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in the Agency. . In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they be.lieved the operation involving underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot. had been initiated. William Harvey testi lied he believed that tire plots 'were completely authorized at every appri,- priate level within and beyond the Agency." although he had "no irrsoiml nels through which such authority may have passed." Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been au- thorized "from the highest level," and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immedate su- perior. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed: * that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's gov- ernment in Cuba, that they were what we had been asked to do. * *" In other words. we had been asked to get rid of Castro and * * there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time. The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials testified that they believed the effort to. assassinate Castro to have been within the parame- ters-of permissible action. But Adminis- tration officials responsible for formu- lating policy, including McCone, testi- .fied that they were net ,aware of the effort and did not authorize it: The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthroiving the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders. The various Presidents and their sen- ior advisors strongly opposed the re- gimes of Castro and Trujillo, the acces- sion ?to power of Allende, and the potential influence of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against thoSe foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example, President Nix- on's orders to prevent Allende from assuming power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day." Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort against Cuba as "a combat situation," and Attorney General Kennedy empha- sized that "a solution to the Cuba problem today carries top priority." Helms testified that the pressure to "get rid of Castro and the Castro re- gime". was intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to "get off your ass about Cuba." ? It is possible that there was a failure of 'communication between policymak- ers and the agency personnel who were experienced in secret, and often violent., action, Although policymakers testified that assassination was not in- tended by such words as "get rid of Castro." Some of their subordinates in the Agency testified that they per- ceived that assassination was desired and that they should proceed without troubling their superiors. The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations appropriately ob- served: The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche?the mention of a part when the whole is to be uncierstOod, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that. it be read in the broader figural sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, -we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Cask" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situaticin? wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said What they, actuall4 meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended. Differing perceptions. between supe- riors and their subordinates were grr.,ph;- catty illustrated iti the Castro contxt.' McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows: Through the years the Cuban problen was Icnowledge whatever of the aulaae; discussed in terms such as ."dispose. of , , , Castro, remove castro, . knock off . Approved 'For Release 2001/08/08 :.CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 . . . identities times exact worde -or ? It 4% Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist governmen in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to change in the Cuban government.2 . Senator MATHIAS. Let me draw an ex- ample from history. When Thomas Becket Was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, _the King said. "who will rid me of this troublesome priest?" He didn't say, "go out and murder him". He said, "who will rid me of this man." and let it go at that. Mr. HELMS. That is a Warming reference to the problem. Senator MATHIAS. You feel that spans the generations and the centuries? Mr. HELMS. I think it does, sir. Senator MATHIAS. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might he taken by the Director or by anybody else as presidential authoriza- tion to go forward? Mr. HELMS. That is right. But in answer to that. I realize that one sort of, grows up' in tradition of the time and I think that any 'of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a ,President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office. 2 It should be noted, however, that this memorandum was prepared several years after the assassination plots when -a news- paper article alleged CIA involvement in attemeis on Castro's life. Helms, who had considerable expe- rience as a covert operator, gave pre- cisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them, as conveying' authority for assassination. .Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was un- necessary for the assassination of Cas- tro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as provid- ing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director." Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and Helms' assistant George McManus, testified that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous ,words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have re- sulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an acade- mician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were expe- rienced in covert operations.' Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administra- tion officials with no covert operation ex- perience. construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret them. The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was within the range of permissible activity was. reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level, and by the failure of the succeS- sive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section. , 4. The Failure in Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge of the Assassination Operation and Their Superiors in . the Agency and in the Administration Was Due to: (A) The Failure of Subordinates to. Disclose Their Plans and Operations to Their Superiors; and (B) the Failure of Superiors in the Climate of Violence and Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations to Rule Out Assassination as a Tool of Foreign Policy; to Make Clear to Their Subordinates That Assassination Was Impermissible; or to Inquire Further After Receving Indications That It Was Being Considered . While we cannot find that officials _responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassina- tion attempts (with the possible excep- tion of the Lumumba case), agency operatives at least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassin- ation to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcus- able in light of the gravity of assassina- tion. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their Supe- riors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration offi- cials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency, and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activi- ties that they did authorize. (a) Agency Officials Failed on Several Occasions to Reveal the Plots to Their Superiors, or to Do so With Sufficient Detail and Clarity Several of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their activities. (i) Castro The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassina- tion efforts against Castro is particular- ly troubling. On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the Com- mittee, it is not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation. The plot continued into McCOne's term, apparently without McCone's or the Administration's knowledge or appro- val. On some occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against Castro, he either failed to inform them, failed to do so clearly, or misled them. Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about the assas- sination operation using underworld fig- ures, but that they did so "circumlocu- tiously", and then only after contact had been made with the underworld and a price had been offered for Cas- tro's death. ? Perhaps Bissell should have checked back with Dulles at an earlier stage after having received approval to give "thorough consideration" to Castro's "elimination" from Dulles in Deceinbc 1959. Bissell further testified that he nevee. raised the issue of assassination with"' non-CIA officials of either the Eisen- hower or Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally .have had no duty to discuss the matter with these Presidents. or other Administration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have "circumlocutiously" spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was inexcusable to with- hold such information from those re- sponsible for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they might have been "circumlocutiously" informed by Dulles. I 'Even assuming that Bissell correctly per- ceived that Dulles understood the nature of the operation, it was also inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further, even if one accepts Bis- sell's assumption that Dulles told the Presi- dents, they would have been told too late because Bissell "guessed" they would have been told that the operalion "had been planned and was being attempted." The failure either to inform those officials or to make certain that they had been informed by Dulles was partic- ularly reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to do so Was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell met with. Bundy and discussed the develop- ment of an assassination capability within CIA?Executive Action. But Bis- sell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Ken- nedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but he testified that he .did not inform the Board of the assassination opera- tion. 2 As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assas- sination operation that was underway. Dulles himself may not have always been candid. On December 11, 1959, he approved the CIA's giving "through consideration to the elimination of Fidel Castro," but told the Special Group in a meeting the following month that "we do not have in mind the quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposi- tion leaders to get a foothold." 2Dulles was also a member,of the Board. The failures to make forthright disclo- sures to policy-makers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation (when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cnba) was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May 1962 the At- torney General was told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pies. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, lcnow that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active witen he learreci that the Attor- 1A-5pMed.f4oTRelease 2001108/08 : ClAfRDP77-00432R000100380004-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 ney General had been. misled. Helms' did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1963, and did so then' in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination effort in response to Sec- retary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms conceded, not factual. When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots. he apparently de- scribed the activities that had occuriaal during prior administrations but did Mt describe the AM/LASH operation which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked.) ? Sohn McCone was Director of the CIA' and at least knew about the pre-Bay of Pigs plot during the Warren Commission's Inquiry. McCort:: failed to disclose the. plot to the Commission. Allen Dulles was on the Warren Commission. He did not inform the other members about the plots that had ? occurred during his term as DCI. Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the assassination oper- ation with McCone or other Kennedy Administration officials because of the sensitivity of the matter, because he had assumed that the project had been _previously authorized, and because the aggressive character of the -Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime led him to believe that 'assassination was permissible, even though he did not receive an express instruction to that effect. He added that he had never been convinced that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go anyplace." Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them were reasons why he should have specifically raised the matter with higher authority. As Helms himself testi- fied, assassination was of a high order of sensitivity. Administration policyma- kers, supported by intelligence esti- mates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized on several occasions that successors to -Castro might be worse than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group (Augmented) required that plans for covert actions 'against -Cuba be submitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have undertaken so drastic an operation without making certain that there was full and unequivocal permission to proceed. ? William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been fully apthorized by the previous Director, because he was un- certain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because he believed that it was not his duty to inform higher authorities. Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba. Harvey reported directly to General Lansdale and the Soecial Group (AugmenZed). The Special Group (Aug- mented) had made it known that covert operations in Cuba should be first ap- proved by it, both by explicit instruction and by its practice tnat particular operas . tions be submitted in "nauseating de- tail." Yet Harvey did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group (Augmented) of the assassination opera- tion, either when he was explicitly -requested to report to McCone, General Taylor, and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April 1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval. Harvey testified that a matter as sensitive as assassination would never be raised in a gathering as large as the Special Group (Augmented). The Committee finds the reasons ad- vanced for not having informed those responsible for formulating policy about the assassination operation inadequate, misleading and inconsistent. Some offi- cials viewed assassination as too impor- tant and seneitive to discuss with supe- riors, while others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not ..uff'xiently advanced; but too late to cell him about it in August 1962, since by that time Harvey had decided to terminate it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure Was someone else's responsi- bility; Bissell said he thought it was up to Dulles, and Harvey believed it was up to Helms. The Committee concludes that the failure to clearly inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Cas- tro was grossly improper. The Commit- tee believes that it should be incumbent on the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might ?be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform- his superiors. . (ii) Trujillo In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that poli- cymakers were not given sufficient in- formation, or were not informed in a timely. fashion. At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Spe- cial Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some deci- sive stroke against Trujillo himself." At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the pas- sage of "limited supplies of small arms and other materials" to Dominican dis- sidents under certain conditions. , At this time, the fact that the dis- sidents had been contemplating the as- sassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at least through the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the internal State Department memorandum which was furnished to Undersecretary Living- ston Merchant, and which was said to have been the basis for the Special Group's agreeing to the limited supply of small arms and other material (i.e., explosive devices), did not mention as-? sassination. Instead, it spoke of "sabo- tage potential" and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [government] by any such minor meas- ure Ens the supplying of small arms and explosives3." At a meeting ? of the Special Group on February 14, 1961, representatives of the CIA' briefed the new members of the Group on outstanding CIA projects. The Dominican Republic was one of the briefing topics. The minutes of that meeting indicate that Mr. b?indy requested a memorandum for "higher authority" on the subject of what plans could be made for a successor govern- ment to Trujillo. Bissell had no clear recollection as to the details of the February 14 briefing and was unable to recall whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was discussed. It is not known, therefore, whether the new members of the Special Group learned, at that time, of Bissel's assessment that overthrow of the regime required a decisive stroke against Trujillo him- self. Robert McNamara recalled no men- tion at that meeting of any dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo. On February 15 and 17, 1961, memo- randa were prepared for the President by Secretary of State Rusk and by Richard Bissell respectively. Although both the Department of State and the CIA then had information concerning the dissidents' intent to aseassinate Tru- jillo if possible, neither memorandum referred to such a contingency. Rusk disclaimed any knowledge of the dis- sidents, intent to assassinate Trujillo until shortly before the event occurred, but Bissell admitted personal awareness of the assassination plans. Bissell's February 17 memorandum indicated that dissident leaders had informed the CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could be imple- merited if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and re- mote control detonation devices." Vari- ous witnessess testified that supplying arms for 300 men would: standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" -use for the arms. One possible method of assassin- ating Trujillo which had long been discussed by the dissidents and which was the favored approach at the time .of Bissell's memorandum envisioned as- sassination by means of a bomb deto- nated by remote control. but the mem- orandum made no reference to the use to which the explosive devices might be put. (There is no record of any query from recipients of the brief- ing paper as to the nature of the dissidents' "plan of action" or the uses for which the arms and explosives were intended.) The passage of athe carbines was approved by CIA Headquarters on March 31, 1961: Although the State Department's representative in the Dominican Republic concurred in the. decision to pass the carbines, he was requested by the CIA not to communi- cate this information to State Depart- ment officials in Washington, and he complied with that request. According- ly, neither the State Department nor the White House was aware or the passage for several weeks. Similarly, there was no contemporaneous disclo- sure outside the CIA, other than to the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic, that machine guns had been sent to the Dominican Republic via the diplomatic pouch. A mernorandum prepared by Adolph Berle, ' the State Department official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine guns, states that "on cross-examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Truijillo and they wanted guns for that purpose." (Berle, Memorandum of Conversation, 5/3/61) Berle's memorandum states that he informed the CIA officials that "we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time." The CIA official reportedly said he felt the same way, even though on the previous day he had been one of the signers of a draft CIA cable which would have permitted passage of the machine guns to the for ". . . their additional protaleceat on their proposed endeavor.'' (Draft Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 HQs to Station Cable, 5/2/61). Although the report of a new anti- Trujillo plot was discussed at a meeting of the Special Group on May 4, 1961, there is no indication that Berle, who was the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Task Force having responsibility for contingency planning for Cuba, the Do- minican Republic, and Haiti, disclosed to higher authority the assassination information which he discovered by "cross-examination." The National Se- curity Council met the next day and noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before it was known what government would succeed him. That national Security Council Record of Action was approved by the President on May 16, 1961. There is no record indicating whether Berle communieated to the President, or to members of the National Security Coun- cil, his knowledge as to the lethal intent of the dissidents who would be carrying out the overthrow of Trujil- lo. (iii) Schneider The issue here is not whether the objec- tives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that President Nixon desired to prevent Al- lende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter of principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics. The rec- ord indicates that up to October 15 they were: after October 15 there is some doubt. The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines' calendar shows at least one White House con- tact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on Oc- tober 22. However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA files? when contrasted with several such . memoranda describing contacts with the White House between September 15 and October 15?may suggest a lack of sig- nificant communication on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House. The standards applied within the CIA . itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes, called for top- ? level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent' Allende from assuming power. ? Machine guns were sent to chile and delivered to mill- ? lary figures there on the authority of rhiddle level CIA officers without con- sultation even with. the CIA. officer. in charge of the program. We find no .suggestion of bad faith in the action of the middle level officers, hut their fail- ur:e to consult necessarily establishes that there Was no advance permission from outside the CIA -for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an unduly lax attitude within the CIA toward consultation with superiors. Fur- ther, this case demonstrates the prob- lems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert op- erations' without specifying which ac-- tons - are permissible and wh'ch are.. ! , not, and without adequately supervising" and monitoring these activities. ? I (b) Administration Officials ,Failed to-Rule Out Assassination .-as a' Tool Of Foreign Policy, to Make Clear to Their Subordinates , . That Assassination Was Impermissible or to Inquire. Further After Receiving Indications That, Assassination Was Being Considered ? While we do not find that high Ad- ministration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nev- ertheless -perceived assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials were remiss in net seeking ex- press authorization for their activitieso their superiors were also at fault- for: giving vague inseructions and for not explicitly rul:ng ? out assassination. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued by Director Helms. (i) Trujillo Immediately following the assassina- tion of 'Trujillo, there were a number of high-level meetings about the Domin- ican Republic attended by the policy- makers of the Kennedy Administration. 'All 'relevant facts concerning CIA and State Department support of the Domin-, ican dissidents were fully known. No di- rective was issued by the President or the Special Group criticizing any aspect of United States involvement in the Dominican affair. Similarly, there is no record of any action having been taken prohibiting future support or encourage- ment of groups or individuals known to .be planning the assassination of a for- eign leader. The meetings and discus- sions following the Trujillo assassination ..iepresent another missed opportunity to establish ? art administration policy against assassination and may partially account for the CIA's assessment of the 'Dominican operation as a suctess a few, ?years later. They may also have encour- aged Agency personnel, involved in both :the Trujillo and the Castro plots, in their belief, that the. Administration: would not be unhappy if the Agency were able to make Castro disappear. No 'euCh claim, .however, was made in tes- timony 'hy, any Agency official. OD Schneider As explained above, there is no evi- dence that assassination was ever pro- posed -as a method of carrying out the Presidential order to, prevent Allende .from assuming office. The Committee believes, however; that ?the granting of carte blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to assigning an im- practical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably short time. Apart from the question of whether any interven- tion in Chile was justified under the' circumstances of this case, the Commit- tee believes that the Executive in any .event should have defined the limits of, permissable action., . -(iii) Lumumba . We are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally au- thorized an assassination effort against .Lumumba due to the lack of absolute .certainty in the evidence. However, it .appears that the strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and. NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings, led Dulle3 to believe tlmt as-.! eassination was desired. The m.nutes contain language concerning the r.-!ed; , to "disrose of' h Lumumlea, an "extrernelyi 10 :strong. feeling 'about the neceSsity for ..straightforward action," and a refusal .rule out any activity that might con- tribute t6-"getting rid of" Lumumba. ' ? ? ? (iv) Castro ,The efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro tooloplace in an atmosphere of extreme .pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy. ':Administration officials to discredit and i.overthrow the Castro regime. Shortly halter Castro's ascendancy to power. lAlleri :Dulles directed that "thorough consideration" be given to the "elimina-. tion' of 'Castro. Richard 'Helms recalled .'th'at:' ? - ? I remember vividly [that the* pressure) was ;verY intense. And therefore, when you go "into the record,- you find a lot of nutty ',,schemps there and those nutty schemes were, .borne of the. intensity .of the pressure. And . - we were quite frustrated, :Bissell *ailed that: During that entire period, the Administra- tion was extremely sensitive about the defeat .that had been inflicted, as they felt, on the -U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, andcwere pursuing every possible means of getting rid of Castro. ? :Another CIA Official stated that some- . tiine in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was: * * chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and. 'the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about ,getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime. "General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation MONGOOSE that "you're in a combat situation where ? we have been given full command." Secretary of Defense McNamara con- firmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated vio- ? lent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was' a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. ' Thereafter, Attorney. General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group .(Augmented) that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top prior- ity .* no time, money, effort?or manpower is to be spared."' &Apse; quently, Operation MONGOOSE in- volved propaganda and sabotage opera- tions aimed toward spurring a revolt of the 'Cuban people against Castro. Meas: ures which were considered by the top pblicymakers included incapacitating sugar workers during harvest season by the use of.chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging mer- chandise in third countries?even those? allied with -the United States?prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming 'in- surgents on the island. Programs under- taken at the urging of the Administra- ? tion included intensive efforts to recruit and arm dissidents within Cuba, and. raids. ?on plants, mines, and harbors. . Consideration and approval of these measures may understandably have led the CIA to conclude that violent actions were an acceptable means of accom-, plishing important objectives. 'The Attorney General himself took a pr- sena! interest in the recruitment and deel- opment of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban.exiles active in the covert war against the Catstro Government. ,Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might well have contri- buted to the perception of some CIA officials that assassination was a per- missible tool in the effort to overthrow the Castro Regime. At a Special Group meeting in. November 1960, Undersei. re- tary Mercl,ant inquired 1:vhe.ther my ,Aannin,q- had been undertaken for "di- rect positive action" against Che Guava- Apprw4d,V=e-r-Release 2-001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 ra, Raul Castro, and Fidel Castro.sCabell replied that such a capability did not exist, but he might well have left the meeting with the impression that assas- sination was not out of bounds. Lands- dale's plan, which was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962. aimed at inducinc, "open revolt and overthrow of the inducing "open regime." Included in its final phase an ,''attack on the cadre of -the regime, including key leaders." The proposal stated that "this should be a 'Special Target' opera- tion a Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential against police " Although Lans- dale's proposal was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was not formally ruled out. Minutes from several Special Group meetings contains language such as "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene." ? On several occasions, the subject of assassination was discussed in the pres- ence of senior Administration officials; Those officials never consented to ac- tual assassination efforts, but they .failed to indicate that :,ssassination was impermissible as a matter of prin- ciph.s. . In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability. to. assassinate. Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative.' Bissell stated that he did not construe Bundy's re- s./narks as authorization for the under- world ;plot against Castro that was then underway. But the fact that he believed that the development of an assassination capability had, as he sub- sequently told Harvey, been approved - by the White House, may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited.' The Inspector General's Report states. that Harvey's notes (which no longer exist) quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey "The White House has twice urged me to create such a capability.'.' 2 Bundy, as the National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such .a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a cap- ability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error. Documents received by the Committee indicate that in May 1961, Attorney General Kennedy and the Director . of the FBI received information that the. CIA was engaged in clandestine efforts ,against Castro which included the use of Sam G?iancana and other underworld -figures. The various documents referred to "dirty business," "clandestine efforts," and -"plans" which were still "working" and might eventually "pay off!' The Committee is unable to determine wheth- er Hoover- and the Attorney General ever inquired into the nature of the CIA operation, although there is no evidence that they did so inquire. The Committee believes that they should have inquired, and that their failure ? to do -so was a dereliction of their duties. ? Documents indicate that in May 1962, AttorneY General Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought:to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. Accord- ing? to the CIA officials who were present at the briefing, the Attorney General indicated his displeasure about lack of consultation rather than about the impropriety of the attempt itself. There is no evidence that the Attorney General. told the CIA that it must not engage in assassination plots in the future. At u meeting of the Special Group ? (Augmented) in Aughst 1962, well after the assaseination efforts were under-. ? way, Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of whether the as- sassination of Cuban leaders should :be explored, and General Lansdale is- sued an action memorandum assigning' the CIA the task of preparing contin- gency plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testi- mony and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any event, ?McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination, within the Agency. ' ? One of the programs forwarded- to. General Lansdale- by the Defense Department in the MONGOOSE program: was entitled "Operation Bounty" ? and' envisioned dropping- leaflets in Cuba offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders. Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indi- cates that persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assassina- tion might be permissible. While the ambivalence of Administra- tion officials does not excuse the mis-: leading '-conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to seek explicit permission, ? this attitude displayed an insufficient concern about assassina- tion 'which may have Contributed ? to the perception that assassination- was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's general objectives. Moreover, with the exception of the tight guidelines issued by the Special Group (Augmented) concerning Opera- tion MONGOOSE, precise ? limitations. were never imposed on the CIA requir- ing prior, permission for the details of. other proposed covert' operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assassina- tion was promulgated until Helms' intra- agency order in 1972. Considering the number of times the subject of assassi- :nation had arisen. Administration offi- cials were remiss in not explicitly for- bidding such activity. The committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible. For example, when Bissell spoke with. Bundy about an Executive Action capa- bility, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination as a tactic. .In May .1962, the Attorney General was misleadingly told about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney' General, however, did not state that assassination was improper. When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassi- nation should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination opera- tion should have been revealed. A firm written order against engaging in assas- sination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified. he had exhibited strong :'version to assassina, tion. 5. Practices Current at the Time i ? nWhich the Assassination Plots -. Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Solei Judgment Were Most, Necessary Various witnesses described elements c;f the system within which the assassin- ation plots were conceived. The Com- mittee is disturbed by the custom that Permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We view the folfowing points as particu- larly dangerous: (11 The expansion ? of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intend- ed purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other coun- ties- into an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence responsibility, for certain operations, (2) The use of circuuilocution or euphemism to describe serious matters ?such as assassination?when precise meanings ought to be made clear. (3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weap- ons. " . (4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one DCI. or one Administration could be presumed to continue without the neces- sity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials. (5) The creation of covert capabili. ties without careful review and authorf- zation by policymakers, and the further risk that such capabilities, once created,. Might be used without speeific authori- zation.. ? (a) The Danger Inherent in- -- Overextending the Doctrine of - 'Plausible Denial" The original concept of "plausible denial" envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to con- ceal American involvement if the ac- lions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as .big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's investigation of assassination and the public disclosures which preceded the .inquiry demonstrate that when the Unit- ed States resorted to cloak-and-dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed. We were particularly disturbed to find little evidence that the risks and conse- quences of disclosure were considered. We find that the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their deci- sions will never be revealed. Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of. plausible denial?a purpose which intends to conceal United States involvement from the outside World? the extension of the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of -the decision-making process is an invita- tion to error, an abdication of responsi- bility, and a perversion of democratic government. The doctrine is the antithe- sis of accountability. (b) The danger of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism" According to Richard Bissell, the ex- tension of "plausible denial" to inter- ApprovedFor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4RDP7743432ROOV10038015d42n te4uiLe'l :the use Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 of circumlocution and etiphertilim in speaking with Presidents and other sen- ior officials. . Explaining till's concept Only heightens, its absurdity. On the one hand, it as- sumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes' out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way 'of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence,' tthe theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate offi- cials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language: superiors are entitled to, and should demand, no less. 'Euphemism may actually have been 'preferred?not because of "plausible denial"?but because the persons in- -volved could not"?bring themselves to state .in plain language what they in- tended to. do. In some instances,, moreover, subordinates may have as- sumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors . did not want the isstie-squarely placed before -them.-"As- sassinate," "murder" and "kill" are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be proposed, let alone. plotted. Failing to call dirty business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done. (c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions - Permitting specific' acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the 'Castro regime) hitirs responsibility and account- abilty. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed: A further danger is, that polic.ymakers *might intentionally use loose general instructions to evade responsibility fOr' embarrassing activities. In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objec- tives and the specific actions under- taken to achieve them was far too wide. It is important that policymakers review the manner in which their direc- tives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from public scrutiny. ? (d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization" One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of underworld figures to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro was their asser- tion that the project had already been ',.approved by McCone's predecessor, Al- lan Dulles, and that further authoriza- tion was -unnecessary, at least until 'the operation :had reached a more ad- vanced stage. We find that the idea that authority might continue or "float" from one administration or director to the next and that there- is no duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision- making. Circumstances may change or judgments differ. New officials should he given the opportunity to review Sig-: nificant programs. " - ? (e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert Capabilities' The development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert. activity increases the probability that the activity will occur, since the capabil- ity represents a tool available for use. There is the further danger that authori? zation for the mere creation of a capabil- ity may be misunderstood as permitting its use without-requiring further author- ization: ? Finally, an assassination capability. should never havebeen created. ? Recommendations The Committee's long investigation of assassination has brought a number of important issues into sharp focus. Above. all stands the question of whether as- sassination is an acceptable tool of American foreign policy. Recommenda- tions on other issues must await the completion of our continuing investiga- tion and the final report, but the Com- mittee needs no more information to be convinced that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law. We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, however, there is presently no statute making it a crime to assassi- nate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence,, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so. A. General Agreement That ihe United States Must Not Engage in Assassination Our view that assassination has no* place in America arsenal is shared by the Ad mi nistra lion. President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked lids Committee to deal with the assassination issue, s"!tted: am opposed to political assassination.. This administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy. (Presidential Press Conference, 6/9/75, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu.' ments, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.) ? The witnesses who testified before the* Committee uniformly' condemned assas- sination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and' reminded us that an open society, more than any, other, is particularly vulnerable to the risk that its own leaders may be assassi- nated. As President Kennedy.reportedly .said: "We can't get into that kind of. thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 4) ? The current Director of Central In- telligence and his two predecessors' testified emphatically that assassination should be banned.- William Colby said: With respect to assassination, my position is clear, I just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it very clear to my subor-. dinates. " " 5/21/75, p. 89.). - Richard Helms, who had been involved' in an assassination plot before he be- came DCI, said he had concluded assas- sination should be ruled out for both moral and practical :reasons:. As a result of 'my experiences through the years, when I became Director I had made tip my mind that this option of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen cm my watch. My; reasons for this xere timse: . ' There arc not only momd reasons hut there are also some other rather practical reason's: It is almost impossible in a demecraey hi keep anything like that secret r " ' Some- body would go .to a- Congressman,. his Sen- ator, he might go to a newspapc'r man, what- , ever the ,case may be. but it ?;itist is not a 12 Approved -F-or Release 2001/08/08.: CIAIIDP7740432R0001.0038000472_, practical alternative:it seems to me,;in our'l sociheetyn. . there' is another consideration * .* T if ?you are going to try by this kind of 'means to remove a-foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that coon-- try, and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice when it is over than you ? were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this Which happened in Vietnam when *President Diem was Om- mated from the scene.. We then had a re- volving door of prime ministers after that for quite some period of time, during which the Vietnamese Government at a time in its us- tory when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker government In other word's,that whole exercise' turned out to the disavantage of the United States: there is no sense. in my sitting here with all the experience I hav.e had And not. sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. It isn't because 1-have lost my cool, or because I' have lost-my guts, it?sfmply is be- cause I don't tthe United States of America these days. hiqk it is a viable option in Chairro' an -Church.. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms?I agree with what you have said fully?but doesn't it also follow on the prac- tical side, apart from the moral side, that since these secrets are bound to come out, - when they do, they do very grave political damage to the?Unifed States in tie world at large? I don't' know to what extent the Rus- sians involved themselves in political assas- sinations, but under their system they at least have a better prospect of keeping it concealed. Since we do like a free society and since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the revelation will then do serious injury to the good name' and rep- utation of the United States. Would you agree with that? ? ? Mr. Helms. Yes, I would. Chairman Church.- Alid finally, if we were to reserve to ourselves the prerogative to: assassiNate foreign 'leaders, we may invite reciprocal action from foreign governments. who assume that if it's our prerogative to -do .so, it' is their prerogative as well, and that is another danger that we at least in- vite with this kind of action, wouldn't you. agree? pi,h.I7r.6'.7H8e)lms: Yes., sir.: (Helms, 6/13/75, John McCone Said he was opposed to assassinations because: I didn't , think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence, . Agency. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 15 ? ' B. CIA Directives Banning Assassivation Helms in 1972 and Colby in 1973 is- sued internal CIA orders banning as- sassination. Helms' order said: .It has recently again been alleged in ,the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and 'Agency policy has long been clear On this issue. To underline it,. however, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or ?suggested by any of oar person- ittoerls:3;6;72(11;lemo: Helms to Deputy Direc- . In one of a series-of orders arising- out the- CIA's own review of ? prior "questionable activity," Colby stated: - CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that as- sassination be employed. (Memo, Colby to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73) C. The Need for a Statute Commendable- and welcome as they are, these CIA directives are not suf- ficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change, and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a temptation. As- sassination plots dd happen. It would ,be irresponsible not to do all that can be done to prevent their happening ,again. A law is needed. Laws express our nation's values; they eleter those who might be tempted to ignore those values and Stiffen the will of those who want - ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 ' to resist the temptation. ' ? ? The Committee recommends a statute which would make it a criminal .offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (1) to conspire:: within or outside the United States, to assassinate a foreign official; (2) to at- tempt to assassinate a. foreign official, or(3) to assassinate a foreign official. Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign official or foreign official guest while such a: person is in the United States. (18 U.S.C. 1.116-1117). However, there is no law which makes it a crime to assassi- nate, to conspire to assassinate, or to 'attempt to assassinate a foreign official while such offidial is outside the United States. The Committee's proposed stat- ute is designed to close this gap in the, Subsection (a) of the proposed statute. would punish conspiracies within the United States; subsection (b) :would punish. conspiracies outside the United States. Subsection (b) is .necessary to eliminate the loophole which would Otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United. States and conspire abroad. Subsections (c) and (d), respec- tively, wouls1 make it an offense to ? attempt to kill a foreign official, outside the United States. . Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) would apply ? expressly to any ."officer or em- ployee of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct' by United States Government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens. In addition, subsection (a), which covers conspiracies within the United States,. would apply to "any other person,". regardless of citizenship. Non-citizens. who conspired within the United States to assassinate a foreign official would clearly conic within the jurisdiction of the law. Subsections (b), .(c), and (d), which deal with conduct abroad, would apply to United States citizens, and to officers or employees of the united States, regardless of their cit- izenship. Criminal liability for acts committed abroad by persons who are not American citizens or who are not officers or employees . of the United States is beyond the jurisdiction of, the United States. . "Foreign official" is defined in sub- section (e). (2) to make clear that an offense may be committed even though the "official" belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a political party. The Committee's inves- tigation?as well as the reality of inter- national politics?has shown that offi- cials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.2 Killing, at- tempting to kill, or conspiring to kill would be punishable under the statute only if it were Politically motivated. Political, motivation would encompass -acts against foreign officials because ,of their political views, actions, or state- . ments. 'Tor example, Lumumba was not an offi- cial of the Congolese government at the time of the pints against his life, and Trujillo, eyen though the dictator of the Dominican Republic, held no official governmental posi- tion in the latter period of his. regime. The definition of "foreign official" in section (e) (2) also provides that such person must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the United States is not at war pursuant to ea declaration of war or against which the United States Armed Forces have .not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Force; pursuant to ? the War . Powers.. Resolution, the ,killing of ? foreign officials on account of -their ? political views would be a .crintinal offense. During the Committee's hearings, some witnesses, while strongly. con- demning assassination, asked whether assassination shouid absolutely be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was 'cited as an example. Of course, the cases which the Committee investigated were not of that character. Indeed, in the Cuban missile crisis?the only situation of true national danger considered in this re- port?assassination was not even con- sidered and, if used, might well have aggravated the crisis. ? In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. AS the Supreme Court has stated,. the Con- stitution "is not a suicide pact." (Kenne- dy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).) ? During an unprecedented emergency, Abraham Lincoln claimed unprecedent- ed power based on the need to preserve the nation: * * * my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispens.! able means, that government?that nation? of which .that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected; vet often a limb must be amputated to save a life: but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that Measures, otherwise un- constitutional, might become lawful, by be- coming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the. nation * * (The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. X, pp. 65-66.) (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894.) Whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers, it is a fan- damental principal of our constitutional system that those powers are checked and limited by Congress, including the inipeachment power. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a Pres- ident pursuant. to his limited' inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to Congress. Only then can Congress judge whether the action trek represented,. in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity' to the life of the Nation. As. Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to Congress for ratification: In full view of his great resnotisiility he has, .so far, done what he hae deemed his .duly. You will now, according to your own judgment perform yours. (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, I561.) 1711 ak.k. cee irvii ee' ? The Committee does not believe that the acts which it has. examined repre- sent the real. American character, They do not reflect the ideals which- have given the people of the. country and ..of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations. The United States must not adopt the tactics of the energy. Means are as important as ends: Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free is less- ,ened. - Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this 'country has the strength to hear the story and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mis- takes and .resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past. Panel Members Listed ? Special to The Nevc Yerk Times ? WASHINGTON, Nov. 29--The Senate select committee whose report ori Cen- tral Intelligence Agency activities was Made Public today was composed of the following 11 members: Frank. Church, Democrat of Idaho, chairman. . John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, vice chairman. ? Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan. Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Min- nesota. Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky. Robert Morgan, Democrat of Nod), Carolina. Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado. Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee. Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona. Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican of Maryland. Richard Schweiker, Republican of Pennsylvania. Approved For keiease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD07-00432R0001003$0004-2 NEW YORK TINEsApproved For Release 2001/08/08: 21 NAv. 1975 Kissinger-C.I.A. Conflict In C-zile Hearings Cited By SEYMOUR M. HERSH The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported yester- day that during its hearings there had been conflicts in tes- timony between Henry A. Kis- singer and the Central Intel- ligence. Agency about the ex- tent of White House authoriza- tion for the agency's role in a Chilean kidnapping plot in October 1970. , ; Mr. Kissinger, who was then president Nixon:s national se- curity adviser, told Lie commit- tee in secret testimony last August that he and his deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, had turned down a specific C.I.A. proposal to organize a military coup d'etat aimed at preventing Salvador Allende from becom- ing President of Chile. Agency officials testified, however, that their subsequent involvement in the kidnapping and assassination of a high-lev- el Chilean general loyal to Mr. Allende came, as the Senate report put it, "with the know- ledge and -approval of the White House." The Senate report concluded that while the United States' policy was to seek a military collo, there was no -evidence that any American official spe- cifically planned an assassina- tion or expected that a kidnap- ring attempt would lead to a shooting. Two Attempts Failed The Senate testimony re- vealed that Richard M. Helms, who was then Director ;of Cen- tral Intelligence, and other agency officials continued ? to aid anti-Allende military fac- tions even after it.became clear that no military coup would be possible without the removal of Gen, Rene Schneider, the army's commander in chief, who was an Allende supporter. The C.I.A. encouraged two unsuccessful kidnapping at- tempts in mid-October on the general, supplying at least 870,- 000 to ? two Chilean officers and three machine guns and other weapons, the testimony; showed. On the third attempt, General Schneider was assas- sinated after he allegedly opened fire on his abductors. The slaying took place cn Oct. 22, 1970, two days before Mr. Allenc'..e's victory in the Sept. Sept. 4 election was to be ratified by the Congress. Mr. Allende, a Marxist who was founder cf the Socialist Party in Chile, de.,..4raated less leftist eandid,:atno. had i been covertly aided by the ,C.I.A. 1. On the previous Sept. 15, ithe Senate report said, Pres- lidera Nixon had summoned Mr. !Helms to a White House meet- !Mg with Mr. Kissinger and John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney .General, and ordered the C.I.A. . to spend $10 million, and "more -if necessary," to provoke a military coup in an effort to "save Chile," , Details of Mr. Nixon's sof:: in the plotting were initially described last July by The New York Times, but the Senate assassinati report included the first direct testimony on the Operation as well as the first account of the dispute between Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. over who authorized what. During his Senate testimony, Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that -he was aware that the 'primary thrust of the White House meeting "was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated." Mr. Kissinger further testified, '"It is clear that Pres- ident Nixon wanted him [Helms] to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take ? the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office." The Senate report describes how the C.I.A. was authorized to report on its efforts to Pres- ident Nixon through Mr. Kissin- ger, bypassing the Ambassador in Chile, the Department -of State, the Pentagon and the 40 Committee. At the time, the 40 Committee which oversees clandestine intel- ligence efforts, was considered one of the most secret units in the Government. This led to what the Senate report called a two-track ap- proach, with the 40 Committee authorizing funds for anti-Al- ; lende propaganda activity and- the White House seeking con- tacts with Chilean military men who would lead a coup. By the end of September, !the Senate report concluded, i both tracks had the same goal: the overthrow of the Allende Government. The Senate report notes that the White House insisted that economic ;pressure also be brought against the Allende 'Government. The report in- cludes the following warning that Amabassodor Edward M. Korry, sent to a Chilean politi- cal moderate in an effort encourage him to become in- volved in the anti-Allende plan- ning: Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a poll-, cy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist socie- ty in Chile." Thomas Karamessines, then the C.I.A. deputy director in charge of covert operations, was placed in direct charge of a special Chilean task. force. He; told the Senate committee of having been under pressure from Mr. Kissinger to accom- plish an overt hi-ow. Mr. Kissin- ge. "left no doubt in my mind," Mn Karamessines testified, "that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get -this accom- plished, and he in turn wa placing us under the heaviest . 14, CIROONA-Opflq?000100380004-2 21 Nov. 1975 White House Not Linked To Plots Against Castrc By JOHN M. special to The WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported today that it had not found any evidence of White House authorization for repeated attempts by the Central Intelligence Agency to inspire a bizarre variety of plots against the life of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. , In the report issued by the 'committee today. nearly a third of which was devoted to the :agency's persistent but unsuc- .cessfnl efforts to aarrange for the deaths of Mr. Castro and his, two principal associates, the panel said that it had un- covered "at least" eight sepa- ;rate plots conceived by C.I.A. ;officials in the Eisenhower, !Kennedy and Johnson Adminis- trations. The death plots some of ' which never progresse d from the planning stage, were aimed variously at the Cuban leader, his brother Raul and Ernesto Che Guevara, the late Cuban Finance Minister, the commit- tee said, and spanned the per- iod from 1960 to 1965. There was no clear indication, CREWDSON . - New?Torlt Timet according to the report, that any of the plots, which in- volved as prospective assassins American underworld figures. Cuban exiles and a C.I.A. agent within the Castro Government? had been apprcved in advance, or even made known to,. Government officials "outside the C.I.A. In addition, the committeel said that there was no indispu- table evidence that Allen W. Dulles, the Director of Central plotting that took place within intelligence when the first plot was conceived, had been made aware of it in detail by his subordinates, -and no evidence at all that John A. IvIcCone, his successor, was told of the plotting that took place within the agency in his tenure. The Senate report conceded, that to provide the United! States with a "plausible denial"! in the event the anti-Castro plots were discovered, Pres-1 idential authorization might have been subsequently "ob- scured." It also declared that, whatever the extent of their! knowledge, Presidents Eisen-, hower, Kennedy and Johnson. should bear the "ultimate re- sponsibility for the actions of, their subordinates. of pressures to -get it ? accom- plished." Mr. Kissinger, -in his testimo- ny, said he knew of no specific plan that involved the abduc- tion of General Schneider. He testified that on Oct. 15, 1970, he met in the White House with Mr. Karamessines to discus's a coup attempt to be led by a retired Chilean general, Roberto Viatex Maram- bio. His chances were not rated very high and it was decided at the meeting to forestall any further action by Mr. Viaux. The basic dispute cited by the Senate emerged from that meeting. Mr. Kissinger, whose testimony was supported by General Haig, said that he had turned "off the collo plans." Mr. Karamessines told the Sen- ate Committee that he had left the meeting after Mr. Kissinger s-aid that "the agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight." . Mr. Karamessines further testified that there never was a White House order ending the anti-Allende effort. ? "I am sure that the seeds that were laid. in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973." he told the committee. alluding to the coup that ousted Mr. Allende in September 1973. and led to his death. . The Senate report noted that ;it had been unable to question former President Nixon in this ;point and had been unable to :lain access to the daily calen- dars of Mr. Kissinger and Mr. ;Nixon to confirm that some of the 'subsequent meetings on a :military solution ir chile alleged to have taken place by C.I.A. officials had actually . been held.,- . The report termed "particu- larly reprehensible" the ap- parent failure of Richard Bis-1 sell, the C.I.A.'s chief of clan- destine operations when he mi-1 tial attempts were made on; Mr. Castro's life, to make cer- tain that Mr. Dulles and Pres- idents Kennedy and Johnson knew what was afoot. And the committee described as "a grave error in judgment" the failure of Richard Helms, Mr. Bissell's successor and now the American Ambassador to Iran. to inform Mr. McCone in early 1962 that piotting against Mr. Castro's life was continuing. The initial planning for a Cuban assassination, the report said, involved an attempt to arrange for a fatal accident involving not Mr. Castro, but his brother Raul. The pian was aborted by Tracy Barnes, then Mr. Bissell's deputy and now deceased, shortly after he had approved it, and the accident never took place. That effort was followed ;by the preparationby C.I.A. scien- tists of a box of cigars, of the brand favored by the Cuban Prime minister, that had been impregnated with a poison. But the Senate committee found no evidence that the -cigars had ever been delivered. The attempt to arrange the accident, the report said, was little more than a response by the C.I.A. to an opportunity' that one of its Cuban agents was to :nave for close access to Raul Castro, and the pois- oned cigars seemed almost an afterthought. But the plotting within the' C.I.A. against Mr. Castro's life Approved For-ReleaseC1A-RDP7-7-00432R000100380004-2 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 NEW' YORK =TES 20 Nov. 1975 began in earnest some eight months before the 1961 invasion of Cuba by an anti-Castro exile foce trained by the agency. The report .said that begin- ning in August 1960, three months before the election of President Kennedy, the C.I.A., working through Robert A. Maheu, a former F.B.I. agent who later served as a top aide to Howard R. Hughes, the billionaire industrialist, asked John RoseIli, a reputed organ- ized-crime figure, to locate one or more Cubans willing to make an attempt on Mr. Castro's life. Mr. Roselli eventually brought' two other top underworld fig- ures into the operation?Sam Giancana, now dead but for years ethe head of an important,' Chicago cime syndicate, and Santos. Trafficante, a Cuban exile who has been associated with criminal elements in Tampa, Fla. Mr. Bissell told the Senate committee that be knew that under-world figures had been enlisted on behalf of the C.I.A. to arrange for the murder, which was to ? have coincided with the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April, and which was to have involved the slip- ping of pills containing toxin into Mr. Castro's food by a waiter in a Havana restaurant. Mr. Bissell told the panel that ! he and another agency official Col. Sheffield Edwards. hat briefed Mr. Dulles "circumIci cutiously-" about an "intelli gence operation" then uncle way against the Castro Govern ,ment, and that they believes !he understood that it revolvet around assassination, althougl the word was never spoken. Mr. Bissell also said that ft assumed that Mr. Dulles hal, informed General Eisenhowel and Mr. Kennedy. On the basil of that indirect briefing. ?? ? The Federal Bureau of In vestigation became aware ii May, 1962. more than a yeal after the Cuban invasion?and the assassination attempt?has failed, that Mr. Giancana had told associates of his involve merit in a scheme to kill Mr Castro. The F.B.I., according to doo uments obtained by the cons mittee, also discovered that Mr Maheu and Mr. Giancana had been involved in tapping a tel ephone in a Las Vegas, Nev. hotel room, and learned upoi investigating that the C.I.A. apparently as a favor to Mr Gianacana, had paid for tht installation. Robert F. Kennedy, the latt President's brother who wai Attorney General at the time inquired about the details os the relationship and was told by Colonel Edwards in May 1972, that Mr. Giancana and others had been involved in at assassination plot against Mr Castro that ended after thd abortive invasion. But the Senate. report said that a second effort, also in. volving poison pills designed for Mr. Castro's food was at that moment under way within the C.I.A., that Colonel lOe, wards, who knew about it, did not tell Mr. Kennedy and Ina( Mr. Helms, who had taken ever front Mr. Bissell, did not came !forward when he learned that :the Attorney General had been misled. Mr. Helms's . reasons for not having told Mr. Kennedy, Mr, McCone or any other superior !about the continuing assassina4 I tion efforts, according to his ;testimony, concerned his as- :sumption that the efforts had previously been authorized by higher-ups. Also, he said that 'he assumed that the Kennedy !Administration's internal ex. pressions of antipathy toward. the Castro Governmert amount*. -ed to tacit apprOval. In any event, -according to !the Senate report, the plot in. volving the underworld and the ;poison pills was subsequently -I abandoned by the C.I.A. after Iseveral of the Cuban operatives I assigned to administer the 'poison to Mr. Castro got "cold :feet." Other schemes were hatched at C.I.A. headquarters in 1963, including one that suggested placing an exploding seashell in the water near Mr. Castro's fa-, vorite bathing spot in the Carib- bean, and another, equally bi- zarre, designed to supply Mr. .Castro with a skindiving suit 'that had been contaminated in 'advance by bacteria. Neither of those schemes, the report said, appears to have been taken beyond the C.I.A.. -laboratory, but later in 1963 a agent inside the Cuban Government, known by the agency cryptonym Am-Lash, was offered a pen containing a. poison needle after he ex- pressed a willingness to take Mr. Castro's life. The agent, the report said, rejected the device as too amateurish. The Senate panel noted that the offer was made to him on Nov. 22, 1963, at almost the precise moment time Mr. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. It was ironic, the report said, that almost at the same mo- ment a special envoy from Mr. Kennedy was meeting with Mr. Castro 'to explore the pos- sibility of improved relations." ? Warren Not Told The Warren Commission, which investigated the circum- stances in the Kennedy assas- sination, was never made aware of the C.I.A.'s attempts on Mr. Castro's life as an adjunct to its inquiry, according to former commission lawyers. Mr. McCone, who was sub- sequently told about the plot- ting against Mr. Castro before the Bay of Pigs invasion, never told the Warren Commission, of which be was a member. of what be know, and Mr. Helms did not volunteer his knowl- edge the Senate report said, "because the precise question was not asked" of him. I The C.I.A. continued to- en- !courage Am-Lash, the report said, by providing him with a cache of weapons in Cuba and ,later by puttnig him in touch with a group of anti-Castro ex- iles in this country who could also supply arms. These effor s continued into 1965, the Senators found, and said that Mr. Helms, who knew about some or them, denied to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Am-Lash had ever been , COLBY ASKS PANEL TO DROP 12 NTS, FROM PLOT REPORT By JOHN M. CREWDSON t,,se 'nNew Ycrk Timen WASHINGTON, Nov. 19?Wil- !ham E. Colby, the Director of !Central Intelligence, appealed today to a Senate committee, !not -to make public the names iof 12 individuals, some of them 'agency officials, who were al- legedly involved in C.I.A. plots against the lives of foreign heads of state. In a raee news conference at the Central Intelligence _Agen- cy's suburban Virginia head- quarters, Mr. Colby said that he feared that the individuals, if named in a committee report expeated to be released to- morrow, might be subject to retaliation from ."unstable and extremist groups." He said that while be op- posed "in principle" publication of the report on C.I.A. asses-, sination plots, which must bel approved by the full Senate in order to be released, his im- mediate concern was to protect "the safety and livelihoods of the individuals involved" in those matters and also "the fu- ture of American intelligence." An All-Out Effort Mr. Colby's unusual appeal,' which seemed to have been addressed as much to the full Senate as to the 11 members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, which has voted unanimously to approve the report's release, marked an all- out effort by the Ford Admin- istration to block disclosurs of the document on the Senate floor. . The Senate is scheduled to begin a closed debate at 9 A.M. tomorrow on whether to !approve cc i.,)rbid the release of !the assassination report, a doc- ument of neariy 400 pages that !is based on a five-month inves- tigation by the select corn- !rnittee. Senator Frank Church, the committee's chairman, said that his panel had considered care- fully the C.I.A.'s arguments for deleting the names of individ- uals included in its report and had done so where it believed that was warranted. "In the end," said Mr. involved in such assassination attempts. Accoelmg to the report, when Mr.. Helms later briefed President Johnson on the early ,Castro plots, he did not de- scribe for him the Am-Lash operation, !the only one that had eontinued into his preels Church, an Idaho Democrat, "the committee decided which names must be included," and he added, "We intend to pro- ceed with the report." According to Mr. CoIey, the! C.I.A. provided the Church! committee with about 30 nernes, of agency employes arid Amer- ican and fomign cellaborators in connection with its inquiry into the assassination plots, be- cause it believed those names were "important to an under-, standing of the matter' by the committee. But, he said, the committee had agreed to the agency's re- quest to remove the names from the final version of its report in only "18 or 20" of the cases. It -was not -a question, Mr. -Colby added, of whether the, assassination attempts werei "good or bad," and he said thati Mr. Ford's exliresseci disapprov-i al of such activities "is shared! by many of us." "The real question," he con- tinued, "is whether we will im- pose an extra legal retaiiationl upon people who, at one 'time,1 did what the general consensus of people and the command structure around them thought was appropriate at the time." At a news conference called after Mr. Colby's, Senator Church defended his intention to seek the release of the -docu- ment with a reference to a de- cision -by a United States _dis- trict judge here earlier this week not to order the deletion of one such name. The judge, Gerhard A. Gesell; ruled that while the identifica- tion of a man described only as a retired C.I.A. official might endanger his life, he was com- pelled to deny the former offi- cial's request for anonymity be- cause the "public interest" in the report's contents "greatly outweighs the right to privacy of an individual." The Senate committee agreed yesterday, however, to excise the name of the retired official, who is understood to be Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the former head of the agency's technical services division, whose name was reported prominently earli- er this year after he was ques- tioned in closed session by the committee about other matters. Mr. Colby, without naming Dr. Gottlieb, acknowledged to- day that some of the 12 names remaining in the Senate report, and possibly some of those de- leted at the agency's request, had been menticeed in news accounts of the Senate commit- tee's investigation. But, he said, there is "a vast difference in my mind between their appearance in press star; les and their official confirma-1 Con in a committee reptirt." Hel also expressed concern that! such confirmation might bring: the individuals harm from un-1 named groups, "either domestic, or !foreign, who might feel; called upon to take some such; action against these people. " The C.I.A. director said that! if neither the select commit-, tee nig the Senate acceded to, his wishes to preF?er.,.: their anonymity, the C.I.A. would, ? pro',- ;de t he named inclividiw Is! with what "limited Protection! Approved. For Release 2001/08/ut Cli:RDP77-00432R00010038000-21 Approved For IgronOlD.E8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380Wy0k Trims 21 NOV. 1975 19. NOV. 1975 . we can give in this country." Mr. Colby said that hg had expressed his concern in fetters to Senator Church and other members of Congress, and that President Ford had written to Mr. Church last month with a request to keep the assassina- tion report secret on the ground that its publication would "result in serious harm to the national interest." The Senate panel voted unanimously to reject Mr. Ford's request, and Mr. Church .said at the time that his com- mittee had undertaken to in- vestigate ? the charges of C.I.A. involvement in assassination plot at the "urgings" of the President himself. The Senate committee's in- quiry was foundd on informa- tion gathered by a Presidential commission on C.I.A. activities set up by Mr. Ford last Janu- ary. As far as is known, no foreign leaders were killed in C.I.A.-inspired plots, which .were directed primarily against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. A White House official said today that summaries of Mr. Ford's arguments against the release of the report had been delivered to key Senators. ' WASHI NGTON STAR 20 NOV 1975 Speculation on CIA agent is deplored The Washington Star, as well as other media, recently speculated as to the identity of the former Central Intelligence Agency officer who ?sought to have the Senate Select Committee delete his name from the committee's assassination report. The President, Judge Gerhard A. Gesell and I all found that there is a real possibility of physical harm to this man or to his family if his name were revealed. Indeed, the Senate Select Committee finally agreed to delete his name from the report. I have great difficulty in under- standing what legitimate purpose was served by the published specu- lation concerning the identity, right or wrong, of an individual whose physical safety is thus endangered. W. E. Colby, Director Central Intelligence Agency 8tory an Unhappy One INTELLIGENCE COSI For 'Voice of America PUT Al $4 KIM By LIND1VCHARLTON - ..spec,ial to The New York_ Tlenes WASHINGTON, Nov. 20? It wasn't the kind of story.. that anyone at the Voice of America was very 'happy about: "It's 'a mean stOry,: not at all ?Consistent with what. . . we think of ourselves,-'." said- ?Administration or Congress. the chief of the new divie Mr. Kamenske and his su- sion. But at 6:30 P.M. They perior, Alan Heil, chief of were ready to start broad- news and current affairs, at casting it around' the world ' first yielded to the pressure MI In, Enishnthe radio, script begins this way: '"In Wash-.: ingtorno a Senate investiga- tion. reveals that the United States Central' Intelligence Agency Was involved in' sev- eral plots to kill ,foreign lead- ers." . By midnight, it wmilebe broadcast several times in English and in Khmer, Thai, Spanish, Hindi,' Arabic, Urdu, Ukrainian and, at what will be dawn in Moscow, Russian. As the 24-hour broadcast cycle turns, the story?modi- fied by time change and ex- panded wit:h reaction, back- , ground and analysis?will' be broadcast in all the 35 ' gbages in which the 'Voice? the broadcast arm of the United States Information Agency?is fluent. Differences in Content - voices have prevailed.. Last spring, under the direction of. the State Department, in- formation about the United States. evacuation from Sai- gon was restricted to "offi- cial - statements" from the . There would .be modifica-, firths for different regions. To be included in brbadcastS to. SoutheastAsia was amore ? detailed look at 'the assassin-,- ation of Ngo Dinh ,diem. the. South. Vietnamese President. For Africa,' the plota to kill the. first Prime Minister ? of' the Congo, now Zaire, Patrice.. Lumumba were de- tailed, along with the' fact that Mr. Lumumba was in fact, 'apparently murdered'' by his rivals,"- not by, the, C.I.A. - - For the 'Latin - American service, the plots. against Fi-: del Castro of --Cuba,- Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Re- public and Gen: Rene Schned of 'Chile ? were' -given prern-? inence. "If you're caught not tell- ing it straight," said Bernard H. Kamenske, .chief of the news division, "you lose any sense of trust with your-liste- ner." He acknowledged that this is not a universal view in government circles, that there are those who think the United States should not be paying good money to advertise its own faults. But he insisted, "There is no al- ternative to it. 'What we at tempt to. provide is reality. ? And any diplomat who thinks. that they're, hurt by. reality, ' they're mistaken." Sometimes those oi oar to go along with the hmit4- tion, then they broke With i i t' n a memorandum to dile Voice staff. "It is important to remember that we strive to know the truth and tell it," the memo said. Mr.' Kamenske; a big, -be? spectacled 'man of 48; said that the . C.I.A. story .did cause many at the broadcast service a sense of "personal embarrassment" because "we are- an American abroad:2! Kenneth R. Giddens, .:the Alabama businessman who heads the agency, was perso- nally regretful: "I think, it's a very tragic thing that we're confronted with this situa- tion, which I doubt -does this nation any good. 'Everybody knows we live in a jungle world, and activities take ,place by almost all nations, when their interests are threatened. But most of them have laws, such as official secrets 'laws, So that some of the More distastefial things' they've done' aren't spread" on the record." He added, "lavish we were.: smart enough and our system'. permitted, some way legally.: ?legally?so we could clean , dirty linen in . private." Playing It Straight Public laundering being the way things are done, howeV- er,.Mr.'Giddens said he had' not even discussed the C.I.A.. report with the news staff; and assumed, "The, men down ? there in charge are going to play this .thing. straight." He was asked. if there had been any pressure to handle the story ginerger- ly, or to downplay it: "Not, on. this," he said, in a studio ?with a smile. , - ' Down the hall, at 3:30 P.M.', Anatol Petrov was broadcast- ing to the Soviet Union about the Senate committee's deci- sion to disregard the Pres- ident and publish a ,"report about participation of C.I.A. in plots to kfll foreign state leaders." A few hours later, in time' for early-rising Muscovites to listen with their morning tea, the Russian service would be saying something. very much like, "In Washing-- ton. a Senate im?dstigation reveals ..." 16 By LESLIE H. GELB Special to The New 'Lark Tintei ? WASHINGTON, Nov. 18?The developing debate over the na- tional intelligence community has forced disclosure for the,, first time of total appropriations for the "national intelligence program." This year's figure, 'knowledgeable officials said, is $4 billion?hidden away in the $90 billion Pentagon spending bill approved by the Senate to- day. These officials said that id was covered by such specific budget title* as "other procure- ment, Air Force," "contingen- cies, defense," and "procure- ment, defense agencies." ? Last September Representa- tive Robert N. Giaimo, Demo- . crat of Connecituct,? made the first move toward forcing dis- closure of the real size and nature of these items. Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat of California, pressed the issue again in a Senate floor speech last Friday. The knowledgeable officials who today disclosed the over- all intelligence total for the first time said they had done so in the hope of forcing closer Congressional scrutiny of va- guely worded multimillion dol- lar budge titles and to bring about an open debate on the secret intelligence budget. $2 Billion in Tactical plan The $4 billion figure, covering 'the "national intelligence pro- gram" and known only to a ; few dozen legislators,d oes not include $2 billion additional for what is ppreferred to as tactical , intelligence spending by the Army, Navy and Air Force. - ? Details of the $4 billion ap- propriation, for what is called the national intelligence pro- gram, are known onld to a few dozen legislators. The ap- propriation does not include $2 billion for what is referred to as tactical intelligence spending by the Army, Navy and Air Force. It has long been known that the national intelligence pro- gram?estimated in the past as running as high as $8 billion ?has been mixed in with the Pentagon budget without iden- tification, but the specific hid- ing places in that budget have never been disclosed authorita- tively. While the House of Repre- sentatives tritruned the program budget this year by about $250 million, it could not be ascer- tained whether the program ever reached $8 billion or whether it has been reduced substantially 'in recent years. The program, according to officials in Congress and the Administration. 'includes $750' million for the Central Intel- ligence agency tucked inside .a $2.1 billion budget it2m iden- tified ont, as "other procure- ment, Air 'Torce," ? Other agencies included in this program and the funds deshmated are as follows: A01376iii6d7f 6FReledi'd 2001/081.08i : CM-RDP-7777004'32R00010038q0042': Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 Christian Science Monitor 3 November 1975 gThe National Security Agency, a semi - autonomous communications and cryptolog- ical agency under the Penta- gon's umbrella, budgeted for about $1.2 billion. gTh e National Reconnaissance Office, another semi-autono- mous unit under the Air Force that runs the satellite photog- raphy program, set to , spend under $2 billion. ? gThe Defense Intelligence Agency, which pulls together intelligence for the armed ser- vices and the Secretary of De- fense, scheduled to spend about; $100 million. Since 1974. most Congress-1 men have been vcting billions: for intelligence each year, knowing only that they were, approving military hardware described no more precisely than "electronic control equip- ment," "communications equip- ment" or "erection of struc- tures and. acquisition of lamd." Now, however, some Con- gressional and. Administration, officials are so convinced that the intelligence budget ? at least, in one ,over-all total? should be subject to a debPte on national priorities, that they' are providing ? this information! to the press. Others, including Representa- tive Giaimo and Senator Cran- ston are using various legisla-! live techniques to get these Intelligence expenditures into the open without technically 1 violating Congressional rules on secrecy. . Vote Neededlor Disclosure ? The general rule is that clas-! sified information can be ma(le, public only by vote of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. Certain com- mittees, however, have official- ly disclosed classified material' by a majority vote of their. own members. Individual legis- lators who take this responsi- bility on themselves ,face cen- sure, sl The Administration has op- posed any budget disclosures on the ground that other na- tions, then, would be more able counteract American pro- grams. Those pressing for disclosure know that the sentiment is decidedly against them. In Sep- tember, the House Appropria- tions Committee voted 30 to 19 not even to receive intel- ligence budget figures from its own subcommittee, and thel whole House voted 267 to 1471 not to make the budget public. By Clayton Jones Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger stands on the threthold of being held in contempt of Congress for withholding State 'Department information. The House Intelligence Committee is due to consider a contempt citation Tuesday (Nov. 4). But the clash between the White House and Capitol Hill may be averted, as with so many recent battles over access to secret docu- ments, in a rush to clean up U.S. spy activities quickly. Because chairman Otis G. Pike (D) of New York is unsure of House backing for a contempt measure, he may accept a com- promise with Dr. Kissinger, committee sources say. "I'm not sure Congress wants to face up to its responsibilities," Mr. Pike said. Dr. Kissinger yielded a bit on Oct. 31 when he went before the House panel that has subpoenaed a State Department document critical of the Secretary's handling of the 1973 Cyprus crisis. Weighing the threats of contempt, Dr. Kissinger said he would hand over the document, which is a lower-echelon memo- randum, on the Cyprus issue, but the memo would be "amalgamated" with others and would not contain the names of working-level, foreign-service officials who authored them. To allow Congress access to every State Department official and memo could destroy the anonymity of officers' recommendations and even lead to a resurgence of McCarthy- 'ism, Dr. Kissinger said. He referred to Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy who in the early 1950s blamed foreign-service ? officers for policy setbacks in China, some- times destroying their careers. "What I am concerned about is that junior officers not slant their reports in a direction that is fashionable . . and be able to write their memoranda without worrying how they would look in five or ten years," Dr. Kissinger testified. But Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin believes that "whistle blowers" in the State Department should be able to tell their stories to Congress without fear of persecution. And minority chairman Robert McClory of Illinois said Congress should not be barred from hearing testimony from employees who are willing to provide information to Congress. Aathor of the Cyprus memo, foreign officer Thomas Boyatt, is one who wants to disclose all but is being held back by Dr. Kissinger. The House unit has dug step-by-step into major spy operations with a call for specifies from each intelligence agency on its risks, costs, and forecasting abilities. I have become unhappy and alarmed as this investigation continues about the cynical, hypocritical, and evil acts we turn up." said Representative Pike. "In one case, the State Department said the CIA opposed a covert operation and it went ahead anyway." Dr. Kissinger revealed that during his six years in the White House under Presidents Nixon and Ford all covert plans were person- ally approved by the President, and most likely that was the case for previous presi- dents. . His disclosure ties a closer link between past questionable CIA activities and presiden- tial responsibility. But the Secretary refused to shed light on the "40 committee" composed of four high government officials ? the President, Vice- President, secretaries of Defense and State Department. The Pike panel probe of this group uncovered 40 covert operations ap- proved between 1972 and 1974 without one meeting of the committee. YE NEW YORK TIMES, 'FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21;-1975 House Panel Firm on Kissinger Citation WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 (AP) The House Select Committee on votedIntelligence d y to move ahead with at least one contempt citation against Sec- retary of tSate Henry A. Kis- singer despite President Ford's protest that the action "invol- ves grave matters affecting our conduct of foreign policy." Otis G. Pike, the New York Democrat who is committee chairman, said the committee would not press two other con- tempt citations if Mr. Ford's advisers delivered promised doc- uments. The three citations voted by the committee last week must be approved by the full House of Representatives before they can be turned over to a. United States attorney for prosecution. The President sent a letter to each committee member protesting against all three ci- tations. He said he personally invoked executive privilege to prevent Mr. Kissinger's turning over state Department requests for covert intelligence opera- tions abroad. :17 ApPrOvece-'-'201771108408 : CIA-RDP77429432R000100380004-2 "Thus, in declining to comply with the subpoena, Secretary of State Kissinger was acting on my instructions as President of the United States," Mr. Ford said. Mr. Ford said the National Security.Council staff has been making "a substantial effort" and will continue to work to provide the committee with the documents it seeks. "This issue involves grave matters affecting our conduct of foreign policy and raises questions which go to the abili- ty of our republic to govern itself effectively," he said. The White House released the letter, dated Yesterday, as presidential aides were turning over documents subpoenaed by the panel before it voted to cite Mr. Kissinger for contempt of Congress. But a committee ,draft report said new material handed over to the panel was not enough to quash the contempt citation. NEW Approved YORK TIMES, MON OV ForReleEMBEase 2Q01/08/? 0_8 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 DAY, NR 10, 1975. C.I.A.'s Work Unimpeded By Inquiries and Reports, Officials of Agency Assert' By SEYMOUR Special to The New M. HERSH York Times tell you a wonderful story." "But it's hard to say that we've lost much because of. tnat," the official said. , Sources cited the following areas, in which there has been some impairment of operations: ? kiSome 'American companies that provided -cover jobs for agents in the United States have curtailed their coopera- tion. 49.A small number of the large American corporations that permitted the C.I.A. to use for- eign offices and branches for cover jobs have become less enthusiastic about permitting the agency to have direct ac- cess to employees overseas. The companies have requested that the agency conduct all its busi- ness with employees through a designated contact man. clSome of the agency's per- sonnel still on clandestine as- signments overseas haVe suf- fered from lowered morale and a confusion about what is per- missible in the field. Everyone now has to check back home With his field officer, and this is taking away operational in- itiative in spot developments, one source said. Some agency officials said; however, that they did not think it was a bad idea to have men in the field checking in with superiors in such cases. ? gThere has been some re- luctance by various officials and operatives in foreign in- telligence services to cooperate., "Some of our old-line contacts don't want to show up in our hearings or in our press;" one source said. "But it just means that it's 'a little bit more diffi- cult to undertake an operation with friendly operatives." He added that such operations were still feasible. gThere have been scattered instances of less cooperation at high-level government-to-gov- ernment interchanges of infor- mation. One high-level Ford Administration official said that some British intelligence offi- cials "no longer tell us where they got information so we can evaluate the source, but only pass on the information. The Boston Globe reported last month that American officials were treating top-secret British information as being ',!-on loan" to avoid the possibility of, its being subpoenaed by Congress or the courts as "property" of the C.I.A. ? But all the sources agreed that intelligence information, including the most sensitive material available, was ? still flowing in. "Things are tougher, that's true," one official said. "But I haven't seen any evidence that things are compromised in terms of being able to tune. tion." One 'high-leel intelligence' ofei WASHINGTON, Nov. 9?Offi- cials of the Central Intelligence Agency, despite repeated public avowals of diminished prestige and operational ability because of the various inquides into in- telligence operations, are con- vinced that the agency will suf- fer no serious loss of authority and no erosion of its ability to produce professional intelli- gence estimates and reports. Key agency oficials do not expect either the Senate or House Select Committee on In- telligence to recommend a ban on clandestine intelligence activ- ities. Instead, they believe the committees will seek to impose more stringent controls on such operations, a compromise they feel will be welcomed by the agency. In a series of recent inter- views, a number of agency of- ficials also expressed 'surprise at what they said was the in- ability of the ? Senate commit- tee, headed by Senator Frank! Church, Democrat of Idaho, to generate public support for its inquiry. ? "Frank Church was the first TV show to close this fall," one senior agency aide said. ? ee Mr. Church and his senior !aides took sharp exception to ,these views. They said that much of the committee's most important work was proceed- ing now in executive hearings and would, if consistent with national security requirements, be made public after the inves- tigation ends next February. All the agency officials in- terviewed agreed that the. public criticism and official investigations following the published reports last December of widespread domestic spying by the. agency had failed to hamper seriously its main func- tion?the collection of worth- while intelligence. ? At one point last February, William E. Colby, the recently ousted Director of Central In- telligence, testified that what he called "exaggerated" charges of improper conduct had "placed American intelligence in danger." "We've been looking for ap- parent, observable effects," one intelligence official said last week. "There are none." ? He added, however, -that agency officials were concerned about "the intangibles, that you don't knew. v.,tiat: you're miss- ng?the defector who doesn't .defect, someone who doesn't. ficial staid that the United States and other intelligence serices occasionally held back things from each other, but that that was was nothing new. One senior Ford Administra- tion official, asked for his as- sessment of potential damage to intelligence operations, com- plained about the continued disclosure to Congress of in- ternal documents relating to agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders and other clan- destine operations. The official said he was concerned that fu- ture Presidents and intelligence chiefs might be restricted be- cause of the fear that succes- sors would make certain data public. Aside from that, however,' the Official said he knew of. na instance in which the agen- cy's ability to produce intelli- gence had been adversely, af- fected by the Congressional hearings. One high-level agency source did say that one European politician had recently turned down covert financing of a political campaign. The official refused to supply further in- formation, and it was impos- sible to gauge how widespread such refusals of secret aid were. A Frequent Question One agency official conceded that a factor in the dispute over how much, if any, damage had been done to C.I.A. operations in the last 10 months was that Congress had repeatedly asked the same question in recent hearings. Last Wednesday, William Nelson, the C.I.A.'s director of operations, was asked for his views on the matter by Repre- sentative David C., Treen, Re- publican of Louisiana, during House hearings. Mr. Nelson ,said that some American citizens and agents abroad had refused to cooperate for fear of being exposed. He said that "there has been a good deal of apprehension" in foreign intelligence services about continuing their relation- ships with the C.I.A. "I don't want to overexag- gerate this, however," Mr. Nel- son added. "The agency is still functioning abroad, and I think functioning rather effectively." A number of agency officials said that a major concern did develop over the publication earlier this year of "Inside the Company," a book by Philip Agee, a former agency opera- tive, describing clandestine agency activity in Latin Amer- ica and naming C.I.A.. covert agents and their undercover contacts. The book led to serious prob- lems for some operatives, intel- ligence officials said. They added, however, that no similar information had leaked from the Congressionel intelligence committees. If a central complaint did' 'emerge during the interviews, which were initiated before the ouster of Mr. Colby last week- end, it was repeated concern about a loss of moral within the egency because of the widesperad public criticism of its domestic spying and some, lof its clandestine overseas ac- I. Some etfieiale, though, dis- 18 counted the' -significance of morale inside any bureaucracy. One high ? level Administra- tion official said that morale had been bad. inside the State Department for 25 years) "but- they still do their job." ' But those officials who were bothered by a loss of morale said that President Ford's sum- mary dismissal of Mr. Colby, who had been Director of Cen- tral Intelligence since ' 1973, had created a uniting surge of sympathy for Mr. Colby in ,the agency. ? One Colby associate said that the director initially planned to leaye the pest last Wednesday ? he later agreed to stay through the end of the year ? after signing 70 supergrade pro- motions that had been author- ized and to award the promo- tions at a ceremony. ? More than 500 senior C.I.A. officials gatheied Wednesday for the ceremony in the audi- torium on the agency's grounds near Washington. "Colby walks in," one eye- 'witness recalled, "and all of a sudden everyone jumps up and applause begins. It lasted five minutes, with Colby trying to shut it off. Now everyone [inside the agency] is saying. that Colby died for our sins." Colby Praised . Mr. Colby has been 'widely praised for his consistent ef- forts to coorperate with the various investigating commit- tees that were set up this year, although his approach is known to have angered many associ- ates and friends of Richard Helms, who was director of the C.I.A. When it was engaged in domestic spying.. ? One 'mild- demurral to the general praise for Mr. Colby's candor came from Representa- tive Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk, whb is chairman of the House intelligence com- mittee. Mr. Pike told Mr. Colby during .a hearing: "It has been my own experience that if you are asked the right question. you will give an honest answer. You. do not make it easy for us* to ask the right question." When the House and Senate committees began summoning agency witnesses, one Colby .admirer said: "You had the making of -a potentially disas- trous situation. And yet by playing it straight, and by try- ing to get the material out. the .agencv has finally come into the -20th century. They now know that acts of wrong- doing must be turned over to the Department of Justice." A number of agency men praised Mitchell Rogovin, a Washington lawyer hired by Nr. Colby, to . aid the agency in its presentations before Con- gress. Sources said that Mr. Rogovin constantly and successfully urged Mr. Colby and others to- turn over voluntarily evidence of wrongdoing as a means of keeping the Congres- sional investigations on the de- fensive. "Part of the problem cr! being in. our culture," one middle-lev- el agency official said in ex- plaining why many in the agen- cy were reluctant to in ke any information public, ":3 that compartmentaliLation is. one of -AppY8litecfrorReTease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-09432R000100380004-2 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2 the fundamental disciplines? the idea is to limit the damage in case the K.G.B. [the Soviet Secret intelligence service] pe- netrates the agency. This be- comes part of the ritual, and some of the things we thought would be abhorrent to the American public" [upon disclo- sure] "are things the people have to put up with day after day." Raw Files Provided One official said in an inter- view two weeks ago that Jus- tice Department officials were being provided with direct ac- cess to the agency's raw files. At least one Justice Depart- ment inquiry, into allegations: that Mr. Helms commiettd per- jury while testifying bfore! Congress, is known to still be under review. Other agency officials also expressed the view that the relatively few new issues raised thus far by the Congressional committees were based entirely on docnments and evidence supplied by the agency. Nothing has been unearthed by the committee that hasn't been discovered by the agency and stopped," one source said Senator Church said today in a televised interview that his committee's report would contain "some new inform about the agency's assassina- tion plot. The official Added that the basic working document uti- lized by the blue-ribbon com- mission set up by President ,Ford and headed by Vice Pres- jident Rockefeller for its investi- gation and report in June was the internal -C.I.A. dossier on ?domestic abuses assembled in .May 1973 at the request of ;James R. Schlesinger, then the 'C.I.A. director, who was dis missed last week as Secretary of Defense. ? Some agency officials specu- lated that the Schlesisger re- port did not include all the agency's domestic wrongdoing, but they doubted that the intel- ligence committees would be able to develop significant new material. tine operatives, the Schlesinger report has been denounced as the "vomit report," a reference to the fact that agency em-1 ployees volunteered much of! the information about the' domestic violations ' to Mr.: Schlesinger's office. There are still some men in the agency, .a highly reliable source said, twho pride themselves on "hav- ing stronger stomachs." There is ? no evidence that Mr. Colby or any other official has authorized further inquiries into domestic wrongdoing, al- though the existence of such attitudes is reported to be wide throughout the agency. Two middle-level C.T.A. offi- cials who are now serving in key managerial positions in the agency expressed disappoint- ment in the public proceedings of the Church committee. "A lot .of basic questions about intelligence and its need haven't been aired, and that's too bad," one said. The other complained that the , Church committee had not begun to exam inc. publicly the "fun- damental" issue of covert oper- ations. ApriroVedfcir Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-NP.77+00-432R001038004L2.- ! A more senior intelligence official wondered whether what ?he felt was the failure of the Congressional investigations to deal with the more substantial issues would not provoke yet another inquiry into intel- ligence in . some future Con- gress. "The Senate had the staff," one agency source said, "but. it got too bogged down in the assassinations." He said that thus far the Church committee had yet to! fix firmly a schedule for public! hearings on the agency's covert activities in Chile, where at! least SS million was spent to. prevent the election of Salva' dor Allende Gossens in 1970: and, failing that, to attempt to make it more difficult for. .Mr. Allende's regime to govern. Mr. Allende was overthrown by a military junta in Septem- ber 1973 and was either ?killed or committed suicide. A number of agency men believe that the House. intel- ligence committee has publicly I examined more basic questions! dealing with the capability of ;the C.I.A. to make accurate intelligence assessments. ! One former agency official said: "The House goes after the arteries, 'while the Senate goes after the capillaries." The Senate committee was known to be engaged in an intense dispute over Senator Church's desire to stage exten- sive public hearings on the C.I.A.'s role in Chile. ? Opposition on Panel Sources close to the commit- 'tee said that opposition from Republicans and some Demo- crats on the nine-member panel had prevented Mr. Church from going forward this week with full-scale public hearings. As of last Friday, the sources said, the Senators had been unable to agree how long the hearings, if public, should last and which witnesses should be summoned. Defenders of the Senate com- mittee, including M. Church, concede that the public hear- ings have failed to arouse strong public interest, but they {insist that the committee 'should not be judged until it I completes its work. A number of sources said ' that the assassination report, scheduled to be released in two weeks, reaches no definite conclusions about who author- ized what in Cuba, Chile, the Congo and the Dominican Re- public. The report, however, is said to contain the most detailed information ever as- sembled outside the C.I.A. on how covert operations are ini- tiated and carried out. Mr. Church is known to be sensitive to the Charges that he sought to obtain personal !publicity by publicly investigat- ing such seemingly ,dramatic but less significant issues as the failure of some low-level! !agency official to destroy lethal! 'toxin stocks after a direct IPres- idential order to do so in late' 1969. 1969. Senator said In a recent 'telephone interview ? that such accusations were "groundless" and added: "The assassination matter would have been unpre- cedented box office. It would have been the most sensational hearings held in this century. I was against bringing ?this out because I. thought it would have caused damage" to the nation. 'Headline-Grabbing' Denied "It's just unconscionable to 'turn around and say that the committee is headline -grab- bing," Mr. Church added. Similarly, William -G. Miller, staff director of the Church committee inquiry, said in a telephone interview that 30 in- vestigators and attorneys had been working since early this year on what he said was one of the central issues in the investigation: Are you* going to have covert operations and !under what conditions and what'controls? Thus far, Mr. Miller said, the staff dealing with that issue has been meeting privately and, may be forced to conclude its, work with relatively little in- formation made public. Mr. Miller conceded that "the things that have been made public are .not as important in the long run, but it takes a lot of maturity and strength to realize that the way you get to the gut issues is to handle them, in executive ses- sion." He added that the Senators on the committee had to mak 'decisions and attempt to ba- lance "what the public should know against national securi- ty." "In every major area of in- quiry," he said, "the more in- formation there is, the greater the sense 'of .having to weigh PHILAD D. ELH-i. 29 October 1975 C Threat? ? .To the.Editon- 'really; incrediblef Our' clvi-. lized world is--.slo.Nly crumbling .before the assault of revolutionar- ies . .in .all -parts of the-globe.and here? at. home,' Sen...-Cnurcli-is iii- vestigating the CL.1,1 ....? ? ,:- "?:::-Does? anyone really .believe that the-enemy and threat to our lives:: ? the FBI or. CIA? -I -believe- We-,re