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November 17, 2016
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April 1, 1952
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 0 IA-12 COPY No. COMMUNISM COMMUNIST PARTY CAPABILITIES UNDER WAR']~IME CONDITIONS INTERIM REPORT ON ARGENTINA, BRAZIL., COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, CUBA, ECUADOF,, PANAMA, VENEZUELA APRIL 1952 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002- INT~.ODUGTORY NOTE ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE COLOMBIA COSTA RICA GUBA ECUADOR PANAMA VENEZUELA Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 25X1A6a TN'~'RODUCTORY I?TOTE 25X1A2g 1. The following survey of capabilities of certain Communist Parties in Latin Am?rica under assumed wartime conditions was pre- pared by the issuing office from replies to questionnaires sent to its Like its predecessor, on Com- munist wartime capabilities ia~ several African and Middle Eastern countries, the present survey is an interim effort,. subject to further revision. 2a The suanmary was prepared in the spring of 19520 3, As in the previous sanmmary, the emphasis here is on the or- ganized assets and facilities cif the Communist Parties which would eanable the Parties to maintain themselves under conditions of probable wartime suppression, sand to ;~.ssist the USSR by organized sabotage, . espionage, military action, o:r disruptive propaganda. 4a The estimates and views contained herein are primarily those 25X1A62pf the issuing office?s A certain amoaant of editing and interpolation lass been performed, but it has been kept to a minimum, except in the cases of Cuba and Brazil, and leas not substara-~ tially altered the conclusioans coantained in the responses to the question- naire, with the exceptions noted, 5, In view of the tentative nature of this report, recipients are requfesf-ed to forward:c~atici~nrr~, a.dditiona.l a:nfora~ia.t~.oa~, estimates and/or any-data which could serve to improve this report, The final versioan of the .report is to present firm assumptions on Communist security-knot political) threats and problems to arise under assumed wartime conditions Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 The Partido Comunista de Argentina (PCAj~ is a well organized CP which has maintained itself' under conditions of partial suppression for several years. ~ The Party's main value t:o the USSR in the event of an East- West War would be the popular support it could rally in favor of Argentine neutrality. If the .Aa~gentine Government followed a policy of full or partial support to the West, the Party would be able to carry out only a small amount of propaganda and agitation to embarrass the Government, and small-scale sabotage of food and raw materials ship- ments to the Western Allies. Unless economic, social, and political conditions deteriorated badly, the Communists could n:ot expect to rally substantial popular support for a defi Hite anti.-Go~-ernment policy, nor to foment an uprising. Underground ?rganization The PCA has had experience in operating clandestinely and could probably maintain itself underground in the event of more repression than it is now experiencing. There is no evidence that it has stepped up its preparations for going underground. Communications The PCA could maintain secure courier communications. Propaganda Equipment The Party would have great difficulty in obtaining equipment and materials to publish any quantity of clandestine literature: Argentine authorities closely control printing plants and the supply of newsprint. Safe Space for Underground Operations Living conditions in Bue~noa Aires would make it fairly easy for the Party to obtain secure spa~ue for small meetings and hide -outs ~ Note: The following observations to not reflect on the relations of the "Dissidents" to tlhe PCA, nor on their capabilities, Approved For 002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-0091580002.00190002-7 o. sufficient for minimum operations. Wartime Solvency The PCA is short of money naw and would probably have trouble financing itself in wartime. Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Care Party membership is about 30, 000. It is not known what percentage would remain loyal and active in the face of vigorous repression. Strength is concentrated in Buenos Aires, and Rosario and Cordoba provinces. Wartime propaganda and sabotage activities would be concentrated in the same areas. Argentine authorities have fairly complete lists of Argentine and foreign Communists, and could probably round up large numbers in an ~emergency~ - Resistance Operations The PCA is not prepared to engage in military actiono It might carry out political assassinations and small-scale acts of violence. However, the topography of the country and the fact that the interior is sparsely settled would make it: extremely difficult to carry on guerrilla warfare. Potential leaders far military action number at the most Z, 000 men --veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Italian resistance, and a few French and Slavs. Maximum manpower available to the Party for military operations is estimated at 4, OOOo The Party is believed to have no substantial quantity of weapons and could probably not obtain any by raiding police stations or army dumps. Sabotage The Party has no secret sabotage organization. Some leaders have given lectures on sabotage to small groups of Communists, but it is not known that a systematic program has been undertaken., Probable sabotage targets would bee the railroads; the .frigorificos; port areas of Rosario, San Lorenzo, Buenas Aires, Comodoro R.ivadavia, Bahia Blanca, and Necochea. San Lorenzo, La Plata, and. Comodoro_ Rivadavia would be most profitable to the Communists because they are the petroleum ports. Several Slav Communist cells exist in. these areas and might be able to interfere with petroleum shipping by sabotage and labor agitation> Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : C1~=RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Subversion of Armed and Security Services Communist influence in the Armed Services is negligible. It was believed at one time to be gre;.ter in the police, but the present degree of penetration is not known. Wartime Propaganda Communist propaganda in the event of an East-West war would be aimed at maintaining the neutrality of Argentina. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 The Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) has been semi-illegal since PJlay 1847. Not until recently, however, has the Government made serious efforts to suppress it. The Party has retained most of its members during the period from 1g46, but -has lately been losing sympathizers. In the event of an East-~M1~est War? the Party could maintain itself underground? could carry out propaganda against Brazilian support to the U. S. , could carry out a certain amount of sabotage and generate labor trouble sufficient to hinaler Brazilian economic support of the U. S. The ability of the Party to raiise a successful revolution is not known and would depend largely upon future events, Underground Organization It is not clear to what exaent PCB structure i s being reorganized to meet increasing government pressure. The organization was not changed greatly when the Party was outlawed in 1g47. A striking feature of the period of semi-]legality was a remarkable proliferation of all kinds of fronts behind which the Gomrnunists were able to carry out political work in relative freedom. There have been scattered reports lately that Party organizations have been destroying their files in some places. Also a pamphlet has been circulated instructing Communists how to behave in case of arrest. The PGB has had enoitgl~ experience in operating underground to enable it to go underground again with reasonable efficiency and speed in case of war. The PCB already has secure courier service Operating personnel on the airlines and railroads t-ave been identified as Party couriers. 25X1X7 Approved For 0002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Propaganda Equipment The Party already has a.n underground press networko Mimeo- graphed publications are distributed in factories,. and small newspapers have appeared even iai sparsely settled areas. Estimates of the Party':a supply of newsprint are conflictinge One report stated that it had a "good reservem" Another report, however, said that the Party was running short of paper and had had to cut the size of its editions of V'oz Operaria frarn 60, 000 to 8, OOOo A number of publishing houses and importi~~g firms are supposed to be contributing to the ~'arty's supply of gaper, In `the event of war, the PCB could probably continue to issue clandestine propaganda, but tree Government could also interfere with the Party's ability to get more: than minimum supplies of paper and other materialso Safe Space for Underground Operations The Party has been able to find adequate secure places for meeting and for housing "wanted'" functionaries. There is no reason to believe that it would not have adequate housing in wartime. Replacement of Cadre The PCB has enough experienced cadres to replace at least the "front line" leaders, should they be arrestedo In 1947, when many of the best-known functionaries went underground, their places were taken by cadres who were not well known to the authorities. Wartime Solvency There are a number of urealthy sympathizers and secret Party members who would enable the: party to remain solvent and to manage its financial transactions securely in event of war? Brazilian authorities believe that the Party has received fu.~.ri ; from abroad through Soviet and Satellite diplomatic. and trade establish.iro.entso Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core Party membership seems to have remained fairly constant at about 150, 000 since 1946. An increasing number of sympathizers has Approved For o 90002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 been falling away from the Pay~ty since 1947. No firm estimate of the number of Party members who would remain loyal in case of war has been received. There have recently been a numbex of defections and expulsions of Party members for nationalistic tendencies. How seriously nationalism would cut into the Party in the crisis of an East-West War is not known. The most prominent of the expellees, Jose Maria Crispim, has been trying to organize a lvational CP not tied to the USSR, but appears thus far to have met vrith little success. Popular Appeal The political influence of the Party has been several times its membership (1945 elections, E~00, 000 votes for the Communist Presi- dential candidate: 10?fo of the total electorate )o Pacifism and isolationism are powerful political forces in Brazil and might be capitalized upon by the Communists. However, the Communist "Peace" campaign has become more and more bogged down. The ability of the Party to capture the support of the "masses" in wartime depends too much upon events and economic-social-political conditions in the future to make a realistic estimate possible. Resistance Qperations The PCB would probably undertake guerrilla operations in the event of war. It has putout numerous pamphlets on tactics, organizations, and weapons-procurement, The Party has been responsible for many acts of violence, Communists have been arrested and found to be in possession of weapons stolen from Arrny warehouses. In addition, there have been many reports to the effect that the Party has been holding courses in guerrilla warfare and street-fighting; that "paramilitary" formation~a have been organized, and that weapons have been smuggled into Brazil from abroad. It is not possible to estimate how far the Party has actually-gone in planning for military action, or how successful it would be in a serious military effort against: the Government, The principle which would probably be followed was given in a document captured in June 1950 which outlined an armed uprising based upon the countryside (the Chinese Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 model). Coupled with this would be an attempt to raise a mutiny in the Army and general strike action in the cities. The present increasing action by the Government against Communists in the armed services could wreck the Party's scheme in that direction. Sabotage Communists have been committing acts of sabotage for some time. During July 1950, Brazilian aU.thorities attributed to the Party 134 acts of sabotage on the Central Railroad in the State of Minas Gerais alonee Methods employed were: removal of spikes and ,)amrning of switch controls. The railroads are very vulnerable to sabotage and at the end of 1950 it was reported that the Party was making special efforts to recruit railroad workers, It was also suggested in 1950 that the Air Force bases at Fortaleza, Natal, Recife, and Porto .Alegre were likely targets for Communist sabotage because of the atreng;th of the Party in those areas. Only a few industrial plants have undertaken steps to guard against sabotage . One source reports that Party pamphlets on the techniques of sabotage have been seized by t:he police. Another source says that the Party has sabotage training schools. It is not known whether ~~,ny kind of an organized sabotage plan or system actually exists, Neither has there been any reasoned estimate of the Party's ability to disrupt Brazilian economy in the event of war. Subversion of Armed and Security Services The PCB has a long history of successful penetration of the Armed Serviceso The main element of the abortive 1935 uprising was the Alianca National Libertadora (ANL), which was a Communist front organization set up to penetrate the Arrny, The Party is believed to have a secret military committee and a structure of secret and "insulated" cells within the Arrnyo Most spectacular, howe,aer, has been the exposure of strong Gomxriunist influence within the army afficerso organization called the Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Clube Militare The organizati.on's publication followed the Communist line on the Korean war, and a number of its members (up to rank of major) have been classified as Communists and arrestedo Party influence has been; strongest the enlisted ranks of the armed serviceso The Ser~;eants? Club, the Airforce Petty Officers? and Sergeants? Club, and the firazilian Ex-Cornbattants Association are believed to have been heavily infiltrated by Party members and sympathizers. A number of Communists connected with the Sergeants' Club have recently been arrested, The Serg~ants? Club in Sao Paulo was closed by the police in the: summer of 19510 Vigorous action taken by the Government in the services in the past few months may spoil the chances .for the Party to cause serious trouble in the event of war o It has been estimated that the Party has not penetrated the criminal investigation police or the military police, which is the force employed against the Cornmunistso The extent of penetration of the traffic police is not known, although the Party?s chances are better here, because of the very low pay-scale. Espionage The PCB could probably perform industrials military and political espionage for the Soviets in the event of war. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 T /"QT TT !/""/~TTTT /\T General The GP has been operating underground since 1948. It could probably maintain a skeleton organization in the event of an East-West War, despite probable increasing repression by a Government friendly to the U. S. It would ].o se most of its mass following, however. The Party could not overthrovc~ the government. It could carry on industrial espionage for the Soviets, It could achieve a limited amount of physical and economic sabotage. The government would be able to round up most of the leaders of the Party and could quickly taunter its sabotage efforts. Underground ?rganization The CP Chile was made illegal in 1948. However, Government suppressive measures have been far from severe, -The Party has had a taste of semi-underground existence. The experience gained should enable it to carry on clandestinely in the event of war without radical readjustment of its organizational and security practices. The GP has developed a secure communications system, with a net of mail-drop, safe-houses and couriers, Propaganda Equiprnexit There is no evidence th:~.t the Party has provided for the production of clandestine propaganda by caching equipment. It has had difficulty in its semi-underground period in finding secure presses and supplies. Replacement of Gadres Party leaders lived for atime clandestinely. It is believed that a "second-string" leadership is also being trained to take over in case the present cadre is knocked Gaut. It has recently been reported that whenever a group meets, at least one of its leaders stays away9 so that at least a skeleton of leaders would escape if the Government- should raid the meeting. The Party is even now chronically short of money. Declining membership contributions would hamper the Party's operations in wartime, but not enough to put. it out of business entirely. Approved For -7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 There was evidence some: time ago that funds had been sent in from abroad and that the Party has a cushion in dummy firms set up by foreign capital, but nothing further in this regard has been received recently. Stren th and Capabilities of the "Hard Gore" V1~artime restrictions are expected to prune the PartyBS member- ship and its mass-following considerably. An estimated 2-5, 000 people of an estimated current membership of 40, 000 would remain loyal and active. They would be concentrated in economically important areas; the industrial and coal :mining areas near Concepcion, the Santiago industrial area, and t1Le northern nitrate and copper regions and ports. Popular Appeal It is expected that left-wingers who now sympathize with the Communists would retreat in the event of a war and vigorous repressive measures. Only the small leftist parties that are most strongly infil- trated by Communists ~"Dernoc:rato del Pueble," the Anthentic Socialist Party, and the Dactrinary Radical Party) could be counted on for much support by the CP. Depending on events prior to a war, the two important Socialist Parties might support the Gommunists. Resistance Operations It is unlikely that- the GP would attempt military operations, but would rather develop sabotage and political propaganda against.Chile's support of the U, S, as a more profitable activity.. The Party probably has no substantial quantity of arms. Unconfirmed reports have been received to the effect that the 1?arty is attempting to form "Comando" groups in each commune, but even as a plan, current evidence is that it has not been implemented. Sabotage .,, The Party has done no s~rsternatic sabotage planning other than to indicate to its militants that it expects local and. individual-initiative in calling and supporting small. strikes and striking at industrial targets of opportunity. Thus, no general strike is expected, but rather, a series of local actions wherevE:r the Communists are in a position to call them. Approved For 190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Sabotage Targets Interference in nitrate a:nd copper production and with the shipping parts for these commodities vv~ould be the most serious threat the Communists could offer the U, S. in case of war, The Government plans to round up Communist leaders in an emergency and believes that it will be able to assure normal production of strategic minerals. Most vulnerable, owing to Communist strength are: the Huachipato steel- producing plant near Concepcion; coal production at Lota and Coronel, near Concepcion; the power plant at Tacopilla, which supplies power to Chile ~ s largest copper mine at: Chuquicamata, is reportedly extremely vulnerable to sabotage from within, or to possible attack by enemy submarine because of its exposed position on the coast. The Party has instructed its militants to encourage labor trouble s at the nitrate and copper shipping portso Subversion of Armed and Security Service The CP probably has no substantial organization in Chile?s defense farces. The Juventud Comunista, however, has reportedly been charged with astepped-up infiltration ~~rograrn~ Twa retired Arrny Generals (Guillerma PORTALES and Oavaldo VALECIA Zapata) are believed to be Communist sympathizers. It is believed, however, that Communist penetration of the Armed Forces or the Investigaciones could not become dangerous within the forseeab:Le futureo Espionage Unless Chile should engage directly in military hostilities, which seems unlikely, the Communists are not expected to be particularly interested in military intelligence. Probably, an informal type of information-collecting service, would be organized to cover industrial production and shipping. Wartime Propaganda The Party would intensify its propaganda efforts to weaken the Government's position. A major element of the campaign would be aimed at arousing hostilityr to a Government that cooperated closely with the U. S. Neither racial disturbaa~nces nor peace riots are expected. The most the Communists could hope for would be harassment. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Security Problems The Government is trying to make plans for mass arrests and internment of Communists, for plant protection in,strategic industries, and for preventing CP propaganda. It has a list of about 21, 000 known and suspected Communists and the list is kept current. By taking action against these people, th.e Government could seriously interfere with the Party's wartime ability to assist the USSR, Approved For ??'?~c? ~^^^~^Q~~~ ? rie_ nP~Q_nna1~R00 X0.01 000 -7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 COLOMBIA It is estimated that the Communists could do very little to assist the USSR in the event of an East-West warn The Party would be reduced to a small "hard core19 without political influenced It could, and probably would, attempt to carry out sabotage of the petroleum industry. It would probably try to raise labor strikes. Unless the Liberals also produced labor difficulties, however, the Communists would not be able to raise a general strike, Party leaders are identified and could be picked up, but only if the Police raised their efficiency, Undergraund Organization The CP Colombia has already gone underground to a certain extent, Basic organizations have been reduced in size to no more than five members. All but a small. part of the Party's archives were destroyed in December 1950 to prevent seizure by the police, Security preparations have been increased, particularly since the naming of Luis Ignacio ANDRADE as of Governments The Party has been considering the creation of a secret committee to be headed by Father Enrique PEREZ Arbelaez to take over in case of emergency. Party communications have been through the regular mails and occasional use of courierso It is believed that no well-organized, secure communications system has been created; however, it is believed that the Communists would have no difficulty in organizing one if necessaryo Propaganda Equipment The Party disposed of mast of its printing equipment because could not afford to operate a regular presso Its literature is now mimeographed, Two or three ~vlandestine leaflets are being published in Bogota, Medellin, and Calio In the event of war, the Party would find it harder to put out written propaganda, but could pra'oably continue to distribute mimeographed material clandestinely, Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Space for Underground Operations The Communists would probably always be able to find places where small groups could meea in safetya No information is available as to whether safe -houses have been obtained for hiding Party leaders or for housing headquarters oi:ficeso Replacement of Cadre It is believed that the Party could replace current leaders without much difficultyo A Communist source estimates that there is a group of about fifty persons from which new leaders could be recruited. It was not estimated whether these persons were experienced or would be efficient leaderse Wartime Solvency The Party has difficulty raising adequate funds now, and would undoubtedly be hard pressed i~a wartime o Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core Severe repression wouldl seriously reduce Party membership, which has been falling off since 194.5,. Present membership is about 2, 500, but a large number of these would desert in wartimeo Hundreds of persons quit the Party in the ernergenc:y following the April 1948 riotse The remaining'vhard core'P would be incapable of carrying out major propa- ganda activities; would probably devote itself to physical sabotage, attempts to raise strikes, and to commit espionage, Popular Appeal The declining popular attraction of the Party is reflected in declining elections voting for :Party candidates Q1~, 000 in 1945; less than 5, 000 in 1951). All sources a?;ree that the Party?s appeal would decline still further in the. event of an East-West War. Resistance Operations It is extremely doubtful that the Party would attempt to organize a resistance organization. 1t has no militarily experienced. leaders. There is a going arms traffic, and weapons would be available easily Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approve 190002-7 to Communists. However, prices high, and most people would not be able to buy a weapon without financial assistance. It is probable that the Communists would support the anti- Gavernment guerrilla groups that are currently operating in Colombia in the event of war, It is not known whether large numbers of Communists would join the existing bands or whether they would be in a position to get control of any significant section of the guerrilla movement.. Sabotage. The Communists have not organized a sabotage network, nor is there- evidence that they have made any plans to do so. It is believed that the Party does not have any trained saboteurs who could give training to others . The main sabotage target would be the refinery at Barrancabermeja. A secondary target would be the power plant at E1 Centro. Sabotage of these two would effectively stop oil production and processing. The oil companies have emergency plant-protection plans, and the producing company, which is run by the Government, could call in troops for protection. Communists in the ports at Barranquilla and Cartagena, and in the smaller ports of Buenaventura and ;5anta Marta could undertake to sabotage port installations by burning. Fire is a serious problem in Colombian fire preventive measures are inadequate and fire-fighting is usually ineffective. Colombian railroads are not adequately protected and are therefore vulnerable to sabotage. Bridges are guarded and in the event of war, the guard would be improved. The National Police are responsible for protection of the Bogota water supply. Among other industrial plants, those that are run by Americans are better protected than the rest. The Communist objective in sabotage would be to embarrass the Government and to disrupt the economy. Colombia is not a direct source of war materials. Approved For ?Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Subversion of Armed and Security Services There is no evidence of Communist penetration of the armed services. A Communist source agrees that there is none of any importance . The Police, likewise, seem to be free from Communist infiltra- tion. There have been cases of the Party?s having been forewarned of raids, but this is believed to be the result of poor security in the Police, rather than the presence of Communist informants. Espionage It is doubted that the Party could produce significant military, scientific, or industrial information for the Soviets in the event of war. Yf the targets in Colombia warranted, the Soviets would probably try to set up -their own networks independent of the Party. They would have difficulty in recruiting by ideological persuasion agents and informants in position to obtain informa.t:ion; would probably have to depend upon buying information. There are a number of leftist professional men (mostly lawyers; some, former Communists) who might provide general information for the USSR; however, many of these could be arrested and convicted. Economic Warfare The basis of Colombia?s economy is coffee, and since the crop could not be effectively sabotaged, aa~d since coffee would continue to be in demand abroad, it is unlikel~a~ that the Communists could seriously disrupt the domestic economy. Wartime Propaganda Communist propaganda woa~ld probably be aimed at exploiting the difference between Colombia's two traditional political parties (Liberals and Conservatives) and at increasing the friction within the Government The present Conservative Government has control of the Army but it is unpopular , Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 A~ppro~ed For . 2-7 The Communist Vanguax~dia Popular is believed to be incapable of rendering assistance to the USSR in the event of an East-West War. It is small, poorly led, and c~;~rrently undergroundo It has no political power. Government agencies have identified most Communists and would be able to arrest them in an emerge~acy. The country is too small to permit significant underground organization or operations. Underground Organization The Vanguardia Popular was o~.tlawed in 194$ and was almost. totally destroyed, Under continuous, suppression it has slowly created a weak, cladestine organization. Secret activities are very difficult because the country is so small and the people inclined to gossip. The- Party has no regular communications system, It uses Party travellers as couriers and ha?: a number of cover addresses. Propaganda Equipment Attempts to a stablish a clande atine press have failed, partly owing to lack of money and partly, to the impossibility of maintaining a print- ing establishment secretly. 'T'here are three mimeograph establishments currently in operationo Their locations are known to the Government, which has not raided them for political reasons, The Party has. made no plans for the acquisition and storage of printing equipment and supplies. Space for Underground Operations It is believed that the Communists would have the greatest diffi- culty in obtaining aid maintaining hideouts in the event of war, Replacement of Cadre The Party has always s~nffered acutely from personnel shortages. In case of war, it would not be able to replace any of its cadre with any type of personnel, known or u:raknown to the authorities. Approved For R ~ 190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190.002-7 Wartime Solvency The Party is now "in the red," and would probably be unable to set up any kind of a secret rnoa~:ey administrating organization (secret accounts, dummy firms, etc. ). Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core Severe undergrouxnd hardship is expected to totally paralyze attendance at meetings, participation in literature dissemination, and general activities, The "hard Bore" consists of about four personso Popular Appeal Resistance Operationns No capability. Sabotage Sabotage capabilities of the Party are practically Wile Targets of remotely possible sabotage attempts would be dock facilities at Limon and Puntarenas; railroad bridges, San Jose -Limon and San Jose-Puntarenas; airport sit San Jose; banana company installations, Ue S, petroleum interests. On the other hand, it wogald be quite possible for foreign sabotage agents to operate in Costa Ric~~, either against targets .there, or using it as a base for operations against the Panama Canal, Border controls are inadequate and local law eY~forcement agencies are not equipped to handle professional saboteurs or other types of agento Persons have often moved about the cou~.try :for several years without any documentation at cello Subversion of Armed and Security Forces Nilo Infiltration might result if the Calderon Guardia party returned to powero The Armed services are fully capable of preventing penetrations Espionage No capabilityo No capabilitya Labor is anti-Communisto " -20- Approved For RP_?aS~200Q~D.8l2Z_ CIA-RDP7S~n9~sRnnn2nn~90002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 How the Comm~x~ists in (~uba, in their party called the Partido Socialists Popular ~PSP~, will make out as the Batista regime develops is not yet clear. Upon this, of course, depends their ability to assist the Soviets in some East-West Wara In the past, the PSP has had reasonably good leadership, by Latin American~Communist sts~,ndardse l.t succeeded in greatly expanding its political power after 1933, and Communists entered the Governments of Batista in 1940 and of Grav San Martin in 1944 as the result of political deals, Recently, however, the l?arty has been declining, politically, financially, and psych.ologicall~y, It is believed capable of maintaining itself in the event of war and probable suppression by the pro-U. S. Government. It could not, barring substantial changes in the political and economic climate, hope to overthrow the Government, either by peaceful political means or by force< Serious military action would also be unlikely. Oan the other hand, the sugar industry offers many targets for sabotage, and the result of a strong sabotage program could be very serious to the U. S. and also to the internal economy of .Cuba. In general, a program of sabotage of the sugar industry, coupled with anti-LJ. S. propaganda is~ the direction PSP wartime effort would most logically take o Undergrous~.d Organization A number of sources reported that the Party was reorganizing, or had made plans to reorganize, against the possibility of suppression in 19510 Details of the reorga~s.ization scheme as reported varied somewhat, but ha.d iag common the pri~aciples of de centralization (smaller cells, more responsibility put on local ciirectiong organs restrictions on lateral contacts betweea~ orgsxnsy and the imposition of standard organiza- tional ar~d personal seca~trity measures. According to oxne fairly reliable source, no reorganization would actually take place w~ntil suppreassion had begun, in order that the Party might coa~ntinue to exercise m~~s:im~.m political influence. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27_:_CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 As early as the summer of 1950, it was reported that the Party was destroying some of its records, and in November, statements were made in Party publications calling for an increase in "revolutionary vigilance" to prevent the infill;ration of unstable and hostile persons into Party organs. Despite the fact that Bar;ista cooperated with the Party during his previous administration to the extent of permitting it to carry out open political activities, it is probable that he will take a firmer stand against Communism during his present rule. One Communist leader has already written to a contact abroad that Batista had begun to put pressure on the Party ~~nd that some leaders might soon .have to take refuge abroad, in Guatemala, preferrably. If, as seems likely, th~~ pressure continues, the Party will be forced to go completely underground. Having had previous experience in clandestine existence, and plenty of opportunity to prepare for it again? the Communists should be able to maintain at least a skeleton organization, and could continue-to operate in the event of an East- West War. It is b elieved that a secure courier system is already in operation, utilizing women and boys in the cities, and bus drivers and conductors going into the interior of the country. Prior to the Batista Co~xp, it was also reported that a number of Party members in public coxr.~munications facilities were expediting secure transmittal of Party messages. They could be expected to continue this until weeded out by the Government. It has also been reported in the past that a number of Cuban "ham" radio operators were Communists. It is possible that a radio net could be maintained for some time. There have been Party members on the staffs of standard broad- cast stations. It is not incon~~eivable that such personnel could be used to transmit disguised messages in wartime until they were identified and arrested. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 -Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :_CIA_RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Propaganda Equipment The Party should be able to maintain a clandestine press in wartime, When the Party newspaper, Hay, was banned in 1950, enough equipment and supplies were removed to a private print shop to put out an illegal paper. During this period, a small paper, Mediodia9 was published fairly regularly, In wartime, the Party would not be able to issue a substitute paper with impunity as it did in 1950, when America. 7eportiva simply took the place of Hoy and was distributed openly. America Deportiva is believed to have been printed in a secret shop. It has been reported that the Party has cached away newsprint and distributed mimeograph rriachines to trusted individuals in small towns. One source (rated "E") stated that "technical departments" would be organized at national and provincial le vela to prepare for and carry out the work of clandestine printing and distribution of underground propaganda. Safe Space for Underground Operations Party meetings have been held for some time in houses of secret Party members and sympathi:~ers, and the Communists are expected to be able to obtain and maintain a sufficient number of safe-houses for meetings and the housing of important, hunted leaders in wartime. One report that has not been confirmed and that is "unusual" to say the least, held that in 19413 a Communist "spelunker" made a tour of mountainous areas to locate caves which might be used as hide -outs and headquarters in case the :Party ever undertook guerrilla warfare, The question of safe space depends largely on the main role the Party would undertake in wartime. If emphasis were put upon sabotage of the sugar industry, or guerrilla operations, then safe quarters would be sought in the couii.try-sides If emphasis were put on political agitation in Habana, then safe houses v~~ould have to be found in or near the cityo Replacement of Cadre On the one hand, it is probable that the Party has enough trained cadres to replace the "first-string" in case it were rounded up, and there have been reports to the: effect that little-known individuals have already been designated to tape over in an emergencyo On the other Approved For Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 hand, Cuban authorities are beaieved capable of identifying any replace- ments soon after they begin to works The Party does not have so many efficient cadres that it could support a series of replacements if the government kept up a campaigns of large-scale arrests and intensive inve sti.gation. Wartime Solvency It has been estimated th~~.t the Party would be able in wartime to maintain secret bank accounts in the name of trusted secret Party members and sympathizers. 'That it has been following this practice for some time was demonstrated by the exposure in January 1952 of such a trusted individual who Yiad embezzled over $13, 000 of Party funds kept to his account in the: Royal Bank of Canadao There have been indications that the Party is having financial difficultiesa These would undoubtedly increase in wartime, and problems of handling them, also. However, it is believed that the Party could finance the restricted activities of which it would be capable in wartime . Strength and Capabilities of Hard Core The Party claimed that i.t had 19, 000 "militants" in February 1950. It is difficult to estimate how many of these would remain both loyal and active in conditions of wartime suppression: 10, 000 would be a generous estimate, Cuban aut:h.orities have an automatic arrest list which contains about 1, 000 nameso Popular Appeal In the partial elections of ,dune 1951, PSP candidates received about 151, 000 votes - 70 4% of the total ballot, This ways about 24, 000 mare than the officially registered Clommunist voters in 1949? In the registra- tions of autumn 1951, only 59, 000 registered as Communist voterso Whether these figures reflect a proportionate decline in the present popular appeal of Communism., or simply a decline in the number of persons willing to register as Communist, is impossible to says It is also impossible to :Foretell the mass political effects of th.e new Batista regime. In the event of war, the sugar economy would depend entirely on the Western market, and military circumstances would dictate economic conditions in Cuba to a large extents It is unlikely that disruption of the economy could be used to raise pro-Soviet sympathies directly, but Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Re.leas~e200DL08127~_CIA-RDP7~-DD~1~RDQ02D0.190002-7 the Communists coa~ld capitalize upon it indirectly, through front .organizations and labor agitation The left wings of the PA.17 ~Partido Action LTnitaria) and of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), both of which were infiltrated by the Communists, might side with the PSP in the event of war, if the Government permitted them to function, which is not likely. Resistance Operations Estimates of the ability of the Ca:mmunists to carry out military activity in wartime are conflicting, On the one hand, the capability was reported to be great, and the Party to have a large number of militarily trained cadreso Oa:~ the other hand, a responsible desk officer has estimated that a military effort would succeed in recruiting no more than a few hundred m~eno Sabotage There is only one industry in Cuba that is of importance to the U~ So --the production and shipping of sugar, The producing industry is greatly decentralized, offering many targets for sabotage, Each P91~entral" has its own railroad lines from mills to warehouses and to the main railroad lines; most mills have their own power plants; molasses and alcohol plants are usually separate from the mills. It is of interest to note 1:hat the probable effect on PSP organization, if the Party chose and were capable of concentrating on sabotage of the sugar producing industry, wo~xld be a considerable decentralization, with wide freedom being given to local organizations to act on their own. initiative , It is difficult to estimatf: haw strong a hold the PSP has in the labor that operates the prod~.cing end o.f th.e industryo In general, the rural popu~.lations, which grow the cane, are anti-Communisto Some of the mill unions are to some extent connected with the Partyo The syndicates in the following esl:a.blishments are the most important of those which are opposed to the anti-Communist Sugar Workers? Federation (FNTA). Whether they are actually pro-Communist or are simply opposed to the current leader ship of the anti-Commuxnist FNTA is not known Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Gomey-Mema Mill, San Nicolas, Habana Province Central Hormiguero 1vIi11, San Fernando de Camerones, Las Villas Central Narcisa, Yuguajay, Las Villas Central Santa I4iiaria, Ra.nchuelo, Las Villas, So far as shipment of sugar to the LJ, S~ is concerned, there appears to be little chance that the Communists could seriously interfere with it by sabotages The Communist maritime union, which like other Communist unions parallels the anti-Communist unions and has the same Warne, has been reported to be largely a paper organization with- out any followingo The bulk oi: Cuban maritime workers belongs to the anti-Communist union. Subversion of Armed and Security Services A very small number of Communist sympathizers are in the Armyo They have been identified and are being watcheda Espionage No substantial information is available on Party plans or organization, if any exist, to carry out espionage in wartimeo Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 By itself, the CP Ecuador (PCE} is believed incapable of rendering important assistance to the USSR directly i.n the event of an East-West War. It could carry oalt a certain amount of sabotage, propaganda, and espionage. It could not mount a serious military operation. Of more ' concern is the possibility that the Party could exert enough pressure on the Government to nullify Ecuador's political and economic support of the United States. At present, the Government appears to be not sufficiently aware of the threat: of Communism to undertake steps to control it. Nor has it given stay evidence of becoming aware of this danger in the forseeable future:. Underground Organization The Party has been reported to have been making plans for under- ground operations several times in the past few years, whenever it feared that the Government might declare it illegal. There is n.o evidence that anything concrete was ever done, however. It is not known whether a secure internal comm~lnications system has been organized or prepared, Ever since 1948, unconfirmed reports have indicated that the Communists have organized a courier service for overseas communications within the Flota Mercente Grancolombiana. The number of couriers, mail drops, etc. , of this service has not been determined to date . Also reported, but unconfirmed, have been a courier service organized by the Guayquil Port Cell aA~d another within the Grande y Hijos Line which carries bana:~nas between Puerto Bolivar and the U. So Propaganda Equipment The Party is not knowca to have made definite plans for obtallAing and hiding printing equipment .and supplies. However, it should have no difficulty in doing so at any til:neo it already awns presses and other duplicating equipment; a Communist-owned printing shop in Quito recently acquired some new equipment. Nor should supplies be arA insurmountable problems the brother of the owner of one of the largest newspapers in Guayaquil is an active Communist, S Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For F~?elease 2000/08I2Z ;CIA-RDPZ8=00915Rnnn~nn~ A0002-7 /'~ T T Safe Space for Underground Operations The Party would have no difficulty in establishing bases for operations. However, owing to the small size and population of Ecuador, it would probably noi: be able to operate undetect ed for any time. Reports to the effect that the Party was choosing safe- houses for headquarters if outllawed have not been confirmed. Replacement of Gadre The PCE would have difficulty replacing its current leadership on all levels. It has only a fe~v capable cadres. Capable personnel who have escaped identification thus far are probably very few. Wartime Solvency The PGE is believed to be capable of raising and administering funds to a certain extent in the underground. Wealthy Party sympa- thizers could be expected to contribute ..funds and to manage them through secret accounts and dummy firms. Strength and Capabilities of Hard Core Estimated PGE mernbexship is about 5, 000. The rank and file is believed opportunist, and if the Party were suppressed, no mare than 1, 000 members would remain loyal and active. Popular Appeal Communist doctrine is riot expected to exert a strong appeal if war comes. The Party has thus far failed to command the prestige of the lower classes largely because. Farty leaders have lacked "political personality" and because of th.e influence of the Catholic Church. Despite the limited appeal of t:he Party itself, however, there is a possibility that it could muster considerable support for anti-American political actions through the Socialist Party, which has cooperated closely with the PCE in the past. The Socialist Party would probably not support the USSR directly in case of a war, but it would probably also fail to give real support t;o the U. S. Furthermore, there is a left-wing of the Socialist Party that would probably support the Communist program in the event of war. Two small parties, the PRL and the VRSE, are. also close to the F'CE in some respects and might support it in wartime. These factors, added to the fact that the Government Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 party, the MCDN, depends partially on Communist votes, make it unlikely that the Government would act vigorously against the PCE in the event of a warn The Party might be able to develop indirect. . support for ita political policies in wartime far beyond what it can directly command in memberf~hip or at the polls. Resistance Operations The PCE is believed incapable of raising a military resistance force. It lacks militarily experienced personnel, and it is thought not to have any significant stores of arms ar ammunition, Neither is it believe@ capable of seizing weapons from Government stores in the event of conflict. Sabotage It is not known if the PQ:E has organized any sabotage network or made concrete plans for sabotage in wartime, The organization of "sabotage committee s/? to mal+.e plans was reported in September 1950. Targets for sabotage would be Guayaquil port facilities, oil production at Anton, the Guayaquil-Quito railroad; factories in Guayaquil, Ambato, and Quito; and, possibly, the :rice fields, It should be noted that a1; present, no plans or organization exist for plant protection against sabotage in Ecuadoro Subversion of Armed and Security Service s The exteiat of Communist infiltration of the Services is not known, It has been reported that penetrations do existe The Director General of the Seguridad National, in :Fact, is considered a radical Socialist who has demonstrated sympatl!xy for the Cornmunistso Local armed and security services appear to be: quite apathetic to the problem of the Communist penetration. In the event of an East-West War, the extent of penetration would depend upon the relationship of the Socialist Party to the Government at that time, and the Governmen't's stand towards the PCE, The Army is believed capable of Countering Communist penetration if permitted to da so by the Government, Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-0091 SR0002~~190002-7 Espionage It is snot known if the Party has made plans for espionage in the event of war, or if a Party intelligence network exists at this time. The Party s ability to -collect information far the USSR will depend upon the relationships between Government, the Socialist Party and the PCE. At this time, the PCE is believed able to obtain almost any type of military, scientific and industrial information it desires from the Government. One of the Functional Senators, Pedro Saad, is the most important labor leader of the PCEp and can legally demand all such information in the possessiorn. of Government ministries, Again, the ability of the Communists to interfere with Ecuador-U. S. trade and financial relations in w~.rtime wilL.~depexad upon the position of the Government vis-a-vis the Socialist Party and the PCE. Undoubtedly, PCE political power could seriously influence the countryas economic policies. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-00915R00020019~0002-7 General The People?s Party ~Conimunist) is believed incapable of serious action against either the Government of the Republic or the United States in the event of warn Existing social, economic, and political conditions are bad; the Government is weak; nevertheless, the Communists have not been able to muster public support of any consequences The Party has ~~ membership of only about X00, but even of these, o~s:ly about 200 sire active It has a srazall youth zation> The most- important leibor federation, the FSTRP, cla.ima a membership of over 20p 000, bust has actually no more than 400 active members. The FSTRP is an s~ffiliate of the Communist-dominated Confederation of Latin American Workers OCTAL), The Party has no money. if war came, the Communists in the Republic would probably rn.aintain a small clandestine organization for anti-American propaganda; and could produce a small amount of intelligence for the Soviets, particularly in the field of Canal defenses and traffic, However, -the National Police in the Republic. and TJ. S~ Services in the Canal Zone would reduce Communist effectiveness to a minimum and might well be able to destroy the Party altogether, The Party has no capacity for conducting military action against the Government. The Government is friendly to the U, Sa and is expected to continue so The Police are believed capable of s~.ppressirdg sabotage atad subversive activities in ' Panama, surveilling airfields and coastal areas, guarding vital routes of communication in the Reput>lic and enforcing travel control measures. Underground Organization The Party was outlawed by Presid.e,~.tial Decree of President Arias in April 1950u D~.ring t:~ae Aroseme~a Administration the ban was not executede There is no evidence that the Party has made systematic plans or concrete preparations for operating clandesta.nelyo 1t has occasionally been rumored that the Party was thinking about setting up s~.fe-houses and secret c.ommta~.ica.tions systems, but the stories have never been confirmed by reliable sourceso Propaganda The Party raewspapery 1J1 Patri.ota, suffers from chronic shortage of money and su~.pplies, In wartimeA a serious effart to suppress the Approved For R 002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Party would probably reduce %t to mimeographing and hand-lettering publication. The Party is believed ir.icapable of replacing arre steal cadres. An estimated 75?jo of its membership would drop out as a result of the risks and hardships of underground existence. Automatic arrest lists now kept current, if used, would result in the arrest of about 1, 500 Communists and Soviet and Sabtellite people. Resistance Capabilities The Party is believed incapable of raising or operating a military resistance forces It lacks militarily experienced personnel. It lacks both the means and the money to obtain armsa Sabotage Aside from the Canal, Panama has no industries offering profitable targets for sabotage. U. S, forces in the Canal Zone could prevent sabotage to the Canal itaelfa It is possible, however, that asmall-acale program of sabotage against public utilities, coupled with a strike effort, could interfere with local food supply and the shipment of food products to the United States to some extent, and thereby result in some anrn,oyance to this country. The merchant fleet, although fourth largest in the world, could not be touched by the Panamanian. Communists, for the ships are foreign- owned, .are manned by non-Panamanian crews, a.nd seldom dock in Panama. E spianage The only significant esp~io~age targets in Panama are Ganal T?efenses and shipping. Tt is believed that security measures in the Canal Zone could be increased sufficiently to scotch any important espionage program mounted by either t1~:e Soviets or the Peopleas Partyo Subversion of Armed and Sec~n.rity Services Panama has no military forces Tt is not known. to what degree, if any, the Communists have ini'iltrated the :ranks of the IoTational Police. Leadership of the police is definitely anti-Gornmuni.sta Approved For R 'C90002-7 Approved For R eas 000 0$/27_:_CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Wartime Propaganda Although lacking equipmea~t for propaganda, the Communists might be able to play upon existing social and economic inequalities to engender friction between the Republic ,~.nd the U. So Exploitable issues area Higher wages paid to American workers in the Canal Zone as compared to Panamania~:~ workers. Lack of social security :for Panamanians in the Zone, Failure of the Government of Panama to solve problems of high prices, unemployment, and racial discrimination, Patriotic resentment of the tla S. power in Panama--particularly, the granting of bases to the LT. S. The Communists have a~tready infiltrated the important (7, 500 followers) Partido Frente Patrioticoo They do not control it, but in a crisis, they might be able to ~:ise it as a lever to push through legislation harmful to the Uo So Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For V .0002-7 Communist capabilities in Venezuela in the event of an East- West War would be very limited. 'Che Government would be pro-U. S. It would bear down hard on the Communists, who are divided between two opposing parties, the PCT (Partida Comunista de Venezuela) and the PRP ~(Partido Revolucionario del Proletariado Comunista). The PCV is itself internally divided into factions. Communist strength has been declining and is expected to continue to do so. The Parties are short of efficient cadres. The only real danger to U. S, interests would be sabotage of Venezue Lan petroleum production, and the Communists by themselves are believed to be incapable of interfering seriously in this. More dangerous would be joint Communist-Action Democratica (AD) operations, There have been rumors of Communist- AD cooperation, but thus far, no confirmation, Underground C)rganization The PCV is already underground, having been outlawed on 13 May 1950. Little is known about its underground organization or what plans, if any, have been madf; for clandestine operations in the event of an East-bleat War, The dissident PRPc is still legal, and has been trying to increase its strength in labor unions. No information is available on the existing internal communications system, Propagarnda Equipment The PCV has a clandest:ine press and distributing apparatus, Its current clandestine publications are irregular and of poor quality. There are enough Communists in the printing trade to ensure a supply of equipment and paper in wartime, but it would probably not be enough for a sustained, voluminous coverage Safe Space for Underground Cpperations The PCV seems to have: safe space for operations in its current undergraund existence, Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Re4eas~ 20AQa10$/27 ~_CIA-RRP7$~9..Q$~ 5.800020019 - - - Replacement of Cadre 0002-7 The Communists would. have considerable difficulty in replacing current leadership with unknown, but efficient, personnel. The present leadership is believed to be inefficient and internally divided. Several important functionaries have been ajiled or exiled. On the other hand, Government Security Services are not sufficiently effective to spot possible cadre replacements, In the event of war, this failure would be somewhat overcome by ini`ormation provided by Communists defect- ing for patriotic reasonsa Wartime Solvency Both the PCV and the F'RPc have been short of money even when legal, Some of the wealthier Communists, many of whom sit on the fence between the PCV and th;e PRPc, might furnish the movement with some funds. It is believed that the Communists would not be able to establish and maintain secret accounts, deposits, or dummy firms, Stren th and. Capabilities of t:he Hard Core The "hard core" expected to remain loyal to the Party in adverse conditions would consist of labor leaders and intellectuals. The effectiveness of the latter wo~xld probably be slight, because they are well-known and would either be arrested or put under close surveillance, Most of the rank and file would drift away from the Party in the event of an East-West War, Popular Appeal Communism has been l~~,tely losing its attraction for the Venezuelan people. Its political pulling power would be extremely small in the event of war. It is believed that no other existing political groups would side with the Communists in wartirn.e, Resistance operations Communist capability o:E creating a military organization is believed to be very slight, T:he Party has neither trained personnel nor substantial stores of arms and ammunition. Government services would be able to destroy any armed groups that appeared. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Rgle.~se.20Q010812Z.:CIA.RDPJS~.a-q'15R0002QD190002-7 Sabotage The prime target in the event of an East-West War would be the oil industry. The industry is row, and will always be, vulnerable to sabotage. However, the petroleum companies have made considerable progress in developing security against sabotage, and the Government security services are also raising their effectiveness in this respect. No information is available on any Communist plans or preparations for organized sabotage in the event of war. Subversion of Armed and Security Services No information is available on the extent to which the Communists have infiltrated the armed and security services, It is assumed to be small. The Government has probably not identified Communists in the services. A factor limiting Communist penetration in the event of expansion of Venezuelan forces would be that most conscripts would come from small towns and farming communities, where the Communists have not developed as much of a following as they have in the cities. Espionage It is believed that security measures imposed in the event of war would make it extremely difficult for the Communists to create and operate an espionage networks Prime target for Communist espionage would be the petroleum industry, not only for production figures, but also for singling out vulnerable targets far sabotage. Economic Warfare The Communists ~mostl~r those in the PRPc- are capable of effecting small strikes and. slow-downs, but nothing important enough to seriously disrupt the Venez?~elan economyo Wartime Propaganda Propaganda woa~.ld be aix~ned at c~.ttin.g off oil exports to the ZJ, S, and her allies. Suppression o:E the Cornmaznist press would make a strong anti-17'o S. propaganda campaign, Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-009158000200190002-7