WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 44

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002100230001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
Document No.
Number 44
1 APR 1949
cisoi e
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
DECLASSIFIED
Class.
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S 7 C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: D A 1EG. 77/1763
Date: 2 2. ?-e By:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
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HIGHLIGHTS__
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UNITED NATIONS
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WESTERN EUROPE
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
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FAR EAST
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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ARTICLE
The Italian Colonies Question
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HIGHLIGHTS
The USSR will probably endeavor to make its attack
upon the Atlantic Pact the principal theme of the forthcoming
UN General Assembly sessions which begin at Lake Success
on 5 April. The Italian colonies question will be the only
problem of major substantive importance to confront the dele-
gates; its solution will depend primarily upon the ability of
the non-Soviet bloc to reach solid agreement (see page 3).
Meanwhile, the mildness of the Soviet reaction to the western
Berlin currency changeover continues to contrast with the
vigor of the Soviet opposition to the Atlantic Pact (see page 5).
The steady trend toward stabilization of the military
situation in Palestine may be checked momentarily by the
army coup in Syria, through delaying indefinitely the scheduled
negotiations between Syria and Israel, but the over-all military
situation in Palestine will not be materially affected by this
delay (see page 9). The Syrian coup will probably not appreci-
ably damage US-Syrian relations but it may set off disturbances
in other Arab states, particularly Iraq and Egypt, whose gov-
ernments probably could not survive a serious outbreak.
A "peace conference" between representatives of
the Chinese Communists and the National Government began
in Peiping on 1 April. The Communist plan to present the
Nationalists with a set of "eight demands," which Acting -
President Li obviously Is not capable of meeting in full, will
enable the Communists to retain the initiative throughout the
conference (see page 11).
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UNITED NATIONS
The forthcoming session of the General Assembly
will focus on the disposition of the Italian colonies, the
Spanish issue, and probably on a Soviet attack on the Atlantic
Pact. The Italian colonies question is the only important
substantive matter, and its solution will depend primarily
upon the ability of the non-Soviet world to reach agreement.
However, both the Atlantic Pact and the Spanish case will
offer fertile ground for Soviet propaganda attacks. Soviet
obstructionism during the forthcoming session will thus be
most prominent in the propaganda field. Minor issues to be
discussed include Israeli membership in the UN, the Minds-
zenty trial, and South African discrimination against Indians
In that country.
Atlantic Pact The USSR may well introduce a resolution
condemning the Atlantic Pact as threatening
world peace and undermining the UN. Although the Soviet
case is weak, the USSR will use the Assembly as a sounding
board for the Soviet propaganda "peace" theme. Through
this propaganda approach, the USSR will attempt to pose
(especially for home consumption) as a defender of the UN
and will try to weaken popular support for the Pact by stimu-
lating the doubts of those western elements who still believe
the UN should be the sole bulwark of world peace.
Spain If the Spanish case comes up in the Assembly, the
subsequent discussion will resolve itself primarily
into a propaganda battle which may link Spain to the Atlantic
Pact and prove embarrassing to the US. Although Poland
has announced that it will seek to withdraw its proposal for
strengthening the 1946 GA resolution (which provided for the
recall of chiefs of mission to Spain and a ban on Spanish
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participation in UN specialized agencies), certain Latin
American nations may seize the initiative and propose
that these prohibitions be eased. The USSR would inter-
pret such a Latin American move as US-inspired and
could accuse the West of having taken the initiative in
aiding the Franco regime. Moreover, the USSR could
attack any pro-Spanish moves as preliminary western
steps toward admitting Spain to the Atlantic Pact. Liberal
opinion in the US and Western Europe may prove particu-
larly susceptible to these charges. Although most Western
European nations prefer to postpone discussion on the
Spanish issue, introduction of a Latin American resolution
would probably result in liberalization of the 1946 ban.
Italian Colonies The outcome of GA voting on the disposi-
tion of the Italian colonies, particularly
TripoMania, is impossible to predict at this time because
of the many conflicting interests and alternative solutions
(see Article, page17). The return of Somaliland to Italy
and the US-UK proposal for ceding most of Eritrea to
Ethiopia will probably be approved, however, although the
vote on the latter proposal may be very close. Approval
of UK trusteeship over Cyrenaica is a strong possibility,
but an effort will be made to make it conditional upon re-
turn of Tripolitania to Italy. With regard to Tripolitania,
one of the following solutions appears most probable:
(1) Italian trusteeship, which is favored by most Latin
American nations and some Western European countries,
notably France; (2) US trusteeship, as proposed by the UK,
which would undoubtedly appeal to the local Arab population;
or (3) multi-power trusteeship which, although administra-
tively cumbersome, might have the most universal appeal.
Any trusteeship will most likely be accompanied by guarantees
of gradual local self-government and eventual independence.
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Italy's prospects for Tripolitunian trusteeship are
improved because of Italian participation in the Atlantic
Pact and in other European unity projects; however, with-
out US-UK support, this solution could not be carried. US
trusteeship would certainly meet with opposition from the
USSR and probably from France, which fears the effect on
its North African colonies. If a stalemate develops on
Trip?Mania, the GA may vote to postpone this issue until
the next session. It is even possible that certain Latin
American states, in an attempt to use Cyrenaica as a ?
bargaining point for obtaining Italian trusteeship over
TripoMania, may insist that the disposition of all Libya
be postponed. As an alternative, they may seek to have
all of Libya included in any multilateral trusteeship.
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WESTERN EUROPE
GERMANY
Berlin Currency The mildness of the initial Soviet reaction
to the western sector currency change-
over in Berlin is probably the result of its gradual nature and
the Soviet desire to await further developments. Under the
currency directive issued by the western military governors:
(1) certain time limits will be imposed upon continued use of
the east mark in the western sectors; (2) western sector resi-
dents will be permitted to exchange 15 east marks for an
equal number of west marks; and (3) the number of west marks
in circulation in western Berlin has been increased. Because
the east mark is still legal and can be used during the next
few weeks for paying rents, taxes, and rations and because
western sector residents working in the Soviet sector will,
for the present at least, continue to be able to exchange part
of their east marks for west marks, no reason exists for
immediate Soviet retaliation. The Soviet Military Administra-
tion (SMA) has already promised that western sector residents
will not be restrained from spending east marks for unrationed,
luxury goods in "free shops" of the Soviet sector. Although
the USSR can take retaliatory action at any time, it now appears
that such action may be postponed until the effects of the cur-
rency reform become more apparent. Such counteraction may
be timed to coincide wita increasing restrictions against the
east mark in western Berlin. The USSR may decide to institute
an east mark currency reform which would invalidate the 300-
400 million east marks now estimated to be in western sector
banks. Current Soviet tactics in Berlin may reflect the reported
recommendation of Soviet Political Adviser Semenov for a
milder over-all Soviet German policy. In addition, the USSR
may wish to avoid drastic retaliatory measures lest these
measures: (1) boomerang against the USSR by further reducing
economic activity in the Soviet zone and decreasing Communist
popularity there; and (2) detract from present Soviet efforts to
convince the world of the USSR's peaceful intentions.
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UNITED KINGDOM
Commonwealth Conference The hurriedly summoned con-
ference of Commonwealth prime
ministers, which convenes in London on 21 April, will concern
itself primarily with the constitutional problem raised by
India's announced intention of becoming a republic. Some
formula will be sought which: (1) will enable India, as a re-
public, to retain membership in a Commonwealth whose only
formal tie is the crown; and (2) will not conflict with the
desire of some older dominions (notably Australia) that nothing
be done to impair the prestige of the crown. A principal
reason for making concessions to India on this issue, and for
speed in so doing, is the need of the UK (and Australia) to
obtain Indian assistance in combatting the growing pressure
of Communism in Southeast Asia. India's constitutional status
must be clarified first, however, because Indian assistance in
combatting Communism would probably be most effective if
India joined Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Ceylon
under Commonwealth auspices in some such "regicnal associa-
tion "as that suggested by UK Foreign Secretary Bevin at the
1948 Commonwealth Conference. The 'regional association"
idea is likely to be further explored in informal discussions
at the April conference.
Jet Aircraft The approaching necessity for decisions on
military aid commitments under the North
Atlantic Pact is forcing the UK to review the British jet air-
craft program. At present the UK must allocate its limited
jet production to: (1) meeting existing export commitments
to foreign countries; (2) aiding Benelux nations under the
Brussels treaty; (3) doubling the jet fighter strength of the
Royal Air Force; and (4) continuing token aid to friendly
countries, whether Pact members or not. jet equipment is
now a profitable item on the British export list. If strategic
planning following ratification of the Atlantic Pact leads to a
redirection of jet exports, thus reducing foreign exchange
earnings, the British will probably ask the US to underwrite
the loss.
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IRELAND
Foreign Policy Although the Irish Government has rejected
membership in the North Atlantic Pact,
opposition within the country to this isolationist stand is
steadily increasing. The Government refused to Join the Pact
because the Irish feel that the partition issue makes a mili-
tary alliance with the UK impossible. The Church and those
who opposed severance of the Commonwealth link, however,
are putting pressure on the Government to consider a more
cooperative attitude toward the Atlantic Pact nations. Although
there is no likelihood of a sudden modification of policy, it is
possible that the Government may eventually be willing to nego-
tiate individual pacts with North Atlantic countries other than
the UK or will seek to appease advocates for Irish participation
In the Pact by emphasizing that Ireland will do its duty as
"a christian nation" in the event of war.
BELGIUM
Belgian Elections Rapidly deteriorating relations between
the two coalition parties (Catholic and
Socialist) may result in a decision to advance the date of the
general elections now scheduled for the autumn of 1949.
Socialist-Catholic disagreement over methods of financing
unemployment compensation, intensified by pre-electoral
campaigning, is preventing constructive government action
on other matters. Any electoral action before late May or
June, however, is unlikely because: (1) most importantly,
Premier Spaak is determined not to allow the dissolution of
Parliament to interfere with ratification of the Atlantic Pact;
and (2) the necessity exists for a prior decision by Parlia-
ment on the advancement of the date of the women's franchise
and the reapportionment of parliamentary seats on the basis
of the new census.
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FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Anti-French Forces More effective opposition to French
authority in North Africa will emerge
If growing collaboration between the Communist and Nation-
alist parties results in the formation of a new political organi-
zation combining dissident and extremist elements from both
groups. Both Communists and Nationalists are apparently
inclined to look more favorably on a united approach: the
Communists, because of the steady decline in their electoral
strength; the Nationalists, because of their continued failure
to achieve independence by persuasion. If the merger should
take place, it would probably be guided by the able and intern-
gent Farhat Hached, Secretary General of the Tunisian nation-
alist labor union.
SPAIN
Monarchy Rumors Belief that he has failed to get a US loan
may force Franco in the near future to
make a decision on a royal successor. Franco's position is
being threatened by the growing lack of confidence among his
followers, as a result of the grave economic situation. (During
recent weeks there has been a notable increase in the number
of rumors conceLming Franco's intention to relinquish his job
as chief of state; some of these rumors may have been deliber-
ately planted to test foreign and domestic reaction.) If Franco
does decide that some move is necessary, he will most proba-
bly establish an interim regency in order to be able to name
his successor while he is still in a position to dictate the terms.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
PALESTINE
Military Stabilization Military stabilization in Palestine
appears closer than ever. Israel
and Lebanon have signed an armistice which provides not
only for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese soil but for main-
tenance by each side of only 1,500 troops as defensive forces
In the border zone, thus allaying Lebanese fears of a new
Israeli advance. Meanwhile, Israel and Transjordan have
Initialed a secret agreement providing for Transjordan's
assumption of responsibility for the Iraqi front in north-
central Palestine, and an armistice between the two govern-
ments may emerge soon. Although the recent coup in Syria
may delay indefinitely the negotiations between Israel and
Syria (the last of the Arab states in contact with Israeli
forces), this delay will not materially affect the over-all
military situation in Palestine.
Progress toward military stabilization has focused
attention on boundaries which will be delineated in a final
peace settlement. By its recent foray into the Negeb, Israel,
which had already seized substantial amounts of territory
over and above the UN partition boundaries, completed its
control of the lands allocated to it under partition; in its
agreement with Transjordan, Israel is forcing Abdullah to
yield additional ground in central Palestine. Under these
circumstances, it is highly improbable that the Israelis will
willingly cede enough territory now held by them to permit
Implementation of the US formula. This formula calls upon
Israel to make territorial compensation for lands they wish
to keep outside the original UN partition boundaries.
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SYRIA
Military Coup Although the military coup in Syria by
Colonel Husni Zaim, Chief of Staff of the
Syrian Army, and his ultra-nationalist followers is not
expected to cause an appreciable deterioration in US-Syrian
relations, the coup will have adverse effects on matters in
which the US has an interest. Zaim, who is personally
friendly toward the West, will probably be able to consoli-
date his control over the Government and by ruling with a
strong hand may be able to solve many of Syria's internal
difficulties. Zaim's coming to power, however, will check
the scheduled Syrian-Israeli armistice talks. There will
also be delays in the ratification of the agreement for the
trans-Arabian petroleum pipeline and the French-Syrian
financial agreement. Moreover, the danger exists that the
Syrian coup may provoke disturbances in other Arab states,
particularly Iraq and Egypt. The governments in these two
countries are not sufficiently stable to insure their surviv-
ing a serious local outbreak.
TURKEY
Security Fears Announcement of the North Atlantic Pact
has stimulated Turkey's desire to clarify
Its own security position, and,during his forthcoming visit
to the US as head of the Turkish UN delegation, Foreign
Minister Sadak will undoubtedly be shopping for additional
US assurances. The Turks have warmly welcomed the Pact
Itself, but their exclusion from it has caused them concern
lest the participating states be strengthened at the eventual
expense of Turkey. Although Saclak may not press for mem-
bership in the North Atlantic group--even if the formation
of another regional security agreement is ruled out--he will
be under great pressure to obtain stronger US assurances
than those already provided.
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FAR EAST
CHINA
Peace Prospects Both the Communists and the National
Government completed their preparations
during the past week for the "peace conference" scheduled
to begin in Peiping on 1 April. The Chinese Communist Party
provided a troublesome overtone to the preparations by announc-
ing that its Central Committee had formally approved Chair!..
Mao Tse-tung's "eight demands" as the basis for the peace
discussions and by notifying the National Government that its
delegates should bring with them all data necessary for imple-
mentation of these eight points. The "eight points formulated
by Mao Tse-tung are: (I) abrogation of the Chinese constitu-
tion; (2) relinquishment of the Kuomintang's prerogatives;
(3) endorsement of Communist '`agrarian reform"; (4) cancella-
tion of "traitorous treaties"; (5) convocation of a political con-
sultative conference to transfer power to a "coalition" govern-
ment; (6) surrender of "war criminals"; (7) confiscation of
bureaucratic capital; and (8) "reorganization" of Nationalist
armies. If Li desires,the Government can comply with the
first five demands; it can comply, in part, with the demands
for surrender of war criminals and confiscation of bureaucratic
capital. But Li's Government cannot possibly comply with the
crucial demand for full surrender of the Nationalist armies,
because it does not have control over all the remaining Nation-
alist military forces. Therefore, the Communists can either:
(1) accept partial compliance from Li's Government and later
move their armies south in the name of the new "coalition"
government; or (2) force a breakdown in negotiations by in-
sisting upon full compliance with their terms and then resume
full-scale military operations to the south. In view of their
lack of trained administrators and their already tremendous
task of consolidating occupied territories, the Communists may
accept Li's terms provided they believe that Li has complied with
Communist demands to the full extent,
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JAPAN
Japanese Resistance The procrastinatory maneuvers of the
Japanese Government, which enabled
the Government to shift to SCAP the onus for an unpopular
budget,reflects a growing Japanese tendency to resist direc-
tion from the occupying authorities. The Yoshida Cabinet
was committed by campaign promises to economic reforms
favoring the vested conservative interests who supported the
Democratic Liberal Party. Prominent among these reforms
were loosening of economic controls, discontinuance of the
transaction tax and government assistance for business re-
covery. SCAP is budget "suggestions," however, recommended
strengthened economic controls and aroused a storm of protest
among the more conservative leaders of the Democratic Liberal
Party. By resorting to delaying tactics, the party finally forced
SCAP to By
the Japanese Government to incorporate eco-
nomic control measures in the new budget. Thus the Demo-
cratic Liberals escaped the embarrassment of being directly
responsible for advocating an "unpopular" budget.
INDOCHINA
Military Drive French military forces in north Indochina
are apparently being so hard-pressed by a
concerted Viet Minh drive that they may be forced to evacuate
the state of Tonkin. The general commanding French forces
in Tonkin has stated that, without supplies and reinforcements,
his troops will be "driven into the sea." The resumption of
extensive military operations along the China-Tonkin frontier
has probably been timed in part to coincide with Bao Dai's
expected return in late April, because the reinforcements re-
quired in the north are being held in southern garrisons to
assure the ex-Emperor a favorable reception there.
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SIAM
Possible Coup Further public disorders or a coup may be
precipitated in Siam by the general dissatis-
faction with the recently promulgated "royalist" constitution
and the continuation of repressive measures designed to main-
tain the present Phibul Government in power. In addition,
tension between the armed services is growing because of
Premier Phibufs apparent failure to carry out his part of
an understanding presumably reached with the navy for elimi-
nating General Kach, army "strong man" and deputy com-
mander-in-chief. The c ommander -in-chief of the navy, having
carried out his part of the agreement, is embarrassed before his
subordinates, some of whom are reportedly considering support-
ing the followers of former-Premier Pridi in any future attempt
to overthrow the government. The probability of a forceful
change in Fovernment has also been increased by the new
"royalist' constitution, which limits the influence and profit-
eering opportunities of present political and military leaders
as well as the means of effecting peaceful changes in the gov-
ernment through political maneuvering.
INDONESIA
Peace Progress Despite modification of the Dutch position
toward restoring the Republicans to authority
at Jogjakarta, there is little indication that the Dutch-are any
less opposed to granting the Republic a dominant position in the
projected Indonesian federation. Some progress has been made,
however, toward the renewal of negotiations between the Dutch
and the Republicans as a result of conditional Dutch acceptance
of the invitation by the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCFP to
discuss with Republican leaders the restoration of Republica
authority in jogplmrta. Although the Republic has not yet accepted
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INDONESIA
the UN invitation, they will probably do so. If the Dutch and
Republicans can reach agreement on Republican restoration,
the way will be paved for convocation of the Dutch-proposed
conference at The Hague, where the disputants can once
again attempt to reach agreement on the transfer of Dutch
sovereignty to a federated Indonesian government.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Communist Activity In an effort to offset their declining
power and numerical strength, Com-
munists in Latin America are now concentrating primarily
on organizational activity. In Mexico, Chile, and Argentina,
non-militant and ineffective Party members are being purged.
Party reorganizations are under way in Ecuador and Mexico;
In the latter country, moreover, Communist organizers are
attempting to regain influence with labor by urging Party
members to join local labor unions. Reports that special
lists of militants are being prepared in Cuba, Argentina, and
Uruguay suggest planning for underground activities. A Cuban
Communist-front group for youths is reportedly driving for
new members. Although these Communist activities may
Improve the Party's position in a few countries where police
repression is absent or counter-propaganda ineffective, there
Is as yet no indication of a reversal in the general trend of
declining Communist strength.
ARGENTINA
US Relations Recent Argentine overtures to the US for
financial assistance, which have been dictated
by economic necessity, will afford the US only a limited period
In which to obtain Argentine concessions. The Peron regime
Is taking a much firmer stand against Communism and has
arrested and jailed as Communists many strikers who sought
wage increases considered inflationary by the government.
The administration's need for US goodwill, coupled with the
current government drive against inflation, is already forcing
a revision in Argentine foreign policy favorable to the US. For
example, Peron has made some modification in his "third
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ARGENTINA
position" foreign policy which, though ostensibly anti-
Communist and anti-capitalist, has been used principally to
oppose US influence in Latin America. Peron's apparent
willingness to make concessions to the US will probably last
only as long as the new economic policies are successful
and remain dependent on US aid. If economic stability is
restored--with or without US aid?Argentine political and
economic independence will revive, and Argentina can be
expected to revert to its normal policy of combatting US
Influence in Latin America. An economic debacle in the
absence of effective US assistance, however, would intensify
customary Argentine opposition to the US and make coopera-
tive action difficult even on matters not usually subject to
rivalry between the two countries.
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THE ITALIAN COLONIES QUESTION
Of the numerous possible solutions open to the UN
General Assembly on the Italian colonies question (see page 2),
only those solutions involving Italys participation in the con-
trol of its former colonies have evoked any appreciable con-
troversy. The persistence of Italy's claims for control over
its former colonies is matched by bitter Arab opposition to
the re-establishment of Italian colonial rule in any form.
Because a large measure of agreement has been reached on
the disposition of Cyrenalca, Eritrea, and Somaliland, the
major remaining controversy centers on the disposition of
Tripolitania.
The Italian Government alleges that its prestige would
be seriously undermined if it were not awarded at least part
of its former colonies. Italy banes its claims for trusteeship
of its pre-Fascist colony of Tripolitania on assertions that
the area would aid the Italian economy, especially with respect
to future Italian emigration, If convinced that Italian trustee-
ship is not now or later feasible, the Italian Government, al-
though it would protest non-participation, would probably prefer
US trusteeship to the establishment by the UN of a multi-power
administration, particularly one which might include the USSR.
The advantages of the US as a security force in North Africa
and the Mediterranean would appeal to the Italians, especially
as they might expect a friendly US to encourage Italian emigra-
tion to the area and US aid could be expected to contribute ?
materially to the area's economic development.
Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania would be unac-
ceptable throughout the Arab world and might cause sporadic
violence in Tripolitania and neighboring Tunisia. A force
considerably larger than the present British garrison in
Tripolitania would be needed to maintain order. Even then,
occasional outbreaks might occur and spread to Tunisia where
sympathy is strong for the Tripolitanian desire for independence.
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The danger of widespread disorder, however, may be lessened
by the reported willingness of some Arab leaders in Tripoli-
tania to come to terms with the Italians once Italian trustee-
ship has become a fact. Experienced observers also emphasize
that in view of Tripolitania's rapidly increasing population rate
and limited economic resources, it could contribute little to
the solution of Italy's emigration problem. Even if Italy could
Implement the ambitious prewar plan to settle about 100,000
Italians in Tripolitania, the situation would scarcely be alle-
viated in Italy,where there are 2,000,000 unemployed and an
annual population increase of 400,000. Moreover, the expense
of the large military force needed to maintain order in the
area would reduce the Italian capability to develop the area's
economy.
Of the other solutions most likely to be considered
by the General Assembly, Tripolitanian Arabs generally would
prefer US trusteeship as guaranteeing the best opportunity
for early independence and economic development. A five -
power trusteeship, with Egyptian participation, would be less
distasteful than Italian trusteeship, but would still be opposed
by: (1) the Tripolilanians, who resent French and Italian
colonial policy and believe five-power administration would
be cumbersome; and (2) the Cyrenaicans, who fear that Egyptian
participation would aid Egypt to press its territorial claims in
Cyrenaica.
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DISTRIBUTION
1
2,64
3
4
5
6
8,70
9
10
11,89
12,13,14
15,16,17
18
19
20
2/
22,23,24
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,
45,46,47,48,49
50
51
52,53,54,55,56
57
58
59
60
61
62,63
65
66,67
68
The President
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, U.S.Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations,General Staff,U.S.Army
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S.Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force
Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research
and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army
34.
Chief of Naval Intelligence
44.
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
Director of Security and Intelligence,Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief ,Acquisition & Distribution Division,OCD,Dept.State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Attention: Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director, joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
Secretary, joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
US Air Force Representative on joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
SECRET
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I
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esetiri-
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2831-8-1948
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