PANEL SAYS CIA, FBI COVERED UP JFK KILLING DATA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

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NO.11
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EASTERN EUROPE
WEST EUROPE
NEAR EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
25 JUNE 1976
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WASHINGTON POST
2 4 JUA: /27,
?
Continued
ill Inquiry
uatre_5t,ested
By George Lardner Jr..
Washington Post Staff Writer
- The Senate intelligence
committee said yesterday
:that senior officials of
both the CIA and 'the FBI
covered up crucial infor-
mation in the course of
investigating ? President
Kennedy's assassination.
Issuing the final findings
of 'its protracted investiga-
tions; the ,committee said it
had been unable to satisfy
itself as to why the Warren
Commission was kept in the
dark, but said that "the pos-
sibility exists that senior of-
ficials in both agencies made
conscious decisions not to
disclose potentially impor-
tant information."
, Filled with tantalizing but
admittedly inconclusive de-
tails, many of them laid out
for the first time, the 106-
.page report emphasized that
it had not uncovered evi-
dence "sufficient to justify a
conclusion that there was a
-conspiracy .to assassinate
President Kennedy." -
But the committee said
the -investigative deficien-
cies" it turned up were sub-
stantial enough to raise
grave doubts about the 'War-
ren Colemi,eione. 1.1;
to justify continued congres-
sional investigation.
Sea. Eicher(' S. Schweiker
(11-Pa., who Played a key
rule in the Senate assassina-
tion inquiry, said it had
turned up "important new
leach;" that were being kept
secret ill hopes that the per-
re.,:nerit new Senate .1atelli-
1,;ence Committee would NW-
sue theta effectively.
Othci? potentlall;i? impor-
tant leads that Went unpin-
Sued at the time of the as-
sassination, according to the
report, included several
mysterious flights from,,
Mexico City to Havana. ,
One of ethem reportedly,
involved a Cubana Airlines
flight the night Kennedy,
was killed which was de-
layed in Mexico City for.
five, hours for an unidentie
fied passenger.. who finally
got aboard "without passing,
through customs" and then''
"traveled to Cuba in the:
cockpit ... thus again avoid-
. ing identification by the pas-
sengers.",e.
Althou g.h the CIA re-
ceived information to this
effect on Dec.- 1, 1963, the
Senate committee said it
was unable to find any in-
dication that the ? CIA had.
conducted a felloW-up in-
vestigation to determine the
identify of the passenger.
The study dwelt heavily
on the CIA's clandestine-
plotting against Cuban Pre-
mie. Fidel Castro at the,
time of the assassination;
and the determination of:
U.S. government officials,.,
especially at the .FBI, to deel
pict Lee Harvey Oswald as
Kennedy's lone killer.
Just four days' after the
President's murder in Dallas'
on Nov. 22, 1963, the Senate:
report disclosed, ,Deputy At-
torney General Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach sent a
Memo to the White House'
declaring: ?
"The public must be antis-,
lied that Oswald* was the
assassin: that he did .not
have confederates who are
slit! at large; and that the
evidence was snch that he
would have been convicted
at trial."
Speculation about Os- .
wald's motives, the Katzen-
bach memo added, "ought to
be cut off, and we should
have some basis for rebut-
ting thought that this. was a
Comniunist conspiracy or "
(as the Iron Curtain Dress is
sayinf-0 a right-wing cotispir-:,
aey to blame it on Com-
mueist 5,"
? By that time, the Senate
;report showed, the CIA was
already making - efforts to
? head off talk .of a conspir-
acy. It attempted, unsuccess-
fully, on Nov. 23, 1963, to
head off the imminent ar-
rest by Mexican -police of
Sylvia Duran, an employee
of the. Cuban copsulate in
Mexico City with whom Os-
wald had talked on a visit,
there two months earlier.
-.Informed by the CIA!s
? Mexico station, that the ar-
rest Could not be prevented,.
.a top-ranking, official in the
CIA's Directorate for Plans,
Thomas Karamessines, Ca-
,bled back that the arrest
'could jeopardize U.S. free-
dom of action on the whole
? question of Cuban responsi-
bility."
- Questioned by the corn-,
mittee two, months ago, Kar-
,.amessines, the. report said,
"could not recall preparing
the cable or his reasons- for
issuing such a message. He
speculated that the CIA
feared the Cubans were re-
sponsible, and that Duran
?? might reveal this during an
interrogation. He further
speculated that if Duran did'
possess such information,
the CIA and the U.S. gove-
ernment would need time to
, react .before it came to the
attention of the public,"
Repeettedly raising the
? possibility that the Kennedy
assassination might have
. been a retaliation by Castro
or his supporters, the com-
mittee said that the CIA had
been meeting since early
September with a secret Cu-
ban agent code-named AM-
LASH who was proposing
an "inside job" against the
Castro regime, including
Castro's assassination.
Although the Senate re-
port does not use his real
name, AM HASH was a sen-
ior Cuban official and. Cas-
tro intimate named Polar:do
Cubcia whom the CIA re-
; 'Milted in 1961 as an impor?
tont "asset" inside Cuba, bet
Whom siii-rne belie 1. o was a
..double agent, His talk about
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getting rid of Castro was
communicated to CIA head-
quarters at Langley, Va., on
Sept. 7, 1;iO3.
Late on the evening of
that same clay, Sept. 7. the
Senate report said, Castro
held an impromptu. three-
hum interview w Associ?
' :tied Press reporter Daniel
Ilarker at an embassy party
in Havana. In the interview.
the Cuban premier warned
against any U.S. efforts to
assassinate Cuban leaders
and said:
"We are prepared to fight
them and answer in kind.
United States leaders should
? think that if they are aiding
terrorist plans to eliminate
Cuban leaders, they them-
selves will not be safe."
The warning apparently
failed to raise any serious
apprehensions in Washing-.
ton.
On Sept. 12; 1963, several
days after publication of the
AP dispatch in U.S. newspa-
pers, an interagency Cuban
Coordinating Committee
met at the' State . Depart-
ment and agreed unani-
mously "there was a strong
likelihood that Castro would
retaliate in some way
against the rash 61 covert
activity in Cuba."
The so-called
"brainstorming" session eon-
eluded, however, that while
kidnapings and attempted
asassinations of U.S. citizens
in Latin America might be
? staged, "attacks against U.S.
officials" in the United
States were "unlikely."
Some CIA officials, such
, as the chief of counterintel-
ligence on the Special .Af-
fairs Staff for Cuban opera-
tions, thought AINILASH's
."bona fides were subject to
question," but the meetings
with the Cuban operative
continued.
On Oct. Oct. 29, 1963. the late
Desmond Fitzgerald, who
was then in charge of the
CIA's Special Affairs Staff,
met with Cubela after being
introduced to him as .a
"personal 'representative" oc
Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy.
AMLASH, the Senate re-
:port recounted, asked for an
, assassination weapon such
?as a high-powered rifle with
telescopic sights. The matter
was apparently left unre-
solved but by Nov. 19, three
days before Kennedy's
sassination, Fitzaerald told
AMLASH's ease off to
inform the Cuban "that the
rifle, telescopic sights and
explosives would be pro-
vided."
Hli.Y.-?11, ady;
Paris at the time, had hetet
planning to return to Cuba,
but on Nov. 20, HY;:l, the re-
port noted, a .Cl. officer
telephoned him and ze.,ked
him to wait for a
on Noy. 22.
"AMLASII as'eed if use
nicetinir h-,
inf.!, and i iso CIA officer re-
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Sponded that he did not
know 'whether it would be
interesting but it was the
meeting AMLASH had re-
quested," the report said.
". . . Thus the Nov. 20 tele-
phone call was the first in-
dication that he might re-
ceive the specific support he
requested"
The report indicated that
AMLASH met only with his
CIA case officer on Nov. 22
and not Fitzgerald; as an
earlier Senate report sug-
gested. At the meeting, the
case officer cited President
Kennedy's Nov. 18, 1963,
speech in Miami "as an in-
dication that the President
supported a coup."
Kennedy had called the
Castro government "a small
band of conspirators" who
consituted a "barrier" which,
"once removed," would en-
sure U.S. support for pro-
gressive goals in Cuba.
"The case officer t old
AMLASH that Fitzgerald
had helped write the speech,"
the Senate report said. The
-CIA official also said a rifle
? and explosives would be,;
..forthcoming and offered the
Cuban a poison pen to use
against Castro. "As
.AMLASH and the case of-
ficer broke ? up their meet-
ing, they were told the
President had .1:icon assasi-
nated."
When -Castro heard the
news in Havana, the report
said quoting French journa-
list Jean ? Daniel who -was
meeting with Castro at the
time, ' the Cuban Premier
asked. about President John-
son: "What authority does,
he exercise over the CIA?"
Despite the CIA schem-
ing, the report said,: neither
the Warren Commission nor
the CIA nor FBI officials
assigned to work on the
Kennedy investigation were
told of the efforts against,
Castro.
As a consequence. Se.hwei-
kmosaid, no one "ever actu-
ally conducted any full-scale
investigation to find out
whether a foreign govern-
ment was involved.
At the FBI, the report
-disclosed that six days after
the 'assassination, then di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover was
given a report "which de-
tailed serious investigative
deficiencies" in the bureau's
handling of 0.swahrs case
after his return from Roe.
sia in 1962 as an erstwhile
Sok let d elector.
The deficiencies resulted
in secret disciplinary actions
against 17 FBI personnel,
The actions were never cum-
ed to the Warren
Commiasicm and siiine were
carried out only after the
commission educluded its
investigation inc September.
1064.
)(meet', the (aimed' tee adds
ed. citing -from various Halt
deem:lent:a neaa el en tins
.eisminiasion 7r5 adversary,
and often eaunnin-i-ned thzAp1*OV6d For Release 2001/08/08
NEW YORK TIMES
2 5 JUN 1976
Kennedy and Castro
Possible Cuban Links to the 1963
Killing Seen as Basis for Study
By DAVID BINDER
Special to The ,New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 24 ? it, "the possibility exists that
On the strength of a report by; senior officials [of the F.B.I.
the Senate Select Committee and the CIA.] made conscious
on Intelligence Activities, some decisions not to disclose poten-
Senators have called for an- tially important information"
other investigation of the as- relating to the assassination.
sassination of Pres- The staff specialists say a
ident Kennedy. If new inquiry could try to deter-
Ne" the' 7 call "is an- mine "on whose authority" and
- Analysisswered, and it m
for what reasons the post-or-
might be one day, tern investigations by both
the new investiga- agencies were crippled or halt-
tion would be the sixth con- ed. -
ducted on -a 'major scale by Second, questions remain tin-
government officials since John resolved about the role Of a
F. Kennedy was murdered m'
Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. man referred to as Am/Lash;
a Cuban official close to Mr.
What more is to be done in Castro, who was chosen by the1
the way of investigation in the C.I.A. to kill the Prime Minister
13th year after the murder of and lead a coup overthrowing
the 35th President of the ,the Castro government.
United States? . The select committee estaha
Trails Have Grown Cold lished that AM/Lash, in reality,
Rolando Cubelo, was receiving
C.I.A. instruction's on eliminat-
ing Mr. Castro at the very time
Lee Harvey Oswald was 'prepar-
'ing to shoot at President Ken-
nedy.-
Was it possible, the commit-
tee staff members . ask, that
.Am/Lash could have been a
double agent whose direct
knowledge of the C.I.A.'s inten-
tions toward Mr. Castro led to
the Kennedy murder?
? The third area for further in-.
'vestigation, Mr. Sehweiker con-
tends, concerns leads purport-
ing to involve several "mysteri-
'ous strangers" of Cuban origin,
whom the intelligence agencies
picked up in the aftermath of
the murder and then dropped.
One lead involved reports as-.
? sem?bled by the C.I.A. about 'a
Trails unexplored at the time
grew cold and now are covered
with the underbrush of passing
years.
J. Edgar Hoover, the director
of the F.B.I. 'at the time of the
assaination, is dead. So is Allen
W. Dulles, Director of Central
Intelligence until the spring of
1961, a man knewledgeable
;about the Kennedy Administra-
tion plots against Cuba's Prime
-Minister, Fidel Castro.
However, according to Sen-
ator Richard S. Schweiker, the
Pennsylvania Republican who
remains among the most en-.
thusiastic of the assassination
students and potential conspir-
acy theorists, the previous Fed-
eral investigations of the
murder 'amounted to "a cover-
up.".
While Mr. Schweiker has re- Cuban-American -who crossed
treated from his assertion of from 'Texas into Mexico on
last October that the Warren .Nov. 23, 1963, and then board-
Commission report would col- .ed a Chban airliner bound for
lapse "like a house of cards," Havana several days .later as.
the only passenger.
Another involved, an uniden=
tified, person who arrived -in
he still maintains that there
are "promising leads." He
takes this view despite the eon.:
elusion of yesterday's report,
which . h helped write, that
no new evidence sufficed "to
justify a conclusion that there
was a conspiracy."
The focus of a new investiga-
tion, however, would be rather
limited in scope and different
in emphasis from the. earlier
studies. aceording to stall'
members of the Senate select
? committee.
Mr. Schweiker and. with less
enthusiasm, some of his Senate
'colleagues, want to tie. up what
,they klieve to be loose ends
,remaining in three fields.
First, as the committee. Puti
its chairman, Chief justiCe'
Earl Warroa was ''seeking
to criticize" tire FBI.
On t WO separate occasiense
the r eport added, "Directors
Hoover asked for ad the dereg.
? ritary materiel mi Warr*
cammiesion members anel,
stall eontaleed in the
'Mexico city the night of the
Kennedy murder and boarded
a Cuban airliner that had been
delayed five hours to take the
man to Havana. The pas:zerger
was not subjected to customs
controls.
A Senate official who is
iclose to the committee investi-
gation said today, 'They feel:
;there is a conspiracy. But they
are not ready to point a finger
yet at pro-Castro or anti-Castro. -
forces. They also feel there are
.indications Am/Lash was a
idouble agent."
Along with the recommenda-
tion that the new Senate intel-
ligence oversight committee,
follow up these aspects of the
assassination, the select com-
mittee has handed over 5,000
,pages of documents relating to
its own investigation.
Senator Schweiker is sched-
uled to appear Sunday on the
1"Face The Nation" television
!program to plead his cause for
'pursuit of the leads.
'But aides of Senator Daniel
K. Inouye, who is chairman-of
the new intelligence commit-
tee, 'said that the Hawaii Dem-
ocrat wanted an Opportunity to
study the latest investigative
report before authorizing a new
inquiry. ? . ,
."It is not -his first priority,".
an Inouye aide said.
.An aide of Howard H. Baker
Jr., a member of the old and
new committees, said, "Loose
ends should be wrapped up,"
but added, "He is not overly
enthusiastic. I doubt if it has
top priority."
Nor is it certain what the
United States would have done 1
or would still do if it were sod-
denly established that the Cas-!.
.tro Government indeed plotted:
and directed the killing of Pres-
ident? Kennedy. - ? ,
At the time, with the- 1961
debacle of the C.I.A.-directed
Bay of. Pigs landing fresh in
mind and the 1962 Cuba mis-
sile crisis only a year behind
them, Kennedy Administration
officials were predisposed to
avoid still another "Cuban
flap," as the select committee
report makes clear.
There is no indication what-.
soever that the currrent lead-
ems of the United, States desire,
"Cuban flap" now, either.
THE WASHINGTON STAR
23 June 1976
Soviets Resume Attack on 3 Newsmen
MOSCOW ? A Soviet*publication has renewed its at-
tacks on three American reporters in Moscow who it
:-claims are associated with the CIA.
? The weekly Literary Gazette yesterday accused
; 'George A. Krimsky of The Associated Press, Christo-
:;pher S. Wren of The New York Times and Alfred
.'Friendly Jr. of Newsweek magazine of seeking !TAW-
,ntary information.
? The May 26 issue of the weekly had accused them of
',working for the CIA. The new article printed what it
:.called "evidence' based, it said, on letters from Soviet
;citizens. ?
:? All three correspondents and their news oraaniza-
etions have rejected the allegations of association with
-the CIA. ,
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NEW REPUBLIC
5 June 1976
An Eye for an Eye?
The Death of JFK
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central
Intelligence Agency engaged in a cover-up of highly
relevant information when the Warren Commission
,vvat investigating President John Kennedy's assassin-
tion in 1963 and 1964. President Lyndon Johnson and
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy became party to
;the effort which consisted of withholding key facts:
from the Warren Commission. The cover-up?contin-
ues even now 12 years later; the FBI still refuses to turn
over to congressional investigators some of its most
sensitive files on the killing of JFK:
The Warren Commission was never told that Attor-
ney General Kennedy secretly formed?before his
:brother was killed?a special intergovernmental com-
mittee, which included FBI and CIA representatives, to
look into the possibility that Cuba's Premier Fidel
Castro might organize attempts on the lives of high
United States government officials. That this commit-
tee existed has .been kept secret although information
;about it reposes in. FBI files_
? .The top-secret comonittee was created by Robert
; Kennedy presumably out of concern that Castro might
, retaliate against CIA attempts,on his life, carried out
directly by the agency's operatives and vith help from
the Mafia. That anti-Castro as,:a:;sination plots were
? afoot in the early 1960% was unknown at the tine (they
were disclosed last year by the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Activities) and the Warren Com-
mission was not .told of them. Only Allen W. Dulles,
who had been CIA director, had knowledge of the a nti-
Castro plots, in its ignorance the commission couldn't
search more intensively into the possible motives of Lee
Harvey Oswald in killing the l'resident. The commis-
. sion had concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin in
Dallas, but it acknowledged its inability to come up with
the motive.
It does not follow, of course', that the Warren Com-
mission would surely have t raced Os wa ki's motives had
it known of. the anti-Castro conspiracies and of the
establishment or Robert Kennedy's secret group some
time before Dallas. There is still no proof that Castro
was behind Oswald. But the cover-up made it
impossible for the commission to seriously pursuc'a line
of inquiry in this area even thongh there had been
much discussion of the significance k.,1 Oswald's links
with the Fair Play for Cuba Commit tee (a pro-Castro
group in the United States) and his aborted efforts tOgo
to Cuba two months before he killed JF:K.
Robert Kennedy, the CIA and the1 w decided to keep
from the Warren Commission the fact that a special
group had been set up to protect American leaders from
possible Cuban assassination plots. To justify its
existence, it would have been necessary to expose the
CIA's own conspiracies against Castro. These were
among.the most closely held secrets of the Kennedy-
Johnson period. That the CIA failed to inform the
Warren Commission of anti-Castro plots?even
though the agency was under presidential orders tc.
provide maximum assistance to the commission?was
confirmed in a memo on April 20, 1975 written by CIA
inspector general Donald Y. Chamberlain. to CIA
deputy director E.H. Knoche. It said: "As far as we can
tell from all of the materials at our disposition, no one
(
discussed with the Warren Commission any alleged
plan to assassinate Castro. There is also no evidence
' that anyone known to our records made a decision ! to
tell the Warren Commission anything about this toe:.c
or any other matter."Chamberlain added that "we have
no evidence in our material indicating Castro's
,.knowledge or the possession of documentation of
; alleged assassination plots directed against him.-
: Two days later, on April 22, 1975, Raymond G.
Rocca, then deputy chief of the CIA's
.,?,,,soi,interintelligence staff, informed Knoche that "our
records show at every point a marked intent to makeas
much available to the [Warren Commission] as was
consistent with the . security of the ongoing
operations." Rocca also reported that his files do not
:'show whether the Warren Commission was informed
.iof a 1962 report from the CIA's station in Guatemala
according to which a statement was made at a
;Guatemalan Communist party meeting that "we need
knot preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President
Kennedy because we know, according to prognostica-
tion, that he will die within the present year."
Although, as Rocca put it, the counterintelligence
staff was the CIA's "working-level point of contact
with the Warren. Commission," -plans- 'to assassinate
Castro were not "known to-us in CIA staff."'
In all likelihood, President Johnson, who knew of the
anti-Castro plotting, also knew that Robert Kennedy
had set up his special committee. But there is no
' indication that he shared that knowledge with Chief
Justice Earl Warren when the commission was orga-
nized in November 1963. Robert Kennedy's testimony
before the Warren Commission likewise omitted
mention of his own fears that assassinations might
breed assassinations. But it is part of the public record
that Johnson subsequently commented, without
elaborating, that President Kennedy might have been
killed in retaliation for his administration's anti-Castro
lpolicies. At the time, this remark was taken to mean
;possible retaliation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion
land subsequent CIA operations against Cuba.
I. All these facts, secret at the time, may have influ-
enced the Kennedy family in its decision to oppose any
:reopening of the assassination probe. Again, a new
.investigation might have led to public disclosures of the
CIA plotting and tarnishing the memory of John and
Robert Kennedy.
Robert Kennedy's interest in aggressive operations
against Cuba was reported in a document written -by
John McCone, then CIA director, on October 4, 1962,
describing a top-level strategy meeting chaired by the
attorney general, McCone wrote that "the attorney
general reported on discussions with the President on
Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage
field, went on to stress that nothing was moving
? forward, commented that one effort attempted' had
Failed IP
? Another element of the cover-up was that in at least #,
50 instances the CIA had, according to an.internal FBI
memo, ignored materials supplied by the bureau. on
Oswald's foreign connections. The responsibility for
following op such FBI leads was in the hands of an ad
hoc group built around the CIA's so-called "D Staff," a
clandestine operations center then headed by William
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Harvey, a senior agency official. The CIA's counterin-
telligence office, directed by James Angleton, reported
directly to Harvey's "D sta ff," a nd it too was involved in
investigating certain aspects of the Kennedy assassina-
tion. Sources contend that the CIA actually destroyed
some of the materials provided by the FBI. Angleton,
according to those sources, may have suspected Soviet
"plants" in the FBI material. The Warren Commission
never knew about any of it.
As has been reported earlier, the FBI destroyed at
least one letter Oswald sent to the Dallas police
department shortly before the assassination. Oswald
; demanded that the FBI stop "harassing" his Russian-
born wife Marina and threatened to blow up the Dallas
. police headquarters if the FBI failed to desist. This
became known only last year, and the FBI never offered
a conclusive explanation for destroying the note.
Likewise, the FBI inexplicably failed to place Oswald on
its "dangerous list" although it did so with other
members of the Fair Play Committee.
-
A CIA memorandum to the Rockefeller Commission,
which last year investigated CIA abuses, said that the
agency still feels, as it did in 1964, that the Warren
Commission should have given more credence in its ;
final report to the possibility of foreign links in the
conspiracy against Kennedy. The memo said that there
were promising leads that were not followed up. This
statement contradicts the FBI memorandum now in the
possession of the Senate Select Committee that the
CIA refused to pursue leads obtained by the bureau.
However, acute rivalry between the CIA and the FBI
, already existed at the time?they actually, stopped
cooperating altogether in 1970?and their estrange-
ment could account for the contradictions.
The cover-up is among the reasons the Senate Select
Committee voted on May 13 to recommend a congres-
sional inquiry into the role of the intelligence agencies
in the Warren Commission investigation, and into
Oswald's motives.
The Senate committee first learned of the cover-up a
few months ago. This is the new evidence the panel
claims it has obtained about Oswald's motives. Sen.
Richard Schvveiker of Pennsylvania and Sen. Gary Hart
of Colorado, who constitute a 'special subcominit tee on
the Kennedy assassination, have written a separate
report on the subject. Neither Schweiker nor Hart has
publicly revealed thus far the nature of the new
? evidence?the cover-up. There is said to be great
pressure to sanitize this report while the full secret.
information would be turned over to the Senate's new
permanent oversight committee on intelligence or
whatever other panel might undertake the
recommended investigation of the Kennedy death.The
subcommittee report is expected to be issued in mid-
June after the FBI and the CIA have inspected it to
remove what they may consider "embarrassing" infor-
mation.
Although senators are far from certain that the
proposed inquiry would actually provide a conclusive
. answer about Oswald's motives?the trail has become
cold in the opinion of many senators?the FBI and the
CIA could find themselves under charges of obstruc-
tion of justice for having withheld significant material
from the Warren Commission.
Among the questions likely to be raised in a new
1 investigation is why Dulles concealed from the Warren
Commission, on which he served, the plotting against
Castro by the CIA. CIA's own records, released in mid-
May, show that the agency had begun to plan Castro's
; assassination in March 1960, when Dulles was CIA
'director, and planning had by then begun for the Bay of
;Pigs. Excerpts from transcripts of the Warren Com-
mission's executive sessions (published in The New
Republic on Sept. 27, 1975) show that Dulles informed
his colleagues that there were certain CIA secrets that
he would keep from everybody except the President of
the United States. Dulles was addressing the still
unclarified question of whether Oswald, as maintained
'by some assassination buffs, had been an undercover
;FBI informer.
A similar question could be raised with John McCone
who was CIA director during the Warren Commission
!investigations and who should be called to testify in any
;new Senate inquiry. McCone was familiar with the
anti-Castro plots and probably knew about Robert
'Kennedy's secret committee.
All the indications are that the existence of this
committee was known to very few people: Robert
Kennedy himself, probably Dulles and McCone, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, and a few selected associates.
Several aides of Robert Kennedy, including a former
assistant director of the FBI, said in interviews last
week that they had not known of the committee. They
said, however, that it was possible that the group,
acting in secrecy, worked out of the White House
before and after the Kennedy assassination Or from the
attorney general's office. .
The Senate Intelligence Committee learned of the
cover-up in the course of its long investigation of the
intelligence community. After references were made
by witnesses to the Robert Kennedy committee in
! testimony touching on foreign assassination plots by
the CIA, the Church Committee asked the FBI and the
; CIA for their relevant files. It is understood that the
CIA made some material available; the FBI refused to do
so for many months. Only recently did the bureau
agree to allow Senate committee members to read parts
; of its secret files, but the senators have to do it at FBI
; headquarters.
I It was in this manner that senators learned of the
;scope of the cover-up by the intelligence agencies.
!They've now requested additional materials from the
FBI. Some senators are said to believe that further vital
information on the Kennedy assassination investiga-
tion may turn up in the FBI files.
It remains unclear why, after 12. years, the FBI is still
reluctant to let senators see all its files on the assas-
sinations., There are no indications that the bureau has
been under any pressure from the I'Vhite I louse?
Presiden t Ford was a member of the Warren
Commission?to withhold material from the Senate. In
fact, Ford himself may be unaware of the contents of
the FBI files. 'Nat raises again a fundamental question:
is the White I louse in full control of the intelligence
agencies?
Tad Szulc
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HUMAN EX InNTS
26 June 1976 a
-- :-
. :'t I.! . . o'l r;-.?* a
..
'' r.' "::''.:?)..;.'1I1
? -, ....
.., -_?
50 H i v ti V
In the fall of 1963, two P. irre assassi- By M. STANTON EVANS
nation plots careened toward
a day of convergence.
One of these, in a general way, we have
known about for years. The victim was
John F. Kennedy, the ?assassin?accord-
ing to official reports--Lee Harvey Os-
wald. The other we haven't known about
-until quite recently. Its intended target
was Fidel Castro, the assassin-to,be
high-up .figure in the Cuban government,?
in continuous contact with the CIA.
The strands of eireums.ance that bind
these- plots together, along with other
anomalies, have spurred an outcry for a
new investgiation of the Kennedy mur-
der. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R.-Pa.)
and Representatives Henry Gonzalez-
(D.-Tex.) and Thomas Downing (D.-
Va.), in particular, have urged that the
investigation be re-opened. On the Ken-
nedy-Castro evidence alone, that request
should be granted by the Congress:
, In the light of recent revelations
about. clandestine activities under
? Kennedy, we have a startling new
perspective not available to the gen-
eral public when .the Warren Com-
mission made its report. We know
that through the summer and fall of
- 1963, the so-called Standing Group
of the National Security Council, in-
cluding Robert Kennedy, Robert Nle-
Namara, John McCone. McGeorge
Bundy and Theodore >iiretiseri, re-
viewed and finally iinpkrninitod a
program el sabotage against the Cas-
tro government.
This program was personally approved
by President Kennedy on June 19, 1963.
"to nourish a spirit of resistance and dis-
affection- against Castro everi as diplo-
matic talks aimed at accommodation
were also going forward. On Oct. 24,
1963. 13 major sabotage operations in-
side Cuba were approved. These were to
be carried out by, or thrOugh, the CIA. ?
Meanwhile, at-a lower level of govern-
ment, even more serious action was afoot.
As documented by the Senate Select
committee on Intelligence, desultory but
more or less continuous gestures toward
assassinating Castro had been considered
by the CIA since the early 1960s, These
inclodcd such exotic devices as poison
cigars and exploding seashells, plus con-
versations with -the Mafia on possible
methods of eliminating the Cuban dic-
tator.
In addition, CIA operatives met ofl.
and on for a period of months with a high
official of the Castro government, known
by the code name of AM/LASH. The
subject of assassinating.Castro kept pop-
ping up in these discussions, and while
the CIA spokesmen reportedly told AM/
LASI i they would not support an assas-.
sination, they did say they would support
a coup, and promised to provide a cache.
of weapons. .
Finally, in the fall of '63, the CIA
promised to deliver a ballpoint pen rigged
with a poison hypodermic needle, which
CIA Director Richard Helms described
as a device "for getting rid of Castro, for
killing him, murdering him, whatever
the case may be." The context was that
the device was delivered to keep AM/
. LASH happy, rather than for actual use,
a somewhat fine distinction. It was hand-
ed over on Nov. 22, 1963---the day that ?
Kennedy himself was murdered.
What makes all this the more incredi-
ble is the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald ?
was a fanatic follower of Fidel Castro.
A Marxist and former defector to the.
USSR, Oswald .had joined- the Castro-
financed Fair Play for Cuba Committee,
displayed a picture of Castro on his man-
- .
telptece, and was a subscriber to The
Militant, the Trotsky Communist pub-
.fication that specialized in running texts
of Castro's speeches. The witnesses who
knew him in New Orleans and Dallas
testified to his absolute devotion to the
Castro
Oswald was in contact with the Com-
munist party in New York and the Trot-
skyist Socialist Workers .party, offering
to do free photographic work for them.
and he subscribed to the publications of -
both. What is striking about these other-
i. antanonistic Nitinxist groups is that
bniii -0-ere committed to the cause of Cas-
tin),
nnd that agents of both were involved
; in cnn orkass of time Fair Play for Cuba
iCoonninte-
Doron? stay in the USSR, Oswald
!had un-:rine:1 the niece of a colonel in the
KGB ... t!, e mini?stly that houses the So-
1 Viet secret police and global intelligence
sc.rviees. On his return to the United
States and Dallas, Oswald generally.
steered clear of the anti-Communist
White Russian community, choosing in--
THE SENTINEL STAR
Orlando, Fla
111 March 1976
Ilarenisment Of CIA
At Ludicrous Stage'
? -
Editor: The harassment of .the
CIA by politicians and a few
irresponsible journalists has now
reached the ludicrous stage. In the
wake of the inept handling of the
Senate and House- ilyiestigations
and the competiton to leak secret
documents, we now hear. from
Robert Horan, the prosecuting
attorney of Fairfax County, Va.
Mr. Horan, having discovered that
CIA headquarters is located in
Fairfax County, has (according to
the: New York Tunes) announced
stead to associate with a Russian expa-
triate couple of decidedly left-wing sym-
path ies.
Eight months before the Kennedy frItlr-
? dcr, 0...said had tried to kill Gen. Edwin
A. Walker---a man otherwise totally dif-
ferent in outlook. from Kennedy, hut
widely publicized in the Dallas news-
papers as art outspoken opponent of Cas-
tro. In tin: summer of 1963, Oswald had
scuffled in the streets against anti-Castro
Cuban esl!..and had taken Castro's part
in a New Orlenns radio debate.
In other ,,,nrds, Oswald hail a long,
consistent i.istory of Nlarxist associ-
ation and sentiment, plus a demon-
strated yea fur i iolence, including
assassioation?hoth geared to the
cause of Fidel Castro. This combi-
nation of factors has been conven-
iently obscured not only by the-War-
en Commission, but also by the con-
ventional critics of the'Commission's
report, roost of whom are eager to
downplay any connection between the
Kennedy murder and left-wing ex-
tremism.
Finally; when he was arrested in Dallas
for the murder of Officer J. D. Tippit, Os-
wald demanded to be represented by
John Abt?attorney for the Communist-
party.
Add the fact that Oswald traveled to
Mexico two months before the Kennedy
assassination to arrange for passage to
Cuba (a request acceded to by Cuban
but denied by I he Soviet
Union, which was supposed to have been
the ultimate object of his journey). All of
this against a backdrop of steadily 'es-
calating rhetorical violence by Castro
and the pro-Ca.;tro literature read by Os-
wald, denouncing Kennedy and the CIA
as thieves and ruffians and saboteurs.
Two assassination plots inyolninp!
Cuba, converging on Nov. 22, 1963. Was
there a connection? The. American people
deserve an answer.
his intention to determine whether
alleged CIA plots against the life
of Fidel Castro have violated
some Virginia Law.
We may hear next from a
politician in the Bronx that CIA
for ce d New York City into
bankruptcy, or, perhaps, a head-
line happy candidate from Mon-
tana can speculate that a CIA
covert action triggered last win-
ter's blizzards.
Let us hope that politicians
closer to home yill refrain from
charging that the weeds choking
our canals and lakes are in fact
CIA listening devices. --JOHN S.
TI 1,TON,
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V I IL ArIE VOICE
21 J U17.2 1976
pki
etAtabe_Ato
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-17.1
BY DICK RUSSELL
The Warren Report, with its
simplistic conclusions about Lee
? Harvey Oswald's "inability to
enter into meaningful relation-
ships," is about to become obso-
lete. Before thins month is up, the:
; Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence will release its own 1T2-
page study of the Kennedy a sttossi-1
' nation?its last and possibly most 1
damaging chronicle of CIA-FBI
wrongdoing, and the first atep
toward d congress- ional investiga-
tion sometithe after the November'
election This much is now certain': ;
The motive, one way or-the other,
goes back. to Cuba?either witht
? Fidel Castro, or against him.
In the -past few weeks, new
information has come out. First a
eew book e-alled "Betrayal," writ- ;
ten by an ex-CIA contract employ-:
`ee named Robert MOITOW, who
claims the asstissination was en-
gineered by a group of right-wing
financiers and anti-Castro exi leS" in
;retaliation for, what they- consitte
tiered Kennedy's sellout at the Bay
? of pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis.;
'Then came arguments from the
opposite angle--copyrighted arti-
cles in the New Republic and!
Washington Post that made it look!
' as if Castro had better start pre-
paring, his defense_ From the looks'
of these, the confusion is only be-
ginning.
; -Past writer George Crile's
hypotheses are correct, the dupItc-
ity surrounding Cuba in the early
lfttaC,s was more staggering than
ever iniagiped. Consider "AM
? LASH," the Cuban the CIA select-
ed to use a poison pen to kill Castro'
in the fall of 1963. Crile identifies ,
him as Rolando Cubela and makes
a strong case for his having been a
double agent for Fidel. A more ;
unlikely Castro rigent. but one
Crile. also suspects, was Florida
alob boss Santo Tr:irk:ante, Jr. A.
key figure in the CIA's liaison with
the Mob in failed attempts to as-
sassinate Fidel, sTreficante is
shown receiving favored treat-
ment from Castro in a Havana jail.
working closely with Castro in a
lottery racket, and in 1963 an-
flouncing to a prominent Mierni
Cuban that Kennedy was "going to
be hit."
The theory ernes. if Castro was
getting advance inside information
on raternata against his life, might
he have decided to retaliate? Tad.
Szadc, in the New Republic, reports
that Hobby I:at:nicely actually
Approved
.,4
!.- 1
e t'ir-\Til
? -- ,q
. ,
-71 '1 a The?
at4i.-ePvi-ncea?-?
? ta9_, ,
formed a top-secret ? intergovern-
mental committee shortly before
his brother was killed to look into
the possibility that Castro might
organize> attempts on the lives of-
- high. U.S. government officials.'
One of the Crile stories closes with.
a quote from Robert Morgan of
North Carolina. a senator on the
. Select -Committee: "There is no
doubt in my mind that John P.
Kennedy was assassinated by.
. Fidel Castro or someone under his
;influence in retaliation for our
'efforts to assassinate him."
" But the one man in a good
position to know Castro's attitude
toward the Kennedys believes the
Castro motive simply doesn't
make sense. - -He is - William
Attwood, former U.S. ambassador
to Guinea and Kenya. current pub-
lisher of Newsday. la the fall of
19.13. ' a speeial adviser to
; America's UN delegation, he un-
dertook secret negot iations,to nor-
. malize relatierts with Cuba.
Asked last week what he thought
of the Castro's-revenge idea:
Auwood scoffed: "Well, I think
that's ridiculous. It was quite obvi-.
? ous to me that Castro, at that time,
; wanted to normalize relations with
; us_ He had no interest whatsoever
in breaking this off, he wasn't
playing any antoe I was on the
, phone at one point to Havana.
, stetting up a possible meeting down
in Veradero to discuss an agenda.
In fact, I was supposed to see the
president richt after Dallas to dis-
cuss the I-and of questions I'd be.
asking. Then. if Castro was agree-
able. I was to go down very quietly.
NOT many people were aware of
this undertaking."
ACcording to Ai mood. by the fall
' of 19i3it U.S. policy toward Cuba
was opera:int; on several different
melee. Thines tied become so dif-
fused that, after Atto,00d received
an olive-branch feeler from Cuba'ti
UN delegate and got approval
from the leentiedys to pursue it.
Secretary of State Dean' Rusk
wasn't even info:-med.
'The State Department had its
aown policy toward Cuba, which
was sort of a frozen. do-nothing
liolictee`Axtwood recalled. "The
CIA, what was left of the eung-Lo
lepes might well still have- teen
.plortine, seta-thing. But J think the
aiienneeitet saw this as a chance to
eft1Se. (Atha as a patitinal issue in
'Lt.64. They didn't want to be at-
tat-he for having loosed uti the
Lay of Pigs. Thee took! say, 'All
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R
j1---c"
A a,.
right., maybe the Bay of Pigs was a
mistake, but now we have an
agreement that Castro will not
subvert Latin America and also
give compensation for our compa-
nies that he'd expropriated, in re-
turn for which we lift the blockade
and unblock the Cuban assets in
Americo.' These were some of the
proposals. And things were moving
;along."
? The Kennedy assassination
brought a halt to all that. For pne
thing, Oswald was an apparent'
Castro sympathizer. For another,
says Attwood, "We were entering
ta Political year; and I don't think
:Johnson really knew what was ;
involved. It sounded too compli-
cated and too risky." Nonetheless,'
? Attwood remembers, Castro did
give his okay for negotiations to
begin and, according to a FrenCh
journalist who was with Fidel on "
the day of Kennedy's death, he was
"shocked and dismayed at the
news of the assassination"
"I've been to Cuba since and ?
stayed in touch with Cubans here
at the UN," Attwood concluded.
"so I have every reason to believe ;
they were sincere. I've always f
if there was any Cuban involve-
ment, it would have been on the
part of the anti-Castro Cubans,.
who might have atad reason to be
fearful ?that some kind of nor-
malization. was in the works and
would have wanted to prevent it.
That's the only conclusion I can
draw from my own experience."
The rumor is that toe tot-meta.-
; ing Senate report will confirm
Attwoods suspicions, especially
- concerning the exile groups that
condacted anti-Castro operations
In 19:13 from Lake Pontehartraiq,
Louisiana and ttik't -Flottida Keys,
That summer, much against. the
CIA's wishes, the Kenuedys had
cut off their funding. The Coast
Guard had been ordered to watch
for any new raids directed at
Cuban s'nortes: numerous exiles
and Minutemen soldier-of-fortune
types were ariested. And bitter-
ness against the Kerinedys was
rife.
If there was anti-Castro involve-
ment, of course, that means a
,cortspirace on American soil. It
also suggests a goad reason for a
CIA-F1t1 (taverna, particularly if
etr ,3. i
itt 1 ?
tax
to
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_
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those agencies had -ever made
prior use of the conspirators. Most
of all, in this bizairre realm, of
turncoats and doabie-turncoat,' it
raises the question of just 'who
' might have used?and maybe set
tip?Lie Harvey Oswald.
? In an election year, the Senate is
reluctant to -take such questions
any further.- Once. the a.ssassina-
tion report comes out, the new
15-man ? intelligence oversight
? . committee says it ? will wait
? another six months before deciding
how to proceed. Even When it does,
the senator who }mows the most
abeut the case won'-t be represent
ed. Thai' is Pennsyvania Republi
ir-
on
air. Richard Schweikf3r, co-eha
man of the ssinati
ni
subcommittee- that spent nei
e/
ed
a eaa
months digging into the maze. B
cause of the Senate's complicat
rules- of seniority and a late bid for
the at-large first-come. first-1
Served seats, he tried but failed to'
? at
II-
? m
win a place. ?
-*Unfortunately. the Stro
Trturrnonds and folks like iii
were the ones who got their hats
the ring months ago," says ai
?_Schweiker staff asaistant. ?Brit
-don't think there ti7as arty plot Id,
keep Schweiker off the new coin-
?
mittee. He intends to stay actively
interested."
Schweiker. who feels his hands
.
were tied by ihe subcommittee's
need for secrecy, plans to keep an
investigator in the field and go
public with additional information
after the initial report is released.
Meantime, before the rest of the
Senate has a -chance to act, the
? House may. take the ball away
from them. For months, retiring
Virginia Democrat Toni Downing
has been battling for a full con-
gressional inquiry into Kennedy's
. murder. He got as far as an all-day
session of the House Rules Com-
mittee on March 31, where a vote
to wait and see what's in the Senate
. report tied 7 to 7 and a move for
indefinite postponement carried 9
to 6. Since then, Downiag has met
privately at least once with House
leaders Carl ? -Albert and Tip
O'Neill. And 0-Neill, the overwhe-
lming favorite to replace the retir-
ing Albert as the -new Speaker. is.
reportedly ready to see -action on ?
Downing'S resolution.
':Our Main talking point/' says
Downing staff assistant Rick
Feeney, "is that we have individu-
als who would be willing to go
under oath right away. Not in six
months but 'in two or three
weeks."
Downing,'s acts is 47-year-old
Baltimore electronics consultant
Robert Morro; who -Wilf; once
arrested in _a 'CIA counterfeiting
scheme and who claims in his
semi-fictional autobiography ni3e-
trayal" that he's closer than any-
one to cracking the'case.
"For more than a decade."
Morrow writes in his introduction,
Approved For
' "handcuffed by the secrecy agrte-
ment required of everyone directly
, or indirectly on the payroll of the
Central Intelligence Agency, I
..
lived with what ? I knew. . .?. This
. 1
book is based upon ? my experi-
ences, on events related to me at
. the time and subsequently by close
associates, and on evidence avail-
able in public testimony. .. . some
dialogue has, been improvised and
certain events reconstructed."
There is little doubt, ?according
to Washington sources,. that
, Morrow did indeed work Cuban
affairs for the CIA during the early
11960.s That, at least, makes him
Ithe first ex-CIA eniployee to speak
?, out. publicly on this subject. He
, says. he will tell far more, far less
cryptically, to a congressional
hearing?and Dawning is inclined
to believe him. ? -
. The problem with "Betrayal"
. (published by Henry Revery) is
'sorting out the improvisations and
:reconstruction S from ?? what
, Morrow really knew. Where he
1 uses real names, the. parties con-
cerned are dead. Where he cannot
?!remember specifics of dates and
. ,!scenes, he invents them. And his
'scenario for. the assassination it-
self, as he readily admits, is noth-
ing more than an imaginative
,
hypothesis. ? '
But if only some of Morrow's
: firsthand knowledge is accurate.
- he has dropped a bombshell. His
initial recruitment, by the CIA, he
. says, grew out of his confidential
? relationship with a Cuban exile
, __ea__ ._. ? . _
leader named Mario Garcia Kohiv.?
. _
- Until the fall ' of 1963, Morrow
, claims to. have maintained fairly
regular eantact with former CIA
, Deputy Dinielor Charles Cabell
. and eas:, officer "Ed Kendricks,"
who bears a strong resemblattee to
: E.dloward I hairs ?ottranne boss of
' covert operations Tracy Barnes:
Cabell and e'Kendricks," accord-
? ing to Morrow, were the overseers
of his main CIA project during
those years?a scheme- to manu-
facture and ? then flood the Cuban
? eeonomy with $50 million in .
. coun-
terfeit pesos ? ? . , .
1 item in chronological order, are
Morrow's neva star-Ili:it: revel a?
! lions:
I.. .
I CkAs an engineering specialist. in
i
i jamming and coiling technirples.
, Mot-row recounts Ida selection for
' a top-secret mission during the
, Bae of Pigs invasion. Given the
:. cede name Robert Porter, he says
he was, flown into Cuba's -Cama-
, guey Mountains to by to discover
the source of some unusual pulse
transmissions that the CIA so-
. spected , might be a signal system.
for ballistic missiles. ? His -alleged,'
? pilot was David Ferric, who died
mysteriously In -1997 Wien New
? Orleans ?District Attorney . Jini
Garrison was about ti: lediet hint
, for conapiraey in the Konitedv as- ,
.saestnation, ? I
ei,The CIA, retis? Morrow actual-
ly stepped up the Bay of Pigs
invasion date without Ken-
nedy's okay. Infuriated, Kennedy
then demanded all data gather-
ed about passible ballistic
missiles turned over to his brother
.at the Justice Department. Not
only did the CIA concludethat the ?
Soviet Union was operating a
control center in the Camaguey
Mountains, Morrow continues, it
also obtained photos smugglecaout
by the anti-Castro underground of
missile launching sites under con-
struction. 13ut the Kennedys chose
to do nothing at that time.
eOn a mission to Europe,
Morrow says the CIA arranged for
him to make a clandestine $2?10,000
arms purchase for Mario Kohly's
Cuban underground. The deal was
consummated_ _through _ aeDallas
eman named "Jake," who Morrow
i says Was Jack Ruby, and a CIA
t
front eailcd Per:aides_ That front
Was handled out of New Orleans by'
CIA consultant Clay Shaw, also
later accuaed and ultimately ac-
'quitted in Garrison's trial. Morrow
says he was taken to the weapons
-warehouse in Athens' by Davi
Ferric.
oDuring that same trip. Morrow'
says the CIA had him pick up an,
envelope in Paris from an Ameri-
can just returned from an extend-
ed tour of the Soviet Union. The
envelope, he was told, :as "the
irJormation wanted from Har-
vey," and had been secreted out of
Minsk. A year later. Morrow as-
serts he was told by Cabell and
"Kendricks" that "Harvey" was a
CIA agent who had gone to Russia
posing as a defector to participate
in an Internal security operation:
make contact with the niece of a
,KGB colonel and arrange to get
her out of Russia as a precondition
for her uncle's defection to the
West.
oAfter the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Morrow claims he was informed
by "Kenddcks" -of CIA reports
that the missiles had not been
removed but taken to hidden sites
deep in the Cuban interior. Ele-
ments of. the CIA believed that
Kennedy and Ithrushchev had
reached a quid-pro-quo agreement
about missiles in Cuba and Turkey.
This, Morrow speculates, was
Kennedy's betrayal?and his
death warrant.
oBy mid-October 1962, the CIA
was worried aboi a losing control of
one of its anti-Castro grours
operating out of New Orleans. Ca-
bell, who was no longer deputy
director but still kept vigil over
numerous covert activities, repor-
tedly wanted Morrow to find out
how closely some of its owr con-i
tract employees?including Cuban
leader Mario Kohly??vere con-
nected to a paramilitary training
camp established at Lake Pont-1
chartmin by clay Shai,v.
Morrow says he was infori
at that same meeting that on
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group?"Jake," or Jack Rubs -
was running Chinese cocaine out e
Cuba under CIA auspices, in ex
change for running guns int,
Mario Kohly's underground. ' 'Her
vey," who had returned from Rus
sia with the ?KGB colonel's nisei
when he came to feel he was wide
suspicion, had been assigned b.
the CIA to report from the Dallas
? New Orleans area on Ruby's actis
ities. "Harvey," or Oswald, ha
also been hired for simile
purposes by the FBI.
?Early in 1963, Morrow write!
he was asked by "Kendricks"
obtain several 7.35-caliber Mani
licher-Carcano rifles for delivet
to Shaw's group in New Orlean
supposedly for an assassinatit
attempt against the leftist
of the Dominican Republic. Jue
Bosch. Three of these rifles we.
picked up by David Ferrie I
private airplane; .Morrow kept
fourth, and today it rests in a gun
I cabinet in his Baltimore home. The,
others, Morrow believes, were,
? ? ,
used against John Kennedy.
oThe last straw for the New
Orleans conspirators, according
to Morrow, was- probably the,
arrest in early October 1963 of
Mario Kohly, himself, and two.
others involved in the CIA's coun-
terfeit peso scheme. The Ken-i
? nedys, Morrow says, had ordered:
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
14 June 1976
the Secret Service to make the!
arrests and so bust up the CIA's;
last best hope at undermining,
Castro's Cuba. .
That's about as far as Morrow!
claims. any firsthand information.
He goes on to speculate about how
Oswald was used, the existence of
an Oswald look-alike in the Lake
Pontchartrain camp, and the roles
of Ruby, Shaw, Ferrie, and others.,
'Even what he says he was told'
staggers the imagination and, in,
most instances, there is simply no
way to back it up. He points to a
vast conspiracy, similar to the dis-
? credited Garrison case, and an
equally vast cover-up by the Ken-
nedys themselves around - the
Cuban missile situation.
? Still, no matter how incredible it
' seems, the Morrow book cannot be
dismissed out of hand. Consider,
Ifor example, that the CIA's newly
released assassination files men-
tion, for the first time, that Os-
wald's rifle might have been a 7.35
caliber Mannlicher ? Carcano.
.There is also this declassified doc-
ument dated December 4, 1963:
"Source on (deleted) said he saw
(deleted). (Deleted) reported
SOVCONGEN -told him 30 No-
ventbei).?that Oswald sent to USSR
? and nial-eiecl Soviet girl under CIA
instructions." By the time those
F-Girl says IA
sent her to Cuba
to poison aS TO
1,??
. . ?
? -?
-NEW. YORK [API?A teen-aged girl who ea-tight the?
eye of Fidel Castro was Sent to Havana by the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1060 to k ill.the ? Cuban, premier
with 'poison tablets to be slipped. into his coffee; the.
New York News reported Sunday. . ?ars! s
The assassination attempt ? failed...because the girl
fearful the tablets might be discovered as she catered
Cuba, secreted them in a jar of cold cream in her-
handbag?and they melted, the News said in a copyright
story by Paul Meskil.
. The girl, identified as Marie Lorenz, told the newspa-
per that CIA agents who recruited her for the assassi-
nation.mission told her "it would change history." She
said the agents also told her, "You're the: only one whO
can dolt ? ' ? ' ?
reSe'..t?
THE 'NEWS SAID an Investigator for the 'Senate..
Intelligence Committee and the newspaper traced the!
girl, to where she now lives in New York City. Quoting
Miss-Lorenz, the newspaper gave this account: ?
??? Miss- Lorenz, a German-American, ; met Castro
aboard the luxury liner Berlin one Month after:.-he
seized power in Cuba in 1959. Miss Lorenz' father was'
captain of the Berlin and took her along on a Caribbe-
an cruise. The Berlin div:ked in Havana, and' the Cir-:
ban leader boarded the ship aid later dined with the
captain and his daughter. .
Castro took a. fancy to Miss Lorenz and later- con-
vinced her to return to Havana as his personal Inlet,-
?
preter.
files were released, Morrow's
book had long since gone into gal-
?leys.
The counterfeit peso story and
Morrow's arrest are also docu-
mented in newspaper files and
court records. Washington attor-
ney Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., re-
1- calls investigating the incident in
1966 and concluding that the ar-
,restsexere "a frame be the U.S.
government,? just as Morrow
maintains.
Morrow has told Congress that
he's now prepared to turn over the
bulk of Mario Kohly's private files,
once the investigation begins..
?Kohly, who once had 115 exile
g,roups under his United Organiza-
tions to Liberate Cuba, was the.
CIA's most favored leader during
that period. And his files, be-
queathed to Morrow upon Kohly's
death in 1975 at age 76, could prove
a fountain of important new infor-
mation. ?
? These days it is instructive to
recall the quaint conclusion of the
Warren Commission's own Gerald
Ford: "The strong evidence Ps)
that Lee Oswald's mind turned to
murder whenever he wanted to
impress Marina.. ... " It's taken 12
years to move from couch to ;an-
spiracy?and -the' new report mey
be only the beginningee
CIA operative Frafac'Fiorini, later known aa Frank
-Sturgis- when he was convicted as one of the Watergate
' burglars, *lade contactswith Miss Lorenz and persuad- ?
ed her to photograph some of Castro's secret papers.
IHe also later helped her escape from Cuba. ? ?
?
? THE CIA TOLD Miss Lorenz that she could perform
1"i tremendous service"?to.the United States by asses-
. . .
.sinating Castro. ?
"I thought ? he- was joking," Miss Lorenz told the
News. -"But they kept coming back to it and a realized
they were serious. - -
; "They decided on poison," Miss Lorenz told- the
News.. "They said. it, would be easy to put poison in his-
'food or drink." , .
Miss.' Lorenz said she was told she would.aeceive
enough money to retire if she were successful, . .?
. She said she flew to Havana, but before meeting
?-?-CaStr6 she slipped the two tablets the CIA had given
.her into her cold cream.
? ? "THE LOBBY AS full of reporters and ()the'''. peo-
ple trying- to. see Castro, but he wasn't there," she
said., "One of his aides recognized me and took me up,
to FIdel's -suite. He asked. me why r left him,' and I
said dt was because. I missed my . mother and- my
home.. ?
'Finally', he ordered food and coffee sentup. When it
came, he fell asleep. on the bed.-
?..`I went into the bathrdora and' opened the jar of cold
cream. I stuck my ? finger in. it, and, the whole thing
came out like yak. couldn't find the capsules. They
had melted.
. . -
? !.'IT WAS;LIKE an-omen. I couldn't dump a glob of
cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went
back to the bedroom and 1 watched, him sleeping. Final-
ly, I Issadown on the bed beside him.
'I thought, "ro hell with it, let, history take its
course.' ?
Miss Lorenz said she flew hack to Miami, the next
Morning, where-she was met by
The News said Fiorini verified Miss Lorenz' storY.
8
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NEW TIMES
25 June 1976
With the help of handwriting analysis, a test called the
Psychological Assessment System and 30,000 personality files,
Jim Keehner spent seven years screening CIA agents and
recruits. He's now on the agency's "useless person" list
By Maureen Orth
The young CIA case officers looked intently at their instructor. He was hold-
ing up a lemon. "I want you to take this lemon," he said, "and never let it leave you
for the next three or four days. Smell it, touch. it. Tell me your feelings about it. Get
to know your lemon like you've never known another lemon in your life. This is an
order."
The instructor was teaching "Personality Theory." He was a CIA psycholo-
gist, an expert called upon to train fresh clandestine operators in some of the secret
arts of intelligence work. The lemon exercise was supposed to measure and improve
their sensitivity, and the trainees were required to turn in written "contact" reports
several days later. It was the usual mix. Some had developed meaningful relation-
ships with their fruits. They rhapsodized for three pages about their lemons and had
no trouble picking them out from a bowl of dozens. One nonconformist, however,
merely drew a big picture of his lemon and labeled it with a question mark. Still, the
instructor, Jim Keehner, was pleased. "I was trying to get them in contact with their
feelings," he explained. "Feelings had been left out of their previous training, which
is all cognitive."
. In 1968 the CIA hired Jim Keehner as a specialist in the agency's .ongoing
effort to increase the psychological skills and awareness of its employees. A CIA
case officer's prime duty is to recruit "agents" among foreign citizens around the
world, and the agency has a vital interest in any method?no matter how far out?
that promises to reveal weaknesses, vulnerabilities and psychic pressure points in
' possible recruits.
The CIA. in fact, has become one of the world's foremost laboratories for unit-
., pal.psychologicalAschniques. Keehner's office in the agency's Technical Service Di-
vision had a 'mandate to test anything?from hallucinogenic drugs to computerized
handwriting analysis?that would help case officers manipulate their agents or other
unsuspecting potential agents. Keehner's mission was to teach other CIA officers
how to bring agents under control.. Ironically, the negative nature of his work loos-
ened his own self-control and brought him to the point of a complete breakdown. Still
bearing the marks of his shattering experience, Keehner hesitantly agreed to provide
. a portrait of the agency's psychological operations.
? Keehner was in the living room of? hours before, and most of the time
his Georgetown apartment, giving me Keehner was uncomfortable and ner-
the CIA's specially designed personality vous. "Would a Catholic talk to the Dev-
test. According -to Keehner, the results ii?" he asked. "That's what the CIA
of this test would tell him my basic ge- thinks of talking to the press."
netie formula: whether I was born an ex- But I scored very high 'on trust-
trovert or an introvert, whether I was worthiness, and that seemed to ease his
moral or amoral, whether I'd be more concern. He was also unscientifically
loyal to a person or a cause, even what biased in my favor because I had the
sort of torture would be most effective same "basic personality formula': as his
against me. former fianc? He began to relax, but
I tried hard to duplicate the geo- only a little.
metric designs on the paper Keehner , To Jim Keehner, relaxing means
showed me. I had to Construct the de- sitting in the window of a "safe house"
signs using pieces of a plastic building chain-smoking cigarettes and wondering
block. A clock on the table next to us who is watching from outside. He also
clicked away, but I was oblivious, checks for the three-agent team (ABC
"Time!" Kechner called. I managed to. "surveillance patterns") when he's
complete every design; but it took me walking down the street, and fears that
too long. I flunked. Keehner seemed anything written about him and the CIA
overjoyed. "Oh, you're an F," he said, will be subject to instant sabotage by his
"I knew you were an F. They're sensi- former superiors. His natural wit is al-
Wye, creative and clumsy." I was taking most drowned in a terminal case of para-
the test so that Keehner might trust me. noia, perhaps because he is aware that
We had met for the first lime only a few he "is an official outcast, a, name on the
CIA's "useless person" list.
It wasn't always so. .A small, thin,
36-year-old Kentuckian, Keehner spent
six years traveling the world for the CIA
with a packet of suicide pills in his pock-
ct. He never forgot the motto of his
office: "Every man has his price." His
job was to find the weakest part of a for-
eign agent's character, his "squeaky
board," and then tell the CIA how to
step on it. He tested European bankers,
Near Eastern journalists, Vietnamese
farmers, a Buddhist monk and an Afri-
can hashish smuggler. He told them he
was testing their aptitude, but he was real-
ly charting how their minds worked.
"We liked some people with low
intelligence who would follow orders,"
Keehner said. "Then there were some
mean ones, the killers. But basically I
'tested nondescript middle-class people
who did it for the money."
Back at CIA headquarters in
Langley, Virginia, Keehner reported his
findings and taught the case officers how
to take advantage of them. He also test-
ed the case officers themselves, seeking
out their weaknesses so that the agency?
would know how vulnerable they were
to enemy spies.
In addition to his direct testing,
Keehner assessed many potential agents
indirectly, without the benefit of inter-
views or tests. He used the information
the CIA collects every year on thou-
sands of unsuspecting foreigners. No
matter how loyal these people might be
to their country, the CIA considers them
potential traitors and labels them either
"susceptible": or "vulnerable." Today
the agency still spends millions to study
them, tap their phones and bug their bed-
rooms in an effort to lure them pr force
them to become agents. Jt is not a pretty
business, and Keehner had to plot how
to bring these targets to the breaking
point.
"I was sent to deal with the most
negative aspects of the human condi-
tion," he said. "It .was planned destruc-
tiveness. First, you'd check to see if you
could destroy a man's marriage. If you
could, then that would be enough to put
a lot of stress on the individual, to break'
him down. Then you might start a rumor
campaign against him. Harass him con-
stantly. Bump his car in traffic. A lot of it
is ridiculous, but it may have a cumula-
tive effect."
The CIA recruited Jim Keehner
? under deep cover. He was excited when
a high-powered Washington outfit called
Psychological Assessments Associates
wanted to interview him. PAA, with
offices in Washington and abroad, is the
cover .for the agency's psychologists. Its
recruiters impressed Keehner by telling
him that if he got the job he would travel
the world testing the aptitudes of busi-
ness executives for high-level positions.
It was August of 1964.
During the next nine months,
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Keehner considered studying for the
priesthood while Psychological Assess-
ments checked him out for a top secret
security clearance. Then .the company
contacted him in Kentucky. where he
was working in the mental ward of a hos-
pital, and invited him to interview fur-
ther for what he thought was a glamor-
ous job with a private psychological -
firm: "They called me in," he remem-
bers, "and said, 'This is the CIA. Do you
want to go on or do you"want to stop?'
It's a funny feeling when they tell you? ,
frightening, yet thrilling and shocking."
He barely hesitated before saying yes.
Visions of dashing spooks danced in his
head.
One thing puzzled Keehner about
the CIA's final interviews, however.
"They never once asked me about the
Vietnam War," he said. Neither did they
probe his views of morality, not in seven
screening interviews and not when he
look the CIA's standard lie-detector test.
No one from the agency questioned
Keehner about American involvement in
Vietnam, then at its peak. The oversight
proved to be significant.
Keehner's intensive training in
the clandestine ways of the CIA sur-
prised him. "I was intrigued with spies,"
he said. "But.as soon as I got to training
I learned that no American who works
for the CIA is a .spy. Never. A spy is a
foreign agent who commits treason and
gives information against his govern-
ment. In the CIA we act as his helpers
and get information for our country.
Never call an American a spy." The
need for secrecy was drilled into him
over and over again. He had to sign a
contract binding him not to reveal his
work to.anyone.
. After training, Keeliner reported
to the Washington office of PAA, where
he set out to learn the rudiments of the
remarkable test he would soon adnrinis-
ter round the world. Keehner's boss,
John Gittinger (now retired), scored a
major breakthrough in measuring per-
sonality development about 25 years
ago. Gittinger took the standard IQ
test?the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale?and converted it to a highly so-
phisticated tool that can predict behavior
based on personality types. The elabo-
rate Psychological Assessment System
(PAS) uses a series of letters to catego-
rize individual personality traits: "inter-
nalizers" and "externalizers" (I and E),
those who see the forest (F, flexibles)
and those who see the trees (R, regulat-
ed). those who adapt ea,ily (A) and those
who don't (U). PAS hypothesizes that
everyone is born with a fixed personality
formula that is often inotlified in early
childhood and adolescence hut never en-
tirely altered.
Because of the I (2",1?N complexity
and it.; bias toward tt;?neii,- tb.stirty, it has
not nc.ittil:ir in the
scientific community. I tio.yever, 1,01110
ptiyChOlt);itit'i vli V, .! I. (*XtellSis y
with the PAS concede that it can
be effective for ( ?1 A's p.1,1,0s,,,. "If I
Were getting into the tottitt.e. business:,
says Denver clinical psychologist Keith
Davis, "I'd think of the PAS I use it in a
psychological program aimed at helping
patients. But people skilled in subtle ma-
nipulation can use it for ? negative pur-
poses."
"I can be Very sneaky myself
about predicting behavior and. personal-
ity formulas," says Dr. Charles Kraus-
kopf of the University of Missouri Psy-
chology Department. "We should be
thinking about this the same way we're
thinking about nuclear problems and bio-
engineering. It's not something that will
hide under the carpet."
Kcehner thinks the public ought
to know about many of the techniques
the CIA uses. "One of the tragedies is
that most CIA research in the basic
sciences is never made avail.tide to the
HAmerican public who paid for it," he
, says. "My boss, for example, was a non-
academic who carried half his work
around in his head."
Gittinger finally had a monograph
of his Psychological Assessment. System
published in The Journal of Clinical Psy-
chology in April of 1973. Today the sys-
tem is being used in several American
universities and hospitals as an aid in vo-
cational guidance, marriage counseling,
correlating personality type with psy-
chosomatic illness arid teaching mental
patients how to play up their strengths.
Keehner believes that most people work-
ing with the test have no idea of its use
by the CIA. And certainly nobody now
using the PAS outside the agency has ac-
cess to the 3G,000 personality formulas
the CIA has accumulated over the years.
The CIA even goes so far as to
dub the personalities of entire countries
with the magic PAS initials. The U.S.,
for example, is ERA?"a masculine ste-
reotype"?externally oriented, regulat-
ed in behavior and adaptable. The coun-
try that most resembles the U.S. is none
other than the U.S.S.R. "The Russians
are EEUs," says Keehner, "like us, but
unadaptable. They follow authority.
blindly." China, on the other hand, is
1RU (internalived, regulated, unadapt-
able), just like former-President Nixon.
? "I've never met an IRU I've liked,"
says Keehner.
In fact, nobody in Keeliner's
office could stand to watch Nixon on
television. Out or 15 psychologists in
Keehner's office, 14 voted for McGov-
ern, not because they loved McGovern
but because they had all indirectly as-
sessed Nixon. Our former leader fared
very imoily. Trained to spot lying, the
CIA psychologists concluded that Nixon
lied in public most of the time.
In addition to testii;g. Keohner's
office? often whipped up psychological
studies of world leaders. Foreign presi-
dents and their aides had their handwrit-
ing seantinized for signs of psychic iin-
balancc. 1< edifier worked on the files of.
many foreign officials, but the ttssess..
.ments on the really big enchiladas were
left to his bosses. Keehner happened to
see Fidel Castro's assessment, and it
noted he had sex with his pants on.
Keehner thought the CIA charter
strictly forbade the agency to assess
American citizens, so he was surprised
when the news broke that the agency had
compiled a psychological profile on Dan-
iel Ellsberg because of what Keelmer
calls a "bureaucratic screw up." "I
guess the Plumbers broke into that office
to get Ellsberg's psychiatric files for the
shrinks," he said. "We could have done
it without them. I asked my boss if he
would have assessed Ellsberg, and he
told me that we probably would have
done it if the White House had asked us
to."
Keehner's office did assess Com-
mander Lloyd Bucher when the Navy
spy ship the Pueblo was captured by the
North Koreans. "We were very in-
volved in trying to figure out how the
North Koreans might affect the crew
psychologically," said Keehner. "Buch-
er should never have been commander
of that ship. He was an orphan, you
know. lie wouldn't intentionally givr
away anything. But he was not equipped
to handie tiny aspect of the sittiation
was in.'?
The CIA assessed Sirhan Sirhan
when Robert Kennedy was assassinated,
and concluded he was insane. Keehner
says he knows of no official assessment
of Lee Lir% ey Oswald, but he says that
CIA ps,l,cholo2ical experts studied Os-
wald on their own and concluded he was
incapable of killing the President by him-
self. (One of the CIA employees who
,worked on the Oswald material
confirrned both the study and the conclu-
sion.) The agency also analyzed letters
from American POWs in Nor th Vietnam
to see if their handwriting showed the
effects of torture. It did, and sonic of the
prisoners were judged to be hallucinat-
ing.
The CIA takes handwriting analy-
sis quite seriously. According to Keeh-
net, the agency's sophisticated methods
can s ork wonders with a simple hand-
writing sample, to the point, of detecting
certain diseases before they are subject
to medical diagnosis. Every New Year's
Day, all the CIA agents in the Soviet
Union forwaid their New Year's cards
from Russian friends to CIA. headquar-
ters so that the handwriting can be
analyied and filed tovay.
The :Taney even spent a half mil-
lion doll,irs to build a machine to graph
handwriting by computer. It was sup-
posed to cut down analysis time from
eight or time hours to four, nut the ma-
chine ire% en functioned properly. A
suit mc believer in handwi it ing analysis.
Keelinci says, "If you take the test and
we see your writing, there's no way we
can Iv tu 01111:11.10t1t you."
The CIA denies it, but Keehner
says it still uses sexual ruses to entrap
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collaborators. In 1969 Keehncr. went to
New York to give the "aptitude test" to
an Americaii nurse who had volunteered
for unofficial ninht duty. "We wanted'
her to sleep with this Russian," he. ex-
plained. "Either the Russian 'would fall
in, love with her and clefecL or we'd
blackmail him. .1 had to see if she could
sleep with hirn over a period of time and.
not get involved emotionally. Boy, was.
she toug.h."
. Keehner .became disgusted with
entrapment tearriques. however, espe-
cially. after watchipe a film of an agent in
bed with a "recruitment target." CIA
'ease officer's. many of Whom K eehner
says "got their jollies" from such assign-
ments. made the film ?ith a ldden cam-
era. Keehner was not only repulsed by
the practice but also found it. quite inef-
fective. "You don't really recruit agents
with sexual blackmail," he says. "That's
why I couldn't even take reading the files
after a while. I was sickened at seeiiig
people take pleasure in other people's
inadequacies. First of all, I thought it
was just dumb. For all the money going
out, nothing ever came back. We don't
recruit that many people. Most of our
agents are walk-ins, people who are easy
? to buy anyway.", - ?
Psychologist Ann .Herndon, a for-
mer CIA colleague who quit to go into
private practice, corroborated Keeh-
ner's view of the CIA's ineffectiveness
in using blackmail as a recruiting tech-
nique. "I never once saw anyone recruit-
ed in the work! did," she said: "I saw 70
to 80 cases a month. We haven't yet re-
cruited our first Mainland Chinese, and
there are at least 14)0 people working full-
time on it."
"It's pretty much of a game,"
Keehner Said. "People took pleasure in
the gamesmanship. Everybody was
looking for a promotion." .
Every morning at 8:30, when Jim
Keehner reported for work, he passed
the inscription in the marble wall of the
CIA's main lobby: "And ye shall know
the truth and the truth shall make ye
free" (John 7:32). Eventually, the words
began to grate on his nerves. He saw it as
a symbol of the hypocrisy he felt sur-
rounded by. Also, he became more and
more disturbed by the moral implications
of his daily work, which was. centered
around the PAS testing system, Keehner
occasionally wondered what would hap-
pen if the government decided to test ev-
eryone and run their genetic ,formulas
next to their social security numbers on a.
giant computer. "There are horrible pos-
sibilities,'' he.said. "It's social engineer-
ing and we don't know yet if people can
beat the test."
His disaffection with the agency
first began over the issue of the Vietnam
War. His office was divided over the
war, with the younger psychologists op-
posing and the older ones endorsing
American policy to keep communism
from spreading, another inch. Keehner
also disapproved of the military cast that
Came over the agency durinAits Vietnam
operations. "The agency was always
swarming with colonels from the Penta-
gon," he says, "I couldn't stand the
waste of money being poured into Viet-
nam.
"My job was becoming more dis-
gusting to me every day. But was over-
whelmed by the CIA. The first year is
confusion. The second is bewilderment.
The third it just kind of dawns on you
what's happening." Keehner, ever a
staunch Catholic, poured out his doubts
twice a month in the confessional to no
avail. "Masturbation was a mortal sin,"
he says. "But when! talked about sexual
blackmail and manipulating people, the
priest said it was a grey area."
It took a while for Keehner to re-
bel. But he found solace in attending
sensitivity training sessions generously
financed by the CIA. Touchie-feelie
techniques were some of the many meth-
ods the agency explored for possible use
in psychological assessments. They were
still alive after the CIA had abandoned
hypnosis, LSD, truth serums and palm-
reading. (ESP, says Keehner, is "still up
in the air.") Both of Keehner's bosses
attended early sensitivity training groups
and found them interesting. They ap-
proved of his request to train as a sensi-
tivity group leader, under cover of
course.
Keehner . soon found himself an
enthusiastic devotee a group grope. He
thought sensitivity sessions not only per-
sonally satisfying but also a possible
means of reforming the agency. On
Mondays he went to Gestalt. On Tues-
days he saw his psychiatrist. On
Wednesdays and Fridays he did yoga.
On Thursdays he rested. "I was really
coming into touch with my feelings for
the first time. I started strongly vocaliz-
ing my objections to the war atthe office.
I stopped wearing a tie to work and that
was against regulations."
Rebeling was an entirely new con-
cept to Keehner. He had managed to
grow up and go through 14 years of Cath-
olic education without once disobeying
his parents or his teachers. No doubt
those qualities made him an ideal candi-
date for the CIA, but the agency obvi-
ously forgot to assess the effects of con-
temporary self-help therapy.
In 1971 Keehner was assigned a
'tour of duty 'in Southeast Asia. He re-
fused to go. One boss told him to "go
over anyway and sabotage it from the
field." Keehner still said no. He never
got another promotion.
Outside the office, however,
Keehner was still cautious., He saw his
psychiatrist once a week for an entire
year undercover because he felt an-
nouncing where he worked would breach
CIA security. Instead, Keehner painted
such a rosy picture of his job at Psycho-
logical Assessments that his psychiatrist
asked if PAA had any job openings. "1
thought I could just talk about my per-
sonal problems and set my work aside,"
Keehner said. "But the more I got into
?
sinking ship."
A year later, after Keehner devel-
oped a severe eye infection, the CIA's
powerful Medical Division put him on
"medical hold," restricting his duties.
He was relieved that he no longer had to
go abroad for assessments, though he
was still expected to work On files in the
office. He asked instead if he could train
incoming CIA recruits, and his request
was granted.
In his new training position,
Keehner enjoyed creative freedom. One
day in class it gave him great satisfaction
to play the record Hair and send the re-
frain blasting through camp: "Right here
in niggertown we've got a dirty little
war." Then he had the recruits march
around the room to feel the music and to
have a little human interaction. The old-
er instructors were amazed. His classes
were always monitored after that. Next, .
he requisitioned 40 lemons from Sup-
ply?the first and last such request?and
had the recruits get to know their lem-
ons. Keehner was not asked back to CIA
training camp.
"Ninety-five percent of the people
who took my course gave it an excellent
in their evaluations," Keehner says. "I
hoped the course would make them face
the reality of what they were doing and
make them think about the theory that
`every man has his price.' Later some of
them said it helped them to get closer to
people so they could recruit agents bet-
ter."
Undaunted, he next came up with
the idea of running week-long sensitivity
groups for CIA employees as part of
their -in-agency training. The CIA gave
its approval, but only after Keehner had ?
had a little chat with William Colby, who
was then director of Clandestine Ser-
vices. "Don't let the press know we're
running these groups." Colby warned.
"Time or Newsweek will get a hold of
this and make it sound like we're doing
something crazy." '
Tension is such ail occupational
hazard at the CIA that the agency is un-
usually tolerant of activities designed to
relieve its employees' anxiety. But it in-
sists that these activities take place "in
house" for reasons of security and con-
trol. Keehner's new project became an
officially authorized outlet for the pent-
up emotions of. the case officers. Ulti-
mately, Recliner's prolonged exposure
to sensitivity training caused him to slip
his own psychic moorings. But he was
happy with his new wink at the onset be-
cause he felt he was helping people
again.
Everyone who came Keehner's
"Human Interaction Lai)" had to take
the PAS test first', and also have his
handwriting analyzed. kechner didn't
want anyone who seemed unstable to go
through such an .intense experience. Be-
sides, it wouldn't do to have too many Fs
and not enough Its in a group. "When I
had all 1:s? once I thought I'd go crazy,"
Keehner says. "Everyone was so sensi-
pproved For Rel8alvSr20614018/0W1! bAilltiFirti001122R000100400001-2
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tive to everyone else's feelings that n
body would talk for days.
"There are some very warm pe
pie in the CIA, but they block off the
feelings. Most of them are Its and the
compartmentalize their own work
their minds. They can do horrible thimu
.all day and then go home and forg
about it. It was amazing to see how we
they functioned considering the amou
of tension their tests displayed
e Group participants ranged in age
from 20 to 60. They were mostly middle-
level employees. "The big officers
wouldn't come because they heard sto-
ries of how people broke down and
cried," said Keehner, "They'd encour-
age the younger employees to come,
though," Keehner wanted his charges to
let it all hang out. They crawled around
the floor making animal sounds. They
went on "trust walks": One person with
his eyes open had to lead another person
with his eyes closed through the woods.
They stood in the middle of the room and
waved in the breeze pretending they
were flowers. "I played music," Keeh-
ner said, "and told them to go to their fa-
vorite place in the room and imagine
they were corning tip out of the earth.
They moved like corn blowing in the
wind. ?
o- Meanwhile, Keehner continued to
. experiment, on his own with new kinds of
encounter groups. His experience with
ir Primal Scream therapy, however,
y ?
proved to be a nightmare and precipitat-
*ed his eventual downfall with the CIA.
Primal Scream requires its partici-
et pants to stay nude in a swimming pool
II for six hours. Keehner began feeling mi-
nt easy when someone put the "Agnus
Dei" on the pool loudspeakers. After all,
the music came right from the Mass, and
it occurred to Keehner that Mass was
probably where he should be at this
hour, not naked in a swimming pool with
a bunch of people in varying stages of
freaking out.
At first he tried to concentrate on
helping others, holding back on his own
feelings?a mistake. Finally, a leader
started pressing on his neck.and Keehner
started screaming. "Then he started
pushing on my genitals," Keehner ex-
plained. "Well, boy, I let out a scream.
don't know if it was a Primal Scream or
not. That's what they called it."
Within 24 hours of his Primal
Scream, Keehner was so anxiety-ridden
he had to take three kinds of tranqui4z.-
ers. He was unable to work. Then lie had
a case of appendicitis and stayed home
for six weeks. When he got back to work
he refused to do any more assessments.
Keehner went to see John Gittinger.
"Why did you ever recruit me?" he
asked: Keehner realized he was "out of
pattern," a poor boy from Kentucky
. compared to- most of the Ivy League
types in the agency. ''1 don't know,"
Giitiu'er replied.
Keehner continued his human in-
teraction labs, but not assessments. One
day it was leaked to him he had been put
on the "useless person" list. He was fo-
rious_ Why hadn't he been told in
advance? he wanted to know. He
planned a confrontation.
Keehner waited until he was at a
staff lunch with all the other psycholo-
gists. including the head of the entit e
Technical Services Division. He began
"I remember this one lawyer who
had been passed over for promotion. All
of a sudden he started to cry and cry. lie
said he felt isolated from all the other
flowers in the room. His one fantasy was
that he was a daisy and that he was going
to die all alone. A couple of days later he
brought me a colorful poster. It said,
'Thank God someone is crazy enough) to
. care for a daisy.' "
While leading groups, Keehner
avoided assessments as much as possi-
ble. But one day Kechoer's boss called
him into his office. "Ile said I wasn't giv-
ing the case officers in the field enough
support, not getting in and telling them
how to manipulate and destroy. I said,
`No, it makes me sick to my stomach.'
He said, 'It bothers all of us but we don't
articulate it.' "
WASHINGTON POST
1 6 JUN 197Z
T
(MV S i1)ti.D1,Letiqitt an
IN,??ar-RDeci by CIA
The Central Intelligence
Anelley has appointed a new
spokesneve .1ndre,), Falk-
iewire, who will. hied the ti-
tle of assistant to tia? irec-
or, Po kievvi :111.
gus ThlitvilThr vi lin is es?
oei nal I o aze.ieried iii
CI 1%; (I,.';:)Ed.V [or
oocral
POST, New York
20 May 1976
to attack from a lotus position, shoeless
in the middle of the .floor. "I want to talk
about the dirty SOBs who work in this
place," he said. "I want to tell each and
every one of you what I think of you."
"You could ? have heard a ? pin
. drop," says Ann I lerndon. "The tension
was so thick: No conflict ever comes out
in the open theme. Everything is kept un-
dercover. Everyone was hotrified. Jim
began to make waves. That was the last
thing they wanted. Everyone was sup-
posed to be like everyone else."
Keehner officially left the CIA
about a month later. "The CIA never
fires anyone," he says. "They're afraid
of vindictiveness." The agency gave him
a $15,0(X) contract to continue running
his sensitivit y groups for a year. Ile was
also promised it second year's contract
in writing. Then, early in the slimmer of
'74, Keelmer's contract was abruptly -
canceled, and he no longer had any job
with the CI A_
He protested the action in a memo
to William Colby, then head of the agen-
cy. Three days later he was accused of a
security violation, a serious offense at
the CIA. The-security violation was typ-
ing his memo at home. Yet Keehner had
typed it at headquarters and could prove
it. Nevertheless, he was told to turn in
his badge immediately. The fighting was
over. Keehner and the CIA were finally
through.
Looking back on his nightmare,
Keehner says he was just an ordinary .
small-town boy who arrived at the CIA
looking for action and adventure. In-
stead he found the horrific, the absurd,
the monstrous and the trivial. George.
Orwell kept bumping into Bob and Carol
and 'fed and Alice. The resulting trauma
has been tough to shake_
?
Finished telling his story, Jim
Keehner stood up and went over to the
Window. "See that guy over there across
the street." he whispered. "He could be
part of an ABC surveillance pattern: On
the other hand. he looks just like my
Gestalt leader.' 0
The Arms Piague
. With plans going forward to inocu- Pentagon demand for a doubled U. S.
late millions against a deadly strain of defense budget. As Sen. Proxmire (D-
M, it is a pity no comparable means are Wis.) points out in interpreting the
at hand for immunizing national leaders CIA data: "The Russians are spend-
against a deadlier disorder: the arms?ing'fribfe rubles than we thought be-
cause they are more inefficient and
wasteful than we thought."
CIA Director Bush puts in this way:
". . . the analysis does not indicate that
the Soviets have any more weapons or
manpower than previously estimated
but that the cost of these defense pea-
grams is greater than we originally had
estimated."
If the Russians are wasting money
-on militaryjnaduess, are we obliged to
iinifate 'them?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA440P77-00432R000100400001-2
plague. Instead, the disorder seems to
be more contagious than ever.
The Central Intelligence Agency has
identified what seems to be an unusually
virulent outbreak in the Soviet Union.
The agency reports Moscow may
have been spending twice as much
on armaments as initially estimated by
the West; the CIA now figures that the
Russians spent between 50 and S5 bil-
lion rubles on defense. ,last
?That is mililitifiatidn for a fre-sil
The Washington Star
trii
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2
Wednesday, June 23, 1976
a
? By H. R. Haldeman
"I just wanted to wish you and
your family a Happy New Year,
Bob," said Alexander Butterfield in
an unexpected telephone call to our
rented home in Arlington. It was Dec.
31, 1974, the eve of the verdict in the
Watergate cover-up conspiracy trial.
Butterfield ? who revealed the
existence of the White House tapes to
the Ervin Committee, thus escalating
the Watergate storm ? had appeared
originally as a prosecution witness at
Fourth of a Series
the trial in Judge John J. Sirica's
courtroom. Alex later offered to be a
character witness for me, a move
which the prosecution twice blocked
successfully through legal maneuver-
in
Watching Butterfield wait on the
witness stand, trying to help me, only
to be denied the opportunity, remind-
ed me of our long relationship dating
back to UCLA and the circumstances
under which he ,came to work in the
? White House.
ALEX ORIGINALLY approached
the White House on his own initiative
? not because I recruited him. He
was 'soon to become an Air Force
general. I have never understood
why he insisted, against my advice,
on dropping his commission. Or why
he suddenly wanted to be part of the
Nixon team.
In view of his subsequent role,
these actions seem even more curi-
ous today.
Was Butterfield- a CIA agent?
Maybe. I just don't know.
In retrospect, I'm ambivalent as to
whether the agency was out to get
Nixon. I don't dismiss it as an impos-
sibility. I do believe that there are a
number of unanswered questions
-about the break-in at the Watergate.
The agency had the capacity and
perhaps, unknown to me, the motiva-
tion.
Before that fateful day, June 17,
4972, seven men ? Richard Nixon,
John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman,
-John Dean, Jell Magruder, Charles
Colson, and .?functioned together
as a very productive team we were,
the "White House people."
?
THE ONLY connection ,any of us
had with Watergate before then was
that John Mitchell lived in the apart-
ment complex bearing that name.
But, since the spring of 1973, we
were henceforth to become known in
history as the "Watergate people".;
The Nixon administration had begun
fading from a constructive govern-
ment into a defensive, embattled re-
;gime, only to capsize in the summer
of 1974.
Suddenly, in a federal courthouse,
the three senior associates of a re-
signed president of the United States
? together with two 1972 campaign c
aides, Robert Mardian and Kenneth'
Parkinson ? were on trial. It gave r
me an eerie feeling, sometimes, to d
realize during their testimony that I. t
had recruited three of the confessed
Watergate figures who took the wit-
ness stand during that trial ? Dean,
Magruder and Colson. And that, as
Ehrlichman and I waited
throughout the long proceedings, un-:
seen but strongly felt, was the brood-
ing presence of Richard Nixon.
A number of myths still exist about
the overall relations of the "Water-
gate people," not only with each
other but with the presidept himself.
MITCHELL AND I, for example,
had an excellent working and person-
al relationship, despite the gap in our
age, background and interests. We
were generally in agreement on most
matters, although there were some
sharp differences regarding person-
Ehrlichman and Mitchell, on the
other hand, had limited rapport, "a
? basically different approach to the
job, and very little mutual trust, fre-
quently dealing at arm's length re-
? garding the policy and operation of
the Justice Department.
John Dean's relationship with
Mitchell ? the father and son anal-
ogy ? was not as close as had been
publicized. But Dean was to a de-
gree, a protege of Mitchell, and there
was a strong, personal bond between
them. Mitchell, for example, was
concerned that Dean's White House
role would not be large enough and
was very reluctant to see him trans-
? fer from the Justice Department. .
? Mitchell and Jeb Magruder had, as
far as I know, a good working rela-
tionship. Jeb, who was afraid of
Mitchell as he was of all senior staff,
was determined to be Atty. Gen.
Mitchell's boy at the "Committee to
Re-elect the President."
CHUCK COLSON and
Mitchell ? well, there was
a strong mutual distrust
and dislike there.
With the president, John'
Mitchell enjoyed a peer
relationship, absolutely
unique in the Nixon White
House. He had full access,
was very free to disagree
with the president, and
argued his points strongly.
Nixon used him as a top
level agent in dealing with
the Cabinet, Kissinger and
political matters, trusting
him completely.
John Ehrlichman and I.
had been close personal and
family friends for 25 years,
going back to our days at
UCLA. Originally identified
as a "Haldeman man,"
probably because I re-
ruited him for the White
House, ?John built his own
elationship with the presi-
ent with my encourage-,
neat and assistance.
Approved
Nixon had a high regard
for Ehrlichman's ability
and judgment. John's as-
sociation with the presi-
dent, however, was often
slightly strained and
uncomfortable in a mutual
way. Analytical and self-as-
sured, Ehrlichman disa-
greed with the president
without fear, frequently,
and in a blunt, direct man-
ner.
JOHN HAD SOME defi-
nite reservations about
Nixon personally. While re-
specting the president's
ability and potential, he ex-
pressed concerns about
Nixon's lifestyle, specifical-
ly in the area of drinking.
t Dean and Ehrlichman
worked well together. Ehr-
lichman tutored Dean in the
many roles of counsel to the
president, and used him as
an agent on many matters.
On the other hand, Magrud-
er and Ehrlichman had no
real relationship.
? I forced some degree of
cooperative effort between
Chuck Colson and Ehrlich-
man, although there was a
mutual distrust and dislike
between them. If Ehrlich-
Man had a fault, he was,
like Mitchell, weak in his
judgment of staff people.
John Dean was the "hot-
dog swinger" in the
"square" Nixon White
House, neither awed by the
building or its chief occu-
pant: He was smooth, han-
dled himself well, and was
enthusiastically backed by
Mitchell, Richard Klein-
dienst (Mitchell's deputy at
the Justice Department and
his successor as attorney
general in March 1972),
Egil Krogh (aide to John
Ehrlichman named under-.
secretary of transportation
in December 1972), and ,
Ehrlichman.
DEAN'S ? relationship
with the' president, despite
suggestions to the contrary,
did not exist until Water-
gate, and only then as a
project officer. I recruited
him, but never saw his FBI
dossier which was not in-
cluded in his personnel file.
But that fact didn't worry
me, since I assumed that
Dean had been cleared at
Justice. My former staff
would be amused to know
that, regarding Dean, I vio-
lated my own cardinal rule
laid down for all subordi-:
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nates "Don't assume."
If I had seen Dean's FBI
dossier it would have bar-
red him from the White
House. Allegations about a
conflict-of-interest charge,
however slight, involving
his prior affiliation with a
law firm would have been
enough to concern me about
the smoke, whether or not
there was any fire.
Chuck Colson was always
a problem. Frankly, I didn't
like him, nor did many
others. His tough, abrasive
manner earned him a bad
reputation with all the staff,
with perhaps the exception
of Dean. He was a protege
of Bryce Harlow (an assist-
ant and later counsellor to
President Nixon), who
introduced him to the White
House. I built Colson up,
and the president, who de-
? WASHINGTON STAR
23 June 1976
11)-16GrfF/21
.veloped a great rapport
with him, found Chuck use-
ful.
HIGHLY POLITICAL,
Colson loved the game,
spicing it with touches of fa-
naticism. But Colson played
to Nixon's darker, less ap-
pealing side. He was not a
seasoned staff man in the
sense of weighing all sides.
Chuck took his own view
and pushed it all-out. If he
had a key fault it was a will-
ingness, even an eagerness,
to carry out the president's
orders indiscriminately.
Jeb Magruder was an
ambitious bootlicker (by his
own self-description). While
a good project man, he was
always self-serving and
weak, pragmatic and with-
out any real convictions. He
was.full of baloney but I
found that I could squeeze it
out of him. I had to run Jeb
by fear and constant goad-
ing. As with many of the
junior men on the White
House staff, I had to chan-
nel and use Magruder's
self-interest and keep him
on a tight leash.
Magruder had no real
relationship with the presi-
dent at all. Originally tap-
.ped as my assistant, he be-
came John Mitchell's man
? by his own design.
DURING OUR three-
month trial in Washington I
had time to reflect on some
of the incidents leading up
to my resignation as chief
of staff. One I particularly
recall involved the day late
in April 1973 when Henry
Kissinger, visibly agitated,
stormed into my corner
White House office. He had
just come from. a meeting
Luck AlireelQ,
By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer
- Alexander Butterfield, the man
who revealed theexistence of the se-
cret recording system in the Nixon
White House, is again in the news
with a suggestion that he might have
been a CIA agent. ?
The renewed suggestion of a CIA
link has left Butterfield somewhat
puzzled and perhaps a little worse off.
While others connected with the
Watergate White House have pros-
pered ? or have been convicted of
crimes ? Butterfield has been job
hunting.
"It doesn't help when your name is
in the news all the time," says But-
terfield, whose testimony about the
secret White House recordings came.
under questioning by the Senate
Watergate committee. ?
THE SUGGESTION conies from
Haldeman, former President:
Richard N. Nixon's White House
chief of staff, who also raises the
possibility that the CIA, for some
motivation unknown. was "out to
get" Nixon. Haider= offers no new
;evidence ler his suggestions, which
came in the fourth part of a five-part
series of newspaper articles he has
!syndicated in advance of publication
of the memoirs on which he is work-
Butterfield, a former Air Force
officer, had joined the Nixon admin-
istration in its first days. He served
in the White House and as federal
aviation administrator from 1973
until last year.
In his ilevnipapee article, Heide-
mau laes this to say about Butterfield
sled the CIA:
"11.1z.x erigiaally approached the
White House on his own initiative ?
net because I recruited him. I-fe was
seen te hecenne en Air Felice general.
Mi.vz ovier e,r,jerstuad why he ia-
riseed, ee,shist. my edvice, on drop-
Li3 COM , Or wit he tied-
deriiii shisiaten tit3
Approveal-ortlielelisee21j01108/081: 081
tcieraione asp at iltleSOM.-
"In view
quent role,
seem even
today.
"Was Butterfield a CIA
agent? Maybe. I just don't
know.
"In retrospect, I'm am-
bivalent as to whether the
agency was out to get
Nixon," Haldeman writes.
BUTTERFrELD has had
to contend with the specter
of the CIA since last sum-
mer, when a ? former Air
Force intelligence officer,
Col. L. ? Fletcher Prouty,
said he had been told that
Butterfield was the CIA's
contact man in the White
House, a position that would
not entail spying on those
for Whom he worked.
Butterfield has emphati-
cally denied it. "I'm not
anti-CIA. It just so happens
that I haven't been (con-
nected with the agency),"
he says.
And he has picked up
some substantial support in
that assertion. After
Prouty's comments, the
Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee looked into the issue.
Its chairman, Sen. Frank
Church, D-Idaho, later an-
nounced the committee had
found "no scintilla of evi-
dence that would substanti-
ate such a charge."
Butterfield says he long
ago became wary of those
who staffed the Nixon White
House. He says that when
the Watergate prosecutor's
operation wits going full
tilt, he was called in by
prosecutors to explain a
memorandum he had writ-
ten that made it appear as.
if he were launching a
political-public relations
cernneign bawd on infor-
of his subse-
these actions
more curious
4-) A,47 c-21r-) rifT
)ei.4? ff
able legality.
Butterfield said he was
able to demonstrate that
the memorandum had been
,doctored to give that im-
pression but he was shock-
ed that some one in the
White House had made the
attempt.
with Nixon about the
"Haldeman problem" and
the options which might still
be available regarding it.
Kissinger, never one of
the "Watergate people,"
said that even the thought
of resignation on my part
was "incomprehensible" to
him. He told me that if
Nixon accepted my resigna-
tion, or permitted me to
leave under any circum-
stances that he, Kissinger,
would resign immediately.-
"I won't serve in an
administration which would
permit such a thing to hap-
pen," he emphasized.
In several telephone con-
versations over the years
after I left the White House,
Henry has expressed the
same feeling of support con-
cerning my departure, but
he didn't resign over it:
Now .
?
WHEN ASKED why
Haldeman might be reviv-
ing the CIA business, But-
terfield says, "I couldn't
begin to guess," although
he adds, "he may really
think that."
' Butterfield takes issue
with Haldeman's news-
paper article on several.
'points. For one thing, But-
terfield had not been select-
ed for, promotion to briga-
dier general, although it
probably wasn't a bad het,
since he had been selected
for full colonel before his
contemporaries, a signifi-
cant mark of recognition.
For another thing, But-
terfield says Haldeman
never advised hint against
dropping his commission.
As Butterfield recalls, it he
was offered a job as Halde-
man's immediate deputy in
the White House but only if
he retired from the Alta
Force and signed on as a
civilian.
"He actually did not ad-
vise me to keep- my com-
mission. He said to think
carefully about it and I
thought carefully about it,"
Butterfield says. ?
By December of 1972.
Butterfield says, he wanted
to get out of the White
House and was nominated
by Nixon to head the Feder-
al Aviation Administration,.
a post which would require
him to sever his connection
with the military service.
HE ACCEPTED the
nomination, he said, be-
cause he did not want to ap-
pear "money oriented" and
because he did not want to
wish to embarrass the
president. The resignation
required by the new post
ended Butterfield's retire-
ment and other military
benefits which he had earn-
ed in his 20 years in the Air
Force.
The Ford administration
forced Butterfield's resig-
nation. Later, a bill to rein-
state his military retire-
ment benefits was defeated
in the Senate amid much
controversy. Butterfield, 50,
still has Civil Service re-
tirement.
For the time being. he is
doing what he calls -free-
lance consulting," but he
acknowledges it is a some-
what uncomfortable posi-
tion for a man who spent his
career in highly structured
organizations. "I'd like to
find a job," he says.
A-RW77-00432R000100400001-2
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-
ITHE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, June 13,1976
The
-
C010
?. By George Crile III
Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine.
N JANUARY, 1975, Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
charged that a senior official of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration had been offered and had exam-
lined a consignment of exotic assassination devices. The
instruments included exploding telephones, flashlights
and cameras, and came complete with triggering mecha-
nisms set to movement, time, pressure, light or sound.
Their only conceivable use was for anonymous murder.
. Cot Lucien Conein, the official Weicker named, was
not in a position to directly deny the senator's assertions.
For one thing, Weicker produced a memo from the now
defunct B.R. Fox Co. of Alexandria that seemed to impli-
cate Conein in the company's decision to produce the de-
vices for his consideration. Nevertheless, Conein man-
aged to convince reporters that there was nothing more
to the incident than the unsolicited mischief of the B.R.
Fox Co. He had gone to look at some eavesdropping de-
vices that he was thinking of buying for DEA when,
much to his surprise, he was shown strange weapons
which he hadn't asked to see and had no intention of
buying.
The story made the network news, but with Conein's
explanation the matter was dropped, and nothing more
has been heard on the subject.
Had it been any other Washington official, this ex-
planation might have sufficed. But Col. Conein is no or-
dinary bureaucrat. It seems incredible that there was no
reaction to the discovery that the man examining the ex-
ploding devices was the same Col. Lucien Conein who
had been the CIA's notorious Far Eastern operative and
the only figure associated with President Nixon's for-
mer team to go on to become a senior official of the
_Ford administration.
A Legendary Career
jf T WOULD have been difficult to imagine a more
turbing appointment than that of Lucien Coneinto al-
most any pest of responsibility in the government, much
less his appointment to a highly sensitive position involv-
ing the most delicate covert operations. In earlier days
the French used to. offer two medical degrees: one re-
quiring many years of school, internship and residency,
and the other calling for an intensive 18-month p1 ogram.
The short-course doctors were not permitted to practice
in France but they were given full 'license to operate in
the Orient. The latter is the kind of license the CIA gave
Lou Conein. It all but read on his Agency contract: "For
Use in the Far East Only." .
Conein's history is by now laeed with legend but the
following appears to be a reasonable summary of his ex- ?
ploits before joining the Nixon White House in 1971:
At the age t2f 17 Conein is said: to have fled his home-
town in Kansas to join the French Foreign Legion. With
?the entry of the United States into World War II he
'transferred to the Office of Strategic Services in France,
where he lived and 1ought441V.fraiopekkg tag& 2
? hood, who were then part of the Resistance. Before he
left, Conein says, they made him a member ? an honor
to bear in mind, for the Brotherhood is an underworld
? organization deeply involved in the drug trade and con-
sidered even more effective and dangerous than its Sicil-
ian counterpart, the Mafia.
After the liberation, Conein parachuted into Vietnam
to join an OSS team fighting the Japanese alongside the
Vietminh. There he met Ho Chi Minh and Gen. Vo Ngu-
yen Giap. A decade later, in 1954, he was back in Viet-
nam as one of Gen. Edward Lansdale's special team,,,
charged with setting up a paramilitary organization in
the Hanoi area. He helped Ngo Dinh Diem consolidate
his power in South Vietnam the next year and in 1963 116.
was the U.S. embassy's liaison with the cabal of generals
who murdered Diem.
Although be has been accused of engineering the as-
sassination, his actual role seems to have been as the
Kennedy administration's only direct conduit to the
coup's plotters. He had occupied this sensitive position
almost.by default. He was married to a Vietnamese and
he alone among the Americans was intimate with most
of the Vietnamese high command. No one else had any-
thing resembling his access to and familiarity with the
Vietnamese style of doing business.
Even so, the CIA considered him an unstable commod-
ity and sent him back to Washington. But he soon man
aged to return as part of an elite 10-man counterinsur,
gency team under Gen. Lansdale which also included
Daniel Ellsberg, then still a war hawk. -
It was Conein's past association with Ellsberg and his
involvement in Diem's overthrow that brought him to
:the attention of the White House in 1971. His contact was.
:E. Howard Hunt, an OSS colleague in World War It
'Hunt had just begun working with Charles Colson, who
was intent both on destroying Ellsberg's reputation and
discrediting President Kennedy (and thus Sen. Edward
Kennedy, then thought Nixon's most formidable politi-
cal rival). One of Colson's hopes was to cast responsibility
for Diem's assassination onto President Kennedy him.
.self.
' Conein's career was then in a tailspin. He had left the
, CIA in 1968 and had persuaded a group of past associates
to back him in a surplus war trading venture in Viet-
nam. By 1970 he had lost all of his and his investors'
money and was back in Washington, drinking heavily
and without much hope for the future. It was at this
point that he was recruited by Howard Hunt.
Conein didn't offer anything of interest to help the
White House undermine Ellsberg's reputation but he
? quickly ingratiated himself with Colson by providing
. NBC with an interview on the Saigon coup that tied the
Kennedy administration far closer (in knowledge, at
least) to that bloody event than before.
With this entre, be was soon asked to give his opinion
on how Bud Krogh and his crew of eager young lawyers
working with the Plumbers in Room 16 might go about
waging the campaign against drugs just launched by the
President.
Operation Diamond
T IS GENERALLY assumed that the rocits of Water-
.11 are to be found in the creation of the Plumbers
to investigate national security leaks. But it was Nixon's
desperate drive against the country's drug epidemic
Which disclosed to his political operatives what secret re-
sources were available for their use and how to tap
them:
To the new President, the country in 1969 seemed to
be dissolving irretrievably into disorder. Drugs may only
have been a symptom of a deeper ailment, but seen from
the White House they were the critical problem from
which so many other troubles flowed.
Nixon was so adamant about cutting off the poison
that in 1971 be declared drugs the country's number one
Problem and appointed Egil Krogh as his personal aide
to direct a federal war against nars.ntici diterolf -rom
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the White House.
By the time Conein appeared, Krogh and his young
aides were desperate to tome up with results for their
demanding chief. They had concluded that conventional
approaches to drug enforcement were useless to deal
with thi.: realities uf the, international narcotics trade.
The problems were everywhere ? not the least being
that foreign governments, or at least 'high foreign offi-
cials, were themselves so often part of the trafficking.
Krogh"s staff was equally frustrated by the reluctance
of the FLI and particularly the'CIA to join it. J. Edgar
Hoover had known that dru2S would be a corrupting in-
flunacc on his agents and i.cpt out of it. The CIA was ev-
ery bit as reluctant. From Thailand to Turkey to the Car-
ibbean, those same people smuggling drugs were also
usclul sources of information on the flow of weapons,
revolution and international intrigue. The federal drug
foet esl.; th it these trio-fa:kers be put out of business;
the CIA wanted to maintain flexibility to gather intellig-
ence. Conchs, then, was just the man Krogh and his aides
were looking for: a man of the world ? albeit a very spe-
cial world ? who understood the other side and knew
how to fight it.
It is uncertain precisely what part Conein played in
the ensuing White House programs; it can only be
pointed out that some of them :were so sensitive that
they required the approval of HenrY Kissinger's 40 Com-
mittee; others appear to have stretched so far over the
boundaries of legality that they were undertaken in to-
tal secrecy.
One of these was Operation Diamond, the elaborate
clandestine organization that Bernard Barker was or-
ganizing in Miami for Howard Hunt. Barker recruited al-
most 200 former CIA Cuban agents and organized them
into specialized units for future operations. They in-
eluded intelligence and counterintelligence groups and
a street-fighting arm, Cubans who had brawled for the
Agency at Communist and anti-Communist rallies across
Latin America. And there was a particularly sensitive
sector known as the Action Teams ? an old CIA term
for units with paramilitary skills including demolition
and assassination.
Barker says that Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy talked
about a number of other operations being organized at
that time for similar purposes ? Ruby, Opal, Crystal,
Sapphire. Much later he was told that they were part of
a larger, White House-coordinated program called Gem-
stone. Much of what Liddy would ultimately propose to
John Mitchell in his famous $1 mi1i plan of political
subversion was taken from the Diamond plan that Bar-
ker drafted. Hunt assured Barker that the action squads
would ultimately be turned against Fidel Castro; in the
meantime, they would be used in the presidential cam-
paign and then es special soldiers in the international
drug war.
Watergate, one might think, should have called a halt
to such extraleE:al plans for narcotics enforcement; in-
stead it seems that the President merely put a bureau-
cratic face on a guerrilla war. Immediately after the '
Join Etirlieliman and Krogh arranged for Co-
nein to be transferred out of the White House to a con-
suiting job with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs. Then, a year later, on July I, 1973, Nixon consoli-
dated all of the previously quarrelling bureaucracies ,
dealing with narcotics into the Drug Engorcement Ad-
ministration; and in November, attracting little atten-
tion in a city ob:;essed with talk of impeachment, Lucien
Conein was appointed head of DEA's newly formed Spe-
cial Operati-3ns Branch: his job, to create worldwide in-
tellivrice T,'2t.V.C1!?13 ? both insido and outside the
to Vfentify and ultimately to put a stop
t3 the work of the major dreg traffickers.
4 '4'4r-',
ORE if.X':1'; CIA or'cleird's bewilderment has
ili.ti 1:e that LucieuCuiea .
r,i,?-?.,n a rat.,,c,..i.ory po:w ion over nar-
r:.t4.",4?5: "Got.: :1!1," 1. Da Silva, who w.ls cc
ApprovedFor Release 20
neirt's boss as Saigon station chief after the Diem assassi-
nation. "You've got to. start with the premise that Lou
Conein is crazy. He worked for me in Vietnam. if work is ?
the word. He was certifiable at that point, I think." But
he was useful: "The Agency does not deal with vicars of ?
the church exIniively. We have all kinds of villains and
rogues involved as well as heroes. You've got Lou Co-;
neins and a -whole lot of other people who serve their
purpose. And. within reason, if you keep them under
control, people like him can do things other people can-
not do. And that's how they survive ..."
On a slow day, Conein is often found at Tony's 'or the
, Class Reunion bar and restaurant, a few blocks from
DEA's offices, drinking beer and telling stories with a
bunch of old OSS, CIA and DEA friends. Conein talks
only occasionally but dominates these gatherings. He sits
all but motionless save for his compulsive smoking and
quaffing from a beer battle that looks quite small in his
thick paw. He has the look of a graying grizzly bear, but
a better image might be that of a gnarled tree that has
been struck more than once by lightning and has sur-
vived. You're sure there would be scars all over, his
body, if you were to want to look. Two fingers are miss-
ing, lost no doubt in some far-off land; the others seem
?L1C1'so.endisn does rot mind questions from reporters. On
this occasion, he growls menacingly that he has been on
to his visitor's inquiries about him. He then gives his
stock prefatory tern:ark: "111 tell you anything you want
to hear but it's nrabehly not the truth."
Even with th.fa unusual qualification, whatever the
chief of DEA's Special Operations Branch says- on the
subject of drugs is necessarily of interest, particularly
when he starts off with the flat declaration that he
would never dream oi mounting operations against one
of the chief sources of narcotics traffic ? the Corsicans.
"You can get killed that way," he explains. "I will not
talk about the Ceasicans, period. I happen to be a mem- ?
tier of the Corsican Brotherhood."
' "Let me tell yen something," he goes on in a voice that.
? makes you strain to listen. "When the Sicilians put out a
contract, it's usually 'united to the continental United
States or maybe CAnada or Mexico, but with the Corsi-
cans it's internatanal. They'll go anywhere. There's an
old Corsican proverb: 'If you want revenge and you act
within 20 years, you're acting in haste.' It wouldn't just
be me. They'd lethe it out on my children and maybe
even some grandetiildren. This is the code."
Amazingly be ei:ids that he would also be wary of run-
ning operations against the CIA's old Cuban agents in
Miami, a number of whom have gone into the drug
trade. He compares them with the Corsicans, whose
effectiveness he Mributes to their training and experi-
ence with the Freach intelligence services: "The Cubans
have received 2.31 thc? 1.-lidecraft from the Agency. If
they could get iao Cuba to rrise hell, they can sure as
bell get into the t_7.5. with drugs."
The problem in trying to move against such adver-
saries, he explains, is that "we have no cover as far as
breaking laws ari7. after this damn Church Committee
we'll have even 77..5.s. You can't do it because 12 or 13
years later mayb you'll have to stand up there with
your balls exposes."
Drinking beer 1::ith Lou Conein, one is given the im-
pression of a man who knows too much about the ways.
of the world to bother with trying to stop the unstoppa-
ble. Readily he rgrees with a suggestion that there is
simply too much .7-oney to be made in the drug trade for
governments to I::: able .to curtail it. A pretty teenage
girl in a short rel skirt f.:,);ite.-, ia asking for directions
and COLt2in phitasophical tone. lie talks of ]iv
big uu can. "I figure I've got 4,000
morc hroads to . :??avE is he orders a.:other
anci. vJ.1*-L .-;;;:nt to usadrugs
anyway c: a .;,at to be drunk?
It hd.11101ill. to 'ira chai.!nrcl. by this legendary
rogue am;c ;t. 1,.ocw!)11;ytily002(i, by misiend.
':?????! dt.%,1-; lel),
irAtf ;\:tiu e
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tions about his activities at DEA are deadly serious.
Recruits From CIA.
THE CREATION of Conein's Special Operations
Branch stemmed from the Nixon administration's
Insistence ths t DEA move away from its "buy and bust"
approach, which yielded only small-time traffickers, and
create a CIA-styled intelligence capability to identify
and then eliminate the major suppliers: There would be
a new intelligence service parallel to the traditional En-
forcement Division. The man assigned to run the new di-
vision, George Belk, was along-time Federal Bureau of -
Narcotics veteran whose tote,,,11 dree enforcement opera-
tion in Detroit had caused his office to inherit the De-
troit Mafia's old nickname, the "Purple Gang." Belk was
enthusiastic to a fault, but he had no experience in intel-
ligence and thus relied heavily on Conein for guidance
in creating what he hoped would becerne an intelligence
empire.
The initial problem was that none of the personnel
available were trained to organize and run professional
Intelligence operations. A number of retired or active
CIA men had been recruited in 1972 and 1973 ? the fig-
ure may now run as high as 100. But none of these origi-
nal recruits were operatives; they were analysts or func-
tionaries. What Belk and Conein wanted were men capa-
? ble of establishing intelligence nets to cover entire re-
gions of the world and they asked the CIA if it could
spare any of its operatives. Conein wanted about 50 but.
settled for 12.
The Agency was more than happy to provide DEA
.with some of its men, for it very much wanted to get out
of the narcotics work forced on it by the White liaise.
The CIA was then being drastically cut back and when
word was spread of the opportunities for advancement
with the new drug agency a number of operatives were
Interested. The first recruits were told they would be
sent overseas with the approximate responsibility of a .
station chief. Of the 12 accepted none had known -Co-
nein. They all transferred expecting a quick rise to the.:
top of a new and growing service; all soon bitterly re-
gretted the move.
Their problems began immediately as most DEA offi-i
cials resented and suspected the 12 new men before they ,
had even arrived. Two years before, the chief of 13NDD
had been so distressed by his agency's corruption that,
'he had the CIA detail him 19 agents to ferret it out.
Their subsequent success alienated them from many at
DEA and even managed to cast suspicion over the other
CIA veterans who joined the new drug agency.
All kinds of problems flowed from the arrival of Co-
nein's recruits in early 1974. The main difficulty
stemmed from the bitter attempts of the enforcement
division to sabotage the growth of the new intelligence
branch. Enforcement even tried to get the operatives as-
signed to its division. Conein finally directed his men not
to come to the DEA office until the matter was straight-
ened out. He had them go instead to a "safe house" he
had acquired for DEA through an old OSS and CIA
friend.
A safe house is the CIA's name for a place where
agents can go in secret: this one was a two-story apart-
ment in the La Salle building at 1028 Connecticut Ave_
NW, half a block from the Mayflower Hotel. Conein told:
his men that the apartment had formerly been operated
by the CIA. Actually ? as we shall see later ? its ident-
ity Is more mysterious than that.
It was reportedly in this apartment that Conein and
his deputy; Sear! iBuch Frank, examined the B. R. Fox as-
sassination devices. Reporters accepted Conein's assur-
ances that he had not expected to be shown the equip-
ment. But according to two senior DEA officials, Conein
knew precisely what B. R. Fox's representatives planned
to show him that day.eMore important, they claim that
he had already developed plans to emilloY them,
"When you get down to it," explained one of the offi-
cials. "Copein wa organizing an assassination
He was frustrated by the big-time operators 'who were
just too insulated to get to . . . He felt we couldn't win,
the way things were going."
According to these officials, meetings were held to de-
cide whom to target and what method of assassination to
employ. Conein then assigned the task to three of the
former CIA operatives detailed to the Connecticut Ave-
nue safe house.
The men he chose were former paramilitary case offi-
cers with the Agency's Special Operations Division who
had run commando raids into North Vietnam. The DEA
officials described them as first-generation Americans,
"very young and patriotic and a little naive. They were
troubled by the assignment but they trusted Conein be-
cause he had been with the CIA. They counted on him
not to put them in a compromising situation."
The program was to begin in Mexico. Conein report-
edly had his men prepare operational plans to deter-
mine the feasibility of killing a number of Mexican traf-
fickers with sophisticated exploding devices. For several
months in 1974 the three, working directly under Co-
nein, traveled back and forth to Mexico. After preparing
their initial plans he had them identify a number of
Mexicans to be recruited to carry out the actual mur-
ders.
According to these accounts, at least one Mexican was
recruited as an assassination agent. The man had grown
up in a border town with a number of major traffickers
and had become a DEA informant after being arrested
on a drug charge. In exchange for murdering his old
friends, the DEA agreed to help him become a legal resi-
dent of the.United States.
The alleged plan was apparently ready to begin by the
beginning of 1975 when Sen. Weicker made his public
charge. One of the operatives had already questioned
Conein on the legality of his assignment. Now, all three
reportedly rebelled and told Conein they would not par-
ticipate any further.
"Those three have since been dispatched to the four
winds, to jobs far from Washington," said one of the.
DEA officials. "They are bitter about how they were
used and very afraid of repercussions."
Conein, in a burst of four-letter words, denied any in-
volvement in such a program. "That is a big lie. That
is bull "He said he knew who the sources were and
that they were the ones who should be investigated, but
he refused to identify them or to offer any reason why
they should not be believed. "Go ahead and print it," he
said twice. "I don't care." One reason he offered to rebut
the story was that he never had anything to do with any
programs in Mexico.
Conein's supervisor, George Belk, now retired, offered
a different version of Conein's activities. lie said that Co-
nein and several of his agents from the Connecticut Ave-
nue safe house had been working on a program involv-
ing Mexico in 1974. But he said he did not know of any
plan for DEA to assassinate anyone. "We were trying to
determine ways and means by which they [the major
drug traffickers] could be immobilized by the Mexican
government. ...The idea was to identify the Mexicans
who were known to be operating... to collect intelligence
to be passed on to the attorney general's office for ac-
tion by their government." He stressed that there was no
extralegal activity taking place.
When asked once again about the reported assassina-
tion program, Belk replied: "That may have been some-
body's concept but nothing ever came of it. As a matter
of fact, nothing ever happened."
Ver Bell and Yesco
PPARENTLY CONEIN'S program did not result in
1. any deaths but its implications become even more
provocative when ht relationship to the manufacturer
of the exploding devices is considered. News act 0111115
describe the B. R. Fox Cu. as a short-lived firm run out et
an Alexandria home by an electronics engineer and a
housewife. There was no explanation as to why Conein
had chosen to buy sophisticated wiretapping equipment
from ettcb en obscure firm.
The explanation, is to be found in the identity of the
17
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2
actual figure behind the B. R. Fox Co. and its arrange-
ments with Conein ? Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell M.
Wer Bell is one of the world's most successful inventors
and manufacturers of silencers and such exotic lethal
weapons as a cigar that fires a single bullet and a swag-
ger stick that doubles as a rocket launcher. But, most im-
portant in this context, he is one of Conein's old OSS,
friends and, according to staff members on the Senate
Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, a business
partner of Conein's at least as recently as 1974.
In an interview, Wer Bell disarmingly acknowledged a
recent business relationship with Conein. Further, he
'proudly asserted that he had worked with Conein to
provide DEA with assassination devices and that the,B.
R. Fox Co. had even shared the same duplex apartment
used by the DEA operatives as a safe house. (This fact is
confirmed by the La Salle building's records.)
Conein's apparent use of Wer Bell for DEA operations
seems all but incredible when the arms manufacturer's
other activities in 1974 are taken into account. That
spring, while Conein was readying his assassination pro-
gram, Wer Bell was negotiating a bizarre arms deal with
Robert Vesco, the fugitive swindler in Costa Rica, Wer
Bell originally agreed to sell Vest() his entire stock of 2,-
000 silenced machine guns. But he was unable to get an
export license and so the two reached a tentative agree-
ment to build an Ingram submachine gun factory in
Costa Rica. (The Ingrain is the same weapon featured in
the opening scenes or "Three Days of the Condor.")
These dealings were sufficiently ,menacing to draw
the interest of Sen. Henry Jackson's Permanent Investi-
gations Subcommittee. Jackson observed that Wer Bell's
Ingrams are not the "normal military defense weapons.
This is the kind of weapon ... used for covert purposes
. shall we say, mini-revolutions or coups or what have
you."
Along with Wer Bell's arms deal, the Jackson subcom-
mittee also investigated Vesco's "penetration'? of the
federal bureaucracy, and particularly the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration. Here it found that the DEA had all
but killed a promising investigation into charges by a
government informer that Vesco was trafficking in her-
oin, and that it had then "lost" most of Vesco's file. Even
more suspicious was the discovery that two of the nar-
cotics agency's wiretap...specialists had flown from Los
Angeles to New Jersey to sweep Vesco's home and office
for possible bugs.
The further the committee probed the entangling re-
lations of Vesco, Wer Bell, Conein and the DEA, the
WASHINGTON POST Suadny, Jane 13, 1976
rim p ,(,)JL
jJ ; .43 ;:j "ir,-)r 'Ar vs? ?T-vg )
I / LI
1q774 777,
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IL
1.3CEN CONFINE reported cf.
"nal fort to eatablish an assaasination
program at the Drug Enforcement
Administration was apparently frus-
trated before it could be tried out.
But this program was perhaps only
the most direct tactic designed for
use in the drug war and the tempo-
rary se:Zit:tek did not deter him from
pursuing other: equally uncooven-
tionel untie:oat:toga. One of the first
end inegent at' tecee was the anonia-
bun seriee of secret operations in
South Florida' cod(anonied Deacon 1.
DZV.,207?'i rc051v: 10 ladtA'ea
teettetet teen aee teaitt ntoaa teet.
7.7-00 "p
...2-?? 'I 1!
Li/(n 7?
more questions were raised. For one thing, Wer Bell was
indicted in 1974, charged with conspiracy to smuggle
large quantities of marijuana into the country, in a case
yet to come to trial. The staff wanted to know the pre-
cise nature of his relationship with Conein.
They had already subpoenaed Conein, Belk and others
to testify when suddenly the hearings were cancelled. If
the staff members know why, they don't explain; but
they also don't conceal their frustration. The decision
' was not theirs.
A Pandora's Box
911 HE RECENT congressional investigations into U.S.
.11 intelligence activities did not examine narcotics op-
erations, and the President's new guidelines for all other
intelligence agencies do not even address themselves to
? DEA operations. DEA is left more or less alone through
its Inspection Division to regulate itself. It is hard to ex-
pect too much from this check: the man scheduled to he
appointed to the number two spot in Inspection, Bud
Frank, is Conein's former deputy. He was on hand that
day two years ago to review the exploding devices.
A few months ago, the Justice Department, of which'
DEA is a branch, conducted an investigation into some
. of Conein's other operations (see box on opposite page).
?
Two attorneys were assigned the task. After reading the
report of their findings, the assistant attorney general
concerned instructed them to tone down their conclu-
sions. The attenuated final version was then attached to
:a genekal report on the intelligence division and strictly
limited to three copies; one each for the attorney gener-
al, the assistant attorney general, and for Peter Bensin-
ger, DEA's new administrator.
' It is understandable that no administration would
wish to take on Col. Conein. It is said that his closet is
filled with skeletons from his days with the CIA, and
that he has a lethal knowledge of where a great number
of other bodies are buried.
But this alone does not explain the silence of the Ford
Justice Department. It is unlikely that any investigation
of Conein could htdp but result in a larger exploration of
other past and present narcotics efforts and it would
inevitably have to enter into the tangled world of Wer
Bell and Vesco.
Moro than likely no one in the Ford administration
even knew of Conein's presence at DEA ? or knew any-
thing about his activities ? until recently. By now it
probably knows mere than it would prefer apparently
enough to avoid opening this potential Pandora's box in
the midst of an election year.
ficcrti in Southern Florida ? par-
ticularly in cocaine ? were Cuban
exiles. This was a new challenge, for
many of these opponents had been
professionally trained in exfiltration
and infiltration during the CIA's
five-yeer secret tvar against Cuba in
the early laaaan The DEA found it-
self helpleas against such experi-
enced professionals. What really
derma; the drug agency was the
diacovery that some of these former
CIA men were putting their old
cat; eatellagence training to work.
egaieen. taeto "We found that if we
i'!".7,;;.3?.0.t.,,,, someone, someena
wee fOr,..v.,tri.F4 tee" et:alai-lied a PEA
oficirJ inYlaiMi. "The Cubans were
actually counter-surveilling us. They
were just beating the pants off us."
The obeteue solution to the prob-
lean was DEA '10 hire its own Cu-
ben eeiteee hence :'aleacon 1, staffed
exclusively by formct. CIA men. Dea-
con I was to te a prototype of the
hind of CIA-Fer East operation that
Conein planned to initiate through-
out the world. Three full-time DEA
officials ? all with CIA backgrounds
? were assiened to direct a net of
about 20 highly experienced Cubans.
From the beginning, the program
was kept secret, even from most of
the officials in Conein's division. He
ran it personelly out of his office in
Wasbiegton, possing orders through
Cule?n netcrart of the CIA who
el:mince tele; ana ;tea!, to Miami.
The drug world that ilatcotics offi-
eirde caleed u ewe io control deals
'Set . :nee: c honey and is char-
1C.CL: of scruples
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about corrupting or killing 'anyone
who gets in the way of the traffick-
ers. It is no wonder that government
narcotics officials so often turn for
assistance to figures as loathsome as
the trade itself.
An argument can be made that no
other kind of person can safely or
effectively operate in such an envi-
ronment. But just as a man is af-
fected by the company he keeps, so
too are drug officials and their pro-
grams twisted by the informants
they employ. The story of Carlos
Hernandez Rumbaut, one of Deacon'
l's informants, shows how far just
one such alliance can go.
IKE MOST of the Cubans in Dea-
con 1, Carlos Hernandez had
been at the Bay of Pigs. Apparently
he first came to the attention of the
old Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs (BNDD) when he was ar-
rested in Mobile in 1969 with 467
pounds of marijuana which he said
be was going to sell in Miami. His.
trial, scheduled for April, 1971, was
postponed when the judge deter-
? mined that his mental state was dis-
turbed.
? With this curriculum vitae the
BNDD regional office at Miami saw
fit the following month to enlist him
as a "Class 1 cooperating individual."
He provided some useful informa-
tion; in return, the bureau not only
paid him $150 but attempted to in-
tercede on his behalf with the Ala-
bama authorities. Unmoved, they
jailed him pending a new trial.
BNDD was thus forced to put Her-
nandez on an "inactive cooperating
individual status."
. He was then convicted and sent-
enced to 15 years. Not even . this
cooled the Miami office's ardor for
Hernandez. He appealed but didn't
have enough money to post his $25,-
000 bond. Deacon l's chief agent and
Coneln's right-hand man on the pro-
ject solved the problem by arrang-
ing for one of Deacon l's informants,
a CIA veteran and a successful Cu-
ban jeweler in Miami, to lend Her-
nandez $12,500. Ile assured the jew-
eler that DEA was in effect gua-
ranteeing the loam As soon as Her-
nandez was released from jail, the
Miami office put him back on active
status.
At this point Hernandez had had
enough of U.S. justice and fled to
Costa Rica, where the government
accorded his drug experience a very
different recognition. Within weeks
he was made an honorary member
of the Costa Rican Narcotics Divi-
sion, then promoted to captain and
second in command by order of then
President Jose Figueres. Soon after,
he becanae Figueres' bodyguard.
All of this information comes from'
Hernandez' confidential DEA file,
which includes CIA reports on Her-
nandez' conduct as a Costa Rican
narcotics officer. One of these iden-
tifies him and a relative of President
Figueres as members of a death
squad that executed at least one nar-
cotics trafficker in early 1973 and
.had sworn to kill more (a solution to
the drug problem eerily reminiscent
of the reported assassination pro-
gram proposed by Conein for Mexi-
co).
Hernandez' assassination effort as
well as his other shady activities
prompted U.S. Ambassador Viron P.
Vaky to insist in May, 1973, that DEA.
discontinue its relationship with its
informant. But Hernandez was now,
for all practical purposes, the Costa
Rican narcotics division and the
;DEA, loath to give up so strategically
placed an asset, disregarded the am- ,
bassador's directive. In October,
1973, the Alabama courts denied
Hernandez' appeal.
fi ERNANDEZ HAD no intention
Ii of returning to the United
States to go to jail. Even so, the mat-
ter might simply have faded away
were it not for the understandable
anger of the Deacon 1 informant
who had guaranteed half of Hernan-
dez' bail. The jeweler, unwilling to
forfeit his $12,500, demanded that
Hernandez make good his loss, and
threatened to track him to Costa
Rica if he didn't.
Hernandez, meanwhile, was still
working with DEA, now in conjunc-
tion with its regional office in Mex-
ico City. He told the drug agency
that the American government was
"treacherous" and he threatened to
"eliminate" anyone who attempted
to come after him. The embassy in
Costa Rica became underStandably
nervous and asked DEA to resolve
THE WASHINGTON" POST/PAIth Dli
20 June 1976
CM Popularity
?
A. few years ago, when young
Americans were dying in Vietnam,
CIA recruiters were' banned, from
many major university campuses.
Today they are more than wel-
come, will probably hire this year.
some 700 clerical employees and
400 professionals.
the dispute quietly. A special agent
?was dispatched to San Jose to soothe
_Hernandez. In a conciliatory mood,
Hernandez at least agreed not to
? harm any American narcotics offi-
cial.
The DEA's machinations to pro-
? tect Hernandez were now forced to
widen. DEA's New Orleans regional
? director was sent to persuade the at-
torney general of Alabama and the
district attorney in Mobile to waive
the appeal bond forfeiture. But the.
director's efforts angered the local
prosecutor, Randy Butler, who not
only refused to cooperate but made
Hernandez an issue in his campaign,
and threatened to tell the world if
DEA made any further attempt to.
keep him out of jail.
And so in late 1973 Carlos Hernan-
dez ? Bay of Pigs veteran, convicted
drug smuggler, DEA informant,
Costa Rican narcotics ace, private
executioner and presidential body-
guard ? was preparing to become
an international incident, ready to
go off right in the middle of the
post-Watergate furor, the moment
the jeweler set foot in Costa Rica.
There was no way to appeal to the
Costa Rican government for help.
There was an election coming up but
Hernandez' position in the country's
narcotics division was so strong that
, no one felt he could be dislodged.
Something had to be done quickly.
Conein's supervisor, George Belk,
decided to pay the jeweler $12,500 by
dramatically increasing his monthly -
cash payments as an informant over,
the next year.
It would appear to have been a
dangerous risk for Belk to authorize
the payments, since they indirectly
assisted a fugitive from a drug case.
But Belk, when contacted, said there
was nothing wrong with this. "Her-
nandez was a source at the time."
But he "didn't work for me, he was
working for the Costa Ricans. The
guy who was working for us, who
had provided the bond money, was
tile crux of the problem."
Meanwhile, one senior DEA offi-
cial reports that Hernandez has
twice since entered the United
States, the proud bearer of an Amer-
ican diplomatic passport.
?GEORGE CHILE III.
The new student interest in join-
ing the Central Intelligence Agency
is undoubtedly the result of the
narrowing job market. Students
now want job and career security.
They also regard intelligence work
as adventurous.
? Such films as "Three Days of the
Condor" and "All the President's
Men," both starring Robert Red-
ford, have glamorized intelligence
with a romance which doesn't
necessarily apply to it but seems
intriguing to the young.
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BALTIMORE SUN
8 June 1976
Cuba denies
lie to death
of Kennedy
Miami (AP)?Cuba's Prime
Minister Fidel Castro categori-
cally denies his governmen
had anything to do with the as
sassination of President John F
Kennedy.
But Mr. Castro has implied
that he will reply in kind to fur-
ther terrorist attacks on Cuban
property or diplomats overseas.
In a speech reported over
Havana radio yesterday, Mr..
Castro also said Cuban combat
troops are being "gradually
withdrawn" from Angola but
that civilian personnel are
being sent to the newly inde-
pendent African nation.
Speaking in the context of
terrorism and what he said
were attempts to kill him and
other Cuban leaders in the ear-
ly days of the Cuban revolution,,
Mr. Castro said about the Ken-
nedy murder:
"Some' imply that such an
action could have been retalia-
tion by the Cuban revolution for
the actions carried out against
the lives of our leaders at that
time. In truth, we reiterate that
never has the Cuban revolution
utilized terrorism.
"I can categorically affirm
that the Cuban revolution never
had the most minor participa-
tion -
d in the death of the Presi-
ent of the United States, John
Kennedy." ?
NEW YORK TIMES
1 7 JUN 1J76
MCE SEE TO BALT
CU. Fgrf, BILSPC3AK,
WASHINGTON, June 15 (UPI)
?A Federal judge has ordered
the Central Intelligence Agency
not to destroy files gathered on
thousands of Americans at the
direction of Presidents Lyndon
B. Johnson and Richard M. Nix-
on, the American Civil Liberties
Union said Tuesday.
A Senate committee staff re-
port said last month that the
agency had compiled the infor-
mation on orders from the two
Presidents, who feared exten-
sive foreign influence on
domestic unrest in the late
1960s and early '70s.
The A.C.L.U. said that Federal
District Judge June Green, in
an order dated June 11, had
told George Bush, Director of;
Central Intelligence, to protecti
tho files pendinct outcome ofl
a civil suit demanding publica-
tion of material.
The civil rights group is ask-
ing that every American whose
name and activities were filed
by the agency be so informed
and the information be released
to them.
Judee Creen ordered Mr.
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
,12 June 1976 ?
tlfintifinfoiniminimitimmlniortaiiii''SAtURDAY inillinitiliimitnnionninumnimintminf
ONE. nf the typical horfors of
our time is the instant journ-
? alist who suddenly pro-
? nounces ex - cathedra on
some problem which requires
a good deal of knowledge he
has not got. The public, more
modest, refrains from pro-
? &icing. its' wri'''uninstructed
opinion out of' nothing and
accepts 'What, it has been
told, or 'at least tends' to.
Misunderstandings or Misinter-
pretations, the product of a
slapdaSh arrogance,: may indeed
be argued against or exposed.
But, over the short run at any
.rate, the advantage is with,,the
first and noisiest assertion.
The most ,recrit example.ia
the brouhaha aboutthe
,Penkovsky Papers. It will 'be re-
Membered ' that in the' 'early
',sixties the Soviet Col Penkovsky,
cdisgUsted 'bp' the' Soviet order
I :arid. horrified' by 'the ',danger it
'presented 'to the- world, ap-
proached the 'West'S intelligence
,services .and ? provided them
.with absolutely crucial. informa-
.tionf 'the, critical days leading
up to the Cuban: missile crisis :of
1,963. Though able to visit, Lon-
,don, he.did not remain but went
;back to his, dangerOus week', eat
:of a 'eente of. duty. Ile' Was eyen-
tually? caught and, executed.
Shortly afterwards a book Was
published in the ,West under the
title y. Penkovsky 'Papers."
.Thotigh: . their _ provenance., I was
tightly:, disguised,, it was clear
that they represented, those, see-
,'tions', of:, reports
Which were not of intelligence
significance. They' preSented a
!striking picture' of Soviet 'society
'Seen 'through ' the 'eyes '6f' ea
?disillusionett,..:membet of the
privilegentsia. They were
'ac-
'cepted as genuine. by -,virtually
'.a11 students ? except. Mr Victor
,Zorza who, from supposed .inter-
,.nal evidence-alleged that they
1.were' faked. by the CIA; His
1. arguments 'were: two-fold ?
particular and general., etee;?,
c? The particulaxs were supposed
:to; be cumulative._ But since each
was without substance, they, did
not, in fact, accumulate., To .take
a perfectly typical and fair ex-
ample: penkovsky had described
.Churayey as one of the leaders
of the Communist party of tlfo
Russian Republice,Zo?rza pointed
out that there was 'no separate
-Communist party of the republic.
ce but there was a Communist
party bureau, of which Churayey
was. vice-chairman- ?
A forger,. one may. feel, ,rnight
have stuck to pettifogging. "ac-
,,curacy;" while a Russian's, hur-
ried report typically does not.
And, 'incidentally, the fact Of
the Penkovsky account of Soviet
:high life being mainly concerned
, with a few 'second-rank figures
unknown to the Western public
tends also to tell against the
ideas of a sensationalist fake:
Zorza's general comments
Last: "-estatieht
T
ROBERT CONQUEST defends Col
Penkovsky, Russian,dissident!rwho,, --,T
? fae?e'cl IOFW"ariit 'the `West' ?52')
, ?
. ? .; . , e r ? ;
amounted, in effect, to an un- whole report.. -If _ anything, the
convincing attempt to read Col formulation,' quite' to the 'con-
Penkovsky's mind, always a risky trary, implies admission at least
procedure. He argued that the, partial or basic authenticity. It
. colonel' "Would not," tYping ? should be. added 'indeed, that an
dangerously, avy0Y,, have, wasted, . :assertion by-the Committee does
time on non-espionage material. "not anyhow quite carry the
But Penkovsky not only clearly weight of infallibility implied:
;wanted to report.. everything for example Gen-Goodpaster,and
'he,. thought.! helpful ,.or..signir. others 'pointed out in the New
ficant, but was also deeply con- York Times a nasty error abOut,
cerned with writing his testament Eisenhower which the committee.
'-both'-'perSona1 ? and- ideological. nevertheless did .:riot scruple to
-MOkeovet; much of' the ,-niaterial include in its final report. In
seems, in any case, to have?been feet,- it '.is quite.- clear that--all
dictated iii London rather than tile alleged paints Made against
-typed in Moscow. This was duly
-pointed out, and there the matter
irested, until, a couple. of. months
ago, the U S Senate Committee
,on, Intelligence, presented, its
,report., C, ? ; ,
? thiS,- a:nd an this Oon the
:ctirrent critics rely. .Readers will
;be ,surpriSedj to ..learn,.,that the
'report _contains . no .assertion pf
the unauthentieity of the' papers.
It attacks.. the CIA at some
length 'fin' ? wickedly' 'misleading
the publisher by passing the
,material ? through, an ,...inter-
Tnediary. In the course of ell:Allis,
,thC,,report.,remarks in passing,
. in a ,muddle'd,and? illiterate fash-
ion. that the ,bookehad been
"prepared and written..by
yit-
,ting ..0 I A, .assets who drew On
,acleal-Case- materials."
' rather snide way' 'of. put-
ting the rather, obviouS fact that
'the' papers had 'been' edited by
"someone iri theCI,A's Confidente
rather than someone they didn't
trust e an ?? inch; was ? instantly
:greeted the- Trines and
-WashinOton :Pose as .proving
the :Tapers were forged: the
:
nsecle` the ;word "febei-
catech"
'the 'Post went to .the
length of quoting approvingly-a
?Soviet. description: ? "coarse
;fraud, a mixture of provocative :surning we. may find this. ? The
.invention and anti-Soviet. slan- -trouble ? is, as Gibbon pointed
out, that an error cOnsisting of
!a single line may take several
pages 'to. refute: I have here
been able to -do no more than
skim .the large .pool of evidence
and argument which exists in
favour of the. general .authen-
the work are. without substance.
This?. does not', prove the.
authenticity-of every, single sen-
tence in the book, which must
await the CIA making the
docunientseayailable,, or.. at. any
rate ;stating its:position clearly.
That .is, .if the ,timid creature
has' regained enough nerve to
Stick its-' head out of the' hole.
into raving politician's and
journalists have. driven 'it. with,
sticks anch, stones.- Meanwhile, .
-it has been a rare experience to
see journalists?and American
journa ists.?aiguing .that the
, (rather perfunctory) conceal-
ment of a source or method of
:transmission should. be thought
to invalidate a, document. Yet
this is quite typical of the manic ?
,note to be' found ',in' a certain
type of journalism; with its in-
.
sistence that; bri matters decided
'by 'Fourth Estate caprice, it is
'the duty of us peasants to accept
the verdict.
But those whose business it
:has been to study with ,care
" Complex , issues which any
'Pulitzer 'person 'believes himself
divinely empowered to master
'in 10 minutes flat, do have a
duty to set the record straight,
'however tedious and time-con-
der" ? a fair indication of the
-comparative intensity of ..-anti-
A mania in the two countries.
The.Senate Committee phrase
could indeed be taken to imply
forgery. But if ithad? really, de-
tected forgery, it would hardly
have, left it as an ambiguous ticity of the Penkovsky Papers,
.aside in. an ,assanit On the CI A and their status as a last Ines-
for a much lesser metier, but sage and testainent from a
would have attacked it fcroci- brave and intelligent man who
ously in detail, at, length -with knew totalitarianism, and hated
?.t'. proofs, 7, in the spirit'of, the- ,What he jelewe
Bush to notify his agency's per- ?
sonnet not to destroy the doc-
uments and computer records.
The judge, in effect, coun-
,termanded a recommendation
in the Rockefeller Commission
report on the C.I.A. last year
that the files, "which have no
foreign intelligence value,
Ishouict ?_te destroyed by the
agency at tee conclusien of the
!Current Conercesionnl investi-
i ee tions or re: soon theteefter 20
les ene-raitted -by law."
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WASHINGTON POST
17 JUN 1976
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
,
c,overo.. Operation
That Failed.'
House Speaker Carl Albert was made
the agent of an undercover attempt by
the Nixon administration in late 1971 to
destroy the effectiveness of a Greek ex-
patriate whose lobbying against the
military dictatorship in Athens inf uri-
ated the Nixon high command.
This effort failed only because top of-
ficials in the State Department found
out about it. They ordered withdrawal
of a malicious, unsigned memorandum
that had been sent to Albert and issued
a private apology to the designated vic-
tim, Elias Demetracopoulos. The memo-
randum on plain white paper was
drafted by State and Central Intellig-
ence Agency bureaucrats.
The episode, reminiscent of other
covert political operations in the 1971-
,1972 ;Nixon White House; can now be?
brought to light because Albert has an-
nounced his decision not to run for re-
-election. Those involved refused to dis-
cuss the affair earlier because of possi-
ble reprisals from the office of the
Speaker, the third highest government
official.
. The failed effort involved, directly or
indirectly, White House legal counsel
John Dean, U.S. Ambassador Henry
Tasca in Athens, an implacable foe of
Demetracopoulos, Nixon fund-raiser
and confidant Thomas Pappas, a rich
Greek-American with intimate ties to
-the military junta and who was under
attack by Demetracopoulos, and lesser
figures.
For the Nixon White House, it ended
on Dec. 29, 1971, shortly after the mem-
Orandum was ordered withdrawn. On
that day, a highly unusual, written ex-
planation of the aborted effort, said by
White House operatives to have? been
unsigned, was sent directly to Dean in
the White House from the State Depart-
ment. It reviewed the campaign against.
Demetracopoulos and stated that, no
matter how controversial he was, no
? case could be made against him. More-
over, it warned that the intended vic-
tim was considering a libel suit against
the U.S. government .for the anony-
mous memorandum, which could
prove extremely embarrassing.
For Demetracopoulos, however, the
affair did not end until he had -ex-
tracted a grudging letter from Albert
fully seven months later. ,The Speaker
told Demetracopoulos that "a routine
inquiry (to the State Department) by a
member of my staff" had triggered the
-memorandum. Albert said his office
had sought the background informa-
tion because Albert had been informed
."you might be seeking an appointment
at some future date." - ? .
In fact, Demetracopoulos first met
Albert in the mid-1950s. He had seen
him many times between then and De-
cember 1971, and had brought high ex-
parliamentary leaders of Greece, ban-
ished from office during the junta's
rule, to the Speaker's office to meet Al-
bert.
Thus, Albert was the victim of a set-
up by the administration, which
wanted the most prestigious congres-
sional figure possible to make the re-
'NEW YORK TIMES,MONDAY, 'JUNE 114,197e-
W . Harvey, C.I.A. Aide, Dead;
Linked to Anti-Castro Plotting
- William K. Harvey, reported-
ly the head of a special Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency group
set up in the 1960's to plan the
removal of foreign leaders by
means including assasination,
died of a heart attack last
Wednesday in an Indianapolis
hospital.
Mr. Harvey, who was 60
years old, was said to have
been in charge of the agency's
efforts against Prime Minister
Fidel Castro of Cuba. He was
among 10 agents whose iden-
tities were disclosed by the
Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence after an investigation
in 1975 of alleged assassination
plots by the United States.
William E. Colby, then Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, had
argued that disclosure of the
names of agents would put.
them in jeopardy of retaliation
by "irrational groups."
Mr. Harvey testified before
the Senate committee that he
had been told by superiors that
the Castor assasination plot had
been aproved at the highest
Ilevels of the government, and
that he had discussed the ef-
forts with his immediate super.
ior, Richard Helms, who later
became director of the agency.
Mr. Harvey moved to Indian-
apolis in 1969 after retiring
from the agency, where he had
Worked for 22 years. He worked
for the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation from 1940 to 1947.
At the time of his death, Mr.
Harvey was law editor for
Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Com-
pany.
He was buried Saturday at
South Cemetery in Danville,
just west of Indianapolis. He
Is survived by his wife, Clara
Grace, a daughter, Sally, and a
son, lames D. Harvey.
Approved
For Release 2001/08/08 :
quest for background information on
Demetracopoulos. When he or his staff
complied, the memorandum calculated
to destroy the effectiveness of Deme-
tracopoulos was quickly sent to Capitol
Hill. The clear purpose: to have it
widely distributed, under the imprima-
tur of the Speaker.
Two copies of the memorandum
were taken to the House, one for Al-
bert, the other for the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee, which had
not asked for it but where it was as-
sumed there would be widespread dis-
tribution. A committee staffer, shocked
by the anonymous document, gave it
only to Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal of
New York, chairman of the European
subcommittee.
Similarly shocked, Rosenthal asked
then Congressional Assistant Secretary
of State David Abshire why the State
Department would lend itself to anony-
mous charges against Demetracopoulos
, that were probably libelous and circu-
late them on Capitol Hill. Abshire,
caught unaware, discussed the matter
with then Deputy Under Secretary of
State William B. Macomber and they
immediately ordered the two copies of
the memorandum retrieved
On Jan. 31, Abshire wrote Demetra-
t copoulos what amounted to an unusual
official apology. The man who ran con-
gressional affairs for the State Depart-
, meat wrote that he had not "seen, ap-
proved or even heard of the paper
prior to its very limited distribution"
and that the department could not
stand behind "a memorandum contain-
ing questionable material."
The last chapter in this plot against.
the man who had come to be regarded
as a dangerous gadfly by Mr. Nixon's
advisers was the most revealing: the re-,
port to John Dean, recipient of so many
undercover reports in those days of the
White House plumbers, explaining why
this particular plot has failed. -
1?05/ aitsiite4 tinteff
Sat., had 12, 1976
?CIA-MISS1?NARY
C INTACT'S cu
? WASHINGTON (UPI)?The CIA has agreed not to seek
intelligence information from U.S. missionaries stationed
abroad but may continue to contact such' missionaries in
the United States, 'according to CIA Director George Bush.
? .Bush, in a series of letters and meetings with Sen, Mark
O. Hatfield (R-Ore.), also has agreed to expand the defini-
tion of missionary to include all Americans abroad who.
are performing tasks involving preaching, teaching, heal-
ing and proselytizing, even if they are not technically
controlled by denominational or- ecumenical groups "pro-
vided'their ultimate sponsorship comes from religious or-
ganizations."
_return, Hatfield has agreed that he would not pro-
ceed with legislation he has introduced which would legis-
late a total ban on CIA-missionary contact. .
The correspondence was made public in the Current
issue of Sojourners Magazine, an evangelical monthly.
The subject first surfaced lest December when Hatfield
revealed that. the intelligence agency had used American
missionaries and had no intention of ending the practice.
Hatfield released letters by former CIA Director 'William
Colby and White House counsel Philip Buchen, speaking
or President Ford, defending the practice.
The Buehen-Coiby responses resulted in a storm of
rotest across the spectrum of U.S. religious thought, with
)any denominations urging prohibitive legislation and
?me saying -any missionary personnel who cooperated
,ith the spy agent.? woulrt ioe
012
9/k-RDP77-00432R0
13 alba
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, Jere 4. 197f,
Insurance Venture
Of CIA Produced
Awkward Situations
0 0. 0
New Light Shed on Problems,
Including Rebuff to Bid for
Acquisition. SEC Inquiry
By DAVID IGNATIUS
Staff ItCpOrteref THE WAt.1, STRRET JOURNAL
, The Central Intelligence Agency got into
the insurance business in 1962. Since then,
the insurance business has got the CIA into
some awkward predicaments.
The agency's original idea in setting up a,
complex of insurance companies was to pro-
vide a discreet means of paying retirement,
disability and death benefits for double
agents and other top-secret operatives who
couldn't receive regular CIA benefits in the
form of U.S. Treasury checks because of
possible exposure.
Lawrence rt. Houston, who helped create
the insurance operation and who directed it
until he retired as the agency's general
counsel in 1973, said the CIA on several oc-
casions even had to rebuff, investors inter-
ested in acquiring what appeared to be a
healthy insurance operation. Another time,
"company" officials had to fend off a Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission insider-
trading inquiry that touched peripherally on
one concern's purchases of a stock. Further
complicating matters, these headaches had
to be handled publicly by CIA employes who.
were merely posing as executives and
hadn't any independent authority even to
sign checks.
These glimpses inside the CIA's- insur-
ance complex, which eventually grew to sev-
eral companies,- emerged from an interview
with Mr. Houston. While the existence of the
$30 million CIA insurance complex was dis-
closed in an April report by the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee, Mr. Houston shed new
light on the problems of managing the agen-
cy's conglomerate.
Mr. Houston declined, however, to name
specific companies in the CIA insurance
complex, which he believes is serving a
"perfectly legitimate and absolutely neces-
sary purpose." He expressed concern that
publication of such specific information
could result in exposure and "serious harm"
for individuals who have received payments
through the project.
Two Existing "Shell" Companies
The CIA decided to get into the insurance
business after finding itself scurrying
around in 1961 to hastily arrange payments
to the families of four American pilots shot
down over Cuba in the Bay of Pigs incident.
The insurance complex was established the
next year with help from friendly industry
executives and lawyers, who apprised the
CIA of two existing "shell" companies and
offered advice on how to "flesh them nut,"
Mr. Houston recalled.
While the CIA tries to write contracts
with its covert operatives that specify regu-
lar employe contributions for pensions and
insurance benefits, many of the payments
by the insurance complex have taken a
more irregular form, Mr. Houston said. For
example, when an "uninsured" operative re-
tired or died, it was often necessary to back-
date elaborate phony benefit policies and
.fund them with lump sums from the CIA.
But it's clear that the role of the insur-
ance complex hasn't been limited to provid-
ing Insurance, The Senate Intelligence re-
port, while approving the general Intent of I
the project, noted cryptically: "The com-
plex also provided a limited amount of sup-1
port to clandestine opern.tions---speciftcally
for tl!? miqui3tilon of operational real estate
ILVid iL: " conduit tor the ',ending of se.le-cte.d
vonert eetIvitioe."
THE WASHINGTON STTrecd-37, Junc 22: 1976
Jack Anderson
nd Les Whitten
The CIA's 'Sex Squad'
In contrast to the. haphazard sex on
Capitol Hill, the? Central Intelligence
Agency for years has conducted an
elaborate and efficient sex operation.
Few national secrets have been more
carefully guarded, but the CIA has
provided kings, presidents, potentates
and magistrates with female compan-
sionship. On a lower level, women have
been made available to defectors and
CIA agents.
Sometimes, the CIA's guests bring
their own partners. More often, the
agency selects the women from its vice
files. The agency also provides "safe
houses" where the liaisons can be con-
summated in protected privacy.
The CIA's sex shop , according to
knowledgeable sources, is run by the
Office of Security. This division acts
primarily as the CIA's internal police
force.
Through field offices scattered
around the country, the Office of Secu-
rity maintains close ties with-state and
local police.In each field office, a
"black book" is kept -of the males and
, females who can be safely recruited to
? entertain the CIA's visitors.
? The black books contain names, tele-
phone numbers and details, gleaned
I largely from local vice squads. In Wash-
ington, for example, CIA agents paid
regular visits to the police depart-
ment's vice squad to photograph docu-
ments.
The late Deputy Chief Roy E. Buick,
who headed the "sex squad" for years,
kept exhaustive records on "perverts"
and "miscreants" around the country.
He had a close, backroom relationship
with the CIA, say our sources.
From 1964 to 1974 the sex operation
was supervised by security director
Harold Osborn.
Each black book entry, according to
sources with access to the files, con-
tains some fascinating vital statistics?
physical description, measurements,
health status and sexual specialties.
This information is used to find sex-
ual partners for princes and potentates,
defectors and agents. The congres-
sional investigations of the CIA, howev-
er, skirted the sex operation. The
Mr. Houston conceded that the insurance 1
company has been used to channel money
for covert operations, as a "sterilized fund-
ing". device to make the payments difficult
to trace. (Most of the covert funding appar-
ently was carried on the books as invest-
ment.) But he denied that this was the real
reason the complex was created. "If the
complex later got into other agency pur-
poses," he said, "It was because it proved
itself a useful instrument." He wouldn't
elaborate.
Recruited About 50 Buoinessmen
To help build a cover for the insurance
complex of foreign underwriting concerns,
based in such places as Bermuda and the
Cayman Islands, and domestic investment ;
concerns, the CIA once recruited about 50
businessmen and retired government and
military employes as directors for the com-
panies, Mr. Houston said. They were paid
$50 to $100 a board meeting, with a maxi-
mum of four meetings a year. Aware that
they were working for the agency, the direc-
tors Would sometimes be asked to advise on
investment portfolio decisions. But Mr. ;
Houston said ha supervis.nd every detail of
the operanon, including management of tho i
from CIA he.mi
Inventment portfolloe
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIPE,RDP7a7100/1
Housiintelligence committee stumbled
on to the information that the CIA once
provided an unidentified Middle East
monarch with female companions. We
have learned that the king was Jor-
dan's Hussein.
It's the CIA's own foreign agents,
coming in from "the cold," who make
the most use of the "safe houses."
When an undercover operative reports
back to the United States, he is whisked
to a "safe house" and a "case officer" is
assigned to watch over him.
The officer is supposed to keep his
charge happy and to provide for his -
needs. If the need should be sexual, the
right contact in the Office of Security
is called upon.
The CIA uses sex for an even more
seamy purpose. As we reported more
than a year ago, the agency has used
prostitutes to lure foreign diplomats
into love traps where their sexual an-
tics were filmed through one-way mir-
rors. The film was later used to black-
mail the foreigners into becoming in-
formants.
In New York, the CIA maintained ad-
joining efficiency apartments on the
sixth floor of a high-rise in Greenwich
Village. On the wall of the blackmail
apartment was a large painting of two
ships. The painting was actually a one-
way mirror.
On the other side of the wail, CIA
agents could watch the action through
the see-through painting and film inti- _
mate moments. A Japanese screen, im-
planted with microphones, provided
sound for the blackmail movies.
In San Francisco, the CIA operated a
similar apartment equipped with bug-
ging devices, but no observation mir-
rors. The New York apartment was ?
used from about 1960 to 1966; the San
Francisco apartment from the late
1950s to about 1965.
ll'ooinote: We confronted Osborn
with the facts about the sex operation.
He denied that any such operation was
conducted "during my tenure." A CIA
spokesman had no comment. Our calls
to the Washington police and the Jor-
danian embassy had not been returned
by press time.
?
tars in Langley, Va.
To make the insurance complex believa-
ble, it had to show healthy profits. The com-
plex, according to the Senate report, has re-
tained accumulated net earnings of about $9
million ;Ince 1562, with its profit from stock i
sales topping $300,000. In managing the port-
folio, Mr. Houston apparently was able to fi-
nesee the end of the go-go market. By the
early 1970s, he said, "we were mainly out of
stocks and into time deposits and Euro-
bonds."
Mr. Houston said he gathered investment
tips from "some witting and some unwit-
ting" consultants and friends and agency
contacts. /ell etock purchases were made
through regular brokerage firms and, to
avoid potential conflicts of Interest, he didn't
Invest In any companies with which the CIA
had contractual relationships.
But profits on the stock dealings and
other transactions haven't been used as a
slush fund to supplement money appropri-
ated for CIA activities by Congress, the law-
yer maintained. Money beyond that needed
to support the underwriting costs is returnad
to tie' U.S. Tree:Airy through various r
e i (-tee
proeditiee, he eal6.
for the insivear.co
3 214AtofotiltIVO601c2.2
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complex, the CIA sought to operate the com-
panies as normally as possible. This meant,
among other things, "laying off" some of its
policies to regular commercial insurance
concerns in so-called reinsurance transac-
tions. Mr. Houston, however, would quietly
notify the chief executives of these compa-
nies that they were actually buying spook in-
surance. The CIA companies also reinsured
policies from the commercial concerns,
again to maintain appearance of normality.
Sometimes: however, the profit-making,
business-as-usual cover proved to be an em?
-
barrassingly successful decoy. On several
occasions, investors approached CIA em-
ployes who nominally headed companies in
the Insurance complex and suggested that
the units looked like good acquisition possi-
bilities. We simply never let it come to the
point of negotiation," Mr. Houston observed.
THE WASHINGTON STAR
20 June 1976
? Jefferson wasn't
himself that day
N. Rex Collier (Letters, May 26)
took you to task for a misleading
headline, "How Presidents Johnson
and Nixon Pushed CIA to Spy on
Us." That was a fair sample. of the
diligence of headline writers in
trying to breathe new life into.tired
old tales of CIA .skulduggery by
dressing them up with sexy new
labels ? often highly imaginative
ones: But now I think we have a bet-
ter one. . :
On June 9, you headlined a story,
"CIA Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Ander-
son." For one thing, the-headline
seems to imply that someone was.
actually thinking about doing away
? with Mr. Anderson, although no-
where in the story is this suggested.
Second, the headline indicates there
was a "goal" to drug Mr. Anderson,
whereas the story merely says
there "was discussion" about it.
And finally, nowhere in the story
is there any allegation of CIA in-
volvement. All we have is reference
to two "former" CIA employees
who were involved, with no sugges-
tion that either had any present con-
nection with the agency. .
No doubt when you're No. 2 you
have to try harder, but do you have
to try that hard? And now-that it is
the season for quoting Mr. Jeffer-
son, we might recall what he wrote
in a letter to John Norvell in 1807:
"The man who never looks into a
newspaper is better informed than
he who reads them, inasmuch as he
who knows nothing is nearer the
truth than he whose mind is filled
with falsehood and errors."
John M. Maury
Washington, D.C.
(NOTE ? Mr. Maury is former
CIA legislative counsel and former
assistant secretary of defense.)
HOUSTON POST
8 MAY 1976
Public doubts of CIA
challenged by Push
By TERRY KLIEWER
, Post Reporter
CIA Director George Bush Friday
' challenged presumptions the nation lacks
confidence in his agency, and he vowed to
continue cooperating with congressional
groups looking into CIA operations.
"I'm not sure how much confidence is
lacking," he told reporters at a news con-
ference at the Rice-Rittenhouse Hotel.
"Some things have been wrong.. . but
the abuses of the past are in the past."
Bush added: "I think the American
people support the concept of a strong
intelligence agency. If they.don't, they'd
better."
He acknowledged the CIA's image "is
not what it should be," but he said putting
"a PR (public relations) gloss" on the .
agency would not be appropriate.
Bush said he hopes negative publicity
swirling about the CIA will not mean a
lower agency budget this year:
"I hope Congress will support the budg-
et levels suggested by the President. . . I
don't see any widespread effort to cut it."
The CIA's new director also said the
spy agency can continue to do its job by
using new measures aimed at increasing
outside oversight of its operations.
"We should disclose and disclose fully
to Congress," he added, "but Congress will
have to protect (secrets)."
JOURNAL, Knoxville
11 June 1976
?-?
Bush said his track record thus far as
director amply shows his intention to
cooperate with Congress. He has visited
Capitol Hill 19 times in 3 months in offi-
cial appearances since assuming his of-
fice, lie said.
Bush is making his first visit to bus-
ton, which he still calls home, since his
return from China, where he was the U.S.
envoy. He addressed the annual meeting
oi the YMCA of Greater Houston at a
Friday night banquet at the hotel.
Explaining at the outset to reporters
that he would not comment on political
matters or on sepsitive intelligence issues.
Bush declined to comment on only a
handful of questions.
But he did note U.S. relations with Red
China are not likely to change in view of
Continuing political turmoil there. And he,
also commented that the CIA. and the
federal government generally, did not
know Cuba's intentions in Africa before
the outbreak of the Angolan war.
"We're still unclear what (Cuba) in-
tends to do," he said. "It's very hard to
predict." .
Bush would not discuss prospects his
Own job as CIA director?a Presidential
appointment?might hang in the balance
in the November election. He said be was
not concerned with "job security" in his
new position, and he repeated previous
statements that he has no political plans.
.isga'sed 'Charge
seems a bit incredulous for a land like the
Soyiee Union, in- which- the Secret police have their
fingers in or on nearly everything and everyone, to
'accuse other nationals within their borders of simi-
? lar affiliations. The claim by a Soviet periodical that
three American newsmen working in Moscow have ?
CIA con Worts-appears to have little substance, if
.
,
?
Not only have 'the three individuals, the news
organizations they work for and the U.S. Embassy
denied the claim, but the only evidence the Soviets
have come forthwith are a few letters .from Soviet
citizens making the allegation. It does develop, how-
ever, that the Soviets may have reason to try to
embarrass the-Americans into leaving the country.
?
All three of.the newsmen speak Russian fluently
and have been making contacts with Soviet dissi-
dents. That means they may have.a fair understand-
ing of how well the Kremlin is living up to the Hel-
sinki agreement it signed last year?the one guaran-
teeing a freer exchange of contacts among people.
23
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- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2
CONSTITUTION, Atlanta
11. June 1976
'By PAUL LIEBERMAN .
With almost three decades
as an official of the Central
Intelligence Agency behind
him, John M. Maury has de-
veloped a favorite saying to
defend some of the agency's
controversial practices.
"I think the President of
the United States ought to
)have some options between
sending a diplomatic note and
sending in the Marines,"
Maury says.
The -man who supervised
this country's spy activities in
both the Soviet Union and the
Middle East adds that the "vi-
able options" should include
"political manipulation that is
supporting a friendly faction;
. . . propaganda where the
source is concealed; and per-
haps supporting one military
faction against another
Maury worked for the CIA
from 1946 to 1974. He was
chief of the agency's Soviet
Russia Division during many
of the peak Cold War years,
from 1954 to 1962. He was
Chief
chief of the CIA station in
Athens from 1962 to 1963.
For the last two years, until
he resigned in March, Maury
was assistant secretary of de-
fense, first under President.
Nixon, then President Ford. It
was on behalf of the Defense
department that Maury was
in Atlanta this Week, address-
ing a foreign policy forum for
members of the Georgia
General Assembly arranged
? by U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn.
In an interview after the
legislative forum MondaY,
Maury said he thought recent
congressional investigations of
the CIA's so-called "covert"
operations were called for,
but argued that the CIA itself
had received unfair criticism.
"I think sorve,of the covert
operations we.e a big mis-
take," the former CIA official
said, mentioning as examples
the Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba and the secret war in
Laos. But Maury said many
covert operations have not
been the CIA's idea. .
"All covert operations were
directed or approved by
GREEN RAY PRESS?GAZthrtn,
25 APRIL 1976
;.'
enness
4:1;-!. ? 7 ?? . ? ?
MAU
i%13y I( "
Press-Gazette Starr Writer
"You cannot operate an In-
telligence Operation in an at-
mosphere where anything that
can be ferreted out- is fair
game for publication," a spe-
cial 'assistant to the deputy
.CIA director said Saturday. ?''
Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas
said that "you ? cannot deal
openly with intelligence opera,
ations without destroying the'
basis for It."
' However, due to recent at-
etdrition given the Central In-
telligence Agency for alleged
involvement In assassination
plots, Thomas said that the
public Can ? look forward to
getting ? I'more ' information ? ?
.. sooner,' i? :" ? ?
"One of the things we are ?
going to have ia a greater
openness in the release of sub-
.stantive information. "? '
But . we have to be ex-
tremely careful in protecting
our sources and methods,"?
said the former 'Air Force of-
ficer. .
Thomas has been a senior
CIA staff member since his
Air Force retirement in 1969.
He had served more than six t
years as the Asst. Chief of .1
Staff, ' Intylligence, ? at ? Air
Force Headquarters.
Nearly all of his military a
career .since 1.941ehaltc.n.p.L c
? ? . ? ?..;4 '14.; !.? 7*
.the 'ntelligence field..... :
? Thomas 'was the. featured
speaker Saturday at the state
convention of the Reserve Of-
ficer's Association .,.at the
Downtowner. Motel. ?; '
? He made his remarks at a
'press conference, prior, to the
speech. ?
? As chief of the coordination
staff of the Director of,Central
Intelligence, Thomas said he
helps establish objectives on
the nation's need for informa-
tion'in certain foreign coun-
tries. ?.
This involves keeping track
of foreign crisis areas such as
world grain trends and OPEC
investments, both of which
would have an impact on U.S.
security, he said.
For most of ,the 29-year his-
tory of the CIA, Intelligence
efforts have beeh focused on
Russia, Which is the only'
country which could physical-
ly threaten the U.S., he said.
However, in recent years
the CIA has been taking a
wider stance in intelligence
operations- .? throughout . the
world. ?
In his speech, he said he in-
ended to (=pilaf:17e what; is
n the future for the CIA.
One of the primary focuses. '
vill be the. rebuilding of 'the
gency's public Image be-
ause of damage done by the
proved For Release 2001
Ap
efends
higher authorities," he said.
"Virtually every objectionable
activity was ordered by the
president or by the assistant
for national security affairs."
Maury said critics thus
have been wrong to describe
the CIA as a "rogue ele-
phant." .
"In fact, it had has been
highly responsive," he said.
Maury Said elimination of
abuses in U.S. intelligence
operations should not come
through a ban on covert
operations. "The answer is not
to elect a fool ,or a scoundrel
president," he said.
Maury characterized Presi-
dent Nixon as an example of
a "scoundrel,? but said he
thought most of the leading
presidential contenders this
year seem "decent" and "con-
siderably better than" four
years ago. .
The former CIA and De-
fense department official said
the civil war in Angola was a
situation in which a covert
CIA operation is justified. He
said the area was not "vital"
NEW YORK TIMES
2 4 JUN 1976
Senate Unit Backs
. to the national interest of the
United States. but that there
was a . "legitimate national
interest" in trying to stem
Soviet influence. Maury said
we might want to excercise
our influence there by "nonat-
tributable means."
Maury said the provision of
military or financial aid to an
anti-Soviet faction was a le-
gitimate covert activity in
that case. He also defended
the use in some situations of
reporters as agents. "I don't
think either of us is compro-
mised if a newspaper man
shares information," he said. .
Maury said he knew of
about a half-dozen cases
where newsmen were paid for
information. Usually. he said,
the newsmen merely did "pas-
sive observation" such as
evaluating possible targets for
recruitment as agents.
"This never gave me any
qualms of conscience, because
never .to my knowledge
we try to influence what went
into their own news reports,"
Maury said.
Knoche Nomination
To No. 2 C.I.A. Job
?
WASHINGTON, June 23 (AP) '
?The Senate Select Committee
; on Intelligence Activities ap-
proved today the nomination of,
E. Henry Knoche to be deputy
director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Mr. Knoche, 51 years old,'
who has served for 23 years in
intelligence analysis at the
agency, received 12 affirmative
votes for confirmation after!
testifying at the first open;
hearing of the new committem!
The committee was formed;
May 19 to oversee intelligence;
agencies. The three other mem-
bers of the panel were to be '
polled later.
Mr. Knoche, who will bead
day-to-day operations of the
C.I.A. as first assistant to its
director, George Bush, said that
he could conceive of no cir-
cumstances in which he could
recommend that an agency cf
agency's implication in assas-;...
sination plots. ' ' ? ?
.' He defended the CIA impli-.
cation in plots against Congo-
lese leader Patrice Lannumba,
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro
and Chilean President Salva-
dor Allende, saying that the
?, plots are all history now.
'Thomas said that the public
?? would be able to better under-
stand why those' plots (lc-
rurred If it could put Itself In-
to the powerfully anti-Corn-
/08/08 : CIA-RD077-00432R
the United States engage in .a
political assassination in peace-
time..
He said that he believed
strongly that the Government
needed the capability of carry-
ing out covert activities "to
lessen the prospects of hostili-
ties or other problems abroad,"
But he said that covert ac-.
tivity comprised only 2 percent
of the C.I.A. budget for the
fiscal year 1977. The figure
was more than 50 percent in.
cold war period after World
War II, he added.
Mr. Knoche told the commit-
tee that he believed guidelines
could be worked out for in-
forming its members en covert
activity. However, he said, the
committee "is going to have ta
get scale understanding w;th
1!,t. White House" as to when
disclosure should be made of
eavert actions under considera-
tion.
The agency, he said, is basic-
Shy "an instrument of forcien
policy" and acts on decisions
made by "hig,her authority."
"We are not the judges of
when we employ co., ert as-
tion," he said.
munist mood which prevailed
In the, ? U.S.- .during f. those:
years,
Another focus will be "dem-
oustrating you can maintain a
secret intelligence program in
an open society. We're con-
vinced we an and will,"a he
said. ?
Third will be proving to the ?
public that not all aspects of a ?
successful intelligence opera-
tion can be made public, he
said,
000100400001-2'
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JOURNAL & COURIER
Lafayette, Ind.
23 May 1976
An attack on
By BERNARD P. LYONS ?
Editor of the Journal and Cowie:.
?
George Bush, Central al.Cealgenee
? Agency directoraegot a few boos and hiss-
es .fret--a-rryr of squirms of embrarrass-
? merit recently when he told the Overseas
Press club that he'd like to have journal-
ists continue to feed information to the
CIA. mr7-777.The statement eit
indicated how far
removed -from
reality the CIA.a
and Bush remain
after revelation in
recent Congres- .
sional hearings and
elsewhere that the
CIA and FBI have
'used newspaper re-
porters as infor-
mants.
The chagrin that g
-met Bus's- re-
marks at the 'Over- ? . Lyons
seas Press club was generated by several
factors. One, that certain newspaper and
other. media reporters had compromised
their professional positions by serving as
informants. Two, that. the: isolated in-
stances of such informing has created the
impression that such spying was wide-
? spread. Three, that Bush had the temerity
to bring up such an embarrassing topic at
a gathering of newspaper people. Four,
that Bush still has no concept that there's
anything at all wrong with such practice
? that, indeed, the "crime" was in. being
discovered. ?
For many years, we've been told that
Soviet diplomatic representatives in this
country, Soviet commercial representa-
tives and newsmen for the Russian
agency Tass invariably lead a double life;
that they also are members of the secret
police, or spies, or both. Most people be-
lieved it, and still do. The Russians, in
turn, have charged that practically every
American assigned to diplomatic, profes-
THE CHICAGO TRIMPiiiii
10 June 1976
*Should Post 'spy'?
WILMETTE?It is scarcely news ? when
a sometime "Playmate" manages to get
advance hype for her book on the Wash-
ington sex scene; or when she tells about
the rigors Of her. "work" with the man
she doesn't even' like.
Nr is it news that an aging man has
a relationship with a well-endowed wom-
an young enough to be his daughter, or
that her salary is paid by John Q. Pub-
lic. Call girls on government accounts
for the "accommodation of foreign visi-
tors" routinely receive far more for
less.
The real news is the silence of the
public over the invasion of rivacy, the
phone tapping [authorized ?only by. the
publicity-hungry party), and the dirty,
credibility
? sional or commercial duty in Moscow is a
CIA agent. We've scoffed at this.
Now, it turns out, the CIA has indeed
?had informants in jobs where no one has
suspected it. Perhaps we should have, but
we didn't. Those of us in the newspaper
business felt, particularly, that while
American governmental employes abroad
have an obligation to pass along informa-
tion to their superiors ? information that
might ultimately wind up in CIA or Na-
tional Security Agency files ? we didn't
believe for a minute that there were
newsmen reporting surreptitiously to the
CIA. Such a link is completely inconsis-
tent with the newsman's job of reporting
information to the public.
The- revelation that some. newsmen ?
however few ? have been on the CIA
payroll has done untold damage to the po-
sition of trust and credibility that a re-
porter and a newspaper must maintain in
order to perform their news-dissemination
task effectively. A recent CIA report of
an impending climatic change throughout
much of the world presents a case in
point. The CIA said that meteorlogical
: Statistics indicate that the world's tem-
peratures will dip slightly over the next
several decades. This could cut crop
yields in subsistence-level countries
enough to produce famine, starvation and
consequent political and economic upheav-
.al. The CIA estimate might be a good one
... but The CIA's credibility today is such
that few %vitt take it seriously.
The same loss of credibility attendthe
reporting of newsmen who permit _them-
selves to be compromised as spies and in-
formers --a for the CIA, FBI, NSA or
whatever. .
Rejection of informer roles for report-
ers isn't a matter of rejecting any larger'
citizen responsibility in a governmental
system that may be threatened by the
world around us. Instead, it's a necessary
course of action to make sure the demo?
cratic system continues to work.
tricks type of spying by the Washington
?
?
Have, we forgotten Show recently the
li'131 and the CIA have been attacked,
censured, and -restricted for the very
same acts. of illegality? Do we now per-
mit others to take over where our gov-
ernment ? agencies . were. compelled to
stop? In this case the media? May they
commit deliberate violations of our First
Amendment and use any questionable
-means to justify the end, no matter how
desirable' the end may be, as in ? the
? Hays case?
Are we brain-washed? If so, there may
be some consolation in remembering
. that any individual or agency, grown too
powerful and arregant? sooner or later
digs its own grave. Maidi Pritchard
NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 197r;
-HIRING OF.NEWSMENi
BY C'.I.A. TO ?LE TOPIC
Representatives of the Na-,
tional News Council and the
'Central Intelligence Agency will
meet next Thursday in an at-
tempt to clarify the council's!
position on employment of
journalists by the intelligence;
community, the council's chair-
man, Stanley H. Fudd, an.
nounced yesterday.
Mr. Fudd said two council!
members, William A. Rusher
and R. Peter Strauss, and the
associate director, Ned Schnur-
man, would confer wtih aides'
of the C.I.A. director, George
Bush, who are authorized to
speak for him. The meeting will
be held at McLean, Va.
The purpose of the meeting,
Mr. Fuld said, is "not to seek
the names of individuals who
may be, or may have been em-
ployed by the C.I.A., but to ob-
tain a clearer exposition of ex-
isting relationships and the
portent those relationships
rnight hold for a free press in
a free society."
The meeting requested by
the council, was arranged as a
result of correspondence be-
tween Mr. Fuld and Mr. Bush,
Mr. Schnurman said.
At the council's regular meet-
ing this week, Richard S. Salant,
president of CBS News, was
elected a member. A change in
the group's bylaws has in-
creased the council membership
from 15 to 18 and Mr. Salant is
the first to be selected. He was
discribed as the first member
to represent a national news
organization. ,
van7Ti191777
Atonement Voted
.For CIA Suicide
Assoelated Press
The Senate passed with-
out debate yesterday a
bill providing $1,250.000
to the family of an Army
chemist who committed
suicide after being given
-LSD without his knowl-
edge aS part of a ?CIA
drug experiment.
Dr. Frank 11. Olson of
Ft. Detrick, Md., jumped
to his death from a New
York hotel room window
in 1953, three days after
he was slipped the drug
at a meeting.
his death was dcseribel
to his family as an un?
explained suicide. 'Not un-
til 22 years later, with
publication of the Roche-
fence Commission report
on the CIA, did t hey learn
the true circumstances.
25
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GLOBE?DEMOCRAT, St. Louis
26 May 1976
-Ci is called
rri-rsunderstood
REGISTER, Des Moines
7 May 1976
- The Central Intelligence Agency has committed the
.big mistake of not making itself understood by the
American public, William E. Colby, former director of
the CIA, said here.
"We need a better way of informing the American
people of intelligence operations," Colby told a lunch-
eon gathering of the Illinois Bankers Convention at
Stouffer's Riverfront Towers Tuesday.
"WE NEED TO share the substantive information,
but we also need to keep our secret sources, just like
newspaper reporters.
"Then there won't be a' surprise when a-story is
leaked."
Colby, head of the CIA from 1973 until last January,
also said the American public has an incorrect image of
the CIA.
The old image, he' said, is one? "of spies in tbe
shadows stealing secret documents. Or stereotype of
James Bond . . ."
Colby said intelligence operations have undergone a
drastic change since World War II.
"TECHNOLOGY has revolutionized intelligence work
. . . electronics, photography, computers . . .
"We now know how many Russian missiles there are.
There's no debate over the gap."
Colby pointed to the armed might of the Soviet Union
in supporting., his contention that a strong U.S.
intelligence operation is needed.
"Concerning the importance of the CIA, you have to
look at-the past and .the future. Fifteen years ago, the
Soviet Union was vastly inferior (to. the United States).
But look at them now.
"AND IN THE FUTURE, several questions arise.
Who will take over for Mao or Brezhnev? . . . And
who's to say the two countries won't someday unite?
"We have to know the world of the 1980s and 1990s.
Knowledge of this sort enables us to negotiate."
Washington Post
12 June 1976
Leak Probe ?
Six reporters, including
suspended CBS correspond-
ent Daniel Schorr, have re-
buffed initial efforts by
House ethics conirriP.tee
vestiz,rators to question them
about who leaked the secret
House intelligence report.
Schorr said he was asked
to appear next week. He
said he replied he would not
without a subpoena and,
even then, "would not tes-
tify with regard to sources."
Schorr has acknowledged
that he was responsible for
publication of the text of
the House intelligence com-
mittee's classified final re-
port in The Vi1lae Voice, a
New York vcekl newspa-
Thc other five reporters
said investigators asked to
"chat" with them about the
case. Ali five said they re-
fused on grounds that they
could not reveal sources.
None of the six was subpoe-
naed.
The five other newsmen
are Jim Adams of the Asso-
ciated Press. Nicholas Hot..
rock and John Cre.vdson of
ear e
What is Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) covert action?
It is diplomacy and warfare by
other means, clandestine efforts to?
governments or -persons
to support U.S? objectives, activity
ranging from propaganda to para-,
military operations to assassina-
tion-plotting.
, It is a foreign policy tool too
often used by presidents. to avoid
policy, debate. It is the task
_assigned to the president's "private
army" to circumvent the. ordinary
processes of governmental checks
and balances.
: It is a function of the CIA which
requires the retention ot unknown
numbers of ..standby "assets"
(agents, journalists, guerrillas) ?
the so-called worldwide 'infras-
tructure" that-made possible thou-
sands of covert actions in the past
and will allow for more in the
future. ?
It is intervention in the internal
, affairs of other governments, just:
one "plausible -denial" step away
: from violation of international,
,treaties and conventions.
It is something most members of
Congress do not want to know
- about..
The Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee seeks to restrict the future use
of covert action by itcreasing con-
gressional oversight. The commit-
tee in its .final report calls for the
establishment of a new intelligence
oversight committee (or commit-
tees) which would have power to
approve and disclose the CIA budg-
,
eCand which. would require prier
notification by the CIA of covert
action. ? ?
The committee's proposal for
strong' oversight now is being
attacked and emasculated in the
Senate., Many of. the .critics are
members of committees which per-
formed so poorly as CIA watchdogs
in the past. These .members reject
the idea of prior notification, of
budgetary authority, of public dis-
closure of CIA activity ? of over-
sight. - ?
The purpose of the year-and- a-
half investigation by- the Senate
and House Intelligence Committees
was to show how the CIA and other
intelligence agencies could be
reined in, not to prove Congress
unequal to the task.
CIA covert action creates a
dilemma for- our democratic sys-
tem:for if a policy is right, why
should it -not be acted out in the
open? The Intelligence'Committee
hopes to eliminate some of the
more ominous aspects of the dilem-
ma by proposing a ban against
assassination, subversion of demo-
cratic-governments and support of
repressive internal security forces
by the-CIA. It does not reject any of
the other -reprehensible covert
?activity, most particularly parami-
litary operations, but evidently
hopes strong oversight will discour-
age or thwart such activity.
-If effective oversight cannet be
achieved, then there is no place in
our system for covert action and
all such activity should be banned.
MED FORCES JOURNAL
APRIL 1976
Scope of and Reasons Behind
U.S./USSR Force Asymmetries
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGEN-
CY should have done the study which
follows, but couldn't "because CIA
would have objected," according to Lt.
General Daniel Graham. recently
retired director of DIA.
Graham praised this analysis of the
Soviet and U.S. military balance at a
recent dinner seminar sponsored by the
National Strategy Information Center
in cooperation with the Institute for
Sino-Soviet Studies of George Wash
The New York Times. Ford
Ilovvan of NBC News and
Banjit de Silva of Reuter
news agency.
ington University and the Russian Area
Studies Program of Georgetown
University's graduate school. Graham
did not specify what objections CIA
would have raised had DIA tried to
release such a comparison.
First installment of the report.
prepared at the request of Senator John
C. Culver (DIA). by the Library of
Congress. compared the U.S./USSR
quantitative balance and was printed
in the March A F./. The Editors.
26
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NEWS, Dallas
28 May 1976
ush qtegions oversight consolidation
lans
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? . .
' N'ishit; poe Bureau c;1 The Neert
'???? 'WASHINGTON
;::gence A_gency Director George Bush of
DarlasTlitirsday said he is not sure the
iewly-:Created Senate .Intelligence
-Committee will result in consolidated
7:tiversight of the nations intelligence
xgathering agencies.. ? " ?
Bushsaid "it Might he the first step
-lin-the right direction," but added that
Concerned that he may have to
eeontinae - to make numerous appear-
'ances before the various Committees
twhich have jurisdiction over the intel-
tllgence agencies.. ? . : ' ?
ft?-.? "I'vp;. been in this joh close to
tfonr months, and I have made 24 offi-
4.641 appearances on the hill, and each.
:one of these requires a certain amount
cf prebriefing: each one requires a cer-
tain amount of follow up," Bush said at
",?Aa'.. Bicentennial Salute to Texas
"(breakfast.
"That Is an enOrinOtts' amount 6f
NEW YORK TIMES
9 JUN 1975
Nixon's Aides Held
To Have Weighed
Drugging Columnist
? WASHINGTON, June 8(UPI)
?The Nixon White House was
considering a plan in March
1972, to discredit Jack Ander-
son, the columnist, by drugging
him so he would appear in-
coherent in a public appea-
rance, a Senate committee re-
ported today.
E.. Howard Hunt, subsequent-
ly convicted for the Watergate
break-in, lunched with a retired
Cintral Intelligence Agency
physician at a Washington res-
taurant a stones throw from
the White House in hopes of
obtaining a hallucinogenic drug
for the project.
Details of the plan to discre-
dit Mr. Anderson, who aroused
the Nixon Administration's ire
by publishing secret White
House transcripts revealing Mr.
Nixon's "tilt" in favor of Pakis-
tan in the war between India
and Pakistan involving Ban-
gladesh in 1971, were published
by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence in a special sup-
plement to its final report.
The drugging project was
dropped after it was deter-
mined to be impracticable.
The intelligence committee,
however, said it "has found no
evidence" to support Washing-
ton Post report by Bob Wood-
ard, Sept, 21, 1975, that the
Nixon White House had at-
tempted to assassinate Mr. An-
derson.
"However," the report said
a White house 'effort was made
in consultation with a former
C.I.A. physician to explore
mean:: of drurehtg Anderson to
discredit him by rendering him
incoherent before a public ap-
pearance.
"This effort apparently never
proceeded beyond the planning
stage." Approved
4ime to spend testifying before' con-
.'
.gressional committees. That's a fairly
large number of appearances when
have the responsibility of running
sOmethjng as important as the intelli-
'gence community."
?Bush said that he is. "nor overly opti-
ng' stic that the creation of the new
:committee will cut down on the num-
bers of visits to the hill that the direc-
tor Of central intelligence must make."-
Bush said that he will work closely
with the Senate committee, and that
once committee chairman Sen. Daniel
K. Inouye. D-Hawaii, has had an oppor-
tunity to get his staff organized Bush
will speak with the senator about de-
creasing the number of 'apperrances
required of the CIA director.
"I'm not going to defend things in
the past that were wrong . . . but nei-
ther am I going to dwell on those
things that are wrong. I find it a waste
of my time to go back and answer
NEWS -TRIBUNE , Tacoma
1 June 1976
'outrageous charges .such as did the
Central Intelligence Agency give $t
million to Tom Dewey in 1948 with a
director appointed by Harry Truman
and expenditures never in that range
of funds for the whole agency," Bush
Said. ?
"If I answered every outlandish,
outrageous charge printed and then
picked up and reprinted, nobody would
be minding the store," Bush said, add-
ing that he does not intend to dm that.
He'said that If "somebody wants to.
'grovel- around: and. .spend his time
worrying about . the excesses of the
past, then fine, we'll resond, properly,
correctly, through spokesmen. But .as
director I'm not going to waste my time
when you've had a year and a half
_ study by the Senate committee and a
year and a half study by the }rouse com-
mittee on spending all my time looking
over my shoulder." -?? -
Russ get even
.7 We received another- example
recently-"of the retaliatory
? lengths to which the Soviet Un-
ion will go, when a Soviet publi-
cation charged that three
-American newsmen in Moscow
are: agents for the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency.
'he Americans, who have de-
nied any CIA connections,? are
.! the: MoseciVrVased Correspond-
ents for The .Associated Press,
? The New York Times and
Newsweek magazine.; .? . ?
- The charge puts them on no-
tice that their positions in that -
country are insecure, and that
? they had better not risk offend-
ing their critics.
One Soviet journalist has
? hinted that the Moscow charges
Were made in retaliation for a
. recent Jack -Anderson column
which said two Soviet newsmen
in Washington are agents for a
Soviet, spy agency. And it would
. appear that the journalist might
be right.
A spokesman for The ,Associ-
ated Press in New York put the
situation into some perspective.
when he.explained the details of
the charge against Associated
Press Correspondent George A.
Krimsky. The publication ? had
accused Krimsky, of recruiting a
young Soviet citizen to work for
the official Russian news agency
Tass, then of receiving unau-
thorized "special material" from
that agency With the. employe's
help. .
The AP termed the charge "a
complete fabrication," pointing
out it would be "ridiculous to
assume that Krimsky or any
American correspondent would
have the slightest influence on
who might or .might not work
for Tass." ?
? And, indeed,, it would.
The spokesman probably put ?
his finger on the real issue when
he pointed out that allthree cor-
respondents are fluent in Rus-
sian, are able to talk directly
with Russian people, and have
.been. in *contact with political
dissidents in Moscow.
"Soviet magazines and news-
papers have trumped up charges
in the past against foreign corre- ?
spondents :in Moscow who have
been able; through their knowl-
edge.of languages; to deal direct-
ly with the Russian people,
particularly dissidents," he said.
"They hope in.this way to intim-
idate the correspondents and cut
off news sources with the Soviet
People." ? ? ? ?
The Americans have been
warned they are treading forbid- ,
den ground. The next step could
he their expulsion. It will be in-
teresting to see if that occurs.
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WASHDIGTON POST
NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1976, 1 8_ JUN- 1376
The LLSiQ on Trial
ve
When the International Labor .Organization marked
its fiftieth anniversary in 1969, its distinguished con-
tributions to improving the lot of the world's workers
and their families were recognized by award of the
Nobel Peace Prize. Less than a decade later ideological
polarization within the world labor body has become
so intense that its survival as a socially effective
organization is in doubt.
Whether it still has a useful role to play is being
tested in the World Employment Conference, now in
session in Geneva. Delegates from 132 rich and poor
countries are addressing themselves to easing the
insecurity and poverty that degrade life for a billion
people, the vast bulk of them in the developing
countries. If the final product is a collection of pieties
aimed at papering over the substantial differences in
approach among the market economies of the West,
the Soviet bloc and the third world, the conference -
will do little to shore up confidence in the I.L.O.'s con-
tinued worth. It will do even less if the attempt at
-consensus collapses and the conference winds up in
another round of recriminations. ' ,
The questions at issue go far beyond a rerun of the
battle over seating the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, which monopolized the delegates' attention at '
the start. The disappointing aspect of that episode was
not the mechanical majority that made a P.L.O. victory
so predictable but the evidence it provided that the -
third-world countries ? remain' more preoccupied with'
bloc politics than with concentrating on realistic solu-
tions to problems that bear with special urgency on their
millions of unemployed and underemployed people.
? The United States has been incontestably right in
leading the opposition to efforts at politicizing the I.L.O.
The whole point of Washington's threat to pull out of
the organization next year is to engender reforms that
would return it to its past course of constructive
accomplishment. Unfortunately, what is still lacking is'
any
any evidence that this country has a positive program
of even modest creativity to put before the employment
conference?one that would supply proof the United ?
States is in Geneva for some purpose other, than to
say "no."
It is scarcely enough for the American delegation in
Geneva to devote its energies to ridiculous position
papers by the I.L.O. staff, which question the "trickle
down" benefits to the poorer countries of economic
growth based on computerized technology and the
spread of multinational corporations. Instead of merely
rejecting all third-world proposals for some intermediate
technology adapted to the needs of n.tarl populations
with neither skills nor schooling, the United States should
Offer initiatives comparable in imagination to those
rAveziced by Secretary of State Kissinger at the United
NaCicee Inst year and in Nairobi last month.
The eneewer to polarization in the I.L.O. or any other
Leiternational agency does not lie in rigidities on the
part of this Government almost as iron-corseted as those
that control the spokesmen for the Communist countries,
all of wheen parade to the conference podium with
ritualistic testimonials to their success in guaranteeing
full employment by decree.
Lure Cleaver
S,iy,s of
/mite
By -George W. Cornell
Associated Press
NEW YORK?From what
he says, he's a changed
man.
Eldridge Cleaver, once a
Marxist, a justifier of vio-
lence, now condemns both. ?
Once a supporter of the
Arab world against Israel, .
he now calls the Arabs fla-
grant racists, defends Israel
and extolls the long Jewish
struggle for racial justice.
"I've developed," he says.
.matured." ?
In a three-hour taped in-
terview in the Alameda
County jail in Oakland, Cal-
if., with two Reform Jewish
leadtrs, and in letters to
them, Cleaver said his ideo-
logical:. transformation re-
sulted from experience with
? communism in Cuba and
, elsewhere and from living
in the Arab world.
"Disillusioning," he called
it repeatedly.
The former Black Panther -
leader, who returned to the
United States voluntarily ?
last fall from Algeria after
seven years in exile to face
charges of attempted mur-
der in a 1968 shootout with
? Police, has now become a
Christian, according to ? the.
prison chaplain.
Cleaver said Marxist and
Arab' societieshe previously
? had praised in theory were
in actual practice harsh,
manipulative and repressive.
"I didn't.; dig it," he said.
"There was no possibilityr of
me relating to it."
He said returning to
America was difficult be-
cause he realized his neW
outlook "would wreak havoc
among my old 'nevi left'
friends and among a formid-
; able array of blacks who are
.imbued with a knee-jerk,
Third World, skin-game ide-
ology," but that his changed
views were firm and wrought
of "hard experience." ?
"On many points, the pro-
gressive movement in the
United States is all wet,
misdirected," he said. "The
? whole idea of settling polit-
ical problems and arguments
by terrorist activities ... it's
something that needs to be
very seriously and actively
combated.
"l'in 40 years old, I want
to contribute to stability
and I think I'm ready to do
that now."
Cleaver, whose ' ho ok,
"Sold on Ice," made him the
darling of revolutionaries of
the 1960s, first indicated his
changed outlook, after his
return, in a Boston Herald-
American article in which
he condemned "communist
dictatorships" and "black
African dictatorships."
He denounced the United
Nations resolution equating
Zionism with racism as a
"travesty of the truth," say-
ing "Jews have done more ,
than any other people to ex-
pose and condemn racism"
and that Arab Countries are
"among the most racist on ?
earth."
In his jail interview with
Albert Morspan of New
York; vice president of the
Union of Hebrew Congrega-
tions, and its Los Angeles
regional director, Rabbi Er-
win Herman, Cleaver said
that in Algeria and other
Moslem Arab countries, he
found racial attitudes "more
cruel" than in America; and .
far behind in ideas of jus-
tice:
"It was just amazing that
such things exist?like, for
instance, slavery," he said.
. "I saw slaves in Algesia.
? They have slaves in Mauri-
tania. They have slaves in
al those countries."
Earlier in Cuba, he said,
'I found a kind of racist gov-
ernment that was frankly
hostile . . I quickly came
into all kinds of conflicts
with them. The reality was
much different than I had
projected . ? They began to
accuse me of attending sec-
ret black power meetings
. . . I left Cuba completely
disillusioned with Cuban
communism."
In regard to the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict in the Middle
East, he said after the Ar-
abs began using "oil as a
weapon," he detected a shift
in American policy toward
Israel. "One could foresee if
that trend continued, the
American government was
capable of sacrificing Is-
rael."
He said he. is now firmly
committed to Israel's "exist-
ence and Integrity."
28
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Friday, June 18, 1976
? Iliz V:azu Star
of Te ?.
77-
WASHINGTON POST
2 0 J Fb,
UNI '
Irrelevant Communists
By Henrys. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
In a study written before
the murder of two U.S.
Embassy officials in Leba-
non, a CIA analyst says the?
impact of international ter-
rorism is likely to be more
sharply felt by the United
States in the next few
years.
There is "good reason to
believe that at least a few
foreign terrorist groups are
planning to step up their at-
tacks on American targets
abroad in the near future,"
the study says. "No matter
how tough and well publi-
cized a 'no concessions'
policy the U.S. government
maintains, it seems likely
that Washington will be
targeted by terrorist de-
mands somewhat more fre-
quently in the future. . . ."
The study warns that
"sooner or later some (ter-
rorist) group is bound to
take the plunge" into using
. weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
are difficult to acquire and
handle, but terrorists might
- seize a nuclear weapons'
storage facility or a nuclear
power plant and threaten
radiological pollution to get
publicity and back up their
? demands, the study sug-
gests.
"A more pressing threat,
however," it continues,
"would seem to lie in the -
field of chemical, biological
and radiological agents."
They are relatively easy to
acquire, so "the danger,
that they could turn up in
the hands of the sort of .
ultra-radical or psycho-
pathic fringe group that
would have the fewest com-
punctions about actually
using them is very real."
The study was written by
David L. Milbank of the
CIA's office of political re-
? search. A foreword to the
document, published in
Classified form in April and
just made public, empha-
sizes "that the approach
adopted and the judgments
advanced are those of the
author."
Milbank studied 375
bombin 137
gs, hijackings,
123 kidnapings, 95 armed
assaults or ambushes, 48
assassinations and 135 other
terrorist incidents from
1968 to 1975, with a slight
decline from a peak in 1973.
TERRORISTS have not
sparked any revolutions or measures.
toppled any governments, The study singles out
Milbank says. But they
Libya the Soviet Union and
have contributed to the col-
j Cuba as the main
and Argentina, com- ists "
ror
George F. Will
Another precinct has been he
from. Comrade Gus Hall, general sec
tary of the Communist Party-USA, a
the party's presidential candidate
the Second time the got 23,343 votes
1972?.03 per cent of the vote), h
launched his campaign with a stirri
defense of detente.
Notice of this event appeared deep
The New York Times, next to a sto
with an overshadowing headline:
Hair Stylist Tops Field
In Annual Fiddle Contest
I ask you: Is that any way to report
the vanguard of the proletariat, chee
by-jowl with a fiddle contest? Well, a
?tually, yes. When I called Manhattan i
formation for the number of t
CPUSA, the operator, who surely is o
of the toiling masses, responded with
Fuestien: "Is that 'Communist' with oi
m' or two?" Her question illustrate
the futility of both New York's ethic
Hanel system and the CPUSA.
?
The CPUSA has been relegated t
what Communists call "the adustbin o
history." But as recently as the earl
1950s it received public attention out 9
all proportion to its importance, just a
the John Birch Society did in the earl
1960s. Both were examples of the spe
ters a bored society invents for its ow
titillation.
The CPUSA's last chance to becom
consequential was in 1948 when man
.of its agents and sympathizers pen
trated the Progressive Party presiden
tial candidacy of Henry Wallace who
poor dear, was the last to know. If Corn
munists had been successful. throve
ard What Madame de Steel said of Ger.
re- mans always has been true of Ameri-
nd. can Communists: They are "vigorously
for obedient" to every exigency of Soviet
in foreign policy. Thus The New York
as Times noted with nice dryness that
ng .Hall's remarks about._ detentee."paral-
lelled" recent Soviet press attacks on
in U.S. critics of detente.
ry Actually, one can almost admire the
energy the CPUSA has invested over
the years in rising above self-respect in
the name of obedience. The Moscow
on trials (which prompted Alger Hiss' ad-
k-? miring statement "Joe Stalin certainly
C- plays for keeps"), Soviet duplicity dure
n- lug the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet al-
he Hance with Hitler, the partition of Po-
ne - land, the attack on Finland?all of
a these drew CPUSA applause.
le Lillian Hellman's anti-Nazi drama
d "Watch on the Rhine" was attacked by
a- party critics in 1940 and praised by
them in 1942. This revolution in es-
o thetic standards was brought about at
f. ? dawn, June 22, 1941, when Germany at-
y tacked Russia. . ? '
I There are scores of reasons why the
S CPUSA is today and always has been a
y Potemkin Village, an empty, cardboard
C- party. But not the least of the reasons is
n ? the CPUSA's marvelous ability to evoke
' laughter, as when a prominent member
e' announced that he had "unmasked the
hiII

m, in in denying Truman the presidescy, then it might have been possible to
" take them seriously. But with Commun
1st help Wallace managed to finish
fourth, behind Strom 'Thurmond's Dix
iecrat candidacy.
It is not the least of the ironies of the
CPUSA's history that it became some-
thing of a national obsession for a few
years after 1943, after it had conclu-
sively demonstrated its impotence.
American Communists have always
? been demoralized by the knowledge
that they lack courage proportional to
desire, and that not even their desire
matches their imported rhetoric. To-
day's Communists know they are like
the Viennese Communists whhse as-
sault on city hall was halted by a sign
that ordered "Keep off the grass."
open Trotskyism" of a rival faction.
General Secretary Hall, who presum-
ably will rule Soviet America after the
revolution, is an Ohioan, a bureaucrat
lacking only a state. He and fellow op-
eratives are gray reminders of what
- Thomas the Cynic says in Ignazio Sil-
, one's "School for Dictators": "No dicta-
tom' has ever had trouble finding civil
servants."
? But were it not already as petrified as
a dinosaur's skeleton, we would want to
embalm the CPUSA, the better to pre-
serve it as a monument to the leftism of
irrelevance, and to that wit who coined
a slogan appropriate for a CPUSA fac-
tional fight involving Jay Lovestone:
"Lovestone is a Lovestonite." It runs in
the family. When the French Commu-
nist Party recently decided to drop ref-
erences to the "dictatorship of the pro-
letariat," a disillusioned former mem-
ber declared that the party "is guilty Of
Right-wing Troskyist petty bourgeois
deviation ism of an opportunist, social-
Fascist character"
releasing terrorists out of
fear of retribution, strained
international relations and
forced expensive defense
Support-
gummy
lapse of regimes in Un,-ers of inteenational terror-
opposing Israel, as well as
training and indoctrinating
.a wide range of "third
world" revolutionaries.
Milbank' s study said..
But the study added that
the sponsoring nations have
found it "difficult to trans-
late assistance into lever-
age or
targets will be hit more
often. The implication was
that the CIA or allied intel-
ligence agencies had infor-
mation on thinking within
some terrorist groups.
IN ADDITION to Amr.:ri-
cans abroad increasingly
mndmat,oncontrol.
being targeted. "the influx
pelted some .n ations to that (the Soviets) continue" -con 4 to ? . . ? d '
2n
are the study &e5 not ex- ot foreign travelers znd
violate their own laws by ? to suppact Eedavewaa
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nection with such major
U.S.-sponsored events as
the current Bicentennial
celebrations and the 1980
Winter Olympics will ines-
capably afford a host of
Opportunities for dramatic
terrorist action," the study
says.
Practical considerations
have so far deterred
foreign-based terrorist
groups from operations in
the United States. These
considerations "will retain
Friday. June 18, 1976
their present force, (but)
there is a good chance that
a few will succumb to the
temptation" to stage inci-
dents here. The study notes
that the operations of
American domestic terror- :
ists, including their possible
cooperation with foreign
groups, lies outside the
CIA's mandate.
Ienergy facilities in this
country. One subject under'
consideration is establish-
ing a federal security force
for nuclear power plants,
instead of having individual
companies and power au-
thorities implement federal
regulations as at present,
and for the transportation
of nuclear materials, now
handled by private compa-
nies also under government
rules.
The unclassified version
The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission currently is
studying the need for spe-
cial safeguards at nuclear I
The Washington Star
Ey Henry S. radsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
The Soviet Union has
charged that the commis-
sion recently established by
Congress to check on
implementation of an East-
West human rights agree-
ment is illegal. The State
Department rejected the
charge.
Congress voted last
month to create a joint
legislative-execntive com-
mission to monitor the way
provisions of the Helsinki
agreement are carried out
by European Communist
countries. The Helsinki
agreement, signed by
President Ford, Soviet
Communist party chief
Leonid L Brezlinev and
other European and Cana-
dian leaders last Aug. 1, in-
cludes pledges to permit
freer mowement of people
and ideas.
Soviet /ambassador
Anatoly F. Dobrynin com-
plained Thursday to the as-
sistant secretary of state
for European affairs, Ar-
thur A. Hartman, about the
commission.
According to a broadcast
in Russian from Moscow,
Dobrynin contended that
the United States is trying
"to assume the right, arbi-
trarily and unilaterally, to
interpret" the agreement
and judge whether other
countries have fulfilled its
provisions.
SAID that the
U.S. commission "contra-
dicts the principle of non-
interference in the internal
affairs of states . . . ." It
said Dobry,iin's represm-
tation to liartman argued
that hurn3a ri2flitc provi-
sions of the agreeric...nt
shookl not be stret;ced
than other ft!;pCCI.S of
cloc.vutneat, t3.Ycit
several 1.-',e.ropenn
relations.
The broadcast said that
the representation pointed
out "the absolute illegality
of" the American approach.
A State Department
spokesman said yesterday
that "we certainly reject
? that."
The Ford administration
initially was unenthusiastic
about the commission, feel-
ing it duplicated State e-
partrnent monitoring.
Opposing it would have left
the administration open to
political attacks, however,
so it has gone along even
though some officials pri-
vately question its constitu-
tionality.
Now the administration is
laving to defend it against
mounting Commtmist
OFFRCRALS DIME see
the Soviet bloc as being
quite sensitive about having
foreign attention focused on
the way it treats dissidents,
limits travel of its citizens
end continues to take the
attitude in control of publi-
cations and the flow of
ideas that an intense ideo-
logical struggle still exists
between East and West.
The commission is to
?nave 15 members and a
budget of 13353,000, not yet
appropriated. The speaker ,
of the House has appointed
six members, with Rep. ?
Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., to
be the commission chair-
man, and the vice president
has named six Senate
members. The President is
to name one representative
each from the State, De-
fense and Commerce De-
partments, but has not yet
done so.
The commission is sup-
posed to report to Congress.
it is expected to provide
material, alaris-,: e.,itia State
?Department r:leteria2, for
the U.S. cla.::;',-.?e,..tica to a
conl'erenao sclie.doiled to 1'.,e
ielft sin a year by the 3$ not-
cirA: s;g'.-.ntcry eaaotries to
thci
nr,,cck-rtacilt.
30
of a recent commission re- ,
port said nuclear power
plants are less vulnerable
to sabotage than many
other industrial targets that
would provide spectacular
results for saboteurs. But
the CIA study says the
threat of nuclear pollution
from a power plant seized
by terrorists "would be
inherently credible" and
"the publicity would be
enormous."
WASHINGTON POST
Z 4 JUN 1976
f;727 liD SPA;.: iC i.. case shows how diffi-
cult it is even :or a teeil-intentioned government
to be sure its ?=?.?):t7 rower 1*.'nts don't
encourage othee.nations to make their own bombs.
Three members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion have jet..t et!nn: I et it is acceptable to sell Spain
ijs ninth American nuciear reactor. But physicist Vic-
tot Gilinsky, in the NRC's first individual dissent in
its 89-case history, disattreed. His stated reasons for
doing so are instructive and worrisome. .
No one accuses Spain, which denies any such inten-
tion, of wanting.its own bomb. New technology, bow--
ever, has made it relatively easy for a country, if. it
chooses to take the momentous political decision, to
arrange for the reprocessing of .spent-reactor fuel
into weapons-grade plutonium. By agreement With
? Madrid, Washingten !.tes tet; :int to ensure that Such
military diversion won't take place if U.S. fuel is
used. But if non-Ttj.S. fe.A is used, "safeguards" be-
come the responsibility of the International Atomic
.Energy Agency; but the IAEA's safeguards are in fact
less stringent than these the t..1;S. can impose. in this
:case, the NRC majority decided that the IAEA's "total
:safeguards framework" (the accounting and inspec-
tion procedures, plus political assurances) would be
:adequate. Mr. Gitiritizy, focusing on the procedures
:.:alone, said they're not yet tight enough.
Now, none of the NRC.members can be said to be
:insensitive to the el.;:ntners of nuclear proliferation:
:the opinion and dissent in this case went through 11.
:drafts. But they. have markedly different approaches.
The majority, notingthet the leophole Mr. Gilirisky
:wanted to close for the ninth Spanish reactor re-
? mains ooen ler the ether eight, took the view that
Cplomatic and, political constraints as well as teehni-
col eine; pren: r211 Spain and that the NRC's reactor-li-
censinn authority is necessarily only ? one of the
States' otill-n:c'hicTation tools. Working
x,ethin the IAEA, to strengthen it, the majority
t;-en:eht, ?Jr. Gilinsky cnpha-
n eeee every technical loophole that
; .;?in Lel out that to his suggestion
;1:-.1in ? .:':en! ; Omit itself to U.S. fuel for this
i.nnenr, tew tneen.'nnent had replied that it.
. ? t 1 H?einen.. the request would pro-
w:otiatifins.'"i'he Department
. ?relations with that ex-
ha ett'
? s seriousness, Eut We
Ce'
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entirely Support the. G linsky. dissent. His anxieties
about nuelear prod, match our own. Nuclear
reactors are being enoerted, by different supPliers,
by Vie busoN. No oi? .:..luility to curb proliferation
can be passed by. Me ee!Y to find, by the NRC's stand-
ard, that a given ex:,i;rt decision is not "inimical to.
. the common defense atIL security" is inadequate. The.
irnphnations and pre;-e'. -nts of the decision must be
'given greater weig14. he record of old agreements
WASHINGTON POST, TUESDAY,
'
and the rush of new technologies is such that not ev-
ery loophole can be closed, then that is no reason not
to try to close those within reach. The licensing-au-
thority of the 17,11:it: is a limited tool; others must be
employed. Spain, for instance, must be pressed to
sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But each.
? available tool must be used to its maximum potential
? effect. That is what we take to be the urgent meaning
of the Giiinsky dissent.
JUNE 22'; 1976
Peter Ramsbotham
Thoughtful Dissent: A Cornerstone
Democracy
; of Maryland by Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British
- From a commencement address at the University art
: -ambassador to the United States:
? Our world today is disturbingly familiar, with loy-
alty oaths and guerrilla wars, with charges and count-
er-charges of treason and loyalty, spies and counter- '
spies. The United States has again, in recent years,
faced the question of whether it is a punishable of-
fense for the individual to follow the dictates of his
- conscience rather than the requirements of his gov-
ernment. The debate is a sharper one here than in my _
_ country: The 'British are an older, more tightly-knit ;
- society, whose strength as a nation has been tested
, from outside more often, century for century, than"
the United States. The story of your birth as a nation, ,
and of the opening up of your vast continent, has illu-
minated more dramatically the qualities of determi-
nation, inventiveness and vigor inherent in the Amer-
ican character, which accentuate the strength of will
of the individual.
'? Two hundred years ago, the signatories to the Dec-
laration of Independence held certain truths to be
self-evident. But behind that statement lay an as-
sumption that every American was capable .of per-
ceiving these truths for himself; that each of them
bore a certain responsibility, as an individual, for a
H continuous relationship with his government. What
could not be deduced from the statement of princi-
ples in the Declaration was that there were specific
political consequences that followed. It turned out
that different individuals did have different moral
? apprehensions; and some of these apprehensions
were wide enough apart to allow for almost directly
opposite interpretations of the obligations of the colo-
nists in the dilemma they faced.
Widely varying opinions about the obligations of
' the citizen are no less a modern phenomenon; indeed,
no democracy is fully alive without such a debate. It ,
is a question of the degree to which dissent is taken
and the country's need for unity at the time. The par- .
;
ailels between Britain's war with the colonies in the
1770s and the American war in Vietnam in this last
decade have been pointed out by modern historians.
, Both wars raised painful questions of judgment and
balance, of courage and loyalty. There is a time when
, dissent and pacifism are intolerable, when a nation is
fighting for its life. To encourage disunity in such cir-
cumstances can be treason. But there are other times
when it is possible to afford the luxury of debate and
disagreement.
? What, then, is the criterion by which we should
_ judge the behavior of the dissenter? By the fervor of
his convictions? By the firmness of his courage? By
.the worth of the proposed alternative?
? We are reaching out here to the extreme point of
. perspective, where a people can effectively pass judg-
ment on themselves. But it is well to remind ourselves
that the relationship between authority and those dis-
senting from it may, at a time of crisis, be a decisive.
factor in the survival of the community. .
Philosophers and historians have pondered over
these problems for millania, and there is little I can
add. But I would leave one thought in the minds of ?
the young people here today?as an injunction to any
would-be dissenters: that dissent (if you feel you must
dissenashould be a contribution to, not a subtraction
from, the strength of your society. There should be a
; firm element of thought and courage in the founda-
- 'lions of your action. Democracy rests on debate, not
I-, on mindless opposition. In order to preserve the free-
doms that we have, there are freedoms which we do
not have, which we must deny ourselves; the free-
Aom, for instance, to escape from the interest which
society (any society) has in you, as an individual and
t. as a contributor.
If your argument measures up to the most strin-
gent, test you can subject it to, in its relationship to
the truth and to the needs of your country, then foi-
1,: . low it with all the courage at your command.
3.
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Rog gngtIM itnt5 Sun., June 13, 1976
BY ALEXANDER
SOLZHENITSYN
Survivor indicts
estern 'Free
? Your notions and mine about
many events and facts are based
? on dissimilar life experience, and
therefore may differ considerab-
- ly. Yet the very angle between
" beams of sight may help us to
perceive a subject in fuller
dimensions. I make bold to direct
? your attention to some aspects of
freedom that are not fashionable
to talk about, but which will not
on that account cease to exist, to
have significance, ?
The concept of freedom cannot
be grasped correctly without an
appreciation of the .vital objec-
'tives of our earthly existence. I
am an advocate of the view that
the aim of life for each of us is
?
not to take boundless pleasure in
material goods, but to take our
departure from the world as het-
i"- ter persons than we arrived at it,
better than our inherited in-
stincts would have made us; that
is, to travel over the span of life
on one path or another of spiri-
tual improvement. (It is only the
sum of ' such progressions that
can be called the spiritual pro-
gress of humanity.) .
If this is so, then external free-
dom is not a-self-sufficient end of
people and of societies, but only '
means facilitating our unde-
formed development; only a pos-
sibility for us to live a human and
not an animal existence; only a
condition in which man may bet-
ter carry out his assignment on
earth. And freedom is not the '
only such condition. No -less than
outer freedom, man needs unpol-
luted space for his spirit, room
for mental and moral concentra- ?
, tion.
Regrettably; contemporary ci-
vilized freedom is reluctant to
leave us this kind of space. Reg,.
rettably, in recent decades :our
Exiled Russian writer Alexan-
der Sok:henitsun is doing research ?
at the Hoover Institution in Stan-
ford for a book on Russia. This ar-
ticle is excerpted from his speech
, upon receiving .the. American
Friendship Athard from the Free-
doms Foundation at the Hoover
' Institution.
. very idea of freedom has been di-
minished and grown shallow in
comparison with previous ages; it
has been relegated almost exclu-
sively to freedom from outside
pressure, to .freedom from state
coercion. To freedom understood
only on the juridical level, and no,
higher. ?
. Freedom! to litter compulsorily
? with commercial rubbish the mail
boxes, the eyes, ears', and brains
s of peeple, the telecasts?soAhat':;
it is impossible' to watch a single
ohe with a sense Of -coherences
. Freedom! to impose. information,
?. taking no account, of the right of.
,the. individual not to aceept. it, of
the light:, of the individual to
peace' of mind. Freedom! to spit
the eye and in the soul of the
,-_ passerby and .the passenger,with
, advertising.
?
Freedom! for editors and ,
-producers to start the:Younger-
. _
generation off with seductive k
miscreations.' Freedom!. for
adolescents of 14-18 years to im-
merse.themselves in idleness and ,
'amusements instead of invigorat-
ipg
,
tasks 'and spiritual growth. :
Freedom! for . healthy young
adults to avoid work and live at
the expense of society. Freedom!
for strikers, carried to the point
of freedom to deprive all the rest
of the citizens of a normal life, of
work, of transportation, water,
and food.
Freedom! for casual, trivial
pens. to glide irresponsibly over
the surfaces of any problem,
pushed forward in haste to shape
public opinion. Freedom! for the
Collection of gossip, while the
Journalist for reasons of self-in-
terest spares compassion for
neither his fellow . man nor his ?
native land. FrCedom! to divulge
the defense secrets of one's coun-
trV for personal political ends.
a, 'Freedom! for the businessmanin '
any commercial transaction no
matter how many people might
be brought to grief, no matter
how his homeland might be be-
32
outs'
? trayed. Freedom! for politicians
" indiscriminately to bring about
.whatever pleases the voter to-
day, but not what farsightedly
provides for his safety and well-
being.
. All these freedoms are often ir-
reproachable juridically, but mor-
- -ally all are faulty. In their exam-
ple We see that the sum total of
- all the rights of freedom is still a
long way from the freedom of
man and of society. It is merely
potentiality being realized in dif-
ferent forms: All of this is a sub-
ordinate sort of freedom. Not the
type of freedom that elevates the
human kind, but a precarious
freedom which may actually be
. its undoing.
Genuinely human freedom is.
inner freedom, given to us by
? God: freedom to decide upon our
own acts, as well as moral re-
sponsibility for them. And he
who truly understands freedom is
. not the man who hurries to ex- .
ploit his legal rights for mercena-
ry advantage, but one who has a
conscience to constrain him even in
the face of legal justification.
think it will not be too much for
us to acknowledge that in some re?
nowned countries of the Western
world in the 20th century, freedom
, has been degraded in the name of
"development" from its original soar-
ing forms; that in not one country of
The world today does there exist that
highest form of freedom of spiritual=?
ized human beings which consists' not
in maneuvering between articles of
- laws, but in voluntary self-restraint
and in full consciousness of responsi-
bility, as these freedoms were con-
ceived by our forefathers.
However, I believe profoundly in
the soundness, the healthiness of the
' mots, of the great-spirited, powerful
American nation?with the insistent
honesty of its youth, and its alert
moral Sense. With my own eyes I
have seen the American country, and
precisely because of that I have ex-
pressed all this today with steadfast
hope.
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LONDON TIMES
3 June 1976:'.
I Lonely men from the East feel they are neglected
S disappoints Soviet emigres
who cannot adapt to new life
From Peter Strafford
New Yoek, June 2 ?
Frustration is growing
among Russian emigres in the
United States about the' diffi-
-culties of adapting to life
here. And the irony is that
just as Soviet dissidents turn
to the foreign press to air
their troubles in Moscow, so
they are tending to do the
same here.
Last . night four ?gr?
trooped into The Times office
in New York and explained
that they were desperate. They
bad tried to attract the atten-
tion of the New York papers,
' they said, even going to the
'length of parading with ban-
ners, but they had been
ignored, . , . .
They complained bitterly
that groups which hold huge
demonstrations in favour of
Soviet Jews and their right to
emigrate, take no interest in
the emigres when they finally
arrive in the United States.
This also applied to politicians
who talked a lot about helping
Russian Jews ter emigrate. _
NEW YORK TIMES
2 1 JUN 1976
Three of? the group ? were
.writers and one a former tele-
vision director. Two of the
writers, Mr Edvard Limonov
and Mr Valentin Prussakov,
wrote an open letter last
autumn to' Dr Andrei? Sak-
harov, the Soviet physicist, in
? which they spoke Of the difficul-
ties faced by ?gr?and
accused him of taking too
.1
idealistic a view of the West.
Last month the two held
their own demonstration, com-
plete with posters, in which
they accused The New York
Times of systematically sup-
pressing information about
'their difficulties.
? The New York -Times, they
said, willingly, printed the
ideas of Alexander . Solz-
henitsyn, whom they described
as "a man out of the past ". It
printed "the naive ideas of
Sakharov and Amalrik about
your world which they- have
never . seen. ?
? "But it conceals and will not
? publish our articles in which
we write about things which
many former Soviet citizens do
, not like about the Western
'world, and in which there is a
mosuivs-f BESS
FOR CURB ON FOES
Strive to Win Cooperation
of Police Abroad After
New Acts of Violence
By MALCOLM W. BROWNE.
Special to The New York Matta
BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, June
18?A bomb explosion at tha.
Yugoslav Embassy in Washing,
ton last week has prompted
a new diplomatic drive by Yu-
goslavia to engage the coopera-
tion of foreign police forces
against opponents of the Bel-
grade Government
Already, Belgrade's initiatives
have borne fruit in West Germa-
ny, where close to a million Yu-
goslays live as migrant workers.
The West German Government
has informed Yugoslavia that
it has formally banned two Yu-
goslav organizations linked
with terrorist activity in West
Germany, and has seized quan-
tities of arms from members in
a series of nationwide raids.
But discussions between the
United States and Yugoslavia
on the subject have been even
' more acrimonious and tense
than ever.
Yugoslavia has charged in
several notes that United States
authorities, includiag the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and
local police forces, tacitly en-
courage terrorism against Yugo-
slav diplomats.
An Ominous Shadow
Tanyug, the official Yugoslav
press agency, asserted that none
of the perpetrators of various
incidents involving Yugoslav
diplomats in the United States
had ever been caught or pun-
ished. Tanyug added that "the
United States authorities are
taking no measures to suppress
this criminal activity" and that
an "ominous shadow" had been
? cast over Yugoslav-American
relations.
A high Yugoslav Foreign
Ministry office official was even
more emphatic in a conversa-
tion.
? "This situation is absolutely
intolerable," he said, "It is not
only your. Government that en-
courages these things, it is your
police and even your embassy
here in Belgrade."
The American position is that
while terrorism in any form is
a crime in the United States,
the mere existence of political
organizations hostile to one or
another foreign ?government is
not.
In any case, the use of the.
great deal about its flaws and
defects, although they are dif-
ferent from those of Soviet
society."
For. 10 years, they con-
cluded: "American newspapers
? have made proclamations about
us, the creative intelligentsia,
who are not free in Russia. We
are now here in the United
States. Why are we now denied
the right to express our views
in the pages of America's so-
called free press ? "
One of the main groups con-
cerned with helping the
emigres is the American Coun-
cil for ?gr?in the profes-
sions. The council's staff con-
cedes that there is a great deal
of frustration, particularly
among the emifres with pro-
fessional qualifications,
because of the difficulty of
adapting to American life.
More and more emigres are
coming to the United States,
the council says, rather than
going to Israel. Over the past
three years, nearly 2,000
.people with a professional
background have arrived, and
about one third are still with-
out jobs.
American police againat politi-
cal dissidents from other coun-
tries would face overwhelming
constitutional and legal obsta-
cles. ?
This American argument,
however, has infuriated key
officials in the Yugoslav Gov-
ernment, reportedly at the very
top, Among those who have
expressed special annoyance on
the subject was Franjo Herl-
jevic, Yugteslay Interior Secre-
tary, who is the chief of police,
intelligence and other security
services.
The main targets of Bel-
grade's campaign abroad have
been members of the Croatian
Ustashi movement, a group that
favors separation of Croatia
from Yugoslavia. The Ustashi
are regarded as the ideological
successors of Croatian Fascist
collaborators with the Nazi oc-
cupation of Yugoslavia, who
supplied troops to fight against
the Allies:
A History of Assassinations
Assassination as a political
tool has a long and important
history in Yugoslavia and the
former nations of which it is
made up. The best-known local
assassin, Gavrilo Princip, pro-
vided the pretext for World
War I by killing the Austrian
Crown Prince.
The worst incidents in recent
years have been the assassina-
tion of the Yugoslav Ambassa-
dor to Sweden in 1971, and the
33
It is possible to provide ;
adaptation training, ?with
money from Washington, for
doctors and eng e ers, a fel ,
even for artists, provided they I
are prepared to go into cent-
mercial art and advertising.
But writers and television ;
.people are almost incapable M.
being helped.
Mr Limonov said he had lost ?
the job he had at Riisskoye
Slovo, the Russian-language
newspaper in New York, after
writing an article in which he
described his disappointment
with life in the West. Mr Prus-
sakov said he was afraid the
same would happen to him
because of their demonstration.
Mr Ma?rat Katrov, the former
television director, feels luck-
ier in that he at least has a .
job as ,a loader hauling con-
tainers of drinking water into
offices. But he points Out bit- -
terly that in Moscow he had
his own television programme,
and says that he would be pre-
pared to take any job in televi-
sion if only one was offered to
him.
One of the difficulties of
course, is that an artist or
writer does not have a privi-
leged place in American life,
and is expected to rough it .
like anyone else.
assassination last last March 7 of"
the Yugoslav consulgeneral in
? Frankfurt.
This month, the Uruguayan
? Anibassador to Paraguay, Carlos
Abdala, was slain by a Yugoslav
named Jozo Damjanovic, who
was reported by the Paraguayan-
police as having said he had
thought he was shooting at the
Yugoslav Ambassador. Belgrade'
regards the case with "utmost
gravity." "
There have been hundreds of
other incidents, especially in
West Germany. Australia, Can-
ada, South America and the
United States, mainly the nuis-
ance bombing of Yugoslav
diplomatic missions or enter-
prises.
A major difficulty govern-
ments face in dealing with
Yugoslav opponents of the
Government of Marshal Tito is
in distinguishing between ter-
rorist groups and others peace-
fully demanding the restora-
tion of civil rights in authorita-
rian Yugoslavia.
In one of the harshest com-
ments ever publicly made in this
country on Yugoslav-American
relations, the Belgrade paper
Borba said:
"This is the last straw. If
the United States really does
not want friendly relations with
our country to be upset, it must
finally put an end to new
crimes. It must promise this
publicly, and also achieve this."
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BALTIMORE SUN
? 11 June 1976
Zest is gene
Unfted Europe lhn
By PETER J. KUMPA
Suit Staff Correspondent
Brussels?The post-war
dream of a united Europe is
all but dead.
For reasons as old as lan-
guage or as new as the recent
energy crisis, Europeans have
lost their zest, their momen-
tum and ?debatably.? their
will to push on to some sort of
federal superstate.
Nationalism guides Europe
once again. It is threatened
more from regional fragmen-
tation than from federalism.
In the United Kingdom, for
example, the movement for
Scottish independence is deep-
er than any rush toward inte-
gration with the continent.
Federalism still has its ad-
? vocates. But it is an idea for
the future once again. Unity is
praised in theory, admired in
word but ignored in the tough,
daily political and economic
decisions of Europe.
? The old timetables for
achieving union through eco-
nomic, then monetary, then
' political means were once en-
dorsed in principle by leading
statesmen of all nine coun-
tries of the European com-
munity. That was in another
era. The goals have been
scrapped and overtaken by
events.
The more modest propos-
als made at the start of the
year by Prime Minister Leo
Tindemans of Belgium have
also been shelved. They are to-
be discussed later in the year
at more European summits.
An idea or two may be
picked from the Tindemans
report. For the heart of the
proposal on bow Europe can
keep the federal idea going,
little more than talk can be
expected.
The mood here in Europe's
bureaucratic center is heavy
with gloom over the federal
future.
"We are adrift on the high
seas. The engine has gone
dead," said one official.
"But," he added quickly with
the one promising fact, "we
are still together on that
ship."
Some co-operation natural-
ly continues. If Europe is net
about to plunge into the vi-
sionary dreams of two dec-
ades ago, neither is it pre-
pared to retreat.
The fell customs union is
eept ried tot,e) into effect on
schedule at the end of 1977.
The common agricultural pol-
icy remains alive despite sur-
pluses and zooming costs.
Some progress can be counted
in the complex process of har-
monization of economies.
The idea of one Europe
flickers on because it is easier
?politically?for the mem-
bers to proceed with the ritu-
als of co-operation rather
than have none at all.
. If a potentially unifiable
Europe is adrift, it has come a
long way.
The European community
now forms a democratic, con-
sumer society with standards
up to and sometimes surpass-
ing American ones. Europe-
ans enjoy American levels of
wealth and American-style
problems of crowded cities
and the soiled environment.
The Europeans do co-oper-.
ate on a number of levels. In
some areas of foreign policy,
for example the United Na-
tions, foreign ministers are
more apt to take similar posi-
tions. At any rate, the idea of
close consultation is improv-
ing.
The community has
brought in Britain after two
French vetoes. It has included
Ireland and Denmark to join
France, Italy, West Germany,
the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg. And it has close
ties with other European
countries with excellent pros-
pects to enlarge the communi-
ty in the next few years.
A serious threat by France
to break up the community
was passed in the mid-1960's
though the price for unity was
a weaker organizational
structure
In all, the record has been
pretty good. It is the future
that is disturbing to European
federalists.
The progress of European
unity up to now has come in
relatively easier fields such as
tariffs.
The degree of sovereignty
surrendered by any state has
been small. No vital area of
an individual state's authority
has been threatened. Europe
does not speak with one voice
in foreign or defense policy, in
monetary co-operation, even
in such fields as industrial
harmony or common trans-
port anvil.
With ernsitive areas left to
negotiate, Europe was hit
s al n
both by the energy crisis and
the worldwide economic turn-
down. It did not take joint ac-
tion to a significant degree to
solve these problems.
Future joint action is hin-
dered by the domination of
the Council of Ministers that
took command from the com-
munity's commission a dec-
ade ago,Technically, majori-
ty voting on the council is pos-
sible. In practice, no decisions
are made without a unani-
mous vote of all nine coun-
tries on any proposal. The un-
derstanding is clear that if
any one of the nine feels
strongly enough about an is-
sue, it will not be pressed
against that country's will.
This veto power by any
member of the community
makes progress difficult and
uncertain. The best example -
lies in implementing the
agreement to have a directly
elected European parliament
by 1978.
Up to now, there has been
no understanding to update
the appointed parliament of
198 members. And it remains
'a great uncertainty whether
the July European summit
will come to any agreement.
The French are sticking to
the 198-member figure. The
British 'would prefer to at
least double the number lest a
European parliament come
into existence with represen-
tation too low for regions such ?
as Scotland. A failure to agree
on the size and selection pro-
cess of a European parlia-
ment would be a serious and
possibly a fatal blow to feder-
alism.
It is not that the parlia-
ment has any great powers. It
can dismiss the I3-member
commission It can ask ques-
? tions
But federalists count on a
revival ot the spirit ot unity
that could came from an insti-
tution that is elected directly
by the people ot the nine
states and is not appointed by
governments In time, its
powers might he expanded ln
time. ii may take a broader
view of issues. a European
view Mai governments do not
wish to risk
The lack of movement in
the Council of Ministers is
partially due to the fact that
the individual ministers rep-
resent governments And any
eloi4o emit:limit:on of the nine
countries shows that to one
.degree or another. each 01 the
governments has weaknesses
They may be coalitions as
in the Netherlands or Den-
mark Or they may have such
narrow maturities as to tear
taking positions that could en-
danger them in future elec-?
wins Li works out so that a
strong enough lobby in any
country able to shake a pieee
of one government can block
an integrating action of the
entire Community.
The hope Of the federalists
is that a European parliament
will be able to rise above pet-
ty pressures to become a
force for integration. France's
Gaullists fear just that possi-
. bility. ?
Another hope is the new
commission with a new presi-
dent that is to take office in
1977. If the European summit
agrees to the recommenda-
tions of Mr. Tindemans, then
the president will be named
? early, perhaps in July. and al-
lowed some leeway in select-
? ing his commissioners.
As it is Britain's turn to
name the president, the choice
centers on Roy Jenkins, a
moderate in the Labor party
and now Britain's Home sec-
retary. If Mr. Jenkins accepts
.the accolade, he may, as a
confirmed and enthusiastic
European, be expected to
breathe more life into the
body that proposes solutions
for the decisions of the Coun-
cil of Ministers.
Even if the fragile hopes of
the federalists do come true,
the outlook for solid progress
in integration does not appear
bright. The twin pressures of
war and poverty are in the
past. For many reasons, Eu-
rope seems willing to have the
United States bear the major
concern for security. Europe
has neither the stomach nor
the will to challenge the
American role.
It would take the magni-
tude of an American pullout?
' a full one, not a partial with-
drawal of troops?or another
serious threat of war to turn
Europe toward greater unity.
The possibility of one of
its members-- Italy ? taking
Communists into its govern-
ment does not unduly alarm
The community. The West
Germans may fret over such
an outcome, but ether states
are too preoccupied with in-
ternal disputes to show alarm.
Some Europeans scoff at
what they consider unneces-
sary Panerican alarm over the
34-
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Italian elections.
Some of this may be due to
the continuing European atti-
tude that the U.S. meddles un-
wisely in affairs on this side
of the Atlantic. Through now
reduced to modest levels, an
anti-American spirit is never
too deep in most Europeans.
They remain determined to
match the Americans in eco-
nomic power in time.
The smaller European
countries in particular?to-
gether with community feder-
alists-- have not been pleased
with the tendency of the U S..
especially in the Nixon-Kis-
singer years, to deal with the
bigger states like West Ger-
many and France on an indi-
vidual basis.
WASHINGTON POST
2 4 JUN 1976
Joseph Kraft
The Consequences
Of Italy's Elections
ROME?Mamma mia. What a mess
the Italians seem to have made of the
elections held here Sunday and Mon-
day- ?
But, in fact, Italy's long-range outlook
not so bad. Short-term difficulties,
while acute, .can be got over if?as a
price for immediate help?the U.S. and
its allies insist that the victorious Chris-
? tian Democratic party abandon the hys-
terical anti-communism which has
come to serve as a screen for corrup-
? tion and inefficiency.
The truly sad consequence of the
election was the unexpected triumph
of the Christian Democrats. They ar-
:.rested a previous slide, winning 38.7
per cent of the vote for parliament this
year as against 35.6 per cent of the vote
in the regional elections last year, and
38.3 per cent of the 1972 vote for parlia-
ment.
The Main reason for this gain lies in
,the promise of change embodied by
some attractive younger candidates,
? notably Umberto Agnelli of the family
which owns Fiat. The anti-Communist
.drive led by the old gang around party
president Amintore Fanfani yielded
very little. For the Demo-Christians
made their gains not on the anti-Corn-
.munist right, but from the smaller cen-
ter parties, attracted by the promise of
reform.
The old gang, however, still controls
the party. Mr. Fanfani strutted into the
TV center here in Rome election night,
arrogant as a peacock, to proclaim a
triumph for "freedom over commun-
ism." He seems to have in mind a Demo-
Christian regime that does not even
talk to the Communists.'
But the old-line Christian Democrats
.have consistently managed Italy's bu-
reaucracy and vast state enterprises in
ways .which promote clients and thus
foster corruption, inefficiency and
huge debts. There is no reason to think
they will, of their own volition, change
now, and make a serious address to Ita-
ly's long-term problems.
. The long-term problems flow from
the post-war economic modernization
of the country. Italy produces first-rate
products, which sell competitively
abroad. Exports make up a substantial
part of Italy's domestic product, and
they have led a rapid, though not solid,
35
recovery from last year's inflation.
But the Communist unions have im-
posed big wage increases on Italian in-
dustry. Italian wages have risen 168 per
cent since 1970 as against 48 per cent in
the U.S., 80 per cent. in Germany, 110
per cent in France and 134 per cent in
Britain.
In consequence, Italian inflation is
surging, investment is almost invisible.
and the country has a tremendous ex-
ternal debt. Unless the problems of in-
flation and investment are solved, Italy
will fall back in the international com-
petition and sink gradually to the level
of an underdeveloped country with
South American-style inflation, corrup-
tion and (maybe) military coups.
The way to turn the economic corner
Is by an informal accord with the Com-,
munists. They would moderate wage
demands in return for a Demo-Chris-
tian pledge to clean up the nationalized
industries and promote private invest-
ment. -
The Communists seem willing to go
along. Though they failed to cut down
the Demo-Christians, they also scored a
big victory-34.4 per cent of the parlia-
mentary vote as against 32.4 per cent in
the regional elections last June and 27.2
per cent in the 1972 parliamentary elec-
tions.
The relatively open line of the Com-
munist leader Enrico Berlinguer has
thus been confirmed by victory at the
polls. So the problem is to force the
Christian Democrats to consult the
Communists on an economic program
even though they govern without
them.
Which is where. the United States
and the European allies come in. They
finance Italy through various arrange-
ments which come up for renewal
soon. Unless they are renewed this
country will go bust.
So America and its allies have potent
means to favor the younger Christian
Democrats at the expense of the old
gang by making a condition of any fur-
ther help some consultation with the
Communists. It would be expecielly fit-
ting for the U.S., which played such a
role in saving Italy from the bad, old
Communists, to now save the country
from the bad, old Christain Democrats.
e, Me, Field Enterprises, Inc.
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Tueniv, June 15, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST
n
171
?
By Thomas W. Lippman
?. washineto? Post Foreign Service
'CAIRO, 'June.. 14 With
iarying degrees of sincerity
and rationality-, many' Arabs
? 4re blaming the ??United
States for the unending
bloodshed ? in Lebanon. ?
During the pat month,
government_ officials,
poli-
t5cf? journal-.
ists and ordinary citizens in'..
ieveraCArab countries havee.
expressed the belief that the.?
1:1inted State is somhow
responsible for -111e.:?,?Leba-
nese . tragedy.. The charge
ts.'beirig heard more ? 'often
? since ,the .overt Syrian mill- ..
tary, ;intervention ; . of, two
seeks ago..e7e,' ??
'\Vh1ngtsin' we ii. p u
fleeted -.tole ? in i relaying in-,:
formation and r a P.s
gnidance ??? to Israel about -
'the Syrian move has given"
rile.tothe popular theory:,
? thae,the United States is ;
supporting Syria's ambitions?.
let?Lebanon in the hope that
the :Palaestinians? will be
i?tishedi', Which .would aid
Thtacl.;t4
it'l& time for the .?
United States to ' make an' ??
Oriednivocal declaration if it ?
Wenot,-.? guilty," an Arab ,?
diPlomat? normally . sympa-
thetic to Washington said
cease-fire in Lebanon and
- stave _off? a major ? Syrian-
Palestinian clash:'
. These . carefully -..worded
? statements have- Usti ally
been coupled with warnings
' about the risk that outside
, intervention ., in Lebanon
? may -.spark a. wider Middle
;ast.Confliet.
? There. is a tendency among
? Arabs to blame anyone but
ethemaelvese:for, their inabil-
. , th ?
N 0
aingn
.? .
sadd as "that murderer,
; Dean Brown." ? ? ?
? ,The ease againstithe United
States was 'Stated: in
rn
tree! forin-?Jast week :by
Yasser Arafat, head of the
, Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation, who accused Wash-
eington of "a sordid plot di-
rected not only against the
? Lebanese , a n d. Palestinian
people
World from the but , against :the, en-,
y o achieve the?unity ey a re
all prefess - to seek. The Gulf to *the! Atlantic:"... '
. ,
' Americans; the ? ItuSsians, Ile said the United Slates
the former- colonial powers,' wants to bring the whole
thee 'od companies and the region into, the American
Zionists are the usual scape-? sphere?of influence," a view
goats, even when there IS held by many Palestinians
no ,credible evidence of who viewed with suspicion
--their, involvement in any the month of improving re-.
'even- crist. Thus, it is con- lations between Washington
venient, ?to '-find - 1 o r e i g n and ?Damascus that pre-
..hands at work in the Leba- ceded ?the Syrian interven-
nese - Ware. which. is an' cm 4 tion. -. ?? -
? barrassment to:'- the entire lni.-:Marxist-dominated
. Arab world:, e,.e, ? .. ? ' Sotitla;Yemen,, students and
:.. Events- suchAis.: theloiht'. werkeTs - de rn o as tr a ted
U.S.-French naval trianeu4 againsteethe? ',Syrian move; ,
vers in .the Mediterranean, calling it a "new link in the -
contribute to the belief that . chain of American ; min- ....-
the ? ? ? sPiraty to r liquidate" the
e great powers are up tO.-
.. . . Palestinian sievolution.".
? their old tricks. - \ . it Is' not drily in the ex- ,
' .In:lebanon; the, decision!. tremist.;or,- leftist countries
by Secretary of State Henri that .the 'United. States is
At... Kissinger to send re- being .:* Criticized,. ' Hero. ? 'in
Aired . Ambassador L. Dean. Egypt, where ? Washington -
Brown on ..a peace mission- has been:in high favor, edi-
torial writers who usually
thise, W.-tend. "Maybe ' ,no- ;
bodywoulit. believe you, hut. :
I think tee clear, statement
would help." ?
. .
So far, the United States
has limited itself . to cau-
tious,. almost tentative state-
. ments. of. endOrsement for
efforts? to, bring. about :a
BALTIMORE SUN
14 June 1976
(gol
vr TryP
a 3 Ri,14.,
for ran
.131 A '
is seen as further evidence,
of American - mach it4fliiti,q.cxYeAe.ef tifficial thinking have
beCause Brown was. the U:Seert-',..:been saying the same things:.
ambassador to Jordare?dure ',..?.-si..'Nobody would ? believe.
?ing the "black ? September'''. ,America's claims that all it
war in 1970, in which did was to keep silent over..
'Hussein 'crushed Palestin- .the..' entry ;? of the ?Syrian` ,
ian forces and expelled the army. into Lebanon,". Mus-
guerrillas from Jordan. The, ? tafa vviote; In ;the
.-
Libyans refer to the? ambas-, mass-circulation newspaper
By u Sun Staff C wrespontient
Tehran, Iran ? With ruth-1
; less efficiency, the Iranian
secret police are huntinv, down
inemign.s of an opposition;
underground movement of
Counnunists and religious;
extremists who only a year agoi
seciii;,d. able to strike at WP
throiVi the ci,iintry, ?
error
ition
After several shoot-outs
here last month, the police
appear confident that they have
broken the rnovcnint, and
sources close to the dissidents
acknowlcd!T that they so far
have not been able to regroup
after sueferiag heavy losses.
36
The intensified - police
campaign has added, however,:
to the pervasive feeling here of
political repression.
Iran's political prisons have
become notorious over the pasti
year with widespread charges!
abroad?and officially denied
here?that they now hold from
25,000 to 100,000 prisoners and
that tortures rival those of the;
medieval inquisitions,
Some Traniaos, mostlyIntel-
lectuals and nir?rniwrS of the
upper middle class, find the
police campai4n connterpili-:
ductive, believing that it simply
creates more opposition to the
JCL/
0 non
Al Akhbar. "The truth is
that the United States Per-
suaded Syria to move and
advised the Israeli leadera
that 'he ? invasion :was in
their own interest." ' ?
,
Some ? Foreign Mlinstry
officials b aveexpressed
much the same view in
private conversations.... ?
The 'clay ? -before '..A.,thirk's
e column:appeared,' the sriine
? paper, largest,, in the . Arab
world, blamed, the Soviet
; Union ; for the Syrian; ad-
Vance. -? "Everybody knows
e:that . Syria Striking the?
Lebanese and.. the Pideptin-
ians with. Russian :tanks,
missiles and. Mig aircraft,"
an editorial said. "EverY-
body knows. as .well that the
? Syrian Baathist- regime:,
? the Soviet Union's cat's-paw
? in.; the area,, (arid _Koskgin
e was in Damascus a few
days ago at the time when
the Syrian ,.forces entered
Lebanon,"? ?
President Sadat,. .in
? interview with' an ...Iranian
newspaper, said' "it has !be-
' come clear . to the Arab
countries and to the entire
World that I,. , Was .rilght -
when I said ,hands off' Leb-
anon.'" ? ? ? !?..--
the Syrian Move, but eias
He has 'strongly. critieied
carefully refrained fr 905
; saying what other outside
; hands he e believes 'to ? be
meddling ? in. .;the .Lebanese
civil war. .
regime. They pint to the large
colonies of Iranian students
abroad who are organized in
active opposition to Shah
Mohammad Hera Pahlavi.
"This brutal and unneces-
sary period of police repression
we are going through now is
turning some of our finest
young minds against the coun-
try," a professor at Tehran Uni-
versity said.
"Each young Communist or
Islamic Marxist the police kill
now will mean 10 new recruits
and 100 sympathizers in a few
years."
Were it not for the inte.nsi-
lied police campaign, a prerni-
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;
neat lawyer here commented,
"these radicals would not have
a real issue since the shah has
gone further in his economic
and social reforms than most
European socialists have....
"But political repression is
an issue that gets international
attention and that, quite frank-
ly, affects everyone of us who
wants to think for himself. The
government may call these
young men terrorists, but they
have more sympathy than is
admitted because of this issue."
The ferocity of the current
campaign by Savak, the Iranian
secret police, puzzles many and
alarms some here since the
radicals have not threatened
the shah's power base in the
least or even been able to put
together a concrete program
able to attract mass support.
"I can see tracking these
men down for their terrorist
activities, like the murder of
the two American colonels,"
said an - industrialist, "but I
wonder about the changes in
our society and political system
this police . campaign is
bringing.
"Frankly, we are in danger
of becoming a police state
because of a handful of terror-
ists, and foreigners say we
already are. And I wonder
whether terror and counter-
terror by police will not simply
generate more opposition."
Outlawed Communists and
the more numerous Islamic
Marxists, members of an alli-
ance of radicals and religious
extremists, arrested over the
past year have included not
only the expected number of
students but workers, farmers,
teachers, young business execu-
tives and a nephew of the shah.
Total political arrests have
been estimated by Western
investigators from Amnesty
International, the international
commission of jurists, and oth-
er groups at 300 to 1,000 a
month. Dissident sources here
said the current police cam-
paign has raised the number, to
more than 1,000 monthly, most
not involved in the underground
movement at all.
The underground opposition
is not regarded as large. The
number of active members was
put by Western observers here
at several hundred, possibly as
many as 1,000; sources close to
the dissidents claimed to have
about 2,000 to 3,000 active
members in their organizations.
Since January, 53 suspected
terrorists have been killed in
gun battles with the police or
executed after trials before
military courts. In mid-May, 10
were killed in shoot-outs in
three northwest cities in one;
day. Later 11 others were killed,
in Tehran. The same week, 16 '
members of an extremist reli-
gious group were arrested in
another city on charges of
assassinating one of the
country's religious leaders.
Since 1972. more than 300
Iranians have been executed
for political activities, accord-
ing to Amnesty International in
London. '
Large numbers of arrests
-00432R000100400001-2
have been made since last Octo-
ber, according to sources here,
with the result that most of the
cells in the underground
network have been broken.
"A year ago, the under-
ground had very well trained,
armed units that organized sev-
eral waves of attacks, assassi-
nations and other terrorist
actions over the spring and
summer," a senior Western dip-
lomat said. "They killed at
least six police officials, proba-
bly four or five times that in
actuality, and three members
of the U.S. mission including
two Air Force colonels. They
struck when and where they
wanted.
"It took the police a good
nine months to get on to these
groups, but they have done so
with a vengeance. Now the
police have the initiative and
the underground is trying to
regroup, so far with little
success."
Several sources close to the
underground opposition
acknowledged the effectiveness
of the secret police campaign
and said that members who had
escaped arrest so far had gone
into hiding and halted most of
their activities. Many are said
to have gone abroad, hoping to
recruit new members from
student groups in the United
States, England and France.
But the ef forts to gather
more support and new recruits
are hampered by the lack of a
cohesive political philosophy by
the various elements in the
Zitgtlesf ZiMel Fri., June It 1916- _ _
underground, which has tried to
ally anarchists, Maoists, ortho-
dox Communists and religious
extremists 'opposing Iran's
headlong modernization drive.
Some of the underground
members see themselves as
successors to the moderate left-
ists who briefly held power
here or to the powerful Com-
munist-led Tudeh party that
even 10 years ago could still
put thousands into the streets in
demonstrations that required
troops and tanks to end.
But today's radicals find
themselves without easy issues
to exploit since the shah's
"white revolution" will provide
all Iranians with health care,
free education, social security
and worker ownership of
industry.
The two issues left?the de
facto military alliance with the
United States and political free-
dom here?do not seem to
move most 'Iranians, who
instead are consumed with
improving their own family's
living conditions. The religious
extremists denunciations of
Western values fall on deaf
ears?Western consumer goods
are exactly what they want.
The radicals also lost much
of their foreign support last
year with the rapprochement
between Iran and its neighbor
Iraq, which had helped finance
and train the underground.
Iranian officials say the radi-
cals are still receiving help
from the Marxist Popular
Front for the Liberation of
Palestine and from Libya.
Pea G
ce: From unsor NAMRU-3?
?
?
the Middle East is often a terrible place, -a sun-. ?
baked arena of murder, brutality and destruction
feeding on religious, political and tribal hatreds. ?-
? :Today Arabs are killing Arabs in Lebanon, while'
their leaders scheme for. advantage and power. Is-
raelis and Arabs. have killed each other in four
wars since 1948.
...Foreigners, too, fall victim to the indiscriminate.
Addlence that claims both VIPs and ordinary falk, ?
young and old. ?
, Just two days ago Francis E. Meloy Jr., the new
U.S. ambassador to Lebanon; Robert 0. 'Waring, an
aide, and their Lebanese driver were killed in Bei- ?
rut while on a diplomatic mission.
The United States and the Soviet Union say, of-
ten in identical words, that they seek only a "just
and lasting peace" in the area. Yetinvariably they
undertake this quest in sending More guns, tanks
ancl. other instruments of destruction to their Mid-
dle Eastern clients. ?
Peace. it. seems, will grow only out of the barrel
of a gun. -
but then tbere is.NAMRU-3-12JS. Naval Medical.
? Research Unit No. 3?a tiny component of Ameri-
can overseas aid at its best. ? - ,
? White violence and ?confrontation have claimed ?
'lives and grabbed headlines, NAMRU-3 has labored -
(inlet ly- and effectively for 30 years to help the peo-
ple of Egypt conquer diseases and ailments that
Americans kno?v only through medical textbooks
?????
or histories of the Middle Ages. It is a battle being
waged by only a handful of American civilian. and
Navy : physicians and scientists attached to
NAMRU-3.
.
As detailed by Don A. Schanche, The Times' cor-
respondent in Cairo, NAMRU-3 was established in
Cairo in 1946 with an assignment that sought to
break an unending cycle of misery and death in one
of the oldest nations in the world: "Conduct medi-
cal research and development concerning the infec-
tious diseases endemic to your area."
Since then, Schanche reported, NAMRU-3 has
-.drtually eliminated typhus and undulant fever
from Egypt and adjacent areas. It has discovered
new treatments for cholera and some forms of en-
cephalitis and other diseases. It has engaged in
fruitful research in the transmission of diseases by
animals and insects, and has set up the best medical
library in the Middle East.
Its work has .been untouched by the turbulence
of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has made the Unit-
ed States a friend at one time and a foe at another
in the eyes of Egyptians. Throughout the three de-
cades of its operations, NAMRU-3 has heen`respect-
cd and supported by SUCCOSSiVe Egyptian govern-
ments.
Such gratitude is a supreme compliment that is
all too rare for U.S, operations in foreign lands. If
only there were more such operations. and the
compliments they attract.
37
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, June 23, 1976
Darkest Africa
To Americans the recent reports
of riots and repression in South Af-
rica are uncomfortably familiar,
and our natural instinct is to apply
American experience to the - situa-
tion by condemning racism, coun-
selling moderation and urging inte-
grationist reforms. This not only
fulfills the moral precept of the
equality of men before the law, af-
ter all, but has also been highly suc-
cessful as a practical policy in the
United States.
In assessing the prospects of a
successful multiracial democracy
in South Africa, though, it is well to
remember that the United States is
an immigrant nation with theory
and experience in striking a balance
between assimilation and ethnic
identity, and that it still has not
resolved its own racial problems. In
South Africa the situation is far
more difficult.
The core of South Africa is the
2.5 million Boers whose ancestors
,started to settle Africa in 1652. The
Boers are among the toughest and
proudest tribes on earth. When
threatened by British 'domination in
the 1830s, they migrated inland
where they conquered the Bantu
tribes invading from the north in a
series of treks and battles that
make the winning of our West seem
trifling. Later they took on the Brit-
ish Empire. Insular, fundamentalist
Calvinist, and fiercely racist; the
Boers will truckle to no one, least of
vil the hated blacks. Unlike other
Colonials," the Boers have no place
ta:go. They even call themselves
Af rikanders?Africans.
The remaining 1.75 million
whites are mostly of British origin.
,They, too, are typically racist, but
because they are English-speaking,
They can emigrate if the situation
deteriorates. There are also 2.2 mil-
lion Cape Coloured, the mulatto de-
scendants of early Boer settlers and
the aboriginal Hottentots, and 750,-
000 Asians; both the Coloured and
the Asians despise and are despised
by the other groups.
Fri., June 18, 1976 log 2ngritz Zimes
The principal antagonists to the
? gs?ers are of course the South Afri-
can blacks, some 18 million Bantu,
an. intelligent and vigorous people.
Their quality is suggested by the
warrior reputation of the most fa-
mous of them?the Zulu. The Bantu
are also racist, against the whites
and against the other tribes. There
nothing, to say the least, in the
history of black-dominated states in
southern Africa to suggest that a
Bantu republic would evolve into
any kind of democracy, let alone a
m,ultiracial one.
There is no need or an Ameri-
can observer of this depressing
s.cene to abandon his belief in the
iribrality of the integrationist model,
dr. to falter in moral support to
dipse South Africans, white and
tirlack, who courageously urge this
curse. But as a practical policy,
aodifying segregation cannot be
9xpected to mollify the blacks or
improve the security of the whites.
The goal of an integrated society is
_
unrealistic considering the dispari-
ties in culture, wealth and numbers
between black and white. - ?
One policy that might offer a
glimmer of hope would be a sharp-
acceleration of the South African
regime's "homelands" policy. lip to
now the "Bantustans" have been lit-
tle more than Indian reservations, _
but it is possible to conceive that
they might e%iolve into real nations,
steadily gaining in independence
and territory until the white South
Africans are reduced to "Boer-
stans." Partition is of course sel-
dom a true solution, and in any
event adoption of a generous home-
lands policy remains a slim hope
indeed.
We will have to get used to the
idea that the U.S. can do very little
positively for South Africa. It would
seem a most promising area for a
policy of strict non-intervention,
though domestic and international
pressures will urge U.S. involve-
ment. Americans will want to see
neither racial equality denied nor
an outpost of Western , civilization
destroyed.
But what can we do? It may be
useful to make occasional un-
friendly noises, if only because
South Africa is an international par-
iah. We have already embargoed
arms sales, but South Africa can
obtain all it needs from other sup-
pliers. Other embargoes and boy-
cotts would have even less effect,
even if there were some "solution"
a boycott policy might be directed
toward. As for American financial
investment in South Africa, it is dif-
ficult and probably inappropriate
for the U.S. government to gauge
how much it aids the regime and-or
the Bantu.
The Russian-Cuban intervention -
in Angola demonstrates, it can and
will be argued, the dangers of not
finding a solution in South Africa.
Alas, Angola teaches more depress-
ing lessons. The Portuguese colony_
was among the most integrated so- '
cieties in the world, yet it broke '
down into anarchy and white flight.
Even with the whites gone, a racial
war broke out among the three ma-
jor tribal groupings and the Com-
munists easily recruited one of
them. No less can be expected in
South Africa.
Violence in South Africa will cer-
tainly continue and probably inten-
sify in coming years; we have just
witnessed the latest skirmish in a
400-year war. The only comfort to
Americans is .likely to be the
thought that if our experience tella
little about South Africa, its experi-
ence tells little about us. What is
happening in Southern Africa is not
an ultimate statement about race
relations for all of mankind. But
neither will UN resolutions, foreign
boycotts, or pious declarations re-, '
solve the historical and cultural
forces involved. What we are seeing
is a calamity resulting from immut-
able fate, a tragedy in the literal
sense of the word.
FERVENT REVOLUTIONARIES 'FEEL GOOD-WE WON'
10000.1%.16.
The Cubans an Arapro
This is the column that caused the expulsion
of Georgie Anne Geyer from Angola.
BY GEORGIE ANNE GEYER
LUANDA, Angola?Beneath the once..
gleaming glass tower of the Hotel Presidente,
Manuel A bdalla of Santiago de Cuba leaned
against a now-scabrouS wall. "Good?" he said.
? "Of course we. feel good. We won."
Abd.dla, a construction chief, is typical of
the Cubans here, Contrary to reports, they
a Want
came voluntarily, they are enthusiastic about
what has happened, and they want to go on
to help "liberate the rest of Africa."
"I came totally voluntarily," he told me.
"I'm a Communist, and nobody can make a
Communist, do anything he doesn't want to
do. Wherever they need us, we'll go."
Talks on the streets of Luanda over a
week's time with several dozen Cubans indi-
cated several trends that contradict some of
the previous reports.
First, the men were not forced to come, tier
0 IL -Lash On
38
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? were they criminal elements that Cuban Pre-
mier Fidel Castro wanted to get rid of. They
are fervent revolutionaries.
Second, although all eagerly want to go
home, they are not at all discouraged about
being in Africa. After all, they say over and
over, they won.
? Contrary to some reports, they keep in
touch with Cuba, and they send and receive
letters from home. But? there their contacts
pretty much end.
They all say, for instance, that they do not
?
know how many Cubans died. One put it "in
the hundreds." They do not know when or if
they are going home. Men like Abdalla are
typical. He said he came in November and
expects to leave in October.
Are the Cubans going to leave? Despite
such indications as Castro's note read to Sec-
retary of State Kissinger in Sweden several
weeks ago saying they would be withdrawn,
? there are no indications of it here.
The Cuban men on the streets of Luanda
? have heard nothing of it and, moreover.
many of them are quietly being switched to ?
civilian positions. In the flexible?and highly
effective?manner of the Cuban armed
forces, men who came as soldiers, like Abdal-
la, are now listed as civilians. He, for in-
stance, is now working in construction.
With this sort of transferring around, you
can make almost anything you want of the ?
numbers game.
But the Cubans also fulfill several other im-
portant functions at this point. Observers
close to the situation say they are one of the
most important supporters of Presidente
Agostinho Neto's policy of biracialism against
? men like Nito Alves and Carlos Arocha, min-
ister of planning and development. These
men, they say, take a black racist position.
For these reasons, the Portuguese still here
?and there remain still about 50,000?will
tell you that they consider the Cuban Marx-
ists their strongest allies. "We all say that
when the last Cubans sail away, we will be
. on that boat, too," a Portuguese translator
? named Lucinda told me. ?
The Portuguese also tell you that the Cu-
' bans, under a .black commander, put down a,
small insurrection in the black. suburb of
? Prenda about three months ago when some
blacks were "going downtown to kill whites,"
The Cuban forces are about half white and
; half black. , _
PHI LAD EL PHI A INV' BK.R
18 JUNE 1976
Amin accuses CIA
of tryirig to kill him
reutte,
LONDON ?President Idi Amin of
Uganda yesterday blamed the CIA
for an alleged attempt to killhim last
week, according to a Uganda broad-
cast monitored in London.
Amin was not hurt when grenades
were allegedly thrown at his jeepin
Kampapa on June 10, but his driver
VMS killed. Knowledgeable sources
have claimed that the whole incident
was staged by Amin.
In effect, while many Socialist countries
now have missions here, and while some An-
golan officials certainly fear the special pow-
er of the Cubans, the Cubans have shown
themselves to be both effective and discreet.
With certain exceptions, their behavior has
been, as one Portuguese put it, "totally cor-
rect." Except for the officers, who have dol-
lars, the average Cuban has no money at all
and thus cannot go out and splurge on the lo-
cal economy.
'Td like to invite you to a beer," one young
Cuban told me, "but I honestly don't have an
escudo. All our money goes directly to our
families in Cuba."
What's more, they have shown themselves
to have an equally discreet but direct effect.
on the government. The form of Marxism be"-
ing developed here, the call for volunteers to
bring in the sugar harvest, even this week's
flamboyant trial of the Western mercenaries
?all show the special touch of the Castroites.
In short, it would be extremely naive to
think that either the Cuban involvement in.
Africa or the African Socialist revolution is
going to stop in Angola. Indeed, with their
own trained people and with the support of
the Socialist bloc, Angola is virtually sure to
become "the" center of African socialism in'
the near future. .
Only this week, for instance, SWAPO, .Or. .
, -the South-West African P2oples Organization,
opened its first headquarters here in Luanda-
and pledged, on this "new border" with South
African-occupied South-West Africa, to
; crease the fight. The same thing is happening --
with guerrillas now fighting on the Mozam-
bique border against the white Rhodesian
government.
?? So some Cubans may be withdrawn and
some may not, but that really doesn't matter..
-They can easily be brought back when they
".are needed in Rhodesia or South-West Africa
?which they judge will not be for a couple ?
of years?and, meanwhile, they are helping'
to build Angola.
What really comes out of the Angolan sit- ?
uation is the fact that the West could easily.
learn some lessons from the Cubans. While
this handful of Western mercenaries, who
come through here as paid killers and misfits,. ?
were on trial here, the Cubans, who could be
considered "revolutionary mercenaries," have.:
given a good example of how it should be done.
39
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Thurwlaylunr124, /0:6 THE WASHINGTON POST I
_
On Ir.& in Discord
? Aussie A
China -?
5,
dresses
odd
By Ross H. Munro
Toronto Globe l Mall
-,..PEKING. June 23 ? Aus-
tralian Prime Minister Mal-
volm Fraser has told China
he has serious doubts about
,the ability of the United
?States to counter growing
Soviet power, because of dis-
agreement between Presi-
dent Gerald Ford and Con-
gress. ?
'.Fraser -believed he was
,speaking strictly privately
when he. told Chinese Pre-
mier Hua "Kuo-feng on Sun-
-clay evening of his -concern,
but ,Australian functionaries
mistakenly distributed trait,
scripts of his remarks in the
..press room set up for the
grirgieg
prime minister's visit.
.Fraser linked his concern
about the United States to
Soviet intervention in An-
..gola, where -pro-Western
;liberation forces were de-
'flied aid by the LLS. Con-
egress. The prime minister.
-.:said he believed the conflict
*.between Congress and the
President- on foreign policy
"materially contributed to So-
viet intervention* in Angola
and the ? belief that there
would not be a reaction
from the United States."
..Some years ago, there
were six or eight significant
leaders in Congress and if a
lruggluile 1S, 1976
_
President had their support.
he Would be assured of the
liupport of the Congress in
"certain policies. There is
:*fioW a risk of the effective-
ness of U.S. foreign policy
?.'bei lig. reduced very severel,:
'because of the differer4:4
'between Congress v.:1d
xecutive." ?
'Fraser then the
strategic situation in the in-
Alan Ocean, .saying be
wanted the United States to
counter growing Soviet na-
i-kpower thsre. If there is
rcr U.S. Naval presence
there, he' said, "It would be-.
golne a Russian sea and I do
dot-believe it is in our inter-
est
or in the interests of
Southeast Asia." -
The Australian prime min-
ister also expressed concern
that Vietnam might play the
same surrogate role for the
Soviet Union in Asia as
Cuba ? has in Africa.
"Because of the attitude of
the United States, Cuba, has
not found it very easy to be
successful in an environ-
ment that is close to the
United States, but with So-
viet support found no diffi-
culty in causing very grave
problems in Angola. We
wonder whether or not Viet-
nam might follow the same
path that Cuba has. We
raise that as a question."
Premier Hua was sched-
uled 'to respond to Fraser's
points at a later session of
their talks. The only sub-
stantive remarks of the pre-
mier carried in the tran-
script quote hiirl as request-
ing that the press be told
only the topics of conversa-
tion and the fact that the
two leaders "had a candid
and sincere-exchange of
Fraser -also said he
wanted to talk at a later ses-
sion about the role that Aus-
tralia, Japan,. the United
States and-China can play in
the Pacific region.
e r Signs From China
,
- *The .Chinese people are being prepared for the
..passing of Mao Tse-tung. Chinese newspapers have
-lately carried pictures of the 82-year-old leader that
give candid evidence of his increased decrepitude,
-in marked contrast to the usual practice of portray-
ing Mao as alert, active and vigorous. The purpose
Of the photos is to signal the Chinese that the inevi-
table time of transition is approaching. That signal
:Should also be heeded by Washington.
Sino-American relations have for some time been
in a state of pause. The absence of movement prob-
-ably .has been dictated by the U.S. political cam.
-paign, and the reluctance of Washington in this
period to deal with the outstanding issue between
-the two countries?American recognition of the
:goVernment on Taiwan as the government of all
;china..
President Ford, in his last known official message
.to ?Peking two months ago, looked forward to a
.!!normalization" of bilateral relations. That word
.means only one thing to the Chinese: acceptance of
Peking's sovereignty over all -of China. That even-
tuality has been implicit in U.S. policy since 1972.
The unanswered questions about how to carry out
-that policy basically involve timing and mode,
which specifically mean arrangements that can be
;.made that would not constitute a sacrifice of Taiwan.
The model for future Taiwan .policy has been set
by Japan, which switched its recognition from the
Nationalist government in Taipei to the Communist
regime in Peking, while at the same time maintain-
Mg a close, growing and accepted economic rela-
tionship with Taiwan. The U.S. government would
undoubtedly be able to follow the same course, pro-
vided there were assurances from China that it
would not seek to win control ()vet Taiwan by force.
The way in which the Taiwan dispute could be
resolved, then, is not a major problem. But the tim-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
0 0 0
ing of a new formal relationship. with China pre-
sents a problem of perhaps growing urgency, an ur-
gency dictated by Mao's enfeeblement and mortali-
ty. That problem is the focus of an important arti-
cle in the current Foreign Policy magazine by Ro-
ger Glenn Brown, a senior CIA analyst.
Brown's central point is that the United States
should move quickly to settle the Taiwan question
so that it can strengthen its standing in Peking
while Mao is still alive. If that is done, Brown
argues, the influence of the pragmatists in the Chi-
nese hierarchy who favor improved ties with the
West would be augmented in the probably una-
voidable conflict over power that will follow Mao's
death. Delay, on the other hand, could work to the
advantage of the radical and pro-Soviet elements in
the Peking leadership who want to resume ideolog-
ical hostility to the non-Communist world and end
the Sino-American connection.
Brown's article is significant on several counts. It
is a departure from?even a defiance of?Secretary
of State Kissinger's policy of controlling all govern-
ment-related statements on China, though Brown
notes that he is speaking for himself and not the
CIA. And it brings into the open a matter of some
delicacy in Washington: the U.S. interest in keep-
ing China and Russia on less-than-friendly terms.
Whatever can be done to bolster the position of the
moderates in China will serve that interest.
No one can foretell what the succession in China
will involve, what balance of forces will emerge.
But it is plausiEe that the United States may have
some ability at least to influence the course of
events, through actions that would support the pol-
icies of Pekings moderate leaders while simul-
taneously serving its own interests. But the time to
act in behalf of that goal may be running out, as
Mao's long Lento; nears its end.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1976
Normalizing Relations With China
By Allen S. Whitinz
, ANN ARBOR, Mich.?The ?first Sino-
Indian exchange of ambassadors since
..the 1962 border war proves Peking's
willingness to mend diplomatic fences
despite domestic politic.:1 tirmoil. On
Oct. 22, 1975, an incident on the dis-
puted Himalayan frontier resulted in
two Indian dead. However, the subse-
quent death of Premier Chou En-lai
and the toppling of his initial suc-
cessor, the then Vice Premier, Teng
Hsiao-ping, did not prevent New Delhi
from improving relations with its
northern neighbor.
_ This should encourage President
Ford and Secretary of State Henry A.
.Kissinger to negotiate the complete
normalization of :relations with China
? before the death of Chairman Mao
.Tse-tung further complicates the politi-
cal scene in Peking.
. The failure to establish full diploma-
: tic relations with the People's Repu-
blic of China is damaging Sino-Ameri-
can detente. Considerable evidence
exists that the pace of normalization
' has fallen far short of what Peking
- had anticipated. ?
?"
In 1975, intimations of Chinese ir-
? ritation became 'apparent. First voiced ?
' .in unofficial conversations, they be- '
came open on the. eve of President
Ford's visit last December. The main
problem is our relationship with Tai-
wan. Our diplomatic recognition and,
'defense commitment are incompatible
with the -understandings reached in
the 1972 Shanghai Communique at the
time of,Richard M. Nixon's China visit ?
? ? as President. ?
These understandings implied that
with the end of the Indochina war and
a tacit agreement by Peking not to use
force against Taiwan, the United States
? would disengage militarily from the
-island, dissolve the defense treaty; and
move toward full diplomatic relations
with China.
The issue for all concerned with
Taiwan's future may be posed in this
way: Can the American sense of moral
obligation and our allies' sense of
United States reliability be sufficiently
met by an arrangement whereby we
explicitly renounce a commitment to
use ,force against force in exchange
for a tacit commitment by Peking not
to use force?
Most proposals that meet the needs
of United States moral concern and
our Asian allies' security concerns fall
short of what is acceptable to Peking.
Any formal pledge of outside defense
assistance is incompatible with Peking's
Insistence?as expressed in the Shang-
hai Communique?that the "liberation
of Taiwan" is China's internal affair.
However, what Peking terms "the
Japanese formula" provides a solution
to the impasse. This would involve
termination of our -defense treaty and
all formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan
while continuing to maintain trade,
travel and economic relationships un-
impaired. ?
Were such a precedent to he followed
bSe the United States, our official ex-
pression'of interast in Taiwan's peace-
ful' evolution would be significantly
reinfarced. by the tangible presence 'of
many American citizens and Considera-
' ble United Stales capital 'on. the island
Any violation by Peking-of. a tacit
'understanding:not to ? attack Taiwan
would challenge important interests
whose influence. :in and on Congress
could- not be discounted in advance.
In addition, because of Tokyo's con-
cern:over sizable - Japanese interests
there, joint consultation would un-
doubtedly produce an appropriate res-
ponse to signp of an imminent effort -
by China to take the island by farce.
To minimize the likelihood of this
eventually., occurring, however, our
position must be made sufficiently
clear and China's tacit acquiescence
sufficiently credible to provide the
necessary assurance that Taiwan will
not be attacked in the aftermath of
American military disengagement.
Two underlying imperatives" cur-
rently, render the normalization of
Sino-American relations urgent. First,
so long as we remain politically and
militarily involved with the Chinese
Nationalists, good relations with . Pe-
king will be vulnerable to political op-
position in China on an issue that
strikes at the most sensitive nerves of
Chinese self-consciousness. Not only
will our bilateral relations be affected
but also our interaction in other areas
such as Korea.
Second; the Peking-Moscow-Wash-
ington ?triangular relationship Is signi-
ficantly involved. After the death of
Mr. Mao, the present intense hostility
between China and the Soviet Union
may, well diminish.' If we have failed,
to complete narthalilation and remain
'I tied to Taiwan's defense, Sino-Soviet
rapprochement: may' come sooner and
.; go further than:it ;otherwise would.:
."; Our competitive position with Mos'.
cow would suffer because Peking must
certainly come to judge our interven-.
tion in its internal affairs is more
'serious that its grievanCes With Mos-
cow.
Indeed, if normalizatiOn has not bc-
curred before an improvement in Sino-
. Soviet relations, it may be more dlf-
.ficult for the 'United States to elicit
tacit acceptance of the desired
? formulations concerning the necessity.
? forpeaceful resolution of the Taiwan'
problem. ? -' ? : ?
Alien S. Whiting, consuitant on China
affairs to Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger between 1969 and 1973, is
professor of politica/ science at the
University of Michigan.
41
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2
KANSAS CITY STAR
25 May 1976 Spy
Jubile
? A great fiesta is planned for June 6
in Cuba honoring the nation's "secret
agents and counterspies." The event
will commemorate the 15th anniver?
sary of the interior ministry which is
in charge of internal security.
It is a peculiar arrogance of strong
totalitarian regimes to not only glorify
their inStruments of terror and oppres-
sion but to positively put them on pa-
rade. Thus in Nazi Germany the Ges-
tapo wore the most dramatic uniforms
and were glamorized at every opportu-
nity. In the Soviet Union the Vast bu-
reaucracy of "security" that encom-
passes the labor and prison .camps. the
spy agencies and ordinary police, is
one big family dedicated to the service
and advancement of the state.
In Cuba politics is organized on the
WASHINGTON POST
2 1 JUN 1975
e in Cuba
block leader system which lends itself
admirably to the type of informant
network that can send men and women
to the Isle of Pines. If Jose hasn't been
showing up at the regular meeting.to
praise the Maximum Leader and the
Cuban people's steady and courageous
journey along the path to socialism,
then something must be wrong with
Jose. In a dictatorship it is considered
admirable to inform on your friends
and relatives if disloyalty is suspected.
It may lead to the firing squad or inter-
rogation in some police basement. But
? it is for the common good.
The frolic announced by Havana will
commemorate Cuban security's victo-
ries over the American Central Intelli-
gence Agency which was "foiled in its
efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro and
overthrow his regime."
I11,112111.0,
o st
By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Staff Writer
"I am a good example of
the results of a policy
clearly conducted to lose .
friends," said an exiled Uru-
guayan leader who was once
considered a friend- of the
United States in ? ? Latin
America. ?
. He is now. in Washington
to denounce U.S. policy in
the hernishphere before a
congressional committee.
Ex-Sen. Wilson Ferreira
Aldunate, ? who narrowly
missed election to the presi-
dency in 1971, accused the
-State Department of keep-
ing afloat the military re-
gime that shut down dernoc-
'racy in Uruguay three years
ago. ?
Wilson Ferreira, 57, is a
strong nationalist who nev-
ertheless is proud to have
been named after the Amer-
ican president. Woodrow
Wilson. Easily as eloquent a
speaker as Fidel Castro but
poles apart from him politi-
cally, he is now so embit-
tered against U.S. policy
that he sees a possible
American contribution to
the assassination of a fellow
exiled ex-senator, Zeiroar ?
Michelini, in Argentina last
month.
"I don't say that itliehelini
I would have lived hut for the
'T.S. eation," Ferreira said in
an interview, "nut peii it inn
peeled his being saved."
By Ferrera's account,
when Michelini sought a
visa to come here last year
?also to question U.S. pol-
icy before congressional
committees?the State De-
partment flagged the Uru-
guayan government,. which
canceled his passport.
Uruguay stranded Michel-
ini in Buenos Aires by in-
forming the U.S. and Argen-
tine governments and the
airlines of the cancellation,
said Ferreira, who offers ex-
tensive evidence that Argen-
tine troops then killed Mi-
chelini and three other Uru-
guayan exiles at the behest
of the neighboring govern.
ment.
A State Department
spokesman said that Uru-
guay, not the United States
initiated discussion of press
reports that Michelin{ would
come here. The State De-
partment replied that noth-
ing would prevent the visit,
the spokesman said, adding
that there waS no record of
Michelini's ever applying
for a visa.
In arty case, said Ferreira.,
the-Urnuayans would be
alive today if the U.S. goy-
eminent had warned Argen-
tine President Cm. Jorge
when they were hid-
'taped --three days before
tapir (neon. -that the United
States wiield not tolerate
any hai boine done to
them
42
0
11
eri
Thus the poor CIA, whose mistakes
become gene'riirriT6irtIttae and whose ,
triumphs must remain unknown, is de-
nounced both at home and abroad. The I
life of, a spy is never easy and it must I
be particularly trying in a democracy
where praise and credit are given :
anonyrnously, but where blame and i
disgrace canoe very public.
Even the most dedicated CIA agent
must look at the approaching festivi-
ties in Havana where his deadly ene-
mies will be garlanded with blossoms
and feel a slight stirring of envy. But
that is one of the prices of working for
a democracy. What is regarded as a
heinous overstepping of bounds here
would be seen as clever police work in
Havana or Moscow. A country is
known by its heroes.
Testifying last week. be-
fore the House subcommit-
tee on international organi-
zations, Ferreira said he de-
spairs of any such humani-
tarian intervention:
"All we want'is to be left
alone. Our countrymen are
struggling in all possible
ways for the defense of the
principles, ideals and way of
life that our country took
from the Constitution of the
United States.
"Not one of us could ever
understand that the im-
mense weight of the same
nation that defined those
ideals 200 years ago, and.to-
day celebrates them with
joy, could continue to be
given in support for the cue--
mies of our people."
Ferreira also charged in
the interview that Assistant
Secretary of State Robert J.
McCloskey had misrepre-
sented the status of Uru-
guayan human rights in a
letter intended to convince
I Congress that violations had
diminished.
McCloskey's letter to sub-
committee chairman Donald
? M. Fraser (D-Minna quoted
the International Commis-
sion of Jurists as saying
Uruguay is "doing ? every.
thing possible to reduce the
risk of mistreatment of po-
lit peisoners."
Tha commission's elan"-
t itra eeneral reepareiled,
lio w,V,V, that the quote was
talain out of eanteet and
that the 'report in fact docu-
mented continuing human-
rights violations.
Fraser, agreeing with,Fere
reira's charge, said, "The
-U.S. government is trying to
. mislead Congress ? on the
question of human rights in
Uruguay."
McCloskey said that
while he signed the letter
as the State Department li-
aison with Congress, it was
prepared by other officials
and he was not yet preparea
to respond.
? The U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives voted last week to
cut off military aid to Uru-
guay because' of humnn-
rights violations there.
As for Argentina, Ferreira
pointed out that the police
had not even bothered to
follow up his urgingS that
they come collect finger-
prints of those who carried
off the Uruguayans. In a
nine-page letter to the Ar-
gentine president ? ho
concluded:
"When the hour of your
own exile ? comes?as you
can be sure it will, General
Videla?if you seek refuge
in Uruguay, an Uruguay
whose destiny will once -
again be in the hands of its
people, we will receive you
without warmth and without
affection; but we will guar-
antee you the protection
which you denied to those
whose death we mourn to.
day."
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