N. KOREA PRESSURES SOUTH WITH GUERRILLA TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 10, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

. 1dAIN.1CHl, ioxyo
Approvedi6o~raF~.?I>$asg6'~999/08/24:CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020004-3
rillas. The following Is what I were murdered by guerrillas North 1{orean guerrillas must
found. were all labeled "bad special have been embarrassed facing
One evening five guerrillas servicemen" or "agents." How unexpected diflicultics - antt-
stormed Into the home of I Suk could the woman and little
Woo, a 35-year-old farmer at children be "bad special serv- 'Sou h I{orcanepcople.tThey ap-
Yyong Chang, Kang Won Pre- Icemen"?
fcclure, and ordered his wife :The guerrilla theory and Patently were not taught how
Te Wa, 33, to prepare supper actual activities were different to deal with South Korean
for. them. The intruders began things in the case of Korean People who hold anti-commun-
to spout propaganda about guerrillas. Their activities Chas- ist senthnent.
communism. The elder mem- ed the people's estrangement I visited several hamlets scat-
I~ers of thr- family, terrified by And fear. The South Korean tered in the mountain region in
the guerrillas' attitude, obedi- Government claimed that such Kang Won Prefecture. Yyong-
ently listened to them. Three guerrilla activities disclosed Ynng Radio had broadcast that
little boys of the family, aged the true asirect of communism a revolutionary committee was
10, 7 and 4, could not under- and their criticism has aroused established and guerrlllas tcm-
stand the situation and one of sympathy from the public. porarily held the area. North
them said chat he did not liko I'or what reason have suer- I{orean propaganda exaggcrat-
communism, without under- rillas tended to resort to vlo- ed their activities. In the broad-
standing what he was saying. lence? cast, guerrilla activities were
The Innocent boy's utterance Those who came to the Ul reported ns an armed uprls[ng
caused lire murder of four of Chin area on the eastern coast in South Korea. Guerrillas
the-family, last November must have be- dealt a hard blow every day to
"The guerrlllas began to glue lieved that they would be giv- South I{orean military and poll-
propngnnda obout Communism. en a welcome and warm recep- ce forces, they also reported.
When my younger brother lion (accdrding to testimonies A ]ender of n hamlet said:
shouted at them 'I don't like by arrested guerrillas.) "I sometimes hear broadcasts
Conununism; they ripped his "We came to release you by the North Korean Rc+dio but
Jaw off," 15-year-old Jong people from pressure," they bey they are all false. They report-
Won, asurvivor of the family, gap to claim at the first hamlet ed that a revolutionary com-
learfully said in telling me how they entered. Contrary to their mlttee was established in this
four members of his family expectation, local residents area. Notlilng of the kind. We
wrre massacred tipped off the Army and police were forced to proclaim the set-
I visited there the next morn- officers. Each time they intrud- up of the comrrrittce at gunpoint
1hg after I heard the report of ed into a hamlet for propagan- and the committee naturally
the murder. I left a jeep and da activities, the number of ceased to exist after the guer-
victirns amon them soared. rillas left here."
walked for some 12 kilometers g
to. the spot. I tried to get in- Their failure to gain the Another lender of n hamlet
fdrmation about the tragedy people's support, despite their where guerrillas had "passed"
belie[ that the g g told me that loyal people were
from several neighboring farm- y were f3 htln
ers in vain. In their expression- for them, and shortage oP food forced to become Communist
less faces I sensed their. seemed to cause them to doubt Party members.
fathomless fear. their judgment. ~ The "facts" were ? prepared
At a shabby restaurant in the I had a chance to talk with Perfunctorily and reported to
hamlet I overheard a veteran Ktm Wol Yong, a priest at a Nortit I{ores by wireless. Then,
telling local residents how Mrs. temple in the Oh Tae .Moan- Pyongyang Radio broadcast
I Te Wa was killed by guerril- tams, where one person was their "victories:' This wall
lac, her head crushed by stones. killed. by guerrillas some 10 their propaganda formula.
I Iclt that these people held i1T days before the murder of the "Guerrillas were making only
feeling toward guerrillas. four members oC the I family, favorable reports to ttrcir home
As in the ease bf the Viet- "Guerrillas shouting loudly offices because thry ~yanted to
ham Wnr, whether guerrilltts' broke into the temple with win appreciation fsorn their
activities could take root de- their shoes on and confined us, bosses. A signed npphcalion of
pends on whether such nctiviti- eight priests of the temple, in a a vtilagcr io join the Commun-
es could win the support of room and threatened to kill us 1st Party was found in the
local rcpidenls. unless we obeyed them. They Pocket o[ a guerrilla who was
For ll'oaiiion ransacked the temple, and then shot to depth. It might have
The prhnnry purpose of suety we began to talk with them. cp+ouldd have~returnMi t home
rillas intrudin loco rural com Their attitude softened. They
g ? even shook hands with us, alive;' sold Chon Chang Keun,
munltles !s to secure their posi? apologizing for disturbing us chief of Kang Nung police
bona, and therefore they have bureau.
ppr~feF~tL~a~~e'~9/08/~A te1~~~~e~t3~aa6YiaA00044~0~t~(k~~'th Korean
' hn, however, had been murder-; t'eport, y hn many aym-
~. Korea Pres -ores .south
~~ With Guerril ~ ,Tactics
CPYRGHT By Sho Ichikawa
antic orrospondent
S1+;nUIr-Illoody battles are being fought in some quarters in the Korean'
Peninsula, I+.arly last November, some 90 guerrillas entered the 're Peg Ilfountaina
from the eastern coast of the Peninsula. I~'ighting between these guerrlllas and
youth Korean military and police corps has not Conte to a~fuli stop yet.
Recently I visited the moan- Every guerrilla who was shot ed a little distance away by
thins near the 38th parallel to to death had a notebook with that time," he said.
track down footprints of goer- him in which local people who Only Propaganda
 CPYRGHT
~~~rt*rXpir~ ~tS~~ 'KJf~~fa~
far as I know, the report was
suspect.
"If guer~rlllas were South
Korean sympathizers as report-
ed by North Korea, someone
must have known them, but...
although th~lr bodies were
shown in pictures, nobody knew
them;' a villager told me.
These farmers doubted the
genuineness of the North Ko-
rean reports.
Iiy Violence
The prime purpose of North
Korea sending guerrillas into
the south can be interpreted
as their abandonment of peace-
ful ways for attaining unlflca-
tion of North and South Korea.
It is also understood that they
might. have considered ft ef-
fective to turn South Korea~in-
ko a "second Vietnam:'
I'fshermen on the eastern
coast were often whisked away
on the 38th parallel by the
North Korean Navy and re-
leased after brain-washed. In
1966, one flshermen was captur-
ed. The number of captured
T1IE ECONOMIST, London
30 Ncwember 1968
h'orea
1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-03061A00(~40002g~p~4-3
and 1,000 between ?anuary and anger Var
October 19G8. According to a aolice rhirr .,r
N
orth Kurea had expected
that not a small number of
these flshermen would become
collaborators but their guerril-
las failed to obtain cooperation
from South Korean people.
Guerrillas from the north
hide themselves beneath fallen
leaves in the Te Peg Mountains
during the daytime and become
active at night. The South I{o-
rean forces encircle their hiding
places and try to find them
from helicopters.
Polite and veterans at each
hamlet take up garrison duties.
On the eastern coast, foxholes
are dug at intervals of some 100
meters against guerrilla inva-
sions and young soldiers are
alerted on sea patrol.
What will be North Korea's
next strategy?
Despite a change In the world
situation, North Korea Chas
steadily escalated its guerrilla
warfare. Judging from this,
they will send them again into
the Te Peg Mountains because
Of the geograp}tical advantage
of the resrlnn_
Nobody here
but us chickens
The demarcation line between North and
Ir1Hn teams with a wide to help them
South Korea stretches t rro miles across
the neck of land joining the two halves +nf
through all the nulrtary and electronic
the country,, and is lxrrrlerrd on each side
harriers in the way. It takes them Go hours
by a denulitarisecl none more than a mile
to get through the dentilitariscd zone and
deep. 1n theory there is a complete hen
then to swine or toboggan across the icy
on hrir>,ttinl; arrrraft, arnxwred vehirles
Lrtjin river irefore they reach safety in the
north.
or wcalxnts into the area, tint in Korea
theory and practirc arc very far apart.
The infiltrators are rarely captured
'T'here is err alnxxt daily exchange of fire,
alive, far they usually blow thentselvcs
and the Amx?ricans have now acrused
up with a grenade when they are
North Kcrrca c,i bringing tanks and assault
cornered. And at the regular armistice
IGuns as well as troops into the area.
meetings at Panmunjom the North
Uverlcxrking the zone on the southern
Korean delegates always deny infiltration
side there arc regularly spaced watch-
and claim that the bodies produced as
towers with radar and guns, which tend
evidence are southerners who have been
disguised after suicide.
ter ge, u1F regularly because wild animals
'ter cc,ntn-on in saute parts of the zone.
The north's prime minister, Kim II-
Ilchind all this there is ant,ther line of
sung, stepped up his war of nerves in
Iefence. A high chicken-wire fence
January with his attempt to assassinate
tretches fmm one side of the country to
the South Korean president, Park Chung-
he other and is topped by festoons of
hee, and with the seizure of the American
~artx?d wire; the area in frYtnt of it is
spy ship 1'ucGlo. T[e has not relaxed the
teavily mined. `There is then a second
pressure since :ago infiltrators have been
halo of N'atrh-tclwera, slid 8t night
killed in ?inctidents since then. I{~ may hope
ncrican and South Korean troops
to keep the promiRe he once made to con-
cupy foxholes at tg-yard intervals.
quer South Korea by Igo. Or he may
to]d local people that the
North and South would be unit-
ed In ]970 and that they would
reward collaborators by ap-
pointing therm village }tends. lie
added that North Korean at-
tacks would be given momen-
tum this year. ,
' If North Korea comes to
realize that tt would be dlf-
ficuit to set up their guerrll?
la positions, they would ro-
sort to destruction of plants
and military facllltics in
South Korea or send puerrll-
las to Seoul and other biy
cities In extensive offensives.
Unrest and crlels In tho Ko-
rean Peninsula, as proved In
the past, would evolve Into a
war by accident.
South Korea, on the other
hand, has built up a steady de-
fense setup and will further
make such efforts. Alter mak-
ing inspeclIon trips in the area,
I have t>nconte worried about
the outcome o[ mutual eseela?
lion of
Despite all these hazanls, the past two
years have seen a sharp increase in tensirnt
CP
along the demilitarised zone and nurre
than goo incidents have- txen reported.
North horeau saboteurs armed with
grenade-launchers and Russian sub-
machine guns try to get through to the
south and even more frequently try to
reach home after completing their missions
there. Most satroteurs are delivered to tht
South Korean
C
YR
PY
GHT
RGHT
 Appr~~ieY~~~'TRelease 1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020004-3
invrstn,cnt there.
North Korea has about .too,ceoc) men
in its arnircl fctrcrs, iru-luclin~ r.~.uc,u \siCh
sl>rcial treinin~ in I;urrrilla ti~hting. ?1"hr
air fctrrr has al,,,ut a thcnr~ancl l.l:+nrs,
inchectinf;, it is said, a nunehcr r,f the
latest hfdr 2,IS Sllltl)ltr(1 h~" \Inscr)K'
recently the Russians have replaced the
Chinese as North liorea's favourite ally.
'1'hc south, too, spentls heavily on defence.
Nearly 3o per cent of the budget goes on
it anrJ South Korean forces number
fcw,txxi men, g7,ax~ of them hghtin~ in
~'ictnane. There are also two Anuncan
tli\?isictns in the country, as well as some
pilc)tc, and in all gc),cx~o American sen?ice-
men are starietned here. If there ~\?as
trouble from the north, the American gth
Atir Force in ]a~an anti the Pacific fleet
are pledged to intervene. With the pos-
sibility of an end to the Vietnam war ut
sight, the Americans may find that they
face a second front in iM:otra. It ire gtrite
a problem for Frosidcnt Nixon to facC in
January.
EA~p'1' AFRICA REPOR`.L1;R, Nairobi
10 January 19r'i9
N~ORTC-1 KORI~~-NS IN AiFRICA
Preliminary moves to
enlist Africa's sympathy
in the event of another war
Ft>> .Incrlrrr l,r(rrt. r,/ t-re Stnitis 1)rrss lac>ietu
CPYRGHT
.., ,.,.
it: has hrc?n nnticeablc that'
the Nnrth K~rrans h,tvr.
been intrrrstin~ t h +? m -
:, e l v e s increasingly in
African affairs. Irt parti-
cular, North Korean dipk)-
mats stationed in Africa
have been travcllint; a f;rrat
deal in crntntrirs whtch cin
'' nc,tyr1, rccof;nisc North
Krn?ca.
These journeys hither
and thither have enabled
the Ivnr1.L Itnre:u- Cnrn-
rrtuni:;ts In be represerrtrel
:, 1. an impressive number
e,f Inalcpendrnrr 1):eys in
African countries with
which they arc not in a
`state of normal diplomatic
rr~latinns, .cnrnc of thcsc?
'African crnmtrirs have also.
Lcrn persuaded to send
tlelc~ratinns to Pyonf;yanf;,
send thero have alsc- been
visits by traders n[ Left-
winr; movements directed
tt~(ainst nstabli;';hcd Govcrn-
men s rn nca -one o
these beinf! led by Gaston
tir,nmirthrl. t-f tht~ Cont;o-
liinslt:r~:t.
Travcllinf; normally by
'way of Budapest, Moscow
anti Irkutsk, these African
delegations -whose jour-
nc~ys arc entirely financed
by the North Korean Gov-
crnmrnt - were mostly in-
vited to take part in the'
cclrbrations fnt' the twcn-
ticth anniversary of tho
founding of the Communist.
Korean State. The North
Koreans have been hoping.
.that these special missions'
from Africa will soon bc',
turned into regular diplo-=
matic missions.
Sympathy sought. It is'
said that in ficneral theseh
African visitors arc im-
pressed by the economic f
,development accomplished
in North Korea -but not
less so by the extraordinary
personality cult of the
orr:m ,ommums ca cr,
Kim 11 Sung. They have
also been surprised to see
that North Korea appears
to be mobilised for war.
Indeed, this war footing
prnhably gives a clue as to
a?hy the North Koreans.
shcntld be indult;inA in
efforts of this kind. An
attempt is being made to
enlist the sympathies of
African countries in Ihc`
event of a nt?\v Korean tvar
in the near future. In such
an event, discussions in the:
:United Nations will play
an important role; and the
.North Koreans know t hnt
~thcir only ht,pc of linclinf;
majority -- in the General
'Assembly at least --lies'
'with the Africans. The
North Koreans have never
'hidden their ambit ions'
.eventually to re-unite their
country by force, and there
have been increasing signs
that the day of their next
attempt may be near.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020004-3
 'vied For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020004-3
SP5 John J. Stetans
Headquarters, I Corps (Group, Korea
Photos by SP5 Greg P. Iger
On the night of 17 January , or orean cowman s
south across the Demilitarized Zone in the boldest act of aggression by
the Communist Pyongyang government since the Korean War. Their mission-
to assassinate the Republic of Korea's President Park Chung Hee at his
residence in Seoul and cause political havoc throughout the South Korean
Bove rrunent .
Four nights later, the agents were intercepted by Korean National
Police on ttie outskirts of Seoul and afire fight ensued. Two of the
agents were killed in the initial battle. Their plan aborted, the others
fled..
One of them, 26-year-old Kim Sin Jo, soon found himself running alone
up Seoul's Inwang Mountain. Moments later, he was spotted by Republic of
Korea Army soldiers, who surrounded him and shouted to him to surrender.
Kim hesitated a minute, then, as he describes it, a "will to live" seized
him. He threw down his weapon and put his hands over his head.
Kim was the only agent to give himself up. During the next week, 23
of the remaining 28 agents fought to their deaths in individual clashes
with police and soldiers-both Korean and American-within the U.S. Army's
I Corps (Group) sector. (Two more were killed in Seoul, one east of
Seou:1. Arrd two, although never found, are believed to have died of
exposure somewhere in the frigid mountains north of Seoul.)
As the one survivor of the assassination attempt, Kim Sin Jo became
a focus of attention for newsmen throughout the world. Articles about
him appeared in newspapers of every language, and he became a familiar
face on Korean television. But still, something was missing.
At*interview sessions, Kim told how he came, but not exactly why.
He explained his reasons in terms of his Communist government's goals,
but he never said what made him, Kim, the individual, want to risk his
life to assassinate the leader of a nation of people who, prior to 1945,
were united to his own.
He also told about 2,400 young North Korean Army officers, like him-
self, who are presently undergoing rigorous training to commit additional
acts of aggression in South Korea.
His comments were interesting-and frightening-.but there were still
some questions that needed to be answered. Such as, how do you get 2,400
young men so worked up that they will sacifice personal safety and life
itself to do something which all rational thinking points to as wrong?
CPYRGHT
 Appra~Gkt~x>nlgF~een~9~1~ (ti31~t~F~~7~'~3~~1/~8~$'1~~~~4t~o
governments, On 15 February, a guard opened a solid green door a e
~02d Military Intelligence Battalion's stockade in Yongdungpo, Seoul, and
there stood Kim Sin Jo, a man from the other side of the chasm-a man with
the answers.
For the next two hours, Kim talked through an interpreter, Corporal
Yoon Nam lio, a member of the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army, at-
tached to the I Corps (Group) Information Office as a reporter. Smoking
cigarettes, and speaking freely and frankly, Kim showed himself to be a
"good soldier"- a strange appellation indeed for a would-be assassin.
As the interview was to show, the deceit of his government had diluted
Kim's mind into a ghostly hue. His powers of critical reasoning had been
deprived of nourishment until they had grown pale and numb. Like an arm
in a cast, his analytical- muscles had grown weak from disuse.
AItPAY 1)I(}F~5'1'
pgrt.y 1.~6Fi
lle aaye that lust before he Rave
himnclf up, a "dealre to live" had
A Foully Grenada-- ncized him. But otherts hs~e a diQer-
Ho'8 Captured nIiVA rot theory. The grenade Kim had
~{ im Sin Jo wn4 horn 26 years ai;o been carrying wee later tented and
found to he defective. It wouldn't
of whnt hr dc9rriho~ nK "poor prole- ? go oR
,
lotion p ~rcnta" in Iho North Korcnn
villnpc of ('h'ontCin, Ily fhc time he Fol/trtriniG nrP exCerp/rr
hiR cdarntir+n nt the No. fi I'coplcrc
School In hiR home town.
Whcu Ihr Korcnn Wnr broke out in
1950, I(im and hiR fnmily Ilcd north
l0 1'ukto, where Ihcy rcmnincd until
the nrmivlirc wnv Ripncd in 1.95;3 at
which lime they rctnrned In Ch'oncin.
Wh,?n 1(im flniRhcd middle Rchcx+l
in .laly 195A, he wnR inatructcd fn
work nl n machine +:Iwp in Ch'on~Gin.
Ilt? worked Ihcre Ihrce ycarR and
thrn Joined 1.he North Korean I'eo-
plcr~ Army nR n private.
In July 19frT, Kint, who hod been
n meml-cr of Ihr Labor 1'nrly Wince
hiR mnchmc-Rhop dayR in Ch'ongin,
waR comrniRRioncd a Recond licutcn-
nnt. A tow monthR Inter he wnR
trnnxfcrrrd Io i.hr 124th Army Unil,
n colocl ::tong of 2,400 hard-core sol-
dicrv~-all olliccrR. Their miRRion-to
(rain ricorouRly for agent activitieR
in South Koren.
Ch+ 16 Jnnonry 19fiA, Kim and 30
other o(ticerR from Ihr 124th dc-
in North Kort?a?
klill: In North Korea nnlhml;
can he printed that ,tittci2c~ the
govcrnmcnt. Ihcy ,can i+r+nt and an-
nouncc only that which can he utilircd
for good propaganda purposes. Puhlt-
catians and speech is well-controlled.
North Korea makes m;my fahc re-
ports through its m;tsti communica-
tions. As you know, after we came
down here, our agents wcrc killed. lint
I heard a North Korean report Thal
it was South Korean youths who had
rebelled against their govcrnmcnt with
arms. 'Things like this arc reported
in This manner by North Korea.
(1. Ilow did yon learn lhr-t
North Korea wne reptrrlinq thir+
rthoul your team'!
kl~i : I listened to a North
Korean broadcast hcrc in the South.
(1. llo~? many kindr+ t-f newrt?
I-nl-erA ore there in North Korea?
Klli: All of the newspapers arc
commllctt by the govcrnmcnt -All of
pnrtod from the North Korcnn cnpi-
tat of 1'yongynng with a miRRion to the papers arc the organization ncws-
ayRnRmm~ic IiOI( 1'rcRidcnt Park papers of the various agencies cxist-
Chung ltce and dentroy hiR preeiden- '"F m North Korea. l-hcrc arc no
t.inl mnnaiort in Sconl. Five dayR later I'rw;rtcly ptrhlishcd papers available.
the P..rnm wnv intercepted by ICorean (1? llnv/' yott ever rend in n
Notional 1'olicc near Seoul. A fire Nc-rlh Knrt?nn newspaper a erifi-
light broke out, and Kim fled. ~iNm of lied I:hirta or 11-e Soviet
A1. the lop of twang Mountain, llnionY
Kim discnrdcd all hiR equipment, ex- K1~1; Occasionally I have seen
eepi one hand grcnnde, which hr kept criticisms of China's Great Cultural
to kill himself phould hr be cnuRht. Rcvalufion and aka criticisms of
DlomcnlR later hr waR npMted by Khrushchcv anti his ideas nn revised
20 ItOK aoklicra. Fle nlippcd into a Communism. .
ahndow braids a road, but the ROK (?, (In your way clown to
aoldierR tturroundcd him. "Come nut ~ieeul, yon mrtl the other a~;enle
-
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 n~li~pxp~?~vor Release 1999/O~Pz~~?~r1oTRDP78-03061AOQ04@~~QPYRGHT
10 ~'~bl uary 1569 CPYRGHT
tvr~~*. -chat meetin^ had originally bean scheduled for
munlsts' condcmnatian oP tho invaaiorl~ And Roman an
President Nicalaa Ceausescu has now publicly and''
explicitly denounced the IIrezhnev Aoctrine Moscow
enunciated last September to justify its aggression ;
against Prague. This is the thesis that socialist states
have less than full sovereignty and that they may
be invaded by other socialist states any time the '
.,
latter thinlt it necessary to protect socialism. The
fact that President Ceausescu spoke 'so openly shortly
afiter his recent tallts with Yugoslav President
Tito gave added, significanc? to his defiant demand,
,that Communist-ruled. states' enjoy full sovereignty,
arj~i independence. i '
't'he Soviet leaders no doubt console themselves
with the fact that they. won a reement lato last year
for a world Communist conb ess in Moscow next
slovaltia, tha tensions in world Communism sparlted
' by that act of political banditry remain unresolved.
Last weekend Italian Communist party leader Luigi
Longo drew stormy applauso` at his party's national
~rrongress by strongly' reaffirrning the Italian Com? .;
i `
r;;~~~.~~xun:s~ disarray
A half year after tho Soviet mvaston
But Lollgo Indicates an Ends
of O~loosition to Meeting of ~
'?~` Party Leaders ii; Moscow ,
Et' :^.OBERT C. I30TY
Special to The Few York Tlmes
' ll"dllall tl a! ly Ilan y: v~c..~cu iv.
Italian Communist party, reaf-i IItaly. end of-World War Ii. immolated himself in protest
firmed today his party's strong .The 68-year-old party secre- against the occupation and the
Outspoken criticism of the in-' olicies it roduced. The rin-
opposition to the Soviet bloc's tart', tvho was the victim of an P P P
intervention in, Czechoslovakia. vasion by Italian Convnunlsts unspecified circulatory- disorder cipal ,Czech delegate to the
has produced strong Soviet cov- last fall, delivered his 25,000- Congress, Evzeh Erban, sat, im-
At the same time, however,) ert pressures,,.including clan- word speech from a special passive, through the first three
he withdrew objections to the! ;destine dissemination to rank- chair that put his head at outbursts but joined in the
long-delayed Soviet project of a and-file Communists of printed ;standing height behind :the fourth round of applause.
nist parties in Moscow. ~-~~-?~- ~?? -?-- -_~___...._,_. ~ to tyre anei ms yoke cra~xeu i
Most observers here identi-, On the public ]eve[, the So-~ occasionally. I Mr. Longo mentioned several
fled these two positions as part ,viet leaders have limited than- The relsi.ivo sharpness and' times the Italian partyy's basic
of an arrangement worked out selves to mild reproofs; lea~~ing unambiguous nature of hiss .loyalty to tJ~e "Octoorr Revolu-i
ik.to Polish and East Ger,nan comments on Czechoslovakia, lion" and'to the Soviet Union,'
in Moscow last month by Enrico surprised some observers, Who ;and, mare concretely, he of-
I3erlinouer, a member of the leaders to deliver virulent pub- expected him to play down the. ,.fered a new Italian line on thr,
lie attacks amounting almost to ~, summit conference or" Commu-
Italian Politburo who is expect- disa?reement. ,
threats of excommunication. "Our. osition of dissent and nist p arties long sou;ht by
ed to be named Mr: Longo s P Moscow, loo resisted h Ital
deputy and xgventual su~cc~Fgssor. Insist on 'Italian Road? disapproval was~~?~~iryrym~~mediate }~'~ g Y Y?
Mr. ~ Longb~~lrclJDk@iGa~ rLl~r R'~l~tS~or~~~l~dQi~~l?a9t}~ o~nTiCd'Qib`S r ~~ ,. " he~te ~~ational
:Italian party's 12th Congress.. are too thoroughly committed meat in Rome only hours after) iconference of Communists and
to the "Italian road to social- the troops crossed the Czech-~ workers parties will be useful;
o e exp anon a
? preclpitated? in many .Communist parties. Tt is
legitimate to speculate now -that the May meeting
will not be entirely a rubbex stamp for Moscow. Mr.
Longo, for example, definers that gathering's useful-
ness as dependent upon?~ta success in "relaunching
oP lntornatiotlaltsm oP vyYhiah we All ?har~a >oed;'~
. Since he also denounced the idea oP any Communist
`~ "guido party" or "guide; state" she seemed to be ;.
hinting that th? Italians do not intend to let Moscow,
. run the congress to suit itself.
Meanwhilm Pelting his escalated its anti-Soviet ,
propaganda to record or near-record heights, whiIa ?.
simultaneously increasing tensions on China's borders
with Mongolia, a Loyal Soviet satellite. The recent
' Chinese behavior suggests Mao believes that lie has
gained much politically in the Communist World as
a result of Kremlin blunders in Czechoslovakia. Cer-
tainiy in strongly condemning last August's Soviet
imperialist.. adventure, the Chinese have staked out
an important claim for leadership of, the independent-
minded elem~ntg in world Communism, elements
whose numbers now are greater than ever.
made the last year a trying one .from outsi4le dictation, to make ..reconfirm the judgment we ex-
for the biggest European Com-, a public, obeisance to Moscow Pressed on the events in the
monist art outside the Soviet: very course of their occurence
p y on the Czechoslovak issue. At and oP tP:air political and the-
bloc} with 4,520,000 members ~ :.the same time. , .the party lead- oretical motivation."
and 25 per cent pf Italian ' ership does .not `dare push ' I-Te went on to say that the
voters. things to an open -break with Italian party rejected the idea
Students a Problem ~ Moscow for fear that some of ' of a "guide state" or "guide
its own, hard-line Stalinists, Party" 2nd insisted on the full
The problems include intro- respect of the autonomy and
sign on the left by students, brought up in a tradition. of ;sovereignty of every Comtnu-
to-Pekin Communists, anar- absolute loyalty to the "father- gist party and socialist state."
P~ dtl f-a
o
H
chists and other "total contest-
ers"; the' development of thinly
veiled factionalism within the
party itself and, above all, the
stresses .resulting from the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in
August by tine Warsaw Pact
states.
The invasion was directed
against the kind of reformist,
e p:uise ~e sense
land of soc';ahsm, would quit
or split the party; sponsibility" of the Prague
Mr,. Longo spoke for four. leaders in taking account of
hours, divided into morning and "all elements of the situation"
afternoon segments. -including, presumably, the
Six thousand dele ales and: ,presence of Soviet-bloc tanks-
'? in trying to construct "a so-
foreign ; ::est were in the red= iialist society always more
"
draped :~sorks Patac:e of this human and efficient
"Communist capital" oP Italy. T3is remarks on CzechosIo-
a,,,,,,,,,~ ,,~~ H~~r ~ Communist vakia -were interrupted ~ four
 CPYRGHT
Iprctf ~~ a ease - ~... . . ~ n t6 "P
ents an o ers, o i e _ _ c a i?h 1 _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ._ _ . _ _
B
inh an ::important moment in
that prgcess oP relaunching oP
interna~fionalisrn oP which we~
all i~avi~ need. This, friends of
revcluntionary and progressive'
movements, is also the terrain
on 3s~jch 1ve want to, and can,..
rein~ofce our relations becausef
thin i& a t?slt tsat only of Get>!1?
monists but also oP all revolu-i
tionary and progressive forces."
On the domestic front, Mr.
Longo counseled the. party to
seek contact with the new up-'
surges of "contestation" by stu-
ciplined ways, but $O tl~nt, ? course are expected to be heaj?d,' spat pwtt,tun- uppua,~,w
against "anarchic fractions. beginning tomorrow, in irhel ,contraception and refusa~.
Quotes Papal Encyclical ;guarded, cryptic terms Comr;u-, ;see peril in a populatio?,
enlarged' costs use to try to cloak in= ,;plosion,
~ RY the year 2000, he ;
He continued and .
.
ternal disagreement from those,
the party s tactical effort to unitiated in the jargon. , ~ ~-about half of the seven ,nl:~:: a
wno Roman Catholics-and; Awaited also are the gregt~? inhabitants of the globe w4,1i
even Christian Democrats-''ings to the Italian Congress,`' be doomed to death by r,anocuvres. Also, it is
argued., most a~umanian equip,
meat comes front Russia and is
obsolete or nbsolescent. The
Russians would doubtless like to
commit Rumania to buying more.
Thirdly,?it.ia a long time since
the Warsaw Pact's combined
general sta>I' (mainly Soviet)
assessed the battlc?worthiness of
Rumania's 150,000?stronq army
(including ; rivo a r m o u r e d
divisions)' ~nd -her, I5,000?sfrong
? air force. ;(This consists of Z40
combat aircraft?organised into I8
darious AI I Gs,) And finally, the
,,pessimists argue, the Russians
would find it useful to familiarise
themselves with terrain over
which an occupying -[ore might
be moved one day.
In Bucharest;, where few
political facts leak out taut srecu
lalion abounds.; the latest ~~rord
' n have ease
their pressure s g t y or ~ a
cl'es:ision on manoeuvres In
Ittamania this year; ?-acnce Presi?
dent Ceausescu's .current bold
..postures. ,
Since my last'visit,.shorlly after
the invasion of Ctechoslovak-a,
Rumanians have become notice,
ably more-outspoken about their
,deep clislikc 'of _evcryonc? anct
everything Russian, Soon after
my arrival this week a Itunurnlan
was telling me the joke about the
Sahara: "Within two years of
taking over the Sahara from the
Algerians, the Russians will be
'
importing sand."
- The Rumanian party leader,
ship obviously has a test,
ing "year ahead. Apart from
the manoeuvres, it faces the
prospect. of a difficult Warsaw
Pact summit. meeting, a Comecon
sununit and a u?orid meeting of
Communist parties: On .each
occasion the Rumanians nro
bound to find thetnse-ves at odds
with fire Itusslan~, I'resiclen
Ceausescu's tactics arc plain; h
is playing for time as he build.
up the country's industrial base
with impressive speed by buyin
ti5'estern technology. lie is?doin
his "best to win friends r~bron
by sending out streams o[ good
wilt and trade rrtiss{ons.
iie~ evidently wants to ~ mak
the ' world Ilurnania?consclou
and sympathetic,. while at ih
same time continuing to proclair
Rumania's total cbmmitn-ent t
the socialist camp and her War
saw fact "silica. TLicy she
sensible tactic:, ,but I imagine h
must often have In mina ancathc
joke going "the rounds here
"The Jsraelis arc lucky--ttaey'r
surrounded by their enemies."'
approved For Release 1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-03061A00040002000
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
 iv~c~ Yox;!~I~ed For Release 1999/08/24 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020004-3
20 February 1969
~c~s~ ~L~ir'f~~7~~T3 ~r':~I~CYS"YCG' O~,~OUZL~`j~CgiUYUing ~es~e ~`xech Inv~~~~.~~.
CPY;RGHT ~ -----,._ _ _ _ ~y TAD szclLC '
V~ENNA, Feb. 1cJ--Six months ~ ~lnvasion is no Ion er effective.
b dissension and Moscow has pawl Niculescu-~Tizil, a rireq'i?. B
aftOt' the 5oviet?led invasion oft' y bee of the ruling eight ~'Piati; '~ to any event, the Soyict
~~echoslovakia, the authority of been forced to rontinue post? presidium of the party. agOd, 'Union has begun to slaw sign:;
the Soviet Union is onto more; poning planned Comecon and Yugoslavia by Edgard Kar~tlj, ' of growing concern over this
being challenged in Eastern Warsaw Pact summit confer- a member of the Presidium and situation.
enecs. a close associate of President + Tlio Soviet Ambassador to
Europe. Tito. '. ~ Rwnanla, Aleksandr V. Basov,
~ ~ The most important develop-~
Indications are mounting that{ Their subsequent private' ,tailed on Mr. Ceausescu Mp;i-;
the democratizin and nation-i meat is the campaign against da and the Soviet Ambassador
g meetings wiU1 Italian Comma- Y' Ivan A. Benc?~
alistic Communist spirit that ,Soviet views by Rumania s nisi leaders, who are the ~iueE ;tn Yugoslavia,
arose In Prague early in lDti8 president, Nicolae Ceausescu Wes#eru Cornnwnist spokesi~~en~ dictov, called yesterday on 14Ti-
and President Tito of Yugo- oP the anti-lnterventson -line? jalko Todorovic, chairman of
has not been checked by the slavfa. and with the Czechoslovak dole- the Executive Commiuco of the;
Soviet intervention in Czecho- .While both leader:r have gallon led by Evzen Erban, a Yugoslav party. +
'slovakla an Aug. 20.21. ' ` Tndn Marshal Ivan I. Yalcu?f
been on record since last Progressive, suggested that a Y.
An examination at the East- August as condemning the broader ideological alllanee was bovsfcy, the Warsaw Pact com-
crn European situation, as seen Czechoslovak invasion, their being organized thre? months mender, and First Deputy For?
'from Vienna, a neutral cross- before a planned Moscow con- eign Minister Vasili Y. Kuznet-
stand has been transformed in ferenco of world Cornnrunist "zov, wile coordinated iho post-
roads capital, brings out these recent months from n passive, parties. ~ invasion political Soviet activi-
key points: or defensive, opposition to an This endeavor is expected to; ties In Czechoslovakia, arrived
~1Rumania; an Increasingly offensive in diplomacy, politics be taken a step further when' in Bucharest for talks.
defiant member of the Soviet- and the press and broadcasting. the Party congress of the They are expected to seek to
directed Warsaw Pact alliance, Tho drive, which includes de- Yugoslav Communists meets in bring pressure on Rumania;
has joined o enl with Yugo- + Belgrade March 11, which has been opposing So?
P Y ~ nuncintions of the Czecho- Two days ago,. the Ruma-I viet political guidance, resist-,
slavia to reject Moscow's "lim- Slovak oecupatian, goes beyond nians provided not.only another log Warsaw Pact maneuvers and
iced sovereignty" doctrine, that specific case and sharply public assertion of their basic deciining to renew a friend-
which sought to justify the criticizes the "limited sov- stand but also contributed a ship treaty with the Soviet
Czechoslovak Invasion on the ereignty" docarino as a threat new definition of what interns-, Union that expired last year.
round of ovcrridin interests to socialism. In addition such tional Communism should be. Rumanian acts of defiance
. ?? In a message to the Danish have included a refusal to
.of the "socialist g common- expressions as 'hegemony, Communist' party, they urged break diplomatic relations with
wealth." ~ ~ clearly aimed at Moscow, have the "righC of each and every. Israel after the lt)G7 Mideast
entered the official Rumanian war. This week, Rumania sent
I' ~Gzechoslovakia's cont'cn- and Yugoslav lexicons to warn Forty independently to estab- ~
'uing defiance of Soviet pies- of possible perils ahead. lish its political Lino by apply- a cultural dclegaiion to Tcl
The two countries equate ing the general truths of Marx- Aviv. and 2cn exhibition of Is-
~sure For political conformity, , ? ,. ism-Leninism to the concrete raeli modern painting wns~
despite the miliUiry occuptttion, - limited sovereignty ~~with the conditions in ;the respective opened in Bucharest yesterda~.
enforced temporary station- A reflection of Yugoslavia s'
is encouraging the new chat- ing of Soviet troops on the country.'
lenges elsewhere in the region territories oP what they call 'I'hr. call for the application Policies was seen in the official
anti gradually bringing the pro- independent socialist states. of "general truths of Mancism- visit to Iiungary this month by
gressivc Communist lcadcrshl There are no Soviet troops in Leninism" appeared to experts Premier Mika Spiljak in a move
P here as the most explicit -call resuming cordial relations be-
Yugoslavia or Rumania. twecn the two countries for the
'back into alignment with the ever issued for Communist in-
Campaign Coordinated. , de cadence in a Warsaw Pact first time since the Czechoslo-
~:Rumanians and the Yugoslavs. P
. ~1Among the Warsaw Pact The coordination of the Ru- country, It v.~as stated more vak invasion.
countries, whose armies part!- manian-Yugoslav campaign can bluntly than in anp py lava- The Soviet problems siX
be traced to the conferencc;slon Czechoslovak art der- months after the Invasion are
cipated in the invasion, aback-;.,president Ceausescu and Fres-,'lartion. compounded by Rumanian,
lash effect !s devcioping. This'- ideal Tito held early this month ~ Basis of Decision Unclear Iiungarlan and East German
has rcrnovcd Hungary from the' in the Rumanian border town .opposition to Integration with?
"hard core" of the invaders' ,Iof Timisoara. ~ The question has arisen why ' In Comecon.
A week later, hSr. Ceausescu Rumania and -Yugoslavia have ~ Tile Rumanians openly Link
camp and made the regime po-,' delivered in Bucharest a chosen this time for such open integration, to "supranntfonal"
litically acceptable io such m? ,strongly worded speech against;defianco of Mascots. endeavors under the general
dependent-minded leaderships 'the "'limited sovereignty" the-~ Opinions ?among spec{allsts approach. enforcing "limited
as that of Yugoslavia anti to ors and intervention by for- include a view ticat the Czecho? sovereignty." The Iiunfi~ri~ns
progressive groups in Czecho- eign Communist parties In the Slovaks' continued resistance: iwho announced this week thr.Y
slovakta. While Poland. East internal affairs of others. The has created a climate proplti-~ ;were studying the convcrtibif-
Germany and Bulgaria officially Rumanian press, ranging from ous for new challenges in East-~ its of the florin, would like
defend the invasion decision, the Communist party daily ern Europe. A related theory is' creation of a convertible c~,r-
Scinteia to the intellectuals that offense is the best defense rency In Comecon, to replace
inner stirrings, new domestic weekly Contemparanul, has in the face of the Soviet re? the Soviet-directed "trade
problems and widespread sec- 'picked up the theme, and iL is.turn to tough.-line Communist A;niblc." Tho East Germans fear
and thoughts are reported from being sounded almost daily. ,orthodoxy. iintcgratian would complica#o
alt three countries. Rumania and Yugoslavia, Some experts believe that heir growing trade with West
~1Des %te stead efforts since :chose last week's congress of both President Ceausescu and 'Germany.
P Y .the Italian Communist party in.Marshal Tito feel that the tide At the six-da}? i-ru~rk after
last fall, the Soviet Union has 'Bologna as a world forum to of history is turning and that the Czechoslovak inva:~ion, a
been unable to "consolidate";express 'their thoughts on their actions may even affect growing consensus in Eastern
Lhe Eastern European area po? t Czechoslovakia, "limited sov= the internal leadership develop- Europe, as exppressed by a
liticaliy, mih ~ o r tiltG~~t~~i nd ~e i ~ir~~ o fi ia1 visitln
~i>~~ ~~~ ~li~~ini6~9~~~~~~'; dcitMlii'1'tth~ti'iii-~~~~~l/AI~JU~2O~t~-~ussians~
ically. Comeco a ovie ? oc robiems are onl be innin
ecoizomic organization, is torn Rumania was represented by~oxy illustrated by the August P _ Y g g'
\t~