BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 27

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100010009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 23, 1959
• Content Type: PERRPT

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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE
NUMBER 27
23 November 1959
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23 November 1959
158. New Party in Iraq Suggested
The editor of Al Thawra, a pro-Qasim nationalist daily in Baghdad,
Yunis at Tat, has launched what is apparently a trial balloon: the suggested
creation by Premier Qasim of a new political party. According to al Tai's
proposal Qasim, now convalescing in the hospital from bullet wounds inflicted
during the recent assassination attempt, is to lead the party himself, as a sort
of "third force" between the anti-Communist nationalist and the Communists.
Qasim's support, if any, could arise from a possible wish to develop grass
roots support in addition to what he already has among groups of both left and
right, none of which is now under his control. Although Al Thawra reportedly
has published "hundreds" of messages in favor of the idea, including some from
prominent army and government officials, no message from Qasim has been
printed, while three members of the Cabinet, all five army divisional
commanders and nine of Iraq's fourteen provincial governors have declared
their approval of the idea. Recently, however, the movement has received
less public attention and seems to have lost some of its momentum, and
Foreign Minister Jawed has publicly voiced disapproval. If Qasim were to
select the party as a means for achieving his objective, there would probably
be a general rush to join the band wagon. If a new party is created, it would
give Qasim a logical excuse to extend the present political "transition period"
perhaps until the middle of next year, which would give him time for necessary
organization. It is possible that from Qasirn.'s adoption of an instrument for
domination of Iraq's civilian political life there might emerge a one party
state similar to the UAR. There is also, however, another possibility which
is that given Qasim's apparent lack of interest in political organizations and
his political naivete, the Communists might infiltrate the new party and
convert it into a convenient facade for their activities.
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.rte November 1959
164. Crisis in Indonesian and Chinese Communist Relations
During early October Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio went to
Peking to discuss Sino-Indonesian relations and in particular, the position of the
overseas Chinese who will be seriously affected by an Indonesian decree, to
become effective 1 January 1961, prohibiting foreign-owned rttail enterprises
outside urban areas. The Overseas Chinese, who make up an economically-
dominant middle-class, number two and a half million. Indonesian local
cooperatives will replace the Chinese-operated enterprises as an initial step
toward economic reform. Subandrio's visit was climaxed by a joint communique
with Foreign Minister Chun Yi consisting largely of platitudes with respect to
Taiwan, West Irian, Bandung, etc. In connection with the decree on retailing,
the communique stated both nations recognized that Indonesian steps towards
economic development would entail measures that would affect "in some way" the
economic position of the Chinese. The innocuousness of the communique belied
the rupture in Sino-Indonesian friendship caused by the extremely harsh treat-
ment Subandrio suffered at the hands of Chinese leadership. In conversations
with Indonesian diplomats at Hong Kong, Manila, and Tokyo and to Indonesian
officials upon his return, Subandrio revealed that Chinese Communist leaders
insulted and tried to intimidate him. Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung received
him in a cavalier fashion and Chou En-lai threatened Indonesia with economic
warfare through the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya if the decree was not
changed. Chou stated the decree was a Western-inspired move against the Chinese
and that if necessary Chinese economic aid to Indonesia would be terminated.
Subandrio reported that he believed the Chinese already considered Indonesia
a vassal state and were bent on controlling Southeast Asia. The Indonesian
Government has not yet issued a statement on Subandrio's reception in China and
it is not believed they will. The Government is going ahead with the enforcement'
of the decree. The content of Subandrio's report on his treatment in Peking has
been leaked by many sources to Western and Asian observers. Chinese
Communist reaction to the visit has resulted in a propaganda campaign in the
pro-Communist Hong Kong press stressing the "difficult plight" of the Chinese
and denouncing the Indonesian Government for "wrong nationalism". 25X1
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23 November T9 9
i165. Soviet Ceremonies
Newspapers in the Soviet Union recently have been sponsoring a campaign
among their readers for suggestions on new "Soviet Bites" which would give
color to the drab procedures of a Communist Society. Izvestia, the government
newspaper, has offered prizes for the best descriptions or proposals for
marriage rites, ceremonies for newborn children and other festivities that
could enrich the USSR's churchless life. A complaint from an automobile factory
foreman supposedly started the search. He deplored the fact that many persons
in the Soviet Union were married in churches, or had their children baptized,
not because they believed in God, but because they enjoyed the solemn and
picturesque ritual. "Regardless of what some moralists say, " the foreman
declared, "customs and rites live among the people." Most of the suggestions
for "new traditions" (if such a thing is rhetorically possible) deal with weddings.
At present a Socialist wedding is a brisk and businesslike affair, which requires
only that the couple trot down to a convenient civil registry and signify their
desire to be wed. The whole affair can be performed during lunch hour, and is
somewhat simpler and considerably cheaper than buying a new pair of shoes
from the local GUM. One of the most imaginative suggestions fora "new Soviet
marriage" came from a cultural director in Byelorussia. He recommended that
weddings be held in a specially decorated club, with suitable dignitaries
presiding. Wide sashes (red, of course) bearing such slogans as "Jealousy is a
survival of corrupt bourgoise society" and "Every girl has the possibility of
becoming a mother heroine" would be tied around the couple. The ceremony
would be followed by a dance, sports and a concert. Early in November, the
nation's first wedding palace was opened in Leningrad. It boasted facilities
ecstatically named "the stair of happiness" and "the hall of triumph", and a
public address system playing sentimental music.
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1 November 1959
r
166. The Hungarian Party Congress
On 14 August 1959, the Central Committee Plenum of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers Party (Communist), which replaced the discredited Hungarian
Workers Party (formed in 1948 with merger of the Communist and Social
Democrat Parties) fixed 30 November 1959 as the opening date of the first Party
Congress since the Revolution. Between 1 September and 10 October lower level
Party organizations representing a claimed 450, 000 membership met to elect
Congress "representatives" and to discuss the Congress agenda already
formalized on highest Party levels. This was announced on 27 September with
the publication of 41 political theses and the blueprint for the second Five-Year
Plan, 1961-1965. The frequent condemnation of various aspects of revisionism
indicate that it still constitutes the principal threat to Party discipline today.
It is interesting to note that no date was announced for the completion of
collectivization in spite of its rather accelerated promotion during the Spring
of 1959. Since the theses' publication some of the lower level "electoral"
meetings have been criticized as displaying "vestiges of revisionism" when the
debates and resolutions appeared apathetic toward the announced program.
Others, who apparently registered dismay over Kadar's failure to announce
a more specific program for collectivization, were scored as dogmatists and
characterized "as grave a threat" to the Party as revisionists. In summary,
outside an external show of Party unity and probable minor personnel changes,
there appears to be no real change forthcoming from the Congress, unless
Radar feels compelled to work against the dogmatists. While assiduously
working toward stability and extension of tight Stalinist control of Hungary
i*ternally, the puppet regime of Kadar has carried on an effort to achieve the
appearance of respectability. Effective 16 September, diplomatic representation
to Indonesia was elevated to embassy status; reports indicate that the regime
has prevailed upon the Finnish government to consider similar elevation of
missions. Previously Japan had consented to re-establishment of relations
with Hungary for the first time since World War II. The regime has concentrates
intensive efforts on having the Hungarian issue dropped permanently from the
agenda of the UN.
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167. Free World Cc?nunist Parties and the Detente-
Important changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy have always caused
trouble for local Communist Parties. Coordination of the action policies of the
entire world Communist movement is a complex operation, involving harmoniza-
tion of the policies of the individual CPs, front organizations and clandestine
action assets with the tactics of the USSR's diplomatic, economic, and propaganda
agencies to achieve the objectives of the CPSU. At present, the CPs and fronts
must adjust their tactics to the developing detente, and in some cases such
adjustment is a radical reversal of previous policies. A major concern for the
CPSU is to make the CPs believe that their own revolutionary interests really
coincide with the strategy of long-term "relaxation. " The movement is uneasy.
It fore sees trouble with its own "hard heads", dilution and penetration by
"bourgeois opportunist" concepts and individuals, the apparent indefinite post-
ponement of revolution, and, in some cases, more aggressive action against it
by local enemies. The CPs have fought the cold war so long that they have trouble
shifting to other forms of "class struggle", in defining enemies other than "US
imperialism", and in working out effective action tactics against the new "nebulou
enemy of the detente. 25X1
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,W3 November 1959
168. Nile Waters
On 8 November the UAR and Sudan signed an agreement outlining the
proposed division of the waters of the Nile R iver, made necessary by the
imminent commencement of construction of the High Dam at Aswan in Egypt
with Soviet technical and economic help. This work has been divided into phases,
in the first of which the USSR has agreed to aid. After work on the first phase
is completed, Egypt is to receive 55. 5 billion cubic meters of the water annually,
while Sudan is to get 18. 5 billion cubic meters. In addition, Sudan will lend
Egypt 1. 5 billion cubic meters until the Sudanese have built irrigation canals
needed to utilize the additional water. A difficult issue, both during and prior
to the negotiations, was the compensation Sudan was to receive for the many
villagers (perhaps 50, 000) whose lands are expected to be flooded by a lake to
be formed above the proposed dam. According to the terms included in the
present agreement, Egypt will pay 15 million Egyptian pounds (about $43, 200, 000)
as compensation for the Sudanese areas to be flooded by the Aswan High Dam.
The signature of this agreement may pave the way for a loan of $50-60 million
by the World Bank to Sudan for construction of another dam at Roseires on the
Blue Nile near the Ethiopian border. Although the UAR-Sudan agreement
culminates years of wrangling in this complex dispute, it is probable that this
is by no means the end of the matter. Other riparian states did not participate
in the conference which ended with signature of the agreement: not only Ethiopia
(source of the Blue Nile) but Great Britain (whose colonies of Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika are all users of some of the head waters) have strong views on
the subject of dividing use of the waters. Perhaps one of the main reasons why
the expression of the expected vehement views from both have so far been
relatively mild is that neither anticipated that the UAR and Sudan would come to
an agreement so quickly on the subject. The preceding agreement was in 19Z9,
when Great Britain was in virtual control of most of the areas mentioned,
excluding Ethiopia but including both Egypt and Sudan. There has already been
opposition to the agreement within Sudan, with charges that the Sudanese
delegation to Cairo was tricked into the agreement. However, there have also
been reports that the Sudanese themselves were fairly devious during the period
of the negotiations.
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APPENTDUM TO BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NO227
Item #169: In this Guidance East Africa is meant to include
Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Uganda, Belgium
Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, Angola, Mozambique,
Bechuanaland, and the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland.
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November 1959
169. East African Political Organizations
East Africa see appendum sheet) is faced with complex problems in
developing political structures which will insure the stability necessary for
economic and social progress. The outlook for a satisfactory solution to these
problems is gloomy because of three factors: the existence of sizeable European
and Asian minorities; the unpromising economic prospects; and the tribal
orientation of most Africans. The major organization vehicles for achieving
independence are the political parties and the trade unions.
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