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June 24, 1976
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25X1A -Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-0043214000100400001t2--' CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO.11 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EASTERN EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA 25 JUNE 1976 PAGE 1 28 32 34 36 38 40 42 DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001108/08 ::CIA-RDP77-00432R00010040000f-2 WASHINGTON POST 2 4 JUA: /27, ? Continued ill Inquiry uatre_5t,ested By George Lardner Jr.. Washington Post Staff Writer - The Senate intelligence committee said yesterday :that senior officials of both the CIA and 'the FBI covered up crucial infor- mation in the course of investigating ? President Kennedy's assassination. Issuing the final findings of 'its protracted investiga- tions; the ,committee said it had been unable to satisfy itself as to why the Warren Commission was kept in the dark, but said that "the pos- sibility exists that senior of- ficials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially impor- tant information." , Filled with tantalizing but admittedly inconclusive de- tails, many of them laid out for the first time, the 106- .page report emphasized that it had not uncovered evi- dence "sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a -conspiracy .to assassinate President Kennedy." - But the committee said the -investigative deficien- cies" it turned up were sub- stantial enough to raise grave doubts about the 'War- ren Colemi,eione. 1.1; to justify continued congres- sional investigation. Sea. Eicher(' S. Schweiker (11-Pa., who Played a key rule in the Senate assassina- tion inquiry, said it had turned up "important new leach;" that were being kept secret ill hopes that the per- re.,:nerit new Senate .1atelli- 1,;ence Committee would NW- sue theta effectively. Othci? potentlall;i? impor- tant leads that Went unpin- Sued at the time of the as- sassination, according to the report, included several mysterious flights from,, Mexico City to Havana. , One of ethem reportedly, involved a Cubana Airlines flight the night Kennedy, was killed which was de- layed in Mexico City for. five, hours for an unidentie fied passenger.. who finally got aboard "without passing, through customs" and then'' "traveled to Cuba in the: cockpit ... thus again avoid- . ing identification by the pas- sengers.",e. Althou g.h the CIA re- ceived information to this effect on Dec.- 1, 1963, the Senate committee said it was unable to find any in- dication that the ? CIA had. conducted a felloW-up in- vestigation to determine the identify of the passenger. The study dwelt heavily on the CIA's clandestine- plotting against Cuban Pre- mie. Fidel Castro at the, time of the assassination; and the determination of: U.S. government officials,., especially at the .FBI, to deel pict Lee Harvey Oswald as Kennedy's lone killer. Just four days' after the President's murder in Dallas' on Nov. 22, 1963, the Senate: report disclosed, ,Deputy At- torney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach sent a Memo to the White House' declaring: ? "The public must be antis-, lied that Oswald* was the assassin: that he did .not have confederates who are slit! at large; and that the evidence was snch that he would have been convicted at trial." Speculation about Os- . wald's motives, the Katzen- bach memo added, "ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebut- ting thought that this. was a Comniunist conspiracy or " (as the Iron Curtain Dress is sayinf-0 a right-wing cotispir-:, aey to blame it on Com- mueist 5," ? By that time, the Senate ;report showed, the CIA was already making - efforts to ? head off talk .of a conspir- acy. It attempted, unsuccess- fully, on Nov. 23, 1963, to head off the imminent ar- rest by Mexican -police of Sylvia Duran, an employee of the. Cuban copsulate in Mexico City with whom Os- wald had talked on a visit, there two months earlier. -.Informed by the CIA!s ? Mexico station, that the ar- rest Could not be prevented,. .a top-ranking, official in the CIA's Directorate for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, Ca- ,bled back that the arrest 'could jeopardize U.S. free- dom of action on the whole ? question of Cuban responsi- bility." - Questioned by the corn-, mittee two, months ago, Kar- ,.amessines, the. report said, "could not recall preparing the cable or his reasons- for issuing such a message. He speculated that the CIA feared the Cubans were re- sponsible, and that Duran ?? might reveal this during an interrogation. He further speculated that if Duran did' possess such information, the CIA and the U.S. gove- ernment would need time to , react .before it came to the attention of the public," Repeettedly raising the ? possibility that the Kennedy assassination might have . been a retaliation by Castro or his supporters, the com- mittee said that the CIA had been meeting since early September with a secret Cu- ban agent code-named AM- LASH who was proposing an "inside job" against the Castro regime, including Castro's assassination. Although the Senate re- port does not use his real name, AM HASH was a sen- ior Cuban official and. Cas- tro intimate named Polar:do Cubcia whom the CIA re- ; 'Milted in 1961 as an impor? tont "asset" inside Cuba, bet Whom siii-rne belie 1. o was a ..double agent, His talk about 3- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 getting rid of Castro was communicated to CIA head- quarters at Langley, Va., on Sept. 7, 1;iO3. Late on the evening of that same clay, Sept. 7. the Senate report said, Castro held an impromptu. three- hum interview w Associ? ' :tied Press reporter Daniel Ilarker at an embassy party in Havana. In the interview. the Cuban premier warned against any U.S. efforts to assassinate Cuban leaders and said: "We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. United States leaders should ? think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they them- selves will not be safe." The warning apparently failed to raise any serious apprehensions in Washing-. ton. On Sept. 12; 1963, several days after publication of the AP dispatch in U.S. newspa- pers, an interagency Cuban Coordinating Committee met at the' State . Depart- ment and agreed unani- mously "there was a strong likelihood that Castro would retaliate in some way against the rash 61 covert activity in Cuba." The so-called "brainstorming" session eon- eluded, however, that while kidnapings and attempted asassinations of U.S. citizens in Latin America might be ? staged, "attacks against U.S. officials" in the United States were "unlikely." Some CIA officials, such , as the chief of counterintel- ligence on the Special .Af- fairs Staff for Cuban opera- tions, thought AINILASH's ."bona fides were subject to question," but the meetings with the Cuban operative continued. On Oct. Oct. 29, 1963. the late Desmond Fitzgerald, who was then in charge of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff, met with Cubela after being introduced to him as .a "personal 'representative" oc Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. AMLASH, the Senate re- :port recounted, asked for an , assassination weapon such ?as a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights. The matter was apparently left unre- solved but by Nov. 19, three days before Kennedy's sassination, Fitzaerald told AMLASH's ease off to inform the Cuban "that the rifle, telescopic sights and explosives would be pro- vided." Hli.Y.-?11, ady; Paris at the time, had hetet planning to return to Cuba, but on Nov. 20, HY;:l, the re- port noted, a .Cl. officer telephoned him and ze.,ked him to wait for a on Noy. 22. "AMLASII as'eed if use nicetinir h-, inf.!, and i iso CIA officer re- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Sponded that he did not know 'whether it would be interesting but it was the meeting AMLASH had re- quested," the report said. ". . . Thus the Nov. 20 tele- phone call was the first in- dication that he might re- ceive the specific support he requested" The report indicated that AMLASH met only with his CIA case officer on Nov. 22 and not Fitzgerald; as an earlier Senate report sug- gested. At the meeting, the case officer cited President Kennedy's Nov. 18, 1963, speech in Miami "as an in- dication that the President supported a coup." Kennedy had called the Castro government "a small band of conspirators" who consituted a "barrier" which, "once removed," would en- sure U.S. support for pro- gressive goals in Cuba. "The case officer t old AMLASH that Fitzgerald had helped write the speech," the Senate report said. The -CIA official also said a rifle ? and explosives would be,; ..forthcoming and offered the Cuban a poison pen to use against Castro. "As .AMLASH and the case of- ficer broke ? up their meet- ing, they were told the President had .1:icon assasi- nated." When -Castro heard the news in Havana, the report said quoting French journa- list Jean ? Daniel who -was meeting with Castro at the time, ' the Cuban Premier asked. about President John- son: "What authority does, he exercise over the CIA?" Despite the CIA schem- ing, the report said,: neither the Warren Commission nor the CIA nor FBI officials assigned to work on the Kennedy investigation were told of the efforts against, Castro. As a consequence. Se.hwei- kmosaid, no one "ever actu- ally conducted any full-scale investigation to find out whether a foreign govern- ment was involved. At the FBI, the report -disclosed that six days after the 'assassination, then di- rector J. Edgar Hoover was given a report "which de- tailed serious investigative deficiencies" in the bureau's handling of 0.swahrs case after his return from Roe. sia in 1962 as an erstwhile Sok let d elector. The deficiencies resulted in secret disciplinary actions against 17 FBI personnel, The actions were never cum- ed to the Warren Commiasicm and siiine were carried out only after the commission educluded its investigation inc September. 1064. )(meet', the (aimed' tee adds ed. citing -from various Halt deem:lent:a neaa el en tins .eisminiasion 7r5 adversary, and often eaunnin-i-ned thzAp1*OV6d For Release 2001/08/08 NEW YORK TIMES 2 5 JUN 1976 Kennedy and Castro Possible Cuban Links to the 1963 Killing Seen as Basis for Study By DAVID BINDER Special to The ,New York Times WASHINGTON, June 24 ? it, "the possibility exists that On the strength of a report by; senior officials [of the F.B.I. the Senate Select Committee and the CIA.] made conscious on Intelligence Activities, some decisions not to disclose poten- Senators have called for an- tially important information" other investigation of the as- relating to the assassination. sassination of Pres- The staff specialists say a ident Kennedy. If new inquiry could try to deter- Ne" the' 7 call "is an- mine "on whose authority" and - Analysisswered, and it m for what reasons the post-or- might be one day, tern investigations by both the new investiga- agencies were crippled or halt- tion would be the sixth con- ed. - ducted on -a 'major scale by Second, questions remain tin- government officials since John resolved about the role Of a F. Kennedy was murdered m' Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. man referred to as Am/Lash; a Cuban official close to Mr. What more is to be done in Castro, who was chosen by the1 the way of investigation in the C.I.A. to kill the Prime Minister 13th year after the murder of and lead a coup overthrowing the 35th President of the ,the Castro government. United States? . The select committee estaha Trails Have Grown Cold lished that AM/Lash, in reality, Rolando Cubelo, was receiving C.I.A. instruction's on eliminat- ing Mr. Castro at the very time Lee Harvey Oswald was 'prepar- 'ing to shoot at President Ken- nedy.- Was it possible, the commit- tee staff members . ask, that .Am/Lash could have been a double agent whose direct knowledge of the C.I.A.'s inten- tions toward Mr. Castro led to the Kennedy murder? ? The third area for further in-. 'vestigation, Mr. Sehweiker con- tends, concerns leads purport- ing to involve several "mysteri- 'ous strangers" of Cuban origin, whom the intelligence agencies picked up in the aftermath of the murder and then dropped. One lead involved reports as-. ? sem?bled by the C.I.A. about 'a Trails unexplored at the time grew cold and now are covered with the underbrush of passing years. J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the F.B.I. 'at the time of the assaination, is dead. So is Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence until the spring of 1961, a man knewledgeable ;about the Kennedy Administra- tion plots against Cuba's Prime -Minister, Fidel Castro. However, according to Sen- ator Richard S. Schweiker, the Pennsylvania Republican who remains among the most en-. thusiastic of the assassination students and potential conspir- acy theorists, the previous Fed- eral investigations of the murder 'amounted to "a cover- up.". While Mr. Schweiker has re- Cuban-American -who crossed treated from his assertion of from 'Texas into Mexico on last October that the Warren .Nov. 23, 1963, and then board- Commission report would col- .ed a Chban airliner bound for lapse "like a house of cards," Havana several days .later as. the only passenger. Another involved, an uniden= tified, person who arrived -in he still maintains that there are "promising leads." He takes this view despite the eon.: elusion of yesterday's report, which . h helped write, that no new evidence sufficed "to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy." The focus of a new investiga- tion, however, would be rather limited in scope and different in emphasis from the. earlier studies. aceording to stall' members of the Senate select ? committee. Mr. Schweiker and. with less enthusiasm, some of his Senate 'colleagues, want to tie. up what ,they klieve to be loose ends ,remaining in three fields. First, as the committee. Puti its chairman, Chief justiCe' Earl Warroa was ''seeking to criticize" tire FBI. On t WO separate occasiense the r eport added, "Directors Hoover asked for ad the dereg. ? ritary materiel mi Warr* cammiesion members anel, stall eontaleed in the 'Mexico city the night of the Kennedy murder and boarded a Cuban airliner that had been delayed five hours to take the man to Havana. The pas:zerger was not subjected to customs controls. A Senate official who is iclose to the committee investi- gation said today, 'They feel: ;there is a conspiracy. But they are not ready to point a finger yet at pro-Castro or anti-Castro. - forces. They also feel there are .indications Am/Lash was a idouble agent." Along with the recommenda- tion that the new Senate intel- ligence oversight committee, follow up these aspects of the assassination, the select com- mittee has handed over 5,000 ,pages of documents relating to its own investigation. Senator Schweiker is sched- uled to appear Sunday on the 1"Face The Nation" television !program to plead his cause for 'pursuit of the leads. 'But aides of Senator Daniel K. Inouye, who is chairman-of the new intelligence commit- tee, 'said that the Hawaii Dem- ocrat wanted an Opportunity to study the latest investigative report before authorizing a new inquiry. ? . , ."It is not -his first priority,". an Inouye aide said. .An aide of Howard H. Baker Jr., a member of the old and new committees, said, "Loose ends should be wrapped up," but added, "He is not overly enthusiastic. I doubt if it has top priority." Nor is it certain what the United States would have done 1 or would still do if it were sod- denly established that the Cas-!. .tro Government indeed plotted: and directed the killing of Pres- ident? Kennedy. - ? , At the time, with the- 1961 debacle of the C.I.A.-directed Bay of. Pigs landing fresh in mind and the 1962 Cuba mis- sile crisis only a year behind them, Kennedy Administration officials were predisposed to avoid still another "Cuban flap," as the select committee report makes clear. There is no indication what-. soever that the currrent lead- ems of the United, States desire, "Cuban flap" now, either. THE WASHINGTON STAR 23 June 1976 Soviets Resume Attack on 3 Newsmen MOSCOW ? A Soviet*publication has renewed its at- tacks on three American reporters in Moscow who it :-claims are associated with the CIA. ? The weekly Literary Gazette yesterday accused ; 'George A. Krimsky of The Associated Press, Christo- :;pher S. Wren of The New York Times and Alfred .'Friendly Jr. of Newsweek magazine of seeking !TAW- ,ntary information. ? The May 26 issue of the weekly had accused them of ',working for the CIA. The new article printed what it :.called "evidence' based, it said, on letters from Soviet ;citizens. ? :? All three correspondents and their news oraaniza- etions have rejected the allegations of association with -the CIA. , : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 _ 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 ? NEW REPUBLIC 5 June 1976 An Eye for an Eye? The Death of JFK The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency engaged in a cover-up of highly relevant information when the Warren Commission ,vvat investigating President John Kennedy's assassin- tion in 1963 and 1964. President Lyndon Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy became party to ;the effort which consisted of withholding key facts: from the Warren Commission. The cover-up?contin- ues even now 12 years later; the FBI still refuses to turn over to congressional investigators some of its most sensitive files on the killing of JFK: The Warren Commission was never told that Attor- ney General Kennedy secretly formed?before his :brother was killed?a special intergovernmental com- mittee, which included FBI and CIA representatives, to look into the possibility that Cuba's Premier Fidel Castro might organize attempts on the lives of high United States government officials. That this commit- tee existed has .been kept secret although information ;about it reposes in. FBI files_ ? .The top-secret comonittee was created by Robert ; Kennedy presumably out of concern that Castro might , retaliate against CIA attempts,on his life, carried out directly by the agency's operatives and vith help from the Mafia. That anti-Castro as,:a:;sination plots were ? afoot in the early 1960% was unknown at the tine (they were disclosed last year by the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence Activities) and the Warren Com- mission was not .told of them. Only Allen W. Dulles, who had been CIA director, had knowledge of the a nti- Castro plots, in its ignorance the commission couldn't search more intensively into the possible motives of Lee Harvey Oswald in killing the l'resident. The commis- . sion had concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin in Dallas, but it acknowledged its inability to come up with the motive. It does not follow, of course', that the Warren Com- mission would surely have t raced Os wa ki's motives had it known of. the anti-Castro conspiracies and of the establishment or Robert Kennedy's secret group some time before Dallas. There is still no proof that Castro was behind Oswald. But the cover-up made it impossible for the commission to seriously pursuc'a line of inquiry in this area even thongh there had been much discussion of the significance k.,1 Oswald's links with the Fair Play for Cuba Commit tee (a pro-Castro group in the United States) and his aborted efforts tOgo to Cuba two months before he killed JF:K. Robert Kennedy, the CIA and the1 w decided to keep from the Warren Commission the fact that a special group had been set up to protect American leaders from possible Cuban assassination plots. To justify its existence, it would have been necessary to expose the CIA's own conspiracies against Castro. These were among.the most closely held secrets of the Kennedy- Johnson period. That the CIA failed to inform the Warren Commission of anti-Castro plots?even though the agency was under presidential orders tc. provide maximum assistance to the commission?was confirmed in a memo on April 20, 1975 written by CIA inspector general Donald Y. Chamberlain. to CIA deputy director E.H. Knoche. It said: "As far as we can tell from all of the materials at our disposition, no one ( discussed with the Warren Commission any alleged plan to assassinate Castro. There is also no evidence ' that anyone known to our records made a decision ! to tell the Warren Commission anything about this toe:.c or any other matter."Chamberlain added that "we have no evidence in our material indicating Castro's ,.knowledge or the possession of documentation of ; alleged assassination plots directed against him.- : Two days later, on April 22, 1975, Raymond G. Rocca, then deputy chief of the CIA's .,?,,,soi,interintelligence staff, informed Knoche that "our records show at every point a marked intent to makeas much available to the [Warren Commission] as was consistent with the . security of the ongoing operations." Rocca also reported that his files do not :'show whether the Warren Commission was informed .iof a 1962 report from the CIA's station in Guatemala according to which a statement was made at a ;Guatemalan Communist party meeting that "we need knot preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know, according to prognostica- tion, that he will die within the present year." Although, as Rocca put it, the counterintelligence staff was the CIA's "working-level point of contact with the Warren. Commission," -plans- 'to assassinate Castro were not "known to-us in CIA staff."' In all likelihood, President Johnson, who knew of the anti-Castro plotting, also knew that Robert Kennedy had set up his special committee. But there is no ' indication that he shared that knowledge with Chief Justice Earl Warren when the commission was orga- nized in November 1963. Robert Kennedy's testimony before the Warren Commission likewise omitted mention of his own fears that assassinations might breed assassinations. But it is part of the public record that Johnson subsequently commented, without elaborating, that President Kennedy might have been killed in retaliation for his administration's anti-Castro lpolicies. At the time, this remark was taken to mean ;possible retaliation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion land subsequent CIA operations against Cuba. I. All these facts, secret at the time, may have influ- enced the Kennedy family in its decision to oppose any :reopening of the assassination probe. Again, a new .investigation might have led to public disclosures of the CIA plotting and tarnishing the memory of John and Robert Kennedy. Robert Kennedy's interest in aggressive operations against Cuba was reported in a document written -by John McCone, then CIA director, on October 4, 1962, describing a top-level strategy meeting chaired by the attorney general, McCone wrote that "the attorney general reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving ? forward, commented that one effort attempted' had Failed IP ? Another element of the cover-up was that in at least #, 50 instances the CIA had, according to an.internal FBI memo, ignored materials supplied by the bureau. on Oswald's foreign connections. The responsibility for following op such FBI leads was in the hands of an ad hoc group built around the CIA's so-called "D Staff," a clandestine operations center then headed by William Approved For Release 2001/08/083: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 pproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Harvey, a senior agency official. The CIA's counterin- telligence office, directed by James Angleton, reported directly to Harvey's "D sta ff," a nd it too was involved in investigating certain aspects of the Kennedy assassina- tion. Sources contend that the CIA actually destroyed some of the materials provided by the FBI. Angleton, according to those sources, may have suspected Soviet "plants" in the FBI material. The Warren Commission never knew about any of it. As has been reported earlier, the FBI destroyed at least one letter Oswald sent to the Dallas police department shortly before the assassination. Oswald ; demanded that the FBI stop "harassing" his Russian- born wife Marina and threatened to blow up the Dallas . police headquarters if the FBI failed to desist. This became known only last year, and the FBI never offered a conclusive explanation for destroying the note. Likewise, the FBI inexplicably failed to place Oswald on its "dangerous list" although it did so with other members of the Fair Play Committee. - A CIA memorandum to the Rockefeller Commission, which last year investigated CIA abuses, said that the agency still feels, as it did in 1964, that the Warren Commission should have given more credence in its ; final report to the possibility of foreign links in the conspiracy against Kennedy. The memo said that there were promising leads that were not followed up. This statement contradicts the FBI memorandum now in the possession of the Senate Select Committee that the CIA refused to pursue leads obtained by the bureau. However, acute rivalry between the CIA and the FBI , already existed at the time?they actually, stopped cooperating altogether in 1970?and their estrange- ment could account for the contradictions. The cover-up is among the reasons the Senate Select Committee voted on May 13 to recommend a congres- sional inquiry into the role of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission investigation, and into Oswald's motives. The Senate committee first learned of the cover-up a few months ago. This is the new evidence the panel claims it has obtained about Oswald's motives. Sen. Richard Schvveiker of Pennsylvania and Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, who constitute a 'special subcominit tee on the Kennedy assassination, have written a separate report on the subject. Neither Schweiker nor Hart has publicly revealed thus far the nature of the new ? evidence?the cover-up. There is said to be great pressure to sanitize this report while the full secret. information would be turned over to the Senate's new permanent oversight committee on intelligence or whatever other panel might undertake the recommended investigation of the Kennedy death.The subcommittee report is expected to be issued in mid- June after the FBI and the CIA have inspected it to remove what they may consider "embarrassing" infor- mation. Although senators are far from certain that the proposed inquiry would actually provide a conclusive . answer about Oswald's motives?the trail has become cold in the opinion of many senators?the FBI and the CIA could find themselves under charges of obstruc- tion of justice for having withheld significant material from the Warren Commission. Among the questions likely to be raised in a new 1 investigation is why Dulles concealed from the Warren Commission, on which he served, the plotting against Castro by the CIA. CIA's own records, released in mid- May, show that the agency had begun to plan Castro's ; assassination in March 1960, when Dulles was CIA 'director, and planning had by then begun for the Bay of ;Pigs. Excerpts from transcripts of the Warren Com- mission's executive sessions (published in The New Republic on Sept. 27, 1975) show that Dulles informed his colleagues that there were certain CIA secrets that he would keep from everybody except the President of the United States. Dulles was addressing the still unclarified question of whether Oswald, as maintained 'by some assassination buffs, had been an undercover ;FBI informer. A similar question could be raised with John McCone who was CIA director during the Warren Commission !investigations and who should be called to testify in any ;new Senate inquiry. McCone was familiar with the anti-Castro plots and probably knew about Robert 'Kennedy's secret committee. All the indications are that the existence of this committee was known to very few people: Robert Kennedy himself, probably Dulles and McCone, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and a few selected associates. Several aides of Robert Kennedy, including a former assistant director of the FBI, said in interviews last week that they had not known of the committee. They said, however, that it was possible that the group, acting in secrecy, worked out of the White House before and after the Kennedy assassination Or from the attorney general's office. . The Senate Intelligence Committee learned of the cover-up in the course of its long investigation of the intelligence community. After references were made by witnesses to the Robert Kennedy committee in ! testimony touching on foreign assassination plots by the CIA, the Church Committee asked the FBI and the ; CIA for their relevant files. It is understood that the CIA made some material available; the FBI refused to do so for many months. Only recently did the bureau agree to allow Senate committee members to read parts ; of its secret files, but the senators have to do it at FBI ; headquarters. I It was in this manner that senators learned of the ;scope of the cover-up by the intelligence agencies. !They've now requested additional materials from the FBI. Some senators are said to believe that further vital information on the Kennedy assassination investiga- tion may turn up in the FBI files. It remains unclear why, after 12. years, the FBI is still reluctant to let senators see all its files on the assas- sinations., There are no indications that the bureau has been under any pressure from the I'Vhite I louse? Presiden t Ford was a member of the Warren Commission?to withhold material from the Senate. In fact, Ford himself may be unaware of the contents of the FBI files. 'Nat raises again a fundamental question: is the White I louse in full control of the intelligence agencies? Tad Szulc Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 I 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 HUMAN EX InNTS 26 June 1976 a -- :- . :'t I.! . . o'l r;-.?* a .. '' r.' "::''.:?)..;.'1I1 ? -, .... .., -_? 50 H i v ti V In the fall of 1963, two P. irre assassi- By M. STANTON EVANS nation plots careened toward a day of convergence. One of these, in a general way, we have known about for years. The victim was John F. Kennedy, the ?assassin?accord- ing to official reports--Lee Harvey Os- wald. The other we haven't known about -until quite recently. Its intended target was Fidel Castro, the assassin-to,be high-up .figure in the Cuban government,? in continuous contact with the CIA. The strands of eireums.ance that bind these- plots together, along with other anomalies, have spurred an outcry for a new investgiation of the Kennedy mur- der. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R.-Pa.) and Representatives Henry Gonzalez- (D.-Tex.) and Thomas Downing (D.- Va.), in particular, have urged that the investigation be re-opened. On the Ken- nedy-Castro evidence alone, that request should be granted by the Congress: , In the light of recent revelations about. clandestine activities under ? Kennedy, we have a startling new perspective not available to the gen- eral public when .the Warren Com- mission made its report. We know that through the summer and fall of - 1963, the so-called Standing Group of the National Security Council, in- cluding Robert Kennedy, Robert Nle- Namara, John McCone. McGeorge Bundy and Theodore >iiretiseri, re- viewed and finally iinpkrninitod a program el sabotage against the Cas- tro government. This program was personally approved by President Kennedy on June 19, 1963. "to nourish a spirit of resistance and dis- affection- against Castro everi as diplo- matic talks aimed at accommodation were also going forward. On Oct. 24, 1963. 13 major sabotage operations in- side Cuba were approved. These were to be carried out by, or thrOugh, the CIA. ? Meanwhile, at-a lower level of govern- ment, even more serious action was afoot. As documented by the Senate Select committee on Intelligence, desultory but more or less continuous gestures toward assassinating Castro had been considered by the CIA since the early 1960s, These inclodcd such exotic devices as poison cigars and exploding seashells, plus con- versations with -the Mafia on possible methods of eliminating the Cuban dic- tator. In addition, CIA operatives met ofl. and on for a period of months with a high official of the Castro government, known by the code name of AM/LASH. The subject of assassinating.Castro kept pop- ping up in these discussions, and while the CIA spokesmen reportedly told AM/ LASI i they would not support an assas-. sination, they did say they would support a coup, and promised to provide a cache. of weapons. . Finally, in the fall of '63, the CIA promised to deliver a ballpoint pen rigged with a poison hypodermic needle, which CIA Director Richard Helms described as a device "for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case may be." The context was that the device was delivered to keep AM/ . LASH happy, rather than for actual use, a somewhat fine distinction. It was hand- ed over on Nov. 22, 1963---the day that ? Kennedy himself was murdered. What makes all this the more incredi- ble is the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald ? was a fanatic follower of Fidel Castro. A Marxist and former defector to the. USSR, Oswald .had joined- the Castro- financed Fair Play for Cuba Committee, displayed a picture of Castro on his man- - . telptece, and was a subscriber to The Militant, the Trotsky Communist pub- .fication that specialized in running texts of Castro's speeches. The witnesses who knew him in New Orleans and Dallas testified to his absolute devotion to the Castro Oswald was in contact with the Com- munist party in New York and the Trot- skyist Socialist Workers .party, offering to do free photographic work for them. and he subscribed to the publications of - both. What is striking about these other- i. antanonistic Nitinxist groups is that bniii -0-ere committed to the cause of Cas- tin), nnd that agents of both were involved ; in cnn orkass of time Fair Play for Cuba iCoonninte- Doron? stay in the USSR, Oswald !had un-:rine:1 the niece of a colonel in the KGB ... t!, e mini?stly that houses the So- 1 Viet secret police and global intelligence sc.rviees. On his return to the United States and Dallas, Oswald generally. steered clear of the anti-Communist White Russian community, choosing in-- THE SENTINEL STAR Orlando, Fla 111 March 1976 Ilarenisment Of CIA At Ludicrous Stage' ? - Editor: The harassment of .the CIA by politicians and a few irresponsible journalists has now reached the ludicrous stage. In the wake of the inept handling of the Senate and House- ilyiestigations and the competiton to leak secret documents, we now hear. from Robert Horan, the prosecuting attorney of Fairfax County, Va. Mr. Horan, having discovered that CIA headquarters is located in Fairfax County, has (according to the: New York Tunes) announced stead to associate with a Russian expa- triate couple of decidedly left-wing sym- path ies. Eight months before the Kennedy frItlr- ? dcr, 0...said had tried to kill Gen. Edwin A. Walker---a man otherwise totally dif- ferent in outlook. from Kennedy, hut widely publicized in the Dallas news- papers as art outspoken opponent of Cas- tro. In tin: summer of 1963, Oswald had scuffled in the streets against anti-Castro Cuban esl!..and had taken Castro's part in a New Orlenns radio debate. In other ,,,nrds, Oswald hail a long, consistent i.istory of Nlarxist associ- ation and sentiment, plus a demon- strated yea fur i iolence, including assassioation?hoth geared to the cause of Fidel Castro. This combi- nation of factors has been conven- iently obscured not only by the-War- en Commission, but also by the con- ventional critics of the'Commission's report, roost of whom are eager to downplay any connection between the Kennedy murder and left-wing ex- tremism. Finally; when he was arrested in Dallas for the murder of Officer J. D. Tippit, Os- wald demanded to be represented by John Abt?attorney for the Communist- party. Add the fact that Oswald traveled to Mexico two months before the Kennedy assassination to arrange for passage to Cuba (a request acceded to by Cuban but denied by I he Soviet Union, which was supposed to have been the ultimate object of his journey). All of this against a backdrop of steadily 'es- calating rhetorical violence by Castro and the pro-Ca.;tro literature read by Os- wald, denouncing Kennedy and the CIA as thieves and ruffians and saboteurs. Two assassination plots inyolninp! Cuba, converging on Nov. 22, 1963. Was there a connection? The. American people deserve an answer. his intention to determine whether alleged CIA plots against the life of Fidel Castro have violated some Virginia Law. We may hear next from a politician in the Bronx that CIA for ce d New York City into bankruptcy, or, perhaps, a head- line happy candidate from Mon- tana can speculate that a CIA covert action triggered last win- ter's blizzards. Let us hope that politicians closer to home yill refrain from charging that the weeds choking our canals and lakes are in fact CIA listening devices. --JOHN S. TI 1,TON, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 V I IL ArIE VOICE 21 J U17.2 1976 pki etAtabe_Ato Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 -17.1 BY DICK RUSSELL The Warren Report, with its simplistic conclusions about Lee ? Harvey Oswald's "inability to enter into meaningful relation- ships," is about to become obso- lete. Before thins month is up, the: ; Senate Select Committee on In- telligence will release its own 1T2- page study of the Kennedy a sttossi-1 ' nation?its last and possibly most 1 damaging chronicle of CIA-FBI wrongdoing, and the first atep toward d congress- ional investiga- tion sometithe after the November' election This much is now certain': ; The motive, one way or-the other, goes back. to Cuba?either witht ? Fidel Castro, or against him. In the -past few weeks, new information has come out. First a eew book e-alled "Betrayal," writ- ; ten by an ex-CIA contract employ-: `ee named Robert MOITOW, who claims the asstissination was en- gineered by a group of right-wing financiers and anti-Castro exi leS" in ;retaliation for, what they- consitte tiered Kennedy's sellout at the Bay ? of pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis.; 'Then came arguments from the opposite angle--copyrighted arti- cles in the New Republic and! Washington Post that made it look! ' as if Castro had better start pre- paring, his defense_ From the looks' of these, the confusion is only be- ginning. ; -Past writer George Crile's hypotheses are correct, the dupItc- ity surrounding Cuba in the early lfttaC,s was more staggering than ever iniagiped. Consider "AM ? LASH," the Cuban the CIA select- ed to use a poison pen to kill Castro' in the fall of 1963. Crile identifies , him as Rolando Cubela and makes a strong case for his having been a double agent for Fidel. A more ; unlikely Castro rigent. but one Crile. also suspects, was Florida alob boss Santo Tr:irk:ante, Jr. A. key figure in the CIA's liaison with the Mob in failed attempts to as- sassinate Fidel, sTreficante is shown receiving favored treat- ment from Castro in a Havana jail. working closely with Castro in a lottery racket, and in 1963 an- flouncing to a prominent Mierni Cuban that Kennedy was "going to be hit." The theory ernes. if Castro was getting advance inside information on raternata against his life, might he have decided to retaliate? Tad. Szadc, in the New Republic, reports that Hobby I:at:nicely actually Approved .,4 !.- 1 e t'ir-\Til ? -- ,q . , -71 '1 a The? at4i.-ePvi-ncea?-? ? ta9_, , formed a top-secret ? intergovern- mental committee shortly before his brother was killed to look into the possibility that Castro might organize> attempts on the lives of- - high. U.S. government officials.' One of the Crile stories closes with. a quote from Robert Morgan of North Carolina. a senator on the . Select -Committee: "There is no doubt in my mind that John P. Kennedy was assassinated by. . Fidel Castro or someone under his ;influence in retaliation for our 'efforts to assassinate him." " But the one man in a good position to know Castro's attitude toward the Kennedys believes the Castro motive simply doesn't make sense. - -He is - William Attwood, former U.S. ambassador to Guinea and Kenya. current pub- lisher of Newsday. la the fall of 19.13. ' a speeial adviser to ; America's UN delegation, he un- dertook secret negot iations,to nor- . malize relatierts with Cuba. Asked last week what he thought of the Castro's-revenge idea: Auwood scoffed: "Well, I think that's ridiculous. It was quite obvi-. ? ous to me that Castro, at that time, ; wanted to normalize relations with ; us_ He had no interest whatsoever in breaking this off, he wasn't playing any antoe I was on the , phone at one point to Havana. , stetting up a possible meeting down in Veradero to discuss an agenda. In fact, I was supposed to see the president richt after Dallas to dis- cuss the I-and of questions I'd be. asking. Then. if Castro was agree- able. I was to go down very quietly. NOT many people were aware of this undertaking." ACcording to Ai mood. by the fall ' of 19i3it U.S. policy toward Cuba was opera:int; on several different melee. Thines tied become so dif- fused that, after Atto,00d received an olive-branch feeler from Cuba'ti UN delegate and got approval from the leentiedys to pursue it. Secretary of State Dean' Rusk wasn't even info:-med. 'The State Department had its aown policy toward Cuba, which was sort of a frozen. do-nothing liolictee`Axtwood recalled. "The CIA, what was left of the eung-Lo lepes might well still have- teen .plortine, seta-thing. But J think the aiienneeitet saw this as a chance to eft1Se. (Atha as a patitinal issue in 'Lt.64. They didn't want to be at- tat-he for having loosed uti the Lay of Pigs. Thee took! say, 'All For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R j1---c" A a,. right., maybe the Bay of Pigs was a mistake, but now we have an agreement that Castro will not subvert Latin America and also give compensation for our compa- nies that he'd expropriated, in re- turn for which we lift the blockade and unblock the Cuban assets in Americo.' These were some of the proposals. And things were moving ;along." ? The Kennedy assassination brought a halt to all that. For pne thing, Oswald was an apparent' Castro sympathizer. For another, says Attwood, "We were entering ta Political year; and I don't think :Johnson really knew what was ; involved. It sounded too compli- cated and too risky." Nonetheless,' ? Attwood remembers, Castro did give his okay for negotiations to begin and, according to a FrenCh journalist who was with Fidel on " the day of Kennedy's death, he was "shocked and dismayed at the news of the assassination" "I've been to Cuba since and ? stayed in touch with Cubans here at the UN," Attwood concluded. "so I have every reason to believe ; they were sincere. I've always f if there was any Cuban involve- ment, it would have been on the part of the anti-Castro Cubans,. who might have atad reason to be fearful ?that some kind of nor- malization. was in the works and would have wanted to prevent it. That's the only conclusion I can draw from my own experience." The rumor is that toe tot-meta.- ; ing Senate report will confirm Attwoods suspicions, especially - concerning the exile groups that condacted anti-Castro operations In 19:13 from Lake Pontehartraiq, Louisiana and ttik't -Flottida Keys, That summer, much against. the CIA's wishes, the Kenuedys had cut off their funding. The Coast Guard had been ordered to watch for any new raids directed at Cuban s'nortes: numerous exiles and Minutemen soldier-of-fortune types were ariested. And bitter- ness against the Kerinedys was rife. If there was anti-Castro involve- ment, of course, that means a ,cortspirace on American soil. It also suggests a goad reason for a CIA-F1t1 (taverna, particularly if etr ,3. i itt 1 ? tax to DP77-00432R000100400001-2 _ -'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 those agencies had -ever made prior use of the conspirators. Most of all, in this bizairre realm, of turncoats and doabie-turncoat,' it raises the question of just 'who ' might have used?and maybe set tip?Lie Harvey Oswald. ? In an election year, the Senate is reluctant to -take such questions any further.- Once. the a.ssassina- tion report comes out, the new 15-man ? intelligence oversight ? . committee says it ? will wait ? another six months before deciding how to proceed. Even When it does, the senator who }mows the most abeut the case won'-t be represent ed. Thai' is Pennsyvania Republi ir- on air. Richard Schweikf3r, co-eha man of the ssinati ni subcommittee- that spent nei e/ ed a eaa months digging into the maze. B cause of the Senate's complicat rules- of seniority and a late bid for the at-large first-come. first-1 Served seats, he tried but failed to' ? at II- ? m win a place. ? -*Unfortunately. the Stro Trturrnonds and folks like iii were the ones who got their hats the ring months ago," says ai ?_Schweiker staff asaistant. ?Brit -don't think there ti7as arty plot Id, keep Schweiker off the new coin- ? mittee. He intends to stay actively interested." Schweiker. who feels his hands . were tied by ihe subcommittee's need for secrecy, plans to keep an investigator in the field and go public with additional information after the initial report is released. Meantime, before the rest of the Senate has a -chance to act, the ? House may. take the ball away from them. For months, retiring Virginia Democrat Toni Downing has been battling for a full con- gressional inquiry into Kennedy's . murder. He got as far as an all-day session of the House Rules Com- mittee on March 31, where a vote to wait and see what's in the Senate . report tied 7 to 7 and a move for indefinite postponement carried 9 to 6. Since then, Downiag has met privately at least once with House leaders Carl ? -Albert and Tip O'Neill. And 0-Neill, the overwhe- lming favorite to replace the retir- ing Albert as the -new Speaker. is. reportedly ready to see -action on ? Downing'S resolution. ':Our Main talking point/' says Downing staff assistant Rick Feeney, "is that we have individu- als who would be willing to go under oath right away. Not in six months but 'in two or three weeks." Downing,'s acts is 47-year-old Baltimore electronics consultant Robert Morro; who -Wilf; once arrested in _a 'CIA counterfeiting scheme and who claims in his semi-fictional autobiography ni3e- trayal" that he's closer than any- one to cracking the'case. "For more than a decade." Morrow writes in his introduction, Approved For ' "handcuffed by the secrecy agrte- ment required of everyone directly , or indirectly on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency, I .. lived with what ? I knew. . .?. This . 1 book is based upon ? my experi- ences, on events related to me at . the time and subsequently by close associates, and on evidence avail- able in public testimony. .. . some dialogue has, been improvised and certain events reconstructed." There is little doubt, ?according to Washington sources,. that , Morrow did indeed work Cuban affairs for the CIA during the early 11960.s That, at least, makes him Ithe first ex-CIA eniployee to speak ?, out. publicly on this subject. He , says. he will tell far more, far less cryptically, to a congressional hearing?and Dawning is inclined to believe him. ? - . The problem with "Betrayal" . (published by Henry Revery) is 'sorting out the improvisations and :reconstruction S from ?? what , Morrow really knew. Where he 1 uses real names, the. parties con- cerned are dead. Where he cannot ?!remember specifics of dates and . ,!scenes, he invents them. And his 'scenario for. the assassination it- self, as he readily admits, is noth- ing more than an imaginative , hypothesis. ? ' But if only some of Morrow's : firsthand knowledge is accurate. - he has dropped a bombshell. His initial recruitment, by the CIA, he . says, grew out of his confidential ? relationship with a Cuban exile , __ea__ ._. ? . _ leader named Mario Garcia Kohiv.? . _ - Until the fall ' of 1963, Morrow , claims to. have maintained fairly regular eantact with former CIA , Deputy Dinielor Charles Cabell . and eas:, officer "Ed Kendricks," who bears a strong resemblattee to : E.dloward I hairs ?ottranne boss of ' covert operations Tracy Barnes: Cabell and e'Kendricks," accord- ? ing to Morrow, were the overseers of his main CIA project during those years?a scheme- to manu- facture and ? then flood the Cuban ? eeonomy with $50 million in . . coun- terfeit pesos ? ? . , . 1 item in chronological order, are Morrow's neva star-Ili:it: revel a? ! lions: I.. . I CkAs an engineering specialist. in i i jamming and coiling technirples. , Mot-row recounts Ida selection for ' a top-secret mission during the , Bae of Pigs invasion. Given the :. cede name Robert Porter, he says he was, flown into Cuba's -Cama- , guey Mountains to by to discover the source of some unusual pulse transmissions that the CIA so- . spected , might be a signal system. for ballistic missiles. ? His -alleged,' ? pilot was David Ferric, who died mysteriously In -1997 Wien New ? Orleans ?District Attorney . Jini Garrison was about ti: lediet hint , for conapiraey in the Konitedv as- , .saestnation, ? I ei,The CIA, retis? Morrow actual- ly stepped up the Bay of Pigs invasion date without Ken- nedy's okay. Infuriated, Kennedy then demanded all data gather- ed about passible ballistic missiles turned over to his brother .at the Justice Department. Not only did the CIA concludethat the ? Soviet Union was operating a control center in the Camaguey Mountains, Morrow continues, it also obtained photos smugglecaout by the anti-Castro underground of missile launching sites under con- struction. 13ut the Kennedys chose to do nothing at that time. eOn a mission to Europe, Morrow says the CIA arranged for him to make a clandestine $2?10,000 arms purchase for Mario Kohly's Cuban underground. The deal was consummated_ _through _ aeDallas eman named "Jake," who Morrow i says Was Jack Ruby, and a CIA t front eailcd Per:aides_ That front Was handled out of New Orleans by' CIA consultant Clay Shaw, also later accuaed and ultimately ac- 'quitted in Garrison's trial. Morrow says he was taken to the weapons -warehouse in Athens' by Davi Ferric. oDuring that same trip. Morrow' says the CIA had him pick up an, envelope in Paris from an Ameri- can just returned from an extend- ed tour of the Soviet Union. The envelope, he was told, :as "the irJormation wanted from Har- vey," and had been secreted out of Minsk. A year later. Morrow as- serts he was told by Cabell and "Kendricks" that "Harvey" was a CIA agent who had gone to Russia posing as a defector to participate in an Internal security operation: make contact with the niece of a ,KGB colonel and arrange to get her out of Russia as a precondition for her uncle's defection to the West. oAfter the Cuban Missile Crisis, Morrow claims he was informed by "Kenddcks" -of CIA reports that the missiles had not been removed but taken to hidden sites deep in the Cuban interior. Ele- ments of. the CIA believed that Kennedy and Ithrushchev had reached a quid-pro-quo agreement about missiles in Cuba and Turkey. This, Morrow speculates, was Kennedy's betrayal?and his death warrant. oBy mid-October 1962, the CIA was worried aboi a losing control of one of its anti-Castro grours operating out of New Orleans. Ca- bell, who was no longer deputy director but still kept vigil over numerous covert activities, repor- tedly wanted Morrow to find out how closely some of its owr con-i tract employees?including Cuban leader Mario Kohly??vere con- nected to a paramilitary training camp established at Lake Pont-1 chartmin by clay Shai,v. Morrow says he was infori at that same meeting that on Release 2001/0 /08 : CIA-RET7-004321k600168218tiOrN21 with Sti` Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 group?"Jake," or Jack Rubs - was running Chinese cocaine out e Cuba under CIA auspices, in ex change for running guns int, Mario Kohly's underground. ' 'Her vey," who had returned from Rus sia with the ?KGB colonel's nisei when he came to feel he was wide suspicion, had been assigned b. the CIA to report from the Dallas ? New Orleans area on Ruby's actis ities. "Harvey," or Oswald, ha also been hired for simile purposes by the FBI. ?Early in 1963, Morrow write! he was asked by "Kendricks" obtain several 7.35-caliber Mani licher-Carcano rifles for delivet to Shaw's group in New Orlean supposedly for an assassinatit attempt against the leftist of the Dominican Republic. Jue Bosch. Three of these rifles we. picked up by David Ferrie I private airplane; .Morrow kept fourth, and today it rests in a gun I cabinet in his Baltimore home. The, others, Morrow believes, were, ? ? , used against John Kennedy. oThe last straw for the New Orleans conspirators, according to Morrow, was- probably the, arrest in early October 1963 of Mario Kohly, himself, and two. others involved in the CIA's coun- terfeit peso scheme. The Ken-i ? nedys, Morrow says, had ordered: THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE 14 June 1976 the Secret Service to make the! arrests and so bust up the CIA's; last best hope at undermining, Castro's Cuba. . That's about as far as Morrow! claims. any firsthand information. He goes on to speculate about how Oswald was used, the existence of an Oswald look-alike in the Lake Pontchartrain camp, and the roles of Ruby, Shaw, Ferrie, and others., 'Even what he says he was told' staggers the imagination and, in, most instances, there is simply no way to back it up. He points to a vast conspiracy, similar to the dis- ? credited Garrison case, and an equally vast cover-up by the Ken- nedys themselves around - the Cuban missile situation. ? Still, no matter how incredible it ' seems, the Morrow book cannot be dismissed out of hand. Consider, Ifor example, that the CIA's newly released assassination files men- tion, for the first time, that Os- wald's rifle might have been a 7.35 caliber Mannlicher ? Carcano. .There is also this declassified doc- ument dated December 4, 1963: "Source on (deleted) said he saw (deleted). (Deleted) reported SOVCONGEN -told him 30 No- ventbei).?that Oswald sent to USSR ? and nial-eiecl Soviet girl under CIA instructions." By the time those F-Girl says IA sent her to Cuba to poison aS TO 1,?? . . ? ? -? -NEW. YORK [API?A teen-aged girl who ea-tight the? eye of Fidel Castro was Sent to Havana by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1060 to k ill.the ? Cuban, premier with 'poison tablets to be slipped. into his coffee; the. New York News reported Sunday. . ?ars! s The assassination attempt ? failed...because the girl fearful the tablets might be discovered as she catered Cuba, secreted them in a jar of cold cream in her- handbag?and they melted, the News said in a copyright story by Paul Meskil. . The girl, identified as Marie Lorenz, told the newspa- per that CIA agents who recruited her for the assassi- nation.mission told her "it would change history." She said the agents also told her, "You're the: only one whO can dolt ? ' ? ' ? reSe'..t? THE 'NEWS SAID an Investigator for the 'Senate.. Intelligence Committee and the newspaper traced the! girl, to where she now lives in New York City. Quoting Miss-Lorenz, the newspaper gave this account: ? ??? Miss- Lorenz, a German-American, ; met Castro aboard the luxury liner Berlin one Month after:.-he seized power in Cuba in 1959. Miss Lorenz' father was' captain of the Berlin and took her along on a Caribbe- an cruise. The Berlin div:ked in Havana, and' the Cir-: ban leader boarded the ship aid later dined with the captain and his daughter. . Castro took a. fancy to Miss Lorenz and later- con- vinced her to return to Havana as his personal Inlet,- ? preter. files were released, Morrow's book had long since gone into gal- ?leys. The counterfeit peso story and Morrow's arrest are also docu- mented in newspaper files and court records. Washington attor- ney Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., re- 1- calls investigating the incident in 1966 and concluding that the ar- ,restsexere "a frame be the U.S. government,? just as Morrow maintains. Morrow has told Congress that he's now prepared to turn over the bulk of Mario Kohly's private files, once the investigation begins.. ?Kohly, who once had 115 exile g,roups under his United Organiza- tions to Liberate Cuba, was the. CIA's most favored leader during that period. And his files, be- queathed to Morrow upon Kohly's death in 1975 at age 76, could prove a fountain of important new infor- mation. ? ? These days it is instructive to recall the quaint conclusion of the Warren Commission's own Gerald Ford: "The strong evidence Ps) that Lee Oswald's mind turned to murder whenever he wanted to impress Marina.. ... " It's taken 12 years to move from couch to ;an- spiracy?and -the' new report mey be only the beginningee CIA operative Frafac'Fiorini, later known aa Frank -Sturgis- when he was convicted as one of the Watergate ' burglars, *lade contactswith Miss Lorenz and persuad- ? ed her to photograph some of Castro's secret papers. IHe also later helped her escape from Cuba. ? ? ? ? THE CIA TOLD Miss Lorenz that she could perform 1"i tremendous service"?to.the United States by asses- . . . .sinating Castro. ? "I thought ? he- was joking," Miss Lorenz told the News. -"But they kept coming back to it and a realized they were serious. - - ; "They decided on poison," Miss Lorenz told- the News.. "They said. it, would be easy to put poison in his- 'food or drink." , . Miss.' Lorenz said she was told she would.aeceive enough money to retire if she were successful, . .? . She said she flew to Havana, but before meeting ?-?-CaStr6 she slipped the two tablets the CIA had given .her into her cold cream. ? ? "THE LOBBY AS full of reporters and ()the'''. peo- ple trying- to. see Castro, but he wasn't there," she said., "One of his aides recognized me and took me up, to FIdel's -suite. He asked. me why r left him,' and I said dt was because. I missed my . mother and- my home.. ? 'Finally', he ordered food and coffee sentup. When it came, he fell asleep. on the bed.- ?..`I went into the bathrdora and' opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my ? finger in. it, and, the whole thing came out like yak. couldn't find the capsules. They had melted. . . - ? !.'IT WAS;LIKE an-omen. I couldn't dump a glob of cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went back to the bedroom and 1 watched, him sleeping. Final- ly, I Issadown on the bed beside him. 'I thought, "ro hell with it, let, history take its course.' ? Miss Lorenz said she flew hack to Miami, the next Morning, where-she was met by The News said Fiorini verified Miss Lorenz' storY. 8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 NEW TIMES 25 June 1976 With the help of handwriting analysis, a test called the Psychological Assessment System and 30,000 personality files, Jim Keehner spent seven years screening CIA agents and recruits. He's now on the agency's "useless person" list By Maureen Orth The young CIA case officers looked intently at their instructor. He was hold- ing up a lemon. "I want you to take this lemon," he said, "and never let it leave you for the next three or four days. Smell it, touch. it. Tell me your feelings about it. Get to know your lemon like you've never known another lemon in your life. This is an order." The instructor was teaching "Personality Theory." He was a CIA psycholo- gist, an expert called upon to train fresh clandestine operators in some of the secret arts of intelligence work. The lemon exercise was supposed to measure and improve their sensitivity, and the trainees were required to turn in written "contact" reports several days later. It was the usual mix. Some had developed meaningful relation- ships with their fruits. They rhapsodized for three pages about their lemons and had no trouble picking them out from a bowl of dozens. One nonconformist, however, merely drew a big picture of his lemon and labeled it with a question mark. Still, the instructor, Jim Keehner, was pleased. "I was trying to get them in contact with their feelings," he explained. "Feelings had been left out of their previous training, which is all cognitive." . In 1968 the CIA hired Jim Keehner as a specialist in the agency's .ongoing effort to increase the psychological skills and awareness of its employees. A CIA case officer's prime duty is to recruit "agents" among foreign citizens around the world, and the agency has a vital interest in any method?no matter how far out? that promises to reveal weaknesses, vulnerabilities and psychic pressure points in ' possible recruits. The CIA. in fact, has become one of the world's foremost laboratories for unit- ., pal.psychologicalAschniques. Keehner's office in the agency's Technical Service Di- vision had a 'mandate to test anything?from hallucinogenic drugs to computerized handwriting analysis?that would help case officers manipulate their agents or other unsuspecting potential agents. Keehner's mission was to teach other CIA officers how to bring agents under control.. Ironically, the negative nature of his work loos- ened his own self-control and brought him to the point of a complete breakdown. Still bearing the marks of his shattering experience, Keehner hesitantly agreed to provide . a portrait of the agency's psychological operations. ? Keehner was in the living room of? hours before, and most of the time his Georgetown apartment, giving me Keehner was uncomfortable and ner- the CIA's specially designed personality vous. "Would a Catholic talk to the Dev- test. According -to Keehner, the results ii?" he asked. "That's what the CIA of this test would tell him my basic ge- thinks of talking to the press." netie formula: whether I was born an ex- But I scored very high 'on trust- trovert or an introvert, whether I was worthiness, and that seemed to ease his moral or amoral, whether I'd be more concern. He was also unscientifically loyal to a person or a cause, even what biased in my favor because I had the sort of torture would be most effective same "basic personality formula': as his against me. former fianc? He began to relax, but I tried hard to duplicate the geo- only a little. metric designs on the paper Keehner , To Jim Keehner, relaxing means showed me. I had to Construct the de- sitting in the window of a "safe house" signs using pieces of a plastic building chain-smoking cigarettes and wondering block. A clock on the table next to us who is watching from outside. He also clicked away, but I was oblivious, checks for the three-agent team (ABC "Time!" Kechner called. I managed to. "surveillance patterns") when he's complete every design; but it took me walking down the street, and fears that too long. I flunked. Keehner seemed anything written about him and the CIA overjoyed. "Oh, you're an F," he said, will be subject to instant sabotage by his "I knew you were an F. They're sensi- former superiors. His natural wit is al- Wye, creative and clumsy." I was taking most drowned in a terminal case of para- the test so that Keehner might trust me. noia, perhaps because he is aware that We had met for the first lime only a few he "is an official outcast, a, name on the CIA's "useless person" list. It wasn't always so. .A small, thin, 36-year-old Kentuckian, Keehner spent six years traveling the world for the CIA with a packet of suicide pills in his pock- ct. He never forgot the motto of his office: "Every man has his price." His job was to find the weakest part of a for- eign agent's character, his "squeaky board," and then tell the CIA how to step on it. He tested European bankers, Near Eastern journalists, Vietnamese farmers, a Buddhist monk and an Afri- can hashish smuggler. He told them he was testing their aptitude, but he was real- ly charting how their minds worked. "We liked some people with low intelligence who would follow orders," Keehner said. "Then there were some mean ones, the killers. But basically I 'tested nondescript middle-class people who did it for the money." Back at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, Keehner reported his findings and taught the case officers how to take advantage of them. He also test- ed the case officers themselves, seeking out their weaknesses so that the agency? would know how vulnerable they were to enemy spies. In addition to his direct testing, Keehner assessed many potential agents indirectly, without the benefit of inter- views or tests. He used the information the CIA collects every year on thou- sands of unsuspecting foreigners. No matter how loyal these people might be to their country, the CIA considers them potential traitors and labels them either "susceptible": or "vulnerable." Today the agency still spends millions to study them, tap their phones and bug their bed- rooms in an effort to lure them pr force them to become agents. Jt is not a pretty business, and Keehner had to plot how to bring these targets to the breaking point. "I was sent to deal with the most negative aspects of the human condi- tion," he said. "It .was planned destruc- tiveness. First, you'd check to see if you could destroy a man's marriage. If you could, then that would be enough to put a lot of stress on the individual, to break' him down. Then you might start a rumor campaign against him. Harass him con- stantly. Bump his car in traffic. A lot of it is ridiculous, but it may have a cumula- tive effect." The CIA recruited Jim Keehner ? under deep cover. He was excited when a high-powered Washington outfit called Psychological Assessments Associates wanted to interview him. PAA, with offices in Washington and abroad, is the cover .for the agency's psychologists. Its recruiters impressed Keehner by telling him that if he got the job he would travel the world testing the aptitudes of busi- ness executives for high-level positions. It was August of 1964. During the next nine months, Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RbP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Keehner considered studying for the priesthood while Psychological Assess- ments checked him out for a top secret security clearance. Then .the company contacted him in Kentucky. where he was working in the mental ward of a hos- pital, and invited him to interview fur- ther for what he thought was a glamor- ous job with a private psychological - firm: "They called me in," he remem- bers, "and said, 'This is the CIA. Do you want to go on or do you"want to stop?' It's a funny feeling when they tell you? , frightening, yet thrilling and shocking." He barely hesitated before saying yes. Visions of dashing spooks danced in his head. One thing puzzled Keehner about the CIA's final interviews, however. "They never once asked me about the Vietnam War," he said. Neither did they probe his views of morality, not in seven screening interviews and not when he look the CIA's standard lie-detector test. No one from the agency questioned Keehner about American involvement in Vietnam, then at its peak. The oversight proved to be significant. Keehner's intensive training in the clandestine ways of the CIA sur- prised him. "I was intrigued with spies," he said. " soon as I got to training I learned that no American who works for the CIA is a .spy. Never. A spy is a foreign agent who commits treason and gives information against his govern- ment. In the CIA we act as his helpers and get information for our country. Never call an American a spy." The need for secrecy was drilled into him over and over again. He had to sign a contract binding him not to reveal his work to.anyone. . After training, Keeliner reported to the Washington office of PAA, where he set out to learn the rudiments of the remarkable test he would soon adnrinis- ter round the world. Keehner's boss, John Gittinger (now retired), scored a major breakthrough in measuring per- sonality development about 25 years ago. Gittinger took the standard IQ test?the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale?and converted it to a highly so- phisticated tool that can predict behavior based on personality types. The elabo- rate Psychological Assessment System (PAS) uses a series of letters to catego- rize individual personality traits: "inter- nalizers" and "externalizers" (I and E), those who see the forest (F, flexibles) and those who see the trees (R, regulat- ed). those who adapt ea,ily (A) and those who don't (U). PAS hypothesizes that everyone is born with a fixed personality formula that is often inotlified in early childhood and adolescence hut never en- tirely altered. Because of the I (2",1?N complexity and it.; bias toward tt;?neii,- tb.stirty, it has not nc.ittil:ir in the scientific community. I tio.yever, 1,01110 ptiyChOlt);itit'i vli V, .! I. (*XtellSis y with the PAS concede that it can be effective for ( ?1 A's p.1,1,0s,,,. "If I Were getting into the tottitt.e. business:, says Denver clinical psychologist Keith Davis, "I'd think of the PAS I use it in a psychological program aimed at helping patients. But people skilled in subtle ma- nipulation can use it for ? negative pur- poses." "I can be Very sneaky myself about predicting behavior and. personal- ity formulas," says Dr. Charles Kraus- kopf of the University of Missouri Psy- chology Department. "We should be thinking about this the same way we're thinking about nuclear problems and bio- engineering. It's not something that will hide under the carpet." Kcehner thinks the public ought to know about many of the techniques the CIA uses. "One of the tragedies is that most CIA research in the basic sciences is never made avail.tide to the HAmerican public who paid for it," he , says. "My boss, for example, was a non- academic who carried half his work around in his head." Gittinger finally had a monograph of his Psychological Assessment. System published in The Journal of Clinical Psy- chology in April of 1973. Today the sys- tem is being used in several American universities and hospitals as an aid in vo- cational guidance, marriage counseling, correlating personality type with psy- chosomatic illness arid teaching mental patients how to play up their strengths. Keehner believes that most people work- ing with the test have no idea of its use by the CIA. And certainly nobody now using the PAS outside the agency has ac- cess to the 3G,000 personality formulas the CIA has accumulated over the years. The CIA even goes so far as to dub the personalities of entire countries with the magic PAS initials. The U.S., for example, is ERA?"a masculine ste- reotype"?externally oriented, regulat- ed in behavior and adaptable. The coun- try that most resembles the U.S. is none other than the U.S.S.R. "The Russians are EEUs," says Keehner, "like us, but unadaptable. They follow authority. blindly." China, on the other hand, is 1RU (internalived, regulated, unadapt- able), just like former-President Nixon. ? "I've never met an IRU I've liked," says Keehner. In fact, nobody in Keeliner's office could stand to watch Nixon on television. Out or 15 psychologists in Keehner's office, 14 voted for McGov- ern, not because they loved McGovern but because they had all indirectly as- sessed Nixon. Our former leader fared very imoily. Trained to spot lying, the CIA psychologists concluded that Nixon lied in public most of the time. In addition to testii;g. Keohner's office? often whipped up psychological studies of world leaders. Foreign presi- dents and their aides had their handwrit- ing seantinized for signs of psychic iin- balancc. 1< edifier worked on the files of. many foreign officials, but the ttssess.. .ments on the really big enchiladas were left to his bosses. Keehner happened to see Fidel Castro's assessment, and it noted he had sex with his pants on. Keehner thought the CIA charter strictly forbade the agency to assess American citizens, so he was surprised when the news broke that the agency had compiled a psychological profile on Dan- iel Ellsberg because of what Keelmer calls a "bureaucratic screw up." "I guess the Plumbers broke into that office to get Ellsberg's psychiatric files for the shrinks," he said. "We could have done it without them. I asked my boss if he would have assessed Ellsberg, and he told me that we probably would have done it if the White House had asked us to." Keehner's office did assess Com- mander Lloyd Bucher when the Navy spy ship the Pueblo was captured by the North Koreans. "We were very in- volved in trying to figure out how the North Koreans might affect the crew psychologically," said Keehner. "Buch- er should never have been commander of that ship. He was an orphan, you know. lie wouldn't intentionally givr away anything. But he was not equipped to handie tiny aspect of the sittiation was in.'? The CIA assessed Sirhan Sirhan when Robert Kennedy was assassinated, and concluded he was insane. Keehner says he knows of no official assessment of Lee Lir% ey Oswald, but he says that CIA ps,l,cholo2ical experts studied Os- wald on their own and concluded he was incapable of killing the President by him- self. (One of the CIA employees who ,worked on the Oswald material confirrned both the study and the conclu- sion.) The agency also analyzed letters from American POWs in Nor th Vietnam to see if their handwriting showed the effects of torture. It did, and sonic of the prisoners were judged to be hallucinat- ing. The CIA takes handwriting analy- sis quite seriously. According to Keeh- net, the agency's sophisticated methods can s ork wonders with a simple hand- writing sample, to the point, of detecting certain diseases before they are subject to medical diagnosis. Every New Year's Day, all the CIA agents in the Soviet Union forwaid their New Year's cards from Russian friends to CIA. headquar- ters so that the handwriting can be analyied and filed tovay. The :Taney even spent a half mil- lion doll,irs to build a machine to graph handwriting by computer. It was sup- posed to cut down analysis time from eight or time hours to four, nut the ma- chine ire% en functioned properly. A suit mc believer in handwi it ing analysis. Keelinci says, "If you take the test and we see your writing, there's no way we can Iv tu 01111:11.10t1t you." The CIA denies it, but Keehner says it still uses sexual ruses to entrap Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA3jDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000012 collaborators. In 1969 Keehncr. went to New York to give the "aptitude test" to an Americaii nurse who had volunteered for unofficial ninht duty. "We wanted' her to sleep with this Russian," he. ex- plained. "Either the Russian 'would fall in, love with her and clefecL or we'd blackmail him. .1 had to see if she could sleep with hirn over a period of time and. not get involved emotionally. Boy, was. she toug.h." . Keehner .became disgusted with entrapment tearriques. however, espe- cially. after watchipe a film of an agent in bed with a "recruitment target." CIA 'ease officer's. many of Whom K eehner says "got their jollies" from such assign- ments. made the film ?ith a ldden cam- era. Keehner was not only repulsed by the practice but also found it. quite inef- fective. "You don't really recruit agents with sexual blackmail," he says. "That's why I couldn't even take reading the files after a while. I was sickened at seeiiig people take pleasure in other people's inadequacies. First of all, I thought it was just dumb. For all the money going out, nothing ever came back. We don't recruit that many people. Most of our agents are walk-ins, people who are easy ? to buy anyway.", - ? Psychologist Ann .Herndon, a for- mer CIA colleague who quit to go into private practice, corroborated Keeh- ner's view of the CIA's ineffectiveness in using blackmail as a recruiting tech- nique. "I never once saw anyone recruit- ed in the work! did," she said: "I saw 70 to 80 cases a month. We haven't yet re- cruited our first Mainland Chinese, and there are at least 14)0 people working full- time on it." "It's pretty much of a game," Keehner Said. "People took pleasure in the gamesmanship. Everybody was looking for a promotion." . Every morning at 8:30, when Jim Keehner reported for work, he passed the inscription in the marble wall of the CIA's main lobby: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make ye free" (John 7:32). Eventually, the words began to grate on his nerves. He saw it as a symbol of the hypocrisy he felt sur- rounded by. Also, he became more and more disturbed by the moral implications of his daily work, which was. centered around the PAS testing system, Keehner occasionally wondered what would hap- pen if the government decided to test ev- eryone and run their genetic ,formulas next to their social security numbers on a. giant computer. "There are horrible pos- sibilities,'' he.said. "It's social engineer- ing and we don't know yet if people can beat the test." His disaffection with the agency first began over the issue of the Vietnam War. His office was divided over the war, with the younger psychologists op- posing and the older ones endorsing American policy to keep communism from spreading, another inch. Keehner also disapproved of the military cast that Came over the agency durinAits Vietnam operations. "The agency was always swarming with colonels from the Penta- gon," he says, "I couldn't stand the waste of money being poured into Viet- nam. "My job was becoming more dis- gusting to me every day. But was over- whelmed by the CIA. The first year is confusion. The second is bewilderment. The third it just kind of dawns on you what's happening." Keehner, ever a staunch Catholic, poured out his doubts twice a month in the confessional to no avail. "Masturbation was a mortal sin," he says. "But when! talked about sexual blackmail and manipulating people, the priest said it was a grey area." It took a while for Keehner to re- bel. But he found solace in attending sensitivity training sessions generously financed by the CIA. Touchie-feelie techniques were some of the many meth- ods the agency explored for possible use in psychological assessments. They were still alive after the CIA had abandoned hypnosis, LSD, truth serums and palm- reading. (ESP, says Keehner, is "still up in the air.") Both of Keehner's bosses attended early sensitivity training groups and found them interesting. They ap- proved of his request to train as a sensi- tivity group leader, under cover of course. Keehner . soon found himself an enthusiastic devotee a group grope. He thought sensitivity sessions not only per- sonally satisfying but also a possible means of reforming the agency. On Mondays he went to Gestalt. On Tues- days he saw his psychiatrist. On Wednesdays and Fridays he did yoga. On Thursdays he rested. "I was really coming into touch with my feelings for the first time. I started strongly vocaliz- ing my objections to the war atthe office. I stopped wearing a tie to work and that was against regulations." Rebeling was an entirely new con- cept to Keehner. He had managed to grow up and go through 14 years of Cath- olic education without once disobeying his parents or his teachers. No doubt those qualities made him an ideal candi- date for the CIA, but the agency obvi- ously forgot to assess the effects of con- temporary self-help therapy. In 1971 Keehner was assigned a 'tour of duty 'in Southeast Asia. He re- fused to go. One boss told him to "go over anyway and sabotage it from the field." Keehner still said no. He never got another promotion. Outside the office, however, Keehner was still cautious., He saw his psychiatrist once a week for an entire year undercover because he felt an- nouncing where he worked would breach CIA security. Instead, Keehner painted such a rosy picture of his job at Psycho- logical Assessments that his psychiatrist asked if PAA had any job openings. "1 thought I could just talk about my per- sonal problems and set my work aside," Keehner said. "But the more I got into ? sinking ship." A year later, after Keehner devel- oped a severe eye infection, the CIA's powerful Medical Division put him on "medical hold," restricting his duties. He was relieved that he no longer had to go abroad for assessments, though he was still expected to work On files in the office. He asked instead if he could train incoming CIA recruits, and his request was granted. In his new training position, Keehner enjoyed creative freedom. One day in class it gave him great satisfaction to play the record Hair and send the re- frain blasting through camp: "Right here in niggertown we've got a dirty little war." Then he had the recruits march around the room to feel the music and to have a little human interaction. The old- er instructors were amazed. His classes were always monitored after that. Next, . he requisitioned 40 lemons from Sup- ply?the first and last such request?and had the recruits get to know their lem- ons. Keehner was not asked back to CIA training camp. "Ninety-five percent of the people who took my course gave it an excellent in their evaluations," Keehner says. "I hoped the course would make them face the reality of what they were doing and make them think about the theory that `every man has his price.' Later some of them said it helped them to get closer to people so they could recruit agents bet- ter." Undaunted, he next came up with the idea of running week-long sensitivity groups for CIA employees as part of their -in-agency training. The CIA gave its approval, but only after Keehner had ? had a little chat with William Colby, who was then director of Clandestine Ser- vices. "Don't let the press know we're running these groups." Colby warned. "Time or Newsweek will get a hold of this and make it sound like we're doing something crazy." ' Tension is such ail occupational hazard at the CIA that the agency is un- usually tolerant of activities designed to relieve its employees' anxiety. But it in- sists that these activities take place "in house" for reasons of security and con- trol. Keehner's new project became an officially authorized outlet for the pent- up emotions of. the case officers. Ulti- mately, Recliner's prolonged exposure to sensitivity training caused him to slip his own psychic moorings. But he was happy with his new wink at the onset be- cause he felt he was helping people again. Everyone who came Keehner's "Human Interaction Lai)" had to take the PAS test first', and also have his handwriting analyzed. kechner didn't want anyone who seemed unstable to go through such an .intense experience. Be- sides, it wouldn't do to have too many Fs and not enough Its in a group. "When I had all 1:s? once I thought I'd go crazy," Keehner says. "Everyone was so sensi- pproved For Rel8alvSr20614018/0W1! bAilltiFirti001122R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 tive to everyone else's feelings that n body would talk for days. "There are some very warm pe pie in the CIA, but they block off the feelings. Most of them are Its and the compartmentalize their own work their minds. They can do horrible thimu .all day and then go home and forg about it. It was amazing to see how we they functioned considering the amou of tension their tests displayed e Group participants ranged in age from 20 to 60. They were mostly middle- level employees. "The big officers wouldn't come because they heard sto- ries of how people broke down and cried," said Keehner, "They'd encour- age the younger employees to come, though," Keehner wanted his charges to let it all hang out. They crawled around the floor making animal sounds. They went on "trust walks": One person with his eyes open had to lead another person with his eyes closed through the woods. They stood in the middle of the room and waved in the breeze pretending they were flowers. "I played music," Keeh- ner said, "and told them to go to their fa- vorite place in the room and imagine they were corning tip out of the earth. They moved like corn blowing in the wind. ? o- Meanwhile, Keehner continued to . experiment, on his own with new kinds of encounter groups. His experience with ir Primal Scream therapy, however, y ? proved to be a nightmare and precipitat- *ed his eventual downfall with the CIA. Primal Scream requires its partici- et pants to stay nude in a swimming pool II for six hours. Keehner began feeling mi- nt easy when someone put the "Agnus Dei" on the pool loudspeakers. After all, the music came right from the Mass, and it occurred to Keehner that Mass was probably where he should be at this hour, not naked in a swimming pool with a bunch of people in varying stages of freaking out. At first he tried to concentrate on helping others, holding back on his own feelings?a mistake. Finally, a leader started pressing on his neck.and Keehner started screaming. "Then he started pushing on my genitals," Keehner ex- plained. "Well, boy, I let out a scream. don't know if it was a Primal Scream or not. That's what they called it." Within 24 hours of his Primal Scream, Keehner was so anxiety-ridden he had to take three kinds of tranqui4z.- ers. He was unable to work. Then lie had a case of appendicitis and stayed home for six weeks. When he got back to work he refused to do any more assessments. Keehner went to see John Gittinger. "Why did you ever recruit me?" he asked: Keehner realized he was "out of pattern," a poor boy from Kentucky . compared to- most of the Ivy League types in the agency. ''1 don't know," Giitiu'er replied. Keehner continued his human in- teraction labs, but not assessments. One day it was leaked to him he had been put on the "useless person" list. He was fo- rious_ Why hadn't he been told in advance? he wanted to know. He planned a confrontation. Keehner waited until he was at a staff lunch with all the other psycholo- gists. including the head of the entit e Technical Services Division. He began "I remember this one lawyer who had been passed over for promotion. All of a sudden he started to cry and cry. lie said he felt isolated from all the other flowers in the room. His one fantasy was that he was a daisy and that he was going to die all alone. A couple of days later he brought me a colorful poster. It said, 'Thank God someone is crazy enough) to . care for a daisy.' " While leading groups, Keehner avoided assessments as much as possi- ble. But one day Kechoer's boss called him into his office. "Ile said I wasn't giv- ing the case officers in the field enough support, not getting in and telling them how to manipulate and destroy. I said, `No, it makes me sick to my stomach.' He said, 'It bothers all of us but we don't articulate it.' " WASHINGTON POST 1 6 JUN 197Z T (MV S i1)ti.D1,Letiqitt an IN,??ar-RDeci by CIA The Central Intelligence Anelley has appointed a new spokesneve .1ndre,), Falk- iewire, who will. hied the ti- tle of assistant to tia? irec- or, Po kievvi :111. gus ThlitvilThr vi lin is es? oei nal I o aze.ieried iii CI 1%; (I,.';:)Ed.V [or oocral POST, New York 20 May 1976 to attack from a lotus position, shoeless in the middle of the .floor. "I want to talk about the dirty SOBs who work in this place," he said. "I want to tell each and every one of you what I think of you." "You could ? have heard a ? pin . drop," says Ann I lerndon. "The tension was so thick: No conflict ever comes out in the open theme. Everything is kept un- dercover. Everyone was hotrified. Jim began to make waves. That was the last thing they wanted. Everyone was sup- posed to be like everyone else." Keehner officially left the CIA about a month later. "The CIA never fires anyone," he says. "They're afraid of vindictiveness." The agency gave him a $15,0(X) contract to continue running his sensitivit y groups for a year. Ile was also promised it second year's contract in writing. Then, early in the slimmer of '74, Keelmer's contract was abruptly - canceled, and he no longer had any job with the CI A_ He protested the action in a memo to William Colby, then head of the agen- cy. Three days later he was accused of a security violation, a serious offense at the CIA. The-security violation was typ- ing his memo at home. Yet Keehner had typed it at headquarters and could prove it. Nevertheless, he was told to turn in his badge immediately. The fighting was over. Keehner and the CIA were finally through. Looking back on his nightmare, Keehner says he was just an ordinary . small-town boy who arrived at the CIA looking for action and adventure. In- stead he found the horrific, the absurd, the monstrous and the trivial. George. Orwell kept bumping into Bob and Carol and 'fed and Alice. The resulting trauma has been tough to shake_ ? Finished telling his story, Jim Keehner stood up and went over to the Window. "See that guy over there across the street." he whispered. "He could be part of an ABC surveillance pattern: On the other hand. he looks just like my Gestalt leader.' 0 The Arms Piague . With plans going forward to inocu- Pentagon demand for a doubled U. S. late millions against a deadly strain of defense budget. As Sen. Proxmire (D- M, it is a pity no comparable means are Wis.) points out in interpreting the at hand for immunizing national leaders CIA data: "The Russians are spend- against a deadlier disorder: the arms?ing'fribfe rubles than we thought be- cause they are more inefficient and wasteful than we thought." CIA Director Bush puts in this way: ". . . the analysis does not indicate that the Soviets have any more weapons or manpower than previously estimated but that the cost of these defense pea- grams is greater than we originally had estimated." If the Russians are wasting money -on militaryjnaduess, are we obliged to iinifate 'them? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA440P77-00432R000100400001-2 plague. Instead, the disorder seems to be more contagious than ever. The Central Intelligence Agency has identified what seems to be an unusually virulent outbreak in the Soviet Union. The agency reports Moscow may have been spending twice as much on armaments as initially estimated by the West; the CIA now figures that the Russians spent between 50 and S5 bil- lion rubles on defense. ,last ?That is mililitifiatidn for a fre-sil The Washington Star trii 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Wednesday, June 23, 1976 a ? By H. R. Haldeman "I just wanted to wish you and your family a Happy New Year, Bob," said Alexander Butterfield in an unexpected telephone call to our rented home in Arlington. It was Dec. 31, 1974, the eve of the verdict in the Watergate cover-up conspiracy trial. Butterfield ? who revealed the existence of the White House tapes to the Ervin Committee, thus escalating the Watergate storm ? had appeared originally as a prosecution witness at Fourth of a Series the trial in Judge John J. Sirica's courtroom. Alex later offered to be a character witness for me, a move which the prosecution twice blocked successfully through legal maneuver- in Watching Butterfield wait on the witness stand, trying to help me, only to be denied the opportunity, remind- ed me of our long relationship dating back to UCLA and the circumstances under which he ,came to work in the ? White House. ALEX ORIGINALLY approached the White House on his own initiative ? not because I recruited him. He was 'soon to become an Air Force general. I have never understood why he insisted, against my advice, on dropping his commission. Or why he suddenly wanted to be part of the Nixon team. In view of his subsequent role, these actions seem even more curi- ous today. Was Butterfield- a CIA agent? Maybe. I just don't know. In retrospect, I'm ambivalent as to whether the agency was out to get Nixon. I don't dismiss it as an impos- sibility. I do believe that there are a number of unanswered questions -about the break-in at the Watergate. The agency had the capacity and perhaps, unknown to me, the motiva- tion. Before that fateful day, June 17, 4972, seven men ? Richard Nixon, John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman, -John Dean, Jell Magruder, Charles Colson, and .?functioned together as a very productive team we were, the "White House people." ? THE ONLY connection ,any of us had with Watergate before then was that John Mitchell lived in the apart- ment complex bearing that name. But, since the spring of 1973, we were henceforth to become known in history as the "Watergate people".; The Nixon administration had begun fading from a constructive govern- ment into a defensive, embattled re- ;gime, only to capsize in the summer of 1974. Suddenly, in a federal courthouse, the three senior associates of a re- signed president of the United States ? together with two 1972 campaign c aides, Robert Mardian and Kenneth' Parkinson ? were on trial. It gave r me an eerie feeling, sometimes, to d realize during their testimony that I. t had recruited three of the confessed Watergate figures who took the wit- ness stand during that trial ? Dean, Magruder and Colson. And that, as Ehrlichman and I waited throughout the long proceedings, un-: seen but strongly felt, was the brood- ing presence of Richard Nixon. A number of myths still exist about the overall relations of the "Water- gate people," not only with each other but with the presidept himself. MITCHELL AND I, for example, had an excellent working and person- al relationship, despite the gap in our age, background and interests. We were generally in agreement on most matters, although there were some sharp differences regarding person- Ehrlichman and Mitchell, on the other hand, had limited rapport, "a ? basically different approach to the job, and very little mutual trust, fre- quently dealing at arm's length re- ? garding the policy and operation of the Justice Department. John Dean's relationship with Mitchell ? the father and son anal- ogy ? was not as close as had been publicized. But Dean was to a de- gree, a protege of Mitchell, and there was a strong, personal bond between them. Mitchell, for example, was concerned that Dean's White House role would not be large enough and was very reluctant to see him trans- ? fer from the Justice Department. . ? Mitchell and Jeb Magruder had, as far as I know, a good working rela- tionship. Jeb, who was afraid of Mitchell as he was of all senior staff, was determined to be Atty. Gen. Mitchell's boy at the "Committee to Re-elect the President." CHUCK COLSON and Mitchell ? well, there was a strong mutual distrust and dislike there. With the president, John' Mitchell enjoyed a peer relationship, absolutely unique in the Nixon White House. He had full access, was very free to disagree with the president, and argued his points strongly. Nixon used him as a top level agent in dealing with the Cabinet, Kissinger and political matters, trusting him completely. John Ehrlichman and I. had been close personal and family friends for 25 years, going back to our days at UCLA. Originally identified as a "Haldeman man," probably because I re- ruited him for the White House, ?John built his own elationship with the presi- ent with my encourage-, neat and assistance. Approved Nixon had a high regard for Ehrlichman's ability and judgment. John's as- sociation with the presi- dent, however, was often slightly strained and uncomfortable in a mutual way. Analytical and self-as- sured, Ehrlichman disa- greed with the president without fear, frequently, and in a blunt, direct man- ner. JOHN HAD SOME defi- nite reservations about Nixon personally. While re- specting the president's ability and potential, he ex- pressed concerns about Nixon's lifestyle, specifical- ly in the area of drinking. t Dean and Ehrlichman worked well together. Ehr- lichman tutored Dean in the many roles of counsel to the president, and used him as an agent on many matters. On the other hand, Magrud- er and Ehrlichman had no real relationship. ? I forced some degree of cooperative effort between Chuck Colson and Ehrlich- man, although there was a mutual distrust and dislike between them. If Ehrlich- Man had a fault, he was, like Mitchell, weak in his judgment of staff people. John Dean was the "hot- dog swinger" in the "square" Nixon White House, neither awed by the building or its chief occu- pant: He was smooth, han- dled himself well, and was enthusiastically backed by Mitchell, Richard Klein- dienst (Mitchell's deputy at the Justice Department and his successor as attorney general in March 1972), Egil Krogh (aide to John Ehrlichman named under-. secretary of transportation in December 1972), and , Ehrlichman. DEAN'S ? relationship with the' president, despite suggestions to the contrary, did not exist until Water- gate, and only then as a project officer. I recruited him, but never saw his FBI dossier which was not in- cluded in his personnel file. But that fact didn't worry me, since I assumed that Dean had been cleared at Justice. My former staff would be amused to know that, regarding Dean, I vio- lated my own cardinal rule laid down for all subordi-: For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-146P77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 nates "Don't assume." If I had seen Dean's FBI dossier it would have bar- red him from the White House. Allegations about a conflict-of-interest charge, however slight, involving his prior affiliation with a law firm would have been enough to concern me about the smoke, whether or not there was any fire. Chuck Colson was always a problem. Frankly, I didn't like him, nor did many others. His tough, abrasive manner earned him a bad reputation with all the staff, with perhaps the exception of Dean. He was a protege of Bryce Harlow (an assist- ant and later counsellor to President Nixon), who introduced him to the White House. I built Colson up, and the president, who de- ? WASHINGTON STAR 23 June 1976 11)-16GrfF/21 .veloped a great rapport with him, found Chuck use- ful. HIGHLY POLITICAL, Colson loved the game, spicing it with touches of fa- naticism. But Colson played to Nixon's darker, less ap- pealing side. He was not a seasoned staff man in the sense of weighing all sides. Chuck took his own view and pushed it all-out. If he had a key fault it was a will- ingness, even an eagerness, to carry out the president's orders indiscriminately. Jeb Magruder was an ambitious bootlicker (by his own self-description). While a good project man, he was always self-serving and weak, pragmatic and with- out any real convictions. He was.full of baloney but I found that I could squeeze it out of him. I had to run Jeb by fear and constant goad- ing. As with many of the junior men on the White House staff, I had to chan- nel and use Magruder's self-interest and keep him on a tight leash. Magruder had no real relationship with the presi- dent at all. Originally tap- .ped as my assistant, he be- came John Mitchell's man ? by his own design. DURING OUR three- month trial in Washington I had time to reflect on some of the incidents leading up to my resignation as chief of staff. One I particularly recall involved the day late in April 1973 when Henry Kissinger, visibly agitated, stormed into my corner White House office. He had just come from. a meeting Luck AlireelQ, By Vernon A. Guidry Jr. Washington Star Staff Writer - Alexander Butterfield, the man who revealed theexistence of the se- cret recording system in the Nixon White House, is again in the news with a suggestion that he might have been a CIA agent. ? The renewed suggestion of a CIA link has left Butterfield somewhat puzzled and perhaps a little worse off. While others connected with the Watergate White House have pros- pered ? or have been convicted of crimes ? Butterfield has been job hunting. "It doesn't help when your name is in the news all the time," says But- terfield, whose testimony about the secret White House recordings came. under questioning by the Senate Watergate committee. ? THE SUGGESTION conies from Haldeman, former President: Richard N. Nixon's White House chief of staff, who also raises the possibility that the CIA, for some motivation unknown. was "out to get" Nixon. Haider= offers no new ;evidence ler his suggestions, which came in the fourth part of a five-part series of newspaper articles he has !syndicated in advance of publication of the memoirs on which he is work- Butterfield, a former Air Force officer, had joined the Nixon admin- istration in its first days. He served in the White House and as federal aviation administrator from 1973 until last year. In his ilevnipapee article, Heide- mau laes this to say about Butterfield sled the CIA: "11.1z.x erigiaally approached the White House on his own initiative ? net because I recruited him. I-fe was seen te hecenne en Air Felice general. Mi.vz ovier e,r,jerstuad why he ia- riseed, ee,shist. my edvice, on drop- Li3 COM , Or wit he tied- deriiii shisiaten tit3 Approveal-ortlielelisee21j01108/081: 081 tcieraione asp at iltleSOM.- "In view quent role, seem even today. "Was Butterfield a CIA agent? Maybe. I just don't know. "In retrospect, I'm am- bivalent as to whether the agency was out to get Nixon," Haldeman writes. BUTTERFrELD has had to contend with the specter of the CIA since last sum- mer, when a ? former Air Force intelligence officer, Col. L. ? Fletcher Prouty, said he had been told that Butterfield was the CIA's contact man in the White House, a position that would not entail spying on those for Whom he worked. Butterfield has emphati- cally denied it. "I'm not anti-CIA. It just so happens that I haven't been (con- nected with the agency)," he says. And he has picked up some substantial support in that assertion. After Prouty's comments, the Senate Intelligence Com- mittee looked into the issue. Its chairman, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, later an- nounced the committee had found "no scintilla of evi- dence that would substanti- ate such a charge." Butterfield says he long ago became wary of those who staffed the Nixon White House. He says that when the Watergate prosecutor's operation wits going full tilt, he was called in by prosecutors to explain a memorandum he had writ- ten that made it appear as. if he were launching a political-public relations cernneign bawd on infor- of his subse- these actions more curious 4-) A,47 c-21r-) rifT )ei.4? ff able legality. Butterfield said he was able to demonstrate that the memorandum had been ,doctored to give that im- pression but he was shock- ed that some one in the White House had made the attempt. with Nixon about the "Haldeman problem" and the options which might still be available regarding it. Kissinger, never one of the "Watergate people," said that even the thought of resignation on my part was "incomprehensible" to him. He told me that if Nixon accepted my resigna- tion, or permitted me to leave under any circum- stances that he, Kissinger, would resign immediately.- "I won't serve in an administration which would permit such a thing to hap- pen," he emphasized. In several telephone con- versations over the years after I left the White House, Henry has expressed the same feeling of support con- cerning my departure, but he didn't resign over it: Now . ? WHEN ASKED why Haldeman might be reviv- ing the CIA business, But- terfield says, "I couldn't begin to guess," although he adds, "he may really think that." ' Butterfield takes issue with Haldeman's news- paper article on several. 'points. For one thing, But- terfield had not been select- ed for, promotion to briga- dier general, although it probably wasn't a bad het, since he had been selected for full colonel before his contemporaries, a signifi- cant mark of recognition. For another thing, But- terfield says Haldeman never advised hint against dropping his commission. As Butterfield recalls, it he was offered a job as Halde- man's immediate deputy in the White House but only if he retired from the Alta Force and signed on as a civilian. "He actually did not ad- vise me to keep- my com- mission. He said to think carefully about it and I thought carefully about it," Butterfield says. ? By December of 1972. Butterfield says, he wanted to get out of the White House and was nominated by Nixon to head the Feder- al Aviation Administration,. a post which would require him to sever his connection with the military service. HE ACCEPTED the nomination, he said, be- cause he did not want to ap- pear "money oriented" and because he did not want to wish to embarrass the president. The resignation required by the new post ended Butterfield's retire- ment and other military benefits which he had earn- ed in his 20 years in the Air Force. The Ford administration forced Butterfield's resig- nation. Later, a bill to rein- state his military retire- ment benefits was defeated in the Senate amid much controversy. Butterfield, 50, still has Civil Service re- tirement. For the time being. he is doing what he calls -free- lance consulting," but he acknowledges it is a some- what uncomfortable posi- tion for a man who spent his career in highly structured organizations. "I'd like to find a job," he says. A-RW77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001--2 - ITHE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, June 13,1976 The - C010 ?. By George Crile III Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine. N JANUARY, 1975, Sen. Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) charged that a senior official of the Drug Enforce- ment Administration had been offered and had exam- lined a consignment of exotic assassination devices. The instruments included exploding telephones, flashlights and cameras, and came complete with triggering mecha- nisms set to movement, time, pressure, light or sound. Their only conceivable use was for anonymous murder. . Cot Lucien Conein, the official Weicker named, was not in a position to directly deny the senator's assertions. For one thing, Weicker produced a memo from the now defunct B.R. Fox Co. of Alexandria that seemed to impli- cate Conein in the company's decision to produce the de- vices for his consideration. Nevertheless, Conein man- aged to convince reporters that there was nothing more to the incident than the unsolicited mischief of the B.R. Fox Co. He had gone to look at some eavesdropping de- vices that he was thinking of buying for DEA when, much to his surprise, he was shown strange weapons which he hadn't asked to see and had no intention of buying. The story made the network news, but with Conein's explanation the matter was dropped, and nothing more has been heard on the subject. Had it been any other Washington official, this ex- planation might have sufficed. But Col. Conein is no or- dinary bureaucrat. It seems incredible that there was no reaction to the discovery that the man examining the ex- ploding devices was the same Col. Lucien Conein who had been the CIA's notorious Far Eastern operative and the only figure associated with President Nixon's for- mer team to go on to become a senior official of the _Ford administration. A Legendary Career jf T WOULD have been difficult to imagine a more turbing appointment than that of Lucien Coneinto al- most any pest of responsibility in the government, much less his appointment to a highly sensitive position involv- ing the most delicate covert operations. In earlier days the French used to. offer two medical degrees: one re- quiring many years of school, internship and residency, and the other calling for an intensive 18-month p1 ogram. The short-course doctors were not permitted to practice in France but they were given full 'license to operate in the Orient. The latter is the kind of license the CIA gave Lou Conein. It all but read on his Agency contract: "For Use in the Far East Only." . Conein's history is by now laeed with legend but the following appears to be a reasonable summary of his ex- ? ploits before joining the Nixon White House in 1971: At the age t2f 17 Conein is said: to have fled his home- town in Kansas to join the French Foreign Legion. With ?the entry of the United States into World War II he 'transferred to the Office of Strategic Services in France, where he lived and 1ought441V.fraiopekkg tag& 2 ? hood, who were then part of the Resistance. Before he left, Conein says, they made him a member ? an honor to bear in mind, for the Brotherhood is an underworld ? organization deeply involved in the drug trade and con- sidered even more effective and dangerous than its Sicil- ian counterpart, the Mafia. After the liberation, Conein parachuted into Vietnam to join an OSS team fighting the Japanese alongside the Vietminh. There he met Ho Chi Minh and Gen. Vo Ngu- yen Giap. A decade later, in 1954, he was back in Viet- nam as one of Gen. Edward Lansdale's special team,,, charged with setting up a paramilitary organization in the Hanoi area. He helped Ngo Dinh Diem consolidate his power in South Vietnam the next year and in 1963 116. was the U.S. embassy's liaison with the cabal of generals who murdered Diem. Although be has been accused of engineering the as- sassination, his actual role seems to have been as the Kennedy administration's only direct conduit to the coup's plotters. He had occupied this sensitive position default. He was married to a Vietnamese and he alone among the Americans was intimate with most of the Vietnamese high command. No one else had any- thing resembling his access to and familiarity with the Vietnamese style of doing business. Even so, the CIA considered him an unstable commod- ity and sent him back to Washington. But he soon man aged to return as part of an elite 10-man counterinsur, gency team under Gen. Lansdale which also included Daniel Ellsberg, then still a war hawk. - It was Conein's past association with Ellsberg and his involvement in Diem's overthrow that brought him to :the attention of the White House in 1971. His contact was. :E. Howard Hunt, an OSS colleague in World War It 'Hunt had just begun working with Charles Colson, who was intent both on destroying Ellsberg's reputation and discrediting President Kennedy (and thus Sen. Edward Kennedy, then thought Nixon's most formidable politi- cal rival). One of Colson's hopes was to cast responsibility for Diem's assassination onto President Kennedy him. .self. ' Conein's career was then in a tailspin. He had left the , CIA in 1968 and had persuaded a group of past associates to back him in a surplus war trading venture in Viet- nam. By 1970 he had lost all of his and his investors' money and was back in Washington, drinking heavily and without much hope for the future. It was at this point that he was recruited by Howard Hunt. Conein didn't offer anything of interest to help the White House undermine Ellsberg's reputation but he ? quickly ingratiated himself with Colson by providing . NBC with an interview on the Saigon coup that tied the Kennedy administration far closer (in knowledge, at least) to that bloody event than before. With this entre, be was soon asked to give his opinion on how Bud Krogh and his crew of eager young lawyers working with the Plumbers in Room 16 might go about waging the campaign against drugs just launched by the President. Operation Diamond T IS GENERALLY assumed that the rocits of Water- .11 are to be found in the creation of the Plumbers to investigate national security leaks. But it was Nixon's desperate drive against the country's drug epidemic Which disclosed to his political operatives what secret re- sources were available for their use and how to tap them: To the new President, the country in 1969 seemed to be dissolving irretrievably into disorder. Drugs may only have been a symptom of a deeper ailment, but seen from the White House they were the critical problem from which so many other troubles flowed. Nixon was so adamant about cutting off the poison that in 1971 be declared drugs the country's number one Problem and appointed Egil Krogh as his personal aide to direct a federal war against nars.ntici diterolf -rom 001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000 15 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 the White House. By the time Conein appeared, Krogh and his young aides were desperate to tome up with results for their demanding chief. They had concluded that conventional approaches to drug enforcement were useless to deal with thi.: realities uf the, international narcotics trade. The problems were everywhere ? not the least being that foreign governments, or at least 'high foreign offi- cials, were themselves so often part of the trafficking. Krogh"s staff was equally frustrated by the reluctance of the FLI and particularly the'CIA to join it. J. Edgar Hoover had known that dru2S would be a corrupting in- flunacc on his agents and i.cpt out of it. The CIA was ev- ery bit as reluctant. From Thailand to Turkey to the Car- ibbean, those same people smuggling drugs were also usclul sources of information on the flow of weapons, revolution and international intrigue. The federal drug foet esl.; th it these trio-fa:kers be put out of business; the CIA wanted to maintain flexibility to gather intellig- ence. Conchs, then, was just the man Krogh and his aides were looking for: a man of the world ? albeit a very spe- cial world ? who understood the other side and knew how to fight it. It is uncertain precisely what part Conein played in the ensuing White House programs; it can only be pointed out that some of them :were so sensitive that they required the approval of HenrY Kissinger's 40 Com- mittee; others appear to have stretched so far over the boundaries of legality that they were undertaken in to- tal secrecy. One of these was Operation Diamond, the elaborate clandestine organization that Bernard Barker was or- ganizing in Miami for Howard Hunt. Barker recruited al- most 200 former CIA Cuban agents and organized them into specialized units for future operations. They in- eluded intelligence and counterintelligence groups and a street-fighting arm, Cubans who had brawled for the Agency at Communist and anti-Communist rallies across Latin America. And there was a particularly sensitive sector known as the Action Teams ? an old CIA term for units with paramilitary skills including demolition and assassination. Barker says that Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy talked about a number of other operations being organized at that time for similar purposes ? Ruby, Opal, Crystal, Sapphire. Much later he was told that they were part of a larger, White House-coordinated program called Gem- stone. Much of what Liddy would ultimately propose to John Mitchell in his famous $1 mi1i plan of political subversion was taken from the Diamond plan that Bar- ker drafted. Hunt assured Barker that the action squads would ultimately be turned against Fidel Castro; in the meantime, they would be used in the presidential cam- paign and then es special soldiers in the international drug war. Watergate, one might think, should have called a halt to such extraleE:al plans for narcotics enforcement; in- stead it seems that the President merely put a bureau- cratic face on a guerrilla war. Immediately after the ' Join Etirlieliman and Krogh arranged for Co- nein to be transferred out of the White House to a con- suiting job with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Then, a year later, on July I, 1973, Nixon consoli- dated all of the previously quarrelling bureaucracies , dealing with narcotics into the Drug Engorcement Ad- ministration; and in November, attracting little atten- tion in a city ob:;essed with talk of impeachment, Lucien Conein was appointed head of DEA's newly formed Spe- cial Operati-3ns Branch: his job, to create worldwide in- tellivrice T,'2t.V.C1!?13 ? both insido and outside the to Vfentify and ultimately to put a stop t3 the work of the major dreg traffickers. 4 '4'4r-', ORE if.X':1'; CIA or'cleird's bewilderment has ili.ti 1:e that LucieuCuiea . r,i,?-?.,n a rat.,,c,..i.ory po:w ion over nar- r:.t4.",4?5: "Got.: :1!1," 1. Da Silva, who cc ApprovedFor Release 20 neirt's boss as Saigon station chief after the Diem assassi- nation. "You've got to. start with the premise that Lou Conein is crazy. He worked for me in Vietnam. if work is ? the word. He was certifiable at that point, I think." But he was useful: "The Agency does not deal with vicars of ? the church exIniively. We have all kinds of villains and rogues involved as well as heroes. You've got Lou Co-; neins and a -whole lot of other people who serve their purpose. And. within reason, if you keep them under control, people like him can do things other people can- not do. And that's how they survive ..." On a slow day, Conein is often found at Tony's 'or the , Class Reunion bar and restaurant, a few blocks from DEA's offices, drinking beer and telling stories with a bunch of old OSS, CIA and DEA friends. Conein talks only occasionally but dominates these gatherings. He sits all but motionless save for his compulsive smoking and quaffing from a beer battle that looks quite small in his thick paw. He has the look of a graying grizzly bear, but a better image might be that of a gnarled tree that has been struck more than once by lightning and has sur- vived. You're sure there would be scars all over, his body, if you were to want to look. Two fingers are miss- ing, lost no doubt in some far-off land; the others seem ?L1C1'so.endisn does rot mind questions from reporters. On this occasion, he growls menacingly that he has been on to his visitor's inquiries about him. He then gives his stock prefatory tern:ark: "111 tell you anything you want to hear but it's nrabehly not the truth." Even with th.fa unusual qualification, whatever the chief of DEA's Special Operations Branch says- on the subject of drugs is necessarily of interest, particularly when he starts off with the flat declaration that he would never dream oi mounting operations against one of the chief sources of narcotics traffic ? the Corsicans. "You can get killed that way," he explains. "I will not talk about the Ceasicans, period. I happen to be a mem- ? tier of the Corsican Brotherhood." ' "Let me tell yen something," he goes on in a voice that. ? makes you strain to listen. "When the Sicilians put out a contract, it's usually 'united to the continental United States or maybe CAnada or Mexico, but with the Corsi- cans it's internatanal. They'll go anywhere. There's an old Corsican proverb: 'If you want revenge and you act within 20 years, you're acting in haste.' It wouldn't just be me. They'd lethe it out on my children and maybe even some grandetiildren. This is the code." Amazingly be ei:ids that he would also be wary of run- ning operations against the CIA's old Cuban agents in Miami, a number of whom have gone into the drug trade. He compares them with the Corsicans, whose effectiveness he Mributes to their training and experi- ence with the Freach intelligence services: "The Cubans have received 2.31 thc? 1.-lidecraft from the Agency. If they could get iao Cuba to rrise hell, they can sure as bell get into the t_7.5. with drugs." The problem in trying to move against such adver- saries, he explains, is that "we have no cover as far as breaking laws ari7. after this damn Church Committee we'll have even 77..5.s. You can't do it because 12 or 13 years later mayb you'll have to stand up there with your balls exposes." Drinking beer 1::ith Lou Conein, one is given the im- pression of a man who knows too much about the ways. of the world to bother with trying to stop the unstoppa- ble. Readily he rgrees with a suggestion that there is simply too much .7-oney to be made in the drug trade for governments to I::: able .to curtail it. A pretty teenage girl in a short rel skirt f.:,);ite.-, ia asking for directions and COLt2in phitasophical tone. lie talks of ]iv big uu can. "I figure I've got 4,000 morc hroads to . :??avE is he orders a.:other anci. vJ.1*-L .-;;;:nt to usadrugs anyway c: a .;,at to be drunk? It hd.11101ill. to 'ira chai.!nrcl. by this legendary rogue am;c ;t. 1,.ocw!)11;ytily002(i, by misiend. ':?????! dt.%,1-; lel), irAtf ;\:tiu e 01/08/08 : CIA-kbP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 ? tions about his activities at DEA are deadly serious. Recruits From CIA. THE CREATION of Conein's Special Operations Branch stemmed from the Nixon administration's Insistence ths t DEA move away from its "buy and bust" approach, which yielded only small-time traffickers, and create a CIA-styled intelligence capability to identify and then eliminate the major suppliers: There would be a new intelligence service parallel to the traditional En- forcement Division. The man assigned to run the new di- vision, George Belk, was along-time Federal Bureau of - Narcotics veteran whose tote,,,11 dree enforcement opera- tion in Detroit had caused his office to inherit the De- troit Mafia's old nickname, the "Purple Gang." Belk was enthusiastic to a fault, but he had no experience in intel- ligence and thus relied heavily on Conein for guidance in creating what he hoped would becerne an intelligence empire. The initial problem was that none of the personnel available were trained to organize and run professional Intelligence operations. A number of retired or active CIA men had been recruited in 1972 and 1973 ? the fig- ure may now run as high as 100. But none of these origi- nal recruits were operatives; they were analysts or func- tionaries. What Belk and Conein wanted were men capa- ? ble of establishing intelligence nets to cover entire re- gions of the world and they asked the CIA if it could spare any of its operatives. Conein wanted about 50 but. settled for 12. The Agency was more than happy to provide DEA .with some of its men, for it very much wanted to get out of the narcotics work forced on it by the White liaise. The CIA was then being drastically cut back and when word was spread of the opportunities for advancement with the new drug agency a number of operatives were Interested. The first recruits were told they would be sent overseas with the approximate responsibility of a . station chief. Of the 12 accepted none had known -Co- nein. They all transferred expecting a quick rise to the.: top of a new and growing service; all soon bitterly re- gretted the move. Their problems began immediately as most DEA offi-i cials resented and suspected the 12 new men before they , had even arrived. Two years before, the chief of 13NDD had been so distressed by his agency's corruption that, 'he had the CIA detail him 19 agents to ferret it out. Their subsequent success alienated them from many at DEA and even managed to cast suspicion over the other CIA veterans who joined the new drug agency. All kinds of problems flowed from the arrival of Co- nein's recruits in early 1974. The main difficulty stemmed from the bitter attempts of the enforcement division to sabotage the growth of the new intelligence branch. Enforcement even tried to get the operatives as- signed to its division. Conein finally directed his men not to come to the DEA office until the matter was straight- ened out. He had them go instead to a "safe house" he had acquired for DEA through an old OSS and CIA friend. A safe house is the CIA's name for a place where agents can go in secret: this one was a two-story apart- ment in the La Salle building at 1028 Connecticut Ave_ NW, half a block from the Mayflower Hotel. Conein told: his men that the apartment had formerly been operated by the CIA. Actually ? as we shall see later ? its ident- ity Is more mysterious than that. It was reportedly in this apartment that Conein and his deputy; Sear! iBuch Frank, examined the B. R. Fox as- sassination devices. Reporters accepted Conein's assur- ances that he had not expected to be shown the equip- ment. But according to two senior DEA officials, Conein knew precisely what B. R. Fox's representatives planned to show him that day.eMore important, they claim that he had already developed plans to emilloY them, "When you get down to it," explained one of the offi- cials. "Copein wa organizing an assassination He was frustrated by the big-time operators 'who were just too insulated to get to . . . He felt we couldn't win, the way things were going." According to these officials, meetings were held to de- cide whom to target and what method of assassination to employ. Conein then assigned the task to three of the former CIA operatives detailed to the Connecticut Ave- nue safe house. The men he chose were former paramilitary case offi- cers with the Agency's Special Operations Division who had run commando raids into North Vietnam. The DEA officials described them as first-generation Americans, "very young and patriotic and a little naive. They were troubled by the assignment but they trusted Conein be- cause he had been with the CIA. They counted on him not to put them in a compromising situation." The program was to begin in Mexico. Conein report- edly had his men prepare operational plans to deter- mine the feasibility of killing a number of Mexican traf- fickers with sophisticated exploding devices. For several months in 1974 the three, working directly under Co- nein, traveled back and forth to Mexico. After preparing their initial plans he had them identify a number of Mexicans to be recruited to carry out the actual mur- ders. According to these accounts, at least one Mexican was recruited as an assassination agent. The man had grown up in a border town with a number of major traffickers and had become a DEA informant after being arrested on a drug charge. In exchange for murdering his old friends, the DEA agreed to help him become a legal resi- dent of the.United States. The alleged plan was apparently ready to begin by the beginning of 1975 when Sen. Weicker made his public charge. One of the operatives had already questioned Conein on the legality of his assignment. Now, all three reportedly rebelled and told Conein they would not par- ticipate any further. "Those three have since been dispatched to the four winds, to jobs far from Washington," said one of the. DEA officials. "They are bitter about how they were used and very afraid of repercussions." Conein, in a burst of four-letter words, denied any in- volvement in such a program. "That is a big lie. That is bull "He said he knew who the sources were and that they were the ones who should be investigated, but he refused to identify them or to offer any reason why they should not be believed. "Go ahead and print it," he said twice. "I don't care." One reason he offered to rebut the story was that he never had anything to do with any programs in Mexico. Conein's supervisor, George Belk, now retired, offered a different version of Conein's activities. lie said that Co- nein and several of his agents from the Connecticut Ave- nue safe house had been working on a program involv- ing Mexico in 1974. But he said he did not know of any plan for DEA to assassinate anyone. "We were trying to determine ways and means by which they [the major drug traffickers] could be immobilized by the Mexican government. ...The idea was to identify the Mexicans who were known to be operating... to collect intelligence to be passed on to the attorney general's office for ac- tion by their government." He stressed that there was no extralegal activity taking place. When asked once again about the reported assassina- tion program, Belk replied: "That may have been some- body's concept but nothing ever came of it. As a matter of fact, nothing ever happened." Ver Bell and Yesco PPARENTLY CONEIN'S program did not result in 1. any deaths but its implications become even more provocative when ht relationship to the manufacturer of the exploding devices is considered. News act 0111115 describe the B. R. Fox Cu. as a short-lived firm run out et an Alexandria home by an electronics engineer and a housewife. There was no explanation as to why Conein had chosen to buy sophisticated wiretapping equipment from ettcb en obscure firm. The explanation, is to be found in the identity of the 17 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 actual figure behind the B. R. Fox Co. and its arrange- ments with Conein ? Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell M. Wer Bell is one of the world's most successful inventors and manufacturers of silencers and such exotic lethal weapons as a cigar that fires a single bullet and a swag- ger stick that doubles as a rocket launcher. But, most im- portant in this context, he is one of Conein's old OSS, friends and, according to staff members on the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, a business partner of Conein's at least as recently as 1974. In an interview, Wer Bell disarmingly acknowledged a recent business relationship with Conein. Further, he 'proudly asserted that he had worked with Conein to provide DEA with assassination devices and that the,B. R. Fox Co. had even shared the same duplex apartment used by the DEA operatives as a safe house. (This fact is confirmed by the La Salle building's records.) Conein's apparent use of Wer Bell for DEA operations seems all but incredible when the arms manufacturer's other activities in 1974 are taken into account. That spring, while Conein was readying his assassination pro- gram, Wer Bell was negotiating a bizarre arms deal with Robert Vesco, the fugitive swindler in Costa Rica, Wer Bell originally agreed to sell Vest() his entire stock of 2,- 000 silenced machine guns. But he was unable to get an export license and so the two reached a tentative agree- ment to build an Ingram submachine gun factory in Costa Rica. (The Ingrain is the same weapon featured in the opening scenes or "Three Days of the Condor.") These dealings were sufficiently ,menacing to draw the interest of Sen. Henry Jackson's Permanent Investi- gations Subcommittee. Jackson observed that Wer Bell's Ingrams are not the "normal military defense weapons. This is the kind of weapon ... used for covert purposes . shall we say, mini-revolutions or coups or what have you." Along with Wer Bell's arms deal, the Jackson subcom- mittee also investigated Vesco's "penetration'? of the federal bureaucracy, and particularly the Drug Enforce- ment Administration. Here it found that the DEA had all but killed a promising investigation into charges by a government informer that Vesco was trafficking in her- oin, and that it had then "lost" most of Vesco's file. Even more suspicious was the discovery that two of the nar- cotics agency's wiretap...specialists had flown from Los Angeles to New Jersey to sweep Vesco's home and office for possible bugs. The further the committee probed the entangling re- lations of Vesco, Wer Bell, Conein and the DEA, the WASHINGTON POST Suadny, Jane 13, 1976 rim p ,(,)JL jJ ; .43 ;:j "ir,-)r 'Ar vs? ?T-vg ) I / LI 1q774 777, v , Ti ? 7--.-In 1---r )t_, , ,, , ," ,...? , ,, bi ,..c.,;,....,? IL 1.3CEN CONFINE reported cf. "nal fort to eatablish an assaasination program at the Drug Enforcement Administration was apparently frus- trated before it could be tried out. But this program was perhaps only the most direct tactic designed for use in the drug war and the tempo- rary se:Zit:tek did not deter him from pursuing other: equally uncooven- tionel untie:oat:toga. One of the first end inegent at' tecee was the anonia- bun seriee of secret operations in South Florida' cod(anonied Deacon 1. DZV.,207?'i rc051v: 10 ladtA'ea teettetet teen aee teaitt ntoaa teet. 7.7-00 "p ...2-?? 'I 1! Li/(n 7? more questions were raised. For one thing, Wer Bell was indicted in 1974, charged with conspiracy to smuggle large quantities of marijuana into the country, in a case yet to come to trial. The staff wanted to know the pre- cise nature of his relationship with Conein. They had already subpoenaed Conein, Belk and others to testify when suddenly the hearings were cancelled. If the staff members know why, they don't explain; but they also don't conceal their frustration. The decision ' was not theirs. A Pandora's Box 911 HE RECENT congressional investigations into U.S. .11 intelligence activities did not examine narcotics op- erations, and the President's new guidelines for all other intelligence agencies do not even address themselves to ? DEA operations. DEA is left more or less alone through its Inspection Division to regulate itself. It is hard to ex- pect too much from this check: the man scheduled to he appointed to the number two spot in Inspection, Bud Frank, is Conein's former deputy. He was on hand that day two years ago to review the exploding devices. A few months ago, the Justice Department, of which' DEA is a branch, conducted an investigation into some . of Conein's other operations (see box on opposite page). ? Two attorneys were assigned the task. After reading the report of their findings, the assistant attorney general concerned instructed them to tone down their conclu- sions. The attenuated final version was then attached to :a genekal report on the intelligence division and strictly limited to three copies; one each for the attorney gener- al, the assistant attorney general, and for Peter Bensin- ger, DEA's new administrator. ' It is understandable that no administration would wish to take on Col. Conein. It is said that his closet is filled with skeletons from his days with the CIA, and that he has a lethal knowledge of where a great number of other bodies are buried. But this alone does not explain the silence of the Ford Justice Department. It is unlikely that any investigation of Conein could htdp but result in a larger exploration of other past and present narcotics efforts and it would inevitably have to enter into the tangled world of Wer Bell and Vesco. Moro than likely no one in the Ford administration even knew of Conein's presence at DEA ? or knew any- thing about his activities ? until recently. By now it probably knows mere than it would prefer apparently enough to avoid opening this potential Pandora's box in the midst of an election year. ficcrti in Southern Florida ? par- ticularly in cocaine ? were Cuban exiles. This was a new challenge, for many of these opponents had been professionally trained in exfiltration and infiltration during the CIA's five-yeer secret tvar against Cuba in the early laaaan The DEA found it- self helpleas against such experi- enced professionals. What really derma; the drug agency was the diacovery that some of these former CIA men were putting their old cat; eatellagence training to work. egaieen. taeto "We found that if we i'!".7,;;.3?.0.t.,,,, someone, someena wee fOr,..v.,tri.F4 tee" et:alai-lied a PEA oficirJ inYlaiMi. "The Cubans were actually counter-surveilling us. They were just beating the pants off us." The obeteue solution to the prob- lean was DEA '10 hire its own Cu- ben eeiteee hence :'aleacon 1, staffed exclusively by formct. CIA men. Dea- con I was to te a prototype of the hind of CIA-Fer East operation that Conein planned to initiate through- out the world. Three full-time DEA officials ? all with CIA backgrounds ? were assiened to direct a net of about 20 highly experienced Cubans. From the beginning, the program was kept secret, even from most of the officials in Conein's division. He ran it personelly out of his office in Wasbiegton, possing orders through Cule?n netcrart of the CIA who el:mince tele; ana ;tea!, to Miami. The drug world that ilatcotics offi- eirde caleed u ewe io control deals 'Set . :nee: c honey and is char- 1C.CL: of scruples Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIAARDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 about corrupting or killing 'anyone who gets in the way of the traffick- ers. It is no wonder that government narcotics officials so often turn for assistance to figures as loathsome as the trade itself. An argument can be made that no other kind of person can safely or effectively operate in such an envi- ronment. But just as a man is af- fected by the company he keeps, so too are drug officials and their pro- grams twisted by the informants they employ. The story of Carlos Hernandez Rumbaut, one of Deacon' l's informants, shows how far just one such alliance can go. IKE MOST of the Cubans in Dea- con 1, Carlos Hernandez had been at the Bay of Pigs. Apparently he first came to the attention of the old Bureau of Narcotics and Danger- ous Drugs (BNDD) when he was ar- rested in Mobile in 1969 with 467 pounds of marijuana which he said be was going to sell in Miami. His. trial, scheduled for April, 1971, was postponed when the judge deter- ? mined that his mental state was dis- turbed. ? With this curriculum vitae the BNDD regional office at Miami saw fit the following month to enlist him as a "Class 1 cooperating individual." He provided some useful informa- tion; in return, the bureau not only paid him $150 but attempted to in- tercede on his behalf with the Ala- bama authorities. Unmoved, they jailed him pending a new trial. BNDD was thus forced to put Her- nandez on an "inactive cooperating individual status." . He was then convicted and sent- enced to 15 years. Not even . this cooled the Miami office's ardor for Hernandez. He appealed but didn't have enough money to post his $25,- 000 bond. Deacon l's chief agent and Coneln's right-hand man on the pro- ject solved the problem by arrang- ing for one of Deacon l's informants, a CIA veteran and a successful Cu- ban jeweler in Miami, to lend Her- nandez $12,500. Ile assured the jew- eler that DEA was in effect gua- ranteeing the loam As soon as Her- nandez was released from jail, the Miami office put him back on active status. At this point Hernandez had had enough of U.S. justice and fled to Costa Rica, where the government accorded his drug experience a very different recognition. Within weeks he was made an honorary member of the Costa Rican Narcotics Divi- sion, then promoted to captain and second in command by order of then President Jose Figueres. Soon after, he becanae Figueres' bodyguard. All of this information comes from' Hernandez' confidential DEA file, which includes CIA reports on Her- nandez' conduct as a Costa Rican narcotics officer. One of these iden- tifies him and a relative of President Figueres as members of a death squad that executed at least one nar- cotics trafficker in early 1973 and .had sworn to kill more (a solution to the drug problem eerily reminiscent of the reported assassination pro- gram proposed by Conein for Mexi- co). Hernandez' assassination effort as well as his other shady activities prompted U.S. Ambassador Viron P. Vaky to insist in May, 1973, that DEA. discontinue its relationship with its informant. But Hernandez was now, for all practical purposes, the Costa Rican narcotics division and the ;DEA, loath to give up so strategically placed an asset, disregarded the am- , bassador's directive. In October, 1973, the Alabama courts denied Hernandez' appeal. fi ERNANDEZ HAD no intention Ii of returning to the United States to go to jail. Even so, the mat- ter might simply have faded away were it not for the understandable anger of the Deacon 1 informant who had guaranteed half of Hernan- dez' bail. The jeweler, unwilling to forfeit his $12,500, demanded that Hernandez make good his loss, and threatened to track him to Costa Rica if he didn't. Hernandez, meanwhile, was still working with DEA, now in conjunc- tion with its regional office in Mex- ico City. He told the drug agency that the American government was "treacherous" and he threatened to "eliminate" anyone who attempted to come after him. The embassy in Costa Rica became underStandably nervous and asked DEA to resolve THE WASHINGTON" POST/PAIth Dli 20 June 1976 CM Popularity ? A. few years ago, when young Americans were dying in Vietnam, CIA recruiters were' banned, from many major university campuses. Today they are more than wel- come, will probably hire this year. some 700 clerical employees and 400 professionals. the dispute quietly. A special agent ?was dispatched to San Jose to soothe _Hernandez. In a conciliatory mood, Hernandez at least agreed not to ? harm any American narcotics offi- cial. The DEA's machinations to pro- ? tect Hernandez were now forced to widen. DEA's New Orleans regional ? director was sent to persuade the at- torney general of Alabama and the district attorney in Mobile to waive the appeal bond forfeiture. But the. director's efforts angered the local prosecutor, Randy Butler, who not only refused to cooperate but made Hernandez an issue in his campaign, and threatened to tell the world if DEA made any further attempt to. keep him out of jail. And so in late 1973 Carlos Hernan- dez ? Bay of Pigs veteran, convicted drug smuggler, DEA informant, Costa Rican narcotics ace, private executioner and presidential body- guard ? was preparing to become an international incident, ready to go off right in the middle of the post-Watergate furor, the moment the jeweler set foot in Costa Rica. There was no way to appeal to the Costa Rican government for help. There was an election coming up but Hernandez' position in the country's narcotics division was so strong that , no one felt he could be dislodged. Something had to be done quickly. Conein's supervisor, George Belk, decided to pay the jeweler $12,500 by dramatically increasing his monthly - cash payments as an informant over, the next year. It would appear to have been a dangerous risk for Belk to authorize the payments, since they indirectly assisted a fugitive from a drug case. But Belk, when contacted, said there was nothing wrong with this. "Her- nandez was a source at the time." But he "didn't work for me, he was working for the Costa Ricans. The guy who was working for us, who had provided the bond money, was tile crux of the problem." Meanwhile, one senior DEA offi- cial reports that Hernandez has twice since entered the United States, the proud bearer of an Amer- ican diplomatic passport. ?GEORGE CHILE III. The new student interest in join- ing the Central Intelligence Agency is undoubtedly the result of the narrowing job market. Students now want job and career security. They also regard intelligence work as adventurous. ? Such films as "Three Days of the Condor" and "All the President's Men," both starring Robert Red- ford, have glamorized intelligence with a romance which doesn't necessarily apply to it but seems intriguing to the young. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD117-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 BALTIMORE SUN 8 June 1976 Cuba denies lie to death of Kennedy Miami (AP)?Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro categori- cally denies his governmen had anything to do with the as sassination of President John F Kennedy. But Mr. Castro has implied that he will reply in kind to fur- ther terrorist attacks on Cuban property or diplomats overseas. In a speech reported over Havana radio yesterday, Mr.. Castro also said Cuban combat troops are being "gradually withdrawn" from Angola but that civilian personnel are being sent to the newly inde- pendent African nation. Speaking in the context of terrorism and what he said were attempts to kill him and other Cuban leaders in the ear- ly days of the Cuban revolution,, Mr. Castro said about the Ken- nedy murder: "Some' imply that such an action could have been retalia- tion by the Cuban revolution for the actions carried out against the lives of our leaders at that time. In truth, we reiterate that never has the Cuban revolution utilized terrorism. "I can categorically affirm that the Cuban revolution never had the most minor participa- tion - d in the death of the Presi- ent of the United States, John Kennedy." ? NEW YORK TIMES 1 7 JUN 1J76 MCE SEE TO BALT CU. Fgrf, BILSPC3AK, WASHINGTON, June 15 (UPI) ?A Federal judge has ordered the Central Intelligence Agency not to destroy files gathered on thousands of Americans at the direction of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nix- on, the American Civil Liberties Union said Tuesday. A Senate committee staff re- port said last month that the agency had compiled the infor- mation on orders from the two Presidents, who feared exten- sive foreign influence on domestic unrest in the late 1960s and early '70s. The A.C.L.U. said that Federal District Judge June Green, in an order dated June 11, had told George Bush, Director of; Central Intelligence, to protecti tho files pendinct outcome ofl a civil suit demanding publica- tion of material. The civil rights group is ask- ing that every American whose name and activities were filed by the agency be so informed and the information be released to them. Judee Creen ordered Mr. DAILY TELEGRAPH, London ,12 June 1976 ? tlfintifinfoiniminimitimmlniortaiiii''SAtURDAY inillinitiliimitnnionninumnimintminf ONE. nf the typical horfors of our time is the instant journ- ? alist who suddenly pro- ? nounces ex - cathedra on some problem which requires a good deal of knowledge he has not got. The public, more modest, refrains from pro- ? &icing. its' wri'''uninstructed opinion out of' nothing and accepts 'What, it has been told, or 'at least tends' to. Misunderstandings or Misinter- pretations, the product of a slapdaSh arrogance,: may indeed be argued against or exposed. But, over the short run at any .rate, the advantage is with,,the first and noisiest assertion. The most ,recrit example.ia the brouhaha aboutthe ,Penkovsky Papers. It will 'be re- Membered ' that in the' 'early ',sixties the Soviet Col Penkovsky, cdisgUsted 'bp' the' Soviet order I :arid. horrified' by 'the ',danger it 'presented 'to the- world, ap- proached the 'West'S intelligence ,services .and ? provided them .with absolutely crucial. informa- .tionf 'the, critical days leading up to the Cuban: missile crisis :of 1,963. Though able to visit, Lon- ,don, he.did not remain but went ;back to his, dangerOus week', eat :of a 'eente of. duty. Ile' Was eyen- tually? caught and, executed. Shortly afterwards a book Was published in the ,West under the title y. Penkovsky 'Papers." .Thotigh: . their _ provenance., I was tightly:, disguised,, it was clear that they represented, those, see- ,'tions', of:, reports Which were not of intelligence significance. They' preSented a !striking picture' of Soviet 'society 'Seen 'through ' the 'eyes '6f' ea ?disillusionett,..:membet of the privilegentsia. They were 'ac- 'cepted as genuine. by -,virtually '.a11 students ? except. Mr Victor ,Zorza who, from supposed .inter- ,.nal evidence-alleged that they 1.were' faked. by the CIA; His 1. arguments 'were: two-fold ? particular and general., etee;?, c? The particulaxs were supposed :to; be cumulative._ But since each was without substance, they, did not, in fact, accumulate., To .take a perfectly typical and fair ex- ample: penkovsky had described .Churayey as one of the leaders of the Communist party of tlfo Russian Republice,Zo?rza pointed out that there was 'no separate -Communist party of the republic. ce but there was a Communist party bureau, of which Churayey was. vice-chairman- ? A forger,. one may. feel, ,rnight have stuck to pettifogging. "ac- ,,curacy;" while a Russian's, hur- ried report typically does not. And, 'incidentally, the fact Of the Penkovsky account of Soviet :high life being mainly concerned , with a few 'second-rank figures unknown to the Western public tends also to tell against the ideas of a sensationalist fake: Zorza's general comments Last: "-estatieht T ROBERT CONQUEST defends Col Penkovsky, Russian,dissident!rwho,, --,T ? fae?e'cl IOFW"ariit 'the `West' ?52') , ? . ? .; . , e r ? ; amounted, in effect, to an un- whole report.. -If _ anything, the convincing attempt to read Col formulation,' quite' to the 'con- Penkovsky's mind, always a risky trary, implies admission at least procedure. He argued that the, partial or basic authenticity. It . colonel' "Would not," tYping ? should be. added 'indeed, that an dangerously, avy0Y,, have, wasted, . :assertion by-the Committee does time on non-espionage material. "not anyhow quite carry the But Penkovsky not only clearly weight of infallibility implied: ;wanted to report.. everything for example Gen-Goodpaster,and 'he,. thought.! helpful ,.or..signir. others 'pointed out in the New ficant, but was also deeply con- York Times a nasty error abOut, cerned with writing his testament Eisenhower which the committee. '-both'-'perSona1 ? and- ideological. nevertheless did .:riot scruple to -MOkeovet; much of' the ,-niaterial include in its final report. In seems, in any case, to have?been feet,- it '.is quite.- clear that--all dictated iii London rather than tile alleged paints Made against -typed in Moscow. This was duly -pointed out, and there the matter irested, until, a couple. of. months ago, the U S Senate Committee ,on, Intelligence, presented, its ,report., C, ? ; , ? thiS,- a:nd an this Oon the :ctirrent critics rely. .Readers will ;be ,surpriSedj to ..learn,.,that the 'report _contains . no .assertion pf the unauthentieity of the' papers. It attacks.. the CIA at some length 'fin' ? wickedly' 'misleading the publisher by passing the ,material ? through, an ,...inter- Tnediary. In the course of ell:Allis, ,thC,,report.,remarks in passing, . in a ,muddle'd,and? illiterate fash- ion. that the ,bookehad been "prepared and yit- ,ting ..0 I A, .assets who drew On ,acleal-Case- materials." ' rather snide way' 'of. put- ting the rather, obviouS fact that 'the' papers had 'been' edited by "someone iri theCI,A's Confidente rather than someone they didn't trust e an ?? inch; was ? instantly :greeted the- Trines and -WashinOton :Pose as .proving the :Tapers were forged: the : nsecle` the ;word "febei- catech" 'the 'Post went to .the length of quoting approvingly-a ?Soviet. description: ? "coarse ;fraud, a mixture of provocative :surning we. may find this. ? The .invention and anti-Soviet. slan- -trouble ? is, as Gibbon pointed out, that an error cOnsisting of !a single line may take several pages 'to. refute: I have here been able to -do no more than skim .the large .pool of evidence and argument which exists in favour of the. general .authen- the work are. without substance. This?. does not', prove the. authenticity-of every, single sen- tence in the book, which must await the CIA making the docunientseayailable,, or.. at. any rate ;stating its:position clearly. That .is, .if the ,timid creature has' regained enough nerve to Stick its-' head out of the' hole. into raving politician's and journalists have. driven 'it. with, sticks anch, stones.- Meanwhile, . -it has been a rare experience to see journalists?and American journa ists.?aiguing .that the , (rather perfunctory) conceal- ment of a source or method of :transmission should. be thought to invalidate a, document. Yet this is quite typical of the manic ? ,note to be' found ',in' a certain type of journalism; with its in- . sistence that; bri matters decided 'by 'Fourth Estate caprice, it is 'the duty of us peasants to accept the verdict. But those whose business it :has been to study with ,care " Complex , issues which any 'Pulitzer 'person 'believes himself divinely empowered to master 'in 10 minutes flat, do have a duty to set the record straight, 'however tedious and time-con- der" ? a fair indication of the -comparative intensity of ..-anti- A mania in the two countries. The.Senate Committee phrase could indeed be taken to imply forgery. But if ithad? really, de- tected forgery, it would hardly have, left it as an ambiguous ticity of the Penkovsky Papers, .aside in. an ,assanit On the CI A and their status as a last Ines- for a much lesser metier, but sage and testainent from a would have attacked it fcroci- brave and intelligent man who ously in detail, at, length -with knew totalitarianism, and hated ?.t'. proofs, 7, in the spirit'of, the- ,What he jelewe Bush to notify his agency's per- ? sonnet not to destroy the doc- uments and computer records. The judge, in effect, coun- ,termanded a recommendation in the Rockefeller Commission report on the C.I.A. last year that the files, "which have no foreign intelligence value, Ishouict ?_te destroyed by the agency at tee conclusien of the !Current Conercesionnl investi- i ee tions or re: soon theteefter 20 les ene-raitted -by law." Approved For ReTe-ase 2001/0 /08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 WASHINGTON POST 17 JUN 1976 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak , c,overo.. Operation That Failed.' House Speaker Carl Albert was made the agent of an undercover attempt by the Nixon administration in late 1971 to destroy the effectiveness of a Greek ex- patriate whose lobbying against the military dictatorship in Athens inf uri- ated the Nixon high command. This effort failed only because top of- ficials in the State Department found out about it. They ordered withdrawal of a malicious, unsigned memorandum that had been sent to Albert and issued a private apology to the designated vic- tim, Elias Demetracopoulos. The memo- randum on plain white paper was drafted by State and Central Intellig- ence Agency bureaucrats. The episode, reminiscent of other covert political operations in the 1971- ,1972 ;Nixon White House; can now be? brought to light because Albert has an- nounced his decision not to run for re- -election. Those involved refused to dis- cuss the affair earlier because of possi- ble reprisals from the office of the Speaker, the third highest government official. . The failed effort involved, directly or indirectly, White House legal counsel John Dean, U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca in Athens, an implacable foe of Demetracopoulos, Nixon fund-raiser and confidant Thomas Pappas, a rich Greek-American with intimate ties to -the military junta and who was under attack by Demetracopoulos, and lesser figures. For the Nixon White House, it ended on Dec. 29, 1971, shortly after the mem- Orandum was ordered withdrawn. On that day, a highly unusual, written ex- planation of the aborted effort, said by White House operatives to have? been unsigned, was sent directly to Dean in the White House from the State Depart- ment. It reviewed the campaign against. Demetracopoulos and stated that, no matter how controversial he was, no ? case could be made against him. More- over, it warned that the intended vic- tim was considering a libel suit against the U.S. government .for the anony- mous memorandum, which could prove extremely embarrassing. For Demetracopoulos, however, the affair did not end until he had -ex- tracted a grudging letter from Albert fully seven months later. ,The Speaker told Demetracopoulos that "a routine inquiry (to the State Department) by a member of my staff" had triggered the -memorandum. Albert said his office had sought the background informa- tion because Albert had been informed ."you might be seeking an appointment at some future date." - ? . In fact, Demetracopoulos first met Albert in the mid-1950s. He had seen him many times between then and De- cember 1971, and had brought high ex- parliamentary leaders of Greece, ban- ished from office during the junta's rule, to the Speaker's office to meet Al- bert. Thus, Albert was the victim of a set- up by the administration, which wanted the most prestigious congres- sional figure possible to make the re- 'NEW YORK TIMES,MONDAY, 'JUNE 114,197e- W . Harvey, C.I.A. Aide, Dead; Linked to Anti-Castro Plotting - William K. Harvey, reported- ly the head of a special Cen- tral Intelligence Agency group set up in the 1960's to plan the removal of foreign leaders by means including assasination, died of a heart attack last Wednesday in an Indianapolis hospital. Mr. Harvey, who was 60 years old, was said to have been in charge of the agency's efforts against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. He was among 10 agents whose iden- tities were disclosed by the Senate Select Committee on In- telligence after an investigation in 1975 of alleged assassination plots by the United States. William E. Colby, then Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, had argued that disclosure of the names of agents would put. them in jeopardy of retaliation by "irrational groups." Mr. Harvey testified before the Senate committee that he had been told by superiors that the Castor assasination plot had been aproved at the highest Ilevels of the government, and that he had discussed the ef- forts with his immediate super. ior, Richard Helms, who later became director of the agency. Mr. Harvey moved to Indian- apolis in 1969 after retiring from the agency, where he had Worked for 22 years. He worked for the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation from 1940 to 1947. At the time of his death, Mr. Harvey was law editor for Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Com- pany. He was buried Saturday at South Cemetery in Danville, just west of Indianapolis. He Is survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter, Sally, and a son, lames D. Harvey. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : quest for background information on Demetracopoulos. When he or his staff complied, the memorandum calculated to destroy the effectiveness of Deme- tracopoulos was quickly sent to Capitol Hill. The clear purpose: to have it widely distributed, under the imprima- tur of the Speaker. Two copies of the memorandum were taken to the House, one for Al- bert, the other for the House Interna- tional Relations Committee, which had not asked for it but where it was as- sumed there would be widespread dis- tribution. A committee staffer, shocked by the anonymous document, gave it only to Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal of New York, chairman of the European subcommittee. Similarly shocked, Rosenthal asked then Congressional Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire why the State Department would lend itself to anony- mous charges against Demetracopoulos , that were probably libelous and circu- late them on Capitol Hill. Abshire, caught unaware, discussed the matter with then Deputy Under Secretary of State William B. Macomber and they immediately ordered the two copies of the memorandum retrieved On Jan. 31, Abshire wrote Demetra- t copoulos what amounted to an unusual official apology. The man who ran con- gressional affairs for the State Depart- , meat wrote that he had not "seen, ap- proved or even heard of the paper prior to its very limited distribution" and that the department could not stand behind "a memorandum contain- ing questionable material." The last chapter in this plot against. the man who had come to be regarded as a dangerous gadfly by Mr. Nixon's advisers was the most revealing: the re-, port to John Dean, recipient of so many undercover reports in those days of the White House plumbers, explaining why this particular plot has failed. - 1?05/ aitsiite4 tinteff Sat., had 12, 1976 ?CIA-MISS1?NARY C INTACT'S cu ? WASHINGTON (UPI)?The CIA has agreed not to seek intelligence information from U.S. missionaries stationed abroad but may continue to contact such' missionaries in the United States, 'according to CIA Director George Bush. ? .Bush, in a series of letters and meetings with Sen, Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.), also has agreed to expand the defini- tion of missionary to include all Americans abroad who. are performing tasks involving preaching, teaching, heal- ing and proselytizing, even if they are not technically controlled by denominational or- ecumenical groups "pro- vided'their ultimate sponsorship comes from religious or- ganizations." _return, Hatfield has agreed that he would not pro- ceed with legislation he has introduced which would legis- late a total ban on CIA-missionary contact. . The correspondence was made public in the Current issue of Sojourners Magazine, an evangelical monthly. The subject first surfaced lest December when Hatfield revealed that. the intelligence agency had used American missionaries and had no intention of ending the practice. Hatfield released letters by former CIA Director 'William Colby and White House counsel Philip Buchen, speaking or President Ford, defending the practice. The Buehen-Coiby responses resulted in a storm of rotest across the spectrum of U.S. religious thought, with )any denominations urging prohibitive legislation and ?me saying -any missionary personnel who cooperated ,ith the spy agent.? woulrt ioe 012 9/k-RDP77-00432R0 13 alba Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, Jere 4. 197f, Insurance Venture Of CIA Produced Awkward Situations 0 0. 0 New Light Shed on Problems, Including Rebuff to Bid for Acquisition. SEC Inquiry By DAVID IGNATIUS Staff ItCpOrteref THE WAt.1, STRRET JOURNAL , The Central Intelligence Agency got into the insurance business in 1962. Since then, the insurance business has got the CIA into some awkward predicaments. The agency's original idea in setting up a, complex of insurance companies was to pro- vide a discreet means of paying retirement, disability and death benefits for double agents and other top-secret operatives who couldn't receive regular CIA benefits in the form of U.S. Treasury checks because of possible exposure. Lawrence rt. Houston, who helped create the insurance operation and who directed it until he retired as the agency's general counsel in 1973, said the CIA on several oc- casions even had to rebuff, investors inter- ested in acquiring what appeared to be a healthy insurance operation. Another time, "company" officials had to fend off a Secur- ities and Exchange Commission insider- trading inquiry that touched peripherally on one concern's purchases of a stock. Further complicating matters, these headaches had to be handled publicly by CIA employes who. were merely posing as executives and hadn't any independent authority even to sign checks. These glimpses inside the CIA's- insur- ance complex, which eventually grew to sev- eral companies,- emerged from an interview with Mr. Houston. While the existence of the $30 million CIA insurance complex was dis- closed in an April report by the Senate Intel- ligence Committee, Mr. Houston shed new light on the problems of managing the agen- cy's conglomerate. Mr. Houston declined, however, to name specific companies in the CIA insurance complex, which he believes is serving a "perfectly legitimate and absolutely neces- sary purpose." He expressed concern that publication of such specific information could result in exposure and "serious harm" for individuals who have received payments through the project. Two Existing "Shell" Companies The CIA decided to get into the insurance business after finding itself scurrying around in 1961 to hastily arrange payments to the families of four American pilots shot down over Cuba in the Bay of Pigs incident. The insurance complex was established the next year with help from friendly industry executives and lawyers, who apprised the CIA of two existing "shell" companies and offered advice on how to "flesh them nut," Mr. Houston recalled. While the CIA tries to write contracts with its covert operatives that specify regu- lar employe contributions for pensions and insurance benefits, many of the payments by the insurance complex have taken a more irregular form, Mr. Houston said. For example, when an "uninsured" operative re- tired or died, it was often necessary to back- date elaborate phony benefit policies and .fund them with lump sums from the CIA. But it's clear that the role of the insur- ance complex hasn't been limited to provid- ing Insurance, The Senate Intelligence re- port, while approving the general Intent of I the project, noted cryptically: "The com- plex also provided a limited amount of sup-1 port to clandestine opern.tions---speciftcally for tl!? miqui3tilon of operational real estate ILVid iL: " conduit tor the ',ending of se.le-cte.d vonert eetIvitioe." THE WASHINGTON STTrecd-37, Junc 22: 1976 Jack Anderson nd Les Whitten The CIA's 'Sex Squad' In contrast to the. haphazard sex on Capitol Hill, the? Central Intelligence Agency for years has conducted an elaborate and efficient sex operation. Few national secrets have been more carefully guarded, but the CIA has provided kings, presidents, potentates and magistrates with female compan- sionship. On a lower level, women have been made available to defectors and CIA agents. Sometimes, the CIA's guests bring their own partners. More often, the agency selects the women from its vice files. The agency also provides "safe houses" where the liaisons can be con- summated in protected privacy. The CIA's sex shop , according to knowledgeable sources, is run by the Office of Security. This division acts primarily as the CIA's internal police force. Through field offices scattered around the country, the Office of Secu- rity maintains close ties with-state and local police.In each field office, a "black book" is kept -of the males and , females who can be safely recruited to ? entertain the CIA's visitors. ? The black books contain names, tele- phone numbers and details, gleaned I largely from local vice squads. In Wash- ington, for example, CIA agents paid regular visits to the police depart- ment's vice squad to photograph docu- ments. The late Deputy Chief Roy E. Buick, who headed the "sex squad" for years, kept exhaustive records on "perverts" and "miscreants" around the country. He had a close, backroom relationship with the CIA, say our sources. From 1964 to 1974 the sex operation was supervised by security director Harold Osborn. Each black book entry, according to sources with access to the files, con- tains some fascinating vital statistics? physical description, measurements, health status and sexual specialties. This information is used to find sex- ual partners for princes and potentates, defectors and agents. The congres- sional investigations of the CIA, howev- er, skirted the sex operation. The Mr. Houston conceded that the insurance 1 company has been used to channel money for covert operations, as a "sterilized fund- ing". device to make the payments difficult to trace. (Most of the covert funding appar- ently was carried on the books as invest- ment.) But he denied that this was the real reason the complex was created. "If the complex later got into other agency pur- poses," he said, "It was because it proved itself a useful instrument." He wouldn't elaborate. Recruited About 50 Buoinessmen To help build a cover for the insurance complex of foreign underwriting concerns, based in such places as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, and domestic investment ; concerns, the CIA once recruited about 50 businessmen and retired government and military employes as directors for the com- panies, Mr. Houston said. They were paid $50 to $100 a board meeting, with a maxi- mum of four meetings a year. Aware that they were working for the agency, the direc- tors Would sometimes be asked to advise on investment portfolio decisions. But Mr. ; Houston said ha supervis.nd every detail of the operanon, including management of tho i from CIA he.mi Inventment portfolloe Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIPE,RDP7a7100/1 Housiintelligence committee stumbled on to the information that the CIA once provided an unidentified Middle East monarch with female companions. We have learned that the king was Jor- dan's Hussein. It's the CIA's own foreign agents, coming in from "the cold," who make the most use of the "safe houses." When an undercover operative reports back to the United States, he is whisked to a "safe house" and a "case officer" is assigned to watch over him. The officer is supposed to keep his charge happy and to provide for his - needs. If the need should be sexual, the right contact in the Office of Security is called upon. The CIA uses sex for an even more seamy purpose. As we reported more than a year ago, the agency has used prostitutes to lure foreign diplomats into love traps where their sexual an- tics were filmed through one-way mir- rors. The film was later used to black- mail the foreigners into becoming in- formants. In New York, the CIA maintained ad- joining efficiency apartments on the sixth floor of a high-rise in Greenwich Village. On the wall of the blackmail apartment was a large painting of two ships. The painting was actually a one- way mirror. On the other side of the wail, CIA agents could watch the action through the see-through painting and film inti- _ mate moments. A Japanese screen, im- planted with microphones, provided sound for the blackmail movies. In San Francisco, the CIA operated a similar apartment equipped with bug- ging devices, but no observation mir- rors. The New York apartment was ? used from about 1960 to 1966; the San Francisco apartment from the late 1950s to about 1965. ll'ooinote: We confronted Osborn with the facts about the sex operation. He denied that any such operation was conducted "during my tenure." A CIA spokesman had no comment. Our calls to the Washington police and the Jor- danian embassy had not been returned by press time. ? tars in Langley, Va. To make the insurance complex believa- ble, it had to show healthy profits. The com- plex, according to the Senate report, has re- tained accumulated net earnings of about $9 million ;Ince 1562, with its profit from stock i sales topping $300,000. In managing the port- folio, Mr. Houston apparently was able to fi- nesee the end of the go-go market. By the early 1970s, he said, "we were mainly out of stocks and into time deposits and Euro- bonds." Mr. Houston said he gathered investment tips from "some witting and some unwit- ting" consultants and friends and agency contacts. /ell etock purchases were made through regular brokerage firms and, to avoid potential conflicts of Interest, he didn't Invest In any companies with which the CIA had contractual relationships. But profits on the stock dealings and other transactions haven't been used as a slush fund to supplement money appropri- ated for CIA activities by Congress, the law- yer maintained. Money beyond that needed to support the underwriting costs is returnad to tie' U.S. Tree:Airy through various r e i (-tee proeditiee, he eal6. for the 3 214AtofotiltIVO601c2.2 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 complex, the CIA sought to operate the com- panies as normally as possible. This meant, among other things, "laying off" some of its policies to regular commercial insurance concerns in so-called reinsurance transac- tions. Mr. Houston, however, would quietly notify the chief executives of these compa- nies that they were actually buying spook in- surance. The CIA companies also reinsured policies from the commercial concerns, again to maintain appearance of normality. Sometimes: however, the profit-making, business-as-usual cover proved to be an em? - barrassingly successful decoy. On several occasions, investors approached CIA em- ployes who nominally headed companies in the Insurance complex and suggested that the units looked like good acquisition possi- bilities. We simply never let it come to the point of negotiation," Mr. Houston observed. THE WASHINGTON STAR 20 June 1976 ? Jefferson wasn't himself that day N. Rex Collier (Letters, May 26) took you to task for a misleading headline, "How Presidents Johnson and Nixon Pushed CIA to Spy on Us." That was a fair sample. of the diligence of headline writers in trying to breathe new life into.tired old tales of CIA .skulduggery by dressing them up with sexy new labels ? often highly imaginative ones: But now I think we have a bet- ter one. . : On June 9, you headlined a story, "CIA Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Ander- son." For one thing, the-headline seems to imply that someone was. actually thinking about doing away ? with Mr. Anderson, although no- where in the story is this suggested. Second, the headline indicates there was a "goal" to drug Mr. Anderson, whereas the story merely says there "was discussion" about it. And finally, nowhere in the story is there any allegation of CIA in- volvement. All we have is reference to two "former" CIA employees who were involved, with no sugges- tion that either had any present con- nection with the agency. . No doubt when you're No. 2 you have to try harder, but do you have to try that hard? And now-that it is the season for quoting Mr. Jeffer- son, we might recall what he wrote in a letter to John Norvell in 1807: "The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehood and errors." John M. Maury Washington, D.C. (NOTE ? Mr. Maury is former CIA legislative counsel and former assistant secretary of defense.) HOUSTON POST 8 MAY 1976 Public doubts of CIA challenged by Push By TERRY KLIEWER , Post Reporter CIA Director George Bush Friday ' challenged presumptions the nation lacks confidence in his agency, and he vowed to continue cooperating with congressional groups looking into CIA operations. "I'm not sure how much confidence is lacking," he told reporters at a news con- ference at the Rice-Rittenhouse Hotel. "Some things have been wrong.. . but the abuses of the past are in the past." Bush added: "I think the American people support the concept of a strong intelligence agency. If they.don't, they'd better." He acknowledged the CIA's image "is not what it should be," but he said putting "a PR (public relations) gloss" on the . agency would not be appropriate. Bush said he hopes negative publicity swirling about the CIA will not mean a lower agency budget this year: "I hope Congress will support the budg- et levels suggested by the President. . . I don't see any widespread effort to cut it." The CIA's new director also said the spy agency can continue to do its job by using new measures aimed at increasing outside oversight of its operations. "We should disclose and disclose fully to Congress," he added, "but Congress will have to protect (secrets)." JOURNAL, Knoxville 11 June 1976 ?-? Bush said his track record thus far as director amply shows his intention to cooperate with Congress. He has visited Capitol Hill 19 times in 3 months in offi- cial appearances since assuming his of- fice, lie said. Bush is making his first visit to bus- ton, which he still calls home, since his return from China, where he was the U.S. envoy. He addressed the annual meeting oi the YMCA of Greater Houston at a Friday night banquet at the hotel. Explaining at the outset to reporters that he would not comment on political matters or on sepsitive intelligence issues. Bush declined to comment on only a handful of questions. But he did note U.S. relations with Red China are not likely to change in view of Continuing political turmoil there. And he, also commented that the CIA. and the federal government generally, did not know Cuba's intentions in Africa before the outbreak of the Angolan war. "We're still unclear what (Cuba) in- tends to do," he said. "It's very hard to predict." . Bush would not discuss prospects his Own job as CIA director?a Presidential appointment?might hang in the balance in the November election. He said be was not concerned with "job security" in his new position, and he repeated previous statements that he has no political plans. .isga'sed 'Charge seems a bit incredulous for a land like the Soyiee Union, in- which- the Secret police have their fingers in or on nearly everything and everyone, to 'accuse other nationals within their borders of simi- ? lar affiliations. The claim by a Soviet periodical that three American newsmen working in Moscow have ? CIA con Worts-appears to have little substance, if . , ? Not only have 'the three individuals, the news organizations they work for and the U.S. Embassy denied the claim, but the only evidence the Soviets have come forthwith are a few letters .from Soviet citizens making the allegation. It does develop, how- ever, that the Soviets may have reason to try to embarrass the-Americans into leaving the country. ? All three of.the newsmen speak Russian fluently and have been making contacts with Soviet dissi- dents. That means they may have.a fair understand- ing of how well the Kremlin is living up to the Hel- sinki agreement it signed last year?the one guaran- teeing a freer exchange of contacts among people. 23 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 CONSTITUTION, Atlanta 11. June 1976 'By PAUL LIEBERMAN . With almost three decades as an official of the Central Intelligence Agency behind him, John M. Maury has de- veloped a favorite saying to defend some of the agency's controversial practices. "I think the President of the United States ought to )have some options between sending a diplomatic note and sending in the Marines," Maury says. The -man who supervised this country's spy activities in both the Soviet Union and the Middle East adds that the "vi- able options" should include "political manipulation that is supporting a friendly faction; . . . propaganda where the source is concealed; and per- haps supporting one military faction against another Maury worked for the CIA from 1946 to 1974. He was chief of the agency's Soviet Russia Division during many of the peak Cold War years, from 1954 to 1962. He was Chief chief of the CIA station in Athens from 1962 to 1963. For the last two years, until he resigned in March, Maury was assistant secretary of de- fense, first under President. Nixon, then President Ford. It was on behalf of the Defense department that Maury was in Atlanta this Week, address- ing a foreign policy forum for members of the Georgia General Assembly arranged ? by U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn. In an interview after the legislative forum MondaY, Maury said he thought recent congressional investigations of the CIA's so-called "covert" operations were called for, but argued that the CIA itself had received unfair criticism. "I think sorve,of the covert operations we.e a big mis- take," the former CIA official said, mentioning as examples the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the secret war in Laos. But Maury said many covert operations have not been the CIA's idea. . "All covert operations were directed or approved by GREEN RAY PRESS?GAZthrtn, 25 APRIL 1976 ;.' enness 4:1;-!. ? 7 ?? . ? ? MAU i%13y I( " Press-Gazette Starr Writer "You cannot operate an In- telligence Operation in an at- mosphere where anything that can be ferreted out- is fair game for publication," a spe- cial 'assistant to the deputy .CIA director said Saturday. ?'' Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas said that "you ? cannot deal openly with intelligence opera, ations without destroying the' basis for It." ' However, due to recent at- etdrition given the Central In- telligence Agency for alleged involvement In assassination plots, Thomas said that the public Can ? look forward to getting ? I'more ' information ? ? .. sooner,' i? :" ? ? "One of the things we are ? going to have ia a greater openness in the release of sub- .stantive information. "? ' But . we have to be ex- tremely careful in protecting our sources and methods,"? said the former 'Air Force of- ficer. . Thomas has been a senior CIA staff member since his Air Force retirement in 1969. He had served more than six t years as the Asst. Chief of .1 Staff, ' Intylligence, ? at ? Air Force Headquarters. Nearly all of his military a career .since 1.941ehaltc.n.p.L c ? ? . ? ?..;4 '14.; !.? 7* .the 'ntelligence field..... : ? Thomas 'was the. featured speaker Saturday at the state convention of the Reserve Of- ficer's Association .,.at the Downtowner. Motel. ?; ' ? He made his remarks at a 'press conference, prior, to the speech. ? ? As chief of the coordination staff of the Director of,Central Intelligence, Thomas said he helps establish objectives on the nation's need for informa- tion'in certain foreign coun- tries. ?. This involves keeping track of foreign crisis areas such as world grain trends and OPEC investments, both of which would have an impact on U.S. security, he said. For most of ,the 29-year his- tory of the CIA, Intelligence efforts have beeh focused on Russia, Which is the only' country which could physical- ly threaten the U.S., he said. However, in recent years the CIA has been taking a wider stance in intelligence operations- .? throughout . the world. ? In his speech, he said he in- ended to (=pilaf:17e what; is n the future for the CIA. One of the primary focuses. ' vill be the. rebuilding of 'the gency's public Image be- ause of damage done by the proved For Release 2001 Ap efends higher authorities," he said. "Virtually every objectionable activity was ordered by the president or by the assistant for national security affairs." Maury said critics thus have been wrong to describe the CIA as a "rogue ele- phant." . "In fact, it had has been highly responsive," he said. Maury Said elimination of abuses in U.S. intelligence operations should not come through a ban on covert operations. "The answer is not to elect a fool ,or a scoundrel president," he said. Maury characterized Presi- dent Nixon as an example of a "scoundrel,? but said he thought most of the leading presidential contenders this year seem "decent" and "con- siderably better than" four years ago. . The former CIA and De- fense department official said the civil war in Angola was a situation in which a covert CIA operation is justified. He said the area was not "vital" NEW YORK TIMES 2 4 JUN 1976 Senate Unit Backs . to the national interest of the United States. but that there was a . "legitimate national interest" in trying to stem Soviet influence. Maury said we might want to excercise our influence there by "nonat- tributable means." Maury said the provision of military or financial aid to an anti-Soviet faction was a le- gitimate covert activity in that case. He also defended the use in some situations of reporters as agents. "I don't think either of us is compro- mised if a newspaper man shares information," he said. . Maury said he knew of about a half-dozen cases where newsmen were paid for information. Usually. he said, the newsmen merely did "pas- sive observation" such as evaluating possible targets for recruitment as agents. "This never gave me any qualms of conscience, because never .to my knowledge we try to influence what went into their own news reports," Maury said. Knoche Nomination To No. 2 C.I.A. Job ? WASHINGTON, June 23 (AP) ' ?The Senate Select Committee ; on Intelligence Activities ap- proved today the nomination of, E. Henry Knoche to be deputy director of the Central Intelli- gence Agency. Mr. Knoche, 51 years old,' who has served for 23 years in intelligence analysis at the agency, received 12 affirmative votes for confirmation after! testifying at the first open; hearing of the new committem! The committee was formed; May 19 to oversee intelligence; agencies. The three other mem- bers of the panel were to be ' polled later. Mr. Knoche, who will bead day-to-day operations of the C.I.A. as first assistant to its director, George Bush, said that he could conceive of no cir- cumstances in which he could recommend that an agency cf agency's implication in assas-;... sination plots. ' ' ? ? .' He defended the CIA impli-. cation in plots against Congo- lese leader Patrice Lannumba, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and Chilean President Salva- dor Allende, saying that the ?, plots are all history now. 'Thomas said that the public ?? would be able to better under- stand why those' plots (lc- rurred If it could put Itself In- to the powerfully anti-Corn- /08/08 : CIA-RD077-00432R the United States engage in .a political assassination in peace- time.. He said that he believed strongly that the Government needed the capability of carry- ing out covert activities "to lessen the prospects of hostili- ties or other problems abroad," But he said that covert ac-. tivity comprised only 2 percent of the C.I.A. budget for the fiscal year 1977. The figure was more than 50 percent in. cold war period after World War II, he added. Mr. Knoche told the commit- tee that he believed guidelines could be worked out for in- forming its members en covert activity. However, he said, the committee "is going to have ta get scale understanding w;th 1!,t. White House" as to when disclosure should be made of eavert actions under considera- tion. The agency, he said, is basic- Shy "an instrument of forcien policy" and acts on decisions made by "hig,her authority." "We are not the judges of when we employ co., ert as- tion," he said. munist mood which prevailed In the, ? U.S.- .during f. those: years, Another focus will be "dem- oustrating you can maintain a secret intelligence program in an open society. We're con- vinced we an and will,"a he said. ? Third will be proving to the ? public that not all aspects of a ? successful intelligence opera- tion can be made public, he said, 000100400001-2' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 JOURNAL & COURIER Lafayette, Ind. 23 May 1976 An attack on By BERNARD P. LYONS ? Editor of the Journal and Cowie:. ? George Bush, Central al.Cealgenee ? Agency directoraegot a few boos and hiss- es .fret--a-rryr of squirms of embrarrass- ? merit recently when he told the Overseas Press club that he'd like to have journal- ists continue to feed information to the CIA. mr7-777.The statement eit indicated how far removed -from reality the CIA.a and Bush remain after revelation in recent Congres- . sional hearings and elsewhere that the CIA and FBI have 'used newspaper re- porters as infor- mants. The chagrin that g -met Bus's- re- marks at the 'Over- ? . Lyons seas Press club was generated by several factors. One, that certain newspaper and other. media reporters had compromised their professional positions by serving as informants. Two, that. the: isolated in- stances of such informing has created the impression that such spying was wide- ? spread. Three, that Bush had the temerity to bring up such an embarrassing topic at a gathering of newspaper people. Four, that Bush still has no concept that there's anything at all wrong with such practice ? that, indeed, the "crime" was in. being discovered. ? For many years, we've been told that Soviet diplomatic representatives in this country, Soviet commercial representa- tives and newsmen for the Russian agency Tass invariably lead a double life; that they also are members of the secret police, or spies, or both. Most people be- lieved it, and still do. The Russians, in turn, have charged that practically every American assigned to diplomatic, profes- THE CHICAGO TRIMPiiiii 10 June 1976 *Should Post 'spy'? WILMETTE?It is scarcely news ? when a sometime "Playmate" manages to get advance hype for her book on the Wash- ington sex scene; or when she tells about the rigors Of her. "work" with the man she doesn't even' like. Nr is it news that an aging man has a relationship with a well-endowed wom- an young enough to be his daughter, or that her salary is paid by John Q. Pub- lic. Call girls on government accounts for the "accommodation of foreign visi- tors" routinely receive far more for less. The real news is the silence of the public over the invasion of rivacy, the phone tapping [authorized ?only by. the publicity-hungry party), and the dirty, credibility ? sional or commercial duty in Moscow is a CIA agent. We've scoffed at this. Now, it turns out, the CIA has indeed ?had informants in jobs where no one has suspected it. Perhaps we should have, but we didn't. Those of us in the newspaper business felt, particularly, that while American governmental employes abroad have an obligation to pass along informa- tion to their superiors ? information that might ultimately wind up in CIA or Na- tional Security Agency files ? we didn't believe for a minute that there were newsmen reporting surreptitiously to the CIA. Such a link is completely inconsis- tent with the newsman's job of reporting information to the public. The- revelation that some. newsmen ? however few ? have been on the CIA payroll has done untold damage to the po- sition of trust and credibility that a re- porter and a newspaper must maintain in order to perform their news-dissemination task effectively. A recent CIA report of an impending climatic change throughout much of the world presents a case in point. The CIA said that meteorlogical : Statistics indicate that the world's tem- peratures will dip slightly over the next several decades. This could cut crop yields in subsistence-level countries enough to produce famine, starvation and consequent political and economic upheav- .al. The CIA estimate might be a good one ... but The CIA's credibility today is such that few %vitt take it seriously. The same loss of credibility attendthe reporting of newsmen who permit _them- selves to be compromised as spies and in- formers --a for the CIA, FBI, NSA or whatever. . Rejection of informer roles for report- ers isn't a matter of rejecting any larger' citizen responsibility in a governmental system that may be threatened by the world around us. Instead, it's a necessary course of action to make sure the demo? cratic system continues to work. tricks type of spying by the Washington ? ? Have, we forgotten Show recently the li'131 and the CIA have been attacked, censured, and -restricted for the very same acts. of illegality? Do we now per- mit others to take over where our gov- ernment ? agencies . were. compelled to stop? In this case the media? May they commit deliberate violations of our First Amendment and use any questionable -means to justify the end, no matter how desirable' the end may be, as in ? the ? Hays case? Are we brain-washed? If so, there may be some consolation in remembering . that any individual or agency, grown too powerful and arregant? sooner or later digs its own grave. Maidi Pritchard NEW YORK TIMES 17 June 197r; -HIRING OF.NEWSMENi BY C'.I.A. TO ?LE TOPIC Representatives of the Na-, tional News Council and the 'Central Intelligence Agency will meet next Thursday in an at- tempt to clarify the council's! position on employment of journalists by the intelligence; community, the council's chair- man, Stanley H. Fudd, an. nounced yesterday. Mr. Fudd said two council! members, William A. Rusher and R. Peter Strauss, and the associate director, Ned Schnur- man, would confer wtih aides' of the C.I.A. director, George Bush, who are authorized to speak for him. The meeting will be held at McLean, Va. The purpose of the meeting, Mr. Fuld said, is "not to seek the names of individuals who may be, or may have been em- ployed by the C.I.A., but to ob- tain a clearer exposition of ex- isting relationships and the portent those relationships rnight hold for a free press in a free society." The meeting requested by the council, was arranged as a result of correspondence be- tween Mr. Fuld and Mr. Bush, Mr. Schnurman said. At the council's regular meet- ing this week, Richard S. Salant, president of CBS News, was elected a member. A change in the group's bylaws has in- creased the council membership from 15 to 18 and Mr. Salant is the first to be selected. He was discribed as the first member to represent a national news organization. , van7Ti191777 Atonement Voted .For CIA Suicide Assoelated Press The Senate passed with- out debate yesterday a bill providing $1,250.000 to the family of an Army chemist who committed suicide after being given -LSD without his knowl- edge aS part of a ?CIA drug experiment. Dr. Frank 11. Olson of Ft. Detrick, Md., jumped to his death from a New York hotel room window in 1953, three days after he was slipped the drug at a meeting. his death was dcseribel to his family as an un? explained suicide. 'Not un- til 22 years later, with publication of the Roche- fence Commission report on the CIA, did t hey learn the true circumstances. 25 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2' - e Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 GLOBE?DEMOCRAT, St. Louis 26 May 1976 -Ci is called rri-rsunderstood REGISTER, Des Moines 7 May 1976 - The Central Intelligence Agency has committed the .big mistake of not making itself understood by the American public, William E. Colby, former director of the CIA, said here. "We need a better way of informing the American people of intelligence operations," Colby told a lunch- eon gathering of the Illinois Bankers Convention at Stouffer's Riverfront Towers Tuesday. "WE NEED TO share the substantive information, but we also need to keep our secret sources, just like newspaper reporters. "Then there won't be a' surprise when a-story is leaked." Colby, head of the CIA from 1973 until last January, also said the American public has an incorrect image of the CIA. The old image, he' said, is one? "of spies in tbe shadows stealing secret documents. Or stereotype of James Bond . . ." Colby said intelligence operations have undergone a drastic change since World War II. "TECHNOLOGY has revolutionized intelligence work . . . electronics, photography, computers . . . "We now know how many Russian missiles there are. There's no debate over the gap." Colby pointed to the armed might of the Soviet Union in supporting., his contention that a strong U.S. intelligence operation is needed. "Concerning the importance of the CIA, you have to look at-the past and .the future. Fifteen years ago, the Soviet Union was vastly inferior (to. the United States). But look at them now. "AND IN THE FUTURE, several questions arise. Who will take over for Mao or Brezhnev? . . . And who's to say the two countries won't someday unite? "We have to know the world of the 1980s and 1990s. Knowledge of this sort enables us to negotiate." Washington Post 12 June 1976 Leak Probe ? Six reporters, including suspended CBS correspond- ent Daniel Schorr, have re- buffed initial efforts by House ethics conirriP.tee vestiz,rators to question them about who leaked the secret House intelligence report. Schorr said he was asked to appear next week. He said he replied he would not without a subpoena and, even then, "would not tes- tify with regard to sources." Schorr has acknowledged that he was responsible for publication of the text of the House intelligence com- mittee's classified final re- port in The Vi1lae Voice, a New York vcekl newspa- Thc other five reporters said investigators asked to "chat" with them about the case. Ali five said they re- fused on grounds that they could not reveal sources. None of the six was subpoe- naed. The five other newsmen are Jim Adams of the Asso- ciated Press. Nicholas Hot.. rock and John Cre.vdson of ear e What is Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert action? It is diplomacy and warfare by other means, clandestine efforts to? governments or -persons to support U.S? objectives, activity ranging from propaganda to para-, military operations to assassina- tion-plotting. , It is a foreign policy tool too often used by presidents. to avoid policy, debate. It is the task _assigned to the president's "private army" to circumvent the. ordinary processes of governmental checks and balances. : It is a function of the CIA which requires the retention ot unknown numbers of ..standby "assets" (agents, journalists, guerrillas) ? the so-called worldwide 'infras- tructure" that-made possible thou- sands of covert actions in the past and will allow for more in the future. ? It is intervention in the internal , affairs of other governments, just: one "plausible -denial" step away : from violation of international, ,treaties and conventions. It is something most members of Congress do not want to know - about.. The Senate Intelligence Commit- tee seeks to restrict the future use of covert action by itcreasing con- gressional oversight. The commit- tee in its .final report calls for the establishment of a new intelligence oversight committee (or commit- tees) which would have power to approve and disclose the CIA budg- , eCand which. would require prier notification by the CIA of covert action. ? ? The committee's proposal for strong' oversight now is being attacked and emasculated in the Senate., Many of. the .critics are members of committees which per- formed so poorly as CIA watchdogs in the past. These .members reject the idea of prior notification, of budgetary authority, of public dis- closure of CIA activity ? of over- sight. - ? The purpose of the year-and- a- half investigation by- the Senate and House Intelligence Committees was to show how the CIA and other intelligence agencies could be reined in, not to prove Congress unequal to the task. CIA covert action creates a dilemma for- our democratic sys- tem:for if a policy is right, why should it -not be acted out in the open? The Intelligence'Committee hopes to eliminate some of the more ominous aspects of the dilem- ma by proposing a ban against assassination, subversion of demo- cratic-governments and support of repressive internal security forces by the-CIA. It does not reject any of the other -reprehensible covert ?activity, most particularly parami- litary operations, but evidently hopes strong oversight will discour- age or thwart such activity. -If effective oversight cannet be achieved, then there is no place in our system for covert action and all such activity should be banned. MED FORCES JOURNAL APRIL 1976 Scope of and Reasons Behind U.S./USSR Force Asymmetries DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGEN- CY should have done the study which follows, but couldn't "because CIA would have objected," according to Lt. General Daniel Graham. recently retired director of DIA. Graham praised this analysis of the Soviet and U.S. military balance at a recent dinner seminar sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center in cooperation with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of George Wash The New York Times. Ford Ilovvan of NBC News and Banjit de Silva of Reuter news agency. ington University and the Russian Area Studies Program of Georgetown University's graduate school. Graham did not specify what objections CIA would have raised had DIA tried to release such a comparison. First installment of the report. prepared at the request of Senator John C. Culver (DIA). by the Library of Congress. compared the U.S./USSR quantitative balance and was printed in the March A F./. The Editors. 26 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 NEWS, Dallas 28 May 1976 ush qtegions oversight consolidation lans Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001.-2 ? . . ' N'ishit; poe Bureau c;1 The Neert '???? 'WASHINGTON ;::gence A_gency Director George Bush of DarlasTlitirsday said he is not sure the iewly-:Created Senate .Intelligence -Committee will result in consolidated 7:tiversight of the nations intelligence xgathering agencies.. ? " ? Bushsaid "it Might he the first step -lin-the right direction," but added that Concerned that he may have to eeontinae - to make numerous appear- 'ances before the various Committees twhich have jurisdiction over the intel- tllgence agencies.. ? . : ' ? ft?-.? "I'vp;. been in this joh close to tfonr months, and I have made 24 offi- 4.641 appearances on the hill, and each. :one of these requires a certain amount cf prebriefing: each one requires a cer- tain amount of follow up," Bush said at ",?Aa'.. Bicentennial Salute to Texas "(breakfast. "That Is an enOrinOtts' amount 6f NEW YORK TIMES 9 JUN 1975 Nixon's Aides Held To Have Weighed Drugging Columnist ? WASHINGTON, June 8(UPI) ?The Nixon White House was considering a plan in March 1972, to discredit Jack Ander- son, the columnist, by drugging him so he would appear in- coherent in a public appea- rance, a Senate committee re- ported today. E.. Howard Hunt, subsequent- ly convicted for the Watergate break-in, lunched with a retired Cintral Intelligence Agency physician at a Washington res- taurant a stones throw from the White House in hopes of obtaining a hallucinogenic drug for the project. Details of the plan to discre- dit Mr. Anderson, who aroused the Nixon Administration's ire by publishing secret White House transcripts revealing Mr. Nixon's "tilt" in favor of Pakis- tan in the war between India and Pakistan involving Ban- gladesh in 1971, were published by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in a special sup- plement to its final report. The drugging project was dropped after it was deter- mined to be impracticable. The intelligence committee, however, said it "has found no evidence" to support Washing- ton Post report by Bob Wood- ard, Sept, 21, 1975, that the Nixon White House had at- tempted to assassinate Mr. An- derson. "However," the report said a White house 'effort was made in consultation with a former C.I.A. physician to explore mean:: of drurehtg Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public ap- pearance. "This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the planning stage." Approved 4ime to spend testifying before' con- .' .gressional committees. That's a fairly large number of appearances when have the responsibility of running sOmethjng as important as the intelli- 'gence community." ?Bush said that he is. "nor overly opti- ng' stic that the creation of the new :committee will cut down on the num- bers of visits to the hill that the direc- tor Of central intelligence must make."- Bush said that he will work closely with the Senate committee, and that once committee chairman Sen. Daniel K. Inouye. D-Hawaii, has had an oppor- tunity to get his staff organized Bush will speak with the senator about de- creasing the number of 'apperrances required of the CIA director. "I'm not going to defend things in the past that were wrong . . . but nei- ther am I going to dwell on those things that are wrong. I find it a waste of my time to go back and answer NEWS -TRIBUNE , Tacoma 1 June 1976 'outrageous charges .such as did the Central Intelligence Agency give $t million to Tom Dewey in 1948 with a director appointed by Harry Truman and expenditures never in that range of funds for the whole agency," Bush Said. ? "If I answered every outlandish, outrageous charge printed and then picked up and reprinted, nobody would be minding the store," Bush said, add- ing that he does not intend to dm that. He'said that If "somebody wants to. 'grovel- around: and. .spend his time worrying about . the excesses of the past, then fine, we'll resond, properly, correctly, through spokesmen. But .as director I'm not going to waste my time when you've had a year and a half _ study by the Senate committee and a year and a half study by the }rouse com- mittee on spending all my time looking over my shoulder." -?? - Russ get even .7 We received another- example recently-"of the retaliatory ? lengths to which the Soviet Un- ion will go, when a Soviet publi- cation charged that three -American newsmen in Moscow are: agents for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 'he Americans, who have de- nied any CIA connections,? are .! the: MoseciVrVased Correspond- ents for The .Associated Press, ? The New York Times and Newsweek magazine.; .? . ? - The charge puts them on no- tice that their positions in that - country are insecure, and that ? they had better not risk offend- ing their critics. One Soviet journalist has ? hinted that the Moscow charges Were made in retaliation for a . recent Jack -Anderson column which said two Soviet newsmen in Washington are agents for a Soviet, spy agency. And it would . appear that the journalist might be right. A spokesman for The ,Associ- ated Press in New York put the situation into some perspective. when he.explained the details of the charge against Associated Press Correspondent George A. Krimsky. The publication ? had accused Krimsky, of recruiting a young Soviet citizen to work for the official Russian news agency Tass, then of receiving unau- thorized "special material" from that agency With the. employe's help. . The AP termed the charge "a complete fabrication," pointing out it would be "ridiculous to assume that Krimsky or any American correspondent would have the slightest influence on who might or .might not work for Tass." ? ? And, indeed,, it would. The spokesman probably put ? his finger on the real issue when he pointed out that allthree cor- respondents are fluent in Rus- sian, are able to talk directly with Russian people, and have .been. in *contact with political dissidents in Moscow. "Soviet magazines and news- papers have trumped up charges in the past against foreign corre- ? spondents :in Moscow who have been able; through their knowl- edge.of languages; to deal direct- ly with the Russian people, particularly dissidents," he said. "They hope in.this way to intim- idate the correspondents and cut off news sources with the Soviet People." ? ? ? ? The Americans have been warned they are treading forbid- , den ground. The next step could he their expulsion. It will be in- teresting to see if that occurs. or Release 2001/08/08 : CIA215tDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 WASHDIGTON POST NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1976, 1 8_ JUN- 1376 The LLSiQ on Trial ve When the International Labor .Organization marked its fiftieth anniversary in 1969, its distinguished con- tributions to improving the lot of the world's workers and their families were recognized by award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Less than a decade later ideological polarization within the world labor body has become so intense that its survival as a socially effective organization is in doubt. Whether it still has a useful role to play is being tested in the World Employment Conference, now in session in Geneva. Delegates from 132 rich and poor countries are addressing themselves to easing the insecurity and poverty that degrade life for a billion people, the vast bulk of them in the developing countries. If the final product is a collection of pieties aimed at papering over the substantial differences in approach among the market economies of the West, the Soviet bloc and the third world, the conference - will do little to shore up confidence in the I.L.O.'s con- tinued worth. It will do even less if the attempt at -consensus collapses and the conference winds up in another round of recriminations. ' , The questions at issue go far beyond a rerun of the battle over seating the Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion, which monopolized the delegates' attention at ' the start. The disappointing aspect of that episode was not the mechanical majority that made a P.L.O. victory so predictable but the evidence it provided that the - third-world countries ? remain' more preoccupied with' bloc politics than with concentrating on realistic solu- tions to problems that bear with special urgency on their millions of unemployed and underemployed people. ? The United States has been incontestably right in leading the opposition to efforts at politicizing the I.L.O. The whole point of Washington's threat to pull out of the organization next year is to engender reforms that would return it to its past course of constructive accomplishment. Unfortunately, what is still lacking is' any any evidence that this country has a positive program of even modest creativity to put before the employment conference?one that would supply proof the United ? States is in Geneva for some purpose other, than to say "no." It is scarcely enough for the American delegation in Geneva to devote its energies to ridiculous position papers by the I.L.O. staff, which question the "trickle down" benefits to the poorer countries of economic growth based on computerized technology and the spread of multinational corporations. Instead of merely rejecting all third-world proposals for some intermediate technology adapted to the needs of n.tarl populations with neither skills nor schooling, the United States should Offer initiatives comparable in imagination to those rAveziced by Secretary of State Kissinger at the United NaCicee Inst year and in Nairobi last month. The eneewer to polarization in the I.L.O. or any other Leiternational agency does not lie in rigidities on the part of this Government almost as iron-corseted as those that control the spokesmen for the Communist countries, all of wheen parade to the conference podium with ritualistic testimonials to their success in guaranteeing full employment by decree. Lure Cleaver S,iy,s of /mite By -George W. Cornell Associated Press NEW YORK?From what he says, he's a changed man. Eldridge Cleaver, once a Marxist, a justifier of vio- lence, now condemns both. ? Once a supporter of the Arab world against Israel, . he now calls the Arabs fla- grant racists, defends Israel and extolls the long Jewish struggle for racial justice. "I've developed," he says. .matured." ? In a three-hour taped in- terview in the Alameda County jail in Oakland, Cal- if., with two Reform Jewish leadtrs, and in letters to them, Cleaver said his ideo- logical:. transformation re- sulted from experience with ? communism in Cuba and , elsewhere and from living in the Arab world. "Disillusioning," he called it repeatedly. The former Black Panther - leader, who returned to the United States voluntarily ? last fall from Algeria after seven years in exile to face charges of attempted mur- der in a 1968 shootout with ? Police, has now become a Christian, according to ? the. prison chaplain. Cleaver said Marxist and Arab' societieshe previously ? had praised in theory were in actual practice harsh, manipulative and repressive. "I didn't.; dig it," he said. "There was no possibilityr of me relating to it." He said returning to America was difficult be- cause he realized his neW outlook "would wreak havoc among my old 'nevi left' friends and among a formid- ; able array of blacks who are .imbued with a knee-jerk, Third World, skin-game ide- ology," but that his changed views were firm and wrought of "hard experience." ? "On many points, the pro- gressive movement in the United States is all wet, misdirected," he said. "The ? whole idea of settling polit- ical problems and arguments by terrorist activities ... it's something that needs to be very seriously and actively combated. "l'in 40 years old, I want to contribute to stability and I think I'm ready to do that now." Cleaver, whose ' ho ok, "Sold on Ice," made him the darling of revolutionaries of the 1960s, first indicated his changed outlook, after his return, in a Boston Herald- American article in which he condemned "communist dictatorships" and "black African dictatorships." He denounced the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism as a "travesty of the truth," say- ing "Jews have done more , than any other people to ex- pose and condemn racism" and that Arab Countries are "among the most racist on ? earth." In his jail interview with Albert Morspan of New York; vice president of the Union of Hebrew Congrega- tions, and its Los Angeles regional director, Rabbi Er- win Herman, Cleaver said that in Algeria and other Moslem Arab countries, he found racial attitudes "more cruel" than in America; and . far behind in ideas of jus- tice: "It was just amazing that such things exist?like, for instance, slavery," he said. . "I saw slaves in Algesia. ? They have slaves in Mauri- tania. They have slaves in al those countries." Earlier in Cuba, he said, 'I found a kind of racist gov- ernment that was frankly hostile . . I quickly came into all kinds of conflicts with them. The reality was much different than I had projected . ? They began to accuse me of attending sec- ret black power meetings . . . I left Cuba completely disillusioned with Cuban communism." In regard to the Arab-Is- raeli conflict in the Middle East, he said after the Ar- abs began using "oil as a weapon," he detected a shift in American policy toward Israel. "One could foresee if that trend continued, the American government was capable of sacrificing Is- rael." He said he. is now firmly committed to Israel's "exist- ence and Integrity." 28 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000160400001-2 Friday, June 18, 1976 ? Iliz V:azu Star of Te ?. 77- WASHINGTON POST 2 0 J Fb, UNI ' Irrelevant Communists By Henrys. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer In a study written before the murder of two U.S. Embassy officials in Leba- non, a CIA analyst says the? impact of international ter- rorism is likely to be more sharply felt by the United States in the next few years. There is "good reason to believe that at least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to step up their at- tacks on American targets abroad in the near future," the study says. "No matter how tough and well publi- cized a 'no concessions' policy the U.S. government maintains, it seems likely that Washington will be targeted by terrorist de- mands somewhat more fre- quently in the future. . . ." The study warns that "sooner or later some (ter- rorist) group is bound to take the plunge" into using . weapons of mass destruc- tion. NUCLEAR WEAPONS are difficult to acquire and handle, but terrorists might - seize a nuclear weapons' storage facility or a nuclear power plant and threaten radiological pollution to get publicity and back up their ? demands, the study sug- gests. "A more pressing threat, however," it continues, "would seem to lie in the - field of chemical, biological and radiological agents." They are relatively easy to acquire, so "the danger, that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of . ultra-radical or psycho- pathic fringe group that would have the fewest com- punctions about actually using them is very real." The study was written by David L. Milbank of the CIA's office of political re- ? search. A foreword to the document, published in Classified form in April and just made public, empha- sizes "that the approach adopted and the judgments advanced are those of the author." Milbank studied 375 bombin 137 gs, hijackings, 123 kidnapings, 95 armed assaults or ambushes, 48 assassinations and 135 other terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1975, with a slight decline from a peak in 1973. TERRORISTS have not sparked any revolutions or measures. toppled any governments, The study singles out Milbank says. But they Libya the Soviet Union and have contributed to the col- j Cuba as the main and Argentina, com- ists " ror George F. Will Another precinct has been he from. Comrade Gus Hall, general sec tary of the Communist Party-USA, a the party's presidential candidate the Second time the got 23,343 votes 1972?.03 per cent of the vote), h launched his campaign with a stirri defense of detente. Notice of this event appeared deep The New York Times, next to a sto with an overshadowing headline: Hair Stylist Tops Field In Annual Fiddle Contest I ask you: Is that any way to report the vanguard of the proletariat, chee by-jowl with a fiddle contest? Well, a ?tually, yes. When I called Manhattan i formation for the number of t CPUSA, the operator, who surely is o of the toiling masses, responded with Fuestien: "Is that 'Communist' with oi m' or two?" Her question illustrate the futility of both New York's ethic Hanel system and the CPUSA. ? The CPUSA has been relegated t what Communists call "the adustbin o history." But as recently as the earl 1950s it received public attention out 9 all proportion to its importance, just a the John Birch Society did in the earl 1960s. Both were examples of the spe ters a bored society invents for its ow titillation. The CPUSA's last chance to becom consequential was in 1948 when man .of its agents and sympathizers pen trated the Progressive Party presiden tial candidacy of Henry Wallace who poor dear, was the last to know. If Corn munists had been successful. throve ard What Madame de Steel said of Ger. re- mans always has been true of Ameri- nd. can Communists: They are "vigorously for obedient" to every exigency of Soviet in foreign policy. Thus The New York as Times noted with nice dryness that ng .Hall's remarks about._ detentee."paral- lelled" recent Soviet press attacks on in U.S. critics of detente. ry Actually, one can almost admire the energy the CPUSA has invested over the years in rising above self-respect in the name of obedience. The Moscow on trials (which prompted Alger Hiss' ad- k-? miring statement "Joe Stalin certainly C- plays for keeps"), Soviet duplicity dure n- lug the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet al- he Hance with Hitler, the partition of Po- ne - land, the attack on Finland?all of a these drew CPUSA applause. le Lillian Hellman's anti-Nazi drama d "Watch on the Rhine" was attacked by a- party critics in 1940 and praised by them in 1942. This revolution in es- o thetic standards was brought about at f. ? dawn, June 22, 1941, when Germany at- y tacked Russia. . ? ' I There are scores of reasons why the S CPUSA is today and always has been a y Potemkin Village, an empty, cardboard C- party. But not the least of the reasons is n ? the CPUSA's marvelous ability to evoke ' laughter, as when a prominent member e' announced that he had "unmasked the hiII m, in in denying Truman the presidescy, then it might have been possible to " take them seriously. But with Commun 1st help Wallace managed to finish fourth, behind Strom 'Thurmond's Dix iecrat candidacy. It is not the least of the ironies of the CPUSA's history that it became some- thing of a national obsession for a few years after 1943, after it had conclu- sively demonstrated its impotence. American Communists have always ? been demoralized by the knowledge that they lack courage proportional to desire, and that not even their desire matches their imported rhetoric. To- day's Communists know they are like the Viennese Communists whhse as- sault on city hall was halted by a sign that ordered "Keep off the grass." open Trotskyism" of a rival faction. General Secretary Hall, who presum- ably will rule Soviet America after the revolution, is an Ohioan, a bureaucrat lacking only a state. He and fellow op- eratives are gray reminders of what - Thomas the Cynic says in Ignazio Sil- , one's "School for Dictators": "No dicta- tom' has ever had trouble finding civil servants." ? But were it not already as petrified as a dinosaur's skeleton, we would want to embalm the CPUSA, the better to pre- serve it as a monument to the leftism of irrelevance, and to that wit who coined a slogan appropriate for a CPUSA fac- tional fight involving Jay Lovestone: "Lovestone is a Lovestonite." It runs in the family. When the French Commu- nist Party recently decided to drop ref- erences to the "dictatorship of the pro- letariat," a disillusioned former mem- ber declared that the party "is guilty Of Right-wing Troskyist petty bourgeois deviation ism of an opportunist, social- Fascist character" releasing terrorists out of fear of retribution, strained international relations and forced expensive defense Support- gummy lapse of regimes in Un,-ers of inteenational terror- opposing Israel, as well as training and indoctrinating .a wide range of "third world" revolutionaries. Milbank' s study said.. But the study added that the sponsoring nations have found it "difficult to trans- late assistance into lever- age or targets will be hit more often. The implication was that the CIA or allied intel- ligence agencies had infor- mation on thinking within some terrorist groups. IN ADDITION to Amr.:ri- cans abroad increasingly mndmat,oncontrol. being targeted. "the influx pelted some .n ations to that (the Soviets) continue" -con 4 to ? . . ? d ' 2n are the study &e5 not ex- ot foreign travelers znd violate their own laws by ? to suppact Eedavewaa Approved For Reiease zuuvfklif/081)PCDIAADR0 9O01 w IT p ain c tn, lijoberrpec eon- -044213 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 nection with such major U.S.-sponsored events as the current Bicentennial celebrations and the 1980 Winter Olympics will ines- capably afford a host of Opportunities for dramatic terrorist action," the study says. Practical considerations have so far deterred foreign-based terrorist groups from operations in the United States. These considerations "will retain Friday. June 18, 1976 their present force, (but) there is a good chance that a few will succumb to the temptation" to stage inci- dents here. The study notes that the operations of American domestic terror- : ists, including their possible cooperation with foreign groups, lies outside the CIA's mandate. Ienergy facilities in this country. One subject under' consideration is establish- ing a federal security force for nuclear power plants, instead of having individual companies and power au- thorities implement federal regulations as at present, and for the transportation of nuclear materials, now handled by private compa- nies also under government rules. The unclassified version The Nuclear Regulatory Commission currently is studying the need for spe- cial safeguards at nuclear I The Washington Star Ey Henry S. radsher Washington Star Staff Writer The Soviet Union has charged that the commis- sion recently established by Congress to check on implementation of an East- West human rights agree- ment is illegal. The State Department rejected the charge. Congress voted last month to create a joint legislative-execntive com- mission to monitor the way provisions of the Helsinki agreement are carried out by European Communist countries. The Helsinki agreement, signed by President Ford, Soviet Communist party chief Leonid L Brezlinev and other European and Cana- dian leaders last Aug. 1, in- cludes pledges to permit freer mowement of people and ideas. Soviet /ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin com- plained Thursday to the as- sistant secretary of state for European affairs, Ar- thur A. Hartman, about the commission. According to a broadcast in Russian from Moscow, Dobrynin contended that the United States is trying "to assume the right, arbi- trarily and unilaterally, to interpret" the agreement and judge whether other countries have fulfilled its provisions. SAID that the U.S. commission "contra- dicts the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of states . . . ." It said Dobry,iin's represm- tation to liartman argued that hurn3a ri2flitc provi- sions of the agreeric...nt shookl not be stret;ced than other ft!;pCCI.S of cloc.vutneat, t3.Ycit several 1.-',e.ropenn relations. The broadcast said that the representation pointed out "the absolute illegality of" the American approach. A State Department spokesman said yesterday that "we certainly reject ? that." The Ford administration initially was unenthusiastic about the commission, feel- ing it duplicated State e- partrnent monitoring. Opposing it would have left the administration open to political attacks, however, so it has gone along even though some officials pri- vately question its constitu- tionality. Now the administration is laving to defend it against mounting Commtmist OFFRCRALS DIME see the Soviet bloc as being quite sensitive about having foreign attention focused on the way it treats dissidents, limits travel of its citizens end continues to take the attitude in control of publi- cations and the flow of ideas that an intense ideo- logical struggle still exists between East and West. The commission is to ?nave 15 members and a budget of 13353,000, not yet appropriated. The speaker , of the House has appointed six members, with Rep. ? Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., to be the commission chair- man, and the vice president has named six Senate members. The President is to name one representative each from the State, De- fense and Commerce De- partments, but has not yet done so. The commission is sup- posed to report to Congress. it is expected to provide material, alaris-,: e.,itia State ?Department r:leteria2, for the U.S. cla.::;',-.?e,..tica to a conl'erenao sclie.doiled to 1'.,e ielft sin a year by the 3$ not- cirA: s;g'.-.ntcry eaaotries to thci nr,,cck-rtacilt. 30 of a recent commission re- , port said nuclear power plants are less vulnerable to sabotage than many other industrial targets that would provide spectacular results for saboteurs. But the CIA study says the threat of nuclear pollution from a power plant seized by terrorists "would be inherently credible" and "the publicity would be enormous." WASHINGTON POST Z 4 JUN 1976 f;727 liD SPA;.: iC i.. case shows how diffi- cult it is even :or a teeil-intentioned government to be sure its ?=?.?):t7 rower 1*.'nts don't encourage othee.nations to make their own bombs. Three members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- sion have jet..t et!nn: I et it is acceptable to sell Spain ijs ninth American nuciear reactor. But physicist Vic- tot Gilinsky, in the NRC's first individual dissent in its 89-case history, disattreed. His stated reasons for doing so are instructive and worrisome. . No one accuses Spain, which denies any such inten- tion, of wanting.its own bomb. New technology, bow-- ever, has made it relatively easy for a country, if. it chooses to take the momentous political decision, to arrange for the reprocessing of .spent-reactor fuel into weapons-grade plutonium. By agreement With ? Madrid, Washingten !.tes tet; :int to ensure that Such military diversion won't take place if U.S. fuel is used. But if non-Ttj.S. fe.A is used, "safeguards" be- come the responsibility of the International Atomic .Energy Agency; but the IAEA's safeguards are in fact less stringent than these the t..1;S. can impose. in this :case, the NRC majority decided that the IAEA's "total :safeguards framework" (the accounting and inspec- tion procedures, plus political assurances) would be :adequate. Mr. Gitiritizy, focusing on the procedures :.:alone, said they're not yet tight enough. Now, none of the NRC.members can be said to be :insensitive to the el.;:ntners of nuclear proliferation: :the opinion and dissent in this case went through 11. :drafts. But they. have markedly different approaches. The majority, notingthet the leophole Mr. Gilirisky :wanted to close for the ninth Spanish reactor re- ? mains ooen ler the ether eight, took the view that Cplomatic and, political constraints as well as teehni- col eine; pren: r211 Spain and that the NRC's reactor-li- censinn authority is necessarily only ? one of the States' otill-n:c'hicTation tools. Working x,ethin the IAEA, to strengthen it, the majority t;-en:eht, ?Jr. Gilinsky cnpha- n eeee every technical loophole that ; .;?in Lel out that to his suggestion ;1:-.1in ? .:':en! ; Omit itself to U.S. fuel for this i.nnenr, tew tneen.'nnent had replied that it. . ? t 1 H?einen.. the request would pro- w:otiatifins.'"i'he Department . ?relations with that ex- ha ett' ? s seriousness, Eut We Ce' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010040000i-2 entirely Support the. G linsky. dissent. His anxieties about nuelear prod, match our own. Nuclear reactors are being enoerted, by different supPliers, by Vie busoN. No oi? .:..luility to curb proliferation can be passed by. Me ee!Y to find, by the NRC's stand- ard, that a given ex:,i;rt decision is not "inimical to. . the common defense atIL security" is inadequate. The. irnphnations and pre;-e'. -nts of the decision must be 'given greater weig14. he record of old agreements WASHINGTON POST, TUESDAY, ' and the rush of new technologies is such that not ev- ery loophole can be closed, then that is no reason not to try to close those within reach. The licensing-au- thority of the 17,11:it: is a limited tool; others must be employed. Spain, for instance, must be pressed to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But each. ? available tool must be used to its maximum potential ? effect. That is what we take to be the urgent meaning of the Giiinsky dissent. JUNE 22'; 1976 Peter Ramsbotham Thoughtful Dissent: A Cornerstone Democracy ; of Maryland by Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British - From a commencement address at the University art : -ambassador to the United States: ? Our world today is disturbingly familiar, with loy- alty oaths and guerrilla wars, with charges and count- er-charges of treason and loyalty, spies and counter- ' spies. The United States has again, in recent years, faced the question of whether it is a punishable of- fense for the individual to follow the dictates of his - conscience rather than the requirements of his gov- ernment. The debate is a sharper one here than in my _ _ country: The 'British are an older, more tightly-knit ; - society, whose strength as a nation has been tested , from outside more often, century for century, than" the United States. The story of your birth as a nation, , and of the opening up of your vast continent, has illu- minated more dramatically the qualities of determi- nation, inventiveness and vigor inherent in the Amer- ican character, which accentuate the strength of will of the individual. '? Two hundred years ago, the signatories to the Dec- laration of Independence held certain truths to be self-evident. But behind that statement lay an as- sumption that every American was capable .of per- ceiving these truths for himself; that each of them bore a certain responsibility, as an individual, for a H continuous relationship with his government. What could not be deduced from the statement of princi- ples in the Declaration was that there were specific political consequences that followed. It turned out that different individuals did have different moral ? apprehensions; and some of these apprehensions were wide enough apart to allow for almost directly opposite interpretations of the obligations of the colo- nists in the dilemma they faced. Widely varying opinions about the obligations of ' the citizen are no less a modern phenomenon; indeed, no democracy is fully alive without such a debate. It , is a question of the degree to which dissent is taken and the country's need for unity at the time. The par- . ; ailels between Britain's war with the colonies in the 1770s and the American war in Vietnam in this last decade have been pointed out by modern historians. , Both wars raised painful questions of judgment and balance, of courage and loyalty. There is a time when , dissent and pacifism are intolerable, when a nation is fighting for its life. To encourage disunity in such cir- cumstances can be treason. But there are other times when it is possible to afford the luxury of debate and disagreement. ? What, then, is the criterion by which we should _ judge the behavior of the dissenter? By the fervor of his convictions? By the firmness of his courage? By .the worth of the proposed alternative? ? We are reaching out here to the extreme point of . perspective, where a people can effectively pass judg- ment on themselves. But it is well to remind ourselves that the relationship between authority and those dis- senting from it may, at a time of crisis, be a decisive. factor in the survival of the community. . Philosophers and historians have pondered over these problems for millania, and there is little I can add. But I would leave one thought in the minds of ? the young people here today?as an injunction to any would-be dissenters: that dissent (if you feel you must dissenashould be a contribution to, not a subtraction from, the strength of your society. There should be a ; firm element of thought and courage in the founda- - 'lions of your action. Democracy rests on debate, not I-, on mindless opposition. In order to preserve the free- doms that we have, there are freedoms which we do not have, which we must deny ourselves; the free- Aom, for instance, to escape from the interest which society (any society) has in you, as an individual and t. as a contributor. If your argument measures up to the most strin- gent, test you can subject it to, in its relationship to the truth and to the needs of your country, then foi- 1,: . low it with all the courage at your command. 3. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Rog gngtIM itnt5 Sun., June 13, 1976 BY ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN Survivor indicts estern 'Free ? Your notions and mine about many events and facts are based ? on dissimilar life experience, and therefore may differ considerab- - ly. Yet the very angle between " beams of sight may help us to perceive a subject in fuller dimensions. I make bold to direct ? your attention to some aspects of freedom that are not fashionable to talk about, but which will not on that account cease to exist, to have significance, ? The concept of freedom cannot be grasped correctly without an appreciation of the .vital objec- 'tives of our earthly existence. I am an advocate of the view that the aim of life for each of us is ? not to take boundless pleasure in material goods, but to take our departure from the world as het- i"- ter persons than we arrived at it, better than our inherited in- stincts would have made us; that is, to travel over the span of life on one path or another of spiri- tual improvement. (It is only the sum of ' such progressions that can be called the spiritual pro- gress of humanity.) . If this is so, then external free- dom is not a-self-sufficient end of people and of societies, but only ' means facilitating our unde- formed development; only a pos- sibility for us to live a human and not an animal existence; only a condition in which man may bet- ter carry out his assignment on earth. And freedom is not the ' only such condition. No -less than outer freedom, man needs unpol- luted space for his spirit, room for mental and moral concentra- ? , tion. Regrettably; contemporary ci- vilized freedom is reluctant to leave us this kind of space. Reg,. rettably, in recent decades :our Exiled Russian writer Alexan- der Sok:henitsun is doing research ? at the Hoover Institution in Stan- ford for a book on Russia. This ar- ticle is excerpted from his speech , upon receiving .the. American Friendship Athard from the Free- doms Foundation at the Hoover ' Institution. . very idea of freedom has been di- minished and grown shallow in comparison with previous ages; it has been relegated almost exclu- sively to freedom from outside pressure, to .freedom from state coercion. To freedom understood only on the juridical level, and no, higher. ? . Freedom! to litter compulsorily ? with commercial rubbish the mail boxes, the eyes, ears', and brains s of peeple, the telecasts?soAhat':; it is impossible' to watch a single ohe with a sense Of -coherences . Freedom! to impose. information, ?. taking no account, of the right of. ,the. individual not to aceept. it, of the light:, of the individual to peace' of mind. Freedom! to spit the eye and in the soul of the ,-_ passerby and .the passenger,with , advertising. ? Freedom! for editors and , -producers to start the:Younger- . _ generation off with seductive k miscreations.' Freedom!. for adolescents of 14-18 years to im- merse.themselves in idleness and , 'amusements instead of invigorat- ipg , tasks 'and spiritual growth. : Freedom! for . healthy young adults to avoid work and live at the expense of society. Freedom! for strikers, carried to the point of freedom to deprive all the rest of the citizens of a normal life, of work, of transportation, water, and food. Freedom! for casual, trivial pens. to glide irresponsibly over the surfaces of any problem, pushed forward in haste to shape public opinion. Freedom! for the Collection of gossip, while the Journalist for reasons of self-in- terest spares compassion for neither his fellow . man nor his ? native land. FrCedom! to divulge the defense secrets of one's coun- trV for personal political ends. a, 'Freedom! for the businessmanin ' any commercial transaction no matter how many people might be brought to grief, no matter how his homeland might be be- 32 outs' ? trayed. Freedom! for politicians " indiscriminately to bring about .whatever pleases the voter to- day, but not what farsightedly provides for his safety and well- being. . All these freedoms are often ir- reproachable juridically, but mor- - -ally all are faulty. In their exam- ple We see that the sum total of - all the rights of freedom is still a long way from the freedom of man and of society. It is merely potentiality being realized in dif- ferent forms: All of this is a sub- ordinate sort of freedom. Not the type of freedom that elevates the human kind, but a precarious freedom which may actually be . its undoing. Genuinely human freedom is. inner freedom, given to us by ? God: freedom to decide upon our own acts, as well as moral re- sponsibility for them. And he who truly understands freedom is . not the man who hurries to ex- . ploit his legal rights for mercena- ry advantage, but one who has a conscience to constrain him even in the face of legal justification. think it will not be too much for us to acknowledge that in some re? nowned countries of the Western world in the 20th century, freedom , has been degraded in the name of "development" from its original soar- ing forms; that in not one country of The world today does there exist that highest form of freedom of spiritual=? ized human beings which consists' not in maneuvering between articles of - laws, but in voluntary self-restraint and in full consciousness of responsi- bility, as these freedoms were con- ceived by our forefathers. However, I believe profoundly in the soundness, the healthiness of the ' mots, of the great-spirited, powerful American nation?with the insistent honesty of its youth, and its alert moral Sense. With my own eyes I have seen the American country, and precisely because of that I have ex- pressed all this today with steadfast hope. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 - Approved For Release 2001/08/08:-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001t-2 LONDON TIMES 3 June 1976:'. I Lonely men from the East feel they are neglected S disappoints Soviet emigres who cannot adapt to new life From Peter Strafford New Yoek, June 2 ? Frustration is growing among Russian emigres in the United States about the' diffi- -culties of adapting to life here. And the irony is that just as Soviet dissidents turn to the foreign press to air their troubles in Moscow, so they are tending to do the same here. Last . night four ?gr? trooped into The Times office in New York and explained that they were desperate. They bad tried to attract the atten- tion of the New York papers, ' they said, even going to the 'length of parading with ban- ners, but they had been ignored, . , . . They complained bitterly that groups which hold huge demonstrations in favour of Soviet Jews and their right to emigrate, take no interest in the emigres when they finally arrive in the United States. This also applied to politicians who talked a lot about helping Russian Jews ter emigrate. _ NEW YORK TIMES 2 1 JUN 1976 Three of? the group ? were .writers and one a former tele- vision director. Two of the writers, Mr Edvard Limonov and Mr Valentin Prussakov, wrote an open letter last autumn to' Dr Andrei? Sak- harov, the Soviet physicist, in ? which they spoke Of the difficul- ties faced by ?gr?and accused him of taking too .1 idealistic a view of the West. Last month the two held their own demonstration, com- plete with posters, in which they accused The New York Times of systematically sup- pressing information about 'their difficulties. ? The New York -Times, they said, willingly, printed the ideas of Alexander . Solz- henitsyn, whom they described as "a man out of the past ". It printed "the naive ideas of Sakharov and Amalrik about your world which they- have never . seen. ? ? "But it conceals and will not ? publish our articles in which we write about things which many former Soviet citizens do , not like about the Western 'world, and in which there is a mosuivs-f BESS FOR CURB ON FOES Strive to Win Cooperation of Police Abroad After New Acts of Violence By MALCOLM W. BROWNE. Special to The New York Matta BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, June 18?A bomb explosion at tha. Yugoslav Embassy in Washing, ton last week has prompted a new diplomatic drive by Yu- goslavia to engage the coopera- tion of foreign police forces against opponents of the Bel- grade Government Already, Belgrade's initiatives have borne fruit in West Germa- ny, where close to a million Yu- goslays live as migrant workers. The West German Government has informed Yugoslavia that it has formally banned two Yu- goslav organizations linked with terrorist activity in West Germany, and has seized quan- tities of arms from members in a series of nationwide raids. But discussions between the United States and Yugoslavia on the subject have been even ' more acrimonious and tense than ever. Yugoslavia has charged in several notes that United States authorities, includiag the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation and local police forces, tacitly en- courage terrorism against Yugo- slav diplomats. An Ominous Shadow Tanyug, the official Yugoslav press agency, asserted that none of the perpetrators of various incidents involving Yugoslav diplomats in the United States had ever been caught or pun- ished. Tanyug added that "the United States authorities are taking no measures to suppress this criminal activity" and that an "ominous shadow" had been ? cast over Yugoslav-American relations. A high Yugoslav Foreign Ministry office official was even more emphatic in a conversa- tion. ? "This situation is absolutely intolerable," he said, "It is not only your. Government that en- courages these things, it is your police and even your embassy here in Belgrade." The American position is that while terrorism in any form is a crime in the United States, the mere existence of political organizations hostile to one or another foreign ?government is not. In any case, the use of the. great deal about its flaws and defects, although they are dif- ferent from those of Soviet society." For. 10 years, they con- cluded: "American newspapers ? have made proclamations about us, the creative intelligentsia, who are not free in Russia. We are now here in the United States. Why are we now denied the right to express our views in the pages of America's so- called free press ? " One of the main groups con- cerned with helping the emigres is the American Coun- cil for ?gr?in the profes- sions. The council's staff con- cedes that there is a great deal of frustration, particularly among the emifres with pro- fessional qualifications, because of the difficulty of adapting to American life. More and more emigres are coming to the United States, the council says, rather than going to Israel. Over the past three years, nearly 2,000 .people with a professional background have arrived, and about one third are still with- out jobs. American police againat politi- cal dissidents from other coun- tries would face overwhelming constitutional and legal obsta- cles. ? This American argument, however, has infuriated key officials in the Yugoslav Gov- ernment, reportedly at the very top, Among those who have expressed special annoyance on the subject was Franjo Herl- jevic, Yugteslay Interior Secre- tary, who is the chief of police, intelligence and other security services. The main targets of Bel- grade's campaign abroad have been members of the Croatian Ustashi movement, a group that favors separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia. The Ustashi are regarded as the ideological successors of Croatian Fascist collaborators with the Nazi oc- cupation of Yugoslavia, who supplied troops to fight against the Allies: A History of Assassinations Assassination as a political tool has a long and important history in Yugoslavia and the former nations of which it is made up. The best-known local assassin, Gavrilo Princip, pro- vided the pretext for World War I by killing the Austrian Crown Prince. The worst incidents in recent years have been the assassina- tion of the Yugoslav Ambassa- dor to Sweden in 1971, and the 33 It is possible to provide ; adaptation training, ?with money from Washington, for doctors and eng e ers, a fel , even for artists, provided they I are prepared to go into cent- mercial art and advertising. But writers and television ; .people are almost incapable M. being helped. Mr Limonov said he had lost ? the job he had at Riisskoye Slovo, the Russian-language newspaper in New York, after writing an article in which he described his disappointment with life in the West. Mr Prus- sakov said he was afraid the same would happen to him because of their demonstration. Mr Ma?rat Katrov, the former television director, feels luck- ier in that he at least has a . job as ,a loader hauling con- tainers of drinking water into offices. But he points Out bit- - terly that in Moscow he had his own television programme, and says that he would be pre- pared to take any job in televi- sion if only one was offered to him. One of the difficulties of course, is that an artist or writer does not have a privi- leged place in American life, and is expected to rough it . like anyone else. assassination last last March 7 of" the Yugoslav consulgeneral in ? Frankfurt. This month, the Uruguayan ? Anibassador to Paraguay, Carlos Abdala, was slain by a Yugoslav named Jozo Damjanovic, who was reported by the Paraguayan- police as having said he had thought he was shooting at the Yugoslav Ambassador. Belgrade' regards the case with "utmost gravity." " There have been hundreds of other incidents, especially in West Germany. Australia, Can- ada, South America and the United States, mainly the nuis- ance bombing of Yugoslav diplomatic missions or enter- prises. A major difficulty govern- ments face in dealing with Yugoslav opponents of the Government of Marshal Tito is in distinguishing between ter- rorist groups and others peace- fully demanding the restora- tion of civil rights in authorita- rian Yugoslavia. In one of the harshest com- ments ever publicly made in this country on Yugoslav-American relations, the Belgrade paper Borba said: "This is the last straw. If the United States really does not want friendly relations with our country to be upset, it must finally put an end to new crimes. It must promise this publicly, and also achieve this." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 BALTIMORE SUN ? 11 June 1976 Zest is gene Unfted Europe lhn By PETER J. KUMPA Suit Staff Correspondent Brussels?The post-war dream of a united Europe is all but dead. For reasons as old as lan- guage or as new as the recent energy crisis, Europeans have lost their zest, their momen- tum and ?debatably.? their will to push on to some sort of federal superstate. Nationalism guides Europe once again. It is threatened more from regional fragmen- tation than from federalism. In the United Kingdom, for example, the movement for Scottish independence is deep- er than any rush toward inte- gration with the continent. Federalism still has its ad- ? vocates. But it is an idea for the future once again. Unity is praised in theory, admired in word but ignored in the tough, daily political and economic decisions of Europe. ? The old timetables for achieving union through eco- nomic, then monetary, then ' political means were once en- dorsed in principle by leading statesmen of all nine coun- tries of the European com- munity. That was in another era. The goals have been scrapped and overtaken by events. The more modest propos- als made at the start of the year by Prime Minister Leo Tindemans of Belgium have also been shelved. They are to- be discussed later in the year at more European summits. An idea or two may be picked from the Tindemans report. For the heart of the proposal on bow Europe can keep the federal idea going, little more than talk can be expected. The mood here in Europe's bureaucratic center is heavy with gloom over the federal future. "We are adrift on the high seas. The engine has gone dead," said one official. "But," he added quickly with the one promising fact, "we are still together on that ship." Some co-operation natural- ly continues. If Europe is net about to plunge into the vi- sionary dreams of two dec- ades ago, neither is it pre- pared to retreat. The fell customs union is eept ried tot,e) into effect on schedule at the end of 1977. The common agricultural pol- icy remains alive despite sur- pluses and zooming costs. Some progress can be counted in the complex process of har- monization of economies. The idea of one Europe flickers on because it is easier ?politically?for the mem- bers to proceed with the ritu- als of co-operation rather than have none at all. . If a potentially unifiable Europe is adrift, it has come a long way. The European community now forms a democratic, con- sumer society with standards up to and sometimes surpass- ing American ones. Europe- ans enjoy American levels of wealth and American-style problems of crowded cities and the soiled environment. The Europeans do co-oper-. ate on a number of levels. In some areas of foreign policy, for example the United Na- tions, foreign ministers are more apt to take similar posi- tions. At any rate, the idea of close consultation is improv- ing. The community has brought in Britain after two French vetoes. It has included Ireland and Denmark to join France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. And it has close ties with other European countries with excellent pros- pects to enlarge the communi- ty in the next few years. A serious threat by France to break up the community was passed in the mid-1960's though the price for unity was a weaker organizational structure In all, the record has been pretty good. It is the future that is disturbing to European federalists. The progress of European unity up to now has come in relatively easier fields such as tariffs. The degree of sovereignty surrendered by any state has been small. No vital area of an individual state's authority has been threatened. Europe does not speak with one voice in foreign or defense policy, in monetary co-operation, even in such fields as industrial harmony or common trans- port anvil. With ernsitive areas left to negotiate, Europe was hit s al n both by the energy crisis and the worldwide economic turn- down. It did not take joint ac- tion to a significant degree to solve these problems. Future joint action is hin- dered by the domination of the Council of Ministers that took command from the com- munity's commission a dec- ade ago,Technically, majori- ty voting on the council is pos- sible. In practice, no decisions are made without a unani- mous vote of all nine coun- tries on any proposal. The un- derstanding is clear that if any one of the nine feels strongly enough about an is- sue, it will not be pressed against that country's will. This veto power by any member of the community makes progress difficult and uncertain. The best example - lies in implementing the agreement to have a directly elected European parliament by 1978. Up to now, there has been no understanding to update the appointed parliament of 198 members. And it remains 'a great uncertainty whether the July European summit will come to any agreement. The French are sticking to the 198-member figure. The British 'would prefer to at least double the number lest a European parliament come into existence with represen- tation too low for regions such ? as Scotland. A failure to agree on the size and selection pro- cess of a European parlia- ment would be a serious and possibly a fatal blow to feder- alism. It is not that the parlia- ment has any great powers. It can dismiss the I3-member commission It can ask ques- ? tions But federalists count on a revival ot the spirit ot unity that could came from an insti- tution that is elected directly by the people ot the nine states and is not appointed by governments In time, its powers might he expanded ln time. ii may take a broader view of issues. a European view Mai governments do not wish to risk The lack of movement in the Council of Ministers is partially due to the fact that the individual ministers rep- resent governments And any eloi4o emit:limit:on of the nine countries shows that to one .degree or another. each 01 the governments has weaknesses They may be coalitions as in the Netherlands or Den- mark Or they may have such narrow maturities as to tear taking positions that could en- danger them in future elec-? wins Li works out so that a strong enough lobby in any country able to shake a pieee of one government can block an integrating action of the entire Community. The hope Of the federalists is that a European parliament will be able to rise above pet- ty pressures to become a force for integration. France's Gaullists fear just that possi- . bility. ? Another hope is the new commission with a new presi- dent that is to take office in 1977. If the European summit agrees to the recommenda- tions of Mr. Tindemans, then the president will be named ? early, perhaps in July. and al- lowed some leeway in select- ? ing his commissioners. As it is Britain's turn to name the president, the choice centers on Roy Jenkins, a moderate in the Labor party and now Britain's Home sec- retary. If Mr. Jenkins accepts .the accolade, he may, as a confirmed and enthusiastic European, be expected to breathe more life into the body that proposes solutions for the decisions of the Coun- cil of Ministers. Even if the fragile hopes of the federalists do come true, the outlook for solid progress in integration does not appear bright. The twin pressures of war and poverty are in the past. For many reasons, Eu- rope seems willing to have the United States bear the major concern for security. Europe has neither the stomach nor the will to challenge the American role. It would take the magni- tude of an American pullout? ' a full one, not a partial with- drawal of troops?or another serious threat of war to turn Europe toward greater unity. The possibility of one of its members-- Italy ? taking Communists into its govern- ment does not unduly alarm The community. The West Germans may fret over such an outcome, but ether states are too preoccupied with in- ternal disputes to show alarm. Some Europeans scoff at what they consider unneces- sary Panerican alarm over the 34- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2, Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100400001-2 Italian elections. Some of this may be due to the continuing European atti- tude that the U.S. meddles un- wisely in affairs on this side of the Atlantic. Through now reduced to modest levels, an anti-American spirit is never too deep in most Europeans. They remain determined to match the Americans in eco- nomic power in time. The smaller European countries in particular?to- gether with community feder- alists-- have not been pleased with the tendency of the U S.. especially in the Nixon-Kis- singer years, to deal with the bigger states like West Ger- many and France on an indi- vidual basis. WASHINGTON POST 2 4 JUN 1976 Joseph Kraft The Consequences Of Italy's Elections ROME?Mamma mia. What a mess the Italians seem to have made of the elections held here Sunday and Mon- day- ? But, in fact, Italy's long-range outlook not so bad. Short-term difficulties, while acute, .can be got over if?as a price for immediate help?the U.S. and its allies insist that the victorious Chris- ? tian Democratic party abandon the hys- terical anti-communism which has come to serve as a screen for corrup- ? tion and inefficiency. The truly sad consequence of the election was the unexpected triumph of the Christian Democrats. They ar- :.rested a previous slide, winning 38.7 per cent of the vote for parliament this year as against 35.6 per cent of the vote in the regional elections last year, and 38.3 per cent of the 1972 vote for parlia- ment. The Main reason for this gain lies in ,the promise of change embodied by some attractive younger candidates, ? notably Umberto Agnelli of the family which owns Fiat. The anti-Communist .drive led by the old gang around party president Amintore Fanfani yielded very little. For the Demo-Christians made their gains not on the anti-Corn- .munist right, but from the smaller cen- ter parties, attracted by the promise of reform. The old gang, however, still controls the party. Mr. Fanfani strutted into the TV center here in Rome election night, arrogant as a peacock, to proclaim a triumph for "freedom over commun- ism." He seems to have in mind a Demo- Christian regime that does not even talk to the Communists.' But the old-line Christian Democrats .have consistently managed Italy's bu- reaucracy and vast state enterprises in ways .which promote clients and thus foster corruption, inefficiency and huge debts. There is no reason to think they will, of their own volition, change now, and make a serious address to Ita- ly's long-term problems. . The long-term problems flow from the post-war economic modernization of the country. Italy produces first-rate products, which sell competitively abroad. Exports make up a substantial part of Italy's domestic product, and they have led a rapid, though not solid, 35 recovery from last year's inflation. But the Communist unions have im- posed big wage increases on Italian in- dustry. Italian wages have risen 168 per cent since 1970 as against 48 per cent in the U.S., 80 per cent. in Germany, 110 per cent in France and 134 per cent in Britain. In consequence, Italian inflation is surging, investment is almost invisible. and the country has a tremendous ex- ternal debt. Unless the problems of in- flation and investment are solved, Italy will fall back in the international com- petition and sink gradually to the level of an underdeveloped country with South American-style inflation, corrup- tion and (maybe) military coups. The way to turn the economic corner Is by an informal accord with the Com-, munists. They would moderate wage demands in return for a Demo-Chris- tian pledge to clean up the nationalized industries and promote private invest- ment. - The Communists seem willing to go along. Though they failed to cut down the Demo-Christians, they also scored a big victory-34.4 per cent of the parlia- mentary vote as against 32.4 per cent in the regional elections last June and 27.2 per cent in the 1972 parliamentary elec- tions. The relatively open line of the Com- munist leader Enrico Berlinguer has thus been confirmed by victory at the polls. So the problem is to force the Christian Democrats to consult the Communists on an economic program even though they govern without them. Which is where. the United States and the European allies come in. They finance Italy through various arrange- ments which come up for renewal soon. Unless they are renewed this country will go bust. So America and its allies have potent means to favor the younger Christian Democrats at the expense of the old gang by making a condition of any fur- ther help some consultation with the Communists. It would be expecielly fit- ting for the U.S., which played such a role in saving Italy from the bad, old Communists, to now save the country from the bad, old Christain Democrats. e, Me, Field Enterprises, Inc. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R006-00406001-2 Tueniv, June 15, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST n 171 ? By Thomas W. Lippman ?. washineto? Post Foreign Service 'CAIRO, 'June.. 14 With iarying degrees of sincerity and rationality-, many' Arabs ? 4re blaming the ??United States for the unending bloodshed ? in Lebanon. ? During the pat month, government_ officials, poli- t5cf? journal-. ists and ordinary citizens in'.. ieveraCArab countries havee. expressed the belief that the.? 1:1inted State is somhow responsible for -111e.:?,?Leba- nese . tragedy.. The charge ts.'beirig heard more ? 'often ? since ,the .overt Syrian mill- .. tary, ;intervention ; . of, two seeks ago..e7e,' ?? '\Vh1ngtsin' we ii. p u fleeted -.tole ? in i relaying in-,: formation and r a P.s gnidance ??? to Israel about - 'the Syrian move has given" rile.tothe popular theory:, ? thae,the United States is ; supporting Syria's ambitions?. let?Lebanon in the hope that the :Palaestinians? will be i?tishedi', Which .would aid Thtacl.;t4 it'l& time for the .? United States to ' make an' ?? Oriednivocal declaration if it ? Wenot,-.? guilty," an Arab ,? diPlomat? normally . sympa- thetic to Washington said cease-fire in Lebanon and - stave _off? a major ? Syrian- Palestinian clash:' . These . carefully -..worded ? statements have- Usti ally been coupled with warnings ' about the risk that outside , intervention ., in Lebanon ? may -.spark a. wider Middle ;ast.Confliet. ? There. is a tendency among ? Arabs to blame anyone but ethemaelvese:for, their inabil- . , th ? N 0 aingn .? . sadd as "that murderer, ; Dean Brown." ? ? ? ? ,The ease againstithe United States was 'Stated: in rn tree! forin-?Jast week :by Yasser Arafat, head of the , Palestine Liberation Organi- zation, who accused Wash- eington of "a sordid plot di- rected not only against the ? Lebanese , a n d. Palestinian people World from the but , against :the, en-, y o achieve the?unity ey a re all prefess - to seek. The Gulf to *the! Atlantic:"... ' . , ' Americans; the ? ItuSsians, Ile said the United Slates the former- colonial powers,' wants to bring the whole thee 'od companies and the region into, the American Zionists are the usual scape-? sphere?of influence," a view goats, even when there IS held by many Palestinians no ,credible evidence of who viewed with suspicion --their, involvement in any the month of improving re-. 'even- crist. Thus, it is con- lations between Washington venient, ?to '-find - 1 o r e i g n and ?Damascus that pre- ..hands at work in the Leba- ceded ?the Syrian interven- nese - Ware. which. is an' cm 4 tion. -. ?? - ? barrassment to:'- the entire lni.-:Marxist-dominated . Arab world:, e,.e, ? .. ? ' Sotitla;Yemen,, students and :.. Events- suchAis.: theloiht'. werkeTs - de rn o as tr a ted U.S.-French naval trianeu4 againsteethe? ',Syrian move; , vers in .the Mediterranean, calling it a "new link in the - contribute to the belief that . chain of American ; min- ....- the ? ? ? sPiraty to r liquidate" the e great powers are up tO.- .. . . Palestinian sievolution.". ? their old tricks. - \ . it Is' not drily in the ex- , ' .In:lebanon; the, decision!. tremist.;or,- leftist countries by Secretary of State Henri that .the 'United. States is At... Kissinger to send re- being .:* Criticized,. ' Hero. ? 'in Aired . Ambassador L. Dean. Egypt, where ? Washington - Brown on ..a peace mission- has been:in high favor, edi- torial writers who usually thise, W.-tend. "Maybe ' ,no- ; bodywoulit. believe you, hut. : I think tee clear, statement would help." ? . . So far, the United States has limited itself . to cau- tious,. almost tentative state- . ments. of. endOrsement for efforts? to, bring. about :a BALTIMORE SUN 14 June 1976 (gol vr TryP a 3 Ri,14., for ran .131 A ' is seen as further evidence, of American - mach it4fliiti,q.cxYeAe.ef tifficial thinking have beCause Brown was. the U:Seert-',..:been saying the same things:. ambassador to Jordare?dure ',..?.-si..'Nobody would ? believe. ?ing the "black ? September'''. ,America's claims that all it war in 1970, in which did was to keep silent over.. 'Hussein 'crushed Palestin- .the..' entry ;? of the ?Syrian` , ian forces and expelled the army. into Lebanon,". Mus- guerrillas from Jordan. The, ? tafa vviote; In ;the .- Libyans refer to the? ambas-, mass-circulation newspaper By u Sun Staff C wrespontient Tehran, Iran ? With ruth-1 ; less efficiency, the Iranian secret police are huntinv, down inemign.s of an opposition; underground movement of Counnunists and religious; extremists who only a year agoi seciii;,d. able to strike at WP throiVi the ci,iintry, ? error ition After several shoot-outs here last month, the police appear confident that they have broken the rnovcnint, and sources close to the dissidents acknowlcd!T that they so far have not been able to regroup after sueferiag heavy losses. 36 The intensified - police campaign has added, however,: to the pervasive feeling here of political repression. Iran's political prisons have become notorious over the pasti year with widespread charges! abroad?and officially denied here?that they now hold from 25,000 to 100,000 prisoners and that tortures rival those of the; medieval inquisitions, Some Traniaos, mostlyIntel- lectuals and nir?rniwrS of the upper middle class, find the police campai4n connterpili-: ductive, believing that it simply creates more opposition to the JCL/ 0 non Al Akhbar. "The truth is that the United States Per- suaded Syria to move and advised the Israeli leadera that 'he ? invasion :was in their own interest." ' ? , Some ? Foreign Mlinstry officials b aveexpressed much the same view in private conversations.... ? The 'clay ? -before '..A.,thirk's e column:appeared,' the sriine ? paper, largest,, in the . Arab world, blamed, the Soviet ; Union ; for the Syrian; ad- Vance. -? "Everybody knows e:that . Syria Striking the? Lebanese and.. the Pideptin- ians with. Russian :tanks, missiles and. Mig aircraft," an editorial said. "EverY- body knows. as .well that the ? Syrian Baathist- regime:, ? the Soviet Union's cat's-paw ? in.; the area,, (arid _Koskgin e was in Damascus a few days ago at the time when the Syrian ,.forces entered Lebanon,"? ? President Sadat,. .in ? interview with' an ...Iranian newspaper, said' "it has !be- ' come clear . to the Arab countries and to the entire World that I,. , Was .rilght - when I said ,hands off' Leb- anon.'" ? ? ? !?..-- the Syrian Move, but eias He has 'strongly. critieied carefully refrained fr 905 ; saying what other outside ; hands he e believes 'to ? be meddling ? in. .;the .Lebanese civil war. . regime. They pint to the large colonies of Iranian students abroad who are organized in active opposition to Shah Mohammad Hera Pahlavi. "This brutal and unneces- sary period of police repression we are going through now is turning some of our finest young minds against the coun- try," a professor at Tehran Uni- versity said. "Each young Communist or Islamic Marxist the police kill now will mean 10 new recruits and 100 sympathizers in a few years." Were it not for the inte.nsi- lied police campaign, a prerni- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 ; neat lawyer here commented, "these radicals would not have a real issue since the shah has gone further in his economic and social reforms than most European socialists have.... "But political repression is an issue that gets international attention and that, quite frank- ly, affects everyone of us who wants to think for himself. The government may call these young men terrorists, but they have more sympathy than is admitted because of this issue." The ferocity of the current campaign by Savak, the Iranian secret police, puzzles many and alarms some here since the radicals have not threatened the shah's power base in the least or even been able to put together a concrete program able to attract mass support. "I can see tracking these men down for their terrorist activities, like the murder of the two American colonels," said an - industrialist, "but I wonder about the changes in our society and political system this police . campaign is bringing. "Frankly, we are in danger of becoming a police state because of a handful of terror- ists, and foreigners say we already are. And I wonder whether terror and counter- terror by police will not simply generate more opposition." Outlawed Communists and the more numerous Islamic Marxists, members of an alli- ance of radicals and religious extremists, arrested over the past year have included not only the expected number of students but workers, farmers, teachers, young business execu- tives and a nephew of the shah. Total political arrests have been estimated by Western investigators from Amnesty International, the international commission of jurists, and oth- er groups at 300 to 1,000 a month. Dissident sources here said the current police cam- paign has raised the number, to more than 1,000 monthly, most not involved in the underground movement at all. The underground opposition is not regarded as large. The number of active members was put by Western observers here at several hundred, possibly as many as 1,000; sources close to the dissidents claimed to have about 2,000 to 3,000 active members in their organizations. Since January, 53 suspected terrorists have been killed in gun battles with the police or executed after trials before military courts. In mid-May, 10 were killed in shoot-outs in three northwest cities in one; day. Later 11 others were killed, in Tehran. The same week, 16 ' members of an extremist reli- gious group were arrested in another city on charges of assassinating one of the country's religious leaders. Since 1972. more than 300 Iranians have been executed for political activities, accord- ing to Amnesty International in London. ' Large numbers of arrests -00432R000100400001-2 have been made since last Octo- ber, according to sources here, with the result that most of the cells in the underground network have been broken. "A year ago, the under- ground had very well trained, armed units that organized sev- eral waves of attacks, assassi- nations and other terrorist actions over the spring and summer," a senior Western dip- lomat said. "They killed at least six police officials, proba- bly four or five times that in actuality, and three members of the U.S. mission including two Air Force colonels. They struck when and where they wanted. "It took the police a good nine months to get on to these groups, but they have done so with a vengeance. Now the police have the initiative and the underground is trying to regroup, so far with little success." Several sources close to the underground opposition acknowledged the effectiveness of the secret police campaign and said that members who had escaped arrest so far had gone into hiding and halted most of their activities. Many are said to have gone abroad, hoping to recruit new members from student groups in the United States, England and France. But the ef forts to gather more support and new recruits are hampered by the lack of a cohesive political philosophy by the various elements in the Zitgtlesf ZiMel Fri., June It 1916- _ _ underground, which has tried to ally anarchists, Maoists, ortho- dox Communists and religious extremists 'opposing Iran's headlong modernization drive. Some of the underground members see themselves as successors to the moderate left- ists who briefly held power here or to the powerful Com- munist-led Tudeh party that even 10 years ago could still put thousands into the streets in demonstrations that required troops and tanks to end. But today's radicals find themselves without easy issues to exploit since the shah's "white revolution" will provide all Iranians with health care, free education, social security and worker ownership of industry. The two issues left?the de facto military alliance with the United States and political free- dom here?do not seem to move most 'Iranians, who instead are consumed with improving their own family's living conditions. The religious extremists denunciations of Western values fall on deaf ears?Western consumer goods are exactly what they want. The radicals also lost much of their foreign support last year with the rapprochement between Iran and its neighbor Iraq, which had helped finance and train the underground. Iranian officials say the radi- cals are still receiving help from the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and from Libya. Pea G ce: From unsor NAMRU-3? ? ? the Middle East is often a terrible place, -a sun-. ? baked arena of murder, brutality and destruction feeding on religious, political and tribal hatreds. ?- ? :Today Arabs are killing Arabs in Lebanon, while' their leaders scheme for. advantage and power. Is- raelis and Arabs. have killed each other in four wars since 1948. ...Foreigners, too, fall victim to the indiscriminate. Addlence that claims both VIPs and ordinary falk, ? young and old. ? , Just two days ago Francis E. Meloy Jr., the new U.S. ambassador to Lebanon; Robert 0. 'Waring, an aide, and their Lebanese driver were killed in Bei- ? rut while on a diplomatic mission. The United States and the Soviet Union say, of- ten in identical words, that they seek only a "just and lasting peace" in the area. Yetinvariably they undertake this quest in sending More guns, tanks ancl. other instruments of destruction to their Mid- dle Eastern clients. ? Peace. it. seems, will grow only out of the barrel of a gun. - but then tbere is.NAMRU-3-12JS. Naval Medical. ? Research Unit No. 3?a tiny component of Ameri- can overseas aid at its best. ? - , ? White violence and ?confrontation have claimed ? 'lives and grabbed headlines, NAMRU-3 has labored - (inlet ly- and effectively for 30 years to help the peo- ple of Egypt conquer diseases and ailments that Americans kno?v only through medical textbooks ????? or histories of the Middle Ages. It is a battle being waged by only a handful of American civilian. and Navy : physicians and scientists attached to NAMRU-3. . As detailed by Don A. Schanche, The Times' cor- respondent in Cairo, NAMRU-3 was established in Cairo in 1946 with an assignment that sought to break an unending cycle of misery and death in one of the oldest nations in the world: "Conduct medi- cal research and development concerning the infec- tious diseases endemic to your area." Since then, Schanche reported, NAMRU-3 has -.drtually eliminated typhus and undulant fever from Egypt and adjacent areas. It has discovered new treatments for cholera and some forms of en- cephalitis and other diseases. It has engaged in fruitful research in the transmission of diseases by animals and insects, and has set up the best medical library in the Middle East. Its work has .been untouched by the turbulence of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has made the Unit- ed States a friend at one time and a foe at another in the eyes of Egyptians. Throughout the three de- cades of its operations, NAMRU-3 has heen`respect- cd and supported by SUCCOSSiVe Egyptian govern- ments. Such gratitude is a supreme compliment that is all too rare for U.S, operations in foreign lands. If only there were more such operations. and the compliments they attract. 37 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, June 23, 1976 Darkest Africa To Americans the recent reports of riots and repression in South Af- rica are uncomfortably familiar, and our natural instinct is to apply American experience to the - situa- tion by condemning racism, coun- selling moderation and urging inte- grationist reforms. This not only fulfills the moral precept of the equality of men before the law, af- ter all, but has also been highly suc- cessful as a practical policy in the United States. In assessing the prospects of a successful multiracial democracy in South Africa, though, it is well to remember that the United States is an immigrant nation with theory and experience in striking a balance between assimilation and ethnic identity, and that it still has not resolved its own racial problems. In South Africa the situation is far more difficult. The core of South Africa is the 2.5 million Boers whose ancestors ,started to settle Africa in 1652. The Boers are among the toughest and proudest tribes on earth. When threatened by British 'domination in the 1830s, they migrated inland where they conquered the Bantu tribes invading from the north in a series of treks and battles that make the winning of our West seem trifling. Later they took on the Brit- ish Empire. Insular, fundamentalist Calvinist, and fiercely racist; the Boers will truckle to no one, least of vil the hated blacks. Unlike other Colonials," the Boers have no place ta:go. They even call themselves Af rikanders?Africans. The remaining 1.75 million whites are mostly of British origin. ,They, too, are typically racist, but because they are English-speaking, They can emigrate if the situation deteriorates. There are also 2.2 mil- lion Cape Coloured, the mulatto de- scendants of early Boer settlers and the aboriginal Hottentots, and 750,- 000 Asians; both the Coloured and the Asians despise and are despised by the other groups. Fri., June 18, 1976 log 2ngritz Zimes The principal antagonists to the ? gs?ers are of course the South Afri- can blacks, some 18 million Bantu, an. intelligent and vigorous people. Their quality is suggested by the warrior reputation of the most fa- mous of them?the Zulu. The Bantu are also racist, against the whites and against the other tribes. There nothing, to say the least, in the history of black-dominated states in southern Africa to suggest that a Bantu republic would evolve into any kind of democracy, let alone a m,ultiracial one. There is no need or an Ameri- can observer of this depressing s.cene to abandon his belief in the iribrality of the integrationist model, dr. to falter in moral support to dipse South Africans, white and tirlack, who courageously urge this curse. But as a practical policy, aodifying segregation cannot be 9xpected to mollify the blacks or improve the security of the whites. The goal of an integrated society is _ unrealistic considering the dispari- ties in culture, wealth and numbers between black and white. - ? One policy that might offer a glimmer of hope would be a sharp- acceleration of the South African regime's "homelands" policy. lip to now the "Bantustans" have been lit- tle more than Indian reservations, _ but it is possible to conceive that they might e%iolve into real nations, steadily gaining in independence and territory until the white South Africans are reduced to "Boer- stans." Partition is of course sel- dom a true solution, and in any event adoption of a generous home- lands policy remains a slim hope indeed. We will have to get used to the idea that the U.S. can do very little positively for South Africa. It would seem a most promising area for a policy of strict non-intervention, though domestic and international pressures will urge U.S. involve- ment. Americans will want to see neither racial equality denied nor an outpost of Western , civilization destroyed. But what can we do? It may be useful to make occasional un- friendly noises, if only because South Africa is an international par- iah. We have already embargoed arms sales, but South Africa can obtain all it needs from other sup- pliers. Other embargoes and boy- cotts would have even less effect, even if there were some "solution" a boycott policy might be directed toward. As for American financial investment in South Africa, it is dif- ficult and probably inappropriate for the U.S. government to gauge how much it aids the regime and-or the Bantu. The Russian-Cuban intervention - in Angola demonstrates, it can and will be argued, the dangers of not finding a solution in South Africa. Alas, Angola teaches more depress- ing lessons. The Portuguese colony_ was among the most integrated so- ' cieties in the world, yet it broke ' down into anarchy and white flight. Even with the whites gone, a racial war broke out among the three ma- jor tribal groupings and the Com- munists easily recruited one of them. No less can be expected in South Africa. Violence in South Africa will cer- tainly continue and probably inten- sify in coming years; we have just witnessed the latest skirmish in a 400-year war. The only comfort to Americans is .likely to be the thought that if our experience tella little about South Africa, its experi- ence tells little about us. What is happening in Southern Africa is not an ultimate statement about race relations for all of mankind. But neither will UN resolutions, foreign boycotts, or pious declarations re-, ' solve the historical and cultural forces involved. What we are seeing is a calamity resulting from immut- able fate, a tragedy in the literal sense of the word. FERVENT REVOLUTIONARIES 'FEEL GOOD-WE WON' 10000.1%.16. The Cubans an Arapro This is the column that caused the expulsion of Georgie Anne Geyer from Angola. BY GEORGIE ANNE GEYER LUANDA, Angola?Beneath the once.. gleaming glass tower of the Hotel Presidente, Manuel A bdalla of Santiago de Cuba leaned against a now-scabrouS wall. "Good?" he said. ? "Of course we. feel good. We won." Abd.dla, a construction chief, is typical of the Cubans here, Contrary to reports, they a Want came voluntarily, they are enthusiastic about what has happened, and they want to go on to help "liberate the rest of Africa." "I came totally voluntarily," he told me. "I'm a Communist, and nobody can make a Communist, do anything he doesn't want to do. Wherever they need us, we'll go." Talks on the streets of Luanda over a week's time with several dozen Cubans indi- cated several trends that contradict some of the previous reports. First, the men were not forced to come, tier 0 IL -Lash On 38 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release:2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 ? were they criminal elements that Cuban Pre- mier Fidel Castro wanted to get rid of. They are fervent revolutionaries. Second, although all eagerly want to go home, they are not at all discouraged about being in Africa. After all, they say over and over, they won. ? Contrary to some reports, they keep in touch with Cuba, and they send and receive letters from home. But? there their contacts pretty much end. They all say, for instance, that they do not ? know how many Cubans died. One put it "in the hundreds." They do not know when or if they are going home. Men like Abdalla are typical. He said he came in November and expects to leave in October. Are the Cubans going to leave? Despite such indications as Castro's note read to Sec- retary of State Kissinger in Sweden several weeks ago saying they would be withdrawn, ? there are no indications of it here. The Cuban men on the streets of Luanda ? have heard nothing of it and, moreover. many of them are quietly being switched to ? civilian positions. In the flexible?and highly effective?manner of the Cuban armed forces, men who came as soldiers, like Abdal- la, are now listed as civilians. He, for in- stance, is now working in construction. With this sort of transferring around, you can make almost anything you want of the ? numbers game. But the Cubans also fulfill several other im- portant functions at this point. Observers close to the situation say they are one of the most important supporters of Presidente Agostinho Neto's policy of biracialism against ? men like Nito Alves and Carlos Arocha, min- ister of planning and development. These men, they say, take a black racist position. For these reasons, the Portuguese still here ?and there remain still about 50,000?will tell you that they consider the Cuban Marx- ists their strongest allies. "We all say that when the last Cubans sail away, we will be . on that boat, too," a Portuguese translator ? named Lucinda told me. ? The Portuguese also tell you that the Cu- ' bans, under a .black commander, put down a, small insurrection in the black. suburb of ? Prenda about three months ago when some blacks were "going downtown to kill whites," The Cuban forces are about half white and ; half black. , _ PHI LAD EL PHI A INV' BK.R 18 JUNE 1976 Amin accuses CIA of tryirig to kill him reutte, LONDON ?President Idi Amin of Uganda yesterday blamed the CIA for an alleged attempt to killhim last week, according to a Uganda broad- cast monitored in London. Amin was not hurt when grenades were allegedly thrown at his jeepin Kampapa on June 10, but his driver VMS killed. Knowledgeable sources have claimed that the whole incident was staged by Amin. In effect, while many Socialist countries now have missions here, and while some An- golan officials certainly fear the special pow- er of the Cubans, the Cubans have shown themselves to be both effective and discreet. With certain exceptions, their behavior has been, as one Portuguese put it, "totally cor- rect." Except for the officers, who have dol- lars, the average Cuban has no money at all and thus cannot go out and splurge on the lo- cal economy. 'Td like to invite you to a beer," one young Cuban told me, "but I honestly don't have an escudo. All our money goes directly to our families in Cuba." What's more, they have shown themselves to have an equally discreet but direct effect. on the government. The form of Marxism be"- ing developed here, the call for volunteers to bring in the sugar harvest, even this week's flamboyant trial of the Western mercenaries ?all show the special touch of the Castroites. In short, it would be extremely naive to think that either the Cuban involvement in. Africa or the African Socialist revolution is going to stop in Angola. Indeed, with their own trained people and with the support of the Socialist bloc, Angola is virtually sure to become "the" center of African socialism in' the near future. . Only this week, for instance, SWAPO, .Or. . , -the South-West African P2oples Organization, opened its first headquarters here in Luanda- and pledged, on this "new border" with South African-occupied South-West Africa, to ; crease the fight. The same thing is happening -- with guerrillas now fighting on the Mozam- bique border against the white Rhodesian government. ?? So some Cubans may be withdrawn and some may not, but that really doesn't matter.. -They can easily be brought back when they ".are needed in Rhodesia or South-West Africa ?which they judge will not be for a couple ? of years?and, meanwhile, they are helping' to build Angola. What really comes out of the Angolan sit- ? uation is the fact that the West could easily. learn some lessons from the Cubans. While this handful of Western mercenaries, who come through here as paid killers and misfits,. ? were on trial here, the Cubans, who could be considered "revolutionary mercenaries," have.: given a good example of how it should be done. 39 Approved For Release .2001108/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Thurwlaylunr124, /0:6 THE WASHINGTON POST I _ On Ir.& in Discord ? Aussie A China -? 5, dresses odd By Ross H. Munro Toronto Globe l Mall -,..PEKING. June 23 ? Aus- tralian Prime Minister Mal- volm Fraser has told China he has serious doubts about ,the ability of the United ?States to counter growing Soviet power, because of dis- agreement between Presi- dent Gerald Ford and Con- gress. ? '.Fraser -believed he was ,speaking strictly privately when he. told Chinese Pre- mier Hua "Kuo-feng on Sun- -clay evening of his -concern, but ,Australian functionaries mistakenly distributed trait, scripts of his remarks in the room set up for the grirgieg prime minister's visit. .Fraser linked his concern about the United States to Soviet intervention in An- ..gola, where -pro-Western ;liberation forces were de- 'flied aid by the LLS. Con- egress. The prime minister. -.:said he believed the conflict *.between Congress and the President- on foreign policy "materially contributed to So- viet intervention* in Angola and the ? belief that there would not be a reaction from the United States." ..Some years ago, there were six or eight significant leaders in Congress and if a lruggluile 1S, 1976 _ President had their support. he Would be assured of the liupport of the Congress in "certain policies. There is :*fioW a risk of the effective- ness of U.S. foreign policy ?.'bei lig. reduced very severel,: 'because of the differer4:4 'between Congress v.:1d xecutive." ? 'Fraser then the strategic situation in the in- Alan Ocean, .saying be wanted the United States to counter growing Soviet na- i-kpower thsre. If there is rcr U.S. Naval presence there, he' said, "It would be-. golne a Russian sea and I do dot-believe it is in our inter- est or in the interests of Southeast Asia." - The Australian prime min- ister also expressed concern that Vietnam might play the same surrogate role for the Soviet Union in Asia as Cuba ? has in Africa. "Because of the attitude of the United States, Cuba, has not found it very easy to be successful in an environ- ment that is close to the United States, but with So- viet support found no diffi- culty in causing very grave problems in Angola. We wonder whether or not Viet- nam might follow the same path that Cuba has. We raise that as a question." Premier Hua was sched- uled 'to respond to Fraser's points at a later session of their talks. The only sub- stantive remarks of the pre- mier carried in the tran- script quote hiirl as request- ing that the press be told only the topics of conversa- tion and the fact that the two leaders "had a candid and sincere-exchange of Fraser -also said he wanted to talk at a later ses- sion about the role that Aus- tralia, Japan,. the United States and-China can play in the Pacific region. e r Signs From China , - *The .Chinese people are being prepared for the ..passing of Mao Tse-tung. Chinese newspapers have -lately carried pictures of the 82-year-old leader that give candid evidence of his increased decrepitude, -in marked contrast to the usual practice of portray- ing Mao as alert, active and vigorous. The purpose Of the photos is to signal the Chinese that the inevi- table time of transition is approaching. That signal :Should also be heeded by Washington. Sino-American relations have for some time been in a state of pause. The absence of movement prob- -ably .has been dictated by the U.S. political cam. -paign, and the reluctance of Washington in this period to deal with the outstanding issue between -the two countries?American recognition of the :goVernment on Taiwan as the government of all ;china.. President Ford, in his last known official message .to ?Peking two months ago, looked forward to a .!!normalization" of bilateral relations. That word .means only one thing to the Chinese: acceptance of Peking's sovereignty over all -of China. That even- tuality has been implicit in U.S. policy since 1972. The unanswered questions about how to carry out -that policy basically involve timing and mode, which specifically mean arrangements that can be ;.made that would not constitute a sacrifice of Taiwan. The model for future Taiwan .policy has been set by Japan, which switched its recognition from the Nationalist government in Taipei to the Communist regime in Peking, while at the same time maintain- Mg a close, growing and accepted economic rela- tionship with Taiwan. The U.S. government would undoubtedly be able to follow the same course, pro- vided there were assurances from China that it would not seek to win control ()vet Taiwan by force. The way in which the Taiwan dispute could be resolved, then, is not a major problem. But the tim- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 0 0 0 ing of a new formal relationship. with China pre- sents a problem of perhaps growing urgency, an ur- gency dictated by Mao's enfeeblement and mortali- ty. That problem is the focus of an important arti- cle in the current Foreign Policy magazine by Ro- ger Glenn Brown, a senior CIA analyst. Brown's central point is that the United States should move quickly to settle the Taiwan question so that it can strengthen its standing in Peking while Mao is still alive. If that is done, Brown argues, the influence of the pragmatists in the Chi- nese hierarchy who favor improved ties with the West would be augmented in the probably una- voidable conflict over power that will follow Mao's death. Delay, on the other hand, could work to the advantage of the radical and pro-Soviet elements in the Peking leadership who want to resume ideolog- ical hostility to the non-Communist world and end the Sino-American connection. Brown's article is significant on several counts. It is a departure from?even a defiance of?Secretary of State Kissinger's policy of controlling all govern- ment-related statements on China, though Brown notes that he is speaking for himself and not the CIA. And it brings into the open a matter of some delicacy in Washington: the U.S. interest in keep- ing China and Russia on less-than-friendly terms. Whatever can be done to bolster the position of the moderates in China will serve that interest. No one can foretell what the succession in China will involve, what balance of forces will emerge. But it is plausiEe that the United States may have some ability at least to influence the course of events, through actions that would support the pol- icies of Pekings moderate leaders while simul- taneously serving its own interests. But the time to act in behalf of that goal may be running out, as Mao's long Lento; nears its end. : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000014-431 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 21, 1976 Normalizing Relations With China By Allen S. Whitinz , ANN ARBOR, Mich.?The ?first Sino- Indian exchange of ambassadors since ..the 1962 border war proves Peking's willingness to mend diplomatic fences despite domestic politic.:1 tirmoil. On Oct. 22, 1975, an incident on the dis- puted Himalayan frontier resulted in two Indian dead. However, the subse- quent death of Premier Chou En-lai and the toppling of his initial suc- cessor, the then Vice Premier, Teng Hsiao-ping, did not prevent New Delhi from improving relations with its northern neighbor. _ This should encourage President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. .Kissinger to negotiate the complete normalization of :relations with China ? before the death of Chairman Mao .Tse-tung further complicates the politi- cal scene in Peking. . The failure to establish full diploma- : tic relations with the People's Repu- blic of China is damaging Sino-Ameri- can detente. Considerable evidence exists that the pace of normalization ' has fallen far short of what Peking - had anticipated. ? ?" In 1975, intimations of Chinese ir- ? ritation became 'apparent. First voiced ? ' .in unofficial conversations, they be- ' came open on the. eve of President Ford's visit last December. The main problem is our relationship with Tai- wan. Our diplomatic recognition and, 'defense commitment are incompatible with the -understandings reached in the 1972 Shanghai Communique at the time of,Richard M. Nixon's China visit ? ? ? as President. ? These understandings implied that with the end of the Indochina war and a tacit agreement by Peking not to use force against Taiwan, the United States ? would disengage militarily from the -island, dissolve the defense treaty; and move toward full diplomatic relations with China. The issue for all concerned with Taiwan's future may be posed in this way: Can the American sense of moral obligation and our allies' sense of United States reliability be sufficiently met by an arrangement whereby we explicitly renounce a commitment to use ,force against force in exchange for a tacit commitment by Peking not to use force? Most proposals that meet the needs of United States moral concern and our Asian allies' security concerns fall short of what is acceptable to Peking. Any formal pledge of outside defense assistance is incompatible with Peking's Insistence?as expressed in the Shang- hai Communique?that the "liberation of Taiwan" is China's internal affair. However, what Peking terms "the Japanese formula" provides a solution to the impasse. This would involve termination of our -defense treaty and all formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan while continuing to maintain trade, travel and economic relationships un- impaired. ? Were such a precedent to he followed bSe the United States, our official ex- pression'of interast in Taiwan's peace- ful' evolution would be significantly reinfarced. by the tangible presence 'of many American citizens and Considera- ' ble United Stales capital 'on. the island Any violation by Peking-of. a tacit 'understanding:not to ? attack Taiwan would challenge important interests whose influence. :in and on Congress could- not be discounted in advance. In addition, because of Tokyo's con- cern:over sizable - Japanese interests there, joint consultation would un- doubtedly produce an appropriate res- ponse to signp of an imminent effort - by China to take the island by farce. To minimize the likelihood of this eventually., occurring, however, our position must be made sufficiently clear and China's tacit acquiescence sufficiently credible to provide the necessary assurance that Taiwan will not be attacked in the aftermath of American military disengagement. Two underlying imperatives" cur- rently, render the normalization of Sino-American relations urgent. First, so long as we remain politically and militarily involved with the Chinese Nationalists, good relations with . Pe- king will be vulnerable to political op- position in China on an issue that strikes at the most sensitive nerves of Chinese self-consciousness. Not only will our bilateral relations be affected but also our interaction in other areas such as Korea. Second; the Peking-Moscow-Wash- ington ?triangular relationship Is signi- ficantly involved. After the death of Mr. Mao, the present intense hostility between China and the Soviet Union may, well diminish.' If we have failed, to complete narthalilation and remain 'I tied to Taiwan's defense, Sino-Soviet rapprochement: may' come sooner and .; go further than:it ;otherwise would.: ."; Our competitive position with Mos'. cow would suffer because Peking must certainly come to judge our interven-. tion in its internal affairs is more 'serious that its grievanCes With Mos- cow. Indeed, if normalizatiOn has not bc- curred before an improvement in Sino- . Soviet relations, it may be more dlf- .ficult for the 'United States to elicit tacit acceptance of the desired ? formulations concerning the necessity. ? forpeaceful resolution of the Taiwan' problem. ? -' ? : ? Alien S. Whiting, consuitant on China affairs to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger between 1969 and 1973, is professor of politica/ science at the University of Michigan. 41 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2 KANSAS CITY STAR 25 May 1976 Spy Jubile ? A great fiesta is planned for June 6 in Cuba honoring the nation's "secret agents and counterspies." The event will commemorate the 15th anniver? sary of the interior ministry which is in charge of internal security. It is a peculiar arrogance of strong totalitarian regimes to not only glorify their inStruments of terror and oppres- sion but to positively put them on pa- rade. Thus in Nazi Germany the Ges- tapo wore the most dramatic uniforms and were glamorized at every opportu- nity. In the Soviet Union the Vast bu- reaucracy of "security" that encom- passes the labor and prison .camps. the spy agencies and ordinary police, is one big family dedicated to the service and advancement of the state. In Cuba politics is organized on the WASHINGTON POST 2 1 JUN 1975 e in Cuba block leader system which lends itself admirably to the type of informant network that can send men and women to the Isle of Pines. If Jose hasn't been showing up at the regular praise the Maximum Leader and the Cuban people's steady and courageous journey along the path to socialism, then something must be wrong with Jose. In a dictatorship it is considered admirable to inform on your friends and relatives if disloyalty is suspected. It may lead to the firing squad or inter- rogation in some police basement. But ? it is for the common good. The frolic announced by Havana will commemorate Cuban security's victo- ries over the American Central Intelli- gence Agency which was "foiled in its efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro and overthrow his regime." I11,112111.0, o st By Lewis H. Diuguid Washington Post Staff Writer "I am a good example of the results of a policy clearly conducted to lose . friends," said an exiled Uru- guayan leader who was once considered a friend- of the United States in ? ? Latin America. ? . He is now. in Washington to denounce U.S. policy in the hernishphere before a congressional committee. Ex-Sen. Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, ? who narrowly missed election to the presi- dency in 1971, accused the -State Department of keep- ing afloat the military re- gime that shut down dernoc- 'racy in Uruguay three years ago. ? Wilson Ferreira, 57, is a strong nationalist who nev- ertheless is proud to have been named after the Amer- ican president. Woodrow Wilson. Easily as eloquent a speaker as Fidel Castro but poles apart from him politi- cally, he is now so embit- tered against U.S. policy that he sees a possible American contribution to the assassination of a fellow exiled ex-senator, Zeiroar ? Michelini, in Argentina last month. "I don't say that itliehelini I would have lived hut for the 'T.S. eation," Ferreira said in an interview, "nut peii it inn peeled his being saved." By Ferrera's account, when Michelini sought a visa to come here last year ?also to question U.S. pol- icy before congressional committees?the State De- partment flagged the Uru- guayan government,. which canceled his passport. Uruguay stranded Michel- ini in Buenos Aires by in- forming the U.S. and Argen- tine governments and the airlines of the cancellation, said Ferreira, who offers ex- tensive evidence that Argen- tine troops then killed Mi- chelini and three other Uru- guayan exiles at the behest of the neighboring govern. ment. A State Department spokesman said that Uru- guay, not the United States initiated discussion of press reports that Michelin{ would come here. The State De- partment replied that noth- ing would prevent the visit, the spokesman said, adding that there waS no record of Michelini's ever applying for a visa. In arty case, said Ferreira., the-Urnuayans would be alive today if the U.S. goy- eminent had warned Argen- tine President Cm. Jorge when they were hid- 'taped --three days before tapir (neon. -that the United States wiield not tolerate any hai boine done to them 42 0 11 eri Thus the poor CIA, whose mistakes become gene'riirriT6irtIttae and whose , triumphs must remain unknown, is de- nounced both at home and abroad. The I life of, a spy is never easy and it must I be particularly trying in a democracy where praise and credit are given : anonyrnously, but where blame and i disgrace canoe very public. Even the most dedicated CIA agent must look at the approaching festivi- ties in Havana where his deadly ene- mies will be garlanded with blossoms and feel a slight stirring of envy. But that is one of the prices of working for a democracy. What is regarded as a heinous overstepping of bounds here would be seen as clever police work in Havana or Moscow. A country is known by its heroes. Testifying last week. be- fore the House subcommit- tee on international organi- zations, Ferreira said he de- spairs of any such humani- tarian intervention: "All we want'is to be left alone. Our countrymen are struggling in all possible ways for the defense of the principles, ideals and way of life that our country took from the Constitution of the United States. "Not one of us could ever understand that the im- mense weight of the same nation that defined those ideals 200 years ago, day celebrates them with joy, could continue to be given in support for the cue-- mies of our people." Ferreira also charged in the interview that Assistant Secretary of State Robert J. McCloskey had misrepre- sented the status of Uru- guayan human rights in a letter intended to convince I Congress that violations had diminished. McCloskey's letter to sub- committee chairman Donald ? M. Fraser (D-Minna quoted the International Commis- sion of Jurists as saying Uruguay is "doing ? every. thing possible to reduce the risk of mistreatment of po- lit peisoners." Tha commission's elan"- t itra eeneral reepareiled, lio w,V,V, that the quote was talain out of eanteet and that the 'report in fact docu- mented continuing human- rights violations. Fraser, agreeing with,Fere reira's charge, said, "The -U.S. government is trying to . mislead Congress ? on the question of human rights in Uruguay." McCloskey said that while he signed the letter as the State Department li- aison with Congress, it was prepared by other officials and he was not yet preparea to respond. ? The U.S. House of Repre- sentatives voted last week to cut off military aid to Uru- guay because' of humnn- rights violations there. As for Argentina, Ferreira pointed out that the police had not even bothered to follow up his urgingS that they come collect finger- prints of those who carried off the Uruguayans. In a nine-page letter to the Ar- gentine president ? ho concluded: "When the hour of your own exile ? comes?as you can be sure it will, General Videla?if you seek refuge in Uruguay, an Uruguay whose destiny will once - again be in the hands of its people, we will receive you without warmth and without affection; but we will guar- antee you the protection which you denied to those whose death we mourn to. day." Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400001-2