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elease 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 10 May 1963 0 OCI No. 0279/63E Copy No. 78 SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Ukease 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927,JQ04000080006-6 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the limitation so imposed. Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 SECRET 10 May 1963 In their struggle with the Soviet Union for leadership of the world Communist movement, the Chinese Communists have shown a keen appreciation of the opportunities that exist in underdeveloped countries. In Latin America, where change of government by violence is the rule, their radical solutions to economic and political difficulties find many a ready ear. Peiping can point to the Cuban revolution as a prime example of the efficacy of its revolutionary theories. At the governmental level, however, China has made few gains: Trade is minimal, and no diplomatic breakthrough has been made since Havana recognized Peiping in 1960. Last fall's Cuban crisis provided China with an opportu- nity to argue that no Communist party could count on the Soviet Union when the chips were down. Peiping did not hesitate to shout about another "Munich" or to publicize the Russian pull-back as dramatic confirma- tion of Chinese charges that the present Soviet leaders are timid and lack revolutionary fervor. The Chinese assiduously contrasted Moscow's unreliability with their own staunch support of revolutionary struggle. Such innuendos found a ready audience in Cuba. Havana feels an instinctive sympathy for Pei- ping's more militant approach to world problems. In addition, both regimes are relatively SECRET recent in origin, both came to power through a guerrilla struggle, and both see the US as their prime antagonist. De- spite the similarity of outlook, however, Chinese support for Cuba is perforce primarily moral and technical. Although Peiping will un- doubtedly seek to increase its influence in Cuba, and delegations of Chinese are continually passing through, there are probably fewer than 250 Chinese Communists permanently stationed on the island. An estimated 50 Chinese serve in the em- bassy, and approximately 200 advisers and technicians-- primarily agricultural--are in outlying posts. There are, how- ever, more than 30,000 ethnic Chinese--15,000 in Havana alone --and they have undoubtedly given rise to the refugee reports Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 SECRET of a substantially larger Chinese Communist presence. There is also a very small num- ber of military advisers. Chinese military aid to Cuba has been limited. Peiping is known to have provided small quantities of conventional in- fantry weapons and antiaircraft machine guns. There are also reports that Cubans have re- ceived flight training in China. Communist Parties The Chinese campaign to in- fluence Latin American Communist parties began in 1959. Twelve Latin American delegations that had attended the 21st Soviet party congress were invited to Peiping at Chinese expense. They were welcomed by Mao Tse- tung and Liu Shao-chi, and their hosts sought to impress them with the applicability of Chi- nese revolutionary tactics to their situation at home. Although almost all the Latin American parties remain Moscow-oriented, there are clear-cut splits in the ranks almost everywhere--splits be- tween the cautious and the impetuous, between those in con- trol and their younger critics. These divisions, rooted in local intra-party strife, have been widened by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the emergence of a Communist Cuba. Peiping's exhortations to head-on struggle strike a sym- pathetic chord in the impatient splinter groups. They quote Peiping to make their case in party squabbles, and the vehe- mence of the ammo-Soviet polemic over strategy gives their own local heresies an air of respect- ability. In Brazil, the party split has become formal. A year ago dissident Communists who were expelled from the Brazilian party set up their own rival political organization. They elected a central committee, issued a party platform, and established a party press. The splinter group, small in com- parison with the orthodox party's membership, has party regulars SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 SECRET worried. Led by Joao Amazonas, the splinter group is pledged to establish a popular govern- ment by revolutionary means and has been encouraged by Com- munist China. Peiping accorded red-carpet tours of the main- land to Amazonas as well as orthodox party leaders it hopes to influence. In Bolivia, it is reported the party has recently forbidden members from continuing on to Peiping after visiting Moscow. All previous travelers who visited both countries reportedly felt more admiration and affection for the Chinese than for the Soviets. Pro-Chinese sentiment is apparently growing among Bolivian party youth, and law students at the University of La Paz have recently formed a group to defend Peiping's ideological stand. In Mexico, the Communist Party is deeply split over the Sino-Soviet question. In Feb- ruary 1963, the Chinese Com- munist trade delegation then visiting Mexico reportedly offered financial aid to a splinter group in exchange for support of Peiping's policies. Since then, internal wrangling has continued, and the differ- ences do not appear near recon- cilia+ion. In fact, the recent pru tponement of the party congress from July to October appears to reflect a concern among party leaders that a congress held this summer might break down over the Sino-Soviet issue. In Venezuela, young party activists--responsible for the current violence--are at odds with old-guard pro-Moscow leaders and are sympathetic to the Chi- nese. A number have traveled to China for paramilitary train- ing. Only in Chile, where the party is legal and enjoys some real prospects of eventually gaining power by parliamentary means, is there little evidence of attraction to Peiping's mili- tant line. Except for Cuba, where trade reached about $200 million in 1962, Communist China has no significant commercial relations in Central or South America. China recently bought about $20 million worth of Argentine wheat and corn as part of the program to relieve severe food shortages by grain purchases in the free world, but trade is usually very small. Peiping's only permanent "trade" office in the western hemisphere outside Cuba is in Chile. A government trade delega- tion visited Brazil and Mexico last winter but was received by SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6 ~fto NOW SECRET minor officials and no discus- sions of substance are known to have occurred. Brazil's Goulart is cool, and Mexico's Lopez Mateos last fall publicly reiterated his government's unwillingness to establish diplomatic rela- tions with Peiping. "People's Diplomacy" Peiping has sought to en- hance its propaganda efforts by inviting influential Latin Ameri- cans to visit China. Such in- vitations are not confined to staunch pro-Communists. Among the more prominent politi- cal figures who have visited Peiping in recent years are Mexico's ex-president Portes Gil, Cuba's President Dorticos and industry chief Guevara, and Chile's Socialist presidential candidate Allende. Last fall Chicago-born Janet Jagan, wife of British Guiana's premier, was received by Mao and accorded top-level attention throughout her visit. If, as seems likely, the Jagans are still in power when British Gui- ana is granted independence, Peiping can probably expect diplomatic recognition. Brazil's Goulart, despite polite expressions of friendship during a 1961 tour, has moved Brasilia little closer to rec- ognizing Peiping. His govern- ment continues to oppose China's admission to international organizations. Only two Chinese delega- tions, trade unionists and journalists, made extensive tours of Latin America last year. The vast majority of visiting Chinese still go only to Cuba-- undoubtedly a result of diffi- culty in obtaining visas to countries with which Peiping has no diplomatic relations. Ex- cluding Cuba, Chinese visits both to and from Latin America have declined slightly since the peak years of 1959-60. The drop roughly coincides with Peiping's severe economic dif- ficulties at home and probably reflects a world-wide retrench- ment effort. As'the domestic crisis eases, Chinese "people's diplomacy" is likely to expand. Propaganda In the past two years the Chinese have beamed a vigorous radio propaganda effort at Latin America. Since 1962 Peiping has been broadcasting 28 hours of Spanish-language programs and about ten hours in Portuguese each week. Direct wireless communications were established with Havana two years ago, and Morse and radiotele- type transmissions to the Americas now exceed 100 hours a week. The Chinese have long published Spanish-language SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6 %0 NW4 SECRET editions of the glossy propa- ganda magazines China Pictorial and China Recons ructs, and this spring the more meaty ideolog- ical fare in the Peking Review was made available to La in American readers in Spanish. The official New China News Agency (NCNA)--working primarily through local Com- munist parties--has established a network of correspondents in Latin America. It has recruited stringers in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Offices manned by Chinese corre- SECRET spondents have been set up in Cuba, Brazil, and Chile. The Havana office of NCNA is the funnel through which most of Peiping's propaganda pours into Latin America. Soon after its establishment in 1959, NCNA's Havana office set up close liai- son with Castro's revamped Prensa Latina news agency--giving it advice and financial support-- and the NCNA chief was appointed to negotiate all preparations for the arrival of China's first western hemisphere ambas- sador in 1960. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6 Approved For Release 2006i0EgP79-00927A004000080006-6 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-R?P79-00927AO04000080006-6