Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 8, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 23, 1963
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5.pdf3.75 MB
25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/ 8-03061A000200030003-5 Briefly Noted Soviets purchase Grain to Meet Shortage On 16 September, the Canadian government announced that the Soviets had agreed to buy $503,000,03) worth of Canadian wheat, some 1'93, 00J, 003 bushels, for delivery by July 1:34. A Soviet ne otiator, Sergei A. Borisov, stated that weather had adversely affected the Soviet wheat crop, compelling the Soviets to purchase wheat elsewhere The Soviets had bought substantial quantities of grain in Australia a short time before. Borisov said that future purchases of Canadian grain would "depend on how much Canada is able to enlarge its pur- chases of Soviet goods," but the current deal is to be paid for in hard dollars, obtained by Soviet gold sales. The degree of Soviet need is marked by their willingness to pay hard dollars for grain to the Canadian government, a practice which Communist China has had to follow for several years now. Of the Soviet purchase, $33,033,030 worth will be delivered to Cuba, and an unknown quantity will go to the bloc countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet purchase is the largest grain purchase for delivery in one year ever recorded; the previous postwar annual h.Zh in total Canadian grain exports was 333,000,003 bushels in 1352-3. The United States has made a foreign aid sale to India of $503,030,333 worth of wheat, but this is spread over a three year period, ending 30 June 1956. We use this story, in conjunction with BPG #123, item 693, to illustrate the failure of collectivization, propaganda campaigns, and the o:ploitation of virgin and fallow lands to solve Soviet agricul- tural problems. We point out that while weather may be partly to blaiie, it is a well-worn alibi used to cover other causes, and that countries like Canada and the United States have enough surplus store nu ay to cover any temporary harvest shortcomings. This story is particularly recommended for underdeveloped countries which may be attracted by the Soviet economic model. International Architects Meeting in Cuba Cuba will host the 7th Congress of the International Union of Architects (UIA, 20 September- October. The U171 somb y, where officers are elected and organization business conducted, follows in Mexico City in conjunction with a Symposium on architecture, 6-15 October. The UIA Congress will be the first bona fide international pro- fessional meeting in Cuba since Castro took over the government. The Eavana site was selected three years ago -- before Castro's open embrace of Communism. Cuba claims that 3,300 delegates from 30 countries will attend. In an attempt to fulfill that claim, Cuba has scheduled a meeting of students and professors of architecture a few days before the UIA Congress, underwritten travel costs and expenses of selected delegates and students, dispatched ships and airplanes to collect delegates and supplemented widely distributed written invitations by personal solicitations. (Briefly Noted Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 (3r00oAM@e 199 10372.11 78-03061A606U8'3r33 UIA officials maintain that their organization is nonpolitical and that they will not permit political subjects to be discussed or the Congress to become embroiled in any cold war arguments. Nevertheless, the UIA president, vice president and secretary- general have agreed to serve on a committee to judge a Cuba- sponsored contest to design a Bay of digs "victory" monument (arms captured at the Bay of Pigs will be one of the Cuban displays at the UIA Congress). The monument contest and Castro's speech ending the Congress are lilely to be the focal points of Cuban propaganda. The presence of delegates from Soviet 1cassia and Communist China may load to polemical exchanges judging from their performance at !5X1C10b other recent international meetings. QSO xecutive Committee Meeting Plagued by Sino-Soviet Rift The Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) executive coa- mittee meeting, hold in Nicosia, Cyprus from 9 to 12 September, was split between Sino-Soviet factions on the following issues: the limited nuclear test ban treaty (the Chicom delegation, reportedly, threatened to wala out if a resolution supporting the treaty should be passed; the chief Soviet delegate stated that "some of our friends insist on all or nothing") ; and the Colombo Conference pro- posals for settling the Sino-Indian border dispute. The meeting did adopt a compromise resolution "appreciating" the signing of the treaty by 3O nations and expressing hope that other steps toward peace and disarmament would follow. NCNA stated that the Soviet delegation and its followers forced the meeting "hastily" to accept a resolution on disarmament and peace on which reservations were voiced by many delegations, including those from Morocco, Guinea, Algeria, Ceylon, Indonesia, the DRV, the South Vietnam liberation front, Japan, Korea, and China. After the close of the conference, TASS charged that: the Chico s' activities boiled down to attempts to sabotage the meeting, to split Afro-Asian solidarity, and to use the session as a platform for "more foul attacits" on the USSR; the Chicoms brought to Nicosia a tremendous amount of anti-Soviet propaganda material and paid slanderers whom they tried to pass as representatives of the peoples 2 (Briefly Noted Continued' Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 (Brir1;lt?ase 199P78-030AI4&0(- of certain Afro-Asian countries, and are trying to bring AAPSO under their control so as to make it serve their own selfish interests. The Indonesian delegation was embittered over the Soviets' question- ing "on whose behalf" they were speaking and "whose interests" they were defending. The chief Chicom delegate attacked: the Soviets for adhering to a policy of "big-nation chauvinism" and collaborating with imperialism; and India for aggression against Pakistan, ideologi- cally and materially supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviets outplayed the Chicoms and Indonesians in the political committee resolution to convoke an A-A workers conference in Africa under the auspices of the permanent secretariat of AA)-?O. The Indonesian delegation issued a statement that plans for a preliminary //hicom/Indonesian-backed? A-A workers conference in Djakarta at The end of October will go ahead, declaring also that "we are not responsible for and not bound by this decision which is not in favor of cooperation between our movement and the workers' movement." The conference passed without a formal vote 18 resolutions, pro-Communist in tone and almost predictable in content on issues such as Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, American negroes, etc. "le continue to use this and all similar developments to stress in all suitable media that AAPSO and its subsidiary organizations are tools of Communist propaganda and subversion, and are increas- ingly becoming the battleground in the Sino-Soviet feuding. Splinter Party Obstruction in Norway. On 24 August, the Norwegian Labor government of Einar Gerharc resigned, and on 27 August a non-socialist coalition government took power headed by John Lyng. Labor, which had been in power since 1935, was charged with negligence in the operation of the state coal mines in Spitzbergen, where 21 miners perished last November; many Norwegians are said to have felt generally that Labor had become complacent, and that it was time for a change. But the change could not have occurred if the two-member leftist-and- neutralist Socialist People's ?arty (SPP) had not held the balance of power in the Storting, Norway's parliament, and if they had not voted against the Labor party. The SPP promptly declared that it would also overthrow the Lyng government at the first opportunity, and on 20 September, Labor and the SPP combined to vote the Lyng coalition out of power. Since the 1961 elections, the Storting has had 74 non-socialist members (Liberals, Christian People's Party, Center Party, and Conservatives), 74 Labor members, and two SPP members. Under current Norwegian law, the next elections will not take place until 1905, and until that date -- unless the law is changed -- the SPP is in a position to break any government which does not bow to its demands. It may be that Labor has now made promises to the SPP; 3 (Briefly Noted Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Ori dWAP o94Tlelse I 99 8-03061AO% OOy8 3 it is also possible that Labor will press for a revision of the law to permit new elections. In any case, the S?P has been able to exert a veto power out of keeping with its numerical strength, while avoiding responsibility. 4 (Briefly Noted Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 MEW 23 September 1963 DATES 25X1C10c 13 Oct Honduras first national election under its 1957 democratic constitution (after 25 years of rightist control). 20 Oct Chinese Communist troops begin advance into India, escalating border war, 1962. 22 Oct US forces USSR to renave offensive missiles from Cuba (22-28 Oct. 1962). 23 Oct Hungarian revolution fails under force of Soviet brutal military repression. 23 Oct-4 Nov 1956. 23 Oct Leon Trotsky expelled from CPSU Politburo in 1926. 28 Oct Czechoslovakia proclaims independence after collapse Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1918. 7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power from the Provisional Government, 1917. 10 Nov World Youth Day (Communist) 10 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), Djakarta 10-17 Nov. 11 Nov International Student Week 11-17 November, conclud- ing with International Students Day on the 17th (International Union of Students, Communist) 12 Nov Leon Trotsky expelled from the CPSU, 1927. 14 Nov (China-Russia) (Unequal) Treaty of Peking cedes Chinese "Great Northeast" to Russia, 1460. 15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of self-determination to peoples of the former Empire, 1917. December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi during December 1963. Approved For Release 1999/ 78-03063b%SM30 3-5 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 25X1C10b COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS 31 August-13 September 1963 Commentary Principal Developments: 1. The Chinese commenced the publication of a series of arti- cles, designed to demolish the Sovie position by careful argument a nd judiciously selected documentation. The first two of these articles appeared within this period. In the first (see Chronology, 6 September; text published in New York Times, 14 September), the Chinese surveyed the histo of a spu e, attempting to prove (with documents) they have consistently opposed Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line since 1956, and that the Soviets have tried to impose military control over China and have conducted subversive activity among the people of China's Sinkiang province. In the second article (see Chronology, 13 September), the Chinese, (with minor reservations) defended the memory of Josif Stalin, con- trasting that "great Marxism n n_rs r`With Khrus c ev, who once (as they show by quotation) praised Stalin, and who now maligns and vilifies him while "regarding Eisenhower, Kennedy and the like 'with respect and trust."' The Soviets did not publish these articles, though some of their propaganda shows that they are well aware of them. 2. Most Soviet propaganda has been kept on a more down-to-earth level. Both Soviets and Chinese used the technique of printing phony letters from notional citizens of the other country, and the Soviets exposed" the Chinese efforts. On 2 September, a "spontane- ous" demonstration took place outside the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, recalling similar demonstrations n e past against the American and other western embassies. 3. The Soviets also prodded at an established Chinese vulner- ability by pointing out that the Chinese militants have failed even to liberate Hon Kong (Nedelya, 7 September; Izvest ya 2 September); these aroma es were not republished by NCNA. 4. But the most striking Soviet effort was their 9 September story of Chinese rioting and "violation of the basic norms of human decency" at the border station of Naushki. The Soviet public (and other bloc publics too) have strong-feelings about such "uncultured" behavior as urinating in public, and the stories served to portray the Chinese as sub-human and bestial. 5. The Soviets did not totally forego the higher things, though; a theoretical article in the 11 September Pravda argued that the Chinese were confusing and losing sight oche main con- flict, to wit:,. that between socialism and capitalism. While quoting Lenin, the author (Glezerman appeare o be outflanking the Chinese appeals to Lenin's theses by turning to a fundamental thesis of the founder of "scientific" socialism, Karl Marx himself. Meanwhile, (#12 Commentary Continued) Approved For Release 1999/ -RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 (#12 Commentary Cont.) day in and day out, the Soviets repeated their claim that they were for peace and that the Chinese were for war - the claim that gives them a great propaganda advantage outside the small world of fanatic revolutionaries. 6. Neither disputant had much success in enlisting further support in the rest of the movement. Highly significant in this respect were speeches by Indonesian CP leader D.N. Aidit in Peking and Pyongyang, on his way back rom Moscow. When spec ng in Peking (reported 2 and 4 September), Aidit did not commit himself to either side but described his policy of "Indonesianizing" Marxism-Leninism for local purposes. In Peking and even more in Pyongyang (11 September), Aidit accompanied passing references to "modern revisionism" (identified only with Yugoslavia) with other references to "modern dogmatism," which he claimed was the Indonesian CP*s term for a pose ion of tailing "one of the parties." Aidit was in Pyongyang to help celebrate the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; although Peking tried to use this anniversary as an occasion for claiming the faithful support of the North Koreans, the references to such support came mostly from Chinese sources, or from such atypical Koreans as Ran Su-tong, head of a delegation of the Korea-China Friendship Association visiting Peking. 7. In the world of the front organizations, the Chinese -- evidently realizing that they would have no chance to dominate the proceedings -- announced on 4 September that they would boycott the third World Meeting of Journalists, sponsored by the International Committee for he Cooperation o ournalists (ICCJ). This Soviet- front meeting is to commence in Naples on 23 September and then proceed eastward by ship to a number of ports in the Eastern Mediter- ranean, ending at Beirut on 4 October; presumably the Soviets see this unusual meeting procedure as a means of maintaining control and also of countering Chinese influence in the Near East. On 13-13 September, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization executive committee met a icos a; the session was prolonge an extra day by debates between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet delegates over the question of endorsing the test ban treaty, and a compromise resolution was finally placed on record without an actual vote. Other Sino-Soviet quarrels arose at this meeting over the Sino- Indian border dispute, the right of delegates from Eastern Europe to attend, and the right of the (pro-Chinese) Indonesian delegation to represent Indonesia. Significance: The first part of September marked a new stage in the Sino- Soviet conflict, characterized by: a. Much greater stress on problems of national honor and sovereignty: e.g., rder disputes, military contro versus military in ependence, and importation o subversive propagan a. 2 (#12 Commentary Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 (#12 Commentary Cont.) b. Sharpened attacks on individuals, especially Khrushchev. c. An increase in propaganda directed to mass audiences, and based on emotional, gu -eels' Issues. 25X1C10b Ideology by no means disappeared from the debate, but its importance decreased. Each side resorted to the Communist practice -- now against each other rather than against the "capitalist" enemy -- of staging support for itself and opposition to its antagonist. And the Soviet attempted to expose this fraudulent practice on the part of the Chinese. The Chinese sought to prove that they had consistently opposed Khrushchev's policies from as early as 1956. They also sought to prove that the Soviets were attempting to impose their control over China by military means as well as through subversion. Their series of articles promises to provide new source material on Communist weaiunesses, comparable to that provided by Ithrushchev's 1956 and 196 attacks on Stalin. In withdrawing from a meeting of the ICCJ, the Chinese implicit ly recognized their own inability to influence left-wing European journalists, and through such journalists, lefl;wing European opinion The Chinese hope for support outside the Communist ranks lies in the underdeveloped areas. The Soviet exploitation of the Naushki incident represents a shift in emphasis from what Communists consider "propaganda" (the spreading of doctrine and ideology, largely among elite audiences) to "agitation" (the use of emotional appeals to arouse mass audiences). Such enlistment of popular support makes a subsequent reversal much more difficult to carry out. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For 14M 419tO614$ U PIIWMM?00200030003-5 #12 31 August-13 September 1963 August 31 - The Council of the League of Red Cross and Red Cres- cent ocieties, meeting in Geneva, passes a Japanese resolution urging the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Accord- ing to Tass, the Chinese delegate "and his Albanian yes-man" slandered the test ban treaty during the debate, forcing the chairman to have the Albanian statements stricken from the record. The Chinese Communist and Albanian delegates abstained in the vote. September 1 -- ?eking broadcasts a "statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government," replying to a ov e statement o 21 August; the two st atements are published simultaneously in China. The Chinese statement is mainly an attempt to rebut Soviet charges that China only sees nuclear weapons an is in- different to the dangers of world war. The Chinese say that They wa continue to criticize a whether or not China is backward, as the Soviets say, "in any case, and even if we Chinese people are unable to produce an atom bomb for a hundred years, we will neither crawl to the baton of the Soviet leaders nor kneel before the nuclear blackmail of the US imperialists." The statement quotes from Mao's 18 November 1957 speech and from the 163 "Long Live Leninism" article, trying to show that the Soviets have distorted the sense of these sources by lifting quotations about the death of half of mankind and rapid reconstruction on the ruins out of their contexts. The Chinese charge: "In the opinion of the Soviet leaders, in this nuclear century to remain alive is everything, and there is no aim in life... they submit to the tender mercies of imperialism.... It is a truly bestial conception." The statement notes that "universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism. capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated," shedding new light on recent Chinese disarmament proposals. September 2 - The Czech government demands the recall of two more Chinese, a commercial official IF -the Embassy and a student, for spreading material criticizing Soviet and Czech policy. Pravda's correspondent in Bonn reports that "the militarist propagandists here are already beginning to express sympathy openly for the hitherto hateful 'Red Chinese,"' and Izvestiya points out that Isom Kong and Macao, unlike Goa (India and est Irian (Indonesia), are still not liberated. In Moscow, a group of Soviet citizens demonstrates outside the Chinese bassy, shouting anti-war slogans (NCNA). In Peking, Indonesian C? leader B.N. Aidit i$ welcomed effusively (in contrast to an absence of Soviet publicity while he was in the USSR), but he makes a non-committal speech at the CC? Higher Party School, briefly condemning both "modern revisionism" and "modern dogmatism." September 3 - Xhrushchev leaves Belgrade for the USSR, ending a 7o week visit. According to NCNA, Ko Htay, a Burmese Cp polit- buro member negotiating for peace with the Burmese government, 1 (#12 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 states his opposition to Indian policy and the test ban treaty, and convents: "I Cannot understand Khrushchev's peaceful co- existence." In ?eying, Aid-it makes another speech on the subject of revolution an co:. zauni sm in Indonesia, at a welcome rally stressing that the ?ICI is compelled to "Indonesianize" Marxism- Leninism; he again opposes "modern do, a ism as well as "modern revisionism." In a Moscow broadcast in Japanese, the commentator (Ilinsi.y) states spec cally that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty is s till in effect; hence there is no need for the inese to have their own nucle.r weapons. September 4 - The Chinese announce that, since the International Co . tee 'or the Cooperation of Journalists refuses to c nge its a-Zen a or meeting arrangements for the Third World Meeting of Journalists, the All-China Journalists Association will~oy- cott the meeting. People's Daily having published a "letter from the USSR" extolling the Chinese leaders and signed "The Soviet Union, V. Ye.," Trud denounces this as a forgery "designed for gullible readers." (In a broadcast to China of 29 August, Moscow Radio read a letter allegedly from a Chinese resident in the Soviet Union, denouncing the Chinese leaders as belonging in "the same category" as the imperialists) September 6 - The editorial departments of People.'] Daily and Red a.g publish "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves;' the first of a series of articles replying to Open Letter of the CPSU of 14 July 1963. In this article, the Chinese trace the origin of the dispute of the 23th C?SU Congress in 1953, and deny Soviet claims that they turned 1030 in April 1960. In line with earlier Chinese polemics, the article denounces the Soviet leaders for their negation of Stalin and the dictatorship of the proletariat; their failure to consult with other CP's, exemplifying their "great power chauvinism;" their indifference to the national liberation struggle; and their espousal of "peaceful coexistence." Apparently seeing to reduce the semantic handicap they face as opponents of "peaceful coexistence," the Chinese bracet it with "peaceful traisition'! (the vfwv that domestic revolutions are unnecessary) and "peaceful competition" (competition in the economic sphere). More novel is the Chinese account of: -- the Soviet role in the Polish and Hungarian disturbances in 1956: "By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force it /the leadership of the CPSU7 committed the error of great power chauvinism. And at the critical moment when the Iungarian counterrevolutionaries had occupied Budapest, for a time it intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary to counterrevolution....We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolu- tionary rebellion in Hungary....and we firmly opposed the erroneous methods of great power chauvinism." 2 (#12 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 -- their own position at the l957 meeting of the parties: "tin the present /T9577 situation of the international communist movement, It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition. But it would be inappropriate to over- emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition.... To the best of our knowledge, there is still not a single country where this possibility is of any prac- tical significance .... To obtain a majority in parlia- ment is not the same as smashing the old state machinery (chiefly the armed forces)." -- the Soviet attempt to impose military control on China: "In 1958 the leadership of the C13SU put forward un- reasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control.... Not long afterward, in June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national de- fense concluded between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data con- cerning its manufacture." -- and of Soviet subversion on Chinese borders: "In April and May 1962, the leaders of the CPSU used their organs and personnel in Sin'tiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union.... the Soviet government refused to repatriate these Chinese citizens.... To this day this incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in relations between socialist countries." Lppended to the article are documents purporting to be: an out- line of Chinese views presented at the November 1357 meeting of the parties; a statement by the Chinese delegation. at the Bucharest meeting in June 1960; and proposals for settling inter- ?arty differences advanced by the Chinese in September 1933. Also on 3 September, a Chinese cultural delegation arrived in Rumania for a one-month's tour as guests of t e Rumanian Writer s Union, and an Albanian French-language broadcast of a Zeri I Popullit article calls on revolutionary communists" to "form organizations which will know how to preserve themselves from t e~treachery of opportunists, which will know how to fight against the revisionist leaders..." September 7 - Tass relays another article (in Nedelya, wee'tly slap ement to =vestiya) pointing to the Chinese o erance of British rule in Hong .ong, where the US Seventh eet Inds haven, where foreign businessmen exploit cheap labor, and where espionage flourishes. 3 (#12 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-0 0611 0 00, 30 03-5 September 7-11 - Naushki border incident: On I)BepteibJ, west ya pue ishes a first acbdu-at of an incident at the Soviet border sfation at Naushki on 7 September when Soviet customs officials sought to confiscate publications "hostile to our coun- try in the possession of Chinese travellers." On 11 September, Xomsomolskaya Pravda reports that 92 Chinese citizens sank to the lowest ebb by turning the customs hall into a'lavatory. Another train was used to carry the non-Chinese passengers on to Moscow, and in the early morning of 10 September, the Chinese train was returned to China; it proceeded to Peking, where the Chinese travellers received a hero's welcome with "drums and gongs." It appears that copies of the Information Bulletin of the YNCNA Russian service containing the 1 September statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government (see above) were se zed by customs officials from trai crew members and students, despite claims that these were "for their own reading." (NCNA does not reveal why they chose to study the statement in Russian trans- lation.) According to Soviet reports, the Chinese tried to lock the customs officers onto the train, and refused to proceed without their publications; they also used the train radio to broadcast the contents of the publicatiorA and to complain of Soviet mistreatment. September 6 - L Moscow Radio roundtable discussion implies that there will De no attempt to answer the 3 September Chinese article, also saying "It would be a vain occupation even to try to list the articles, ... published this weer. by ... press organs of China.... It would be undignified to fall into the quarrelsome, hysterical tone which Peking is obviously trying to impose upon us." However, in a speech at the National Harvest Festival in Warsaw, Vladyslaw Goni:,l a attacked, more in sorrow an n anger," the Chinese refusal o sign the test ban treaty; this might have been P. reply to the 3 September article, in which the Chinese claimed to have intervened on behalf of 'Poland in 1956. Also on 8 Sept- ember, a Moscow broadcast quotes an article in Liturnaya Gazeta pointing out that, for all the Chinese boasting a they publish the views of their opponents, the publication of an item in People's Daily only brings it to the eyes of the middle and hig e~ ranks of the CCP; the Chinese masses are only fed the Chinese line. September 9 - Ped Fla,, compares the alleged alignment of the Soviet Union wl n the imperialists, exemplified by the test ban treaty, with the "Holy Alliance" formed by Metternich in tLe early nineteenth century: "It can be said with assurance that the new 'Holy Liliance' will come to no better end than the old." In another article, Red Flag quotes again a part of the text of the 1963 "Long Live eninism" article. September 10 - Responding to the Chinese tactic of quoting from he record, a Moscow broadcast to Yugoslavia quotes articles 4 (#12 Chronology Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 from the nopie's Daily of 1955-1250, praising the USSR for assist- ing the oppressed nations. (Similar broadcasts were made on 6 September to the United Kingdom, and on 3 September to Albania.) September 11 - D.E. Aidit, now in ?-yong-jang at the fifteenth anni- versary celebration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, continues to maintain an independent position: "The easiest position, but not the safest position, is the position to tail one of the parties,... It does not need much thinking.... called by the Indonesian Communists modern dogmatism, `':7 is not a correct position. it is a bureaucratic position, the position of a bull whose nose is already tied so that it is easy to draw him hither and thither." September 11 - ?'avda prints an article by Glezerman, ancusin: the Chinese of b being-revisionist, in that "They have subjected to revision the thesis of the /1577 declaration and the 119537 statement that the Basic conty aciction of the is the contradiction between socialism and capitalists, putting this into the backEr'ound in their documents and putting it on a level with other consideratiom ...Marx and Engels based the inevitability of a socialist revolution of the proletariat chiefly on an analysis of the basic contradiction of a capitalist society, the contradic- tion between the public character of production and the private character of profit.... ,oday7 the con- tradiction between the perishing capitalist social- economic formation and the communist formation which is establishing itself becomes the basic contradiction of the mo6o n a 3e, being the age of transition from capitalisn to socialism." September 12 - Pravda publishes a statement from the exile Spanish CP, strongly endorsing the test ban treaty, and not: n; that, in contrast to Communist China, "even the government of Franco intands to sign." A member: of the Czech National Assembly is reported as Eanouncing the "megwic:aniacal, nationalist irresponsibility" of the Chinese. ?ravda also publishes an article by two loaders of the Martinique Cp, adding to the attack on the CCP. September 13 - ho editors of Peop'le's Daily and Red E publish TEAS second -in their announced series o articles, On th. 'unstion of Stalin." While admitting that ;twin "made some mista:,es.... wave some bad counsel in the inter: nat ona l communist movement.... and thereby7 caused some losses to the Soviet Union and th international communist movement" (possibly a reference to Stalin's policy of trusting Chian;; Kai-she's in 1927), the Chinese maintain that he was "a great Mar::ist-1,eninist, a great pro ].e- tarian revolutionary." Khrushchev has completely "negated" 5 (412 Chronology Continu::c) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress and since, although he "was in the leadership of the party and state in Stalin's period and... actively supported dnd firmly executed the policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries." The Chinese quote from Khrushchev's statements made in the 1933's, including the following: "'Our party will mercilessly crush the band of traitors and betrayers, and wipe out all the Trotsky-Right dregs.... The guarantee of this is the unshakable leadership of our Central Committee, the unshakeable leadership of our leader Comrade Stalin.... Vie shall totally annihilate the enemies -- to the last man -- and scatter their ashes to the winds." (6 June 1937, 5th party Conference of Moscow Oblast) Moreover, the article maintains that Stalin knew how to admit his mistakes, that "after the victory of the Chinese Revolution he admitted his mistake " while Khrushchev does not: "He singly does not know what self-criticism is; all he does is to shift the entire blame on to others and claim the entire credit for himself." By his 23th Congress secret speech, which he still fears to disclose to the Soviet people, Khrushchev "provided the imperialists and the reactionaries of all countries with exceedingly welcome anti-Soviet and anti-communist ammunition." In attacking "the cult of personality," the Soviet leaders of actually violate Lenin's teachings, including the principle of democratic centralism. A revolutionary party should "have a fairly stable nucleus of leadership, which should consist of a group of long-tested leaders who are good at integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution"; here the Chinese leaders seem to have them- selves in mind. After a ringing statement that Khrushchev, "try as he may, ...can never succeed in overthrowing Marxism- Leninism which Stalin defended" It ho article ends rather sur- prisingly: "We would lino to offer a word of sincere advice to Comrade Khrushchev. We hope you will become aware of your errors and return from your wrong path to the path of Marzism-Leninism. Lon; live the great revolutionary teachings of Mar; , angels, Lenin, and Stalin!" 6 (#12 Chronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSENSIONS COT'2UNISTES No. 12 31 aout-13 septembre 1963 i aout: Le Conseil des societes de la Li ue de la Croix ou a et du Croissant Roue, qu sest r uni a Gen ve, adop- t- uno resolution apona se reciamant la prohibition com- plbte des essais d acmes nucleaires. Solon TASS, is dele- gue chinois 'let son acolyte albanais" se livrbrent a des ca- lomnies au sujet du trait- pendant le debat, obligeant le president de faire rayer du proces-verbal lea declarations de 1'Albanais. Les delegues de la Chine communiste et de 1'Albanie se sont abstenus de voter. 1 septembre: Pekin diffuse a la radio"une declaration du o f e parole du ouvernement chinois" en r pons- la decla- ration sovi ique u 21 aou ; lea deux declarations ont dto publiees simultanement on Chine. La declaration chinoise constitue surtout une tentative do refuter lea accusations soviets ues d'a res la uelle la Chino ne cherche u ob- en r des acmes nucl acres et au elle se d sint resse den d3 ors d une guerre mondiale. Les Chinois ddclarent qu ils continueront a critiquer l 'Union Sov16tique, que la Chine soft ou non un pays retardataire, ainsi que le de'clarent lea Soviets; "en tout etat de cause, et memo si nous, peu- ple chinois, nous etions incapables de produire une bombe atomique au cours des cent ans a venir, nous no ramperons pas sous la direction du baton des leaders sovietiques et nouB no nous agenouillerons pas sous l'effet du chantage nu- cleaire des imperialistes des Etats-Unis". La declaration cite un passage du discours de Mao du 18 novembre 1957, ainsi qu'un autre de Particle publie on 1960, "Vive,le leninisme", et cherche a montrer quo lea Soviets avaient deform- le sons de ces sources en citant en dehors do lour contexte les pas- sages au sujet de la wort de la moitie de l'humanite of de la reconstruction rapid- sur lea ruiner. Les Chinois de clarent: "Do l'opinion des leaders sovietiques en ce sie- cle nucleaire, le tout c'est de rester vivant, et quint a la vie ells n'a aucun but... Its s'en romettent a la grace de 1'imperiaiieme... Cola est une conception vralment bestiale". I1 ost souligne dans la declaration quo "le desarrienont couplet of universel ne pout avoir lieu qu'apres que l'impe- rialisme, le capitalisme et tour lea autres systenes d'ex- ploitation auront ete elimines", ce qui place sous un jour nouveau lea offres de desarmement faster recemment par lea Chinois. 2 septembre: Le gouvernement tcheque exige le rappel de deux autros Chinois, un attache commercial de 1 ambassade of un 6tudiant, qui avaient dissenine uno documentation cri- tiquant lea Soviets et la politique tcheque. Le correspon- dent do la "Pravda" a Bonn fait savoir que "lea propagandis- tes mUitaristes comiencent ici 'a exprimer ouvertement lour Approved For Release 1999/08/241: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 synpathie pour ceux qui auparavant etaient des Chinois rou- ges ha!ssablos", "Izvestiya" souligno que Hong Kong et Ma- cao a l'oncontre do Goa (Inds), et 1 Irian Occidental T n- 3onesio) n'ont toujours pas ate liberties. A Mo_ scou, un groups do citoycns sovietiques manifestent autour de 1'am- bassade chinoise en hurlant des slogans contre la guerre (Agonce do presse de la Chine nouvelle). A Pekin, is leader communists indonesien D.N. Aidit eat acceuilli avec effusion (en contrasts avec is manque do publicite de la part des So- viets lorsqu'il sc,trouvalt on Union.Sovietique), ,ais it fait un discours sans s'engager a 1'Ecole superieure du par- ti communists, condamnant brievement aussi bien "ie revi- sionnisille moderns" que is "dogmatisme moderns". 3 septembre: Khrouchtchev quitte Belgrade pour l'U.R.S.S.% teruinant une visits qui a dure deux semaines. D aprbs 1 A- gence do presse de la Chine nouvelle, Ko Htay, membre du Po- litburo du parti communists birman, qui eat en train de n6go- cier la paix avec is gouvernement birman, declare son oppo- sition n ! la politique de 1' Inde et au traits interdisant lea essais nucleaires; it commente:"Je no peux~comprendre la co- existence pacifique de Khrouchtchef". A Pekin, Aidit pro- nonce un autre discours au sujet de la rev ion et du com- munisme on Indonesia a un ralliement de bienvenue; it souli- gne quo le parti communists indonesien eat force d'"in- sianisor" le marxisme-leninisme. Ii s'oppose de nouveau au 11 do~giaatisme moderns" ainsi qu'au "revisionnisme moderns". Au tours dune radio-diffusion en langue japonaise a Moscou, le comrlentatour (Ilinsky) declare notamment que le traits dalliance sino-sovietique eat toujours en vigueur; par con- sequent, lea Chinois n'ont pas besoin d'avoir leurspropres arines nucleaires. 4 septeubre: Les Chinois annoncent qu'etant donne is refus UU do modifier son ordre du jour ou lea dispositions prises pour in 3e reunion mondiale des lournalistes, l'Aosociation pan- chinoiso des journalistes boycattera cette reunion. Le "Quotidian du Peuple" ayant publie une "lettre do 1'U.R.S.S." exaltant lea leaders chinois et signee Nnion Sovietique, V. Ye.",~ le "Trud" la qualifie de faux a l'usage des lec- teurs credules". (Dana une radio-diffusion a la Chine lo 29 aout, Radio-Moscou a donne lecture dune lettre adressee soi-diaant par un Chinois residant on Union Sovietique, let- tre dans laquolle lea leaders chinois etaient dits apparte- nir "a la rie'ne categorie" que lea irzperialistes. ) 6 sopteubro: Les editoriaux du "Quotidien du Pouple" et du Drapcau Rouge" publient "L'origine et le developpeaent dos differences antra lea leaders du parti communists do 1'Union Sovietique of nous-Dames"is premier dune saris d'articles repondant a la lettre ouverte du parti communists de l'Union Sovietique du 14 juillet 1963. Dana cot article, lea Chinoio situent Pori ine de la dispute au XXe Con res du part c r1- nunisto do l 'Union Sovietique en 195, et dementent l'affir- mation dos Soviets qu'ils ont fait volte-face do 1800 on avr 1960 Dana is ton des polemiques chinoises precedentes, Approved For Release 1999/08/24: ( IA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Particle denonco lea leaders sovietiques pour avoir renie Stalinoat la dictature du proletariat; pour n'avoir pas consult, / lea autres partis communistes, montrant ainsi "lour chauvinism/ do grande puissance"; pour leur indifference en- vers la lutte de liberation nationale; et pour avoir adopt d "la coexistence pacifique". Cherchant apparonnent a reduire le handicap semantique qui est le lour en tant qu'adversaire de la coexistence paeifique, lea Soviets la laaent dana la rued/ categorie quo "la transition pac if ique" (opinion quo lea revolutions nationales no sont pas ndceasaires) at quo "la oorapetition paeifique" (concurrence dans le doraaine eco- norniquo). Recit inedit chinois sur: -- le role sovi6tique dans Jos desordres en Hongrie at an Pologne en 1956: "En ayant recours aux troupes pour dompter lea cauarados polonais par la force arnee, its [lea loaders du ptarti communiste do l'Union Sovi6tique] conrlirent 1 erreur de pratiquer le chauvinism/ do grand/ puissance. Et au moment critique ou lee controrevolutionnatree hongrois occupaient Buda- pest, ils eurent 1'intention pendant un moment d'adoptor une politique do capitulation at d a- bandonner la Hongrie socialists a la contrerevo- lution... Nous insistames a ce qu'ils prissent tout/ raosure necessaire pour /eraser la rebellion controrevolutionnaire en Hongrie... at nous nous opposames fermement aux methades errondes du chau- vinisme de grand/ puissance." -- lour propre position a la reunion des partis de 1957: "Dans la situation pre'sente [1957] du raouvement co:_lnuniste international, it est avantageux du point de vue tactique do se ref erer au desir dof transition pacifique. Mais it serait malvenu d ex- aerer la possibilite do transition pacifiquo... D apres cc que.nous savons, it n'y a pas encore un soul pays ou cette possibilite puisse avoir une signification pratique... Obtenir une najorite au Pa,rlement est autre chose quo de domolir le vieil appareil gouvernonental (principalement lea forces ar:lees) -- la tentative sovietique d'imposer un gouvernement ni- litairo a la Chine: "En 1958, lea leaders du parti cornaunisto de 1'U- nion sovietique presenterent des requetes derai- sonnables tandant a placer la Chine sous control/ militaire des Soviets... Peu de temps acres, on juin 1959, le gouvernement sovietique denongait unilateralenent les accords sur la nouvelle tochno- logic pour la defense nationals, conclue entre la Chine at l'Union Sovietique an octobre 1957, at rofuseront do fournir a la Chine un echantillon do Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 la bombe atomique et lea informations techniques concerncnt sa fabrication". -- et sur la subversion sovietique le long des frontie- res chinoises: "En avril et ma i 1962, lea leaders du part i coe- nuniste de 1'Union Sovi6tiqueutiliserent lours organismos et lour personnel a Sinkiang, Chine, pour so livrer a des activit6s subversives ~L gran- de echolle dans la region de 1'Ili; ils attire- rent ou obligerent par la force plusieurs dizai- nes do milliers de citoyens chinois de so rendro on Union Sovietique... Le gouvernenent sovietique a refuse do repatrior ces citoyens chinois... Jus- qu'a cc jour, cot incident na. pas eta r?gle. C'est on effet un eveneuent etonnant, sans prece- dent Bans lea relations entre pays socialistes". Aiout6s a l'article se trouvent des documents qui repre- sentent soi-disant: un resume des vues chinoises present-es a la reunion des partis de novembre 1957; une declaration do la dolen-c.tion chinoise h la reunion de Bucarest en juin 1960; 11 et des propositions pour regler lea differends ontre partis sounisos Dar lea Chinois on septenbre 1960. Eg^le:ient du 6 soptombre, une delegation culturolle chi- s noise cst arrives an Rumania pour une tournee de un uois, in _ vit e par I Union des crivains roumains; une radio-diffusion on languc franpaise par lea Albanais d'un article de Zeri I Popullit' faisant appel "aux connunistes revolutionnaires" do "forger dos organisations sachant se proteger contre la tra- hison des opportunistes, et sachant combattre lea leaders re- visionnistes..." 7 septel_foro: TASS roproduit un autre article (dins "Nedelya~ supple"acnt hebdomadaire do "Izvest iya") qui souligne quo lost Chinois tolerant la 2presence-des Britanni ues %a Ho Kong, ou la 7 flotto des Etats-Unix trouvo e1 r_iouillage, oil les honme % d'affaires 6trangors oxploitent une main-d'oeuvre a bon march, of ou flourit 1'ospionnage. 7-11 septoLbre: Incident do frontiers a Naushki: le 10 sep- tembro, 'Izvestiya \publiait un premier rapport sur 1'inci- dent ay,nt eu lieu a la gare-frontiore sovietique do Naushki le 7 soptombro, alors que lea douaniers sovi6tiques cher- chaiont . confisquer des publications "hostiles a notre pays et qui so trouvaient on possession do voyageurs chinois". Le 11 soptombro, "Komsouolskaya Pravda" annonrgait quo 92 ci- toyens chinois 6taient tombes au-dessous do tout on transfor- mant 1a Salle des douanes en on w.c. Un autre train fut uti- lise pour transporter "a' Moscou lea passagers non-Chinois, of au debut do la uatin6e du 10 septembro, le train chinois fut retournc on Chine; it so rendit u Pekin ou lea voyageurs chi- nois furont regus on heros avec "tambours et gongs". Il souble quo lea copies du bulletin d'inf ormation publ' Approved For Release 1999/08/24: ItIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 par le sorvico russe de 1'Asence do presse de la Chine nou- volle, of contenant la declaration du ler se tenbro d' n or- to-parole du RouvorneQent chinois (voir ei-dessus furont enlevo'es par lea douanlors aux equipos de service du train et aux otudiants, ualgre lours assertions quo cos copies 6 talent destines "a lour propre usage". (L'Agencedo presse do la China nouvelle no dit pas pourquoi ils decidbrent d'6- tudior cotto declaration dans sa traduction rusae.) D'aprbs lea rapports sovietiques, lea Chinois tonte"rent d'onferraer lea doutnicrs sovietiques dans le train at refuserent de con- tinuer lour voyage sans lours publications; ils se sorvirent egalenont do la radio du train pour diffuser le contonu do c e s publications et pour so pla indre des r:rauva i s t ra it ement s quo lour infligeaient lea soviQtiques. 8 soptoubre: Une discussion a la radio de Moscou fait croiro quTill nay aura a c ne tent tive do fa e re e a l'ar title chinois du septeLbre et declare egalenent: "Co sorait du temps perdu quo d'ossayer do dres- ser no serait-co qu'une liste des articles... publics cette seEtaine par... lea organs de pres- so ehinois.,. I1 serait indigne do prendro le ton quorollour et hist drique quo Pekin tres certaino- ;ont ossaye do nous imposer". Toutofois, dans un discours au festival national do la r6polto Varsovie. WGonulka attaqua 'dans un esprit Wladyslaw do poinplutot quo de colere"he refus des Chinois do signer le traito intordisant lea experiences nucle'aires; cola aurait pu titre uno reponse a Particle du 6 septeubre, dans lequel lea Chinois pretendirent titre intervenus an favour de la Po- logne on 1956. Egale ont le 8 septeubro, une radio do Moscou citait un article do "Liturnaya Gazeta" soulignant au sujet dos assertions chinoises qu'ils publient lea opinions do tous lours adversaires, quo la publication d'un article dans lo "Quotidian du Pouple" no torabe que sous les yeux dos offi- ciels superieurs of moyons du parts coununiste chinois; quant aux Masses ollos no sent nourrios quo do propagande ehinoise. noveabro: Lo "Drapeau Rouge" compare le pretendu aligno- Lent de 1 Union Sovietique sur lea imperialistes, rais on 6vi- denco par lo traite interdisant lea experiences nucl eairos, avoc la "Sa into Alliance" foruee par Metternich au debut du 190 sieclo, "On pout dire aver certitude que la nouvelle 'Sainte Alliance' no donnera pas de neilleurs resultats que 1'ancienn- Dans un autre article, le "Drapeau Rouge" cite do nouveau une partio du toxto do Particle "Vive le leninisrae", datant do 196o. 10 septoabro: En reponse a la tactique chinoise dtavoir ro- cours dos citations, uno radio de Moscou dostin6e a la You- goslavic cite lea articles du "Quotidian du Peuple" datant do 1956 - 1958, dans lesquels 1'Union Sovietique ost felicitc, pour son assistance aux nations opprimoos. (Dos diffusions analogues furont faites io 6 septorabro a destination du Royaurae-Uni, of lo 8 septerabro de 1'Albanie. ) Approved For Release 1999/08/245: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 11 so tepbro: D.N. Aidit, so trouvant Pyongyang pour la 4l bration du 15e anniversaire do is Rgpublique populaire denocratiquo do Corse, continue a carder une position ind6 pendanto: "La position la plus facile macs non pas la moans dancerouso eat do so mettre a is traine de l'un dos partis... Cola no domando pas beaucoup de re flexion .. of c'est cc quo los communistes indon6 sions qualifient do dogmatisrue moderne, qui no root if is pas is position. Cost uno position bu- ro ucratique, une position d'un taureau ayant deja is cords au nusoau et qu'il eat facile de tiror do tous lea cotes". 11 septombro: "Pravda" publie un article do Glozorman, ac- cusaos Chinois d'etro des revisionnistes, parse quo: "Ils ont fait reviser la these do la declaration (19571 et du compte-rondu tde 1960] qui spec if iait quo is contradiction fondamentale do cot ago eat unc contradiction entre le socialisto et le capi- talisuo, rejetant cola dans l,ombro dans lours documents, et le placant au memo nivoau quo d'au- tros considerations... Marx et Engels basaient l'inevitabilite de is revolution socialists du proletariat sur l'analyse principaleiment des con- tradictions fondamontalos do is societe .capita- listo, des contradictions entre le caractbre pu-. blic do is roduction et le caractbre prive du be- nefice... tAujourd'hui] is contradiction entre la formation sociale et economiquo du capitalisme en perdition et la formation communiste en train do s'etablir devient la contradiction fondarmentale des temps modernes, qui eat 1'"ge do is transi- tion du capitalisme au social iste." 1 tombre: La "Pravda" publie une declaration d'un membro du parti comuuniste espagnol on exil,,qui approuve fermement le traits interdisant les essais nucleaires, et qui souligno quo contraireuent a la Chine communists, "memo le gouverno- Eont do Franco a 1'intention do le signer". Un oribre de e nationals tcheque aurait expose "l'irresponsabi- 1'Asscnbl6` lite nationaliste mogalomaniaque"des Chinois. "Pravda" pu- blic e'G ionont un article de deux leaders du parti communis- to martiniquais qui s'associent aux attaques centre le parti communisto chinois. 13 septeribro: Les editeurs du "Quotidien du Peuple" et du Drapeau Rouge" publient le 2e article do lour serie annon- cee, "sur is question de Staline". Tout on admettant quo Stalino "c fait cortaines orreurs... a donne quelques mauvais consoils au mouvoment international communists... tot par consequent] a provoque certaines pertes en Union Sovietiquo et daps lo nouvement communiste international" (il cot possi- ble quo cc soit une allusion a is politique do Staline de faire confiance a Chiang Kai-shek on 1927), lea Chinois sou- App'6$9rIist'13i9t9/0gx-YP ?-a6qA'UUb2_'Ob03b0n5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 grand proletaire revolutionnaire". Khrouchtchef a complete-- mont "denigro" Staline au tours du 200 Congres du parti~~com- nuniste do l'Union Sovietique, et depuis ceete ep~oque,` boon qu'il fit partie dos dirt giants du parti of de 1 Etat a 1 e- poquo do Staline ot... qu it alt soutenu activenent et oxcs cute avoc forziet' la politique d' aneantissenont des contre- revolutionnaires". Les Chinois citent dos passages dos de- clarations faites par Khrouchtchef on 1930, dont le suivant: "Notre parti eerasera inpitoyablenent la bande de traftres, et liquidera toute la lie des trots- kistos at des a-droite... La garantie on eat don- nco -)ar la direction inebranlable du comito central, par la direction inebranlable do notre chef le ca- riarado Staline... Nous annihilerons conpletement nos onnonis, jusqu'au dernior homme, et nous re- pandrons lours cendres au vent." (6 juin 1937, 5e Conference du parts du district do Moscou) Dtautro part, l'articlo affirue quo Staline savait ad- iiettre sos erreurs, "qu'apres la victoire do la revolution chinoise it admit son erreur", alors que Khrouchtchef no le fait pas:"Il no salt simplement pas cc que auto-critique vout dire; tout cc qu'll fait c'est do rejeter le blame tout ontier sur los autres of de pretendre a tout est ue ritoire . Dans on discours secret du XXo tongr s, 4 craint toujours de reveler au pouple sovietique, Khrouch- tchef "a donne aux imperialistes et aux reactionnaires do tous los pants des munitions anti-sovictiques et anti-comnu- nistes oxtrouonent utiles". En attaquant "lo culte de la personnr1ite", les dirigeants sovietiques portaient onfreinto aux onsoignoments de L6nine, et notamnent au principe do con- tralis-.--io, de ioerat iquo. Un parti revolut ionna ire "do it avoir un noyau do chefs suffisamment stables, compose d'un groupe do leaders eprouves do longue date qui savent integrer la verite univorselle du marxisme-leninisne a la pratique con- crete do la revolution"; a ce point it semble quo c'est eux- moracs quo los leaders Chinois sous-entendent. Apra la d e' clarat ion rotent issante quo Khrouchtchef "quoiqu 11 fasse... no ro'ussira janais a ronverser le narxisne-leninisne quo de'fendait Staline" Particle so ternine d'une fa9on plutot surprenante: "Noes ainerions donner un consoil au camarado Khrou- chtchef. Nous esperons que vous vous rendrez conptc do vos orrours of que vous abandonnerez la mauvaise void Hour revenir sur la vote du narxisne-l'ninisme. Vivont les Brands enseignements revolutionnaires do Marx, Engels, Lenine, of Staline; " Approved For Release 1999/08/247: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 C IIGIA -- DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS No. 12 31 Agosto-13 Septiembre 1963 31 Agosto: El Consejo de la Liga de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja la Cre- ciente Rota, reuni en Ginebra, aprueba una resoluci6n del Ja n reco- menda do la prohibici'on absolute de los ensayos de arenas nucleares. De acuerdo con Taasss~ el delegado chino "y su albands del am6n" calumniaron el tratado contra los ensayos'dxtrante el debate, obligando al presidente de la asemblea a excluir del acta las declarations albaneses. Los de- legados de China Comunista y de Albania se abstuvieron de votar. 1 Septiembre: Pekin difunde por radio una "declaraci6n del portavoz del Gob erno chino" en respuesta a is declaraci6n sovidtica de 21 de agosto; en China se publican ambas declaraciones simultdneamente. La declara- ci6n china es principalmente una tentativa de refutar las denuncias so- vidticas en el sentido de que China quiere solamente arenas nucleases y es indiferente a los riesgos os cue guerra mundial. Los chinos dicers que continuardn critieando a la URBS, es china retrasada o no, coano dicen los sovi6ticos; "en todo caso, y adn cuando nosotros el pueblo chino no podamos en cien afios producir una bomba at6mica, ni nos arrastraremos bajo la batuta de los lideres sovidticos ni nos arrodillaremos ante el chantaje nuclear de los imperialistas norteamericanos". La declaraci6n contiene citas del discurso de Mao de 18 de noviembre de 1957 y del ar- t1culo "Viva el Leninismo" de 1960, tratando de demostrar que los so- vidticos han tergiversado el sentido de ambos extrayendo de su contexto citas acerca de la muerte de media humanidad y la r4pida reconstrucci6n sobre las ruinas. Los chinos denuncian: "En opini6n de los lideres sovidticos, en este siglo nuclear permanecer con vida to es todo, y no hay prop6sito en la vida... se scnneten a la dulce misericordia del imperialismo Es un concepto verdaderamente bestial." La declaraci6n apunta que "el desarme universal y completo se puede poner en prdctiva solo despuds que el imperialismo, el capitalismo y to- dos los sistemas de explotaci6n hayan sido eliminados", poniendo mds en claro las recientes proposiciones chinas sobre el desarme. 2 Septiembre: El Gobierno checo exige el retiro de otros dos chinos, un funcionario comercial de la embajada y un estudiante, por distribuir material de critica de la politica sovidtica y checa. El corresponsal de "Pravda" en Bonn informs que "aqul los propagandistas militaristas empiezan ya a expresar abiertamente su simpatia con los hasta ahora odiosos 'chinos rojos'," e "Izvestiya" apunta que Hong Kong y Maaccao, al contrario de Goa (India) e IriAn Occidental (Indonesia) estdn a'un sin libertar. En Mosctt, un grupo de ciudadanos sovidticos hacen una manifestaci6n frente a la embajada china, gritando consignas antibdli- cas (Agencia Nueva China). En Pdkin, al lider del PC indonesio D. N. Aidit le hacen un recibimiento efusivo (en contraste con la ausencic. de publicidad cuando estuvo en la URSS), pero 61 pronuncia un discurso sin compromiso en la Escuela Superior del Partido Comunista chino con- denando brevemente tanto el "revisionismo contempordneo" como el "dog- matisrno contempordneo". 3 Septiersbre: Kruschev parte de Belgrado hacia la URSS, concluyendo una visita de dos semanas. De acuerdo con la Agencia Nueva China, 1 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Ko Htay, miembro del politburo del PC birriano que estd haciendo nagocia- ciones de paz con el Gobierno birmano, declara su oposici6n a la politi- ca de la India y el tratado contra los ensayos, y comenta como sigue: "No entiendo la coexistencia pacifica de Kruschev". En Pekin, Aidit pronuncia en una manifestacidn de recibimiento otro discurso sobre el t6pico de revolution y cornznismo en Indonesia, poniendo hincapid en que el PKI estd obligado a "indonesianizar" el marxismo-leninismo; de nuevo se opone al "dogmatismo contempor neo asi como al "revisionismo con- terapor6neo". En una emisi6n de la Radio de Mosctt, en japonds, el co- mentarista (Ilinsky) declara especificamente que el tratado de alianza chino-sovi6tico est6. a-in en vigor; por lo tanto no tienen los chinos necesidad de sus propias armas nucleares. 4 Septiembre: Anuncian los chinos que, como el Cor:it6 International Para la Cooperation de los Periodistas rehusa combiar el teraario o los arreglos pars la convocatoria del Tercer Encuentro Mundial de Periodis- tas la Asociaci6n de Periodistas de Toda China va a boicotear icha reunion. Una "carta de la URSS" publicada por el "Diario del Pueblo" ~~ en alabanza de los lideres chinos y firmada "La Uni6n Sovidtica, V. Ye., es condenada por "Trud" coin falsification "ideada pares los lectores crddulos". (En una difusi6n a China el 29 de agosto, la Radio de Mosed ley6 una cartes que se decia ser de un residente chino de la Union ovi- 6tica condenando a los lideres chinos como pertenecientes a "la misma categoria" que los imperialistas.) 6 Septierabre: Los departamentos editoriales del "Diario del Pueblo" 7 Bandera Roja" publican "El origen y desarrollo de las divergencias en- tre el liderato del PUGS y nosotros , el primero de una serie de arti- culos en respuesta a la Carta Abierta del PCUS de 14 de Julio de 1963. En dicho articulo los chinos trazan el origen de la querella del XX Con- r~ eso del PCUS en 1956 y niegan los asertos sovi6tieos de que en abril de 1960 habian dado una vuelta de 180 grados. Como las anteriores po- 16micas chinas, el articulo condena a los lideres sovi6ticos por haber negado'a Stalin y la dictadura del proletariado; por no haber consul- tado con otros PC, dando ejenplo de su "chovinisno de gran potencies"; por su indiferencia a la lucha por la liberation national; y por su a- poyo a la "coexistencia pacifica". Aparentemente tratando de reducir la desventaja semdntica que encaran como opositores de la "coexisten- cia pacifica", los chinos la ponen en el mismo cuadro que la "transi- ci6n pacifica" (la opini6n de que las revolutions internas son inne- cesarias) y la "competencia pacifica" (la competencia en la esfera e- con6mica). Mds novedosa es la description china de: -- el papel sovi6tico en los disturbios en Hungria y Po- lonia en 1956: "Adelantando tropas en una tentative de someter a los ca- maradas polacos por la fuerza armada elles Clos lideres del PCUSJ incurrieron en el error del chovinismo de gran potencia. Y en el momenta critico en que los contrarre- volucionarios hdngaros habian ocupado Budapest, por un tiempo tuvieron intenc16n de adoptar una politica de ca- pitulaci6n y abandonar a la Hungria socialista a la con- trarrevoluci6n... Nosotros insistimos en que fueran to- madas todas las medidas necesarias para aplastar la con- trarrevoluci6n en Hungria... y firmemente nos opusimos a los err6neos rdtodos del chovinismo de gran potencia." Approved For Release 1999/08/242 CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 -- su propia posici&n en la reuni6n de los partidos en 1957: "'En la actual situaci6n Cen 1957J, en el movimiento comunista international es ventajoso desde el panto de vista tdctico referirse al deseo de la transici6n paci- fica. Pero serfa impropio poner demasiado 6nfasis en la posibilidad de la transici6n pacifica... Por todo lo que nos consta no hay an un solo pals donde dicha posi- bilidad sea de segnificacidn prdctica... Obtener una ma- yoria parlamentaria no es to mismo que destrozar la vieja maquinaria del estado (principalnente las fuerzas armadas). -- la tentativa sovidtica de imponer su control militar sobre China: "En 1958, el liderato del PCUS adelant6 demandas irrazo- nables con intenci6n de poner a China bajo el control mi- litar sovi6tico... No mucho despu6s, en junio de 1959, el Gobierno sovi6tico unilatera:rnente destroz6 el acuerdo sobre nueva tecnologia para la defensa national concluido entre China y la Uni6n Sovidtica en octubre de 1957 y re- hus6 suministrar a China una muestra de bomba at6mica y datos t6cnicos sobre su fabricaci&n." -- y la subversi6n sovi6tica sobre las fronteras chinas: "En abril y mayo de 1962, los lideres del PCUS emplearon sus 6rganos y personal en Sinkiang, China, para llevar a cabo actividades subversivas en gran escala en la regi6n de Ili y engatusaron y coaccionaron a varias decenas de millares de ciudadanos chinos para que fueran a la Uni6n Sovi6tica... el Gobierno sovidtico se neg6 a repatriar a estos ciudadanos chinos... Hasta hoy, permanece este in- cidente sin resolver. Esto es en verdad un acontecimiento sorprendente, nunca visto en las relations entre los pas- ses socialistas." El articulo lleva apdndices en forma de documentos que aparentan ser: un bosquejo de las opinions chinas presentadas ante la reuni6n de los partidos de novienbre de 1957; una declarac16n de la delegaci6n chi- na en la reuni6n de Bucarest de 1960; y proposiciones para arreglar las divergencias entre los partidos ofrecidas por los chinos en septiembre de 1960. Tambi6n el 6 de septiembre, una delegaci6n cultural china lleg6 a Rumania para llevar a cabo una gira de un mes como invitados de la ni6n Runana de Escritores, y una emisi6n albanesa en lengua francesa de un articulo de "Zeri i Popullit p~ ide a los "comunistas revolucionarios" que "formen organizaciones que sepan permanecer a salvo de la traici6n de los oportunietas, que sepan luchar contra los lideres revisionistas..." 7 Septiembre: Tass pasa otro articulo (en "Nedelya", el suplemento se- manal de Izvestiya") que apunta la tolerancia china del doriinio britz#- nico en Hong Kong, donde la S6ptina Flota norteamericana encuentra a- brigo, donde los comerciantes extranjeros explotan la nano de obra ba- rata y donde florece el espionaje. 7-11 Septtiembre: Incidente fronterizo de Naushki: El 10 de septiembre, Approved For Release 3: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 "Izvestiya" publica una primera versi6n de un incidente en la estaci6n fronteriza sovidtica de Naushki el 7 de septiembre cuando funcionarios aduaneros sovidticos trataron de confiscar publications "hostiles a nuestro pals en mans de viajeros chinos." El 11 de septiembre "Komso- molskaya Pravda" informa que 92 ciudadanos chinos descendieron al nivel mds soez haciendo de la sala de aduanas un excusado. Otro tren fue em- pleado para llevar a los posajeros no de nacionalidad china hasty Mos- ad y el tren chino fue devuelto a China en las primeras horas del 10 de septiembre; sigui6 hasty Pekin, donde los viajeros chinos gozaron de un recibimiento triunfal con "boonbos y platillos". Ejemplares del Boletin de Information del servicio en ruso de la Agencia Nueva China, conteniendo la declaration de 10 de se tiembre del portavoz del Gobierno chino (vea m s arriba , parece que fueron confis- cados a la tripulac n del tren y a estudiantes, a pesar de que decian tenerlos "para su propia lectura". (La Agencia Nueva China no explica por qud lo estudiaban en la versi6n rasa.) Dicen los informes sovidti- cos que los chinos trataron de encerrar bajo have a los funcionarios de aduana en el tren, y se negaron a seguir sin sus publications; tan- bidn utilizaron la emisora del tren para difundir el contenido de las publicaciones y para quejarse de maltratos sovidticos. 8 Septiembre: Una discusi6n de mesa redonda por Radio Moscd da a en- ten Ur que no habrd contestation al articulo chino de 6 de septiembre, diciendo tasabi n: "Seria vano empeflo siquiera tratar de hacer una lista de Jos articulos, ...pubiicados esta semana por ... organs de prensa de China... Serla indigno caer en el tono ren- cilloso e hist6rico que Pekin estd evidentemente tratando de imponernos." Sin embardo, en un discurso en el Festival national de la Cosecha en Varsovia, Wladislaw Gomulka atac6, s con pena que con ira", la negativa, china de formar el tratado contra los ensayos; esto puede haber sido respuesta al articulo de 6 de septiembre, en el cual los chinos pretendieron que habian intercedido por Polonia en 1956. Tambidn el 8 de septiembre una emisi6n de Mosed cita un articulo en "Literatur- naya Gazeta" que apunta que, cnn todo y echarse los chinos de que publi- can las opiniones de sus opositores, la publication de un articulo en el "Diario del Pueblo" to pone a la vista de los sectores medios y superiores del PC chino; a las rnasas chinas se les ofrece solo la linea china. 9 Septienbre: "Bandera Roja" compara la alineaci6n que dice existir entre la Union Sovidtica y los imperialistas, ejenplo de la cual es el tratado contra los ensayos, con la "Santa Alianza" formada por Metter- nich el siglo 19:"Se puede decir con seguridad que la nueva 'Santa Ali- anza' no llegard a mejor fin que la anterior". En otro articulo "Ban- dera Roja" de nuevo cita parte del texto del articulo "Viva el Leni - nismo" de 1960. 9 Septiersbre: Respondiendo a la tdctiea china de citar los archivos, una enisi6n de la Radio de Moscd a Yugoslavia cita articulos del "Dia- rio del Pueblo" de 1956-1958, encomiando a la URSS por ayudar a las nations oprinidas. (El 6 de eeptiembre se hicieron transmisiones pa- recidas al Reino Unido y el 8 de septiembre a Albania). Approved For Release 1999/08/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200030003-5 11 Septiembret D. I. Aidit, ahora en Pyongyang aslstiendo a la conmemoracion del 150 aniversario de la Republica Popular Democratica de Xoreu, continua manteniendo une posicion in- dependiente: "La posicion mas facil, pero no la mas segure, es la de it de rabo a una de las partes, ... No requiere mucho pensar.., llamado par los comunis- tas indonesios dogmatismo contemporaneo, no es~ una posicion correcta. Es una. posicion buroora- tica, la posicion de un toro al que ya Be ha amar- rado por la nariz y se hace facil hacerlo venir a este o al otro lado." 13 Septiembre; "Pravda" publica un articulo de Glezerman en el que a.cusa a be chinos de revisfoniamo porque "Han sometido a revision la tesis de las decla- raciones rde 1957 y 1960] de que la contradic- cion basica de la epoca es la contradiccion entre el socialismo y el capitalismo, poniendo esto en el contrafondo de sus documentos y colocandolo al nivol de otras consideraciones.., Marx y Engels basaron la inevitabilidad de una revolution so- ciclista del proletariado prrincipalmente en un an^lisis de la contradiccion basica de una socie- dad capitalists, la contradiccion entre el earac- ter publico de la production y el caracter priva- do del lucro... CHoy] la contradiccion entre la moribunda f ormacion socioeconomica capitalista y la, formation comunista que se va estableciendo Be convierte en la contradicci6n basica de la epoca moderna, siendo la epoca de la transition del ca- pitalismo". 12 Septiembre; "Pravda" publica una declaration del PC es- panol on el exilio suscribiendose fuertemente el tratado contrc los ensayos, y apuntando que, por contraste a la China comu- nista, "hasta el Gobierno de Franco tiene intention de f irmar.' Se informa que un miembro de la Asemblea National theca ha con- denado 1^ "irresponsabilided megalomana nacionalista" de los chinos, "Pravda" tambien da a la luz un articulo de dos 1i- deres del PC de Martinica anadiendo al ataque contra el PC chino. 13 Septiembre; E1 "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" publi- can el se undo articulo de la aerie, "Sobre la cuestion de Stalin". Reconociendo que Stalin "cometio algunos errores,,., dio algunos malos consejos en el movimiento comunista inter- nacional...Cy por ende] ocasiono algunos perdidaa a la Union Sovietisa y al movimiento comunista internacional" (refirien.. dose posiblemente a la poiftica de Stalin de fiarse de Chiang Kai-shek on 1927), los chinos mantienen que fue "un gran mar- xista-leninista, un gran revolucionario proletario". Kru- schev ha "negado" completamente a Stalin, en el XX Congreso del PCUS y desde entonces, "aunque estaba on la dirigencia del Partido en la epoca de Stalin y... activamente apoyo' y Ap r o dr or ftUe