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February 10, 1964
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1 DP78-03061A0002000500R41 C10b pprovea or a ease Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 10 February 1964 BMr.ef1 Noted Kwame Nkrumah's Soviet-style "Legality." Ghana's government-appointed polling officials obediently turned in a 99.9 per cent score for "yes" votes in the signifi- cant February first referendum. The Convention People's Party is now designated the "vanguard of the people in their struggle to build a Socialist society," an almost verbatim copy of the clause from Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution. No attempt was made to conceal the coercive nature of the registered ballots system and the frequent unavailability of the "no" ballot box. This predicted "victory" gives Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's President- for-life, the trappings of legality for future dictatorial de- cisions, foreshadowed by the December dismissal of the Chief Justice who acquitted three former officials of a treason charge. The elimination of an independent judiciary removes the last facade from Nkrumah's totalitarian "socialist" state. (Briefly Noted) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1 8-03061 db1wv D01*34 DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST 2 Mar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore capitalism by Bukharin Rykov and Yagoda et al, (18 sentenced to death 2-13 March 1935. 5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1?79), 1953. 8 Mar Russia -- February Revolution (Julian Cal. 23 Feb-2 Mar) 8-15 March 1917. 13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan Dalai Lama, 1959. 14 Mar Karl Marx dies (born 5 May 1818), 1883. 18 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1921. 1 Ap Berlin Blockade begins, 1948. 4 Ap North Atlantic Treaty signed in response to Soviet imperialism in Europe, 1949 (15th anniversary). 11 Ap Liberation from Fascism - "Day of Remembrance" celebrated annually by Commie resistance fighters,FIR, 17 Ap Nikita Khrushchev born 70 years ago, 1?94. 18 Ap European Coal and Steel Community (Europe's first federal community) -- Treaty signed, 195-1 18 Ap Bandung Conference -- 29 Afro-Asian countries call for self-determination, 18-27 April 1955 22 Ap Lenin born, 1870, Chicoms issue "Long Live Leninism" statements, challenging KOarushchev, 1960. 29 Ap India and Chinese People's Republic enter 8-year pact for "peaceful coexistence." 1954 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1939 a12d :.CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #21 18-31 January 1964 Commentary Principal Developments: 1. While a Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow was reporting that people there have come to realize that Peking will not cease its anti-Soviet polemics, and thus Sino-Soviet relations "have entered a new phase" (Chrono, Jan. 20), the Soviets undertook some new moves against Peking. They began mass distribution (domestically, in Russian only, as far as reported) of a new book (signed to the press in October but evidently withheld because of the moratorium on polemics) by top CPSU ideologists vigorously attackin "the anti-Marxist doctrines of the CCP" (Chrono, Jan 21 Pravda editorial on the 19th omitted mention of any Asian party (other than Soviet-aligned Mongolia) when listing 1963 contacts among "the socialist countries" and "their Marxist-Leninist parties." On the 20th, TASS branded an NCNA report as "absolutely groundless and nothing but misinformation," and on the 30th a Pravda article entitled "Why Mislead?" con- demned the Chinese for trying to distort the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in exchange for guaranteed sugar purchases, Castro signed a joint communique which confirmed "a complete unity of views" on all questions, including inter- national affairs and problems of the world Communist movement (Chrono, Jan 23). 2. The December and January issues of the Soviet-captive, multilingual, international monthly journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism'(World Marxist Review in English edition )s which has posed as the organ of the World Communist Movement, published several articles signed by Communists from various countries which clearly support Soviet and attack Chinese positions (Chrono, Jan. 27). (The Chinese and North Koreans withdrew completely from the PP&S operation and the Japanese decided to edit their own edition focally during the past year.) 3. The Chinese, rejoicing in the "tremendous welcome" given to Chou in 4 more African countries and in the agreement with the French establishing diplomatic relations, hardly men- tioned the terms of their dispute with Moscow during this period. Then in the first few days of February they released several blockbusters. People's Daily and other Peking press on the 3rd printed the text of the Pravda "Why Mis ead?" editorial plus a sardonic reply to it; excer stst from theiew Soviet "anti-China books" an NCNA announcement of the first of a series of volumes of anti-China material from the Soviet press;" and a slashing (#21 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 QIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 "editor's note" with the latter, asserting that "over 2000 items of anti China material" were printed in Russian publications by Nov. 30. The following day appeared the seventh in the Joint People's Daily/Red Flag series pegged to the 14 July CPSU open letter, entitled "The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times." This 18,000-word blast is the most direct, insulting challenge yet to Khrushchev and the CPSU leadership. ee hrono, Addendum, for description of these pots deadline items.) 4. In two more non-Communist countries, Ceylon and Peru, pro-Chinese factions set themselves up in formal opposition to the old "revisionist leadership." In Ceylon, the dissidents held their own "Seventh Party Congress" Jan. 19-21, formed a new "Central Committee," and adopted resolutions repudiating Soviet- line resolutions of the old Party (Chrono, Jan. 25). Much the same thing happened on Jan. 18 in Peru, where the continuing struggle between the factions led to-the proclamation of a new Party organ, Bandera Roja (Red Flag) and the storming of the offices of the old-line Party daily Vn idad by the pro-Chinese forces on Jan. 27, with demolition of its installations (Chrono, Jan. 18-27). 5. A new communique by the North Vietnamese Party con- firmed its solidly pro-Chinese orientation Chrono, Jan. 21) -- although the Party also dispatched a top-level delegation for Party talks in Moscow (Jan. 27). Italian CP boss Togliatti reiterated the PCI's opposition to an early world party conference and support of a meetings of the parties of Western Europe (Chrono, Jan. 21). Meanwhile, additional reports from Bucharest demon- strate the long strides taken by Rumania in the direction of independence from Soviet domination -- and apparently in a some- what Westerly direction (Chrono, Jan. 20 and 22). 6. An interesting note of yet undetermined significance was introduced after the end of the period when Chou was reported by Edgar Snow as saying in their interview that "we have reached an agreement with the Soviet Union that negotiations be held an the Sino-Soviet boundary questions." Significance: The Sino-Soviet conflict flared to a new intensity as the Soviets -- their plea and unilateral moratorium on polemics having failed to win Chinese reciprocity -- published a few new propaganda thrusts, ---- only to encounter the most savage Chi- nese attacks of all, including a taunting dare to the Soviets to carry out their "threats and intimidation." This new Chinese onslaught would seem to represent a "last straw," a point-of no return in the degeneration of relations between the two parties and states, ---- except that relations have survived a series of previous attacks which looked like "last straws" in their turn! Approved For Release il 61110 1111116"1 DP78 V(AOW+0 J2J6d%VBt3) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 The Soviet polemical thrusts were tin arativel mild, hackneyed and defensive, and their most spectacular political success -- the joint communique in which Castro testified to "complete unity" with them -- was of doubtful value and dura- bility: not only was it obviously paid for by economic con- cessions, but at one point it uses the formulation "complete identity of views as expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban state- ment of 23 May 1963," almost as if to remind us of how freely the Cubans interpreted their "identity" with the Soviets in the period immediately following Castro's earlier mission to Moscow. On the other hand, the Chinese gains -- not only in the free world, with Chou's further personal conquests and de Gaulle's recognition, but also in the Communist movement, with the estab- lishment of organized pro-Chinese parties in Ceylon and Peru -- are concrete and probably irreversible, seemingly supporting the monumental arrogance of their latest polemical blasts. Moscow's problems in trying to handle relations with the rampaging Chinese are truly staggering. 25X1C10b (#21 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 9910$/24 ;,,CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003 X1 Cl Ob 4 (#21 Commentary Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Relea IA-RDP78-03061A00020 OCOIN8 Approved For Release 1 0 1 4. CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 ? Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 CSBONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS #21 18-31 January 1964 Throughout period - The Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lei ro s on through Africa see rono, Dec, 14 and continuing), but plans and prospects for further visits are upset in wake of re- volts and mutinies in Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. Chou's charm reportedly won warm response during the remainder of his tour of Mali (15-21), in Guinea (21-27), in the Sudan (27-30) and in Ethiopia from the 30th. He is expected in Somalia on Feb. 1 for a 3-day stay, but scheduled visits to Kenya and Tanganyika have been "postponed." It was announced that the post- ponements were decided by the Chinese, -- but Tanganyika President Nyerere also canceled his proposed visit to China, and observers saw the changes as tied to Chinese broadcasts attacking the use of British troops to put down the mutinies and to indications of Chinese complicity in the turbulent events. Moscow continued to avoid direct comment on the Chou trip. January 18 - An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial commenting on the 8 January joint Alban an- nose declaration capping Chou's visit coined a new prase In the poem cs: a failure of the plans of N. chev against our country proved to the world that modern revisionism, like imperialism, is a 'paper tiger."' Ehrushchev's rev sons group as stopped at nothing, iti says: "it has gone so far as to plot against our country, sometimes in a hidden or indirect manner and sometimes directly. It has acted in the same manner against the CPR." Etc. January 18-27 - On January 18-19, the pro-Chinese faction of the Peruvian held its own congress at which ey ,expelVW several old guard pro-Soviet Party leaders and "elected new leadership." At a press conference several days later, Dr. Saturnino Paredes, "newly elected First Secretary," states that his group "will staunchly defend Marxist-Leninist principles" and supports Fidel Castro. At the same time, Victor Acosta, Secretary General of the old PCP issues a statement belittling the importance of the rebel group. On January 27 the pro-Chinese storm the building housing the old Party's daily Unidad and demolish the installa- tions. (Local press and radio -reports, plus NCNA.) January 19 - A Pravda editorial pegged to the continuing Castro visit extolls the visits of delegations and the personal meetings walks between leaders as "the good tradition furthering the strengthening of friendship" of "the socialist countries their Marxist-Leninist parties, and fraternal coup res. then re- counts such fraternal contacts curing a pas year, including specific reference to all contacts involving, in addition to Cuba, the CEMA countries -- including Mongolia -- and Yugoslavia -- but with no mention of any parties of Asia. On the same ay the major Chinese papers publish a long excerpt from the December issue of the Japanese 's theoretical and political journal Zenei entitled "Sino- ov e o emics and Revisionism in Japan" whicf--is intended to "refute the slanderous attacks on the Chinese CP by Noboro Sato and other renegades o e Jup, {{'*~21 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03D61A000200050003-3 P&WHAtff telease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 January 19-21 - Pro-Chinese ex ellees from the Cie lon Communist Party o eir own T even National Congress" in Colombo Jan- uary 19-21, elect a new "Central Committee," declare themselves to be the CCP, and repudiate several resolutions of the old ty leadership ich had favored the Soviet, Yugoslav, anti-Stalin line and had condemned the Albanians and the Chinese line. All Chinese papers prominently feature the story on the 25th. January 20 - Belgrade Borba carries an article by its Moscow correspondent Bayalski ating that people in Moscow think that relations between the USSR and China have entered a new phase' Mat they realize by now that eking is unwilling to give up its anti-Soviet polemics, that they sharply criticize Chinese behavior, and they believe that the dispute will continue for a long time to come. Bayalski goes on to say that the Soviet leader- ship is not yet decided whether it should continue to refrain from countering the Chinese attacks, explaining that "this, of course, is an intricate problem ... and one must always consider not only the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, but those of all socialist countries and of the international Communist movement. This is how people here explain the fact that the Soviets have refrained from polemics." Tass takes exception to a 12 January NCNA report on the return to na o ou Hung-ching, the n erpreter of a Chinese delegation who had defected in Tokyo in October, which "contends that Chou was forcibly detained for several hours at the USSR Embassy in Japan, despite alleged appeals ... by representatives of the Japanese public and also by the Japanese authorities." This statement, Tass declares, "is absolutely oundless and is nothin but misinformation of up bl c opinion.- a same me, ass announces A "a new group of Chinese specialists has arrived at Dubna .. to work at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research.... The group of Chinese workers at the institute is now the most numerous of all ire groups of people's democratic countries." January 20 and 22 - New York Times carries two articles by its Bucharest correspondent Binder summing up numerous developments in Rumania's "Independence Drive," which "a Western observer des- cribes as e- uss ca on u the discreet official of the Gheorghiu-De regime prefer to term 'Rumanification."' The biggest single change came last autumn with the a'abolit the Maxim Gorky Institute of Russian Language and Literature, which had been a center of Soviet educational influence," and Russian was eliminated as a compulsory language in the schools. 90 percent of the contents of Lumea, the weekly magazine which replaces the Rumanian edition of-Moscow's New Times (see Chrono, Dec. 27-30), are said to be reprints from Western publications. A guide pointed to a razed area filled with rubble and said simply: "That was the Russian bookstore." The Russian names of several shops and movie houses have been changed to Rumanian. Foreign trade statistics disclose that Rumania's commerce with Western countries grew from 20% to 33% of the total during the last 4 years, and the press is publicizing the presence of Western concerns in the country. Etc. 2 (#21 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Jyeff Qr 1&%%?(S41`0J1J-- ?7ea%~%M8O O0959293jasit to ugos avia w a press conference in which, according to ayug, he said; "We have found a common attitude and pointed to the path along which one should go towards un y. We expect to follow the path and thus attain favorable results." Both aaggrr~e~~~e~ that "the Chinese CP attitude toward questions of peace ance- coex stence 1son a "harms the international labor and Communist movement. ' 'iogliatti r iterated the Italian CPts opposition to a world co conferenof CPts at this time and its approval of "the proposal for convening a meeting of the CP's of The 40th snniwer of Lenin*s death serves as a peg for a series o ommen? the world-s mists reflecting their current stance in the "great conflict." Pravdats editorial was ]Largely an ode to magnificent Soviet achievements and majestic prospects -- mainly in a material sense. "Supplementing Lenints well-known formula," Pravda coined a new slogan: "Communism is Soviet power plus the a ec r ca on o e entire country p us h c emIcaIiza on of the national economy:" East German CC Secretary Honecker issued a statement obse- quiously pra sing "the Soviet Union (which) has become the basis of the whole world socialist system." On the other extreme, the Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial included some of the most vitriolic attacks to date on "the splitting and sapping activity engaged in by the N. Khrushchev group to revise and discredit Marxism-Leninism," on its "demagogy and intrigue," its "capitula- tion," "treason," and "blackmail." The only Rumanian comment we have seen was by a Prof. Bugnaru who never once mentoned the CPSU, although the views he set forth were generally in tune with ?oe Soviet line. The Chinese did not even mention the anniversar in any report seen by us. The North oreanNodong Sinmu editorial was only mildly anti-revisionist, but a or a namese chose this date to publish in Nhan Dan the common que o e TW= y s n in ,plenum in %-c-ember on a international situation and e Party-Os n erne Iona asks," together with an editorial pegged to it. The Party appears ever more strongly opposed to "modern revisionism" but in an interesting departure the communique state: "Our Party draws a clear political distinction . era sm, and e e within the international Communist movement who commit the error of revisionism or r g w ngoppor un sm. our atti- tude with regard to the Tito revisionist clique is to expose it consistently, and, with regard to the mistaken people within the ICBM, to struggle for the sake of unity...." The editorial specifically speaks of "consolidating and strength- ening unity between the Soviet Union and China" and expresses 3 (#21 Chronology Cont. ) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 sinceVVFte F I s SM/2*bOMAM 80Gd* 0 003-3 their priceless support and assistance." All Chinese gapers carried full text of this North Vietnam communique a on the 3rd. Meanwhile, correspondents in Moscow reported (Radio Belgrade on the 21st, Reuters on the 23ra1 and UPI on the 24th) that a new book, appearing quietly under the innocuous title Conversations on Political Topics, vigorously attacks the anti- s doctrines of the EXT. it was prepared by a group of nine under genera eTc itors p of chief CPSU ideologist Ilyichev and released for publication on 23 October, u apparently held up due to the Soviet moratorium on polemics. Observers saw in its appearance a si nal that Soviet patience with the Chinese was exhausted and the CPSU as ec e to hit back once more. a rs print- ng is-in 200,000 copes, apparently in Russian only. January 23 - Castro's 10-day visit with IChrushchev concluded with a long-term agreement covering Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar at guaranteed prices and a joint communique which declared that "a complete unity of views was confirmed on all the questions dis- cussed," which Included nterna onal problems of interest to both sides and urgent question on a world Communist and workers movement.- Later In the communique, the formulation was: "complete Ident ty of views as expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban statement of 23 May 1963." In amplifying on this "identity of views," the communique states that Cuba "considers the success achieved by the Soviet Union in the struggle for the cessation of nuclear tests... is a step forward toward peace and disarmament," thus contradicting the strong Chinese attack on the test-ban treaty and possibly indicating Cuba's intent to sign. It also says that Castro "stated the support" of Cuba for Khrushchev's new proposal for a treaty renouncing the use o orce in terri- torial disputes, The Soviet press exulted: av a s editorial on the ca led the communique "a documento of enormous significance ... impregnated from beginning to end by the complete unity of views" of the two parties and governments. January 25 - An Albanian Zeri IIPPopuullit editorial, "The Voyage to Africa and Albania by Comm a chou sn-Tai and the Reaction of the Titoists," begins by denouncing the Tito gang for its violent reaction to the Chou visit but soon goes on to its main thrust: "While the Tito gang launched open attacks against the k an-'ic its peace policy with the aim of obscuring ... the great inter- national role of China, the other modern revisionists organized a conspiracy of silence regarding a historic visit by the Premier of the CPR tats council. Why this silence ... ?11 zjp,s answer: My cannot reconcile themselves to Chinese policy which "unmasks their anti-Leninist pacifist concept of peaceful coexistence.... Furthermore, the revisionists cannot norm u c opinion in their countries, about the great success of the visit of the Chinese government delegation to Africa, for this would cause new troubles and new anxieties. It would show how defamatory., untruthful and absurd-is their propaganda against the CPR...." January 27 - Brief releases from Hanoi and Peking announce the deparTure of a top-ranking delegation of North Vietnamese Commu- nists, led by Fir's Secretary Le Duan, for party talks with the QSU in Moscow. Hanoi says only that they ~~woouu11ldCCh"exchai1nge views... on pr ApprovedFoor' eleasen' N910811 /'4 : CIA-RDP78-03061A Mz 05' %'6 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 The North Korean Party organ Nodong Sinmun carries a 15,?w- word article entitled o High the Revolutionary Banner of National Liberation," which, like their similar effort on October 28, comprehensively presents Chinese views tailored to represent the interests of a smaller nation. It goes out of the way to denounce "the Dange group of the API" and "some people calling themselves Communists" who support and praise them. New York Times writer Harry Schwartz reviews an article in the December issue of World Marxist Review (English-language edition of Problems of Peace an Socialism, ' a Soviet-supported, Prague-based, mu - ngua monthly ournal,by Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Chilean CP, which sharply attacks, the Chinese Communists for trying to force the Castro ofrevolu- on on the OUTO-ans who are dedicated to a policy of non- violent revolution. The letter reveals that the Chinese CP sent "a recent letter" to the Chilean CP with this aim, c u d the statement: "In Latin America the 'peaceful way' which you advocate stands in sharp contrast to the revolu- tionary way of Fidel Castro and the other comrades who led the Cuban people to victory." The last issue of our Chronology reported a Reuters Moscow dis- patch (Jan. C) reporting that the lead article in the January issue of PP &S, signed by a Czech, a Canadian and a Syr'- attackingie Chinese press for recognizing dissident splinter groups as "genuine communist revolutionaries," and a subsequent report has described another anti-Chinese article in the same issue by Jaime Peras, Secretary of the Uruguayan CP. January 30 - Pravda features an "Observer" article entitled "Why sea f"""which protests that, while the Khrushchev proposal for an international treaty renouncing the use of force in territorial disputes has been published, welcomed and given serious study in most countries of the world, the Chinese press organs have not published it or any of the world reaction to it but "take it upon themselves to comment on these documents and even to make an assessment of them." It asks: "Why mislead the Chinese people and turn them against the Sov a people?" Observer com- plains:"It is as ifin na they prefer to hand newspaper readers rea -made assertions and assessments .... IT on the same day, the nese press features a harshly taunting article from the December issue of the Malayan Monitor, London-published organ of the Malayan CP, which says that "everywhere the modern revisionists have suffered a crushing defeat in the great debate, thanks to the staunch and well-prepared efforts of the anti- revisionist leadership and ranks of the Communist and workers parties of the world, in particular the CCP, the Albanian Workers Party the eP's of Korea, Indonesia, the DRV,' etc. It taunts Khrushchev directly: 5 (#21 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 "In their agony of impending total defeat, they e modern revisionists) cry -no pole cs and nno Alit Coming from em suic, cries are ye a insults o an arsons who, having set e to your house, urges you not to Dower a ou pu out the flame but to use to g e ppeo eace. Marxist-Leninists are not exponents o polemics for the sake of gaining a debating point, nor are they to be fobbed off with placatory gestures of 'unity.' Unlike the modern revisionists, they do not regard principle and expediency as synonymous and interchangeable." Lest anyone have doubts as to whom it means by "modern revisionists," the article states clearly: "It is no accident that both Khrushchev and Tito are now in the same ideological camp -- openly and eves defiantly." (In view of the importance of several developments in the four days immediately following the close of our reporting period, we are attaching this Addendum to include some reference to them.) February 2 - In an interview granted in Conakry, Guinea, to sympathetic correspondent Edgar Snow, Chou En-lai is quoted as saying: "We have reached an agreement with the-Soviet Union that negotiations be held on the no- ov a boundary ques ons." Februarv 3 - Peking Peo le's Daily features a number of items on e no- oviet conflict: The text of the 30 January Pravda article "Why Mislead?" - An article replying to Pravda, entitled "A Blow at Lyndon Johnson Stings Pravda." It begins sarcastically: "Once upon a time there was a story of the Siamese twins, It was said that when one of the pair "was-hit the other felt the pain, i puzzles one now Is that this curious kinship ould appear between the leaders of the CPSU and the 'President of the 'U. '- asks: a sort o a con one re ex s hir?... Does it mean that the Soviet leaders intend to reach an agreement with Johnson under which they would join hands in forbidding the peoples to oppose imperialism and start revolution? If so, Pravda has good reasons for its nervousness...." - Excerpts from the new Soviet book, Conversations on Political Topics (see Chrono, Jan.2 , under the head- line -ou licious Attacks on the CCP." 6 (#21 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 CHRONOLOGY -- ADDENDUM Ap-proyl$c ri ftg RRjjVAQ8j&4aiC4fi5Dfi7PsQ39g1&2903P 0P)VPP3-3 China Materials from the Soviet Prress' goes on sale- throughout na today,," together w the text of the preface to the volume by the editorial board of the World Culture Publishing House. It says that, "accord- ing to incomplete statistics, by 30 Nov. over 2000 items of anti-China material of all descriptions... had been printed In 26 national papers and periodicals and 23 local papers and periodicals in the Soviet Union." A Pee lets Daily "editor's note" which says that, "since N. ru ev, leader of the CPSU, proposed 'an end to polemics' on 25 October 1963, the Soviet press has continued its anti-China propaganda right along." It points particularly to excerpts from the "more than gan these pages. tt "eople can Mislead" see rom this Pravda article pub- lished that the CPSU leader's proposal for 'an end to public polemics is only,: a fraud, perpetrated for ulterior motives. a propaganda in the book". it says, "is nothing SU-stale, trite phraseology," and the Pravda article "is even more ridiculous." "As for the reprimand in Pravda to the effect that the Chinese press has not published ;Qhrushchev's letter of 31 December to the heads of governments, we can candidly say to the CPSU leadership, what is your hurry? We will deal with it, and will comment on it, too. A Chinese ppubliShing house is already m-RS ing up volumes of your anti-China articles for successive issuance. A road must be traveled step by step, and a bill of accounts must be settled item by item. W e st have hot finished answering the open Setter you published last July. a makes you so impatient?" February 4 - The seventh in the series of joint People's Daily/ Red Flag articles r ng to the14 July PSU open letter is published by the nese. Inasmuch as We re- ._vec: oa ;Tan English language NCNA summary by our deadline, we will comment on it only tentatively now and follow up with a more complete analysis in our next installment. Entitled "The Leaders of the C?SU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," the article begins by declaring unequivocally that "the leaders of the PSU headed by rushchev have become the chief representatives of mo ern revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in the iff'e-rnational Communist movement." It defines splittism as follows: "Splittism means to split with Marxism-Leninism.' Anyone who opposes and betrays Marxism-Leninism and undermines the basis o proletarian unity is a sp er.... Anyone who persists in a revisionist line and turns a revolutionary proletarian party Into a reformist bourgeois party is a Witter.... The splitters in the Communist ranks are those who, to meet the needs of the bourgeoisie, split with Marxism-Leninism,... and they remain splitters even when for 7 (#21 Chronology Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 403-3 r er, I-Ir the Cebu leaders insist on marking o e majority' from the 'minority,' we would like to tell them quite frankly that we do not recognize their majority." Wallowing deeper in murky "clarifications," the article says that "opportunism and revisionism are the political and ideological roots of splittism, and splittism is the organiza- tional manifestation of opportunism and revisionism. It can also be said that opportunism and revisionism are splittism as well as sectarianism. The revisionists are the greatest and vilest splitters and sectarians in the Communist movement." In direct incitement to revolt in the USSR, the article recalls the many errors in domestic and ore gn policies of the C?SU leadership and says: "The actions of the leaders of the CPSU have brought deep shame upon a great Soviet Union and the and seriously damaged the fundamental interests of the Soviet people, is none other than the leaders of the CPSU headed y , rush ev who are anti-Soviet." Before closing, the article predicts "the eventual burial" of the revisionists, taunts Khrushchev on his fraudulent call for an en to polemics ("What sort o games are you playing, saying one thing at one time and another thing at another?"), and dares the Soviets to make good on their "outright threat and in m a aon In the Soviet Government statement of eptem- er which declared that the Chinese face "the most resolute rebuff from the CPPSU and the Soviet people" if they continue the polemics: "Do you really believe that other people are bound docilely to obey your orders and tremble at your roar? To be frank, ever since 21 September we have been eagerly waiting to see wha .e mos resolute rebuff would be." (#21 (Mronology) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 CRONOLOGIA - DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS #21 18-31 Enero 1964 En todo el perfodo: La dele acion china encabezada por Chou En-lai prosigue su correr a par Africa ver Cronologra 14 y seguido) pero los planes y perspectivas de otras visitas se echan a porder a razz do revueltas y motinea en Zanzibar, Tanganika, Kenya y Uganda. La simpatfa de Chou se dice que consiguio calida respuesta por el resto de su gira per Mali (15-21), Guinea (21-27), el Sudan (27-30) y Etlopfa desde el 30. So le espera en Somalia el 10 para una visita do 3 dfas, poro las visitas programadas a Kenya y Tanganika han sido "pospuestas". So anuncio quo habfan sido pospuestas por los chinos -- pero el presidente Nyerere do Tanganika cancelo tambien au propuesta visita a China, y los observa- dores interprotaron los cambios como relacionados con emi- sionos chinas atacando el emploo do fuorzas brita'nicas para sofocar los motines y con indicios de complieidad china on los borrascosos acontecimientos. Moacu continuo evitando conentar directamente sobre el viaje de Chou. 18 Enero: Un editorial del "Zeri i Popullit" de Albania, corn ntndo sobre la declaration eoniunta chino-albanesa del 8 do enero quo coron6 la visita do Chou, invents una nueva frase on las polomicas:"E1 fracaso de los planes do N. Kru- schov contra nuestro pats demostro al mundo que of revisio- nisno contomporanoo, Como el imperialisrno, es un__ti~re do a el'. ' El grupo revisionists de Kruschev no se ha de- tenido ante nada, declara:"ha llegado al oxtroio do eomplo- tar contra nuestro pads, a veces de nodo oculto o indirecto y otras directamente. Ha actuado del mis,~io modo contra la RP china". Y asf por el estilo. 18-27 Enero: El 18 y 19 de enero, la faction prochina del PC peruano celebro su propio congreso on of cual expulsa- ron a varios lfderes prosovieticos de la vioja guardia y "eligioron una nueva diroctiva" En una rueda de prensa unos dfas ras tarde, el doctor Saturnino Paredes, "rocien~ electo primer secretario", declara quo su prupo "dofendora con enteroza loa prineipios marxistas-leninistas" y apoya a Fidel Castro. Al misr.o tio2po, Victor Acosta, socrotario general del viejo PC peruano, expide una declaration dos- prociando la importancia del nuevo grupo. El 27 do enero los elemcntos prochinos atacan el edificio del diario "U- nidad", del antiguo partido, y deatrozan los equipos. (In- fornes locales do prensa y radio as Agencia Nueva China). 19 Enero: Un editorial de "Pravda" con respecto a la visi- tc. actual do Castro ensalza las visitas do delegaciones y las reuniones y conversaciones personates ontro dirigontes co:_o "la buena tradition que adelanta el fortalociuiento do la a,astad" do "los parses socialistas sus artidos car- xistaB-leninistas y los pa ses fraternos . Luego hate un Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 recuento de tales contactor fraternos durante el pasado ano, haciendo referencia espeoffica a todos Jos pafses incluyen- do, adenas de Cuba, los pafses del Consejo de Asistencia Econoa,ica Mutua, entre ellos Mongolia --- y Yugoslavia -- pero sin referirse aningunpartido de Asia. El nismo dfa los principalel Deriodicos chinos, publican un largo frag- nento de la edition de diciembe de "Zenei", el o gano teo- rico y polftico del PC lapones, con el tftulo de "Las pole- nicas chino-sovietioas y el revisionisno en el Japon", con proposito de "refutar los ataques calunniosos contra el PC chino do Noburo Sato y otros renegados del PCJ . 19-21 Enero: Las expulsados prochinos del PC ceilanes ce- lebran su propio "VII Congreso national" en Colombo en 19- 21 do enoro, eligen un nuevo "Comite central", se autode- nominan el FCC y repudian varias resoluciQnes del liderato del PC antiguo que habfan favorecido la lfnea sovietica, yugoslava, antistaliniana y habfan condenado a los albaneses y la lfnea china. Todos los periodieos chinos destacan la noticia el dfa 25. 20 Enero: El "Borba" de Beigrado publica un artfculo do Bayalsdi, su corrospondal en Mosc'u, on que declara quo la gente on Moscu tree qua las relaciones entre la URSS y Chi- na ham ontrado on una nueva fase, quo ya conprenden que Fe- kin no osta dispuesto a renunciar a sus pole:oicas antiso- vieticas, que critican severaraente la conducta china y,que croen quo la disputa va a continuar por nucho tienpo nas. Bayalski'declara adenas que el liderato sovietico no ha de- cidido aun si debera continuar eximiendose do responder a los ataques chinos, explicando que "esto, por supuesto, es un problem intrincado... y uno debe sienpre tenor on cuen- ta no solo los intoreses del PCUS y la Union Sovietica, sino Jos do todos los pa-fees socialistas y del noviniento nista international. Asf es como la gente aquf explica que los sovioticos Be hayan exinido de las polenicas". Tass to-ma exception de un_despacho de la Agencia del 12 de ene- de una dolegacion china quo habfa defeccionado on Tokfo on dospacho el cual "pretende que a Chou lo detuvie- octubro , ron por la fuerza varias horaB on la Ennajada do la URSS an el Japon, a pesar de supuestos ruegos... do representantes~f del publico japones y tarobien de las autoridades japonesas . Esta declaration, Tass afirma, "es absolutanente carento do fundarnionto y no es otra cosa aue dar information falsa a la o in o publ lica . Al iisno tienpo, Tass anuncia quo un nuevo grupo de especialistas chinos ha llegado a Dubna a trabajar on el Instituto Conjunto de Investigation Nuclear,,. El grupo do trabaladores chinos on el instituto as ahorn of nas nureroso de todos los rrruipos de Jos pafses do democracia popular". 20 y 22 Enoro: El "Now York Ti2Ies" publica dos artfculos do su corresponsal Binder on Bucarest resumiendo nunerosos acontocimientos en la "Cappana Independentista" de Ru ania Approved For Release 1999/08/24: ,IA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 la cual "un observador occidental describe Como 'dosrusifi- cacion' Pero que los discretos funcionarias del- regimen de 57heorghiu-Dej prefieren llamar 'rumanificacion'." El cambio individual mayor ocurrio el otono paeado con la abolition del Instituto Maximo Gorki de Lengua y Literatura Rusas, que habCa sido Centro de influencia educational sovietica, y se elimino el ruso Como lengua obligatoria an laB escue- las. El 90 por ciento del contenido do "Lumea", el soma- nario quo desplaza la edition an rumano del "Nuovos Tiem- pos" de Moscu (ver Cronologfa, 27-30 diciembre),?so dice qua as reproducido de publicaciones occidentales, Tin gufa senalo? un solar rasado y lleno de escombros y dijo sencil- lamente:"Eso era una librerfa rusa". Los noubres rusos de varias tiondas y tines han sido cambiados por rursanos. Las estadfsticas do comercio exterior senalan quo el conercio do Ru:aania con pafses occidentales crecio del 20 al 33 por ciento del total durante los 'ultimos cuatro anos y la pron- sa esta dando publicidad a la presencia do compa:Ms occi- dentales on el pats, y asf por el estilo. 21 Enero: El Caudillo Togliatti-del PC italiano concluyo su visita do 7 d as a Yugoslavia con una conferencia do prensa on la que, segun Tanuyg, declare:"Henos hallado una actitud an comun y hemos Be nalado el Camino por el cual debar unocia la unidad. Confiamos seguir dicho Ca- mino y asf obtener resultados favorables". Ambos estan de acuordo que "la actitud del PC chino hacia las cuestiones do la paz y la coexistencia pat fica esta errada" y "ner- udica of movimiento international obrero y comunista*, Togliatti reitero la oposieion del PC italiano a una confe- rencia mundial de PCs por ahora y su aprobacion de "la ao- puost do convocar una reunion do los PCs de Europa Occiden- tal , El 400 aniversario de la muerta de Lenin sirve do per- cha para una serie do co:.jentarios por los comunistas mun- dialos quo roflejan su actitud actual sobre el "gran con- flicto". El editorial do "Pravda" fue mayoraente una oda a las magnfficas realizaciones sovieticas y a sus :uajestu- osas porspectivas -- principalente en sentido material. "Como suplemento a la bien conocida formula do Lenin," "Pravda": invento una nueva consi;na: "El comunisJo as el coder sovieti o :gas la electrification de todo el a a as. la guimif is ac ion do la ec onom a mac tonal , El socretario Honocker del CC del partido do Alera- nia Oriental oxpidio una declaration obsequiosa elogiand.o 11la Union Sovietica (quo so ha tornado on la base del sis- tema socialista mundial integro". Al otro extremo, on of editorial del "Zeri I Popullit" de Albanis se produjeron~t algunos do los ma's vitriolicos ataques hasta hoy contra la actitud do escision y debilitamiento a que so dedica el grupo do N. Kruschev para revisar y desacreditar cl't:_larxis- mo-loninisLo", contra su "demagogia e intriga , su capi- tulacio'n", "traicion" y "ehantaje", El unieo corentario Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 conentario runano que hemos visto fue el de un tal profesor Bu3naru quo on niniun nomonto nonbro al PLUS, aunque las opiniones. que oxpuso oran -enoralnento aeordes con la lfnoa soviotica Los chinos ni siquiera nonclonaron of anivorsario on ningun informo quo nosotros hayanos visto. El editorial dcl "Nodong Sinaun", do Corca del Norte, tuvo solazonto un lovo tono antirrcvisionista, hero los viotnanoscs oscogic- ron osta focha Para publicar on su "Nhan Dan ci cozunicado dol novono plono dol CC del Partido colobrado en dici?nbre con respocto a "la situacion internacional y las tareas in- tornacionales del Partido" asf cono un editorial sobre esto tong. El Partido aparace rags y pas opuesto al "revisio- nismo contenporanoo' pero la declaraoion presenta una in- terosante diforencia: "Nuestro Partido ostablece una clara distin- cion politica entre la canarilla revisionista do Tito, lacayo del imperialism o, y la ,iente dontro del novimiento co.:'unista internacional quo conete el error del revisionisto u opor- tunismo de dorecha. Nuestra act tud con ros- pocto a la caraarilia revisionista do Tito es donunciarla consecuentenente, y an cuanto a los equivocados en of seno del moviraiento comu- nista internacional, luchar on bien de la u- nidad..," El editorial so refiero ospoefficamento a "consolidar y fortaloeor la unida3. ontre la Union Sovietica y China" y exprosa sinccras gracias a ambas "y a los otros pafses fra- ternos por su inapreciable apoyo y asistoncia " El dfa 23 todos los diarios chinos publicaron cl texto ntorro de co:unicado norvietnames. los corresponsales on Moscu informaron Entretanto , (la rmftio do Bel-raclo el dfa 21, Reuters el 23 y UPI of 24) quo un nuovo libro, apareeido sin alboroto bao of inofen- sivo t tulo "Conversaciones sobre topicos poljticos l&nza un vig,oroso atague contra las doctrinal antimarxistas del PC chino, Fue redactado por un grupo do nuove bajo la direr on editorial del ideology o princ i,pal del PCUS, Ilyi- chov, y oxpedido para ser pubiicado el 23 do octubro pero aparentenente suspondido debido a la moratoria soviotica do las polo'micas. Los obsorvadores vieron on su pubiicacion of indicio do quo la pacioncia soviotica con los chinos so hcb a acaba!o y el PLUS hab a resuelto contraatacar otra vez. La pri:iora tirada os do 200.000 ejer2plares, parece quo on ruso solerlente. 2 Enero: La visita do 10 dfas de Castro a Kruschev tormi- no on un acuordo a largo plazo sobre las collpras sovieticas do azucar cubano a precios ~arantizados y un corunicado coniunto quo aeclaraba quo use confirmo una completa uniclad do paroccros on todas las cuestionos discutidas , quo in- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: (MA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 El escritor Harry Schwartz del "Now York Times" conen- ta sobro un artfeulo del numero de dieiembre do "World Mar- xist Review", (odicion en lon3ua inrlesa de "Problemas do la Paz y of Socialisao", monsuario multilinhde subvencio- nado por los sovieticos y con sods on Pra-a), eserito por Luis Corvala&n, seorotario general del PC chileno, atacando fuortomento a los conunistas chinos por tratar de iuponer a los chilenos quo estan dedicados a la revolucion incruenta el tipo castrista do revolucion. La carta revela quo el PC chino dirinio "una Carta reciente" al PC chileno inspi= rada on tal proposito, conteniendo la declaration: "En America Latina, la 'vfa pacffica' quo Vds propu3nan esta on agudo contrasts con la vfa rovolucionaria do Fidel Castro y los otros cciaradas?quo llevaron al pueblo cubano a la victoria". El ultimo numero do nuestra Cronologfa decfa do un dospacho do Reuters desde Moscu (8 de onero) con respecto al articulo principal de la edici.on de enero del "PP&S", suscrito por un choco, un canadiense y un sirio, en quo so atacaba a la prensa china por reconocer a Irrupitos robana- dos coo le,` timos revolucionarios conunistas", y ;as tarde so ha infornado otro artfculo antichino on la aisna edition oscrito por Jaime Peras, secrotario del CC del PC uru3uayo. 0 Enero: "Pravda" resalta un artfculo do "Observador" ti- tu1ado: c,Por quo despistar?" en el que so protesta el he- cho do quo, nientras quo la propuesta do Kruschev por un tratado international renunciando al ompleo do la fuerza on las disputas torritoriales ha sido publicada, bion recibida y ostudiada soriamonte on la mayorfa do los pafses del uun- do, los oranos chinos no la han publicado ni tampoco la reaction sundial a ella porn "so pormiten comentar sobre dichos documentos y hasta hater una valoracion do ellos". Hace 1a ,)ro-unta:"LPor quo despistar al pueblo chino -Y volvorlo on contra del pueblo sovietico?" So la:ionta of Observa.dor : Es coo quo on China prefieren +)onor on Banos do los loctores afirmacionos y valoracionos fabricadas do antemano..." El nisno dfa la prensa china publica un ar- tfoulo provocador de la edition de diciembre del "Malayan Monitor", or-ano del PC ualayo publicado an Londros, que, declara quo 'den todas partes los revisionistas contespora- noos han padocido una aplastante derrota on el ^ran debate, -racias a los esfuerzos resistentes y bien preparados del liderato a ntirrevisionista y los miembros de los partidos conunistas y obreros del mundo y en especial del PC chino, of Partido Albanes do Trabajadores y los PC de Corea, In- donosin, la RDV, etc. Le hala las barbas a Kruschev direc- ta::onte: "En la a,-onfa de su roxina derrota total los revisionistas conte:aporaneos) clatan Approved For Release 1999/08/24. CIA-RDP78-03061AO00200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 'clue no- haya polenicas' y 'que no haya es- eision'. En bona de ellos, seuelantes ari- tos soncono los insultos do un incendiario que habi ndolepeado fuera la Casa del proiimo. le aconseia no apa,yarlo sino utili- zar las llamas Para encender 'la pia de la aaz . Los narxistas- eninistas no son expo- nentes de pole'micas por ,anarse un tanto on of debate, ni se les va a enC-atusar con tes- tos aplacantes de 'unidad'. En contraste con los rovisionistas contenporaneos, no conside- ran los principios y la eonveniencia coup si- no'nimos a intercambiables". For si alGuien tiene dudas do a quien se refiere cono "revisionistas contenporaneos", el articulo afirma claranen- te:"No es accidental que tanto Kruschov cono Tito ostan ahora on el mismo Campo ideol6gico -- abierta y hasta desa- f ladoranenta" CRONOLOGIA - ADITAMENTO (Por la inportancia de varios acontecimientos ocurridos on los cuatro dfas in:aodiatamente despue's do nuestro porfodo actual, ofrocemos este Aditanento para dar al una cuenta do los nisnos.) 2 Fobroro: En una entrovista on Conakry, Guinea, concedida por Choui-lai al corresponsal bien dispuesto Edgar Snow so lo atribuyen estas palabras:"Hemos lleGado..a un acuerdo con la Union Sovietica an el sentido do que se lleven a Ca- bo nor;ociaeiones sobro las cuestiones fronterizas chino- sovioticas. 3 Fobroro: El "Diario del Pueblo" de Pokfn publica al unos art culos sobro el conflicto chinosoviotico; - El toxto del artfculo de "Pravda":"LPor quo' dos- pistar?" do 30 do onero. - Un artfcul,o contestando a "Pravda" titulado:"Un rolpo a Lyndon Johnson le duele a "Pravda". E:ipie- z1 con sarcasno:"Habfa una vez un cuonto do los :aollizos siameses. Se decfa que cuando a uno so le porrabaal otro le dolfa. Lo que me extrana ahora es quo esta curiosa relation haya do aparecer entre los lfdores del PCUS y el ~residente d?los EE.UU. Pro unta:"& ue espocie de reflojo condicionado, es este? ...bSi;nifica que los dirirentes sovie- ticos tienen intention do lleGar a un acuordo con Johnson nediante el cual so unirfan para prohibir a los pueblos oponerse al i;aperialisno y lanzarse a la revolution? En tal caso, "Pravda" tione buenos Approved For Release 1999/08/24 7 CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 notivos para estar nerviosa..." - Fraomentos del nuevo libro sovietico, "Conversacio- nes sobre topieos politicos (ver CronoloCfa, 21 onero) bajo el oncabezamiento, "Ataques rlaliGnos sin nesura contra el PC chino." - Anuncio de la Arrencia Nueva China de quo "el rpi_me toao 'Materiales antichinos (tomados) do la prensa s o iatica' sale a la vents hay, Junto con el texto del prefacio al torso por la junta redactora do la Editorial Cultura Mundial. Dice qua do acuordo con estadfsticas inconpletas, Para el 30 de novieabro uas do 2.000 piezas contra China do todas las va- riedades... habfan sido iapresas on 26 periodieos y revistas nacionales y 23 periodicos y revistas locales on la Union Sovietica." - Una "nota editorial" del "Diario del Pueblon qua dice que "desde qua N.S. Kruschev, lfdor del PCUS, propuso 'un fin a las poleaicas' el 25 do octubre do 1963, la pronsa soviotica-ha continuado sin cesar su propajanda antichina." Senala an especial of libro de "uas de 300 pa~lnas" y el articulo "LPor quo despistar?" do "Pravda publicado an dichas patinas. "La -ante puedo ver de estos riateriales quo la propu esta del lfder decal PLUS de 'poner fin a las polemics no as nas qua un fraude. perpetra- do por noviles ulteriores. La props-anda del li- bro, afirna, no as nas que fraseoloria pasada,Ifre- ealontada-", y el artfeulo do ''Pravda' as "aun mas ridfculo". "En cuanto al re`ano an 'Pravda' on of son- tido do quo la pronsa china no ha publieado la oarta do Kruschev de 31 do diciezibre a los jefes do 3obiernos, podenos decir con candi- dez al liderato del PCUS: Por Quo la 2risa? Do ella nos ocupareioos y tambien la comenta- reaos. Una editorial china esta ya propa- rando todos do sus artfculos antichinos para entre-las sucesivas. Un casino hay que via- jarlo paso a paso y un estado do cuentas ha clue pa^arlo artfeulo por articulo. Todav a, no heaps acabado do eontestar la carta abier- t^ quo publicaron of ultiao 14 do Julio. i,Por quo so inpaciontan tanto?" 4 Febroro: Los chinos publican el aoptimo artfeulo conlun- to de Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" do la serie on contostacion a la carta abierta del PCUS do 14 do Julio. Habionclo rocibido solaEionte un resuaen an inr71Qs publicado por la A-encia Nueva China al cierre do este nunero, por ahora comentarenos provisionalmente y volverenos on nuestro Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :8CIA-RDP78-03061 A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 proximo con un anolisis mas conpleto. Bajo el tftulo de "Los diriGentes del PCUS son be escisionietas ma's Grandes de nuastra ?oca", el artfculo eupieza deelarando sin o- qufvoco quo 'losdirirentea de POUS encabezados nor Kru- schev se han convertido on los rinci ales re?resentantes del revisionisno contonporaneo as cono los nas Grandes es- cisionistas on el oviniento conunista international". Define el escisionisnno cono siguo:"Eaeisionismo quiore de- cir 'excision respecto al narxismo-leninisno`. Gualguipra quo se onontfa y traiciono al narxismo-loninismo y socave la base de la unidad proletaria es un osoisionista,.. Cual- guiera quo persista on una.llinea revisionista y convierta un partido proletario revoluoionario en un partido bur-ues refornista es un esciaionista... Los escisionistas on lax filas comunistas son aquellos que para atender a las nece- sidsdos do la burguesfa so escisionen del marxismo-leninis- mo... ysiguon siendo eseisionistas aun cuando por un tie;- Adom s, a os riven es del PCU insisten en a im tar . la 'mayorfa' de la Iminorfa', quere1oe decirles muy fran- c amente que no rec onoc ernos su mayorf a . " Enred.andose max on turbias "aclaraciones", el artf- culo afirma clue "el oportunisno y el revisionisno son las rafoes ideolo3icas del escisionisno, y el escisionisno es la manifestation orC.anica del oportunismo y el revisionis- mo. So puede tanbion docir quo el oportunismo y el revi- sionis-mo son escisionisno asi Como sectarismo. Los revi- sionistas son los mayores y nos viles escisionistas y sec- tarios dol movimiento comunista." Incitando directamento a la revolution en la URSS, el art culo rocuerda los mismos erroros do pol tica inter- na y exterior del liderato del PCUS y declara:"Las actua- cionos do los diri^rentes del PCUS han aparejado profunda yorr onza a la -Iran Union ovietica y el PCUS y ,Derludica- do sorianonte los interes fundauentales del pueblo soon e tico. No son otros Cue lox dirirontes del -PCUS encabeza- dos por Kruschev lo_ que son antisovieticos,T' Antes do concluir el artfculo prediee "el sepulta- mionto al fin al cabol' do los revisinistas, se burla de Kruschev -)or su solicited fraudulenta do ar fin a lax o- lemcas LQuo class de partidas rata u?ando, diciendo MO en una ocasi'n y aquello on otra?,') y reta a los so- yieticos a curjplir su "intimidation y amenaza declarada an la declaration del gobierno soviQtioo de 21 de septiem- bre quo doclaraba quo a los chinos les eapera "el ma's res- uelto rochazo del PCUS y el pueblo sovie'tico" si continuan las polomicas:"LCreen realmente que otros pueblos tienen docilmonto que obodecer las ordones de ustedee y te:mblar ante sus ruaidos? Francamente, desde el 21 de se tiombre henos ostado esperando para ver en quo consistira Ol =as resuolto rochazo. Approved For Release 1999/08/2k: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 bourgeois eat un divisionniste... Les divisionnistes parmi lea rings dos co :munistes sont coux qui pour satisfaire aux besoins do la bourgeoisie, rompent avec le marxisme-leninis- me.,, o_ aui , ostont divisio ,ates L;g~me lprsau'ils ant une maiorit to;.aporaire ou g ils detie' nnent des pastas do din- ______ ean s Plus loin, "si lea leaders du P.C. de 1 'Union sovietiquo insistent a faire une difference entre la majo-- rite at la ninorite", nous lour dirons tros frcnche-aent quo nous no reconnaissons pus lour maiorite," S'enfongant plus avant dans des "clarifications" te- nebrouses, 1 article declare que "1'opportunisa et le ro- visionnisme sont lea raeinos politiques et ido'ologiques du divisionnisrie, et le divisionnisme eat une manifestation au 36in dune organisation do l'opportuniame at du revision- nismo. On pout dire egalemont que 1'opportunisme et lo revisionnisna-constituent is d1visionnisme aussi bien quo le sectaris_ae, Les revisionnistes sont dos divisionnistes do 1'especo la plus grando et la plus basso ainsi quo des soct^ires dans le raouvemont eommunisto," lncitant directenont a la re'volto on Union sovietique, Particle rappolle le grand nor.bre. d orreurs comrisos dans lea politiquos internes at etrangeres par lea chefs du P. C. do l'Union sovietique, et declare:" Les actions de cos leaders du P.C. do 1'Union sovioti ue ont couvort do honte le grand pays do 1'Union soXiatiguoo of soiparti coy;rzu s o et ontorte un pre4udice sarieux aux interets fondaoon- taux du pouple sovietique. Ce nest nuls autres que lea loaders du P .C. de 1 U on sovvi iaue, avoc Khrouchtchof a l~ our tcte,yui sont anti-soviets . Avant do terriiner, l'articlo predit que lea rcvision- nistos seront eventuel1o ont "onterrosw of couvre Khrouch- t l fl f do sarcasnos pour son appal frauduleux en favourd u- ne fin dos pol atues ("A quollo sorto do jeu jouoz-vous lorsque vous doclarez quolque chose, puis l'oppose 1'ins- tant d'cpres? ") , at defie lea Soviets de :iettre on pratigue lours ":;onc?cos d'intinidationff contenues dans la declara- tion du souvornoment sovietique du 21 septembro selDn la- quollo los Chinois so truuvent on presence "do la rebuffade la plus rc'soluo do la part du P.C. do ltUnion sovietique at du pouplo sovietique si le pouple chinois prolongoait la pol&:iquo:"Croyoz-vous reellement quo lea autres peuplos sont tonus ^ obeir docilement a vos ordres et a trembler lorsque vous rugissez? Pour etre francs, depuis lo 21 sep- tembre nous aeons attondu avec impatience our voir co quo cetto robuffado des plus olues pouvait etre Approved For Release 1999/0124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 CH.RONOLOGIE - DISSENTIONS CONMUNISTES No 21 13-31 janvier 1964 Periode entierre: La dale a~tionn chinoise emmenee par Chou En-lac roule a travers_1 A` rique voir Chronologie du 14 decembre et la suite), mais lee plans et les possibilitea pour lea visites a venir sont deranges par suite des revol- tea at des mutineries a Zanzibar, au Tanngganyika, au Kenya at en Uganda. Le charme do Chou a, parait-il, obtenu des reponses chaleureuses au cours du rests de sa tournee: on Mali (15-21), an Guinea .(21-27), au Soudan (27-30), at an Ethiopic, a partir du 30. I1 est attendu an Somalia le ler janvior pour un sejour do 3 jours, mais les visites prevues au Kenya at au Tanganyika ont ete"remisesa plus tard". I1 a ate annonce quo cette remise a eta decide par les Chinoie macs lo pre'sident Nyerere du Tanganyika a annuls egalament la visits qu'il projetait on Chine, at las observateurs es- timont quo ces changemonts sont on rapport avec lea attaques menc-os par is radio chinoise contra 1 utilisation des trou- pes britanniques chargees d'etouffer lea mutinerics of con- tro acs roforoncos a la complicate dos Chinois dins ces de- sordros. Moscou continue a evitor les commontaires directs sur lo voyage do Chou. 18 anvier: Un editorial du journal albanais "Zara 1 Popul- lt commentant sur la declaration albino-chinoise du 8 jan- vier a lc. fin do la visito do Chou a product cotta nouvelle formula dens la o~ 1emiguet'L'cchec des plans de N. Khrouch- tehof dirigcs conntrc notro pays demontre au mondo quo le re'visionnisme modorno tout comma l'imperialismo n'ost qu'un ro de pa for Le (rouge r:'visionniste do Khrouch- tch no's ost arr,ta devant rion declare-t-i1. I1 est- 11 jusqu~ comploter contra notro pays, parfois d'une m.{ na.:ro caohco at indirecte, at parfois directemcnt. Il a agi do namo contra la Republique populaire chinoise", dit- al. Etc... 18-27 ianvior: Les 18-19 janvier, la faction pro-chinoise du P.C. poruvion a rouni son propre Congr s :,u sours duquol ollo ucxpuls plusiours leaders do la vieille garde pro- sovietacuo du parts at "proceda a 1'eloction de nouveaux leaders'. A uno oonf?rence de presso, plusiours fours plus tard, to Dr Saturnino Paredes, "promier secretciro nouvollo- mont olu", declare clue on groups "dcfendr3 formement loa prinoipes marxistes-leninistes", at soutiondra ?idol Castro. Au moms moment, Victor Acosta, socretaire gencrcl do 1'an- cien P.C. peruvion fait para#tre une declaration chorohant % 10 a reduiro l'importance du groups rebelle. Lo 27 janvior, los pro-chinois ottaquent le batiment ou so trouvc lc quo- tidian do 1'ancaon parti, "Unidad", at on brae lea instal- lations. (Proses locale at nouvelles de la radio, plus A- gcnce do prosao Chino nouvollo). Approved For Release 1999/08/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 19_ anvier: Un editorial de "Pravda", a 1'occsion visite de Castro qui se~poursuit, chante lea louanges des visites de delegations at des contacts personnels at des conversations entre leaders an disant qua cool est "dans la bonne tradition qui renforce 1'amitie" parmi "lea pays so- oialistes, leura partis marxistea-1eninistes, at lea pays8 frateriiels", L editorial ensuito de ces contacts P fratcrnels qui eurent lieu 1'annee dernie% re, mentionnant particulieroment tous lea contacts auxquels participaient an dehors de Cuba lea pays du Conseil d'a8sistance econo- mique mutuelle, -- dont la Mongolia -- at la Yougoslavie -- mail sans mentionner aucun des artis de 1'Aaie. Le meme jour, lea principaux iournaux c inois publiaient un low extrait du numero de decembre du journal politique of the orique du P.C japonais "Zenei", article intitule "Polemi- ques sino-sovietiques at revisionrnisme au Japon", dont le but eat do "refuter lea atta ues calombieuses dlri ces con- tre le PAC chinois par Noburo Sato of d autres renegats du P.C japonai s 19-21 anvier: Les membres pro-chinois expulse's, du P.C. do Ce lan reunissent lour propro 7e Congros national" a Co- lombo du 19 au 21 janvier, elisant un nouveau "Comite cen- tral", so declarant 3tre le parti communiate ceylanats, st repudient plusieurs resolutions des leaders de l'ancion parti qui proonisaiant la politique sovietique, yougosla- ve at anti-stalinienne, at qui condammaient lea Albanais et la politique chinoise. Tous lea journaux chinois donnerent de grands compte-rendus sur cat ovenement le 25. 20janvier: Le "Borba" do Belgrade publie un article de son correspondant do Moscou Bayalski qui declare quo le su le et to Chino sont entrees dans une nouvelle phase, qu ils compronnont maintonant quo Pekin no vout pas abandonnor sea polomiquos anti-sovietiqu ca, 7u'ils critiquent violemment la conduits des Chinois et qu ils estiinent quo la dispute continuora pendant longtemps. Bayalski va jus7 u'a dire quo lea leaders sovietiqu::s nc savant pas encore a i1s doivcat continuer a s abstcnir de r6pondre aux attaques ehinoises, expli9uant quo "ceci tres cortoinornont eat un problems com- pli3uc... et on doit toujours considarer non scule:aent lea intorets du P.C. do 1'U.S. of do 1'Union aovietique, mais egciomont ceux des pays socialistas et ceux du iiouvo ont com:iunistc international. Cleat ainsi que le peuple sovic- tique oxplique le fait quo lea Soviets se sont abstenus do poursuivre la politique". Tess s'Eleve cantro un rapport du 12 ianvior do 1'Agence de prosse Chine nouvelle sur le ro- tour on Chine do Chou Houng-ching, 1 interprets do la dcle- tation chinoise qui a deserts a Tokyo on octobre, car arti- cle protondant "quo Chou a ate detcnu contra son grc pendant plusieurs heures "a 1'a3ba.ssado s:,vietique au Jap-.n ilalgre do soi-disant protestations... per dos representants du pu- blic jcponais at aussi par lea autorites japonaises...". Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 i Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Cetto declaration, annonce Tass, "est absolument sane fon- de-font of ne fait quo dernuter l' opinion publique . En mew teaps, Tass annonco quo in nouveau groupe do specia- liates chinois est arrive a Dubna...-pour travaill?r Bans 1'Inatitut do rocherohes nucleaires... Le groupe do travail- lours, chinois a l'institut est .caintenant le plus noubrux de tous los groupenents vonant dos pays de de:aocratie popu- la 20-22 janvior: Le "New York Tinos" public doux articles ear son corrospondant do Buoarest Binder qui resume ce qui s est passe on Rou:'anio pendant le mouve:~,ent "pour 1'independanoo" quo "un obsorvateur occidental qualific do 'de'-russifica- tion' Dais qu'un official discret du regime Gheorghiu-Doj p+r'o foro appelor 'rounanifieation"'. Le plus grand change- nent ost survenu cn autonne dernier avec l'abolition do l'Institut Maxine Gorky do langue at de litterature russes, qui a eta un centre d'influenco sovietique", la langue rus so etant supprinee comma langue obligatoire dans las ecoles. Quatre-vingt-dix pour-cent des textes contenus Bans "Lunoa", l'hobdomadairo qui roupla e e 1' edition rou .ono des "Tcnps nouveaux" do Moscou (voir Chronologie, decembre 27-30), so- raiont,parait-il, dos reprodutions d'articles do publica- tions occidontales. Un guide attira V attention sur ua terrain roz pli do debris of dit si;cpleiaent: "La so trouvait la libr"Ario russe". Los noes russos ont cte suppriucs pour plusiours raagasins of cincmas of ont tc ro:_!placcs pa.r dos no-,-,s rournains. La statistiquo sur lo co LiL rco extcrieur ::ontrc quo lo co:norce do la Rounanie avoc lea pays occi- dontaux ost passe do 20 pour-cent a 33 pour-cent du total au cours do cos 4 dcrnieros annoos, la presse de son cite parlo do la presence do co:pagnics occidontales dans le pays. Etc,,. 21_ anvier: Le chef du P.C. italien Tliatti a torainc sa vsito dc 7 fours on You oslavie par uno conference do prosso dons laquello, d apres Tunyug, it a declare:"Nous aeons dcfini une attitude co_,nune of indique la route quo 1'on doit suivre vers 1 unite. Nous avons l'intcntion do suivre cc che:ain et parvenir ainsi a dos resultats favora- blos". Togliatti of le i..Durnal sent d'accord que ,''atti- tude du P.C. chinois_a 1'egard des questions do pays at do coexistence pacifique eat erronee" at "fait du tort au :aou- va -:cnt ouvrier international et au aouve:cent co-T~aunistc", T'glia.tti c onfir::a 1' opposition du P. C. italien u une con- ference aondiale du parti con.aunisto on co w^or ont ainsi quo 1'a.pprobation par le parti "de la proposition pour con- voquer uno reunion dos partis co .unistos de 1 Europe Occi- dcntalc". Lo 40e annivorsaire do la -ort de Lenine cat un pre- texto pour uno serio do coL.nentaires par les co:a:aunistos du rondo, co:::ientairos qui indiq ent leur position prescnte duns 1e "grand ccnflit". Un editorial d.: "Pravda" otait Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 surtout un panegyrique dos :aagnifiques resultats obtenus parr los Soviets of dos perspectives aajostuouscs, principa- le wont d'u_z point do vue materiel. "Ajoutant a la foroule do L5nine bion connue," "Pravda" Produisit un nouveau slo- "Lcco :r:unisrae e'est la uissanca sovietigue plus 1Te'- lectrification do touto pays Plus V introduction do la chi::io dins 1 rcconoraio nationals, 10 taire du C.C. do 1'Alle2aano do 1'Est, Honeckcr, socre a fait uno declaration louant obsequiousement "l 'Union so- vietiquo qui eat devonuo la base do tout le systeiao socia- liste mondial". A 1'autre extr6:iic, un editorial du journal albanais "Zeri i Popullit" contenait los attaques los plus violontos jusqu'a present contre "1'aetivite' destructrice ongagco par le groupe de Khrouchtchof chorchant a reviser et a discrediter le", eontre sa "de.::ago- gio of sea intrigues", et eontre "sa capitulation, Sc tra- hison of son chantage". Le seul com:aontairo rouraain quo noun avons eu otait du professour Bugnaru qui no :_entionna anais le P.C. de 11U.S. bien que los opinions Tiit de f enda it 'taient g' ~ienerale..lent d accord avec la politique so- victique. Los Chinois n'ont ja:aais ;:ientionnc l'anniversaire d- 'ns lcs rc.ppcrts quo ncus avons eus. L editorial du "No- dong Sin_mz" do la Ccree du Nord n' eta it que modere . ent anti-rs'visionniste, axis les Nord-Vietnal..isns chois.irent cetto occc sion pour publier dans lo Nhan Dan" un__c:,,.:.:uni- quo du 9o nlcnu du C.C. du parti tonu on deco.2brc sur situation intornationa.le et sur les tEches intornaticn:los du parti" on me:.e tc.:ps qu'un editorial sur le ...3?x:3 thcm:e, Le pcrti saLiblo atrc ens ro plus Oppose au "rovisionnise :::Odcrns" .:Tais declare ccpcnl.ant qu une digression int res- santc:? "r?otrc parti fait une distinction politique prociso ontro in clique revs isevi nniste Tito, 1L7quais do l' iraporialisLe, at lc$ gins du mou- ve::ciat co~:a::lunistc international qui so renaont eoupables do r&visionnis:7o of d opportunisa:e do droito. 11?otro attitude a 1 egard do la cliquo revisionnisto de Tito oat do la dcn,:)n- cor constc::a-2ent tandia quo colic a 1' egarl dos Bens Bans 1ierrour au scan du :::ouvo ont coia.aunisto international oat do lutter pour l'u- nito..." L''ditorial acntionnc apccifiquo.ncnt "la consolilation de 1unitc ontro 1'Union sovietiquc et la Chine" of expri::c dos rc_;orcioents sinceres aux dcux pays "ot aux cutros pays frctorncls pour lour soution at lour assistance do va- 1cur". Tous los iournaux chinois roproduisaient lc 23 le tcxtc ont for do cc c o:...:uniqu6 du Nord Viet-na:a. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 :centre-tenps, lea corrospondants de Mosoou font savoir (Radio-Bolgrade du 21, Reuters du 23 at United Press Inter- national du 24) qu'an nouveau livro paru sous le titre in- offonsif de Conversations sur des sujots politiquos, atta- auont v-i,gourousement lees doctrines ant ~arxistes du P.0, chinois. Co livre a ete re are par un M p p groups do neuf ~er- sonnos sous la direction du chof idoologue du P ,,G. de 1. U- nion sovietique Ilyichov of onvoy6aa la publication le 23 ootobro, nais dont la vonte a ate retardeo Bans doute on raison du noratoire soviotique sur lea poleniques. Los observatours voiont Bans sa Varution un signal indiguant Quo 13 nation o des Soviets a 1' egard dog Chizno_ie se_ trou vast uiseo of quo l? P.C. de 1`Union soviet auo ova ddcid6 uno fols do plus de rendro coup pour cow, La pre- niero 6c'ition eat on 200.000 oxo plairos, an langue russo seulonent.a co qu'il soable, 3 anvior: La visite do 10 ours de Castro a Khrouchtohef s ast terninoc par un accord a long torne portant sur lea achats soviotiquos do suers cubain a des prix garantis, at par un ~o munieue' 9ui doclarait quo "un unite cc.-o1atc de yues 'tait confirnee sur toutes lea questions disoutoes" 01 dont "les problenes internationaux interessant les d.eux e t6s of lea Questions urszentes intQressant le co~mmini an jondial of le nouve ont ouyrier". Plus bas, le cocnunique' disait:"Uno idontito coupleto do vues a e"tQ oxprinee par la declaration sovieto-cubaine du 23 jai. 1963". En 61aborant Bur cotto "identlto do vues" le connuniquo declare qua Cu- ba "considere lea sucoes obtenus par 1'Union sovioti3uo dans la lutte pour la cessation des oxperiences nucleaires .,, co: :o un pas vors la paix of le saruemont," s oppo- sant -insi a 1'attaque vigourouse des Chinois centre le traits interdisant lea experiences nucleaires at indiquant probablonont 1'intontion dos Cubains de signer co traits. Lo coMunique declare egalejent quo Castro "avait pro"is lo soution" do Cuba on favour do la nouvelle proposition do Khrouchtchef pour un traits renoncant de recourir a la force dins les disputes torritoriales. La presse sovieti- quo exults: un editorial de "Pravda" du 24 qualifiait cc e o mi;unique "do docunent d'uno signification anonje, , , i. - pregnc- du c ouiionoevent ~a la fin par une identite do vues complete" dos deux partis at des dcux Souverne.ents, 25. anvicr: Un editorial du "Zeri i Popullit" albanais Voy~go on Afrique of on Albania du Ca:iarado Chou En-lai of reaction des Titoistes" debuto par une denoneiati n c;o la band.o de Tito pour sa reaction violento a la visito do Chou ::.ais passe rapidement a son coup principal: "Alors quo la bands do Tito langait des attaques contra la Ro~ublique populcire~ hinoise at sa politique do paix, avoc 1 int,3n- tion do donigror... le grand role international do la Chino, los autres re'visionnistes jodernes organisaient une conspiratjon du silence a 1re&ard do la visito historiguo du t,rom3ler nintetre du Conseil dEat de la Republiouo Do- Approved For Release 1999/08/54: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 pulaire chinoise Pourquoi co silence..."Zeri i Po- pullit rcypon :.: ails no peuvent Be reconcilier a la politique chinoise qui "_~ lour conception pacifists et anti- 1oninisto do coexistence nacifiaue D'autre part, lea revisionnistos no neuyentr inforiaer 1 opinion publigUe dans 1 urs>a s au sujot du grand sueo s re:ports par la visito do 1G. co1egation fu gouvernemont chinois en Afriquo, car cola occ-es i onnora it do nouveaux des ordres at de nouvolles nxiotos. Cola demontrerait quel point lour propaganda contro lc Repub iquo " populaire chinoise eat diffaiatoiro, fausse of absurde,,, 27 anvier: Courts coixiuni3ues de Hanoi at de Pekin an- noncant lo to depart dune delectation inportante do eoauunis- tes du Nord Viot-naa sous In direction du pre:ier seretai- ro Lc Dua n, pour proceder a? des entretions avec le P .C. 11 ion sovietiaue a Mosco. Hanoi declaro. si:ple:aent qu ils ";??roc 6deront a des echanges de vuos,, , cur dos pro- bloucs cc interct comm-+un". Lo "Nodong. Sinuun", organs du -arti do la Corse du Nord, public un article do 15.000 lots sous le titre: Fai- tes flottor la banniQrc revolutiDnn~ire do liberation na- tionale" qui, a l'instar d'un article analogue du 28 octo- bro,%prosonto on detail lo point do vue chinois arrange :1e _aniorc a ropresenter los interets des petits pays. Il s'^ a ttcho a denoncer "le groups Dtngc du P.C.I." at "car- taines porsonnos qui pronnent 1t no:.i de co s~,unistes" at qui to supportont at le soutiennent. Harry Schwartz, du "New York Tit::es ", passe on revue un article du nu.:ero do decenbro de la v o ~arxiste uonc?ialo" (cc'ition do langue analaise)et oble es !a In _pa.ix of Cu socialisve, journal ::ionsuel multi ingue soutenu p~~r los SDviots so trouvant a Prague, article par Luis Cor- volan, secretaire general ccu P.C. dhilion,qui at a ue vig- le.anont log co.izunistes chinos pour assayer di-p osor no r volution c':u xenro Costro aux Chiliens qui sont voues a In politiquc do revolution non violente. La lottro fait savoir quo le 'P? C-__chinots a envoys receaaent gge._ sett e u__P,~, chilion avec cotto intention, at quo la lettro co2pronait In loclaration suivanto: "En Anoriqu o Latins, le t oyon pac ifiquo' quo vous preconisez contrasts violemment avec la i:,ethodo revolutionna ire de Fidel Castro at d'autres ca--grades qui ont conduit lo peujle cubain a la victoire". Le ,.ernier nu;aero do notre Chronologio ,2ontionnait un coil unique de Reuters de Moscou (8 janvier) irnd.iquant quo Particle do fond clans 1'edition -de anvier du PP&S, si- gns par un Tchaque, un Canadian at un Syrian, attaguait la presso chinoise pour avoir reconnu a dos grouporaents ~ftis- Approved For Release 1999/08/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 s,donts?la qualite' de "ve'ritables coanunistes revolution- n^ires". Plus tara, un corL.uniqu o ~ urlait ~d'ur __autr arti- a1e i.- ch1 c s dens is L70 nunero, signe Jaime ?eras, secretairo du C. C. du P. C. uruguayon. ,120 anvicr: Un article do "L'obsorvcteur" dans "Pravda", intitule:"Pourquoi induire on orreur?" article qui protostc contro le fait quo, alors quo la proposition c'o Khrouchtchof do concluro un traite intornationol rononc,ant de recourir a la force clans~Jos disputes torritoriales a etc public`, bien roqu at otudie se'rieuse:aent Bans la plupart dos pays l.u ,-2-Mr-lo, dos organes de la prose chinoise so soient abstonus lc publior ou do .ontionnor les reactions dins lo mondo cotto proposition nais qui "s tarro4ont lo droit do eo:aen- ter sur cos docu:lents at nerve U les evaluer" L'article do "Pravda" do:ando:"Pourguoi induiro on errour~la pouple chi- nois of lo dresser contre le peuIjlo sovieti uee?" "L'obser- vateur se Plaint: "C est conDe si ils preferaiont an Chine 'onner aux looteurs !as affirmations et des #va' 1uations tc tos faites., La :Done jour, la presse chinoise publiait un article du nuoero do deco br e du "Malayan Monitory )r- gano du P.C. ::alais public G Londres, qui eelare clue: "Los revisionnistes uodornes ont souffort partout uric dofaito cr^sainto cons 10 grand bat grace aux efforts vixoureux of bion prcparos des chefs anti-revisionnistes et grace aux plrtis coumunistos at trav~?illistos du rondo, an particulior 10 P.C. chinois, lo parti travailliste albanais, les partis co:iuunistes do la Corce, do 1`Indonesic, do la Republique d % onocratiquo du Viet-na:a, etc,,. Il s attaquo diroctoDont a Khrouchtchof: "Fans lour agonio d'uno d'faito totale ncnte,, les rovisionnistcs uodornos crient: !Pas do n-1 e aues at Pas do divisionT~Vo-.1 1 nant do lour pa~'t, des excl~ :cations do la sor- ts sent co o dos insttltes Droforeea Dear das incondiaires qui, avant :ais le fe a our -mat- son. vous dentin:?ent do no as vows Zclor teinc'ro le feu do s' on servir pour a11u- nor lo calu::ict cle la paix. Los Larxistos-leni- nistos no sont pas dos intorpretes do poleai1 quos pour to plaisir do :aarquer un point clans un dobat, et ils no sont pas egale::lent dupes par dos gostes conciliatoires d unite'. A l'encon- tro dos re'visionnistes nodernos, ils no consi- clorent pas quo principle at opportunite soiont synonyos ou interchangeables,i' Pour qu'il,nty ait aucun doute au au4et do ceux qu'ils qualifiont de "revie1onnistes L:odernes", 1 article declare claire:-,ont:"Ce n'est pas par accident quo Xhrouchtchof at j_1-to so trouvent ac tuelle,:;ent tour lea deux daps e e _1e cant/ ideoloRiquo, ouverte:aent at dome d'une fawn provo quante, Approved For Release 1999/08724: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 CHRONOLOGIE - ADDENDUM (Et~7nt donneo l'ihportance do plusieurs eve- noL:onts qui so sont pro?cuits dins lea quatro fours qui ont immediatement suivi la fin de la perio:'e couvorte par notre rapport, cot ad- cdonduia ost destine a on donnor un aporgu.) 2 fevrior: A Conakry, en Guinee, duns une interview accor- dee a Edgar Snow, correspondant sy:ipathisant, Chou En-lai aurait declare: "Noun soiines parvenus in accord ayes VU -k nion sovitiguo de procedor des negociations sur._jes questions de frontieros sino-sovi6tiques," -3 fcvrier: "Le Quotidien du peuple" de Pekin publie un cer- tain noubro d'artielos sur le conflit sino-sovietique: - Le toxte de 1'article do "Pravda" du 30 janvier "P.ourquoi induire on erreur?" - Un article reponc'.ans ^ "Pravda" intitul'e:"Un coup port" a Lyndon Johnson atteint la 'Pravda'", L'arti- cle debuto dune iianiere sareastiquo:"Il y ava-it une fois une histoire concernunt des jumcaux sia- nois. Ell o disait que lorsgue 1'un dos ju Beaux e'- -Lai f frap;Jo. _1 autro eprouvait une sensation de dou- lour. Ce qui etonno iaaintenant c est _quo catto pa- rente curieuse oxisto gnnre les leaders ( C de 1 Union sovietique of le president des Etats-Unis" 1 i'ticlo degande; Que1 genre do rflexc con: ition- no cola ropresonto-t-il?...Cola vout-il dire quo los leaders sovietiquos ont 1'intontion do eoncluro un accord avec Johnson aux for os duquol ils s ac- cordoraient a interdiee aux pouplos de s'oppDsor a% l' imperialis.::c of a pr-Reeder a des revolutions? Si cola oat le cas, 'Pravda' a do bonnes raisons de so sontir norvousc... " Passages'un nouveau livro sovietique: "v, a- tions sur dos su ots politi ues" (voir Chron71oic du 21 janvior) sous lo titre: Attaqucs malvoillantes contre lo P.C. ehinois." - Un co-.unique do 1'ASonco do prosse Chine nouvelle c'apres loquel "le nresier volume 1o uateriaux'anti- chinois tires de la presse sovietique eat -As on vento aujourd'hui Bans la Chine touto entiere", cvcc lo texto do la preface a ce volume par les e~-Utours 'es Editions de la culture on:diale. Iieclaro quo " tapres des statistiques inconpletes on 'ate du 30 novembre, plus do 2,000 articles de _.,at6riaux anti- chinois de tous genres,., ont ate publics cans 26-" journaux nationaux of dans 23 journaux et perm 1- quos locaux do 1'Union sovietique". Approved For Release 1999/08124: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 - Uno Note do 1'editeur dans "Le quotidian du peuple" qui declare cue "Depuis quo N.S. Khrouohtchef, chef ~u P.C. do 1 Union sovietique, a propose do wottro un terme aux poleniqucs le 25 octobro 1963, la pros- se sovietique a continue sa propaganda anti-chinoi- soL article souligne particulieremont lea ex- traits dun livro "da plus do 300 pages" intitule`: "Pourquoi induire an erreur?" public par la "Pravd& Cos natericux indiquent quo la proposition du lea- dor du P, Q. a Uni nn sovietique do cesser lea po- 1 omigues publiques ne cp a itq,e Oulu ne fraude, er- petroe c na des buts tendanoieu~c,, La propaganda continue dans co livre declare Particle, "n'est rion d'autre qu'uno phraseologie defralchie at re- battue" at Particle do la "Pravda" n'en eat "qua plus ridicule", "En ce qui concerno la reprimande contonuo dans "Pravda" adresseo a la presse ehinoise pour no pas avoir public la lottre do Khroueh- tchof du 31 do?cembro aux chefs de 3ouvernement, 1ous pouvons demander au P.C. de 1 Union sovi- e'tique Les raisons qu'ils ont pour se depecher? Nous ehalement nous traitons to cotta lottre of nous comnenterons dessus. Una maison 1Ye- dition chinoiso constituo deja dos volumes do vos articles anti-ehinois qui Raraftront ul- teriourorsont, Le chooin doit etre parcouru pas a pas et la note dovra so relor article Dar article. Nous n avons pas encore fini do r pondro a 1a lettrc quo vous avez public le 14 juillet dornier. Quest-cc qui vous rend aussi inpatients?" 4 fevrior: Lo 7edlune aerie d'articloe publie's on co un par Le quotidian du eu le' et IL? drapeau rou^e on re- ponso a la lettre ouverte du 14 juillot du P~CC. do VU 10 n -povidtique , a :;t6 publl&o par lea Chinois. Etant donne quo nous n Lvons roqu qua le resume an anglais do VAC-once do presso Chine nouvelle, nous no ferons naintenant quo dos co.:mentairos provisoires of nous on donnerons une cnalyse plus co::plete dans notre numero suivcnt. Sous lc titre: "Los leaders du P.C. do 1'Union sovietique sont lea plus ;rands faisours de division qui aient existe", 1 article de- bute en declarant sans equivoque qua "les leaders du P.C. de i'Union sovietique emmenes par Khrouchtchef sont devenus lea princi aux r sentants du revis o smo m der a gin s quo es pus Brands faiseurs do division dans le mouve-, ment du communisme international." Il definit le division- nisme comma suit:"Le divisionniame signifie rupture avoe le marxisne-leninisme. Quicongue s'oppose au marxisne-le- ninismo et le traiit at quieonque sape lea fondements de 1 uni e proletarienne eat un divisionnisto.,4 Quicongue persisto dans La po].itique re'yisionniste at transforms un pc:rti revolutionnairo p o taire on un parti reforuatour Approved For Release 1999/05/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Rele A-RDP78-WOBd OOI 03-3 730. The Lot of the Soviet Citizen 25X1ClOb BACKGaOTJ D: Economic development requires investment in plants and acfiines, and this means saving, i.e., foregoing a certain amount of immediate consumption in the expectation of greater returns in the future. But the ratio of saving to consumption is not fixed or automatic, and is not determined by purely economic forces. In some places, the pressures a g a I n s t saving (or reckless consumption) have hampered development. In others saving has been exalted into an article of faith and a tool of power: suc s the case with the SS,. Communist slogans suggest that the goal of Marxism-Lenin- ism is the welfare of the ordinary citizen. In practice, however, the main goal of Soviet planning has been to maintain and to enhance the power of the CPSU and its leaders. By any objective standard, the collectivization of agriculture has been a failure; some Soviet experts foresaw the difficulties, even before col- lectivization was introduced. But Stalin wanted to rule the peasants, not negotiate with them. Now the prestige of the party, as well as a large part of its power, is linked to the collective system. In industry, the policy of developing capital goods and military production has served the power interests of the Kremlin, w a n preferred to rely on secret police and anus rather than appease popular demands or reach accommodations with foreign powers (except Nazi Germany). Stalin's terrorism was too vicious and self-defeating to last, and steel production is (as Ihrushchev has admitted) no longer the yardstick of political power: there are other weapons now besides the steel-eating cruisers, tanks, howitzers, and H3 shells. But PSU prestige is still invested in Stalin's system of plans, quotas, and norms, and the new weapons require vast new investments in materials and technical skills. Also, the planners continue to bow before the old idols of dams and blast furnaces, partly out of habit. Khrushchev tries to appease the Soviet consumer with words and sometimes even with deeds, but his plans and programs still pro- vide for industrial output to grow faster than consumer goods. As shortages continue, he explains that consumers must defer to the needs of national defense against the supposedly aggressive imperialists. Years of neglect of consumer goods, housing, and services cannot De remedied overnight. s e a tached materials show, Soviet housing is behind schedule and shoddy in quality; cuts in working hours and increases in take-home pay have been post- poned; the growth rate in consumer goods is falling off; and bread is getting grayer. On 1 June 1962, even before the 1963 crop failure, ricer for meat and butter increased 30 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. The failures of agriculture 733 . Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RD 78-03061A000200050003-3 (733,a 1t j d For Release DP78-0?06P&&AW0 3-3 hamper the production of textiles and other consumer goods, as well as that of food. It is noteworthy that although the October Revolution is now 47 years behind us, the Soviet citi- zen has yet to enjoy his share of his nation's production. The production of consumer goods fell from 60.5 per cent of total production in 1928 to 31.2 per cent in 1950, less than 26 per cent in 1960 and 25 per cent in 1963; at the 22nd Congress, thrushchev promised that henceforth industrial growth would only be 20 per cent more rapid than growth in consumer goods production -- instead of being 70 per cent higher, as heretofore. 25X1C10b &. " " " (738. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (738 Qyed For Release RDP78-OjQd6j4QqfijWqO?@%Q3-3 25X1C10b 3 (730.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 . Approved For Release 10-030SVA U"0.13-3 739. Chicoms Seek to Break Isolation 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: Communist China has recently taken several steps to re out of a self-imposed isolation characterized by a hard, inflexible attitude and by aggressive actions toward neighbors. This Chicom change of tactics is apparently based on conclusions drawn from the Sino-Soviet dispute and her posi- tion vis-a-vis the non-Communist world, Tactical decisions of the Chinese Communist regime are intimately affected by the nature and extent of her ambitions and also by her arrogance. Communist China aspires not only to leadership of the world Communist movement and not only to a prominent role in world affairs, but to the d o m i n a n t position in both worlds. There is ample evidence of this aspiration in the Great Leap Forward -- an attempt to convert, in a few short years, a back- ward, inefficient, undisciplined agricultural society with practically no industrial base, into the most powerful nation on earth. That they should attempt it at all is testimony of their driving ambition; that they should persist in the attempt, despite warnings of their friends and overwhelming economic knowledge and experience accrued by Marxist and non-Marxist countries alike, provides an accurate gauge of their arrogance, While the whole effort failed miserably, they have never renounced it and have even shown signs that they may try it again some day. CC? Gains Against the CPSU. The Chinese Communists have made headway in e r quarrel with the Soviet Union. They have successfully captured the initiative in the Communist Parties of Asia (See guidance item 730, 13 January 1964); they are now ready for an intensified attack against the CPSU's hegemony within the other Communist Parties of the world, having already had some success in these activities. The Italian CP newspaper, L'Unita, has said that Peking "supports fractionist groups in Belgium., France, Greece, Switzerland and Italy." There are pro- Chinese splinter groups in the British and Austrian Communist Parties and Chinese sympathizers in Scandinavia. In Latin America there are dissidents in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela, and there is a dissi- dent C? in Brazil. The Chinese Communists have also been active in the Communist international front groups: they first try to take over the front and, failing this, attempt to split it (see guidance item 711, 13 November 1953). All of these activ- ities are aimed at displacing the CPSU as leader of the world Communist camp. To this end, the Chicoms have created a vast propaganda app aratus. They have expanded their International ra io road- ca.s ing acilities: Radio Peking now uses 27 short wave Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78~03861~$$ Do 56003-3 (73g4PpMvdd For Release -RDP78-03 ICM-3 transmitters to carry daily programs even in such languages as Swahili, Tamil and Hausa, in addition to extensive programming in all the major languages of the world. There are reports that the Chicoms are paying the bill to expand Radio Tirana (Albania) into a large international broadcasting center to carry the Chinese line to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The New China News Agency has more than 50 offices in all parts of the world and is still expanding. The Peking Review, which started life as a simple vehicle to inform ra erna parties of domestic Mainland developments, has become an organ supporting Communist China's campaign for leadership of the Communist bloc. It is printed in English, French, Spanish and Japanese (See guidance item 708, 4 November 1963). The second conclusion apparently drawn by the Chicoms concerns their position and relationships with the non-Communist world. The CPSU and its adherents (as we as the non- ommunis world) have used China's hard line in general and her position on the nuclear-test treaty in particular to isolate China and publicize her image as an implacable advocate of violence and nuclear war. To change this image and to gain access to denied areas, the Chinese Communists have undertaken an extensive campaign supported by the propaganda network mentioned above and supplemented by such other tactics as Chou En-lai's recent tour of Africa. Chou, in his public appearances, is impressing the Africans with his "reasonableness" and his "understanding" of Africa's problems (See guidance item 734, 27 January 1964). It is safe to guess that in some of his private conversations he is discussing China's correctness in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At this juncture, the CPR's most prominent success is deGaulle's recognition and agreement to exchange ambassadors. It is to be expected that ? in the near future, Communist China will intensify her efforts to get recognition from other Western and uncommitted governments and to snow-ball herself into ad- mission into the United Nations. One tactic that can be anti- cipated is the bait of China's "vast market of 700 million people," coupled with the threat that those who come first will receive the most favors in negotiating trade agreements. It is too early to predict what will happen on the ques- tion of China's admission to the United Nations or even how many countries will follow France's lead and grant ?eking dip- lomatic recognition. It seems probable, for the immediate future, that Communist China will continue all activities con- tributing to her dual image as best suited to leadership of the world Communist movement and, at the same time, as destined to become the leader of an alliance of Asian, African, and Latin American countries. 25X1C10b Approved For Release RDP7$MOt1ABQQ72QQg50003-3 (73App oved For Relea IA-RDP78-03b913A*Ub5-3 25X1C10b 3 (739. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 29X3EA'9$f6Vjd For Relea DP78-03U6W&W2W -3 (739.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 10 February 1964 740 ;1?ves1 ~~/h0$Br dI Y RDP78-03061 A000200050003-3 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: Khrushchev Slows Down. On 17 April 1964, Khrushchev will be 70 years old, and overdue for retirement. The Communist custom of celebrating multiple 5th and 10th anniversa- ries and their unprecedented propaganda ballyhoo on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday (21 December 1949) make this an apt occasion for another major effort. Khrushchev has outlived the expected life span of Soviet males (64.0 years) and has reached the decades where the incidence of death is highest. Only one US President has served in the White House past his 70th birthday --Eisenhower in his last year. That Khrushchev is slowing down is shown by the record of his speech-making. He made formal speeches 24 times in 1958, 29 times in 1959, 21 times in 196b, 33 times in 1961, 15 times in 1962, and 14 times in 1963. His latest pictures show-an older, thinner man than the hard-drinking, shoe- banging activist of the late 1950's. On 24 April 1963, shortly after his last birthday, Khrushchev gave a speech in which he suggested that perhaps he was considering retirement--or perhaps that others had suggested it, and he had refused to agree. (Texts of this and other statements referred to in this guidance are contained in an unclassified attachment, "Khrushchev Speaks," The texts are referred to in this section by parenthetical numbers. 25X1C10b The Ends Justice the Means. All politicians occasionally contradict themselves, or fail to carry out promises. Khrushchev has, however, an almost unparalleled record for inconsistency and failure to perform. In 1961, in the midst of a denunciation of Stalin, Khrushchev approved of a "proposal" for A monument to the victims of Stalin, including the former Ukrainian leaders, Postyshev and Kosior. (2) Actually, Khrushchev himself had been a member, together with Molotov and NKVD chief Yezhov, of a Special Commission sent by Stalin in August 1937 to wipe out Ukrainian nationalism. In January 1938, it was Khrushchev Who replaced Postyshev as alternate member of the Politburo, and Kosior as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee. On 26 May of that year, Khrushchev stated that "the peoples of the Soviet Union rejoice that they have uprooted this foul, abominable, treacherous gang, the loathsome Trotskyite-Bukharinite bandits, that they have eradicated and exterminated them under the leader- ship of our great Stalin, under the leadership of our Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov." (also 3,4) On 19 June 1938, a new Central Committee was elected for the Ukraine; only three men (less than three per cent) remained unpurged from the 1937 Central Committee. Khrushchev's Ukrainian purge outdid Stalin's purg of the A11- Union Central Committee: _there 16J per cent of the Central Com- mittee members elected in 1934 were re-elected in 1939, da~ (740 Cont,) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (740 Cont.) ww~ 10 February 1964 Some grisly remnants of the Ukrainian purges were discovered during the World War II German occupation: in 1943, a Ukrainian doctor at Vinnitsa uncovered 95 mass graves containing 9,439 victims, shot in the back of the neck. Relatives identified some of the bodies as persons arrested for "nationalism" in late 1937 and 1938, and medical experts concluded that the deaths occurred between 1938 and 1940, that is during the period of Khrushchev's rule. It is charitable to assume that Khrushchev acted only to save his own neck, and it is pleasant to note that he has repudi- ated Stalin's methods. It is not true, however, that he rejected Stalin as soon as the old man was dead. While Premier, Georgi Malenkov pioneered in urging more emphasis on consumer goods, and in saying that a new world war would mean "the destruction of world civilization." But Khrushchev took up the cudgels for heavy industry, attacking "right deviationists" (i.e., Malenkov) in the old Stalinist style. (5) At that time, Khrushchev did his best to identify himself and his allies (such as Molotov and Bulganin) with Stalin, so that a biographical article described him in March 1955 as "one of the closest comrades-in-arms of J.V. Stalin," and Khrushchev himself praised Bulganin in the same terms in a speech of 8 February 1955. One year later, as everyone now knows, Khrushchev denounced Stalin in a secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress; within four years, Khrushchev revealed that Bulganin was a member of the "anti-Party group." Prophecies and Promises: An Economy of Abundance for the People. Since 1955, Khrushchev has made many promises about catching up with the West. On 22 May 1957, in Leningrad, he promised to catch up with the United States in milk production by 1958, involving an increase of 40 per cent. (6) Thanks to the excellent 1958 conditions, an increase of 19 per cent was actually achieved; in the four years after 1958, only a further 5 per cent was gained, according to Soviet statistics. When this speech was republished in a series of collected speeches in 1962, the spe- cific prophecy was omitted, and he was only said to have stated that the USSR could overtake the US "in the next few years." Reporting an the CPSU program at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 Khrushchev predicted that industrial output would increase six- fold, and agricultural output two and one half times by 1980. Thus industrial output, the star performer of Soviet statistics, was to increase by an average of 9 to 10 per cent throughout the period. Yet industrial output, according to a Soviet economist (Valentin Kudrov), was down to 8.5 per cent in 1963 from a 1962 9.5 per cent. (Western analysts believe that all Soviet indus- trial output figures are inflated by double counting -- e.g., counting both a machine and the steel used to make it -- and in other ways, and that non-military industrial output for 1963 was about 7 per cent. See also Peter Wiles, "Western Research into the Soviet Economy," Survey, January 1964, p. 76; Wiles believes most private Western analysts would put the annual average for 1959 and 1961 at 7 per cent.) Despite this 1963 drop, and de- 2 Approved For Rely IA-RD0400 Ad00200050003-3 (74I ~1.ef For Relep~~ QIRl~ ? DP78-03061 A000200050003-3 10 February 1964 spite a decline in industrial investment since 1959, twenty-year industrial growth could still--in terms of Soviet statistics-- reach an average of 9 to 10 per cent per year. But in agri- culture, the twenty-year program must already--in its third year --be regarded as a lost cause. A Pravda article of 13 January stated that agricultural output for 1963 was 50 per cent higher than in 1952: this "good-sounding" statistic, when compared with other Soviet figures, indicates that the 1963 harvest was 9 per cent below the 1962 level, which was itself a mediocre year. In fact this 1963 harvest is below any year since 1957, when Khru- shchev gained full control of the Soviet government. Although nearly half of Khrushchev' s 1958-63 speeches have been on agri- culture and related affairs, agriculture has not advanced. Since Stalin's death, the plowed and sown area in the so-called Virgin Lands increased 410 per cent, but output for this area for 1963 was only 48 per cent greater than in 1953; the yield per hectare fell from 8.7 quintals to 3.1 quintals. Over the decade, yields averaged 6.3 quintals, while the target set by Khrushchev and the Central Committee had been 10 to 11 quintals. Actually, it is largely Khrushchev's campaign approach to agriculture, his peddling of one panacea after another and in particular, his attempt to gain rapid results by plowing without fertilizing, that have brought about the current agricultural difficulties. 25X1C10b %a - - 16M (740 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (740 Wyd For Relea108/24 : CIA-RDP78-03P~~4e%00200051(A3-3 25X1C10b REFERENCES: Konrad Kellen, Khrushchev, a Political Portrait (New York, 1961) Roy MacGregor-Hastie, The Man From Nowhere (New York, 1961) George Paloczi-Horvath, Khrushchev, the Road to Power (London, 1960) Lazar Pistrak, The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power (New York, 1961) Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev (Washington, 1958) 4 dwwbdb~ (740.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 10 February 1964 741. AF, FE, WH Made in Czechoslovakia: New Meanin for an Old Trademark 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: Between the two world wars, Czechoslovakia became known throughout the world as a prosperous and orderly country with a government based on Parliament and elections by secret ballot. Through the inherent diligence of its people, the trademark "Bade in Czechoslovakia" became known and respected in all corners of the globe. Heavy and precision machinery, textiles, shoes, glass, costume jewelry, as well as the excellent Pilsen beer and Prague hams, were as easily found in Hong Kong as in Buenos Aires. Following the years of Nazi occupation, the people of Czechoslovakia were delivered into the "Soviet sphere of influ- ence" as a result of WWII developments. The implied threat of Soviet military intervention greatly helped the Czechoslovak Communist Party in seizing control in 1948. After a period in which the Communists consolidated their power, condemning 60,000 people to exile and additional thousands to prison and to the gallows, Czechoslovakia became totally subjugated to the Soviet Union, in domestic affairs as well as in international relations. Once the Czechoslovak Communists had been placed in control, the Soviet Union lost no time in exploiting the country. Not only were there valuable natural resources and a highly developed industry, but its pre-war reputation as a democratic, orderly nation and a producer of fine goods made Czechoslovakia an excel- lent carrier for the export of Communism by the Soviet Bloc. Czechoslovakia became a spearhead for Communist subversion of underdeveloped areas. Latin America was given high priority because Soviet representatives are barred in many of these coun- tries and where the Soviets do maintain diplomatic relations they are unpopular and closely watched. The majority of Czechoslovak trade representatives stationed overseas resigned after the Communist takeover and sought asylum abroad. Under orders from Moscow the New Czech regime replaced, the former trade representatives, diplomats and military attaches with reliable Party cadres. Many individuals sent abroad, even in a semi-official capacity, had to undergo special training. The former Czech Military Attache in Washington, Frantisek Tisler, testified in 1960 that about 45 percent of Czech officials abroad are trained in espionage and political warfare, and are actually employed and controlled not by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Trade, but by the Ministry of Interior (in charge of secret police and espionage). r T. r. w w _ (741 Cont. ) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000 BR 50003-3 ('41 .;ont. 7 Fe ruary The overall scope of Czech efforts in underdeveloped world areas has grown conspicuously out of proportion to normal econ- omic or diplomatic activities of so small a country, especially with domestic economic difficulties publicly admitted by Party Secretary, Antonin Novotny, and other regime officials. the Czech regime has followed the universal Communist pattern of failure in agriculture and industry. Not only have these fail- ures been visited heavily on the Czech consumer, but the coun- try's outstanding reputation for reliable products has been clouded by the export of shoddy goods and resulting complaints from buyers worldwide. In the face of this, the Czech regime has continued to give high priority to foreign programs. For example, the Czechs are believed to have more personnel in Latin America than the Soviet Union and other Satellites combined; the demonstrable Czech per ca ita contribution to political activity abroad is more than twice that of the Soviet Union. 25X1C10b 2 {{ )) Approved For Releas 9 / 4 : CIA-RDP781b3061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1 9 0 78-030igA%%'2M0 3 7-2 AF,FE,WH. Cuba's Long-range Sugar Pact With Russia 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: Fidel Castro's trip to the Soviet Union, 13-23 January , has resulted in a trade pact that will have far- reaching effects on Cuba's economy. Under the terms of the agree- ment, Russia will buy the bulk of Cuba's sugar production for a period of six years at a guaranteed price of six cents a pound. Cuba, in turn, pledges to deliver a total of 24.1 million tons, as follows: 2.1 million tons in 1965; 3.0 million tons in 1966; 4.0 million tons in 1967; 5.0 million tons each year in 1968, 1969, and 1970. In order to meet these quotas, Castro hopes to increase the production of sugar to 10 million tons a year by 1968. This ambitious program contrasts sharply with last year's production of 3.8 million tons and even with Cuba's highest pro- duction: 7.2 million tons attained in 1952. In spite of much speculation, largely stimulated by the ap- parent suddenness of his departure and the unusual secrecy sur- rounding the preparations, Castro's trip to the USSR did not come about as a result of the Panama riots. That Cuban agents partic- ipated in them, there can be little doubt. But it is almost equally certain that Castro was as much surprised as the local Panamanian Communist Party at the sudden manner in which the riots escalated in magnitude and violence. Castro had probably arranged for this trip some time before: he is reported to have told a European visitor late in December that the two could not get to- gether again until after January, since he was going to be absent from Cuba during most of that month. On balance, Castro's trip was something of a diplomatic triumph, both for him and for Khrushchev. For Castro.. Cuba will S be assured a stable price for its sugar over a to :.-of six years. While six cents a pound is only a little oyerlm.lf the current market price, it is higher than the average of the last ten years. Castro argues that it is better for Cuba to be as- sured of a stable price for sugar over a long period of time than to try to make a few quick profits from momentarily high prices at the risk of losing later when prices drop. Sugar prices, since World War II, have fluctuated dispro- portionately -- by comparison with metals, cotton, beef, grains, or even coffee -- ranging from less than three to over eleven cents a pound. One of the things that Latin American countries have been crying loudest for, especially the one-crop countries, is a stable price for their key commodities. They angrily accuse the United States of paying low prices for raw materials and selling the finished products at high prices; they claim that manufac- tured products have steadily risen in price while raw materials (742 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 1964 ? 42 CO~Atpproved For Rele IA-RDP78 03061 A000200050003-3 have remained the same. Of course there is enough truth is this argument to make good propaganda against the U.S. Susceptible Latin American audiences will be impressed by this aspect of the trade pact. The quid pro quo in the deal, at least at the moment, for Khrushchev, was Castro's support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict as spelled out in a joint communique issued at the end of the visit. Castro endorsed the Soviet interpretation of the pronouncements of the Moscow Communist ?arty conferences of 1957 and 1960, and specifically approved Soviet measures to strengthen the unity of the international Communist movement. He further agreed that Moscow's peaceful coexistence policy has brought about "a certain easing of international tensions" and somewhat belatedly sided with the Soviets on the nuclear test ban treaty. 25X1C1Ob 2 (742 Cont.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (742 CApprIved For Rele - DP78-(S0RAMMOU5P03-3 25X1 Cl Ob (742) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1929L~842 4gWQ%%k 3 743 AT-,g. Lessons of Zanzibar 25X1C10b BACKGROUND: A far-seeing training and indoctrination program an assiduous attention to exploitable political wweaak- nesses have again paid off for international communism. new government of Zanzibar (which includes the nearby island of Pemba), dominated by the leaders ofthe bloody althoughcoup under the 12 January, now looks strongly pro-Communist nominal leadership of a veteran nationalist. Some of the sub- versive efforts which led to the Communist success in Zanzibar had been apparent for many months and are present and increasing in other states with weak political traditions and poor economic bases. Methods of Subversion. Large numbers of Zanzibari students went abroad -- ma n y o ast Europe and China but also to Cuba -- for education of the Communist variety. AbdukrE.',man Mohamed "Babu," kingpin of the revolution and now Foreign Min- ister, personally selected many of the students who travelled through Cairo -- many illegally -- to the Communist training schools. Trade union officials and scores of potential leaders tapped by the Communist World Federation of- Trade Unions received special training courses; the Secretary of the Zanzibar Federation of Progressive Trade Unions was trained in Peking. The Havana office of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) received "students," trained them in guerrilla warfare tactics and later directed them against the legally elected government of the newly independent Zanzibar which included the ZNP. youth arms of the Afro-Shirazi (ASP) and the Umma p shock troops of the revolution, did the actual fighting under the leadership of self-styled Field Marshall John Okello and -- and perh -- by Cuba arm (Fo some 40 hotheads tandnCommunist tiesaof theecoup leaders, seer specific training the biographic sketches attached). Propaganda. Anti-western literature poured into Zanzibar at a ra a perhaps exceeding that of any other country in Africa. Lacking the continent-wide facilities groups so usdul to Moscow, the quantities of reading material, such as the Peking Review at give-away prices. The New China News Agencyy propaganda machine in Zanzibar as it is elsewhere (see Ref 1.), is an' Ba'ou was the local representative. The NCNAchief o Tao Liang, based in Dar es Salaam and once expelled New Delhi for his aggressive "unjournalistic activities on behalf of Peking. Financing. Babu, who founded the radical Umma party Chinese receive-''c. -as muc~i as $50, 000 per year from tuhistposition through the mechanism of NCNA and possibly through Approved For Release 19 - 0~0ftgOvR-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/2: CIA-RDP78-%%O,eAb000QP@Q03-3 (743 Cont.) on the board of the Peking-financed Revolution, published in France (see Ref. 3). on January 13th , wh a mews reporting from Zanzibar was at a virtual standstill and the nature of the revolt unclear, France Observateur carried an article by Jacques Verges, Revoluti n' publisher, titled "Chinese Victory in Zanzibar." Political Moves included familiar united front tactics whereby a u s mma party cooperated with the trade unions and the ASp in opposition to the coalition government of mid-1963. By so doing, they not only strengthened the anti-government opposition but played upon -- and ultimately directed toward revolution -- both the genuine nationalism and the African racialism of the ASP. Following the coup, Karume of the AS? was installed as president of the people's Republic, probably because of his popular following. A power struggle still appears undecided but Babu is believed to be the strongman of the government. Soviet-sponsored Communist fronts have pro- vided means of contacting, training an inane na g individuals for seizing organizational power, for spreading thinly-disguised propaganda and for increasing local front memberships. The Cairo ZT? office had close contacts with the Cairo AAPSO office which in turn had direct ties with Moscow and ?eking. (See Ref 4)., 25X1ClOb (743. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (743 Moyed For Release 1,,q9,9/Q8(24., CIA-RDP78-01$6 O020005QQQ3-3 ruary 3 (743. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-030,1 40002000 Q003-3 (743 Cont.) .. 10 jie ruary 0 25X1C10b L!. wam" (743.) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Releas A. &OW I A RDP78-O306$O0 fE00 3-3 744 AF,g. AAPSO Interest in the organization of African Unity 25X1C10b BAC4SGROUND: Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPS?, an o~ soot of the Communist-controlled World peace Council, was established in 1057 with Headquarters in Cairo os- tensibly to coordinate the efforts of the Afro-Asian countries in developing their economic and cultural resources. By 1360 the control of the Organization was firmly in the hands of the vino-Soviet Bloc. Representatives of the Soviet Union and Com- munist China supported by Communist party members from Asian countries and Communist lining members of African revolutionary movements have since a me held worn ng majorities on a policy making and action bodies of the organization (i.e. the Executive Committee, the Fund Committee, and the Permanent Secretariat). The Permanent Secretariat is funded almost entirely by equal annual contributions from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the UAR. Small donations from other members are inconse- quential. The Fund Committee, responsible for doling out material aid to -revolutionary movements, is under the direction of three officers: Ismail Toure, president, Chu Tzu-chi of China and Mehdi Den Barka of Morocco, Vice Presidents. Inasmuch as both Ismail Toure and Mehdi Ben Barka have consistently fol- lowed the Chinese line at both the Committee and Secretariat level, the Fund Committee is in fact under Chinese control. At the October 1963 meeting of this Committee, Ismail Toure thanked the Chinese for their contributions and singled them out as the only members that had completely fulfilled their obligations to the Fund Committee. Since the Communists took over control of the Organization, the major AAPSO objective has been to liquidate all traces of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa and Asia. To this end, AA?uO material and propaganda support has been directed toward militant revolutionary groups in still dependent countries and toward radical pro-Communist opposition parties in countries whose governments are not willing to line up with the Communist Bloc. The AA?SO has supported among others the exiled pro- Communis Union des-Populations merounaises (UPC) in its efforts to overthrow President Ahidjo in the Cameroun Republic, the Sawaba Party against ?resident Diori of Niger, and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) against wing Iiassan of Morocco. It has promoted the Oginga Odinga wing of the Kenya African National Union, Oscar Xambona in Tanganyika, Congress Party for Independence of Madagascar and the Communist- controlled African National Congress in South Africa. (744. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (744 roved For Releas AQQ 1nJQ IA-RDP78-@8O% Op 03-3 During the period from 1960 to 1962, a working arrange- ment existed between the AA? C and the All African People's Conferen k~ n a r_a can organ r.ati 5n aisle at aiding 5 ra ie f1i51m-colonial government). This arrangement enabled the Communist-dominated AAPSO to direct the policy of the AA?C (although there were no Bloc members in the AAPC) through: first, influence on individual African leaders who held posi- tions on the steering Co:nnittee of the AP.PC and also on the xecutive Committee or Secretariat of the M.PSO; second, . Abdculaye Diallo, Secretary General of the A.2,?C who attended all important AiPSO meetings; and third, funds passed from the AA?SO to the A PC (Tvhich inclnded such large sums as five hundred thousand pcbunds sterling in March 1961. ) Due to the decreasing number of dependent African Mates, the non-governmental AA = C became obsolete: in 1963 nd the Organizes _f.or o African amity, an crgani:jation of governments oT fnc?e i6nce African awe , was est~..~lish.~d. Within the fraoewor.: of the OAU, the Committee of Nine is now the main instrument for aiding liberat on t ovemer sin Africa. As such it has become an object of major interest to e E S?. Dis- cussions of how best to collaborate with the Committee of Nine have taken place at all levels in AAPSO policy circles. The matter has received careful attention at Secretariat meetings, at Fund Committee meetings, and at the Executive Committee meet- ing of September 1963. These discussions have resulted in an AXPSO decision that "collaboration" is essential between the two organizations interested in aiding liberation movements in Africa, that is the AA..?SO and the Committee of Nine. It is too soon to see whether the AAP O will be successful in effecting a liaison with the Committee of Nine but indications are that the AA?SO will certainly press in this direction in the coming months. >Turther, some AA?SO leaders (e.g. Oscar L,arbona, Ismail aoure) hold hey poste ons n the ^ommittee of Nine, a circumstance facilitating contact between the two organizations. 25X1ClOb 2 "ERMIEW6 (744. Continued) Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 (744 c rpved For Relea -RDP78 1)30-9-d fl3Q 03-3 25X1C10b 3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3 Approved For Release _ DP78-03041AFooe e951003-3 745 WH,F. Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) Santiago, Chile, 9 - 14 March 6 25X1C10b BACS.1,320U10: The Second Latin American south Congress (LAYC or Con-reso Latino-Americano de Juventudes), a Castro-Communist inspired and controlled vehicle to attract the youth of Latin America to the idelista team, is slated to begin on March 0, 11"'1S4 in Santiago, Chile. The Communist-front World Federation of Democratic Youth (T;17 7D!) and the International Union of Stu- cents (1U S) are cor.-.ed s sponsors of the five-day scheduled rally. If disagreeL.DntF which hampered preparations for the Congress and forced an earlier postponement have been suffi- ciently smoothed over, the Conference is likely to get underway on or about the appointed date. If and when the Communist youth of Latin America bring down the gavel in Santiago, it will be against a background of conflict within the Communist movement in the hemisphere. Should the Sino-Soviet dispute be kept in the bac