CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 30, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
v~cDivr-Tr
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 1224
OCt NO. 0273/61
30 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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IDOCUMENTNO. 25X1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
State Department review completed CLASS. CHANGED TO:: TAU o "X1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 March 1961
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Communist bloc propaganda suggests that the USSR will
not agree unconditionally to the British proposals on Laos
and that the Communists will try to avoid a commitment on
a cease-fire before an international conference is con-
vened. However, favorable references to the British pro-
posals by Gromyko, together with the generally moderate
tone of the Pravda "Observer" article on 27 March, reflect
Moscow's desire not to exacerbate the critical situation
in Laos. The Boun Oum government is holding back on
adopting a political position pending the outcome of
East-West deliberations on Laos, but cabinet discussions
continue on possible courses of action. Recent Commu-
nist military activity in Laos has been limited to small-
scale actions, possibly reflecting immediate political
considerations,but the Communist forces are capable of
stepped-up operations at any time against the dispirited
Laotian Army.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The UN is continuing its pressure on Leopoldville to
allow the re-entry of UN troops into Matadi, but the Congor
lese are adamant that only civilians can be permitted in
the port for the time being. The question of how Indian
troops to be transported by sea--the bulk of those ex-
pected--will enter the country thus is still unsolved.
Various Congolese officials apparently are making un-
coordinated efforts at negotiations between the Leopold-
ville and Stanleyville regimes. Tshombd is sending 1,000
troops against Manono, capital of the secessionist
"Lualaba state" in north Katanga.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The chief Soviet delegate has had little to say at
the nuclear test ban negotiations in Geneva during the past
week, but has indicated that he will present a comprehen-
sive reply to the new Western proposals after the detailed
explanations are completed. Outside the conference,
Tsarapkin has used several press interviews to minimize
the extent of Western concessions and to emphasize his
warnings against further French testing. He has, how-
ever, stopped short of making cessation of French test-
ing a precondition for further negotiations. He has
also stressed the "paramount importance" of the
Soviet proposal for a tripartite council to administer the
control system. Ambassador Thompson believes that the
tripartite concept proposed by Khrushchev for the UN
Secretariat has become basic Soviet policy on
questions of international administration and
that Moscow, therefore, will probably maintain
its position on the council for administering
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the nuclear control system even to the point of a
breakdown of the Geneva talks. 25X1
CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Announcement of the formation of the anti-Castro
"Revolutionary Council" has evoked comparatively little
hemisphere reaction thus far; an Argentine official at
the UN has given it qualified endorsement. F_ I
Increased difficulties in the sugar
cane harvest--many of them involving suspected sabotage--
seem likely to reduce this year's crop below earlier
estimates.
KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL SHAKE-UP CONTINUES. . . . . . . . . Page 12
Khrushchev's shake-up of Soviet officialdom has
claimed another of his lieutenants, presidium candidate
Pospelov, and is reaching into all levels of party and
government. Corruption and deficiencies in the agri-
cultural field continue to be the most frequent charges.
Still other .factors are involved, however, including
political maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants
in preparation for the party congress to be held in
October. If the demotions and firings, now in their
13th week, continue at the present rate, they will be
the most extensive housecleaning undertaken by Khru-
shchev.
SOVIET OFFICIAL VISITS ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA . . . . . . . Page 13
The Soviet ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin,
apparently failed to achieve the main objectives of his
recent trip to South America. Of the countries which he
proposed to visit, only Ecuador and Venezuela granted
him visas, and neither of these would agree to establish
diplomatic relations with the USSR. President Betancourt
of Venezuela complained to Bazykin of unfair Soviet
competition in oil sales and described local Communists
as agitators inspired by Moscow. Ecuador agreed to an
exchange of trade delegations, however, and both coun-
tries may develop cultural contacts with the Soviet
Union. Although Bazykin's official reception was cordial,
the attitude of the public was cool and at times hostile.
DISSENSION IN ECUADOR OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA. .
President Velasco's vacillation on policy toward
Cuba and the bloc is contributing to a sharp division
between pro- and anti-Castro forces in Ecuador.
There are indications of an
impending cabinet shake-up which may favor the pro-
Castro group. Domestic unrest rising from the Castro
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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issue may threaten prospects for holding the 11th Inter-
American Conference, often postponed and now scheduled
to begin in Quito on 24 May. post o
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The forced resignation of Argentine Army Commander
in Chief Toranzo Montero has at]east temporarily strength-
ened the Frondizi government. Most top military leaders,
although they agreed with some of Toranzo Montero's com-
plaints over Peronism and Communism, felt that his
demands for stronger pressure on Frondizi constituted
a threat to constitutional government. Toranzo Montero
retains some influence within the armed forces, however,
and has warned that he will be "active on the sidelines."
MOROCCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
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Morocco intends to back its claims to Spain's Saharan
territories and to recently independent Mauritania by
armed action was well as by diplomatic pressure.! 25X1
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nticipating that the issue of Mauritania's UN
ip would be brought up at the current General
Assembly session, Morocco appears to be fomenting unrest
in order to focus international attention on its claims.
ISRAELI AID IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Although three recipients of Israeli aid--Ghana,
Guinea, and Mali--signed Nasir's anti-Israel resolution
last January at the African "summit" conference in
Casablanca, Tel Aviv has decided to continue to expand
its aid program among new African states. The Israeli
Government plans to send 400 experts to Africa and Asia
during 1961; approximately 500 nongovernment technicians
from Israel are already there. About 1,000 foreign
trainees are to come to Israel this year. Other Arab
states have joined Nasir in mpaign
against the Israeli program. 25X1
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BELGIAN GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
The success of the Socialist party in the elections
on 26 March has increased the likelihood that Belgium's
next government will be a coalition of the Social
Christian and Socialist parties, with Paul Henri Spaak,
Socialist leader and former secreaty general of NATO,
playing a prominent role. While no major changes in
foreign policy are anticipated, Spaak has been privately
critical of some of his country's moves in the Congo and
would probably bring about greater Belgian cooperation
both there and in NATO matters.
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS . .
Leaders at the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), at their recent high-level meeting
in Brussels, made some progress toward overcoming the
difficulties confronting the organization. Affiliated
unions have pledged $7,250,000 to the proposed $10,000,-
000 solidarity fund to help finance free trade unionism
in the developing areas of Asia, Latin America, and
Africa, and a start was made toward a more efficient
organization of the ICFTU itself. Nevertheless, the
confederation seems likely to continue to suffer from
internal frictions and lack of complete support by its
affiliates--as indicated by the refusal of the British
unions to make further contributions to the fund.
. Page 21
SCIENCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The Chinese Communists are in the fifth year of a
12-year scientific program with the objective Of reaching
"world levels of achievement." Progress is being made
in the 11 priority technological fields--including atomic
energy and jet propulsion. China's small group of com-
petent scientists is being slowly augmented by stu-
dents trained in bloc countries. However, research
and development are limited by a shortage of scientists
and equipment. Further limitations arise from China's
heavy dependence on Soviet technical assistance,
sharply curtailed by the withdrawal of Soviet techni-
cians last summer.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ROLE IN THE BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE . . . Page 23
Czechoslovakia is providing economic and military
assistance to 17 countries outside the bloc. Total aid
extended thus far amounts to $660,000,000, compared
with a Soviet aid total of $3.8 billion and a Chinese
Communist aid total of $350,000,000. About half of
the Czech aid is being provided for economic develop-
ment projects, the remainder for military equipment.
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30 March 1961
SPECIAL ARTICLES
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . Page 1
Recent announcements by such key UN members as
Britain and Brazil that they will not continue to
support the moratorium on Chinese UN representation
indicate that use of this procedural device will no
longer preserve Taipei's position in the UN. The
British Foreign Office believes that Taipei's sup-
porters will not even be able to attach conditions--
such as UN membership for Nationalist China as
"Taiwan" or "Formosa"--to the seating of Peiping.
The growing opposition to the moratorium, which post-
pones discussion of either the seating of Peiping or the
ouster of Taipei, reflects a belief among members that
the UN must soon take action on the problem.
DE GAULLE'S PROGRAM FOR THE FRENCH ARMED SERVICES . . . . Page 5
De Gaulle is reorganizing the French armed forces
to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. Most of his
long-range objectives, including early achievement of a
nuclear capability, are embodied in a law passed last
fall which lays out a program for the development of
the armed forces in the period 1960-65. Various as-
pects of this program, particularly the priority being
given to nuclear weapons, are at variance with an
earlier plan which called for a balanced development
of all services. This has aroused sharp criticism,
especially among senior army officers who are also
critical of De Gaulle's Algerian and NATO policies.
T.-D. LYSENKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The recent revival of the influence of Trofim D.
Lysenko, a power under Stalin in the fields of agricul-
ture and biological research, is anomalous at a time
when Khrushchev is calling for the best scientific
methods to solve the USSR's agricultural problems.
Lysenko's theories of genetics, based on Communist
doctrine rather than science, are deplored by repu
table scientists in the USSR. The current favor ac-
corded by Khrushchev probably stems from Lysenko's
willingness to promise fast practical results. Al-
though Lysenko is far from regaining the authority he
exercised under Stalin, he is in a position to exert
significant influence over agricultural research.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
LAOS
Bloc Diplomacy
On 24 March, the day fol-
lowing President Kennedy's state-
ment on Laos, Gromyko told Am-
bassador Stevenson at the UN
that he had a message from Khru-
shchev to deliver orally to the
President and asked for a meet-
ing as, soon as possible. In his
conversation with the President
on 27 March,,Gromyko said that,
in the USSR's view, the latest
British proposals--contained in
a note delivered on 23 March--
could serve as a basis for set-
tlement in Laos. However, having
offered this hopeful statement,
Gromyko urged that both sides
should show restraint and take
steps to prevent the conflict
from spreading. He did not
clarify the Soviet Union's po-
sition on the question of a
cease-fire and said that Mos-
cow's reply to the British note
would be forthcoming in the
near future.
The favorable references
to the British proposals by
Gromyko, together with the gen-
erally moderate and positive'tone
of the authoritative Pravda
"Observer" article onTarch,
appear to reflect the Soviet
leaders' awareness that the re-
cent military and diplomatic
moves by the US and Britain
have brought the contest over
Laos to a new and more critical
phase. Gromyko's remarks after
the meeting with the President
expressing hope for a peaceful'
settlement suggest that Moscow
sought to forestall any decisions
by the SEATO conferees which
might raise the possibility of
expanded military action.
At the same time, the So-
viet Union had to maintain its
own strong bargaining position
in Laos. This was reflected in
the Pravda warning that bloc
policy would not be influenced
by hints of "collective inter-
vention by SEATO" and by move-
ments of American naval and mil-
itary forces. European satel-
lite propaganda has also at-
tempted to demonstrate that the
US--not the Communists--has been
guilty of intervention in Laos
and must bear full responsibil-
ity for the crisis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Pravda Commentary
The "Observer" article,
which has received unprecedented
publicity by Radio Moscow, rep-
resented a direct reply to Pres-
ident Kennedy's press conference
remarks, which had previously
been barely mentioned by Moscow
media. The article sought to
emphasize the fact that the USSR
was the earliest and most con-
sistent proponent of a negotiated
settlement in Laos and followed
the general line taken by Pre-
mier Khrushchev in his interview
with Ambassador Thompson on 9
March, pointing out that the
USSR and the US now agree that
the objective should be a truly
neutral and independent Laos.
While Pravda took issue with the
President's remarks regarding
the origins of the Laotian
crisis, the article welcomed
his statement that the US wants
peace and not war in Laos, a
truly neutral government, and
a settlement through negotia-
tions.
Although the article avoided
any direct comment on the British
proposal for a cease-fire, it
implied that the USSR would not
agree to any approach which would
indicate Soviet responsibility
for and direction of the Pathet
Lao - Kong Le forces. Pravda
characterized President ennedy's
call for a cessation of armed
attacks by externally supported
Communists as "tantamount to an
ultimatum to the people of Laos."
While Pravda' ,s position would
not necessarily preclude Soviet
agreement to a joint appeal by
the Geneva do-chairmen for a
de facto cease-fire, recent bloc
propaganda on this issue suggests
an intention to evade any firm
commitment on the timing of a
formal cessation of hostilities
prior to an international con-
ference, on the grounds that this
is a matter for the conference
itself to decide.
The Asian Communists
A 23 March People's Dail
editorial, Peiping'sfirs press
commentary on Laos in more than
10 days, called on all "peace-
loving forces to firmly support
the patriotic struggle of the
Lao people" and proposed only
that common efforts be made to
convene a 14-nation conference--
a conference in which the Com-
munists would try to ensure
strong Pathet Lao participation
in a coalition Laotian govern-
ment.
Hanoi, in a 25 March edito-
rial attacking the position Pres-
ident Kennedy took at his press
conference, accused the US of
endorsing an immediate cease-
fire only to strengthen "rebel"
forces. The concept that the
ICC could actually be used to
help bring about a cease-fire
prior to the international con-
ference was roundly castigated
by the Pathet Lao,who, on 27
March, charged this would "serve
US perfidious schemes." Even
North Korea joined in to attack
the President's press confer-
ence statement ,and depict the
US as "driven to the corner."
Peiping broadcast a highly
edited version of the Pravda
"Observer" article, choosing
to emphasize that portion which
implied the use of force to
counter any SEATO move in Laos.
However, Communist China's For-
eign Minister Chen Yi, during
a recent interview in Burma,
carefully skirted a question on
SEATO intervention in Laos which
would have provided an opportu-
nity for explicitly threatening
to counter such a move with Chi-
nese forces. Asked what would
be the result if SEATO openly
invaded Laos, Chen Yi replied
in writing that "the civil war
will be prolonged, the suffering
of the Laotian people will be
increased."
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The most precise threat to
continue the war in Laos has
come from the Pathet Lao, who
on 28 March broadcast another
statement warning of an ap-
peal "to peace-loving countries
for military help" unless the
US ceases its "interference" and
accepts the 14-nation conference.
Prime Minister Nehru, more
active than ever in his role as
international broker, has been
using his influence in several
major capitals to move the crisis
toward a negotiated solution.
After exchanging messages with
President Kennedy and Prime Min-
ister Macmillan, Nehru contacted
Khrushchev appealing for his
support of the British proposals
and expressing the hope that they
would lead to a cease-fire, re-
convening of the ICC, and later
an international conference.
The Indian leader had earlier
indicated his readiness to re-
call the ICC, initially perhaps
in New Delhi, if requested by
the two Geneva co-chairmen.
Political Scene in Vientiane
Further political moves in
Vientiane have been held in abey-
ance during the absence of King Sa-
yang and General Phoumi, who were
in southern Laos until 29 March,
and pending the outcome of East-
West deliberations on the Lao-
tian crisis. However, cabinet
discussions are continuing on
possible courses of action.
Vientiane leaders continue to
look to international support for
the defense of Laotian territory.
Former Premier Phoui San-
anikone, meanwhile, is working
behind the scenes for a replace-
ment of the present government,
which he feels is "dictatorial"
and only antagonizing the ma-
jority of the population. He
proposes that the King persuade
Boun Oum and Phoumi to step down
and that he then take personal
charge of a transitional govern-
ment pending a general election.
There is considerable support
for this proposal among other
conservative Laotian politicians,
and Savang reportedly has taken
it under advisement.
Nehru continues in his pub-
lic statements to underscore
the gravity of the Laotian situa-
tion and to endorse the British-
US approach as constructive and
the best means of achieving
what he feels is immediately
required--an end to hostilities
and the influx of arms.
Nehru also sent word to
Souvanna Phouma in Paris!
urging Souvanna to
return to Phnom Penh for further
talks with Phoumi. Nehru appar-
ently feels continued efforts
toward reconciling Laotian polit-
ical elements must proceed with-
out delay to ensure the success
of international negotiations.
New Delhi generally has taken
the position that any national
government not taking in all fac-
tions would be neither effective
nor acceptable as a basis for
international agreement.
The Military Situation
There has been only minor
skirmishing during the past week.
While thy'Kong Le - Pathet Lao
forces have the capability for
renewed offensive action, they
have been engaged primarily in
consolidating their positions on
the various fronts. The lull in
the fighting may be a purely
tactical measure on their part,
but might also reflect Communist
intent to allow the pattern of
international negotiations to
become established.
Army leaders, despite re-
duced enemy pressure along
Route 13, remain fearful of an
attack on Luang Prabang, Phoumi
believes the enemy objective
is complete domination of north-
ern Laos, with Luang Prabang
as an immediate target. The
strength of the Kong Le - Pathet
Lao forces north of the Phou
Khoun road junction would ap-
pear to rule out a victory
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
over the numerically superior
government defenders, posi-
tioned about 25 miles south of
Luang Prabang. However, the
army's morale, which General
Ouane describes as at "an all-
time low," could be an overrid-
ing factor.
Laotian Army leaders are
also concerned over recent move-
ments by Pathet Lao troo s north
of Luang Prabang.
The situation in the Muong Sai -
Nam Bac region is somewhat ob-
scure
Government forces north of
Vang Vieng on Route 13 have
been making some progress in
regaining lost ground, and have
now reached a point about 15
miles north of that village.
Their slow advance has been fur-
ther held up in recent days by
felled trees, mines, and mortar
fire. In the area south of the
Plaine des Jarres, enemy forces
are still trying to crack the
government's defensive position
at Tha Thom. This effort is
being hampered by Meo guerrilla
operations throughout the Plaine
des Jarres area,,which are in-
flicting substantial casualties
on isolated enemy units and
hindering supply movements.
New enemy action in the
Kam Keut area, some 70 miles
southeast of Pak Sane, has been
reported. Firm details are
still lacking, but Vientiane
is taking a serious view of the
situation, fearing'an enemy
move-to cut the country in half.
The attacks .n this area prob-
ably are intended primarily as
a diversionary move at this
time, but the enemy's control
of Kam Keut and Lak Sao to the
east facilitates access to Laos
from North Vietnam via the Vinh-
Thakhek road.
North Vietnamese Involvement
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There is an increasing num-
ber of reports
oncer X1
of ort Vietnamese units in
Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
Although the withdrawal
of the approximately 2,000 Chi-
nese Nationalist irregulars
from Laos has been proceeding,
Chinese Nationalist officials
report that the operation is
being complicated by Laotian
efforts to recruit from amore
these elements.
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Leopoldville
The situation in the Congo
continues to drift, and little
progress has been made toward
easing relations between the UN
Command and the Congolese or
between Leopoldville and Stan-
leyville. The Congolese still
oppose a UN military presence
in the lower Congo at the port
of Matadi, although their rela-
tions with the UN Command have
improved since UN representative
Rajeshwar Dayal was temporarily
replaced by Makki Abbas in mid-
March.
Secretary General Hammar-
skjold wants to re-establish at
least a minimal UN military
force at Matadi--sufficient to
protect the area containing the
UN warehouses--and if the Congo-
lese remain intransigent he may
take the matter to the Security
Council. The Congolese author-
ities, who are willing to permit
UN technicians at Matadi but not
military forces because of the
effect on the populace, have
charged that the UN is deliber-
ately holding up needed food
supplies at the port because of
reluctance to recognize the Ileo
government in Leopoldville. The
position of the UN Command is
that without UN supervisory per-
sonnel--and protecting troops--
at the port it is unable to as-
sume responsibility for the dis-
patch of supplies from the Matadi
warehouses.
Nehru's toughening attitude. On
27 March he stated in the Indian
Parliament that the UN must oc-
cupy Matadi, by force if neces-
sary. He warned that India
could not send troops there if
they are not assured of a safe
landing. The departure from
Bombay of a US naval transport
with an estimated 2,300 Indian
troops on board was postponed
from 29 March to 1 April at the
UN's request.
Various Congolese officials
apparently are making uncoordi=
nated efforts to improve their
relations between Leopoldville
and Stanleyville. Minister of
Information Bolikango and Leo-
poldville provincial President
Kamitatu have not yet left for
Stanleyville,even though
Kamitatu is reported desirous
of mediating and claims that
Gizenga has expressed to him a
desire to negotiate.
Premier-designate Ileo,
however, has wavered on granting
permission; he is concerned that
Kamitatu, who was a strong Lu-
r-umba supporter, may defect to
the Gizenga regime upon arrival
in Stanleyville. Kamitatu states,
however, that such fears are
groundless because he is prima-
rily interested in serving his-
constitutents in Leopoldville
Province and, moreover, has had
serious differences with Gizenga
in the past.
Hammarskjold's position is
considerably strengthened by
General Mobutu announced
on 29 March that negotiations are
in progress between his officers
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and military representatives of
Stanle ville.
Stanleyville
An official of the Ameri-
can Embassy in Leopoldville, com-
menting on his most recent trip
to Stanleyville, reports that
public order continues to im-
prove there and that authorities
are developing some sense of
responsibility, with greater
control over their armed forces.
He believes that, although the
principal leaders are still pre-
occupied with their own claims
to legitimacy, Stanleyville rep-
e ubHi C of t1_ o
G-va
aButa
ono Bumbe -Aketi
a kLab
:ii:8:staie
APo..t .opals .-.. V7
25X1
Atlantic
Ocean
uluabouig
~8akwange
Lupute
30 MARCH 1061
31592
Maniema
LI.-
Kongolo
Albertville
Manono
? Mans
Mwanga
. M i t w a b y ...........,
resentatives might now be will-
ing to attend a conference of 25X1
Congolese leaders on some neu-
tral ground if their security
were assured by the UN.
Moreover, they seem increas-
ingly disenchanted with the fail-
ure of the bloc and Afro-Asian
nations to send aid or diplomatic
representatives. Any inclination
on the part of Gizenga to nego-
tiate with Leopoldville may be
inhibited by Mulele, his Cairo
representative.
There has been no change in
the position of the Sudan, which
continues to bar supply shipments
to Stanleyville. The African
states supporting Gizenga con-
tinue to talk of ways to assist
him, so far fruitlessly.
Katanga
Katanga's President Tshomb6,
who is seeking to gain support
among moderate African states
for his Congo federation plan,
recently suffered a rebuff to
his international prestige at
the hands of Liberian President
Tubman, who refused to agree to
a Tshomb6 visit because of pre-
vailing Lumumbist sympathies in
Liberia. Meanwhile, Tshomb6 is
likely to create a problem for
the UN and the West if he car-
ries out his military effort
against the Baluba tribal strong-
hold at Manono held by pro-Gi-
zenga troops.
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The Katanga force, which
numbers about 1,000, apparently
plans to make a gradual advance
The UN is taking no mil-
itary action to meet the
threat to Manono, but UN mil-
itary commander General McKeown
has been in Elisabethville
trying to persuade Tshomb6--so
far unsuccessfully--to call off
the advance.
UN officials are particu-
larly concerned that the 60
South African volunteers or some
of the other white troops serv-
ing with Katanga may clash with
the UN's Nigerian troops and
give: rise to an incident with
racial repercussions_
In addition there is con-
siderable concern-in the min-
ing centers of,Katanga that the
large urban concentrations of
Baluba tribesmen there may cause
trouble.
The Belgian consul general
in Elisabethville stated on 28
March that between 85 and 90
Belgians now serving with Tshom-
bd's forces military techni-
cians under contract and volun-
teers for the "white legion"--
would leave by mid-April. He
hinted that Brussels might have
to withdraw more Belgians as a
result of international pressure,
but he implied that the Belgian
Foreign Ministry has little con-
trol over the Ministry of Af-
rican Affairs, which apparently
is continuing its assistance
to Tshomb6. The Katanga presi-
dent has previously given his
approval for the withdrawals
but recently has become irri-
tated over Belgian dealings
with his Baluba rival, Jason
Sendwe, and now is only re-
luctantly acquiescing in
their departure,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS
The Soviet delegation has
maintained virtual silence in
the Geneva conference but has
indicated that Moscow will pre-
pare a comprehensive reply to
the new Western proposals. In
private discussions on 22 and
23 March, chief Soviet dele-
gate Tsarapkin urged Ambassador
Dean to be patient and await a
Soviet response after the United
States and Britain complete.
development of their proposals.
He told the ambassador that he
would continue to listen to
the American plans with inter-
est and that the USSR was
anxious to bring about a suc-
cessful conclusion to the
negotiations.
In the conference session
on 24 March, Tsarapkin reiter-
ated the Soviet delegation's
intention to wait until the
end of the US and British
presentation before commenting
in detail. He claimed that
since the US position appeared
to be a "package" proposal, an
analysis and evaluation of
individual points could not be
given until conclusion of the
Western explanations.
During a private conver-
sation with the chief British
delegate on 27 March, Tsarapkin
avoided any comment on the
Western proposals but repeated
his familiar line that the
USSR had made all the conces-
sions. He claimed that the
Soviet proposals would be
adequate to control a test
ban; he characterized a ban as
a measure of "extremely limited
significance," stating that
any treaty would be an exper-
iment in international control,
and should therefore begin with
only a minimum of control fea-
tures.
council to supervise the con-
trol system,;and made no
reference to French testing.
The British delegate gained the
impression that the Soviet
delegation was prepared to
continue negotiations through
the summer.
The only substantive point
raised by Tsarapkin at the con-
ference concerned freedom of
action of the three powers to
resume small underground tests
when the voluntary moratorium
on these tests expired. Fore-
shadowing the probable line of
attack on this issue, he asked
whether the American proposals
admitted the possibility of re-
suming underground tests at
that time. The USSR has pre-
viously insisted that the
three powers should not be
automatically free to do so.
A member of the Soviet
delegation has also indicated
privately that it will insist
that there be only 15 control
posts for the USSR, rather than
the 19'proposed by the West,
and will hold out for Soviet
representation on the inspection
teams. He stated that the
Soviet delegation regarded the
new American proposals as
bargaining counters.
Outside the conference,
Tsarapkin has continued his
sharp criticism of the new
American and British proposals.
In an interview with a CBS
correspondent on 23 March, he
stated that the Western pro-
posals contained little new
and showed that the US con-
tinued to hold an unacceptable
position on such questions as
the number of on-site inspections,
the staffing of control posts:
and on-site inspection teams,
and the scientific criteria
Tsarapkin agreed with the
British suggestion that the
end of May be a target date.
for concluding a treaty, but
only if the Soviet terms were
accepted. He made only brief
mention of the Soviet proposal
for a tripartite administrative
for determining which detected
seismic events qualified for
on-site inspection. He applied
the same term to the US posi-
tion on the. number of control
posts in the USSR, the dura-
tion of the moratorium on small
underground tests, and a "num-
ber of other questions."
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Tsarapkin took a similar
line in an interview with a
correspondent of the Italian
Communist newspaper L'Unita on
24 March. In an interview with
a representative of the Polish
press service on 25 March, he
subdivided the American plan
into three parts: 1) questions
on which the US takes the same
attitude as in the past; 2)
certain issues on. which the
West has made a short step
forward, and 3) those points
on which the West approached
the Soviet compromise proposals.
Without spelling out the specif-
ic issues, Tsarapkin declared
that even the rare concession
seemed "illusory" and qualified
by numerous conditions and
reservations.
would have to put the whole
test ban negotiations into the
framework of complete and gen-
eral disarmament "if the Amer-
icans failed to produce some
Rt
reported
that Tsarap in, in a private
conversation, belittled the
Western concessions and stated
that things looked bad for the
success of the conference.
Tsarapkin has also used
press interviews to repeat his
warning on the "negative effect"
of continued French testing
and to underscore the importance
.of the Soviet proposals for a
tripartite administrator for
the control system. In the
Polish press service interview
he repeated his statement,
given at the opening session,
on the "negative influence" of
French testing on the negotia-
tions. Tsarapkin stated that
continued testing by France
"would render questionable the
efficacy of an agreement." He
told CBS that French tests
threatened to nullify the pos-
sibility of concluding a treaty.
In private talks a member of
the Soviet delegation pointed
out, however, that these warn-
ings did not pose any precondi-
tions for further negotiations.
On the question of a three-
member administrative council,
Tsarapkin termed it a "fundamen-
tal problem" and "of paramount
importance." Ambassador Thompson
believes that the Soviet plan for
a three-member secretariat to
replace the UN Secretariat has
become basic Soviet policy and
that Moscow, therefore, will
probably maintain its position
on the three-member council to
administer a test ban even to
the point of a breakdown in the
talks at Geneva.
The volume of Soviet propa-
ganda commentary on the nego-
tiations last week was higher
than for any week since the ne-
gotiations began in the fall of
1958. Peiping has remained si-
lent on the negotiations. The
revised Western proposals were
broadly characterized by Soviet
propagandists as "nothing new,"
and a widely broadcast comment
claimed they were intended as
"psychological preparation for
torpedoing" the talks. Moscow's
commentators have also reported,
however, that the Soviet delega-
tion must await the explanation
of the Western plan before
appraising the individual pro-
posals. Wide publicity has been
given to the Soviet proposal for
a tripartite administrator and
to Tsarapkin"s warnings against
further French testing.
Although there is no explic-
it threat of a Soviet test re-
sumption nor any demand that
France join the negotiations, a
broadcast to France on 27 March
claimed that an "effective" in-
ternational agreement is "hardly
possible" so long as "one of the
European great powers" continues
testing. TASS on 28 March report-
ed the Soviet delegation had
pointed out that French testing
complicates not only the Geneva
talks but the whole disarmament
problem. 25X1
(Concurred in by OSI
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CUBA
There has been only limited
international comment so far
on the 22 March announcement of
the formation of the anti-Castro
"Revolutionary Council" under
Castro's former Premier Jose
Miro Cardona. An Argentine
representative in the UN gave
as his immediate opinion that
the creation of a Cuban govern-
ment-in-exile would have a "fa-
vorable impact in Latin Ameri-
ca," but added that the formal
announcement should have been
made in some Latin American
country tb avoid the charge
that the new organization is a
US "satellite" or "puppet."
Radio Moscow charged the United
States with violating several
international agreements in al-
lowing the anti-Castro group
to organize a "government" on
its soil.
Castro reacted by boasting
in a 25 March speech of the re-
sistance with which Cubans would
meet any invasion attempt by
"mercenaries" (i.e., anti-Cas-
tro Cuban exiles) or "marines."
The "mercenary government" would
last 24 hours or perhaps a lit-
tle longer, he said, adding
that "if they begin playing at
local war, imperialism may meet
with hemispheric war." He said
that Cuba had many more arms
than the Congo or Laos, and as-
serted that, in case of an at-
tack on Cuba, "peasants and
workers from many other Ameri-
can countries will march to war
against imperialism."
Recent reports describing
Cuba's internal economic situa-
tion are dominated by accounts
of consumer-goods shortages,
but most foreign observers in
Havana continue,to feel that
the regime is not threat
ened by such economic dis-
locations.
Sabotage and organized re-
sistance activities evidently
are continuing to increase
throughout Cuba despite a pre-
sumably steady gain in the
strength of the government's
instruments of repression. Ac-
counts of attempted sabotage
of industrial and agricultural
installations are becoming in-
creasingly 25X1
frequent, and anti- 25X1
Castro terrorists are explod-
ine bombs daily in Havana
Recent reports indicate
that sugar cane fires--allegedly
set by saboteurs--may be increas-
ing. A considerable portion of
such fire-damaged cane normally
can be salvaged by grinding it
immediately, but the growing in-
cidence of such reports implies
some reduction in Cuba's esti-
mated total 1961 sugar crop of
5,50(),000-6,000,000 tons as well
as the further erosion of support
for Castro among the peasant
groups on which his popularity
rests. The present slowdown in
Camaguey Province by sugar-mill
workers protesting wage cuts
provides a further illustration
of 'disenchantment with Castro
among lower income groups.
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KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL SHAKE-UP CONTINUES
Khrushchev`s~current shake-
up of Soviet officialdom has
claimed another of his lieu-
tenants and has reached into
all levels of the party and
government bureaucracies. The
poor results in agricultural
production last year touched off
the shake-up, and corruption and
deficiencies in the agricultural
field continue to be the most
frequent charges leveled against
the victims. Still other fac-
tors are involved, however, in-
cluding political maneuvering
among Khrushchev's lieutenants
in preparation for the 22nd
party congress, to be held in
October. If demoti.'on.s and fir-
ings continue much longet at
the present rate, this will be
the most extensive bureaucratic
housecleaning since Khrushchev
took over.
The most recent high-level
victim is 62-year-old party
presidium candidate Pospelov,
who has lost his assignment as
a member of the party central
committee's bureau of the RSFSR
--in charge of propaganda ac-
tivit'ie s in the Russian Repub
lc.. He has been demoted to a
position he held once before
(1949-52) --director of the party's
Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
He replaces Gennady Obidhkin,
the institute's director since
1952. Pospelov remains a candi-
date member of the party presi-
ium, but the lesser importance
of his new assignment makes it
doubtful that he will be re-
elected to the presidium at the
October congress.
Pospelov's removal from
the RSFSR bureau is undoubtedly
related to the replacement in
late January of the deputy chair-
man of the bureau, presidium
member Aristov. These actions
appear likely to have resulted
from competition among Khru-
shchev's lieutenants. The re-
lease of both these officials
from the party secretariat in
May 1960 "to devote full time"
to their duties on the RSFSR
bureau was presumably a prelude
to their current demotions.
Pospelov's duties in the
bureau have been taken over by
Mikhail Yakovlev, ambassador
to the Congo until expelled by
'tbo MQbvtu regimq in September
1960. Yakovlev assumed his new
responsibilities sometime prior
to 4 March when, as a member of
the bureau, he gave a speech on
the tapk9 of the press to a con-
forence of RUSK newspaper of-
ficials.
Yakovlev, 50 years old, had
never held a top-ranking posi-
tion. A minor party official
during World War II, he had
become deputy chairman of USSR
Gosplan by 1956 and a year
later deputy chairman of the
State Committee for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Coun-
tries. In mid-1958 he was pro-
moted to deputy chairman, of the
RSFSR Council of Ministers,
presumably in charge of cul-
tural affairs, and later re-
ceived the additional post of
RSFSR minister of foreign
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
affairs, holding both these two
posts until his Congo assignment
last August.
Now in its 13th week, the
shake-up of government agricul-
tural officials and the reor-
ganization of agricultural
agencies have involved the fir-
ing or reassignment of nine of
the fifteen republic agricul
ture ministers in addition to
USSR Agriculture Minister Vla-
dimir Matskevich. Although most
seem to have been made scape-
goats for the agricultural de-
ficiencies, a few apparently
were moved to other responsible
work to clear the way for ad-
ministrators with the scientific
and research experience needed
to,direct the ministries in
their new agricultural research
functions.
In addition, 11 provincial
party chiefs--over half of them
central committee members--have
been fired in the campaign and
several others have been given
lateral transfers, presumably
to break up local cliques and
friendships. Their current loss
of standing probably forecasts
their exclusion from the new
central party bodies to be
elected in October. At present
almost half those elected to
those bodies at the 20th party
congress in February 1956 appear
slated to be dropped; since the
congress is still seven months
away, many others will probably
also lose out.
The Soviet ambassador to
Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin, and
his personal secretary, Vladimir
Chernyshev, made an "unofficial"
visit to Ecuador and Venezuela
from 7 to 23 March. Bazykin had
also sought visas from Panama,
Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay,
planning to stay five to ten
days in each country visited.
Most were slow to reply, however,
forcing him to postpone his trip
for a month.
By early March, only Ecua-
dor and Venezuela had granted
visas, Colombia had refused, and
the requests to Panama, Haiti,
and Paraguay were still pending.
In answer to Paraguay's demand
to know the "true purpose" of the
visit, Bazykin said it was
merely a courtesy trip and that
he would perhaps have a chat
with the foreign minister.
During his stay in Ecua-
dor, Bazykin met with the Presi-
dent, vice president, foreign
minister, and two other cabinet
ministers. He also contacted
leftists in Quito and Guayaquil
and called on one of Ecuador's
top Communist leaders.
His official reception was
cordial, but the attitude of
the public was generally hos-
tile. The government rejected
six requests to hold demonstra-
tions, but on the night of
Bazykin's arrival a group of
about 50 persons burned a Soviet
flag outside his hotel. The So-
viet visitors had strong police
protection, as small groups of
demonstrators, often joined by
passers-by, dogged them through-
out their stay. The Quito
Chamber of Commerce refused
to meet with Bazykin, despite
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pressure from Foreign Minister
Chiriboga.
Chiriboga told US Ambas-
sador Bernbaum that he had re-
jected Bazykin's feeler for dip-
lomatic relations and emphasized
to the press that the visit was
solely for commercial purposes
and was made at Soviet initia-
tive. Bazykin, however, told
the press that the USSR consid-
ers that relations with Ecuador
already exist and that only an
exchange of ambassadors is lack-
ing.
Ecuador agreed in principle
to send a commercial. mission to
the USSR to study the possibil-
ity of exporting bananas--.Ecua-
dor's chief product--and other
agricultural produce in exchange
for farm and highway machinery.
Alfonso, who had met with him
in Mexico last September. Perez
announced that Venezuela was in-
terested in establishing some
form of relations with the So-
viet Union, and also that he
planned to go to Moscow, pos-
sibly during his scheduled Au-
gust trip to Tehran for the
third conference of petroleum
exporting nations. Following his
initial talk with the ambassador,
Perez indicated to the press that
the recent increase in ~oviet
petroleum sales outside the bloc
is not a threat to world petro-
leum prices or to the develop-
ment of the Organization of Oil
Producing Countries.(OPEP).
After persistent efforts
to gain an interview, Bazykin
was received by President Betan-
court on 22 March. Betancourt
Chiriboga asserted that "bananas I told him that in Venezuela, Com-
have no ideology" and "to trade munists are considered "agita-
is not to acquiesce." !!tors and troublemakers" inspired
Chiriboga told Ambassador
Bernbaum he believed Bazykin
made a tempting loan offer to
President Velasco. In his talk
with the minister of education,
Bazykin offered scientific and
technical aid, and in his final
press conference on 11 March,
he hinted at a cultural exchange
between the universities of
Quito and Moscow.
On his arrival in Caracas
on 12 March, Bazykin stated
that his visit was unofficial
but that he would like to confer
with top government officials
and businessmen. He claimed
that his visit to Ecuador had
been a great success and that
Ecuador would send a trade dele-
gation to the USSR in the latter
half of April--a move which he
characterized as "the first step
toward the establishment of dip-
lomatic and trade relations."
During his 11-day stay in
Venezuela, Bazykin spent a good
deal of time with Minister of
Mines and Hydrocarbons Perez
directly from Moscow, and that
Cuba now served as a bridgehead
for spreading Communism through-
out South America. In sharp
contrast to Perez' remarks, the
President also charged the USSR
with unfair competition through
the sale of its oil in Western
markets. In reply to a question,
Betancourt said the Venezuelan
Government would be willing to
sell to Cuba oil from its roy-
alty share of production; it
would, however, require payment
in advance at a price equal to
what it now receives from the
oil companies.
In his final press confer-
ence Bazykin gave no indication
that his overtures to Betancourt
had been rebuffed and said that
after conferring with the Presi-
dent, five cabinet ministers,
and congressional, university,
and trade union leaders, he had
the impression that most Vene-
zuelans consider the establish-
ment of relations with the USSR
"a question of time and of wait-
ing for the most opportune mo-
ment." While re-emphasizing that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
his visit bad not been official,
he stated that he had discussed
the establishment of relations
with everyone with whom be
talked.
Bazykin devoted many of
his remarks to trade relations
and asserted that as a result
,of his visit, which included a
tour of oil fields with Perez,
he "better understood" Vene-
zuela's position concerning
petroleum and OPEP. He placed
particular emphasis on the
"benefits" Latin American re-
publics could derive from re-
lations with the Soviet Union,
especially in barter.
DISSENSION IN ECUADOR OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA
President Velasco's vacil-
lation on policy toward Cuba
and the bloc is contributing
to a sharp division between
pro- and anti-Castro forces in
Ecuador. The principal spear-
head of the pro-Castro element
is Manuel Araujo, a close
friend of Velasco and a pro-
moter of anti-US violence in
Ecuador in late 1960. Araujo,
who was minister of government
until December, is strongly
disliked by the military, and
his resignation from that post
was reportedly caused by mili-
tary pressure. He is said to
be organizing a clandestine
group of Communists and other
leftists to foment a Castro-
style revolution; he may have
coordinated his plans with
top leaders in Cuba during his
recent visit there.
In a speech shortly after
his return in late February,
Araujo openly called for a "rev-
olution" patterned after Cuba's,
to begin at the conclusion of
Velasco's term in 1964. He
has also waged a campaign to
force the resignation of For-
eign Minister Chiriboga--
leader of the anti-Castro fac-
tion in the government.
The anti-Castro forces--
which include moderate Social-
ists as well as Conservatives,
Liberals, and the Catholic
hierarchy--have been aroused
by the pro'Communist tendencies
in Ecuadorean policy and have
petitioned for a break in re-
lations with Cuba. Some of
these elements, led by former
President Ponce, have been
considering ousting Velasco.
This group may have significant
support from active and retired
officers. The former army
commander, an enemy of Velasco
as well as of Araujo; was ar-
rested on 23 March for involve-
ment in the plotting.
Velasco has not only Cul-
tivated the good will of the
Cuban regime, which is support-
ing Ecuador in its boundary
dispute with Peru, but also has
publicly expressed his confi-
dence in Araujo since the lat-
ter's return from Cuba. Indi-
cations of an impending shake-
up in the cabinet--probably
including the removal of Chiri-
boga--and the reported reassign-
ment of a number of anti-Com-
munist officers suggest that
Velasco is leaning toward the
pro-Castro group and is con-
cerned with the growing opposi-
tion of rightists.
This domestic unrest
threatens the success of the
11th.Inter-American Conference,
scheduled to begin in Quito on
24 May. The prospect that
Castro may attend and that
Ecuador will insist on dis-
cussing its boundary dispute
with Peru--a nationalistic
issue which could touch off
widespread violence--are other
disruptive factors.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S UNMET
The resignation of Army
Commander in Chief Toranzo Mon-
tero has at least temporarily
strengthened the Frondizi govern-
ment in Argentina, in that it un-
derscores the armed forces' re-
jection of threats to constitu-
tional government. The resigna-
tion resulted from a showdown
with War Secretary Fraga over
the long-standing issue of mili-
tary pressure on President Fron-
dizi's policies.
Toranzo Montero's formal
letter of resignation, which he
released to the press one hour
after he sent it to Fraga on 25
March, was a virtual admission
of his desire to overthrow Fron-
dizi. It accused the administra-
tion of corruption and of soft-
ness toward Peronism and Commu-
nism, and made a critical refer-
ence to Argentina's offer on 4
March of its good offices to ease
US-Cuban tensions. Although he
overplayed his hand, Toranzo Mon-
tero retains important support
within the military and has
warned that he will be "active
on the sidelines."
The military in general share
Toranzo Montero's concern over
Peronista and Communist activi-
tie s, which are extensive de-
spite executive decrees outlaw-
ing political activity by both
the Peronista-sponsored Justicial-
ista party and the Communist par-
ty. The provinces have 'been reluuc-
tant to enxorce these decrees,
and the Communists and some Per-
onista groups have worked with
legal leftist parties, thus stim-
ulating military fears of a left-
ist united front. The Peronistas
are split, and an increasing num-
ber are ignoring Peron's orders
from his exile in Spain to cast
a blank protest vote and to op-
pose the government through all
available means.
military.
Frondizi's party won an im-
portant victory in the municipal
elections in Santa Fe Province
on 19 March-after defeats in
Buenos Aires and Mendoza in Feb-
ruary. This new show of public
confidence will further strength-
en Frondizi in dealing with the
25X1
Morocco's claims to a sub-
stantial portion of the western
Sahara were dramatized when the
so-called "Mauritanian Army of
Liberation" on 11 March seized
eleven oil prospectors--includ?-
ing three Americans--in the
Saguia el-Hamra region of Span-
ish Sahara. Rabat had warned
when Spain granted concessions
to nine American firms in 1959
that it did not recognize Span-
ish sovereignty over the area
and that concessiabai?es would
later have to revalidate their
claims with the Rabat Government.
Moroccan claims include
the enclave of Ifni, to which
Moroccan irregulars laid siege
in 1957; Spanish Sahara, governed
as a province of Spain; the new-
ly independent state of Mauritania;
and the westernmost portion of
the French Saharan department of
Saoura.
Faced with the probability
that supporters for Mauritania's
application for membership in
the United Nations would insist
on raising the issue at the re-
sumed session of the UN General
Assemblys Rabat may well have
used Mauritanian dissidents, who
have pledged allegiance to the
Moroccan King, to create inci-
dents in the area again in order
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CANARY ISLANDS
.
(SD.) 0 IFNI
(SD/
o 0;,.j Q Tantan
El Aiunh
SAGUTA
SPANISH EL HAMRA
I.......
SAHARA'.
Villa O
Cisnero o0
Off'
O
MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
30 MARCH 1961
0 STATUTE MILES
N I G E R
500
J
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to focus ihternational..attention
on Moroccan claims.
Rabat probably encouraged
the formation 'of the "Mauritanian
Army of Liberation," reported
to number between 600 and 1,400
men, and its activities along
the Moroccan - Spanish Saharan
Spain has reinforced its
troops to nearly 6,000 men con-
centrated in the area of El Aiun.
Last week Spanish forces were re-
ported to have surrounded and an-
nihilated a group of irregulars;
Spain claims to be prepared for an
outbreak of hostilities with
Morocco,
King Hassan II warned on 22
March, when the oilmen were re-
leased, that Morocco intended to
press its territorial claims and
that other prospectors might be
seized. The palace-oriented Ma-
ghreb Arab press agency seems to
be preparing Moroccan opinion
for military action in southern
Morocco.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ISRAELI AID IN AFRICA
A recent speech by Israeli
Foreign Minister Golda Meir in-
dicates that Israel, despite the
anti-Israel resolution adopted
in January at the African "sum-
mit" conference in Casablanca,
has decided to continue expanding
its foreign aid program in Af-
rica. Mrs. Meir discounted the
Casablanca resolution, which was
inspired by the UAR, as having
been prompted by only a "tempo-
rary need" to support slogans
harmful to Israel. She said it
does not reflect "the entire po-
litical balance sheet" of Israel's
relations with African states.
The resolution criticized
Israel as "an instrument of im-
perialism and neocolonialism"
in Africa as well as the Middle
East. Its signatories included
the heads of state of Ghana,
Guinea, and Mali, each of which
receives Israeli aid, as well
as of the UAR and Morocco. Sub-
sequent Israeli representations
to the governments of the first
three evoked. reiterations of
their support of the resolution,
although Ghana's Nkrumah gave
private assurances of continued
good will toward Israel. The
three, nevertheless, appear
ready to accept aid from any
source, and on that basis the
Israelis have decided to con-
tinue assisting them.
Mrs. Meir said Israel would
send 400 government experts to
Africa and Asia during 1961; ap-
proximately 500 nongovernmental
technicians also have been sent.
Israel maintains 160 missions in
35 countries in Africa and Asia.
Ghana is still the program's
showcase. More than 100 Israeli
experts in agriculture, marine
navigation, and construction are
serving there, while numerous
Ghanaians are taking courses in
Israel. Mali is one of the newest
recipients of Israeli aid, hav-
ing received small arms--subse-
quent to the Casablanca confer-
ence--under terms which made
them virtually a gift.
About 1,000 foreign trainees
are scheduled to attend courses
in Israel this year. The training
program includes academic studies
at the Haifa Institute of Tech-
nology and the Hebrew University
in Jerusalem as well as a five-
year medical course and a four-
year curriculum in agricultural
engineering. Military courses are
also conducted; about 200 Ethio-
pian paratroopers recently were
trained by the Israelis.
Seminars in various fields
are. held periodically,. Last
August, Israel was host to 126
delegates from 41 countries at
an international conference onM
''Science in the' Advancement of
New States." The African and
Asian delegations were urged to
look to Israel as a training
ground for technicians and for
ideas and research facilities.
Another venture in Tel
Iviv, the Afro-Asian Institute
for Labor Studies, is sponsored
Jointly by the Israel Federation
of Labor (Histadrut),and the
AFL-CIO. Sixty-four students
from 31 African and Asian coun-
tries currently are attending
the first of a series of six-
month courses. The purpose of
the school is to demonstrate
Israel's rapid economic develop-
ment under a democratic politi-
cal system to labor leaders and
members of cooperatives from
underdeveloped areas.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Nasir recognizes Israel's
aid program as a challenge to
his own efforts to exert influ-
ence in Africa. UAR propaganda
media regularly denounce Israeli
activities in Africa as "im-
perialist" machinations. Other
Arab states have supported the
UAR campaign.
It remains to be seen
whether, in the face of the
Arab countercampaign, the Is-
raeli program will reap signif-
icant political advaii.tages for
Tel Aviv. Despite the Casa-
blanca resolution, the Israelis
apparently still feel that they
can count on gaining diplomatic
benefits, particularly when the
Arabs press their perennial
grievances on Palestine in the
UN.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS
The success of the Social-
ist party in the elections on
26 March has increased the
likelihood that Belgium's next
government will be a coalition
of the Social Christian and
Socialist parties, with Paul
Henri Spaak, Socialist leader
and former secretary general
of NATO, playing a prominent
role. While no major changes
in foreign policy are antici-
pated, Spaak has been privately
critical of some of his coun-
try's moves in the Congo and
would probably bring about
greater Belgian cooperation
both there and in NATO matters.
The opposition Socialists,
who had been generally expected
to suffer marked losses as a
result of the Socialist-led
strikes in December and Janu-
ary, actually gained both in
popular votes and Senate seats
and held their own in the lower
house. Some left-wing Social-
ists apparently defected to
the Communists, who gained
three additional seats in the
lower house. The Social Chris-
tians, the leading partner in
Premier Eyskens' coalition,
lost heavily--mainly to two
right-wing groups which rallied
support from conservative-
minded voters dissatisfied with
Eyskens' handling of the Congo
crisis and the subsequent eco-
nomic austerity law. The con-
servative Liberals, junior part-
ners in the coalition, gained
popular votes although they
lost one of their 21 seats in
the lower house.
Eyskens' government is con-
tinuing in a caretaker capacity
until some agreement can be
reached among the parties--none
of which has a majority in
either house. The chairman of
the Social Christian party,
Theo Lefevre, favors cooperation
with the Socialists but faces
strong opposition from the
COMMUNISTS 5(+3)
10327
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FLEMISH CHRISTIAN
PEOPLE'S UNION
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
middle-class wing of his party,
which wants instead to continue
the coalition with the Liberals.
The Labor elements in his party
have for some time been more in-
clined toward an alliance with
the Socialists, and moderate
elements in both these parties
believe that the difficult eco-
nomic readjustments ahead re-
quire a coalition of Belgium's
two largest parties.
Spaak would probably play
a leading role--either as pre-
mier or foreign minister--in
any such coalition. Having been
out of Belgian party politics
from 1957 until a few weeks ago,
he is less committed than any
other prominent leader to Bel-
gium's past actions in the Congo,
and on 13 March in a conversa-
tion with the American charge
in Brussels he voiced strong
criticism of the Congo policies
of the Belgian Government. Both
on Congo questions and in any
effort to strengthen Belgium's
support of NATO, Spaak would face
strong opposition, even in his
own party, to any major change
in government policy, but he
would be able to exercise more
stringent control over the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and
reduce the freewheeling activity
of officials in the Ministries
of Defense and African Affairs
regarding the Congo.
The first task of any new
government will be to put Bel-
gium's fiscal house in order and
stimulate the growth of the econ-
omy. Lefevre, in his effort to
improve prospects for a coali-
tion with the Socialists, has
said that a new long-range fi-
nancial and economic program
should be substituted for the
controversial "loi unique,"
which provoked the strikes and
was finally adopted in February
over Socialist opposition.
INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS
Measures to make the
International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) a
more effective instrument for
advancing free trade unionism,
particularly in the under-
developed areas of the world,
were the principal topic of
discussion at an extraordinary
session of the ICFTU's execu-
tive board in Brussels from 13
to 17 March. Some progress
appears to have been made, but
the constructive atmosphere
which prevailed may have been
achieved in part by agreement
to avoid a showdown on several
basic issues.
The major item on the agenda
was a plan providing for the re-
grouping of primary ICFTU ac-
tivities--such as education,
training, and organizing support
--under three or four new as-
sistant secretaries-general.
The ICFTU'?s bureaucratic in-
efficiency has long been de-
cried by its affiliates, and
Secretary General Becu's de-
lay in proposing correctives
caused a major quarrel at the
executive board meeting last
December.
How soon and how effec
tively Becu's new plan will be
implemented remains to be seen.
Only two of the new posts have
been filled, and one of these
by an appointee who encountered
opposition from certain of the
powerful International Trade
Secretariats on which the ICFTU
leans heavily for support in
the organizing field.
Board discussion of financ-
ing for ICFTU support activities
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in the developing areas of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America also
produced somewhat uncertain re-
sults. About three fourths of
the $10,000,000 sought by the
ICFTU's International Solidarity
Fund for the next three years
has now been pledged. Satisfac-
tion over the AFL-CIO's offer of
$3,250,000 ($750,000 less than
had been asked for) is tempered,
however, by the total default of
the British Trades Union Congress
(TUC), already in arrears on past
contributions. TUC delegate
George Woodcock declared that the
British unions "cannot afford"
their proposed $2,250,000, and
would make no further contribu-
tionsto the fund.
Although there is some hope
that a TUC contribution will be
forthcoming before the 1962 ICFTU
congress, Becu and other leaders
are nonetheless concerned over
the British attitude. Woodcock
not only questioned the ICFTU's
need for "large amounts" of money,
but added that the ICFTU should
concern itself primarily with
"economic and social matters."
By implication this would seem
to indicate a lack of sympathy
for the ICFTU's increasing em-
phasis on organizational activ-
ities--a.. program which other
trade union leaders think essen-
tial if free trade unionism is
to establish itself in areas now
in the process of industrializa-
tion.
On the problem of uncoordi-
nated, unilateral activities by
affiliates in such areas--long a
source of friction among the
ICFTU, AFL-CIO, and TUC--the
ICFTU appears to have beat a
strategic retreat. Apparently
reconciled to the continuation
of such activities, Becu pro-
posed only that they be under-
taken in "consultation" with the
ICFTU. Although probably a more
realistic assessment of the
ICFTU'srelationship to its,"major
affiliates, this stand leaves
much to good faith and contrasts
with past ICFTU predictions that
an uncoordinated approach, partic-
ularly, to the complicated trade
union situation in Africa, is
bound to fail.
The Chinese Communists,
determined to achieve status as
a world power as quickly as pos-
sible, are giving high priority
to science and technology. They
now are in the fifth year of a
12-year scientific development
program drawn up in 1956 under
the aegis of Mao Tse-tung and
Chou En-lai. The program, which
concentrates Chinese effort in
11 priority technological fields
--including atomic energy and
jet propulsion, is being execut-
ed in an orderly manner with
much zeal and determination.
Significant successes have been
achieved, but the program's an-
nounced goal of attaining
"world levels of achievement" by
1967 is beyond reach.
China's small nucleus of
competent, Western-trained sci-
entists is being slowly augment
ed by students trained in bloc
countries. However, research
and development are limited by
a shortage of scientific man-
power and by China's heavy de-
pendence on Soviet technical
assistance, sharply curtailed
by the withdrawal of Soviet
technicians last summer. Never-
theless, native capabilities are
probably adequate to provide some
spectacular results from a few
high-priority projects in both
the military and economic
sectors.
In addition, China is ac-
quiring the capability for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
development of most conventional
armaments and for routine tech-
nological support in economic
areas, but high-quality scientif-
ic resources are not expanding
rapidly enough to meet all crit-
ical needs in agriculture and in-
dustry.
Achievements in public
health have been impressive. Ep-
idemic diseases have been re-
duced, and concepts of sanita-
tion among the people have been
widely established. General
health practices are still poor,
however, and the control of com-
mon diseases such as bacillary
dysentery, tuberculosis, and
schistosomiasis will be far from
complete during the remainder
of the program. A shortage of
doctors trained in Western
medicine forces the regime to
continue to support and encour-
age traditional Chinese practi-
tioners.
Research in physics, chem-
istry, and metallurgy remains
relatively primitive, and the
level of performance in these
sectors is not expected to im-
prove greatly in the next few
years. Biological and agri-
cultural research and develop-
ment programs have also been
poor, especially in relation
to the pressing demand in China
to raise food production. Any
tangible benefits to agriculture
from this quarter during the
plan will probably come from the
application of known practices.
The entire program is ham-
pered by a lack of adequate re-
search facilities. These facil-
ities are growing, especially
in priority military and in-
dustrial areas, a.nd are prob-
ably keeping pace with the growth
in trained personnel in most
fields of science and technology.
As of the moment, however, only
about 1,000 highly trained sci-
entists are available to plan,
supervise, and carry out activity
that would be considered signif-
icant in Western scientific cir-
cles. Graduates of China's own
scientific schools are not
well trained by world stand-
ards and are not sufficient-
ly numerous to give the re-
gime reason to hope for an
early escape from its de-
pendence on the rest of the
bloc in even this limited area.
25X1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ROLE IN THE BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE
Czechoslovakia, second only
to the USSR as a contributor to
the bloc's foreign aid program,
is,providing economic and mili-
tary assistance to 17 underde-
veloped' countries. Total Czech
aid extended thus far amounts to
$660,000,000, compared with the
Soviet aid total of $3.8 bil-
lion and a Chinese Communist aid
total of $350,000,000. About
half of the Czech aid is being
provided for economic develop-
ment projects, the remainder for
military equipment. Some of the
major bloc arms agreements, par-
ticularly those signed with Mid-
dle Eastern countries in 1955-56,
were negotiated by Czechoslovakia.
In addition, Czechoslovakia is
the bloc country most active in
establishing and expanding trade
relations with countries in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.
Unlike Soviet aid, Czech
aid has for the most part been
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extended for single light in-
dustrial and consumer projects,
to private companies as well as
to governments. From 1954 to
1958 Czechoslovakia initiated
the bloc economic aid program
in six countries in Asia and
Latin America with small short-
term credits for such projects
as cement plants, sugar refin-
eries, and textile mills. Since
1959, however, there has been a
trend toward providing longer
term lines of credits to be used
for public development projects'
the largest single line of cred-
it--$48,500,000--was extended
to India in 1959. With the ex-
ception of about $4,000,000 in
grant aid to Guinea, Cambodia,
and Somalia, all Czech aid has
been in the form of credits.
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Total Czech economic aid
to the underdeveloped countries
since 1954 amounts to $335,000,-
000, about a fourth of which has
been used. India, Indonesia,
the UAR, Iraq, and Cuba have
been the principal recipients,
but significant credits have
been provided to Ethiopia and
Guinea and a new credit of an
unknown amount has been extended
to Cambodia. The most recent
Czech aid was a $1.4 million
grant to Somalia--the first bloc
overture to that country.
Prague has undertaken its
largest projects in India, where,
in addition to the several ce-
ment plants and sugar refiner-
ies already constructed, a large
foundry project, a heavy machine
tool plant, and a heavy elec-
trical machinery plant are
planned for construction in the
next few years. Indonesia,
Iraq, and the UAR have received
significant Czech lines of cred-
it for industrial development,
and the first bloc aid extended
to the Castro government was a
Czech line of credit for $20,-
000,000 in June 1960.
In addition to the aid ex-
tended on its own account, the
Czechs are participating in
projects involving Soviet eco-
nomic credits. In Egypt, for
example, Czechoslovakia is pro-
viding under Soviet credits equip-
ment for several industrial
projects and the Aswan dam con-
struction.
Significant Czech aid of-
fers outstanding include a cred-
it offer to Bolivia for mineral
processing and an offer of both
economic and military aid to
Ecuador.
Military Assistance
Agreements covering~a mini-
mum of $325,000,000 in military
credits have been negotiated by
Czechoslovakia with the UAR,
Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia,
Guinea, and Cuba, although some
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of the equipment under these
agreements probably was sup--
plied by the USSR. Czechoslo-
vakia was the first bloc coun-
try to extend military aid to a
nonbloc country, concluding arms
agreements with both Egypt in
1955 ,and Syria in 1956. Under
these arrangements, Czechoslo-
vakia provided the material and
apparently assumed much of the
financial burden.
In the 1956 agreement with
Yemen, however, Czechoslovakia
--though it negotiated the deal
and provided some arms--probably
fronted for the USSR.
In recent years, Czecho-
slovakia, although still used
as the bloc's initial contact
for arms deals, has acted main-
ly as a participant in agree-
ments between the Soviet Union
and nonbloc countries, supplying
arms, equipment, and training
often not available in the USSR.
The first Indonesian arms
deal in 1958 apparently was an
exception;-,Prague carried out
the entire agreement, probably
because of Djakarta's unwilling-
ness at that time to become di-
rectly involved in an arms deal
with Moscow.
Virtually all the military
credits arranged by Czechoslo-
vakia have been used.
Czechoslovakia's chief con-
tribution to the bloc offensive
to promote closer economic ties
with the underdeveloped countries
continues to be in the-field of
trade.. In many.areas the bloc has
established economic ties solely
through Czech commercial initia-
tives. In some countries, while
other bloc states, particularly
the USSR, are involved in an aid
program,Czech activities have been
restricted to increasing trade.
Czech activities in 'Mali; -for
example, have been concentrated on
establishing commercial relations.
Under an agreement with the USSR
and Czechoslovakia,Mali will sell
most of its peanut crop--its prin-
cipal export--to the bloc during
the next year. Both the USSR and
Communist China have initiated an
aid program in Mali.
Czechoslovakia's trade with
the underdeveloped countries in-
creased from $175,000,000 in
1954 to an estimated $415,000,-
000 in 1960.
(Prepared by ORR
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Recent announcements by
several key Western UN members
that they will no longer sup-
port the moratorium on Chinese
UN representation indicate that
time has run out for Taipei in
the United Nations. The grow-
ing opposition to postponing
discussion of either the entry
of Peiping or the ouster of
Taipei does not necessarily
imply support for Peiping's
admission but does reflect a
long-held belief among UN mem-
bers that the organization must
come to grips with the problem.
The General Assembly at
each of the past ten sessions
has voted a moratorium on con-
sideration of the Chinese repre-
sentation question. This pro-
cedural device for delaying a
decision requires only a simple
majority of votes. Any vote on
the substance, of the issue--
ouster of Taipei or admission
of Peiping--would presumably re-
quire a two-thirds. majority.
In the first five of these
sessions,,over two.-thirds favored
the moratorium. Since 1956,
however, as new UN members have
rapidly increased the size of
the-organization, the moratorium
has mustered only a simple ma-'
jority; in October 1960 it was
approved by the smallest margin
since 1951, when the issue first
arose. This setback to Taipei's
position was compounded by
statements ' from. various
African delegates that their
abstentions were grudgingly
given and would not be repeated
in the future. After the last
ballot, the general mood of
many supporters of the mora-
torium was that it would not
pass again.
Since October,' there has
been increasing speculation about
IN THE UNITED NATIONS
the future of Nationalist China,
sparked notably by statements
from Britain and Brazil that
they would no longer support
the moratorium. Uncertainty
among UN members about the
position of the new US admini-
stration has also encouraged
speculation.
Although the Chinese repre-
sentation issue was postponed
for the duration of the 15th
General Assembly session--which
resumed on 7 March after a two-
month recess--Peiping's sup-
porters could attempt to re-
open the question at the cur-
rent session, though it would
require a two-thirds majority
to reverse the previous de-
cision.
Factors Affecting Peiping's
Admission
Some UN members argue for
Peiping's admission to the UN
because they subscribe to the
concept of the universality of
UN membership. Members are also
influenced by the desire to
bind the Chinese Communists not
only to the principles of the
UN Charter but to any inter-
national agreement that may be
reached on disarmament or the
banning of nuclear tests--
which they believe-would be ac-
cepted by the United Nations
as a whole.
Other members are eager to
see Peiping exposed to the rough-
and-tumble of UN debates and
voting line-ups; they see in
these encounters an opportunity
to exploit any differences be-
tween Peiping and Moscow.
The gradual erosion of
Taipei's position in the UN,more-
over, has: resulted in some un-
easiness among its supporters,
who by no means want to be the
"last to recognize" Peiping.
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Probably the greatest ob-
stacles to Peiping's admission
are its belligerence and its
opposition to any proposal that
would accord some international
status to the Nationalists--
even as "Taiwan" or "Formosa."
Many of Peiping's supporters
are reluctant to scuttle Taipei
completely. As a charter mem-
ber, Nationalist China has con-
tributed greatly to the develop-
ment of the United Nations, and
Dr. Tsiang, its permanent repre-
sentative since 1947, is held
in high esteem as a parliamen-
tarian.
Strong resistance to Pei- -
ping's entry on the part of the
United States has been a primary
factor.''In September 1959, how-
ever, Latin American irritation
over the problem of Chinese UN
representation was summed up by
the Brazilian delegate when he
stated that support for the
moratorium was "the heaviest
burden the Latin American coun-
tries had to bear in return for
US friendship."
There remains on the UN
books a 1951 resolution brand-
ing Communist China an aggres-
sor in Korea; the UN embargo on
strategic shipments to the main-
land was a direct outgrowth of
this resolution. However, a
precedent favorable to Peiping's
cause was set in 1955 when Spain
was admitted to the UN despite
a 1946 UN resolution condemning
its conduct.
Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chen Yi was recently
quoted as saying that Peiping
will not enter the UN until the
US ends its "occupation" of
Taiwan and withdraws its forces
from the area. Many UN members
which now support Peiping would
probably not accept the idea
that such a concession could
be made a prerequisite for Com-
munist China's entry in the UN.
Commonwealth and Europe
Certain Western European
states and "old Commonwealth"
members like Australia, while
supporting the moratorium, have
for many years believed that
Peiping's recognition and its
admission to the UN were in-
evitable but that it was not
yet time for such action. They
felt that in the meantime, closer
de facto relations with Commu-
nist China would reduce the
general tension and might make
the act of eventual recognition
easier. They looked on the
gradual deterioration of the
Nationalists' UN position as
part of the process.
The statement by British
Foreign Secretary Home on 8
February that Communist China
should be seated in the United
Nations has been subsequently
amplified in a privately ex-
pressed view by the Foreign Of-
fice that Taipei's supporters
would not even be able to at-
tach conditions to the seating
of Peiping. On the other hand,
the Foreign Office would oppose
admitting the Chinese Communists
if they insisted on UN recogni-
tion that Taiwan belonged to
them or that the 1951 aggres-
sion charge against Communist
China be expunged from UN re-
cords.
At the Commonwealth prime
ministers' conference in London
from 8 to 17 March, the majority
apparently endorsed London's
contention that Peiping should
be seated--and Taipei presumably
excluded. Australia and New
Zealand--both with considerable
public opinion favoring recogni-
tion of Peiping--appear reluctant
to modify their opposition to
its admission to the UN now, but
they may go along with Britain
if it refuses to support the
moratorium again. Canada has
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consistently favored the mora-
torium in the past, and Ex-
ternal Affairs Secretary Green
told Ambassador Merchant on 20
March that he personally op-
posed Peiping's admission.
A French Foreign Ministry
official stated on 21 February
that the British attitude was
unlikely to change the French
Government's opposition to seat-
ing Peiping. He indicated, how-
ever, that Paris was going to
restudy the question. He be-
lieved that the situation with-
in the UN was changing, although
he felt that Communist China
would probably prejudice its
chances of admission by posing
unacceptable conditions.
Austrian Foreign Minister
Kreisky recently stated that
there would be "no difficulty
for Austria" in recognizing the
Peiping regime, but that his
government's future attitude
in the UN--it now abstains on
the moratorium--"would depend
on circumstances."
The Scandinavian countries
--with the exception of Iceland
--all recognize Peiping and
have opposed the moratorium for
many years.
Recognition of China by UN Members
UNITED
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ESTIMATED FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES
1960-65
PROVIDED BY PROGRAM LAW
EXPENDITURES
(PROGRAMED ANNUALLY)
Army
1,508
1813
363
365
Navy
675
989
198
138
1,284
1,977
395
305
Inter-
Service
1,094
486
1,580
316
186
2,406
3,953
6,359
1,272
994
The principal increases under
the law go to the "interservice"
category, which includes the
nuclear weapons and missile pro-
grams, and to the air force.
The equipment funds for the
army and navy remain stabilized
at about the 1959 level.
CONTRACTING AUTHORITY PROGRAMED UNDER
FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT LAW (1960-1965)
(MILLION DOLLARS)
The Program Law does not itself commit funds or provide contracting authority, but
obliges parliament to vote the programed funds in each annual military budget. The
1960 and 1961 portions of the program funds have been approved by parliament.
1. Special Research and Development
2. Special Missiles
Hawk
Surface-to-surface missiles,
strategic and tactical
157
216
3. Aircraft
Mirage IV
204
Force Mirage III
361
Training aircraft
12
Light transport
37
Navy Etendard IV
51
Maritime patrol
94
Tri-
service Helicopters
63
Over-all research and devslopmenr
79
901
4. Land Vehicles
306
5. Principal Warships
Missile Cruisers
Submarines
169
2,406
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Nearly half of the research
appropriation covers the develop-
ment and production of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles.
Although the army continues
to receive about 40 percent of
the over-all military appropria-
tions, its slice of the five-year
program law covers only the cost
of new vehicles, most of which
will probably be simply replace-
ments. Therefore, this will not
permit complete modernization
of the army in Germany
e navy ge s -a
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modest construction program,
including carrier aircraft and
submarines.
The Defense Committee
speculated, on the basis of
Defense Ministry estimates,
that long-range equipment needs
would entail expenditures of
nearly $8.8 billion in a second
five-year program to run through
1969, The missile program would
get the largest increases in
that period, when it will be at
the production stage. The com-
mittee's concern over the em-
phasis on missiles at the ex-
pense of conventional-force
modernization was reflected in
its expression of hope that
funds allocated for army and
navy equipment categories would
also be greatly increased.
De Gaulle's Modifications
While the main lines of
the current reorganization and
modernization antedate De Gaulle's
return to power, he has pro-
vided the political stability
and continuity which such a
long-range program requires
and has taken personal charge
of its implementation. Thus
he saw to it that the constitu-
tion of the Fifth Republic made
his title of commander in chief
more explicit than the nominal
authority assigned to the presi-
dents of the Fourth Republic.
A long-planned revision
of the concept of "national
defense" was effected with 'the
drastic defense decree of early
1959 which gives the government
practically unlimited control
over civilians in time of emer-
gency. He has modified the
1957 plan to accelerate the
creation of a nuclear strike
force at the expense of a more
balanced program for all the
services, and many of his
command changes and staff re-
organizations have seemed de-
signed as much to ensure mili-
tary loyalty and responsiveness
to himself and his policies as
to modernize the French armed
services.
It is also evident that
he has modified or ignored some
of the major political prerequi-
sites postulated by the staff
which framed the reorganization
and modernization plan of 1957.
These included "firm attachment
to the Atlantic pact" and a
"long-term" solution in Algeria,
implying "no abandonment."
For example, when De Gaulle
was both premier and defense
minister in 1958, he created
the post of chief of the Nation-
al Defense Staff as the "su-
preme military authority of the
land," and installed the widely
respected Ely in it. Ely took
over the important coordinating
functions of the former Perma-
nent General Secretariat of De-
fense, which under the Fourth
Republic had been headed by a
civil servant, and also most of
the functions of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces, whose
new chief was a lower-ranking
general.
The latter's authority
over individual service chiefs
of staff was further reduced
by dividing their responsibili-
ties into administrative and
operational categories and
putting the administrative
matters under a civilian "minis-
ter delegate" for each service.
The effects of ill-defined and
overlapping authority were com-
pounded by De Gaulle's habit
as president and commander in
chief of issuing orders or making
his wishes known without regard
for regular channels.
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PROJECTED ALLOCATION OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES
1960-1965 1965-1970
( External )
Nuclear Weapons
190 Mirage III jet interceptors
200 Mirage Ills
IRBM's
6 modernized brigades -Expanded to
I-2Aircraft carriers
25 Mirage IVs (Mach 2 jet bombers
6 modern divisions with tactical
1-2 Cruisers
with nuclear capability )
nuclear armament
Amphibious force with helicopter carriers
50 Etendard IVs ( carrier-based air-
atrol aircraft
27 maritime
craft with nuclear capability )
p
Antisubmarine warfare force
(Assault capability for debarking 1500-2000 men )
Several nuclear submarines
( two aircraft carriers,
Possibly tactical nuclear weapons
( missile equipped )
one helicopter carrier )
I Army division ( 20,000 lightly equipped men
Conventional submarines and escorts
I Interservice group equivalent to 2 divisions
( Internal )
250,000 reserves ( could be mobilized
within one week ). Expanded to
400,000 reserves ( 90,000 active duty )
The Changes in top-level
commands announced in February
appear primarily intended to
place absolutely loyal Gaullists
in key positions and generally
to strengthen De Gaulle's con-
trol over the services, particu-
larly the army. Thus his former
personal military adviser,
General Jean Olie, who on 1
March succeeded Ely as chief of
staff for national defense, is
expected to work much more
closely with De Gaulle than did
Ely, who scrupulously respected
the constitutional requirement
that he report directly to the
premier rather than to the presi-
dent.
General Crepin has been
succeeded by a more politically
sophisticated officer, General
Fernand Gambiez, as commander
in chief in Algeria. In turn
the designation of Crepin to
be commander of French forces
in Germany ensures that this
major body of combat troops will
remain responsive to De Gaulle.
This evidently could not be
guaranteed under its present
commander, General Paul Allard,
who is a proponent of "French
Algeria."
A major reorganization
of the National Defense Staff
structure was approved in
principle on 1 March. It will
reportedly eliminate the three
civilian minister delegates
and will establish a Delegation
for Armaments,. directly sub-
ordinate to the minister of
armed forces, which would have
responsibility for all arms
programs--both conventional and
nuclear. Informed speculation
on other aspects of the reorgan-
ization sees the French de-
fense forces divided into three
categories (deterrent, interior
defense, intervention) which
correspond to those foreseen
when the program law was passed.
Military Reactions
Although the armed forces
approved of many of De Gaulle's
moves in the defense field,
many officers have had increas-
ing misgivings over the long-
range effect on French security
of his Algerian policy. Many,
including Ely himself, are also
concerned about the over-all
wisdom of De Gaulle's coolness
toward NATO.
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The 1960 program law's em-
phasis on the creation of a nu-
clear striking force was round-
ly criticized by a wide range
of political and military lead-
ers as wastefully expensive and
absurd from the standpoint of
realistic power relations--par-
ticularly after the US proposals
to make NATO a "nuclear power."
The nuclear strike force was
also criticized by many who
felt the army was being denied
the new and replacement materiel
and equipment it needed to win
the Algerian war.
The recently approved plan
for armaments centralization
is already being criticized,
particularly by the navy, which
is jealous of its weapons and
supply system and will probably
be inclined to resist the army
general who seems the most like-
ly candidate for "delegate for
armament."
For much of the army, the
entire reorganization program
is likely to be viewed sourly
against the background of the
unfulfilled conditions postu-
lated when the-original plan
was formulated in 1957. Facing
the prospect of leaving Algeria
without a complete victory and
feeling that the program law
discriminates against the army,
many officers are reportedly
talking of leaving the service.
While a number of army of-
ficers will probably be re-
leased in any event as the post-
Algerian demobilization and re-
organization shapes up, the ma-
jority will undoubtedly remain.
Nevertheless, for many whose
military orientation in recent
years has focused on guerrilla
warfare and on retaining Al-
geria at all costs, the polit-
ical and technical reorienta-
tion would be difficult. Stu-
dents of the army's structure
have already pointed to the in-
creasing opportunities of ad-
vancement which modernization
will offer the comparatively
few highly technically trained
younger officers at the expense
of their infantry-oriented
seniors.
Many responsible military
leaders also reportedly are
apprehensive over the possible
effect, the condemnation of the
Algerian war by many French in-
tellectual and religious lead-
ers may have on the morale of
future conscripts. These of-
ficers complain that the army
is being increasingly isolated
from the nation by such activi-
ties.
Outlook
Those who for political
or military reasons wish to
arrest or modify the program
must reckon with the fact that
much of it is now several years
old--particularly the nuclear
weapons effort--and that the
passage of time will increas-
ingly consolidate it along
lines marked out by De Gaulle.
There also seems to be agree-
ment that he has increasingly
imposed his will on the armed
forces--particularly~the army--
and can be expected to move
skillfully to parry and over-
come opposition elements.
Nevertheless, it is also ap-
parent that De Gaulle--in si-
multaneously requiring the armed
services to accept his version
of the reorganization plan
while he prepares what many will
regard as an inglorious with-
drawal from Algeria--still runs
a considerable risk in defying
entrenched interests in the
armed forces and a gamut of po-
litical leaders with varying
axes to grind on this issue.
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Trofim D. Lysenko, the
controversial Soviet scientist
who in Stalin's time had wide
influence in the fields of agri-
culture and biology, is regain-
ing--at least in agriculture--
some of the authority he lost
after Stalin's death. His ap-
pearance at the January central
committee plenum on agriculture
and the appointment of his ad-
herent M. A. Olshansky as min-
ister of agriculture are evi-
dence of the increase in
Lysenko's political prestige.
Reputable scientists view
Lysenko as a charlatan, and his
rise at a time when Khrushchev
is calling- for the application
of the best scientific effort
to the solution of the USSR's
agricultural problems appears
something of an anomaly.
on the basis of the immediate
applicability of their research
in industry or agriculture.
Rising Political Prestige
In his speech to the plenum
on 14 January, Lysenko sharply
attacked the work of former
Minister of Agriculture V. V.
Matskevich and urged reorganiza-
tion of the ministry itself.
He charged that the ministry
had ignored his cattle-breeding
experiments and, in fact, thought
so little of them that his
breeding stock had been slaugh-
tered for meat. He complained
that his 20-page protest, ad-
dressed to the-.ministry six
months earlier, had not been
acknowledged until January. At
this point Khrushchev commented
caustically, "They read slowly
in the Ministry of Agriculture."
Khrushchev's personal eval-
uation of Lysenko, expressed
privately to visiting Westerners
in the spring of 1956 when Ly-
senko's career appeared to be
in eclipse, suggests that the
Soviet leader himself is the
source of his reviving influ-
ence: "As to Lysenko, opinions
about his theories vary. It is
necessary to discuss and com-
pare in order to evaluate cor"
rectly all theories. Lysenko
is one of our prominent agron-
omists, but he has the charac-
ter of a dog.... (Other) scien-
tists fear his bad nature.
Nevertheless, I repeat that he
is a very prominent agronomist.
Many pseudo-scientists who
criticize him are not worth his
little finger." At this point
Mikoyan interjected: "You
exaggerate."
The Soviet premier's public
praise of Lysenko has emphasized
his "close ties with life," a
favorite Khrushchev theme in
science and education programs.
Khrushchev has often voiced sus-
picion of scientists concerned
with basic theoretical research
for their failure to contribute
directly to the national econ-
omy; last year he recommended
that all scientists be paid only
Other high-ranking poli-
tician at the plenum took
pains to make it clear that they
did not share Matskevich's in-
difference to Lysenko's work.
D. S. Polyansky, premier of the
Russian Republic (RSFSR), stated,
"We have all the requirements to
obtain highly productive cows
yielding milk with a high butter-
fat content--cows which are be-
ing developed under the direc-
tion of the outstanding scien-
tist T. D. Lysenko."
T. I. Sokolov, party boss
of the agriculturally important
Tselinnyy (New Lands) Kray,
linked Khrushchev and Lysenko
in praise: "We are confident
that the reorganization of the
Ministry of Agriculture--carried
out on the initiative of N. S.
Khrushchev--the further consoli-
dation and development of the
Michurin trend in science--
headed by the remarkable worker
and outstanding scientist. T. D.
Lysenko--will secure the further
development of all phases of
agriculture on a correct scien-
tific foundation." (I. V.
Michurin, somtimes called the
Burbank of Russia, preceded
Lysenko in asserting that hered-
itary variation, is the result
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of the effects of environmental
changes.)
Lithuanian party boss A.
Yu. Snechkus called attention
to the fact that Lysenko's cat-
tle would soon be introduced
into the Lithuanian livestock
program and that Lithuanian
farms would apply mixtures of
organic-chemical fertilizers
as advocated by Lysenko.
Olshansky, whose appoint-
ment as minister of agriculture
was announced on 29 December,
has been described by other
scientists as a close associate
and "a true disciple" of Ly-
senko. Olshansky is to have
fabricated research to prove
Lysenko's theories and then be-
lieved what he had fabricated.
Both Olshansky and Lysenko ac-
companied Khrushchev to Kiev in
late January on the first leg
of the premier's inspection
tour of agricultural.areas. Ly-
senko joined Khrushchev on the
speakers' platform at the con-
ference of RSFSR agricultural
workers in Moscow in late Feb-
ruary. Both Lysenko and 01-
shansky appeared with him at
the meeting of agricultural
workers in Akmolinsk in mid-
March, and Olshansky also ac-
companied him to the Kazakh
agricultural workers' meeting
in Alma-Ata.
Khrushchev has continued
to heap public praise on Ly-
senko. In Moscow on 23 February
he commented: "It Is a good
thing to study with scientists
who are closely connected with
life, such as Academician
Trofim D. Lysenko. I myself
have listened a good deal to him
and his pupils, and have sev-
eral times visited his farm
near Moscow, and the Odessa in-
stitute. I recall with grati-
tude the talks which I had with
him."
With Olshansky heading the
reorganized Ministry of Agri-
culture and with Khrushchev's
admiration publicly expressed
and echoed by other party
leaders, Lysenko is clearly in
a position to exert significant
influence in the programing of
research in agricultural insti-
tutes.
Theory on Heredity
Lysenko's career began in
the early 1930s,when he achieved
some success in accelerating the
maturation of plants by treating
the seeds before planting. His
experiments were not scientifi-
cally controlled, and the con-
clusions he drew went far beyond
anything that could be supported
by the results achieved.
Contradicting all other
scientific work in genetics, he
has insisted that genes and
chromosomes are sinister bour-
geois myths, and that the whole
living organism draws inherit-
able characteristics from its
environment. Hereditary changes
can thus, in his view, be di-
rected by man's changing the
environment and need not depend
on accidental mutations or on
the limited changes possible
through selective breeding.
These theories, although
without demonstrated scientific
basis, are compatible with
Marxist doctrine and may even
be taken seriously by their pro-
pounder, whose scientific edu-
cation, received during the
1920s, was quite haphazard. In
addition to being politically
useful, his theories have always
been attractive because they
promise shortcuts to agricultural
gains which more orthodox genet-
icists, promise only over a long
period of time. This, indeed,
is probably the key to Lysenko's
popularity with Khrushchev, who
seems almost desperate for a
quick improvement in the Soviet
agricultural picture.
Lysenko's scientific op-
ponents have thus been faced
with the difficult task of con-
vincing Soviet political lead-
ers who want to believe his
views that his "scientific dis-
coveries" are either misinter-
pretations of evidence or in
some cases deliberate falsifi-
cation of results. To replace
his attractive promises, they
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themselves can offer only the
delay of further research be-
fore their own successes can
be applied in agriculture.
Moreover, their proof that Ly-
senko is wrong in his claims
rests on scientific premises
and techniques which look like
hairsplitting to the nonspecial-
ist.
Influence Under Stalin
To compensate, at least
vis-a-vis political leaders,
for his weak scientific back-
ground, Lysenko attributed his
"successes" to the inspiration
of Stalin and the socialist sys-
tem, and charged scientists who
questioned his claims with
political treason. In Stalin's
later years, Lysenko achieved
control of both agricultural
policies and biological re-
search. Under his aegis, the
campaign of the late 1940s to
purify Soviet biology of "bour-
geois-imperialist" opposition
to his theories resulted in the
closing of institutes, the re-
writing of textbooks, and the
arrest of scientists. Stud
books and pedigree records were
abandoned; hybrid corn develop-
ment was checked.
The Soviet afforestation
program was saddled with in-
structions to plant seedlings
in clusters, on the theory that
competition would make each
tree grow more lustily. All
the plantings suffered from
crowding, and the program was
later condemned as a failure.
Basic biological research
stagnated, since Lysenko's views
on the exchange of character-
istics between the whole living
organism and its environment
left no scope for proper labo-
ratory research.
Even before Stalin's
death, Lysenko's opponents, en-
couraged by hints of a general
political thaw, renewed their
efforts to remove his grip from
the biological sciences. In
the spring of 1955, the Academy
of Sciences' Botanical Journal
summed up the results of a
re-examination of Lysenko's
claims: "It has now been con-
clusively demonstrated that the
entire concept is factually un-
sound and theoretically and
methodically erroneous, and that
it is not of practical value...."
Having noted that in at
least one instance the investi-
gators had found clear evidence
of falsification of results in
order to support Lysenko's
claims, the journal complained
that "T. D. Lysenko is resur.
recting in our science...the
naive transformist beliefs that
were widespread in the biology
of antiquity and the Middle
Ages." The journal referred
bitterly to "the clearly theo-
logical nature" of Lysenko's
belief in the ability of plants
to select for themselves good
qualities deriving from their
environments.
In April 1956 Lysenko's
critics finally achieved his
resignation from his post as
president of the Academy of
Agricultural Sciences. He re-
tained the directorship of the
Institute of Genetics--under the
USSR Academy of Sciences--but a
number of competent geneticists
established fruitful research
programs outside the jurisdic-
tion of this institute.
In July 1956, Matskevich,
then minister of agriculture,
complained publicly about the
serious inadequacies in agri-
cultural research. In only
thinly veiled allusions to
Lysenko, he attributed these
shortcomings to the conceit of
"certain scientific workers...
based simply on ignorance,"
and stated, "A number of
scientists, especially those
who pride themselves on their
remarkable discoveries which,
at least in their own eyes,
are causing a revolution in
science, have properly studied
neither the native nor the
foreign literature on the sub-
ject under discussion, nor the
practices of socialist agricul-
ture."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Lysenko's recovery in po-
litical prestige since 1956
may not reach the heights he
achieved under Stalin. De-
spite his success in 1959 in
effecting the removal from
their posts of a few individual
opponents in biological theory,
the main-.course of Soviet basic
research in biological theory
has not been deflected by Ly-
senkoism, nor has it been sig-
nificantly weakened by the
regime's increased emphasis on
applied science.
There is some evidence
that a deliberate effort is
being made to restrict his in-
fluence to agriculture. In his
speech at the January plenum
Lysenko attacked A. N. Nes-
meyanov, president of the USSR
Academy of Sciences, for a De--
cember article in Pravda on the
prospects for the u ture of
biological research. Referring
to the "alleged" existence of
genes, Lysenko declared: "This
scientific doctrine, which does
not correspond to reality, was
long ago refuted by Michurinite
biology and on the basis of ex-
perimental facts in agricultural
practices." In December 1958,
he had attacked Nesmeyanov for
devotion tb'the cause of basic
theoretical research as opposed
to applied science.
At the January plenum he
sharpened this attack to complain
that biophysics and biochemis-
try, were lagging badly under
the leadership of Nesmeyanov,
who had cited these fields as
the most promising for future
research.
In contrast to the atten-
tion devoted to Lysenko's re-
marks on agriculture, the So-
viet central press all but ig-
nored this patent attempt to re-
gain control of biological re-
search. Izvestia noted tersely
that he "devoted a considerable
part of his speech to questions
on Michurinite biology and the
formation of species"; Pravda
failed to print even this much
information. The TASS account,
not carried in the central press,
added Lysenko's dictum that the
sole correct program for the re-
construction of the work of all
biological and agricultural
scientific research organizations
is that based on dialectical
materialism--in the interpreta-
tion of which he claims unique
competence. The full text of the
speech appeared only in the
specialized Rural Life, a journal
published by the party central
committee and devoted to agri-
cultural affairs.
Lysenko's tendency to prom-
ise fast results, when combined
with Khrushchev's impatience, may
lead to the adoption of panaceas
and a misuse of resources in
agriculture. Lysenko's special
organic-chemical fertilizer mix-
ture, while no less effective
than other fertilizers, was con-
demned in 1957 by the USSR Acad-
emy of Agricultural Sciences as
an unnecessarily complicated
measure without scientific basis
and entailing an uneconomic use
of resources.
Lysenko's influence on agri-
cultural research could in the
long run undercut Soviet agri-
cultural progress through the
substitution of his pet theories
for more potentially fruitful
lines of investigation.
Lysenko is in a strong po-
sition politically, since, as
under Stalin, he has influence
without responsibility. When the
Soviet shelter-belt program was
declared a failure, the first
deputy minister of forestry was
fired, not Lysenko, whose advice
the former had been forced to
follow. If the USSR has another
poor harvest in the near future,
the blame can again be placed on
mistakes of planning and procure-
ment officials and of farm chair-
men, on speculation and theft, or
on unfavorable weather. The more
widely Lysenko's'theories are
applied and publicly attributed
to him, however, the more vul-
nerable he will become as a
potential scapegoat for a future
agricultural disaster.
25X1
(Concurred in By 25X1
ORR and OSI)
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