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November 11, 2016
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August 4, 1998
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February 3, 1969
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000200W1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 February 1969 EFFECT OF INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON COMMUNIST FRONTS The degree of consternation, opposition and disarray caused among Com- munist front organizations presumably surprised the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact invaders of Czechoslovakia. Some officials in some front headquarters and certain national affiliates of the fronts, condemned or deplored the invasion as being contrary to national sovereignty and independence; in some cases front officials, speaking as individuals in order not to invoke the credentials of the front itself, voiced sharp criticism. Given the fact that support of Soviet foreign policy and of Communist Party objectives is the overriding purpose of the fronts' existence, open disagreement with the Mos- cow leadership of the fronts is a most significant development, indeed one which has never occurred before.* The problem is further accentuated by the fact that the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) with headquarters in Prague -- the most important international front with by far the largest mem- bership -- issued the strongest statement of condemnation and its activities and organization were particularly affected. The fronts' reactions to the invasion by "fraternal" forces unquestionably impaired their usefulness to the Soviets at a moment when their support was sorely needed. Most likely, the invasion also contributed to furthering the general erosion of the fronts' influence on selected target audiences -- a trend evident in the past few years due to such factors as the Sino-Soviet dispute, the strained relations between the Soviets and Cuba, the increasing demands for national independence and individual freedom within the Soviet camp, etc. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the fronts had maintained silence on the struggle for freedom in that land in spite of the fact that four of them are headquartered in Prague, including the WFTU, International Union of Students (IUS), and the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). The Soviets have worked hard to restore "normalcy" in the fronts, and they have been rather successful so far. While major differences remain over the invasion, the Soviets have managed to impose a tacit understanding to avoid the invasion/intervention issue to the degree possible and to concen- trate on Vietnam, "European Security," the Middle East, Greece and other propa- ganda missions. In any event, whereas in the period immediately following the invasion, front meetings which had been scheduled earlier had to be can- celed or postponed because of the tension and disarray in the fronts, the WCP *The invasion of Czechoslovakia is the first instance of the fronts' failure to support Moscow wholeheartedly on a major issue. In 1956 none of the fronts questioned, and some supported outright, the Soviet invasion which brutally suppressed the Hungarian Revolution. It should be noted, however, that there had then been strong differences of views within the World Council of Peace (WCP) leadership, and by failing to commit itself did signify some- thing less than approbation. In this context it might also be recalled that in 1948 Moscow's control of the fronts was so complete as to lead to the im- mediate expulsion of the Yugoslav affiliates from all fronts when Stalin ex- pelled Tito from the Cominform. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 and WFTU did manage to hold major meetings by November and December, respec- tively. These conferences particularly the WFTU's, were less than harmonious, but organizational splits or other deep, irreparable divisions did not occur. Highlights of Front Reactions -- World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) On 28 August the WFTU Secretariat issued a statement endorsing the earlier public reactions of WFTU Secretary General, Louis Saillant and WFTU President, Renato Bitossi and "condemning and deeply regretting" the military interven- tion by the five Warsaw Pact countries. The statement stressed that relaxation of international tension can be achieved only if everyone adheres to the rules of noninterference in the internal affairs of others and of negotiations to settle problems. Saillant emphasized that this declaration reflects the funda- mental principles which justify the WFTU's existence. While the Secretariat's statement was supported by most of its affiliates in non-Communist countries, particularly by the Italian CGIL and the French CGT, it was bitterly condemned by Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe, in par- ticularly uncompromising terms by the Polish trade unions (yielding to imperi- alist propaganda; an act of arbitrariness not reflecting the attitude of the WFTU; etc.). During September it appeared that a split might develop within the WFTU and there were indications that the Soviets might oust the organiza- tion's leadership. A number of Soviet-arranged, fence-mending meetings were held concurrent with Soviet attempts to intimidate and bring Bitossi and Saillant to heel. However, these actions and the efforts of WFTU's Soviet vice-president, Aleksandr Shelepin, could not even force a retraction of the WFTU Secretariat statement critical of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. In the October issue of World Trade Union Movement, the acting secretary of the WFTU, Pierre Gansous, wrote an editorial in which he said "... serious divergencies have arisen within the WFTU and more widely within the interna- tional trade union movement ..." but "the WFTU must go on. The difficulties will be serious but the will to surmount them in order to ensure the continu- ity of the WFTU is great." He stressed that member organizations must coexist and co-operate, especially against U.S. aggression in Vietnam. During October and November, bilateral and multilateral meetings of WFTU national affiliates were continued,and the 18th WFTU General Council meeting, originally planned for Rostock, East Germany (2-5 October) was held in East Berlin (16-19 December). Great efforts were expended to mask the dissensions that have continued to plague the WFTU since its condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow and its allies insisted defensively, in reportage and comment during and after the meeting, that a spirit of harmony prevailed, and failed to mention Czechoslovakia in accounts of the speeches made at the session or in the final resolution. But the Rumanian speech attested, obliquely, to strains at the conference and the Italian Communist organ L'Unita aired the Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 dissenting minority position upheld by the CGIL on the issue of what the guid- ing ideological and organizational principles of the WFTU should be. In brief, it maintained that it should be a democratic international organization inde- pendent of parties and governments with each national trade union center free to determine its own path and orientation. It would now appear that the Soviets' ability to force the resignation of Bitossi or Saillant was limited, so long as the PCI and the PCF continued to assert their independence of the CPSU. Their positions may be less tenable, however, as the Italian and French parties move further back into Moscow's fold. -- World Council of Peace (WCP) The WCP statement on Czechoslovakia was issued three weeks after the inva- sion -- the hesitation reflecting its own dilemma and that facing most of the fronts. Published on 10 September in Brussels and signed by WCP's Belgian Co- ordinating Chairman Isabelle Blume, and Indian Secretary General Romesh Chandra, the statement expressed "concern and anxiety" but, unlike the WFTU, welcomed the "agreement" reached in Moscow. With this mild rebuke, the WCP was out of step with several of its affiliated peace movements, especially in Europe, which denounced the invasion. The disruption caused in the WCP was apparently not particularly serious: It opened its new headquarters in Helinski on September 20 and that same day published its first appeal which asked for action during the Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People (15-21 October). Chandra led a WCP delegation to the Afro-Asian "Conference for Support for the Vietnamese People" held in Cairo in September and a joint WCP/Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference in support of the Portuguese Colonies and of the Peoples of Southern Africa was decided upon during September for January (18-20) in Khartoum. The WCP's stress on collaboration with and support of "third generation fronts" (such as AAPSO) and other groups in the Third World precedes, of course, the Czeca, crisis. It reflects the WCP's awareness of its limited action potential in those areas where it must operate entirely in its own name, which is too tainted with Communism to permit a wide freedom of action. In October the WCP felt strong enough to call a Presidential Committee meeting, as many members had demanded immediately after Czechoslovakia was invaded. It took place in Lahti, Finland, from 11 to 13 November and dealt with many familiar action issues: Vietnam, the Middle East, support of the Arab Peoples, Greece, Latin America, etc. The official conference press re- lease stated that differences of viewpoint on Czechoslovakia were expressed, and the common wish was for an improvement in the situation. Prior to the meeting, the Yugoslav League for Peace had written to the WCP demanding "con- crete action in favor of the victims." At a preparatory meeting in Vienna, from 10 December, for the Conference for European Security and Co-operation, it was decided to postpone the con- ference by some five months and to hold it in Vienna in October 1969. The Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on December that the 65 delegates from Western and Eastern European countries had expressed serious differences of views on questions of national sovereignty and noninterference in the af- fairs of other nations. -- International Organization of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) As reported by Le Monde on 13 September, the President and Secretary General of the IADL issued a statement addressed to the IADL affiliates of the Warsaw Pact countries, excluding Rumania, condemning the armed interven- tion in Czechoslovakia which was "contrary to the norms of international law." Internal stresses in this lawyers' organization over the Czech invasion are not surprising, particularly since it is heavily involving in various kinds of anti-Vietnam War propaganda and "investigative" actions. -- World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) The only significant action taken by this organization concerning the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a statement by its Italian Communist President, Rodolfo Mechini. He issued a personal statement on August 27, condemning the military action. WFDY's Secretary General, Le Gal, was replaced by another French Communist youth leader , Michel Jouet, but no reason was given for the change. Only the Chilean affiliate of the WFDY expressed support for the So- viet action in Czechoslovakia. International Union of Students (IUS) The IUS issued no statement on Czechoslovakia. The Secretariat met on 26 August in Prague, but decided to postpone discussions. At the next meet- ing on 7 October, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky, IUS President and Chairman of the Czecho- slovak Youth Organization, requested the removal of the Czechoslovak matter from the agenda. In a letter on 24 August to the youth organizations of all Warsaw Pact powers involved in the invasion, he had accused them of violating the bonds of friendship by "clear and absolutely unfounded aggression" and demanded withdrawal of the foreign troops "who are mainly made up of members of your organizations." Several Western European and African members of the IUS were displeased with the IUS's official silence. The fact is that Vokrouhlicky's views remain as stated in his letter of 24 August. -- International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) On 22 August, the IOJ protested against the occupation of its headquarters in Prague by the invading troops. The statement said: "we protest most ear- nestly against this illegal measure" and it appealed to all IOJ members and all colleagues throughout the world "to oppose by every means this brutal inter- vention." On 3 September, the IOJ Secretariat demanded that the Czechoslovak Union of Journalists be allowed to resume normal operations and it is now plan- ning for an international exhibition, "Interpres '69," to be held in Prague, 11-18 June, 1969. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 -- Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) There is no evidence of any significant reaction to the Czechoslovak issue in this organization, which is somewhat surprising given WIDF's alleged concern with injustice and related matters. The reason for the silence may well be that the WIDF is headquartered in Ulbricht-controlled East Berlin. The French affiliate sent the WIDF a statement condemning the military inter- vention in Czechoslovakia. -- World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) This organization has been deeply affected by the invasion of Czechoslo- vakia. Scientific World (No.. 6) admitted that the invasion had complicated the work of the WFSW. Thw Swiss government blocked the convening of the Ninth General Assembly, due to be held in Switzerland from September 25-29, and the work in Prague of the Central and Eastern European Center was inter- rupted. The WFSW did not issue a statement on the invasion because, it said, the 29 affiliated organizations could not agree on a common view. The edi- torial in Scientific World explained that besides disagreeing on the question of the invasion, affiliates also disagreed on whether the subject came with- in the terms of the WFSW charter and constitution. They finally agreed that the WFSW was a federation of scientific organizations, each with an equal right to a view on how the constitution should be applied. -- International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR) The FIR has been deeply affected by the invasion Czechoslovakia. Its Italian President, Banfi, in a letter to Presidium members, condemned the military intervention in one European country by another, and the French and Italian affiliates issued statements reflecting views similar to Banfi's. The FIR and all its West European affiliates sent messages of support to Dubcek. The Sixth Congress, which was due to be held in November, has been postponed until 1969. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Aaaroved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 -- - - - -- - -- -- February 1969 CASTRO'S PERSONAL REIGN The official celebration of the tenth anniversary of Fidel Castro's seizure of power was marred by two events: the announcement of sugar ra- tioning by the world's leading sugar producer and the dramatic escape of 88 Cubans into the Guantanamo Naval Base. The two cases illustrate the sorry state of Cuban economic and political life since Castro came to power and became the self-proclaimed "liberator" of all the Andes. Castro's pre- occupation with extending his "liberation" movement to all Latin America can be partially explained as a method of bolstering his own revolution, but is also largely due to his own personal inclinations and weaknesses. The one major success of his life has been toppling the (already wobbly) Batista regime, He is trying to relive and recreate this single act on a hemispheric basis and by this obsession has brought chaos to Cuba, has os- tracized his country from the Western Hemisphere and alienated many of the "fraternal" Communist Parties and certain old-time Cuban Communists, too. His fervent enthusiasm for exporting the revolution has dissipated the good- will and faith originally bestowed upon his government by other Latin Amer- ican countries. Cuba as a Revolutionary Model Castro has devoted an inordinate amount of time and attention to his doctrine of revolutionary war, or guerrilla warfare. Since he came to power many of his speeches have called for the overthrow of the established gov- ernments of almost all of his neighbors and have stressed the part to be played by the peasants in guerrilla warfare. A very small number of extrem- ists have been attracted by Castro's revolutionary zeal and Castro has sup- ported them in varying degrees, often to the dismay and at the expense of the orthodox Communist parties. At one time or another guerrilla warfare has been tried in sixteen or seventeen Latin American countries and has failed in all of them. Several countries -- Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala and Colombia -- are believed to be currently designated by Castro as pri- ority targets for guerrilla warfare. Failures and Setbacks Venezuela first became a prime target for Castro in 1960 and this led to severance of diplomatic relations by Venezuela in 1961. By 1963 Vene- zuelan terrorists were being trained in Cuba and arms were supplied to terrorist groups inside Venezuela who were trying to wreck the elections. An unprecedented wave of terrorism preceding the elections failed to pre- vent 87% of the voters from going to the polls. The Communist Party of Venezuela broke with the Castroites and subsequently changed its tactics. Castro continued his efforts against Venezuela and in 1966 Dr. Julio Iribarren Borzes, brother of the then Foreign Minister, was kidnapped and murdered; the crime was boastfully admitted by the Havana representative of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). In 1967 Castro sent a number of Cuban military personnel to Venezuela to support the pro-Castro movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Most of these men were captured or killed as they attempted to land. They were to join a group of Cubans who had been infiltrated into the country in 1966 and were subsequently apprehended. About 100 guerrillas of the MIR still Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 operate in Eastern Venezuela and engage in terrorist acts; the latest case involved the arrest of forty persons,and documents seized at the time con- tained orders from Cuba to stage an uprising before the inauguration of the new President. Even though Castro has persisted in trying to unseat the government of Venezuela over a period of eight years, he has been totally unsuccessful and in the process has incurred the wrath of the PCV which accused him of setting himself up as an "untouchable revolutionary oracle." The most spectacular failure was, of course, Bolivia where Castro sent his chief revolutionary evangelist Che Guevara to establish a guerrilla movement. Since Guevara's death, guerrilla activities have slowed down but there is no evidence to conclude that Castro has given up his hopes of exporting the revolution to Bolivia. In his eulogy to Guevara in October 1967, he admitted Che's death was a tremendous blow to the revolu- tionary movement but said, "they are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts, the defeat of his theses...." At the Havana Cultural Congress in January 1968, Castro again reiterated his vow to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolu-_ tionaries throughout the world, Castro's calls for revolution were not so frequent in 1968. This may be due to several factors: the dismal state of the Cuban economy, to un- rest within the country, and pressure from the Soviets. Castro's crackdown on all aspects of Cuban life is becoming increasingly unpopular and his patron, the USSR, more impatient with his ineptness at home and the havoc he has wrought among the pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America. The State of Cuban-Soviet Relations Despite the numerous irritations, which are real on both sides, the "ties that bind" these two disparate countries are unlikely to be severed. The Soviet Union's political and economic investment in Cuba is far too great to abandon and Castro is well aware of this. The Soviet subsidy of the Cuban economy is believed to be more than one million dollars per day with total indebtedness approaching two billion dollars, excluding mili- tary aid. The new technical aid agreement signed 7 January 1969 provided for aid in reconstruction of the technical base of Cuban television, assistance in the fields of irrigation and drainage,. and an amendment to the 1967 agree- ment on peaceful uses of atomic energy, whereby the USSR would provide Cuba with an experimental atomic reactor. Although the 1969 trade protocol has not been signed, it is generally thought that the terms will be as generous or more so than the 1968 agreement in which Cuba was granted $328 million in credits and which called for $970 million in trade. The Soviets have shown that they are willing to pay their loyal supporters for endorse- ment of their invasion of Czechoslovakia and the meaning was not lost on Castro. No doubt his endorsement was completely cynical -- in part to gain more favorable terms for the new economic agreement. It is not known if Cuba will attend the World Communist Conference in May 1969 (there have been no Cuban representatives at preparatory meetings), but it could be part of the price Castro must pay for his continued doles from the USSR. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: dIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Practically speaking, Russia appears to be more unhappy over the chaotic conditions of the economy and over her small chances of collecting the 2.5 percent interest on the Cuban debt, not to mention the principal, than over the political provocations of Castro. Even the purging of old line Anibal Escalante and other pro-Soviet elements brought the most restrained comment. These provocations have been more of a nuisance than a serious affront and in some cases actually served Soviet purposes throughout the continent. The image of a peaceful. trade and diplomatic partner, which the Soviets are as- siduously pursuing throughout Latin America,is served well by the contrast of Castro's violent invectives and actions. Moscow is not opposed to vio- lence and has given honorable mention to the guerrilla movements of Guate- mala, Colombia and Venezuela, for instance. The main quarrel the Soviets probably have with Castro's political philosophy, revolutionary warfare, is that it does not work. The Soviets would undoubtedly prefer a less egocentric, egotistical man who would be more easily controlled,but the fact remains that Castro stays in power only through the military and eco- nomic support of the Soviet Union. The Soviets must surely find Castro a strange ideological bedfellow with his espousal of his own brand of Marxism, a doctrine which proclaims that the Communist Party is not neces- sarily the vanguard of the revolution and that those who want to make the revolution have the right and duty to constitute themselves the vanguard, independently of the Marxist-Leninist parties. By Castro's personal de- cree, Marxist-Leninist theory, the essence of all Communist dogma, is no longer taught in Cuban universities. Castro's intransigent militancy and desire for personal power are of concern to the Soviets, but they must nevertheless defend Castro to prove no Communist country ever reverts to capitalism and because he is able to exploit anti-Yanqui nationalism and the social and economic iniquities which exist in Latin America. Castro knows he cannot exist without Soviet sup- port and realizes the Soviets are as intent about their subversion of the continent as he is in exporting the revolution. Diplomatic Relations with Latin America Castro's egocentric desire to impose his beliefs on the entire conti= nent has almost totally isolated his country, even from the Latin American Communist parties,which are rejecting him. Almost every nation has been the target of his subversion and each has reacted by applying diplomatic and economic sanctions against; Cuba. With the exception of Mexico, which did not vote for the OAS san-:tions, the embargo has not been broken. Dip- lomatic isolation h as been a barrier to Castro's efforts to support guer- rilla activities, since one of the reasons for their failures has been the lack of support mechanisms. Without this isolation, Castro would be able. to fund and advise guerrilla groups through his diplomatic installations and an upsurge of guerrilla activity could be expected. Castro is currently soft-pedaling his theme of the export of the revo- lution in certain Latin countries; this is probably temporary and at the behest of the Soviets and should be interpreted as merely an attempt to Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 break this isolation. Chile is believed to be interested in re-establishing relations with Cuba and it is possible other countries would follow once they feel it would be unlikely that Castro will be replaced and that he poses no threat to them. This would, in fact, certainly not be the case and would be a great disservice to the other Latin American countries under at- tack. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 4 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Est & Ouest 7--30 November 1968 HOW FIDEL CASTRO RUINED CUBA Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia has very oppDrtunely recalled to the westerners that there exists a Soviet imperialism and colonialism, i1 does not seem useless for us to illustrate this imperialism by still other examples than by the European side of'.the USSR. A recent 270 page study, devoted to Cuba, furnishes us an overwhelming documentation on that island of nearly 8 million inhabitants. [Footnote: Jose R. Alvarez-Diaz, A Com- parative Study of the Cuban Economy Before and After Castro. Miami, Florida, 1968.J This work permits the reader to follow step by step the process of degradation that Fidel Castro and his group have inflicted on a country in full development. Moreover, it should be said in behalf of the men of the Kremlin that for once -- one time does rot make a habit! -- they neither invaded nor conquered Cuba; it is Castro who presented it to them as a gift, a gift that they adjudged to be a rather onerous one at first and the essentially strategic value of which they did not discover until 1962. It is true that the missile affair of November 1962 taught Khrushchev that this was a rather poisoned gift. Cuba Before Castro Cuba is a part of what is called the "third world." However, despite the slightness of its territory and population, it must be classed among, the most under-developed countries of Latin America. As for its national per capita income, Cuba fell behind Venezuela and Uruguay in 1958, but before Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Like most of the so-called under- developed countries, Cuba sadly sensed its dependence on the industrial- ized nations. The fact that most of the countries of the third world are single-crop (monoculture) lands involves a double servitude. On the one hand, they are in an inferior position in dealing with their clients, who profit from their position of monopoly buyers since the selling country hardly has any alternative to selling the product which almost alone creates its wealth. On the other hand, they are closely tied to the fluctuations in the world market prices, the dropping of which can lead them to catas- trophe. Finally -- but this is unrelated to the question of single-crops -- lacking capital, they are obliged to remunerate the foreign capital invested in their economy and thus feel themselves "exploited." This com- bination of facts obviously gives a singular resonance to the anti- imperialist slogans. Castro profited from this. An unhappy combination of circumstances permitted him to take power in the beginning of 1959 and to carry out his program which, in the beginning, consisted only of a few sentences: it was necessary to withdraw Cuba from the hold of "imperialism" (which, in the event, was obviously American), it was necessary to diversify the Cuban production to break the servitude of a single-crop (sugar), it was neces- sary to end the hold of foreign capital, basically American, on the national economy. After which the road would be open to bring to the working class' well-being and abundance. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 However the Cuban economy had not awaited the accession to power of Castro to start down the path which permitted it to gradually emancipate itself from its servitudes. Its: agricultural production had begun to diversify while the sugar production had remained almost steady between 1949-51 and 1957-58, that of bananas had increased 30% and that of rice had more than doubled. Indus- trial activity showed an appreciable growth: just from 1953 to 1959 the manufacturing industry progressed by 19%, construction by 21%, and the pro- duction of gas and electricity by 58%. "fin the same period, the principal Cuban industry, that of sugar, little by little escaped foreign control, essentially American. Here is how the refineries were classed by nationality: Sugar Refineries Number (units) Production (percent) 1939 1952 1958 1939 1952 1958 Cubans 56 113 121 22 % 55 % 62 % Americans 66 41 36 55 % 43 % 37 % Others (a) 52 7 4 23 % 2 % 1 % 174 161 161 100% 100 % 100 % (a) principally Spanish Foreign control over Cuban banks also diminished. The Cuban banks amassed more and more deposits, the importance of banks owned by foreign capital fell fairly sharply: Deposits In Commercial Banks (millions pesos) Total Cuban Deposits Foreign Deposits (a) 1939 138,9 23,3 (17 %) 115,6 (85 %) 1950 647,6 294,5 (46 %) 353,1 (54 %) 1958 1,076,8 658,2 (61 %) 418,6 (39 %) (a) principally American The Cuban economy was thus in the process of growing more and more out of its primitive stage of under-development, of monoculture, and of dependence. It was at this point, 1 January 1959, that Castro took power. 2 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 The Upset In taking power the Castro group had no economic program to speak of, but only a few broad-brush documents sketching a democratic planning on a base of private industry witB the aim of diversifying agricultural produc- tion and industrializing the country. But once their dictatorship was established, the new masters adopted a new line of conduct under the pressure of the communist extremists. They rushed the reforms, the whole of which resulted in less than two years in a complete upset (it would be giving them too much honor to call it a rev- olution) of the Cuban economy. The agrarian reform -- the first decisions were taken as early as May 1959 -- began by the distribution of lands exceeding an area of 30 "caballerias" (402 hectares) to the farmers and agricultural workers. The expropriation was to have been accomplished with an indemnity in the form of bonds reimbursable in 20 years carrying an interest of 4.5% per annum. These bonds have never been delivered and the former landowners are still waiting to be indemnified. Since October 1960, most of the lands expro- priated have been under the direct control of the state which prescribes. thereafter to the farmers the nature and quantity of what they are to pro- duce. During the same period, the government took in hand the non-agricultural sector by expropriations, again without indemnity. In October 1960, these nationalizations were the subject of two decrees. In the beginning of 1961 the state appropriated to itself 18,500 large and middle-sized enter- prises which represented 80% of the industrial production and 55%`of the agricultural production. In undertaking these confiscations without indemnity, Castro inevit- ably entered into conflict with the United States. The Cuban proprietors obviously had no means of defense. But the American government could not overlook the plundering of its own citizens. During the year 1960, rela- tions between the two countries became more and more strained. Being unable to import American crude oil for lack of dollars, Castro signed an accord with the USSR, which did not require much persuading. But the Cuban re- fineries owned by Americans refused to process the Russian oil and were expropriated by Castro. The United States retaliated by reducing their purchases of Cuban sugar and that led to the confiscation of all American holdings in Cuba. On 3 January 1961 the United States broke diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro. The sequence of these events might leave the impression that this fatal linkage might have been avoided if the Castro group had shown itself more conciliatory in the question of indemnities. It is, however, per- mitted to suppose that Castro had deliberately wished and provoked this break. Certainly he did not declare himself "Marxist-Leninist" (it would be nice to know what his poor brain understands by this term) until later, in his speech of 2 December 1961. But it is certain that the Soviet example, seen from afar, must have impressed him for a long time and that his Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Communist advisors pushed him in that direction. And it is not by chance that he,had envisaged since 1960 the launching of a five-year plan slated to get underway in 1961. It was, not by chance, either, that he appealed, as early as August 1960, to the enlightened advice of Charles Bettelheim, well known specialist and expert in under-development. Mr. Bettelheim felt that it would be premature to launch a five-year plan before. having proceeded with the nationalization of the banks and the creation of a central banking system, with the nationalization of an impor- tant part of the wholesale commerce and with the creation of a national In- stitute of Foreign Commerce. Castro deferred to the advice of Mr. Bettelheim and the plan was not launched until the beginning of 1962 as a four-year plan. Dependent on Moscow Having cut himself off from the traditional and normal circuits of the world economy, Castro turned toward the USSR and toward the Soviet bloc in general, including China. It was necessary to industrialize the country at any cost and at full speed, in conformance with the old thesis of Moscow according to which extreme industrialization is the sole salvation for an under-developed country eager to escape from its misery and to free itself from its, dependence on "imperialism." Cuba was to receive equipment worth $357 million, divided as follows (in millions of dollars): USSR 200 China 60 Czechoslovakia 4o Rumania 15 Hungary 15 Poland 12 East Germany 10 Bulgaria 5 Moscow had foreseen everything, even the "experts" charged with in- stalling this equipment, with advising the Cuban technicians, and with spotting,(this was not known until a little later) the best places for the famous rockets which provoked the grave conflict of November 1962. Two years later, toward the middle of 1963, Castro had to face the facts: the promises had not been kept. In all, Cuba had received only eight factories from the Soviet bloc: 3 from Czechoslovakia, 3 from East Germany, 1 from the USSR and 1 from Poland. He had been promised five times as many. The equipment delivered by the Soviet bloc was for the most part unusable, for the same reasons as in the USSR: shortage of spare parts, of tires, of generators. In any case the industrialization plan failed. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 But cut off from the markets of the free world, Cuba had become a satellite of the USSR and could no longer export except to the Soviet bloc. Having essentially only sugar to export and the members of the Soviet bloc not paying in hard currencies -- the exchanges were carried out on a barter basis -- Cuba lost all freedom of movement. The dictatorial planning according to the Soviet model did the rest. In February 1964, Ernesto Guevara, then the economic director of Cuba, gave a speech of "self-criticism" in which this admission may be found: "Our task consists at present of regaining in certain sectors of pro- duction the technical level that we formerly possessed and that we have lost." Summary Balance Sheet We can only take into account certain essential facts in the limited framework of this expose. Let us begin with the principal production of Cuba, sugar. Cuba produced 5.964 million tons of it in 1959. After 1961, a favorable year (6.767 million tons), the consequences of collectivization began to be felt: 4.815 million tons of sugar in 1962, 3.800 million in 1963 and in 1964. Since the failure of industrialization, the government has made a major effort to reverse the trend, since it has to export some- thing. Sugar production is estimated by the government (thus a figure sub- ject to caution) at 6 million tons in 1967. Six million head of livestock were counted in 1958. This number fell to 4.4 million in 1964 and grew to 5.2 million in 1967. The production of beef fell from 200,000 tons in 1959 to 100,000 tons in 1962; that of pork from 38,600 tons in 1959 to 20,000 tons in 1962. Since that date the statistics are lacking; this is understandable. Since 24 March 1962, innumerable products are rationed and the inevit- able corrollary of rationing, the black market, has appeared. The following table contrasts the average consumption in 1958 with the quantities allotted on the ration cards in 1962: 1958 1962 oil 0,75 livre (a) 9,5 livre rice 2 1.8 onces 1 1.8 onces vegetables 224 grammes 172 grammes beef 2 1.3 onces 0,75 livre poultry 1,5 livre 0,5 livre fish 1 livre 0,25 livre dairy products 0,75 litre 0,20 litre (a) 1 livre = 16 onces - 46 grammes Approved For Release 1999/08/24: G2IA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 This is a balance sheet of bankruptcy. Castro had wanted to deliver Cuban from the American "imperialism." He delivered it, bound hand and foot, to Soviet imperialism. Castro wanted to diversify the Cuban economy and to industrialize it to deliver it from the servitudes that monoculture brings. He stopped and reverse the process of liberation in which it was engaged. And he ruined it more than ever. Which does not at all hinder many students around the world from proclaiming themselves "Castroites." Approved For Release 1999/08/24`: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Approvett F Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A00040002001 gYRGHT Commerif Fie Castro a ruine Cuba pUISQUE I'invasion dc la Tch6coslovaquic a rappels fort opportundment aux Occiden. taux qu'il exists un impcrialisme et un cola nialisme sovi6tiqucs, it ne nous parait pas inutile d'illustrcr cet impcrialismc par d'autres exemples encore que par le a Slacis w euro- p6en de M.R.S.S. Une rdcente dude de 270 pages, consacrdc a Cuba, nous four-nit unc surabondante documentation sur cette He de pr6s do 8 millions d'habitants (1). Cet ouvrage permct au lectcur de suivre pas a pas le processus do degradation que Fidel Castro et son ctquipc ont inflige a un pays en pIcin de- vcloppcmcnt. Encore faut-il dirt a la. ddcharge des hom- mes du Kremlin que pour unc foil - une fois n'cst pas' coutume I -- ils n'ont ni envahi ni conquis Cuba ; c'est Castro qui leur an a fait cadcau, un cadcau qu'ils jugerent plutot ond- reux au debut ct dont ils ne ddcouvrircnt la valcur essentiellement stratdgiquc qu'cn 1962. II cst vrai qua I'affairc des missiles de novem- bre 1962 fit comprendre a Khrouchtchev que cc cadcau d.tait plutOt cmpoisonnd. CUBA AVANT CASTRO Cuba fait partic de cc, qua I'on appcllc lc a tiers monde *. Cepcndant, cn dspit de ]'exi- pitd do son tcrritoire at de sa population, it taut lc classer parmi les pays Ics moins sous-ddvcloppds de 1'Amdrique latine. Quant au revenu national par tctc d'habitant, Cuba sc.classait cn 1958 apr6s lc Venezuela et I'Uru- uay, mais avant 1'Argentine, Ic Chili at le cxlquc. Tout comme la plupart des pays dits sous- dvclopp6s, Cuba resscntait doulourcusement a ddpcndance a I'egard des nations industria- isecs. Lc fait que la'plupart des pays du tiers monde sont des pays do monoculture compor- ts uno double servitude. D'unc part, ils sort an position d'inf6xiorit6 en face de Icurs clients, lesquels profitent do lour monopole d'ache- teurs puisque le pays vendeur n'a gu6re autre chose a exporter que le produit qui fait sa richcsse quasi unique. D'autre part, ils depen- dent dtroitcment des fluctuations des sours mondiaux, dont In baisse pcut les acculer a une catastrophe. Enfin - mais ccci n'a rien a voir avec la monoculture - manquant de capitaux, ils sont obliges de r6mun6rcr les ca- pitaux btrangcrs invest.is daps ]cur 6conomie et se sentcnt ainsi " exploitds Cet ensemble de faits donne 6videmment une sinlulicre for- ce de percussion aux slogans anti-impcrialismms. Castro en profita. Un malhcurcux con- tours de circonstances lui permit de s'cmp, rcr du pouvoir au d6but de 1959 et de rraliser son programme qui, au debut, ne tenait clue Bans quelques phrases : it fallait soustr: .ire ; Cuba a 1'emprise de a 1'imptrialismc * '! I an l'occurrence, etait 6videmment nm6ricain), it fallait diversifier les productions cubaines pour rompre Ics servitudes de la monoculture. (sucre), ii fallait industrialiser le pays a toute vitesse, it fallait en finir avcc ]a mainmise du capital 6tranger, essentiellement americain, sur l'6conomie nationale. Apres quoi, la voie serait libre pour apporter a la population la- boricuse Ic bien-titre at 1'abondance. Ccpendant, 1'6conomic cubaine n'avait pas attcndu l'accession au pouvoir de Castro pour s'cngager dans unc voic Iui pcrmettant do s'6manciper graduellement de ses servitudes. Sa production agricole commencait i se diversifier Alors que la production sucriere 6tait rest6e a peu pr6s 6talc entre 1949-1951 at 1957-1958, celle des banancs avait augrncntu do 30 %'o at cells du riz avait plus qua dou- b16. L'activit6 industricile marqua un cs7;or appr6ciable : rien u'entre 1953 ct 1959, ]'in- 1 dustrie manufacturiere progressa dc 19 96, IC batiment de 21 ?b, la production du gaz at de l'dlectricitd de 58 ?,b. En memo temps, la principals industrie cubaine, celle du sucre, s'6tait peu h peu sous. traite a la mainmise 6trangere, esscntici:o-ment amdricaine. Voici comment se r6partis- saient les raffirleries quant a lour nationalite : Nombre (unites) Production (pour cent) 1939 1952 1958 1939 1952 1958 Cubaincs ..... 56 113 121 22 % 55 ",5 62 % Arn6ricaines .. , 66 41 36 55 %'o 43 % 37 Autres (a) 52 7 4 23 56 2 ;0 1 y~ 174 161 - 161 100 96 100 96 100 (a) 8urtout cop note . (t) Jou R. Atvarrr-Dlrtz. A Comparative Study Of the Cuban Scvnom before and alter Castro (Mtaml. pfflved for Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400020018-8 Baines aila~ Fkft#1~41C44 F s~a n~~I,J /08/ 4 : 4p ~ c 1 ~ ~i in~@bE 0 i18p08t banques cubaines concentraient de plus en assez',net : CPYRGHT Ddp6ts daps les banques commerciales (Millions de pesos) 1939 ................ 138,9 1950 ................ 647,6 1958 ................ 1.076,8 Banques cubaines 23,3 (17 1/1 ) 294,5 (46 90) 658,2 (61 96) Banques dtrangc`res (a) 115,6 (83 96) 353,1 (54 %) 418,6 (39 96) L'dconomie cubaine dtait done en train do sortir do plus en plus de son stade primitif de sous-ddveloppement, do monoculture et do ddpendance. Vest a cc moment-la, le 1?' jn- vier 1959, quo Castro prit le pouvoir. LE CHAMBARDEMENT En accddant au pouvoir, 1'dquipc de Cas- tro n'avait pas do proprammc dconomi uc a proprement parlor, mans sculement quelqucs documents-canevas prdconisant une planifica- tion ddmocratiquc, sur la base do 1'entreprise privde en vue de diversifier la production agricole et d'industrialiscr le pays. Mais une fois lour dictature dtablie, les nouveaux maltres adopti rent une nouvelle Ii- gne de conduite sous la pression des cxtrdmis- tcs communistcs. Its piecipiterent les rdfor- mes, dont l'ensemble se solda, au bout de moins do deux ans, par un chambardemcnt compict (cc scrait lour faire trop d'honneur quo d'appeler vela une revolution) do taco- nomie cubaine. La rdforme agraire les premieres ddci- sions furcnt prises does mai 1959 --. ddbuta ar In distribution des terres excd.dant une surface do 30 . caballerias Y. (402 hectares) aux fez` micrs et aux ouvriers egricoles. L'expropria- tion devait s'effectucr avec indcmnitd, contre des bons renabotirsables en vingt ans et por- tauit un itatt?rt:?t de 4,5 ",o par an. Ces bons n'out jaiaaais etc dclivrds' ct ics anciens pro- priclaires attendant toujours d'etrc indcmni- ses. Des octohre 1960, la plupart des cxploi- tattoits expropric'cs lurcnt souniiscs an con- tritlc direct de I'Etat, tlui prescrit desormais atax exploitants la nature ct la quantite de cc du'ils out a produirc. Pendant la iniaue pcriodc, lc gouvcrne- ment lit main basso sur le sectcur non-agri- cutt., en cxpropriaiit, la encore, saris indemnate. E.-ii octobie 1960, cos nationalisaLions lircnt 1 ub,Let tie dcux deerets. Ala debut de 1961, Fl;tat s'ctait appropric 18.501) grandes ct i ycnnes entrcprrses, lesquclles represen- latetal 80 1,14 de Ia production industricllc ct 55 1,10 de la production agricolc.. 1:n prtaccdant a des confiscations sans in- Castro cut la inevitabteincnt en con- 11u acct, les Etats-Unis. Les proprietaires cu- hains n'aa?aient evidcnument aaicun nioycn de delouse. Maus Ic gouverneincnt aincricain no ponvait st, d0sinteresser des spol iations dont ttu?ciat victitnes ses prupres ressortissants. Au tours de I'annt:c 1900, ICs relations cntre les deux pays se lendont de plus cn plus. ,tic pou- Vault plus importer de petiole brut amcric:ain tame tie dollars, Castro signe tin accord avec laquclle ne se twit pas prier. Mais les raltinerics cubaines possedecs par des Amcricaius i?elusent tic trailer lc petrolc rus- se et cunt eaproprices par Castro. Les Etats- Uttis ripostem en redu-scuat- lours achats de sucre cuhain, et c'cst la confiscation de tous les avoirs americains a Cuba. Le 3 janvicr 11)61, les Etats-Unis rompcnt lours relations diplomatique4 avec Fidel Castro. L:a succession do cos faits pourrait iaisscr croire (pie cot enchaincment fatal aurait pu :.ire wild si l'cquipc do Castro s'dtait mon- tree plus conciliante Bans la question do I'ia- tlcnuiisation. 11 est cependant perinis do sup- poser (pie Castro avail delih6remcnl voulu et provoquc ccttc rupture. Ccrtes, it no s'cst dut- clare marxistc-lcninistc r (on aimerait bien savoir cc que sa pauvrc cervelle entend par cc termc) quo sur le tard, dans son discours du 2 dcccmbre 1961. Mais it est certain quo 1'cxcinplc sovictiquc vu de loin devait l'impres- sionner depuis longtenips et quo ses Conseil- lers communistcs Font poussc dans ccttc di- rection. Et cc n'cst pas un hasard qu'il ait cnvisagc tics 1960 Ic lanccmcnt d'un plan quin- qucnnal appele A dcmat?rer cn 1961. Cc n'cst pas tin hasard non plus qu'il ait fait appel des null( 191,0 aux conscils dclaires tic M. Charles I3cttellieim, cClcbrc spdcialistc et expert du sous-devcloppcrncn t. M. 13ettelhcim estima qu'il dtait prdmatu- rd do lancer lc plan quinqucnnal avant d'avoir Qroccdc a la nationalisation des banques ct a la creation dun systeinc bancatrc centralise, a la nationalisatiota dun secteur important du commerce tic pros et a la creation d'un Insti- tut national du Commerce exlcricur. Castro dcfeia aux conscils tic Al. 13cilelheim, et lc plan no tut lance qu'au debut de 1902 cotntnu plan quadricnnal. SOUS LA DEPENDANCE DE MOSCOU S'etant coupe des circuits traditionnls ct norniaux do F economic mondiale, Castro se tourna vcrs M.K.S.S. et vcrs le bloc sovictiquc en general, y coinpris la Chine. 11 latlait indus- triauser le pays a tout. prix, et en britlant Iles stapes, conlorniement a.la vicille these do Mos. cou scion laqucllc l'indus(rialisation a outran- cc est in seule planche de salut`pour les pays sous-dcveluppes dcsircux de sorter do lour mt- scCrc et de s'aftranchir de lt:ur clt pcndance a 1'4gard de ? 1'iiripcrialismc a. Cuba devait rccevoir de l'outillage d'4ne valour de 357 millions do doll;us so rdpartis- Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 CPYRGHT Approved or Release sant cumane suit (en millions de dollars) U.R.S.S . ................. 200 Chine ... 60 Tchdcuslovaquic ............ 40 Roumanic .................. 15 Ilongrie ................ 15 Polugnc . 12 Allctnagnc de YEst .......... 10 Bulgaric .................... 5 Moscou avail tout prcvu, m6mc lcs a ex. pcrts . charges d'installcr cct outillage, do conseiller Ics technicians cubains ct de rep& rer (cola ne se sut qu'un pcu plus tard)' Ics cndroits Ics plus propiccs aux cdlebres fu- sdcs qui provoqutrent Ic grave conflit' de' no. vembre 1962. Dcux ans plus thrd, vcrs lc milieu do 1963, Castro tlut se rcndre it 1'ccvidcnce : Ics pro. messes n'avaient pas 61d tcnucs. Au total, Cu- ba n'avait resu quc huit usines du bloc so- vidtiquc : 3 do Tchdcoslovaquic, 3 d'Allemagne oricntalc, I de I'U.R.S.S., ct 1 do Pologne. On lui en avait promis cinq fois plus. L'outillagc livr6 par le bloc sovictiquc dtait lc plus souvcnt inutilisabic pour its me- mes raisons qu'en U.R.S.S.: manquc do pi6ces' de rechangc, de pncus, de dynamos. De toute f;i4Ur1, 1c plan cI'in~lu~triali~;.+tir~n ("tail torr,bd h 1'c;cu. MM,, coup's de toitti Its In,irchc. du monde lihrc, ((h;t c;tait dcti?nne tut satellite tic; I'11.It.S.S. ct Ile pouiait plus cxpcsr to que vet's Ic bloc snvictigIi '. N';tyrant csticnticllemcnt que dlt sircre It exporter ct Jcs nicmhres du bloc sovictiquc nc.payant pas en devises fortes, Ies dchangcs s'cffcctuant sur in be du troc, Cu- ba pcrdit touts lihcrtd de mouvcment. Lae planification dictatorialc scion lc mo- delc sovictiquc fit le restc. En's fdvricr 1964, Ernesto Guevara, alors Ic dircctcur economi- quc Ile Cuba, prononSa tin discotirs d'. s auto- critique . oil I'on u'ouvc rct avcu : Notre tactic consists i1 present h retrou- ver dans ccrlains ?secteurs tic production le nivcau technique quo noes possedions ct qua nous:,avons perdu .. BILAN SOMMAIRE Nous no pouvons faire drat quo des faits esscntiels clans le cadre limitd do cet cxposd. Commcncons par la principals production de Cuba, lc sutra. Cuba cn avait produit 5.964 millions tic tonncs en 1959. Apri'-,s 1961, annde fasts (6.767 millions), Ics consequences cc la collectivisation se fircnt sentir : 4.815 m;" de tonnes de sucre cn 1962, 3.800 malions en 1963 ct en 1954. Depuis 1'dchlcc de 1'i ndus~ r ia1i- -cation, lc ouvcrncmcnt fait do pros efforts pour rcmnntcr la pente puisqu'il faut bien ex- porter cvclquc chose. La production sucri're cst cstirrdc par le gouvcrncmcnt (donc chiffrc sujct h caution) h 6 millions de tonnes en '1967. On comptait 6 millions de tdtcs de bdtail en 1958. Cc nombrc est tombd u 4,4 millions en 1964, pour rcmontcr a 5,2 millions en 1967. La production do la viands de bceuf est io nbCe de 200.000 tonnes cn 1959 h 10:1000 tonnes en 1962 ; celle do la viands de pore de 38.600 tonnes en 1959 tt 20.000 tonnes en 1.962. Depuis cette date, Ics statistiqucs font dd- faut ; on comprcnd pourquoi. Dcpuis le 24 mars 1962, d'innombrabics produits sont rationnds, et 1'indvitabie corol- lairc du rationncment, lc marche noir cst crtrd dans Ics mmurs. Lc tableau ci-dessous confronte In con:om mation moyenne do 1958 avec les cuar:titds alloudes sur cartes cn 1962 : 1958 1962 Mat. grasses .. 0,75 livre (a) 0,5 livre Riz .......... 2 1. 8 onces 1 1.8 or.ces Legumincuses , ct legumes 224 grunmcs 172 gram. Viande do beeuf 2 1. 3 onccs 0,75 1iv;o Volaille ..... 1,5 livrc 0,5 1ivro Poisson ..... I livrc 0,25 li k rc Lait .. ..... 0,75 litre 0,20 litra (a) 1 11vro = 16 onccs n 4C0 grmmnncs. C'est un bilan de faillite. Castro avait promis lc bicn-@tre an pcuplo cubainc et l'industrialiser pour la soustrairc Castro avait voulu soustrairc Cut'a h c I'imperialismc a amdricain. 11 1'a livrdc lticds ct poings lids h I'impdrialisme sovictiquc. Castro avait voulu diversifier 1'Ecor.,irnie cubaine ct l'industrialiscr pour la soustrairc aux servitudes quc cnmporte la monoculture. 11 a arrcte ct renver?d le processus d'aiiran chissement oii clle e-tait engages. Et ii 1'n rui- nee par-dessus le marchd. Cc qui n'cm17Ccha point maints ctudiants h travers le monc1 do ; so proclamcr a carstristcs P. Lucien LAURA T. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8 Y0R?, TIME S A pr6R d For R CASTROPOSTPONES INDUSTRIAL DRIVE AlsoAnnounces Rationing of Sugar in Speech Marking His lOth.Year in Power Special to Y5, New York T:mn MIAMI, Jan. 2 - Premier Fidel Castro today committed Cuba to a long-range agricul- tural development plan and by implication indefinitely post- poned the country's Industrial- ization, once a major economic goal, Mr. Castro spoke at a mass rally on Havana's Josd Marti Plaza commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Cuban rev- olution, After 25 months of guerrilla struggle, he came to power on Jan. 1, 1959,' when the Cuban dictator, Fulgenclo Batista, fled the country. In a two-hour-and-l0-minute speech, monitored here, Mr. Castro condemned what he called an excessive domestic ,consumption of sugar and an- inounced rationing would begin !tomorrow. Sugar accounts for 185 per cent of Cuba's exports. NEW YORK TIMES 10 J Lnuary 1969 a r7 C1s ,viz Tell ?f ,ri By JUAN do ONIS going mad in Cuba. They will Thu 13-year-old Cuban stu dent who made this statement and children who succeeded in fighting past Cuban Army escape to the United States A frail woman from Havana who found the strength in he 195-pound body to bet hersel Approved For R Foresccw Hard Tames i tons in 130" and mac ;silt : n tons this year. Ie2ls,na1l51 DP78tel`',bf.d ' 1l'),30 Cuba's agricultural pro- duction would grow at a rate of 15 per cent a year. But ho also indicated that hard times still lay ahead. "We have to work very hard and will face many dif- ficulties," he said. lie said that 1069, which he called "the year of decisive ef- fort," would be "a year of 1S months of hard work" during which Cubans might have to 'forgo Christmas and New Year holidays. At the same time 1MIr. Castro (disclosed creation of a new central agency to corrdinate the agricultural development program. The new Agricultural ands Livestock Development Agcn- ,cy appears to he an amalgam of several existing or.ganiza- tions. Its creation emphasized a recent trend toward central- ization in Cuba's economy sphere. Industrialization was an early goal of the Castro regime. But the effort, directed by the late Ernesto Cho Guevara as `sinister of Industry, made little headway. After about five years, the basic economic effort began to shift back to agriculture. AMr. Castro has suggested that after 1970 a modest in- dustrial development would he possible, based on improved agriculture. High Sugar Goals Set According to the production schedule for sugar, Cuba was to have produced eight million and two small sons over the six-foo. size fence around the u atoned her children play, with plastic toy trucks at the Cuban .refugee center here. "I didn't want them to -row up under Communism," she said, A ;,ire t-3tm-, man, who spent thtoe ;e,.;s in the Cub,-.n Army a,d w ;s One of the' leaders of them escape, said Inc wa ready to go back and fight. to o,er.hrow Premier Fidel. Castro if the United States. rave st.pport to instrgentj ubans. Tapes: Pinned on Nixon ' People Cuba have their; ;topes pig.; ed on he aiu. "If there is a new inva- i'. .mo it will d'.` f~rcr ale d is tons, and in his speech Mr, Castro indicated that only about five million tons would be produced this year. In explaining the rationing, Mr. Castro said the 1970 goal would be met. He said that increased do- mestic consumption resulted not only from the rationing of other foodstuffs but also from by the fact that in the absence of corn, sugar cane has been widely used to feed animals. For the first time in many years, Mr. Castro thanked the Soviet Union and the rest of the Soviet bloc for what he termed their "decisive aid" in the last "10 most difficult years." He said that many of the past economic difficulties were caused by the fact that produc- tion has considerably dimin- ished as a result of a drop in labor productivity and "total inexperience" and ignorance" of Government officials. He indicated that overcom- ing these problems has been difficult and that to a large extent these two adverse fac- tors continue to affect the Cuban economy. Mr. Castro mentioned foreign affairs briefly. Speaking about the recent seizure of a Cuban fishin,-?boat 'by' Venezuela, he indicated that if such an in- cident was repeated, Cuba might retaliate by intercepting 'commercial airliners flying over Cuba and forcing them to land, or by prohibiting flights over Cuba. The fishing boat, the Alecrin,i was released by Venezuela and' returned to Cuba Sunday. President Kennedy gave (United States training arms and limited support to a Cuban exile 1 invasion in 196 11 that was: thwarted in CIS hours at the Say of Pigs by Premier Castro's lair force and militias. There was no internal uprising. Hunger and forced labor were .the two complaints most gcn- icrally voiced by the refugees, who came from. various parts of the island. They included both lower-middle-class stu- dents a nd laborers, in addition to entire working-class fami- lies. Their feat constituted the +:largest mass escape since the !Castro regime bega,Ii 10 years ago. "Not only is there not enoug'i to cat, but they make. .you spend extra hours in t::e. fic'.ds after a 5'-hour work, v' .:i4 a N:cro b :'ors G!,antLinar ao, a ty late zags"'CCs ~iho : t`r.'.'eU lease 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000200 18-8 18-8 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT here froA5"p' ," Lr"T RIease'r199910812 1i~Q a~~~~ A ~4~G2OO1$c~4ht :heir w yesterday n Lwo m e. 5 aces tern met at)( drSCU9ti ? a I iti at he ast$minute and just thmtrgit the barbed v rc. Navy planes, were bein proc- to use the big trailer truck jumped aboard. "I don't know 1 ow rill -try for residence in the to get through the barbed wire V/her, the trailer was were killed," one rc:ugce sal United States today along with !enclosures and checkpoints jammed, Mr. Delgado closed the "but I saw some :=eople fall nti F d Th b ' f 160 C ro oor. u a s erl! lthe regular daily quota o manned by ere were estimated to wounded, including women a !refugees who arrived here by Battalion around the 17.4-mile be 150 aboard. children. If we had only h airlift from Varadero Beach, perimeter of the Guantanamo arms we would h;'.ve wi under the United States-,ibase, Stopped by Road Patrol them out Cuba " p , . Cuban agreement that permits A plan of the base was ob ! From Guantanamo, they set Among those surrounded w some people to leave for the~.tained and a weak :Dint in the out for Caimanera, the Cuban the wife of Daniel D l d .. e ga o ]United States. IiCuban defenses chosen. The!town closest to the United ran to get her and was sho Processed With Others plotters tried unsuccessfully to States base. It was 4 A.M A "I saw him fall but he ke , I k, Ilacquire arms and ammunition, road patrol stopped the truck, on firing and got a couple o This is the salt, but slow way The decision to make thebut Mr. Delgado said he was the soldiers," said ct refuge out of Cuba for those who have attempt came during Christmas on his way to pick up a load The exchange of gunfire alto a United States sponsor, Some, week, when some of the mcm- of sugar and was allowed to~j many to get across the fend arrivals today had already wait hers o Etch Guantanamo group Pass- and into the base B . ed more than three years for an had been given leaves to visit] Near the town cemetery, the Did Not Fire Hack exit permit. The fugitives chose their families. six-foot Cuban barbed wire;' the dangerous, illegal way out. Mr. Delgado and a nephew, ifences come within 300 yards! The United State, marine; It cost some of them their lives Daniel, put about 20 membersiof the road. The Guantanamo' inside the base are n,)t allowed and others, including 40 be- of their family and some (base fences are 300 yards be-' to fire back at the Cul,ans with. sieved to have been captured, friends from Havana into the yond, out specific orders. 'Iaese were face the liklihood of years of truck and set off for Guan- Mr. Delgado drove off the, not issued. imprisonment in Cuban laboritanamo 600 miles to the east. road and set across the field There is a fairly re.-ular flow camps. Along the route they picked la cement pillbox con iron legs. of Cubans into the Guantanamo An account of the escape was up some others who were do-iThe truck smashed over the base. Some arrive by land, and ieced together from the recol? tog farm work. ,pillbox. some swim past Cuban cutters. ections of different partici- The trailer, a big United From another pillbox, two The monthly rate it, believed pants, some of whom asked notIStates-built truck in which a, Cuban senives armed with auto- to be about 100. to he identified because of rel Soviet diesel engine had been matic rifles ifles rushed out. Daniell Oscar Torres ez, a 19- atives still in Cuba. installed, arrived in Guantaeen Delgado, firing a .45-caliber; year-old jockey in in t ti aining at Truck Driver Began It mo about 1 A.M. Monday. Mr. pistol, the only weapon pos- Hialeah Race Course tire, made DeI"ado parked near the head- scssed by the group, killed the it to Guantanamo ]at.- in 1067 The plot began with a Ha- h' Par two sentries: The younger Del- by swimming five hot,rs. vana truck driver named Del-,quarters of the Committee for fi gado was said to be a marks- Many arriving toe:av were gado, whose job for the state the Defense of the Revolution, man, friends of Mr. Torres Sanchez. transportation enterprise took These watchdog committees As the truck careened to- IIe was on hand to eet themi him on frequent trips to the often gather city people to be ward the Cuban wire fence, oneland provide advice or: housing,i eastern Province of Oriente. In trucked to work in the country- wheel went into a ditch andijobs and the finding of rota-' Guantanamo, a major sugar- side. the trailer jackknifed. The peo-!tives. producing region in Oriente, Mr. It attracted little attention,! pie inside spilled out and heade- Among the refu cis was al Delgado met it group of young therefore, as the plotters en- for the fence. - It was broad little girl about one and a half men who were living in semi tired, daylight. years old, who was pulled over clandestine fashion to escape Many, of the fugitives were An alarm had been sounded. the fence in the scramble. Heil military service or forced ag- Cuban soldiers opened fire as parents have not appeared. ricultural labor. 9 January 1969 - - .. _- '' L.r I rtvn 1 L 1'YMUM I 81 of 150 Shoot 'ay Past Cuban Lines, Teach Guantanamo and Fly to Florida Rest of Band Is Killed or Seized Survivors Are Accepted by U.S. MIAMI, Jan. 8 -- A group of 81 'Cubans shot their way past Cuban Army guards yester- day and entered the United States base at Guantimo. They arrived in Miami today as refugees. It was the largest number of Cubans ever to flee at one time since Fidel Castro came to power 10 years ago. Unyt otb i dtf n .lamnica ran - ~\ty1,3,-.---^-~~~''`" /s? / A ~ l n LatI IC :onr0 11 \+ v ( , J^~ FLA.I` nCCmr~ i+Guarl crnornoS' ,(itrf f M'am v rt s H A dl~rilo C\ o ~ ' ~ e _s" z5 ' s 1 u f. ia au U . ~} Li~ 1 aj ti* y i15. NAVAL Li's EiG7 e9 VQFtQ STATION ~saunanzra h f h 1 a us, Sa u J AT IAOAj I Seal kiru)ston 3 Carr 1' ican- cYea 110X1). I I c ilers p M i he New Ysrk Tinos Jan. 9, 9 1 he U.S. base at Guantanamo, shown in black on both maps 6 3 1999108/24: CIA-RDP78-03MAWT se 4 to discuss details of the break, but the Cubans arrive this morning at the "oast Gaud's Opa-Locka Air iies, belch- nayce since Palace. It Castro was and nearly ten years band to of obedient Soviet satellite. In the last re- ing black smoke as they crawl like guerrillas had vanquished the army of die- sort, Cuba stands alone-and that is tilt wounded beetles along encpty streets; svas? Fidel wants it. shuttered bars and Cabarets (tctnpor:u?ily decade in to Breach: 't'rue. Castro dutifully cle- reopened for the :mnivers.try cclebra- first fast aafar the ak the annnianivers raary ryto. of his But fended (he. Soviet sus:csinn of (;v.reho- flops) with names like .?\:cndy's" and cover, Fidel dispensed with his usual his- Slovakia and last week, ill a rare move. "Lm Vegas," :ucd disheveled hotel lob- rionics. In what for him was a brief two. ; t tccally ,,:n'c sloscosv public thanks for hies where stalled fish are still ineougru- our r and ten-minute speech, Castro pro- its aid, But there' is nu love lost between oust displayed along with placards re- claimed 1 as Cuba's Year of Decisive file Russian and Cuban people. With a uordiug ill English their length, weight Effort-a year in which Cubans would be ft.attkttc.ss that would have been unthink- and the name of the American angler called upon to make further personal sac- able a esv years .ego, Soviet diplotrtats in who canglct them. cons to rescue their nation's saggin; llavana poke cnndesccudimg flu at the Model: But if Havana i,, out of the economy. To cover the event, Newsweek's s?ol stile Cuban teatpcranu-nt and c?mdenc- most depressing; cities on e c?th, it is cs- Paris bureau chief, Edward Behr, who last 1e,