WHY WE NEED THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 10, 1976
• Content Type: BOOK

-.Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005'T -`'
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
GOVERN1\TENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EAST EUROPE
WEST EUROPE
NEAR EAST
AFRICA
LATIN AMERICA
Destroy after backgrounder has served its
purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
 .Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
t 3
L J
A former Director of the agency
puts television coverage of its
activities into historical perspective
By John A.. McCone
[The Central Intelligence Agency has
been much in the news lately, as tele-
vision news has covered Congressional
investigations of the agency's activities.
To add to viewers' understanding of
that coverage, we present this article
by John A. McCone, who was Director
of the CIA during the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations, 1961-65. Be-
fore that, he was one of the architects
of the Department of Defense, and
served as Deputy Secretary of Defense
under James Forrestal.]
Any government, including even those
which have the most elementary inter-
national association, must collect foreign
intelligence. This pursuit of a special
kind of information-and its refined
product, which is knowledge-is an in-
dispensible function.
Vigorous nations depend on their
leaders to devise a strategy that will
provide both for their security and for
their economic and political well-being.
History teaches us that leaders cannot
meet this responsibility unless they
learn the political, economic and mil-
itary capabilities and intentions of other
nations.
Today, great nations are armed as
never before. And the leaders of great
states must take heed of the risk in-
volved. Furthermore, in their economic
life, nations both large and small are
interdependent, one with the other-
more now than ever before in the past.
On the military side, the maneuver-
ing of possible hostile forces, the de-
ployment of mass-destruction weapons
and-what could hoofI,
porlance?-the hidda PPAS
even more advanced weaponry, must
all be discovered in good time and their
possible effects measured. On the
economic side, the task of intelligence
services that provide information to safe-
guard the well-being of the state has
lately been vastly amplified: a consortia
has appeared that seeks to get economic
advantage by imposing quotas and ex-
orbitant prices on raw materials that
heretofore have been in relatively free
international flow.
Walter Lippmann once wrote, "Foreign
policy is the 'shield of the Republic";
and Sherman Kent, the distinguished
historian, has said, "Strategic intel-
ligence is the thing that gets the shield
to the proper place at the right time. It
is also the thing that stands ready to
guide the sword."
What these men are saying is merely
that sound decisions designed to pro-
tect the security interests and the
economic and political welfare of our
country can only be made against a
background of knowledge. Without the
knowledge gained from foreign-intel-
ligence gathering methods, and the ap-
praisal of the significance of that knowl-
edge developed through careful and
studious analysis of the -information,
leaders can make no policy decisions
with reasonable assurance that the ac-
tion they plan is a correct one.
All vigorous nations, large and small,
support a foreign-intelligence apparatus.
Invariably, the organization is clandes-
tine. Even in open societies, practical
considerations demand that the organ-
ization be kept out of public view and
its work made known only to the
power. When you make public dis-
closure of the intimate details of a
foreign-intelligence service you paralyze
an otherwise effective operation.
It is no surprise that the so-called
superpowers-the United States and the
Soviet Union-both maintain elaborate
intelligence systems; but the intelligence
efforts of other countries throughout the
world, some 40 in all, are also signifi-
cant. Among them all, the intelligence
service of the United States is the only
one (except West Germany's) that was
initiated and authorized legislatively-
in our case, by Congressional action
after long and thoughtful consideration
by both houses of the Congress and
with its operations and budgets re-
viewed by Congressional committees.
We got into the foreign intelligence
business fairly recently. Between the two
World Wars, the United States main-
tained little in the way of an intelligence
community. To be sure, the Army and
the Navy maintained separate intelli-
gence units of their own, specifically to
meet their needs in times of war. The
Department of State kept a watchful
eye on world happenings, and ambas-
sadors regularly reported their observa-
tions. But, we had no organization in
existence to analyze the whole flow of
information and to study the dangers to
American security inherent in the pat-
tern of action reported from abroad.
Thus, an inquiry into our surprise at
Pearl Harbor, conducted after World
War 11, disclosed that our various gov-
ernment agencies had in hand-days
prior to the actual attack-all essential
information concerning Japan's prepara-
tions for war, including the assembly
and departure of the Japanese fleet. -.+
The State, War and Navy Departments
had each gathered the information, and
each had used it for its own special
Interests, but-disastrously-no branch
of government then had the duty to put
the information together and alert the
President of impending danger.
It was to correct this gaping de-
ficiency in our government machinery
that the Central Intelligence Agency
was created under the National Se-
curity Act of 1947. To ensure that it
would remain apart from partisan at-
tachments and parochial interests, the
CIA was developed essentially as. a
civilian organization.
It was then recognized that many de-
partments of government must, in the
interests of their departmental respon-
sibilities and to broaden the base of all
intelligence appraisals, continue their
own intelligence efforts. I am speak-
ing of the intelligence division of the
State Department known as the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research--a
thoughtful organization that assesses
Information for the State Department;
the Defense Intelligence Agency that
supports the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinates
the work of the three separate service
intelligence units and manages the
corps of military attaches; the intelli-
gence units of the Army. Navy and Air
Force maintained to serve their Chiefs
of Service and to provide current tech-
nical intelligence information to field
commanders; the intelligence units of
the Treasury Department, and the En-
ergy Research and Development Agency
(formerly the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion), both of which contribute im-
portant specialized Information on for-
few who ner.,d to know. Usually, the eign developments; and, finally, the
elLhW6y2OqDlMA98lMiCkkgRD1r?r7>c'-0043tOlX6I IL O`rfstigation, which,
and the control over it are both em- As o r s extensive domestic
bedded at 1110 topmost echelon of operations, is constantly unearthing in-
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7'
formation either originating abroad or
having a significant foreign connection.
At the apex of this large, complex
Community is the Central Intelligence
Agency. Its Director, as the President's
principal intelligence officer, is charged
by Presidential directive with the re-
sponsibility for the general direction of
the community as a whole. This func-
tion he carries out in his individual role
and as chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board, which is the senior
body of the community. and is composed
of the directors of several departmental
intelligence organizations.
The Central Intelligence Agency's re-
sponsibilities, as established by law,
range from the collection of overt and
covert intelligence by its own con-
siderable establishment to the correla-
tion and assessment of intelligence
findings from all sources. In addition,
the CIA is charged with protecting in-
telligence sources and methods and
with executing tasks assigned by the
President or the National Security Coun-
cil. Under this latter mandate fall such
essential activities as counterintelli-
gence, which means ferreting out, to-
gether with the FBI, the covert activities
of others. Also, the mandate covers
covert political action and covert para-
military operation's-the supporting or
training and equipping of third-country
nationals who espouse our principles of
freedom and who are under attack by
Communist forces directed from the
center of Communist power.
Unevaluated intelligence-raw, as it
is known in the trade-comes in many
ways. Through the long sweep of his-
tory, . human contact, both open and
covert, has been the major source of
intelligence. Conversations between
heads of state, reports from ambassa-
dors and military attaches, and articles
in newspapers and other publications
all contribute to the inventory of infor-
mation. But the richest source is us-
ually the secret agent. a well-trained
professional, concealed under disarm-
ing cover, who usually moves in the
highest and most informed circles.
The ethics of clandestine intelligence
operations have long been debated and
some would do away with them. The
fact is that no international covenant
forbids clandestine operations, and they
go on as they have for centuries. At
least 40 nations today support clan-
destine services-no great state can
abandon them.
In the recent past, technology has
enormously lengthened the reach and
sharpened the penetration of intelli-
gence. High-flying aircraft carrying so-
phisticated cameras, supplemented by
orbital satellites equipped with even
more advanced cameras, have been
able to look down into fortress societies
and record in startling detail what is
actually developing.
A correspondingly wide range of elec-
tronic sensing and tracking devices
makes it quite possible to accurately
deduce the yield of nuclear devices,
exploded either in the atmosphere or
underground. at great distances: and
10 supply information on the character-
istics and performance of military equip-
ment that is being developed and tested
beyond otherwise impcneSrable frontiers.
Indeed, in the event of a surprise attack,
we would get our first warning_ of the
blow being prepared from these inlolh-
gence-gathering syalerns.
raw material, once obtained, must be
drawn together, analyzed and corre-
lated. And it must be evaluated before
it becomes useful knowledge. An es-
timate of the developing situation
emerges, and from this estimate a head
of state, consulting. with his advisers,
can chart a course of action that will
best meet the developing situation. With-
out the intelligence itself and the so-
phisticated estimate, the head of a gov-
ernment would be groping toward a
decision.
All raw intelligence entering the com-
munity flows in one form or another to
the CIA. From this processing comes a
digest of what it all means and an es-
timate of what its consequences could
be. The bits and pieces of informa-
tion from near and far are studied by
men and women of the highest capabil-
ities: political scientists, economists,
historians, linguists, engineers, phys-
icists and other experts.
Daily intelligence reports are sent to
the President and his principal advisers.
Finally, there appears a body of papers
known as the National Intelligence Es-
timates. presenting a continuing analysis
of military, political and economic situa-
tions that bear directly on our national
security and well-being.. All are the
product of the analytical process and
are prepared within the halls of the
Central Intelligence Agency, with a sub-
stantial oversight by the United States
Intelligence Board.
Preparing this body of literature in
its various forms is, in my opinion, the
most important activity of the agency.
It is certainly the least publicized.
In the discharge of 'its duties, the
United States Intelligence Board gathers
weekly at CIA headquarters-and often
more frequently-to review the national
estimates prepared by the CIA analysts.
This review is made before the es-
timates are passed to the President and
to others by the Director. It is also with-
in the Board's purview to advise the
Director on how best to supply the
intelligence needs of the Nation's policy-
makers, schedule the flights of the re-
connaissance satellites and. photo-
graphic planes, fix the tasks of the
National Security Agency, advise the
precautions that may be desirable for
protecting the Nation's intelligence
sources and methods, and maintaining
a watch office to be constantly on the
alert for surprise hostile developments.
In the tempest-abundantly reported
by television and the press-that has
been whirling over the heads of the in-
telligence community and particularly
the CIA in recent months, the accusa-
tion is frequently sounded that our in-
telligence community is an unsuper-
vised, free-wheeling body-a law unto
itself. This simply is not true. The -*
President, himself, 'exercises control in
a number of ways: through personal
contact with his Director; through the
Office of Budget and Management and a
subcommittee of the National Security
Council that oversees covert activities;
and also through a civilian advisory
board that meets frequently, reviews the
community's operations and reports to
the President. The House of Representa-
tives and the Senate have special com-
mittees to oversee the community's ac-
tivities and to review its budgets.
For all of this extensive oversight,
recent accusations of wrongdoing-
some imagined, others grossly over-
stated, but still a few justified-have
set up a clamor for closer supervision
of the intelligence operations and es-
pecially the clandestine activities.
In my opinion, the noise has been
so great and the image of CIA has
become so tarnished that changes must
be made to extinguish, as much as
possible, criticism, to restore con-
fidence and to provide an on-going
dynamic foreign intelligence service. But
no changes will be useful unless the
Congress, the press and electronic
media, and the public can feel as-
sured that the Nation's entire intelli-
gence ? service, in playing its part to
ensure the well-being of our Nation,
will always confine its operations to ac-
ceptable moral and legal standards.
The remedies involve both legislative
and executive action. As we seek
change, we must take great care not-to
damage the effectiveness of the intelli-
gence organization and we must accept
the practical truth that a foreign intelli-
gence operation, to be effective at all,
must by its very nature remain "in
privacy"-its activities must be cloaked
in secrecy. In a free society, we find it
difficult to accept this concept, but so-
ciety must accept the "cloak."
The proximity of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and its Director to the
President and the National Security
Council should be made more con-
spicuous. Indeed, it might be advisable
to identify the organization as an arm
of the National Security Council and
identify it that way by name. Its Director
would then be the Nation's principal in-
telligence officer, with statutory authority
over all of the activities now conducted
by the CIA and with general supervision
over the community as a whole. A sub-
committee of NSC with high-level repre-
sentation from State, Defense. Treasury
and the White House itself, could pro-
vide a watchful eye over all intelligence
activities, not merely certain covert op-
erations as now is the case. The Presi-
dent's Civilian Advisory Board should
continue to provide him with an in-
formed viewpoint outside of the chan-
nels of government.
To strengthen Congressional oversight,
I suggest we create a single joint com-
mittee on intelligence, with membership
drawn from both houses and adequately
staffed. Such a committee should func-
tion in the same manner as the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy has func-
tioned for almost 30 years. The con-
fidentiality of all that is provided to this
committee that I propose must remain-
within the committee, as has been the
case through the years with our nuclear
affairs. In particular, oversight by such
a joint committee must be accepted
as oversight by the Congress as a
whole.
In one way or another, risks of leaks
and disclosures of sensitive operations
must be lessened or eliminated under
severe penalties, authorized by law.
Beyond this, anyone who has been
seriously connected with the responsi-
bilities of national security will hope
that our prolonged and painful review
of the roles and missions of the CIA.
and the work of the intelligence com-
munity as a whole, will end up by pre-
serving an organization that can. serve
our security needs and yet rest com-
fortably within American political philos-
ophy. Our Nation would hardly be safe
Gathering the inform%0VbV ttFor Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
start of the intaIiige%o p ocess. ''7~he
2
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
By Lyle Denniston.
Washington star staff writer
Dick Helms was waiting for his
19-hour flight back to Tehran. He had
been home again - was it the 14th
time? -to testify before Congress.
A friend, there to see him off
,
thought Helms was somewhat preoc
parted, "if I .wind up at Leavenworth,
He finds himself somewhat oddly
poised these days.
Helms has every right to expect
,
? his Closest friends feel, that if he
came home from Iran, left the gov-
business - quickly.
But he is allowing himself to think,
at least in moments of sad humor,
penitentiary instead.
ONE OF THE most durable figures
in the government for a generation, a
easily through the. corridors of
power, an urbane and polished guest
in Washington's most envied salons,
as well connected as any professional
in town, Richard McGarrah Helms at
But, maybe, not anymore.
ing damage lawsuits in court. He has
been under criminal investigation for
a year. And every time he flies back
His woe comes mainly out of the
That role in that period has been
investigated by a half-dozen congres-
sional committees, an "in-house"
team at the CIA itself, the Rockefel-
ment, and now a federal grand jury.
"HELMS IS being absolutely
chewed up in this process," one of his
Dick is being made the sacrificial fig-
In all of the investigations, past or
has been the most predictable target.
Not surprisingly, there is a strong
worked with Helms for years that the
whole secret intelligence apparatus
former director, perhaps more so.
But it is Reims himself who per-
presidents. Only a few men in the last
30 years of American history have
reached the eminence to which
Helms rose - and he did it largely
unnoticed in public.
INDEED, THERE are those who
believe that Helms is in trouble now
-precisely because, when he did come
out into the open, he seemed so far
out of reach, so remote to the aver-
age observer in Washington.
"There is a tremendous gap," sug-
gests a diplomat who knows Helms
well, "between the power elite - and
Helms is part of that - and the little
fellow."
But even inside the "power elite,"
not many have had the respect and
trust that Helms could claim among
the truly powerful. Helms, for exam-
ple, could expect to have dinner with
a key senator, perhaps at the Sena-
tor's house, the night before appear
ing at a crucial committee session.
They might even plan how it would
go
Back when he was a fairly junior
man at the CIA, an associate recalls,
"Helms was exposed much more
than the average to the higher levels.
He was constantly being consulted."
It seems there has been something
special about Helms from the very
beginning - at least as he is seen by
men and women who frankly confess'
their bias in his favor.
"If one capsules Dick as an East-'
ern Establishment product of a mod-'
estly well-off family - out of the New
.York metropolitan area,
and Williams College -
that is about right. That'
produced a kind of person
in the Depression years who
was a little more sophisti-
cated than the average
American."
IT IS QUITE common, in
fact, for his associates to
stress Helms' breeding.,
"He is a polished and ma-
ture individual; his whole
background would indicate
that. You wouldn't expect
him to be a clumsy man,
and he isn't. Compared to
the average person, there is
a broad depth to his back-
ground."
Cultured, disciplined.
Those are the qualities that
helped Helms move up, and
move around, in Washing-
ton. There have been, to he
sure, some missteps and
mishaps along the way..
Even some of those, how-
ever, add to the image that
Helms showed to those
around him and in the
power centers of the na-
tion's capital.
Because his whole career
in government had been in
"the clandestine service"
Richard Helms has not been
conspicuous to the public.
But Helms always was
the man that an intelligence
professional could count on
back home, almost from the
earliest post-war days of
the Forties. And he became
a man whom even presi-
dents felt free to lean on.
His record in the CIA and
earlier intelligence units,
and especially his direct
service for presidents, is a
source of pride to him. "I
believed in the importance
to the nation of the function
that the agency served. I
still do: without regrets,
without qualms, without
apology," he has said.
It is a record that is pub-
licly known only in the most
general way. The specific
revelations and accusations
that have emerged from the
probes of the CIA show
some of his problems; they
do not show how- Helms got
to be a "power elite" fig-
ure.
HIS BASIC biography
provides the start: He went
to private school in Gstaad,
Switzerland, with the sons
of sheiks and prime minis-
ters, graduated Phi Beta
Kappa from Williams after
being chosen "most likely.
to succeed" in his class,
traveled frequently in
Germany . and became
fluent in the language,
interviewed Hitler as a
United Press reporter in
1936, moved into the Office
of Strategic Services as a
bright young Navy man
during the war, and was re-.
cruited into OSS service
after the war. He was in
intelligence from then on.
'His marriage, to Julia
Bretzman Shields in 1939,
was to make a major differ-
ence to his later career, in
an unusual way. The col-
lapse of that marriage in
1968 also became a factor in
'his role in government and
in Washington society.
While with the OSS dur-
ing the war, Helms made
contact with a handful of
men who would remain
influential in U.S. intelli-
gence - whether they were
inside or outside the gov-
ernment - for years to
conic. These included Allen
W. Dulles, John McCloy,
Lucius Clay, David Bruce,
Andrew Berding, Frank
Wisner.
When many of those men
.became civilians again
pare Richard helms to ligcppSQumdoFor Releasei2O0V018106 i)ClA-RDP77-OOlR82 2061 Ooa1t600`ijiitall
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
that had developed a high
sensitivity to Soviet politi-
cal maneuverings and spy
activity in Western Europe.
That provided a cohesion
which, 30 years later, still
holds many of the original
OSS men together intellec-
tually and philosophically. '
Seeing the OSS disman-
tled, -in what these men
thought was President
Harry Truman's .way of get-
ting rid of OSS' chief Wil
Liam Donovan, and worried
that Washington was not
sufficiently keen on the
Soviet threat, the small OSS
remnant kept pressuring
associates back home to get
a continuing organization
formed. The Strategic Serv-
ices Unit was set up, and
the group that included
Helms was persuaded to
stay in Europe to provide a
"product" - that is, intelli-
gence information, primari.
ly on the Soviets.
THEN THE Central Intel-
ligence Group was formed,
and Helms was brought
home to head its "German
desk." It was a key move
for him: He was in a posi-
tion in the CIG where he
could use his intelligence
background, and that would
count later in bureaucratic
skirmishes.
"In those days," one
long-time intelligence man
says, "the top leadership
was extremely, weak. The
leadership then was mili-
tary, with no knowledge of
the business."
It was at about that time
- perhaps the spring of ,
1946 - that Helms became
a "division chief" handling
what is generally referred
to as "clandestine" work.
That can mean either
gathering intelligence se-
cretly about the other side's
threat to the United States
or penetrating the other
side's spy network
("counter-intelligence"), or
trying to prevent penetra-
tion of U.S. spying
("counter-espionage").
Helms was in the division
post when the CIG became
the Central Intelligence Ag-
ency in 1947. During those
years, the sweeping
Communist takeover of
Eastern Europe and such
episodes as the Berlin air-
lift crisis produced heavy
activity in Ilelms' division.
After the Korean war had
begun, in 1950, Helms con-
tinued his rise in the CIA's
clandestine service.
. "DICK BECAME the.
buffer between the profes-
sionals and this succession
of military officers (who
headed the CIG and then
the CM)," a colleague
remembers. "This is a role
.
was
that the professionals have not controlled by Helms. It tivity.
(NOTE. Helms declined,
through the State Depart-
ment, to be interviewed for
this series. Former associ-
ates agreed to interviews,
provided that their names
not be used.)
get what you wanted."
But while he was satisfy.
ing the professionals,
Helms also was keeping his
superiors happy, too, and
was expanding his contacts
beyond the CIA at inter-
agency meetings on U.S.
foreign crises.
"As he rose in the agen-
cy," an associate says,
"Helms realized it was
important for him that he
understand the power,
influence and governmental
situation in Washington. He
couldn't lurch around town
clumsily. A lot of people
around town were very glad
to give him a hand."
He was becoming espe-
cially well connected and,
at the same time, "sure-
footed." But just as impor-
tant, he was staying in this
country. Most of his profes-
sional colleagues wanted to
be abroad: "That's where
.the fun was," one of them
suggests. But Helms could
not go overseas;.he has told
associates that his wife ob-
jected. '
Whatever.the reason, it
kept him in a key spot and
largely shaped his future
career. "From about 1950
until 1965;" says an associ-
ate, "the one point of con-
tinuity in the entire place
was Dick Helms. Every sta-
tion chief, every senior offi-
cer and a lot of the juniors
went to him."
IN THE EARLY part of
this period, when the agen-
cy was still feeling its way,
in a new field, Helms' su-
periors also depended upon
him, passing to him many of
the minor but necessary
administrative headaches
of the day.
With- the Korean war,
pressure from U.S. military
and diplomatic officials for
intelligence "results" in-
creased. Those demands
apparently were not limited
to gathering spy data on the
enemy. They included what
intelligence officers call
"clandestine operations" -
that is, undercover
military-type or political
action, helping friends or'
hurting enemies in a regime
or country abroad.
"We had all done
clandestine operations dur-
ing the war; we knew how
to do it," says a Helms as,
sociate from the OSS days
and later.
However. a new unit was
formed - the Office of poli-
cy Coordination -- to do the
Disparagingly, one of
Helms' colleagues of that
time suggests that the OPC
"wanted to remake the
world with huge sums of
money, subsidies, black
bags and so forth. There
was pretty considerable
chaos, for a few years."
THE PROFESSIONALS'
dominance, however, began
to re-emerge when Allen
Dulles, back in the agency,
moved up to head CIA in
1953. "This was somebody
we all knew," says one of
the professionals -of that
period. "Dulles was very
knowledgeable, very intelli-
gent, he had some knowl-
edge of the operations busi-
ness."
It was a boon to Helms'
career, too. "Here was
Dulles' favorite younger
officer, Mr. Richard Helms,
close at hand," an associate
relates. "Dick became the
focal point between all the
guys who were in the opera-
tions business."
Most importantly, Dulles
tired of having two sections
of the agency handling
"clandestine" work, so he
merged the intelligence-
gathering functions with the
"operations" activities.
This came, Helms' associ-
ates say, after "a whole
series of embarrassments"
by the "operations people."
Helms was the No. 2 man
at the top of the clandestine
unit, but actually was more
than a deputy. His boss,
Frank Wisner - an old OSS
partner - relied on him
heavily.
"For the first time, the
professionals had a chance
to get at some of these fair-
ly wild schemes," a col-
league remembers, suggest-
ing that Helms and his staff
brought "operations" back
to what was practical and
workable.
When Wisner's health
broke, Dulles did not put
Helms in charge. Instead,
he turned to Richard Bissell
- a move that hurt Helms'
pride, so much that he con-
sidered quitting. "This was
a rough period for Dick's
ego," a close friend remem-.
bers.
BUT HIS CAREER actu-
ally benefited. Because he
was one of their own, CIA
professionals continued to
work mostly through
Helms. But, more decisive-
ly, Bissell got into trouble.
The fiasco of th,~ Bay of
Pigs - the CIA-managed
invasion of Cuba during the
John Kennedy administra-
tion - cost Bissell as well
as Dulles their jobs in 1962.
Helms became "deputy
director of plans" - that is,
professionals were concern-
ed," according to a col-
league. When a
businessman -engineer,
John McCone, became head
of CIA after Dulles, "Helms
pretty much was left to con-
tinue to run the business."
"Pretty soon," an associ-
ate says, "John Kennedy.
was calling Dick Helms."
McCone, close to Kenne-
dy, had done much to help
Helms meet the right people
around town. He also coach-
ed Helms on "the world of
Washington," a friend says.
"From the down days
under Bissell, until he was
brought along by McCone, I
have never seen such
growth as there was in
Helms. Even his manner-
isms became more re-
fined."
HE MOVED UP to be
deputy director of CIA in
1965, under President Lyn-
don Johnson's choice as
CIA chief after McCone,
Adm. William F. (Red) Ra-
born.
"Here, again," a CIA
professional says, "the one
person inside the agency on
the clandestine side who
had had the public exposure
at State. Defense, the White
House, was Dick." In June,
1966, after President John-
son had tired of Raborn's
repeated miscues - includ-
ing a suggestion to the
Dutch intelligence chief
that the United States
should give Germany the
atomic bomb - Raborn was
'fired. Helms became CIA
chief.
That pleased the CIA '
professionals - and the
press - immensely. Here
was a leader who had come
all the way from the begin-
ning, who could sit down
with a troubled case officer
or station chief and ease his
woes, who became "one of
the most visible and most
popular - probably THE
most popular" - director
ever, and a man who "knew
a lot of people in town."
He ran his office effi-
ciently; the desk was usual-
ly clean when he went home
at night. Associates de-
scribe him as a man who
"didn't pontificate with peo-
ple, who "didn't put on
airs," who was "direct,
friendly - but tough if. he
has to be," who was;
"charming but with possi-
bly a little suggestion of 1
iron underneath," who "at-
tracted very deep-rooted
personal loyalty."
Socially, llelms was as
much a success as he was
at the office. However, he
never was regarded as "a
superficial playboy" or "a
social butterfly." lie was.
an old friend says, "no man
to stay up over the last
drink."
",Per .:t011S" jobs
It
to wander Rlovd'trp3dj F Fd9sb120()11V06108 :ut'iAr-R6DR7)7a(Mi2kG6?10041d?06c7. Helms is said to
be a. titan w/io needs sleep
h i',y ninth of abo6':'.-ndks and 4
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005=7
,more than most men his
age. He falls to sleep quick-
ly, sleeps easily and long.
THERE WAS always a
measure of semi-anonymity
to his social pursuits. At
parties, one hostess says,
"he sits in the background
mostly; he never let you
know what he was think-
ing."
He'drinks Scotch, but
never more than a couple of
drinks. He also is said to be
fond of fine wine - a taste
he had brought home from
Europe.
There is no doubt that
Helms became a sought-
after guest in Washington.
During the time he was
separated. from his first
wife, when Helms lived at
the Chevy Chase Club, he
was regularly pursued by
hostesses. "One society fig-
ure here says that "all the
women would say, `Why
don't we get Dick Helms for
an `extra'?" He was re-
.garded, she adds, "as very
.un-creepy; he would strike
WASHINGTON STAR
15 JAN 1976
you as a Chevy Chase golf-I
er." (Actually, his game is
tennis.)
It was during this same
time that Helms was rising,
in the space of three years, .
to the top of CIA. And that,
some of his old friends
think, was a most difficult
and very likely costly ex-
perience for him.
"The sudden move from
down inside the agency, to
deputy and then to director,
pitched Dick out into that
world of chauffeur-driven
cars, club memberships,
the social circuit, exposure
to Cabinet meetings, the
NSC, senators and con-
gressmen," a long-time as-
sociate says. Despite his
"training" under McCone,
..it was the first time Helms
was in a world where he
was not sure-footed."
THERE ALSO were diffi-
culties at home. He and his
wife were separated for a
long period, and then di-
vorced. Helms married the
woman who had- been a _so-
cial friend of the family,.
Mrs. Cynthia McKelvie.
The divorce, all of his
friends say, was a heavy
financial burden to Helms.
"Dick was not a wealthy
man. In the divorce, he
gave up what he had..He
and Cynthia have sailed
very close to the wind finan-
cially," says a close friend.
"They have been remark-
ably adept at maintaining
their position under the cir-
cumstances."
The Helmses took an
apartment at the Irene, a
high-rise on Willard Avenue
in Chevy Chase. "It used to
be such a surprise; Dick
always answered the phone
himself," recalls an ac-
quaintance. "He said they
couldn't afford any ser-
vants, that there was hard-
ly enough money for the
furniture."
In fact, some of Helms'
friends believe that the
financial situation and the
difficulties of adjustment
kept Helms from leaving
government service at that
time.
"I asked him why he
agreed to take the ambassa-
dorship," said a friend. "He
said he wanted to get Cyn-
thia away where she could
live comfortably for a
while."
HE APPARENTLY had
had several good job offers
outside of government. But
he agreed to go to Tehran
after, apparently, being
fired from the CIA job by
President Nixon. "He was
quite unceremoniously
forced out," says an associ-
ate.
Called to Camp David
Nixon's Maryland retreat,
Helms was given a choice of
ambassadorships. He chose
Iran, and went.
Afterward, CIA Director
William E. Colby is said to
have remarked to Defense
Secretary James Schlesing-
er (Helms' immediate
successor at CIA) when
both of them had been fired
by President Ford:
"You know, Dick Helms
outlasted us both."
The Charmed Life of Richard Helms - Park 2
By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer
- The whole room tells of power, of
rank, of prestige; it may be one of
the most impressive places in Wash-
ington.
On two walls are photographs of
many of the figures who have domi-
nated this city since World War II;
many of the pictures are signed with
a warm, personal note.
On another wall, there is an array
of certified honors capable of stirring
deep envy.
And on the fourth wall, there is the
most enviable collection of all: this
man's portrait on a half-dozen front
covers of news magazines. r
Of course, there is the man him-
self. If anyone in Washington can
claim respect, surely he could - and
does. He speaks easily, assuredly,
knowingly. Behind an imposing desk,
his gaze is fixed in a dominating way.
THIS IS Stuart Symington, U.S.
senator from Missouri. A man who
has known presidents and has been
consulted by them. A man who, it
often has been assumed, ought to
have been in the White House him-
self.
He also is one of Richard Helms'
be._t r_:....,t.. .., Washington
committee sometimes went
for a whole year without
meeting.
It was within such a
small community of the
powerful that the CIA and
Helms routinely operated -
and -did so with approval, at
least implied approval.
BUT TIMES have
changed. Powerful friends.
like Symington are in no
position to stop the process
of inquiry that is now going
on, or even to shape its
course. In fact, they are
'feeling pressed themselves
to come up with some ideas.
of their own for reform.
The process means, for
Helms individually, that his
reputation and perhaps his
future are very, much at
stake:
He is described. by
friends as somewhat stoic
about the prospect of per-
sonal ruin, perhaps telling
'himself that it is the price
he knew he might have to
pay in his kind of profes-
sion. He is not going to take
on his critics or criticize his
w a
even,
h of is
b bl
o
t
It IS p1 ; t..u,, ........- _e reality _ f .,... ,, .. Helms has been in that very office in Tememucred for having said that he sociates say. "I don't think
the Russell 1;uiiding, sharing with had not evt!n asked about the CIA you'll find Helms throwing
Symington secrets that never will be running a secret war in a lot of mud around," says
known publici'. Laos. Lately, Symington a former colleague.
Symington doesn't reveal tnem; he has re)eatcd often that the But what is happening to
does not even allude to them. But he Sen to s CIA "oversight" Helms and to the CIA
Approved For Realease ease'2001/0CIA-R1T77-00,f32Rbd01 M4t1'665-0ll a
is ready, even eager, to defend
Helms.
"I'm just as sure that that man
didn't do anything that wasn't in the
national interest as I am that the sun
is going to come up tomorrow morn-
ing."
It is a testimonial that, at the mo-
ment, Helms needs badly. The for-
mer director of the CIA is
beleaguered, and nowhere is he in
more trouble than in Congress. Day
after day, accusations of CIA
misdeeds come out of congressional
committees and Helms gets a good
share of the blame.
THE TROUBLE with Symington's
support, however, is that it doesn't
mean much these days. At another
time, even a hint of doubt about what
the CIA was up to would have been
turned off with a word from a Sym-
ington or an Allen Eliender, a John
Stennis or a Mendel Rivers.
A little circle of members was the
only forum in Congress to which the
CIA reported. It was not uncommon,
apparently, for those lawmakers to
decide that no one else on Capitol Hill
needed to know what they had been
told.
There were no leaks. There was
nd then the pretense or
no
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROO0100410005-7
wider aspect, too. It may
affect the whole future of
the secret intelligence sys-
tem.
Somewhat awkwardly
and uncertainly, it seems,
Congress has been trying to
take over some of the power
of foreign policy manage-
ment. The spy business is,
and always .has been, di-
rectly mixed up in that.
The approval - or, at
least, the easy tolerance -
:of what the CIA was doing
was part of a well de-
veloped congressional habit
of leaving the tough deci-
sions on diplomacy and
military strategy to the
White House. The lawmak.
ers chose to be very accom-
modating, and presidents
took that to mean indiffer-
ence.
THAT SYSTEM came
close to collapsing with the
Vietnam war, in the later
stages, anyway. And it then
became politic - and po-
litically salable - for Con-
gress to try to assert itself.
That was especially true
after the Pentagon Papers
"leak" and then the Water-
gate scandals showed how
far presidents felt free to go
in the name of "national se-
curity" The CIA revela-
tions followed, almost pre-
dictably.
"I believe," suggests a
former colleague of Helms,
"that the combination of
disgust and fatigue from
Vietnam and Watergate are
playing an equal role."
It is not yet clear, and
won't be for months, how
far Congress wants to go
now to give itself control
over the CIA or to put other
kinds of restraints on the
agency. So far, Senate and
House committees have fo-
cused on a variety of CIA
"dirty tricks," but it is not
yet clear that Congress is
prepared to put a stop to all
of that.
There are even fewer in-
dications of what Congress
Wants done about the entire
approach to spying and
intelligence in general.
Some who have spent
their careers in espionage
seem prepared to believe
that - because of the kind
of inquiry Congress is mak-
ing - the CIA may simply
be abolished.
"THE AGENCY," one of
these professionals com-
ments, "doesn't deserve a
living from the United
States. The United States
can do anything it wants to
the agency. .. . But if you
base a decision on what, so
far, the country has b. en
given to hear, I see no rea-
son to expect that the agen-
ev would not be disman-
about Congress' intentions
at this point is whether it
wants to do anything at all
about the power of presi-
dents to use the CIA.
That is where long-time
professionals in U.S. spying
see the most serious
abuses, and that is where
most of them think Helms'
problems - and those of
other CIA leaders - first
arose.
There has been a split,
for at least 25 years, in the
intelligence community
over the value of the so-
called "cowboy" approach
to espionage. That ap-
proach means all the secret
techniques of disrupting the
enemy, from supporting
favored political factions
abroad to dreaming up
schemes to murder foreign
leaders such as Fidel Cas-
tro.
Pressure from the very
top of the government for
"cowboyism" apparently
began to develop heavily
during the Korean war,
when the CIA's Office of
Policy Coordination - the
"dirty tricks department"
- was formed.
"If the government had-
n't been so hepped on this in
the early Fifties, a lot of
these problems wouldn't
have arisen," says a CIA-
leader of that era.
PRESIDENT Dwight
Eisenhower probably was
the first to show a real
interest in that side of the
intelligence business, ac-
cording to the profession-
als. "He had dealt with
intelligence and operations,
and with the Resistance,
during the war," recalls
one.
Within the White House,
the National Security Coun-
cil began working up
schemes to make trouble
for Communist regimes
abroad. There quickly de-
veloped a tendency at the
agency's OPC to plan
major - and very expen-
sive - "covert operations."
Under the pressure, the
agency got sloppy about
this side of its work, ac-
cording to career men who
were involved. "We were
talking about sending 20
people where one would do,
spending $20 million instead
of $1 million," recalls one
professional, who adds:
"Nothing so concentrates
the mind of an intelligence
agency as a healthy short-
age of funds."
But there was no short-
age, and most professionals
at the CIA knew the reason:
The White House was inter-
ested. "It was perfectly
policy vacuum."
Another remembers:
"Allen Dulles used to come
back from the White House
with one of these ideas, and
he would say: 'Don't tell me
it's crazy - we don't have
any choice.'
THE* PROCESS appar-
ently stirred deep dissen.
sion within CIA ranks. One
key source of resentment,
apparently, was a depar-
ture from the system of
having "clandestine opera-
tions" plans work their way
up from the station chiefs
abroad.
"For many years - up to
the arrival of the Kennedys,
perhaps it was with Eisen-
hower - nothing had ever
been generated and put into
motion-that didn't originate
in the operations area, and
then was pushed upward for
approval, at the - policy
area," a CIA leader re-
counts.
Some who did not like the
idea of starting at the top
with such schemes protest-
ed and, when that failed,
got out. But, one profes-
sional says, "some of us
used to sit around and ra-
tionalize that, if we left,
someone else would just be
put in to do it. Some of us.
felt we could keep these
things under control." But
he adds bluntly, "you ac-
cepted these demands or
you got out."
Helms did not get out.
"His primary loyalty was to
the executive," an associ-
ate suggests. "That was the
tradition in which he was
raised as a professional.
This is where you basically
were going to get your
orders. If you got a request
from the White House, it
was pretty hard to say no.
What the hell were you in
business for?"
Another CIA professional
describes what was hap-
pening within the govern-
ment and CIA:
"Since Kennedy - in-
cluding Johnson and Nixon
- you have had a personal-
ized government; the
government of the U.S. is
run out of the White House,
a strong president relying
on one or two individuals.
"A LOT OF the cowboy
bent in recen years stein
med from the fact that'
we've had frustrated presi-
dents. They had problems
they couldn't solve through
would be sent for, and told
he's got to save Iran, or
save Jordan, or save Italy,
or save France. He would
say, 'Yes sir!' and then he
would come back and say
'Save Italy!' "
It is because of such
recollections that CIA
professionals angrily dis-
pute the remark of Chair-
man Frank Church, D-
Idaho. of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee that the
CIA has acted as "a rogue
elephant" and that it treat
ed the presidency "almost
as an irrelevancy."
Some of these men also
think that one defense made;
by Helms himself - that
presidents have been
shielded from knowing
embarrassing things, so
they could deny them if the
United States got caught -
has been heavily overdone.
That, one ex-CIA official
says, "is a complete red
herring." Another, while
conceding that there have
been times "where the link
between policy and carry-
ing it out has become fuzzy
over a period of time," adds
that "most of these have
not been because of a deter-
mination of Helms that he
was going to run the show."
These professionals are
just as sure that Helms, and
others, did not operate
without telling Congress
what they were doing. They
dispute Sen. Symington's
comment that "the CIA
wasn't watched; they could
do anything they wanted."
ONE FORMER CIA offi-
cer recalls: "You would go
up there and brief two or
three guys. Then you might
be called before the full
committee in an open hear-
ing; and there sat those
boys who know all about
this, looking up at the ceil-
ing."
There is, among the men
who served along with
Helms, a growing skepti-
cism that Congress and the
White House will now do?
much more than they ever
have to provide solutions
for the problems now being
uncovered.
"The question is," says
one of these professionasis,
"can Congress and the
executive arrange their af-
fairs in such a way that the
agency can conduct opera-
tions with proper guid-
ance?"
Another adds: "This is
not so much a problem for
the agency. God damn it,
the country's faced with the
problem. I don't think it's
important what happens to
the a ency. But I .%ou d
have thought the first thing
we would want to do was to
study the United States as it
is today, and decido v ,;-l it
e w
e peop
were
tled." Approved fem , ei1easet2OO1/O8lO8 : C ~ '43~'V Oo'1bO41
in no ` ` o3' overt lore
What is the least pcicar felt they were actu7
g
(at CIA'.7, Allen Dulles 6
clear to me, says a man
who was in the "opera-
tions" side of CIA then,
'.that th
ho
l
the orthodox machinery of
government. And they
haven't been willing to use
their own powers.
"They have been inclined
more to turn to the agency
for capabilities they didn t
really understand. They
would go to State and go to
the Pentagon, then some.
,6z.IA what
needs apun bey and
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
do."
Helms' former col-
leagues see a possibility
that, after the focus on
CIA's misdeeds in secret
military or political adven-
tures, Congress may decide
to wipe out "the clandestine
side of the business." That
would include intelligence-
gathering and protection of
WASI4INGTCN STAR
16 Jan. 1976
the U.S. espionage network
itself, as well as "dirty,
tricks" operations.
"IF THE UNITED States
is to be asked to forgo any
covert means of obtaining
intelligence, we certainly
would get less intelligence.
The amount of hard fact
which emerges from
Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer
It is somewhat after 10 in the
morning, June 23, 1972. In the Oval
Office at the White House, presiden-
tial assistant H.R. Haldeman is talk-
ing - quite excitedly - to President
Richard M. Nixon.
"You seem to think the thing to do
is to get them to stop?" Haldeman
asks, referring to the FBI investiga-
tion of the Watergate burglary just
six days before.
"Right, fine," Nixon answers.
"They say," Haldeman says, "the
only way to do that is from White
House instructions. And it's got to be
to Helms and to -= ah, what's his
name - ? Walters." He goes on:
"And the proposal would be that
Ehrlichman and I call them in, and
say, ah - "
He - doesn't finish the .scenario.
Nixon interrupts: "All right, fine.
How do you call him in - I mean you
dust - well, we protected Helms
from one hell of a lot of things."
Haldeman, agrees. "That's what
Ehrlichman says."
THE "HELMS" they say has been
protected is Richard Helms, at the
time the director of the CIA.
His name comes up again that day
at the White House, a few hours
later. Again, Haldeman is talking
about the plan to get the FBI to stop
the Watergate investigation, relying
on Helms to do it.
The President says: "If it gets out
that this is all involved, the Cuba
thing would be a fiasco. It would
make the CIA look bad, it's going to
make Hunt look bad, and it is likely
to blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing
which we think would be very unfor-
tunate - both for CIA, and for the
country, at this time, and for Ameri-
can foreign policy. Just tell him to
lay off. Don't you?"
Haldeman agrees. and seems
satisfied with the solution. "Yep.
That's the basis to do it on. Just leave
it at that."
As that part of the conversation
closes, Nixon again mentions Helms
in a cryptic way: "Helms is not one
to (unintelligible;
TILE REFERENCES to Helms
meant little when that day's tran-
script came out in the late summer of
1974 The mentions of Helms, in fact,
clandestine intelligence is a
small part of the total infor-
mation available at any one
time - but it very often is
priceless. Very often, it is
the missing link."
There appears to be
major concern, in fact, that
a loss of secret
information-gathering
could hamper the process of
developing the "intelli-
gence estimates" upon
which much U.S. military
and diplomatic policy is
based.
The future of the "esti-
mates" system has not fig-
ured significantly in con-
E ressional probes of the
IA.
The charmed life of Richard Helms
own early role in the "Watergate
cover-up" - the revelation that
forced the president to resign.
But the references to Helms may
have meant something significant
then. If ever explained fully, they
may mean something significant in
the future.
For the time being, however, they
are merely in the record of history,
posing still lingering questions about
Richard Helms and the Watergate
scandals.
Those scandals included, of course,
not only the burglary at the Demo-
cratic Committee headquarters at
the Watergate complex, and the
"cover-up" of the White House role
in trying to stop the FBI probe, but
also the use of the White House
"Plumbers" team for a 1971 break-in
at a California psychiatrist's office
during the White House-led investi
gation of the Pentagon Papers leak.
It is one of the ironies of Helms'
current problems that he and his as-
sociates believe that he was fired as
CIA chief, and sent off to be ambas-
sador to Iran, solely because he
would not cooperate with Nixon and
? Part 3
ings that Helms attended at
the White House as the
Watergate case began to
unfold, and the variety of
ways in which top Nixon
aides leaned on the CIA.
Still, it is uncertain that
!everything there is to be
known about any of that has
been disclosed. Some of the
CIA's own tape recordings
have been destroyed. Not
all, of the White House tape
recordings have been dis-
closed.
. There is no indication,
though, that Helms faces
legal problems because of
the scandals beyond the
potential difficulty in the
Justice Department's year-
old perjury investigation of
some of his congressional
testimony. The whole mat-
ter seems largely closed.
WHAT HAS come out
publicly has raised, but not
answered, at least these
questions about Helms and
the scandals:
? What did. Nixon mean
"The word was passed around 'at about having "protected"
the time," recalls a friend of Helms, Helms?
Nixon confident
"that Helms had not been able to get Why was
along with (Henry) Kissinger. That that Helms would go along
is totally false. The real reason is with the idea of using a
that Helms had stood up against "national security" ruse to
Nixon on the Watergate cover-up." stop the FBI investigation
PART OF the roof that of Watergate.
p Why did neither Helms
persuades Helms' associ- nor any other CIA official
ates that he was punished tell Watergate prosecutors
for being "obstructionist" about these pressures or
on Watergate is that, on about past associations with
leaving the CIA, he did.not Howard Hunt when they,
get the National Security first learned he was tied to
Medal - something that a the Watergate burglary?
retired CIA chief might . Why didn't they tell the,
normally expect. The idea prosecutors about Nixon
was suggested, but never campaign aide James W.
acted upon at the White McCord's attempts to warn
House. the CIA that the White
Helms' conduct in each of House was trying to make
the scandals has been Watergate look like a CIA
probed by a variety of con- plot in order to protect its
gressional committees. secrecy?
Pages upon pages of . Did anyone at the CIA
committee hearings track know, in advance, about the
back and forth over the Watergate break-in?
Plumbers incident, CIA ? What does it mean that
sponsorship of some of for. Howard Hunt
an ex-CIA
,
were largely passed over then amid 1 r CIA officer E. Howard c~
the sensational revelat4ippirb>tlea"iFmr Fipjgafeggg;l $1Q8tiitQjA-RDP77-00 jf ;Q01i 'Q 9v?Qc t
7 and in the Watergate bur-
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROO0100410005-7
glar ?
? Why did the CIA try to
head off FBI inquiries into
White House aide John D.
Ehrlichman's dealings with
the CIA over the Plumbers
incident a year before
Watergate?
? What is the full story be-
hind Helms' firing as CIA
director?
described his reactions at a
key White House meeting in
1972 this way:
"Here was Mr. Halde-
man, Mr. Ehrlichman, the
two most senior officials in
the White House next to the
president himself, giving
this instruction. And I real-
1y feel like now, as I did
then, that it ' would have
been presumptuous to have
pressed them any harder as
to how they had come up
with this, or where they had.
gotten the idea, or who was
behind it."
Helms also has testified
that he did not feel free to
E o around Haldeman and.
hrlichman and talk to
Nixon himself about the as-
signment those aides were
giving to the CIA.
It is not clear, yet, just
what kind of relationship
Helms had with Nixon. His
associates say they doubt
that the CIA director ever
felt he could pick up the
telephone and call the
president, and they say he
was at the White House
fewer times than specula-
tion would indicate.
Helms has said that, at
that 1972 White House
meeting in the week after.
the Watergate burglary,'
Haldeman passed him by
and spoke directly to his
deputy - Lt. Gen. Vernon
A. Walters - about the plan
to "limit" the FBI probe.
Helms, however, did regard
that as "odd," he has testi-
fied.
SEN. STUART Syming-
ton, D-Mo., a close friend of
Helms, has suggested that
the Nixon administration
put Walters in as Helms'
deputy to insure that one of
"their men" would be in a
controlling spot at CIA.
Walters had been an official
interpreter for Nixon dur-
ing some of his foreign trips
as vice president in the
1950s.
cover-up by paying Water- agents or operations, it
gate burglars bail fees. (CIA) should be immedi.
But there are many gaps ately notified."
between those claims of Four days later, accord.
non-involvement and the ing to testimony by Gen.
specific suggestions, hints Walters, White House aide
and implications that come John W. Dean began pres-
out of the mass of testimony suring the agency to use
and evidence gathered in "covert action funds" to
congressional probes of pay bail and salaries for the
Watergate. Watergate burglars be-
Perhaps the most signifi- cause they "were getting
cant day in the whole period scared and were wob-
for Helms,' then and now, bling."
was June 23, 1972 - six The general has testified
days after the Watergate that he felt this approach
burglary, and the day on was wrong, and said he told
which Nixon and Haldeman Dean he "would have no
talked of using Helms to part in this and was quite
shut off the FBI probe of prepared to resign on this
Watergate. issue." Helms said he ad-
BETWEEN THE Oval vised Walters not to "yield
Office sessions of Nixon and an inch" in his resistance.
Haldeman that are record- Thus, within 10 days after
ed on the June 23 tapes, the burglary. Helms was
there was a meeting a little aware that the White House
after 1 p.m. elsewhere in was heavily involved with
the White House: in Ehr- the Watergate incident, and
that the CIA was being
lichman's office on the'sec- pressured to take a role.
and floor. This was called to In fact, however, he knew
put into effect the plan that - two days after the bur-
the president and Halde- glary - that the incident
man had just agreed to fol- was somehow related to
low. Nixon's campaign organ-
Haldeman and Ehrlich- ization. On Monday, June
man we're there, and so 19, Helms talked with CIA
were Helms and Walters. aides about the involvement
When' Helms first dis- of McCord, one of those ar-
cussed that meeting at a rested that Saturday morn-
congressional hearing in ing. McCord was a former
May 1973, he said the CIA officer and Helms
Watergate burglary was apparently knew right
not discussed. However, away that McCord was
when he next discussed it, working as chief of Nixon's
in August 1973, after seeing campaign security staff.
a memo by Walters on the The role of Helms and the
meeting, Helms said CIA in the Watergate affair
Haldeman did mention the has been probed at length
burglary and had said that by Sen. Howard Baker, R-
"the opposition" (presum- Tenn., who was a member
ably, the Democrats) was of the Senate Watergate
"capitalizing on it." Committee, and his staff
He said Haldeman made aide on that panel, Fred D.
some "incoherent reference Thompson.
to an investigation in Mexi- THEY HAVE explored
co, or an FBI investigation, the activities of Robert F.
running into the Bay of Bennett, whose public rela-
Pigs." tions firm had hired How-
That, as Helms said he and Hunt after he retired
learned later, was a refer- from the CIA in 1970. Ben-
ence to the fact that some nett'S f;r w
m
THOSE QUESTIONS, in
turn, lead to others, broad-
er in scope and perhaps
harder to answer, about
Helms and the CIA in the
Nixon era.
They involve the degree
to which CIA's intelligence
duties are carried out here
eit home, the sensitivity -
or lack of it - at the White
House about limits, on CIA's
authority, the nature of
CIA-FBI dealings, the con-
trols - or lack of them -
on secret escapades by ex-
CIA officers, the chain of
command within the CIA
and above it, the responsi-
bility - if any - of CIA's
leaders to filter out the
necessary from the frivo-
lous when .they get orders
from the White House, and
obey only the ones that they
think are compelling.
One conclusion, bearing
on many of these issues,
does seem to have emerged
already: The CIA was
treated in the Nixon admin-
istration as virtually an
extension of the White
House. Perhaps, as some of
Helms' colleagues have
suggested, that was the ap-
proach that presidents have
taken for the past 20 years.
Helms' troubles and the
current plight of the CIA it-
self are posing issues that,
.apparently, no one in gov-
ernment has ever asked
seriously.
"You have to define what
a president can do itttder
the term 'national
security,' " suggests one of
Helms' long-time associ-
ates.
The Watergate scandals
seem almost a classic case
study of extreme answers
to that. Very early and
throughout, the one theory
upon which aides - and
Nixon himself - sought to
justify their actions was
"national security." But it
is not even clear that offi-
cials felt obliged to define
what they meant; merely
reciting the phrase often
seemed to be enough.
as as a
That is the same Walters, money from Nixon's cam- , t
however, whose name aign organization had been -CIA cover" at the he time..
Haldeman had trouble laundered" through Mexi- Just ibefore n
remembebreak-in at the remembering when he talk- co before it wound up in the had learned Bennett
Hunt had
ed of going to CIA officials bank account of one of the been planning to wiretap
about the FBI. Watergate burglars, a the telephones at Demo-
There is one fact: Helms Cuban exile leader. critic -candidate George
was removed as CIA direc- Haldeman went on to say, McGovern's headquarters
tor at the end of 1972, before Helms said, that the Mexi- here. Two days after the
the Watergate scandal can angle could lead the Watergate burglary - be-
began to unravel publicly. FBI to discover some "cov- fore Hunt's name was men-
Beyond that, there is his ert" CIA operations, and tioned by the press as hav-
own testimony that he did that Walters should go to ing been tied to that
fight against misuse of the Acting FBI Director L. incident - Bennett talked
CIA in the cover-up. Patrick Gray and tell him with Hunt and a
rentl
ppa
y
IT IS APPARENT, how In May 1973, Helms told to stay out of that area - all' but confirmed his strong
ever, that when White the Senate Foreign the that the FBI probe "should suspicion that Hunt was
House officials turned to the Ctions had "totally and l that 1h00 the be tapered off or reduced, deeply involved with
CIA CIA, they did not bother to or something." Watergate.
in any ac- mpts Bennett told a CIA case
go into detail about security to -et t it involved resisted"
t
d
justifications. Ordering the officer with whom he h:,
agency into action was August this country. In AS THEY LEFT the been dealing about his
s
August 1973, he told the meetin Helms testified, sus p of Hunt, but not
justification enough. p
Helms, in 1973 testimony Senate Watergate Commit- he waled downstairs with until July 10, A memo on
tee he had told Walters to Walters to a waiting auto- that conversation sup-
'e on tscandals, gave some "hang in there" in resisting mobile, and told the general
osedly was given to
indicatran of what he felt White House demands that to say only to Gray that "if
was expected of him. A rovedlaf&ERtANEraSer2OOm/O1N08 t43A(31D1R7 1004$8M0O1OO 1e( (' At.Fatc prosecutors
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
had learned before then
from Bennett himself that
he thought Hunt was in-
volved. But the CIA itself
reportedly did not relate
any of this either to prose-
cutors or to the FBI.
The agency also did not
pass along word that a CIA
employe, Lee R. Penning-
ton Jr., had gone to visit
McCord's home shortly
after the burglary, and may
have destroyed some
records. That data also was
withheld, for a time, from
the Senate Watergate Com-
mittee.
Much of the' testimony
and evidence that raises
questions about Helms and
the whole series of scandals
during the Nixon adminis-
tration bears on the role of
Hunt, and CIA officials'
awareness of that.
One of Helms' own as-
sociates criticizes the
'Helms-Hunt relationship:
"As a personal weakness,
Helms tolerated some
prima donnas - like E?
Howard Hunt - beyond the
time he should have."
Aside from the Bennett
memo showing his suspi-
cion that Hunt may have
been involved. in the break-
in plot, 'the Baker-Thomp-
son investigation turned up
evidence that in March 1972
three months before the
Watergate burglary - a
CIA officer in Miami was
told that "Hunt was em-
ployed by the White
WASHINGTON STAR
1 7 JAN 1976
By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer
House." At the time, Hunt
was recruiting Cuban
exiles, apparently for the
burglary.
Helms' associates insist
that the White House did.
not check with the CIA be.
fore putting Hunt on its
payroll, and that, if it had, a
"derogatory" reply would
have been given.
ANOTHER ITEM that
figured in the Baker-
Thompsn probe was a
transcript of a CIA tape
recording of a telephone
call that Ehrliehman had
made to the CIA on July 7,
1971, asking that help be
provided for Hunt for an
investigation he was doing.
That call, made to the
then-CIA deputy director,
Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Jr., apparently was part of
the White House Plumbers
investigation of the leak of
the secret Pentagon Papers
to the New York Times. As
part of that probe, a White
House team led by Hunt
broke into the office of a
Beverly Hills, Calif., psy-
-chiatrist, Dr. Lewis Field-
ing. He had been treating
Daniel Ellsberg, allegedly.
the source of the leak of the-
documents.
The Ehrlichman-Cush-
man transcript about Hunt
reportedly was discussed
by CIA officials at a meet-.
ing June 19, 1972 - 'two'
days after the Watergate
burglary, and three months
after the agency is said to
Dick Helms had a lot on his mind
when he got to work on that Friday
morning.
In Moscow, the Soviet Union was
ousting four British diplomats and a
businessman, showing mild displeas-
ure over Britain's decision of two
weeks earlier to throw out 105 Soviet
spies.
In Paris, negotiations over an
agreement to end the Vietnam war
were idling along between the United
States and North Vietnam.
And in Hanoi, Soviet President
Nikolai V. Podgorny wound up a five-
day visit, leaving behind new
promises of military aid to North
Vietnam.
IT WAS OCT. 8,1971; Helms was
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, responsible for watching
what America's enemies do.
The most. significant matter of the
day for Helms was not, however,
overseas. It was a summons to the
Oval Office at the White House, by
operatives had found a unique way to
translate what they had learned
about the fall of Diem.
Copies of phony cables to Saigon,
making President John Kennedy's
government look even worse, were
found in the White House safe of E.
Howard Hunt after the Watergate
break-in.
The incident over the secret files
was described by the Rockefeller
Commission after its investigation of
the CIA last year as "another serious
instance of misuse of the agency by
the White House."
It concluded: "The commission
recognizes that the director cannot
be expected to disobey a direct re-
quest or order from the President
without being prepared to resign."
resign. He and
his agency were drawn into many of
the Nixon administration's multi-fa-
ceted efforts against domestic
have
h
i
f
osal
es. 1 V.a?y o
t
e
ene
Richard Nixon and his aides had ". p
Nixon took the file and slid it into a been found to be plainly illegal. It
wanted to get secret files held by th ? e?k dr.~u j' rprtKident ,
CIA, for use .at;ai,iAlppiip_VeA or ge~eas Abol/0p/OP
ItOr it : CIA-RDPne-004 2ROh?0L'-ootl 111 UO&l~ y to work vu
enemies" -- administration critics, evident that the White lfouse political
have. learned that Hunt was
working for the White
House. (Whether it is a
coincidence or not, that is
the same day on which
Helms talked with aides
about McCord and the
Watergate break-in.)
THE ACTUAL tape
recording of the Ehrlich-
man call in 1971 was de-.
stroyed in January 1973.
Congressional probers were
told this was done on
Helms' direct orders.
Helms was then in the proc-'
ess of leaving the CIA post.
He has testified that every-
thing the agency had on
any of the scandals had
been turned over to the
FBI.
Helms also has said, at
various committee hear-
. ings, that he was unaware
that Hunt was doing any-
thing in this country: In
early 1973, he told the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that "nobody knew
he (Hunt) was going to be
involved in any domestic
activity." However, the
House Judiciary Committee
in 1974 published a memo
showing that CIA aide Karl
Wagner - the one who
knew about the
Ehrlichman-Hunt tie - had
broken off" contact with
Hunt in 1972 because "his
requests appeared to in-
volve the agency in domes-
tic clandestine operations,"
which are illegal.
The CIA director himself
had a part in the decision to
go along with the agency's
help for Hunt in 1971, as
Ehrlichman asked.
"I recall," he has testi-
fied, "that Gen. Cushman
informed me that he had
authorized giving to How-
ard Hunt a tape recorder
and a camera, and I asked
for what purpose and he
said he wanted to conduct a
one-time interview and that
he had been properly au-
thenticated by the White
House and that he was
working at their behest.
Hunt actually was given
a wig, hidden camera, tape
recorder and other items
for use as a physician dis-
guise. The camera, hidden
in a tobacco pouch, was
used by Hunt to photograph
the offices of Dr. Fielding. .
IN ANOTHER facet of
the Plumbers case, Helms
authorized the preparation
- at White House request
- of a psychological profile
on Ellsberg. He testified
later that he had "genuine
regrets" about. that.
Helms has said that he
.did not believe that the
Plumbers incident and the
agency's dealings with
Hunt had anything to do
with the Watergate scan-
dal.
"Nobody had given us the
slightest indication that
anything underhanded was
afoot," he said in May 1973.
The charmed life of Richard Helms-Part 4
and Sen. Edward Kennedy in particu-
lar since he then seemed likely to be-'
come Nixon's Democratic opponent
in the 1972 election.
The idea was to leak contents of
these files a little at a time, creating
embarrassment for Democrats be-
cause of the policy faux pas disclosed
in the files.
Helms, while giving up some files,
had refused to let one go: on the fall
of the Diem government in South
Vietnam.
But that was likely to be quite
embarrassing to the Kennedy name,
so the White House wanted it. Nixon
called in Helms to demand the file,
saying he needed it for use in possi-
ble negotiations with the Soviet
Union.
? A CIA MEMO on the meeting says
IIelms handed over the file, saying he
worked "for only one president at a
time" and that any papers he had
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
homefront problems. '
When congressional committees
began probing these, Helms was pre-
pared to take the blame, he said.
"You've got to protect the president
from the dirty stuff," he told report-
ers. "Somebody's got to take the
heat. so let old Helms take it, and I'm
taking it. You can't ask the president
to sign off on illegal activity."
Helms grew up in the
:tradition of working for
-presidents, and of protect-
ing them when CIA projects
of interest to the White
House went awry. He has
said, repeatedly, that his.
loyalty was to the presi
dent, and he did not regard,
that as a crime. , , ,
The most serious accusa-;
tions of illegal "'domestic
spying" by the CIA involve
incidents during the years
that Helms led the agency..
He has insisted that these!
:were limited and selective;;
not massive, and his friends,
.have 'said' he kept some oft
the incidents from' being
worse.
His own explanation of
the evolution of many of
these efforts, as a matter of
government policy, shows
why he is now making no'
Helms has testified: "There . fore he can report in?"
never has been any 'ques- In 1974 the CIA did issue
tion about the intent of the
Congress to confine the
agency's intelligence func-
tion to foreign matters."
orders to its staff to limit
collection of foreign intelli
gence to overseas, when it
involved American citizens.
That supposedl
is don
y
e
. PART OF Helms' diffi- only when the FBI express-
culties now, however, grow ly asks the CIA to monitor a
out of his assurances to citizen's foreign activities.'
Congress that the agency The CIA does not feel free
was not involved in domes- to pick and choose among
tic surveillance. the FBI requests.
When he appeared before AS ONE HELMS associ
the Senate Foreign Rela- ate remarked: "It is not up.
tions Committee on Feb. 7,' to us to decide whether the
1973, he was asked by Sen. bureau has a right to be
Clifford Case, R-N.J.: interested."
"It has been called ?to my Although the FBI, like
attention that in,1969 and the CIA, has lately gotten
1970 the White House asked into trouble over the mat-
that all intelligence agen- ters in which it did get
cies join 'in the effort to interested, it was assumed
learn as much as they could for many years that the FBI
about the anti-war move- had almost ulimited respon.
ment, and during this peri. sibility for "domestic se-,
od U.S. Army Intelligence curity.".
became involved and kept There seem to have been
files on U.S. citizens. Do been many times, however,
you know anything about when frustration with FBI
the activities of the CIA in results led high-ranking
that connection? Was it government officials to turn
asked to be involved?" to the CIA to back up the
Helms replied: "I don't' FBI in its field.
recall whether we er
w For example He' s
agency, so I need not
emphasize how extremely
sensitive this makes the
paper. Should anyone learn
of its existence it would
prove most embarrassing
f
ll
or a
concernd"
e. Apparently even tinCHAOS ddnottwok
well enough in gathering
data on what were called
"restless youth." The Nixon
administration promptly
got busy on what became
the "Huston plan" _ a
broad-scale campaign
(never put into full effect)
to monitor domestic activ.
ists and dissidents, using
wiretaps, burglaries, mail
interception and other ille-
gal tactics.
STILL, CHAOS continued
in operation until March 15,
1974 - more than a year
after Helms had departed.
He had been a supporter of
it and a leader in it through-
out.
On Sept. 6, 1969, Helms
sent key officials in the CIA
a memo telling them to pro-
vide supp,rt to Operation
e
asked, but we were not in- testified in 1973 that the CHAOS. Considerable re-
volved because it seemed to Foreign Intelligence Advi sistance apparently de-
'me that was a clear viola sory Board, which advises veloped within the CIA. But
IN THE LATE 1950s and
Helms
ut th
io
p
. t
the
at down The
n of what our charter president, had continu- Rockefeller Commission re-
early ate 1960s," committee he a told a year Senago, ' was; o ally made "feelers" about
-There have been other this. The question was ported that a Dec. 5, 1972,
"came the sudden and quite Helms memo said:
dramatic upsurge of ex- Ai asked repeatedly, Helms "CHAOS is a legitimate
Creme radicalism in this In -testimony last year,' said, whether "there isn't counterintelligence function
country
rq and abroad, an up- Helms said that CIA moot- somebody else that can -take of the agency and cannot be
of violence against au- toting of "radicalism" in on some of these things if stopped simply because
Charity and institution, and tlris country turned up 'the FBI isn't doing them as some members of the
the advocacy of violent, information showing that it well as they should?"
"did in fact have some organization do not like this
change in our system of The Rockefeller Commis- activity."
government. ;overseas connections." Sion, in analyzing Operation Although CHAOS a
But the Rockefeller CHAOS' monitorin of the entl Ppar-
"By and in itself, this via- "Comission disclosed that, in g y put the agency further
fence, this dissent, this radi- anti-war movement, said: into domestic activity than
calism were of no drect con- reporting back to the White "The FBI, unlike the it had ever been before, it is
cern to the CIA. It became ' House, the agency came to CIA, generally did not pro- not yet _ clear whether
so only in the degree that the "repeated duce finished, evaluated Helms or other CIA officials
the trouble was inspired by, ' conclusion .... it could intelligence. Apparently for face any serious criminal
or coordinated with; or find no significant foreign these reasons, the Presi- charges because of it.
connection with domestic dent (Johnson) looked to
subversion mechanisms the Director of Central IT HAS BEEN reported
abroad. In such event the EVEN THOUGH a "for- Intelligence (Helms) to pro- that Helms may be prose-
CIA had a real, a clear and - eign connection" is neces- duce a coordinated evalua- cuted for his role in approv-
proper function to perform, sary to justify CIA actions, tion of intelligence bearing ing a CIA break-in of a
but in collaboration with the the agency has not consid- upon the question of dissi- photo studio in Fairfax,
FBI. ered itself confined strictly Bence." Va., on Feb. 19, 1971. How-
, "The agency did perform to what happens outside the ever, it is expected that that
that function in response to United States. HELMS AND the CIA did will be only a minor charge
the express concern of the In fact, professionals in just that. The commission - a misdemeanor.
president." intelligence - including' noted that, on Nov: 15, 1967, But Helms already has
In that sentence, the Helms - have argued that Helms personally delivered serious legal problems be-
word "president" there is no way to draw a a report to Johnson with a cause of another CIA activi-
president" means clear line against any CIA covering note saying "this ty inside this country: open-
two: Nixon and Lyndon B. activity inside the nation's
Johnson. "Operation is the study of the United ing mail. The program was
borders. States Peace Movement you begun in 1953, whenn Allen
CHAOS," the CIA's code- "The agency," Helms has requested." W. Dulles was CIA director
named program to collect- testified, "is cwith
data on dissident Ameri- charged When Nixon came into and Helms was one of his
cans and the "peace move- collecting foreign intelli- the White House, and key aides.
m; nt" in general, was set gence domestically from Operation CHAOS contin- The mail that was opened
up to serve both of those U.S. citizens or residents tied, the CIA director at one generally was that between
presidents. traveling abroad." point showed that he knew the U.S. and Communist
"These White House de- One of his former associ- the agency had gone out of countries. The operation
mantis," the Rockefeller ates makes the point more its bounds. continued for 20 years ;,,,1.
Commission concluded, colorfully: Helms' covering memo- during that time, more t,>.'rn
"scent to have encouraged "it is simply naive to say 'randum with a report to 200,000 letters and mi:.?r
top CIA ha have C11 .aura to that the agency can operate Henry Kissinger on Feb. 18, pieces of mail were operuecl.
stretch and, on some occa- only overseas. Suppose one 1969, said: CIA officials, loolo1,
suns, to exceed (its) legis- of our men in this country "in an effort to round out back, seek to justify tine
picks tip some foreign Intel- our discussion of this sub- program on the ground tl,:tt
lative restric'tionN." ]thence: dovs he have to t;a
lay law the CIA is sup- ject,' we have included a it was lie}Tun and contiturf,l
up to the Canadian border section t
i,rn?~d to I ? c
r
an
t
n,ri rt.,c:
rnt,raran stu- during two wars _ t:$,;,??r
to and put one f
fat sign sccci'lty ratirtter lpproved For Release 8b< ^6`$'/~~y: Cwit in t hoe-004Iicharter ofeRUOrthis s "tro troopps s wet - wh n 1;
wrt On t t were in the fuj,'"
10
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
and thus contact with U.S.'
enemies was considered to
But whatever the ratio-
the Rockefeller Commission
"U.S. statutes," it said,
"specifically forbid opening
the mail." It also suggested
that the opening may have
violated . constitutional
rights of privacy and free
speech and press.
THE MAIL-OPENING
project continued for three
years after the White House
had been told, in a 1970 re-
port signed by Helms and
others, that it had been dis-
continued. He has since
intention to mislead," say-
ing he believed at the time
WASHINGTON STAR
] 8 JAN 1976
By Lyle Denniston
Washington Star Staff Writer
that, the report was refer-
ring to a discontinued effort
.by the FBI.
Helms has been sued in a
damage case filed by the
American Civil Liberties
Union because of the inter-
ception of mail to,and from
the Soviet Union. The Jus-
tice Department in Decem-
ber hired private lawyers to
represent Helms and other
present and former officials
in such cases.
Both the damage lawsuit
and any criminal. cases that
may be begun against
Helms are likely to raise a
basic legal question: wheth-
er CIA officials have im-
munity for their actions
even when U.S. law says
such actions are illegal.
Already lawyers are
working on theories that
intelligence operations are
A military sedan. moves easily
down a one-way, residential street in
Santiago, Chile. It is morning, a little
after 8, on Oct. 22, 1970.
Gen. Rene Schneider, chief of
Chile's army, is on his way to the De-
fense - Ministry downtown, deter-
that the military stays neutral in the
out of the other auto, one carrying a
.45-caliber pistol.
is broken, and one of the youths
reaches in and fires the pistol repeat-
edly - at least five times. The
general is hit as he tries to draw his
own pistol. Wounded in the chest,
neck and right hand, Schneider lin-
gers for three days, then dies.
known to be associated with extreme
rightist political groups, are the
prime suspects.
"ALL THESE people have been
trained by the CIA . . . The CIA. is
Chilean senator charges. He is
Aniceto Rodriguez, secretary-gener-
al of the Socialist party - part of the
Communists, that put Dr. Salvadore
Two days after the shooting of
Schneider, the Chilean Congress ap-
proves Allende, making him the first
Marxist president in Latin America.
1973. _ Allende himself is dead, shot
deeply - the U.S. Central Intelli-
So was "Track If." And so was Rich-
a different form of govern.
mental activity, related to
the very survival of the na-
tion, and thus should be
judged by different legal
standards.
One precept from ancient
Roman law is likely to be
relied on, according to one
Helms associate. It is
"salus publica lex supre-
ma" - "The public safety
is the highest law."
It may be that some im-
munity might be gained be-
cause of a long-standing ar-
rangement under which the
Justice Department let the
CIA decide on its own
whether any agency offi-
cers should be prosecuted if
they broke laws while on
the job.
THE AGREEMENT,
reached in 1954, provided
When Allende came to power,
Helms was director of the CIA and
thus was a key man in carrying out
the anti-Allende plot known as
"Track II." By the time Allende
died, Helms. had left the CIA to be
U.S. ambassador to Iran, but "Track
II" may still have been in effect,, in
some form.
IT IS NOT settled, even yet,
whether "Track II" worked or failed.
Schneider died, but the death of that
key opponent of military overthrow
did not keep Allende out of office.
The seeds of plotting sown in 1970,
nevertheless, may have grown into
the coup three years later.
What is settled, and quite clearly
now, is that the whole Chile episode
is a continuing. problem for Helms,
maybe his most, serious.
If he is charged with the crime of
lying to congressional committees, it
most likely would be over his testi-
mony on Chile.
The Chilean operation and its
aftermath have become symbols in
the three years of revelations about
the CIA - and about Richard Helms.
Perhaps no secret U.S. intelligence
"operation" has been so deeply and
frequently probed. For many., it
illustrates the lengths to which an
American president will go in trying
to deal with foreign adversaries. It
also shows the degree to which the
CIA has been put to work by presi-
dents to get results overseas that no
president would try to justify public-
y at home.
that if the CIA made up its
mind that prosecution of an
officer would force the
agency to disclose secrets,
the CIA could simply tell
the Justice Department
that, and not refer the case
at all.
This ended in January
1975, . according to the
Rockefeller Commission.
However, some agency
officials - perhaps Helms
himself - might argue in
court now that they relied
upon this arrangement, and
thus they had no criminal or
otherwise unlawful intent in
the actions they took.
Moreover, officials might
argue that, since many of
their actions were not only
known to but were ordered
by presidents, they gained
immunity for what they
then did.
He recalled later that, at
a White House meeting
Sept. 15, 1970, on the Chile
problem, he got as sweep-
ing a mandate as he had
ever had. "If I ever carried
a marshal's baton in my
knapsack out of the Oval
Office, it was that day."
The CIA had, in fact,
been turned loose by the
president, himself, Richard
M. Nixon. Helms' hand-
written notes on the meet-
ing in the Oval Office read:
One in 10 chance perhaps,
but save Chile!
worth spending
not concerned risks in-
no involvement of
'Embassy
$10,000,000 available;
more if necessary
full-time job - best men,
we have
game plan
make, the economy
scream
48 hours for plan of ac
tion.
A CIA memo dated the
next day translated those
notes, as Helms discussed
the mandate with his agen-
IN THE CIA's annals, the Chilean cy associates:
operation is not an isolated entry. "The Director told the
The agency has done similarly bold group that President Nixon
things at other times against other had decided that an Allende
adversaries. regime in Chile was unac-
None of those plots, however, ceptable to the United
stands out in helms' career as does States. The President asked
the one involving Chile. the Agency to prevent Al-.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
lende from coming to power
or to unseat him. The
President authorized
$10,000,000 for this purpose,
if needed. Further, the Ag-
ency is to carry out this
mission without coordina-
tion with the Departments
of State or Defense."
A CABLE TO the CIA
chief in Santiago went out
on Sept. 21, saying:
"(Track Two) - This is au-
thority granted to CIA only,
to work toward a military
solution to problem."
That, then, was Track II:
An out-and-out military
coup. Track I had been a
many-faceted plan that in-
cluded $250,000 for possible
use to bribe Chilean con-
gressmen, along with other
propaganda and economic
pressures.
Track II was a lot more
direct: CIA encouragement
of a coup, first by Gen.
Robert Viaux, then by Gen.
Camilo Valenzuela. The plot
included the passing of
three machine guns and
money to the conspirators.
Officials here now have
no doubt that the shooting
of Schneider was done by
Viaux's associates, after
Viaux was supposed to have
been dissuaded because he
was considered to be "a
nut."
The Senate Intelligence
Committee's study of the
Chilean operation, and
especially of Track II,
leaves unclear whether
high Nixon administration
officials actually decided to
call off a coup attempt.
Secretary of State Henry
A, Kissinger, then a White
House aide, and his deputy
at the time, Alexander M.
Haig, have insisted that a
decision was made on Oct.
15 to stop the coup plan, and
that they thus knew nothing
about a plot to kidnap
Schneider or about the sup-
plying of money or weap-
ons. CIA aides disagreed
with that version, saying
Valenzuela was not sup-
posed to be turned off -
only Viaux - and that they
kept the White House fully
informed on the whole plan.
Helms. It is unlikely at this
stage that he will be charg.
ed with violating any law
because of his direct role
with Track 11 or other parts
of the Chilean operation.
His legal problem, rather,
arises out of what he has
told senators about all of
this.
On Feb. 7, 1973, he ap-
pea red before the Senate
Foreign Relations Commit-
tee to testify on his nomina-
tion to be ambassador to
Iran. The senators wanted
to know about Chile, among
other things.
Sen. Stuart Symington,
D-Mo., asked: "Did you try
in the Central Intelligence
Agency to overthrow the
government of Chile?"
Helms: "No, sir."
Symington: Did you have
any money passed to the
opponents of Allende?"
Helms: "No, sir."
On March 16, 1973, he ap-
peared before a Senate
Foreign Relations subcom-
mittee investigating the
Chilean operation. The sub-
committee chairman, Sen.
Frank Church, D-Idaho
(now the Intelligence Com-
mittee's chairman), asked
Helms: "Up to the time
that the Congress of Chile
cast its vote installing Al.
lende as the new president,
did the CIA attempt in any
way to influence that
vote?"
Helms: "What vote?"
Church: "The vote of the
Congress."
Helms: "No, sir."
He volunteered: "If the long session with the
agency had really gotten in Rockefeller Commission
behind the other candidates during its probe of the CIA.
and spent a lot of money As he walked down a corri.
and so forth, the election dor, pursued by reporters,
might have come out dif- he confronted CBS reporter
ferently." Daniel Schorr and shouted
at him: iller Schorr!" "Killer Schorr!
HE ALSO SAID that the K
idea of bribing members of Schorr had been report.
the Chilean Congress to get ing that the CIA had been
them to vote against Al- involved in assassination
lende was considered plots, and also had been
"quite unworkable" in 1970. pursuing Helms somewhat
He testified: "Allende had aggressively, trying for an
this all wrapped up, it was interview on the subject.
put in. the bag, aru there
was nothing that was going
to HELMS' OUTBURST,
change it." whether spontaneous or
In addition, Helms told calculated, did seem to re.
the senators:
, flect the frustration that he
"As best I recall, a very and many former col-
'secret probe was made to leagues feel over the assas-
,find out whether there was sination question.
anything in 'Chile that Focus on plots' to kill
llooked like a force that' leaders such as Fidel Cas-
TheldAllende overthrow
government RafaelTrujillo, LNgo Dinh
was not even in at the time Diem, and Gen. Schneider,
the probe was made; just to intelligence officers think,
see if there were any forces misses a key point: any
there to oppose Allende's country, including the
advent as president. It was United States, is going to
the a were quickly a established have an "arsenal" of varied
.affort was techniques available for use
thee no further o a
ade along those lines, to in pursuing its interests -
be-
the best of my knowledge, yond its borders.
at least I know of none." A Helms colleague com-
He did concede to the menu: "Covert action is a
war." the
committee that day that he Marines, to for landing
had withheld information at "If there "If thepen war."
the 1973 hearings, saying e comes a time,"
that "at that time, Al. another suggests, "when,
after due
process, me gang
tlende's governnment was in ernmen
is to be t decides something
;power in Chile and we did
not need any more diplo- is to be done, there ought to
:matic incidents . . . I felt be a mechanism to do it. it
obliged to keep some of this can't be whistled up at a
IN APRIL 1974, CIA stuff, in other ' words, not time something has got to
be Director William E. Colby volunteer a good deal of organization You wcan't hich d of dof have an
secretly informed a House information." which doffs its
subcommittee that the A month later, Justice pajamas in the morning
Nixon administration had Department officials ac- going and
to h sayh 'Today l we are
had
had an $8 million program knowledged that they were ave a Today
politi-
1970 and 1973 to try investigating Helms for cal action.'
to undermine the Allende possible perjury.
regime. HAVING A mechanism
Some eight months later, A HELMS associate now or capability is distinctly
on Dec. 19, 1974, Colby paid offers a simple defense for different, many CIA profes-
a visit to then-Acting Atty. him: "He had a feeling that sionals believe, from ;ctu-
Gen. Laurence H. Silber- these weren't his secrets to ally carrying out a ~.
man to inform the Justice give" tine operation.
Department that Helms There is no indication Thus, they are not
may have committed per- that Helms is in any other prepared to concede that
Colb irn his 1973 testimony, ofghe r ~uublenecc; tine of any the critics of assassination
by pparently decided to plots involving possi- planning are, in fact, sin-
make that contact volun. ble "elimination" of foreign cere about attacking actual
tarily, after the CIA had leaders. There has been secret o
perations. These
MILITARY PLOTTERS finished a probe of its own some suggestion that a men tend to doubt that
in Chile into past agency activities, variety of U.S. treaty com- senators and other critics
unsuccessful did make attempts to two including the Chilean epi- mitments may y of have these been can really believe that America
kidnap Schneider, and U.S, sode. violated by get along without any
officials were aware of Helms came before the activities, b but it would be kind of secret operations.
rare for the
these. Then, Schneider was Senate Foreign Relations p government to But the p
s
killed in the third attempt Committee again a month rilelms, like others CIA action" firmly deny thrt other ofessionaa
to abduct him, later -- Jan. 22, 1975. It was officials who had some role "Political
a covert'
"American officials," the a closed session. He was with the plots, has been ss inatio hesr, whether Ws else
Senate committee con- asked about what he had drawing heavy criticism or something else,
eluded, "did not desire or said in reply to Symington from members of Congress cn controtrot l what the nation does
encourage Schneider's two Years before, and he and in the press over the in intelligence. "The
death. Certain high officials answered: assassination issue. That is clandestine service runs the
did know, however, prat the "As far as the earlier the one issue on which political action, not the con
dissic en:s planned to kid- statement is concerned, Helms has allowed himself Crary, says one former
nap Gen. Scl:ii;;idei whether the agency tried to to lose his temper in public CIA lmicial.
The possibility of his death overthrow the government - a most uncharacteristic helms' associates say
should have been recog- of Chile, I answered 'No.' I blowup that continues to they agree that it is healthy
nixed as 1 forcaa?r;ibie risk believe that is true. if it has ruzzic some of his closest for Congress to studY
of his k:idnappiiig_ ' been alleged differently by friends. litical action" and a le
One who did know wa sorr~ur s
~pl i4 ,T,tt nefpft6 2001/08/(9$ ~i41 ?Pi77 3?@R0001IY64t DOtSs~Ttti arts that t??tp-
- a ter Helms had finished Ped,,-^utthry ;'rI- YORit TINES
11 Jan. 1976
-The `New' Communism . .
The controversy over C.I.A. funding of non-Communist
political parties in Italy raises fundamental questions'
about what, if anything, the United States can or should
do about recent gains by Communists across much of,,
southern Europe from Portugal to Greece-and partic
ularly in France, Spain and Italy, where a new coordi-
ttated Communist strategy has emerged.
w under Enrico Berlinguer this Communist strategy has
moved dramatically in Italy toward strong public claims
pt independence from Moscow and commitment- to
Western-style democracy. Mr. Berlinguer has pledged
his party to preserve democratic liberties, a parliamen-
tary system, a mixed economy, membership in the
Common Market and NATO-and to leave office quietly
if- later defeated at the polls. Despite much skepticism
by non-Communists, these claims have paid off with 33
percent of the vote, only two points below the ruling
Christian Democrats.
. F~ The French Communists,' long among the Kremlin's
most obedient and militant followers in the West; until
recently had not gone nearly so far. 'In fact, Secretary
General Georges Marchais' electoral .alliance and com-
mon program with the Socialists since 1972 came under
attack as a result of Communist losses at the polls while
the Socialists doubled their vote to become, France's
biggest party. But in the last two months, after long
internal debate, Mr. Marchais appears to have bested his
opponents and committed the French Communist Party
definitively to "the Italian way."
,'A joint. Marchais-Berlinguer statement in November,
pledged the two Communist parties to respect "the.
liberty of thought and expression, of the press, of .
meeting and association, the right to demonstrate, the
free movement of persons inside and outside their
country, the inviolability of private life, of religious
liberties, the total freedom of expression of currents
of thought and of every philosophical, cultural and
aItistic opinion." It added:
"The French and Italian Communists favor ' the,
plurality of political parties, the right of opposition
parties to exist and to act, the free formation of
majorities and minorities and the possibility of their
alternating democratically, the lay character and demo-
cratic functioning of the state and the independence of
justice.... Their position is not tactical."
Since then, Mr. Marchais has joined Mr. Berlinguer
ire, resisting Soviet proposals to be adopted at a "unity"
meeting of European Communist parties. The French
Communists have engaged in polemics with Moscow
over Russian detention of a dissident intellectual and
the existence of a prison camp in Soviet Latvia. They
have adopted a more neutral attitude toward China.
0., , issing^er's N h lo, mare
The alignment of the Western world's two most
powerful Communist parties on virtually a Social Demo-
cratic approach has bemused many voters in both
countries-whether it is meant sincerely or not-and has
reinforced the chances both have of entering governing
coalitions. Yet the obvious and historically-based possi-
bility exists that, once in office, the Communists might
well repudiate their current promises, seize power,
leave NATO and unite with Moscow in a Communist
alliance from Asia to the Atlantic. Any such trend
and confront the United States with desperate choices.
This is Secretary Kissinger's nightmare.
A different prospect has been evoked by Spanish
Communist leader Santiago Carillo. Moscow, he said
recently, fears that Communist accession to power- in
the West would lead to "a bloc of European socialist
countries" independent of the Soviet Union with West-
,ern-style freedoms that would become a pole of
,attraction for Eastern Europe and "the whole world's
working class movement." The survival of the Soviet
form of Communism might be endangered ultimately by
a.-schism of this kind, which could even dwarf the
breakaway of Yugoslavia and China. Remote as this
evolution may now appear, it helps to -allay fears in .
Italy and France of Communist accession to power.
Secretary Kissinger has been warning Europeans for
many months that the entrance of Italy's Communists
into a coalition government with the Christian Democrats
could lead quickly to the dissolution of NATO and Amer-
ican withdrawal from Europe. But perhaps the day has
come when the United States no longer has the ability
through warnings or other means to harness the political
tides in West Europe. It cannot alone revive the fading
Christian Democrats of Italy, as Secretary Kissinger him- .
self has noted. Only Italians can do that. .
and American Policy
The chief contribution the United States can make now
ds that of positive example, moving vigorously to termi-
nate the world recession that has weakened the democ-
racies and set the stage for Communist gains. The kind of
assistance provided to Portugal's democratic parties by
K+
West European trade unions and allied political groups,
with marginal American financial aid, undoubtedly has
helped to blunt the Communist power drive there and
cannot be excluded elsewhere, particularly when Soviet
financing and covert operations invite counter-moves.
But the Communist gains in Italy stem from the strains
of recession, inflation and unemployment, which strike
hammer blows at a political and social structure already
crumbling under tha incompetent leadership of the
geriatric Christian Democratic Party.
.:Revitalization of the Christian Democrats and their
alliance with the Socialists and other smaller parties
to their left can best be brought about by economic.
revival in the industrial world as a whole. A strong
recovery in the Unite;i States, \Vest Germany and Japan,
further liberation of trade and imaginative measures in
monetary, energy and raw materials policy-as discussed
at the Rambouillet summit conference-could give a new
lease on life to the democratic parties of Italy and
France more effectively than covert financial aid. The
essential prerequisite is agreement between the Ford
Administration and the Congress on a coherent policy
for the world economy.
There may still be time. Communist accession to
power is less likely to come before than after the 1978
elections in France and the 1977 elections in Italy,
despite the current Cabinet crisis there.
But I,' American policy remains confused in this
Presidential election year and recession continues in
Europe, events in Italy could move more rapidly than
t.ivat. The alignment of the French Communist Party
behind "the Italian way" reinforces such a prospect.
The United States can offer a merely negative approach,
based on the fears and doctrines of the past--or it can
strive positively to provide a better way, as It did in the
could move Nest I_iirrp p jv Fs~r~e ~ y~t M)/08%( KsbA-90PV?'V0432R00?
~00410005-7
t
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
Wednesday, January 14, 1976
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
A sensitive issue since Helsinki
Soviets bast U.S. radio `intrusion'
By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Moscow
Soviet newspapers and TV have begun a new
wave of attacks on American radio broad-
casting to the Soviet Union.
Foreign broadcasting has proved to be an
especially sensitive point with Moscow ever
since last fall's summit conference at Helsinki
promised a freer exchange of people and ideas
across national borders. Soviet press and TV
criticism of it more than doubled in December
and early January and is again on the
increase.
Moscow accuses the formerly CIA-financed
Radio Liberty of interfering in the internal
affairs of the Soviet Union, hindering detente,
conducting "sabotage and espionage" and
"open slander" against the Soviet Union, and
lying.
Much more mildly it charges the official
American Voice of America (VOA) with not
reflecting the pro-detente policy of the Amer-
ican administration or public support for
detente (as shown in a year-old gallup poll).
Both radio stations, along with the British
Broadcasting Corporation, provide almost
domestic services to their Soviet audiences.
They play pop music and, for example,
announce the times and places of otherwise
unpublicizet: unofficial art shows in Moscow.
Their programming has changed drastically
from the cold-war days of the 1950s, when
Radio Liberty's sister, Radio Free Europe,
N?IE,d YORK TIIaS
6 Jan. 1976
.15 Soviet Jews Denounce
Ford on Emigration Issue
MOSCOW, Jan. 5 (Reuters)-
A group of Soviet Jews said
today that President Ford had
harmed prospects for a mote
liberal Soviet emigration policy
with his criticism of Congres-
sional efforts to get it eased.
Mr. Ford said in a television
interview two days ago that
'efforts to tie improved trading
status for the Soviet Union to
freer emigration had damaged
the chances of many to emi-
grate.
In a statment handed to
activists said "every such state-
ment is taken in the U.S.S.R.
as an encouragement for per-
secutions and a hardening of
the emigration policy." They
added:
"Statements like that of thel
Pregid~~nt have bone and con-
tim.ie to do great harm. We!
cate.^,oriuaily protest against
i.avin?g our destirnc, and those
of o'rr children sacrificed in the
political. Interests of certain
carcles."
which broadcasts to East European countries,
urged Hungarians to revolt against the Soviet
Union. But dissident Soviet literature and
information about political arrests and impris-
onment are still featured.
After. Soviet-American detente was estab-
lished, Soviet jamming of the VOA was halted
in September, 1973, and some VOA reporters
have since been given visas to visit the Soviet
Union, along with the American President or
Secretary of State.
Soviet jamming of Radio Liberty continues,
however. Western radio is. popular among
Soviet youth, as spontaneous inquiries about
V.OA to Western travelers in the Soviet Union
attest.
In the latest Soviet broadside at American
radio, the Communist Party daily Pravda
asserted on Jan. 13, in a major spread at the
bottom of a page, that Radio Liberty and
Radio Free Europe are trying to change the
system in. the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
Although it acknowledged that there is no
longer "direct subversive instigation" it
charged that "the essence remains the same."
The "international public," it said, is in-
dignant because "official U.S. institutions
direct and finance this subversive activity
against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist coun-
tries."
The radio station's activity, Pravda said, is
"incompatible with the final act of the pan-
European (Helsinki) conference, with the
elementary norm of international law, with
144
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
the process of lessening of international
tensions, and the development of good neigh-
borly peaceful cooperation."
Pravda listed a score of names it identified
as CIA agents or, in three cases, "former
Gestapo and Hitler reconnaissance agents"
working for Radio Liberty. It also charged
Radio Liberty with bugging telephone conver-
sations between foreign embassies and mis-
sions in West Germany and of sending anti-
Soviet literature to the Soviet Union.
CIA funding of Radio Liberty was dropped
after it became public knowledge five years
ago. The broadcasts are supported by open
congressional appropriations and have a gov-
erning board appointed by the U.S. President.
The Pravda attack came the day after a
fairly sophisticated critique of VOA news
appeared in the much-less-authoritative news-
paper Soviet Russia. Two days earlier a
prime-time TV commentary had denounced
foreign broadcasting to Russia as interfering
in Soviet internal affairs.
The increase in Soviet criticism of Amer-
ican radio broadcasting after the Helsinki
conference followed the American backlash
against detente.
The Western media emphasized the humani-
tarian provisions of the Helsinki conference
and focused on Moscow's treatment of Soviet
citizens. The Soviet media accused the West of
ballooning the few Soviet dissidents out of all
proportion and of interfering in internal
affairs. Each side viewed the other as violat-
ing the spirit of Helsinki.
 Apptoved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004100b5-7
Tuesday, January 13, 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Behind $6 million in covert political aid
o trust Iy's-
By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
"An error of judgment" by Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger is the way some
liberals, many of them in the intelligence
community, are describing covert U.S. aid to
anti-communist parties in Italy.
These critics say it would be more useful if
American leaders and diplomats started talk-
ing to Italian and perhaps other European
Communists before they come to power.
The nub of the argument over the Italian
subsidy - $6 million to be used to back
Christian Democrats and Socialists - is
whether the Italian Communist Party can be
trusted in its claims to be independent from
Moscow and second and even more important,
to be converted to democratic processes.
Kissinger critics insist that communism in
Europe is in crisis, and that a new schism,
successor to those made by Yugoslavia,
Albania, and China, is in the making.
For Secretary Kissinger the Italian oper-
ation - news of which was leaked from
congressional committees briefed by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - is all
part of the "managing the outward thrust of
the Soviet Union," which he sees as the real
character of detente. He warned members of
NATO council at their last meeting in Brus-
sels, that they must beware of letting commu-
nists participate in their governments.
Of about 2 million communists in Western
Europe at present, it is estimated that 1.7
C
million are in Italy. Led by Enrico Berlinguer
the Communist Party there won a third of the
vote in parliamentary elections last June.
Party members now dominate regional and
local government in three regions, Tuscany,
Umbria, and Amilia Romana, so that 50
percent of all Italians live in communist-
controlled areas.
As members -of the second-largest party,
Italy's Communists participate in parlia-
mentary committees and thereby already play
a quasi-governmental role by influencing an
estimated 70 percent of legislation.
But the nagging question about the Italian
'Communists, as far as the U.S. is concerned,
is the extent of the party's loyalty to the Soviet
Union.
Before 1968, Italian Communists had sought
to persuade the electorate that the liberal
experiment in Czechoslovakia proved that the
Soviet Union would tolerate a pluralist ap-
proach to socialism. But when the Russians
marched into Prague, the Spanish, Belgian,
and British parties were quick to express their
dismay. Only the West German and French
parties stuck with the Soviet Union.
The opposition the Russians now face by a
meeting.was dramatized last November be-
tween Mr. Berlinguer and the French Commu-
nist leader Georges Marchais. The two not
only declared that they would seek govern-
mental status only by democratic means but
they endorsed freedom of speech, pluralist
VOW YORK TIM:F..:S
18 Jan. 1976
GItaly's Reds Build Power
By Tactics of Moderation
By ALVIN SHUSTER
Speo!l to The New York Times
ROME, Jan. 17-The Commu- I party confirmed what most Ita-
inist Party, preaching its own
l brand of moderation and re-
sponsibility, is making new in-
m saaaoc~6~
political systems, and "alternations" of ruling
parties - meaning that if they ever got into
the government they would step aside if the
electorate voted them out.
In other statements the Italian party has
gone further, in asserting that it wants Italy to
stay in NATO and the European Economic
'Community.
Dr. Kissinger's reaction to all this is, in
effect: "Beware. It may be all tactical. The
Stalinists remain latent. If a West European
communist government had to choose be-
tween a pro-Soviet and a pro-U.S. policy, they
would probably choose the Soviet Union. not
because their independence is a fraud but
because they agreed with the Russians funda-
mentally. Their democratic professions are,
furthermore, only skin deep. Just wait till
they get their hands on power and you will
see."
Some of Dr. Kissinger's advisers believe,
also, that the rank and file of European
communists are more wedded than their
leaders to Soviet leadership, thereby setting
up a powerful undercurrent for return to
orthodoxy.
And they note that deeply imbedded in the
psyche of all European communists is the fear
of the Soviet Union and the memory of the
time, in 1923 when the Third International was
new, when the Spanish Communist Party tried
an independent course and the Soviet Union
managed to expel all the leading cadres
except six, with whom they founded a new and
obedient party.
to let them share power."
. It is this possibility of the
Communists sharing power that
worries Secretary of State Hen-
ry A. Kissinger and other West-
ern officials despite the party's
declaration of support for con-
lians believed-that the Com-I tinued membership of Italy in
ts were playing an in- the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
i
s
mrm
creasing role in shaping domes-I ganization. Mr. Kissinger's ef-
forts and the recently revealed
feel-
The Socialists
tic policies
din
,
.
g
plans for new secret spen
social life of-Italy and improv- ing squeezed out, withdrew.bv the Central Intelligence
ing its chances of emerging i their support of the Govern-i Agency here are all designed to
as the country's largest party.,,ment because, in effect, they', bolster the non-Communist
Time appears on the side' saw the Christian Democrats forces and to stave off the
of the Italian Communists and drawin closer to the Commu- view of Mr. Kissinger, the
many diplomats and others) nists out of necessity and rely- presence of Communists in the
agree that even the present 1 ing more on them in quiet deal- (Italian Government would'
future of the alli-I
t
te
hrea
n the
,ings in Parliament:.
lance and weaken Western;
Time for Sharing Europe.
"The f ommutnists should hen- I As of now
the Communists
,
t Chri
-
-
i
political crisis here could work
to their advantage. The stand-
ing of the non-Communist par-
~
,
nan
ties led by the dom
tiara Democrats, serf[: to dec+in'- said one non-Communist mem-I Their strength and influence
with each crisis and this (ill" her of Parliament. "'They canljas Italy's second largest and
arisirg from the rrsin.:;llrioa, slant) back and say that nothing~l hest organized party are far
of the Cuhint is no vxccnl[:m. on that no comhinaGon oCl~%tr ;he than ," II calty realitcd
Gut~=1la tmttiido and tl;cir toW(,S are
In grin[ nl down the ,, ,! er rt+cs can.jrt i! lo-11
r.:cnt lust tvl=cl;, [it(, >+rAppr~/LP~t~ith4ls'tQ~iti44~tolpT'dt&S'l7(~y'cfoIif*Niii~
Control of the North
They control all the major
cities north of Rome, including
Turin, Milan, Bologna, Genoa,
Florence and Venice. There are
Communist or Communist-So-I
cialist administrations in five)
of Italy's 20 regions and in
42 - of its 94 provinces. The
result is that they locally'
govern about 48 percent of I
the population. '
Even Christian Democrats,
who have dominated politics
here since the end of 'World
War II, say privately that it
would he impossible to operate
without the cooperation of the
Communist Party. They still
rule out, however, any agree-
ment on Communist demands
for the "historical contprom-,
ise," which means seats in a
coalition cabinet of Christian
Democrats, Socialists and other
non-Communist parties.
"It has reached the point
where the Christian Democrats
cannot agree to govern with
I the l'nnuntlni is but cannot
'1OO 10605-7,;tem either,"
dill one experienced diplomat.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
1 The leader of the Communists 'In local elections this spring,
in Parliament, Mario Pochetti, !they are expected to do well
agreed that their views were :again, perhaps winning control
crucial in pushing through most of the municipal government
,
important laws, But Communist of Rome itself, a prospect that' we sometimes ,.it t uccl Com-
'officials insisted thr.t there was particularly dismays the Vati-, ,munists."
,nothing new in this, that their can. There are signs that lh^
deputies were merely acting Early Elections Possible Communists are picking up
as a responsible opposition in. If Aldo Moro, the outgoing middle-class. support, adding to
a democratic society. Prime Minister now charged their strength among the work-
g
s
gu
as a p
on o
Image of Responsibility , with trying to form a new ers and the young In univer- I fluence."
of Still, there are the questions
It is this image of responsi- !government fails, national elec- s ties,s, it isi o
ntta question pro-
built that has helped the, tions would follow this spring often asked. Are all the leaders
Y or summer, a year ahead of whether a student is a Com- all the rank and file lead. .
party grow. For, by mcst calcu- I they munist hut whether he is fur: and g
lotions, the Communists haveschedule. Whenever the are, } to Fallow the democratic road,
held, the Communists could: ther g left, in e the , extremist field ower if defeated in elec-~
the Hower all major bills. econo- emerge even stronger and in fringes that argu .;ue part! lions and enerfe ' maintain
the block all maor bills, bring; a a position to reinforce demands too bourgeois. a moderate linen Or, will a
.the country to a stop and' that the Christian Democrats All this. however. is not td
wreak general chaos. "'egest tho'. the' party is wah? radical wing emerge, over
The Communists use cris allow them into the cabinet.; out its Problems or '.v?h^ throwing Mr. Berlinguer and
As matters now stand in A
. those who agree with him?
such as the present one, in Italy,. dangers ahead. It is well aware:
cabinet seats are just for ' exampl^, that man- a-e No one, of course, knows
!which the search goes on for !about all the Communists lack lool:ing clo ely at the adntinis? the answer to those questions.
a new government, to under- these days. Their strength on trations in the cities taken w,(- At Communist Party headquar-
score their moderation. They the local levels, in regions and since, the Tune clectionc to sce ters, in downtown Rome, they
keep their supporters in the cities, and in other areas, is v'hether the Communists can say that the rank and file is
powerful trade unions calm and substantial and. growing. Their .make things wort- in a c.ourtrq behind the Berlinguer policy,
,they say there is no need now influence on the national scene where almost nothing ever and that it recognizes the fruits.
for elections because time is also rising, though still limit- I seems to operate smcothty, e-_-' of moderation in the success
would be lost in pressing ahead led in, the fields of, foreign.af cept, pe-haps. for waiter of the party so far.
with needed economic and oth- fairs and defense. Moscow Link a Problem The reasons for Communist'
They measures. "The Government decides on
They attack the Socialists a new economic There are also 'problems for, caution in approach here are
for having withdrawn - package so the party in its continuing links varied. They realize, for ex-
g parlia- happens?," said one.diplo-
f ample, that a coalition with
mentary , support ' for the mat. "Ugo La Malfa. the Depu- to. Moscow, despite. its insis- F
governing Christian Democrats ( ty Prime Minister, calls Luciano tence on autonomy. And there: the Christian Democrats, rather
and Republicans. Then the is the worry among many Ital. than a take-over by themselves,
Y Barba, the Communist Party's ons that once the Communists would create the least tur-
make a new pitch for the "com- economic. expert, and fills him I'
promise" that would give them !in.. The Communists then make gain power, or a share of pow-1 bulence in Italy and ease the
cabinet seats, too. er, they won't give it up. 1 shock when they do assume
a few suggestions. It's all kind This, too. deeply worries Mr. Power.
In the minds of many voters, of an unhistorical comprom-
the substance of declared spe- use." . Kissinger. In his view, the pres As the Communists see it,
cific policies by the major par- ' in committee work in the ence of Communists in the, a gradual move toward' the
ties is secondary to the desire Chamber of Deputies, where Italian . Government wouldi reins of power would not touch
for change, for social justice, the Communists hold 179 of threaten the future of the Alli-i off the kind of panic that could
or. efficient and less tthe 630 seats, they also play ance and weaken Western lead to Italy's collapse econom-
for more and less cor- or Europe.. He also believes, de- ically. But many diplomats and
a vital and quiet role. They site the pronouncements of the ;Italian businessmen believe
meets in housing, health, edu- spite joined with the Christian Dem- here, that a member of that even a coalition govern-
cation and the economy. party ocrats in an open coalition
iTh. Communists, whose sir- an anti-Communist alliance men?t would be enough to stifle
gaps include "we have clean on a limited abortion bill, an- forced to defend its members investment, frighten off foreign
b
geeing other political parties g
hands," have won votes by against tn. Soviet Union can- business, endanger chances
pointing to their efficient local that wanted a more liberal law._ not share power with ? Com- for needed economic loans and
administrations, by stressing Paper Has Great Impact munists ideologically linked to credits and scare away the
,the need for "better 'manage- The Communist newspaper, Moscow. tourists.
(ment" of Italy's resources and L!'Unita, the third largest in, Enrico Berlinguer, the 53- For the present, there seems
by other themes. circulation, makes a major im- year-old Sardinian and former) to be little chance of eroding
All such rhetoric coupled with 'pact. The books it criticizes criminal lawyer who directs the support' the Communists
increasing public disillusionent become the books people talk! the party machine, and his now enjoy, with or without
in the Christian Democrats and about. The issues it raises are I aides, have often stressed how C.I.A. money. This week, for
with social and economic' ten- those widely discussed. The de- independent' the party is of example, a senior Christian
sions, have served the Commu- I cisions it praises are often; Moscow, how it condemned the Democrat leaned back after a
mists well. In the regional and those many applaud. Most f:Soviet invasion of Czechoslo- long discussion of the Commu-
,local elections' last June, one newspapers and magazines 1 Ivakia, how it criticized the ousts and said:
of every three voters backed f veer to the left, including those' Portuguese Communists for "It seems to me the problem
the party and it came within 211 most respected. "revolutionary" attempts to is how to absorb the Commu-
percentage points of overtak- "It's all rather vulgar to be seize power and how it is hold- nists in coming years, not how
ing the Christian Democrats as ~ ! anti-Communist these days," ing out for guarantees of to keep them out."
Italy's largest. . . 'I I said a university professor. "It's; autonomy.
V-l-SHINGTON POST
2 1 AN 1976
PhonY Greetings
From Uncle Sarn
Reuter
has been sending fake in-
vitations to French VIPs
asking then to accept special
United States bicentennial
medals here later this', ',vk, a
written on autfientic embassy
notepaper and sent to at least
15 "very distinguished French
citizens who have been active
in 1''raneo-American
relations,"
"Most of them probably
should receive a medal," he
said. But the spokesman said
no such medals were being
awarded and hr hzld no idea
how the honiel? lead obtained
d ccuduassy'sstationery
all become so fashionable. even' "Our -relationship with all
amen? those in the middle other Communist parties is
Iclasse's, who drive men cars, I
those(basedn. on ot not d bfriendship, but we
live in pleasant homes
tare tied by the policies
of Communist countries," Mr.
Berlinguer said' recently. "We
do not see the Soviet ' Union
as a guide, no Communist Par-i
ty, not even the Soviet party,
idin
o
iti
f
in-
h
46
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
NEW YORK TIMES
10 JAN 1976
U.S. Vexed,. b ' India ,~ :.
But A voids .Polemics
WASHINGTON, Jan. 9- plish no positive results while
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's giving Mrs. Gandhi additional !became too angry when India
latest anti-American charges fuel for her charges that. the began to resent the aid. We
:have revived the Administra- United States has been seeking probably also overestimated In-
tion's irritation with her, but her overthrow. dia's importance, and we be-
'have failed to shake its resolve came. trapped in Indian-Paki-
1o avoid sayin or doing any. In recent interviews, officials;
z here defended this low=key pot-,stan disputes."
,thing that could be interpreted icy as the best suited to the cir Relations with" India were
as interference in Indian affairs: custances. They said that the severely strained as the result
Privately, many 7fficials here United States could do little to of the Indian-Pakistani war of
.have voiced annoyance with affect short-term events in December 1971, when the Unit-
Irs. Gandhi. In recent inter India, but over the long run ed States accused India of ag-
;yiews, one high official said he, could play a Part in developing gression against East Pakistan,
,was -personally "saddened" by, a "mature" relationship." , now Bangladesh, and sided
the continuation of the state of A prevalent view among with the Pakistanis. `
,emergency in India that has, s American ties with Pakistan
curbed political and press free American officials is that Mrs. since then have been quite
+doms. Gandhi has a strong personal good. Relations with India have
distrust of the United States, a
This view w
s h
e
i
ht
ti
d b
ll
d
m
f
.
a
e
g
c cours
ore erra
ene
owe
a
o
y but that other Indian leaders (
.what the Administration . re- would like to develop better Mr. Kissinger visited the sub-
gards as Mrs. Gandhi's free. continent in October-November
relations, if only for economic
wheeling attacks on the United 1974, and told the Indians that
,States reasons. And despite the pens- during the Congress the United States regarded In
odic attacks on the United
Party convention last week, dia as predominant in size,
Slates, economic ties with India She frequently returned to one have been
' population and power, and
of her. favorite themes: that because of India's improved, ie part wanted a sounder relationship
.discipline and vihemee: were large-scale with New Delhi.
needed because of the threat purchases of American grain But
last February the favor-
in the last two ears.
posed by the Central Intelli. years. trend was set back when
gene Agency. Call for Stronger Ties the United States lifted its arms
A Low-Key Response The Indian Government said embargo on the .subcontinent.
in its ' policy: statement opening India. -regarded the move as
But in keeping with the Ad- the new session of Parliament an effort to rebuild Pakistan's
ministration's decision to avoid Monday that "we desire a ma- armed forces, and therefore an
polemics with Mrs. Gandhi, the ture and constructive relation= unfriendly act.
State Department limited its re- Iship with the United States." ' Actually, despite the lifting
sponse to a middle-level tele- "A serious effort should be - of the arms embargo, Pakistan
phoned protest to the Indian; ~ made to understand each other has not yet made any signifi-
Embassy, expressing "concerns with a view to strengthening cant purchases. One official;
and dismay" at Mrs. Gandhi's) peace, stability and coopera. said today that the Pakistanis
remarks. 11 tion," it said. had inquired about Hawk an-
Ever since the state of emer-i American officials said that tiaircraft missiles and TOW an-
gency was declared on June 26.1 statement reflected exactly titank missiles, but had made
Washington has refused to Washington's conception of no firm requests. All sales have
comment on the curb on free- where relations should go. to be in cash, and this has
doms in India. Secretary of "For too many years, the' put restraints on the Pakistanis,
State Henry A. Kissinger has United States looked on India! who can get arms at better
ordered that there be no "gratu- !too emotionally," one exne terms elsewhere. India has no
such criticism would accom- Itoo,generous.?;with Apr Aid,. and.G
need for American arms, get-
ting fLn adequate supply :from
the Sgviet Union and its' ownl
arms industry.
U.S. Proceeds Cautiously
Ironically, the state of emer-'
gency in India opened the. way.
to a renewal of the slow trend
toward better relations with the'
,United States, because the In-
dians, who were very sensitive
,to Western criticism of, the
.suppression of press freedom
and the, arrest of thousands of
'political opponents of Mrs.
.Gandhi, stated that they fa-
vored good relations with
Washington.
But because of strong opposi-
tion by American liberals to
the Indian curbs, the Adminis-
tration has gone very cautious-
ly. The American Ambassador,
William B. Saxbe, has deliber-
atel~ let Indians take the initia-
:tive, -stressing .that good rela-
?tions were a two-way street.{
President Ford had planned
to visit India and Pakistan last.
fall, but put off the trip because
of the political situation in In-
dia.Mr. Ford, in a September
,interview, called= the state of
emergency "a very sad develop-
ment" for India. This prompted
a strong rebuke from the Indian
Government.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister!
Y. B. Chavan visited the United I
States in October and the first;
meeting of a joint commission;
between the two countries wasi
held with little publicity.
The Indians are now trying
to increase exports to the Unit-j
ed States to redress a trade;
balance heavily favoring they
United States because of the:
sale of nearly 10 million tons]
of.grain in the last two years. -
Approved For Release 2001/0$/08 : CIA- DP77-00432R000100410005-7.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY. 19, 1976
The Paralysis of Power''
By Ernest W. Lefever .
WASHINGTON- Taking advantage
of American confusion over its peace=
keeping role in the third world and,
its:. creeping policy paralysis induced:
by breast-beating on Capitol Hill and;'
in the media, the Soviet Union has
.launched a massive military effort iri .
Angola, presumably , to transform that:'`
..;strategically located and mineral-rich'
,country into a Cuba-style client state:
Moscow's intervention in Angola is
farm larger and more brazen than any
of its earlier and only partially such:?;
cessful attempts to establish beach-',
heads in a dozen other African states.,';
including Nigeria, Zaire, the Congo,:.
..Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Somalia. The
Soviet Union has dispatched a political'
mercenary force of 7,500 heavily`
armed Cubans to impose its will on;:
`Angola. The 150,000 tons of arms
include automatic weapons, armored
vehicles, mortars, rockets, antiaircraft
guns, MIG jet fighters, and'ground-to-
air missiles.
The Soviet military action has
nothing to do' with "national Lbera=
`;lion." Angola was liberated . from
Portugal last Nov. 11. It has a great
deal to do' with what U.N. Ambas-
sador. Daniel 'Patrick Moynihan has
aptly called' Soviet colonialism.
Moscow has 'already established
military port facilities in Somalia and
its navy uses the ports of Conakry on
the Atlantic and Dar es Salaam on
the. Indian Ocean. Newly independent
Mozambique has a Marxist regime.
If Angola should fall under Soviet
influence, Moscow would be in a
position to deny Western military and
.possibly commercial' access to_ several
j important seaports in southern Africa.
For their own security and economic
i? reasons, the Presidents of,two neigh-
i:boring states, Mobutu Sese Seko of
Zaire and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
,are strongly opposed to Soviet pen-
- etration into Angola.: At the .recent
Organization of 'African. Unity,summit
;meeting in Addis Ababa, they advo-
-cated that the'three Angolan factions
'be permitted ' to' settle the question
-,of. contested sovereignty, without ex-
ternal 'military intervention. . This, as
it'happens, is also 'the position of the
United States and South Africa. The
O.A.U.. summit adjourned without act-
on Angola..,
But the, Soviets apparently plan, to
continue their conquest through their
Cuban proxies, determined not to re-
peat the mistakes they made in Chile
where they also worked closely with
the Cubans in attempting to further
radicalize President Salvador Allende's
Marxist regime, which came in with
36.5 percent of the vote. In their
postmortems on the 'failure of the
unpopular Allende Government, the
Leninist logicians condemned it for
not *'taking earlier and more. drastic
action, including, military force, to
consolidate its minority position.
Consequently, ,Angola is not the
first hot spot to be further enflamed
by Moscow-dispatched mercenaries.
Cuban intelligence agents and military
men have been used to train, lead, or
otherwise support terrorist and other
insurgent groups in a dozen countries
from Chile to Canada, (Quebec Libera-
tion Front) and from the Middle East
(the Pal estine Liberation Organization)
to Zaire. The Cubans are mercenaries
because Moscow is, subsidizing the
Castro regime to the tune of about $2
million a day. ,
Responding to the Soviet-Cuban
intervention in Angola, President Ford
and Secretary of State Kissinger'
have said that if it persists. it
may jeopardize detente, that many
splintered concept that so easily lends
itself to obfuscation. The Administra-
tion has also provided some small
material , aid to the two Angolan
.factions seeking to build a moderate
THE WASH TNGTON POST Friday. Jan. 23, 1976
a e
By Karen De Young
\' deflir,^.fpn post -,1Jf) :',n'e.
Less than six months in
power, the government of
Nigeria has stirred tip internal
dissension by taking all anti-
American line in its foreign
policy and then seeming to
back away from that line.
The conflict appcars to be
between those who.e ideology
makes them critical of the
United States and iho::e with
strong economic links to
America, which is tig 'la's
biggest customer for oil. The
;ru!ila1 y governine'nt of Cell.
Aturt;+%,, ~,ltlilarllowd appears
t
..v nu,c an
agv"u,:.u ut:ut suchanimage. 'l'hemi, early tills lllollth,
Approved For Release 2001/d~/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010d''"add a}lructed criticism
e
government prepared to have mutually
beneficial diplomatic and economic
relations with the West. This modest
assistance was vetoed last month
'by the U.S. Senate in a mood of self-
castigation, an action labeled by Presi-
dent Ford as "a deep tragedy."
But perhaps the tragedy should not.
be laid wholly at the door of Congress.
Has the President ever made it clear
to the American people what is really
at stake in Angola? Is Angola not
,one more testing ground between
two radically different ways of organ-
Izing society-one emphasizing self-
determination and consent and the
other elite dictatorship and coercion?
What about the mischief-making' po-
tential of a' Soviet Angola in Africa?
America' is not the policeman of
the world. We have no mandate to
impose our democratic. institutions on
other peoples. But we do have a
'responsibility, commensurate with our
power and consistent with our inter-
ests, to resist the forcible imposition
of totalitarian power, as we have done
in the past in Europe and Korea.
if detente has any substance, Angola
is certainly a test case. No American
'troops are needed. Why does not Mr.
Ford, hopefully with the support of
Congress, inform Mr. Brezhnev that,
U.S. -grain shipments to the Soviet
Union will be suspended and the
strategic arms limitations talks broken
off until Moscow withdraws its Cuban
expeditionary force from Angola?
This would take courage in these
troubled times when the earlier "illu-
sion of American omnipotence" is
giving way to an even more dangerous
malady-the paralysis of ? power.
Ernest W. Lefever, a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution, is the author
of "Spear and Scepter: Army, Police
and Politics in Tropical. Africa."
ve 1?A nti -SIB
Policy Line
The issue was Angola, which
Mohammed made the oc-
casion for his first public
stand on an International
issue--important in a country
that, as black Africa's richest
and most populous nation, has
long sought an image as an
international leader.
One of the criticisms of
htohamnnled's predecessor,
Cen. Yakuhu Cowin, deposed
by a coup last July, was that
he seemed to have passed up
several elmaiwes to snlitiifv
Mohammed went further,
vehemently attacking
President Ford for his attempt
to rally support for the
Popular Movement's two
rivals and accusing the United
States of "crude bullying and
insulting logic at the expense
of the Angolan people."
At about the same tinge, it
became known that Nigeria
had told the United States to
close ? down its Foreign
Broadcast Lifonnation Str-
So two months ago
Mohammed's government,
taking advantage of the news
of South African military
involvement in Angola, seized
such a chance. It announced
its full political and financial
support for the Soviet-backed
Popular Movement for the
t,il oration of Angola, winning
the approval of anti-American
elements within Nigeria as
well as capitalizing on the
unpopularity of racially
!,tin retoa lvd South Afri,
 iY
pproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7,
as a CIA base.
Pro-Western Nigerians,
acutely aware that U.S. oil
purchases finance Nigeria's
multibillion-dollar develop-
ment program, became
concerned over how far the
economic ties with the United
States could he stretched.
Indications from the state
Department still suggest,
however, that the ties are not
at the breaking point yet.
Concerned private American
businesses, which have close
to $1 billion sunk into Nigeria,
have been assured that
relations are still proceeding,
normally.
Evidence of a Nigerian
attempt to respond to the pro-
Western faction's concerns
came in Mohammed's sur-
prising moderate statement
following adjournment of the
recent Organization of African
Unity summit meeting.
Although 111ohamned had
pledged to lead pro-Popular
Movement forces at that
meeting, and denounced the
U.S. attempts to influence
uncommitted delegates in the
opposite direction, he refused
to label the stalemate a
failure, saying that no one
W~ ~ JANC19N 7s POST
"could begrudge either view"
of the Angolan issue.
One indicator of the
direction Mohammed's
government may take, ob-
servers say, will be arms
purchases to outfit Nigeria's
quarter-million-man army,
the largest in black Africa. five C-130 transport planes
Most of the equipment used from the United States and a
by the Nigerian government squadron of Soviet Migs. State
during the four-year civil war Department officials say that
came from the Soviet Union, other purchases of American
because the United States arms are "in the works."
refused to supply weapons to fight against the Biafrans.
The OAUSummitOn Angola
THE ANGOLA SUMMIT of the Organization of African
Unity must be read as a serious setback for the Soviet
Union, which had hoped to see the OAU endorse its client,
the Popular Movement, condemn South African in-
tervention, and perhaps even acknowledge Moscow's
support for Angolan "liberation." The OAU did none of
these things. Finding itself divided right down the
middle, it chose to live with its divisions rather than fight
the issue out in a way that might have given one side a,
political' victory but thus humiliated the other. The
organization refused either to recognize the Popular
Movement, as the Movement desired, or to call for a
government of national unity, as the Movement's
Angolan rivals desired. Jt further refused to denounce
South African intervention alone, taking the position in
includin
ti
g
on,
effect that it would condemn all interven
later attempts starting only in November to denounce the
Russia's and Cuba's, or none at all.
The upshot is that the struggle in Angola will goon, but Soviet-Cuban role. The further possibility exists that
without the great boost to the Popular Movement and its initial use of the CIA provided some part of the pretext
Communist patrons which many had expected to come for the far larger Soviet operation that eventually
out of Addis Ababa. The organization has now said, in as flowered. In any event, by undertaking a CIA operation
clear a voice as its members' circumstances permit, that that controversy had rendered vulnerable to leaks and
Angola is for Angolans. As Zaire's president fairly that could. not easily weather disclosure and domestic
stated, for the first time South Africa and the Soviet storm, the administration was inviting a political defeat
Union have been equated in African minds. We think this of potentially greater consequences than any victory it
outcome gives the Popular Movement fresh reason to might have won by a quick successful intervention.
consider compromising with its Angolan rivals. The The OAU summit has not ended the Angolan affair. But
Popular Movement has Soviet weapons and advisers and we trust it has ended the period in U.S. Angolan policy
d- when Washington felt it necessary to conduct a test of
i
tary a
Cuban troops but, though these offer mil
vantages, more and more they constitute political wills with the Soviet Union. The United States does not
liabilities. Particularly would this be the case if South have so much political capital these years that it can
Africa were promptly to withdraw all of its own forces afford to put it at risk in pl,kes.like Angola, where the.
and leave Moscow and Havana isolated as the lone non- outcome of a local power struggle is difficult to ordain at
'African interventionists. By the best estimates, best, and, in. any event, only as important to national
as Americans themselves make it out tobe.
it
y
moreover, the Popular Movement does not control a secur
NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY JANUARY 21, 1976
~~Ist is Aid to Zaire' epartment are less concerned
.r about Zaire than about the
' comparabii amount of funds to. aid immediately. The chairmen danger of a new rupture in
* in the +i olan Mob ccLed, and high State De- relations with Congress if the
By LESLIE H. GELB its allies fi?n m, l !
gprAl to The New York Tuaes civil war. Fne Cen'-rat Into>lii- Partment officials suspended wishes of the representatives
WASHINGTON, Jan. ?0-- fence Agee y has been funnel the Order to execute the loan. are ignored.
State Department officials areliirt,? covert military aid and One official said: "We have The State Department is~
expected to decide in a few (cash through Zaire to the two not gone ahead-yet; we're try- legally without specific provide tilc-
day s whether to gc; aticatl de- Wr?:,tern-supported An.r,oian lih- inn to see if we can meet Con aiithoi l
wouicll
slate obi, lions fiotr kt:y Con- e.1 essional onsuppo led by tthtin e Soviet grOffici als ofltheiAfrica bureau leaders said but that fic egtheysltine
~ertwrgliad 1. id_rs with .n.~SrnuP pf
er,u?r;;rnc 1tr in of ''tip tntlit>n{ Uninn, of the. State Department arp,uc; rc t,ard this as a breach of a
y V!mhtistration officials in-I11tl.at the $10 miliio;i in Indus-i tt o-ye"r 'working relationship.
I Lirie accori;n+; ive r,oacin- sr t a
to l
mwia tr 1 ials. fnnu:.d several tr mnllit: l,~ trial credits is urgently needed! Cen;ress has not p+s
cki.ttitnen ,t n ;,ht ilic inicn- ~tn mcei. the dc tr rio icing ccc. lx,w foreign-.lid hiii flit 1:151.,
The atti5 1111
are uon.+'rn r char tt i: rrif Ii,`.?n Of Ss r rv fairy of LALc nomic Situation in Zaire. In the ih5cr:ce of new It ~, ,`,-aid `'oi'i`~ r'll"`~ `''`'rLAiprovec' rorirF eleaser2~001/08/08~r: rRDP77Officia-ls 7 piograitas.trc art,
majority of either the land area or the population of
Angola. A compromise would ensure the Movement a
reduction of the national and regional tensions otherwise
bound to plague Angola for years.
The Ford administration had prophesied that the
Senate's action in clamping down on further CIA activity
in Angola would cripple Africans who oppose Soviet
intervention. But, this did not happen at Addis Ababa.
Those Africans did not.and do not need American
prompting to know where their own best interests lie. We'
are aware that the administration's use of the CIA in
d
Angola starting; last July was done at the behest, an
with the blessing, of various African states. We feel,
nonetheless, that by so using the CIA, the administration-
made easier a South African intervention that otherwise
might not have taken place, while undermining its own
That Soviet equipment is
now wearing out, and the
angry ban Nigeria established
against American arms at the
end of the war in 1970 has been
allowed to lapse.
So far, Nigeria's biggest
weapons expenditures have
 Approved For Release 200.1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
tinued by means of a resolu-
tion continuing spending au-
thority based on last year's
aid bill.
Aid Can Be Redirected
Operating within these reso-
lutions, the Administration can
!redirect aid from one country
.to another or increase aid to
a -country without Congres-
sional approval. It is merely
required to -inform Congress 15
-days before carrying out its
decision;
Under an arrangement in
effect for the last two years,
however, the State Department
has invariably been responsive
to objections by committee
chairmen, either modifying de-
cisions or reversing there in!
according with the wishes of.'
the chairmen.
Senator Daniel K. Inouye,
Democrat of Hawaii and chair-
man of the Senate appropria-
tions subcommittee on foreign
operations, was informed of thel
LONDON TIMES
7 Jan. 1976
decision to send the aid yes-I to' require' prior approval" off subcommittee, called yester-' every decision to rprfirprt terday afternoon. He imme--I _rj day's notification by the Ad-'
~diately registered his objections
with Mr. Kissinger.
In a telephone interview to-
assumed that the aid had al-,? and chairman of the House
ready been given, but said that; 'appropriations subcommittee on
he was pleased to hear of the! foreign operations, said in an
reconsideration, given the fact-
that "the Ad interview today that he gave
t
h
ministration "an attempt to slip:
one by before Congress has a
chance to act."
"It's stupid and an affront
to the express concerns of
+Congress," he said.
I So far this year, Zaire has
received $15 million in Govern- I
minis
ration
as - ment - sponsored commercial
honored the working relation- his approval to the aid yes-I credits. The State Department
ship until now." 'terday, "But I'm protesting it is seeking $19 million addi
Assurances Sought ! today; I don't think they've tional in military credit sales,
Representative Clement j.. justified it." f and a $20 million loan by the
Zablocki, Democrat of Wiscon- Mr. Passman and Mr. Inouye Export-Import Bank.
sin, and a key member of the objected to a similar State De- I President Mobutu Sese Seko
House International Relations partment request for Zaire in of Zaire has been a supporter)
Committee, said that he might! October. At this time, Mr. Kis- of United States policy in
singer was seeking $22.7 mil- !Africa in recent years. On
favor certain kinds of aid to!
Zaire if there were assurances! lion in long-term loans for (Monday, following the emer-
that the aid would not directly Zaire, but did not go ahead gency meeting of the Organiza-
or indirectly find its way into; with the loan because of Con- tion for African Unity, Mr.
Angola. gressional objections. IMobutu charged Moscow with
`' He added: "But if the State Action Called an Affront ! "intolerable intervention" inJ
Department does not follow Representative David R?1 Angola.
Congressional desires on this Obey, Democrat of Wisconsin,' -
matter, we:will rewrite the law! a member of Mr., Passman's,
ussia
increase aid.
Representative Otto E. Pass-
liberation movements during the
fight against the Portuguese was
always the National Front for
the Liberation of Angola. Its
genesis goes back to 1954 when
Mr.. Holden Roberto formed a
group of dissidents among the
e now to ll out
of Angola?.
Washington, Jan 6.
President Ford has only one
card left to play in the game
against Russia. for the future
of Angola, and he played it
again yesterday. He said that
continued Soviet. intervention
in. Angola would damage
f' broader . relations" with
America, and the Russians do
not need to be reminded that
the fate of the Salt II talks
;twill be decided in the next few
weeks.
Detente has not been. going
well lately, but it remains the
-_
-
,
both coming out the,,way lie Bakongo 'tribe in northern
wants. , Angola. It started. fighting in
There is much confusion over. 1961 and soon afterwards was
American and Russian interven- formed into the NFLA.
lion in Angola and the question Throughout the 1960s, the
of which outside power inter- brunt of the fighting was in the
of first is hotly debated north. Mr Roberto has been
leere. -: Two basic facts are constantly supported by Presi-
clearly established, however. dent Mobutu of Zaire, who is
The Russians. have been sup- his brother-in-law. When Presi-
porting the dent Mobutu opened relations
pro-communist with China, Mr Roberto
popular Movement for the followed his example and went
at Liberation least since 196aMPLA to Peking in 1973. The Chinese
s A1go3;a5 --and the e
crucial event in the civil war began-to . supply him with arms
was Dr Agostinho Neto's coup and to train his troops.
Isst August in which he' sue- ' The ' 200 or so Chinese
nd Dr . seeded in driving the two rival advisers in Zaire training camps
policy, and Mr Ford ;;d
D
r
Henry" Kissinger' have repeat- f nationalist movements out were were all believed to have left
edly ' suggested that Russian Luanda. by the end of last year. It is
intervention in Angola would 3.)r Nete, a . gynaeocologist , alleged that at various times
as one of the during the 19G0s and- early
harts it. They hope to ersuade and a poet, was-
the Russians that persisting in founders of the MPLA and has 1970s, the Central Intelligence
their African adventure would led it since .1962. Its chief Agency gave some symbolic
end detente, ruin Salt and that r-ipport has always come from assistance to the NFLA, with an
the game is not worth the he educated among the Afri- eye to the 'future. Official
candle. Involvement in Angola `ant and coloured people and 'American policy was to stay out
might turn out for the Russians 11e slum-dwellers ' in Luanda. of Africa.
the way Vietnam turned out S military operation was The third Angola liberation
for - the Americans. Lased in Brazzaville, too far movement, the Union for the
The Americans also hope 'way to be a useful base of Total Independence of Angola,
that the Russians will conclude o'-Ieration P in Angola proper, UNITA, is ' led by Mr Joseph
013t well- laced to take over Savimbi-.lie was once one of
that Africans are not to be I Cabina when the Portuguese bir Roberto's lieutenants, and
relied on, and will remember . left. broke away from the NFLA in
the collapse of their efforts in I Dr Neto has been to Moscow 1966 to form Unita.
Zaire immediately after. its ; on a number of occasions and None of these three move-
independence in 1960 and per- ! 'rte Russians armed and trained meats received large-scale
Maps also their fluctuating for. his forces in the Conga. They assistance from non-African
tunes in Egypt. moved into Luanda soon after countries during the fight
There are signs that the . the Portuguese coup in April, against the Portuguese or eiur-
Russians might be ready to 1974, drove their rivals out lag the period of alternate
back out, and the Americans List Anigust and took over the bickering and fighting between
are giving them every help by I port of Luanda when the Portu- the Portuguese revolution in
urging a cease-fire and the gusto left on November 11. April, 1974 and Angolan
withdrawal of foreign troops. , It is undisputed that inimedi- . independence in November
mouth Africans might allow tie
Russians and Cubans to with-
draw inure discreetly.
Meanwhile, the President and
Secretary of Stute have to de-
Cede what negotiating', position
to take on SUIt II in the next
creek or in,n. Dr Kissinger has
r iiostponed his next visit to
lnscow several tiaras and if he
!.o%v goes there before the end
of the iuontlt, it, might be it
sign that Salt and Angola are
began delivery of mtadern . The series of events that led
equipment, including the to the present crisis began,
122nun rockets, which have a according to sources here, in
range of nine miles and which October, 1974 when the
immediately turned the tide of Russians started increasing
battle against lviiiittt and .he their military aid to the MPLA.
N1 LA. The question is whetiicr Sonic CIA officials thought that
the ,Russians decided ou this the Russians were taking steps
massive a:?nis supply because of 11) CiiSUre that Dr New, Whom
Annericau acid Souilr -African they consider a communist,
interveittioa during the should come out on tali alter.
sutnnier, Angola became independent,
The nrowt impcwttuit of the Sources in tit'asitin;gion now
say that the CIA -first decided
that steps must be taken to help
the anti-communists among the
Angolan nationalists in Janu-
ary, 1975. The Forty Committee,
which supervises the CIA. then
approved sending $300,000 to
the.NFLA.
This. was ' a very -small -suns -
and obviously would 'not itself
have.=:.provoked: the Russians
into as dramatic an increase in
their help -for the -MPLA as
eventually -occurred. On the
other hand it was seen by both
--sides as a - token - of--things to
come, and might have worried
the Russians-for.-that reason.
-Ate any event, the '.Russians
continued to supply the MPLA
and; according to sources here,
President Kaunda made a per-
sonal-appeal to President Ford
in April, last year to reverse
,what he considered to be a tide
sweeping the MPLA to victory.
Many senior officials in the t
State Department, including. the
assistant secretary responsible
for Africa, opposed any further
American involvement in
Angola, on the grounds that the
-MPLA would probably 'win any-
way and that that would not
necessarily be a disaster.
Dr Kissinger disagreed and
in July, 1975, the CIA was
authorized to spend 14 million
dollars on arms for the NFLA
and Unita. The equipment
went in through Zaire and in
due course helped the NFLA to
seize the whole country down
to a line about 90 miles north
of Luanda.
The MPLA set2ed -Luanda
breaking the- truce and. the
coalition, in August, before tine
NFLA had had a chance to
benefit frorn the CIA's largesse
which, in any case, was much
less , than the Russians were
then giving to the MPLA. I'ris
CIA's investment paid its first
dividends in September and
October when the MPLA was
driven back to the region
around Luanda.
lbleanwhik?, a much enure
effective intervention was tak-
ing place in the south, wiwre
tree South Africans carne to the
help of Unita and mounted an
ariuck up the coast. which car-
rii:d tlnita to a point more titan
100 miles to 112,
he south of
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100450005-7
, r 14
 AppiRbved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432RO0010041000'5-7
If there is any single event
which precipitated the immense
increase in Soviet aid to the
MPLA it was this South African
offensive, not the American
subsidy to the NFLA. American
aid was increased in the autumn
to a total of $32m.
Congress is firmly opposed to
any further aid being sent to
the anti-communists in Angola,
and passed a Bill just 'before
Christmas cutting it out of the
defence budget.
Now Unita and the NFLA
have' run out of steam, the !
MPLA has steadied the situa-?
Lion, and it is at last possible
that a general withdrawal of
foreigners would allow the
Angolan factions to continue
their civil war from roughly
the positions they would have
occupied anyway, without the
Russians', Americans' and South
Africans' intervention.
Patrick Brogan
WASHI NGTCN POST
1 1 JAN 1976
Report .its Famine Cover-tqi
A famine that killed 100,000
Ethiopians in 1973 was
covered up for months* by
diplomats and international
relief agencies in an effort to
protect the regime of
Emperor. Haile Selassie, a
report from the Carnegie
Endowment for International
Peach charges. The cover-up,
in which U.S. officials played
a leading role, severely
hampered relief efforts
throughout that year and well
into 1974, the report adds.
Entitled "The Politics of
Starvation," the 101-page
document details how
traditional diplomacy worked
to conceal facts about
drought, crop failure,
pestilence and widespread
starvation in order to avoid
embarrassing Haile Selassie
and his government. .
The Ethiopian government,
content to allow peasants in
the hinterland to die of hunger
and disease, put pressure on
intergovernmental and
Christian Science Monitor
13 Jan. 1976
Joseph Q. Harsch .
Lessons from Angola"'
The Kissinger-Ford effort to head off the
lodgement of Soviet influence in Angola by
clandestine action is now in the damage
control phase.
There is still a possible propaganda recov-
ery by brandishing Moscow as the sole
other outsiders are out).
foothold to the central area controlled by the
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola) faction which Moscow has been
backing for years.
Dr. Kissinger may even be able to salvage a
Soviet withdrawal at the next bargaining
round over detente, although Moscow would
have to be paid something substantiai for
giving up the fruits of what is for them. a
highly successful power politics adventure.
So we do not yet see the sequel to the story.
But matters have reached the point where we
can see clearly enough that the American
resort to clandestine operations in Angola is a
failure bordering on fiasco.
The purpose was perfectly proper - to
prevent the lodg;'mcnt. of Soviet infiuence on
the west coast of southern Africa. But the
methods chosen along the way were either too
little and too late, or the wrong ones.
The first mistake was to let Moscow pick the
1957 and do nothing about it for years except
to refuse help to the same faction but
give a pittance, a few thousand dollars, to an
private relief agencies to
conceal facts about the
disaster long after it had
gotten completely out of hand,
it says.
Meanwhile, bureaucratic
bumbling and official and
private corruption inside
Ethiopia contributed to the
misery of millions and may
have pushed that country
beyond the point of no return
where self-sufficiency is
concerned.'
Jack Shephard, the report's
principal author, and Stephen
J. Green, writer of a summary
chapter, said that as. a result
of the events of 1973-74,
Ethiopia is probably doomed
to be a relief-client state for at
least 10 years and perhaps
indefinitely.
By the end of 1975, 500,000
persons may have died of
starvation and cholera,
largely as a result of the . .
calculated inaction by
Ethoiopia's government and
its foreign collaborators, the
report says.
In a bitter passage in his
was enough for him to start building a political
organization, but nothing like enough to build
an army. In April substantial quantities of
Soviet arms and supplies arrived in Luanda
for the MPLA. They used it successfully to
consolidate their hold on the capital. By July
they were well-established and their rivals had
been pushed away from the capital.
In July the Ford administration decided to
do more for Mr. Roberto and his FNLA and
authorized $14 million to be piped to him
through the government of neighboring Zaire.
But at this point serious disagreement devel-
oped inside the government in Washington.
Both at the State Department and at CIA much
professional opinion disapproved. In effect,
Secretary of State Kissinger overruled his
experts. One of them, Nathaniel Davis. even
resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs. No one at CIA
resigned, but many disapproved of or dis-
trusted the decision.
summary chapter, Green, a
former U.N. children's fund
officer in Ethiopia, wrote
about how diplomats and
international civil servants
sought to pursue "concepts of
peace, children and youth,
public health, etc.. in an
abstract, long-term form."
"The problem in Ethiopia,
in 1973 was that many people
did not have any long-term
interests. They were dying.
"That they were dying was,
somewhat curiously, per-
ceived as a political em-
barrassment to Haile
Selassie's government by that
government and by virtually
all of the foreign officials in
that country. So nothing was-
-done.
and at CIA -- always dangerous because' it
usually leaks out. On top of that came a
surprising failure to realize how gun-shy
Congress might prove to be about anything
about it. Meanwhile the Soviets, unbothered
by any Congress or public opinion, shipped in,
large further amounts of weapons and sup-
plies, and also a lot of Cubans - perhaps as
many as 10,000 by now.
action on the international skirmish line. It is
unlikely that the MPLA will be long grateful to,!
doubt about the suitability of clandes211,
operations within present circumstance.
Open diplomacy might have worked better'
Dr. Kissinger would be advised to listen more
attentively to his experts, and give the CIA a
rest. They had enough trouble on their hands
already without Angola.
Formal independence day in Angola came
on Nov. 11. At that time the Ford adminis-
tration added another $18 million to the secret WA~S:1 r+GTOId POST
funds available to the anti-MPLA factions. .L JAN 1976
This was cleared with the appropriate "watch
dog" committees of Congress. But when the $c}io3iar~hilira flit
administration then proposed to add another
$28 million (for a total of $60 million in all) the
Senate balked. The story leaked out from
dissident senators who felt the chill of a
possible second Vietnam. The operation
ceased to be clandestine.
alienated the strongest faction without build- So there was the first mistake of letting the
ing a credible rival when there was still time Soviets have ;I monopoly of aiding the MPLA.
Then last January (a year age) a decision Mr. Roberto, but giving him only a pittance.
ACCRA, ,)an. 13--An in.
ternational students' meeting
today called for the with-
drawal of all scholarships to
developing countries from
rorcign agencies such as the
1iocseteller and Ford
Found.;I ions. The students
sale! they believe that, award of
such scholarships anal loin
n-
tlatF; ; ss hv' forei},n figencil..;
Ltaclcrt,t thu 1',VLA th sutx pifiQi .1200 006/0&etCFA,' tDRM400432ROOO1.O04100051711t to "'I
f
r, llnl)f L ?ill :. in
o t e"As.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7
11A NOTON POST
JAN 1976
Jack Anderson
es ec i the . Torturers Chile
In our swashbuckling days shortly after
the turn of the century, a Barbary pirate
named Raisouli made the mistake of
kidnapping an American citizen named
Perdicaris. Teddy Roosevelt immediately
fired off a cable from the White House:
"Perdicaris alive or Raisouli dead." To
lend emphasis to the message, Roosevelt
landed a detachment of Marines on. the
Barbary coast. Perdicaris was hastily
released.
There was a time when Americans could
count upon the protection of their gover-
nment when they traveled abroad. Today,
any foreign potentate can drag them off to
his torture chambers without risk of
retaliation.
The State Department clearly is more
interested in preserving its cozy
relationships with dictators and despots
than in upholding the human rights of
American citizens: Those unfortunate
enough to get caught in the coils of a
foreign police can expect little more from
the State Department than a polite mur-
mur of protest.
This has been dramatized by two con-
trasting incidents in the military oligarchy
of Chile. The dictatorship last week
released Dr. Sheila Cassidy, a British
citizen, who had been stripped naked,
lashed to a bed and tormented with
electric shocks by the official torturers.
The moment she, was safe on British sqil,
the British government withdrew its
Ambassador from Chile and issued a
stinging statement.
"Dr. Cassidy` was tortured by the
t:hilean security police." the statement
charged. "In order to obtain information
from her, they stripped her and gave her
severe electric shocks, No British
government can accept such uncivilized,
brutal treatment of a British subject at the
hands of a foreign government."
A year earlier, an American art teacher,
Amy Conger, was ai,used by the Chilean
Air Force. She wits Ii:r.tlt'd Ihr+tu h the
streets '.'ith hrtasts bared and later
slununed on a bed and tortured. She was
deprived of water, tt nil rt slevp and frn'ced
to stand until she ahnost collapsed. Otiee
she was btindfnlrh'j and then catapulted
di wn some steps.
The ,;nu't?ir:ut. consul in Sanliaoo, Fred
I'cud . quietly set?ured her rt'icaso. The
State I)ep:u-ttnerd filed no formal protest
but, on the routrary, conspired to keep her
(':1st' ilttiet. When we finally published her
story, Portly spoke up in support tint of a
A4
tety Conger but of Ihi'' C.rilc;ut tut atrcrs.
She has pleaded with the State Depar-
tment to investigate her case. As evidence,
she provided'a 16-page report describing
how she had been treated. But the State
Department hasn't even bothered to an-
swer all her correspondence.
Secr etary of State Henry Kissinger
simply doesn't want tortured Americans
rocking his diplomatic boat. Rather than
offend the torturers, he has even risked
antagonizing Congress.
A year ago, Congress amended the
Foreign Assistance Act to bar money from
countries that consistently violate human
rights. The law requires the President to
report to Congress on the status of human
rights in recipient countries.
In compliance with the law, the State
Department cabled more'than 60. am'-:, bassadors and asked them to file human
rights status reports. These were
assembled for submission to Congress. But
at the last minute, Kissinger classified the
information and refused ? to' release 'it.
Instead, he delivered a general report
which omitted the sordid details. Sen. Alan
Cranston, D-Calif., has been clamoring to
vain for the full information, which the law
requires Kissinger to divulge.
This American appeasement has merely
encouraged the despots to continue their
harsh routines. There is no better example
than the Chilean military junta, which
started out brutalizing communists but is
now using the. same savagery against
anyone who gets in the way.
Our sources in Chile have documented
the case, for example, of Pedro Araya
Ortiz. He is a former construction worker
Who got himself elected to the Chilean
Congress as a Christian Democrat. He is a
"Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger simply
doesn't want tortured
Americans rocking his
diplomatic boat. Rather
than offend the torturers,
he has even risked
aritagoni ping C,origress.
V
political moderate, an anti-communist, a
family man with an 18-month-old son and
an aged mother to support.
He provoked the wrath of the junta,
apparently, by searching for four union
leaders who had mysteriously disap-
peared. Like himself, they were also
moderate Christian Democrats.
Last September, Araya was seized on
the streets as he was leaving his mother's
home. Four security agents beat him,
shoved him into the back of their car and
held him down with machine guns at the
back of his neck.
They sped with their prisoner to a
special torture center near the Air Force
base in Antofagasta. We have been
provided the details of his detention, down
to the street locations of two torture
centers where he a was held.
At first, he was stripped bare and
strapped to a metal table. For 48 hours, the
torturers worked him over. They wet down
his feet and applied electrical shocks.
They beat the soles of his feet. They
burned the tender part of his arms with
lighted cigarettes. They gave him 'no food
or water.
Eventually, the junta let Araya go.
Several friends gathered at the prison gate
to greet him, but they saw a white station
wagon speed out with Araya inside.
It was later learned that the
Congressman was whisked, blindfolded, to
a special clinic-located on Santa Lucia
Street next to the Chilean-British Cultural
Institute--where torture victims are
nursed back to health. A doctor treated
him for nine arm burns, severe burns on
the soles of his feet and a dislocated tendon
in his right foot.
Then Araya was dumped on a street
near Santiago's athletic stadium and left.
to hobble to the, home of a friend. ? His
friends insisted that he see a doctor. He
was examined first at Santiago's
Diagnostic Institute, later at the institute
of Neurosurgery at Salvador hospital. lie
remains today tinder intensive psychiatric
care and is able to walk only with theaid o
crutches.
Meanwhile , thin united Nations and tl
Organization of American States ha?
denounced torture in Chile. The Brit`
have withdrawn their ambassador
protest. But the I tithed States r-emainl
cordial tennis with the tortur.
Un'ted Feature Syndicale, Inc.
Approved For Release 2001/0$008 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7