(SANITIZED)WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 133
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 2, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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u L U n L I
2 August 1965
13riefly Noted 0000'
Fanaticism Nkrumah's Unreal World
in
Africa In a sympathetic but
revealing portrait of
Kwame Nkrumah,, aspir-
ant to the leadership of all Africa,
J. Kirk Sale (lecturer in history
at the University of Ghana 1963-
1964) says that The Redeemer has an
"obsession with ideology, and conse-
quent departure from reality."
This supremely egotistical and
ambitious man, believing in a so-
cialism akin to communism, ignoring
practical needs, and living in a
world of his own imagination, has
subjugated his country and led it
to the verge of bankruptcy.
His ideology has been set forth
most recently in a little book called
Consciencism, "a philosophy and id-
eology for de-colonization and de-
velopment, with particular reference
to the African revolution." The bur-
den of Nkrumah's philosophy of life
is that facts will bend to support
his ideology. [See attachment "The
Loneliness of Kwame Nkrumah" from
the NYTimes magazine section, 27 June
1965, which includes a review of his
The attached article is a sober
and believable assessment of the man,
his illusions and ideology. It should
be drawn upon, in sorrow more than
anger, to alert the small elite
groups of African leaders to charac-
ter traits involved in Nkrumah's
Messianic drive for power. In the
unsettled conditions of the emerging
nations, this willful man still has
the capacity for serious trouble-
making in the councils of Africa as
he seeks to mold this world in his
own image.
Sensational Historians Discuss
Meeting in Hidden Past
Moscow
The May 1965 issue (No.
5/211) of the Polish-
language journal Kultura, published
in Paris, contained a report by for-
eign students who visited Moscow in
1961; this report describes discus-
sions by historians (17 and 18 June)
of the draft of a volume covering
Soviet history from 1933 to 191+1, the
period of the worst of Stalin's purges.
Several historians sharply criticized
this volume, one of a series covering
the whole range of Russian history,
because it did not go far enough in
revealing the truth about this -,-; nra
including such crucial facts a50X1-HUM
exploitation of the kolkhozniks by the
state, the secret clauses of the Nazi-
Soviet pact, the purge trials, and the
number of Stalin's victims. Or50X1-HUM
the soundest comments--actually
in an attempt to defend the draft--
pointed out, that it was wrong to use
Stalin's methods in dealing with
Stalin's cult; "we must write in such
a way that we won't be ashamed of our
work in ten years," and not describe
people as either Gods or devils. A
translation of the Kultura article is
50X1-HUM
S F C R f T ~RrinPltr nTr,+o- n,.nt. )
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Signi f icunt Dates /
AUG.
16 USSR and Poland sign treaty establishing mutual frontier. Twentieth
anniversary. 1945.
17 Alliance for Progress Charter signed by 20 American countries (all ex-
cept Cuba) at Punta del Este. 1961.
19 Vietminh seizes power as Japanese troops withdraw; 2 Sept. declares
country's independence . 20th anniversary. (France recognizes
6 March 19+6).
20 Leon Trotsky fatally assaulted at home near Mexico City. 1940.
23 USSR and Hitler Germany conclude Non-Aggression Treaty. 1939-
27 Treaty of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact),signed: renounces war as national
policy instrument. 1928. [Ratified by 62 nations by effective date
(24- July 1929); 9 Feb 1929, the "Litvinov Protocol" mutually binds USSR,
Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Rumania to Treaty.]
30 II World Population Conference, Belgrade, 30 Aug-10 Sept.
SEPT.
1 Germany invades Poland: World War II begins. 1939.
8 10th Congress, Union of Resistance Veterans for a United Europe,
Brussels, 8-12 September (pro-west).
9 III Arab Summit, Casablanca.
10 III annual Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Accra: post-
poned,; no date set.
10 Continental Congress for Self-Determination of Peoples and of Solidarity
with Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Santiago, Chile 10-12 Sept. Gov-
ernment ban on foreign communist representatives.
13 International Memorial Day for Victims of Fascism, annually celebrated
by communist Inter'l Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR).
14 UN GA calls for USSR "to desist from repressive measures" in Hungary
and adopts report of Special Committee. 1957.
17 USSR invades Poland. 1939.
19 Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and War (Communist).
20 USSR grants sovereignty to East Germany. Tenth anniversary. 1955?
21 People's Republic of China proclaimed. 1949.
28 Friedrich Engels born (145 years ago) 1820. Dies 5 Aug 1895.
28 First International founded, London. 1864. Disintegrates by 1872.
28 USSR and Germany conclude "Friendship and Boundary" Treaty. 1939.
28 USSR and Estonia sign 10-year pact which "shall not in any way infringe
sovereign rights of parties..." 1939.
w ~ w w ~ r
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acbnti
COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
4K
Commentary
Principal Developments:
50X1-HUM
7-20 July 1965
1. Chinese and Albanians resume their anti-Soviet propaganda offen-
sive, with harsh attacks pegged to the Tito visit to the USSR, an interview
to Japanese reporters by Chairman Liao Cheng-chi of the Chinese A-A Soli-
darity Committee scornfully disparaging Soviet intent to aid North Vietnam,
and an Albanian blast tied to'1t.rriman's "mission to Moscow." The Chinese
also publicize anti-Soviet materials from the Australian dissident CPA (M-L)
and the Japanese CP.
2. The Helsinki World Peace Congress brings "fierce debates" and
"sharp struggle' between the Chinese camp, spearheaded by the Albanians,
and the Soviet-aligned majority before 1500 delegates: see separate guid-
ance item for details.
3. Soviet spokesmen continue to maintain an "anti-polemics" posture,
campaigning against the sin of "imperialist aggression and repeating their
call for unity in action, while the CPSU holds talks with delegates of the
Belgian and Chilean CPs, and the Bulgarian with the French, all supporting
the Soviet line. In addition to the general endorsements in reports of the
above meetings, TASS publicizes a statement by the South African CP urging
a new international meeting "at the earliest possible opportunity" and
adding that the refusal of some elements to participate should not prevent
the others from going ahead.
4. The International Preparatory Committee decides to postpone the
Ninth World Youth Festival to an indefinite date and logatipn next year,
to the accompaniment of detailed Chinese accounts of a stormy battle by
Chinese-Indonesian-Japanese forces to retain Algiers as the site while the
Soviet "manipulators" "rammed through" their "scheme to prevent the festi-
val from being held in Africa." Soviet youth boss Reshetov charges the
"splatters" with "concocting a lie." See separate guidance item for de-
tails.
5. The Chinese-aligned (and supported) weekly organ of the dissi-
dent "Belgian CP," La Voix du Peuple, publishes a strong down-the-line
denunciation of Castro's conduct over the past couple of years, pegged to
his attack on the Algerian coup. Meanwhile, Guevara is still missing from
public view (see #57), but the fresh appearance of posters bearing his por-
trait in Havana is taken to demonstrate that he is not in disfavor.
c r?w=~ f n + n l ,.+ \
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SECRET
6a analysts conclude from various events that, "dur-
ing the last few months, Pyongyang seems to have reverted to a course of
relative independence in bloc affairs, like that it pursued until late
1962 when it began to side heavily with Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dis-
puteo" The North Korean regime ended its violent attacks abruptly with
Khrushchev's fall and has since ignored c1.cial issues in the dispute.
Meanwhile, a North Vietnamese economic delegation in Peking pays effusive
tribute to Chinese "whole-hearted and all-out support and assistance."
7. The pro-Chinese dissident Italian Communists announce that they
have organized in Milan a "National Committee of the Movement of Italian
M-Ls and decided to call a national congress at a place and time to be
announced later.
8. As the period closes, the Rumanian Party Congress has drawn
delegates of 55-60 parties of all persuasions in the schism -- believed
to be the broadest representation since the 1960 81-party conference in
Moscow (including even the Yugoslavs, excluded in 1960) -- but as of our
deadline it appears that the hosts are successfully preventing any po-
lemics or political conflicts at least in public.
Significance:
As the Chinese aggressively push their anti-Soviet political cam-
paign at the sessions of the World Peace Congress and the World Youth
Festival Preparatory Committee, along with public polemics, most Com-
munists can find satisfaction only in the fact that their losses during
this period were relatively contained. Despite the bitter fighting and
the walk-out of Soviet and Indian delegates from one session, the WPC did
avert permanent split and managed to compromise on a relatively satisfac-
tory general statement and resolution on Vietnam. The WYF/IPC also averted
a, permanent rupture, although a post-voting Chinese statement warned that
a break is close. And the remarkable Rumanians, effectively maintaining
their neutrality and independence in action as well as in words, have ap-
parently succeeded in suppressing public polemics and private infighting
among the representatives of the wide spectrum of warring factions gath-
ered for their Party Congress, thus averting a battle royal which could
have amounted to a major step in the crumbling of the movement.
The crumbling process does continue, however, as witnessed by the
sharp attack on Castro by the organ of the Chinese-supported dissident
Jacques Grippa faction of Belgian Communists.
Meanwhile, the warfare in Vietnam continues as the most important
focal point and touchstone of policy for all Communist parties, fronts,
and other groups,
.. r a n r v (Commentarv Cont.)
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS 50X1-HUM
7-20 July 1965
April (delayed): ""Following a period of forced suspension" -- as the
Journal itself puts it --- Nuova Unita, Milan-published 'monthly organ;'
of the pro--Chinese dissident Italian Communists, resumes publication with
No. 2, April. It features an appeal To the Marxist-Leninist comrades in
Italy":
''The National Committee of the Movement of Italian 11-Ls, ,Which
was organized in Milan on April 1965 with the participation of re-
presentatives from existing M-L groups throughout Italy, has decided
to call a national congress of the movement at a place and at a time
to be announced later...."
Another article entitled "Communique," states that: "... the Italian
M--Ls, by way of general strategy, agree with the '25 points, of the Chinese
CP and with the document issued by the Albanian Labor Party against the
theses of the PCI 10th Congress.`' It gives the names of 11 members of the
"Provisional National Committee," five of whom are identified as the "Board
of Directors'' of the monthly.
July 2 (delayed): La Voix du Peale, Brussels weekly organ of the pro.-
Chinese dissident Belgian CP, carries a vitriolic attack on Cuban dictator
Castro. Entitled vfhere Is Castro Going?' , it details a long list of
grievances dated back to May 1963, when Castro visited Moscow and, it in-
sinuates, sold himself to Khrushchev for a sugar contract. Within the
past year, it says, Castro displayed his revisionism in supporting the
Moscow test-ban treaty, offering (in a 6 July 1961+ NYTimes interview) to
withdraw his material support of revolutionary movements in Latin America
if the U.S. would cease aiding anti-Cuban rebels -- "a Castroite re-
edition of the deal proposed by Khrushchevto Kennedy: 'remove your mis-
siles from Turkey and I shall remove my missiles from Cuba'" -- and send-
ing a delegation to the "schismatic" March'Muscow meeting of CPs. But its
harshest attack is directed at Castro's new attitude toward the coup in
Algeria:
"Since 23 June 1965, Castro has launched himself (or else has
been launched) into the vangurd against the Algerian revolution.
Whereas Moscow observed a hypocritical silence and Budapest criti-
cized, Castro attacked. Does he realize that in this aggressive
orientation against Algeria, in associating himself with all the
imperialist forces linked with the counter-revolutionaries, he scut-
tles the prestige of the man who was the leader of the victorious
Cuban revolution? ... It is the same role as played by the Asian
'spokesmen' of the Khrushchevites, the Mongolians, in the joint
straggle of the imperialists and revisionists against the Second
Bandung Conference .... A Castro, who ought to think about Escalante,
distributes good points to Ben Bella, invective to Bouteflika,
(Chronology Cont.)
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reproaches and threats to the Algerian revolution, going so far as
to speak about breaking off diplomatic relational All this inco-
herent aggressiveness can only bring joy to imperialism and revision-
ism....
NCNA Melbourne publicizes a statement by E.F. Hill, Chairman of the
pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L), published in the 1 July issue
of Vanguard. Urging struggle against revisionism to the very end, Hill
says:
"Reports from the Soviet revisior#ists show that they are in a
terrible hurry to complete their betrayal of the October Revolution.
They are restoring the profit motive, private enterprise, abolishing
state planning, and developing 'theories' that apologize for capital-
ism. Internationally, they are scheming with the U.S. imperialists
and slandering the revolutionary peoples by whispers and intrigues
ft
July 4 (delayed): NCNA distributes a 3,000-word review of Akahata's 22
June denunciation of the CPSU leadership (Chrono #56).
July (delayed): Czech Party daily Rude Pravo carries a remarkably frank
discussion of current Soviet economic problems pegged to an article by
"leading expert of the Soviet Gosplan, A. Maltin," in Moscow's
Ekonomicheska a Gazeta, entitled ''The Great Maneuver."
t1... There are still glaring social differences among the di-
verse strata of the population. According to general data, the
average worker's monthly wage is about 90 rubles -- 900 korunas --
and the lowest wages drop to 40 rubles. Many families still live
under poor housing conditions, even in one-room apartments....
The seven-year plan did not bring a decisive change: many
tasks for improving living standards have not been implemented.
The gap between the growth in the means of production and that of
consumers goods industry continues to be considerable...."
July 6 (delayed): Bulgarian Party daily Rabotnichesko Delo carries a
communique on 22?-28 June talks with a French CP delegation headed by
Politburo member Leroy:
"?.. Inspired by the decisions jointly worked out at the 1957 and
1960 conferences, the two delegations confirmed their full agreement
with the communique of the 19 fraternal parties adopted in March 1965
in Moscow and expressed the firm resolution of the French and Bulgarian
Communists to take all measures together with the CPSU and with the
other fraternal parties for strengthening the unity.... (They) are
convinced that the organization of a new conference of Communists and
workers parties fully corresponds to the interests of the ICM...."
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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J : TASS publicizes a statement by the South African CP supporting
a 99W.4t. , 4 4.2481 e to . at the earliest possible opportunity," adding
t v a any section, howevver important, to Rarticipate, should
n?e thos
TAS$ .a o reports that an I pz epian CF delegation headed by Chari-
man A 4d It was welcomed by CPSU officials 8xislov and 1onomarev on arrival
t.?
An article in Moscow's New T Imes hails Tito's June visit (Chrono #57)
as significant "far beyond the framework of relations between the two coun-
tries and parties .'
NCNA -distributes. a. cor newt ito's Ivisit cast jgating the "new leaders
_..~.II.II~ YYIYI U 1 I I 1 I IYI I II I
of the CPSU" for t.r all-out reception no other foreign heads of state
or government-have been so received in the USSR since the downfall of K.")
and for tJ.sgrantly setti to naught the udgement made in the 1.60 state-
___ on the renegade to .. .que.
"Praising to-the-skies the Titoist revisionist line, they not
only extolled:.the -Tito Clive 's 'successes' in restoring capitalism
in tgoslavia, but expressed. the desire to 'study' 'their 'experience'
in 'socialist u~onstr%ictio t.' ... The, 1 ` Sovietader shi has gone
tart r K and stands EMIetely on the side o eTitoite re-
v o it rou~p/.... (They also) took advantage of Tito's visit to
provide him 11 with a tribune- to peddle revisionist wares and attack the
M-I, fraternal parties. In his speech at the Soviet Yugoslav friend-
Ship meeting in. the Kremlin 30 June, ?ito made unbridled attacks on
the principled stand of the fraternal lM-L parties an peace and peace-
exults r2.d the efforts of representatives of certain
9rx:
with a decisio to host one the event until next year', no date or location
s ec f i.. A SS interview on the 14th with Chairman Reshetov of the
coil,mittee of SovietRouth Organizations expresses Soviet support: it also
it
A 3-day emergency session in Tampere (Helsinki) of the
me na .. c, rat tors Committee for the Ninth World Youth Festival
(origi nally scheduled to open 28 July in Algiers) concludes on the 10th
-o gRlit the youth movement," inc_tuaing a "ire they especia-u.y
e.'t On the .Oth, NCNA responds with a detailed account
(Chronology Cont.)
of "a spokesman of the All-China Youth Federation" and in its version of
events, "Inspite of the opposition of the Chinese, Indonesian, and
Yrapanosedelegates, " the Soviet manipulator "rammed through" the decision
to reconsider' the site, "a. scheme to prevent the festival from being held
in Africa.' "The Rumanian delegate abstained from voting."
Dm ithe ter' s .e to which Reshetov alluded, in reporting the comments
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"After the voting, the Chinese delegation issued a statement
stressing that the ... resolution forced through ... grossly inter-
fered in Algeria's internal affairs. The scheme was to undermine
the holding of the Youth Festival in Africa.... This nefarious
practice by the Soviet delegate, manipulator of the meeting, could
only further split the international youth movement and ... he
should be held fully responsible for the serious consequences aris-
ing from his action.
[Detailed coverage in separate item.]
July 9: TASS reports on talks held by a delegation of the Soviet-aligned
Belgian CP headed by Chairman Burnelle with CPSU officials including
Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomarev, 25 June to 9 July. They "stressed the
vital necessity of active struggle for the unity and cohesion of the inter-
national Communist and workers movement on the basis of the principles of
M-L." Radio Moscow in French on same subject mentioned "the line of the
Communist movement worked out at the conferences of 1957 and 1960 and con-
firmed by the communique of the consultat meeting of the representatives
of 19 fraternal parties in Moscow."
TASS also reports that talks between a_Chilean CP delegation headed
by SecyGen Corvalan and CPSU officials Suslov and Ponomarev "revealed
'complete identity of views of both parties on problems of the IC&WM.'"
"The urgent necessity of exerting every effort for the consolidation of
unity of the ICM was stressed. A unanimous view was expressed that the
Moscow consultative meeting was an important step in this direction."'
July 10: Albanian Party daily 2eri I Popullit carries a bitter 9,000-
word comment on the Tito visit to Moscow. "... showing that the traitors
and usurers who are esent at the head of the art and the USSR have
fully rehabilitated the Tito clique, and that not the slightest difference
exists today" between them. Some of the more colorful passages in this
diatribe are:
-- "The role of the Tito gang as mediating agent between American
imperialists and K. revisionists is know wn, just as its role as
adviser is known....
-- "One of the essential aims of Tito's trip to the Soviet Union
was to search for a way to help U.S. imperialism suppress the heroic
people of South Vietnam....
-- "Does not the attitude to the evegtp of 19 June in Algiers, and
the interference of the K. and Titoite revisionists and their allies
in the internal affairs of the Algerian people indicate that all
their declarations and sermons are but` a bluff and pure demogogy?...
4 (Chronology Cont.)
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The revisionists measure others with their own ardstick. It
is known how K and the present Soviet leaders in 1958, through a
'putsch,' liquidated the old Bolshevik leaders Molotov, Malenkov,
Kaganovich, and others. One also knows that the present Soviet
leaders similarly liquidated N. K.hrushchev himself. That is why,
being themselves 'putschists,' they could only consider the action
of the revolutionary council in Algiers on 19 June as a putsch.
"The K revisionists, in reinforcing the Titoist experience of
the degeneration of socialism and the restoration of capitalism,
are in point of fact taking their last step on the path of treason
it
Djakarta Government-aligned newspaper Merdeka, in an article entitled
The Peking-Moscow Fever," says:
"(Maoism)... naturally satisfies the Chinese nationalist senti-
ment. It enables the CPR to free itself from the guardianship of
the Soviet Union, which was formerly regarded as the mother country
of all of the proletariat through the world. However, saying that
the Chinese type of revolution is the general type in colonial and
semicolonial countries, or, generally speaking, in the Asian, African,
and Latin American countries, the CPI can -- if we are not careful
enough -- also call itself the mother country of those Asian, African,
and Latin American countries which f.ght for political and economic
independence. It is hoped that the CPR will not take over this former
Soviet attitude....
... Apart from the fact that the differing views of these two
anti-Nekolim champions have not helped to 'clear the minds of Afro-
Asian countries,' the divergence of opinion on the problem of Soviet
participation in the (Afro Asian) conference -- with the CPR voicing
disapproval of Soviet participation -- has adversely affected the
monolithic unity of the Afro Asian front.....
July 10-15: The World Peace Congress in Helsinki brought "fierce debates"
and "sharp struggle" ?-- as NCNA puts it -- between the Chinese camp,
spearheaded by the Albanian delegation, and the Soviet-aligned majority.
[Detailed coverage in separate item.]
July 11: AP reports from Havana: "In an action without precedent, the
walls of Havana have been plastered with posters bearing portraits of
Major Ernesto Guevara, who has not been seen publicly for four months."
(See #57 for account of Yugoslavia's attack on Guevara for his interview
in an Egyptian journal critical of Yugoslav, Polish, Czech, and Soviet
revisionism.) Noting also that Havana bookstores are filled with G's
book, Guerilla Warfare, and another with a photo of G on the cover, AP
says: "These honors were interpreted here as implementing a Castro de-
cision to publicize the view that, although G has disappeared from the
limelight since he returned from an Asian-African tour, he is not in dis-
grace."
5 (Chronology Cont.)
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Jgy 13: TASS announces that UAR President Nasir will make an official
visit to the USSR on 27 August. CAP Cairo on the 15th reports "official
sources" there as saying that Nasser has asked to see Khrushchev during
his visit to Moscow.)
July 14-15: Reuters reports from Algiers that a Soviet Embassy official
speaking to correspondents there on the 14th denied recent reports claim-
ing that the Soviet Consulate had been closed down and Soviet technicians
expelled on orders of the new Algerian leaders: he said that "the Soviet
Consular service was functioning normally", and that Ambassador Pegov "paid
a courtesy call on Col. Boumedienne yesterday." Next day Moscow accorded
recognition to Boumedienne via a message of congratulations.
Jul 15: Reuters Tokyo reports that Liao Cheng-chi, Chairman of the
Chinese Afro Asian Solidarity Committee, told Japanese reporters in Pek-
ing that day that:
-- It is doubtful that the missile bases being built by the Soviet Union
in North Vietnam are genuine.
-- China had rejected a recent Russian request to build an airbase in
south China near the Vietnam border because it is doubtful if the Russians
really mean to fight for the Vietnamese.
-- The Soviet Union sent only a small amount of weapons to North Vietnam,
despite the fact that China had arranged transit for hundreds of rail
cars at the request of the Russians.
July 16: The Austrian press (according to AP Vienna) reports that Bulgarian
Premier Zhivkov told Austrian newsmen accompanying the Austrian Foreign
Minister to Sofia on the 12th that the unsuccessful April coup against the
regime was the work of "pro-Chinese elements -- people of primitive think-
July 17: A communique on the visit of a North Vietnamese economic delega-
tion to Peking effusively expresses their T militant solidarity" in "ulti-
mately defeating the common enemy, U.S. imperialism." The Vietnamese ex-
press "deep and sincere gratitude" for Chinese "whole-hearted and all-out
support and assistance under all circumstances" and bow to the from the
'beloved and respected Chairman Mao Tse-tung...."
July 18 and continuing: The Congress of the Rumanian CP brings together
in Bucharest representatives of some 55-60 CPs ranging over the full
spectrum of the Sinn-Soviet schism, -- with advance reports that the
Rumanian hosts had stipulated that no polemics would be permitted. All
Rumanian speeches emphasize Rumania's stance of independence and neutrality
in relations both within the ICM and with the non-Communist world, and they
appear to have taken all possible measures to avoid any conflict or sem-
blance of favoritism. The Soviet and Chinese delegations are described
6 (Chronology Cont.)
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as being seated on opposite sides of the hall in identical places of
honor, and the Rumanian applause as being equally measured between them.
Brezhnev and satraps Ulbricht and Zhivkov are the only party chiefs to
head their delegations, but the Chinese are well represented by top
polemicists headed by GenSecy Teng Hsiao-ping. The major protagonists
(at least, as reported until we go to press) generally avoid polemics,
limiting themselves to stating their respective lines, for example: the
CCP message says -- "... revisionism is the main danger in the ICM ....
the CCP, together with the fraternal parties, will carry the struggle
against modern revisionism through to the end," and Teng adds ,7... and
at the same time firmly combat modern dogmatism"; Brezhnev -- calls
for "unity in action," repeatedly cites the great slogan of our move-
ment, 'Proletarians of all countries, unite! '
July 20: In an attack aimed primarily at U.S. "aggressive war in Indo-
china, Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit takes off on the "particularly
dangerous and mystifying role played by the Khrushchevite revisionists who,
advocating their sorely remembered 'coexistence,' incite the imperialists
to commit new crimes...."
"Harriman's mission to Moscow and his secret talks with Kosygin
... prepare the way for new imperialist-revisionist plots against
the Vietnamese people....
In view of conclusive facts and the forceful unfolding of the
new Soviet American 'epic,' people cannot allow themselves to be
duped by the pseudo-revolutionary poses and phrases of the treacher-
ous revisionist Brezhnev-Mikoyan-Kosygin-Suslov quartet...."
7 (Chronology)
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SECRET 2 August 1965
WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL "POSTPONED"
The International Preparatory Committee (IPC) for the
World Youth Festival (WYF), meeting in Tampere, Finland on 8-10 July,
announced that the Festival had been postponed until next year. A spe-
cial committee was formed to recommend to the IPC a locale and date.
Some 15,000 youth and students were reportedly planning to attend the
meeting which had been scheduled for Algiers, 28 July to 7 August. This
would have been the first WYF held outside Europe and only the third to
take place outside the Soviet bloc.
The Algerian coup of 19 June had immediately dimmed the prospects
for the WYF. Algerian authorities began arresting members of the Algerian
National Preparatory Committee and within a week the Algerian members of
the IPC were either in jail or hiding, while other IPC members mostly
Eastern European, had fled Algeria. A few communist students demonstrated
in Algiers against the new regime, with moral support from Communist and
other Leftist youth and student groups in many areas of the world. Ac-
cording to news reports, the USSR had cut its credits for the Festival
four days after Ben Bella's overthrow, and a number of Festival delega-
tions (including Cuba) had decided not to go to Algiers.
At a meeting on 24 June, the IPC, without consulting the ostensible
festival hosts, i.e., the Jeunesse de Front Liberation Nationale (JFLN),
or the Algerian government, decided to withdraw the WYF from Algeria. A
resolution issued 25 June and published in L'Unita, the Italian Communist
daily, stated that the Preparatory Committee "cannot remain indifferent
to developments in Algeria. Since June 19, members of the Permanent Com-
mission [of the IPC] have been isolated inside Algeria with no opportunity
to establish contact with other countries. In such conditions, the Com-
mission cannot continue preparations for the 9th Festival."
The JFLN issued a communique on 3 July denouncing the IPC's "inter-
ference in Algeria's internal affairs, While Algerian youth were prepar-
ing to receive the youth of the whole world, the IPC took the grave uni-
lateral decision of leaving Algeria on 25 June, thus abandoning work
entrusted to it by the IPC General Assembly." If there had been any doubt
before as to the actual power behind the Festival, the JFLN communique be-
trayed the emptiness of persistent Algerian claims that it controlled the
WYF.
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Hardly coming as a surprise, the Sino-Soviet conflict also en-
tered the decision to postpone the WYF. In a statement issued 2 July,
the All-China Youth Federation condemned the IPC's 25 June resolution
which they claimed was adopted through "Soviet manipulation behind the
back of Algeria." The Chinese accused the IPC of attacking Algerian
authorities and raising unreasonable demands flagrantly interfering in
Algeria's internal affairs. They charged that "the Soviets, in trying
to change the site to Europe, are trying to undermine the friendship
between African youth and the youth of other countries and to split the
unity of the movement." (On 20 July, the All-China Youth Federation
launched an extraordinarily sharp attack on the decisions reached by the
IPC and the statement to the press made on 14 July by the Chairman of
the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations. The appropriate NCNA cover-
age is enclosed as an Unclassified Attachment. The Chicoms charge the
Soviet youth organization with undermining the Festival, interference in
Algeria's internal affairs for reconsidering the venue of the Festival,
splitting the unity of the international youth and student movement, and
trying to advance Soviet foreign policy aims. The account also exposes
details of Soviet manipulation.) In support of the Chinese position,
the Indonesian youth organization issued a demand on 4 July that the
Festival be held in Algeria. It declared that any attempt to change the
site to East Europe would be a provocation and it opposed holding the 50X1-HUM
Festival anywhere outside Asia or Africa.
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S t G K L I 2 August 1965
CASTRO AND THE COUP IN ALGIERS
The missile crisis of October 1962 occurred at a moment
when Ahmed Ben Bella was on a state visit to Havana. He had just been
named premier of Algeria as a result of the September elections and was
destined to become president for a five year term the following September.
It was only natural for the highly temperamental rulers of two "revolu-
tionary" countries -- one caught in flagrante between the two cdlossi --
to find that they had much in common. They issued a joint communique as-
serting, among other things, that Cuba "has the right and duty to defend
its national independence and sovereignty."
In time, the rapport between these two "comrades in arms" blossomed
into a friendship more personal and intimate than that which ordinarily
exists between heads of state. During the border war that broke out in
the fall of 1963 between Algeria and Morocco, Castro came to Ben Bella's
aid with several hundred technicians and an unknown, but quite consider-
able, quantity of munitions. (BPG #129, 18 Nov 1963, Item #712: "Castro's
Military Aid to Algeria Backfires") Already deeply involved in fomenting
revolution in Africa, Castro made his embassy in Algiers the focal point
for Cuban activities on the Dark Continent, further proof of the close
collaboration between the two countries. (BPG #169, 5 Jul 1965, Item
#920: "Cuban Subversion in Africa")
The foregoing serves to explain the shock which Castro apparently
suffered when he learned, on 19 June 1965, that Ben Bella had been over-
thrown by his Vice-President and Minister of Defense, Col. Houari
Boumedienne, and that there was no news of his safety or whereabouts.
For a few days, Radio Havana treated the incident cautiously. On 22 June,
newscasts began carrying reports that reflected unfavorably on the new re-
gime, featuring pro-Ben Bella demonstrations and arrests of students. On
25 June, the Prensa Latina correspondent in Algiers reported that he had
been denied permission to see Ben Bella. He was assured, however, that
Ben Bella had been "ousted, not liquidated."
In the meantime, two important conferences were about to take place
in Algiers: the Afro-Asian "Summit" Conference (Second Bandung) and the
Ninth World Festival of Youth and Students. On 26 June, Castro cancelled
Cuban participation in the Youth Festival and used the occasion of an ad-
dress to the disappointed Cuban delegates (numbering 800) to make an of-
ficial statement on Cuba's position, broadcast live by Radio Havana. In
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a two-hour, rambling harangue, much of which appeared to be ad-libbed,
Castro declared emphatically his personal loyalty to Ben Bella and ex-
pressed his grief at the "treacherous" overthrow of "a government which
was our closest friend." He reminisced emotionally over the moral sup-
port he had received from Ben Bella during the missile crisis, repeatedly
condemned the "treacherous coup," but reserved judgment on Boumedienne.
One of Castro's most hurtful remarks was his characterization of the
overthrow as a military coup and not a revolution: "... The military
insurrection that overthrew Ben Bella's government is not, nor can any
one classify it as, a revolutionary insurrection."
Not content with airing such judgments via radio, Prensa Latina had
its office in Algiers include Castro's speech in an information bulletin
and give it wide distribution among the civilian population. The new
Algerian government responded on 30 June by closing the PL offices. Mean-
while, Havana has withdrawn its ambassador and relations between the once
friendly countries remain strained though not diplomatically broken.
Reactions by Moscow and Peking were much more cautious. Moscow re-
ported the Algerian events without comment, carefully refraining from
making any value judgments on the overthrow of an official "Hero of the
Soviet Union." On 14 July, after four weeks of reticence, he Soviet
Government congratulated Boumedienne. Much less restrained, Peking not
only gave the initial events much publicity, but also offered Chinese
government support for the new revolutionary Council. On 22 June, in a
speech in Cairo, Chou En-lai dismissed the coup as an "entirely internal
affair," and the next day, Foreign Minister Chen I, in Algiers for the
preparatory meeting, reiterated personally to Boumedienne his government's
support.
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JtGKLI 2 August 1965
RUMANIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION
At the end of June, the Rumanian goirernment published
the text of a new draft constitution, a document registering Rumania's
change from a "People's Republic" to a "Socialist Republic," one of a
number of changes accompanying the renaming of the "Rumanian Workers'
Party" to "Rumanian Communist Party." The "Ninth Rumanian Communist
Party Congress" (as the "Fourth Rumanian Workers' Party Congress" was
rechristened at the last moment, counting pre-World War II RCP Con-
gresses) has endorsed the current draft, and it will doubtless be ap-
proved by Rumania's parliament, the Grand National Assembly. Under
Communist rule, Rumania has had two other constitutions, those of 1948
and 1952. The present document resembles its predecessors in many re-
spects, but differs in being much more independent (from Moscow) and
nationalist in tone, and also in expressing more concern for individual
rights.
The 1952 constitution was preceded by a lengthy preamble, display-
ing spaniel-like admiration of the Soviet Union; the new constitution
makes no mention of that country. Instead, the new document uses some
of the language of Rumania's April 1964 "declaration of independence,"
saying in Article 14: "The foreign relations of the Socialist Republic
of Rumania (SRR) are based on principles of respect for sovereignty and
national independence, equality of rights and mutual advantages, and
noninterference in internal affairs." The same article, while commit-
ting the SRR to "relations of friendship and fraternal collaboration
with the socialist countries," also asserts that the SRR "fosters rela-
tions of collaboration with countries having other social-political
systems." In general, the new constitution is much less a copy of the
1936 Soviet constitution than was the case with the Rumanian constitution
of 1952.
A new note is struck with the declaration (Article 13) that "the
purpose of all state activities is the development of the socialist
system, constant improvement of the people's material and cultural well-
being, the guarantee of man's freedom and dignity, and comprehensive af-
firmation of the human personality." References to human dignity and the
affirmation of the human personality, while sometimes made by the young
n r n n r T i _,.,
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Karl Marx, have not hitherto been a feature of Communist constitutions.
The new document sets a limit of 24 hours on investigative arrest (Arti-
cle 31); the 1948 constitution had established a limit of 48 hours for
arrest without warrant, and the 1952 constitution, while calling for a
warrant, set no time limit whatever. Article 35 contains an interest-
ing innovation: it provides that persons whose rights are violated by
an illegal action of a state organ "may request the competent organs,
under conditions stipulated by law, to annul the action and compensate
for the damage." This article amounts to an admission of past injustices,
and seems to be backed up by Article 96, according to which "courts hear
the pleas of those whose rights have been violated by administrative ac-
tions, and can also decide on the basis of the law the legality of these
actions." Article 104 is also noteworthy; it states that "in trial acti-
vities, judges and people's assessors are independent and accountable
only to the law." (One of the issues in Yugoslavia's Mihajlov case was
the charge that Tito in effect had directed the courts to find Mihajlov
guilty. 50X1-HUM
The affirmations of individual rights in the new constitution lose
some of their lustier when it is realized that many of these provisions
already existed in earlier constitutions, where they have often been
dead letters. Thus guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and assembly
(Article 28); of freedom of religion (Article 30); against arrest with-
out warrant (Article 31); against entry into homes without a warrant
(Article,32); and of the inviolability of correspondence (Article 33)
also appeared in Rumania's 1948 and 1952 constitutions, and in the Soviet
1936 constitution. All these constitutions have provided for "universal,
equal, direct, and secret suffrage" -- but there has been no real choice
of candidates. Experience shows that it would be a grave mistake to take
a Communist constitution at face value.
Even on its face, the new Rumanian constitution forbids any use of
freedom of speech, press, meetings, and demonstrations for "purposes
contrary to the socialist system" (Article 29); binds citizens to "con-
tribute to the strengthening and development of the socialist system"
(Article 39), and makes "violation of the military oath, betrayal of
the homeland, desertion to the enemy, and the damaging of the state's
defensive ability ... punishable with the full severity of the law"
(Article 41). In the past, such provisions have been used to ration-
alize the worst violations of human rights. The weakness of Communist
constitutions is that they do not actually represent the supreme law of
the land; Party rules and practices are decisive, and Party leaders arbi-
trarily establish the norms. Addressing the Ninth Congress on 19 July,
Rumania's new party boss, Nicolae Ceausescu, made it clear that the new
constitution means no abdication of control, saying that the document
would ensure the "enhancement of the role of the Socialist state as the
organizer of the whole activity of building the Socialist system."
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JtGIItI
Nevertheless, affirmations of human rights are not without value,
particularly when they are extended, and when past violations are im-
plicitly recognized. If human rights are still sometimes violated,
the violation is done with a bad conscience. In most of East Europe,
respect for the law is on the increase, and officials can no longer be
sure they can break it with impunity, Within the Party as well as out-
side it, the rights of human beings are gaining new recognition.
e r r n r r I _ <
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SECRET 2 August 1965
SUKARNO AND THE PKI --
WHO CONTROLS WHOM?
Each year on .17 August, the anniversary of Indonesian
independence, President Sukarno delivers a major policy address. Last
August his speech was "A Year of Dangerous Living." This was a particu-
larly prophetic title because each crucial step Sukarno took throughout
the year drew him closer into the web of the PK1 and through it to con-
trol by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (See unclassified attachment
for a detailed chronology of relevant developments -- i.e., increasing
influence permitted the PKI and growing collaboration with the Chinese
-- within Indonesia and between Indonesia and the Chinese Peoples Re-
public).
This trend was confirmed in the PKI's gigantic celebration of their
45th anniversary which began on 23 May and carried over into the first
week of June. The Indonesian government provided trucks and other vehi-
cles to transport everyone to and from the Bung Karno Stadium for the
rally, schoolchildren were dismissed from classes, most shops were closed,
and the general atmosphere gave the Communist anniversary the appearance
of an official State occasion. President Sukarno was the principal speaker
at the opening celebration. He praised the PKI and encouraged them to con-
tinue "their contribution to the Indonesian Revolution." He also admonished
"Communist phobes" and warned them against upsetting the "unification of all
national revolutionary forces within Nasakom." (Nasakom is Sukarno's name
for what he sets forth as a new concept for his brand of government, namely
a coalition Cabinet uniting all nationalist, religious and Communist ele-
ments). He closed his address by urging the PKI to "go onward, onward,
onward, and never retreat!" (See unclassified attachment for excerpts of
Sukarno's speech.)
The PKI, in its anniversary celebration, had set itself the dual
objective of demonstrating that it is THE national party and that it is
the exclusive official supporter, protector and interpreter of Sukarnoism.
In summing up the themes and results of the celebration, PKI Chairman Aidit
said that it "turned into a truly national celebration" demonstrating the
"unity between the PKI and President Sukarno and his assistants."
R F C R FT fo-~q (",+ )
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There was another noteworthy development during the PKI's an-
niversary celebration: Peng Chen, chief of the CCP delegation, was
allowed by the PKI and by Sukarno to use this forum to make extremely
insulting charges against the CPSU. This development has an element
of poetic justice. Sukarno has taken over one billion dollars in
credits from the USSR; and in earlier times, Sukarno allowed the Soviets
to use their Djakarta visits to level insulting charges at the US from
whom he had "borrowed" about the same amount.
Communist China demonstrated its approval of the entire PKI an-
niversary proceedings by carrying extensive laudatory accounts in
People's Daily and in the newscasts of Radio Peking and the New China
News Agency. Mao Tse-tung sent a message praising the PKI's achieve-
ments as a "glorious page ... in the annals of the Revolution in the
East."
Sukarno used the celebration and the carnival atmosphere as an-
other way of keeping the minds of the Indonesian people off their
r e a 1 troubles: the cost of living has risen over 2,000 percent
in the past six years, and inflation has driven the actual rate of
foreign exchange to 7,000 rupiahs to the US dollar, compared to the
official rate of 45 to 1.
P r" n r T
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JtGKt1 2August 1965
SUKARNOAND THE PKI --
WHO CONTROLS WHOM?
Each year on 17 August, the anniversary of Indonesian
independence, President Sukarno delivers a major policy address. Last
August his speech was "A Year of Dangerous Living." This was a particu-
larly prophetic title because each crucial step Sukarno took throughout
the year drew him closer into the web of the PKI and through it to con-
trol by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (See unclassified attachment
for a detailed chronology of relevant developments -- i.e., increasing
influence permitted the PKI and growing collaboration with the Chinese
-- within Indonesia and between Indonesia and the Chinese Peoples Re-
public).
This trend was confirmed in the PKI's gigantic celebration of their
45th anniversary which began on 23 May and carried over into the first
week of June. The Indonesian government provided trucks and other vehi-
cles to transport everyone to and from the Bung Karno Stadium for the
rally, schoolchildren were dismissed from classes, most shops were closed,
and the general atmosphere gave the Communist anniversary the appearance
of an official State occasion. President Sukarno was the principal speaker
at the opening celebration. He praised the PKI and encouraged them to con-
tinue "their contribution to the Indonesian Revolution." He also admonished
"Communist phobes" and warned them against upsetting the "unification of all
national revolutionary forces within Nasakom." (Nasakom is Sukarno's name
for what he sets forth as a new concept for his brand of government, namely
a coalition Cabinet uniting all nationalist, religious and Communist ele-
ments). He closed his address by urging the PKI to "go onward, onward,
onward, and never retreat!" (See unclassified attachment for excerpts of
Sukarno's speech.)
The PKI, in its anniversary celebration, had set itself the dual
objective of demonstrating that it is THE national party and that it is
the exclusive official supporter, protector and interpreter of Sukarnoism.
In summing up the themes and results of the celebration, PKI Chairman Aidit
said that it "turned into a truly national celebration" demonstrating the
"unity between the PKI and President Sukarno and his assistants."
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SECRET ,
There was another noteworthy development during the PKI's an-
niversary celebration: Peng Chen, chief of the CCP delegation, was
allowed by the PKI and by Sukarno to use this forum to make extremely
insulting charges against the CPSU. This development has an element
of poetic Justice. Sukarno has taken over one billion dollars in
credits from the USSR; and in earlier times, Sukarno allowed the Soviets
to use their Djakarta visits to level insulting charges at the US from
whom he had "borrowed" about the same amount.
Communist China demonstrated its approval of the entire PKI an-
niversary proceedings by carrying extensive laudatory accounts in
People's Daily and in the newscasts of Radio Peking and the New China
News Agency. Mao Tse-tung sent a message praising the PKI's achieve-
ments as a "glorious page ... in the annals of the Revolution in the
East. "
Sukarno used the celebration and the carnival atmosphere as an-
other way of keeping the minds of the Indonesian people off their
r e a 1 troubles: the cost of living has risen over 2,000 percent
in the past six years, and inflation has driven the actual rate of
foreign exchange to 7,000 rupiahs to the US dollar, compared to the
official rate of 45 to 1.
n r o n r T
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JtUKLI ~August lyo7
WORLD PEACE COUNCIL BESET BY SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT
The Seventh World Peace Congress in Helsinki, Finland
from 10-15 July became one more forum for discord within the Communist
world and its auxiliary peace movement. The Soviets, over the objections
of several groups, retained control of the Congress sponsored by the
Communist front World Peace Council (WPC). The Chicom clique took the
most strenuous exception to Soviet leadership, challenging the Soviets'
policy of disarmament and peaceful coexistence. The final resolutions
of the Congress, which were accepted by the Chicoms, suggest that the
Soviets compromised to a certain extent but did not change the basic
precepts of their policy. They decried political intolerance that would
erect barriers to unified and concrete actions for peace at the Congress
and in official propaganda. However, the tone of their reply to the
Chicoms' challenges was relatively restrained. Neither Sino-Soviet dif-
ferences nor the power struggle within the WPC mitigated the combined
assault on imperialism, specifically U.S. policy in Vietnam.
The International Preparatory Committee (IPC), gathering directly
before the Congress, heard a report on the 22-23 May IPC meeting in
Helsinki which outlined what the Congress would discuss and how it should
go about doing so. The report drew rebuttal from the Chicoms who had
abstained from participation in all preparatory activities. Debate on
rules of procedure, reorganization of the WPC and substantive issues
(e.g. Vietnam, peaceful co-existence) carried over into and throughout
the Congress proper. World-wide, both the Communist and non-Communist
press have focused on the Sino-Soviet exchanges. Ironically, the non-
Communist Finnish media generally played down coverage of the Congress,
suggesting that the Finns have been embarrassed by association with the
dispute at the Congress or the Congress per se, or both. Over 15,000
delegates and observers from 98 countries either witnessed or partici-
pated in the arguments, The Africans seem to have been generally dis-
turbed by the disrupting effects of the dispute, but depending on the
point under discussion, national groups found themselves either more or
less aligned with one or the other of the protagonists. However, the
Soviets did receive active, across-the-board support particularly from
the Indians while the Chicoms were able to launch vitriolic broadsides
via their Albanian, Indonesian and Pakistani associates.
t' r n n r T
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The WPC secretariat's autocratic control over the procedures of the
Congress were successfully challenged to the extent that an extraordinary
plenary session gave 21 additional delegations the right to address the
Congress for specified periods of time. While the Chicoms did not re-
treat from their unsuccessful demand for unlimited debate, the plenary
session compromise afforded them an additional opportunity to attack the
Soviets but also for small Afro-Asian nations to be heard.
WPC President Bernal's memorandum on reorganization, supported by
the Chicoms principally as a means to attack the Soviets but also by
others wanting a greater hand in the organization (i.e. Bernal's own
:British associates, the U.S. group and Afro-Asian organizations), was not
`brought before the Congress, on the grounds it would first have to go
before the Council. Since the Presidential Committee had discussed the
proposal on 8 July, Soviet ability to block it and also the selection of
new executive bureau members testify to continued Soviet manipulation of
the WPC. The Chicoms also lost another battle in their attempt to re-
duce the working committees from seven to four which would have allowed
them to focus the Congress on the topics suiting their position.
Issues. On the subject of war vs "peaceful coexistence," the Chi-
coms insisted the Congress should focus on opposition to war, the liqui-
dation of imperialism as the only premise for disarmament, and said that
application of peaceful-coexistence to the U.S. with respect to Vietnam
was "appeasement." Further, they said that to firmly oppose the imperi-
alists in Vietnam does not threaten to escalate the conflict into nuclear
holocaust -- the central point of contention between the protagonists.
But the General Statement circumvented this controversial issue by saying
that imperialist adventures in cases such as Vietnam strike "a grave blow
at the aspirations of the people to detente and peaceful coexistence,"
calling for "action to isolate U.S. imperialism...'to support the strug-
gles of the peoples... against colonialism.... Faced with the people's
determination and their common front of struggle, the forces of oppres-
sion and war will not prevail."
The Congress rejected the U.S. delegation's proposal -- already
strongly opposed by the Chicoms but applauded by the Soviets in the Com-
mittee -- to dispatch a peace delegation to Hanoi, the Viet Cong, Peking,
Moscow, London, Washington and the U.N.
The primary Soviet objective was unity (i.e. the status quo in the
World Communist Movement as against Chicom leadership ambitions). To
attain unity, the Soviets were willing to make concessions of a sort to
the Chicoms. They ignored attacks on their spokesmen and they limited
themselves to a temporary walkout from the committee on disarmament,
nuclear free zones and nonaligned countries. The unanimous endorsement
of the General Statement does not mean that there was anything approaching
a genuine meeting of the minds over grave disputes. The WPC continues
to be in disarray, as just two exemples will illustrate. The Soviets
2
50X1-HUM
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JCto HCI
assembled over 400 of the participants in Leningrad immediately after the
congress __ an unusual aftermath to a T4PC meeting. There is no sign of
rapprochement between the feuding elements of the Japanese peace mo-ir _
went. 50X1-HUM
3
P[ P n r T
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THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
almost completed the wall
around Flagstaff House, and
once all the bars are in place and
the gates installed the official head-
11" "A
quarters of the President of Ghana
will be a fortified 200-acre island in
the middle of Accra. Behind three
separate gates manned by armed
guards Kwame Nkrumah will be able
to look out over a private enclave
that includes a battery of offices, an
army camp, a military hospital, a
radio station and his own personal
zoo.
Flagstaff House tells much about
the incredibly complex and indelibly
fascinating personality of Kwame
Nkrumah, Ghana's unquestioned
leader for the last 15 years and one
of Africa's most important figures.
It reflects most obviously the single-
minded concern for security of a man.
who has every reason to be afraid,
since the political opposition he has
driven underground has burst to the
surface in two assassination attempts
in the last three years. He seldom
leaves the Flagstaff fortress, and
then either without any warning or
with hundreds of police and soldiers
guarding his routes. On a trip last
year to the port city of Tema, 20
miles away, the route through the
capital was lined by guards sta-
tioned 50 feet apart and the open
highway cluttered with armored cars
and police cruisers.
Nkrumah's home is almost as well-
guarded as his office, though he
usually spends less time there. It is
In a remodeled-17th-century castle on
an isolated promontory overlooking
the Gulf of Guinea, and to the earlier
fortifications a high protecting wall
has been added in recent years. Last
-. J. KIRK SALE has reported from Africa
for several newspapers and was for a
.year (1963-64) a lecturer in history at
the University of Ghana.
year, after an assassination attempt
within Flagstaff itself, Nkrumah
burrowed himself there and made it
virtually unapproachable, with a
dozen policemen guarding the en-
trance road, two small tanks lined
up against the wall and a gunboat of
the Ghana Navy cruising in the
harbor.
I once drove up as far as the front
gate while taking a visiting Ameri-
can on a sightseeing tour of the city,
but at the wall a rifle-wielding
soldier roughly turned us back and
told us sternly that it was forbidden
even to look at the castle. A group
of Western newsmen who did man-
age to fast-talk their way past the
main gate so upset Nkrumah that he
had them clapped into fail - from
which, incidentally, they managed to
fast-talk their way out the next day.
,KRUMAH'S fear has led him
to some extreme lengths. He dis-
trusts both those nearest him-he is
said to have shot a bodyguard with
his personal revolver one jumpy day
-last February-and those farthest
away, who are more suspect because
less under watch. Passing around
copies of Andrew Tally's spies-under-
the-bed book, "C.I.A. - The Inside
Story," was harmless enough, but he
began to see C.I.A. machinations ev-
erywhere and to suspect all Ameri-
cans on principle. Once he warned
civil servants that they should stay
away from those subversive cocktail
parties at the American Embassy,
and his puppet press even attacked
"those Peace Corps spies, spies and
saboteurs." He deported three abso-
lutely innocent Americans from the
University of Ghana on charges of
"treasonable activities" which he,
never oven tried to prove, and re-
fused to listen to anyone who pointed
out the absurdity of his accusations..
Flagstaff House also reflects the
isolation of a man imprisoned by
such fear. Its walls have served not
only to protect him, but, in a deeper
sense, to cut him off from the
raucous, rhythmical world that is
Accra and the common people whose
life was once his own. Outside, on the
broad macadam of Independence
Avenue, passes a panorama of
Ghana: "market mammies" with
basins of fried fish impossibly bal-
anced on their heads; members of
the W.P.A.-style "Workers Brigade"
clapping hands (the Ghanaian equiv-
alent of the
raised thumb) for rides; bikes,
'buses, Volkswagens and Mer-
cedes-Benzes - in ascending
order, the transportation stat-'
us sybols for Ghanaian work-
ers - carelessly and loudly
weaving past the white-jack-
eted traffic cop at the main
gate; "mammy wagons," un-
believably ramshackle trucks
whose wooden sides bulge with
passengers and produce, clat-
tering to the market. Inside,
Nkrumah sits alone at a broad
desk in a quiet, air-conditioned
room.
Nkrumah's public appear-
ances are rare and he usually
chooses to communicate to his
people through the press and
radio; for any major pro-
nouncement he uses not the
public platform but the radio
station within his walls. Few
visitors get to see him and
often his own advisers are
kept away by his camp of sec-
retaries; those who are likely
to prove bothersome, like a
delegation of disgruntled
chiefs or non - Communist
Western reporters, never get
beyond the first gate. His per-
sonal life is kept almost com-
pletely shrouded; when his.
wife gave birth to their third
child, the fact went unre-
ported and publicly unknown
for three months.
It is no accident that a zoo
occupies a central spot at
Flagstaff House, for as Nkru-
mah has increasingly isolated
himself he has increasingly
turned his attention to the
animals around him. His me-
nagerie now Includes baboons,
leopards, kangaroos, a hyena,
a hippopotamus and two
gawky camels, said to be a
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gift from Nasser, which can
often be seen grazing on the
sparse fields opposite the
main gate. Those who have
visited him recently report
that often the only real ex-
citement and liveliness he' dis-
plays is when showing off
this collection.
Nkrumah has always been
a lonely man. He was an only
child, very close to his mother,
In a society where large fami-
lies are almost universal; he
once wrote that "any happiest
hours were spent alone. I used
to wander off on my own for
hours on end." At school he
hated the regimentation of
military drill and shunned
team sports in favor of soli-
tary running (and since his
best efforts were at 220 and
440 yards, one Accra wag has
since referred to this as "the
loneliness of the short-dis-
tance runner"), During his
difficult life in the United
'States in the thirties, cut off
from home and family, he
lived an almost pathetically
isolated existence which he
later described as producing
"a most 'haunting feeling, of
loneliness."
Once back in Ghana and
absorbed in the life of a poli-
tician, Nkrumah had little op-
portunity for solitude, but
found that in many ways his
10 years of Western training
separated him from the tradi-
tional life around him. He
worked long hours and made
it a point to withdraw for a
week or two, once "to a quiet
spot a hundred miles or so
out of Accra in order to medi-
tate." After his political posi-
tion was secure - around 1960,
when he was elected Presi-
dent of the new Republic of
Ghana-he was able to turn
,more and more from being an
active public figure into a
secluded administrator. And
today, behind his walls, he
leads an existence very much
alone.
NDERSCORING Nkru-
rhah's loneliness in the last
few years'has been his lack
of male companionship, on the
level of either friend or ad-
viser. So many one - time
friends have turned against
him for one reason or another
that he now seems reluctant
to send out the tentacles of
friendship to anyone. Ako
Adjei, whom he had known
and trusted since his days in
America and who had been
Foreign Minister in several of
his Cabinets, was found guilty
this year of plotting to kill
Nkrusnalr; Tawia Adamafio,
former party leader and once
the man closest to Nkrumah,
was sentenced in the same
plot; Komla Gbedemah, who
engineered Nkrumah's first
election and was a successful
Finance Minister for many
years, was kicked out of the
Government in 1961 amid later
accused as the instigator of
an attempted overthrow; and
the list could go on.
All of this has made Nkru-
mah naturally suspicious
about those he allows close to
him, and one reason that he
now works up to 20 hours a
day may be that he is reluc-
tant to trust anyone else with
his burden of work. It is in-
teresting that of those closest
to him personally today-the
three B's, Defense Minister
Kofi Baako, personal trouble-
shooter Geoffrey Bing and
radical-left columnist II. M.!
Banner-the first is in poor
health and the last two are
whites with no chance to form
a rival power structure, men
from whose friendship, in
short, there is no threat
For some men, women might
supply an outlet for loneliness,
but not for Nkrumah. He has
always been afraid, he has
said, "to become too entangled
with a woman," and even
from his earliest days, he con-
fesses, "my fear of women
was beyond all understand-
ing," a feeling "I have never
outgrown." His closest attach-
ment was to his mother-he
reports that as a child "I used
to be angry when my father
came to sleep in our bed....
I told him that I was also
married to her and it was my
job to protect her"-,and -ap-
parently no one has been able
to take her place.
Today he Is married to an
Egyptian, Fathia Ritzk, but it
was from the beginning a
marriage of convenience rath-
er than love (he probably had
not even seen his bride before
they got married) and it is
doubtful that she shares
enough of the Ghanaian ex-
perienee or the political pas-
sion to be very close to Nkru-
r'r
ONE substitute for the
lack
of personal friendship
may be the animals in his
zoo, who can be releases for
4 a feeling Nkrumah dares not
share with those around hits
and cannot share with the
public, but of course this is
not enough, A more effective
and pervasive substitute is
;friendship In the abstract
rather hall the particular-
that is, public adulation, on
Which Nkrumah seems ? to
thrive.
He has no hesitation in
having the party papers refer
to him as "His Messianic
Dedication," "The Nation's
Pillar of Fire and Fount of
Honor" or simply "The Lead-
er"; his speeches on Radio
Ghana are preceded with as
much as 15 minutes of tra-
ditional "praise-singing," a
privilege once reserved for
chiefs alone. When a slight
earthquake shook Accra on
the day Nkrumah announced
his new Seven-Year Develop-
ment Plan, The Evening News
report ran :
"After the Messiah had
launched the people's program
to build a socialist state .
.THE EARTH TREMBLED
.AND THE TREES SHOOK,
THE WIND BLEW AND
THERE WAS RAIN in Accra
which had not seen a drop of
water for a long time. , .. The
second Messiah has arrived.
Ye know not when he cometh,
says the Bible, and we say to
the world that HE is here."
And this is not extraordi-
nary; it is daily fare. Such
"unsober adulation," as one
Ghanaian intellectual wrote
last year, "may unintentional-
ly cut off the President from
the people," thus increasing
the isolation it is intended to
overcome. But in the short
run it seems to provide Nkru-
mah a very welcome mani-
festation that the people of
Ghana are his friends (not to
mention worshipers) en masse
even if they so often turn out
to be his enemies individually.'
The intermingled fear and
isolation, the one breeding the
other, form an essential part
of Nkrumah's personality. In
2'
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turn, they reflect what is per-
haps the essential key to un-
locking this complex man: his
consistent self - centeredness,
self - absorption, egotism
what in psychological terms
might be considered narcis-
sism.
The evidence to support a
diagnosis of Nkrumah as nar-
cissistic is not, of course, con-
elusive. but signals such as
these occur too frequently to
be overlooked,
An inordinate affachment to
his own ideas, Nkrurkah has
continually. thrust his own
ideology on his country and
the world in five turgid books,
in half a doter polemical
newspapers, on?.his powerful
broadcasting stamn-and has
done this even knowing it has
alienated many of his fol- .
lowers, angered many of his
fellow leaders and offended
many of his creditors. `'
A supreme couvietion in
the rightness of his sections.
Nkrumah has always believed
religiously that his way was
the only way, a feature very
effective in gaining supporters
in his fight for independence,
and neither bombs, betrayals
nor abuse have shaken him;
last year, for example, when
moving to take over the Uni-
versity of Ghana, he blithely
ignored even Conor Cruise 0'
Brien, then Vice Chancellor
and one of his own appointees,
who suggested that his action
was improper.
An acute sensitivity to any.
kind of criticism. Nkrumah
has found criticism so dis-
tasteful that he has eliminated
the political opposition, reor-
ganized the Legislature so that
detractors can't lift their
heads and clamped full con-
trol over all domestic news
-media and occasionally over
foreign imports as well, he
led a violent campaign last
year against "rumor-mongers"
who were said to be telling
tales. about him behind his
back. In March one poor taxi
driver was jailed for three
years for passing on a rumor
to his back-seat passengers,
who happened to be high-,
ranking military men.
An unrelaxing desire to
mold reality to fit his pre-
;ccpts. Nkrumah has sought to
change what his ideas cannot
admit of and has refused to
admit of what his, power
cannot change. He has ac-
tively supported. left-wingers
throughout the continent in
hopes of proving that Africa,
is really socialist at heart,
and at home he allows his
papers to make up news and
montage photographs that:
will match his preconceptions.
Two years ago he decided that
all drivers should immediately
switch to the right-hand side
of the road as a move of soli-
darity with the fanner French
states around him, and only
a last-minute burst of ra-
tionality halted the campaign
and saved the lives of thou-
A continual need for public
reaffirmation of his value.
Nkrumah has encouraged not.
only adulation from the press
but sycophancy from those
around him, and has held a
steady stream of elections and
referendums as evidence that
he is really popular, His own
words betray this need: "It is.
essential," he announced in
1.962, "that once every five
,years [the peopled shall have
the opportunity to renew their
faith and confidence in the
party and its leader" (my
italics).
IN view of such recognized
symptoms as these, then, it
does not seem too much to see
Nkrumah as an example of a
narcissistic personality, pro-
viding that this is understood
as analysis and not condem-
nation. And what should we
expect of such a personality?
In Erich Fronim's words, a
narcissist "has to increase his
power, his ruthlessness and his
narcissism." Nkrumah has
done exactly that.
Since 1961 Nkrumah has in-
creased his power steadily and
relentlessly. He has taken over
full executive direction of the
all-powerful Convention Peo-
ple's party, of which he is life
president, assumed full com-
mand of the armed forces, re-
moved all possible political ri-
vals from his inner councils,
councils,
outlawed the opposition
United party and jailed its
leaders, made the legislature
into a rubber stamp (in fact,
he has ordered M.P.s to find
outside jobs because there is
not enough to keep them busy
in the legislature), purged
police and army ranks of pos-
sible dissidents, clamped ab-
solute authority over all
weapons of propaganda, given
himself veto power over top-
level judicial decisions, and
taken control of university
education. Today Nkrumah
reigns supreme.
He has also increased his
ruthlessness. He has passed a
steady series of harshly puni-
'tive laws allowing him to jail
,opponents up to 20 years
without trial or appeal, used
them to jail more than 100
(some even say 1,000) sus-
pected dissidents including
professors and students, used
police interrogation and house
arrests to cow both friends
and foes, stationed soldiers
with automatic rifles to guard
key locations such as banks
and communications centers,
openly threatened military
action against anti-Govern-
ment demonstrations, con-
doned an uncontrolled mob
invasion designed to intimi-
date university students, al-
lowed party hacks remarkable
freedom in bullying recalci-
trant judges, Middle Eastern
entrepreneurs and hesitant
schoolmasters, and used courts
at all levels to enforce execu-
tive orders.
In part, of course, Nkrumah
has been forced to such harsh
'ness because of the threat of
subversion, but his ruthless-
ness grows within a vicious
circle common to many au-
thoritarians: fearing those he
oppresses, he oppresses those
he fears.
Finally, there is what can
only be described as Nkru-
mah's growing sense of un-
reality. It explains his inabil-
ity to have close friends, his
belief' in his own rightness,
his acceptance of "unsober
adulation," his drive to re-
make Africa in his own
image.
He has always been without
the day-to-day balances that
,provide incursions of reality in -
other men-he has no hobbies,
eats very little, drinks and
smokes not at all. He has al-
ways plunged headlong into his
fantasies, first his games, then
his religion, later his nation-
alism; Peter Abrahams once
reported that "he seemed con-
sumed by a restlessness that
led him to evolve some of the
most fantastic schemes." And
today fear, isolation and a,
growing authoritarianism have
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worked to place Nkrumah in a
special world of his own, not
quite connected with the real
world outside his private pat-
There are certain links
with reality, of couriie, even
beyond three common to, every
mortal man: his fear seems
reasonable since there are In
fact those who want' to kill
him; his isolation seems real-
istic as a way to preserve him-
.self and his great works; his'
absorption of power seems
reasonable, since everyone iii.
the nation keeps telling him it
is. Which is to say that there
is a sufficiently realistic basis
to Nkrumah's unreality to
keep him on this side of san-
ity and to make him quite a
different figure in degree from
an Egyptian pharoah, say, or
Hitler.
But his unreality is unmis-
takable, and it is clearest of
all in Nkrumah's excessive at-
tachment to his own ideology,
an attachment that leads him
to some of the most senseless
moves. He has set up some-
thing called the Kwame Nkru-
mah Institute of Ideology,
formed ideological "study
groups" and started two propa-
ganda newspapers, all of which
concern themselves day in and
day out with whatever Nkru.
mah has thought or is thinking.
He has also recently formed
a committee to insure "ideo-
logical purity" in the land by
purging libraries and book-
stores of publications which do
not conform to the "Nkrumah-
ist" ideology. Now, of course,
there are not going to be many
volumes left in the Accra Pub-
lic Library if this last move is
seriously pushed-and it seems
.that it is being-but this only
points up the depth of Nkru-
mah's unreality, for when the
ideological steamroller runs up
against the realistic mountain,
it is the mountain that must
give way or be run over.
Nkrumah's .decisions today
are based not so much on prac-
tical necessities as on ideologi-
cal commitment; not on what
actually is but on what ideo-
logically should be. It is not
too much to say that if Nkru-
mah were given the choice be-
tween ridding Ghana of all its
ills on practical lines in a dee
ade or on his own rigid ideo-
logical lines in three, he would ;
Unhesitatingly choose the lat-
ter. Such is the depth of his
commitment.
There are three major exam-
ples of how in recent years
'.irlenlnl!y hll" \VIa1 OVer
Iit'll 1ity.
1" ir.st, the ideology not only
la"oriaimsA the necessity and
rightness of Socialism but de-
mands a unity of purpose
among Socialist l i.e., Cummu-
nist) countries. Hence Ghana
has embarked on extensive'
trade agreements with the
Eastern bloc, not because she
wants Eastern goods (very few
Ghanaians care for the hot
Czechoslovak shoes or unpala-
table Chinese pigs' knuckles
that now crowd Accra's stores)
and not because she finds the
): mast a profitable trade part-
ner (the Communists have so
far failed to make good on $5
million worth of commitments)
but primarily to back up her
ideological identity with the
East by economic connections.
The result has been that Gha-
na's industries and agriculture
have been withering for lack
of supplies, her consumers
have been deprived of many
common Western imports and
faced with rationing of still
others, and her finances have
plunged to the point that she
is in debt by perhaps as much
as $800 million.
Second, the ideology holds
that "capitalism is but the
gentleman's method of slav-
ery" which uses "the cajole-
ment, the wheedlings, the se-
duction and the Trojan horses
:of neo-colonialism" in undevel-
oped countries "to subordinate
their interests to those of a
foreign power." Hence Ghana
has turned away as much as
possible from the capitalist na-
tions on which it would logi-
cally depend for foreign trade
and economic assistance. The
United States is continually
depicted as putting bombs in .
the hands of Nkrumah's ene-
mies, Britain is assailed for
every real and imagined ill af-
fecting its former colony, West
Germany is castigated as a,
"running dog of imperialism." It is little wonder that when
Ghana went around last month
secretly soliciting desperately
needed funds from these coun-
tries it was given the cold-
shoulder at every stop. Yet
there is no suggestion that
Ghana has any intention of
giving up its ideologizirl bar-
rage in order to get economic
isustenanee,
Lastly, the ideology holds
y tliitt it tight "Union (of African
'States" under a Socialist ban-
+ncr is essential ard that "we
shull never relax our effort" to'
bring total independence and
unity to this African conti-
nent." Yet Nlcrumah's African
Affairs Bureau has steadily
alienated most of the conti-
nent's leaders with its free-
wheeling interference (with
anything from propaganda to
guns) on behalf of left-wing
causes even in sovereign na-
tions; his "freedom fighters"
village on the outskirts of Ac-
era has provided a haven for
all kinds of leftist dissidents
.kicked out of other countries;
his insistence that "Africa
must unite," pursued with all
the subtlety of a jackhammer,
has angered such realistic lead-
ers as Julius Nyerere, Presi-
dent of Tanzania, who last year
told him bluntly to mind his
own business. But Nkrumatr's
ideology does not make allow-
ances for any business in Af-
rica not being his, nor does his
mind appreciate the difference
between persuasion and med-
dling.
And so it goes - ideology
over practicality, illusion over
reality no matter what the
results.
HE latest demonstration of
.Nkrumah's obsession with ide-
ology, and consequent depar-
ture from reality, has taken
the form of a little book pub-
lished last spring (and almost
totally ignored in this coun-
try) called "Consciencism," a
"philosophy and ideology for
decolonization and develop-
ment, with particular reference
to the African revolution."
This book was pushed on
Ghana with all the propaganda
weapons available to the state,
and they are considerable:
mass meetings, public speeches,
front-page news reports.
lengthy (and impenetrable)
commentaries, full-page adver-
tisements, broadcasts and dis-
cussion groups---all running on
for weeks. All of it seemed an
acute example of loss of bal-
ance, especially since not more
than 5 per cent of the country
was able to read the incredi-
bly canriliex prose and not
more than 1 per cent was able
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to make y sense out of it.
"Consci ncism" itself is never
really exphtined-in fact, it Is
nowhere defined nor is any at-
tempt made to reveal whose
conscience is being talked
about-but it seems to be an
ideology mixing all those things
.Nkrumah holds dearest, what-.
,ever they may be It some-
how combines, without, ever
explaining just how, whatever
Nkrumah chooses to mean by
"Socialism"-materialism, hu-
manism, egalitarianism, love
thy-neighborism, "communal-
ism in modern dress," "tradi-
tional African society" and
much more-with whatever he
found valuable in winning in-
dependence-mass party, elite
vanguard, mass propaganda-
cunt - education, "positive ac-
tion," authoritarian control,
etc. Throw all these together,.
stir with long words and philo-
sophical gobbledygook, and
comes ':Consciencism."
In a way, the book partakes
of the very unreality that in-
spired it. "Consciencism" holds
that "matter has an original
power of self-motion," "the
fundamental law of evolution
is dialectical," that "space
must, to the extent that it is
real, derive its properties from
those of matter" and that with
its principles "the mind-body
problem is solved."
The last chapter is almost
undecipherable and its unreal-
ity suggests that whoever con-'
cocted it might be certifiably
insane. Here the problems of
all societies (especially colo-
nial ones) are solved through
symbolic logic : "Let Pa repre-
sent the positive action in an
individual," "Let cg represent
philosophical consciencism as
elaborated by the conditions of
g and the experience and con-
sciousness of Its people," and
so on in bewildering variety.
Then it is but a simple Ein-
steinian task to see that "there-
fore a general formula arises
thus:
S -'m-{-C+D+UGi"
futile to try to foretell what
the deep and chaotic personal-
ity of Kwame Nkrumah will
mean for Ghana in the years
ahead, for it is in the nature of
such a soul that It is irrational,
uncertain, unpredictable.
Ghana today is, in a very
real sense, a product of this
complex personality. The cocoa
farmer, whose crop forms Gha-
'
na
s only major export, depends
or ."hence the progressive un- for his existence on the deci-
ion of liberated territories, for sions Nkrumah makes as to
example, a union of African whom to trade with; the see-
states, might be ... represent- ondary-school student in the
ed ... more analytically: bush village, whose talents are
U G
pa l.,.k
(pa+na)+(pa+na)+(pa+na)+(p +na)Gk]."
G1 OG2 OG 0
It makes no better sense in
context than out.
At this juncture it seems
k-1
earnestly solicited to build to-
morrow's nation, depends for
his future on the content Nkru-
mah chooses to give the uni-
versities and on the opinion of
the local party officer: the
civil servant in the Accra of-
fice, whose skills are required
to develop the minerals and
build the factories, depends for
his job on the projects that
occur to Nkrumah's craggy,
mind and his willingness to
accept them unquestioningly.
Over the entire country, from
the seas to the savannah, on
its economy, its politics, its so-
ciety, the long shadow of
Nkrumah is cast.
It may be that his unreality
will be adjusted, his vision
cleared-but just now it seems
likely that the land must en-
dure more and more of his
vagaries. And that will spell a
sorrow for Ghana of which the
man behind the walls of Flag-
staff House may never be
aware.
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2 August 1965
Soviet Historians on Soviet Historiogr22hy
of the Period 1933 ---1241
(from the Polish journal Kultura, Paris, No. 5/211) 1965)
On June 17 and 18, 196+ there was an interesting discussion at the
USSR Academy of Science's Institute of History on the "draft" of Volume
IX in the series The History of the USSR from the Most Ancient Timees,
which covers the period 1933 - 1941* Some foreign students who were in
Moscow at the time were present and wrote down, though perhaps not always
accurately and in detail, the most striking excerpts from the discussion.
Despite the possible inaccuracies, there can be no doubt that the discus-
sion was unusually interesting: it testifies to a fairly broad range of
"freedom of speech," to the personal bravery of the speakers, and to a
general hatred of the supposedly revered "great Stalin."
Alexander Paviovich Korushev began the discussion with a criticism
of the "draft's" treatment of the period during the second five-year
Plan* W1nn he said that in 1933, students standing in line to receive
a bowl of soup fainted from hunger, cries of protest were heard in the
auditorium. The speaker answered them by saying that he had seen this
himself. He added that the "draft" ought to describe the conditions and
system of food rationing in more detail. He continued:
Korushev: During the second five-year plan, many projects such as
the White Sea Canal were built by the inhabitants of forced labor
camps who have never been rehabilitated. Only the leaders have
been rehabilitated, not the masses. The IX Volume should at least
mention how many forced laborers took part in these projects. The
condition of the peasants in the kolkhozes should also be described:
in 1933 their condition was worse than in 1929, worse even than in
1913. ("If that is true, then why was the October Revolution nec-
essary?" called Professor Genkina from the auditorium.) The slo-
gans of collectivization were good only for export; there were no
material incentives. The kolkhozniks each received two kilograms
of grain per labor-day while producing 69 kilograms: the state
took over the other 67. The "draft" should mention the distribu-
tion of agricultural produce between those who produced it and the
state. And what about the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939? Were there
any secret clauses? The western press says that there were such
clauses on Poland and other questions. If this is true, it should
be indicated in the "draft"; if it is not true, it should be shown
that the western press is lying. And the war with Finland. What
lessons did the Soviet army learn from it? It is stated in the
draft that the defense industry increased its output by two to two
and a half times in the years 1938 - 1940, but the production of
tanks, arms, and airplanes did not increase at all. What called
(Cont.)
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forth the "increase"? How many officers were liquidated during
the purges? Thirty-three thousand or forty thousand? Our array
was without commanders on the eve of the war. Was there any sort
of plan for conducting the war? The DC Volume should explain why
the commanders of the General Staff were changed so often in the
years 1940-1941, and should tell what the strength of the army was
in men and arms.
In the ensuing discussion, the following people made interesting
comments :
Yekirim: Praise of the fanaticism with which Stalin built social-
ism is out of place in the IX Volume. There was fanaticism before
the period of the "cult," but during the period of the "cult"
Stalin only hindered the construction of socialism. The repres-
sions reached their culmination in 1937. Why doesn't the IX Vol-
ume elucidate the origin of the repressive measures and why does
it say nothing of the fact that torture was used to extract con-
fessions from people? The names of the people who landed in
prison during the "cult" should be enumerated.
Tomunov: It is not true that Hitler's coming to power brought the
downfall of democracy in the Soviet Union. This was Stalin's fault.
The period of the "cult" was a definite epoch in the history of the
USSR, and the DC Volume should explain this, as well as why and to
what extent the people believed in Stalin.
Nekrasova: The five-year plans were unrealistic. This should be
indicated in the discussion of the third five-year plan.
Prof. Genkina: The previous speakers were too critically disposed.
If the slogans of the collectivization were proclaimed only to de-
ceive the west, and the structure of our state has remained the
same as it was in the thirties, then what conclusions are people
to come to? Why would the party have tolerated this for thirty
years? The IX Volume provokes the reader too much. In the latest
historical studies, Stalin is hardly mentioned. This is incorrect,
because students will ask, "and where was Stalin?" In this re-
spect, the I!C Volume maintains the correct point of view. But it
is often repetitive, and there are too many contradictions in it.
It is also untrue to say that there is now no access to the archives.
Genkina's last assertion produced an animated argument among those
present on the extent to which scholars can use the archives for their
studies. Roshal stated that in the Museum of the October Revolution,
the second and seventeenth sections are still closed. It developed that
the second section contained documents on Lenin, but it was not explained
what was In the seventeenth section.
(Cont.)
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Kurits: There are too many contradictions in the IX Volume.
History should be written simply, just as it happened. The puni-
tive agencies of the NKVD should be considered.
Ulyanovskaya: The TX Volume should explain our participation in
the Spanish Civil War and state how many volunteers there were and
how many tanks were sent. It is long since time to reveal these
secrets and many more like them. Was Nikolayev (the assassin of
Kirov) expelled from the party for being a partisan of Zinoviev?
Were the purge trials secret or open? (Voice from the audience:
"If they were open, it was only for agents of the MLVD;") And what
about Gamarnik's suicide? He was buried as an enemy of the people,
but arrested for being too popular. The names of the people who
brought about Pokrovsky's downfall, especially those who are still
active, should be published.
Aleksandr Vlamimirovich Snyegov's speech aroused particular in-
terest. He arrived at the meeting late, after Genkina's speech, and
spoke without notes. His speech met with the approval of those present
on the whole, despite occasional protests.
Snyegov: We agree that the thirties was a period full of contra-
dictions during which the Soviet Union both advanced and fell back
at the same time. The IX Volume's half-truths in its description
of that time still represent tremendous progress in comparison with
the complete lies of previous historical works on the period. The
question arises, "for whom is the IX Volume intended?" To judge
from its composition, it is intended for those who already know a
fair amount about the period. There should consequently be more
names, not necessarily of all those rehabilitated, but certainly
the greater part.
If the Volume does not speak the truth, then it is not history. In
many works on the thirties, kow-towing is mixed with lies - and this is
called history. The IX Volume should describe the artificial obstacles
placed in the path of progress; Kaganovich's role should be explained.
1930 was the most difficult year for agriculture in our history. The
IX Volume should indicate the difficulties which Stalin personally
created during collectivization and explain why, despite these diffi-
culties, collectivization was nonetheless able to move forward. On the
"cult": was there much genuine opposition to Stalin during this period?
In all probability, there was none whatsoever. Was the execution of
Kamenov and Zinoviev for espionage necessary? (Voice from the audience:
"No:") The IX Volume should also make clear who signed falsified docu-
ments for the trials. We all know that there will be other editions of
this volume. The chief editor has an important problem, but words to
express the whole truth ought to be found. The psychological riddle of
Stalin should be resolved and an answer given to the question, "what did
he give the country?" Stalin's provocations of various peoples should
be explained. It should be proved that there was no opposition to Stalin
at this time; the right words must be found to present this. What was
3 (Cont.)
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the significance of the battle with Trotsky? Was it senseless? If
there were only twelve Trotskyites in the concentration camps, can we
conclude that the other 80,000 were Leninists? Soviet historians have
endlessly repeated Stalin's hackneyed phrases about lefts, rights, and
Trotskyites; more sensible terms must be found. All this leads only to
the profanation of our banner in the world; nothing has hurt the cause
of socialism more than Stalin's actions in the thirties.
Was it really necessary to liquidate the Polish revolutionaries in
1938? Wasn't this valuable aid for Hitler? I hope you understand what
I'm talking about. Why is the partition of Poland praised in the IX Vol-
ume? What did it contribute to the defense of the USSR? The eye-
witnesses who are still alive should be consulted. This is a very dif-
ficult volume, and I'm happy that I'm not responsible for it.
Snyegov's speech concluded the first day's discussion, but its
tone dominated the next day's session as well. The following speakers
made the most interesting remarks.
Polikov: This book has many weak places, especially in its descrip-
tion of the events from 1938 - 191+1. It is incorrect to assert
that the trials of 1934-38 were directed solely against the oppo-
sition. The military trials were not trials at all and were con-
ducted in complete secrecy. This must be explained. We have
become accustomed to paint everything in black and white. We must
learn to offer more complex evaluations. Snyegov's position on the
Treaty of 1939 and the partition of Poland is not entirely correct.
Stalin had grounds for his action, namely, the elimination of an
evil perpetrated earlier; the Treaty returned part of Poland and
Byelorussia to us.
Gessen: How are we to explain the rise of the "cult?" The DC
Volume speaks only of repressions, but other sources must be exam-
ined. Nothing is said of the population's material condition; the
volume should have shown what the socialist revolution has given
the people. Nothing is said of Soviet armed might; the details of
the repressions against the military should have been given. Much
has already been written on this in military periodicals. What
was the influence of the repressions on our military preparedness?
The consequences were greater than the mere elimination of the
higher commanders. Tukhachevsky clearly foresaw the development
of the second World War, but since he had been condemned as an
enemy of the people, all his ideas were cast aside. This should
have been discussed, but nothing is said of it in the IX Volume.
Finally, all aspects of the "cult of personality" should be clari-
fied in detail. How did Stalin and his cohorts - Kaganovich,
Malenkov, Molotov - attain their aims?
1+ (Cont.)
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Chaadayeva, an Old Bolshevik, spoke very emotionally:
How do I personally explain the rise of the "cult?" Did we believe
in Stalin? We did. We felt that Stalin didn't take into account
certain aspects of the repressions. It is now time for us to speak
out on the subject. There was a huge difference between Lenin and.
Stalin. Lenin was a great humanist, and this is what attracted us
to him. Even the Menshevik opposition could not help but like him;
Vladimir Ilich admitted his errors: he stated frankly that the
Bolsheviks were making many stupid mistakes, but he justified them
on the basis of the fact that this was their first attempt to govern
a country and conduct a socialist revolution. People heard him,
believed him, and followed him. Lenin listened to the opposition
and learned from it. Before his death, Lenin failed to designate
his successor. Svedlov, whom Lenin had treated as a son, had died.
No one remained to him. He warned the party about Stalin and rec-
ommended the introduction of a collective government. (At this
point, Chaadayeva began a sharp personal attack on Stalin, but
the chairman requested her to limit her remarks to the book.) I
sincerely confess that I don't know how to explain the rise of the
"cult." It was as if the Central Committee had ceased to exist;
Stalin became the only leader. The tragedy of this development was
that when the most important decisions were being considered, the
old tradition of turning to the people and listening to it was
abandoned. From the end of 1929 on, the Cheka ruled the party,
intimidated gatherings, etc. Stalin surrounded himself with people
who set him on a throne and blindly surrendered all power into his
hands. This was a great error: the party should always control the
actions of its leaders.
Lopatov: This Volume is much better than other works on the same
period, and its criticism is much more realistic. However, criti-
cism of the "cult" must go deeper and it must be contrasted with
Leninism. We cannot stop, as has hitherto been done, with super-
ficial criticism. The facts must be set forth in greater detail and
the complex personality of Stalin must be analyzed. This can be
done as it has been done with Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great.
Stalin trampled on all the accepted norms of conduct not only in his
relations with capitalist countries, but with socialist countries
as well. We must speak of his mistakes in this area, as well as the
problem of collectivization. We have payed, dearly for his innumer-
able mistakes. For example, highly trained and educated people went
to work in the country, but they couldn't remain there because the
conditions were too terrible. People arrived and fled. This should
be mentioned. There are many distortions in the draft on the IX
Volume, and they should be eliminated.
5 (Cont.)
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Gusev: The book's structure is incorrect, and there are many rep-
etitions as a result. The contemporary structure of Soviet society
should have been examined. Who, essentially was liquidated? What
social organizations were destroyed, and what significance did this
have? These questions must be answered in order to understand what
happened in the thirties. The IX Volume should describe Stalin's
role in the construction of a personal dictatorship and the trans-
formation of social organizations and institutions into puppets.
The IX Volume, however, should not limit itself to the description
of errors; the Soviet economy developed powerfully, and this should
be stressed.
A young aspirant, whose name was not recorded:
The rise of the "cult" should be described better and more exten-
sively. After the XXII Party Congress, it became clear that the
repressions were not accidents, but Stalin's conscious policy.
Evidence should be given in exact figures. Announcements on the
number of victims have varied from hundreds to millions. It should
also be explained why a number of people have not been rehabili-
tated, despite the fact that evidence on which they were convicted
has been discredited. The IX Volume also leaves important ques-
tions of foreign policy unexplained. Take the war with Finland.
Why did the Soviet army suffer defeats at the beginning? This was,
after all, the army that defeated Hitler.
Yukabovskaya, a member of the editorial board for the IX Volume:
Many specific problems are still insufficiently studied, a fact
which complicated the preparation of the text. Only after the con-
demnation of the "cult of personality" has it become possible to
begin the study of this period. During the period of the "cult,"
we were obliged to write about everything as either exceptionally
good or exceptionally bad - white or black with nothing in between.
But this tendency has remained with us to the present. In this
respect we are still under Stalin's influence. Have we really been
able to give an objective appraisal of any individual, with a delin-
eation of both his good and bad features? (The audience agrees,
"no.") But no one is either a God or a devil. Today we can no
longer write this way; we must write in such a way that we won't be
ashamed of our work in ten years. So we can't use Stalin's methods
in dealing with the "cult." We must be objective. The party would
not have tolerated Stalin if he had been a criminal and a villain.
We have said everything that we could about the trials; they were
not secret. Chervyakov, Ordzhonikdze, and many others committed
suicide.
Danilov: I wish to return to the question about half-truths posed
by Snyegov. It is not true that the entire truth was known to the
authors and that they concealed some of it. Much of the IX Volume
6 (Cont. )
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is based on research conducted earlier. Many problems will have
to be studied more deeply before the rise of the "cult of personal-
ity" is explained:
Verkhin: Before we can answer many of the questions which have
arisen in the course of this discussion, we ought to consider the
basic problem of the role of the individual in history. Similarly,
we must determine the role of the masses before we can answer other
questions. In my opinion, social forces are the most important.
In the final analysis, the rise of the "cult of personality" did
not alter the socialist character of Soviet society and has not
hindered its subsequent development. Consequently, the victory of
socialism in the USSR should be stressed rather than the rise of the
"cult of personality,"
On this note, the Soviet historians' discussion of the treatment of
the treatment of the Stalin period in The History of the USSR from the
Most Ancient Times came to an end. In closing the session, its chairman,
Academician Kim, called the discussion fruitful in that it had uncovered
many shortcomings in the draft of the IX Volume. Some of the speakers
had gone too far, he continued, and made impermissable judgements, as,
for example, Snyegov in his treatment of foreign policy. The chairman
could also not agree with Snyegov's assertion that the authors of the
IX Volume had knowingly written "half-truths": many questions remain
unanswered to the present day so that such a reproach is completely
unfounded.
"I always insist on the truth," said the chairman, "and the truth
is that during the rule of Stalin and with Stalin, we built socialism in
our country." As historians, we should write about what actually happened,
and not about what might have happened or what should have happened. The
question of the "cult of personality" should not cloud our vision of the
fact that our country achieved outstanding successes. The IX Volume is
not a monograph on the "cult of personality" or the repressions which
occurred as a result of it.
Although it may be concluded from the chairman's closing words that
the next (or final) reworking of the draft for the IX Volume will not
differ greatly from the proposed text, the frankness of the speakers and
the very fact that a public discussion of this sort took place in Moscow,
indicates that far reaching changes have occurred in the nature of the
Soviet intelligentsia.
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COMMUNIST CHINESE DEPLORE SOVIET ACTIONS
ON YOUTH MEETING
New China News Agency, English Service,
20 July 1965
Peking, 20 July--The spokesman of the All-China Youth Federation in
a statement today commented on the decision adopted at a recent meeting
of the international preparatory committee of the ninth World Youth and
Student Festival in Tampere, Finland, and on the press statement made by
Petr Reshetov, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organizations,
on 14 July.
He said: The international preparatory committee of the ninth World
Youth Festival held a meeting in Tampere, Finland, from 8 to 10 July.
In spite of the opposition of the Chinese, Indonesian, and Japanese dele-
gates, the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations manipulated the meet-
ing to pass a decision which interfered in Algeria's internal affairs and
called for reconsideration as to the venue of the Festival. In a press
statement in Moscow on 14 July, Petr Reshetov, chairman of the Committee
of Soviet Youth Organizations, expressed full support for the decision
and scurrilously attacked those youth organizations which differed with
it. This is another serious move by the leaders of the Soviet youth or-
ganizations to undermine the festival, interfere in Algeria's internal
affairs, and split the unity of the international youth and student move-
ment.
It has already been decided that the ninth Festival will be held in
Algeria. The Algerian side has repeatedly declared that the ninth fes-
tival would be held in Algeria as was decided earlier. Consequently,
there is no reason whatever to have another discussion. Despite all
this, the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations manipulated the
international preparatory committee of the festival to pass the decision
for "reconsideration' of the question of the venue of the festival.
In his statement of 14 July, Reshetov, while acknowledging that the youth
of Algeria had contributed greatly to the preparatory work of the festival,
once again declared his full support for the erroneous decision of the
international preparatory committee. He, however, made no mention of the
Algerian stand that there should be no change in the venue?..of the festival.
This exposes the hypocrisy and double-dealing on the part of the leaders
of the Soviet youth organizations.
After the Algerian event on 19 June, leaders of the Committee of Soviet
Youth Organizations plotted in the international youth and student organ-
izations under their control to transfer the ninth festival to be held in
Africa for the first time to a place in Europe. Their activities are
known to us and to many other youth organizations. It is no secret at
all. To cover up their sinister activities which cannot bear the light
(Cont.)
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of day, Reshetov actually said that what was said about these activities
was a "lie" fabricated by others. In so doing, he made what he wanted
to conceal more conspicuous. People who have enough common sense would
ask: If they have no intention to transfer the festival from Algeria
in Africa, why should they insist on "reconsideration" of the question
of the venue of the festival, a question already settled? To speak the
truth, they try to change the venue of the festival to suit the foreign
policy of their own country.
It is obvious that the decision adopted on 25 June by the permanent com-
mission for the festival was brazen interference in Algieria's internal
affairs and was strongly opposed by youth organizations of many countries.
The Algerian side in its two communiques issued on 3 July definitely
pointed out this fact. Reshetov in his statement on 14 July once again
supported this decision. Such persistence in crude interference in the
internal affairs of another country is indeed rarely seen in the inter-
national youth movement.
In his statement, Reshetov actually called those who took exception to this
erroneous practice "enemies" who allegedly wanted to "split the youth
movement." The leaders of the Soviet youth organizations took the enemy
as their friend and friend their enemy. They invariably took those anti-
imperialist youth organizations which differed with them as their enemy
and took U.S. imperialism--the real enemy of the youth of all lands--as
their friend. People like them who take the enemy as their friend are
the worst splitters.
It is no accident that the leaders of the Soviet youth organizations com-
mitted these errors. They have long been accustomed to wield the baton
in the international youth movement, to manipulate and make the inter-
national youth and student organizations, including the World Festival
of Youth and Students, serve their general line of "peaceful coexistence"
which means Soviet-American cooperation for world domination.
It may be recalled that it was no other than the leaders of the Soviet
youth organizations who had coerced the international preparatory com-
mittee to submit to the unreasonable demand of the imperialists that the
Algerian delegation must not be allowed to carry the flag of the Algerian
National Liberation Front at the seventh festival in Vienna in 1959. It
was again they who prevented many delegations from carrying anti-
imperialist and anti-U.S. placards in a demonstration and refused to al-
low the Palestine delegation to take part in the festival in the name of
Palestine and under the Palestine flag at the eighth festival in Helsinki
in 1962. It was they who stubbornly opposed having anything anti-
imperialist among the slogans of the ninth festival; they who included
in its program a series of activities, extremely preposterous in character,
to extol the United Nations, a tool of U.S. imperialism, for its aggres-
sion; they who preach "peaceful coexistence" and "general and complete
2 (Cont.)
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disarmement," and they who spread the yellow culture and the American
way of life at the meeting of the ninth festival's international pre-
paratory committee held at the end of last year.
Now they have made use of the ninth festival to interfere in Algeria's
internal affairs. No fine words can gloss over their features from sham
unity and a real split, sham anti-imperialism and real capitulation, and
sham revolution and real sabotage.
Chinese youth resolutely oppose the foul activities of the leaders of
the Soviet youth organizations to undermine the unity of the international
youth movement and the decision adopted at the preparatory committee meet-
ing held in Tampere under their manipulation, for continued interference
in Algeria's internal affairs and sabotage against the holding of the
ninth festival in Algiers. However, the leaders of the Soviet youth organ-
izations may prevaricate and slander, they cannot escape the responsibility
for wrecking the festival, interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, and
splitting the unity of the international youth and students movement.
Additional Details
New China News Agency, English Service, 20 July 1965
Peking, 20 July--The international preparatory committee for the ninth
World Youth Festival held a plenary meeting 8-10 July at Tampere, Finland,
according to a report from Helsinki. Under the manipulation of the Soviet
delegate, the committee rammed through the meeting a resolution which is
a new flagrant act of interference in the internal affairs of Algeria and
a disruptive move to prevent the festival from being held in that country.
This threw further light on the ugly features of the Soviet delegate in
creating a further split in the international youth movement.
The meeting was hurriedly opened on the afternoon of 8 July in the absence
of the Algerian delegate, the chairman of the international preparatory
committee for the festival, and delegates of many other countries. It
had neither a democratically elected leading organ, the presidium, nor
an agenda.
The delegates of China and Indonesia said that the meeting must not be
held without the participation of the delegate from Algeria,, the host
country of the festival. They demanded that the meeting be postponed
until the arrival of the Algerian delegate, but the person who presided
over the meeting, instead of heeding this demand, arbitrarily made the
meeting vote and adopt an absurd procedural proposal advanced by the
Yugoslav delegate. The proposal limited the speech of each of the members
of the preparatory committee to 10 minutes, and in violation of the prac-
tice of international conferences, forbade the observers of the Belgian
Communist Youth Union and other organizations from speaking at the meeting.
3 (Cont.)
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The meeting adjourned after brief morning and afternoon sittings on 9 July.
During this time the Soviet delegate busied himself with conspiratorial
moves behind the scenes and spread malicious rumors about the Algerian
political situation. The Algerian delegate, who had just arrived, spoke
at a sitting that lasted from the evening of 9 July to the early morning
of 10 July. He renewed the demand that the ninth world festival be held
in Algiers. He proposed, however, that its convocation be postponed until
next year.
Chien Ta-wei, head of the Chinese delegation, said that the international
preparatory committee meeting should discuss ways and means of holding
the festival in Algeria so successfully that it would become a grand re-
view of the anti-imperialist forces of the youth of all countries. It
should not discuss the question of the venue of the festival because
that had been decided on a year ago. He expressed firm opposition to
the scheme to prevent the festival from being held in Africa. He reaf-
firmed the demand that the festival be held in Algeria as decided. He
also cited facts to show how the permanent commission under the manipu-
lation of a big power interfered flagrantly in the internal affairs of
Algeria. He demanded that the erroneous resolution of 25 June be rescinded.
When the Chinese delegate spoke a handful of people pounded the tables in
an attempt to create a disturbance.
The delegates of Indonesia and Japan appealed to the youth of all coun-
tries to be vigilant against the scheme of imperialism and its agents to
split the anti-imperialist front and wreck the festival. They demanded
that the festival be held in Algeria as agreed. They exposed the various
despicable schemes to interfere in Algeria's internal affairs. The Ru-
manian delegate said that only the Algerian people had the right to solve
their own problems and no intervention in Algeria's internal affairs should
be allowed.
Soviet Delegate Petr Reshetov failed to mention a single word about hold-
ing the youth festival in Algeria. Instead, he proposed the setting up
of a subcommittee to reconsider the venue of the festival. This fully
exposed the plot of the Soviet delegate to have the festival held outside
Algeria. Reshetov also viciously attacked by insinuation the youth organ-
izations which stood for holding the festival in Algeria.
Singing the same old theme of the Soviet delegate who manipulated the
meeting, some delegates proposed a change in the venue of the festival,
saying that Algeria had no qualifications for the festival. They sug-
gested that a small group be formed to study a new venue and demanded
that the meeting approve the erroneous resolution adopted by the dominant
commission on 25 June.
Before the meeting adopted its resolution, the Chinese, Indonesian, and
Japanese delegates put forth a joint draft resolution reaffirming that
the youth festival should still be held in Algiers and demanding that the
4 (Cont.)
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meeting rescind the erroneous resolution of the dominant commission
which interfered in Algeria's internal affairs and sabotaged the hold-
ing of the youth festival in Algeria. But the draft resolution was
rejected by the Soviet and other delegates. The manipulator of the
meeting forced through a resolution which approved the 25 June resolu-
tion of the dominant commission, and proposed the postponement of the
youth festival and reconsideration of the so-called venue of the festi-
val. When the resolution was put to a vote the Chinese, Indonesian, and
Japanese delegates voted against it and made statements condemning the
undemocratic proceedings of the meeting, pointing out that the resolution
was wrong. The Rumanian delegate abstained from voting.
After the voting the Chinese delegation issued a statement stressing that
the meeting was a very unseemly one. The resolution forced through the
meeting was a continuation of the dominant commission resolution of 25
June which grossly interferred in Algeria's internal affairs. The scheme
was to undermine the holding of the youth festival in Africa. The state-
ment pointed out in conclusion that this nefarious practice by the Soviet
delegate, manipulator of the meeting, could only further split the inter-
national youth movement and that he should be held fully responsible for
the serious consequences arising from his action.
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2 August 1965
Treaty Establishing the
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COi4NNITY
This comprehensive treaty, signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, sets forth
the policies, rules and the provisions for institutions for the European
Economic Community. Articles 1 through 8, which establish the principles
for the Community of the six members -- Belgium, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, French Republic, Italian Republic, Luxembour, and the Netherlands
-- are as follows:
By the present Treaty, the-High Contracting Parties establish among
themselves a EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member
States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States.
For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities
of the Community shall include, under the conditions and with the timing
provided for in this Treaty:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties
and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and ex-
portation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent
effect;
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common com-
mercial policy towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to
the free movement of persons, services and capital;
(d) the inauguration of a common agricultural policy;
(e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;
(Cont.)
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(f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall
not be distorted in the Common Market;
(g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to
co-ordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy dis-
equilibria in their balances of payments;
(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the ex-
tent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market;
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve the
possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising
of their standard of living;
(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank intended to
facilitate the economic expansion of the Community through the creation
of new resources; and
(k) the association of overseas countries and territories with the
Community with a view to increasing trade and to pursuing jointly their
effort towards economic and social development.
ARTICLE 4
1. The Achievement of the tasks entrusted to the Community shall be
ensured by:
--an ASSEMBLY,
--a COUNCIL,
--a COMMISSION,
--a COURT OF JUSTICE.
Each of these institutions shall act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon it by this Treaty.
2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and
Social Committee acting in a consultative capacity.
Member States shall take all general or particular measures which
are appropriate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising
out of this Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims.
They shall abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty.
2 (Cont.)
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ARTICLE 6
1. Member States, acting in close collaboration with the institutions
of the Community, shall co-ordinate their respective economic policies
to the extent that is necessary to attain the objectives of this Treaty.
2. The institutions of the Community shall take care not to prejudice
the internal and external financial stability of Member States.
Within the field of application of this Treaty and without prejudice
to the special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the
grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited.
The Council may, acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a
proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, lay
down rules in regard to the prohibition of any such discrimination.
ARTICLE 8
1. The Common Market shall be progressively established in the course
of a transitional period of twelve years.
The transitional period shall be divided into three stages of four
years each; the length of each stage may be modified in accordance with
the provisions set out below.
2. To each stage there shall be allotted a group of actions which shall
be undertaken and pursued concurrently.
3. Transition from the first to the second stage shall be conditional
upon a confirmatory statement to the effect that the essence of the ob-
jectives specifically laid down in this Treaty for the first stage has
been in fact achieved and that, subject to the exceptions and procedures
provided for in this Treaty, the obligations have been observed.
This statement shall be made at the end of the fourth year by the
Council acting by means of a unanimous vote on a report of the Commission.
The invocation by a Member State of the non-fulfilment of its own obliga-
tions shall not, however, be an obstacle to a unanimous vote. Failing a
unanimous vote, the first stage shall automatically be extended for a
period of one year.
At the end of the fifth year, the Council shall make such confirm-
atory statement under the same conditions. Failing a unanimous vote,
the first stage shall automatically be extended for a further period of
one year.
3 (Cont.)
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At the end of the sixth year, the Council shall make such a state-
ment acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a report of the Com-
mission.
4+. Within a period of one month as from the date of this last vote,
each Member State voting in a minority or, if the required majority vote
has not been obtained, any Member State, shall be entitled to require the
Council to appoint an Arbitration Board whose decision shall bind all
Member States and the institutions of the Community. The Arbitration
Board shall be composed of three members appointed by the Council acting
by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission.
If the Council has not within a period of one month from the date
of such requirement, appointed the members of the Arbitration Board, they
shall be appointed by the Court of Justice within a further period of one
month.
The Arbitration Board shall appoint its Chairman.
The Board shall give its award within a period of six months from
the date of the vote by the Council referred to in paragraph 3, last
sub-paragraph.
5. The second and third stages may not be extended or curtailed except
pursuant to a decision of the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote
on a proposal of the Commission.
6. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not have the effect
of extending the transitional period beyond a total duration of fifteen
years after the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.
7. Subject to the exceptions or deviations provided for in this Treaty,
the expiry of the transititonal period shall constitute the final date
for the entry into force of all the rules laid down and for the comple-
tion of all the measures required for the establishment of the Common
Market.
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th aft; Con: t,itution Text
Socialist Rcpulblic of Rumania
Junr' 146Y
Article 1-Rumania is a socialist republic. The Socialist Republic of Rumania
is a state of town and village working people. It is sovereign , independent,
and single entity. Its territory is inalienable and indivisible.
Article 2--All power in the Socialist Republic of Rumania belongs to the people,
who are free and masters of their destiny. The people's power is based on the
worker-peasant alliance. In close unity the working class, the leading class
in society, the peasantry, intellectuals, and other categories of working people,
regardless of nationality, are building the socialist system and creating
conditions for the transition to communism.
Article 3--The leading political force of, the entire society of the Socialist
Republic of Rumania is the Rumanian Communist Party.
Article 4-.-As the sovereign holders of power, the people implement this
power through the Grand National Assembly and people's councils, bodies elected
by universal, equal, direct, and secret vote. The Grand National Assembly and
people's councils form the basis of the entire system of state organs. The
Grand National Assembly is the supreme organ of state power, and all. other
state organs carry out their activities under its leadership and supervision.
Article 5--Rumania's national economy is a socialist economy based on socialist
ownership of production means. In the Socialist Republic of Rumania, exploitation
of man by man is abolished forever, and the socialist system of remuneration in
accordance with the quantity and quality of work is being implemented. Work
is a task of honor for each citizen able to work.
Article 6--Socialist ownership of production means is either state ownership of
goods belonging to all the people or cooperative ownership of goods belonging to
all cooperative organizations.
Article 7--All underground resources--mines, state land, forests, water, and natural
energy sources..-plants and factories, banks, state farms, MTS, communications,
state transport and telecommunications means, the state building and apartments
fund, and the material base of state social-cultural institutions belong to all
the people. They are state property.
Article 9--The land of agricultural production cooperatives and livestock,
implements, installations, and buildings belonging to them are cooperative
property. Plots of land which, in accordance with the statutes of agricultural
production cooperatives, are alloted for family, farming by cooperative peasants
are cooperative property. Living quarters and annexfarm structures, the land
on which,they'are situated, and,'in accordance with the statutes of agricultural
production cooperatives, productive livestock and'smal1 agricultural
inventories are the personal property of cooperative peasants.
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Tools, machines, installations, and buildings of artisan and consumer
cooperatives are cooperative property.
article 10--Agricultural production cooperatives, a socialist form of agricultural
organization, insure conditions for intensive land cultivation and the application
of advanced science. By increasing production, they contribute to development of
the national economy and a constant improvement in the living standards of the
peasantry and all people. The state supports agricultural production cooperatives
and protects their property. The state also supports other cooperative organizations
and protects their property.
Article 11--Undet the conditions of cooperativized agriculture; the state
guarantees by law for peasants who cannot associate themselves in agricultural
production cooperatives ownership of the land that they themselves till with
their families and ownership of implements used for this purpose. Ownership
by artisans of their workshops is also guaranteed.
Article 12--Land and buildings can be expropriated only for projects in the
public interest and against payment of just compensation.
Article 13--The purpose of all state activities is development of the socialist
system, constant improvement of the people's material and cultural well-being.,
the guarantee of man's freedom and dignity, and comprehensive affirmation of the
human personality. For this purpose, the Rumanian socialist state organizes,
plans, and directs the national economy, protects socialist property, guarantees the
full exercise of citizens' rights, insures socialist legality and protection
under the law, develops education of all categories, insures conditions for the
development of science, art, and culture, carries out health protection,
guarantees the country's defense and organizes its armed forces, and pursues
relations with the other states.
Article 14--The Socialist Republic of Rumania maintains and develops relations
of friendship and fraternal collaboration with the socialist countries, fosters
relations of collaboration with countries having other social-political systems,
and works in international organizations in order to insure peace and under-
standing among people. The foreign relations of the Socialist Republic of Rumania
are based on principles of respect for sovereignty and national independence,
equality of rights and mutual advantages, and noninterference in internal affairs.,
Article 15--The territory of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is organized in
territorial administrative units known as regions, rayons, towns, and communes.
Regions of the Socialist Republic of Rumania are Arges, Bacau, Banat, Brasov,
Bucharest, Cluj, Crisana, Dobrogea, Galati, Hunedoara, Iasi, Maramures,
Mures-Hungarian autonomous, Oltenia, Ploesti, and Suceava. Capital of the
Socialist Republic of Rumania is the city of Bucharest.
Article 16--Rumanian citizenship is acquired and lost in accordance with the law.
II--Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens:
Article 17--Citizens of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, regardless of
nationality, race, sex, or religion, enjoy equal rights in all fields of
economic, political, juridical, social, and cultural life. The state guarantees
the equality of rights of citizens. No limitation on these rights and no
discrimination in their exercise on the basis of nationality, race, sex, or
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religion are permitted. Any manifestation intended to establish such
limitations, nationalistic-chauvinistic propaganda, or the incitement of racial
or national hatred are punishable by law.
Article 18--Citizens have the right to work. Each citizen is insured the
opportunity of engaging, in accordance with his training, in activities in the
economic, administrative, social, or cultural fields with remuneration according
to quantity and quality. For equal work, the salary is equal. Measures for
work protection and security and special measures for the work protection of
women and youth are established by law.
'Article 19--Citizens are entitled to rest. This right is guaranteed for those
who work by stipulating eight hours as the maximum length of the working.day,~
a weekly rest, and annual paid holidays. In sectors of heavy and very heavy
work, the duration of the working day is reduced below eight hours without a
reduction in wages.
Article 20--Citizens are entitled to material insurance for old age, illness, or
work incapacity. The right of workers and employees to material insurance is
achieved by pensions and sickness benefits granted within the framework of the
state social insurance system and of members of cooperative organizations or
other public organizations by forms of insurance organized by them.
The state insures medical aid through its medical institutions. Paid maternity
holidays are guaranteed.
Article 21--Citizens are entitled to schooling. The right to schooling is
insured through eight-year general and compulsory elementary schools,, all
categories of free education, and the system of state scholarships. Education
in the Socialist Republic of Rumania is state education.
Article 22--Cohabiting nationalities are insured the free use of their mother
tongue, as well as of books, newspapers, magazines, the theater, and all categories
of education in their own tongue. In rayons also inhabited by a nationality
other than Rumanian, all organs and institutions orally and in writing also use
the language of the respective nationality and appoint employees from its ranks
or other citizens who know the language and the way of life of the local population.
Article 23--Women have the same rights as men. The state protects (the sanctity
of--ed.) marriage and the family and the.interests of mother and child.
Article 24--Youth are insured necessary conditions for development of their
physical-and intellectual. abilities.
Article 25--Citizens have the right to elect and be elected to the Grand National
Assembly and people's councils. Voting'is universal, equal, direct, and secret.
All citizens 18 years and older are entitled to vote.
Citizens w#h voting rights who are 23 years or older can be elected deputies. to the
Grand.Natiortal Assembly and people's councils.. The right to nominate candidates
is insured for all working people's and Rumanian Communist Party organizations,
trade unions, cooperatives, youth and women's organizations, cultural associations,
and other mass and public organizations.
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Voters have the right to recall a deputy at any time in accordance with the
procedure on whosr basis he was nominated and elected.
The insane and mentally retarded and persons deprived of their rights for a period
determined by judicial sentence do not have the right to elect or be elected.'.
Article 26--The most progressive and conscious citizens from the ranks of workers,
peasants, intellectuals, and other categories of working people unite in the Rumanian
Communist Party, the highest form of organization of the working class and its
vanguard detachment. The Rumanian Communist Party expresses and faithfully serves
the people's aspirations and vital interests, fulfills the leadership role in all
fields of socialist construction, and directs the activities'of mass and public
organizations and state organs.
Article 27--Citizens are entitled to join trade union, cooperative, youth, women's,.
and social-cultural organizations, creative unions, scientific, technical, and
sports associations, and other public organizations. The state supports the
activities of mass and public organizations, creates conditions for development of
the material base of these organizations, and protects their assets in accordance
with the law. Mass and public organizations insure the broad participation of
the people's masses in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the
Socialist Republic of Rumania and the exercise of public control, the expression of
the democracy of the socialist system. The Rumanian Communist Party achieves an
organized link with the working class, peasantry, intellectuals, and other
categories of working people and mobilizes them in the struggle to achieve construction
of socialism.
Article 28--Freedom of speech, press, gatherings, meetings, and demonstrations is
guaranteed for citizens of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
Ye
Article 29-Freedom of speech, press, gatherings, meetings, and demonstrations cannot
be used for purposes contrary to the socialist system and the interests of those
who work.. Any association of a fascist or antidemocratic nature is prohibited.
Participation in such associations and propaganda of a fascist or antidemocratic
nature are'punishable by law.
Article 30--Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all citizens. Everybody is free to
have or not to have a religious faith. Freedom to practice religion is guaranteed.
Religious cults are organized and operate freely. The mode of organization and
operation of religious cults is regulated by law. The school.is separated from the
church. No religious faith, congregation, or community may open or.maintain education:
institutions other than special schools for the training of religious staff.
Article 31--Citizens are guaranteed the inviolability of the individual. No one may
be detained or arrested if no proof or solid evidence exists that he has perpetrated
an act punishable by law. Investigative organs may order the detention of a person.
for a maximum. duration of 24 hours.. No one may be arrested except on the basis of a
warrant issued by the court or prosecutor.
Article 32--Domicile is inviolate. No one may enter the residence of a person without
his consent except in cases and under conditions specifically stipulated by law.
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Article 33--The secrecy of correspondence and telephone conversations is
guaranteed.
Article 34--The right to petition is guararteed. State organs are obliqed to
solve in accordance with law citizens petitions regarding personal or puuiic rights
and.interests.
Article 35--A person whose right is violated by an illegal action of a state
organ may request the competent organs, under conditions stipulated by law, to annul
the action and compensate for the damage..
Article 36--The right to hold personal property is protected by law. Personal
property,may consist of income and savings resulting from work, living. quarters
with an attached farm and the land on'which both are situated, or goods for
;personal use and comfort.
Article 38--The Socialist Republic of Rumania grants the right of asylum to
foreign citizens persecuted for their activities in defense of the interests of those
who work or for participation in the struggle for national liberation or defense of
peace.
Article 39--Each citizen is dutybound to respect the constitution and laws, protect
socialist property, and contribute to the strengthening and development of the
socialist system.
Article 40--Military service in the armed forces is compulsory and a duty of honor
for citizens.
Article 41--Defense of the homeland is the sacred duty of each citizen. Violation of
the military oath, betrayal of the homeland, desertion to the enemy, and the
damaging of the state's defensive ability are the most serious crimes against the
people and punishable with the full serverity of the law.
III--(Words indistinct) Grand National Assembly:
Article 42--T:e Grand National Assembly, supreme organ of state power, is the
unique legislative organ of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
Article 43--The Grand National Assembly has the following main duties:
A--It adopts and modifies the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
B--It controls the electoral system.
C--It approves the state national economic plan and the state budget and makes the general
accounting at the end of the budget period.
D--It organizes the Council of Ministers, ministries, and other central organs of
state administration.
E--It controls organization of the judiciary and the procuratura.
F--It establishes norms of organization and operation of people's councils.
G--It establishes administrative organization of the territory.
11--It grants amnesties.
5
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I--It ratifies and abrogates international agreements which require modification of
the laws.
controls :(ooti' rbleaza)' 1tb' guidance decisions.
Q--It controls the activities of the procuratura.
R--It exercises general control over the activities of people's councils.
S--It establishes the general line of foreign policy.
J--It elects and recalls the State Council.
K--It elects and recalls the Supreme Court and prosecutor general.
M--It exercises general control over implementation of the constitutionality of laws.
N--It controls the activities of the State Council'.
0--It controls other central organs of state administration.
P--It hears accountability reports on the activities of the Supreme Court and
T--In the interests of defense of the country, public order, and state security,
it proclaims a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout the entire
territory of the country.
V--It declares a state of war. A state of war can be declared only in the event
of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Rumania or against another
state with which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has mutual defense obligations
under international treaties, or in the event of a situation for which the
obligation to declare a state of war is established.
W--It appoints and recalls the supreme commander of the Armed Forces.
Article 44.-Grand National Assembly deputies are elected for electoral precincts
with similar numbers of inhabitants. The delimitation of electoral precincts
id done by State Council decree. One deputy is elected from each electoral
precinct. The Grand National Assembly consists of 465 deputies.
Article 45--The Grand National Assembly is elected for a four-year legislative
period determined from the date of the end of the mandate of the previous Grand
National Assembly. The Assemblyts mandate remains valid undil expiration of the
term for which it was elected. If it finds that circumstances make it impossible
to hold elections, the Grand National Assembly may decide to extend its mandate
for the period covering these circumstances.
Article 46--Elections to the Grand National Assembly take place on one of the non-
working days of the last month of each legislature. The date of the elections is
fixed at least 60 days beforehand. The newly elected Grand National Assembly
is convened during the three months following expiration of the previous Grand
National Assembly mandate.
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Article 47--The Grand National Assembly checks the legality of the election of
each deputy and decides on the validation or anhullment of the election. If an
election is annulled, the deputy's rights and duties cease at the m(nrent of
annullment.
Article 48--The Grand National Assembly adopts its own rules of operation.
Article 49--The Grand National Assembly annually fixes its budget, which is
included in the state budget.
Article 50--Foe the legislative period, the Grand National Assembly elects the
Grand National Assembly Bureau, which consists of the Grand National Assembly
chairman and four deputy chairmen.
Article 51?-The Grand National Assembly chairman presides over the sessions of
the Grand National Assembly. He may designate any of the deputy chairmen to
carry out some of his tasks.
Article 52--The Grand National Assembly elects deputies to permanent committees.
Permanent committees make reports on or advise regarding draft laws on problems
sent to them by the Grand National Assembly chairman for study in accordance
with their competence. Upon the request of the State Council, the permanent
committees submit advice on draft decrees having the force of law. The Grand
National Assembly may set up temporary committees for any problems or fields of
activity and stipulate the powers of and the mode of activities by each of
these committees. All state organs and employees are dutybound to make
requested information and documents available to Grand National Assembly
commi.ttee s .
Article 53--In exercising control over the constitutionality of the laws, the
Grand National Assembly sets up a constitutional committee for the legislative
period. Without exceeding one-third of the total number of committee members,
specialists who are not deputies, members of the Supreme Court, and teaching
cadres of the higher education and scientific research networks may be elected
to the constitutional committee. The committee submits to the Grand National
Assembly reports and advice on its own initiative or at the request of organs
stipulated in Assembly operational rules.
Article 54--The Grand National Assembly works in sessions. Its ordinary sessions
are convened two times each year.. The Grand National Assembly is convened when-
ever necessary in extraordinary sessions on the initiative of the State Council
or of at least one-third of the total number of deputies.
Article 55--The Grand National Assembly functions only if at least one-half plus
one of the total number of deputies are present.
Article 56--The,Grand National Assembly approves laws and decisions. Laws and
decisions are considered approved if they receive a majority vote of the Grand
National Assembly deputies. The constitution is adopted and amended with a
vote of at least two-thirds of the total number of the Grand National Assembly
deputies. Laws and decisions of the Grand National Assembly are signed by the
Assembly chairman or the vice chairman who presided over the session.
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iQrtiele 57--After approval. by the Grand National Assembly, laws are published
in the official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Rumania within 10 days at
the latest under the signature of the State Council chairman.
Article 58-.Each Grand National Assembly deputy has the right to ask questions
and interpellate the Council of Ministers or any of its members. Within the
framework of control exercised by the Grand National Assembly, a deputy may ask
questions of and interpellate the Supreme Court chairman and prosecutor general.
A person asked or interpellated is dutybound to give a verbal or written answer
within three days at the latest and, in any case, during the same session.
Article 59--For the preparation of Grand National Assembly debates or interpel-
lations, a deputy has the right to demand necessary information from any state
organ, addressing himself for this purpose to the Grand National Assembly Bureau.
Article 60--Each deputy is dutybound to periodically submit to voters accountability
reports regarding his activities and those of the Grand National Assembly.
Article 61--No Grand National Assembly deputy may be detained, arrested, or sent
for penal trial during a session without prior consent of the Grand National
Assembly or between sessions without State Council consent. A deputy may be
detained without such consent only in the event of a flagrant infraction.
Article 62--The State Council is the supreme organ of state power with permanent
activity and subordinated to the Grand National Assembly.
A--It fixes the date of elections to the Grand National Assembly and people's
councils.
B--It appoints and recalls leaders of central organs:of:istate'administration
who are not members of the Council of Ministers.
D--It establishes and awards the decorations and titles of honor and authorizes
the wearing of decorations awarded by other states.
F--It grants citizenship, approves the surrender of citizenship, and withdraws
Rumanian citizenship.
G--It grants the right of asylum.
H--It ratifies and abrogates international treaties except those whose ratification
or abrogation is within the competence of the Grand National Assembly..
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I--It establishes the ranks of the diplomatic missions and accredits and recalls
the diplomatic representatives of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
J--It receives letters of credence and recall of the diplomatic representatives
of other states.
K--Ir, international relations, the State Council through its chairman represents
the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
Article 64--The State Council has the following main duties during periods between
Grand National Assembly sessions:
A--It convenes Grand National Assembly sessions.
B--Without amending the constitution, it establishes norms with power of law. Norms
with power of law are submitted to the first Grand National Assembly session for
debate in accordance with the procedure for adoption of laws. The state national
economic plan, state budget, and general accounting at the end of the budget period
are approved by the State Council only when the Grand National Assembly cannot meet
because of exceptional circumstances.
C--It appoints and recalls the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the
prosecutor general when the Grand National Assembly cannot meet because of
exceptional circumstances.
D--It gives laws in force their compulsory general interpretation.
E--It grants amnesty.
F--It controls the application of the laws and decisions of the Grand National
Assembly, the activities of the Council of Ministers, ministries, other central
organs of state administration, and the procuratura, hears the accountability
reports of the Supreme Court and controls its guidance decisions, and controls the
documents of people's councils.
G--It appoints and recalls members of the Council of Ministers at the proposal of
its chairman.
H--It appoints and recalls the chairman and members of the Supreme Court.
I--In the interests of defending the Socialist Republic of Rumania and insuring
public order and state security, it proclaims, in cases of urgency, a state of
emergency in localities or throughout the entire territory of the country.
J--In cases of urgency, it declares partial or general mobilization.
K--In cases of urgency, it declares a state of war. A state of war can only be
declared in the event of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Rumania
or against another state with which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has mutual
defense obligations under international treaties, or in the event of a situation
for which the obligation to declare war is established.
L--It appoints and recalls the supreme commander of the Armed Forces.
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Article 65--The State Council is elected by the first session of the Grand National
Assembly from among its members for the duration of the legislature. The State
Council functions until election of the new State Council during the following
legislature.
Article 66--The State Council consists of the chairman, three deputy chairmen, and.
15 members. It elects a secretary from among its members.
Article 67--The State Council carries out its activities in accordance with the
principle of collective leadership.
Article 68--The State Council issues decrees and adopts decisions signed by its
chairman. Decrees with power of law are published in the official bulletin of
the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
Article 69--The State Council submits to the Grand National Assembly accountability.
reports on the implementation of its tasks and the observance and implementation in,
state activities of the laws and decisions of the Grand National Assembly. The
State Council as a whole and each of its members are responsible to the Grand National
Assembly. State Council members are responsible for their own activities, as well
as for all State Council activities.
IV--Central Organs of State Administration:
Article 70--The Council of Ministers is the supreme organ of`sta'te administration.
The Council of Ministers exercises'general leadership of executive'.aetivities
throughout the country and has'the following main duties:
A--It establishes general measures for implementation of the internal and foreign
policy of the state.
B--It organizes and insures implementation of laws. ,
C--It leads, coordinates, and controls the activities of ministries and other central
organs of state administration.
D--It takes, steps to insure public order and protect state interests and
the rights of citizens.
E--It draws up the draft state plan and draft state budget and makes the general
accounting at the end of the'budget period.
F--It establishes measures for implementation of the state plan and budget.
G--It sets up enterprises, state economic organizations, and institutions of
republican' interest.
H--It sets the annual figure of citizens who will be called up for military service
and takes steps for general organization of the Armed Forces.
I--It exercises general leadership in the field of relations with other states
and takes steps to sign international agreements.
J--It suspends the decisions of regional people's councils which do not conform
with law.
K--It exercises leadership, guidance, and general control of the activities of the
executive committees of all people's councils.
10
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Article 71--The Council of Ministers is elected by the first session of the Grand
National Assembly for the legislative duration. The Council of Ministers functions
until election of the new Council of Ministers by the next legislature.
Article 72--In fulfillment of its tasks, the Council of Ministers approves decisions
on the basis of and for implementation of the laws. Decisions of a normative
nature are published in the official bulletin of the.Socialist Republic of Rumania.
Article 73--The Council of Ministers consists of the chairman, the deputy chairmen
of whom one or more may be first deputy chairmen, ministers, and leaders of other
central organs'of state administration as stipulated by law.
Article 74--The Council of Ministers carries out its activities on the basis of the
principle of collective leadership and insures the political and administrative
unity of action of ministries and other central organs of state administration.
Article 75--The Council of Ministers as a whole and each of its members are
responsible to the Grand National Assembly and, during the interval between sessions,
to the State Council. Each member of the Council of Ministers is responsible for
his own activities, as well as for the entire activities of the Council of Ministers.
Article 76--Ministries and the other central organs of state administration implement
state policy in branches of fields of activity for which they were set up.
Article 77--Ministers and leaders of other central organs of state administration
issue, on the basis of and for implementation of the laws and decisions of the
Council of Ministers,, instructions and orders, as well'as other documents stipulated
by law. Their documents, which are of a normative nature, are published in the
official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Rumania.
Article 78--Ministers and leaders of other central organs of state administration
are responsible to the Council of Ministers for the activities of the organs which
they head.
V--Local Organs of State Power and Local Organs of State Administration:
Article 79--People's councils are local organs of state power in regions, rayons,
towns, and communes. People's councils direct local activities, insuring the economic,
social-cultural, and administrative development of the territorial administrative
units where they have been elected, the maintenance of public order and socialist
legality, and protection of citizens' rights. People's councils organize the
participation of citizens in the solution of state and public affairs on a local
level.
Article 80--A people's council has the following main duties:
A--It approves the budget, local economic plan, and the general accounting at the
end of the budget period,
B--It elects and recalls its executive committee.
C--It sets up enterprises, economic organizations, and state institutions of local
interest.
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D--It directs, guides, and controls the activities of its executive committee,
local specialized irgans of state administration, and-subordinated enterprises
and institutions.
Article 81--People's councils consist of deputies elected in electoral precincts.
One deputy is elected per precinct. Electoral precincts established for
elections of people's council deputies have similar populations. The duration
of the mandate of a people's council is four years with the exception of a,
communal people's council, which is two years. The duration of the mandate is
determined from the date of expiration of the mandate of the previous people's
council. New elections take place on one of the nonworking days of the last
month of the people's council mandate.
Article 82--People's councils elect deputies to permanent committees which
support the councils in fulfillment of their duties.
Article 83--People's councils work in sessions,' which are convened by their
executive committees. Extraordinary sessions are convened on the initiative
of executive committees or at the request of at least one-third of-the total
number of deputies.
Article 84--People's councils function when at least one-half plus one of the
total number of deputies are present. At each session, a people's council
elects a presidium to direct its work.
Article 85--Each people's council deputy is periodically required to submit to
voters accountability reports regarding his activities and those of the people's
council to which he has been elected.
Article 86--People's councils adopt decisions by a majority vote of
council deputies. Decisions of a normative nature are brought to the notice
of citizens in the manner stipulated by law.
Article 87--The executive committee of a people's council is the local organ of
state administration enjoying general competence in the territorial administrative
unit in which the people's council has been elected.
Article 88--The executive committee of a people's council has the following main
duties:
A--It implements the laws, decrees, and decisions of the Council of Ministers
and other documents of higher organs.
B--It implements the decisions of the people's council which elected it.
C--It draws up the draft local budget and economic plan and makes the general
accounting at the end of the budget period.
D--It implements the local budget and economic plan.
E--It directs, guides, and controls the activities of special local organs of
state administration and subordinated institutions and enterprises.
F--It directs, guides, and controls the activities of executive committees of
people's souncils which are lesserti ranking than the people's council which
elected its.
12
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G--It suspends decisions which do not conform with the laws of people's councils
directly subordinated to the people's council which elected it.
Article 89--An executive committee is elected by the first session of a people's
council,from among its deputies for the duration of the people's council .,.andate.
After expiration of the people's council mandate, the executive committee continues to
function until election of the new executive committee.
Article 90--An executive committee of a people's council consists of the chairman,
deputy chairmen, and a number of members established by law. The executive committee
carries out its activities in accordance with the principle of collective leadership.
Article 91-1n exercising its tasks, an executive committee of a people's council issues
decisions on the basis of and'for implementation of the law. ' Decisions of a
normative nature are brought to the notice of citizens in the manner stipulated by law.
Article 92--An executive committee is responsible for its activities to the people's
council which elected'it. The executive committee is also responsible to the executive
committee of the higher ranking people's council. The executive committee of a
regional people's council is reponsible to the Council of Ministers.
Article 93--Special local organs of state administration are organized and operate at
executive committeees of regional, rayon, and town.people's councils in accordance with
the law.
Article 94--Justice is implemented through the Supreme Court, regional courts, people's
courts, and military courts established in accordance with the law.
Article 95--By their trial activities, the courts defend the socialist system and
people's rights, educating citizens in a spirit of respect for the law. By applying
penal sanctions, courts seek to correct and reeducate violators and prevent new
violations.
Article 96--Courts try civil, penal, and any other cases within their competence.
In cases stipulated by law, courts exercise control over the decisions of administrative
or public organs involved in jurisdictional activities. Courts hear the pleas of
those whose rights have been violated by administrative actions and can also decide
Article 97--The Supreme Court exercises general control over the trial activities of
all courts. The method of exercising this control is established by law. For standardized
implementation of law in; trial activities,-the Supreme, Court issues guidance decisions.
Article 98--The Supreme Court is elected by the first session of the Grand National
assembly for the legislative duration. The Supreme Court functions until election of
the new Supreme Court of the next legislature.
Article 99--The Supreme Court is responsible in its activities to the Grand National
Assembly and between sessions to the State Council.
Article 100--6rgganization of the courts, their competence, and trial procedure are
established by'law. The trying of cases of the first instance in people's courts,
regional courts, and military courts is carried out with the participation of people's
assessors. The exception is cases which the law. disposes otherwise.
Article 101--Judges,and people's assessors are elected in accordance with procedure
established by law.1
13
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V
'article 102--Judicial proceedings are in the Rumanian language but insuring in
regions and rayons Inhabited by a population of a nationality other than Rumanian
the use of the mother tongue of the respective population. Parties which do not
speak the language in which judicial proceedings take place are insured the
possibility of becoming acquainted with the dossier with the help of translators and
the right to plead in court in their mother tongue.
Article 103--Trial is public with the exception of cases stipulated by law.
Article 104--In trial activities, judges and people's
accountable only to the law.
assessors are independent and
Article 105--The right of defense is guaranteed in trials,
VII--Procuratura Organs:
Article 106--The procuratura of the Socialist Republic of Rumania supervises observance
of the law by ministries and other central organs of state administration, local organs
of state administration, organs of penal prosecution, courts, officials, and other,
citizens.
Article 107--The procuratura is headed by the prosecutor general. Procuratura--organs
include the procuratura general, the regional, rayon, and town procuratura, and the
military procuratura; Procuratura organs are hierarchically subordinated; to one
another.
Article-108.-The prosecutor general is elected by the first session of the Grand
National Assembly for the legislative duration and functions until election of the
new prosecutor general by the first session of the next legislature. Prosecutors
are appointed by the prosecutor general.
Article 109--The prosecutor general is responsible to the Grand National Assembly for
procuratura activities and in the interval between sessions to the State Council.
VIII--Emblems of the Socialist Republic of Rumania:
Article 110--The emblem of the Socialist Republic of Rumania consists of mountains
covered by forests above which the sun rises. On the left side of the emblem is an
oil well. The emblem is framed by a garland of wheat. There is a five-pointed
star on the upper part. At the bottom of the emblem, the garland is wrapped in a
tricolor band bearing the inscription "Socialist Republic of Rumania."
Article 111--The state seal bears the national emblem encircled by the inscription
"Socialist Republic of Rumania."
Article 112--The flag of the Socialist Republic of Rumania consists of vertical red,
yellow, and blue bands with the blue innermost and the national emblem in the center.
Article-113--The state anthem will be approved by the Grand National Assembly.
IX--Final and Transitional Dispositions:
Article 114--The present constitution becomes valid on the date on which it is approved.
Article 115--The constitution of 24 September 1952 and any dispositions in laws, decrees,
and other normative acts contrary to the provisions of the present constitution are
abroggtad as of the same date.
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Article 116--Banknotes and metal coins bearing the current name of the state, the
Rumanian People's Republic, and the bank of the Rumanian People's Republic, the
State Bank, will continue to be fully valid. They will be withdrawn from circulation
only as they become worn. Banknotes and metal coins to be placed in circulation in
accordance with legal dispositions bearing the new name of the state, the Socialist
Republic of Rumania, and the new name of, the bank, the National Bank of the Socialist
Republic of Rumania, will circulate with present currency.
15
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Fact Sheet Background Use Only
2 August 1965
Chronology of Events Related
to PKI Influence in Indonesian Government
August 17, 1964: President Sukarno indirectly denounced those who try to
impede the growth of Communist power as "hypocrites" and accused them of
sabotaging his Nasakom policy.
24 August 1964: Cabinet reorganization gave increased influence to PKI
as pro-Communist was named Labor Minister and Njoto (Second Deputy Chair-
man of PKI) was brought into Cabinet as minister of state attached to the
presidium.
November 1, 1964: Sukarno visited China and he and Chou En-lai issued a
communique on their "complete unanimity" of views.
November 27, 1964: Chen Yi visited Indonesia and public statements stressed
Indonesian-Chinese Communist community of interests.
December 3, 1964: Editor of Revolusi arrested and charged with causing in-
ternal disunity because he allowed attacks on the PKI to appear in his
newspaper.
December 18, 1964: Sukarno bans the "Body for the Protection of Sukarnoism,
an anti-Communist consortium, from public activity.
January 3, 1965: Sukarno withdraws from UN in spite of requests from other
non-aligned nations not to do so. Only Communist China applauded his move.
January 5, 1965: Sukarno bans .Murba Party, a nationalist party of Marxist
orientation, from public activity. PKI was instrumental in bringing about
the ban.
24 January 1965: Sukarno hails close ties with Communist China in welcom-
ing General Kuang Jen-nung to Indonesia.
29 January 1965: Communist China and Indonesia announce agreement on
China's extension of 100 million dollars in credits to Indonesia.
24 February 1965: Sukarno says Indonesia can no longer afford freedom of
the press as he bans several anti--Communist papers.
1 April, 1965: Cabinet reshuffle demotes anti-Communist ministers Saleh
and Malik and strengthens role of Subandrio and PKI.
(Cont. )
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1 May 1965: Sukarno appoints pro-Communist minister to organize May Day
celebration which PKI is allowed to turn into typical Communist demonstra-
tion.
23 May 1965: President Sukarno addresses PKI rally and warns against anti-
PKI activities by other groups in Indonesia.
10 June 1965: In lecture to military leaders, Sukarno lends tactic support
to PKI Chairman Aidit proposal for a Nasakom Board to advise the armed-
forces leadership on political affairs.
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Fact Sheet Background Use Only
2 August 1965
_Excerpts of Sukarno Speech
At PKI Anniversary Rally
What Brother Aidit said just now was true. He said that in the past
weeks, there was commotion in the camp of the imperialists, first, because
the PKI was going to observe its 45th founding anniversary on a large scale,
and second, because at the PKI founding anniversary rally, the President
of the Indonesian Republic, Sukarno, would be present and deliver a speech.
There was a commotion within as well as outside the imperialist group.
In the framework of the policy we are pursuing, namely the policy
which I have advocated since long ago, the policy of unifying all pro-
gressive revolutionary forces, it is no wonder that the Indonesian Repub-
lican Government embraces the PKI. That I, as mandatary of the MPRS em-
brace the PKI, and that I, as great leader of the Indonesian revolution,
embrace the PKI. This is because the PKI is unde.iiably a strong element
in the task of completing the revolution.
Just now Brother Aidit mentioned why the PKI has become a great
party and why it has expanded. The PKI has become strong. The PKI is
now a party with a membership of 3 million persons, with 3 million youths,
and 20 million sympathizers. Why has the PKI become this kind of a party?
It is because the PKI consistently has been a progressive revolutionary
party. There is no doubt, brothers, that the Indonesian revolution can-
not be completed if all pregressive revolutionary forces are not unified
into one force. I embrace the PKI.
Speaking of Nasakom, brothers, I once told the Indonesian public
that all delegations to the recent 10th anniversary celebration of the
first Afro Asian conference were deeply impressed by Nasakom. They were
surprised to see that Indonesia, which, according to what the imperialists
used to say, was going to collapse in no time, was going to fall in no
time, was a country whose people would die of hunger, was a country in
chaos. On the contrary, is evidently a strong country whose people are
evidently calm and whose people are evidently well and healthy. This is
so, because Indonesia is following a Nasakom policy.
Nasakom has been admired by all delegations to the 10th anniversary
celebration of the Afro-Asian conference. Nasakom has even served as
an example to Afro-Asian conference. Nasakom has even served as an ex-
ample to Afro Asian nations in their struggle against imperialists. The
moment the delegations understood this, it became much easier for me to
explain to them why Indonesia has taken the initiative to hold Conefo,
the Conference of the New Emerging Forces. In fact, the delegations
first of all were impressed by the fact that it was Indonesia which came
up with the idea of the new emerging forces. It was no other country but
Indonesia. Now I am working hard to realize a union of all emerging forces.
Now, Indonesia wants to hold Conefo, the Conference of the New Emerging
Forces.
(Coat . )
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Once the delegations to the 10th anniversary celebration of the first
Afro-Asian conference had been impressed by Nasakom, it became so easy to
explain to them that Conefo is actually an international Nasakom. Why
can it be called an international Nasakom? Because in the projected
Conefo we want to unify all anti-imperialist forces, no matter on which
side they stand, as long as they are anti-imperialist in nature.
In Indonesia itself, there have been those who asked me: Bung, why
do you call your policy of unifying all anti-imperialist and revolutionary
forces Nasadom? Why use "kom"? Why not, as in 1926, when Bung Karno for
the first time broached the idea of unifying all revolutionary forces--
nationalist, Islamic, Marxist, or nationalist, religious, Marxist forces
--use, for instance, Nasamarx. Why use the expression Nasakom? Why use
"kom" and not "Marx?" Why not use Nasamarx instead of Nasakom? How is
it that Bung Karno uses Nasakom? Now listen carefully, brothers. The
term which has been most abused b olitical scoundrels is "Marxist." You
know that, for instance, the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party--ed.), which
I have abolished, used to boast and claim: We, Marxists; we, Marxists;
we, Marxists. But let me say here that they are not Marxists. They are
the villains of Marxism. Therefore, I did not want to use the expression
Nasamarx. If I use Nasamarx, I am afraid that former PSI members might
join the movement, and all along they have been counterrevolutionary.
They are villains of Marxism. Besides, I purposely chose the "kom" in
Nasakom, because here in Indonesia, there are many people with "kom-phobia."
They fear "kom." They are afraid of the PKI; they hate the PKI; they want
to destroy the PKI completely.
Brothers, with regard to the forthcoming Afro Asian conference in
Algeria, if possible, we shall unite with Asian African countries at the
second Afro Asian conference in Algeria. However, if this is impossible
--for instance, there are countries which do not want to take part because
they are pro-Malaysia--then it would be better for them not to take part
in the conference. They had better stay outside the Afro Asian conference,
even if we have to hold the second Afro Asian conference with a smaller
number of countries which, however, are all anti-imperialist. This is
better than holding a conference in which a large number of countries take
part, but among which there are imperialist tools and lackeys.
Now, I would like to inform you that the majority of Asian and African
countries do not want to accept Malaysia at the second Afro Asian conference.
It is true that there are one or two or three countries which accept
Malaysia, brothers. However, as I said just now, thanks to God Almighty,
the majority of Asian and African countries share Indonesia's stand and
reject Malaysia's participation at the second Afro Asian conference. There
is no doubt, borthers, that Malaysia is an imperialist lackey.
At an earlier PKI congress I said: PKI, go onward! Now I say: PKI,
go onward, onward, onward; never retreat! Brothers, that was my message
at this 45th anniversary rally of the PKI. I thank you.
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Fact Sheet Background Use Only
2 August 1065
Seventh World Peace Congress
Helsinki, Finland
10-15 July 1965
General Statement
The unanimously adopted statement issued at the conclusion of the
Congress summarized its work:
"The questions before the congress were discussed concretely
and in depth in seven commissions: 1) support for the people
of Vietnam in their just struggle for independence, unity, and
peace; 2) the liberation of peoples under colonial domination,
the preservation of national sovereignty, the struggle against
apartheid and racism, and the violation of human rights; 3) dis-
armament; 4) elimination of the vestiges of World War II and
European security; 5) the economic sovereignty of nations; 6)
the economic and social consequences of the arms race, the re-
conversion from war production to peace production; 7) the
creation of an atmosphere favorable to peace, cooperation of
peace organizations, and problems of the U.N. organization."
It commented on the general situation of the world
"The Congress has met at a time when the world situation is
very grave. U.S. political and military leaders have entered
upon a policy of armed aggression and military adventures, as
the cases of Vietnam, Santo Domingo, and the Congo clearly
prove. This armed aggression and military adventures strikes
a grave blow at the aspirations of the peoples for detente and
peaceful coexistence. The spearhead of the imperialist attack
is in southeast Asia, where American armed forces have un-
leashed aggression against the people of South Vietnam."
It cited other areas of conflict and "imperialist aggression" which
included "Laos and Cambodia using the bases set up in Thailand and Japan";
Africa where "Portuguese fascist colonialists with the aid of NATO are
stepping up oppression" and spoke of the "threat to peace and international
security" caused by efforts "to impose a white minority government on the
African majority" in Rhodesia. It cited other African countries where
''genuine independence is threatened by neocolonialist practices," and
"imperialist plots." It denounced tension in the Middle East resulting
from "the existence of American and British military bases, the presence
of an American fleet equipped with nuclear weapons, and the maneuvers of
the imperialists and their supporters" against Arabs in Palestine, in the
Arabian peninsula, and in Cyprus. It spoke of "American imperialists"
(Cont.)
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and their efforts "to maintain their domination over the countries of
Latin America, and resorting to military intervention.' It cited
"colonial domination in the Caribbean" and the "military occupation of
the Canal Zone" in Panama. It spoke of the tense situation in Europe
"as a consequence of rearmament instigated by NATO" and called for "the
creation of a system of collective security in Europe" and the "Creation
of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe." It also called for "the es-
tablishment of normal relations between the two German states at all
levels, and the peaceful settlement of the German question." It said,
"it is more and more necessary and urgent to ban nuclear weapons, to
destroy them and preclude their use."
Finally,
"The Congress calls on all peoples to demand that their govern-
ments take action to isolate American imperialism and stop its
aggression, to support the struggle of the peoples on every
continent against colonialism, for genuine independence, free-
dom, and economic and social development, and in opposition to
neocolonialism and exploitation. The congress calls on all
people to take action to stop the arms race and obtain con-
crete disarmament measures, to demand the dismantling of mili-
tary bases and the withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign
soil, and concrete measures for world security and the peace-
ful settlement of issues in dispute."
[Moscow, TASS, International Service
in English, 15 July 19651
Resolution on Vietnam
At the conclusion of the meeting, a resolution on Vietnam, "the
central question of the Congress," was adopted:
"Expressing the feelings shared by billions of people through-
out the world, the congress is deeply concerned about the war
provoked by the policy of armed aggression of the U.S. im-
perialists in contravention of the Geneva agreements of 1954,
a war which is being intensified from day to day with the di-
rect and increasing participation of the armed forces and
even of U.S. strategic aircraft. The congress expressed deep
indi=gnation at the U.S. policy of escalation, which is dan-
gerously extending the war beyond the borders of South Vietnam,
including attacks and provocations against the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam, a sovereign and independent country, thus
seriously endangering the peace and security of the peoples of
southeast Asia and of the world."
2 (Cont.)
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The resolution continued by calling for: (1)"the immediate end of
U.S. aggression in South Vietnam"; (2) "the immediate withdrawal of U.S.
troops and their satellites from South Vietnam"; (3) "the removal of U.S.
military bases from South Vietnam"; (4) "the immediate ending of bombing
and other aggressive acts against the DRV." It also said: "the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is the only true legal
representative of the South Vietnamese people." It continued: the
people of South Vietnam must be allowed to settle their own affairs with-
out foreign interference...."
"The congress makes an urgent appeal to the forces of peace and
democratic organizations of the whole world to launch a broad,
powerful, and uninterrupted movement embracing all sections of
society, to give every possible support to the people of Vietnam
in their just struggle against the U.S. aggressive war and for
national independence, unity, and peace."
[Moscow, TASS, International Service
in .anglish, 15 July 19651
Support for Chicom Position
The Albanian press reported the 10 July dispute over procedural
matters as
"a violent struggle between those delegations that want to see
normal progress in the work of the congress and the Soviet dele-
gation and some other delegations that follow its example, who
want to use the congress to popularize and promote the general
capitulationist line of the Soviet revisionist leaders."
It continued with a statement from Thanas Nado, head of the Albanian dele-
gation, who demanded the right to present his delegation's views on the
agenda and the proposed order of work:
'The true reason for these proposals, which may be called 'gag-
ging' proposals, is the fear of the Ichrushchevite revisionists,
who are about to impose their line on our movement through the
Soviet. Peace Committee, who are afraid to let those people ex-
pressing points of view different from their own be heard in
this hall. They fear being faced with world public opinion
and, being pushed by the irresistible desire to impose the
policy of their government on the peace movement, seek to make
this movement a prop for a policy of theirs which is in flagrant
3 (Cont. )
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contradiction to the demands of millions of people from all
continents fighting against the enemies of peace; they more-
over demand support for these clauses, which are so damaging
to the dignity of the honorable representatives present in
this hall."
[Tirana, ATA, International Service
in French, 13 July 19651
The next day, Foto Cami, an Albanian delegation member, charged
that the Soviets "boast greatly about the aid and support they are giv-
ing the Vietnamese people" and asked, "what is this aid and what is
this support?"
"we cannot remain silent and fail to unmask and condemn here
the noisy and wholly demagogical declarations by the Soviet
delegate, who in order to dupe people, has tried to pass off
the attitude of the Khrushchevite Soviet leadership as a
"firm anti-imperialist stand" and one "supporting the strug-
gle of the Vietnamese people." Undeniable facts testify that
the worsening and the extension of the struggle in Vietnam is
not only the result of the policy and the aggression of American
imperialism, but also the result of the policy of unprincipled
concessions and capitulation to the imperialist aggressor, of
the policy of betrayal of the vital interests of the peoples
pursued by N. Khrushchev's followers, who have made common
cause with imperialism. It is now clear that the American
imperialists would not have acted with so much cruelty and
arrogance had they not had the support of the Soviet leaders
and their followers, whose supreme ideal is alleged peaceful
coexistence and multilateral cooperation with American imperi-
alism.... what preoccupies and worries the Soviet leaders more
than any thing is not the fate of the Vietnamese people and
their patriotic liberation struggle, but the fate of American
imperialism, of the alliances and cooperation with it, the
fate of the aggressor, whose defeat in Vietnam must be pre-
vented, for this defeat would demolish their line of peaceful
coexistence and the peaceful road, their club of superpowers,
the all-powerfulness of atomic weapons, and the impossibility
of victory by the nationl liberation struggles of the peoples
in our era, and so forth."
[Tirana, ATA, International Service
in French, 14 July 19651
4 (Cont.)
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The conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese was spelled out
by a speech made by Chao I-min, head of the Chinese delegation, who at-
tacked "certain people [who] are pushing an erroneous line in the world
peace movement," and said:
"They do not genuinely oppose U.S. imperialism or support the
oppressed nations in their struggle for emancipation. In-
stead they are actively preaching the settlement of world
problems through Soviet-U.S. cooperation, general and com-
plete disarmament, and an unprincipled peaceful coexistence
in an effort to lead the peace movement astray. As a con-
sequence, there have appeared a series of major differences
of principle in the course of the preparation of this congress
and in its proceedings, as well as in the world peace movement
itself.
"Those who are pursuing this erroneous line in the peace move-
ment are now raising a hue and cry about unity and concerted
action, and asserting that we must not concentrate our main
attention on what disunites us, but on what unites us, but it
is they themselves who have destroyed the basis of unity and
who are creating and enlarging the split.
"The struggle against the policies of aggression and war pur-
sued by imperialism with the United States at its head, consti-
tutes the basis of unity for the world peace movement. Without
this basis, what can there be which unites us? We must dis-
tinguish between enemies and friends, unite real friends to
oppose real enemies; and in no case should we reverse enemies
and friends....
"Those who have their baton to implement their erroneous line
are not practicing democracy at all. They do not allow con-
sultation and discussion on an equal footing, and have con-
sistently imposed their will on others. They have carried
on all kinds of disruptive activities within the World Peace
Council, such as suppressing democracy, manipulating meetings,
and splitting organizations. These people have laid down quite
a number of restrictive rules and regulations for this congress
so that they can manipulate it at will and deprive others from
addressing the plenary sessions. The Chinese delegation firmly
opposes these practices, and as it has been proved by what actu-
ally happened, such undemocratic practices are most unpopular
and cannot succeed...."
[Peking, NCNA International Service
in English, 11+ July 19651
5 (Cont.)
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Support for Soviet Position
A Soviet spokesman answered the Albanian charge by reminding the
gathering "that the Vietnamese delegation appreciates the Soviet aid,"
and then walked out of the meeting. [Prague, CTK International Service
in English, 13 July 1965] In support of the Soviet position,the Polish
delegate called the Chicom pronouncement "damaging to the peace move-
ment," and condemned it as an "attempt to split the congress."' [Moscow,
TASS, International Service in English, 13 July 1965, Helsinki dispatch]
He elaborated his position by saying:
'The socialist countries are supporters of the policy of peace-
ful coexistence, the only alternative to nuclear war. For us
the struggle for peaceful coexistence is tantamount to the
struggle against U.S. aggression and is in active and full
solidarity with the national liberation movement. The policy
of the Soviet Union and of other socialist states does not
leave any doubt as to this fact. Therefore, I do not under-
stand how is it possible to come forth here with charges about
yielding to imperialism and attempting to cooperate with it.
Such charges introduce false lines of division into our move-
ment and bring harm to its unity and the force of its influence."
[Warsaw, PAP, International Service
in English, 13 July 1965]
Other Communist media denounced the Albanian attack. A Czech dis-
patch called it "a slanderous and insulting attack on the Soviet Union
and the world peace movement [which] did not meet any response from the
crushing majority of the delegations." [Prague, CTK, International Ser-
vice in English, 13 July 1965] A Rude Pravo correspondent spoke of the
"constructive" discussions which were taking place at the meeting despite
''the gross and impudent conduct of the Albanian delegate who constantly
strays from the given theme." [Emil Sip, 13 July 1965 Rude Pravo].
Another Czech correspondent said that the Albanian delegate "devoted
his entire speech to insulting the Soviet Union." The next day, Rude
Pravo said "... the main thing is the prevalence of the spirit of unity
and the effort to arrive at something practical and concrete. For this
reason, it is regrettable that the Chinese and Albanian delegations do
not overlook any opportunity to use the forum for attack against the
Soviet Union...."
[Emil Sip in 14 July 1965 Rude Pravo]
6 (Cont.)
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the
defeated
Victor
Harty Sch iz -Wilde
/Hoyfli,
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[Following is a translation of an article by Harry Schulze-
Wilde in the German-language periodical Der Monat (The Month),
Berlin, Vol XVII, No 201, June 1965, pages 39-61.]
The date was 24 May 1940. Three policemen stand chatting in front of
the house at the corner of Wiener and Morelos Streets in the Coyoacan sec-
tion of Mexico City. This house had been the home of the world famous
Russian revolutionary leader and founder of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky, for
the past 3 years. These three policemen were members of the 10-man police
detail which the Mexican government had assigned the job of guarding the
mansion which had been improved into a fortress. The police detail was
organized in two groups of five men each who pulled an 24-hour tour of duty.
Shortly after 0300, two men wearing police uniforms and a third man
wearing the uniform of an army lieutenant approached the group of chatting
policemen. "What's cooking, fellows?" they asked, making as if this was
an inspection. "Oh, nothing special," replied the policemen who were
standing in front of the watchtower. At that very moment, however, the
three men who had just arrived, pulled out their revolvers and shouted:
"Hands up, you damned swine!" At the same time several men burst out of
the darkness, some of them in civilian clothes and others wearing uniforms.
They disarmed the five guards and took their weapons and tied them up.
After having knocked out the outside guards, they knocked on the iron
gate, although not particularly loudly, in order not to alarm the guards in
the machine gun-equipped towers along the concrete wall. The gate was opened
and about 20 men sneaked inside. They penetrated into the garden and from
there fanned out over the entire house. Immediately afterward, bursts of
fire from submachineguns tore the stillness of the night. But before the
inhabitants of the neighboring mansions can get their bearings, all is quiet
again. The intruders disappeared in the dark streets and the last ones of
them fled, taking the two cars in the garage of the mansion.
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Half an hour later, the police, alerted by the neighbors, arrives
on the scene. The policemen immediately begin an-investigation. According
to statements made by the guards, who had in the meantime been released,
about 300 shots were fired but only Trotsky's grandson by the name of
Esteban, who had arrived a few days ago from France, was hit in the left
foot by a stray bullet. Leon Trotsky, who was the target of the attack,
was merely scared, as was his wife, Nathalia Sedova, the four American
secretaries, the German national Otto Schuessler, a French couple, and
three servants, that is, the female cook, the chambermaid, and the houseboys.
In Trotsky's bedroom, the investigating police officers counted 73
bullet holes. The couple escaped this murderous crossfire through the doors
and windows only because they immediately dove under the bed. Little Esteban
had likewise hidden under his bed when he heard the shots. Although he was
only 11 years old, he knew that someone was out to kill his grandfather at
all costs. About a dozen assassination attempts had failed in the past.
Trotsky's children, two sons and two daughters, had already been murdered
or driven to death in the past. Of the grandchildren, only Esteban is still
alive.
But it was not only the closest relatives who died of an unnatural
death; many of his friends and seven of his secretaries likewise died unnat-
ural deaths: in the USSR, in Spain, in Paris, in Switzerland, and in other
countries. The murderers, who had been sent out by Joseph Stalin, managed
to find their victims even in hospitals and in lonely mountain villages.
This is also the reason why Trotsky had his house in Coyoacan converted
into a fortress. All conceivable safety measures were included. The main
gate was strengthened with two crossbars; when the main gate is open, a
bright light goes on above the entrance. The windows are equipped with
steel protective shields containing gun ports; a network of electric wires
makes it impossible to climb over the walls. The slightest contact with
these wires triggers alarm bells which make an infernal noise.
The riddle as to how the attackers were able to get into this heavily
protected fortress without a fight and without setting off the alarm devices
was soon solved: the American Robert Sheldon Harte, who was on night watch
duty, had disappeared. It must have been he who opened the gate; according
to the statements by the police officers, he fled with the attackers in the
last of the two cars. But Trotsky considers it impossible that he was in
cahoots with these assassins; he believed that Sheldon Harte was kidnapped.
A few days later, the corpse of the secretary was found in an iso-
lated, uninhabited house. Investigation revealed quite definitely that
Sheldon Harte had not been held there as a prisoner and that he was murdered
while asleep, after some time had passed. The murderers then quickly hid
his body under the clay floor of the room. They probably thought that this
traitor could also betray them. Still, Leon Trotsky refused to believe that
Harte had betrayed him.
I
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The trial of the attackers -- who were discovered with astonishing
speed and who were made to talk with rather severe methods -- took place
early in July. But it was only the second team that sat on the bench; the
foreign agents behind them, undoubtedly men working for the Soviet secret
police, escaped. The international public reacted to the trial with moder-
ate interest. Even in Mexico the war in Europe absorbs the attention of the
people more than the dark machinations of Stalin's secret police -- a fact
which the plotters of this assassination attempt certainly figured on.
About 2 weeks before the assassination attempt on Trotsky, the German
army had launched its offensive in France. The Maginot Line, which was con-
sidered unbeatable, was broken, Paris was occupied, France was forced to
ask for an armistice, and the British army was driven off the continent.
But the Soviet Union had also been active. After the occupation of Eastern
Poland in September 1939, the Red Army occupied the hitherto independent
countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the middle of June.
Trotsky is in agreement with the way the trial is being conducted
there. Unmistakably he declares: "In no other country of the world, neither
in France nor in Switzerland nor in Spain, has a crime of the GPU [Soviet
Secret Police] ever been investigated and prosecuted with such care as this
particular attempt on my life in Mexico!" But he also knows that the mur-
derers will not give up just because they failed this time. He told a
higher police officer the following: "Destiny has given me another exten-
sion but it won't be long." As he awakens in the morning he usually tells
his wife: "Well, they didn't kill us last night. We have a little reprieve."
Who is this man who has so far escaped more than a dozen assassination
attempts, whose four children have been murdered or were allowed to die because
medical aid was refused them, whose house has been set on fire several times
in order to smoke him and his followers out like rats and whom communists
throughout the world have branded as a "traitor to socialism," as "servant
of the capitalists," as "agent of fascism," and most recently also as "agent
of American imperialism?"
Leon Davidovich Bronstein, called Trotsky, was born in Yanovka,
Kherson Province (Ukraine) on 26 October 1879 (7 November according to
the Gregorian calendar). He was the fifth of eight children, four of whom
died young. His father, David Bronstein, was a prosperous farmer who had
bought 400 Desyatinas of fertile farmland from a noble estate owner who had
come upon hard times; through hard work, he succeeded in increasing his
holdings. He built new workshops, new stables for the animals, and a big
mill. After the revolution, which his son helped win, he lost everything.
Embittered and at the same time proud of his son, he died in 1922 as manager
of a government-owned mill.
When Leon Davidovich was born, Russia was under the rule of Tsar
Alexander II, who in 1861 had freed the serfs. The progressive-liberal
forces therefore had great hopes in him. But he was murdered on 1 March 1881
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before he was able to crown his reform work through a constitution. His son,
Alexander III, was completely under the influence of Pobedonostsev, the
chief procurator of the Holy Synod, a bigoted reactionary who would have
loved to reintroduce serfdom.
The old Bronstein who -- like millions of Russian peasants -- could
neither read nor write, sent his son to a Jewish school where he was taught
in the Yiddish language which he was not familiar with. The language spoken
at home was Ukrainian. Attendence at this Jewish school, however, was very
important for little Bronstein: this is the place where he also learned
Russian.
Back in Yanovka, he continues his education by himself. At the age
of 6, he was able to make out bills for his father and he could even keep
books. The parents were tremendously proud of their son. They were sure
that this child prodigy had to go to college! The next place for him to go
was therefore bound to be Odessa, a big port of the Black Sea, the Russian
Marseille, and the "most notorious police city of this police state."
But the 7-year old boy was not admitted to a government school;
instead he went to the "Saint Paul technical high school," founded by the
German Lutheran community. Instruction was given in the Russian language
and the students and teachers were of German, Swiss, Russian, Polish,
Rumanian, and Greek origin -- a true cross section of the jumble of nation-
alities in this part of Russia. The student body also included a large num-
ber of religious denominations: in addition to students from Lutheran,
Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, and Calvinist families, the school
was even attended by children from various sects.
During the very first year, young Bronstein was the first in his class;
he learned German and French as well as Italian and Greek and Latin. He did
not engage in any kind of political activity. There were no revolutionary
circles in the liberal "Saint Paul's school"; these revolutionary circles
sprang un only in the government schools which were run like military barracks.
At the age of 17 he went to Nikolayev to attend the university there;
this is where he came into contact with "Marxist" for the first time. But
at first he only thought that they were ridiculous. In a toast at a new
year's celebration in 1896 he said: "Curse all Marxists who bring so much
harshness and desolation into life." His first political article was likewise
against Marxism.
But this did not last long. When he graduated with the rating of
"excellent" in 1897, he was already an enthusiastic supporter of the theories
of Karl Marx which came from London and Germany. Old Bronstein ranted and
raved and demanded that his son drop all of these revolutionary theories.
But Leon Davidovich did not give in. He instead dropped his father's allow-
ance and earned his living by private tutoring.
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At the age of 19 he organized a revolutionary group in Nikolayev
called the "South Russian Workers Federation"; this was almost like a party
although it did have local limitations. When the situation got too hot for
him there; he decided to return to Yanovka in 1898. On the way there he
was arrested by the police. He was under investigative arrest for almost
2 years; at the end of 1899 he was exiled to Siberia for 4 years without a
trial.
While in prison, he married Alexandra Sokolovskaya who had likewise
been condemned to exile. In his book My Life, lie devoted no more than 3
lines to this event: "Our common work created close bonds between us. In
order not to be settled separately, we had ourselves married in the Moscow
prison, while underway to our exile." This marriage produce two daughters.
Before 4 years had passed, Trotsky left his family.
The fame of the young revolutionary, who had organized his own group
at the age of 19 and who maintained contact with his likewise exiled comrades
from the place of his exile in Verkholensk, had spread to Central Russia.
The articles, which he published under the pseudonym of "Antid Oto" in the
Eastern Review, published in Irkutsk, likewise attracted attention. He was
urged to return. Equipped with a forged passport, in which he had entered
the name of one of his prison guards, he reached Irkutsk. This quite acci-
dentally selected "passport name" of Trotsky was to make world history.
In Irkutsk he took the train to Samara, today called Kuibyshev,
headquarters of the illegally published newspaper Iskra (The Spark) and
rallying point of the Marxist-oriented revolutionaries who were winning more
and more supporters, in contrast to the terrorist groups which were so active
in the past. From there he was sent to Kharkov, Poltava, and Kiev, in order
to supervise the local underground groups of the Social Democratic Party.
Back in Samara, he was invited to come to London which was the Western
European headquarters of Iskra. This "invitation" -- which in effect was a
command -- had been signed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
Wherever Trotsky turned up, he quickly attracted attention; his out-
standing intellectual capacity quickly earned praise; the analytical keenness
of his articles and his brilliant talent as a speaker likewise earned him
fame. After a few weeks he also played an important role in London. At
the 2nd Congress in 1903, which had begun in Brussels and which was then
moved to London, everyone noted his dash and his passion. Lenin thought
that he had "unusual characteristics" and suggested that Trotsky be appointed
to the editorial staff of the foreign edition of Iskra. Later on he was
sent to France, Switzerland, and Belgium. On his travels he met not only
the most important European socialists but also Nathalia Sedova, who was
at the time studying art history in Paris. Without any formalities at city
hall, she became his mate and from then on shared all triumphs and all suf-
fering with him.
Trotsky and the 10 years older Lenin (who from time to time helped and
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i
promoted him) had by no means infrequent clashes, mostly because of secondary
issues; this is a fact which Stalin 20 years later made wide use of in order
to accuse Trotsky of an "anti-Leninist" -- in other words, "anti-revolution-
ary" -- attitude. This of course was intentional slander. It has turned
out, by the way, that it was Trotsky who was right in many of these issues,
and not Lenin. It is not correct to say that these two men were enemies;
instead, one might compare them to the two poles of a magnet who together
produced a field of force. Today we know that it was not only Trotsky who
was heavily influenced by Lenin (as a result of which numerous Russians
living in exile called Lenin's "club"); we also know that Lenin took over
many things contained in Trotsky's theories, such as for instance, the idea
of the "permanent revolution." Of course, the father of this thesis was not
Trotsky; it has been proved that it was his sometime patron, the Russian
Emigrant Alexander Helphand who later on became known throughout the world
under the name of Parvus. By "permanent revolution" he meant a revolution
which would not be completed until all countries of the world had become
communist -- and Trotsky of course took over this meaning.
The influence which Helphand exerted on many Russian and Western
European socialists was to some extent based on the fact that he had pre-
dicted, as early as 1895, the Russian-Japanese war which did not break out
until 10 years later and that he also predicted the Russian revolution which
would come after that war as a "prelude to the world revolution." This proph-
ecy is of course the exact opposite of the predictions of Marx; it was a
rather eerie prophecy and constituted a considerable contribution to the
consolidation of the reputation of "the dialectical concept of history."
When trouble broke out in St. Petersburg in January 1905, Trotsky
left his safe position with the by then very prosperous Parvus-Helphand,
who had given him an apartment and a job in Munich, and went to Russia --
a dangerous undertaking because exiles who had escaped were punished with
extreme severity after they had been arrested again. Almost all of the
other leading revolutionaries therefore continued to live abroad and waited
in order to find out how the situation would develop.
But Trotsky courageously plunged into the whirlpool of events. He
became the recognized leader of the heavily communist-colored revolution
of 1905 which heavily shook tsarist Russia. But it was not only the many
strikes that rattled the political structure of the autocratically governed
country; a much more serious fact was that the fleet mutinied. It was
extremely difficult to restore the old order.
Early in December 1905 Trotsky was arrested and 23 months later he
was sentenced to lifelong exile in a Godforsaken village in the Polar region
at the mouth of the Ob River. On the way there he managed to escape. With
extraordinary energy and astonishing physical toughness, he fought his way
through the Taiga [tundra] and reached Petersburg from where he returned to
London after staying a few days in Helsinki. He arrived in time to partici-
pate in the 5th Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Worker Party.
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For the first time he developed his -- that is to say Parvus's --
theory of the "permanent revolution" in public. Lenin and other left-wing
socialists, including Rosa Luxemburg, supported him and hailed him not only
as a great revolutionary, whose courageous appearance in St. Petersburg and
later during the trial had aroused worldwide attention, but also as an impor-
tant theoretician. After that he went to Berlin where his mate Nathalia
Sedova was waiting for him with his son Leon who had been born in 1906.
Trotsky was a celebrated figure also in Germany. Parvus introduced
him to the leaders of German social democracy, such as Karl Kautsky, old
Bebel, Georg Ledebour, Franz Mehring, and Hugo Hase. These were interna-
tionally known names because the German Social Democratic Party was the
strongest and best organized in the world. But the years from 1907 until
191+ basically were only training years for Trotsky. He was not to find
his historical mission in life until after the outbreak of World War I --
without of course having been aware of this at the time.
Leon Trotsky had never been interested in military matters; he did
not come into contact with problems of strategy and tactics until he was a
war correspondent during the two Balkan wars in 1911 and 1912. In his arti-
cles, he not only relentlessly exposed the atrocities committed by both
sides and which reminded him "of the methods of the 30 Years' War"; he also
became increasingly interested in military tactics and operations. It was
not enough for him to describe the effect of certain measures or moves; he
also wanted to find out what their causes and their interconnections were.
At the outbreak of World War I he happened to be in Vienna. After a
short stopover in Switzerland, he went to Paris. As during the two Balkan
wars, he once again worked as correspondent for a number of newspapers,
changing his cover name from one place to the next. His 1915 and 1916 arti-
cles, in which he discussed the development of the war into a position war,
attracted wide attention. It is primarily due to the subsequent systematic
slander of Trotsky by Stalin that these journalistically brilliant and highly
significant essays are just about unknown today.
During his stay in Paris, Trotsky was also a frequent visitor to the
National Library. There he studied primarily military magazines and textbooks,
probably without ever guessing how important the knowledge he gained there
would be to him later: less than 5 years later, Leon Trotsky commanded a
victorious army of more than a million men in numerous battles.
In September 1916, the French government deported this undesirable
emigre to Spain. On 20 December, he and Nathalia Sedova and their two sons,
Leon and Sergey, boarded a Spanish steamer in Barcelona which was to take
them to New York. As the ship passed the Straits of Gibraltar, Trotsky
wrote the following to a friend: "This is the last time I am looking at
that old rascal Europe."
Upon his arrival in New York he was enthusiastically welcomed by
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numerous Russian socialists who had found refuge there. Could they guess
that they were hailing one of the great leaders of the coming revolution?
Barely 2 months later there were red flags flying from many palaces of the
nobility in the Russian capital of Petrograd (St. Petersburg).
In New York, Trotsky went from meeting to meeting and predicted the
victory of socialism although during the first weeks it looked as if the
bourgeoisie would keen control of the situation and the tsar was forced to
abdicate only in order to step up the war effort. But Trotsky was sure of
his cause. Triumphantly he declared: "The tremendous avalanche of the
revolution is in full swing and no'human force can ever stop it!" Like Lenin,
he demanded not just the overthrow of the old system but also the termination
of the war.
Boarding a Norwegian vessel, he left New York on 27 March 1917.
During a stopover in Canada, the British picked him up. Under the pressure
of numerous protests he was released after 3 weeks and was allowed to con-
tinue his trin. On 17 May, one month after Lenin, he reached Petrograd.
A vast throng welcomed him. The workers lifted the hero of the revolution
of 1905 to their shoulders and carried him through the streets in triumph.
A few hours after his arrival he hurried to the Smolny Institute,
the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviets. Although he was admitted only as
a member with an advisory vote, Trotsky was satisfied. No one else was as
powerful a speaker; it was not his yes or no vote slip that would decide the
issue; it was his words that would decide the issue. After a short time,
he was the spokesman of the revolution. It was particularly the sailors on
the warships and at the Kronstadt naval base who stuck with him through thick
and thin -- a success which was to bring about the decision on 7 November
1917.
In July, Lenin and his supporters had failed to seize power; Trotsky
was arrested at that time with many others but he was soon released. At
the end of September the Petrograd Soviet elected Leon Trotsky -- now an
official member of the Bolsheviks as its chairman. In the meantime the
economic crisis had reached unexpected proportions. The supply of foodstuffs
to the cities had broken down completely; this was due partly to the disas-
trous transportation situation and partly to the situation on the farms as
such.
The government had not been prepared to launch a farm reform or even
to promise it; this is why the landless farmers took matters into their
own hands. The consequence of this arbitrary action was bound to be a drop
in the farm output figures. Of course, the cities suffered the most as a
result of this. In addition, there was a manpower shortage. More than
5 million farmers were in the army at the front, behind the lines, or in
prisoner of war camps in Germany and Austria-Hungary. This was one of the
reasons why the demand of the Bolsheviks for an immediate peace treaty
always found tremendous approval in the villages.
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Parallel to this agitation among the workers and farmers, prepara-
tions were underway for a new Bolshevik uprising. Trotsky thought that the
classical forms of revolution in the past were outdated. Storming such
places as the Bastille, battles at the barricades, and emotional mass
uprisings had become senseless. The modern state had to be captured through
an organized coup d'etat. In developing this new revolutionary strategy,
Trotsky was for the first time able to make practical use of the military
science studies he has pursued in Paris.
He made his plans almost like a general staff officer. By means
of propaganda, the position was softened up for the assault so that, after
sufficient preparation, smaller, well-equipped assault squads were able to
paralyze the nerve centers of the government. If you first capture the
ministries, the electric power plants, and the telephone exchanges, the
opposition is doomed to failure and your own victory is assured.
When the German army command went on the offensive again, Petrograd
was threatened for a time. The government ordered the military units to
march and prepared to move to Moscow. Trotsky sounded the alarm in the
Soviet. The soldiers, whom he had propagandized in the meantime, refused
to leave Petrograd. A military revolutionary committee distributed 5,000
rifles to the workers, allegedly only for the "defense of the capital."
But when the German troops discontinued their advance on Petrograd, it
was said that these weapons were to be used "in the defense of the gains
of the revolution." But everyone in Petrograd knew that the Bolsheviks
were now trying to overthrow the government.
Democratic Prime Minister Kerensky was determined to make a fight of
it. On 6 November he outlawed the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda (Truth) which
had been published under the name Rabotchiy Put (Worker Road) ever since
the July coup d'etat. In response to this, Trotsky had the printing
plants of the bourgeois newspapers occupied and issued a new edition of
Pravda whose front page carried the famous Order No 1:
"The enemies of the people have gone on the offensive during the
night. They are planning a treacherous attack against the Petrograd Soviet
of worker and soldier delegates.
"All regimental, company, and crew committees, along with the com-
missars of the Soviets and all of the revolutionary organizations must be
permanently in session and must concentrate all news about the plans and
actions of the plotters in their hands.
"No soldier may leave his unit without approval from the committee.
"The cause of the people is in firm hands. The conspirators will be
wiped out.
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1
"No hesitations, no doubts! Steadfastness, constancy, perseverance,
and determination are needed. Long live the revolution."
This was the signal for general action. During the night of 7 Novem-
ber (25 October according to the old Russian calendar), the coup d'etat was
carried out on the basis of plans worked out by Trotsky. Tough assault
squads occupied the railroad stations, the electric power plants, the mili-
tary rations warehouses, the water reservoirs, the bridges leading from the
suburbs to the downtown section, the telephone exchange, the State Bank,
and numerous other buildings. Around 1000 all access streets to the Winter
Palace were blocked. The ministers were cut off from the rest of the world
and this was in fact the victory of the Bolshevik revolution.
Prime Minister Kerensky had left the capital early on 7 November in
a car made available to him by the American embassy in order to get help
from the outside. His ministers were waiting in the Winter Palace for him
to return. Around noon, revolutionary soldiers, with fixed bayonets,
scattered the deputies of the "Provisional Council of the Russian Republic."
About an hour and a half later, Trotsky opened a session of the Petrograd
Soviet and declared in the name of the "military revolutionary committee"
that the provisional government was no longer in existence.
Among the deafening cheers of the delegates he added: "A few minis-
ters have been arrested. The others will be arrested in the next few days
or hours. The revolutionary garrison, which is at the disposal of the mili-
tary revolutionary committee, has already dissolved the meeting of the pre-
liminary parliament. We were told that the uprising of the garrison would
be drowned in rivers of blood. We do not know of a single victim or casualty.
I know of no other example in history in which a revolution has been accomp-
lished so completely without bloodshed."
This was indeed true. Never before had there been an overthrow of
this kind which did not claim any victims and the Russian-French newspaperman
Claude Anet stated with astonishment that the backward, illiterate Russians
had made a revolution entirely different from any of the others reported
in the history books. But there was no denying that the Bolshevik power
seizure had taken place like an offensive based on plans made by the general
staff. No one had heard any shooting anywhere; no where was there any
insubordination of revolutionary workers and soldiers. The streets were
empty and there was not even any looting.
Lenin -- who on the preceding evening, still in disguise, had come
out of hiding to go to the headquarters of the revolutionary committee at
the Smolny -- thought that this silence was rather ghostly. He, too, was
still thinking of the classical image of the old revolution. Not until
reports kept coming in from the individual assault squads did he realize
that the revolution had succeeded. On the evening of this highly eventful
7 November, the spiritual leader of this revolution and Trotsky, who had
fainted due to exhaustion, slept on the floor in a room next to the great
hall of the Smolny.
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The Winter Palace, headquarters of the government, had still not
been taken. Now Trotsky's friendship with the sailors paid off . The
Cruiser "Aurora" put to sea from Kronstadt and headed for Petrograd where
it opened fire. But it only fired blank ammunition. The Winter Palace
did not fall as a result of the attack by the sailors; it was stormed and
carried by assault in the old style. The metropolis of an empire of 150
million inhabitants, in which 5 million soldiers and policemen were under
arms, had capitulated without a fight to 10 thousand and perhaps 15 thousand
largely illiterate peasants and workers, led by a man who had never before
had a chance to test his military talents.
Lenin was the chairman of the new government of people's commissars.
Trotsky was foreign minister. But after only 3 days he had to go "to the
front" -- right at the gates of Petrograd: ousted Kerensky had succeeded
in winning over a few regiments of Cossacks to his side. But before the
fight could break out, Trotsky had defeated them through the power of his
speech. The Cossacks surrendered after a brief skirmish. Along with this
victory message the capital received the news that Moscow and other big
cities had likewise joined the revolution and new governments were also
established in the rural areas.
Trotsky himself was in charge of the peace negotiations with Germany
and its allies, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, at Brest-Litovsk.
The imperial German government missed a big chance here. Instead of con-
cluding a reasonable peace with the Bolsheviks and thus setting an example,
it imposed a very severe dictated peace. The Soviet government in the end
accepted the very harsh conditions in order to get a breathing spell. In
March 1918 Trotsky switched from the foreign ministry to the newly organized
war commissariat. It was now his job to set up reliable Red units in order
to be able to fight the White Guard armies, which were springing up all
over the country.
What he had left in the way of military units did not look very
promising, especially not when it came to winning a victory. The old anti-
military propaganda had now turned against the Bolsheviks. In addition,
foreign intervention armies penetrated into Russia from all sides. The
Japanese had landed at Vladivostok and the Czech prisoners of war had
organized their own legion in Siberia which now rose against the Soviets.
On their march to the West they ran into hardly any resistance at all.
In addition, Petrograd and Moscow increasingly felt the activity of tsarist
agents who were more and more recovering from the blow they had taken on
7 November.
On 22 April 1918, Trotsky submitted a plan to the executive committee
of the Soviets according to which former tsarist officers were to be accepted
into the Red Army, now being founded. He prevailed over
the opposition of extreme left-wing circles, although he was quite aware of
the danger that many of these officers, who volunteered, did so only with
the intention of attacking the Bolsheviks from the rear.
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Early in August Moscow heard that the Czechs had taken Kazan; Trotsky
immediately jumped on his train and went to the front; for 2 and a half years
he and his closest collaborators lived in this rolling headquarters which
was his very own invention and which soon became a legend. This armored
train was pulled by two locomotives and carried automobiles, guns complete
with shells, small arms, food and medication, a printing plant, a library,
and a telegraph and radio station. Trotsky could always be found wherever
the danger was greatest. But the tide turned when he stood in the very
front line at Kazan. The revolutionary soldiers were swept along by the
enthusiasm of their leader and launched a counterattack. And 6 weeks after
the Czechs had captured Kazan, the Red Army recaptured this important city
on the Volga. Lenin immediately sent a telegram:
"I enthusiastically hail the brilliant victory of the Red Army. May
this be a sign that it will crush all resistance by the exploiters and assure
the victory of world socialism."
This unexpected success changed the situation of the Bolsheviks over
night. The Czechs and the tsarist units marching with them understood that
they were no longer dealing with a few bunches of rebels; they realized
that they were now facing units led by strategic experts. For the tsarist
officers this was a tremendous surprise. Who was this Trotsky who managed
to take a beaten army which would flee in panic everytime it faced its
enemies and who could imbue it with a new aggressive spirit and lead it to
victory?
After the collapse of the Central Powers in November 1918, new front
lines developed. Besides, Trotsky, who was against any kind of intriguing
and plotting, had made himself an enemy within his own party, an enemy whose
cunning no one realized in the beginning; that man was Joseph Stalin,
supreme political commissar of the 10th Army which was at that time under
the command of ex-Cavalry sergeant Voroshilov. Upon request from Trotsky,
Lenin called Stalin back to Moscow -- a humiliation which Stalin never forgot.
The campaign of slander against the founder and organizer of the Red Army
began during those days: Stalin charged the war commissar with being a
"friend of tsarist generals."
When some of the old officers, who had been accepted into the new
army, were exposed as traitors, Stalin struck his first blow. But Trotsky
was saved again, thanks to the foolishness of such White Guard generals
as Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and Krasnov, each of whom, on his own, and
without coordination, now marched on Moscow. This required a new campaign
in the field and the organizer of the Red Army was an indispensable man.
In his train, he rode from one front to the other, from the Volga where he
decisively defeated Kolchak, to the Southern front where he directed the
fighting against Denikin, whom he defeated just as decisively as Yudenich
who had advanced against Petrograd in the North. On his 40th birthday, the
2nd anniversary of the Bolshevik power seizure, Trotsky was able to report
the victory of the Red Army in Moscow.
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About 5 months ago in March 1920, the Poles and the Ukrainian dicta-
tor Petlyura, who had been driven out only the year before, penetrated into
Soviet Russia. They captured Kiev. This new war quickly took on the charac-
ter of a nationalistic and perhaps even religious war. Poland had been
Russia's "arch-enemy" for many centuries; in addition, the inhabitants of
this state, which had been revived in 1918, were Roman Catholic, in contrast
to the Greek Orthodox Russians. Many former tsarist officers, who had refused
to help in the past, now volunteered for the Red Army in order to defend the
"legitimate church" against the "Roman church."
Once again Trotsky went to the front. Wherever possible, he stopped
any kind of nationalistic or anti-Catholic propaganda in the army. In one
of his orders of the day he wrote this: "Let every Red Army man, who
raises his knife against a prisoner of war, against unarmed men, sick men,
or wounded soldiers, have his hand chopped off." His presence always had
an electrifying effect. A counterattack was launched in June and a few weeks
later the Red Army, now grown to half a million, was at the gates of Warsaw.
The fall of the Polish capital seemed to be a matter of days.
But then occurred the much debated "miracle on the Vistula," the
counterpart to the "miracle on the Marne" in September 1914, when the French
stopped the Germans. General Tukhachevskiy, the supreme commander of the
Red Army appointed by Trotsky, had ordered the Red Army units operating in
the South under the command of Budenny to screen the left wing of the advance
on the Polish capital. But the political commissar of this army group,
Joseph Stalin, who was jealous of Tukhachevskiy and his rapid climb to the
rank of general at the age of 26, wanted to gather his own laurels. Instead
of linking up with the Red Army units before Warsaw, he caused Budenny to
move against Lemberg. His units were to move into that city at the same
time as Tukhachevskiy moved into the Polish capital.
Polish Marshal Pilsudski, advised by General Weygand who had hurried
in from France, pushed into this gap and rolled up the flank of the army
that was pushing toward Warsaw. This meant that Poland, as good as defeated
on one day, emerged victorious from this war. The Soviet Union was forced
to conclude a peace treaty whose conditions were dictated by Warsaw. Trotsky
and Tukhachevskiy, in verbal and written form, accused the political commis-
sar of the 10th Army of having caused this disastrous defeat.
This fiasco explains a whole series of actions taken by Stalin. He
not only had Tukhachevskiy and Trotsky and all of their supporters killed
but he also transformed his hatred to the entire Polish nation. It was
most probable that he gave the order to murder the 14,500 Polish officers
in 1940 who had been captured by the Soviets. About 4,200 corpses were
found in the forest of Katyn: these were the inmates of the camp at
Kozielsk. The inmates of the camp at Starobielsk, almost 4,000 men, were
likewise murdered. But their graves have not been discovered to this very
day. The 6,567 inmates of the Ostashkov camp were loaded on two sailboats
at Archangel and these boats were sunk in the White Sea -- allegedly during
artillery firing practice.
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Things calmed down to some extent after the Polish-Russian war.
But there were still individual uprisings by generals loyal to the tsar;
still, the Red Army always won. This result, which made the Bolsheviks
very happy, of course was offset by the terrible casualties of the 4-year
civil war. The Soviets had seized power in November 1917 almost without
bloodshed; but after that, during the battles of the following years, more
than 3 million people died. The Russian famine of 1921-1922 also claimed
about 5 million victims. It was a consequence of the economic break up
caused by war, revolution, and civil war and it was also due to natural
disasters.
Trotsky was most bitterly disappointed by the Kronstadt mutiny.
The sailors at that naval base and fortress revolted and demanded a human-
ization of conditions. Their demands included the following: more personal
freedom, in other words, a let-up in the dictatorship, and fraternization
of the people. Among the rebels were many of the men who had followed
Trotsky and who in 1917 had made a decisive contribution to the victory of
the Bolsheviks when their ship shelled the Winter Palace. But the party
ordered that ruthless measures be taken against the sailors. On 3 April
1921 Trotsky took the victory parade with a heavy heart: of all of the
military operations which he had directed since 1917, the one against
Kronstadt was the bloodiest.
At the end of 1923 he became seriously ill and had to go on conva-
lescent leave in the South of the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter Lenin
died on 21 January 1924. The secretary general of the party, Joseph Stalin,
knew how to keep the founder of the Red Army from the funeral: he cabled
his mortal enemy Trotsky, who was in Tiflis at the time, the wrong date
for the funeral. Later on, Trotsky maintained that Stalin was afraid:
"He (Stalin) was afraid that I would ask the doctors about the possi-
bility of [Lenin's] poisoning and that I would ask for a special autopsy."
The spectators did note that Leon Davidovich Trotsky was not among
the leading comrades who carried Lenin's coffin; but they did not give it
much thought. Still, the question as to whether and in what sequence a
leader was to participate in official celebrations took on profound signifi-
cance on that day.
Stalin advanced step by step. Systematically he manned all positions
with comrades loyal to him and thus isolated Trotsky in the party and in the
CC. Then he was ready to strike. At the 15th Congress on 2 September 1927
he proposed a resolution according to which all men who in any way propagated
opposition views were to be thrown out of the party. Only a man who pros-
trated himself and who signs a statement of repentence could in the future
expect any kind of mercy.
The resolution was adopted and this sealed the fate of Trotsky. He
had already been forced to move his office out of the Kremlin; now the CC
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threw him out of the party and on 16 January 1928 Stalin ordered the depor-
tation of his arch enemy, who was intellectually so superior to him, and
of his supporters to Siberia. For Trotsky he had selected the city of
Alma Ata, the Kazakh capital, 4,000 km from Moscow. When Trotsky refused
to go there, secret police dragged him and his family by force so that
they would catch the regular train to Tashkent. At the terminal, there
was a bus waiting for the exiles which took them to Alma Ata.
His supporters, who had been exiled to isolated little villages in
Siberia, soon established contact with each other. But Trotsky's hope of
building up an underground organization did not materialize. He realized
that the Soviet GPU was considerably better organized than the old Okhrana,
the secret police of the tsars.
With his arrival in Alma Ata, there began a bitter path of suffering
for Trotsky, his wife, and his oldest son, Leon Sedov, such as there are
very few in history. On 9 June 1928 he received a telegram in which a friend
informed him of the death of his eldest daughter Nina. She might perhaps
have been saved if her illness had been properly treated. But the pharmacy
in the Kremlin refused to give her the necessary medication.
At the end of the year Stalin demanded that Trotsky be expelled from
the territory of the Soviet Union. The members of the political bureau, who
had been hand-picked and promoted by Stalin, agreed -- with one exception.
The foreign commissariat was ordered to find a land that would be ready to
give an entry visa to the founder of the Red Army. About 5 days later
Trotsky was told that he would be deported to Constantinople. He refused to
leave the Soviet Union and demanded to see his son Sergey and the latter's
wife and children.
The family was then forcibly transported to Odessa where it was put
on board a Russian freighter on 10 February. But Sergey and his wife, who
had been allowed to go to the big port on the Black Sea, volunteered to
remain behind in the USSR. This was the last time they saw each other.
The ship entered the Bosporus 2 days later. Trotsky handed a statement to
the Turkish police officer who came on board the ship.
"To Kemal Pasha, President of the Turkish Republic. Dear Sir, at
the gates of Constantinople I have the honor to inform you that I am crossing
this border only in obedience to brute force. I ask you, Mr. President, to
accept any such sentiments as I might have under these conditions."
The Russian consul, who likewise had come on board, gave Trotsky
1,500 dollars, so to say as "initial capital" for the establishment of a
new life. Except for his files, this was all he had. He rented a house on
the Island of Prinkipo. He never suffered any financial difficulties. He
wrote articles and essays and he worked on a biography as well as on a history
of the Russian revolution. All of these works were translated into many lan-
guages and he earned considerable royalties with which he was able to publish
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his Bulletin of the Opposition which, after some time, became a self-
supporting operation.
Very soon, however, he came to feel Stalin's hatred once again. A
fire suddenly broke out in his home. The fire destroyed some of his files
for whose preservation Trotsky has taken more precautions than for his own.
He was barely able to save himself and his family and despite the great
danger kept carrying files and documents out of the burning house. From
that moment on he tried to flee to another country in which he might feel
safer. But wherever he asked for refuge he was refused. Finally France
agreed to accept him.
Before he left Turkey, he was informed that his second daughter
Zinaida had died in Berlin on 5 January 1933 and he received a letter from
the Soviet Union that both of his sons-in-law had been deported. Both of
them perished miserably in Siberia. But their four children disappeared like-
wise. Stalin did not overlook any of the Trotsky clan, provided the particu-
lar member was in his power.
Trotsky left Prinkipo in the summer of 1933. For about 2 years he
lived under various names in France; then he had to go to Norway whose
socialist government in the meantime had given him permission to stay there.
Shortly before his move in 1935 he learned that his youngest son Sergey and
the latter's wife, who had remained behind in the Soviet Union, had been
arrested. He never found out where they and their children died.
After the assassination of the Petrograd party secretary Kirov on
1 December 1934, numerous old Bolsheviks were arrested in Moscow because
Stalin accused them of "complicity." He said that Trotsky had ordered this
assassination. But the fact is that this crime -- as Khrushchev disclosed
to the 20th Congress -- was carried out upon Stalin's orders or at least
with his approval. The rather transparent accusation that Trotsky had
planned Stalin's assassination likewise was a mere invention intended to
put pressure on the Norwegian government. Minister of Justice Trygve Lie,
later on the first secretary general of the UN, urged Trotsky to refrain
from any kind of "current political activity." He said: "I ask your per-
mission in restricting your residence permit and I further ask you to under-
stand that your outgoing and incoming mail can only be handled through offi-
cial channels."
"If it is your intention to arrest me," replied Trotsky, "then you
cannot ask that I authorize you to do this likewise." Trygve Lie tried for
a compromise: "After all, there is a condition between arrest and complete
freedom." Trotsky would agree to nothing: "In that case I would prefer
arrest."
He did not have to wait long. At the end of September 1936 he was
interned in a house carefully guarded by 15 policemen.
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This measure aroused great attention throughout the world but none
of the critics was prepared to go his own government in order to offer Trotsky
refuge in some other country. Besides, it is almost certain that internment
at that time just about saved his life because Stalin's assassins at that
time were busy killing many friends of Trotsky. Why would they omit him?
On the other hand, this isolation had a very profound effect, not
at all apparent to Trotsky: it cut him offfrom the rest of the world
and a politician not in the midst of things is of necessity turned into
a sectarian.
The man who replaced the classical "barricade revolution" with a
general-staff-style coup d'etat suddenly was inclined to rather astonishingly
mistaken analyses of the international situation and the situation in the
Soviet Union. As we read the magazine Unser Wort -- Halbmonatszeitung der
Internationalen Kommunisten Deutschlands (Our Word -- Semimonthly of the
International Communist of Germany) which is published in the German language
by the Trotskyites in Paris today, a magazine which very often published
articles by Trotsky, we cannot help but wonder to what great extent he and
his followers failed to understand what was going on.
The Trotskyites failed to see that not only the economic and socio-
logical driving forces, which in the past had led to the unleashing of a
revolution, had changed fundamentally; they also failed to see that the
technique of a (successful) revolution had changed -- this partly due to
Trotsky's work. But just as the "cabinet wars" of the 18th and 19th centu-
ries, which were anything but "class struggles" as Marx asserted, had been
replaced by the total or"popular" war of the 20th century, so did the world
war of 1914-1918 prove that the workers in almost all countries -- whether
they were right or wrong is completely unimportant here -- believed that
they had to defend something: their homeland.
We must clearly understand this: in 1914-1918 the workers defended
their "capitalist" homeland and not some kind of socialist homeland. In
the meantime, the 8-hour day had become reality and the gradual integration
of the socialist parties into the government after the world war had turned
the "homeless apprentices" of old, the "proletarians," into citizens. It
seems that Trotsky did not realize that this had taken place and that he
did not understand what it meant; he wrote and thought and analyzed the
situation as he did before 1914 in his articles in the Russian emigre news-
papers -- and along with him his followers.
In the meantime, the first big "show trial" had been held in the
Moscow House of Labor Unions; this trial was to be followed by another six
"public trials" (and hundreds of others of which no one ever heard anything).
All of the charges which could be investigated abroad turned out to have
been false. For instance, one of the accused maintained that he had met
Trotsky in a hotel which actually had burned down 20 years before the alleged
meeting. Another said that he had been sent to Russia by the Gestapo [Nazi
secret police] -- of course on orders from Trotsky -- in 1932. But the
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Gestapo did not come into existence until the summer of 1933. One accused
by the name of Lifshits really took the cake during the second trial: he
accused himself of having organized no less than 10,380 attacks on railroad
lines over a period of 5 years -- in other words, five attacks per day.
Anyone and everyone would have defended himself against the charges
of being behind these acts of sabotage. But of Trotsky the government of
the country that had given him refuge asked that he accept these insane
statements in silence. Of course, he was not prepared to do that. He did
not refuse, either; in his replies he also sharply attacked the Soviet
Union and Stalin; these attacks culminated in the following classical
statements:
"Of the 12 apostles, only Judas proved to be a traitor. But if he
had come to power, he would have pictured the other 11 apostles as traitors
and, with them, all of the other, lesser disciples, whose number Luke himself
has given at 70."
These attacks found more and more attention and the world public
was soon convinced that not a single word was true in any of the charges
made at the so-called "trials of the enemies of the people." For the Nor-
wegian government, these disclosures were just one more reason to watch
Trotsky even more closely. These intolerable conditions ended when the
President of Mexico, General Lazaro Cardenas, said that he was prepared to
offer refuge to the founder of the Red Army whom Stalin had stripped of
Soviet citizenship. A Norwegian tanker brought Trotsky and his wife to
Tampico at the turn of the year 1936-1937. From there he took a special
train of the Mexican government to Mexico City where he first of all found
shelter with the painter Diego Rivera.
About 5 weeks after his arrival, Trotsky was informed that his oldest
son Leon Sedov, the last of his four children, had suddenly died on 16 Febru-
ary 1937 in a Paris hospital, under mysterious circumstances following a
successful removal of his appendix. For many days he and Nathalia Sedova
shut themselves off in their room in the house in Coyoacan which they had
just rented and would not allow anyone to see them. When Trotsky once
again showed himself to his collaborators, his eyes were red and his beard
was dissheveled. He knew now that he was "living on borrowed time" and that
Stalin would try harder than ever before to have him assassinated.
Shortly thereafter his friends told him that.a number of unknown
persons had been spotted in the vicinity of his house in Coyoacan for several
days. But his collaborators and the secretaries were likewise watched, as
it turned out pretty soon. Moscow had probably learned that the American
publishing house of Harper was planning to publish a biography of Stalin,
written by Trotsky; the publication of this biography was to be prevented at
all costs.
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kind of fortress. The iron grills were replaced with a thick concrete wall
which had only one entrance. Inside there was a second wall which surrounded
the garden from which the house itself could be reached. The first room
was used as library and office; this was the place where the bodyguards
stayed and checked every visitor. The big dining room was then reached
through a bullet-proof door and only from there could one reach Trotsky's
personal study which was provided with numerous bookshelves, a big desk,
and a phone. In the adjoining rooms, he lived with his wife, while the
collaborators were billetted in another building which for some incompre-
hensible reason had only one exit. Despite these security measures, the
hired assassins managed to penetrate into this fortress without a fight on
24 May 1940. It is just about a miracle that Trotsky, his wife Nathalia
Sedova and his grandson Esteban Volkov, who had just arrived from Paris,
survived this attack. There is no doubt as to who sent these assassins
and Trotsky was quite outspoken about this. In a letter to the attorney
general and to the Mexican foreign minister he makes himself quite clear:
"Over the past several years, Stalin had hundreds of my real or pre-
sumed friends executed or shot. Then he caused the murder of my entire family,
with the exception of myself, my wife, and my grandson. In Switzerland he had
his agents murder a fellow by the name of Ignaz Reiss, one of the GPU chiefs,
when the latter publicly accepted my ideas. These facts were established
without doubt by the French police and by the Swiss courts. The same agents
who murdered Ignaz Reiss also pursued my son in Paris. Furthermore, on the
evening of 7 November 1936, GPU agents broke into the scientific institute
in Paris and stole some of my files. Two of my former secretaries, Erwin
Wolff and Rudolph Klement, were murdered by GPU agents; the former was killed
in Spain and the latter in Paris. The real objective of all of the show
trials in Moscow in 1936 and 1937 was to get me handed over to the Soviet
Union and into the hands of the GPU.
"This list of crimes and similar excesses could be supplemented with
many other examples. All of them were aimed at my physical destruction.
But Stalin is behind all of this. His weapon is the Soviet secret police
which has its agents in every country, in other words, the CPU."
In the rest of this letter, Trotsky also mentions his suspicion that
the German Gestapo might make common cause with the Soviet secret police
which in July 1934 was renamed from GPU into NKVD. This is not as crazy
as it sounds. In August 1939 Stalin had signed a pact with Hitler but it
is quite obvious that there must have been a secret treaty in addition;
the development of events and the way these two countries work together
seem to prove this. After all, did not the publicly announced treaty pro-
vide for cooperation between the two secret police organizations? The
German secret service and the NKVD helped each other already during the
liquidation of Marshal Tukhachevskiy and about a dozen other high Soviet
officers. When soon thereafter the Soviet authorities celebrated the entry
of the German army into Paris by hanging out flags on public buildings in
Moscow, Trotsky's suspicions became even more credible.
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Of course, there is one thing that not even the suspicious Trotsky
was able to guess: that his murderer was already inside the heavily guarded
house at the corner of Wiener and Morelos Streets and that he was just
waiting for the right moment, always urged on by his bosses, to perpetrate
the deed.
The chief of the "Trotsky special division" and the man in charge
of the assassination attempts against the founder of the Red Army was Dr.
Gregory Rabinovich, a cover name concealing NKVD General Leonid Eitingon.
In America, Rabinovich-Eitingon turned up as a "representative of the Soviet
Red Cross" with headquarters in 'New York. In 1940 he temporarily lived in
a mansion near Trotsky's house. But here again he played the role of a
highly refined diplomat of the Jewish faith who on every occasion emphasizes
his "purely humanitarian mission."
The public hears only about two attempts to assassinate Trotsky but
this does not prove that other plans were not underway because Rabinovich-
Eitingon undoubtedly has many other irons in the fire. After the successful
second attack he was able to withdraw the assassination specialists, who were
certainly still kept in readiness rather quickly or he could switch them to
other persons who were unpopular, in the Kremlin, such as for instance, General
Krivitsky who defected in 1939 and who made some very embarrassing disclo-
sures which the international press published widely.
Krivitsky moved to New York in 1940 because France at that time was
a playground for NKVD agents and because he no longer felt safe there. Soon
thereafter he was found dead in his hotel room, most probably a victim of
Eitingon's agents. But the Soviet police also used the German Gestapo and
the counterintelligence agencies of other countries. There are a number of
cases in which we are sure that communists denounced their own comrades to
the Gestapo in order that these comrades would be put in concentration camps
where the dirty job of assassination could be accomplished for the NKVD.
Or unpopular members found "special materials" of the CP on their persons
or in their possession, after which the police is notified anonymously and
then finds these compromising materials during a house search. This inevi-
tably leads to sentencing for espionage and the particular victim then dis-
appears for some time in some prison.
The number of opposition communists removed in this manner runs into
the thousands if not tens of thousands. The Spanish civil war of 1936-1939
offered a particularly dirty possibility for getting rid of unpopular party
members and perhaps even using their death as propaganda. Stalin had many
critics of his policy enticed to Spain as "volunteers" where they were
either allowed to die a "hero's death" or where they were shot down in
rear areas as "agents of Franco." The henchmen who carried out these dirty
jobs, however, were not only Soviet NKVD men; French, German, and especially
Spanish communists also volunteered for these dirty details. The best of
these professional murderers were brought back to the Soviet Union partly
after the collapse of the Republican Army and partly even before; back in
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the Soviet Union they were sent to schools in order to learn the very
latest fine points of their trade.
Among these specially selected men there was probably also a Spanish
citizen by the name of Ramon del Rio Mercader, son of the Spanish female
NKVD agent Caridad Mercader. He was born in Barcelona on 7 February 1914.
When his mother left her husband, del Rio, in 1925, she took along her
children who, in addition to Ramon, included three sons and one daughter.
She first went to Toulouse and then to Bordeaux and Paris. Nobody knows
how she made a living at that time. One thing is certain: she was not yet
in the service of the NKVD at that time. It is probable that she joined
the French CP in France. It seems that she was recruited for the NKVD by
a French airforce officer with whom she was intimate.
After his graduation from school, Ramon del Rio Mercader attended a
hotel management school in Lyon; but after one year, the 15-year old returned
to Barcelona. Although his mother had brought him up as a communist, this
did not stop him from working in the fancy hotels of the "capitalists" and
adopting their living habits. This helped later on when he maintained that
he was the son of a filthy-rich Belgian. His perfect behavior and comport-
ment was considered as proof by everyone.
He served in the Spanish army from 1932 until 1934 and became an active
communist during that time. There is no doubt that his mother contributed
considerably to this; she had in the meantime returned to Spain, most prob-
ably on orders from the NKVD. But it seems that the decisive factor in
the hiring of Ramon del Rio Mercader was the political situation.
After the 1931 elections, which were won by the Left, there were
uprisings of farm workers who were living in misery on the big estates of
absentee landowners. During the next elections in 1933 the right-wing
parties were victorious under the leadership of Gil Robles, of the Catholic
"Popular Action." The reactionary forces once again were victorious. Any-
one from the Left who wanted to stay out of jail had to camouflage himself.
In 1935, young Ramon was ordered to found a club of artists called "Cervantes"
-- a kind of illegal party and propaganda cell of the communists. The
place was quickly discovered and Mercader had to spend a few months in jail.
What he had so far lacked in the way of experience and toughness in
the political struggle, he now learned quickly from other political pris-
oners. After the 1936 elections, which again brought a swing to the Left,
he was released ahead of schedule and joined the communist militia, firmly
determined to "repay" the reactionaries. When the civil war broke out soon
thereafter, he was appointed political commissar with the rank of lieutenant
in the 27th Division on the Aragon Front. Members of this military unit
later on talked about his unscrupulous behavior. He was very much like his
mother who has been described as a "gun moll" filled with fanatical hatred
of anyone who was against Stalin.
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No one knows whether she introduced her son Ramon to the highest
officials of the NKVD in Spain or whether these men noticed him on their
own. But it is certain that he was a member of the interstaff of the NKVD
at the very latest in 1937. He had thus found his "mission" and lived the
life of a Comintern agent who had unlimited money available to him.
Systematically educated by his superiors in this "sweet political
life," he never managed to break away from it because serving in the NKVD
meant prosperity and power for him. As NKVD man he was able to move people
he did not like out of the way. All it took was one flick of the wrist,
one anonymous accusation.
Soon his superiors thought that he was ready for a big mission --
the biggest mission which the NKVD could assign anybody to at the end of
the 30's. First of all he was sent to Paris in the spring of 1938 with
orders to pass himself off as the son of a Belgian millionaire diplomat.
He did not have to be careful with the way he handled his money and in addi-
tion to the usual informer activity he was only asked to do one thing: he was
supposed to establish intimate relations with a certain American woman who
was not exactly a beauty and who was, on top of all this, several years
older; he was to play the role of her enthusiastic lover.
This American woman by the name of Sylvia Ageloff, a convinced
Trotskyite, had been working as an applied psychologist for the Board of
Education of the city of New York. Her "girlfriend" Ruby Well, secretary
of Louis Budenz, the then chief editor of the communist central organ in the
United States, the Daily Worker, had enticed her to Paris. Budenz, who was
later on converted to Catholicism, in a book reciting his confessions, made
certain statements which easily make it possible to reconstruct the diaboli-
cal game whose initiator undoubtedly was Ravinovitch-Eitingon.
In June 1938, Ruby Weil, quite by accident, introduced Sylvia to
Ramon del Rio Mercader in Paris; at that time he called himself Jacques
Mornard-Vandendreschd and maintained that he was the Teheran-born son of
a Belgian diplomat. He said that he was born in 1904 in order to make it
look as if he was older than Sylvia. There was indeed a man by the name of
Jacques Mornard who had been born in Teheran in 1908 and whose mother's
maiden name was Vandendriessche. No one ever found out whether the real
Mornard ever knew about Mercader's double game.
Sylvia Ageloff fell for her new friend with the good manners who was
able to say: "I love you" so convincingly -- just as Rabinovitch-Eitingon
had figured she would. The 27-year old American woman, whose love life in
the past had notbeenexactly satisfactory, at any rate was unable to realize
whom she was facing, although there were quite a few things at that time
which might have aroused her suspicion.
For instance, Mornard disappeared for -a few weeks from Paris in July
1938. Writing Sylvia from Brussels, he said that his mother had been seriously
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injured in an auto accident while his father had merely suffered shock.
When Sylvia went to Brussels, her friend could not be found at the address
he had given. After his return to Paris he told her that he suddenly had
to go to Britain; the truth was that he probably simply wanted to get away
from her for awhile or that he had to meet Eitingon. He also tried to
corrupt her. One day he offered to sell a series of articles of hers to
a so-called "Argus Publishing Company." Sylvia would write an article
each week which was allegedly printed but she never was given any copies of
the magazine.
But love had completely blinded this convinced female Trotskyite.
She believed every word she was told by her boyfriend with whom she lived
in a marriage-like relationship and who was ever so attentive. Evening
after evening he picked her up in his impressive car, even when she partici-
pated in September in the strictly conspiratorial charter meeting of the
4th International for which Trotsky had issued a call and which he had been
preparing since 1934. But even if she herself had been more careful -- the
NKVD would still have found out what was going on without her. One of the
most trusted friends of the murdered Leon Sedov, now a representative of
Trotsky in Paris, the Soviet emigre of Polish-Ukrainian origin, by the name
of Mark Szborovski,a student of medicine, was a spy of Moscow.
This is why Eitingon was able to instruct his agent Mornard to make no
attempts whatever to attend the conference or to find out anything about it
through questions. All he was allowed to do was to pick up Sylvia Ageloff
who was hopelessly in love with him, partly also because he seemed so dis-
interested in her political activities. In the spring of 1939 Eitingon
went one step further. Mornard was supposed to tell his fiance that a Bel-
gian newspaper had offered him a job as a correspondent in the United States.
He therefore suggested to Sylvia that she return to New York and wait for
him there because he would follow her soon. But he did not turn up and drop
in on her until September, after the outbreak of World War It.
To her great surprise he now called himself Frank Jacson. When she
asked him how he had suddenly managed to obtain a Canadian passport, he said
that he could not get an entry permit because he was a Belgian citizen and
he therefore bought a forged passport for 3,600 dollars in order to be near
her. It was found out later on with the help of the serial No 31377 that
this passport had indeed been issued on 22 March 1937 to a Canadian by the
name of Tony Babich who had been born in Lovinac in Yugoslavia on 13 June
1905 and who had been killed in action during the Spanish civil war in the
summer of 1937. The NKVD, which handled all of the papers of the"Interna-
tional Brigade," had this passport forged. In the process, the forgery
expert obviously forgot to put the letter "k" in the name Jackson.
In October 1939 "Jacson" went to Mexico City on his doctored passport.
From there he wrote Sylvia that he felt lonely and that he missed her. Right
away she took 3 months leave of absence and followed her fiance who thus took
a big step closer to his objective because Sylvia would of course also visit
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ICI
her sister who happened to be working as a secretary for Trotsky. Full of
pride she introduced her bridegroom who made a tremendous impression on her
sister because of his perfect manners. Mornard now had the "in" that would
take him into the house in Coyoacan; the most important thing for him now
was to have patience.
And Jacson did have patience. He was in no hurry because he had not
met Trotsky in person as yet. But it would be wrong to credit him with this
brilliant tactic of assassination which was worked out psychologically down
to the last detail. The plans were-certainly made by Dr. Rabinovich alias
General Eitingon who was much more experienced in getting such plots hatched.
It was he who managed to play on the feelings of the unfortunate Sylvia
Ageloff with such great skill and it was he who guided all of the steps of
Jacson after the assassination attempt of 24 May 1940.
On 27 February 1940 Trotsky changed his last will as if he knew that
his days were numbered. The passages in which he talks about his wife Nathalia
Sedova bear witness to his very tender feelings for her:
"It was my good fortune to be a fighter for socialism; in addition
to this, destiny gave me the good fortune of being her husband. Over the
almost 40 years of life together she has always been inexhaustible source of
love, generosity, and tenderness. She suffered greatly but I am happy when
I realize that she did have some days of happiness."
The 24 May 1940 attack on the house at the corner of Wiener and
Morelos Streets had failed; Eitingon now moved up his second pawn, Frank
Jacson, who in the meantime had managed to gain admittance to the fortress,
without having asked for it. He had promised Sylvia Ageloff, who in the
meantime had returned to New York in March, that he would never enter this
house without her and he had given her his word of honor; but since the
Rosmer couple, who had brought grandson Esteban to Coyoacan, one day asked
Jacson to run a few errands for them, he automatically had a chance to drop
in at the house in Coyoacan.
Later on the Rosmers, with whom the Trotskys had been closely connected
for many decades, accepted Jacson's offer to drive them in his car to the
ship which they were taking upon leaving Mexico. And now, 4 days after the
first attack on 28 May 1940, he pulled up in front of the house in Coyoacan.
The couple was still at breakfast and he was asked to join them at the table.
This was the first time he met Trotsky in person. In his letter to Sylvia,
Jacson told his fiance why he had broken his promise. This correct behavior
of course had a positive effect in his favor.
After his return from Veracruz he very wisely did not try to meet the
"great old man" right away again. He stayed in the background and did not
show up, as we can see from the entries in the guard book which the secre-
taries kept with great accuracy. He did not turn up again in Coyoacan until
12 June in order to announce that he was going to New York and that he would
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leave his car to the guards for their personal use. This again is a point
in his favor especially since he allows one of the guards to accompany him
to the plane.
In New York he received the last instructions -- and, considering
the systematic operating procedure of Leonid Eitingon, we can certainly
assume that a number of "dress rehearsals" were made. Jacson is fully
aware of the danger of his mission and this is why all possibilities that
might develop must be discussed in great detail. After his return he sug-
gested to Trotsky that he accompany him on a mountain climbing trip. He
said that he was a very seasoned mountain climber but when the suggestion
is not immediately accepted he drops it. He is by far too cautious to force
anything.
The various weapons which were later on found on him also indicated
that he was thinking of all possible ways of assassination. In his right
coat pocket he carried a 35-cm long and 3 cm wide dagger; as a second weapon
he carried a caliber .45 pistol loaded with eight rounds. The instrument
with which he finally perpetrated the deed -- an ice pick -- he bought neither
in New York nor in France, as he said later; instead he probably stole it in
April from the owner of a tourist hotel in which he had lived for a while
before his New York trip.
The guard book records his longest visit on 29 July 1940: from 1440
until 1550. On that day Trotsky and his wife had invited him and his fiance,
who was spending her annual vacation in Mexico, for tea. On 8 August he is
again in the house and stays for more than an hour. The "dress rehearsal"
for the assassination took place on this eleventh visit. He said that he
had written an article and that he would like Trotsky to read it over.
While Trotsky read the article, Jacson sat down on a table behind Trotsky's
chair, something which the host thinks rather unpleasant.
After that Trotsky told his wife that he did not want to see this
strange young man anymore; besides he noticed that Jacson kept his hat on
all the time and held his overcoat close to himself. There was a good reason
for this, as it turned out later: on that very day he carried the stolen ice
pick and other weapons with him. Of course, Trotsky did not have the slightest
idea about any of this but he had a rather unpleasant feeling, as if he was
somehow threatened.
Perhaps Jacson wanted to carry out the assassination on that Saturday
and perhaps he simply could not muster enough courage. But there are certain
indications which lead to the conclusion that, despite all of his unscrupu-
ousness, he resisted becoming a murderer -- deep inside himself -- until the
very last. During the last days before the assassination, not only Sylvia
Ageloff noticed that her fiance looked strange; Trotsky and his wife were
also beginning to wonder about his strange behavior which began to look very
bad compared to his former poise.
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The 20th of August began very pleasantly for Trotsky. The weather
was perfect and he felt better than ever before. Arising around 0700, he
greeted his wife with the rather fatal words: "Well, they didn't kill us
last night either. And I have not felt so good in a long time." The morning
mail also brings happy news. Trotsky is informed that his files had arrived
at Harvard University, without any of the secret services trying to interfere
with the shipment. He had expected some sort of trouble because he had left
his files and other documents to the university only on the condition that
some of these files be placed under lock and key until 1980.
In the morning he dictated an article on the dictaphone. At 1300
he received his American attorney who advised him to take action against a
certain slander case. After a period of rest, Trotsky returned to his desk.
Shortly after 1700, as every day, he went to the stables in the courtyard
in order to feed the rabbits and chickens. Taking care of these animals is
a welcome alternative for him instead of walks and longer hikes in the vicin-
ity or in the mountains which he had to give up for security reasons.
When Nathalia Sedova looked down into the garden, she saw young Jacson
standing next to her husband. Once again she notices his nervous behavior.
He looked as if he were seasick. Jacson greeted her with pronounced courtesy
and called after her: "I am terribly thirsty. Could I have a glass of
water?" She offered him tea but he replied: "No, thanks; I had a late lunch
and it seems that some of it is backing up on me. I feel as if I am choking."
Later on he makes excuses for his girlfriend Sylvia because she had not
arrived as yet. He said that she would come any moment in order to say good-
bye because both of them would leave for New York tomorrow.
But in reality he very cleverly kept her away. She was waiting for
him in her hotel, as he told her to do, and since he is late, something which
is quite unusual for him, she became more and more worried by the minute.
Suddenly she is seized by an inexplicable anxiety. She calls the hotel in
which both of them were living but no one knew where he was. At the very
moment Jacson was already talking to Trotsky and showed him a few typewritten
pages; this was the article which he had submitted to him three days ago
and which he had revised in the meantime. Searchingly the old man looks at
the visitor and as he notices that Jacson looks very bad he says full of sym-
pathy: "You look sick. I don't at all like your looks. You're to watch
your health more."
Slowly taking off the gloves which he usually wore when feeding the
domestic animals, Trotsky walked around in his study. Jacson followed him.
About two or three minutes later, shortly before 1800, Nathalia Sedova
heard a terrible outcry. She ran outside -- and saw her husband lying at
the balcony door in the dining room, covered with blood. "Jacson," groans
Trotsky and immediately afterward: "Natasha, I love you so much." While
she tried to take care of her seriously injured husband, there was much
shouting in the study. The guards were beating down on the assassin with
their pistol butts. He tries to defend himself and whimpers: "They had
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me in their power; they have arrested my mother. Sylvia has nothing to
do with this."
Despite his deadly head injury, Trotsky understood what Jacson said
and asked one of his bodyguards: "No, no; don't kill him -- he must be made
to talk." The guards stopped beating the assassin who in the meantime had
regained control of himself. When the police arrived a few minutes after
1800 he gave them a letter; he did not have any other personal identity
documents or other papers on his person; he maintained that he had destroyed
them earlier. The letter, written in the French language, was probably
written many days before on the typewriter; the date was entered in pencil,
as was the signature "Jac."
In this letter Jacson first of all states that he is a member of
an old Belgian family and that he was recruited for the 4th International
by a friend who then caused him to go to Mexico. He continued as follows:
"After a few talks he (Trotsky) finally told me quite clearly what
he wanted of me. At that moment all of the illusions collapsed and I felt
great distrust toward this man in whom I had believed until then.
"I was to go to Russia and organize a series of assassinations of
various personalities, first of all Stalin. This was against all of the
basic rules of the struggle which so far had been an open and honest struggle
and this destroyed my entire belief. I nevertheless did not agree at that
time [sic] because I wanted to know how far the low character and hatred of
this man would go."
This was the strategy of the NKVD. It is probable that
Eitingon
typed
this letter himself when Jacson was in New York. But the
general
made
the mistake of making the persuasion periods somewhat too
short, per-
haps
because he was misinformed and perhaps also because he did
not know
that
every visitor and every visit were carefully recorded. This means
that
Jacson was in Coyoacan for a total of eleven visits, totaling 4 hours
and 27 minutes. During this time he had no more than 15 minutes with
Trotsky, in private. But this is not long enough to get to trust a man to
make him an offer such as this. Besides, all of this fitted only too well
into the image of the "show trials" in Moscow.
In addition, Jacson stated that Trotsky was in the service of "Ameri-
can imperialism," in other words, that he was being paid by the government
in Washington. In 1940 the Soviet Union was still maintaining friendly
relations with Hitler Germany. In the trial, which only took place 3 years
later, Trotsky is no longer an "American agent"; instead he is a "fascist
bloodhound" in the pay of the Gestapo because now Hitler is fighting
against the Soviet Union and Moscow has allied itself with the once dis-
tained "American plutocrats."
Jacson made the following statement about the perpetration of the
deed as such:
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"After my talks with Trotsky I developed an unspeakable hatred of
him. I clearly realized that I was one of those whom he had abused for his
own personal advantage because he forced his supporters to sacrifice them-
selves for his own interests, without any pangs of conscience. This is why
I decided to kill him and then to commit suicide only after I was sure that
he was dead.
"On the day of the assassination I entered the house around 1830.
Harold opened the door. In the courtyard I met several of Trotsky's secre-
taries. They told me something which I did not understand. I asked Harold
whether Sylvia was there because she had said that she wanted to visit the
'old man.' But he said no. I said: 'Well, I suppose she will come later.'
I found Trotsky feeding his rabbits. Then he asked me to go to his study
with him. There he took my papers and sat down in a chair at the desk. I
stood to his left and he turned his back to me. He was certainly not sus-
picious.
"I put my coat, into whose right corner [sic] a dagger had been sewed
and in whose left side I had the ice pick, on some piece of furniture, I
don't recall which one. I only know that it was on the East side of the
room behind Trotsky. While he read the article I took the ice pick out of
my raincoat, closed my eyes and hit him on the head. I struck him only
once. He let out a terrible yell, threw himself at me at the same time,
and bit me in the left hand. You can still see the impression made. Then
he staggered back. After the first outcry, Harold was the first to appear;
he went to work on me with his pistol butt and he was then joined by Charles
and Hansen. I had been stunned by the deed itself and I made no attempt to
flee. I do not know whether anyone else entered the room. The police came
later and brought me here."
The Belgian consul who was brought in to look at him doubted Jacson's
statement that he was really called Mornard-Vandendreschd. The Belgian
consul maintained that there was no diplomat by that name and that there
was no military academy at Dixmuiden and no Jesuit school in Brussels which
the assassin maintained he had attended. But Jacson-Mornard persisted in
his statement. It was impossible to check out his statement because in
German-occupied Belgium there is no opportunity for investigations. Only
the diplomatic yearbooks were available. The investigators did not get on
the right track until years later when, as a result of certain indications
and hints, the fingerprints of Ramon del Rio Mercader are found; as we
remember, he had been sentenced to prison because of communist agitation in
Barcelona in 1936. A comparison of the fingerprints definitely proved the
identity of Jacson-Mornard.
His statement, which he shouted at a moment when he was afraid for his
life and in which he maintained that he was being blackmailed because his
mother was under arrest later on turned out to have been sheer invention
after many years. At the time of the assassination she and her friend
Eitingon were 500 m away from Trotsky's house, waiting for her son, in the
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hope that he would succeed in escaping after the murder. She was fully
informed on all of the preparations. Later on, Caridad Mercader told a
Spanish party comrade by the name of Jesus Hernandez, who was minister of
justice during the civil war (and who broke with the communists in 1950)
that she had discussed the assassination of Trotsky directly with Stalin
and Beria during her visits to the Soviet Union.
After the deed was done she and her son were awarded the Order of
Lenin, one of the highest Soviet decorations. Evacuated to Ufa during
the war and put up in the big-shot hotel "Bashkiriya" there, she lived
later on in the Moscow "Lux" hotel from 1943 until she left the country in
1944, along with other Comintern big shots. Equipped with forged passports,
she lived in Mexico from October 1944 until November 1945 where the estab-
lished contact with the female communist Dr. Esther Chapa who until 1947
was the "head of the prison delegation for the prevention of crimes." Of
all people, she picked Trotsky's assassin to be her contact man in the
prison in which he is serving his sentence. This meant that Jacson was
able to move about freely within the prison compound and that he had great
influence upon the guards and prisoners because of his "job."
No one knows whether Caridad Mercader during her second stay in Mexico
hoped to be able to make it possible for her son to escape, just as Eitingon
was able to escape from New York before the 1943 trial, but there are some
indications for this. When steps were taken for the first time to help him
escape, Jacson-Mornard simply refuses to go along. And he had good reasons.
He was scared by the example of what had happened to the other NKVD agents.
So long as Stalin was alive, he was safer in prison.
A few minutes after the assassination, hundreds of people had gathered
in front of Trotsky's house. Reporters arrived and an ambulance came along
with the police. But the secretaries refused to allow their chief to be
removed so long as police General Jose Manuel Nunuz [sic] was not present.
They were afraid that other assassins might attack the convoy and kill the
seriously injured man. They were still hoping that Trotsky could be saved.
Only after Trotsky had been moved to the hospital is the assassin, half
beaten to death by the secretaries, moved out. Quite by accident, he is
put in a room right next to the one holding his victim.
Just 2 hours after the attack, seriously injured Trotsky,
who
in
the meantime had lost consciousness, is on the operating table.
The
doctors
realize that his condition is hopeless. Still, they try to save
him
--
although in vain. He died on 21 August 1940, at 1925, 25 hours
and
35 min-
utes after the attack.
The news of his death pushes the war news off the front pages of the
newspapers. Hundreds of thousands file past his bier in the Great Hall of
the Alcazar, in the center of the Mexican capital, in complete silence. A
vast throng of people followed the funeral procession and very soon the
people in the streets sing the "Gran Corrida" about Leon Davidovich Trotsky.
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This sad folk song whose author is unknown is on everyone's lips within
a few days:
"Trotsky is dead -- slain between morning and night. Those who
have loved him now wail. He who ordered this deed is laughing. He came
to us in Coyoacan in order to find hospitality in peace after many years
of struggle and suffering and Trotsky found death among us. The murderer
posed as a friend who was trusted and sneaked into the house which Trotsky
had built among us. And he pulled out his ax. He slew his host and
friend who had not done him any wrong. All of Mexico cries for him now
and all of Coyoacan is in mourning."
The murderer, who quickly recovered from his shock and the beating
he had received, is interrogated constantly. He has an explanation and an
answer for everything and whenever he gets caught in his own contradictions
he suddenly manages to protect himself by maintaining that his memory has
failed him. Only once did he lose self-control completely; that happened
when he was confronted with his girlfriend Sylvia Ageloff, who was likewise
under arrest.
On 20 August she had in vain waited for her friend at the Hotel
Montijo until about 1900; she then phoned Coyoacan and heard what had hap-
pened. She immediately went to the scene of the crime and surrendered to
the police. The authorities did believe her when she said that she had
nothing to do with the assassination but the investigative agencies thought
it wiser to take her along for the time being.
When she was put under arrest, the assassin was no longer there. As
she now saw him before her, she shouted: "Take this murderer away. Kill
him. He has killed Trotsky. Beat him to death."
One of the officers turned to Sylvia and said: "Jacson maintains
that you are the only reason for his existence and that he killed Trotsky
because of you because you were supposed to become a victim of his intrigues."
"Lies. Nothing but lies" replies Sylvia. "He is a hypocrite, a
murderer. Kill him."
In her presence Jacson-Mornard does not dare repeat his statements.
Sylvia Ageloff contradicts him on many points and everyone who witnessed this
confrontation was convinced that she said the truth when she shouted in
utmost excitement: "He is a traitor in love, in friendship, in everything.
I know now that I have been the tool of this swine." She spat on him and
when the police took him away she called after him: "You bastard. You
bastard. You bastard."
Despite Sylvia Ageloff's statements there are many points which the
police and the attorneys do not have answers for because it is difficult to
check these statements in view of wartime conditions; the murderer and his
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boss, Eitingon, who did such a fine job of preparing the assassination,
certainly figured on this too. As a result, the investigation could not be
as thorough as it should have been.
The longer the investigation lasts, the easier the murderer has it
in prison. He has unlimited funds available; he can afford a phonograph, a
radio, books, newspapers, wine, and even female companionship. By the time
the trial is held in 1943 -- after the victorious battle of Stalingrad --
the international sympathy for Stalin reached a high point considered impos-
sible in the past.
Quite by accident it was announced that the defense attorneys had
received 20,000 dollars "from an unknown source." It is easy to guess where
this money came from. The verdict is announced on 16 April 1943: Ramon del
Rio Mercader alias Jacques Mornard alias Frank Jacson is given the maximum
sentence allowed for murder under Mexican law: 20 years imprisonment. The
verdict among others says this:
"From the beginning of his trip to Mexico until he established per-
sonal contact with Trotsky and even afterward, Mornard's behavior is full
of untruths and trickery. The court must therefore conclude that Frank
Jacson or Jacques Mornard undertook his trip to Mexico for the sole purpose
of murdering Trotsky."
The American Trotskyites asked the government in Washington to be
allowed to move the body of Leon Trotsky to the United States but the State
Department refused to issue a visa to the dead man. On 27 August 1940 the
corpse is cremated and the urn containing his ashes is buried in the garden
of the house in Coyoacan. The spot is marked by a white rectangular stone
over which waves a red flag.
Shortly before that, another grave had been dug right next to it.
The marble slab reads: "In Memory of Robert Sheldon Harte, 1915-1940, mur-
dered by Stalin." Harte, allegedly kidnapped after the 24 May attack, was
indeed murdered by Stalin's agents but for an entirely different reason
than Trotsky assumed: he was a spy who had to be silenced. But Trotsky
kept believing in the loyality of his bodyguard and awarded the dead man
an honor which he had not earned.
The room in which Trotsky was fatally injured has been left in the
same condition. His wife Nathalia Sedova, who was to live in that house for
another 20 years, wanted to make sure that nothing was changed. She has
become a lonely old woman; all she has left is one grandson -- and her
memories. These memories are not to be touched. Every morning she greets
the tomb of her husband. And she also looks at the marble slab and she
likewise believes that Harte was not a spy. Admitting the theory of the
police would be like treason to her murdered husband and her murdered sons
and grandchildren.
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ii
After Khrushchev's disclosures to the 20th Congress, Nathalia Sedova
petitioned the Soviet government that the victor of the 7 November 1917
revolution, the subsequent founder of the Red Army, Leon Davidovitch Trotsky,
be rehabilitated; she received no reply to this petition. The doors of the
prison opened for Mercader 10 years after Stalin's death. Czech communists
were waiting for the murderer at the gates. They took him to Cuba by plane.
We lost track of him in Czechoslovakia but we do have information to the
effect that he is living in a small village near Prague. Of course, he
has been stripped of his Order of Lenin and he is no longer a "hero of the
Soviet Union."
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HARRY SCHULZE-WILDE
Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger
Es ist der 24. Mai 1940. Vor dem Haus Ecke
Wiener- and MorelosstraBe im Stadtteil
Coyoacan von Mexico City, in dem der welt-
bekannte russische Revolutionsfiihrer and Griin-
der der Roten Armee, Leo Trotzki, seit drei Jahren
lebt, stehen plaudernd drei Polizisten. Sie gehoren
zu jenen zehn Polizeibeamten, die von der mexi-
kanischen Regierung mit der Bewachung dieser
zur Festung ausgebauten Villa betraut wurden.
Jeweils fiinf von ihnen haben 24 Stunden Dienst.
Kurz nach drei Uhr morgens nahern sich ihnen
zwei Manner in Polizeiuniform and ein dritter
in der Uniform eines Armeeleutnants. ,Was gibt's
Kameraden?" fragen sie, als handle es sick um
eine Inspektion. ,Nichts besonderes", antworten
die vor dem Wachtturm stehenden Polizisten.
Doch in diesem Augenblick ziehen die drei An-
kommlinge ihre Revolver and rufen: ,Hande
hoch, Ihr verdammten Schweinel" Gleichzeitig
tauchen aus dem Dunkel mehrere Manner auf,
einige in Zivil, die anderen in Uniformen. Sie
nehmen den fi of Wachtposten die Waffen ab and
fesseln sic.
Nachdem sie die auBere Bewachung aus-
geschaltet haben, klopfen sie an das eiserne Tor,
doch nicht gerade sonderlich stark, um die Posten
in den mit Maschinengewehren bestiickten
Turmen auf der Betonmauer nicht zu alarmiercn.
Das Tor offnet sick sofort, etwa 20 Mann huschen
in das Innere. Audi in den Garten dringen sie ein,
and von dort aus verteilen sie sick fiber das ganze
Haus. Unmittelbar danach zerreiBen FeuerstoBe
aus Maschinenpistolen die Stille. Aber bevor die
Bewohner der benachbarten Villen so reiht zur
Besinnung kommen, ist alles vorbei. Die Ein-
dringlinge verschwinden in den dunklen StraBen,
die letzten fRichten mit den beiden Autos aus
den Garagen des Hauses.
Nach einer halben Stunde trifft die von Nach-
barn alarmierte Polizei ein. Sie beginnt sofort mit
der Untersuchung. Nach Aussage der von ihren
Fesseln befreiten Bewacher wurden etwa 300
Schiisse abgefeuert, aber nur Trotzkis Enkel
Esteban, der erst vor wenigen Tagen aus Frank-
reich gekommen ist, wurde durch einen Streif-
schuB am linken FuB verletzt. Leo Trotzki, dem
der Oberfall gegolten hat, ist mit dean Schrecken
davongekommen, ebenso seine Fran Nathalic
Sedowa, die vier amerikanischen Sekretare, der
Deutsche Otto SchuBler, ein franzosiches Ehepaar
and die drei Dienstboten: die Kochin, das Stuben-
madchen and der Hausbursche.
In Trotzkis Schlafzimmer zahlt der unter-
suchende Polizeibeamte 73 Einschlage. Die Ehe-
leute sind diesem morderischen Kreuzfeuer durch
Fenster and Tiiren nur entronnen, weil sie sick
sofort unter das Bett geworfen hatten. Audi der
kleine Esteban versteckte silt, als er die Schiisse
horte, unter seinem Bett. Trotz seiner elf Jahre
weiB er, daB man semen Grolvater unter allen
Umstanden toten will. Rund ein Dutzend Atten-
tate sind bisher fehlgeschlagen. Trotzkis Kinder,
zwei Sohne and zwei Tochter, wurden bereits
ermordet oder in den Tod getrieben. Von den
Enkelkindern lebt nur nosh Esteban.
Aber nicht nur die nachsten Angehorigen, auch
zahlreiche seiner Freunde and Sieben Sekretare
starben eines unnatilrlichen Todes: in der UdSSR,
in Spanien, in Paris, in der Schweiz and in
anderen Landern. Die von Josef Stalin aus-
gesandten Murder wuBten ihre Opfer selbst in
Krankenhausern and einsamen Gebirgsdorfern
zu finden. Das ist auch der Grund, weshalb
Trotzki sein Haus in Coyoacan zur Festung aus-
bauen lieB. Alle erdenklichen SicherheitsmaB-
nahmcn wurden getroffen. Das Haupttor ist mit
zwei Querstangen verstarkt, and wenn es geoffnet
wird, leuchtet eine helle Lampe fiber dem Eingang
auf. Die Fenster haben stahlerne Schutzschilde
mit SchieBscharten, and ein Netz von elektrischen
Drahfen macht es unrnoglich, die Mauer zu iiber-
klettern. Bei der geringsten Beruhrung der Drahte
werden Alarmglocken ausgelost, die einen
hollischen Larm machen.
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
Das Ratsel, wie die Aftentater in these so
gesicherte Festung kampflos and ohne die Alarm-
anlagen in Betrieb zu setzen, eindringen konnten,
lost sick bald: Der in dieser Nacht mit der Wache
betraute Amerikaner Robert Sheldon Harte ist
verschwunden. Er muff das Tor geoffnet haben,
and nach Aussage der Polizeibeamten ist er mit
den Attentatern im letzten der beiden Autos
geflohen. Aber Trotzki halt es fur unmoglich, daB
er mit den ausgesandten Mordern unter einer
Decke steckte; er glaubt, Sheldon Harte sei ent-
fuhrt worden.
Wenige Tage spater findet man die Leiche des
Sekretars in einem abgelegenen, unbewohnten
Haus. Die Untersuchung ergibt einwandfrei, das
Sheldon Harte dort nicht als Gefangener gehalten
and erst nach einer gewissen Zeit im Schlaf um-
gebracht wurde. Die Morder haben ihn dann
unter der Lehmdecke des Fuf3bodens hastig ver-
scharrt. Wahrscheinlich glaubten sie, daft der Ver-
rater audi sie verraten konnte. Dennoch will Leo
Trotzki nicht an den Treuebruch Hartes glauben.
Der Prozef3 gegen die Attentater, die erstaun-
lich schnell entlarvt werden konnten and die man
mit rauhen Methoden zum Sprechen brachte,
findet bereits Anfang Juli statt. Doch nur die
zweite Garnitur sitzt auf der Anklagebank; die
auslandischen Hintermanner, zweifellos Beauf-
tragte der sowjetischen Geheimpolizei, sind ent-
kommen. Die Weltoffentlichkeit reagiert auf den
Prozef3 nur mit maBigem Interesse. Selbst in
Mexiko nimmt der Krieg in Europa die Aufmerk-
samkeit der Menschen mehr in Anspruch als die
dunklen Machenschaften der Stalinschen Geheim-
polizei, ein Umstand, den die Initiatoren des
Attentats mit Sicherheit einkalkuliert haben.
Zwei Wochen vor dem Anschlag auf Trotzki
hatte die deutsche Wehrmacht in Frankreich ihre
Offensive eroffnet. Die fur uneinnehmbar ge-
haltene Maginot-Linie wurde durchbrochen, Paris
besetzt, Frankreich zum Waffenstillstand gezwun-
gen and die englische Armee vom Festland ver-
trieben. Aber auch die Sowjetunion war aktiv
gewesen. Nach der Okkupation Ostpolens im
September 1939 besetzte die Rote Armee Mitte
Juni die bis dahin selbstandigen Staaten Litauen,
Lettland and Estland.
Trotzki ist mit der Prozel3fuhrung einverstan-
den. Unmit3verstandlich erklart er: In keinem
anderen Land der Welt, weder in Frankreich noch
in der Schweiz, noch in Spanien, ist je eines der
Verbrechen der GPU mit solcher Sorgfalt unter-
sucht and verfolgt worden, wie jetzt in Mexiko
der Anschlag auf mein Lebenl" Aber er weif3
auch, daB die Morder wegen des miBgluckten
Anschlags ihre Absicht nicht aufgeben werden.
Einem hoheren Polizeibeamten gegenuber erklart
er: ?Das Schicksal hat mir nodi einmal eine Frist
gegeben, dock sic wird nicht von langer Dauer
sein." Wenn er morgens aufwacht, pflegt er zu
seiner Frau zu sagen: "Heute nacht haben sic uns
nicht umgebracht. Wir haben noch einen kleinen
Aufschub erhalten."
Wer ist dieser Mann, der bis jetzt mehr als
einem Dutzend Anschlagen entging, dessen vier
Kinder man ermordete oder durch Verweigerung
arztlicher Hilfeleistung in den Tod trieb, dessen
Haus man mehrere Male anziindete, um ihn and
seine Anhanger wie Ratten auszurauchern, and
den die Kommunisten der ganzen Welt als ,Ver-
rater am Sozialismus", als ?Kapitahstenknecht",
als ?Agenten des Faschismus" and neuerdings
auch als ?Agenten des amerikanischen Imperialis-
mus" brandmarken?
Leo Davidowitsch Bronstein, genannt Trotzki,
wurde am 26. Oktober 1879 (nach dem grego-
rianischen Kalender am 7. November) in Janowka,
Gouvernement Cherson (Ukraine), geboren. Er
war das funfte von acht Kindern, von denen aber
schon vier fruhzeitig starben. Dem Vater David
Bronstein, einem wohlhabenden Landwirt, der
400 Desjatinen fruchtbaren Ackerbodens von
einem heruntergekommenen adligen Gutsbesitzer
erworben hatte, gelang es durch harte Arbeit,
semen Besitz zu vergr0ern. Er baute Werk-
statten, neue Stalle fur das Vieh and eine groBe
Muhle. Nach der Revolution, der sein Sohn zum
Siege verhalf, verlor er alles. Verbittert and
gleichzeitig stolz auf ihn, starb er 1922 als Leiter
einer staatlichen Mdhle.
Als Leo Davidowitsch geboren wurde, regierte
in RuBland Zar Alexander II. Er hatte 1861 die
bauerliche Leibeigenschaft aufgehoben. Die fort-
schrittlich-liberalen Krafte setzten deshalb grofle
Hoffnungen auf ihn. Aber bevor er sein Reform-
werk durch eine konstitutionelle Verfassung
kronen konnte, wurde er (am 1. Marz 1881) er-
mordet. Sein Sohn, Alexander III., stand ganzlich
unter dem Einflui3 Pobjedonosszews, des Ober-
prokurators des Heiligen Synod - eines bigotten
Reaktionars, der am liebsten die Leibeigenschaft
wieder eingefuhrt hatte.
Der alte Bronstein, der - wie Millionen rus-
sischer Bauern - weder lesen noch schreiben
konnte, schickte seinen Sohn auf eine jiidische
Schule, wo er in jiddischer Sprache, die er nicht
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Trotzki, der besiegfe Sieger
beherrschte, unterrichtet wurde. Zu Hause sprach
man ukrainisch. Aber der Besuch dieser jidischen
Schule war fur den kleinen Bronstein trotz allem
von grof3er Bedeutung: Er lernte dort namlich
auch russisch.
Wieder in Janowka, bildete er sich selber
weiter. Bereits mit sechs Jahren konnte er dem
Vater die Rechnungen ausschreiben and sogar
die Bucher fiihren. Die Eltern waren auf ihren
Sohn unsagbar stolz. Fur sie stand Pest: Dieser
Wunderknabe mul3te studierenl Die nachste
Station des Bildungsweges konnte deshalb nur
Odessa sein, die Hafenstadt am Schwarzen
Meer, das russische Marseille and die beriich-
tigste Polizeistadt dieses Polizeistaates".
Doch nicht in einer staatlichen Schule fand der
siebenjahrige Knabe Aufnahme, sondern in der
,,Realschule des HI. Paulus", ciner Griindung der
deutsch-lutherischen Kirchengemeinde. Der Un-
terricht wurde in russischer Sprache erteilt, die
Schuler and Lehrer waren deutscher, schweize-
rischer, russischer, polnischer, rumanischer and
griechischer Herkunft, ein getreues Spiegelbild des
Volkergemisches in diesem Teil des Zarenreiches.
Aber auch dem religiosen Bekenntnis nach war
alles vertreten: neben Schiiiern aus lutherischen,
romisch-katholischen, griechisch-orthodoxen, jii-
dischen and calvinistischen Familien besuchten
sogar Kinder verschiedener Sekten diese Schule.
Der junge Bronstein, schon im ersten Schuljahr
Primus seiner Klasse, lernte hier vor allem deutsch
and franzosisch, ferner auch italienisch and die
klassischen Sprachen Griechisch and Latein. Po-
litisch betatigte er sich nicht. In der vom liberalen
Geist gepragten ,Sdiule des Hl. Paulus" gab es
keine revolutionaren Zirkel; sie entstanden nur
in den wie Kasernen gefiihrten staatlichen
Schulen.
Erst in Nikolajew, wo sich der Siebzehnjahrige
auf den Besuch einer Universitat vorbercitcn
sollte, trat er mit ?Marxisten" in Verbindung.
Doch vorerst forderten sie nur seinen Spott her-
aus. Bei einer Silvesterfeier 1896 erklarte er in
einem Trinkspruch: ,Fluch alien Marxisten, die
soviel Harte and Ode in das Leben bringen." Und
der erste politische Artikel aus seiner Feder
richtete sich gegen den Marxismus.
Diese Episode war jedoch nur kurz. Als er 1897
sein Abitur mit ,ausgezeichnet" bestand, war er
bereits cin begeisterter Anhanger der aus London
and Deutschland kommenden Lehre von Karl
Marx. Der alte Bronstein tobte and verlangte von
seinem Sohn, er solle sich mit revolutionaren
Theorien nicht mehr befassen. Leo Davidowitsch
gab nicht nach. Er verzichtete auf die materiellen
Zuwendungen des Vaters and verdiente semen
Lebensunterhalt mit Privatstunden.
Noch in Nikolajew organisierte er, 19 Jahre
alt, eine revolutionare Organisation, den ,Siid-
russischen Arbeiterbund", beinahe schon so etwas
wie eine Partei, wenn auch in lokalen Grenzen.
Als ihm der Boden zu heil3 wurde, wollte er 1898
nach Janowka zuriickkehren. Unterwegs ver-
haftete ihn die Polizei. Fast zwei Jahre saB er in
Untersuchungshaft, Ef de 1899 wurde er ohne Ge-
richtsurteil fiir vier Jahre nach Sibirien verbannt.
Im Gefangnis hatte er die ebenfalls zur Ver-
bannung verurteilte Alexandra Sokolowskaja ge-
heiratet. In seinem Buch ?Mein Leben" widmete
er diesem Ereignis nicht einmal drei Zeilen: Die
gemeinsame Arbeit hatte uns eng verbunden. Um
nicht getrennt angesiedelt zu werden, hatten wir
uns im Moskauer Etappengefangnis trauen
lassen." Aus der Ehe gingen zwei Tochter her-
vor. Aber noch vor Ablauf der vier Jahre verliefi
Trotzki seine Familie.
Der Ruhm des jungen Revolutionars, der mit
19 Jahren eine eigene Gruppe organisiert hatte
and der von seinem Verbannungsort Wercholensk
aus Verbindung mit seinen ebenfalls verbannten
Kameraden hielt, hatte sick bis nach Zentral-
Rufiland verbreitet. Audi die Artikel, die er unter
dem Pseudonym ,Antid Oto" in der in Irkutsk
erscheinenden OstIichen Rundschau veroffent-
lichte, fielen auf. Man legte ihm deshalb nahe
zuriickzukehren. Mit einem falschen PaB aus-
geristet, in den er den Namen eines Gefangnis-
warters eingeschrieben hatte, erreichte er Irkutsk.
Dieser zufallig gewahlte ,Pauname" Trotzki solite
Weltgeschichte machen.
In Irkutsk bestieg er den Zug nach Samara, dem
heutigen Kuibyschew, Hauptquartier der illegal
erscheinenden Zeitung Iskra and Sammelbeeken
der marxistisch orientierten Revolutionare, die
gegeniiber den friiher so aktiven Terroristen-
gruppen immer mehr Anhanger gewannen. Von
dort aus schickte man ihn nach Charkow, Poltawa
and Kiew, die geheim existierenden Ortsgruppen
der Sozialdemokratischen Partei zu kontrollieren.
Wieder in Samara, erhielt er die Aufforderung,
nach London zu kommen, der westeuropaischen
Zentrale der Iskra. Die einern Befehl gleich-
kommende ,Einladung" hatte Wladimir Iljitsch
Lenin unterschrieben.
Wo immer Trotzki auftauchte, wurde man rasch
auf ihn aufmerksam, riihmte man seine iiber-
ragenden geistigen Fahigkeiten, die analytische
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
Scharfe seiner Artikel and seine glanzende
rednerische Begabung. Auch in London spielte
er schon nach wenigen Wochen eine bedeutende
Rolle. Auf dem II. Parteitag im Jahre 1903, der
in Briissel begonnen hatte and dann nach London
verlegt wurde, registrierte man seinen Elan and
seine Leidenschaft mit Aufmerksamkeit. Auf
Lenins Vorschlag hin, der ihm ,seltene Eigen-
schaften" attestierte, wurde Trotzki in den Redak-
tionsstab der Auslands-Iskra gewahlt. Spater
schickte man ihn nach Frankreich, in die Schweiz
and nach Belgien. Auf semen Reisen lernte er
nicht nur die bedeutendsten europaischen Sozia-
listen kennen, sondern audi Nathalie Sedowa, die
damals in Paris Kunstgeschichte studierte. Sic
wurde, ohne standesamtliche Formalitaten, seine
Lebensgefahrtin, die fortan alle Triumphe and
alles Leid mit ihm teilen sollte.
DaB Trotzki and der um zehn Jahre altere
Lenin (der ihn zeitweise furderte) nicht selten
- meist wegen zweitrangiger Fragen - heftig
aneinandergerieten, ist cine Tatsache, die Stalin
20 Jahre spater weidlich ausnutzen sollte, um
Trotzki einer ?antileninistischen" - and das hieB
?antirevolutionaren" - Haltung zu bezichtigen.
Das war eine bewuBte Verleumdung. Es hat sich
uberdies erwiesen, daB in vielen dieser Fragen
nicht Lenin, sondern Trotzki recht hatte. Nahe-
liegender als von Gegnerschaft zu sprechen, ware
es, die beiden Manner mit den zwei Polen eines
Magneten zu vergleichen, die nur zusammen ein
Kraftfeld erzeugen. Heute wissen wir jedenfalls,
daB nicht nur Trotzki von Lenin stark beeinfluBt
wurde (so daB In zahlreiche, im Exil lebende
Russen als dessen ,Keule" bezeichneten), sondern
daB auch Lenin vieles von Trotzkis Theorien
ubernahm: zurn Beispiel die der ?Permanenten
Revolution". Der Vater dieser These war aller-
dings nicht Trotzki, sondern nachweislich sein
zeitweiliger- Gunner, der russische Emigrant
Alexander Helphand, der spater unter dem
Namen Parvus weltbekannt wurde. Unter ?Per-
manenter Revolution" verstand er - and nach
ihm Trotzki - eine Revolution, die erst dann
beendet sei, wenn alle Lander der Erde kommu-
nistisch geworden waren.
Der EinfluB, den Helphand auf viele russische
and westeuropaische Sozialisten ausiibte, griindete
sich nicht zuletzt auf die Tatsache, daB er bereits
1895 den erst zehn Jahre spater ausbrechenden
russisch-japanischen Krieg and in dessen Folge
die russische Revolution als Vorspiel zur Welt-
revolution" vorausgesagt hatte. Diese den Pro-
gnosen von Marx entgegengesetzte Prophetic
schien unheimlich and trug nicht wenig dazu bei,
den Ruf der ?dialektischen Geschichtsauffassung"
zu festigen.
Als es im Januar 1905 in St. Petersburg zu
Unruhen kam, verlieB Trotzki seine gesicherte
Position bei dem schon recht vermogenden
Parvus-Helphand, der ihm in Munchen Wohnung
and Arbeitsmoglichkeiten gegeben hatte, and
reiste nach RuBland - ein gefahrliches Unter-
nehmcn, denn entflohene Verbannte wurden,
wenn man sic wieder faBte, auBerordentlich hart
bestraft. Fast alle anderen fiihrenden Revolutio-
nare blieben dagegen im Ausland, um erst einmal
abzuwarten, wie Bich die Verhaltnisse entwickeln
warden.
Trotzki stiirzte sich mutig in die Strudel der
Ereignisse. Er wurde zum anerkannten Fiihrer
der stark kommunistisch gefarbten Revolution von
1905, die das zaristische RuBland schwer erschiit-
terte. Nicht nur die zahlreichen Streiks ri ttelten
am politischen Gefuge des autokratisch regierten
Staates, viel schwerer wog, daB auch ein Teil der
Flotte meuterte. Nur mit Miihe gelang es, die alte
Ordnung wiederherzustellen.
Anfang Dezember 1905 wurde Trotzki ver-
haftet and 23 Monate spater zu lebenslanglicher
Verbannung in ein gottverlassenes Nest im Polar-
gebiet an der Mundung des Ob geschickt. Auf
dem Wege dorthin gelang es ihm, zu entkommen.
Mit auBergewohnlicher Energie and staunens-
werter korperlicher Zahigkeit schlug er sich durch
die Taiga and erreichte Petersburg, von wo er
nadi einigen Tagen Aufenthalt fiber Helsinki
nach London zuri ckkehrte. Er traf gerade node
rechtzeitig cin, um am V. Parteitag der Sozial-
demokratischen Arbeiterpartei RuBlands teil-
nehmen zu kennen.
Zum ersten Male entwickelte er hier in der
Offentlichkeit seine, das heiBt Parvus' Theorie von
der ?Permanenten Revolution". Lenin and andere
Links-Sozialisten, unter ihnen Rosa Luxemburg,
unterstiltzten ihn and feierten ihn nicht nur
als groBen Revolutionar, dessen mutiges Auf-
treten in St. Petersburg and spater im ProzeB
weltweites Aufsehen erregt hatte, sondern auch
als bedeutenden Theoretiker. AnschlieBend reiste
er nach Berlin, wo ihn seine Lebensgefahrtin
Nathalie Sedowa mit dem 1906 geborenen Sohn
Leon erwartete.
Auch in Deutschland wurde Trotzki gefeiert.
Parvus machte ihn mit den Fi hrern der deutschen
Sozialdemokratie bekannt: mit Karl Kautsky,
dem alten Bebel, Georg Ledebour, Franz Mehring
and Hugo Hase. Ihre Namen hatten internatio-
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nalen Klang, denn die deutsche Sozialdemokra-
tische Partei war die starkste and bestorganisierte
der Welt. Aber die Jahre 1907 bis 1914 waren fur
Trotzki im Grunde genommen nur Lehrjahre.
Erst nach Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges sollte
er seine historische Aufgabe finden - ohne daft
ihm das sofort bewuBt geworden ware.
Mit militarischen Fragen hatte sick Leo Trotzki
bisher nosh nicht beschaftigt, erst wahrend der
beiden Balkankriege 1911 and 1912 sah er sich als
Zeitungskorrespondent mit den Problcmen von
Strategic and Taktik konfrontiert. In seinen
Artikeln enthiillte er nicht nur schonungslos die
Greueltaten, die von beiden Seiten begangen
wurden and die ihn ,an die Art des DreiBig-
jahrigen Krieges" erinnerten, er beschaftigte sich
auch zunehmend mit militarischen Unternehmun-
gen. Nur die Auswirkungen irgendwelcher MaB-
nahrnen zu schildern, geniigte ihm nicht; er wollte
auch die Ursachen and inneren Zusammenhange
erkennen.
Der Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges iiber-
raschte ihn in Wien. Nadi kurzem Zwischen-
aufenthalt in der Schweiz reiste er nach Paris.
Wie wahrend der beiden Balkankriege betatigte
er sich auch jetzt - unter wechselnden Pseudo-
nymen - als Korrespondent verschiedener Zei-
tungen. Aufsehen erregten vor allem seine 1915
and 1916 geschriebenen Artikel, in denen er sich
mit der Entwicklung des Krieges zum Stellungs-
krieg beschaftigte. Der spateren, systematischen
Diffamierung Trotzkis durch Stalin ist es zuzu-
schreiben, daB these journalistisch brillanten and
hochbedeutenden Aufsatze auch heute noch nahe-
zu unbekannt rind.
In den Pariser Jahren war Trotzki zudem ein
eifriger Besucher der Bibliotheque Nationale. Er
studierte dort vor allem militarische Zeitschriften
and Bucher, wohl ohne zu ahnen, welche Be-
deutung die dabei gesammelten Kenntnisse and
Erkenntnisse einmal erlangen wurden: Keine fiinf
Jahre spater befehligte Leo Trotzki eine in zahl-
reichen Schlachten siegreiche Millionenarmee ...
Im September 1916 schob die franzosische Regie-
rung den unliebsamen Emigranten nach Spanien
ab. Am 20. Dezember ging er mit Nathalie
Sedowa and den beiden Sohnen Leon and Sergej
in Barcelona an Bord eines spanischen Dampfers,
der ihn nach New York bringen sollte. Als das
Schiff die Strafie von Gibraltar passierte, schrieb
Trotzki an einen Freund: ?Das ist das letzte Mal,
daB ich der alien Kanaille Europa einen Blick
zuwerfe."
Als er in New York eintraf, wurde er von zahl-
reichen russischen Sozialisten, die hier Asyl
gefunden batten, begeistert begriifit. Ahnten sic,
dali sic einen der grofien Fiihrer der kommenden
Revolution feierten? Zwei Monate spater wehten
in der russischen Hauptstadt Petrograd (St. Peters-
burg) auf vielen Adelspalasten rote Fahnen.
Trotzki fuhr in New York von Versammlung
zu Versammlung and prophezeite den Sieg des
Sozialismus, obwohl es in den ersten Wochen aus-
sah, als ob das Burgertum die Macht in der Hand
behalten wUrde and der Zar nur deshalb zur
Abdankung gezwungen worden war, um die
Kriegsanstrengungen zu vergroliern. Aber Trotzki
war sich seiner Sache sicher. Triumphierend
erklarte er: Die machtige Lawine der Revolution
ist in vollem Lauf, and keine menschliche Kraft
wird sick ihr entgegenstemmen konnenl" Wie
Lenin verlangte auch er nicht in erster Linie den
Sturz der alten Gesellschaftsordnung, sondern die
Beendigung des Krieges.
Mit einem norwegischen Schiff verliefi er am
27. Marz 1917 New York. Doch bei einer
Zwischenlandung in Kanada holten ihn die
Englander von Bord. Unter dem Druck zahl-
reicher Proteste wurde er nach drei Wochen
freigelassen and durfte seine Reise fortsetzen. Am
17. Mai, einen Monat spater als Lenin, erreichte
er Petrograd. Eine ungeheure Menschenmenge
begruf3te ihn. Die Arbeiter hoben den Helden der
Revolution von 1905 auf ihre Schultern and
trugen ihn im Triumph durch die Strafien.
Schon wenige Stunden nach seiner Ankunft
eilte er in das Smolny-Institut, den Sitz des Petro-
grader Sowjets. Obwohl man ihn nur als Mitglied
mit beratender Stimme aufnahm, war Trotzki
zufrieden. Kein anderer hatte eine derartige Rede-
gewalt wie er, and nicht sein Ja- oder Neinzettel
wurde entscheidend sein, sondern das, was er zu
sagen hatte. Die Rechnung ging auf. Schon nach
kurzer Zeit war er der Wortfiihrer der Revolu-
tion. Besonders die Matrosen auf den Kriegs-
schiffen and im Marinestiitzpunkt Kronstadt
hielten fest zu ihm, ein Erfolg, der am 7. Novem-
ber 1917 die Entscheidung herbeifiihren sollte.
Nachdem im Juli ein Versuch Lenins and seiner
Anhanger, die Macht an sich zu reif3en, fehl-
geschlagen war, wurde auch Trotzki mit zahl-
reichen anderen verhaftet, aber bald wieder frei-
gelassen. Ende September wahlte der Petrograder
Sowjet Leo Trotzki, nunmehr offizielles Mitglied
der Bolschewiki, zu seinem- Prasidenten. Die
wirtschaftliche Krise hatte inzwischen ungeahnte
Ausmalie erreicht. Die Versorgung der Stadte mit
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Lebensmitteln war vollig zusammengebrochen,
teilweise wegen der katastrophalen Transport-
verhaltnisse, teilweise wegen der Zustande auf
dem Lande.
Da die Regierung nicht bereit gewesen war, eine
Bodenreform einzuleiten, oder auch nur zu ver-
sprechen, hatten die landlosen Bauern zur Selbst-
hilfe gegriffen. Die Folge dieser Eigenmachtig-
keiten konnte nur ein Absinken der Produktions-
ziffern sein. Die Stadte litten naturgemaB am
meisten darunter. AuBerdem mangelte es an
Arbeitskraften. Ober fiinf Millionen Bauern
standen an den Fronten, dienten in den Kasernen
oder vegetierten in den Gefangenenlagern
Deutschlands and Osterreich-Ungarns. Das war
einer der Griinde, warum die Forderungen der
Bolschewiki nach einem sofortigen FriedensschluB
auch in den Dorfern groBe Zustimmung her-
vorrief.
Parallel mit dieser Agitation unter den Arbei-
tern and Bauern liefen die Vorbereitungen fur
eine neue Erhebung der Bolschewiki. Trotzki ging
dabei von der Oberlegung aus, daB die klassi-
schen Formen bisheriger Revolutionen uberholt
seien. Bastillensturm, Barrikadenkampfe, emotio-
nale Massenerhebungen waren sinnlos geworden.
Der moderne Staat muBte durch einen organisier-
ten Staatsstreich erobert werden. Bei der Entwick-
lung dieser neuen Revolutionsstrategie kamen
Trotzki erstmals jene Erkenntnisse praktisch
zunutze, die er bei seinen militarwissenschaft-
lichen Studien in Paris gewonnen hatte.
Er traf seine Anordnungen fast generalstabs-
maBig. Mit propagandistischen Mitteln wurde die
Stellung sturmreif gemacht, so daB nach geniigen-
der Vorbereitung kleinere, gut ausgeriistete
StoBtrupps die Nervenzentren des Staates lahm-
legen konnten. Eroberte man zunachst die Mini-
sterien, Elektrizitatswerke and Telefonamter, so
war jede Gegenwehr von vornherein zum MiB-
erfolg verurteilt and der eigene Sieg gesichert.
Als die deutsche Heeresleitung wieder zur
Offensive uberging, war eine Zeitlang auch Petro-
grad bedroht. Die Regierung gab Marschbefehle
an die Truppen heraus, and schickte sich an, nach
Moskau iiberzusiedeln. Trotzki schlug im Sowjet
Alarm. Die von ihm aufgeputschten Soldaten
weigerten sich, Petrograd zu verlassen. Ein milita-
risches Revolutionskomitee verteilte 5000 Gewehre
an die Arbeiter, angeblich nur zur ?Verteidigung
der Hauptstadt". Als jedoch die deutschen Trup-
pen ihren Vormarsch gegen Petrograd einstellten,
hieB es, these Waffen dienten ?zur Verteidigung
der Errungenschaften der Revolution". Aber
jedermann in Petrograd wuBte, daft es die
Bolschewiki nunmehr auf den Sturz der Regierung
abgesehen hatten.
Der demokratische Ministerprasident Kerenski
war zur Abwehr entschlossen. Am 6. November
verbot er die bolschewistische Prawda, die seit
dem Juliputsch unter dem Titel Rabotschij Putj
erschien. Daraufhin lieB Trotzki die Druckerei
der biirgerlichen Zeitungen besetzen and gab eine
neue Nummer der Prawda heraus, auf deren
Vorderseite der beruhmte Befehl Nr. 1 stand:
?Soldaten 1 Arbeiter l Burger 1
Die Volksfeinde sind in der Nacht zum An-
griff ubergegangen. Man plant einen verrate-
rischen Anschlag gegen den Petrograder Sowjet
der Arbeiter- and Soldatendelegierten ...
Alle Regiments-, Kompanie- and Mannschafts-
komitees mit den Kommissaren des Sowjets and
alle revolutionaren Organisationen mussen in
der Permanenz tagen and alle Nachrichten i ber
die Plane and Aktionen der Verschworer in
ihren Handen konzentrieren.
Kein Soldat darf ohne Genehmigung des
Komitees seine Einheit verlassen.
. Die Sache des Volkes ist in festen Han-
den. Die Verschworer werden vernichtet ...
Keine Schwankungen, keine Zweifell Festig-
keit, Standhaftigkeit, Ausdauer and Ent-
schlossenheit sind vonnoten. Es lebe die
Revolution."
Das war das Signal zur allgemeinen Aktion.
In der Nacht zum 7. November (dem 25. Oktober
nach dem alten russischen Kalender) wurde der
Staatsstreich nach den von Trotzki ausgearbeite-
ten Planen ausgefuhrt. Zu allem entschlossene
StoBtrupps besetzten die Bahnhofe, die Elektrizi-
tatswerke, die militarischen Proviantlager, the
Wasserreservoirs, die Briicken von den Vorstadten
zum Stadtinnern, die Telefonzentrale, die Staats-
bank and zahlreiche andere Gebaude. Gegen
zehn Uhr morgens wurden auch alle Zugange
zum Winterpalais abgeriegelt. Die Minister waren
von der Umwelt abgeschnitten, and damit hatte
die bolschewistische Revolution faktisch gesiegt.
Ministerprasident Kerenski hatte die Hauptstadt
am Morgen des 7. Novembers mit einem Auto der
amerikanischen Botsciaft verlassen, um Hilfe von
auBen herbeizuholen. Seine Minister warteten im
Winterpalais auf seine Riickkehr. Am Mittag
trieben revolutionare Soldaten mit dem blanken
Bajonett die Abgeordneten des ,Provisorischen
Rates der Russischen Republik" auseinander.
Anderthalb Stunden spater eroffnete Trotzki eine
Sitzung des Petrograder Sowjets and erklarte im
Namen des ?MilitNrischen Revolutionskomitees",
die provisorische Regierung bestehe nicht mehr.
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Unter dem brausenden Jubel der Delegierten
fugte er hinzu: ,Einige Minister befinden sich in
Haft. Die anderen werden in den nachsten Tagen
oder Stunden verhaftet werden. Die revolutionare
Garnison, die zur Verfugung des militarischen
Revolutionskomitees steht, hat die Versammlung
des Vorparlaments aufgelost. Man hat uns gesagt,
daft der Aufstand der Garnison in Stromen von
Blut ersauft werden wiirde. Uns ist auch nicht ein
einziges Opfer bckannt. Ich kenne in der Ge-
schichte kein anderes Beispiel einer Revolution ..
die so unblutig verlaufen ware."
Das traf in der Tat zu. Noch nie hatte es einen
Umsturz gegeben, der kein Opfer gefordert hatte,
and erstaunt stellte der russisch-franzosische
Journalist Claude Anet fest, daB die zuri ck-
gebliebenen analphabetischen Russen eine Revo-
lution ganz anders machten, als in den Geschichts-
biichern nachzulesen sei. Aber es lieB sick auch
nicht bestreiten, daft die bolschewistische Macht-
ergreifung wie eine nach den Planen eines Gene-
ralstabes gestartete Offensive abgelaufen war.
Nirgends hatte man Schi sse gehort, nirgends sah
man Insubordinationen revolutionarer Arbeiter
and Soldaten. Die StraBen waren leer, es wurde
nicht einmal gepliindert.
Lenin, der am Abend vorher, noch immer ver-
kleidet, aus seinem Versteck in den Sitz des Revo-
lutionskomitees, den Smolny, gekommen war, kam
these Rube unheimlidi vor. Audi er hatte noch
die klassischen Bilder friiherer Revolutionen vor
Augen. Erst als er die Berichte horte, die laufend
von den einzelnen StoBtrupps eingingen, erkannte
er, daB der Umsturz gegliiclct war. Am Abend
dieses ereignisreichen 7. November schliefen der
geistige Fi hrer dieser Revolution and Trotzki,
der vor Erschopfung olinmachtig geworden war,
auf dem FuBboden eines Zimmers neben der
groBen Halle des Smolny.
Noch war das Winterpalais, Sitz der Regierung,
nicht genommen. Jetzt bewahrte sich Trotzkis
Freundschaft mit den Matrosen. Der Kreuzer
,,Aurora" dampfte von Kronstadt gegen Petrograd
and eroffnete das Feuer. Doch es wurde nur mit
blinder Munition geschossen. Das Winterpalais
fiel nicht durch die Angriffe der Matrosen, es
wurde regelrecht erstilrmt. Die Metropole eines
groBen Reiches mit 150 Millionen Einwohnern, in
dem fiinf Millionen Soldaten and Polizisten unter
Waffen standen, hatte vor zehn-, vielleicht auch
fiinfzehntausend zum groBen Teil analphabeti-
schen Bauern and Arbeitern, die von einem Mann
gefuhrt wurden, der noch nie Gelegenheit gehabt
hatte, seine militarischen Fahigkeiten unter Beweis
zu stellen, kampflos kapituliert.
Der neuen Regierung der Volkskommissare
prasidierte Lenin. Auflenminister war Trotzki.
Doch schon nach drei Tagen muBte er an die
Front" vor den Toren Petrograds gehen: Dem ge-
sturzten Kerenski war es gelungen, einige Ko-
sakenregimenter fur sick zu gewinnen. Aber
bevor es zum Kampf kam, hatte Trotzki sie schon
mit der Macht seiner Rede besiegt. Nach lour: em
Geplankel ergaben sie sick. Gleichzeitig mit dicser
Siegesmeldung lief die Nachricht in der Haupt-
stadt ein, daB sich Moskau and andere groBe
Stadte der Revolution angeschlossen hatten and
auch auf dem Lande setzte sich die neue Regie-
rung durch.
Die Friedensverhandlungen mit Deutschland
and semen Verbtindeten Osterreich-Ungarn, Bul-
garien and der Tiirkei in Brest-Litowsk leitete
Trotzki selber. Die kaiserlich-deutsche Regierung
verspielte dabei eine groBe Chance. Statt mit den
Bolschewiki einen Verstandigungsfrieden zu
schlieBen and damit ein Beispiel zu geben, setzte
sie einen Diktatfrieden durch. Die Sowjetregie-
rung nahm die recht harten Bedingungen schlieB-
lich an, um eine Atempause zu gewinnen. Trotzki
wechselte im Marz 1918 vom AuBenministerium
in das neugebildete Kriegskommissariat hiniiber.
Er hatte nun die Aufgabe, verlaBliche Rote Ein-
heiten zu schaffen, um die i1berall im Land ent-
stehenden weiBgardistischen Armeen besser be-
kampfen zu konnen.
Was nosh an Truppen vorhanden war, gab zu
Siegeshoffnungen keinen AnlaB. Die antimili-
taristische Propaganda von einst hatte sich ?gegen
die Bolsdiewiki gekehrt. Dabei drangen von alien
Seiten Interventionsheere in RuBland ein. Die
Japaner waren in Wladiwostok gelandet, and die
tschechischen Kriegsgefangenen hatten in Sibirien
eine eigene Legion gebildet, die sick jetzt gegen
die Sowjets erhob. Auf ihrem Marsch gegen
Westen fand sie kaum Widerstand. Dazu spi rte
man in Petrograd and INIoskau zunehmend die
Tatigkeit zaristischer Agenten, die sick von dem
Schlag, der iimen am 7. November versetzt wor-
den war, mehr and mehr erholten.
Am 22. April 1918 legte Trotzki dem zentralen
Exekutivkomitee der Sowjets cinen Plan vor, nach
dem auch ehemals zaristische Offiziere in die zu
griindende Rote Armee eingestellt werden sollten.
Gegen die Opposition ultralinker Kreise setzte er
semen Willen durch, obwohl er sich der Gefahr
bewuBt war, daB viele dieser Offiziere, die sick
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zur Verfugung stellten, nur mit der Absicht
kamen, den Bolschewiki in den Ri cken zu fallen.
Als Anfang August in Moskau die Meldung
einlief, daft die Tschechen Kasan eingenommen
hatten, fuhr Trotzki mit dem Zug an die Front.
Zweieinhalb Jahre hausten er and seine engsten
Mitarbeiter fortan in diesem fahrenden Haupt-
quartier, das seine ureigenste Erfindung war and
bald zur Legende wurde. Dieser gepanzerte Zug,
den zwei Lokomotiven zogen, beforderte Autos,
Geschiitze samt Granaten, Handfeuerwaffen,
Lebensmittel and Medikamente, eine Druckerei,
eine Bibliothek, eine Telegrafen- and eine Radio-
station. Trotzki war immer dort zu finden, wo es
gefahrlich war.
Als er bei Kassan in den vordersten Linien
erschien, wendete sick das Blatt. Die revolutiona-
ren Soldaten lieBen sick von ihrem Fiihrer mit-
reif3en and traten zum Gegenangriff an. Sechs
Wochen nachdem die Tschechen Kasan ein-
genommen hatten, eroberte die Rote Armee these
wichtige Stadt an der Wolga zuruck. Lenin
schickte ein Telegramm:
?Mit Begeisterung begriif3e ich den herrlichen
Sieg der Roten Armee. Er moge uns ein Wahr-
zeichen sein, daft sie jeden Widerstand der Aus-
beuter vernichten and den Sieg des Welt-
sozialismus sichern wird."
Dieser unerwartete Erfolg veranderte die
Situation der Bolschewiki schlagartig. Die Tsche-
chen and die in ihrem Schatten marschierenden
zaristischen Einheiten begriffen, daft sie es nicht
mehr mit ein paar rebellierenden Haufen zu tun
hatten, sondern mit Einheiten, die nach strate-
gischen Gesichtspunkten gefuhrt wurden. Fur die
zaristischen Offiziere war das eine ungeheure
C7berraschung. Wer war dieser Trotzki, der es
fertig brachte, eine geschlagene Armee, die sich
panikartig zuriickzog, mit neuem Angriffsgeist zu
beseelen and zum Siege zu fiihren?
Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Mittelmachte im
November 1918 bildeten sick. neue Fronten. Ober-
dies war dem jeder Intrige abholden Trotzki
innerhalb der eigenen Partei ein Gegner er-
wachsen, dessen Verschlagenheit anfangs niemand
erkannte: Josef Stalin, Oberster politischer Kom-
missar der 10. Armee unter dem Befehl des ehe-
maligen Wachtmeisters Woroschilow. Lenin berief
Stalin auf Wunsch Trotzkis nach Moskau zuruck,
eine Demutigung, die dieser niemals vergessen
sollte. Die Verleumdungskampagne gegen den
Griinder and Organisator der Roten Armee be-
gann in diesen Tagen: Stalin beschuldigte den
Kriegskommissar, ein ?Freund zaristischer Gene-
rale" zu sein.
Als einige der eingestellten alten Offiziere als
Verrater entlarvt wurden, holte Stalin zurn ersten
Male zum Schlage aus. Aber Trotzki wurde nosh
einmal gerettet, dank der Unvernunft der weiB-
gardistischen Generale Koltschak, Denikin, Jude-
nitsch and Krassnow, die jeder fur sich and nicht
koordiniert gegen Moskau marschierten. Das
machte neue Feldzuge notig, fur die der Organi-
sator der Roten Armee unentbehrlich war. Mit
seinem Zug fuhr er von einer Front zur anderen,
von der Wolga, wo Koltschak vernichtend ge-
schlagen werden konnte, zur Sudfront, um die
Kampfe gegen Denikin zu leiten, der ebenso be-
siegt wurde %vie Judenitsch, der im Norden gegen
Petrograd vorgeruckt war. An seinem 40. Geburts-
tag, dem zweiten Jahrestag der bolschewistischen
Machtergreifung, konnte Trotzki in Moskau den
Sieg der Roten Armee melden.
Fiinf Monate spater, im Marz 1920, fielen die
Polen gemeinsam mit dern erst im Vorjahre ver-
triebenen ukrainischen Diktator Petljura in So-
wjetruf3land ein. Sie eroberten Kiew. Dieser neue
Krieg nahm schnell einen nationalistischen, sogar
religiosen Charakter an. Polen war seit Jahrhun-
derten Ruf3lands ?Erbfeind", dazu waren die Be-
wohner dieses 1918 wiedererstandenen Staates
romisch-katholisch, im Gegensatz zu den grie-
chisch-orthodoxen Russen. Viele ehemalige za-
ristische Offiziere, die ihre Hilfe bisher verweigert
hatten, stellten sich jetzt der Roten Armee zur
Verfugung, um die rechtma8ige Kirche" gegen
die ?R6mischen" zu verteidigen.
Trotzki eilte wiederum an die Front. Er unter-
band, soweit es moglich war, die nationalistische
wie antikatholische Hetze in der Armee. ?Moge
jedern Rotarmisten die Hand abgehauen werden,
der sein Messer gegen einen Kriegsgefangenen,
gegen Waffenlose, Kranke and Verwundete
ziickt", schrieb er in einem Tagesbefehl. Seine
Anwesenheit wirkte elektrisierend. Schon im Juni
kam es zum Gegenangriff, and wenige Wochen
spater stand die auf eine halbe Million ange-
wachsene Rote Armee vor Warschau. Der Fall
der polnischen Hauptstadt schien nur nosh eine
Frage von Tagen zu sein.
Aber da ereignete sick das vieldiskutierte
?Wunder an der Weichsel", Gegenstuck zu dem
?Wunder an der Marne" im September 1914, das
den deutschen Vormarsch in Frankreich stoppte.
Der von Trotzki eingesetzte Oberbefehlshaber der
Roten Armee, General Tuchatschewski, hatte den
im Siiden unter dem Kommando von Budjonny
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
operierenden roten Einheiten befohlen, den
linken.Flugel des Vorstof3es auf die polnische
Hauptstadt abzusichern. Doch der politische Kom-
missar dieser Heeresgruppe, Josef Stalin, der dem
mit 26 Jahren zum General beforderten Tucha-
tschewski die steile Karriere neidete, wollte eigene
Lorbeeren pfli.icken. Statt sich mit den vor War-
schau stehenden roten Einheiten zu vereinigen,
veranlaf3te er Budjonny, gegen Lemberg vorzu-
stoBen. Seine Einheiten sollten dort zur gleichen
Zeit einziehen wie Tuchatschewski in der pol-
nischen Hauptstadt.
Der polnische Marschall Pilsudski, beraten von
dem aus Frankreich herbeigeeilten General
Weygand, stieB in die Lucke and rollte die auf
Warschau vorstof3ende Armee von der Flanke
her auf. Damit ging das schon so gut wie be-
siegte Polen als Sieger aus dem Krieg hervor. Die
Sowjetunion muf3te einen Frieden schlie3en, des-
sen Bedingungen Warschau diktierte. Trotzki and
Tuchatschewski beschuldigten in Wort and Schrift
den Polit-Kommissar der 10. Armee, these kata-
strophale Niederlage verursacht zu haben.
Aus jenem Fiasko erklart sich eine ganze Reihe
der spateren Handlungen Stalins. Er lieB nicht
nur Tuchatschewski and Trotzki samt ihren An-
hangern umbringen, sondern ubertrug seinen HaB
auch auf die polnische Nation. Mit hochster
Wahrscheinlichkeit hat er im Jahre 1940 den Be-
fehl zur Ermordung der 14 500 polnischen Offi-
ziere gegeben, die in sowjetische Gefangenschaft
geraten waren. Etwa 4200 Leichen fand man im
Walde von Katyn: die Insassen des Lagers
Kozielsk. Die Insassen des Lagers Starobielsk,
nahezu 4000 Mann, wurden ebenfalls ermordet.
lhre Graber konnten bis heute noch nicht entdeckt
werden. Die 6567 Insassen des Lagers Ostaschkow
wurden in Archangelsk auf zwei Barken verladen,
die im Weifien Meer versenkt wurden - wie es
hief3, bei Artillerie-SchieBiibungen.
Nach dem polnisch-russischen Krieg trat eine
gewisse Beruhigung ein. Wohl kam es nosh zu
einzelnen Erhebungen zarentreuer Generale, doch
die Rote Armee blieb immer siegreich. Dieser fur
die Bolschewiki erfreulichen Bilanz standen die
furchtbaren Opfer des fast vierjahrigen Burger-
krieges gegenuber. Nachdem die Machtergreifung
der Sowjets im November 1917 nahezu unblutig
verlaufen war, starben in den Kampfen der fol-
genden Jahre fiber drei Millionen Mcnschen. Noch
mehr Opfer, etwa funf Millionen Menschen, for-
derte die Hungersnot in den Jahren 1921/22. Sic
war eine Folge der durch Krieg, Revolution and
Burgerkrieg verursaditen wirtschaftlichen Zer-
riittung sowie von Naturkatastrophen.
Am bittersten beriihrte Trotzki der Aufstand
von Kronstadt. Die Matrosen der Seefestung
revoltierten and verlangten eine Humanisierung
der Verhaltnisse. Ihre Forderungen waren: mehr
personliche Freiheit, also Verminderung der
Diktatur, and Verbruderung der Volker. Unter
den Rebellen befanden sich viele seiner einstigen
Anhanger, die 1917 mit der BeschieBung des
Winterpalais entscheidend zum Sieg der Bolsche-
wiki beigetragen hatten. Aber die Partei befahl,
ohne Rucksicht ,durchzugreifen". Am 3. April
1921 nahm Trotzki die Siegesparade ab, unfrohen
Herzens: Von alien militarischen Unternehmun-
gen, die er seit 1917 geleitet hatte, war die gegen
Kronstadt die blutigste gewesen.
Ende 1923 erkrankte er ernstlich and muBte
Heilung im Silden der Sowjetunion suchen. Kurz
darauf, am 21. Januar 1924, starb Lenin. Der
Generalsekretar der Partei, Josef Stalin, verstand
es, den Griinder der Roten Armee von den Be-
grabnisfcierlichkeiten fernzuhalten: Er telegra-
fierte seinem in Tiflis weilenden Todfeind Trotzki
einen falschen Termin. Spater behauptete Trotzki,
Stalin habe Angst gehabt:
,,Er [Stalin] hatte befiirchten mussen, daB
ich ... die Arzte nach der Moglichkeit einer
Vergiftung befragen and eine besondere Ob-
duktion verlangen wurde."
Den Zuschauern fiel zwar auf, daB unter den
filhrenden Genossen, die den Sarg Lenins trugen,
Leo Davidowitsch Trotzki fehlte, sie dachten sich
aber wohl nichts dabei. Doch seit diesem Tag sollte
der Frage, ob and in welcher Reihenfolge jemand
an offiziellen Feierlichkciten teilnahm, eine tiefe
Bedeutung zukommen.
Stalin ging Schritt fur Schritt vor. Systematisch
besetzte er alle Amter mit ihm ergebenen Ge-
nossen and isolierte damit Trotzki in der Partei
and im Zentralkomitee. Dann wagte er es zuzu-
schlagen. Auf dem XV. Parteitag am 2. September
1927 brachte er eine Resolution ein, nach der alle,
die irgendwelche oppositionellen Ansichten pro-
pagicrten, aus der Partei ausgeschlossen werden
sollten. Nur wer sich unterwerfen and Reue-
erklarungen unterschreiben wurde, durfte in
Zukunft auf Nachsicht rechnen.
Die Resolution wurde angenommen and damit
war Trotzkis Schicksal besiegelt. Bereits aus dem
Kreml ausquartiert, schloB ihn das Zentralkomitee
nun auch aus der Partei aus, and am 16. Januar
1928 ordnete Stalin an, seinen ihm geistig so iiber-
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Trotzki, der besiegte Sieger
legenen Todfeind and dessen Anhanger getrennt
nach Sibirien zu deportieren. Fur Trotzki hatte er
die 4000 Kilometer von Moskau entfernte ka-
sachische Hauptstadt Alma Ata ausgesucht. Da
Trotzki sick weigerte, dorthin zu fahren, schlepp-
ten Geheimpolizisten ihn and seine Familie ge-
waltsam zum fahrplanmaBigen Zug nach Tasch-
kent. An der Endstation wartete bereits ein
Autobus auf die Verbannten, der sic nach Alma
Ata brachte.
Seine Anhanger, die in einsame Dorfer Si-
biriens verbannt worden waren, nahmen bald
Verbindung untereinander auf. Doch Trotzkis
Hoffnung, einen illegalen Apparat aufbauen zu
konnen, erftillte sich nicht. Er erkannte, daB die
sowjetische GPU erheblich besser organisiert war
als die alte Ochrana, die Geheimpolizei der Zaren.
Mit seiner Ankunft in Alma Ata hatte fur
Trotzki, seine Frau and seinen altesten Sohn
Leon Sedow ein Leidensweg begonnen, wie die
Geschichte nur wenige kennt. Am 9. Juni 1928
erhielt er ein Telegramm, in dem ihm ein Freund
den Tod seiner altesten Tochter Nina mitteilte.
Sic hatte vielleicht gerettet werden konnen, wenn
ihre Krankheit sachgemaf3 behandelt worden
ware. Sogar Medikamente aus der Kreml-Apo-
theke hatte man ihr verweigert.
Ende des Jahres beantragte Stalin die Aus-
weisung Trotzkis aus dem Territorium der So-
wjetunion. Die Mitglieder des Politburos, von
Stalin ausgesucht and gefordert, stimmten dafur
- mit einer einzigen Ausnahme. Das AuBen-
kommissariat erhielt den Auftrag, ein Land zu
finden, das bereit war, dem Griinder der Roten
Armee ein Einreisevisum zu erteilen. Bereits funf
Tage spater eroffnete man Trotzki, daB3 er nach
Konstantinopel ausgewiesen werde. Er weigerte
sich, die Sowjetunion zu verlassen and verlangte,
semen Sohn Sergej and dessen Frau and Kinder
zu sehen.
Zwangsweise transportierte man die Familie
mach Odessa, wo sic am 10. Februar ein russisches
Frachtschiff besteigen muBte. Doch Sergej and
dessen Frau, die man in die Hafenstadt am
Schwarzen Meer hatte reisen lassen, blieben frei-
willig in der UdSSR. Es war ein Abschied furs
Leben. Zwei Tage spater fuhr das Schiff in den
Bosporus ein. Dem tiirkischen Polizeioffizier, der
an Bord kam, uberreichte Trotzki eine Erklarung.
?An Kemal Pascha, President der tiirl:ischen
Republik. Sehr geehrter Herr, am Tor von
Konstantinopel babe ich die Ehre, Sic davon in
Kenntnis zu setzen, dab ich these Grenze nur
der Gewalt gehorchend iiberschreite. Ich bitte
Sic, Herr President, meine dementsprechenden
Gefiihle entgegenzunehmen."
Der russische Konsul, der ebenfalls an Bord ge-
kommen war, ubergab Trotzki 1500 Dollar, so-
zusagen als "Anfangskapital" fdr die Grundung
einer neuen Existenz. Aufler seinem Archiv war
das alles, was er besal3. Er mietete sich auf der
Insel Prinkipo ein Haus. Materielle Not litt er
nicht. Er schrieb Aufsatze and arbeitete an einer
Biographic sowie an einer Geschichte der russi-
schen Revolution. Alle these Arbeiten wurden in
zahlreiche Sprachen iibersetzt and trugen ihm
recht beachtliche Honorare ein, mit denen er sogar
ein Bulletin der Opposition herausgeben konnte,
das sick mit der Zeit selber trug.
Bald aber bekam er erneut den HaB Stalins zu
spiiren. Plotzlich brach ein Brand in seinem Haus
aus. Er vernichtete einen Teil des Archivs, fur
dessen Erhaltung Trotzki mehr Sorge getragen
hatte als fur sein eigenes Leben. Nur mit knapper
Not konnten er and seine Familie sick retten, and
trotz der Gefahr trug er nod Akten aus dem
brennenden Haus. Von diesem Augenblick an
bemuhte er sich, ein anderes Land zu finden, wo
er sich sicherer fiihlen konnte. Doch wo immer er
um Asyl bat, wurde er abgewiesen. Schliefilich
erklarte sich Frankreich bereit, ihn aufzunehmen.
Vor der Abreise erhielt er die Nachricht, daft
sich seine zweite Tochter Sinaide am 5. Januar
1933 in Berlin das Leben genommen hatte, and
aus der Sowjetunion schrieb man ihm, daB seine
beiden Schwiegersohne deportiert worden seien.
Sic gingen in Sibirien elend zugrunde. Audi ihre
vier Kinder verschwanden. Stalin vergafi keinen
aus der Sippe Trotzkis, sofern das betreffende Mit-
glied in seiner Gewalt war.
Im Sommer 1933 verlief3 Trotzki Prinkipo. Zwei
Jahre lebte er unter wechselnden Namen in
Frankreich, dann muf3te er nach Norwegen, dessen
sozialistische Regierung ihm eine Aufenthalts-
genehmigung erteilt hatte. Kurz vor der Umsied-
lung im Jahre 1935 erfuhr er, daB man seinen
jiingsten Sohn Sergej and dessen Frau, die in der
Sowjetunion zuriickgeblieben waren, verhaftet
hatte. Er sollte niemals erfahren, wo sic and ihre
Kinder den Tod fanden.
In Moskau waren mach der Ermordung des
Petrograder Parteisekretars Kirow am 1. Dezem-
ber 1934 zahlreiche alte Bolschewiki verhaftet
worden, die Stalin der ,Beihilfe" beschuldigte.
Als Auftraggeber der Murder bezeichnete er
Trotzki. In Wahrheit geschah dieses Verbrechen,
wie Chruschtschow auf dem XX. Parteitag ent-
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
hiillte, in Stalins Auftrag oder zumindest mit
seiner Billigung. Die fadenscheinigc Beschuldi-
gung, Trotzki habe auch seine Ermordung geplant,
war eine Erfindung, um die norwegische Regie-
rung unter Druck setzen zu konnen. Justizminister
Trygve Lie, spater erster Generalsekretar der Ver-
einten Nationen, legte Trotzki nahe, jeder ,aktu-
ellen politischen Tatigkeit" zu entsagen: ,Id, bitte
um Ihre Billigung, daft wir Ihre Aufenthalts-
bedingungen einschranken, und ich bitte ferner
um Ihr Einverstandnis, dal3 Ihre abgehende und
ankommende Post nur auf dem offiziellen Wege
crledigt wird."
"Wenn Sie die Absicht haben, mich zu ver-
haften", erwiderte Trotzki, k6nnen Sie nicht
verlangen, daft ich Sie dazu auch nosh autori-
siere." Trygve Lie sudite nach cinem Kompromif3:
?Es gibt dock einen Zustand zwischen Verhaftung
und volliger Freiheit." Trotzki lief3 sich auf nichts
ein: ?Dann ziehe ich die Verhaftung vor." Er
brauchte nicht lange zu warten. Bereits Ende Sep-
tember 1936 internierte man ihn in einem von
15 Polizisten streng bewachten Haus.
Diese Maf3nahme erregte in der Weltoffentlich-
keit gro6es Aufsehen, aber keiner der Kritiker
war bereit, sich bei seiner Regierung dafiir ein-
zusetzen, Trotzki Asyl zu gewahren. AuBerdem
darf man als fast richer annehmen, daB ihm diese
Internierung zu dem damaligen Zeitpunkt das
Leben rettete, denn gerade in jenen Jahren brach-
ten Stalins Murder zahlreiche Freunde Trotzkis
um. Warum hatten sic vor ihm selber Halt machen
sollen? Andererseits hatte die Isolierung eine tief-
greifende Auswirkung, die am allerwenigsten
Trotzki bewult wurde: Sie schnitt ihn von der
Umwelt ab, und ein Politiker, der nicht mitten
im Leben steht, wird zwangslaufig zum Sektierer.
Der Mann, der die klassische "Barrikaden-
Revolution" durch den generalstabsmaf3ig aus-
gefiihrten Staatsstreich ersetzte, neigte auf einmal
zu erstaunlichen Fehlanalysen der internationalen
Lage, wie auch der Lage in der Sowjetunion. Wer
heute die von den Trotzkisten in Paris in deutscher
Sprache herausgegebene Zeitschrift Unser Worf
- Halbmonafszeifung der Infernationalen
Kommunisten Deufschlands liest, in der auch sehr
oft Artikel Trotzkis erschienen, muf3 sick wundern,
wie sehr er und seine Epigonen die Verhaltnisse
verkannten.
Daf3 sick nicht nur die wirtschaftlichen und
soziologischen Triebkrafte, die bisher zur Aus-
losung einer Revolution fiihrten, grundlegend
geandert hatten, sondern auch die Technik einer
(erfolgreichen) Revolution, und das nicht zum
wenigsten durch Trotzki, sahen die Trotzkisten
nicht. Dock wie die ,Kabinettskriege" des 18. und
19. Jahrhunderts, die durchaus nicht nur ?Klassen-
kampfe" waren, wie Marx behauptete, durch die
totalen oder ?Volks"-Kriege des 20. Jahrhunderts
abgelost worden waren, so hatte der Weltkrieg
1914/18 bewiesen, daf3 die Arbeiterschaft in fast
alien Landern - ob zu recht oder zu unrecht,
ist fur die Beurteilung vollig nebensachlich -
glaubte, etwas verteidigen zu mussen: das Vater-
land.
Wohlgemerkt: Die Arbeiter verteidigten 1914/18
ihr ,kapitalistisdies" und nicht irgendein soziali-
stisches Vaterland. Inzwischen war der Acht-
Stundentag Wirklichkeit geworden, und die all-
mahliche Integration der sozialistischen Parteien
in den Staat nach dem Weltkrieg hatte die ,vater-
landslosen Gesellen" von einst, die ?Proletarier",
zu Staatsbiirgern gemacht.Von dieserEntwicklung
und ihrer Auswirkung nahm Trotzki offensichtlich
keine Kenntnis; er schrieb und dachte und analy-
sierte die Lage wie vor 1914 in semen Artikeln in
den russischen Emigrantenzeitungen - und mit
ihm seine Epigonen.
Inzwischen hatte im Moskauer Gewerkschafts-
haus der erste grof3e,,Schauprozef3" stattgefunden,
dem nosh sechs weitere ,dffentliche Prozesse"
folgen sollten (und hunderte, von denen man
kaum etwas horte). Alle Beschuldigungen, die im
Ausland nadigepriift werden konnten, erwiesen
sich als falsch. So wollte zum Beispiel ein Ange-
klagter Trotzki in einem Hotel getroffen haben,
das 20 Jahre vorher abgebrannt war. Ein anderer
behauptete, 1932 von der Gestapo - natiirlich
im Auftrage Trotzkis - nach RuBland geschickt
worden zu sein. Aber die Gestapo gab es erst seit
dem Sommer 1933. Den Vogel schof3 ein Ange-
klagter namens Lifschutz im zweiten Prozeli ab:
Er bezichtigte sick, in nur fiinf Jahren nicht
weniger als 10 380 Eisenbahnanschlage organisiert
zu haben, also taglich fiinf.
Gegen die Beschuldigungen, hinter diesen
Sabotageakten zu stehen, hatte sick jeder vertei-
digt. Von Trotzki aber verlangte die Regierung
seines Asyllandes, diese wahnsinnigen Behaup-
tungen schweigend hinzunehmen. Dazu war er
natiirlich nicht bereit. Dock er widersprach nicht
nur, er richtete in seinen Erwiderungen auch
scharfe Angriffe gegen die Sowjetunion und
gegen Stalin, die alle in der klassischen Formu-
lierung gipfelten:
,,Von den zw6lf Aposteln erwies sick nur
Judas als Verrater. Aber wenn dieser die Macht
erlangt hatte, wurde er die anderen elf Apostel
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als Verrater hingestellt haben, and auch alle die
geringeren Jiinger, deren Zahl Lukas mit sieb-
zig angibt."
Diese Angriffe fanden zunehmend Gehor, and
bald war die Weltoffentlichkeit uberzeugt, daB
von den in den sogenannten ,Schadlingsprozes-
sen" vorgetragenen Anklagen kein einziges Wort
stimmte. Fiir die norwegische Regierung waren
these Enthiillungen ein Grund mehr, Trotzki nosh
scharfer zu kontrollieren. Die unhaltbaren Zu-
stande fanden erst ein Ende, als der President von
Mexiko, General Lazaro Cardenas, sich bereit
erklarte, deco Grinder der Roten Armee, dem
Stalin die sowjetische Staatsbiirgerschaft abge-
sprochen hatte, Asyl zu gewahren. Ein norwegi-
scher Tanker brachte Trotzki and seine Frau um
die Jahreswende 1936!37 nach Tampico. Von dort
fuhr er in einem Sonderzug der mexikanischen
Regierung nach Mexico City, wo er zunachst bei
dem Maler Diego Rivera Unterkunft land.
FUnf Wochen nach seiner Ankunft erhielt
Trotzki die Nachricht, daB rein altester Sohn
Leon Sedow, das letzte seiner vier Kinder, am
16. Februar 1937 in einer Pariser Klinik nach einer
gut verlaufenen Blinddarmoperation unter ge-
heimnisvollen Umstanden plotzlich verstorben
war. Tagelang schlossen er and Nathalie Sedowa
sick in ihre Zimmer in dem gerade erst gemieteten
Haus in Coyoacan ein and lief3en niemanden vor.
Als sichTrotzki seinenMitarbeitern wieder zeigte,
waren seine Augen gerotet and sein Bart verwil-
dert. Er wuBte jetzt, daB er nur nosh ?ein Toter
auf Urlaub" war, Stalin wurde noch mehr als bis-
her bestrebt sein, ihn ermorden zu lassen.
Kurz danach meldeten ihm seine Freunde, daB
sick schon seit Tagen unbekannte Personen in
der Nahe des Hauses in Coyoacan herumtrieben.
Aber audi seine Mitarbeiter and die Sekretare
wurden iiberwacht, wie rich bald herausstellen
solite. Wahrscheinlich hatte man in Moskau
erfahren, daB der amerikanische Verlag Harper
eine Biographie Stalins aus der Feder Trotzkis
herauszubringen gedachte, and deren Erscheinen
sollte unter allen Umstanden verhindert werden.
Auf Anraten der Polizei lieB Trotzki das Haus
zu einer Art Festung ausbauen. Die Eisengitter
wurden dutch eine dicke Betonmauer ersetzt, die
nur einen Eingang hatte. Im Innern gab es noch
eine zweite Mauer, die den Garten umschloB, von
dem man in das Haus gelangte. Der erste Raum
diente als Bibliothek and Sekretariat, hier hielten
sick aber auch die Leibwachter auf, die jeden
Besucher Uberprilften. Durch eine kugelsichere
Tiire erreichte man das groBe EBzimmer, and erst
von da aus gelangte man in das Arbeitszimmer
Trotzkis, das mit zahlreichen Biicherregalen,
einem groBen Arbeitstisch and einem Telefon
ausgestattet war. In den Raumen nebenan wohnte
er mit seiner Frau, wahrend die Mitarbeiter in
einem Nebengebaude untergebracht waren, das
aber unbegreiflicherweise nur einen Ausgang
hatte.
Trotz dieser Sicherheitsmaf3nahmen gelingt es
den gedungenen Mordern am 24. Mai 1940 kahnpf-
los in die Festung einzudringen. DaB Trotzki,
seine Frau Nathalie Sedowa and der gerade aus
Frankreich angekommene Enkel Esteban Wolkow
den Uberfall i berleben, kommt einem Wunder
gleich. Wer die Morder ausgesandt hat, steht
auBer Zweifel, and Trotzki nimmt auch kein Blatt
vor den Mund. In gleichlautenden Schreiben an
den Generalstaatsanwalt and an den mexikani-
schen AuBenminister stellt er unmiBverstand-
lich fest:
. Wahrend der letzten Jahre hat Stalin
Hunderte meiner wirklichen oder vermeint-
lichen Freunde erschieBen lassen. Sodann hat
er meine gesamte Familie, mit Ausnahme von
mir selbst, meiner Frau and eines Enkelsohnes,
umbringen lassen. In der Schweiz lieB er Ignaz
ReiB, einen der Chefs der GPU, durch seine
Agenten ermorden, als er sich offentlich zu
meinen Ideen bekannte. Diese Tatsachen wur-
den einwandfrei durch die franzosische Polizei
and die Schweizer Gerichtshofe festgestellt.
Dieselben Agenten, die Ignaz Rei{ ermordeten,
waren es auch, die meinen Sohn in Paris ver-
folgten. Ferner erbrachen am Abend des 7. No-
vember 1936 Agenten der GPU das wissen-
schaftliche Institut in Paris and raubten einen
Teil meines Archivs. Audi wurden zwei meiner
alten Sekretare, Erwin Wolff and Rudolph
Klement, durch GPU-Agenten ermordet; der
erste in Spanien and der zweite in Paris. Und
das eigentliche Ziel der ganzen Schauprozesse
in Moskau in den Jahren 1936 and 1937 war,
meine Auslieferung an die Sowjetunion zu
erreithen and mich der GPU in die Hande zu
spielen.
Die Liste dieser and ahnlicher Verbredhen
konnte beliebig erganzt werden. Alle zielten
auf meine physische Vernichtung ab. Dahinter
aber steht Stalin. Seine Waffe ist die sowje-
tische Geheimpolizei, die in jedem Land ihre
Agenten unterhalt - die GPU ..."
Im weiteren Verlauf dieses Schreibens spricht
Trotzki auch den Verdacht aus, daB die deutsche
Gestapo mit der sowjetischen Geheimpolizei, seit
Jul! 1934 nicht mehr GPU, sondern NKWD
genannt, gemeinsame Sache machen konnte. Das
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
ist durchaus nicht so unsinnig, wie es auf den
ersten Blick erscheint. Im August 1939 hat Stalin
mit Hitler.einen Pakt geschlossen, aber es liegt auf
der Hand, daB es darnber hinaus nosh einen
Gehcimvertrag gegeben haben muB; die Entwick-
lung der Ereignisse and das Zusammenspiel
bewiesen es. Sah dieser nicht veroffentlichte Ver-
trag auch die Zusammenarbeit der beiden Staats-
polizeien vor? Bereits bei der Liquidierung von
Marschall Tuchatschewski and rand einem
Dutzend weiterer hoher sowjetischer Offiziere
haben sick der deutsche Sicherheitsdienst and der
NKWD die Balle zugeworfen.
Als bald darauf die sowjetischen Behorden den
Einzug der deutschen Wehrmacht in Paris mit
dem Beflaggen der offentlichen Gebaude Moskaus
feiern lassen, werden Trotzkis Vermutungen noch
glaubhafter.
Fines allerdings ahnt nicht einmal der miB-
trauische Trotzki: daB sein Murder bereits in dem
so streng bewachten Haus an der Ecke Wiener
and Morelos-StraBe verkehrt and nur noch auf
eine giinstige Gelegenheit wartet, gedrangt von
seinen Auftraggebern, die Tat zu vollbringen.
Oberster Chef der ?Sonderabteilung Trotzki"
and damit Leiter der Mordversuche gegen den
Grunder der Roten Armee ist Dr. Gregory
Rabinowitsch, ein Deckname, hinter dem sick der
NKWD-General Leonid Eitingon verbirgt. In
Amerika tritt Rabinowitsch-Eitingon als ?Repra-
sentant des Sowjetischen Roten Kreuzes" auf, mit
Sitz in New York. 1940 bewohnt er jedoch zeit-
weise eine Villa in der Nahe von Trotzkis Haus.
Aber auch hier spielt er den vornehmen Diplo-
mates jUdischen Glaubens, der bei jeder Gelegen-
heit seine rein humanitare Mission" betont.
In der Offentlichkeit werden nur zwei Versuche
bekannt, Trotzki zu ermorden, aber das beweist
nicht, daB nicht noch andere Vorbereitungen
laufen, denn zweifellos hat Rabinowitsch-Eitingon
nosh etliche andere Eisen im Feuer. Nach dem
gegluckten zweiten Anschlag kann er dann die
noch in Bereitschaft stehenden Mordspezialisten,
die es mit Sicherheit gibt, sofort zuri.ickziehen,
beziehungsweise auf andere im Kreml miBliebige
Personen ansetzen, zum Beispiel gegen General
Krivitzki, der 1939 absprang and recht peinliche
Enthullungen machte, die von der Weltpresse
nachgedruckt wurden.
Krivitzki siedelte 1940 nach New York uber, da
er sich in Frankreich, zu dieser Zeit einem Dorado
far NKWD-Agenten, nicht meter sicker fiihlte.
Bald darauf findet man ihn tot in seinem Hotel-
zimmer, hochstwahrscheinlich ein Opfer der
Agenten Eitingohs. Aber die sowjetische Polizei
bedient sich auch der deutschen Gestapo and der
Spionageabwehrorganisationen anderer Lander.
Einige Falle sind verburgt, daB Kommunisten ihre
eigenen Genossen der Gestapo denunzierten, da-
mit these in ihren Konzentrationslagern fur den
NKWD das schmutzige Geschaft der Ermordung
besorgte. Oder man steckt miBliebige Mitglieder
der KP ?Spezialmaterial" zu, das dann die
anonym benachrichtigte Polizei des jeweiligen
Landes bei einer Haussuchung findet. Eine Ver-
urteilung wegen Spionage ist dann sicker, and das
betreffende Opfer verschwindet fur einige Zeit in
einem Zuchthaus.
Die Zahl der auf dieses Weise beseitigten oppo-
sitionellen Kommunisten geht in die Tausende,
wenn nicht Zehntausende. Eine besonders perfide
Moglichkeit, mil3liebige Parteimitglieder umzu-
bringen and mit ihrem Tod gegebenenfalls nosh
Propaganda zu machen, bot der spanisehe BUrger-
krieg 1936/39. Stalin lieB zahlreiche Kritiker
seiner Politik als ?Freiwillige" nach Spanien
locken, wo sie entweder den ?Heldentod"
sterben durften oder im Hinterland als ?Agenten
Francos" fiisiliert wurden. Die Handlanger dieser
schmutzigen Methoden waren jedoch nicht nur
sowjetische NKWD-Manner; auch franzosische,
deutsche and vor allem spanische Kommunisten
stellten sich dafiir bereitwillig zur Verfugung. Die
bewahrtesten dieser berufsmaBigen Murder wur-
den nach dem Zusammenbruch der republikani-
schen Armee, teilweise auch schon friiher, in die
Sowjetunion geholt, wo sie in besonderen Schulen
die letzten Feinheiten ihres Gewerbes lernten.
Wahrscheinlich befand sick unter diesen Aus-
erwahlten auch ein spanischer Staatsburger
namens Ramon del Rio Mercader, der Sohn der
spanischen NKWD-Agentin Caridad Mercader.
Er wurde am 7. Februar 1914 in Barcelona ge-
boren. Als seine Mutter 1925 ihren Mann del Rio
verlieB, nahm sie ihre Kinder, auiier Ramon noch
drei Sohne and eine Tochter, mit. Zuerst ging
sie nach - Toulouse, spi ter nach Bordeaux and
Paris. Wovon sie damals lebte, konnte nicht
geklart werden. Sicker ist nur, daB sie zu jener
Zeit noch nicht im Dienste des NKWD stand.
Wahrscheinlich trat sie erst in Frankreich der KPF
bei. Fur den NKWD diirfte sie von einem fran-
zosischen Fliegeroffizier, mit dem sie intime
Beziehungen unterhielt, angeworben worden sein.
Nach seiner Schulentlassung besuchte Ramon
del Rio Mercader eine Hotelfachschule in Lyon,
aber schon nach einem Jahr kehrte der Fiinfzehn-
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jahrige nach Barcelona zuriick. Die ihm von der
Mutter anerzogene kommunistische Gesinnung
hinderte ihn nicht daran, in vornehmen Hotels
den ?Kapitalisten" zu dienen and sick deren
Lebensgewohnheiten anzueignen. Spater kam ihm
das zugute, als er behauptete, der Sohn eines
schwerreichen Belgiers zu sein. Sein tadelloses
Benehmen wurde von alien als Beweis angesehen.
Von 1932 his 1934 diente er in der spanischen
Armee, and erst wahrend dieser Jahre wurde er
ein aktiver Kommunist. Zweifellos trug die
Mutter erheblich dazu bei, die inzwischen -
hochstwahrscheinlich im Auftrage des NKWD -
nach Spanien zuruckgekehrt war. Doch die poli-
tischen Verhaltnisse ddrften das entscheidende
Engagement Ramon del Rio Mercaders bewirkt
haben.
Nachdem in den Wahlen des Jahre 193.1 die
Linken gesiegt hatten, kam es zu Aufstanden der
durch die Latifundienwirtschaft verelendeten Land-
arbeiter. Bei den Neuwahlen 1933 siegten die
Reditsparteien unter Fuhrung von Gil Robles
von der katholischen ?Action Popular". Die Reak-
tion feierte noch einmal Triumphe. Wer von der
Linken nicht mit den Gefangnissen Bekanntschaft
machen wollte, muBte sick tarnen. Der junge
Ramon erhielt 1935 den Auftrag, in Barcelona
einen Kiinstlerklub Cervantes" zu griinden, eine
illegale Partei- and Propagandazelle der Kommu-
nisten. Die Sadie flog schnell auf, and Mercader
muBte fur einige Monate ins Gefangnis.
Was ihm bisher im politischen Kampf an Erfah-
rung and Harte gefehlt hatte, wurde ihm jetzt von
den anderen politischen Gefangenen beigebracht.
Nach den Wahlen 1936, die wieder einen Links-
ruck brach.ten, vorzeitig befreit, trat er der
kommunistischen Miliz bei, felt entschlossen, es
den Reaktionaren ,heimzuzahlen". Im bald dar-
auf ausbrechenden Burgerkrieg wurde er zum
Politischen Kommissar im Range eines Leutnants
bei der 27. Division an der Aragon-Front ernannt.
Angehorige dieser militarischen Einheit erinnerten
sick spater seiner Skrupellosigkeit. Er glich darin
seiner Mutter, die als ein von fanatischem HaB
gegeniiber alien Gegnern Stalins erfiilltes ?Flinten-
weib" geschildert wurde.
Ob sic ihren Sohn Ramon mit den hochsten
Funktionaren des NKWD in Spanien in Ver-
bindung brachte, oder ob these von sich aus auf
den jungen Mann aufmerksam wurden, ist nicht
bekannt. Sicher aber ist, daB er spatestens im
Jahre 1937 zum engsten Mitarbeiterstab des
NKWD gehorte. Er hatte damit seine ?Aufgabe"
gefunden and fuhrte das Leben eines Komintern-
agenten, dem unbeschrankte Geldmittel zur Ver-
fiigung standen.
Systematisch von seinen Vorgesetzten zu diesem
?siiBen politischen Leben" erzogen, kam er nicht
mehr davon los, denn dem NKWD zu dienen,
bedeutete fur ihn Wohlstand and Macht. Als
NKWD-Mann konnte er ihm unbequeme Men-
schen verschwinden lassen. Ein Wink, eine
anonyme Anzeige geniigte.
Bald hielten ihn seine Befehlshaber fur reif,
eine groBe Aufgabe zu erfiillen - die groBte,
die der NKWD gegen Ende der dreiBiger Jahre
zu vergeben hatte. Zunachst schickte man ihn im
Frdhjahr 1938 nach Paris, mit dem Befehl, sick
als Sohn eines miilionenschweren belgischen
Diplomaten auszugeben. Mit Geld brauchte er
nicht zu geizen, and auBer der iiblichen Spitzel-
tatigkeit verlangte man von ihm nur eines: Er
sollte mit einer gewissen Amerikanerin, die nicht
gerade eine Schonheit and noch dazu einige Jahre
alter war als er, intime Beziehungen aufnehmen
and den feurigen Liebhaber spielen.
Diese Amerikanerin namens Sylvia Ageloff,
eine uberzeugte Trotzkistin, war als praktische
Psychologin im Amt fur Schule and Erziehung
der Stadt New York tatig gewesen. Ihre ,Freun-
din" Ruby Weil, die Sekretarin von Louis
Budenz, des damaligen Chefredakteurs des
kommunistischen Zentralorgans der USA Daily
Worker, hatte sic nach Paris gelockt. Budenz, der
spater zum Katholizismus iibertrat, hat in einem
Bekenntnisbuch Mitteilungen gemacht, mit deren
Hilfe sick das teuflische Spiel, dessen Inspirator
zweifellos Rabinowitsch-Eitingon war, einwand-
frei rekonstruieren lieB.
Ruby Weil vermittelte im Juni 1938 in Paris
auch die, naturlich rein ,zufallige", Bekanntschaft
Sylvias mit Ramon del Rio Mercader, der sich jetzt
Jacques Mornard-Vandendreschd nannte and be-
hauptete, der in Teheran geborene Sohn eines
belgischen Diplomaten zu sein. Als Geburtsjahr
gab er, um alter als Sylvia zu erscheinen, 1904 an.
Tatsachlich existierte ein Jacques Mornard, der
aber 1908 in Teheran zur Welt gekommen war
and dessen Mutter den Maddiennamen Vanden-
driessche fuhrte. Ob dieser echte Mornard von
dem Doppelspiel Mercaders wuBte, konnte bisher
nicht geklart werden.
Sylvia Ageloff verfiel dem neuen Bekannten
mit den guten Manieren, der so uberzeugend
sagen konnte: ?Ich Liebe dick", ganz wie es Rabi-
nowitsch-Eitingon berechnet hatte. Die 27jahrige
Amerikanerin, bisher in Liebesdingen nicht gerade
verwohnt, vermochte jedenfalls nicht zu erkennen,
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
wen sie vor sick hatte, obwohl ihr mit der Zeit
manches hatte auffallen, manches sie zur Vorsicht
hatte mahnen mussen.
Beispielsweise verschwand Mornard im Juli 1938
fur einige Wochen aus Paris. In einem Brief aus
Brussel teilte er Sylvia mit, seine Mutter habe bei
einem Autounfall schwere Verletzungen erlitten,
wahrend sein Vater mit dem Schrecken davon-
gekommen sei. Als Sylvia ebenfalls nach Brussel
fuhr, war ihr Freund unter der angegebenen
Adresse nicht aufzufinden. Zuriickgekehrt nach
Paris, erklart er ihr, er habe plotzlich nach Eng-
land verreisen mussen, wahrend er wahrscheinlich
nur Urlaub von ihr nehmen wollte oder sich mit
Eitingon treffen muf3te. Er versuchte auch, sie zu
korrumpieren. Eines Tages erbot er sich, laufend
Artikel von ihr an eine ?Argus-Verlags-Gesell-
schaft" zu verkaufen. Sylvia schrieb jede Woche
einen Beitrag, der angeblich gedruckt wurde, aber
nie erhielt sie Belegexemplare.
Doch the Liebe machte sogar diese uberzeugte
Trotzkistin blind. Sie glaubte ihrem Freund, mit
dem sie in einem eheahnlichen Verhaltnis lebte
and der so aufinerksam war, jedes Wort. Abend
fur Abend holte er sie mit seinem pomposen Auto
ab, selbst als sie im September an der streng
konspirativen Grundungsversammlung der IV. In-
ternationale teilnahm, fur die Trotzki den Auf-
ruf geschrieben and die er seit 1934 vorbereitet
hatte. Aber selbst wenn sie vorsichtiger gewesen
ware - der NKWD hatte auch ohne sie genau
gewuf3t, was vorging. Einer der Vertrautesten des
ermordeten Leon Sedow, nunmehr der Vertreter
Trotzkis in Paris, der sowjetische Emigrant
polnisch-ukrainischer Abkunft Mark Sborotvski,
Student der Medizin, war ein Spitzel Moskaus.
Deshalb konnte Eitingon seinen Agenten
Mornard anweisen, keinerlei Versuch zu machen,
der Konferenz beizuwohnen oder durch Fragen
etwas dariiber in Erfahrung zu bringen. Nur
Sylvia Ageloff, die ihm unrettbar verfallen war,
nicht zum wenigsten gerade wegen des offensicht-
lichen Desinteressements ihres Freundes, durfte er
abholen. Im Fruhjahr 1939 ging Eitingon einen
Schritt weiter. Mornard muBte seiner Verlobten
eroffnen, daB ihm eine belgische Zeitung den
Posten cines Korrespondenten in den USA an-
geboten hatte. Deshalb schlage er Sylvia vor,
zuruck nach New York zu gehen and dort auf
ihn zu warten, denn er werde bald nachkommen.
Doch erst im September, nach Ausbruch des
Zweiten Weltkrieges, tauchte cr bei ihr auf.
Zu ihrer Oberraschung nannte er sich jetzt
Frank Jacson. Auf ihre Frage, wieso er plotzlich
Besitzer cines kanadischen Passes sei, erklarte er,
als belgischer Staatsbdrger hatte man ihn nicht
einreisen lassen, deshalb habe er sich fur
3600 Dollar einen falschen PaB gekauft, um bei
ihr sein zu konnen. Spater stellte man an Band
der Nummer 31377 fest, daB dieser Pali am
22. Marz 1937 dem Kanadier Tony Babich,
geboren am 13. Juni 1905 in Lovinac in Jugo-
slawien and im Sommer 1937 im spanischen
Burgerkrieg gefallen, ausgehandigt wordcn war.
DerNKWD,der alle Papiere der ?Internationalen
Brigade" verwaltete, lieB diesen PaB falschen.
Dabei vergaB der zustandige Spezialist offenbar,
bei dem Namen Jackson das ?k" einzufugen.
Im Oktober 1939 reiste ?Jacson" mit dem
frisierten Pall nach Mexico City. Von dort schrieb
er Sylvia, er fiihle sich einsam and sehne sick nach
ihrer Gesellschaft. Flugs nahm sie einen drei-
monatigen Urlaub and folgte ihrem Verlobten,
der damit seinem Ziel ein groBes Stuck naher
kam, dean Sylvia besuchte naturlich auch ihre
Schwester, die bei Trotzki als Sekretarin arbeitete.
Voller Stolz stellte sie ihren Brautigam vor, der
auf die Schwester wegen seines vollendeten
Benehmens groBen Eindruck machte. Die Briicke
zu dem Haus in Coyoacan war geschlagen, nun-
mehr hieB es nur nosh Geduld zu haben.
Jacson hatte sie. Er iiberstiirzte nichts, denn
noch hatte er Trotzki selber nicht kennengelernt.
Aber these hervorragende, psychologisch bis ins
letzte durchdachte Taktik des Morders seinen
eigenen Oberlegungen zuzuschreiben ware falsch.
Die Plane stammten mit Sicherheit von dem im
Einfadeln solcher Intrigen viel erfahreneren
Dr. Rabinowitsch alias General Eitingon. Er war
es, der mit den Gefiihlen der unglucklichen Sylvia
Ageloff so raffiniert zu spielen verstand and der
auch nach dem Attentat vom 24. Mai 1940 alle
Schritte Jacsons lenkte.
Am 27. Februar 1940 anderte Trotzki sein
Testament, als ahnte er, daB seine Tage gezahlt
waren. Die Passagen, die von seiner Frau Nathalie
Sedowa sprechen, zeugen von groi3er Zartheit
des Gefiihls:
,,Zu dem Gluck, ein Kampfer fur den Sozialis-
mus zu sein, gab mir das Schicksal das Gluck,
ihr Mann sein zu diirfen. In den nunmehr fast
vierzig Jahren unscres gemeinsamen Lebens-
weges blieb sie eine unerschopfliche Quelle der
Liebe, der GroBmut and Zartlichkeit. Sic
erduldete grof3e Leiden ... Aber ich empfinde
doch Erleichterung bei dem Gedanken, daB sie
trotzdem Tage des Glucks genossen hat ..."
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Da der Oberfall vom 24. Mai 1940 auf das Haus
an der Ecke Wiener and Morelos-Stra13e sein Ziel
verfehlt hat, bringt Eitingon nunmehr semen
zweiten Bauern, Frank Jacson, ins Spiel, dem es
inzwischen gelungen ist, ohne selbst darum
ersucht zu haben, in die Festung eingelassen zu
werden. Zwar hat er Sylvia Ageloff, die im Marz
nach New York zurUckfuhr, ehrenwortlich ver-
sprochen, dieses Haus ohne sie nicht zu betreten,
aber da das Ehepaar Rosmer, das den Enkel
Esteban nach Coyoacan brachte, Jacson eines
Tages urn einige Gefalligkeiten bat, ergab sich
dessen Besuch in Coyoacan von selbst.
Spater nehmen die Rosmers, mit den Trotzkis
seit Jahrzehnten eng befreundet, Jacson Ange-
bot, sie mit seinem Auto zum Schiff zu bringen,
mit dem sie Mexiko verlassen wollen, erfreut an.
Vier Tage nach dem ersten Attentat, am 28. Mai
1940, fahrt er vor dem Haus in Coyoacan vor. Da
die Eheleute nosh beim Fri hstiick sind, wird er
aufgefordert, mit am Tisch Platz zu nehmen. Bei
dieser Gelegenheit begegnet er Trotzki zum ersten
Male. In einem Brief an Sylvia teilt Jacson seiner
Verlobten mit, warum er sein Versprechen
gebrochen habe. Diese Korrektheit wirkt sich
natiirlich. positiv fur ihn aus.
Nach seiner Rilckkehr aus Veracruz drangt er
sich klugerweise nicht danach, dem ?groBen
Alten" sofort wieder zu begegnen. Er macht sich
rar, wie die Eintragungen im Wachbuch, das die
Sekretare mit minutioser Genauigkeit fi hren,
beweisen. Erst am 12. Juni taucht er wieder in
Coyoacan auf, um mitzuteilen, daB er nach New
York fahre and sein Auto inzwischen den Wacht-
posten zur freien Benutzung iiberlasse. Audi das
spricht sehr fur ihn, um so mehr als er sick, von
einem der Wachter zum Flugzeug begleiten lai3t.
In New York erhalt er die letzten Anweisungen,
and bei der Systematik, mit der Leonid Eitingon
vorgeht, dart man als sicker voraussetzen, daB
auch verschiedene ,Generalproben" gemacht wer-
den. Jacson ist sick der Gefahrlidikeit des Unter-
nehmens wohl bewuBt, and schon deswegen
mussen alle Moglichkeiten, die sick ergeben
konnen, grundlich erortert werden. Nach seiner
Ri ckkehr schlagt er Trotzki vor, ihn bei einer
Bergtour zu begleiten. Er empfiehlt sich als
gei bter uhd versierter Bergsteiger, dock da man
nitht sofort darauf eingeht, kommt Jacson nicht
mehr darauf zuri ck. Er ist zu vorsichtig, um etwas
zu forcieren.
Auch die verschiedenen Waffen, die man spater
bei ihm findet, deuten darauf hin, daB alle mog-
lichen Totungsarten erwogen wurden. In seiner
rechten Manteltasche tragt er einen 35 cm langen
and 3 cm breiten Dolch mit sick, als zweite Waffe
eine mit acht Patronen geladene Pistole Kali-
ber 0,45. Das Tatwerkzeug, einen Eispickel, hat er
aber weder in New York noch in Frankreich
gekauft, wie er spater behauptet, er entwendete
ihn wahrscheinlich bereits im April dem Besitzer
eines Touristenhotels, in dem er vor seiner New
Yorker Reise einige Zeit wohnte.
Das Wachbuch notiert seinen langsten Besuch
am 29. Juli 1940: von 14.40 Uhr bis 15.50 Uhr.
An diesem Tage haben Trotzki and dessen Frau
ihn and seine Verlobte, die ihren Jahresurlaub in
Mexiko verbringt, zum Tee eingeladen. Am
8. August ist er wieder im Hause and bleibt etwas
fiber eine Stunde. Die ?Generalprobe" fur den
Mord findet bei diesem elften Besuch statt. Er
erklart, einen Artikel geschrieben zu haben, um
dessen Begutachtung er bitte. Wahrend Trotzki
liest, setzt sich Jacson auf einen Tisch hinter des-
sen Stuhl, ein Umstand, den der Gastgeber als
unangenehm empfindet.
Hinterher sagt Trotzki seiner Frau, dai3 er
diesen merkwurdigen jungen Mann nicht mehr
zu sehen wunsche; auBerdem sei ihm aufgefallen,
daft Jacson die ganze Zeit fiber den Hut auf
dem Kopf behielt and seinen Mantel fest an sich
pref3te. Das hatte, wie sich spater herausstellte,
seinen guten Gri nde, dean schon an diesem Tage
trug er den gestohlenen Eispickel and die anderen
Waffen bei sich. Trotzki ahnte davon natUrlich
nichts, aber er hatte ein ungutes Gefiihl, wie von
einer drohenden Gefahr.
Vielleicht wollte Jacson bereits das Attentat an
diesem Samstag ausfiihren, and es gebrach ihm
nur an Mut. Gewisse Anzeichen lassen jedenfalls
den Schluf3 zu, daB er sich, trotz aller Skrupel-
losigkeit, innerlich bis zuletzt dagegen wehrte,
zum Murder zu werden. So fallt in den letzten
Tagen vor dem Anschlag nicht nur Sylvia Ageloff
das Aussehen ihres Verlobten auf, auch Trotzki
and dessen Frau wundern sick fiber sein fahriges
Wesen, das gegeni ber seiner fri heren souveranen
Ruhe sehr unvorteilhaft wirkt.
Der 20. August beginnt fur Trotzki recht ange-
nehm. Es herrscht strahlendes Wetter, and er
fuhlt rich wohler als vorher. Als er um sieben
Uhr aufsteht, begriif3t er seine Frau mit den
fatalistischen Worten: ,Sic haben uns these Nacht
wieder nicht umgebracht. Und ich habe mich
schon lange nicht so wohl gefuhlt wie heute."
Auch die Morgenpost ist erfreulich. Trotzki erhalt
die Nachricht, sein Archiv sei in der Harvard-
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Universitat angekommen, ohne da13 irgendwelche
Gehcimdienste versucht hatten, sich einzuschalten.
Nachdem er seine Akten and sonstigen Unter-
lagen der Universitat nur unter der Bedingung
iiberlassen hatte, daf3 ein Teil des Archivs bis
zum Jahre 1980 unzuganglich bleiben solle, war
ein Gewaltakt zu erwarten gewesen.
Den Vormittag uber spricht er einen Artikel in
das Diktaphon. Um 13 Uhr empfangt er semen
amerikanischen Anwalt, der ihm rat, gegen be-
stimmte Verleumdungen vorzugehen. Nadi einer
Ruhepause sitztTrotzki wieder an seinemSchreib-
tisch. Kurz nach 17 Uhr geht er, wie jeden Tag,
zu den Stallen im Hof, um die Kaninchen and die
Hiihner zu fiittern. Die Pflege der Tiere ist ihm
willkommener Ersatz fur die Spaziergange and
grof3eren Wanderungen in der Umgebung oder
in die Berge, die er aus Sicherheitsgriinden hat
aufgeben mussen.
Als Nathalie Sedowa in den Garten hinunter-
blickt, sieht sie neben ihrein Mann den jungen
Jacson stehen. Wiederum fallt ihr sein nervoses
Benehmen auf. Er hat die Gesichtsfarbe eines See-
kranken. Jacson griif3t sie betont zuvorkommend
and ruft ihr zu: ,Ich bin schrecklich durstig.
Konnte ich wohi ein Glas Wasser haben?" Sic
bietet ihm Tee an, aber er antwortet: ?Nein,
ich habe zu spat gegessen and das Essen will
nicht recht rutschen. Es wurgt mich im Hals."
Spater entschuldigt er seine Freundin Sylvia, daf3
sic noch nicht da sei. Aber sic werde jeden Augen-
blick kommen, um sick zu verabschieden, fugt er
hinzu, denn morgen wurden beide nach New
York abreisen.
In Wirklichkeit hat er sic listig ferngehalten. Sie
wartet, wie verabredet, im Hotel auf ihn, and da
er ganz gegen seine Gewohnheit unpiinktlich ist,
wird sic von Minute zu Minute unruhiger. Un-
erklarliche Angst hat sic befallen. Sic telefoniert
mit dem Hotel, in dem sic beide wohnen, doch
dort weiB man nichts. Zur selben Zeit spricht
Jacson bereits mit Trotzki and zeigt ihm einige
maschinengeschriebene Matter: den schon vor drei
Tagen vorgelegten, jetzt umgearbeiteten Artikel.
Forschend betrachtet der alte Mann den Besucher,
and als er bemerkt, daft Jacson recht schledit
aussieht, sagt er mitfuhlend: ?Sic scheinen krank
zu sein. Ihr Aussehen gefallt mir gar nicht. Sic
mussen mehr auf Ihre Gesundheit achtenl"
Langsam die Handschuhe abstreifend, die er
beim Futtern der Haustiere zu tragen pflegt, geht
Trotzki in sein Arbeitszimmer. Jacson folgt ihm.
Zwei oder drei Minuten spater, kurz vor 18 Uhr,
hurt Nathalie Sedowa einen furchtbaren Schrci.
Sic lauft nach drauien - ihr Mann liegt blut-
iiberstrimt an der Balkontiir im EBzimmer.
?Jacson", stohnt Trotzki, and gleich darauf:
,,Natascha, ich habe dick so lieb." WVahrend sic
sich um ihren schwerverletzten Mann kiimmert,
dringen aus dem Arbeitszimmer Schreie. Die
Wachter schlagen mit Pistolengriffen auf den
Attentater ein. Er versucht sick zu wehren and
wimmert: ?Sic haben mich in ihren Harden, sic
haben meine Mutter eingesperrt ... Sylvia hat
nichts damit zu tun ..."
Trotzki versteht, trotz der todlichen Kopfwunde,
was Jacson sagt and bittet einen der Leibwachter:
?Nein, nein, man soil ihn nicht toten - er muB
zum Sprechen gebracht werden!" Die Wachter
lassen von dem Attentater ab, der sich schon
wieder in der Gewalt hat. Der Polizel, die wenige
Minuten nach 18 Uhr eintrifft, i.ibergibt er einen
Brief; Personalpapiere and sonstige Hinweise auf
seine Identitat besitzt er nicht, er will sic vorher
vernichtet haben. Der Brief, in franzosischer
Sprache abgefaBt, ist wahrscheinlich schon vor
Tagen mit der Maschine geschrieben worden; das
Datum wurde mit Bleistift eingetragen, ebenso die
Unterschrift ?Jac".
Jacson erklarte darin zunachst, er gehore einer
alten belgischen Familie an and sei von einem
Bekannten fur die IV. Internationale angeworben
and veranlaflt worden, nach Mexiko zu fahren.
Er fahrt fort:
Nach einigen Unterhaltungen sagte er
[Trotzki] mir endlich klipp and klar, was man
von mir wollte. In diesem Augenblick waren
meine Illusionen verflogen, and ich fiihlte
grof3tes Mif3trauen dem Manne gegenuber, an
den ich bis jetzt geglaubt hatte.
Ich sollte nach Ruf3land gehen and dort eine
Reihe von Attentaten gegen verschiedene Per-
sonen and an erster Stelle gegen Stalin organi-
sicren. Das widersprach.jeglichen Prinzipien des
Kampfcs, der bis jetzt offen and ehrlich gewesen
war, and zerstorte all' meinen Glauben. Trotz-
dem sagte ich nicht zu, denn ich woilte wissen,
wieweft die niedrige Gesinnung and der Haf3
dieses Manner gehen wiirden..."
Das ist die Strategic des NKWD. Wahrschein-
lich hat Eitingon diesen Brief geschrieben, als
Jacson in New York war. Der General beging
dabei aber den Fehler, die Uberredungszeiten zu
niedrig anzusetzen, vielleicht wcil er falsch in-
formiert war, vielleicht auch, Weil er nicht wuf3te,
daf3 Uber jeden Besucher genau Buch gefuhrt
wurde. Elfmal war Jacson in Cayoacan, insgesamt
4 Stunden and 27 Minuten. In dieser Zeit sprach
er mit Trotzki unter vier Augen hochstens 15 Mi-
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nuten. So schnell wird man aber mit einem Men-
schen vertraut genug, um ihm derartige Angebote
zu machen. AuBerdem paBt alles zu gut in das von
Moskau verbreitete Bild der Schauprozesse".
Bei der Vernehmung erklart Jacson iiberdies,
Trotzki habe im Dienste des ,amerikanischen
Imperialismus" gestanden, sei also von der Regie-
rung in Washington bezahlt worden. 1940 unter-
halt die Sowjetunion noch freundschaftliche Be-
ziehungen zu Hitlerdeutschland. Im ProzeB aber,
der erst drei Jahre spater stattfindet, ist Trotzki
kein "amerikanischer Agent" mehr, sondern ?ein
faschistischer Bluthund" im Solde der Gestapo,
denn Hitler fuhrt inzwischen gegen die Sowjet-
union Krieg and Moskau hat rich mit den einst
geschmahten ?amerikanischen Plutokraten" ver-
biindet.
Uber den Hergang der Tat gibt Jacson zu
Protokoll :
. Nach meinen Gesprachen mit Trotzki
hegte ich einen unsagbaren HaB gegen ihn. Es
wurde mir klar, daft ich einer von denjenigen
war, die er Fur seine personlichen Vorteile miB-
braucht hatte, denn ohne jegliche Gewissens-
bisse zwang er seine Anhanger, sich fur seine
eigenen Interessen aufzuopfern. Deshalb be-
schlofi ich, ihn zu toten, and erst Selbstmord zu
begehen, wenn er nicht mehr weiterlebte.
Am Tage des Attentats kam ich gegen halb
sieben in sein Haus. Harold offnete mir die Ti r.
Im Hof traf ich verschiedene Sekretare von
Trotzki. Sie sagten etwas zu mir, was ich aber
nicht verstand. Ich fragte Harold, ob Sylvia dort
sei, denn sie hatte geauBert, daB sie den Alten
aufsuchen wollte. Aber er verneinte. Ich sagte:
,Dann wird sie wohl spater noch kommen.'
Ich fand Trotzki bei der Futterung seiner
Kaninchen ... Dann ... bat er mich in sein
Arbeitszimmer. Dort nahm er meine Papiere
and setzte sich in seinen Stuhl vor dem Schreib-
fisch. Ich stand links von ihm and er kehrte mir
den Riicken zu. Er war keineswegs miBtrauisch.
Ids legte meinen Mantel, in dessen rechter
Ecke der Dolch eingenaht war and in dessen
linker Seite sich der Eispickel befand, auf
irgendein Mobelstiick - ich weiB nicht mehr
worauf. Ich weiB nur, daft es an der Ostseite
des Raumes hinter Trotzki war. Wahrend er
den Artikel las, nahm ich den Eispickel aus
meinem Regenmantel, schloB die Augen and
schlug ihm auf den Kopf. Ich schlug nur einmal
zu. Er stieB einen gellenden Schrei aus, warf
rich gleichzeitig auf mich and biB mich in die
linke Hand. Sie kornen jetzt noch die Druck-
stellen sehen. Dann stolperte er zuriick. Nach
dem Schrei tauchte zuerst Harold auf, der mich
mit der Pistole bearbeitete, dann Charles and
Hansen. Ich war schon durch die Tat betaubt
and machte keinerlei Versuch zu fliehen. Ob
sonst noch jemand das Zimmer betrat, weiB ich
nicht mehr. Spater kam die Polizei and brachte
mich hierher ..."
Der belgische Konsul, der ihm gegenubergestellt
wird, bezweifelt die Angaben Jacsons, daft er in
Wirklichkeit Mornard-Vandendreschd heiBe.
Einen Diplomaten dieses Namens gibt es nicht,
so wie es in Dixmuiden keine Militarakademie
and in Briissel kein Jesuitenkolleg gibt, die der
Morder besucht haben will. Aber Jacson-Mornard
bleibt bei seiner Behauptung. Oberpruft werden
kann sie nicht, denn in dem von Deutschland be-
setzten Belgien sind Nachforschungen nicht mog-
lich. Nur die diplomatischen Jahrbii.cher liegen
vor. Erst nach Jahren kommt man auf die richtige
Spur, als man, dank entsprechender Hinweise, die
Fingerabdriicke Ramon del Rio Mercaders findet,
der 1936 in Barcelona wegen kommunistischer
Agitation zu einer Gefangnisstrafe verurteilt
worden war. Ein Vergleich mit denen Jacson-
Mornards beweist einwandfrei die Identitat.
Audi seine in scheinbarer Todesangst heraus-
geschriene Behauptung, man habe ihn erpreBt,
Weil man seine Mutter festgesetzt habe, erweist
sich Jahre danach als frei erfunden. Zur Stunde
des Attentats wartete sie, zusammen snit ihrem
Freund Eitingon, 500 Meter entfernt von Trotzkis
Haus auf ihren Sohn, in der Hoffnung, daB es
ihm gelingen werde, nach dem Mord zu entkom-
men. Audi fiber die Vorbereitungen war sie genau
informiert. Dem spanischen Parteigenossen Jesus
Hernandez, wahrend des Burgerkrieges Justiz-
minister (er sagte sick 1950 von den Kommuuisten,
los), erzahlte Caridad Mercader spater, daB sie
wahrend ihrer Besuche in der Sowjetunion direkt
mit Stalin and Berija uber die Ermordung
Trotzkis verhandelt habe.
Nach der Tat verleiht man ihr and ihrem Sohn
den Leninorden, eine der hodisten sowjetischen
Auszeichnungen. Wahrend des Krieges nach Ufa
evakuiert and dort im Prominentenhotel ?Basch-
kirija" untergebracht, wohnt sie von 1943 bis
zu ihrer Ausreise im Jahre 1944 im Moskauer
;,Lux", zusammen mit anderen KominterngroBen.
Mit falschen Passen versehen, lebt sie vom Ok-
tober 1944 bis November 1945 in Mexiko, wo
sie Fuhlung mit der Kommunistin Dr. Esther
Chapa aufnimmt, die bis 1947 ?Chef der Gefang-
nisdelegation zur Vorbeugung von Verbrechen"
ist. Ausgerechnet den Morder Trotzkis ernennt
sie zu ihrem Vertreter im Zuchthaus, in dem er
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Harry Schulze-Wilde
seine Strafe absitzt, das heif3t, Jacson kann sich
innerhalb der Gebaude Frei bewegen and hat kraft
seines ,Amtes" groBen Einflufi auf die Warter
and Gefangenen.
Ob Caridad Mercader bei ihrem zweiten Auf-
enthalt in Mexiko hoffte, noch einmal eine Flucht-
moglichkeit fur ihren Sohn vorbereiten zu konnen,
wie Eitingon von New York aus schon vor dem
Prozef3 im Jahre 1943, ist unbekannt, aber
manches spricht dafdr. Als man sich das erste Mal
fur seine Flucht einsetzte, machte Jacson-Mornard
nicht mit. Er hatte dafi r seine guten Griinde. Das
Beispiel anderer NKWD-Agenten schreckte. Im
Gefangnis war er zu Stalins Lebzeiten sicherer.
Schon wenige Minuten nach dem Attentat
haben sich vor dem Hause Trotzkis Hunderte von
Menschen versammelt. Reporter sind gekommen,
and mit der Polizei ist auch ein Krankenwagen
eingetroffen. Doch die Sekretare verweigern den
Abtransport ihres Chefs, solange nicht der Poli-
zeigeneral Jose Manuel Nuiiuz zugegen ist. Sie
befiirchten, weitere Mordschergen konnten den
Transport iiberfallen and den Schwerverletzten
toten. Noch hoffen sie auf Trotzkis Rettung. Erst
nachdem Trotzki ins Krankenhaus gefahren wor-
den ist, wird auch der von Sekretaren halbtot
geschlagene Attentater abtransportiert. Der Zufall
will es, daft man ihn in dem Zimmer neben dem
seines Opfers unterbringt.
Zwei Stunden nach dem Anschlag liegt der
schwerverletzte Trotzki, der inzwischen das Be-
wuf3tsein verloren hat, auf dem Operationstisch.
Die Arzte erkennen, dali sein Zustand hoffnungs-
los ist. Dennoch versuchen sie, ihn zu retten, aber
es ist alles vergebens. Am 21. August 1940 um
19.25 Uhr, 25 Stunden and 35 Minuten nach dem
Attentat, stirbt er.
Die Nachricht von seinem Tod verdrangt die
Kriegsmeldungen von den ersten Seiten der
Zeitungen. An seiner Leiche, im Groien Saal des
Alcazar inmitten der mexikanischen Hauptstadt
aufgebahrt, defilieren Hunderttausende in stum-
mer Trauer voruber. Beim Begrabnis folgt eine
ungeheure Menschenmenge dem Kondukt, and
bald singt man in den Straflen den ?Grand
Corrida" fiber Leo Davidowitsch Trotzki. Dieses
traurige Volkslied, dessen Dichter niemand kennt,
ist innerhalb weniger Tage in aller Munde:
?Trotzki ist tot - erschlagen
zwischen Morgen and Nacht.
Die ihn geliebt haben, klagen.
Der es bef ohlen hat, lacht.
Gastfreundschaft and Frieden zu suchen
Nach Jahren volt Kampf en and Not,
Kam Trotzki zu uns nach Coyoacan
Und fand bei uns seinen Tod.
Als Freund, dem man herzlich vertraut hat,
Schlich sich der Morder ins Haus,
Das Trotzki bei uns sich gebaut hat,
Und zog seine Axt heraus.
Er ersdrlug seinen Wirt and Freund,
Der ihm nichts Bases getanl
Ganz Mexiko weint nun um ihn,
Und es trauert ganz Coyoacan."
Der Morder, der sich von seinem Schock and
den Schlagen schnell erholt, wird pausenlos ver-
hort. Er wei8 fur alles eine Erklarung, and wenn
er sich in WidersprUche verwickelt, schi tzt er
Gedachtnisschwund vor. Nur einmal verliert er
vollig seine Fassung: als man ihn seiner ebenfalls
verhafteten Freundin Sylvia Ageloff gegeniiber-
stellt.
Nachdem sie am 20. August bis gegen 19 Uhr
in ihrem Hotel Montijo vergeblich auf ihren
Freund gewartet hatte, rief sie in Coyoacan an
and horte, was geschehen war. Sie eilte sofort
zum Tatort and stellte sich der Polizei zur Ver-
fiigung. Zwar glaubte man ihr, daB sie an dem
Attentat nicht beteiligt gewesen sei, dock die
Untersuchungsbehorden hielten es fur richtiger,
sic vorlaufig festzunehmen.
Den Attentater hatte man bei ihrer Festnahme
schon abtransportiert. Als sic ihn jetzt vor sich
sieht, schreit sic: ,Bringt den Morder weg! Totet
ihnI Er hat Trotzki ermordetI Schlagt ihn tot!"
Einer der Beamten wendet sick Sylvia zu and
sagt: ?Jacson behauptet, daft Sic sein einziger
Lebenszweck seien and daf3 er Ihretwegen Trotzki
getotet babe, da Sic das Opfer seiner Intrigen
werden sollten."
?Lauter LiigenI" widerspricht Sylvia. Er ist ein
Heuchler, er ist ein Morderl Totet ihnl"
In ihrer Gegenwart wagt Jacson-Mornard nicht,
seine Behauptungen zu wiederholen. Sylvia
Ageloff widerlegt ihm vieles, and jeder, der
dieser Gegeniiberstellung beiwohnt, ist uberzeugt,
da13 sic die Wahrheit sagt, wenn sic in hbchster
Erregung herausschreit: ?Er ist ein Verrater in
der Liebe, in der Freundschaft, in allem. Ich weif3
jetzt, daft ich das Werkzeug dieses Schuftes ge-
wesen bin." Sic spuckt ihn an, and als er hinaus-
gefuhrt wird, ruft sic hinter ihm her: Du
Kanaille 1 Du Kanaillel Du Kanaillel"
Fur die Kriminalisten and Anwalte bleiben
trotz der Aussagen von Sylvia Ageloff ungezahlte
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i
Fragen often, denn wegen der kriegsbedingten
Verhaltnisse lassen sich zahlreiche Behauptungen
nicht nachpriifen, ein Umstand, den der Morder
and sein Inspirator Eitingon, der ihn so hervor-
ragend praparierte, richer einkalkuliert haben. So
kann die Untersuchung nicht mit der gebotenen
Grundlichkeit gefiihrt werden.
Je langer die Untersuchung dauert, desto mehr
spielt sich das Leben des Morders im Gefangnis
ein. Ihm stehen unbeschrankte Geldmittel zur
Verfugung, er kann sick ein Grammophon, einen
Radioapparat, Bucher, Zeitungen, Weine and
sugar Damenbesuch leisten. Als der Prozef3 1943
stattfindet, hat - nach der siegreichen Schlacht
von Stalingrad - die internationale Sympathie
fur Stalin einen nie fur moglich gehaltenen Hohe-
punkt erreicht.
Wie durch Zufall bekannt wird, haben die Ver-
teidiger ?von unbekannter Seite" 20 000 Dollar
erhalten. Die Herkunft des Geldes laBt sick er-
raten. Am 16. April 1943 wird das Urteil ver-
kiindet: Ramon de Rio Mercader alias Jacques
Mornard alias Frank Jacson wird zur Hochststrafe
verurteilt, die das mexikanische Strafgesetzbuch
fur Mord kennt: 20 Jahre Zuchthaus. Im Urteil
heifit es:
,,Vom Beginn seiner Reise nach Mexiko bis
zur Herstellung personlicher Beziehungen zu
Trotzki and auch danach ist Mornards Ver-
halten voller Unwahrhaftigkeit and Tiicke. Das
Gericht muB daraus schlieBen, dab Frank Jacson
oder Jacques Mornard seine Reise nach Mexiko
zu dem ausschlief3lichen Zweck der Ermordung
Trotzkis unternahm ...
Die amerikanischen Trotzkisten baten die Re-
gierung in Washington darum, die Leiche Leo
Trotzkis in die Vereinigten Staaten i1berfiihren
zu durfen, aber die State Department verweigerte
.auch dem Toten ein Visum. Am 27. August 1940
wind der Leichnam eingeaschert and die Urne mit
der Asche im Garten des Hauses in Coyoacan bei-
gesetzt. Ein weiBer rechteckiger Stein, i.iber dem
eine rote Fahne weht, bezeichnet die Stelle.
Daneberrist kurze Zeit vorher nosh ein anderes
Grab ausgehoben worden. Auf der Marmorplatte
steht: In Memory of Robert Sheldon Harte,
1915-1940, murdered by Stalin." Harte, nach
dem Uberfall am 24. Mai angeblich zwangsweise
verschleppt, wurde in der Tat von Agenten Stalins
ermordet, dock aus ganz anderen GrUnden als
Trotzki: Er war ein Spitzel, der mundtot gemacht
werden muBte. Aber Trotzki glaubte unersdiiit-
terlich an die Treue seines Wachters and erwies
dem Toten unverdiente Ehre.
Das Zimmer, in dem Trotzki todlich verwundet
wurde, belaf3t man in dem Zustand. Seine Frau
Nathalie Sedowa, die noch 20 Jahre in dem Haus
leben wird, legt Wert darauf, dab man nidits ver-
andert. Es ist einsam um sie geworden; nur ein
Enkel blieb ihr - and die Erinnerung. Sic soil
nicht verwischt werden. Jeden Morgen gruBt sie
das Totenmal ihres Mannes. Audi die Marmor-
platte sieht sie, aber sic glaubt ebenfalls, daft
Harte kein Spitzel war. Die These der Polizei an-
zuerkennen, kame ihr wie Verrat an ihrem er-
mordeten Manne and den ermordeten Sohnen
and Enkelkindern vor.
Als Nathalie Sedowa nach den Enthullungen
Chruschtschows auf dem XX. Parteitag die So-
wjetregierung ersucht, nunmehr auch den Sieger
der Revolution vom 7. November 1917, den
spateren Grunder der Roten Armee, Leo Davi-
dowitsch Trotzki, zu rehabilitieren, erhalt sic
keine Antwort. Zehn Jahre nach Stalins Tod
offnen sich fur Mercader die Tore des Zucht-
hauses. Am Tor erwarten tschechische Kommu-
nisten den Morder. Sic bringen ihn zum Flugzeug
nach Kuba. In der Tschechoslowakei verliert sick
seine Spur, doch liegen Nachrichten vor, daB er in
einem kleinen Dorf bei Prag lebt. Den Lenin-
Orden hat man ihm allerdings wieder abgenom-
men, and er ist auch kein Held der Sowjetunion"
mehr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/06: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040003-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/06: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040003-3
In defending their position, the Soviet delegate said:
"The hearts of 225 million Soviet people are beating in unison
with the hearts of our Vietnamese friends, the speaker de-
clared. We are doing everything to provide not merely moral
and political, but material assistance to the Vietnamese people,
to strengthen their defense capacity. No one must remain neutral
in this just struggle against barefaced aggression. Our people
are ready to further extend their assistance to the people of
Vietnam and provide it on any scale that might be required."
[Moscow, TASS, International Service
in English, 12 July 19651
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/06: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040003-3