WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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World-wide
Perspectives
KEY DATES
March--April Western Europe Anti-NATO demonstrations are
expected in conjunction with
NATO's 20th anniversary. Prin-
cipal dates: 18 March 1949
NATO formed; 4 April 1949 NATO
treaty signed; 10 April 1969
20th anniversary NATO minister-
ial meeting in Washington.
March 50th Anniversary of founding of
Comintern.
March-- Vienna 2nd Preparatory Meeting for Con-
ference on European Security and
Cooperatign (had been scheduled
by WCP for October).
March 17 Moscow Preparatory Commission Meeting
for World Communist Conference
in May.
March 18 Conakry Conference of African and Euro-
pean Trade Unions sponsored by
All-African Trade Union Federa-
tion and WFTU.
March 22-27 Rabat Seminar on Education in Africa
for African Student Unions, sup-
ported by IUS.
April 12-21 Kuala Lumpur World Fellowship of Buddhists,
9th General Assembly.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Our objective of keeping the lessons of the Czechoslovakian crisis
fresh and alive is becoming more difficult in view of the absence of
dramatic developments on the Czech .scene. Under the circumstances we
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must endeavor to relate the implications of the Soviet action to the
more basic long-term interests of the target audience. In most cases
this boils down to the issue of the demonstrated dangers of too close
political, economic, and military relations with the Soviet Union.
In most parts of the world the local Communists are probably the
single group most sensitive to current developments in Czechoslovakia
and every effort should be bent to deepening the divisions which the
invasion caused in their ranks.
VIETNAM
Last year the Vietnamese celebration of the Lunar New Year was
marred by the greatest enemy offensive of the war -- an attack coldly
calculated to benefit from the truce agreement which permitted many
of the South Vietnamese defenders to celebrate the Tet holidays with
their families. In 1969 the Tet holiday, which began at midnight on
the 15th of February and lasted until midnight of the 21st, was cele-
brated in relative peace -- apart from dozens of minor violations by
the Communists. There was, in contrast to last year, little or no
sign of a large scale offensive.
The following week the Communists did attempt a widespread at-
tack against the cities and towns. At the time this is written the
attack is still going on. But it is already evident that the Commu-
nists' offensive capability is in no way comparable with what it was
one year ago. The only result of the attack will be more senseless
bloodshed. In a low key and objective tone the following points may be
presented to highlight the contrast:
a. During the three months (November, December and
January) of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the
number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars rally-
ing to the South Vietnamese Government under the Chieu Hoi
(Open Arms) program was 8,500. At the outset of the Campaign
its goal had been set at 5,000, which critics then claimed
was unrealistically high.
b. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign put ARVN
(Army of the Republic of Vietnam) troops into many of
South Vietnam's outlying hamlets, increasing greatly the
number of hamlets participating in the civic aid program
and also providing more protection than previously for the
villagers from Viet Cong raids.
c. In connection with protection for the villagers,
approximately 20 per cent of the 1.1 million South Vietnam-
ese recruited into the Self-Defense Corps have been armed
since the last Lunar New Year. This arming is not only vi-
tal in helping the people to defend themselves, but is
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generating in the villagers a sense of national unity and
enables them to participate, not fence-sit, when their vil-
lages are under Viet Cong attack. The arming also demon-
strates the government's confidence in the villagers' com-
mitment to opposing the Communists.
d. In the past year an increasing number of Viet Cong
political cadre have been arrested as a result of South Viet-
namese villagers reporting such individuals to team members
of Operation Phoenix (designed to identify and apprehend mem-
bers of the Viet?Cong infrastructure).
e. As more areas are pacified, the Viet Cong loses
at once its local source of both manpower and food and
once more reduces its tax base.
We believe that a comparison of the enemy's activities and capa-
bilities today with those of a year ago is a valid measure of his
strength. Much of the credit for the improved conditions is due to
South Vietnam's government, army and people.
Confronted with the choice of emphasizing the divisive aspects of
the Italian Communist Party's 12th Congress, which was, in fact., an in-
ternational Communist forum, or alternatively of emphasizing the unity
of Communists in their common hostility to the United States and its
allies, we believe that our media assets should highlight all signs of
disagreement and disarray at the Congress, and the attached unclassified
backgrounder reflects that choice. The PCI Congress was important for
the Soviets as a potential help or hindrance in their effort to unify
the international movement, with an eye more particularly to convoking
an harmonious World Communist Conference next May. The more we can pub-
licize the evidences of disarray in the movement, the more difficult it
should be for the Soviets to achieve or even plausibly claim unity in
the Communist camp.
At the same time, assuming that in general free world parties
gain in local prestige and political strength to the extent they can
plausibly claim independence from Soviet dictates or even from adherence
to the Soviet line, we must constantly point to the ties that do, in
fact, bind. In some instances we can point to the "genuine" indepen-
dence of other parties (far removed from the local scene), and subject
to doubt the claims to independence of the local CP with the aim of
provoking more extravagant gestures of disagreement with the Soviet
line. The very absence of such gestures can be grounds'for claiming
local CP subservience to the alien influence of the Soviets.
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The odd behavior thus far of Soviet media concerning the Comintern
anniversary is puzzling. FYI: Soviet radio propaganda broadcast six
items on the Comintern anniversary during the last week of January,
none the following week, and 16 the second week of February (the latest
week for which ,~re have a tabulation). End FYI. Whatever the Soviets
decide to do about the anniversary, it is to our advantage to publicize
it and the Comintern as much as possible, always tying it in with what
we can plausibly insist is a hiddeh Soviet desire to impose something
similar on the world Communist movement of today. Feature articles
should. be developed recalling its sinister, subversive character and,
for the benefit of Communist audiences, recalling how Stalin used it
as a major foreign policy arm for Soviet national purposes, and as a
means of absolutely controlling foreign Communist parties. A conven-
ient peg for this will be the 17 March meeting of the Preparatory Com-
mission of the World Communist Conference. Stations having the capa-
bility are urged to use assets to dig up articles written over past
years on the Comintern which will serve to recall its more unsavory
aspects.
This is University Reform? Student protesters around the world might
profitably pause for a brief moment's reflection on their privileges as
contrasted with those of some of their less fortunate contemporaries.
Just a year ago, in March 1968, thousands of Polish students in Warsaw
marched in protest to dramatize their grievances against the university.
They were attacked by steel-helmeted club-wielding policemen: over 1,100
were arrested; the injured were spirited to hospitals in the outlying
areas of Warsaw so that no one can say with certainty how many were hurt.
The regime's response was expressed in a nutshell by Minister of
Education Henryk Jablonski, as reported in the leading Polish CP daily,
Trybuna Ludu, on 3 January 1969. He said that higher education must
conform to contemporary demands, that is, it must "actively cooperate
in the building of socialism." To ensure that these demands are met,
the Polish law on higher education was amended by the Sejm (Parliament)
on 20 December 1968 in such a way as to almost completely reverse the
former law of 1958 liberalizing Polish universities. Under the amend-
ment rectors will be appointed by the Minister of Education, not elected
as before by the academic senate. Other university officials and pro-
fessors (who are no longer required to hold a degree) are to be appointed
by the Minister. Such appointments can be terminated at any time by
the Minister. The later can also transfer any professors who oppose
these changes. At the same time, the new law prohibits professors from
resigning.
The university's s,--,r-.ate will now include three non-academic members:
the university's Party lecretary, the head of the military studies depart-
ment, and the Chairman of the Youth Council. The new members must be
nominated by the Party.
oft
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There is to be a council for youth affairs. However, two-thirds
of its members are to come from the academic staff and the rest from
youth organizations which are Government-organized and Party-controlled.
Help This Soviet Propaganda to Backfire. A 4 February 1969 Pravda
article accused the United Kingdom of participating with West Germany
in a nuclear fuel production venture (actually a tripartite arrange-
ment including The Netherlands) just to give the project an air of
respectability so that "Bonn can continue its drive for nuclear weap-
ons behind Britain's back." In fact, the project is designed to pro-
duce enriched nuclear fuel by a gas centrifuge method and to give its
participants entree into the nuclear power market independent of other
major fuel producers (including the U.S.A.). All three participants
acknowledge the safeguards against weapons production as laid down by
EURATOM and the proposed project is subject to these safeguards --
which, most significantly, include inspection.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is pressuring West Germany to sign
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One factor deterring
West Germany has been her fear that the NPT provisions might provide
a commercial stranglehold on nuclear power. The nuclear powers, es-
pecially the Soviet Union, deny that NPT poses any threat to commer-
cial ventures. The tripartite nuclear fuel production venture could,
therefore, serve as a test case of the sincerity of Soviet assurances
-- if, while she wooed West Germany into the NPT club, her media were
to cease conjuring up the sinister image of Bonn's nuclear weapons
production carried on under the unsuspecting noses of her NATO allies.
Cloth rationing in China Indications are sifting through to Hong
Kong from the Mainland that the customary January distribution of the
annual cloth ration coupons may be postponed for six months. For the
regime to abandon, or at least delay, giving this sop to the already
inadequately clothed Chinese people undoubtedly means that the pro-
duction of cloth has been yet another victim of the Cultural Revolu-
tion (for, as far as we know, the supply of raw cotton has been ade-
quate). To cover the delay, the 1968 cloth coupons are being extended
to mid-year. It is suggested that any coverage of the subject in con-
nection with China's attempts to import cloth, etc., include specula-
tion that the extension of the 1968 coupons to mid-year probably means
the actual distribution of cloth will be delayed; that this postpone-
ment is one more indication of how the Chinese people continue to foot
the bill for Mao Tse-tung's senile schemes; and that inability of the
Mao regime to produce (or share) the basic necessities among its people
is another illustration of how far away from the theory of Communism the
Chinese Peoples' Republic has been led.
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Rumanian Chuckle. "Soon after my arrival this week, a Rumanian was
telling me the current joke about the Sahara: 'Within two years of
taking over the Sahara from the Algerians, the Russians will be im-
porting sand.'" Nicholas Carroll.., London Sunday Times, 16 February
1969.
The Emperor's (School) Clothes. Castro's admirers and apologists are
seemingly able to find something laudable in everything he has done.
And even relatively objective observers have consistently pointed to
at least two things he is supposed to have accomplished: taken wealth
from the rich and redistributed it to the poor, and created a school
system that gives every mother's child an equal education. But Fidel
Castro himself, in a speech on 5 January, stated that 22% of the Cu-
ban children aged from 6 to 16 do not attend school. Twenty-two per
cent!
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