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March 30, 1961
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Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00 0080001-14 CONFIDENTIAL v~cDivr-Tr CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. 1224 OCt NO. 0273/61 30 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 IDOCUMENTNO. 25X1 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 0 DECLASSIFIED State Department review completed CLASS. CHANGED TO:: TAU o "X1 NEXT REVIEW DATE: Approved For Release 20D5103/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A00'AITbbO'$b(3?"f-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 CIA-RDP79-00927AO03f 0080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 March 1961 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Communist bloc propaganda suggests that the USSR will not agree unconditionally to the British proposals on Laos and that the Communists will try to avoid a commitment on a cease-fire before an international conference is con- vened. However, favorable references to the British pro- posals by Gromyko, together with the generally moderate tone of the Pravda "Observer" article on 27 March, reflect Moscow's desire not to exacerbate the critical situation in Laos. The Boun Oum government is holding back on adopting a political position pending the outcome of East-West deliberations on Laos, but cabinet discussions continue on possible courses of action. Recent Commu- nist military activity in Laos has been limited to small- scale actions, possibly reflecting immediate political considerations,but the Communist forces are capable of stepped-up operations at any time against the dispirited Laotian Army. CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 The UN is continuing its pressure on Leopoldville to allow the re-entry of UN troops into Matadi, but the Congor lese are adamant that only civilians can be permitted in the port for the time being. The question of how Indian troops to be transported by sea--the bulk of those ex- pected--will enter the country thus is still unsolved. Various Congolese officials apparently are making un- coordinated efforts at negotiations between the Leopold- ville and Stanleyville regimes. Tshombd is sending 1,000 troops against Manono, capital of the secessionist "Lualaba state" in north Katanga. NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 The chief Soviet delegate has had little to say at the nuclear test ban negotiations in Geneva during the past week, but has indicated that he will present a comprehen- sive reply to the new Western proposals after the detailed explanations are completed. Outside the conference, Tsarapkin has used several press interviews to minimize the extent of Western concessions and to emphasize his warnings against further French testing. He has, how- ever, stopped short of making cessation of French test- ing a precondition for further negotiations. He has also stressed the "paramount importance" of the Soviet proposal for a tripartite council to administer the control system. Ambassador Thompson believes that the tripartite concept proposed by Khrushchev for the UN Secretariat has become basic Soviet policy on questions of international administration and that Moscow, therefore, will probably maintain its position on the council for administering SECRET i 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03PJZF&A -RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO031DD080001-1 SECRET the nuclear control system even to the point of a breakdown of the Geneva talks. 25X1 CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11 Announcement of the formation of the anti-Castro "Revolutionary Council" has evoked comparatively little hemisphere reaction thus far; an Argentine official at the UN has given it qualified endorsement. F_ I Increased difficulties in the sugar cane harvest--many of them involving suspected sabotage-- seem likely to reduce this year's crop below earlier estimates. KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL SHAKE-UP CONTINUES. . . . . . . . . Page 12 Khrushchev's shake-up of Soviet officialdom has claimed another of his lieutenants, presidium candidate Pospelov, and is reaching into all levels of party and government. Corruption and deficiencies in the agri- cultural field continue to be the most frequent charges. Still other .factors are involved, however, including political maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants in preparation for the party congress to be held in October. If the demotions and firings, now in their 13th week, continue at the present rate, they will be the most extensive housecleaning undertaken by Khru- shchev. SOVIET OFFICIAL VISITS ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA . . . . . . . Page 13 The Soviet ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin, apparently failed to achieve the main objectives of his recent trip to South America. Of the countries which he proposed to visit, only Ecuador and Venezuela granted him visas, and neither of these would agree to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. President Betancourt of Venezuela complained to Bazykin of unfair Soviet competition in oil sales and described local Communists as agitators inspired by Moscow. Ecuador agreed to an exchange of trade delegations, however, and both coun- tries may develop cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Although Bazykin's official reception was cordial, the attitude of the public was cool and at times hostile. DISSENSION IN ECUADOR OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA. . President Velasco's vacillation on policy toward Cuba and the bloc is contributing to a sharp division between pro- and anti-Castro forces in Ecuador. There are indications of an impending cabinet shake-up which may favor the pro- Castro group. Domestic unrest rising from the Castro SECRET ii Page 15 $ F, Approved For Release 2005/037 EF-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0031aO080001-1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 issue may threaten prospects for holding the 11th Inter- American Conference, often postponed and now scheduled to begin in Quito on 24 May. post o ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 The forced resignation of Argentine Army Commander in Chief Toranzo Montero has at]east temporarily strength- ened the Frondizi government. Most top military leaders, although they agreed with some of Toranzo Montero's com- plaints over Peronism and Communism, felt that his demands for stronger pressure on Frondizi constituted a threat to constitutional government. Toranzo Montero retains some influence within the armed forces, however, and has warned that he will be "active on the sidelines." MOROCCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 25X1 Morocco intends to back its claims to Spain's Saharan territories and to recently independent Mauritania by armed action was well as by diplomatic pressure.! 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X6 nticipating that the issue of Mauritania's UN ip would be brought up at the current General Assembly session, Morocco appears to be fomenting unrest in order to focus international attention on its claims. ISRAELI AID IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 Although three recipients of Israeli aid--Ghana, Guinea, and Mali--signed Nasir's anti-Israel resolution last January at the African "summit" conference in Casablanca, Tel Aviv has decided to continue to expand its aid program among new African states. The Israeli Government plans to send 400 experts to Africa and Asia during 1961; approximately 500 nongovernment technicians from Israel are already there. About 1,000 foreign trainees are to come to Israel this year. Other Arab states have joined Nasir in mpaign against the Israeli program. 25X1 SECRET iii Approved For Release 2005/03I:1$-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003fD0080001-1 SECRET BELGIAN GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20 The success of the Socialist party in the elections on 26 March has increased the likelihood that Belgium's next government will be a coalition of the Social Christian and Socialist parties, with Paul Henri Spaak, Socialist leader and former secreaty general of NATO, playing a prominent role. While no major changes in foreign policy are anticipated, Spaak has been privately critical of some of his country's moves in the Congo and would probably bring about greater Belgian cooperation both there and in NATO matters. INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS . . Leaders at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), at their recent high-level meeting in Brussels, made some progress toward overcoming the difficulties confronting the organization. Affiliated unions have pledged $7,250,000 to the proposed $10,000,- 000 solidarity fund to help finance free trade unionism in the developing areas of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and a start was made toward a more efficient organization of the ICFTU itself. Nevertheless, the confederation seems likely to continue to suffer from internal frictions and lack of complete support by its affiliates--as indicated by the refusal of the British unions to make further contributions to the fund. . Page 21 SCIENCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22 The Chinese Communists are in the fifth year of a 12-year scientific program with the objective Of reaching "world levels of achievement." Progress is being made in the 11 priority technological fields--including atomic energy and jet propulsion. China's small group of com- petent scientists is being slowly augmented by stu- dents trained in bloc countries. However, research and development are limited by a shortage of scientists and equipment. Further limitations arise from China's heavy dependence on Soviet technical assistance, sharply curtailed by the withdrawal of Soviet techni- cians last summer. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ROLE IN THE BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE . . . Page 23 Czechoslovakia is providing economic and military assistance to 17 countries outside the bloc. Total aid extended thus far amounts to $660,000,000, compared with a Soviet aid total of $3.8 billion and a Chinese Communist aid total of $350,000,000. About half of the Czech aid is being provided for economic develop- ment projects, the remainder for military equipment. SECRET iv 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03m LRflIL-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO031M080001-1 SECRET 30 March 1961 SPECIAL ARTICLES CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . Page 1 Recent announcements by such key UN members as Britain and Brazil that they will not continue to support the moratorium on Chinese UN representation indicate that use of this procedural device will no longer preserve Taipei's position in the UN. The British Foreign Office believes that Taipei's sup- porters will not even be able to attach conditions-- such as UN membership for Nationalist China as "Taiwan" or "Formosa"--to the seating of Peiping. The growing opposition to the moratorium, which post- pones discussion of either the seating of Peiping or the ouster of Taipei, reflects a belief among members that the UN must soon take action on the problem. DE GAULLE'S PROGRAM FOR THE FRENCH ARMED SERVICES . . . . Page 5 De Gaulle is reorganizing the French armed forces to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. Most of his long-range objectives, including early achievement of a nuclear capability, are embodied in a law passed last fall which lays out a program for the development of the armed forces in the period 1960-65. Various as- pects of this program, particularly the priority being given to nuclear weapons, are at variance with an earlier plan which called for a balanced development of all services. This has aroused sharp criticism, especially among senior army officers who are also critical of De Gaulle's Algerian and NATO policies. T.-D. LYSENKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10 The recent revival of the influence of Trofim D. Lysenko, a power under Stalin in the fields of agricul- ture and biological research, is anomalous at a time when Khrushchev is calling for the best scientific methods to solve the USSR's agricultural problems. Lysenko's theories of genetics, based on Communist doctrine rather than science, are deplored by repu table scientists in the USSR. The current favor ac- corded by Khrushchev probably stems from Lysenko's willingness to promise fast practical results. Al- though Lysenko is far from regaining the authority he exercised under Stalin, he is in a position to exert significant influence over agricultural research. SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03$-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 Approved For ReleaW2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0031tN80001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY WEEKLY REVIEW LAOS Bloc Diplomacy On 24 March, the day fol- lowing President Kennedy's state- ment on Laos, Gromyko told Am- bassador Stevenson at the UN that he had a message from Khru- shchev to deliver orally to the President and asked for a meet- ing as, soon as possible. In his conversation with the President on 27 March,,Gromyko said that, in the USSR's view, the latest British proposals--contained in a note delivered on 23 March-- could serve as a basis for set- tlement in Laos. However, having offered this hopeful statement, Gromyko urged that both sides should show restraint and take steps to prevent the conflict from spreading. He did not clarify the Soviet Union's po- sition on the question of a cease-fire and said that Mos- cow's reply to the British note would be forthcoming in the near future. The favorable references to the British proposals by Gromyko, together with the gen- erally moderate and positive'tone of the authoritative Pravda "Observer" article onTarch, appear to reflect the Soviet leaders' awareness that the re- cent military and diplomatic moves by the US and Britain have brought the contest over Laos to a new and more critical phase. Gromyko's remarks after the meeting with the President expressing hope for a peaceful' settlement suggest that Moscow sought to forestall any decisions by the SEATO conferees which might raise the possibility of expanded military action. At the same time, the So- viet Union had to maintain its own strong bargaining position in Laos. This was reflected in the Pravda warning that bloc policy would not be influenced by hints of "collective inter- vention by SEATO" and by move- ments of American naval and mil- itary forces. European satel- lite propaganda has also at- tempted to demonstrate that the US--not the Communists--has been guilty of intervention in Laos and must bear full responsibil- ity for the crisis. 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar ft proved For Release 200W B Y CUPFLW9-00927A003100080001 J1age 1 of 25 Approved For Relea, a.2OO5/03/29: CIA-RDP79-OO927AOO31008OOO1-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ?' Lao Kay Ban Ta Viang Ban?, t~n ng :ilet Xg Khou j GULF OF TI-R(AI L AN ttopeU VIETNAM r()PEu) 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar A~proved For Release 200?U/I'YC9-00927AO03100080001-baize 2 of 25 Approved For Release..2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0031fd'080001-1 ,SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The Pravda Commentary The "Observer" article, which has received unprecedented publicity by Radio Moscow, rep- resented a direct reply to Pres- ident Kennedy's press conference remarks, which had previously been barely mentioned by Moscow media. The article sought to emphasize the fact that the USSR was the earliest and most con- sistent proponent of a negotiated settlement in Laos and followed the general line taken by Pre- mier Khrushchev in his interview with Ambassador Thompson on 9 March, pointing out that the USSR and the US now agree that the objective should be a truly neutral and independent Laos. While Pravda took issue with the President's remarks regarding the origins of the Laotian crisis, the article welcomed his statement that the US wants peace and not war in Laos, a truly neutral government, and a settlement through negotia- tions. Although the article avoided any direct comment on the British proposal for a cease-fire, it implied that the USSR would not agree to any approach which would indicate Soviet responsibility for and direction of the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces. Pravda characterized President ennedy's call for a cessation of armed attacks by externally supported Communists as "tantamount to an ultimatum to the people of Laos." While Pravda' ,s position would not necessarily preclude Soviet agreement to a joint appeal by the Geneva do-chairmen for a de facto cease-fire, recent bloc propaganda on this issue suggests an intention to evade any firm commitment on the timing of a formal cessation of hostilities prior to an international con- ference, on the grounds that this is a matter for the conference itself to decide. The Asian Communists A 23 March People's Dail editorial, Peiping'sfirs press commentary on Laos in more than 10 days, called on all "peace- loving forces to firmly support the patriotic struggle of the Lao people" and proposed only that common efforts be made to convene a 14-nation conference-- a conference in which the Com- munists would try to ensure strong Pathet Lao participation in a coalition Laotian govern- ment. Hanoi, in a 25 March edito- rial attacking the position Pres- ident Kennedy took at his press conference, accused the US of endorsing an immediate cease- fire only to strengthen "rebel" forces. The concept that the ICC could actually be used to help bring about a cease-fire prior to the international con- ference was roundly castigated by the Pathet Lao,who, on 27 March, charged this would "serve US perfidious schemes." Even North Korea joined in to attack the President's press confer- ence statement ,and depict the US as "driven to the corner." Peiping broadcast a highly edited version of the Pravda "Observer" article, choosing to emphasize that portion which implied the use of force to counter any SEATO move in Laos. However, Communist China's For- eign Minister Chen Yi, during a recent interview in Burma, carefully skirted a question on SEATO intervention in Laos which would have provided an opportu- nity for explicitly threatening to counter such a move with Chi- nese forces. Asked what would be the result if SEATO openly invaded Laos, Chen Yi replied in writing that "the civil war will be prolonged, the suffering of the Laotian people will be increased." SECRET 30 Mar 6Approved For Release 200 ': ELit$1679-00927AO0310008000f-*ge 3 of 25 Approved For Release-2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00316db80001-1 SECRET The most precise threat to continue the war in Laos has come from the Pathet Lao, who on 28 March broadcast another statement warning of an ap- peal "to peace-loving countries for military help" unless the US ceases its "interference" and accepts the 14-nation conference. Prime Minister Nehru, more active than ever in his role as international broker, has been using his influence in several major capitals to move the crisis toward a negotiated solution. After exchanging messages with President Kennedy and Prime Min- ister Macmillan, Nehru contacted Khrushchev appealing for his support of the British proposals and expressing the hope that they would lead to a cease-fire, re- convening of the ICC, and later an international conference. The Indian leader had earlier indicated his readiness to re- call the ICC, initially perhaps in New Delhi, if requested by the two Geneva co-chairmen. Political Scene in Vientiane Further political moves in Vientiane have been held in abey- ance during the absence of King Sa- yang and General Phoumi, who were in southern Laos until 29 March, and pending the outcome of East- West deliberations on the Lao- tian crisis. However, cabinet discussions are continuing on possible courses of action. Vientiane leaders continue to look to international support for the defense of Laotian territory. Former Premier Phoui San- anikone, meanwhile, is working behind the scenes for a replace- ment of the present government, which he feels is "dictatorial" and only antagonizing the ma- jority of the population. He proposes that the King persuade Boun Oum and Phoumi to step down and that he then take personal charge of a transitional govern- ment pending a general election. There is considerable support for this proposal among other conservative Laotian politicians, and Savang reportedly has taken it under advisement. Nehru continues in his pub- lic statements to underscore the gravity of the Laotian situa- tion and to endorse the British- US approach as constructive and the best means of achieving what he feels is immediately required--an end to hostilities and the influx of arms. Nehru also sent word to Souvanna Phouma in Paris! urging Souvanna to return to Phnom Penh for further talks with Phoumi. Nehru appar- ently feels continued efforts toward reconciling Laotian polit- ical elements must proceed with- out delay to ensure the success of international negotiations. New Delhi generally has taken the position that any national government not taking in all fac- tions would be neither effective nor acceptable as a basis for international agreement. The Military Situation There has been only minor skirmishing during the past week. While thy'Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have the capability for renewed offensive action, they have been engaged primarily in consolidating their positions on the various fronts. The lull in the fighting may be a purely tactical measure on their part, but might also reflect Communist intent to allow the pattern of international negotiations to become established. Army leaders, despite re- duced enemy pressure along Route 13, remain fearful of an attack on Luang Prabang, Phoumi believes the enemy objective is complete domination of north- ern Laos, with Luang Prabang as an immediate target. The strength of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces north of the Phou Khoun road junction would ap- pear to rule out a victory SECRET 30 Mar 61Approved For Release 21 9/ '194]gY4-W P79-00927AO03100080ggigq 4 of 25 Approved For Release.2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100**980001-1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY over the numerically superior government defenders, posi- tioned about 25 miles south of Luang Prabang. However, the army's morale, which General Ouane describes as at "an all- time low," could be an overrid- ing factor. Laotian Army leaders are also concerned over recent move- ments by Pathet Lao troo s north of Luang Prabang. The situation in the Muong Sai - Nam Bac region is somewhat ob- scure Government forces north of Vang Vieng on Route 13 have been making some progress in regaining lost ground, and have now reached a point about 15 miles north of that village. Their slow advance has been fur- ther held up in recent days by felled trees, mines, and mortar fire. In the area south of the Plaine des Jarres, enemy forces are still trying to crack the government's defensive position at Tha Thom. This effort is being hampered by Meo guerrilla operations throughout the Plaine des Jarres area,,which are in- flicting substantial casualties on isolated enemy units and hindering supply movements. New enemy action in the Kam Keut area, some 70 miles southeast of Pak Sane, has been reported. Firm details are still lacking, but Vientiane is taking a serious view of the situation, fearing'an enemy move-to cut the country in half. The attacks .n this area prob- ably are intended primarily as a diversionary move at this time, but the enemy's control of Kam Keut and Lak Sao to the east facilitates access to Laos from North Vietnam via the Vinh- Thakhek road. North Vietnamese Involvement 25X1 25X1 There is an increasing num- ber of reports oncer X1 of ort Vietnamese units in Chinese Nationalist Irregulars Although the withdrawal of the approximately 2,000 Chi- nese Nationalist irregulars from Laos has been proceeding, Chinese Nationalist officials report that the operation is being complicated by Laotian efforts to recruit from amore these elements. 25X1 25X1 5X1 125X1 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar 6 pproved For Release 209A?129: X-} 79-00927A00310008000f-ge 5 of 25 Approved For Releasr2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO031009N0001-1 SECRET Leopoldville The situation in the Congo continues to drift, and little progress has been made toward easing relations between the UN Command and the Congolese or between Leopoldville and Stan- leyville. The Congolese still oppose a UN military presence in the lower Congo at the port of Matadi, although their rela- tions with the UN Command have improved since UN representative Rajeshwar Dayal was temporarily replaced by Makki Abbas in mid- March. Secretary General Hammar- skjold wants to re-establish at least a minimal UN military force at Matadi--sufficient to protect the area containing the UN warehouses--and if the Congo- lese remain intransigent he may take the matter to the Security Council. The Congolese author- ities, who are willing to permit UN technicians at Matadi but not military forces because of the effect on the populace, have charged that the UN is deliber- ately holding up needed food supplies at the port because of reluctance to recognize the Ileo government in Leopoldville. The position of the UN Command is that without UN supervisory per- sonnel--and protecting troops-- at the port it is unable to as- sume responsibility for the dis- patch of supplies from the Matadi warehouses. Nehru's toughening attitude. On 27 March he stated in the Indian Parliament that the UN must oc- cupy Matadi, by force if neces- sary. He warned that India could not send troops there if they are not assured of a safe landing. The departure from Bombay of a US naval transport with an estimated 2,300 Indian troops on board was postponed from 29 March to 1 April at the UN's request. Various Congolese officials apparently are making uncoordi= nated efforts to improve their relations between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Minister of Information Bolikango and Leo- poldville provincial President Kamitatu have not yet left for Stanleyville,even though Kamitatu is reported desirous of mediating and claims that Gizenga has expressed to him a desire to negotiate. Premier-designate Ileo, however, has wavered on granting permission; he is concerned that Kamitatu, who was a strong Lu- r-umba supporter, may defect to the Gizenga regime upon arrival in Stanleyville. Kamitatu states, however, that such fears are groundless because he is prima- rily interested in serving his- constitutents in Leopoldville Province and, moreover, has had serious differences with Gizenga in the past. Hammarskjold's position is considerably strengthened by General Mobutu announced on 29 March that negotiations are in progress between his officers SECRET 30 Mar 67Approved For Release 20D/D ~J : CTX- '79-00927AO03100080001-1ge 6 of 25 Approved For Release2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO0310NIOO01-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 and military representatives of Stanle ville. Stanleyville An official of the Ameri- can Embassy in Leopoldville, com- menting on his most recent trip to Stanleyville, reports that public order continues to im- prove there and that authorities are developing some sense of responsibility, with greater control over their armed forces. He believes that, although the principal leaders are still pre- occupied with their own claims to legitimacy, Stanleyville rep- e ubHi C of t1_ o G-va aButa ono Bumbe -Aketi a kLab :ii:8:staie APo..t .opals .-.. V7 25X1 Atlantic Ocean uluabouig ~8akwange Lupute 30 MARCH 1061 31592 Maniema LI.- Kongolo Albertville Manono ? Mans Mwanga . M i t w a b y ..........., resentatives might now be will- ing to attend a conference of 25X1 Congolese leaders on some neu- tral ground if their security were assured by the UN. Moreover, they seem increas- ingly disenchanted with the fail- ure of the bloc and Afro-Asian nations to send aid or diplomatic representatives. Any inclination on the part of Gizenga to nego- tiate with Leopoldville may be inhibited by Mulele, his Cairo representative. There has been no change in the position of the Sudan, which continues to bar supply shipments to Stanleyville. The African states supporting Gizenga con- tinue to talk of ways to assist him, so far fruitlessly. Katanga Katanga's President Tshomb6, who is seeking to gain support among moderate African states for his Congo federation plan, recently suffered a rebuff to his international prestige at the hands of Liberian President Tubman, who refused to agree to a Tshomb6 visit because of pre- vailing Lumumbist sympathies in Liberia. Meanwhile, Tshomb6 is likely to create a problem for the UN and the West if he car- ries out his military effort against the Baluba tribal strong- hold at Manono held by pro-Gi- zenga troops. SECRET 30 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 7 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Releas2'005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A0031000'8.0001-1 SECRET The Katanga force, which numbers about 1,000, apparently plans to make a gradual advance The UN is taking no mil- itary action to meet the threat to Manono, but UN mil- itary commander General McKeown has been in Elisabethville trying to persuade Tshomb6--so far unsuccessfully--to call off the advance. UN officials are particu- larly concerned that the 60 South African volunteers or some of the other white troops serv- ing with Katanga may clash with the UN's Nigerian troops and give: rise to an incident with racial repercussions_ In addition there is con- siderable concern-in the min- ing centers of,Katanga that the large urban concentrations of Baluba tribesmen there may cause trouble. The Belgian consul general in Elisabethville stated on 28 March that between 85 and 90 Belgians now serving with Tshom- bd's forces military techni- cians under contract and volun- teers for the "white legion"-- would leave by mid-April. He hinted that Brussels might have to withdraw more Belgians as a result of international pressure, but he implied that the Belgian Foreign Ministry has little con- trol over the Ministry of Af- rican Affairs, which apparently is continuing its assistance to Tshomb6. The Katanga presi- dent has previously given his approval for the withdrawals but recently has become irri- tated over Belgian dealings with his Baluba rival, Jason Sendwe, and now is only re- luctantly acquiescing in their departure, SECRET 25X1 25X1 30 Mar 61. CIA RD Pa . e 8 of 25 Approved For Release AURA P79-00927A003100080001-1~ Approved For Release. A05/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100980001-1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS The Soviet delegation has maintained virtual silence in the Geneva conference but has indicated that Moscow will pre- pare a comprehensive reply to the new Western proposals. In private discussions on 22 and 23 March, chief Soviet dele- gate Tsarapkin urged Ambassador Dean to be patient and await a Soviet response after the United States and Britain complete. development of their proposals. He told the ambassador that he would continue to listen to the American plans with inter- est and that the USSR was anxious to bring about a suc- cessful conclusion to the negotiations. In the conference session on 24 March, Tsarapkin reiter- ated the Soviet delegation's intention to wait until the end of the US and British presentation before commenting in detail. He claimed that since the US position appeared to be a "package" proposal, an analysis and evaluation of individual points could not be given until conclusion of the Western explanations. During a private conver- sation with the chief British delegate on 27 March, Tsarapkin avoided any comment on the Western proposals but repeated his familiar line that the USSR had made all the conces- sions. He claimed that the Soviet proposals would be adequate to control a test ban; he characterized a ban as a measure of "extremely limited significance," stating that any treaty would be an exper- iment in international control, and should therefore begin with only a minimum of control fea- tures. council to supervise the con- trol system,;and made no reference to French testing. The British delegate gained the impression that the Soviet delegation was prepared to continue negotiations through the summer. The only substantive point raised by Tsarapkin at the con- ference concerned freedom of action of the three powers to resume small underground tests when the voluntary moratorium on these tests expired. Fore- shadowing the probable line of attack on this issue, he asked whether the American proposals admitted the possibility of re- suming underground tests at that time. The USSR has pre- viously insisted that the three powers should not be automatically free to do so. A member of the Soviet delegation has also indicated privately that it will insist that there be only 15 control posts for the USSR, rather than the 19'proposed by the West, and will hold out for Soviet representation on the inspection teams. He stated that the Soviet delegation regarded the new American proposals as bargaining counters. Outside the conference, Tsarapkin has continued his sharp criticism of the new American and British proposals. In an interview with a CBS correspondent on 23 March, he stated that the Western pro- posals contained little new and showed that the US con- tinued to hold an unacceptable position on such questions as the number of on-site inspections, the staffing of control posts: and on-site inspection teams, and the scientific criteria Tsarapkin agreed with the British suggestion that the end of May be a target date. for concluding a treaty, but only if the Soviet terms were accepted. He made only brief mention of the Soviet proposal for a tripartite administrative for determining which detected seismic events qualified for on-site inspection. He applied the same term to the US posi- tion on the. number of control posts in the USSR, the dura- tion of the moratorium on small underground tests, and a "num- ber of other questions." SECRET 3 0 Mar Bfproved For Release 200 R,yC iR 9-00927A00310008p I 1 g of 25 Approved For Release '2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO031000ZO001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Tsarapkin took a similar line in an interview with a correspondent of the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unita on 24 March. In an interview with a representative of the Polish press service on 25 March, he subdivided the American plan into three parts: 1) questions on which the US takes the same attitude as in the past; 2) certain issues on. which the West has made a short step forward, and 3) those points on which the West approached the Soviet compromise proposals. Without spelling out the specif- ic issues, Tsarapkin declared that even the rare concession seemed "illusory" and qualified by numerous conditions and reservations. would have to put the whole test ban negotiations into the framework of complete and gen- eral disarmament "if the Amer- icans failed to produce some Rt reported that Tsarap in, in a private conversation, belittled the Western concessions and stated that things looked bad for the success of the conference. Tsarapkin has also used press interviews to repeat his warning on the "negative effect" of continued French testing and to underscore the importance .of the Soviet proposals for a tripartite administrator for the control system. In the Polish press service interview he repeated his statement, given at the opening session, on the "negative influence" of French testing on the negotia- tions. Tsarapkin stated that continued testing by France "would render questionable the efficacy of an agreement." He told CBS that French tests threatened to nullify the pos- sibility of concluding a treaty. In private talks a member of the Soviet delegation pointed out, however, that these warn- ings did not pose any precondi- tions for further negotiations. On the question of a three- member administrative council, Tsarapkin termed it a "fundamen- tal problem" and "of paramount importance." Ambassador Thompson believes that the Soviet plan for a three-member secretariat to replace the UN Secretariat has become basic Soviet policy and that Moscow, therefore, will probably maintain its position on the three-member council to administer a test ban even to the point of a breakdown in the talks at Geneva. The volume of Soviet propa- ganda commentary on the nego- tiations last week was higher than for any week since the ne- gotiations began in the fall of 1958. Peiping has remained si- lent on the negotiations. The revised Western proposals were broadly characterized by Soviet propagandists as "nothing new," and a widely broadcast comment claimed they were intended as "psychological preparation for torpedoing" the talks. Moscow's commentators have also reported, however, that the Soviet delega- tion must await the explanation of the Western plan before appraising the individual pro- posals. Wide publicity has been given to the Soviet proposal for a tripartite administrator and to Tsarapkin"s warnings against further French testing. Although there is no explic- it threat of a Soviet test re- sumption nor any demand that France join the negotiations, a broadcast to France on 27 March claimed that an "effective" in- ternational agreement is "hardly possible" so long as "one of the European great powers" continues testing. TASS on 28 March report- ed the Soviet delegation had pointed out that French testing complicates not only the Geneva talks but the whole disarmament problem. 25X1 (Concurred in by OSI SECRET 30 Mar 61%pproved For Release 201109211: 79-00927A00310008000?Ige 10 of 25 Approved For Release.2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CUBA There has been only limited international comment so far on the 22 March announcement of the formation of the anti-Castro "Revolutionary Council" under Castro's former Premier Jose Miro Cardona. An Argentine representative in the UN gave as his immediate opinion that the creation of a Cuban govern- ment-in-exile would have a "fa- vorable impact in Latin Ameri- ca," but added that the formal announcement should have been made in some Latin American country tb avoid the charge that the new organization is a US "satellite" or "puppet." Radio Moscow charged the United States with violating several international agreements in al- lowing the anti-Castro group to organize a "government" on its soil. Castro reacted by boasting in a 25 March speech of the re- sistance with which Cubans would meet any invasion attempt by "mercenaries" (i.e., anti-Cas- tro Cuban exiles) or "marines." The "mercenary government" would last 24 hours or perhaps a lit- tle longer, he said, adding that "if they begin playing at local war, imperialism may meet with hemispheric war." He said that Cuba had many more arms than the Congo or Laos, and as- serted that, in case of an at- tack on Cuba, "peasants and workers from many other Ameri- can countries will march to war against imperialism." Recent reports describing Cuba's internal economic situa- tion are dominated by accounts of consumer-goods shortages, but most foreign observers in Havana continue,to feel that the regime is not threat ened by such economic dis- locations. Sabotage and organized re- sistance activities evidently are continuing to increase throughout Cuba despite a pre- sumably steady gain in the strength of the government's instruments of repression. Ac- counts of attempted sabotage of industrial and agricultural installations are becoming in- creasingly 25X1 frequent, and anti- 25X1 Castro terrorists are explod- ine bombs daily in Havana Recent reports indicate that sugar cane fires--allegedly set by saboteurs--may be increas- ing. A considerable portion of such fire-damaged cane normally can be salvaged by grinding it immediately, but the growing in- cidence of such reports implies some reduction in Cuba's esti- mated total 1961 sugar crop of 5,50(),000-6,000,000 tons as well as the further erosion of support for Castro among the peasant groups on which his popularity rests. The present slowdown in Camaguey Province by sugar-mill workers protesting wage cuts provides a further illustration of 'disenchantment with Castro among lower income groups. 25X1 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar 6Vproved For Release 200Wn1 4 QtftjF4W9-00927A003100080001 i1ace 11 of 25 Approved For Release 2605/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO0310008'0001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEK??t' SUMMARY KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL SHAKE-UP CONTINUES Khrushchev`s~current shake- up of Soviet officialdom has claimed another of his lieu- tenants and has reached into all levels of the party and government bureaucracies. The poor results in agricultural production last year touched off the shake-up, and corruption and deficiencies in the agricultural field continue to be the most frequent charges leveled against the victims. Still other fac- tors are involved, however, in- cluding political maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants in preparation for the 22nd party congress, to be held in October. If demoti.'on.s and fir- ings continue much longet at the present rate, this will be the most extensive bureaucratic housecleaning since Khrushchev took over. The most recent high-level victim is 62-year-old party presidium candidate Pospelov, who has lost his assignment as a member of the party central committee's bureau of the RSFSR --in charge of propaganda ac- tivit'ie s in the Russian Repub lc.. He has been demoted to a position he held once before (1949-52) --director of the party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism. He replaces Gennady Obidhkin, the institute's director since 1952. Pospelov remains a candi- date member of the party presi- ium, but the lesser importance of his new assignment makes it doubtful that he will be re- elected to the presidium at the October congress. Pospelov's removal from the RSFSR bureau is undoubtedly related to the replacement in late January of the deputy chair- man of the bureau, presidium member Aristov. These actions appear likely to have resulted from competition among Khru- shchev's lieutenants. The re- lease of both these officials from the party secretariat in May 1960 "to devote full time" to their duties on the RSFSR bureau was presumably a prelude to their current demotions. Pospelov's duties in the bureau have been taken over by Mikhail Yakovlev, ambassador to the Congo until expelled by 'tbo MQbvtu regimq in September 1960. Yakovlev assumed his new responsibilities sometime prior to 4 March when, as a member of the bureau, he gave a speech on the tapk9 of the press to a con- forence of RUSK newspaper of- ficials. Yakovlev, 50 years old, had never held a top-ranking posi- tion. A minor party official during World War II, he had become deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan by 1956 and a year later deputy chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Coun- tries. In mid-1958 he was pro- moted to deputy chairman, of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, presumably in charge of cul- tural affairs, and later re- ceived the additional post of RSFSR minister of foreign SECRET 30 Mar proved For Release 2005E EILYCRE I V9-00927AO03100080001-page 12 of 25 Approved For Release _=n5/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00310008Q001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY affairs, holding both these two posts until his Congo assignment last August. Now in its 13th week, the shake-up of government agricul- tural officials and the reor- ganization of agricultural agencies have involved the fir- ing or reassignment of nine of the fifteen republic agricul ture ministers in addition to USSR Agriculture Minister Vla- dimir Matskevich. Although most seem to have been made scape- goats for the agricultural de- ficiencies, a few apparently were moved to other responsible work to clear the way for ad- ministrators with the scientific and research experience needed to,direct the ministries in their new agricultural research functions. In addition, 11 provincial party chiefs--over half of them central committee members--have been fired in the campaign and several others have been given lateral transfers, presumably to break up local cliques and friendships. Their current loss of standing probably forecasts their exclusion from the new central party bodies to be elected in October. At present almost half those elected to those bodies at the 20th party congress in February 1956 appear slated to be dropped; since the congress is still seven months away, many others will probably also lose out. The Soviet ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin, and his personal secretary, Vladimir Chernyshev, made an "unofficial" visit to Ecuador and Venezuela from 7 to 23 March. Bazykin had also sought visas from Panama, Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay, planning to stay five to ten days in each country visited. Most were slow to reply, however, forcing him to postpone his trip for a month. By early March, only Ecua- dor and Venezuela had granted visas, Colombia had refused, and the requests to Panama, Haiti, and Paraguay were still pending. In answer to Paraguay's demand to know the "true purpose" of the visit, Bazykin said it was merely a courtesy trip and that he would perhaps have a chat with the foreign minister. During his stay in Ecua- dor, Bazykin met with the Presi- dent, vice president, foreign minister, and two other cabinet ministers. He also contacted leftists in Quito and Guayaquil and called on one of Ecuador's top Communist leaders. His official reception was cordial, but the attitude of the public was generally hos- tile. The government rejected six requests to hold demonstra- tions, but on the night of Bazykin's arrival a group of about 50 persons burned a Soviet flag outside his hotel. The So- viet visitors had strong police protection, as small groups of demonstrators, often joined by passers-by, dogged them through- out their stay. The Quito Chamber of Commerce refused to meet with Bazykin, despite SECRET 25X1 30 Mar 61Dpproved For Release 2C EJRM:RUIWP79-00927AO0310008000Pa1ge 13 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 `SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMA:ty pressure from Foreign Minister Chiriboga. Chiriboga told US Ambas- sador Bernbaum that he had re- jected Bazykin's feeler for dip- lomatic relations and emphasized to the press that the visit was solely for commercial purposes and was made at Soviet initia- tive. Bazykin, however, told the press that the USSR consid- ers that relations with Ecuador already exist and that only an exchange of ambassadors is lack- ing. Ecuador agreed in principle to send a commercial. mission to the USSR to study the possibil- ity of exporting bananas--.Ecua- dor's chief product--and other agricultural produce in exchange for farm and highway machinery. Alfonso, who had met with him in Mexico last September. Perez announced that Venezuela was in- terested in establishing some form of relations with the So- viet Union, and also that he planned to go to Moscow, pos- sibly during his scheduled Au- gust trip to Tehran for the third conference of petroleum exporting nations. Following his initial talk with the ambassador, Perez indicated to the press that the recent increase in ~oviet petroleum sales outside the bloc is not a threat to world petro- leum prices or to the develop- ment of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries.(OPEP). After persistent efforts to gain an interview, Bazykin was received by President Betan- court on 22 March. Betancourt Chiriboga asserted that "bananas I told him that in Venezuela, Com- have no ideology" and "to trade munists are considered "agita- is not to acquiesce." !!tors and troublemakers" inspired Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum he believed Bazykin made a tempting loan offer to President Velasco. In his talk with the minister of education, Bazykin offered scientific and technical aid, and in his final press conference on 11 March, he hinted at a cultural exchange between the universities of Quito and Moscow. On his arrival in Caracas on 12 March, Bazykin stated that his visit was unofficial but that he would like to confer with top government officials and businessmen. He claimed that his visit to Ecuador had been a great success and that Ecuador would send a trade dele- gation to the USSR in the latter half of April--a move which he characterized as "the first step toward the establishment of dip- lomatic and trade relations." During his 11-day stay in Venezuela, Bazykin spent a good deal of time with Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Perez directly from Moscow, and that Cuba now served as a bridgehead for spreading Communism through- out South America. In sharp contrast to Perez' remarks, the President also charged the USSR with unfair competition through the sale of its oil in Western markets. In reply to a question, Betancourt said the Venezuelan Government would be willing to sell to Cuba oil from its roy- alty share of production; it would, however, require payment in advance at a price equal to what it now receives from the oil companies. In his final press confer- ence Bazykin gave no indication that his overtures to Betancourt had been rebuffed and said that after conferring with the Presi- dent, five cabinet ministers, and congressional, university, and trade union leaders, he had the impression that most Vene- zuelans consider the establish- ment of relations with the USSR "a question of time and of wait- ing for the most opportune mo- ment." While re-emphasizing that SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 14 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY his visit bad not been official, he stated that he had discussed the establishment of relations with everyone with whom be talked. Bazykin devoted many of his remarks to trade relations and asserted that as a result ,of his visit, which included a tour of oil fields with Perez, he "better understood" Vene- zuela's position concerning petroleum and OPEP. He placed particular emphasis on the "benefits" Latin American re- publics could derive from re- lations with the Soviet Union, especially in barter. DISSENSION IN ECUADOR OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA President Velasco's vacil- lation on policy toward Cuba and the bloc is contributing to a sharp division between pro- and anti-Castro forces in Ecuador. The principal spear- head of the pro-Castro element is Manuel Araujo, a close friend of Velasco and a pro- moter of anti-US violence in Ecuador in late 1960. Araujo, who was minister of government until December, is strongly disliked by the military, and his resignation from that post was reportedly caused by mili- tary pressure. He is said to be organizing a clandestine group of Communists and other leftists to foment a Castro- style revolution; he may have coordinated his plans with top leaders in Cuba during his recent visit there. In a speech shortly after his return in late February, Araujo openly called for a "rev- olution" patterned after Cuba's, to begin at the conclusion of Velasco's term in 1964. He has also waged a campaign to force the resignation of For- eign Minister Chiriboga-- leader of the anti-Castro fac- tion in the government. The anti-Castro forces-- which include moderate Social- ists as well as Conservatives, Liberals, and the Catholic hierarchy--have been aroused by the pro'Communist tendencies in Ecuadorean policy and have petitioned for a break in re- lations with Cuba. Some of these elements, led by former President Ponce, have been considering ousting Velasco. This group may have significant support from active and retired officers. The former army commander, an enemy of Velasco as well as of Araujo; was ar- rested on 23 March for involve- ment in the plotting. Velasco has not only Cul- tivated the good will of the Cuban regime, which is support- ing Ecuador in its boundary dispute with Peru, but also has publicly expressed his confi- dence in Araujo since the lat- ter's return from Cuba. Indi- cations of an impending shake- up in the cabinet--probably including the removal of Chiri- boga--and the reported reassign- ment of a number of anti-Com- munist officers suggest that Velasco is leaning toward the pro-Castro group and is con- cerned with the growing opposi- tion of rightists. This domestic unrest threatens the success of the 11th.Inter-American Conference, scheduled to begin in Quito on 24 May. The prospect that Castro may attend and that Ecuador will insist on dis- cussing its boundary dispute with Peru--a nationalistic issue which could touch off widespread violence--are other disruptive factors. 25X1 25X1 SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 15 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S UNMET The resignation of Army Commander in Chief Toranzo Mon- tero has at least temporarily strengthened the Frondizi govern- ment in Argentina, in that it un- derscores the armed forces' re- jection of threats to constitu- tional government. The resigna- tion resulted from a showdown with War Secretary Fraga over the long-standing issue of mili- tary pressure on President Fron- dizi's policies. Toranzo Montero's formal letter of resignation, which he released to the press one hour after he sent it to Fraga on 25 March, was a virtual admission of his desire to overthrow Fron- dizi. It accused the administra- tion of corruption and of soft- ness toward Peronism and Commu- nism, and made a critical refer- ence to Argentina's offer on 4 March of its good offices to ease US-Cuban tensions. Although he overplayed his hand, Toranzo Mon- tero retains important support within the military and has warned that he will be "active on the sidelines." The military in general share Toranzo Montero's concern over Peronista and Communist activi- tie s, which are extensive de- spite executive decrees outlaw- ing political activity by both the Peronista-sponsored Justicial- ista party and the Communist par- ty. The provinces have 'been reluuc- tant to enxorce these decrees, and the Communists and some Per- onista groups have worked with legal leftist parties, thus stim- ulating military fears of a left- ist united front. The Peronistas are split, and an increasing num- ber are ignoring Peron's orders from his exile in Spain to cast a blank protest vote and to op- pose the government through all available means. military. Frondizi's party won an im- portant victory in the municipal elections in Santa Fe Province on 19 March-after defeats in Buenos Aires and Mendoza in Feb- ruary. This new show of public confidence will further strength- en Frondizi in dealing with the 25X1 Morocco's claims to a sub- stantial portion of the western Sahara were dramatized when the so-called "Mauritanian Army of Liberation" on 11 March seized eleven oil prospectors--includ?- ing three Americans--in the Saguia el-Hamra region of Span- ish Sahara. Rabat had warned when Spain granted concessions to nine American firms in 1959 that it did not recognize Span- ish sovereignty over the area and that concessiabai?es would later have to revalidate their claims with the Rabat Government. Moroccan claims include the enclave of Ifni, to which Moroccan irregulars laid siege in 1957; Spanish Sahara, governed as a province of Spain; the new- ly independent state of Mauritania; and the westernmost portion of the French Saharan department of Saoura. Faced with the probability that supporters for Mauritania's application for membership in the United Nations would insist on raising the issue at the re- sumed session of the UN General Assemblys Rabat may well have used Mauritanian dissidents, who have pledged allegiance to the Moroccan King, to create inci- dents in the area again in order SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 SECRET CANARY ISLANDS . (SD.) 0 IFNI (SD/ o 0;,.j Q Tantan El Aiunh SAGUTA SPANISH EL HAMRA I....... SAHARA'. Villa O Cisnero o0 Off' O MAURITANIA Nouakchott 30 MARCH 1961 0 STATUTE MILES N I G E R 500 J 25X1 to focus ihternational..attention on Moroccan claims. Rabat probably encouraged the formation 'of the "Mauritanian Army of Liberation," reported to number between 600 and 1,400 men, and its activities along the Moroccan - Spanish Saharan Spain has reinforced its troops to nearly 6,000 men con- centrated in the area of El Aiun. Last week Spanish forces were re- ported to have surrounded and an- nihilated a group of irregulars; Spain claims to be prepared for an outbreak of hostilities with Morocco, King Hassan II warned on 22 March, when the oilmen were re- leased, that Morocco intended to press its territorial claims and that other prospectors might be seized. The palace-oriented Ma- ghreb Arab press agency seems to be preparing Moroccan opinion for military action in southern Morocco. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 17 of 25 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ISRAELI AID IN AFRICA A recent speech by Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in- dicates that Israel, despite the anti-Israel resolution adopted in January at the African "sum- mit" conference in Casablanca, has decided to continue expanding its foreign aid program in Af- rica. Mrs. Meir discounted the Casablanca resolution, which was inspired by the UAR, as having been prompted by only a "tempo- rary need" to support slogans harmful to Israel. She said it does not reflect "the entire po- litical balance sheet" of Israel's relations with African states. The resolution criticized Israel as "an instrument of im- perialism and neocolonialism" in Africa as well as the Middle East. Its signatories included the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, each of which receives Israeli aid, as well as of the UAR and Morocco. Sub- sequent Israeli representations to the governments of the first three evoked. reiterations of their support of the resolution, although Ghana's Nkrumah gave private assurances of continued good will toward Israel. The three, nevertheless, appear ready to accept aid from any source, and on that basis the Israelis have decided to con- tinue assisting them. Mrs. Meir said Israel would send 400 government experts to Africa and Asia during 1961; ap- proximately 500 nongovernmental technicians also have been sent. Israel maintains 160 missions in 35 countries in Africa and Asia. Ghana is still the program's showcase. More than 100 Israeli experts in agriculture, marine navigation, and construction are serving there, while numerous Ghanaians are taking courses in Israel. Mali is one of the newest recipients of Israeli aid, hav- ing received small arms--subse- quent to the Casablanca confer- ence--under terms which made them virtually a gift. About 1,000 foreign trainees are scheduled to attend courses in Israel this year. The training program includes academic studies at the Haifa Institute of Tech- nology and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as well as a five- year medical course and a four- year curriculum in agricultural engineering. Military courses are also conducted; about 200 Ethio- pian paratroopers recently were trained by the Israelis. Seminars in various fields are. held periodically,. Last August, Israel was host to 126 delegates from 41 countries at an international conference onM ''Science in the' Advancement of New States." The African and Asian delegations were urged to look to Israel as a training ground for technicians and for ideas and research facilities. Another venture in Tel Iviv, the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies, is sponsored Jointly by the Israel Federation of Labor (Histadrut),and the AFL-CIO. Sixty-four students from 31 African and Asian coun- tries currently are attending the first of a series of six- month courses. The purpose of the school is to demonstrate Israel's rapid economic develop- ment under a democratic politi- cal system to labor leaders and members of cooperatives from underdeveloped areas. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X6 Nasir recognizes Israel's aid program as a challenge to his own efforts to exert influ- ence in Africa. UAR propaganda media regularly denounce Israeli activities in Africa as "im- perialist" machinations. Other Arab states have supported the UAR campaign. It remains to be seen whether, in the face of the Arab countercampaign, the Is- raeli program will reap signif- icant political advaii.tages for Tel Aviv. Despite the Casa- blanca resolution, the Israelis apparently still feel that they can count on gaining diplomatic benefits, particularly when the Arabs press their perennial grievances on Palestine in the UN. 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 19 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0 3100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY BELGIAN GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS The success of the Social- ist party in the elections on 26 March has increased the likelihood that Belgium's next government will be a coalition of the Social Christian and Socialist parties, with Paul Henri Spaak, Socialist leader and former secretary general of NATO, playing a prominent role. While no major changes in foreign policy are antici- pated, Spaak has been privately critical of some of his coun- try's moves in the Congo and would probably bring about greater Belgian cooperation both there and in NATO matters. The opposition Socialists, who had been generally expected to suffer marked losses as a result of the Socialist-led strikes in December and Janu- ary, actually gained both in popular votes and Senate seats and held their own in the lower house. Some left-wing Social- ists apparently defected to the Communists, who gained three additional seats in the lower house. The Social Chris- tians, the leading partner in Premier Eyskens' coalition, lost heavily--mainly to two right-wing groups which rallied support from conservative- minded voters dissatisfied with Eyskens' handling of the Congo crisis and the subsequent eco- nomic austerity law. The con- servative Liberals, junior part- ners in the coalition, gained popular votes although they lost one of their 21 seats in the lower house. Eyskens' government is con- tinuing in a caretaker capacity until some agreement can be reached among the parties--none of which has a majority in either house. The chairman of the Social Christian party, Theo Lefevre, favors cooperation with the Socialists but faces strong opposition from the COMMUNISTS 5(+3) 10327 SECRET FLEMISH CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S UNION 25X6 25X1 30 Mar 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Pa a 20 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 Approved For Refe'ase 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A09S100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY middle-class wing of his party, which wants instead to continue the coalition with the Liberals. The Labor elements in his party have for some time been more in- clined toward an alliance with the Socialists, and moderate elements in both these parties believe that the difficult eco- nomic readjustments ahead re- quire a coalition of Belgium's two largest parties. Spaak would probably play a leading role--either as pre- mier or foreign minister--in any such coalition. Having been out of Belgian party politics from 1957 until a few weeks ago, he is less committed than any other prominent leader to Bel- gium's past actions in the Congo, and on 13 March in a conversa- tion with the American charge in Brussels he voiced strong criticism of the Congo policies of the Belgian Government. Both on Congo questions and in any effort to strengthen Belgium's support of NATO, Spaak would face strong opposition, even in his own party, to any major change in government policy, but he would be able to exercise more stringent control over the Min- istry of Foreign Affairs and reduce the freewheeling activity of officials in the Ministries of Defense and African Affairs regarding the Congo. The first task of any new government will be to put Bel- gium's fiscal house in order and stimulate the growth of the econ- omy. Lefevre, in his effort to improve prospects for a coali- tion with the Socialists, has said that a new long-range fi- nancial and economic program should be substituted for the controversial "loi unique," which provoked the strikes and was finally adopted in February over Socialist opposition. INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS Measures to make the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) a more effective instrument for advancing free trade unionism, particularly in the under- developed areas of the world, were the principal topic of discussion at an extraordinary session of the ICFTU's execu- tive board in Brussels from 13 to 17 March. Some progress appears to have been made, but the constructive atmosphere which prevailed may have been achieved in part by agreement to avoid a showdown on several basic issues. The major item on the agenda was a plan providing for the re- grouping of primary ICFTU ac- tivities--such as education, training, and organizing support --under three or four new as- sistant secretaries-general. The ICFTU'?s bureaucratic in- efficiency has long been de- cried by its affiliates, and Secretary General Becu's de- lay in proposing correctives caused a major quarrel at the executive board meeting last December. How soon and how effec tively Becu's new plan will be implemented remains to be seen. Only two of the new posts have been filled, and one of these by an appointee who encountered opposition from certain of the powerful International Trade Secretariats on which the ICFTU leans heavily for support in the organizing field. Board discussion of financ- ing for ICFTU support activities 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar %proved For Release 20?1NYI~:79-00927A00310008000$age 21 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AOK100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY in the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America also produced somewhat uncertain re- sults. About three fourths of the $10,000,000 sought by the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund for the next three years has now been pledged. Satisfac- tion over the AFL-CIO's offer of $3,250,000 ($750,000 less than had been asked for) is tempered, however, by the total default of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), already in arrears on past contributions. TUC delegate George Woodcock declared that the British unions "cannot afford" their proposed $2,250,000, and would make no further contribu- tionsto the fund. Although there is some hope that a TUC contribution will be forthcoming before the 1962 ICFTU congress, Becu and other leaders are nonetheless concerned over the British attitude. Woodcock not only questioned the ICFTU's need for "large amounts" of money, but added that the ICFTU should concern itself primarily with "economic and social matters." By implication this would seem to indicate a lack of sympathy for the ICFTU's increasing em- phasis on organizational activ- ities--a.. program which other trade union leaders think essen- tial if free trade unionism is to establish itself in areas now in the process of industrializa- tion. On the problem of uncoordi- nated, unilateral activities by affiliates in such areas--long a source of friction among the ICFTU, AFL-CIO, and TUC--the ICFTU appears to have beat a strategic retreat. Apparently reconciled to the continuation of such activities, Becu pro- posed only that they be under- taken in "consultation" with the ICFTU. Although probably a more realistic assessment of the ICFTU'srelationship to its,"major affiliates, this stand leaves much to good faith and contrasts with past ICFTU predictions that an uncoordinated approach, partic- ularly, to the complicated trade union situation in Africa, is bound to fail. The Chinese Communists, determined to achieve status as a world power as quickly as pos- sible, are giving high priority to science and technology. They now are in the fifth year of a 12-year scientific development program drawn up in 1956 under the aegis of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The program, which concentrates Chinese effort in 11 priority technological fields --including atomic energy and jet propulsion, is being execut- ed in an orderly manner with much zeal and determination. Significant successes have been achieved, but the program's an- nounced goal of attaining "world levels of achievement" by 1967 is beyond reach. China's small nucleus of competent, Western-trained sci- entists is being slowly augment ed by students trained in bloc countries. However, research and development are limited by a shortage of scientific man- power and by China's heavy de- pendence on Soviet technical assistance, sharply curtailed by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians last summer. Never- theless, native capabilities are probably adequate to provide some spectacular results from a few high-priority projects in both the military and economic sectors. In addition, China is ac- quiring the capability for 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar 61Approved For Release 2 5 t 9 : L'IAIFWP79-00927A0031000800(1-ce 22 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A00S100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY development of most conventional armaments and for routine tech- nological support in economic areas, but high-quality scientif- ic resources are not expanding rapidly enough to meet all crit- ical needs in agriculture and in- dustry. Achievements in public health have been impressive. Ep- idemic diseases have been re- duced, and concepts of sanita- tion among the people have been widely established. General health practices are still poor, however, and the control of com- mon diseases such as bacillary dysentery, tuberculosis, and schistosomiasis will be far from complete during the remainder of the program. A shortage of doctors trained in Western medicine forces the regime to continue to support and encour- age traditional Chinese practi- tioners. Research in physics, chem- istry, and metallurgy remains relatively primitive, and the level of performance in these sectors is not expected to im- prove greatly in the next few years. Biological and agri- cultural research and develop- ment programs have also been poor, especially in relation to the pressing demand in China to raise food production. Any tangible benefits to agriculture from this quarter during the plan will probably come from the application of known practices. The entire program is ham- pered by a lack of adequate re- search facilities. These facil- ities are growing, especially in priority military and in- dustrial areas, a.nd are prob- ably keeping pace with the growth in trained personnel in most fields of science and technology. As of the moment, however, only about 1,000 highly trained sci- entists are available to plan, supervise, and carry out activity that would be considered signif- icant in Western scientific cir- cles. Graduates of China's own scientific schools are not well trained by world stand- ards and are not sufficient- ly numerous to give the re- gime reason to hope for an early escape from its de- pendence on the rest of the bloc in even this limited area. 25X1 CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ROLE IN THE BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE Czechoslovakia, second only to the USSR as a contributor to the bloc's foreign aid program, is,providing economic and mili- tary assistance to 17 underde- veloped' countries. Total Czech aid extended thus far amounts to $660,000,000, compared with the Soviet aid total of $3.8 bil- lion and a Chinese Communist aid total of $350,000,000. About half of the Czech aid is being provided for economic develop- ment projects, the remainder for military equipment. Some of the major bloc arms agreements, par- ticularly those signed with Mid- dle Eastern countries in 1955-56, were negotiated by Czechoslovakia. In addition, Czechoslovakia is the bloc country most active in establishing and expanding trade relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Unlike Soviet aid, Czech aid has for the most part been SECRET 30 Mar 6)kpproved For Release 20'KM721J:IM79-00927A00310008000PIge 23 of 25 Approved For RTase 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AOM100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY extended for single light in- dustrial and consumer projects, to private companies as well as to governments. From 1954 to 1958 Czechoslovakia initiated the bloc economic aid program in six countries in Asia and Latin America with small short- term credits for such projects as cement plants, sugar refin- eries, and textile mills. Since 1959, however, there has been a trend toward providing longer term lines of credits to be used for public development projects' the largest single line of cred- it--$48,500,000--was extended to India in 1959. With the ex- ception of about $4,000,000 in grant aid to Guinea, Cambodia, and Somalia, all Czech aid has been in the form of credits. 25X1 25X1 Total Czech economic aid to the underdeveloped countries since 1954 amounts to $335,000,- 000, about a fourth of which has been used. India, Indonesia, the UAR, Iraq, and Cuba have been the principal recipients, but significant credits have been provided to Ethiopia and Guinea and a new credit of an unknown amount has been extended to Cambodia. The most recent Czech aid was a $1.4 million grant to Somalia--the first bloc overture to that country. Prague has undertaken its largest projects in India, where, in addition to the several ce- ment plants and sugar refiner- ies already constructed, a large foundry project, a heavy machine tool plant, and a heavy elec- trical machinery plant are planned for construction in the next few years. Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR have received significant Czech lines of cred- it for industrial development, and the first bloc aid extended to the Castro government was a Czech line of credit for $20,- 000,000 in June 1960. In addition to the aid ex- tended on its own account, the Czechs are participating in projects involving Soviet eco- nomic credits. In Egypt, for example, Czechoslovakia is pro- viding under Soviet credits equip- ment for several industrial projects and the Aswan dam con- struction. Significant Czech aid of- fers outstanding include a cred- it offer to Bolivia for mineral processing and an offer of both economic and military aid to Ecuador. Military Assistance Agreements covering~a mini- mum of $325,000,000 in military credits have been negotiated by Czechoslovakia with the UAR, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Guinea, and Cuba, although some SECRET 30 Mar Approved For Release 200MUMN&TC bPV9-00927A003100080001-age 24 of 25 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0,03100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY of the equipment under these agreements probably was sup-- plied by the USSR. Czechoslo- vakia was the first bloc coun- try to extend military aid to a nonbloc country, concluding arms agreements with both Egypt in 1955 ,and Syria in 1956. Under these arrangements, Czechoslo- vakia provided the material and apparently assumed much of the financial burden. In the 1956 agreement with Yemen, however, Czechoslovakia --though it negotiated the deal and provided some arms--probably fronted for the USSR. In recent years, Czecho- slovakia, although still used as the bloc's initial contact for arms deals, has acted main- ly as a participant in agree- ments between the Soviet Union and nonbloc countries, supplying arms, equipment, and training often not available in the USSR. The first Indonesian arms deal in 1958 apparently was an exception;-,Prague carried out the entire agreement, probably because of Djakarta's unwilling- ness at that time to become di- rectly involved in an arms deal with Moscow. Virtually all the military credits arranged by Czechoslo- vakia have been used. Czechoslovakia's chief con- tribution to the bloc offensive to promote closer economic ties with the underdeveloped countries continues to be in the-field of trade.. In many.areas the bloc has established economic ties solely through Czech commercial initia- tives. In some countries, while other bloc states, particularly the USSR, are involved in an aid program,Czech activities have been restricted to increasing trade. Czech activities in 'Mali; -for example, have been concentrated on establishing commercial relations. Under an agreement with the USSR and Czechoslovakia,Mali will sell most of its peanut crop--its prin- cipal export--to the bloc during the next year. Both the USSR and Communist China have initiated an aid program in Mali. Czechoslovakia's trade with the underdeveloped countries in- creased from $175,000,000 in 1954 to an estimated $415,000,- 000 in 1960. (Prepared by ORR 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar 63Approved For Release 20W-MV213: 79-00927AO0310008000?Age 25 of 25 Approved For Rise 2005/09/ 9 A-RDP79-00927AGM1 00080001 -1 CJ ET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Recent announcements by several key Western UN members that they will no longer sup- port the moratorium on Chinese UN representation indicate that time has run out for Taipei in the United Nations. The grow- ing opposition to postponing discussion of either the entry of Peiping or the ouster of Taipei does not necessarily imply support for Peiping's admission but does reflect a long-held belief among UN mem- bers that the organization must come to grips with the problem. The General Assembly at each of the past ten sessions has voted a moratorium on con- sideration of the Chinese repre- sentation question. This pro- cedural device for delaying a decision requires only a simple majority of votes. Any vote on the substance, of the issue-- ouster of Taipei or admission of Peiping--would presumably re- quire a two-thirds. majority. In the first five of these sessions,,over two.-thirds favored the moratorium. Since 1956, however, as new UN members have rapidly increased the size of the-organization, the moratorium has mustered only a simple ma-' jority; in October 1960 it was approved by the smallest margin since 1951, when the issue first arose. This setback to Taipei's position was compounded by statements ' from. various African delegates that their abstentions were grudgingly given and would not be repeated in the future. After the last ballot, the general mood of many supporters of the mora- torium was that it would not pass again. Since October,' there has been increasing speculation about IN THE UNITED NATIONS the future of Nationalist China, sparked notably by statements from Britain and Brazil that they would no longer support the moratorium. Uncertainty among UN members about the position of the new US admini- stration has also encouraged speculation. Although the Chinese repre- sentation issue was postponed for the duration of the 15th General Assembly session--which resumed on 7 March after a two- month recess--Peiping's sup- porters could attempt to re- open the question at the cur- rent session, though it would require a two-thirds majority to reverse the previous de- cision. Factors Affecting Peiping's Admission Some UN members argue for Peiping's admission to the UN because they subscribe to the concept of the universality of UN membership. Members are also influenced by the desire to bind the Chinese Communists not only to the principles of the UN Charter but to any inter- national agreement that may be reached on disarmament or the banning of nuclear tests-- which they believe-would be ac- cepted by the United Nations as a whole. Other members are eager to see Peiping exposed to the rough- and-tumble of UN debates and voting line-ups; they see in these encounters an opportunity to exploit any differences be- tween Peiping and Moscow. The gradual erosion of Taipei's position in the UN,more- over, has: resulted in some un- easiness among its supporters, who by no means want to be the "last to recognize" Peiping. SECRET 30 Mar 61 Approved For Relea M / fLkIJ P79-00927AO031000 J-1i of 13 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0'03100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Probably the greatest ob- stacles to Peiping's admission are its belligerence and its opposition to any proposal that would accord some international status to the Nationalists-- even as "Taiwan" or "Formosa." Many of Peiping's supporters are reluctant to scuttle Taipei completely. As a charter mem- ber, Nationalist China has con- tributed greatly to the develop- ment of the United Nations, and Dr. Tsiang, its permanent repre- sentative since 1947, is held in high esteem as a parliamen- tarian. Strong resistance to Pei- - ping's entry on the part of the United States has been a primary factor.''In September 1959, how- ever, Latin American irritation over the problem of Chinese UN representation was summed up by the Brazilian delegate when he stated that support for the moratorium was "the heaviest burden the Latin American coun- tries had to bear in return for US friendship." There remains on the UN books a 1951 resolution brand- ing Communist China an aggres- sor in Korea; the UN embargo on strategic shipments to the main- land was a direct outgrowth of this resolution. However, a precedent favorable to Peiping's cause was set in 1955 when Spain was admitted to the UN despite a 1946 UN resolution condemning its conduct. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi was recently quoted as saying that Peiping will not enter the UN until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its forces from the area. Many UN members which now support Peiping would probably not accept the idea that such a concession could be made a prerequisite for Com- munist China's entry in the UN. Commonwealth and Europe Certain Western European states and "old Commonwealth" members like Australia, while supporting the moratorium, have for many years believed that Peiping's recognition and its admission to the UN were in- evitable but that it was not yet time for such action. They felt that in the meantime, closer de facto relations with Commu- nist China would reduce the general tension and might make the act of eventual recognition easier. They looked on the gradual deterioration of the Nationalists' UN position as part of the process. The statement by British Foreign Secretary Home on 8 February that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations has been subsequently amplified in a privately ex- pressed view by the Foreign Of- fice that Taipei's supporters would not even be able to at- tach conditions to the seating of Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose admitting the Chinese Communists if they insisted on UN recogni- tion that Taiwan belonged to them or that the 1951 aggres- sion charge against Communist China be expunged from UN re- cords. At the Commonwealth prime ministers' conference in London from 8 to 17 March, the majority apparently endorsed London's contention that Peiping should be seated--and Taipei presumably excluded. Australia and New Zealand--both with considerable public opinion favoring recogni- tion of Peiping--appear reluctant to modify their opposition to its admission to the UN now, but they may go along with Britain if it refuses to support the moratorium again. Canada has SECRET Mar 61 pproved For Release Z SPEC //9.3/.&9 :A RA- P 9-00927AO031000&0001-1 30 age 2 c2 13 Approved For Re1e'Ise 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0O 100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY consistently favored the mora- torium in the past, and Ex- ternal Affairs Secretary Green told Ambassador Merchant on 20 March that he personally op- posed Peiping's admission. A French Foreign Ministry official stated on 21 February that the British attitude was unlikely to change the French Government's opposition to seat- ing Peiping. He indicated, how- ever, that Paris was going to restudy the question. He be- lieved that the situation with- in the UN was changing, although he felt that Communist China would probably prejudice its chances of admission by posing unacceptable conditions. Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky recently stated that there would be "no difficulty for Austria" in recognizing the Peiping regime, but that his government's future attitude in the UN--it now abstains on the moratorium--"would depend on circumstances." The Scandinavian countries --with the exception of Iceland --all recognize Peiping and have opposed the moratorium for many years. Recognition of China by UN Members UNITED STATES Rt-15 of 13 Approved For Release 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A0100080001-1 SECRET ESTIMATED FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES 1960-65 PROVIDED BY PROGRAM LAW EXPENDITURES (PROGRAMED ANNUALLY) Army 1,508 1813 363 365 Navy 675 989 198 138 1,284 1,977 395 305 Inter- Service 1,094 486 1,580 316 186 2,406 3,953 6,359 1,272 994 The principal increases under the law go to the "interservice" category, which includes the nuclear weapons and missile pro- grams, and to the air force. The equipment funds for the army and navy remain stabilized at about the 1959 level. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY PROGRAMED UNDER FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT LAW (1960-1965) (MILLION DOLLARS) The Program Law does not itself commit funds or provide contracting authority, but obliges parliament to vote the programed funds in each annual military budget. The 1960 and 1961 portions of the program funds have been approved by parliament. 1. Special Research and Development 2. Special Missiles Hawk Surface-to-surface missiles, strategic and tactical 157 216 3. Aircraft Mirage IV 204 Force Mirage III 361 Training aircraft 12 Light transport 37 Navy Etendard IV 51 Maritime patrol 94 Tri- service Helicopters 63 Over-all research and devslopmenr 79 901 4. Land Vehicles 306 5. Principal Warships Missile Cruisers Submarines 169 2,406 SECRET Nearly half of the research appropriation covers the develop- ment and production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Although the army continues to receive about 40 percent of the over-all military appropria- tions, its slice of the five-year program law covers only the cost of new vehicles, most of which will probably be simply replace- ments. Therefore, this will not permit complete modernization of the army in Germany e navy ge s -a 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 30 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 6 of 13 Approved For Rase 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A00'3100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY modest construction program, including carrier aircraft and submarines. The Defense Committee speculated, on the basis of Defense Ministry estimates, that long-range equipment needs would entail expenditures of nearly $8.8 billion in a second five-year program to run through 1969, The missile program would get the largest increases in that period, when it will be at the production stage. The com- mittee's concern over the em- phasis on missiles at the ex- pense of conventional-force modernization was reflected in its expression of hope that funds allocated for army and navy equipment categories would also be greatly increased. De Gaulle's Modifications While the main lines of the current reorganization and modernization antedate De Gaulle's return to power, he has pro- vided the political stability and continuity which such a long-range program requires and has taken personal charge of its implementation. Thus he saw to it that the constitu- tion of the Fifth Republic made his title of commander in chief more explicit than the nominal authority assigned to the presi- dents of the Fourth Republic. A long-planned revision of the concept of "national defense" was effected with 'the drastic defense decree of early 1959 which gives the government practically unlimited control over civilians in time of emer- gency. He has modified the 1957 plan to accelerate the creation of a nuclear strike force at the expense of a more balanced program for all the services, and many of his command changes and staff re- organizations have seemed de- signed as much to ensure mili- tary loyalty and responsiveness to himself and his policies as to modernize the French armed services. It is also evident that he has modified or ignored some of the major political prerequi- sites postulated by the staff which framed the reorganization and modernization plan of 1957. These included "firm attachment to the Atlantic pact" and a "long-term" solution in Algeria, implying "no abandonment." For example, when De Gaulle was both premier and defense minister in 1958, he created the post of chief of the Nation- al Defense Staff as the "su- preme military authority of the land," and installed the widely respected Ely in it. Ely took over the important coordinating functions of the former Perma- nent General Secretariat of De- fense, which under the Fourth Republic had been headed by a civil servant, and also most of the functions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, whose new chief was a lower-ranking general. The latter's authority over individual service chiefs of staff was further reduced by dividing their responsibili- ties into administrative and operational categories and putting the administrative matters under a civilian "minis- ter delegate" for each service. The effects of ill-defined and overlapping authority were com- pounded by De Gaulle's habit as president and commander in chief of issuing orders or making his wishes known without regard for regular channels. SECRET 30 Mar 61Approved For Release 2j39 AgfI ,P 9-00927AO03100089PaOje1 7 of 13 Approved For ReTTease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PROJECTED ALLOCATION OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES 1960-1965 1965-1970 ( External ) Nuclear Weapons 190 Mirage III jet interceptors 200 Mirage Ills IRBM's 6 modernized brigades -Expanded to I-2Aircraft carriers 25 Mirage IVs (Mach 2 jet bombers 6 modern divisions with tactical 1-2 Cruisers with nuclear capability ) nuclear armament Amphibious force with helicopter carriers 50 Etendard IVs ( carrier-based air- atrol aircraft 27 maritime craft with nuclear capability ) p Antisubmarine warfare force (Assault capability for debarking 1500-2000 men ) Several nuclear submarines ( two aircraft carriers, Possibly tactical nuclear weapons ( missile equipped ) one helicopter carrier ) I Army division ( 20,000 lightly equipped men Conventional submarines and escorts I Interservice group equivalent to 2 divisions ( Internal ) 250,000 reserves ( could be mobilized within one week ). Expanded to 400,000 reserves ( 90,000 active duty ) The Changes in top-level commands announced in February appear primarily intended to place absolutely loyal Gaullists in key positions and generally to strengthen De Gaulle's con- trol over the services, particu- larly the army. Thus his former personal military adviser, General Jean Olie, who on 1 March succeeded Ely as chief of staff for national defense, is expected to work much more closely with De Gaulle than did Ely, who scrupulously respected the constitutional requirement that he report directly to the premier rather than to the presi- dent. General Crepin has been succeeded by a more politically sophisticated officer, General Fernand Gambiez, as commander in chief in Algeria. In turn the designation of Crepin to be commander of French forces in Germany ensures that this major body of combat troops will remain responsive to De Gaulle. This evidently could not be guaranteed under its present commander, General Paul Allard, who is a proponent of "French Algeria." A major reorganization of the National Defense Staff structure was approved in principle on 1 March. It will reportedly eliminate the three civilian minister delegates and will establish a Delegation for Armaments,. directly sub- ordinate to the minister of armed forces, which would have responsibility for all arms programs--both conventional and nuclear. Informed speculation on other aspects of the reorgan- ization sees the French de- fense forces divided into three categories (deterrent, interior defense, intervention) which correspond to those foreseen when the program law was passed. Military Reactions Although the armed forces approved of many of De Gaulle's moves in the defense field, many officers have had increas- ing misgivings over the long- range effect on French security of his Algerian policy. Many, including Ely himself, are also concerned about the over-all wisdom of De Gaulle's coolness toward NATO. SECRET 25X1 30 Mar 61 Approved For Release 2~Op5/Q/R:J~4T~28NA-00927A003100080$Oa1g-e 8 of 13 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The 1960 program law's em- phasis on the creation of a nu- clear striking force was round- ly criticized by a wide range of political and military lead- ers as wastefully expensive and absurd from the standpoint of realistic power relations--par- ticularly after the US proposals to make NATO a "nuclear power." The nuclear strike force was also criticized by many who felt the army was being denied the new and replacement materiel and equipment it needed to win the Algerian war. The recently approved plan for armaments centralization is already being criticized, particularly by the navy, which is jealous of its weapons and supply system and will probably be inclined to resist the army general who seems the most like- ly candidate for "delegate for armament." For much of the army, the entire reorganization program is likely to be viewed sourly against the background of the unfulfilled conditions postu- lated when the-original plan was formulated in 1957. Facing the prospect of leaving Algeria without a complete victory and feeling that the program law discriminates against the army, many officers are reportedly talking of leaving the service. While a number of army of- ficers will probably be re- leased in any event as the post- Algerian demobilization and re- organization shapes up, the ma- jority will undoubtedly remain. Nevertheless, for many whose military orientation in recent years has focused on guerrilla warfare and on retaining Al- geria at all costs, the polit- ical and technical reorienta- tion would be difficult. Stu- dents of the army's structure have already pointed to the in- creasing opportunities of ad- vancement which modernization will offer the comparatively few highly technically trained younger officers at the expense of their infantry-oriented seniors. Many responsible military leaders also reportedly are apprehensive over the possible effect, the condemnation of the Algerian war by many French in- tellectual and religious lead- ers may have on the morale of future conscripts. These of- ficers complain that the army is being increasingly isolated from the nation by such activi- ties. Outlook Those who for political or military reasons wish to arrest or modify the program must reckon with the fact that much of it is now several years old--particularly the nuclear weapons effort--and that the passage of time will increas- ingly consolidate it along lines marked out by De Gaulle. There also seems to be agree- ment that he has increasingly imposed his will on the armed forces--particularly~the army-- and can be expected to move skillfully to parry and over- come opposition elements. Nevertheless, it is also ap- parent that De Gaulle--in si- multaneously requiring the armed services to accept his version of the reorganization plan while he prepares what many will regard as an inglorious with- drawal from Algeria--still runs a considerable risk in defying entrenched interests in the armed forces and a gamut of po- litical leaders with varying axes to grind on this issue. 25X1 SECRET 30 Mar 61 pproved For Release ? CQ / 9 :AC ~JRP 59-00927AO0310008000~age 9 of 13 Approved For Re1ase 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0N100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Trofim D. Lysenko, the controversial Soviet scientist who in Stalin's time had wide influence in the fields of agri- culture and biology, is regain- ing--at least in agriculture-- some of the authority he lost after Stalin's death. His ap- pearance at the January central committee plenum on agriculture and the appointment of his ad- herent M. A. Olshansky as min- ister of agriculture are evi- dence of the increase in Lysenko's political prestige. Reputable scientists view Lysenko as a charlatan, and his rise at a time when Khrushchev is calling- for the application of the best scientific effort to the solution of the USSR's agricultural problems appears something of an anomaly. on the basis of the immediate applicability of their research in industry or agriculture. Rising Political Prestige In his speech to the plenum on 14 January, Lysenko sharply attacked the work of former Minister of Agriculture V. V. Matskevich and urged reorganiza- tion of the ministry itself. He charged that the ministry had ignored his cattle-breeding experiments and, in fact, thought so little of them that his breeding stock had been slaugh- tered for meat. He complained that his 20-page protest, ad- dressed to the-.ministry six months earlier, had not been acknowledged until January. At this point Khrushchev commented caustically, "They read slowly in the Ministry of Agriculture." Khrushchev's personal eval- uation of Lysenko, expressed privately to visiting Westerners in the spring of 1956 when Ly- senko's career appeared to be in eclipse, suggests that the Soviet leader himself is the source of his reviving influ- ence: "As to Lysenko, opinions about his theories vary. It is necessary to discuss and com- pare in order to evaluate cor" rectly all theories. Lysenko is one of our prominent agron- omists, but he has the charac- ter of a dog.... (Other) scien- tists fear his bad nature. Nevertheless, I repeat that he is a very prominent agronomist. Many pseudo-scientists who criticize him are not worth his little finger." At this point Mikoyan interjected: "You exaggerate." The Soviet premier's public praise of Lysenko has emphasized his "close ties with life," a favorite Khrushchev theme in science and education programs. Khrushchev has often voiced sus- picion of scientists concerned with basic theoretical research for their failure to contribute directly to the national econ- omy; last year he recommended that all scientists be paid only Other high-ranking poli- tician at the plenum took pains to make it clear that they did not share Matskevich's in- difference to Lysenko's work. D. S. Polyansky, premier of the Russian Republic (RSFSR), stated, "We have all the requirements to obtain highly productive cows yielding milk with a high butter- fat content--cows which are be- ing developed under the direc- tion of the outstanding scien- tist T. D. Lysenko." T. I. Sokolov, party boss of the agriculturally important Tselinnyy (New Lands) Kray, linked Khrushchev and Lysenko in praise: "We are confident that the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture--carried out on the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev--the further consoli- dation and development of the Michurin trend in science-- headed by the remarkable worker and outstanding scientist. T. D. Lysenko--will secure the further development of all phases of agriculture on a correct scien- tific foundation." (I. V. Michurin, somtimes called the Burbank of Russia, preceded Lysenko in asserting that hered- itary variation, is the result SECRET 30 Mar 61Approved For Release g {ffg (g9A -Ef'?9-00927AO031000800kie 10 of 13 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY of the effects of environmental changes.) Lithuanian party boss A. Yu. Snechkus called attention to the fact that Lysenko's cat- tle would soon be introduced into the Lithuanian livestock program and that Lithuanian farms would apply mixtures of organic-chemical fertilizers as advocated by Lysenko. Olshansky, whose appoint- ment as minister of agriculture was announced on 29 December, has been described by other scientists as a close associate and "a true disciple" of Ly- senko. Olshansky is to have fabricated research to prove Lysenko's theories and then be- lieved what he had fabricated. Both Olshansky and Lysenko ac- companied Khrushchev to Kiev in late January on the first leg of the premier's inspection tour of agricultural.areas. Ly- senko joined Khrushchev on the speakers' platform at the con- ference of RSFSR agricultural workers in Moscow in late Feb- ruary. Both Lysenko and 01- shansky appeared with him at the meeting of agricultural workers in Akmolinsk in mid- March, and Olshansky also ac- companied him to the Kazakh agricultural workers' meeting in Alma-Ata. Khrushchev has continued to heap public praise on Ly- senko. In Moscow on 23 February he commented: "It Is a good thing to study with scientists who are closely connected with life, such as Academician Trofim D. Lysenko. I myself have listened a good deal to him and his pupils, and have sev- eral times visited his farm near Moscow, and the Odessa in- stitute. I recall with grati- tude the talks which I had with him." With Olshansky heading the reorganized Ministry of Agri- culture and with Khrushchev's admiration publicly expressed and echoed by other party leaders, Lysenko is clearly in a position to exert significant influence in the programing of research in agricultural insti- tutes. Theory on Heredity Lysenko's career began in the early 1930s,when he achieved some success in accelerating the maturation of plants by treating the seeds before planting. His experiments were not scientifi- cally controlled, and the con- clusions he drew went far beyond anything that could be supported by the results achieved. Contradicting all other scientific work in genetics, he has insisted that genes and chromosomes are sinister bour- geois myths, and that the whole living organism draws inherit- able characteristics from its environment. Hereditary changes can thus, in his view, be di- rected by man's changing the environment and need not depend on accidental mutations or on the limited changes possible through selective breeding. These theories, although without demonstrated scientific basis, are compatible with Marxist doctrine and may even be taken seriously by their pro- pounder, whose scientific edu- cation, received during the 1920s, was quite haphazard. In addition to being politically useful, his theories have always been attractive because they promise shortcuts to agricultural gains which more orthodox genet- icists, promise only over a long period of time. This, indeed, is probably the key to Lysenko's popularity with Khrushchev, who seems almost desperate for a quick improvement in the Soviet agricultural picture. Lysenko's scientific op- ponents have thus been faced with the difficult task of con- vincing Soviet political lead- ers who want to believe his views that his "scientific dis- coveries" are either misinter- pretations of evidence or in some cases deliberate falsifi- cation of results. To replace his attractive promises, they SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO0310008000 age 11 of 13 30 Mar 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Approved For RetOrase 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A093,100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY themselves can offer only the delay of further research be- fore their own successes can be applied in agriculture. Moreover, their proof that Ly- senko is wrong in his claims rests on scientific premises and techniques which look like hairsplitting to the nonspecial- ist. Influence Under Stalin To compensate, at least vis-a-vis political leaders, for his weak scientific back- ground, Lysenko attributed his "successes" to the inspiration of Stalin and the socialist sys- tem, and charged scientists who questioned his claims with political treason. In Stalin's later years, Lysenko achieved control of both agricultural policies and biological re- search. Under his aegis, the campaign of the late 1940s to purify Soviet biology of "bour- geois-imperialist" opposition to his theories resulted in the closing of institutes, the re- writing of textbooks, and the arrest of scientists. Stud books and pedigree records were abandoned; hybrid corn develop- ment was checked. The Soviet afforestation program was saddled with in- structions to plant seedlings in clusters, on the theory that competition would make each tree grow more lustily. All the plantings suffered from crowding, and the program was later condemned as a failure. Basic biological research stagnated, since Lysenko's views on the exchange of character- istics between the whole living organism and its environment left no scope for proper labo- ratory research. Even before Stalin's death, Lysenko's opponents, en- couraged by hints of a general political thaw, renewed their efforts to remove his grip from the biological sciences. In the spring of 1955, the Academy of Sciences' Botanical Journal summed up the results of a re-examination of Lysenko's claims: "It has now been con- clusively demonstrated that the entire concept is factually un- sound and theoretically and methodically erroneous, and that it is not of practical value...." Having noted that in at least one instance the investi- gators had found clear evidence of falsification of results in order to support Lysenko's claims, the journal complained that "T. D. Lysenko is resur. recting in our science...the naive transformist beliefs that were widespread in the biology of antiquity and the Middle Ages." The journal referred bitterly to "the clearly theo- logical nature" of Lysenko's belief in the ability of plants to select for themselves good qualities deriving from their environments. In April 1956 Lysenko's critics finally achieved his resignation from his post as president of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences. He re- tained the directorship of the Institute of Genetics--under the USSR Academy of Sciences--but a number of competent geneticists established fruitful research programs outside the jurisdic- tion of this institute. In July 1956, Matskevich, then minister of agriculture, complained publicly about the serious inadequacies in agri- cultural research. In only thinly veiled allusions to Lysenko, he attributed these shortcomings to the conceit of "certain scientific workers... based simply on ignorance," and stated, "A number of scientists, especially those who pride themselves on their remarkable discoveries which, at least in their own eyes, are causing a revolution in science, have properly studied neither the native nor the foreign literature on the sub- ject under discussion, nor the practices of socialist agricul- ture." SECRET 30 Mar 61Approved For Release gq& 29 A~h-~LES9-00927AO0310008000dage 12 of 13 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0DZ100080001-1 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Lysenko's recovery in po- litical prestige since 1956 may not reach the heights he achieved under Stalin. De- spite his success in 1959 in effecting the removal from their posts of a few individual opponents in biological theory, the main-.course of Soviet basic research in biological theory has not been deflected by Ly- senkoism, nor has it been sig- nificantly weakened by the regime's increased emphasis on applied science. There is some evidence that a deliberate effort is being made to restrict his in- fluence to agriculture. In his speech at the January plenum Lysenko attacked A. N. Nes- meyanov, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, for a De-- cember article in Pravda on the prospects for the u ture of biological research. Referring to the "alleged" existence of genes, Lysenko declared: "This scientific doctrine, which does not correspond to reality, was long ago refuted by Michurinite biology and on the basis of ex- perimental facts in agricultural practices." In December 1958, he had attacked Nesmeyanov for devotion tb'the cause of basic theoretical research as opposed to applied science. At the January plenum he sharpened this attack to complain that biophysics and biochemis- try, were lagging badly under the leadership of Nesmeyanov, who had cited these fields as the most promising for future research. In contrast to the atten- tion devoted to Lysenko's re- marks on agriculture, the So- viet central press all but ig- nored this patent attempt to re- gain control of biological re- search. Izvestia noted tersely that he "devoted a considerable part of his speech to questions on Michurinite biology and the formation of species"; Pravda failed to print even this much information. The TASS account, not carried in the central press, added Lysenko's dictum that the sole correct program for the re- construction of the work of all biological and agricultural scientific research organizations is that based on dialectical materialism--in the interpreta- tion of which he claims unique competence. The full text of the speech appeared only in the specialized Rural Life, a journal published by the party central committee and devoted to agri- cultural affairs. Lysenko's tendency to prom- ise fast results, when combined with Khrushchev's impatience, may lead to the adoption of panaceas and a misuse of resources in agriculture. Lysenko's special organic-chemical fertilizer mix- ture, while no less effective than other fertilizers, was con- demned in 1957 by the USSR Acad- emy of Agricultural Sciences as an unnecessarily complicated measure without scientific basis and entailing an uneconomic use of resources. Lysenko's influence on agri- cultural research could in the long run undercut Soviet agri- cultural progress through the substitution of his pet theories for more potentially fruitful lines of investigation. Lysenko is in a strong po- sition politically, since, as under Stalin, he has influence without responsibility. When the Soviet shelter-belt program was declared a failure, the first deputy minister of forestry was fired, not Lysenko, whose advice the former had been forced to follow. If the USSR has another poor harvest in the near future, the blame can again be placed on mistakes of planning and procure- ment officials and of farm chair- men, on speculation and theft, or on unfavorable weather. The more widely Lysenko's'theories are applied and publicly attributed to him, however, the more vul- nerable he will become as a potential scapegoat for a future agricultural disaster. 25X1 (Concurred in By 25X1 ORR and OSI) SECRET 30 Mar 61Approved For Release sv/4k/L29A - g9-00927A0031000800~l-gle 13 of 13 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1 Approved F6? Release 2 ~~927A003100080001-1 Scnncm CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100080001-1