BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 28, 1960
• Content Type: PERRPT

Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00100010002-9
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/05: CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010002-9
28 March 1960
210. Turkish Restrts on A Free Press
On March 7, the "dean" of Turkey's journalists and editor of the liberal,
independent Istanbul newspaper, Vatan, 72-year-old Ahmet Emin Yalman, was
jailed for reprinting an article from US daily which the court said belittled
Turkey's Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, Yalman said that a recent medical
examination had shown that he was unwell. He added: "In spite of the strength of
my will, these troubles may not allow me to resist for long the hardships of
prison life. " The International Press Institute (IPI), which again has met in Tokyo,
recently appealed at Geneva to editors to protest "in the strongest possible terms"
against what it called increasing persecution of press freedom in Turkey. Although
there are no official statistics, the IPI believes that more than 200 Turkish
journalists have been imprisoned over the past five years. In Turkey, where the
government, as in most countries other than the US, has a monopoly of broadcast-
ing facilities, most of the press supports the opposition. There is no doubt that
sometimes its criticism of the government, in articles or cartoons, is immoder-
ate. But the fact remains that the Turkish press cannot operate freely, fearlessly,
or efficiently under the present restrictive press laws which are sometimes as
unpredictable as they are unjustifiably severe. Turkey has been a republic almost
thirty-seven years and has enacted a constitution which provides its citizens with
certain rights and freedoms,' including freedom of the press. However, in all but
ten of those years, despite the constitution, it has been ruled by dictatorships
(beginning with that of Ataturk), and its ruling governments, like the present one,
have yet to learn to accept the buffetings and unkind cuts of democratic life. For
your information only, a good example of the sort of distorted thinking that goes
on in their minds is contained in a recent letter to the Washington Post by the
Turkish Embassy's Press Attache, referring to a report reprinted in that paper
on December 26 about the indictment passed against a number of journalists in
Turkey. He says: "As outlined in detail in the joint communique issued by the
Turkish Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Press and Information, Turkey is
ruled by its representative National Assembly, whose laws are executed by the
country's law courts. Therefore, any attempt by a non-official organization at
not only protesting against, but even questioning of the decisions of these national
institutions constitute no other than an attempt at interfering in the country's
internal affairs. "
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Z21. The Japan-US ltual Security Treaty
The Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty was signed in Washington on 19
January. Since then a running fight has been raging in Japan over its ratification.
The principal opponents of Prime Minister KISHI Nobusuke are: (1) the so-called
"anti-mainstream" faction of Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the leader
of which, KONO Ichiro, is trying to use the ratification issue to embarrass,
harrass and eventually topple Kishi and gain the premiership for himself; (2) the
two Socialist parties, the left-wing Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the more
moderate Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which are opposing ratification.
because of a combination of sincere neutralist anti-militarist conviction held by
many members and the fact that their opposition gives them a means of enhancing
their own following at the expense of the LDP; (3) the USSR and Communist China,
which oppose the treaty because it deals a blow to their hopes of neutralizing
Japan and restricting US influence there; and (4) the Japanese Communist Party,
which supports the bloc's aims. The satellites and other free world CP's also
have echoed the bloc's line. There exists in Japan a fairly widespread fear that
the US military presence there will eventually mean the introduction of nuclear
weapons and missiles and the use of the islands as a staging area for military
operations in other parts of the Far East - leading ultimately to Japan's becoming
involved in another war. It is from this well of feeling that the Socialists are
drawing most of the support for their opposition to the treaty. Propaganda from
Moscow and Peking also is trying to play on this sentiment, by portraying the
treaty as the basis for turning Japan into an imperialist stronghold, and condemn-
ing the revised treaty as an aggressive alliance aimed at the "peace-loving"
nations of the Communist bloc. In a bitter exchange of diplomatic notes, the USSR
has charged that the tre aty violates the joint Soviet-Japanese declaration of
October 19, 1956. The USSR therefore has concluded that it is no longer obligated
to return the two Japanese islands of Shikotan and Habomai -- to which it had 25X1
agreed in the joint declaration.
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222. Soviet Diploma: Blundering in Pakistan v y
On March 12, the same day on which eh presented his letters of credence
as the new Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, M. S. Kapitsa, said in Rawalpindi,
provisional capital of Pakistan, that Pakistan Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir's
proposal to Afghanistan that a referendum be held among the Pushtu-speaking
people of Afghanistan could be only a "Joke." (These people are called Pathans
in Pakistan and Pushtus in Afghanistan.) Kapitsa said that as the Pushtu-speaking
people comprise the basic population of Afghanistan, the question of a plebiscite
among them does not arise. On the other hand, he said, it is logical that a
section of Pushtu-speaking people who were separated from Afghanistan by
"British colonialists" 60 years ago should be asked through a plebiscite if they
wanted to remain in Pakistan or join Afghanistan or to form an independent state.
Khrushchev had said much the same thing after his recent Asia tour. The Soviet
Government, Kapitsa said, found it easy to understand the Afghan Government's
point of view and felt "that self-determination is in line with the UN Charter. "
Reportedly, Kapitsa also stated that the USSR did not recognize the Durand Line,
which has been the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1893. A total
of approximately 9 million Pathans live in the areas on the two sides of the
Durand Line. King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and his cousins Prime Minister
Daud and Foreign Minister Nairn are Pushtus; similarly, the President of
Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub, is a Pathan, as is the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pakistan Army, General Musa.
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? 28 March 1960
223. Continued Sovi -Interference in Iran
Following the failure of direct talks with the Shah of Iran, which began in
January 1959, and the signature of an Iranian-US bilateral pact, the Soviet Union
has resorted to an old and well-tried Kremlin technique to achieve its purposes
through use of more devious and covert methods in trying to rebuild its subversive
potential in Iran. Soviet agents, presumably including both Soviet intelligence
personnel and members of the outlawed Tudeh (Communist) Party, are attempting
to organize anti-regime Iranian nationalists. The Soviets have criticized the
Tudeh Party Central Committee for lack of action from its base, since being
forced underground, in Leipzig, East Germany, This Committee has now been
directed to organize and develop a nationalist group that is more suited to Soviet
designs, which include the ousting of the present regime. The Soviets have already
approached a number of Iranian military men to lead this nationalist group but
apparently have not yet decided whom to select. Nationalist elements in Iran, mans
of whom for a variety of reasons have all been opposed to the Shah's regime, for
years have been powerless to develop an effective organization. It is probable that,
after protracted suppression, some of them would be willing to accept Soviet
support, although many of the more moderate nationalist groupings would prefer
free world backing. Meanwhile, Soviet broadcasts continue to flay the Shah and his
"coup" regime. On 7 March Moscow Radio stated: "T,he anti-national policy of
(Shah) Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and (Prime Minister) Manuchehr Eqbal is
augmenting the revulsion and anger of the people of Iran. " The following is a
typical sample from the same broadcast: "In Teheran and other cities in Iran,
leaflets are being published and distributed among the people inviting Iranians to
overthrow the rotten and perfidious Pahlavi dynasty.. These days official quarters
in Teheran debate with great anxiety the shaky position of Egbai's government
and the Shah's throne. " If the Soviet agents succeed in dodging the vigilance of
SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence and security organization, their moral and
material support will undoubtedly add significantly to the strength of anti-regime
nationalist forces.
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28 March 1960
224. East Germanyd the Underdeveloped CountrieNK
A major objective of Soviet foreign policy is gain worldwide recognitibs
of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the East German government. By such
recognition Moscow hopes to expand its capability for economic penetration of the
underdeveloped countries by utilization of East German industry. Tempting aid
and trade offers from East Germany are eventually coupled with pressure for
diplomatic recognition. Thus, in a recent statement in which he reiterated a
longstanding offer of aid to India, East German Deputy Premier Heinrich Rau
spoke of political recognition, implying that the granting of credits would be
possible only between countries which maintain diplomatic relations. By the end of
1959 the East German credits since 1954 totaled only $50 million, of which only
$20 million had actually been used. From July to December 1959 there were 265
East German technicians in the underdeveloped countries, mainly concentrated in
Turkey and the UAR, By December 1959 some 640 nationals of underdeveloped
countries had received or were about to receive training in East Germany. In 1958
trade between East Germany and underdeveloped countries was about $180 million
(and remained about the same in 1959 although there was a sharp fall in trade with
Syria and Turkey and a sharp increase with Egypt and India). This trade will
probably increase rapidly over the next few years providing additional pressures
for international acceptance. Thus, the role of East Germany in the bloc's
penetration program has so far been slight. In the case of Guinea, deliberate
haziness on the part of all p; parties has clouded the situation as to whether there is
"zeal" recognition or not and consequently it is expected, at least as long as the
situation remains hazy, that West Germany will not break relations with Guinea.
This precedent may spark a rapid erosion of the Halstein doctrine that West
Germany will break relations with any nation recognizing East Germany and the
development of diplomatic relations between underdeveloped countries and the
bloc. Most vulnerable to East German persuasions because of their hunger for
capital or their economic commitment to the bloc are Ethiopia, Iraq, the UAR,
India, Ghana, and Indonesia.
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28 March 1960
Item #221: Themes outlined in Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 29,
Item No. 181, "The Battle for Japan" dated
21 December 1959, and Bi-Week's Guidance No, 30,
Item No. 185, "Revision of the United States-Japan
Security Treaty" dated 4 January 1960 remain
generally valid and still should be played.
CROSS-INDEXING
220. Turkish Restraints on a Free Press - F.
221. The Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty .. A, E, I, J, T,
U.
222. Soviet Diplomatic Blundering in Pakistan - F.
223. Continued Soviet Interference in Iran - F, J, U.
224. East Germany and the Underdeveloped Countries -
C, P, U.
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