DISAPPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000500070086-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: July 28, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

S13926 - -'-'1- - - - - - - - - -CONO9ES910YAI: RTE ORD _'SENATE - - - - - - - - - - - Jury Z,!5, I V 10
objection, the nomination is considered
and confirmed.
Mr. ROBERT C. B
dent, I ask unanimous
order for the quorum c
The PRESIDING OF
nomination of Maj. Gen. Wilbur L.
Creech to be a lieuten t general.
objection, the nomin ion is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legisl ive clerk read the
nomination of -Maj. en. Thomas W.
Morgan to be a lieuten nt general
objection, the nomin ion is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legisla ive clerk read the
nomination of Lt. Gen William J. Evans
to be a general.
The PRESIDING O FICER. Without
objection, the nomina ion is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legisla ive clerk read the
nomination of Maj. G L. George Rhodes
to be a lieutenant gene al.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nomina ion is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legisla 've clerk read the
nomination of Maj. -G 1. Devol Brett, to
be a lieutenant general.
The PRESIDING O FICER. Without
objection, the nomina on is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legisla ve clerk read the
nomination of Lt. Gen. Felix M. Rogers,
to be a general.
The PRESIDING 0 FICER. Without
objection, the nomina on is considered
and confirmed. -
The assistant legislat ve ,clerk read the
nomination of Maj. Ge . John F. Gonge
to be a lieutenant gener 1.
The PRESIDING O FICER. Without
objection, the nominat on is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legislat ve clerk read the
nomination of Maj. G n. Raymond B.
Furlong to be a lieutena it general.
The PRESIDING O ICER. Without
objection, the nominat on is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Maj. Ger. George G. Lov-
ing, Jr., to be a lieutena t general.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nominat' n is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legislate a clerk read the
nomination of Maj. Gen. Robert T. Marsh
to be a lieutenant gener .
The PRESIDING OF CER. Without
objection, the nominati n is considered
and confirmed.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYR . Mr. President,
I move the Senate ret n to legislative
session, and I ask for tyeas and nays
on the motion.
The PRESIDING OF ICER. Is there
a sufficient second? Th e is not a suf-
ficient second.
Mr. ROBERT C. B D. Mr. Presi-
dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceed-
ed to call the roll.
objection, it is so order d.
Mr. ROBERT C. BY D. Mr. Presi-
dent,'I ask for the yeas nd nays on the
motion to return to legislative session,
The PRESIDING OFF CER. Is there a
sufficient second ?
There is a sufficient sec nd.
The yeas and nays we e ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYR . Mr. President,
I suggest the absence o a quorum:
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legisla ive clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYR . Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consen that the order
for the quorum call 'be r cinded.
The PRESIDING OF1 CER. Without
objection, it is so Ordered.
The question is on th motion of the
Senator from West Vir inia. The yeas
and nays have been ord red. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislate a clerk called
the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BY D. I announce
that the Senator from Florida. (Mr.
CHILES), the Senator fr m Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH) , the Senator f om Mississippi
(Mr. EASTLAND), the Sen tor from Mas-
sachusetts (Mr. KENNLD ) the Senator
from Rhode Island (Mr PASTORE), the
Senator from Rhode Isla d (Mr..PELL),
the Senator from Conner 'cut (Mr. RIB-
ICOFF), and the Sena r from New
Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) re necessarily
absent.
I further announce Mat, if present
and voting, the Senate from Rhode.
Island (Mr. PELL) -would vote "yea."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I anri nce that the
Senator ' from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER),
the Senator from Oklaho a (Mr. BELL-
MON), the Senator from ew. York (Mr.
BUCKLEY), the Senator from Arizona
(Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from
New York (Mr. JAVITS) the Senator
from Maryland (Mr. MA HIAS) and the
Senator from Ohio ( . TAFT) are
necessarily absent.
The result was annou ced-yeah 84,
nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 9 Ex.]
YEAS-84
Abourezk Garn
Allen Glenn
Bartlett Gravel
Bayh Griffin
Beall Hansen
Bentsen Hart, Gary W.
Biden Hart, Philip A.
Brock Hartke
Brooke Haskell
Bumpers Hatfield
Burdick Hathaway
Byrd, Helms
Harry F., Jr. Hollings
Byrd, Robert C. Hruska
Cannon Huddleston
Case Humphrey
Clark Inouye
Cranston Jackson
Culver Johnston
Curtis Laxalt
Dole Leahy
Domenici Long
Eagleton Magnuson
Fannin Mansfield
Fong McClellan
Ford McClure
McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
Metcalf
Mondale
Montoya
Morgan
Moss
Muskle
Nelson
Nunn
Packwood
Pearson
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Roth
Schweiker
Scott, Hugh
Scott,
William L.
'Sparkman
Stafford,
Stennis
Stevens
Stevenson
Talmadge Tunne
NA S-0
NOT V ING-15
Baker Eastland Pastore
Bellmon Goldwater Pell
Buckley Javits Ribicoff
Chiles Kenne y Taft
Church Mathi Williams
So the motion w Ts agreed to.
LEGI,%AT VE ESSION
The PRES OFFICER (Mr.
BUMPERS). Th o ion having been
agreed to, the 1 a e is once again in
DISAPPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS ON THE ISLAND OF
DIEGO GARCIA
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two hours
having elapsed, the Senate will now re-
sume the consideration of unfinished
business, Senate Resolution 160, which
the clerk will state.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 160) disapproving
construction projects on the Island of Diego
Garcia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
for debate on the resolution, any debat-
able motion, or appeal, is limited to 5
hours, to be equally divided between and
controlled by the Senator from Missis-
sippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the Senator
from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND),
with one-half hour each reserved for the
Senator from Virginia. (Mr. WILLIAM L.
ScoTT) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
TACT) , in addition to the 5 hours.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I be-
lieve that I am entitled to half the time,
because the Senator from Mississippi and
the Senator from South Carolina are
both against the resolution of disap-
proval. I would hope that the distin-
guished Republican leader would take
that up with the distinguished Senator
from South Carolina, because there has
to be a division of time, and I think I am
entitled to it as the author of the resolu-
tion.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. The Senator, of
course, is making a reasonable request--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. Senators will please
take their seats or retire to the cloak-
room.
Does the Senator from Pennsylvania
wish to proceed?
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, the
Senator from South Carolina is here, and
the Sen4tor from Mississippi is tempo-
rarily off the floor. Because the Senator
from South Carolina is here, he can, of
course, speak for himself. But I under-
stand he is willing to agree to a reason-
able division of time, if the distinguished
majority leader will also work it out that
the chairman of the committee--
. Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, yes, I know the
distinguished chairman of the commit-
tee and the distinguished Senator from
South Carolina would like to split the
time; and I would ask unanimous con-
sent that I be given half of the time and
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July 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
McGovern
Rackwood
Stennis
-McIntyre
Pe~,rson
Stevens
Metcalf
Peilpy
Stevenson
Mondate
Pro)Xnire
Stone
Montoya
Ranc1 lph
Symington
Morgan
Roth
Talmadge
Moss
Schwei r
Thurmond
Muskie
Scott,
Tower
Nelson
William L.
Tunney
Nunn
Stafford
Young
Mr ROBERT C. BYAD. I announce
that the Senator from 'Florida (Mr.
CHILES), the Senator from\Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH), the Senator from' Mississippi
(Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator ADM Mas-
sachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the enator
from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTOR , the
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. LL),
the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. BI-
COFF). and the Senator from New Jerky
(Mr. WILLIAMS) are necessarily absent.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON),
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLD-
WATER), the Senator from New York (Mr.
BucxLEY}, the Senator from New York
(Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Maryland
(Mr. MATHIAS), and the Senator from
Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quo-
rum is present.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The first
order of business is advising and con-
senting to the first nomination on the
calendar.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President,
may I respectfully inquire of the distin-
guished assistant majority leader wheth-
er this is a filibtfster or not?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Not In the
usual sense, In regard to which the dis-
tinguished Republican leader and his
colleagues have shown themselves to be
very adept.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I want the coun-
try to know that, in the opinion of the
minority leader, this is a filibuster de-
signed to prevent us from having a vote
on New Hampshire before the recess. I
shall make that point from time to time
between now and the recess.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
the Senator has had numerous votes al-
ready. I think he has had eight votes on
the motion to send the matter back to
New Hampshire, so he has been given
plenty of opportunities to vote.
He was given an opportunity to vot
went and he lost on that motion.
this week.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. If we 4et some
other chances this week, I s all feel, I
would say, rather moder ely better
about it. I shall feel bes of all if we
were to succeed in prevai . We have a
chance of prevailing if a allow the roll
to be called, have the enators stay out
of the well, and let a rollcall vote be
announced accord ly. One may harbor
the thought, as t French say, and in
that way, one y march forward with
some progress.
Mr. ROB C. BYRD. The march-
ing, I think, as done not at the request
of the leadership on this side. If ther,
was any marching done, it must have
been ordered elsewhere. We know noth-
ing about it.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I thank the dis-
tinguished assistant majority leader, and
I understand he will now proceed with
the filibuster.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the
distinguished Republican leader. The
leadership on this side is simply reacting
to the actions "that were evident, begin-
ning on last Saturday, when the dis-
tinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr-
ALLEN), exercising his right under the
rules, objected to my unanimous-consent
request that there be a 10-minute period
for the transaction of routine morning,
business today' with a 2-minute limita-
tion on statements therein. That was a.
in and so the leadership on this sido~
h ust protected itself accordingly.
M JOHNSTON. Mn President, will
the S ENator yield?
Mr. P\OBERT C. BYRD. I would just
as soon At on with the nominations but_
yes, I will yield. `
Mr. JOH (ST'ON. It just occurred
-tation agreement n the whole gstion
of Durkin-Wyman.
Mr. ROBERT C. YRD. Tl t is the
solution. The leaders on t s side has
repeatedly made such pro sal to the
leadership on the other nd, exercis-
ing their rights, they hav ejected it re-
peatedly.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I nde1e if the dis-
tinguished Senator in Pe ylvania
would be in a mood 6 speak abt a time
limitation on all estions with espect
to Durkin-Wym so we can brig this
Mr. ROBER,'i''C. BYRD. Mr. President
swer to quOtion-
chance
to be given an opportunity to be heard,
in a squeaky sort of way, every now and
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Well, the dis-
tinguished Republican leader knows we
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. In response to
be reasons why Senators on both sides
of the aisle would prefer an opportunity
and strongest, as we view it. our strong-
est, Issue of the 35 issues stated in the
that every aspect of justice would be
served if we could only have a tally, that
is, just a count, to see how many people
S 13925
dropped pieces of the paper in the ba, lot
box in 10 precincts, just to count, the
papers not to count the votes, wVwere
That compelled us to con ude we
were subject to the tyranny 91 the ma-
jority by 61 to 38, and that e have no
hope of prevailing throng the
process
suggested, namely, that a go ahead
with a vote on every is e, so that the
majority can roll us o by one 34 more
times. We just do no like being rolled
Mr. ROBERT C. YRD. The Senator
is not being "ro1 d," and on that first
issue the vote w As not 61 to 38. A good
many Democr voted with the Repub-
licans, but th Republicans voted solidly.
Mr. HUG SCOTT. I will say to the
Democrats ho voted with us there are
some rea nable people on the other side
of the aAle, and we welcome this excess
of log- , and we anticipate more of it.
Mr ROBERT C. BYRD. Well, there
are/'-easonable people on both sides of
As to "rolling" the minority, that is
pure horseradish.
Mr. President, I ask for the regular
order.
U.S. AIR FORCE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The reg-
ular order is advising and consenting to
the nomination.
The Senate resumed consideration of
the nomination of Maj. Gen. Kenneth
L. Tallman to be a lieutenent general.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nomination is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
nomination of Lt. Gen. Robert E. Huyser,
to be a general.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the nbmination is considered
and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
omination of Lt. Gen. Daniel James,
obj
and
The
ssistant legisla
nomirla
Schafer,
. the
Air Force
general.
The PRES _i
objection, the omina
and confirmed.
The assistant 1 sla
nomination of M
Smith, to be a lieute
The PRESIDING
objection, the nomina
and confirmed.
tive clerk read the
NOMINATION PASSED OVER-MA * GEM
SLADE TO BE LIEUTENANT
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. M.
Pres
I ask unanimous consent tha
nomination go over.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. ~Ji
T.ne
objection, it is so ordered.
The assistant legislative clerk rea
nomination of Maj. Gen. Charles' E.
Buckingham to be a lieutenant general.
ident,
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 July 28, 1975 Approved 1 ~I1 JC& - D 5J7fl 44R000500070086-9 S13927
the distinguished senator from South I am in receipt of letters from the .going to extend into the billions of dol-
Carolina, for the Senator from Missis- Ambassadors- of Malagasy-formerly lars.
sippi, be given the other half. known as Madagascar-off the coast of In addition to high economic cost,
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. To be divided--- Africa, and Somalia, expressing their there is the question of political uncer-
Mr. MANSFIELD. Equally. concern over what the United States is tainties and the danger of heightened
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. The other half of attempting to do, tensions. Are we going to put a chip on
the time to be divided equally, by agree- I should mention, also, that in addition our shoulder and dare the Soviet Union
:vent between the Senator from Mis- to no treaty, to the best of my knowledge, to build up its naval strength in the In-
sissippi and the Senator from South there is no executive agreement--or, if dian Ocean? Are the Russians going to
Carolina. there is, it has not been brought to the put a chip on their shoulder and dare
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is all right. attention of Congress-by means of us to build up our naval strength in the
That is a matter that the Senator from which the United Kingdom grants cer- Indian Ocean? Are we going to hear
Mississippi and the Senator from South tain rights to the United States on this about hobgoblins during the course of
Carolina would have to agree on. But I uninhabited flyspeck, this atoll, in the this debate? Incidentally, may I say, in
would like to have the half of the time Indian Ocean. reading the conference report on the
on this side. Mr. President, I think there has been military authorization bill, it appears to
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Yes; the Senator too much hanky-panky in the field of me that, to a large extent, the Pentagon
from South Carolina advises that that forcing policy so far as the military is has come out on top in anything, in al-
is satisfactory with him if it is with the concerned. I recall, for example, that most everything, it desires. They are get-
Senator from Mississippi. some years ago, a General Burchinal, I ting the Rickover nuclear missile cruis-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without believe--either the commander of the er-only $60 million to start with, but
objection, it is so ordered. U.S. 8th Air Force in Europe or the the total cost, as of now, will be be-
Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, then, deputy commander--carried on negotia- tween $1.2 and $1.3 billion.
that half of the time would be under my tions with the Government of Spain. If Do you know, Mr: President, how many
control or whomever I may designate. those negotiations, conducted without of those missile cruisers they want, cost-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- the knowledge of Congress, had been put ing between $1.2 and $1.3 billion?
ator is correct, into effect,' we would have been involved, Twenty-five to twenty-eight. They have
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the in our relationship with Spain, to par- retained the B-1 when the B-52's are
Senate has now proceeded to the con- ticipate under certain circumstances on capable of still continuing in operation
sideration of Calendar No. 199, Senate the African continent. Fortunately, that for anywhere from 10 to 20 years.
Resolution 160, a resolution disapprov- was found out in time. Where is all this money coming from?
ing construction projects on the island , I do not blame General Burchinal, be- When is it going to stop? Have we not
of Diego Garcia. cause he was acting under instructions, learned anything from Vietnam? We
As the Senate knows, Diego Garcia is a But I do not like the idea of negotiations have neither the resources nor the man-
flyspeck in the Indian Ocean, an atoll, so- being carried on in behalf of this country power to be the policeman of the world.
called, situated approximately 1,000 miles in that manner; because when they are, And here, we want to go into the Indian
south of India, if my recollection is cor- the civilians, who are supposed to be Ocean and, for the time being, spend
rect. The Navy has been endeavoring to supreme in the conduct of the govern- just tens of millions of dollars, but
establish a base in Diego Garcia since the ment of this country, under the Constitu- eventually, down the road, and not too
early 1960's; and, over the opposition of tion, are left out in the cold and are pre- far down the road, billions of dollars.
the late, great Senator' from Georgia, sented with facts when it is too late, Why? So that we can develop a flyspeck
Richard Brevard Russell and others, it usually, to do anything. In the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, so
seems to be on the threshhold of making So, Mr. President, I know of no treaty that we can have a three-ocean navy.
further progress, but we shall see, with the United Kingdom which gives us When Is Congress going to wake up?
There is at the present time a resolu- rights on Diego Garcia. I know of no When is it going to recognize that it
tion of disapproval of the recommenda- executive agreement which gives us represents- all the American
tion of the President of the United States, rights on Diego Garcia, though I antici-- When is it going to learn the lesson of
who had advocated that the funds men- pate that there may well be one. I have Vietnam? Or is it ever?
tioned last year-$13 million or $14 mil- tried for years to find out about it, and I think, Mr. President, that we ought
lion-be used for further construction so far I must admit failure, to give this matter the most serious con-
purposes on that flyspeck in the Indian What the countries bordering the In- sideration, because, while perhaps the
Ocean, than Ocean want is an ocean of peace, Soviet Union does intend to expand its
Mr. President, to the best of my knowl- a sphere of peace. What our Navy wants, naval presence in the Indian Ocean, I
edge, I know of no negotiations which is to spread itself halfway around the think we ought to see if something can-
have been conducted between this coun- world, and what I think the significance not be worked out by means of which
try and the United Kingdom relative to is is the closeness of Diego Garcia to the the Indian Ocean can remain a sphere
the use of Diego Garcia. I know of no oilfields of the Middle East. of peace and not be subject to what has
treaty which has been before the Com- The significance also is that this means been happening in the Pacific Ocean in
mittee on Foreign Relations, seeking to the start of a three-ocean Navy. If the recent years. It is a time to seek mutual
bring about, openly, an agreement on Senate and Congress and the American restraint on naval deployments and it is
this particular atoll, people want to do that, they should lay time to do so before those deployments
It is my understanding that an amend- it all out in the open. A three-ocean become a fait accompli.
ment was submitted to S. 1517, the om- Navy-we have enough to do looking So, Mr. President, as we consider this
nibus foreign relations authorization after the two oceans, the Atlantic and bill later today, I hope that, despite the
bill, on Friday last, expressing the sense the Pacific, on the east and on the west, recommendation of the President of the
of Congress that the President should So, Mr. President, I think that. this United States, enough Senators will have
seek negotiations with the Soviet Union amendment, which was agreed to by the the gumption to stand up and say no to
to achieve agreement on mutual limita- Committee on Foreign Relations and this further expansion of American mili-
tions of naval and other deployments in which will be before the Senate shortly, tary power, to this continuation of a
the Indian Ocean. is a critical one because it requests the "policeman of the world" policy, to this
It is my understanding that all the na- administration to pursue fully diplomatic exorbitant cost, which this country can
tions along the littoral-Asia and Af- channels on this matter before both na- no longer undergo. The stakes are great
rica-have indicated that they are op- tions-the United States and the Soviet as far as this particular atoll, this fly-
posed to what is being undertaken in Di- Union-embark on the path of increased speck in the Pacific Ocean, is concerned.
ego Garcia. I realize, of course, that we competition in the Indian Ocean region, I hope that the debate-and I am sure
have been assured privately-very pri- a competition which would clearly pose it will be-will be spirited, that the facts
vately-that while that is the public at- high economic costs. The figure pro- will be laid out, and I hope, also, that
titudes of the nations along the littoral, jetted, and I have the figure .at my dis- emotions will not supersede responsibili-.
underneath they really want us to go posal, is something just under $200 mil- ties and a recognition of the facts of life,
ahead, lion. But if we start this program, it is After all, if we undertake this program,
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S13928 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - `E.h(ATE ,/
xe American people can be prepared to Southeast Asia. We are afforded today, And this is what must be understood ,s
ay and pay and pay; and for what? A however, the opportunity to determine we are permitted today to vote clearly en
!'speck in the Indian Ocean, which is whether the American flag will in ef- an issue with its full significant before
anted by none of the littoral states, the feet be embedded in the Indian Ocean. us this time. We are being u,arnF d
states bounding the ocean; a flyspeck The tragic mistake of Southeast Asia- ahead, not being told after the 'act.
rhich will be very close to the Middle a mistake that touched and must be On May 19 when this resolution of
last, where a large portion of the world's shared by every administration of the disapproval was introduced; I asked,
dl is in the ground or in production. It past three decades-a mistake which in "Why, in the face of the fact that x.li
sill take us half-way around the globe addition to the great losses of life and nations bordering on the Indian Ocean
.o an area in which we have no busi- treasure turned son against father and have asked the United States and the
mess, an area which can bring about a brother against brother to a degree un- Soviet Union not to escalate the arra
atuation which will produce a new spir- equaled since the War Between the race in the Indian Ocean area, has t .e
.,ling of armaments and the costs at- States-is behind us by a matter of mere administration forwarded this letter of
=ached thereto, an area of possible dan- weeks-and we are considering :f new certification?" Again, I ask the question.
,er, which I think we should forego while and dramatic venture into South Asia. The 30 nations on the littoral of the In
ae can still see clearly, before we have the This is not simply an issue of $1- mil- than ocean have all publicly asked the
ohanee. deliberate or otherwise, to send lion today or $175 million in the near United States to refrain from deployment
American men into that area and repeat, future or even the additional $8 billion at Diego Garcia. These nations include
an the future, another Vietnam. that is necessary for the three-ocean Australia, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand,
Mr. President, I am against any Viet- Navy; it is also a matter of extending Singapore, Indonesia, Somalia, Mala-
nams, anywhere in the world. I hope and intruding in dramatic fashion U.S. gasy, and others. Does this opposition
'.ghat, at long last, we have learned the military presence and might in r rela- mean anything to the administration?
lesson of misadventure, that tragedy, tively untouched area of the globe. The Does it mean anything to this Con-
which cost 55,000 American lives, which proponents would argue that this is dif- gress? Does it mean anything to the
cost 303,000 American wounded, which ferent from Vietnam, from Cambodia,. people of this Nation who sent us here
cost approximately 150 billion American from Laos, from Thailand-that there and whose surrogates we are?
dollars, and which, beforc we get through are no people to alienate on Diego Gar- I remember most vividly, when the So-
paying for it, is going to cost this Nation cia. viet Union was building a missile base
at least, at the very least, $435 billion- That is correct. There is no people, in Cuba that posed a direct threat to
and the payment will extend well into and there have been no people ir_ Diego our mainland the U.S. military forces
the last portion of the first half of the Garcia except U.S. military personnel in What al s ed nca state o of
part e din ss.
next century. recent years, and very recent yearn, I may
I urge my colleagues later today to give say. the wishes of the littoral nations. Is it
the most serious consideration to all the But our ships will be there. Cur de- that their state of war readiness is so
implications contained in the Diego stroyers and carriers and whatever else insignificant to us? Oh, the Proponents
Garcia situation and to weigh them most will use this base to patrol every inch will say, some of the representatives of
carefully, because we will pay and pay of water off the 30 countries comprising these nations secretly invite us to go into
through the nose in the years and in the the littoral of this ocean-maintaining the Indian ocean but publicly they can-
decades ahead. an American presence but with al'.-- not admit it. What a familiar ring. Were
I, for one, am sick and tired of sending Mr. STENNIS. May we have quiet, Mr. these not the whispers of our allies
American men and women to fight or to President? We want to hear. around the globe during our tragedy in
be placed in a position where they may The PRESIDING OPF'ICER. Tlie Sen- Southeast Asia?
have to fight in foreign areas of the ator's request is appropriate- Let the Have we not heard this refrain year
world, unless-unless-it is necessary for Senate and the galleries be in cyder so after year after year from our Pentagon
the security of the United States. Viet- that the speaker may be heard. and our State Department and previous
nam was not. Diego Garcia is not. Mr. MANSFIELD. I will repel': administrations as well as this? Of
Mr. President, I have spent about 20 Our destroyers and carriers and what- course we have. How often are we going
minutes this morning explaining my po- ever else will use this base to patrol every to be goaded at appropriate times during
sition on Diego Garcia, that flyspeck in inch of water off the 30 countries com- the year with these whispers, these insin-
the Indian Ocean upon which so much prising the littoral of this ocean--main- cations, these innuendoes?
money has been spent so far, and tens of taining an American presence and with I hope we have matured beyond the
millions of dollars of expenditures are all the sophistication of the seventies-a point of whispered diplomacy and public
contemplated in the immediate future, moving rather than a stationary target.. policy arrived at in secret. If the public
and in my opinion billions of dollars in What a narrow lesson to have learned. officials of the nations of the littoral
the not-too-distant future. from three decades in Southeast Asia, insist publicly that we refrain from ex-
Mr. President, Richard B. Russell, one and its cost in 55,000 dead Americans., panding our presence in the Indian
of the giants of the Senate's past, spent 330,000 wounded Americans, 150 billion Ocean, who are we attempting to in-
more than half his natural life in the American dollars. and the cost of that fluence by going against that publicly
U.S. Senate. His expertise concentrated war will reach at least, based on prices in expressed judgment?
on military policy and strategy. He left 1972 $435 billion. Think what has hap- The issue is more than just money,
a great imprint on all with whom he pened since inflation. Based on 1975; but it is time as well that we consider the
served, including the Senator from prices, it will cost this country $435 bil?. taxpayer's pocketbook. Navy figures in
Montana now speaking. On Vietnam he lion for that misadventure, that`ragedy the possession of the Military Construe-
and I agreed and both of us opposed in in Southeast Asia. tion Appropriations Subcommittee indi-
the beginning, and that also includes the Very few of us went to Vietnam but cate that this base will cost approximate-
distinguished chairman of the Commit- our sons and our brothers did. it is go.- ly $175 million. I contend that the money
tee on Armed Services, the Senator from ing to be your sons and your grandsons the administration is requesting to start
Mississippi (Mr. STExwrs)-all three of who are going to be paying for Vietnam construction of a Navy facility on Diego
us opposed in the beginning-the real well into the last quarter of the first half Garcia is only a downpayment. Oh, yes,
beginning going back two decades- of the next century, the 21st cea.tury. you will hear figures that the most it will
direct American involvement; we parted Was our mistake there simply a mat- cost is about $35 million in construction,
after that decision for direct involve- ter of tactics? Or was it something more but this simply is not so. What about the
.went was made-after the flag was profound? Did we not learn that America costs of equipment; costs to pay Seabees
planted-but that divergence was based should have no design on maintaining a to build this base? I have figures that
more on our separate opinions of how modern-day empire by replacing the show that it will cost not only $175 mil-
best then to serve the honor of our coun- autonomy of individual nations. Did we lion to build the base and $8 billion to
try. not learn that we cannot and should not expand the fleet to operate from that
The Senate never really had a crisp attempt to make the nations of the world base, but also approximately $800 million
decision on the direct involvement in in our own image and our own likeness. each year for these expanded fleet opera-
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July CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 13929
tions. These are all dollars coming out of in Somalia. Last year it was Socotra and ity to fuel American warships. I believe
the American taxpayers' pockets. And Umm Zasr in Iraq. that the term repeatedly being used is "a
those are just the costs for expanded The United States has had a limited filling station." What sarcasm.
naval operations, operating base in the Indian Ocean-Per- According to the information fur-
In January 1974, the Air Force, when sian Gulf since 1948. We have communi- nished by the Committee on Armed
it appeared- that they would be left out of cations facilities there; we have a supply Services, U.S. naval ships have access to-
the Diego- Garcia program, came in with ship that stands by; and we operate two day to 16 countries around the Indian
a request to extend the runway by 4,000 destroyers out of Bahrein. At Berbera, Ocean littoral-may I repeat, Mr. Presi-
feet and to spend $3.3 million for Air Somalia, the Russians have communica- dent: U.S. naval ships have access today
Force-related operational facilities. The tions facilities; they have a so-called bar- to 16 countries around the Indian Ocean
Air Force has admitted that they want racks shop there; and they operate sub- littoral-for the specific purpose of fuel-
to operate C-135 tankers out of Diego marines and surface ships out of Ber- ing and bunkering. In fact, the Soviets
Garcia. For what use? The answer is bera. There is an airfield being built that are welcome in only 13 of the littoral
Air Force reconnaissance over' the Indian the Somalis say will be 4,000 meters in states. So it is not that we do not have
Ocean; but the added capacity extends length, and there is a missile-handling a place to refuel our ships or ports to
as well the U.S. strategic air capacity facility. However, there is no indication visit. It is really that the Navy wants a
from the western Pacific into the full that there are any bunkering facilities new operating base in Diego Garcia--
reaches of the Indian Ocean. for Russian naval ships in the harbor of halfway around the world and on a fly-
From the beginning, it has been my Berbera. In fact, the Somalis contend speck in the Indian Ocean.- They have
contention, when the request first was that the fueling facilities will hold 130,- wanted such a facility for many years,
made by the Navy, that the creation of 000 barrels of fuel, which certainly is not well over a decade, to my personal knowl-
an. operational facility at Diego Garcia much fuel. On the other side of the coin, edge; I believe two decades, perhaps a
was only the entering wedge for a three- - I must point out that the Navy wants little more. Usually Congress, and espe-
ocean Navy. I know there are elaborate 600,000 barrels on Diego Garcia. cially the Senate, especially the Senate,
projections saying that the U.S. Navy We have an advance communications has stood up on its hind legs and opposed
will operate only in the Indian Ocean on facility already on Diego Garcia, a coin- this unwarranted expansion.
an interim basis, which amounts to ap- munications facility which was put on In fact, a study was made by the Joint
proximately 6 months out of every 12- Diego Garcia only because we were be- Chiefs of Staff in the late 1950's concern-
month period. I am well aware of the ing forced out of a communications fa- ing the "strategic island concept." It was
fact that the Navy contends that- they cility at Kagnew in Ethiopia; and when decided then-then, in the late fifties--
will be able to operate in the Indian we were forced out, our military did not by the Navy that it should have an op-
Ocean with a carrier force of 12 in num- want to get out. erating facility on the island of Diego
ber, a reduction from the present 15- We have an advanced communications Garcia. The strategic premises for this
carrier force. But, I say to my colleagues, facility already on Diego Garcia; already operating facility go that far back. As my
you can expect in future years that the an 8,000-foot. runway-so you can see colleagues are well aware, negotiations
Navy will come to the Congress saying that anything that the Russians have at were started 9 years ago for an operating
that because of the Russian presence in Berbera, the United States already has base at Diego Garcia.
the Indian Ocean, we must have addi- at Diego Garcia. We have reached status I want to state that regardless of
tional carriers-an additional -buildup. quo. Russians in the Port of Berbera, Somalia,
I -beg my colleagues to remember that Speaking of Berbera, it is interesting the Navy would still want an operating
we started in Vietnam.by placing a few to note that the Somalian Government base at Diego Garcia. Secretary Schles-
hundred advisers to train the Vietnamese has invited--I believe through Under inger, appearing before the Military
Army and not more than a few hundred Secretary of Defense Clements-U.S. Construction Subcommittee in June, was
million dollars. It can be all but assured Navy ships to visit Berbera. If my infor- asked - the question: If there were no
that if we start a naval base on Diego mation is correct, plans are now under Russian naval operations out of the Port
Garcia, it will be the beginning of an way-perhaps dates have been set-for of Berbera, Somalia, would the Navy still
escalation that will lead to an all-out U.S, Navy ships to visit Berbera in Au-- want the base on Diego Garcia?
arms race in the Indian Ocean area. And gust or September. If I am wrong in that His answer? An emphatic "Yes." The
then there is oil. The argument is used respect, I hope the Department .of De- Navy would still want the base on Diego
over and over again thatour presence in fence will correct me. - Garcia.
the Indian Ocean is vital to keep the sea Perhaps we can find out by going to The arguments go beyond raising the
lanes open for U.S. petroleum interests, the office of the Vice President, where strategic threshold in that area of the
I submit that our presence in the Indian there is a task force drumming up sup- world. The Alice in Wonderland logic of
Ocean had absolutely no effect on the oil port against this resolution. of disap- the "bargaining chip" has returned: Let
situation during the Yom Kippur war of proval. So they have their guns all out- us build up Diego Garcia and our pres-
October 1973. The- Arabs shut the oil off, the Pentagon, the State Department, the ence in the Indian Ocean, the whispers
The U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of White House--and all we have are 99 - in the Senate corridors say, and then we
Defense, and the U.S. State Department Senators, who may or may not exercise will be able to negotiate it away, prob-
could do nothing about it. The Arabs good judgment in this instance, who I am ably with great drama, by a future ad-
simply said they would not sell us oil and sure will vote their convictions. ministration in a decade to come, and we
they can do it again. But the argument is I do think it is odd for a flyspeck in all will feel good that another step to-
still used that the Navy will insure oil the Indian Ocean to have this array of ward peace has been achieved.
over the transit routes of the Indian heavy artillery, even outside this Chain- And at what cost? How, Mr. President,
Ocean, ber, buttonholing Senators and asking can we participate in such a charade,
In each year that the Navy has had the them, perhaps telling them-I hope no such a perversion of logic and reason?
request before the Congress for an op- Senator-would ever be told by anybody in Today, the Indian Ocean, thank God, is
erational base on Diego Garcia, there is the executive branch-how they should not yet an area of superpower confronta-
aways the new threat. vote on a measure which is our respon- tion. In fact, it is one of the last areas of
Mr. President, it is difficult for me to sibility and ours only. the world in which neither of the super-
understand why Senators cannot see I hope these lobbyists will go away and powers has permanent installations. The
through the Berbera, Somalia, testimony occupy themselves doing the duties which Soviet Union has received a bunkering
by the Department of Defense. Past his- are theirs under the law. Those duties are and logistics welcome from 13 nations in
tory indicates- that when DOD wants to not to try to twist arms in the Senate, to the littoral of the Indian Ocean. In turn,
get a new appropriation through the try to get us to do something against our the United States has a similar welcome
Congress that is controversial,- we gen- will, and I hope the Senate will keep that in 16 countries. The Somalian facility,
erally hear the words "the threat, the in mind. investigated by our own colleagues, offers
threat-the United States must counter Then, there is . the argument that to no greater assistance than the present
the threat." Now the threat Is that the operate in the Indian Ocean, we must U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf.
Russians are building a base at Berbera, have in Diego Garcia a bunkering fac:li- The distinguished Senator from Iowa
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S 13930 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE July 28, 19'i 5
,Mr. CULVER), who has demonstrated Vietnam and Southeast Asia? How best the limit to take care of a two-ocean
such insight and attention to this mat- should we manifest American foreign Navy to guard us on the Atlantic on our
ter during his years in congress, and policy abroad? Can the United States east and the Pacific on our west.
especially since he came to the Senate- live in harmony with other nations of So far there is no indication that Viet-
a most welcome addition-argues for a the world, regardless of their cultural, na:m and Southeast Asia have taught us
further period of pause to permit the governmental, or social structures? Is a lesson. We are spending more than
cmmencement of talks with the Soviets our policy now, "live and let live." ever, going beyond what the Pentagon
on preventing a further arms race in the rather than "in our image and .like- wants in some instances. Are we going
Indian Ocean. Why now must we rush to ness"? to be taken for a ride, or are we going
accelerate the arms race? Why must we I think these and many other quos- to face up to our responsibilities as Sell-
now convert a relatively peaceful and tions that are basic to a reevaluation ators of the United States?
stable part of the globe into another area of American foreign policy are essential Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
of potential conflict, confrontation, and, before new ventures are undertaken. myself such time as I may use.
yes. even war? This flyspeck is pretty The momentum of a past policy Now, Mr. President, I think we all
close to Middle East oil. should not foreclose a possible option agree this is a highly important decision
Just a few weeks ago, the Senate con- for restraint in the arms race. To build which is to be made. I have dealt with
sidered the military procurement au- a base as a bargaining chip to give it this issue for several years, as one Sena-
thorization bill. It was only a matter of away is a logic that might also need tor, and I did not readily agree at all
days after the Nation's abrupt with- reassessment. I hope our final jucig- to back this expansion. I did agree last
drawal from Southeast Asia. From all relent will reflect the maturity of a set- year that we approve an amendment
sectors, we heard voices of reason, voices tied nation entering its third century making this a special part of the bill so
calling for a reevaluation of American and not'Just the bravado of a growing that the Senator from Montana or any-
foreign policy and the strategic and mili- boy. one else could bring it before the Senate
tary arms that would complement that At the outset of these remarks, I n- at a special matter on the facts. We fin-
policy as we approached the future. yoked the memory of a great Senator of ally agreed to that in conference and pro-,
I was one who listened to those voices the past, Richard Russell of Geori>ia, vided that the President of the United
with fresh hope. For years with many of who chaired the Committee on Armed States, Mr. Ford, who was then just very
my colleagues in this body, I. have at- Services. About a decade ago the Navy recently in office, would have to make
tempted to confront the issues wrought had another request before that commit- a certification-let us get these facts now
by American military forces who have tee. It was for a new type vessel that about where the authorization is, that he
been stationed abroad for three decades. could move men and their equipment would have to make a certification-as
Almost 25 percent of all our military faster and in greater number than ever President, as to the need for this facility,
forces are stationed on foreign' soil. Not before. The vessel in question was the and then a resolution of disapproval
since the time of the Roman Empire so-called FDL. Senator Russell opposed would be in order, within a 60-day pe-
have so many ventured so far from home that Navy request not because the yes- riod, to be passed on by either the House
in peacetime. I have believed that exist- sel would not do what the Navy said it or the Senate. If the resolution of dic-
ing American foreign policy can be would do, not because the cost was too approval passed then the appropriation
achieved with far fewer stationed abroad. high for the mission it would accom- would be killed, otherwise it would not
I still do, and did when the military pro- plish, but rather for a more basic and be.
curement bill was before us. But, like sensible reason. Senator Russell said : Let us remember the money has already
others, I refrained from raising again If we make it easy for the Navy to go been authorized, over half of it. It has
been authorized this year for a second
that issue at that time. I believed the places and do things, you can be assured
overwhelming Senate sentiment desired that they will always be going places ,red amount, the second installment, and
maintenance of the status quo in the doing things. this will be the last one except a minor
context of foreign affairs until the dust one that I will mention.
of Vietnam and Southeast Asia had Mr. President, that is the issue today. . Mr. President, may we have order--
settled. Even expanded requests for mili- To expand the present Navy facility on may we have quiet, I mean. There may
tary hardware, considered necessary for Diego Garcia, we will certainly be mak- be some who are looking for the facts.
existing commitments, were permitted ing it far easier for the Navy to go to the We agreed in the committees, in the
to pass through awaiting an honest Indian Ocean and to go there en mass. authorization language, that the second
reassessment. Once there in full force, I am sure that sum also would follow the disposition
I refer In that Instance to the so- it will find many things to do. Today, the of this matter that is now before us.
called Rickover nuclear cruiser, which Senate has a unique opportunity. I hope So there t complication before us.
it
was opposed by the Department of De- that the. Senate will exercise this oppor-
fense, which was opposed by the OMB, tunity so as to create a pause-a pause except that this is an additional pro-
which is going to cost $1.2 to $1.3 bil- that might open a positive opportunity ceeding here that gives everyone a
toward world peace. chance to be heard. I think this is a pol-
lion at present day prices, and for which Mr. President, may I say that, is a icy question. I just mention that I have
they have plans numbering somewhere certain sense, I speak as a veteran. I was helped to bring to a conclusion this situ-
between 25 and n 28. The cost $1.3 going n, an enlisted man In the Navy, discha~--LLged ation in which we are passing on this
v way ubeyond
first one $to is built. billion, honorably with the rank of seaman sec- matter today.
even-before the fi and class. I was an enlisted manin the Now, Mr. President, let us be certain
The Senate did not approve the Rick-. Army, discharged honorably with the we get the facts on this matter. Talking
over nuclear cruiser and the chairman rank of private. I was an enlisted man about a third-ocean Navy with these
I the Committee on the Budget, who in the Marine Corps, discharged honor- huge sums of money, no one that I know
hope and expect will speak o n this ably with the rank of Pfc..I have given. of in a position of authority, who has
matter when the conference report is 5 years in the service of my country in dealt with this matter, has given any
before us, had something to say about uniform. I think I know what I am talk- figures except the figures that are now
the President himself busting the ing about. I only hope that the Senate before us, I mean, based on the realities.
budget which he sent down. So I hope will weigh this matter carefully and will Here is a more recent affirmation of the
we will keep that factor in mind, too, be fully aware-as some of us have tried Chief of Naval Operations, a man who,
As a matter of fact, this year, the to be-fully aware of just-what this I think-and I am sure all of us think--
Pentagon has gotten just about every- means in the future; $10 million, $13 is a man worthy of belief, Admiral Hollo-
thing it requested and a little more. million, $175 million, $8 billion, and way. Last year I wrote him a letter re-
When are we going to wake up? what do you have in this ocean of peace? ?f erring to the sums of money authorized
Why, then, should not the same atti- An arms race; chips on the shoulde-s of and I asked him whether or not there
rude, of maintaining the status quo on the Soviet Union and the United States. Were any other plans or further expenses
commitments, on new ventures into new They build, we build. They send ships, to be incurred.
areas, apply? What is our post-Vietnam we send in ships. We cannot afford a in his response, dated November 26,
foreign policy? What are the lessons of three-ocean Navy. We are stretchf?ci to 1974-that is about the time we had this.
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July 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
matter, in conference-Admiral Hollo-
way, as Chief of Naval Operations, said:
Other than the $26.8 million from fiscal
year 1075 and 1976 proposed for the fleet
logistics support function, and so forth, the
Navy has no plans for future military con-
struction programs for Diego Garcia.
Now, on June 10, 1975, at a hearing, t
referred to the above letter and asked
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger-
What is the situation now, Mr. Secretary,
as to any further plan for an expansion of
this island into a more permanent base?
Secretary Schlesinger said:
The plans are unchanged, Mr. Chairman,
the improvement cost and the requested cost
amount to about $37 million. We intend an
austere support facility.
Now, that is the direct evidence upon
this project. The cost and the plan.
Later, we have had this certification
from the President of the United States
in response to a law that Congress passed
that he must make an evaluation. He
must make an evaluation as the Chief of
State, as the head of the administra-
tion, and we decide the matter finally
after he has made his evaluation. He
certified here in a solemn declaration
that is before us. It is in the report, I
am sure, and I do not have it right now
where I can reach it.
That covers the point as to the cost,
and that covers the point as to the need
now.
Mr. President, right today, now, as I
am told, we have talk about a third
ocean navy. We now have a small task
force over there in the Indian Ocean. We
are already in there. We have no base;
we are not planning a base. We are plan-
ning a supply depot, or a filling station,
or storage area for fuel, for gasoline and
oil. That is all, and we are already there.
Now, where is that? That is in the
Indian Ocean.
I am told, Mr. President, that now,
day or night, at any given time, of all
the oil that is moving on the high seas
in the world, at least half of it is right
there in that area.
That means something. I am sure it
means something to us. It means a lot
to me as I, more or less, fumble along
in the hearings on the appropriations
requested for long-range research and
development for new and additional
sources of energy.
This is where our present supplies of
oil are. They can be cut off. Maybe it
does not, make any difference, but I be-
lieve that it is highly important that
we at least have a presence there that is
capable of meeting a situation.
We pray to God that no such situation
will arise, but if oil to the whole free
world is on the move there and it is in-
tercepted for very long, I think we
would have to do something. Certainly
if it is known that the source of fuel for
our ships is 3,500 miles away-and those
are the facts-then that makes trouble
more likely.
As I say, we have a task force there
now. I wish the Indian Ocean could be
set up as an area of peace, along with
others. They are not going to paint me
into a corner as a warmonger during
this debate, either, because the record
shows to the contrary.
But I say now, this is a point of pre-
paredness for us, certainly, to this lnod-
est extent.
it Is 3,500 miles from there to the
Philippines, and. that Is where we have
to go and come, back and forth, with
these naval vessels that carry those oil
supplies.
I brought the map along. I am not
strong on having all these maps lined
up there, but I thought this was one
case where everyone would have a chance
to see and understand.
Mr. President, may I wait until I can
have the attention of the Senators?
I invite attention to that route now
from the Philippines over to Diego Gar-
cia, thrgpgh a particular strait through
which our vessels carry these supplies.
This is not really good. It is what is
known in naval terms as a torturous
route. Whatever fuel we have, except for
60,000 gallons that I will refer to later,
we are cut off from it, and there is that
3,500-mile journey from the Philippines.
:1 say it is just commonsense. We do
not have to argue what the foreign policy
is going to be in the Mideast, or who is
in danger there, or how much Israel may
be concerned, or Iran might be con-
cerned, or Suadi Arabia. I mention now
that they have not a chance in the world
td cope with. this problem. They are not
going to have any third-ocean navy. They
cannot have a one-ocean navy.
If we mean business now about pro-
tecting against what might be a danger
for the free world nations, and I include
ourselves as No. 1, we better at least go
this far in preparing for the future.
I said I was slow to move with my
actual support for this project. Well, I
have no doubt about it now, especially in
view of this oil situation.
I do not want to frighten anyone. I just
say, look in depth at the facts. Look in
depth at the facts as to where we would
be;, should steps become necessary. What
about those we are supposed to be pro-
tecting, where would they be? Where
would they be should this area there be.
imperiled?
I am the one that moved to table the
amendment here for additional military
aid to Israel., that is, when the military
authorization bill was up.
a certainly was not running out, on
whatever promise or obligation we have
to Israel or anyone else in A hat area.
But it seemed to me that there was a
lack of. preparedness out on this high-
way, where all the oil in the world is
moving, in motion every day and every
night, and we would be failing to an-
ticipate possibilities and take a reason-
able, small step for preparedness.
'What is this island? What is Diego
Garcia? They are talking about build-
ing up a port for a third ocean navy.
Diego Garciia is a small island, 1,000
miles away from any continent, an island
that has approximately 10 square miles
of land-10 square miles, That is a total-
ity of only 10 square miles, something
like 65 hundred to 67 hundred acres. It
is in a half new moon shape, and only
S 13931
7 feet above the sea level-7 feet. How
are you going to build a great port or a
base there for the operation of a navy?
Such things are just beyond possibility
because of the physical limitations of
thi$ little dot on the sea.
Some of the things that are said about
the possibility of this installation are
imaginary.
I say again, Mr. President, there is no
doubt about us having a legitimate in-
terest. Beyond that, there is an absolute
necessity, for the time being, for us to
keep these channels open for control of
two-thirds of the world's supply of oil.
As I have already said, one-half of the
world's oil in transit at any given time
is in ships on the Indian Ocean. We will
'hear debate later from an eyewitness as
to what the Soviets are doing over there
in Somalia. I do not come here to try to
frighten anyone. These are facts of life.
I do not go out and try to frighten any-
one, or talk about things as I wish they
were, or as they ought to be. We have
to deal with facts as they are. .
I know just a little about the attitudes
of those nations around there. They are
not in a position to be asking us to come
there. I think I am on safe ground in
saying that virtually every one of them
would be very glad for us to have a little
more fuel. I have not heard of any offi-
cial' protest, and I cannot find any pro-
test-official protest. Somebody might
have made a speech over there or'voted
for a resolution, but I mean an official
protest about our coming in there, ex-
cept perhaps by one of these small na-
tions.
I believe that, as a practical matter, it
just does ,not work out or pan out that
these other places do not want us to do
anything about the situation.
I do not think there is any doubt of
what is safer for Israel, also Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and others.
I do not think we have heard or will
hear any meaningful complaints to in-
fluence the President or this Govern-
ment, those complaints coming from
those nations.
I overlooked saying that this island
of Diego Garcia is uninhabited. I thought
they called them atolls. That is the Pa-
cific term, I am told. But on the side of
the world where Diego Garcia is, they
call that an island.
I do not see any grounds either-and
I would not now favor-building any
huge fort there. Of course, for a naval
base they cannot and will not do any-
thing without the consent and money
from the Congress. The President of the
United States cannot do it and the Navy
cannot do it. Only the Congress can sup-
ply those funds.
We have gone on now for at least 2
years arguing about this matter and the
supporting facts have become stronger
and stronger and stronger and stronger.
We are going to hear from one of the
most alert Members of this body as to
what the real facts are there at Berbera.
This is not what is claimed to be the facts .
or any self-serving declarations or some-
thing of that kind, but the facts as he
found them there with his own eyes and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE, July 28, 1975
ears and. the impressions of his mind,
assisted in this problem by a very ver-
satile group of outstanding ability, the
men who went with him.
We have been standing by. What about
our capabilities? We have not done a
thing. Except for 60,000 gallons of fuel
and we are still depending upon fuel
3,500 miles away. This proposal would
provide for 700,000 barrels of fuel, ap-
proximately, and about half of it would
be for planes from the carriers, and the
other half would be fuel oil-fuel oil for
naval vessels.
As I understand, this Navy task force
in the Indian Ocean now is oil burning.
They are not nuclear ships. That is my
point.
As I recall, we have only one opera-
tional carrier which is a nuclear powered
carrier. We are, and will be for a long
time. a Navy that requires this liquid
fuel.
I am not for any all nuclear Navy. We
never did agree on anything like that
in conference. It was the Senate con-
ferees that held this thing down so that
ships would not be nuclear wherever the
President of the United States would
certify that a nuclear type would not
serve the interests of the Nation at that
particular time and for that purpose.
I will not dwell on this much, but the
Soviet Union has been steadily increas-
ing its basic capabilities in this area while
we have made no increase. They have
started constructing new facilities at Ber-
bera, Somalia, which will significantly
Increase their ability to operate.
I wish this had not been the case. I
can long for agreements as strongly as
anyone else. I wish this had not been the
case. I wish that international agree-
ments could be worked out to limit naval
deployments in the Indian Ocean. But as
long as we are showing this weakness by
not getting this facility here for the fuel,
I think we are just straying that much
farther and farther from getting any
agreement. Those are realities of the
matter. Some individual over there in the
Soviet Union may say something to the
contrary, They have said those things
to me, years ago. But often it does not
pan out.
I think we have waited long enough.
I think we ought to move forward on
this supply question, anyway. I have no
doubt, if the Members of this body get
all the facts in this case, that the judg-
ment of a sizable majority will say that
we had better move, at least to this ex-
tent.
One word further about some kind of
an agreement. Our committee expressed
the hope that an evaluation would in-
clude a thorough exploration of the pos-
sibility of achieving, with the Soviet
Union, mutual military restraints, with-
out jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area
of the Indian Ocean.
I think the United States has done well
as a whole, in its negotiations with the
Soviet Union in recent years, largely as
a result of fine efforts on the part of not
only Mr. Kissinger, but also valuable
Members of this body and the House of
Representatives. I am advised now that
the State Department did explore the
possibility of negotiating mutual re-
straints in the Indian Ocean, and that
the President then elected not to ap-
proach the Soviet Union before the Diego
Garcia issue was decided. It is bound to
have been the President who decided
that, because that is the course taken.
His recommendation is here. We had
written it out into the law that this
thing could not move until he had made
this review and had certified it to us.
Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will e:y_-
cuse me, I want to finish these point, ,
and then I will yield to the Senator.
I lean toward the idea of yielding, but I
believe we are just cutting too much into
whatever continuity of thought we have
to offer; so, if the Senator from Iowa will
excuse me, I will yield later. I think tl e
he understands.
I can fully appreciate, Mr. President,
the concern about this matter. I had
some concern myself, I repeat for empha -
sis, when it started. There is nothing that
I have ever followed any more thoroughy
than I have tried to follow this issue here,
this very question.
This resolution today resolves itself
right down to the bare bones of
supplying fuel-necessary fuel-within a
reasonable time for any action that we
might have to take. Do not say we wIl
not have to take any. Who would ever
have thought that our ship would be at-
tacked over there on the other side if
the world. in international waters, but
near Cambodia and Thailand? This es-
sential energy, upon which our econon.y
is built and upon which. unfortunate];',
we are so dependent moves on the higl;-
roads, the travel lanes, the ship lines ref
the world moving through this area d, v
and night, and this will continue for
years to come.
The idea of our holding back just with
a hope or a wait-and-see attitude, hold-
ing back the building of a new supply
source for this energy, is something I
just cannot abide.
I am no pessimist. I hope. But I have
seen during all these years that we hate
had the benefit of the Azores, the benefits
that came to our Navy and Air Force, our
power, andour strength; and I see th;+t
now, of course, in the utmost jeopard;r.
We can no longer depend on it, really.
In the Indian Ocean area, we have
only a little naval facility which is total?y
inadequate or incapable of giving any
large degree of support--Bahrein, I be-
lieve it is pronounced-just a little place
with room for the berthing of one shi?i,
and no large ship. And then in Spain--
I remember I was in Spain when the
original agreement was signed about tl,e
bases. I read yesterday about the tre-
mendous development of the Spanieh
economy in those intervening years. But
everyone knows that our renegotiation
for U.S. bases there is underway, and ~s
proceeding with difficulty.
I have referred to the Philippines sev-
eral times. That is where we have sonic
fuel supplies. But President Marcos has
publicly stated that he intends to take
over those U.S. bases within 3 years, anrt
convert them to a joint operation.
I do not think that is a threat. It'
the way he feels about it now. Anyway,
it means that we are not getting stronger
there. There is something underneath
that is uncertain. In Greece, we know the
tremendous pressure there against the
bases. In Turkey-where are we going
from here?
One of the very best presentations I
have ever heard on this floor was with
reference to giving the President of the
United States some continued leeway
and negotiating room, some kind of a
hand, with reference to the situation
there in Turkey-Greece-Cyprus. And
we have held up on that, I say respect-
fully, I think too much and too long.
Now, here is one place where we have
a friendly free nation that has given us a
lease over here in this vital area. Do not
say that it is off over there where itdoes
not matter. It does matter. These Arab
diplomats who are interested in this.
Their pictures are on the front page,
not off on page 22. It is the very oppo-
site of domination for us to be picking
up the fuel capacity a little, and to be a
little more alert and not so unfortunately
unprepared, so far as time is concerned,
in having to go 3,500 miles to get a sim-
ple little thing like fuel.
Mr. President, I yield briefly to the
Senator from Iowa, if he wishes.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I will yield the floor,
Mr. President, just as soon as the Senator
from Iowa has had a chance to ask his
question. I appreciate the fact that he
has waited.
Mr. CULVER. I thank the distin-
guished chairman for his willingness to
yield to me for the purpose of a question.
The question, Mr. President, is: Is the
distinguished chairman supporting base
expansion at Diego Garcia simply for the
logistical fuel convenience that it pro-
vides?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes; that is the primary
reason. There are two different kinds of
fuel, of course, as the Senator knows.
There is oil for the ships and fuel for the
jets, to power the aircraft.
Mr. CULVER. But the support of the
distinguished chairman is for that pur-
pose, and he does not envision a more
elaborate utilization of that facility or
further development of that facility. Is
that correct?
Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. It is
presented on those facts, and those are
the facts. I know there is speculation
to the contrary, and the facts may
change. But that is my primary purpose
now.
Mr. CULVER. Is the distinguished
chairman willing to make the legislative
history clear at this point that, if the
proposed construction is allowed, it is not
intended to approve either further base
development in the Indian Ocean area or
the costly construction of a new Indian
Ocean fleet?
Mr. STENNIS. That is certainly not my
purpose now, to try to lay the ground-
work for the items that the Senator men-
tioned, but I have learned by experience
that it is better to wait until the facts
are in in future years before saying what
we are going to do. It was sent up here,
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S 13933
as I understand it, for us to use judgment Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield W. CULVER. Am I being recognized
based on the facts. for a question? in my own right?
Mr. CULVER. The reason for the ques- Mr. STENNIS. I yield for a question Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have
tion is, as the distinguished chairman I only on my time but within limit on that, not yielded the floor.
am certain appreciates, to try to ascer- too, Mr. President. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
tain his own personal perception of what Mr. CULVER. I think it is useful to ator from Iowa has no time.
steps we are taking now and the extent have a colloquy on these matters. Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, yes; I yielded
to which he is determined to see, as was Mr. STENNIS. I am merely referring him such time as he may desire to pose
described by Secretary Schlesinger, an to the time, I say to the Senator., his question.
austere facility here. Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time does The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Seri-
Mr. STENNIS. That is right. the Senator desire? ator has as much time as he desires,
Mr. CULVER. If that is the current Mr. CULVER. I just want to address yielded to him by the Senator from Mon-
intent of the Senator, should the legis- a question to the distinguished chair- tana. The Senator from Mississippi now
lative history on this occasion make that man. has the floor and has yielded to the Sen-
clear? Mr. STENNIS. It will be on my time, if ator from Iowa to pose a question.
Mr. STENNIS. There is no doubt about the Senator has just one question. Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate that rul-
it, I say to the Senator from Iowa. I have Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, the chair- ilig. I have not yielded the floor. I am
tried to state it, and that is my purpose. man has made reference in his statement trying to accommodate my friend.
But I speak for myself and for the pres- to the report. language of the Committee Mr. MANSFIELD. This is not on my
ent facts only. on Armed Services of a year ago, where time, now.
Mr. CULVER. The thing that, of it was stated in the committee, the com- The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not
course, concerns me, I say to the Senator mittee that the Senator so ably on the time of the Senator from Mon-
from Mississippi, Is that he mentioned chairs-=- tana. We are on the time of the Senator
and made reference to Admiral Hollo Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I hope from Mississippi.
way's statements and also to statements the Senator will get on with his question. Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, the fear
of Secretary Schlesinger concerning the A complaint has been registered with me in this situation is that we might have a
present intention for that base facility 'that I am. yielding too much time. debate. I hope the greatest deliberative
and any subsequent use concerning the Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, In view of body in the world could risk a momen-
growth_to a three-ocean navy. It is true the concern that repeatedly has been ex- tary debate.
that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pressed by. my distinguished chairman, My question to the chairman is this:
testified on June 10 before our committee I ask unanimous consent that the time it The Senator properly stated that the
that it was: takes for me to pose my question to him, Committee on Armed Services express its
Not now our intention permanently to to express it properly, be attributed to "hope" that "such" an evaluation would
deploy ships into the Indian Ocean. me, the Senator from Iowa. I do not want include a thorough explanation of the
The operative words being "not now to encroach. upon his valuable time. His possibility of achieving with the Soviet
our intention to permanently deploy side has only 21/2 hours, and I can real- Union mutual military restraint without
ships in the Indian Ocean." ize the anxiety with which he is watch- jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area of
Mr. President, however, in a March ing the clock. the Indian Ocean."
1974 interview with Seapower magazine, Mr- STENNIS. No. The wisdom of that request was based
the then Vice President .of the United Mr. CULVER. Just put that aside. We on the fact that the United States is pro-
pro-
the t States, Mr. Ford, himself stated, and I have quibbled back and forth on who has ceeding forward here without having
quote: time and who is using time. Put it on exercised any diplomatic option, without
Now, I think also that we've got to actively my time. I ask unanimous consent for having initiated any conversation with
explore the desirability of having an Indian that.
the Soviet Union since 1971.
Ocean fleet The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Despite the wise statements by our
.
ator from Iowa has no time. committee, under the able leadership of
Of course, the concern that some of us Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I the Senator from Mississippi, the admin-
have already expressed is that such a yield sufficient time for that purpose to istration replies that they have con-
fleet will mean a cost estimated at 5 to the distinguished Senator from Iowa. sciously decided not even to attempt
8 billion additional dollars, and annual Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, who has negotiations with the Soviet Union. They
maintenance and operation costs of an the floor? have arrogantly disregarded. the ex-
estimated $800 million for the three car- Mr. CULVER. Who has the time? pressed recognition and request of the
riers, plus the additional planes and The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- distinguished chairman's own commit-
ships, and the support ships that would ator from Mississippi has the floor. tee. Assistant Secretary of State Robert
have to accompany such a development. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I make McCloskey wrote me a letter in which he
So these fears, I say to our distin- this statement- said:
guished chairman of the committee, with Mr. MANSFIELD. But the Senator It was decided not to approach the Soviets
all due respect, I do not think can be yielded. at the present time.
cavalierly dismissed. Mr. STENNIS. I understand that.
We have heard from military analysts We all operate under the Senate rules, I respectfully ask the Senator from
from independent sources, such as the and other Senators have a right to time Mississippi, as the able and distinguished
Brookings institution, we have heard in these matters. I am willing to try to chairman of this committee, whether or
from other naval officers, on this point answer the questions of the Senator. I not, in his judgment, that inadequate,
and we know that the Navy for many know the rules of the Senate, A Senator inept, pathetic response from our U.S.
years has sought the opportunity to have yields only for a question. If one goes Department of State constitutes an ade-
a three-ocean naval presence and sought over the line a, little, that is all right. quote exploration with the Soviet Union
that base and other bases in the Indian So let me have the Senator's question, about the prospects and the possibilities
Ocean area for that purpose. briefly put, please, and my answer will of mutual arms restraint in the Indian
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the be brief. Then I want to yield the floor Ocean?
Senator will yield, without being at fault, and let. the debate proceed, under the Mr. STENNIS. I think some effort has
the Senator has gone far beyond the idea rules of the Senate. been made. 11 have evidence to believe
of asking questions. I yielded on my time I yield to the Senator now, under those that some effort has been made in that
only for a question with reasonable addi- circumstances. field. It is not a one-way street. Other
tions thereto. nations in that part of the world have
Does the Senator want to use some of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen.- to be consulted, and have been, to an
his own time? ator from :[owa is recognized. extent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, a parlia- 'The best 1 can say now is that, in spite
yields time? mentary inquiry, of that effort, the conclusion was that
. Mr. THURMOND and Mr. CULVER The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- it was better to go on with this modest
addressed the Chair, ator will state it. improvement, as I have outlined.
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t~ 28, 19 i 5
I helped put this provision in the bill,
that the President of the United States
would have to certify what he thought.
He has acted, and he has done the best
be could. I think he had grounds for
that act, I say to the Senator from Iowa.
Mr. President, I yield the floor. How
much time did I consume? What time is
charged to me?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi has 29 minutes re-
maining.
Mr. STENNIS. Twenty-nine minutes
out of how much?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Out of a
total of 75 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thought we had 21/2 hours apiece.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is correct. However, this morning,
the 21 hours belonging to the Senator
from Mississippi was divided between
Senator STENNIS and Senator THURMOND.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that all the time, un-
der the usual rule, be accorded to the
distinguished chairman of the commit-
tee, and lie can work out something with
the Senator from South Carolina.
I withdraw the request.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that when I am not in the Chamber,
the time on this side be under the control
of the distinguished assistant majority
leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BARTLETr. Mr. President-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the
Senator from Oklahoma asking for
recognition?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Oklahoma Is recognized.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a unanimous-
consent request?
Mr. BARTLETT. I yield.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President. I ap-
preciate the courtesy of the Senator from
Oklahoma.
I ask unanimous consent that my leg-
islative assistant, Sally Horn, have the
privilege of the floor during the consid-
eration of Senate Resolution 160.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, in
connection with the dialog that took
place between the distinguished chair-
man and the Senator from Iowa con-
cerning whether or not the administra-
tion has been interested in evaluating
the possibilities of mutual arms restraint
in the Indian Ocean, I should like to read
a letter which I received from Robert J.
McCloskey, Assistance Seertary for Con-
gressional Relations of the Department
of State, concerning this matter. It isr
dated July 17 of this year.
DEPARTMENT Or STATE.
Washington, D.C., July 17, 1975.
Ron. DEWEY F. BARTLETT.
U.S. Senate.
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR BARTLETT: With respect to
the question of arms limitations in the In-
dian Ocean, which you and Under Secretary
Sisco have been discussing telephonically, I
hope thefollowing information will be help-
ful to you.
Before certifying to Congress that the ex-
pansion of facilities on Diego Garcia was es-
sential to the national interest, the Admin-
istration re-evaluated the military and for-
eign policy implications of the Diego Garcia
proposal, including the matter of arms limi-
tations talks with the Soviet Union. On the
basis of that review, it was decided not to
approach the Soviets at the present time.
A significant factor in this decision was
the evident lack of Soviet interest in such
talks. As you know, in 1971 we responded
officially and favorably to a Soviet suggestion
that we explore the possibilities of arms lim-
itations in the Indian Ocean area. We have
heard nothing from them since that time,
despite several public iterations of our will-
ingness to consider constructive suggestions.
Morevore, we need to resolve the issues relat-
ing to our proper role in the Indian Ocean.
Debate on this began in early 1974, centered
around our expansion plan for Diego Garcia.
From extensive experience in negotiations on
arms control, we believe the chances for any
useful talks with the Soviets would be im-
proved were the Diego Garcia matter resolved
in such a way as to demonstrate that the
U.S. is determined, and has the means, to
protect its security interests in the Indian
Ocean. As the Secretary has indicated, we
would be prepared in these circumstances
to explore the possible methods of limita-
tions, which we have been studying within
the Government, bearing in mind the need to
guard against an imbalance in the area which
would adversely affect our security interests.
Our periodic deployments to the Indian
Ocean-and our proposed limited expansion
of facilities at Diego Garcia to support them
more efficiently and effectively-do not, we
believe, fuel an arms race in the area. We re-
main Interested In constructive proposals for
limitations, but an adequate level of U.S.
presence in that important area is essential.
I can assure you that we take seriously the
concerns expressed by several Senators, and
we have read with interest accounts of their
recentdiscussions in the USSR. As you know,
we are pursuing improved relations with the
Soviet Union on a broad front. Arms limita-
tions talks with the USSR are a part of that
process and, in each case, specific negotia-
tions have been undertaken when we thought
mutual interests, timing, and circumstances
were most propitious. Experience has shown
that this approach is best calculated to pro-
duce a successful outcome.
If I can be of further assistance on this
subject, please do not hesitate to contact
me.
Sincerely,
ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I yield to the
Senator from Iowa on his time.
Mr. CULVER. I appreciate the Sena-
tor's yielding.
Mr. President, the proposed base ex-
pansion on Diego ? Garcia is an issue on
which honorable individuals can have a
sincere difference of opinion.
This does not concern me.
What does concern me is that some
good Americans who saw the mistake of
our Government's policies in Vietnam so
prophetically and who fought so coura-
geously to change those policies now
seem inclined to tolerate this Diego Gar-
cia expansion as just another minor item
in a $100 billion defense budget.
I can well understand a strong pro or
con position on this Issue based on differ-
ing views as to the direction our foreign
and defense policies should take in the
years ahead.
What I cannot understand, in the
light of our recent traumatic experience
in Vietnam, is the failure to see the por-
tent of this provocative step of military
expansion in u vast area of the world
which is comparatively stable and in
which our interests are not significantly
threatened.
It is true that the island of Diego Gar-
cia is a flyspeck of coral atoll, five miles
wide by 13 miles long, in the far reaches
of the Indian Ocean, 1,000 miles south-
west of India and about the same dis-
tance east of Africa. It is also true that
most Americans do not know what Diego
Garcia is or where it is or how it relates
to such urgent, close-at-hand problems
as unemployment and the rising cost of
living.
But only a few years ago, the Tonkin
Gulf was similarly unknown to most of
us.
Now it is a household term identified
with the fateful escalation of our mili-
tary intervention in Southeast Asia.
The Tonkin Gulf incident, the Tonkin
Gulf resolution and the Vietnam war are
now history.
But we have an overriding responsibil-
ity to avoid making the same kind of
mistake over again.
If we proceed with this expansion in
the Indian Ocean at this time-without
even trying the peaceful, less costly, no-
risk alternatives--then we will indeed be
simply replaying the first act of a sce-
nario identical with that which took us
into the quagmire of Vietnam.
We have time. We have alternatives.
Let us at least try the less costly, peace-
ful options. If the options do not work,
then we can proceed with the proposed
base expansion. But, remembering Viet-
nam, let's take time to look before we
leap.
We have, in effect, come to the first
major test of our ability and determina-
tion to chart a new, more constructive
direction in foreign and defense policy
that does not rely exclusively on auto-
matic: military escalation and gunboat
diplomacy.
In the post-Vietnam reassessment dia-
logue, one point that has been empha-
sized is the urgent need for closer Inte-
gration of our foreign and defense poli-
cies. Our defense effort and our military
spending should be geared to specifically
identified foreign policy objectives. Too
often, in the past, the Pentagon has gone
out ahead, creating its own policies, leav-
ing those'responsible for our foreign pol-
icy to catch up. The proposed base
expansion on Diego Garcia is a classic
example of the Pentagon creating for-
eign policy.
The background of Diego Garcia is as
follows:
For nearly 20 years, the Pentagon has
pushed for a base expansion on this is-
land which we have leased from the
British.
Last year, the Senate turned down the
appropriation for this project, specify-
ing that the $20 million authorized for
the project was not to be spent until the
President certified that the base was in
the national interest. The President has
gone through the formality of certifying
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this, but no one has made a convincing
case that this expansion is needed.
This year, the Pentagon is featuring as
the centerpiece for its selling of Diego
Garcia to Congress the revelation that
the Soviets have constructed some naval
support facilities at Berbera in Somalia.
Obviously, we cannot regard any So-
viet activity lightly. Recent eyewitness
accounts by U.S. congressional delega-
tions report the facilities include an air-
field, petroleum storage tanks, barracks,
a communications facility, and a build-
ing designed for storing and handling
missiles.
The Implication is that this Soviet ac-
tivity ipso facto makes it necessary for us
to counter with the expansion on Diego
Garcia..
The Berbera matter has been spectac-
ularly publicized amid conjecture as to
exactly what is there and how major a
facility it is that the Russians are build-
ing.
Lost in the superficial dramatics are
the basic points that are really vital to
the decision on Diego Garcia:
One, that the Soviet activity, even if
the most exaggerated accounts of its ex-
tent are accepted, does not pose sufficient
threat to our national interest to warrant
the risk of opening up the superpower
arms race in a vast new area of the
world.
We must remember that the major new
Soviet activities at Berbera came after
the Pentagon proposal to go ahead with
Diego Garcia expansion, and that Secre-
tary Schlesinger has testified that we
would want that base even if the Rus-
sians shut down their activities at Ber-
bera. the absence of negotiations,a
mutual limitations, the Soviets can be
expected to increase their naval presence
in the Indian ocean, according to CIA
predictions.
Two, that the Diego Garcia move might
actually weaken, rather than. strengthen
our security, position in the area by dis-'
turbing our present good relations with
the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean,
who, if they perceive us to be precipitat-
ing an arms race in the region, may deny
us the access we now have to their ports
and facilities.
Three, that there are feasibly, less pro-
vocative alternative actions that we can
take to counter the Soviet activity and to
preserve the strategic balance.
Finally, contrary to the impression
many people are getting from this con-
trovery, the present U.S. military posi-
tion in the Indian Ocean is one of solid
strength, not weakness, as compared to
that of the Soviet Union, so haste for the
go-ahead of the expansion on Diego Gar-
cia is not in any sense imperative.
This means that we have time to con-
sider and try out the no-risk options
available to us as alternatives to military
escalation.
Mr. President, I am not talking about
permanently foreclosing the proposed
base expansion. I am asking for time to
try less costly, less dangerous Initiatives
that we have not given a chance, as yet.
Admittedly, we have no way of know-
ing what the U.S.S.R.'s eventual plans
are in Berbera, how Important their fa-
cility may become and how it will be
used. Given that uncertainty, we need
to proceed with care and restraint aim-
ing at the protection of our long=range
interests and friendly relations with the.
other nations of the area. The condi-
tioned reflex reversion to military build-
up does not always generate strength
in the long run.
I want no part of any move that will
weaken the strategic position of the
United States. I believe the . peaceful
moves I am proposing for the Indian
Ocean will strengthen our overall se-
curity position, not weaken it, in the
long range. In the short range, exercis-
ing these options simply does not risk
that much. .
Specifically, I have proposed these
initiatives :
First, that the expansion of the Diego
Garcia base be postponed until next
year so that the alternatives can be ex-
plored.
Second, that the United States initi-
ate negotiations at once with the Soviet
Union for mutual arms restraint in this
region.
Third, that the present restrictions on
economic and technical aid to Somalia,
restrictions imposed in 1971 because
ships from other nations bearing the
Somali "flag of convenience". were trans-
porting cargoes to Cuba and North Viet-
nam, should be lifted. If the adminis-
tration does not see fit to take this ac-
tion, as it is in its power to do, Congress
should proceed with appropriate legis-
lation.
Fourth, that a policy be inaugurated
of U.S. ship visits to Somalia leading to-
ward generally improved political rela-
tionships. It is my hope, too, that agree-
ment will be reached in the near future
for U.S. naval vessels to visit Somali
ports. President Siad of Somalia offered
to permit this, at the time he visited
President Ford, last November.
Fifth, that basic economic aid and
technical assistance programs be devel-
oped to further a new era of peaceful
relations with Somalia.
MY'. President, Barry M. Blechman, a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institu-
tion, summarizes in an article recently
published. in the Washington Post, the
overriding reason against proceeding
with the Diego Garcia expansion at this
time.
"A U.S. base at Diego Garcia," he
writes, "would constitute another step to-
ward increased competition with the So-
viet Union in the Indian Ocean, a region
relatively remote from both superpowers.
The fact that the U.S.S.R. already has
taken a comparable step does not compel
us to follow suit."
Mr. Blechman goes on to point out that
increased United States-Soviet rivalry in
the Indian Ocean would divert limited
U.S. military resources from more press-
ing needs, such as the Mediterranean,
would Increase the risk of our getting In-
volved In some future conflict in the re-
gion, and would impair relations with
friendly nations in the area.
He writes:
And finally, it means another step toward
the establishment of a requirement in. U.S.
S 13935
military planning for the maintenance of a
permanent U.S. fleet in the region; a move
that, in the absence of cuts in U.S. naval
deployments elsewhere, could imply incre-
mental defense expenditures on the order of
$6 to $8 billion for ship and aircraft pro-
curement and $800 million per year in oper-
ating costs.
In this reference, it is interesting to
note that Secretary of Defense Schles-
inger testified before the Armed Serv-
ices Committee that-
It is not now our intention permanently
to deploy ships in the Indian Ocean.
However, in a March 1974 interview,
Mr. Ford himself stated:
Now I think also that we've got to actively
explore the desirability of having an Indian
Ocean fleet.
By contrast, Mr. Blechman concluded
his article with this statement:
The obvious, if remote, solution to the in-
cipient superpower competition in the Indian
Ocean is a formal treaty in which both the
United States and the Soviet Union agree to
limit their naval deployments there.
Mr. President, I think the distin-
guished Senator from Oklahoma (Mr.
BARTLETT) has put his finger on the
single most crucial issue in this entire
debate this afternoon. That, simply
stated, is why, oh why, is the U.S. Gov-
ernment afraid to initiate diplomatic
discussions with the Soviet Union to-
ward seeking mutual arms restraint in.
the Indian Ocean?
I was interested in the letter that the
Senator received from Mr. MCCLOSKEY.
He may also be interested in the origin
of that letter. That letter was eventually
written because the Senator from Iowa
wrote to our Department of State on
June 12. I wrote them, one,-to accept the
Somalian invitation to have our Ambas-
sador go visit that Port of Berbera. I
also wrote them and inquired why the
U.S. Department of State has failed,
since 1971, even seriously to raise the
question of diplomatic negotiations to-
ward achieving some sort of mutual arms
restraint in the Indian Ocean.
Since 1971, we have had what some
people call detente. It may or may not
be what a lot of people hope and pray
it may be, but the fact of the matter is
the relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union has, in a
very significant way, been altered since
1971.
We have been in SALT talks with the
Soviet Union, affecting the most sensi-
tive and strategic survival questions in
our mutual relationship. We have had
every other conceivable initiative across
the whole range of our relationships-
economic, political, social, and, this
week, shaking hands in outer space.
The question is why, in view of that
backdrop, has our Department of State
refused to negotiate or even offer to ne-
gotiate with the Soviet Union mutual
arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, par-
ticularly when we have all these scares
about missile crises, about the Russians
are coming, about all these other con-
cerns?
I wrote them and I asked them a ques-
tion. Does Senator BARTLETT know this?
They never even responded to that part
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE July 28, 1975
of my letter. They answered the first
part. They did not even answer that part
about negotiations until several weeks
later.
The fact of the matter is, the U.S.
Government is not interested in negotia-
tions on the Indian Ocean. The fact of
the matter is that the Pentagon, once
again, is the driving force in American
foreign policy in the post-Vietnam
period.
I was interested in hearing all this
talk today about this being only a tiny
atoll; it is 5 miles wide, 10 miles long;
it is a rock. The distinguished chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services said
it is not even inhabited by anybody.
Let me tell you something, Mr. Presi-
dent: the Gulf of Tonkin did not have a
lot of bodies floating in it. Nobody on this
door had heard about the Gulf of Tonkin
'iefore that war started, and nobody had
heard about places like Khe Sanh, either,
and I lost my best friend there. We are at
the crossroads.
Have we learned the lessons of Viet-
nam? We are going to find out in a very
significant way this afternoon. We came
off the back of Vietnam. People wrung
their hands and said, oh, America is
oing to hunker up in the hole, America
is going to retreat to Fortress America,
it is going to be a period of neoisolation-
ism. Well, if the alternative to interven-
tionism and acting as global policeman
is neoisolationisr, then I reject that
alternative. There is a middle ground and
today, we are going to. find out.
Mr. President, the State Department
finally answered my letter said that they
thought about negotiations with the So-
viet Union, but they decided that, be-
cause there was a lack of interest, they
were not even going to initiate an inquiry.
And do you know why? Because the De-
partment of Defense was leaning on them
so hard.
We should give- that Secretary of De-
fense Schlesinger double pay, because he
is doing two men's jobs. He is Secretary
of Defense and of State.
I came to the U.S. Congress 11 years
aa.go, served on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee for 10, under the naive as-
sumption that the foreign policy of
America was set by civilians, by Presi-
dents, by the Department of State, and
by the appropriate committees of Con-
oress in the area of foreign affairs and
foreign relations. One does not have to
be around here long to know how funda-
mentally false that assumption is.
We have not even talked to the Rus-
sians about this question since 1971. All
1 say to this body is why? What are we
,f raid of? We are not weak in the Indian
Ocean; we are powerful. Any time we dis-
patch an American carrier task force
over to the Indian Ocean. it is like put-
cing a 400-pound man in a washtub;
,here is not any water left. The fact of
the matter is that the French fleet
:.alone-the French fleet alone-equals
he Soviet fleet today in the Indian
01:oa-1. Four to 6 out of every 12 months
-rice 1973, we have put American car-
iQr task forces over there.
We put the U.S.S. Enterprise in there-
wsrth:36 attack airplanes carrying 7.5 tons
of ammo under their wings, and 24 F-14
fighters. Do we have to fear interdictin u
of oil lines? Rubbish_
The fact of the matter is that the So-
viet Navy has one diesel sub over there.
one diesel sub in their fleet, and it is onl
equal to the French fleet. And the British
have their own significant capability.
The Director of the CIA, Mr. Colby
has testified that interdiction of oil sup
plies is not going to come from Sovie
subs. It is going to come at the well-
head-embargoes. That is where it i.z
going to come from.
We have 29 countries in the littora
area states, 29 friendly nations in larger
part because right now. we can go into
36 ports in 18 countries for refueling ove
there. We refueled over there all durini
the 1973 oil embargo. But not one o'
those countries favors our expanding I,.
Diego Garcia.
The Australian Prime Minister wa
here last January, and he said, "Do no
go in there." But we are going arrogantl:
to disregard all the heartfelt opinion o
mankind in that area and, in classic, cop
war fashion, America is going to stick it
big nose under the tent of an arms race
We are on the slippery slope of mili
tary escalation. We are at the crossroad,
It is a rock today, but it is going to be
benchmark tomorrow. Mark my words.
Why not look before we leap? If then,
is one lesson out of Vietnam-I am or
my time, Mr. President. If there is on
lesson out of Vietnam-
Mr. BARTLETT. Will the Senato
yield for a second?
The only thing I want to straighter
out, without interrupting his remarks, i ;
to make sure this is on his time. I anm
not sure he has time.
Mr. CULVER. That is right; it is 0I.
my time, and I am assured I have ample
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen -
ator has been given time by the distin -
guished majority leader. He is now oi.
that time.
Mr. CULVER. We are at the cross
roads. When people say, have we leainec_
the lesson of Vietnam, we are going te;
find out today. They say, "What Is tha
little tiny place? What is it called?" You
are going to find out tomorrow.
The chairman talks about just a modes
expansion. Well, we have independen
military analysts who tell us that it i
going to mean a three-ocean Navy, $ -~
to $8 billion, three carriers, all the sup
port ships and airplanes that can gE
on them.
All I say, Mr. President, is that there
is no Senator who will tolerate for ont-
moment America being in an inferio'
status in a military position of vulnera-
bility in the Indian Ocean or anywhere
else.
The hard fact of the matter is tha
America is not weak today; it is strong
The only people talking about how weal
America is are the Secretary of Defense
the Secretary of State, and the Presided
of the United States, and I am sick ant
tired of that poor-mouthing.
We are bristling with power. Whe3
you put the U.S.S. Enterprise into th,
Indian Ocean, with all the accompanyint
slips afloat, and you put the A-6's
A-7's, and the F-14's on these decks, wh<
cares if they have got all their Styx
missiles out there.
Do you know why they have so many
in Berbera? The Soviet missiles are so
lousy in large part that their navy can-
not have the operational sophistication
and reliance that our fleet possesses. They
are 20-nautical mile range, late 190 vin-
tage. To hear the Pentagon and hear
some of the Members in the Chamber talk
you would think they were interconti-
nental ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads poised and aimed on Honolulu.
Hogwash. Hogwash.
Let us talk - facts. All I am saying is
this: yes. it is a modest request now.
But I am saying before we make this
modest request, before we approve it, let
us insist in this age of detente, if detente
means anything, that we at least initi-
ate a serious overture to the Soviet Union
to negotiate Negotiate what? Mutual
naval arms limitations agreement in the
Indian Ocean; for example, a limitation
on ship-days on both sides. You can ver-
if y that. It Is enforceable.
What are the advantages in doing
that'?
Well, the advantages are clearly, first
and foremost, that we avoid this costly,
dangerous arms race. The chairman talks
about the danger of confrontation there
with the Soviet Union over the oil lines.
Thai; is far more sensitive than the stra-
tegic arms limitation talks going on right
now. If it is that serious we ought to
talk.
Now, second, what else does it do? It
a Cleves the advantage of not flying in
the face of the considered opinion of
every ally we have got in the area. It is
stupid to go ahead and plunge into this
when all the countries in the region, in-
cludsngAustralia, say, "Do not do it."
It is stupid when we could get resup-
plied'., refueled over there all during the
embargo. How many of those countries,
Mr. President, that now make available
to us some 36 ports, are going to close
them down? If we go ahead with this
base expansion, arrogantly. disregarding
the opinion of those countries, how many
are going to be inflamed with anti-
American judgments? That. is a great
and burning issue. The Indian Ocean
may not mean much to us; Diego Garcia
may be a flyspeck, an atoll, somewhere
but, my friends, there are some 29 coun-
tries which live along the Indian Ocean,
and who are we in the post-Vietnam
period to start at once again arrogantly
to disregard their judgment, their judg-
ment, their opinion, their sensitivities?
If the Soviet Union says, "Nyet, nyet.
e do not want to talk," OK, OK, they
cio not want to talk. We will burn them
up in the arms race. They cannot stay
vvith us. They are not even with us today.
When we, have to go ahead with Diego
Garcia, Mr. President, we will be going
forward, sir, with the burden the USSR.
The onus, the blame, will be clear. It was
America which made the good-faith ef-
fort; it was America which' tried its best
with diplomatic civility, enlightenment,
compassion and concern to go forward
to work out a rational relationship and
understanding and resolution of the
problems of the Indian Ocean.
Let the Soviets explain to world opir.-
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July 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
ion, Mr. President, why they are not will-
ing to enter into this mutual and hu-
manitarian approach and response.
Now, Mr. President, every year since
1971, every single year, the General As-
sembly of the United Nations has come
forth with a statement called the "zone
of peace," begging the superpowers of the
world who heretofore had remained out
of the Indian Ocean to stay out. "Leave
us alone. We do not want to be. caught
up in these big power politics. We do not
want to be put in a situation where we
are being muscled under through gun-
boat diplomacy. Respect our sovereignty.
Respect our integrity. Play in your own
sandboxes."
Always, they will concede, we have
to have rights of navigation, freedom of
the seas. That is what the law of the
seas is all about, and we should insist
to the, end on that right.
But, Mr. President, every year since
1971 the General Assembly has said,
"Keep the superpowers out." All the lit-
toral area states have said, "Please stay
out," including Australia. And yet we go
forward and we go in.
Mr. President, it is said there are a
few of these countries that will privately
say that they want us to come in, they
want Diego Garcia. Well, Mr. President,
that has an awfully painful familiar
ring to me, too. I remember as a new boy
in the House. Foreign Affairs Committee
in 1965 going to Vietnam. I remember
leaving Vietnam and going to Thailand,
and I remember talking to officials in
various parts of Southeast Asia, and
they said, "You know, we are all for you
but we cannot say a word about it pub-
licly."
Let me just, tell you something, Mr.
President, the day you get politicians
saying privately they 'are all for you and
publicly going out into the town square
and whipping them up against America
so they can get elected, you are on
pretty shaky ground. If there is one
lesson of Vietnam, that clearly ought to
be it.
Mr. President, we are right back into
the bargaining chip game. That is what
Secretary Kissinger is saying to us,
I want it for a bargaining chip.
Why invest hundreds of millions of
dollars of the taxpayers' money, money
from Dubuque, Iowa, into a theory
when we can determine the genuine in-
tentions of the Soviet Union in ? a mat-
ter of minutes?
One of the last big bargaining chips is
that white elephant called an ABM that
my people are still paying for.
No, Mr. President, if there ever was
a time to negotiate, the time is now. I
believe that we should talk before we
build. I believe that we should build be-
fore we fight and, I believe, Mr. Presi-
dent, that we should fight to the death
before we surrender. But you have got
to get your orders straight. You have got
to get it in the regular order, Mr. Presi-
dent, regular order. Talk before we
build, build before we fight, and fight
before we surrender. We have got the
cart before the horse again. We have
got the State Department running
around with its tail between its legs try-
ing to catch up with foreign policy as
it is set by the Defense Department.
That is what is happening.
Now, finally, Mr. President, let us
make that serious effort. Some of us were
in the Soviet Union-one of the co-
chairmen was the distinguished Senator
from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY)-
and we explored in formal sessions with
the Soviets the extent of their willing-
ness seriously to discuss the question of
mutual naval arms restraint in the In-
dian Ocean.
As we reported to our Secretary of
State immediately upon. our return-the
following day-and as we worked closely
with our own State Department escort
officers on the trip, and as we reported in
subsequent correspondence to the Secre-
tary of State, we said that although the
initial response of the Soviet Union was
general and vague, we had- subsequent
reason to believe that the Soviet Union
would respond positively to the initiation
of a formal request to enter into nego-
tiations and discussions over the question
of mutual naval arms restraint in the In-
dian Ocean.
That is all we said. We gave them
chapter and verse on what exact and
specific evidence we had to substantiate
that hope.
That was just a hope. It may be wrong.
It does not take long to find out if it is
wrong, or not, but we feel that the sig-
nal we had should not be disregarded; it
should be explored.
What is lost in that no risk policy? No
risk.
We can find out whether they want to
be responsible and act in good faith,
constructive and substantial. We can
find out in a matter of-a few months, and
what is last, Mr. President, to delay long
enough to find out? Nothing is lost, I
submit, and there is everything to gain-
the prospects of the outside hope, remote
though it may be, that we will not have
to go to,a three-ocean Navy; $5 to $8
billion more money to the taxpayers of
America at a time this country is going
bankrupt.
We are not going bankrupt as a result
of ADC, we are going bankrupt because
of this insane arms race and overkill.
We talk about national security.inter-
ests, as the able Senator from Missouri
so frequently has had the opportunity
and the good sense to remind us, but we
do not listen. When we talk about na-
tional security interests, we talk about a
three-legged stool: Guns and tanks, arms
which we have got so n}uch of that they
get in the way; and we talk about the
strength and fundamental and basic
health of an economy which is the engine
and heartbeat of the whole effort; and
we talk about the morale and the wel-
fare of the people, their confidence in
the political institutions and the intelli-
gence of decision makers to allocate pri-
orities in a compassionate humane, logi-
cal and rational way.
Mr. President, I have mentioned the
three-legged stool; today it has one good
leg and two that are about ready to fall
off, and the only good one is the guns
and tank leg.
So we have nothing to lose by making
S 13937
this serious approach to the Soviet Union.
What do we have to gain? We might
avoid an arms race. We may also salvage
a few friends in that area in the critical
continent of Africa and the subcontinent
of India. We may also keep open some
of those refueling opportunities that were
open to us all during the 1973 embargo.
What we are talking about here on
Diego Garcia-and we have already spent
$63 million for a communications cen-
ter, is about $37 million more to dredge
the harbor, extend the runways, build
some officer barracks, and so forth.
. The Navy has wanted this thing since
the late 1950's. They not only wanted
Diego Garcia, but bases all over the
Inidan Ocean. The minute the British
pulled out, they thought, hot dog, let us
pick up those properties.
As the late Senator from Georgia, Mr.
Russell, once said, make it easy for the
Navy to go places and do things, and
they will go places and do things. I do
not blame them. I do not blame them for
wanting every toy in the store. I blame
us for having the stupidity to give them
that and more.
I do not blame them. That is their job.
They are professional military people.
I do not think they are acting irrespon-
sibly when they want places for con-
venience, bu it is we who are supposed
to represent the larger national interest.
It is we who are supposed to have the
maturity to give consideration in the cal-
culus of America's best interests, whether
or not in fact that national security in-
terest largely defined, is best served by
this particular narrow escalation of mili-
tary power.
That is our job. That is not their job.
Now, we talk here about this Indian
Ocean.
Right now the French are here in Re-
union Island. They are equal to the So-
viet fleet.
We are talking about 30 days in gas
and oil for aviation, planes, and to fuel
ships.
In view of the fact that the Senator
from Mississippi made this argument, I
would just like to address it.
When we send a task force, carrier
task force of the U.S. Navy, into the
Indian Ocean-we have been doing it on
a regular basis ever since 1973-it is out
there for about 6 months of the year. One
of the reasons our Navy costs so much
is because they properly have a mission
to handle global responsibilities, to get
out to sea and stay at sea.
The Soviet Navy is not so designed or
constructed; it does not have'a mission
of comparable magnitude.
When we go out, we can stay at sea
30 days. The American taxpayers pay a
lot of money to permit them the capa-
bility.
No other country in the world even has
such powerful aircraft carriers. We have
got 13 right now. The Soviets have a few
with helicopters on them. So what?
We sail out the U.S.S. Enterprise, a
nuclear aircraft carrier. It has got so
much stuff on it, so much firepower, it
can hardly float. It can hardly float.
We talk about a Styx missile, 20-mile
range. It is ludicrous. The Styx missile,
late 1950 vintage, has been given to 13
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE July 28, 1975
different countries by the Soviet union show the flag, if we want to muscle up taxpayer, with all the additional risk of
already. Egypt has got them. India has for the boys when we go into port confrontation on the high seas, and the
them. Everybody has got them. We have plenty of opportunities to do prospects and probability that there will
The incredible irony to me is that we that. soon follow an escalation into a more
are in one room, all excited about that. I think, Mr. President, we should not serious and potentially disastrous conse-
We have seen a few crates. So what? The only exhaust our diplomatic initiatives; quence for all mankind.
missiles are coming. OK. we should exhaust our economic initia- Finally, Mr. President, if we proceed
They do not have the patrol boats yet. tives. Here is Somalia, one of the seven in arrogant disregard of the opinion of
They have got to have a patrol boat to poorest countries in the world, with $70 all the littoral states including some of
put the missile on to shoot it 20 miles at per year per capita income. We cut them our finest. greatest, and most historic
sea. Big deal. off from foreign aid. We cut them off in supporters in the region, then, Mr. Pres-
They are going to Somalia. Our own 1971. Do the Senators know why? Be- ident, I am afraid the answer is we have
DOD, our own intelligence, admits they cause those poor, pathetic people hap- not learned much, if anything at all,
are going to the Somalians. All right, pened to have a permitted registry of from Vietnam. We are responding to the
good luck. I hope they can keep them foreign ships, under a contract nego- tragic misadventure and trauma of Viet-
in repair. So what? They are nonnuclear, tiated with an earlier government, which nam in a way which shows we did not
they are not going anywhere. We have made runs to Cuba and North Vietnam. learn anything but are only hellbent in
got the A-6 and A-? flying off that air- We cut them off and let those people our madness to reassert our machismo
craft carrier. We have cruisers, destroy- starve. in a reckless fashion which will not serve
ers, we have oilers-oilers-keep that in Somalia went to every country in the the long-term interests of America's true
mind-oilers. Western world. They went to America, national security or the prospects of
They are out there 30 days without the to Great Britain, to Italy, and they said, world peace,
need for anything. Except it really is a "Give us some help." Nobody would help Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I
good thing those nations have sandy them. So they got a phone call one day would say to the distinguished Senator
shores because when you put the U.S. and it was Mr. Khrushchev. He said, from Iowa that that was a lengthy ques-
Navy in that little bathtub, they wash "Come to Moscow. We will help you." tion and it will take a little time to
people up on the beach_ They have been providing economic and answer.
If they do not know it, we will need military assistance to them ever since. I would first like to say that the letter
some new admirals. But as Mr. BARTLETT can personally that I read, which stimulated the dis-
We are not lacking fire power. We are attest, they have 3 million people and tingulshed Senator from Iowa to ex-
lacking will and intelligence. one-half million of them are in danger pound at length on Diego Garcia and
Now, they are out 30 days. If they run of starving to death. They have 1 doctor other matters, makes it very clear
out of fuel and want to stay on, stay 30 for every 20,000 people. They want to that the administration is interested
days, what kind of global contingency have the American Navy come and visit; and has been studying the matter of
are we trying to deal with? they want to make Berbera an interna- negotiations; that they are interested.
Do we face a serious interdiction? Do tional port. We are the ones who will certainly, and should be, in protecting
we mean we have a problem with Soviets force that nation into the Soviet bloc the security interests of this Nation in
coming up, wanting to risk world war with our pigheadedness. We are the ones the Indian Ocean and believe that that
III over stopping that oil? who will guarantee that. They are yearn- can best be done with a. modest expan-
What do we think the French will do ing for assistance from the West. They sion of Diego Garcia.
then, or the British, what do we think are yearning to get back in better shape The Secretary says:
we are going to do then? with their Moslem brothers in the Mid- . [w]e would be prepared in these cir-
I will say that we will be closer to dle East. cumstances to explore the possible methods
world war III then than with SALT That is another point. We are pouring of limtations, which we have been studying
talks. Why not have some talks if that is arms into Iran and Saudi Arabia to build within the Government, bearing in mind the
the risk? That is not even the risk. up their own forces in the Persian Gulf. need to guard against the imbalance in the
The Soviet Navy now has one diesel They are having a meeting, Mr. Presi- area which would adversely affect our secu-
submarine, one diesel submarine in the dent, of the Persian Gulf States this rity interests.
Indian Ocean. That is all they have got. fall. One of the matters at the top of the The distinguished Senator from Iowa
Big deal. We have got nuclear Russian agenda is going to be a collective secu- mentioned that foreign policy is dictated
submarines off the coast of America. rity agreement and a formal insistence by the military in this country. I would
Why do we not close down and go pray? that the superpowers get out of the In- like to bring to his attention that
What difference does it make? One diesel dian Ocean. We already know that. Yet there have been several efforts already.
sub. Is that what we are building this we persist in the insane step of getting discussions, hearings, and debate on this
base in Diego Garcia for? on this slippery slope just a little more. floor on the authorization bill for Diego
Let us give negotiations a try for a Mr. President. all I am saying is just Garcia and on the bill to provide appro-
few months, put the ball in the Russians' take 6 months off. Make a serious shot at priations. Then there has been the cer-
court, put the burden on their back and negotiations. Say to the Soviets, "Put up tification process by the President with
say to the Soviet Union, "You talk peace or shut up. We are prepared to build the debate pending today and the resolu-
all the time, you talk about detente all this base." I will be the one leading the tion by the distinguished majority leader.
the time, put up or shut up." fight to get it built. I do not think we So I think we can see that the Congress
Mr. President, it is disturbing that they will need additional help, but I will be is playing a very large role in formulat-
ire building at Berbera. It is rather here leading the fight to get it built, if ing the policy that we will be following
primitive.' The able and distinguished the Soviet Union is going to act irre- in the future in the Indian Ocean.
Senator from Oklahoma will give us a sponsibly. not respecting the mutual The distinguished Senator mentioned
firsthand account. There has never been self-interest we share in having a naval that the Soviets have one attack subma-
any doubt in terms of the character of arms limitation agreement for the In- nine, a diesel submarine. His intelligence
those potential capabilities. We do. know dian Ocean. must be different from mine because the
that the Somalian Government has ex- But. Mr. President, if we have learned intelligence available to the committee
tended naval visitation invitations for- anything out of Vietnam, I think it points out that in addition to I attack
mally to the U.S. Government. Let us should be that we look before we leap, submarine there are 4 major surface
take them up on it. Let that U.S. Navy that we proceed with caution. We, as a combatants, 2 amphibious ships, 2 mine
fleet steam into Berbera. If we are talking matter of fact, have not even exercised sweepers, 6 logistics ships, and one Intel-
about political perceptions of the littoral the diplomatic option and we are called ligence collector, for a total of 16 cur-
area States, let them take a look at the upon to respond in a cold war way which, rently dispatched in the Indian Ocean.
[r.S.S. Enterprise, the nuclear carrier, Mr. President, in all respects I greatly The distinguished Senator mentioned
and then compare any silly thing the fear will lead to the three-ocean Navy on several occasions the three-ocean
Soviet fleet can finally float down there. with all the additional cost of $5 navy.:[ think this figure of speech is a
Let them compare that, if we want to to $8 billion on the hard-put American matter of semantics to some extent. I
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S 13939
think what he is really talking about is restraint would be a very lengthy process, tages result from proximity of land-
numbers of ships. It could very well be and would require a lot of time, It would based aircraft and Black Sea naval
that the future requirements that this be a mistake to undertake an initiative forces-with the June-5 reopening of the
Nation envisions for its best interests in with the Soviets while the Diego Garcia ~ Suez.
the Indian Ocean would require addi- natter is still pending congressional ap- There are many technical difficulties
tional ships. proval. It could possibly leave the mis- such as measurement difficulties-ship
Certainly, all indications today are taken impression that we would be will- days versus ships versus tonnage ;
that Soviets are continuing to increase ing to sacrifice Diego Garcia in the event questions about what kinds of forces are
their number in this vital area. of the of an arms limitation agreement. included; for example, submarines, mine-
world. Any arms control agreement will re- sweepers, auxiliaries, trawlers; questions
The distinguished Senator knows, and quire land-based aircraft for verification. about the role of land-based airpower in
the majority leader who also mentioned Diego Garcia has already been invaluable the naval balance; problems about treat-
this point.knows, that expanding Diego for surveillance of Soviet activities.. ing forces outside the region versus
Garcia does not, in itself, increase the Only after Diego Garcia construction forces in the Indian Ocean itself; prob-
number of ships that will be deployed on is under way should we consider any loins arising from the existence of other
a deployment basis or permanently in arms control negotiations with the So- forces in the region belonging to littoral
the Indian Ocean. viets in the Indian Ocean area-at least states as well as other otuside powers.
Mr. President, the distinguished Sena- this is my opinion--and only after we So I think the distinguished Senator
tor from Iowa made a very impassioned have developed a technically feasible from Iowa should know that what he is
plea that we permit just 6 months, just arms control approach. suggesting is a very complicated series
another extension of delay, in order to The United States cannot be placed in of negotiations that would take many
give us the opportunity for arms reduc- a position where dilatory Soviet nego- years to culminate, and without any
tion negotiations with the Soviets. ti.ating procedures could deprive us of assurances of success.
I am very surprised that he makes this badly needed facilities on Diego Garcia, Mr. President, I would like to com-
point so strongly, because delay in itself at a time when our vital and legitimate ment at this point on the trip that we
would force the United States to nego- interests could soon be jeopardized, and took to Somalia, Berbera, and Mogadis-
tiate from weakness rather than from a I think this is what the Senator from cio. This was authorized by the Commit-
position of parity or near parity. This Iowa Is advocating, tee on Appropriatio-s and also the
delay that .the Senator is recommending Even if we were to assume the Soviets Armed Services Committee, There was
could possibly be looked upon by the would act in good faith, the very difficult a group of experts, so that the conclu-
little nations of the Indian Ocean as a and technical negotiations would likely sions that I have reached in the recent
sign of weakness, or even of lack of be protracted. report that was released last week are
interest on the part of this country. That The President cannot accept any ne- my own, but based on the expertise of
would certainly encourage the little na- gotiation requiring either a link between many others and the observations of the
tions to tie their stars to the Soviets Diego Garcia and arms control or a re- entire team which spent 6 hours in
rather than to the Western nations, and quirement that we proceed to talk to the Berbera.
I think that this could be the reason Soviet Union on this question. First, the obvious conclusion to us, as
that those countries are unwilling to We are, of course, carefully studying we saw the situation at Berbera, was
speak out in public as they do in private the possibilities for arms control meas- that the facilities have significant mili-
to express just how they do feel about ures in the Indian Ocean, and will con- tary potential, and second, that the
the presence of the United States in the sider a Soviet approach on its merits Soviets control or at least have access to
Indian Ocean. with an expansion of Diego should they approach us. There are many all facilities at Berbera.
Garcia. special difficulties in developing work- The facilities at Berbera are still un-
What the Senator is suggesting is add-' able arms control measures for the In- dergoing expansion, and the total scope
ing to the already 1 year of delay of the dian Ocean, and the United States is of the effort planned cannot be accu-
modest expansion of Diego Garcia, while actively working to see if solutions can rately determined. However, I shall out-
the Soviets continue to expand their be found. line the capabilities of the observed and
facilities, as they have in the past. Multiple asymmetries between the analyzed facilities.
Such a delay is to the advantage of the naval needs and structures of the United I would comment on the statements
Russians and to the disadvantage of this States and the-U.S.S.R. create very seri- made by the distinguished Senator from
country. This delay would require the ous negotiation difficulties. The fact is Iowa, as well as the distinguished ma-
United States to unilaterally refrain that the United States and its Western jorityleader, because in both instances
from increasing its narrow capability European allies have an especially vital they downgraded, in comparison, the fa-
in the Indian Ocean, the Senator says, interest in assuring that sea lanes of cilities at Berbera which the Soviets con-
for 6 months. He does not know how communication to the Persian Gulf oil trol and have access to, compared to the
long the negotiations would take. It supply are kept open. The Soviets do not planned modest expansion of facilities
obviously would be much longer than have an equal problem of communica- at Diego Garcia.
that, but he wants us to. refrain from tion, of keeping open sea lanes of com- At the present time, the harbor at
increasing the military capability of this munication, for their oil supplies. -Berbera has depths of 50 to 60 feet,
country in the Indian Ocean while the Any agreement limiting United States whereas at Diego Garcia, inside .the atoll,
Soviets continue to expand their facili- and Soviet deployment must also take it would be necessary to dredge in order
ties for several years, at least. into account, the large and growirig-rnili- to create a good harbor area for a task
I point out to the Senator that this tary forces of a number of littoral states. force of six ships.
would be another victory for the Soviets. Unconstrained, these forces might be- Berbera at the present time has ample
along with the Greece-Turkey contro- come a major source of instability in a depth and ample space for a large task
versy, which certainly has had some im- generally unstable region, force, much larger than that contem-
petus from the Congress, and which of When considering "nuclear free zones, ? plated at Diego Garcia. There is also
course is weakening the eastern end of zones of peace, and mutual withdrawn} adequate berthing space, material han-
NATO, like the opening of the Suez of naval forces" proposals, it is abpa:ren't dling of equipment, storage space, and
Canal, the expulsion of U.S. forces from that the Soviets do not have a realistic access roads tb enable the port facility
Turkey, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces quid pro. quo to offer. In any agreement to serve a naval task force which it does
from Southeast Asia. Though balanced which merely limits the forces deployed do.
force limitation would increase stability to a particular region, as Indian Ocean The communications facility is a long-
in the region and reduce the danger of limitations would do, rather than the to- range, high-powered facility capable of-
conflict, arms control in itself is not use- tal. inventories of both sides, as SALT very long transmissions and receptions
ful for security unless the capabilities does, for example, we must pay particular completely under the control of the So-
of all_ parties are correspondingly di- attention to the relative capabilities of viets.
minished. each side to bring in forces from outside . Incidentally, just to show. the interest
I would like to point out that agree- the region in the event the agreement of the Soviets in those transmission fa-
ment with the Soviets- on mutual arms breaks down. Soviet geographical advan- cilities, when we approached the -gate
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE July 28, 1975
from some 100 feet away the Somalian
guards drew their rifles on us in the lead
car and then later onone particular in-
dividual who walked up to the gate to see
if he could gain entry.
The same thing happened at the other
facility, the receiver facility.
As to the missile handling and storage
facility, the Senator from Iowa said that
this is just a Styx missile facility. There
have been Styx missile crates seen there,
and there were some small dollies also
seen which would be for handling mis-
siles, probably bigger than the Styx. But
there is a great capability there with a
25-ton crane and a capability to handle
any of the missiles that the Soviet Navy
would be using in surface to surface or
any air to surface missiles that would be
used by the Air Force. It is capable, ac-
cording to the experts, of handling any
missiles that the Soviet Union has for its
Navy.
It is also apparent that the Somalians
have no use for this facility. They do
not now have even the ships to fire the
Styx missile, although they say that they
will have them soon. Their officers had no
knowledge of and could not respond to
routine questions, that were asked of
them about the facility.
The airport facility, of course, is un-
der construction at Berbera but will be
in the neighborhood of 13,000 to 14,000
feet long. The planned airport at Diego
Garcia is for 12,000 feet. Certainly they
would be comparable when completed.
However, the length of the one at Ber-
bera, is under construction, whereas, the
one at Diego Garcia is only planned as an
extension of the current 8,000-foot run-
way.
A number of outbuildings are under
construction, and it is impossible to tell
just how they would be used, but there
were other prefabricated structural
members in a storage area that also were
designated for additional buildings at the
airport facility. There is much construc-
tion going on, Including housing, a new
water supply, and other buildings that
they identified as a hospital, which obvi-
ously was not a hospital because of its
very strong and unique construction.
So the Soviets are there in large num-
bers, estimated at 1,500, compared to an
estimated 600 that would be at Diego
Garcia if this expansion is approved.
The fuel storage facility at Berbera is
being expanded from 40,000 to 170,000
barrels. I know that the distinguished
majority leader was advised by his staff
member that there are no bunkering
facilities available at the present time at
Berbera. We were advised of this by the
Somalians. But it does not make any
sense to accept this fact as the facts in
the case and as the gospel truth because
they also said that the expansion of the
bunkering facilities is for Vie purpose of
enabling the Berbera port facility to en-
gage in trade and business with the open-
ing of the Suez Canal with the commer-
cial fleets. So if this is the case, they
certainly are willing to use the bunkering
facilities.
Also, the Soviet Navy does make a great
use of oilers in bunkering their ships and
have, on many occasions, had the oilers
tied up in the harbor filling their ships
as well as filling the storage facilities
The storage facilities will also provide
gasoline jet fuel for the airport. There 1:~
a pipeline under construction from the
POL facility to the airport and also te
the significant missile facility.
So I think that the distinguished Sen-
ator from Montana and the distinguished
Senator from Iowa are being misled if
they are of the opinion that this is not a
significantnaval facility and air facility
that the Russians control and to which
they have access. I am advised that as a
naval facility it exceeds any other facility
to which the Soviets have access, includ-
ing Cuba, outside of the Soviet Union.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, may I
ask the Senator a question?
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I will be glad to
yield on the Senator's time.
Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if the
Senator is in opposition to the resolution"
Mr. BARTLETT. Would the Senator
like to obtain time from the distinguishes
majority leader?
Mr. PASTORE. About what?
Mr. BARTLETT. I just asked if thr
Senator would like to obtain time.
Mr. 'PASTORE. I may be on the Sen-
ator's side for all I know. From whoa:
am I going to ask for time? I am asking,
question. If it is a matter of time, I wil'
just sit down.
Mr. STENNIS. No.
Mr. THURMOND. I will grant the dis-
tinguished Senator time.
Mr. PASTORE. Now everyone wants to
grant me time.
The question I ask is this: My mind i?:
open on this. I have not made up m;'
mind, but a lot of questions have been
raised by the distinguished majority
leader, the Senator from Iowa, my owes
colleague, and the distinguished Senato ,
from Missouri.
Essentially, why do we have to be in the
Indian Ocean? Will the Senator tell m
the answer to that question? Why do w--
have to be there?
Mr. BARTLETT. I will be glad to.
Mr. STENNIS. I will answer.
Mr. PASTORE. I do not care who an-
swers the question. I do not care. I want
to make my mind up what the right:
thing is.
Mr. BARTLETT. I think the answe
to that is a very long-winded answer.
Mr. PASTORE. Do not get winded oe
make it long.
Mr. BARTLETT. It requires an effort
to evaluate the proper role of this Natior -
But certainly I think the area of the
Indian Ocean is an unstable area ani
it butts right up to the Mideast. Them
is not only the oil supply routes that flow
out of the Gulf of Suez and into the In -
dian Ocean, but also the production site:,
of oil in the Middle East.
Another reason for our interest is tha =?.
the Navy by its very nature is a grey t
ambassador for this country and has
been on many occasions.
Mr. PASTORE. Is it to keep the se --t
lanes open?
Mr. BARTLETT. It is to keep the se i
lanes open. It is a protective area. If
the Senator would just let me, I wi.1
cover a few other points.
Mr. PASTORE. Yes.
Mr. BARTLETT. Certainly this facil.-
ity I.,; for contingency purposes. It is in
support of our friends. We want to see
the Indian Ocean remain a stable
region and not dominated by one outside
power.
I mention just a few things about the
fact that naval power is ideal for bal-
ance. It is historically acceptable and
tends to be flexible. It does not have
the provocation of territorial military
commitments. It is very valuable in
times of disaster to our friends, and it
provides local self-sufficiency in needs
of defense. It is a visible sign of interest.
It can deter harassment and blackmail.
It can maintain existing rights and fa-
cilities that the United States has, It is
a safe means of evacuating civilians,
commands respect of our enemies, and
so M.
Mr. PASTORE. May I interrupt the
Senator for just a moment?
I am a member of the Subcommittee
on Defense Appropriations. Frankly,
when the military came before our
committee-and this is an old chest-
nut, this matter of Diego Garcia; this
is not something that just came up
last week-I was quite impressed when
they made their presentation. But since
then many questions have been asked,
and many reasonable people are a little
confused about this-why very reason-
able people should be on one side and
very reasonable people should be on the
other side.
I was told that this was strictly a
refueling depot, an oil refueling depot. Is
that correct?
Mr. BARTLETT. This is a depot for
bunkering naval ships for providing ad-
ditional fuel for aircraft, for surveillance
by aircraft. It also would have a dredged
outharbor area accommodating a six-
ship task force, and it would have other
facilities.
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator said this
is a sensitive part of the world, and in-
deed. it is. I think many other places are,
also, But why are all the countries in the
perimeter surrounding the Indian Ocean
against our presence there? Why is that
so, if we are there to keep peace?
Mr. BARTLETT. I think that one very
good reason is that they are afraid of the
Soviet presence; they are afraid to ex-
press themselves as they really feel. They
wonder whether or not our delays, are a
matter of indecision or lack of interest
or whether we really are committed to a
presence there.
Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BARTLETT. Has the Senator fin-
ished?
I will yield to the Senator in a moment,
but first I want to wind up my comments
on Berbera.
The Berbera location is extremely
valuable. As the Senator knows better
than I, it is right on the trade routes go-
ing through the Suez and coming out of
the Persian Gulf. It is also right across
from Aden, where the Soviets have a
very significant facility, with access to
both naval and air facilities.
Another point I should like to make,
which is an area that was mentioned by
the Senator from Iowa, is that the Gov-
erninent of Somalia says that they would
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July 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEMI
like to improve relations with the United surance by our experts, on the trip and spent approximately 4 to 6 months a year
States. I believe that we very definitely on return, that this facility has that Tover ake he Amehcan ier task cforce arrier, up .
should evaluate this; but as soon as we capability.
do-and I am sure we will-it is then Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will all the firepower on it, and put it in, and
as I mentioned earlier, it is like putting
geing to be up to them to take some steps the Senator yield?
in the direction of friendly relations or Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for a 400-pound man in a washtub. There
to me. is no other power on Earth that can
parity relations with uu because they yielding
certay certainly have ave gone all out to permit the Mr. SYMINGTON. What is the defini- match our aircraft carriers. We have 13
Soviets to have a very significant mili- tion of "expert"? Who were the people of What do we have on the U.S.S. Enter-
Berbera facility or series of facilities in the involved?
Berbera area. . Mr. BARTLETT. This gentleman is an prise, for example? We talk about the
I recommend that proceed with tile I Air Force has adequate background In been giveneto craze.
countries all cover the
proposed that at this expansion expansion of Diego jt Garcia. notwithstanding t he ste is jf a sig- the base from a was aerial briefed photographs prior talking about the fear tofsthe Styx mis-
nifict Soviet t military capability the existence of ta sit to our leaving. sile; we are holding hearings next door
ant v a
Berbera. The results of this trip greatly Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen- about the most sophisticated antimissile
missile stuff going into the Middle East.
reinforce the arguments in favor of this at.
proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. I Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the By the droves, we are hawking that stuff.
Senator yield? Back to the U.S.S. Enterprise. The
certify- Mr. BARTLETT. I yield. On whose U.S.S.- Enterprise alone carries 12 A-6
think ink that the serves President a is great correct in need to the
e
in a
-mil United States in its overall interests in ti Thel think Ois up. lanes, each of which FFICER. Who radius and can deliver 7.5-
Mr. ns7of ord-
the Indian Ocean. nance on each one of those planes off the
Mr. President, I hope my colleagues yields time?
will defeat the Mansfield resolution, and Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time does Enterprise alone.
In addition, we have 24 A-7's on the
we will show the people of this Nation the Senator want?
that we do have a concern for the over- Mr. CULVER. How much time might Enterprise, with a 700-mile radius and a
all interests of the United States, wher- be available? 7.5-ton capacity on each plane.
ever they exist. Mr..MANSFIELD. We have 76 minutes Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield?
I yield the floor, available, to be divided among 6 Sen- I have asked some very simple questions,
if I could only get them answered in the
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the tears.
Senator yield to me for a question, a I yield 5 minutes to the Senator. RECORD. The trouble here is that the time
genuine question? Mr. CULVER. I thank the distinguished is being devoured by those who are for
Mr. BARTLETT. I yield. Majority leader. it and those who are against it, people
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator went to I ask the Senator from Oklahoma who have made up their minds. There are
Berbera. He viewed a missile installation whether, in the entire course of the testi- a lot of people in the Senate who have
there, as to the size and capability. Much niony on this issue or as a result of any not made up their minds. We would like
has been said here about the Styx mis- of the briefings he has had, he has been to have the answers to the questions. We
eila, With respect to the capacity and advised that the present missile capabil- do not get them.
capability of the building that the Sen- ity or potential capability of the facility The question I should like to have
ator saw, for possible future use, was it at Berbera, even if expanded, would re- answered is this: Do we have to be in
large enough to take care of ship-to- suit in a Soviet-controlled capability that the.Indian Ocean at all?
ground missiles? would affect the tactical or strategic bal- Mr. CULVER. I think we have to be
Mr. BARTLETT. The Senator is ante of the Indian Ocean region, given in the Indian Ocean to the extent that
correct. the current disposition of forces. Has the we, in our national Interest, have to
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is versed Senator been told that by any source? maintain a global presence. I think it is
in this field to a considerable degree. Mr. BARTLETT. No, I have not been consistent with the law of the seas, with
Was that his impression, based on the told that. het me'say that that does not the wrightaoff access
the Io allr thOceane .
information he received then? mean it is not correct. we in ia
Mr. BARTLETT. This was my impres- Mr. CULVER. It is my understanding, what form and shape that presence takes
sion. Perhaps even more important, our from all the testimony we have had, that Is what the debaCe today is all about.
missile expert said that this facility had in no way has it been implied by the Mr. PASTORE. I understand. Before
much greater capability than that re- Department of Defense or any other wit- we get off on another tangent, my ques-
quired of the Stvx missile. In fact, he ness that, even given the worst case tion is, if we have to be in the Indian
said that the Styx missile can be dis- scenario of Soviet capability in Berbera, Ocean, what is wrong with having a fuel
assembled without any elaborate equip- in the use of this facility, it is going to depot for the escort ships that have to
ment. But this facility does have a 25- have that kind of potential impact. protect the Enterprise, which is nuclear?
ton hoist. It has a clear span of 30 feet. As a matter of fact, the Soviet ship-to- What is wrong with it?
It is a significant facility, capable of ship missiles do not exceed a 40- or 50- Mr. CULVER. First of all,. the thing
handling any missile the Soviet Navy mile range, anyway, as the chairman I think is wrong with it is that Diego
has. mentioned.. The Soviets do have some Garcia constitutes a permanent U.S.
Mr. MANSFIELD. What is the range submarines that carry four antiship presence In the Indian Ocean. It is a
of the Styx? cruise missiles of 250- to 500-mile range. permanent base presence which, in my
Mr. STENNIS. It is a short range, in The hooker is that these missiles require judgment, is clearly not necessary in
the neighborhood of 25 miles. a plane near the target for final guid- terms of our security interests. It is a
Mr. BARTLETT. The missile storage ance. In short., there is no real offensive matter of intervention.
and handling capability is far beyond power there. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
the Styx missile. - The French Navy already has the Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. Is it large enough, in Exocet missile, with a 20-nautical-mile Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield another
the Senator's opinion, to be used for range, and that is in the French fleet, minute.
U.S.
submarine-launched missiles? I mean, to which equals the Soviet presence now. Mr. CULVER. It is not essential to Unational security interests.
handle those missiles and care for them, The Senator from Rhode Island is
keep them in shape, for use by sub- properly concerned about the adequacy If we go ahead with ? that base, we
marines. of American strength in the region vis-a- essentially have two concerns. One is that
Mr. BARTLETT. Yes. It has the capa- vis this proposed threat. Take the U.S.S. we are going ahead with that base in
bility of handling submarine missiles. Enterprise alone, which has been steam- arrogant disregard of the expressed and
Mr. STENNIS. Did the Senator raise ing around over there this year. As a formal considered judgment of every-
that point there with his experts? matter of fact, I say to the Senator from one of the 29 littoral area states, includ-
Mr. BARTLETT. I was given full as- Rhode Island, ever since 1973 we have ing Australia,
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IONAL RECORD -SENATE July 28, 1975
Also, every year since 1971, the U.N.
General Assembly has urged a zone of
peace for the region.
Fl ?ally, we are going ahead without
even attempting the most feeble efforts
at negotiating with the Soviet Union, on
a bilateral basis, for a mutually agreeable
naval arms agreement in the region.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Sznator's additional time has'expired.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 1 additional
minute. Then I shall have to parcel out
the time to people who have been
waiting.
Mr. PASTORE. It is not a matter of
who has been waiting all day. The ques-
tion is that the people who have been
talking on the subject have made up
their minds. one way or the other. There
are a lot of people around here who
have not made up their minds at all.
Mr. MANSFIELD. One minute to the
Senator from Iowa.
Mr. CULVER. I say to Senator PASTORS
that one other problem with going for-
ward, in the judgment of some of us, is
the very real danger that at the present
time, where we have 36 ports, according
to DOD, where the United States can
refuel already in the littoral region, and
where, in part, we were allowed to refuel
even during the 1973 oil embargo itself,
when we beefed up our presence in the
Indian Ocean, we run the risk of many
of those ports being closed down to us
if we go ahead against their opinion.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield 10 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Vermont (Mr. LEAHY).
Mr.LEAHY. I thank the distinguished
majority leader,
Mr. President, the proposed expansion
of naval facilities on Diego Garcia not
only signals a new escalation of the de-
.tense budget but carries with it in my
estimation, far-reaching Implications
for our long-range foreign policy goals.
The $108 million required for the com-
pletion of the facility is relatively small
when compared with major weapons sys-
tems and the overall military budget.
However, it could well be but the open-
ing wedge for the eventual expenditure
of billions of dollars.
The fact is that the expansion of the
base on Diego Garcia cannot be justi-
fied unless the Navy plans to station a
carrier task force full-time in the region.
This would give the Navy, which is
scheduled to reduce from 15 to 12 car-
riers, the perfect excuse to keep 15 car-
riers. According to a Brookings Institu-
Lion report, the eventual deployment of
an aircraft carrier task force In the In-
dian Ocean would cost between $5 bil-
lion and $8 billion in new ship construe-
tion. In addition, taxpayers would be
saddled for years to come with an an-
nual increase in Navy operating costs of
$800 million.
Therefore, I think that, from just a
dollars-and-cents point of view, it is
imperative that the expansion of these
facilities be absolutely justified before
we embark on such a course. No one
doubts that the expansion will indeed
add to the capability of the Navy to op-
erate in the Indian Ocean.
But far too little consideration has
been given to its impact on our foreign
Policy and to its tax implications. TL e rity be endangered if this matter is de-
tactical advantages of such a step cannot lased a few months or a year until we
be considered in a void. have explored all diplomatic prospects?
Do we really need this expanded base? Let us take a look at the map over
Does the increased Soviet presence in the there. It is the same kind of map that
area require an immediate response of we have when the Pentagon comes be-
this magnitude? These questions cannot fore the Armed Services Committee and
really be answered in the absence of az5s ask ;for anything new. If we look at that
steps by our Government to avoid a map and look at the red stars which in-
naval arms race and a superpower con dicate where the Soviets have military
frontation in the Indian Ocean. installations, it would appear that they
In its 1974 report on the military con.- totally surround the United States. The
struction authorization bill, the Senate same maps give the appearance that the
Armed Services Committee deferred United States has extremely few bases.
funds for Diego Garcia until the ad- Mr. President, why not just give up? We
ministration could make a "full reevalu- have all those Soviet red stars around
ation" of the matter, in the hope that surrounding us, and a couple of little
this would include a "thorough explana- U.S. blue stars to indicate that the
tion of the possibility of achieving with United States is somehow valiantly
the Soviet Union mutual military re holding on.
straint without jeopardizing U.S. inter Mr. President, it does not mention the
ests in the area of the Indian Ocean." fact that we now have over 3,000 mili-
The conference report at that tim tars, naval, and air bases scattered
merely called upon the President to throughout the world, and that does not
advise the Congress that he had evalu include those in the United States. Of
ated all military and foreign policy im- that number, 300 are classified as major
plications of the expansion and to advise installations. More than half a million
the Congress in writing that the projec' American servicemen and servicewomen
is in the national interest, are stationed abroad including 60,000
We asked the President to certify to afloat with our fleets in all the seas of
Congress whether it is necessary, and the world. How much more do we need?
the administration, in what I thought The maps certainly show a different
was a rather arrogant attitude, in curt, picture than if the Pentagon provided
two-sentence communication, advised maps showing where all our bases are
Congress on May 12, 1975, that, yes, It and all our people are-land and air
is necessary. Somehow, Congress, whicl and sea-as compared to the Soviet
is supposed to have oversight responsibil- Union. It would be an entirely differ-
its in this area, is expected to jump at ent picture.
those two sentences and go ahead. The As the leader of the free world we
President offered no analysis of his have a responsibility to use our power
evaluation and offered no explanation of to maintain peace and stability. But we
how the expanded base will enhance our do not have a mandate to act as the
defense posture or further our foreign world's policeman with a military base
policy goals. There was no attempt what- on every block, so to speak.
ever to bring Congress into the decision- No nation on the Indian Ocean littoral
making process on this issue in any is threatened by aggression. For more
meaningful way. Once again, the Con- than 30 years this area of the world has
gross is being asked to rubber stamp been relatively tranquil without benefit
an administration proposal which can of huge superpower military bases. When
eventually have tremendous effect on the Congress approved $5.4 million in 1970
budget and which can signify a major for an austere naval communications fa-
shift in our foreign policy. cility on Diego Garcia, it was with the
Mr. President, the fact is that no clear understanding from the adminis-
meaningful efforts have been made by tration that there were no plans for a
the administration to extend detente to larger base.
the Indian Ocean. We have not raised Why, then, the rush to build amulti-
the issue of arms restraint in the Indian purpose facility without a prior attempt
Ocean with the Soviet Union since 1971. to negotiate an arms free zone? Whose
It is not a case where diplomacy has security is suddenly endangered? What
failed; it has not even been tried. The changes have there been since 1971? Has
Congress and the American people have the balance of power in the area changed
yet to learn what our foreign policy is to drastically as to warrant a headlong
that requires a costly military buildup rush to commit billions of dollars with-
in a relatively unmilitarized area of the out first pursuing all diplomatic routes
world. available to us? Or did the administra-
We know that each year since 1971 Lion purposely hold rack its plans at the
the United Nations General Assembly time of the initial expenditures.
has urged that the Indian Ocean be Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has
made a "zone of peace." We know that raised the specter of a new Soviet base
none of the 29 nations bordering on the at Berbera, Somalia, as a major reason
Indian Ocean has given public support for immediate action on our part in ex-
for the expansion of our Diego Garcia panding the Diego Garcia base. While
base. Quite to the contrary, India, the there is considerable evidence that the
nearest major power to the island, op- Soviets are building air and naval facili-
poses bur building the base; and our ties at Berbera, there is no evidence to
closest allies in the area, Australia and indicate that the strategic balance in the
New Zealand, have publicly expressed Indian Ocean is being upset by the pres-
their opposition. ent level of Soviet construction there.
Why, then, the haste to proceed with This construction will not make Berbera
this expansion? Will our national secu- a major naval base.
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July 28, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL R ribly
misleading From all reports, the facilities there whatever else might be necessary. But, it areke er else terwhat we are doing, and
are simply not extensive enough to per- is not necessary at this time. no of
mit the Soviet Navy to conduct major A lesser, but often repeated, rational Mr. President, we are the leaders of
operations or maintain a continuous for this project is the argument that it is the free world, and especially now, with
Perhaps important to the United States and the the post-Vietnam era, this puts a far,
presence Ocean.. free world to keep the sea far greater responsibility on us than we
a, know. major in But the base the is Indian
present ex planned. Wpansion at doBer- not langs indust in the area open and unfettered ever had. I do not think we are carrying
bera only marginally increases the capa- -and that, somehow an expanded Diego out that responsibility by expanding mil-Indian
Ocean
first bilities of the Soviet Navy and is not t, Garcia
The 7the Flwould eet ,nable us to
present dino the trying totnegotiate a pe cefiul zone in
dicative that a major base will be built.
The United states has, and will con- Indian Ocean during the oil embargo in that huge area.
tinue to have, the capability of deploy- the fall of L973, and failed to alter the I thank the distinguished majority
ing' substantial naval forces in the In- course of events. As the proposed expan- leader for yielding to me, and I yield back
dian Ocean. We twice sent carrier task sion on Diego Garcia would only in- my time.
forces into the Indian Ocean in 1971, and crease the length of time the U.S. Navy Mr. PELL address the Chair.
have sent others on a regular basis since could remain on station in the Indian Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
1973. The administration has not pre- Ocean, it is unclear to me how that ex- yield to the Senator from Rhode Island
sented any facts to Congress to indicate pansion would give the Navy the ability and then, on Shis own time, I yield to enator from Virgin a M the
that the tactical naval balance or the to affect another Arab-initiated oil em- ti ngui h SCOTT).
overall strategic favor s the Indian bargo, wonder, short r. of outright President, if military WI
that is what Mr. PELL. I thank the majority leader.
Ocean which now fhas been United I suggesting to us?
States and our, allies has been seriously the Unthinkable as administration is that might be, it would Mr. President, it is difficult to add
affected by the Soviet construction at much that is new to the debate concern-
Berbera. be the height of naivete to think that ing Diego Garcia. For over a decade, the
Mr. President, I grant that this con- such action could be limited to a minor advocates of an American naval presence
struction signifies an increased Soviet conflict or even to the Indian Ocean, in the Indian Ocean have favored the
interest in the Indian Ocean, and car- much less that Diego Garcia would play development of this small coral island;
ries the disturbing possibility of future much of a role, if any, in its eventual for just a of, many Members of Con-
military expansion. However, I do not outcome. However, if the administration Band other individuals have jbelieve that this fact by itself is justifica- feels that the expansion at Diego Garcia gress r efforts to oppose this proposed joined
ine expan-
time enough for our going forward at this is necessary to increase-our capability to lion of American commitment abroad.
time with military and naval expansion fight a major war in the Indian Ocean, Nevertheless, with this on Senator
Essentially, the Indian Ocean. then the Congress should be told now MANSFIELD'S Senate Resolution 160, the
Essentially, we have two options open that this is just the first step in what M NSF has arrived at Resolution 160, the
to us. We can, as the administration and would have to be a long and costly road point, thus requiring my making some
the Pentagon have requested, match the toward a creation of a three-ocean Navy. additional comments.
Russians ship for ship and base for base It should not be unreasonable to ask for Supporters of the efforts to expand the
in another never-ending vicious cycle of honesty from the administration in dis- V.S. naval facilities on DGarcia
escalation. Or, before taking that mo- cussion of its military policy. U.S. emphasize certain factors. Diego i They correct-
mentous step, we can seek negotiations Mr. President, to proceed at this time ly point out c that American T the Soviet Union on naval arms would run counter to our best national ly upon oil resources in the depcnrec Middle Ease
with
limitations in the Indian Ocean. We have interests. It would be an admission to the and Persian re Gulf is growing, while ithe
nothing to lose and everything to gain world of the failure of our foreign policy andendrsi of ulf Eh
by trying to maintain the peaceful status to solve international problems without and Japan our allies growing, these supeste es is -
of that area of the world. If the Viet- resort to flaunting our military might. It rope ready greaa. In addition, it has been
nam debacle taught us anything, it would trigger a serious escalation of the shown ghat the Soviet Union, fhasitaen
taught us the need for caution, and re- arms race, It would cost taxpayers bil- sh
and
straint beefore committing our power. lions of dollars and weaken our ability thnewe a privileges in of the Somalia's Suez port of Canal Ile and
On our recent trip to the Soviet Union to deal with pressing domestic problems. bera, has steadily increased its naval
as part of the Senate delegation to the It would show our complete disregard for.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Parliamentary Conference, the views of the nations in that area of presence in enlar the ged Indian dian Ocean.
naval Assesertrtin isg that Senator CULVER, Senator GARY W. HART, the world. that is enla ed American these vital
and I discussed this situation with sev- In view of the risks and the poten- economic interests and balance the vital
eral Soviet officials. We received Indica- tially enormous costs, i strongly urge nvthese individuals are Soviet
tions that their Government might be that the Diego Garcia expansion be de- naval a the here expansion of naval are ad-
willing to negotiate a limitation of naval layed until the administration has shown val activity, c ties vocating Diego Garcia to naval facili
the
arms in the Indian Ocean. We relayed a serious attempt to negotiate an arms United States rin the pro.
these impressions to the Secretary of limitation in the area. Let us show the Wed S I efind s position myself in disagreement
State urging that he further explore 'world that with all our immense power advocates of the Diego Garcia proj-
To possibility, of such negotiations. we can act with caution and restraint. with is not s much with their Garcia
forgo diplomatic initiatives until If such efforts are unsuccessful, and they eat ecct with their conclusions. their. bsev i-
after we are already on a path of costly may well be, then-the responsibility for tions as
nt that the United States While
and
competitive military escalation in the any subsequent events will rest squarely is will be evident teat the dnite dSta upon im and
area might be to lose the opportunity on the Soviet Union.
which exists today for a real test of de- Mr. President, I grow very, very con- ported sources of oil, it is oticthe In w
tente. In order to provide an opportu- cerned that we are falling into a situa- an expapande nwio al pre to alleviate this
nity for such negotiations, I strongly sup- tion where what Congress does might dian Ocean
port the resolution of the distinguished well be ignored. We might as well simply problem.
majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, to let the Pentagon decide each year what Manipulation of oil supplies and prices
postpone for this year further expansion it wants. Perhaps we are at a point where has occurred at the wellhead by the local
of the Diego Garcia facilities. instead of having a military budget or a producers exercising their political and
Mr. President, no one denies that the military debate we should simply put economic powers. The threat to the oil
United States has vital interests
Indian Ocean. However, those Interests Pentagon cant a two tanks nd several of tankers by the Soviet Union or anyone
can best be served by our making every large trucks to the Treasury building and else; as a result, the solution to the oil
effort to make the area a "zone of peace." just load up with whatever it wants, be- problem lies not in the deployment of
Should the attempt to do so fail, we al- cause it does not seem to make such sense additional naval force, but rather in a
with the development of both
ways have the option of proceeding with what we do. We are still the expansion at Diego Garcia and with with these kinds of charts which, I think, coupled program
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SE NAT.E July 28, 1975
new sources of oil and alternative forms seek an agreement with the Soviet Union Gulf and Norfolk, Va., in the United
of energy. limiting the deployment of military fcrce States. It also seems odd that we have
Much space has been allotted by the in the area while the opportunity :till not, used this base since 1967. Yet, we
media recently to the Soviet presence in exists. plan to
the Indian Ocean, and specifically to Today's vote bears added si spend approximately $38 million
their status in the Somali port of Ber- as well. Not only will the Senate's dcci- base the initial cost of the Diego Garcia
bera. The logic often expressed in that sion affect the future course of American Experience teaches us, moreover, that
since the Soviets now have a facility in foreign policy in the Indian Ocean, but once we start a project of this nature,
the area the United States must have one it will provide a general indication of there is a tendency to expand its usage,
as well. But this line of thinking is over- the future direction of American foreign its capabilities, and its cost and, I con-
simplified and tends to distort the situa- policy after the experience in Indochiaa. tir.ue to be concerned about the United
tion. Not only does the United States al- For too long the United States has been States bearing a disproportionate share
ready enjoy the use of facilities at Bah- Indiscriminate in its commitments, wL,ile of the responsibilities and costs within
rein, Subic Bay, Philippines, and else- at the same time overemphasizing the the free world.
where around the region, but it is often military dimension of foreign policy. The It is my understanding that we have
forgotten that Somalia has offered the United States cannot afford simply to docking privileges in the Persian Gulf
United States facilities similar to those react to alleged Soviet intentions, nor at Bahrain and although it has limited
provided the Soviet Union at Berbera. can it continue to base its foreign policy facilities, a command flagship is home-
In addition, it is necessary to consider on the premise that expanded milit?