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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 C?1jEU N P c- r- n n r *aq~r Ee.._ . (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIA, State Department review(s) completed. co 2 March 1961 11,3 IT I 25X1 ~ 25X`l ss. D [i DECLASStFi'D 25X1 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 1 / 4 QAj COPY NO. 71 OCI NO. 0269/61 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Next Page (s) Next 5 = Page,(s) In Doc Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 u ment Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY WEEKLY REVIEW CONGO The incursion by Gizenga forces into the Luluabourg.area of Kasai Province, which caused much apprehension in Leopold- ville, has faded out this week. UN sources claim that Luluabourg is a "UN city"; nevertheless Congolese troops of Mobutu, ac-. cording to press reports, have engaged in riots with the local populace which.have resulted in more than 40 fatalities. The UN has confirmed that another Gizenga force estimated at two battalions is moving from Ikela in central Congo toward Coquil- hatville, capital of Equateur Province, which the UN reports virtually unguarded by Leopold- ville forces. Hammarskjold told Ambassador Stevenson on 28 Feb- ruary he did not think recent military operations in the Congo had changed the balance of power among the various factions. For at least a month, Gi- zenga's forces.have apparently operated with relative freedom in northern Kasai Province. The population there, which includes Lumuiriba's own tribe, either is politically apathetic or fa- vors Gizenga'S Stanleyville re- gime. The force that "took" Luluabourg apparently had rea- son to expect that Mobutu's troops would not resist. The Gizengist withdrawal began on 27 February, the troops quitting Luluabourg "like a wave on sand," some disappearing in- to the bush after abandoning their weapons, and some withdraw- ing to the northeast toward 'Kivu Province.. According to UN sources, all Congolese troops have been cleared from the city and the airport. According to the Ghanaian UN commander on the scene, the officers of the invading force did not have control of their men, and the force evidently dispersed rather than submit to a. disarmament agreement which its leaders had negotiated with the local UN contingent. Gi- zengist officers involved in these negotiations and the com- mander of the pro-Mobutu garri- son asked for and received UN protection, although there are indications that the Leopold- ville government intends to take disciplinary action against its officers. This confusion in Luluabourg illustrates the de- pendence of Congolese military operations on the whims of in- dividual units. The Gizenga forces in Luluabourg, according to eyewit- nesses, did not have even the most meager logistical support --and other Stanleyville columns operating in Kasai are probably in a similar condition. Gi- zenga's over-all supply problem appears to be precarious. The expulsion of five Com- munist journalists from Stan- leyville on 28 February--al- legedly because Gizenga was piqued about not receiving aid from Communist countries--prob- ably was intended by Gizenga to. dramatize his supply situa- tion. The Sudanese UN delegate told an American official on 27 February that Khartoum does not intend to give way to So- viet and UAR pressure for trans- it rights. He said various devices were being tried, but would not succeed. Gizenga apparently re- mains the dominant figure in Stanleyville and the city is SECRET .2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY reported calm. General Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, re- portedly issued orders on 26 February that anyone molesting Europeans will be shot, and Gizenga had earlier decreed that only the central Stanley- ville government can order the death sentence. Gizenga, who has little tribal support and has maintained his position largely through political manip- ulation, may have weakened it by defending Europeans. However, he appears to have removed some potential rivals. Benard Salumu, formerly his rep- resentative in Cairo and more recently a leading figure in the Stanleyville regime, is reported to have fled, presum- ably as a result of a struggle for power. In Leopoldville, the riot- ing by Congolese army elements appears to have resulted from fear both of an impending at- tack by Gizenga's columns and the possibility of attempts by UN forces to disarm Mobutu's troops. Kasavubu's radio ad- dress on 27 February in which he urged resistance to UN "tutelage" may worsen the al- ready tense situation between UN personnel and the Congolese army, and further attacks on UN personnel could lead to re- taliatory action by the UN force. In late February, Congo- lese officials in Leopold- ville were making frantic ef- forts to put together a force with which to oppose Gizenga's advance. In the event Gizenga's forces move on Leopoldville, they would be unlikely to meet effective opposition in eastern Leopoldville Province, where most the the tribes supported Lumumba. Acting Defense Minister Kazadi was trying to raise two battalions of volunteers in the Leopoldville area, and report- edly even asked Albert Kalonji, head of the South Kasai State, to send his two battalions of poorly trained troops against the Gizenga force in Lulua- bourg. When this request was reported to the UN command, Dayal protested, objecting to Kalonji's "aggressive posture." According to UN sources in New York,Kalonji's troops had taken up positions near Luluabour by 27 February. General Mobutu, with ap- proximately 1,500 troops, is in the vicinity of Bumba, pos- sibly still hoping to advance into Orientale Province. UN sources estimate that, although he has some trucks brought up by river from Coquilhatville, he would not be able to carry out an attack on Stanleyville. Following a 21 February meeting with UN commander McKeown, Mo- butu promised to take up only defensive positions to prevent infiltrations from Stanleyville, but he refused to meet with Lundula to discuss a cease- fire and establishment of a neutral zone. Hammarskjold thinks there is a chance that Mobutu and Lundula might join forces in a military al- liance against all politi- cians. 25X1 25X1 Mobutu may be planning at- tempts to reassert Leopoldville's SECRET Page 2 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY control in Kivu Province. The American consul in Usumbura re- ported on 23 February that Mo- butu troops in plain clothes had appeared in Ruanda-Urundi, allegedly on a mission to buy off the garrisons now controlled by Gizenga across the Congo bor- der in Bukavu. The consul com- ments that this operation has a better chance of succeeding than did Mobutu's abortive at- tempt on 1 January, also from Ruanda-Urundi, to take over Kivu Province. Belgium would be open to further severe cen- sure should such an operation take place from Ruanda-Urundi, which it administers as a UN trust territory. Gizenga's apparent mili- tary successes probably contrib- uted to the 28 February agree- ment among Tshombe, Ileo, and Kalonji.which provides for a pooling of military forces and continuing military and polit- ical consultations. By thus .tacitly admitting the existence of Katanga as a separate entity, Ileo and Kasavubu may have un- dermined their claim to be the spokesmen for. the entire Congo. The agreement is unlikely to result in much direct mili- tary support for the Leopold- ville regime. Tshombe is more likely to use his troops against dissident Baluba tribesmen to maintain his own position. Within the last two weeks he has reportedly issued Mauser rifles and ammunition to many members of his Conakat party in Elisabethville and the sur- rounding villages, but this action appears to be more an attempt to raise morale and to guard against an anti-Conakat uprising than to increase the fighting strength of the Katanga army. t h e C o n g o However, Tshombe on 28 February denounced his tacit cease-fire agreement with the UN and threatened for the first time to move his troops outside of Katanga. SECRET Secretary General iammarskj old describes his new Congo mandate as 'open ended" regarding what is to be done and "indefinite" regard- ing who is to carry it out. He remains cautious in his inter- pretation of provi- sions authorizing the use of force. He be- lieves that UN troops could take positions to keep contending Page 3 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYYA'RY forces apart and use force to hold such positions against at- tack. However, in his view, UN forces could not initiate the use of force. Hammarskjold insists that he must abide by the limitations set by coun- tries contributing troops and cites Tunisian, Ethiopian, and Sudanese demands that their troops not become parties to internal conflicts. On the basis of this inter- pretation, UN advisers estimate that 25 battalions (23,000; men) are necessary to maintain law and order. They believe 19 battalions could prevent troop, movements within the Congo. If Morocco and Indonesia comply with Hammarskjold's appeal to keep their troops there, the UN force in the Congo will remain at 19 battalions. Hammarskjold has requested African states to supply five or six additional battalions for use in Katanga, and apparently is hoping for three or more battalions from India. He regards an Indian contribution as the "key" to the situation at present. Hammarskjold has held a series of meetings with his 18- member Congo Advisoky Commit- tee with the over-all objective of forcing the states represented on that body to take responsi- bility as a group for imple- mentation of the resolution. He believes that the only way he can act is by some agreement among Africans which would off- set Soviet pressure. By involv- ing these states in executive decisions about UN Congo opera- tions, Hammarskjold probably hopes to protect his office and the Secretariat from the inevi--- :tkble attack by UN members should UN troops ever actually initiate the use of force. Hammarskjold does not in- tend to replace Dayal imme- diately, although his contract expires in two weeks. Hammar- skjold said that Dayal would have to stay until "we are around the corner" of the pres- ent crisis. Hammarskjold's reluctance to replace Dayal stems in part from the diffi- culty of finding a suitable replacement as well as to his fear of alienating India. His requests for several men from various Asian, and African countries have been refused by the governments mainly on the ground that these men were needed at home. Paris is sharply critical of UN efforts in the Congo and believes they have only weak- ened the prestige and strength of the legitimate government. Opposed to any expansion of the UN mandate, and to neutraliza- tion of the Congolese Army, Paris advocates strong and im- mediate support of Kasavubu and believes the US, Britain, France, Belgium, and friendly African countries should act in concert to build up Kasavubu so that he could serve as a lodestone around whom a moderate central government could be formed. Though Paris has ceased its initial direct aid to the Katanga forces, its extreme irritation with the UN, its dislike of US policy, and the serious threat to Kasavubu, suggest, that Paris may consid- er direct aid is imperative. Khrushchev Letters Khrushchev's letters of 22 February to Nehru and other.: heads of government probably were intended as the USSR's response not only to Hammar- skjold's new mandate but also SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Pale . of 29 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET to recent US warnings against unilateral intervention. Khru- shchev sought to counter the Security Council resolution by insisting that the UN operation has failed and that if the pres- ent situation continues, West- ern forces may intervene "be- hind the facade of the UN." The letters repeated most of the points contained in the Soviet Government's statement of 14 February on the Congo, with the, addition of a renewed demand that Hammarsjkold be replaced by a three-man executive organ representing the West, the Com- munist bloc, and the neutral- ists. Khrushchev charged, "It is Hammarskjold who killed Lu- mumba," and declared, "We can- not tolerate a UN secretary gen- eral branded with this abomi-,-. nable murder The Soviet premier avoided a direct attack on the United States, but he warned certain unnamed "statesmen in the West" that a "big stick" policy is "rife with mortal danger for those who pursue it." Khru- shchev's proposal to replace the UN operation by a commission of African states is an attempt to align the pro-Gizenga Casablanca powers--Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR--with the USSR. Nkrumah had earlier pro- posed reconstituting the UN force into an African military command for the Congo and now intends to present his plan personally to the UN General Assembly session scheduled to reconvene on 7 March. A 22 February communique signed by the Casablanca powers meeting in Accra called for re- organization of the UN Congo forces and their subordination to an African command. Khrushchev's proposed com- mission, which would deal only with the "legal government" of Gizenga,would have the tasks of supervising the removal of the "aggressors," ensuring the ter- mination of "all forms of for- eign intervention," and creat- ing conditions for "normal ac- tivities by the Congolese Gov- ernment and parliament." By publishing Khrushchev's letter to Nehru, Moscow may hope to head off an Indian de- o send combat troops to the Congo. Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are apparently thinking in terms of a brigade- size unit (about 3,000 men). SECRET Page 5 of 28 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Efforts by Vientiane to reach a reconciliation with Souvanna Phouma probably will be resumed following his re- turn to Phnom Penh on 1 March from a week of consultations with his "government" at Xieng Khouang and with other supporters in Laos. The evident hardening of Souvanna's attitude, however, is a complicating factor. Souvanna has advanced three possible solutions to the Lao- tian crisis: creation of a co- alition government including Pathet Lao representation, de- pendent on withdrawal of "Ameri- can troops" from Laos; creation of a "neutral, nonpolitical" government, presumably composed of civil servants acting under the King; or the early convening of a 14-nation conference--as suggested by Sihanouk--to organ- ize new general elections in Laos which would be supervised by a commission appointed by the conference. Souvanna's determination to press the Laotian Govern- ment on this issue is reflected in the tough statements issued under his name during his stay in Xieng Khouang, including a call for the development and consolidation of a "powerful army to liberate all of Laos." Souvanna was also quoted as doubtful that the "Laotian people and Pathet Lao forces can accept a broadening of the Boun Oum government. If there is any broadening, it can only be with the collaboration of the Pathet Lao of the govern- ment which I have set up." Vientiand's attitude will be influenced by its irritation over Souphannouvong's denunciation of King Savang's neutral nations proposal and Souphannouvong's claim that the King is a "pris- oner of the imperialists." A government communique issued on Souphannouvong's statement --which Souvanna subsequently echoed--termed it "hostile to the King's spirit for neu- trality and harmony which could have serious conse- quences for the Laotian Government's reconciliation policy." SECRET Page 6 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 1ao ---2 J INDONESIA SECRET L,, S?UTM ttope(VIETNAM i CAMBODIA 200 --I Page, 7 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Burmese Premier U Nu, in rejecting the invitation for Burma to serve on a neutral nations commission, stated that "acceptance would imply recog- nition of the Boun Oum govern- ment, which Burma had not recog- nized." Nu reiterated Burma's doubts that Sihanouk's 14- nation proposal could bring about tangible- results, and instead advocated free elec- tions in Laos under the super- vision of a neutral nations commission, on which Burma would be willing to serve. The Burmese premier noted the necessity for the big pow- ers ; of both East and West to stay out of the Laotian dis- put and for the leaders of opposing "factions" in Laos to agree on a modus vivendi to hold such elections. Both.'Moscow'and Peiping moved quickly to undercut King Savang's proposal. Their immediate response suggests concern lest favorable in- ternational reaction to the proposal deprive the bloc of the diplomatic initiative in Laos. Soviet Ambassador Abramov in Phnom Penh may have been instrumental in persuading Souvanna to go to Xieng Khouang. While Souvanna had entertained the idea for some time, Abramov undoubtedly tried to impress him with the urgency of immediately identify- ing himself with the Xieng Khouang regime in order to offset Savang's netural nations proposal. In the first authorita- tive commentary in over a month on Moscow's conditions for reaching a settlement in Laos, a Pravda article on 23 Febru- ary stressed the need to con- vene an international conference before the International Con- trol Commission (ICC) can re- sume its activity in Laos. The article commented obliquely on King Savang's declaration by charging that the Boun Oum government is "flouting the Geneva agreements, which pro- vide the only foundation for peace and security in the Indo- china area." The article claimed that the USSR's pro- posals for dealing with the crisis have "met with wide-' spread international response," and contended that Britain, which together with the USSR chaired the 1954 Geneva Con- ference, has agreed in principle that any settlement. should be based on the Geneva agreements. Pravda also welcomed Brit- ain's proposal of 21 January for reactivating the ICC in Laos as a "move toward a real- istic approach." The article went, even further than Moscow's earlier official reply--which suggested that the ICC could meet in New Delhi--by saying the ICC "must meet at once." The bloc's insistence that any Laotian negotiations SECRET 2Mar61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 8 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY or settlement be based on the 1954 Geneva agreements stems from its conviction that this approach would guarantee a major bloc voice in any solu- tion and provide the best de- vice for obtaining strong Pathet Lao participation in any expanded government of "nation- al unity" that might be rec'- ommended' by an international The most comprehensive statement of the USSR's posi- tion regarding a Laotian set- tlement was made by Soviet Ambassador Menshikov to Secre- tary Rusk on 28 February. Menshikov called Sihanouk's proposal of "paramount impor- tance" and said that the 14-na- tion conference proposed by the Cambodian leader could fur- nish the ICC with the addition- al powers necessary for its operation. The Soviet ambassa- dor also noted that US support for the Laotian King's neutral nations proposal was actually an abandonment of the Geneva agreements and would lead to the creation of a new commission for which there is no legal ground. Peiping propaganda treat- ment of the Laotian situation has contrasted with Moscow's avoidance of direct criticism of the US administration. People's Daily on 25 February charged that tthe US "has been stepping up aggression against Laos" while talking of a polit- ical settlement. It described the neutral nations proposal as "nothing but a US intrigue." The editorial also drew attention to the presence of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Laos, and said the US was planning for "these brigands to join the civil war." About 3,000 of the irregulars have taken up residence in Namtha Province after being forced out of Burma under pressure from the Burmese Army assisted by Chinese Communist forces. The irregulars issue was raised somewhat more stridently in another People's Daily article on 27 a ruary. ere Peiping raised the implicit threat of intervention "if US imperialism dares to incite the Kuomintang bandits to join the Laotian rebel forces." People's Daily said such a move would "seriously menace the security of China's south- western border"--a menace that "absolutely cannot be toler- ated." The commentary also cited a recent statement by Kong Le warning that if the Na- tionalist irregulars are- not withdrawn, "the Souvanna Phouma government will take measures similar to those adopted by the Burmese Government to eliminate them." No Chinese Communist mili- tary personnel are known to be in Laos at the present time, but Peiping is using the pres- ence of Nationalist irregulars there as a convenient excuse for linking Communist China's national interests more closely to the Laotian crisis. The irregulars could be used by Peiping to justify a military role in Laos, and the presence of an old enemy on "China's southwestern border" would be- come a likely issue for pro- longing any international con- ference in which the Chinese Communists took part. General Phoumi, in a press interview, has denied any in- tention of using the Nationalist irregulars in the government's military effort. He termed their SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY presence "embarrassing" and said steps are being taken to resolve the problem. tionalist China has indicated willingness to withdraw those irregulars "subject to its control," but a substantial number may not fall into this category. The military situation in Laos continues generally quiet, but Phouui claims to have reports that the Pathet Lao high command worked out plans with Souvanna Phouma for a major surprise attack on Luang Prabang in hopes of cap- turing the King and installing the Souvanna regime in the royal capital. Phoumi, however, is confident that government strength in the Luang Prabang area is sufficient to repel any attack. There is no other informa- tion concerning such enemy in- tentions, but the logistical build-up by the Kong Le!- Pathet Lao forces in the vicinity of the Phou Khoun road junction has reached a level sufficient to support a counterattack on government troops who remain bogged down a few miles east Of the junction. In the Tha Thom area, gov- ernment strength is insufficient to take advantage of the order- 25X1 ly withdrawal of Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces northward to- ward Xieng Khouang. The objective of the 27 February talks between De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba --to open the way for direct negotiations between France and the Algerian rebel lead- ers--has apparently been achieved. Official French statements on 1 March implicit- ly confirm that De Gaulle now is willing to negotiate with- out a prior cease-fire. He hopes to move fast enough to prevent consolidation of French rightist opponents of his pol- icy; this opposition, together with resistance to negotiations among factions in the rebel leadership, threatens an early settlement. The 2 March communique is- sued jointly by rebel "premier" Ferhat Abbas, Bourguiba, and the new Moroccan King, referring to negotiations in the frame- work of a North African federa- tion, suggests that Tunisia and Morocco intend to play a role in any Algerian negotiations. Bourguiba's son told US officials on 1 March that De Gaulle and Bourguiba "hit it SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY off admirably" and that Bour- guiba was convinced De Gaulle "was on the right path." He said De Gaulle had personally changed the phrasing of the communique issued by the two Presidents from "early evolu- tion" to read "rapid and posi- tive evolution." The Tunisians believe De Gaulle will release the imprisoned rebel leaders, headed by Mohammed'Ben Bella, and open Algerian concentration camps. Bourguiba apparently-re- frained from pressing De Gaulle for a detailed timetable, but Bourguiba Jr. had the impres- sion that a De Gaulle - Abbas meeting was a definite possi- bility. The younger Bourguiba thought secret contacts had already begun. Originally De Gaulle made a cease-fire a precondition of political talks with the rebels, but he has increasingly blurred this demand. French Minister of Information Terrenoire's public statement on 1 March, following De Gaulle's report to the babinet of his talks with Bourguiba, implicitly confirms that De Gaulle how has dropped the demand. Terrenoire omit- ted any reference to a cease- fire when he:announced that the government was ready to dis- cuss the conditions of a self- determinat ion vote with the various Algerian political fac- tions, particularly the rebels. Rebel leaders have maintained that they will not accept any form of cease-fire before nego- tiations are completed. De Gaulle has also public- ly maintained that the Algerian rebels are not, representative of Algeria and that he could discuss Algeria's future only with all factions there. Ac- cording to Bourguiba, De Gaulle now admits that the rebels rep- resent "nine tenths" of Alge- rian sentiment. The first public reaction from the Algerian rebel side was an announcement by Abbas in Rabat, made in conjunction with Moroccan King Hassan II and Bourguiba, that "no obstacle should stand in the way of di- rect negotiations" between Paris and the rebel government. The three called for an inde- pendent Algeria within the framework of a North African federation, the so-called "Magreb" federation uniting Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The Magreb idea is an old one among North African leaders. The idea of such a federation, linked to France, has appealed to De Gaulle and is probably viewed by him as a possible vehicle for "selling" Algerian independence to France. Com- petition between North African leaders, however, has heretofore prevented any serious progress toward attainment of a federation. Bourguiba's son said De Gaulle was conducting a "one- man show" on Algeria and did not even fully inform Premier Debre or Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on the contents of his talks with Bourguiba. De Gaulle reportedly "silenced" Debre's various objections at Rambouillet. An outstanding example of the obstacles to an early set- tlement is the question of con- trol of the Sahara and recent French moves concerning the area. Debre, on a visit to the Sahara just prior to the De Gaulle - Bourguiba talks, stated publicly SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 11 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY that France intended to remain there and that the Sahara be- longed to none of the neighbor- ing-territories. Paris on 1 March announced a fourth nuclear test to be held there soon, and the'- French military headquar- ters for the Sahara is being moved from Algiers to Reggane, the nuclear test site. In Algeria, European set- ler extremists have stepped up a campaign of bombings, and at least 17 Europeans--veterans or reservists--have been arrested as members of a "French Algeria" maquis. Serious Moslem rioting has recently occurred in Oran. Further obstacles to negotiations are indicated by Bourguiba Jr.'s statement that he thought there was some resistance to them with- in the rebel leadership. Rebel leaders have claimed they are under heavy pressure from Moscow and Peiping and that they intend to be tough in negotiations. The death on 26 February of King Mohamed V, who had been the only significant force for unity and stability in Morocco, seems certain to inaugurate a new period of political turmoil. Mohamed's 31-year-old son has moved speedily to solidify his rule as Hassan II. He immedi- ately ordered military and se- curity units to enforce order and already is reported seeking to form a government of "nation- al union." The principal challenge to Hassan's authority as a theoret- ically absolute monarch is the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), a strong, left-wing nationalist-labor group led by a collegium of young intellectu- als who demand a constitution and government responsible to the people. Among its leaders are former Premier Abdallah Ibrahim; former Deputy Premier Abderrahim Bouabid, who now is serving as its organizing secre- tary general; former resistance leader Mohamed el-Basri; Mehdi Ben Barka, student leader and self-exiled former tutor of the new King; and Mahjoub Ben Seddik, dynamic secretary general of Morocco's most powerful labor organization, the 600,000-mem- ber Moroccan Labor Union. A predominantly urban or- ganization, centered in Casa- blanca and Rabat, the UNFP has during the past nine months been strengthening its organization and seeking supporters in the army and in areas where it was weakest. That much organiza- tional work remains to be done was implicit in comments by a member of the UNFP secretariat, who expressed the "left's uni- versal dismay at the death of the King, which could not have occurred at a worse time." He told an American official that the opposition prefers to wait suggesting some seven to ten days, or roughly the period of state mourning--rather than take immediate action against SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 12 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Hassan. He also stated that the UNFP will "invoke the name" of the dead king to try to counter Hassan's expected ex- ploitation of the respect and affection Moroccans held for his father. Hassan will rely principal- ly on the 30,500-man army, of which he has been chief of staff, but whose loyalty to him has yet to be tested. The army is undergoing an internal crisis caused by friction between na- tionalistic but disorganized young officers and senior of- ficers--among whom are the new King's closest military advisers --who gained their experience in the French Army. Hassan may also count on a measure of support, at least initially,, from the conserva- tive Istigial party, which on 28 February called on "all na- tional organizations to unify their ranks to work for the realization of the national ob- jectives of Mohamed V," and urged the "wholehearted and widespread allegiance of the nation to King Hassan II." The palace-created and pro-monarch- ist Popular Movement will be the most likely vehicle for en- listing rural and tribal backing for Hassan, although it lacks dynamic leadership. Morocco's foreign policy under Hassan probably will con- tinue to be formal-"nonalign- ment." Although Hassan was considered to be personally pro-French--in fact he was ac- cused by his opposition of having "sold out" to France-- he has sought contacts with Moscow and Cairo. Hassan so- licited from the USSR the re- cent gift of Soviet jet air- craft and is reported to have initialed during Soviet Presi- dent Brezhnev's visit to Moroc- co last month an agreement for Soviet economic aid. He seems likely to make further arrange- ments with the Sino-Soviet bloc. At the same time he may press for new concessions from the US . and France in, connection with base arrangements made in 1959 7 and 1960 and probably will intensify pres- in northern Morocco. sure for the evacuation of the 3,000 Spanish troops, remaining Cuba's recent cabinet changes are aimed at organizing the economy more efficiently and paving the way for an an- nounced one-billion-dollar five-year industrialization program. Plans announced on 24 February for the creation of three new ministries and the reorganization of other eco--- nomic administrative bodies were reportedly fashioned by Cuban and Czech technicians in Prague. The new economic order conforms closely to the Com- munist pattern for state con- trol of the economy. The National Bank of Cuba, now to be headed by former Commerce Minister Cepero Bonilla, will issue all currency and function as the government's fiscal agent in all domestic and international financial affairs. Che Guevara, former presi- dent of the National Bank and now chief of the new Ministry of Industry, has apparently strengthened his position as SECRET Page 13 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Cuba's chief economic adminis- trator, since the national pe- troleum and mining institutes and the sugar mills have been transferred to his ministry. The 27 February attempt on his life--evidently the second such attempt within the last four months--underlines the importance with which anti-Castro elements regard him. In an apparent change of tactics toward other Latin Am- erican governments,. the Castro regime delivered a lengthy letter on 24 February to the remaining Latin American diplo- matic missions in Havana in- sisting that Cuba harbors no intentions of exporting its rev- olution. Reiterating the fa- miliar charges that the United States plans aggression against Cuba, the letter reportedly im- plied Castro's approval of the current Ecuadorean proposal for jbiht Latin -American mediation df US-Cuban dif- ferences. The note followed by only 12 days Castro's speech alleging US aid to anti-Castro elements and claiming Cuba's right to spread its revolution abroad. Cuba probably hopes to reduce the possibility of solid Latin American support for collective action against it. The '.'first regional Latin American plantation workers' conference" in Havana, sched- uled to begin on 3 March, is at- tracting delegates from other Latin American Communist parties and Communist-front organiza- tions as well as observers from Soviet bloc countries. Anti-Castro forces are con- tinuing their activities through- out Cuba, despite government claims that major resistance centers have been, or are about to be, eliminated. Government forces have claimed the capture of about 900 rebels in the Sierra Escambray area, where Havana previously estimated that fewer than 1,000 counter- revolutionaries were concentrated. Reports of new engagements with guerrillas indicate, however, that considerable numbers remain at large. Unconfirmed reports of es- capes and defections of prominent persons are circulating among opposition elements. According to recent press reports, former labor chief David Salvador--an opportunist who turned against Castro and was captured while seeking to leave the island in November 1960--has fled Cuba 25X1 with a number of followers from his antigovernment "30 November SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 14 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 1 SECRET. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The over-all combat effec- tiveness of Soviet commands in East Germany (GSFG), Poland (NGF), and Hungary (SGF) has been increased during the first year of Khrushchev's "demobi- lization program." While mili- tary forces within the USSR have been reduced, manpower of the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe has been maintained at the approximate level of 1959. No line units were disbanded or transferred from these ex- terior commands. These forces have been strengthened by the continued introduction of improved tanks, guns, and air- craft; in the GSFG, several conventional artillery and antiaircraft artillery units have probably been replaced by missile units. Although these forces have a nuclear weapons delivery capa- bility, there is no evidence of local stockpiling of nuclear warheads. Such warheads could be readily airlifted from the USSR. Soviet units in Eastern Europe are highly trained, Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe Estimated Strength Soviet Northern Southern r`up Forces Group Group I ~~xxaa~~ 1 L?J 1 l` Wittstock` '1r Fuerstenberg 4 Gross Doelln' EP l er: EAST Magd burg Glau' Z?ss en/W?e(sdorf REPUBLIC J f (GSFG) (N (SGF) 336,000 Troops 44,000 T ops 65,000 Troops Motorized Rifle Divisions ............10 ...................... .1,.. ,,,..............1 Tank Divisions ....................... 10.......................1.....................3 Heavy Tanks ...................... 1,120.....................95...... .......... 285 Medium Tanks ................... 4,600............... ....475.. 980 Artillery Pieces .................. 5,800..............._.,,.22 ,,.................420 Jet Fighters ......................... 24...................308.... ............ 216 Jet Light Bombers ................112................., 000-..........,....... 60 CZECHOSLOVAKIA No Soviet Units 31628 Group of It Army o Tank Air Air' Forces Army Army Corps I Surface-to-Surface Missile I Surface-to-Air Missile SECRET RUMANIA No Soviet Units Page 16 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY well-equipped forces, maintained at a~ higher level of combat capability than the Soviet av- erage, and relatively immune to some of the short-term fluc- tuations in policy that affect Soviet forces elsewhere. The GSFG has been essentially an armored strike force with ap- propriate infantry, artillery, and tactical air components. It is well organized and' equipped to . conduct. either.offensive:' action into Western Europe or a mobile defense of its own area. In Hungary, the recent conversion of a rifle division into a tank division suggests that the forces there are no longer serving primarily in an occupation capacity--their function since the 1956 revolt. This force, by its present com- position and disposition, forms a southward extension of the GSFG and increases the Soviet capability for ground combat into or against Central Europe and the Mediterranean region. The force in Poland is organ- ized to protect Soviet communi- cation routes across that coun- try. The deployment of surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) in East Germany, begun in 1959, was continued during 1960. Six 6-launcher Guideline SAM sites are believed operational now; four of these, however, have probably been transferred to East German Army control. The GSFG probably also acquired a short-range surface-to-surface .missile (SSM) capability during the last 18 months. Reports of tank-borne "rockets,'.' which may be either the 150-nautical- mile (n.m.) ). Scud 5SM or. the Frog unguided rocket There is also evidence that the Soviets have longer range missiles--the 350-n.m. or the 700-n.m. Shyster SSM-- in East Germany. Equipment modernization in the three external commands appears to follow a common pat- tern. The best information of progress is from the GSFG, which now has replaced about 70 per- cent of its authorized number of medium tanks with the new T-54, has received about 4,400 of its 7,000 authorized armored personnel carriers (some of the newer tracked amphibious type), and has instituted a reorgani- zation of artillery units (in- cluding emphasis on larger caliber antiaircraft guns). Rapid accretion of general- purpose vehicles in recent months is believed to have brought the command to full strength in this category. Soviet tactical air ele- ments in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary--particularly the 24th Tactical Air Army of the GSFG--have increased their com- bat capability through the ac- quisition of new classes of fighters and through improve- ments in support and weapons systems. Training of both the ground and air elements in the three Eastern Europe commands is in- tense and realistic. In the GSFG, it culminates annually in combined maneuvers at high levels, during which simulated atomic strikes are employed by both sides. Displacement train- ing for missile units appears to have taken place in 1960 for the first time. In field train- ing, great stress is laid on the rapid crossing of water obsta- cles, for which new techniques and equipment have been intro- duced. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 17 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOVIET AGRICULTURAL REORGANIZATION Moscow during the last week formalized the reorganization of agriculture agreed on at the January central committee ple- num. According to a resolution of 20 February, the Ministry of Agriculture--already weakened by the abolition of Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) in 1958 and later the loss of its plan- ning and supply functions--will. lose most of its remaining func- tions. It will be chiefly re- sponsible for, carrying out: ; prac- tic$liresearch,andidissemibating tbe..results. At the local level, the=_ria,ietry will; establish model. farms in each rayon. The State Planning Commit- tee (Gosplan) will take over the ministry's responsibility for state farms, forestry, and ir- rigation projects and may in addition have some supervisory power over collective farms, Among its duties is "analysis of the implementation of cur- rent agricultural production plans and...of the financial affairs of state and collective farms." The Central Statistical Directorate will prepare the an- nual and quarterly accounts of the::state and collective farms, a function formerly performed by the ministry. A separate resolution ap- proved the structure of the new Agricultural Machinery and Sup- ply Union. This organization will supply equipment, spare parts, fertilizer, and other needs to the state and collec- tive farms and will be respon- sible for the repair and test- ing of agricultural equipment. It will also handle some of the functions of the old MTSs. The former MTS chief, P. S. Kuchumov, has been appointed chairman of this union. 2 Mar 61 On 25 February Moscow an- nounced creation of a State Committee for Agricultural Procurements to be chaired by Deputy Premier N. G. Ignatov. This committee will control the collection of agricultural products through a system of "contracts" with state and col- lective farms. The regime un- doubtedly hopes that the new system, by concentrating state procurement in a single agency with a widespread network of local agents, will give greater control over state purchases and reduce illegal practices at the local level. The former State Committee for the Procure- ment of Grain Products has been abolished. Control over that portion of farm produce which is not procured by the state will al- so be tightened. According to a decree, also issued 25 Feb- ruary, consumer cooperatives will step up purchases of the "surplus" output of collective farms and collective farmers in order to sell it locally at prevailing prices. This will put greater pressure on col- lective farms to sell this sur- plus through quasi-official channels rather than directly on the collective farmers' free markets. Another decree was issued on 22 February to increase the planned state allocations for rural electrification during 1961-65. This is in line with Khrushchev's January plenum statement calling for an in- crease in state agricultural investment over the original Seven-Year-Plan goals. This investment, which remained low in 1959 and 1960, is to be in- creased primarily in irrigation and electrification projects. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1? `26 91 Ilrur . Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 .SECRET. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY According to the original Seven-Year-Plan directive, the major share of agricultural in- vestment was to originate from collective farm funds rather than from state resources. Much of the irrigation and electri_,-- fication construction was to be carried out by intercollective- farm enterprises without the aid of state funds. The excel- lent 1958 harvest swelled the income of collective farms and thus generated a high level of collective farm investment in 1959, but poor harvests in 1959 and 1960 undoubtedly led to lower investments in 1960, and the out- look for 1961 is not promising. Thus the regime may have turned to state resources to offset the probable underfulfiliment of collective farm investment. The adoption of a new wage system for state farm workers-- a part of the over-all adjust- ment of wages, hours, and work norms throughout the state sec- tor--follows considerable criti- cism during the past two years of the system adopted in 1958. In the past, state farm work- ers were paid for fulfilling their daily work tasks without regard to quantity or quality of the end product. Under the new system wages will be com- puted on the basis of all three of these considerations. The system of awards to workers has been improved and new wage scales set up for ma- chine operators, who will re- ceive bonuses for timeliness of field operations and for the proper care of machines. Presumably, the new wage system will mean an over-all increase in the wages of the state farm worker since an ad- ditional 260,000,000 rubles have been allocated in 1961 for the readjustment in wages. The new system will require a more conscientious effort from the worker and may also divert his attention from his own private plot. 25X1 ORR) (Prepared by 25X1 COMMUNIST CHINA SLOWS INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM Recent statements from Pei- ping bear out previous indica- tions that Communist China has been forced to reorient and slow down its industrialization pro- gram as a result of two con- secutive years of bad harvests, the withdrawal of Soviet tech- nicians last summer, and the economic dislocations created by the "leap forward." Another problem which probably contrib- uted to the apparent retrench- ment is the deterioration of China's balance of payments. By 1960, the regime's pre- occupation with increasing the volume of industrial output had created serious problems within industry. It is esti- mated that the gross national product was only about 3 per- cent higher than in 1959 as against an expected increase of about 13 percent, that .' SECRET' 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REV#W Page 19 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY industrial production was 8 per- cent below plan, and that indus- trial investment actually de- clined, No details concerning a revised plan have been forth- coming, but statements on in- dustrial construction policy in 1961 indicate that scheduled rates of growth have been sharp- ly reduced. The first such statement was by economic plan- ner Po I-po in Red Flag. The main effort in Ti u ial con- struction "for the next two or three years," he wrote, will be to consolidate the gains al- ready made, to reinforce lag- ging sectors, and to improve the quality of output of indus- try as a whole. The rate of investment in heavy industry is to be reduced, according to Po, so that agriculture, light in- dustry, mining, and transporta- tion can catch up. Industrial investment may in fact again decline in 1961 if this is done.. Po stated that, within heavy industry, efforts will be concentrated on "an all-out campaign to complete construc- tion projects." He is probably alluding to projects on which work stopped when Soviet tech- nicians were abruptly withdrawn. He said priority will be given to projects urgently needed, those easiest to finish, and those which will have an im- mediate effect on the economy. This suggests that Soviet tech- nicians are not expected to return at least for the pres- ent, and that completion of Soviet aid projects already started--the core of Peiping's industrialization program--will occupy Chinese technicians for some time. A People's Daily editorial on 11 February said that pro- duction of new prestige items, such as large turbogenerators and complex machine tools, prom- inently featured during the "leap forward," is to be de- layed. This would enable Chi- nese industry to concentrate on the production of essential anxiliary equipment and spare parts which formerly were im- ported from the bloc. A reduction of capital im- ports has been necessary be- cause of shortages of export- able agricultural products. People's Daily implies, however, that Peiping is going beyond this necessary reduction. The regime appears to have re- oriented its industrialization program so as to rely more on its own resources and less on technological assistance from the bloc. The new policies signal the end of China's efforts to industrialize at breakneck speed. Whether they consti- tute merely a tactical retreat remains to be seen. A top-level Soviet economic delegation is now in Peiping for negotiations on future trade and economic relations between the two coun- tries. There are indications that some sort of preliminary agreement preceded the dele- gation's arrival in Peiping, and that both parties hope to stem the deterioration in eco- nomic relations which resulted from political differences be- tween the two governments. The question now is whether Peiping's apparent retreat from some of its more unorthodox economic policies will elicit further Soviet financial or technical (Prepared by ORR) assistance. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 20 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY NORTH VIETNAM CHANGES Pham Van Dong, one of North Vietnam's top party leaders and a veteran diplomat, has resigned as foreign minister, a post he had held concurrently with the premiership for more than five years. Dong is still premier, however, and it is unlikely that the move signals any major shift in Hanoi's foreign policy in the immediate future. His successor, party central com- mittee member Ung Van Khiem, had been deputy foreign minister for the past six years and prob- ably has had an important voice in foreign affairs. Khiem probably will give top priority to the regime's program for rapid reunification Of Vietnam. One of the few prominent figures in the North Vietnamese regime to have been born in South Vietnam, he was a leader of Communist guerril- la activities in southern Indo- china for over two decades. The 50-year-old Khiem has long been a close associate of party First Secretary Le Duan. The two went north together in 1954 after years of clandestine activities south of the 17th parallel. Both men have been linked with the current inten- sified campaign to unseat South Vietnam's President Diem. During the past year, two others who served with Le Duan during his guerrilla days have moved up in the government and FOREIGN MINISTERS party structure. Pham Hung and Le Duc Tho were named to the party secretariat last Septem- ber and were the only two in- dividuals elevated in the po- litburo order of precedence. Hung was placed in over-all charge of the government's agri- cutural programs last July, and Tho now may be responsible for party organization. Le Duan's success in elevating his old guerrilla colleagues to high office attests to his growing influence in the regime and bolsters his position as Ho Chi Minh's most likely successor. Unlike Pham Van Dong, who led Hanoi's delegation to the Geneva and Bandung conferences and who has traveled widely throughout the bloc, Ung Van Khiem is known to have left Vietnam only twice since World War II. In the summer of 1955 he accompanied Ho Chi Minh to Moscow and Peiping, and in 1959 he attended Communist China's tenth anniversary celebrations. Now, however, he is slated to lead a government delegation to Africa and, as foreign min- ister, will actively press Hanoi's campaign for closer ties with the new African coun- tries. Guinea and Mali recog- nized North Vietnam last year, and Khiem is probably optimis- tic about his prospects for pro- moting further diplomatic ex- changes. RHODESIAN FEDERATION In his address to the par- liament of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 27 February, Prime Minister Roy Welensky belligerently thrust an olive branch at Britain. Earlier he had threatened to call a special election on the issue of independence. In his speech he denounced Britain's plans to give the 2,400,00 Af- ricans of Northern Rhodesia SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 21 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 .SECRET.......... greater representation in that protectorate's territorial leg- islature--calling it a "half- baked scheme"--but offered to participate in new talks on en- larging that body. He warned that if London declines this offer, "it may be necessary to fight for what we have created during the last 70 years." The Macmillan government has been deeply concerned that an impasse might develop and has been under pressure--albeit declining--from right-wing Con- servative party backbenchers for some accommodation with the Rhodesian settlers. It reacted quickly to Welensky's sugges- tion inviting him to London for discussions. Welensky agreed to come on 3 March. Neverthe- less, London has shown no in- clination to abandon its pro- African proposals. Officials in Salisbury an- nounced on 28 February that they were demobilizing the national guardsmen and reservists called up during the past two weeks in anticipation of African vio- lence, and were lifting the ban on leaves for some 5,000 police in Southern Rhodesia. London's proposal is to give the Africans of Northern Rhodesia approximate legisla- tive parity with the white set- tlers--a significant gain over their present status. The exact proportion of Africans and whites in the legislature would be the subject of later discus- sions. The Africans have de- manded a majority in the leg- islative and executive councils and are not satisfied with this approach. However, they have not resorted to violence, as had been widely feared. Kenneth Kaunda of the lead- ing United National Independence party and Harry Nkumbula of the African National Congress left London in late February, and are en route to Northern Rho- desia. With their arrival, African dissatisfaction--par- ticularly if London interprets the proposal to suit Welensky-- may be channeled into strong protest, possibly including vio- lence against Europeans in the copper belt area of Northern Rhodesia. The bulk of the Rhodesian settlers--the 230,000 in South- ern Rhodesia and the 70,000 in Northern Rhodesia--appar- ently believe that the North- ern Rhodesian constitution- al talks will have a decisive impact on the future of white settlement in central Africa. Therefore, the settler-con- trolled federal parliament, as well as the settlers them- selves, would probably give Welensky strong backing in threatening gestures to London. The conference of prime ministers of the British Common- wealth beginning in London on 8 March will be the second in about ten months, although such meetings usually are held every two or three years. A major reason for a con- ference at this time is to de- cide whether South Africa can remain a member of the Common- wealth after it becomes a re- public this spring. Other mem- bers--including India, Malaya, Ghana, SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 22 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET . Nigeria, Canada, and Ceylon--are cool to the idea because of South Africa's apart- heid policy in ra- cial matters. Prime Minister Macmillan apparently intends to make a ma- jor conciliatory ef- fort. He hopes to prevent formal dis- cussion of apartheid and thus to avoid acrimonious exchanges which could result in South Africa's ex- pulsion. Britain for some time has been seeking to persuade other members that retaining South Af- rica would make it BACKGROUND Seven of the eleven independent members of the British Commonwealth recognize Queen Elizabeth as head of state and are governed in the name of the Crown. Three are republics with a president as chief of state, and acknowledge the Queen only as head of the Commonwealth. All three have become re- publics without altering their status as members. Malaya be- came an independent member as a federation with an elected Paramount Ruler as head of state. Approval for continued mem- bership as a republic must be unanimous on the part of the other members; this approval has always been granted in the past. Members attaining independent membership in the Common- wealth since World War II are: President Prasad 15 Aug 1947 (change approved 1949) President Ayub Khan 15 Aug 1947 (change approved 1955) Ceylon Queen Elizabeth 4 Peb 1948 Ghana President Nkrumah 6 Mar 1957 (change approved May 1960) Malaya Tungku Syed Putra 31 Aug 1957 Nigeria Queen Elizabeth 1 Oct 1960 easier to induce it to change its racial policies and that an expulsion--unprecedented in the grouping--would seriously under- mine Commonwealth ties. Can- ada's Prime Minister Diefen- baker apparently is one of the strongest opponents of South Africa but has indicated he will reserve his position pending the outcome of discussions at the conference. Apparently there is an increasing interest in obtain- ing Commonwealth-wide under- standing--if not agreement-- on London's position regarding major international questions such as disarmament and nuclear tests, and on critical areas such as the Congo and Laos, possibly in anticipation of a summit meeting later this year. In view of the British position--stated publicly by Foreign Secretary Home on 8 February--that Communist China should be admitted to the UN, London is likely to want to con- sider tactics to bring this about. It was the consensus of the prime ministers' conference last May that Peiping should be brought into disarmament discus- sions, and the Macmillan govern- ment would undoubtedly like to obtain Commonwealth views on the representation question for dis- cussion with President Kennedy in April. The application of Cyprus for Commonwealth membership for at least five years will prob- ably be approved, as will the request of Sierra Leone for membership after becoming inde- pendent on 27 April. The future structure of the Commonwealth, particularly the status of the smaller territories gaining in- dependence, is also scheduled for discussion. Further, Mac- millan will presumably try to re-establish rapport with Nehru-- London has been irritated with Indian diplomacy in regard to Laos, and Nehru is reported resentful of Macmillan's "par- tisan" support, of Beliium in the Congo. SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 23 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 ....... SECRET BRAZIL'S FIRST MONTH UNDER QUADROS Janio Quadros in the first month of his five-year term of office has made a few moves to- ward closer relations with the wino-Soviet bloc and has stressed the need for economy in domestic administration. The new Brazil- ian President"has had to spend considerable time on filling sub- cabinet posts but is reported also to have devoted attention to the programs of each of his cabinet ministers. Quadros has made initial moves in the "truly independent" foreign policy he proposed on 31 January in his inaugural address. His administration has recently announced that it will support inclusion of the Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly agenda at the next session, although it has not yet decided whether to recognize Communist China or support its admission- to the United Nations. The Foreign Ministry an- nounced on 23 February that Brazil will establish relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bul- garia. Renewal of diplomatic relations with the USSR is also reported under active considera- tion. Czechoslovakia and Poland are the only bloc countries in which Brazil now has missions. In addition, Foreign Min- ister Arinos on 24 February sug- gested a visit to Brazil by Marshal Tito in response to a question by ,a Yugoslav journalist in Brazil a. to how the two countries could best expand relations. With respect to Cuba, Quadros has taken no decisive position, despite his words of praise for the Castro regime during the campaign. He has, however, maintained his position of opposing collective measures against Castro. While Quadros has not as yet publit;ly out- lined a policy for Africa, he has indicated his belief that Brazil could assume the role of a bridge between the West and Africa--a belief his predecessor expressed during 1960. Quadros proposed on 24 February, for instance, that a scholarship program to foster Brazilian relations with Africa be expand- ed, despite the country's need for austerity. When Brazil refused to participate in this year's in- ter-American military exercises with the United States, a Brazilian diplomat commented to an American official that he believed the decision was based primarily on Quadros' desire to establish a neutral position for Brazil in foreign affairs. Press reports from Brazil state that the admin- istration' is hesitant about a $100,000,000 loan offer from the United States and comment that the new President might prefer to pull the country out of its financial hole through increased business deals with both East and West. Quadros has not yet public- ly spelled out the drastic eco- nomic measures he apparently plans, but he has taken advan- tage of initial enthusiasm for his administration to lengthen SECRET 2 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 24 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY government working hours and dismiss more than 10,000 polit- ically appointed government workers--a step similar to his first moves as governor and mayor of Sao Paulo earlier in his career. Commissions have been appointed to draw up plans with- in the next several weeks for solving specific problems, and the individual ministries are to report by 9 March on plans for 30-percent reductions in their budgets. Quadros probably hopes that leftists, who are likely to protest his economic measures, may be conciliated by his foreign policy. Soviet-Italian trade is scheduled to increase during the next five years as a result of negotiations recently held in Moscow. A protocol for 1961, the final year of the current four-year trade agreement, calls for a rise in commerce to about $240,000,000--an increase of more than 20 percent over 1960. A new four-year agreement (1962- 65) provides for further annual increases, with total trade pos- sibly reaching as much as ',)'500,- 000,000 in 1965. One of the main benefits Moscow derives from these agreements is the acquisition of tankers and ad- vanced technical equipment. The USSR's trade with Italy has developed rapidly since 1958 and by the end of 1961 probably will exceed by more than $100,- 000,;000 the original over-all four-year target of some :500, - 000,000. The trade has not remained balanced as planned under the 1958-61 agreement, however, largely because of Moscow's failure to import its share of commodities under the agreement. Apparently in order to stimulate Soviet buying and to balance trade, Italy agreed in 1960 to extend government- guaranteed five-year credits of up to $100,000,000. Since the new four-year agreement also calls for balanced trade, sim- ilar financing arrangements may also have been provided for under this pact. During the next five years, in addition to supplying equip- ment for the USSR's chemical industry--in some instances com- plete installations--Italy will export 240,000 tons of steel pipe, "no less than" eight 35,- 000-ton oil tankers, synthetic rubber, rolled steel, machinery, and other goods. Soviet de- liveries apparently will be limited to oil, coal, ores, pig iron, wheat, and lumber. The USSR has been guaranteed a market for 14 percent of Italy's annual oil imports through 1965, Thus, Moscow is scheduled to supply an average of over 4,000,000 tons of POL a year. The new agreement includes the commodities covered by the $200,000,000 special barter ar- rangement signed in Moscow last fall by Enrico Mattei, head of the Italian state fuels agency. In return for 12,000,000 tons of Soviet :crude and fuel oil between 1960 and 1965, Mattei agreed to deliver steel pipeline equipment and synthetic rubber to the USSR. Although trade with the Soviet Union accounts for only about 2 to 3 percent of Italy's total, the growing unfavorable balance of trade and some SECRET Page 25 of 28 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY unemployment in certain indus- trial sectors presumably were instrumental in Rome's decision to increase its trade commit- ments with the USSR. Soviet readiness to purchase chemical plant equipment, large-diameter steel pipe, and modern tankers from other Western industrial countries probably was a further stimulus. The Italian decision to construct tankers for the USSR is an important gain for Moscow, which last fall embarked on an extensive effort to build up a modern tanker fleet through the acquisition of large Western vessels. Similarly, the sup- ply of steel pipe will aid the USSR's program of constructing pipelines for the transportation of its oil to its European satel- lites. In addition, the imports of chemical plant equipment are in keeping with the goals of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-65). (Prepared by ORR) The Soviet agency Novosti (News), which was established on 21 February, combines the functions!of a press agency supplementing the official wire service TASS and an information agency supplying materials about the USSR for distribution abroad. The draft charter states that Novosti aims, "by the wide cir- culation abroad of truthful in- formation about the Soviet Union and by familiarizing the Soviet public with the life of people abroad, to promote in every way the strengthening of mutual un- derstanding, trust, and friend- ship between peoples." Official statements have stressed that Novosti is an "independent information organ of the mass public organiza- tions of the USSR," apparently in the hope that foreign and domestic audiences will be more susceptible to pronouncements from seemingly nonofficial So- viet sources. Four of these so-called public organizations --through which the regime mo- bilizes support for-.its program --are sponsoring the new agency: the USSR Writers' and Journal- ists' Unions, the Union of So- viet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and the All- Union Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. Novosti will open branches in most foreign countries and have a "wide network" of for- eign and domestic correspon- dents. It will conclude con- tracts with foreign press, radio, and television organi- zations and private individuals in accordance with the local laws on distributing Soviet materials. The branch to be opened soon in Sweden may ke- place the existing Soviet In- formation Bureau and its pub- lication News From the Soviet Union. The council which will run Novosti consists of the top officials of the four sponsoring organizations and of prominent writers and scientists who have been active in promoting-Soviet propaganda in the past. Among the council members are Pavel Satyukov--editor of Pravda and president of the Journalists' Union--and Aleksey Adzhubey-- SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 26 of 28. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Izvestia editor, Khrushchev's son-in-law, and co-author of books propagandizing Khrushchev's trips through America and Asia. Appointment to the council of an expert on underdeveloped areas, Anushavan Arzumanyan- who ii-in member of the presid- ium+-of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and di- rector of the Institute of World Economics and Interna- tional Relat iont+- it, one iri- dication that such areas will be a particular target of Novosti. SECRET Page 27 of 28, Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IraEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL ARTICLES WESTERN INFLUENCE TN WORLD ORGANIZED LABOR In the contest for influ- ence in organized labor, the free world's largest labor or- ganization--the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)--has been en- countering substantial diffi- culties. This is particularly true in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the ICFTU could be an influential instru- ment for initiating some of the important institutions of Amer- ican and Western European soci- ety. In these countries, how- ever, either the concept of or- ganized free labor is failing to take root or emerging unions are often on the defensive against Communist infiltration or government controls. Part of the ICFTU's dif- ficulty in meeting these chal- lenges stems from the internal frictions and organizational problems which have long af- flicted international free la- bor. These will be principal topics of discussion at a meet- ing of the ICFTU's Executive Board in Brussels on 13 March. In addition, however, there is the continuing difficulty of finding meaningful applications of Western trade unionism to The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICCTU), by far the largest of the free labor internationals, claims some 138 affiliated national centers or federations representing about 57,000,000 workers in 103 countries. Next in importance are the International Trade Secretartats (ITS), now 20 in num- ber with a total affiliated membership of more than 30,000,000 workers. The smallest of the major inter- nationals is the International Federation of Chris- tian Trade Unions (IFCTU or CISC) with about 5,000,- 000 affiliated workers. Most of these are West Euro- pean, with a scattering of membership in Latin Amer- tea, Africa, and Asia. IFCTU headquarters is in Brussela. pre-industrial societies, where the ICFTU is hampered by its own historical development. In- ternational cooperation among unions goes back more than a century, but has involved mainly unions with similar industrial backgrounds. Moreover, the dom- inant elements of the ICFTU to- day are still unions from the highly developed economies of the United States, Britain, and the Western European continent. The ICFTU is a product of the cold war. In 1945, the major French and British trade unions and the American CIO joined with the Soviet trade unions to form the World Fed- eration of Trade Unions (WFTU). During its first two years, the organization expanded rapidly in the industrialized countries and gained world-wide influence. By 1948, however, Communist manipulation had provoked a crisis in the organization. Fi- nally, in December 1949, the British Trade Unions Congress (TUC), the non-Communist unions on the Continent, and the Amer- ican CIO and AFL withdrew to form the ICFTU. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) claims an affiliated member- ship of about 90,000,000 workers in more than 75 countries. About 90 percent of its members are drawn from the state-controlled labor organisa- tions in the Sino-Soviet bloc, but there are im- portant free world affiliates such as the prin- cipal national federations of France (COT), Italy (CGIL), and Indonesia (SOBSI). .YrpeIled from both Paris and Vienna, the WFTU presently has its headquarters in Prague. SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 1 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Of the 57,000,000 workers which the ICFTU now claims to represent, roughly three fourths are still drawn from Western Europe and the western hemi: sphere. Its principal officers are also Western Europeans-- President Arne Geijer of Sweden and Secretary General Omer Becu- of Belgium. Indigenous nation- als predominate, however, in the ICFTU?s four regional of- fices--European (ERO), Asian (ARO), Inter-American (GRIT), and African (AFRO) In recent years, labor leaders from de- veloping areas have assumed a larger role in the Brussels secretariat. The ICFTU is financed by affiliation fees and by a one- cent levy per member on affil- iates able and willing to pay. Since 1956; however, "project" activities have been paid for by voluntary contributions to the so-called International Sol- idarity Fund, the present goal of which is $10,000,000 for the period 1961-63. American un- ions have been asked to supply $4,000,000 of this, British $2,500,000, West German $2,000,000, and Swedish $1,000,- 000. While international Com- munism has a single labor in- strument in addition to the party apparatus, the ICFTU has acquired no such monopoly in the free world. Allied with it in general objectives but often competing in practice is the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU or CISC)--like the ICFTU, an international organization of national labor federations. Much more important, however, are the International Trade Secretariats (ITS)--the 20 in- ternational associations of trade unions in a given craft or industry in different coun- tries. They are linked with the ICFTU vertically through the affiliation of their constit- uent, unions with the various ICFTU national centers, and laterally through ICFTU-ITS liaison machinery. Jurisdictional lines be- tween the ITS and the ICFTU are blurred, but the ITS have tra- ditionally leaned toward prag- matic trade unionism rather than political causes. Accord- ingly, they have lent as- sistance in organizing, particu- larly in underdeveloped coun- tries, extended financial aid to strikers, and promoted im- proved labor legislation as a practical means of protecting international labor standards. By comparison, the ICFTU is less restricted in its approach and has proclaimed as its aim "a free society based on free labor." Thus, during the past ten years, the ICFTU has under- taken propaganda campaigns against international Commu- nism in general; has protested against the Franco and Salazar dictatorships, Castro, and French colonial policies in Algeria; and has lobbied against govern- ment restrictions on or inter- vention with the collective bar- gaining rights of labor in such countries as Japan and Greece. However, on the practical side, the ICFTU has also at- tempted to represent labor in international organizations, such as the UN and OEEC, con- ducted training courses for budding union leaders, and voted funds to support the Poznan strikers and the Hungarian reb- els. ICFTU Problems The extent of the ICFTU's interests is frequently at the root of the charge that it is relatively ineffectual. Add- ing to the impression of in- effectiveness, however, have SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 2 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY been the chronic frictions which have historically afflicted the cooperative efforts of free la- bor. Originating in the conflict- ing national, political, and economic interests, and in doc- trinal differences, these fric- tions seem so deep-seated as to cast doubt at times on the basic assumption of the international labor movement--the community of workers' interests. Such con- flicts have aborted the numer- ous efforts of recent years to amalgamate the ICFTU and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, are re- sponsible for the uneasy work- ing relationship between the ICFTU and the ITS, and are re- lated to the continuing organ- izational problems of the ICFTU itself. AFL-CIO leaders have fre- quently charged the ICFTU with being the preserve of bureaucrats oriented toward European inter- ests and ineffective in dealing with the practical problems of trade unionism. These European leaders have in turn resented what they consider attempted domination by the Americans, who are comparative newcomers to the international labor scene. While the AFL in particular has criticized an alleged "Social- ist orientation" of the Euro- peans, the latter are skeptical of the "excessive preoccupation" with anti-Communism on the part of the AFL. Asian, African, and Latin American affiliates have charged both sides with inatten- tion to non-Western problems and mentalities. As a result of such dif- ferences, a number of the na- tional federations have often sponsored foreign promotionalac- tivities without 'reference to the ICFTU. In Africa, for example, the operations of the AFL-CIO and the British TUC have been frequently uncoordinated, com- petitive, and even recrimina- tory. The AFL-CIO has accused the TUC, with its program of "grass-roots gradualism," of restraining the development of unions which support national- ist independence movements. The TUC has charged the AFL-CIO of indiscriminate anticolonialism, of discouraging sound trade union development, and of "buy- ing" and corrupting trade union leaders. Often public knowledge, these accusations have natural- ly been utilized by the USSR and by neutralist-inclined Af- ricans to discredit the ICFTU as an "instrument of Western imperialism." In large degree, these cross-currents were the source of the bitter struggle last summer which resulted in the forced retirement of former ICFTU Secretary General Olden- broek, his replacement by Becu, and the agreement to reorganize the ICFTU headquar- ters. This reorganization has yet to be fully effected. However, it is to be discussed again at the 13 March ICFTU Executive Board meeting, and the effectiveness of the ICFTU as an instrument of free world labor solidarity may hinge on the meeting's outcome. Asia and Latin America The lack of unity and pur- pose has had especially deplor- able consequences in those areas where industrialization is just beginning. Despite such achievements as the es- tablishment of the Asian trade union college in Calcutta, the ICTFU and free labor as a whole have both lost ground SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 3 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY in non-Communist Asia in the past few years. In areas where a market economy does not yet exist, unions are extremely weak; in Japan, India, and the Philippines, there is serious division in the ranks of free labor; in Indonesia and Japan, there are strong pro-Communist or neutralist unions; and in Pakistan and Indonesia, govern- ment restriction or manipula- tion of labor organizations is a growing threat. ICFTU leaders themselves have recognized their problems, as evidenced by the remarks of Geijer and Becu when they at- tended the ICFTU-ARO Fifth Asian Regional Conference in Manila last fall. Becu bluntly declared that free trade union- ism has failed to keep pace with Asian industrialization and population growth, that union membership has failed to increase, and that affiliated unions have accomplished little by way of concrete benefits for their members. Becu placed much of the blame for this on the affiliated unions, but ARO has been poorly organized to give them help. Like the parent ICFTU, ARO has been troubled by petty internal frictions, and only recently has it moved to eliminate bureau- cratic deadwood. In Latin America, the sit- uation of the ICFTU and its re- gional organization, ORIT, is comparably complicated, and the outlook in a number of areas for free trade unionism also bleak. Established in January 1951, ORIT is historically the suc- cessor to the AFL-sponsored Pan-American Federation of La- bor, and AFL influence in ORIT has been correspondingly large. About 75 percent of ORIT's worker membership and a great portion of its funds come from its US and Canadian affiliates, while most of its expenditures are in Latin America. Immediately following its foundation, ORIT-ICFTU concen- trated on informational and educational activities, in which fields it has had some success. More recently, it has undertaken more direct assistance to the local labor movements, and since 1957--in conjunction with the ITS--has turned more toward or- ganizational programs. These efforts are still on a small scale--as of mid-1960, ORIT had in its direct employ five pro- fessional organizers. Even these limited opera- tions have been handicapped by conflicts and differences among the ICFTU, ORIT, and the AFL- CIO. Always claiming a high de- gree of autonomy, ORIT has strongly resisted "intervention" by the Brussels secretariat, and has charged that bypassing on the part of the ICFTU-,and ITS has hurt ORIT's prestige with its affiliated national centers. ICFTU leaden s have 'responded--to these charges by claiming': ORIT is a "declining influence" in Latin America, in part be- cause it is widely regarded there-as a creature of the AFL-CIO--an allegation exploit- ed by the "Communists?Peronistas, and the International Federa- tion of Christian Trade Unions." Domination of ORIT by la- bor leaders in the United States and the organization's allegedly benign attitude toward dictators were the burden of Castro's com- plaints in taking the Cuban trade unions out of ORIT in November 1959. The same pretexts have been used for the efforts of the Communist-dominated and most im- portant labor confederation of Chile to attempt to launch a single, unified hemisphere la- bor organization unaffiliated with either' the ICFTU or WFTU. SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 4 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY These proposals for a "neutralist" organization of Latin American labor have con- cerned ICFTU leaders almost as much as Communist infiltration efforts. President Geijer in a recent article speculated on the potential danger that unions outside the ICFTU, together with pro-Castro organizers and the "Peronist/Fascist movement," might be able to make common cause with the Communists on an anti-American platform. Africa Serious as these problems may be, however, many trade union leaders have recently come to regard Africa as their foremost challenge--where, until 1957, the ICFTU was largely in- active and where, since then, its internal conflicts have be- come most evident. For the past several years, control of the emerging African trade unions--closely allied with nationalist and independ- ence movements--has been a con- test ostensibly among the ICFTU, the CISC, the WFTU, and a group of neutralist unions. This four-way struggle is more ap- parent than real, however, since the CISC--representing some 240,000 workers in French-speak- ing Africa--shares the general objectives of the ICFTU,and the two are moving toward a more cooperative approach. Moreover, while the neutral- ists, following the lead of the Ghanaian and Guinean unions, nominally oppose ties with either East or West, they have been tactically allied with the Communists in opposing the ICFTU. International Communist labor's entry into Africa dates from 1945, when unions within Britain and in metropolitan France were still affiliated with the WFTU. Although those indirect ties between WFTU and the African unions were broken in 1949, WFTU continued to op- erate within the various unions and gained great good will by supporting national and anti- colonialist union leaders. During the past year, WFTU and the bloc have sharply stepped up their work among African trade union leaders and, in the opinion of the AFL-CIO's Irving Brown, have also made noticeable progress at the grass- roots level. Despite the WFTU foothold, the ICFTU has moved slowly and ponderously to strengthen its African organization. Its first African regional conference was not held until January 1957, and while it was agreed to es- tablish three area offices as the basis for an African re- gional office (AFRO), only one of these was operative as late as March 1960--and that largely due to the efforts of Tom Mboya of Kenya. At the second ICFTU regional conference in Lagos in November 1959, AFRO's con- stitution was drawn up and a preparatory committee established. Nevertheless, not until the third regional conference in Tunis last November was the constitu- tion finally ratified and the initial appointments made. The establishment of AFRO was opposed at every step by the militant neutralists, in- spired initially by the UAR- sponsored Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference of late December 1957 and early Janu- ary 1958, and by the subsequent All-African People's Conference. Leadership of the neutralist movement has passed successively from the largely Egyptian Inter- national Confederation of Arab Trade Unions to Sekou Toure's UGTAN, based in Conakry, and then to Nkrumah's Ghanaian Trade Union Congress. With the general line that the African unions should SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 5 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY sever ties with both the ICFTU and the Y!'FTU, the neutralists have held rival conferences and propagandized against the ICFTU as a mere tool of London and Washington. At the same time, the neutralists have ac- cepted informal support and fi- nancial assistance from WFTU which, for example, is appar- ently underwriting Toure's new "African Workers' University" in Conakry. While the neutralists thus far have failed to organize their All-African Trade Union Federation (a constituent con- ference is now scheduled for 8 ray) and there are signs of disunity in the neutralist camp, the ICFTU's task in Africa is nonetheless a difficult one. There have been similar signs of competition and disunity within AFRO, and strenuous ef- forts are being made to dis- credit pro-ICFTU leaders like Mboya--who, under the pressure, has seemed lately to take a more equivocal stand. More- over, AFRO seems likely to be judged both by what it can contribute in concrete support to its affiliated unions and by the recognition it can give to the emotional appeal of pan-Africanism. It is ques- tionable whether it can give this recognition effectively, in view of the long- ring divisions in the ICFTU itself over colonial issues. That the ICFTU encounters these manifold problems is in- dicative in one sense of the significance of its operations and the importance of its oc- casional successes. As a pri- vate organization conducting a world-wide operation, it is unique, and to its credit it has given practical assistance, training, assistance, and coun- sel to its affiliates. It has also reflected the aspirations of underdeveloped countries for economic advancement and polit- ical independence. In important respects, moreover, the problems of the international free trade union movement--particularly in the world's developing areas--are a reflection of the problems of the free world itself--in- eluding the burden of the colonial past and the strength of the Communist competition. The problem of "nonappli- cability" of free trade union- ism to situations where mass poverty ij the rule and a mar- ket economy does not yet exist is also a problem shared by other Western institutions. Finally, while union interna- tionals have an important role to play in creating a climate in which unions can thrive, they are limited in the extent to which they can associate themselves with governmental programs to achieve this--if they are to remain "free" and are to preserve their right to oppose the W"'FTU on grounds it is government controlled. Many observers would none- theless conclude that the in- ternational free trade union movement has aggravated its own problems. It has tolerated in- efficient and frequently divided bureaucracy; national rivalries have been magnified rather than moderated; petty personality conflicts have become major disputes; and even the richest of affiliates have seemed nig- gardly in their contributions SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, The UN General Assembly resumes its 15th session on 7 March beset by political crises and financial difficulties which some members believe en- danger the organization's exist- ence. The 99-member assembly now is dominated by groups of neutralist, underdeveloped, and politically immature states whose control of votes far ex- ceeds their capability or will- ingness to implement the very peace and security operations they demand of the United Na- tions. UN financial resources are strained by the costs of spe- cial operations such as those in Palestine and the Congo. The regular UN budget, together with the special operations, will total more than $200,000,- 000 in 1961. The UN comptroller estimates that as of 31 March the UN will need an additional $10,000,000 in cash to make necessary minimum disbursements. Many UN members are in ar- rears on their regular assess- ments, and seven--Bolivia, Na- tionalist China, Ethiopia, Honduras, Hungary, Paraguay, and the UAR--may lose their right to vote at the resumed session because the amount each owes exceeds assessments for two full years. Other states-- including France and those of the Soviet bloc--have refused to pay their assessed share of the special operations. and six European satellite leaders, attended the first half of the 15th General As- sembly. This pressure led to a protracted general debate-- a period at the opening of the assembly when chiefs of delega- tions present policy statements for their governments. This prevented the assembly from getting down to regular business until late in the session. More- over, many members temporized because of the impending US elections. As a result, only a few items were disposed of by 21 December, when the ses- sion recessed. The 17 new members, all former dependent territories, swelled the ranks of the Afro- Asian bloc and resulted in a voting imbalance that put the Western states on the defen- sive. The most significant in- stance was the assembly's en- dorsement on 28 October of an anticolonialist declaration by a vote of 89 for, none against, and nine abstentions--by Aus- tralia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Britain, and the United States. Ambas- sador Stevenson reported on 11 February that recent conversa- tions at UN headquarters showed that US influence and prestige, especially among Asian and Afri- can members, were severely damaged by a series of votes during the first half of the session which seemingly put the United States in the colonialist camp. More than 20 heads of gov- ernment, including Khrushchev The 15th assembly has also recognized the right of the Al- gerian people to self-determina- tion and independence, called for negotiations between Italy SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 7 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY and Austria over the South Ti- rol, and elected three new mem- bers to the Security Council. The assembly's economic and so- cial committees completed their work, while the legal and budge- tary committees have only a few items left. Items left over for the resumed session are primar- ily political in character, with anticolonial and East-West issues predominating. There is growing specula- tion among UN members that such contentious issues as disarma- ment, Hungary, and Tibet might be postponed until the regular 16th session. Members argue that such action would shorten the 15th session and, by avoid- ing debate on cold-war items, also contribute to a favorable climate for any US-Soviet meet- ing. However, Khrushchev's re- cent letter to Nehru indicates Moscow intends to continue to attack Hammarskjold and the com- position of the UN Secretariat. Africa Although the situation in the Congo has been heatedly de- bated, no resolution has been passed and the issue was left in abeyance when the current session recessed. The delega- tion of President Kasavubu,how- ever,was seated in early Decem- ber. The Security Council on 21 February issued a strong man- date for the UN operation in the Congo. Should the council not be able to carry this out effectively, the assembly would almost certainly take up the issue at once. UN operations in the Congo also will affect debate on other African and "colonial" issues. On 20 December 1960 the General Assembly established a three-member commission to go to Ruanda-Urundi--a UN trust territory administered by Belgium--to observe condi- tions in the territory and assess prospects for independ- ence. To this end elections there were postponed by Bel- g Mum at the urging of its allies and the United Nations. Comments by a member of the commission indicate that its report to the General Assem- bly will be critical of Belgian administration. In the plebiscite in the trust territory of British Cameroons on 11 and 12 Febru- ary, Northern Cameroons voted to become part of Nigeria and Southern Cameroons chose to join the Republic of Cameroun, formerly under French adminis- tration. 'there probably will be a heated debate when the UN plebiscite commissioner makes his report to the General As- sembly; Cameroun has lodged a vehement protest with the United Nations against the manner in which British author- ities organized the plebiscite in the north, and Foreign Minister Okala intends to raise the issue at the resumed session. . Two items involving the Union of South Africa and its racial policies will give the anticolonialists a field day. Discussion of apartheid and the treatment of Indians in South Africa may well be vitri- olic and lead South Africa to withdraw from this session, if not from the UN. Just before the 15th ses- sion recessed, 11 African states submitted a resolution calling for General Assembly endorse- ment of Mauritania's application for admission to the UN. The SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 8 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY application--strongly opposed by Morocco, which claims the territory--was vetoed by the USSR by linking the admission of Mongolia with Mauritania. Discussion of the issue could lead to strong pressures on the United states to concur in the admission of Mongolia and to exert influence on Nation- alist China to forego its veto of Mongolia--a territory Taipei considers part of China. Middle East During the resumed session, the secretary general will make his fourth annual report on the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Palestine. Proposals to dis- band UNEF or reduce its size are likely to be raised, par- ticularly in view of the UN's budgetary problems. Removal of the force could lead to re- newed fighting between the UAR and Israel. The Soviet bloc and the countries in the Middle East which benefit from the presence of the force have re- fused to pay their assessed share of the costs. Discussion of the report of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees invariably turns into an Arab-Israeli debate on the Palestine problem as a whole. During the first part of the session the Arabs insisted on a resolution calling for a change in the composition of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and for the appoint- ment of an administrator for refugee property in Israel, No agreement was reached with the Arabs, who will continue to press Western UN members for what they call a less pro- Israeli policy. Arab feeling is running high on this issue. Arab members have raised the question of independence for Oman, a major interior area in the British-protected Sultanate of Muscat. Britain would prefer that the item not be discussed, but the Arab League at a 4 February meeting announced that the question would be pursued vigorously. For the tenth consecutive year, the General Assembly will discuss the Korean question. The new government in Seoul is committed to the past policy of reunification of Korea through "genuinely free elections un- der UN supervision." However, renewed public interest in re- unification following the April revolution has increased sup- port in South Korea for limited contacts with North Korea. Such public speculation has led many neutrals to seek ways of getting the UN to establish these contacts and may lead to determined efforts to invite North Koreans to the debate as a first step. The difficulty of keeping the Tibetan issue alive in the UN stems from the fact that discussion must be confined to Chinese Communist violation of human rights. Going beyond this aspect of the problem would raise juridical and political questions that would lessen sup- port'for Tibet's complaint and might prevent any action at all by the assembly. The Dalai Lama, however, would like to have the UN affirm the self-determination of the Tibetan people and even ap- point an investigating committee. Although the assembly de- cided in October to shelve the SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 9 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY question of Chinese UN repre- sentation for the duration of the session, it did so by the slimmest margin since 1951. Peiping's supporters may there- fore attempt to reopen the is- sue. Nationalist China, more- over, may lost its right to vote unless it makes a payment of more than $1,000,000 toward its overdue assessments before the session resumes. The UN Charter provides that the Gen- eral Assembly may permit a de- faulting member to vote only if failure to pay is due to "conditions beyond the control of the member." Taipei will almost cer- tainly lose its seat on the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) , although the five permanent members of the Secu- rity Council have traditionally been re-elected when their three-year terms expire. Thir- teen ballots failed to break the deadlock between the lead- ing candidates, India and Bel- gium, for the remaining vacant seat; the issue therefore was postponed until the resumed session. Nationalist China polled only eight votes on the last ballot thrown open to ad- ditional contenders. Nine disarmament resolu- tions remain on the table for the resumed session, although three relatively noncontentious resolutions were adopted in the first session (two calling for cessation of nuclear tests and one directed against dissemina- tion of nuclear weapons).. The establishment of a substitute for the ten-nation Disarmament Committee, which the Soviet bloc denounced after walking out of the Geneva negotiations last June, is one of the major prob- lems to be solved before negotiations can be resumed. On the broader question of formulat- ing directives for the new fo- rum,the Soviet Union will prob- ably press for the adoption of the "compromise" Indian resolu- tion,which endorses the Soviet proposal for a single treaty calling for "general and com- plete" disarmament. It is also possible that the USSR will renew its call for a special session of the General Assembly to be attended by the heads of government to discuss disarmament. The UN special represent- ative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, has submitted his report to the General Assembly, and it should provide the basis for discussion of the Hungarian question. However, the admis- sion of new members to the UN with no great interest in this problem and the increasing tend- ency of many other members to attach little if any importance to the issue has eroded support for the West's position. In addition, Hammarskjold believes that "we have nothing to gain from debating Hungary" and that to help the Hungarian people we should "switch off the light." Support is also dwindling on the question of the creden- tials of the Hungarian UN del- egation- It has been seated only provisionally each year since 1956, but this does not affect vote. the right to speak and The Soviet complaint on alleged US aggressive inten- tions-,-an aftermath of the U-2 and RB-47 incidents--has been dropped. Also remaining is the Cuban complaint about US inten- tions to attack the island. SECRET 2 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 10 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4 gE CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100040001-4