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January 29, 1962
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25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 Approved For R,~ Lase 20 78-Q3~~~~0~~~009-8 Editorial Rage Results of the 22nd CFaU Con rasa Vt1e have selected far this issue same relatively light, readable camrnen- taxy (see Attachments) appearing in a monthly journal closely assoicated with the French Socialist Farts {SFIC}, La Nation Socialiste, in December, 1961. Although they strongly oppose the ~n~r Fi is a Marxist party and the jot;d~nal's editors are former CI' members. Material from this source would normally be most effective in democratic and left socialist circles; but in the present confusion and soul-searching, it might well reach CI' and front activists everywhere far effective impact. The. first brief article, "Khrushchev Will not Rehabilitate Trotsky" by Marcel Briand (name not immediately identifiable), sarcastically demolishes, from the Trotskyite point of view, the de-Stalinization by Stalinites within "limits imposed by the need to keep the present apparatus in place at all costs." The author effectively uses a demand by (the Iate) Mme. Trotsky for rehabilitation of that former Lenin. partner, including the quote that she considered the present Soviet regime "as far removed from Marxism and the proletarian revolution as that of Franco in Spain." The second article, "Broken Idols and ?~ened Eyes" by Francois Ver~-n {also oat identified), attacks the limited de-Stalinizatian more heatedly, going back to show that Stalin's excesses stemmed from Leninism: "the procedures that ... attained the annihilation, not only of the Czarist bourgeoisie, but also of the non-Bolsheviks and primarily the social-democratic Mensheviks served later during the Stalin regime to eliminate the standpat or reticent Communists." The author concludes by describing the consternation in the ranks of the French Communists and bids the Socialists to help them "to disentangle themselves from their ideological quagmire: if they are ready once again to struggle for a free and democratic socialism, their place is in the Socialist Party. " For an inside view into the consternation and confusion in the French CF which Veran describes, we would refer to an article signed only "S, A. " in the French Communist monthly La Nouvelle Criti ue far December (No. 131, pp.28-36), "The Wisdoms u~r'~ioice. Stating that "there was na personality cult at the time of Lenin," the author lists "the unquestionable authority acquired by Stalin in the victorious construction of Socialism, " "the nature of his character, " and "the vestiges of feudalism in the conscience ~sf the backward masses," which "combined ... when external dangers becanc~e apparent ... to transform his authority into a reign and his reign into de s patism. " The author considers and rejects several justifications, including Boris Leontiev's reaction wizen half his colleague at Pravda were arrested one morning: "I way an honest Communist and wasn o ered;" and Francoise Giraud in I'Expre s s : "his hands had to strangle the throat of old, l~.zy and romantic K-ussia a ring forth not only torrents of blood but also tons of steel; who vaould have done more and faster ?" Approved For Release 20 ~~~6~~00~~1~(~~v~~~~$d} (c~pr~oved For Release 20 -0306(~,Q~~Q~$(s~~9-8 In the succeeding paragraphs the author tortuously relates the cult to morals (communist, of course} and answers to his satisfaction the questiona "But if Stalin had not died" and "Why raise the question now, after he's been dead for eight years '~" Suddenly, however, he is asking the question "How had we been able to believe?" {ha, ex~hasis) just like a defector, and his answer is pitiful: ~'~ "This is not a matter of defense, bud an effort at explanation. The facts`; revealed were true. No one knew them or published them, W e pushed them aside, There are several reasons fox this, The most profound are, perhaps, those which have to do tivith our social being, our function: idealism,. individualism. We pushed these facts aside because they did not conform to our image of a socialist society .... It was not possible to have thieves in the Soviet Union, no liars, no crimes, no injustices because socialism, by definition, (hi emphasis) excluded lying, injustice and crime (we were wrong not a out the principle but about the time element); and the USSR had brought the Socialist Revolution. The author squirms on through another doyen paragraphs of diffuse ~ornmunist gobbledegook and concludes in confirmation of "the wisdom of our choice," but this must be anti-climactic to anyone who reads beyond the above, We are not attaching the text because of its length and limited usefulness, but will be glad to comply with requests fox copies. Approved For Release 20 P78-03061.~,'I~q~Q9-8 Approved For Rele 2000/0 -03061wA0~~1~Q.~.0~~2 S~2II~'3~'.I.:Y 1NC1TL'l~ What T Forgot to Tell the 22nd Congress ... by Nikita S. Khrushchev rus c ev gives an arrogan answer o critics who taunt him with his fear to tell the "full truth about his own role in promoting the personality cult of -- Stalin" -- in a satire (which is based on accurate statements of fact and quo- tations from Khrushchev's Stalin era speeches and articles) published by the editors of the AFL-CIC3 Free Tra:le Union News in their January, 1962, issue. In a series of flashbacks a ri u e o rus c ev, he indicts himself twice over for his admitted complicity in Stalin's crimes, and for distorting or glossing over that complicity in the 2flth and the 22nd CPSU Congresses. He spologi~es time after time far "having forgotten" to tell the Congresses certain very important facts about his own involvement. The mythical speech is replete with 'a~unorcw.s irony which also exposes the current propaganda line of the Kremlin. Mr. K reports that it is necessary for him to reveal these facts because educated people must not be kept waiting decades to read his speech to the 20th CPSU Congress (as they were for publication of Lenin's testament warning the Central Committee about Stalin's serious defects), and because the articles from which ~.e quotes (which he assures them are npt a "bourgeois forgery") are securely buried. A copy of the AFL-CIC~ News in which "What ~ ~'org~~;to Teil the 22nd Congress... "appears, wi a found in the .Att~ichments. Translations in French, Italian, Spanish and Gexman, as well as the English original, z~re available in any quantity and may be obtained by simple request to Head- quarters. The article is one of the best compilations of fact,from the point of content and style, available on K's tactics and the Communist Party system. The primary target is the Communist fellow traveller in whatever group or audience he may be found. The article may be used in direct mailing or it may be reprinted in whole or in part with or without direct attribution. Cuba ''~Telcomed as 13th Member in the Family of Socialist States F_~ owing is an excerpt rom a speec y au e root, ecretary General of the Butch Communist Party (CPN) published in I?e Wa,rheid, CPN daily, on 5 January 1962: - ------~ "Socialism has made great successes in 1961 and has spread itself to new countries. The People's State of Cuba is, on the third anniversary of its revolution, well on the way to Socialism. A unity party of w:~rkers, peasants and progressive persons is busy bringing this about on the basis of Marxism-Leninism through fusion with the ol~l Communist Party. Cuba is the thirteenth member in the family of Socialist States. " Every opportunity should be taken to bring this blunt admission by the head of the I?utch CP that CuUa is a Communist State to the attention of leftists and liberals who persist in refusing t^~ recognize the character of Castro's Cuba. We contrast this statement with the much more cauti~sus treatment given to Cuba by Soviet me~:lia, which, while encouraging close relations and mutual assistance, have not acknowledged Castro's Cuba as a member of the Communist. Sloe in any way. Approved For Release 2000/0 _ _ ~ _ 8-03061A000100050009-8 " 'Approved For Rele,~e 2000 2 78-030~~00010~050009-8 435. The Winds of Change in Africa 25X1C10b Back round: In 1945 there were four independent states in the continent of A~r%ca Scu~;h Afxica, Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt). Today - 17 years later - there axe twenty-nine and others are expected; tl~~e total is more than that of any other continent.. The twenty-nine votes of these states make up mare than one-fouxth of the UN General Assembly's pxesent total of 104, w urther, there axe prospects that other African areas will gain .independence, namely: Rwanda-Urundi, Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, Algeria; perhaps Portuguese Afxica the Rhodesian and Nyasaland, British protectorates in South Africa, S. W. Africa. Yt is worthy of note that almost all the African territories freed during the period 1946-1961 were previously British ox French, deapite reams of Communist propaganda criticizing the British and French as colonialists. By contrast, it is of interest to inquire what state {anywhere) has been given independence by the Soviet Communists once they have gained control of it. Answer: none. In fact, during the same period and just before it the USSR and tlxe Chinese Communists were adding enormously to their empires and subjugating territories and peoples wherever they could... e. g. in Hungary: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, East Germany, Rumania, the Baltic States, Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea. This background serves to place in perspective the request by the USSR on ZII August 1961 at the UN Genexal Assembly that the Sixteenth UNGA include an item on colonialism. The USSR claimed that "the colonial power' efforts to frustrate the United Nations Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples are a challenge to the United Nations and create a threat to world peace and security. The Soviet Government, firmly convinced that the United Nations cannot remain inactive in the face of the intolerable situation that has arisen with regard to the complete and final liquidation of colonialism, is submitting to the General Assembly, for consideration at its Sixteenth Session, the question of the situation with xe gard to the imple - mentation of the 'Deela.ration on the ranting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.' " ~he Dec'laration referred to was passed by the UNGA on 14 December 196d~/ Leis than a month Later, the USSR accused the United States of being an "accomplice in all the bloody atrocities perpetrated by the other colonial powers in their colonies." The growth in the number of independent states of Africa -each with the same voting strength in the UNGA as the U. S. ox USSR - bxings to the fore the question of the alignment of these states especially since together they number more than a quartex ~f the UNGA total. Tn general (and with certain exceptions on both the "West" and the "East" side) they are neutral and express the desire to xemain aloof from the cold war. Even Guinea, which has hithexto followed the Soviet lead ixz the UN, has been showing signs of 4 5 {Continued) Approved For Release 2000 P78-03061~Ob0'f00050009-8 h85. , -(Cont.) ~ 7 ? Januar 19b2 Approved For Relea,~.e 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-030G~00010~050009-8 late of a weakening of this attitude and as late as January ?, ixi the presence of the uoviet Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, President ~ekou Toure said in Conakry (the capital) that Guinea was detorrnined to keep gut of the coXd war. There are three majc~x groups i.-~ Africa, each named after a particular conference crf l-ifrican states. The first, "Brazzavillyy Group," consists of a total of 13 states, 11 of them former French colonies,` plus Toga and Cameroun, The "Casabla.nca Group" consists of six states: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the UAR and the Provisional Government of Algeria, Then there is the 'Monrovia Group" (conference of African and Malagasy states) of 21 African states which mostly combines - no nation in the "Casablanca Group" is a ember -those former British and French states which are now independent. Although there axe a number of alliances among the African states, there can be no veneralization about them - ei:thex on the "East-West" struggle or even on some African issues. While almost all African states, for example, detest apartheid, they cannot speak with ore voice even about it: youth Africa is, of course, the dissentient. Even the Arab states, despite constant disagreements about one question or another within the Arab League, are more united on one question about which they all feel the Same, namely, 25X1 C10b I rael. ~ Central African Republic, C1~ 3, Malagasy, Congo (B}, Gabon, Senegal, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Mauritania (Liberia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, sierra Leone, Congo (L), Congo (B), Camero~ n, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Togo, Libya, Somalia, Central African Republic, Chad, aenegal 485. {Continued) Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CI' - -03061A000100050009-8 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 y Approved For Release 20n~insti~~-? CI'~-BDP78-0306~0~01000500~9-8 anuary 19 2 ~~1C~? Support of Gerrx~an fascism: The Historical Record Background; The following selected incidents offer ample evidence in suppor o ~ e a ove thesis: a. Secret Rearmament Conspiracy. The Versailles peace treaty (1919) far a~_e ermany a mocern, eavy weapons. The Soviet Union, struggling to build up its Red Army in the midst of civil war and other emergencies, was sorely lacking in military equipment, experienced officers an military technicians, Despite violent political clashes between German Communists anG the government of the first German ('~1'Teimar) Republic, secret cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr (the 144,440 man military force permitted Germany under '#fie Versailles treaty) :aeveloped on a large scale, until it was exposed in a sensational investigation conducted by the German Reichstag (parliament). Ruth 1~:'~scher, one-time German Communist Party leader, wrote in STALIN AND GERMAN GCJiYiMUNISM (Harvard University Press 1948): "During 1922-1923 liaison between the General Staffs of the two armies (i. e: German and Soviet) was made by order of Trotsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Ar my, This was done, however, following the foreign policy worked out by the Politburo anc? first of all by the General Secretary (Stalin). , , "(p. 265). Later in the same book, Fischer relates: "In March, 1921, the Russian General Staff sent Karl Radek (one of Lenin's closest associates) to Berlin with a secret proposal.. , . The German army was offered Russian assistance in building up its armament, contrary to the provisions of Versailles, by establishing arsenals on Russian sail. The ~3unkexs firm (German aircraft manufacturer) built factories at Fiii, Samara and Saratov.... Reichswehr Major Lohmann tested submarines in the Baltic and tl~ Black Sea. German officers were sent to Russia to conc'uct training courses for experts in -- chemical warfare and for pilots.... Late in 1926, three German- owned ships arrived at Stettin-~#'rom Russia with a cargo of grenades for the Reichswehr. " (pp, 52$-534) The account given in INCOMPATIBLE ALLIES by Gustav Hilger, who was Counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow and participated in the negotiations between the two countries, confirms many of the facts related. by Ruth Fischer and proviues more details of the extent of German secret arrangements with and military activities in the USSR. b. Communists Eulogize Nationalist Saboteur Schlageter. The first vKave of erman na iona ism a er or ar ne s ruc xn 23, with French occupation of the Ruhr industrial center, run-away inflation and Approved For Release 2000/Q$(27 _CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 4$6. (Continued} ~p rgv~ed For Release 2000/D /27 ;~ fA-RDP78-03061A000100050g09-8 486: ~n . ~ ~ January 19 2 finally Hitler's abortive beerizall putsch in Munich, 9 November 1923. The Communists, instead of o~:posing their interaxationalist ideology against this feverish sa reac:l of nationalist agitation, tried to outbid Hitler and other ~zationalist demagogues lay assailing the Versailles treaty and the German republic, while at the sa:-~ze time attempting to fraternize with the right-wing extremists. These tactics reached a climax in a speech in which the above me~-itioned Marl Radek praised the memory of Albert Leo Schlageter, a German nati--~nalist executed by the p'rench for sabotaging a railroad in the occupied Ruhr area. Ruth Fischer (op. cit.) reports: "After years of secret discussions with Gerrna.n nationalists, Radek at last openly proposed a united front between them, the army and the Coir~munist Party. In June 1923, at a meeting in Moscow of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Comintern, Radek delivered a speech under the title 'The Comintern's Fight Against Versailles and the Capitalist Gffensive.... "' (p. 263} "A few days later, at the same meeting of the Comintern's Executi ve Committee, ...Radek took the floor, to deliver a panegyric on the nationalist hero, -Leo Schlageter: '.... Schlageter, a courageous soldier of the c:,unterrevoluti^n, deserves to be ~- sincerely honored by us, the soldiers of the revolution. "' (pp. 270-271) c. Communists Aid Hitler's Rise to Power. Communism -- as an internal any.: as an externa treat -- was one o the most effective pretexts which provided conservative, middle class and business leaders' support for fascist adventurers like Hitler and Mussolini. The continuous German Communist efforts to undermine the Weimar Republic, to split the labor movement and to destroy the Social Democratic Party, effectively weakened the position of Hitler's opponents in Germany: the German CP before Hitler was a powerful force, with up to lOQ deputies in the Reichstag and nearly 5 million popular votes. The Comintern tactics ~e~ ng the moderate Socialists as the principal enemy also benefited Hitler. Goerge F. Kennon, in RUSSIA E1ND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN (Little, Brown & Ca. , 1961) recalls: "At the sixth Congress of the Corzmunist International, which c~~nvened in Moscow in 1928.. . the line was laid down that the spearhead of Communist political activity in Germany was to be directe~.l squarely against the Social Democrats. The latter were; in fact, to be called for agitational purposes 'Social Fascists' -- with a view to obliterating in the minds of the German electors all real distinction between the Social Democratic leadership and that of the extreme right-wing groups. " (p. 28 6) In the critical period between 1930, when the Nazis obtained for the first time 1Q7 seats in the Reichstag, and 1933, when Hitler seized power, the German Communists assistecTT-Iitler in many ways. ~'or instance, they participated in aNazi-sponsored campaign for a referendum to oust the Social Democratic state government of Prussia, they took part in a Nazi- provoked transport worlcers strike in Berlin, their propaganda tried to z Approved For Release 20001A~/2~ ;CIA RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 486. (Continued) ~gb.(~r9ved For Relearse 2 P78-03061~q~Q.,'~0~~~9-8 surpass that of the TTazis in nationalist demagoguery and they continued to assail tine institutions of the republic and the parties which supported the repu':~lican regime. Kerman (op. cit. ), after discussing the direct responsibility of the Communists for Hitler's seizure of power, concludes: "The consequences of Hitler's-accession to power were not entirely disagreeable to the long-term purposes of the Russian Communist movement. Hitler~s triumph in 1933 put an enr1, after all, for more than a decade to come, to the possibilities for enuine rapprochement between the German people and the remainder of the zest. It produced precisely that aggravation of the contradictions within the Vd'e stern w=~rlcl an which both Lenin and Stalin had staked their diplomacy. It produced another world war, cnnstitu.ting the second great drain in a century an the spiritual and physical energies of the V~Testern peoples and ending with the delivery of half of Europe into Soviet hands. " (p. 292) d. Moscow's Share of Guilt- in Hitler's ~Erorld Velar Two. Stalin dire ctpyr opene t e ~vay or it er s war o aggression y signing the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on 23 .Flu~ust 1939, occupying the Baltic states (Est~enia, Latvia and Lithuania) as his reward any' sharing with the Nazi war-lord the spoils of Poland. Moreover, from the beginning of the war until Hitler attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June I9~I, Communists the world over sabotaged the Western war effort against Hitler, especially in France. Fxanz 33orkenau, himself once a senior Comintern official, describes the--impact of Communist treason on the French war effort in 1939-~t~ (in EUI;t;PEAN COMMUNISM, London 1953): "When the French Cozx~rnunists hinted at the desirability of desertians, there were real deserticros. When they prompted sabotage of war production, they instigated real acts of sabotage. A frighteningly large part of the armaments issuing from the Paris factories whose worl~ers were under Communist influence were dud's, or worse, were sabotaged so as to produce mortal accidents. Here and there, but not in general, the evildoers were caught and three young Communists were shat after having sabotaged hundreds of airplanes in the Farman works. It is more difficult to assess quantitatively the effects of Communist propaganda for desertion, fraternization with the enemy, and throwing away one's arms. Bu.t the generals were convinced that Communist propaganda was the rnaj~r factor in the rapid collapse of the army. " (p. 3Q4) At the same time, the Soviet Union furnished huge quantities of strategic raw materials and essential foodstuffs for Hitler's war machine and permitted the Nazi Reich to maintain contacts with its ally, 3apan, across its territory. Documents captured in the Nazi archives provide ample evidence of Soviet support of the Nazi war effort. erections extracted from two of these documents illustrate the nature of this support as follows: Approved For Release ~nnnia~z ?-r~-enp~R_03064'1~00~~4~~~~9-8 `f8~' ~~~`OZed For Rele~ 20 8-0306"~APO'0'Ob"9-8 ". The supplies from the Russians have heretofore been a very substantial prop t~ the German war ec~~nomy. Since the new commercial treaties went into effect, Russia has supplied over 3Q0 million Reichsmarks worth of raw materials.... " f~'orei~n ?ffice IvIemcran~:u.m, signed by Schnurre, Berlin, 2B September 194{F~ "The Navy inten3s to abandon the base on the Murmansk Coast ~f _ Ru.ssia~ as such are now available in Norway. Please inform #he Russians of this decision and, on behalf of the Government of the Reich, convey our thanks for--valuable assistance. In ael~aition to the official note, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy inte:zds a~so~-to express his gratitude in a personal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy..... /''T'elegram to German Embassy, Moscow, 25X1 C10b signed. by W oermann, Berlin, 4 September 194' Approved For Relea -030~'C~A000100050009-8 Approved For Release 200 P78-030~~8~y~9~~~(~~~9-8 487. THE BERI~;IN CRISIS: .CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 25X1C10b Background: The following important developments leave taken place since 'Vi'e aTs~.,uiclance clealinl; with the situ-anon in Berlin (No. 73 of 28 August, entitled The Berlin Crisis: Encc~uxaging Communist Opposition}: 1. ~T'dest German Elections of 1? September: Replacement of CDU majority con ro y coa a. on government and a wealtening of ~'idenauer's position; likelihood the Chancellor's "European" policies may increasingly be challenged by elements concerned primarily with German national interests . 2. Ruslc-Gr-.~myko Talks in New Yorlc in Uc~tober: represent the----- first direc . ~. - ovie a s since a ennedy-Khrushchev confron- tation in jTienna in June, 1961, in hi:s speech to the 22nd CPSU Congress, I~hrushclaev characterized the husk-Gromyko conversations as an in~',ication of a "more reasonable" attitude on the part of the West. 3, I{hrushchev Repoxt to 22nd Cp'SU Congress 17 October: the Soviet 1ea~er, ui ore~er o remove e qua i o an ultimatum" (if a new Berlin arrangement satisfactory to the Soviets was not forthcoming), formally withe'rew his threat of proceeding by the year's encl with a separate Soviet t~loc "peace treaty" with East Germany, which unilaterally w;~u.ld abridge flee ~x1'est's Berlin access rights. Khru.shchev told the Congress that he saw a "prospect for achieving peaceful coexistence for the entire period in which the social and political problems now dividing the world will have to be solved. " The reasons for Khrushchev's removing the cleaclline on Berlin may have included the following: a. The fact that -- in a certain sense -- the talks with the West regarding Berlin had already begun, and to pave the way for formal negotiations by removing Western objections to negotiating uncle r duress; b. The erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 1961 and the prohibition of free movement within Fierlin, went a long way toward accomplishing immediate Soviet objectives (closing the refugee escape hatch and preventing further flight of badly needed manpower; sealing off East Berliners and East Germans from the "'pernicious" influence of West Berlin; more firmly incorporating the Soviet sector of Berlin into the "GDI;" and establishing a de facto state border through the center oaf Berlin); c. The Soviet Union also may have believed that the results of the September elections and the impact of the 13 August action improved the Soviet chances of we~rkening West Germany's ties to NATO and tlxe Common Market -- the Soviet memorandum handed to German Ambassador Kroll in Moscow in late December, 1961, is the most striking of several recent examples of Soviet Approved For Release 2000 78-03061,~Q0~0?85~A?8~8 ? ~$7A~~F~e~l For Release 200 P78-030~,~60O~h90A99-8 efforts to persuade West Germans that a mutually advantageous Soviet-Federal ltepublie accommodation is possible and in the German national interest. 4 Thompson-Gromyko Exploratory Talks in Moscow, I?ecember, 1961 - ,7anuary`~+~~` ese a s represent a extern a ort to determine if realistic negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin are possible. Soviet Objectives: With the mast pressing of the Soviet objectives accomp is e y t e ~3 August action sealing off East and West Berlin in violation of Four 3~ower agreements, the hard core of the controversy at t'~is stage concerns the continued Soviet effort to erode the status of West Berlin by bestcswing on the East German regime the life and death power to regulate all entry to and all egress from West Berlin, by severing West Berlints close ties to the Federal Republic, and by divorcing the internal defense of `Nest Berlin from the three Western protection powers, thus preparing the wsy for the eventual absorption of a withered West Berlin into East Germany. (The Sc~viet Union has indicated it is willing to accept the token presence of allied garrisons in West Berlin; however, in this case they insist on the presence of a contingent of Soviet troops. Having violated the Four Power status of all ~f Berlin, they now prepare a "Four-Power status" far Weyt Berlin.) Together with further Soviet pursuit of their Berlin objectives, there has been a re-focusing of Soviet sights on their principal strategic `objective in Western Europe: the separation of West Germany from NATO `and the ~omrnon Market. In this re-focusing, they have been impelled by three principal factors, two of which f rom their point of view are positive -- namely, the successful sealing of the Berlin sector borders in August and the^.utcame of the German elections in September -- ~.nd one of which is very definitely negative -- the impressive forward movement toward unification of Western Europe. Because cf the above-mentioned re-focusing, and possibly also because of current preoccupation with relations with the other members of the Communist bloc, Khrushchev appears currently to be marking time on Berlin and awaiting the results of his recent initiatives. Since ~hrushchev's removal of the separate "peace treaty" deadline, the Soviet Union has avoided authoratative comment regarding deadlines or unilateral action on Berlin, Bast German propaganda and high-level pronouncements have reflected a general uncertainty :ever the course of Soviet policy in the coming months. Finally, the evident S~,viet interest in continuing the talks with ~.mbassador Thompscra suggests that no new major Soviet moves (this would n;~t preclude East German moves) will be taken against Berlin until the 25X1C10b current round of diplomatic pr~:bings ie concluded. Approved For Release 20^^~^Qi~~ ? ~'I~-!?nP78-03061~A~0(~~00~5000~-8 8 ~n znuecl 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 9 Januar 1962 ~p oved For Rele~e 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-0304000100050009-8 .~ monists Unmask Subversion in South Vietnam Background; Radio Hanoi oa 18 January 162 announced that in Ia.te peGemcer, ~j6f, "Marxist-Lenin4sts in South Vietnam met and decided to set up the Vietnamese People's ll:evalutianary Party." Priox to this announcement the 1-Ianni Regime propaganda Iine was that the Viet Cong (Communist guerrillas) and the National Liberation Front (Communist (rant organization operating in South Vietnam) were simpiy indigenous South Vietnamese fighting to liberate the area fr?m the '~imperialists~s puppet clique cf Ng~s Dinh Diem.'T Despite massive evidence tc the contrary, the Communist line has suggested t3aat once the imperialists were thrnwn out, South Vietnam would enjoy some measure of autonomy in a united Vietnam. The Cammunists have now chosen to unmask their direction and control of the Viet Ccng. Besides parroting Viet Cong's usual propaganda line (workers unite and throw Off the yoke of the U, S. /Diem clique, support the National Liberation Front, etc. ), they new paxty's declaration '}calls cYn the people in the north to strive to build an ever mare prosperous and atr?ng North Vietnam, making it a solid base for the struggle for peaceful reunification of the Gauntry, ... " Thus in its 18 January announcement, Hanoi belatedly felt compelled to acknowledge that the guerrillas in South Vietnam are. Communists and North Vietnam is their base. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A0001000v~~~09-8 Approved For Rel~,se 2000 ~~(~i'b~~~0~~~-8 Ci.ctions to the 22nd CPSU Con roes Amon Latin American CP's, Back round: During the 22nd CPSU Congress, none of the Latin American delegates en orsed Khrushchev's attack against the anti-Party group. Those from the Dominican Republic and Honduras failed to sugport Khrushchev's attacks on Albania or on the Stalin cult of personality. Delegates from 14 Latin American countries supported the attack against Albania .only, while six Latin Amexican delegates specifically attacked Albania and the Stalin cult of personality. This disparity indicates the confusion which was created the delegates by the Soviet actions at the Congress. Subsequently, after the return of the delegates, the Communist Party of Uruguay was the first of the Latin American Parties to formally endorse Khrushchev's new Party Program. Although the Parties of Paraguay and Colombia later joined Uruguay in supporting Khrushchev's attack on the Albanians and the Chinese Communists, the other Latin Amexican Parties were generally late in responding to developments within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, There is some reason to believe that intro-Party debates, between supporters of the Soviet line and those supporting Peiping have taken place in Brazil, Chile and Ecuador. 'The results of the Moscow proceedings have probably had a more disquieting impact on some Latin American Communists, and particularly on their sympathizers, than the relatively calm public reaction they evinced would seem to indicate. The most important consequence of Khrushchev's opening speech at the Congress was the effect it had on all those to whom, in spate of his defects, Stalin remained. the great theoretician of Marxism and worthy successor of Marx and Lenin who made the Soviet Union what it is today and should continue to be revered throughout history as one of the fathers of Socialism. Although most Party members had managed to accept Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin at the 2Qth CPSU Ccngress in 1956, many were unconvinced and now wondered why it had been necessary to reopen this issue at the 22nd Party Congress. Some have interpreted the renewed attacks on Stalin as a device to persecute certain leaders in the Soviet Union. Although the leaders of the various Parties have accepted the conclusions of the Congress as law, lower levels within the Party have been somewhat bewildered and haves been asking numerous questions. Why, they ask, have the letter which Molotov sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU in October 1961 and the statements made by the Albanians in their awn defense not been published locally? Some have expressed disappointment in the fact that the 22nd CPSU Congress was mainly concerned with local problems such as the dispute between the CPSU and Albania, the internal ideelagical difficulties of the CPSU, and the re-emergence of the cult of personality issue. They felt that, since the beginning of the C?ngress, Khrushchev was largely defenrlin himself and appeared to be trying to maintain his position within the CPSU. The question has been raised as to where some of the present CP leaders were (and hew they behaved} during Stalin's rule. The special situation prevailing in both Brazil and in Cuba is noteworthy. A l~~ng standing and profound rift has been in existence within the Brazilian C ~4p~m3~ed'~e71~as~0~?8/~ ~ 4~A~~~St~$~6~74$0'(~'4'0~10$?~9~ obtain advice in his struggle against the "opportunistic and revisionist" policy 489, (Continued) 48.9 ~ ant. A~~ro~e~d For Rele 200 - P78-030~.1.~~~~' I~~~~v0~ ~-8 of the Secretary General of the Party, Caries Prestos. Sino-Soviet frictions, emphasized by Klixushchev during the 22nd CPSU Congress, have been reflected in this struggle. Prestos has accused Prado's group of being Stalinist, of violating the organizational principles of Lenin, of refusing to recognize past errors, as revealed by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and of forming an anti -Forty group. In addition, Pradc has been accused of taking advantage of the-Brazilian GP's new policy, which they knew was designed principally to achieve the legality of the Party, in order to attack the Party leaders. Another criticism has been that Prade's leftist group has, by participating in pro.-Cuban front activities, attempted to use the Cuban revaluti~n as an example of the successful application of leftist revolutionary theory. The PCB leaders have objected to the fact that the leftists have distributed Che Guevaxats book on guerrilla warfare which was translated into Portuguese by leftist leader Mauricio Grabois, A number of leftist leaders, including several members of the Central Committee, were expelled from the Party for factional anti-Party activity, for plotting against the Party unity line, for follwiilg dogma and assuming a sectarian position on basic principles, thus serving the interests of the enemies of the proletariat and of the people. Prado's group, on the other hand, has accused Prestos cf using Stalinist dictatorial methods in order to gain approval of the new Party line .which they claim has abandoned the basic tenet of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in order to adopt a policy of compromise and revisionism. The PCB leadership i~ condemned for refusing to recognize that the political and economic ills of the country can only be solved by modifying the basic political and social structure of the nation, thus failing to adhere to the traditional revolutionary principles o# communism. The leftists deplore the fact that even the experiencE of Cuba has failed to open the eyes of the PCB leadership to the need far revolutionary communism and they wish to lead the Party back along the true path cf Marxism and to restore its role as the vanguard of the proletariat. They want to apply the concept of class struggle and argue in favor of a policy which uses other than "geaeeful't means to achieve Bower. They claim that the present statutes and program of the PCB are no longer in accord with Marxist-Leninist theory. In addition to Brazil, Cuba presents a situation wherein Cuban allegiance to Moscow is open to question. In spite of professions of faith on the part of Fidel Castro and cif Blas Roca, which included Roca's condemnation of the Albanian CP at the 22nd CPSU Congress, the Cuban leaders sent greetings on 29 November 1961 to Albania on the anniversary cf the establishment of the Albanian People's Republic. This was followed by the arrival of the first Albanian ambassador in Havana in early December, 1961, which was sharply criticized by several Latin American GP's, particularly the Uruguayans and theGhileans. _. In discussing the 22nd CPSU Congress on I December 1961, Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Cuban CP was very careful nat to offend Stalin!s admirers while exl:laining why the Stalin cult of personality had to be ec~ndemned. He described how Stalin's first period was the fight against the enemies ~Jf the Party -that is, ~.~f Leninism -and that this fight, which gained great victories :suer these enemies, contributed greatly to the victory ~~f Socialism in the Soviet Union. He went on to explain that Stalin, "who was a ;rest Marxist, an outstanding Marxist," had a series of negative aspects in his personality which caused him to promote his deificati~~n as a result ~f which tl~e principle of collective leadership was eliminated. Roca wa~,~~a ~s~w~~~ ~~~i~~i s~~~~~~~oc~~o~~e~ ~g~Ap~r~~e~i For Rele,~e 200 78-0306~0~,15Q~-8 responsible for the numerous unjuut condemnations and executions which took: place under Stalin. Roca then added: "There are those people who say that Stalin had great merits. Yes, nobody denies that. The Soviet Party will not deny it either. Stalin will occupy his pierce in history with his merits and his errors. ? In addition to maintaining close friendly diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Peiping, certain attitudes of the Cuban leaders seem to be more inspired by ~'eiping than by Moscow.. A good example of this lies an the criticism. which was made in December, 1961, of certain "improprieties" extant among the militiawornen. The latter were accused of transforming their baggy unifoxms by giving them a waistline and of using fancy hairsoes, nailpolish and perfume. These objectionable features were describe3 as vestiges of capitalism. which must be discarded in the new social order. Such comments axe more reminiscent of a Chinese population uniformly clad in shapeless dungarees than of a renascent Moscow which attempts to improve the clothing habits of the population and invites the Paxis house of Dior to put on a fashion show in Moscow. 25X1~C10b 25X1C10b Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050009-8