BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 29, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Briefly Noted
Indonesia Reverts to "Confrontation" on Malaysia
Indonesian President Sukarno's 10 July statement heralded a
return to his "confrontation" policy on the formation of the Fed-
eration of Malaysia, which is due to become formal on 31 August.
It was widely assumed that his renunciation of that policy after
the Manila foreign ministers' conference was only a tactical
maneuver and that he would continue covert action to cause the
Federation's downfall if he could not prevent a s formation.
Sukarno's real objection is that he sees the proposed federation
as an obstacle to his own expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia.
In what appears to be a deliberate misunderstanding of. the position
agreed to in Manila by the Malayan, Indonesian and Philippine
foreign ministers, Sukarno claims that the signing of the Malaysian
agreement in London violated Malaya's pledge not to take further
steps without prior consultation. After a series of conflicting
reports as to his attendance, Sukarno went to the 30 July "summit"
meeting in Manila with Rahman and Macapagal. His main tactic pre-
sumably will be to continue to harp on the Borneo-referendum issue
and to plug for a longer-range confederation of the area to in-
clude Indonesia.
US policy is to support, with some qualifications, the forma-
tion of Malaysia as an expression of the will of the Malayan,
Singapore and Borneo peoples for voluntary association into a unit
that best corresponds to the legitimate self interests of inde-
pendent countries., Where appropriate, we preempt Indonesian and
Communist efforts to stigmatize the federation as "neo-colonialist"
and as a means for continuing Western influence. We point out
that a common and more dangerous enemy -- Communist China -- is
lurking in the background ready to take advantage of any confusion
or ill-will that is brought about by prolonged disputes over the
Jorm that Malaysia should take or over the ultimate disposition of
the British Borneo territories.
We also mention that Sukarno is using this issue to distract
the attention of his own people from the serious internal short-
comings of his own regime, particularly economic and social stag-
nation. We further mention that when Sukarno finds himself com-
pelled to think about popular referendums, he should confine him-
self first to West New Guinea, where he is showing signs of
reneging on his commitment to allow the inhabitants there to
determine whether they prefer to sever their ties with Indonesia
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(Briefly Noted Cont.) 29 July 1963
DA ES OF PROPAGANDA INT11113ST
20 Aug Leon Trotsky assassinated in Mexico City, 1943.
24 Aug, Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact signed, 1939.
24 Aug North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) entered into force,
1949.
31 Aup- Feb. of Malaysia due to come into being.
1 Sept
7 Sept
Sept
12 Sept
15 Sept
WW II starts, 1939. Stalin sympathizes with Hitler
by attacking West warmongers.
Khrushchev appointed First Secretary, CPSU, 1953
(tenth anniversary).
Red China's troops entered Lhasa, Tibet, 1951.
(Chi coax announcement cane 14 Sept.)
Inter-Parliamentary Union conference to be held
Belgrade, 12-13 Sept.
Soviet Union signed Friendship and Mutual Assist-
ance and Collaboration treaties with Bulgaria,
Rumania and Hungary, pledging not to change their
social or economic systems, .
17 Sept Soviet Union invades Eastern Poland and divides
country with Nazi Germany, 1939.
17 Sept International Committee for Cooperation of Journal-
ists (ICCJ) Conference scheduled on board Soviet
ship in the Mediterranean, Sept. 17 - c .
19 Sept Starts Week of International Struggle Against
Fascism and War (Communist).
21 Sept People's Republic of China proclaimed, 1949.
26 Sept First International founded London, 1834 (disinte-
grates by 1372).
29 Sept International Union of Architects (UIA), seventh
Congress, -tavana, Cuba, 29 Sept. - 3 Oct. to be
followed by UIA General Assembly and International
Symposium on Architecture, Mexico City, 6-15 Oct.
2
(Briefly Noted)
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PROPAGANDIST'S GU ICJ TO COMMUNIST D IS S NS IONS
#S
Commentary
9-22 July 1963
Principal Developments:
1. The CPSU--CCP party talks continued in complete secrecy
frorn July 5 to 20, -- with a day of recess following each session,
presumably to permit the Chinese to consult with Peking. The
CPSU Presidium, headed by I.hrushchev, entertained the delegates
at a banquet "in a friendly atmosphere" on the 20th. A brief
joint communique was issued on the 21st: it stated only that both
sides had set forth their views and agreed, on the initiative
of the Chinese, to adjourn until some time later, the place and
time to be agreed on through consultations. Mao himself, in one
of his increasingly rare public appearances, headed the
"tremendous welcome" to the Chinese delegates in ;Peking.
2. In sharp contrast to this ostensibly friendly stalemate
in forsial relations between the principal adversaries, political
propaganda warfare raged throughout the Communist world with
increased acrimony and hostility. The USSR and China were
increasingly treating each other as outright enemies in a series
of sharp pronouncements, featured by a hard-hitting, 22,300-word
CPSU "open letter" of 14 July in response to the CCP letter of
14 June. On the Chinese side, a Peking rally of 10,000 welcoming
their delegates back from their unsuccessful challenge to Soviet
domination of the Woaen's Congress in Moscow heard the delegation
praised for the struggle it waged "against the enemy."
3. The publication by the CPSU of their 14 July letter
(together with -- at last -- the 14 June CCP letter to which
it responded) was the signal for a wave of attacks on the Chinese
positions by the Soviet European satellites, which published
both documents with editorials and statements supporting the
CPSU and condemning the CCP.
4. The Rumanians, however, further demonstrated their
independence by publishing both letters but refraining from
comment; boss Gheorgiu-Dej agreed to participate in the Moscow
CIMA meeting mentioned below, but the Rumanian CP publicly
condemned CEMA policy toward Rumania through an authoritative
spokesman to a Western correspondent. Balancing this, the
party published two pamphlets in support of peaceful coexistence
and disarmawient.
5. The Chinese were not noticeably shaken by the new
Soviet-led European offensive, reacting immediately to the CPSU
letter in a rather condescending manner, forecasting a massive
counter-attack in good time. ~C
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(#9 Commentary Cont.) 29 July 1963
6. The Czech Government also "transferred the ideological
dispute to the sphere of state relations" by demanding on 3 July
the recall by China of 3 NCNA correspondents,accredited to
i?rague, for illegal and harmful distribution of Chinese polemics,
thus following the lead of the Soviet recall order of 27 June.
The Chinese strongly protested this "serious incident, under-
minin the unity between the Chinese and Czechoslovak peoples
and aggravating Sino-Czech relations."
7. The increased temper and scale of the warfare between
parties in recent weeks has further intensified dissension
within parties and front organizations throughout the world.
3. The visit of Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak with
Xhrushchev in Kiev and the auspicious convening of the three-
power test-ban talks in Moscow while the CPSU-CC? talks were
in progress were non-Communist activities which infuriated the
Chinese and were shrilly denounced by them, Khrushchev's
announcement of his planned August visit to Yugoslavia was also
a direct affront to Peking.
0. A Soviet plane crash in IrkutsLL on 13 July killed the Al-
banian Ambassador to Pelting and six other Albanians, plus a CPR
official from their Afghanistan Embassy ano two Cninese couriers.
Significance:
"U n i t y" is such a dominating concept throughout the
history of all Communist (and socialist) Movements, that the CC?
and CPSU, despite the rapid deterioration of their relations
and the increasingly open and spiteful hostility between theta
and their followers, still managed to avoid the onus of an
open break and "saved face" by the transparent device of
"adjourning" the Moscow talks for an indefinite period, subject
to uncertain future agreements between the two Central Committees.
The 14 July CPSU open letter has ushered in a dew phase of
the conflict. It is the first really hard-hitting, counter-
it-tacking ?PSU document, presumably indicative of the fact that
the Soviet leadership stung to the quick by the overweening
arrogance and poisonous enmity of the CCi? attacks -- has decided
that any hope for a cessation of public polemics was dead and that
the time for counter-attack had come. Moreover, it largely abandons
the sterile attempt to answer Peking's casuistry by s h i f t i n g
the debate from the scholastic refinements of Marxist-Leninist
exegesis to a rather forceful exposition of the real issues of
strategy and power po cs at s a e, accusing e y trans-
parent insinuation) of
attempts to provoke nuclear war between the
Soviet Union and the US$
promoting racial conflict instead of class
strug le, tr ing to turn the non-white races
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(#8 Commentary Cont.)
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failure to solve the problems of building
communism in China,
unwarranted interference in internal affairs
of the Soviet Union (aggravated by inability to
25X1C1Ob understand those affairs), and so forth.
/Mote: The French and Spanish
translations of the CPSU 14 July
letter will be attached to the next
BPG issue?
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#8 9-22 July 1963
July99 - Pravda carried a 700-word CPSU statement which denounced
tie'7Julyira.'lly in Peking applauding the five Chinese expelled
from the USSR for "illegal" dissemination of the 14 June CCP
letter: It "cannot be assessed as other than a desire /a delib-
erate campaign7 to kindle in the fraternal Chinese people senti-
ments and moons unfriendly to the Soviet Union, to aggravate the
situation in the course of the negotiations .... disregarding the
dangerous consequences of this policy."
July 99 and 16 - The Yugoslav agency Tanyug reported from Bucharest
the publication of two Rumanian booklets supporting Soviet foreign
policy lines. The first, on 9 July, entitled Peaceful Coexistent
contains "an objective criticism of dogmatic tendenc? es in the
international workers movement," and "speaks of the absurdity of
the theory of the export of revolution and defends current
principles that peaceful coexistence and disarmament facilitate
the national liberation process. The secon , on t He 16t , is
devoted to the Moscow tripartite test-ban negotiations "unequivo-
cally underlining Rumania's dedication to the idea of general
disarmament" and "welcomes and defends Soviet initiatives" in
nuclear test ban negotiations.
July 10 - All Peking papers gave front-page prominence to a 1200-
word 10 July CCP statement in reply to the 9 July CPSU statement
described above, and print the latter at the bottom. The Chinese
complain that the CPSU accusation "is totally unjustified," and
ask if it is not "in itself a slander against the CCP to refuse
to let people know what our letter of reply actually said, while
at the same time profusely attacking the letter as a 'slander'
against the CPSU and raising a colossal uproar?" Noting that the
CPSU has not only extended ideological differences to the sphere
of state relations but "is also whipping up a campaign against
the CCP all over the Soviet Union," the Chinese ask "how far are
the comrades of the CPSU prepared to extend the Sino 'Soviet cam-
erences The Chinese press also printed an NCNA Moscow spatch
reporting "the campaign whipped up by the CC/CPSU through meetings
and resolutions of Soviet party organizations at various levels,"
and another dispatch rounding up the editorials of principal
Soviet papers attacking the CCP.
Jul 10 - Both the Chinese and the Albanians used the occasion of
Albanian Army Day to emphasize their ideological solidarity
against the modern revisionists.
July 10 - A Hungarian Party and Government delegation headed by
Kadar arrived in Moscow for a visit which observers saw timed to
demonstrate East European solidarity with the CPSU and USSR.
Kadar warmly greeted by Khrushchev, in contrast to his ignoring
the Chinese delegation.
July 11 - The second anniversary of the Chinese-N.Zorean friend-
ship treaty was used to emphasize their ideological solidarity
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part i ~~pa a in a m ss meeting in a ,
chairman of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Confer-
included in his speech the charge that: "certain self-
styled Marxist-Leninists have applauded Kennedy's so-called peace
strategy and are trying their best to prettify US imperialism and
its ringleader, Kennedy. They are deliberately deceiving the
people to serve the needs of US imperialist schemes of aggression."
July 13 - The first public mention by either side that party taIRF
are a ng held in Moscow came in a 2200-word Peoples' Daily edito-
rial which acknowledged "a number of importance" ferences....
serious in nature," and complained that "to describe them as beini?
between the CCP on one hand and the whole international Communist
moves .ent on the other is not in accord with the facts and not
helpful to the elimination of the eences."' De : ite the
"distressing" Soviet actions on the eve of the talks, the Chinese
"refrained from taking measures corresponding" and sent their
delegation to the talks. "But we now have to point out with heavy
hearts that events have gone contrary to our hopes." Seeing the
Soviet actions, "people are fully justified in worrying whether
the CC/CPSU wants to push Sino-Soviet relations to the brink of
and s r:ossib e o
rupture.... Ideas cannot be blockaded
resolve ideological differences by dictates or commands....
There were many people who committed such follies in the past,
and they all failed." But the differences will be resolved, they
say, "if one really treats the other as an equal instead of trying
to impose on him. If the differences cannot be resolved today,
they can wait until tomorrow. If they cannot be resolved this
year, they can wait until next year."
July 14 - Peoples' Daily carried an "Observer" article complaining
rly about forts to "woo the Soviet Union to oppose
China, and to pctson Sino-Soviet rela ons. a article accuses
"US imperialism" of "deliberately misrepresenting the revolution-
ary viewpoints of the CCP, alleging that China 'stands opposed to
peaceful coexistence,' 'is warlike,' and 'advocates the export of
revolution,t" (but this is exactly what is done by the CPSU in
their letter published simultaneously, -- see below).
July 14 - A brief Tokyo Mainichi article on Japanese Foreign Office.
scrutiny of the talks states at, according to the Foreign Office,
there are 88 Communist parties in the world, of which 22 are pro-
Soviet, 6 are pro-Chinese, "and the rest are mostly adopting the
attitude of neutral opportunists. The Foreign Office says, how-
ever, that there are some so-called neutral parties which are
leaning toward Communist China, such as those in Japan and Rumania.
Therefore, the Foreign Office is noting the fact that a certain
Communist Chinese leader said that 'half of the world's Communist
parties are supporting Communist China."
July 14 -- Pravda published a 223,000-word "o een~n letter from the
I'RU to 'Party organizations and all Communists -e-Soviet
non, and also, at last, the text of the 14 June ULT et eai
whi-ch it replied. In view of Its length and importance we are
appending our analysis of this document at the end of our
Chronology. The CPSU letter was carried together with the text
of r;j* err eet i 78a/2Et: yR?$7 gan
otnichesko Delo, the Czech organ Rude Provo, and the B. German
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Neues eutschland, and on the 6th by t e Hungarian organ
1epsza a sag. a Polish organ Trybuna Ludu on the 15th carried
the full text but only excerpts of the CCP letter. (The
Peking press reported the above information on the 17th but did
not report the substance of the CPSU letter.) Continuing to be
"different," the Rumanians followed later, publishing both letters
in their organ Scinteia in two installments, half on the 17th and
half on the 16th. All Mongolian newspapers published the text of
the CPSU letter (but apparently not the CCP) on 19 July.
July 15 - A 1200-word "Observer" article in Peoples' Daily bitterly
a ac ked "the Tito group" for "frenziedly fannih /ie flames,
poisoning Sino-Soviet relations, disrupting the unity between China
and he Soviet non and that of the international Communist move-
ment, and peddling its notorious modern revisionist goods."
July 15 - Pravda featured a 2500-word editorial on the CpSU "open
letter," staa$ ng that the letter was published (on the preceding
day) "in connection with the inimical actions of the CCP leaders,
their aspiration to exacerbate the controversy. in the international
Comrwan movement which he themselves Began, their deliberate
distc.. tion of the position o our party, an the incorrect fer-
pret ton of the motives which prompted us temporarily to retain
from pubIishing the 14 June CCP letter. Having taken our patience
to be weakness, the Chinese comrades began to present our desire
to avoid exacerbating the controversy almost as an btention to
'conceal' from Soviet Communists and the Soviet people the views
of the Chinese leaders." It goes on to accuse the Chinese of
"putting forth and upholding special positions on racial questions
of the present day." The balance of e editorial consists o a
brief review of the Soviet position on the vital questions at issue
as stated in the open letter. Izvesti a dovotos its editorial for
the day to the same subject, emphasizing support of the CPSU line
by the Soviet people.
tactics in making use of the Sino-Soviet differences and poisonin
Sino-Soviet re a ons are to laud the Soviet non and vilify Chine
to woo the soviet n on and attack Mina."
Jul 16 - Pravda published a 1400-word editorial on "The Unbreak-
a e pity-'o -"'e Party and the People" which describes how "Commu-
nists and all Soviet people reacted with firm approval to the open
letter." A 1000-word Izvesti a editorial, "A Mighty Support," went
even further to state that. ? ae press of the countries of the
socialist commonwealth and of Communist parties in capitalist
states fully shares the stand of the open letter," and it quotes
from the Czech Rude Pravo and Polish Trybuna Ludu and cites
L'Humanite and n ta- as examples.
July 16 - The Czech central Party organ Rude Pravo and the Slovak
avda carried a 5000.word editorial on the Sino-Soviet
exchange which slavishly follows the CPSU line, even in its
July 16 - A 2000-word "Observer" article in Peoples" Daily attacker
Indian reactionaries in the Anti-China cchorus," using phrases
phraAseolo C& eleati 9 :J~ eR~~7 ,AM
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"everyone ... is surprised not only by its suercil~.ous tone any
its far from fastidious vocabulary, disregard realit and
oobbje~e ve ac s, untness In pro err ng the coarsest char es
agarri 1 and he other Communist parties: what series
the eye ... is the endless stressing of the "revolutionary line"
as opposed to the supposedly 'opportunist' and 're+risionist' line
of 'certain people. "
July 16 - The Hungarian Party organ Nepszabadsag accompanied the
ex s of both letters with a 900-word editoriaal which condemns
the Chinese for "seeking further to sharpen these differences, so
that, arbitrarily interpreting distortin and falsifying the
Jointly scusse and universally accepted ne of communist and
workers parties, it can force its own profoundly wrong views,
which have been refuted by both history an the present reality,
on the Communist movement," and affirms that "the Hungarian
Communists fully agree with the CPSU CC's letter."
July - All Sofia newspapers carried editorials stressing the
mpor ance of the CPSU letter. The Party organ Rabotnichesko Delo
asserted that "the Bulgarian working people, close y united aroun
the Bulgarian CP headed by its CC, again voice their warm support
for the great CPSU9 ....."
July 17 - The Yugoslav Politika concludes: "There can be no ques-
tion of a compromise with the effete, reactionary Chinese ideas,
since even the slightest concession to their present views would
bring defeat to socialism as a whole, for this would mean surren-
dering the real ideas of socialism. Because of this, the deter-
mination of the CPSU headed by lthrushchev in the conflict with
the Peking dogmatists has the backing not only of the Communist
parties, but also of all the progressive people of the world."
The Yugoslav organ Komunist carried a similar article on the
following day.
July 12 - Moscow's Trud carried an article by its correspondent
reporting on a trip=rough china after the 1963 May Day celebra-
tions which complains about.the CCP's ungrateful ignoring of
Soviet aid. Also, "we found at the same time traces of unwise
attempts to arouse among the fraternal Chinese people unfriendly
feelings and moods toward the USSR. This, of course, embittered
us. We thought: who needs that, and for what?" On the same day,
Krasnaya Zvezda, armed forces newspaper, carried front page account
o reports by--Top military officers to higher military academies
on the nature of the dispute and the Soviet Party's views.
July 18 - The Polish Party organ Trybuna Ludu published a 2100-
worcd a itorial which, though more moderatein its opposition to
the Chinese line than other Soviet bloc organs, asserted clearly
its full support of the CPSU line.
Jul 18 -- The Chinese press revealed -- by reporting the funeral
proceedings -- that the Albanian Ambassador to China and six other
Albanian comrades, plus the Commercial Secretary of the Chinese
Embassy in Afghanistan and two Chinese couriers were killed in a
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othors, and attendaz,ce by Vice Premier Chen Yl.
July 18 - Prav?:aa ca. vied a 2000-word Stepanov article doifending
t ~viet cone pt of aid to the national liberation movement,
including the charge that "the Chinese comrades essentially do
s ng a-ac on ha dogs not bring with it the sme of gunpowder.
July 18 - The Indonesian agency Antara reported PSI Chairman Aidet,
as say ng, "I wish to reiterate that Indonesia's Communists have
no pretense at becoming the m,= r':iator because they do not feel the:
they stand outside of the current great discw3sion in the inter-
national Communist movement.... The PKI thinks it is good to
hold bilateral talks... and to convene a meeting of all Marxist-
Leninist parties." The Indonesian agency further reported
"Observers noted that once again. Aidit avoided openly and in
public to side with the policy o., the CCP. As is known, organi-
ations and leaders of the PII have supported the Chinese attitude.
at international meetings and in press articles on various
problems."
July 18 - Communist newspapers in Sydney and Melbourne, according
to th Australian Overseas Service, state that the number of
Communists who have resigned from the Party in Victoria over the
Peking-Moscow differences now totals 62. The Central Committee
alleges that this is the result of a calculated attempt by a
group led by E.F. Hill, former Victoria secretary who rejects
peaceful coexistence, to cause confusion and create the impression
that the Party is experiencing a major split.
July 18 - The Chilean official CP organ El Silo asser+ed its
agreement with the CPSU against the "raving sanders" of the
Chinese, which "not only are erroneous, but also are a falsifica-
tion and betrayal of Marxism."
July 19 - The Peoples'Daily editorial, "Expose the U.S. Nuclear
concludes: -we that the Soviet Union will not fall
into this trap." On the same day, the Peking press gives front-
page prominence to a rally of more than 10,000 Chinese in Peking
to accord warm welcome to the Chinese delegation back from the
WID' congress in Moscow. "A resolution adopted at the rally amid
stormy applause pledged full support for the activities of the
Chinese women's delegation and for the correct line it persisted
in at the congress. The resolution condemned header of the,
Soviet women "s delegation and some leaders of the for openly
starting an an - nese chorus at the congress, and fortheir
arrogance and arbitrariness, their violation odemocracy and
their sectarian and splitting ac v es. opening the ra y,
Teng ng- ao said a t e nese delegation, "...waging a
common struggle against the enemy, successfully held its ground
in a sharp and intense struggTO against attacks, slanders and a
series of most v c pus maneuvers. Delegation e chief Yang Yun-yu
sa a , un er the man pu a on of Popova, head of the Soviet
delegation," the congress "proceeded very badly." It was, she
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JJu~u~_~~y19 i TA reports that on 8 u y the ec overnmen e-
manded the recall of three Chinese NCHA correspondents from
Prague (two were in Peking at the time) on the grounds that their
news releases had published Chinese polemics. The Chinese Ambassa-
dor "rejected this unreasonable demand on the spot," and on 13
July the ]Embassy "lodged a strong protest and categorically re-
jected the unreasonable demand." On 17 July the Czech Government
complained that the Chinese had not complied with the recall
demand. "arthermore, NCNA is still continuing the activities
against which we have protested." The Czechs cancelled the press
card of the remaining correspondent and gave him 40 hours to get
out of the country. "Thus the Czech Government has precipitated
a serious incident, undermining the unity between the Chinese and
echoSlovak peopTes an
aggravating no- ec relations.
20 July all Peking papers published a nese Foreign ministry
statement on the expulsion as well as the NCNA commentary.
Prague also released a Czech Government statement on the incident
20 July, stating that the ousted correspondent had departed 19 Jul.
July 19 - Speaking at a Kremlin rally honoring visiting Hungarian
boss agar, Khrushchev, according to Western correspondent wit-
nesses, exploded in an extemporaneous outburst against the Chinese,
groping for words in obvious vexation and appealing to his audience
for help as he spluttered to a halt while searching for a word.
M, rushchev was quoted as saying; "I declare to those who would
like to overthrow us: I challenge you, gentlemen. Comrades,
let's pick out any plant or any collective farm. You present
your program and we will present our program. Let the people be
the judge. And you may rest assured you won't need armor or
padding for protection...."
July 19 - The Czech Party CC issued a 2500-word statement which
declares that the CPSU open letter "is in full harmony with the
views and lines of our Party." They state that a letter sent on
20 January 1962 to the CC/CCP "described in detail the exceedingly
harmful activities of Chinese representatives in international
organizations and the incorrect views of the CCP leadership on
basic political questions;" but "the facts and arguments of this
letter were not given a direct answer by the CCP leadership,
which refused to deal with them." A further letter was sent on
9 July 1962. The Czechs also claim that "serious damage" was
caused to the national economy of Czechoslovakia and other social-
ist countries by the sharp reduction in Chinese trade relations
"through the fault of the Chinese representatives."
Jul 20 - All Peking papers give top front-page prominence to a
statement dated July 19 by a spokesman of the CC/CCP on the CPSU
open letter. On inner pages they published the full text of the
CPSU letter (many parts bold-faced) together with a Peoples' Dail
editorial statement. Peoples' Daily also republished the full text
of the 14 June CCP leter so that members o the cup ana the
Chinese people may know the views of both sides and compare and
study." The CCP statement said that Chinese national, provincial
and city papers would also publish the CPSU letter, and that both
letters would be broadcast to the whole world in many languages.
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They are replaying their own letter "so that out opponents will
have the material at their disposal for making criticisms which
are up to the mark. Frankly speaking, so far the criticisms are
not up to the mark and not con.!incin ," They add: "there is
only one. reason we are broadcasting the 14 July open letter of
the CC/C?SU: It is a remarkable piece of work. To quote a
Chinese poem: 'A remarkable work should be enjoyed together and
doubts analyzed in company.' ... the open letter of the CPSU is
superlative material for learning by negative example," The
statement concludes: "the Imperialists,, headed by e U.S.,,
and the Indian reactionaries and the Yugoslav revisionist clique
have acclaimed it with one voice and vilified the CC?. Such
statements deserve attention, We shall select the prize ones and
publish them for all members of our Party and all the Chinese
people to appreciate."
The Peoples' Daily editorial note accuses the letter:'.-of try-
ing to con ue and poison people's minds on the question of
nuclear war, trying to pin the vicious charge of bellicosity on
China, and, in particular, to attack Comrade Mao Tse-tung. In
accusing the Chinese leaders of making a 180-degree turn in
evaluating the 20th CPSU Congress, "the CPSU leaders know full
well that the CC/CCP has never cosidered the 20th CPSU Congress
to be wholly positive." "Take another example, the question of
extending ideological differences to the sphere of state relations
The fact is that on 16 July 1960 the Soviet side suddenly notified
China of its decision to withdraw alltheIM-and more Soviet
experts in China within a month, to scrap the hundreds of agree-
ments and contracts it had signed, and to discontinue supplies
of many important items of equipment and materials.... Yet the
CC/CPSU blames China.... So complete a reversal of the truth
s Indeed as on: The open letter is full of Est ances of
this sort na ess than 70 to 00 of them -- and is mposs -
ble to list t em all here. We shall provide the necessary
material to clear up these matters in future articles."
July 20 -- The 3. German Party organ Neues Deutschland published
a 000-word editorial expressing ful endorsement o the CPSU
open letter, including the statement that good relations between
the CPR and the other socialist countries "changed with the
beginning of the 'great leap forward."" Also, the Germans remark
that "it is significant that the whole CC/CCP letter of 14 June
does not contain a single word about socialist democracy.....
Perhaps this is connected with the fact that the CCp leaders have
a special concept of socialist democracy. We recall, for
instance, that they were conducting a campaign under the slogan:
'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought
Contend."' But "the CCp leadership itself has done the opposite
Whereas in their 1960 statement the Communist and workers
parties proceeded from the fact that in our epoch of transition
from capitalism to socialism the struggle between the two world
systems is the main issue, the CC leaders deny this fact and
contend that the struggle of the national liberation movement in
Asia, Africa and Latin America represents the main fighting front,
the 'storm center of world revolution.' ...."
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July 20 - The T?ttI deleation headed by Chairman Aidit arrived in
oow. NCNA reported that Aidit stated at the Djakarta airport:
"the imperialist and the Yugoslav revisionists were trying their
utmost to torpedo the talks between the CPSU and the CCP" and:
"For my part, I believe, to conduct consultations with these two
Communist parties will be not only in the interests of the inter-
national movement, but also in the interest of the development of
the new emerging forces." Answering a question by a Western
correspondent, Aidit said: "1, and the ?KI, have stood on the
side of the Moscow statement because it states in definite terms,
all Communists must condemn and expose modern revisionism."
July 23-21 - The CPSU-CCP bilateral talks ended on the 20th, with
rushch presiding at a banquet given by the CPSU Presidium
for the delegates. A brief communique issued on the 21st states
only that "in the course of the meeting, both sides set forth
their views and positions on a number of important questions of
principle in contemporary world developments, the international
Communist movement, and Soviet-Chinese relations. At the CCP
.?-deie ation's suggestion, agreement was reached to make an interval
in the work of the delegations so as to continue the meeting some
time later. The place and time of the continuation of the meeting
will be agreed upon additionally through consultations between
the CC/CPSU and the CC/CCp." Peking reported that
Mao himself "and other leader's Party and State were among
the 5,000 people who were present to give a tremen ous welcome to
the delegation" in Peking.
July 23-22 - Moscow announced on the 20th that the party chiefs
os t aeA countries would convene in Moscow on 24 July, to
"discuss a report of the CEMA Executive Committee on work done to
carry out the decisions of the June 1962 GEMA conference ... and
the further task of the development of economic cooperation
between these countries." The Washington Post of 22 July reported
an interview granted by Mihaittio banu unman of the Rumanian
-A. Chamber of Commerce, who has recently emerged as his country's
spokesman on relations with both the bloc and the Western world,"
in which he condemned Comecon for failing to respect the "rights,
interests and sovereignty" of his country. Ciobanu said that
"more than a third" of the capital equipment for Rumania's
industrialization since the inception of the country's 6-year plan
in 1960 had come from the West. The reporter adds that "foreign
economists here feel that the figure is actually 60 percent or
more."
July 21 - All Peking papers gave prominence to an NCNA report that
ee i CPSU in a new wave o' opposition to I;he CCP has "set in
motion all its propaganda media to launch unbridled slanders and
vilifications." Pravda and other papers are reported to have
carried statements "flagrantly attempting to incite the Chinese
people and the members of the CCP against the beloved leadership
of the CCP,"
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'July 21 - The Hungarian organ Nepszabadsag states that Marxist-
en n ;st parties and 1=:.,aderr4 "ur. -n mt.:4Ts y conder:;n the schi matic
activities of thy: ChirfAse ir.aderF3 and their:5ro dev ..tio:. from the
glaidir!;; Len_.nist ;~rin~: .plea ,," It par~icu ';~rly c oscr .hes t1tie
French, Germ-IM., 3.ustri.an, Colombian a;-:Jd Cha.lean art{ ^cs as :Zavor-
ing the Sov:'.cwt line.
Juuly~~2_1~ - Try-: Czech organ Rude Pravo added another editorial
suppo Ling the Soviet line an 'con7emning the Splitting policy"
of the Chinese.
July 22 - Tanyug reported that Yugoslavia and the USSR have signed
as procol under their 1961-65 trade agreement whereby Soviet
experts will be sent to Yugoslavia to advise on the installation
of Soviet equipment to be shipped to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav tech-
nicians are also to be trained in the USSR. Press reports from
Moscow on the announcement that Khrushchev had accepted an invita-
tion to visit Hungary speculated that he may combine it with his
planned visit to Yugoslavia in August (announced by Khrushchev
on 19 July at a reception in the Hungarian Embassy).
References
The New Cold War: Moscow vs. Peking, by Edward Crankshaw.
armoncswor , Middlesex, England; Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A.;
and Mitcham, Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books 1963. A tight,
readable review of the factors and events leading to open "cold
war" struggle between the USSR and Communist China. 167 pp.
The full text of the 14 July CPSU open letter was published in
English in all editions of the NYTimes, July 15, as a supple-
ment to the Indian CP organ New kge, July 21,. and to the CPUSA
organ The Worker, July 28.
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Analysis of CPSU "open letter" published 14 July 1363
The letter states as its purpose "to set out our posi-
tion on the fundamental questions of the international
Communist movement in connection with the letter of the
CC/CCP of 14 June 1333." It sweeps over the range of dif-
ferences in theory with the Chinese, seldom coining to grips
with their casuistic ideological argumentation, accusing
the Chinese of attributing to the CPSU views and positions
which it does not hold -- and at the same time stretching
CCP positions to extremes which the CCP does not really
hold. It sets forth a long list of complaints against
Chinese conduct in recent years, in many cases reversing
charges already directed against the C?SU by the Chinese!
It names Mao and other Chinese leaders in such a context
as to accuse them by inference of vacillating, wavering,
and making 133-degree turns. The Soviets accuse their
adversaries of substituting r a c i a l struggle for class
strug le, propagating the Slogan a east wind prevails
over the west" in place of "workers of the world, unite,"
and several times infer that the Chinese have "other goals
which have nothing in common with revolution" or "the
abolition of capitalism." The Chinese are accused of want-
ing to embroil the USSR and the USA in deadly warfare
against each other. The tone of the letter can readily be
seen in the wording of some of the phrases blasting the
Chinese: "frankly inimical actions"; "splitting activities";
"camouflage their erroneous views and incorrect positions";
"did their best to insult and attack the Soviet Union";
"Juggling quotations"; "monstrous fabrication and slander";
"trying to smear the CPSU ?Program"; "their utter helpless-
ness"; "psuedotheoretical discou7tse"; "haughtily and abusive-
ly accuse"; "flouting of agreements"; "resort to foul lan-
guage"; "sinks to insinuations"; "absurdity";' "use the
Albanian leaders as their mouthpiece"; etc.
The CPSU letter (in 6 numbered parts) begins with a
1230-word review of the provocative June/July conduct of the
Chinese, "mistaking our restraint for weakness." It recalls
"nearly half a century" of Soviet leadership in the struggle
for 'the triumph of Marxism-Leninism" an Soviet "tremendous,
disinterested aid to all peoples fighting for their liberation
frog the yoke of imperialism," citing especially aid to
China where it is even now assisting in the construction of
33 enter rises and -projects. Mao is quoted as saying in
that "the nese people will never forget all this,"
to which the CPSU adds: "one can only regret that the
Chinese leaders did begin to forget this."
The letter points to the Chinese "Long Live Leninism"
publication in April 1960 and attributed to Mao, as the
first openly revealing the Chinese "differences with the
WCM." The letter traces further steps by the Chinese to
impose their views : the June 1960 V'UFTU session in Peking,
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rove or
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After the latter, "they resumed the propaganda of their
course, using as a mouthpiece the leadership of the
B t :n the back of our ?arty,
they launched a ca:sapaign against the CC/C'?SU and the Soviet
Government." In October 1961 the CC/CPSU "undertook new
attempts to normalize relations with the CCP," and followed
these with efforts through autumn 1332 which were not
answered.
The letter then accuses the Chinese leaders of carry-
in. ideological differences over to state relations,
iv ng figures showing drastic reductions in trade over
the past threw years "on the initiative of the Chinese
leaders." It adds that sagreemen s among raterna
pci8 are nothing more than a temporary episode, whereas
relations among the peoples of the socialist countries
are now being established for all time to come."
Reviewing the "splitting activities" of the Chinese at
the December 1361 WPC session in Stockholm and 1962 sessions
of the WFTU, WPC, AAPSO, WFDY and d9IDF, the Soviets co apla in
that the Chinese froze them out of the 3rd AAPSO conference
in Moshi: "the leader of the Chinese delegatial told the
Soviet representatives that 'the w h i t e s have nothing;
to do here."' The Chinese also prevented the Soviets groin
par cippating in the Djakarta journalists conference "on
the plea that the Soviet Union is not an Asian country."
find at the recent 71IDF congress, the Chinese "accused
the overwhelming majority of taking to splitting activities,"
when "only the representatives of two countries -- China
and Albania -- out of 110 countries represented at the
congress voted against" the appeal.
In Part 2 the CPSU turns to "the gist of the differ-
ehces." "The essence of the matter is that, having started
An offensive against the positions of the Marxist-Leninist
karties on the cardinal positions of today, the Chinese
comrades first ascribe to the CPSU and other Marxist-
Leninist parties v ews which they nave never expressed and
which are aen to them: second they try by verbal recog-
nition o the formula and pos ons borrowed from e
documents of the omina s movement to camou age their
erroneous views and incorrect positions. To cone out-
openly" against peace u coexistence, sarmamen , e c.,
wwoo l mean to lay bare their positions in the eyes of the
Communists of the whole world and peace-loving peoples and
to repulse them." Therefore, "the clearer the weakness
of the positions of the CCP leadership becomes, the more
zealously it resorts to such camouflage." Behind this
"scholastic" camouflage, however, are the vital questions of
war and peace; the role and development of wor ~soca.a_.-
st system; the-struggle against he eo ogy an practice:
of the 'persona y cu *; strategy and tactics o e
world labor movemen ; and the national liberation s toggle.
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"The CC/CPSU believes it a necessary duty to tell the
Party and the people with all frankness" that the CC?
leadership takes "a diametrically opposite approach to such
vital problems as t e possibility of averting a world thermo-
nuclear war, peaceful coexistence of states with eren
soda systems, and: he interrelation between the struggle
for peace and the development o the world revolutionary
movement. "What stands behind the loud revolutionary
p rases of the Chinese comrades? Lack of faith in the
forces of the working class, its revolutionary capabilities,"
etc. "To take up the way proposed by the Chinese comrades
means to alienate the popular masses." "The atomic bomb
does not adhere to the class principle: destroys every-
o y w n range of Its devastating, force;' The Chinese
"obviously underestimate all the danger of thermonuclear
war" when they contend that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger."
"Some responsible Chinese leaders also have declared that
is possible to sacrifice hundreds of millions of peop e
n war. On the ruins of destroyed imperialism, e
vi carious peo les -- asserts the collection ng Live
en n sm, .., will create a civilization a thousand
times higher than Under the capitalist sysem.
The letter then remarks pointedly: "The posing of the
question in this manner by the Chinese comrades may engender
a well-justified suspicion that this is no longer a -class
but one with en re y eren alms .... s mpossib e
not to note the fact that instead of the class internation-
alist approach expressed in the call 'workers of e wor ,
un e, the Chinese comrades stubbornly propagate the slogan
deprived of any class meaning: 'the east wind prevails over
the west."
Reviewing the Cuban crisis, the letter states that "the
Chinese comrades did their best to insult and attack the
Soviet Union." It concludes: "The impression arises that
the leaders of the CCP regard the preservation and intensi-
fiti ittpill iltions
caon onernaional tension, esecayn rea
advantage,
Part 3 of the letter is given to the "personality cult,"
with the CPSU accusing that "the CC? leaders took upon them-
selves the role of defenders of the personality cult, the
propagators of Stalin's faulty ideas." Mao, Liu and Tong
are quoted as originally approving the 20th CPSU Congress
action.
"Practice is the best measure of truth," the letter
states, and cites advances of the last 10 years. But the
CCP leaders "hint at some sort of 'bourgeoisization' and
'degeneration' of Soviet society. To follow their line of
thinking, it comes out that if people walk in bast sandals
and eat watery soup out of a bowl, this is communism, --
A r ieb W41&699 9 JYff/ J ~ l -- D 63691 A AM0006-3
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better tomorrow, this is tantamount to a restoration of
capitalism;,'
The letter then turns to the CC?? attack on the Soviet
claim that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been
replaced in the USSR by "a state of the whole people."
"Anyone who reads the discourses in their letter ... will
undoubtedly note their utter helplessness and lack of
eop e. a are
knowledge about tFF-Tif e o the Soviet people.-
Being taught that hostile classes still remain in Soviet
society, and therefore, you see, the need for the dictator-
ship of the proletariat remains." The CCP letter cites as
hostile classes "bourgeois hangers-on, parasites, black-
marketers," etc. "One must concede," say the Soviets,
"this is quite an original notion of the Chinese comrades
about classes and class struggle. Since when are these
parasitical elements considered a class? And what class?"
In Part 4, the CPSU treats "the ways and methods for
the revolutionary struggle of the working class in the
countries f ca italisn, the s rugg o for national libera-
tibn, the ways ac-"~L the of all mankind to
socialism." The Chinese depict it as though they stand
for world revolution and the CPSU and other parties
-: "have forgotten the revolution." Actually, says
the CPSU, the division "lies on an entirely different plane:
some -- namely the leaders of the CC? -- talk about world
revolution ... while others -- those prec se y whom the
Chinese comrades criticize -- approach the matter of revo-
lution with utmost seriousness and, instead of phrasemonger-
ing, work hard, seeking to find the best ways to the victory
of socialism, gays which conform best to present conditions,
and fight hard for national independence, democracy auad
socialism." By their peace policy, the letter si.ys, Soviet
Communists "give inestimable aid to the working class" of
the capitalist countries, scoring "magnificent successes."
Lenin is cited on the importance of economic victory, "but
now it turns out that there are comrades who think that
V.Y. Lenin was wrong. What is this -- lack of faith in the
ability of the countries of socialism to a ea cap a sm
who ~encoun er nay culties in the u ng o soc a ism,
VFW become scourag@ ...?
"The Chinese Communists haughtily and abusively accuse
the Communist Parties of France, Italy the U.S. and oMer
countries o nothing less than opportunism and reformism,
of 'pa" 3r.'iamentary cretinismt and even of slipping down to
t bourgeois socialism, t" but "every knowledgeable Marxist-
Leninist knows that to advance a slogan for an armed uprising
when there is no revolutionary situation in the country means
to doom the working class to defeat."
Turning to "the relationship between the struggle of
the international working class and the national-liberation
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A~S'W~lo4fR~s$~8`4~"I'-R'U
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the letter calls them "the great forces of our epoch," and
adds that "the correct coordination among them constitutes
one of the main requisites for victory over imperialism."
But the "new theory" of the Chinese, the CPSU says, is that
the main contradiction is "not between socialism and imperi-
alism but betvaen the national-liberation movement and
imperialism," and "the decisive force in the struggle against
imperialism ... is not the world system of socialism, not
the struggle of the international working class, but again
the national-liberation movement. In this VU .-the Chinese
wa popu
comrades apparently wish to win in t e easiest
among the peoples o Asia, r ca and Latin erica. But
let no one be ece vQ by this wtheory.T' Whether the Chinese
theoreticians want it or not, this theory essentially means
the isolation of the national-liberation movement rom e
international work n7 class an its o sPr ng -- a wor_
system a soc a sm!' e n the rumpus a ou word revolu-
tion' raised 'y t ? e Chinese comrades are other goals that
have nothing in common with revolution."
Part 5 of the Soviet letter focuses on the theme that
"the erroneous views of the CCP leaders ... are inseparably
linked with their practical activities directed owar un er-
rn n n a un o e wor soda s camp and e n er-
atona omiunist movement." Chinese reduction in trade with
the socialist community by more than 50% in the last 3 years
is elaborated on again.
Further, the letter says, "the CCP leadership organizes
and supports various anti-party groups o rene a es w o
come out against the Communist parties in the ., Brazil*
a y, Belgium, Australia and n a, and it gives some
detail, including publishing and circulating "in many lan-
guages articles discrediting" these parties, resorting to
"foul expressions" such as 'double-dealing,"' etc. "And in
its letter of June 14 the CCP leadership sinks to insinua-
tions that the CPSU, too, alle edl 'comes out in the role
o a helper o Ln er a sm. No one except r o s I y
bas et darec, in v ew of the o vim ous absurdity of s, to
?v such slanderous accusations at the great Party of Lenin.'
This section of the letter concludes with a reference
to the CCP statement that tt is "impermissible for one party
to place itself above the other fraternal parties, ... to
interfere in the internal affairs of fraternal parties...."
As one example the CPSU cites Chinese "excommunication" of
Yugoslavia. The letter quotes Peoples' Daily in 1955:
"Yugoslavia has already achieve notable successes in the
construction of socialism," and statistics show further
consolidation of the socialist sector since that time. "WWh,y,
then, have the Chinese leaders changed so drastically their
position on the Yugoslav question? It is hard to find
an explanation other than that they saw in this one of the
advantageous -- in their opinion -- pretexts to-discredit
he policy of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist par es."
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Section 6 is a 1000-word recapitulation on a note of
triumph and confidence. "Our glorious Leninist party....
was steeled and strengthened in this struggle for the
purity of Marxism-Leninism, and fears no attacks by latter-
day splitters and opportunists from whatever quarter."
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 Approved For RdA99lAkajt;fdg1A000200020006-3
No 5 9-22 Julio 1963
9 Julio: "Pravda" public6 una declaraci5n del. PCUS de 700 pala-
bras condenando el mitin de 7 de Julio colebredo en Pekin pars
Teste jar a los cinco cht.nos expulsados de la tJn; S par la difusi6n
"ilegal" de IS, carta del PC china de 14 de junio: "no se puede con-
siderar otra toss que el deseo tuna campa4(a intencional] de encen-
der en el fraterno pueblo chino sentimientos y disposiciones de
inamistad hacia la Uni5n Sovl6tiea, de agravar Is situaci6n en el
transcurso de las negociaciones ... pasando por alto las consecuen-
cias de semejante politica.
9 y 16 Julio: La agenda yugoslava Tanyug informs de Eucarest 1a
publicaciftde dos folletos rumanos en apoyo de las lineas sovi6ti-
cas de politics exterior. El primero, de 9 de Julio, titulado "La
Coexistencia Pacifica," contiene "une crftica objetiva de las ten-
dencias dogm6ticas en el movimiento obrero internacional" y "habla
de to absurdo de la teoria sobre la exportaci6n de la revolution y
defiende los principles actuales de que la coexistencia aciifficaa y
el desarme facilitan el proceso de liberaci n nacional." l Segun-
do, de 16 de Julio, est dedicado a las negociaciones tripatitas
en Moscd sobre proscription de los ensayos nucleases, "subrayando
inequivocamente la dedicaci6n rumana a los idea del desarme general"
y "acepta con benepideito y defiende las iniciativas sovidticas" en
las negociaciones sobre proscription de ensayos.
10 Julio: Todos los diaries de Pekin desplegaron en primers plana
una declaraci6n de 1.200 palabras expedida el 10 de Julio por el
PC chino en contestaci6n a la declaraci6n de 9 de Julio descrita
anteriormente, y publicaron esta~dltima al calce. Los chinos se que-
jan de que is acusaci6n del PCUS "carece totalmente de justificaci6n,"
y preguntan si no es "en of una calumnia contra el PC chino rehusar
informar al pueblo to que realmente dijo nuestra carts de contesta-
ci6n, en tanto que se ataca profusamente Is carts como 'calumnia'
contra el PCUS y se provoca un colosal alboroto." La "mesura" de
China, dicen, "es patente a todos." Apuntando que el PCUS no solo
ha extendido las divergencias ideol6gicas a is esfera de las rela-
ciones entre estados lino que "est6. tambi6n agitando una campalla
contra el PC chino por toda Is Union Sovi6tica," loo chinos pregun-
tan "haste 6 extremos est6n los came alas del PCUS dispuestos a
extender las ver encias chino-sovi6ticas. La prensa china publicd
tanibi n un despacho de Mosc de la agencia china Sinjua informando
"la campaTia agitada por el CC del PCUS por media de reuniones y re-
soluciones de organizaciones del partido sovi6tico en varios nive-
les," y otro despacho pasando revista a los editoriales de los prin-
cipa:Les 6rganos sovi6ticos atacando al PC chino.
10 Julio: Los chinos asl como los albaneses aprovecharon is oca-
si6n del Dia del Ej6rcito alban6s pars hacer enfatica an solidari-
dad ideol6gica contra los revisionistas contempordneos.
10 Julio: Una delegaci6n hingara del partido y del gobierno encabeza-
dadapor Iadar lleg6 a Nosed en vista que los observadores considera-
ron intencionadamente oportuna pars, demostrar la solidaridad de
Euro oriental c 1 PLUS is URSS. Kruschev recibi6 afectuosa-
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~i Faok gleaM ~A gC24anCI8i PFtl?agn%lb0a .@PM-3
china.
11 Julio: El segundo aniversario del tratado de amistad chino-
norcoreano fire uti:Lizado Para acentuar su solidaridad ideol6gica
contra el revisioni.mo contempordneo. Los chinos m6s importantes,
con Chou a la cabeza, tomaron parte en una manifestaci6n en Pekin
en la cual Kuo Mo-jo, vicepresidente de la Conferencia Consultive
Politica del Pueblo Chino, incluy6 en su discurso la acusacibn de
que: "ciertos sedicentes marxistes-leninistas has: aplaudido is. lla-
mada estrategia de paz de Kennedy y se estnn esforzando por embel-
lecer el imperialismo norteamericano y su cabecilla, Kennedy.
Estrin intencionalmente engafando al pueblo Para suplir las nece-
sidades de los planes de agresi6n del imperialismo norteamericano."
13 Julio: La prinera menci6n ptdblica de una u otra parte de que en
Moscu se eston sosteniendo conversaciones vio la luz en un edito-
rial de 2.200 palabras en el "Diario del Pueblo" que reconoc16 "un
ntimero de importantes divergencias de principio" entre los parti-
dos, divergencias "de cardeter grave," y se quej6 de que "presen-
tarlas como que son entre el PC chino de una parte y el movimiento
comunista internacional entero de la otra no concuerda con los hechos
y no coadyuva a is. eliminaci6n de las divergencias. A pesar de as
"apenantes" actuaciones sovidticas en la vispera de las conversa-
ciones, los chinos "se abstuvieron de tomar las medidas correspon-
dientes" y mandaron su delegaci6n a las conversaciones. "Pero
tenemos que apuntar con el coraz6n oprimido que los bechos han
ido contra to que esperdbamos." En vista de las actuaciones sovi-
6ticas, "la gente tiene enters justificaci6n en preocuparse de si
el CC del PCUS uiere a ujar las relaciones chino-sovi6ticas al
borde de is. ruptura... Las ideas no se pueden bloquear y es im-
posi le resolver las divergencias ideol6gicas por dictados u 6rde-
nes... Hubo mucha gente que cometi6 semejantes locuras en el pasa-
do, y todas fracasaron." Pero, afaden, las divergencias se reesolve-
r6n "si uno trata al otro realmente como iqual en lugar de tratar
de impon6rsele. Si has divergencias no se pueden resolver hoy,
pueden aguardar hasta matana. Si no se pueden resolver este ago,
pueden aguardar hasta el pr6simo."
)A Julio: El "Diario del Pueblo" public6 un articulo de "Observa-
dor` quej6ndose amargate de los esfuerzos de los Estados Unidos
de "congraciarse con la Uni6n Sovl ica, oponerse a China,, y empon-
relaciones chino-sovifticas. El articulo acusa al "im-
perialismo norteamericano de intencionalmente desvirtuar los pan-
tos de vista revolucionarios del PC chino, alegando que China 'est6
en oposici6n a la coexistencia paeifica,' 'es belicista,' y 'aboga
por la exportaci6n de is. revoluci6n,'"' (pero esto es precisamente
to que hace el PCUS en su carta publicada simultdneamente -- v6ase
m6s adelante).
14 Julio: Un breve articulo en el "Mainichi" de Tokio sabre el
examen de las conversaciones por parte del ministerio japon6s de
Relaciones Exteriores declara que, segdn dicho ministerio, bay en el
mundo 88 partidos comunistas, de los cuales 22 son prosovi6ticos, 6
son prochinos "y el resto est6n en su mayoria adoptando la actitud
de oportunistas neutrales. El ministerio de Relaciones d.eclara, no
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Por to tanto el mini terio de Relaciones ai,unta el hecho de que
cierto dirigente comtanista chino declar6 que 'la mitad de los
partidos comunistas del mundo est&n apoyando a China Comunista.''"
14 Julio: "Pravda" publics una "carta abierta del CC del PLUS a
todas las organizations del partido todos los comunistas de la
Uni n Sovi tica, de longitud de 22.000 palabras, y tambi?n por fin
el texto de la Carta de 14 de junio.del PC chino a la cual replica-
ba. En vista de su longitud e importancia (el mismo PC chino la
denomina "una notable obra" -- vdase 19 Julio), hemos afiadido nues-
tro andlisis de dicho documento al final de nuestra Cronologia.
La carta del PCUS fue publicada integramente, junto al texto de la
carta de 14 de junio del PC chino, el 15 de Julio en el abotniches-
ko Delo, rgan del partido bulgaro, el "Rude Pravo," organ del par-
tido checo, y el "Neues Deutschland," organ del partido alemdn ori-
ental, y el 16 por el 6rgano hxingaro "Nepszabadsag." El 6rgano
polaco "Trybuna Ludu" public6 el 15 el texto integro del PCUS pero
solo partes de la Carta del PC chino. (La prensa de Pekin inform6
lo anterior el dia 17 Pero no inform6 el contenido de la carts
del PCUS.) Persistiendo en su "diferencia," los rumanos salieron
mds tarde, publicando ambas cartas en su 6rgano "Scinteia" en dos
partes, la mitad el 17 y el resto el 18. Todos los per16dicos
mogoles publicaron el texto de 1a Carta del PCUS (pero aparentemente
no la del PC chino) el 19 de Julio.
15 Julio: Un articulo del "Observador" en 1.200 palabras publica-
doo en el "Diario del Pueblo" atac6 violentamente al "grupo de Tito"
por "aventar fren6ticamente las llamas, emponzotlando las relaciones
chino-sovi6ticas, estarbando la unidad entre China y is. Uni6n Sovi-
6tica y la del movimiento comunista internacional y voceando su
mercaderia de revisionismo contempordneo."
15 Julio: "Pravda" en un editorial de 2.500 palabras sobre la
Carta abierta" del PCUS declaro que la carta habla sido publicada
(el dia anterior) "con relaci6n a las actuaciones inamistosas de
los dirigentes del PC china, su aspiraci n a exacerbar la controver-
sia en el movimiento comunista internacional queelllos mismos em-
p zaron, su intencional desvirtuacibn de la posicitn de nuestro
partido y la incorrecta inter~retai6n de los m6viles que nos in-
dujeron por al n tiela-po no publicar la carta de 14 de junco del
PC chino. Tomando por debilidad nuestra paciencia, be camaradas
chinos empezaron a presenter nuestro deseo de evitar exacerbar la
controversia casi como intenci6n de 'ocultar' de los comunistas
sovi6ticos y el pueblo sovidtico las opiniones de los lideres
chinos." A continuaci6n acusa & los chinos de "proponer y apoyar
posiciones especiales sobre cuestiones raciales del dia de hoy."
El resto del editorial consta de una breve resefia de la posicibn
sovi6tica sobre las vitales materias en cuesti6n: "la guerre y
la paz, e1 papel y el desarrollo del movimiento comunista mundial,
la lucha contra la ideologia y la prdtica del culto a la personali-
dad, is. cuesti6n de is. estrategia y la tdctica del movimiento obre-
ro mundial y la lucha por is. liberaci6n nacional." "Izvestiya"
dedica su editorial de este dia al mismo terra, subrayando el apoyo
del pueblo sovi6tico a la linea del PCUS.
App s .'- ?& FIac~8t_~ilr7t831ii~01~~
 Appr&trhi' oo emv~ianno""fr, l%*gAWsM tR%a WA of
en su ataque contra los EE.UU. el 14 de Julio: "La t6ctica de
Nehru para aprovecharse de las divergencias chino-sovi6ticas y em-
onzoflar las relaciones chino-sovidticas consiste en elogiar a la
Union Sov tics y denigrar China; congraciarse con la Union
save tics y atacara China
16 Julio: En un editorial de 1.400 palabras titulado "La unidad
irrompible del Partido y el pueblo," "Pravda" describe como "los
comunistas y todo el pueblo sovi6tico reaccionaron con firme aproba-
cibn de is. carts abierta." Un editorial de 1.000 palabras en
"Izvestiya" titulado "Poderoso Apoyo" fue aun m6s adelante, decla-
rando que "la prensa de los passes de is. conidad socialista y de
los partidos comunistas en los passes capitalistas comparte integra-
mente la posici6n de la carte abierta," y da como ejemplo citas del
"Rude Pravo" checo y el "Trybuna Ludu" polaco y menciona "L'Humanite"
y "L'Unita."
16 Julio: El 6rgano central del partido checo "Rude Pravo" y el
eels aco "Pravda" de Bratislava publicaron un editorial de 5.000
palabras sobre el intercambio chino-sovi6tico, siguiendo servil-
mente la Linea del PCUS hasta en su fraseologia. Comenzando por
fustigar la carta de 14 de junio del PC chino, declara que "a
todos ... sorprende no solo su tono de superioridad y su vocabula-
rio que dista mucho de ser selecto, su indiferencia hacia la r a
lidad y los hechos objets os, su aspereza al presenter Las
das denuncias contra el PC y los otros partidos comunistas: to
que salta a is. vista ... es el interminable 6nfasis sabre la 'lines
revolucionaria' en oposici6n a la supuesta linea 'oportunista'
y 'revisionista' de 'cierta gente.'"
16 Julio: El 6rgano ht5ngaro "Nepsaabadsag" acompaF16 a los textos
de ambas cartas un editorial de 900 palabras condenando a los chi-
nos por "tratar mds de agudizar dichas divergencias, de modo que,
arbitrariamente interpretando, desvirtuando y falseando la linea
conjuntamente discutida yy universalmente aceptada de los partidos
comunistas y obreros, puedan imponer sobre el movimiento comunista
sus opiniones profundamente equivocadas, que han lido refutadas
por historia ass como por la realidad actual," y afirmando que "los
comunistas h~Cingaros esttn completamente de acuerdo con la carts del
CC del PCUS."
17 Julio: Todos los diarios de Sofia publicaron editoriales hacien-
do resaitar is. importancia de la carts del PCUS. El 6rgano del
partido, "Rabotnichesko Delo," declar6 que "el pueblo trabajador
bulgaro, unido estrecbamente en derredor del PC bulgaro encabezado
par su CC, de nuevo expresa su c6,lido apoyo del gran PCUS, ... "
17 Julio: El diario yugoslavo "Politika" declar6: "No puede ad-
mitirse componenda con las ideas decadentes y reaccionarias chinas,
ya que is. minima concesi6n a sus actuales opiniones significaria la
entrega de las verdaderas ideas del socialisto. Por este motivo,
la decisi6n del PCUS encabezado por Kruschev en el eonflicto con
los dogmdticos de Pekin cuenta con el respaldo no solo de los par-
tides comunistas sino de todas las gentes progresistas del mundo."
El 6rgano del partido "Komunist" public6 al die siguiente expre-
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corresponsal informando sabre un viaje por China despu6s de las
celebraciones del Primero de Mayo de 1963 en el cual se queja de
la indiferencia desagradecida de los chinos hacia la ayuda sovi6-
tica. Tambi6n, "encontramos al propio tiempo rastros de imprudentes
tentativas de evocar entre el fraterno pueblo chino sentimientos y
attitudes inamistosas hacia la URSS. Esto por supuesto nos amarg6.
Pensamos: yqui6n necesita tal cosa, y pare qu6?" El mismo dia
"Krasnaya Zvezda," el diario de las fuerzas armadas, public6 en pri-
mera plans noticias sobre informes rendidos por los mds altos jefes
militares a las academias militares superiores sobre el cardcter de
la querella y las opinions del partido sovi6tico.
18 Julio: El 6rgano "Trybuna Ludu" del partido polaco public6 un
editorial de 2.100 palabras que, aunque mds comedido al expresar
au oposici6n a la lines china que los otros 6rganos del bloque so-
vi6tico, declar6 su integro apoyo a la linea del PCUS en t6rminos
meridianos.
18 Julio: La prensa china revel6 -- al informar las exequias --
que leembajador alban6s en China y otros seis camaradas albaneses
ademds del secretario comercial de la embajada china en Afganist6n
y dos mensajeros oficiales chinos perecieron en una tragedia a6rea
sovi6tica el 13 de Julio cuande un TU-104 en que viajaban de Pekin
a Moacu se estrell6 al aterrizar en Irkutsk. El entierro fue cere-
.monia gubernamental, con ofrendas florales del premier Chou En-lai
entre otras y la presencia del vicepremier Chen Yi.
18 Julio: "Pravda" public6 un articulo de 2.000 palabras escrito
por S panov en defensa del concepto sovi6tico de ayuda al movi-
miento de liberaci6n national, incluyendo la denuncia de que "los
camaradas chinos esencialmente no desean reconocer como revolucio-
nario ni un proceso ni una acct n- ue no trai a en si el olor a
1~ vora.
18 Julio: La agencia indonesia Antera inform6 que el presidente
Aidit del PKI habla declarado: "Deseo reiterar que los comunistas
de Indonesia no presumen de hacerse mediadores porque est6n al mar-
gen de la actual gran discusi6n en el movimiento comunista inter-
nacional ... El PKI tree que es bueno sostener conversaciones bila-
terales ... y convocar una asamblea de todos los partidos marxis-
tas-leninistas." La agencies Indonesia inform6 ademds que "los ob-
servadores notaron que de nuevo Aidit habla evitado abierta y pd-
blicamente ponerse del lado de la politics del PC chino. Coma se
sabe, organizaciones y dirigentes del PKI hen apoyado las actitudes
chinas en reuniones internacionales y en articulos de prensa sobre
diversos problemas."
18 Julio: La prensa comunista de Sydney y Melbourne, de acuerdo
con e Australian Overseas Service, informa que el total de comu-
nistas que han renunciado del partido en Victoria con motivo de las
divergencias entre Pekin y Moscd llega ahora a 62. El Comit6 Cen-
tral alega que esto se debe a una tentative intencionada de un
grupo encabezado por E. F. Hill, ex seeretario de Victoria que re-
hus6 avenirse a la politica de coexistencia pacifica, de ocasionar
confusion y crear la impresi6n de que en el partido est6. ocurrien-
do una eseisi6n grave.
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ester de acuerdo con el PCUS contra las "calumnias delirantes" de
los chinos, que "no solamente son err6neas sino tambidn falseami-
ento y traici6n al marxismo."
19 Julio: El editorial del "Dierio de Pueblo" titulado "Denunciar
el Fraude Nuclear de EMU..." termina diciendo que "confiamos que
la Uni6n Sovi6tica no caerd en esa tramps." El mismo dia is prensa
de Pekin dio provocativo realce en primers plans a una manifesta-
ci6n de mds de 10.000 chinos en Pekin pars rendir cdiido recibimien-
to a is delegaci6n china que regresaba del congreso de la FDIM en
Mosc1. "Una resoluci6n adoptada en is manifestaci6n entre entruen-
dosos aplausos promet16 completo apoyo a las actividades de is de-
legaci6n china de mujeres y a is lines corrects en ue ersisti6 en
el congreso. La resolucion conden a is dir gente de la de a a~ ci n
sovitica de mujeres y a algunas d r gentes de la DIEM p or iniciar
abiertaamente un coro antichino en el co eso y por su arrogancia
y arbitrariedad, su violaci n de is. democracla y sus act3 ivdades
sectarian yescissio istas ' Inaugurando la manifestaci n, Teng
Ying-cam o declarO que la delegaci6n china, "... conduciendo una lu-
eba comun contra elenemigo, consigui6 mantener su terreno en una
lucha muds e intensa contra ataquuea, calumnias y una serie de de-
salmadas maniobras." La jefa de la delegacion Yang Yun-yu declar6
que, bajo a manipulaci6n de Popova, jefa de is delegaci6n sovi6-
tica," el congreso "se desarroll6 muy mal." Fue, indic6, "el con-
greso peor y mds axitidemocrdtico que haya sido celebrado en is.
bistoria de la FDIM."
19 Julio: La agencia china Sinjua inform6 que el 8 de Julio el
gobierno checo requiri6 is salida de tres corresponsales de Sinjua
de Praga (dos estaban entonces en Pekin) debido a que sus informes
periodisticos habian publicado pol6micas chinas. El embajador chi-
no '"rechaz6 de piano dicha exigencia irrazonable," y el 13 de
Julio la embajada "hizo protesta formal y categ6ricamente rechazo
is irrazonable exigencia." Sin embargo, el 17 de Julio el gobierno
checo se quej6 de que los chinos no habtaxi satisfecho is demands de
retiro. "Ademds, Sinjua todavia continua las actividades contra
las cuales hemos protestado." Los checos cancelaron el carnet de
prensa del corresponsal que quedaba y le seftalaron 48 horas para
abandonar el pats. "De este modo el Gobierno checo ha precipitado
un ave incidents socavando is unidad entre los pueblos chino
checoslovaco y ravando las relaciones chino-checas. El 20 de
Julio toda la prensa de ek n public una declaraci n del ministe-
rio de Relaciones chino sobre la expulsi6n asi como el comentario de
Sinjua. Praga tambi6n dio a is publicidad tins decleraci6n del go-
bierno checoslovaco sabre el incidents el 20 de julio, declarando
que el corresponsal expulsado habia partido el 19 de Julio.
19 Julio: Hablando ante una manifestaci6n en el Kremlin en honor
al and 6n htngaro Kadar, Kruschev hizo estallido verbal inesperado
contra los chinos, de acuerdo con corresponsales de Occidente que
to presenciaron, tratendo de encontrar frases en su evidente irrita.
ci6n y pidiendo ayuda a los presentee mientras enmudecia por falta
de palabras apropiadas. A Kruschev le atribuyeron estos conceptos:
"Declara a quienes quisieran derrocarnos: Yo lee reto, caballeros.
Camaradas, escojamos cualquier fabrica o granja colectiva. Ustedes
presentan au programa y nosotros presentamos nuestro programa.
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armadura o aco c ado pars su pro etc n ...
19 Julio: El CC del PC ebeco expidib una declaration de 2.500 pala-
bras declaraudo que is carte abierta del PCUS "est6, en completa
armenia con las opinions y is linen de nuestro partido." Declaran
que una carte enviada el 20 de enero de 1962 al CC del PC chino
"describib en detalle las actividades extremademente perniciosas
de los representantes chinos a las organizaciones internacionales
y las opiniones incorrectas de los lideres del PC chino sobre cues-
tiones politicas b..sicas;" Pero "los hechos y argumentaci6n de
dicha carts no recibieron contestaci6n directs por parte del lide-
rato del PC chino, que se neg6 a tratarlaa." Otra carte fue envia-
da el 9 de Julio de 1962. Los checos tambi6n alegan que is aeria,
reducci6n en las relaciones comerciales con China, "por culpa de
los representantes chinos," ocasion6 "grave dafio" a la economic
nacional de Checoslovaquia y otros paises socialistas.
20 Julio: Todos los diarios de Pekin destacaron en primera plena
una dec araci6n fechada el 19 de Julio per un portavoz del CC de PC
chino sobre la carte abierta del PLUS. En pdginas interiores pu-
blicaron el texto integro de la carta del PCUS (en muehas partes
en negrita) asi como una declaracion editorial del "Diario del
Pueblo." Dicho diario tambi6n public6 de nuevo el texto de la
carta del PC chino de 14 de 'unto "pare que los miembros del PC
chino y el pueblo chino puedan conocer las opinions de ambos lados
y las comparen y estudien." La declaration del PC chino expres6
tambi6n que los diarios nacionales, provinciales y urbanos tambi6n
publicarian la carte del PCUS y que ambas cartas serian difundidas
al mundo entero en machos idiomas.
Estrin jugando otra vez una partida con su propia carta "pare
que nuestros adversarios tengan el material a an disposition pars
criticar a su altura. Hablando francamente, haste shore, las cri-
ticas no eaten a su altura no convencen." Afaden: "existe solo
una raz n por ].a cual estamos transmitiendo la carts abierta del
i4 de Julio del CC de PCUS: es una obra extraordinaria. En cita
de un poems chino: 'Una obra extraordinaria debe ser gozada en
conjunto y dudas analizadas en compafiia.' ... is carts abierta del
PCUS es material superlativo pare aprender por medio de ejemplo
negativo." La declaraci6i eoncluye: "los imperialis as, encabbe-
zados por los Estados Unidos, y los reaccionarios de la India y
is carrilla de revisionistas de Yugoslavia is. han aclamado todos
de una voz y han difamado al PCC. Tales declaraciones merecen aten.
cibn. Seleccionaremos las sobresalientes y las publicaremos para
clue todos los miembros de nuestro Partido y todo al pueblo chino
las pueda apreciar."
La nota editorial del "Diario del Pueblo" acusa a la carts
de tratar de confundir y de envenenar las mentes del pueblo con
relation a una guerra nuclear, tratando de atribuirle la acusaci6n
viciosa de belicosidad a la China, y, en particular, atacar al ca-
marada Mao Tse-tung. Al acusar a los lideres chinos de oar una
vuelta de 180 grados al evaluar el Vig6simo Congreso del PCUS, "log
lideres del PLUS saben bien que el CC del PCUS nunca ha considerado
al Vig6simo Congreso del PLUS enteramente positivo." "Tomemos otro
ejemplo, is euesti6n de la extension de is divergencias ideol6gicas
hasta is esfera de relaciones de estado. El hecho es que el 16 de
Julio de 1960 el lado sovi6tico de pronto notific6 a China su deci-
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un mes, de abolir los cientos de acuerdos y contratos que habla
firmado, y de descontinuar las provisiones de muchos accesorios im-
portantes de equipo y de materiales ... Sin embargo el CC del PCUS
le hecha la culpa a China... ;Tal reversi n de a verdad es real-
mente sorprendente! La carta abierta es-t-if llena de ejemplos de esta
ndole -- nada menos ue de 70 a 80 -- y as imposible presentarlos
todos aqu . roveeremos el material necesario para aclarar estas
situaciones en articulos futuros."
20 Julio: El 6rgan del Partido de Alemania Oriental "Neues Deuts-
chla "nd public6 un editorial de 5.000 palabras apoyando completamen-
te la Carta abierta del PCUS, incluyendo la declaraci6n de que bue-
nas relaciones entre el RPC y los otros passes socialistas "han
cambiado con el comienzo del 'gran paso adelante.'" Tambi6n, dicen
los alemanes que "es significante que.la carts completa del 14 de
junio del CC del PC chino no contiene ni una sola palabra acerca de
la democracia socialista ... Posiblemente est6 relacionado con el
hecho que los lideres del PC chino tienen un concepto especial de
la democracia socialista. Recordamos, por ejemplo, que estaban
ilevando a Cabo una campafa, bajo la frase de reclamo: 'Que Fiorez-
can Cien Flores, Que Batallen Cien Modos de Pensar.'" Pero "el
liderato mismo del PCC ha hecho todo to contrario ... Mientras que
en su declaraci6n del 1960 los partidos obreros y comunistas prosi-
guieron del hecho de que en nuestra 6poca de transici6n del capi-
talismo al socialisto la lucha entre los dos sistemas mundiales es
el suceso principal, los lideres del PC chino niegan este hecho y
sostienen que la lucha del movimiento de liberaci6n nacional en
Asia, Africa y la Am6rica Latina representa el frente de lucha prim
cipal, el centro de la tormenta de la revoluci6n mundial.'..."
20 Julio: La delegaci6n del PKI encabezada per el presidente Aidit
1 eg a Moscu. La agencia de noticias china Sinjua inform6 qua
Aidit declar6 en el aeropuerto de Jakarta: "los imperialistas y
los revisionistas yugoslavos estaban tratando hasta el 'fltimo extre?
mo de torpedear las conversaciones entre el PCUS y el PC chino" y:
"For mi parte, creo, que conducir consultas con estos dos partidos
comunistas no sera solamente en los intereses del movimiento inter-
nacional, pero tambi6n en el inter6s del desarrollo de las nuevas
fierzas que est6n surgiando." En contestaci6n a una pregunta de
un corresponsal del Occidente, Aidit dijo; "Yo, y el PKI, hemos
respaldado is declaraci6n de Moscd porque declara en frases defini-
tivas, que todos los comunistas deben condenar y de desenmasearar el
revisionismo moderno."
20-21 Julio: Las conversaciones bilaterales PCUS-PC chino termina-
ron el 20, presididas por Kruschev en un banquete ofrecido por el
Presidium del PCUS para sus delegados. Un comunicado breve emitido
el 21 declar6 solo que "atrav6s de is reuni6n, ambos lados expusie-
ron sus puntos de vista y sus posiciones sobre varios asuntos irn-
portantes de principio en los desarrollos del mundo contempordneo,
el movimiento internacional comunista, y las relaciones sino-sovi6ti-
cas. A sugesti6n de la delegaci6n del PC chino, acordaron tomar un
int6rvalo del trabajo pars continuar con is reuni6n mds tarde. El
Lugar y is hors de la cunt nuaci n de is reuni n se acordar adi-
cionalmente atrav6s de consultas entre el CC del PCUS y el CC del
PC chino." Pekin inform6 que el mismo Mao "y otros lideres del
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presentee Para darle la tremenda bienvenida a la delegaci6n" en Pe-
20-22 Julio: Moscil anunc16 el dia 20 que los jefes de los partidos
de los pa ses del CAEM se reunirsan en Moscd el 24 de Julio Para
"discutir un informe del Comite Ejecutivo del CAEM sobre trabajo
que ha de llevar a cabo las decisions de la conferencia de junco
del 1962 del CAEM... y la otra tarea del desarrollo de cooperaci6n
econ6mica entre estos dos passes." El Washington Post" del 22 de
Julio informb una entrevista concedida por Mihai Ciobanu, "Presi-
dente de la Camera de Comercio de Rumania, que ha surgido recien-
temente comp el portavoz de su pass en las relaciones no solamente
con el bloque sino con el mundo Occidental." en el cual conden6
al CAEM por haber fracasado con respecto a "los derechos, los inte-
reses y la soberania" de su pals. Ciobanu dijo que "mess de un ter-
cio" del equipo capital Para la industrializaci6n de Rumania desde
el comienzo del plan de seas aflos en el 1960 habla llegado del Oc-
cidente. El corresponsal afiade que "los economistas extranjeros
aqui opinan que la estadistica es realmente 60 por ciento o mess."
21 Julio: Todos los per16dicos de Pekin le dieron importancia a
un informe de is. agencia de noticias china Sinjud que el CC del
PCUS en una nueva ola de oposici6n al PC chino ha "puesto en mo-
vimiento todo su medio de propaganda para lanzar calumnias sin fre-
no y difamaciones." "Pravda" y otros peri6dicos se dice que han
publicado declaraciones "tratando escandalosamente de inciter al
pueblo chino y a los miembros del PC chino en contra del amado li-
derato del PC chino,"
21 Julio: El 6rgano hungaro "Nepazabadsag" declares que los partidos
y lo; 1 Beres Marxists-Leninistas "coadenan unanimemente las acti-
vidades cismdticas de los lideres chinos y su divergencia de los
principios gulas de Lenin." Describe particularmente a los parti-
dos franceses, alemanes, austriacos, colombianos y chilenos come
apoyando la Linea de conducta sovidtica.
21 Julio: El 6rgano checo "Rude Pravo" aladib otro editorial
apoyando la linea de conducta china y "condenando la Linea de con-
ducta divergente" de los chinos.
22 Julio: Tanyug inform6 que Yugoslavia y la Unibn SoviOtica han
firmado un protocolo bajo su acuerdo de comercio del 1961-65 bajo
el cual los expertos sovi6ticos serdn mandados a Yugoslavia Para
aconsejar en la instalaci6n del equipo sovi6tico que ha de mandarse
a Yugoslavia. T6cnicos yugoslavos ser6n entrenados en la Unibn
Sovi&tica. Informes de prensa de Moscu. sobre el anuncio de que
Kruschev habla aceptado una invitaci6n Para visitar a Hungria espe-
cularon que posiblemente to combine con su planeado viaje a Yugos-
lavia en agosto (anunciado per Kruschev en una recepci6n en is.
enba jades hungara).
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 Approved F2rH~ IP9.9/O/3 IRjl Fas- @00200020006-3
No. 8
9 - 22 juillet 1963
9juillet - Pravda a publie un communique de 70o mots du
parts eommuniste le l 'Union Sovietique attaquant la mani-
festation du 7 juillet a Pekin an tours de laquelle furent
applaudis lee 5 Chinois expulses de 1'Union Sovietique pour
"dissemination illegale" de la lettre du 14 juin du P.C.
chinois;"Cela no pout etre considers que comme une action
concertee tendant a faire naitre chez le peuple fraternol
chinois des sentiments et un etat d'esprit hostiles" a 1'e-
gard de 1'Union Sovietique, a agraver la situation alors que
lee negotiations sont en tours... sans tenir tompte des con-
11
.
sequences danp.ereuses d'une pareillee nolitiaue
9-16 luillet L'Agence yougor lavo. Tanyu. : nnonco do uo rost
la publication de prospectus en langue roumaine qui soutien-
nent la politique etrangere Sovietique. Le premier. date du
9 juillet,eontient sous le titre de "coexistence pacifique"
"une critique objective des tendances do?matiques dans le
mouvement international des travailleurs, et rentionne
"l'absurdite de la theorie d'exportation de la revolution et
parle des principes actuels selon lesquels la coexistence et
le desarmement faeiliteront le pro res de la liberation a =
tionale . Le deuxieme, date du 16, eat consacre aux nego-
tiations tripartites de Moscow sur 1'interdiction des essais
atomiques, et "souligne sans equivoque le devouement de la
Roumanie a fides du desarmement general" et "salue et sou-
tient lee initiatives sovietiques" dans sea negotiations.
10 uillet - Tous lea journaux de Pekin publient en Jere
page des articles allant jusqu'a 1.2oo mots, la declaration
du 10 juillet faite par le parti communiste chinois en re-
ponse a cells du 9 juillet du P.C. de 1'Union Sovietique
mentionnee ci-dessus, cells-ci etant publiee en bas de la
page, Les Chinois se plaignent de ce que l'accusation du
P.C. de 1'Union Sovietique "etait tellement injustiftee" et
se dsmandent at ce n'est pas eommettre un acte de calomnie
contre le P.C. chinots "que de refuser de porter 'a la con-
naissance du peuple ce que notre lettre contenait, et en
meme temps d'attaquer violemment cette meme lettre on. la
qualif cant de calomnie dirigee contre le P.C. de l'Union
Sovietique et en soulevant un tumulte enorme?" La Chine
fait preuve de "moderation", disent-ils, "ce qui no fait de
doute a personne". Soulignant que le P.C. de 1'Union Sovie-
tique a non seulement etendu lea differences ideologiques an
domaine des relations d'Etat macs "qu'ils fomentent une cam-
pagne centre le P.C. chinois a travers 1'Union Sovietique",
lea Chinois demandent "jus u'a uel oint lea camarades du P.C
P.C. de 1'Union Soviets ue ont-ils 1 in ention de porter le
dMdrend s o-soviets ueg La presse ch noise a publie
ega ement un communique e 1'Agence de presse de la Chine
nouvelle emanant de Moscou qui mentionne "la campag,ne fomen-
tee par le comite central et le P.C. de l'Union Sovietique
au moyen do reunions et de resolutions prises par lea orga-
Approve 'or Re 1. 9& b 1 : ?A-`~8 '! -8H6TA6682000 bb56s-3
 Ap cipau Cournauxsov e ~gsaaq~ua Te ia_trin-
10 iuillet - Les Chinois et lee Albanais pr-)fitent de l'oc-
casion du jour de 1'armee albanaise pour souligner lour so-
lidarite ideologique contre is revisionnisme moderns.
10 juillet - Une delegation du parti et du gouvernement hon-
grois ayant a sa tete Kadar eat arrivee a Moseou pour y faire
une visite que lea observateurs considerent avoir ete arran-
gee a un moment propice pour prouver la solidarite des euro-
peens de l'Est d'un cote et le P.C. de l'U.R.S.S. de l'autre.
IChrouchtchef a fait une reception chaleureuse a Kadar,.qui
fait contraste avec la mantere dont it a ignore la delegation
chinoise.
11 juillet - Le deuxieme anniversaire du traite de l'amitie
entre la Chine et la Coree du Nord a servi de pretexte pour
mettre en relief leur solidarite ideologique contre is revi-
sionnisme moderne. De haute fonctionniroo chinolo , c;n Co;-1-
mencant par Chou, ont prix part a un rassemblement en masse
a Pekin, au cours duquel Kuo Mo-jo, vice-president de la
conference politique consultative des peuples chinois,a porte~
au tours de son discours l'accusation suivante:"Certains pre-
tendus marxistes-leninistes ont applaudi la soi-disant stra-
tegie de paix de Kennedy,et font de lour mieux pour faire pa-
raltre l'imperialisme americain et son chef Kennedy sous le
meilleur jour. Its trompent is peuple a des fins dans l'in-
tention de soutenir lea projets agressifs de l'imperialisme
des Etats-Unis".
13 iuillet - C'est pour la premiere fois que l'un des adver-
saires d Clare publiquement que lea entretiens entre partis
sont en cours a Moscou. Cette declaration eat contenue dans
un editorial de 2.200 mots paru dans la Quotidian du Peuple
qui reconnalt 1'existence "de divergences d ' __._-__.
prlnc ipe impor-
tantes et nombreuses" entre lea deux partis, divergences "de
nature serieuse, et se plaignait que "lee presenter comme
etant soulevees entre is P.C. chinois d'un cote et tout le
mouvement international communists de l'autre eat contraire
aux faits et no contribue pas a l'elinination de ces divver-
genes iialgre lea agissements "navrants" des Soviets a la
veille des entretiensI lea Chinois "se sont abstenus. de pren-
dre des mesures qui s imposaient" et ant envoys lour delega-
tion a la reunion. "iIais nous devons souligner maintenant,
le coeur lourd, que lee evenements ont prix une tournure au-
tre. quo celle que nous esperions. Au vu des agissements so-
vietiques, "les peupies soot pleinement justifies a se deman-
der at le comite central du P.C. de l'Union Sovietique a i'in-
tention de pousser lea relations sino-sovietigues usg3i auk
aeuil d'unerupture., Ii eat impossible d imposer un blocus
des idees et it eat impossible de resoudre des differends i-
deologiques a coups de ddcrets et d'ordres... Bien des ^ens
ont commis des folies pareilles dans is passe, et ils ont
tous echoue," Mats lea differends seront resolus, diseat-ils
at vraiment l'on se traitait l'un l'autre en egaux au lieu
que chacun essaye de s'imposer a l'autre. Si lea differends
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 App W*W0R a 19g!/08li4glOP4 P78dd '6AQ4A2?AQ2 U
attendre jusqu'a demain. S'ils rte pouvaient pas titre reso-
lus cette annee, ils peuvent attendre jusqu'a l'an prochain'.'
14 .iuillet - Le Quotidien du Peuple a reproduit un article
as 1 0_b rver qui Be plaignait amerement des efforts au'ac-
com. liasent lea E tats Unis dans le but de sedu~.rel pion
Sovi ti ue en a tie a s opposer a la Chine, eta em;?oisonner
lea relations sino-sov ti ue t'. L 'article accuse apee-
ria isms des Etats Unis d avoir "fausse a dessein les o'-)i-
nions revolu ionnaires du P.C. chinois, affirmant que la"
Chine s'opposait a la coexistence pacifique, et belliqueuse,
et preche l'exportation de la revolution", (mats c'est ex-
actement ce que fait le P.C. de l'Union Sovietique clans sa
lettre publiee simultanement, - voir ci-dessous).
14 ,)uillet - Un bref article par le Tokyo lainichi concer-
nant lea observations faites par le ministere des aaires
etrangeires japonais our lea entretiens, declare que d'apres
le ministers des affaires etrangeres it y aurait 88 partis
communistes dans le monde, dont 22 sont pro-sovietiques, 6
pro-chinois, "et le reste adoptant surtout une attitude
d'opportunisme neutre. Le ministere des affaires etran-b-
res declare cependant qu'll y a un certain nombre de partis
pretendus neutres qui penchent vers la Chine communiste,
tels par exemple ceux du Japon et de la Roumanie. Par con-
sequent, is ministers des affaires etrangeres prend note du
fait qu'un certain leader communiste chinois a declare que
la moitie des parties communistes du monde soutenaient la
Chine communiste".
14 .fuillet - Pravda publie une lettre nuverte de 22.000
Mots "du comite central du P.C sov tits ue Aoutes lea or-
ganisations de artis et tousles communistes de l"Jnion
Sov__3tigue; " ells publie enf in egalement le texts d..o J a
lettre du 14 uillet du P.C. chinois a laquelle sa Tttre
ouverte constitue une reponse. E ant donnee la lon-:ueur
et 1'importance de cette lettre, nous en donnons l'analyse
a la fin de notre chronologie. La lettre du parti co:l1iunis-
tede l'Union Sovietique a ete reprodu to en entier, avvec
le texts de la lettre du 14 tuin du P.C, chinois, le 15
juillet dans le Rabotnichesko Delo, organe du parti bulgare,
le Rude Pravo, organs tchecue, et le Neues Deutschland,
organs de i Aliemagne de 1 Est; she a et le 1 par le
Nepszabadsa, organe du parts hongrois. L'organe polonais
Trvbuna Ludu du 15 donnait en entier le texte de la lettre
du P.C. de I'Union Sovietique mats no donnait que des ox-
traits de la lettre du P.C. chinois. (Cette information a
ete donnee par la presse de Pekin le 17, mats sans reprodui-
re le contenu de la lettre du P.C. de 1'Union Sovietique.)
Les Roumains restent "differents des autres", et suivirent
plus tard on pi.bliant lea deux lettres dans leur organe
Scinteia la premiere moitie is 17 et la deuxieme moitie is
18. Le 19 juillet, taus lea journaux de la iongolie pu-
bliaient le texts de la lottre du P.C. de .'Union Sovietique
(mail ne semblent pas avoir publie celui de la lettre chi-
noise).
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 Apprli lIeaT~ 1 3'W9n4a8C4A OP ! 03?6SA?0~~@~n~~ 6r3`
ana is uotidien du Peuple attaque violemment "le -:roupe
de Tito" pour avoir 'attisi lea flammes avec frenesie, em-
poisonne lea relations sino-sovietiques, detruit 1'harmonie
entre le Chine et l'Union Sovietique ainsi que cells du
mouvement international communists, et avoir offert sa
merchandise qui,a la connaissance de tous,consists de r6
visionnisme moderne".
15 .uillet - La Pravda publie un editorial de 2,500 mots
concern "la lettre ouverte" du P.C. sovietique et decla-
re que cette lettre a ete publiee "le jour precedent" "en
raison des ais~sements hostiles des leaders du P.C. chinois,
de leur desi-ir dTenvenimer a discorde qui exists dans le
mouvement communists international et qu' ils ont eu:.-::trees
souleve la deformation intentionnelle '-~
, qu ils apportellt a la
position de notre parti et de l'interpretation incoherente
des :raisons qui nous ont pousses a nous abstenir tempo-
rairement de publier la lettre du P.C. chinois du 14 juin.
Ayant confondu notre patience avec de la faiblesse, lea
camarades chinois se mirent a tralter notre desir d'eviter
d'envenimer la controverse comme s'il constituait presque
une Intention de cacher aux communistes sovietiques et aux
peuples sovietiques lea opinions des leaders chinois."
L'editorial va jusqu'a accuser lea Chinois de "etablir et
tenir des positions s eciales sur lea questions raciales
d'au ourd'hui . Le reste de 1 editor al consists en une
revue raps a de la position sovietique sur lea questions
importantes de la controverse, telles qu'elles ont etc
presentees dans la lettre ouverte. Izvestiya consacre un
editorial sur le memo sujet, soulignant le`soutien accords
au point de vue du P.C. sovietique par is peuple de 1'Union
Sovietique.
16 uillet - tin article de 2.000 mots si ,ne bbservateur
dans le uotidien du peuple attaque "les rcactionnaires de
1'Inde dans le choeur ant Chinois", se servant de phrases
presque identiques a celles de leur attaque du 14 juillet
diri8ee contre lee Etats Unis:"La tactique de Nehru, qui
lotions entre Chinois et Soviets consists a a rouve r 1 U-
-
nion Soviets ue et a Beni g rer la Chine- F
faire la con
a 1 Union Sovi tigue et a attaguer la Chine..'
16 juillet - La Pravda publie un editorial de 1,400 mots
sur'unite indestructible du parts et du peuple" qui de-
crit la maniere dont "les communistes et tout le peuple so-
vietique ont reagi, avec ferme approbation a la lettre ou-
verte". Un editorial de 1.000 mots dans Izvest i, "un
soutien puissant" alla memo jusqu'a declarer que la proese
des pays socialistes et des bartis communistes dans los
pays capitalietes part-3c cnt ioro.:tont 1c, poc it ion pri :c derv'
la lettre ouverte", et elle cite le Rude Pravo tchecue et
la Tr_ybuna Ludu polonaise ainsi.que 1 Humanite et 1 Unita
en tant q exemples.
App 16 V2 uillet IeaRude
malo. 4 ~'lD-b%v6c,`A(2OOb'
 l,-
et le jouri al slovaoue Bratislava ~ravd.a -Dublient
App jkEo .(R(Y 1~.{OO 'C~Kb A 4 - 49 c,
cc, t,orial qui suit f id.61einont, 1C. 1i ne du . art SO J .4 :-C
jucque dcno sa phr seolo-ie. zSttaquaat 1a. 1etctre du
juin clu ::'. C. Chiuoiw Gee le d.6 gut, 11 dcclcrc r'tou is 1'
?oi1CC... so trouve no:-i seulo-ent sur-.iris )a:r son ton c eda.i-
' nouet soil vocabula ire qui eat loin d I etrc `le t, on
~icngi e de respect envers 1a realitd' et les faitcobj: cti:: s,
cc rudesse en ,pro Brant lee accusations lea ,plus roc Li i1c3
contre is norti sovietiquc :t d'autrea lDerti^ 0 :l e"OC-?.:
co C1 1i r2. ~~e lc vue... ect is fit de souli' 1cr Cilw COS O
la l: ''. ne revolut iOnna ire, oppo aeea lc. Pro te''t(f.uc 11 *a : o":)--
")o rtuniste et r0visioilniste d.2 cer t a inso ei1
l6 IL171~.O:~ - e Sz'D'.Cdorr?an.e Ctu 1-) rti 110'1' roi_e, iL iu
suivre le texte sloe d.eu ' lettres d'u_n editoi'ial dC: 1OO
"Otis qui cOnd.4'i ne les Chinoi$ pour c.voir "caorc le i:. .J_; uicer
e,ncora -plus le co!."..f lit de tlaniere 'a -oouvoir, am
ter-3retitionc arbitra ires de deformation et de fa.lcia icy --
tio,l de la li'":.ne deo oartis co lalun.istes et trc.vaillDi).m.
C ic:cute co'njointeiont et u liverselle.zent, ii_r_3ose au :ou
Ve,1cn" co,]_Iuniste sea Oro-iros vues -,aroiolde,lent erroaccc
cui out ete re ut es aussi bisu. par l'hictoire quo --)ar
la realite ';3r seilte, " et of ir,:le quo "los coti.luni"'G,De
loll .roil sent entiere:x,ent daccoro aver la lettire d.u
do 1'Unio-n Jovieciaue. "
1.7, ?juillet Touc lee journaux do " ofic. publient C "c .-
uorir u._ soul ir;na_nt 1' i?m aorta nce do lc lettre du C . de
l'U,n:'LO.n 33-ovidtiq
a:,otnicries!:o iielo,, oruc'cle du ')anti,
a. i- r :e quo "lea travailleurs bul pares etr0itc.iont .1.LC
autour du )4 rti co:?:'.!iuniste bul,_are, ui4ft ;fur soil co?.:2itc
central, e::?7riwent de nouveau leur soutien chaleurc'Lt:: cU
ra:1c1 )a1'ti co ? luniste de 1'Uniou. ,ovietique, ... it
17nuillet - Le ''olitt'za your oslave declare quo "ler] tec.
c%ers ce e,ci~1 se sent ert2ba.rques en uric croi-c de con-U'-cro
cou lea a33't1 e COi11'":luilj a t,2e, l-s 'OUVc 1e,1t?3 C1. ;2ocrc!t"iq o3,
lea '.:Cris pro, ressi e, centre lea idea rec~.les c?.ci i4 rx.is .
le-le niccie qui ont etc c,.ebarrase es avec le cuecee quo
Von sait des residus du stc.linis.Lie." Le jou:.-ic.i Co-aclu:c:
''I1 lC' pout titre question d.'un co_1,irociis avoc leg idccc
rcac -ioianj hires et caduques dee' Chinois,,'puicCue la: 'Oi'_idre
C0'aCecsio'u a leurs vues presentes entra inerait la G: iii .e
du coc ialis.,?e Clam soil ease-ible, p uiscue cola equivcu-
Cdi'ait a rcnier los verita."31es idees du socialis?.,lo.
cctte raison ic: resolution du -.C. sovieticjue Gvec
i
Uclle: ' e sa fete, clans le conl;Elit 4:vec few dar:_~a"cL ce,~ 6e
in,est non seule2ent soute,iue ?par lea i,arti c co tic coe,
ale er ule,.ilent :.far tout Jos Leas ,pro r e c a L'! du O d c.
.0111.11$1, 1'0r'_e e du ,3arti Jou:osla:vc, ) hi1c' i''v L1O. .'-
c 1010 analoTuevle jour savant.
1 Fj~.?illet - Lo Trud de Loseou 13ubl ait un. article do 50.2.
corree-:)ondant en vo a ,e on Chine apres is cel6bra:t:LO:i c:Lz
?1rO Tier 1,1x:1 1963, dons icquel celui-ci se iglu l.U do 1 ' in-
: ratitude ,:aailt este'e -,jar le 2.0. chinois dans cc iocoil
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5
 d'ignorer 1'aide annortee }gar lea Soviets. E7alement
Appr gl ~Q Iga&~e1: O 1 I~!e s~0 ~06-3
mahquant, do sa`esse de soulever parmi le peuple fro ter-
ael clainois des sentiments et un etat'.d'esprit hostiles
envers 1'U.R.S.S. Ceci evidemment nous a fait de la peine.
=rows avons pense: Qui a besoin de cola et pourquoi faire?"
Le memo jour, Krasna e Zvezda, journal des forces an', es,
publiait en premiere gage des compte-rendus do rapports
faits par des officiers superieurs aux academies
taires superieures our la nature du differend et our lo
point do vue du parti sovietique.
1C u fillet - 'Irybuna Ludu, organe du parti polonais, pu--
bli it un editorial de 2.100 mots qui, bien quo plus ~no-
dcre dins son opposition a la ligne chinoise quo ne font
etc los autres organes du bloc sovietique, assurait dd son
antler soutien de la ligne du parti communiste sovietique
on tormes lea plus clairs.
lQ Ju llot - La presse chinoise fait connaitre, clans un
e po:.^tage sur lea obseques, que l'ornbassadeur albanais
on Chine ainsi que six autres camarades albanais, at le
secreteire commercial de l'ambassade chinoise on Afaanis-
tan avec deux courriers chinois, ont6te' tugs dans is ca-
tastrophe de l'avion sovietique du 13 juillet, qu'un
iU-1011 qui los transportait do Pekin a :Hioscou s'ccrasa
1' attorrissa`;s a Irkutsk. Les funeraillc:s :prirent
l'ellure d'un ovenement d'Etat, avec couronZnes du premier
iainistre Chou En-lai entre autres, at on presence cl.u vice
premier ministre Chen Yi.
lQ uillot - La Pravda public un article do 2.000 hots
jar Stcpanov, d6 on dant la conception sovietique d.' aide
au mouvomcnt do liberation nationals, at comportant 1 t ac-
cusation quo "les camarados chi,nois so rofusontosoonticl-
1e cnt a reconnaitrF on tart due rcvluionnsirec uno
scule csure unesoulo action qu n ontrainc avec cllo
1 occur de la i)oudre.
'
-ju;illet - L'ag,cncc indonasionno Antara fait savoir
quo lo prdsidoht du parti communists indondsicn AicLit
a declare:"Jc voudrais affirmer do nouveau quo los co
munistos indonesiens n'ont pas la pre tent ion do dovo.nit
los mediatours car ils n'ont pas l'impression d'etrc on
dc?_iors do la brands discussion prGsento qui a lieu dons
lo mouvomont international conimuniste.., Lc P.C. i,_zdo-
nosien ostime qu' it strait bon do proc6dor c dos ontro -
tiers bilatoraux... at do raunir tous los partis .;rc~rxis-
tos-le'ninistoo." L'agence indon6sionno poursuit on dc-
cla:rant:"Los obscrvatcurc ont note qu'unc fois do plus
Aidit a ovite do prondro lo parti dos comrnunistco chi-
nols ouvorte;nont of on public. Comma on lo sait, l,::s
orr~.'ani sat ions of los loaders du P.C. indonc`sion avalont
soutcnu lcs Chinois aux reunions inter?rationales ct dons
dos articles do prosso cur des problcnmcs v&rics."
13Y juillot - Los journaux conimunistos do Sidney at do
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 !.Iolbournc, d'apres la Australian Overseas Servioo, doe1a-
Appr FVrcR&keassait999M8/24 tGm.l . @P78 3WU00620002 6
parti a Victoria on raison dos difforonds ontro Pekin of
aloscou attcint maintonanta lo total do 62. Lo comit6 cen-
tral pretond quo ccci cat l'offof d'un effort concerto du
;roupc a la tctc duquol so trouvo E, F. Hill, ancien so-
cretairc do Victoria, qui a rcjctd la politique do coox-
ictonco pacifiquo, dans lo but do creer la confusion at
unc impression quo lc parti souffro d'uno rupture niajourc.
13 uillet - El Silo , organs officiol du P.C. chilicn,
G l f'irlnc ctro d7ac orravoc lo P. C. do lUnion Sovi6tiquc
contrc "lea divagations calomniouses" dcs Chinois qui "sort
non soulo-mont faussos inais qui falsifiont at trahisscnt lo
-marxisrno."
19 uillet - L'editorial du Quotidian du 1cuplc "dovoilant
la frauds nuclcairo dos Etats Unis conclut: ous osperons
quo 1'Union Sovietiquo no tombora pas dans cotto trapPpc."
Lo memo jour, is prosso pdkinoise public d'uno manibrc
provoquanto on prorai6ro page lo compte-rondu conccrnant
un rasaoinblomont do plus do 10.000 Chinois A Pal i11, qui
accouilliront chalourcusoment is de1dgation chinoiso do
rotour du con_res do la Fd'dcration d6mocratiquc intcriia-
le dos fcamcs tcnuo a i oscou. "Uno resolution adoptoo a
cc ra somblemont, Darmi un tonnerrc d'apploudisacnioits,
prof ottait un souticn complot dos activitds do la d616-a-
tion dos f ornmcs chinoises of do la li, no corrcc uo gu' ollec
ont constamiiiont soutcnue au tours du concerns. La rosolu-
dl oata.on des fomrnc,s__so-
tion condamnait lc chef do is
viotiguc of curtains loaders do is iicdcrat .o~1 c7cnoc oti-
quc intornationalc dos fammos pour avoir fait ouvorto wont
un choour anti-chinois au tours du coat-res, oi, maul^.l u~^
arro -ante at l fa on arbi ra rc do ortor at'ccffi-66 la
dci_iocrGuic ainsi Quo our lours a,isserkcnte scctaires ct
sc snt is discor?do, Tong Yin: -chao qui a ouvort lo ro ^-
soinblcmcnt, a ditquo la d6logation chinoise "... ^ou-'Q-
na!it la lutto conirnuna contrc 1'ciznoini., qu'allc a.vait _?ro--
tc`o cos positions avcc sU5as au c`ours d'unc 1~utc v?o-
lonto of intonso contrc lop attu ues, lea caloiiinicw of
hl.
lea manoouvros los plus bassos. Lo chof die la do16-,.tion
yang Yun-yu a doclar6 quo ua l'cffct dos iiianipulations
d.c Popova, chof do is delegation aovictiquc, " lo coi-K-roe
"so deroula dune faoon tros you satisfaisanto." ? eto,
d.it-ollc, "le congroU lc plus mauvais of lc iioins
cratiquc qui alt jainais ou lieu dana 1'histoire do is .2!0-
duration domocratiquc internationals dos foniinos."
1,:_, ,uillct - L"Agoncc do pressc do is Chino nouvollc an-
nonco quo 3 juillot lc Souvornoinont tctzequc a dc.iola.cdo 1s
rappel do trois correspond.ants chinois do 1'Agonoc d.c
prosso do is Chine nouvollc qui so trouvaicnt a PrC;`;uc,
( l' opoquo, d.oux d' ontro oux so trouvaicnt a 261-,.in),
protextant quo lours communiques contcnaiont do is >o-
lomiquo chinoiso. L' a nbassadour chinois "rojota cctto
roqucto ddraisonnablc sur placo, " at lo 13 juillct,1'aiii-
basoado protostait vigourcuscraont at rc jetcit catogoriquc
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 mont cetto domandc dcraisonnablo." Toutcfoic, 10 17 juillet
Approvedu Qifeiiease tl$$S4Q8/ : CJA DPi718-G3064A W2DDfl2D0D64 a
n'aiont pas donnd suite a lour roquotc do rappo1. (D'au-
tro part, l'A onco do presse do la Chino nouvcllo poursuit
toujourn Ica activitos contra to quollos sou: a:vons pro-
toste". Los Tchoquos rotirbrent la carte do presse au'
corrospondant so trouvant on Tchecoalovaquio at lui don-
neront 43 houras pour quitter lo pays. "Do cotta manibro
lo g;ouvcrnemont tcllequo a provoque un inoidcnt nerzou',
cement 1'unite entre los pouples chinois of cchccoslosa~uc
et~.ortuntattointo aux rola:tio,j Gino-tchccorz,lQv~~~.'
La 20 juillet, tous lea jqurna.ux do P61-,in publiaiont una
dcclarati.on du min.istbro dos affaircs etran errs chinois
concornant cotta expulsion, ainsi quo Ica cormentairc do
l'Agonco do presse do la Chino nouvelle. Le 20 juillot,
Prauuo faisait egalemont paraitro uno declaration du -ou-
vcrnomont tchcquo our 11incident, declarant quo to co;.-
roapondant oxpulso avait quitte le pays lo 19 juilict.
1 _, ui le - Prcnant lay parole o uno reunion au Xrc~~l.in
on 1 honnour do is visito du chef hog grois Kadar, ;hi^auch-
tchof, d'apres lo t6:ioignago do corrospondants occidcnltau;L,
fit cclator un barrage improvise contra los co~s`,unisto ,
chorchant coo mots, manilcctomont scrioux at appolant
1'audionco k eon aide lorsqu'il so mottait a bafouillar a
la recherche d'un mot, Khrouchtchcf aurait dit:''Jo d
clarc a roux qui voudr.aiont noun ronvorsor: jo vous defio,
iicsciours. Camarados, prcnons n' i :,parto quollo unino ou
n.'isporte qucllo farm collcctivo. Vous y prescntorcz,
votro pro rammo at nouc ir prescntcron 1c notro. Laissons
1c- pcuplo jug,or. Et vows pouvcz otro surs quo vouc nczu-
roz Pao bosoin d'armuro ou do rombourrago pour vouc pro-
tcor... "
19 juillet - Le comitaj central du par; ti tchcquo a fait
pars itrc uno declaration do 2.500 mots d'aprbs laqualle
la lottro ouvorto du P.C. covi6tiquo "s'harmoniso ontio-
remont avoc los vuos at Ica lignos do conduito do notra
parti.". I1 dcclaro qu'uno lettro onvoy6c be 20 juillat
1962 au eomite central du P.C. chinois "prccisait on dc--
tails tan agi^conionts oxtrc;:momont nuisiblos dos ra rascn-
tants chinoic aux or-anications intcrnaat .onaloo, ai'1na_
quo los opinions ineorroctos dos chefs du parti comriunis-
to chinois cur loo questions politiquc fond~a;ie,lc~:les;"
macs, "loo faits at los arguments do cotta lettr(", a:n'cu-
rent pas do re:)onsc dirocto do is part dos chefs du par-
ti communisto chinois qui rofuscront Von tonir corpta."
Unc tdouxiemo lettro fut onvoycc lo 9 juillet 1962, i 2. Los
Tcihcqucs. prdtondant oGalemont quo la cause do 1 oconomic
nationalc do is Tchacoslovaquio at d'autros pa..-,r s #boc].a
Mates L?, cubs "dos torts odrioux" du -?alt do la r6duc.-
tion abruptc dos relations eommcreialos avoc la Chine "par
la fauto do, roprcecntants chinois."
2 uillot - Touc law journaux do Pekin annoncont on pro-
i cro patio is declaration datdo du 19 juillct d'un ~orto-
oa.rolc du comitc central du parts coaimunictc chinois au
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3
8
 Apprlu, , e, oScRg~ a~ t~ 9 t UtzR1D.F~78 30~6*I ( 2( ~(d Ql&~z3c.
Sur 1'un.e doe uutros paG on, ila: publicront lc toxto on
onticr do la lottrc eovictiquo (avcc do nombroux pas.3a ?;cs
on c ,,ractoroc gran) accoLnpa,?nc do commontaires 6ditoriaux
du cuota.di_cn du Pounlo. Lo quotidian du Paolo oublia
a n }vcu lc toxic cinticr do IL la lcttro du 1~;? ~juin
4.
IS _
du P.C. chinoiu "do raniaro co quo to parti co-i aiunictc
chinoia at lo pcuplc chinoi$ OuiUsont connaitro Ica opi-
nions dca doux c6tda, lea coMparor at lce dtudicr." La de-
claro,tion du P.C. chinoi^ proct$ait quo lac journaux no-
t ionaux, provinciaux at urbaizieo do la Chinc publioraiont
0Goiclcnt la lcttro du P.C. do 1'Union Sovictiquo, at
quo Ion dcux lottro^ ecraiont radiodiffusce0 au -.iondc oa1-
tior on un grand nombro do lan3uoo. Loa Chinoia el cic:rc--
rciat qu' ilo reproduisaiont lour propro lettre "afire do
-.r)or,nottro lours adversairoo d' avoir lo materiel lour
disposition pour qu' ilo puiacont on faire uno crit iquo
a la hauteur. Pour parlor franchomcnt, juoqu'4, present
'r
cotta critiquc nra ot6 ni a la hautcur i13 coilva:inoant o
Ile a j outcrcn"i,:"I1 qu'unc raieon pour noun fo iro
radiodiffuacr la lcttro ouvorto du 1l!? juillct o:;laz~.a~gt du
c omits control du P.C. do 1Union Soviot iquc : c' u.Ut u~_1
oxorlplairo do travail roi arquablo. Pour sitar un po ._o
ohs oi$: un travail rouarquable dcvrait ctrc approcic 011-
corn ag:~io,..
a t loo doutoc dcvraicnt etrc analyco^ on
La lottro ouvorto du, P.C. do 1'Union Sovietiquc con,-lti-
tuc un do cu acnt sup0r iq poracttant_ c1' U.pl)rcndr_c?_ iaa l^ _1 t 1
e}s, e zQ atiF,'' La dcelarc tion conelut : Les inp6 L: liatcs ,
c.VCC 10$ Etato Unto a icur teto, lea rcactioimaire $ in-
d.ionc ainc i quo la clique rcvi$ionnistc you onlavc l' oast
acclanc unanimol:7cnt at ont donigrc 10 parti corn."lunisto
ohinoia. Do pareilloa d6clarctionn izioritcnt qu' on $ r
arrotc. You-- $clcctionncrona crux qui ;;16ritont dc: roco-
voa,r un prix, ct noun lo= publiorons pour quo tout lao
nombrc? do notro parts at tout lc pcupbc chinoi^ puicocnt
lc;, approc icr. "
Use note c'd.itorialc: du Q,.uotidion rdu Pcup~lo accucc
la lcttro do chorchor a Comer a confusion dana 1 coprit
du poupbo at a vorcor du poi: on our la qua: t ion. d.c ice
[ucrro nucloairc, au ,:ioyon do baaaaa accusations toiloc
quo calla do l'esprit bolliSorant quo manifoatcrait la
China, at on particulior au roy0n d'attaquoa dirig;6oa
contra lc canaradc Id Co Tso-teunS. Zia accuaant 1c12 "Ji'_11n013
d' av o it fait un rev iroront do 180 dcg,rc o, dana 1' cv ,.lac"
tion .u 200 congrcc du parts. co-maiunir to do l'Unio~-1 : o?,rIC-
tiquc "loss loadora du parti co-mia,uniste do 1'Unio_a Sovic-
tiquo savant parfaitomcnt quo lc comitc contral du ?.C.
Illinois n'a jauaio conoidere quo le 200 Bong roe du
do 1'Union Sovietiquo ait .6t6 onticrcn0nt poeitif.
Prcnoz un autro oxonplo, la qucation do fcirc o'to-adre:
lo docaccord ideoloztque au d.orlain? deo rclatiolo d Lu0t.
Le fait act quo l0 16 ?juillot 1960, lc cote soviotic?ue c
not if is aoudainmost ? la China sa d.ccioion do rotircr
]_en plus 1.300 oxpcrt$ aovictiquco on Chino dine lc cou-
rant du uoia, d'annuler lea ccntainoo d'accorda at do
Approved yflacRel c.j999 4[z,C RDP:7B- {9' lAO06266o16bo6?3'-
 Appr rvedxFor gaae 199or 4: 91t
d 90+259py?q6.3
i 4~"~
;_t ccpcndant le narti central du P.C. do 1Union tiouo accuco la Chino... un dclatrt au" i co~_lplot do la
v cit c t vrai_.cizt tonna:nt: La lcttre ouvorto Oct )Ici-
cxei.u1c do ~c cnrc - au ;roino 0 30 de cce
ng d'
1G. - at it oct l:lpocciblc ici do loo citortouc. joua
allon donor lo -matdriol nccccoairo pour 6luoidor cc^
quoctionc dano don articloo a vonir."
20 juillot - Ncuos Deutschland, orsano do 1'A1loa?acne do
.'J., public un ddi-torial do 5.000 : otc qui c.cpri:c unc
1 approbation complete do la lottro ouvorto du P.C. do ltU-
nion Sovictique, y compric la declaration quo do bol.. m.oc
relations ontro la Rcpubliquo Populairc chilaoioo at loo
autroc pays coo ialiotc; "ont chase avoc 1' avono%.ont ciu
Grand bond on avant," Lc c Allooando coulig.nont o ;alcncnt
"qu' it oct siGnif icatif quo da.noo touts la lcttrc du co-
':oitc control du P.C. chinoic du 14 juin i1 n= ait sac
un soul mot au cujct do la dcrnocratic ocialicto...
Pout-Are cola a rapport au fait quo ice lca.doro du pax^ti
co-Lz,.,:.unicto ohinoio ant unc conception opc cialc do 1a dc-
::aocratic cocialiotc. Nouc rappclono par ox32ple, qutilc
n n
avaionG 1none unc campagno sous lo sloSan do trLaiscoz
flcurir dcc containoo do flour,-, laicscz dos ccntaisico
d'ceoloo do pens-670 no faire eoncurronco." IIaic, "loo
lcadoro du parti con.nuniote chinoic cux-..icinac ont fait
lo controiro... Alorc quo dano lour d6clcration do 1960,
loc partia communictec at ouvriorc cunt partic du Drin-
cipc qu'n notro cpoquc do trancition du co.pitalic to Ou
cocialicmc la luttc cntro ice dcux syctcres conctituc to
problcrc principal, loo loadoro du parti coiimuni,ctto chi-
noi6 ronicnt cc fait at pr6tondcnt quo la luttc du 'clou-
vcr.,cnt national do liberation on Aoic, on Afriquc at. on
L mc'riquo Latins ropresonto..ic front do combat principal,
lc contra d' attaquc do la rovolut i.on nondialc...:
20 ajuillet - La dclc ration du parti com:municto ind.ori5.aicn
oya.r -c a, ca tote , lc prec idont A idit cot arrivcc a iior c ou.
L'A ;cncc do procco do la Chino nouvcllc fait oavoir qutiii-
dit4 a declare a l t aorodromo do D jal-.arta: "Lao is poria L! -tcry
at los revicionnictoc you .oslavcc chorchaicnt do lcua'
:_iicux ~1 torpillor Jos ontrotionc ontro lc parti co.:_o.1-1i tc
coo I'Union ; ovictiquo of lc parti ao _rauni^t0 chinoic" ct:
"poll Ala part, jo croic quo proccdcr as don concultct olio
avcc con dour parti c' cor:]rluniotoc conctitucra non oculo-
ment uric action dons i' intcrot du iiouvcoont int rr_~.tial~~ 1,
.a, ic7 [e-mail] dons. l' intcrct du duvclopperlcnt do c nou-
vollcc forccc qui co crc'ont." : epondant a uno quo:tionz
par un corrospondant occidental, Aedit d6cla ra: "1ioi-
:,c_ac at to parti comuuni:tc indonesion nouc nouc co 2:..1cc
rang d'e du coto do la declaration do idioccou Asarco qu' cl.lc
ddclare on tarp ac prccio quo touo los co rnunictc doivcnt
condainnor et dcvoilor 10 revioionni2mC nod.orno."
._20>21 , uillct - Los ontrcticno bilatcraux Intro loc:r~ti
co~A~-_, 1-liato do 'U? i n Sovictiqu: at le p arti col_pu:. in~to
Appr4 f . 4K F_ e~ pi ~ 444: 9AAPRMroaOfiU000200O2?o88t3 a. t
 Approve For R I ase 1999/08/24: CIA D 78-O q ,JAiOQR p~ 6
ull anquo ed.onn0 par e pr c u c ,
l'Union Sovidtiquc on lthonncur dot d6le'u6o. Un brof
coa_: iuniquo" public lo 21 declarait soulclaont quo "au court
do in rcunion loo dour cotes ont pro"sentc laura vues at
lcuro positions our un nombrc important do goustiono do
principo concornant lot 6v6nomonito octuolo dana lo Tondo,
lo nouvomont intcrnationa l co;mmunioto, of ton roles tioac
vino-covictique'c . A in mug ostign do 14 d6l atiotl._d.u
1parti conmuniotc chinoin, ll ontonte a 6 faits do _-)roc6-
dor a una interruption du travail do in dclcCation at do
continuer la rcunion t uno data ultericuro. Lc liou at
la date' do cotta nouvcllc r ion ncr ,icnt d6cid.6o appo
concultotion ouppl6montairc outro lot CoI.itc3 contraux
du parti coma unicto coviotiquc at du parti coi.nunintc
chinoin." Pekin annonce quo Mao lui-ncmo "at d'autrco
loa:dor.c du parti of do 1'Etat Ctaicnt parri.i loo 5.000
poroonnoc praconton a 1'onormc cc'renonic do bionvonuc on
1'honncur do in d61d ation" a Pekin.
20-22 Ltallet - Lc 20, 11oscou annonpait quo loo chafc+ dos
pays du Council pour l'asoistanco cconoaiquc nn.utuollc no
rcuniraient a Moncou lo 24 juilict afin do "discutor
d'un rapport du coLiitc oxecutif do cc council our lo
travail accompli pour in :.lint on application dco. d.eci-
cionc do in confercncc du conscil do juin 1962... Ci:lci
quo du travail a vcnir pour lo davoloppafacnt do in coo-
poration cconomiquc ontro coo pays." Le 'TachinZco_1 Post
d.u 22 juillot publiait uno intcrviow accordoG par iihai
Cioba nu, "rcaidant do in Cha;.:nbrc do coi'a,:lcrce rounaino, qui
rocoiinont oat roosorti on 'cant quo portc-pcrolo do non
pays au nujot dco rolationa avoc ion pays du bloc at ccux
du r~.ondo occ idontal, " dins loqucl i1 condar nctit lo CO;.'*,. Coi
pOUr_ n'avoir pas rospcctc' "ice droito, ion intc'rctn at
couvcrainotc'' do son pays. Ciobanu a d.cciard quo " pluc
d'un tiers" du capital d)6quipo:uont pour 1' induntrialina-
t-? on do in Roumania dopuis 1' avcne;~::nt on 1960 du plan
do six on.- do co pays, provonait do 1'0ccideiZt. La repor-
tor a. jouto quo "its economictos ctranScro octimont is 1
quo cc chiffro dopanscrait recllcuent 60 pour-cant."
21gullct - Toun ion journaux do Pekin publiont un co
muniquG do l'A&:clcc do proono do in Chino nouvcllo nolon
lcquol lc conit6 control du parti comnunisto do l'U.1i.on
ovidt iquc, dana uno nouvcllc va.guo d. oppoc it ion au,L pci"-
ti co-,, nunir3tc chinoic, "a mis on marchc tour aon ',:!Oro i
ca:l.o u o . tr
do propa ando pour no lancor on una dGboucho do
Pravda at d'autrca journaux aurciont fait dos doiciara.:cio.an
`61: z 7c'hcrchont nottom ont ~_ incitor lc peuplo chinoic at
ion i:lc nibroc du parti coi inuniotc chinoic cc dronocr contra
lac chefs bion-ai::lcs du parti coa _.luniotc chinoin."
21, uillet - Nopnzabad^a ,. or ant hen roi s dcciar:; quo
Ica partin narxictes--,ldniniaton at ion load.oro "cond.LiC-
nont unanimol:nant ion a .inconontc ochisilatiquon don 1Gc d.erc
Chinoin ainsi quo lou.r~dcviation dos principea diroctcurc
ld'nictoc." Il cito on articulior ion partin franc c,in,
App rov-@d,_ ~Q d.ae e1,&91l9iQQ/2 l:& ~ 8~I o(~2iJt@02~14tfi6 c
 Appr Rq~ O POjRa jgp/ 8/j4 :IqI SQ 3 4VI~uM000200020006-3
21_ juillct - Rude Provo, organo tclioquc,f public Un dito-
rici do pu^ qui ^outic.lt i- ligno covictiquc of co z-
damno la politiquc. chinoicc qui wc'mc la divi cion't.
22 Juil t - Tunyug fait cavoir quo la youe;oolavic ct
ont ai no un protocolo aux tomo- do lcux? ac-
cord co.,i:crcial pour 1961-1965, qui prcvoit ltonvoi d'cx-
iOrtc covi(:~tiqucc on Yougoclavie pour concoillor ou cujot
do 1' installation do i'c'quiporont covictiquc qui ,ncr3:
on, Yougoclavic. D' autrc part, dc o technic iono you-
coclavos foront dcc sta ca on Union Sovictiquc. Dar co~1-
~_iuniqucc do procco 6i c,ncnt do Moccou concornant la nOUV31-
lc quo Khrouchtchof a acce te< unc invitation do so ronIdro
on Hongric, doclaraiont qup' it pourrait conbincr cc vo:,?ci c
avoc.la vicito'projctco on Yougoclavic pour lo _ioia
d.'ci.out (annonco par Khrouchtchof lc 19 juillot la roccp-
tion do l'ciiibaaaado honSroiao).
Approved For Release 1999/08/22: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3
 Approved For Release 1999 78-03061A09820002009623
332. Communist Internationalism - Past, Present and Future.
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: The attached, UNCLASSIFIED 9-page study on
subject prow des background information (additional copies may
be ordered from }IQ). It traces the origin of Communist inter-
nationalism back to MARX' "Communist Manifesto," briefly out-
lines the facts of the first, second and third Internationals
and of the COMIN 'ORII and summarizes the role of the International
Communist Fronts and of International party meetings in the 6WCM
since World War Two. It describes the inexorable decline of
Communist internationalism from Lenin through Stalin to the
present and concludes by briefly discussing the principal current
contradictions preventing a true internationalist policy or a
true global organization of the WCM. At the end, 5 books are
listed for recommended reading.
 25X1C10b
lk Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200020006-3
 Approved For Release 1999/0A'121~ ^QQtiW78-03061A0X 0 3
683. East-West Trade: A False Issue
25X1 C10b
BACKGROUND: One favorite tactic of the Soviets is to seize
a slogan which, in itself, almost everyone would support, then to
maintain that this is a Soviet program and to claim that Western
capitalist` governments, in particular the United States govern-
ment, are opposed to this program. "Peaceful coexistence" is
one such slogan and another is "improving East-West trade." Some-
times American policies which are essential for free world security,
such as the embargo on the export of strategic goods to the Soviet
bloc, can be twisted to blacken the reputation of the United
States. Also, for reasons of internal politics, moral indignation,
and bureaucratic difficulties, Americans sometimes do things which
lend color to Soviet q.ccusations and which appear irrational to
outsiders: for instance, boycotts of polish ham sales. Armed
with such cases, Soviet propagandists find it easy to convince
various wishful thinkers that the Soviets offer wonderful things,
and are only obstructed by selfish American interests.
International Trade Conference. Slogans of this kind are all
the more useful when they can b e a red in the atmosphere of an
international conference, preferably one including as many under-
developed nations as possible. In the field of trade, a conference
e
is now planned to take place under UN auspices in March l9S the
World Trade an Development Conference The Soviets have
presse for an as -u?est trade conference or many years, and last
year the United States accepted a modified conference proposal
sponsored by 34 Asian, African and Latin American countries, and
also by Yugoslavia; this proposal was adopted by the UN Assembly
last December. The 34-nation proposal was acceptable to the US
because it stressed the problem of helping developing countries,
because it was limited to UN members (thus excluding Communist
China and East Germany), and because it provided that measures
would be taken up "leading to the gradual removal of tariff, non-
tariff, and other trade barriers arising from industrialized
countries which affect the exports of developing countries and
expansion of international trade in general." Such barriers could
include Soviet closed markets and state trade monopolies as well
as western embargoes.
Zven preparatory meetings provide sounding boards. In a
first preparatory meeting for the WTDC, last February, the Soviets
made a new effort to insert "obstacles to East-West trade" in the
agenda, their vague formula being intended to open the way for
propaganda attack. In a second preparatory meeting (at Geneva)
in June, the Soviets urged long-term trade agreements (coinciding
with Soviet five year plans), and tried to make development
assistance contingent on disarmament, as well as attacking Western
embargoes as usual.
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More indicative of Soviet strategy were proposals at the June
meeting for establishing a or lade Organization, which would
replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which
the United States and 41 other countries adhere (as full partners;
there are 10 others who participate under special arrangements),
and which serves to settle economic differences between the major
free world economic groupings, such as the US, the Common Market,
and the European Free Trade Association. GATT is a multilateral
contract which encourages the reduction of tariffs, the elimination
of quotas, and above all, the equal treatment of all foreign part-
ners in each market (most-favored-nation principle). In other words,
GATT serves as an instrument for free world economic cooperation,
and also for the spread of the classic principles of free trade, and
its destruction would be a political as well as an economic setback
to the United States and its allies. The Soviets accordingly attack
GATT, and try to convince developing countries that the organization
they propose would be more helpful. The Soviets would exercise a
veto in their proposed World Trade Organization, along Troika lines,
and wou use to impose a pattern of bilateral trade In which
their economic superiority vis-a-vis many other countries would
enable them to trade on their own terms. By its nature, the Soviet
trade monopoly stein is a highly discriminatory device which makes
the USSR unfitte" for participation in a GATT-type system, and the
logical western response to Soviet demands is to demand that the
Soviets drop all import restrictions, use world prices as a base
for internal prices, and in fact adopt a free market system. Soviet
attacks on western embargoes are only red herrings designed to con-
ceal the completely controlled character of Soviet foreign trade.
But the Soviets apparently intend to launch a major attack on GATT,
and also on the Common Market, at the WTDC, all the more so since
the WTDC will meet two months before the opening of GATT negotiation*
under the "Kennedy round," in May 1964.
Soviet goals at the approaching WTDC help to elain recent
Sovie efforts to convince Western businessmen that new maricetg-are
available in the Bloc, if only Western governments will remove
restrictions. These Soviet efforts follow a typical pattern: first,
it was made known that the. Soviets are ready to contract for large
amounts of steel pipe, large numbers of ships, or large-scale plants.
Then it is found that the Soviet desires involve a conflict with
Western embargoes or business secrets, and the Western businessmen,
ready and anxious to trade, are encouraged to think that they are
thwarted by Western governments or self-interested monopolies
(e.g. oil). The Soviets hope and expect that pressure on Western
governments will result.
Thus, . Sovietci.?1.esations visited the United Kingdom last fall,
and the US this s pri.ng, spreading stores that large orders might
be placed. The British were led to think that they could sell ships
(shipbuilding is a depressed industry in most countries, and
especially in the UK), but it turned out that the Soviets wanted to
pay in oil, Even though the UK was willing to consider such a deal,
no Soviet order for ships came forward. Britain, Germany, and the
US were much concerned early this year over the question of whether
lari pepdim~ or I eease wa /0 12 X A P2 lV8- 3%6~A 02000 ' gh the
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Germans agreed that this would be contrary to NATO security interests
and cancelled their contracts, the British were apparently ready to
violate NATO solidarity in order to sell the pipe (pipe is not on
the COCOM list and its manufacture would have aided a depressed area).
Yet the Soviets, while getting some pipe from Sweden, have left the
British dangling; apparently they calculate that the disappointment
will cause the British to agitate further against export restrictionsi
causing political-economic problems involving also allied policy.
In another case, the Soviets gave British engineering firms to
understand that they were ready to buy a $280,000,000 refinery,
which would be the world's largest. It turned out that the Soviets
not only wanted assurances that they were getting the most up-to-
date equipment, they also wanted to "see for themselves" that they
were getting it -- in other words, they wanted access to all the
secrets of the big international oil companies, something which none
o the engineers could possibly have obtained for them. (See The
Statist, 21 June 1933) Yet the "offer" was later dangled again when
p arc o Wilson, leader of the British Labour party, visited Moscow
in June. It may be that the Soviets will eventually place an order
for such a refinery somewhere, since they need it and since it need
not involve any trade secrets, but meanwhile they are using the
proposal to tantalize British businessmen, and British politicians
as well. Berthold Beitz, the General Manager of Kru , was warmly
received in scow n., ay, even av ng a long interview with
Khrushchev. Possibly Beitz brought home some secret orders, but
according to Der Spiegel (5 June), he failed to secure a ship con-
tract he had sought,
As in the case of British business, the Soviets may be trying
to use Beitz to bring pressure on his government. In England, a
meeting was hold from to 15 M rc , with Soviet and World Peace
Council participation, and passed a resolution urging governments
to support the WTDC and to have the WTDC "seek the elimination of
the cold war in trade," On 5 July, a report appeared, signed by
20 British industrialists calling themselves the East-West Trade
Group; this report stated that the British Government could increase
trade if it would review import licensing to end discrimination
against East European products (read "Soviet oil"), begin discussion
with these countries on a five-year trade expansion program (which
would fit in with the next five year plans), and extend credit
insurance covering contracts for capital equipment bought by East
European countries (easing a current Soviet shortage of foreign
exchange).
The possible benefits of trade with the Bloc are easily exagger-
ated. The East-West a e Group claimed that British exports to the
Mococ would be tripled in five years -- which if true would make them
come to 9% of current British exports to non-sterling areas. This
would not radically improve the British foreign trade situation,.
since some of these exports would otherwise be exported elsewhere.
For all of Beitz's activity, Krupp's exports to the Soviets only
come to DM 15 million out of a total product of DM 4 billion. West
Germany is the largest exporter to the USSR outside the Bloc, with
$17 Pp oveiiai~Fnor Release'1t- I31~'18~~0~$~10~Oee
(683. Continued)
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$12.7 billion. The fact that the West Germans can be the greatest
exporters to the USSR sheds a strange light on Soviet claims that
"cold war" considerations are an obstacle to trade; if this were
true, West Germany should stand at the bottom of the scale.
Soviet 1conoyiic Needs. The Soviets are indeed interested in
may: in purchases abroad; n particular, they want to obtain advanced
western technology without doing expensive research (for industrial
espionage) themselves. Recent Soviet purchases abroad include
chemical plants (to produce fertilizers, synthetic fibers, and
synthetic fuels), and they have also interested themselves in food
processing equipment. These purchases seem to reflect a current
crash program to make Soviet agriculture produce, and to get more
food (for example, by fishing).
But the Western strategic embargoes are not the limiting factor
in Soviet foreign trade. in volume, the results of ending such
restric ions wou Be insignificant. The limitation, to put it
baldly, is that the Soviets can't finance their purchases with
enough of anything that anyone wants, principal Soviet exports are
oil, lumber, grain, and ores and metals, in that order. In the
case of oil, much has lately been -divertod to Cuba; in the case of
lumber, neither Soviet supply nor Western markets are susceptible
to major expansion; in the case of grain, there Is ordinarily none
to scare outside the Bloc; in the case of ores and metals, the
values are low. The Soviets have discussed the export of machinery
with various nations, especially the British, but it is doubtful
that Soviet machines could be marketed in volume in any advanced
Industrial country, and there is always the problem of parts and
service. Adequate marketing and service organizations are costly,
and yet essential if sales are to be maintained. As a result of
their lack of acceptable exports, the Soviets are now suffering from
a shortage of foreign exchange, and their situation in the near
future in this respect is likely to grow more difficult. Exporters
who are offered contracts by the Soviets would be well advised to
-be sure that payment is fully guaranteed, as some creditors may find
themselves offered the choice of some low-value barter commodity
or nothing.
Soviet economic plans avoid foreign trade. The Soviets give no
indication that they are seriously interested in making foreign
trade a greater factor in their economic life. Their economic plans
aim largely at self-sufficiency: the proportion and pattern of
these plans leave no gaps which might indicate any expectation to
import materials in question.
'That are the true Soviet objectives in the foreign trade field?
1. They want to obtain easier credit and better condi-
tions for barter in order to buy t a ngs they nee most
urgers y.
2. They want to obtain knowledge of advanced western
industrial techniques. If western strategic controls are
ease , and trade secrets are made more readily available,
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the result might be a decrease rather than an increase
in large scale orders, the buying of prototype plants
being no longer necessary. Needless to say, Soviet pur-
chases of prototype machinery are never the beginning of
a long-term, continuing requirement; the machines are
simply copied.
3. They want to turn Western businessmen against
Western governments, ma ng them believe that the govern-
me~are standing in the way of increased trade.
4. They want to weaken Western unity by pitting some
countries (such as Britain--and West e-rmany) against each
other and against the United States over the issue of
trade restrictions, also by attacking GATT.
5. They want eventually to establish a World Trade
Organization which would obstruct rather than further
free multilateral trade, and which would support SoUet
ek ors to organize trade on a bilateral basis, with
Moscow at one end. They doubtlessly hope to get the
support of underdeveloped nations in this effort, though
these countries are not so unsophisticated on this sub-
ject as Moscow thinks.
Actually, the practical dangers of the Soviet trade offensive
can easily be overestimated. Perhaps the most serious matter is
the possibility that, in countries like Japan, Great Britain, and
Vest Germany, the question of East-West trade may become a political
football, with local politicians adopting demagogic anti-Amer can
policies. Such tactics, aimed at supposed US hostility to free trade,
are completely misdirected. It is the Soviets who are opposed to
free trade; it is only they who by a change in their economic policy,
25X1C10bcould bring about a major increase in their foreign trade volume.
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29 July 1933
634 PF,g. Nkrumah's Political Extremism
25X1C10b
BACKG.Rt)tJND; Although the African heads-of-state meeting
at F. r y p~ ~.^~ turned down President Nkrumah's plan for the
in tedi .te, political unity of Africa, the unprecedented meet-
ing of 30 of the 33 independent African countries reflects to
some degree Nkrumah's own strenuous pan-African drive. For
six years the Ghanaian leader has exhorted other lead':rs and
their pzoples to accept his concept of an Africa united under
a strong central government and he has left little doubt that he
envisions himself as the first President of a united African nation.
N1rumah has also resorted to widespread subversion in
-. other African countries by providing money an.U_eFias to radical
nationalist groups; training and supporting potential opposi-
tion leaders and exiles from independent countries; and inveigh-
ing against other governments through an extensive propaganda
Program.
The Addis Ababa conference heard many public, though
frequently veiled, references to Nkrumah's interference in the
political life of other African countries. Mali's President
iteita undoubtedly had Ghana in mind when he spoke against
African countries which maintain exiles who are plotting "subversive
activities in independent African states."
Organizations with supra-national responsibilities. Nkrumah
has established several compre iensive organizes ons tofurther
his efforts and provide the foundation for an all-African struc-
ture. The African Affairs Secretariat (AAS) is the executive
for implementing iaruma s
pan-African policies. Its official
action arm, the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), was established
in 1959 ostensib y, according-to the ana Yearbook, to concern
itself with "political parties and movements .... especially the
dependent African states which are engaged in the fight to free
themselves from foreign domination. It provides these parties,
movements and similar organizations with necessary information
to promote achievement of their ob ec;We-s -(our `uncer1TnTng)
The 3s rumahTS most Tmportan organizational weapon for
subversion and persuasion in African countries. For example,
Ghana supported exiles from neighboring Togo who were plotting
to overthrow the ?rime Minister; one of the exiles was the
leader of an unsuccessful assassination attempt. At the same
time he urged that Togo be integrated into Ghana. in another
case, witnesses at a Nigerian subversion trial in early 1963 test-
ified to having received training in subversive techniques in Ghana
(even including an unverified suggestion that some of the instruct-
ors were from the Communist bloc).
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(634 Contd.)
29 July 1963
The African Affairs Center (AAC) is responsible for exiles
from dePe7n-a iit :.^3.ca'1 coup rTes and from those whose regimes
are hostile to Nkrumah. Exiles from South Africa, Angola,
Ivory Coast, Togo, Nigeria and Cameroon are among those who have
fled to Ghana. The Center receives and houses them and arranges
for their support and training.
The Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political
Science Winne a, G bana, was established or the avowed purpose
of providing "ideological education to activists and Freedom
Fighters of the African Struggle against imperialism, colonial-
ism and neo-colonialism" and for training students in the
"African Liberation Movement." (See staff study on "N"krumaism
and Communist Holding of Ghana Youth," sent to certain stations
ywith Book Dispatch #365, 18 March 1963). Here 'nationalist
leaders from the de andent African countries are trained in the
organizational and ideological principles of Nkrumai.sm
principles which closely resemble those of the Communist world.
The Institute's political science syllabus, for example, contains
thirteen subheadings of which eight are identical with those in
Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the basic ideological text
pub isn.e By e COU in 1959. Other course outlines correspond
closely to those of Political Economy -- A Marxist Textbook
written by John Eaton, a leading member o the r is . The
Institute's director is assistant to the Director of Press and
Radio for advising the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation on "politi-
cal interpretation and proper treatment of news items," --
insuring that Ghanaians also receive the proper political indoc-
trination.
The Ghanaian Trade Unions Congress (GTUC) has been active
in supporting radical r can trade union movements, the anti-
Western All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) in particular,
and in disaffecting affiliates of the free world international
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICF'TU). GTUC brings trade
union officials to the Kwame Nkrumah Institute for training and
assists others to obtain scholarships for study in the Soviet
bloc. The Lagos West African Pilot of July 5th reports that the
GTUC is urging the to convene an all-African labor con-
ference to decide "Joint action within the spirit and require-
ments of the African situation," undoubtedly calculated to
enhance Ghana's appeal to the increasingly powerful African
trade union movement.
The Foreign Ministry has more than once been caught inter-
fering in host country affairs through its diplomatic install-
ations. Ghana's Charge in Leopoldville was forcibly expelled
in 1960 when he tried to influence Congolese developments through
Antoine Gizenga, as he had successfully doon-e through the latter's
predecessor, Patrice Lumumba. Ghana retaliated by recognizing
Gizenga's Stanleyville "government"j openly flouting the legally
constituted central Congolese government. The First Secretary
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(604 Cont.)
29 July 1933
of Embassy at Mogadiselo, Somali Republic, was declared persona
non grata in March lec-2 fo:c-:"me :F.,s~ n local affairs'7"No-
UlTain-a-LO.-diplomats vis,,,e asked to leave the : pox Coast in early
1963 following the F.rz4 st o : citizenry accu:, ~ o:. T oc ing subver-
sion against the gove~--rAaent. Lia,r.~ria asked for racall of the
Ghanaian Second Secretary in Sepcemier 1961, charging him with
attempting to subvert Liberian youths.
Ghanaian news media. Spark the weekly BAA paper and
Ghana'r'.6-rTn-c, a pr ey i. ancT, n trument, is distributed clan-
destinely in an estimated 15,000 copies throughout the continent.
:published since December 1962 under the editorship of Kofi Batsa,
tnown as a Communist sympathizer, it closely follows the Com-
munist line and reprints, often without attribution, articles
from Communist publications such as the USSR's New Times, the
Soviet-controlled international theoretical journal World
,Marxist Review, and the Chicom's English language Peking Review eviewa
Consistent with Nkru,-iah's stated belief that neo-co on a sm
and dependency are synonymous with Western power, Spark is
violently anti-American. Nor are other African countries spared.
Attacks on the Congo, Nigeria and the former French colonies
are coimonplace; one of the reasons may be that exiles such as
the Nigerian Samuel Ikoku, once involved in a coup attempt at
home, are now writing for Spark.
Although the largest newspaper, the independent Daily Graphic,
is essentially moderate in tone, the government-owned Ghana
Times and the Convention People's .1 'arty (CPP) Evening are
dot-adulatory of the President and scathing toward the West
and the anti-I.rumah powers. The same positions characterize
the GTUC bilingual monthly, African Worker, distributed through-
out Africa and the Voice of Africa beamed to other countries in
several languages,
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) and its subordinate
bodies could be subject to strong Ghanaian influence if the
interim Secretary-General, UN Ambassador Tesfaye of Ethiopia,
who is believed to be pro-Nkrumah, should receive the permanent
appointment. The membership of other standing committees of the
OAU will of course affect the policies and actions of the organi-
zation.
PRESIDENT NKRUMAH. Supplementing organizational programs
to sprea a ana an brand of African revolution, Nkrumah
assiduously attempts to build his own image as the most revolu-
tionary and most statesmanlike African personality and the
inevitable leader of an Africa united according to his precepts.
Calling himself a Christian Marxist-Leninist, he has attempted
to propound a revolutionary ideology for African socialism to
attract radical following from all Africa. However, some
nationalist leaders realize that Nkrumah's assistance has a
purpose. Holden Roberto, leader of a rebel group fighting for
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Angolan freedom from ?Portugal, said at Addis Ababa, "... the
big disappointment for African nationalism has been Nkrumah.
He talks big but does little. He does not want to help, he
wants to give orders."
Internationally, Nkrumah prefers to be counted among the
leaders of the non-aligned countries, although his public posi-
tions are certainly not neutral. He condemned as "reactionary"
the Iraqi revolution of February 1963 which overthrew the Soviet-
supported regime of General Karem cassem. He castigated the
MacMillan government for sending arms to India (a fellow member
of the British Commonwealth) following the Chinese attack and
subsequently joined five other neutral nations in urging Sino???
td1:4.u border uogotlations -viithout conoidoration .or :':... morst^
3f the dispute.
In Ghana, Nkrumah's personal popularity has suffered from
the increasing repression of domestic political life and from
.the stringent measures necessary to support the sagging economy.
Popular discontent burst into the open in August 1962 with an
attempt at Kulungulu to assassinate Nkrumah followed by a series
of bombing attacks. Two Cabinet Ministers and a prominent CPP
official were arrested and accused of being "imperialist tools,"
Their trial has been delayed until August 1963, presumably for
lack of evidence. He permits no political opposition and con-
tinues to exert his personal authority over most of the govern-
mentrs activities.
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For private circulation.
Contents may be used
freely, but text must
n o t be reprodpced
verbatim.
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM -- PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
CPYRGHT
INTRODUCTION.
In the last several years, the Communists have been encountering increas-
ing difficulties in the international relations among their parties, govern-
ments and front organizations. Some people attribute these widening cracks
in the once "monolithic" World Communist Movement (WCM) exclusively to the
differences between Moscow and Peking. The significance of the latter shall
not be denied or minimized, but it is essential for any realistic understanding
of these growing Communist troubles to recognize the basic conflict between
their internationalist ideology and the reality of their political, military
and economic power interests. The present paper outlines some of the basic
facts contributing to this understanding.
HISTORY.
Origins. The internationalist beliefs and organizational attempts
which have characterized the Communist (and Socialist) movements of the 19th
and 20th centuries originated in the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, in which Karl Marx
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CPYRGHT
and Friedrich Engels., on the eve of the revolutions of 1848, proclaimed
their profound conviction that the internationalization of all coming
human history was "inevitable" -- and, consequently, of the international
character of the Communist movement -- in ringing, apodictic phrases:
"The workingmen have no country ("Vaterland" in the German
original). We cannot take from them what they have not got."
"National differences and. antagonisms between peoples are
daily more and more vanishing. . . . The supremacy of the
proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster."
"The Communists everywhere support every. revolutionary
movement against the existing social.and political order
of things . . .they labor everywhere for the union and
agreement of the democratic parties of all countries."
"Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution.
The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They
have a.world to win. Workingmen of all countries unite!"
The Three Internationals. Communists and Socialists accepted Marx'
internationalism .as a basic article of faith, both intellectually and
emotionally, but all attempts to translate this faith into.workable inter-
national organizations fell far short of their intentions:
The First International ("International Workingmen's Association"),
founded by Marx in London 19;7,-was a loose federation of individuals and
small groups, which broke up less than 10 years later, mainly because of
the fundamental conflict between Marxists and Anarchists (Bakunin).
The Second International ("Labor and Socialist International")
was founded in Paris 1669. Its members were mostly Social Democratic
and Labor Parties in all industrial countries of Europe which grew into
mass parties with numerous representatives in their countries' parlia-
ments -- Lenin's underground Russian Bolsheviks being the only exception.
--
World War One 1914 broke the Second International into three factions
a. the r i g h t wing or revisionists, such as the
majority of the German SP, the British Labor party,
and the Scandinavian SPs;
b. the c e n t e r or Austro-Marxists, represented by the
Austrian SP, the minority of the German SP, the French
and Italian SPs;
c. the 1 e f t wing or Zimmerwald (their first meeting
place in Switzerland) movement, centered around Lenin
and including the Spartacus League in Germany and other
left-wing splinter groups.
2
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CPYRGHT
The Second International was reconstructed after World War I (Hamburg,
1923), broke up again during World War II and was rebuilt once more after-
wares:..{-Frankfurt, 1951).
The Tb.ird International.. ('Communist International" -- COMINTERN)
was founded in Moscow 1919. and organized along. Lenin's line of "democratic
centralism."' It was initiated and completely dominated by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU),.then the only party in power. On paper,
it had affiliates in 57 countries but actually very few parties outside
Russia represented significant political strength. During World War II,
Stalin dissolved the COMINTERN (191-3).
International Communist Organizations since World War Two.
a. The Information Bureau of Communist P sties (COMIhFQBM) was
founded in 194T and had its headquarters first in Belgrade, then in
Bucharest. It consisted of representatives ofall..European Bloc parties
.and of the French and Italian CPs. Its main Visible activity -- apart
from formalizing.Stalin's decision to- expe>+; the Yugoslav. cP.1.91+8 -- was
the publication of a weekly ;journal, FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A,PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRACY, in.several languages. It was dissolved. again in 1956.
b. International Communist Fronts (ICFs). Beginning even before
the end of the war, a dozen new international organizations were set up,
with varying initial degrees of Communist influence, but all ultimately
serving the ends of the WCM. They include the World Peace CouaciJithe
World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democra'ic Youth,
the International Students Union, the Women's International Democratic
Federation, and several others. These organizations resumed certain
functions of the dissolved.COMINTERN, stimulated the creation and develop-
ment of Communist fronts in non-Communist countries and engaged in-a wide
variety of global and regional activities, holding rallies and congresses,
operating training centers, publishing periodicals and pamphlets in many
languages, providing traveling instructors and organizers, and so forth.
-Even though far larger and more efficiently organized than.- any comparable
Communist fronts before World War Two and quite active in many. fields,
including such spectacular propaganda events as the World Youth Rallies and
the World Peace Congresses, they do, nevertheless, not constitute a true or
comprehensive international organization of the WCM. At first, it appeared
that the ICFs -- financially dependent upon Moscow and stage-managed by CPSU
officials in key positions were more suitable to Soviet control than
national CPs, especially where the latter were in power or represented size-
able strength in opposition. More recently, however, Soviet manipulation of
ICFs has encountered increasing Chinese opposition and other difficulties and
Moscow appears to switch increasingly to bilateral relations with national
CPs, national fronts and (where practicable) governments.
c. International Communist Party Meetings. Even though frequent
close contacts between all CPs, especially bilaterally between the CPSU
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CPYRGHT
andall other CPs, were maintained after the dissolution of the COMINTERN
including meetings of "fraternal" delegates at national party, congresses --,
only two formal meetings of the leaders of all Gds of the world.-were held
since World War Two, both in Moscow,, in 1957 and 1960 It is significant
that no such meetings were held while Stain was still alive. Important as
these two conferences and the resolutions unanimously adopted by them
(considered, especially in Chinese Communist polemics against Moscow, as
the "lair" of the WCM) undoubtedly were, they did not lead to any new inter-
national organization. Moreover, the spirit and letter of their resolutions
was soon submerged in the rising flood of dissensions in the Communist camp,
especially between Moscow and Peking.
Symbols. The symbols of internationalism assumed-a paramount role
from the earliest days of Marx-inspired labor movements, even before World
War One. All parties, socialist and.communist, adopted the red flag as
their banner, placed internationalist slogans -- especially the final Words
of the Communist Manifesto, "Workingmen of all Countries, Unite" -- on
placards, in meeting halls and on the mastheads of their publications.
Meetings ended --and demonatrebors marched to the strains of the
"Internationale" (which, incidentally, was written and composed in honor of
the first International and.was therefore "common property" of Socialists
and Communists):
"Arise ye prisoners of starvation,
Arise ye wretched of this earth . .
This song became the anthem of the movement: audiences rose from their
seats, men took off their hats. . . . The Soviet union originally adopted
the Internationale as its national anthem, but replaced it with a more
traditionally Russian tune during World War Two.
Emotional Impact. The idea of a "world-wide revolutionary brotherhood"
inspired the rank-and-file of first the Socialist and later the Communist
movements far beyond any reasoned acceptance of the internationalist doctrines
of Marx and Lenin. The feeling of having friends and fellow-militants in all
parts of the globe, of belonging to an "Irresistibly advancing" world-wide
movement (in the concluding words of their anthem: "The International Party
will be the human race"), encouraged the faithful, especially where the party
w.as weak, undergoing persecution or suffering setbacks. This strong com-
mitment to internationalism has been demonstrated over the years through
innumerable activities, from collecting funds, clothing or medical supplies
for strikers, political prisoners and other casualties of the common
struggle in far away lands to the thousands who volunteered to risk their
lives in revolutionary fighting, from the Paris Commune 1871 to the Spanish
Civil war, 193+ - 1938.
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THE DECLINE OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM.
Lenin's Approach. Lenin was not an internationalist in the same cosmo-
politan sense as Marx and Engels had been (it is no accident that under
Stalin "cosmopolitan" became an ominous insult in the Communist dictionary):
his thoughts and efforts were focused on revolution in Russia, f?kst and
foremost. However, his allegiance to Marx' doctrines led him to the con-
viction that a revolution in Russia alone had no chanbe to survive, until
paralleled -- or, at least, quickly followed -- by revolutions in the more
advanced industrial nations of Europe. He founded the Third International
primarily as an instrument of promoting the world revolution elsewhere, if
only because further revolutionary successes were imperative to safeguard
the future of Communist Russia. He admitted bluntly:
"Of course the final victory y of socialism in a s i n g 1 e
country is impossible." (At 3rd Council of Soviets,
January 1918)
Thus, the COMINTERN in Lenin's days may be defined as a truly revolutionary,
internationalist organization, even if primarily intended to saveand protect
the Soviet Union.
Stalin and "Socialism in One Country". When Stalin became supreme
ruler, Europe had fully recovered from the severe shocks she had undergone
in the wake of World War One and all hope for new Communist revolutions in
other key countries had been abandoned. TROTSKY alone stuck to the
original concepts of internationalism and of "permanent" world revolution --
but Stalin soon eliminated Trotsky and his sympathizers throughout the WCM.
Stalin gradually reduced the COMINTERN to a mere tool of the CPSU's and the
Soviet. Government's foreign policy, changing its policies and tactics when-
ever he felt this necessary in Moscow's interest. This was most dramatically
illustrated by the 7th and last COMINTERN Congress, Moscow 1935, which
elected Bulgarian George Dimitrov, hero of the Reichstag fire trial, as
Secretary General and adopted the "Trojan Horse strategy" of popular fronts
which became particularly successful in France and -- at least temporarily --
in the Spanish Civil War. This was a complete reversal of the preceding
strategy of "class against class," which had denounced the Social Democrats
as "Social Fascists" -- a reversal dictated by Stalin's growing fear of
Hitler's rapidly rising aggressive power. The anti-Fascist popular front
strategy was just as suddenly abandoned in August 1939, when the Stalin-
Hitler pact was signed -- with complete disregard of the interests of the
Communist Parties in Central and Western Europe which were se-vex jy shaken by
Moscow's totally unexpected "co-existence" with Hitler.
World War Two. The first two years of the German-Russian conflict,
from Hitler's assault in June 1941, until the battle of Stalingrad, early
in brought the Soviet regime close to the brink of total
disaster. Stalin soon recognized that the appeals of Communist doctrine
5
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and internationalist enmity against Hitler Fascism did not at all suffice to
bolster the morale of his armed forces and of his civilian populations. He,
therefore, not only dissolved the COMINTERN (which may have been more a
formal concession to the Western allies than a fundamental change of his
.thinking) but based domestic war propaganda and indoctrination increasingly
on nationalistic, patriotic} traditionally Russian appeals, while at the same
time enlisting the active help of the Russian Orthodox Church. The-war-was
officially designated as "The Great Patriotic War" -- with little reference
to its" anti-fascist, internationalist aspects. Stalin, toasting the Red
Army commanders in the Kremlin, on May 24, 1945, proclaimed:
"I drink primarily to the health of. the Russian people because
it is the most-outstanding of all the nations that constitute
the Soviet Union. I drink to the health of the Russian
people, because, during this war, it has earned universal
recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among 811
the peoples of our country. I drink to the health of the
Russian people, not only because it is the leading people, but
also because it is gifted with a clear mind, a staunch character,
and patience."
(Stalin, "On the Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union", pp. 241-42) .
At Present: "Independence" and "E ualit " of National Communist Parties.
The Moscow meeting of the 81 Communist Parties in November 1960, the last
authoritative assembly of the entire WCM, solemnly reasserted the basic
tenets of internationalism:
"The socialist (i.e. Communist) countries and the socialist
comp as a whole owe their achievements to . . . their close
fraternal cooperation and mutual internationalist assistance,
and above all, to the fraternal, internationalist assistance
from the Soviet Union."
Later on, the statement of the 81 parties exhorted. all comrades:
"At a time when imperialist reaction is joining forces to
fight Communism, it is particularly imperative vigorously
to consolidate the world Communist movement. Unity and
solidarity redouble the strength of our movement and provide
a reliable guarantee that the great cause of Communism will
make victorious progress . . . . It is the supreme inter-
nationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist party to work
continuously for greater unite in the world Communist move-
Nevertheless, the conference did not only fail to set up any new inter-
national organization, but even recognized formally the right to
every national CP to determine its own course independently:
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"All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have
egua1 rights, they shape their policies according to the
specific conditions in their respective countries and in
keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles, and support each
other."
The text also suggested procedures for consultations among parties::
The Communist and workers' parties hold meetings whenever
necessary to discuss urgent problems, to exchange experience,
acquaint themselves with each other's views and positions,
work out common views through consultations and cc d,?n6,.te
joint actions in the struggle for common goals. Whenever
a party wants to clear up questions relating to the activities
of another fraternal party, its leadership approaches the
leadership of the party concerned. If necessary, they hold
meetings and consultations."
Actually, however, no further international Communist meeting has been held
and differences between parties have been vented in public polemics rather
than through the consultative method recommended.
CONCLUSIONS AND FORECASTS.
World Soviet Republic? According to the original Communist concept,
all countries in which the Communists would seize power were to join the
original Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, thus expanding the latter
into a World Soviet Republic. Stalin, at the 10th All-Russian Soviet Con-
gress, December 1922, proclaimed:
"Let us hope that by forming our confederate republic we
shall be creating a reliable bulwark against international
capitalism and that the new confederate state will be another
step towards the amalgamation of the toilers of the whole
world into a s i n g 1 e World Socialist Soviet RLeRublic."
Actually, however, each additional country, taken over by the Communists,
retained its sovereignty and national independence. This Was initially
primarily a concession to the nationalist and patriotic traditions of these
nations, concealing. the expansion of Stalin's empire: today, however, there
can be no doubt about the true independence of China from Moscow. Even the
European Satellites, though still dependent upon the Soviet Union in a
variety of ways, have regained a large degree of autonomy. Poland changed
its regime in 1956 very much against Moscow's wishes, Czechoslovakia paid
only lip service to Kh.rushchev's Destalinization, Rumania still opposes
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Moscow-imposed economic "coordination" and Albania has completely defied the
Kremlin's displeasure, siding aggressively with China against the Russian
"neo-revisionists."
National Interests Vs. Internationalism. In every Communist country,
the interests of the ruling Communist elite have merged gradually. with the
interests of the nation, including traditional claims of previous autocratic
and imperialist regimes. The Soviet Union has obviously no intention to
abandon the conquests of the Tsars, especially in Asia. and celebrates
Tsarist heroes, including even Ivan the Terrible. Communist China is
reasserting imperial Chinese claims to Tibet, the Indian border regions and
ultimately most of Southeast Asia, Communist Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have
inherited the Balkan quarrels of their predecessors, notably in the feud
over Macedonia. The Soviet Union is no longer capable of bending the services
of all the Communist Parties of the world to its will, regardless of their
own national interests, as Stalin did: but it is not willing to change its
foreign policies in accordance with those interests of other CPs, either.
Khrushchev's attempt to appease De Gaulle in the midst of the Algerian war,
China's attack upon India and many other moves of the Communist powers were
undertaken without any consultation with -- or consideration for the
interests of -- the Communist Parties of France, Algeria, India or the other
countries involved.
Contradictions. Genuine internationalism is intrinsically
d e m o c r a t s c: it requires cooperation of all nations on a basis
of equality, free exchange of opinions and protection of minorities.
Communists do not only not concede equal rights or freedom of opinion to
non-Communists, they have also methodically curtailed and finally (under
Stalin) eliminated all rights of minorities within their own ranks -- which
they have condemned. as "factionalism," "deviationism" and worse. Even if
all areas under Communist control would have been consolidated into one
"world Soviet Republic" (see above), its internationalist character would
have been vitiated by the totalitarian methods of Communist dictatorship.
Now, however, with a dozen separate Communist regimes and a number of free-
world CPs increasingly intent upon their own courses of national action, the
contradiction between professed internationalist creed and actual, national
or regional, political and organizational practice has become wholly
unbridgeable.
The Outlook. The developments summarized in the present paper must
not make us jump to the conclusion that the WCM is about to disintegrate
into national parties or even regional groupings. We must assume that at least in the foreseeable future, i.e. during the next 5 years or so --
Communists in all parts of the world, whatever their tactical, ideological
or national differences, will still be held strongly together, at least by
their common e n m i t y against the non-Communist world, but also by
their common o r i g i n s. Any Communist country can presumably still
expect military assistance from any other Communist country (even China
from the Soviet Union), if attacked by an outside power. Illegal CP9 and
Approvea or a ease
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those engaging in guerrilla warfare and other forms of violent subversion will
continue to depend on the Communist powers for. arms, training, safe haven,
diplomatic and propaganda support. But while these factors are likely to
sustain some degree of cohesion in the WCM, it is equally safe to state that
the traditional"monolithic" character-of the WCM has irrevocably disappeared.
The contradiction between lip service to orthodox internationalism in
doctrine and propaganda, on the one hand, and increasing tactical. adaptation
to national interests (including even "great power chauvinism," at least in
the cases of Russia and China), on the other hand, is likely to increase
steadily. The older the WCM grows, the wider the chasm between its most
advanced (or successful) and its most backward (unsuccessful) components,
the less effective common ideological and historical ties, the more probable
its ultimate splintering into different tendencies-and factions.
Recommended reading:
"From Lenin to Khrushchev" by Hugh Seton-Watson,
New York and London (a concise factual history of World Communism).
"Pattern for World Revolution" by Ypsilon, New York.
(Chapters of Comintern history written by two of its former
officials.)
"World Communism Today" by Martin Ebon, New York 1948.
(Largely information on the parties affiliated with the Comintern)
"The Communist International -- Documents" Edited by Jane Degras,
London & New York.
"International Communism and World Revolution" by GI]nther Nollau,
New York (translated from the German: "Die Internationale: Wurzeln
and Erscheinungsformen des Proletarischen Internationalismus.")
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