THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001400190001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release : gliMiga78-00915R0014001-00-0
5 RUG 1964
THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
Introduction
The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) is the largest Communist ,
party outside the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party
and of be youth organisation totals 3.250.000.
As a legal party, its members hold positions in government service
at an levels, up to cabinet positions just below fan ministerial rank. It
directs several important mass organizations.
Partai Marba is an avowedly nationalist Communist party, otherwise
differing little from the PICI. Not a mass party, a number of its members
have political influence due to personal prestige.
Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese
Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Organ*
iaations (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citiseaship
(BAPERK1).
IL The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) Apparatus.
Strengthz
Claimed 2.000,000
Estimated 1.750.000
Distributions ?
Central :siva
East Java
600.000
650,000
Also strong in plantation and oil centers of Sumatra.
Character 3
A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological
level of the rank and file is low, but an extensive and systematic party
training program is having some effect in developing second and third level
leaders.
Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the
pOlit.bareatt. No open dissension has been observed although some strains
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may be occurring under the impact of the Lino-Soviet dispute. Personal
direction by politbureau and central cornrnittee members of secretariat
and mass organization work ensures central control.
Some secret party members have been identified and there are
probably many more. An illegal party structure paralleling the legal
party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried en covertly
intt lot local, tactical purposes.
UI. Principal Propaganda Media
Harlan Rakjat the PM official daily newspaper
Circulation 58, 000
Bintang Timur party.line paper. bat mot formally partr.esatrelled.
Circulatios 25.000
Bletang Merab PKI monthly theoretical journal.
W. Party Assets in Government
tieetoral Strength:
1955 general dlection 4.000.000 votes
1957 municipal election
(incomplete) 7. 200,000 votes
The party in Ow 1955 election wae-fourth nationally and third
ia Java.
Cabinet:
No PKI members in inner cabinet.
2 PKI members were appointed in February 1942 to stewiy created ,
-State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank. Howsrver. the
Party considers the Cabinet :sorsa:A:scion of February 1962 ? net setback.
Cotes& Rojong Parliament:
43 PKI representatives
20 &actions' r?PressystatiVes who are PKImembbere.
. -aumedio." ?JD
whilst I- , DOS
,4,3111, Ot
addiftia* 1 to
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Supreme Advisory Council:
A PKI representatives
6 fUnctional, representatives who arc PKI members.
National Planning Councils
16-22 PKI-controlled members out of 77.
Civil Service:
30% of civil service workers an claimed as members of affiliates
of the Communist trade union federation. Central Organisation of Labor of
AU Indonesia. (SOBSI)
PKI participation in regional governments is most pronounced in East
and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities in local
councils. There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other
provinces, particularly in Sumatra.
Y. Party Assets in Civic Institutions
The PKI controls a number of mass organizations through fractions
within them at both the central and riegiona,1 levels. Of the important CMOs
only the Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBS!), the labor
front, does not have a department in the PKI secretariat devoted to its
affairs. PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Polithareas
inesobers and other PKI members in the organization's central. offices.
Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI)
Claimed membership 3,033.000
Affiliate of WFTU
Principal areas of strength
Oil, estate, transportation and cornmenicatina and
public work* workers. (Java. Sumatra and Celebes.)
? Four of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and
lecretary.general. are PEI members.
SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organisations
In Indonesia. It has a potential capacity for tying up communications and
disrupting economic life through strikes and demonstrations.,
Youth Organisations
PEMUDA RAMIAT (People's Youth)
Claimed membership ' 1.250,000
Principal strength in Java
Affiliate of WFDY and has permanent representative
at WYDY headquarters.
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Pemuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance to the
PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. It is
militant and its members have played a leading part in anti?Western
demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers. initially 100# 000,'
for the liberation of West Irian. Pemuda Rakjatla membership is draws
principally from youth of the working class.
Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements. (CGIO)
Claimed membership - -3,000.5.000
Affiliate of IUS
Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers
through infiltration of targer, non-Communist student organisations.
COM membership is much more solidly Communist than
Is the case in most fronts. For example. Mt but 2 of 22 officers chosen
by the Godja Made CGMI branch in March LW were PKI members.
Indonesian Peasant Movement (ETI)
Claimed membership (1959) More than 4.000,000
Not affiliated with WFTU but has seat delegates to
International conferences sponsored by WFTU.
Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and
North Sumatra.
The DTI is the PKI instrument for grass roots organising
and propaganda activity, in the countryside. It endeavors to substitute itself
for appointed officials in local administration and was the instigator of some
recent peasant disturbances.
Indonesian Laaraeals Movement (GER WANI)
Claimed membership 800.000 (Jannary1961)
Affiliate of WIDF
Principal usefulness to the PKI is as a propaganda
instrument. GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non.Commenist
women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National
Federation of Women's Organisations.
The League for People's Culture (LEKRA)
Claimed membership more than 60.000_ (February 1962).
9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra. i1 in Borns*
Has close contacts with both III'S and WirDY and work,
with friendship societies and peace movement.
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LEKRA is the most active cultural organization in
Indonesia, performing functions which have been neglected by the
Ministry of Education, Training. and Culture. It has given a Marxist
coloration to much of Indonesian current writing and promotes attacks
against European and U. S. cultural activities. LEKRA sent $ delegates
to the Afro.Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent in 195$ and participated
in ? similar coaference at Cairo in early 1962.
Indonesian Peace Committee (IPC)
No membership figures available
1952 Stockholm Appeal 217.496 signatures
1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650.000 signatures
Claims 66 branches of which SS are in Java.
The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most
Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the orgAttised
peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread sapport
in all sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders.
A (re-/. sian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
The AAPSO, a Communist-directed instrument for
fomenting the national liberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian
concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefore
.joys wide support in Indonebia, including the poditive endorsement
of President Sukarno. A PM member is this permanent representative of
Indonesia on the secretariat in Cairo.
Friendship Societies
Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist
bloc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives
and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for
ail the countries of the bloc except Albania. PM Members participate in
their leadership and activities as do Partai Murba tenders. Most of this
activity is in Java, although the Indonesian-Chins** society claims 19
branches in Sumatra and the Indonesiaa*Soviet society bas branches in
Sumatra and Bali.
VI. International Ties
The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its leaders have
spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet thaion,,
and party policy has generally been consistent with the Soviet line. There
are signs that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22?11
""819@swggh,
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Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions
on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own
basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy
requirements over its own national interests is a key question under
debate.
Partai Murba
Claimed strength
Principally in Java
Electoral strength (1955)
175.000
225.000 votes
ihartai Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist
Party. Other than its rejection of international ties the Murba policies
are indistinguishable from those tif:the PKI. It has no significant mass following
but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of
its leaders and their associations with Sukarno.
VIII. Overseas Chinese
Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through
the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the
PKI. This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings
of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion
with which the government already regards the Chinese minority.
Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI)
Estimated membership 50,000
BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the
rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the
membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the
Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and
loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a
particular appeal, to Chinese youth.
Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH)
A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous
business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and
property rights. CHCTITIli accepts direction from the Chinese Communist
Embassy, having severed its former KMT ties. It occasionally acts
as sa instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing
policy towards the overseas Chinese.
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IX. ialetives and Tactics
Since the present leaders took over control of the Portal &muftis
Indonesia (PIG) after the ill-fated Igadiun uprising in 1948, the
Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building
both a mass party and a broad following, emphasizing legal political
activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno.
This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would
bring them increasing influence as their political activities were
unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It
has been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic
and foreign, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain
power, either through constitutional electoral procedures or through
their admission by President Sukarno to a share of power at the
cabinet levet. To maintain this quasi-alliance, the Plia has brought
itself to accept some presidential actions which must have been distasteful;
e:g. the decrees severely Limiting all political party activity and, more red.
cently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's
demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitutional
principles of Pantjasila, which incleci affirmation of a belief in God.
President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the
political leaders around him, has accepted the PKI's cooperation as
a means of maintaining his own political position vis-a-vis other
potential power center': at the IMMO time measures have been taken
that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to ? point
where it might endanger his government. To this end the President has
accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force in the
country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political.
or the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party
for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to
approach closely enough to Coriimunist programs to forestall Communist
exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support.
The Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism and anti.colonialism is in
accord with Communist polity but it also appeals to strong public feeling
which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program
of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and
industrialization are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist
thunder. These efforts have, however, not bees effective.
The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's calculations
oil has been the unexpected flexibility of the PKI in adjusting itself to these
?
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measures. The party has been able to endorse Sukarno's objectives
while retaining freedom to criticise deficiencies in their implementation.
The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance permits the
Communists to capitalize on the resulting popular discontent while still
endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicised intentions of the government.
To a considerable degree the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal
by borrowing Marxist programs has only serried to give tho Communist
objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the PK'
of these key issues for exploitation.
The Communists have also been able in some cases to pressure
the government into more extreme positions or to hastier actions than it
might otherwise have taken. Intransigence on West Irian may well
-
alienate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence
upon the Communist bloc from which escape would be very difficult.
Yet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies
and programs of national mobilisation the government has felt compelled
? to adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces
against the rival claims of the PIM
The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprise*
by the unauthorised action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But
these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled
to step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it had not planned
and for which it was not prepared. The economic dislocation caused by
these events has made the government vulnerable to new PKI pressures.
In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of
cooperation and competition between the government and the PK/ which
each has carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more
nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President.
The PM has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position
of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian
affairs is stronger than ever. The government has found itself steadily
drawn into positions on both the national and international level which are
ever closer to the Communist program, more dependent upon Communist
support, and increasingly estranged from non..Cornxnunist forces. The
key point in this process was perhaps reached with the adoption.in 1960
Of the NASAKOM (nationalist, religious. Communist) formula which
established as a matter of principle the right of the PKI to equal represent*
atlas at all levels of the country's political and economic structure. The
most recent development in the process was the Peesident'a *pooch at
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the PIC 7th Congress in April 196Z in which he denounced ?anti?
Communist phobias- and gave the Plti his full endorsement as loyal,
patriotic, nationalist revolutionaries. Other hopes, that this process
might inspire a nationalist, TITOIST trend in the Commtmist party
leadership, have also been disappointed, for the PKI is one et OW most
epos advocates of international Comxmmiat
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15 AUG 1962
THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONE61A
I. Introduction
The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) is the largest Communist
party outside the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party
and of its youth organization totals 3.250,000.
As a legal party, its members hold positions in government service
at all 1eveL, up to cabinet positions just below lull ministerial rank. It
directs several important mass organizations.
Partai Murba is an avowedly nationalist Communist party, otherwise
differing little from the PKI. Not a mass party, a number of its members
have political influence due to personal prestige.
Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese
Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Organ..
isations (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citiseaship Body.
(11APERKI).
U. The Partal Komunis Indonesia (PHI) Apparatus.
Strength:
Claimed 2.000.000
Estimated 1.750.000
Distribution: ?
Central Java
East Java
600.000
650.000
Also strong in plantation and oil centers of Sumatra.
Character:
A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological
Level of the rank and Ale is low, but an extensive and systematic party
training program is having some effect in developing second and third Level
leaders.
Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the
petit-bureau. No open dissension has been observed although some strains
"IfflieMess
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may be occurring under the impact of the Sitio-Soviet dispute. Personal
direction by politbureau and central committee members of secretariat
and mauls organization work ensures central control.
Some secret party members have been identified and there are
probably many more. An illegal party structure paralleling the legal
party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried on covertly
41 for Weal, tactical purposes.
IU, Principal Propaganda Media
Marian Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper
Circulation 511, 000
Bintang Timm party-tine paper, but not formally party...cos:trolled.
Circulation 25, 000
!listens kferah PKI monthly theoretical journal.
IV. Party Assets in Government
Electoral Strength:
1955 general election
.1957 municipal election
(incomplete)
in Urn.
6,000.000 votes
7, 200,000 votes
The party in sltz 1955 election wad fourth nationally and third
Cabinet:
No PKI members in inner cabinet.
2 PKI members were appointed in February 1,962 to newly created
State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank. However, the
Party considers the Cabinet reorgaeisation of February l9412 a net setback.
astens Rojong Parliament:
43 MCI representatives
20 functional representatives who sr. PKI grifirdierts
Elg',1144
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Supreme Advisory Council:
fl PM representatives
6 fUnctionat representatives who are PM members.
National Planning Council;
16-12. PM-controlled members out of 77.
Civil Service:
30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affiliates
ef the Communist trade union federation. Central Organization of Labor of
AU Indonesia. (L501351)
PM participation in regional governments is most pronounced in East
and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities in local
councils. There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other
provinces, particularly in Sumatra.
Y . Party Assets in Civic Institutions
The PM controls a number of mass organizations through fractions
within them at both the central and regional levels. Of the important ones
only the Central Organization of Laber.of AU Indonesia (SOBSI), the labor
front, does not have a department in the PM secretariat devoted to its
affairs. PKI control and use of SOBSI is effected by two Politbareas
members and other PK' members in the organization's central offices.
Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBSI)
Claimed membership 3,033,000
Affiliate of WFTU
Principal areas of strength
Oil, estate, transportation and commanicaties and
public works workers. (Java. Sumatra and Celebes.)
Your of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and
Secretary...moral, are PM members.
SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organisations
in Indonesia. It has a potential capacity for tying up communications sad
disrupting economic life through strikes and demonstrations.
Youth Organisations
PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth)
Claimed membership 1.250.000
Principal strength in Java
Affiliate of WFDY and has permanent representative
at lifIrDY koadgeertere.
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Pemuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance to the
PKI and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. It is
militant and its members have played a leading part in anti.Westerts
demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers, initially 100,000.
for the liberation of West Irian. Pamuda Rakjatss membership in drawn
principally from youth of the working class.
Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements. (CGMI)
Claimed membership 3, 000.5, 000
Affiliate of WS
Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers
throe& tafiltration of larger. non.Communist student orgattisations.
CGMI membership is much more solidly Communist than
Is the case is most fronts. For example, all but 2 of 22 officers chosen
by the Gadja Mada CGMI branch in March 1961 were PKI members.
Indonesian Peasant Movement (DTI)
Claimed membership (1959) More thee 4, 000, 000
Not affiliated with WFTU but has sent delegates to
international conferences sponsored by WFTU.
North Sumatra.
Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and
The BTI is the PEI instrument for grass roots organising
and propaganda activity, in the countryside. It endeavors to substitute itself
for appointed officials in local administration, and was the instigator of sena*
reqeat peasant disturbances.
Inaonesiee IVIAneuls Movement (GER WANI)
Claimed membership 800,000 (January 1969 +
Affiliate of wrzir
Principal usefulness to the PIC is as a propaganda
r instrument. GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non?Commaaist
women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National
Federation of Women's Organisations.
The League for People's Culture (LEKRA)
Claimed membership more than 60.000 (February 1962)
9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra, #18 Bonk.*
Has close contacts with both IU8 sad WFDT and works
with friendship societies and peace movement.
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LEKRA is the most active cultural organieation is
Indonesia, performing functions which have been neglected by the
Ministry of Education. Training, and Culture. It has given a Marxist
coloration to much of Indonesian current writing and promotes attacka
against European and U. S. cultural activities. LEKRA seat 11 delegates
to the Afro?Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent la 19511 and participated
Is ? similar conference at Cairo in early 1962.
Indonesian Peace Committee (IPC)
No membership figures available
1952 Stockholm Appeal 217,496 signatures
1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650.000 signatures
Claims 66 branches of which 55 are in Java.
The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most
Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organized
peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread smart
in ali sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders.
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
The AAP60, a Communist-directed instrument for
fomenting the national liberation movement fits neatiy into Indonesian
concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefore
? et)joys wide support in Indoneiia, including the poditive endorsement
of President Sukarno. A PKI member is the permanent representative of
Iadotiksia en the secretariat in Cairo.
Friendship Societies
Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist
bloc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives
and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for
all-the countries of the bloc except Albania. PKI members participate in
their leadership and activities as do Partai &barbs leaders. Most of this
activity is in Java although the Indonesian-Chinese society claims 19
branches in burnatra and the Indonesian.Soviet society has branches in
Sumatra and Bali.
VI. International Ties
The PKI has Long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its leaders have
spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union,
and party policy has generally been aonsistent with the Soviet Use. There
are algae that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22nd
ot
legipppg, %atom
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atiaWei&
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Congress of the CPSU, the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions
on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own
basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy
requirements over its own national interests is a key question trader
debate.
VU. Partai Murba
Claimed strength
Principally in Java
Electoral strength (1955)
175,000
225.000 votes
1)artal Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist
Party. Other than its rejection of international ties the Mahe policies
are indistinguishable from those Of the PKI. It has no significant mass following
but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal prestige of
its leaders and their associations with Sukarno.
VIII. Overseas Chinese
Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through
the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the
PKI. This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-Chinese feelings
of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion
with which the government already regards the Chinese minority.
Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI)
Estimated membership 50,000
BAPERKI was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the
rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the
membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the
Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and
loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a
particular appeal to Chinese youth.
Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH)
A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous
business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and
property rights, CHCTTilli accepts direction from the Chinese Communist
Embassy, having severed its former KMT ties. It occasionally acts
as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing
policy towards the overseas Chinese.
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IX. 2jecttves and Tactic.
Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Kamm,/
Indonesia (PKI) after the Ill. fated Madiun uprising in 1948. the
Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building
both a Mali party and a broad following, emphasising legal political
activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno.
This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) would
bring them increasing influence as their political activities were
unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It
has been gaols purpose to influence government policy, both domestic
and foreign, toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain
power, either through constitutional electoral procedures or through
their admission by President Sukarno to a share of power at the
cabinet level. T6 maintain this quasi-alliance, the PKI hay brought
itself to accept some presidendal actions which must have been distasteful;
e:g, the decrees severely limiting all political party activity and, more re.
canny, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's
demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitutional .
principles of Patttjasils, which include' affirmation of a belief in God.
President Sukarno on Ms part, together with a number of the
political leaders around him, has accepted the PKI's cooperation as
a means of maintaining his own political position vu-avis other
potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken
that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point
where it might endanger his government. To this end the President has
...accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force in the
country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political
or the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party
for public support, the government's policies hay* been calculated to
approach closely enough to Communist programs to forestall Communist
exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support.
The Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism and anti-colonialism is in
accord with Communist policy but it also appeals to strong public feeling
which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program
of Land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and
industrialiaation are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist
thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective.
The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's calculations
off has been the unexpected flexibility of the Pla in adjusting itself to these
se
iftt,"1090116
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measures. The party has been able to endorse Sukarno's objectives
while retaining freedom to criticise deficiencies in their implementation.
The steady deterioration of the economy for instance, permits the
Communists to capitalize on the resulting popular discontent while still
endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicised intentions of the government.
To a considerable degree the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal
by borrowing Marxist programs has only served to give the Communist
objectives au official blessing without at the same time depriving the PIII
of these key issues for exploitation.
The Communists have also been able in some cases to pressure
the government into more extreme positions or to hastier actions than it
might otherwise have taken. Intransigence on West Man may well.
alienate Indonesia completely from the West and drive it into a dependence
upon, the Communist bloc from which except: would be Very difficult.
Tet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies
and programs of national mobilisation the government has felt compelled
to adopt to maintain its position Al the ludo, a domestic political forces
against the rival claims of the PKL
The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises
by the unauthorized action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But
these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled
to step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it bed not planned
and for which it was not prepared. The economic dislocation caused by
these events has made the govertument vulnerable to now PKI pressures.
In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of
cooperation and competition between the government and the pla which
each has carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more
nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President.
The PK/ has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position
of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian
affairs is stronger than ever. The government has found itself steadily
drawn into positions on both the national and international level whidt are
ever closer to the Communist program, more dependent upon Communist
support, and increasingly estranged from non..Corruzunist forces. The
key point in this process was perlutpe reached with the adoption in 194._
of the NASAICOM (nationalist, religious, Communist) formula which
established as a matter of principle the right of the PKI to equal represent*
alio* at all levels of the couutry's political and economic structure. The
most recent development in the process was the President's speech at
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the PKI 7th Congress in April 19152 in which he danounced
Communist phobias" and gave the Mt his full endorsement as loyal*
patriotic, nationalist revolutionariee. Other hopes, that this process
might inspire a nationalist. TITOIST trend is the Communist party
leadership, haw also been disappointed, for the PKI is ass of the utast
op** advocates of international Communist salty.
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1 5 AUG 1962
THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
I. Introduction
The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PM) is the largest Communist
party outside the Communist bloc. Claimed membership of the party
and of its youth organization totals 3.250.000.
As a legal party, its members hold positions in government service
at an levels, up to cabinet positions just below fall ministerial rank. It
directs several important mass organizations.
Partai Murba is an avowedly estionalist Communist party, otherwise
differing little from the PKI. Not a mass party, a number of its member*
have political influence due to personal prestige.
Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed by the Chinese
Communist Embassy through the Federation of Overseas Chinese Orgasm.
iaations (CHCTTH) and the Indonesian Consultative Citiasaship Body.
(BAPERKI).
U. The Parts. Komunts Indonesia (PR Apparatus.
Strength:
Claimed 2,000,000
Estimated 1,750.000
Distributions.
Central Java
East Java
600,000
650,000
Also strong in plantation and oil centers of Sumatra.
Character:
A mass party with trained and dedicated leadership. The ideological
Level of the rank and file is low, but an extensive and systematic party
training program is having some effect in developing second and third level
Leaders.
Leadership is concentrated in a small, compact group in the
potit*bureas. No open dissension has been observed although some strains
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taileau
may be occurring under the impact of the Sine-Soviet dispute. Personal
direction by politbureau and central committee members of secretariat
and mass organisation work ensures central control.
Some secret party members have been identified and there are
probably many more. An illegal party structure paralleling the legal ?
party is believed to exist. Some paramilitary action is carried en *overtly
bItt for Weal, tactical purposes.
Principal Propasanda Media
Harlan Rakjat the PKI official daily newspaper
Circulation
Bintang Tim= party-line paper, but not for fly party.centrelled.
Circulation 25.000
BintankMerah PKI monthly theoretical joraa1.
IV. Party Assets in Government
Zleetoral Strengths
1955 general ilection
1957 mualcipal election
(incomplete) 76200,000 votes
54,000
La Java.
6.000.000 votes
The party in MK 1955 election wag fourth nationally and third
Cabinet:
No PKI members in inner cabinet.
2 PKI members were appointed in February 1962 to newly created
,?State Leadership positions just below full ministerial rank. However, the
Party considers the Cabinet reorganisation of February 1962 a net setback.
Oolong Rojong Parliament:
43 PKI representatives
20 fitactionsi representatives who are Pia orsesehess.
tV1P
Ext'
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Supreme Advisory Council:
p2 PM representatives
6 functional representatives who are PKI members.
National Planning Council;
16-22 PM-controlled members out of 77.
Civil Service:
30% of civil service workers are claimed as members of affiliates
of the Communist trade union federation. Central Organisation of Labor 01
AU Indonesia. (SOBSI)
PM participation in regional governments is most pronoanced in East
and Central Java where in a number of cases they hold pluralities in local
councils. There is evidence that there is similar penetration in other
provinces, particularly in Sumatra.
Y. Party Assets in CLrie Institutions
The PKI controls a number of mass organizations through fractions
within them at both the central and regional Levels. Of the important ones
only the Central Organization of Laber.of All Indonesia (SOBS% the labor
front, does not have a department its the PM secretariat devoted to its
affairs. PEI controt and use of 60136I is effected by two Politburoaa
atkint))111TO and other PKI members in the organizetionss central onkel*
Central Organization of Labor of All Indonesia (SOBS")
Claimed membership 3,033,000
Affiliate of WFTU
Principal areas of strength
Oil. estate, transportation and commanication and
public works workers. (Java. Sumatra and Celebes.)
Four of the Central Bureau, including the Chairman and
Secretary.gofteral, are PKI members.
SOBSI is one of the more militant Communist organisations
ift Indonesia. It has a potential capacity for tying up communications and
disrupting economic We through strikes and demonstrations?
Youth Organisations
PEMUDA RAKJAT (People's Youth)
Claimed membership'1, 250. 000
Principal strength in Java
Affiliate of Vain and has pe neat representative
at Wirier isoadqaarters.
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Pernuda Rakjat overtly acknowledges its allegiance to dm
PM and functions as the equivalent of a Young Communist League. It is --
militant and its members have played a leading part in anti-Western
demonstrations. They have also volunteered in numbers. initially 100.000,
for the Liberation of West Irian. Pemuda Rakjat's membership it drawn
principally from youth of the working class.
Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements. (C0114)
Claimed membership - -3.000.5,000
Affiliate of IUS
Exercises influence out of proportion to its numbers
through inflitretion of larger. non-Communist student organisations.
CCM membership is much more solidly Communist than
I. the case in most fronts. For example, all but 2 of 22 officers chosen
by the Gadja Ueda CGMI branch in March 1961 were PKI members.
Indonesian Peasant Movement (BTI)
Claimed membership (1959) More than 4.000.000
Not affiliated with WFTU but has sent delegates to
international conferences sponsored by WFTU.
North Sumatra.
Principal strength in East Java, Central Java and
The BTI is the PKI instrument for grass roots organising
and propaganda activity, in the countryside. It endeavors to substitute itself
for appolated officials in local administraticft and was the instigator of MIMS
recent peasant disturbances.
Itt8onesisk '11,Lorae1os Movement (GER WANI)
Claimed membership 800.000 (January 1960
Affiliate of WIDE'
Principal usefulness to the PKI is as a propaganda
fr'L instrument. GERWANI has brought a number of prominent non.Commaaist
women into the movement and exerts some influence in the National
Federation of Women's Organisation..
The League for People's Culture (LEKRA)
Claimed membership more than 60.000_ (Feb!uary 1962)
9 branches in Java, 2 in Sumatra. tin Boras. "
Has close contacts with both IUS and WFDT and works
with friendship societies and peace movement.
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LEKRA is the most active cultural organisation in
Indonesia, performing functions which have been neglected by the
Ministry of Education, Training, and Culture. It has given a Marxist
coloration to much of Indonesian current writing sad promotes attacks
against European and U. S. cultural activities. LEKRA sent $ delegates
to the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent in 195$ and participated
in a similar conference at Cairo in early 1962.
Indonesian Peace Committee (IPC)
No membership figures available
1952 Stockholm Appeal 217,496 signatures
1955 Vienna Peace Pact 650,000 signatures
Claims 66 branches of which SS are in Java.
The peace ideal has wide appeal in Indonesia and most
Indonesians are not convinced of the Communist nature of the organised
peace movement. Consequently the movement receives widespread support
in a11 sections of Indonesian society, including top political leaders. .,
,Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
The AAPSO, a Communist-directed instrument for
fomenting the national liberation movement fits neatly into Indonesian
concepts of foreign policy and international alignments and therefor*
*Novi wide support in Indonetaa? including the poditive endorsement
of President Sukarno. A PKI member is the permanent representative Of
IndoAsia on the secretariat in Cairo.
Friendship Societies
Friendship societies are a device by which the Communist
bloc gains direct access to the masses to promote Communist objectives
and improve the Communist image. Such societies exist in Indonesia for
all-the countries of the bloc except Albania. PEI members participate in
their leadership and activities as do Partai Murba leaders. Most of this
activity is in Java, although the Indonesian-Chinese society claims 19
branches in Sumatra and the Indonesian...Soviet society has branches in
Sumatra and Bali.
VI. International Ties
The PKI has long been regarded as Moscow oriented. Its leaders have?
spent considerable periods of time in the bloc, especially in the Soviet Union.
and party policy has generally been eonsistent with the Soviet line. There
are signs that since November 1960, and more apparently since the 22nd
eutreNwa
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Congress of the CPSU. the PKI is moving closer to Chinese positions
on both foreign and domestic questions and may be reassessing its own
basic policy. The need to give precedence to Soviet foreign policy
requirements over its own national interest. is a key question under
debate.
VU, Partai Murba
Claimed strength
Principally in Java
Electoral strength (1955)
175.000
225.000 votes
Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) is a nationalist Communist
- Party. Other than its rejection of international ties the Murba policies
are indistinguishable from those tif.:the PIC. It has no significant mass following
but enjoys considerable political influence through the personal. prestige of
its leaders and their associations with Sukarno.
VIII. Overseas Chinese
Communist activity among overseas Chinese is directed through
the Chinese Communist Embassy. Very few Chinese are members of the
PKI. This no doubt reflects a desire not to align the anti-C'hinese feelings
of the Indonesian people against the PKI and not to increase the suspicion
with which the government already regards the Chinese minority.
Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BA PERK!)
Estimated membership 50.000
BA PERK! was formed in 1954 ostensibly to protect the
' rights of Indonesian-born Chinese. It is open to all races, but the
membership is principally Chinese. BAPERKI is controlled by the
Chinese Communist Embassy and promotes Communist ideas and
loyalty to the Peking regime in the Chinese community. It has a
particular appeal to Chinese youth.
Federation of Overseas Chinese Organizations (CHCTTH)
A typical Chinese association, controlled by prosperous
business men and devoted to the protection of Chinese business and
property rights, CHCTTIII-1 accepts direction from the Chinese Communist
Embassy, having severed its former KMT ties. It occasionally acts
as an instrument of the Chinese Communist government in implementing
policy towards the overseas Chinese.
mreimieissise.
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IX.C,21tj?t2Egy_ts_a_ad Tactics
Since the present leaders took over control of the Partai Komusie
Indonesia (PKI) after the ill-fated Iv!adiun uprising in 1948. the
Communist movement in Indonesia has adhered to a program building
both a mass party and a broad following, emphasising legal political
activity and cooperation with the government of President Sukarno.
This policy, they have expected (and in large measure correctly) woald
bring them increasing influence as their political activities were ?
unrestricted and they could exploit the popularity of the President. It
has been their purpose to influence government policy, both domestic
and foreign. toward Communist objectives, and, eventually, to gain
power, either through constitutional electoral procedures or through
their admission by President Sukarno to a share of power at the
cabinet level. T6 maintain this quasi-alliance. the PKI ham brought
itself to accept some presidential actions which must have been distastefnit
e:g. the decrees severely limiting alt political party activity and, more to.
gently, the amendment, of the party constitution at the President's
demand to satisfy his requirement that all parties accept the constitstional
principles of Pentjasila, which incbSi affirmation of a belief in God.
President Sukarno on his part, together with a number of the
political leaders around him, has accepted the Pia's cooperation as
a means of maintaining his own political, position vis-amvis other
potential power centers; at the same time measures have been taken
that are designed to prevent the growth of Communist strength to a point
where it might endanger hie government. To this end the President has
accepted the Communist Party as a legitimate political force is the
country rather than challenging it to a showdown in either the political
or the military arena. To blunt the competition of the Communist Party
for public support, the government's policies have been calculated to
approach closely enough to Communist programs to forestall Communist
exploitation of issues on which they might expect strong public support.
The Indonesian foreign policy of neutralism and anti-colonialism is in
accord with Communist policy but it also appeals to strong public feeling
which the Communist would exploit if the government did not. A program
of land reform, nationalization of foreign (at least Dutch) enterprises, and
industriathation are other examples of this attempt to steal the Communist
thunder. These efforts have, however, not been effective.
The factor which has perhaps thrown the President's caiculatione
off has been the unexpected flexibility of the PICI in adjusting itself to these
??
"MILftailjob
Inealark
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measures. The party has been able to endorse Sukarno's objectives
while retaining freedom to criticize deficiencies in their implementation.
The steady deterioration of the economy, for instance, permits the
Communists to capitalize on the resulting popular discontent while still
endorsing and in fact exploiting the publicised intentions of the government.
To a considerable degree the attempt to negate the Communist mass appeal
by borrowing ivarxist programs has only served to give the Communist
objectives an official blessing without at the same time depriving the Pla
of thesa key issues for exploitation.
The Communists have also been able in some cases to pressure
the government into more extreme positions or to hastier actions than it
might otherwise have taken. intransigence on West Irian may well
alienate Indonesia completely from the West and dri4e it into a dependence
upon the Communist bloc from which escape would be very difficult.
Yet any recession on this issue is made extremely difficult by the policies
and programs of national mobilization the government has felt compelled
to adopt to maintain its position as the leader of domestic political forces
against the rival claims of the PIM
The Government's hand was forced in the seizure of Dutch enterprises
by the unauthorised action of Communist-controlled trade unionists. But
these actions could not be disavowed. The government was then compelled
to step in and proceed to legitimize the seizure which it had not planned
sold for which it was not prepared. The economic dislocation caused by
these events has made the government vulnerable to new PM pressures.
In sum it appears that the outcome of the delicate balancing of
cooperation and competition between the government and the PIC which
each has carried on with an eye to its own profit has accorded more
nearly with the Communist expectations than with those of the President.
The PICI has continued to grow in numbers and in influence. The position
of the Communist bloc, particularly of the Soviet Union, in Indonesian
affairs is stronger than ever. The government has found itself steadily
drawn into positions on both the national and international level which are
ever closer to the Communist program, more dependent upon Communist
support, and increasingly estranged from non.,Cornrounist forces. The
key point in this process was perhaps reached with the adoption in 1960._
of the NASAKOM (nationalist, religious, Communist) formula which
established as a matter of principle the right of the Pla to equal represent.
Mien at all levels of the country's political and economic structure. The
most recent development in the process was the President's spud' at
? '
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ng and
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the PKI 7th Congress in April 1962 in which be denounced 'Intl.
COTEUXIIIIIiit phobias" and gave the FKI his full endorsement as icrysl,
patriotic, nationalist revolutionaries. Other hopes. that this procesS
nsight inspire a nationalist, TITOIST trend in the Communist party
leadership. have also been disappointed4 for the PKI t was of the 11204
eyes advocates of figs:national Communist unity.
Approved For Releas