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January 10, 1976
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-.Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005'T -`' INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. GOVERN1\TENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EAST EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA LATIN AMERICA Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 .Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 t 3 L J A former Director of the agency puts television coverage of its activities into historical perspective By John A.. McCone [The Central Intelligence Agency has been much in the news lately, as tele- vision news has covered Congressional investigations of the agency's activities. To add to viewers' understanding of that coverage, we present this article by John A. McCone, who was Director of the CIA during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-65. Be- fore that, he was one of the architects of the Department of Defense, and served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under James Forrestal.] Any government, including even those which have the most elementary inter- national association, must collect foreign intelligence. This pursuit of a special kind of information-and its refined product, which is knowledge-is an in- dispensible function. Vigorous nations depend on their leaders to devise a strategy that will provide both for their security and for their economic and political well-being. History teaches us that leaders cannot meet this responsibility unless they learn the political, economic and mil- itary capabilities and intentions of other nations. Today, great nations are armed as never before. And the leaders of great states must take heed of the risk in- volved. Furthermore, in their economic life, nations both large and small are interdependent, one with the other- more now than ever before in the past. On the military side, the maneuver- ing of possible hostile forces, the de- ployment of mass-destruction weapons and-what could hoofI, porlance?-the hidda PPAS even more advanced weaponry, must all be discovered in good time and their possible effects measured. On the economic side, the task of intelligence services that provide information to safe- guard the well-being of the state has lately been vastly amplified: a consortia has appeared that seeks to get economic advantage by imposing quotas and ex- orbitant prices on raw materials that heretofore have been in relatively free international flow. Walter Lippmann once wrote, "Foreign policy is the 'shield of the Republic"; and Sherman Kent, the distinguished historian, has said, "Strategic intel- ligence is the thing that gets the shield to the proper place at the right time. It is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword." What these men are saying is merely that sound decisions designed to pro- tect the security interests and the economic and political welfare of our country can only be made against a background of knowledge. Without the knowledge gained from foreign-intel- ligence gathering methods, and the ap- praisal of the significance of that knowl- edge developed through careful and studious analysis of the -information, leaders can make no policy decisions with reasonable assurance that the ac- tion they plan is a correct one. All vigorous nations, large and small, support a foreign-intelligence apparatus. Invariably, the organization is clandes- tine. Even in open societies, practical considerations demand that the organ- ization be kept out of public view and its work made known only to the power. When you make public dis- closure of the intimate details of a foreign-intelligence service you paralyze an otherwise effective operation. It is no surprise that the so-called superpowers-the United States and the Soviet Union-both maintain elaborate intelligence systems; but the intelligence efforts of other countries throughout the world, some 40 in all, are also signifi- cant. Among them all, the intelligence service of the United States is the only one (except West Germany's) that was initiated and authorized legislatively- in our case, by Congressional action after long and thoughtful consideration by both houses of the Congress and with its operations and budgets re- viewed by Congressional committees. We got into the foreign intelligence business fairly recently. Between the two World Wars, the United States main- tained little in the way of an intelligence community. To be sure, the Army and the Navy maintained separate intelli- gence units of their own, specifically to meet their needs in times of war. The Department of State kept a watchful eye on world happenings, and ambas- sadors regularly reported their observa- tions. But, we had no organization in existence to analyze the whole flow of information and to study the dangers to American security inherent in the pat- tern of action reported from abroad. Thus, an inquiry into our surprise at Pearl Harbor, conducted after World War 11, disclosed that our various gov- ernment agencies had in hand-days prior to the actual attack-all essential information concerning Japan's prepara- tions for war, including the assembly and departure of the Japanese fleet. -.+ The State, War and Navy Departments had each gathered the information, and each had used it for its own special Interests, but-disastrously-no branch of government then had the duty to put the information together and alert the President of impending danger. It was to correct this gaping de- ficiency in our government machinery that the Central Intelligence Agency was created under the National Se- curity Act of 1947. To ensure that it would remain apart from partisan at- tachments and parochial interests, the CIA was developed essentially as. a civilian organization. It was then recognized that many de- partments of government must, in the interests of their departmental respon- sibilities and to broaden the base of all intelligence appraisals, continue their own intelligence efforts. I am speak- ing of the intelligence division of the State Department known as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research--a thoughtful organization that assesses Information for the State Department; the Defense Intelligence Agency that supports the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinates the work of the three separate service intelligence units and manages the corps of military attaches; the intelli- gence units of the Army. Navy and Air Force maintained to serve their Chiefs of Service and to provide current tech- nical intelligence information to field commanders; the intelligence units of the Treasury Department, and the En- ergy Research and Development Agency (formerly the Atomic Energy Commis- sion), both of which contribute im- portant specialized Information on for- few who ner.,d to know. Usually, the eign developments; and, finally, the elLhW6y2OqDlMA98lMiCkkgRD1r?r7>c'-0043tOlX6I IL O`rfstigation, which, and the control over it are both em- As o r s extensive domestic bedded at 1110 topmost echelon of operations, is constantly unearthing in- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7' formation either originating abroad or having a significant foreign connection. At the apex of this large, complex Community is the Central Intelligence Agency. Its Director, as the President's principal intelligence officer, is charged by Presidential directive with the re- sponsibility for the general direction of the community as a whole. This func- tion he carries out in his individual role and as chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, which is the senior body of the community. and is composed of the directors of several departmental intelligence organizations. The Central Intelligence Agency's re- sponsibilities, as established by law, range from the collection of overt and covert intelligence by its own con- siderable establishment to the correla- tion and assessment of intelligence findings from all sources. In addition, the CIA is charged with protecting in- telligence sources and methods and with executing tasks assigned by the President or the National Security Coun- cil. Under this latter mandate fall such essential activities as counterintelli- gence, which means ferreting out, to- gether with the FBI, the covert activities of others. Also, the mandate covers covert political action and covert para- military operation's-the supporting or training and equipping of third-country nationals who espouse our principles of freedom and who are under attack by Communist forces directed from the center of Communist power. Unevaluated intelligence-raw, as it is known in the trade-comes in many ways. Through the long sweep of his- tory, . human contact, both open and covert, has been the major source of intelligence. Conversations between heads of state, reports from ambassa- dors and military attaches, and articles in newspapers and other publications all contribute to the inventory of infor- mation. But the richest source is us- ually the secret agent. a well-trained professional, concealed under disarm- ing cover, who usually moves in the highest and most informed circles. The ethics of clandestine intelligence operations have long been debated and some would do away with them. The fact is that no international covenant forbids clandestine operations, and they go on as they have for centuries. At least 40 nations today support clan- destine services-no great state can abandon them. In the recent past, technology has enormously lengthened the reach and sharpened the penetration of intelli- gence. High-flying aircraft carrying so- phisticated cameras, supplemented by orbital satellites equipped with even more advanced cameras, have been able to look down into fortress societies and record in startling detail what is actually developing. A correspondingly wide range of elec- tronic sensing and tracking devices makes it quite possible to accurately deduce the yield of nuclear devices, exploded either in the atmosphere or underground. at great distances: and 10 supply information on the character- istics and performance of military equip- ment that is being developed and tested beyond otherwise impcneSrable frontiers. Indeed, in the event of a surprise attack, we would get our first warning_ of the blow being prepared from these inlolh- gence-gathering syalerns. raw material, once obtained, must be drawn together, analyzed and corre- lated. And it must be evaluated before it becomes useful knowledge. An es- timate of the developing situation emerges, and from this estimate a head of state, consulting. with his advisers, can chart a course of action that will best meet the developing situation. With- out the intelligence itself and the so- phisticated estimate, the head of a gov- ernment would be groping toward a decision. All raw intelligence entering the com- munity flows in one form or another to the CIA. From this processing comes a digest of what it all means and an es- timate of what its consequences could be. The bits and pieces of informa- tion from near and far are studied by men and women of the highest capabil- ities: political scientists, economists, historians, linguists, engineers, phys- icists and other experts. Daily intelligence reports are sent to the President and his principal advisers. Finally, there appears a body of papers known as the National Intelligence Es- timates. presenting a continuing analysis of military, political and economic situa- tions that bear directly on our national security and well-being.. All are the product of the analytical process and are prepared within the halls of the Central Intelligence Agency, with a sub- stantial oversight by the United States Intelligence Board. Preparing this body of literature in its various forms is, in my opinion, the most important activity of the agency. It is certainly the least publicized. In the discharge of 'its duties, the United States Intelligence Board gathers weekly at CIA headquarters-and often more frequently-to review the national estimates prepared by the CIA analysts. This review is made before the es- timates are passed to the President and to others by the Director. It is also with- in the Board's purview to advise the Director on how best to supply the intelligence needs of the Nation's policy- makers, schedule the flights of the re- connaissance satellites and. photo- graphic planes, fix the tasks of the National Security Agency, advise the precautions that may be desirable for protecting the Nation's intelligence sources and methods, and maintaining a watch office to be constantly on the alert for surprise hostile developments. In the tempest-abundantly reported by television and the press-that has been whirling over the heads of the in- telligence community and particularly the CIA in recent months, the accusa- tion is frequently sounded that our in- telligence community is an unsuper- vised, free-wheeling body-a law unto itself. This simply is not true. The -* President, himself, 'exercises control in a number of ways: through personal contact with his Director; through the Office of Budget and Management and a subcommittee of the National Security Council that oversees covert activities; and also through a civilian advisory board that meets frequently, reviews the community's operations and reports to the President. The House of Representa- tives and the Senate have special com- mittees to oversee the community's ac- tivities and to review its budgets. For all of this extensive oversight, recent accusations of wrongdoing- some imagined, others grossly over- stated, but still a few justified-have set up a clamor for closer supervision of the intelligence operations and es- pecially the clandestine activities. In my opinion, the noise has been so great and the image of CIA has become so tarnished that changes must be made to extinguish, as much as possible, criticism, to restore con- fidence and to provide an on-going dynamic foreign intelligence service. But no changes will be useful unless the Congress, the press and electronic media, and the public can feel as- sured that the Nation's entire intelli- gence ? service, in playing its part to ensure the well-being of our Nation, will always confine its operations to ac- ceptable moral and legal standards. The remedies involve both legislative and executive action. As we seek change, we must take great care not-to damage the effectiveness of the intelli- gence organization and we must accept the practical truth that a foreign intelli- gence operation, to be effective at all, must by its very nature remain "in privacy"-its activities must be cloaked in secrecy. In a free society, we find it difficult to accept this concept, but so- ciety must accept the "cloak." The proximity of the Central Intelli- gence Agency and its Director to the President and the National Security Council should be made more con- spicuous. Indeed, it might be advisable to identify the organization as an arm of the National Security Council and identify it that way by name. Its Director would then be the Nation's principal in- telligence officer, with statutory authority over all of the activities now conducted by the CIA and with general supervision over the community as a whole. A sub- committee of NSC with high-level repre- sentation from State, Defense. Treasury and the White House itself, could pro- vide a watchful eye over all intelligence activities, not merely certain covert op- erations as now is the case. The Presi- dent's Civilian Advisory Board should continue to provide him with an in- formed viewpoint outside of the chan- nels of government. To strengthen Congressional oversight, I suggest we create a single joint com- mittee on intelligence, with membership drawn from both houses and adequately staffed. Such a committee should func- tion in the same manner as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has func- tioned for almost 30 years. The con- fidentiality of all that is provided to this committee that I propose must remain- within the committee, as has been the case through the years with our nuclear affairs. In particular, oversight by such a joint committee must be accepted as oversight by the Congress as a whole. In one way or another, risks of leaks and disclosures of sensitive operations must be lessened or eliminated under severe penalties, authorized by law. Beyond this, anyone who has been seriously connected with the responsi- bilities of national security will hope that our prolonged and painful review of the roles and missions of the CIA. and the work of the intelligence com- munity as a whole, will end up by pre- serving an organization that can. serve our security needs and yet rest com- fortably within American political philos- ophy. Our Nation would hardly be safe Gathering the inform%0VbV ttFor Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 start of the intaIiige%o p ocess. ''7~he 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 By Lyle Denniston. Washington star staff writer Dick Helms was waiting for his 19-hour flight back to Tehran. He had been home again - was it the 14th time? -to testify before Congress. A friend, there to see him off , thought Helms was somewhat preoc parted, "if I .wind up at Leavenworth, He finds himself somewhat oddly poised these days. Helms has every right to expect , ? his Closest friends feel, that if he came home from Iran, left the gov- business - quickly. But he is allowing himself to think, at least in moments of sad humor, penitentiary instead. ONE OF THE most durable figures in the government for a generation, a easily through the. corridors of power, an urbane and polished guest in Washington's most envied salons, as well connected as any professional in town, Richard McGarrah Helms at But, maybe, not anymore. ing damage lawsuits in court. He has been under criminal investigation for a year. And every time he flies back His woe comes mainly out of the That role in that period has been investigated by a half-dozen congres- sional committees, an "in-house" team at the CIA itself, the Rockefel- ment, and now a federal grand jury. "HELMS IS being absolutely chewed up in this process," one of his Dick is being made the sacrificial fig- In all of the investigations, past or has been the most predictable target. Not surprisingly, there is a strong worked with Helms for years that the whole secret intelligence apparatus former director, perhaps more so. But it is Reims himself who per- presidents. Only a few men in the last 30 years of American history have reached the eminence to which Helms rose - and he did it largely unnoticed in public. INDEED, THERE are those who believe that Helms is in trouble now -precisely because, when he did come out into the open, he seemed so far out of reach, so remote to the aver- age observer in Washington. "There is a tremendous gap," sug- gests a diplomat who knows Helms well, "between the power elite - and Helms is part of that - and the little fellow." But even inside the "power elite," not many have had the respect and trust that Helms could claim among the truly powerful. Helms, for exam- ple, could expect to have dinner with a key senator, perhaps at the Sena- tor's house, the night before appear ing at a crucial committee session. They might even plan how it would go Back when he was a fairly junior man at the CIA, an associate recalls, "Helms was exposed much more than the average to the higher levels. He was constantly being consulted." It seems there has been something special about Helms from the very beginning - at least as he is seen by men and women who frankly confess' their bias in his favor. "If one capsules Dick as an East-' ern Establishment product of a mod-' estly well-off family - out of the New .York metropolitan area, and Williams College - that is about right. That' produced a kind of person in the Depression years who was a little more sophisti- cated than the average American." IT IS QUITE common, in fact, for his associates to stress Helms' breeding., "He is a polished and ma- ture individual; his whole background would indicate that. You wouldn't expect him to be a clumsy man, and he isn't. Compared to the average person, there is a broad depth to his back- ground." Cultured, disciplined. Those are the qualities that helped Helms move up, and move around, in Washing- ton. There have been, to he sure, some missteps and mishaps along the way.. Even some of those, how- ever, add to the image that Helms showed to those around him and in the power centers of the na- tion's capital. Because his whole career in government had been in "the clandestine service" Richard Helms has not been conspicuous to the public. But Helms always was the man that an intelligence professional could count on back home, almost from the earliest post-war days of the Forties. And he became a man whom even presi- dents felt free to lean on. His record in the CIA and earlier intelligence units, and especially his direct service for presidents, is a source of pride to him. "I believed in the importance to the nation of the function that the agency served. I still do: without regrets, without qualms, without apology," he has said. It is a record that is pub- licly known only in the most general way. The specific revelations and accusations that have emerged from the probes of the CIA show some of his problems; they do not show how- Helms got to be a "power elite" fig- ure. HIS BASIC biography provides the start: He went to private school in Gstaad, Switzerland, with the sons of sheiks and prime minis- ters, graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Williams after being chosen "most likely. to succeed" in his class, traveled frequently in Germany . and became fluent in the language, interviewed Hitler as a United Press reporter in 1936, moved into the Office of Strategic Services as a bright young Navy man during the war, and was re-. cruited into OSS service after the war. He was in intelligence from then on. 'His marriage, to Julia Bretzman Shields in 1939, was to make a major differ- ence to his later career, in an unusual way. The col- lapse of that marriage in 1968 also became a factor in 'his role in government and in Washington society. While with the OSS dur- ing the war, Helms made contact with a handful of men who would remain influential in U.S. intelli- gence - whether they were inside or outside the gov- ernment - for years to conic. These included Allen W. Dulles, John McCloy, Lucius Clay, David Bruce, Andrew Berding, Frank Wisner. When many of those men .became civilians again pare Richard helms to ligcppSQumdoFor Releasei2O0V018106 i)ClA-RDP77-OOlR82 2061 Ooa1t600`ijiitall Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 that had developed a high sensitivity to Soviet politi- cal maneuverings and spy activity in Western Europe. That provided a cohesion which, 30 years later, still holds many of the original OSS men together intellec- tually and philosophically. ' Seeing the OSS disman- tled, -in what these men thought was President Harry Truman's .way of get- ting rid of OSS' chief Wil Liam Donovan, and worried that Washington was not sufficiently keen on the Soviet threat, the small OSS remnant kept pressuring associates back home to get a continuing organization formed. The Strategic Serv- ices Unit was set up, and the group that included Helms was persuaded to stay in Europe to provide a "product" - that is, intelli- gence information, primari. ly on the Soviets. THEN THE Central Intel- ligence Group was formed, and Helms was brought home to head its "German desk." It was a key move for him: He was in a posi- tion in the CIG where he could use his intelligence background, and that would count later in bureaucratic skirmishes. "In those days," one long-time intelligence man says, "the top leadership was extremely, weak. The leadership then was mili- tary, with no knowledge of the business." It was at about that time - perhaps the spring of , 1946 - that Helms became a "division chief" handling what is generally referred to as "clandestine" work. That can mean either gathering intelligence se- cretly about the other side's threat to the United States or penetrating the other side's spy network ("counter-intelligence"), or trying to prevent penetra- tion of U.S. spying ("counter-espionage"). Helms was in the division post when the CIG became the Central Intelligence Ag- ency in 1947. During those years, the sweeping Communist takeover of Eastern Europe and such episodes as the Berlin air- lift crisis produced heavy activity in Ilelms' division. After the Korean war had begun, in 1950, Helms con- tinued his rise in the CIA's clandestine service. . "DICK BECAME the. buffer between the profes- sionals and this succession of military officers (who headed the CIG and then the CM)," a colleague remembers. "This is a role . was that the professionals have not controlled by Helms. It tivity. (NOTE. Helms declined, through the State Depart- ment, to be interviewed for this series. Former associ- ates agreed to interviews, provided that their names not be used.) get what you wanted." But while he was satisfy. ing the professionals, Helms also was keeping his superiors happy, too, and was expanding his contacts beyond the CIA at inter- agency meetings on U.S. foreign crises. "As he rose in the agen- cy," an associate says, "Helms realized it was important for him that he understand the power, influence and governmental situation in Washington. He couldn't lurch around town clumsily. A lot of people around town were very glad to give him a hand." He was becoming espe- cially well connected and, at the same time, "sure- footed." But just as impor- tant, he was staying in this country. Most of his profes- sional colleagues wanted to be abroad: "That's where .the fun was," one of them suggests. But Helms could not go overseas;.he has told associates that his wife ob- jected. ' Whatever.the reason, it kept him in a key spot and largely shaped his future career. "From about 1950 until 1965;" says an associ- ate, "the one point of con- tinuity in the entire place was Dick Helms. Every sta- tion chief, every senior offi- cer and a lot of the juniors went to him." IN THE EARLY part of this period, when the agen- cy was still feeling its way, in a new field, Helms' su- periors also depended upon him, passing to him many of the minor but necessary administrative headaches of the day. With- the Korean war, pressure from U.S. military and diplomatic officials for intelligence "results" in- creased. Those demands apparently were not limited to gathering spy data on the enemy. They included what intelligence officers call "clandestine operations" - that is, undercover military-type or political action, helping friends or' hurting enemies in a regime or country abroad. "We had all done clandestine operations dur- ing the war; we knew how to do it," says a Helms as, sociate from the OSS days and later. However. a new unit was formed - the Office of poli- cy Coordination -- to do the Disparagingly, one of Helms' colleagues of that time suggests that the OPC "wanted to remake the world with huge sums of money, subsidies, black bags and so forth. There was pretty considerable chaos, for a few years." THE PROFESSIONALS' dominance, however, began to re-emerge when Allen Dulles, back in the agency, moved up to head CIA in 1953. "This was somebody we all knew," says one of the professionals -of that period. "Dulles was very knowledgeable, very intelli- gent, he had some knowl- edge of the operations busi- ness." It was a boon to Helms' career, too. "Here was Dulles' favorite younger officer, Mr. Richard Helms, close at hand," an associate relates. "Dick became the focal point between all the guys who were in the opera- tions business." Most importantly, Dulles tired of having two sections of the agency handling "clandestine" work, so he merged the intelligence- gathering functions with the "operations" activities. This came, Helms' associ- ates say, after "a whole series of embarrassments" by the "operations people." Helms was the No. 2 man at the top of the clandestine unit, but actually was more than a deputy. His boss, Frank Wisner - an old OSS partner - relied on him heavily. "For the first time, the professionals had a chance to get at some of these fair- ly wild schemes," a col- league remembers, suggest- ing that Helms and his staff brought "operations" back to what was practical and workable. When Wisner's health broke, Dulles did not put Helms in charge. Instead, he turned to Richard Bissell - a move that hurt Helms' pride, so much that he con- sidered quitting. "This was a rough period for Dick's ego," a close friend remem-. bers. BUT HIS CAREER actu- ally benefited. Because he was one of their own, CIA professionals continued to work mostly through Helms. But, more decisive- ly, Bissell got into trouble. The fiasco of th,~ Bay of Pigs - the CIA-managed invasion of Cuba during the John Kennedy administra- tion - cost Bissell as well as Dulles their jobs in 1962. Helms became "deputy director of plans" - that is, professionals were concern- ed," according to a col- league. When a businessman -engineer, John McCone, became head of CIA after Dulles, "Helms pretty much was left to con- tinue to run the business." "Pretty soon," an associ- ate says, "John Kennedy. was calling Dick Helms." McCone, close to Kenne- dy, had done much to help Helms meet the right people around town. He also coach- ed Helms on "the world of Washington," a friend says. "From the down days under Bissell, until he was brought along by McCone, I have never seen such growth as there was in Helms. Even his manner- isms became more re- fined." HE MOVED UP to be deputy director of CIA in 1965, under President Lyn- don Johnson's choice as CIA chief after McCone, Adm. William F. (Red) Ra- born. "Here, again," a CIA professional says, "the one person inside the agency on the clandestine side who had had the public exposure at State. Defense, the White House, was Dick." In June, 1966, after President John- son had tired of Raborn's repeated miscues - includ- ing a suggestion to the Dutch intelligence chief that the United States should give Germany the atomic bomb - Raborn was 'fired. Helms became CIA chief. That pleased the CIA ' professionals - and the press - immensely. Here was a leader who had come all the way from the begin- ning, who could sit down with a troubled case officer or station chief and ease his woes, who became "one of the most visible and most popular - probably THE most popular" - director ever, and a man who "knew a lot of people in town." He ran his office effi- ciently; the desk was usual- ly clean when he went home at night. Associates de- scribe him as a man who "didn't pontificate with peo- ple, who "didn't put on airs," who was "direct, friendly - but tough if. he has to be," who was; "charming but with possi- bly a little suggestion of 1 iron underneath," who "at- tracted very deep-rooted personal loyalty." Socially, llelms was as much a success as he was at the office. However, he never was regarded as "a superficial playboy" or "a social butterfly." lie was. an old friend says, "no man to stay up over the last drink." ",Per .:t011S" jobs It to wander Rlovd'trp3dj F Fd9sb120()11V06108 :ut'iAr-R6DR7)7a(Mi2kG6?10041d?06c7. Helms is said to be a. titan w/io needs sleep h i',y ninth of abo6':'.-ndks and 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005=7 ,more than most men his age. He falls to sleep quick- ly, sleeps easily and long. THERE WAS always a measure of semi-anonymity to his social pursuits. At parties, one hostess says, "he sits in the background mostly; he never let you know what he was think- ing." He'drinks Scotch, but never more than a couple of drinks. He also is said to be fond of fine wine - a taste he had brought home from Europe. There is no doubt that Helms became a sought- after guest in Washington. During the time he was separated. from his first wife, when Helms lived at the Chevy Chase Club, he was regularly pursued by hostesses. "One society fig- ure here says that "all the women would say, `Why don't we get Dick Helms for an `extra'?" He was re- .garded, she adds, "as very .un-creepy; he would strike WASHINGTON STAR 15 JAN 1976 you as a Chevy Chase golf-I er." (Actually, his game is tennis.) It was during this same time that Helms was rising, in the space of three years, . to the top of CIA. And that, some of his old friends think, was a most difficult and very likely costly ex- perience for him. "The sudden move from down inside the agency, to deputy and then to director, pitched Dick out into that world of chauffeur-driven cars, club memberships, the social circuit, exposure to Cabinet meetings, the NSC, senators and con- gressmen," a long-time as- sociate says. Despite his "training" under McCone, ..it was the first time Helms was in a world where he was not sure-footed." THERE ALSO were diffi- culties at home. He and his wife were separated for a long period, and then di- vorced. Helms married the woman who had- been a _so- cial friend of the family,. Mrs. Cynthia McKelvie. The divorce, all of his friends say, was a heavy financial burden to Helms. "Dick was not a wealthy man. In the divorce, he gave up what he had..He and Cynthia have sailed very close to the wind finan- cially," says a close friend. "They have been remark- ably adept at maintaining their position under the cir- cumstances." The Helmses took an apartment at the Irene, a high-rise on Willard Avenue in Chevy Chase. "It used to be such a surprise; Dick always answered the phone himself," recalls an ac- quaintance. "He said they couldn't afford any ser- vants, that there was hard- ly enough money for the furniture." In fact, some of Helms' friends believe that the financial situation and the difficulties of adjustment kept Helms from leaving government service at that time. "I asked him why he agreed to take the ambassa- dorship," said a friend. "He said he wanted to get Cyn- thia away where she could live comfortably for a while." HE APPARENTLY had had several good job offers outside of government. But he agreed to go to Tehran after, apparently, being fired from the CIA job by President Nixon. "He was quite unceremoniously forced out," says an associ- ate. Called to Camp David Nixon's Maryland retreat, Helms was given a choice of ambassadorships. He chose Iran, and went. Afterward, CIA Director William E. Colby is said to have remarked to Defense Secretary James Schlesing- er (Helms' immediate successor at CIA) when both of them had been fired by President Ford: "You know, Dick Helms outlasted us both." The Charmed Life of Richard Helms - Park 2 By Lyle Denniston Washington Star Staff Writer - The whole room tells of power, of rank, of prestige; it may be one of the most impressive places in Wash- ington. On two walls are photographs of many of the figures who have domi- nated this city since World War II; many of the pictures are signed with a warm, personal note. On another wall, there is an array of certified honors capable of stirring deep envy. And on the fourth wall, there is the most enviable collection of all: this man's portrait on a half-dozen front covers of news magazines. r Of course, there is the man him- self. If anyone in Washington can claim respect, surely he could - and does. He speaks easily, assuredly, knowingly. Behind an imposing desk, his gaze is fixed in a dominating way. THIS IS Stuart Symington, U.S. senator from Missouri. A man who has known presidents and has been consulted by them. A man who, it often has been assumed, ought to have been in the White House him- self. He also is one of Richard Helms' be._t r_:....,t.. .., Washington committee sometimes went for a whole year without meeting. It was within such a small community of the powerful that the CIA and Helms routinely operated - and -did so with approval, at least implied approval. BUT TIMES have changed. Powerful friends. like Symington are in no position to stop the process of inquiry that is now going on, or even to shape its course. In fact, they are 'feeling pressed themselves to come up with some ideas. of their own for reform. The process means, for Helms individually, that his reputation and perhaps his future are very, much at stake: He is described. by friends as somewhat stoic about the prospect of per- sonal ruin, perhaps telling 'himself that it is the price he knew he might have to pay in his kind of profes- sion. He is not going to take on his critics or criticize his w a even, h of is b bl o t It IS p1 ; t..u,, ........- _e reality _ f .,... ,, .. Helms has been in that very office in Tememucred for having said that he sociates say. "I don't think the Russell 1;uiiding, sharing with had not evt!n asked about the CIA you'll find Helms throwing Symington secrets that never will be running a secret war in a lot of mud around," says known publici'. Laos. Lately, Symington a former colleague. Symington doesn't reveal tnem; he has re)eatcd often that the But what is happening to does not even allude to them. But he Sen to s CIA "oversight" Helms and to the CIA Approved For Realease ease'2001/0CIA-R1T77-00,f32Rbd01 M4t1'665-0ll a is ready, even eager, to defend Helms. "I'm just as sure that that man didn't do anything that wasn't in the national interest as I am that the sun is going to come up tomorrow morn- ing." It is a testimonial that, at the mo- ment, Helms needs badly. The for- mer director of the CIA is beleaguered, and nowhere is he in more trouble than in Congress. Day after day, accusations of CIA misdeeds come out of congressional committees and Helms gets a good share of the blame. THE TROUBLE with Symington's support, however, is that it doesn't mean much these days. At another time, even a hint of doubt about what the CIA was up to would have been turned off with a word from a Sym- ington or an Allen Eliender, a John Stennis or a Mendel Rivers. A little circle of members was the only forum in Congress to which the CIA reported. It was not uncommon, apparently, for those lawmakers to decide that no one else on Capitol Hill needed to know what they had been told. There were no leaks. There was nd then the pretense or no Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROO0100410005-7 wider aspect, too. It may affect the whole future of the secret intelligence sys- tem. Somewhat awkwardly and uncertainly, it seems, Congress has been trying to take over some of the power of foreign policy manage- ment. The spy business is, and always .has been, di- rectly mixed up in that. The approval - or, at least, the easy tolerance - :of what the CIA was doing was part of a well de- veloped congressional habit of leaving the tough deci- sions on diplomacy and military strategy to the White House. The lawmak. ers chose to be very accom- modating, and presidents took that to mean indiffer- ence. THAT SYSTEM came close to collapsing with the Vietnam war, in the later stages, anyway. And it then became politic - and po- litically salable - for Con- gress to try to assert itself. That was especially true after the Pentagon Papers "leak" and then the Water- gate scandals showed how far presidents felt free to go in the name of "national se- curity" The CIA revela- tions followed, almost pre- dictably. "I believe," suggests a former colleague of Helms, "that the combination of disgust and fatigue from Vietnam and Watergate are playing an equal role." It is not yet clear, and won't be for months, how far Congress wants to go now to give itself control over the CIA or to put other kinds of restraints on the agency. So far, Senate and House committees have fo- cused on a variety of CIA "dirty tricks," but it is not yet clear that Congress is prepared to put a stop to all of that. There are even fewer in- dications of what Congress Wants done about the entire approach to spying and intelligence in general. Some who have spent their careers in espionage seem prepared to believe that - because of the kind of inquiry Congress is mak- ing - the CIA may simply be abolished. "THE AGENCY," one of these professionals com- ments, "doesn't deserve a living from the United States. The United States can do anything it wants to the agency. .. . But if you base a decision on what, so far, the country has b. en given to hear, I see no rea- son to expect that the agen- ev would not be disman- about Congress' intentions at this point is whether it wants to do anything at all about the power of presi- dents to use the CIA. That is where long-time professionals in U.S. spying see the most serious abuses, and that is where most of them think Helms' problems - and those of other CIA leaders - first arose. There has been a split, for at least 25 years, in the intelligence community over the value of the so- called "cowboy" approach to espionage. That ap- proach means all the secret techniques of disrupting the enemy, from supporting favored political factions abroad to dreaming up schemes to murder foreign leaders such as Fidel Cas- tro. Pressure from the very top of the government for "cowboyism" apparently began to develop heavily during the Korean war, when the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination - the "dirty tricks department" - was formed. "If the government had- n't been so hepped on this in the early Fifties, a lot of these problems wouldn't have arisen," says a CIA- leader of that era. PRESIDENT Dwight Eisenhower probably was the first to show a real interest in that side of the intelligence business, ac- cording to the profession- als. "He had dealt with intelligence and operations, and with the Resistance, during the war," recalls one. Within the White House, the National Security Coun- cil began working up schemes to make trouble for Communist regimes abroad. There quickly de- veloped a tendency at the agency's OPC to plan major - and very expen- sive - "covert operations." Under the pressure, the agency got sloppy about this side of its work, ac- cording to career men who were involved. "We were talking about sending 20 people where one would do, spending $20 million instead of $1 million," recalls one professional, who adds: "Nothing so concentrates the mind of an intelligence agency as a healthy short- age of funds." But there was no short- age, and most professionals at the CIA knew the reason: The White House was inter- ested. "It was perfectly policy vacuum." Another remembers: "Allen Dulles used to come back from the White House with one of these ideas, and he would say: 'Don't tell me it's crazy - we don't have any choice.' THE* PROCESS appar- ently stirred deep dissen. sion within CIA ranks. One key source of resentment, apparently, was a depar- ture from the system of having "clandestine opera- tions" plans work their way up from the station chiefs abroad. "For many years - up to the arrival of the Kennedys, perhaps it was with Eisen- hower - nothing had ever been generated and put into motion-that didn't originate in the operations area, and then was pushed upward for approval, at the - policy area," a CIA leader re- counts. Some who did not like the idea of starting at the top with such schemes protest- ed and, when that failed, got out. But, one profes- sional says, "some of us used to sit around and ra- tionalize that, if we left, someone else would just be put in to do it. Some of us. felt we could keep these things under control." But he adds bluntly, "you ac- cepted these demands or you got out." Helms did not get out. "His primary loyalty was to the executive," an associ- ate suggests. "That was the tradition in which he was raised as a professional. This is where you basically were going to get your orders. If you got a request from the White House, it was pretty hard to say no. What the hell were you in business for?" Another CIA professional describes what was hap- pening within the govern- ment and CIA: "Since Kennedy - in- cluding Johnson and Nixon - you have had a personal- ized government; the government of the U.S. is run out of the White House, a strong president relying on one or two individuals. "A LOT OF the cowboy bent in recen years stein med from the fact that' we've had frustrated presi- dents. They had problems they couldn't solve through would be sent for, and told he's got to save Iran, or save Jordan, or save Italy, or save France. He would say, 'Yes sir!' and then he would come back and say 'Save Italy!' " It is because of such recollections that CIA professionals angrily dis- pute the remark of Chair- man Frank Church, D- Idaho. of the Senate Intelli- gence Committee that the CIA has acted as "a rogue elephant" and that it treat ed the presidency "almost as an irrelevancy." Some of these men also think that one defense made; by Helms himself - that presidents have been shielded from knowing embarrassing things, so they could deny them if the United States got caught - has been heavily overdone. That, one ex-CIA official says, "is a complete red herring." Another, while conceding that there have been times "where the link between policy and carry- ing it out has become fuzzy over a period of time," adds that "most of these have not been because of a deter- mination of Helms that he was going to run the show." These professionals are just as sure that Helms, and others, did not operate without telling Congress what they were doing. They dispute Sen. Symington's comment that "the CIA wasn't watched; they could do anything they wanted." ONE FORMER CIA offi- cer recalls: "You would go up there and brief two or three guys. Then you might be called before the full committee in an open hear- ing; and there sat those boys who know all about this, looking up at the ceil- ing." There is, among the men who served along with Helms, a growing skepti- cism that Congress and the White House will now do? much more than they ever have to provide solutions for the problems now being uncovered. "The question is," says one of these professionasis, "can Congress and the executive arrange their af- fairs in such a way that the agency can conduct opera- tions with proper guid- ance?" Another adds: "This is not so much a problem for the agency. God damn it, the country's faced with the problem. I don't think it's important what happens to the a ency. But I .%ou d have thought the first thing we would want to do was to study the United States as it is today, and decido v ,;-l it e w e peop were tled." Approved fem , ei1easet2OO1/O8lO8 : C ~ '43~'V Oo'1bO41 in no ` ` o3' overt lore What is the least pcicar felt they were actu7 g (at CIA'.7, Allen Dulles 6 clear to me, says a man who was in the "opera- tions" side of CIA then, '.that th ho l the orthodox machinery of government. And they haven't been willing to use their own powers. "They have been inclined more to turn to the agency for capabilities they didn t really understand. They would go to State and go to the Pentagon, then some. ,6z.IA what needs apun bey and Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 do." Helms' former col- leagues see a possibility that, after the focus on CIA's misdeeds in secret military or political adven- tures, Congress may decide to wipe out "the clandestine side of the business." That would include intelligence- gathering and protection of WASI4INGTCN STAR 16 Jan. 1976 the U.S. espionage network itself, as well as "dirty, tricks" operations. "IF THE UNITED States is to be asked to forgo any covert means of obtaining intelligence, we certainly would get less intelligence. The amount of hard fact which emerges from Lyle Denniston Washington Star Staff Writer It is somewhat after 10 in the morning, June 23, 1972. In the Oval Office at the White House, presiden- tial assistant H.R. Haldeman is talk- ing - quite excitedly - to President Richard M. Nixon. "You seem to think the thing to do is to get them to stop?" Haldeman asks, referring to the FBI investiga- tion of the Watergate burglary just six days before. "Right, fine," Nixon answers. "They say," Haldeman says, "the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and to -= ah, what's his name - ? Walters." He goes on: "And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I call them in, and say, ah - " He - doesn't finish the .scenario. Nixon interrupts: "All right, fine. How do you call him in - I mean you dust - well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things." Haldeman, agrees. "That's what Ehrlichman says." THE "HELMS" they say has been protected is Richard Helms, at the time the director of the CIA. His name comes up again that day at the White House, a few hours later. Again, Haldeman is talking about the plan to get the FBI to stop the Watergate investigation, relying on Helms to do it. The President says: "If it gets out that this is all involved, the Cuba thing would be a fiasco. It would make the CIA look bad, it's going to make Hunt look bad, and it is likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfor- tunate - both for CIA, and for the country, at this time, and for Ameri- can foreign policy. Just tell him to lay off. Don't you?" Haldeman agrees. and seems satisfied with the solution. "Yep. That's the basis to do it on. Just leave it at that." As that part of the conversation closes, Nixon again mentions Helms in a cryptic way: "Helms is not one to (unintelligible; TILE REFERENCES to Helms meant little when that day's tran- script came out in the late summer of 1974 The mentions of Helms, in fact, clandestine intelligence is a small part of the total infor- mation available at any one time - but it very often is priceless. Very often, it is the missing link." There appears to be major concern, in fact, that a loss of secret information-gathering could hamper the process of developing the "intelli- gence estimates" upon which much U.S. military and diplomatic policy is based. The future of the "esti- mates" system has not fig- ured significantly in con- E ressional probes of the IA. The charmed life of Richard Helms own early role in the "Watergate cover-up" - the revelation that forced the president to resign. But the references to Helms may have meant something significant then. If ever explained fully, they may mean something significant in the future. For the time being, however, they are merely in the record of history, posing still lingering questions about Richard Helms and the Watergate scandals. Those scandals included, of course, not only the burglary at the Demo- cratic Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex, and the "cover-up" of the White House role in trying to stop the FBI probe, but also the use of the White House "Plumbers" team for a 1971 break-in at a California psychiatrist's office during the White House-led investi gation of the Pentagon Papers leak. It is one of the ironies of Helms' current problems that he and his as- sociates believe that he was fired as CIA chief, and sent off to be ambas- sador to Iran, solely because he would not cooperate with Nixon and ? Part 3 ings that Helms attended at the White House as the Watergate case began to unfold, and the variety of ways in which top Nixon aides leaned on the CIA. Still, it is uncertain that !everything there is to be known about any of that has been disclosed. Some of the CIA's own tape recordings have been destroyed. Not all, of the White House tape recordings have been dis- closed. . There is no indication, though, that Helms faces legal problems because of the scandals beyond the potential difficulty in the Justice Department's year- old perjury investigation of some of his congressional testimony. The whole mat- ter seems largely closed. WHAT HAS come out publicly has raised, but not answered, at least these questions about Helms and the scandals: ? What did. Nixon mean "The word was passed around 'at about having "protected" the time," recalls a friend of Helms, Helms? Nixon confident "that Helms had not been able to get Why was along with (Henry) Kissinger. That that Helms would go along is totally false. The real reason is with the idea of using a that Helms had stood up against "national security" ruse to Nixon on the Watergate cover-up." stop the FBI investigation PART OF the roof that of Watergate. p Why did neither Helms persuades Helms' associ- nor any other CIA official ates that he was punished tell Watergate prosecutors for being "obstructionist" about these pressures or on Watergate is that, on about past associations with leaving the CIA, he did.not Howard Hunt when they, get the National Security first learned he was tied to Medal - something that a the Watergate burglary? retired CIA chief might . Why didn't they tell the, normally expect. The idea prosecutors about Nixon was suggested, but never campaign aide James W. acted upon at the White McCord's attempts to warn House. the CIA that the White Helms' conduct in each of House was trying to make the scandals has been Watergate look like a CIA probed by a variety of con- plot in order to protect its gressional committees. secrecy? Pages upon pages of . Did anyone at the CIA committee hearings track know, in advance, about the back and forth over the Watergate break-in? Plumbers incident, CIA ? What does it mean that sponsorship of some of for. Howard Hunt an ex-CIA , were largely passed over then amid 1 r CIA officer E. Howard c~ the sensational revelat4ippirb>tlea"iFmr Fipjgafeggg;l $1Q8tiitQjA-RDP77-00 jf ;Q01i 'Q 9v?Qc t 7 and in the Watergate bur- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432ROO0100410005-7 glar ? ? Why did the CIA try to head off FBI inquiries into White House aide John D. Ehrlichman's dealings with the CIA over the Plumbers incident a year before Watergate? ? What is the full story be- hind Helms' firing as CIA director? described his reactions at a key White House meeting in 1972 this way: "Here was Mr. Halde- man, Mr. Ehrlichman, the two most senior officials in the White House next to the president himself, giving this instruction. And I real- 1y feel like now, as I did then, that it ' would have been presumptuous to have pressed them any harder as to how they had come up with this, or where they had. gotten the idea, or who was behind it." Helms also has testified that he did not feel free to E o around Haldeman and. hrlichman and talk to Nixon himself about the as- signment those aides were giving to the CIA. It is not clear, yet, just what kind of relationship Helms had with Nixon. His associates say they doubt that the CIA director ever felt he could pick up the telephone and call the president, and they say he was at the White House fewer times than specula- tion would indicate. Helms has said that, at that 1972 White House meeting in the week after. the Watergate burglary,' Haldeman passed him by and spoke directly to his deputy - Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters - about the plan to "limit" the FBI probe. Helms, however, did regard that as "odd," he has testi- fied. SEN. STUART Syming- ton, D-Mo., a close friend of Helms, has suggested that the Nixon administration put Walters in as Helms' deputy to insure that one of "their men" would be in a controlling spot at CIA. Walters had been an official interpreter for Nixon dur- ing some of his foreign trips as vice president in the 1950s. cover-up by paying Water- agents or operations, it gate burglars bail fees. (CIA) should be immedi. But there are many gaps ately notified." between those claims of Four days later, accord. non-involvement and the ing to testimony by Gen. specific suggestions, hints Walters, White House aide and implications that come John W. Dean began pres- out of the mass of testimony suring the agency to use and evidence gathered in "covert action funds" to congressional probes of pay bail and salaries for the Watergate. Watergate burglars be- Perhaps the most signifi- cause they "were getting cant day in the whole period scared and were wob- for Helms,' then and now, bling." was June 23, 1972 - six The general has testified days after the Watergate that he felt this approach burglary, and the day on was wrong, and said he told which Nixon and Haldeman Dean he "would have no talked of using Helms to part in this and was quite shut off the FBI probe of prepared to resign on this Watergate. issue." Helms said he ad- BETWEEN THE Oval vised Walters not to "yield Office sessions of Nixon and an inch" in his resistance. Haldeman that are record- Thus, within 10 days after ed on the June 23 tapes, the burglary. Helms was there was a meeting a little aware that the White House after 1 p.m. elsewhere in was heavily involved with the White House: in Ehr- the Watergate incident, and that the CIA was being lichman's office on the'sec- pressured to take a role. and floor. This was called to In fact, however, he knew put into effect the plan that - two days after the bur- the president and Halde- glary - that the incident man had just agreed to fol- was somehow related to low. Nixon's campaign organ- Haldeman and Ehrlich- ization. On Monday, June man we're there, and so 19, Helms talked with CIA were Helms and Walters. aides about the involvement When' Helms first dis- of McCord, one of those ar- cussed that meeting at a rested that Saturday morn- congressional hearing in ing. McCord was a former May 1973, he said the CIA officer and Helms Watergate burglary was apparently knew right not discussed. However, away that McCord was when he next discussed it, working as chief of Nixon's in August 1973, after seeing campaign security staff. a memo by Walters on the The role of Helms and the meeting, Helms said CIA in the Watergate affair Haldeman did mention the has been probed at length burglary and had said that by Sen. Howard Baker, R- "the opposition" (presum- Tenn., who was a member ably, the Democrats) was of the Senate Watergate "capitalizing on it." Committee, and his staff He said Haldeman made aide on that panel, Fred D. some "incoherent reference Thompson. to an investigation in Mexi- THEY HAVE explored co, or an FBI investigation, the activities of Robert F. running into the Bay of Bennett, whose public rela- Pigs." tions firm had hired How- That, as Helms said he and Hunt after he retired learned later, was a refer- from the CIA in 1970. Ben- ence to the fact that some nett'S f;r w m THOSE QUESTIONS, in turn, lead to others, broad- er in scope and perhaps harder to answer, about Helms and the CIA in the Nixon era. They involve the degree to which CIA's intelligence duties are carried out here eit home, the sensitivity - or lack of it - at the White House about limits, on CIA's authority, the nature of CIA-FBI dealings, the con- trols - or lack of them - on secret escapades by ex- CIA officers, the chain of command within the CIA and above it, the responsi- bility - if any - of CIA's leaders to filter out the necessary from the frivo- lous when .they get orders from the White House, and obey only the ones that they think are compelling. One conclusion, bearing on many of these issues, does seem to have emerged already: The CIA was treated in the Nixon admin- istration as virtually an extension of the White House. Perhaps, as some of Helms' colleagues have suggested, that was the ap- proach that presidents have taken for the past 20 years. Helms' troubles and the current plight of the CIA it- self are posing issues that, .apparently, no one in gov- ernment has ever asked seriously. "You have to define what a president can do itttder the term 'national security,' " suggests one of Helms' long-time associ- ates. The Watergate scandals seem almost a classic case study of extreme answers to that. Very early and throughout, the one theory upon which aides - and Nixon himself - sought to justify their actions was "national security." But it is not even clear that offi- cials felt obliged to define what they meant; merely reciting the phrase often seemed to be enough. as as a That is the same Walters, money from Nixon's cam- , t however, whose name aign organization had been -CIA cover" at the he time.. Haldeman had trouble laundered" through Mexi- Just ibefore n remembebreak-in at the remembering when he talk- co before it wound up in the had learned Bennett Hunt had ed of going to CIA officials bank account of one of the been planning to wiretap about the FBI. Watergate burglars, a the telephones at Demo- There is one fact: Helms Cuban exile leader. critic -candidate George was removed as CIA direc- Haldeman went on to say, McGovern's headquarters tor at the end of 1972, before Helms said, that the Mexi- here. Two days after the the Watergate scandal can angle could lead the Watergate burglary - be- began to unravel publicly. FBI to discover some "cov- fore Hunt's name was men- Beyond that, there is his ert" CIA operations, and tioned by the press as hav- own testimony that he did that Walters should go to ing been tied to that fight against misuse of the Acting FBI Director L. incident - Bennett talked CIA in the cover-up. Patrick Gray and tell him with Hunt and a rentl ppa y IT IS APPARENT, how In May 1973, Helms told to stay out of that area - all' but confirmed his strong ever, that when White the Senate Foreign the that the FBI probe "should suspicion that Hunt was House officials turned to the Ctions had "totally and l that 1h00 the be tapered off or reduced, deeply involved with CIA CIA, they did not bother to or something." Watergate. in any ac- mpts Bennett told a CIA case go into detail about security to -et t it involved resisted" t d justifications. Ordering the officer with whom he h:, agency into action was August this country. In AS THEY LEFT the been dealing about his s August 1973, he told the meetin Helms testified, sus p of Hunt, but not justification enough. p Helms, in 1973 testimony Senate Watergate Commit- he waled downstairs with until July 10, A memo on tee he had told Walters to Walters to a waiting auto- that conversation sup- 'e on tscandals, gave some "hang in there" in resisting mobile, and told the general osedly was given to indicatran of what he felt White House demands that to say only to Gray that "if was expected of him. A rovedlaf&ERtANEraSer2OOm/O1N08 t43A(31D1R7 1004$8M0O1OO 1e( (' At.Fatc prosecutors Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 had learned before then from Bennett himself that he thought Hunt was in- volved. But the CIA itself reportedly did not relate any of this either to prose- cutors or to the FBI. The agency also did not pass along word that a CIA employe, Lee R. Penning- ton Jr., had gone to visit McCord's home shortly after the burglary, and may have destroyed some records. That data also was withheld, for a time, from the Senate Watergate Com- mittee. Much of the' testimony and evidence that raises questions about Helms and the whole series of scandals during the Nixon adminis- tration bears on the role of Hunt, and CIA officials' awareness of that. One of Helms' own as- sociates criticizes the 'Helms-Hunt relationship: "As a personal weakness, Helms tolerated some prima donnas - like E? Howard Hunt - beyond the time he should have." Aside from the Bennett memo showing his suspi- cion that Hunt may have been involved. in the break- in plot, 'the Baker-Thomp- son investigation turned up evidence that in March 1972 three months before the Watergate burglary - a CIA officer in Miami was told that "Hunt was em- ployed by the White WASHINGTON STAR 1 7 JAN 1976 By Lyle Denniston Washington Star Staff Writer House." At the time, Hunt was recruiting Cuban exiles, apparently for the burglary. Helms' associates insist that the White House did. not check with the CIA be. fore putting Hunt on its payroll, and that, if it had, a "derogatory" reply would have been given. ANOTHER ITEM that figured in the Baker- Thompsn probe was a transcript of a CIA tape recording of a telephone call that Ehrliehman had made to the CIA on July 7, 1971, asking that help be provided for Hunt for an investigation he was doing. That call, made to the then-CIA deputy director, Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., apparently was part of the White House Plumbers investigation of the leak of the secret Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. As part of that probe, a White House team led by Hunt broke into the office of a Beverly Hills, Calif., psy- -chiatrist, Dr. Lewis Field- ing. He had been treating Daniel Ellsberg, allegedly. the source of the leak of the- documents. The Ehrlichman-Cush- man transcript about Hunt reportedly was discussed by CIA officials at a meet-. ing June 19, 1972 - 'two' days after the Watergate burglary, and three months after the agency is said to Dick Helms had a lot on his mind when he got to work on that Friday morning. In Moscow, the Soviet Union was ousting four British diplomats and a businessman, showing mild displeas- ure over Britain's decision of two weeks earlier to throw out 105 Soviet spies. In Paris, negotiations over an agreement to end the Vietnam war were idling along between the United States and North Vietnam. And in Hanoi, Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny wound up a five- day visit, leaving behind new promises of military aid to North Vietnam. IT WAS OCT. 8,1971; Helms was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for watching what America's enemies do. The most. significant matter of the day for Helms was not, however, overseas. It was a summons to the Oval Office at the White House, by operatives had found a unique way to translate what they had learned about the fall of Diem. Copies of phony cables to Saigon, making President John Kennedy's government look even worse, were found in the White House safe of E. Howard Hunt after the Watergate break-in. The incident over the secret files was described by the Rockefeller Commission after its investigation of the CIA last year as "another serious instance of misuse of the agency by the White House." It concluded: "The commission recognizes that the director cannot be expected to disobey a direct re- quest or order from the President without being prepared to resign." resign. He and his agency were drawn into many of the Nixon administration's multi-fa- ceted efforts against domestic have h i f osal es. 1 V.a?y o t e ene Richard Nixon and his aides had ". p Nixon took the file and slid it into a been found to be plainly illegal. It wanted to get secret files held by th ? e?k dr.~u j' rprtKident , CIA, for use .at;ai,iAlppiip_VeA or ge~eas Abol/0p/OP ItOr it : CIA-RDPne-004 2ROh?0L'-ootl 111 UO&l~ y to work vu enemies" -- administration critics, evident that the White lfouse political have. learned that Hunt was working for the White House. (Whether it is a coincidence or not, that is the same day on which Helms talked with aides about McCord and the Watergate break-in.) THE ACTUAL tape recording of the Ehrlich- man call in 1971 was de-. stroyed in January 1973. Congressional probers were told this was done on Helms' direct orders. Helms was then in the proc-' ess of leaving the CIA post. He has testified that every- thing the agency had on any of the scandals had been turned over to the FBI. Helms also has said, at various committee hear- . ings, that he was unaware that Hunt was doing any- thing in this country: In early 1973, he told the Sen- ate Foreign Relations Com- mittee that "nobody knew he (Hunt) was going to be involved in any domestic activity." However, the House Judiciary Committee in 1974 published a memo showing that CIA aide Karl Wagner - the one who knew about the Ehrlichman-Hunt tie - had broken off" contact with Hunt in 1972 because "his requests appeared to in- volve the agency in domes- tic clandestine operations," which are illegal. The CIA director himself had a part in the decision to go along with the agency's help for Hunt in 1971, as Ehrlichman asked. "I recall," he has testi- fied, "that Gen. Cushman informed me that he had authorized giving to How- ard Hunt a tape recorder and a camera, and I asked for what purpose and he said he wanted to conduct a one-time interview and that he had been properly au- thenticated by the White House and that he was working at their behest. Hunt actually was given a wig, hidden camera, tape recorder and other items for use as a physician dis- guise. The camera, hidden in a tobacco pouch, was used by Hunt to photograph the offices of Dr. Fielding. . IN ANOTHER facet of the Plumbers case, Helms authorized the preparation - at White House request - of a psychological profile on Ellsberg. He testified later that he had "genuine regrets" about. that. Helms has said that he .did not believe that the Plumbers incident and the agency's dealings with Hunt had anything to do with the Watergate scan- dal. "Nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot," he said in May 1973. The charmed life of Richard Helms-Part 4 and Sen. Edward Kennedy in particu- lar since he then seemed likely to be-' come Nixon's Democratic opponent in the 1972 election. The idea was to leak contents of these files a little at a time, creating embarrassment for Democrats be- cause of the policy faux pas disclosed in the files. Helms, while giving up some files, had refused to let one go: on the fall of the Diem government in South Vietnam. But that was likely to be quite embarrassing to the Kennedy name, so the White House wanted it. Nixon called in Helms to demand the file, saying he needed it for use in possi- ble negotiations with the Soviet Union. ? A CIA MEMO on the meeting says IIelms handed over the file, saying he worked "for only one president at a time" and that any papers he had Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 homefront problems. ' When congressional committees began probing these, Helms was pre- pared to take the blame, he said. "You've got to protect the president from the dirty stuff," he told report- ers. "Somebody's got to take the heat. so let old Helms take it, and I'm taking it. You can't ask the president to sign off on illegal activity." Helms grew up in the :tradition of working for -presidents, and of protect- ing them when CIA projects of interest to the White House went awry. He has said, repeatedly, that his. loyalty was to the presi dent, and he did not regard, that as a crime. , , , The most serious accusa-; tions of illegal "'domestic spying" by the CIA involve incidents during the years that Helms led the agency.. He has insisted that these! :were limited and selective;; not massive, and his friends, .have 'said' he kept some oft the incidents from' being worse. His own explanation of the evolution of many of these efforts, as a matter of government policy, shows why he is now making no' Helms has testified: "There . fore he can report in?" never has been any 'ques- In 1974 the CIA did issue tion about the intent of the Congress to confine the agency's intelligence func- tion to foreign matters." orders to its staff to limit collection of foreign intelli gence to overseas, when it involved American citizens. That supposedl is don y e . PART OF Helms' diffi- only when the FBI express- culties now, however, grow ly asks the CIA to monitor a out of his assurances to citizen's foreign activities.' Congress that the agency The CIA does not feel free was not involved in domes- to pick and choose among tic surveillance. the FBI requests. When he appeared before AS ONE HELMS associ the Senate Foreign Rela- ate remarked: "It is not up. tions Committee on Feb. 7,' to us to decide whether the 1973, he was asked by Sen. bureau has a right to be Clifford Case, R-N.J.: interested." "It has been called ?to my Although the FBI, like attention that in,1969 and the CIA, has lately gotten 1970 the White House asked into trouble over the mat- that all intelligence agen- ters in which it did get cies join 'in the effort to interested, it was assumed learn as much as they could for many years that the FBI about the anti-war move- had almost ulimited respon. ment, and during this peri. sibility for "domestic se-, od U.S. Army Intelligence curity.". became involved and kept There seem to have been files on U.S. citizens. Do been many times, however, you know anything about when frustration with FBI the activities of the CIA in results led high-ranking that connection? Was it government officials to turn asked to be involved?" to the CIA to back up the Helms replied: "I don't' FBI in its field. recall whether we er w For example He' s agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing f ll or a concernd" e. Apparently even tinCHAOS ddnottwok well enough in gathering data on what were called "restless youth." The Nixon administration promptly got busy on what became the "Huston plan" _ a broad-scale campaign (never put into full effect) to monitor domestic activ. ists and dissidents, using wiretaps, burglaries, mail interception and other ille- gal tactics. STILL, CHAOS continued in operation until March 15, 1974 - more than a year after Helms had departed. He had been a supporter of it and a leader in it through- out. On Sept. 6, 1969, Helms sent key officials in the CIA a memo telling them to pro- vide supp,rt to Operation e asked, but we were not in- testified in 1973 that the CHAOS. Considerable re- volved because it seemed to Foreign Intelligence Advi sistance apparently de- 'me that was a clear viola sory Board, which advises veloped within the CIA. But IN THE LATE 1950s and Helms ut th io p . t the at down The n of what our charter president, had continu- Rockefeller Commission re- early ate 1960s," committee he a told a year Senago, ' was; o ally made "feelers" about -There have been other this. The question was ported that a Dec. 5, 1972, "came the sudden and quite Helms memo said: dramatic upsurge of ex- Ai asked repeatedly, Helms "CHAOS is a legitimate Creme radicalism in this In -testimony last year,' said, whether "there isn't counterintelligence function country rq and abroad, an up- Helms said that CIA moot- somebody else that can -take of the agency and cannot be of violence against au- toting of "radicalism" in on some of these things if stopped simply because Charity and institution, and tlris country turned up 'the FBI isn't doing them as some members of the the advocacy of violent, information showing that it well as they should?" "did in fact have some organization do not like this change in our system of The Rockefeller Commis- activity." government. ;overseas connections." Sion, in analyzing Operation Although CHAOS a But the Rockefeller CHAOS' monitorin of the entl Ppar- "By and in itself, this via- "Comission disclosed that, in g y put the agency further fence, this dissent, this radi- anti-war movement, said: into domestic activity than calism were of no drect con- reporting back to the White "The FBI, unlike the it had ever been before, it is cern to the CIA. It became ' House, the agency came to CIA, generally did not pro- not yet _ clear whether so only in the degree that the "repeated duce finished, evaluated Helms or other CIA officials the trouble was inspired by, ' conclusion .... it could intelligence. Apparently for face any serious criminal or coordinated with; or find no significant foreign these reasons, the Presi- charges because of it. connection with domestic dent (Johnson) looked to subversion mechanisms the Director of Central IT HAS BEEN reported abroad. In such event the EVEN THOUGH a "for- Intelligence (Helms) to pro- that Helms may be prose- CIA had a real, a clear and - eign connection" is neces- duce a coordinated evalua- cuted for his role in approv- proper function to perform, sary to justify CIA actions, tion of intelligence bearing ing a CIA break-in of a but in collaboration with the the agency has not consid- upon the question of dissi- photo studio in Fairfax, FBI. ered itself confined strictly Bence." Va., on Feb. 19, 1971. How- , "The agency did perform to what happens outside the ever, it is expected that that that function in response to United States. HELMS AND the CIA did will be only a minor charge the express concern of the In fact, professionals in just that. The commission - a misdemeanor. president." intelligence - including' noted that, on Nov: 15, 1967, But Helms already has In that sentence, the Helms - have argued that Helms personally delivered serious legal problems be- word "president" there is no way to draw a a report to Johnson with a cause of another CIA activi- president" means clear line against any CIA covering note saying "this ty inside this country: open- two: Nixon and Lyndon B. activity inside the nation's Johnson. "Operation is the study of the United ing mail. The program was borders. States Peace Movement you begun in 1953, whenn Allen CHAOS," the CIA's code- "The agency," Helms has requested." W. Dulles was CIA director named program to collect- testified, "is cwith data on dissident Ameri- charged When Nixon came into and Helms was one of his cans and the "peace move- collecting foreign intelli- the White House, and key aides. m; nt" in general, was set gence domestically from Operation CHAOS contin- The mail that was opened up to serve both of those U.S. citizens or residents tied, the CIA director at one generally was that between presidents. traveling abroad." point showed that he knew the U.S. and Communist "These White House de- One of his former associ- the agency had gone out of countries. The operation mantis," the Rockefeller ates makes the point more its bounds. continued for 20 years ;,,,1. Commission concluded, colorfully: Helms' covering memo- during that time, more t,>.'rn "scent to have encouraged "it is simply naive to say 'randum with a report to 200,000 letters and mi:.?r top CIA ha have C11 .aura to that the agency can operate Henry Kissinger on Feb. 18, pieces of mail were operuecl. stretch and, on some occa- only overseas. Suppose one 1969, said: CIA officials, loolo1, suns, to exceed (its) legis- of our men in this country "in an effort to round out back, seek to justify tine picks tip some foreign Intel- our discussion of this sub- program on the ground tl,:tt lative restric'tionN." ]thence: dovs he have to t;a lay law the CIA is sup- ject,' we have included a it was lie}Tun and contiturf,l up to the Canadian border section t i,rn?~d to I ? c r an t n,ri rt.,c: rnt,raran stu- during two wars _ t:$,;,??r to and put one f fat sign sccci'lty ratirtter lpproved For Release 8b< ^6`$'/~~y: Cwit in t hoe-004Iicharter ofeRUOrthis s "tro troopps s wet - wh n 1; wrt On t t were in the fuj,'" 10 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 and thus contact with U.S.' enemies was considered to But whatever the ratio- the Rockefeller Commission "U.S. statutes," it said, "specifically forbid opening the mail." It also suggested that the opening may have violated . constitutional rights of privacy and free speech and press. THE MAIL-OPENING project continued for three years after the White House had been told, in a 1970 re- port signed by Helms and others, that it had been dis- continued. He has since intention to mislead," say- ing he believed at the time WASHINGTON STAR ] 8 JAN 1976 By Lyle Denniston Washington Star Staff Writer that, the report was refer- ring to a discontinued effort .by the FBI. Helms has been sued in a damage case filed by the American Civil Liberties Union because of the inter- ception of mail to,and from the Soviet Union. The Jus- tice Department in Decem- ber hired private lawyers to represent Helms and other present and former officials in such cases. Both the damage lawsuit and any criminal. cases that may be begun against Helms are likely to raise a basic legal question: wheth- er CIA officials have im- munity for their actions even when U.S. law says such actions are illegal. Already lawyers are working on theories that intelligence operations are A military sedan. moves easily down a one-way, residential street in Santiago, Chile. It is morning, a little after 8, on Oct. 22, 1970. Gen. Rene Schneider, chief of Chile's army, is on his way to the De- fense - Ministry downtown, deter- that the military stays neutral in the out of the other auto, one carrying a .45-caliber pistol. is broken, and one of the youths reaches in and fires the pistol repeat- edly - at least five times. The general is hit as he tries to draw his own pistol. Wounded in the chest, neck and right hand, Schneider lin- gers for three days, then dies. known to be associated with extreme rightist political groups, are the prime suspects. "ALL THESE people have been trained by the CIA . . . The CIA. is Chilean senator charges. He is Aniceto Rodriguez, secretary-gener- al of the Socialist party - part of the Communists, that put Dr. Salvadore Two days after the shooting of Schneider, the Chilean Congress ap- proves Allende, making him the first Marxist president in Latin America. 1973. _ Allende himself is dead, shot deeply - the U.S. Central Intelli- So was "Track If." And so was Rich- a different form of govern. mental activity, related to the very survival of the na- tion, and thus should be judged by different legal standards. One precept from ancient Roman law is likely to be relied on, according to one Helms associate. It is "salus publica lex supre- ma" - "The public safety is the highest law." It may be that some im- munity might be gained be- cause of a long-standing ar- rangement under which the Justice Department let the CIA decide on its own whether any agency offi- cers should be prosecuted if they broke laws while on the job. THE AGREEMENT, reached in 1954, provided When Allende came to power, Helms was director of the CIA and thus was a key man in carrying out the anti-Allende plot known as "Track II." By the time Allende died, Helms. had left the CIA to be U.S. ambassador to Iran, but "Track II" may still have been in effect,, in some form. IT IS NOT settled, even yet, whether "Track II" worked or failed. Schneider died, but the death of that key opponent of military overthrow did not keep Allende out of office. The seeds of plotting sown in 1970, nevertheless, may have grown into the coup three years later. What is settled, and quite clearly now, is that the whole Chile episode is a continuing. problem for Helms, maybe his most, serious. If he is charged with the crime of lying to congressional committees, it most likely would be over his testi- mony on Chile. The Chilean operation and its aftermath have become symbols in the three years of revelations about the CIA - and about Richard Helms. Perhaps no secret U.S. intelligence "operation" has been so deeply and frequently probed. For many., it illustrates the lengths to which an American president will go in trying to deal with foreign adversaries. It also shows the degree to which the CIA has been put to work by presi- dents to get results overseas that no president would try to justify public- y at home. that if the CIA made up its mind that prosecution of an officer would force the agency to disclose secrets, the CIA could simply tell the Justice Department that, and not refer the case at all. This ended in January 1975, . according to the Rockefeller Commission. However, some agency officials - perhaps Helms himself - might argue in court now that they relied upon this arrangement, and thus they had no criminal or otherwise unlawful intent in the actions they took. Moreover, officials might argue that, since many of their actions were not only known to but were ordered by presidents, they gained immunity for what they then did. He recalled later that, at a White House meeting Sept. 15, 1970, on the Chile problem, he got as sweep- ing a mandate as he had ever had. "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day." The CIA had, in fact, been turned loose by the president, himself, Richard M. Nixon. Helms' hand- written notes on the meet- ing in the Oval Office read: One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! worth spending not concerned risks in- no involvement of 'Embassy $10,000,000 available; more if necessary full-time job - best men, we have game plan make, the economy scream 48 hours for plan of ac tion. A CIA memo dated the next day translated those notes, as Helms discussed the mandate with his agen- IN THE CIA's annals, the Chilean cy associates: operation is not an isolated entry. "The Director told the The agency has done similarly bold group that President Nixon things at other times against other had decided that an Allende adversaries. regime in Chile was unac- None of those plots, however, ceptable to the United stands out in helms' career as does States. The President asked the one involving Chile. the Agency to prevent Al-. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 lende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Ag- ency is to carry out this mission without coordina- tion with the Departments of State or Defense." A CABLE TO the CIA chief in Santiago went out on Sept. 21, saying: "(Track Two) - This is au- thority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem." That, then, was Track II: An out-and-out military coup. Track I had been a many-faceted plan that in- cluded $250,000 for possible use to bribe Chilean con- gressmen, along with other propaganda and economic pressures. Track II was a lot more direct: CIA encouragement of a coup, first by Gen. Robert Viaux, then by Gen. Camilo Valenzuela. The plot included the passing of three machine guns and money to the conspirators. Officials here now have no doubt that the shooting of Schneider was done by Viaux's associates, after Viaux was supposed to have been dissuaded because he was considered to be "a nut." The Senate Intelligence Committee's study of the Chilean operation, and especially of Track II, leaves unclear whether high Nixon administration officials actually decided to call off a coup attempt. Secretary of State Henry A, Kissinger, then a White House aide, and his deputy at the time, Alexander M. Haig, have insisted that a decision was made on Oct. 15 to stop the coup plan, and that they thus knew nothing about a plot to kidnap Schneider or about the sup- plying of money or weap- ons. CIA aides disagreed with that version, saying Valenzuela was not sup- posed to be turned off - only Viaux - and that they kept the White House fully informed on the whole plan. Helms. It is unlikely at this stage that he will be charg. ed with violating any law because of his direct role with Track 11 or other parts of the Chilean operation. His legal problem, rather, arises out of what he has told senators about all of this. On Feb. 7, 1973, he ap- pea red before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee to testify on his nomina- tion to be ambassador to Iran. The senators wanted to know about Chile, among other things. Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., asked: "Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the government of Chile?" Helms: "No, sir." Symington: Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?" Helms: "No, sir." On March 16, 1973, he ap- peared before a Senate Foreign Relations subcom- mittee investigating the Chilean operation. The sub- committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho (now the Intelligence Com- mittee's chairman), asked Helms: "Up to the time that the Congress of Chile cast its vote installing Al. lende as the new president, did the CIA attempt in any way to influence that vote?" Helms: "What vote?" Church: "The vote of the Congress." Helms: "No, sir." He volunteered: "If the long session with the agency had really gotten in Rockefeller Commission behind the other candidates during its probe of the CIA. and spent a lot of money As he walked down a corri. and so forth, the election dor, pursued by reporters, might have come out dif- he confronted CBS reporter ferently." Daniel Schorr and shouted at him: iller Schorr!" "Killer Schorr! HE ALSO SAID that the K idea of bribing members of Schorr had been report. the Chilean Congress to get ing that the CIA had been them to vote against Al- involved in assassination lende was considered plots, and also had been "quite unworkable" in 1970. pursuing Helms somewhat He testified: "Allende had aggressively, trying for an this all wrapped up, it was interview on the subject. put in. the bag, aru there was nothing that was going to HELMS' OUTBURST, change it." whether spontaneous or In addition, Helms told calculated, did seem to re. the senators: , flect the frustration that he "As best I recall, a very and many former col- 'secret probe was made to leagues feel over the assas- ,find out whether there was sination question. anything in 'Chile that Focus on plots' to kill llooked like a force that' leaders such as Fidel Cas- TheldAllende overthrow government RafaelTrujillo, LNgo Dinh was not even in at the time Diem, and Gen. Schneider, the probe was made; just to intelligence officers think, see if there were any forces misses a key point: any there to oppose Allende's country, including the advent as president. It was United States, is going to the a were quickly a established have an "arsenal" of varied .affort was techniques available for use thee no further o a ade along those lines, to in pursuing its interests - be- the best of my knowledge, yond its borders. at least I know of none." A Helms colleague com- He did concede to the menu: "Covert action is a war." the committee that day that he Marines, to for landing had withheld information at "If there "If thepen war." the 1973 hearings, saying e comes a time," that "at that time, Al. another suggests, "when, after due process, me gang tlende's governnment was in ernmen is to be t decides something ;power in Chile and we did not need any more diplo- is to be done, there ought to :matic incidents . . . I felt be a mechanism to do it. it obliged to keep some of this can't be whistled up at a IN APRIL 1974, CIA stuff, in other ' words, not time something has got to be Director William E. Colby volunteer a good deal of organization You wcan't hich d of dof have an secretly informed a House information." which doffs its subcommittee that the A month later, Justice pajamas in the morning Nixon administration had Department officials ac- going and to h sayh 'Today l we are had had an $8 million program knowledged that they were ave a Today politi- 1970 and 1973 to try investigating Helms for cal action.' to undermine the Allende possible perjury. regime. HAVING A mechanism Some eight months later, A HELMS associate now or capability is distinctly on Dec. 19, 1974, Colby paid offers a simple defense for different, many CIA profes- a visit to then-Acting Atty. him: "He had a feeling that sionals believe, from ;ctu- Gen. Laurence H. Silber- these weren't his secrets to ally carrying out a ~. man to inform the Justice give" tine operation. Department that Helms There is no indication Thus, they are not may have committed per- that Helms is in any other prepared to concede that Colb irn his 1973 testimony, ofghe r ~uublenecc; tine of any the critics of assassination by pparently decided to plots involving possi- planning are, in fact, sin- make that contact volun. ble "elimination" of foreign cere about attacking actual tarily, after the CIA had leaders. There has been secret o perations. These MILITARY PLOTTERS finished a probe of its own some suggestion that a men tend to doubt that in Chile into past agency activities, variety of U.S. treaty com- senators and other critics unsuccessful did make attempts to two including the Chilean epi- mitments may y of have these been can really believe that America kidnap Schneider, and U.S, sode. violated by get along without any officials were aware of Helms came before the activities, b but it would be kind of secret operations. rare for the these. Then, Schneider was Senate Foreign Relations p government to But the p s killed in the third attempt Committee again a month rilelms, like others CIA action" firmly deny thrt other ofessionaa to abduct him, later -- Jan. 22, 1975. It was officials who had some role "Political a covert' "American officials," the a closed session. He was with the plots, has been ss inatio hesr, whether Ws else Senate committee con- asked about what he had drawing heavy criticism or something else, eluded, "did not desire or said in reply to Symington from members of Congress cn controtrot l what the nation does encourage Schneider's two Years before, and he and in the press over the in intelligence. "The death. Certain high officials answered: assassination issue. That is clandestine service runs the did know, however, prat the "As far as the earlier the one issue on which political action, not the con dissic en:s planned to kid- statement is concerned, Helms has allowed himself Crary, says one former nap Gen. Scl:ii;;idei whether the agency tried to to lose his temper in public CIA lmicial. The possibility of his death overthrow the government - a most uncharacteristic helms' associates say should have been recog- of Chile, I answered 'No.' I blowup that continues to they agree that it is healthy nixed as 1 forcaa?r;ibie risk believe that is true. if it has ruzzic some of his closest for Congress to studY of his k:idnappiiig_ ' been alleged differently by friends. litical action" and a le One who did know wa sorr~ur s ~pl i4 ,T,tt nefpft6 2001/08/(9$ ~i41 ?Pi77 3?@R0001IY64t DOtSs~Ttti arts that t??tp- - a ter Helms had finished Ped,,-^utthry ;'rI- YORit TINES 11 Jan. 1976 -The `New' Communism . . The controversy over C.I.A. funding of non-Communist political parties in Italy raises fundamental questions' about what, if anything, the United States can or should do about recent gains by Communists across much of,, southern Europe from Portugal to Greece-and partic ularly in France, Spain and Italy, where a new coordi- ttated Communist strategy has emerged. w under Enrico Berlinguer this Communist strategy has moved dramatically in Italy toward strong public claims pt independence from Moscow and commitment- to Western-style democracy. Mr. Berlinguer has pledged his party to preserve democratic liberties, a parliamen- tary system, a mixed economy, membership in the Common Market and NATO-and to leave office quietly if- later defeated at the polls. Despite much skepticism by non-Communists, these claims have paid off with 33 percent of the vote, only two points below the ruling Christian Democrats. . F~ The French Communists,' long among the Kremlin's most obedient and militant followers in the West; until recently had not gone nearly so far. 'In fact, Secretary General Georges Marchais' electoral .alliance and com- mon program with the Socialists since 1972 came under attack as a result of Communist losses at the polls while the Socialists doubled their vote to become, France's biggest party. But in the last two months, after long internal debate, Mr. Marchais appears to have bested his opponents and committed the French Communist Party definitively to "the Italian way." ,'A joint. Marchais-Berlinguer statement in November, pledged the two Communist parties to respect "the. liberty of thought and expression, of the press, of . meeting and association, the right to demonstrate, the free movement of persons inside and outside their country, the inviolability of private life, of religious liberties, the total freedom of expression of currents of thought and of every philosophical, cultural and aItistic opinion." It added: "The French and Italian Communists favor ' the, plurality of political parties, the right of opposition parties to exist and to act, the free formation of majorities and minorities and the possibility of their alternating democratically, the lay character and demo- cratic functioning of the state and the independence of justice.... Their position is not tactical." Since then, Mr. Marchais has joined Mr. Berlinguer ire, resisting Soviet proposals to be adopted at a "unity" meeting of European Communist parties. The French Communists have engaged in polemics with Moscow over Russian detention of a dissident intellectual and the existence of a prison camp in Soviet Latvia. They have adopted a more neutral attitude toward China. 0., , issing^er's N h lo, mare The alignment of the Western world's two most powerful Communist parties on virtually a Social Demo- cratic approach has bemused many voters in both countries-whether it is meant sincerely or not-and has reinforced the chances both have of entering governing coalitions. Yet the obvious and historically-based possi- bility exists that, once in office, the Communists might well repudiate their current promises, seize power, leave NATO and unite with Moscow in a Communist alliance from Asia to the Atlantic. Any such trend and confront the United States with desperate choices. This is Secretary Kissinger's nightmare. A different prospect has been evoked by Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carillo. Moscow, he said recently, fears that Communist accession to power- in the West would lead to "a bloc of European socialist countries" independent of the Soviet Union with West- ,ern-style freedoms that would become a pole of ,attraction for Eastern Europe and "the whole world's working class movement." The survival of the Soviet form of Communism might be endangered ultimately by a.-schism of this kind, which could even dwarf the breakaway of Yugoslavia and China. Remote as this evolution may now appear, it helps to -allay fears in . Italy and France of Communist accession to power. Secretary Kissinger has been warning Europeans for many months that the entrance of Italy's Communists into a coalition government with the Christian Democrats could lead quickly to the dissolution of NATO and Amer- ican withdrawal from Europe. But perhaps the day has come when the United States no longer has the ability through warnings or other means to harness the political tides in West Europe. It cannot alone revive the fading Christian Democrats of Italy, as Secretary Kissinger him- . self has noted. Only Italians can do that. . and American Policy The chief contribution the United States can make now ds that of positive example, moving vigorously to termi- nate the world recession that has weakened the democ- racies and set the stage for Communist gains. The kind of assistance provided to Portugal's democratic parties by K+ West European trade unions and allied political groups, with marginal American financial aid, undoubtedly has helped to blunt the Communist power drive there and cannot be excluded elsewhere, particularly when Soviet financing and covert operations invite counter-moves. But the Communist gains in Italy stem from the strains of recession, inflation and unemployment, which strike hammer blows at a political and social structure already crumbling under tha incompetent leadership of the geriatric Christian Democratic Party. .:Revitalization of the Christian Democrats and their alliance with the Socialists and other smaller parties to their left can best be brought about by economic. revival in the industrial world as a whole. A strong recovery in the Unite;i States, \Vest Germany and Japan, further liberation of trade and imaginative measures in monetary, energy and raw materials policy-as discussed at the Rambouillet summit conference-could give a new lease on life to the democratic parties of Italy and France more effectively than covert financial aid. The essential prerequisite is agreement between the Ford Administration and the Congress on a coherent policy for the world economy. There may still be time. Communist accession to power is less likely to come before than after the 1978 elections in France and the 1977 elections in Italy, despite the current Cabinet crisis there. But I,' American policy remains confused in this Presidential election year and recession continues in Europe, events in Italy could move more rapidly than t.ivat. The alignment of the French Communist Party behind "the Italian way" reinforces such a prospect. The United States can offer a merely negative approach, based on the fears and doctrines of the past--or it can strive positively to provide a better way, as It did in the could move Nest I_iirrp p jv Fs~r~e ~ y~t M)/08%( KsbA-90PV?'V0432R00? ~00410005-7 t Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 Wednesday, January 14, 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR A sensitive issue since Helsinki Soviets bast U.S. radio `intrusion' By Elizabeth Pond Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Moscow Soviet newspapers and TV have begun a new wave of attacks on American radio broad- casting to the Soviet Union. Foreign broadcasting has proved to be an especially sensitive point with Moscow ever since last fall's summit conference at Helsinki promised a freer exchange of people and ideas across national borders. Soviet press and TV criticism of it more than doubled in December and early January and is again on the increase. Moscow accuses the formerly CIA-financed Radio Liberty of interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, hindering detente, conducting "sabotage and espionage" and "open slander" against the Soviet Union, and lying. Much more mildly it charges the official American Voice of America (VOA) with not reflecting the pro-detente policy of the Amer- ican administration or public support for detente (as shown in a year-old gallup poll). Both radio stations, along with the British Broadcasting Corporation, provide almost domestic services to their Soviet audiences. They play pop music and, for example, announce the times and places of otherwise unpublicizet: unofficial art shows in Moscow. Their programming has changed drastically from the cold-war days of the 1950s, when Radio Liberty's sister, Radio Free Europe, N?IE,d YORK TIIaS 6 Jan. 1976 .15 Soviet Jews Denounce Ford on Emigration Issue MOSCOW, Jan. 5 (Reuters)- A group of Soviet Jews said today that President Ford had harmed prospects for a mote liberal Soviet emigration policy with his criticism of Congres- sional efforts to get it eased. Mr. Ford said in a television interview two days ago that 'efforts to tie improved trading status for the Soviet Union to freer emigration had damaged the chances of many to emi- grate. In a statment handed to activists said "every such state- ment is taken in the U.S.S.R. as an encouragement for per- secutions and a hardening of the emigration policy." They added: "Statements like that of thel Pregid~~nt have bone and con- tim.ie to do great harm. We! cate.^,oriuaily protest against i.avin?g our destirnc, and those of o'rr children sacrificed in the political. Interests of certain carcles." which broadcasts to East European countries, urged Hungarians to revolt against the Soviet Union. But dissident Soviet literature and information about political arrests and impris- onment are still featured. After. Soviet-American detente was estab- lished, Soviet jamming of the VOA was halted in September, 1973, and some VOA reporters have since been given visas to visit the Soviet Union, along with the American President or Secretary of State. Soviet jamming of Radio Liberty continues, however. Western radio is. popular among Soviet youth, as spontaneous inquiries about V.OA to Western travelers in the Soviet Union attest. In the latest Soviet broadside at American radio, the Communist Party daily Pravda asserted on Jan. 13, in a major spread at the bottom of a page, that Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are trying to change the system in. the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although it acknowledged that there is no longer "direct subversive instigation" it charged that "the essence remains the same." The "international public," it said, is in- dignant because "official U.S. institutions direct and finance this subversive activity against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist coun- tries." The radio station's activity, Pravda said, is "incompatible with the final act of the pan- European (Helsinki) conference, with the elementary norm of international law, with 144 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 the process of lessening of international tensions, and the development of good neigh- borly peaceful cooperation." Pravda listed a score of names it identified as CIA agents or, in three cases, "former Gestapo and Hitler reconnaissance agents" working for Radio Liberty. It also charged Radio Liberty with bugging telephone conver- sations between foreign embassies and mis- sions in West Germany and of sending anti- Soviet literature to the Soviet Union. CIA funding of Radio Liberty was dropped after it became public knowledge five years ago. The broadcasts are supported by open congressional appropriations and have a gov- erning board appointed by the U.S. President. The Pravda attack came the day after a fairly sophisticated critique of VOA news appeared in the much-less-authoritative news- paper Soviet Russia. Two days earlier a prime-time TV commentary had denounced foreign broadcasting to Russia as interfering in Soviet internal affairs. The increase in Soviet criticism of Amer- ican radio broadcasting after the Helsinki conference followed the American backlash against detente. The Western media emphasized the humani- tarian provisions of the Helsinki conference and focused on Moscow's treatment of Soviet citizens. The Soviet media accused the West of ballooning the few Soviet dissidents out of all proportion and of interfering in internal affairs. Each side viewed the other as violat- ing the spirit of Helsinki. Apptoved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004100b5-7 Tuesday, January 13, 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Behind $6 million in covert political aid o trust Iy's- By Dana Adams Schmidt Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Washington "An error of judgment" by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is the way some liberals, many of them in the intelligence community, are describing covert U.S. aid to anti-communist parties in Italy. These critics say it would be more useful if American leaders and diplomats started talk- ing to Italian and perhaps other European Communists before they come to power. The nub of the argument over the Italian subsidy - $6 million to be used to back Christian Democrats and Socialists - is whether the Italian Communist Party can be trusted in its claims to be independent from Moscow and second and even more important, to be converted to democratic processes. Kissinger critics insist that communism in Europe is in crisis, and that a new schism, successor to those made by Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, is in the making. For Secretary Kissinger the Italian oper- ation - news of which was leaked from congressional committees briefed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - is all part of the "managing the outward thrust of the Soviet Union," which he sees as the real character of detente. He warned members of NATO council at their last meeting in Brus- sels, that they must beware of letting commu- nists participate in their governments. Of about 2 million communists in Western Europe at present, it is estimated that 1.7 C million are in Italy. Led by Enrico Berlinguer the Communist Party there won a third of the vote in parliamentary elections last June. Party members now dominate regional and local government in three regions, Tuscany, Umbria, and Amilia Romana, so that 50 percent of all Italians live in communist- controlled areas. As members -of the second-largest party, Italy's Communists participate in parlia- mentary committees and thereby already play a quasi-governmental role by influencing an estimated 70 percent of legislation. But the nagging question about the Italian 'Communists, as far as the U.S. is concerned, is the extent of the party's loyalty to the Soviet Union. Before 1968, Italian Communists had sought to persuade the electorate that the liberal experiment in Czechoslovakia proved that the Soviet Union would tolerate a pluralist ap- proach to socialism. But when the Russians marched into Prague, the Spanish, Belgian, and British parties were quick to express their dismay. Only the West German and French parties stuck with the Soviet Union. The opposition the Russians now face by a meeting.was dramatized last November be- tween Mr. Berlinguer and the French Commu- nist leader Georges Marchais. The two not only declared that they would seek govern- mental status only by democratic means but they endorsed freedom of speech, pluralist VOW YORK TIM:F..:S 18 Jan. 1976 GItaly's Reds Build Power By Tactics of Moderation By ALVIN SHUSTER Speo!l to The New York Times ROME, Jan. 17-The Commu- I party confirmed what most Ita- inist Party, preaching its own l brand of moderation and re- sponsibility, is making new in- m saaaoc~6~ political systems, and "alternations" of ruling parties - meaning that if they ever got into the government they would step aside if the electorate voted them out. In other statements the Italian party has gone further, in asserting that it wants Italy to stay in NATO and the European Economic 'Community. Dr. Kissinger's reaction to all this is, in effect: "Beware. It may be all tactical. The Stalinists remain latent. If a West European communist government had to choose be- tween a pro-Soviet and a pro-U.S. policy, they would probably choose the Soviet Union. not because their independence is a fraud but because they agreed with the Russians funda- mentally. Their democratic professions are, furthermore, only skin deep. Just wait till they get their hands on power and you will see." Some of Dr. Kissinger's advisers believe, also, that the rank and file of European communists are more wedded than their leaders to Soviet leadership, thereby setting up a powerful undercurrent for return to orthodoxy. And they note that deeply imbedded in the psyche of all European communists is the fear of the Soviet Union and the memory of the time, in 1923 when the Third International was new, when the Spanish Communist Party tried an independent course and the Soviet Union managed to expel all the leading cadres except six, with whom they founded a new and obedient party. to let them share power." . It is this possibility of the Communists sharing power that worries Secretary of State Hen- ry A. Kissinger and other West- ern officials despite the party's declaration of support for con- lians believed-that the Com-I tinued membership of Italy in ts were playing an in- the North Atlantic Treaty Or- i s mrm creasing role in shaping domes-I ganization. Mr. Kissinger's ef- forts and the recently revealed feel- The Socialists tic policies din , . g plans for new secret spen social life of-Italy and improv- ing squeezed out, withdrew.bv the Central Intelligence ing its chances of emerging i their support of the Govern-i Agency here are all designed to as the country's largest party.,,ment because, in effect, they', bolster the non-Communist Time appears on the side' saw the Christian Democrats forces and to stave off the of the Italian Communists and drawin closer to the Commu- view of Mr. Kissinger, the many diplomats and others) nists out of necessity and rely- presence of Communists in the agree that even the present 1 ing more on them in quiet deal- (Italian Government would' future of the alli-I t te hrea n the ,ings in Parliament:. lance and weaken Western; Time for Sharing Europe. "The f ommutnists should hen- I As of now the Communists , t Chri - - i political crisis here could work to their advantage. The stand- ing of the non-Communist par- ~ , nan ties led by the dom tiara Democrats, serf[: to dec+in'- said one non-Communist mem-I Their strength and influence with each crisis and this (ill" her of Parliament. "'They canljas Italy's second largest and arisirg from the rrsin.:;llrioa, slant) back and say that nothing~l hest organized party are far of the Cuhint is no vxccnl[:m. on that no comhinaGon oCl~%tr ;he than ," II calty realitcd Gut~=1la tmttiido and tl;cir toW(,S are In grin[ nl down the ,, ,! er rt+cs can.jrt i! lo-11 r.:cnt lust tvl=cl;, [it(, >+rAppr~/LP~t~ith4ls'tQ~iti44~tolpT'dt&S'l7(~y'cfoIif*Niii~ Control of the North They control all the major cities north of Rome, including Turin, Milan, Bologna, Genoa, Florence and Venice. There are Communist or Communist-So-I cialist administrations in five) of Italy's 20 regions and in 42 - of its 94 provinces. The result is that they locally' govern about 48 percent of I the population. ' Even Christian Democrats, who have dominated politics here since the end of 'World War II, say privately that it would he impossible to operate without the cooperation of the Communist Party. They still rule out, however, any agree- ment on Communist demands for the "historical contprom-, ise," which means seats in a coalition cabinet of Christian Democrats, Socialists and other non-Communist parties. "It has reached the point where the Christian Democrats cannot agree to govern with I the l'nnuntlni is but cannot '1OO 10605-7,;tem either," dill one experienced diplomat. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 1 The leader of the Communists 'In local elections this spring, in Parliament, Mario Pochetti, !they are expected to do well agreed that their views were :again, perhaps winning control crucial in pushing through most of the municipal government , important laws, But Communist of Rome itself, a prospect that' we sometimes ,.it t uccl Com- 'officials insisted thr.t there was particularly dismays the Vati-, ,munists." ,nothing new in this, that their can. There are signs that lh^ deputies were merely acting Early Elections Possible Communists are picking up as a responsible opposition in. If Aldo Moro, the outgoing middle-class. support, adding to a democratic society. Prime Minister now charged their strength among the work- g s gu as a p on o Image of Responsibility , with trying to form a new ers and the young In univer- I fluence." of Still, there are the questions It is this image of responsi- !government fails, national elec- s ties,s, it isi o ntta question pro- built that has helped the, tions would follow this spring often asked. Are all the leaders Y or summer, a year ahead of whether a student is a Com- all the rank and file lead. . party grow. For, by mcst calcu- I they munist hut whether he is fur: and g lotions, the Communists haveschedule. Whenever the are, } to Fallow the democratic road, held, the Communists could: ther g left, in e the , extremist field ower if defeated in elec-~ the Hower all major bills. econo- emerge even stronger and in fringes that argu .;ue part! lions and enerfe ' maintain the block all maor bills, bring; a a position to reinforce demands too bourgeois. a moderate linen Or, will a .the country to a stop and' that the Christian Democrats All this. however. is not td wreak general chaos. "'egest tho'. the' party is wah? radical wing emerge, over The Communists use cris allow them into the cabinet.; out its Problems or '.v?h^ throwing Mr. Berlinguer and As matters now stand in A . those who agree with him? such as the present one, in Italy,. dangers ahead. It is well aware: cabinet seats are just for ' exampl^, that man- a-e No one, of course, knows !which the search goes on for !about all the Communists lack lool:ing clo ely at the adntinis? the answer to those questions. a new government, to under- these days. Their strength on trations in the cities taken w,(- At Communist Party headquar- score their moderation. They the local levels, in regions and since, the Tune clectionc to sce ters, in downtown Rome, they keep their supporters in the cities, and in other areas, is v'hether the Communists can say that the rank and file is powerful trade unions calm and substantial and. growing. Their .make things wort- in a c.ourtrq behind the Berlinguer policy, ,they say there is no need now influence on the national scene where almost nothing ever and that it recognizes the fruits. for elections because time is also rising, though still limit- I seems to operate smcothty, e-_-' of moderation in the success would be lost in pressing ahead led in, the fields of, foreign.af cept, pe-haps. for waiter of the party so far. with needed economic and oth- fairs and defense. Moscow Link a Problem The reasons for Communist' They measures. "The Government decides on They attack the Socialists a new economic There are also 'problems for, caution in approach here are for having withdrawn - package so the party in its continuing links varied. They realize, for ex- g parlia- happens?," said one.diplo- f ample, that a coalition with mentary , support ' for the mat. "Ugo La Malfa. the Depu- to. Moscow, despite. its insis- F governing Christian Democrats ( ty Prime Minister, calls Luciano tence on autonomy. And there: the Christian Democrats, rather and Republicans. Then the is the worry among many Ital. than a take-over by themselves, Y Barba, the Communist Party's ons that once the Communists would create the least tur- make a new pitch for the "com- economic. expert, and fills him I' promise" that would give them !in.. The Communists then make gain power, or a share of pow-1 bulence in Italy and ease the cabinet seats, too. er, they won't give it up. 1 shock when they do assume a few suggestions. It's all kind This, too. deeply worries Mr. Power. In the minds of many voters, of an unhistorical comprom- the substance of declared spe- use." . Kissinger. In his view, the pres As the Communists see it, cific policies by the major par- ' in committee work in the ence of Communists in the, a gradual move toward' the ties is secondary to the desire Chamber of Deputies, where Italian . Government wouldi reins of power would not touch for change, for social justice, the Communists hold 179 of threaten the future of the Alli-i off the kind of panic that could or. efficient and less tthe 630 seats, they also play ance and weaken Western lead to Italy's collapse econom- for more and less cor- or Europe.. He also believes, de- ically. But many diplomats and a vital and quiet role. They site the pronouncements of the ;Italian businessmen believe meets in housing, health, edu- spite joined with the Christian Dem- here, that a member of that even a coalition govern- cation and the economy. party ocrats in an open coalition iTh. Communists, whose sir- an anti-Communist alliance men?t would be enough to stifle gaps include "we have clean on a limited abortion bill, an- forced to defend its members investment, frighten off foreign b geeing other political parties g hands," have won votes by against tn. Soviet Union can- business, endanger chances pointing to their efficient local that wanted a more liberal law._ not share power with ? Com- for needed economic loans and administrations, by stressing Paper Has Great Impact munists ideologically linked to credits and scare away the ,the need for "better 'manage- The Communist newspaper, Moscow. tourists. (ment" of Italy's resources and L!'Unita, the third largest in, Enrico Berlinguer, the 53- For the present, there seems by other themes. circulation, makes a major im- year-old Sardinian and former) to be little chance of eroding All such rhetoric coupled with 'pact. The books it criticizes criminal lawyer who directs the support' the Communists increasing public disillusionent become the books people talk! the party machine, and his now enjoy, with or without in the Christian Democrats and about. The issues it raises are I aides, have often stressed how C.I.A. money. This week, for with social and economic' ten- those widely discussed. The de- independent' the party is of example, a senior Christian sions, have served the Commu- I cisions it praises are often; Moscow, how it condemned the Democrat leaned back after a mists well. In the regional and those many applaud. Most f:Soviet invasion of Czechoslo- long discussion of the Commu- ,local elections' last June, one newspapers and magazines 1 Ivakia, how it criticized the ousts and said: of every three voters backed f veer to the left, including those' Portuguese Communists for "It seems to me the problem the party and it came within 211 most respected. "revolutionary" attempts to is how to absorb the Commu- percentage points of overtak- "It's all rather vulgar to be seize power and how it is hold- nists in coming years, not how ing the Christian Democrats as ~ ! anti-Communist these days," ing out for guarantees of to keep them out." Italy's largest. . . 'I I said a university professor. "It's; autonomy. V-l-SHINGTON POST 2 1 AN 1976 PhonY Greetings From Uncle Sarn Reuter has been sending fake in- vitations to French VIPs asking then to accept special United States bicentennial medals here later this', ',vk, a written on autfientic embassy notepaper and sent to at least 15 "very distinguished French citizens who have been active in 1''raneo-American relations," "Most of them probably should receive a medal," he said. But the spokesman said no such medals were being awarded and hr hzld no idea how the honiel? lead obtained d ccuduassy'sstationery all become so fashionable. even' "Our -relationship with all amen? those in the middle other Communist parties is Iclasse's, who drive men cars, I those(basedn. on ot not d bfriendship, but we live in pleasant homes tare tied by the policies of Communist countries," Mr. Berlinguer said' recently. "We do not see the Soviet ' Union as a guide, no Communist Par-i ty, not even the Soviet party, idin o iti f in- h 46 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 NEW YORK TIMES 10 JAN 1976 U.S. Vexed,. b ' India ,~ :. But A voids .Polemics WASHINGTON, Jan. 9- plish no positive results while Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's giving Mrs. Gandhi additional !became too angry when India latest anti-American charges fuel for her charges that. the began to resent the aid. We :have revived the Administra- United States has been seeking probably also overestimated In- tion's irritation with her, but her overthrow. dia's importance, and we be- 'have failed to shake its resolve came. trapped in Indian-Paki- 1o avoid sayin or doing any. In recent interviews, officials; z here defended this low=key pot-,stan disputes." ,thing that could be interpreted icy as the best suited to the cir Relations with" India were as interference in Indian affairs: custances. They said that the severely strained as the result Privately, many 7fficials here United States could do little to of the Indian-Pakistani war of .have voiced annoyance with affect short-term events in December 1971, when the Unit- Irs. Gandhi. In recent inter India, but over the long run ed States accused India of ag- ;yiews, one high official said he, could play a Part in developing gression against East Pakistan, ,was -personally "saddened" by, a "mature" relationship." , now Bangladesh, and sided the continuation of the state of A prevalent view among with the Pakistanis. ` ,emergency in India that has, s American ties with Pakistan curbed political and press free American officials is that Mrs. since then have been quite +doms. Gandhi has a strong personal good. Relations with India have distrust of the United States, a This view w s h e i ht ti d b ll d m f . a e g c cours ore erra ene owe a o y but that other Indian leaders ( .what the Administration . re- would like to develop better Mr. Kissinger visited the sub- gards as Mrs. Gandhi's free. continent in October-November relations, if only for economic wheeling attacks on the United 1974, and told the Indians that ,States reasons. And despite the pens- during the Congress the United States regarded In odic attacks on the United Party convention last week, dia as predominant in size, Slates, economic ties with India She frequently returned to one have been ' population and power, and of her. favorite themes: that because of India's improved, ie part wanted a sounder relationship .discipline and vihemee: were large-scale with New Delhi. needed because of the threat purchases of American grain But last February the favor- in the last two ears. posed by the Central Intelli. years. trend was set back when gene Agency. Call for Stronger Ties the United States lifted its arms A Low-Key Response The Indian Government said embargo on the .subcontinent. in its ' policy: statement opening India. -regarded the move as But in keeping with the Ad- the new session of Parliament an effort to rebuild Pakistan's ministration's decision to avoid Monday that "we desire a ma- armed forces, and therefore an polemics with Mrs. Gandhi, the ture and constructive relation= unfriendly act. State Department limited its re- Iship with the United States." ' Actually, despite the lifting sponse to a middle-level tele- "A serious effort should be - of the arms embargo, Pakistan phoned protest to the Indian; ~ made to understand each other has not yet made any signifi- Embassy, expressing "concerns with a view to strengthening cant purchases. One official; and dismay" at Mrs. Gandhi's) peace, stability and coopera. said today that the Pakistanis remarks. 11 tion," it said. had inquired about Hawk an- Ever since the state of emer-i American officials said that tiaircraft missiles and TOW an- gency was declared on June 26.1 statement reflected exactly titank missiles, but had made Washington has refused to Washington's conception of no firm requests. All sales have comment on the curb on free- where relations should go. to be in cash, and this has doms in India. Secretary of "For too many years, the' put restraints on the Pakistanis, State Henry A. Kissinger has United States looked on India! who can get arms at better ordered that there be no "gratu- !too emotionally," one exne terms elsewhere. India has no such criticism would accom- Itoo,generous.?;with Apr Aid,. and.G need for American arms, get- ting fLn adequate supply :from the Sgviet Union and its' ownl arms industry. U.S. Proceeds Cautiously Ironically, the state of emer-' gency in India opened the. way. to a renewal of the slow trend toward better relations with the' ,United States, because the In- dians, who were very sensitive ,to Western criticism of, the .suppression of press freedom and the, arrest of thousands of 'political opponents of Mrs. .Gandhi, stated that they fa- vored good relations with Washington. But because of strong opposi- tion by American liberals to the Indian curbs, the Adminis- tration has gone very cautious- ly. The American Ambassador, William B. Saxbe, has deliber- atel~ let Indians take the initia- :tive, -stressing .that good rela- ?tions were a two-way street.{ President Ford had planned to visit India and Pakistan last. fall, but put off the trip because of the political situation in In- dia.Mr. Ford, in a September ,interview, called= the state of emergency "a very sad develop- ment" for India. This prompted a strong rebuke from the Indian Government. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister! Y. B. Chavan visited the United I States in October and the first; meeting of a joint commission; between the two countries wasi held with little publicity. The Indians are now trying to increase exports to the Unit-j ed States to redress a trade; balance heavily favoring they United States because of the: sale of nearly 10 million tons] of.grain in the last two years. - Approved For Release 2001/0$/08 : CIA- DP77-00432R000100410005-7. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY. 19, 1976 The Paralysis of Power'' By Ernest W. Lefever . WASHINGTON- Taking advantage of American confusion over its peace= keeping role in the third world and, its:. creeping policy paralysis induced: by breast-beating on Capitol Hill and;' in the media, the Soviet Union has .launched a massive military effort iri . Angola, presumably , to transform that:'` ..;strategically located and mineral-rich' ,country into a Cuba-style client state: Moscow's intervention in Angola is farm larger and more brazen than any of its earlier and only partially such:?; cessful attempts to establish beach-', heads in a dozen other African states.,'; including Nigeria, Zaire, the Congo,:. ..Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Somalia. The Soviet Union has dispatched a political' mercenary force of 7,500 heavily` armed Cubans to impose its will on;: `Angola. The 150,000 tons of arms include automatic weapons, armored vehicles, mortars, rockets, antiaircraft guns, MIG jet fighters, and'ground-to- air missiles. The Soviet military action has nothing to do' with "national Lbera= `;lion." Angola was liberated . from Portugal last Nov. 11. It has a great deal to do' with what U.N. Ambas- sador. Daniel 'Patrick Moynihan has aptly called' Soviet colonialism. Moscow has 'already established military port facilities in Somalia and its navy uses the ports of Conakry on the Atlantic and Dar es Salaam on the. Indian Ocean. Newly independent Mozambique has a Marxist regime. If Angola should fall under Soviet influence, Moscow would be in a position to deny Western military and .possibly commercial' access to_ several j important seaports in southern Africa. For their own security and economic i? reasons, the Presidents of,two neigh- i:boring states, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, ,are strongly opposed to Soviet pen- - etration into Angola.: At the .recent Organization of 'African. Unity,summit ;meeting in Addis Ababa, they advo- -cated that the'three Angolan factions 'be permitted ' to' settle the question -,of. contested sovereignty, without ex- ternal 'military intervention. . This, as it'happens, is also 'the position of the United States and South Africa. The O.A.U.. summit adjourned without act- on Angola.., But the, Soviets apparently plan, to continue their conquest through their Cuban proxies, determined not to re- peat the mistakes they made in Chile where they also worked closely with the Cubans in attempting to further radicalize President Salvador Allende's Marxist regime, which came in with 36.5 percent of the vote. In their postmortems on the 'failure of the unpopular Allende Government, the Leninist logicians condemned it for not *'taking earlier and more. drastic action, including, military force, to consolidate its minority position. Consequently, ,Angola is not the first hot spot to be further enflamed by Moscow-dispatched mercenaries. Cuban intelligence agents and military men have been used to train, lead, or otherwise support terrorist and other insurgent groups in a dozen countries from Chile to Canada, (Quebec Libera- tion Front) and from the Middle East (the Pal estine Liberation Organization) to Zaire. The Cubans are mercenaries because Moscow is, subsidizing the Castro regime to the tune of about $2 million a day. , Responding to the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger' have said that if it persists. it may jeopardize detente, that many splintered concept that so easily lends itself to obfuscation. The Administra- tion has also provided some small material , aid to the two Angolan .factions seeking to build a moderate THE WASH TNGTON POST Friday. Jan. 23, 1976 a e By Karen De Young \' deflir,^.fpn post -,1Jf) :',n'e. Less than six months in power, the government of Nigeria has stirred tip internal dissension by taking all anti- American line in its foreign policy and then seeming to back away from that line. The conflict appcars to be between those who.e ideology makes them critical of the United States and iho::e with strong economic links to America, which is tig 'la's biggest customer for oil. The ;ru!ila1 y governine'nt of Cell. Aturt;+%,, ~,ltlilarllowd appears t ..v nu,c an agv"u,:.u ut:ut suchanimage. 'l'hemi, early tills lllollth, Approved For Release 2001/d~/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010d''"add a}lructed criticism e government prepared to have mutually beneficial diplomatic and economic relations with the West. This modest assistance was vetoed last month 'by the U.S. Senate in a mood of self- castigation, an action labeled by Presi- dent Ford as "a deep tragedy." But perhaps the tragedy should not. be laid wholly at the door of Congress. Has the President ever made it clear to the American people what is really at stake in Angola? Is Angola not ,one more testing ground between two radically different ways of organ- Izing society-one emphasizing self- determination and consent and the other elite dictatorship and coercion? What about the mischief-making' po- tential of a' Soviet Angola in Africa? America' is not the policeman of the world. We have no mandate to impose our democratic. institutions on other peoples. But we do have a 'responsibility, commensurate with our power and consistent with our inter- ests, to resist the forcible imposition of totalitarian power, as we have done in the past in Europe and Korea. if detente has any substance, Angola is certainly a test case. No American 'troops are needed. Why does not Mr. Ford, hopefully with the support of Congress, inform Mr. Brezhnev that, U.S. -grain shipments to the Soviet Union will be suspended and the strategic arms limitations talks broken off until Moscow withdraws its Cuban expeditionary force from Angola? This would take courage in these troubled times when the earlier "illu- sion of American omnipotence" is giving way to an even more dangerous malady-the paralysis of ? power. Ernest W. Lefever, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of "Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical. Africa." ve 1?A nti -SIB Policy Line The issue was Angola, which Mohammed made the oc- casion for his first public stand on an International issue--important in a country that, as black Africa's richest and most populous nation, has long sought an image as an international leader. One of the criticisms of htohamnnled's predecessor, Cen. Yakuhu Cowin, deposed by a coup last July, was that he seemed to have passed up several elmaiwes to snlitiifv Mohammed went further, vehemently attacking President Ford for his attempt to rally support for the Popular Movement's two rivals and accusing the United States of "crude bullying and insulting logic at the expense of the Angolan people." At about the same tinge, it became known that Nigeria had told the United States to close ? down its Foreign Broadcast Lifonnation Str- So two months ago Mohammed's government, taking advantage of the news of South African military involvement in Angola, seized such a chance. It announced its full political and financial support for the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the t,il oration of Angola, winning the approval of anti-American elements within Nigeria as well as capitalizing on the unpopularity of racially !,tin retoa lvd South Afri, iY pproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7, as a CIA base. Pro-Western Nigerians, acutely aware that U.S. oil purchases finance Nigeria's multibillion-dollar develop- ment program, became concerned over how far the economic ties with the United States could he stretched. Indications from the state Department still suggest, however, that the ties are not at the breaking point yet. Concerned private American businesses, which have close to $1 billion sunk into Nigeria, have been assured that relations are still proceeding, normally. Evidence of a Nigerian attempt to respond to the pro- Western faction's concerns came in Mohammed's sur- prising moderate statement following adjournment of the recent Organization of African Unity summit meeting. Although 111ohamned had pledged to lead pro-Popular Movement forces at that meeting, and denounced the U.S. attempts to influence uncommitted delegates in the opposite direction, he refused to label the stalemate a failure, saying that no one W~ ~ JANC19N 7s POST "could begrudge either view" of the Angolan issue. One indicator of the direction Mohammed's government may take, ob- servers say, will be arms purchases to outfit Nigeria's quarter-million-man army, the largest in black Africa. five C-130 transport planes Most of the equipment used from the United States and a by the Nigerian government squadron of Soviet Migs. State during the four-year civil war Department officials say that came from the Soviet Union, other purchases of American because the United States arms are "in the works." refused to supply weapons to fight against the Biafrans. The OAUSummitOn Angola THE ANGOLA SUMMIT of the Organization of African Unity must be read as a serious setback for the Soviet Union, which had hoped to see the OAU endorse its client, the Popular Movement, condemn South African in- tervention, and perhaps even acknowledge Moscow's support for Angolan "liberation." The OAU did none of these things. Finding itself divided right down the middle, it chose to live with its divisions rather than fight the issue out in a way that might have given one side a, political' victory but thus humiliated the other. The organization refused either to recognize the Popular Movement, as the Movement desired, or to call for a government of national unity, as the Movement's Angolan rivals desired. Jt further refused to denounce South African intervention alone, taking the position in includin ti g on, effect that it would condemn all interven later attempts starting only in November to denounce the Russia's and Cuba's, or none at all. The upshot is that the struggle in Angola will goon, but Soviet-Cuban role. The further possibility exists that without the great boost to the Popular Movement and its initial use of the CIA provided some part of the pretext Communist patrons which many had expected to come for the far larger Soviet operation that eventually out of Addis Ababa. The organization has now said, in as flowered. In any event, by undertaking a CIA operation clear a voice as its members' circumstances permit, that that controversy had rendered vulnerable to leaks and Angola is for Angolans. As Zaire's president fairly that could. not easily weather disclosure and domestic stated, for the first time South Africa and the Soviet storm, the administration was inviting a political defeat Union have been equated in African minds. We think this of potentially greater consequences than any victory it outcome gives the Popular Movement fresh reason to might have won by a quick successful intervention. consider compromising with its Angolan rivals. The The OAU summit has not ended the Angolan affair. But Popular Movement has Soviet weapons and advisers and we trust it has ended the period in U.S. Angolan policy d- when Washington felt it necessary to conduct a test of i tary a Cuban troops but, though these offer mil vantages, more and more they constitute political wills with the Soviet Union. The United States does not liabilities. Particularly would this be the case if South have so much political capital these years that it can Africa were promptly to withdraw all of its own forces afford to put it at risk in pl,kes.like Angola, where the. and leave Moscow and Havana isolated as the lone non- outcome of a local power struggle is difficult to ordain at 'African interventionists. By the best estimates, best, and, in. any event, only as important to national as Americans themselves make it out tobe. it y moreover, the Popular Movement does not control a secur NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY JANUARY 21, 1976 ~~Ist is Aid to Zaire' epartment are less concerned .r about Zaire than about the ' comparabii amount of funds to. aid immediately. The chairmen danger of a new rupture in * in the +i olan Mob ccLed, and high State De- relations with Congress if the By LESLIE H. GELB its allies fi?n m, l ! gprAl to The New York Tuaes civil war. Fne Cen'-rat Into>lii- Partment officials suspended wishes of the representatives WASHINGTON, Jan. ?0-- fence Agee y has been funnel the Order to execute the loan. are ignored. State Department officials areliirt,? covert military aid and One official said: "We have The State Department is~ expected to decide in a few (cash through Zaire to the two not gone ahead-yet; we're try- legally without specific provide tilc- day s whether to gc; aticatl de- Wr?:,tern-supported An.r,oian lih- inn to see if we can meet Con aiithoi l wouicll slate obi, lions fiotr kt:y Con- e.1 essional onsuppo led by tthtin e Soviet grOffici als ofltheiAfrica bureau leaders said but that fic egtheysltine ~ertwrgliad 1. id_rs with .n.~SrnuP pf er,u?r;;rnc 1tr in of ''tip tntlit>n{ Uninn, of the. State Department arp,uc; rc t,ard this as a breach of a y V!mhtistration officials in-I11tl.at the $10 miliio;i in Indus-i tt o-ye"r 'working relationship. I Lirie accori;n+; ive r,oacin- sr t a to l mwia tr 1 ials. fnnu:.d several tr mnllit: l,~ trial credits is urgently needed! Cen;ress has not p+s cki.ttitnen ,t n ;,ht ilic inicn- ~tn mcei. the dc tr rio icing ccc. lx,w foreign-.lid hiii flit 1:151., The atti5 1111 are uon.+'rn r char tt i: rrif Ii,`.?n Of Ss r rv fairy of LALc nomic Situation in Zaire. In the ih5cr:ce of new It ~, ,`,-aid `'oi'i`~ r'll"`~ `''`'rLAiprovec' rorirF eleaser2~001/08/08~r: rRDP77Officia-ls 7 piograitas.trc art, majority of either the land area or the population of Angola. A compromise would ensure the Movement a reduction of the national and regional tensions otherwise bound to plague Angola for years. The Ford administration had prophesied that the Senate's action in clamping down on further CIA activity in Angola would cripple Africans who oppose Soviet intervention. But, this did not happen at Addis Ababa. Those Africans did not.and do not need American prompting to know where their own best interests lie. We' are aware that the administration's use of the CIA in d Angola starting; last July was done at the behest, an with the blessing, of various African states. We feel, nonetheless, that by so using the CIA, the administration- made easier a South African intervention that otherwise might not have taken place, while undermining its own That Soviet equipment is now wearing out, and the angry ban Nigeria established against American arms at the end of the war in 1970 has been allowed to lapse. So far, Nigeria's biggest weapons expenditures have Approved For Release 200.1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 tinued by means of a resolu- tion continuing spending au- thority based on last year's aid bill. Aid Can Be Redirected Operating within these reso- lutions, the Administration can !redirect aid from one country .to another or increase aid to a -country without Congres- sional approval. It is merely required to -inform Congress 15 -days before carrying out its decision; Under an arrangement in effect for the last two years, however, the State Department has invariably been responsive to objections by committee chairmen, either modifying de- cisions or reversing there in! according with the wishes of.' the chairmen. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii and chair- man of the Senate appropria- tions subcommittee on foreign operations, was informed of thel LONDON TIMES 7 Jan. 1976 decision to send the aid yes-I to' require' prior approval" off subcommittee, called yester-' every decision to rprfirprt terday afternoon. He imme--I _rj day's notification by the Ad-' ~diately registered his objections with Mr. Kissinger. In a telephone interview to- assumed that the aid had al-,? and chairman of the House ready been given, but said that; 'appropriations subcommittee on he was pleased to hear of the! foreign operations, said in an reconsideration, given the fact- that "the Ad interview today that he gave t h ministration "an attempt to slip: one by before Congress has a chance to act." "It's stupid and an affront to the express concerns of +Congress," he said. I So far this year, Zaire has received $15 million in Govern- I minis ration as - ment - sponsored commercial honored the working relation- his approval to the aid yes-I credits. The State Department ship until now." 'terday, "But I'm protesting it is seeking $19 million addi Assurances Sought ! today; I don't think they've tional in military credit sales, Representative Clement j.. justified it." f and a $20 million loan by the Zablocki, Democrat of Wiscon- Mr. Passman and Mr. Inouye Export-Import Bank. sin, and a key member of the objected to a similar State De- I President Mobutu Sese Seko House International Relations partment request for Zaire in of Zaire has been a supporter) Committee, said that he might! October. At this time, Mr. Kis- of United States policy in singer was seeking $22.7 mil- !Africa in recent years. On favor certain kinds of aid to! Zaire if there were assurances! lion in long-term loans for (Monday, following the emer- that the aid would not directly Zaire, but did not go ahead gency meeting of the Organiza- or indirectly find its way into; with the loan because of Con- tion for African Unity, Mr. Angola. gressional objections. IMobutu charged Moscow with `' He added: "But if the State Action Called an Affront ! "intolerable intervention" inJ Department does not follow Representative David R?1 Angola. Congressional desires on this Obey, Democrat of Wisconsin,' - matter, we:will rewrite the law! a member of Mr., Passman's, ussia increase aid. Representative Otto E. Pass- liberation movements during the fight against the Portuguese was always the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Its genesis goes back to 1954 when Mr.. Holden Roberto formed a group of dissidents among the e now to ll out of Angola?. Washington, Jan 6. President Ford has only one card left to play in the game against Russia. for the future of Angola, and he played it again yesterday. He said that continued Soviet. intervention in. Angola would damage f' broader . relations" with America, and the Russians do not need to be reminded that the fate of the Salt II talks ;twill be decided in the next few weeks. Detente has not been. going well lately, but it remains the -_ - , both coming out the,,way lie Bakongo 'tribe in northern wants. , Angola. It started. fighting in There is much confusion over. 1961 and soon afterwards was American and Russian interven- formed into the NFLA. lion in Angola and the question Throughout the 1960s, the of which outside power inter- brunt of the fighting was in the of first is hotly debated north. Mr Roberto has been leere. -: Two basic facts are constantly supported by Presi- clearly established, however. dent Mobutu of Zaire, who is The Russians. have been sup- his brother-in-law. When Presi- porting the dent Mobutu opened relations pro-communist with China, Mr Roberto popular Movement for the followed his example and went at Liberation least since 196aMPLA to Peking in 1973. The Chinese s A1go3;a5 --and the e crucial event in the civil war began-to . supply him with arms was Dr Agostinho Neto's coup and to train his troops. Isst August in which he' sue- ' The ' 200 or so Chinese nd Dr . seeded in driving the two rival advisers in Zaire training camps policy, and Mr Ford ;;d D r Henry" Kissinger' have repeat- f nationalist movements out were were all believed to have left edly ' suggested that Russian Luanda. by the end of last year. It is intervention in Angola would 3.)r Nete, a . gynaeocologist , alleged that at various times as one of the during the 19G0s and- early harts it. They hope to ersuade and a poet, was- the Russians that persisting in founders of the MPLA and has 1970s, the Central Intelligence their African adventure would led it since .1962. Its chief Agency gave some symbolic end detente, ruin Salt and that r-ipport has always come from assistance to the NFLA, with an the game is not worth the he educated among the Afri- eye to the 'future. Official candle. Involvement in Angola `ant and coloured people and 'American policy was to stay out might turn out for the Russians 11e slum-dwellers ' in Luanda. of Africa. the way Vietnam turned out S military operation was The third Angola liberation for - the Americans. Lased in Brazzaville, too far movement, the Union for the The Americans also hope 'way to be a useful base of Total Independence of Angola, that the Russians will conclude o'-Ieration P in Angola proper, UNITA, is ' led by Mr Joseph 013t well- laced to take over Savimbi-.lie was once one of that Africans are not to be I Cabina when the Portuguese bir Roberto's lieutenants, and relied on, and will remember . left. broke away from the NFLA in the collapse of their efforts in I Dr Neto has been to Moscow 1966 to form Unita. Zaire immediately after. its ; on a number of occasions and None of these three move- independence in 1960 and per- ! 'rte Russians armed and trained meats received large-scale Maps also their fluctuating for. his forces in the Conga. They assistance from non-African tunes in Egypt. moved into Luanda soon after countries during the fight There are signs that the . the Portuguese coup in April, against the Portuguese or eiur- Russians might be ready to 1974, drove their rivals out lag the period of alternate back out, and the Americans List Anigust and took over the bickering and fighting between are giving them every help by I port of Luanda when the Portu- the Portuguese revolution in urging a cease-fire and the gusto left on November 11. April, 1974 and Angolan withdrawal of foreign troops. , It is undisputed that inimedi- . independence in November mouth Africans might allow tie Russians and Cubans to with- draw inure discreetly. Meanwhile, the President and Secretary of Stute have to de- Cede what negotiating', position to take on SUIt II in the next creek or in,n. Dr Kissinger has r iiostponed his next visit to lnscow several tiaras and if he !.o%v goes there before the end of the iuontlt, it, might be it sign that Salt and Angola are began delivery of mtadern . The series of events that led equipment, including the to the present crisis began, 122nun rockets, which have a according to sources here, in range of nine miles and which October, 1974 when the immediately turned the tide of Russians started increasing battle against lviiiittt and .he their military aid to the MPLA. N1 LA. The question is whetiicr Sonic CIA officials thought that the ,Russians decided ou this the Russians were taking steps massive a:?nis supply because of 11) CiiSUre that Dr New, Whom Annericau acid Souilr -African they consider a communist, interveittioa during the should come out on tali alter. sutnnier, Angola became independent, The nrowt impcwttuit of the Sources in tit'asitin;gion now say that the CIA -first decided that steps must be taken to help the anti-communists among the Angolan nationalists in Janu- ary, 1975. The Forty Committee, which supervises the CIA. then approved sending $300,000 to the.NFLA. This. was ' a very -small -suns - and obviously would 'not itself have.=:.provoked: the Russians into as dramatic an increase in their help -for the -MPLA as eventually -occurred. On the other hand it was seen by both --sides as a - token - of--things to come, and might have worried the Russians-for.-that reason. -Ate any event, the '.Russians continued to supply the MPLA and; according to sources here, President Kaunda made a per- sonal-appeal to President Ford in April, last year to reverse ,what he considered to be a tide sweeping the MPLA to victory. Many senior officials in the t State Department, including. the assistant secretary responsible for Africa, opposed any further American involvement in Angola, on the grounds that the -MPLA would probably 'win any- way and that that would not necessarily be a disaster. Dr Kissinger disagreed and in July, 1975, the CIA was authorized to spend 14 million dollars on arms for the NFLA and Unita. The equipment went in through Zaire and in due course helped the NFLA to seize the whole country down to a line about 90 miles north of Luanda. The MPLA set2ed -Luanda breaking the- truce and. the coalition, in August, before tine NFLA had had a chance to benefit frorn the CIA's largesse which, in any case, was much less , than the Russians were then giving to the MPLA. I'ris CIA's investment paid its first dividends in September and October when the MPLA was driven back to the region around Luanda. lbleanwhik?, a much enure effective intervention was tak- ing place in the south, wiwre tree South Africans carne to the help of Unita and mounted an ariuck up the coast. which car- rii:d tlnita to a point more titan 100 miles to 112, he south of Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100450005-7 , r 14 AppiRbved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432RO0010041000'5-7 If there is any single event which precipitated the immense increase in Soviet aid to the MPLA it was this South African offensive, not the American subsidy to the NFLA. American aid was increased in the autumn to a total of $32m. Congress is firmly opposed to any further aid being sent to the anti-communists in Angola, and passed a Bill just 'before Christmas cutting it out of the defence budget. Now Unita and the NFLA have' run out of steam, the ! MPLA has steadied the situa-? Lion, and it is at last possible that a general withdrawal of foreigners would allow the Angolan factions to continue their civil war from roughly the positions they would have occupied anyway, without the Russians', Americans' and South Africans' intervention. Patrick Brogan WASHI NGTCN POST 1 1 JAN 1976 Report .its Famine Cover-tqi A famine that killed 100,000 Ethiopians in 1973 was covered up for months* by diplomats and international relief agencies in an effort to protect the regime of Emperor. Haile Selassie, a report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peach charges. The cover-up, in which U.S. officials played a leading role, severely hampered relief efforts throughout that year and well into 1974, the report adds. Entitled "The Politics of Starvation," the 101-page document details how traditional diplomacy worked to conceal facts about drought, crop failure, pestilence and widespread starvation in order to avoid embarrassing Haile Selassie and his government. . The Ethiopian government, content to allow peasants in the hinterland to die of hunger and disease, put pressure on intergovernmental and Christian Science Monitor 13 Jan. 1976 Joseph Q. Harsch . Lessons from Angola"' The Kissinger-Ford effort to head off the lodgement of Soviet influence in Angola by clandestine action is now in the damage control phase. There is still a possible propaganda recov- ery by brandishing Moscow as the sole other outsiders are out). foothold to the central area controlled by the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) faction which Moscow has been backing for years. Dr. Kissinger may even be able to salvage a Soviet withdrawal at the next bargaining round over detente, although Moscow would have to be paid something substantiai for giving up the fruits of what is for them. a highly successful power politics adventure. So we do not yet see the sequel to the story. But matters have reached the point where we can see clearly enough that the American resort to clandestine operations in Angola is a failure bordering on fiasco. The purpose was perfectly proper - to prevent the lodg;'mcnt. of Soviet infiuence on the west coast of southern Africa. But the methods chosen along the way were either too little and too late, or the wrong ones. The first mistake was to let Moscow pick the 1957 and do nothing about it for years except to refuse help to the same faction but give a pittance, a few thousand dollars, to an private relief agencies to conceal facts about the disaster long after it had gotten completely out of hand, it says. Meanwhile, bureaucratic bumbling and official and private corruption inside Ethiopia contributed to the misery of millions and may have pushed that country beyond the point of no return where self-sufficiency is concerned.' Jack Shephard, the report's principal author, and Stephen J. Green, writer of a summary chapter, said that as. a result of the events of 1973-74, Ethiopia is probably doomed to be a relief-client state for at least 10 years and perhaps indefinitely. By the end of 1975, 500,000 persons may have died of starvation and cholera, largely as a result of the . . calculated inaction by Ethoiopia's government and its foreign collaborators, the report says. In a bitter passage in his was enough for him to start building a political organization, but nothing like enough to build an army. In April substantial quantities of Soviet arms and supplies arrived in Luanda for the MPLA. They used it successfully to consolidate their hold on the capital. By July they were well-established and their rivals had been pushed away from the capital. In July the Ford administration decided to do more for Mr. Roberto and his FNLA and authorized $14 million to be piped to him through the government of neighboring Zaire. But at this point serious disagreement devel- oped inside the government in Washington. Both at the State Department and at CIA much professional opinion disapproved. In effect, Secretary of State Kissinger overruled his experts. One of them, Nathaniel Davis. even resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. No one at CIA resigned, but many disapproved of or dis- trusted the decision. summary chapter, Green, a former U.N. children's fund officer in Ethiopia, wrote about how diplomats and international civil servants sought to pursue "concepts of peace, children and youth, public health, etc.. in an abstract, long-term form." "The problem in Ethiopia, in 1973 was that many people did not have any long-term interests. They were dying. "That they were dying was, somewhat curiously, per- ceived as a political em- barrassment to Haile Selassie's government by that government and by virtually all of the foreign officials in that country. So nothing was- -done. and at CIA -- always dangerous because' it usually leaks out. On top of that came a surprising failure to realize how gun-shy Congress might prove to be about anything about it. Meanwhile the Soviets, unbothered by any Congress or public opinion, shipped in, large further amounts of weapons and sup- plies, and also a lot of Cubans - perhaps as many as 10,000 by now. action on the international skirmish line. It is unlikely that the MPLA will be long grateful to,! doubt about the suitability of clandes211, operations within present circumstance. Open diplomacy might have worked better' Dr. Kissinger would be advised to listen more attentively to his experts, and give the CIA a rest. They had enough trouble on their hands already without Angola. Formal independence day in Angola came on Nov. 11. At that time the Ford adminis- tration added another $18 million to the secret WA~S:1 r+GTOId POST funds available to the anti-MPLA factions. .L JAN 1976 This was cleared with the appropriate "watch dog" committees of Congress. But when the $c}io3iar~hilira flit administration then proposed to add another $28 million (for a total of $60 million in all) the Senate balked. The story leaked out from dissident senators who felt the chill of a possible second Vietnam. The operation ceased to be clandestine. alienated the strongest faction without build- So there was the first mistake of letting the ing a credible rival when there was still time Soviets have ;I monopoly of aiding the MPLA. Then last January (a year age) a decision Mr. Roberto, but giving him only a pittance. ACCRA, ,)an. 13--An in. ternational students' meeting today called for the with- drawal of all scholarships to developing countries from rorcign agencies such as the 1iocseteller and Ford Found.;I ions. The students sale! they believe that, award of such scholarships anal loin n- tlatF; ; ss hv' forei},n figencil..; Ltaclcrt,t thu 1',VLA th sutx pifiQi .1200 006/0&etCFA,' tDRM400432ROOO1.O04100051711t to "'I f r, llnl)f L ?ill :. in o t e"As. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7 11A NOTON POST JAN 1976 Jack Anderson es ec i the . Torturers Chile In our swashbuckling days shortly after the turn of the century, a Barbary pirate named Raisouli made the mistake of kidnapping an American citizen named Perdicaris. Teddy Roosevelt immediately fired off a cable from the White House: "Perdicaris alive or Raisouli dead." To lend emphasis to the message, Roosevelt landed a detachment of Marines on. the Barbary coast. Perdicaris was hastily released. There was a time when Americans could count upon the protection of their gover- nment when they traveled abroad. Today, any foreign potentate can drag them off to his torture chambers without risk of retaliation. The State Department clearly is more interested in preserving its cozy relationships with dictators and despots than in upholding the human rights of American citizens: Those unfortunate enough to get caught in the coils of a foreign police can expect little more from the State Department than a polite mur- mur of protest. This has been dramatized by two con- trasting incidents in the military oligarchy of Chile. The dictatorship last week released Dr. Sheila Cassidy, a British citizen, who had been stripped naked, lashed to a bed and tormented with electric shocks by the official torturers. The moment she, was safe on British sqil, the British government withdrew its Ambassador from Chile and issued a stinging statement. "Dr. Cassidy` was tortured by the t:hilean security police." the statement charged. "In order to obtain information from her, they stripped her and gave her severe electric shocks, No British government can accept such uncivilized, brutal treatment of a British subject at the hands of a foreign government." A year earlier, an American art teacher, Amy Conger, was ai,used by the Chilean Air Force. She wits Ii:r.tlt'd Ihr+tu h the streets '.'ith hrtasts bared and later slununed on a bed and tortured. She was deprived of water, tt nil rt slevp and frn'ced to stand until she ahnost collapsed. Otiee she was btindfnlrh'j and then catapulted di wn some steps. The ,;nu't?ir:ut. consul in Sanliaoo, Fred I'cud . quietly set?ured her rt'icaso. The State I)ep:u-ttnerd filed no formal protest but, on the routrary, conspired to keep her (':1st' ilttiet. When we finally published her story, Portly spoke up in support tint of a A4 tety Conger but of Ihi'' C.rilc;ut tut atrcrs. She has pleaded with the State Depar- tment to investigate her case. As evidence, she provided'a 16-page report describing how she had been treated. But the State Department hasn't even bothered to an- swer all her correspondence. Secr etary of State Henry Kissinger simply doesn't want tortured Americans rocking his diplomatic boat. Rather than offend the torturers, he has even risked antagonizing Congress. A year ago, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act to bar money from countries that consistently violate human rights. The law requires the President to report to Congress on the status of human rights in recipient countries. In compliance with the law, the State Department cabled more'than 60. am'-:, bassadors and asked them to file human rights status reports. These were assembled for submission to Congress. But at the last minute, Kissinger classified the information and refused ? to' release 'it. Instead, he delivered a general report which omitted the sordid details. Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., has been clamoring to vain for the full information, which the law requires Kissinger to divulge. This American appeasement has merely encouraged the despots to continue their harsh routines. There is no better example than the Chilean military junta, which started out brutalizing communists but is now using the. same savagery against anyone who gets in the way. Our sources in Chile have documented the case, for example, of Pedro Araya Ortiz. He is a former construction worker Who got himself elected to the Chilean Congress as a Christian Democrat. He is a "Secretary of State Henry Kissinger simply doesn't want tortured Americans rocking his diplomatic boat. Rather than offend the torturers, he has even risked aritagoni ping C,origress. V political moderate, an anti-communist, a family man with an 18-month-old son and an aged mother to support. He provoked the wrath of the junta, apparently, by searching for four union leaders who had mysteriously disap- peared. Like himself, they were also moderate Christian Democrats. Last September, Araya was seized on the streets as he was leaving his mother's home. Four security agents beat him, shoved him into the back of their car and held him down with machine guns at the back of his neck. They sped with their prisoner to a special torture center near the Air Force base in Antofagasta. We have been provided the details of his detention, down to the street locations of two torture centers where he a was held. At first, he was stripped bare and strapped to a metal table. For 48 hours, the torturers worked him over. They wet down his feet and applied electrical shocks. They beat the soles of his feet. They burned the tender part of his arms with lighted cigarettes. They gave him 'no food or water. Eventually, the junta let Araya go. Several friends gathered at the prison gate to greet him, but they saw a white station wagon speed out with Araya inside. It was later learned that the Congressman was whisked, blindfolded, to a special clinic-located on Santa Lucia Street next to the Chilean-British Cultural Institute--where torture victims are nursed back to health. A doctor treated him for nine arm burns, severe burns on the soles of his feet and a dislocated tendon in his right foot. Then Araya was dumped on a street near Santiago's athletic stadium and left. to hobble to the, home of a friend. ? His friends insisted that he see a doctor. He was examined first at Santiago's Diagnostic Institute, later at the institute of Neurosurgery at Salvador hospital. lie remains today tinder intensive psychiatric care and is able to walk only with theaid o crutches. Meanwhile , thin united Nations and tl Organization of American States ha? denounced torture in Chile. The Brit` have withdrawn their ambassador protest. But the I tithed States r-emainl cordial tennis with the tortur. Un'ted Feature Syndicale, Inc. Approved For Release 2001/0$008 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410005-7