COMMUNIST THEORY ON THE USE OF VIOLENCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001300230001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNIST THEORY ON THE USE OF VIOLENCE MU)
GUERRILLA WARFARE
1. General attitude. In Communist doctrine, the use of violence
for political objectives is entirely legitimate, practically unavoidable,
and indeed, although Communists usually seek to put another face upon
it. desirable. Lenin was fond of quoting the popular version of the
Clausewitz dictum that war is politics continued by other means and said
of it that "rightly, the Marxists have always considered this axiom as the
theoretical foundation for their understanding of the meaning of every
war."*
2. Legitimacy of violence. The same position is taken about violence
In wars Of "national liberation" and in situations that are not definable as
war between nations: in struggles short of insurrection, in the revolutionary
seizure of power, and in the consolidation of the revolution by destruction
of the counter-revolutionaries. Every form of struggle is legitimate.
The Communist movement. Lenin said, "does not tie its hands.... it
recognizes all methods of politica struggle, as long as they correspond
to the forces at the disposal of the party and facilitate the achievement
of the greatest results possible under the given condition."* Explicitly,
terrorism is considered perfectly legitimate:
"1-Ce have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we do so.
Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied,
or may even be essentkal in certain moments of Cie battle, under
certain conditions, and when the troops are in a certain condition..."
(Lenin)***
3. Necessity for violence. Lenin repeatedly stressed the use of
violence in the seizure of power. This was both a practical political
"Socialism and war," 1915.
** "Urgent tasks of the movement," 1900.
*** "V here to begin," 1901.
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consideration,based upon his conviction that the "class enamy' will
not der without a fight but rather at the decisive moment
resort to force in defense of its privileges. "* and it wis a psychological
dictated by Lenin's desire to intensify class hostility. The
state"? he said.
"cfanot be superseded by the prolatar
process of 'withering away,' but. as a general 0.
*violent revolution... The necessity of systematically
the manse. with this and precisely this view of violent revolution
lies at the root of all the teachings of Marx and Engels."**
4. .,,Ioitation of legitimacy of vi212t2stknoznatuni_i_it _movement.
In this way, Lenin posed the Illegitimacy of violence in resistance to
the legitimate use of violence by Cominurdats. Since his day, the
Communist movement has continued to base its judgmentson the criterion
of mdtich "class fits and which one loses by any given political action,
whether violent or non-violent. Thus, the movement both rationalises
and covers its preparations for violence and aggressive action by imputing
aggressive intentions to their chosen enemy, purposefully blurring in its
own interest the distinction between legitimate defense and aggression.
It also uses this device to deprive its victims and enemies of any right
to claim legitimacy for defensive measures they may take. Until at
least 1954, the CEPSU used the thesis of capitalist encirclement? to this
end throughout the world, placing upon free world Communists the
obligation to be prepared to use violence in defense of the USoR and the
socialist camp. This obligation, although no longer emphasized or even
stated, still exists. The 6 December 1960 Statement of eighty-one
Communist parties declared that the imperialists are preparingibr war,
** "The
rade
d revol
1917.
cra 1899.
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and particularly for war against the Communist bloc. This provides
a different but equally characteristic doctrinal premise with which
free world CP's can justify to their own members the build-up of their
capabilities for violence and guerrilla warfare, even if their true motive
is to prepare for local aggressive struggle.
S. Expediency of violence. Lenin viewed the question of the use of
violence as one of expediency. "There are conditions in which violence
is both necessary and useftd. and there are conditions in which violence
cannot produce any results."* Whether violence should be used is thus
not a matter of principle but a problem of tactical leadership, taking into
account forces, objectives, and timing. Lenin explicitely said that the
Bolsheviks had "rejected individual terror only out of considerations of
expediency"**--in ether words, 'individual terror" was poor politics.
6. Revolution as an art. Thie attitude derives from Lenin's conviction-.
and teaching--that uprising is an art, that is, a matter of technique, which
the Communist party had to master.( In making this point, he described
the necessary conditions for an uprising. He stated that it had to have
a broad class base, that the people had to be convinced of the need for
revolutionary measures (including violence). and that, the uprising had
to take place at a crucial point in the development of the revolutionary
situation.*** This statement is of great theoretical importance because it
establishes that the function of the party and of conspiratorial work by the
Communist movement before an uprising is to bring these conditions about
* "Successes and difficulties of the Soviet power". 1919.
*
"'Left-wing'Communism, an infantile disorder". 1920.
*** "Marxism and uprising". Collected Works, Vol. XXI. Bk pg.
224-229.
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ieben they do not develop spontaneously. Dependence upon spontaneity
has, of course, been systematically denounced by Lenin and the Communist
movement as opportunism and treason to the revolution.* Decisions on
the utility and necessity of violence in the build-up and seizure of power
In specific situations obviously are to be made In these terms. Up to
the moment when power is seized, violence, like other forms of struggle,
is useful U it can help build the mass base, promote the revolutionary
unsurge, and assist the Communist movement in predicting and if possible.
controlling the development of the required critical situation.
7. Condemnation of undiscriminatinA use of violence. Since the
preparation and conduct of a revolution is an art, it follows that the
Indiscriminate, unintelligent, or mechanical recourse to violence by
Communist parties has since Lenin's time logically been condemned as
"left adventuristn." This concept still remains valid. The Communist
Party of Iraq, for examplei was obliged Ili late 1959 to criticize its own
left advieinturist tendencies after the ltirkuk massacre of July 1959, which
occurred as a result of the party's recourse to violence to exert pressure
on the Qasim regime. As of the end of 1960. both the CPSU and the Chinese
party condemned left adventurism, although the targets of their criticisms
were different.
8. Violence in Communist seizure of power. Lenin emphasised violence
in the socialist revolution. He held that the possibility of "peaceful
development of the revolution" was "latElimli rare in history."** "13y way
of exception, in some small country, for instance, after the social revolution
had been accomplished in a neighboring big country. peaceful surrender
of power by the bourgeoisie is possible. if it is convinced that resistance is
hopeless ant it it prefers to save its skin."***
1117-7171;Zied Works Vol. II, Bk,. 1# pp 27.4-19.
eget "On compromises". 1917.
*** "A caricature of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economiszot ", 1916.
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9. Refinement of doctrine on the role of violence: the "force in bein
Since the middle of World War U the CPSU has tried to refine the doctrine
on the role of violence in seizures of power by developing new concepts.
which the Soviets embody in treatment of the "peaceful" road to
socialism. They have maintained since 1948 that the military and political
power of the USSR (and Dow of the whole bloc) constitutes what we would
call a "force in being." committed as a matter of principle to the defense
of any Communist regime once established. This. in theory, makes it
possible for some Communist parties to seise power without actual
recourse to armed struggle, provided the party itself succeeds in
organising sufficient armed force under its own control to inhibit local
? counterrevolutionary recourse to violence.--Thlir "force in being."
effective without even being committed to conflict, was represented by
workers militias in Czechcalovakia and by Communist-controlled reguTat
forces built up in Poland. Hungary, and the Balkans prior to 1948.
Events of 1949-1951 (Korea. Berlin) and of 1953-1954 (in Southeast Asia)
notwithstanding, this doctrine is again embodied in the December 1960
Statement of eighty-one Communist parties. (Characteristically, such
situations during the 19504 are now used to "prove" that imperialist
aggressions and efforts to precipitate a general war have been and can
be defeated:) Since at least 1955, there has been strong pressure upon
the free world Communist pArties--particularly in Asia. Africa, and Latin
America--to master these doctrines and to work out new ways of building ,
reliable armed strength, particularly by creating a pars-military
capability. This does not entail any abandonment of their long-standing
efforts at the subversion of the existing armed forces.
10. Current doctrinal specifications for "peaceful revolution". A
doctrinal reformulation of the specific prerequisites for achieving power
by "peaceful" mesas, based upon the principle of the force in being. has
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been hammered out in recent years. The CPSU adopted a thesis at its
20th Congress in 1956 that in "present day conditions the working class
in many, capitalist countries" may be able to carry out revolutions
without violence. The premise?that the enemy must be convinced
that it is hopeless to resist?is the same as Lenin's. But the CPSUes
elaboration of the thesis and derivative Soviet policies became of an
,
issue in the dispute between the CPSU and the Chinese Communists'.
The thesis was incorporated into the statement adopted by eighty-one
Communist parties in Moscow and published on 6 December 1.960. The
formulation in the statement, with its qualifiers and provisos, needs quoting
in full.
"Today in a number of capitalist countries the working class,
headed by its vanguard, has the opportunity, given a united working-
elass and popular front or other workable forms of agreement and
political co-operation between the different parties and public
organisations, to unite a majority of the people, win state power
without civil war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of
production to the hands of the people. Relying on the majority of
the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements incapable
of relinquishing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and
landlords, the working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular
forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament
from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie
? Into an instrument serving the wbrLIng. people, launch an extra-
parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary
forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realisation
of the socialist revolution. Alt this will be possible only by broad
and ceaseless development of the class struggle of the workers,
peasant masses and the urban middle strata against big monopoly
capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms, for peace
and socialism.
"In the event of the exploiting classes resorting to violence against
the people. the possibility of non-peaceful transition.to socialism
should be borne in mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms,
that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In this case
the degree of bitterness and the forms of the Class struggle will depend
not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up by the
reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the
people, on these circles using force at one or ether ?stage of the struggle
for socialism.
"The actual possibility of the one or the other way of transition
to socialism in each individual country Cepends on the concrete
historical conditions."
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11. Significance of The first paragraph validates
the *selective use of violence, where it is necessary to bring about the
conditions and actions prescribed for "peaceful" revolution. The last
two paragraphs reaffirm the legitimacy both of armed struggle and of
all measures to force the enemy to capitulate. There has in fact been
. ,
no doctrinal change since Lenin on the use of violence in non-revolutionary?
situations or in "national liberation." The 6 December Statement takes
no explicit doctrinal position on the use of violence in non-revolutionary
tor pre-revolutionary) situations, but it cites among other promising
developments, the recent Occurrence of "big woricing class strikes" and
the "powerful movement of the *peoPle. Tin Japan?/ against the Japanese-U.S.
military alliance."
IL Violence in "National Liberation" Struggles. Lenin wrote approvingly
?
. of "national wars of the colonies against Such wars are
"ineVitable, they are progressive and revolutionary. Lenin said.* and
they should be supported on condition that such a rebellion "is not a
rebellion of a reactionary class."** The 6 December Statement of eighty-one ,
Communist parties explicitly endorses "national liberation wars." as well
as struggle "by non-military methods, depending upon the specific conditions
in the country concerned." "National liberation wars" are viewed by the
Communists as valuable for undermining "imperialism" and for creating
conditions favorable for the eventual seizure of power by local Communist
IZIOVeraettta..
*The pamphlet by Junius." 1916.
**"Discussion on self-determination summed up." 1916.
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13. The problem of armed forces. As in the Communist seizure of
power, so in the preparation and conduct of wars of "national liberation."
the question of armed forces is a crucial one. The central theoretical
question has been whether the buildup of Communist armed force for a
takeover of power in an underdeveloped country, should be undertaken in
opposition to dominant nationalist forces or within the, framework of an
alliance with them. The growing number of such independent states,
many of which are dominated by anti-Communist nationalists, and the
obvious Soviet interest in exploiting to the full diplomatic. economic,
and military relationships with nationalist regimes are new facts
relating to the problem. The failures of Communist parties during the
19454951 period to achieve politically significant results either through
armed uprisings against national governments (India, 1948-1950;
Indonesia 1948, Malaya, Philippines, etc.) or through subversion
of the armed forces of the regime (Iraq, Iran, India, Indonesia, Pakistan,
- Brazil, etc.), -made it apparent that new approaches were required.
14. The 1955 thesis. The thesis on the 50th anniversary of the 1905
Russian revolution, propounded by the CPSU's Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin
Institute during 1955. made it clear that the Soviet leaders believed the
best opportunities lay in full exploitation of alliances for violent and radical
national revolutionary struggle. Using the abortive 1905 Russian revolution
as the precedent, the institute pointed out that, even when such national revolu-
tions failed, they nevertheless paved the way for Conununist seizure of
power.
15. Advice on the application of the 1955 thesis. Although authoritative
and explicit theoretical material on this questions is virtually unavailable.
the CPSU advice given secretly to the CP of Brazil at this time embodies
'
one critical concept. Pointing out the failure of the Brazilian party'.
?
revolutionary attempt in the 19304. it stated that the creation of substantial
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and reliable party-controlled armed force would be infinitely easier if the
party would help a radical nationalist, anti-imperialist government gain
power. Then. the CPSU pointed out, a campaign to "democratize" the
state-supported forces for defense against domestic counter-revolution
and external intervetttion, together with the subversion of the nationalist
regular forces and the grass-roots infiltration of local peoples' militia
units, could, over a period of time, give the party the violent action
capability it needed for taking power. Implicit in this strategy is the need
for creating and maintaining an atmosphere of national crisis which would
be sufficiently intense to override the momentary hesitations and fears of
"vacillating" nationalist allies until the final moment of crisis. At
this moment, with the Communist seizure of power, the vacillators
could be dispensed with. The approach also *ices a premium on the
- ability of the Communist party tocferate secretly as well as openly within
the national revolutionary forces, and both the Soviet and the Chinese
parties have directly helped free world CPs in recent years to develop
their capacity for secret work.
16. TIJIL)5?112esis as a guideline. The general approach embodied in
the 1955 thesis obviously represents a maximum program, whose main value
was that it set down terms and limits within which a Communist party could
develop its long-range work no matter howunfavorable its initial position
might be. Many such parties have long carried on covert programs to
infiltrate national armed forces, notably in Brazil. Egypt, Syria, India.
Iran and Indonesia. The emergence of popular reeistattce organizations in
Syria. Iraq, and Lebanon during real or concocted crises (1956-1959) did in
fact show that the Conant:321st parties bad the will and ccpability to apply
the 1955 ideas, but in tAcs case except that of Cuba has the party been able to
maintain the advantage it initially won. The promotion of alliance with
radical nationalist forces can be, and since 1955 has been, undertaken with
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varying success both where these forces were in opposition to the existing
government (Cuba, Iraq, Algeria, Black Africa) and where these forces
already dominated a nationalist government (Syria, Indonesia. UAB).
17. Theory and practice in Communist commitment to violence.
In theory, Communist parties should support any violent anti-imperialist
revolutionary struggle in underdeveloped countries, but in fact many
parties have been cautious in committing themselves. When the 26 July
Movement launched its guerrilla war in Cuba. the Cuban CP remained
in the background and did not commit itself to armed struggle for some time.
The Algerian CP. too, refrained from offering its support to the ALN for
several months after violence began. The Communist Party of China,
?'however, has consistently maintained that such struggles deserve prompt
? and fah support by Communists. The Chinese have also been more willing
than the other bloc parties over the past six years... and particularly since
1958?to commit China to the support of guerrilla struggles on the part
of national liberation movements. They maintain that such unqualified support
is a responsibility that the Communist parties cannot reftiseaf Communist'
takeovers of power are eventually to be achieved. The meager available
evidence suggests that the more cautious CPSU has favored a conspiratorial
effort during the hazardous initial period of nationalist armed uprising, a
program of covert infiltration and manipulation of the top leadership of
nationalist forces. The CPSU appears to believe that this is primarily a
task for individual local and foreign Communists.freqUently secret party
members or persons not in contact with the local party?rather than for
the Communist party itself. This appears to have been the case in Iraq
and Cuba., The technique is not new; it was apparently employed in
Indonesia between 1945 and the Madiact uprising in 1948.
18. Infiltration of nationalist forces. The initial conspiratorial effort
may be very small, but it assumes additional isziportance at the moment
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when the local Communist party commits itself to the support of armed
struggle. Its importance again increases when the national revolutionary
effort succeeds in overthrowing the existing regime, whether through a
coup d'etat or through successful guerrilla warfare. In the stage prior
. to the oveithrow of the existing regime, Communists who have penetrated
the leadership of nationalist forces can inject Communist organisational
doctrine into the operations of these forces and assist members of the
Communist party to acquire positions in them, so that the Communists may be
able to exert influence and to protect and assist the CP in its own activities.
After the overthrow, these individuals can use their influence to commit
the new nationalist regime to radical programs of violence of direct value
to the Communist drive for power, such as the operation of military tribanals,
the expulsion, discrediting, replacement, and liquidation of the main
Communist enemies, and the adoption of radical courses in foreign policy.
There is also reason to believe that in some instances they play an important
role by providing the leaders of the new government with information?true
or false?intended to provoke or justify the adoption of specific violent
measures which favor the extension of Communist influence and block any
possibilities of reconciliation of the nationalist leaders with erstwhile
opponents or the major Western powers.
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19. Problem of Communist participation in the nationalist power. As
the events in Syria, Egypt, Iraq. and Cuba since 1957 chow, a crucial
point occurs in the build-up of Communist capability for armed struggle
within a national revolutionary regime when the Communist party demands,
as a "democratic" right. recognition. legality, and a share in state power.
This first point of crisis has posed theoretical problems for the inter-
national Communist movement as far back as 19Z6-19Z7, when, in China,
the break between the CPC and the 'Kuomintang developed. Before 1954,
it was generally accepted on the basis of post World Thar 11 experience
that these demands could be made successfully either in, the course of a
national liberation war, in the final stages of a successful civil war, or
with the protection and support of Soviet troops. Actual armed struggle
by Communist forces or the open employment of military power was
inevitably a key factor in these theories. In the past six years, however,
considerable attention has been devoted to theories on peaceful ways to the
seizure of power. Theories eschewing recourse to violent struggle have
been advanced, but in the Moscow declaration of 1957 and the 1960 Statement
they have been generally repudiated as unacceptable revisionism.
ZO. Solution to the jsrotlam--"democratization". Other theories have
given priority to more flexible and subtle forms of anti-imperialist struggle,
and insisted that anti-imperialist forces deserved supportleven when the
nationalist leaders were anti-Communist in local matters. This line has
placed a great premium on secret infiltrations and on the activity of front
groups as a means of evading and eventually eliminating local anti-Communism.
But since 1957 another doctrine has been advanced, with which the CPSU
has now openly identified itself in the 1960 Statement. Communist debates
from 1958 through 1960 over the role of bourgeois nationalists have called
attention to a new and undesirable development which threatens the validity
of the whole Communist approach to winning power through the radical
nationalist alliance. As expressed in the 1960 Statement, it is the tendency
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of "certain nationalists" to use demogogy, radical policies, and regular
military forces to strengthen their own domestic power positions to the
detriment of the Communiet party. Pakistan. India. Indonesia, the
UAR, and the Sudan are all obviously referreii to. In 1961 the Indonesian
and Syrian parties have made explicit criticisms along these lines of
certain radical policies adopted in the past by their governments, and the
"democratization" of the armed forces has been demanded by several
parties. Such a development is obviously undesirable from the Communist
point of view and, in consequence, Communist parties are now committed
In the 1960 Statement to demand that nationalism be not only radical and
anti-imperialist, but also 'democratic". That is, nationalist regimes
must give Communists and Communist parties the freedom arid authority
which--short of a seizure of power?they seek. The right to bear arms
and command units, whether in the regular or para-military forces, is
obviously one of these "democratic" rights the Communists demand.
21. Plruressive radicalization. The Communist program for the
increasing radicalization of the internal and foreign policies of a nationalist
regime has a definite logic. As a Cuban Communist leader said at the
Moscow Conference in December, 1960, progressive radicalization of
nationalist policies accelerates" and "deepens" the revolution. In
international questions radicalism is essential if nationalism is to lead to
Increased hostility to Western powers and the eventual "merger of anti-
imperialism with socialist revolutions." In many cases national Communist
parties have sought to "radicalize" nationalist government foreign policies
by agitation and the use of violence (India's 1955 "peaceful" invasion of
Goa), by support and pressure for the implementation of particular radical
policies (e.g.. UAR. nationalization of the Suez Canal and of British bases,
support of violent colonial liberation struggles in Africa by the VAR. Iraq,
Morocco), and by exploiting irredentism (India?Kashmir and Goa;
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Indonisia--West Irian). The promotion and exploitation of radical
nationalist support in Latin America for Puerto Rican independence and
for the nationalization of the Panama Canal are currently both major
Communist themes, as the March 1961 Conference on National Independence
La Mexico City reveals. The radical international policies of the Cuban
regime have full Communist backing; so do those of Guinea.
22. Bloc sueport. The Communist parties of the Soviet bloc, further-
more, are committed to supplementing the efforts of local Communist
_
parties and supporting violent anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle, as
the 6 January 1961 speech of N. S. Khrushchev shows. But like the free
world Communist parties at the national level, most bloc parties--
particularly the CPSU?seek to do this without sacrifice of their own
independence of action, without adopting a course of action which entails
a serious risk of becoming directly embroiled in a war. This hazard
presented itself in 1956 at the time of the Suez crisis.
23. Consolidation and defense of Communist power. After the
Communists have seized power. Lenin taught, violence is still more
necessary to destroy all resistance. A ruthless dictatorship is required.
"Firstly, capitalism cannot be defeated and eradicated without
the ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, who
cannot at once be deprived of their wealth, of their advantage of
organization and knowledge, and consequently for a fairly long
period will inevitably try to overthrow the hated rule of the poor;
secondly, every great revolution, and a socialist revolution in
particular, even if there were no external war, it inconceivable with-
out internal war, i.e.. civil war, which is even more devastating than
external war, and involves thousands and millions of cases of wavering
and desertion from one side to another, implies a state of extreme
indefinitnesse lack of equilibrium and chaos."*
"The immediate tasks of the Soviet government". 1919.
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24. Current doctrine on consolidation. Current doctrine also holds
that power acquired must never be surrendered. Thus, the suppression
? of tb.e uprising of 1956 in Hungary was called by the CPS.; "the only correct
course to take", the fulfillment of "our international duty".* The
dictatorship of the proletariat, once established, is committed to the use
of necessary violence, unrestricted by law, in order to destroy the
domestic enemy, to make counterrevolution impossible, and to defeat
invasion from abroad. In the USSR. the CPSU maintains a plan and a
nucleus around which Communist partisan forces can be organized in
the event of general war. In early 1957 Soviet doctrine held that modern
military technology made the use of guerrilla forces more, rather than
less, important in the event of war and that success depended upon the
adequacy of preparations made before the outbreak of hostilies. This view
was conveyed to some free world Communists receiving training at the
CPSUts Higher Party School in Moscow.
25. Discrimination in the use of violence in consolidation. In
consolidating power, the use of violence is highly selective. It is directed
mainly at the discrediting of opposition political forces, at disrupting those
military forces that the CP cannot control, and at the liquidation of the
few groups and persons who can provide centers for organizing resistance
and counterrevolution. The term "salami tactics" has been applied to
describe the successive use of violence against the various sources of
potential opposition, beginning with those groups which are both the most
serious threats and most easily disposed of. Theoretical arguments have
arisen in the bloc parties on this question, particularly after the events in
Hungary and Poland. Conservative Communist theoreticians have in the
past criticized certain Communist parties (that of Poland, for example)
for their failure to be consistent and thorough in liquidating potential
opponents of the regime. Examples of the effective use of revolutionary
tribunals and security forces to eliminate and completely destroy potential
Pravda, 23 November 1956.
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nuclei Of resistance have been much quoted, and events in Cuba and
Iraq show that the advice has been accepted. Differences still exist
within the movement, however, over the question of how far the use of
such selective violence should be carried. The present Polish and
Hungarian party leadership. for example, have been most insistent that
such violence should be used sparingly, and that unnecessary continuation
of its use can only result in failure in the long run..
- 26. Violence in an unconquered part of a national state. In certain
countries/-such as-Viet Nam?the Communist regime which has consolidated
its control over a portion of national territory maintains and uses an
elaborate organization to conduct partisan warfare in the territory that
rernaini unconquered. The role of violence in such situations can vary
appreciably with changes in Communist general strategy and the fortunes
of war. Para-military mobile forces may be maintained, and committed
periods of aggressive pressure or crisis. In other circumstances, the
. ,
use of violence may be reduced to local terrorist threats and attacks;
? ,.clashes with defending free world forces in order to provoke the latter to
carry out punitive operations against the local populati,n; and the use of
\,
assassination and sabotage to sow defeatism and panic. Even the USSR
and other European bloc governments. in spite of their proclaimed belief
that the domestic basis for effective counterrevolution no longer exl,sts,
continue under present conditions to use violence against leaders of
refugee organizations of their nationals abroad.
27. The problem of liquidating a Communist military capability. The
experience of the Greek and Malayan civil wars shows that, even in the
event of a general defeat of an attempted seizure of power. a Communist
revolutionary goverra*nt, basing itself on bloc soil, will try to continue
partisan-guerrilla struggle. Justifying the abandonment of such a struggle
poses serious theoretical problems. In its 1960 campaign against "right
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opportunism" and Khrushchev, the Chinese CP gave considerable publicity
to its conviction that a Communist party must never voluntarily liquidate
a capability for armed struggle once it is organized. The Chinese quoted
their own experience of 1946-1949 to prove the validity of the doctrine.
But Communist parties never accept responsibility for such military
disasters. In most such situations specific party leaders aro eventually
made scapegoats, accused of strategic and tactical errors, and in some
cases even accused of collaborating with the enemy. 'Where the Communist
party cannot (or will not) dispense with its existing leaders and fails to
win from its enemy the minimum political concessions and general amnesty
those leaders demand as a condition for the cessation of irregular warfare.
the Communist forces feel obliged to continue violent struggle, if only in
a symbolic form. There may be divergent views within the Communist
movement of what the necessary minimum conditions for abandoning armed
struggle should be in any specific case. This is, for example, a problem
in Burma and Malaya. In Laos the minimum demands advanced in 1954
were raised when the Pathet Lao reverted in 1960 to armed struggle, and
that organization now appears deter ed to persist in armed struggle unless
it receives guarantees of the integrity f its forces and recognition of its
political role in a "neutral" Laos.
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