EFFECTS OF INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON COMMUNIST FRONTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020018-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 3, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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February 1969
EFFECT OF INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON COMMUNIST FRONTS
The degree of consternation, opposition and disarray caused among Com-
munist front organizations presumably surprised the Soviet and other Warsaw
Pact invaders of Czechoslovakia. Some officials in some front headquarters
and certain national affiliates of the fronts, condemned or deplored the
invasion as being contrary to national sovereignty and independence; in some
cases front officials, speaking as individuals in order not to invoke the
credentials of the front itself, voiced sharp criticism. Given the fact that
support of Soviet foreign policy and of Communist Party objectives is the
overriding purpose of the fronts' existence, open disagreement with the Mos-
cow leadership of the fronts is a most significant development, indeed one
which has never occurred before.* The problem is further accentuated by the
fact that the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) with headquarters in
Prague -- the most important international front with by far the largest mem-
bership -- issued the strongest statement of condemnation and its activities
and organization were particularly affected.
The fronts' reactions to the invasion by "fraternal" forces unquestionably
impaired their usefulness to the Soviets at a moment when their support was
sorely needed. Most likely, the invasion also contributed to furthering the
general erosion of the fronts' influence on selected target audiences -- a
trend evident in the past few years due to such factors as the Sino-Soviet
dispute, the strained relations between the Soviets and Cuba, the increasing
demands for national independence and individual freedom within the Soviet
camp, etc. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the fronts had maintained
silence on the struggle for freedom in that land in spite of the fact that
four of them are headquartered in Prague, including the WFTU, International
Union of Students (IUS), and the International Organization of Journalists
(IOJ). The Soviets have worked hard to restore "normalcy" in the fronts, and
they have been rather successful so far. While major differences remain over
the invasion, the Soviets have managed to impose a tacit understanding to
avoid the invasion/intervention issue to the degree possible and to concen-
trate on Vietnam, "European Security," the Middle East, Greece and other propa-
ganda missions. In any event, whereas in the period immediately following
the invasion, front meetings which had been scheduled earlier had to be can-
celed or postponed because of the tension and disarray in the fronts, the WCP
*The invasion of Czechoslovakia is the first instance of the fronts' failure
to support Moscow wholeheartedly on a major issue. In 1956 none of the fronts
questioned, and some supported outright, the Soviet invasion which brutally
suppressed the Hungarian Revolution. It should be noted, however, that
there had then been strong differences of views within the World Council
of Peace (WCP) leadership, and by failing to commit itself did signify some-
thing less than approbation. In this context it might also be recalled that
in 1948 Moscow's control of the fronts was so complete as to lead to the im-
mediate expulsion of the Yugoslav affiliates from all fronts when Stalin ex-
pelled Tito from the Cominform.
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and WFTU did manage to hold major meetings by November and December, respec-
tively. These conferences particularly the WFTU's, were less than harmonious,
but organizational splits or other deep, irreparable divisions did not occur.
Highlights of Front Reactions
-- World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
On 28 August the WFTU Secretariat issued a statement endorsing the earlier
public reactions of WFTU Secretary General, Louis Saillant and WFTU President,
Renato Bitossi and "condemning and deeply regretting" the military interven-
tion by the five Warsaw Pact countries. The statement stressed that relaxation
of international tension can be achieved only if everyone adheres to the rules
of noninterference in the internal affairs of others and of negotiations to
settle problems. Saillant emphasized that this declaration reflects the funda-
mental principles which justify the WFTU's existence.
While the Secretariat's statement was supported by most of its affiliates
in non-Communist countries, particularly by the Italian CGIL and the French
CGT, it was bitterly condemned by Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe, in par-
ticularly uncompromising terms by the Polish trade unions (yielding to imperi-
alist propaganda; an act of arbitrariness not reflecting the attitude of the
WFTU; etc.). During September it appeared that a split might develop within
the WFTU and there were indications that the Soviets might oust the organiza-
tion's leadership. A number of Soviet-arranged, fence-mending meetings were
held concurrent with Soviet attempts to intimidate and bring Bitossi and
Saillant to heel. However, these actions and the efforts of WFTU's Soviet
vice-president, Aleksandr Shelepin, could not even force a retraction of the
WFTU Secretariat statement critical of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.
In the October issue of World Trade Union Movement, the acting secretary
of the WFTU, Pierre Gansous, wrote an editorial in which he said "... serious
divergencies have arisen within the WFTU and more widely within the interna-
tional trade union movement ..." but "the WFTU must go on. The difficulties
will be serious but the will to surmount them in order to ensure the continu-
ity of the WFTU is great." He stressed that member organizations must coexist
and co-operate, especially against U.S. aggression in Vietnam.
During October and November, bilateral and multilateral meetings of WFTU
national affiliates were continued,and the 18th WFTU General Council meeting,
originally planned for Rostock, East Germany (2-5 October) was held in East
Berlin (16-19 December). Great efforts were expended to mask the dissensions
that have continued to plague the WFTU since its condemnation of the invasion
of Czechoslovakia. Moscow and its allies insisted defensively, in reportage
and comment during and after the meeting, that a spirit of harmony prevailed,
and failed to mention Czechoslovakia in accounts of the speeches made at the
session or in the final resolution. But the Rumanian speech attested, obliquely,
to strains at the conference and the Italian Communist organ L'Unita aired the
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dissenting minority position upheld by the CGIL on the issue of what the guid-
ing ideological and organizational principles of the WFTU should be. In brief,
it maintained that it should be a democratic international organization inde-
pendent of parties and governments with each national trade union center free
to determine its own path and orientation.
It would now appear that the Soviets' ability to force the resignation
of Bitossi or Saillant was limited, so long as the PCI and the PCF continued
to assert their independence of the CPSU. Their positions may be less tenable,
however, as the Italian and French parties move further back into Moscow's fold.
-- World Council of Peace (WCP)
The WCP statement on Czechoslovakia was issued three weeks after the inva-
sion -- the hesitation reflecting its own dilemma and that facing most of the
fronts. Published on 10 September in Brussels and signed by WCP's Belgian Co-
ordinating Chairman Isabelle Blume, and Indian Secretary General Romesh Chandra,
the statement expressed "concern and anxiety" but, unlike the WFTU, welcomed
the "agreement" reached in Moscow. With this mild rebuke, the WCP was out of
step with several of its affiliated peace movements, especially in Europe, which
denounced the invasion.
The disruption caused in the WCP was apparently not particularly serious:
It opened its new headquarters in Helinski on September 20 and that same day
published its first appeal which asked for action during the Week of Solidarity
with the Vietnamese People (15-21 October). Chandra led a WCP delegation to
the Afro-Asian "Conference for Support for the Vietnamese People" held in Cairo
in September and a joint WCP/Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
Conference in support of the Portuguese Colonies and of the Peoples of Southern
Africa was decided upon during September for January (18-20) in Khartoum. The
WCP's stress on collaboration with and support of "third generation fronts"
(such as AAPSO) and other groups in the Third World precedes, of course, the
Czeca, crisis. It reflects the WCP's awareness of its limited action potential
in those areas where it must operate entirely in its own name, which is too
tainted with Communism to permit a wide freedom of action.
In October the WCP felt strong enough to call a Presidential Committee
meeting, as many members had demanded immediately after Czechoslovakia was
invaded. It took place in Lahti, Finland, from 11 to 13 November and dealt
with many familiar action issues: Vietnam, the Middle East, support of the
Arab Peoples, Greece, Latin America, etc. The official conference press re-
lease stated that differences of viewpoint on Czechoslovakia were expressed,
and the common wish was for an improvement in the situation. Prior to the
meeting, the Yugoslav League for Peace had written to the WCP demanding "con-
crete action in favor of the victims."
At a preparatory meeting in Vienna, from 10 December, for the Conference
for European Security and Co-operation, it was decided to postpone the con-
ference by some five months and to hold it in Vienna in October 1969. The
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Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on December that the 65 delegates
from Western and Eastern European countries had expressed serious differences
of views on questions of national sovereignty and noninterference in the af-
fairs of other nations.
-- International Organization of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)
As reported by Le Monde on 13 September, the President and Secretary
General of the IADL issued a statement addressed to the IADL affiliates of
the Warsaw Pact countries, excluding Rumania, condemning the armed interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia which was "contrary to the norms of international law."
Internal stresses in this lawyers' organization over the Czech invasion are
not surprising, particularly since it is heavily involving in various kinds
of anti-Vietnam War propaganda and "investigative" actions.
-- World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)
The only significant action taken by this organization concerning the
invasion of Czechoslovakia was a statement by its Italian Communist President,
Rodolfo Mechini. He issued a personal statement on August 27, condemning the
military action. WFDY's Secretary General, Le Gal, was replaced by another
French Communist youth leader , Michel Jouet, but no reason was given for the
change. Only the Chilean affiliate of the WFDY expressed support for the So-
viet action in Czechoslovakia.
International Union of Students (IUS)
The IUS issued no statement on Czechoslovakia. The Secretariat met on
26 August in Prague, but decided to postpone discussions. At the next meet-
ing on 7 October, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky, IUS President and Chairman of the Czecho-
slovak Youth Organization, requested the removal of the Czechoslovak matter
from the agenda. In a letter on 24 August to the youth organizations of all
Warsaw Pact powers involved in the invasion, he had accused them of violating
the bonds of friendship by "clear and absolutely unfounded aggression" and
demanded withdrawal of the foreign troops "who are mainly made up of members
of your organizations." Several Western European and African members of the
IUS were displeased with the IUS's official silence. The fact is that
Vokrouhlicky's views remain as stated in his letter of 24 August.
-- International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
On 22 August, the IOJ protested against the occupation of its headquarters
in Prague by the invading troops. The statement said: "we protest most ear-
nestly against this illegal measure" and it appealed to all IOJ members and all
colleagues throughout the world "to oppose by every means this brutal inter-
vention." On 3 September, the IOJ Secretariat demanded that the Czechoslovak
Union of Journalists be allowed to resume normal operations and it is now plan-
ning for an international exhibition, "Interpres '69," to be held in Prague,
11-18 June, 1969.
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-- Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
There is no evidence of any significant reaction to the Czechoslovak
issue in this organization, which is somewhat surprising given WIDF's alleged
concern with injustice and related matters. The reason for the silence may
well be that the WIDF is headquartered in Ulbricht-controlled East Berlin.
The French affiliate sent the WIDF a statement condemning the military inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia.
-- World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)
This organization has been deeply affected by the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia. Scientific World (No.. 6) admitted that the invasion had complicated
the work of the WFSW. Thw Swiss government blocked the convening of the Ninth
General Assembly, due to be held in Switzerland from September 25-29,
and the work in Prague of the Central and Eastern European Center was inter-
rupted. The WFSW did not issue a statement on the invasion because, it said,
the 29 affiliated organizations could not agree on a common view. The edi-
torial in Scientific World explained that besides disagreeing on the question
of the invasion, affiliates also disagreed on whether the subject came with-
in the terms of the WFSW charter and constitution. They finally agreed that
the WFSW was a federation of scientific organizations, each with an equal
right to a view on how the constitution should be applied.
-- International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR)
The FIR has been deeply affected by the invasion Czechoslovakia. Its
Italian President, Banfi, in a letter to Presidium members, condemned the
military intervention in one European country by another, and the French
and Italian affiliates issued statements reflecting views similar to Banfi's.
The FIR and all its West European affiliates sent messages of support to
Dubcek. The Sixth Congress, which was due to be held in November, has been
postponed until 1969.
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-- - - - -- - -- -- February 1969
CASTRO'S PERSONAL REIGN
The official celebration of the tenth anniversary of Fidel Castro's
seizure of power was marred by two events: the announcement of sugar ra-
tioning by the world's leading sugar producer and the dramatic escape of
88 Cubans into the Guantanamo Naval Base. The two cases illustrate the
sorry state of Cuban economic and political life since Castro came to power
and became the self-proclaimed "liberator" of all the Andes. Castro's pre-
occupation with extending his "liberation" movement to all Latin America
can be partially explained as a method of bolstering his own revolution,
but is also largely due to his own personal inclinations and weaknesses.
The one major success of his life has been toppling the (already wobbly)
Batista regime, He is trying to relive and recreate this single act on a
hemispheric basis and by this obsession has brought chaos to Cuba, has os-
tracized his country from the Western Hemisphere and alienated many of the
"fraternal" Communist Parties and certain old-time Cuban Communists, too.
His fervent enthusiasm for exporting the revolution has dissipated the good-
will and faith originally bestowed upon his government by other Latin Amer-
ican countries.
Cuba as a Revolutionary Model
Castro has devoted an inordinate amount of time and attention to his
doctrine of revolutionary war, or guerrilla warfare. Since he came to power
many of his speeches have called for the overthrow of the established gov-
ernments of almost all of his neighbors and have stressed the part to be
played by the peasants in guerrilla warfare. A very small number of extrem-
ists have been attracted by Castro's revolutionary zeal and Castro has sup-
ported them in varying degrees, often to the dismay and at the expense of
the orthodox Communist parties. At one time or another guerrilla warfare
has been tried in sixteen or seventeen Latin American countries and has
failed in all of them. Several countries -- Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala
and Colombia -- are believed to be currently designated by Castro as pri-
ority targets for guerrilla warfare.
Failures and Setbacks
Venezuela first became a prime target for Castro in 1960 and this led
to severance of diplomatic relations by Venezuela in 1961. By 1963 Vene-
zuelan terrorists were being trained in Cuba and arms were supplied to
terrorist groups inside Venezuela who were trying to wreck the elections.
An unprecedented wave of terrorism preceding the elections failed to pre-
vent 87% of the voters from going to the polls. The Communist Party of
Venezuela broke with the Castroites and subsequently changed its tactics.
Castro continued his efforts against Venezuela and in 1966 Dr. Julio
Iribarren Borzes, brother of the then Foreign Minister, was kidnapped and
murdered; the crime was boastfully admitted by the Havana representative
of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). In 1967
Castro sent a number of Cuban military personnel to Venezuela to support
the pro-Castro movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Most of these
men were captured or killed as they attempted to land. They were to join
a group of Cubans who had been infiltrated into the country in 1966 and
were subsequently apprehended. About 100 guerrillas of the MIR still
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operate in Eastern Venezuela and engage in terrorist acts; the latest case
involved the arrest of forty persons,and documents seized at the time con-
tained orders from Cuba to stage an uprising before the inauguration of the
new President. Even though Castro has persisted in trying to unseat the
government of Venezuela over a period of eight years, he has been totally
unsuccessful and in the process has incurred the wrath of the PCV which
accused him of setting himself up as an "untouchable revolutionary oracle."
The most spectacular failure was, of course, Bolivia where Castro sent
his chief revolutionary evangelist Che Guevara to establish a guerrilla
movement. Since Guevara's death, guerrilla activities have slowed down
but there is no evidence to conclude that Castro has given up his hopes of
exporting the revolution to Bolivia. In his eulogy to Guevara in
October 1967, he admitted Che's death was a tremendous blow to the revolu-
tionary movement but said, "they are mistaken who believe that his death is
the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts, the defeat
of his theses...." At the Havana Cultural Congress in January 1968, Castro
again reiterated his vow to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolu-_
tionaries throughout the world,
Castro's calls for revolution were not so frequent in 1968. This may
be due to several factors: the dismal state of the Cuban economy, to un-
rest within the country, and pressure from the Soviets. Castro's crackdown
on all aspects of Cuban life is becoming increasingly unpopular and his
patron, the USSR, more impatient with his ineptness at home and the havoc
he has wrought among the pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America.
The State of Cuban-Soviet Relations
Despite the numerous irritations, which are real on both sides, the
"ties that bind" these two disparate countries are unlikely to be severed.
The Soviet Union's political and economic investment in Cuba is far too
great to abandon and Castro is well aware of this. The Soviet subsidy of
the Cuban economy is believed to be more than one million dollars per day
with total indebtedness approaching two billion dollars, excluding mili-
tary aid.
The new technical aid agreement signed 7 January 1969 provided for aid
in reconstruction of the technical base of Cuban television, assistance in
the fields of irrigation and drainage,. and an amendment to the 1967 agree-
ment on peaceful uses of atomic energy, whereby the USSR would provide
Cuba with an experimental atomic reactor. Although the 1969 trade protocol
has not been signed, it is generally thought that the terms will be as
generous or more so than the 1968 agreement in which Cuba was granted $328
million in credits and which called for $970 million in trade. The Soviets
have shown that they are willing to pay their loyal supporters for endorse-
ment of their invasion of Czechoslovakia and the meaning was not lost on
Castro. No doubt his endorsement was completely cynical -- in part to gain
more favorable terms for the new economic agreement. It is not known if
Cuba will attend the World Communist Conference in May 1969 (there have
been no Cuban representatives at preparatory meetings), but it could be
part of the price Castro must pay for his continued doles from the USSR.
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Practically speaking, Russia appears to be more unhappy over the chaotic
conditions of the economy and over her small chances of collecting the 2.5
percent interest on the Cuban debt, not to mention the principal, than over
the political provocations of Castro. Even the purging of old line Anibal
Escalante and other pro-Soviet elements brought the most restrained comment.
These provocations have been more of a nuisance than a serious affront and
in some cases actually served Soviet purposes throughout the continent. The
image of a peaceful. trade and diplomatic partner, which the Soviets are as-
siduously pursuing throughout Latin America,is served well by the contrast
of Castro's violent invectives and actions. Moscow is not opposed to vio-
lence and has given honorable mention to the guerrilla movements of Guate-
mala, Colombia and Venezuela, for instance. The main quarrel the Soviets
probably have with Castro's political philosophy, revolutionary warfare,
is that it does not work. The Soviets would undoubtedly prefer a less
egocentric, egotistical man who would be more easily controlled,but the
fact remains that Castro stays in power only through the military and eco-
nomic support of the Soviet Union. The Soviets must surely find Castro
a strange ideological bedfellow with his espousal of his own brand of
Marxism, a doctrine which proclaims that the Communist Party is not neces-
sarily the vanguard of the revolution and that those who want to make the
revolution have the right and duty to constitute themselves the vanguard,
independently of the Marxist-Leninist parties. By Castro's personal de-
cree, Marxist-Leninist theory, the essence of all Communist dogma, is no
longer taught in Cuban universities.
Castro's intransigent militancy and desire for personal power are of
concern to the Soviets, but they must nevertheless defend Castro to prove
no Communist country ever reverts to capitalism and because he is able to
exploit anti-Yanqui nationalism and the social and economic iniquities which
exist in Latin America. Castro knows he cannot exist without Soviet sup-
port and realizes the Soviets are as intent about their subversion of the
continent as he is in exporting the revolution.
Diplomatic Relations with Latin America
Castro's egocentric desire to impose his beliefs on the entire conti=
nent has almost totally isolated his country, even from the Latin American
Communist parties,which are rejecting him. Almost every nation has been
the target of his subversion and each has reacted by applying diplomatic
and economic sanctions against; Cuba. With the exception of Mexico, which
did not vote for the OAS san-:tions, the embargo has not been broken. Dip-
lomatic isolation h as been a barrier to Castro's efforts to support guer-
rilla activities, since one of the reasons for their failures has been the
lack of support mechanisms. Without this isolation, Castro would be able.
to fund and advise guerrilla groups through his diplomatic installations
and an upsurge of guerrilla activity could be expected.
Castro is currently soft-pedaling his theme of the export of the revo-
lution in certain Latin countries; this is probably temporary and at the
behest of the Soviets and should be interpreted as merely an attempt to
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break this isolation. Chile is believed to be interested in re-establishing
relations with Cuba and it is possible other countries would follow once
they feel it would be unlikely that Castro will be replaced and that he
poses no threat to them. This would, in fact, certainly not be the case and
would be a great disservice to the other Latin American countries under at-
tack.
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Est & Ouest
7--30 November 1968
HOW FIDEL CASTRO RUINED CUBA
Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia has very oppDrtunely recalled to
the westerners that there exists a Soviet imperialism and colonialism, i1
does not seem useless for us to illustrate this imperialism by still other
examples than by the European side of'.the USSR. A recent 270 page study,
devoted to Cuba, furnishes us an overwhelming documentation on that island
of nearly 8 million inhabitants. [Footnote: Jose R. Alvarez-Diaz, A Com-
parative Study of the Cuban Economy Before and After Castro. Miami,
Florida, 1968.J This work permits the reader to follow step by step the
process of degradation that Fidel Castro and his group have inflicted on
a country in full development.
Moreover, it should be said in behalf of the men of the Kremlin that
for once -- one time does rot make a habit! -- they neither invaded nor
conquered Cuba; it is Castro who presented it to them as a gift, a gift
that they adjudged to be a rather onerous one at first and the essentially
strategic value of which they did not discover until 1962. It is true
that the missile affair of November 1962 taught Khrushchev that this was
a rather poisoned gift.
Cuba Before Castro
Cuba is a part of what is called the "third world." However, despite
the slightness of its territory and population, it must be classed among,
the most under-developed countries of Latin America. As for its national
per capita income, Cuba fell behind Venezuela and Uruguay in 1958, but
before Argentina, Chile and Mexico. Like most of the so-called under-
developed countries, Cuba sadly sensed its dependence on the industrial-
ized nations. The fact that most of the countries of the third world are
single-crop (monoculture) lands involves a double servitude. On the one
hand, they are in an inferior position in dealing with their clients, who
profit from their position of monopoly buyers since the selling country
hardly has any alternative to selling the product which almost alone creates
its wealth. On the other hand, they are closely tied to the fluctuations
in the world market prices, the dropping of which can lead them to catas-
trophe. Finally -- but this is unrelated to the question of single-crops
-- lacking capital, they are obliged to remunerate the foreign capital
invested in their economy and thus feel themselves "exploited." This com-
bination of facts obviously gives a singular resonance to the anti-
imperialist slogans.
Castro profited from this. An unhappy combination of circumstances
permitted him to take power in the beginning of 1959 and to carry out his
program which, in the beginning, consisted only of a few sentences: it
was necessary to withdraw Cuba from the hold of "imperialism" (which, in
the event, was obviously American), it was necessary to diversify the Cuban
production to break the servitude of a single-crop (sugar), it was neces-
sary to end the hold of foreign capital, basically American, on the national
economy. After which the road would be open to bring to the working class'
well-being and abundance.
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However the Cuban economy had not awaited the accession to power of
Castro to start down the path which permitted it to gradually emancipate
itself from its servitudes.
Its: agricultural production had begun to diversify while the sugar
production had remained almost steady between 1949-51 and 1957-58, that of
bananas had increased 30% and that of rice had more than doubled. Indus-
trial activity showed an appreciable growth: just from 1953 to 1959 the
manufacturing industry progressed by 19%, construction by 21%, and the pro-
duction of gas and electricity by 58%.
"fin the same period, the principal Cuban industry, that of sugar,
little by little escaped foreign control, essentially American. Here is
how the refineries were classed by nationality:
Sugar Refineries
Number (units)
Production (percent)
1939
1952
1958
1939
1952
1958
Cubans
56
113
121
22 %
55 %
62 %
Americans
66
41
36
55 %
43 %
37 %
Others (a)
52
7
4
23 %
2 %
1 %
174
161
161
100%
100 %
100 %
(a) principally Spanish
Foreign control over Cuban banks also diminished. The Cuban banks
amassed more and more deposits, the importance of banks owned by foreign
capital fell fairly sharply:
Deposits In Commercial Banks (millions pesos)
Total
Cuban Deposits
Foreign Deposits (a)
1939
138,9
23,3
(17
%)
115,6
(85
%)
1950
647,6
294,5
(46
%)
353,1
(54
%)
1958
1,076,8
658,2
(61
%)
418,6
(39
%)
(a) principally American
The Cuban economy was thus in the process of growing more and more
out of its primitive stage of under-development, of monoculture, and of
dependence. It was at this point, 1 January 1959, that Castro took power.
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The Upset
In taking power the Castro group had no economic program to speak of,
but only a few broad-brush documents sketching a democratic planning on a
base of private industry witB the aim of diversifying agricultural produc-
tion and industrializing the country.
But once their dictatorship was established, the new masters adopted
a new line of conduct under the pressure of the communist extremists. They
rushed the reforms, the whole of which resulted in less than two years in
a complete upset (it would be giving them too much honor to call it a rev-
olution) of the Cuban economy.
The agrarian reform -- the first decisions were taken as early as
May 1959 -- began by the distribution of lands exceeding an area of 30
"caballerias" (402 hectares) to the farmers and agricultural workers. The
expropriation was to have been accomplished with an indemnity in the form
of bonds reimbursable in 20 years carrying an interest of 4.5% per annum.
These bonds have never been delivered and the former landowners are still
waiting to be indemnified. Since October 1960, most of the lands expro-
priated have been under the direct control of the state which prescribes.
thereafter to the farmers the nature and quantity of what they are to pro-
duce.
During the same period, the government took in hand the non-agricultural
sector by expropriations, again without indemnity. In October 1960, these
nationalizations were the subject of two decrees. In the beginning of
1961 the state appropriated to itself 18,500 large and middle-sized enter-
prises which represented 80% of the industrial production and 55%`of the
agricultural production.
In undertaking these confiscations without indemnity, Castro inevit-
ably entered into conflict with the United States. The Cuban proprietors
obviously had no means of defense. But the American government could not
overlook the plundering of its own citizens. During the year 1960, rela-
tions between the two countries became more and more strained. Being unable
to import American crude oil for lack of dollars, Castro signed an accord
with the USSR, which did not require much persuading. But the Cuban re-
fineries owned by Americans refused to process the Russian oil and were
expropriated by Castro. The United States retaliated by reducing their
purchases of Cuban sugar and that led to the confiscation of all American
holdings in Cuba. On 3 January 1961 the United States broke diplomatic
relations with Fidel Castro.
The sequence of these events might leave the impression that this
fatal linkage might have been avoided if the Castro group had shown itself
more conciliatory in the question of indemnities. It is, however, per-
mitted to suppose that Castro had deliberately wished and provoked this
break. Certainly he did not declare himself "Marxist-Leninist" (it would
be nice to know what his poor brain understands by this term) until later,
in his speech of 2 December 1961. But it is certain that the Soviet example,
seen from afar, must have impressed him for a long time and that his
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Communist advisors pushed him in that direction. And it is not by chance
that he,had envisaged since 1960 the launching of a five-year plan slated
to get underway in 1961. It was, not by chance, either, that he appealed,
as early as August 1960, to the enlightened advice of Charles Bettelheim,
well known specialist and expert in under-development.
Mr. Bettelheim felt that it would be premature to launch a five-year
plan before. having proceeded with the nationalization of the banks and the
creation of a central banking system, with the nationalization of an impor-
tant part of the wholesale commerce and with the creation of a national In-
stitute of Foreign Commerce. Castro deferred to the advice of Mr. Bettelheim
and the plan was not launched until the beginning of 1962 as a four-year
plan.
Dependent on Moscow
Having cut himself off from the traditional and normal circuits of
the world economy, Castro turned toward the USSR and toward the Soviet bloc
in general, including China. It was necessary to industrialize the country
at any cost and at full speed, in conformance with the old thesis of Moscow
according to which extreme industrialization is the sole salvation for an
under-developed country eager to escape from its misery and to free itself
from its, dependence on "imperialism."
Cuba was to receive equipment worth $357 million, divided as follows
(in millions of dollars):
USSR
200
China
60
Czechoslovakia
4o
Rumania
15
Hungary
15
Poland
12
East Germany
10
Bulgaria
5
Moscow had foreseen everything, even the "experts" charged with in-
stalling this equipment, with advising the Cuban technicians, and with
spotting,(this was not known until a little later) the best places for the
famous rockets which provoked the grave conflict of November 1962.
Two years later, toward the middle of 1963, Castro had to face the
facts: the promises had not been kept. In all, Cuba had received only
eight factories from the Soviet bloc: 3 from Czechoslovakia, 3 from East
Germany, 1 from the USSR and 1 from Poland. He had been promised five
times as many.
The equipment delivered by the Soviet bloc was for the most part
unusable, for the same reasons as in the USSR: shortage of spare parts,
of tires, of generators. In any case the industrialization plan failed.
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But cut off from the markets of the free world, Cuba had become a satellite
of the USSR and could no longer export except to the Soviet bloc. Having
essentially only sugar to export and the members of the Soviet bloc not
paying in hard currencies -- the exchanges were carried out on a barter
basis -- Cuba lost all freedom of movement.
The dictatorial planning according to the Soviet model did the rest.
In February 1964, Ernesto Guevara, then the economic director of Cuba,
gave a speech of "self-criticism" in which this admission may be found:
"Our task consists at present of regaining in certain sectors of pro-
duction the technical level that we formerly possessed and that we have
lost."
Summary Balance Sheet
We can only take into account certain essential facts in the limited
framework of this expose. Let us begin with the principal production of
Cuba, sugar. Cuba produced 5.964 million tons of it in 1959. After 1961,
a favorable year (6.767 million tons), the consequences of collectivization
began to be felt: 4.815 million tons of sugar in 1962, 3.800 million in
1963 and in 1964. Since the failure of industrialization, the government
has made a major effort to reverse the trend, since it has to export some-
thing. Sugar production is estimated by the government (thus a figure sub-
ject to caution) at 6 million tons in 1967.
Six million head of livestock were counted in 1958. This number fell
to 4.4 million in 1964 and grew to 5.2 million in 1967.
The production of beef fell from 200,000 tons in 1959 to 100,000 tons
in 1962; that of pork from 38,600 tons in 1959 to 20,000 tons in 1962.
Since that date the statistics are lacking; this is understandable.
Since 24 March 1962, innumerable products are rationed and the inevit-
able corrollary of rationing, the black market, has appeared.
The following table contrasts the average consumption in 1958 with
the quantities allotted on the ration cards in 1962:
1958
1962
oil
0,75 livre (a)
9,5
livre
rice
2 1.8 onces
1 1.8 onces
vegetables
224 grammes
172
grammes
beef
2 1.3 onces
0,75
livre
poultry
1,5 livre
0,5
livre
fish
1 livre
0,25
livre
dairy products
0,75 litre
0,20
litre
(a) 1 livre = 16 onces - 46 grammes
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This is a balance sheet of bankruptcy.
Castro had wanted to deliver Cuban from the American "imperialism."
He delivered it, bound hand and foot, to Soviet imperialism.
Castro wanted to diversify the Cuban economy and to industrialize it
to deliver it from the servitudes that monoculture brings. He stopped and
reverse the process of liberation in which it was engaged. And he ruined
it more than ever. Which does not at all hinder many students around the
world from proclaiming themselves "Castroites."
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 Approvett F Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A00040002001 gYRGHT
Commerif Fie Castro a ruine Cuba
pUISQUE I'invasion dc la Tch6coslovaquic a
rappels fort opportundment aux Occiden.
taux qu'il exists un impcrialisme et un cola
nialisme sovi6tiqucs, it ne nous parait pas
inutile d'illustrcr cet impcrialismc par d'autres
exemples encore que par le a Slacis w euro-
p6en de M.R.S.S. Une rdcente dude de 270
pages, consacrdc a Cuba, nous four-nit unc
surabondante documentation sur cette He de
pr6s do 8 millions d'habitants (1). Cet ouvrage
permct au lectcur de suivre pas a pas le
processus do degradation que Fidel Castro et
son ctquipc ont inflige a un pays en pIcin de-
vcloppcmcnt.
Encore faut-il dirt a la. ddcharge des hom-
mes du Kremlin que pour unc foil - une fois
n'cst pas' coutume I -- ils n'ont ni envahi ni
conquis Cuba ; c'est Castro qui leur an a fait
cadcau, un cadcau qu'ils jugerent plutot ond-
reux au debut ct dont ils ne ddcouvrircnt la
valcur essentiellement stratdgiquc qu'cn 1962.
II cst vrai qua I'affairc des missiles de novem-
bre 1962 fit comprendre a Khrouchtchev que
cc cadcau d.tait plutOt cmpoisonnd.
CUBA AVANT CASTRO
Cuba fait partic de cc, qua I'on appcllc lc
a tiers monde *. Cepcndant, cn dspit de ]'exi-
pitd do son tcrritoire at de sa population,
it taut lc classer parmi les pays Ics moins
sous-ddvcloppds de 1'Amdrique latine. Quant
au revenu national par tctc d'habitant, Cuba
sc.classait cn 1958 apr6s lc Venezuela et I'Uru-
uay, mais avant 1'Argentine, Ic Chili at le
cxlquc.
Tout comme la plupart des pays dits sous-
dvclopp6s, Cuba resscntait doulourcusement
a ddpcndance a I'egard des nations industria-
isecs. Lc fait que la'plupart des pays du tiers
monde sont des pays do monoculture compor-
ts uno double servitude. D'unc part, ils sort an
position d'inf6xiorit6 en face de Icurs clients,
lesquels profitent do lour monopole d'ache-
teurs puisque le pays vendeur n'a gu6re autre
chose a exporter que le produit qui fait sa
richcsse quasi unique. D'autre part, ils depen-
dent dtroitcment des fluctuations des sours
mondiaux, dont In baisse pcut les acculer a
une catastrophe. Enfin - mais ccci n'a rien
a voir avec la monoculture - manquant de
capitaux, ils sont obliges de r6mun6rcr les ca-
pitaux btrangcrs invest.is daps ]cur 6conomie
et se sentcnt ainsi " exploitds Cet ensemble
de faits donne 6videmment une sinlulicre for-
ce de percussion aux slogans anti-impcrialismms.
Castro en profita. Un malhcurcux con-
tours de circonstances lui permit de s'cmp, rcr
du pouvoir au d6but de 1959 et de rraliser
son programme qui, au debut, ne tenait clue
Bans quelques phrases : it fallait soustr: .ire ;
Cuba a 1'emprise de a 1'imptrialismc * '! I
an l'occurrence, etait 6videmment nm6ricain),
it fallait diversifier les productions cubaines
pour rompre Ics servitudes de la monoculture.
(sucre), ii fallait industrialiser le pays a toute
vitesse, it fallait en finir avcc ]a mainmise du
capital 6tranger, essentiellement americain,
sur l'6conomie nationale. Apres quoi, la voie
serait libre pour apporter a la population la-
boricuse Ic bien-titre at 1'abondance.
Ccpendant, 1'6conomic cubaine n'avait pas
attcndu l'accession au pouvoir de Castro pour
s'cngager dans unc voic Iui pcrmettant do
s'6manciper graduellement de ses servitudes.
Sa production agricole commencait i se
diversifier Alors que la production sucriere
6tait rest6e a peu pr6s 6talc entre 1949-1951
at 1957-1958, celle des banancs avait augrncntu
do 30 %'o at cells du riz avait plus qua dou-
b16. L'activit6 industricile marqua un cs7;or
appr6ciable : rien u'entre 1953 ct 1959, ]'in- 1
dustrie manufacturiere progressa dc 19 96, IC
batiment de 21 ?b, la production du gaz at de
l'dlectricitd de 58 ?,b.
En memo temps, la principals industrie
cubaine, celle du sucre, s'6tait peu h peu sous.
traite a la mainmise 6trangere, esscntici:o-ment amdricaine. Voici comment se r6partis-
saient les raffirleries quant a lour nationalite :
Nombre (unites)
Production
(pour cent)
1939
1952
1958
1939
1952 1958
Cubaincs .....
56
113
121
22
%
55
",5
62 %
Arn6ricaines .. ,
66
41
36
55
%'o
43
%
37
Autres (a)
52
7
4
23
56
2
;0
1 y~
174
161
-
161
100
96
100
96
100
(a) 8urtout cop note .
(t) Jou R. Atvarrr-Dlrtz. A Comparative Study Of
the Cuban Scvnom before and alter Castro (Mtaml.
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 Baines aila~ Fkft#1~41C44 F s~a n~~I,J /08/ 4 : 4p ~ c 1 ~ ~i in~@bE 0 i18p08t
banques cubaines concentraient de plus en assez',net :
CPYRGHT
Ddp6ts daps les banques commerciales (Millions de pesos)
1939
................
138,9
1950
................
647,6
1958
................
1.076,8
Banques cubaines
23,3 (17 1/1 )
294,5 (46 90)
658,2 (61 96)
Banques dtrangc`res (a)
115,6 (83 96)
353,1 (54 %)
418,6 (39 96)
L'dconomie cubaine dtait done en train
do sortir do plus en plus de son stade primitif
de sous-ddveloppement, do monoculture et do
ddpendance. Vest a cc moment-la, le 1?' jn-
vier 1959, quo Castro prit le pouvoir.
LE CHAMBARDEMENT
En accddant au pouvoir, 1'dquipc de Cas-
tro n'avait pas do proprammc dconomi uc a
proprement parlor, mans sculement quelqucs
documents-canevas prdconisant une planifica-
tion ddmocratiquc, sur la base do 1'entreprise
privde en vue de diversifier la production
agricole et d'industrialiscr le pays.
Mais une fois lour dictature dtablie, les
nouveaux maltres adopti rent une nouvelle Ii-
gne de conduite sous la pression des cxtrdmis-
tcs communistcs. Its piecipiterent les rdfor-
mes, dont l'ensemble se solda, au bout de
moins do deux ans, par un chambardemcnt
compict (cc scrait lour faire trop d'honneur
quo d'appeler vela une revolution) do taco-
nomie cubaine.
La rdforme agraire les premieres ddci-
sions furcnt prises does mai 1959 --. ddbuta ar
In distribution des terres excd.dant une surface
do 30 . caballerias Y. (402 hectares) aux fez`
micrs et aux ouvriers egricoles. L'expropria-
tion devait s'effectucr avec indcmnitd, contre
des bons renabotirsables en vingt ans et por-
tauit un itatt?rt:?t de 4,5 ",o par an. Ces bons
n'out jaiaaais etc dclivrds' ct ics anciens pro-
priclaires attendant toujours d'etrc indcmni-
ses. Des octohre 1960, la plupart des cxploi-
tattoits expropric'cs lurcnt souniiscs an con-
tritlc direct de I'Etat, tlui prescrit desormais
atax exploitants la nature ct la quantite de cc
du'ils out a produirc.
Pendant la iniaue pcriodc, lc gouvcrne-
ment lit main basso sur le sectcur non-agri-
cutt., en cxpropriaiit, la encore, saris indemnate.
E.-ii octobie 1960, cos nationalisaLions lircnt
1 ub,Let tie dcux deerets. Ala debut de 1961,
Fl;tat s'ctait appropric 18.501) grandes ct
i ycnnes entrcprrses, lesquclles represen-
latetal 80 1,14 de Ia production industricllc ct
55 1,10 de la production agricolc..
1:n prtaccdant a des confiscations sans
in- Castro cut la inevitabteincnt en con-
11u acct, les Etats-Unis. Les proprietaires cu-
hains n'aa?aient evidcnument aaicun nioycn de
delouse. Maus Ic gouverneincnt aincricain no
ponvait st, d0sinteresser des spol iations dont
ttu?ciat victitnes ses prupres ressortissants. Au
tours de I'annt:c 1900, ICs relations cntre les
deux pays se lendont de plus cn plus. ,tic pou-
Vault plus importer de petiole brut amcric:ain
tame tie dollars, Castro signe tin accord avec
laquclle ne se twit pas prier. Mais
les raltinerics cubaines possedecs par des
Amcricaius i?elusent tic trailer lc petrolc rus-
se et cunt eaproprices par Castro. Les Etats-
Uttis ripostem en redu-scuat- lours achats de
sucre cuhain, et c'cst la confiscation de tous
les avoirs americains a Cuba. Le 3 janvicr
11)61, les Etats-Unis rompcnt lours relations
diplomatique4 avec Fidel Castro.
L:a succession do cos faits pourrait iaisscr
croire (pie cot enchaincment fatal aurait pu
:.ire wild si l'cquipc do Castro s'dtait mon-
tree plus conciliante Bans la question do I'ia-
tlcnuiisation. 11 est cependant perinis do sup-
poser (pie Castro avail delih6remcnl voulu et
provoquc ccttc rupture. Ccrtes, it no s'cst dut-
clare marxistc-lcninistc r (on aimerait bien
savoir cc que sa pauvrc cervelle entend par
cc termc) quo sur le tard, dans son discours
du 2 dcccmbre 1961. Mais it est certain quo
1'cxcinplc sovictiquc vu de loin devait l'impres-
sionner depuis longtenips et quo ses Conseil-
lers communistcs Font poussc dans ccttc di-
rection. Et cc n'cst pas un hasard qu'il ait
cnvisagc tics 1960 Ic lanccmcnt d'un plan quin-
qucnnal appele A dcmat?rer cn 1961. Cc n'cst
pas tin hasard non plus qu'il ait fait appel des
null( 191,0 aux conscils dclaires tic M. Charles
I3cttellieim, cClcbrc spdcialistc et expert du
sous-devcloppcrncn t.
M. 13ettelhcim estima qu'il dtait prdmatu-
rd do lancer lc plan quinqucnnal avant d'avoir
Qroccdc a la nationalisation des banques ct a
la creation dun systeinc bancatrc centralise,
a la nationalisatiota dun secteur important du
commerce tic pros et a la creation d'un Insti-
tut national du Commerce exlcricur. Castro
dcfeia aux conscils tic Al. 13cilelheim, et lc
plan no tut lance qu'au debut de 1902 cotntnu
plan quadricnnal.
SOUS LA DEPENDANCE DE MOSCOU
S'etant coupe des circuits traditionnls ct
norniaux do F economic mondiale, Castro se
tourna vcrs M.K.S.S. et vcrs le bloc sovictiquc
en general, y coinpris la Chine. 11 latlait indus-
triauser le pays a tout. prix, et en britlant Iles
stapes, conlorniement a.la vicille these do Mos.
cou scion laqucllc l'indus(rialisation a outran-
cc est in seule planche de salut`pour les pays
sous-dcveluppes dcsircux de sorter do lour mt-
scCrc et de s'aftranchir de lt:ur clt pcndance a
1'4gard de ? 1'iiripcrialismc a.
Cuba devait rccevoir de l'outillage d'4ne
valour de 357 millions do doll;us so rdpartis-
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 CPYRGHT
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sant cumane suit (en millions de dollars)
U.R.S.S . ................. 200
Chine ... 60
Tchdcuslovaquic ............ 40
Roumanic .................. 15
Ilongrie ................ 15
Polugnc . 12
Allctnagnc de YEst .......... 10
Bulgaric .................... 5
Moscou avail tout prcvu, m6mc lcs a ex.
pcrts . charges d'installcr cct outillage, do
conseiller Ics technicians cubains ct de rep&
rer (cola ne se sut qu'un pcu plus tard)' Ics
cndroits Ics plus propiccs aux cdlebres fu-
sdcs qui provoqutrent Ic grave conflit' de' no.
vembre 1962.
Dcux ans plus thrd, vcrs lc milieu do 1963,
Castro tlut se rcndre it 1'ccvidcnce : Ics pro.
messes n'avaient pas 61d tcnucs. Au total, Cu-
ba n'avait resu quc huit usines du bloc so-
vidtiquc : 3 do Tchdcoslovaquic, 3 d'Allemagne
oricntalc, I de I'U.R.S.S., ct 1 do Pologne. On
lui en avait promis cinq fois plus.
L'outillagc livr6 par le bloc sovictiquc
dtait lc plus souvcnt inutilisabic pour its me-
mes raisons qu'en U.R.S.S.: manquc do pi6ces'
de rechangc, de pncus, de dynamos. De toute
f;i4Ur1, 1c plan cI'in~lu~triali~;.+tir~n ("tail torr,bd h
1'c;cu. MM,, coup's de toitti Its In,irchc. du
monde lihrc, ((h;t c;tait dcti?nne tut satellite
tic; I'11.It.S.S. ct Ile pouiait plus cxpcsr to que
vet's Ic bloc snvictigIi '. N';tyrant csticnticllemcnt
que dlt sircre It exporter ct Jcs nicmhres du bloc
sovictiquc nc.payant pas en devises fortes, Ies
dchangcs s'cffcctuant sur in be du troc, Cu-
ba pcrdit touts lihcrtd de mouvcment.
Lae planification dictatorialc scion lc mo-
delc sovictiquc fit le restc. En's fdvricr 1964,
Ernesto Guevara, alors Ic dircctcur economi-
quc Ile Cuba, prononSa tin discotirs d'. s auto-
critique . oil I'on u'ouvc rct avcu :
Notre tactic consists i1 present h retrou-
ver dans ccrlains ?secteurs tic production le
nivcau technique quo noes possedions ct qua
nous:,avons perdu ..
BILAN SOMMAIRE
Nous no pouvons faire drat quo des faits
esscntiels clans le cadre limitd do cet cxposd.
Commcncons par la principals production de
Cuba, lc sutra. Cuba cn avait produit 5.964
millions tic tonncs en 1959. Apri'-,s 1961, annde
fasts (6.767 millions), Ics consequences cc la
collectivisation se fircnt sentir : 4.815 m;"
de tonnes de sucre cn 1962, 3.800 malions en
1963 ct en 1954. Depuis 1'dchlcc de 1'i ndus~ r ia1i-
-cation, lc ouvcrncmcnt fait do pros efforts
pour rcmnntcr la pente puisqu'il faut bien ex-
porter cvclquc chose. La production sucri're
cst cstirrdc par le gouvcrncmcnt (donc chiffrc
sujct h caution) h 6 millions de tonnes en '1967.
On comptait 6 millions de tdtcs de bdtail
en 1958. Cc nombrc est tombd u 4,4 millions
en 1964, pour rcmontcr a 5,2 millions en 1967.
La production do la viands de bceuf est
io nbCe de 200.000 tonnes cn 1959 h 10:1000
tonnes en 1962 ; celle do la viands de pore de
38.600 tonnes en 1959 tt 20.000 tonnes en 1.962.
Depuis cette date, Ics statistiqucs font dd-
faut ; on comprcnd pourquoi.
Dcpuis le 24 mars 1962, d'innombrabics
produits sont rationnds, et 1'indvitabie corol-
lairc du rationncment, lc marche noir cst
crtrd dans Ics mmurs.
Lc tableau ci-dessous confronte In con:om
mation moyenne do 1958 avec les cuar:titds
alloudes sur cartes cn 1962 :
1958
1962
Mat. grasses ..
0,75 livre (a)
0,5 livre
Riz ..........
2 1. 8 onces
1 1.8 or.ces
Legumincuses
,
ct legumes
224
grunmcs
172 gram.
Viande do beeuf
2 1. 3 onccs
0,75 1iv;o
Volaille .....
1,5 livrc
0,5 1ivro
Poisson .....
I livrc
0,25 li k rc
Lait .. .....
0,75 litre
0,20 litra
(a) 1 11vro = 16 onccs n 4C0 grmmnncs.
C'est un bilan de faillite.
Castro avait promis lc bicn-@tre an pcuplo
cubainc et l'industrialiser pour la soustrairc
Castro avait voulu soustrairc Cut'a h
c I'imperialismc a amdricain. 11 1'a livrdc lticds
ct poings lids h I'impdrialisme sovictiquc.
Castro avait voulu diversifier 1'Ecor.,irnie
cubaine ct l'industrialiscr pour la soustrairc
aux servitudes quc cnmporte la monoculture.
11 a arrcte ct renver?d le processus d'aiiran
chissement oii clle e-tait engages. Et ii 1'n rui-
nee par-dessus le marchd. Cc qui n'cm17Ccha
point maints ctudiants h travers le monc1 do ;
so proclamcr a carstristcs P.
Lucien LAURA T.
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 Y0R?, TIME S
A pr6R d For R
CASTROPOSTPONES
INDUSTRIAL DRIVE
AlsoAnnounces Rationing of
Sugar in Speech Marking
His lOth.Year in Power
Special to Y5, New York T:mn
MIAMI, Jan. 2 - Premier
Fidel Castro today committed
Cuba to a long-range agricul-
tural development plan and by
implication indefinitely post-
poned the country's Industrial-
ization, once a major economic
goal,
Mr. Castro spoke at a mass
rally on Havana's Josd Marti
Plaza commemorating the 10th
anniversary of the Cuban rev-
olution, After 25 months of
guerrilla struggle, he came to
power on Jan. 1, 1959,' when
the Cuban dictator, Fulgenclo
Batista, fled the country.
In a two-hour-and-l0-minute
speech, monitored here, Mr.
Castro condemned what he
called an excessive domestic
,consumption of sugar and an-
inounced rationing would begin
!tomorrow. Sugar accounts for
185 per cent of Cuba's exports.
NEW YORK TIMES
10 J Lnuary 1969
a r7
C1s ,viz
Tell ?f ,ri
By JUAN do ONIS
going mad in Cuba. They will
Thu 13-year-old Cuban stu
dent who made this statement
and children who succeeded in
fighting past Cuban Army
escape to the United States
A frail woman from Havana
who found the strength in he
195-pound body to bet hersel
Approved For R
Foresccw Hard Tames i tons in 130" and mac ;silt : n
tons this year.
Ie2ls,na1l51 DP78tel`',bf.d '
1l'),30 Cuba's agricultural pro-
duction would grow at a rate
of 15 per cent a year.
But ho also indicated that
hard times still lay ahead.
"We have to work very hard
and will face many dif-
ficulties," he said.
lie said that 1069, which he
called "the year of decisive ef-
fort," would be "a year of 1S
months of hard work" during
which Cubans might have to
'forgo Christmas and New Year
holidays.
At the same time 1MIr. Castro
(disclosed creation of a new
central agency to corrdinate
the agricultural development
program.
The new Agricultural ands
Livestock Development Agcn-
,cy appears to he an amalgam
of several existing or.ganiza-
tions. Its creation emphasized
a recent trend toward central-
ization in Cuba's economy
sphere.
Industrialization was an
early goal of the Castro regime.
But the effort, directed by the
late Ernesto Cho Guevara as
`sinister of Industry, made
little headway. After about
five years, the basic economic
effort began to shift back to
agriculture.
AMr. Castro has suggested
that after 1970 a modest in-
dustrial development would he
possible, based on improved
agriculture.
High Sugar Goals Set
According to the production
schedule for sugar, Cuba was
to have produced eight million
and two small sons over the
six-foo. size fence around the
u atoned her children play,
with plastic toy trucks at the
Cuban .refugee center here.
"I didn't want them to -row
up under Communism," she
said,
A ;,ire t-3tm-, man, who
spent thtoe ;e,.;s in the Cub,-.n
Army a,d w ;s One of the'
leaders of them escape, said Inc
wa ready to go back and fight.
to o,er.hrow Premier Fidel.
Castro if the United States.
rave st.pport to instrgentj
ubans.
Tapes: Pinned on Nixon
' People Cuba have their;
;topes pig.; ed on he
aiu. "If there is a new inva-
i'. .mo it will d'.`
f~rcr ale d is
tons, and in his speech Mr,
Castro indicated that only
about five million tons would
be produced this year.
In explaining the rationing,
Mr. Castro said the 1970 goal
would be met.
He said that increased do-
mestic consumption resulted
not only from the rationing of
other foodstuffs but also from
by the fact that in the absence
of corn, sugar cane has been
widely used to feed animals.
For the first time in many
years, Mr. Castro thanked the
Soviet Union and the rest of
the Soviet bloc for what he
termed their "decisive aid" in
the last "10 most difficult
years."
He said that many of the
past economic difficulties were
caused by the fact that produc-
tion has considerably dimin-
ished as a result of a drop in
labor productivity and "total
inexperience" and ignorance"
of Government officials.
He indicated that overcom-
ing these problems has been
difficult and that to a large
extent these two adverse fac-
tors continue to affect the
Cuban economy.
Mr. Castro mentioned foreign
affairs briefly. Speaking about
the recent seizure of a Cuban
fishin,-?boat 'by' Venezuela, he
indicated that if such an in-
cident was repeated, Cuba
might retaliate by intercepting
'commercial airliners flying over
Cuba and forcing them to land,
or by prohibiting flights over
Cuba.
The fishing boat, the Alecrin,i
was released by Venezuela and'
returned to Cuba Sunday.
President Kennedy gave
(United States training arms and
limited support to a Cuban exile
1 invasion in 196 11 that was:
thwarted in CIS hours at the
Say of Pigs by Premier Castro's
lair force and militias. There
was no internal uprising.
Hunger and forced labor were
.the two complaints most gcn-
icrally voiced by the refugees,
who came from. various parts
of the island. They included
both lower-middle-class stu-
dents a nd laborers, in addition
to entire working-class fami-
lies. Their feat constituted the
+:largest mass escape since the
!Castro regime bega,Ii 10 years
ago.
"Not only is there not
enoug'i to cat, but they make.
.you spend extra hours in t::e.
fic'.ds after a 5'-hour work,
v' .:i4 a N:cro b
:'ors G!,antLinar ao, a ty
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here froA5"p' ," Lr"T RIease'r199910812 1i~Q a~~~~ A ~4~G2OO1$c~4ht :heir w
yesterday n Lwo m e. 5 aces tern met at)( drSCU9ti ? a I iti at he ast$minute and just thmtrgit the barbed v rc.
Navy planes, were bein proc- to use the big trailer truck jumped aboard. "I don't know 1 ow rill -try
for residence in the to get through the barbed wire V/her, the trailer was were killed," one rc:ugce sal
United States today along with !enclosures and checkpoints jammed, Mr. Delgado closed the "but I saw some :=eople fall
nti
F
d
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f 160
C
ro
oor.
u
a
s
erl!
lthe regular daily quota o
manned by
ere were estimated to wounded, including women a
!refugees who arrived here by Battalion around the 17.4-mile be 150 aboard. children. If we had only h
airlift from Varadero Beach, perimeter of the Guantanamo arms we would h;'.ve wi
under the United States-,ibase, Stopped by Road Patrol them out
Cuba
" p
,
.
Cuban agreement that permits A plan of the base was ob ! From Guantanamo, they set Among those surrounded w
some people to leave for the~.tained and a weak :Dint in the out for Caimanera, the Cuban the wife of Daniel D
l
d
..
e
ga
o
]United States. IiCuban defenses chosen. The!town closest to the United ran to get her and was sho
Processed With Others plotters tried unsuccessfully to States base. It was 4 A.M A "I saw him fall
but he ke
,
I k,
Ilacquire arms and ammunition, road patrol stopped the truck, on firing and got a couple o
This is the salt, but slow way The decision to make thebut Mr. Delgado said he was the soldiers," said ct refuge
out of Cuba for those who have attempt came during Christmas on his way to pick up a load The exchange of gunfire alto
a United States sponsor, Some, week, when some of the mcm- of sugar and was allowed to~j many to get across the fend
arrivals today had already wait hers o Etch Guantanamo group Pass-
and into the base
B
.
ed more than three years for an had been given leaves to visit] Near the town cemetery, the Did Not Fire Hack
exit permit. The fugitives chose their families. six-foot Cuban barbed wire;'
the dangerous, illegal way out. Mr. Delgado and a nephew, ifences come within 300 yards! The United State, marine;
It cost some of them their lives Daniel, put about 20 membersiof the road. The Guantanamo' inside the base are n,)t allowed
and others, including 40 be- of their family and some (base fences are 300 yards be-' to fire back at the Cul,ans with.
sieved to have been captured, friends from Havana into the yond, out specific orders. 'Iaese were
face the liklihood of years of truck and set off for Guan- Mr. Delgado drove off the, not issued.
imprisonment in Cuban laboritanamo 600 miles to the east. road and set across the field There is a fairly re.-ular flow
camps. Along the route they picked la cement pillbox con iron legs. of Cubans into the Guantanamo
An account of the escape was up some others who were do-iThe truck smashed over the base. Some arrive by land, and
ieced together from the recol? tog farm work. ,pillbox. some swim past Cuban cutters.
ections of different partici- The trailer, a big United From another pillbox, two The monthly rate it, believed
pants, some of whom asked notIStates-built truck in which a, Cuban senives armed with auto- to be about 100.
to he identified because of rel Soviet diesel engine had been matic rifles ifles rushed out. Daniell Oscar Torres ez, a 19-
atives still in Cuba. installed, arrived in Guantaeen Delgado, firing a .45-caliber; year-old jockey in in t ti aining at
Truck Driver Began It mo about 1 A.M. Monday. Mr. pistol, the only weapon pos- Hialeah Race Course tire, made
DeI"ado parked near the head- scssed by the group, killed the it to Guantanamo ]at.- in 1067
The plot began with a Ha- h' Par two sentries: The younger Del- by swimming five hot,rs.
vana truck driver named Del-,quarters of the Committee for fi
gado was said to be a marks- Many arriving toe:av were
gado, whose job for the state the Defense of the Revolution, man, friends of Mr. Torres Sanchez.
transportation enterprise took These watchdog committees As the truck careened to- IIe was on hand to eet themi
him on frequent trips to the often gather city people to be ward the Cuban wire fence, oneland provide advice or: housing,i
eastern Province of Oriente. In trucked to work in the country- wheel went into a ditch andijobs and the finding of rota-'
Guantanamo, a major sugar- side. the trailer jackknifed. The peo-!tives.
producing region in Oriente, Mr. It attracted little attention,! pie inside spilled out and heade- Among the refu cis was al
Delgado met it group of young therefore, as the plotters en- for the fence. - It was broad little girl about one and a half
men who were living in semi tired, daylight. years old, who was pulled over
clandestine fashion to escape Many, of the fugitives were An alarm had been sounded. the fence in the scramble. Heil
military service or forced ag- Cuban soldiers opened fire as parents have not appeared.
ricultural labor.
9 January 1969 - - .. _- '' L.r I rtvn 1 L 1'YMUM I
81 of 150 Shoot 'ay Past Cuban Lines,
Teach Guantanamo and Fly to Florida
Rest of Band Is Killed or
Seized Survivors Are
Accepted by U.S.
MIAMI, Jan. 8 -- A group
of 81 'Cubans shot their way
past Cuban Army guards yester-
day and entered the United
States base at Guantimo.
They arrived in Miami today
as refugees.
It was the largest number
of Cubans ever to flee at one
time since Fidel Castro came
to power 10 years ago.
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6
3 1999108/24: CIA-RDP78-03MAWT
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to discuss details of the break,
but the Cubans arrive this
morning at the "oast Gaud's
Opa-Locka Air iies, belch-
nayce since Palace. It Castro was and nearly ten years band to of obedient Soviet satellite. In the last re- ing black smoke as they crawl like
guerrillas had vanquished the army of die- sort, Cuba stands alone-and that is tilt wounded beetles along encpty streets;
svas? Fidel wants it. shuttered bars and Cabarets (tctnpor:u?ily
decade in to Breach: 't'rue. Castro dutifully cle- reopened for the :mnivers.try cclebra-
first fast
aafar the ak the annnianivers raary ryto. of his But
fended (he. Soviet sus:csinn of (;v.reho- flops) with names like .?\:cndy's" and
cover, Fidel dispensed with his usual his- Slovakia and last week, ill a rare move. "Lm Vegas," :ucd disheveled hotel lob-
rionics. In what for him was a brief two. ; t tccally ,,:n'c sloscosv public thanks for hies where stalled fish are still ineougru-
our r and ten-minute speech, Castro pro- its aid, But there' is nu love lost between oust displayed along with placards re-
claimed 1 as Cuba's Year of Decisive file Russian and Cuban people. With a uordiug ill English their length, weight
Effort-a year in which Cubans would be ft.attkttc.ss that would have been unthink- and the name of the American angler
called upon to make further personal sac- able a esv years .ego, Soviet diplotrtats in who canglct them.
cons to rescue their nation's saggin; llavana poke cnndesccudimg flu at the Model: But if Havana i,, out of the
economy. To cover the event, Newsweek's s?ol stile Cuban teatpcranu-nt and c?mdenc- most depressing; cities on e c?th, it is cs-
Paris bureau chief, Edward Behr, who last 1e,