WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

28 August 1964
OCI No. 0346/64
Copy No.
74
WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
REcJtti.;1VTK
RETURN TO
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VW SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 27 August 1964)
VIET AND CHINESE AID TO TANGANYIKA AND ZANZIBAR
Moscow is concluding new economic aid pacts and step-
ping up its military akd. China is sending economic
advisers, and has sent a delegation to negotiate
specific aid contracts.
MOSCOW RETREATS ON AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
Moscow has made a tactical withdrawal on the question
of Soviet participation at the Afro-Asian conference
next spring by indicating that the USSR will not make
its support for the meeting dependent on an invitation.
KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO THE MAJOR GRAIN AREAS
The tenor of his speeches suggests that his immediate
interest is to get this year's harvest in quickly with
minimal losses. His proposed changes in policy and
organization will be discussed by the central committee
in November.
BLOC'S FRIENDSHIP OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONAL BY OCTOBER
The main section will be in operation in October,
almost a year behind schedule. A 690-mile section
is apparently only 32 inches in diameter instead
of 40 inches as planned.
Page
CHANGES IN YUGOSLAV AGRICULTURAL POLICY 4
Recent price increases for agricultural products represent
a basic change in policy, particularly toward private
farmers, and place economic needs before the long-run
political goal of socializing agriculture.
CAUTION CHARACTERIZES RUMANIAN NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS 5
Both hosts and guests avoided polemics and contro-
versial actions during the festivities, but Rumanian
leaders did not pass up the opportunity to emphasize
nationalistic themes.
POLITICAL CRISIS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The inability of the Military Revolutionary Council to
agree on a single new chief of state reflects serious
internal divisions. The Viet Cong have not yet taken
advantage of the situation.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
Page
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
Growing estrangement between Athens and Nicosia appears
to have been papered over during President Makarios' 25
August visit to Athens. Turkey's insistence on rotating
part of its contingent on Cyprus could lead to a new
incident.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO
Although the rebels have failed to take Bukavu, they
have made other gains in northeastern Congo. Early
intervention by the Organization of African Unity
appears increasingly likely.
SOUTH KOREAN STUDENTS STILL RESTIVE 9
Opposition student leaders have spent the summer strength-
ening their organizations, and Seoul authorities tear
new trouble after the school year begins on 1 September.
EUROPE
AREA NOTE
On Italy
THE BERLIN PASS TALKS
Three unresolved points remain but agreement is ex-
pected by early November to allow Christmas visitations
again this year. Additional provisions will allow visits
during the year.
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PRE-ELECTION MANEUVERS BEGINNING IN BRITISH GUIANA
Jagan's People's Progressive Party will contest the
general elections still opposing proportional repre-
sentation.
Page
CHILE NEARS CRUCIAL 4 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 14
Most Chilean observers consider Senator Frei as a
sure winner, but the Communist-Socialist candidate
Allende is still a threat.
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SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO TANGANYIKA AND ZANZIBAR
Moscow is concluding new
economic aid pacts and stepping
up its military aid activities
in the United Republic of Tan-
ganyika and Zanzibar (URTZ).
In an effort to expand its
influence as well as to counter
increasing Chinese Communist and
Western activities, the USSR now
has agreed to provide unspeci-
fied economic and technical as-
sistance. A Soviet delegation
probably will be sent to conduct
preliminary surveys and to con-
clude specific details of the
program and amounts of credit.
Soviet assistance had been lim-
ited to small military shipments
to Zanzibar and the presence of
small groups of technical per-
sonnel in Tanganyika and Zanzi-
bar.
China, following through on
the $31-million economic aid
program to the United Republic
signed in June, has sent a dele-
gation to Dar es Salaam to ne-
gotiate specific aid contracts.
Three projects--an experimental
state farm, a textile plant, and
an agricultural implements fac-
tory--had already been agreed
upon in principle. Although Chi-
nese economic technicians con-
tinue to arrive in Zanzibar to
work as advisers in various
fields--the total now is over 50
--little progress appears to have
been made under China's separate
aid agreement with Zanzibar. To
date, none of the $14 million
in economic credits has been
allocated to specific projects.
Peiping's effort to expand into
the military assistance field
will be limited by its inability
to match bloc military equipment
more readily available from the
USSR.
Soviet arms shipments thus
far have included some artillery,
military vehicles, one "light"
plane, and small arms. A group
of 17 Soviet military technicians
has been training Zanzibari per-
sonnel since spring. The in-
flux of 90 Soviet personnel
last week included some 20-24
additional specialists, with
dependents, to beef up the pres-
ent Soviet military advisory
group. A Soviet military dele-
gation led by a high-ranking
official from the Defense Min-
istry also was among the recent
arrivals. This delegations prob-
ably is embarked on a good-will
mission--inspecting Soviet mil-
itary equipment and training
and assessing military require-
ments. Any expansion of Soviet
military training to include
both Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris
presumably will be used by Mos-
cow to introduce additional per-
sonnel and equipment.
SECRET
28 Aug 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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MOSCOW RETREATS ON AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
Moscow has made a tactical
withdrawal on the question of
Soviet participation in the sec-
ond Afro-Asian Conference. In
an official statement to African
and Asian countries recently pub-
lished in Pravda, Moscow reas-
serted its right to attend,
stressed that Soviet participa-
tion would help in realizing the
aims of the conference, but in-
dicated that the USSR's support
for the Afro-Asian movement will
not depend on an invitation to
the meeting.
Moscow had declared on 4
May that it would support the
conference only if its aim is
"the unity of all. anti-imperial-
ist forces." A government state-
ment at that time suggested that
a conference from which Peiping
was allowed to exclude the USSR
would not foster Afro-Asian unity.
The latest statement suggests
that Moscow's subsequent campaign
28 Aug 64
--including pressure from Mikoyan
during his visits to Indonesia,
Japan, and other Asian countries
--to rally strong support for
Soviet participation fell short
of its goal.
The dominant reaction of
Afro-Asian governments was ap-
parently one of embarrassment
and reluctance to become in-
volved in Sino-Soviet bickering.
The Soviets probably conc_}uded
that further pressure would have
negative results.
Asian movement.
Despite Moscow's latest
pronouncement, however, the
question of Soviet participation
in the coming conference is
bound to arise again. The Rus-
sians can be expected to make
further efforts to exploit the
issue by accusing Peiping of
flagrant attempts to split,
weaken, and dominate the Afro-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pag:~ 2
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The Communist World
KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIP TO THE MAJOR GRAIN AREAS
Khrushchev's tour of the
provinces during the first half
of August underscored the impor-
tance of this year's harvest to
the Soviet economy. With a good
grain crop ripening in the fields,
he urged local officials to get
the harvest in on time and with
minimal losses. Speed is par-
ticularly important this year,
because the late spring shortened
the harvest period in the cru-
cial new lands areas.
Specific points proposed
by Khrushchev during this trip
clearly show the extent to which
over-all agricultural policy and
organization remain in flux.
Several of his suggested ap-
proaches either repeat past pro-
posals that were never put into
practice or supplant organiza-
tional innovations that have been
ignored, even though approved.
The tenor of his remarks, more-
over, indicated that his greatest
interest at this time is I.P. com-
pleting this year's harvest sat-
isfactorily. The central com-
mittee plenum in November--first
announced during this trip--will
consider his new suggestions.
Reflecting the impact of
Western agricultural experience,
the Soviet premier plugged for
a county agent system to bring
the latest in technological de-
velopments to the farms. Simi-
larly, he again advocated large-
scale poultry, dairy, and hog
farms along the lines of US
practice.
In a different vein Khru-
shchev suggested that specialized
agencies be established to su-
pervise the production of indi-
vidual crops and the different
kinds of livestock; the relevant
research and experimental sta-
tions would also be under their
jurisdiction. He did not
identify what agencies these
vaguely defined entities might
replace, or at what administra-
tive level they would function.
His proposal that a group of
agricultural workers be respon-
sible for all operations on a
particular plot of ground, from
sowing to harvesting, is a con-
tinuation of his program to
grant more direct incentives to
the workers. Extension of such
a system, which is currently in
the experimental stage, could
be one of the major reforms pro-
posed for the forthcoming
plenum.
Khrushchev's proposal that
farms growing produce for sale
in the cities operate their own
retail outlets, but with maximum
prices set by the state, appears
unrealistic. On the other hand
his suggestion to allow larger
farms to store grain temporarily
in their own facilities would
ease the existing harvest prob-
lems of manpower mobilization,
work scheduling, unrepaired and
defective machinery, and unsuit-
able transport vehicles tempo-
rarily requisitioned from the
military.
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28 Aug 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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1AV' 1,40
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The Communist World
The main section of the
Friendship Oil Pipeline from the
USSR to Eastern Europe (see map)
will be in operation this October,
almost a year behind schedule. The
section from Penza to Mozyr, a dis-
tance of 690 miles, was reportedly
built with 32-inch pipe instead of
40-inch pipe as originally planned.
The use of smaller diameter
pipe was apparently dictated pri-
marily by the continued priority
given to construction of gas pipe-
lines. Of the 3,000 miles of 40-
inch pipe that has been laid in the
USSR, oil pipeline accounts for
only 10 percent. The remainder is
used to carry gas from the Gazli
field in Uzbek to the Ural indus-
trial region and from the North Cau-
casus and western Ukrainian fields
to the Moscow area. Only one fourth
of all 40-inch pipe has been pro-
duced domestically. The remainder
came from contracts with West Ger-
many, Italy, and Sweden in effect
prior to the NATO embargo.
When Eastern Europe's refin-
ery construction program is com-
pleted by 1970, the Friendship
pipeline will not be able to han-
dle the quantities of crude oil
required for capacity operation
of the refineries. Because the 32-
inch pipe reduces the annual esti-
mated maximum capacity from 48 mil-
lion metric tons (MMT) to 24 MMT, 25X1
lated to parallel the entire system.
plans apparently have been formu-
The Yugoslav Government's re-
cent decision to raise substantially
the minimum guaranteed prices for
a wide range of agricultural prod-
ucts is an effort to bring produc-
tion out of the stagnation that has
characterized recent years. The de-
cision represents a basic policy
change, providing for a major in-
crease in agricultural incomes rela-
tive to those outside agriculture
and a reduction in the discrimina-
tion against private farmers, who
own more than 85 percent of the
country's arable land. In enact-
ing this decree, Yugoslavia is plac-
ing economic needs before the long-
run political goal of socializing
agriculture.
Since World War II, the Yugo-
slav Government has kept agricul-
tural prices artificially low to
finance industrialization and has
favored state-controlled farms with
rebates and subsidies which were not
applicable to the private peasant.
Since 1959, prices of agricultural
products had been allowed to rise,
but they were still too low to per-
mit profitable operations by so-
cialized agricultural enterprises
or to induce private farmers to pro-
duce enough for the market. Even
with the new incentives, Yugoslav
agriculture will continue to be
hampered by backward techniques,
small farms and insufficient sup-
plies such as fertilizer.
In the long run the price in-
creases, which will benefit the pri-
vate farmer as well as the social-
ized producers, are likely to stimu-
late both production and sales to
the state. To date, however, the
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28 Aug 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET The Communist World
price increases are not having the
desired effect. The wheat crop did
not come up to the optimistic fore-
casts in late June. Consequently,
farmers kept back a larger percent-
age of crops than expected for their
own use. They may also be withhold-
ing wheat from the market in expecta-
tion of further price increases. In
order to meet the cities' needs this
year, the government has increased
by a third its original request for
900,000 tons of PL-480 wheat.
The increase in prices of agri-
cultural products is substantially in-
creasing the cost of living of urban
families. Workers' incomes are being
raised but not enough in some cases to
cover increased living expenses. How-
ever, continuing rapid industrial 25X1
growth should permit further wage in-
creases that will remove many of
these inequities.
CAUTION CHARACTERIZES RUMANIAN NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS
During festivities on 23 August
marking the 20th anniversary of Ru-
mania's National Day, both hosts and
guests avoided polemics and contro-
versial actions. In contrast to the
recent Polish 20th anniversary cele-
bration, representatives of the So-
viet and Chinese camps and Yugo-
slavia attended, all apparently try-
ing to woo the independent-minded
Rumanians.
The Rumanian leaders did not,
however, pass up the opportunity to
emphasize such nationalistic themes
as Rumania's economic success and
the importance of independence and
sovereignty in relations with all
states. Party First Secretary Dej
also said in his major address that
"life shows that strict respect for
the inalienable right of all peoples
to decide their own fate is an es-
sential requirement for the consoli-
dation of peace." On the other hand
Bucharest carefully avoided comment
on current problems in international
Communist relations which might ag-
gravate either the Russians or the
Chinese.
Speeches by the delegates, too,
were devoid of comment on Sino-So-
viet relations. This restraint was
in deference to the presence of rep-
resentatives from both camps, as well
as to Rumania's continued public re-
luctance to support Moscow's proposal
for a preparatory meeting of Commu-
nist parties.
Against this carefully staged
backdrop of fraternity, however, the
Rumanian party appears to have start-
ed a.ca.utious but more determined cam-
paign to have Moscow alter its plans
for the projected meeting.
In a recent series of press con-
ferences held at home and abroad in
connection with the anniversary, Ru- 25X1
manian diplomats declined to commit
themselves when asked if Bucharest
would send representatives.
Bucharest may not commit itself
publicly until it has determined
whether or not it can rally support
from other Soviet-oriented parties.
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The inability of the Mili-
tary Revolutionary Council (MRC)
in Saigon to agree on a new
chief of state and its compro-
mise selection of a temporary
triumvirate of Generals Khanh,
Minh, and Kbiem reflect serious
internal divisions. It also
casts doubt on the ability of
the present Vietnamese leaders
to develop political arrange-
ments which will dampen urban
unrest.
According to a communique
issued on 27 August, the MRC
voted to dissolve itself after
selecting the new "steering"
triumvirate. The communique
also said that the 16 August
charter, which elevated Khanh
to the presidency and touched
off the latest crisis, has been
revoked. Khanh's cabinet will
administer the country "tem-
porarily," pending convocation
within sixty days of a national
congress to select a new chief
of state. The congress also is
to "set up national organs in
conformity with the people's
aspirations."
Early opposition developed
within the MRC to Khanh's plan
to have the council dissolve
itself. This opposition appears
to have stemmed primarily from
officers associated with the
Dai Viet Party, while General
Khiem played both sides. The tri-
umvirate is evidently a stopgap.
It is by no means certain
that this maneuver will succeed.
The Buddhist leadership prob-
ably will not accept an en-
hanced political role for
Khiem, whom they associate with
the old Diem regime. Demonstra-
tions by Buddhists and students
in the northern cities of Hue
and Da Nang have reflectee a
strong suspicion of MRC inten-
tions. Violence has again
flared in Saigon where ten-
sions were heightened by re-
ports that troops had fired
on Catholic demonstrators.
Although Communist mili-
tary activity--particuarl
terrorism--continued to ii,
crease gradually this weep, no
specific Viet Cong military
exploitation of the currerot
crisis has been noted. Three
bombing incidents which occurred
in Saigon during the week were
probably the work of Viet Cong
taking advantage of police
preoccupation with student
and Buddhist demonstrations.
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While intensive diplomatic
efforts have continued in the
search for a Cyprus solution,
there have been indications of
growing estrangement between
Athens and Nicosia. On 25 Au-
gust, President Makarios flew
to Athens for top-level consulta-
tions.
The Greeks had been attempt-
ing to prevent Makarios from
pushing ahead with his efforts
to develop closer relations with
Moscow. Pressure from Athens
also appears to have been re-
sponsible for canceling Cypriot
Foreign Minister Kyprianou's
visit to Moscow, originally
scheduled for 21 August. Before
visiting Athens, Makarios and
other Cypriot leaders had in-
sisted that negotiations with
the USSR would continue
Top Cypriot officials have
also warned publicly that enosis
will be acceptable only if it is
chosen by the Cypriot people in
"the exercise of their right of
self-determination." The Cyp-
riots have already rejected all
proposals to compensate Turkey
in any way for permitting enosis.
In Ankara, there is opposi-
tion to any plan not providing
for a fairly large military
base on Cyprus under Turkish
sovereignty. Military command-
ers and political leaders, in-
cluding some in Prime Minister
Inonu's own political party,
are critical of his decision to
stop the air attacks against
Cyprus in early August. Re-
cent military personnel changes
have weakened the moderate pro-
Inonu forces. Coupled with the
rise in criticism of Inonu is
a developing anti-American feel-
ing. Some military leaders are
particularly critical of Ameri-
can "pressure" on Turkey and
have also expressed disillusion
with NATO.
On Cyprus, there has been
little change in the situation
although the danger of an im-
mediate outbreak over the eco-
nomic blockade of the Turkish
Cypriots appears to have lessened.
At UN insistence, Makarios has
allowed limited amounts of food
and fuel to enter the Turkish-
controlled areas. Greek Cyp-
riot restrictions on the amount
of these supplies could create
a new crisis, however.
A new confrontation between
the Greek Cypriots and the Turks
appears possible in the next few
days. The Turkish Government
has informed the UN that about
31 August it intends to rotate
some members of its army contin-
tion.
gent stationed on Cyprus.
Makarios has consistently re-
fused Turkish requests for per-
mission to carry out the opera-
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28 Aug 64
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