(Sanitized) GUIDELINES

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 14, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 1, 1968
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0.pdf5.3 MB
SE CRE7 TRcocP4 25X1 C February 1968 WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES 1 PROBLEMS-OF REFORM IN CHILE (WH) 2. SOVIET PENETRATION OF NIGERIA (AF, EUR, NE) 3 HANOI AND THE VIET CONG FACE MULTIPLYING PROBLEMS COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ABROAD OUSTED DURING 1967 25X1 C Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 SECRET 25X1C1OB L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs (13 December 1967 to 16 January 1968) 1. Preparations for the Budapest consultative meeting continue to hold the center of attention of most of the Communist world. A CPSU statement carried by TASS on 9 January disclosed that the opening date will be 26 February and confirmed reports that the Hungarian invitation was sent only to the 81 parties which participated in the 1960 Moscow conference, contradicting the 25 November announcement that "all" fra` ternal parties would be included. This excluded the Yugoslav party -- which stated its intent to boycott the meeting under any circumstances. The Budapest daily NEPSZABADSAG claimed on 24 December that "some 30" parties had declared their intent to join the 18 signatories; TASS has since; then reported acceptances by a number of parties, but it is not clear.whether these are in addition to those counted by NEPSZABADSAG. There has been (at this writing) no indication that any of the Far East parties has yet committed itself. 2. Meanwhile, various developments underscore Soviet difficulties in managing Communist affairs even among generally Moscow-oriented CP's: a. The Italians and Yugoslavs are organizing a 22 January Rome meeting of representatives of some 20-25 Communist and other left-wing political parties from countries bordering on the Medi- terranean to plan "a major conference dealing with threats to peace in the area" on the very eve of the Budapest conference. Yugoslav Communists, who leaked the story to the western press in Belgrade, reportedly view the conference as "something of a slap at the Soviet Union," according to the NEW YORK TIMES of 14 January 1968. b. Rumania became further estranged from the USSR and the Sov- iet bloc. The 14-15 December visit of Ceausescu with CPSU leaders produced a communique described as the coldest ever resulting from a visit of a Communist leader; at least one foreign correspondhnt in Moscow described the situation as "the brink of a major crisis." (Anatole Shub in the WASHINGTON POST). On 3-4 January Ceausescu paid a "friendship visit" to Tito which was seen as a consultation on opposition to the Budapest meeting. (However subsequent news reports indicate the Rumanians will attend that conference.) Mean- while, a Rumanian delegation signed new protocols,, in Tel'iiv on 19 December greatly increasing trade and providing for joint indus- trial ventures. And in Bonn it was reported on 12 January that Rumania imported more industrial machinery and equipment from West Germany in 1967 than from the USSR for the first time since World War II. West Germany has become Rumania's principal creditor. c. The Czechoslovakian Communists finally ousted old-liner Novotny from his 14-year Party leadership on 5 January in a stormy Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Central Committee plenum which began 19 December (recessed on the 21st for the holidays), despite Brezhnev's hasty visit to Prague on 8-9 December in an apparent attempt to avert the action. The compromise victor, 46-year-old Alexander Dubcek, moved in from the top spot in the Slovakian party organization, thus becoming the first Slovak to head the national party. There seemed to be nothing in Dubcek's background foreshadowing resistance to Soviet policies; indeed, he grew up in the USSR while his dedicated Communist father worked there. Less than a week after he took command the Party's official daily, RUDE PRAVO, published an article which set forth in broad outline a series of radical policy proposals which appear to be more liberal domestically than those of the Yugoslav "revision- ists", and more independent internationally than those of Rumania. (These, however are similar to articles in the same paper last sum- mer and may well represent only the hopes of the liberals, not the policy of the new leadership.) d. Further Soviet problems with Cuba were seen when, only four days after PRAVDA on 29 December glorified the Soviet "oil bridge ... guaranteeing the supply of oil to the Cuban economy," Castro announced stringent gasoline rationing and other curbs on oil because Soviet deliveries had been so inadequate that Cuba had to use its military reserves. e. In mid-January the Communist; press revealed ex post facto that the Soviet "troika" -- Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny -- had made secret visits to Warsaw, on 13-14+ January, and to East Berlin, on 15-16 January. This was the highest-level Soviet delegation to travel abroad since Khrushchev's trips with Bulganin. Speculation on the reasons for such a move included discussion of further prep- arations for the Budapest conference, measures to curb West Germany's growing ties with Eastern Europe, and discussion of the new Czech leadership ... but there have been no "inside" reports as yet. 3. The most notable Soviet Bloc achievement during this period was a 19-21 December Warsaw meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers which drew Rumanian and Yugoslav participation. It produced a weak communique which did not repeat their earlier charge of Israeli "aggression", bal- anced a renewed call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab ter- ritory with the reaffirmation of Israeli's right to exist, and failed to mention any pledge of military and economic aid to the Arabs. 4. Moscow suffered public exposure of internal unrest during this period, brought into the open by the daring opposition of a number of brave Moscovites to the regime's efforts to crack down on dissident intel- lectuals. Even the daily organ of the British Communist Party, MORNING STAR, was moved to condemn the secrecy of the trail of Galanskov and his colleagues in a front-page editorial on 13 January. And in New Delhi, Approved For Release 2005/Q4/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 where Svetlana Alliluyeva chose freedom last year, there was a repeat performance on a lower level as 28-year-old Aziz S. Ulug-zade, member of a Soviet youth delegation and son of a prominent Tadzhik writer, slipped away from his colleagues and requested asylum in the U.S. Embassy an 20 December. After complicated negotiations, he was permitted by the Indian Government to leave on 31 December for refuge in Great Britain. 5. Reports from Communist China indicate the continued spread of disorder and violence in many areas. Most schools are apparently still closed, despite the orders to reopen last fall. Meanwhile, a speech by Peking Revolutionary Committee Chairman Hsieh Fu-chih, reported in Can- ton Red Guard newspaper WEN NO TUNG HSUN of 11 December, indicates that the Chinese CP is planning to hold a national congress -- the last was its 8th in 1956 -- between. May and October of this year. It will be totally rigged, with delegates appointed from the top down. Further Chinese isolation from the world resulted from the expulsion of the only Czech correspondent from Peking 15 January, and the closing of the NCNA office in Brussels on 22 December. 6. Miscellany: A pro-Chinese "Parti Communiste Marxiste-Leniniste de France" was formally constituted by dissidents formerly associated in the "Mouvement M-L" at a 30-31 December congress in Aixe-en-Provence. The weekly L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE will continue as the organ of the party. ....The strengthened Berlin' wall permitted only 120 refugees to escape across the boundary in 1967, according to the Wast Berlin "August 13" organization. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 3 NEW YO4pp!'TMSg For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 7 January 1968 G YRGHT '56 Soviet TV Film Omits Khrushchevl ap.UU to The New York T1mes year. But the rebellion, which The producers were frank! was suppressed by the Soviet about the tragedies of those Army, is described as a result years, however, and particularly of plotting and active interven- denounced the dictator for the lion by Western imperiatists, purges In which thousands were 1shot and millions sent to labor primarily the United States. camps. MOSCOW, Jan. 6-Nikita S. Khrushchev, in his momentous "secret speech" before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Com- munist party in 1956, exposed Stalin as a tyrant whose abuses of power had caused suffering to millions and inflicted great harm on Soviet society. The speech marked a turning point In Soviet history, but in a one-hour television documen- tary, about that turbulent year, the producers have succeeded in recalling the events without once mentioning Mr. Khrusch- chev's name or even alluding to his existence. He was ousted from power three years ago. The documentary shown to. night, briefly records that the 20th party congress demolished the myth of Stalin and con. demned his rule of terrorism. But full credit Is given to the party and its Central Commit- tee. Hungarian Revolt Recalled The film also deals with the anti-Communist uprising in Hungarian rebels are shown firing on streets at troops and security police. The narrator says. that weapons and anti Communist Hungarian emigres had been infiltrated into the country from Austria. The television documentary films, each devoted to a year of Soviet rule, began to bet shown last fall to mark the 50th anniversary of the Bolshe- vik Revolution, celebrated Nov. 7. The programs were inter- rupted shortly before the holi. day and were resumed Dec. 25 with 1953, the year of Stalin's death. In contrast to the blackout on Mr. Khrushchev, the films about the nineteen-thirties and forties occasionally showed Stalin,' usually without comment. WASHINGTON POST 7 January 1968. Soviets Put Nikita out .Of Picture Reuters MOSCOW, Jan. 6 Soviet historians, who decreed Josef Stalin a nonperson, may have decided the same fate for Niki- ta Khrushchev, the Soviet lead er who began the historic pro- cess of destalinization. Congress of the Communist Party, at which Khrushchev, then Party Secretary, de The official Soviet motion Picture record of the year 1956, released tonight, in. eludes the momentous 20th The films about the years,' after Stalin's death have care- fully avoided mention of Mr. Khrushchev, who became party ~chiief, and Georg,' M. Malenkov, who took over the premiership. Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, who was named Premier in 1955 forced to step down, appeared fleetingly in a scene of young Communist volunteers arriving in Kazakhstan to plant the the vast vigin lands to wheat. The marshal's portrait was being raised by someone at the edge of a crowd of welcomers. . Narration of the years since Stalin death poses a sensitive political problem for the films' producers since most of the members of the post-Stalin col- lective leadership have since been disbraced. ality" and liquidating his hne- mies in a reign of terror. But the motion picture does not name either Stalin or Khrushchev, who was ousted In 1964 and now lives in re- tirement in Moscow. The commentator of the movies-part of a series de. voted to 50 years of Commu? nist power-begins to speak in solemn tones and back- ground music fades out as the movie comes to the 20th Con. gress. Ile'tells listeners that dele. gates' to the Congress dis- cussed "temporary failures and mistakes." The film at no time shows the Presidium of the Congress wh - ere Khrushchev sat-but only shots of rank-and?filc delegates. A brief reference to the arrival of Yugoslav President! Tito for his first visit t M s I o o ? pounced the 1 e d' tfor for cow after the s w' f~j.pvod-, ?g>tr a M. 005/ d Rsi;At- oi4 Ing a train and striding across the platform with his hand outstretched. But as he approaches his host, Khrushchev, the scene fades out. CPYRGH7 28 December 1967 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00049004}5 much to Influence Spanish 'party challenges the policies of their countries now. It Policies that its own diplomatic and economic seuvi- .~ ... fine eauld d t t th o m rn e 1st royalists" to prevail. it had TILE S p a n I a h Communist ! to give them some indication of h I d P hi s manage arty, w c from a secret headquarters In Eastern Europe on funds pro. vided by the Kremlin, has bitten hard the hand that feeds It The party has rejected Moscow's prompting that It The Communist World by Victor Zorza o a urn isting regimes away from pendence on the United States. The Kremlin's Spanish policy should work with other political forces in Spain to establish a constitutional monarchy. It Soviet support. This is why the added insult to injury by Izvestia" article was published. announcing this over ' Radio The quarrel between the Independent Spain," a sup- Spanish party-in-exile and the posedly clandestine radio station Kremlin reflects the wider dis- which Is operated from Czecho- pute in the world Communist Slovakia with the aid of Soviet movement between the funds. moderates and the radicals. In The Soviet Union's preference Latin America the Cubans and for Spahish royalty was con- their associates, much farther to veyed by an article in "Izvestiathe Left than the Spanish party, the official. Government paper, 'represent the radicals who are Had the article appeared In a :impatient at Russia's flirtation "less responsible paper," said with the "reactionary" regimes. the Spanish Communist Party's They suspect that the reply,. we would have taken no Kremlin is pursuing Russian notice of it." But the publication national Interests In Latin' of it In "Izvestia " might cause America rather than those of the some people to think, said the' world revolution, and that In broadcast, that the article doing so it is hindering their. reflected the views of the Spanish own revolution. This Is a com party, or, worse still, that it was plaint often heard in the Conr- an attempt to " correct " the munist parties since the early party's attitude. days of the Comintern, particu- But the article was neither of larly after Stalin transformed the, these things, the broadcast Communist International into a declared. " We formulate our tool of Soviet foreign policy. town policy" If the party were Gold estion to o " follow the line 1* set out in qu " Izvestia," the broadcast said., There were certainly many the Spanish Communists would Spanish Communists during the. fall into error. Spanish Civil War who thought The broadcast thus says, in that their party was being bled effect, that the " Izvestia " to death for the greater glory of .article was not an attempt to . Stalin. Their suspicions were dictate to the Spanish party-but silenced by the r u t h l e s s that. If It was, the Spanish party operations of Stalin's s e c r e t will not have it. This Is only an police whose tentacles extended attempt to sweeten the pill, for. even over the battleflelds of the writer of the " Izvestia " Spain. article cannot have been in recent -years, there have !unaware of the party's uncom- been several unofficial attempts promising stand against the by Moscow to reestablish diplo- monarchy. First step' in other words, "Izvestia " was reflecting the views of the Kremlin, as it always does In matters of policy. There is some disagreement among Spanish ;Communists as to whether they of the monarchy as a first. step. matic relations with Spain. One of the difficulties which stands In the way of a reconciliation is ' the question of Spanish gold, 500 .tons of which was shipped to Moscow during the civil war. So far the Russians have refused to return IL The Spanish Communists, whose political following in the country is small but not Insignificant, would naturally suspect that In Spain, too, Russia Because the Spanish party 1s, seeking to satisfy its own Internal affairs. But since the whether the Communists can interference in the party's #ry ' rotilme's bet'ause It uuhlr and it would evidently prefer to :see a liberal "constitutional monarchy" as a step towards a regime of the Left. The Spanish Communists, on the other hand, fear that a constitutional monarchy might .prove to be so strong as to keep their party out in the cold for a long time- to come. In a statement broadcast by "Radio Independent Spain" at the beginning of this month, the s general secretary of the Spanish !Communist Party, Santiago Car- rifle, maintained that the Com- munls+ts had repeatedly said that they would never take part in any action to restore the monarchy. If the monarchy was restored, they would regard It as a " continuation of the dicta. torship," even though it might try to present itself as a " liberal " regime. But the "Izvestia " article, published a few days later. said that " monarchy " and " reaction " need not be synonymous. Den- mark and Norway were monar- ,chies, but their peoples enjoyed democratic freedoms In a remark that might have been addressed directly to the Spanish Communist Party, "Izvestia" said that "one must not fail to take into account the possibility of the restoration of the monarchy, if only for a time." Don Juan, the Pretender, "Izvestia" said, was In favour of a dynamic and liberal monarchy, and had declared that he Wanted to occupy the throne only with the support and agreement of the people. Differences Where, asked " Radio Indepcn. dent Spain," had " Izvestia " obtained Don Juan's views I " We do not know these opinions," it declared. The " Izvestia " article had presented " a variety of debatable proposi- tions " which " were bound to cause confusion "-presumably in the minds of party members, who might come to look with favour on a constitutional ' monarchy, in opposition to the party leadership. But there was a " profound difference" between the stand of " our party," said the broadcast, and the view expressed by " Izvestia." That was why the party had decided to publish this " Inrlflcsi bii" ut If as more than a c~artAcation--ft is this, the -Kremlin could not those of the Spanish Communist a challenge, and a declaration of formal declare that It favoure Party. Independence. which Is sympto- ~itd ,t1~ i n w situation In the since thishl VpgkP>~tlerc}t gasq 21Q~ cr 0 *6MLb3061A000U96Ilist movement. 25X1C1OB L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 F:OR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968 PROBLEMS OF REFORM IN CHILE Eduardo FREI Montalva's election as President of Chile in September 196+ was hailed by democratic forces as a major step forward in the his- tory of a country long considered one of the most stable and democratic in Latin America. It was hoped that his dynamic, reform-minded Christian Democratic administration would prove to be an effective alternative to Communism by offering a real route to social and economic progress. Frei's decisive victory in the presidential election was followed six months later by an impressive Christian Democratic Party (PDC) showing in the March 1965 congressional elections. The PDC, won a majority in the Chamber of Deputies as well all the Senate seats it contested. However, the Senate majority remained in opposition hands, presenting a serious ob- stacle to the passage of Frei's reform measures. Since December 1966 the Senate has been controlled by an informal coalition of the Communist- Socialist front, FRAP (Popular Action Front), and the opportunistic Radi- cal Party (PR), supported at times by the conservative National Party (PN). In January 1967 the PN voted with this combination in the Senate to embarrass the government by withholding permission for Frei to make an official trip to the United States. Christian Democratic Party What is Christian Democracy? Its definition varies from country to country in Latin America. The movement is a force on the left which espouses change and reform, often radical in nature. It has parties in 16 of Latin America's 20 countries, but only in four of them -- Chile, Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador -- is the movement of current political significance. In only one of these -- Chile -- is the PDC the governing party. Christian Democracy is based essentially on the Roman Catholic Church's growing liberalization in social issues. While the majority of Christian Democrats are Roman Catholics, the ideology of the party throughout Latin America is one of general Christian practice and not especially one that is grounded in the precepts and tenets of Roman Catholicism. Many Latin American Christian Democrats have renounced the teachings of the Catholic Church. The changes advocated by the PDC are broad in range and include agrarian and tax reform, and extensive economic planning and control by the state. Classical capitalism is repudiated. The Christian Democratic movement is def4nitely on the left, but the distance from the center varies from country to country. No matter where the parties stand, however, Chile's President Frei may be regarded as the symbolic hemispheric leader of the movement. Recent PDC Trends toward the Far Left After Frei's victory the PDC was faced with the problem of changing from an opposition party to a governing party. Frei had drained off many of the most able, moderate party members for positions in his government, leaving a leadership vacuum which he himself refused to fill -- he feels Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 that the position of the presidency transcends party leadership respon- sibilities. The left-wing "rebel" faction of the PDC -- taking advantage of its newly acquired freedom of action -- gained control of the party on 16 July 1967 by taking over the national council and the presidency of the party. Five days before the party elections last July, the PDC rebel fac- tion asserted its independence of the Frei administration by engineering a party resolution approving the formation of a Chilean committee of the Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). The declaration damaged Chile's image in both North and South America and disheartened Christian Democrats elsewhere in Latin America who had regarded the Chilean party as a prime example of successful radical reforms through peaceful means. Frei reacted by denouncing LASO and labeling Chilean delegates to the LASO Conference as "traitors," point- ing out that while he had no legal means of preventing LASO from forming a local committee, his government "will repress without hesitation any subversive intent and will not permit Chile to be the base for any action whatsoever which interferes in the free self-determination of other peoples," adding that "Chile has all the means necessary" to control extremists. One of the first acts of the new PDC governing group was to appoint a commission to "stimulate a non-capitalistic way of development." The commission's "Chonchol Report" advocated large-scale government inter- vention in the economy and nationalization of industry and conflicted directly with Frei's more moderate reform program. Shortly thereafter, the rebels demanded that Frei shake up his cabinet, firing the ministers of health and labor, whom they considered too far to the conservative right; Frei refused, saying that the selection of cabinet officers is the prerogative of the president -- but he did compromise by agreeing to consult the new party leadership on important questions of internal and foreign affairs. A drop in popular support for both Frei and the PDC was indicated in the 2 April 1967 municipal elections, when Frei, placing his adminis- tration and program on the line in the hope of turning the municipal voting into a plebescite for the PDC, received only 35.6 per cent of the vote -- a distinct decrease from the 42.3 percentage received in the 1965 congressional elections. However, Frei regained at least interim control of the PDC on 7 January of this year at a special party convention where after a hard-fought 15-hour battle during which the President made two personal apperances to defend his program -- he received a vote of confidence of 278 against 202. Senator Rafael Gumucio, the rebel leader, and his directorate stepped down to make room for the new chairman, Jaime Castillo Velasco, former Land and Colonization Minister and staunch supporter of President Frei. The PDC convention pledged support for Frei's reform program, including his wage adjustment legislation, but voted against his one-year ban on strikes. (See Attachment A) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Communist Party of Chile (P.CCh) During the course of the recent disputes in Latin America between adherents of the Cuban brand of militant revolutionary Communism and the advocates of the more moderate Moscow line of peaceful revolution, the PCCh has consistently favored the "via pacifica." Secretary General Luis Corvalan is one of the foremost Latin American proponents of the theory that the correct strategy for achieving Communist goals in a par- ticular country can best be determined by the local Communist Party, and that armed revolution is not the way to success in Chile. To prove this thesis the PCCh will have to make an all out effort to gain power through legal means; therefore it can be expected to attempt to broaden its popular base aslmuch as possible in preparation for the 1970 election. Corvalan, in an article in the "World Marxist Review" for July 1967 (see Attachment B), claims that this is being accomplished: "The Communist effort gradually to win over the masses from the Christian Democrats, delivering them from bourgeois influence and rallying petit-bourgeois support for the People's Action Front, is bearing fruit." Since July 1967 PCCh has made several steps toward inspiring a loose left-to-far- left coalition with the Radical and Socialist parties, even though a new split within the Socialists themselves (see below) and other factors may keep these three parties from any meaningful coalition behind a common presidential candidate in 1970. The PCCh took an active part in the campaign of Alberto Baltra, the Radical Party's +aandidate for the senatorial by-election on 17 December 1967, and the Communists and the Radicals are likely to continue their cooperation. Baltra won the senate seat by a narrow margin over the PDC candidate Jorge Lavandero, who received little help from his party. Socialist Party of Chile (PS) Dissensions within the PS during the last year tended to strain the unity of the FRAP, the Communist-Socialist coalition of several years' standing, in its struggle against the Frei administration. In a PS Party plenum in June Senator Raul Ampuero, motivated by presidential ambitions and disagreeing with Socialist Party leader Salvador Allende, withdrew from the meeting, taking with him another Senator, six deputies, and 15 (of about 30) regional secretaries. Ampuero, who has since been expelled from the party, threatens to drain off the remainder of his so-called "popular socialist" following from the PS and establish a party of his own -- thereby creating a special dilemma for the Communists, who would then be forced to maintain working relations with two groups opposed to each other. At the PS Party congress in November, Senate President Allende, long a supporter of Castro's extremist views, suddenly found himself on the other side of the fence. The extremist faction of the PS, which had come out strongly against supporting Radical Party candidate Baltra for the special senatorial election on 17 December, vilifying the PR as an "opportunistic bourgeois grouping," and condemning the electoral process as a means to power, decided not to participate in the election. Allende, Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 booed when he counseled moderation toward the Radicals, threatened to resign the Senate presidency and did, in fact, later turn over his official duties to an acting president. Meanwhile, the extremist faction, strength- ened by the Ampuero withdrawal from party leadership, threatened to form a new party -- possibly in combination with the Movement of the Revolu- tionary Left (MIR) and other ultra extremists -- unless the congress adopted a harder line toward elections. The congress finally decided on a compro- mise course -- to abstain from the December senatorial by-election and participate in future elections on a selective basis only. The decision will further increase the strains within FRAP, since the PCCh is committed to the legal road to power. Student Trends toward the Far Left In the student field there has also been a significant turn to the extreme left. In the Concepcion University Student Federation (FEC) elections the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Socialist University Brigade (BUS) formed a coalition to defeat the Christian Demo- cratic slate. The FEC Council will be composed of five members of the winning coalition, three Christian Democratic Youth members and one Radi- cal Youth member. The new president, Luciano Cruz of the MI4, was expelled from the Communist Party youth organization in 196+ for adopting a posi- tion more radical and extreme than that held by the Communist Party. The election of Cruz would seem to indicate that University of Concepcion students openly support violent revolutionary change. Frei's Reform Program In spite of opposition from both the extreme left and the far right, the PDC reform program has made some headway. Just past the mid point of his "revolution in liberty," Frei has managed to obtain some of the neces- sary legislation for his program, although in his own party the left wing seems to have more in common with the Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front than with the-government.- Frei's land reform program has been. hailed as the best of its kind in Latin America. The Land Reform law, which was signed 16 July 1967 by Frei, proposes to parcel out 100,000 small holdings to landless farm workers, squatters who have worked land they do not own for at` 'least five years, sharecroppers, renters, and caretakers or owners of land insufficient to support one family. The lan.d,which will be sold to peasants without down payment and on long-term credit, will be expropriated from other land holders, who will be paid in cash and bonds over the next 25 years. Land can be expropriated if it is larger than 160 acres of irrigated land, if it has been abandoned and lies fallow, or if it is poorly administered or upproductive. This does not mean all large farms will be taken over by the government for sale. In outlining his program Frei has said: "There are 260,000 farms in Chile; we propose to expropriate only 4,000 of these." All this is to be accomp- lished in the next five years, according to'Frei's program. In this pro- gram as well as in most of his other reforms, Frei is caught in a cross- fire by his political opponents -- the Communist and Socialist parties Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 4 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 are claiming that the law does not go far enough in that it will not pre- vent the rich land-holders from hanging on to their properties by hook or crook, and the rightwing interests contend that turning over good land to Chile's ignorant campesinos is a criminal waste. Inflation has long been recognized as a major problem in Chile by the Frei administration. His latest measure to,combat increasing inflation is a composed wage adjustment plan which would limit wage increases in both public and private sectors, establish a wage increase partly payable in slow-maturing government savings bonds, prohibit strikes for additional wage increases and impose extensive price controls. A 24-hour general strike in protest against this wage bill was called on 23 November by the Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh), which is controlled by the Communist and Socialist Parties. The strike was also supported by non- Communist unions not affiliated with CUTCh. The government initiated proceedings against the leaders of the strike charging them with "organi- zing, guiding and promoting" massive riots, Wrhich left at least five per- sons dead and 66 injured. The 35-day strike at the Anaconda Copper Com- pany's mine was settled on 4 December, with wage increases far above the government's suggested guidelines. Other copper workers struck last month, both in sympathy with the Anaconda miners and in cooperation with the strike of 23 November. When their contracts expire next year they will undoubtedly demand wage increases at least equal to those attained by the Anaconda workers, thus ending Government hopes for wage and price restraint in 1968. Frei has initiated other reforms -- some quite unpopular with the voters. In order to lessen Chile's dependence on imported foodstuffs and conserve foreign exchange, he placed a ban on the sale of beef three weeks out of every four; and in an effort to regularize the working day, he shortened the daily three-hour siesta and placed strict regulations on the hours of movies and bars. In the fields of education and housing the Frei administration had made significant progress. Other portions of Frei's reform program, however, have not fared so well -- his revision of corporation law have been held up by the opposition majority in the senate. Any attempt to assess the Frei government's popularity, however, must take into account his successes and failures on issues such as agrarian reform and inflation. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness of his agrarian program -- just getting underway -- but he managed to reduce inflation from 48 per cent a year when the PDC took over in 1965 to 19 per cent in 1966. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Febrero de 1968 PROBLFMAS DE IA REFORMA EN CHILE La eleccidn de Eduardo Frei Montalva como Presidente de Chile, en septiembre de 1964, fu4 considerada por las fuerzas democrdticas como un paso hacia adelante en la historia de un pals considerado por largo tiempo como uno de los mds estables y democrdticos de Latinoameriea. Se espe- raba que su administraci6n Cristiano-Dem6crata, dindmica y reformista, probarla ser una alternativa efectiva al comunismo, ofreciendo una ruta verdadera hacia el progreso econ6mico y social. La decisiva victoria de Frei en las elecciones presidenciales fud seguida, seis meses mds tarde, en las elecciones para congresistas de 1965, per la presencia del impre- sionante Partido Dem6crata Cristiano (PDC). El PDC obtuvo la mayorfa en la Comara de Diputados y en todas las curules del Senado; sin embar- go, el Senado permaneci6 en manes de la oposici6n, presentando un serio obstdculo en la aprobaci6n de las medidas de reformas presentadas por Frei. Desde diciembre de 1966 el Senado ha estado controlado por una coalici6n informal del frente Socialista-Comunista, FRAP (Frente de Acci6n Popular), y del oportunista Partido Radical (PR), apoyado en oca- siones por el conservador Partido National (PN). En enero de 1967 el PN vot6 con esta combination en el Senado con el fin de sabotear al go- bierno denegando el permiso a Frei de un viaje oficial a los Estados Unidos. Partido Dem6crata Cristiano Qud es Democracia Cristiana? Su definici6n en America Latina, varfa segun el pals. El movimiento es una fuerza de izquierda que pro- mulga cambio y reforma, a menudo en forma radical. Tiene partidos en 16 de los 20 passes de la America Latina, pero solamente en cuatro de ellos - Chile, Peru, Venezuela y El Salvador - el movimiento tiene una verdadera importancia polftica. Unicamente en uno de estos passes - Chile - el PDC es el partido que gobierna. La Democracia Cristiana estd basada esencialmente en la creciente liberacidn social de la Iglesia Catdlica Romana. Aunque la mayorfa de los cristiano-dem6cratas son cat6licos romanos, la ideologla del Partido, a traves de America Latina, es la practicada por la generalidad.de los cristianos y no estd especialmente basada en los preceptor y normas del Catolicismo Romano. Muchos cristiano-dem6cratas latinoamericanos 'fan renunciado a las ense- fianzas de la Iglesia Catdlica. Los cambios abogados por el PDC son muy amplios e incluyen las reformas agraria y de impuestos, un extenso plan econ6mico y el control por el estado. El capitalismo cldsico es repu- diado. El movimiento Cristiano-Dem6crata es definitivamente de izquier- da, pero la distancia que to separa del centro varfa segun el pals. An sin tener en cuenta las tendencias de los partidos, puede conside- rarse al Presidente Frei de Chile como lfder simb6lico del movimiento en el hemisferio. - 1 - Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Recientes Tendencias del PDC hacia is Extreme Izquierda Despu4s de is victoria de Frei, el PDC se en;rent6 con el proble- ms de tener que cambiar de partido de oposici6a a partido de gobierno. Frei ha extrafdo de su partido a muchos de los miembros moderados mds capacitados pars ocupar posiciones en su gobierno, dejando un vacfo en la jefatura que 61 mismo rehusa ilenar -- 41 siente que la posici6n pre sidencial est6 por encima de las responsabilidades de is jefatura del partido. Ls fracci&n "rebelde" del ale izquierda del PDC -- aprove chdndose de su libertad de acci6n recientemente adquirida, obtuvo el control del partido el 16 de Julio de 1967, tomando las riendas del consejo nacional y ocupando is presidencia del partido. Cinco dfas antes de las elecciones del partido en Julio pasado, la fracci6n rebelde del PDC asent6 su independencia de is administraci6n de Frei con is elaboraci6n de una resoluci6n del partido aprobando is formaci6n de un comit6 chileno de is 0rganizaci6n Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (OCAS) - organizaci6n apoyada por Cuba. La deelaraci6n afect6 is imagen de Chile en Norte y Sur Am4rica y descorazon6 a los cristiano-demdcratas en toda Am4rica Latina que hab:fan visto en el par- tido chileno el primer ejemplo del 4xito de las reformas radicales por medios pacfficos. Frei reaccion6 denunciando a OCAS y tildando de "traidores" a los delegados chilenos a is Conferenc:La de OCAS, senalan do que aunque 61 no tenfa medios legales pars imped:tr a OCAS is formaci6n de un comit6 local, su gobierno "reprimir6 sin vacilar todo intento sub- versivo y no permitird que Chile sea la base pars cual ,uier acci6n que interfiers con is libre determinaci6n de otros pueblos', anadiendo, "Chile tiene todos los medios necesarios" pars controlar a los extre- mistas. Uno de los primeros actos del nuevo grupo gobernante del PDC fug el de nombrar una comisi& pars "estimular una forms no capitalis- ts de desarrollo". La comisi6n "Iaforme Chonchol", abog6 por una in- tervenci6n del gobierno en gran escala en is economi.'a y en is naciona- lizacidn de is industria e interfiri6 directamente con el programs de reforms mds moderado de Frei. Poco despuds los rebeldes pidieron que Frei rehiciera su gabinete ministerial, suspendiendo a los ministros de Salud y de Trabajo, a quienes ellos consideraban de tendencias de- masiado derechistas. Frei se neg6 diciendo que la selecci6n de los miembros del gabinete era una prerrogativa del presidente - pero se comprometi6 accediendo a consultar con is nueva jefatura del partido importantes aspectos sobre asuntos internos e internacionales. Las elecciones municipales del 2 de abril de 1967 indicaron una baja en el apoyo a Frei y al PDC, cuando Frei, al poner su administra- ci6n y su programs en juego con is esperanza de convertir las elecciones municipales en un plebiscito pare el PDC, obtuvo solemente el 35,6 por ciento de la votaci6n - una baja apreciable del 1+2,3 por ciento que obtuvo en las elecciones pars congresistas en 1965. Sin embargo, Frei volvi6 a ganar por lo menos el control inte- rino del PDC el 7 de enero de este aflo en was convenci6n especial del tsrtido, donde - despu4s de was ardorosa lucha de 15 horas, durante less cuales el presidente se hizo presente dos veces pars defender su Approved For Release 2005/94221-: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 programs, recibid un voto de confianza de 278 contra 202. El lfder re- belde, Senador Rafadl Gumucio y su directiva se retiraron para dejar el lugar al nuevo director, Jaime Castillo Velasco, Ex-ministro de Tierras y Colonizacidn y partidario incondicional de Frei. La convenei6n del PDC invoc6 la ayuda pare el programs de reforms de Frei incluyendo su legislacidn sobre ajuste de salarios pero vote en contra de su procla- ma de ilegalizar las huelgas durante un ano (v4ase anexo A). Partido Comunista Chileno (PCCh) Durante el curso de las recientes disputas en Amdrica Latina entre los partidarios del comunismo revolucionario militante de sello cubano y los partidarios de is lfnea de Moscd, de revolucidn pacffica, el PCCh ha favorecido continuamente is "v:fa pacffica". El Secretario General Luis Corvaldn es uno de los principales proponentes latinoamericanos de la teorfa de que is estrategia corrects pars lograr las metal comunistas en un determinado pats, debe ser establecida por el partido comunista en un determinado:,pafs, y clue una revoluci6n armada no es la forma de obtener dxito en Chile. Para probar data tCsis, el PCCh tendril que ha- cer un verdadero esfuerzo a fin de ilegar al poder por medios legates; sin embargo, es de esperar que intente aumentar su base popular tanto como sea posible a fin de prepararse pars las elecciones de 1970. Cor- valdn, en un artfculo en la "World Marxist Review" (Revista Mundial Marxists) de Julio de 1967 (ver anexo B), pretende que se estd logrando, "el esfuerzo comunista de ganarse gradualmente a las masas de los cris- tianos demdcratas, liberdndolas de is influencia burguesa y obteniendo el soporte del peque n burgues pare el Frente de Accidn Popular, estd dando su fruto". Desde Julio de 1967 el PCCh ha dado varios pasos ha- cia is inspiraci6n de una coalicidn suelta de izquierda a extreme ipio: ghierda con los partidos Radical y Socialists, adn cuando una nuevarup- tura dentro de los mismos socialistas (vdase adelante) y otros factores, pueden mantener a estos partidos apartados de ens coalicidn significan- te respaldando a un candidato presidencial comdn en las elecciones de 1970. El PCCh tomb parte active en is campana de Alberto Baltra, el candidato del Partido Radical para las elecciones de senadores el 17 de diciembre de 1967 y parece que los comunistas y los radicales conti- nuardn dando su colaboracien. Baltra gan6 la curul del senado por un estrecho margen sobre el candidato del PDC, quien recibid poca ayuda de su partido. Partido Socialists Chileno (PS) Las disenciones dentro del PS durante el ano pasado tendieron a atirantar is unidad del FRAP, is coalici6n comunista-socialista por varios afios en su lucha contra is administracidn de Frei. En un pleno del PS celebrado en Junio, el senador Radd1 Ampuero, ilevado por ambi- ciones presidenciales y en desacuerdo con el lfder del Partido Socia- lista, Salvador Allende, se retir6 de la asamblea, arrastrando consi- go a un senador, seis diputados y quince (de aproximadamente 30) secre- taries regionales. Ampuero, quien desde entonces ha estado expulsado del partido, amenaza con buscar la escisidn del remanente de los que 41 llama "socialistas populares" que an siguen en el PS, y establecer en partido propio -- creando por consiguiente un especial dilema a los comunistas, quienes entonces tendrdn que mantener relaciones de trabaJo con dos grupos opuestos entre sf. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 --3 - Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 En el congreso del PS celebrado en noviembre, el Presidente del Senado, Allende, por mucho tiempo partidario de los pantos de vista extremistas de Castro se encontr6 al otro lado de is vaila. La frac- ci6n extremista del PS que se habfa pronunciado fuertemente en contra del apoyo al candidate del Partido Radical, Baltra? para las eleccio- nes especiales de senadores del 17 de diciembre, calificando al PR de "agrupaci6n burguesa oportunista" y condenando el proceso electoral como medio del poder, decidi6 no participar en las elecciones. Allende fug abucheado cuando aconsej6 moderaei6n hacia los radicales, amenaz6 on retirarse de la presidencia del senado y efectivemente lo hizo mas tarde relegando su posici6n a un preside-ate encargado. Mientras tanto, la fracci&n extremists reforzada con is renuncia de Ampuero de la jefa- tura del partido, amenazaba con former un nuevo partido -- posiblemente con el Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) y otros ultra-extre- mistas -- a menos que el congreso adoptara una ifnea mds severs en las elecciones. Finalmente el congreso se decidi6 por un curso de compro- miso -- abstenorse en las elecciones pare senadores en diciembre y par- ticipar en las elecciones futuras dnicamente en una base selectiva. La decisi6a aumentard posteriormente las escisiones dentro del FRAP, ya que el PCCh estd comprometido a is via legal pars el poder. Tendencia de los Estudiantes hacia is Extremes Izguierda En el campo estudiantil tambi4n ha habido un giro fundamental hacia la extreme izquierda. En las elecciones de is Federaci6n Estu- diantil de la Universidad de Concepci6n (FBC), el Movimiento de iz- uierda revolucionaria (MIR) y is Brigada Universitaria Socialists BUS) formaron una coalici6n pare derrotar a is fracci&n Dem6crata Cristiana. El consejo de is FEC estard compuesto por cinco miembros de is coalici6n ganadora, tres miembros-.de is Juventud Dem6crata- Cristiana y un miembro de is Juventud Radical. El nuevo presidente, Luciano Cruz, del MIR, fug expulsado de is organizaci6n de is juven- tud del Partido Comunista en 1964 por adoptar una posici6n mds radical y extreme que is que segufa el Partido Comunista. Is elecci6n de Cruz parece indicar que los estudiantes de is Universidad de Concepci6n apoyan abiertamente el cambio revolucionario violento. Programs de Reforms de Frei A pesar de is oposici6n tanto de is extreme derecha como de is extreme izquierda, el programs de reforms del PDC ha hecho algdn progre- so. Justamente, habiendo pasado del punto medio de au "revoluci6n en libertad", Frei ha.conseguido obtener algo de is legs laci6n necesaria pars su programs, an cuando en su propio partido el ala izquierda pa- rezca estar ins en comdn con el Frente de Aeci6n Popular Comunista-So- cialista que con el gobierno. El programs de reforms. agraria de Frei ha sido ensaisado comp el mejor de su clase en Amdrica Latina. La Ley de Reforms Agraria que fug firmada por Frei el 16 de Julio de 1967.. propone percelar 100.000 pequefios lotes pare los campesinos sin tierra, arrendatarios que hayan trabajado por lo menos cinca aflos terrenos ajenos, cosecheros, mayordomos o propietarios de tierra tusuficiente pars mantener una familia. La tierra que nerd v*ndida a los campesinos sin cuota inicial y a un largo plazo, serd expropiada a otros propieta- rios a quienes se les pagard on dinero y on bones durante los 25 alas siguientes. La tierra podrd ser a opiada si t s yor Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-0306 0 u Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 de 160 acres de tierra irrigada, si ha sido abandonada y permanece des- montada o si estd pobremente administrada o se encuentra improductiva. Esto no quiere decir que Codas las fincas grandes vayan a ser apropia- das por el gobierno pars su vents. Al delinear este programs, Frei ha dicho: "En Chile hay 260.000 fj.ncas; nos proponemos expropiar solamente 4.000". Todo esto serd llevado a cabo en los pr6ximos cinco anos de acuerdo con el programs de Frei. En este programs al igual que en Is mayor parte de sus otras reformas, Frei estd entre dos fuegos, sus opo- nentes politicos - los.partidos socialista y comunista reclaman que is ley no vs lo suficientemente lejos al no impedir que los terratenientes retengan sus propiedades por medios tortuosos o aviesos, y los intereses de las derechas claman que entregar buenas tierras a los ignorantes campesinos chilenos es un desperdicio criminal. La inflacidn ha sido reconocida durante largo tiempo por la ad- ministracida de Frei como el mayor problems en Chile. Su ltima medida pars combatir la creciente inflacidn es un plan compuesto de reajuste de salarios que limite al aumento de los mismos, tanto en los sectores pdblicos como privados, establecer un aumento en los salarios pagadero parte en bonos de ahorro del gobierno a 1 argo plazo, prohibir las huel- gas par demanda de aumento en los salarios e imponer un extenso control sobre los precios. El 23 de noviembre, la Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh) que estd controlada por los partidos socialista y co- munista, llam6 a una.huelga general de 24 horas en protests contra esta ley de salarios. La huelga f ud apoyada tambien por uniones no comunis- tas ni afiliadas a la CUICh. El gobierno inici6 procesos contra los lfderes de la huelga acusdndoles de "organizar, guiar y promover" moti - nes masivos que dejaron un saldo por lo menos de cinco muertos y 66 he- ridos. La huelga de 35 dfas en la mina. de is Compa.nfa de Cobre Anacon- da fud solucionada el 4 de diciembre con un aumento de salarios muy por encima de las lfneas promulgadas por el gobierno. Otros mineros de cobre hicieron huelga el mes pasado pars simpatizar, tanto con los mi- cros de Anaconda como pars cooperar con is huelga del 23 de noviembre. Cuando sus contratos expiren el ano entrante, sin duds, demandardn au- mentos de salarios por lo menos iguales a los obtenidos por los traba- jadores de Anaconda, acabando asf con las esperanzas del gobierno de una restriceidn en los precios y salarios en 1968. Frei ha iniciado otras reformas - algunas bastante impopulares pars los votantes, a fin de reducir la dependencia de Chile en alimen- tos importados y conservar el cambio exterior, implantd Una disposicidn prohibiendo is venta.de carne tres.semanas de cads cuatro; y en un es- fuerzo pars regularizar Is jornada de trabajo,,acortd-la siesta diaria de tres horse y establecid regulaciones estrictas en be horarios de los cines y de los bares. En los campos de educaci6n y vivienda, la administracidn Frei tuvo progresos de importancia. Otros aparte del programs de reforma de Frei no han ten.do tanta suerte - su revisidn de la ley sobre corporaciones ha sido rechazada en el senado.por is oposi- cidn mayoritaria. Sin embargo, el cualquier intento pare tasar la popularidad del gobierno de Frei, deben tomarse en consideracidn sus dxitos y fracasos en aspectos tales como el de la reforms agraria y is inflaci6n. Es muy Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-~DP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 V pronto an Para juzgar la efectividad de su programa agrario -- recien puesto en marcha -- pero 1ogr6 reducir la inf'laei6n en un 48 por ciento, cuando el PCD asumi6 el poder y en un 19 por ciento en 1966. Approved For Release 2005/04/21a EIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 CHRI,i ~WNV*(We gW05/04(:J1) : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 CPYIRGHT Frei w I ins ao,nahea on Chilean reforms Bye%stafr correspondent of made Mr. Frei's role quite difficult - in The Christian Science Monitor light of the sharp opposition he faces from both Left and Right in Chile's political Mexico City spectrum. Eduardo Frei Montalva's success in re. gaining control of leadership of his party is a personal triumph for the Chilean Chris. tian Democratic President. At the same time, victory provides Chile's reformist President with new impetus to carry out his moderate program of national reforms. As seen by hemisphere observers here, Mr. i~ rei's success at ousting extremists from control of party apparatus signals a smooth- er path in his struggle to win nationwide sup- port for his reforms. On the Left, the Communist Socialist amal- gam known as Frente de Accibn Popular (FRAF) has called the Frei reforms "too little and too late," in the words of the Socialist leader, Sen. Salvador Allende Got. sens, who lost out in the 1964 presidential election to Mr. Frei. Rightist opposition On the Right, oldtime conservative and liberal parties are banded together in a new national party, and represent conserva- tive business and landholding groups. Also to the right of the Christian Democrats but The Frei victory came in a marathon 1S. 6r,1raatiy regarueu as sumewnati muuerare hour party congress which ended in the clear is the Radical Party. party mandate for the President's reform In numerous electoral contests, as well program. The majority of delegates voted as in the arena of political debate, these 278 Ito 202 to support the President. forces have presented stiff opposition to It was a hard-fought battle, requiring two Mr. Frei. Frei appearances. But in the final tally, the Thus when control of the Christian Demo- six-month extremist hold on party leader. cratic Party appartus fell into the hands of ship was ended and extremist leaders re. extremists last June, Mr. Frei was pre- signed. sented with a serious new obstacle to his Jaime Castillo, onetime Frei cabinet mem- reform program. For a time it appeared ber and perhaps leading Christian Demo- to observers that he was losing control of cratic theoretician, was promptly elected his own party, Chile's largest. new president of the party in wake of the There have been numerous hints, however, resignations. that in the crucial vote Mr. Frei would still be able to rally the party behind him. Moderation criticized And he did just that in a speech which Regarded as a noncontroversial party fig* observers on the scene say was a rousing call for support. ure but one loyal to President Frei, Mr. "I have been criticized for attempting to Castillo is expected to concentrate his at- proceed with prudence. . . and this has tention on ending party differences. occurred within my own party," President These differences are significant. Opposi. Frei said in the course of his speech. "The Lion forces to Mr. Frei, headed by Rafael opposition exploits these sputterings to in- Agustin Gumucio, say the President has flame the impatient ones." The President said an international con. not moved fast enough with his reforms. spiracy of the "economic right" combined Moreover, they say reforms announced to with "international Marxism" was a serious date are too moderate. They also have threat to his reform program and he called called for elimination of the capitalist sys- on all Christian Democrats to rally around tem in Chile and its replacement with a the party banner to work for moderate vague doctrine termed "comuntarian-. reforms. ism." In a special report titled "A Noncapitalist Controversial plan Route to Development," extremist elements In the voting during the party convention, expounded a philosophy which to many ob. held in Pehaflor, a small Chilean village 25 servers differs little from a program ad- vanced by Marxists and others of Chile's far miles from the capital city of Santiago, the Left. Christian Democrats voted to back almost Control of the Christian Democratic Party all parts of the reform program. This in. apparatus by forces of the extreme Left eluded the controversial and un o ular Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A00040004.000D-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 CPYRGHT forced-savings plan for all Chileans-a plan designed to curb the nation's rising infla- tionary pattern. The party did, however, vote against one Frei proposalLone that would ban all labor strikes fore one year. But this was a small defeat in the multihour session which saw a procession of votes which supported the Chilean Christian Democratic leader. Mr. Frei and his supporters argue that reform is essential for Chile, but it must come about through legislative vote and must not undermine the Chilean Constitu? tion. Mr. Frei calls his program a "revolu- tion in liberty." Key elements of the Frei program in. elude agrarian reform including land distri- bution, Chilcanization of the copper industry (in which the government owns a substan. tial share of foreign-controlled copper com. panics), education; reforms including expan. sion of the system to include all Chileans, tax reform, and significant housing construc- tion. 'Temporary setbacks' The Frei reform program has been widely viewed as a major test of whether a Latin- American nation can carry out reform within the context of existing social and economic order. The latest Frei victory gives new hope to those who believe such reform is possible. Many observers of the Chilean scene have not been overly concerned by setbacks to the Frei program which have occurred from time to time, saying, as one here this week said, "In'the end Mr. Frei always manages to win the battle despite temporary set- backs." Only time will tell, however, whether Mr. Frei has won a lasting victory over dissident elements within the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Castillo, new head of the party, said after assuming the post that he is inter- ested in being the leader of all Christian Democrats but refrained f om making any other statements on the party vote. In line with this, Radomiro Tomic, Chile's Ambassador to Washington and a member of party often regarded as Its leading presidential hopeful. for 1970, urged the party in a cable that "there will be neither winners nor losers" in the show- down. Approved For Release 2005/04/4 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 CPYRGHT WORLD NIA IST P,EfIE a rague Release 7- - July 1967 National Liberation Movement Today Alliance of the Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latbi America 1. The fig)tt against imperialist domination and against the oppression of local oligarchies. tense and arduous, diverse in form but single in content and ultimate aim, is gaining momentum in La+;:f Arena. Latin Americans are on the road to national and social liberation, , democracy pnd socialism. Their fight for freedom is conditioned by the need fqt social progress; their ship is sailing before the wind of'especially those forced to resort to armed struggle (in Guatemala, t history. ) Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia) or to function underground. i True, they have to contend with imperialism's aim of maintaining The Latin American wars of independence in the past century its grip onn;the continent and with the aim of the oligarchies to 'were continental wars. When Bolivar, Sucre, San Martin and two forces is in full swing. The time of grand battles has come: w~orth Ajnerican imperialism is resorting to undisguised inter- ' 'Wntion. It$ system of military pacts and missions, anti-guerilla training eer;ltres and units of "green berets", "black berets" and Rangers is a:form of armed aggression. President Johnson has stated he will stop qt nothing to prevent any other country from following Cuba's example. The Imperialists are prepared to sow death and destruction ijt town and village, flouting international law as they 1 did at Playa 6ir6n and Santa Domingo, and as they are doing every # day in Vietnam. The independence of every Latin American country is in jeopardy. The road to falvation, to a happy future, is that of battle. sovereignty and right to self-determination. As pointed out by the Thirteenth Congress of our.Party, "the supreme task, the task of tasks. Is to frustrate the aggressive designs of the imperialists. The fight for revolutionary reconstruction and people's rule blends with the fight against US intervention. for sovereignty, self-determination and peace". The historical mission of the proletariat is to abolish capitalism anti-imperialist action as they fight together for common aims against the aggressive interventionist policy of the Yankee im- perialists. The fight against US imperialism and the local oligarchies. their common enemy. is bringing the Latin-American re tcs chrser together. So are the imperatnts of solidarity wti.h the r:he ie:Yes or the world, particularly of Vietnam and Cuba, and with the anti- Imperialist and anti-feudal movements on our own continent, striving also for the freedom of the other American peoples: No national stales and nogcographical frontiers existed on ourcontinent in those days. The borders of the various colonial possessions were rather indistinct, and the independence armies fighting for the liberation of their people counted In their ranks officers and soldiers from other colonies. It was not until independence was won and capitalism began to develop that the national states came into existence. But. as before, the peoples of Latin America had a common destiny, common problems and common enemies. Still, they could not and did not escape the effects of the law or the uneven development of capitalism and capitalist society. Against the present general setting of back- wardness, there are appreciable disparities between the countries in levels of economic, political and social development. This gives the revolutions a national complexion and conditions their variety in form and discrepancy in time. For this reason. the present situation differs from that of the past century. However, Washington is pursuing its policy of aggression and Intervention throughout the continent, which, as the Cuban Communist Party stressed in its statement of May 18, "inter- nationalises aggressive wars, in which soldiers of different nationali- ties arc engaged, as in the Korean War and now in South Vietnam :fie with changes in the international situation. In the 'thirties, where North American, South Korean, Thai, Filipino, New Zealand ) when Hitler Germany was the centre of world reaction. the task was, and Australian troops have been committed, and as in Santo to rally all forces against fascism in defence of freedom. Now that; Domingo, where soldiers were shipped from Brazil, Costa Rica, US imperialism is the main reactionary force, the task is to enlist all Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay; furthermore, imperialism is forces against the imperialist policy of war and aggression, for the, trying through the OAS to build up an international armed force for liberation o' colonial, nco-colonial and dependent countries, for use against Cuba and the liberation movements on the continent". peace and peaceful coexistence, fusing these efforts with the fight: This necessitates joint action by the Latin-American peoples and for the social reconstruction imperative in every country. . imparts an all-continental complexion of outstanding international One or another specific aspect of the world-wide struggle against importance to their struggle. imperialism conics to the fore, depending on what the adversary is;1 Working hand in hand with the local oligarchies, imperialism doing in the particular area at the particular moment. Yet every area' spurns the principle of non-interference and the sovereignty and of battle is part of the single historical movement. frontiers of the Latin American countries. It espouses the so-called The October Revolution in Russia, the 50th anniversary of which Idoctrine of ideological frontiers, which revolutionaries have to we celebrate this year, marked the beginning of the end of capitalist counter with the utmost solidarity. Among other things, this pre- domination. It ushered in the socialist era, the time of the liberation supposes direct participation in the liberation struggles of fraternal of the working class and of pcoplcs oppressed by imperialism,; peoples wherever this is warranted by necessity. provided it is done Today, socialism is being built in Cuba on American soil. Social under their leadership. conflicts have engulfed our continent, which is an important theatre i In some cases. as in the anti-fascist war in Spain, revolutionaries In the world-wide battle against imperialism, for democracy, pence s of different nationalities may participate jn large numbers, with and socialism. Imperialist plunder. coupled with the tyranny of the marked political and historical effect. However. the most important feudal oligarchies, is imposing poverty and suffering on millions of contribution revolutionaries can make to liberation and working. Latin American workers. Peasants and Indians, and prejudicing the class victory on a world scale is struggle in their own country and Interests of students, white-collar workers, intellectuals, tradesmen their moral and material support to revolutionary battles in other .and industrialists, who no pk dh~ ~bl~dl~Q1' R?P78-03061AO00400040005-0 numbers, And they will gain in political awareness and extend their " t ont-nunlar Manl alto, Marx and Engels. the founders of Marxism and of proletarian Internationalism, stressed that "though . 'd build socialism, while the specific tasks may change in accord. not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat Willi the it is no secret that Latin America i revolutionaries nave ditlering bourgeoisie is at firggpatjl~~pgIteAP~>a~111~1t?431Ai'fFB~I~sO$OSFQOA~A0~4D1~tal+illency made its appearance country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own after considerable numbers of new fighters from the less politically bourgeoisie." developed sections of the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie joined In this national struggle it is the revolutionaries in each country the Latin American revolutionary movement, and after differences who determine the variou, aspects and concrete.tasks of the revolu- of an international order obstructing the struggle broke out among tion, They know the sonic situation setter thnii anybody 0100 and the revolutionaries. are in a far bcuer position to define the alms and the mcaiods of The allusion here is to problems bred by the development of attaining them. They may err, but are less likely to do so t! an others. modern society, the emergence of new extremely complex social equipped to assume full responsibility for working out the right I, course of action after a preliminary review of their own experience, The Cuban revolution is proof of the fact that reality plays havoc with preconceived assumptions, serving as a reminder of the folly, of generalising the singular fcatu~cs of this or that experience. This, is not to say, however, that the specific features of one revolu- tion, pay that, of the Cuban, will not recur elsewhere (at least in a somewhat different form). We believe, therefore, that in some Latin- 4 American countries revolution may be sparked off by a guerilla movement, as was the case in Cuba. For this to happen the courage and d4termination of a group of revolutionaries, though an important, sometimes even decisive l actor, is, pot enough. Much more essential are favourable general conditionst To be sure, we hold that they need be neither absolutely of maturiqq" with a clear prospect of becoming fully ripe. t tim f i l it i t pl t d fi th d th e C or ne e xac e erta n s no easy o e ace an e guerilla orriomc other form of armed action. Lenin warned against reckless vfures which, as a rule, cause a senseless waste of lives and c4' in retreat. On the other hand, Leninism has always been crew cly bold, infused with the desire to advance the revolutionary causIt would be wrong therefore both to reject out of hand or bliq'dly accept any specific form of struggle. The main thing is to empark squarely on. the path of struggle, size up the situation to the best of one's ability and decide on the most propitious course of action. The revolutionary must.be ready to take the offensive at any mo ent, to retreat when necessary, and to perceive situations favouurable for revolution. Many trends-men, women and youth of varying political views 2' and social backgrounds-have joined the liberation struggle. The important thing is to extend the anti-imperialist front and engage against, the common enemy all sections of the public, including those who may not be admirers of the Cuban revolution and revolution in general, but who have taken a stand in behalf of Cuba's right to build socialism and the right of all Latin American peoples to opt for the sy tem of their choice. Any attempt to impose the Communist view on the other anti- imperialist!,forccs, and similarly any attempt by the latter to impose their viewskon others, can but hamper unity of action and narrow the struggle! against the common enemy. This is wily the accent should be on. the specific tasks that all agree need to be serried out-that is, on what unites, rather than divides, Latin Ame ary movement. We believe that the Organisation for A an Solidarity (OLS) and the respective national country to country and to the growth of the revolutionary forces. Lenin pointed out that any growth of the working-class movement and appearance of new fighters and new sections of working people "is inevitably accompanied by vacillation in theory and tactics". And he called attention to the fact that "the yardstick of an imaginary ideal" will get us nowhere and that vacillation should be regarded as "a practical movement of ordinary people". In other words, what we are dealing with arc growing pains that cannot conceivably be removed overnight. But it is also a cogent fact that imperialism benefits from differences arising between the revolutionary forccs, and especially from differences in the Com- munist parties. It is our duty, therefore, to prevent differences from obstructing united action against the common enemy. DitTerences arising between Communist parties should not impede mutual understanding any more than differences between Communists and other revolutionaries should impe.tr th - common fight against imperialism. Experience has shown that open polemics results in senseless name-calling and in arbitrary judgments. It serves no useful purpose and only aggravates the difficulties. Sometimes, it is true, a party has no choice but to express its opinion publicly. We have nothing against this. Out we are sure that direct contacts, bilateral and multilateral meetings, :a tactful fraternal dialogue and, most important of nil, steadfast unity of ncllon, are the best way to further mutual understanding. The driving force of the revolution in Latin America comprises the working class, pcnsants (tire majority of whom in many the national bourgeoisie. There are contradictions between than, but common interests in the fight against US imperialism and the oligarchies predominate. This offers a serviceable basis for tinily and call: for closer bonds. Our policy of united action by all anti- imncrialist and anti-oligarchic forces builds nn the belief that an alliance of workers and peasants, of the proletariat and the non- proletarian elements, is the hest possible basis for an enduring and militant united front. To make headway, mutual understanding lictwccn proletarian and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries is absolutely essential. The proletariat, the most powerful social class on our continent, is still growing. As many as 40 million pcopie (of whom one out of } every three is a factory or farm labourer), or more than half the gainfully employed population between the Rio Grande and Cape Horn, earn a livelihood by selling their labour power. In five countries, that is, Mexico, Brazil, Aui'entina, Uruguay and Chile, with nearly two-thirds of the total potmtation of Latin America, the proletariat is relatively strong, and not in numbers only. Communist parties exist in all Latin American countries. Like the fraternal parties elsewhere in the world, irrespective of their degree of development, they expound ideas that strike terror into imperialism, of which they arc the most relentless enemies. They arc the bearers of the finest revolutionary traditions of their peoples and have acquitted themselves splendidly ire tl " :^'nortant committees fhould concentrate on extending and co-ordinating intcrnationat-solidarity and joint action. What is needed most is for all revolutionaries, all anti-imperialists and all popular movements on our cgflkrncnt to thrash out a common revolutionary standpoint. This, hop( cr, is inconceivable before a certain process of develop ment run .its course. We may accelerate the course, but cannot as; yet consider it completed. If, therefore, we were to try and impose a, standard' approach, entirely unnecessary difficulties would arise. The best way to facilitate unity in defence of the Cuban revolution and the fight against imperialism and its agents is to promote joint action and to accentuate what unites us, while rectifying whatever disunites us. CPYRGHT work of disseminating Marxism and socialist ideas, :N.._.--Ilding the scientific socialist outlook of the foremost workers and intcllcc- ti als. Cultivation of proletarian intcrnationism among the working class is one of their accomplishments. In brief, it is they who are forging_ the class consciousness of the Latin American proletariat and the ti-i r'a i t 7 s coies CPYRGHT In all the countries of Lttitalbunmarel>F?~bZietiemsgs~t8b6aN 1 (tlll1P8-t33~ rf,~~ t t amen the petty- subjected to persecution at one time or another. But they have nevergeolsie can be trace fo~ ft es g '',vag the the proletariat, flinched in face of the terror campaigns. Thousands have seen the to the years of work put in by the Communist Parties, to the entire inside of prisons and concentration camps, thousands have been modern development of history, influenced chiefly by the steady manhandled and tortured, and many leaders have paid with their growth of the socialist system. lives for their convictions. Staunch and experienced fighters emerge Objectively speaking, the revolutionary mood of the petty- from this ordeal. bourgeoisie is a welcome fact. It is a manifestation of progress and Some Communist parties, entrenched among the masses, con- should not be regarded as merely a posture or an as act of despera- stitute an influential and at times even the decisive, political force. Lion, an act which the petty bourgeoisie admittedly often commit. Others are still small and lack some of the requisites of a vanguard. Under no circumstances should we underrate the revolutionary w tial of the ru - and an t , - -- en However, international experience na3 snvwn toss small panics can po t Latin American bourgeoisie is no longer capable or' heading at times virtually overnight ents ontin l tio la b c . g , nary c rge revo u e ome Just before the Second World War, for example, the Italian Com- revolutionary processes (though some sections of it may participate d f one orce an munist Party numbered 15,000 members in a country with a in them), the petty bourgeoisie is still a revolutionary rkin th i h g e wo ere es w population approaching 50 million. Yet after Mussolini's downfall that may even play a leading role in countr towards the end of the Second World War Cho Party grew into a class is weak numerically and lacks the needed political powerful force of millions of members. Early in 1958, at the time the - weight. Percz Jimenez dictatorship was overthrown in Venezuela, the The Cuban revolution has demonstrated that the petty bourgeoisie Communist Party had a mere 300 members; soon, however, its has a potential of revolutionary courage in battling for national membership numbered tens of thousands, making it in a matter of liberation and socialism. months the biggest political body in Caracas. There is, then, a distinct bond between the revolutionary trends of Communists organise the workers in trade unions, fight for the the proletariat, on the one hand, and those of the petty bourgeoisie, economic and social demands of the people and safeguard working- on the other. There is much that unites them, but also much that class unity by inspiring a new, anti-imperialist patriotism. divides them. Petty-bourgeois revolutionaries tend at times to under- The most advanced section of the working class and the best of rate the workers and the Communist parties, to gravitate towards the Latin American intelligentsia have joined ? the Communist' nationalism, recklessness, terror and, at times, even anti-communism parties. These-parties have their sources in the proletariat of their and anti-sovietism. Also, they are more susceptible to despair and respective countries, in the October Revolution, in the victory of subjectivism. But.they are revolutionary all the same, and the Leninism, of revolutionism over reformism. proletariat must put the accent on unity with them rather than on hi l d i f p ea ers ng or This consolidation of the Latin American Communist parties is fighting their mistakes. The two trends are compet a great gain of the revolutionary working class. Their path has not of the movement; to a certain extent, their rivalry is ideological. But " been strewn with roses. They have had to withstand the assault of their class adversaries and also to combat anarchism, Trotskyism and other petty-bourgeois trends In their own ranks. The founding of Communist parties brought about the fusion of Marxism with the working-class movement. This was an historical Imperative to that the working Blabs, to us# Mttrles.words, should not be only a class In Itself but a class for itself, and that Its fight for emancipation should be a conscious fight. Pernicious tendencies and sectarian views, isolationism, passivity, adventurism, conformism and time-serving occur now and then in the Communist parties regardless of whether they arc functioning legally or underground. Nona of these can be combated effectively, unless a continuous fight Is waged for the Party line through criticism and self-criticism and hard daily work among the masses. These pernicious tendencies, which we Chilean Communists know all too well from our own experience, are a hindrance to party development. But small partics.grow into big ones by virtue of their vanguard position in the social struggle, for as the proletarian masses gather experience they range themselves , alongisde the socialist-communist unity within the People's Action Front. The Communists. This we want to make absolutely clear. However, we Socialist Party, like the Communist, has deep roots in the working only the politically conscious workers but also a considerable' _s? considerable influence also among the petty bourgeoisie, with the section of the pcttybourgcoisie are adopting a revolutionsryIt Socialists holding an edge. The petty-bourgeoisie do not comprise a attitude and fighting for the liberation of our continent with the aim'; special group in the Communist Party, whose leadership derives of building socialism. This bccnmo doubly evident after the. cialist chiefly from the working class. ft+w~hllitm in l'ulat, 1 The mutual understanding of Chile's Communists and Socialists f $oitic ill' the i+ctt (,iitrgeoI ie Jilin the C'unttttuaist pnitir;i itr (comes up against snags from time to time, but the alliance is become friends and followers, exerting an influence of their gown for ,sufficiently strong to make'a split highly Improbable. It draws Its a certain length of time. However, a more considerable part forms strength from the will of the people. As Comrade Galo Gonzales Its own parties or joins the Left wing of other movements, pointed out at the Tenth Party Congress in 1956, whenever Socialists This trend often engenders sectarianism. In Chile, for example, and Communists worked together "the working class has gained and 'Communists campaigned for n time for the dictatorship of the whenever we parted ways or quarrelled the enemy benefited". W~:pre proletariat and for Soviet power. This approach did not help our strong when we stand together, and weaker when we do not.' he Party to grow. (Upon abandoning this sectarian line, we delncd the pc?plc of Chile will not win, political power unless Socialists and Chilean revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution, but (.?/aunttmiats tire allies. Neither Communists nor Socialists can claim realised in 1945 that even this non-sectarian definition had been sole leadership. We need each other. - rendered unsound by reason of the world-wide changes-advance of o c t r oisie and of the working class the working class, thecontAPWM E t1"c fteo2Ri AffliKz2'~,fi~~? Rig {~Q{ 95tget taken a definite' fight, if anything is done to accentuate this rivalry and precipitate a for the destruction" of either trend, the solo beneficiary will be imperialism. That imperialisni and its agents are concentrating precisely on intensifying the rivalry should be enough to tsar this out. The national bourgeoisie, too, which seeks to maintain its class positions, is also eager to see the. proletariat and the petty bour- geoisie part ways. So today, mutual understanding, co-operation and united action by the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie is a matter of the first magnitude, The Latin American Communist parties arc aware of the need for understanding with the other Left forces, above all those espousing socialism. However, this does not apply to anti-Party groups and splinter parties, who represent no'one and who live off factional activity and dissent. The militant co-operation of the working class and the revolu- tionary petty bourgeoisie need not stop short of founding united revolutionary Marxist-Leninist parties wherever they have parties of their own today. In Chile this co-operation has crystallised into revolutionary ardour of the bourgeoisie.) stand. Most of them support the Radical or Christian Democratic narlics. } Ilowever, since the municipal elections last April the more tartan and revolutionary petty-bourgeois groups is being torgca in advanced groups in i I jb Rwle say 004 C1 $B F~tt411 01~(30O i3 into the fight for change ground, have been working for an understanding with the Socialists and Communists. Their leader, Alberto Baltra, maintains that "the objective Interests of the proletariat and the middle sections are similar", that "the world is moving inevitably towards socialism' and with the ultimate aim of sparking off anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutions. It is up to the revolutionaries to find the way to mutual under- that "a soclallsed alternative is perfectly conceivable, paving the way 'clearly, in each country the choice rests with the local revolutionary to effective planning, replacement of the capitalist system, abolition of . forces, which makes it doubly necessary to disseminate Marxist. monopolies, decline of imperialist Influence and to accumulation and Leninist ideas and implant proletarian ideology. mobilisation o,,the considerable resources required to expand national capital and, hence, the rate of Chile's development';. Baits described * ' ? people's unity as "a process of Joint action by Radical and other The argument- most frequently used by the enemy is that the ft forces". Communists' united action policy is simply a tactical manoeuvre Some deputies and many members of the Christian Democratic to strengthen their hand, to absorb real and possible allies, use them Party, too, are calling for "concentrated fire on the oligarchy" and to the fullest and then abandon them and to go on to achieve a for joint action with the People's Action Front. Mosthave expressed Communist one-parry empire. 3 themselves in favour of'socialism. It would be a sheer waste of breath to go into this at length, for it To be sure, their idea of socialism differs substan6,&.-. -i .n that is malicious slander pure and simple. That the Communists will of the Socialists and Communists. But the important thing is their gain in strength is certain, despite all the difficulties. The other desire to reach an understanding with the People's Action Front. progressive forces will also grow in proportion to their contribution The most important factor in Chile today is the desire for change. to'lhc common struggle, because the march of time favours the Thanks to Communist and Socialist efforts, the people are beginning exponents of progress, not the reactionaries, In Chile, the co- to realise that the old economic structure must be radically altered. operation of Socialists and Communists has benefited both parties. The national bourgeoisie represented by the Christian Democratic They improved their positions in the recent elections, with the Party is acutely conscious of the advances made by the revolutionary Socialists making a somewhat bigger advance this time. working class and of the possibility of a major shift in public senti- We Communists have always maintained that the working class 40 ment, which could bring the working class to power. Consequently, has two types of allies--permanent and temporary. This is an objec- large sections of the national bourgeoisie have declared themselves live fact. History never stands still. Upon attaining one goal, society in favour of change, offering reformist solutions within the Alliance- begins planning the next. New tasks and contradictions appear, for-Progress framework. To stem the tide, the oligarchy, too, aligned conditioning changes in the political approach, with new nlign- itself with the Christian Democrats in the 1964 presidential election, menis, some drifting into the reactionary camp and the majority thus enabling the latter to win. straining forward. It is not the Communists, therefore, who by The thirty months of the Christian Democratic government have malice aforethought part ways with groups that had been their been enough to disenchant the people who had believed in bourgeois allies. reformism. Most of them turned to the Popular Action Front and imperialist policies of menacing world peace, flouting the rights now seek revolutionary change. of nations, assailing democratic freedoms and human rights, and Needless to say, this reaction was not spontaneous. It was brought prejudicing the interests of all socio-economic groups save those of about by the work of the Communists who have consistently urged the monopoly bourgeoisie, evoke the indignation of all social strata, joint action by all partisans ofchange, regardless of whether or not including a large part of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. On the they are against the government. other hand, the spectacular achievements of the socialist world and The shift in favour of the Communists and Socialists was reflected its accomplishments, which are in harmony with man's aspirations in the results of the April municipal elections. The Communist for freedom, learning, culture and welfare, coupled with its aid to Party polled 354,000 and the Socialist Party 322,000 votes. Some non-socialist countries .;hiring to independent development, is 120,000 electors who previously voted Christian Democrat sided making socialism attractive not only to the proletariat, but also to with the Communists and Socialists, who polled 30 per cent of the other classes and social strata. rote. Meanwhile, the Christian Democratic, Party, which formerly The development of the Cuban revolution into a socialist one and collected 42 per cent, slipped to 36 per cent. The Socialists and the socialist orientation of sonic revolutionary processes in Africa Communists are on the upgrade, while the Christian Democrats and the Middle Cast could never have occurred other than in the new have entered a phase of decline. historical conditions brought about by the October Revolution and The future of the Radical Party, which represents some 16 per then the Soviet victory over flitter Germany, after which socialism cent of the electorate and consists chiefly of middle class people, will became a world system strong enough to safeguard the new rcvolu- depend on its eventual understanding with the People's Action tionary states, frustrate imperialist blockades and assist the newly- Front. free countries in their independent development. In the circumstances, the People's Action Front is becoming a in this situation, the problem of our temporary alliances with centre of contact for all the democratic forces in the country. non-proletarianand non-Communist forecscallsfor a newapproach. The election was a serious setback for the Christiat-Democratic, Our allies now have much greater opportunities for marching ahead, Party and for President Frei's administration. It was a setback for not of course without vacillation'and difficulties. Whatever happens, the reformist alternative and the Christian Democratic variety of the it is farthest from our minds to use them at some specific stage, only pilot experiment offered by the US imperialists to some of the Latin to discard them at another. On the contrary, we could wish for American countries. The election also showed that the Communist nothing better than to co-operate with them indefinitely. effort gradually to win over the masses from the Christian Demo- What we Communists want is a progressive alignment of all crits, delivering them from bourgeois influence and rallying petty- champions of democracy and socialism, recognising the right of bourgeois support for the People's Action Front, is bearing fruit. every ~Ily to participate in nil stages of the revolutionary process This Communist policy holds out good prospects for the people's and In nil governments that the people's struggle may bring.irtto movement in its advance and in combating the enemy on other being. fronts in the event of Chile being affected by the present epidemic of It should be added here that many Communist parties do not "gorillism consider the one-party system obligatory for socialist society. The Doubtless the situation in the country is a singular one. But else- where In Latin Amcr' t m 1 u c tandin &-!-CPYRGHT ;l between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. And Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-0306:1 A000400040005-0 CPYRGHT matter hinges on specific national conditions and on the existence in many countries of democratic and popular political forces and of objective social realities that fondition a multiplicity of progressive trends and parties. The Communist Party of France, for example, does not believe that "the one-party system Is essential for the transition to socialism", and the Italian Communists share its, opinion. The Communists in Chile, 'too, favour a multi-party system. We hold that the Communist and Socialist parties should not only jointly lead the people in tic fight against imperiat?sm_tiid the oligarchy but also jointly build the socialist society of we expect many other groups to participate as well. The Communist Party of Chile, a working-class party, exercise leadership in co-operation with the Socialist Party, which, as have noted before, holds strong positions in the country. Man problems faced by our movement are settled by agreement between the Socialists and Communists on the initiative of one of them. We call this joint leadership, which in Chile represents the concrete form in which the Communist Party plays its vanguard role. It may be that ultimately the Communists and Socialists will form a united party. But so far the question has not arisen, and is not likely to arise in the foreseeable future, and perhaps may never arise. As for the other Latin American countries, it appears that the need for united action by Communist parties and other revolutionary forces fits in with the need for co-operation at the level of joint leadership by those revolutionary forces which, in a definite sense, share the function of vanguard. A vanguard cannot conceivably be built by arbitrary or synthetic means around a leader or a few men who, individually, at least in their own opinion, adopt radical standpoints and prepare for revolutionary action. The exceptions to this rule only bear this out. A vanguard is the result of the fusion of Marxism with, the working-class movement, the moulding of revolutionary thought (above all among proletarians) and the application of Marxism- Leninism to the concrete conditions of a country, that is, the result of purposeful activity and of a natural, rather than spontaneous. process. On the other hand, as Lenin said, it is not enough to call oneself the vanguard or the forward contingent; all other contingents must be convinced that we really are in the van. The Latin American Communist parties were founded at different times. They function in different conditions and in different social and political situations. Some arc going forward from dissemination of scientific socialist ideas to consolidating their bonds with the masses, to organising mass struggle, to the phase of intensive social and political work which paves the way to the conquest of power, to the rapid development of the Latin American parties into the guiding force of the revolutionary movement. However, the Communists do not consider this the only possible perspective. In the name of the proletariat and on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, they arc -prepared to raise' to the highest possible level co-operation and unity with the other revolutionary forces,. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 25X1C1OB L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968 Soviet Penetration of Nigeria The birth of Nigeria on 1 October 1960 was acclaimed by many as the entry onto the world scene of a black African state "destined to emerge as a major power in Africa." The British wanted Nigeria to be- come their "showpiece" in. West Africa, but a showpiece of good govern- ment by Western standards -- a major mistake in the case of Nigeria. The country is a collection of diverse nations, tribes and cultures. Its people speak three major languages -- Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo -- and about 150 minor languages. English is the official language, but many Nigerians cannot speak it. Religions make the gap even wider. Most of northern Nigeria is Moslem, and its culture comes from centur- ies of contact with Arab caravans. The south is Christian and pagan, with a Bantu culture, somewhat modified by European incursions into the coastal areas. British rule has been the only unifying factor in Nigeria's past history, and even then the British administered it as three units -- the colony of Lagos and the northern and southern pro- tectorates. Since 1960 this loosely knit structure of incompatible cultures and racial groups has been held together by a constitution written as if intended for a people -united by'Anglo=Saxon traditions- and committed to a multiple-party system of government. Its present internal problems were inevitable. In January 1966 an Ibo officers' clique staged a coup, murdering officials and seizing power. Six months later a non-Ibo officers' clique ousted them with additional bloodshed. Each tribal faction called on tribal loyalties for support and this inflamed latent passions. Northerners began to slaughter Ibos in their territories -- upwards of 30,000 men, women and children who had been living and working in northern cities as civil servants, techni6ians and traders were murdered in a barbarous fashion. About two million survivors fled south where an Ibo Colonel named Odumegwu Ojukwu led the secessionist movement that in May 1967 created the independent state of Biafra. (For further background data, see Attach- ment A.) SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in Africa by supplying arms and planes to developing countries inimical to the. West began in Egypt in 1955 and extended rapidly to Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana. Quick to take advantage of a chaotic situation, the Soviets have turned toward Nigeria. Until last year Moscow never showed it- self sympathetic toward the Western-oriented leaders of the Nigerian Federation of 1960. However, after the fighting broke out in July 1967 between the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria and the secessionist state of Biafra, the Soviet Union was quick to respond to the FMG's appeal for assistance. During the latter part of 1967 the Soviets managed to sell over $5 million worth of military equipment Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 to the FMG, including 10-12 MIG jet fighters and three patrol boats. There are currently about 50 Soviets in Nigeria training Nigerians to operate and maintain the equipment. By the end of August a Nigerian jet fighter was already attacking secessionist forces in the Midwestern State. Other Communist countries have also proffered military and techni- cal assistance. In 1965 Czechoslovakia extended a $14-million line of credit to Nigeria and, after the secession, furnished to the FMG six jet trainers -- which can also be used as fighters and bombers. In September 1967 there were 14 Hungarian civil engineers engaged in roadbuilding and river control in northern Nigeria. Polish pilots now predominate in harbor operations. But through it all the Soviet Union insists that the conflict in Nigeria is an internal one and that all that ' the: Soviets want is peace and stability for Nigeria! In October 1967 Soviet Premier Kosygin, in a personal message to Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian Chief of State, stated that he is opposed to any outside interference in Africa's internal affairs. While the Soviet Union is giving military support to General Gowon's Federal Military Government, it is also pursuing its standard tactics of penetrating Nigeria from within. A number of Soviet-Nigerian friendship societies have recently been formed in the Western State, the home of the Yoruba tribe. With the withdrawal of the educated Ibos to Biafra, the Soviets have found it expedient to cultivate the Yorubas, who are now supplanting the Ibos in public office. Friiendship societies are also being formed in the largely Muslim north, where the Soviets undoubtedly foresee future ties with the rest of Muslim Africa. Moscow is also trying to enlarge its toehold in the Nigerian labor movement. Following the dissolution of all political parties in 1966, the pro-Communist "Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party" formally dis- banded, but its weekly organ ADVANCE has been taken over by the pro- Moscow Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and continues along party lines. On 5 November 1967 ADVANCEpubllshed a glowing message of greet- ings to the Soviet Union for its 50th Anniversary and a tribute by the head of the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship Society to the great friendship shown by the Soviet Union in Nigeria's time of need. While openly professing its support for Gowon's government, the Sov- i.et,Union is giving its covert support to the extreme Left. In an October 1.967 article on Nigeria in the international Communist journal WORLD MARX- IST REVIEW, the Soviets praised the banned Socialist Worker's and Farmers' Party and claimed that this party and the NTUC are in the forefront of the struggle against "feudal and captialist" elements in Nigeria (See Attachment B.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 The Soviets have also stepped up their efforts aimed at the infor- mation media. The Soviet news agency, Novosti, has recently appointed a representative in Ibadan and a splinter journalists' organization is receiving Communist support. With the relaxation of FMG import restric- tions, there has been an increased influx of Communist literature, which can be bought at newstands and bookstores, and which is also distributed by the NTUC and affiliated unions. The Soviets have requested permission to increase their Embassy staff in Lagos and have just opened a new chancery which is obviously designed for a greatly augmented diplomatic force. The Soviet Union had long taken special interest in countries that supply oil to Western Europe: Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and others. Now it has taken a stake in Nigeria which, before the war broke out, was supplying ten per cent of Britain's oil and has rich oil resources as yet only partially exploited. Soviet interest in Nigerian oil became apparent in early 1967, following speculation in the American press that an independent Eastern Nigeria might give the oil companies better terms than they enjoy under existing contracts with the FMG. Over twenty mil- lion tons of oil were produced in Nigeria in 1966, and 63 per cent of that in the Eastern Region. If Biafra remained an independent state, the Sov- iet Union's chances of cutting into that vast oil reserve would be negli- gib'.e. Once Moscow had made the decision to support the FMG, it did not hesitate to play upon Nigerian suspicions of the United States by linking that country's oil interests with Biafra and claiming that the United States is supporting the rebel forces with white mercenaries. In addition to its oil reserves, the Eastern Region has a palm pro- ducts crop that has been bringing in nearly $100 million a year. Now, of course, revenue from both oil and palm products is denied to the FMG. The oil reserves of the Midwesternv-Region are at least as large as those of the East, although not yet as well developed. The Western Region re- lies largely on its $100 million yearly cocoa crop, and the landlocked, North on its $150 million crop of peanuts, which, however, must be moved through the East or West to the sea. While oil and cocoa are Nigeria's major exports, its natural resources also include coal, iron, limestone and natural gas. It produces 45 per cent of the world's columbium ore -- used in the manufacture of steel alloys. With a foreign trade amount- ing to $1.5 billion in 1966, it is the biggest and richest state in Black Africa, and -- with the decline of Western influences -- a natural target for Soviet subversion. Although the soviets have made a substait3ai:breakthroUghin-Nigeria, and their position can be expected to improve at all levels in the future, Approved For Release 2005/04/2'x: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 there are still important influences at work against Communist aims. General Gowon does not wish to break Nigeria's traditional ties with the West, particularly with Great Britain which has resumed military support to his government. In addition both Gowon and his foreign affairs minis- ter, Dr. 0. Arikpo, seem fully aware of the dangers inherent in too ser- ious a commitment to the Communist camp. As long as the present govern- ment is in power, Western interests will continue to be represented in Nigeria and expansion of the Communist subversive base may yet be conk tained. Approved For Release 2005/4/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 CPYRGHT THE NEW ApER a or FkWase - - - 1 January 1968 Nige ria: Study in ypocrisy. BY George T Orick IGERIA, the world's tenth most tion among much of the citizenry. populous country, has torn it- The one serious exception was the came to a halt as 60 million citizens evaluated the military government's intentions. This quickly removed millions of pounds from daily circulation, and for a short time it was possible for a father to enroll his child in a paro- chial school without paying a bribe to the registrar, or for a dying hos- pital patient to get a bedpan without bribing the nurse. Soon. however. Ironsi became a Big Man-Rolls Royce with motorcycle outriders. embassy parties, the works-and a wary populace relaxed. Membership cards in the revived Bribe Scorncrs' League were quietly put away, and business returned to normal-al- most. It was already too late: Foreign investment was declining, food prices were rising, and tribal hatreds and regional suspicion were becoming exaggerated into overt hostility. Oil drilling and pumping had increased, helping to preserve for a time the illusion that the economy remained viable. The multi-regional charter of the oil operations. moreover, was a practical argument for continued national unity. But the big tribal cats. tied together by their tails in the artificial colonial creation called Nigeria, were fighting free of one another-each blaming the others for the growing troubles, and each convinced it was the rightful dictator of terms for continued national as- sociation. In the six months between that first Army coup and the second in July 1966, it was Ironsi's Ibo tribe of Eastern Nigeria whose influence was felt. Ironsi permitted his tribes- men to encroach disproportionately into the civil service and into the managerial levels of the big quasi- public corporations that operated self apart, aborted its economic and reaction in the predominately Mos- social development, and begun the lem Northern Region. extermination and suppression of its The young officers made two ser- most advanced tribal component. ious mistakes. First, in doing away The developed countries which had with those responsible for Nigeria's regarded Nigeria as the very model drift into heedlessness, they killed of black African promise and sta- the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar bility now watch the disaster, para- Tafawa Balewa, a gentle man who lyzed by their own habitual stances, had grown in world stature as his relationships and antagonisms. The government rotted from within, and situation is a study in functional his manipulator, Sir Ahmadu Bello, 'hypocrisy, both on the part of the the Sarduana of Sokoto, who in ad- ? developed countries and of the Ni- dition to being premier of the North- gerians themselves. ern Region was spiritual leader of Until two years ago, the industrial Nigeria's Moslems. Deep in Rama- nations rejoiced in the capacity of dan fasting, the Moslems did not corrupt Nigerian governments, re- react immediately; but when they gional and Federal, to buy millions did, six months later, their fury was of pounds' worth of largely unneces- spiritually as well as politically moti- sary capital goods, and in the capa- vated. city of Nigerian farmers to expand Secondly, the officers assigned to their plantings of peanuts, cocoa and kill the Iho premier of the Eastern oil palm to keep even with declining Region, Michael Okpara, failed to world market prices. The big share- fulfill their mission, and in two days cropper country was doing fine: pro- tribalism eclipsed idealism: The of- ducing more every year, buying more ficers handed over the central gov- and more goodies at the company crnment to their Army superior, Ibo store--and going satisfactorily into Brigadier General Aguiyi-Ironsi. By long-term debt. the time Ironsi himself was mur- Then the Nigerians embarrassed dcred in July 1966, tribal polariza- the world by exposing to public view tion in Nigeria had gotten well under what most of the participants had way. known from the start: that Nigeria Since the military men were fairly was not a developing country; it naive about the techniques of cor- was not, in fact, a country at all. In ruption, while foreign businessmen January 19.66, when a group of trained them in the proper use of young Army officers representing Swiss bank accounts the growth rate many tribes seized control from. the of the Nigerian economy began to thoroughly corrupt hierarchy of fall. For several weeks after Ironsi political leaders, there was jubila- came to power, there was a sharp , The bv~ ~~e j~hones ~'r~ } ak a~ CkL jj~~ t ~} $ ~~ electric c r ~ Jrrr-lu i i l Irjr i d+ , C , ,, e , . Pot ~E?~l~l vrs n Igen. 611 ey e wor''ks a~Itdports and work erl in Nigeria for six ears. ~' ~YP'~QI~It"~1 1cve s' ()RICK new ronlrihu- shrinkage in the country's cash flow: CPYRGHT That the :Ibos were probably more qualified than the other big Nigerian{ tribes to operate the government, bureaucracies was particularly galling to their rivals. Through almost unique tribal open mindedness, the Ibos had moved in half a century, from primitive paganism to Chisti anity, to progressive, educated mod- ernism. This angered the increasing- ly decadent Yorubas of the Western Region, and the feudal, static, fatal- istic Moslem Hausas of the North- ern Region. Y JUNE 1966, the country's fragile framework could no longer survive the imbalance of one- tribe supremacy. The Ibos were moving too fast, too gleefully in their search for the secrets of dur- able national power, and the keys to the safe. Tribal fragmentation was the order of the day, and one-tribe supremacy was, after all, only a warped version of tribal fragmenta- tion. A scapegoat had to be found for Nigeria's troubles. Clearly, the Ibos were the enemy, for they represented much that was hateful to both the Yorubas and the Hausas: They worked together in a spirit of mutual self-help, instead of clinging together out of mutual sus- picion; their upstart peasant vigor challenged the clever, subtle sophis- tication of the Yorubas and the dig- nified tranc, of the Nausas: their tribal democracy was almost un- African. Particularly tirestm;c was the Ibo insistence that political lead- ers are stewards of public trust, owing their constituents at least a shilling's worth of benefit for every pound of bribe sent to Switzerland. Most disturbing of all was the Ibo conviction that there is a future be- yond the beginning of the next rainy season, and that a man could some- how learn to control that future to his betterment. power, he set about restoring the dignity and local-level power of tra- ditional chiefs and minor kings in the Western (Yoruba) Region. This limited gesture was about as far as he could go in applying democratic thinking to the Yorubas, but its tentative success was too much for the Northerners. Thus, on July 29, 1966-two days after a conclave of traditional' chiefs whose support he was wooing, at which he had decreed that the national anthem would be sung at the opening and closing of all school sessions and.at all public entertain- ments-Ironsi was murdered by Northern soldiers. Killed with him was Colonel Fajuiyi,,his governor of the Western Region, and his ally in courting the chiefs. Each of the major Nigerian tribes is a nation in spirit, and bigger than most African countries in size: There are about 17 million Nausas, 15 million Yorubas and 9 million Ibos. During the week fol- lowing Ironsi's death, it was evident that no replacement could he selected from these tribes, giving rise to the short day of the minority tribe. Lieu- tenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian member of one of Nigeria's 200-odd smaller tribes, emerged as the nominal leader of the military government. Gradually Gowon has become little more than a miouth- piece for the Hausa leaders, who still speak of national unity yet say, and not always so privately, that unity (meaning Northern domina- tion) is not possible unless the Ibos are either killed or contained in their homeland. For two months after he became Supreme Commander of the Military Government of Nigeria, Gowon tried to bring sonic semblance of order to the country. Then in September 1966, the Moslem Hausas got down to the serious business of extermi- The Ibo reflex was operative in nating Ibos: In less than 10 days Ironsi, and the affable, permissive they slaughtered upwards of 50,000 general began to think politically Ibo men women and children who Northern cities as traders, techni- cians and civil servants. The Army units in the North, already purged of Ibos in July and August, instead of stopping the slaughter partici- pated in it. Whether the killing stopped sud- denly through Gowon's good offices, or because it was planned to begin and end on a signal from the North- ern leaders, is a subject of debate to this day in Nigeria. In any event, the next six months saw nearly 2 million Ibos who had over the years gone to live in all parts of Nigeria flee back to their homeland in tile' Eastern Region. Disintegration, accelerated by the mass killings, was irreversible by early 1967. Foreign investment shrank to almost nothing, ending the proliferation of factories that had passed for development. Trade dropped to about half its normal level; Nigeria was no longer viewed as a prime market for toothpaste, plastic shoes, used clothing and all the other manifestations of Western prescriptions for African progress. Whites began to leave, and the with- drawal of their purchasing power pushed the Nigerian economy down still further, The leader of the Thos, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. disappointed his old friend (iowon by listening to his assurances of goodwill and fair treatment with the special car of a man whose people have been mar- tyred for the wrong reasons: Oju- kwu reflected the growing paranoia of his tribesmen, and in threatening secession he found support among the minor tribes of the Pastern Region who had begun to identify their interests with the Ibos'. int.ii TtiU. RFSi of Nigeria VU stagnated, the Eastern Re- gion came alive with secession fever, and in May constituted itself as the Republic of Biafra. Whites fled- except for missionaries, arms sales- men and diplomats. A month later , d Gowon began a gentleman's In his search for theA$*6 dEFW6r RRf asb TodW 4/zit . &Ar~ft$-03061A000400040005-0 war in CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2005/04%21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 are basically capitalists and hope lessly bourgeois; but the Russian presence clouds the situation and minimizes U.S. effectiveness in any effort to knock heads together and bring peace. Nigeria would be a sad and pointless place for a new East- West confrontation. The British have never been able to leave Moslems alone. The desert is the opposite of an island and seems always to fascinate than.. Of all the Nigerian tribes whose leaders learned tq speak with a good British accent. [lie Iiausas, on the southern fringe of the Sahara, have remained the most amenable. The Iho leaders have good British accents, too, but they think Ibo. Nearly all colonial rebellions against British rule origi- naled in Iboland, including (lie final drive for independence. So the British have quietly cast their lot with the Northern-controlled Fed- ? eral government. And a considerable' lot it is: British-owned oil companies, trading companies, raw-materials ex- tractive and purchasing companies, and British investment still dominate the Nigerian economy, All of this means more pious talk of unity for unity's sake. Biafra has made some strange friends in its struggle for embryonic progressivism. Portugal has become the principal channel through which arms and supplies reach Biafra, and a telecommunications link through Lisbon keeps Biafra in tenuous touch with the world. The crisis of Africa's biggest nation tends to divert atten- tion from Portugal's unpopular colo- nial holdings elsewhere in Africa; and for the moment, Portuguese help is as acceptable as any to the des- perate Biafrans. Rhodesian planes have also been reported in occasional traffic into and out of Biafra, and Rhodesia's motive may be similar to Portugal's. French prospectors have reported- ly found a particularly rich oil field in northwestern Biafra, which may account for the sale to Biafra of French helicopters and arms. The extent of the French presence in Biafra is not fully known, since the world press reports the war almost. exclusively from Lagos. It is known, though, that the Biafran government has been promising mineral and raw material concessions to its new friends in order to get still more tools and money for its war. Like a low-rated boxer selling more per- centages of himself than exist, Bi- afra is fair game for fiscal adven- turers, who stand to gain a great deal for low stakes if independence can be brought off. T IIE ORGANIZATION for African Unity-whose members fear fragmentation in a world where eco- nomic success belongs more and more to nations acting in concert- has been easily dissuaded by the Federal government from making any serious efforts to effect peace in Nigeria. That Nigeria's principal human resource for development- the Ibo tribe-niay be decimated while the ono acts out its charade in perfect righteousness is one of the unfortunate contradictions of Africa today. No African nation has recog- n;zed Biafra, and no other nation cart until the black countries make the first move. Such are the rules of the world game of diplomatic pa- tronization. Biafra possesses all the elements of a viable political and economic entity. Its population is certainly large enough, it has plenty of raw materials to trade in the world mar- kets, and in aggressive human core. The oppo ite argument, for unite. is; equally convincing. A big Nigcria could in time, become a nucleus of a huge federation encompassing its landlocked neighbors to the north and perhaps its smaller neighbors to the west-the first real possibility' of a United States of Africa. Yet what is needed is not an immediate determination of the merits of seces- sion vs. unity but rather a cessation of fighting, and most particularly of, genocidal aggression against the Ibos. In terms of world politics, the positions of the various powers: toward the Nigerian tragedy are orthodox and perfectly correct-in' other words, based on their own self- interest. The hypocrisies involved in the public descriptions of those positions are irritating to a number of observers, though, and must be galling to the Biafrans, principally the Ibos, who know they are being penalized in the name of unity fop being progressive in a country un- able to move out of stasis. The heedless inrush of machinery salesmen, investors, and merchant adventurers after Nigerian indepen- dence in 1960-backed by European and American government credit, cash and guarantees-was not, some- how, seen as foreign intervention.-, Now that the pickings are slimmer. persuasive, even strong measures to stop the current slaughter in Nigeria are labelled intervention and fore- stalled by the label. It has, however, the ring of abandonment, of an ab- dication of responsibility. The Ni- gerians, no matter what their tribe. are the same people today in their inchoate thrashing as they were yes- terday when they so happily posed for their unity portrait and bought what the developed world said they should have. CPYRGHT s-sue E the expectation that minimal force would bring the rebels to heel. Oju- kwu not only held off Federal attacks but shocked the Lagos government by immediately seizing the Midwest Region and grabbing nearly $10 mil- lion in cash from the banks and busi- ness houses there. An earnest war was obviously called for, and effec- tive control of the Federal military forces was lifted from Gowon by the Northern Officers. Now, after nearly half a year of fighting, Federal troops have found it impossible to establish military supremacy over the stubborn Bia- frans, even though they have retaken the Midwest and established some measure of control over approxi- niately, 25 per cent of Biafra's land area..Ojukwu, meanwhile, has been given a mandate by his Consultative Assembly, representing 14 million people from all tribes in Biafra, to continue the fighting. With the lbos feeling compression, and with the other tribes in Biafra having com- mittcd themselves to secession be- yond the point of no return, the Federal troops are facing an elusive and difficult opponent. Formal mili- tary action has increasingly degen- erated into unconnected guerrilla skirmishes. Enugu, the Biafran capital, has fallen to Federal forces-largely be- cause of a sellout by a handful of Biafran officers who decided the situation was ripe for a Communist coup. (They have since been ex- ecuted by Ojukwu.) But capitals are portable, especially the Biafran capi- tal. and olliecs of the civil service have been scattered in three other Biafran cities. The present center of government is Ojukwu's car, the most portable capital of all. tion more realistic broadcasts from Radio Kaduna, in the Northern capital, discussing the final solution to the Ibo problem and dolefully listing names of lbo leaders marked for execution. If the truculent Biafrans show no signs of giving up, it is be- cause they at least know they are literally fighting for their lives. Therein lies the major hypocrisy of the Nigerian disaster: The public posture of nearly everyone else re- flects a pious concern for Nigerian unity, as if this were still possible. Diplomats, businessmen and other foreigners familiar with the situation know very well that the loos, and perhaps other tribes in Biafra. face extermination in large numbers; that in the event of a Federal victory in the civil war the Eastern survivors will be pariahs. Gowon and his government maintain that Nigerian unity is the sole issue in the civil war; they claim such matters as the clash between Moslem and Christian ethics and suppression of the uppity lbos do not exist. That the civil war has turned puni- tive is undeniable; that there is una- nimity on the purpose and extent of the punishment to be meted out to the Ibos is debatable. Gowon's per- sonal attitude seems more petulance than hatred; his field commanders seem committed to mass slaughter. But no matter who prevails, there is little chance that the Ibos will be welcomed back as real participants in a unified Nigeria, should there ever again be a unified Nigeria. Em- ployment is a critical issue in the country, and the Ibos, having been displaced in their jobs by Yorubas and members of other tribes, are not likely to find postwar Nigeria re?- ccptive to their aggressive penetra- . ducer of crude oil. Sixty per cent of the Nigerian oil reserves so far dis- covered are in the Eastern Region, and 60 per cent of that is in iboland. So talk of unity means, among other things, talk of who is to control the oil. Religious conversions from ani- mism in West Africa are being won by the Moslems, seven to three. To deny that there is religious involve- ment in the Nigerian impasse is fatuous nonsense, especially when it is realized that two directly opposite -ways of looking at life are in clash between the North and the East: Moslem fatalism and Christian self- determination. A sort of jihad is in progress, no mistake. Tribal supremacy is not in doubt for the moment. The loos could gain supremacy only through complete military victory, and that is all but impossible, considering the array of Nigerian and world forces against them. The Yorubas, through a half- century of internal bickering and dis- organization, have forfeited their claim to forceful influence, especially now that Nigerian military power is virtually a Northern monopoly. The Hausas and their intermingled Fulani remnants are supreme again. No world power seems willing to intervene to stop the war, to mini- mize the gathering genocide. Amer- ica has abdicated its growing influ- ence in Nigeria to the British on the thin, vestigial pretext that it is in the British sphere of influence, and that a special relationship between Wash- ington and London precludes Amer- ican interference. The American cop- out has hurt and angered many Ni- gerians deeply. Now the USSR-invoked by the aiiu iii u~~~ wvumu not, at a cru- upwards of 10 thousand noncom- ~~a i l i a po nt last spring, permit arms bat ants have recently been siau h- c y g aNt:Y, tribal supremacy and h purc ases by Nigeria-has moved tered by Federal troops in the com- h religion are what the Nigerian i h nto t e vacuum with MIG and hat areas. They experience little con- turmoil is all about. and unity as an Czech Delfin jets, and hundreds of fusion, therefore, when they com- abstract concept cannot he serious.- technicians.? The Russians prob- pare Federal broadcasts from Lagos ly discussed. Oil is money, and Ni - ably cannot make lasting headway promising safety to the somewhat gcria is the world's 10th largest pro.- Approved For Release 2005/04/21: CIA-RDP78-03061iAd b 80 0$W'o West. Africans (B) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 WORLD MARXIST REVIEW Vol. 10, No. 10 October 1967 Nigerian Patriots Want National Unity N IGERIA, largest country in Africa, is in the throes of war.. and French penetration. The Americans operate through "aid": The conflict was sparked off on May 30, when Col. Nigeria is one of the nine "selected" countries which this year account Odumcgwu-Ojukwu, Governor of the Eastern Region, for 86 per cent of all American economic aid. The New York Times announced the region's secession from the Federation to become the recently published an incomplete list of 36 American companies independent republic of Bi f E l a ra. ar y in July, Federal troops were active in Nigeria. Some of them arc drawing up development plans ordered into Biafra One mo i h . re war, w t all its attendant destruction of life and property, was added to the list of wars already raging. The conflict had been maturing for some time. In fact, its roots can be traced to the divide-and-rule policy customarily followed by British imperialism in colonial territories. Its repercussions were painfully felt after Nigeria became independent in 1960. The ruling feudal and capitalist elements fomented communal strife, pursued a reactionary policy that left foreign-monopoly control intact and aggravated the poverty of the people. These factors, in the aggregate, arc responsible for the present tragedy. In February, the New York Times had this to say to potential Anerican investors: "The Federal Republic of Nigeria possesses abundant human and natural resources. Moreover, Nigeria main- tains an open-door policy towards foreign capital ... and has the largest and fastest growing market in Africa." With the biggest population of any African country, Nigeria probably also has Africa's greatest natural wealth potential. It is the world's biggest exporter of palm products a major row f , , g er o o e struggle. Nigeria now has a workers' cocoa beans and ground-nuts; its northern areas supply 90 per cent paper, Advance. In the summer of 1964, the country experienced the of the world's columbite and 9 per cent of its tin, and Nigeria also biggest general strike in African history, involving 800,000 workers exports quantities of timber, cotton, hides, rubber and soya beans. in practically every branch of the economy. Its economic and strategic importance was enhanced in recent Discontent grew, and in January 1966 triggered off a coup by a years with the discovery of rich oil deposits in the South-east. With group of progressive officers led by Chukuwma Nzcogwu. The new an output of more than 20 million tons last year, Nigeria is Africa's government, however, did not last long, and power passed to army third, and the world's 17th, biggest oil producer, supplying about chief General Ironsi, who was able to hold out for only six months. 10 per cent of Britain's requirements, American economists estimate In fact, Ironsi only succeeded in complicating the situation; he that within five to ten years Nigeria will rank with the world's top banned all political parties, including the Socialist Workers' and ten oil-producing countries. Farmers' Party. General Ironsi was overthrown in July and a new The growth of the freedom m ...e... t B de ce but Iberia, as the catty telegraph rightly stated on August 15, 1967, was to be turned into a "'show-window' of successful devolution from colonial paternalism to the responsible exercise of self-government". Independence was hedged off with reservations that safeguarded the interests of the imperialist mono- polies, which continue to operate just as they did in the colonial days. So much so, that practically the entire economy is controlled by the United Africa Company, a subsidiary of the great Unilever monopoly. Its operations extend from production of primary products to the clothing industry and retail trade, and together with other British firms it has cornered the supply of imported foods and consumer goods. The country's finances arc controlled by two British banks, Barclays and the Bank of West Africa. In oil, 85 per cent of extraction, refining and export are in the hands of Shell-BP, a combine of British Petroleum and the Anglo- Dutch Shell firm. Its new refinery at Port Harcourt is owned jointly by the com 4 pany ( 0 per cent), the Federal Government (40 per cent), and private Nigerian investors (20 per cent). A pipeline has been built others are prospecting for oil, and still others are actually producing and exporting oil. The whole profit structure rests on rich natural resources and cheap labour, and to maintain that structure the imperialists have trained a cadre of bureaucrats and politicians. The foreign-monopoly stranglehold, the policy of the feudal chiefs, the compradore and venal bureaucracy have sharply aggra- vated social conflicts. The gap between the privileged minority and the poverty-striken majority is steadily widening. And in recent years the feudal and capitalist elements, supported by foreign Big Business, have maintained an offensive against living standards through wage freezes and confiscation of communal land tilled by the peasant farmers. The result has been more poverty and more unemployment. The working people have never accepted this and through their trade unions have been fighting to change the situation. The Marxist-Leninist Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party, founded in 1963 is in the forefront f th It leaned for support on the feudal sultans and emirs in North ern Nigeria, but General Gowon realised that, in this complex situation, his administration could survive only if it had the backing of the public, and if it curbed the omnipotence of the foreign monopolies. The ban on the political parties was not lifted, though many political detainees were released, among them Obafemi Awolowo, the West-Nigerian radical leader. The new government announced it would encourage economic and cultural co-operation with the socialist countries. For one thing it envisaged a substantial increase in trade with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and co-operation with these countries on oil refining, iron and steel and other projects. The Nigerians attach importance to the recent Soviet visit of their Commissioner for Information and Labour, Mr. Anthony Enahoro, and to the signing of a cultural agreement. Advance (September 2) commented that the visit "not only strenthened the relationship between the USSR and Nigeria but also opened a new era of friendliness and mutual understanding between our two countries". On Januar f .~ - .. _ y wi h - -- arr the oil to E h .+..un. t ' -' t xperts e Vii companies. It would still receive half of the profits, plus estimate that oil could become the basis of intensive industrialisation, concession payments and taxes, but there would be more stringent but industrialisation is the last thing the foreign monopolies want. financial control. The oil companies, predictably, objected. Shell-BP Latterly, US business has conic into the picture~J~ 1~j1+2v u# , but American and been vigorous efforts Apwo` i 3FlWhRQ"e rtit`vVCttt'b, i`Mah t~S2fR' toug6~atttittuude and suc suspended production. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 The imperialists retaliated by stepping up subversion in an attempt to sever off the oil-rich regions. They adroitly exploited tribal tension, always part of Nigerian life. Nigeria is inhabited by numerous tribes, the biggest of which are the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. The Hausa, followers of Islam, are concentrated in the North, whereas the Yoruba and Ibo are con- centrated in the predominantly Christian South. Originally the North formed a separate region, while the South was divided into three--the Western (including the Federal District of Lagos), the mid-West and Eastern regions. Distribution, of the population, according to the latest census figures published in the Nigerian Sunday Times in August 1964, is as follows : Northern Nigeria .. .. .. 20,758,875 Eastern Nigeria .. .. 12,394,462 Western Nigeria .. 10,265,846 Mid.-West Nigeria.. .. .. 2,535,839 Lagos District .. .. .. 665,246 All Nigeria .. .. .. 55,620,268 The Northern Region, as will be seen from the table, predomin- ated. Nor is that accidental, for prior to colonialisation the North was an agglomeration of feudal states with which the British com- pacted to exploit the people and the natural resources through a system of indirect administration, that is, through the feudal emirs and sultans. This tended to keep alive the old, backward structure. In the South, direct rule encouraged the development of capitalist relations, the rise of industry and towns, a national bourgeoisie and a working class and, in the final analysis, a powerful national- liberation movement. CIA-RDP78-03.06 Ah00Q4Qg040005 an Easterner, abo esh t e eu a system. inc a sultans and emirs, alarmed at the prospect of lbo rule and loss of their privileges, engineered a series of massacres in which thousands of Easterners were killed and their homes sacked. Then, in July, came another military coup: Ironsi was overthrown and killed, and Major- General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner, established a military government. The Eastern Region governor, Colonel Ojukwu, refused to recognise the new regime, though there was no indication of what policy it would follow. This precipitated a new series of anti- lbo attacks, in the course of which, according to press reports, not less than 30,000 people were killed. Needless to say, this inflamed tribal passions. About two million Easterners fled from the North. But was war inevitable? Nigerian progressives say it could have been avoided. In one of its August issues, Advance printed a letter by Chukwuma Nzeogwu, organiser of the progressive January 1966 revolution, to Tunji Otegbeye, General Secretary of the banned Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party: "I do realise that each component portion of our hapless Federation is in itself a little federation. This is all the more reason why the solution 'of the problem of nationalities should have been tackled in the same manner as the USSR dealt with its own nationalities. We must continue to preach this idea in preparation for the day when the people can fully liberate themselves through a popular revolution." The letter was written in Enugu, the Eastern capital, at the height,, of the chauvinist hysteria following the proclamation of the indepen- dence of Biafra. Supported by the progressive forces, the Federal government made several attempts to preserve the Federation. In January, General Gowon had a meeting (in Ghana) with the governors of all the regions. Their communiques emphasised the need to '"preserve the political unity of the country". Things looked more hopeful but , , The first labour organisations and the first political parties in a situation charged with distrust and imperialist intrigue, chau- working for national independence originated in the southern, vinist passions, and acrimony, continued to mount. Ojukwu refused western and eastern regions. Nigerians still remember the 1949 to,turn in tax revenue to the Federal government, and the latter miners' strike in Enugu, capital of the Eastern Region, when many retaliated by cutting off communications with the Eastern Region. workers were shot down on orders of the colonial authorities. On May 27, the Federal government made a last attempt to keep The post-independence divide-and-rule policy was designed the country united by revising the administrative map. The old primarily to divide the Southern Region, where the revolutionary regions were abolished and 12 states formed instead. This broke movement was maturing, and place it under the control of the Northern domination, for the Northern Region was divided into six northern feuda.ls. This, in fact, was consolidated in the Nigerian units and the Eastern into three. This, it was hoped, would weaken Constitution: each region would have its own legislature and the stranglehold of the Northern sultans and emirs. But it also government, but the North would always have a majority (167 seats worked against Colonel Ojukwu and his separatists and destroyed out of 312) in the Federal Parliament. the imperialist hopes of creating a puppet oil republic. Long before independence capitalist industry and trade were The Nigerian press often likens the Biafra breakaway, backed and A growing in the Southern regions, with their predominant Ibo and largely incited by the imperialists, with the split in the Congo in Yoruba populations. In the Eastern Region, where good land was 1960. And while the comparison applies only to a point, there is this scarce and there was practically no industry, unemployed Ibos common feature: in both cases the aim is to slice off areas rich in migrated to the North. Here, thanks to their spirit of enterprise and natural resources. Just as they wanted to turn Katanga into a copper tribal mutual support, they were able to start businesses of their republic, they now want to turn the Eastern Region into an oil own. After independence many Ibos were brought into the govern- republic. And in both cases the method has been much the same- merit services. exploitation of tribal discord, assiduously cultivated for years by the Meanwhile, in the North, there had been little retreat from feudal colonialist administration. customs and religious fanaticism, both formidable obstacles to Nor do the monopolies make any secret of the fact that they are progress. The peasants were weighed down by the monopoly interested in Nigeria's oil and other wealth, and not in the well- system of of feudal relationships, religion and foreign monopoly being and future of its people. Writes the London Times: "With the exploitation. In these circumstances-and not without aid and Suez Canal closure and the threat to Western oil supplies from the encouragement by the leading element in the Eastern Region-there Middle East, Nigerian oil, mainly concentrated in Biafra, could developed what might be described as a superiority complex, with achieve a vital new importance". all its ugly chauvinism in relation to the "backward" North. The The imperialist powers are officially neutral in the conflict; Northerners, on the other hand, exploited this, and also relative lbo indeed, some have announced support of the Federal government prosperity, to incite the Hausa tribe against the lbos, who were held (a lesson learned from the Congo, one suspects). But in practice- responsible for the poverty and misery of the peasants. In other and that much is obvious from the Nigerian press-some of them words, this was the old British divide-and-rule policy, and it should have been giving support to the separatists. There was, for instance, be said that Nigeria is not the only country where it has been, and the incident with the US plane carrying arms to Port Harcourt in is being, employed to sidetrack attention from social, economic and Biafra which crash-landed in Cameroon. Advance charged US political problems. intelligence with recruiting mercenaries through Israel and supplying The military coup of Jmuuau 196 ??vert rr~ fcy~~l~q e, he~i rt Balewa government, and t ~ rrrt ? g6,aA0o00nI000re4~~~5 ~~e position of the rous Approved For Release 2005/04121 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 imperialist powers as hostile. There have been protests from different circles. The pro-government Morning Post noted recently that Britain and the US were gravely impairing their prestige and would henceforth find it hard indeed to win back Nigerian friendship through "aid". Nigeria's patriots, notably its working class, are campaigning for territorial integrity and demanding effective measures to block sup- port for the separatists. Wahab Goodluck, President of the Nigerian Trades Union Congress, has declared that the task of the labour movement is to preserve Nigerian unity. And a trade union programme to that end calls for nationalisation of oil companies that refuse to pay taxes to the Federal government, for measures to stop the espionage activities of US and British organisations and consulates, organisation of volunteer security detachments and permission for the Trades Union Congress to rally the workers against imperialist conspiracies. In Eastern Nigeria itself, many favour national unity, and have been drawn into the separatist movement under pressure. The revolutionary traditions of the working class, which is least of all subject to chauvinist influence, are very much alive in Enugu, Port. Harcourt and other parts of Biafra. The Trades Union Congress and the banned Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party enjoy wide influence too. This is how the situation is described by Tunji Otegbeye: "It is true that the forces of tribal chauvinism have risen to control the affairs of the Eastern Region of our country; that secession has been popularised through the radio and the press. But, all the information reaching us here indicates that the common people do not bclioe that the ansmcr to our teething probtcros is Balkanisation of our country." Progressive opinion and Communists the stiorld over are deeply disturbed by developments. They hope and beliese that Nigeria's patriots, its working class and the people generally kill put an end to the fratricidal swear and presersc Nigeria's unity. Peace and unity is the first step towards a democratic ,tructure and a just solution of the social and national problems that continue to beset Africa's biggest country. \lantadou Dionne 4 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 25X1C1OB L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968 Problems Besetting Hanoi and the Viet Cong For the Communist leaders of North Vietnam, 1967 was a year charac- terized by more failures than successes and beset with problems of increas- ing severity. In the area of population control, which most observers recognize as vital to ultimate victory and lasting peace, the Communist forces continued to suffer a steady loss. Captured enemy documents orig- inally revealed that the Communists lost control over one million people between mid-1965 and mid-1966. It has since been estimated, on the basis of population control statistics, that another million persons deserted the Communist cause in 1967. Some of the "desertions" were the result of the extension of friendly areas of control, but most were caused by the flight of people from enemy-controlled areas. Many fled the dangers caused by military operations against the guerrilla forces. Disenchant- ment with their treatment by the Viet Cong -- who increasingly expected food, shelter, intelligence and tax money -- was a major reason for the population's swing away from the Viet Cong as were the prospects of a more secure life under the protection of the South Vietnamese Government, and the appeal of the Government's economic and social development programs. One of these, the Revolutionary Development (RD) program trains 59- man teams to go into hamlets all over South Vietnam to teach the people about farming, the need for education, medical and sanitation techniques, etc. The RD cadres have been increasingly successful in helping the people and often in providing resources for the way to a better life. At the end of 1965 there were 3,000 such team workers, by December 1966 there were 24,000 and by mid-1967 35,000. By the end of 1968 it is anticipated that more than 60,000 RD workers will have graduated from the National Training Center at Vung Tau and will be at work in the field trying to build a new and better Vietnam. A measure of their success was illus- trated this spring when 4,500 of South Vietnam's 12,500 hamlets were suffi- ciently secure to hold the first round of free elections. The Chieu Hoi ("open arms") defector program encountered unprece- dented success in the first half of 1967, winning over more Viet Cong defectors in six months than it had in the whole of 1966. By November 1967 over 25,000 Viet Cong had defected.* Captured enemy documents have revealed great concern on the part of the enemy leadership over the inroads of the Chieu Hoi program on their manpower as well as the effect of the RD program on their population base. The RD cadres are high on the list of targets for assassination by the Viet Cong and the intelligence given to the South Vietnamese Government by Hoi Chanh (ralliers to the Govern- ment) is a cause for continuing concern to enemy leaders. A link between *Although this figure represents a drop in the number of Viet Cong de- fectors,experts attribute this to the fact that the-Chieu Hoi program has been sufficiently successful to appeal to all save the hard core Viet Cong. They have now been reached and the number of defectors may decline fur- ther. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 these two government programs has been the willingness of an increasing number of Hoi Chanh to work in the RD program. One problem inevitably breeds another, and the Communists' shrinking area of population control markedly reduced their ability to extract food, shelter, protection and tax money from the population. The amount of intel- ligence they were able to gather via the civilian population also dwindled with a steady reduction in their effectiveness. An increase in the bru- tality exercised to keep the population under control only served to alie- nate the people more and eventually this loss of influence was felt in fewer recruitments for the Viet Cong fighting forces. As far as can be learned from Viet Cong defectors, the enemy, in the early days, had little difficulty in recruiting sufficient manpower in South Vietnam to fill the ranks of existing Viet Cong units and to activate new units as well. By mid-1966 the Viet Cong was recruiting an estimated 7,000 guerrillas per month. However, their waning population control and the increased Allied military pressure have greatly reduced the Viet Cong's ability to recruit, and between January and May 1967 their recruiting average was only about 3,500 per month. To bolster their dropping numbers, the enemy was forced to find recruits somewhere and considerable evidence points to the increas- ing enlistment of women and young boys. The supply of fighting men from North Vietnam, which averaged about 8,000 during the first six months of 1966, dropped to an estimated 5,000 for the same period in 1967. Allied bombing has made infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam more difficult and certainly more hazardous, but that is only one portion of the problem. North Vietnam has great numbers of able-bodied men available, but over half a million must be used constantly to repair damage caused to North Vietnam's vital trans- port arteries by Allied bombing in order to keep up the flow of imported materials on which their entire war machine depends. That fact eliminates at least 300,000 able-bodied men from military duty. Other major drains on manpower are the constantly increasing need for troops to man coastal defenses, heavy artillery batteries, and more than 7,000 anti-aircraft gun sites, and the growing need for army and security forces to maintain inter- nal. security. It is suspected that the North Vietnamese Army leaders will inevitably be driven to drafting younger men and then boys as well as women to keep their fighting units close to minimum strength. Closely related to Communist difficulties in maintaining troop strengths are Communist difficulties in supplying the troops they do have with rice, clothing, medicines and a variety of other essentials. Hanoi's agricultural and industrial output has shrunk to such a minute fraction of its former volume, that it is now dependent upon the Communist bloc for most of these civil requirements as well as virtually all its military supplies. Supplies traveling overland can come only through Communist China, whose internal discord and running argument with the USSR have caused innumerable stoppages of badly needed supplies for-Hanoi. Allied bombing Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 of the area close to the China border compounds transportation diffic,i ties as does the mountainous terrain of the frontier area. Allied bor: of the areas close to Haiphong (the major seaport) has caused Haiphong's virtual isolation from the rest of the country and goods leaving it since October of 1967 have had to be ferried laboriously across each of the many waterways. Godowns quickly filled to overflowing and the congestion has become so serious that valuable goods have been left in the open streets. As for supply of foodstuffs, numerous captured documents, prisoners, and defectors have reported that food is increasingly scarce, that many of the rice growing areas formerly used by the Viet Cong have beeniover- run by Government troops and that the population is increasingly loath to pay higher taxes or to produce food upon demand. And the increased demands have served to alienate more of the population with the result that the Viet Cong has a decreased base from which to derive support. The Communist difficulties are interlocking and feed upon one another in other ways as well. The population swing against the Viet Cong result- ed in a considerable reduction in the intelligence furnished the Viet Cong which resulted in a poorer military showing. A concomitant increase in intelligence flowing to the Allied troops has, in turn, been of consider- able military help. In 1967 the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam suffered heavier casualties than in any previous year (92,000 KIA by actual body count in 1967 as compared to 58,000 in 1966), they saw their supposedly impregnable base areas overrun in large-scale operations (such as Cedar Falls and Junction City), they lost immense quantities of arms and foodstuffs, abandoned quantities of top secret military and political documents and saw the destruction of literally miles of laboriously con- structed underground tunnels. 1967 also saw a steady decline in the desertion rate from the South Vietnamese army and a steady increase in'that of the Communist forces. The Communist forces are also losing greater numbers in combat -- more than four times as many men as all the allied forces combined; Communist losses reached an alltime high in January 1968 with 5000 enemy troops killed in two weeks. In 1965 the South Vietnamese Army was losing three weapons for each Communist weapon they captured. By late 1967 they were capturing four Communist weapons for each one they.lost. There is no question that one of the telling factors in the declin- ing combat effectiveness of the Communist forces has been the growing mili- tary maturity of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The ARVN now has para- military forces. The ARVN has made more contact with the enemy and in- flicted more losses than ever before and U.S. observers are quick to point out that the South Vietnamese soldier is shouldering more of the heavy combat burden with every passing month. (See Hanson Baldwin article, attached, for details.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Tied in with the Communists' declining fortunes is a propaganda prob- lem, a weakness, that is being interpreted in some quarters as the major influence on their future military course. Whereas Communist forces achieved 13 significant military victories in 1965 and four in 1966, there were none in 1967. The end of 1967 was characterized by heavy concentra- tions of Communist troops (principally at Dak To in October and Loc Ninh in November) who sought, with what appeared to be suicidal desperation, a military victory. "Human wave" attacks followed one upon the other, with appalling losses against an enemy in an obviously vastly superior position on land and in the air. The lunacy of these attacks can be inter- preted, in light of the mounting difficulties facing the Communist forces in 1968, as a dramatic illustration of North Vietnam's anxiety to secure an improved position from which to negotiate an end to the war. The Communist military offensive undertaken in early January may be a prelude to a diplomatic offensive by Hanoi to start as soon as it is possible to do so without its appearing to be the result of a military defeat. If this speculation is correct, the enemy's belated willingness to sue for peace, or at least to commence negotiations, constitutes the strongest evidence of increasing Communist military weakness. Approved For Release 2005/04121 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968 1943-1945 1946-1949 KOREAN CHRONOLOGY A series of wartime agreements between U.S., Britain, China and the U.S.S.R. led to the reestablishment of Korea as a free and independent state. The Soviets occupied a portion of Korea from the 38th Parallel north, while the U.S. occupied the South. A Joint Soviet/American Commission failed to reach agreement on the formation of a Korean government. The U.S. referred the matter to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1947. Elections sponsored by the UN were held in May 1948. The North Koreans refused to par- ticipate and established their own government. The UN subsequently declared the Republic of Korea to be the legitimate Government of Korea. The Americans and Soviets withdrew their troops. 1949-1950 The UN established a new commission on Korea to 'work for reunification of the country, in the light of developments "which might otherwise involve military conflict in Korea." December 1949-January 50 Mao Tse-tung conferred with Stalin in Moscow. A Sino-Russian Treaty of Fri ndship and Mut}zal Assistance was signed. Allegedly the decision to attack the South was made at this time. 25 June 1950 A force of 60,000 North Koreans crossed 38th Parallel* The U.S. requested UN action and UN forces were commited to Korea. October 1950 Chinese CpDunists began infiltrating thousands of troops into North Korea. November 1950 200,000 Chinese troops smashed across the 38th parallel in a massive drive which split and trapped UN forces and brought Chinese forces in South Korea to a fighting strength of 400,000. 14 December 1950 The UN General Assembly approved a resolution for the creation of a Cease Fire Committee to negoti- ate! a compromise solution. Communist China was invited to the UN to discuss peace terms. No compromise was reached. 1 February 1951 The UN General Assembly condemned Communist China as the aggressor in Korea. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Spring 1951 April 1951 Chinese Communists begin their spring offensive with a force which totaled 600,000. UN forces began counter-attacks which. defeated the Chinese offensive and opened the way for armistice nego- tiations. General. MacArthur was relieved of command. Presi- dent Truman assured the allies that he did not wish to extend the war. June 1951 UN forces drove the Communist forces back to the 38th parallel. 23 June 1951 10 July 1951 26 July 1951 1952 Russia's Jacob Malik, during a UN radio program said, "Discussion should be started for ,a cease- fire." UN (including ROK), North Korean and Chinese Com- munist representatives met in the first truce session. at Panmunjom. The negotiators agreed on an agenda after weeks of exchanges of messages between General Ridgway and Marshal Kim Il Sung. The truce talks dragged on; all major issues were agreed upon except the voluntary repatria- tion of prisoners. During these negotiations the UN forces were continually denounced for alleged violations of the truce. The war continued and the Chinese, despite their agreement not to do so, increased their troop strength to a total of 700,000 plus 1,000 airplanes in comparison with a total of 450,000 UN forces, which remained static during this period. U.S. casualties alone were 30,000 per year, while negotiations continued. October 1952 Truce talks were suspended indefinitely over the issue of repatriation of prisoners. April 1953 27 July 1953 An agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was reached after an adjournment of six and. a half months. An armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom after more than three years of war and two weeks of negotiations. Approved For Release 2005/4/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 App ~ l5e?rN~ I ? se(WP5/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Saigon Controls Two-Third's Of the Country, Computer Says SAIGON, Dec. 1 (AP) --,schools available, development Two-thirds of South Vietnam's 17 million people now live in secure areas controlled by the Saigon government, the U.S. mission said today. The U.S. Embassy unveiled its new computerized Hamlet Evaluation System and said .the "secure" population has increased more than a million since last January. Ambassador Robert W. Komer, who heads the Ameri- can side of the pacification program, told a news confer- ence that the computer system provides a detailed monthly check on the campaign for the allegiance of the South Viet- namese living in the country's 12,800 cities and hamlets. A checklist on 18 major Criteria Is filled out on comput- er cards for each hamlet by the U.S. district adviser and put through computers in Sai- gon and Bangkok, he said. In addition to hamlet securi. ty, the cards include informa- tion on such -matters as WASHINGTON POST (2) 7 December 1967 projects, health facilities and even whether the hamlet chief sleeps in the hamlet at night. Pointing out that human evaluators previously weren't even sure how many hamlets were In South Vietnam, Komer said the new system is "not even near perfect, but it's more objective, more systemat- ic and it focuses on the key as- pects of pacification." "I think It's getting a pretty accurate picture," he added. The system has been in use since January. Only 8650-or 63 per cent of South Vietnam's 12,600 ham- lets can be evaluated. The rest are controlled by the Viet. cong. But Komer said popula. tion figures are more impor. tant than the number of ham- lets considered secure because the hamlets vary In population from 50 to 20,000 persons. Sai. gon and other large cities are classed as a group of hamlets. He said government-con- trolled hamlets tend to be larg- er and more prosperous since the government gives higher priority to more heavily popu- lated areas. Secure hamlets now em- brace 66.6 per cent, of the pop- ulation. Contested hamlets ac- count for 16.2 per cent of the population, while another 17.2 per cent lives under Vietcong control, according to the com- puter report. When the system was put into operation last January, Komer said, 62.1 per cent of the population lived in secure, hamlets, 18.5.per cent were in. contested areas and 19.4 per cent were under Vietcong con? trol. The population then was estimated at 16.4 million. Vietcong control Is highest in the Mekong Delta, where it runs 27.6 per cent, according to the report. In the embattled Military Corps I area just south of 'the Demilitarized Zone, 28.5 per cent of the people are said to be under Vietcong control. A Long Night of Burning By Peter Arnett water buffalo slaughtered burns. Of the village's popu the hamlet' s bamboo lation of 2008 400 were , DAKSON South Vietnam, Dec. 6 (AI'1-The Montag- fence. missing, presumably driveh hard tribesmen of- Dakson A day later, the bodies of into the jungle by the learned only recently how to men, women and children en mv. were laid out in rows under Within hours, the injured use matches. Flame throw- s were beyond their the one shade tree on the began dragging themselves imag[- hill. On the lid of a basket into the hospital at the nation. But for were the bodies of a tiny nearby provincial capital of one hour Tuesd ay brother and sister, still Songbe. Some were carried, just after midnight these clinging to each other. Like "I picked up a little girl the weapons, wielded by Vietcong, wreaked death th the other bodies at llakson, to move her from a litter to they were blistered b flame a bed," said Dr. Herbert Ro- " a Theyh threw fire at us;'' throwers. Y . senbieeth of Flemington,, "They throw said the survivors in this By late Wednesday, 63 N.J. "Her flesh came away "New Life" hamlet 80 miles bodies had been dragged in my hands. She was dead." ,vr from the bunkers where the Nurse Linda Mudge of ce d st of Saigon. They population hid when the Mansfield, Pa., said she had trere describing one of the Vietcong first launched its "never seen people so filthy. most vicious attacks of the attack. More were expected They had been crawling war against Vietnam's civil. to be dug up. American and around In the mud all night. `Ian Population. Vietnamese officials at the Their wounds were packed ' 'Sixty scene estimated that as in mud. .. 1. an- a thatched-roof Lt. Col. Nguyen Duong i a 1 5 CIA-MDR780MOOM0104100640 ~~ ~ rows late ~l dt t'eR c ~ /b razed by fire. The ashes At least 47 were wounded, scribed the' cause of this blew across the carcasses of 33 of them with serious carnage as "a calculated Communist attempt to frighten the Monlagnard population away from the, government-the stakes are high." The people of Dakson are members of the Steng tribe nomads who move freely back and forth across the border of neighboring Cam. bodia. The women gig bare- breasted and the men wear simple loincloths. Many of them have been used by the Communists as porters. i Late in 1066, the Saigon government won several thousand Stengs over to its side. These were settled In "New Life" hamlets around Songbe. The hamlets are fortified enclaves guarded by Revolutionary Develop- ment teams. The Vietcong. have made it clear this year that they want the tribesmen back their control. Emis. t visited the new vil? lages, warning the Inhabi. tants, that their. ? houses would be burned _ur~ s t co~fl~ I'tf ?~' gin gt Nlontagnt l~r4Ka1 nE6tr elea* ~Ot Clsf~ 78-OT BR'.arQ!l~ AmerlOcans d Vlo Jungles. Bred in their flimsy bamboo Songbe across the valley Dakson apparently was singled out as an example, it repulsed three earlier at- tacks. The assault this week was probably ca ried out by more than a battalion. The 120-man defense force was beaten to the southern edge, of the hamlet. According to survivors, the Vietcong shouted through bullhorns: "Evacu- ate your houses, you must return with us. ,,Evacuate your houses." deep bunkers dug beneath them. One survivor, a man named Duot, said he heard the enemy shouting to him to leave. He said he was too frightened to move. He saw a shadow In his doorway. Then a jet of flame shot out, searing his back and shoulders, As his house began to burn, he crawled out. All around him, he said, men were running and SAIGON POST 8 December 1967 (3) 37 Guerillas and Nurse; Biggest Haul said, the hamlet seemed to be ablaze in minutes. The Vietcong melted back Into the jungle. Saigon authorities erro neously Identified Dakson during the confused first ac- counts from the area Tues- day as Daksong. a bigger settlement near the Cambo- dian border 50 miles farther north, The U.S. Mission at first reported 300 dead In the Incident, but this was later scaled down. NEW YORK TIMES (u) 22 November 1967 Washington: VVhv' Westmoreland Tired Plafooii , and BunkerAre Optimis'tic' By JAMES RESTON Their conclusion is that the Surrenders WASHINGTON Nov. 21-- United States and its allies are r_ -.1 W tm l d d steadily wearing down the e o n SAIGON. I)''. 7 'UPli-Tired, hungry arid stared, a pl.ihron of 37 guerillas and-their 1S- year-old girl nurse stumbled out of the jungle and surrendered in the largest single communist dee-i feclion of the war, U. S. spokesmen said today. "They were afraid to die. They stated they lacked food and were disenchanted with the Viet ('ling cause," the spokesmen announced. The platoon carried four automatic weapons In surrendering Tuesday at the village of Loc An, about 3(jfh blF 6ii9a'~06t1~i00046Ej 49@O5 D to fade away 2 Into the jungle. puted areas td provide military' intelligence. 5. Finally, the Vietcong now control only 2,500,000 people out of a total of 17.2 million in South Vietnam-down from 4,000,000 in mid-1965. And ac-' cording to the latest estimates here,. Vietcong recruitment in the South has dropped from, 7,500 to about 3,600 a month, in the last twelve months. This is what Westmoreland: and Bunker mean by "steady. progress." The -war, they csti mate, is now further along toward a conclusion than the World War was. after Nor-' mandy and the Korean War d the official con- WASHI;.NGT(N PA" Release 2005/04/21: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 24 November 1 ,7 a.-.tire. "` Pza pers Raise U.S. Hopes By Lee Lescaze %VnNhil. tan Pn,c Forri n finale' SAIGON, Nov. 23-Cap- lured enemy documents, which have become one of .the major Indices in measur- ing the progress of the Viet- nam war, show that areas of South Vietnam controlled by the Vietcong are deciint Ing. Both Ambassador. Ell- 'Sworth Bunker and Gen. William C. Westmoreland quot+cd from the enemy doc- uments In speeches in Washington last week, in de- scribing the hardships and failures of the Communists. The men here who work with the documents, most of whom are attached to.the in- -tellihence staff of the U.S. Military Headquarters, say that the material they see is becoming increasingly excit- `1ng. Documents have given evi?. dence of the enemy's inabill. ty to find recruits, food and align of the people in never-+ North. Vietnamese and Viet- 'al arras of the country.. cong, there have been The U.S. Mission in Sal- repeated statements of the gon yesterday released four difficulties of fighting in the lengthy documents In which countryside and the fear of the Vietcong mention theiri American air strikes and ar- ;loss of control over the pop-1 tillery. ulation? ' Communiques from com-; A cadre's notebook cap- bat groups to their head- during t T d l as anuary ure l Operation Cedar Falls de- Scribes Vietcong control In 1965 and 1966. "A comparison with the early part of 1965 shows a ,decrease of 1 million people in rural areas due to the ,presence, of U.S, troops." The cadre wrote, "We have greatly worn down the enemy, potential, , All the same, we have failed,to win many people over to our side." "If we fall to solve this problem urgently, we will be bound to encounter more difficulties," the notebook year is 30( )MO. The decrease dinh and other provinces. 7 or no intelligence value. of quantity also involved a More than 3 million pages The largest single group of documents have been cap decrease in quality:" lured by American and of translators in South Viet- Other documents criticize nam sifts this material and wavering determination South Vietnamese troops puts what is important into this year-1.5 million were among some Vietcong Vietcong Sol right- - diets. This captured in all of 1966. English. In addition to being , Ism" manifests itself in Passed to Saigon screened for their English ability, these Vietnamese "fear of hardships and a A piece of paper uncov- translators have to learn the fierce, protracted war, es- ered on a military operation vocabulary of the Victcong.i capism and demoralization," is passed through intelli- Often the enemy uses according to a Vietcong po- gence channels from com- words, and phrases which' litical directive Issued last pany to battalion to brigade are not intelligible to other January and captured in to division and then to the Vietnamese-it Is a lan- September. Combined Document Exploi-. guage developed from years "Overestimating t h e tation Center In Saigon. of guerrilla fighting among' enemy, ,and becoming sub- The lower levels have lirn- people who are not meant to ject- to his psychological Ited means to translate and know all of the army's; slonary peace and the slack- they pass them up to Sal- ening of alertness for enemy gon. The CDEC works quick propaganda, signs of weari- ly to separate the, docu- ness and the Inclination to ments into categories. enjoy some rest," are other Its first responsibility and weaknesses the directive or- first Interest Is In uncover-; ders controlled, criticized Ing information that may be and corrected, of value to soldiers in the Setbacks Described -field. In diaries, letters to their Recently, the CDEC got a families and other personnel description of an enemy quarters asking for more men, rice and medicine have been captured in large. num- bers recently. The 171st Vietcong Regi- ment moved from its tradi- tional base in War Zone D about 40 miles north of Sai- gon in September because it couldn't get rice to feed its men, according to a docu- ment cited by U.S. military officials. As it moved west from its former stronghold, elements of the U.S. 1st Division picked up its trail and inflicted heavy casualties in a series of battles during September and October. says ?at another point.', "Food supply does not "Four-fifths of the funds de- meet the combat require- rive from the population'. - ment," a May 13 political di- rective issued in Phuyen minefield in a certain area. In less than 24 hours they Sent word back to the troops who had found the docu- ment. The troops had planned to walk into the minefield area the next day. After receiving the report from CDEC they sent men with. minesweepers ahead of the combat soldiers. The minefield example Is only one of many times that CDEC has helped field troops avoid a trap or frus- trate an enemy attack. Not a Stalemate Data which provides this sort of Immediate help to combat units Is the first priority with the documents' center. Most documents fall into a second category which Includes the type of enemy reports, Bunker and Westmoreland quoted re-, cently. From enemy internal or- ders, after action reports, memorandum and personal documents, intelligence men gather ia picture of a foe who Is not fighting a stale mated war, but is hurting batll;1, guerrillas dropped to 180,000 Province says and there are The Center has other cate- and the requiremani 9!&Od FWPFeI> l!28A04 'I` ?i~faR 07810 301 ?400040005-0 ocumen are, of.,marginal Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 .NEW YORK TIMES (6) 17 December 1967 `Arvin' Is a Mixed Bag By HANSON W. BALDtVIN SAIGON, South Vietnim - Units of the -South Vietnamese Army moved into a few of the new bunkers and strong points of the "McNamara Line" south of the demilitarized zone last week. At the same time, three Vietnamese ranger battalions took over .from the U. S. 199th Brigade the principal burden of providing a pacification screen around Saigon. These and many other indices pointed to what some-but by no means all-U. S. officers feel is an increasing Vietnamese mili- tary maturity. Everyone agrees' that greatly improved Viet-; namese combat effectiveness- better leadership, better disci- pline, less corruption, a lower desertiol rate and better morale -acre essential If a military vic- tory is to be won and confirmed by the political victory of pacifi- cation. The expanded responsibilities of the Vietnames armed forces are, In a sense, a test of the degree of improvement in these forces since their low point in 1965. That they have improved is unquestionable; that they have a long way to go Is also unquestionable. The armed forces now number about 750,000 men and ' women and include many different types of military and, paramilitary units. Conscious of Clamor American officers in Vietnam are conscious of the public clamor In the United states' about "Arvin"-the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. But they t feel that many unfair criticisms: and sweeping generalizations have been made, and that since'; U. S. combat units have been In Vietnam, the American press! has not reflected adequately the: heavy combat burden shouldered by the Vietnamese. "The truth is," one observer put it, "that everything you say; about the Vietnamese forces Is true." The armed forces are a mixed ' bag. They are spotty and uneven; militia; some of the best units have fought the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to a stand- still. In some units the war stops at siesta time and the dark of the night is a time to sleep, not to patrol. But not In all. Some uniti repeat the same mistakes they have made time, after time in the past. But not' all. Some units loot the villages they are supposed to, defend. But not all. Some units are commanded by officer politicians. But not all. There are highly encouraging bnd very discouraging signs. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that there have been few Vietnamese Army debacles in 1967. Two years ago, V.C. Main Force units used to give "Arvin" units a bloody nose and Govern- ment forces left stores or bun- dted of bodies on the fields. It IS true, of course, that more. %1J. S. troops and increased air.` rind artillery support for "Arvin" jhave been major factors in the `improved performance. Nevertheless, even in the Mekong Delta where three "Arvin" divisions have shoul- dered the principal burden, the Vietcong units have lost more than they have gained. Two local V.C. battalions have been de- activated, and even the once. feared and famous Taydo batal-j lion, which operated near` Cantho, has been worn down- to a fraction Of its former strength. Leadership is Vital The effectiveness of South Vietnamese units is almost a direct reflection of their leader- ship. And in Vietnam-an unde- veloped country with only 13 years of independent life and more than 20 years of war- leadership is thin indeed in both .the North and the South. Thus, the results vary from the sublime to the ridiculous from unit to unit. In the Camau Peninsula, a battalion of the 21st Division-regarded as one of the patrols regularly to five "clicks" (kilometers) beyond its base camp. But in the Vungtau coastal region, the vessels of the Viet- namese Navy's in-shore patrol usually lie snugly in harbor at night, the very time when V.C. blockade running sampans may land their arms. There are many things being done to change this very mixed picture. A list of ineffective "Arvin" officers at many levels has been prepared: some have even been relieved and a few court martialed. An inspector general of the South Vietnamese Army is now checking effective- ness of units and commanders. Retraining programs and mobile 'training teams are operating throughout South Vietnam with regular and regional and popular forces. Enlisted men have been promoted from their ranks; new sources of officers and noncoms are being tapped, and slowly, very slowly, the French Man- darin system which tended to. restrict commissions . to the upper classes is being broken. Many Reforms New laws have broadened the draft; a rice ration, pay raises, a better accouhting system and stiffer penalties have reduced the desertion rate by about 37 per cent this year as compared to last year. Even so, desertions .still account for about 71 per cent of the total manpower losses In the South Vietnamese armed forces, and the slow struggle to make all the units combat effective is only In Its first' chapter. Nevertheless the process has started. "Amin" has rebounded from the dismal 'days of 1965, and next year the process of re- equiping the "Arvin" forces -- which has already started with the assignment of M-l6 rifles to. the First Division---will bebroad-. ened and expedited. their leadership varies from ex- cellent to execrable; some of the better "Arvin" divisions engaged in providing a pacification screen Popular Force platoons are ragged, undAppt1Qdeti4dentel elease' 28 Y'fs efA-&I"-0306 IA000400040005-0 WASHINGT01~ @d ltl Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 12 Janua4 Record Enemy Toll ?rnm T(rws Dispatches ' SAIGON, Jan. 11-The U.S. Military Command today confirmed a South Vietnamese report that more Viet- cong and North Vietnamese were killed last week than In any other week of the war. An American spokesman said 2868 enemy troops were `'killed during the week, which included the 36-hour New Year truce. In the same period, guerrillas killed 184 American. troops, he added. The highest previous total of Communist deaths In any. week was in March when 2783 guerrillas died in seven days of fighting, the U,S. spokesman said. MISSING oR KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED 1;'6 12/30 1/6 12/30 1/6 12/30 'U.S.'........... 184 185 1132 437 37 (not given), S. Vietnamese .. 263 227 657 556 '83 63 Other Allied ... '19 37 36 47 0 0 -Communist ....2868 '1438 (not.given) (not given) ?As reported by the U.S. Command. WASHINGTON POST 8 January 1968 (8) tyening is comprehensible, in fact, if you do not grasp the amply documented fact that the efforts the enemy troops are now being asked to make are regularly pre- sented as climactic, with the assurance that they will be followed by peace-by-coalt- tidn." THE GENERAL dissemi- nation of this happy assur- ance in Vietnam is the rea- son, in turn, for the convic- tion of the informed group in Washington that Hanoi is getting ready to offer nego- tiations, although only on Hanoi Seen Aiming for Talks, ,On I'Lled Terms, After Attack AFTER LONG years of ,waiting, almost everyone in the narrow circle of in- formed persons is 'at last convinced that Ilanoi is on the verge of a major drive for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Yet there is lit- ,tie rejoicing, for two quite different reasons. The first and simplest rea- son is the kind of enemy ef- fort that must be expected in the very near `future, which will be aimed to ere- ate a favorable climate for the kind of talks that Hanoi .obviously wants. This can, perhaps, cost all too many American and allied lives. For example, Khesanh, the most westerly of the Ala- rines' fortified outposts on the DAIZ, is now held by less than two battalions of :troops. It enjoys overwhelm- ;ing artillery support, but at this season it Is very hard to resupply. And no less than Six regiments of the North Vietnamese home army-the equivalent of two divisions .-have been moving into place around this outpost held by less than two batta- lions, The temporarygjy~i of Khesanh is imaginable. Gen. Westmoreland may perhaps order evacuation in order to throw the very slow-moving enemy off bal- ance for a while, anchoring the western end of the Ma- rine line on the DA'IZ on the more easily defensible rock- pile position. But there is no sign of any such plan. Other less important posi- tions like the airfield at Banmethout and even Plei- ku, where the attack on the U.S. barracks touched off the Northern bombing, are also beginning to be menanced, albeit by less substantial enemy forces than those around Khesanh. There have been a whole se- ries of sapper and even ground force attacks on dis- ,tricts and provincial capitals in South Vietnam in recent weeks. These will no doubt continue throughout this month'at a minimum. . ALL THIS PAST or fu- 'ture enemy activity can only be put in perspective by the captured documents summa- rized in the last report in Hanoi's own terms. As to the motives for such an offer, they are obvious enough. One motive Is the simple fact that the strain and bur- den of the war are becoming near-unbearable for both Hanoi and the Vietcong pup- pets. That Is why the ex- traordinary step is being taken of promising the enemy troops an end of the war at a stated time. As for the other motive, Hanoi is obviously planning to use the lever of the election year In America to get a- better deal than would be possible later on. No positive negotiating move will be made, most probably, until the attacks now prepared have at length been mounted. The offer will then take the initial form, beyond doubt, of a public or private intimation by Hanoi: "You stop bomb- ing the north uncondition- ally, and we'll start talking about coalition government In the South." This has al? ready been telegraphed by the Hanoi Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. There are only two draw backs to this. An uncondi. tional, unreciprocated bomb. Jag halt in the North Is a nice, simple way to give the enemy just the respite he needs, so that the U.S. and allied soldiers at the front, will have a brand new war on their hands in six months' time. And the kind of coalition ;Hanoi wants to, talk about is also Intended to permit the "occupation of the countryside," followed by "surrounding the towns," leading to "complete vic- tory." But there are all too many people in this country who have forgotten all our past experience, In Korea and elsewhere. President John- son will need a lot of guts to stand up to the clamor of people like' these. What al- most certainly lies ahead Is this space. Some documents tacked by the 18th Regi- profoundly, encouraging for announce that the "winter- ment, so the schedule was the long run, In fact, but It fin I xig kept. may be rough going in the cam a 5 : CIAhRIDF;i11(161*'RO O040t0&eun. formation of a coalition gov- ernment in which (the. National Liberation) Front will fully, participate." All.indicate that climatic, especially intensive enemy efforts will produce peace- and-coalition during 1968. A few documents even say that fighting will end "after the Tet holidays -- which means in early Febru- ary. A fairly far-out, but broadly representative speci- men, is a propaganda direc- tive from Binhdinh Province, where the other side has long been in very'bad trou- ble. "The period 20 December to 5 January will be re- garded," said this directive, "as the climax of the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign." Being interpreted in the light of hindsight, this meant that in Bindinh, the dreadfully tattered and eroded 18th North Viet- namese,regiment was being asked to make one last bold effort, in the form of an at- tack on. one of the most fully pacified districts. Tuy- Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400040005-0 WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS (9) 12 January 1968 The Viet Cong Offensive % THE Viet Cong have been attacking at a hard, fast pace ever since the New Year's truce ended. A Communist bat- talion flattened Tan Uyen, a ? district town 23 miles north of Saigon; another occupied for three hours Khiem Cuong, a province capital 21 miles northwest of Saigon. Commandos hit supposedly, se- cure Kontum airfield in the highlands. North Vietnamese troops are showing new toughness in the central coastal plains and valleys, notably Que Son. And now a big buildup is reported near exposed Khe Sanh, near the Laos bor- der. We find this situation ominous and mystifying. Allied commanders take some satis- faction in the high price the communists are paying: 2868 reportedly killed the first week of the year. But the fact the Reds can mount an offensive in every section of the South - despite the 1.2 m i I l i o n men the "improving" allies have under arms - gives us no cbm-. fort. As the Saigon-area attacks show, the Viet Cong evidently are using "War Zone C':' northwest of the capital, de- spite themassive American "clean-out" -in "Operation Junction City" over a year agog , And there is some disturbing arithme- tic in the latest official estimates of communist strength in the South. De- s, p I t e 87,534 communists reportedly killed anc1 ` 27,178 defected last year, their ranks ' increased from 281,000 to somewhere between 298,000 and 333,000 comparing Jan. 1, 1967 and Jan. 1, 1968, To cover losses and achieve that build- up, the communists had to recruit or infiltrate between 132,000 and 167,000 new troops! Either the official statistics are out of whack, or the communists are not being so badly hurt by Gen. Westmoreland's "war of attrition" as we are led to believe. Even so, why the big communist of- fensive now? Probably to add to the fears of the South Vietnamese populace and further shake the morale of Sai- gon's armed forces and make headlines in the USA. There may also be an inter- nal motive: in recent weeks Viet Cong indoctrinators have urged their troops to make a special effort before the Tet holidays (at month's end) to win the "decisive victory" they promise will bring about a coalition government on favorable terms. Maybe, then, the current offensive is :designed as a prelude to a new diplo- matic move by Hanoi. We'll know short- ly. If the communist do use the Tet pe- riod to.make an offer, it will have to be more detailed and forthcoming than the bare "willingness" to talk provided we permanently halt our Northern bombings. In the past some leading doves have shrieked with fury that just when (it seemed) .the chances for peace talks brightened, the U.S. would "destroy" the prospect by upping its bombing raids or sending in reinforcements. Now that peace talk is in the air again - and is accompanied by the current commu- nist offensive In the South - we haven't; beard even it chirp of complaint. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 6 25X1C1OB L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 +~, Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968 Expulsions of Communist Officials from Free World Countries in 1967 Country Country from Month When Name Position which Expelled Expelled ALBANIA: none (none in 1966) BULGARIA: none (2 in 1966) COMMUNIST CHINA: 9 (7 in 1966) a. CHEN Lu-chih First Secretary India June The Indian Government labelled Chen a spy and ordered him out of the country. Unofficially, the real reason is regarded to be retaliation for the severe beating of India diplomats in Peking. b. HSIEH Ch'eng-hao Third Secretary India June The Indian Government labelled Hsieh a spy and ordered him'out of the country. See above note on Chen for the unofficial reason for Hsieh's ouster. c. HSU Jen Consul General Indonesia April HSU was expelled as a result of a series of rude exchanges between Chi- nese Communist diplomats and Indonesian officials. d. LI Chien Third Secretary Kenya July LI was expelled for interference in Kenya's internal political affairs, specifically as a-direct result of the Chinese Communist Embassy's letter to a Nairobi newspaper attacking Kenya's Minister of Economic Planning and Develop- ment. First Secretary Indonesia September e. LU Tzu-po LU was declared PNG by the Indonesian Republican Government because he and another official were held responsible for shooting at Indonesian youths who were holding a demonstration at the Chinese People's Republic Embassy com- pound in Djakarta on 5 August 1967. f. SHIN Hsin-jen Assistant Naval Attache Indonesia January Shih was told in a diplomatic note to leave Indonesia by 28 January at the latest. He was accused of demonstrating an unfriendly attitude toward the Indonesian Government and people. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 g. SU Sheng Consul Indonesia September Su was declared PNG by the Indonesian Republican Government because he and another official were held responsible for shooting at Indonesian youths who were holding a demonstration at the Chinese People's Republic Embassy com- pound in Djakarta on 5 August 1967. h. YAO Teng-shan Counsellor Indonesia April Yao was Charge d'Affaires at the time she was expelled as a result of a series of rude exchanges between Chinese Communist diplomats and Indonesian officials. i. YU Min-sheng Journalist Burma July Yu, a NCNA correspondent in Rangoon, was ordered on 14 July 1967 to leave the Union of Burma by air before noon on 17 July 1967. CUBA: none (4 in 1966) CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 6 (5 in 1966) a. Vaclav BUBENICEK Press Attache Brazil March Bubenicek was alleged to have written derogatory material about Brb.zil for Czech newspapers. b. Oldrich HLAVICKA Assistant Commerical Ghana June Attache Hlavicka was expelled by an official Ghanaian Government decision,evi- dently to curtail Czech influence in Ghana. c. Karel PATEK Representative of firms Turkey April MOTOKOV and METALIMEX Patek was accused of collecting secret documents and information about Turkish NATO ties and defense plans. d. Jiri PRAVDA Representative of Czech Ghana June news agency Pravda was expelled by an official Ghanaian Government decision, evi- dently to curtail Czech influence in Ghana. e. Jiri SMIDT Press and Cultural Greece September Attache Smidt was arrested during a meeting with an espionage agent. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 f. Jaroslav SVOBODA Chauffeur France September Svoboda was sentenced to 10 years in prison in Paris for espionage. He was released in exchange for a French prisoner imprisoned in Czechoslovakia. EAST GERMANY: none (3 in 1966) HUNGARY: 1 (2 in 1966) a. Istvan LASZLO Third Secretary Switzerland April Laszlo was charged with repeated attempts to gather information on the Union of Hungarian Emigres in Switzerland and on that basis ordered on 21 April to leave Switzerland. NORTH KOREA: none (7 in 1966) POLAND: 1 (3 in 1966) a. Leszek BEKSINSKI Representative of Polish Belgium December travel agency Beksinski was expelled for conducting "improper activities," he had been implicated in the Staszczak case. Staszczak was arrested by Luxembourg's counter-espionage service for espionage and deported to the Netherlands, where he was assigned to the Commercial Section of the Polish Embassy. Staszczak left the Netherlands in haste, presumably to avoid being declared PNG. RUMANIA: 2 (none in 1966) a. Vasile ILIE Second Secretary Greece September Ilie was caught in a meeting with an espionage agent whom he had recruited in Greece, and to whom he had given intelligence requirements at previous meetings. b. Florea STOIANA First Secretary Brazil August Stoiana. was expelled for involvement in intelligence activities. USSR: 10 (38 in 1966) a. Vladimir A. GLUKHOV Representative of Netherlands January Aeroflot Glukhov was arrested and subsequently expelled for an abortive attempt to obtain Dutch state secrets; he had been interested in air defense systems and aircraft construction techniques. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 b. Aleksey N. KAZANTSEV Novosti representative Ghana June Kazantsev was declared persona non grata for "committing slanderous propaganda activity against the Government and people of Ghana aril for engaging in wanton acts of espionage in an attempt to bring the outlawed CCP and its notorious ex-leader and criminal Kwame Nkrumah back into power." c. Valentin I. KOROVIKOV Pravda correspondent Ghana June Korovikov was expelled for the same reasons as Kazantsev. (See above.) d. Anatoli T. OGORODNIKOV TASS correspondent Belgium April Ogordnikov was accused of endangering state security. He was reported in the press as having been involved in directing and paying a "Madame X" to gain employment in SHAPE, and to photograph secret documents there. e. Ignor Pavlovich OSHURKOV Commercial repre- Greece March sentative Oshurkov was linked to the famous Rinaldi case in Italy, and expelled for that reason." f. Yuri Kuzmich PAVLENKO Attache Italy March Pavlenko was reportedly an Embassy contact man for Giorgio Rinaldi, the norminal head of a spy ring which operated against NATO installations in several Mediterranean countries. g. Boris M. PETRIN Attache Cyprus March Petrin was expelled for the same reason as Oshurkov. (See above.) h. Ivan Yaklovlevich PETROV Official of inter- Switzerland February national organization Petrov was expelled for asking a senior Swiss civil servant to spy for the USSR. Petrov had been a high-ranking member of the UN-associated Inter- national Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Geneva, a post( to which he had been elected by all: member; nations of the ITU. i. Nikolay I. Ranov Aeroflot Representative Cyprus March Ranov was expelled for the same reason as Shurkob. (See above.) Albert M. ZAKHAROV Second Secretary Greece March Zakharov was expelled for the same reason as Oshurkov. (See above.) YUGOSLAVIA: none (1 in 1966) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 January 1967 ,Expuisions - 1966 Poem;ion Expelled from Military Attache Greece Bulgarian Military Attache Zahari KRISTANKOV was arrested by Greek security officials on 3 November 1966 while he was holding a clandestine meeting with a Greek non-commissioned Army officer whom the Greek authorities had been surveilling for more than a month. Perceiving the approach of the security officials, KRISTANKOV attempted to flee in his automobile and was only stopped by police officers firing at the rear tires, thus immobilizing the automobile. He was released when he dis- closed his identity and claimed diplomatic immunity, but was declared PNG by the Greek government that same day. 2. POPOV, Stefan Commercial Representative Colombia It was announced in the Bogota press in October 1966 that Stefan POPOV, commercial representative in the Bulgarian trade mission in Colombia had been declared personna non grata and given four days to leave the country. Fie was accused of intervening in the internal af- fairs of Colombia and of giving unspecified aid to the subversive ele- ments in that country. However POPOV appealed the order and was still in Colombia at year's end. COMMUNIST. CHINA 1. CHANG Chung-hsu, Embassy employee Kenya (also spelled CHMG Tsung-hsu) In March 1966, ten diplomats, correspondents, and commercial repre- sentatives from Communist nations were expelled by Kenya for attempt- ing to subvert the government of that country. They included persons from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Communist China. While specific charges were not levied against individuals, the Minister of Home Affairs,'Daniedarap Moi stated that more than 16400,000 had been used by "certain individuals" to subvert the government. CHANG Chung- hsu was declared PNG on 9 March and his colleague, YAO Ch'un, Third Secretary of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was PNG'd on 16 March. Approved For Release 2005/04/21: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040069cmt? ) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Second Secretary Ghana 2. CHL Kuei-yu After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah (24 February.1966) the National Liberation Council discovered massive evidence of subversive activities by Communist nations that had been carried on under the former dictator. These discoveries resulted in the departure from Ghana of nearly 1000 Soviets and about 250 Chinese. Of these, only 20 Soviets and 3 Chinese were officially declared PNG. The Chinese were CHU Kuei-yu, HU Ting-is and TIEN Chang-sung, who were served with PNG notices on 14 March 1966 and given 48 hours to leave Ghana because they. were "intelligence HU Ting-i, First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Accra, Ghana, was declared PNG on 14 March 1966 and given 48 hours to leave the country. (See CHU Juei-yu above for further details.) 4. LI En-chiu Charge d'Affaires Netherlands LI En-chin, Charge d'Affaires of the Chinese Communist Embassy at The Hague, Netherlands, was PNG'd on 19 July 1966 for implication in the abduction of the Chinese welding expert HSU Tzu-tsai from a hospital in The Hague. HSU Tzu-tsai had injured himself in attempting to defect and had been taken to a hospital for treatment, whence-he was abducted .by members of the Chinese Communist Embassy. He subsequently died. officers engaged in espionage." 3., IHU Ting-i First Secretary TIEN Chang-sung, attache of the communist Chinese Embassy in Accra, Ghana, was declared PNG on 14 March 1966 and'given 48 hours) to leave l 5. TIEN Chang-sung Attache s. the country. (See CHU Kuei-yu, above, for further detai 6. YAO Chun Third Secretary Kenya YAO Chun was PNG'd from Nairobi, Kenya on 16 March 1966. His wife, WANG Ming-o, an English interpreter, was expelled with him. (See CHANG Chung-hsu, above, for further details.) WANG Erh-k'ang Second Secretary Switzerland the Swiss government on 24 March d 'D790- b l ' y are ang was dec WANG Erh-k 1966 because of his contacts with JUO Yu-shou, Cultural Attache of the Chinese Nationalist Embassy in Burssels, who was for years an agent of the Chinese Communists in Bern. MEWZA, Juan Third Secretary Ghana On 24 September 1966 the four diplomatic officials of the Cuban Embassy in Accra, Ghana, were ordered to leave the country for inter- fering in the internal affairs of Ghana. They actually departed on Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 2 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 was not officially stated in the formal accusation against them, infor- mation leaked out that they had been involved in, among other things, conspiring to return Kwame Nkrumah to power in Ghana. The other persons involved were: Georgina PEREZ Puig, Gaspar VARONA Hanlen, and Antonio Lino VARONA Salgado. 2. PEREZ Puig, Georgina Charge d'Affaires Ghana Georgina PEREZ Puig was ordered to leave Ghana on 24 September 1966, and actually left on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further details.) 30 September, at which time the Cuban Embassy was closed. Although it 3. VARONA Hanlen, Gaspar Third Secretary Ghana Gaspar VARONA Hanlen was PNG'd on 24 September 1966 from Accra, Ghana, and left on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further details.) 4. VA,RONA Salgado, Antonio Lino Third Secretary Antonio Lino VARONA Salgado was expelled from Accra, Ghana, on 24 September 1966 and departed on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further details.) because he had engaged in espionage activities inimical to the govern- ment of that country. His expulsion had been preceded, on 10 March, by that-of Zdenek KUBES of the Czechoslovak. news agency, CETEKA, and Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy. 2. KOZUBIK, Stanislas Second Secretary Kenya Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was expelled from that country on 10 March 1966. He was accused of having: engaged in activities inimical to the host government. Also ousted on'the same date was Zdenek KUBES of the Czech news agency CTK. On 15 March Jan CARDA, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy was also expelled. Kenya On 15 March 1966 Jan CARDA was given 24 hours to leave Kenya CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1. CARDA, Jan Third Secretary 3. KUBES, Zdenek CETEKA (Czech news agency) correspondent Kenya Zdenek KUBES was accused by Kenya of having engaged in activities inimical to that country, specifically of having planted in the local press aniarticle unfriendly to the government of President Kenyatta:' He was declared PNG on 10 March 1966. Also ousted on the same date was Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy. On 15 March Jan CARDA, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy was also expelled.' Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 :? CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 . OPATRNY, Jiri Attache United States of America Jiri OPATRNY was declared PNG by the U.S. Government on 13 July 1966 for having attempted to bribe a Department of State employee to plant a secret wireless transmitting device in the office of the director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the State Depart- ment. It was revealed the following day that the State Department employee had, with the approval of the FBI, pretended to cooperate with the Czech Embassy for more than five years as a secret agent. OPATRNY was given 3 days to leave the U.S.A. At the same time it was revealed that Zdenek PISK.,the Czech diplomat who originally recruited the State Department employee, had left the U.S.A. in 1963 but had recently returned as First Secretary of.the Czech United Nations Mission in New York City. When the U.S. Government informed the United Nations Secretariat of PISK's past espionage activities, he was returned to his homeland. 5. PISK, Zdenek First Secretary, Czech Mission to U.S.A. United Nations On 13 July 1966 the Department of State revealed that the Czech embassy in Washington had attempted to subvert a Department employee. The employee had reported the attempted recruitment to his superiors and had thereafter for more than five years, pretended to cooperate with the Czechs. in 1961 he was "recruited" by Zdenek PISK, then Second Secretary of the Czech embassy, who returned to his homeland in 1963; after handing over the agent to Jiri OPATRNY, Attacht of the Embassy. In 1966 PISK returned to the United States with the Czech mission to the United Naitons in New York. When the details of the attempted espionage case were made public in July 1966, the UN Secre- tariat was informed of PISK's role in the,case and he was then returned to Czechoslovakia. (See also note on Jiri OPATRNY, above.) EAST GERMANY 1. APPEL, Heiner ADN (East German News Service) Kenya correspondent Heiner APPEL was declared PNG.by the government of Kenya in February1966 because of his "lavish entertainment" of Kenyan leftists with the ultimate aim of subverting the government. 2. GRAEFE, Karl-Heinz ADN (East German News Service) Ghana correspondent Karl-Heinz GRAEFE, a staff member of the ADN, was expelled from Ghana in November 1966 for subversive and other activities incompatible with the status of a journalist. According to an official Ghanaian statement, GRAEFE had sent and received secret messages and a search of his residence revealed an article which contained "wholly untrue statements" about Ghana, its aim being to "damage Ghana's reputation." The Eas't'German Trade Mission was also ordered closed at this time. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 4 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 KRUGER, Jurgen (Major) (alias) Ghana ROGALLA, Jurgen (true) Representative of Ministry for State Security Major Jurgen KRUGER arrived in Ghana in November 1964. He estab- lished a secret training school for Ghanaian spies which was exposed upon the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966. KRUGER was arrested but not tried since the EAst German government held 350 Ghanaian students then studying in that country as hostages in order to arrange KRUGER's release. On 25 May 1966 the Ghana Government released KRUGER in exchange for the students. KRUGER had been formally charged with "illegal entry into Ghana, impersonating a diplomat and using his privileged position to conduct espionage against countries with which Ghana had friendly relations." Prior to his release KRUGER .confessed to the charges against him and further admitted that his true name was Jurgen ROGAL a. 1. BUDAI, Ferenc Second Secretary of trade mission Italy 2. NOVAK, Janos Third Secretary Kenya Following the eclipse of the notoriously pro-Communist Oginga Odinga,' who lost his influential post as 'Vice-President of the KANU Party,isome 11 diplomats and journalists from Communist countries were expelled from Kenya. They included Soviets, Czechs, Chinese, an East German and the Hungarian, NOVAK. They were accused of maintaining contacts with certain leftist Kenyan politicians for the ultimate pur- pose,of subverting the Kenyatta government. Ferenc BUDAI was arrested by Italian police in Milan, Italy, on 3 November 1966 while in the act of receiving secret information from an Italian citizen employed by the United States 40th Tactical Air Force in Italy. Since BUDAI did not have diplomatic status, he was not declared personna non grata, but is being held for trial. NORTH KOREA 1. CHU-Chan-pyon Trade Mission Uruguay CHU Chan-pyon was expelled from Uruguay in the Spring of 1966 when his visa expired. (See CHU Chang-won, below, for further details.) 2, CHU Chang-won Trade Mission Uruguay In February 1966 the Uruguyan Government announced that it would refuge to renew the visas of the North Korean Trade Mission members when they expired. The announced reason was that the North Koreans were attempting to act as diplomats rather than as trade representatives. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA=RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 As a consequence three North Koreans left with their families on 11 February: CHU Chang-won, MUN Chong-sok, and YI Hyong-su. A fourth member of the trade mission stayed until his visa ran out and then left: CHU Chan-pyon. 3. KIM Kong Interpreter In March 1966, in the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, three members of the North Korean embassy in Accra, Ghana were given 30 days to leave the country by the National Liberation Council. They were NO Su-ok, Ambassador, SIN Sang-ku, Third Secretary, and KIM Kong, Interpreter. 4. MUN Chong-sok Trade Mission, Uruguay MUN Chong-sok was expelled from Uruguay in February 1966, when his entry visa expired and the Uruguyan Government refused to renew it. (See CHU Chang-won, above, for further details.) '5. NO Su-ok Ambassador NO Su-ok was expelled, on 30 days notice, from Ghana. (See KIM Kong, above, for further details.) 6. SIN Snag-ku Third Secretary Ghana SIN Sang-ku was expelled, on 30 days notice from Ghana. (See KIM Kong, above, for further details.) 7. YI Hyong-su Trade Mission YI Hyong-su was expelled from Uruguay in February 1966. Chang-won, above, for further details.) { 1. DZIEDZIC, Ryszard (Major) Military Attache Uruguay (See CHU U.S.A. As a result of harrassment of two U.S. military attaches in Poland in April 1966, for which the Polish Government refused to make amends, Col. Stefan STAREWSKI, assistant air attache of the Polish embassy in Washingtoni,:,was expelled on 4 May 1966. In retaliation the Polish Government then expelled three U.S. military attaches from Warsaw. This in turn resulted in two other Poles,,hieut. Col. Tadeusz WISNIEWSKI and Major Ryazard DZIEDZIC, being declared PNG on 20 May 1966 by the United States. 2. STARZEWSKI, Stefan (Colonel) Assistant Air Attache U.S.A. . STARZEWSKI was expelled from the U.S.A. in May 1966. (See'DZIEDZIC, above, for further details). Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 6 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/04121 :, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 WISNIEWSKI, Tadeusz (Lt. Col.) Military Attache U.S.A. WISNIEWSKI was expelled from the U.S.A. in may 1966. (See DZIEDZIC, above, for further details.) . SOVIET UNION 1. ABRAMOV, Valdimir Mikhaylovich Trade Mission Ghana In the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah(February 1966), a large number of Communist officials was expelled from Ghana. This included over a thousand Soviets, of whom only 20 were officially declared PNG. According to the Ghana radio, and a "White Book" on "Nkrumah',s Subversion in Africa," the Soviets were actively involved in every possible form of subversion. Not only did they train and super- vise the internal Ghanaian secret police, including the detachments charged with protecting Nkrumah, but they also trained and supervised the Ghanaian espionage and sabotage-services which operated against the other countries of Africa. These Soviets were declared PNG on 16 March 1966 and left almost immediately. 2. AKHMEROV, Robert Isaakovich First Secretary Ghana AKHMEROV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 3. GLADKIY, Nikolay Ivanovich Second Secretary Ghana GLADKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 4. GLUKHOVSKIY, Vasiliy Vasilyevich Trade Mission Ghana GLUKHOVSKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 5. IVANOV, Nikolay Iosifovich Acting Consul Uruguay Four Soviets were expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966 for "intervening in labor affairs and inciting strikes." An official Uruguayan Government memorandum stated that the four men were members of the Soviet State Security Service and Military Intelligence and summarized their objectives as: precipitating labor paralysis through strikes and stoppages; aggravating Uruguay's economic difficulties by disorganization of work, industrial sabotage and economic subversion; and strengthening the position of Communist agents in the labor unions. The four Soviets were: YANGAYKIN, Aleksey A., ZUDIN, Nikilay A., IVANOV, and Valeriy F. SHVETZ. 6. KAMAYEV, Yevgeniy Borisovich Second Secretary Ghana KAMAYEV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 7 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 KATAYEV, Valeriy V. Second Secretary KATAY'EV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 8. KISAMEDINOV, Maksut Mustarkhovith Second Secretary Ghana KISAMEDINOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 9. KISELEV, Ivan Pavlovich First Secretary Ghana KISELEV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 10. KOBYSH, Vitaliy Ivanovich Correspondent of "Izvestiya" Brazil and Radio Moscow KOBYSH was expelled from Brazil on 13 April 1966. A government source stated only that he had falsely reported that Brazilian govern- ment officials had accepted bribes. However press reports stated that he had provided financial aid to leftist publications and had encour- aged them to publish articles defamatory to government officials. U. KODAKOV, Vladimir Alexsandrovich First Secretary Kenya In mid-March 1966 Kenya expelled 11 officials from Communist countries. Although no reasons for this action were officially declared, it is well known that these officials were closely involved with a leftist opposition group within the Kenyan government which included Oginga ODINGA, a pro-Communist vice president of the KANU Party and also vice-president of the government. KODAKOV was declared PNG on 10 March 1966 and left that same day. 12. KOZLOV, Yuriy Nikolayevich Secretary to Military Attache Ghana KOZLOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 13. KRIVAPOLAV, Viktor S. Trade Mission KRIVAPALOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 14. KURITSYN, Yuriy Vasilyevich Novosti Press Agency Kenya correspondent KURITSYN was one of five Soviets expelled from Kenya in March 1966. He was declared PNG on 10 March and left that same day. (See KODAKOV, above, for further details.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 8 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 15. LAPUSHENKO, Nikolay Ivanovich Instructor, Ideological Ghana LAPUSHIENKO was one of 20 Soviets, expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 16. LEMZENKO, Kir Gavrilovich Member of trade mission Italy Kir Gavrilovich LEMZENKO attempted to recruit an Italian non- commissioned naval officer to obtain secret information on the Italian Navy and on the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces in Southern Europe, based in Naples. The Italian officer reported the recruitment attempt to Italian security authorities who encouraged him to pretend to cooperate with the Soviet. As a result the security forces were able to catch LEMZEVKO red-handed paying the non-commissioned officer for photographs which he believed to contain secret information. LEMZENKO was declared PNG on 3 November 1966 and given 48 hours to leave the country. 17. MALININ, Aleksey Romanovich Assistant Commercial Counselor U.S.A. MALININ was declared personna non grata on 31 October 1966 by the U.S. Government on the heels of the arrest of a U.S. Air Force sergeant for "conspiring to commit espionage" by delivering to the Soviet dip- lomat "information relating to the national defense of the United States." The sergeant worked as a communcations equipment repairman. 18. MAMURIN, Leonid Aleksandrovich Soveksportkhleb employee Thailand MAMURIN was arrested by Thai police on 26 September for espionage. Security officials stated they had abundant evidence that he was col- lecting information about Thailand and he was charged with performing actions detrimental to the state. He was later released to Soviet custody and left the country very shortly thereafter. 19. MATYUSHIN, Anatoliy Nikolayevich TASS correspondent Ghana MATYUSHIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana. on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 20. OBOLENTSEV, Fedor R. TASS correspondent Libya OBOLENTSEV was quietly PNG'd'from Libya on about 7 December 1966. The story broke in the Italian press ("Il Giornale d'Italia") on 15-16 December. According to the Italian article OBOLENTSEV was a secret agent, an expert in Arabic, and had attempted to corrupt, with money and promises of support, the country's most influential officials and personalities. 21. OBUKHOV, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Attache Thailand OBUKHOV was declared PNG in Bangkok, Thailand on 28 September for activities incompatible with his diplomatic status which affected the Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040 05-0 9 Cont . ) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 national security. His expulsion closely followed that of B.A. MAMURIN, Soveksporthleb employee, who was arrested for espionage on 26 September and expelled from the country. 22. ORLENKO, Vladimir Ivanovich Doorkeeper Ghana ORLENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 23. OVECHKIN, Vladimir Yevgenyevich TASS engineer Ghana OVECHKIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on i6 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 24. PETRUK, Boris Georgiyevich . Instructor, Ideological Ghana Institute, Winneba PETRUK was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16, March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 25. POPOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich First Secretary Ghana POPOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. .(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details,) 26. REVIN, Valentin Alekseyevich Third Secretary U.S.A. On 1 September 1966 the U.S. Department of State declared Valentin A. REVIN PNG for having attempted to buy secret information on the United States space program, missiles, and aircraft. He had paid over $5,000 to an American businessman who was secretly cooperating with the FBI while pretending to engage in espionage for the Soviets. The American had been cultivated by Soviet diplomats since 1961. 27. SHELENKOV, Albert A. Consular Officer Ghana SHELENKOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 28. SHPAGIN, Mikhail Mikhaylovich Trade Mission Cologne West Germany On 20 January 1966 the Federal Interior Ministry of West Germany denounced a Soviet spy ring operating in that country. It was based on a West Germany scientist who had been forced to work for the Soviets in order to secure the release of his wife from Fast Germany. The scientist reported the situation to his government and the Soviets were observed in their clandestine contacts by West Germany security officials. Four of.the.five Soviets denounced for their part in this spy ring had already left the country when the announcement was made. The fifth, SHPAGIN, was recalled by the Soviet Government at the request of the West German government in January 1966. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 29. SHVETS, Vladimir Fedorovich Embassy Administrative Uruguay Officer SHVETS was, one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.) 30. SILIN, Boris A. Attacie's driver Ghana SILIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV,?above, for further details.) 31. SMIRNOV, Leonid Vasilyevich Third Secretary Tunisia SMIRNOV was ordered expelled from Tunisia on 16 March 1966 in retaliation for a similar measure taken against a Tunisian diplomat in Moscow. 32. SOLYAKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich TASS representative Kenya SOLYAKOV was expelled from Kenya on 15 March 1966 (Se KODAKOV . e , above, for further details.) 33. TARASEMO, Sergey Ivanovich Engineer, Office Ghana of Economic Counselor '1'ARASENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) 34. YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich Sovexportfilm Kenya representative YAKOVLEV was expelled from Kenya on 15 March 1966. (See KODAKOV, above, for further details.) 35. YANGAYKIN, Sergey Alekseyevich Cultural Attache Uruguay YANGAYKIN was one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.) 36. YUKALOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich First Secretary Kenya YUKALOV was expelled from Kenya on 10 March 1966. (See KODAKOV, above, for further details.) 37. ZINKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy V. Sovexport representative Ghana ZINKOVSKIY was one of 20 Soviets ex ell d f p e rom Ghana on 16 March 1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 11 (Cont.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 12 ZUDIN as one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.) 38. ZUDIN, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Embassy Press Officer U ay YUGOSLAVIA 1. STRELEC, Ronald Third Secretary -- Cultural Affairs Argentina Ronald STRELEC was declared PNG by the government of Argentina on 22 July 1966 for proselytizing among Yugoslavian emigres in Argentina and for illegal distribution of propaganda. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0 JAPAN TIMES 29 April 1967 2 Couples Found Guilty of Spying PARTS (UPI)-The state security court Thursday found a `Vest German couple. and a Czech couple guilty of spying on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for East l Germany. The court sentenced Peter Kranick, a 30-year-old West German to 20 years in jail, for passing out information collected by his wife from the former headquarter., of NATO in Paris. Kranick's wife, 27-year-old Renee wbo worked as a secre- tary at NATO for about two years received a 14-year jail sentence. Hans Bammler, a 4',-year- old Czech who was. sent by j East German intelligence to act as liaison man and who transmitted the information supplied to East Germany was sentenced to 18 years in jail. His wife Maria was sen.. tenced to 12 years in jail for i helping her husband. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0