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December 21, 2016
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June 26, 2006
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November 20, 1975
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Approved For Release 2006_/Q6/26_: CJARDIP788,1Q2A':,' 2A000100040001-2 November 20 1975 C TGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SLIN A. / Niue stimulate purchase of potables in returnable containers. 'Elie council's action in Montgomery is, 'of course, only a skirmish won in a war in which the bottling and beverage industries have shown no inclination to surrender. But, in conjunction with other recent engagements, it is progress. The Environmental Protection Agency last week took the first procedural step to require a 5-cent deposit on all beverage containers sold under federal auspices, which would have an obvious impact on the Washington area. And the Maryland Court of Appeals in March upheld an ordinance passed by the town of Bowie in 1971, requiring the manda- tory deposit. There appears to be developing a wider feeling that disposable containers represent a ridiculous wastefulness and a lack of aes- thetic concern for onr own backyards. The arguments of the bottlers and soft-drink purveyors do not hold water, and they would do well now to get cracking on the the con- versiorf back to returnables instead of trying to impede the effort by rhetoric and. litiga- tion. No serious argument has been made that elimination of throwaways would involve no difficulties. But the point is that these would be temporary and worth the economic divi- dend in conservation. One recent study, by the Maryland Governor's Council of Eco- nomic Advisers, said that weaning ourselves from disposables would create 1,500 jobs in the state, would produce $1.1 million in new tax revenue, and would reduce highway litter in the neighborhood of 30 per cent. Throwaways are a problem, as we have sal before, that is not so intractable as many o our urban knots. We trust that Mr. Gleasoi will see it that way, this time around. An in a time of scarce household money, eve in Montgomery, the savings to the consume of drinks In returnables over throwaways amounts to 60 per cent. ' CULTURAL NOTE This tidbit is offered to any sociologist or urban anthropologist who has been too busy filling out forms for foundation grants to get around to field work. It means something, we think, perhapS something of coruscating insight. A proud municipality in our area spon- sored a Halloween dance for its "older teen- agers" at the community center. The town will be left anonymous, to spare it possible embarrassment, but also because we suspect its experience was duplicated in other suburbs. The following description comes from the town newsletter. "Despite the presence of some 10 chaperons and 3 policemen, the men's toilet was stopped up with paper and the room flooded, and empty beer cans, bottles and cartons were strewn over the parking lot area. Considering that an estimated no young people were present during -the evening, except for the problems noted above and a messed up gym floor, the dance was characterized to be about - as orderly as expected in these days and times." The comingling of tones in this brief dis- patch?of fatalism, ennui, frustration,, and a sense that the town may have gotten off with lesser ravages than anticipated?should Speak eloquently to the trained investigator of current social phenomena. NOTE In the Recant) of November 11; 1975, the first paragraph of Mr. BAYH'S re- marks on page S195138 are incorrectly set forth. In the permanent. REcoaa the paragraph will be printed as follows: EXTENSION OF REVENUE SHARING Mr. BAYH. Mr, President, I wish to express my concern about the need for early action to extend the revenue shar- ing program. I believe that most Mem- bers of Congress and concersed citizens agree that the revenue sharing program has been successful, and it is my percep- tion that the program will be reenacted with little opposition. The questions are when Congress will act and how much money will be allocated to the program. CONCLUSION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GLENN). The period for the transaction of routine morning business is closed. CLOSED SESSION The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GLENN)-. Under the previous order, the hour of 9 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will go into closed session, not to extend beyond 1 p.m. The Chair now directs the Sergeant at Arms to -clear the galleries, close the doors of the Chamber, and exclude all those not sworn to secrecy. (At 9 a.m. the doors of the Chamber were closed.) PROCEEDINGS IN CLOSED SESSION Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GLENN). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am about to make a unanimous-consent re- quest, and I do so with some fear and trepidation because of the numbers in- volved, and that number in relation to the closed session which the Senate will now undertake. I think it is a very bad precedent to have more than two people here at any time from outside the Senate, but on this occasion, in view of the situation which has developed, I ask unanimous con- sent?and this is not to be considered a precedent?that the following members of the staff of the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence be accorded, full privileges for tile period of this closed door session of the Senate. Before I list their names, again, they will have to be sworn in by the Sergeant at Arms and pass that test: William 0. Miller, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Curtis Smothers, Charles Kirbow, David Aaron, Joseph Di- Genova, Richard Inderfurth, Robert Kelley, Charles Lombard, Michael Madigan, Elliot Maxwell, Walter Ricks, Burton Wides, Mr. ALLEN. Reserving the right to object?and I shall not object?will the Senate be given an opportunity to ex- %1100 press itself during this. session on the advisability of releasing the names of CIA agents who may have been involved in assassination plots? Mr. MANSFIELD. The leadership would never think of foreclosing any right, privilege, or prerogative of the Senate, and the answer_ would be in the affirmative. Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Chair. The PRESIDING Gleh'ICER. Is there further objection? Mr. ALLEN. I thank the distinguished majority leader. Mr. GRIVetiN. Mr. President, on the point that the Senator from Alabama has just raised, when will it be possible to have a discussion on that particular question. I ask the majority leader? Mr. MANSFIELD. Under the agree- ment reached, the session cannot go be- yond 1 o'clock, Mr. GRIFFIN. Then I wonder if there could be a period of at least 15 minutest something at the beginning, to lay out some basic legal questions about this that Senators could then be Mulling over in their mind as they are listening to the rest of the presentation and then, perhaps, some further discussion at the .end? Mr. MANSFIELD. I would think so, and I am sure that the chairman of the committee and the ranking Republican member of the committee would be will- ing to give that consideration. Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield? Mr. CHURCH. May I just say, in the interest of orderly - presentation, the chairman and the vice chairman had hoped to present the report, during which these questions to which the Sen- ator from Michigan refers will be al- luded to, became they have been care- fully considered by the committee, and then after that, of course, any discussion concerning the question that the Senator raises would be entirely appropriate. Mr. GRIFFIN. The Senator from Michigan has some questions that he would not just expect the distinguished chairman to allude to, but to address himself to. Mr. CHURCH. There will be plenty of opportunity to do that. Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Mr. TOWER. The way that we agreed on it yesterday is that the time should be equally divided between the Senator from Idaho and myself. Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right. Mr. TOWER. And then on a rota- tional basis we would yield to people on our side in turn. The presentation by the chairman and the vice chairman should not take an extraordinarily long time and each mernbsr of the committee, I think, ought to expaess himself briefly and I think there will be adequate time for colloquies and qu? stions on this matter on the part of the I lembers of the Senate that wish to participate. Mr. CRIFFIN. Including-- Mr. ReSTORE. Reserving the right to object? - Mr. SPARKMAN. Just a question.- S 20623 MORUCDF Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 S20&2'4 ? Approved For Ref .I :iZa ccizei2i2x) o o004(100drin er 20, 19-75 Nifty suggested that, at some pointehe the pm- ceedings this morning; if the Senate de- sired to engage in, debate,, these special assistants- for the members of. the cora- mittee-might be dismissed. I do-not object - to that, but I think, in any case, thechiet counsel for the Democratic- side and deputy counsel for the Republican side should remain. ? Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSIsiELD; I yield; . Mr, SYMINGTON. It is my under, standing- that the committee felt the re- port should be published. Is that correct? Mr. CHURCH. Yes. The committee so voted and, then, reconfirmed. its. vote fol- lowing receipt of, a Presidential letter asking that the report remain concealed. Mn SYMINGTON. Was that decision by the committeeunanimous? Mr. CHURCH. That decision wae taken withouta dissenting vote. There was one abstention. Mr. SYIVII.NGTON.. That being true, I hope, we?do not chase windmills. We- cer- tainly my intention, if the committee works- this many months, speaking per- sonally- for myself, whatever the- com- mittee thinks should- be done with this report I. am going to be for, and I hold myself under no- obligation not:to-be. for. Mr. CHURCH. I thank the. Senator very much. Mr.- MANSFIELD: M. President, in view' of the- fact that 15, minutes have 'elapsed- under the time schedule, could the Chair at this -time act on, my request that. these additional staff members. be allowed.? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mn President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, reluctantly, because if the subject is this complex that we have to have this-number of staff people on the floor I do not know how a person Iikemy- self can understand it, I askunanienous-- Iwill not object. Go ahead. ? The. PRESIDING OFFICER. IS, there objection?, ? Without objection, it. is so, ordered. Mn ROBERT C..BYRDelelrePresident; I ask unanimous consent thatparagraph numbered 4 of rule 36, page 55' of the Senate Manual; be printed in- the REC- ORD at this-point.. There- being no. objections the para- graph. was ordered, to. be printed in the RECORD, as-follows: 4'. Any Senator or officer of the Senate who shall disclose the secret or confidential busi- ness or proceedings or the Senata shall be Pablo, if a. Senator, to suffer expulsion from the-body; and if an officer, to dismissal from the service-of the-Senate, and to-punishment for contempt. Mr. PASTORE: Reserving the righlet object-- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. There, la a re- quest pending. ? Mr.. MANSFIELD. I. yield, to- the Senator. Mr. PASTORE: I was wondering, could we not set a, time limit insofar as the presentation, -because none of us know here what is going. to develop: The PRESIDING OrtesCER. Could the Senator speak up, please? We doe:tot have a loud, speaker system.. Mr. PASTORE. If we go from 9until 1, I think what we. ought to do is set aside an hour or an hour and a half in. the beginning and, then. we can- resume the talk about the:legalities-involved and. the procedures to, be followed- because, after all, here. we are in the dark.. We do- not know what is going to- develop, until we hear it and I think that is what-we ought to. do. We ought. to set aside an hour and a_ half or an hour of the first- 5 hours., . What is it, 5 hours? - ? Mr_ MANSFIELD. Four. hours. Mr.. PASTORE_ Four haun- t Then_ we take it. from. there, and. then we can have 15. minutes or 20 :minutes. Mr. MANSFIELD, Make it the last hour to give them a chance to explain. Mr. PASTORE. That is- right.. Mr. SPARKMAN.Will theleader yield for ? a question e . Mr. MANSFIELD... Yes; and then. to the Senator. from. Nerth Dakota- . Mr. SPARKMAN. I. merely- want to ask, the leedee read off quite a Iong, list of names.. Mr. MANSFIELD. Too- long a list.. . Mr. SPARKMAN. Are. they a part of the Senate?' Mr. MANSFIELD. They are not, a part of the Senate.. They are attaches, at- tached_ to. the. Select Committee..- Mr.. SPARKMAN. '17'hey are a part of the committee? Mr.. MANSFIELD. Yes.. - Mr. SPARKMAN. I thank the Senator. ; Mr.. YOUNG. My question, along the same line, I can see where some. staff. members are. necessary; but L cannot understand why and I would like an. exe planation. of why so many. There-will probably be more staff, members than Senators. Mr. MANSFIELD. Will, the Senator yield? . There are 11 members on the. commite tee and it allows them each an assistant, plus the Democratic counsel and the Re- publican counsel. Just like the umpire made a decision based on his judgment in St. Louis last Sunday with which- some people found fault. The leadership has done the best it could and it has re- duced it from about 25 down to 13, Mr. YOUNG. I am not going to object, but I think there will be bigger press cov- e Page this. way than if we let the press it. Mr.. MANSFIELD. I agree.. Mr. BAKER. I might say, for the ret- as aira,nce of our colleagues,, there is an, ci ier reason to want thm. ehere That is in the interest of security_ We broke the st if clown into compartments. One cone- pa; trnent did not know what the ether con pa,rtment was working on. So there is Ito staff member, except the majority and minority counsel, who have a, gen- eral overview, and they do, not. in, de- tail. This was- to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings.. It seems to me we need at. least this many in order to have. a full presentation. While I agree with. the majority leader that it is unfortunate,. I believe it is essential. Mr.. CHTT7S. Now they will it. all put together for them? Mr. BAKER.. This is put together in a printed book that will, be placed on the desks. Members of the committee in a drafting session have approved the draft. But in. order to elaborate or. extend on any point in there, we will need rep- resentatives from the several drafting groups. Mr. CHILES., Will they all be here at one time? Mr. BAKER'. Eleven of them. Mr. CHURCH, May I say in further- ance of. what,. the distinguished Senator Mr. PASTORE. May we take our seats so we_can talk? SCHWEIKER. Let us turn the microphones on. Mr. CHURCH: This has been- an ex- traordinarily diligent committee. Mem- bers have, for 6'months., sat through end,- lesS sessions in the most intensive inves- tigation of the assassination-issue. I have never served on a committee where there was such fidelity- of' attendance on the part of the-membership-. These commit- tee members should not only have the right, but have- expressed the. the desire, to participate in this presentation. Be- -cause of the breadth. of the material covered; each one has assumed a respone sibillty for a particular chapterif highly technical Questions arise. For that rea- .son, the committee members- feel the need to have their own staff . assistant sitting with them. Mr. MANSFIELD'. Time is- fleeting. Could, we get a judgment? Mr. CIMPS., Can I ask' one more ques- tion? I can understand the explanation .of the need to have the staff members for the- answering- of questions'. I wonder if at some stage when the questions are answered so- to speak, if we get to- a point where. we want some debate, could, they then be excused? It would seem to me that there might well be some time that we would just want to have the Senate here if we were going to have a debate. Mr. MANSFIELD. The answer, I would assume, would be in the affirmative, or at least that wouldebe my opinion. Mr. TOWER. I think any Senator would be- within his rights in trying to promulgate a consent request to exclude staff. Mr. CHURCH. / think in that situation the chief counsel, the Democeatio and Republican counsel for the committee, ought to- be allowed to- remain. Mr. STENN. IS, Can. the Senator speak a little louder so. we can. hear? The PRESIDING OvieiCER.. If we might all keep that in minds please do so. I am having trouble hearing up- here. We do not have a loudspeaker system. If, during this discussion,, we can all speak up, we would all appreciate it. Mn MANSFIELD. You-are-doing great. Mr. CHURCH. Senator Crimus hos ? Mr. MANSFIELD. May I. emphasize the fact that this is not to be considered a precedent, the idea of having such huge staff numbers, comparatively- speaking in a closed sessimr. Now the time is &mane- divided be- tween the chairman and ti .e vice chair- man of the committee. Mr. TOWER. Mr. Pres. dent,. I ask unanimous consent that tin time on the presentation of the select cc mmittee re- port be equally divided' betw :en the Sen- ator from Idaho and the Sonator from Texas. s ? Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 '`` November 20, *1 Ap 75 p' proved ForWe ?(2'0.6'" iaReEM69M6tt. b(r2fiRFAMeiR000100040001-2 ? The PRESIDING OSVICER. Withovio objection, it is so ordered. Mr. CHURCH. Mr, President, I be- lieve the Senator's request is represen- tative of the bipartisan spirit which has guided the committee from its origin. Mr. President, I reserve to myself such time as this initial presentation may re- quire. Mr. MUSKIE. I wonder if it would not be helpful for the Senator to speak from the well, facing the Senate. We could all hear him better. Mr. CHURCH. May I inquire of the Chair if those assistants whose presence has been requested might enter the Chamber and assume their places? - [The Vice President assumed the Chair at this pointl Mr. CHURCH. In the summer of this year, the Select Committee on Intelli- gence took up the investigation of U.S. involvements in alleged assassination plots against foreign leaders, continuing the task begun by the Rockefeller Com- mission. rhe select committee asked for closed session today to describe our find- ings and conclusions to our colleague's before making =sir reIreii: report 7-1- able to the American people later this afternoon. We will turn to the contents of the reports in a moment, but, first, I would like to express my gratitude to Senator TOWER, whose constant attention to his responsibilities as vice chairman has been of invaluable assistance to the com- mittee. And to all other members of the committee who have worked so hard. The same expression of appreciation has been earned by members of the staff, in connection with this report, whose names I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the names of staff members were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: William G. Miller, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Curtis Smothems, Charles Kirbow, David Aaron, Frederick Baron, David Bushong, Elizabeth Culbreth, Rhe it Dawson. ' Joseph Dennin, joSeph. DiGenova, Rich- ard Inclerfurth, Loch Johnson, Robert Kelley, Charles Lombard, Michael Madigan, Elliot Maxwell. Paul Michel, Andrew Rostal, Gordon ? Rhea, Walter Ricks, Patrick Shea, Jack Smith, Greg Treverton, Burton Wides. ? Mr. CHURCH. Never have I known a group of harder working men and women. This committee has heard over 100 witnesses. It has studied thousands of documents and amassed a record of sworn testimony almost 10,000 pages long. We have spent months drafting and redraft- ing this report to make sure the evidence was stated fairly and completely. Meeting first in a subcommittee composed of Senator TOWER, Senator HART of Colo- rado, and myself, and then in the full committee, our descriptions of the assas- sination plots are all carefully docu- mented, and we have done our utmost to meet i he requirements of Senate Resolu- tion 21 to determine the full facts about the matters we investigated. I am proud to say that the committee adopted this report by unanimous vote, an accomplishment, I think, that was not thought possible when we first un- dertook the investigation. The committee also decided to recon- firm its earlier decision last summer te make the report public. Thissvote was also unanimous, with one abstention. Our reasons for feeling so strongly about tha Trigt of the people to have access to this historic document are set forth in sum- Marv' on_nage a cir tate report. We believe the publiFis entitled to know what the instrumentalities of their Government have done. We believe that our recommendations can be judged only in the light of the factual record. We be- lieve the truth about the assassination charges should be told because democ- racy depends upon an informed elec- torate. Truth is the very anchor of our democracy. We wrestled long and hard with the contention that the facts disclosed in this report should be kept secret since they are embarrassing to the United States. We concluded that despite any tern- porary injury to our national reputation, foreign peoples will, upon sober reflec- tion, respect the United States more for keeping faith with its democratic deals than they will condemn us for the mis- conduct revealed. We doubt that any other country would have the courage to make such a disclosure, and I personally believe this to be the unique strength of the American Republic. ? Our decision to make the report public was reinforced by the fact that portions of the story had already been told. In- nuendo and misleading piecemeal dis- closures are unfair to the individuals in- volved; nor are they a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public Policy judgments. In short, the rumors and allegations about the assassination plots must be put to rest. Any effort to keep the truth from the American public could on have the effect of increasing the corrosive cynicism about Govern- ment, which is such a threat to. our so- ciety today. au) without dissent, the committee agreed upon clear criteria for determin.- frig-which individuals shouldhe identified byh their true names in the repnrt. -W-e-Vere exceedingly careful. We asked the administrations so ? - GIME ? fire-report for the purpose of comments frig on this particular quesp:onee&ter lengthy cliTscus-gfon and. atmlication ....of thesnommittee's standards, we agreed to lisnit_insference for more than one-half of the nani-e-i regnested to be deietedsiy thLariministration ton title or, in some cases, a pseudonymTifowever, some pub- lic officials and some of tile -persons sMom t="Agericy used in-rosrraliTSTibla incluoing iijxr fignressewere so central tOollie....reirart that we concluded their true identities shoiUdiferiliade IrrrCWTt Tames _Madison recognized the right of freely examining public characters and free communication thereon as the only effective guardian of every other right. And, as the Supreme Court stated: The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legisaltive process. That power is broad. It comprehends the probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, ineffi- ciency or waste. the right of the committee to name in --reporrthose offf6Taisha were-re- sponMe for the assassination plots-- is beyond serious doubt. The -o-iilY time this right was chair lenge-UT-is iTiVaS In an ft th-hour attempt tose-gatide a certain name fiiii tne-fe- pert, the lightis-Laeseonamitteestoom- clusie that rianaelipl-kericialsy the Fetters,' district courts Earlier this week, the U.S. district ? court had occasion to review whether the inclusion of the name of a certain. former official in the report violated any of his constitutional rights. Judge Ger- hard Gesell found, in his opinion that the only right even conceivably at issue was the right of privacy. He then concluded, after having heard full argument in camera in which the CIA and its general counsel were represented, and after tak- ing public arguments in open session, that-- A former government official has no right of privacy vis-a-vis the Congress where his official conduct is under review. The court decided further? . This is not, as the Court views it, a case of exposure for the sake of exposure alone, ? The court ruled in this case that "the public interest greatly outweighs any private interest of the plaintiff." The court found the standard the committee applied in determining whether to in- clude certain true identities to be, in the words of the court, "responsible criteria." Now let me turn to the substance of the report. AU of you have a copy before you, and from time to time we may have occasion to turn to certain parts of it. It is organized as follows: Part introduces the committee's work, explains why the report must be made public, and summarizes the events examined in the body of the report. Part II explains several key concepts which are necessary to understand the events reviewed in the report, such as the nature of covert action, the basic lines of authority in the CIA, and the doctrine of plausible denial. Part III sets forth the facts and testi- mony relating to the assassination oper- ations and the level at which they were authorized. Part IV contains the findings and con- clusions of the committee. ? Finally, part V, outlines the recom- mendations of the committee. During the course of Its investigation, the committee addressed four broad questions. First, did the United States or U.S. -officials instigate, attempt, or aid and abet plots to assassinate foreign leaders? Second, did U.S. officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the killing of foreign leaders? Third, where U.S. officials were in- volved in assassination plots or other killings, were their activities r.uthorized, and if so, at what levels of ou Govern- //lent? Fourth, even if the involvem .tat- of of- ficials of the U.S. Government 11 assassi- nation activities was not expr !ssly au- thorized, did those officials perceive their actions to be within the ,scope of their lawful authority? Furthermore, slid high- Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78602992A000100040001-2 S 206,2 Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A00010004p001-; mileNGRESSIONAL RECORD?SE?Th' Zove'nwer2 1975' er authorities exercise, adequate control the opportunityarose. In the AMLasaa, Presidents o otherperg.mis above- the govern. to. prevent such. operation, the- CIAmisinterpretation?-r-- gave active support mental agency PT agencies involved. Richard. Helm, whohad been involved ? and encouragement to. a. Cuban whose Let me just. diese here a..moment to hi an assessination, plot before he be- intent to assassinate Castro. was, known, explains that the committee was very came-the Director of the CIA, issued. an and provided him with. the ?means for ? careful:- not to- make- findings.. where: the intraageney order banning assassination, carrying. out the assassination. - evidence- was insufficient,. 07 where it once he-became Director in 1972. William. ? The overthrow of Rafael Trujillo was, was-conflicting, or where there-were gaps Colby did the: same- in 197%. and told the clearly an. objective of U.S. foreign.- pole -- which we were unable. to fill because. we committee: _ . - icy.. American officials offered both en- were reaching back 15 years into a world couragement and Weapons. to- dissidents, . With respect to assassination, by ;position- of secrecy. is clear. I just think it Is wrong. . in the Dominican Republic., known. to.' In those cases.; however, we set out the have the Intent to assassinate Tnijillo. evidence so that Members of the Senate, The committee's findings and canal- The United States was not involved, the American public, and historians in sions are set out. in. part IV of the. report, however, in the- actual assassination, the future- might have an. opportunity to beginning at page 255. Its. findings re- Similarly, American officials offered. know what this committee found isa con- garding whether officials of theU.S. Gov' encouragement to a group of Vietnamese nectima with the evidence and.make their ernment were involved in. assassination generals plotting the overthrow of Ngo- own appraisal of each case., _ attempts. appear at pages 255 through Dinh Diem. However, the assassination Di fairness to men now dead who can- 257. of Diera and his brother Ngo- Dinh lah.0 not speak up for themselves,. only in. those Senator TOWER and I have-agreed. to. was neither planned nor suggested, by situations where the evidence was con- 'divide the initial presentation, and in or- officials of this country. elusive; did the committeemake findings, der not to duplicate. what he intends to Our investigation has established that .Sce if I may repeat,. the committee- . say, I would like to address the remain-- officials of the U.S. Government offered, makes four other major findings.. der of my time toan outline of the. find- encouragement to the Chilean dissi-- The first relates to the committeeoa in- ings and. conchisions of the committee. dente, and plotted the kidnaping of ability to make a finding that the- asses- The committee,s investigation estab- Gene Ren?chneider, but no U.S. at- sina,tion plots were authorized by the lishes once and for all that assassination cial planned, or encouraged Schneider's Presidents or other- persons above- the is an abhorrent practice that must never murder. Certain high officials did knows. governmental agency or- agencies in.- again be undertaken in times of peace however, that the dissidents planned to - by the U.S. Government. Our view that - volved: - kidnap General Schneider, and. the pos-- The. second. explains -why certain- offt- - assassination. has no, place in, America's sibility that he would be killed. should cials, may have perceived that according arsenal is shared by? this- administrations have been recognized as a. foreseeable to their judgment and experience as- President Ford, when he asked this. come- risk of the kidnaeine, sassination was an. acceptable course of mittee to study- America's involvement in In addition to these five cases, the action. - . assassinatione bated: . committee has received evidence that. The third criticises. Agency officials for I am oppose& to political assassination.. ranking Government- officials discussed, ladling: on, several occasions- to. disclose. This administration has. not and will not use and may have- authorized the establish- their plane anti, activities to superior =- such_ means. as instruments of national ment within the-CIA of a. generalizect as-- thorities.- or for failing to da so with policy, saesination. capacity known. as the Ex- sufficient-detail and clarity_ Witnesses; who. testified before the eeutive Action project. . The fourth, criticizes administration committee- denounced assassination. as The question of the level at which. officials for not ruling out assassination,, immoral, described it as impractical, and these plots were authorized or known ? particularly after. certain administration reminded us. that an open society, more about in the U.S. Government Is a, coin- officials had become aware of prior asses- than any other, is particularly vulnerable plex one, not susceptible to-easy answers. sination plans and the. establishment of to the risk that its own leaders may be. Our conclusions concerning this-issue are- a general assassination capability. . assassinated-.something of which we set forth at length in pert 4- of there- As explained at. pages 262' and. 263', we hardly need to-be- reminded, I should port. Those findings are- introduced and could find no hard evidence that asses- think. summarized at pages 6 and 7 of the in- sinetion was seriously considered or ment outside of the CIA. The- minutes Now let me, turn to our findings with troduction and summary section of the-- urged in the high councils of Govern- respect to the' plots themselves. Turning; report, from which I now quotes . first to the- Lumumba? case, we have-con- The picture that emerges from- the evt- of the National Security CounciL and cluded that officials' of the. U.S. Govern- dencs is not a clear one. This may be- due special. group meetings, however, con- n /tient formulated a plot' to- assassinate to, the. system of deniability; and thee come-' tai repeated exhortations, for action Patrice-Lumumba., and took steps in fur- quasi state of the evidence which', even after such- as. getting rid. of. Lumumbe and re- therance of that plot; including the-tie- our long investigation, remains conflicting- moving Castro While assassination- may livering of lethal biological substances to, and. inconclusive. Or it may. be that. there not have been, explicitly authorized by the Congo. This Nation had no involve- were in fact serious shortcomings in the sys- the Presidents and, their advisers; their ment, however, in Lurnumba's actual tem of authorization so that an activity such strong expressions' of hostility to cer- as- asassthation could have been undertaken. thin foreign leaders created: arr. environ- death, which occurred at the hands of by an agency of the United States- Govern- his Congolese enemies. meat- without express authority. ment in which it was likely that some In the Castro case, the committee has The Committe hnds that .the system of ex-- CIA. official& would perceive- assassina- found that officials' of the U.S. Govern- ecutive. command and control was so am- time as a permissible course- of action. meat initiated and participated ill a se- big-uous that it is difficult to be certain at We have found that the plots to: as-- what levels assassination activity was known.. sassinate Lumumba. and Castro were ries of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and other members of the Cuban leader and authorized. This situation creates the- clearly authorized by. the Deputyy. Direc- ship. Plans to assassinate Castro with -- disturbing prospect that Government officials tors for Plans, the head of the CIA - might have undertaken the assassination. covert-actionarm.. The plot to a...ia.S.,-, poisoned Cigars-, exploding seashells-, and plots without it having been uncontroverti- s ? - mates Lumumba had the approval of a contaminated diving suit did not ad-- lily clear that there was explicit authorize- vance beyond the laboretory phase. An-- tion from the Presidents. It is also possible Alien Dulle,s,.whawas the Director of the- e User plot, however, in which the- U.S. there might have been a- successful "plaits- Central Intelligenee Agency when the' Government used unca rworld figures, ible denial" in which Presidential authorize- assassination, plot in. the- Congo. took reached: the stage of 11; ?clueing .poison tion was issued but is now obscured. Whether place:. ? pills, procuring potential tesassins within, or not the respective Presidents knew of or There is. considerable evidence that. authorized the plots, as. chief executive of... Dulles.nuay himself have- authorized the Cuba, and appa,rently del vering the pills ricer of the United States, each, must bear plot, to kill. Castro. althougle there. is no to the island itself. the ultimate resposihility for the activities Yet another episode in ?olved a Cuban of his subordinates. eviden.cee that. his. successor, John. Mc- who initially had no in ;ention of en- The Committee- makes-four other major Cone,. was. aware of the assassination Iat- gaging. in. assassination, ut who finally findings. The first relates to- the Commit- tempts against Castro that- took place agreed, at. the. suggestion of the CIA, tee's Inability to make a finding that the during his tenure. as, Director of thefl to attempt to assassinate Raoul Castro it assassination plbts were authorized by the CIA. Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 IV 07.'0110er -.V'U, 1t175 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 20627 We have no solid evfaRRPL-Y4ECKII,eleigAi3q9WWPciigAla-1 rt)fe)7c?gP2-n?A?99i1P4?93/29P12a., our future President Eisenhower or President Ken- Wiand and control system must await will illaaalvorthy of the best of our past. nedy were aware of any U.S. assassina- completion of our continuing investiga- [Applause.] tion plots. One witness did recall a tion and the issuance of our final report. Now, I should like to recognize the clis- statement by President Eisenhower at But the committee has received sufficient tinguished Senator from Texas who the NSC meeting that left him with the evidence to be convinced that an ab- serves so well as vice chairman of the impression that President Eisenhower solution prohibition against assassination committee. had ordered Lumumba's elimination, but should be written into law. Mast TOWER. I yield myself such time other persons who attended that meet- It would be irresponsible not to do all as I may require. lag testified that they did not recall ever that can he done to prevent assassination Mr. President, I compliment the dis- hearing President Eisenhower order his from happening again. A law is necessary tinguished Senator from Idaho, the assassination, to deter specific conduct, to strengthen chairman of the Select Committee, for Our investigation has also raised seri- the will of those who want to resist urg- his very good summation of the contents ous questions not only about knowledge lags to engage in such conduct, and to of the report. He has worked very hard and authorization of the assassination express the values of our Nation, to make this report a reality and has efforts at the Presidential level but also The committee, therefore, recommends earned the gratitude of the Senate in the about whether officials of the CIA suffi- the enactment of a law that will provide Process. . eiently informed their superiors in the criminal sanction against the assassina- I have just a few comments in ampli- agency and officials above the CIA about tion of foreign leaders, as well as any ileation of the chairman's presentation. their activities, conspiracies or attempts to commit Such While I agree with him substantively on In the final analysis, the tragic events acts in time of peace everything that he said regarding the re- investigated by the committee were in The proposed law is contained in ap- Pert, we may have come degrees of dis- large part a result of the system of exec- pendix A at page 289 of the report. It agreement on matters of foreign policy, utive command and control which is sometimes asked whether a,ssassina- but I will not open the foreign policy de- created the risk of confusion, rashness, tion should be ruled out absolutely, such bate here today. and irresponsibility in the very areas as in a time of truly grave national The select committetawernes before the where clarity and sober judgment were emergency. Adolf Hitler is often cited as Senate today for consideration?prior iii eoaaaasa most, necessary, an example. Of course, the cases which officiaraisclosure to allpjablicfeater Whatever can be said in defense of the the committee investigated were not of Port on matters of veryea_nayeonsational original purpose of the doctrine of plau- that character at-an. Tragically, they re- importance.-ItThas been apparent since sible deniability, the extension of the lated to Latin leaders and black leaden the first sill...facing of allegations of U.S. doctrine to internal decisionmaking was of little countries that could not possibly involvement in assassination attempts absurd. have constituted a threat to the security that this Senate inquiry would have a The democratic process is undermined of the United States, profound ipapa,ct on the future course by any doctrine which insulates elected The only time when Mr. Castro per- of our intelligence organizations and officials from information on which to mitted his island to become a base for their activities. This report will be the base their decisions. According to some Russian missiles, the only time during first public document to provide an in- witnesses, the extension of the plausible which it might have been said that he depth review of some of the workings of denial doctrine to internal decisionmak- had become a threat to the security of intelligence-related aspects of our m- ing required the use of circumlocution the American people, was the one time tional security apparatus. and euphemism in speaking with Presi- when all assassination activity, plans, Along with some other members of the dents and other senior officials. Failing and plots against his life were stood select committee, I initially expressed to call dirty business by its rightful name down. strong reservations against any detailed may have increased the risk of dirty So we are not talking about Adolf account of the evideuce received by this business being clone. Hitler or anything of that character, nor committee?not because of any partisan Ultimately, Presidents must be held are we prejudicing actions taken in a consideration but, rather, for fear of responsible for determining the nature grave national emergency when the life permanent damage to the Nation's se- at' major Government activities and for of the Republic in endangered. In such curity and the continued effectiveness of preventing undesirable activities from cases, the President has constitutional our intelligence agencies, taking place. High administration of- powers to act to defend the Nation; and While I accept and respect the judg- ficials had a duty to make clear to their he is answerable to history, to Congress, rnent of my colleagues, T am corn elled subordinates that assassination VMS im- and to the American people for the RC- tO state m continuing concern regsr permissible and to inquire further when tion he takes in emergencies of that trig the wiz cun ou pu c isclosure. they received indications that assassi:na- extreme character, The ultimate effect of the repo-II-may be ton was being considered by some of The committee's sentiments are aptly for the American public to appreciate their subordinates, summarized in the epilog to the report that quick, seemingly easy answers, such Just as Presidents must be held ac- which appears at page 285. as assassination, are not the most effec- countable, their subordinates through- The committee does not believe that live way to rid ourselves of those with out the Government had a concomitant the acts which it has examined repre- whom we are engaged in ideological duty to disclose fully their plans and ac- sent the real American character. They combat. tivi ties. This sets a demanding standard do not reflect the ideals which have given Careful public examination of the en- but the committee supports it. The fu- the people of this county and of the tire 1-e o?aar'aMb gfilaillarap-ravide eozne nee- tura of democracy rests upon such ac- world hope for a better, fuller, fairer spec are or evaluation of the views of life. countabili ty. thiaaFaalreasSatalaTasurramarilf place the I might suggest, as all Senators know, We regard the assa.ssination plots as Outire 'Et-a_a?rlia........raruTr departures from that nothing is more fraught with peril aberrations. The United States must not dernocraticoleadition at the feet of th,e to the foreign policy of a nation than adopt the tactics of the enemy. means much maligned and too of ten maligned assassinations. They have set off great are as important as ends. Crisis makes it iiitellige_nce cornet-natty. IThatafilliTa?tje. wars including, as Senators will remem- tempting to ignore the wise restraints Pu- blic win begin to aa-estle, as the select her, the First World War, and thus the that make men free; but each time we committee has, with the real problem-- need is evident for clear command, con- do so, each time the means we use are the absolute necessity for instrumentali- trol, and complete accountability within wrong, our inner strength, the strength ties of the U.S. Government to have the executive branch, which makes us free, is lessened, secrets and discharge their obligation to The committee's long investigation of Despite our distaste for what we have protect the people's right to be secure, Investigation assassination has brought a number of seen, we have great faith in this coun- with the assurance that the American important issues into sharp focus; Above try. The story is sad, but this country public and Congress stand behind them. all stands the question of whether as- has the strength to hear the story and It may be that baring these reprehen- sassination is an acceptable tool of to learn from it. We must remain a 'aible activities is necessary to achieve American foreign policy. Recommenda- people who confront our mistakes and this result. tions on other issues which relate more resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, It is a very difficult problem with s - Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 s 20628 Approved For RelteitkaNWAAilidgie_02k9-12A0a1000400611.1 2 rvorember 20, .197,7,1 which to wrestle. We might raise this rhetorical question: At what point must the people's right to know be subordi- nated to the people's right to be secure, to the extent. that an effective intelli- gence-gathering capability can make them secure? Before turning to the results of our investigation, I should like to say an- other word concerning public, release of the report. The President sent a letter to every member of the select commit- tee, asking that we not_make the report public. His concern is not to conceal from the public any activities of his ad- ministration. Everything we looked into occurred before this administration came into office; so it is bemuse of no concern with the President's own skin that he made this requet of us. Rather, he feels that public . release will cause serious harm to the national interests and would endanger certain individuals. I fully understand and accord a great deal of weight to the President's con- cern. The Preeident., in the concluding para- graph of his letter, sharpened the com- mittee's problem by stating: I am sure the select committee will recog- nize the enormous responsibility it has to see to it that serious damage will not result to the United States by the publication or this report and will recognize also the duty which I have to emphasize the disastrous consequences which can occur by publica- tion. receiving the President's letter, the committee has made---Fateat st-ficles in accommodating most of his stated elejection.s. In the few instals in which ilaajantiu4e of the report :Fii-gift, have :-revealed sensitive sources or methods, the com.mittee has deleted entirely such ref eren.ces. The committee has always intended to omit such references, and this con- cern in that regard has been heightened by the President's remarks. The dele- tions were based on the judgment and advice of a longtime CIA employee who worked for several days with a member of the staff in receiving the report.. This expert also pointed out several places in the report which may have unneces- sarily -risked the life or livelihood of a CIA employee or agent by divulging his name. In each instance, we weighed the risk fonnetential harm ttiTM individual whlea?might result if his or-Tier name were used. The committee then decided wtilatoisdekte the name, to ProvitV an alias, or to leave the individual's iilithe repciet. 7m-iiir"fiTt=7ep or t itself: In gen- eral, I believe the report fairly repre- sents what happened. Some of the wit- nesses, I personally believe, did not tell the whole truth, and others concealed what may be the truth. On the whole, history should record this investigation as an honest effort by a hard-working committee. The select committee, pursuait to Sen- ate Resolution 21 and the necessity to -:omplete the work begun by the Rocke- 'eller Commission, spent many long nours over the last 8 months conducting our investigation into the alleged as- mssination efforts against foreign lead- ers. As a matter of fad, we have been so diligent in this activity that I suspect that all 11 members of the committee have allowed -some constituent business to slide a bit. We May be rewarded for that later. One aspect of the plots which has be- come clear to me is the historical con- text of the times in which they occurred. America in the post-war period was en- gaged in a battle against the spreading infection of communism in what have been called the "back alleys of the world." Soviet influence was increasing In the emerging new nations that were former- ly of colonial status. In the summer of 1960, shortly after the Congo gained its independence from Belgium, Patrice Lu- mumba threatened to invite the Soviets into the hastened Belgian withdrawal. When Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959, his appearance was gen- erally acclaimed, but it became increas- ingly clear Over the next 12 months, as Cuba signed a trade agreement with the Soviets and then nationalized industries, that Castro's presence and influence 90 miles off our shores constituted a clear and present danger to the United States. It is understandable, then, that as to each target of assassination that this committee Studied, we found that the President of the United States viewed those targeted with extreme hostility. Commenting further on the-matter of Cuba, and I shall not go into the assassi- nation plots, because my distinguished colleague from Idaho has already sum- marized these, I would expand further, however, on the Castro matter. The au- thorization for the plots against Fidel Castro appears to stem from a document discovered by the CIA only last week and delivered to the committee last Fri- day evening while the staff was in the process of proofreading the galleys of the report. This document makes it crystal clear that Allen Dulles approved the thorough consideration of the elimination of Fidel Castro in December of 1959. Prior to the receipt of that document, it had not been entirely certain whether Allen Dulles ap- proved or knew of the planning against Castro. In light of that document, the only question remaining is whether the individuals who were directed to consider the plan somehow exceeded Dulles' order by contacting underworld figures. It is my strong personal conclusion that the CIA employees who received the order from Dulles to plan for eliminating Cas- tro need not have returned to him at that point, even assuming that they did not. In the highly disciplined CIA, I would expect employees to go forward with an order for consideration until they came up with a plan which they were confident would succeed. After these many months of investiga- tion. I concluded that in each of the cases studied, assassination Was an improper and reckless tactic, one which did not serve our national interest. I concur in the committee's recommendation that there be legislation to outlaw further as- sassination efforts against foreign leaders. My second and more general conclu- sion is that by no means should any past involvement in -;isassination- plots versely reflect on the present CIA lead-, ership or on the great number of its high; ly disciplined, dedicated, and enormous- ly- loyal employees. I sincerely hope thati we have not placed the CIA or our other. intelligence apparatus in a position which would, in any way, erode or threaten our necessary covert efforts or our highly1' sophisticated and sensitive collection methods. As the chairman noted, the task be- fore our committee has been difficult and} carrying out these responsibilities ha4 been painful. We have worked diligently in our efforts to provide the Senate al liar assassination American people answers to the ar assassination questions. I believe than to the extent possible, this report pro vides those answers. Mr. President, I think I would be remiss if I did not allude to the fact that the report of the select committee whicn the Senate is considering today is 'very unique as to subject matter. But it. haa something in common with most well- prepared Senate documents. It would not have been possible without the dedicated _work of the staff. I think we have been especially fortunate on the select com- mittee in assembling a most able an well-trained group of capable people ie all levels of positions. The excellence in our clerks, secretaries, researchers, an professional staff members is exceede. only by their willingness to work. lorn long hours furthering the committee investigative efforts and accomplishin the formidable paperwork which accom .panies a major investigation. In no are of the committee's work have these quail ties been more evident than during ti: investigation of the various assassin, tion allegations and in preparing the in port submitted today. I should like personally to thank ever woman and man on our staff who Seer. ficed personal time in order that the a, jectives of Senate Resolution 21 coul. be Met. The preparation of the repot has been a bipartisan staff effort, and know that I express the sentiment of a. of my colleagues on the committee whe I extend our appreciation to the entin staff for a splendid and, perhaps, menu mental piece of work. ? Mr. CHURCH. ejee. President, this re port, as I earlier mentioned, is the me port of your commiffee. The resolutioi 1...)y which the committee was ernpowere, to undertake this investigation delegla(rei' to the commtltee The authority to Issue sal reports as, in the judgment of tee coininittewarrantect. Zhis repot:. bears the signatures ort-fie members oi the co___,_minitlee, all- of whose sioxia.tures eieepear ,i2-.-eTtf 'that of Puna? TIAR on the Democratic sicfr-Wao was unable to attend many of the hearings because of his illness. I should like, first, to lefer to Senator HART, the ranking Demi ,cratic Member, for any remarks he wou d like to make. Then other members of the committee may have some commen Is, after which the floor will be open te general ques- tions and debate. - Senator HART, is there anything you would care to say? Mr. PHILIP A. H/ART. No; except to Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 November- 20, 1075 CONGRESSIONAJ, g.. ECORD-3M ? Approved For Release 2006/06/26 : UA-RDP7 thank you and Senator Towaa and oth-se the senior Senator from Minnesota ers for your kindness during that periocrironr 5 minutes. and to indicate that my views, very brief, . are found on page 297. In short, I feel 1 that I have been able to inhale enough of . the testimony and participate in suffi- cient of the discussion to support the 1 ? committee recommendations for a stat- ' ute explicitly prohibiting assassination '? activity. I feel that I would be faking it . if I signed a rePort indicating that I par- ticipated in the authorship, or signed as a regular participant. Mr. CHURCH. I just want to say how much we all appreciate the fact that Senator HART is back with us again in connection with our continuing work. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, in my 9 years in the Senate, I have never under- taken anything more difficult, more em- barrassing, and potentially more darnag- ing than this inquiry and investigation, notwithstanding the others in which I have participated. Even so, I think it was essential that we go forward 'with the inquiry, because I think that, having . the suggestions made that there were, I believe, irregularities in the intelligence apparatus, it would be unconscionable not to inquire into it. I think both Senator CHURCH and Sen- ator TOWER have done a magnificent job, not only of administering the investiga- 1 Lion and the staff, but of maintaining a ' degree of equanimity and tranquility in 1 an emotionally charged and a potentially political atmosphere. I commend them and each member of 9 the committee as well as the staff for keeping their cool. I generally agree wtih the committee report and with the observations by Sen- ator Cirencir and Senator TOWER. I do believe, however, that were we involved in a trial of the facts before a jury in the usual traditional way that a different result might have obtained. . I. rather expect that a scholarly and responsible analysis of the facts does indeed give us only one possible conclu- sion, and that is we do not know whether Presidents authorized or did not au- thorize these assassination attempts. There is no doubt that the attempts occurred. But I think if we tested the proof by the usilarFaxtroom standards, tna is, the appearance and demeanor of the witness while testifying, of his means of knowledge, of his prior inconsistent statements, of the possibility of involve- meat, and inconsistencies while testi- feing under cross-examination of the witness , his means of knowledge, his interest in the subject matter, if .any, I think by observing the testimony as well as hearing it, one woql_d_cuncluae?L_Is I have concluded, -oh-bajance iLis mare_ likely that Preside/Its did knee:v._ jalq i probalfly authorized the several activities ; tbanTeat teey did tiot. It TS a -97,17-f cry from saying we have I proved that. Rather I think it more likely that diminishes the linage of the intelli- gence community as an irresponsible ap- paratus. I think it intensifies the need ! that we put in place a system of account- ability for significant agency and Presi- dential activities. Mr. CCIURCH. Mr. President, I recogs Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator very much. I also wish to join the others in com- mending our chairman and our vice chairman for their work in -the devel- opment of this historic report. - In my opinion, we need a CIA; we need the best intelligence-gathering agency in the world, and we must make certain that we continue to have it. To have a CIA, it must operate in secret. This is a very grievous conces- sion for a democracy to make but one which must be made if it is going to do its work. - What bothers me about what has been developed in this report as that our in- telligence operations are not only secret but they have been unaccountable; as we tried to sort through the facts of these 'allegations and pin down what hap- pened, it came to be like trying to nail jello to the wall.. Practically everything said in direct testimony was contradicted by somebody else. The documents often contradicted one another or there were contradictions in the same document.. As you read this report you will find that running through the whole CIA and the Government sthicture that was sup- posed to control these very sensitive and explosive matters was the doctrine of plausible deniability, the theory that if something was exposed everyone is re- sponsibility ought to be in a position to deny it. I think you will see by the documents that it does not work. It ends up with a principle of implausible deniability. We put our top officials in a position where -they either ultimately have to ad- mit responsibility for an operation or worse they have to lie about it, as we did in the U-2 incident, as we did initially in the Bay of Pigs, and so on. It is a theory that does not work. It is humiliat- ing- and it undermines American confi- dence in its own Government; SO I would hope, as we consider this report, we would see how we can strengthen the CIA. Equally important we must consider how we can also make certain that from here on out should there be questions about responsibility for an operatien, the record, privately and secretly, but clearly, disclose who did it, why, and who is responsible. Not only is this required because de- mocracy must have that kind of ultimate accountability but, I think it can help increase the sobriety and restraint of those making the decisions. I think there is evidence in the report that many of these steps were taken by people- rather loosely and without mature considera- tion?among other reasons, because they did not think they would be blamed if someone found out. So both because our Constitution re- quires it and, second, because we want to make certain that our Government is very careful when they do covert oper- ations?and I hope we will prohibit much of the sort of thing that is in this re- port?I think it is important to nail down on accountability system that can- not he avoided. A second point I would like to make S 20629 N1A000100040001-2 cone' the technique of assassination itseirst of all, I think it is a very dangerous tactic for Government leaders to pursue. There is a statement in Mac- beth about how inventions return to plague the inventor. We do not know what happened, but when we pursue a strategy of assassinating foreign leaders, I think we ought to concern ourselves with the possibility that foreign leaders might decide that if we are going to play such a game against them they can play it against us. Now, it embarrasses me, with Senator KENNEDY present?and it also is not an accurate refleotion of the record?to say that one of the things that disturbed me the most in our investigation was to find an interview by Prime Minister Castro 5 weeks before the tragic assasination of President Kenedy in which he said just that. He knew that the CIA was trying to. assassinate him, and he said so publicly. The second thing I would like to say on this point is this: running through practically every one of these attempts by the CIA was an incredibly naive view that somehow, with a couple of guns, a couple of bucks -or a couple of lies, we know no one could ever do to us, - It never worked. We were never able to kill anybody we tried to kill?that is the first thing; and, moreover, there is no evidence that if succeeded, it would not be more harmful to us than leaving things the way they were. Third, it seemed to me there was never any serious discussion about the overall risks of what we were doing; what hap- pened if the public heard about it, what would be the results in that society, and what would be the fundamental result -to the integrity and moral authority of our country in foreign affairs. Today, no mat- ter what happens around the world, if Faisal is killed, we did it. If there is trouble in Portugal, we did it. We get blamed for more things we do not do than any country in the world, because we have stuck our nose naively and foolishly into too many people's businesses. And almost always, it does not work. It kicks back on us, and it hurts us more than it can possibly help. But it seems those questions were never asked. So I would hope we would look at the system of command and control over overt operations. But I also hope we would look at the question of how much American can really influence the inter- nal politics of another society in this way. Mr. President, the events described in this report are in every sense a tragic chapter in American history, Rather than dwell on the report and its detailed account of the assassination plots which the Select Committee investigated, I would rather dwell upon America's re- sponse to this tragic story. There are two basic response: to trag- edy. One is to withdraw, to tune out, to become self--absorbed and cyni ai. The other, more difficult, response I; to ac- cept the facts and then go forwt rd with the changes that will help ? ass i re that tragedy will not be repeated. I believe that confronted w,th the facts, the American people ha re the strength and character to choose tae sec- ond course. It is my hope that, through Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 S 20630 Approved For Ret,mieggp89kiCIA,RDP.Z8B029_92ACW01000400,01 2 -Ra.:01{0?sEr. -ivovember 20, 197,:, save all the public outcry that this report will rightly generate, the American people will not lose sight of the important les- sons to be learned. It is my conviction? based on this report and the subsequent work of the committee in the whole range of intelligence activities?that major changes are required in the way our Gov- ernment conducts itself in this vital field of national security. ? Today I would like to focus briefly on these changes. The first step, as recommended in the report, is to rule out assassination as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. War- time obviously constitutes a different sit- uation, but in peacetime, there is no place for assassination in our arsenal of international policies and programs. Nonetheless, if we are to continue to have clandestine intelligence organiza- tions?which I believe are necessary given the current state of world affairs? then we must take steps to insure that these organizations strictly adhere to policies, purposes and standards of the American Government and the Ameri- can people. Two things are called for: 111.171er Te.viiietter struc- tureuntaninty for clandestine ac- Tieniee. Second, we must adopt more mature poritcies aoveming sudh" inteingeleacieene era ions. Accountability is the most important issue. I am. prepared to accept that in- telligence activities must be secret. But I am not willing to further concede that they can be unaccountable. I am con- vinced that if we had an effective sys- tem of accountability, the misguided ef- forts outlined in this report would never have been undertaken. Much public discussion is likely to fo- cus on whether the President knew and approved of the assassination plots out- lined in the committee's report. This is an important issue and we have put for- -ward all the relevant facts at our dis- posal. But tbe real issue is that there Is no system to hold the Government to account in such matters. Instead we had a system of deniability, where everyone could avoid responsibility or claim higher authority for their actions, or both. Theoretically, the CIA reports to the President. But in practice, the Agency usually takes orders from a committee, or from Presidential assistants, or acts on its own authority. Committees, of course, are a notorious way to avoid re- sponsibility. And in some a.clminstrations, there were up to a half-a-dozen Presi- dential assistants purporting to speak for the President. Even in those adminis- trations where the line of command was clear. Presidential assistants have not been subject to congressional scrutiny. Until the establishment of the Select Committee, the CIA itself did not appar- ently discuss the matters contained in this assassination report with the then duly-constituted congressional bodies. This system is unacceptable in a de- mocracy. It must change. To this end, I propose that the following remedies be given serious consideration. They seek to provide a clear system of accountability backed up by one of the most important principles of our Founding Fathers?the control of power through the process of checks and balances. There must be a clear chain of com- mand. No longer should the CIA report to a committee, or to a shifting group of Presidential aides and advisers. More- over, all Clandestine activities?intelli- gence and counterintelligence, not just covert actions?should be subject to re- view in this chain of command. The chain of command should in- clude a Cabinet officer. The President is too busy to monitor the intelligence com- munity. The chief of intelligence cannot do it himself; for he has too great a self-interest. So there must be someone between him and the President. Assist- ants to the President should not do it, for they are too insulated from congressional oversight. I have therefore concluded that it is a Cabinet officer, be it the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, on whom we must place the primary re- sponsibility for policy review and opera- tional accountability for our clandestine intelligence activities. he clas services the '`o sera- tonal" part of the CIA I. ifiro?a?separate aaencv with a Primary mission _to cells -s.Tslenntealigence_ This is strong medicine, but I believe it is essential to strengthen outside con- trol over potentially dangerous and risky clandestine activities. It would apply the concept of checks and balances to the Intelligence community. It would permit intelligence analysts to make a more ob- jective assessment of the activities of the clandestine operators than if they live under the same roof as they do today? an arrangement by which the operators have inevitably bested the analysts. The effectiveness of congressional oversight would also be strengthened. There is no question but that we can keep closer tabs on clandestine activities if they are not insulated from over- sight by being mixed in with an agency that has a vast array of other programs and personnel running technical collec- tion projects and producing various forms of intelligence. Moreover, we are likely to produce bet- ter intelligence by moving the clandes- tine service out of CIA. This would free CIA analysts of any obligation to rely more on their clandestine services than on other vital sources of intelligence such as NSA, State and Defense. Finally, we must establish a system of effective congressional oversight. The Select Committee staff has been develop- ing proposed legislation to that end, which the committee will turn to shortly. We must of course have no illusion that structural changes alone will solve e sery problem. They cannot provide 100- percent assurance against future abuse. While we must be realistic about-what wr can accomplish through legislation, ws must avoid the cynicism which says th it Government is inherently had, that no ;hing can be done about it, and that all we can do is hope for better human nature. I believe that something can be dor e; that something must be done. And II _ hope that the changes I have outlined will be given the most serious considera- tion. In addition, however, we need to make some changes in our outlook. The Amer- ican people are determined not to be the world's policeman, prepared to intervene with military force in every corner of the globe. We must not substitute the equally fallacious and naive idea that we can change the course of history with a cou- pie of bucks, a couple of lies, or a couple of guns. As we face the challenges of the next quarter of this century, we should keep in mind an important lesson which ap- plies to every aspect of life and human endeavor. We should do those things that we do best; those things that we are - equipped to do. The brightest chapters of American international involvement in peacetime are the constructive epi- sodes?the Marshall plan, NATO, the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress? and the darkest chapters are those when we thought we could beat the totalitar- ians at their own game. In facing the unpleasant facts of the assassination report, America must also face the more encouraging fact that we are just not very good at that sort of thing. . The idea that this kind of business can be kept secret, and therefore cost free, has proven to be an illusion. The dirty secrets Inevitably come out and America ends up paying more, once these dee-dh. are revealed, than it ever could have achieved by their success.. Mr. President, I am hopeful and con - fident that America will learn the lesson, of this report. I believe that we can modify our intelligence institutions to make them accountable to the Cons rese and the American people and prevent, further abuses of this sort. In the end, van confident that America will be strengthened by once again learning the lesson that our Government must be true to the American character and to our basic values. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield a minutes to the Senator from Arizona. Mr. GOLDWAreast. Mr. President, be. fore Tread the paper I prepared I woulo like to concur in what Senator BAKER ha, said and what Senator MoNnsnE touched on by this statement: I askee two different top men of the CIA if they would lie to protect the Presidency, an they both said they would. I think w have to accept that determination on their part as an obstacle over which we probably can never crawl. I believe that theennislientannn. a an in- terim report on assassinations is an ac- t-tones which the-S-enajaasiell_nonme to regret.. While I have added my signature to the report, it is purely an act of gratitude for the hard work done by the committee and the staff. My own views on this whole subject matter are appended to the report. Now, strong arguments can be made for the public's right to know. And, in general, I fully support the principle that I Americans must know and need to know about their Government. But ile,ditioenaesellynansle_apinas, iaack to Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 November 20, 194Cproved Fceeelett5ESSIMOLII2RICORBEIRM(PATVA000100040001-2 the founding of this Re )ublic certain But, the fact that substantial damage iiiarzeim ave been exciutd from Ceneraf re=ciple, qrand-Jury nropecesE iflis cot71earriple. The conduct nLin- tellieence operations and methods is anc tiler example. -In one way or another the United States has been involved in intelligence activities beginning with the Revolution- ary War. By tradition common to all nations our intelligence operations have been shrouded in secrecy. It is inconceivable to me that any of our allies would publish the kind of re- port we propose to release today; and let us remember that some of them hold to democratic principles just as dearly as we do. There are several questions I believe the Senatorsshould ask themselves as We ponder the question of releasing an intteien report on _assuesinatiouse it will answer? I believe answer is_ "First. Will it raise more _questions than "Yes." Will the reputation of great Americans be damaged? -behe-c76:15-3 answer is "Yes." Three. vora serve any_p_ubfic este iiTaTr'NZT -Trolif:WETTI serve any legislative j?ux- po se :) IThay "No.' ---FIVCITS-the-benefits of publishing met- weigh-flie-liazaras EinphaficallVrsay - -Tr Wfifie there may be some possibility that classified information will be re- vealed through the publication of this report, I believe a sincere and deter- mined effort has been made to prevent such an occurrence. 3:y1m _augsjin is the diplomatic damage this documenr" ma do country. It is difficult o preeict the re- aZadirs of our friends and enemies abroad, but I believe it will be generally unfavorable to our interests. In fact, a few weeks ago, in visiting the headquarters of NATO, this whole subject was the major subject of dis- cussion between our eommanders there and the commanders of our allies. Cooperation by foreign governments wich- our diplanalfe and interir,--geriCe SZ'eices T-s to r large extent based on intituar confildF?nce. Where-intelligence opTei'aTiFiris are involved, assurances Cif s-eCreey provfde a flow of Itifeemation-.-a ow-that, s7cipS-7,_ theiT seercry agreements are iTioiead. -- -,lallfirrhuteation of thlets renort will certainly have one bad eYe-ct; It will m fe 17:more coeficulrfor fbragen govern- 717-1i7-67.TilTeirrelYTO-r-eiiTiTdinfe'firf-o-a- eeetteiFeST-65.if f-Hter into c-onTricTeTitial eTiis with- tife A til?F?-;STi-v-vi_ ire',Ta will be respeaa-NrahTer die information received by the wEele-C1 Con-aWEtee fla-ta -W.Er7,-Iiito the initearti-re: port was gaTEed in oTher years from seilli-V were given promises of coat- dentia lee and in some -cmifances protec- ti-Zen.. I ha ;ten to add that the substantial dame ee that has been done to our Intel- beence services is not the result of ac- tions by Congress. We all know the story. Much o.' what has appeared In the press was released by persons who had some political or personal grievances. has already been done is no reason to throw another log on the bonfire. Part of the problem we are facing comes from the determination of recent Congresses to assert authority over for- eign policy. The meddling with Jewish immigration from Russia and the med- dling in the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus are two examples--and two ex- amples where the effects were bad. I could cite more. I believe it is impossible for the Con- gress to try to influence the day-to-day decisions in foreign policy. Moreover, I believe the President and his agents must have the primary role in our relations with other countries.. In other words, the Congress is at- tempting to do something which has failed in the past. One of the weak- nesses in the Articles of Confederation was the lack of executive authority in foreign policy. In the aftermath of World War I, the Senate injected itself into the postwar settlement with considerable damage done for the long-range interests of America. Notably, was the failure to join the League of Nations, which signaled that America had retreated into isola- tionism. I believe that Congress does have rights and obligations in the conduct of foreign policy. They derive from article II, sec- tion 2 of the Constitution e What we are talking about is the broad area of gen- eral policy decisions through the treaty making process. For the most part Presidents have submitted important _policy decisions to the Congress. The creation of NATO and of the Marshall plan are examples of how the President and the Congress have shared important policy decisions. And, here are two examples where the Nation and the free world benefited beyond measure. Mr. President, one more minute or two Is all right. Turning to the subject of abuses, I believe we know the story of where re- cent administrations strayed away from the law. If laws have been violated, then let us return indictments, and let the courts do their job. The wholesale foraging of the Con- gl.'esa-Tago-Tire---anztas---or-feeeTlinTare-k ariil the intellrgence serVICes diI?IfWljICh It d?rx life- COM- fort to our opponeriles and to embarrass our frfacTS. - ? "Our reputation absrecie.1 ne Lee-thee-teed bye-eeclacie Cif-public self-flagellafion. Most of our alliT-1 are dumfounded, In- ('i featrais7a, fia7; ?_q-C1 by -Ellg we are. eloffig. -TTel us get on with the job of remedial legislation where needed. Let us not tell the world we are re- treating into isolationism. meet_ important let us eet our intel- ligence _services out orfifFElece lighth, because those-rigTitsThlinc ? ern at a ieerfeI,e-afib-ff'ellf[lir7Flrr-fTtnerOVe. cffil-,cfrr---A,rf:- terarcteTit I rec- ognize Senator HUDDL2STON for 5 min- utes. Mr. IIUDDLESTON. I thank the chair- man. S2031 First of all, I express My appreciation to the chairman and the vice chairman of our committee and the entire staff. I think the leadership they have given to this very important work has been ex- emplary in every aspect of the word and has contributed to the success the committee has had to date- in dealing with these very difficult and complex problems. ? Mr. President,. the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities is today releasing its first-and One of its. princi- pal-reports. It is, therefore, a proper and fitting time for us to pause to reflect on the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. in- telligence community and of this con- gressional committee and to bring the focus on this report and the committee's activities into perspective. There have been, since this investi- gation was initiated, fears by those who believed legitimate ? and necessary intel- ligence activities would be undermined and those who believed that a coverup of Improper activities and policies was like- ly. I believe that our committee has prov- en that those on both the outer edges of - the spectrum were incorrect. I believe that we have proven that we can study, even Investigate, without impairing nec- essary operations and without blinding 'ourselves to questionable activities, which may have gone beyond authority granted, legal norms, or simple propriety. But, Without a doubt, the greatest dis- service we can do to our intelligence ap- paratus, our investigation, our Nation, or ourselves is to ,view these activities out of the context in which they exist and which, to a great extent, has formed them. For me, the danger of any imbal- ance, of any misunderstanding, of any misrepresentation, lies in three areas we should all be aware of. It lies, I believe, In, first, a discounting of the threats to U.S. security which do exist; second, a 'pretension that ill-advised actions and policies have not taken place; or third, allowing sensational and isolated events-especially those events occurring In other times, other places, other at- mospheres-to be viewed outside the context in which they had their being. Fire is comfort or danger, depending on Its nature and the circumstances. So, tete are intelligence activities. The key lies in protecting the features which provide comfort and preventing those which raise danger. Intelligence activities do- not today- and never have-existed in a vacuum. It is, I believe, important to remember that modern U.S. intelligence activities were an outgrowth of the attack on Pearl Har- bor more than 30 years ago. There had been a number of warning s:.gris that hostilities could be -expected, but the available information was not properly analyzed and evaluated--and ii, there- fore, was not translated into pee icy. U.S. intelligence activities were furd-ter nur- tured in post World War n Europe, where a confrontation between East and West became the modus operate U. And, with time, as American in le rests- whether for good or for bads whether in- evitable or avoidable-., nread through- Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 S 20632 Approved For Relmt4tVggtotWuCkatigEffak32A2;AOR010004 'NS out the world, so too did U.S. intelligence efforts. As the years have passed, the direct and obvious relations between intelli- gence and national security have perhaps been obscured. A softening in the chal- lenge atmosphere of previous decades and a diminishing threat of military confrontation in Europe have suggested to many that the cold war has indeed become history. As Berlin walls have given way to detente, Sputniks to joint space ventures and Czechoslevakias to security conferences, the events and de- velopments which once reminded us of security needs have been clouded. This does not mean, however, that they have ceased to exist. Today, inter- ests continue to vary among nations. One need only look at recent debates within the United Nations to see how far and deep the divisions run. One need only fol- low the arms sales throughout the world and the probable impending enlargement of the nuclear community to understand how fragile peace and security really are. One need only review the recent history of the Middle Fest to know that, despite some rays of light, the -stages for con- frontations- are still set. One need only examine the very complex shifts in world -economic power to realize that challenges to peace and economic well-being will arise in many new forms in the years ahead. One need only refer -lb scholars' speculations about the Soviet Union after Erezhnev or Yugoslavia after '171tce to un- derstand that the world is still not the safe haven we wish it would be. One need only read the press speculations about SALT violations to recall that some of our security blocks are agreements, which are subject to abrogation and breach. The threats remain. The conflicts among those who share this planet are still there. That they may look?and in- trinsically be?different from the way they were, in the late 1940's, the 1950's, an.d even the 1960'a, does not signal their demise. Forms can change but basic real- ities remain. And out of this conies two lessons: The need for a strong, effective Intelligence community continues, and methods and policies of the past may be creatures of their own time and place. While today's interim report of the select committee details the kind of sen- sational, spectacular, and even bizarre activities that always grab the headlines, It is important to remember that intelli- gence operations are more than dreams and fancies pursued by modern-day ad- venturers. They are much more than groups of ill-advised men and women stirring a witches brew of plots and counterplots and manipulating foreign nations and peoples, as many detractors of the intelligence community would have us believe. These situations are the ex- ception, not the rule. They are the few instances where the bounds of authority and propriety have been clearly over- stepped. They need correction. But, the larger number of persons in the intelli- gence community are inVolved in legiti- mate activities, taken under proper com- mand and control?honest men and women pursuing a job which few will ever know about or appreciate and yet which is a cornerstone to much of our Nation's security. As such they need, de- serve?and must know they have?the firm backing of those they work to pro- tect. And, they are certainly entitled to clearly defined authority and guidelines clearly enunciated by the Nation's policy- makers. Thus, in approaching the committee's work, I have tried constantly to keep in mind these few principles?my work on the committee has only underscored my belief in them?my commitment to a strong, efficient, well-organized intelli- gence community as an essential of our national security, my concern that in- telligence agencies be put above the level of suspicion raised by many reports and the belief that we must constantly strive to keep the information available and our activities in proper perspective. As we begin with the report before us today, I hope my colleagues will think about these principles and their relation to our considerations. EVOLVEMENT Or ASSASSINATION REPORT To properly appraise the significance Of the committee's Interim Report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" we must look at the genesis of the report. The enabling reso- lution, Senate Resolution 21, instructs the committee to investigate and report on the full gamut of governmental in- telligence activities and the extent, if any, to which such activities were "illegal, Improper, or unethical." Moreover, in ad- dition to that general mandate, the com- mittee was and remains bound to investi- gate, study, and make legislative rec- ommendations. ? Senate Resolution 21, for example, re- quires the committee to study and inves- tigate the following: . The extent and necessity of . covert in,. telligence activities . . abroad; (The) nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States In- telligence activities; The need for improved, strengthened, Or Consolidated oversight of United States in- telligence activities by the Congress . During the course of the inquiry of 'the Presidentially appointed Rockefeller Commission into improper domestic ac- tivities of the CIA, allegations surfaced concerning assassination activity by the agency on behalf of the U.S. Government. That panel conducted interviews and re- viewed documents, and it filed with the President a separate, classified report on the various assassination plots pursuant to information provided to it by. the CIA in the form, basically of the 1967 Inspec- tor General's report. That Commission's report was not and never has been made public. At the direction of the President, however, the Commission delivered to the select committee what work it had com- pleted, along with documents relating to assassination. ? The committee then proceeded to con- duct an exhaustive investigation. Liter- ally thousands of documents were read, hundreds of witnesses were interviewed, and thousands of pages of testimony were taken under oath in executive session to determine both the truth of the allega- tions and under what authority such ac- tions, if true, were conducted. The corn- 3 Pt Irgmber 20, 1975 xnittee, in an effcsrk to be fair to the agency and to the Individuals involved, hying and dead, and hopefully to resolve the questions concerning authority and command and control followed every lead, requested every relevant document, and interviewed every available witness. It is important to note that as a result of such an indepth look at this single issue of assassination we gleaned valuable in- formation that will be applicable to our broader investigation of the intelligence community. For example, we have re- ceived documents of the various National security council, special group, special group?augmented, 303 committee, and 40 meetings. Thus, we have been privy to the documents of the decisionmaking mechanisms in the executive branch which deal with covert actions of vari- ous types. We have seen the problems in that decisionmaking process, the dilem- mas, and pitfalls. - Our exhaustive look into "Operation Mongoose," the anti-Castro covert action program in the post-Bay of Pigs era, readily demonstrates the importance which our assassination investigation served. The totality of the documents and testimony concerning that operation provided a substantial background for the consideration of other instances of covert action. IMPORTANCE OP REPORT - It is certainly true that the assassi- nation issue is not only one of the more sensational of those covered, but prob- ably also the most unpalatable to the American people and to the world. But its sensational and unsavory nature does not mean that it can or should be avoided. In fact, it is,- perhaps, particu- larly important that these matters bt reviewed in an open and objective man- ner and be placed in proper perspective. Ignoring the issues could only have fueled the fires of'speculation and innu- endo. It could only have provided those with qualms about the agency with addi- tional reason to charge "coverup." The far better approach, I believe, is this re- port which has been worked on by all members of the committee and which seeks to bring the very important ele- ments of knowledge and perspective to the events of a time when U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. role in the world were perceived quite differently from the way they are today. At the same time, the report is im- portant because, as I suggested earlier, It: raises many of the more general issues regarding intelligence activities. It raises 'questions of propriety regarding policy. This is, of course, an extremely difficult area with which to deal. One man's morals are not another's. What is per- missible in war and confrontation may not be permissible in peace. Considera- tion of such issues readily lends itself to plot s oratory and rhetoric which contrib- ute little to a true understanding of the corn olex and comprehensive issues in- volv et I think there could be little de- bate over the statement that assassina- tion of foreign leaders is not a policy of the lf.S. Government. It is not. It should not 1 e. But, to wax oratorically on that, to th exclusion of other considerations, is to place the issue out of context. Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 November 29, -11;975 !proved ForW eiggi646(5PbtAkkteGOROP-7.81Miag20,000100040001-2 S 20633 IbelOof the kind of activities detailed in this coined in the Federalist Papers and e report, the records of the Federal Convention, s I believe further that the legislative that the President was to be held re- c response is much more likely to be ap- sponsible when he failed to superintend - propriate if both Congress and the people his subordinates. Moreover, superim- i are informed of the nature and extent of posed upon this more particular stand- e - the problems. ard wire his constitutional duty to take The findings of the committee repre- care that the laws be faithfully executed. sent a distillation of all the evidence, Thus, whatever else may be said on the - both documentary and testimonial, com- question of authorization, the various Piled by this committee on this highly Presidents involved in the time frame of - sensitive Issue. We deplore the-use of as- these plots should have known about t sassination as an instrument of either them if, in fact, they did not. It is such official or unofficial U.S. policy. Having accountability that supports the fragile said that, however, I must hasten to add underpinnings of a democracy. This that it was not and As not the task of this conclusion is clearly supported in terms committee to assess blame for these acts, of the constitutional history and frame- Our investigation into this one area was work within which these tragic events- not conducted as a trial. Our objective occurred. has been to ascertain what occurred, how But, as I have said, it is for each reader it occurred, why it occurred, under what of the report to decide for himself where authority it occurred, and how the decd. responsibility rests. Our task now is to sions were arrived at. assume the burden. of oversight and act There is no doubt, as the report clearly where we may have failed to act in the details, that agents of the U.S. Govern- Pas ment plotted the assassination of foreign We have an old saying in my State leaders and in some cases direct action that "it ain't what you don't know that was taken to carry out the plots, hurts you; it is what you know that The evidence does not show that any ain't so that gets you into trouble." I foreign leader was actually slain as a think from reading reports around the result of these plots, country and the world a lot of people And, unfortunately, the evidence also know a lot of things that "ain't so" about Is not conclusive as to the question of ori- the United States and our intelligence gin or authority and to what extent, if gathering operations. I believe the no- any, Presidents participated or had lease of this report will help dispel some knowledge of the plots themselves or the of those misconceptions. actions to carry them out. I decided to su rt the r It is not happenstance that this is the eeyeer?.eanlz.afterebeing fuleyeesenyineedetei case. The doctrine of plausible deniabil- my own mind that the releaSe would do ity, the practice of circumlocutory re- suliZantiarrn ports, and oral-only accounts of official gaffiering oreeralle-rai1taate meetings have effectively confounded all thar-7-I might sueeteleyelayeetaelthefree efforts to piece together the complete and the committee members of the accurate story after the passing years, genee_zathering organiztforis who haye as indeed they were probably Intended testified that thisektne theew.ork of to do. That is part of the system as it EF,Qs,c-iiTtnittee, the information that has operated that cries for correction. been obrailiett?ra-S?CatiSetr no?serious What Presidents knew and what part pFablem. -TriTereTtetiZrarsratie-piissie they played in these matters is left to t'aTi-CTe?Where' one ageTiFthat they might the inference of each reader of the re- haVei" te"- get- ffra:dislC.17..tio t t port. The available evidence is there, become part o r &Joao -0 e f?c-pu 'op ? n n that Whatever view is taken on that issue, the the?iiirrir-nre-,02_11:53-6:i. system by which CIA actions in this Wile en ; ey would havetgotteniallneor area of inquiry were supposed to be no Beyond . the propriety question, the are the questions of what intelligene policies are proper, how such policie should be- determined in a democrati society, what command and control ar rangements exist or should exist botl within an intelligence agency and ahoy, it, what the role of covert activities ir intelligence work is, what standard should overlay our entire intelligence ef forts, and what degree of direction and ,supervision should be assumed by Con 'gross. These are not easily answered, bu the information which we-have gathered as part of the assassination study should lend understanding to them, and it cer- tainly underscores the necessity for clearer determinations of policy as early as possible. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS The committee has, of course, con- ducted all of its proceedings concerning the subject of this report in executive session. This was done out of a unmet- ! mom understnding and appreciation of the need to be responsible in our method. We have had access to the most sensitive , information which nations can possess. We heard from individuals whose very lives were in the balance because of their past involvement in these activities. All of the members of the committee felt a deep sense e of personal responsibility for . the actions of the committee and, on the whole, we met that challenge by estab- lishing what I consider to be a remark- ? able record of security during our delib- erations. Each member exercised great restraint considering the length and depth of the proceedings on this issue. For security reasons., some information must remain secret. But, because of the attention given to the issue and the ques- tions raised, a report to the American people seems essential to overcome any brooding shadows which may remain. We would not have served our citizenry well - had we left them totally in the dark on these activities. I decided to support; re- lease of the report, however, only after assuring myself that such release would 1 in no way impair our national security. The committee has engaged in long and ) deliberate consultation with the various 7 agencies who are referenced in the re- ./ port in order to come to agreement; on what had to be deleted to avoid harming legitimate intelligence activities' of an ongoing nature. These negotiations have led to massive deletions from the original text .hi an effort to accommodate the needs of intelligence with the needs of the public. In concluding that American citizens should be advised to the fullest extent possible of the activities of its Govern- ment full consideration was given to the probability that the revelation of these activities most likely will be embarrassing ' to our country. Great care was given to differentiate between embarrassment and real harm to national security. It is my judgment that our Country is great enough and our people hearty enough to sustain embarrassment when such is called for. And perhaps the em- barrassment itself will provide us with the necessary incentive to take swift and. decisive action to prevent the recurrence supervised and controlled was grossly So we are not engaging here, in my inadequate. Agency officials have testi- ? Judgment, in. any exercise that is going fled that on occasion they failed to fully to cause serious harm to the security of or adequately disclose to both Directors ow* country. of Central Intelligence and to officials We are, of course., fully aware of the above the agency the exact nature of Probability. that the release of this re- their actions. Conversely, this approach pert would cause some embarrassment to "briefing" both directors and respon- to the United States. We have taken that sible officials at high levels of the execu- into full consideration. We have been tive branch was, in part, precipitated by very careful to delineate between cm the subtle indications .of those higher barrassment and real harm. I personally officials that they wanted to be kept in- think that our country is strong enough' striated from certain "activities," so that and our people are hardy enough that they could plausibly deny knowledge, we can accept embarrassment when such Is called for. It just might be that that very embarrassment will provide the in- centive, the spur that we need, in order to take the kind of decisive and swift ateigate and the formal imptachment action that, is necessary to provide th.e proceeding?ha,ve focused on the stand- legislative framework to prevent these ard of Presidential responsibility re- things from recurring. quired in areas involving the actions of As has already been pointed out, we subordinates. Indeed, during both of the did not conduct the hearings as a court_ above investigations frequent reference It was not our objective to attempt to was made to the Madisonian precept, fix blame. We simply trierlto find out As the committee notes, blame not- withstanding, the responsibility for the plats must lie with the Presieents. Re- cent inVestigations by the Congress? Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 S. 20 634 Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 ONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENA,,,,X November 20, 1075 what occurred, when it occurred, why it occurred, how it occurred, and how the decisions were arrived at that initiated this action. The evidence, of course, is not con- elusive in every respect. There can be no doubt that this coun- try was involved in plots and attempts to assassinate foreign leaders. There can be no doubt that in at least-two instances. plans were put into effect to carry out these plots by our own agents. The question of what Presidents knew, to what extent they participated, is left unclear and is left to the inference of each reader of this report as to where that responsibility is. But I believe the report is correct, and the findings- of the committee are cor- rect, when they say that the -final re- sponsibility must rest with the Presi- dents. Our responsibility now is to proceed to our own oversight burdens, and the burden. of providing the kind of- legis- lativetframework that is necessary in order-to make sure that our-intelligence- gathering operations can-operate in the very- efficient manner that is necessary but stay within the bounds .of what a free and democratic society demands. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to. the- Senator from Maryland. Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas- for yielding me this -time-------- - 1. believe that the painful story that has unfolded in the factual record which is now on the desks of Senators can, In fact, be the source of some important lessons-for the future. Very briefly, I would suggest that these included some new insight into the cor- rosive effects of the exercise of great power in excessive secrecy without those checks and balances that are designed to . guard liberty and- to protect, our values. ? Second; I -would_ suggest that it poses the necessity .for Congress to determine- the proper role of intelligence- agencies within the constitutional system of Gov- ernment.' Finally, that it poses the need for a' new, comprehensive statutory charter for all of the intelligence agencies. I think viewed in this perspective we can see that the publication a the report does have a clear legislative purpose, for the proposal of that charter for all in- telligence agencies is the most -useful work that the select committee can sic- complisie I think it Is the basic Justifi- cation for the existence of the commit- tee. I believe we are going to-have to work very, very hard in the next 3 months to ful nu that purpose. But the legislative purpose is also served by the mere factual record which is set forth -as a part of this report. In the course of this examination and this irieestigation, as Senators have heard, we have examined witnesses, we have examined many documents. I be- lieve constitutional government requires more than rhetoric. It requires some ren- dering of accounts, accountability. That is really the definition of this report. On the question of publication, I would refer you again to James Madison. He said that knowledge will forever govern ignorance and people who mean to be their own governors must arm them- selves with the power which knowledge Is. I believe Madison there spells out a duty which is the very essence of democ- racy. This is a darker side of life, a darker side of Government, centained in this report, but life presents us sometimes with hard and difficult jobs. If we are to prevent further erosion and rot we have to face tip to the facts as we have found them to be. Much of what Senators will End he this teport is, of course, inconclusive. There ought to be no- illusions that even the work done by the Members of the com- mittee and by the very efficient and effec- tive staff that we have gathered gives us any more than some oblique insight into the destructive effect of excessive secrecy on the practice of Government. There-is much more here that is of concern to the Congress: Attempts to pervert the press; attempts to invade the literary and aca- demic Worlds. If. the _Congress is con- cerned about these subjects, it is going to have to stiffen its backbone to consider what was the job to be done in these areas. . Our purpose here was not -to damage- the intelligence services or injure the rep- utations of past administrations, What we were trying to do and are trying to do is to stop the erosion of society's values caused by excessive secrecy and by un- checked executive power by making this tecord just as factual and accurate as possible. These assassination plots are, of course, profoundly . disturbing. But I think we have to recognize they are not unique. They are a repetition of many stories that are familiar in history. I be- lieve they are disturbing because they represent a step backward. History has, In fact, often witnessed the practice of assassination as an instrument to prac- tice or to terminate political power, and history also shows that men and govern- ments have come to recognize the com- pelling force of ethical principles. Over that far doorway is the motto' novous ordo seclorum, a new order of the ages.- But the etory that is unfolded in this document is not the story of a new order for the ages. It is the old order, the order that we thought we had abandoned in establishing this Government. When practiced against a domestic leader, essessination is common murder. When practiced against a foreign leader, assassination is an act of war without even the sorry sanction that war gives to the taking of human life. I think there can be no place in a world that is striving toi lard civilization for either practicing or condoning assas- sinations. I think that pr nciples are im- personal?if they are rigl t for the weak, they ought to be right ft r the strong? and that moral strength s more endur- ing than power. If nations will be guide- by these con- cepts, I think they caneavc id some of the lessons of history, that a contrary course brings tragedy not only to the victim of the assassination but to tie assassin as well. I believe that nothing that is in these pages will be found to contradict the lessons that mankind ought to have learned, that you cannot practice this kind of policy, without very grave conse- quences. The question has been raised here, and I arn sure will be raised in many places, as to whether there will not be grave- damage to our country's name in the eyes of our friends abroad and our friends around-the world. I think that we will In fact strengthen our country's reputa- tion by making known our efforts at self-correction, and by our adherence to the traditional values and' beliefs that the world associates with Americas I think that by doing that, we can insure that America keeps its place as a beacon to which men everywhere may look as the best hope for representative democ-, racy On the globe. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STONE) . Who yields time? Mr. CHURCH. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from North Cam- line. Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President and gen- tlemen of the Senate: I join with what has already been said by my colleagues, and especially with regard to the objec- tivity of the committee and the diligence of the committee. I think if you read this report carefully, you will find the sub- stance of some 11,000 or 12,000 pages of testimony set forth in a very objective manner. At the end of the report, On pages 299, 300, and 301, are set forth three pages of additional views which I have tried to- prepare very carefully. I,ask unanimous consent that those three pages be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the addi- tional views of Senator MORGAN were ordered to be printed in the Recoare as follows: . ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SK.NATOR ROBERT Moacits4 . Our Nation needs a strong, secure, and ef- fective intelligence community. Our memory of Pearl Harbor and testimony taken in hear- ings with regard to that catastrophe as well as testimony taken during these hearings clearly establish the need for a central intel- ligence- agency to coordinate the intelligence gathered by our various agencies of Govern- ment. If the United States had had a co- ordinating intelligence agency in 1941, the- disaster at Pearl Harbor would, in my opin- ion, have been averted. That we have now, and continue to have, such an agency is es- sential if we are to avert any future threats to our national security. Our national secur- ity is, after all else, of paramount import- ance. We must recognize, however, that our national, security can be subverted by over- zealous governmental action as well as an domestic or foreign agents. Our Na- tion cannot remain intact if we ourselves subvert our own ideals; consequetitly, it Is as Important for our government, to abide by them. In the words of I.1.3. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis: i"Decency, security, and liberty alike de- mand that governmental officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct as 'the citizen. In a government of laws, exIst- ence of the government will be imperiled If It fails t,o observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for Ill, it teaches the whole .people by its exarriple. If the govern- ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con- Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 November 20, proved F9PiferratFs4sERWeiMcEVAS66-I41.92A0001 00040001-2 S 2(1'637i , tempt for the laws it invites every man lobe- *teeither authority, even though this Commit- come a lave unto himself; it invites. anarchy. To declare in. the adenhais.tration of la democracy suelr as eursj the end justifies the means would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, ?-[wel. re- solutely set four] face." - ? It Is argued, many cases justifiably so, that in dealing with our national secur- ity, and, especially with hostile or adversary forces abroad, extraordinary means are neces- sary. So long as the Soviets maintain HOB agents around the World, we must maintain an effective intelligence gathering capability. However, this report deals with a particular activity of the government, which in, the absence or armed conflict, would, if true, shock the conscience and morals -of most Americans. That this investigation was neces- sary was unfortunate, but it was nracle so by the broadly circulated and printed re- parte of alleged. assassination plots,: some of which were given, credence by public state- ments by various officials.. It was my belief, in the beginning, end still is, 'that it would. be far better to ascertain, the truth as far as pos- sible, and clear the airs to the .end that our intelligence agencies Could get back to their assigned, taska . . I have weighed in my own mind for many days and nights how much of the informa- tion contained in this report should 'be made available, to the American public- and thus to the world, 'Including our potential adver- saries. That the public, has a right to know le incontrovertible, but whether that right extends to -information-which could damage' -our: 1.-rnage and national- security is not. so e wily deternani:ed.:?10,, '.0.tiStactory roi. the Members of the -Congress .t the dilly -eleeted representatives of the people, to hold such Information. in, trust for the people2 In some cases of national security the answer can . and must be "yes", and in the future, such Information must be held' by competent and aggressive oversight' committees. In the present situation too. much Water has gone.nver-the dam for such secrecy and to refuse- to make as full and complete a 'dis- closure as is consistent with the safety end protection of our present intelligence per- son'nel would only add to the intrigue, and the issue could not be put to rest. So though I have in some instances voted with ? some of my colleagues to-retain much information in executive session, I have concurred with the issuance of this report after being assured that the release of it would not violate any law with regard be classified matter and after the respective agencies have had. another chance to recommend aeclusitin of extremely Sensitive matters, Throughout the hearings one issue has re- mained paramount in my mind. If the alleged acts happened, were they the result of over- curious, over-zealous intelligence agents who were acting like "a rogue elephant on the rampage, or,- were they basically the acts of responsible, well-disciplined . intelligence agents acting in response to orders of "high- er authority"? Tti Me the conclusion is im- portant. If the first is true, then the agencies must be revamped or possibly dismantled and new agencies created to replace them. If the second is true, then clearer lines of au- thority must be established and stringent oversight by the duly elected representatives- of the people must take place. During the course of these hearings. I have been impressed by the belief held by the principals that those illegal- end immoral acts engaged in by our intelligence agenda n ere sanctioned by higher authority and even by the "highest authoeity." I am cons -slimed by the huge amount of eircurnstan- tee evidence that this is true. Although illegal and immoral activities carried out by our intelligence agencies cannot be justified by any argument, it is, I think, important to note that these actions were carried out in the belief -fleet they were eanctioneel by teo has been, unable to esteblish whether or not presidential authority was given. Some of the acts conducted by these agen- ekes could have been, and probably were, be- yond the scope of the 'projects authorized. In addition, the agencies. may have con- dilated. other activities which, in spite of this investigation, am still unknown-to this Com- mittee, Thus, they cannot be absolved. of all the blame_ Since our Intelligence agencies act on both a compartmentalized and need-to-know basis, it is difficult to establish in retrospect who was informed and what authority was given. It, is also difficult to establish what was told, to those who were- informed since circumlocution was aLso a standard practice within the chain of authority. The practice was, after all,' adopted to insure official de- niability as -well 'as to acquire consent. And the effectiveness or these techniques of ."need-to-know" and "circumlocution" is at- tested by the fact that this Committee not only has been unable to establish whose con- sent was given, but has also been unable to establish who was not involved. We have been able to establish neither responsibility nor innocence. In this situation, the presumption of, innocence cannot be applied without question, since, the mere willingness to par- ticipate in circumlocutions briefings implies a willingness to deny responsibility at crucial times, Consequently, I also believe that re- sponsibility for the illegal actions of our in- telligence agencies must be shared; it should not- ? be tarried entirely by our intelligence community. Itt drafting- legislation to circumscribe the activitiea of intelligence gathering agencies, I would stress the need to guarantee their ability to function effectively jour complex and dangerous world. The effectiveness of our intelligence agencies must not be limited solely by sound and practical applications of law drafted with clear objectives -in , mind. ..We must know what we want our intelligence , agencies to do and what we do not want them to do.. Then we can confidently allow them to function in the knowledge that they will not only defend the law but abide by it. Only in that, way can we be certain that our society will be preserved as an embodiment of our openly democratic ideals. Although we must Muse intelligence, we also must preserve our _open society, for to destroy the latter for the sake of the former would be a complete per- version of our goals. While we may realize that investigations of this nature into sensitive governmental actions In effect strengthen our country, we would be foolhardy to think tor a moment that our enemies, and perhaps even friends, will openly acknowledge this significant ac- complishment. We can EtSfiUnle, for instance, that our opponents will go to greet lengths to publicize and distribute propaganda based 'on this report Inimical to the best interests of the United States. That this, in fact, will be done only serves to reinforce my belief that we need, and must have, as strong an intelligence capability as possible. And while this Committee is charged with the respon- sibility of investigating end reporting on the misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency, we cannot reveal the details of the many meaningful accomplishments of the Agency which without a doubt have been beneficial to our country, That we have such an agency now, that we maintain our intelligence po- tential in these times of contineing inter- national tension is essential to our society and, continued existence as a nation. ? The release of this report, based on the public's right to know, does not cemproiniee our right to be secure. The report details only the actions of Aeency employees in the ertees under investigation and does not un- necessarily reveal confidential'i nrefllgence sources and methods. One can. however, suc- cessfully predict the impact the report. will ? have11101.he news media. of previous revelations concerning a.seasainations whicit have appeared in the press have gone a long way towards sensationalizing this country's involvement in assassination plots. This re- port corinrms smne prior public allegations while it disproves others. While some may shudder upon learning that the events re- lated in the report actually took place, we can all take great-pride in. the ability of this country to look frankly at problems within our system of government, and accordingly, in our ability to govern ourselves. History undoubtedly' record our ability to openly ? reveal and discuss improper, unpopular gov- ernmental actions as. one of tie- basic, ele- ments in the continued existence of our free society and the general ability we, as a na- tion, have achieved to subject ourselves and our government to the rule of law. Mr. MORGAN. In, addition to that, let me say just one or two things. I join especially in the comment of the distinguished Senator from Ten- nessee with regard to the facts and the evidence as he has observed them, and. especially in the comments. of the Sena- tor from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) with regard to his very keen observa- tions concerning the need for a Central Intelligence Agency, and also, the need for some degree of Secrecy. - As we have gone about our duties throughout these several months, there has been one question paramount in my mind. That question is this: Were the.. ? events which we have all found shocking to the morals and consciences of all Americans conunitted by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency on their own and without authority, acting irre- sponsibly, or were they in fact acts which Were cerninitteii by a well-disciplined his organization acting under the justified belief that they were carrying out orders of higher authority? - I -think the- answer to these questions is important. For if the answer to the first is affirmative, then we must, in my opinion,, reorganize and revamp the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, if not in fact dismantle it and start again. But if, on the other hand, the answer is "no" to the first and "yes" to the second, that is, that they acted in. the belief that they were carrying out orders of higher au- thority, then I think we are compelled in this Congress to strengthen the guide- lines under which the intelligence agen- cies operate, and the oversight that Con- gress must maintain. From listenino? to all of the evidence .anaehserving_the witnesses fled before us, us, I have concluded from ence?Mat, by. what we. in law would call its -g-ferri. er-weigiit file Prin- cipals in the events tlialThve, are talking ab:efLaIted- ta?Ehe firm-retief that they were carrying out orders of higher au- thority, aticr-ram satisfied in my mind that they wre jus fled Ln,L)ef. That is not to say that I believe that every single act carried out by the Cen- tral Intelligence agents was authorized by higher authority, but it is to say that I think the overall planning was author- ized by higher authority, or -at least the principals were justified in believing so. That being true, I believe it devolves upon us now to legislate change, not only in outlawing assassinations, which, as I say, have shocked the coitriences anti Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 S 20636 Approved For Re94's morals of every freedom-loving !i- can, but also it becomes incumbent upon us to make sure that we maintain strict oversight over these. agencies. I find, Mr. President, as a whole, that the members of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence agen- cies are highly dedicated and competent individuals. I have said many times throughout this investigation that while I am extremely concerned about the events that we have disclosed to you here this morning, I believe more strongly than I ever have that the real; threat to the national security of this country and to the individual freedoms and liberties ofthe people of this country comes not so much from the Central Intelligence Agency, but from the abuse Of power and the misuse of power by the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation and pc.ssibly the Internal Revenue Service. So as ? we proceed with the next 3 months of this investigation, I. hope you will be just as aware and just as atten- tive to what is going on as you have seen for the last 9 months. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ? Mr. TOWER. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Pennsylvania. -- . Mr. SCHWELKER. Mr. President, first, I wduld like to compliment the chair- man - of our distinguished commit- tee, the. Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) and the vice chairman of our committee, the Senator from Texas (Mr. Towza) for their very great leadership and very fair and equitable handling of some very difficult and complex problems. Second, I would like to compliment the staff for their dedicated seal in. the effort that really made this very tedious and painful job possible. I join with my colleagues on the Sen- ate Select Committee on Intelligence Ac- tivities to present to the Senate a report entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots In- volving Foreign Leaders." The investiga- tion which led- to this report has been long and difficult. I believe the commit- tee report accurately reflects the evidence uncovered, and I concur With the com- mittee's findings and conclusions. Thus, I would like to address these remarks to the question of why -this report should be made public. The Select Committee voted without dissent to make the report available to the public. I strongly support that judg- ment. This decision was made after 9 months of taking testimony from over 100 witnesses, reading literally hundreds of documents, spending many hours dis- cussing findings and formulating rec- ommendations. It was made af ter exten- sive consultations with the executive branch, including meetings with repre- sentatives of tile Defense Department, the State Department, and the CIA. These discussions enabled the committee to insure that no sensitive sources and methods of intelligence gathering were ncluded and compromised. It was made . titer the committee examined the pros- ( ill circumstances of each individual who .gured in this report, deleting the names c.f many and disguising others by the use c aliases, so that no one's life or lived- h sod would be threatened. In short, the decision to make this VII3W8M644-cifsPegos2V61-hao 000ziok5)-r-rber 201 1975 report public was made against the backArritcret agency and the other agencies as ground of the fullest possible study of well. Such an understanding is abso- the issue. lutely necessary if the public Is to be a But some might say that the securing ,of sources and methods of intelligence gathering and the protection of individ- uals is not enough. They say that the report should not be published because it would embarrass the United States and hinder our Nation in the conduct of its foreign affairs. There may be temporary injury, true. But I believe the countries of the world will recognize that our willingness to ex- amine our past and seek a better future openly, without flinching, is an indica- tion of the greatness of our country. In our effort not to offend, we could suppress this report, but our Nation is admired in proportion to the openness of our society. Withholding this report from the public would more .closely resemble the prac- tices of totalitarian regimes, who are haunted by the disparity between their Public faces and their private souls, than it would the history of this great land. Even more important than the impact of this report on other nations are the effects of its publication here at home. It is these ultimate positive effects on the Nation which led me to join with the .committee in, its dpproval of the publi- cation of this report. The publication of this report will: First, clear, the air. The innuendb, charges, piecemeal and self-serving dis- closures, have provided an incomplete and distorted view of what individuals and Government agencies did, and what they did not do. The publication of this report will dis- courage similar occurrences in the future. Great power, arid the serious abuses which flow from it, flourish in secrecy. Government officials with such power will hesitate to use it for illegal or unethical conduct if they know that some day their actions will be exposed and that they will be held accountable. Thus, public dis- closure is yet another check in our sys- tem of checks and balances. The publication of this report will re- new public faith in Government. The public has been ignored, or deceived, too long. The public needs governmental rec- ognition of their right to know, and gov- ernmental acknowledgment of the im- portance of honesty and candor. The public will .not stand for yet another coverup. The publication of this report will al- low the public to make up its own mind; not the Senate, not Congress, not the President, not the CIA?the Public. Without the information contained in the body of this report, the public could not possibly judge either the conclusions or the recommendations of this commit- tee or whatever legislative action that we are going to take in the future in this area. The publication of this report will en- courage public participation in the legis- lative process. Congress will soon be con- sidering legislation concerning not only assassination, but also executive and con- gressional oversight of the intelligence agencies. This detailed report provides a basic understanding Of the very special problems of -this important and highly participant instead of a bystander in the dialog about the CIA and other intelli- gence agencies' future. These are among the positive benefits of publishing this report. I do not need. I believe, to belabor the point that de- mocracy depends upon the accountability of public servants. And accountability rests upon. knowledge. Thus, the public's right to know is central?is funda- mental?to our very form of government. As James Madison wrote: A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. A people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. The report should be made available so that the public will know what has been done in its name. Without such a report, the people could not understand their past, nor would they be able to de- sign a better future. The great American philosopher Santanyana once wrote: Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it. The assassination T attempts by our Government .are a? shameful part of American .history. They must be con- demned. They must not be repeated. As they were a product of secrecy, public disclosure will assure that they will never happen again. Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Colorado. Mr. GARY HART, Mr.- President, shortly- after taking office, President Eisenhower asked a citizen commission to study the status of the intelligence com- munity in this country. In September 1954 that commission reported back to the President and its chairman, General James Doolittle, in statements contained in the introduction of that report, stated' as follows: . another important requirement an aggressive covert psychological, politica and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruth- less than that _employed by the enemy. 2,1( one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accom- pilshment of this mission. . . . . . . It is now clear that weare facing an Implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means cod at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. . . . . It may become necessary that the, American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy. Mr. President; we have sowed the wind and we are reaping the whirlwind. That philosophy antic nated in that report has dominated tne intelligence community in this country the last 20 years, and today we are seeing its results.. Our committee did not choose to get into the assassination 'question. But W3 had no alternative once the facts began to emerge but to inquire mo those facts Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 No ve)nber -'roved FoRgatS2Wiskg2e-:EbiArftb-FrAbli *es been an. Instance In which, in my judgment, someone in our committee or on its staff has leaked Information, but not to the jeopardy or detriment of the national security of this country.. Mr. President, Congress itself has been on trial?the question of whether Con- gress could exercise investigative respon- sibility in an area of the utmost secrecy and delicacy and carry out that respon- sibility in the manner that it has been carried out. I think our committee arid the Members of this body should he proud of the work that has been done here and all done under the umbrella of national security. I was appointed to this committee less than. 30 days after I took the oath of office. In the 9 or 10 months that have passed since that time; I have become aware that whether I serve here 5 more years or 50, more years, the work that this committee does may be the most im- portant think in which I will have an opportunity to participate. The work that the committee presents to you, the Sente of the United States, will be among the most important of the issues that any of you will face.. There is a saying from the Bible: You shall know Lne truth, and the truth shall make yern free. and we had no alternative but to follow those facts wherever they might lead.. Mr. President, if this report represents anything, it is the fact that the. truth cannot and will not be hidden. lArlat have we found as a result of 9 mon'ths' of a:T*71We -found cffaosi wel(Wnalaiure'61.7-Tv,"6"-Toillia--e-ifie?drency, and worst or all; WFThund abandonment-of the tfus Naitien was founded: It is tragic andiromc that Upon the eve of the celebration of the 200th anni- versary of this Nation its greatest delib- erative body would sit here today dis- cussing matters of this sort. I point out that this is., first of all, an interim report. None of us believes that this report contains all of the facts. For myself, r am net sure that all of the facts will ever be known. In a footnote at page 181 of this report, Senators will find a matter that only recently came to our attention that a middle-level. CIA official requested the establislunent of something that he called a. "Health Alteration Committee! to deal with an Iraqi colonel, presumably to eliminate him merely because he did not agree with. our foreign policy in his nation or in fact balked at some of the activities that we wanted to pursue. Information of this sort will continue to come out over the years, and I am not sure the American people will ever en- tirely know the truth. One other fact I think is important. We are looking at the entire intelligence community. As our distinguished col- league from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has pointed out on many occasions, the CIA in dollar torteinly represents ?''15 percent of Uria entire =Minna. Mtn The information that we develop about other elements of this community win be brought out in our finalereporti There is one other element. that I think is important for us particularly here today to note, and that is there is a tendency when things go wrong. or un- happy facts come out for the politicians of this country to point their finger at the people who carry out. orders. But if this record_ shows. anything, Mr. Presi- dent, it shows that the politicians in the White House, in administrative - posi- tions, were themselves as guilty as the operatives who carried out many of these activities, and the Congress of the United States over the years, I think, must bear equal blame for riot exercising its proper role of oversight and responsibility, and that is the matter that not only our com- mittee, but every Member of this body will have to answer for eventually. I add one word to that which has been said by many of our colleageus. We had a staff of 100-some individuals collected under an atmosphere where people in the press and in this body itself said we could not put together a staff which would act responsibly and even the-mem- bers of the committee themselves. could not act responsibly. I took the floor sev- eral days ago to point out there had been leaks, tut there had not been at that Lane one leak that was attributable to roe comealttee members or the staff that we had ,acillected. Unforaunately, since that time, there Ironically i that motto is found on the walla of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I should. like to stress, one or two other matters, and I will be brief. -Firat of all, this committee faced. the choice, when it began this unpleasant duty of investigating the aasassination allegations, of whether to conduct its hearings in public_ or in executive ses- sion, behind closed doors. I do not believe that any member of the committee had any doubt that a long series of public hearings, featuring these many witnesses, and telecast to the four corners of the globe, for weeks and months on end, would have constituted unprecedented political box office. But it would have done this country grievous damage. So we refrained from. holding any public hearings. on the mattersthat are taken up and discussed in this report. However, from the bettilTz., it was understood?an'-he committee twice its vote, affirmed?that at the end of the investigation a report would issue. That was iiiidersicial by Clre PresidenfTand all theanif the %7e At ['he 11th nQL:tr, alter the work of :1-.:corj?trniqee had. been clone, any ratalTii?telis Were ffirTiWfiThiyiliii an attempt to this report concealed. The viP1'Isto tioCe romitibnreTae Inr-d Mia Plea Una report. --Senator Towsa has already told you how carefully we went through this re- port with agents of these very agencies to execlude any name that, in the judg- ment of the committee, should be deleted. or any reference that in any way might expose intelligence sources or any other matter relating to the legitimate national security interests of the United States. Of those names they asked us to ex- clude, we excluded 20 and that left aborit cYcY2A000100040001-2 S 297 Atli the committee took a view dif- ferent from that of the executive branch. I can explain each of those nine, but will just give you some idea why the com- mittee took a different view, by citing a few examples, One such example is Mr. Dearborn, who is named in the report. He was the ranking U.S. official in the Dominican Republic where the assassination of - Trujillo occurred. He was in close and continuous- contact with the assassins, even transferring weapons, and has iden- tified himself publicly by writing a letter to the editor of the Washington Post on the assassination.. A second, Conein, was the contact with tire assassins in another country, Smith Vietnam, and his role was fully publi- cized when the Pentagon papers were published. Indeed, the reference to Intri by name in the report helps to clarify the fact that the United States never_ intended the assassination of Diem. Three others?Harvey, King, and Tweedy?were high-ranking CIA officials who helped, develop detailed plans for the assassination plots. Two of them held policy-making positions,. and their role is so intricately interwoven into this re- port that to exclude their names and po- sitions would be to render the report incomplete. Two others are Viaux and Valenzuela, who are foreigners. They were convicted by military tribunals for their roles in the pilots in their own countries.. Three others were members of the Mafia. John Roselli was a Mafia leader who, contacted by Mayheu, participated with the CIA in several attempts against the life of Castro. His appearance before the committee was. highly publicized, not - by the committee but by the press. His role has been commented on exteneiVely in the .press on numerous occasions. An- other is Santos Trafficante. He was a Mafia chieftain with gambling interests in Cuba who was used by Roselli and Mayheu to locate the Cubans to carry out the assassination plots and was a prin- cipal in the conspiracy. The final name was Robert Maheu, himself, who was the CIA's. contact man with the Mafia_ He testified before the committee amid, indeed, afterward he hold a press conference in which he die- c cissed his role. . i5cr weliclieveetilat in those CP eS where we i5snnrnu in the report. we have it_iudiciouslY a:a:it unfit:411-z t 1.1 eir,e,_;1-iritlitt not be a 1.1t,Ason for (1%)jecF.g te: the-r;ile-as-F-67f "MT...reportefi h tam!. TOGT.R. r yield myself 2 minutes. Generally speaking, althoitgh what, the enairman says is correct, that sonic ob- stacles were thrown in the way of the in- vestigation, we. probably got as much cm- operation as we reasonably coull expect, note that it was not so miiUIh he:?q- tartez in disclosing, matters to tue com- mittee as in Making those matt' rs pub- lic. I think that has been the irimary concern of the various agencii a with which we have dealt?not tint they did not want- to cooperate with tics com- mittee- and disclose eensitive mainers to the committee, but that they 'did nc t want Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 S 20638 CON9tESIONAL UCORD SENAI'.E - Npvember 20, 1975 Approved For Release 6/06/26 ? CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 the matters further disclosed to theeeeb- signed to serve the national interest. Tbf It Is going to have a profound impact lie. It is important to make that di7rnc- materials were turned over in classified form, on our international relations. It Will You will recall that I said on June 9, 1075, "I know that the Members of Congress in- volved will exercise utmost prudence in the handling of such information." The President goes on in his letter to the chairman of the committee: It Is not a question of withholding infor- mation required by the Select Committee to carry out its inquiry into these allegations, which relate entirely to past achninistrations of both parties. On the contrary, I have en- deavored to make all of the information available to your committee so that legisla- tion can be proposed, if necessary, and to the Justice Department to facilitate any investi- gation indicated. However, we must distin- guish between disclosures to the Select Com- mittee of sensitive information and publica- tion of that information which is harmful to the national Interest and May endanger the physical safety of individuals. There is no question about the access to these materials by appropriate official. The only issue con- cerns publication, which obviously cannot be limited to Members of Congress or other American citizens. Then, if you will read with me from rule The VerY first clause cin7F- tion 3 reads as follows' All confidential communications made by the President of the United States to the Seril 1- shall be by the Senators and the officera of the 'Senate kept secret: and all ti.eaties which may be laid before the Senate, and all remarks, vote-s-,?Knd- proaeTdings thereon Shall alio-be kept secret . . . Notice the word "also," which indicates that the second clause is a separate clause from the first clause. But even in the case of treaties, it says . . . until the Senate shall, hy their reso- lution, take off the Injunction of secrecy, or unless the same shall be considered In open Executive session. ? Even more pertinent is section 5 of rule =XVI. Whenever, by the request of the Senate or any committee thereof . . And these materials were provided in response to the request of the commit- tee? . . . any documents or papers shall be com- municated to the Senate by the President or the head of any Department relating to any matter pending in the Senate . . . The CIA investigation by this commit- tee was a matter pending in the Sen- ate? . . the proceedings in regard to which are secret and" ardfltW1,_...tiRaincter ratm sareectoeumepes ericapaperseetiall be consid- ered as contidentiale_ancl shall tioL als- CIOSed without leave of the Senate. .1 raise this question becausei think it is a very, very ftindamental Questiene I understend the situation which is being_ presen-tede it is that unless the Senate takes some affirmative action to o'verfilff the action of We TaT6et-eariffattee-e-thiS report will -f-submit that would be not only in vio- lation of the rules ortri-e-eriate, but. .5 very bad precedent. If we were to do this?anniia,y5i-it should be done?it is certainly one of the most basic and fun- damental decisions that is going to be made in the service of any of us in this body. tion because, generally speaking, I think we have had a pretty good level of coop- eratiort I must eay_ehat Min_Colhy has been extremely coopera.tive. Ii_ge_alourse, ob- jected to our publicalion of us rei-M. - which T think is normal under the cir- cumstances. But I do not believe that at any time he withheld anything from the committee in an effort to impede its in- ves tiga Lion. So again I think the point should be made that the question is; What do we make public? What is of such sensitive nature that it should not be made pub- lic? I think the Members- of the Senate and the Members of the House have a right to know, on a need-to-know basis, anything that the intelligence commu- nity has. But I think that we, ourselves, must be very judicious in what we reveal to the public. We will be facing up to this awesonie responsibility in. the days to come, in our continuing investigation. I stress what Senator HART men- tioned?that is, that this is an interim report, that our work is not yet -done, and we are currently engaged in looking Into the matters that I think prompted Senate Resolution 21 in the first place, which launched this investigation, and that is in the area of domestic abuse. I believe this is the area of perhaps greatest importance. - So I want to make sere that you have everything in perspective and know that this committee has not been dealing only with assassinations. This is only part, Of it. - This is perhaps a less important part .of it than what is done in the domestic area, in the way of abuse, that infringes on the rights of American citizens. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Michigan. Ur. GRIFFIN I thank the Senator from Texas. Mr. President. I did not rise to speak to'ffre. question of the wisdom of releas- ing this report to the public but, rather, the question or the procedure by which Ira-V5Tird-1ie?datreeTrta is made. I should lute to prevail. upon Senabas to referto the Standing Rules of the Senate and turn TOTi1fe-1=1, particui- ar y secteoras and a ereo , and- I think we can bring into focus the question I want to raise. That ee rule X7s..eXITI of the Senate, particularly sections 3 and 5. I take it that no one wouldiiiesto,thit tills re- por EF6atairis information which was pro- vided by the President or heads of de- partmen.ts of the executive bra in classified form. Ifie basic Question is whether or not that material is to be made public_ and It see-Ifatris it to be iTie publiejlenahatepeonesluee9 Let me just fill in here be calling attention to I, letter dated October 31, addressed to Chairman CHURCH, from the President c f the United States, to which reference Las already been made. I want, to faces o u a couple of. sentences. I have endeavored -to make available all tl e material in the executive branch on this in bject to -the Select Committee of the Seri- at and the House and -the Department of Ju -dice. This was done under procedures de- have a profound impact, I suggest, on the ability of the executive branch, of the President, under any administration of either party, in his relationship with Congrees, if he Cannot assume that con- fidential Information requested of him and delivered on a classified basis will be treated as classified information, at least in accordance With the rules of the Sen- ate itself. And certainly, it will have a profound impact on the ability of the President of the United States to deal in international affairs with other nations. It is not enough to say, yes, but you can make a motion here, in the Senate, in closed session, to deny the committee the right to publish this report. If we accept that, then we have said that any com- mittee or any subcommittee of the Sen- ate, from now on, has the right to make public any classified information pro- vided by the executive branch. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. GRIFFIN. I gladly yield. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator agree that the Senate itself has the right to re- moire the secrecy and authorize the ad hoc committee to publish the report? Mr. GRIFFIN. I think that section 5 Is right on the point. - Mr. PASTORE. In other words, what you are actually saying is that the com- mittee, on its own? Mr. GRIFFIN. Does not have that authority. Mr. PASTORE (continuing). Must have to report back to the Senate with their recommendations. Mr. GRIFFIN. That is right. Mr. PASTORE. But it is up-to the Sen- ate to authorize the publication of it. Mr. GRIFFIN. And it is an obligatior, under the rules that the Senate itself, as a whole, cannot duck. Mr. PASTORE. I think the anator is right. Otherwise, we would be setting a ba rece en , . i we can do it, I1IFXN. We had this kind of question arise in the Committee on For- eign Relations, having to do with classi- fied documents relating to the Sine! agreement. The committee inadvertently. I would say, because I do not think we were adequately aware of the rules of the Senate when it was done, without any improper motive, whatsoever?rand I at- tribute no improper motive, incidentally. in this situation, either. We can have dif- ferences of opinion as to what the rules should require. In that instance, classified documents which had already appeared in the New York Times were made public by a com- mittee vote. But, afterward, the com- mittee itself recognized that they had made a mistake and that the action taken by the committee was not in ac- cordance with the rules, and it so Indi- cated. At least, that precedent was not established, because the rornmittee, it- self, acknowledged that it had. not acted in accordance with the rul ts of the Sen- ate. I just want to emphash e the impor- tance here of not allowir g this to be made public without COM aliance with the rules of the Senate, - Approved For Release 2006/06/26: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2 Novembel. 20, IniSroved FoCP4kcaliM 12RECONZP-78615 I will say this: As for me, I shouldligrave received from the Parliamentarian, have a difficult time voting today, not tha t1Tri committee was given the ad. having had a chance to read this report thority to issue this rewirt judethie_rufejs at all, on the question of whether the of the in beingbeing referred to here are Senate should authorize it to be made ?not being interpreted pranerlv by the public. I think Senators ought to have distinguished Senator from Michigan. an o foIflit3r read-and-1T if They do not, in the circumstances, pre- and-etnedeliberate, to some extent, on -tile elude the committee from issuing the very, very fundamentaTiirettfdifiliWifv-- -report, on its own authority. We have ing naq.ional securitytand national inter- looked into this very carefully. est, as to Tv-Figh?er thficimu1d If the Senate wants to vote no confi- ffe-rifiateitir TT-that-In -fife denne_inetlistsona4t.tee nd enioituae- eircirnViii-vOte tir Make it puhlft3713Ilt committee irom?slit= tbis I should thi_p_k_Lc,a1173iira b the be-tier part of wisdom to delay this decision until _Eiffel' The recess and to-give ae7ii- klt"s an 01-1-DOEIliatY tO be flayogni- zapLand aware of what they might be doing Mr. cunus. Will the distinguished Senator yield for a question? Mr. GRIFFIN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Nebraska. ? Mr. CURTIS. Is what the distin- guished Senator saying that a commit- tee cannot release secret information unless the Senate affirmatively grants permission for it? Mr. GRIFFIN. I have a difficult time reading section 5 any other way, I say to the Senator from Nebraska. Mr. CURTIS. In other words, the ab- sence of a motion denying the committee the right to release it would not suffice, would it? - Mr. GRIFFIN. Absolutely not. cuRaas. I think the penalty re- ferred to in section 4 or paragraph 4, whichever it is, of rule XXXVI is so 2=A000100040001-2 S 20639 severe-- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's 10 minutes have expired. Mr. TOWER,. I will yield 5 additional minutes to the Senator from Michigan. Mr. CURTIS. IJi1ieiia wastlinlid,bau- dleethisein stnineLecintormity_toules, etrheeyeiese theecommittee or those mem- berseetithe eommilketwhe do release it wouldebeefacing a very enTharrassinix Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator for his contribution. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Alabama, Mr, ALLEN. I think we might inquire of the chairman if this committee report may not possibly be in the hands of the media now in view of the embargo printed here on the outside indicating they have got a right to MOVE: it eta rting at 4 o'clock this afternoon? Mr. CHURCH. First of all, I am in complete disagreement with the argu- ment being made about the rules of the Senate end their applicability in this case, and we are prepared-- ? Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator speak louder; we cannot hear him? Mr, CHURCH.. I agmementiLigaentjemng ina-ctre that our proceedings here are in any ,riispect, contrary Jo the, rules of the SeniaL. We have investigated this very thor- oughly. We have conferred with _tine F liamentalaan; ..We, have received his orrin- loneba-sed u p with e iIr&f?Iancflve amp ninpeineet[to arffitentheenaee. Now, we are pTepared to show, based flq, the precedents and the oflliTh7t17,i7e may do so. But it takes on af1b:rao tire_ arthe Senate to clTat. It is always within the Senate's power7For that rea- son, although these reports are out on the Senators' desks and, as practical public men we knoW the difficulty, fol- lowing this session, of preventing the contents of the report from being dis- seminated Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. CHURCH (continuing). Never- theless, in deference to the Senate, we have refrained from circulating the re- port to the press until we have first had an opportunity to come to the Senate and make its contents known to the Sen- ate. But we do not accept the proposi- tion laid down by the Senator from Michigan, and we are prepared to refute it. Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying that he original lesolaion f2311n..1 tad alit] otly ? Mr. CHURCH. yteen Mr. PASTORE. I would like to hear the- iiegmilent as to whSilt dOes. Mr. CIIIITICTITITiTeTd7CiSena tor MON- Mr. MONDALE. I would like to respond to this. Mr. TOWER. Mr, President, is this on the time of the Senator from Idaho? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, itis. Mr. MONDALE. This executive session was called under the unanimous-consent agreement propounded by the majority leader, not for the purpose of acting on the report, but for the purpose of hearing it. We thought out of deference to the Senate and in view of the delicacy of this matter that it ought to be heard first by Senators before it is released to the public. It is not here to be adopted OU approved. It is here to be heard. That is the nature of this meeting'. The suggestion was made by the Sen- ator from Michigan that under. rule XXXVI, since this report- was based in part upon sonte classified information obtained from the executive department-, it may only he released under that rule by an affirmative vote of the Senate. ejaaie_cilrecked_with_the EaL111-7 neentarian and it is elriti_onininhntneet ruin foOck-TI refers to private c-emmuni- 6.7t1Eiris- tlifft-rtre erei terrte---the Sen- ate as a hoTe iThIl?itt6f deliberations waif- respect to a treaty, anrmatters oi that kind that are con- Sq-cWrecratexeciffri.'e session. tlider those eirsamistances yotilave to yore- to no- lease it. tly_,t he satit7liat matters that grurii_titinelyre committees, TaiTh are_p_ften efiTTTsifleci,Than leriTeased tilcse_committees iiiirteir normal tune- tion. Sift ASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a questiOn? Mr. MONDALE. Yes, I yield. Mr. PASTORE. Why did we have to have an executive session today if you are going to release it anyway? If you are not seeking the approbation of the Senate in what you are doing, why did we come here in secrecy to begin with? "VVIly did we not have- an open meeting? Mr. - MONDALE. Two things: First, there are. many matters that could be asked about that could only be answered in executive session and, in deference- to the Senators-- Mr. PASTORE. Answered by whom, by the Senate? Mr. MONDALE. Well, by experts? Mr. MANSFIELD. By the committee. Mr. MONDALE. By expert people, dealing with some aspects not neces- sarily stated in this report, matter that could not be answered except in execu- tive session. Second, out of deference to the Sena- tors, in light of the highly delicate na- ture of this matter, it seemed only proper that a thorough briefing of our colleagues be made. Now, the, Senate resolution, which was the product of -1174-distlii-Fiaceil--Set-i-ci- t-o-r-firOlft-Rhocre Island,, confers dit? this committee_ the_m_thoritYi......11.14tie-d requircs ..oL. this commitke?thal is Committee on on- Intelligence, tly