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July 1, 1963
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Relea 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030600200020004-5 1 July 1963 Briefly Noted Soviet Officials Fabricate Slave Stories to Prevent Fraternization. The New York Times carried on 4 June (Press Comment, 4 June) an article describing a controversy which has arisen between African students in Moscow and the Soviet authorities. On 27 Oct- ober last year, Koisomolska a Pravda, the official paper of the Young Communist e~ gue,pubed a -story on the alleged adven- tures of a Soviet girl who married a Moslem student, left the Soviet Union with him, and later was sold by him to a friend, who' wanted a sixth wife in his harem, The Soviet press being rather deficient in spicy stories of this kind, the tale attracted wide- spread interest, Actually it appears that the story was com- pletely fictitious, and that it was published in order to dis- courage Soviet girls from fraternizing with foreign students. The purpose was accomplished, in that symptoms of hostility to foreign students increased. A group of Arab students obtained an assurance that the abduction had not been to any Arab country, but a group of African students was unable to gain satisfaction. According to the African students, they were told that the story was invented and they were promised that a retraction would be published, But such a retraction has not appeared. (See also New York Times, 9 June 1963, in Press Comment, 10 June 1963. overage n non-American media is expected, and will be reproduced in Press Comment.) This incident should be given maximum play in all non-white areas sending students to the Soviet bloc. Comment should point out (1) the attempt of the Soviet authorities to discourage fraternization, and (2) their admitted lying and their failure to carry out the promise of a retraction. (Note: Separate guidance has been dispatched to selected stations on this subject.) Chinese People's Congress Postponed. Chou En-lai announced on June 7th that the 1963 session of the National People's Congress (the fourth session of the 2nd NPC), Communist China's rubber-stamp legislature, has been rescheduled from the second to the last quarter of this year. The Sino-Soviet talks scheduled to begin July 5 probably affected the decision. However, since the chief purpose of these con- claves has been to publicize regime policies and accomplishments, the worsening crop outlook and continued retrenchment in industry are the more likely causes of its postponement. The sessions have been held annually since 1954, with the exception of 1961 which was also a year of exceptional economic difficulties. Whatever the reasons, the postponement of the Congress is evidence that the body, which strives to create the appearance Approved For Release 1999/08/24: IA-RDP78-S K'O Od10t5) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061,000200020004-5 (Briefly Noted Cont..) 1 July 1963 of being a democratic institution, exists only for the conven- ience of the regime and this year it would be a distinct incon- venience even to such a totalitarian regime as the CCP. In commenting on the postponement, we note that it would not be possible to eliminate the convening of a legislative body if it had any real functions to perform in governing a society. We also point out that the election of deputies for the third NPC Con- gress will have to be postponed into 1964, so that even the pretence of having a legislative body will be suspended. Soviet Concern over African Developments An article by IzvestiY a "observer" V. Kudryavtsev in the May issue of the Soviet Publication International Affairs (see Attach- ment), the English version of the monthly ourna ez dunarodnnaya zhizn',reveals a considerable Soviet concern over Afri an develop- me n s. Kudryavtsev attended all three conferences of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). Writing after the most recent AAPSO conference in Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963, he finds that AAPSO's work is of diminishing value for two main reasons: (1) power in Africa has gradually shifted from popular (liberation) movements to the growing number of independent governments which are preoccupied with local problems and are not adequately represented at the non-governmental AAPSO conferences; and (2) while not stating so specifically but strongly implying, because AAPSO is increasingly dominated by the Chicoms. The article is of particular interest because it fails generally to take an optimistic view of African developments and, indeed, rather critically views those African trends which are potentially inimical to Soviet Interests. It may be inferred from the article that the Soviet Union will at appropriate occasions point to trends in Africa which in its opinion are wrong. The author contemptuously refers to unnamed antagonists as simpletons who have forgotten their own origin and fail to realize that African liberation would be impossible were it not for the Soviet revolution, the defeat of Fascism, and the work of "progressive forces" in the West. In the same context the author notes that some of the intensely nationalistically inclined figures are using the solidarity movement not only against imperialism and colonialism but also against "white people in general." In unattributable outlets we use this article as a basis for editorial treatment following the same line as in previous AAPSO guidances, generally as follows: The Soviet Union, and other Communist regimes, look with favor on newly independent countries o n 1 y when these countries permit the local CPs to work freely its (Brief 1 gt ~t s~ Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A(00 '06ozMd Bv Approved For Relea,e 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030&-000200020004-5 (Briefly Noted Cont.) 1 July 1963 towards gaining control of the country. When developing countries search for their own policies or adopt policies which are opposed to Communism, national aspirations are decried or labelled as being more expressions of bourgeois ideology. We explain that Communists have only scorn for attempts to carry out social, economic and other reforms, unless these reforms are carried out completely along Communist lines and lead to social revolution within the country. On appropriate occasions, we also throw light on the Soviet concern over the growing Chinese influence in front organizations such as AAPSO, and we comment that the Chinese-led ,_viit along racial lines may well cripple Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world areas. Sixtieth CPSU Anniver:: try 17 July -10 August. The CPSU dates its birthday from the second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) held in Brussels and London in 1903. Factional disputes over the type of party organization to be developed dominated the sessions. Lenin rejected the view of the majority and stuck to his concept that the party should be a small revolutionary conspiratorial group, centralized and tightly controlled. Several delegates opposing his views walked out of the meetings in disgust at Lenin's intransigeance, leaving him at the end of the Congress with a small majority of 4 in the remaining 44 representatives. Lenin used this temporary situation to namo his faction the Bolsheviki (majority) and his opponents the Mensheviki (minority) and utilized the opportunity to pack the controlling organs of the RSDLP and the party newspaper Iskra in Switzerland. There was a final break between the two dons in 1912 although they continued to work together before and during the 1917 Revo- lution. The Mensheviki were liquidated as a political force after the Lenin-Trotsky coup d'etat in which similar dictatorial, conspiratorial maneuvers were used by the CPSU minority to eliminate the provisional government and all opposition. Wherever comments on the CPSU's anniversary celebration are appropriate, we q u e s t i o n the political and historic right of Khrushchev's organization of the ruling managerial class to take credit for the revolutionary endeavours of the RSDLP 60 years ago. Commenting to non-Stalinists.and Cortraurlist sympathizers we seek to counter the forthcoming eulogies of Lenin by concentrating on his dictatorial ru a an his use of con- spiracy to out-maneuver and ultimately liquidate opponents. We characterize the developments in and the present state of the Soviet Union in historical terms: to all European or other audiences (mainly intellectual) who understand the French Thermidor we compare Khrushchev's "collective" leadership, policies 3 (Briefly Noted Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Relere 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03064A000200020004-5 (Briefly Noted Cont.) 1 July 1963 and practices with the Directorate which followed Robespierre's execution (this was treated fully more than a year ago in BPG #87 item 503 "The Thermidorean Reaction" 26 March 1962); to other audiences, particularly Communists and their sympathizers, we stress that the loss of revolutionary leadership in the present CPSU, the failure to solve conflicting demands, the effort to suppress both the right and the left, and the increasing appearance of popular demands and pressures against restraints of the regime, are all part of a historical process, the running out of the limited Communist plan to organize society in its image and dominate mankind. Approved For Release 1999/08/24 P78-03061A0D2e0 2000?4$gvd) Approved For Relea 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306) 000200020004-5 (Briefly Noted) DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST I July 1963 20 July Indo-China war concluded with Geneva Agreement I54 =ambodia, Laos, Vietnam) 22 July OAS Panama Declaration of principles signed by 19 Western Hemisphere countries in 1956. (US invited first International Conference of American States to Washington in 1899, the first step toward creating the Pan American Union.) 31 July Malaya announced end of 12-year fight against Communist guerrillas, 1960. August Brazilian municipal elections in Pernambuco State scheduled for early August. Pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes. 6 Aug. 2nd Latin American Youth Conference, still scheduled for Santiago, Chile, 6 - 11 August but likely to be postponed or cancelled. 13 Aug. Communist East Germany sealed East-West Berlin border by building a wall in 1961 (more than 30,000 refugees had registered in West Berlin in the preceding month). 14 Aug Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic (Chiang Kai Shek) signed in 1945. 17 Aug. Soviet-Polish Treaty went into effect. Poland received German territory as compensation for territory annexed by the Soviet Union, 1945. 9.0 Aug. Leon Trotsky assassinated in 1940 in Mexico City. 24 Aug. Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939. 24 Aug. North Atlantic Treaty entered into force 1949 (NATO). 17 Sept. International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICCJ) Conference on board Soviet ship in the Medeterranean, Sept. 17 - 1 Oct. 29 Sept. International Union of Architects (UIA), seventh Congress, Havana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be followed by UIA General Assembly and International Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct. (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Releaso 1999/08MNdb@*ABPli 8-0306'14000200020004-5 PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #6 11-24 June 1963 Commentary Principal Developments: 1. The Chinese Communists delivered and published their long-delayed response to the CPSU letter of 30 March (see Chronology, 15 June). It was a long, un- yielding, arrogant, even insulting rc-statement of their most militant interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory, plus harsh denunciation of recent Soviet inter- nal developments and of Soviet conduct in relations with other fraternal socialist parties and countries, topped off by another taunting challenge to the CPSU to publish the materials on both sides. (NCNA announced that the new message had already been published in book- let form, together with the CPSU letter to which it replied.) On the same day, the Peking Peo lees Daily and the Albanian Zeri I Popullit feature nasty ttackts on Tito and Yugoslavia, Albanians coupling Tito directly with Khrushchev. 2. Moscow observers report that Soviet officials were obviously shocked by the tone and timing of the CCP message, just three days before the opening of the CC plenum of the CPSU, convened to discuss ideological problems. The CPSU reacted with a statement released on the first day of the plenum which regretted the "arbitrary interpretation" and "unwarranted attacks," and which stated that they would not publish it because publication would call for a public reply which would further aggravate polemics, contrary to "the understand- ing reached." Speakers at the plenum were compelled to address themselves to the Chinese dispute and the plenum adopted a resolution on the subject, all rejecting the attacks and supporting the Khrushchev line. The Soviet press joined in the chorus. 3. Meanwhile, the North Koreans again demonstrated their support of the Chinese in a joint statement at the conclusion of President Choe's visit to China and with the North Vietnamese during a visit of a North Korean delegation to North Vietnam. 4. On the other side, the Yugoslavs have taken ad- vantage of several opportunities to reassert their firmness, and the East Germans officially protested to the Chinese against their dissemination of their polemical materials. 5. The Rumanian party further demonstrated its "independence" by publishing a lengthy review of the Approirid eF as~e9 g8fi&PC r-F FIOWaUQOOJO0?BQ004-5 contrary. (Commentary Continued) A proJFbr Relea, I 999/081 ! -03061A000200020004-5 6. The resignation of a CC member from the Australian CP and the ousting of five from their Central Executive positions was interpreted locally as portending the formation of a dissident, pro- Chinese party there. Somewhat the same situation seems to be developing in the Ecuadoran CP (accord- ing to the OCI Weekly Summary dated 21 June), though we are not able to furnish any published reports in the Chronology. FBIS has furnished an unpublished (7) OUO report of a 3-day plenum of the Chilean CP, at whfch the Secretary General violently attacked the ChiComs and condemned visiting Chinese writers in Chile for making anti-Soviet propaganda. The plenum repeated its support of the Soviet line, but it is believed that a purge of the ranks will be forthcoming. Significance: In their conduct during this period, the Chinese cou a.rdly have been more provocative, insolent, challenging, and downright hostile toward the C'SU and still remain within the outermost limits of nominally "fraternal" relations. It is not only that their polemic directly con- tradicts the Soviet line on many vital questions and labels Soviet positions as "absolutely impermissible," but they directly impugn Soviet sincerity (see the two uses of "under the pretext" sections 20 and 23, and the "CPSU should match their deeds with their words" in section 22) and spew out such nasty insults as great.-.power chauvinism, sectarianism, splittism, subversion, crudely interfering, imposing their own wrong line, advocating one thing today and another to- morrow, -- and, horror of horrors,-- tantamount to helping restore capitalise! And finally, their repeated challenge to the Soviets to publish both sides was so worded as to make it a matter of deciding between truth and falsehood rather than honest differences of opinion; Moreover, their maneuvers were no less provocative than the content of their message. After deliberately refraining from replying to the CPSU letter for ten long weeks, the Chinese launched this massive attack just 3 days before the important CPSU plenum and about two weeks before the bilateral talks are to begin, -- and simultaneously announced that it had already been pub- lished in booklet form. Only the outcome of the Sino-Soviet talks, still scheduled to open on 5 July, will conclusively show how to interpret the perplexing submissiveness of the Soviets who, despite their protests, appear to be "turning the other cheek" towards their Chinese tormentors. For the time being, several differ- ent, mutually exclusive interpretations are conceivable: a. the Soviets want to give the Chinese sufficient rope to hang themselves, e.g. they refrain from re- paying the CCP in kind until the negotiations, in order to demonstrate Peking's guilt before the entire World Communist Movement (relatively the most likely explanation). Approved For Release 1999/08/2.42GJA-UP78-03061A~000200020004-5 CATS ommentary Continuer A rG9ii'or Release. 19 DP78-03061ZO00200020004-5 b. Or the Soviets are primarily playing for time, willing to swallow some more ideological insults (especially since Khrushchev apparently -- and mis- takenly, seen from his place -- underestimates the importance of "doctrinal squabbles," putting first priority on military, especially nuclear strength, second on scientific and industrial achievements) --- hoping that time is working for them, e.g. by way of seeing Mao depart from the scene. c. Or the Presidium has inside information to the effect that the Chinese dragon's bark is far worse than its bite, i.e. that the CCP is really willing to make concessions behind closed doors but tries to save face and improve its bargaining position until then (an admittedly unlikely, but not im- possible alternative). d. Or the pressure on Khrushchev inside the CPSU to come to terms with Peking is so strong that K. cannot aggressively deal with the increasingly deadly insults compiled in that latest letter (no evidence to support this possibility, either -- but the "inferiority complexes," caused among Soviets and other European Communists by the bar- rage of devastating ChiCom accusations, may have led to a crisis between revolutionary emotions and more conservative practices which characterize the Khrushchev line). The foregoing is intended mainly as "food for thought" for 25X1C10b recipients. 25X1C10b lk Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Relea 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061,A000200020004-5 CERO LOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSI NS #6 11-24 June 1963 June 7 - In a speech at Ljubljana, reported in Politika, Sel- grado of 8 June, Yugoslav Deputy Premier Kardeltto China that relations between socialist countries must be based on equality and mutual respect. "What would the relations. . . become if every socialist country ascribed to itself the right to declare another socialist country to be capitalistic, imperialist, agent of imperialism, etc. . . . China must realize that it cannot subordinate the whole of international socialism to its momentary interests and aiabitions." June 12 - The North Korean organ Nodon Sinmun in a lengthy, reps ive article stressed the necessx ytoo build "a self- supporting economy under the banner of self-reliance." June 15 - NCNA announced that the ChiCom Ambassador in Moscow had ivered to CPSU Presidium member Suslov a reply dated 14 June to the CPSU letter of 33 March to the CCP (Due to its length, we are appending our analysis of this highly important document at the end of this Chronology.) The full text was published by all Peking papers on 17 June under the heading "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," and NCNA announced on the same day that it had already been Published in booklet form together with the ex s o a 5111 arc letter to W-Hich it replied and o the earlier exchange between the two, 21 February from CPSU and 9 March from CCA. June 15 - On the same day, both the Chinese People's Daily an a Albanian Zeri I Popuilit carried harsFi'a tacks on Tito and the Yugos av rev s onists. The relatively short Chinese article, accusing the Titoites of "trying to worm their way into the ranks of the international Communist move- ment to carry out unscrupulous sabotage," is distinguished only by its scurrilous language: "The Tito group's attacks and slanders are no novelty; they are mere spittle collected from the cuspidors of the imperialists and other revisionists." The Albanian, however, picks up the underlined implication of Soviet collusion and spells it out unequivocally. Tito, it says, "expounded their /T and K7 identical profoundly anti- Marxist and anti-revolutionary views on questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, the paths and forms of the transi- tion to socialism, etc. What is characteristic is that in dealing with all these questions, Tito used N. Khrushchev's language." And later: "The renegade Tito in a string of slanders, in particular against the CCP, has qualified the firm struggle of principle being waged by the CCP fend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and to oppose the counter-revolutionary views and hostile attacks of the modern revisionists, }as 'a 'struggle for hege sccYearPTiat~edK0020004-5 App@aj[gJi~ri~`hi2 d (#6 Chronology Continued) Wop d )For Releas,,,, 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200020004-5 judges others' from his chauvinistic angle. Be- cause it is precisely they who claim to have the monopoly on the 'creative development of Marxisn' -- and all others must join in step -- they have not shrunk from anything to impose their own views: from plots -- even organizing counter- revolutionary insurrections as'ar , from the liquidation o eading cares in frater- nal parties who oppose eir rev s orast course, dispatching for their purpose special envoys to convince the leading circles of these fraternal parties, -- and even economic and military pres- sures and use of flattery and means of corruption." And later, this aggrieved indictment: "The modern revi- sionists manipulate Lenin in a cynical way and they distort him without shame." June 17-20 - On the 17th, the Havana Revolucion (formerly official organ of Castro's 26th of July movement; still re- garded as reflecting Fidel's personal line) published a 5- column Prensa Latina dispatch from Peking on the CCP letter. Hoy, (recently designated as the official organ of United )arty of the Socialist Revolution as well as the CP) carried a similar piece on the 10th, credited to Hsinhua, Peking. However, this reportage craftily avoided any description of the harshly controversial polemics: for example, each of the 25 sections was listed, but only in a single title-like sentence or phrase denoting the "problem" discussed, such as "11 - The transition from capitalism to socialism!' The Cuban articles were published before the CPSU had issued its statement (see next item in Chro- nology) vetoing any publiciz- ing of the CCP letter, but on the 20th, the Rumanian :Party organ Scinteia published a report almost identical with the Cuban, credited to the Rumanian agency Agerpress, Peking. June 10 - TASS released a statement which, after recalling the earlier CPSU-CCP exchanges proposing the halting of polemics and holding of a bilateral meeting, acknowledged receipt of the CCP letter of 14 June. However, the CPSU stated: "This letter gives an arbitrary interpretation to the declaration and statement of the Moscow conferences of Marxist-Leninist parties, distorts the major theses of these historic documents, and contains unwarranted attacks on the CPSU and other fraternal parties. All this gives rise to deep regret. The CPSU CC believes that the publication at pre- sent in the Soviet press of the letter of the CC CCP dated 14 June 1963 would call for a public reply which would lead to a further aggravation of the polemics, would not ac d t Approved For Release 1999/08i~ PftoRqUed) ((0p9@Q&d&For Release, 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 reached, and would run counter to the opinion of the fraternal parties on this question. This should not be done, all the more in view of the coming meeting between representatives of the CPSU and the CCP on 5 July this year." June 18-21 - Although the large "ideological plenum" of the aiad been scheduled to discuss internal problems, most of the speakers in the closed session and resolution reacted to the Chinese attack by rejecting as "groundless and slander- our" the Chinese attacks on Soviet policy, supporting the Khrushchev line, and approving Khrushchev's action "in rallying further the forces of the world Communist movement" and his "concrete actions and measures" taken in the USSR's relations with Peking. The resolution on China and the appointments of Brezhnev and Podgorny to the Secretariat were generally re- garded as evidence of enhanced support for Khrushchev in his foreign as well as domestic policies. June 19 and continuin - A visit to North Vietnam by a dele- gation o the oxorean Supreme People's Assembly, led by Vice President Pak Kum-chol, is being used to propagate the Chinese-oriented North Korean line, with repeated attacks on modern revisionism in a Nodon Sinmun editorial on the 19th and in Pak's speeches in ano . f-rs host, Truong Chinh (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the DRV National Assembly), in his reception speech on the 20th, gave restrained concurrence: "Together with the fraternal parties, we resolutely defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, oppose revisionism and dogmatism and other wrong tendencies, especially revisionism." On the 19th NCNA also reported that the latest issues of two North Vietnam organs, Party theoretical journal Eyoc Tap and the Labor Youth Union's Tien Phones, had carried a ac;s on Yugoslavia and its new constitution. June 19 - The Yugoslav agency TANYUG described an article in the grade Komunist responding to the ChiCom attacks on the Yugoslav party following her Fifth Plenum. In answering the questions as to what is the direct aim of theChinese attacks, Komunist said: "They are, in fact, efforts to impose their own v ews on the international labor movement on the pretext of protecting Marxism-Leninism and taking the role o- arbiter over the policy of all the socialist countries and parties. The Chinese leadership thus only aggravates the actual dilemma in the international labor movement -- the need of deciding between blind dogmatism and arbitrary adventurism, and the active and persistent struggle for peace and socialism based on a creative application of Marxism, a policy which springs from, a genuine sense of responsibility for the fate of the world in which we live." June 20 - News dispatches from Moscow reported that the ChiCom Em'?'bas`sy, in defiance of stated Soviet desires, was distributing copies of "the 67-page CCP letter" to Soviet organizations, 3 (#6 Chronology Cont.. JWMtd-Oor Releasg 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 difficulties in passing beyond the front door of the Chinese Embassy have been cordially handed as many copies of the letter as they wanted, UPI reported. June 20-24 - The Australian Overseas Service reported that the A u t lian CP has split over the issues of the CPSU--CCP dispute. It cited the AC? weekly Guardian, which reported the dismissal of five members of t We Party's Central Execu- tive in Victoria for "fractionalism, breeches of the Party's constitution and rejection of democratic centralism." Radio Australia's reporter said that all named have shown strong Peking leanings. One Victoria CC member veteran of 22 years, resigned from the Party. On the 24th, Radio Australia reported that another 25-year CP member had resigned "because he opposed the revisionist policy (of) its CC," thus feeding speculation that Australia may soon have two Communist Parties. June 21 - The East German news agency ADN announced that First Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer had protested to the Chinese Ambassador over Chinese dissemination of printed matter in violation of the existing order and legal regulations. ADN added: "It is to be regretted that the Embassy of the CPR in the GDR by such steps has acted against the wish enter- tained by the Marxist-Leninist parties that public polemics among fraternal parties should be ended and that differences of opinion should be ironed out by means of negotiations." June 21 - The Pelting People's Daily published a commentary on ohn F. Kennedy's Great onsp racy" which interprets the American President's 10 June American University speech as "a cunning and vicious move in his 'peace strategy,"' aimed to influence the outcome of tlx3Sino-Soviet debate and "to divide the Red bloc." "As a special detachment of US impe- rialism, the Yugoslav modern revisionists are beside them- selves with joy at Kennedy's speech and have lauded it to the skies." "However, all who firmly uphold the unity of the socialist camp and that of the international Communist move- ment will never allow themselves to be taken in." June 23 - The extensive visit of North Korean President Choe Yon -kon to China (see our last Chronology,-June 5) ended with a 12-page joint statement signed by Liu Shao-chi and Chos, which (to nobody's surprise, after Choe's earlier speeches) followed a tough Chinese line, denouncing modern revisionism and declaring that "it is absolutely impermissible one-sidedly to reduce the foreign policy of the socialist countries to peaceful coexistence." June 23 - The Rumanian Scinteia, again alone of all the ."as .~uropean bloc, publis e lengthy report of the CPSU plenum's resolution on China, including its rejection of the CCP charges and its charging of the Soviet representa- tives to "promote undeviatingly" the Khrushchev line in their talks with the Chinese, Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : 1;IA-RDP(7,030a&0fl8RgP %d) (IlAp$?8feA For Relea?g 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306IA000200020004-5 .Tune 24 - Editorials in Pravda and Izvestiya reviewing the wort o the CC plenum rdIterated tha? et ins oof the plenum resolution which "categorically rejected" as "groundless and slanderous the attacks by the CC CCP on our party and other Communist parties," and authorized the delegation to the July talks to follow Khrushchev's policies "unswervingly.'" Reporting this from Moscow, New York Times correspondent Topping added that Soviet officials, who had not expected that the July talks would result in any ideological recon- ciliation but had hoped for an agreement that would limit the dimensions of the dispute and maintain some facade of unity, were obviously shocked by the delivery of the harsh Chinese letter only three days before the opening of the plenum. June 24 -- NCNA quoted "a spokesman of the CPR Embassy in the G as.expressing "utter amazement at the ADN statement of 21 June which attacked the Chinese Embassy for distributing printed matter." The spokesman said that the printing and distributing of "this important Marxist-Leninist document" was "fully justified and in accordance with international practice," and it "undoubtedly will help increase the fra- ternal German people's correct understanding of the CCP's position and viewpoints and thus will be beneficial to strengthen unity." After complaining that ADN "hurriedly published the statement," even before the Embassy could com- municate with its government, the spokesman said: "such practice can only be regarded as a deliberate attempt to incite an uproar, attack the CCP, widen differences in the international Communist movement, and undermine the unity among fraternal parties." He concluded with a reminder that the Sixth SED Congress had "resorted to non-Marxist-Leninist tactics in launching preposterous attacks on the CCP." Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : ;EylA-RDP7k 1%%4rPusd) (i ppWd~or Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061Ap00200020004-5 APPENDIX to CHiROMOLOOY Analysis of CCP letter to the CPSU dated 14 June 1963 After a few introductory remarks about the "common and sacred duty" of all parties to uphold and strengthen unity, the ChiCon message stated that, inasmuch as the CPSU letter "raises the question of the general line of the international Communist movement," "we, too, would like to express our view, which con- stitutes our proposal on the general line . . . and on some related questions of principle." (The CPSU letter had not "raised the question of the general line," but it had damned the CPSU's views as "the line of the Communist movement," the correctness of which has been fully confirmed by "the entire course of world development in recent years," and had flatly stated that "we are deeply convinced that there are no grounds for a re-examination of this line.") The Chinese position is set forth in 25 numbered sections (about 13,030 words), the first 17 of which re-hash previously expressed ChiCom views on the theoretical issues in the dis- pute, especially the questions of revolution and war. "In the last analysis, it is a question of . . . whether or not to accept the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, whether or not to recognize the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution, whether or not to accept the fact that the people still living under the imperialist and capitalist system, who comprise two-thirds of the world's population, need to make revolution." The ChiCom answer: "the transition from capitalism to socialism can only (our underlining here and throughout) be brought about-trough proletarian revolution," and those who try to "predict peaceful transition" on the basis of "absurd parallels" are repudiating Marxism. Continuing in this vein, they repeatedly emphasized that Asia, Africa and Latin America "are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism." On war: those "certain persons /ho7 now actually hold that it is possible to bring about 'a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars' through 'general and complete disarmament"' are perpetrating "sheer illusion." "Peaceful coexistence" (a "Lenin thesis," and not a "great discovery" by certain persons a few years ago) is a valid concept within a narrow, strict interpretation, but it cannot be made "the general line of foreign policy of the socialist countries." "If the general line . . . is one-sidedly reduced to 'peaceful coexistence,' 'peaceful competition,' and 'peace- ful transition,' this is to violate the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement, to discard the historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to depart from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism." "If anybody, following in the footsteps of others, defends the erroneous opportunist line and policies pursued by a certain socialist country . . . , then he is departing from Marxism- Leninism and proletarian internationalism." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 6 (#6 Chronology Continued) Appr iov 'ior Relea g: 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 With section i8, the Chinese begin attacking specific Soviet internal developments and Soviet conduct in relations with other fraternal parties and states, and the tone grows increasingly arrogant and nasty. A novel feature of the CPSU 3rd Program, adopted by the 22nd Party Congress in 1931, was the statement that, "having brought about a complete and final victory of socialism -- the first phase of communism -- and the transition of society to the full-scale construction of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the US&.. from the point of view of the tasks of internal develop- ment." Until the achievement of full communism -- with the disappearance of classes and the withering away of the state, -- Soviet society will be governed by a "state of the entire people" (an ill-defined and nebulous concept). In sections 13 and 19 the Chinese roundly denouce "the announcement, half- way through, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is no o~ nger necessary." "This, too, is not a question about the internal affairs of any particular party but a fundamental problem involving the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism." "Does this not disarm the proletariat and all the working people, organizationally and ideologically, and is it not tantamount to helping restore capitalism?" In section 20, the Chinese turn to "the issue of "combating the cult of the individual" which they brand as "erroneous and harmful," because raising this question "is actually to counter- pose the leaders to the masses, undermine the party's unified leadership which is based on democratic centralism, dissipate its fighting strength and disintegrate its ranks." Furthermore, "what is more serious is that, under the pretext of 'combating the cult of the individual,' certain p re sons are crudely inter- fering in the internal affairs of other fraternal parties and fraternal countries and forcing other fraternal parties to change their leadership n or er to impose their own wrong-line on these parties,is all this If it is no ea -power MHat chauvinism, sectarianism and splittism? What is all this if it i s not subversion?" In 22, the Chinese attack Soviet conduct in its economic relations with the socialist camp: "Economic cooperation must be based on the principles of complete equality, mutual benefit, and comradely mutual assistance. It would be great-power chau- vinism to deny these basic principles and, in the name of 'in ernational division of labor' or 'specialization,' to impose one's own will on others, infringe on the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries, or harm the interests of their people. . . . It would be preposterous to follow the practice of gaining profit for oneself at the expense of others." The attack is shifted to the field of political relations between fraternal parties in section 22. The CPSU should match their deeds with the fine words of their 30 March letter: "it is impermissible for any party to place itself above others, to interfere in their internal affairs and to a o al W MVd* 'Re1*as t9g8~6124 : o- lu in d ' s an line of one s own party on -other fraternal parties WMW&Oor Releaj 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200020004-5 as the "common program of the international Communist movement." How to treat the "Marxist-Leninist fraternal Albanian Workers Party" and the "Yugoslav revisionist clique of trat,tors to Marxism-Leninism" are "two essentially different questions" and "must on no account be placed on a par." "Who is it that has taken splitting actions in Soviet- Albanian relations? Who is it that has bxtonded the ideological differences between the Soviet and Albanian parties to state relations? Who is it that has brought the divergence between the two countries into the open before the enemy? Who is it that has openly called for a change in the Albanian party and state leadership? All this is plain and clear to the whole world. Is it possible that the leading comrades of the CPSU do not really feel their responsibility. . .?" "The series of distressindevelopments which have occurred in a soc.a camp in the past period have harmed the interests not only of the fraternal parties concerned, but also of the masses of the people in their countries. This convincingly demonstrates that the larger countries and parties need to keep in mind Lenin's behest never to commit the error of great-Rower chauvinism. The comrades of the CPSU state _][n t r letter tat 'the CPSU has never taken and will never take a single step that could sow hostility among the peoples of our country toward the fraternal Chinese people or other peoples.' Here we do not desire to go back and enumerate the many unpleasant events that have occurred in the past, and we only wish at the comrades of the CPSU will strictly abide by this statement in their future -fictions. During the past few years, our party members and our people have exercised the rea$est restraint In the face of a series of grave inc en s w e were In violation of the principles guiding e relations among fraternal parties and countries, despite the many difficulties and losses which have been mppoosed on us," Concentrating in section 23 on the Yugoslav problem, the Chinese note that "certain persons are attempting to introduce the Yugoslav revisionist clique into the socialist community," and assert that "this is openly to tear up the agreement unanimously reached at the 1960 meeting. . . and is absolutely impermissible." N)w "certain persons are openly saying that dogmatism not revisionism is the main danger, or that doEsnatism is no less dangerous than revisionism, etc. . . . They must not barter away principles, . . . advocating one thing today and another tomorrow, . . . . On a pre ex of 'creatively developing Marxism,' . . . they describe as 'universal Marxist-Leninist truths' their own prescriptions which are based on nothing but subjective conjecture an are divorced from reality and rom the masses, an ey force others to accept these prescriptions unconditionally. That is 1 wh ,r~, Q In 1 AaB/ 8? d ( - 7&3Q3 1 At ' st Communist movement."" ?3 06 Chronology Continued) t ~Vqsrswt'oor Releaa 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 In the brief section 24, the Chinese scornfully contrast to their ideal of a self-reliant, Marxist -Leninist, pro t etar an revolutionary party such despicable types as a "bourgeois reformist par';y, " a "re v'isionist party.," and "a party that parrots the cr'. rds of others, copies foreign ex- perience withouUana- . , rulis farier and thither in response to the baton of certain persons abroad, and has become a hodgepodge o rev is n ism, ogmatimn, and everything but Marxist-Lenin is t principles." Finally, in section 25 the Chinese tauntingly repeat their challenges to the CPSU to follow their example and publish the articles on both sides of the dispute, because "it is the duty of Marxist-Leninists to distinguish between truth and falsehood with respect to the differences that have arisen in the ICM.." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: r"'A-RDP78-0306 ~O8h20? 02~o00 y4-5 Approved For ReleaW 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061.&000200020004-5 CBRONOLOGIE - DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES No 6 11-24 juin 1963 7 uin: Dane un discours d Liubliana, relatd dans "Politika". Belgrade, le 8 Ou n, 1'adjoint du premier ministre Kardelj a dit , la Chine que lea relations entre pays socialistes doivent &tre basdes sur 1'dgalitd et sur le respect mu- tuel. "Que deviendraient lee relations... si chaque pays socialists s'arro- geait le droit de qualifier un autre pays socialiste de capitaliste, d'impdria- liste, d'agent de l'impdrialisme, etc... La Chine doit comprendre qu'elle ne peut subordonner le socialisme international tout entier A sea intdr9ts et sea ambitions du moment." 12 .ruin: "Nodong Sinmun", Journal paraissant en Core du Nord, a soulignd en un long article plein de rdpdtitions is ndcessitd de construire "une dconomie qui se supporterait elle-mine sous la banniere de la confiance en soim?me". 15 uin: L"Agenee de presse de la Chine nouvelle annonce que l'ambassadeur de is Chine communiste . Moscow a remis , Souslov, membre du Prdsidium du Parti communists de 1'Union sovidtique, une rdponse datde du 14 Juin a is lettre des partis communistes de I'Union sovidtique du 30 mars adressde au Parti communis- te chinois, (en raison de is longueur de ce document important, nous en donnons une analyse 6, is fin de cette chronologie). Le texte fut publid en entier dens tous lea journaux de Pekin le 17 juin sous le titre "Une proposition con- cernant Is, ligne gdndrale du mouvement communiste international", et 1'Agence de presse chinoise annoncait le m?me jour que sa_publication existait ddA sous forme de livre contenant d alement le texts de is lettre du 0 mars du Parti, communiste de 1'Union sovi ti ue & laquelle elle r pondait, ainsi que ]'dchange de lettres pr4e dentes entre lee deux partis, lettre du 21 fdvrier dmanant du Parti sovidtique, et celle du 19 mars adressde par le Parti chinois. 1,5 juin: Le m.e jour, le "Quotidien du peuple", journal chinois, et le "Zeta i! opullit , Journal albanais, attaquerent violemment Tito et lea rdvisionnis- tes yougoslaves. L'article relativement court, publid par lee Chinois qua ac- cusaient lea partisans de Tito "d'essayer d'infiltrer lea range du mouvement communiste international pour y pratiquer leur sabotage sans scrupule", ne se distingue que par son langage grossier:"Lea attaques et lea diffamations du ghroupe de Tito ne constituent pas une nouveautd; ce ne sont que crachats re- ceuillis dans lea craehoirs des impdrialistes et autres rdvisionnistes". Les Albanais de leur c8td reprennent l'implication soulignde de complicit sovid- tique et is prdcisent sans dquivoque possible. Tito, ddclarent-ils, "a ex- posd leur opinion identique et profonddment anti-marxiste et anti-rdvolution- Haire sur lea questions de is guerre et de is paix, sur celles de la coexis- tence pacifique, sur celles des chemins et des formes que prend la transition vers le communiste, etc... (c'est-d,-dire lea opinions de Tito et de Khrouch- tchef). Ce qu'il y a de caractdristique c'est qu'en traitant de touter ces questions Tito a employd is language de Khrouchtchef. Et, plus loin: "Le rendgat Tito en une sdrie de calumnies, profdrdes notamment coutre le Parti communists chinois, a traitd de lutte pour l'hd- gdmonie is lutte de Principe que le Parti communiste chinois mene fermement Bans le but de ddfendre is puretd du marxisme-ldninisme et de s'opposer aux opinions contre-rdvolutionnaires et aux atta- ques hostiles des rdvisionnistes modernes. Il l'a fait comme Mon- sieur Khrouchtchef lui-mgne a essayd de le faire. 11 eat clair que Tito aussi bien que Khrouchtchef uge e s Wj~j%g%Q6004 Yo rCR~O&fl 4>dl t XQ-5 1 Approved For Rele 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306'1000200020004-5 monopole sur le d v loppement crdateur du marxisme, et que tour lea autres n'ont qu'& se mettre au pas, que rien ne les a arr-- td's pour imposer leurs vues: ni les complots, com ris 1'or ani- sation d'insurrections contre-rdvolutionnaires comme en Hongrie, ni la liquidation des cadres dirigeants dans des parts fraternels qui s opposaient leur cours r visionniste' ni l'envoie avec mis- sions spdciales de ddldguds chargds de convaincre lea cercies diri- geants de ces partis fraternels, ni me'me les pressions dconomiques et militaires et le recours d la flatterie et aux moyens de corrup- tion." Et plus tard, cette accusation:"Les rdvisionnistes moderns manipulent Ldnine dune faron cynique et le ddforment sans honte." 17-20 juin: "Revolucion", journal publid d La Havane (qui fat 1'organe officiel du Mouvement du 26 juillet de Castro, et que Von considere toujours comme ex- primant lea ides personnelles de Castro) a reproduit un communiqud sur cinq co- lonnes de "La Prensa Latina" adressd de Pdkin au sujet de la lettre du Parti com- muniste chinois. "Hoy" (qui rdcemment a dtd ddsignd 11organe officiel du Parti unifid de la rdvolution socialiste aussi bien que celui du parti communiste) pu- bliait un article analogue le 18 qu'il attribuait A "Sinhua", Pdkin. Cependant, ce reportage a dvitd adroitement de mentionner les poldmiques violentes: par example, les 25 sections n'dtaient mentionndes que par une simple phrase sous forme de titre, ou de phrases indiquant le "probinaie discutd, comme par exemple: "11 - Transition du capitalisme au socialisme". Les articles cubains furent pu- blids avant que le Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique n'ait fait parattre sa ddclaration (voir l'article suivant de la Chronologie) par lequel it interdisait toute publication de la lettre du Parti communiste chinois, mais le 20 "Scin- teia", organe du Parti roumain, publiait un rapport presque identique & celui des Cubains attribud a l'agence roumaine "Agerpress", Pdkin. 18 juin: L'agence Tass publiait une ddclaration qui, apres avoir rappeld les dchanges prdcddents entre Ie Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique et le Parti communiste chinois qui proposait de cesser la poldmique et de fixer une reunion bilatdrale, accusait rdception de la lettre du Parti communiste chinois datde du 14 juin. Le Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique Mclarait cependant: "Cette lettre donne une interprdtation arbitraire des ddclarations faites aux confdrences de Moscou des partis marxistes-16ninistes, ddforme lea theses principales de ces documents historiques, et contient des attaques injustifides contre le Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique et d'autres partis fraternels. Tout cela est profonddment regrettable. "Le Comitd central du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique es- time que publier d, prdsent dans la presse sovidtique une lettre du Parti central du Parti communiste chinois datde du 14 join 1963 exigerait qu'il soit rdpondu publiquement ce qui entratnerait une aggravation de la politique, ne serAit pas dans l'esprit de l'accord obtenu, et irait a, l'encontre de 1'opinion de partis fraternels sur cette question. Cela devrait Otre fait d'autant moires que les reprd- sentants du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique et du Parti commu- niste chinois doivent se rdunir le 5 juillet de cette annde." 18-21 juin: Bien qu'un "pldnum iddologique" important du Comitd central du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique ait dtd prdvu pour discuter des problemes in- ternationaux, la plupart des orateurs d'une rdunion privde ainsi que is rdsolu- tion A ve4 P4RLSteftas i q A-RDR$eU8S'pAO OO a8O4 5itchev et enAfA9n+~~"~~_~~~ ~eCC~ ci-i7esQ61~~g~n~-uses contre is. politique sovidtique. La rdsolution a approuvd Khrouchtchef d'avoir "continud d relier les forces du mouvement communiste mondial," et elle a approu- vd"les actions et les mesures concrbtes" prises A 1'4gard des relations entre 1'U.R.S.S. et Pdkin. La rdsolution sur is Chine et la nomination de Brezhnev et de Podgorny au Secretariat sont considdrdes en gdndral comme dtant une preuve de soutien accordde d sa politique dtrangere aussi bien que de sa politique intd- rieure. 19 juin et les fours suivants: Une visite dans le Vietnam du Nord par une ddldga- tion de lAssembide pQpulaire suprine de la Core du Nord, sous la direction du vice-president Phak Kum-chol, sert.t propager la ligne nord-kordenne d'orienta- tion chinoise, d l'aide d'attaques rdpdtdes contre le rdvisionnisme modern ex- primdes dans un dditorial du "Nodong Sinmum" pare le 19, et dans lee discours que Phak fit d Hanoi. L'h6te de Phak, Truong Chinh, (president du Comitd permanent de l'Assemblde nationale de la Rdpublique ddmocratique du Vietnam) approuva en termes mesurds dans son discours de rdception du 20:"De concert avec les partis fraternels, nous ddfendons rdsolument is. puretd du marxisme-idninisme, nous nous opposons an rdvisionnisme et au dogmatisme ainsi qu'ft d'autres tendances erro- ndes, 1e rdvisionnisme en particulier." L'Agence de pre see de is. Chine nouvelle a dgalemeut communiqud le 19 que les derniers numdros des publications vietna- miennes, le "Hoc Tap", journal thdorique du parti et le "Tien Phong", jkurnal du syndicat professionnel de is jeunesse, se sont dgalement attaques d la Yougosla- vie et d sa nouvelle constitution. 19 juin: L'Agence yougoslave "Tanyug" parle d'un article pare ft Belgrade dans le omunist", qui rdpond aux attaques des communistes chinois contre le parti yougoslave ft is. suite de son cinquieme plenum. De savoir quel dtait le but des attaques chinoises, le "Kommunist" ddclare:"Ce sont en effet des efforts pour im- poser leurs propres vues sur le mouvement travailliste international, sous prd- texte de protdger is marxisme-ldninisme et de prendre un rele d'arbitre au sujet de is politique de tous les pays et de tour les partis socialistes. Les diri- geants chinois ne font qu'aggraver ainsi le dilemme vdritable qui se pose au mou- vement travailliste international - le besoin de ddcider entre un dogmatisme a- veugle et une politique aventuridre arbitraire, et la lutte active et persis- tante pour is paix et le socialisme basde sur une application crdatrice du mar- xisme, politique qui jaiilit d'un Sens vdritable des responsabilitds pour l'ave- ni.r du monde dans lequel nous vivons." 20 muin: Des communiques de Moscou font savoir que l'ambassade de is Chine commu- niste, en ddpit du ddsir exprimd par les Soviets, distribuait des copies "d'une lettre de 67 pages adressde par le Parts communiste chinois" aux organisations so- vidtiques, aux journaux et aux correspondants dtrangers dont ceux des partis com- munistes. Les journalistes occidentaux qui d'habitude dprouvent des difficuitds de ddpasser is porte d'entrde de l'ambassade chinoise furent recus cordialement et obtinrent autant de copies de is lettre qu'ils en ddsiraient, rapporte la Uni- ted Press International. 20 u',n: La radio de is Aastralian Overseas Service annonce que le Parti commu- niste australien s'est trouve divisd our la question du diffdrend iddologique en- tre he Parti communists de l'Union sovidtique et le Parti communiste chinois. Ces radios citent 1'hebdomadaire du Particcomministe australien, he "Guardian", qui annonce que cinq membres du comitd exdcutif central du parti dans 1'Etat Victoria out dtd relevds de leurs fonctions pour raison de "fractionalisme, en- freinte ft is. constitution du Parti et opposition au centralisme ddmocratique." Le speaker de Radio Australia a ddclaarrd que tous les membres relevds de leurs fonct,gr8 L Ail 4U -e$ a ooh 1i ~1" 3a 'q Fg jMW du Com central t e dtor a onn as admission au parts apr8s en avoir bent aeux part s nrnunlsee f JRvPgo33 s1 #a9*ew 4a6t 21 uin:L'A.D.N., agence de presse de l'Allemague Orientale, anaonce que le pre- mier adjoint du minis tre des affaires dtrangbres Winzer a protests auprbs de 1'anbassadeur chinois contre la dissemination d'iunprimds pratiquds par lea Chinois en ddpit des instructions et des rdglements en vigueur. L'A.D.N..ajoute:"Il est regrettable que l'ambassade de la Republique populaire de la Chine dans is Rd-pu- blique democratique allemande ait, en ce faisant, agi contre le desir des partis marxistes-ldninistes de faire censer lea disputes en public entre lea partis :2ra- ternels et de faire rdgler lea differences d'opinion au moyen de negotiations." 21 juin: Le "Quotidien du people" de Min a publid un cozimentaire sur "la grande consp tion de John F. Kennedy", dans lequel ii declare que le discours du pre- uident fait le 10 juin A: 1'American University dtait "une manoeuvre habile et mal- :Caisante dans sa stratdgie de paix, tendant A influencer lea rdsultats des debats sovidtiques prochains et '& diviser le bloc rouge'." "En leur qualitd de ddtache- ment special de l'lmpdrialiame amdricain, lea rdvisionnistes modernes yougoslaves no peuvent coutenir leur joie en presence du discours de Kennedy et en font lea louanges jusqu'au ciel." "Cependant, tous ceux qui maintiennent fermement l'uni- td du camp socialiste et celui du mouvement international communiste ne permettront jamais A sly laisser prendre." 23 uin: La visite prolongde du president de is Corse du Nord Choe Yong-kon en Chine voir notre derriere Chronologie du 5 juin) a prix fin par une declaration commune de 12 pages signees par Liu Shao-chi et Choe, qui, pour ne surprendre per- sonae spree lea discours prononcds par Choe, a suivi la ligne rigide des Chinois, denoncant le rdvisionnisme modern, et declarant qu'il dtait "absolument impossi- ble de pemettre une reduction unilatdrale de la politique dtrangere des pays socialistes A I'dtat d'une eoexistence pacifique." 24+ uin: Les dditoriaux de "Pravda" et d'"Izvestiya " passent en revue le travail du omits central du plenum et reproduisent lea termer de la rdsolution de ce ple- num qui "rejeta catdgoriquemenfcomme calomnieuses et non fondles lea attaques du Comite central du Parti communiste chinois dirigees contre notre parti et d'au- teres partis eommunistes; Bette rdsolution autorisa dgalement la delegation pour lea entretiens de juillet de suivre is politique de Khrouchtchef "sans devier". Dans sa deAche de I4oscou, le correspondent du "New York Times" Topping ajoute que lea officiels sovidtiques qui, s'ils ne s'attendaient pas b. ce que lea entre- tiens de juillet aboutissent A une reconciliation ideologique espdraient toutefois qu'un accord surviendrait limitant la dispute et maintenant une certain facade .'unite, furent manifestement choquds par la violence de is lettre chinoise dis- tribute trois .fours A peine avant 1'ouverture du plenum. 24+ uin: L'Agence de presse de is Chine nouvelle cite "un porte paroles de l'am- baseade de is Rdpublique populaire chinoise aupres de la Republique democratique allemande" qui s'est declare "profondement etonne par is declaration de 1'A.D.N. du 21 juin, attaquant l'ambassade chinoise pour avoir distribud des imprimCs". Le porte paroles a declare que l'impression et is distribution de "ce document mar- xiste-ldninisteimportant" etait "pleinement justifie et en accord avec is pratique internationale," et qu'i1 allait "certainement aider le peuple fraternal al.lemand A mieux comprendre is position du parti communiste chinois ainsi que son point de vue, et qu'il contribuera de cette fawn A renforcer i'unitd." Aprbs s'$tre plaint que 1'A.D.N. "avait publid sa declaration en h?te" m?me avant que l'ambassade Wait pu comrauniquer avec son gouvernement, le.porte.paroles ddclara?"une fa on pareille d'agir doit *tre consideree comme n'etant qu'une tentative concertee A. provoquer une explosion, une attaque dirigee contre he Parti communiste chinois, petisiYs~Iautef~ffit en rappe anf que le scongr5s de n~dlab SSE Dees Approved For Relea ZIM29 019 4A:1jI $ 306WO0200020004-5 Analyse de la lettre datde du 14 juin 1963, adressde par le Parti commu- niste chinois au Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique. Aprbs une introduction sur "le devoir est sacrd" de tous les partis de maintenir et de renforcer 1'unitd, le message des communistes chinois ddclare que daps la mesure off. la lettre du Parti communiste sino-sovidtique "souldve la question de la ligne gdndrale du mouvement international communiste",.. nous aussi, nous voudrions exprimer notre point de vue qui reprdsente notre proposi- tion concernant la ligne gdndrale... et sur certaines questions de principe qui sly rattachent," (La lettre du Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique n'a pas '"soulev6 la question de la ligne gdn&rale; mail elle a qualifid les vues du Parti communists de 1'Union sovidtique de "ligne du mouvement communiste," dont la justesse a dtd entibrement confirmde par "le tours entier des dvdnements rnondiaux de ces dernbbres anndes," et elle a ddclard carrdment que "nous sommes pronfonddment convaincus qu'il n'existe aucun foademen pour examiner de nouveau cette ligne.") La position chinoise est ddfinie dans 25 articles numdrotds (comprenant environ 18.000 mots), dont lee premiers 17 reprennent les vues ddjh exprimdes des communistes chinois sur les questions thdmriques soulevdes au tours de dis- putes, particuli6rement celles de la rdvolution et de la guerre. "En derniere analyse, c'est une question... d'accepter ou de ne pas accepter la vdritd uni- verseile du marxisme-ldninisme, de reconnattre ou non la signification univer- selle de la route tracde par la rdvolution_d'octobre, d'accepter ou de rejeter le fait que des gens qui vivent encore sous des rdgimes impdrialistes et capi- talistes et qui composent lee deux tiers de la population mondiale ont besoin de faire la rdvolution." Les communistes chinois rdpondent:"La transition du capitalisme an socialisme ne peut Otre accomplie qu'& 11aide d'une rdvolution proldtarienne," et ceux qui essaient de "prddire Me transition pacifique" sur .a base as "parall&les absurder," rdpudient le marxisme (le passage soulignd Bans cette phrase et ceux jusqu'& la fin de ce texte font dtd par nous). Pour- suivant Bans cet dtat d'esprit, ils soulignbrent constamment que l'Asie, l'Afri- que et i'Amdrique Latine constituaient "lee zones les plus vulndrables parmi celles placdes sous la domination impdrialiste, et ddchoyaient de rdvolutions mondiales d'od partaient des coups directs adressds A 1'impdrialisme." Sur la guerre: ces "certaines personnes" qui, & i'heure actuelle, prdtendent "qu'il est vraiment possible de crder un monde sans arses, sans forces armdes et sans guerre au moyen d'un ddsarmement g6ndral et complet ne font que crder "une il- lusion pure et simple." "La coexistence pacifique (qui est une these de Ldnine et non pas une grande ddcouverte faite it y a quelques anodes par certaines per- sonnel) reprdsente un concept valide dans le cadre d'une interprdtation dtroite et stricte, mail on peut en faire "une ligne gdndrale de politique dtrangbre pour les pays socialistes." "Si la ligne gdndraie.,. se trouvait 9tre rdduite unilatdralement a. une coexistence pacifique, une competition pacifique et une transition pacifique, cela enfreindrait les principes rdvolutionnaires de la de- claration de 1957 et de celle de 1960, ferait abandonner la mission historique de la revolution proldtarienne mondiale, et ferait ddvier des enseignements re- volutionnaires du marxisme-leninisme." "Celui qui, sur les traces de certains autres, defend la ligne opportuniste et erronde ainsi que la politique poursui- vie par un certain pays socialiste... s'dcarte du marxisme-leninisme et de 1'in- ternationalisme proletaire." Avec l'article 18 debute l'attaque chinoise contre certains dvdnements precis de la vie intdrieure de 1'Union sovidtique et contre la conduite par les sovietApor 2lf ?$P FkR8aQ:1'r /d8PN9 81MR '-8 63 WAD02ft 0 5 chiaaiA #ddFOT3 Rol UNIM M 13k&dMR 78 # G*WQWO u Parti c piste de 1'Union sovidtique, adopte par le 226me congrts du parti en 1961, comportait une ncuveautd dons is d6clexation suivante:"Avant abouti a is. victoire complete at finale du sccialisme, premiere phase du communisme, et au passage de is socidtd A. la construction dtendue du communisme, is dictature du proletariat a rempli as. mission historique et a cessd d'Otre indispensable en Union sovidtique en ce qui concerne lea tItches de ddveloppement intdrieur." Jusqu't ce qu'un arrive au communisme integral, avec is disparition des classes at l'atrophie de 1'Etat, is socidtd sovidtique sera gouvernde "par un stat du peuple tout entier" (conception mal ddfinie et ndbuleuse). Les articles 18 et 19 des Chinois exponent avec vigueur "1'annonce, Ao mi-chemin, que is dictature du px?oldtariat n'dtait plus ndcessaire." "LA, non plus it nest pas question d'af- faires interns d'un Etat particulier, main d'un problAme fondamental qui im- p.ique is vdritd universelle du marxisme-1eninisme." "Est-ce que cela ne ddsar- ne pas le proletariat et tous lea travailleurs dans leur organisation at leur iddologie, et est-ce que vela n'dquivaut pas A, contribuer A, is restauration du apitalisme?" -'~- Dana l'article 20, lea Chinois se portent sur "la question de combattre le culte de l'individu", qu'ils qualifient "d'erronde et de malfaisante" car sou- lever cette question dquivaut A? dresser lea leaders et lea masses lea uns contre les autres, A, saper la direction unie du parti basde sur le centralisme ddmocra- tique, A, dissiper sa force combative at A, ddsintdgrer sea Tangs". D'autre part, "bien plus sdrieux est le fait que sous dtexte de combattre le culte de 1'indi- ;rdu certaines personnel font preuve ding rence sans scrupule dans lea affaires irftdrieures des autres partis et pays fraternels, at obligent d'autres partis fx'atex'nels A changer leers chefs afro d'im poser a ces partis leer gore lime :rronde. Quest-ce que tout eels. reprdsente s non un chauvinisme, un sectarisme Bt un esprit de diffusion de grande puissance? Quest-ce quetout vela sinon de La subversion? Dana l'articie 22, lea Chinois attaquent la conduite par lea Soviets de 'curs relations dconomiquesavec le camp socialiste:"La cooperation dconomique bit etre basde sur des principes d'dgalitd complete, d'avantages mutuels, at .'assistance mutuelle fraternelle. Ce serait du chauvinisme de grande puissance jue de nier ces principes fondamentaux at, au nom de is division internationale 3u travail ou de is specialisation, que d'imposer sa propre volontd aux autres, lue d empieter sur 1 inddpendance et la souverainetd des pays fraternels, ou que le heurter lea intdrgts de leurs peuples... I1 serait absurde de suivre is pra- bque de se mdnager des avantages aux depends des autres." Dana l'article 22, i'attaque est transferee dans le domain des relations ?g1itiques entre partis; fraternels. Le Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique Levrait mettre sea actions d'accord avec lea belles paroles de as lettre du 30 oars:"On ne peut permettre qu'un parti prenne le pas sur les autres, qu'il inter- :?ienne daps leurs affaires internes, at qu'il adopte une attitude patriercale A '_eur egard... qu'il impose en tant que programme commun du mouvement communiste ;.nternational le programme, lee resolutions at la ligne de son propre parti aux autres partis fraternels. Les questions d'attitude envers "le parti fraternel iarxiste-ldniniste des travailleurs albanais" et "la clique rdvisionniste des ;raftres du marxisme -ldninisme yougoslave" sont "deux questions essentieliement iiffdrentes" que l'on ne doit A, aucun prix "placer sur le mine niveau." "Qui est-ce qui par sea actions tend A, aemer le desaccord.dams lea relations entre Soviets et Albarais? Qui est-ce qui a in- troduit dans lea relations d'Etat lea differences iddologiques qui existent entre lea partis sovidtique: et Albanais? Qui est? CA o9d#F r- 9@I "tl A2*ur(UA-RDPM&d fc~e~k0 2@9020004-5 A&P? 3 g en eu parrs es groupes a rigeants 04-5 du parti et de i'Etat albanais? Cela est simple et clair pour le monde entier. Ii est possible que lee camarades dirigeants du parti communiste de 1'Union sovidtique ne se rendent pas compte de ce que reprdsentent leurs responsabilitds...?" "La sdrie d'dvdnements an issants qui West produite dans le passe au sein du camp socialiste a portd prejudice nor.seulement aux partis fra- ternels intd'resses, macs encore aux masses populaires de leurs pays. Cela prouve dune manure convaincante qu'il est du devoir des pays lea plus grands et de leurs partis de garder presents d 1'esprit is commandement de Ldnine de ne jamais commettre 1'erreur de pratiquer un chauvinisme de ranee puissance, Les camarades du parti communiste de l'Ur on sovi tique d,c rent data leur lettre que le Parti communiste de l'Union sovidtique n'a jamais rien en- trepris et n'entreprendra jamais quoique ce soit de nature d semer 1'hostilitd parmi lea peuples de leurs pays envers is peuple fra- ternel chinois et lea autres peuples. Nous n'avons pas 1'intention de retourner en arribre et d'dnumdrer le grand nombre d'dvdnements ddplaisants qui se sont produ is daps le passe, et nous esp runs simplement que lea camarades du Parti communiste de 1'Union sovidti- que adhdreront strictement d cette declaration data leurs actions fu- tures. Au cours des quelques anndes rdcentes, lea membres de notre _rti et notre eu le ant fait preuve de is plus gran r serve en prdnce d e seried'incidents graves aux principes directeurs des relations entre partis et pays fraternels, et eels malgrd lea diffi- cultds nombreuses et lea pertes qui nous out dtd im.os es. Dans Particle 23, se concentrant sur le probleme yougoslave, lea Chinois aoulignent que "certaines personnel cherchent A introduire la clique rdvisionniste yougoslave dans la communautd socialiste," et affirment que "cela dquivaut ouverte - :aent A ddchirer l'accord pris A l'unanimite au cours de la reunion de 1960... et vela ii est absolument impossible de le permettre. Maintenant, "certaines person- 'ies declarent ouvertement que c'est le dogmatisme et non pas le rdvisionnisme qui constitue le danger principal ou que Is dogmatisme est aussi dangereux que le re- visionnisme, etc... Its ne doivent pas marchander sur lee principes... prdconisant une chose aujourd'hui et une autre demain... sous le prdtexte de ddvelopper le marxisme dune faron cr atrice... its qualifient de veritd marxiste-ldniniste uni- verselle leurs propres ordonnances qui ne sont basdes que sur des conjectures sub- jectives et qui n ont rien t voir avec is realitd ou avec lea masses, et ils obii- gent lea autres d accepter ces ordonnances sans poser de conditions. C'est pour cette raison que bien des phdnomenes graves se sont produits au sein du mouvement international communists. Dans un article bizare et court, larticle 24, lea Chinois comparent avec addain l'idde qu'ils se font d'un parti rdvolutionnaire qui soit inddpendant du .narxisme-ldninisme et proldtaire d ces genres de partis mdprisables qui sont "le parti rdformiste bourgeois..., le parts rdvisionniste..., et le parti qui comae un perro uet re ate lea mots des autres invite tout ce qui est dtranger sans chercher ,] analyser, court de tous lea c t s sous la direction de certaines personnes d 1'6tranger, et qui eat devenu une sorte de mac oine de r visionnisme, de dogma- t;isme et de tout ce que Von veut ~, 1'exception des principes marxistes-ldninistes." Enfin, dans Particle 25, lea Chinois rdpbtent avec sarcasme leur ddfi au Parts communiste de l'Union sovidtique de prendre leur exemple et de publier lea ar- ticles reprdsentant lea deux c'8tds de la dispute, parce que "i1 est du devoir des :narxistes-ldninistes de distinguer entre la veritd et le mensonge en ce qui concer- ns lea pprov f g Fe g'it1 WWO 1 $e1 q EjQ n"O69 0G0MC*tional.' 7 Approved For Rel ?1 /08/245M3 EDP 4900200020004-5 No 6 11-24 Junio 1963 7 Junio: El vicepremier yugoslavo Kardelj, en un discurso en Ljubljana informado el 8 de junco en el 6rgano "Politika" de Belgrado, manifest6 a China que las relaciones entre los passes socialistas deberian basarse en la igualdad y el respeto mutuo. "LQu6 seria de las relaciones ... si cada pals socialista es capitalista, imperialista, agente del imperialisme, etc. ...T China deberh comprender que no puede subordinar a sus momentaa- neos intereses y ambiciones todo el socialismo internacional." 12 Junio: El 6rgano norcoreano "Nodong Sinmun" en un extenso y repeticio- so art culo destac6 la necesidad de construir "una economic que se manten- ga a si misma, bajo la bandera de is autodependencia." 15 Junio: Sinjua (la agenda noticiera china) inform6 que el embajador- de China comunista en Mosc-d habla entregado a Suslov, miembro del presi- dium del PCUS una contestaci6n fechada el 14 de junco a is carta del PCUS del 30 de marzo al PC chino (importantisimo documento cuyo andlisis ofrecemos como ap6ndice a esta Cronologia debido a su longitud). El texto integro fue publicado en todos los diarios de Pekin del 17 de junco bajo el titular de "Una Propuesta concerniente a la lines general del Movimien- to Comnunista Internacional." Sinjua anunc16 el mismo dia que el texte ya habla sido publicado en forma de follete junto con los textes de la carts del CUS de 29 de marzo a la cual contestaba y del intercambio anterior entre los dos, del PCUS el 21 de febrero y del PC chino el 9 de marzo. 15 Junio: El mismo dia el "Diario del Pueblo" chino y el "Zeri i Popullit" alb n s publicaron fuertes ataques contra Tito y los revisionistas yugos- lavos. El articulo chino, relativamente breve, acusando a los particarios de Tito de "tratar de insinuarse en las filas del movimiento comunista in- ternacional pare ilevar a cabo sabotaje sin escr.pulo," se distingue solo por los improperios que contiene: "Los ataques y calumnias del grupo de Tito no son novedad; son mere saliva recogida de los escupidores de los imperialistas y otros revisionistas." El articulo albands, por otra parte, recoge is implicacl6n que subrayamos sobre colusi6n sovidtica y is pone en tantas palabras. Tito, manifiesta, "expuso sus opiniones id6nticas (de Tito y Kruschev], profundamente antimarxistas y antirrevolucionarias, so- bre cuestiones de guerra y paz, coexistencia pacifica, las vias y formal de la transici6n al socialismo, etc. Lo que es caracteristico es que al tratar todas estas cuestiones Tito emple6 el lenguaje de N. Kruschev." Y mks adelante: "El renegado Tito en una sarta de calumnias, especialmente contra el PC de China, ha calificado la firme lucha de principio que man- tiene el PC de China en defense de is pureza del marxismo-leninismo y em contra de is opini6n contrarrevolucionaria y los ataques hos- tiles de los revisionistas modernos, como 'lucha por la hegemonia,' precisamente Como el mismo N. Kruschev pretendi6 calificarla. Este claro que T., como K., juzga a los demas desde su dngulo cho- vinista. Como son epos precisamente los que reclaman para si el monopolio del 'deaarrollo creader del marxismo' -- todos los demas tienen que marchar al mismo comps -- no se han abstenido de nada pare imponer sue propias oponiones: de complete -- hasta organi- zando contrar revoluciones como en Hungria -- de la lii uidaci6n de cuadros diri enter en los partidos fraternos ue se on Approved For R 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0301A000O0HO%04-5 - 1 - Approve gcttuaM e lonista~2despach~ n3oPp a sue xibes 2en~ 22os Des peciales que convenzan a los circulos dirigentes de dichos par- tidos fraternos -- ni aun de presiones econ6micas y militares y el empleo de la lisonja y los medios de corrupci6n." Y mds adelente, eats denuncia quejumbrosa: "Los revisionistas modernos manipulan a Lenin cinicamente y to deforman decvergonzadamente." 17-20 Junio: El 17, el diario "Revoluci6n" de la Habana (6rgano oficial que fue del Movimiento 26 de Julio de Castro, y considerado aun como re- flejo de la opini6n personal de Fidel) public6 a cinco columnas un despa- eho de Prensa Latina desde Pekin describiendo la carta del PC chino. El diario "Hoy" (designado recientemente 6rgano oficial del Partido Unido de la Revoluci6n Socialista asi como del PC), public6 el 18 un ar- ticulo, atribuido a Sinjua, Pekin. Este reportaje, sin embargo, astuta- mente evadi6 la descripcibn de las amargas pol6micas: anotando, por ejemplo, cada una de las 25 sections pero solo con una oraci6n o frase a estilo de titular denotando el "problema" discutido, como "ll - La tran- sici6n del capitalisme al socialismo." Los articulos cubanos fueron pu- blicados antes de haber el PCUS emitido su declaraci6n (v6ase a continu- aci6n) ve:ando toda publicidad para is. carts del PC chino, pero el dia 20 el 6rgano del PC rumano "Scinteia" public6 un informe casi iddntico al cubano, atribuido a is. agencia rumana Agerpress desde Pekin. 18 Junio: TASS emiti6 una declaration que despu6s de recordar los ante- riores intercambios entre el PCUS y el PC chino proponiendo la suspen- sion de las pol6micas y la celebraci6n de una reuni6n bilateral, acus6 recibo de is. carta del PC chino de fecha de 11+ de junco. Sin embargo, el PCUS declar6: "Esta carta da una arbitraria interpretation a las dos decla- raciones de las conferencias en Moseld de Partidos marxistas-le- ninistas, deforms las tesis principales de dichos hist6ricos do- cumentos y contiene injustificados ataques contra el PLUS y otros Partidos fraternos. Todo esto ocasiona gran pesar. "El CC del PCUS estima que la publicaci6n en la prensa sovidtica actualmente de la carts del CC del PC chino de 14 de junco de 1963 demandaria una respuesta pifblica que conduciria a una mayor agravac16n de la poldmicas, no concordaria con el acuerdo a que se ha llegado y serfa contraria al parecer de los Partidos fra- ternos sobre esta cuesti6n. Esto no deberd hacerse, mds aun en vista de la pr6xima reunion entre representantes del PCUS y el PC chino el 5 de julio de este affo." 18-21 Junio: Aunque el "pleno ideol6gico" ampliado del CC del PCUS hab a sido Para discutir problemas internos, la mayoria de los oradores en las sesiones secretas y is. resoluci6n f.nal reaccionaron ante el ata- que chino apoyando la linea de Kruschev y rechazando como "sin fundamen- ts y calumniosos" los ataques chinos contra la politica sovi6tica. La resoluci6n aprob6 is. actuaci6n de Kruschev al "reunir mds estrechamente las fuerzas del movimiento comunista mundial" y se suscribi6 a las "me- didas y acciones concretes" llevadas a cabo en las relations de la URSS con Pekin. La resoluci6n sobre China y el nombramiento de Brezhnev y Podgorny al secretariado fueron generalmente considerado$ como indicio de acrecido apoyo para Kruschev en sus actuacion'es en materia internacio- A rrwkMar oope 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 M An ro ed F r Release.1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061 00200020004-5 uniVo y s?g.: La visita a Vietnam del Norte de una elegaci6n de la Asamblea Suprema del Pueblo de Cores del Norte, encabezada por el vice- presidente Phak Kum-chol, estd siendo utilizada para propagar la Linea norcoreana pro China, con repetidos ataques contra el revisionismo modern en un editorial de "Nodong Sinmun" del 19 y en los discursos de Phak en Hanoi. El anfitri6n de Phak, Truong Chinh (presidente de la comisi6n per- manente de la Asamblea Nacional de la Rep1.blica Democrdtica de Vietnam), en su discurso de recepci6n el dia 20 expres6 su acuerdo restringido; "Junto a los Partidos fraternos, resueltamente defendemos la pureza del marxismo-leninismo, nos oponemos al revisionismo y el dogmatismo y otras malas tendencias, especialmente el revisionismo." El 19, Sinjua tambi6n inform6 que los uitimos ndmeros de dos 6rganos de Vietaiam del Norte, la revista te6rica del Partido, "Hoc Tap," y el 6rgano "Tien Phong" de la Uni6n Juvenil Obrera, hablan publicado ataques contra Yugoslavia y su nueva constituci6n. 19 Junio: La agencia yugoslava Tanyug inform6 sobre un articulo en el 6n gan "o"o Kamunist" de Belgrado respondiendo a los ataques del PC chino contra el Partido yugoslavo a raiz de su Quinto Pleno. En cotstestaci6n a la pre- gunta sobre el prop6sito directo de los ataques chinos, "Komunist" expres6: "Son de hecho esfuerzos por imponer sus propias opiniones en el movimiento sindical internacional so retexto de proteger el marxisme-leninismo.y to- mar el papel de drbitro de la politics de todos los passes y partidos so- cialistas. De esa manera los lideres chinos solamente agravan el dilema mismo del movimiento sindical internacional -- la necesidad de decidir en- tre el dogmatismo ciego y el aventurismo arbitrario, y la activa y persis- tente lucha por la paz y el socialismo a base de una creadora aplicaci6n del marxismo, politica que nace de un genuino sentido de responsabilidad por la suerte del mundo en que vivimos." 20 Junio: Despachos de prensa de Moscd informaron que la embajada de China comunista, a despecho de los deseos sovidticos declarados, estaba distribuyendo ejemplares de la "carts de 67 pdginas del PC chino" a or- ganizaciones sovi6ticas y per16dicos y corresponsales extrajeros, incluso los de passes comunistas. La agencia UPI inform6 que a los redactores occidentales, que normalmente tienen dificultad pars, it mds alld del portal de entrada de la embajada china, les fueron cordialmente entregados todos los ejemplares de la carta que quisieran. 20 Junio: La Australian Overseas Service i.nform6 por radio que el PC australiano se ha dividido por las causal de la disputa ideol6gica del PCUS y el PC chino. Bas6 su informaci6n en el semanario "Guardian" del PCA; que dio a conocer el despido de cinco miembros del ejecutivo central del Partido en el Estado de Victoria por "fraccionismo, infracciones de la Constituci6n del Partido y rechazo del centralismo democrdtico." El periodista radial de Radio Australia expres6 que todos los hombres menci- onados han demostrado fuerte tendencia pro Pekin. Un miembro del comit6 central en Victoria, con historial de 22 a1os, se dio de baja del Partido, dando lugar a pensar que Australia puede pronto tener dos Partidos comu- nistas. 21 Junio: La agencia ADN de Alemania oriental anunci6 que el primer vice- canciller Vinzer habla protestado ante el embajador chino por la distri- buci6n de impresos en contravenci6n del orden existente y las reglas legs- les. Afiadi6 la ADN: "Es de sentirse que la Embajada de la RPCh en la RDA con tales pasos haya actuado contra el deseo clue anima a los Partid s Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 - 3 - M yn e'sue~. a `p' orri neego0cia- ci6n. 21 Junio: El "diario del Pueblo" de Pekin public6 un comentario sabre "La Gran Conspiraci6n de John F. Kennedy," interpretando el discurso del Presidente en American University el 10 de junco como "jugada astu- te y maligna de su 'estrategia de paz'" con intenci6n de influir en el resultado del debate chino-sovi6tico y "dividir el Bloque Rojo." "Como destacamento especial del imperialismo norteamericano, los revisionistas modernos yugoslavos estdn fuera de si de regocijo con el discurso de Kennedy y lo han alabado hasta los cielos." "No obstante, todos los que firmemente sustentan la unidad del campo socialista y la del movimiento comunista internacional jamds se dejar6n engaklar." 23 Junio: La extensa visits del Presidente Choe Yong-ton a China (v6ase nuestra dltima Cronologia, 5 Junco) concluy6 con una declaraci6n conjunta de 12 pdginas suscrita por Liu Shao-chi y Choe, siguiendo (Para sorpresa de nadie, en vista de los discursos anteriores de Choe), la dura Linea : china, denunciando el revisionismo moderno y declarando que "es absolute- mente impermisible reducir unilateralmente la politica exterior de los passes socielistas a la coexistencia Pacifica." 24 Junco: "Pravda" e "Izvestiya" publicaron editoriales repasando el tray bajo del plena del CC y reiterando los t6rminos de la resoluci6n del mismo que "categ6ricamente rechaz6" como "infundados y calumniosos los ataques del CC del PC chino contra nuestro Partido y otros Partidos comunistas" y autoriz6 a la delegaci6n a las conversaciones de Julio a seguir la po- litics de Kruschev "invariablemente." Informand.o esto desde Moscu, el corresponsal Topping del "New York Times" a!fadi6 que los funcionarios so- vi6ticos, que no hablan contado con que las conversaciones de Julio re - s ultaran en reconciliaci6n ideol6gica alguna Pero si que hubiera un acuen- do que limitara las dimensions de la disputa y mantuviera alguna aparien- cia de unidad, dieron muestras inequivocas de sobresalto por la entrega de la rude carte china solo tres dins antes de la fecha del pleno. 24+ Junco: Sinjua cit6 las palabras de "un portavoz de la embajada de la RPCh en la RDA" expresivas de "completo estupor por la declaraci6n de la ADN del 21 de junco atacando a;la embajada china por distribuir materia impresa." El portavoz manifest6 que la impresi6n y distribuci6n del "im- portante documento marxista-leninista" era "completamente justificada y de acuerdo con la practica internacional." e "indudablemente ayudar6 a incrementar la corrects comprensi6n por parte del fraterno pueblo alemdn de la posici6n y opiniones del PC de China y asi serd beneficiosa en el fortalecimiento de la unidad." Despu6s de quejarse de que la ADN "apre- suradamente public6 la declaraci6n" aun antes de que is. embajada pudiera comunicarse con su gobierno, el portavoz declar6: "Semejante practice solo puede considerarse como tentative intentional de incitar a escdndalo, atacar al PC de China, ensanchar las divergencias en el movimiento comu- nista internacional y socavar la unidad entre los Partidos fraternos." Concluy6 con un recordatorio de que el VI Congreso del SED habia "echado mario de tdcticas no marxista-leninistas al lanzar ataques descabellados contra el PC de China." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: ,CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For ReleaSg'12`4LtFA?03061A000200020004-5 Andlisis de la Carta del Pc Chino al PCUS el 14 de Junio de 1963 Despu4s de unas palabras de introducci6n referentes al "deber sagrado y coma" de todos los Partidos de mantener y reforzar la unidad, el mensaje del PC chino declar6 que Como la carts del PCUS "trae a cuento la cuesti6n de la lines general del movimiento comunista internacional," "nosotros tambi6n quisi&ramos expresar nuestra opini6n, que constituye nuestra propuesta sabre la Linea general ... y sobre algunas cuestiones relacionadas de principio." (La carts del PLUS no habia "traido a cuenta is cuesti6n de la linea general," pero si habia definido las opiniones del PCUS como "la Linea del movimiento comunista internacional" cuya cor- recci6n ha sido completamente confirmada por "el curso entero del desar- rollo mundial en aflos recientes," y habia declarado lisa y llanamente que "estamos profundamente convencidos de que no existen fundamentos pars un reexamen de dicha lines.") La posici6n china estd expresada en 25 secciones numeradas (unas 18.000 palabras), entre las cuales las primeras 17 recalientan opiniones chinocomunistas expresadas anteriormente sobre las cuestiones te6recas en disputes, especialmente las cuestiones de la revoluci6n y is guerra. "En ultimo andlisis se trata de .'.. aceptar o no la verdad universal del mar- xismo-leninismo, reconocer o no is significaci6n universal de la via de is Revoiuci6n de Octubre, de scepter o no el hecho de que la gente vive aun bajo el sistema imperialists y capitalista, y que comprende las dos terceras pastes de is poblaci6n mundial, necesita hacer la revoluci6n.." La respuesta chinocomunista: "La transici6n del capitalismo al socialis- mo se puede producir solamente (el subrayado aqui y en adelante es nues- tro) por media de la revoluci n proletaria," y aquello que tratan de "predecir is transici6n pacffica" a base de "paralelos absurdos" estdn repudiando el marxismo. Continuando con este tenor, repetidamente se de- clara que Asia, Africa y America Latina son "las zonas mds vulnerables bajo el dominio imperialista y los centros de torments que asestan golpes directos al imperialismo." Acerca de is guerra: las "ciertas personas (que] ahora liegan a mantener que es posible producir 'un mundo sin ar- enas, sin fuerzas armadas y sin guerras' por medio del 'desarme completo y general'" estdn perpetrando una "pura ilusi6n." La "coexistencia pacf- fica" ("tesis de Lenin" y no "gran descubrimiento de ciertas personas hace unos amos) es un concepto vdlido dentro de una estrecha y estricta interpretaci6n, pero no se puede hater "la linea general de is poiitica exterior de los passes socialistas." "Si is lfnea general ... es unila- teralmente reducida a is 'coexistencia pacffica', ' competencia pacffica' y 'transici6n pacifies,' eso es violar los principios de la declaraci6n de 1957 y la de 1960, desechar is misi6n hist6rica de is revoluci6n pro- letaria mondial y apartarse de las enseflanzas del marxismo-leninismo." "Si cualquiera, siguiendo las pisadas de otro, defiende is err6nea lines oportunista y las polfticas proseguidas por cierto pals socialists ..., se estar6 apartendo del marxismo-leninismo y el internacionalismo prole- tario." Con la secci6n 18 los chinos comienzan a atacar asuntos internos sovi6ticos especificos y is conducta sovidtica en sus relaciones con es- tados y Partidos fraternos, haci6ndose su tono mda y mds arrogante y ofen- sivo. Una caracteristica novedosa del III Programs del PCUS, adoptada par el XXII Congreso del Partido en 1961, foe is declaraci6n de que, "ha- biendo producido una victoria completa y definitiva del socialismo--- pri- m~p8doi:@ 1999/(/2A~7$8069~'i4+~(~2~0?r 5 Ap sbxed "rr lpw J a4 zaCi`c RUa$zRlO&Wp .qqg O@&-? plido su histbrica misibn y ha cesado de ser indispensable en is URSS desde el punto de vista de las tareas del desarrollo interno." Hasta la consecuci6n del comunismo compieto -- con la desaparici6n de las clases y el desvanecimiento del estado -- is sociedad serb, gobernada por un "estado del pueblo entero" (concepto mal definido y nebuloso). En las secciones 18 y 19 los chinos denuncian fuertemente "el anuncio, a me- dio camino, que ya no es necesaria is dictadura del proletariado." Esto tambi6n no es cuesti6n de los asuntos internos de un Partido deter- minado sino un problems fundamental que envuelve is verdad universal del marxismo-leninismo." No desarma esto al proletariado y a todo el pueblo trabajador, organizativa e ideol6gicamente, y no eguivale a coa4yuvar a restaurar el capitalismo?" En is seccibn 20 los chinos se dirigen a "la cuesti6n de 'combatir el culto al individuo'" que ellos denuncian como "err6nea y nociva," ya que traer al tapete esta cuesti6n "es realmente contraponer los lideres a las masas, minar el liderato unificado del Partido que se bass en el centralismo democrbtico, disipar su fuerza combativa y desintegrar sus filas." Ademds, "la que es mds grave es que so pretexto de 'combatir el culto al individuo,' ciertas personas estbn burdemente interviniendo en los asuntos internos de otros Partidos fraternos y palses fraternos y forzando a otros Partidos fraternos a cambiar su liderato para imponer su propia Linea errada a dichos Partidos. LQu es todo esto si no esc sio- nismo sectarismo y chovinismo a estilo de gran potencia? 4Qu6 es todo si no subversi n? En Is seccibn 22 los chinos atacan la conducts sovi6tica en sus relaciones econ6micas con el cameo socialists: "La cooperaci6n econ6mi- ca deberd basarse en los principios de igualdad completa, beneficio mutuo, y asistencia mutua en compa?lerismo. Serfs chovinismo propio de gran po- tencia negar dichos principios bd,sicos y, a nombre de la 'division inter- nacional del trabajo' o 'especializacibn,' imponer is voluntad propia sobre otros, eonculcar is independencia y soberania de passes fraternos o perjudicar los intereses de sus pueblos. ... Berta descabellado seguir la prdctica de sacar partido para at mismo a expensas de otros." En le seccibn 22 el ataque vira hacia el campo de las relaciones politicas entre los Partidos fraternos. El PCUS deberia emparejar sus hechos con las Buenas razones de su carts del 30 de marzo: "Es impermi- sible que ningdn Partido se coloque por encima de otros, intervenga en sus asuntos internos y adopte modales patriarcales en sus relaciones con ellos, ... [y es impermisible] imponer el programs, las resolutions y is lines del propio Partido sobre otros Partidos fraternos como 'el programs comdn del movimiento comunista international.", La manera de tratar al "fraterno Partido marxista-leninista de los Trabajadores Alba- neses" y is de tratar la camarilla revisionista yugoslava de traidores al marxismo-leninismo" son dos "asuntos esencialmente diferentes" y "de nin- guna manera deber?in ser puestos a la par." "'LQuibn es el que ha realizado actos de escisionismo en las relaciones entre sovi6ticos y albaneses? LQuibn es el que ha extendido las divergencias ideol6gicas entre los Partidos sovi6tico y albands al terreno de las relaciones entre estados? Quin es el que ha puesto las divergencias entre ambos passes al descubierto ante el enemigo? LQuibn es el que ha demandado roaeF ` e `e b*OV2 -~ FA-R 9P* ( 6icXOB0L2b66 04-5 App Approved ft ,etea ,8 $ , a RgMtQ3 QA,0a 20004-5 entero. ZSer, posible que los camaradas dirigentes del PCUS realmente no recuerdan an responsabilidad...? "La serie de acontecimientos apenantes que ban tenido luger en el cameo socialista en el pasado per odo ha perjudicado los intereses no solo de los Partidos fraternos en cuestibn sino tambidn las masas populares en sus passes. Esto com- prueba convincentemente que los mayores passes y Partidos ne- cesitan tener en mente el encargo de Lenin de nunca cometer el error chovinismo propio de gran potencia. Los camaradas del PCUS manifiestan en an carta que 'el PCUS jemds ha dado ni dard ni un solo paso que siembre la hostilidad entre Jos pueblos de nuestro pals hacia el fraterno pueblo chino u otros pueblos.' No deseamos aqui volver atrds y enumerar los muchos aconteci- miientos desagradables que ban ocurrido en el pasado, y solo de- seamos que los camaradas del PCUS se ajusten estrictamente a dicha declaraci6n en sus actuaciones futures. En los <imos altos, los miembros de nuestro Partido y nuestro pueblo ban ejer- cido el ma or dominio des mismos ante una serie de graves in- cidentes v olatorios de los principios que gu an las relaciones entre passes y Partidos fraternos, no obstante las muchas difi- cultades y pdrdidas que nos ban lido impuestas. Concentrando en is. seccibn 23 en el problema yugoslavo, los chinos apuntan que "ciertas personas estdn tratando de introducir a la camarilla revisionista yugoslava en la comunistd socialista," y afirman que "esto es destrozar abiertamente el acuerdo adoptado undnimemente en la reuni6n de 1960 ... y es absolutamente impermisible." Ahora "ciertas personas estdn declarando abiertamente que el dogmatismo y no el revisionismo es el mayor peligro, o que el dogmatismo no es menos peligroso que el revi- sionismo, etc. ... No deberdn canbalachear los principios ... abogando boy por una coca y maftana por otra... So pretexto de 'desarrollar el mar- xismo creativamente, ...describer como 'verdades marxistas-leninistas universales' sus propios preceptos basados unicamente en la conjetura sub- `e~ tiva y divorciados de la realidad y de las masas, y obligan a otros a aceptar dichos preceptor incondicionalmente. Por eso es que muchos fen6- menos graves se ban producido en el movimiento comunista international. En la breve y extraPfa seccibn 24 los chinos desdeffosamente contras- tan a su ideal de un Partido revolucionario proletario marxista-leninista confiado en sf mismo tipos despreciables tales como un "partido burgu6s reformista," un "partido revisionists" y "un partido que parlotea como el lord las palabras de otro, copia la experiencia extranjera sin analizarla, corre de un lado a otro obedeciendo a is. batuta de ciertas personas en el extranjero y se ha convertido en una mescolanza de revisionismo, dogmatis- mo y de todo menos los principios del marxismo-leninismo." Finalmente, en la seccibn 25 los chinos repiten con chufletas sus retos al PCUS a seguir su ejemplo y publicar los artfculos de ambos lados de la disputa, porque "es deber de los marxistas-leninistas distinguir en- tre is verdad y is. falsedad con respecto a las divergencies surgidas en el seno del movimiento comunista international Approved For Release 1999/08/24 t(IA-RDP78-03061 A000200020004-5 1 July 1963 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061.000200020004-5 673. Constitutional and Structural Stability: Fundamental 25X1 C10b Factors in the o ar The Supreme Test of the Cold War. it is safe to predict that the o War -- i.e. the free wor 's continuous effort to reduce Communist expansion, subversion and aggression at least to a "safe" level where it no longer involves the threat of gen- oral war, if only by miscalculation -- will last quite a few more years and will require, for its successful conclusion, con- tinued maximum exertions by all free nations. Even if its course does not lead to actual nuclear conflict, there is a pressing need to overcome a succession of political.and socio- economic crises, local and regional insurrections, and diplomatic, propagandistic and mass-organizational pressures by the World Communist Movement. For this purpose, Cold War allies will continue to require the very highest degree of loyalty, moral fiber, endurance and far-sightedness among all free people: if nuclear war should be added to all Cold War strains and stresses, these demands will be obviously still far higher, if the free world is to win the war and rebuild its civilization afterwards. Consequexntly, the free world's efforts through the years ahead must be spearheaded by those nations which offer mankind the best possible hope for passing this supreme test: nobody can predict the future with a high degree of certainty, but we can unques- tionably derive important lessons from the past performances and the present conditions of the nations involved. Criteria of Stability and National Cohesion.. The following factors are essential in evaluating a nation's ability to pass the above described tests: 1. Constitutional Continuity. The better a nation has succeeded in adapting its institutions and govern- ment policies to internal and external changes without a violent break of constitutional order, the more probable that it will master future crises, too, and that its citizenry will remain loyal. All other circumstances being equal, a constitution which has functioned for several generations will command far higher and more reliable allegiance than a regime set up relatively recently after one or more violent and/or fundamental changes in the constitutional order. 2. Military Record. A nation's role in past wars Appfb~' De4' ~.n~eg Ins tw ind rac y~an oyty of asorces an (673. Continued) (OMB? For Release-499 9/ a ? rIa j fP78-030614p002.p0 y0 Jff Population in war emergencies --, while no automatic guarantee of future victories (the character of enemies, as well as its own warlike qualities may change quickly), is as significant as its continued maintenance of both nuclear and conventional arma- ments and present psychological preparedness for all types of military conflicts. 3. National Cohesion Vs. Internal Subversion. No nation is today entirely immune to possible sub- version since the Communist Bloc will stimulate sub- version even in countries where it does not arise spontaneously. However, there is a fundamental difference between small-scale, isolated subversive efforts which can be controlled by the country's security services and large-scale subversion bol- , stered by tangible popular sympathies, which serious- ly threatQ the nation's fabric in peace or in war. The seriousness of subversion in any given country can be measured not so much in absolute terms, but in comparison, with the cohesion loyalty and the constructive, patriotic socio-political efforts of the majority of the population. (Subversion, in this context, denotes not only Communists, but includes also any other elements endangering the stability of a nation, whether Fascists, separatists or the like.) 4. Flexibility and Adaptation to Internal and External anges. The manner in which a nation as dealt with inajor changes in its domestic situation or in its international relations, the relative ease of transition to new positions and the acceptance of necessary changes by population and government, are also highly indicative of a nation's ability to pass new tests. Such shifts may include transition from rural to urban economy and society, technological revolutions (e.g. automation), immigration and emigration, minority problems, relations between motherland and colonies, and so forth. (The following paragraphs apply the foregoing criteria to the principal nations of the free world.) United States. Has maintained the same constitutional system since 1799, adjusted to changing conditions by amend- ments: even the Civil War, 1861 -- 1865, did not break the continuity of the constitution or of the institutions based on it. The US has won all wars in which she became involved: her participation in World Wars One and Two was decisive for the outcome of these global conflicts. Neither Nazis nor Communists gained dangerously strong influence. Whatever sympathies local Nazi groups may have enjoyed among the mil- lions of German-Americans evaporated quickly when Hitler ` eA a opRelb9sUS1 fte*M*PCIA ? 03061 AGMMM004-5 (623. Continued) (61pp99,pd)For Release 199 DP78-03061 000 099R024 unions and certain intellectual circles was reduced, largely through the initiative of the groups concerned (e.g. CIO's investigation and subsequent expulsion of Communist-controlled unions), below the danger point. US settled relations with her former possessions amicably, granting independence to the Philippines, raising Hawaii and Alaska to statehood and estab- lishing the commonwealth of Puerto Rico according to the vote of its population. Britain. Has continued her unwritten constitution with- out break, adapting to changing conditions -- for instance, by reducing the role of the House of Lords and increasingly shift- ing towards a "welfare state." Britain participated in winning World War one and Two -- though she could not have won either war without massive US intervention. Her latest military ven- ture, Suez 1956, was a failure. Fascist and Communist groups are small, though defeatist trends -- "unilateral disarmament" -- have spread far beyond the insigAificant CP. Britain has divested herself of her once farflung empire with only rela- tively minor conflicts and maintains, on the whole, close relations with most of her former colonies -- many of which are now voluntary members of the British Commonwealth. On the whole, Britain has adjusted to her reduced world position in good grace and has taken realistic measures to rearrange her diplomacy, defense and economy accordingly. France. Has experience) four violent breaks in her con- stitutional order within the last 100 years: the end of the 2nd empire and the establishment of the 3rd republic in the awake of her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, 1379/71; the 3rd republic was replaced by the Pertain regime as a result of France's defeat in the first year of World War Two, 1940; the Petain regime (Vichy) was followed by the 4th republic at the end of World War T4wo; the 4th republic was overthrown by the present de Gaulle regime in 1958. France lost the war with Germany, 1870/71; fought on the winning side -- bearing the main burden among the Western powers -- in World War One (even though her armies were severely shaken by the great mutiny of April, 1917) ; her forces collapsed after a few weeks of fighting in the first stage of World War Two, a crushing defeat repaired only by US interven- tion later in the war; lost the colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria and the intervention against Suez (jointly with Britain and Israel), 1956. The French CP, though radically reduced in her parliamentary representation through de Gaulle's sweeping electoral reforms, still polls more than one fifth of the popular vote and con- trols the strongest labor union federation. Right-wing extremists, too, have played significant roles in recent years, from the Cagoulards of 1934 through the groups which collaborated with the Nazis during World War Two to the "Secret Army" in A 1AM*bv d~R'e MeMM&M* 3RDPq8tD064LAO?0200020004-5 3 OMPAdbolks (673. Continued) "AvpirdVc1 For Releases 199 P78-03061 Q0002~0(04 France lost her richest colonies, Indochina and Algeria, after costly a _d protracted wars, leaving especially in Indochina (Vietnam Laos, Cambodia) many critical, un- solved problems. Settlement with most of her other colonies in Africa was amicable and France retained con- siderable influence there. (France still owns some minor overseas territories, such as Martinique and French Guiana. in the Caribbean and New Caledonia in the Pacific. While France has recovered remarkably well from the destruction suffered in World War Two and from the loss of her colonies, a--_,y realistic adjustment to her changed (i.e. reduced) role in world affairs is still impeded by strong and emotional wishful think- ing about her past grandeur -- delusions by no means limited to de Gaulle and his close associates. Germany. Her constitutional regime was changed violently four tth"an the last 100 years: 1671, the Second Empire was established by Bismarck as result of the victory over France; 1910, the Kaiser was replaced by the Weimar Republic in the wake of the defeat in World War one; 1933, Hitler seized power; following military occupation in 1945, after Germany's defeat in World War Two (during which the Allied powers established a 4-Zone regime over all of Germany), two separate governments were established in West and East Germany in 1949. Germany was the principal loser in both World Wars. Her split into a Communist and a free part (likely to last until the Soviet Union should retreat) provides an element of basic instability. In West Germany, the CP is outlawed and was numerically weak even while legal; but West Germany is a prime target of Soviet (and East German) subversion efforts. Right-wing extremism hardly appears on the West German political scene today -- but this may be temporary and due to the present prosperity and to the moral condemnation of Nazi crimes rather than to a genuine disappearance of anti-democratic tendencies. Other Nations. The free world includes many other countries besides those discussed above, including big and important nations such as India, Japan, Italy, Argentina, and so forth. None of these is a real candidate for leadership in the Cold War since all are lacking either the military or industrial potential, or occupy too peripheral a position in the community of the free world -- quite apart from any shortcomings in their constitutional stability. The general criteria outlined above, however, apply 25X1 C1 ob to any nation, large or small. 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 1 July 1V 33 6261 Op d Fao ReI' 9e 0Is24EcoCIAo- is Di8f03i0u1A0002?f0020004-5 -25X1 C10b 15ov e oc KO : CEMA's Failure to Progress. The Council for Mutual Economic 21ssistv'nee kCZAA) is e economic Planning and trad- ing organization of the USSR and the East European satellites. C)MA was founded in 1349, partly as an answer to the American Marshall Plan, and partly as a move to discourago other satel- lites from following the example of Yugoslavian heresy. Eco= nomically, it was intended to coordinate the plans and economies of the bloc countries and to direct the satellite economies into specialized types of production. Such special- ization would be much more rational economically than the prevalent attempts to make each country self-sufficient, but specialization was apparently also designed to make the satel- lites obedient and subservient; with thorough specialization, it would become impossible for these countries to imitate Tito. But it was easier to establish the CEMA organization than to bring the coordination and specialization program into effect, and in fact almost nothing happened. Following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1256, which revealed the persistence of nationalist feelings in the satellites, and following the related failure of the over-ambitious five year Plans of that period, the Kremlin decided to make a new, second effort to turn the bloc into a closely knit economic group. In succeeclinZ years CEM[ planned inter-satellite electricity networks and pipelines and work was begun on them. But progress in trade volume was still slight, in embarrassing contrast to the success of the West European Common Market, while specialization was virtually non-existent. Therefore in June 1962, the Soviets began a third campaign to get CEMA off the ground. Judging by some of Khrushchev's remarks, he may have been anxious to enable CEMA to trade on equal terms with the Common Market and the capitalist world generally; his interest in East-West trade has often been shown, as in the recent reception accorded to the manager of Krupp's of Essen, Berthold ?1eitz. At all events the party secretaries assembled in Moscow, a document entitled "Basic Principles of International Socialist Division of Labor" was issued, the Communist press circulated a long article by Khrushchev, and the construction of a new CEMA headquarters building began in a Moscow suburb. The CEMA Executive Committee, whose members are all deputy premiers in their countries, now meets every two raonths, and CEiRA's bureaucracy, including a permanent secre- tariat and an increasing number of permanent commissions, has expanded rapidly. At the Executive Committee's December 1962 meeting, the non-Soviet members agreed to establish a joint P?? ~ 6&o Fb sei1 $1 8t 4Q IA R6JF O3 6I 0 -5 poo rrans;-remont _ (674. Continued) (674 Cont.) 1 July 1963 Appr4~( ANC ~ 1 9 / filhAg P78 03 ~-1 h03Js00 oaQs4-5 The most notable sign of its built-in difficulties has been the resistance of Rumania to a central planning system, ex- pressed at many committee meetings, and especially at the April Executive Committee meeting in Moscow (Economist Foreign Report, 2 May 1963; London Times, 9 May 1963). a Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian press bias also made implicit criticisms of CEMA's plans to dismantle factories in certain satellites and transfer them elsewhere. While the Czech radio denied on 29 March that Czech plants were as yet being dismantled and moved, it admitted that they would be moved in the future, and a part of the Hungarian radio industry was packed up and shipped to Bulgaria; later, the Hungarians refused to buy Bulgarian radios. All the smaller CEMA states have some doubts about special- ization, and Rumania, more vocal than the others, is said to be especially aroused over the opposition of the CEMA planners to a large-scale expansion of the Rumanian steel industry. (On Rumania, see also Guidance #657a, 6 May 1963.) With the USSR beginning preparations for its next five year plan, and with the satellites exposed to the rival attractions of ?eking, the West, and Yugoslavia, the Soviets badly need to get CEMA into operation. Yet they face two tremendous problems: conomic nationalism and the lack of economic prices. Economic Nationalism. The leaders of Eastern Europe are determined to mate esr countries technically comparable with the Soviet Union and with Western European nations. It was probably this goal that led many of these men to become Commu- nists,. and in their party training, often in the USSR, they absorbed Soviet lore on giant dams and steel mills. In the postwar years, even while Soviet troops were removing equip- ment to rebuild the USSR, and even while Stalin was using so- called "joint stock companies" to operate choice satellite industries for Soviet profit, local Communists were planning and starting to implement grandiose plans for miniature Soviet Unions, complete with steel mills, tractor plants, and all the other typically Soviet industries. Stalin, who was much more a Machiavellian politician than an economist, seems to have feared that if the satellites specialized, they would tend to cooperate with each other, perhaps eventually forming a political union against the USSR. On the other hand, he did not take them seriously as individual countries, and he cal- culated that with each satellite a weak, non-specialized economy, they would compete with each other for Soviet favor; Moscow would hold the reins. But economically, and especially from the standpoint of Soviet economic interests, this multiplication of small, all- around economies made little sense. More than half the ore needed by satellite steel plants is imported from the USSR, and substantial amounts of other raw materials are drawn from the same source. Not only are these materials diverted from Soviet use, but the overburdened Soviet and satellite transport facilities must haul them over long distances. From being Approved For Release 1999/08/248 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 (674. Continued) (674 Cont.) 1 July 1963 e 'Vcv.Pg Fo4kr ga 0 qW r RjAiz DP7 n-Q30o 00 002 0 000s - el::ites have changed into importers, and they draw on the none- too-ample food supplies of the Soviet Union. Although most of the relief for Poland and Hungary after the 1956 uprisings was squeezed out of past Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have discovered on that and other occasions that satellite economic difficulties may entail Soviet economic contributions. The predominately Soviet officials in CEMA have logic on their side in demanding that Rumania abandon her Stalinesrue plans and concentrate on oil and grain production. But for Rumanians, industrialization is all-important, an expression of inherited nationalism and, at the same time, the only way of emerging from Balkan backwardness. The choice between economic nationalism and specialization is ultimately a choice between political independence and lasting vassal status. Other CEMA members are less defiant at the moment, but they too are likely to. resist any sacrifice of their "national sovereignty." Most Communists are also nationalists, and if forced to choose between national interests and loyalty to Khrushchev -- who in any case is no longer an unquestioned authority -- many will follow the line of national interests. The Lack of Economic Prices. The question of economic nations sm would e much less acute if the bloc had a normal market economy. Among western cou"tries, industries are usually located in the most economic places. Steel plants, for example, have usually been placed where coking coal and iron ore were readily available, since steel plants in other locations will have higher costs and make less profit. One reason why Switzerland and Sweden prosper is that, instead of running large-scale, unprofitable steel complexes, they concentrate on the products (such as cutlery and watches) they are best able to make and sell. But (paradoxically for economic materialists) the economic policies of Communist countries are settled on political, not economic grounds, and these policies are influenced by quasi-aesthetic factors, such as reverence for tall smokestacks and massive masonry walls. Economic activities are pursued by plan -- that is, by order -- and supply and demand are deliberately ignored; according to Marx, economic values are based on labor cost, and not on supply and demand. Therefore prices in each Communist country are established by the state, allegedly on a cost basis, actually with the intention of favoring plan execution, but in any case arbitrarily. This means that prices reflect the whims of the adminis- trator, that they constitute no reliable index to the scarcity of delivery cost of a commodity, and that they provide no true reflection of the costs of capital depreciation and stockpiling. Factories have been built in Siberia which received their materials from and delivered their products to the Ukraine; managers amass vast stores of unused machines and equipment against the possibility of shortages; and machines once produced have sometimes proved unneeded or unsuitable, and have been left to rust in the open. Not only is there no price indicator of demand and overhead costs, but the absence of a market makes Approved For Release 1999/08/24 ?CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 (674. Continued) (674 Cent,) 1 July 1963 JA m o aFelti gy'I $ "AAI: } P dOaq~ AORR JQOOa20 04-5 er cause of hoarding and waste. Lip service is rendered to "accountability," but in the last analysis, production and use are determined by order. 'Price problems become more acute in Soviet foreign trade, and most acute of all in trade with other bloc countries. All Soviet foreign trade is conducted by corporations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In trading with capitalist coun- tries, the planners first decide what imports are needed and what exports may be disposed of, and then the Ministry strikes the best bargain it can; often the transaction amounts to a quantitative barter. The Soviet domestic cost plays no role in deciding the amount to be traded, and indeed the arbitrary Soviet prices, insulated from the influence of world markets, would be practically useless for making such a decision. As. to Soviet trade with other bloc countries, these countries have Price structures which are like the Soviet structure in being arbitrary, but which differ from the Soviet structure in all their particular prices, being the product of different sets of planners working with different economies. Between these economies and the Soviet economy, there is no objective standard of cost, and In order to find such a standard, the bloc countries have had to use world market prices as a point of departure in their negotiations with each other. At present, 1957-50 world prices are used, and begin- ning in 1964, these Will be replaced by a new average world Price, based on the five year period 1957-61. This should be an improvement, but obviously the standard is somewhat out of date. At all events, even with such a capitalist yardstick, Ck114A trade is a two-way barter, base! on the particular quantity of goods needed for each country's plan. Foreign exchange (i.e., funds available for use in any foreign free market) Plays virtually no role in intra-bloc trade. Without foreign ex- change, barter is necessary, and simultaneous multilateral barters are difficult to work out. Various expedients have been tried, but the right to obtain as-yet-unspecified goods at an unspecified future data (essential if trade is not arranged in a single quid pro quo agreement) is hard to reconcile with a planned, controlled economy. Some third or fourth country might suddenly appear and demand goods earmarked for domestic purposes. In short, the bloc is unwilling to adopt a real market economy, with real money which can be spent as the owner of the money wishes. Adoption of a market economy would of course mean abandoning a major part of Communism. But without markets, trade relations remain primitive and cumbersome. One result of the no-market, play-money system is that, for the mcs t part, the bloc countries do not know what commodities are in short supply. Another result is that it is difficult for them to tell who produces a given commodity most cheaply. Most impor- tant of all (and most characteristic of Communism), trade tends to become a contest o ,? Approved For Release f 19?6/~tllfra ktbl ~--KbP ` 3?ti X200020004-5 (674. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24": CIA-RDP78-03061AO&1b0H6B04-5 Lue oorrowed yardstick of worltii prices ; ?ves as a point of departure for *pis contest, but the final*eerms must be hammered out in c y1o -at1c-type negotiations. It is no wonder that departures from the yardstick usually favor the politically and economically superior country, the USSR A survey of 1960 statistics has shown that, in that year, the Sovietsovercharged their partners (relative to western prices) in 41 cases, and undercharged them in 10. The total of overcharges was 23 times the total of undercharges. Thus, while official figures made it appear that the USSR exported more to its partners than it im- ported from them, this appearance was due to Soviet over-pricing, and trade in terms of western prices made the USSR a net importer, exploiting the bloc. The variation from market prices may not be due entirely to plan, but had the advantage been to the smaller countries, we may imagine that it would have been quickly corrected. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 25X1C10b Approved For Relea 1999/ . 78-03061?A~0020Q03QQ94it63 675. Cuba's "New Look" Economy is Soviet Colonialism BACKGROUND: Cuba's new emphasis upon developing its sugar products?n constitutes a basic policy change. During the first years of Castro's regime, the objective was agri- cultural diversification and industrialization, Intended to reduce Cuba's dependence on a single crop and to make it "economically independent." The problems this policy created have been detailed in earlier Guidance items on Cuba (see below). Cuba's sugar production has deteriorated and the leaders of the Castro regime have become more strident and critical as they exhort the Cubans to greater efforts. The decision to increase the production of sugar now emerges as part of the Communist pattern of Soviet economic control and imperialism as it limits Cuba to the role of a producer of raw materials within the Soviet realm. Castro himself revealed the plot in his long 4 June "meet-the-press" report on his trip to the Soviet Union (see Guidance #668, "Castro's Mission to Moscow"). He said his talks about Cuba's sugar and economy were "of the highest import to Comrade Khrushchev and the Soviet Government" and declared: "For us, it means that we must seriously get to work on all this, in order to prepare the position that we are going to occupy in the world of produc- tion in which we are going to specialize. What are we going to do? We are going to build an economy based on international division of labor." That Cuba's "specialization" would be agriculture and specifically sugar was emphasized by Cuban agricultural chief Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on 8 June as he urged radical improve- ment in sugar production which he described as the "basic factor" of the economy, and on 15 June when he told the Cubans "to produce much more sugar and also much more corn, rice, more and better tobacco, more vegetables, more products of all kinds, and more cattle. That is our duty and that is your obligation. . ." The Communist Pattern. The Soviet Union established the basic pa ern for a Communist economy, namely a totally con- trolled state plan centered on the development of capital goods and heavy industry. The Soviets have maintained a rigid doc- trine of industrialization first, particularly vital industries, at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods industries. But the USSR has now decided that its satellites should not follow this Communist pattern, and it assigns to other Approved For efeasee1 999 :Kul-, t1 0 6 b'd' 'fit " '" "' (675. Continued) (6x75 Cant ) /Approved Por Relea 1999/0 / P78-03061,AO002b b0 ?" economy of the Soviet Union. In particular, countries like Rumania, with her oil (and now Cuba, with her sugar) are to specialize on their traditional primary products. None of the satellites is to develop a balanced economy, none is to be able to provide for its own economic needs in independent trade throughout the world. This specialization is aimed generally to strengthen Soviet political control by keeping the satellites dependent on the USSR. Aside from the general control technique, control and dependency have been developed by the Soviet Union through a variety of specific methods, such as: 1. Trade treaties -- especially supplying arma- ments in exq ange for goods at prices favorable to the Soviet Union; 2. Binational "joint stock companies" -- which gave the Soviets control of key industries (these were largely dropped in the 1950's, but recent Soviet proposals for "joint investment" suggest that the concept is being revived and refined); 3. Loans -- which insure long-term indebtedness to the ov ts; 4. Technicians, managers, advisers experts extending ov e influence and control at key points in the planning and execution stages of every major economic enterprise. The Soviet Union strives to control the trade of the Bloc and is the main buyer, seller, broker and clearing house. While there are signs of "independence" movements within the Bloc, these only strengthen the Soviet interest in extending its economic exploitation of new areas, for prestige as well as economic reasons. In this context, Latin America offers an appealing prize and Cuba represents the Soviet "foot in the door." The Cuban Experience. Soviet "trade imperialism" con- stitutes an a ort to -.y- developing countries loose from trade relations with the Western world and to bind them to the USSR. Latin America offers an example of how this works -- the Soviets buy surplus goods and materials without regard to the world market; then "dump" the goods on the world market at prices to suit their own propaganda purposes regardless of the economic crisis this might create. Soviet handling of Cuba's sugar illustrates the pattern -- a long-term purchase contract at prices favorable to the USSR, a "generous" adjustment in the purchase price when the world market price. goes up (but a price which at the time was only half the world price), evidence of re-selling on the open market at a profit,etc. (See Guidance #663, "Castro's Mission tA-maO'6@11s For"1"$'/2 QIP7 ROP?8646' OOOa9OO2@?04-5 (675. Continued) (675 Cont.) " " " " a mw iv #63 App roved For Relea 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0306WO0200b2~~0"4-J #6 1WHb, "Cuba's Sugar Crop Exposes Basic Communist Failings.") When Castro came to power, the United States was Cuba's most important source of capital and its chief trading partner. In 1959, the last year of normal trade, 75% was with the US -- 453 million dollars in each direction, 350 million dollars of Cuba's exports being sugar. Trade with the Soviet Union was negligible -- about 1S million dollars a year. Using the propaganda slogan, "economic independence," Castro prepared the way for Soviet economic imperialism and colonialism. Foreign private capital was confiscated without compensation; aid from the West was refused; trade with the West was rejected as a form of "imperialist exploitation." As a substitute, he accepted Soviet offers of marvelous prospects of trade -- "generous help" as the propaganda describes it. By 1961, Cuba's trade with the US had all but stopped while trade with the Soviets had jumped -- the dollar ex- change Probably was more than Soviet trade with Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria. At the same time, Cuba's trade with the Communist countries of Europe also increased -- Poland-Cuba trade tripled between 1960 and 1961. But this did not mean that the Bloc trade compensated for Cuba's losses from severing trade with the US. Cuba-US trade was nearly in balance but there was a deficit -- a growing one in Cuba-Bloc trade -- 40 million dollars in 1961, 225 in 1962. Also, there was a loss of at least 100 million dollars from the transfer of sugar from the preferential US market to Communist markets which pay a lower price. This sugar loss has increased as the market price went up while the Soviets continued to pay the pegged low price and Cuba's production has decreased. In addition, more than 76% of Cuba's export income is only a credit on the books of the central banks of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. This means that Cuba must accept the products the Bloc countries offer in trade without regard to normal price and quality considerations. Cuba's economy must be geared to the Bloc in order to utilize the Bloc's exports. Realistic economic considerations are minimized; political considerations are emphasized. As Cuba's Minister of Industries Ernesto "Cho" Guevara acknowledged 6 January 1961 when dis- cussing the Soviet purchase of Cuba's sugar, "it happened simply as a political proposal." From another aspect, there is no information to indicate the extent to which Cuba's sugar exports to the Soviet Union are considered as payment for the excessive amount of military hardware which has been sent to the island. How have these developments affected Cuba? In explaining "the maguttudeFoT the g e s signed the socialist countries," Guevara declared in 1961 that Cuba would have to change -- "the socialist countries use the decimal system, we 3 Approved For Release 1999/ 78-030~AM0089PPA, 9435 (675 Cont.) Approved For Releaa 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061,&00020002OOO4-b use the . . . system of pounds and so forth. The socialist countries measure electricity at 50 cycles per second, ours is 60 cycles per second. We will have to change all of this." The "change" has meant the deterioration of Cuba's economy and the Cuban's living standards. Wages have been lowered; rationing has been imposed; there are shortages of imported foodstuffs and consumer durables; raw materials, fuels and capital goods are limited; long haulage from Communist coun- tries has increased freight charges and added drains on the limited foreign exchange; quality as well as quantity has deteriorated. 25X1C10b The departure of Cuba's managerial class and its trained and experienced workers has caused problems in every sector of the economy. Coupled with shortages of raw materials and spare parts, it closed plants and slowed down production. Lack of spare parts for the American machinery has led to conversion to Bloc equipment and there is evidence that this switch has been less than satisfactory (see attached unclassified press comments). Castro's revelation that henceforth Cuba will be an agricultural specialist and a supplier of raw materials for the Soviet Union completes the colonization of Cuba and fixes its role as a satellite of the Soviet Union. The attendant propaganda promising a brighter future cannot hide the fact that the average Cuban, who had more than the average Soviet to begin with, is getting less and less. 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Releases+1999%02** P78-03061,UOO OdffMOUOP 676 AF,FH,WH.' Chinese Influence in International Communist 25X1 C 10b ron ; Orrg s zat ions BACKGROUND: In attempts to counter Soviet influence in Asia, Africa and to a 1-sser degree in Latin America, the Chicoms apparently seek to form a competing set of front organizations to the older, established international fronts. The most con- crete example of this trend is the Afro-Asian Journalists' Con- ference (AAJC) in Djaka to Indonesia (24-30 Ap it 'o; see EMIR= I where the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and the Soviet delegation had only observer status. The new Afro-Asian Journalists' Organiza- tions (AAJO) set up in Djakarta will undoubtedly be dominated by the Chicoms and enjoy the strong support of the Indonesians, who did much of the organizational work prior to and at the Conference, and did the Chinese bidding during the Conference proceedings, In line with general LAPSO policy, the Chicom representatives called for a tri-continent journalists' meeting to include Latin Americans as well as Afro-Asians. The International Union of Students (IUS) may also have to cope with a rival organization in ae fro-Asian-Latin American area. The Now Delhi daily Patriot /recently created to support Krishna ME-NON and thus not suspect ecf of anti-Communist propaganda7 reported on 25 April 1963 in an item datelined Hong Kong, April'24, that the Chinese Students Union has strongly backed the proposal of the Indonesian Federation of University Students to convene a tri-continent conference of students which is expected to found a new international organization. According to the news item, the Soviet Asian student organization is to be kept out of the planned conference, following the pattern established at the AAJC in Djakarta. Also, according to an NCNA broadcast of 11 May, the chairman of the Union of Indonesian Student Organiza- tions called on the all-China Youth Federation and All-China Students' Federation to convey a March resolution concerning the convocation of a tri-continent student conference. However, a Chicom/Indonesian CP-backed Afro-Asian lorkerst Conference, which was planned for Djakarta in May has been postponed, probably because of the conditional response of many Afro-Asian trade unions which called for prior consultation among WFTU affiliates. The work of the World Peace Council (WPC) is also severely hampered by tensions caused in its ra ~s by clashes of pro-Soviet and pro-Chicom forces -- with Soviet-oriented elements, however, still having the upper hand. At council meetings last winter, the WPC was faced for the first time with difficulties in passing resolutions on vital questions and was forced to delay and re- ( 676. Continued) OrSVFd4Ar Relea 1999/ !lI~r78-0306OOOZDOII0063 a spring meeting of the WPC council, Warsaw was finally desig- nated as the site and the date fixod for C-12 June. The meeting was to concern itself with the key problems of international policy, including the problems of :uropean security and Germany, the formation of atom-free zones and the development of national liberation movements. While some participants already were an route to Warsaw, the meeting was indefinitely postponed, presumably because the UPC's spring disarmament campaign through- out the world had been so successful as to call for a full assessment of its impact prior to a council meeting. This explanation was, of course, a cover for whatever serious inter- nal conflict must have been the true reason for the last-minute, embarrassing postponement of the meeting. A basic difference in tactics between th Soviets and Chicoms is that the latter seek to advance the "liberation" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America without the participation of "peace organizations." The Chicoms make little-veiled attempts to exclude the WPC from AAPSO!s mission and they have been fairly outspoken on the matter of excluding the WPC (as well as women's and youth international organizations) from a tri-continent "liberation" alignment. In the meantime, the established Soviet-controlled inter- national front organizations seek to increase their own activi, ties in the underdeveloped world areas to the degree that they are able to do so. 25X1C10b Approved For (ease 1999/0$/24: CIA-RDP786061A000200020004-5 CPYRGHT From the English edition, International Affairs, of the May 1963 issue of the monthly journal MMzhdu::-. -rya zhLzr,.. , Moscow, pp. 51-56 PROBLEMS OF AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY Thoughts at the Foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro V. Kudryavtsev # I have attended all the All-African Peoples' Conferences (in Accra, Tunis and Cairo) and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conferences (in Cairo, Conakry and Moshi) held in Africa in recent years. The latest solidarity conference met., early in February at the foot of Mt. Kilimanjaro, in the Mawenzi School on the outskirts of Moshi in northern Tanganyika. As I sat in the hail of the School (named after Kilimanjaro's second tallest peak), I involuntarily compared all these forums. The importance of these meetings for the struggle of the African and Asian peoples can hardly be overestimated. At the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra, for example, one of the issues was whether the word "imperialism" should be mentioned in the resolutions. This time no delegate had the slightest doubt that imperialism is Enemy No. 1 of the peoples-of.both continents. The resolutions of the Moshi conference are sufficient to show how much'more politically mature the participants are., These conferences have rallied progressive public opinion in the African countries, mapped out common tasks in the national-liberation struggle, exposed, the latest, cunning methods of the colonialists and have clearly shown that American imperialism is the chief mainstay of colonialism. The Afro'-Asian forums have helped the African peoples. realise that they are not alone, that their fight is-part of the general struggle of progressive mankind against imperialism and its disgraceful system of colonialism, and that peoples fighting for their freedom and independence enjoy the support of the Soviet Union and all the other Socialist countries and of all progressive mankind. This has greatly increased the strength of the African freedom fighters and has inspired them to work even more persistently for the complete abolition of colonialism ontheir continent. And yet against the background of all these indisputable successes, there have been changes in'the atmosphere at these conferences. since the first one held in Cairo in 1957 and what is more, not all these changes have been for the better. A great number of national flags -- over 60 altogether -_ fluttered outside the school building. in Moshi; miniature national flags decorated the delegates' tables, many more than in the Cairo University Hall in 1957; and naturally the envoys of the Afro-Asian peoples were-given a hearty welcome by the host country. Nevertheless in Moshi I noticed many things which have changed over the last five years. To begin with, the familiar faces of many well-known leaders of the African peoples' struggle for national liberation were conspicuous by their absence. Many who hold governmental posts in the newly independent countries now attend inter-governmental meetings and not public.forums like the conference in Moshi. Others thought it necessary to stay away for reasons of inter-party rivalry or because of unwillingness to impair, now or perhaps in future, their relations with: the former metropolitan country by co-operating with "Communist" circles which, they claim, have initiated such conferences. To bring home this point I need only compare the list of those ex- pected at Moshi and those who actually came. For example, Dr. Hastings Banda, the national-liberation movement'leader who now heads the Govern- ment of Nyasaland, was invited but did not come. Judging by his quite, frank statements, narrow party considerations outweighed any. consideration of the need for solidarity in the struggle for Africa's freedom. Nor did I see any relegates from the Afro-Malagasy countries (formerly French colonies) with the exception of representatives of the Union of the Peoples Approv 1'e? " 9/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004QPYRGHT of Cameroon, the opposition party, and one delegate from the progressive organisations of Malagasy Republic. Former French Africa was virtually unrepresented at the Moshi conference owing to opposition from the Governments and ruling parties. This naturally has harmed the cause of solidarity and brought grist to the mill of the colonialists. These remarks do not only apply to existing independent states. As regards Kenya which is still fighting for independence and is certainly in need of solidarity, there were no representatives from the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU),'the rival of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) particularly on the question of the future constitution (whether Kenya. is to be a'federal or unitary state). The two parties are contesting which will be_in power after the proclamation of independence. Moreover, Ronald Ngala, leader of KADU, evidently prompted by purely party politics, persisted in slinging mud at the organisers of the Moshi conference, try- ing hard to represent it as a "Communist conspiracy". Friction between certain countries was. felt more keenly than before at the recent conference and on several occasions it nearly precipitated a crisis. I am not speaking of the Indochinese border conflict which some enemies of,Afro-Asian. solidarity strove to exploit for their own ends. A cloud was also cast by the conflict between Somalis and. Kenyans over the part'-6f Kenya in the north inhabited by:Somalis. The British colonialists, aware of the Kenyans' negative attitude to the possible secession of the northern territory, had arranged something in the nature of a referendum shortly before the Moshi conference which showed that Somalis favouredjoining the Somalia Republic. This added fuel to the flames, which was also apparent at the conference. There are a ,number of border disputes of this kind due to the arbitrary frontiers fixed by the colonialists at the Berlin Conference at the end of last century. The colonialists, directly or through their agents, keep rubbing salt into these unhealed wounds. The recent upsurge of extreme nationalist, feeling in different parts of Asia and Africa, particularly in the Middle East, laid its imprint on the Moshi conference. Some of the more chauvinistically-inclined leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement not against imperi- alism, colonialism and its agents, but against all white people. They are ready to sacrifice the truth, as they did, so far cautiously, in Moshi, and to shrug their shoulders at the participation (even though only partial) of international organisations such as the World Council of Peace, international women's and youth organisations, etc. They sacrifice the truth because they pretend that the liberation of Asia, -Africa and Latin America is possible even without the participation of progressive organisations throughout the world, without those white people who because of their views 'actively fight against imperialism and its colonial attributes. There are in fact people with short memories who want to forget that the liberation of Africa would have been inconceivable without the Great October Socialist Revolution, without. the existence of the power- ful Socialist community, without the defeat of fascism in the Second World War, without the selfless struggle of the progressive forces inside the imperialist countries. The danger of imparting to the solidarity movement some kind of a nationalistic slant exists, and this danger was evident at the Moshi conference. The main'thing that put me, a veteran of the Afro-Asian conferences, on guard was the relatively "good-natured" attitude of the imperialists to the proceedings at Moshi. I recalled the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra and the First Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo. There the imperialists, particularly the Americans, rushed into battle discarding almost all disguise. Things went to such lengths that Irving Brown, representative of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in Western Europe and Northern Africa, despite his official position, personally translated delegates' speeches from French into English and vice versa to give a favaoitrable tinge to some of the statements. In Accra the conference organisers (the official "host" on that occasion was the British Governor- General Lord Listowel, who opened this conference against imperialism:) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 CPYRGHT Approved For Lease 1999/08124: CIA-RDP78-061A000200020004-5 decorated the hall with the flags of all the United Nations members. Among them were the flags of the colonial Powers against which the cot:- ference was directed, and also of puppet regimes, like that of the Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan. Even in little things one saw that the colonialists were giving battle to the peoples of Africa and Asia at the solidarity conferences. Now, in 1963, they behaved very modestly, although the choice of Tanganyika as the conference site was very symbolic. After the First World War,, it was Tanganyika, wrested by the British from the Germans, that completed the solid British colonial chain from Cairo to Capetown. Now it was the place where debates were held on how to eliminate all forms of colonialism once and for all. There is no need to speak at length about the importance of such conferences. The struggle for the complete independence of Africa is far from over. The young independent states have not yet grown strong, while colonialism, enriched with the experience of recent years, has become more flexible and cunning. That is why the Afro-Asian peoples need solidarity now, like the air they breathe. While tremendous changes have occurred in Africa since the first soli- darity conferences and new trends and new conditions have arisen, the form of expressing solidarity through these conferences has remained unaltered. A certain discrepancy between form and content has appeared and was apparent at the latest conference. In 1957, when the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in Cairo, there were few independent states in Africa apart from the "old" ones, like Ethiopia and Liberia. The winning of independence and freedom was the main task confronting almost all the African countries. The national-liberation movements followed different political directions, but they were all brought together by one common objective -- the over- throw of the colonial regimes. If a delegation failed to attend the con- ference, the colonial authorities were to blame, and all the delegates vigorously denounced their action. At that time the conference was able to voice its unanimous opinion on all general issues, inasmuch as there were almost no specific questions. Today there are many independent states on the African continent. Many public and political organisations which a few years ago were lead- ing the fight for independence have become ruling parties. In some coun- tries opposition parties and organisations have appeared. At times it is opposition from the Left, the kind that seeks to push on the Govern- ment which wants to stop halfway and is inclined to find a common lan- guage with the former metropolitan country. There is opposition from the Right which thinks that the policy of the Government is too revolu- tionary. There are also countries with no opposition, since many young African states have introduced the one-party system. Whereas formerly it was clear who should take, part in solidarity conferences, it is now much harder to decide. If the ruling party is represented it is bound to inject an element of statehood, of international relations into the conference. A left opposition may attend which is denounced in its own country as "the agent of third states"; if the Right opposition attends, the question arises: is it worthwhile, from the standpoint of over-all African interests, to lend importance to this opposition by allowing it to participate in the conference? The participation of one or another delegation, especially against the wishes of the Government of the country concerned, may therefore do more harm than good to general African solidarity, viewed in the light of the common interests of completely abolishing colonialism. Inter-state relations and official foreign policy lines are in- creasingly having an effect on the proceedings of solidarity conferences. Member countries of the Afro-Malagasy Union, as I noted earlier, were absent at Moshi, and border issues are being brought up more and more often at such conferences. In these conditions conference recommendations impose few obligations and are not really binding on anyone. Nor is it clear who will carry them out. A Kenyan delegate, for example, told me that as soon as he returned home he would find the decisions of the Moshi conference relegated to the background by the struggle between KANU and KADU. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 A great many purely local, specific problems have arisen in each country, which all-African or Afro-Asian public conferences are unable to settle. Africa has today become a continent of independent states, while the general concept of "Africa" has been cast into political oblivion.. Therefore it would be appropriate, for example, to call a conference on the struggle against racialism in the South African Republic, in support of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique in their fight against Salazar Portugal, against the artificial federations created by the colonialists who want to an tribalism, etc. The first'undertaking of this kind is the recommendation of the Moshi conference to arrange an Afro-Asian con- ference on cultural questions. Other questions are increasingly being transferred to governmental meetings and conferences of African states where the struggle between different political trends and orientations is now being fought out. The imperialists and their agents have shifted their main attention to this field, having realised in time that governmental policy has now advanced to the fore and that this is where battle must be joined with the mounting national-liberation movement of the African peoples. What direction will governmental policy follow, i rhat paths of eco- nomic development will be taken, who will provide economic aid and on what terms? -- these and many other questions on which the future of African states depends, are now`being decided at governmental level. (In many African countries Governments are not formed by political parties, but themselves organise mass political parties in order to create a broad base for themselves.) While emphasis is correctly being laid on the struggle for economic independence, it would be premature for Africa to reduce everything to economic problems. A struggle is under way as to who will determine the direction of economic'aevelopmeAt (this'is clearly revealed by the internal,politi- cal struggle'in Senegal, Ghana and other African states).' On this question'too the imperialists naturally do not want to'yield to the African progressive forces which see the future of`Africa in Socialism. The struggle around these issues is no less bitter than it was in the period directly prior to the winning of political independence. There are the examples of 'the assassination of President.'Sylvanus Olympia, the numerous plots against President Kwame'Nkrumah;.the arrest of Mamadou Dia in Senegal, the anti-Communist terror in some Arab coun- tries, etc. The imperialists'do.not'neeessarily have to do this dirty work themselves since they have. agents . who were'carefully groomed and bred in the spirit of Western."civilisation" during colonial rule. These pro-colonialist' circles knocked together,the Afro-Malagasy Union, for example, which has'now._openly pitted'itself against African opinion, assembled in Moshi to demonstrate all-African solidarity rein- forced by solidarity with the peoples. of Asia and Latin America. This Union has been set up on the basis of the "French-speaking countries", former 'French colonies which?economically are still bound hand and foot to the metropolitan country. Within this bloc there is "solidarity" not in the struggle for the complete abolition of colonialism, but in preserving ties with France.. Such Afro-Malagasy solidarity is ' bf': most 'benefit to' (French ii eri- alism -- since it represents' amore flexible way of keeping former colonies in check by invisible reins and in this way strikes a blow at all-African solidarity. Bargaining is now going on over . the terms for binding the Afro- Malagasy Union to the European Common Market. France and her allies would also like to draw the former British colonies (Nigeria, Sierra Leone and perhaps some others') into this. net. Moreover, they make no secret of the fact that this is a struggle between imperialists for influence in Africa. This Is?the meaning and purpose o.' such an alliance as the Afro-Malagasy Union. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 CPYRGHT - Approved For Rase 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0 61A000200020004-5 Everything associated with colonialism has been implacably criticised and condemned at the solidarity conferences, but usually nothing has been said about colonialism's African agents for fear that this could harm African solidarity. In the present conditions, however, this "silence" unwittingly screens or even exonerates the actions of those African leaders who,.together with the colonialists, are blocking the rca d of the African peoples to genuine independence. When the call of Soviet fishing boats at a'southern Madagascar port for fresh water, a normal thing under maritime law, is used by Philibert Tsiranana, President of the Malagasy Republic, as a pretext to urge France and other NATO Powers virtually to occupy Madagascar by naval and air forces of this bloc to protect the island from a mythical "Communist menace", he inflicts on.the African people no-less, and perhaps greater, harm than the colonialists themselves. The French colonialists will calmly exploit Tsiranana's request to spread nee-colonialist propaganda about the equal relations France has supposedly established with her former colonies. We could also refer to the pro-colonialist policy pursued by Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast Republic, and some other leaders of former French colonies. All these matters however are bound up with the general question of foreign policy orientation, and the policy of economic attachment toihe former metropolitan country. But there are dangerous symptoms of another kind. They are to be found in the sphere, of internal politics in countries where power has been taken over by men brought up in the spirit of Western "civilisation", and not by patriots ready to make any sacrifice for the future of their people. We could refer, for example, to the artificial expansion of the adminis- trative apparatus in Nigeria with the direct co-operation of the coloni- alists who themselves drew up the country's constitution even prior to the proclamation of` independence. This was done in keeping with the old policy of "divide and rule" and for the personal enrichment of a definite group at the expense of the national budget. The American.FOreign Affairs has counted up that Nigeria has one Governor-General, three Governors, one Federal Prime Minister and regional Prime Ministers, over 100 ministers and almost as many deputy-ministers, and a large number of members of the eight Federal and regional Legisla- tive Assemblies. The result is that;Nigeria, with a smaller population than Britain, pays four times as'much for the . maintenance of the country's administrative machine. Is not this too much for a young country badly in need. of funds for building up an,.independent economy? The country i also..hand in yet'another.way: a stratum 'of government officialis, 'divorced from-the:people'and brought up in the old spirit of the colonial administration, is?created;'it is not particularly interested in innova- tions nor is it prepared to make. any sacrifices for the good of the state. We could, here refer to the authoritative opinion of David Dacko, President of the?CentralAfrican Republic,(the former French colony of Ubangi-Shari, which wasvery backward economically). 'Addressing.the National Assert ly last year, he spoke anxiously about thy: conduct of the administration set up after the ; winning~of 'independence., The President said that. there was inter-trjbai rivalry for jobs and posts in the ministries and departments, which natLrally was undermining the unity of the people in face of yesterday's colonialists. Noting that the people believed in the new administration, the President asked: "But do we'not live'today in the most beautiful villa's, drive around in luxurious cars ani eat regu- larly every day? Aren't we, the e3.ite, responsible for the disorders and the extinetion- of'the people,. ,for not solving the problems which doom them. to. poverty?." President Dacko quoted a deputy'-who said that in some respects-the African elite was even more dangerous for the country's future than colonialism. "We must not forget that it'will be against us that the masses will rise up if we do not remedy the situation in good time," the President declared in conclusion. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 How serious this question is can also be judged from the very strict measures taken by President Kwame Nkrumah against ministers of his Govern- ment who sought to enrich themselves. He rightly branded their acts as a plot against the republic's national independence. It is important to realise that the proclamation of independence of the African states owing to the abolition there of the political and economic monopoly of a colonial Power has opened up their borders to other Powers who seek to gain influence there. American, West German and Japanese monopolies have swarmed into the former French and British colonies in Africa. They would all like to give them "aid", knowing in advance that a good deal of it would go on bribing government officials or for administrative purposes, and not on economic development. Politi- cally they make use of this "aid" to foster a feeling of dependence among the leaders of the young states. At the same time their propaganda seeks to convince the Africans that most of the new countries are unable to develop their economy and culture with their own resources and are fully dependent on foreign Powers. U.S. "aid' in the form of surplus agricultural commodities has a particularly demoralising influence. American propaganda centres (which receive for thier upkeep 20 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of the delivered agricultural commodities) tell the Africans that the assistance given by the Socialist countries in building dams, power sta- tions and heavy industry plants will make itself felt only in many years' time, while the United States, you see, is even now "saving" the people from starvation and poverty. This type of propaganda does influence some people. Some leaders of the newly independent states like to be in the position of a beautiful young girl who has many "suitors" and expects to get something from every one of them. The attitude of these African leaders who want to "keep their suitors on a string" is to the economic, and also political advantage of the monopolies both of the former metropolitan country and capitalist states which have never had any colonies in Africa. There is a great desire for Socialism among the African peoples who have tasted all the "blessings" of capitalism under colonial rule. Aware of this, imperialist propagandists are losing all hope of discrediting the experience of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries among wide sections of the people (I am not speaking of the narrow stratum of administrative personnel and'perhaps intellectuals brought up under the colonial regime and convinced of the superiority of Western civilisation). The colon'ialists.have therefore invented a new ruse, picturing the Soviet Union as after the same objectives in Africa as the United States and the other Powers which want'-to get a firm. grip on the African continent and its natural wealth. After.this kind of:spaaeiior?,. the monopoly propagandists find it easier'to.'declare that local progressive organisations, including Communist, are "agents of Moscow" bent on tying Africa to the Soviet chariot. Choose who gives you better service'today, American propagan- dists tell the African peoples. They lay stress not on future develop- ment, but on current exigencies which make it easier to influence a country by a showy display of economic "aid".''They want to substitute high-pressure salesmanship for the real issue it the competition between the two systems, which is most directly. linked with the question of the African countries' future development. -. It is a pity that this propaganda leads some African political leaders away from the right road. Personally I am not surprised-at the appearance of many theories of "African Socialism". First, this reflects the tremendous striving of the African peoples for Socialism and, second, it shocrs that the African countries arr increasingly turning from an object of history into a subject, a fact which is exerting ever greater influence on the development of mankind. Psychologically, it is understandable why so. many African leaders want to put forward their awn theory of their country's development along Socialist lines. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Iwo, The Senegalese journal LtUnite Africaine has written: "Africa must no longer allow others to do its thinking for it. It must no longer be satisfied with ready-made patterns, obsolescent schemes, imported doctrines and ideologies." For many years the colonialist concept of the world was indeed dinned into the heads of the Africans. After liberation colonial ideological chauvinism almost inevitably aroused a reaction in the form of ideological nationalism, which tries to limit human experience to the African continent (African originality) and temporarily refuses to see the tried and tested experience of all mankind. A few words should be said about the latest theories of international relations circulating in Africa, which, I an deeply convinced, are a product ndt of African "originality", but of the subtle, corrupting propaganda of the neocolonialists. An article by President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, one of the ing leaders of the new Africa, was published in the Tunisian weekly P=rigue at the end of last year. The main theses of this article, only in more concise form, were outlined in his speech which'I heard at the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi. President Nyerere holds that "a second invasion of Africa" is now taking place, which is more dangerous than the first invasion by the colonialists. The difference in these invasions, in hisgopinionm is that during the first invasion the foreign Powers disunited the African peoples by inciting some tribes against others, while now they are inciting not tribes, but entire coun- tries, because the political geography of Africa has changed so greatly in the meantime. Who, in Nyerere's opinion, is engaged in the "second invasion of Africa"? He draws an equation sign between the rich capitalist states and, what he calls, the rich Socialist countries, because both, he asserts, are using their wealth not to wipe out poverty but to."gain might and prestige' Although President Nyerere mentions neither the United States nor the Soviet Union by name, it is clear to all whom he means. He con- cludes that the principal task of the poor (read, African) countries is "vigilantly to watch that neither some nor other of the rich countries utilise them as their tool", and to create the unity of the African peoples under the banner of pan-Africanism. I want to repeat that after my many visits to Africa, I an not sur- prised that there is some mistrust of the Great Powers and, frankly speaking, of all whites in general. These sentiments were fed by colonialism and it would be ridiculous to think that they could be eradicated. in two or three years. The leaders of the African states might, however, be expected to be more wary of neo-colonialist bait dangling from rusty colonial hooks. They ought to realise that today when the correlation of forces in the world has changed in favour of Socialism.and when the formerly oppressed peoples want to follow the Socialist road, imperialist propaganda is-eager to claim that the Socialist countires are as self-seeking as the capitalist Powers. Moreover, the imperialists rely on their extensive colonialist experience and on another advantage (temporary and overrated), namely, that many of the present leading people in Africa have been educated in the spirit of Western "civilisation" and are infected with capitalist ideology. To draw a sign of equation between the capitalist and the Socialist countries means a failure to see that the abolition of colonialism and the rise of the many independent states in Africa is extremely closely bound up with the existence of the powerful Socialist community; to see that the Soviet Union uses its wealth not to "gain might and prestige", not to subjugate other countries, as Mr. Nyerere infers, but to abolish poverty the world over, Africa included. Only. Soviet people as Marxists hold that this cannot be achieved by a redistribution.of existing wealth among consumers. They think that the less developed countries must be given real assistance in building up their independent economy. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0002000T Theories, like the ones we heard in Moshi, cannot be regarded as being to the credit of African nationalism about which the inve...tors of these theories are so concerned. Speaking of these theories, N. S. Khrushchov said at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany that "this confused thinking pollutes the minds of the 1-berated peoples and makes it easier for the colonialists to preserve their posi- tions in the young independent countries".. What kind of African nationa- lism is this if. the harvest of these theories is reaped by the colonialists, the sworn enemies of any sign of African nationalism or originality (who if not the colonialists has falsified the history of the African peoples, asserting that they had neither a culture nor even a history to speak of!). These countries, as I said earlier, have ceased to be an object of history. They now have their own interests. Naturally many elements in these countries are still bound, as though by an umbilical cord, to the colonialist Powers and are economically dependent on the big monopolies. These elements act as vehicles of imperialist influence. At the present moment, however, nationalism can play an.independent role in international. affairs, moreover, a role which is often at.,variance frith the interests of the imperialist Powers.,- . All these are temporary phenomena and. eventuel,.ly each country will have to choose one or another road of development, ,, the more so since there is no "third road", much as it maybe desired . by the advocates of "originality". History. is implacable and does not forgive confused. thinking even iftsprings from, the best..of intentions. . There are.still many. .dif'ficult~es ,facing. the. African peoples. What is most punt them. is' unity, ,and ,it ts to. develop and streng- then this unity that the solidarity movement was created and Afro-Asian solidarity conferences are held. The biggest enemy of this unity is Americar}, imperialism which now in fact. heads all the colonial Powers. U.S. imperialism employs every ruse and artifice to.break up the unity of the African peoples. It does not necessarily do it itself, but often resorts to the services of Afri.Can leaders who are closely associated with the colonialists and are,prepared:to make any . compromise. at the expense of the people. The American imperialists and their'neo-colonialist colleagues do not economic pressure alongside hypocritical "philanthropy" and "aid", diplomatic talks combined with terror and assas- sination of outstanding African fighters for freedom, ideological sub- version together with provocat .ols.,;.bla,ckmaii and lying propaganda.; The peoples of.Africa have to exercise ' the .greatest vigilance, they.must. learn. tp differentiate. .between . friends ' and enemies and to match shoulder to shoulder towards their cherished goal -- the complete emancipation of the African continent from colonialism. To repulse neo- .,colonialism the African peoples mist.streugthen to,the utmost their. unity and their solidarity with all.,progressive forces of the world... Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For ReleasepM /M A-0,15~W-03061A000200020004-5 . Chios in Castrots Cub< Edward Behr, former Reuter correspondent and a Saturday Evening Post editor, wrote in the C June 1963 issue oche Post, n the above title: "The Cuban revolution has failed. Four years after Fidel Castro's take-over, this once prosperous Caribbean island is in an inextricable mess. Its agriculture and industry are nearing collapse. Under Castro's Communist-dominated regime, a para- lyzing bureaucracy is wasting badly needed Soviet aid. In short there is a tremendous -- indeed comical -- discrepancy between the image projected by Cubats propaganda machine and the reality of Cuba today. "I recently spent three weeks in Cuba. . . ?. I worked on a sugar plantation as a volunteer machetero. I talked to scores of Cubans, both high and low. . . . I talked to em- bittered Soviet-bloc technicians. In the company of a polish engineer, I went on a tour of Havana's houses of ill fame, which Cuban officials say no longer exist, ending up in a brothel catering specially to Russian soliders. . . I came away with facts which contradict some rosy, recent reports. "Despite Soviet arms, promises and investments, however, I found in Cuba only one flourishing industry -- the creation of Communist propaganda designed to bide the differences be- tween the Cuban image and the truth . . . . everything is crumbling at the edges. Nothing works any more. Nothing can be replaced if it goes wrong. . . . Today cars in various states of disrepair litter the streets . . . they story of Cuba's once-prosperous agriculture and its budding industry is a story of almost fatal failure. 'It will take five years,' a Russian economist working in Cuba said, 'just to consolidate the country.' Sugar Production Lags "What has happened to Cuba's sugar industry, once the most efficient in the world? Absenteeism on a large scale . . . valuable sugarcane fields were uprooted . . . enthusiasm is waning . . most of the Soviet-made mechanical cane cutters have broken down . . . bureaucracy and idleness. . . "And the Japanese embassy is still chortling over the case of the Japanese watermelon farmer, long settled in Cuba, who produced 130 tons of watermelons on his 10-acre farm; the people's farm next door, which had planted watermelons over 130 acres, produced 10 tons. "Cuba's estimated 10,000 Soviet-bloc technicians include burly women cotton pickers from Uzber:istan, chemical engineers from Poland, police and army officers from East Germany, teachers and doctors from Czechoslovakia as well as Russians in almost every walk of life. . . . they are appalled by the confusion and waste. 'Guess what happened today?' said one. May ordered 130,000 hospital thermos ters. They showed up today. They are weather thermo;eters, for God's sake.'' I'lThey want me to plant a million oil-palm seedlings in eight days,' a French agricultural expert complained. 'They don't even want to know where. . .? "'How can I work under such conditions?' says a Pole, Communist "Gains" "What gains Communism brings to such people is open to some quebtion. One employee in the Education Ministry told me how she watched a schoolteacher write a sentence on a blackboard for the class to copy.. 'Every word contained a spelling mistake, including the word 'school'.' Standards have plummeted even further in the universities. "A Polish lecturer at Havana University explains: 'These people want a formula for everything . . . they no longer think for themselves . . .' Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For Releelse 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03QAA000200020004-5 THE RED DICTIONARY: IMPERIALISM, COLONY, COLON I. ,&A IMPERIALISM: "A State policy which leads to the annexation of terr, or en's-'and the national oppression of occupied countries." Lenin in "Imperialism-the Highest Stage of Capitalism." a predatory foreign policy." -- Eshakov, Standard Dictionary ,of the Russian Language. ". . . . an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry . . . for the conquest of territory . . . to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony." -- Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V. COLONY: "An industrially backward country which has com- pletely-" Lost independent sovereignty, politically, economically and culturally and is under the domination, suppression and exploitation of imperialist countries. These countries supply raw material to imperialist countries and the imperialists market commodities in the colonial areas. Large investments are made by the imperialists to take over control of the colonial areas. "Semi-colonial countries appear on the surface to have independence and sovereignty but actually are manipulated politically, economically, and culturally by imperialists." -- Dictionary of New Terms, Shanghai, 1952. COLONIALISM: "The colonizers . . < bribe people who have Power, ins a-'[. T"''good governments' and set up aggressive blocs They allot fonds for 'economic aids;' they give armaments to certain countries 'free of charge.' But in return the states which receive these arms must supply the colonizers with cannon fodder, set up big armies and thereby exhaust their peoples. The colonizers give a dollar in 'aid' in order to receive ten dollars later in return by exploiting the peoples who have accepted such 'aid.' After this, they enslave the peoples politically. Such are the 'new' forms of colonial domination." -- Khrushchev, Pravda, 30 Dec. 1955. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 g y wai ins, their turn while the Cuban girls argued interminably with a couple of Cuban militiamen who wanted to close the place down for the night. Lost year.. I was told, business was far more brisk. "Even before last October's crisis, the Russians were not popular in Cuba, either with the Cubans or the other East Europeans. 'They live apart from the rest of us,' says a Polish factory manager. . . . They suffer, too, from two major draw- backs. They are utterly unused to giving, and -- in a country where 60 percent of the population is colored or of mixed blood -- they are profoundly racist. "So far the revolution has meant a steady deterioration in living standards. . . It is, to the Russians, a costly white elephant. It has yet to demonstrate that Communism brings anything but hardships, muddle, and economic regression. It is producing nothing but millions of half-baked Communists, so crudely untutored that they are, in the words of a Communist- bloc adviser, 'unfit for export."" Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 CPYRGHT Approved For Rase 19.99/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03 1A000200020004-5 Cuba's Most Vocal Critics: Soviet Bloc Technicians THE non Sunday Times, 26 May 1963: "It is significant that the most vocal critics of Castro today are to be found, not among the cautious, resigned remnants of Cuba's middle class, but among the Soviet bloc technicians there. As efficient technocrats and specialists in their various fields, they know a country in a mess when they see one. "Today most Cubans see . . . the gradual breakdown of trans- port, the impossibility of getting the smallest and simplest spare parts. . . . 'Cuba has a flavour all its own'. . . . As anyone arriving in Havana soon finds out, the flavour is one of rotting garbage, over-powering Russian petrol fumes and exposure, 24-hours a day, to Cuba's sole really flourishing industry: its Communist propaganda . . . Shops are dispiritingly bare . . . All but the topmost Cuban officials are dogmatic. Communists- come-lately whose keenness is equalled only by their ignorance of the outside world. . . "Cuban officials agree that the next five years will be a transition period. During this time, presumably, the remain- ing American-made cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, factory machines, buses and lorries will have brok9n down. A third of Cuba's buses has already bson in mobilised owing to a shortage of spare parts. Cars in various slates of decay litter the sides of roads. Water ouppli,es in Cuba are subject to the vagaries of American-made pumps which are beyond the ingenuity of even the most skilled Cuban mechanic. Teiephonos are breaking down. And, oriinou ly, there are no signs that t. e Soviet bloc can come to the re cue by yuppLying either spare parts or comparable goods. -a:i -11_1rtg E-22 'homy "Cuban officials admit that the revolution has ?",ed to a deterioration of livirY sta,ndarcas . . . Cubans dismiss the shortages of con;eumer goods with the answer that, productive investments come first. But, as the Soviet bloc techsaicians are quick to point out, both Castro's agricultural and industrial development programmes have gone seriously wrong. . . . Nowhere is failure more visible than in the field which matters most to Cuba's economy: sugar production. Until 1961, production oscillated between 5.5 and 6,5 million tons. This year, the harvest will be around 3 million tons. . . . Absenteeism, combined with a daily minimum wage regardless of work actually done, plus a heavy drift to the towns, to the army and to the softer 'people's farms' explains the light of the sugar industry The 'penrole's farm,' are plRgued with bureaucracy. . . Absenteeism is high /in industry7 and the Czech::a, Poles and East Germans who run most of Cuba's TEcotories today are driven to desperation by the Cubans' lackadaisical ways. . . . Cubans tend to look down their no ;o, at Soviet products, and Rumanian tele- phones have x t ly been s n lod out f:r so=)cia1 deri ivn. The Russian tractors, adap -ed in Cuba to work as cane-cutters, have been an almost total failure. `v . . . thero is a deep-seated difference between Castro and Khrushchev on the ways and means of spreading the Cuban example ? ? ? . he /'astro7 is in favour of 'direct action' by armed re'-dels, exploiting peasant discontent with the backing of 'liberals' who can be eliminated later . . . The last thing Khrushchev wants is the massive export to the rest of Latin America of half-baked Communists 'suitable,' as one Eastern European in Cuba put it, 'only for home consumption.' This, and not aid . . . has been the main topic of discussion between Castro and Khrushchev this month, Despite newly found cordiality between Khrushchev and Castro, there is a feeling in Cuba, that Khrushchev is not entirely displeased with the American cordon sanitaire which cuts off Cuba from the rest of the world except or air and sea communi- cations controlled from Moscow." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 CPYRGHT Approv t~ Ofir David Rousset, writing in the Italian-language monthly, Corrispondenze Socialista (Socialist Correspondence), Rome, 1arc , reports "The first thing I was struck by in Cuba was the deterio- ration of the cities and the disaffection of the Cubans toward Castroism. . . Today the cities are falling apart and the farm youths are Invading them. . Gradually paralysis spreads over the cities. It threatens industry. It beats against the plan- tations. . . . The technical substructure established by the Americans in Cuba is gradually coming apart. From factories to light switches -- everything in Cuba Is American. "Thus the Cuban can make a very instructive comparison every day: a comparison between the quality of the American products and the quality of the Russian products. This, at the same time, only increases his imagination and his discontent. . . . As far as the Cuban city dweller is concerned, there is no longer any doubt but that people in the United States live better than in the USSR. "The technical deterioration goes hand-in-hand with the scarcity in consumer products and the almost vertical drop in the quality of consumer articles. , . . Within a span of 2 months, all prices rose between 100 and 200 per cent. . . . Rationing has caused a tremendous price rise . . . today the ration card dominates the country. . . the people in general are expecting the situation to become worse and worse. "The cities have become hostile . . . they are at the point of breaking with the leaders of the revolution . . . about 50 per cent of the medical profession fled from the island and the figure would be 100 per cent included the surgeons. and specialists. . . . Practically all the-administrators, tech- nicians, farm managers, engineers, and a very large percentage of skilled workers have left Cuba.. This vast exodus has created a vacuum that cannot be filled. . . . The foreign experts, most of whom know very little Spanish and are ignorant of the local traditions, remain an. alien body." CPYRGHT Cuba's Standard of Living Higher than USSR Guillermo Martinez Marquez, reported in the Spanish-language newspaper, La Esfera (The Sphere), Caracas, Venezuela, 18 April 1963: ~-- -- -.___ e Russian technicians, who actually disembarked to dis- mantle some industries installed in Cuba and unknown in Russia, have the mission of industralizing the country. The reality of the most recent statistics proves that in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, Cuba has more rooms, more hospital beds, more schools, more newspapers, more automobiles, more highways, more. televisions, more radio receivers, more movie houses, more tele- phones, better doctors, better food, less illiteracy, and a higher standard of living than the Russians. Faced with the axiom that one cannot give what he does not have, Marxist dialectics has succeeded in convincing some ingenues that Communism is going to give Cuba what it had not been able to give the Russians In the 45 years since the so-called revolution of October 1917." Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5 Approved For F -lease 1999/08/24: CLA-RDP78-( p61A000200020004-5 USSR MW CUBA: A STATISTICAL COMPARISON The Soviet Union is a socialist country, Cuba is striving to emulate the Soviet example and to be called a "socialist" state -also. How far does Cuba have to go? As an example, selected items from the Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations for 1961 and from the Soviet statistical handbook, Narodnoye osyays ov SS.SR, for 1956 and 1959, offer a base for comparison. Housin : In 1953, 6 million Cubans lived in 7.9 million rooms. Housing: that these rooms were small, say, 6 square meters, each Cuban had 7.9 square meters of housing space. In 1955, the average Russ an had square meters of housing space. Meat: In 1948/49, the average Cuban ate twice as much meat as the average Russian did in 1959. Cars: In 1958, the Cubans had 8 times as many passenger automobiles as an equal number of Russians ii1959. TV Sets: In 1960, Cubans had 4 times as many television receiving sets as equal number of Rus ans n 1960. Summary: For Cuba to "achieve" socialism, therefore, the Castro reg e must destroy about 140,000 cars, 400,000 TV sets and several hundred thousand houses and eat less. The latest reports from Havana indicate that considerable progress is being made on Cuba's road to socialism. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020004-5