BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 23, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Briefly Noted
Soviets purchase Grain to Meet Shortage
On 16 September, the Canadian government announced that the
Soviets had agreed to buy $503,000,03) worth of Canadian wheat, some
1'93, 00J, 003 bushels, for delivery by July 1:34. A Soviet ne otiator,
Sergei A. Borisov, stated that weather had adversely affected the
Soviet wheat crop, compelling the Soviets to purchase wheat elsewhere
The Soviets had bought substantial quantities of grain in Australia
a short time before. Borisov said that future purchases of Canadian
grain would "depend on how much Canada is able to enlarge its pur-
chases of Soviet goods," but the current deal is to be paid for in
hard dollars, obtained by Soviet gold sales. The degree of Soviet
need is marked by their willingness to pay hard dollars for grain to
the Canadian government, a practice which Communist China has had to
follow for several years now.
Of the Soviet purchase, $33,033,030 worth will be delivered to
Cuba, and an unknown quantity will go to the bloc countries of
Eastern Europe. The Soviet purchase is the largest grain purchase
for delivery in one year ever recorded; the previous postwar annual
h.Zh in total Canadian grain exports was 333,000,003 bushels in
1352-3. The United States has made a foreign aid sale to India of
$503,030,333 worth of wheat, but this is spread over a three year
period, ending 30 June 1956.
We use this story, in conjunction with BPG #123, item 693, to
illustrate the failure of collectivization, propaganda campaigns, and
the o:ploitation of virgin and fallow lands to solve Soviet agricul-
tural problems. We point out that while weather may be partly to
blaiie, it is a well-worn alibi used to cover other causes, and that
countries like Canada and the United States have enough surplus store
nu ay to cover any temporary harvest shortcomings. This story is
particularly recommended for underdeveloped countries which may be
attracted by the Soviet economic model.
International Architects Meeting in Cuba
Cuba will host the 7th Congress of the International Union of
Architects (UIA, 20 September- October. The U171 somb y, where
officers are elected and organization business conducted, follows in
Mexico City in conjunction with a Symposium on architecture, 6-15
October.
The UIA Congress will be the first bona fide international pro-
fessional meeting in Cuba since Castro took over the government.
The Eavana site was selected three years ago -- before Castro's open
embrace of Communism. Cuba claims that 3,300 delegates from 30
countries will attend. In an attempt to fulfill that claim, Cuba
has scheduled a meeting of students and professors of architecture a
few days before the UIA Congress, underwritten travel costs and
expenses of selected delegates and students, dispatched ships and
airplanes to collect delegates and supplemented widely distributed
written invitations by personal solicitations.
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UIA officials maintain that their organization is nonpolitical
and that they will not permit political subjects to be discussed
or the Congress to become embroiled in any cold war arguments.
Nevertheless, the UIA president, vice president and secretary-
general have agreed to serve on a committee to judge a Cuba-
sponsored contest to design a Bay of digs "victory" monument (arms
captured at the Bay of Pigs will be one of the Cuban displays at
the UIA Congress). The monument contest and Castro's speech ending
the Congress are lilely to be the focal points of Cuban propaganda.
The presence of delegates from Soviet 1cassia and Communist China
may load to polemical exchanges judging from their performance at
!5X1C10b other recent international meetings.
QSO xecutive Committee Meeting Plagued by Sino-Soviet Rift
The Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) executive coa-
mittee meeting, hold in Nicosia, Cyprus from 9 to 12 September, was
split between Sino-Soviet factions on the following issues: the
limited nuclear test ban treaty (the Chicom delegation, reportedly,
threatened to wala out if a resolution supporting the treaty should
be passed; the chief Soviet delegate stated that "some of our
friends insist on all or nothing") ; and the Colombo Conference pro-
posals for settling the Sino-Indian border dispute. The meeting
did adopt a compromise resolution "appreciating" the signing of the
treaty by 3O nations and expressing hope that other steps toward
peace and disarmament would follow. NCNA stated that the Soviet
delegation and its followers forced the meeting "hastily" to accept
a resolution on disarmament and peace on which reservations were
voiced by many delegations, including those from Morocco, Guinea,
Algeria, Ceylon, Indonesia, the DRV, the South Vietnam liberation
front, Japan, Korea, and China.
After the close of the conference, TASS charged that: the
Chico s' activities boiled down to attempts to sabotage the meeting,
to split Afro-Asian solidarity, and to use the session as a platform
for "more foul attacits" on the USSR; the Chicoms brought to Nicosia
a tremendous amount of anti-Soviet propaganda material and paid
slanderers whom they tried to pass as representatives of the peoples
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of certain Afro-Asian countries, and are trying to bring AAPSO under
their control so as to make it serve their own selfish interests.
The Indonesian delegation was embittered over the Soviets' question-
ing "on whose behalf" they were speaking and "whose interests" they
were defending.
The chief Chicom delegate attacked: the Soviets for adhering
to a policy of "big-nation chauvinism" and collaborating with
imperialism; and India for aggression against Pakistan, ideologi-
cally and materially supported by the Soviet Union.
The Soviets outplayed the Chicoms and Indonesians in the
political committee resolution to convoke an A-A workers conference
in Africa under the auspices of the permanent secretariat of AA)-?O.
The Indonesian delegation issued a statement that plans for a
preliminary //hicom/Indonesian-backed? A-A workers conference in
Djakarta at The end of October will go ahead, declaring also that
"we are not responsible for and not bound by this decision which
is not in favor of cooperation between our movement and the workers'
movement."
The conference passed without a formal vote 18 resolutions,
pro-Communist in tone and almost predictable in content on issues
such as Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, American negroes, etc.
"le continue to use this and all similar developments to stress
in all suitable media that AAPSO and its subsidiary organizations
are tools of Communist propaganda and subversion, and are increas-
ingly becoming the battleground in the Sino-Soviet feuding.
Splinter Party Obstruction in Norway.
On 24 August, the Norwegian Labor government of Einar Gerharc
resigned, and on 27 August a non-socialist coalition government
took power headed by John Lyng. Labor, which had been in power
since 1935, was charged with negligence in the operation of the
state coal mines in Spitzbergen, where 21 miners perished last
November; many Norwegians are said to have felt generally that
Labor had become complacent, and that it was time for a change. But
the change could not have occurred if the two-member leftist-and-
neutralist Socialist People's ?arty (SPP) had not held the balance
of power in the Storting, Norway's parliament, and if they had not
voted against the Labor party. The SPP promptly declared that it
would also overthrow the Lyng government at the first opportunity,
and on 20 September, Labor and the SPP combined to vote the Lyng
coalition out of power.
Since the 1961 elections, the Storting has had 74 non-socialist
members (Liberals, Christian People's Party, Center Party, and
Conservatives), 74 Labor members, and two SPP members. Under
current Norwegian law, the next elections will not take place until
1905, and until that date -- unless the law is changed -- the SPP
is in a position to break any government which does not bow to its
demands. It may be that Labor has now made promises to the SPP;
3
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it is also possible that Labor will press for a revision of the law
to permit new elections. In any case, the S?P has been able to
exert a veto power out of keeping with its numerical strength, while
avoiding responsibility.
4
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MEW 23 September 1963
DATES 25X1C10c
13 Oct Honduras first national election under its 1957
democratic constitution (after 25 years of
rightist control).
20 Oct Chinese Communist troops begin advance into India,
escalating border war, 1962.
22 Oct US forces USSR to renave offensive missiles from
Cuba (22-28 Oct. 1962).
23 Oct Hungarian revolution fails under force of Soviet
brutal military repression. 23 Oct-4 Nov 1956.
23 Oct Leon Trotsky expelled from CPSU Politburo in 1926.
28 Oct Czechoslovakia proclaims independence after
collapse Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1918.
7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power
from the Provisional Government, 1917.
10 Nov World Youth Day (Communist)
10 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),
Djakarta 10-17 Nov.
11 Nov International Student Week 11-17 November, conclud-
ing with International Students Day on the 17th
(International Union of Students, Communist)
12 Nov Leon Trotsky expelled from the CPSU, 1927.
14 Nov (China-Russia) (Unequal) Treaty of Peking cedes
Chinese "Great Northeast" to Russia, 1460.
15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of
the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of
self-determination to peoples of the former Empire,
1917.
December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation,
4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi during December 1963.
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COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
31 August-13 September 1963
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese commenced the publication of a series of arti-
cles, designed to demolish the Sovie position by careful argument
a nd judiciously selected documentation. The first two of these
articles appeared within this period. In the first (see Chronology,
6 September; text published in New York Times, 14 September), the
Chinese surveyed the histo of a spu e, attempting to prove
(with documents) they have consistently opposed Khrushchev's
peaceful coexistence line since 1956, and that the Soviets have
tried to impose military control over China and have conducted
subversive activity among the people of China's Sinkiang province.
In the second article (see Chronology, 13 September), the Chinese,
(with minor reservations) defended the memory of Josif Stalin, con-
trasting that "great Marxism n n_rs r`With Khrus c ev, who once
(as they show by quotation) praised Stalin, and who now maligns and
vilifies him while "regarding Eisenhower, Kennedy and the like 'with
respect and trust."' The Soviets did not publish these articles,
though some of their propaganda shows that they are well aware of
them.
2. Most Soviet propaganda has been kept on a more down-to-earth
level. Both Soviets and Chinese used the technique of printing
phony letters from notional citizens of the other country, and the
Soviets exposed" the Chinese efforts. On 2 September, a "spontane-
ous" demonstration took place outside the Chinese Embassy in Moscow,
recalling similar demonstrations n e past against the American
and other western embassies.
3. The Soviets also prodded at an established Chinese vulner-
ability by pointing out that the Chinese militants have failed even
to liberate Hon Kong (Nedelya, 7 September; Izvest ya 2 September);
these aroma es were not republished by NCNA.
4. But the most striking Soviet effort was their 9 September
story of Chinese rioting and "violation of the basic norms of human
decency" at the border station of Naushki. The Soviet public (and
other bloc publics too) have strong-feelings about such "uncultured"
behavior as urinating in public, and the stories served to portray
the Chinese as sub-human and bestial.
5. The Soviets did not totally forego the higher things,
though; a theoretical article in the 11 September Pravda argued
that the Chinese were confusing and losing sight oche main con-
flict, to wit:,. that between socialism and capitalism. While quoting
Lenin, the author (Glezerman appeare o be outflanking the Chinese
appeals to Lenin's theses by turning to a fundamental thesis of the
founder of "scientific" socialism, Karl Marx himself. Meanwhile,
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(#12 Commentary Cont.)
day in and day out, the Soviets repeated their claim that they were
for peace and that the Chinese were for war - the claim that gives
them a great propaganda advantage outside the small world of fanatic
revolutionaries.
6. Neither disputant had much success in enlisting further
support in the rest of the movement. Highly significant in this
respect were speeches by Indonesian CP leader D.N. Aidit in Peking
and Pyongyang, on his way back rom Moscow. When spec ng in Peking
(reported 2 and 4 September), Aidit did not commit himself to either
side but described his policy of "Indonesianizing" Marxism-Leninism
for local purposes. In Peking and even more in Pyongyang (11
September), Aidit accompanied passing references to "modern
revisionism" (identified only with Yugoslavia) with other references
to "modern dogmatism," which he claimed was the Indonesian CP*s
term for a pose ion of tailing "one of the parties." Aidit was
in Pyongyang to help celebrate the 15th anniversary of the founding
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; although Peking tried
to use this anniversary as an occasion for claiming the faithful
support of the North Koreans, the references to such support came
mostly from Chinese sources, or from such atypical Koreans as
Ran Su-tong, head of a delegation of the Korea-China Friendship
Association visiting Peking.
7. In the world of the front organizations, the Chinese --
evidently realizing that they would have no chance to dominate the
proceedings -- announced on 4 September that they would boycott the
third World Meeting of Journalists, sponsored by the International
Committee for he Cooperation o ournalists (ICCJ). This Soviet-
front meeting is to commence in Naples on 23 September and then
proceed eastward by ship to a number of ports in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, ending at Beirut on 4 October; presumably the Soviets see
this unusual meeting procedure as a means of maintaining control
and also of countering Chinese influence in the Near East. On
13-13 September, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
executive committee met a icos a; the session was prolonge an
extra day by debates between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet delegates
over the question of endorsing the test ban treaty, and a compromise
resolution was finally placed on record without an actual vote.
Other Sino-Soviet quarrels arose at this meeting over the Sino-
Indian border dispute, the right of delegates from Eastern Europe
to attend, and the right of the (pro-Chinese) Indonesian delegation
to represent Indonesia.
Significance:
The first part of September marked a new stage in the Sino-
Soviet conflict, characterized by:
a. Much greater stress on problems of national
honor and sovereignty: e.g., rder disputes,
military contro versus military in ependence,
and importation o subversive propagan a.
2
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(#12 Commentary Cont.)
b. Sharpened attacks on individuals, especially
Khrushchev.
c. An increase in propaganda directed to mass
audiences, and based on emotional, gu -eels'
Issues.
25X1C10b
Ideology by no means disappeared from the debate, but its importance
decreased.
Each side resorted to the Communist practice -- now against
each other rather than against the "capitalist" enemy -- of staging
support for itself and opposition to its antagonist. And the Soviet
attempted to expose this fraudulent practice on the part of the
Chinese.
The Chinese sought to prove that they had consistently opposed
Khrushchev's policies from as early as 1956. They also sought to
prove that the Soviets were attempting to impose their control over
China by military means as well as through subversion. Their series
of articles promises to provide new source material on Communist
weaiunesses, comparable to that provided by Ithrushchev's 1956 and 196
attacks on Stalin.
In withdrawing from a meeting of the ICCJ, the Chinese implicit
ly recognized their own inability to influence left-wing European
journalists, and through such journalists, lefl;wing European opinion
The Chinese hope for support outside the Communist ranks lies in
the underdeveloped areas.
The Soviet exploitation of the Naushki incident represents a
shift in emphasis from what Communists consider "propaganda" (the
spreading of doctrine and ideology, largely among elite audiences)
to "agitation" (the use of emotional appeals to arouse mass
audiences). Such enlistment of popular support makes a subsequent
reversal much more difficult to carry out.
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#12 31 August-13 September 1963
August 31 - The Council of the League of Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent ocieties, meeting in Geneva, passes a Japanese resolution
urging the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Accord-
ing to Tass, the Chinese delegate "and his Albanian yes-man"
slandered the test ban treaty during the debate, forcing the
chairman to have the Albanian statements stricken from the record.
The Chinese Communist and Albanian delegates abstained in the vote.
September 1 -- ?eking broadcasts a "statement by the spokesman of
the Chinese Government," replying to a ov e statement o
21 August; the two st atements are published simultaneously in
China. The Chinese statement is mainly an attempt to rebut
Soviet charges that China only sees nuclear weapons an is in-
different to the dangers of world war. The Chinese say that They
wa continue to criticize a whether or not China is
backward, as the Soviets say, "in any case, and even if we Chinese
people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a hundred years,
we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders nor kneel
before the nuclear blackmail of the US imperialists." The
statement quotes from Mao's 18 November 1957 speech and from the
163 "Long Live Leninism" article, trying to show that the Soviets
have distorted the sense of these sources by lifting quotations
about the death of half of mankind and rapid reconstruction on
the ruins out of their contexts. The Chinese charge:
"In the opinion of the Soviet leaders, in this nuclear
century to remain alive is everything, and there is no
aim in life... they submit to the tender mercies of
imperialism.... It is a truly bestial conception."
The statement notes that "universal and complete disarmament can
be realized only after imperialism. capitalism and all systems
of exploitation have been eliminated," shedding new light on
recent Chinese disarmament proposals.
September 2 - The Czech government demands the recall of two more
Chinese, a commercial official IF -the Embassy and a student, for
spreading material criticizing Soviet and Czech policy. Pravda's
correspondent in Bonn reports that "the militarist propagandists
here are already beginning to express sympathy openly for the
hitherto hateful 'Red Chinese,"' and Izvestiya points out that
Isom Kong and Macao, unlike Goa (India and est Irian (Indonesia),
are still not liberated. In Moscow, a group of Soviet citizens
demonstrates outside the Chinese bassy, shouting anti-war
slogans (NCNA). In Peking, Indonesian C? leader B.N. Aidit i$
welcomed effusively (in contrast to an absence of Soviet publicity
while he was in the USSR), but he makes a non-committal speech
at the CC? Higher Party School, briefly condemning both "modern
revisionism" and "modern dogmatism."
September 3 - Xhrushchev leaves Belgrade for the USSR, ending a
7o week visit. According to NCNA, Ko Htay, a Burmese Cp polit-
buro member negotiating for peace with the Burmese government,
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states his opposition to Indian policy and the test ban treaty,
and convents: "I Cannot understand Khrushchev's peaceful co-
existence." In ?eying, Aid-it makes another speech on the subject
of revolution an co:. zauni sm in Indonesia, at a welcome rally
stressing that the ?ICI is compelled to "Indonesianize" Marxism-
Leninism; he again opposes "modern do, a ism as well as "modern
revisionism." In a Moscow broadcast in Japanese, the commentator
(Ilinsi.y) states spec cally that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty
is s till in effect; hence there is no need for the inese to
have their own nucle.r weapons.
September 4 - The Chinese announce that, since the International
Co . tee 'or the Cooperation of Journalists refuses to c nge
its a-Zen a or meeting arrangements for the Third World Meeting
of Journalists, the All-China Journalists Association will~oy-
cott the meeting. People's Daily having published a "letter from
the USSR" extolling the Chinese leaders and signed "The Soviet
Union, V. Ye.," Trud denounces this as a forgery "designed for
gullible readers." (In a broadcast to China of 29 August, Moscow
Radio read a letter allegedly from a Chinese resident in the
Soviet Union, denouncing the Chinese leaders as belonging in
"the same category" as the imperialists)
September 6 - The editorial departments of People.'] Daily and
Red a.g publish "The Origin and Development of the Differences
Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves;' the first of
a series of articles replying to Open Letter of the CPSU of 14
July 1963. In this article, the Chinese trace the origin of the
dispute of the 23th C?SU Congress in 1953, and deny Soviet claims
that they turned 1030 in April 1960. In line with earlier Chinese
polemics, the article denounces the Soviet leaders for their
negation of Stalin and the dictatorship of the proletariat; their
failure to consult with other CP's, exemplifying their "great
power chauvinism;" their indifference to the national liberation
struggle; and their espousal of "peaceful coexistence." Apparently
seeing to reduce the semantic handicap they face as opponents of
"peaceful coexistence," the Chinese bracet it with "peaceful
traisition'! (the vfwv that domestic revolutions are unnecessary)
and "peaceful competition" (competition in the economic sphere).
More novel is the Chinese account of:
-- the Soviet role in the Polish and Hungarian disturbances
in 1956:
"By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the
Polish comrades by armed force it /the leadership
of the CPSU7 committed the error of great power
chauvinism. And at the critical moment when the
Iungarian counterrevolutionaries had occupied
Budapest, for a time it intended to adopt a policy
of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary to
counterrevolution....We insisted on the taking of
all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolu-
tionary rebellion in Hungary....and we firmly
opposed the erroneous methods of great power
chauvinism."
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-- their own position at the l957 meeting of the parties:
"tin the present /T9577 situation of the international
communist movement, It is advantageous from the point
of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful
transition. But it would be inappropriate to over-
emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition....
To the best of our knowledge, there is still not a
single country where this possibility is of any prac-
tical significance .... To obtain a majority in parlia-
ment is not the same as smashing the old state machinery
(chiefly the armed forces)."
-- the Soviet attempt to impose military control on China:
"In 1958 the leadership of the C13SU put forward un-
reasonable demands designed to bring China under
Soviet military control.... Not long afterward, in
June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore
up the agreement on new technology for national de-
fense concluded between China and the Soviet Union
in October 1957, and refused to provide China with
a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data con-
cerning its manufacture."
-- and of Soviet subversion on Chinese borders:
"In April and May 1962, the leaders of the CPSU used
their organs and personnel in Sin'tiang, China, to
carry out large-scale subversive activities in the
Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of
thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet
Union.... the Soviet government refused to repatriate
these Chinese citizens.... To this day this incident
remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding
event, unheard of in relations between socialist
countries."
Lppended to the article are documents purporting to be: an out-
line of Chinese views presented at the November 1357 meeting of
the parties; a statement by the Chinese delegation. at the
Bucharest meeting in June 1960; and proposals for settling inter-
?arty differences advanced by the Chinese in September 1933.
Also on 3 September, a Chinese cultural delegation arrived
in Rumania for a one-month's tour as guests of t e Rumanian
Writer s Union, and an Albanian French-language broadcast of a
Zeri I Popullit article calls on revolutionary communists" to
"form organizations which will know how to preserve themselves
from t e~treachery of opportunists, which will know how to fight
against the revisionist leaders..."
September 7 - Tass relays another article (in Nedelya, wee'tly
slap ement to =vestiya) pointing to the Chinese o erance of
British rule in Hong .ong, where the US Seventh eet Inds
haven, where foreign businessmen exploit cheap labor, and
where espionage flourishes. 3 (#12 Chronology Continued)
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September 7-11 - Naushki border incident: On I)BepteibJ,
west ya pue ishes a first acbdu-at of an incident at the Soviet
border sfation at Naushki on 7 September when Soviet customs
officials sought to confiscate publications "hostile to our coun-
try in the possession of Chinese travellers." On 11 September,
Xomsomolskaya Pravda reports that 92 Chinese citizens sank to the
lowest ebb by turning the customs hall into a'lavatory. Another
train was used to carry the non-Chinese passengers on to Moscow,
and in the early morning of 10 September, the Chinese train was
returned to China; it proceeded to Peking, where the Chinese
travellers received a hero's welcome with "drums and gongs."
It appears that copies of the Information Bulletin of the
YNCNA Russian service containing the 1 September statement by the
spokesman of the Chinese Government (see above) were se zed by
customs officials from trai crew members and students, despite
claims that these were "for their own reading." (NCNA does not
reveal why they chose to study the statement in Russian trans-
lation.) According to Soviet reports, the Chinese tried to
lock the customs officers onto the train, and refused to proceed
without their publications; they also used the train radio to
broadcast the contents of the publicatiorA and to complain of
Soviet mistreatment.
September 6 - L Moscow Radio roundtable discussion implies that
there will De no attempt to answer the 3 September Chinese article,
also saying
"It would be a vain occupation even to try to list the
articles, ... published this weer. by ... press organs of
China.... It would be undignified to fall into the
quarrelsome, hysterical tone which Peking is obviously
trying to impose upon us."
However, in a speech at the National Harvest Festival in Warsaw,
Vladyslaw Goni:,l a attacked, more in sorrow an n anger," the
Chinese refusal o sign the test ban treaty; this might have been
P. reply to the 3 September article, in which the Chinese claimed
to have intervened on behalf of 'Poland in 1956. Also on 8 Sept-
ember, a Moscow broadcast quotes an article in Liturnaya Gazeta
pointing out that, for all the Chinese boasting a they
publish the views of their opponents, the publication of an item
in People's Daily only brings it to the eyes of the middle and
hig e~ ranks of the CCP; the Chinese masses are only fed the
Chinese line.
September 9 - Ped Fla,, compares the alleged alignment of the
Soviet Union wl n the imperialists, exemplified by the test ban
treaty, with the "Holy Alliance" formed by Metternich in tLe
early nineteenth century: "It can be said with assurance that
the new 'Holy Liliance' will come to no better end than the old."
In another article, Red Flag quotes again a part of the text of
the 1963 "Long Live eninism" article.
September 10 - Responding to the Chinese tactic of quoting from
he record, a Moscow broadcast to Yugoslavia quotes articles
4 (#12 Chronology Continued)
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from the nopie's Daily of 1955-1250, praising the USSR for assist-
ing the oppressed nations. (Similar broadcasts were made on 6
September to the United Kingdom, and on 3 September to Albania.)
September 11 - D.E. Aidit, now in ?-yong-jang at the fifteenth anni-
versary celebration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
continues to maintain an independent position:
"The easiest position, but not the safest position, is
the position to tail one of the parties,... It does
not need much thinking.... called by the Indonesian
Communists modern dogmatism, `':7 is not a correct
position. it is a bureaucratic position, the position
of a bull whose nose is already tied so that it is
easy to draw him hither and thither."
September 11 - ?'avda prints an article by Glezerman, ancusin:
the Chinese of b being-revisionist, in that
"They have subjected to revision the thesis of the
/1577 declaration and the 119537 statement that the
Basic conty aciction of the a.ge is the contradiction
between socialism and capitalists, putting this into
the backEr'ound in their documents and putting it on a
level with other consideratiom ...Marx and Engels
based the inevitability of a socialist revolution of
the proletariat chiefly on an analysis of the basic
contradiction of a capitalist society, the contradic-
tion between the public character of production and
the private character of profit.... ,oday7 the con-
tradiction between the perishing capitalist social-
economic formation and the communist formation which
is establishing itself becomes the basic contradiction
of the mo6o n a 3e, being the age of transition from
capitalisn to socialism."
September 12 - Pravda publishes a statement from the exile
Spanish CP, strongly endorsing the test ban treaty, and not: n;
that, in contrast to Communist China, "even the government of
Franco intands to sign." A member: of the Czech National Assembly
is reported as Eanouncing the "megwic:aniacal, nationalist
irresponsibility" of the Chinese. ?ravda also publishes an
article by two loaders of the Martinique Cp, adding to the attack
on the CCP.
September 13 - ho editors of Peop'le's Daily and Red E publish
TEAS second -in their announced series o articles, On th. 'unstion
of Stalin." While admitting that ;twin "made some mista:,es....
wave some bad counsel in the inter: nat ona l communist movement....
and thereby7 caused some losses to the Soviet Union and th
international communist movement" (possibly a reference to
Stalin's policy of trusting Chian;; Kai-she's in 1927), the Chinese
maintain that he was "a great Mar::ist-1,eninist, a great pro ].e-
tarian revolutionary." Khrushchev has completely "negated"
5 (412 Chronology Continu::c)
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Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress and since, although he "was in
the leadership of the party and state in Stalin's period and...
actively supported dnd firmly executed the policy for suppressing
counterrevolutionaries." The Chinese quote from Khrushchev's
statements made in the 1933's, including the following:
"'Our party will mercilessly crush the band of traitors
and betrayers, and wipe out all the Trotsky-Right dregs....
The guarantee of this is the unshakable leadership of
our Central Committee, the unshakeable leadership of
our leader Comrade Stalin.... Vie shall totally
annihilate the enemies -- to the last man -- and
scatter their ashes to the winds." (6 June 1937,
5th party Conference of Moscow Oblast)
Moreover, the article maintains that Stalin knew how to admit
his mistakes, that "after the victory of the Chinese Revolution
he admitted his mistake " while Khrushchev does not: "He singly
does not know what self-criticism is; all he does is to shift
the entire blame on to others and claim the entire credit for
himself." By his 23th Congress secret speech, which he still
fears to disclose to the Soviet people, Khrushchev "provided
the imperialists and the reactionaries of all countries with
exceedingly welcome anti-Soviet and anti-communist ammunition."
In attacking "the cult of personality," the Soviet leaders of
actually violate Lenin's teachings, including the principle of
democratic centralism. A revolutionary party should "have a
fairly stable nucleus of leadership, which should consist of a
group of long-tested leaders who are good at integrating the
universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice
of revolution"; here the Chinese leaders seem to have them-
selves in mind. After a ringing statement that Khrushchev,
"try as he may, ...can never succeed in overthrowing Marxism-
Leninism which Stalin defended" It ho article ends rather sur-
prisingly:
"We would lino to offer a word of sincere advice to
Comrade Khrushchev. We hope you will become aware of
your errors and return from your wrong path to the
path of Marzism-Leninism. Lon; live the great
revolutionary teachings of Mar; , angels, Lenin, and
Stalin!"
6 (#12 Chronology)
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CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENSIONS COT'2UNISTES
No. 12 31 aout-13 septembre 1963
i aout: Le Conseil des societes de la Li ue de la Croix
ou a et du Croissant Roue, qu sest r uni a Gen ve, adop-
t- uno resolution apona se reciamant la prohibition com-
plbte des essais d acmes nucleaires. Solon TASS, is dele-
gue chinois 'let son acolyte albanais" se livrbrent a des ca-
lomnies au sujet du trait- pendant le debat, obligeant le
president de faire rayer du proces-verbal lea declarations
de 1'Albanais. Les delegues de la Chine communiste et de
1'Albanie se sont abstenus de voter.
1 septembre: Pekin diffuse a la radio"une declaration du
o f e parole du ouvernement chinois" en r pons- la decla-
ration sovi ique u 21 aou ; lea deux declarations ont dto
publiees simultanement on Chine. La declaration chinoise
constitue surtout une tentative do refuter lea accusations
soviets ues d'a res la uelle la Chino ne cherche u ob-
en r des acmes nucl acres et au elle se d sint resse den
d3 ors d une guerre mondiale. Les Chinois ddclarent qu ils
continueront a critiquer l 'Union Sov16tique, que la Chine
soft ou non un pays retardataire, ainsi que le de'clarent
lea Soviets; "en tout etat de cause, et memo si nous, peu-
ple chinois, nous etions incapables de produire une bombe
atomique au cours des cent ans a venir, nous no ramperons
pas sous la direction du baton des leaders sovietiques et
nouB no nous agenouillerons pas sous l'effet du chantage nu-
cleaire des imperialistes des Etats-Unis". La declaration
cite un passage du discours de Mao du 18 novembre 1957, ainsi
qu'un autre de Particle publie on 1960, "Vive,le leninisme",
et cherche a montrer quo lea Soviets avaient deform- le sons
de ces sources en citant en dehors do lour contexte les pas-
sages au sujet de la wort de la moitie de l'humanite of de
la reconstruction rapid- sur lea ruiner. Les Chinois de
clarent:
"Do l'opinion des leaders sovietiques en ce sie-
cle nucleaire, le tout c'est de rester vivant,
et quint a la vie ells n'a aucun but... Its
s'en romettent a la grace de 1'imperiaiieme...
Cola est une conception vralment bestiale".
I1 ost souligne dans la declaration quo "le desarrienont
couplet of universel ne pout avoir lieu qu'apres que l'impe-
rialisme, le capitalisme et tour lea autres systenes d'ex-
ploitation auront ete elimines", ce qui place sous un jour
nouveau lea offres de desarmement faster recemment par lea
Chinois.
2 septembre: Le gouvernement tcheque exige le rappel de
deux autros Chinois, un attache commercial de 1 ambassade
of un 6tudiant, qui avaient dissenine uno documentation cri-
tiquant lea Soviets et la politique tcheque. Le correspon-
dent do la "Pravda" a Bonn fait savoir que "lea propagandis-
tes mUitaristes comiencent ici 'a exprimer ouvertement lour
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synpathie pour ceux qui auparavant etaient des Chinois rou-
ges ha!ssablos", "Izvestiya" souligno que Hong Kong et Ma-
cao a l'oncontre do Goa (Inds), et 1 Irian Occidental T n-
3onesio) n'ont toujours pas ate liberties. A Mo_ scou, un
groups do citoycns sovietiques manifestent autour de 1'am-
bassade chinoise en hurlant des slogans contre la guerre
(Agonce do presse de la Chine nouvelle). A Pekin, is leader
communists indonesien D.N. Aidit eat acceuilli avec effusion
(en contrasts avec is manque do publicite de la part des So-
viets lorsqu'il sc,trouvalt on Union.Sovietique), ,ais it
fait un discours sans s'engager a 1'Ecole superieure du par-
ti communists, condamnant brievement aussi bien "ie revi-
sionnisille moderns" que is "dogmatisme moderns".
3 septembre: Khrouchtchev quitte Belgrade pour l'U.R.S.S.%
teruinant une visits qui a dure deux semaines. D aprbs 1 A-
gence do presse de la Chine nouvelle, Ko Htay, membre du Po-
litburo du parti communists birman, qui eat en train de n6go-
cier la paix avec is gouvernement birman, declare son oppo-
sition n ! la politique de 1' Inde et au traits interdisant lea
essais nucleaires; it commente:"Je no peux~comprendre la co-
existence pacifique de Khrouchtchef". A Pekin, Aidit pro-
nonce un autre discours au sujet de la rev ion et du com-
munisme on Indonesia a un ralliement de bienvenue; it souli-
gne quo le parti communists indonesien eat force d'"in-
sianisor" le marxisme-leninisme. Ii s'oppose de nouveau au 11
do~giaatisme moderns" ainsi qu'au "revisionnisme moderns". Au
tours dune radio-diffusion en langue japonaise a Moscou,
le comrlentatour (Ilinsky) declare notamment que le traits
dalliance sino-sovietique eat toujours en vigueur; par con-
sequent, lea Chinois n'ont pas besoin d'avoir leurspropres
arines nucleaires.
4 septeubre: Les Chinois annoncent qu'etant donne is refus
UU
do modifier son ordre du jour ou lea dispositions prises pour
in 3e reunion mondiale des lournalistes, l'Aosociation pan-
chinoiso des journalistes boycattera cette reunion. Le
"Quotidian du Peuple" ayant publie une "lettre do 1'U.R.S.S."
exaltant lea leaders chinois et signee Nnion Sovietique,
V. Ye.",~ le "Trud" la qualifie de faux a l'usage des lec-
teurs credules". (Dana une radio-diffusion a la Chine lo 29
aout, Radio-Moscou a donne lecture dune lettre adressee
soi-diaant par un Chinois residant on Union Sovietique, let-
tre dans laquolle lea leaders chinois etaient dits apparte-
nir "a la rie'ne categorie" que lea irzperialistes. )
6 sopteubro: Les editoriaux du "Quotidien du Pouple" et du
Drapcau Rouge" publient "L'origine et le developpeaent dos
differences antra lea leaders du parti communists do 1'Union
Sovietique of nous-Dames"is premier dune saris d'articles
repondant a la lettre ouverte du parti communists de l'Union
Sovietique du 14 juillet 1963. Dana cot article, lea Chinoio
situent Pori ine de la dispute au XXe Con res du part c r1-
nunisto do l 'Union Sovietique en 195, et dementent l'affir-
mation dos Soviets qu'ils ont fait volte-face do 1800 on avr
1960 Dana is ton des polemiques chinoises precedentes,
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Particle denonco lea leaders sovietiques pour avoir renie
Stalinoat la dictature du proletariat; pour n'avoir pas
consult, / lea autres partis communistes, montrant ainsi "lour
chauvinism/ do grande puissance"; pour leur indifference en-
vers la lutte de liberation nationale; et pour avoir adopt d
"la coexistence pacifique". Cherchant apparonnent a reduire
le handicap semantique qui est le lour en tant qu'adversaire
de la coexistence paeifique, lea Soviets la laaent dana la
rued/ categorie quo "la transition pac if ique" (opinion quo
lea revolutions nationales no sont pas ndceasaires) at quo
"la oorapetition paeifique" (concurrence dans le doraaine eco-
norniquo). Recit inedit chinois sur:
-- le role sovi6tique dans Jos desordres en Hongrie at
an Pologne en 1956:
"En ayant recours aux troupes pour dompter lea
cauarados polonais par la force arnee, its [lea
loaders du ptarti communiste do l'Union Sovi6tique]
conrlirent 1 erreur de pratiquer le chauvinism/ do
grand/ puissance. Et au moment critique ou lee
controrevolutionnatree hongrois occupaient Buda-
pest, ils eurent 1'intention pendant un moment
d'adoptor une politique do capitulation at d a-
bandonner la Hongrie socialists a la contrerevo-
lution... Nous insistames a ce qu'ils prissent
tout/ raosure necessaire pour /eraser la rebellion
controrevolutionnaire en Hongrie... at nous nous
opposames fermement aux methades errondes du chau-
vinisme de grand/ puissance."
-- lour propre position a la reunion des partis de 1957:
"Dans la situation pre'sente [1957] du raouvement
co:_lnuniste international, it est avantageux du
point de vue tactique do se ref erer au desir dof
transition pacifique. Mais it serait malvenu d ex-
aerer la possibilite do transition pacifiquo...
D apres cc que.nous savons, it n'y a pas encore
un soul pays ou cette possibilite puisse avoir une
signification pratique... Obtenir une najorite au
Pa,rlement est autre chose quo de domolir le vieil
appareil gouvernonental (principalement lea forces
ar:lees)
-- la tentative sovietique d'imposer un gouvernement ni-
litairo a la Chine:
"En 1958, lea leaders du parti cornaunisto de 1'U-
nion sovietique presenterent des requetes derai-
sonnables tandant a placer la Chine sous control/
militaire des Soviets... Peu de temps acres, on
juin 1959, le gouvernement sovietique denongait
unilateralenent les accords sur la nouvelle tochno-
logic pour la defense nationals, conclue entre la
Chine at l'Union Sovietique an octobre 1957, at
rofuseront do fournir a la Chine un echantillon do
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la bombe atomique et lea informations techniques
concerncnt sa fabrication".
-- et sur la subversion sovietique le long des frontie-
res chinoises:
"En avril et ma i 1962, lea leaders du part i coe-
nuniste de 1'Union Sovi6tiqueutiliserent lours
organismos et lour personnel a Sinkiang, Chine,
pour so livrer a des activit6s subversives ~L gran-
de echolle dans la region de 1'Ili; ils attire-
rent ou obligerent par la force plusieurs dizai-
nes do milliers de citoyens chinois de so rendro
on Union Sovietique... Le gouvernenent sovietique
a refuse do repatrior ces citoyens chinois... Jus-
qu'a cc jour, cot incident na. pas eta r?gle.
C'est on effet un eveneuent etonnant, sans prece-
dent Bans lea relations entre pays socialistes".
Aiout6s a l'article se trouvent des documents qui repre-
sentent soi-disant: un resume des vues chinoises present-es
a la reunion des partis de novembre 1957; une declaration do
la dolen-c.tion chinoise h la reunion de Bucarest en juin 1960;
11
et des propositions pour regler lea differends ontre partis
sounisos Dar lea Chinois on septenbre 1960.
Eg^le:ient du 6 soptombre, une delegation culturolle chi-
s
noise cst arrives an Rumania pour une tournee de un uois, in
_
vit e par I Union des crivains roumains; une radio-diffusion
on languc franpaise par lea Albanais d'un article de Zeri I
Popullit' faisant appel "aux connunistes revolutionnaires" do
"forger dos organisations sachant se proteger contre la tra-
hison des opportunistes, et sachant combattre lea leaders re-
visionnistes..."
7 septel_foro: TASS roproduit un autre article (dins "Nedelya~
supple"acnt hebdomadaire do "Izvest iya") qui souligne quo lost
Chinois tolerant la 2presence-des Britanni ues %a Ho Kong, ou
la 7 flotto des Etats-Unix trouvo e1 r_iouillage, oil les honme
%
d'affaires 6trangors oxploitent une main-d'oeuvre a bon march,
of ou flourit 1'ospionnage.
7-11 septoLbre: Incident do frontiers a Naushki: le 10 sep-
tembro, 'Izvestiya \publiait un premier rapport sur 1'inci-
dent ay,nt eu lieu a la gare-frontiore sovietique do Naushki
le 7 soptombro, alors que lea douaniers sovi6tiques cher-
chaiont . confisquer des publications "hostiles a notre pays
et qui so trouvaient on possession do voyageurs chinois".
Le 11 soptombro, "Komsouolskaya Pravda" annonrgait quo 92 ci-
toyens chinois 6taient tombes au-dessous do tout on transfor-
mant 1a Salle des douanes en on w.c. Un autre train fut uti-
lise pour transporter "a' Moscou lea passagers non-Chinois, of
au debut do la uatin6e du 10 septembro, le train chinois fut
retournc on Chine; it so rendit u Pekin ou lea voyageurs chi-
nois furont regus on heros avec "tambours et gongs".
Il souble quo lea copies du bulletin d'inf ormation publ'
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par le sorvico russe de 1'Asence do presse de la Chine nou-
volle, of contenant la declaration du ler se tenbro d' n or-
to-parole du RouvorneQent chinois (voir ei-dessus furont
enlevo'es par lea douanlors aux equipos de service du train
et aux otudiants, ualgre lours assertions quo cos copies 6
talent destines "a lour propre usage". (L'Agencedo presse
do la China nouvelle no dit pas pourquoi ils decidbrent d'6-
tudior cotto declaration dans sa traduction rusae.) D'aprbs
lea rapports sovietiques, lea Chinois tonte"rent d'onferraer
lea doutnicrs sovietiques dans le train at refuserent de con-
tinuer lour voyage sans lours publications; ils se sorvirent
egalenont do la radio du train pour diffuser le contonu do
c e s publications et pour so pla indre des r:rauva i s t ra it ement s
quo lour infligeaient lea soviQtiques.
8 soptoubre: Une discussion a la radio de Moscou fait croiro
quTill nay aura a c ne tent tive do fa e re e a l'ar
title chinois du septeLbre et declare egalenent:
"Co sorait du temps perdu quo d'ossayer do dres-
ser no serait-co qu'une liste des articles...
publics cette seEtaine par... lea organs de pres-
so ehinois.,. I1 serait indigne do prendro le ton
quorollour et hist drique quo Pekin tres certaino-
;ont ossaye do nous imposer".
Toutofois, dans un discours au festival national do la
r6polto Varsovie. WGonulka attaqua 'dans un esprit
Wladyslaw
do poinplutot quo de colere"he refus des Chinois do signer
le traito intordisant lea experiences nucle'aires; cola aurait
pu titre uno reponse a Particle du 6 septeubre, dans lequel
lea Chinois pretendirent titre intervenus an favour de la Po-
logne on 1956. Egale ont le 8 septeubro, une radio do Moscou
citait un article do "Liturnaya Gazeta" soulignant au sujet
dos assertions chinoises qu'ils publient lea opinions do tous
lours adversaires, quo la publication d'un article dans lo
"Quotidian du Pouple" no torabe que sous les yeux dos offi-
ciels superieurs of moyons du parts coununiste chinois; quant
aux Masses ollos no sent nourrios quo do propagande ehinoise.
noveabro: Lo "Drapeau Rouge" compare le pretendu aligno-
Lent de 1 Union Sovietique sur lea imperialistes, rais on 6vi-
denco par lo traite interdisant lea experiences nucl eairos,
avoc la "Sa into Alliance" foruee par Metternich au debut du 190
sieclo, "On pout dire aver certitude que la nouvelle 'Sainte
Alliance' no donnera pas de neilleurs resultats que 1'ancienn-
Dans un autre article, le "Drapeau Rouge" cite do nouveau une
partio du toxto do Particle "Vive le leninisrae", datant do
196o.
10 septoabro: En reponse a la tactique chinoise dtavoir ro-
cours dos citations, uno radio de Moscou dostin6e a la You-
goslavic cite lea articles du "Quotidian du Peuple" datant
do 1956 - 1958, dans lesquels 1'Union Sovietique ost felicitc,
pour son assistance aux nations opprimoos. (Dos diffusions
analogues furont faites io 6 septorabro a destination du
Royaurae-Uni, of lo 8 septerabro de 1'Albanie. )
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11 so tepbro: D.N. Aidit, so trouvant Pyongyang pour la
4l bration du 15e anniversaire do is Rgpublique populaire
denocratiquo do Corse, continue a carder une position ind6
pendanto:
"La position la plus facile macs non pas la moans
dancerouso eat do so mettre a is traine de l'un
dos partis... Cola no domando pas beaucoup de re
flexion .. of c'est cc quo los communistes indon6
sions qualifient do dogmatisrue moderne, qui no
root if is pas is position. Cost uno position bu-
ro ucratique, une position d'un taureau ayant
deja is cords au nusoau et qu'il eat facile de
tiror do tous lea cotes".
11 septombro: "Pravda" publie un article do Glozorman, ac-
cusaos Chinois d'etro des revisionnistes, parse quo:
"Ils ont fait reviser la these do la declaration
(19571 et du compte-rondu tde 1960] qui spec if iait
quo is contradiction fondamentale do cot ago eat
unc contradiction entre le socialisto et le capi-
talisuo, rejetant cola dans l,ombro dans lours
documents, et le placant au memo nivoau quo d'au-
tros considerations... Marx et Engels basaient
l'inevitabilite de is revolution socialists du
proletariat sur l'analyse principaleiment des con-
tradictions fondamontalos do is societe .capita-
listo, des contradictions entre le caractbre pu-.
blic do is roduction et le caractbre prive du be-
nefice... tAujourd'hui] is contradiction entre la
formation sociale et economiquo du capitalisme en
perdition et la formation communiste en train do
s'etablir devient la contradiction fondarmentale
des temps modernes, qui eat 1'"ge do is transi-
tion du capitalisme au social iste."
1 tombre: La "Pravda" publie une declaration d'un membro
du parti comuuniste espagnol on exil,,qui approuve fermement
le traits interdisant les essais nucleaires, et qui souligno
quo contraireuent a la Chine communists, "memo le gouverno-
Eont do Franco a 1'intention do le signer". Un oribre de
e nationals tcheque aurait expose "l'irresponsabi-
1'Asscnbl6`
lite nationaliste mogalomaniaque"des Chinois. "Pravda" pu-
blic e'G ionont un article de deux leaders du parti communis-
to martiniquais qui s'associent aux attaques centre le parti
communisto chinois.
13 septeribro: Les editeurs du "Quotidien du Peuple" et du
Drapeau Rouge" publient le 2e article do lour serie annon-
cee, "sur is question de Staline". Tout on admettant quo
Stalino "c fait cortaines orreurs... a donne quelques mauvais
consoils au mouvoment international communists... tot par
consequent] a provoque certaines pertes en Union Sovietiquo
et daps lo nouvement communiste international" (il cot possi-
ble quo cc soit une allusion a is politique do Staline de
faire confiance a Chiang Kai-shek on 1927), lea Chinois sou-
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grand proletaire revolutionnaire". Khrouchtchef a complete--
mont "denigro" Staline au tours du 200 Congres du parti~~com-
nuniste do l'Union Sovietique, et depuis ceete ep~oque,` boon
qu'il fit partie dos dirt giants du parti of de 1 Etat a 1 e-
poquo do Staline ot... qu it alt soutenu activenent et oxcs
cute avoc forziet' la politique d' aneantissenont des contre-
revolutionnaires". Les Chinois citent dos passages dos de-
clarations faites par Khrouchtchef on 1930, dont le suivant:
"Notre parti eerasera inpitoyablenent la bande
de traftres, et liquidera toute la lie des trots-
kistos at des a-droite... La garantie on eat don-
nco -)ar la direction inebranlable du comito central,
par la direction inebranlable do notre chef le ca-
riarado Staline... Nous annihilerons conpletement
nos onnonis, jusqu'au dernior homme, et nous re-
pandrons lours cendres au vent." (6 juin 1937, 5e
Conference du parts du district do Moscou)
Dtautro part, l'articlo affirue quo Staline savait ad-
iiettre sos erreurs, "qu'apres la victoire do la revolution
chinoise it admit son erreur", alors que Khrouchtchef no le
fait pas:"Il no salt simplement pas cc que auto-critique
vout dire; tout cc qu'll fait c'est do rejeter le blame tout
ontier sur los autres of de pretendre a tout est ue
ritoire . Dans on discours secret du XXo tongr s, 4
craint toujours de reveler au pouple sovietique, Khrouch-
tchef "a donne aux imperialistes et aux reactionnaires do
tous los pants des munitions anti-sovictiques et anti-comnu-
nistes oxtrouonent utiles". En attaquant "lo culte de la
personnr1ite", les dirigeants sovietiques portaient onfreinto
aux onsoignoments de L6nine, et notamnent au principe do con-
tralis-.--io, de ioerat iquo. Un parti revolut ionna ire "do it avoir
un noyau do chefs suffisamment stables, compose d'un groupe
do leaders eprouves do longue date qui savent integrer la
verite univorselle du marxisme-leninisne a la pratique con-
crete do la revolution"; a ce point it semble quo c'est eux-
moracs quo los leaders Chinois sous-entendent. Apra la d e'
clarat ion rotent issante quo Khrouchtchef "quoiqu 11 fasse...
no ro'ussira janais a ronverser le narxisne-leninisne quo
de'fendait Staline" Particle so ternine d'une fa9on plutot
surprenante:
"Noes ainerions donner un consoil au camarado Khrou-
chtchef. Nous esperons que vous vous rendrez conptc
do vos orrours of que vous abandonnerez la mauvaise
void Hour revenir sur la vote du narxisne-l'ninisme.
Vivont les Brands enseignements revolutionnaires do
Marx, Engels, Lenine, of Staline; "
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C IIGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS
No. 12 31 Agosto-13 Septiembre 1963
31 Agosto: El Consejo de la Liga de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja la Cre-
ciente Rota, reuni en Ginebra, aprueba una resoluci6n del Ja n reco-
menda do la prohibici'on absolute de los ensayos de arenas nucleares. De
acuerdo con Taasss~ el delegado chino "y su albands del am6n" calumniaron
el tratado contra los ensayos'dxtrante el debate, obligando al presidente
de la asemblea a excluir del acta las declarations albaneses. Los de-
legados de China Comunista y de Albania se abstuvieron de votar.
1 Septiembre: Pekin difunde por radio una "declaraci6n del portavoz del
Gob erno chino" en respuesta a is declaraci6n sovidtica de 21 de agosto;
en China se publican ambas declaraciones simultdneamente. La declara-
ci6n china es principalmente una tentativa de refutar las denuncias so-
vidticas en el sentido de que China quiere solamente arenas nucleases y
es indiferente a los riesgos os cue guerra mundial. Los chinos dicers que
continuardn critieando a la URBS, es china retrasada o no, coano dicen
los sovi6ticos; "en todo caso, y adn cuando nosotros el pueblo chino no
podamos en cien afios producir una bomba at6mica, ni nos arrastraremos
bajo la batuta de los lideres sovidticos ni nos arrodillaremos ante el
chantaje nuclear de los imperialistas norteamericanos". La declaraci6n
contiene citas del discurso de Mao de 18 de noviembre de 1957 y del ar-
t1culo "Viva el Leninismo" de 1960, tratando de demostrar que los so-
vidticos han tergiversado el sentido de ambos extrayendo de su contexto
citas acerca de la muerte de media humanidad y la r4pida reconstrucci6n
sobre las ruinas. Los chinos denuncian:
"En opini6n de los lideres sovidticos, en este siglo nuclear
permanecer con vida to es todo, y no hay prop6sito en la
vida... se scnneten a la dulce misericordia del imperialismo
Es un concepto verdaderamente bestial."
La declaraci6n apunta que "el desarme universal y completo se puede
poner en prdctiva solo despuds que el imperialismo, el capitalismo y to-
dos los sistemas de explotaci6n hayan sido eliminados", poniendo mds
en claro las recientes proposiciones chinas sobre el desarme.
2 Septiembre: El Gobierno checo exige el retiro de otros dos chinos,
un funcionario comercial de la embajada y un estudiante, por distribuir
material de critica de la politica sovidtica y checa. El corresponsal
de "Pravda" en Bonn informs que "aqul los propagandistas militaristas
empiezan ya a expresar abiertamente su simpatia con los hasta ahora
odiosos 'chinos rojos'," e "Izvestiya" apunta que Hong Kong y Maaccao,
al contrario de Goa (India) e IriAn Occidental (Indonesia) estdn a'un
sin libertar. En Mosctt, un grupo de ciudadanos sovidticos hacen una
manifestaci6n frente a la embajada china, gritando consignas antibdli-
cas (Agencia Nueva China). En Pdkin, al lider del PC indonesio D. N.
Aidit le hacen un recibimiento efusivo (en contraste con la ausencic.
de publicidad cuando estuvo en la URSS), pero 61 pronuncia un discurso
sin compromiso en la Escuela Superior del Partido Comunista chino con-
denando brevemente tanto el "revisionismo contempordneo" como el "dog-
matisrno contempordneo".
3 Septiersbre: Kruschev parte de Belgrado hacia la URSS, concluyendo
una visita de dos semanas. De acuerdo con la Agencia Nueva China,
1
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Ko Htay, miembro del politburo del PC birriano que estd haciendo nagocia-
ciones de paz con el Gobierno birmano, declara su oposici6n a la politi-
ca de la India y el tratado contra los ensayos, y comenta como sigue:
"No entiendo la coexistencia pacifica de Kruschev". En Pekin, Aidit
pronuncia en una manifestacidn de recibimiento otro discurso sobre el
t6pico de revolution y cornznismo en Indonesia, poniendo hincapid en que
el PKI estd obligado a "indonesianizar" el marxismo-leninismo; de nuevo
se opone al "dogmatismo contempor neo asi como al "revisionismo con-
terapor6neo". En una emisi6n de la Radio de Mosctt, en japonds, el co-
mentarista (Ilinsky) declara especificamente que el tratado de alianza
chino-sovi6tico est6. a-in en vigor; por lo tanto no tienen los chinos
necesidad de sus propias armas nucleares.
4 Septiembre: Anuncian los chinos que, como el Cor:it6 International
Para la Cooperation de los Periodistas rehusa combiar el teraario o los
arreglos pars la convocatoria del Tercer Encuentro Mundial de Periodis-
tas la Asociaci6n de Periodistas de Toda China va a boicotear icha
reunion. Una "carta de la URSS" publicada por el "Diario del Pueblo" ~~
en alabanza de los lideres chinos y firmada "La Uni6n Sovidtica, V. Ye.,
es condenada por "Trud" coin falsification "ideada pares los lectores
crddulos". (En una difusi6n a China el 29 de agosto, la Radio de Mosed
ley6 una cartes que se decia ser de un residente chino de la Union ovi-
6tica condenando a los lideres chinos como pertenecientes a "la misma
categoria" que los imperialistas.)
6 Septierabre: Los departamentos editoriales del "Diario del Pueblo" 7
Bandera Roja" publican "El origen y desarrollo de las divergencias en-
tre el liderato del PUGS y nosotros , el primero de una serie de arti-
culos en respuesta a la Carta Abierta del PCUS de 14 de Julio de 1963.
En dicho articulo los chinos trazan el origen de la querella del XX Con-
r~ eso del PCUS en 1956 y niegan los asertos sovi6tieos de que en abril
de 1960 habian dado una vuelta de 180 grados. Como las anteriores po-
16micas chinas, el articulo condena a los lideres sovi6ticos por haber
negado'a Stalin y la dictadura del proletariado; por no haber consul-
tado con otros PC, dando ejenplo de su "chovinisno de gran potencies";
por su indiferencia a la lucha por la liberation national; y por su a-
poyo a la "coexistencia pacifica". Aparentemente tratando de reducir
la desventaja semdntica que encaran como opositores de la "coexisten-
cia pacifica", los chinos la ponen en el mismo cuadro que la "transi-
ci6n pacifica" (la opini6n de que las revolutions internas son inne-
cesarias) y la "competencia pacifica" (la competencia en la esfera e-
con6mica). Mds novedosa es la description china de:
-- el papel sovi6tico en los disturbios en Hungria y Po-
lonia en 1956:
"Adelantando tropas en una tentative de someter a los ca-
maradas polacos por la fuerza armada elles Clos lideres
del PCUSJ incurrieron en el error del chovinismo de gran
potencia. Y en el momenta critico en que los contrarre-
volucionarios hdngaros habian ocupado Budapest, por un
tiempo tuvieron intenc16n de adoptar una politica de ca-
pitulaci6n y abandonar a la Hungria socialista a la con-
trarrevoluci6n... Nosotros insistimos en que fueran to-
madas todas las medidas necesarias para aplastar la con-
trarrevoluci6n en Hungria... y firmemente nos opusimos a
los err6neos rdtodos del chovinismo de gran potencia."
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-- su propia posici&n en la reuni6n de los partidos en 1957:
"'En la actual situaci6n Cen 1957J, en el movimiento
comunista international es ventajoso desde el panto de
vista tdctico referirse al deseo de la transici6n paci-
fica. Pero serfa impropio poner demasiado 6nfasis en
la posibilidad de la transici6n pacifica... Por todo lo
que nos consta no hay an un solo pals donde dicha posi-
bilidad sea de segnificacidn prdctica... Obtener una ma-
yoria parlamentaria no es to mismo que destrozar la vieja
maquinaria del estado (principalnente las fuerzas armadas).
-- la tentativa sovidtica de imponer su control militar sobre China:
"En 1958, el liderato del PCUS adelant6 demandas irrazo-
nables con intenci6n de poner a China bajo el control mi-
litar sovi6tico... No mucho despu6s, en junio de 1959,
el Gobierno sovi6tico unilatera:rnente destroz6 el acuerdo
sobre nueva tecnologia para la defensa national concluido
entre China y la Uni6n Sovidtica en octubre de 1957 y re-
hus6 suministrar a China una muestra de bomba at6mica y
datos t6cnicos sobre su fabricaci&n."
-- y la subversi6n sovi6tica sobre las fronteras chinas:
"En abril y mayo de 1962, los lideres del PCUS emplearon
sus 6rganos y personal en Sinkiang, China, para llevar a
cabo actividades subversivas en gran escala en la regi6n
de Ili y engatusaron y coaccionaron a varias decenas de
millares de ciudadanos chinos para que fueran a la Uni6n
Sovi6tica... el Gobierno sovidtico se neg6 a repatriar a
estos ciudadanos chinos... Hasta hoy, permanece este in-
cidente sin resolver. Esto es en verdad un acontecimiento
sorprendente, nunca visto en las relations entre los pas-
ses socialistas."
El articulo lleva apdndices en forma de documentos que aparentan
ser: un bosquejo de las opinions chinas presentadas ante la reuni6n de
los partidos de novienbre de 1957; una declarac16n de la delegaci6n chi-
na en la reuni6n de Bucarest de 1960; y proposiciones para arreglar las
divergencias entre los partidos ofrecidas por los chinos en septiembre
de 1960.
Tambi6n el 6 de septiembre, una delegaci6n cultural china lleg6 a
Rumania para llevar a cabo una gira de un mes como invitados de la ni6n
Runana de Escritores, y una emisi6n albanesa en lengua francesa de un
articulo de "Zeri i Popullit p~ ide a los "comunistas revolucionarios"
que "formen organizaciones que sepan permanecer a salvo de la traici6n
de los oportunietas, que sepan luchar contra los lideres revisionistas..."
7 Septiembre: Tass pasa otro articulo (en "Nedelya", el suplemento se-
manal de Izvestiya") que apunta la tolerancia china del doriinio britz#-
nico en Hong Kong, donde la S6ptina Flota norteamericana encuentra a-
brigo, donde los comerciantes extranjeros explotan la nano de obra ba-
rata y donde florece el espionaje.
7-11 Septtiembre: Incidente fronterizo de Naushki: El 10 de septiembre,
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"Izvestiya" publica una primera versi6n de un incidente en la estaci6n
fronteriza sovidtica de Naushki el 7 de septiembre cuando funcionarios
aduaneros sovidticos trataron de confiscar publications "hostiles a
nuestro pals en mans de viajeros chinos." El 11 de septiembre "Komso-
molskaya Pravda" informa que 92 ciudadanos chinos descendieron al nivel
mds soez haciendo de la sala de aduanas un excusado. Otro tren fue em-
pleado para llevar a los posajeros no de nacionalidad china hasty Mos-
ad y el tren chino fue devuelto a China en las primeras horas del 10
de septiembre; sigui6 hasty Pekin, donde los viajeros chinos gozaron de
un recibimiento triunfal con "boonbos y platillos".
Ejemplares del Boletin de Information del servicio en ruso de la
Agencia Nueva China, conteniendo la declaration de 10 de se tiembre del
portavoz del Gobierno chino (vea m s arriba , parece que fueron confis-
cados a la tripulac n del tren y a estudiantes, a pesar de que decian
tenerlos "para su propia lectura". (La Agencia Nueva China no explica
por qud lo estudiaban en la versi6n rasa.) Dicen los informes sovidti-
cos que los chinos trataron de encerrar bajo have a los funcionarios
de aduana en el tren, y se negaron a seguir sin sus publications; tan-
bidn utilizaron la emisora del tren para difundir el contenido de las
publicaciones y para quejarse de maltratos sovidticos.
8 Septiembre: Una discusi6n de mesa redonda por Radio Moscd da a en-
ten Ur que no habrd contestation al articulo chino de 6 de septiembre,
diciendo tasabi n:
"Seria vano empeflo siquiera tratar de hacer una lista de
Jos articulos, ...pubiicados esta semana por ... organs
de prensa de China... Serla indigno caer en el tono ren-
cilloso e hist6rico que Pekin estd evidentemente tratando
de imponernos."
Sin embardo, en un discurso en el Festival national de la Cosecha
en Varsovia, Wladislaw Gomulka atac6, s con pena que con ira", la
negativa, china de formar el tratado contra los ensayos; esto puede haber
sido respuesta al articulo de 6 de septiembre, en el cual los chinos
pretendieron que habian intercedido por Polonia en 1956. Tambidn el
8 de septiembre una emisi6n de Mosed cita un articulo en "Literatur-
naya Gazeta" que apunta que, cnn todo y echarse los chinos de que publi-
can las opiniones de sus opositores, la publication de un articulo en
el "Diario del Pueblo" to pone a la vista de los sectores medios y
superiores del PC chino; a las rnasas chinas se les ofrece solo la linea
china.
9 Septienbre: "Bandera Roja" compara la alineaci6n que dice existir
entre la Union Sovidtica y los imperialistas, ejenplo de la cual es el
tratado contra los ensayos, con la "Santa Alianza" formada por Metter-
nich el siglo 19:"Se puede decir con seguridad que la nueva 'Santa Ali-
anza' no llegard a mejor fin que la anterior". En otro articulo "Ban-
dera Roja" de nuevo cita parte del texto del articulo "Viva el Leni -
nismo" de 1960.
9 Septiersbre: Respondiendo a la tdctiea china de citar los archivos,
una enisi6n de la Radio de Moscd a Yugoslavia cita articulos del "Dia-
rio del Pueblo" de 1956-1958, encomiando a la URSS por ayudar a las
nations oprinidas. (El 6 de eeptiembre se hicieron transmisiones pa-
recidas al Reino Unido y el 8 de septiembre a Albania).
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11 Septiembret D. I. Aidit, ahora en Pyongyang aslstiendo a
la conmemoracion del 150 aniversario de la Republica Popular
Democratica de Xoreu, continua manteniendo une posicion in-
dependiente:
"La posicion mas facil, pero no la mas segure,
es la de it de rabo a una de las partes, ... No
requiere mucho pensar.., llamado par los comunis-
tas indonesios dogmatismo contemporaneo, no es~
una posicion correcta. Es una. posicion buroora-
tica, la posicion de un toro al que ya Be ha amar-
rado por la nariz y se hace facil hacerlo venir
a este o al otro lado."
13 Septiembre; "Pravda" publica un articulo de Glezerman en
el que a.cusa a be chinos de revisfoniamo porque
"Han sometido a revision la tesis de las decla-
raciones rde 1957 y 1960] de que la contradic-
cion basica de la epoca es la contradiccion entre
el socialismo y el capitalismo, poniendo esto en
el contrafondo de sus documentos y colocandolo al
nivol de otras consideraciones.., Marx y Engels
basaron la inevitabilidad de una revolution so-
ciclista del proletariado prrincipalmente en un
an^lisis de la contradiccion basica de una socie-
dad capitalists, la contradiccion entre el earac-
ter publico de la production y el caracter priva-
do del lucro... CHoy] la contradiccion entre la
moribunda f ormacion socioeconomica capitalista y
la, formation comunista que se va estableciendo Be
convierte en la contradicci6n basica de la epoca
moderna, siendo la epoca de la transition del ca-
pitalismo".
12 Septiembre; "Pravda" publica una declaration del PC es-
panol on el exilio suscribiendose fuertemente el tratado contrc
los ensayos, y apuntando que, por contraste a la China comu-
nista, "hasta el Gobierno de Franco tiene intention de f irmar.'
Se informa que un miembro de la Asemblea National theca ha con-
denado 1^ "irresponsabilided megalomana nacionalista" de los
chinos, "Pravda" tambien da a la luz un articulo de dos 1i-
deres del PC de Martinica anadiendo al ataque contra el PC
chino.
13 Septiembre; E1 "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" publi-
can el se undo articulo de la aerie, "Sobre la cuestion de
Stalin". Reconociendo que Stalin "cometio algunos errores,,.,
dio algunos malos consejos en el movimiento comunista inter-
nacional...Cy por ende] ocasiono algunos perdidaa a la Union
Sovietisa y al movimiento comunista internacional" (refirien..
dose posiblemente a la poiftica de Stalin de fiarse de Chiang
Kai-shek on 1927), los chinos mantienen que fue "un gran mar-
xista-leninista, un gran revolucionario proletario". Kru-
schev ha "negado" completamente a Stalin, en el XX Congreso
del PCUS y desde entonces, "aunque estaba on la dirigencia
del Partido en la epoca de Stalin y... activamente apoyo' y
Ap r o dr or ftUe