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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 OLC 72-0289 7 March 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Conversation with Senator Symington re Radios and DD C I 1. Today the Director told me of a phone conversation he had this morning with Senator Symington, who called to say he thought Senator Fulbright and the Committee were being treated unfairly on the question of the Radios. He asked the Director whether the Agency had any connec- tion with the Radios. The Director explained that the "umbilical cord" had. been completely severed, and that we had had no Agency people in the Radios for several years. He expressed the personal view that it would be a pity to give up the Radios without getting something in return. the Europeans or t o Symington said he thought we ought to turn them over Director volunteered the remark that he was quite satisfied 2 Th e . with the appointment of the new DDCI. He said he had had several talks with General Walters and was quite relieved to find that he was not a "stiff neck" military type but someone who was well qualified and had "been around" quite a bit. 25X1 1JOHN M. MAURY egislative Counsel Distribution: Original - Sen. Symington 1 - O&M DDCI 1.- Radios 1- Chrono Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3346 rI - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 i / V-"'V v v CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 foreclosure comes within a year, the company has ari $800 return on the $9,200.) 'rho homeowner packs up her children and belongings and resumes her search for decent housing, disenchanted with the American dream of home ownership and minus ' her down payment, possible closing costs and a few dollars in equity. ' And the public which finances the scheme through monthly mortgage insurance pay- ments under some FHA programs is out an- other few thousand dollars. Abuses in FHA programs are not new. publicity on irregularities in one Ironically , program-Section 236--caused the federal government to suspend that program while the much larger Section 221(d) 2 program continued unhampered on its abuse-filled way MAJOR FHA HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAMS Here, briefly, are the major FHA home ownership programs: Section 203-The largest of the programs, this Is used to insure standard mortgages in stable neighborhoods. Aplication fees and mortgage insurance premiums paid by home buyers to the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund finance any foreclosures necessary un- der the program. Section 221(d) (2-This is the largest of the Inner city home ownership programs. It provides for down payments as low as $200 for persons displaced by governmental ac- tions.(urban renewal, highway building, etc.) and liberalizes creditrequiremenrts. Foreclos- ures are financed by the General Insurance Fund, funded through mortgage insurance - grains. since 1943, described the area as a "Poor, - Section 223-A section used in combing- but respectable neighborhood, with working are available to the public, as are the tion with 221 or 203 which allows a house in draft versions of the reports. a "reasonably viable" area a to be insured for class people." mortgage if one or more requirements of But in early 1068, conditions, particularly - The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without another section would preclude a mortgage crime, took a turn for the 'Worse, according' objection, it is so ordered, under that section. Foreclosures are financed to former neighbors. (See exhibit 1.) by the Special Risk Insurance Fund which is "They (vandals) tore the copper guttering Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this funded by premiums and fees from several right off my house in broad daylight," Fran- Work is the result of a request which I FHA programs. cis Green, formerly of 2820 Bads said, "I _ figured it wasn't safe for the kids anymore." sent to Shortly the thereafter', Library Mr. on June Charles 8 8, , 19' 197?1. r, From the it. Louis Globe-Demo6, Asked about the sale of houses the 197972] area, Green said, "I figured blockbusting was Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, and Mr. EIGHTY-FOUR VACANT HOMES; 84 VACANT LOTS: what was going on. I hope they catch them James Price, analyst in National De-- (the speculators) at it so it won't happen fense, both of the Library of Congress, ABUSE OF PROGRAM Dooms NEIGHBORHOOD here (at his new house In South St. Louis)." met with Mr. Robert Dockery of the coin- (By Robert H. Teuscher and At the same time that things turned bad mittee staff for the purpose of discussing Harry E. Wilson, Jr.) on Eads and St. Vincent, a group of real owing this meeting, Mr. Eighty-four vacant lots testify mutely here estate companies moved in. the Dockery request. was informed Followingd this the n Mr. to the abuses in a federal program designed Between September, 1968, and June, 1970, by y would epar one to lies i neighborhoods the on e ch of, Radios, te hat Mr dPr ce own homes. and put poor to 23 real houses on to firms, who then resold sold famil into o their homes. The el lots are the tail-end of what has be- houses under the 221(d) (2) program. would be responsible for the Radio Free come an all-too-common urban phenome- The houses were bought by the realty firms Europe - study and that Dr. Joseph. non-blockbusting, real estate speculation, for an average of $5,000, with some going for Whelan, Specialist in Soviet and East 00o ff f the Library would little at $1, European A alts O e resp ing ball. They represent one-third of all the fore- houses several months later to 221(d) (2) study. At approximately the same time, closures , the averae mortgage in uraance federal program. Section 221 (d) (2) faEachsof the housesghad b been pprais 0ed at Mr. Dockery was informed that, at Mr. mortgage insur The houses that once stood on these lots an average of $10,000, the sale price, by HUD Price's suggestion, an independent con- were certified for 25 to 30-year mortgages appraisers, and the appraisers had also cer- sultant, specialized in audience research only three and four years ago by appraisers tified that the houses were good for 20-30 analysis techniques, would be brought in from the St. Louis area office of the Depart- year mortgages. to evaluate ' the Radios' audience-re- ment of Housing and Urban Development cant every one of those houses is a va- (HUD). ' sponse claims. According to HUD regulations, houses And there are 27 other vacant lots on At e c request, the Library agreed to should not be approved for federally insured Eads and St. Vincent, all of which rrrs were each include in the efinal reports a rtsunle on mortgages unless the HUD appraiser finds through federal mortgage pogras The tearer err co participants. i a1 p their drafts them sound enough to stand for at least to the 221(d) (2) mortgage first part of January and Mr. three-fourths of the term of their mortgages. HUD officials are not sure how the houses, during the Yet an average of only 18 months after which were old in the first place, ended up in Geliner forwarded them to Mr. Dockery appraisal and sale with the federally insured such condition to require demolition, on January 14. In his transmittal memo, mortgages, these 84 houses were sold to HUD The reason could have been mismanage- on January r clearly identified the status for their Insured values in foreclosure pro- ment or abuse by the homeowner, or a faul- M the reports a noting: ceedings. ty HUD appraisal, in the first place, accord. of by HUD then decided that the houses were ing to George. 0. Hipps, director of HUD's We will be happy to have your comments Into and either structurally unsound or too expensive Single Family and Land Development Divi- before ewe putt tstu he Our reval sop th se ansm f to repair and demolished, them. si Who wereithee winners in this, example drafts has not yet been completed and we The he Section 221 program that once too will wish to make some changes. financed these houses (2 houses e allows low-income of speculation and blight? families in the inner city to purchase homes The oroginal owners were forced to sell by providing mortgage insurance similar to at.rock bottom prices for fear-of crime and the FHA or GI home mortgages used by mil- speculation. lions of American families, The 221 (d) (2) families lost all of their The program differs from standard mort- equity in homes they could not afford, and gage plans by permitting down-payments as most of them are now ineligible for any other 200 and by requiring rehabilitation federal housing programs. low as $ of the homes before sale. The program's track record has not been good. The fo?;eclosure rate here now stands at 8.63%, the fourth highest in the nation, Re- cording to HUD Secretary George Romney. (The foreclosure rate for standard mortgages is less than one-half of one percent.) Paying off the foreclosed 221(d) (2) more I t s e gages in the City of St. Louis has cast 7 million 2 . fdralovernment more than $ The Record for Section 221(d) (2) in St. Louis Home mortgages insured (1967-June, 1071)____ 2,144 " Foreclosures (Jan. 1972) -------- 265 Foreclosures (percentage) ------ 8. 63 Cost of mortgage payoffs------ $2, 705, 000 Repairs after foreclosure ------- $662,474 ----------------- $80,610 Demolitions -- HUD recoup from resales ------- -$1, 155,700 Repairing foreclosed homes for resale has . RADII) FREE EUROPE AND RADIO cost another $600,000, and demolition of the LIBERTY 84 houses has cost $80,000. HUD has been able to recoup only $1.16 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the million on the resale of repaired houses or Library of Congress has completed its vacant lots. reports an Radio Free Europe and Radio Real estate speculators and mortgage com- panies, however, have turned tidy, and some- Liberty. The reports were delivered to the times immense, profits, records show. _ Committee On Foreign Relations On Fri- In the meantime several stable neighbor- - day, March 3, at 5 p.m. hoods have been ruined. In view of the controversy surrounding The Eads and St. Vincent avenue neigh- these reports and the allegations that I borhood, in the shadow of Firmin Desloge and members of the committee staff have Hospital on the Near South Side, is an ex- tried to suppress this information or alter ampl tion o-osthe blight that 211(d) (2) mortgage geits presentation, I ask unanimous con- Insurance. speculators and 221(d)(2) sent to have the reports, plus my cor- As As late as 1967, this was a burs-collar, mid- respondence with the Library, included dle-class area, made up of single and two- in the RECORD at the conclusion of my re- When the real estate firms resold the b onsible for the Radio Liberty Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Marcia 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-'SENATE S 3347 Mr. Dockery reviewed the drafts and formance be the ultimate judge. No country 20 years of his professional career to in preparation for the initial House-Sen- should claim infallibility and each country Eastern European and Communist af- ate Conference on S. 18, he prepared a should be prepared to re-examine its own fairs. He asked that I not reveal his name, background memorandum, dated Janu- attitudes for the common good. but I would like to quote from his letter ary 21, for the Senate conferees in which It is interesting to contrast these senti- for the benefit of my colleagues: he summed up the reports' findings ' in - merits with the objectives of Radio Free It seems clear to me, were there no RFE or the following way: Europe and Radio Liberty. The Radio Radio Liberty now in existence, that nobody Preliminary versions of the Library's stud. Free Europe report states for example: would suggest that this would be the time lea are now completed and are complimentary Radio Free Europe's policy in its political to establish such a station. The pattern of to the Radios' efforts to breech the censor- broadcasts is to press for reform within the our relations with the countries of Eastern ship imposed on the people of Eastern Eu- prevailing Communist system in East Europe has evolved in such a manner, that rope and the Soviet Union. The studies do Europe . terosts one in would that part o that part of t tthe argue world that would in- make it clear, however, that the Eastern bloc .would be countries and the U.S.S.R. are strongly op- And the Radio Liberty study leaves no better served by setting up such a station posed to these broadcast activities. doubt as to the purpose of its broadcasts: now. M .Assuming the stance of a "patriotic" The main argument for. continuance of the The same information was available Soviet communicator and acting on the station, then, is now the bureaucratic one: to the staff of the House Foreign Affairs democratic principle of a free press, Radio a large organization with an expensive staff Committee who were briefed by the Li- Liberty identifies with what it believes to now exists, and so must presumably continue brary's researchers prior to the House- be the best interests of the Soviet peoples to exist, even though the need for it (if Senate conference on and speaks in their behalf, hoping ever was such) has long since disap- January 26. ping that to peared. But the staffs can be taken care of On February 2, Mr. Dockery met with the long run this effort will contribute to much more economically, with generous sev- Messrs. Gellner, Price, and Whelan to those forces seeking to bring about a demo- erance pay, than by prolonging the life of discuss the draft reports, His Comments cratic transformation of Soviet society. For, an unneeded station. suggested that the draft reports were Radio Liberty's ultimate goal is the peace- ful democratization of the Soviet Union; and I think this is a very perceptive ob- deficient in several key respects, such as it holds to the belief that the best assurance servation and one which serves full con- neglecting the origins of and reasons for for peace with Russia is through the diminu- sideration, particularly by those who, up the Government's decision to establish tion of Soviet totalitarianism and the growth to this point, may have been exposed to and fund the Radios. Mr. Dockery also of democracy. only one side of this issue. I, of course, suggested that the researchers may have Mr. President, if after 1 short week am persuaded that the Radios ought to be placed too much reliance on the public we can reach the kind of understanding liquidated, unless perhaps our European information handouts provided by the with the People's Republic of China that allies are willing to pick up their fair Radio organizations themselves-organs- would foreclose a "Radio Free China" share of the financial burden that these zations which I might point out still re- aimed at reforming the Peking govern- Radios impose-a burden which the fuse to acknowledge publicly any ties to ment, then I find it incomprehensible, American taxpayer would otherwise have the U.S. intelligence community. after these years of direct contact with to continue to bear alone. The validity of these comments was, of the Soviet Union, that we must continue In this connection, it might be help- course, a matter for the Library's staff to to support a "Radio Liberty" whose ob- ful to include at this point a copy of my judge, and I wish to emphasize that at jective is the "diminution of Soviet recent letter to Senators PERCY and no time did I or anyone connected with totalitarianism-" ? ' HUMPHREY, the three principal sponsors the Committee on Foreign Relations ? I regret that the Library's reports do of Senate Resolution 272, and I ask attempt to direct the Library's research not come to grips with this kind of is- unanimous consent to have the letter effort or to influence the findings and sue. Nor do they see? any contradiction printed at this point. in the RECORD. recommendations developed from it. ? between these radio operations and the There being no objection, the letter In this regard, I might point out that administration's "low profile" policy. Nor was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, the final reports are substantially. the is there any mention of the Nixon doc- as follows: same as the original drafts and, although trine, the concept of "shared responsi- MARCH 1, 1972. the Library indicates that it is prepared bility" and its possible application to Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY, to undertake two additional' studies Western European financial support for U.S. Senate, which will concentrate on the foreign the radios. Washington, D.C. policy aspects of the Radios and on alter- Rather, what we are left with is two which DEAR you and s t onl trip press release. SENATOR: native and enaoa Humphrey issued to- - native financing arrangements for them, rather. dreary commentaries on two very day, I understand that you plan tomorrow I am inclined to think that this is little bureaucratic organizations whose com- to introduce a resolution in support of Radio more than belated recognition of the ? mon goal is to liberalize the governments Free Europe and Radio Liberty. In this con- foreign policy significance of these Radio of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union nection, I though it might be helpful to you operations. by broadcasting "balanced news" to the to have my views on the current legislative I believe this significance is primary, peoples of these countries. The people, in situation. as it must be with each and every pro- turn, according to the theory, then pres- cour urse dun boon Sto uphold tees, I am grain we conduct abroad. And in consid- sure their respective governments for latest adopted t e, the legis- grain these reports and their generally democratic reforms, and this, in turn, vides the Radios with an authorization of $35 s35 favorable comments, .[ hope my col serves to create conditions for world million for this fiscal year. The House ver- leagues and others will keep in mind the peace. sion of this legislation extends the funding wleel slags foIlo ing the P1' sident couple Of course, the theory runs headlong authority through fiscal 1973. On side have held firmly to the mark trip to Cwin. The culmina is dra- into the brutal experiences of Hungary one-year authorization and on the other the trip, the United States-China con- and Czechoslovakia, and if there were side the House conferees have held just as the trip, the United any validity at all to the theory, I cannot firmly to their two-year authorization. De- y 27, states for ex- believe that President Nixon, Dr. Kissin- spite all that has been said about the dead- ample: ger, and Secretary of State Rogers would lock that has. developed, I think it is fair The United States, supports individual have agreed to discard it so gingerly in to say that the House conferees' position freedom and social progress for all the the ease of China. But they did, as the has the practical effect of denying the Radios peoples of the world, free of outside pressure the fu'tlding that would otherwise be avail- or intervention, joint communique of February 27 states, able at least for the remainder of this fiscal And they did it for good reason: Such a year. If the House conferees are as dedicated In this same spirit, the communique theory, I believe, is based on nothing as they say they are to preserving the Radios, goes on to read: more than an arrogant belief that people then .1 am at a loss to explain their refusal to The United States believes that the effort around the world will act like we want accept the funding for this fiscal year and to reduce tensions is served by improving them to act if we only tell them how. to consider fiscal 1973 funding in the course communications between countries that have of the normal legislative processes. different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of Mr. President, the proper perspective Having said all of this, I should make clear confrontation through accident, miscalcula- on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty my own serious doubts about funding these tion or misunderstanding. Countries should was perhaps best stated in a letter Which Radios beyond, the current fiscal year. Of treat each other with mutual respect and be I received recently from a retired foreign particular concern to me and to the other willing to compete peacefully, letting per- service officer, who devoted more than Senate conferees is the lack of any apparent Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 03348 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 1972 interest on the part of our Western European allies to help share the financial burden im- posed by the Radios. Such sharing would certainly be consist- ent with the Nixon Doctrine and would servo to erase many of the doubts that I and others have about continuing U.S. support for these Radio operations, Accordingly, It seems to me that multilateral funding arrangements would provide a meaningful alternative to the present arrangement and this, of course, is something that could be fully explored in connection with any fiscal 1973 funding re- quest. I had not intended to go on quite so long, but I very much hope this letter helps to clarify the current legislative situation as well as my own position on this Issue. With best wishes, I am .Sincerely yours, J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman. Duplicate letter sent to Senator HuM- FIIREY. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Finally, Mr. Presi- dent, I wish to bring to my colleagues' attention the fact that last year the Committee on Foreign Relations was able to obtain from the Department of State a brief description of the arrange- ments made and mechanisms used by the executive branch to maintain policy con- trol and direction of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I invite Senators and Congressmen who are interested in this information, to look at it in the com- mittee's Capitol office, S-116. 1 'regret to say that it is available on a classified basis only, a restriction insisted upon by. the Department of State. EXHIBIT 1 JUNE 8, 1971, Mr. CHARLES R. GELLNER, Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.. DEAR MR. GELLNER: The Committee on Foreign Relations Is presently considering legislation that would authorize public funds for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. During its consideration of these pro- posals, the Commit" , came to the conclu- sion that it needed additional information on these two radio operations. The purpose, therefore, of this letter is to request that members of your staff prepare for the Com- mittee an in-depth, background study on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I should hope that such a study would lead to some conclusions as to the effectiveness of these radio stations and whether or not it Is in the public interest to support them with tax dollars. I should appreciate this project receiving your earliest consideration. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact Mr, Robert Dockery of the Committee staff. Sincerely yours, J. W. FULBRIGHT, ? Chairman. AUGUST 6, 1971. Mr. CHARLES R. GELLNER, Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. GELLNER: In connection with my request of June 8 asking the Library of Congress to prepare a background study on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am en- closing a copy of the Committee's report on S r, mate Bill 18 (as amended), which the Son- rto passed on August 2. You will note in the report that the Com- mittee considers S. 18 as stopgap legislation for fiscal year 1,972,.and that it is divided in its opinion on the. merits of Radio Free Eu- rope and Radio Liberty. The report also notes that for fiscal year 1973 the Committee will place great emphasis on the studies being prepared by the GAO and the Library of Congress. In view of the Committee's comments and its emphasis on these studies for next year, the urgency which I attached to my earlier request has subsided somewhat. Accordingly, I should hope that your efforts would be concentrated on the preparation of a full, complete report that would afford the Com- mittee a solid basis for judging the two Radios in an overall manner. For the Committee's purposes, I am hope- ful that your study will be available no later than the end of this calendar year. Sincerely yours, J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman. Director, Legislative Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. JAYSON: I am writing to you about the Library's reports on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I understand that both reports are in the final stages of preparation and will prob- ably be available within the next couple of weeks. In this connection, I wish to offer the suggestion that each study include a full and complete resume of the authors and of the consultant who worked on the au- dience research analysis portion of the re- ports. I offer this suggestion in view of the con- troversy now surrounding these reports. This controversy has, quite naturally I think, gen- erated a growing and legitimate interest in having the previous work experience and ex- pertise of those responsible for the research placed on the public record. My suggestion serves to satisfy this interest and to place this additional information before the public. I appreciate your consideration of this matter. Sincerely yours, _ J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Washington, D,C., March 3, 1972. Hon, J, W. FULBRIGHT, U.S, Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR FULDRIGHT: The attached re- ports are forwarded in response to your let- ters of Juno 8 and August 6, 1071, request- ing that CRS conduct in-depth background studies of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Ra- dio Liberty (RL) and prepare full reports for the Committee on Foreign Relations. The attached reports examine the history, organization, and operations of RFE and RL respectively. Two additional studies are be- ing prepared discussing alternatives for pos Bible administration of RFE and RL and analyzing the Radios' roles in the context of U.S. foreign policy, These will be forwarded at a later date. The study on RFE was conducted by James R. Price and that on RL by Joseph G. Whe- lan, both of the staff of the Foreign Affairs Division. Annexes in the reports on the audi- once analysis operations of the two Radios were prepared by a consultant, Lorand B. Szalay of the American Institutes for Re- search.. As a consultant, any recommenda- tions he makes are made on his own respon- sibility and not that of CRS. Biographies of the authors, pursuant to your request, have been set forth in the Annexes of each report. Sincerely,. - LESTER S. JAYSON, Director. RADIO FREE EUROPE-A SURVEY AND ANALY- SIS-CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF STUDY (By James R. Price, analyst in national de- fense Foreign Affairs Division, February 29, 1972). [Footnotes at end of each chapter.] BACKGROUND In January, 1971, the Congress began to take under consideration the question of the funding and administration of Radio reee Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)- two radios beamed respectively at five East European Communist countries and the So- viet Uniori. Both radios had hitherto ostensi- bly been supported by private funds but had actually been largely funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The central questions to be considered by the Congress were whether continued federal support of the two radios was in the national interest and, If so, what form this support should take. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on these questions in May, 1971, following which the Chairman requested separate in-depth back- ground studies on the two radios from the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office.' This study is in partial response to the Committee request. It examines the history, organization, administration, and operations of Radio Free Europe. A similar but separate study has been prepared by the Congres- sional Research Service on Radio Liberty. The present study does not examine the various alternatives for possible administra- tion of RFE in the future as these have been proposed in the Congress and the Executive branch or which might otherwise be consid- ered. Nor does it analyze what kind of role, if any, RFE might fulfill In the broadest context of U.S. foreign policy. These are being examined in separate reports to be submitted to the Committee in the future. By illuminating in a factual way the his- tory and present organization, purposes, and operations of RFE, it is hoped that this study will assist in an evaluation of its activities In the context of U.S. foreign policy and how it relates to currently declared purposes of that policy. It is also hoped that an in-depth research effort on this little-understood or- ganization will assist a broader understand- ing of Its mission and functions, will dispel possible knowledge gaps and misconceptions, and will provide useful information for those concerned with assessing its purposes and impact. SOURCES AND METHOD OF APPROACH Apart from occasional articles in the press, no serious evaluative or even descriptive ma- terial has been published on Radio Free Eu- rope since 1963. Of the two works available until 1963, one, Radio Free Europe, by Robert T. Holt, was the outgrowth of graduate study and was based on field observation in Munich. The other, Voices Through the Iron Curtain, was written by RFE's former Deputy European Director, Allan A. Michie, and must therefore, be read with Mr. Michie's partisan- ship In mind. Neither of these books contains up to date material on RFE's current con- cepts and activities, although they were relied upon to provide the necessary background against which the current review was con- ducted. The lack of published information about RFE posed a problem how to obtain the data necessary for a study In sufficient de- tail to assist the Congress in its delibera- tions, The only practical alternative was to obtain this information directly from RFE, either in the form of RFE documentation, of interviews with RFE officials, and of direct observation of RFE facilities and operations. This was the course adopted. Information supplied by RFE is not, for the most part, susceptible to verification from Independent Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3349 information on as factual a basis as possible. saw only Communist movies, and learned Africa, the Middle East, and Asia has re- When judgments, evaluations, and opinions about the outside world only from material suited in an increase in the number of of RFE officials are quoted or referred to in slanted for them by the Communist propa- higher-power (200 kilowatt or better) trans- this study, the sources from which they camer ganda operators." 1 matters from a handful to nearly 250 in op- are clearly identified. In early February, .1949, State Department eration or on the way. Free Europe, Inc. Pres- Radio Free Europe maintains complete officer George Kennan met with former Am- ident William P. Durkee has contended: files of its scripts, internal evaluation proce- bassador to Japan; Joseph C. Grew, to pass Both the jamming and a growing inter-, dures, research products, and administrativb on the results of a number of discussions Terence from neighboring broadcast fre- history. These files were made freely avail- Mr. Kennan had conducted with people both quencies operated by other international able, to the Congressional Research Service in and out of government regarding an ap- broadcasters has led to a steady erosion in team, and several hundred scripts, research propriate response to" Soviet policy. Mr. Ken- the technical quality of RFE's signal ... U reports, and other documents were reviewed nan's recommendations for action outside NON13ROADCAST OPERATIONS during the course of the study. the realm of government `? were seconded by Although broadcast operations have al- A key objective of the study was the rigor- those of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, ways been the largest and most important ous evaluation of RFE audience and public who urged Grew to establish a private group activity carried out by Free Europe, Inc.? opinion research methodologies and findings. to help deal with certain aspects of Eastern two other instrumentalities have also played Many of RFE's claims of listenership acid European exiles, who, having fled the Iron a role in achievement of the broader pur- effectiveness are based upon these findings. Curtain, were paying frequent visits to the poses originally envisioned by Ambassador In addition, crucial programming decisions State Department, Mr. Grew acceded to this Grew and the other founders of the orga- made by RFE management are increasingly request and, joined by his old friend' and nization. These instrumentalities were (1) based upon recommendations from the former Foreign Service colleague, Mr. DeWitt the Free Europe Press which, until the fall Audience and Public Opinion Research Do- C. Poole, invited a number of prominent of 1956, engaged in balloon leaflet opera- partrnent in Munich. Accordingly, an expert Americans to join in the founding of the tions behind the Iron Curtain, and has also consultant in attitude and public opinion National Committee for 'a Free Europe- carried out various other publishing activi- research, cross-cultural communication, and which was formally incorporated in the state ties; and Free Europe Exile Relations, which Eastern European affairs was retained to con- of New York on June 2, 1949.2 At a press con- was set up to maintain contact with and duct an evaluation of RFE's Audience and ference, Mr. Grew spoke of the necessity of support of various exile political and pro- Public opinion Research programs. The re- - finding suitable occupations for.the "demo- fessional organizations such as the Assembly port of this consultant, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay cratic exiles who have come to us from East- of Captive European Nations and others. At of the American Institutes for Research, is ern Europe," but he also spelled out the no- the present time, however, Free Europe, Inc. appended as Annex A. Highlights of this re- tion of an exile broadcasting operation: has divested itself of all activities except the port are discussed in Chapter VI. Our second purpose will he t-. put the broadcasting and research programs of Radio By far the most important insights into voices of these exiled leaders on the air, ad- Free Europe. Two staff members within the RFE operations were gained from observa- dressed to their own peoples back in Europe, Free Europe, Inc. headquarters are respon- tioir and interviews conducted in the field. In their own languages, in the familiar tones. sible for tying up any loose ends remaining The research team visited the Free Europe, We shall help them also, if we can, to get from the terminated exile relations program, Inc. corporate headquarters in New York on their messages back by printed word." D and even these are being phased out. two occasions. Two weeks were spent at RFE By July of 1949, a Radio Committee within CORPORATE STRUCTURE headquarters in Munich, Germany, where the overall organization had been established Radio Free Europe is the major, and soon- the team interviewed key personnel In all to develop broadcasting operations. In July, to-be-sole, activity of its parent organiza- RFE departments, observed the preparation, 1960, the Radio Committee went on the air tion, Free Europe, Inc. Free Europe, Inc.- production, and broadcasting of program ma- as Radio Free Europe, a division of the Na-. the corporate successor to the original Na- teriai in each of the country Broadcasting tional Committee for a Free Europe. By the tional Committee for a Free Europe-is a Departments, and attended the daily rounds end of the year, RFE's one 7.5-kilowatt short- private, non-profit membership corporation of staff meetings where RFE policies are wave transmitter in Germany was broadcast- organized under the laws of the state of New formulated. The insights gained during the lug one and a half hours daily to Poland, York. Overall direction is exercised by a field portion of the study were crucial to the Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Board of Directors of nineteen. prominent proper evaluation and interpretation of the and Bulgaria. Programs were taped in New U.S. citizens under the Chairmanship of re- hundreds of RFE documents examined York and flown to the transmitter in Ger. tired General Lucius D, Clay. President of throughout the course of the study. many. Free Europe, Inc., Is Mr. William P. Durkee. At all times and at all working levels, the By the end of 1951 RFE had in operation Mr. Durkee is also a former Director of research team received prompt, complete, and three powerful transmitters in Germany and Radio Free Europe in Munich. Corporate courteous cooperation from the RFE staff, one in Portugal. One of these transmitters headquarters are at 2 Park Avenue, New This cooperation was essential to the efficient .was a 135 kilowatt medium wave unit broad- York, N.Y. 10016. and prompt completion of the present study. casting a full day's schedule to Czechoslo- Fund-raising from the private sector is FOOTNOTE vakia. The others provided strong short wave conducted through a sister corporation, Ra- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on For- signals into Czechoslovakia, Poland, and dio Free Europe Fund, Inc., of which Mr. eign Relations Radio Free Europe and Radio Hungary. New headquarters facilities in Durkee is rt S. also sL Ch id, and d tof which he Bethlehem r. Liberty. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Munich facilitated the preparation of more Stewation, is airman of t e the Board. July 30, 1971. 27 p. 92nd Congress, let sess., program material there instead ?of in New Steel Stewart Cpoooioe Euro e, Inc. and the RFE York, and total broadcast time increased or of p S. Rep. 92-319. p. 3. nsider,i,a? By the miry 1950'c. R.FF opera- Fund, Inc. are the same persons, but the CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF p `1 y b " r is not identical? RADIO FREE EUROPE per day oadcasts through some 29 trans- The RFE Fund, Inc., is an outgrowth of ORIGINS matters Slovakia, t with br to h abo, about Hungary, of the Crusade for Freedom, organized in 1950 half lf that quantity Czecho- Radio Free Europe owes its birth to the material beamed to Bulgaria and Rumania.' by General Clay to conduct public relations of a number of prominent Amerl- and fund-raising for the Free Europe Coln- reaction p CURRENT ACTIVITIES mittee. In 1953, the Crusade became a proj- cans-in and out of government-in the face Today, Radio Free Europe ? broadcasts cot of the American Heritage Foundation, of the Soviet Union's rapid post-war moves average 15 hours per day to the five Eastern which it remained until July of 1955, when . to establish complete hegemony over Eastern European countries concerned. Czecho- it again became independent. Among its Europe. Imposition of the Berlin Blockade Slovakia is the target of more than 20 hours other accomplishments, the Crusade for and the Communist takeover in Czecho- daily; Poland and Hungary receive about 19 Freedom created the trademark for the en- slovakia In 1948 were but two of the more hours every day, while Rumania and Bul- tire broadcast operation. To symbolize the sensational manifestations of Soviet policy garia receive smaller amounts of attention, first Crusade in 1950, the Directors commis- which, in Eastern Europe, was characterized respectively 12 and 71 hours of RFE pro- stoned the casting in England of a ten-ton by a massive Soviet military presence and gramming per day.' This active broadcasting "Freedom Bell;" which was rather obviously the shutting-off of the population (more schedule is beamed over some 32 active and . an international analog to the American Lib- than 100 million people) from outside con- stand-by transmitters in West Germany and erty Bell. The Freedom Bell was transported hrmr_ ,-,mod F.ha 7i?it"A qt-t- rdnrinv the initial tacts. '1'ne iron uurtaln was Aunt of censor- - ship, pervasive secret police systems, strict- ever, only four of these transmitters are mod- Crusade campaign (which reportedly resulted monopoly of all ern, high-power (260 kilowatt) equipment, in attracting some $1,317,000 in private con- est border controls, and the installed in Portugal in 1964. The remainder tributions~ and was then installed atop the means of public communication by Soviet- date from 1954 or earlier, and are said to be tower of West Berlin's City Hall, where it controlled Communist regimes. As a result, underpowered. While RFE has stood still in rang each noon. The chiming of its tones the population living behind the Iron Cur- power transmission for the last 7 years, the were, for a time, used as the station-break tain at that time "heard only Communist ' proliferation - of world-wide short-wave for Radio Free Europe.0 ideas, listened only to Communist radios, broadcasting operations by the USSR, gov- The relative success-or lack of same-en- read only Communist newspapers and books, ernxnents in both East and West Europe, joyed by the RFE Fund, Inc.'s campaign is Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3350 CONGRESSIONAL RE, CORD -SENATE March, G, 1971-1 a matter of some controversy. According to Senator Clifford P. Case, the annual returns from media campaigns donated by the Ad vertising Council and estimated to be worth between $12 million and $20 million in free media space, aggregate less than $100 thou- sand, while supplementary solicitations from private industry add only a "srnall'part" of the total RFE budget of approximately $21- 22 million annually.1' In a letter sent to Sen- ator J. William Fuibright on July 16, 1971, Free Europe, Inc. President William P. Dur- kee reported: "As I can, however, appreciate and under- stand your interest. I can tell you that con- tributions to Radio Free Europe have amounted to $17,007,383 from FY 1951 through FY 1971 so far. In FY 1970 there were 8,279 corporate contributors, and in FY 1971 there have been 4,462 corporate con- tributors as of now." According to Mr. John Dunning, Assistant to the President, the total contributions over the entire period represented some 18.7 per- cent of RFE's total operating cost, includ- ing the cost of the fund-raising. Over the same period, fund-raising costs have approxi- mated 37.5 of fund-raising receipts-a cost- income ratio which has recently been re- duced to about 30 percent.". FACILITIES AND STAFF Although the corporate headquarters is in New York, and the President and Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. exercise ultimate control over the entire operation, most of the day-to-day activities of Radio Free Europe are carried out in a largely autonomous manner at the RFE headquar- ters in Munich. The Director of RFE, located in Munich, is responsible to the President of Free Europe, Inc.., for the overall direction and,Inanagement of all broadcasting and re- lated operations, including the Munich head- quarters and all field components. The latter include not only news bureaus in 10 major European cities, but the New York bureaus of each of the five Broadcasting Departments (Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian) which make up the Radio Free Europe network as well as the transmitting and monitoring s1tes in Germany and Portu- gal. Organization. charts, depicting the struc- ture and interrelationships of Free Europe, Inc., Radio Free Europe, and the RFE Fund, Inc., appear on the following two pages. NEW YORK In New York, the President of Free Europe, Inc. and his supporting management and fiscal control staff number some 29 persons, including 7 persons managing the affairs of the RIFE Fund, Inc. In addition, five security guards bring the New York corporate head- quarters staff up to 34 full-time personnel; overall total to 35. This staff performs the normal functions of a corporate headquarters, i.e., various ad- ministrative and policy support functions. In addition, another 98 persons in New York work directly for Radio Free Europe. RFE employees in New York consists of: Broadcasting Department employees (editors, writers, clerical) ---------- 37 Production Personnal-__ --------- . 10 News (including special events and the library (1 half-time) -------------- 16 Support (wireroom, mailroom, repro- duction, purchasing; switchboard) (1 half-time) --------------------- 28 Engineering ------------------------- 3 FRE New York Director's Office ------ 2 Total plus 2= 98--------------- 90 Production Personnel News (includ- ing special events and the library) (1 half-time) ,----------------------- 16 Each of RFE'S five Broadcasting Depart- ments has its own New York Bureau and, in addition, about 15 percent of the total mate- rial used in broadcast programming is col- lected and put together in New York. The .New York staff of RFE, however, reports di- rectly to the broadcasting Department Chiefs and the Director of RIPE in Munich. EUROPE The operational headquarters of Radio Free Europe is located in Munich, where ap- proximately 970 persons operate five separate broadcasting services to Poland, Czechoslo- vakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and where a large research staff builds and main- tains extensive political, economic, and bio- graphical files on the East European coun- tries concerned. Another 128 persons are em- ployed at the RFE monitoring facility at Schleissheim and the two transmitting sites at Iiolzkirchen and Bibiis. The transmitter at Gloria, near Lisbon, Portugal, is staffed by some 346 persons, while RFE news bu- reaus in Athens, Bonn, Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome Stockholm, and Vienna employ another 69 persons. All of the Broadcast Department personnel are former nationals of the countries to which they broadcast, and number as follows: Bulgarian Broadcasting Department____ 41 Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department_ 100 Hungarian Broadcasting Department-_- 85 Polish Broadcasting Department--_--__ 101 Rumanian Broadcasting Department--- 45 Each of these Broadcasting Departments has a proportionate number of its own nationals in the New York Bureaus of the five Depart- ments-a total of about 37 persons. Except for the top engineering staff, most of the engineers at the Munich headquarters and at the transmitting and monitoring sites In. Germany are German citizens. These number about 469 persons. Of the 346 em- ployees at the Gloria transmitter, only five are U.S. citizens. Radio Free Europe, then, employs a total staff of about 1,611 persons, of whom only about 221 are Americans?, This Is in addition to the Free Europe, Inc., and RFE Fund, Inc, staff mentioned earlier. In Germany, Free Europe, Inc. is registered as a foreign non-profit corporation, holds long-term leases to the RFE headquarters in Munich, to two transmitter sites and two monitoring reception stations, and is licensed to operate transmitters by the German Fed- eral Ministry of Posts and Telecormuunica- tions. The transmitter operation in Portugal was established in 1951 to provide a more distant base from which higher short-wave frequen- cies would be effective and jamming par- tially overcome, The license for the operation Is held by a Portuguese corporation, S.A. de Radio-Retransmissao, S.S,R,L., or "RARET." By Portuguese law, 60 percent of the RARET Board of Directors are Portuguese citizens and hold a majority of Its voting stock. The remainder are connected with Free Europe, Inc., which supplies all the financing. Al- though the license permits either. broadcast- ing or rebroadcasting, the sole function of RARET at the present time is to relay to Eastern Europe programs relayed from Mu- nich to It by radio. cosTS According to estimates supplied by the General Accounting Office, the costs in Fiscal Year 1971 for operation of all aspects of Radio Free Europe were $22,366,876.41. An- other $244,035.99 was invested in capital equipment, and $501,072.65 was expended in support of the RFE Fund, Inc. operations. EVOLUTION OF RFE PROGRAM PIIILOSOPIIY, ORGANIZATION, AND GOALS In the 22 years which have elapsed since the National Committee for a Free Europe Was established in December, 1949, a number of powerful forces have combined to bring about some fundamental changes in both the objectives sought and the techniques used i by Radio Free Burope.'These forces have been { manifest in the changing style of U.S. foreign policy as well as in the post-war history of Eastern Europe. Probably the most spectacu- lar manifestation of these forces which di- rectly affected RIPE was the Hungarian re- bellion of 1956. Indeed, most of the press and many of the RFE staff refer to 1956 as a "watershed" in. RFE history. By this is meant a concept that until 1956 RIPE activities had certain strong characteristics which, in the aftermath of the Hungarian tragedy, have been fundamentally altered. _ As is usually the case with sweeping gen- eralizations, the watershed theory is par- tially valid-but not completely so. Funda- mental changes in RFE's approach to its basic purposes began to occur as early as 1952, and, despite the sensational and per- vasive publicity about Hungary, RIPE's cur- rent policies and programming philosophies can be, more accurately described as the result of evolution and careful planning rather than of the trauma of the revolution of 1956. Knowledge of how and why this evo- lution occurred is a prerequisite to a real- istle appreciation of what RIPE has become and what it hopes to accomplish. As noted earlier, Radio Free Europe orig- inated in the early stagesof the cold war- the aftermath of Soviet Imposition of the _ Berlin Blockade and the Communist take- over in Czechoslovakia and other countries in Eastern Europe, United States policy fur- ther hardened with the outbreak of a hot war in Korea, and reached a peak during the Eisenhower Administration when a policy of the "peaceful liberation of the captive coun- tries" was enunciated as a major goal of United States foreign policy. Radio Free Eu- rope's initial organization reflected the "lib- eration" philosophy later enunciated by Eisenhower and Dulles. After some experi- mentation (broadcasts to Albania were tried, but abandoned in view of the small number of radio sets in that country) RIVE evolved into a network of five related but distinct stations broadcasting separate schedules and different program materials to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bul- garia. The basic purpose was to provide the populations of those countries with an alter- native to the press and radio so closely con- trolled by the Communist regimes. Addition- ally-and this has remained consistently true throughout RFE's history-RFE was con- ceived of as "indigenous" to the target coun- tries. This is in direct contrast to the Voice of America, the BBC, Doftsch Wolle, Radio Madrid, and other foreign language services of various governments-all of which pre- sent a "foreign" viewpoint to their target audiences. RFE set out to provide a "home service" which would, to the greatest possible extent, compete directly with regime pro- gramming. To provide this "home service," RIPE had perforce to rely largely upon "home talent"-exiles-few of whom were experi- enced in radio programming. The first years of operations, therefore, were fairly large- scale exercises in on-the-job training, marked, as could be expected, with a certain number of blunders and some clumsiness. Following "tile "liberation" philosophy, the five broadcasting operations each bore the original title of it separate "Free Voice", i.e., the Polish broadcasts were called the "Voice of Free Poland," the Czechoslovak broadcasts emanated from the "Voice of Free Czechoslo- vakia," and so forth. Early scripts reflected this approach. They were, Michie asserts, "written by writers who were learning the business, lacked authenticity, and were over- loaded with rhetoric, exhortations to the lis- teners and the opinions of the editors, who tended to speak as the conscience of the cap- tive peoples." 11 RFE's Policy Handbook, written in 1950-51, illustrates the philoso- phical tone underlying the early RFE scripts. Four ways are listed by which RFE might sustain the morale of the captive peoples and, stimulate them in a spirit of noncoop- eration": Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 i~1at'chh G, 1972 .OiiN RESSIONAL RECORD SIsN AE S3351 (a) by reminding [the] listeners con- stantly that they are governed by agents of a foreign power whose purpose Is not to fur- ther the national interest but to carry out the imperialistic aims of the rulers of Soviet Russia; (b) by displaying the moral and spir- itual emptiness of communism as an ideology and the material incapacity of communism, as an economic ssytem, to provide an accept- able standard of living for the working class; (c) by inculating hope of eventual liberation through a convincing display of the superi- ority of the skill, resources, and military strength of the West, and through reitera- tion of the promise that the West intends that [the] listeners shall be free; (d) by sowing dissension in each regime through exposing the ineptitude of its officials, and sowing fear among the officials by denounc- ing confirmed acts of oppression and cruelty, and threatening retribution.15 Despite these exhortations, however, as early as 1952 there was evidence that RFE policylnakers had become wary of the "liber- ation" approach, and foresaw its possible consequences, which later materialized in the Hungarian uprising of 1956-an event which prompted widespread and, in the opin- ion of some observers, substantially unjusti. fied criticism of the alleged role of RFE in inciting the uprisings. During the 1962 Presi- dential campaign, when debate included the issue of "containment" [of communism], vs. "liberation," RFE issued a "Special Guidance for Broadcasts on Liberation": We of RIPE ... cannot comment upon these statements [on liberation by General Eisen-. hewer and Mr. Dulles] with unqualified op- timism, for to do so would be to deceive our listeners by Inspiring in them exaggerated hope of Western intervention . not one word in these statements [on liberation] can be used to encourage militant anti-cominu- nists to go over from passive to active resist- ance in the expectation that such resistance will be supported by Western elements.t0 The abortive uprising in East Berlin soon after the death of Stalin in 1953 suggested the futility of any expectation of Western military support of anti-communist uprisings in the Soviet Bloc. This led to RFE's own' adaptation of its role as an exponent of "liberation" to "liberalization" instead. RFE began at that time to develop a technique of "chipping away" at Communist power struc- tures, looking toward the day when gradual evolution within the Coqimunist nations would bring them nearer to the freer societies in the West. "'Peaceful liberation' through 'liberalization' became the RFE strategy." 17 This new approach required intensive anal- ysis of the internal events and trends in, Eastern Europe-analysis which would indi- cate the kind of encouragement the audi- ences should be given. Frontal attacks against the Communist regimes were downgraded in favor of programs designed to encourage long-range and subtle attitudinal changes among the listeners. In an RFE staff report issued in January, 1957, this new policy was summarized: RFE's broad role would appear to be to keep alive the pressure for freedom among our peoples, supplying them with the facts, the comprehension of free democratic' methods, and the inspiration of free-world achieve- ment which will enable them to chart effec- tively their own courses toward freedom 7e According to its spokesmen, the pattern of RE'S programming since 1053 has been in- creasingly one of intensifying its competi- tion with regime media in terms of provid- ing the kind of accurate, quick, uncensored, and objective "voice of the opposition" which is found in most Western democratic socie- ties. Virtually all of RFE's resources are focused on this goal. An extensive research and analysis service--whose reports are avail able to scholars the world over-provides background material for programming anti that there had been no incitement and no for policy planning. The Audience and Public 'promises of western aid to the rebels. Ade- Opinion Research Department takes advan- nauer added, however, that sonic of the tage of increased travel abroad by East Euro- broadcasts had contained "remarks . sub- peans to study RFE's audiences. These studies ject to misinterpretation." - According to a provide continuing data to guide determina- report dated April 27, 1957 on Radio Free tion of needs for change in RFE's program Europe presented to and approved by the content and format. RFE's Central Newsroom Council of Europe, the remarks considered in Munich reportedly receives and processes by Mr. Adenauer to be subject to misinterpre a million words a day-from RFE's own tation were probably contained in a broad- monlto ,I P 1 1 f o C ig ommunist news agencies and 40 Communist radio and television sta- tions, from the Western news service, and from its own news bureaus in Washington, New York, the United Nations, and leading cities of Western Europe. Some 000 Soviet and East European publications are regular- ly screened for background information." In The objective of this activity and the goal of this policy is the provision of a journalis- tically excellent, entertaining, and credible network of radio stations which can capture and hold the interest of the listening audi- ences In the five Eastern European nations concerned. RFE cites the research of its own. Audience and Public Opinion Research De- pariment as evidence that this goal is being achieved. According to RFE, by the end of 1970, RFE's listenership among persons over 14 years of age had reached these percentages of the total population: Poland, 59 percent. Rumania, 67 percent. Hungary, 55 percent. Czechoslovakia, 50 percent. Bulgaria, 45 percent. Source: William P. Durkee, "East Europe and Radio Free Europe in an Era of Negoti- ation," a statement submitted by Free Eur- ope, Inc. to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 14, 1971. The statistics quoted above .appear in Annex XI, p. 1. In line with the policy of encouragiiig lib- eralization rather than liberation, the five In- dividual broadcasting services are no longer known as the "Voice of Free Poland," etc. They are known instead as the "Polish Broad- casting Department," the "Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department," etc., of Radio Free Europe. Within the, RFE structure, these country Broadcasting Departments are each headed by a chief who is a native of the target country, and, each operates with con- siderable autonomy within a broad policy framework established by the Director of RIDE in Europe, and subject to the approval of the President of Free Europe, Inc. in New York. RFE AND THE POLISH AND. HUNGARIAN UPRISINGS IN 1996 Radio Free Europe's stated policy of re- straint on the question of East European "liberation" (as quoted above from the 1962 Special Guidance for Broadcasts on Libera- tion) was twice put to public test In the mid. 1950's. On one well-publicized occasion-the Hungarian uprising of October-November 1956-the.policy foundered, at-least in part. In connection with the Poznan riots in Po- , land in June of that year, however, RFE con- ducted its operations in a manner that re- ceived virtually no criticism from responsible observers. A brief review of what happened in these two instances would permit events to be seen in context. - THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING OF 1956 Probably the most-publicized and still. lingering charge against RFE is that its broadcasts tended to incite the Hungarians to rise up against their Communist govern- ment and that RFE either promised or strongly implied that the Western powers would come to the direct aid of the Hun- garian rebels. . The charge of incitement to rebellion has been dismissed by the German' Government of Konrad Adenauer, which was involved because RFE broadcasts from its territory. The.West German Government reviewed all the tapes of broadcasts from RFE to Hungary during the period In question, and concluded the Observer, a responsible British publica- tion. The broadcast ran as follows: This morning the British Observer pub- lished a report of its Washington correspon- dent. This situation report was written be- fore the Soviet attack early this morning. .In spite of this the Observer correspondent writes that the Russians have probably de- cided to beat?down the Hungarian revolution with arms. The article goes on: 'If the Soviet troops really attack Hungary, if this our apprehension should become true and the. Hungarians ' will hold out for three - or four days, then the pressure upon the government of the United States to send military help to the freedom fighters will become irresis- tible.' This is what the Observer writes in today's number. The paper observes that the American Congress cannot vote for war as long as the presidential elections have not been held. The article continues: 'if the Hungarians continue to fight until Wednes- day, we shall be closer to 'a world war than at any time since 1939221 Allan A: Michie, Deputy Director of RFE, was in charge of coordinating RFE activities during the Hungarian affair. In his book, Voices Through the Iron Curtain, Michie reports that a detailed post-mortem of some 308 separate scripts broadcast during the uprising revealed that another three scripts, in addition to the one quoted above, were found to be "in clear violation" of RFE poli- cy guidances, and that "only a further six- teen programs were found to involve some distortions of policies or failure to imple- ment a policy guidance on a specific sub- ject." za Michie attributed these three scripts to the misguided efforts of two RFE Hun- garian editors to help the freedom fighters by giving them military advice and know- how. Both Michie and University of Minne- sota scholar Robert T. Holt, however, re- ported another major broadcast which def- initely was in.accord with a policy directive cabled from New York. Perceiving its role as supportive of the program being advo- cated by the freedom fighters, RFE, on Oc- tober 29, 1956, broadcast a compilation of major demands monitored from various i1- legal broadcasts from the rebels and which it felt to be the minimum conditions ac- ceptable to the freedom flghters:~ 1. Immediate and total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. 2. Total dissolution of the AVH [security police] immediately, and placement of the direction of any new police or security forces and the army in the hands of a minister not associated with any previous cabinet or Cen- tral Communist body. 3. Full amnesty to all freedom fighters who participated in the uprisings. 4. Exclusion from the new temporary gov- ernment of all persons associated in any way with the regime government or top party command since Imre Nagy's previous premiership. 5. The majority of the cabinet of the new temporary government to be drawn from the various patriot groups on a representa- tive basis. 6. Immediate calling of a Constituent As- sembly, selected by free secret popular vote, to frame a new charter of government and action program-this charter and program to he submitted to the people for free, secret voting on acceptance or rejection within a' stated period, such as six months. 7. Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact of Hungary, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3352 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 8. Continuation of local workers' and other broadcaster on October 29, while the Khrush- councils and patriot committees which have chev delegation was in Warsaw for talks with been formed during the crisis and contin- the Poles, illustrates the Implementation of uous communication between them, until this policy: 21 all the above conditions have been. achieved. The Politburo delegation, having landed in Since these eight points clearly added up Warsaw and taken up its quarters at the to the complete overthrow of the Communist Belvedere in order to open Its talks with the Hungarian regime and the total removal of Politburo of the PZPR, knew .very well Soviet Influence from Hungary, their retrans- that no one either in the Politburo nor in mission back to the Hungarian audiences by the party rank and file, nor even among the Radio Free Europe during the uprising in people, i.e., among the vast majority of effect constituted active support of the armed Poles, can envisage for a moment a break rebellion once it had 'broken. out. Accord- with that political make-up in which our ing to Holt, such support was not incon- country found itself against Its will and in sistent with RFE policy, since "Radio Free which it must continue against its will until Europe had always operated on the assump- objective conditions favouring a radical tion that it could not lead the captive peo- change are established. The attitude of the ples to freedom; it Could only assist them in people within the last twelve years has the struggle they might initiate with policies shown that it is a nation full of political they had devised." 21 Nor did Michie, who had wisdom, a nation which can subordinate its. coordinated RFE broadcasts during the up- feelings to the existing situation without rising, consider RFE's endorsement of the losing, at the same time, its ideological ob- eight-point program unusual or inflamma- jectives from sight. Poles know very well tory: that Soviet Russia has at its disposal both In its broadcasts on. October 29, the Voice military and economic means which would of Free Hungary was able to stress these enable it to interfere in Poland. points as the common program of the rebel- Although RFE support of Gomulka was lion. While associating itself with the de- tactical in nature, based upon a temporary minds of the patriots, at no time did RFE congruence of it was effective, available evidence -go beyond the specifics of the programs suggests voiced by them; to have done so would have predated by the regime. Michie quotes an given the impression that RFE, as an "out- unnamed Polish Communist Party official, a sider," was trying to Influence the course of Gomulka supporter, as having commented to the revolution.25 an RFE reporter in Stockholm, some weeks If, by its active encouragement of armed after the Polish events, that "Had RFE not attempts to dislodge the Soviet Union from told our people to be calm, I am not sure an area it considered vital to its strategic whether we-alone would have managed to Interests, RFE was not "trying to influence cope with the situation." 2? the course of the revolution," the question remains unanswered as to exactly what RFE did hope to accomplish in the face of massive Soviet power and the virtually certain knowl- edge that Western intervention would not oc- cur. The charges that RIVE programming had incited the rebellion have been pretty well disproven (independent research conducted on Hungarian escapees indicates that few of the freedom fighters attributed the outbreak of the rebellion to the influence of any out- side incitement). But it is-clear that, after the rebellion was underway, RFE improvised its own policies, and found itself caught up in the emotions of the times. With the ad- vantage of hindsight, it can be said that the results, at best, were unfortunate for all concerned. TilE POGNAN RIOTS RFE's experience earlier that year, from June to November, with the Polish crisis. sparked by the Poznan riots was a different one. In the first palace, RFE's Polish analysts were convinced from the outset that violent uprisings would not drive the Russians out Radio Free Europe from 1952 through 1957 and, during most of that time, was Deputy Europe Director at Munich. Id Holt, op. cit., p. 22. 15 Radio Free Europe Policy Handbook, quoted in Holt, op. cit., p. 22. 10 Special Guidance for Broadcasts on Lib- eration, September 2, 1952, in Holt, op. cit., .p. 24. 17 Michio, op. cit., p. 76. 19 Summary of Accomplishments and Find- ings, RFE Staff Conference, January 3-5, 1957, p. 1, in Holt, op. cit., p. 22. 10 Durkee, op. cit., Annex VI, p. 2. For a description of this department and Its work see below, Chapter VI. The percentage figures refer to respond- ents who stated explicitly that they were RFE listeners. As will be developed in more detail in Annex A, subsequent questions on frequency of listening showed in 1970, for example, that 52-98 percent listened once a week or. more and 2-27 percent listened less frequently. 20 New York Times, January 26, 1957. 21 Holt, op. cit., p. 197. 22 Michie, op. cit., p. 257. 28 In Holt, op. cit., p. 191. 91 Holt, op. cit., p. 190. 2? Michie, op. cit., p. 226. 20 Holt, op. cit., p. 175. 27 Holt, op. cit., p. 182. 21 Holt, op. cit., p. 182. 20 Michio, op. cit., p. 191. CHAPTER III: RFE POLICY AND Policy objectives It has been noted that when Radio Free Europe went on the air in the early 1950's, its purposes were linked to U.S. Cold War Strategy. RFE engaged in continuous psy- chological warfare against Eastern European regimes and with the aim of keeping alive in the people the hope of eventual "libera- tion" from the Communist governments. RFE executives acknowledge that program- ming fifteen or twenty years ago was polemi- cal and "addressed to an audience assumed to be uncritically receptive to anti-Coin munism." I Relaxation of the strict Stalinist controls in the mid-1950's however, resulted in somewhat greater tendencies toward plu- ralism in Eastern European societies, less rigidity in the Communist systems, and sub- sequently a bit more give-and-take between the people and the respective regimes. Though they remained strictly controlled and censored, regime media became some- what less dogmatic. RFE's response-accelerated though not solely motivated by the 1956 Hungarian af- fair-has been a near-total modification of its earlier approach. It has sought to stay ahead of its regime radio competition, to re- tain and expand its listenership. Above all, RFE has striven to (a) know its audiences and their preferences better and, (b) raise the level of professional expertise in all phases of RFE activity. Polemics have been deemphasized in favor of more and better straight news covercage of world and local news events. The objec- tive is to enhance audience appeal and to improve credibility by filling the "news gap" brought about by regime censorship policies. In the words of Free Europe, Inc. President Durkee, RFE "seeks to function much as a democratic, responsible, independent station -would function within each of the five coun- tries if the regimes permitted it." 2 In sup- port of this thesis, Durkee quotes the follow- Ing RFE standing broadcasting guidelines, .calling for a policy of balanced commentary coupled with comprehensive, objective, and accurate news reporting: 2 "It Is essential that RFE, while making clear its dedication to freedom and the prin- ciples for which it stands, seek to engender I Michie, Allan A. Voices Through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story. New York, Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1963, PP- 0-7. 2 Holt, Robert T. Radio Free Europe. Min- neapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958, pp. 9-11. On p. 233, footnote 8 to Chapter I lists membership of the original Committee, in addition to Mr. Grew and Mr. Poole, as Frank Altschul, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, A. S. Berle, Jr., Francis Biddle, Robert Woods Bliss, James B. Carey, Hugh A. Drum, Allen W. Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark F. Ethridge, William Green, Charles R. Hook, Arthur,Bliss Lane, Henry R. Luce, Arthur W. Page, Charles M. Spofford, Charles P. Taft, DeWitt Wallace, Matthew Well, James A. Farley. For a list of the current Board of Di- rectors of Free Europe, Inc., (who are also Directors of the companion fund raising or- ganization, RFE Fund, Inc.) see Annex B to this report. 2 As quoted in Holt, op. cit., p. 12. h Holt, op. cit., pp. 14-16, passim. c Durkee. William P. East Europe and Radio guidance, issued soon after news of the first . statement submitted by Free Europe, Inc. to disturbances at Poznan, put it this way: 2? the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on We understand and appreciate the motive- June 14, 1971. The hours quoted appeared tions which have driven the workers of in Annex VII, p. 1. Poznan to desperate measures. However, riots ? Durkee, op. cit., p. 14, footnote (1) . and revolts are not likely to improve matters ? Free Europe, Inc., is the corporate suc- in Poland, for the police may be given an cessor to the old National Committee for a opportunity for reprisals which only make Free Europe. things worse . . . ? Annex B to this report lists the Officers, RIVE broadcasts followed a dual policy of Directors, and Members of the two corpora-_ advocating calm and restraint, while deliver- tiOns. ing accurate accounts of events to the listen- 0 Michie, op. cit., p. 17. ing audience. This policy was, however, made 10 U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Roe-, easier by the fact that the "legitimate" Ord, January 25, 1971, p. 5130. Communist leader. Gomulka soon emerged as A complete analysis of the RFE funding a kind of "honest broker" between the structure, including sources and related ad- workers and the Soviet Union. RFE eau- ministrative costs, is being prepared by the tiously backed Gomulka, In the belief that 'General Accounting Office as part of its report his program of mild reform within the to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, system was receiving, popular backing and Presumably this report will contain inforina- represented the "only chance Poland has in Lion on funding by contributions. the immediate future to obtain a measure I2 Biographic information about key staff of independence from Moscow." 21 RFE did of the Munich headquarters of RFE Is in- not want to see Gomulka pushed into a eluded in Annex C. position which would provoke the Russians 13Michie, op. cit., p. 71. Allan A. Michie, into armed Intervention. An RFE script aprofessional writer and journalist, was with Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Mai ch 6, 1972, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA'T'E S" 3353 among its listeners, even in the Communist hierarchy, a high degree of respect as a thor- oughly . responsible and reliable source of news, commentary, and other information ... Comment on'intornal. affairs should be es- sentially constructive, calm and reasoned, avoiding a belligerent tone. Denunciation and personal attacks or ridicule can only serve to prejudice the achievement of RFE policy objectives. RFE will, however, condemn vio- lations of human rights when these are of a nature and magnitude that demand public attention. In dealing, with difficulties of which the people may be expected to be aware, care should be taken to clarify their origins and their deeper significance for the mass audience, avoiding polemical treatment of the kind which the audience is known to recent. "Meaningful alleviations by the govern- ment will be noted as they occur, and pro- fessions of intent to make further improve- merits should be appropriately noted and welcomed. Comments on the internal scene must deal with important issues and be di- rected toward the attainment of specific ain:ls. Criticism should be selective, never petty, and handled In such a way that it supports the people In striving for further reforms. Criticism of government policies and practices should be characterized whenever possible by positive treatment illustrating means for remedying the problem ender dis- cussion. "Attractive alternatives,". including those of social democratic origin, which offer practical solutions to current and long-range problems should be presented." This standing general instruction has been restated in specific language for each of the five Broadcasting Departments. The follow- iiig text, obtained from the Director of RFE in Munich, is typical of the "restraints" im- posed by RFE upon these Departments. It has been abridged and edited by the author of this replort in order to remove country-- specific references and mention of specific groups and people: RESTRAINTS' voice of an opposition party . . . or of the . . . people as a whole, 10. Continued treatment of. key themes is essential but monotony or needless repeti- tion should be avoided. 11. No programs should be broadcast which are based upon or use rumors or un- substantiated information. If, under unusual circumstances, a constructive purpose will be served by calling attention to a rumor, It should clearly be identified as such. 12. RFE should not jump to conclusions, either by attaching undue weight to . government or other pronouncements which of Directors. Each of these gentlemen was candid in referring to past connections with the "sponsor"-a euphemism for the CIA. All - affirmed that those past connections have now been broken. According to these spokes- men, the nature of past connections corre- sponded more closely to the relationship be- tween, say, a major Foundation and that Foundation's grantee than the kind of rela- tionship which one might expect to exist The correct tone is as important in ad- hering to RF'E policy as correct content of broadcasts. The following restraints are therefore emphasized: 1, Avoidance of vituperation, vindictive- ness, and polemics. 2. Avoidance of broadcast materials, the content or tone of which is or could be legitimately construed as inflammatory or inconsistent with [local] or international polical realities. Even straight news can be inflammatory if improperly handled. 3. Avoidance of blatant, propagandistic argumentation. 4. Avoidance of sweeping generalizations and evaluations. 5.-Avoidance of any action which would amount to or could be reasonably construed as incitement to open revolt or other vio- lence. ii. Avoidance of tactical advice, by which is meant recommendations for specific action in particular cases, except in unusual cir- cumstances, and then only by indirection. The people . provided they know the rel- evant facts, are usually better qualified to judge the efficacy and consequences of their action than anyone outside the country. Such advice is likely to be resented and, If acted upon, could cause regime reprisals and o urope ac ree between a government agency and one of its subordinate extensions. RFE officials would meet with the "sponsor" to discuss budgetary matters and to exchange views on he overall nature f F tivities. E Such exchanges of -views were restricted to not carry out to the letter, or by unduly- tho broad generalities of policy, e.g'., agree- ment that broadcasting operations would 13. RFE should not encourage defec- emphasize journalistic professionalism as a tions . . . - major objective. 14. RFE should not lead the . . .'people The realities of the day-to-clay problems to believe that in the event of an uprising of running the five stations in Munich pre- the West would intervene militarily. RFE eluded, as will be seen subsequently in this must not . . . speculate about an uprising report, any attempts by the "sponsor" to ... nor contingencies arising therefrom. "censor," dictate, or otherwise assume a 15. Jriticism of the ... government should chain of command role in RFE's daily activi- be to the fact and to the Issues involved, ties. "Sponsor" support was renewed each Insofar as possible it should be subtle and in- year on the basis of "sponsor" assessment of 'direct. . RFE's existence as a professionally-independ- 16. RFE should not broadcast any material ent disseminator of news and Information as which could be characterized as petty gossip, being in the interest of U.S. policy toward slander, or attacks on the personal lives or East Europe. families of government or party figures, or Within this context, it would appear that on individuals as such .. . the corporate management structure has not-certainly In recent years-been a mere EMERGENCY CONDITIONS - front through which the policies of the In the event of emergency conditions . . U.S. Government funding sources have been due to violent demonstrations, armed up- 'conveyed. To the contrary, the Officers and rising and revolutions, or war, RFE will not Board of the corporation make a persuasive assume any attitude toward such develop- case that corporate policies originate within ments or participate in them in any way, the corporate policymaking structure, and except for straight--and restrained news re- that corporate autonomy from the funding porting, until It receives guidance from [Free source is a highly-prized and jealously- Europe, Inc.] New York. guarded possession. The Boards of the two POLICY' FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION corporations are coillprised of citizens of The mechanisms through which RFE considerable prominence-men who have . policies are formulated and implemented are ready access to leading business and political based u.puon RFE's founding concept-"a co- circles in the United States, and who do not operative effort of free East Europeans broad hesitate to make use of this access when the casting to their countrymen at home, under interests of the corporations so demand. American management and supported by-the These Individuals. regard their business and professional expertise necessary to the op- professional acumen as well as publicly es- oration of a radio station." 4 As previously tablished and their devotion to and ap- .noted, RFE's overall policies are under the preciation of the U.S. national interest a direction and control of the President and basic assumption underlying their election Board- of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. In to the Boards. They view the efficient and New York. The Director of RFE in Munich continued implementation of Free Europe, is responsible to the President, and has pri- -Inc.'s, basic charter as their sole and freely- mary responsibility, within the frame of re- assumed obligation to the U.S. Government. ference of overall Free Europe, Inc., policy - Although they are willing to listen to .and for all standing and ad hoc policies related consider specific policy options, they do not to the management and operation of the consider themselves subject to the opera- radio stations. Thus there are two levels of tional supervision or control of U.S. Govern. policy: broad organizational and corporate ment agencies. - policy, and the day-to-day considerations of The individuals consulted, including Presi- running five radio stations which broadcast dent Durkee and General Clay, were unani- news, commentary, features, and music, moos in (a) a conviction that day-to-day policy supervision and control by any single FREE EUROPE, INC. - funding source cannot be exercised without Annex B lists the officers and members of destroying the timeliness, flexibility, and both Free Europe, Inc., and the RFE Fund, effectiveness' of the broadcast operations and, Inc. The Free Europe, Inc. Board of Direc- (b) an unwillingness to continue participa- tors is the highest legally-constituted govern- tion in any enterprise so controlled and su- ing body responsible for all activities of the pervised. All affirmed that the organization organization. This Board of Directors is self- had operated in accordance with this kind perpetuating, and has been from the outset. of responsible independence in the past, to A key function of the Board has been to the satisfaction of all concerned. supervise the liaison with outside backers The minutes of meetings of the Free Eur- In flexibility. which has been maintained by the principal 7. Avoidance of patronizing or conde- officers of the corporation. Although the au- scending positions or Indulging in- preach- , thor of this report did not interview offi- ing. cials of the Central Intelligence Agency, it 8. Avoidance of narrow and parochial Is a safe assumption that contact between points of view . - - that Agency and Free Europe, Inc. was prob- 9. Avoidance of tone or content which ably a major function of the Free Europe, -- would give RIPE the air of a voice of emigre Inc. corporate headquarters. - opinion . . , the term "we" should not be The author did talk at length with Presi- used to suggest that the speakers are repre- -dent William P. Durkee of Free Europe, Inc., senting the views of any .. . emigre group, members of his staff, and with General Lucius nor . , as spokesmen or as the purported D. Clay,'C'hairman of the Free Europe Board ope, Inc. Board of Directors and the Board's Executive Committee illustrate the nature and level of policymaking which takes place in New York. The author examined the inin- utes of all meetings held between October 9, 1970 and April 8, 1971. Major items taken up by the Board and/or the Executive Com- mittee during this- sample period included the following: 5 "a. Budgetary pressures and fund-raising problems. These were discussed at all except two meetings, as RFE was attempting to cope with the problems caused by inflation, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3354 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- S!=N A A h L e i a i'ci t ti, i J i 2 revaluation of the German mark, and some Hovey, as President and Executive Vice Pres- The purpose of these meetings is both a crit- reduction in funding from the "sponsor." Ident respectively of RFE Fund, Inc., are ique of effectiveness of materials broadcast, A basic decision of the Board was to try to , responsible for organizing the annual na- and a correlation of Broadcasting Department implement the urgently-needed $4,750,000 tional fund drive and for the public-infor- programming with the opinion and prefer- transmitter modernization program through mation advertising campaign conducted exsces of the listening audience, as revealed' the results of fund-raising campaigns, thus through the Advertising Council, The Fund's by Audience Research reports. RFE tain that the execut to the reduced "sponsor" contributions activities nrep andidistributioncof of placing thexp imaryxresponsibil ty for pro- s leaving free ct meet operating expenses without any, solicitation volunteers; p p paration printe full ce- Directors th has worked very xwell,ry t Broadcast materials reduction in broadcast activities, yertising copy, radio and television annou, ad- gram "U? The nature and degree of Communist-, Uloc attacks on RFE. menu; arrangement of speaking engage- advantage of the special skills of the ex-and c. A detailed discussion and analysis of ments; from the coitribu- their interest andxmorale inia m nner which public and the queries The Boarhe Boaid p processing of tiers received .0 ? would be impossible under a system of im- by the against Polish nR FE Government. progranirain nitheade complaints urerd a refec frto prove utlining the mean RADIO FREE EUROPE plementing 'prepared scripts. orders At and the same translating centrally- time, Director uroa in efct to prevent the ld prompt Role of the director Walter assures that the final responsibility of aefprotests which could prompt In- American management is fully recognized. maetrials any ly legitimate git. The Board was n- Within the broad framework of corporate had no Programming Department formed that the "sponsor" and a "high level policy established by the Board of Directors RFE has 1967, and each Broadcasting interagency committee" were agreed that and the President in New York, Radio Free as such since all RFE should stand fast against outside pres- - Europe in Munich enjoys a near-total auton- Department has full development. The D responsibiliabilityty f for RFE sure for, fundamental changes in the char- the director, condRalphuct Walter ( who, Is, in effect, the programming chief for the ac "ear its bug. five-station combination. Mr. Walter, the "d, Meetings psogrngs in in February and April, 1971, also a Vice President of Free Europe, Inc.) r, makes responsib Sen- tions of Mr. Wal- staffs faciillit estoto ass st him Inttbothspro- deal prim maxim atortCa e'saproposeh lthe egislt ionaand with the conta t withhPr sidentDurkee, buy in d Board's cooperation with the Department of ter and his staff make all the daily decisions gramming and policy functions. A descrip-ome dail u and facilities staff these the State which 3u t mate found lthe r broadc st pert ion. Editorial pidl olicies a respore do- mtion ade of them in policy form lation andypro- way into S. 1936." veloped in daily meetings between the Dirac- gram implementation follows. tor, key elements of the Director's staff, and The news department THE ROLE OF Laws PRESIDENT executives of the five country Broadcasting Nthn Kingsley, Chief of RFE's News De- Under the By-Laws of Free Europe, Inc., the Departments. Numerous administrative pro- ,country Broadcasting Board the of Directors has "full power in the cedures have been developed to assure ode- De artxnent to the fithe relationship management and control of the policies, ac- quate follow-through on implementation of Departments as one of a news and news fes- tivities, funds, and affairs of the corpora- approved policies, and it is the Director's tares agency with five radio stations as tier." The Board accordingly appoints officers responsibility to keep the President of Free clients. The dissemination of accurate, and interim directors, approves budgets and Europe, Inc. promptly and fully informed. , and relevant news every hour on the auditors' reports, reviews periodic operational In the interest of speed and flexibility, RFE timelyhour is probably the single most importane takes o submitted by the President, and has ruled out any general policy of pre-broad- activity of Radio Free Europe. News broad- takes other actions it considers necessary in cast review of programs or the use of cen- casts are, according to RFE Audience and cutive officer trally-prepared master scripts. Pre-broadcast ? Public Opinion Research reports, the most directing the organization. The chief executive officer of Free Europe, reviews are, however, required in rare in- heavily listened-to of all RFE pr, the in . Inc. is the President, who is appointed by stances on certain designated sensitive topics. Mr. Kingsley and his 9 editorial colleagues and responsible to. the Board. With the New In emergency situtions, such as the Warsaw in the news department are all experienced York lcadquarters staff previously described, Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia In 1968, the journalists who take considerable pride in he carries out the following functions: Director requires the pre-broadcast review the professionalism of their work. Kingsley, Corporate: Liaison with the Chairman and of all commentaries as a double-check a veteran of more than 16 years with the members of the Board of Directors, includt against the possibility of incitement or mis-. New York Herald Tribune in Europe and the the preparation' of periodic meetings of the he understanding by the audience. In general, United States-die last assignment there was Board and Executive Committee, and con- crisis situations call for a tightening-up of as National Editor-operates a brisk and sultation on major policy, organizational, and all review procedures.7 bustling department. It reminds one of the fiscal developments, It should be emphasized that the review news room of any large American metro- Governmental relations: Consultation and -procedures under discussion are those re- politer daily newspaper or who service, but branches s with the de and legislative quired solely by the Director of RFE, in is unique In the nature and variety of its { branches and whatever bdepartments, come Munich, from his own staff in Munich. There news sources and in the fact that it deals Re- are no established procedures which require daily in 8 to 10 languages. The News De- under s, e other bodies may be m appropriate centl present or future arrangements. Re- RFE to clear any scripts in advance with partment consists of a Central News Room, Gently this has included the Department of State , for exchanges of information; commit- Free L+'urope, Inc., or with any "sponsor" a Monitoring Section, an Audio Section, and representatives. a nof RFE News Bureaus. A total of , and members of , toes dud. ion and individual e Congressin- as Broadcasting departments some number e some 180 editorial, reportial, technical personnel make up the hnicant to legislation and ceof d requests for gee staff. formation; the rents financing; Budget and Manage- hearThe t ande so l ofc the x enti irrep opiThe Central News Room (CNP) mlt, to Off1 0 and and the Gen- operation-are seaa ce and Ccis Re- each from these audience The Central News Room edits and pro- dntby a ionaals Director Policy search Accounting Service and a ProryrOffi as r their respective rsiddent studies. atn: The President countries. These men are directly responsible daces anews-and-features file of about rec super- from a day words 000 the both or of RFE. of sources tly respand consults with Director o oyRFd to. preparation tof broadca thud erials and the Standard west rn news agencies,yrecei ed by programming, r Munich on broad d questions of polic and xon organizational problems production processes by which these mate- teletype, are: and key personnel actions, on relations with rials are put on the air. Staffs of these de- United Press International, Reuters, European governments and with RFE's West partments range from 101 in the Polish Agence France-Presse, and Deutsch Presse also monitors the teletype output of European Advisory Committee. The handling Broadcasting Department to 41 in the But- Agentur. of such matters is facilitated by a daily flow garian Department, and are comprised of per-CNR of teletypes and mail, and by occasional vie- sonnel of the variety of talents required to t he t executives both inns.. following eleven Communist news serv- its by the President and Director and other pprnews, ducecone b,oottlturctru and m of political, pro- Tass (Soviet), Hsinhua (People's Republic , sports and Budget: General Budget: G Fiscal and supervision of gramming featured by the stations. All of China), CETEKA (Czechoslovakia), PAP expenditures and of accounting and auditing, Broadcasting Departments are strongly step- (Polish), MTI (Hungarian), Agerpres (Ru-arian Department by News t letypee em o slav), ADN ('East GBul erm n), ATA (Albanian), d in New orted by the njug bud as Accounting Department presentation Vie York and mainta U.S.-based e accounts of all over- cuits-and continuous for content a dreffective ess is anM terial from the etso rces,)from the News seas b Inormalelementsnts. g of scripts Public lic Information: The RFE research maintained for the Director by RFE's Broad- Department's extensive radio monitoring product, as noted elsewhere, has widespread cast Analysis Unit. During the course of the services, and from RFE News Bureaus is byproduct use among scholars, journalists, author's visit to Munich, Mr. Walter inaugu- edited and rewritten to produce trio daily and others in the U.S. and abroad, The'Pres- rated a new procedure whereby the Director news-and-features file. News stories are trans- ident's staff is responsible for meeting all re- of each Broadcasting Department will have mitted via teletype to the newsrooms of the oint ting five ecialists of meetings artments as quests this country for information and theiBroadcast A alysis Un tiand the Audience written, foraeach B oadcast Department pro documentation. Fund-raising: Mr. Durkee and Mr. J. Allan and; Public Opinion Research Department. daces a taxi-minute live newscast each hour. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S ;355 These hard-news stories, combined with adds- York, and a fulltime correspondent in Wash- the Communist world, and of Communist tional feature material, are distributed ington, D.C. Parties not in power, is of great interest to in printed form, known as the "daily Although the news bureaus often supply ' East European audiences, RFE makes an of- budget," to other, key addressees within the items faster than the commercial wire serv- fort to maintain its expertise on these mat- Munich headquarters throughout the day. ices, their primary role is to focus upon tors through the CAA staff. This staff includes The overnight accumulation is picked up and events of special interest to Eastern Euro- three analysts on the Soviet Union, two on distributed to the Chief of the News Depart- pean audiences-events which are often Yugoslavia, one on China, one on East Ger- meat, the Director of RFE, Broadcasting passed over by the wire services. The activi- many, one on Albania, and one on the non- Department chiefs, and selected members of ties of Communist Parties outside the Soviet ruling Communist Parties. Chief of the De- the Director's staff at their homes at 0000 Bloc is but one example of the kind of news pertinent is Mr, Samuel Lyon. each morning. This not only provides these given detailed treatment by RFE bureaus. Sources and Methods individuals with substantial breakfast read- Press reviews, sound actualities, and the pro- ing material, it enables them to prepare diction of a number of regularly-scheduled electronic, considers the mess, both printed and far Communist cor trite theme themselves mentally for policy and program- programs are other major bureau activities, selves asoasc, by the ming decisions based on the news each as by far the most important source morning. The importance placed by the RFE News of information. RFE analyzes every Corsi- Department on journalistic professionalism munist newspaper, professional journal, pe- Non-news feature materials produced by is reflected in the background and expert- riodical, and other publication of note pro- CNR include such items as information on ence of the editorial and reportorial staff of _ duced in Eastern Europe. Most of the small the theater, musts, books, art, science, medi- the Department-0 or provincial newspapers are also examined, cine, travel, industry, education, fashion, Research and analysis as these contain much of the kind of do- cooking, and so forth. The Week in Reviews is a 3,000-word summary of each week's Research and Analysis plays a dual role at tailed and topical information overlooked by events, prepared in text-and-sound form but RFE. It provides-direct support to the Broad- the metropolitan press. Much of the cross- which Is used as a model by individual casting Departments in terms of background reporting material, and information on de- Broadcasting Department editors in writing information and analysis as well as contem- velopments within-country came from this their own language adaptations of the mate- porary factual material, and it 'provides sub_ kind of source. The News Department's ex- rial. Monitoring reports in English, consist- stantial staff assistance to the Director in the tensive radio monitoring activity of metro- ing of about 60 pages of specialized East formulation of policy. As will be subse- politan and local stations in East Europe and European news, are issued twice a day. quently demonstrated, the Research and An- elsewhere is also a valuable source of infor- alysis chiefs probably have quicker access to motion for research and analytical activities, The monitoring section and bring more long-range influence to bear. as is the Input derived from the Communist The Monitoring Section regularly audits upon the RFE Director than do the Broad- news and wire services. Finally, another good the output of some 40 Communist radio sta-, casting Department chiefs. As the RFE orga- source of information is to be found in West- tions in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, nixation chart indicates the two Research ern publications-the press, scholarly jour- Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The result and Analysis Departments are staff elements nals, and commercial publications. of 'approximately 300 hours of such monitor- of the Office of the Director-totally rep- Information from these varied sources is ing per day is the selection for editorial han- orated from the Broadcast Departments and analyzed, categorized, and filed In the in- dling and transcription of some 100,000 hence totally independent of them. formation analysis centers within each of the words. Most transcribing is done in the origi- five Research and Analysis Sections. The card nal languages. In this fashion, the Broadcast- The East Europe research, and analysis files in these information centers are care- ing Departments are kept informed about department (EERA) fully maintained, and even some of the hard the Output of their competition-the regime EERA is by far the larger of the two De- copies-the newspapers and publications radios, Other material is rewritten into Eng- partments, staffed by some 82 members, and themselves-are preserved within the Sec- lish-language bulletins and moved into the dealing with the five countries to which tions for several years before being micro- regular Central News Room news' circuit. RFE broadcasts-Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, filmed or assigned to warehouse storage. Thus the monitoring operation is an impor- Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, The Director The manually-operated file card system tart sourcefo # r news developments within o EERA is Mr James B hldf hk ..rown, aoer oas wored well to date., The research anal- Eastern Europe-developments which are dual U.S.-U.K. citizenship and who has been ysts are thoroughly familiar with their files 'then "cross-reported" by RFE to each of its with Radio Free Europe since 1957, The basic and are usually able to retrieve relevant in- listening audiences. components of EERA are five research and formation from the files very rapidly. The audio section analysis sections corresponding to RFE's The accumulation of twenty years has, The role of the Audio Section is tro- audience countries. These vary in size just however, caused storage problems, and there vision role of the any news the and e o- as do the Broadcasting Departments they is no way by which to test scientifically the vision to accompany The Ipany news Services were originally designed to serve. The re- responsiveness of the information retrieval Department of RFE describes his role as fol- search and analysis sections are staffed by operations as they are presently constituted. wren leer; since its inception. Each section actly how much relevant information on a "These sounds, or `actualities,' are selected has its own information analysis center con- given topic is contained in the information from hours of taped material and made sisting of hundreds of thousands of 5 x 8 bank and which was not retrieved in a given available.for broadcasts on master tapes con- inch cards containing biographic, social, cue- case. The best that can be said is that both taming tight excerpts. Transcripts also are tural, economic, political, and historical in- the research analysts and their Broadcasting provided to support the sound excerpts so formation organized according to a modi- Department users appear reasonably satisfied that each RFE Broadcasting Department may fled Library of Congress classification sys- with the results. prepare native-language 'Overlays' for its tem. RFE research personnel on both manage- listeners or translate fully at the end of the In addition to the experienced East Euro- meat and working levels. are aware that actuality. pean research staff, Mr. Brown has the as- their operations could benefit from a greater "Feature material issued by the Audio Sec- sistance of five young Americans with ad- utilization of automation, and that today's tion includes interviews with pop stars, sports vanced degrees' in history or political sci- state-of-the-art in information storage and figures, intellectuals, etc. Almost any story ence who serve as Brown's Policy Assistants retrieval could provide some significant lm- issued by CNR either on its news circuit or _ for each, country. The Policy Assistants work pr'ovements in utilization of the RFE files. In the Program Topics can be supported by closely with the research and analysis see- They are equally aware, however, that pres- sound. tions, but have the main task of writing ent and foreseeable budgetary constraints "Important sources 'of audio material are studies and memoranda of a broader, more relegate any serious discussion of automa- RFE's bureaus and the Monitoring Section. policy-oriented type than the usual output tion to the academic. The latter often provides taped excerpts from of the country sections. The Policy Assist- Both the files of the information analysis major East European announcements and ants also serve as a link between the Amer- centers and the supporting library operation speeches to reinforce or' illustrate a major lean management team and the Broadcasting are unique in 'their quantity, scope, and development. Departments, facilitating the smooth form- comprehensiveness in East European lore, ulation and implementation of the Director's and it would be impossible to put It realistic "In addition to the production of approx- policy decisions. EERA also employs two price on their value to the scholars, govern- imately 20 sound actualities a day, the Au- economists who specialize in the economic ments,? journalists, and others who regularly dig Section arranges program exchanges with problems of East Europe and whose contribu- subscribe to the RIPE research output. Other European radio stations and issues a 'lions to broadcasting are considered quite In Europe, for example, RFE has a list of monthly calendar events in Europe." valuable, ssome 094 regular subscribers to research u- ,___ , _ __ , cies Radio Free Europe maintains European (CAA) t, governmental and employees, CAA is much smaller than EERA, consist- persons in business and the communication bureaus in Athens, Berlin,?Bonn, Brussels , Geneva, London, Paris, Rome, Steekholm ing of only 13 staff members. It is not there- industries, and others. More than 200 sinii- There as fore able to provide the same kind of de- ear subscribers are in the United States, and Vienna, and stringers tailed analysis as is needed on the five au- bringing the total distribution list of RFE re- needed. ere is also a newsroom in New _ dience countries. Since news, of the rest of search reports to 900. RFE Bureaus The Communist area analysis department rar ~? +"~~~ mstiititn- tions individual scholars research instit I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3356 Indices of background studies, situation reports, press surveys, and other research products produced by Rl'E during the latter part of 1971 are included. in Annex G. The broadcast analysis unit Originally organized primarily for the pur- pose of checking on the implementation of policy, the Broadcast. Analysis Unit has evolved into a mechanism for quality control as well as policy control. Directed by Mr. Miloslav Kohak, the Broadcast Analysis Unit is staffed by seven country Broadcast Ana- lysts, a number of translators. who occasion- ally double as analysts, and appropriate sup- port personnel bringing the total staff to 27 persons. The Broadcast Analysis Unit has a formid- able workload-possibly the heaviest per cap- ita in RFE. Each day the major programs of each Broadcast Department are monitored, summarized, and analyzed for adherence to RFE policy and for comprehensiveness of cov- erage. The Daily Summaries comprise a key management tool for keeping up with the voluminous programming of the Broadcast Departments. All programs are analyzed to chart coverage of special policy guidances and news themes deemed important by manage- ment, and a report on the extent of such coverage is delivered to the Director each week. Also each week, there is a meeting be- tween the B.A. Unit and the Director (and occasional informal meetings with Broadcast Directors) for the purpose of assessing style, content, and delivery techniques of program- ming. Program changes and the correction of flaws often result from these meetings. More recently-in October 1971-Director Walter instituted joint meetings between the Broadcasting Departments, the Broadcast Analysis Unit, and the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department. At these meetings, the Broadcasting Departments re- ceived the full benefit of correlations be- tween B.A. Unit critiques and the audience preferences as estimated by audience re- search techniques. Indications to date are that these meetings are lively and spirited, but are received in a, constructive spirit by the Broadcasting Department chiefs. A management tool of crucial importance to RITE is the series of statistical reports on RFE programming produced each month by the Broadcast Analysis Unit?r These reports quantity the programming output for each Broadcasting Department in terms of pro- gram content, expressing the results in per- centages of air time devoted to each type of programming. Statistical .tabulations are ac- companied by narratives which explain simi- larities and differences between the output of the different BD's and which enable man- agement to remain well informed about trends in performance-strengths and weak- nesses-in programming., The audience and public opinion research department The Audience and Public Opinion Re- search Department (APOR) is another staff element of growing importance. Its basic purpose is as its name implies: to attempt to conduct market research which will provide scientifically usable information to enable RFE to (a) know 'better the likes and dis- ,likes of its potential audiences, (b) know ac- curately the impact of specific programming on those audiences, and; (c) keep track of the size and composition of RFE audiences. APOR activities, are the subject of a separate annex (See Annex A) .of this study, and will .be described and evaluated in detail in Chapter VI, The West European Advisory Committee of Radio Free Europe Although It Is not an integral part of the RFE organizational structure, nor does it participate directly in the formulation rof RFE policy, a group known as the West hEuropean Advisory Committee of Radio Free CO tGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE . - March 6, 19 12 Europe does play an important indirect role in policymaking and deserves brief mention. The West European Advisory Committee to Radio Free Europe is an informal group of eminent Europeans who meet about once a year with officers and directors of Free Europe, Inc. to discuss East-West relations, East European developments, and the work of RFE. "The group was established in 1959; its fourteenth session was held in Monte Carlo October 24-25, 1970. In recent years its meet- ings have been enlarged by invitations to non-members. An advance written report is submitted to participants by RFE, which also covers the costs and provides the necessary conference services. Current Chairman is Dirk U. Stikker, of the Netherlands. His predecessors were Randolfo Pacolardt and Paul van Zeeland .. . "Radio Free Europe's meetings with the members and guests of WEAC have served RFE beneficially in three ways: they give RFE a range of current West European opin- ion onEast European policy and prospects; they elicit specific recommendations with respect to RFE's broadcasting and its rela- tions in West Europe; and they acquaint _a new group of distinguished Europeans each year with the policy, analytical capacity, and impact of Radio Free Europe," 12 IIOW POLICY Is MADE AT RFE Radio Free Europe's weekly broadcasting schedules call for 657 hours 42 minutes of broadcasting to the five audience countries, Of this total, some 292 hours and 27 minutes -represent original programming, with `the remainder being repeats at different times of day. Up to 16 percent of the original programming is prepared in New York; the remainder is prepared each day in Munich, These figures graphically illustrate the speed and flexibility with which the in- dividual policymaking components of RFE, described in the previous section, must work together every day. These figures, together with the disparate audiences of the five countries, also illustrate the impracticability of central scripting or the pre-broadcast review of scripts except in limited quantity and unusual circumstances. The question of "policy control," or "policy supervision," by any group external to RFE's Munich head- quarters-even by the Free Europe, Inc, Board of Directors-becomes largely one of trust and confidence in RFE's management and procedures based on evaluated perform- ance. RFE's internal procedures are de- signed to deliver the kind of performance justifying confidence. News evaluation The RFE format of 10-minute newcasts each hour on the hour by each of the five Broadcasting Departments requires the pro- duction of a tremendous amount of evaluated news each day. The process begins at 0600 hours each morning, when the ovenight accumulation of the news budget is delivered to key RFE executives at their homes, This overnight accumulation is read with special care by Kingsley and his senior assistants in the News Department. At. about 0900 hours Kingsley and his staff review the budget together, discussing any Items of questionable authenticity or unsual import- ance. Plans are made to confirm or refute doubtful items or restrict the manner in which they can be used If at all. Both at the early morning meeting and throughout the day the News Department is responsible for bringing questionable press reports to the Director's attention. A good deal of RFE's political programming is based upon reviews of both the Western and East- ern press, Such reviews are carried in the news bucjget along with the hard news items. To assure proper and objective handling of press review material, however, the DI- rector's Office Issues Recommended Lists twice daily. These lists provide guidelines for the use of articles from the Eastern and Western press picked up and reported in RFE's Internal news service. Highlighting key reports which are of greater than normal significance, either in a positive or negative way, the Recommended Lists evaluate news items in descending order of usefulness for broadcast as Especially Useful, Useful, Note- worthy, Background Information Only, or Clear Attribution Only. This latter evalua- tion means that the item may be used if a Broadcasting Dcpartment so desires, but its source must be clearly irdentified and not as- sociated in any way with RFE. Especially Useful and Background Information Only classifications-along with Clear Attribution Only-are binding on the Broadcasting De- partments who muse: follow the evaluations on the Lists. The Morning Recommended List for October 26, 1971 is attached is An- nex J. The Broadcast Analysis Unit has a con- tinuing responsibility to report on the extent to which items evaluated as Especially Use- ful are utilized by the Broadcasting Depart- ments. Straight news items from the many sources avallahle to RFE are evaluated by Kingsley and his staff, and only those items which meet high journalistic standards of authenti- city are teletyped for newscast to the Broad- casting Department news rooms. The director's pre-meeting Each morning at 0930 hours a preliminary policy discussion takes place in the Direc= tor's office. Attendees Include the Director, his deputy, the respective Eastern European and Communist Area research chiefs or their designees, the chief of the Broadcast An- alysis Unit, and senior representatives of the News Department. Occasionally other execu- tives, such as the chief of the Information Services Division (the RFE term for public .relations), may be present. No representa- tives of the Broadcasting Departments at- tend the Director's pre-meeting. Usually the BD chiefs are conducting simultaneous staff meetings of their own; more importantly, the Director keeps the inputs from his research and policy assistants separate from those of his Broadcasting Department Directors. The basic purpose of the pre-meeting is to take note of major events affecting world af- fairs or East Europe which have occurred since the previous day and to decide whether RFE needs to take a formal policy stance on any of them, or what kind of coverage, if any, RFE should air. Daily guidance summaries During the pro-meeting of October 26, 1971, for example, the major news event discussed was the previous night's vote at the United Nations which admitted the People's Repub- lic of China and expelled the representatives of the Republic of China on Taiwan, The im- plications of this development to East Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States were clearly far-reaching, and all participants at the meeting agreed that a Daily Guidance Summary (DGS) should be hued. Mr. J, F. Kun, China specialist of the Communist Area Analysis Department, was present at the meeting and offered his view that the basic RFE policy line should, as it addressed the ex- pulsion of Taiwan, be couched in terms of "regret rather than anger." This was ac- cepted by the group and Mr. Kun was di- rected to draft the guidance. The result was a DOS dated October 26, 1971 entitled PRC Admitted to UN on Basis of Albanian Resolu- tion. ADMISSION Or THE PRC TO THE UN The DOS of October 26 was factual, moder- ate in tone, and based upon key points brought out during the UN debate. It sum- marized the history of the evolving U.S. position, favoring admission of the PRO to the UN, and acknowledged that such admix-, Sion was favored by the great majority of UN members. U.S. Ambassador Bush's statements Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE during the debate were quoted in support of the principle that no UN member in good standing should be expelled without cause. 111+E concluded that the expulsion tended to diminish the service the members of the UN had done by admitting the PRC, and that, although the PRC's future contribution to the UN could not be precisely predicted, it was to be hoped that that contribution would have a stabilizing effect on world affairs. It was suggested that the Broadcasting Depart- merits make use of their New York bureaus in providing coverage along the suggested lines. _ Daily Guidance Summaries, the exception, not the rule The issuance of Daily Guidance Sum- Inaries as a result of the Director's pre-meet- ing or the subsequent broader policy meeting at 10 o'clock is, however, more the exception than the rule. On most clays, the items in the news are routinely disposed of orally and no written guidances are required. Occasionally a "guidance note"-mere informal than a DGS-is issued, but this too occurs only sporadically. As a matter of fact, the term "guidance" is not precisely descriptive in twins of the function of a DGS. Most of these documents merely sum up the situation as accurately as possible, highlight the important points, call attention to possible pitfalls, and let the Broadcasting Departments take it from there. With rare exceptions, the "guidance" pro- vided by the Director--and which is bind- ing on the Broadcasting Departments-is finalized during the 10 o'clock meetings. When written DGS are issued, it is usually later in the day, when BD programming is at- a relatively advanced stage. But this pro- gramming is supposed to be in compliance with the Director's policy, and the written DGS provide a record of this policy by which specific scripts can later be checked. During the period covered by the field study (October 23 through November 5, 1971) only four DGS were Issued. In addi- tion to the DGS on China and the UN, issued on October 26, a DGS on Britain's entry into the Common Market was published on Octo- ber 29, and two DGS resulted from the No- vember 2 pre-meeting, One of these dealt with some aspects of Hungary's "New Eco- nomic Mechanism," the other with the fact that the Albanian Communist Party Con- gress convened with the presence of a delega- tion from Communist Chiria-an unprece- dented occurrence.u BRITAIN CIIOOSES THE COMMON MARKET This Daily Guidance Summary recounted the historical background leading up to Heath's parliamentary victory, took note of the fact that the pro-Common Market senti- ments of political leaders in Britain do not yet, according to the polls, have a majority of popular support, but opined generally that what was good for Europe and Britain eco- nomically was unlikely to harm the United States. The heart of the DGS was expressed in the following paragraph: "The enlargement of the Commit nity should be seen as part of wider changes in the world picture-changes marked, among other things, by the implementation of West - Gerrnany's Ostpolitik, the entry of China into the United Nations, cautious moves toward a European Security conference and the emergence of Japan as a major economic power. The bipolar world of yesterday is giv- ing way to something new-and many adap- tations will be necessary by many nations." The remainder of the DOS also took note of Comecon de jure opposition to enlargement of the Market but also of the fact that on a de facto basis many of the non-Soviet Comecon members had sought to further their own economic interests through bi- lateral agreements with individual EEC states. The DGS also noted in passing that Communist China had welcomed West Eu- ropean integration as demonstrating resist- ance to control and interference by the "super-powers." THE NEM AND ITS PROBLEMS The DGS dealt with a number of technical economic aspects of the dif['iculti@s being encountered by the Hungarian Government in its progress toward greater efficiency under a plan known as the New Economic Mecha- nism. It summarized an October 22 speech of Premier Pock in which the Government point of view was presented, characterizing this presentation rather favorably as " . noteworthy not only for its comprehensive survey of all the economic troubles of na, tional concern, but also for the regime's determination to come to grips with them in the very near future . . ." The DGS went on to evaluate certain aspects of the NEM: . . Thp degree of pluralism that has emerged in - Hungary has been one of the finest achievements of the NEM, and, aside from the freer atmosphere it has fostered, it probably represents the country's best po- tential for truly dynamic development in all sectors of national life . The BD's were advised to comment on the technical economic aspects of the situation along these generally positive lines. The Hun- - garian BD, however, received added advice focusing upon some of the shortcomings as well as the constructive aspects of Fock's +policy. It was pointed out, for example, that there were contradictions between Fock's criticism of the "lenience allegedly shown to- ward 'undisciplined' workers by enterprise managers" and the Government's prior ad- missions that the growth in industrial output during the last two years had been achieved through higher labor productivity. Too, it was pointed out that the Govern- ment's recommended intensive economic methods could not be implemented if needed machinery imports from the West were re- duced in the campaign to eliminate Hun- gary's unfavorable balance of trade. Instead, the government should redouble its "efforts to increase Western exports through co-oper- ation agreements with Western firms." ALBANIAN CONGRESS MEETS WITHOUT CHINESE DELEGATION PRESENT The DGS noted that Communist China's failure to send a delegation to the Party Congress of its closest ideological and politi- cal ally was an "unprecedented develop- ment, and one that was probably prompted by considerations of major significance." The DOS went on to speculate about some of the possible reasons for Chinese absence. Among these could be a leadership crisis in Peking or possible differences of views between the Albanian and Chinese leadership "over the recent Chinese efforts to normalize relations with the U.S." The guidance also called at- tention to Rumania's absence from the Con- gress, speculating that, in the light of China's absence, Rumania might have felt more conspicuously at odds with the USSR had she attended a Congress boycotted by the USSR-influenced Communist groups. The policy meeting at .10 o'clock At the conclusion of the Director's pro- meeting, the participants move to a large conference room where they are joined by the Broadcast Department Directors, key BD editors, research and analysis, and other staff members concerned with the daily formula- tion of broadcast materials. In appearance, these daily 10-o'clock meet- ings resemble somewhat meetings of the UN Security Council, although they are charac- terized by an absence of the invective which often permeates that august body. Key par- ticipants are seated around tables forming a hollow square. Their advisers and other participants occupy rows of chairs behind the tables. - - S 3357 The Director usually opens the meetings with a summation of the most important conclusions of the Director's pre-meeting. Often he will asl; a specialist to elaborate upon some of the relevant factors. Mr. Brown, - the EERA chief, may discourse upon the impact, say, of Britain's entry into the Com- mon Market upon East European economics, or Mr. Kun may, as he did during the Oc- tober 26, meeting, summarize the factors involved in in that instance the writing of a DGS on China's admission to the UN. All Broadcasting Department Directors are thereby put on notice as to the Director's preliminary conclusions as to how major events should be treated in the clay's pro- gramming. Individual Broadcasting Department Di- rectors then proceed to make individual pres- entations of major items to be treated in their own programs for the clay. There is it good deal of give-and-take in these discus- sions, but the atmosphere is quite ,positive and the discussants are experienced and sophisticated individuals long accustomed to working out difficult problems together. Usu- ally the outcome of a meeting is more an exchange of relevant ideas and information than a hammering-out of a difficult policy question. If there are any ambiguities in policy, however, these seem to be quickly resolved. Each Department is faced by a busy workday, and the participants are reluctant to waste time in extended discussion. This is well illustrated by the fact that some forty or fifty persons usually attend the ten o'clock meeting, yet it is a rare meeting that runs past eleven o'clock. Five days a week a "country" meeting is held following the ten o'clock meeting, Par- ticipants are the Director, appropriate re- search specialist, and key individuals from the Broadcasting Department whose audi- ence country is the subject of the particular meeting. In these meetings, both analytical and programming matters- are reviewed in depth. Minutes are kept of all the meetings, and the results are immediately teletyped to Free Europe, Inc, and Radio Free Europe in New York. These messages are in the form of notification, not requests for approval. By the time they are read at the beginning of the work day in New York, the Munich staff is already two-thirds through its daily pro- gram preparation and production because of the six-hour difference. By the end of the lunch hour in Munich, many of the programs for the day are already written; some are in production. The broadcasts of original programs begin in the afternoon and are carried through the evening hours together with some afternoon repeats. Morning programs, except for the hourly live newscasts, are mostly repeats of the previous day's most important programs. Since the Daily Guidance Summaries usually do not reach the Broadcasting De- partments until the editors and writers are well into the clay's work, the Broadcasting Department Directors take caro to assure that their individual staffs are well and corn- pletely informed of the results of the daily policy meetings. This is usually clone at brief but intense Departmental staff meetings im- mediately following adjournment of the ten o'clock meeting. Daily Guidance Summaries, then, become for all practical purposes more a means by which the Director's staff can, evaluate subsequent programming for com- pliance with decisions taken at the 10 o'clock meetings than written directives to be fol- lowed verbatim by the five radio stations which make up RFE. Copies of Munich's daily teletyped reports to New York for October 26, 27, 28, and 29, plus that of October 30 (sent on November 2) and those of November 2, 3, 4, and 5- are in- cluded in Annex L. A "Radio Free - Europe Program Flow Chart," illustrating the collaboration among management, Broadcasting Departments, the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3358 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE , Central News Room, research and analysis staffs, production specialists, and technical support services in the production of RFE programs, appears on the following page. . TOOTNOTES IDurkee, op. cit., Annex VII, p. 2. 2 Durkee, op. cit., p. (3. I Ibid., p. 6--7. 4 Durkee, op. cit., Annex VI, p. 1. Without access to classified sources of information, there was no way for the au- thor of this report to arrive at any defensi- ble conclusion regarding the nature and pur- poses of contacts which may have occurred from time to time between individual RFE officials and "sponsor" representatives, and which involved subject matter not covered in minutes of Free Europe Board of Direc- tors meetings. Biographic sketches of eight key execu- tives in the New York headquarters of Free Europe, Inc. are included in Annex C. ? The descriptive material on RIPE internal procedures has been drawn by the author from RFE internal documents and from in- terviews conducted in Munich with RFE per- sonnel during the period October 23-Novem- ber 6, 1971. ' The script of the Week in Review for the week ending October 28, 1971 Is attached as Annex E. 0 Information Services Department, Radio Free Europe, undated pamphlet, Radio Free Europe's News Operation, p. 4. 10 Biographical sketches of key members of the editorial staff are attached as Annex F. 11 A sample statistical report for May, 1971, is attached as Annex H. rs Durkee, op. cit., Annex. V., p. 1. A list of members and recent guest participants in WEAC is attached as Annex I. to The full texts of all of these Daily Guld-, ance summaries are contained in Annex X. CHAPTER IV: PROGRAM CONTENT "Here at Radio -Free Europe there are no illusions about sudden changes in govern- mental forms in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has convincingly demonstrated, most recently in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, that there continue to be limits to what will be toler- ated. Communist regimes are likely to re-. main in power for the foreseeable future re- gardless of the wishes of East Europeans. But the pace of change in today's world will not bypass East Europe a,nd modifications are taking place. Thus, within the framework of the Communist system, positive evolution can be encouraged, and we try to do this. At the same time, we try to discourage actions which could intensify trends toward greater. repression." These are the approximate words heard by the author of this report in varied forms from each of the Broadcasting Department Directors and from all responsible RIVE exec- utives interviewed. Another aspect of this basic philosophy had been stated In a broad- er context as early. as September 10, 1966, when Ralph E. Walter, then Policy Director and now RVE Director, stated the following in a speech to the American Political Science Association: "Of prime importance will be to encourage the return of Eastern Europe to Europe in the broadcast sense. The divorce of East and West has been unnatural and Irrational except in terms of what the Soviets have considered their security interests. The growth of nationalism may lead Eastern European states to distance themselves from the Soviet Uniion, but it would be a tragedy if it led again to rekindling national hatreds. For if the past is in. any sense prologue, the future will not then merely be that of Hun- garian against Russian and Pole against Rus- sian. Unhappily, It Will in all likelihood also be Rumanian against Hungarian, ' Pole against German, and Czech against Pole. No-Eastern Europe must be helped to broaden its horizons. Less subservience- political, economic, and ideological-to the USSR is essential to the creation of. healthy societies. The future East European relation- ship to the USSR should be that of neighbor to neighbor. There is no reason to believe that the USSR will disappear; hence, every reason to work toward normal state to state relations between the Soviet Union and those countries on her western frontiers. It would be unwise and dangerous for Western radio to advocate enmity with the Soviet Union. An hicreased effort can usefully be devoted toward encouragement of longer range think- ing that looks toward growing ties between East and West Europe, indeed between East and the Atlantic community. RFE has for a number of years advocated increased East- West exchange, freer tourism, additional trade, student tours, and participation in international conferences and discussions. Of course, this is a process that requires broad Western interest-something not al- ways as evident as one might wish." AN ALTERNATIVE "HOME SERVICE" It is in support of this pragmatic approach that the content of RIPE programming is designed. The way this programming is pack- aged and how it is delivered to its audiences is, however, a function of quantity as well as quality of service. The variety of social, intel- lectual, and economic levels among the po- tential audience is a factor, as is the fact that an "alternative home service"-as RFE refers to itself-must be on the air at what- ever time its listeners may be inclined to hear it. RFE'e distinctiveness from "foreign" broadcasting services is illustrated by the following comparison of daily air time in hours on weekdays:1 Deutsche VOA BBC Wells RFE Bulgaria.__..--------- 1:30 2:15 2:00 7:30 Czechoslovakia------- 2:00 3:30 2:00 20:20 Hungary------------- 2:00 3:15 1:00 1900 Poland______________ 2:00 3:30 I:30 19:60 Rumania------------- 1:30 2:30 2:00 12:00 PROGRAM MAKEUP Radio Free Europe reports that its five national services broadcast a total of over 557 hours per week, broken down as fol- lows: 2 Percent News ----------------------- ---- ,16.1 Politically-oriented programs (com- mentaries, round table discussions, press surveys, etc.) ---------------- 34.7 Music and entertainment ------------ 21, 6 Cultural, scientific, and other non-po- litical information and special-audi- ence programs (youth, women, labor, sports, etc.) ----------------------- 18.8 Religious ---------------------------- 2.2 Miscellaneous ---------------------- 6.6 Although RFE maintains that this for- mat is the result both of experience and care- ful study of audience attitudes and prefer- ences, it also asserts that RFE tries to take full; advantage of any opportunities to stim- ulate audience interest in all "subjects im- portant to their understanding of their world."' One type of programming, which began as a manifestation of the later cate- gory but which has become an important and popular element of RFE's format is called "cross-reporting." Regime censorship is applied across-the-board-i.e., East Euro- pean regimes censor not only information media from the West, but media from the other Communist countries as well. In addi- tion; events within neighboring East Euro- pean countries had traditionally been of .minimal interest. Cross-reporting was de- vised to spur local interest in the Affairs of March 6, 19'12 East European neighbors. By concentrating on reporting to each country, developments in other East European countries, the USSR, and among Communist Parties in the rest of the world, RFE has sought to "introduce constructive ideas in a context which implies that they are. ideologically defensible and politically practicable (at least in the eyes of one Communist leadership), to create hope and interest in the possibility of change, and to emphasize what East Europeans have in common apart from (and in contrast to) the Soviet Union." I RFE offers findings of its Audiance and Public Opinion Research Department purporting to show that in 1068 this form of programming was considered "important" by large majorities of its five audiences, RFE programming is centered around "news every hour on the hour," but tends in general toward what would be. called in American broadcast parlance a "magazine", format. This consists of lively discussion and presentation of various aspects of life, with- out excessive political accents. This repre- sents a change from RFE's earlier highly- structured schedule described in RFE docu- ments as a schedule of special programs for workers, farmers, labor, youth, etc. It is not that these audiences are no longer sought; rather, the labels have been removed and the audience appeal lies in the way material is present, Youth audiences, educated elites, professional and managerial personnel-these are specifically believed by RFE to have been the main generators of political pressure and change and hence are favored audiences. RFE also takes pride in its expertise in eco- nomics, and now broadcasts "wide-ranging discussion, expert as well as popular, of eco- nomic topics in place of the early negative criticism by non-experts." 5 Popular music is extensively used, both to build audiences and to provide an attrac- tive vehicle for commentaries to the audi- ences who tuned in for the music. RFE also promptly broadcasts fast-break- ing events, and accommodates unorthodox program ideas such as broadcasting verbatim the texts of major documents repressed by Communist regimes. In crisis situations, RFE is prepared to remain on the air for 24 hours per clay for as many days as neces- sary, "both to keep audiences in all five countries aware of actual developments and to provide reassurance against wild rumors." 0 RFE's Broadcast Analysis Unit has com- piled a chart of its programming by subject category to all five of the countries of its jurisdiction. This chart appears on the fol- lowing page. Statistical analyses, charts, and even de- scriptive summaries and actual scripts do not, however, convey a full picture, of the flavor, image, nor even the net content of RIVE programs. To begin with, despite the authentic East European tone and style of the Individual Broadcasting Departments, there Is also a definite "American" flavor to. overall RIPE programming. This results from several factors. The use of certain types of musical themes and interludes, avoidance of "dead" air, quick and precise timing, and the tasteful use of light or humorous ap- proaches, even to serious subjects-these are some of the factors. Disc jockey and "pano- rama" formats are others. The fact that vir- tually all of the popular music aimed at the youth audiences is Western carries its own, sometimes subtle, punch. the antiwar and protest songs of Joan Baez and John Len- non, for example, are said to have quite an impact on young East Europeans who face daily life under the constraints of an "estab- lishment" of a very different type from the one to which Miss Baez resents the payment of taxes .7 Nor, in terms of ultimate impact, can the label "political" be restricted to those pro- grams so described by RFE Broadcast Analy- sis procedures. The objective presentation of Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3359 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE hard news without regard for topic, source, cusslon with the Broadcast Analysis Depart- Die Welt. or any other factor save accuracy is con- ment, which has the Director's mandate to MTI (Hungarian news agency). sidered a "political" act by East European check upon policy implementation as well as Noy ns, Lud governments whose censorship is punctured general program quality. Baltimore Sun. by RFE newscasts. In the words of one Com- In Chapter III it was recorded that during, monist official, Wlodzimierz Sokorski, Chair- the period of the field study in Munich WashingChicago totoS n PoPost, st man, Polish Radio/Television: (October 23 November 5, 1971) RFE manage- Times. "One must not forget that the very char- ment issued four Daily Guidance Summaries CFiincncinancial al actor of ideological struggle presupposes setting forth RFE policy for treatment of Die Presse. opposition to the notion of objective infer- four major news events. In the following Christian Science Monitor. mation." paragraphs, news and other sources used by Journal of Commerce. Mon Star. There are times, however, when the "no- RFE in carrying out this policy and the na- t tion of objective information Is not always ture and degree of the content of the result- Montreal Star. viewed as hostile, even by a regime such as Ing programs are briefly summarized: Svenska eitun . Dagbladet. that of Ceausescu in Rumania-a regime Admission of Communist China to the U.N. Handelstidning. the expulsion of Taiwan Suomen Sociaaldemokraa?ti. n cal conformity. Rumania has not jammed RFE since July 30, 1963-a date preceding Rumania's open declaration of April of 1964. that she intended to follow all independent course in foreign policy. In some respects the "relationship" of RIFE with the Rumani- an regime has touches of ambivalence. The Rumanian government-like its counter- parts in the four other East European coun- tries to which RFE broadcasts-squirms at criticism, no matter how mild, how objec- tive, or how tactfully put. On the other hand, a look at the program patterns being broad- cast by RFE to Rumania suggests that RFE often, for its own ends, serves certain pur- poses of the regime. RFE broadcasts are un- likely to criticize Rumanian foreign policy, which seems designed to abet purely nation- al interests to a degree greater than seen elsewhere in East Europe. The Rumanian Broadcasting Department's "relationship" with the Ceausescu govern- ment is not, however, entirely serendipitous. Repressive domestic policies-most recently the crusade for ideological purity which was launched by Ceausescu in the summer of 1971-draw consistent and reasoned criti- cism. And, some months ago, Cornel Chiriac, a leading figure among Rumanian disc jock- eys in Bucharest, tired of the increasing re- strictions placed by the government upon the music he could play and upon general curtailment of the freedom or artistic cre- ativity. Chiriac slipped out of Rumania and turned up in a refugee camp not far from Munich. Noel Bernard, Director of RFE's Rumanian Broadcasting Department, heard about him and hired him at once. Today, a The controversial U.N. vote admitting Washington Evening tSar. Communist China to the U.N. and expelling Catholic News Review. the Chiang regime was the major news story In the quotations excerpted from these of the morning of October 26. The Daily newspapers and agencies, coverage was given Guidance Summary spelling out RFE's rec- - to Wa estern Espectrumo of U.S. onp Pand olitical Opinion, treat- ommended treatment of this topic has been summarized on page 61, above, and the com- ment afforded the topic by leading Com- plete text of this DGS appears in Annex K. munist journals in Eastern Europe and the Examination of RIVE scripts and Broadcast Soviet Union. Analysis summaries reveals that each of the Admission of the United Kingdom to the Broadcast Departments gave this topic heavy Common Market coverage for several days, both in the form of The decision of the British Parliament to individual political commentaries and in ex- join the Common Market was the second tensive reviews of the press in both the Coin- major would development to take place dur- munist and non-Communist worlds. Press ing the period of the field study in Munich. Review and Political Program No. 177-the RFE policy in handling coverage of this prime political program of the Rumanian momentous event was outlined in a Daily Broadcasting Department for October 26, Guidance Summary on November 29, 1971 1971-carried a commentary almost identical entitled Britain Chooses the Common Mar- in language and tone with that of the DOS lcot. This DGS was summarized on page 63, as the seventh of eight topics covered in the above, and its full text is to be found in program.LO The Bulgarian BD gave the topic Annex K. similar, though not identical, treatment the of this event was thorough, same day in its political program The World RFE coverage but, except 'for coverage press event which were Today. The Czechoslovak BD, with some em- sporadically aired over a period of a few days, phasis on the tense atmosphere in the Gen- was confined largely to reportage and com- eral Assembly, handled the story in its inter- was y in anticipation of the vote and, national Block; Newsreel, the major political afterwards, to interpretive reporting of the program of the Hungarian BD, stressed the significance of the British move on October precedent set by the expulsion of Taiwan, 29 and 30. On October 29 coverage along the but added more optimistic notes about posei- lines of the DGS was carried in the Bul- ble moves away from world bipolarization in garian The World Today, the Czechoslovak reports from its correspondents in London - International Block-which dwelt at some and Paris. The Facts and Views Views commentary length upon the broader impact on Europe of the Polish Broadcasting Dtoartment added as 'a whole and the world trend against bi- oth some historical o perspective ain n of the issue, thought but in polarization-and the Hungarian Newsreel, therwise ollowed the t tr which pointed out that the expanded EEC the DGS fairly closely. will be a "more equal" partner of the U.S. Chirlac's popular musical program "Metro- Commentary on the China-U.N. issue per- nome" formerly one of Radio Bucharest's - sisted for two or three days,'with individual most listened-to shows-is again heard in BD's both zeroing in on some of the specific Bucharest-but on Radio Free Europe in- points raised by the DOS, and taking advan- stead. Chiriac's fan mail from Rumania and tage of later news breaks for new ideas. Nix- from other East European countries indi- en's reaction to the "undisguised glee" of cotes that he has lost none of his popularity some of the delegates, Rogers' reaffirmation there through making the switch.5 of U.S. support of the U.N., and the view of Broadcasting schedules for each of the five both liberal and conservative U.S. politi- Broadcasting Departments, together with clans-all of these received ample coverage thumbnail descriptions of each type of pro- in RFE commentaries. grain on the schedule, are included in Annex As the week progressed, coverage of China M. Broadcast Analysis summaries for the pe- and the U.N. tended to move from the realm rind October 26-November 5, 1971 are con- of RFE commentary to that of extensive re- tained in Annex N. Implementation of Policy views of the world press. Among the journals in Program Content (politically-oriented pro- and news agency reports quoted were: grams). As noted earlier, most of RFE's daily policy decisions affecting the content of program- suing are reached in Munich through oral consensus among,the Director, his staff, and executives of the five Broadcasting Depart- ments. Certain key topics, however, in the field of both news and cosnlnentary, rate spe- cial policy treatment in the form of written Recommended Lists (referring to the usage of articles from Eastern or Western press - sources) and Daily Guidance Summaries (re- ferring to RFE commentary upon important Eastern European or international develop- Mel-its). During the period of the field study in Munich, the author observed daily both the formulation of oral and written policy guidances and their implementation in each of the Broadcasting Departments. These ob- servations were the basis for subsequent die- London Times. London Daily Mail. Manchester Guardian. London Daily Telegraph. Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Lo Figaro. L'Aurore. Paris Jour. Le Monde. Salzburger Nachrichten. Frankfurter Allgcmelne Zeitung. Toronto Globe and Mail. Agence France Presse. Deutsche Press Agentur. Dagens Nyheter. Helsingen Sanomat. Pravda. Rude Pravo. Btuttgarter Zeitung. - but will also cause some headaches for the USSR and its East European allies. The Polish BD, in its Pacts and Views, was some- what more outspoken in that it pointed out that expansion of the Common Market was a blow to the Kremlin, which had opposed this turn of events. The Polish Panorama of October 29 also excerpted statements of a number of West European and British poll- ticians, as well as mentioning the negative reaction- of Moscow radio and of the East German press. The Rumanian Political Pro- gram closely followed the RFE policy as ex- pressed in the DGS. It also paralleled Polish coverage in terms of excerpting the state- ments of prominent West European spokes- men and calling attention to negative reac- tions in Moscow and East Berlin. Press reviews aired by the five Broadcast- ing Departments encompassed a somewhat narrower range than those devoted to the admission of China to the U.N.-a circum- stance motivated, no doubt, by the fact that Britain's admission to the Common Market- important though it was-did not spark the danger of international controversy and ex- tended interest of the-China vote at the U.N. Hungary-Some problems with the new eco- nomic mechanism The Daily Guidance Summary entitled The NEM and its Problems, summarized on page 64, above, was issued by RFE on November 2, 1971. This DOS is, however, a good exam- ple of DGS' being primarily the recording of a consensus rather than an actual directive. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3360 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 11'72 Reason: the economic speech of Premier Fock on this subject was delivered on October 22, and most of the commentaries of the Hun- garian Broadcasting Department had already been broadcast prior to the date of the DOS. Exatnlnalion of the Broadcast Analysis sum- maries in Annex N reveals that many of the points enumerated in the DGS had already been covered-though with a more critical tone than that taken In the DGS-by the Hungarian BD prior to publication of the DOS. And, as indicated by RFE's Daily Re- port No. 246 of October 27 (see Annex L), the DOS itself was the product of a brain- storming session between management, re- search staff, and the Broadcasting Depart- ment on that date, tempered later by a back- ground paper issued by the East European Research and Analysis Department. In its effects, therefore, the DGC merely summed up the thinking of RFE's Hungarian experts in all departments, primarily for the guid- ance . of the non-Hungarian Broadcasting Departments. These Departments did, in fact, air broadcasts based on the DGS, but the Hungarian coverage was nearly all be- fore the fact. On November 3, the Hungarian BD, in its Commentary program, did re- capitulate the situation, giving some empha- sis to the desirable aspects of the pluralism in the society, and speculating that Premier Pock might be well advised not to press too hard for a "consensus.' - illbanian- Congress meets without Chinese delegation present In view of mainland China's admission to the U.N. on the basis of an Albanian resolu- tion, and of the continuing tension between China and the USSR, the opening of the Al- banian Communist Party Congress without the presence of a delegation from its chief ally and supporter was, to put it mildly, un- precedented. Analysis and speculation on this subject was, therefore, highly news- worthy to RFE's East European audiences (a summary of the contents of RFE's Daily Guidance Summary dated November 2 on this topic appears on page 66, above). Coverage of this topic along the suggested guidelines of the DGS was complete, al- though not especially heavy. The tone of the DGS was anticipated on November 1 by the Czechoslovak BD which, in its Inter- national Block, speculated carefully that nei- ther the Chinese -nor the Rumanians would attend. All of the Broadcasting Departments except the Polish one aired feature commen- taries on November 2. The Poles added their This visit, including a stopover in East Ger- many, and Kosygin's visit to Cuba had to compete for air time with other major events such as the Tito visit to Washington and the slow progress of inter-German negotiations over Berlin. The style of cover-' age of major international topics is one of low-key analysis buttressed by a wide selec- tion of quotations of opinion from Western press sources, with an occasional Communist press quote included when pertinent. -Other International topics covered in commentaries during the period under study were: 1. The current state of U.S.-Soviet cooper- ation-some optimism tempered by reflection upon the New York Times-reported Soviet nuclear build-up. 2. Soviet criticism of the price structure within COMECON. 3. The arrests of Jews in the Soviet Union and other manifestations of anti-semitism there. 4. The Czech arms shipments and other Communist interference in the problems of Northern Ireland. 6.' The visit of Holland's Queen Juliana to West Germany. 6. Meetings of the NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels. 7. Evidence of ecumenism in West Ger- many. 8. Personnel changes in the Polish Government. 9. The foiling of a Soviet plot In Mexico. 10. The Soviet practice of the use of men- tal hospitals for the incarceration of political dissidents: - 11. Resignation of the Turkish Govern- ment. 12. Kissinger's arrangements with Peking for President Nixon's scheduled visit. .13. The uncertain status of Lin Piao. 14. U.S. relations with Japan vis-a-vis Okinawa. 15. Foreign students in the U.S. 16. Ecological problems. 17. The Synod of Bishops in Rome. 18. World Monetary problems, 19. U.S. aid to the third world. 20. International status of the' Taiwan government. 21. Chinese credits to Rumania. 22. Anniversary of the ? 1966 Hungarian revolution. 23. Visit of Indira Gandhi to London and the U.S. 24. Nuclear underground testing at Am- chitka. . 25. An orphange project in Vienna. 26. Norwegian wage policies. 27. Differential concepts of Marxism. mention, the main thrust of the story had 28. Protestant youth centers in Bavaria. died. The Rumanian BD, though carefully `- 29. The Arab-Israeli problem. (very neutral including Rumania's absence from the Al- banian Party Congress in its coverage, was circumspect in tone, handling the Rumanian angle of the DGS (i.e., Rumania probably did not want to appear too conspicuous in attending a Congress boycotted by the USSR at this time) in a low key. Other international themes Although the Broadcasting Departments were careful to include comprehensive cov- erage of the four items subjected to DGS treatment during the two-week period of the field study, only the major developments surrounding admission of the People's Re- public of China to the U.N. and Britain's entry into the Common Market ranked very high in terms of emphasis and air time. The U.S. Senate's action in rejecting the foreign aid bill, for example, received much more attention than did the problems of either the Albanian Party Congress or Hun- gary's problems with the New Economic Mechanism. Coverage of the Senate action was factual and matter-of-fact, with con- siderable reliance on clearly attributed quotes from the Western press. Soviet Com- munist Party Chairman Brezhnev's visit to Paris was another item of major interest. 30. Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations over Macedonia. 31. Ukrainian Catholic Bishops and the Vatican. 32. Civil air defense in the Tadzhik SSR. 33. Problems of motorists in the USSR. 34. East German elections preview. 35. International Problems of the British Communist Party. 36. Increased tension between India and Pakistan. 37. Reviews of numerous books on ecology, international law, literature, etc. 38. Economic, social, and political prob- lems in the USSR, 39. Split In Finnish Communist Party. 40. Various activities of Communist Par- ties in East Europe. 41. Nobel Prize awards in Physics and Chemistry. 42. Various samisdat excerpts. . 43. Yugoslav military maneuvers. 44. General developments at the U.N. 46. Progress of Nixon's economic programs in the U.S. - 46.. Reverberations of Soviet spy affairs in Belgium and the U.K. - 47. Franco-German relations. 48. Developments involving the Allende regime In Chile. 49. Ideological conformity in Rumania. 60. The round-table review of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia conducted by prominent European Marxists on Austrian television. 1. 1 - 51. Developments Involving Britain, the Irish Republican Army, and Northern Ire- land. 52. Savings Cooperatives in West Germany. .53. Problems of Czechoslovak agriculture. 54. Women vote for the first time in the Swiss elections. 55. Special school for West German con- scientious objectors. 56. South African Anglican tented. 57. Defense Secretary Laird studying possibilities of more withdrawals. . 58. Sino-Soviet rivalries. in. Saigon, U.S. troop 59. Social and economic problems of Amer- lean Negroes. 60. Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations to end polemics. 61, Western defectors in Moscow. 62. Cultural life in China. 63. Review of 1971-72 edition All the World Aircraft. 64. The arrival of Cardinal Mindszenty in Vienna. 65. Protests of Catholic and Protestant clergy against conditions in Brazil. 68. Inauguration of President Thieu in Saigon. 67, Israeli technical assistance to Africa. 68. Twenty-third Congress of the European Agricultural Federation (CEA). 69. Italian CP publication of its "program for government." 70. Foreign operations of the Soviet KGB. 71. Proposed two=way bazater program be- tween Australia and Rumania. 72. Agricultural reform in Poland. 73. East European economic growth. 74. Japanese Communists seek better re- lations with China. 75. Organized labor in Sweden. 76. Advantages and disadvantages of the Dnieper irrigation system in the Ukraine. 77. Benefits to Soviet consumers as result of Soviet leaders' taking the promises they have made seriously. 78. Diplomatic moves toward a European Security Conference. The preceding list is comprehensive, but not all-inclusive. Many other items-espe- cially involving cross-reporting-were also re- ported upon. The most consistent reporting technique used is- that of introductory com- mentary of a descriptive type, followed by extensive quotations from broad spectrums of the world press. Even this partial list, how- ever, illustrates clearly why written policy guidances can be prepared for only a tiny minority of the items covered-items involv- ing extreme sensitivity or possible contro- versy. National themes Although international news is compre- hensively reported, developments within the audience countries themselves receive a higher priority, for it is in the field of domes- tic affairs that the "newsgap" is most ap- parent. The following paragraphs capsulize samples of political and editorial reporting broadcast to the five audience countries dur- ing the period covered by the field portion of the study-from October 26 through No- vember 6, 1971. Illustrative scripts from each BD are included in Annex O. In addition, be- cause the broadcasts of the Polish Broadcast- ing Department have been the subject of re- cent complaints by the Polish Government to the German Federal Republic, several Polish-language broadcasts aired by RFE in ,June and October of 1971-which illustrate RFD policy toward Poland and how this Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 1'/Iarch G, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3361 policy is implemented in typical political of West Berlin. Professor Buctow discussed Chancellor reported the displeasure of Soviet broadcasts-are included in Annex P. some of the reasons underlying student un- leaders at the German reaction to the inva- Bulgarian broadcasts rest, primarily in the West. Buetow concluded sl.on of Czechoslovakia, and noted that the During the period under review, broadcasts that the questioning of the merits of exist-. Soviets gave no guarantee that similar situ- by the Bulgarian BD centered around the ing institutions is a natural result of educat- ations will not recur. need or more freedom centered the ing a population in the political and social Commented upon the vacillating attitudes nef Bulgaria, the need for less of Information on idea- sciences, and observed that the youth rebel-- of the Communist Party toward October 28 ual conformity less more on technical lion was primarily a rebellion of bourgeois as Czechslovakia's.Independonce Day, begin- loEcalency nd maand promotion technical youth, secondly a rebellion of students, and ning with the Comintern position that criteriaprofi as the sob assignment ssie as of bureau- only In the third place a rebellion In the Czechoslovaia was established as an arti- critir inertia, and frequent of bureau- schools. Buetow also pointed out that work- ficial unit by An.-Fre .ch imperialism, go- , wand deed on the part of ncy ing-class. youth is, by and large, outside the ing through the theme of the Gottwald re- be Gover tween word or Sample programs: revolutionary movement. -gime which did recognize October' 28 as the ent, Crirnmed the pl eprog al policies of the The full text of Professor Buetow's inter- date of the founding of the Czechoslovak Bulgarian Government, noting that there are view, along with the editorial commentary Republic, and concluding with the new re- re- ul ri provisions student self-govern- her aron the so-called "gray stream" in Bulgarian nunciation of the program of national 'sov- still no revision coxrimudent the Gov- literature (broadcast respectively on Octo- ereignty after April 1969. RITE concluded that prior anent d ment to this end. her 27 and 29, 1971) is included in Annex O. this vacillation was necessary to bring Quoted the West German press on the Con- Czechoslovak broadcasts Czechoslovakia into line with Soviet inter- tral Committee's expulsion of former Minis- Two major events provided most of the eats* ter of the Interior Solakov because of his stimuli for Czechoslovak programming due- Reviewed Cznchoslovakis history under alleged Stalinist methods, ing the period of the field study. These were democratic and Communist regimes, with. Noted that the scheduled October 23-24 Czechoslovakia's Independence Day on Oc- quotes from T. deMasaryk pen eon humanitarianism,. Congress of Bulgarian Journalists did not toner 28, and the national elections ached- democracy, independence, Marxism, and take place and that the Government had not tiled for November 28, 1971. In view of Bolshevism. informed the public of any reasons for post- Czechoslovakia's postwar history-and espe- Focused attention on the forthcoming elec- ponctnent. Discoursed at some length on the cially its history since the spring of 1968- lions as a "ritual with the Czechoslovak public's "right to know." these events focused considerable attention people maneuvered into the position of pas- . Complained editorially about the regime's upon the Soviet doctrine of limited cover- slue voters with no real choice." failure to complete the draft of a final five= eignty of the "socialist" countries and upon Criticized the increasing pre-election pres- year plan, with resultant disruption of nor- the charade-like nature of the Husak gov- sure on workers, kepecially by trade unions. mil economic activity. ernment's approach to the elections process. par in is in the Czechoslovak worWest, kers, lack u the unlike rig ghts htsr of coile of collec- Editorialized on the real reasons for per.. Failure of the IIusak regime to give sub- sistence of the "gray stream" in Bulgarian stance to the 1908 law providing for a genu- true bargaining and are not supported by literature (publication of books and tracts ine federal relationship between Czechs and their unions against the burcauracy. Which the publlc will not buy and which clog Slovaks-a law which Husak, during the Criticized it government t directive closing the inventories of book stores). Concluded brief office of Dubcek, had strongly sup- Czechoslovakia's borders to foreigners during that ineptitude on the part of the publishing portedalso provided strong impetus to pro-election and election days, wondering houses was less to blame than the Communist Czechoslovak programming. In tone, most of why the shutters will be closed the world oil Party's requirement that literature be judged the scripts were quite critical of the regime, on the occasion of this "unique el election op- primarily on its Ideological content and only although they avoided personal invective. Comm P'oComme." secondarily on artistic merit. Sample programs: ented on the regime's pre-election Commented upon the continuing lack of Criticized Husak, a Slovak, for ignoring statistical claims on electric power, steel adequate communication with the public de- the forthcoming anniversary of the federa- acorp w P cord won, and meat consumption as not in spite the emphasis placed upon this need by tion despite his earlier boasts, before coming ith the facts a that Czechoslovakia has Bulgarian representatives at the recent ses- to power, of his personal role in its achieve- to import and regulate electric consumption, sion of the International Organization of ment. The BD pointed out that federalism is ? Import Russion ore for steel production, and Radio Broadcasting and Television. Men- now only a fecade, but that Husak had pre- lags behind both Britain and France in meat boned again the postponement of the Con- viotisly linked the achievement of a federa- production. RFE concluded that the regime gross of Bulgarian Journalists, tion in 1968 with the Czechoslovak rebirth fills techniexperts, al jobs with party hacks Instead Contrasted the emphasis placed upon the under Dubcek-a fellow Slovak. mm gent qualified tatis ho ng that official govern- govern- role of trade unions in helping the Commu-. Quoted a book by a Yugoslav professor in versity statistics scan of that e / u uni- ionist Party mold a socialist society with But- Belgrade labeling Czechoslovak federalism a in aduates cannot use their education garian Communist Party Chairman Todor sham. The professor' viewed current trends adgrdequate jabs. Zhivkov's own criticism of the unions for in Czechoslovakia as toward the strengthen- for r t he the e election was that publicly ta n candidates inadequately defending the interests of the ing of centralism and the restriction of na- a few election lel announced only workers. tionalities, a days before the edate-a cir- Comparcd conditions in Bulgaria now and Replayed tapes of Husak speeches promis- p cumgov re showing Ho?u lttle irmingathe as they were 20 years ago by "then and now" ing greater popular freedom at the time he ee government places upon informing the quotations of Bulgarian leaders-illustrat- signed the federation law in 1968. people. ing the principle that the more things change Quoted a New York Times account of Pres- happenings Summarized a th e e last Swiss press Czechaoslova of the the more they remain the same. ident Johnson's memoirs recalling how the y rl oslovak plenary Com- Satirized communism as a system based Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia had per- meeting Party Central Committee pleaat on illusions. suaded LBJ to call off his nlannerl grin +- tneetixrg-an account which concluded that Republic and Czechoslovakia. The same had speculated that editor Krumov's removal vasion of Czechoslovakia had brought about might have been a step toward reducing fric- severe factionalism within many western varticle kfo, however, also noted that the got tion with Yugoslavia since Krumov was a Communist Parties. reign policy is determined by y the fight he between "socialism" and "imperialism." spokesman for an assertive nationalist fac- Noted that the Soviet White Paper on t tion. 1968 invasion, severely criticized by the . Editorialized that Czechoslovakia's current Criticized Criticized the Komsoniols for interfering Czechoslovak Communist Part includin anti-British campaign, following cancella- tare on a recent speech by IIusak, in which for a xcan erxny, was based also on the need beating the 00th birthday of its rector, Pan- for a new outside enemy after the regime had telei Zarev who received honors primarily - the German press concluded that Husak had modified its position on West Germany. because because e followed the Party lice. himself admitted that Smrkovsky and other Excerpted Danish press commentary on reformers "certainly are not mere zeroes." Noted the importance of truth as a pro- upon the opportunism dis- requisite to the proper practice of politics. whether Bulgaria is a satellite or a rebel, The played by Communist superpowers in terms Commented upon Husak's speech on the Daues had speculated that Bulgaria's anti- of subordinating ideology mission of coIle es and universities, raisin Yugoslav campaign xriight have been g gY when power poll- [ g prompted by a desire to let Belgrade and tics comes to the fore. the question as to why there is no open and A2omnpt know that desire to let s can take and Recalled Moscow's 1956 "sovereignty and public discussion in Czechoslovakia. M scow ent line on hertain questi t all equality for all" declaration, noting that on Reported a Deutsche Presse Agentur dis- Independ. this demonstrated a sharp contrast be- patch on the poor results of "normalization" Iii its Youth Forum No. 68 of October 27, tween words and deeds in terms of the quel- in Czech culture, evidenced by the fact that 1971, the Bulgarian BD broadcast all inter- ling of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the there is still no Czech Writers' Union. view-part of a continuing series of inter- 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. .Britain's positive move in join- views with prominent scholars-with Profes-- Quoted Willy Brandt's interview with CBS ing the Common Market with the stalemated sor Hellmuth Buetow of the Free University Television, during which the West German economies of the Comecon countries. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 53362 Reported a television panel show in Aus- tria featuring i,rominent reform Commu- nists who concluded that humanistic Marxism is the sole alternative to Soviet-type com- rnunism. Poked fun at Radio Prague's criticism of the purchase of horror films, commenting that it is ridiculous to take umbrage at thril- lers in a state where. horrible things are experienced daily. Replied to official Czechoslovak propaganda on "U.S. fascism" in the Angela Davis case, pointing out the facts of the crime and in- dicating circumstances wherein the trial is open to the public, the USSR has been in- vited to send observers, experienced defense lawyers have been provided, the Court agreed to a change of venue, and Angela's sister remains free to travel and denounce the U.S. R-FE asked whether such circumstances would be possible in the Czechoslovak Socialist Re- public. Included in Annex 0 are several typical commentaries broadcast on October 27, 1971, and emceed by Slava Volny, who until 1968 was a leading commentator of Radio Prague, Hungarian broadcasts Hungarian-language broadcasts were weighted heavily with economic subjects dur ing the period tinder review, although the anniversary of the 1956 uprising also re- ceived considerable attention. Analysis of a major speech by Premier Fock on the state of the Hungarian economy, and the govern- ment's plans to achieve greater progress un- der the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) contained a number of points which were in- cluded in a Daily Guidance Summary on Hungary's economic problems. (See p. 64, above, and Annex K.) The Hungarian SD's critique of Fock's economic policies was somewhat sharper than the tone of the ap-. plicable DGS, but was well within the bounds of what would be considered legitimate-even moderate-journalistio license in the West, In illustrative broadcasts, the Hungarian BD: Gave Premier Pock credit for an accurate analysis of Hungarian economic problems, but criticized him for unfairly passing the blame down to the individual enterprise managers. Advocated abolition of privileges accorded state-owned farms In order to provide incen fives to the aggicultural cooperatives to stick to farming instead of branching out into other fields- an activity which the govern- ment said it would ban. Praised farm workers and the regime for launching a contest to reduce the high ac- cident rate in agriculture. Agreed with the goals, but criticized the tactics employed by government economic regulators to get the NEM moving again. Suggested at least partially releasing some of the brakes on economic enterprises to. stimulate movement rather than cutting back investments and increasing controls. Urged the Communist Party hierarchy to force local Party functionaries to implement government decisions to provide more aid to private farm plot owners. Defended the case of the leader of a co- operative who visited a western country to seek aid for an unfinished agricultural proj- ect and was criticized by the local press, The case was defended on its merits and with the argument that collectives do not get. their fair share of investment allocations from the government. Recommended that in the context of the NEM the twin problems of overinvestment and foreign trade deficits should be solved without either overexploitation of labor or curtailed productivity. Trade balances are best solved by increas- ing exports rather than curtailing imports of capital machinery . needed for increased production. Emphasized the need to replace obsolete industrial machinery; thus deplored the gov- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENA !'. Mai ,m 6, 1) i2 ernment's tendency to out back on such nec- essary investment as wasteful and profit- cutting.' Concluded that the growth of pluralism in the society was one of the best effects of the NEM, and recommended that the govern- ment not push too hard for consensus which, on vital issues, might "be unnatural and cause more problems." Attributed to the shortage of pork in ru- ral areas to a lack of cooperation between state purchasing agencies and rural coop- eratives. Noted the existence of small-scale foreign commerce along Hungary's borders with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. Deplored the lack of such commerce along the Austrian border, and suggested that Introduction of same might help the small farmers purchase directly- badly-needed small farm machinery. Held out hopes for better Hungarian-Ru- manian relations, Observed that Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty has settled in Vienna. Summarized highlights of two studies by Communist Party functionaries in the pro- 1956 hierarchy showing that the 1956 upris- ing was not instigated from outside, but was a genuine expression of the nation's aspira- tions for justice and freedom. Commented retrospectively that the Hun- garian people, Communist Party, and the Soviet leaders had learned much from the experience of 1956. The people had learned that it was not wise to entertain romantic ideas about great powers of East or West; the Soviet leaders, that after 1956 and 1908 no ideological and social uniformity can be achieved in the satellites; the Party, that It must walk the tightrope between public apathy and the threat of Soviet intervention. This ambiguous policy has its shortcom- ings, but it is no.little achievement when one recalls the sense of absolute hopelessness of 16 years ago. Called the attention of villagers to a new government decree stipulating that all own- ers of real estate must register their holdings with the local councils before June 30, 1972. Welcomed the fact that the new coopera- tive law greatly expanded the scope of au- thority of the cooperative general assem- blies. Castigated the government for failure to repay promptly those peace bonds which the Ra.kosi regime had imposeed on the popu- lation. Cited a dispute between two Hungarian newspapers about whether Soviet poet Yev- tushenko had ever been in Hungary before as illustrating the danger of allowing people to be misled by false information. RFE sug- gested this danger could be avoideed by al- lowing greater freedom of the press. Decried the lack of adult education pro- grams for Hungarian farmers during winter evenings when weather conditions make farm work impractical. RFE promised to try to fill this gap with a weekly adult education course for farmers. Welcomed Hungary's agreement with Yugo- slavia to construct the long-delayed Andria pipeline. The BD found it curious that the decision was made on Soviet initiative, which suggests Soviet unwillingness or inability to meet Hungary's oil requirements, Also wel- comed the news that much talked about, and oft-delayed, negotiations with Czecho- slovakia on the Danube hydroelectric project would soon be resumed. Commented favorably on the government's promises to increase support to Hungarian artisans and made several suggestions as to how the many problems of these craftsmen may be solved. The full text of the Hungarian Broad- casting Department's major political pro- gram, Newsreel, of October 28, 1971, is in- eluded in Annex O. On that date, Newsreel dealt primarily with international themes, but its commentary on freedom of the press, pegged to a dispute between Esti Hirlap and Nepszabadsag-two major publications- over the latter's rebuke of the former for' quoting Yevtushenko "out of context" on Yehudi Menuhin's definition of freedom, is a good illustration of the general tone of domestic political broadcasts. Polish. broadcasts Although RFE's earlier history tended to be dominated by the sensationalism sur- rounding its broadcasts to Hungary before and during the 1956 uprising, the most re- cent controversies have been prompted by Polish-German relations and Polish Govern- ment allegations of the inflammatory na- ture of broadcasts produced by RFE's Po- lish Broadcasting Department. Paradoxical- ly, It was the Polish BD's cautious and mod- erate approach to the Poznan riots in 1956- to which the Gomulka regime paid private tribute ?-which was overshadowed by the Hungarian affair. By the same token, much of the most recent sensationalism about Polish broadcasts will not withstand care- ful scrutiny-a conclusion reached by most of the Western press some time ago. As is evident from a compilation of U.S. and for- eign press clippings submitted by RFE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its hearings, RFE currently is rated highly for objectivity by an overwhelming major- ity of those West European and U.S. news- papers which have publishgd comments on the subject 19 The tenor of the continuing Polish Gov- ernment attacks on RFE raises the question, however, of just what basic policies guide the prograni.niilig of the Polish Broadcast- ing Department. Accordingly, the author se- lected sample scripts from the files of the Polish BD which dealt directly with the new Polish leadership and the direction being taken by the Polish United Workers' Party PUWP-the official title of the Communist Party in Poland. These scripts, entitled The Situation Within the Party Before tide 6th Congress, (in four parts) and New Generals in the PRL were broadcast during the pe- riod October 12-15, 1971 by Jan Nowak, Di- rector of the Polish Broadcasting Depart- ment, and by Mr, J. Ptaczek, one cf the se- nior Polish Editors. An additional Nowak script selected was Mr. Nowak's three-part series on The Role of RFE, broadcast on June 22, 23, and 24, 1971. The complete texts of these scripts are contained in Annex P. Highlights of these scripts are summarized as follows: Self-perception of the role of the Polish Broadcasting Department Nowak began his series of broadcasts on the role of RFE by recalling a chance meet- ing in 1944 with a young Russian deported as a slave laborer to Nazi-occupied Poland. This young "Soviet man," as lie described himself, conveyed the impression of a "gram- ophone record endlessly repeating Pravda and Izvestia articles." Thoroughly brain- washed as a result of the total Soviet mono- poly on information during his formative years, the young man exhibited no trace of independent thinking or independent judg- ment. This experience evoked a gloomy im- age of a future Poland-already destined to be in the Soviet orbit-peopled with similar mental automatons reared under similarly sterile Intellectual circumstances. That to- day's Poland does not conform to that gloomy image Nowak attributed to rapid advances in . communications technology-advances which have made It possible to put an end to the information monopoly of totalitarian state structures. Noting that RFE programs today con- stitute 86% of the broadcasting beamed into Poland by the three largest Western radio Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 61 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD' SENATE S3363 stations, Nowak commented that postwar gle nor of the many ramifications its resolu- parison of the problems faced by Gierek with experiences in Eastern _Europe "teach us that tion could entail. those faced in 1950 by Gomulka, and an ex- well-informed nations, knowing the true. _ A substantial tactic used against Gierek position of the way conservative Party pres- state of affairs, aware of their aspirations, by the Party conservatives is the deliberate sures, untempered by public exposure and thinking Independently, are a dynamic ele- spread of rumors and misinformation- discussion, served to force Gomulka away ment, exerting an influence, not only on the mostly centering on the dangers of revision- from the path of reform and back to the In- group In power, but also on changes In the' ism and the likelohood that revisionism ternal needs of the apparatus. According to very system of government itself. Even when carried too far will end where the Prague Nowak, exactly the "same phenomena which they are completely deprived of democratic Spring of 10G8 did. According to Nowak, accompanied Gornulka's rule from the very freedoms." He added that under these cir- the "opposition is counting that in order to first months also appear now, in the fir.-it cumstances "it is not difficult to understand, pacify these moods Gierek will have to period of the exercise of authority by Gierek's the war to the death which the communist sharpen the course, to give up the plans of team." But Nowak also pointed out that governments have declared on Radio Free more considerable changes and reform, that historical analogies should not lead to a Europe and Radio Liberty ... conducted as he will have to return, to the [repressive] false fatalism, and that it is by no means if the survival and salvation of the commu- road of his predecessor." inevitable that Glerek will follow the road nisi system depended on victory." The broadcasts went on to specify that the of his predecessor. To avoid this, however, Nowak acknowledged that RFE cannot presentation of the rationale and means Gierek must avoid Gomulka's mistakes-the abolish censorship, "but it certainly can put being used by Party functionaries to attack prime one being the destruction of the coun- effective restraints on it." He questioned the Gierek should not be interpreted as an [RFE] ter-balance to the conservative wing of the efficacy of concealing facts if, "by simply recognition of "Gierek and his leadership as Party. Nor can more personnel shakeups in turning on the radio, one can learn about liberals or reformers consistently aiming at the Government and the Party constitute everything from Radio Free Europe ... the the modernization of the Polish economic- such a center-balance, for it has been dem- smallest gap through which the hidden truth political system." Gierek is, according to the onstrated that bureaucratic pressure can be can penetrate to the broad masses renders RFE analysis, merely a more practical Party skillfully and effectively employed to Sabo. the entire effort of the censors Ineffective." man-a man who is unique among the lead- tage reform.-from-above. "A counter-balance Nowak defined RFE's role as a surrogate ership in having an authentic proletarian can only be created through the control of opposition, providing some aspects of the background. This pragmatism has convinced the social element over the bureaucracy, checks and balances at work In democratic him that "following the December shock, , and thus by allowing greater freedom of pirb- systems. He cited the intensity of the tech- something would simply have to change, cer- lie criticism and discussion . for freedom meal (jamming), political, and diplomatic tain conclusions will have to iae drawn if of the press, even limited, constitutes under campaign to silence RFE as evidence that the Party is to avoid another disaster." the present system the only possible form the Communist regimes understand this role Gierek's major contribution was character- of social control over the class of Party bu- only too well. He added that the disappear- - ized as the fact that, "after December, he was reaucrats and the only effective brake on ante Of this major symbol of Western In- able to subdue the revolutionary ferment their . . ., pushing Poland to the bottom terest In the welfare of East European.peo- without resorting to mass terror." Nowak and plunging the country in tragic stagna- ples-"the shutting down of Radio Free Eu- pointed out that a number of the cautious tion. A return to the road which Gomulka rope and Radio Liberty-would.... finally emergency measures of the Gierek regime- followed for 14 years could only lead in one clear the desired way to the goal which ... removal of some of the most hated leaders, direction-to new conflicts and upheavals, has so far been impossible to achieve some concessions to the workers, some ges- concealing a big and dangerous unknown." the enslavement of minds." Nowak cited an. tures to the intelligentsia, limited dialogue Implementation of current policy in Polish other major goal of RFE as to "demonstrate with the .. -ifll ~ioroK some - imilteq which is: to defend the right of every citizen ularity." Th is was a far cry from the nthu- Thus the examination of basic scripts pro- to express his own view, irrespective of siasin shown Gomulka after 1956, and is dument ced by cafes Polish Broadcasting Depart-self- of whther we agree with it or l1ot." best described as a "wait and see" attitude- role snan cps aetion press perception i a general Thus, concluded Noway, the silencing of a short-term credit. The Polish BD gave practical ole purposes, within within the e on ex for Po o- RFE or any window "wide open to a world Gierek credit for realizing that in order to land's present . The very different from. the one in which [the consolidate and extend such a credit, some specif eolic socio-political toward contemporary framework. ant people] have to live" has become a question clear and visible improvement of material specific of neither att k fr support of Poland of the highest import to Communist leader- conditions must be achieved. regime one in attack t nor support of the ship. Nowak described the workers as now the the spotlight in tote. Instead, the and reasoned to keep RFE perception of and policy -toward the "only great force In the community with the ion focused of upon ane opm nis , contemporary situation in Poland whom the Party must seriously reckon." He with cussion upon Polish major During the four-day speculated that should the workers' cautious with the hope that the Polish people, through people, through period from October being more fully informed, will independent- 12-15, 1971, inclusive, the Polish Broadcast- could be again disappointed, the situation ly bring the force of public opinioto bear ing Department presented a detailed analysis rapidly deteriorate-an eventuality to upon all factions of the regime. Insofar as the with pa cu political situation totrole of Via. ` - political deplored by the USSR because workers' Polish BD broadcasts exhibit some optimism olitical cost of putting down a that Gierek may yet avoid knucklin ward Caerek and his new team and the pit rising by force. Consequently, said Nowak, y unde- fails he faces in trying to implement his Gierek probably enjoys greater support from tionaries, , completely o o may ay be cyn bee described ancb y programs. - - Moscow than is generally realized. But fat- pps Live c as Polish BD Director Nowak described what tional struggles are also welcome to Moscow, some as supportive of Gierek. Inasmuch as he viewed as a power -struggle- taking place in that they facilitate Moscow's role as a actiobroadcasts are offet erpres t re imp, between the Party bureaucracy-especially balance wheel in the affairs of Poland. Thus, however, it omissions clear that the present quite its middle echelons-and Glerel s new lead- and, astir that this demonstrated support s quite the antit i as has been demonstd by ership. He pointed out that at an important position, , ton Moscow'streluctance OP- osition, counting the i-RFE campaign of the Polish Govern= Party conference in September, "a practi- see Gierek emerge as the unchallenged leader ment, is certainly not fully appreciated by tally open attack against the present leader- of the Party, Is the most dangerous factor in the regime. ship was made." This attack was couched the situation. . in general terms and centered on the familiar Against this background, the Polish BD Munich, the period of field observation in theme that the "danger of revolutionism" Presented an analysis of the Party's Direc- Munich, the Polish Broadcasting Depart- was a greater danger to the Party than tives for the 0th Party Congress-guidelines men t: threats from any other source. According to which are to become the Party's program for Commented upon a series of personnel Nowak, the terminology used made it un- the future. Conceding that Gierek and his changes in the Polish Government as gen- mistakably clear to Gierek that the whole team realize the need for basic reforms and orally positive in increasing the expertise policy of the post-December leadership was . institutional changes in the Party to ample- brought to bear upon major problems. under attack. Motivation behind the attack meat stated goals, especially economic ones, Described the difficulties faced by Polish was said to be the fact that the thousands Nowak commented that' the power struggle scholars in airing their grievances to the gov- of middle-echelon Party functionaries-not previously described as acted to make the Di- er?nment. themselves in policymaking posts-see a rectives themselves ambiguous and unin- Commented that the Polish October of 1956 threat in any changes or reforms-even the formative. "The author's or authors' chief proved that even in a dictatorial regime an "timid and so far undefined economic re- aim was, on the one hand, not to lose the opposition capable of enforcing a change in forms and changes of the system"-to their limited credit of the people, and on the other the governing team could arise. own positions of authority and privilege, not to get exposed to charges of revisionism Analyzed the new composition of the Plan- Nowak hypothesized that for the moment and not to provide opportunities for attacks tying Commission, rating its new chief as a the aim of these bureaucrats is not to oust to the Party reaction." Thus there is no way "man who understands the needs of the con- Gierek, but to make a figure-head out of him, for the Polish people to find in the wording temporary countryside." make hire dependent upon the Party con- ohe Directives any real clues as to how Commented that the pre-Congress Party servatives, and deprive him of freedom of present policies will develop in the forthcom- Guidelines on Housing which dwelt upon movement. Nowak asserted that the people Ing years. have not been informed of this power strug- The series concluded with a detailed com- awhether to build less lare partment houses constitute a o"b dojoke" !I-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S ,3,64 .. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1J "l2 cludin lustrating lack knowledge about the con- hegh-level sr of ptionhe Ministryl oft the Intg Inwas stitute discriminwas are tricin that ted to Partysmember- stnucti industr industry. Pointe ted out that the Congress of the PUWP Referred to an official Polish Press Agency and that Party membership was shunned by professionals con- because asdde- sideredethe endless meetings and ideological they merely rubber-stamps decisions already taken nit o z of the communique of ltrade unionsnew by a Party elite. Praised GiereY.'s letter to apre-Congress fenders and representatives of workers' in- training sessions involved as a sheer waste conference at Gdansk, but pointed out that terests. The BD commented that this was al- 'of time. positive statements alone are not enough: ways supposed to be so, but under Party Commemorated the 20th anniversary of the post-December improvements have been too bureaucrats the trade unions had become Rumania Broad that g lDepartmentiz of R1? e slow, perhaps because of the opposition of tools of the establishment. h retrogressive Party bureaucrats. _ Reviewed the situation of Ukrainian enough in Rumania to preclude the neces- Commented upon the presence of Chan- Greco-Catholics in Poland and at the Synod sity of Rum more decades of RFE broadcast-? cellor Brandt's representative at the beatifi- of Bishops in Rome, g to i, cation ceremonies for Father Kolbe, attribut- Commented con the propoz dilaw, "Protect- n Comm ntedits that Ce e sufescu' a bloww by hay ing this to the importance which the German lug Government attached to this symbolic oc oc- that this serious problem needs determined ideological drive which, in fact, rests on a casion-an occasion which RFE felt could action, but questioning whether the proposed narrow Soviet-style Interpretation of Marx-ninism. pave the way understanding hg between additional Suggested that the p oblem would not Le Noted the fact that death sentences had Germans and Poles on both human and be solved by new laws, but by the allocation been meted out to embezzlers of a state food stDo loubbtedtels. the veracity of a statement of funds for needed educational, guidance, store. The BD repudiated this medieval type Dminp by the Minister of the Interior welcoming pub- and corrective institutions. of punishment and the obviously deficient licity about the militia and security agencies. On the question of the "dialogue" between control system which allowed embezzlement The BD pointed out that no findings on the the Party and the people, the BD commented to continue for 12 years without being de- militia-security responsibilities for bloodshed that the limited freedom for public crit- tected. Questioned the utility of exemplary ntences, and cause of epidemic real dialogue. but what seems to be an embsted that during December disturbances have been not y taadequate fward from published. Reported the statement of Polish Vice- Reported evidence of continuing large- be sought in the poverty of the citizens Minister Willman that he demanded the scale East German defections to the West. rather than in their dishonesty. expulsion of RFE from Germany during an Annex 0 contains the full texts of eight Reviewed commentary by the Italian news- ofizcial visit to Bonn. BD commentary commentaries aired by the Polish Broad- paper Corriere deZa Sera on Rumania's skill- viewed- these attacks as raising the impor-' casting Department on November 2, 1971 on ful and courageous foreign policies which the tance of "this modest instrument of lnfor?- its main political program, Facts and Views. newspaper viewed as a possible forerunner mation," and quoted the Frankfurter. Rund- These commentaries cover subject material of current East-West developments. schau's refutation of charges of "subversion" ranging from the illegal traffic in gold and Noted that industrial safety in Rumania is against RFE. Elaborated upon. the demo- foreign currencies, in intraparty opposition still deficient despite Ceausescu .s personal cratic approach to a free press, and denied to Gierek, to an account of the inaugura- efforts to improve it. Recommended a public that the present regime in Poland was iden- tion of South Vietnamese President Thleu. inquiry into the latest mine disaster and in tical to the state and the nation. Noted that _ Rumanian broadcasts an attempt to determine whether the over- the present attacks on RFE were proceeding Diplomatic efforts on the part of both ambitious goals of the five-year plan and along lines laid down by Goinulka three years Hungary and Rumania to improve their re- the ideological campaign which might be ago-plans which envisaged main diplomatic distracting the attention of labor leaders lotions-which for a time had been marked from adequate safety standards might not be pressure against RFE in Bonn and Washing- with unusual bitterness-provided subject partly to blame. ton. Also noted evidence of an even broader matter for a number of commentaries during pContrasted Ceausescu' professed demo- anti-RIVE campaign, which creates popular the period under review. These efforts were erotic principles with hiss Broady tactic o- impression that RFE, is an extraordinarily supported by the Rumanian BD as praise- gaining personal control of all state and powerful institution. Concluded that no one worthy and constructive. On the negative o . y sectors, is forced to listen to_ RFE and that the one side, the drive toward a greater degree of part effective way of fighting RFE is to allow free- ideological "purity" launched by Ceausescu Reviewed a broad sample of Western press dom of information and opinion in Poland, commentary on Rumania's small cultural Quoted West German opinion polls show- on July 6. 1971 has been viewed with con- revolution." siderable alarm by both groups of Rumanian Editorialized on Ceausescu's address to the ing a majority of Germans favoring radian intellectuals and by RFE's Rumanian Broad- plenary meeting of the Communist Party's Lion of Bonn's t treaties with Warsaw and. casting Department. During the period cov- Cmeeting of the Communist leader Moscow. Said this confirmed earlier expres- ered by the field study, sample RFE broad- ' Central now aware that his dogmatic July leader lions RFE con ion that the Germans were e casts to Rumania: are disapproved of by the intelligentsia. Al- frontier. reconciled to the Oder-Neisse Criticized the Grand National Assembly for frontier. though the people will welcome measures de- Criticized the inadequate and vague being a?year late in approving the five-year signed to eradicate corruption and abuses, formulation of the pre-Congress guidelines plan. This delay, said to be occasioned by die- Why ntt the clock back in the cultural and on wages. Quoted critical comments from the putes between Ceasusescu and leading .con- educational fields-a policy which will only Polish domestic press, and praised the Glerek amists over the tempo of implication, was increase the present domestic chaos? excessive. According to the BD, professional Commented that the kind of campaign for regime for permitting more open criticism. economists were cautious in their approach Welcomed democratization of Party nomi- to implementation, feeling that haste must ideological purity now under way in Ru nation procedures res for delegates to the Con- be avoided. The regime, on the other hand, mania has, in other socialist societies, always gross, hoping they would also apply to other was pushing for rapid results. The BD cau_ proven a hindrance to the improvement of Party elections. tinned against the adverse impact on the living standards in keeping with the possibili- Reported that both Germans and Poles workers if regime recommendations for speed ties now available through technology. were taking more steps toward the normal- took precedence over the approach of pro- Quoted a Western press report attributing ization of relations. economists. Ceausescu's cultural revolution to his inten- Connnented on the scandalous conditions fessional Commented that the Niculescu Mizil mis- remains the vigilant guardian of Communist in Polish mental hospitals. lion to Budapest was a significant step to- Praised Giasek for more the ufor ward improved relations with Hungary. dogma, and that he intends to stern corrup- studeies so as to give more freedom for Reported on Bavarian MP Essl's protest tion. The Western writer was quoted as be- sudeints. against the harsh competition of the Ru- Roving that Ceausescu will not succeed Welcomed the Italian license for prodttc- manian Aroconstruct firm with German com- either in stemming corruption or improv- tion of a Polish Fiat Automobile. panes-competition facilitated because the lug Party morale since he cannot afford a Noted some improvements in Polish local Rumanian firm, operating in Germany, was purge of great proportions similar to that press activities, but commented that the underpaying its employees and failing to effected by the cultural revolution in China. g comply with German labor legislation requir- The complete text of the Rumanian Broad- press as to full do expression was of the inadequate- naai ht casting Department's Press Review and Po- la ely oca suo wstill on Of local l ing the payment of certain stof the fithf Zitical Program No. 177-its major political largely because of the opposition o Speculated and that implementation roram-broadcast on October 26, 1971 is Party organizations. Ideological aeducational a proved included in Annex O. This program contains Reported on Party reactionary factions op- by the party Executive Committee on July 6 the day's tof eight gpics: posed to Gierek's technocratic approach in may presage a "cultural revolution in Ru- The treatment reatm nta and the National As- filling personnel vacancies, and commented ' mania. seinbly The Five-Year that these factions are waging quiet warfare Criticized draft legislation providing that High-Level Rumanian Party Delegation in against Gierek. management functions in state enterprises Buda estr Reported on the disclosures of large-scale be assigned exclusively to graduates of the Frapakfurter RundscTzau on Rumanian Illegal `trade in gold and foreign currencies, Central Institute for the Education of Lead- Workers u West Germany. commenting that the -long impunity of 'ing Cadres in the Economy and State Admin- ewindlers and police inactivity indicated istration: Pointed out that this proposed law . Brezhnev in Paris. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 33Gr_ The Times (London) on Soviet Group's Unit's limited staff performs its tasks reason- Plea to Psychiatrists. concluded that there were no cases at that Jewish Problem in Russia. ably well. Most of the summaries accurately date wherein Especially Useful items or Daily . reflect both the tone and content of broad- Guidance Summary materials had not been Communist China Admitted to U.N. casts. In some cases, however, the system _ fully covered. 1'ito's Interview with the Washington Post. errs. The Broadcast Analysis summary for Quality control one of the BD's on a date in early September Monthly information report From the foregoing it can easily be seen 1971, for example, summarizes a broadcast Another . regularly-scheduled Broadcast that the substantial volume of politically- , editorial as follows: Analysis report is issued monthly, covering oriented material alone broadcast each day [name deleted]'s Birthday and his Re5POyt- innovations in programming carried out dur- by RFE's five radio stations presents a form- sibilities.-Editorial noted that [name of ing the month, outstanding features common idablo problem for RFE management in leader deleted] 60th birthday was preceded to more than one Broadcasting De2 Department,. terms of assuring continued high quality in by one day by former party chief and premier and the highlights of major programming of program assuring production, and delivery. [name deleted] 71st birthday. [former pre- each Broadcasting Department for the And, although the purposes of this study 'mien] belongs to the past while [present month. The report also records speical meet- require some concentration upon political leader] is going high. Opinions on [present ings between Broadcast Analysis and DD per- equirming, it should be remembered that leader] personality vary between being very gonnel, and actions taken to improve pro- the high quality of the remaining "non-pa- _ negative and somewhat positive. He may feel gramming or remedy deficiencies previously litical" programs-constituting almost half very content about his achievements. How- Noted. of each day's output--is also of great im- ever, he ought to think also in terms of what her The 1971, for Information Report for mare- portance to RFE's continued effectiveness. his place in [name of country deleted] his- changes es in example, notes ing oftt the, First-line responsibility for` the quality tory would be. He should not forget that the n n the religious of the e of lpar, and the broadcast product lies, of course, in the darkest spot on his profile is his complete new w programming rBroadcasting castin in the Polish h De De hands of the five Brodcasting Department subjugation to, the USSR, day his- focusing upon serialized excerpts lofbooks Directors. Ultimate responsibility is that of torians will stress that during [le ]'s rule banned by the Polish Government as well as the Director of RFE. In between these two the star of [country] as an independent and some changes in the Polish BD's Facts and seats of responsibility are two Important sovereign state faded away, the BD con- '[news series to provide more pointed and staff elements- the Broadcast Analysis Unit eluded. noncommittal coverage of specific domestic and the Audience and Public. Opinion Re- The original script being summarized, events. search Department. Although these two however, contained the following language: entities are staff elements of the Director's The "dictatorship of the proletariat" .? Th ern o noted aeiona report al deevvetopm m the ents given of inent Office, they in fact play a dual role. They "permits only sympathetic references" to its coverage nt loen prominent serve as independent monitors of broadcast leaders which is why an accurate description cstine the programming of all Broad- servo ions on behalf of the Director, . and, of the character, endowments, and short- casting Departments, information observing that RFE they also serve increasingly half comings of coverage provided ded of news subjects subjects to East which Euere as impartial ad- [name of leader] is at present peen audiences visors directly to the Broadcasting Depart- very difficult. meats. In both roles, the BA Unit and the The London Observer . , , wrote . "evil either distorted by or unavailable for the ap- ents d D . epartment strive to maintain the eyes, cowardly, cruel, cold, haughty, stu- ices. omestic information media serv- kl.nd of detached, hard-nosed objectivity Pfd. ? ices. In n addition to the events covered by Dail which G ill id y u w allow management decisions on A [country] observer states: "ldoleteril is A ance Summaries (exnlainert t,m? Directors or the subjective biases of both an extremely narrow-minded man. However meeting that the bulls of coverage consisted editorial and managerial personnel. This is much he may appear to be modest and calm, of extensive press reviews, including virtu- a demanding task; one which, if properly so much also is he cowardly and servile. He ally all the major West German newspapers, carried out, is not conducive to the winning is not a Stalinist but a blind and obedient as 'well as the New York Tirnes, the London of popularity contests. It is also one which tool of the Russians." Tirnes, the Daily Telegrpec Les Echos, and is essential to the successful continuance of And to end with a third descri pion: de- the Washington Post. Special mention was so complex an enterprise as the operation of leted] is not a stupid and common man as Czec ohos f a ovak BD's fourBD's p popular commentary Comass -a five highly individualistic multilingual radio he is generally considered to be." Cou e tiea stations broadcasting to five similar audi- When these documents were brought to that Brandt'spoli tcal creed dmo str tes his ences whose governments are, by and large, the attention of the appropriate Broadcast- understanding of the West German youth's hostile to the notion of unfettered com- Ing Director and the Chief of the Broadcast aspirations for a rapproachment with East munication from abroad. Analysis Unit in Munich, both gentlemen Euro can outh. Kosygin's Cana tour The activities of the Audience and Public acknowledged that (a) the language and tone also eceived broad RY'S overage d nn event Opinion Research Department will be exam- of, the script violated standing RFE policy which was marked by silence in the East fined in some detail in another chapter. In against petty and personal attack and (b) European media in terms of the Jewish dem- the remainder of this chapter, the work of these violations were not detected by the onstrations and the tight security precau- the Broadcast Analysis Unit will be described normal review machinery available for the tfons in force during the visit. It was also in sufficient detail to convey the essence of purpose. how it performs in both components of its eioted thet all the Broadcaso Departments dual role. - It is likely that human fallibility will re- except the Rumanian one also began broad- - sult in such slips from time to time. On the casting regularly-scheduled material on Daily broadcast analyses other hand, the other review procedures utf- problems of ecology?+ RFE's basic tool in checking on the activ- lined by the Broadcast Analysis Unit and the ities of the five Broadcasting Departments Director to keep familiar with all program- Broadcast pnalysis meetings for compliance with RFE policy in political ming characteristics of each Broadcasting From g the of q standpoint o control t prorol progr?anuning is the series of Daily Broad- Department should keep such occurrences complia complian?nce wi gwitth h as y policy, , p prob rob to cthe m st cast Analyses produced by the Broadcast to a mininmum. - ably 'the moss Analysis Unit. These reports are issued each Weekly reports useful procedure emquent e the Director day on the activities of each BD. Special note The Broadcast . rho dcastning y fregnit eronnel and top is taker of usage of Especially Useful items Analysis Unit maintains a Broadcast Analysis Unit personnel and top err the Recommended Lists (ses page 68 log of the usage o? lack of usage of Especially management staf to-discuss the overall qual- on th aRd of mendednLi with Daily Gui 8, Useful items from the Recommended Lists, ity of the programming of specific Broadcast-ove) aboe Summaries or Guidance Notes when as well as a similar log on Daily Guidance ing Departments and their personnel. These these have been issued see Summaries and Guidance Notes. Each week a meetings are held about once a week, with above) . Iv addition, each (see algeso 60, 61, summary report is forwarded to the Director each meeting restricted to a discussion of the program dealing with c;her national or fed of RFE on the subject of covege of these activities of a single'BD. To facilitate candor torn is ro ram dl affairs summarized o a Brian- items by the five BD's. The Broadcast Anal- and avoid unnecessary personal emborrass- Analyst, and the mmari r is a ysis Weekly Report of November 4, 1971, coo- ment, no Broadcast Department personnel at- co t in ss nd detail to zry uppose-" eriugthe week of October 25 to October 31, -tend these meetings. Careful minutes are anent to draw general ailnc o altoow about age- 1971, a for example, lists each program of kept and supplied to the Director. In some nature add sco era a o each Broadcasting Department covering the cases, the Director may then make these min- natur e a fils of Daily Boven pr gr la Especially Useful Item for October 25, 1971 utes available to the Broadcast Directors. In comrin the yses (Reddaway in The Times- on Soviet Group's any case, the Director follows through on the g period of the field study Oeto- Plea to Psychiatrists) 'and the two DGS in reconmendatious which grow from these ber 26--November 5, 1971) is contained in force for that period, nanmely the one on ad- meetings, and maintains a continuing, dia- Annex N. mission of the People's Republic of China logue with Iris Broadcast Directors as to the Extensive comparisons of original scripts to the U.N. (see pages 61, 80, above) and critical points which may be raised. The with subsequent Broadcast Analysis sum- -Britain's entry into the Common Market minutes of a meeting held on March 19, 1971 - rnaries indicate that the Broadcast Analysis (see pages 63, 83, above). The report also to discuss the activities of the Czechoslovak Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE Alarm t 6, 172 the period Broadcasting Department struck the author Alas, it is undoubtedly one of the worst. Broadcasting Department covering of this report as especially useful in illustrat- The . . findings . . . confirm my earlier October See the section 20-November th5, 1971. e Poznan riots, p. 30, a - 11 lug the broad scope and depth of these die- gram a tthat this is it he editor of the series sly is a con- supra. cue r. Too, this the ]particular or meeting re- g' redlrepresenta- heeled rather mbar assn in tg, comments which lyi studies the domestic g man, diligent- compendium of Annex personmally- g press, pinpoints naturally follow from objective critiques. the shortcomings and advocates the right tie clippings from the Although is Consequently, the text of this report, edited remedies and policies. Alas, he seems to be European, and U.S. press. gh ch slightly needlesSly embarrass iindividuals, is at- ability, and hence hiss offerings are painfully for RFEf is impressive. Thea liberal Munich dull, uninspired, plodding, poorly phrased, daily Sueddcutsch Zcitung-a paper close to ortive of his tacked u Annex R. As os be expected, raced ngs called for that el is excessively excessively mechanical, influenced i by domes is Ostpolitile-onaJunea9, 1971 supppresent d the the purpose r detecting aen improving de- complete and unabridged transcript of RFE than the goaspects ecfocus of b more communist jargon in programming Is Polish news programming for the entire day raving. For example, the Broadcast Analyst upon the pon thbad ad than the good programming se sa ily be sinld out forlundeue not neces- Pf June 1, 1971, and invited its comment, form its own opinions as to the accuracy iand reviewing some Programming changes made Y to by one BD to take advantage of the unique due note is taken of what the Broadcast Ana- objectivity of RFE reporting. prune listening hours of the audience, lysts consider the stronger aspects of RIPE 3-9 The Weekly Report of November 4, 1971, e.g.: is included-in Annex Q. praised the changes noting Audience programming, and Public Opinion Research sears rch Department All musical shows are straightforward "The full text -of the Monthly Information report reflecting a larger listening audience musical presentation with no political con- Report for October 1971, is included in An- during the particular time block. On the tent. However, this type of music does have nex Q. other hand, the analyst also commented that a certain political connotation because for ... the revamped program- youth it represents a purely Western type of CHAPTER V. RFE PERFORMANCE: COVERAGE or Sometimes falls short of the goals that the beat entertainment. The . . listeners' re- MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS reform in 1970 had set for it. Thus, some spouse shows enthusiasm for the programs. In the preceding two chapters consider- editors' personal contributions happen The disc jockeys are well experienced, and In attention was paid to how policies are to be lengthy stories which are too tedious they do an outstanding job ... made at Radio Free Europe, how these poli- current programming- to produce the desired impact for which this The editor In charge of writing this kind eies are reflected Free type of programming. is aiming. On the other of- political commentary is a young person especially in programs created and broad- hand, some of the editors limit their per- who lived in . until 1967 and is familiar cast during the period covered by the held sonal contributions to the announcement of with prevailing conditions in his native study in Munich-and what procedures are the hour and other paltriness, thereby miss- country, and he deals skillfully with youth in effect to assure both compliance with ing the purpose of their physical presence problems ... policy and maximum excellence in program According to private information, young coricynt. Several conclusions emerge from the studio viz., it lively contact with the listeners [to a satirical political commen- this analysis: audience. . . Poor scheduling also came in for criticism tary] tape . . . the shows for further cir- a. In the conduct of its daily broadcasts, at the same meeting. Noting that particular culation? Radio Free Europe management in Munich One original commentary by BD said that enjoys a near-total autonomy in decision- APOR rwant oc air just a In time the when.. in all fairness [to an East European leader] making. POR research f indicated a drop noted e that- he was striving for national Independence, b. The volume and immediacy of RFE pro- ce Prec u ti enei e the rgy are being wasted ed under difficult circumstances. BD made it rammin together with the disparate audi- Prh i this time ever are bean clear that it did not mean to defend . g g this program that nus described as a enter of RFE's five audience countries and carefully prepared and unusually interesting whose policies it always had criticized, but it the six-hour time difference between New combination of news and commentary, must admit a truth now recognized by world York and . Munich render impracticable which would deserve a much wider and Public opinion. Of the latter commentary ... either central scripting or the pre-broadcast higher quality audience than the small num- said that it struck him as fair ... and spoke review of scripts except in limited quantity her of housewives and retired people who highly of BD's objectivity. Mr. Cook said that and unusual circumstances. listen to it. . . he knew the program, and was highly ap- c. The question of before-the-fact control Evaluation of a program of political com- preciative of ... statesmanlike approach. or supervision of RFE broadcasting policy by Although, as noted earlier, the Broadcast- any group external to RFE's Munich liead- mentsries drew the following mix of com- Ing Department Directors do not attend these quarters-even by the Free Europe, Inc. meats: meetings, there is substantial feed-back to Board Directorsbls largely one of trust and The relative popularity of .. Is, I think, the Broadcasing Directors and their editors a tribute to its author and reader. older er re- directly from individual Broadcast analysts, confidence in RFE's management and in a Its greater popularity ty among ol- number or procedures intended to deliver In addition, the meetings usually result in the kind of performance justifying confi- opn . . . seems to confirm my earlier a number of follow-up recommendations oaihionth n that Mr. . . has a good but old- which the Director and his staff take u with dente. fashioned o1930 urs sh polemical style. P d. Analysis of scripts and quality con- the Broadcasting Directors. trol procedures during a sample two-week It u is of formula, rou isbut ky I to tamper wonder with a whether sun- an In October 1971, RFE Director Walter in- l fla, nt period indicates that RFE programming is, occasional commentary in this series by Mr, to which a new series of country meetings despite occasional human errors, balanced, -who also has an effective .but more to which Broadcasting Directors are invited. comprehensive, objective, and largely free of modern polemical approach-might not in- These meetings relate the evaluations of inflammatory polemics. On the other hand, crease the popularity of this series still fur- the Broadcast Analysis Unit, the findings of RFE programs consistently prod East Euro- the .Audience and Public Opinion Research peen governments, pointing out both their they. The program's lesser popularity with edu- Department, and the professional judgment successes and their shortcomings, and urging sated listeners indicates, I think, the lima- and experience of the Broadcasting Directors courses of action to liberalize the socio- tation . of aggressive polemics. in a continuing effort to improve program- political systems of the area. Evaluation of a program intended for a ming and make it more timely and relevant e. RIPE management is conscientious and youthful audience was related to APOR find- of youth to the needs of the audience. consistent in the design and application of as- lags that only a small percentage e of youth FOOTNOTES increasingly sophisticated proccclures application actually listened to the program. The analyst Statistics submitted by RFE. secs R.FE operations objectively and to strive added; in connection with these findings: 2 These figures were calculated by RFE's for continued improvement in program They also confirm my earlier opinion that Broadcast Analysis Unit and are based upon quality and timeliness. the program is somehow misconceived: too the kind of quantified content analysis of The inside-out observation of RFE activi- didactic and propagandistic for the well- RFE programs illustrated in the statistical ties leading to these conclusions over a two- educated and too pretentiously intellectual report contained in Annex H to this report. week sample period was in itself an Inter- for the unsophisticated. Its middle-aged 0 Durkee, op. cit., Annex VII, p. 3, esting experience despite the obvious limita- editor tiles perhaps too hard for an idealistic d Ibid. tions inherent in such a brief field study. youth appeal, but the effect is sometimes 5Ibid., p. 4. Of greater import to an overall examina- insincere or patronizing. 0Ibid. tton of RIVE, however, is some assessment of Among the Broadcast Analysts meeting 7 RFE disc jockeys in Munich report con- Its performance, under varying conditions of reports reviewed by the author, the apogee siderable mail from listeners to this effect. stress, and over longer periods of time. To this end, terms of scathing criticism was reached , attention will now be ttuned to by the following evaluation of a program 8 Monitored by RFE, June 17, 1968. the general nature of RFE broadcasts dur- group:ed for an important economic interest "Interview with Noel Bernard, Munich, ing four major recent historical events. group: October 26, 1971. The rapid internal changes in Czecho- This is probably the most important 10 The full English translation of this pro- slovakia which led to the 1966 Warsaw Pact group-oriented program in our broadcast- gram is included in Annex 0-a compendium invasion of that country in 1968 is one of ing, and should therefore be one of the best. of typical political commentaries of each those events. The succession of developments Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, ?1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 3367 in Poland, which began In November-Deee-m- ulnely democratic exercise of 'power and a especially those alleging that RFE is out ber 1970 and which resulted in the replace- system of government based on and respon- of touch with the realities of Eastern Eur- lnent of Wiadislaw Gamulka by Edward sive to the consent of the governed., ope-are difficult to answer on an objective Gierek In the Party leadership is another. Censorship was abolished by law on Jtine basis. So long as the lid remains firmly Publication by the New York Times of the 26, 1968, and for the first time in a Com- clamped down, "there is little to go on be- so-called "Pentagon Papers" in the summer munist country there existed a virtually free sidet the contention of the cooks that the of 1971 is a third, though less important, ma- press, followed by a wave of open criticism of contents of the pot are as advertised-and jor development, It is certainly an event pro- officials and individuals. By the end of April that they are merely bubbling contentedly, viding a test of RFE's objectivity in han- the Soviet Party Newspaper Pravda was show- not boiling." fl dling an affair which caused great embarrass- ing signs of concern, although it did not yet Periodically, according to RFE's analysis, ment to the U.S. Government-RFE's major attack Dubcek, Novotny's successor as Party the pressures in the pot either burst the sponsor. And finally, the release of Joseph' chief. Publication at the end of June of a clamps, or the clamps are loosened, and there Cardinal Mindszenty from his 15-year sane- strong plea for continued reform, signed by is a swift upsurge of the pot's contents. At tuary in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, his 70 intellectuals, set off a virulent Pravda at- these times sentiments and passions long re- move to Rome, and his final settlement in tack on the freedom of communications strained are given voice, grievances aired, Vienna put the final touches upon contempo- media in Czechoslovakia. In addition, Dubcek and demands made. Such moments afford op- rary RFE treatment of the aftermath of the had rejected a call by the Soviet Union and portunities to measure, with the objective 1058 uprising in Hungary, The following four other Warsaw Pact members for a sum- yardstick of comparisons between positions summaries of RFE programming during the mit meeting. Thus the pressures toward con- espoused by RFE and concessions granted "Prague Spring" and the "Polish December" frontation between Dubcek and the orthodox by the rulers, the degree to which RFE broad- are based upon RFE's own compilations of Communists began to snowball, casters in fact reflect accurate perceptions of broadcast material-compilations which were During this period-April-August 1968- the vital interests of their audiences. sent by RFE tothe Senate Foreign Relations the Czechoslovak public was well informed An opportunity to test this yardstick was Committee in the summer of 1971 (in the by their own communications media. Yet, re- provided by the hundred and fifty days in case of the Polish December) and to RFE's ports RFE, despite the newly-acquired press Poland beginning on December 14, 1970, with West European Advisory Committee in Now freedom (and perhaps because that freedom, ' the riots in the Baltic ports. vember 1968 (in the case of the "Prague being newly-acquired, was of uncertain dura- Although no one was able to predict the Spring"). Files on RFE handling of the tion) Czechoslovaks were still anxious to timing and the violence of the worker detn- Pentagon Papers and the Mindszenty- affair gather information from all sources, includ- onatrations, Radio Free Europe broadcasts were compiled at the request of and in Co- ing Western broadcasts. for the preceding two years had been Char- operation with the Congressional Research RFE policy during this period was to urge acterized by commentary on the "hesitancy Service. support of the Dubcok leadership which was and lack of Imagination of the Polish regime 'm a "PRAGUE SPRING" OF 1968 traveling cautiously along the road to greater in dealing with the stagnation of the coun- The removal of Antonin Novotny in Jan-? democratization. The results of the continu- try's economy and the discontents of the nary 1968 from the top leadership of the ous maneuvering between Dubcek and the public." 4 Czechoslovak Communist Party signalled the Warsaw Pact powers, however, Impelled RFE The build-up for the specific outbreaks, end of an era in that country and presaged to continue some needling I whenever Czech- which began at Gdansk on the night of the beginning of a new, but what turned out oslovak government policies appeared to December 15-16, 1970, appears to have begun to be a short-lived period of evolving free- be backsliding too much. with the announcement by the Party plenum dom. During this period, when Czechoslo- On August 20, 1968, the Czechoslovak ex- in May of a new wage and incentive system, vakia enjoyed a brief flirtation with a genu- periment with liberalization came to an RFE's analysis of this system concluded that finely free press, RFE Audience and Public abrupt end with the invasion of the country it contained more controls than incentives, Opinion Research reports indicated a steady by Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, would intensify worker dissatisfaction, and erosion of its listenerahip until the invasion and Bulgarian troops: In line with final that the Polish economy would continue to by Warsaw Pact powers and the reimposition broadcasts of Radio Prague, RFE adopted a drift, A May 21 RFE broadcast commented of censorship was reflected by a correspond- policy of maximum dissemination of factual that "the problem boils down to creating a Ing upsurge in the RFE listening audience information. RFE also conveyed world-wide, direct link between greater work effort and in Czechoslovakia. Communist and non-Communist, reaction to the wages of the workers concerned." A May The chain of events was apparently set in the invasion and, in commentaries, stressed 31 broadcast stated that "the ruling elite no motion by reaction of the Novotny regime to the peaceftil nature of the Czechoslovak re- longer believes in the elementary honesty of a Writers' Congress held in June of 1967 and form movement and the fact that at no time either the economic apparatus or the work- during which a number of basic Issues, had this movement violated socialist norms ing Inasses." By October 12, 1970, RFE broad- deetned by the regime to be hostile, were nor jeopardized Czechoslovak-Soviet friend- casts held that "the imagination of the world raised. The regime took disciplinary action ship. The RFE line was summed up in a of labor does not reach out to 1971 when the against rebel writers and shut off reportage broadcast on August 27-at the moment beneficial effects of the 'incentive reform' are of the events of the Congress. In October, Dubcek returned from Moscow where he had expected to materialize . one has to eat 1967, a Slovak Communist Writers meeting been forced to agree to apply the brakes to and live somewhere right now. Meanwhile, produced criticism of regime behavior after the reform program: the prices of food and consumer goods for the June conference, and Indicated that only "Sometimes it is the duty of statesmen. to daily use are going up, there are shortages by listening to foreign broadcasts could one. avert the worst ossibilities in order to obtain adequate information, P pre-. everywhere, and housing is becoming more RFE broadcasts during this period were serve better opportunities ..What Czech- expensive ." aimed at airing the discussion of the basic oslovakia has nowt is less than what it had Despite the fact that Polish economic prob- greys and extending the ;cope of discussion would have had if Civil morale had crumbled land as well as of RFE analysts, Communist by bringing up related ideas expressed earlier under the weight of the occupation regime media reaction to RFE's commentary on the in other quarters such as economists, jurists, . and the government had been assumed by a need for economic reforms was uniformly scientists, and imanagers, RFE agroup of collaborators willing to comply with hostile, extending even to personal attacks pubnti ts the industrial ndustria ven abroad E also s the every foreign wish. There is no government on individual RFE commentators. In June ubliciz for refatte io gCziven abroad of collaborators and traitors ill o 1970, a provincial Communist Party daily ad- p strug Throughout the closing months of 1967 kia; Czechoslovakia has statesmen who had. matted shortcomings In the economy and dissatisfaction within the country accelerated to give to a foreign power something which deplored the efforts of the economic adminis- and culminated with the dismissal of Novotny does not belong to it, lest they had to give tration to hide them rather than blame the at a Central Committee session in early Jan- this power everything . . individuals concerned-a situation the daily uary. RFE welcomed this action, and pointed xliS "POLISH DECEMBER" OF 1970 said was exploited by "imperialist centers" out, in its broadcasts, the opportunity avail- There is ample evidence that within the like RFE. able to the new leadership which had been Communist East European regimes there are On Saturday, December 12, 1970, the regime brought to power by forces favoring reform, few occasions on which public opinion is not announced price increases on a wide range An internal RFE guidance, covering its ap- severely inhibited, and that the controlled of necessities-food, creduc and feeler preach to the events in Czechoslovakia, was press in the five countries does not afford theoretically effect by reducti ons on other issued on February 29, 1968. The guidance an outlet for more than one view on major pliances. goods, primarily household out stated, in part: subjects. The standard regime approach to the tacfact , that Dtce the her h eholdRFE poiance ouse14, ted s in "The foremost tactical objective of RFE out wer RFE broadcasts, for example, is to denounce question were beyond the purchasing power er broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on the coon- RFE as reactionary, imperialist, an espion- of most workers, could not be bought even try's domestic affairs over the next several age organization, and so on. At the same at the reduced prices, and re resented over- months must be to help maximize the exist- time, RFE commentators are discredited by p produced and over-stocked items. Cou- 11hg and incipient social pressures which de- the regimes as out of touch with the events, ? sequentiy, these price changes penalized low- mind progress from debate to institutional- personalities, and popular sentiment in East- er and middle income groups. In an internal ization, from piecemeal reform to a funda- ern Europe. guidance paper, RFE predicted that the po- mental overhaul of the political system, from . RFE spokesmen acknowledge that. for long litical consequences could be serious. On the patchwork "democratization" to a more gen- periods of time these regime contentions- night of December 15-16, news of the first Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3368 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 1972 outbreaks at Gdansk, Gdynia, and Sopot was In its own analysis of RFE's role in the replies were made, they did not associate RFE telephoned to RFE from Sweden, where a "Polish December," RFE editors cited a with any of the various controversial issues. 'Polish refugee had picked up a local Gdansk lengthy series of broadcasts through Febru- Rather, they dwelt in a low key upon the radio broadcast.. RFE monitors were then ary 1971, in which they described "19 points issue of freedom of the press, allowing the able to pick up signals from Radio Szczecin of substance, ranging from purely economic . East European listener to make his own coin- and Gdansk, began broadcasting the news, through political to cultural affairs, on which parisons with the controlled East European and supplied its taped monitoring of Polish Polish popular demands, or concessions the media. There were occasional exceptions. In broadcasts to all Western media requesting new leadership felt obliged to grant, and the a broadcast on June 25, 1971, the Czecho- them. Meanwhile, Polish censorship had kept positions espoused by Radio Free Europe slovak Broadcasting Department broadcast a most of the population unaware of what was were in noteworthy accord." The editors also commentary described in the following terms happening until, by the afternoon of Decem- . noted points on which Polish popular senti- by the broadcast Analysis Unit: ber 16th. when the news was pouring into ment and RIVE broadcasts did not coincide, "In view of.a Prague commentator's state- Poland from Western broadcasts, the Polish attributing these to the concern at the -re- ment, in connection with the publication of news agency PAP and Radio Warsaw began prisals which the actions of the coastal the classified Pentagon papers, that 'there is carrying reports of the outbreaks. "Adven- strikers might provoke. Thus RFE, going no democracy in America,' CS BLOCK (Elias, turers and hooligans" were blamed by the of- against popular sentiment, had repeatedly M 5) depicted what would happen if Rude ficial media for exploiting the situation, urged caution, and the necessity not to let Pravo got hold of secret material revealing RFE broadcasts continued to feature Po- things get out of hand. how the August 1968 intervention was pre- land's deepening economic problems and the More recently, RFE has prepared a more pared. In 1968 CS newspapers discussed the price increases as the real causes of the concise analysis of its role prior to the hitherto undisclosed circumstances of the disturbances, labeling the official characteri-. Gdansk strikes. Entitled Fourteen Polish national calamity, intent on pinpointing the nation of protesting workers as "hooligans" Points," this analysis concentrates upon com- people responsible for it. As a result tanks as merely a "well-known propaganda trick." paring what RFE had to say on major issues moved In, and normalized 'democracy' prac- Polish media then began to concede that before the outbreaks took place with con- tically destroyed the CS press. The dispute workers as well as "hooligans" were on the cessions made by the Gierek leadership to in U.S. between the government and the press streets in Gdansk And Gdynia, but shunted restore political stability and economic pro- has been placed in the hands of the courts. all possible blame to Radio Free Europe. In ductivity. The positions espoused by RFE on If the whole affair offers any lesson about a commentary on December 18, the Polish these issues before December 20, 1970 are set , democracy, then the Radio Prague com United Workers Party (Communist Party) out, by means of excerpts from RFE's Polish mentator apparently failed to notice it." Central Committee's official daily, Trybuna broadcasts. These positions are then followed, In presenting its coverage, RFE quoted the Ludu, conceded the "difficult problems of in each case, by an account of developments. following press sources: our economy and living conditions of work- subsequent to December 20, 1970, with em- The.New York Times. ers," but blamed the violence on "trouble- phasis on the concessions made in response Washington Post. makers" who sow rumors and misin- to revealed public opinion by the new lead- Christian Science Monitor. formation, incite to street demonstrations, ership. . Chicago Tribune. provoke violence . . . The subversive Radio RADIO FREE EUROPE AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS Goteborg Handelstidning. Free Europe abets this. It calls for excesses The brief but intense sensation occasioned Louisville Courier Journal, and pushes [people] to irresponsible and by the New York Times' publication of a Time. ' of wsweek. harmful aots,the costs which are tout series of ten articles, beginning on June 13, NeBerlin skeTidene (Denmark). paid for not the hirelings in Munich but 1971, based upon its own analysis of a multi- g? by all of us':t the whoof le society volume, .highly-classified history of the U.S. Washington Evening Star. The Western press generally credited'RFE role in Vietnam, presented RFE broadcasters Baltimore Sun. , repor London with a varigty of challenging and delicate Arbetet (Sweden), with Telegraph, and timeliness Bonnn Telegraph, for example; reported from situations. As a news dissemination agency, Arbeiter Zeltung. 17: - Bon With the outbr ak of RFE could not fail to be comprehensive, ac- Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munch). With the outbreak awory food rioting n curate, and rapid in its coverage without Stuttgarter Zeitung. fo Poland, again of the ore attention severe loss of credibility. Though an orga- La Croix. Without once again on Radio Free Europe nization sponsored by and financially largely Le Monde. Without the affected, few Poled have the beholden to the U.S. Government, RFE none- Figaro. immediately affected area would on, for nor known theless had to face a decision to embarrass The Times (London). until yesterday what was going and f icia was its sponsors further by intensifying the Die Presse (Vienna). only then s ag Radio broke the and the one spread of information the Government was Kurier. street news agency po r their silence on the attempting court action to suppress to vast . Boston Globe. street ecememsber r 18, north." audiences ruled by regimes hostile, to say Politiken. Oo Decy, Gomulka RFE broadcast himself quoted the least, to U.S. aims in Vietnam. Philadelphia Inquirer. best old speech by himsas the And, as a politically-oriented network of Chicago Stn Times. thee broadcasting stations, RFE had to consider Daily Telegraph (London). hest description of why the new disturbances had occrre-a speech delivered the temptation to propagandize the many Wall Street Journal. Polish Party leader r after ter the Poznan riots of aspects of this issue which seemed ready- Long Island Press, 19"F RFE said, years part: made for psychological exploitation-the rel- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. "Fourteen yay ago Gomulka condemned ative degree of freedom of the press in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung. the previous Party leadership for having been compared to the East, for example. Economist. afraid to toll the working people the truth uth RFE's decision was to refrain from prop- The Australian. He rejected the propaganda thesis that agandizing, largely to avoid editorial com- . Los Angeles Times. imperialists, agents, provocateurs, and eve- International Herald Tribune. Mies of People's Poland were responsible for mentary, and to act primarily as the dis- In In Suisse. the workers' revolt. The working class pro- seminator of news, providing its audiences La Su a Su s Nyheter. tested, it had resorted to strike because-as , with the broadest possible spectrum of pub- United Press International. Gomulka said-its cup had run over lashed materials from the most highly-re- Ur buns Press Two days later, Gomulka was replaced by spected Western news sources. RFE sought to New York PLudu. ost. Edward Gierek, and the new Party leader provide its listeners with the same array of Nall Mail London). and Polish media switched to language whih facts, opinions, and analyses available to Daily M Maail Merkur. was not really very different from RFE's, In Informed citizens in the West, thus enabling Combat. a broadcast on December 20, Gierek said: them to judge the many facets of the issues Co Louis Post Dispatch. "The recent events have recalled to us in for themselves. In a memorandum sent to the St. a painful way the basic truth that the Party Congressional Research Service, RFE sum- The The Gua Gusrdixnian: Kronenzeit. must always maintain close bonds with the marized its philosophy: collection of summaries prepared by RFE's Broadcast Analysis Unit in which each working class and the whole nation, that it "Implicitly, the case is a trenchant illustra- A cannot lose a common language with work- tion of one of the fundamental differences be- F ram containing references to nt- Annex e from each Gierek described the motives for work in- pervasive political control which character- g The full text of red, Is attach t the izes the- East European systems-that of a terTuptio and as "mostl honest," althoughndecrying ttl eir "exploitat on" by free versus a cntrolled press, a press which fthe ree versus a Department is also included in Annex. "enemies of socialism and a-social and crim- serves the broad interests of institutions and inal elements." Gierek promised that the principle in a democratic society or the more THE EXILE OF JOSEPH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY Politburo would concentrate on improving narrowly defined and controlled interests of In the tumultuous history of Eastern Eu- the situations of low-income families and party policy in a communist state. On this rope since the second World War, no succes- problems of working women, youth, and issue as well the lines of opinion were drawn sign of events so epitomizes this history of housing. Other media took the cue. Even the not by RFE, but by the station's accurate re- conflict and confrontation, of personal and Party organ Trybuna Ludu on December 22 flection of Western opinion." political tragedy, .and, more recently, of the blamed the crisis on "ill-conceived ooncep Generally, RFE did not reply directly to profound changes wrought by time, as does tions of economic policy." polemics aired by East European media. When the ordeal, the imprisonment, the asylum, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE and finally the release, of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty.In February of 1949 a Hungarian court had sentenced Mlndszenty to life imprisonmentfor alleged crimes against the state-an act bringing into sharp focus the conflict be-tween communism and the Catholic Church which for many years was waged with un- relenting bitterness, In October 1980, dur-ing the Hungarian uprising, Mindszenty was released from prison but was forced to seekrefuge in the American Legation in Budapest when Soviet military force. brought the re- game of Janos Kadar to power. There he re- malned, having vowed never to leave until vindicated of all charges, until September 28, 1971, when the Vatican announced an agree- meat with the Hungarian Government pro viding for Mindszenty's permanent exile abroad.On September 10, 1971, RFE's Rome Bureau advised Munich that an "authoritative in- formant" in the Vatican had indicated thatthe Holy See and the Hungarian Govern- ment were very close to an agreement pro- viding for the safe conduct and permanent exile from Hungary of Cardinal Mindszenty. RFE-Munich notified Free Europe, Inc. of this development, adding that RFE planned no usage of the news tip until it could be verified.When, on September 28, Mindszenty'a ar- rival in Rome was announced by the Vatican,Munich and New York exchanged cables to the effect that broadcast coverage would initially confine itself to information obtain ed from statements made by the Vatican andthe U.S. State Department. All Broadcast De- partments reported the news, and followed up with background stories based upon RFE research. The Hungarian broadcast based its report on information published in Osserva- tore Romano, noting that Mindszenty's situation" would not be changed, and that the contents of the re- "agreement" between the Vatican and the Hungarian regime were not known.. It also noted that MTI (the Hungarian newsagency) had reported the event. The Polish Broadcasting Department reported the dardi- Vatican welcome, factually outlined his careor, and noted his refusal to accept "amnesty" from the Hungarian government. September 29th was by far the biggest broadcast day. On that date the results of the morning policy meeting in Munich were cabled to New York as follows: [regarding Hungary] arrival in Rome is the main story of the day. In addition to materials DS, an EERA [East European Research and Analysis] paper will be telexed to you today. The Hungarian BD in a commen- tary tonight will welcome the arrangement which was worked. out and express the hope more progress will, now be made in church-state relations. The BD Will criticize regime for not annulling Mindazenty's trial and sentence, and express appreciation for Mindazenty's decision to accept the sacri- flee of leaving his native land. Other coverage by the Hungarian and other BD's will be es- eentlaliy reportorial and descriptive. 'UPI has just reported, quoting the Hun- garian Official Gazette, that the 'Hungarian Presidential Council has decided to am- nesty (Kegyelem in Hungarian) Cardinal Mlndszenty considering his age and bad of health.' According to information wewe received earlier the Cardinal and the Vat- lean were hoping that the regime would not take this step which signifies a restate- ment of Mindszenlty's original 'guilt.' We believe the Cardinal will reject this 'am- nesty."' The Broadcast Departments-particularly the Hungarian BD-discussed in detail the ramiflcations of the event, using material supplied from RFE'g .research and analysis elements and following the lines of.daily , program recommendations and discussions In morning policy meetings which were, as usual, teletyped to New York. Materials sup- porting script writing wore also supplied by RFE's Rome Bureau, the New York news- room and press coverage from other areas wired in by RFE's European bureau's or re- ported by press agencies, On the 29th, the Hungarian BD covered the subject in seven broadcasts. The Bulgarians, Polish, and Ru- manian BD's each aired two broadcasts on this subject, while the Czechoslovak cover- age was spread over three. Copies of key communications between RFE in Munich, Rome, and New York, lists of principal programs, and applicable Daily Broadcast Analyses of programs actually aired are included in Annex V. Also included in the Annex are two scripts-Newsreel No. 292 and Commentary No. 238-broadcast on September 29, 1971 by the Hungarian Broad- cast Department, As can be seen from the Daily Broadcast Analyses, the BD's went into exhaustive de- tail on the many facets of the event, from background on the Cardinal, descriptions of his trip to Rome, and background on the Esztergom Archdiocese, to general reviews of .Vatican-Hungarian Government relations and the problems remaining between the two. Coverage of the case continued on Sep- tember 30 with a Hungarian Broadcasting Department description of Mindszenty cele- brating Mass in Rome and the opening of the Third Synod; and the Bulgarian, Polish, and Rumanian BD's concentrating on reviews and American press. On Oc- of the European tober 1, almost all coverage was based on press reviews.. On October 2, there were fur- they re-tellings of the story and more press reviews. By October 4, the possibility of the Cardi- nays moving to live in Vienna had arisen in the press, , and was reported by RFE- but in the form of quotes from the world press, , always giving clear attribution of the source. After October 6, coverage of the Minds- zenty story dwindled to an occasional press- review item. More recently, in the absence of new developments, , coverage has virtually, ceased. CONCLUSIONS Both the intensive examination of RFE programming during the two-week period of the field study in Munich' and the retro- spective study of RFE scripts over longer periods of time and in connection with ma- jor or historical events bear out a general ob- servation that RFE coverage is thorough, ob- jective, , and reasonably dispassionate in its coverage of even highly controversial sub- jects. as a programming de- vice, and the selectivity of press sources is well balanced. . Although partisan biases are hard to detect in RFE programming, it is the author's 's view that, by and large, RFE com- mentaries tend to lean slightly toward the "liberal" approach as this term is currently used in American policies. The use of the terms "dispassionate" and "balanced" should not, however, be inter- preted programming. On the contrary, RFE scripts is simply that commentary is aimed at the specifics of East European political systems and practices, not necessarily at the philos- ophy . Communism as a socio-economic sys- tem is, of course, the subject of frequent and even biting it is the practice, the implementation, of stated Communist ideals that usually re- ceives the fire-not the ideals themselves. Nor is the criticism purely negative. Valid achievements are given due credit, and al- ternative approaches to stagnated courses of action are supplied in abundance. The amount of research underlying script preparation deserves special mention.- Con- S 3369 temporary life in East Europe is evaluated against an overwhelming amount of hard, evaluated data in RFE' research files which are well-maintained and constantly expand- ing. The personal convictions of individual script-writers or announcers loom rather small unless they can be validated by RFE's substantial and scholarly expertise in East European affairs. It is likely that this factor, 'even more than careful management proce- dures, contributes the most toward RFE's stature of scholarship and objectivity, and serves as the greatest hindrance to free- wheeling editorfalism. FOOTNOTES 1 West European Advisory Committee, Twelfth Session, Rome, November 18-19, 1968. Annex to the Political Report, Section 1, p. 4. The subsequent paragraphs are based upon this document, which is included in its en- tirety in Annex S. 7 The needling was, however, tempered with caution lest the regime be prodded into untenable positions, RFE's Daily Guidance Summary for July 11, 1968 stated: "The Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department will see its role not In increasing such pressures but rather in providing all the relevant facts and information upon which the Czecho- slovak citizen will be best able to form an intelligent judgment of the situation." Broadcasts to the other four countries would stress the statements by Czechoslovak leaders "which attest to continuing Czecho- slovak adherence to the. Warsaw Pact and to principles of 'socialism' as adapted to unique Czechoslovak traditions and conditions." 8 Durkee, op. cit., Annex IX, p. 1. This An- nex to Mr. Durkee's submission to the Sen- ate Foreign Relations Committee is a lengthy and extremely detailed chronology and analy- sis of the events leading up to and following the overthrow of Gomulka and his replace-, merit by Edward Gierek. The following para- graphs are based upon this RFE analysis. 4 Durkee, -op. cit., addendum to Annex VII; p.1. 8 The full text of Fourteen Polish Points is included in Annex T. CHAPTER VI:. THE IMPACT OF RADIO FREE EUROPE Analysis- of the extensive facilities and policy machinery utilized by RFE to formu- late and implement its programs, and of the content of RFE's daily broadcasts, leads to a logical question. How effective are RFE's attempts to achieve its stated goal of dis- seminating objective information and "bal- anced commentary" to five East European countries for the purpose of encouraging positive evolution within the framework of the Communist system? RFE broadcasts reach two overlapping but distinct audiences. These are comprised of government and Communist Party officials of five East European countries on the one hand, and -five corresponding general popu- lations on the other. RFE's total impact is the product of the reaction it arouses in both 'of these audiences and how that reaction affects U.S. foreign policy interests. To break the measurement of RFE's impact upon these two audiences into researchable components, it is hypothesized that RFE's impact can be measured in three ways: (1) by direct audience interview -techniques adapted to RFE's special circumstances; (2) indirectly by assessing the nature and inten- sity of Communist regime attacks upon RFE-in terms of propaganda, diplomatic atcion, and technical measures to inhibit listenership-and; (3) indirectly by obser- vation of any policy changes which may be made by East European governments in re- sponse to RFE broadcasts. Research under the first category attempts to provide information as to the size and composition of RFE listenership and whether RFE broadcasts are credible and persuasive on political and economic matters, and Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3370 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 19'72 whether they are entertaining and informa- The third general function of the depart- tive in the presentation of news and the ment Is public opinion research which fur- other educational? social, and cultural sub- nlshes a picture of changes in social and jects in the RFE repertory. political conditions in the countries with Research under the latter two, categories which Radio Free Europe Is concerned _.. . attempts to measure whether and how RFE public opinion research . provides the stimulates the Communist regimes-in terms Broadcasting Departments with information either of direct hostile response or of even regarding the climate in which RIVE programs grudging approval as illustrated by the adop- are received. Beyond this, published reports tion of limited measures of "reform. Observa-. In this research area are, whenever appro- tion of public pressures toward reform in prlate, made available to scholars in the field these countries is also one indirect and cir- of East European studies and empirical social cuhistantial measure of whether people have research. not only been persuaded; but have been The fourth major function is psychological moved to action-presumably as a result, in research which offers insight into such areas at least some instances, of their having been as motivation patterns, value systems, goals supplied with sufficient information to en and needs of the audience and the potential able them to assess the situation and take audience, conflicts between traditional values appropriate action. and "communist values," adjustments to and In the remainder of this chapter an analy- rejection of the socio-political system, sis will be made of each of these three ap- etc.... proaches to estimating the not impact of The fifth general function lies in improve- RFE activities. Examination of the latter _ment of the measuring devices and research two is based upon East European broadcasts techniques themselves in order that the other and publications and a variety of, Western four functions may be increasingly more ac- press sources as compiled by RFE research curately and reliably performed for the good staff from their extensive research and monl- of the organization as a whole ... taring files.. Based upon rather extensive Mr. Hart's APOR Department has de- spot-checking of these files in Munich, it veloped its own methodology for assessing appears to the author that RFE's compila- East European public opinion by interview- tions are representative as well as compre- lug East European nationals-some 6500 In hensive. in any case, constraints of time and an average year-who are traveling in West- resources precluded any effort to conduct ern Europe. These interviews are conducted a parallel independent examination of the by independent research organizations under, original sources, contract to Radio Free Europe, and the` RFE's direct interview-survey methods Of respondents are said to be unaware of the audience research were, however, subjected RFE sponsorship of the interviews. RFE to independent evaluation and study by a describes the nature of its methodology as special attitude and opinion -research and in follows: 12 inter-cultural communication retained for 1. Each survey employs a number of local. this purpose by the Congressional Research opinion-research institutes in different Service. This evaluation was conducted in countries to draw independent samples. This Europe by Dr. Lorand B. Szalay, a Senior minimizes chances of opinion bias due to Research Scientist with the American In. location of interviews and interviewing tech- stitutes for Research office in Kensington, niques. No survey is published until at least Maryland. The full text of Dr. Szalay's re- six independent samples have been taken. port, together with a description of his pro- Generally,,a survey of any nationality takes fesslonal credentials, is ? contained in An- in more than 1,000 interviewees, and Is hex A. judged reliable only if all the results obtained AUDIENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH from all the samples correlate highly . , . AT RFE Radio Free Europe claims to have acquired an audience of some 31 million persons in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania-about half of the population over the age of fourteen. The majority of these listeners reportedly tune in on RFE. two or three times a week. Young people are said to be becoming a large part of the audi- ence and to comprise a youthful listenership about twice the size of that of the Voice of America or the :BBC. These and other claims made by Radio Free Europe are based upon the findings of RFE's own Audience and Public Opinion Research Department in Munich. Its Direc- tor, Mr. Henry O. Hart, describes the five gen- eral functions of. his Department, as follows: To ensure Radio Free Europe's achieving maximum effectiveness requires as a first step that Audience and Public Opinion Research acquaint all echelons of the, organization at all times with the present status of per- formance. This is the all-important audit function ... rendered so crucial because no other reliable means exist to measure per- formance. Since this audit function also points to areas of strength ... as Weil as weakness, it serves as a take-off point for helping Radio Free Europe toward ever better performance. This leads to the second and even more im- portant function ... which is to study and measure ways to Increase Radio Free Europe's effectiveness. It is evident that the audit function and the dynamic guidance function are interrelated. At present much more time is devoted to the latter function, as it closely. 2. RFE employs a procedure . specially adapted to the nature of the sample: Called Continual and Comparative Sampling, it derives from the principle of repeated in- dependent samples used in, for example, the biological sciences; it is designed to guard against untypical samples which can occur because different types of people may choose different Western countries to which to travel. Accordingly, many independent samples are drawn from among travelers in a wide variety of countries, at a wide variety of times .. , 3. Samples consist wholly or almost wholly of East European nationals visiting the West and planning to return to their native coun- tries, rather than refugees or immigrants who have made a psychological break with the thinking of their compatriots. 4. To make sample results representative of the population at large, disproportions were corrected ex post facto by increasing the weight of opinions of underrepresented groups, and decreasing those of the over- represented. Asked by Radio Free Europe to evaluate its research methodology, the New York firm of Oliver Quayle and Company sub- mitted a report in October 1970, expressing the view that RFE's conduct and use of opin- ion research was fundamentally sound, and accurate within a five to six point error mar- gin? RFE audience research reports list Radio Free Europe as outstripping by far all other Western broadcast operations In the Ave East European nations studied. The over- whelming majority of the respondents rate parallels the needs of the. Broadcasting De- RFE as either very or fairly reliable. Survey partments, - reports consistently show that nearly all lie- teners tune in to news and commentaries. Young people reportedly listen in great num- bers to "beat" music and jazz; older persons to "standards," folk music, and operetta. Magazine formats--offering a mixture of on- the-spot reports, brief documentaries, and some analysis-are said to be popular with all groups. Thus RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research findings depict the organization as one which attracts and holds a large and in- fluential audience in one of the world's key areas; an organization whose activities are highly valued by this audience, and one which serves to hold open a window to the world through which pours information and entertainment not available from any other source. The basic question which arises Is how valid are the data upon which RFE bases these findings? In Munich, as an inte- gral part of the Congressional Research Serv- ice field study, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay con- ducted a detailed analysis of APOR pro- cedures. Highlights and major findings are summarized in the'following paragraphs: Approach and Relevance RFE's audience research has developed in response to conditions and situational char- acteristics which are exceptional in broad- casting. In the first place, the tight control of communications media maintained by East European Communist regimes precludes most of the common means of feedback such as a free press, free elections, and free research. Secondly, most East Europeans do feel poorly informed, Thus, they form large and receptive audiences for international communication. Finally, East Europeans may neither be fully identified with the ideologi- cal blueprints of the governments concerned, nor can they be considered to have remained entirely uninfluenced by the experiences of the last three decades. They may have as- pirations similar in many ways to those of Western peoples; but they cannot be simply equated. Audience a'alysis at RFE in its present form produces extensive and timely informa- tion by interviewing several thousand East Europeans each year. The survey data con- tain three major categories of information; Listenership data. nronram evaluation, and attitude studies. This research performs an important pioneering service as the scope of the indigenous audience and public opin- ion research in RFD's five Eastern European countries is modest and the publication of results is selective. In the social and political fields, the validity of data issued by the government is frequently questionable. RFE's basic approach Is to attempt to derive solid, objective information from large audience samples, which represent wide cross-sections of the populations. This is a large-scale effort to apply modern opinion survey methods in real life situations. it requires a careful adjustment of technical- scientific criteria to the special social, politi- cal, and psychological conditions which ob- tain in Eastern Europe. This explains why the relevance of the RFE research is substantive not only in con- nection with the immediate use of the data in program planning and evaluation, but also In the broader context of introducing and applying social science research to this area. RFE; research traces and evaluates so- cial and political trends in. five Communist- controlled Eastern. European countries in which objective public opinion research ef- forts are seriously hampered by political conditions.4 Representatives of RFE samples RFE interviews nearly 7,000 East European nationals traveling in Western Europe each year. Each national sample (excepting Bul- garia) includes over 1,000 cases. The inter- views are conducted by independent public opinion, research organizations in various Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE-S 33371 EastlargeEoeall ed 200 - stream ofroregime atttacks in all information titularly Radio Free Europe, perform the vital exorcisin g mess i i estimate to exce b t Popu ravel ,nn mers 000 annually) as tourists, visitors, business- media. In 1968, for example, well over 1,000 rroleof a influence es c O both on the such instances were noted. E' ^ y e ,... .. and even on the communist rulers. Not men, or sportsmen. ia7..~nn1 and mnT.Pmical - d the m seas have no RF their own lea Idit in detall ncaes, As Annex A ers, of large samples, numerous independent sub- That the regimes attack Ixrr, is entirely, choice but to rely on information provided samples, and its attempts to reach visitors to be expected in view of the importance from abroad . . randomly to reduce the biases of selectivity Communist regimes attach to the control and [from Trybuna Ludu (Polish Communist are all sound measures which help to over- censorship of information media. The Chang- Party daily, April 18. 19681: come the odds against success in a complex ing nature of such attacks in recent years ?The complaints that Radio Free Europe, research task. Although RFE's optimism and is however, probably of greater significance the anti-communist broadcasting station confidence in the representativeness of the than the quantity or frequency of such based in Munich, gave better coverage of the samples may not be readily proven merely attacks. Since about 1965, RFE's influence [Polish student riots] events than did the by the adapted design or research method, has become increasingly the subject of sort- polish mass media are justified and although some of RFE's statistical as- ous, dispassionate, and even scholarly anal- Polish mass media are Lof Truth" h (Polish Lesson ess weekly) Truth" sumptions may be questioned, the results of ysis by regime ideologists and propagandists. in [Jacek Snopkiewlez: "The the field study in Munich indicated a eon- According to the Communist publications April Walka 19681 siderable body of empirical evidence in the and monitored broadcasts in RFE files, these ers which took place in results of APOR research suggesting that Communist analysts have acknowledged that .M"Mhaybbe the Wroclaw, disorders h, h too and Po in such confidence is not unfounded. The CRS in the contest of ideas, the Communist re- would have taken a different course if research findings also show that the samples gimes are on the defensive. They realize fully nan the full information about the causes be- include not only people from all walks of the ideological risks of "peaceful coexistence" hind the student riots at Warsaw University life but also from a broad and varied spec- and evidence a new respect for the power of had reached these communities on time. tram of political opinions, mass communication. The information was not sufficient. The first Scope and Utilization of Information Ob- Since the Czechoslovak developments of, article on the subject appeared in the pro- The 1968, the Soviet media have paid unprece- artiielc t only th 13th of March. The The use of audience analysis data within dented attention to the susceptibility of East vincial rt vrgume pn presonly on these 13th was too The of we Radio Free Europe is institutionally orga- European audiences to RFE broadcasts. RFE to stand up to the propagandist srguments nized. The various Broadcasting Departments . analysts interpret this intensified concern as to the so-called e 'emissaries,, ropan and to nts show a general and fairly uniform apprecia- indicating recognition by Soviet leadership of th broadcasts of Radio Free Europe." tion of the value of the listenership data. that East European peoples are far more The hn oft of RFree "cross-reporting" The program evaluation results are received attuned historically to Western ways of activities The is ctu fated 's the folrepor two occasionally with mixed feelings. This can be thinking and more susceptible to Western ions: by -g explained by the fact that when the evalua- ideas than Soviet citizens are. excerpts rptsafr Ni from Polish "Current publications: in anti- tion indicates a decline in program popu- In years past the major. thrust of Cam- [Zdisl PCur "Current aIdaigi- Su nist st on Political Sprawy ry and ny Ideal owe larity, the feedback, while useful and neces- munist attacks against RFE was to denigrate C ommunist sary, is not flattering. The atttiude data and RIVE as a "remnant of the cold war" and an December 1968 issue]: special studies information is of more recent obstacle to "detente." More recently, the (Warsaw), Dorigin and up to now has been used on a trend has been to portray RFE as an instru- "The application in practice of the new more sporadic basis. It probably deserves ment of dangerous Western concepts of propaganda strategy, consisting of a projec- more special attention. "peaceful coexistence." RFE is regard as the tion of the existing situation on one country new "revision- to another country. While, until recently, al- R11115. Auarence anu ,.-uN?r.. ...r.?.-- - - - . In short, says tiaras own auurynra r-=-.8 -- ----- I -- search findings are not always easy to accept situation, "the regime's grievance about RFE . models, at present the political concepts of at full face value. The reaction of the been All one is that today it reflects important sentiment one socialist state are opposed and given Department has, extremes in old ton over- within the country for reform, that its anal- as an example to those of another socialist going to seine' extremes in order a over- yses are based on the realities of contempo- Zycie Partii, No. 1, 19661: come quest credibility gap. The nexr-end- rary Communist society, and that RFE's [From an article in the Polish publication, ing r me for full ngs, wa hile etio sci ci of APOR cross-reporting is an effective technique for Zycie Partii, No. 1, 1966] : dental of ifiaally spreading the "infection" of reform ideas in [RFE suggests that] in the other socialist pepatnt hadingn some scientifically praiseworthy , RIPE has resulted which sald accrued East ELimps." countries the changes are "more important, benefits erta n sampling techniques q es RFE's analysis is based upon the compile- bolder, more independent' ... [It] insinu- wfor of certain saeed techniques Lion of a considerable amount of material ates to listeners that their own party and to ification mod se allow for much quicker fedback of re- published in Communist countries. Some ex- government have fallen behind." search results into dogdmplanning. are De con- - amplesfollows: ? One manifestation of Communist regime tails of this suggested modification [From proceedings of the Cultural Com- reaction to the situation described in the tamed in Annex A. mittee of the Czechoslovak National Assem- preceding quotations has been to wage prop- Free has can be stated that Radio bly, 2, 1968]: Free Europe has invested a great deal of re- ' agenda, and limited diplomatic campaigns "People in the area [West Bohemia] rely designed to effect the eventual disbandment senuhy o planning and too supervising its re- almost exclusively on Radio Free Europe of both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. watch to test It undertook extensive research and West German Television programs for Another manifestation has been the swal- ork is and the repres rotedre ures. It of is the felt information about what is happening in lowing of some pride and the re-ordering of samples and to validate procedures. a and Czechoslovakia, They pick up a -lot of half- some media programming to make it more shat the htrategy of using tourist o visitor truths but also a lot of truth which they competitive with RFE. In Hungary, for ex- samples generalenerally has proven dependable. itself to be sound and should get from our own mass media." ample, "beat" musical programs broadcast by g [Stanislow Mialkowskt (Polish party com- RFE became so popular that Radio Budapest The answer to the question of how valid mittee instructor) in Gazeta Bialostocka for has begun similar programming. In Budapest the RFE Audience and Public Opinion August 31, 19681: slovakla, an RFE program aimed at youthful Research findings he considered is, there- "Our party organizations, particularly in audiences now has its counterpart on Radio fore, that they may be considered as valid villages, still feel there is not enough infor- Prague. The following quotes illustrate a within a commonsense meaning of the term, mation. Hence, here and there, its members growing appreciation of their dilemma by Exact statistical projections may not be pre- are influenced by the hostile programs of Communist spokesmen: cisely their evaluated-although Quayle estimates 'Fred Europe.' We activists are not always able [from t spoke '(Hungarian Communist their accuracy to within a margin of five or to adopt the right attitude to some matters. theoretical monthly(, July rian] six percent-but exact percentages are far For instance we only learnt about the regu- "We have to consider that if we fail to less important than the general trends. It lation of wages and prices very late, while public adequately, the audience should be noted that, in addition to those people in the street talked about it several inform f the theile public a adequately, t e raddi ce who listen directly to RFE broadcasts, the days before." tions the will grow . .the work of radio and additional percentage of those who receive [from Prague's Rude Provo, January 21, television is disturbed in the highest degree RFE news indirectly by word of mouth is 1969] : by the frequent dogmatic reserve and timid- hard to estimate. The censorship of news "Lack of information has another unfavor- able consequence, The citizens, as under the ity of authorities (whose responsibility is to formation produce a favorable climate te for Novotny regime show increased interest in inform the public and to deal with questions spreading information by word of mouth. information from Western sources, such as of interest to the public) . If we fail to The importance of these private channels in Radio Free Europe or Voice of America. And talk about something, the enemy will do so, controlled societies has been emphasized by this is certainly not a good thing." and thus reticence will mean a political de- numerous accountsa [W. Bienkowski, former Polish Minister of feat. We consider the demand for better in- NATURE OF COMMUNIST REGIME ATTACKS ON Education in "The Driving and Retarding formation of party members and public as RFE Forces of Socialism," Kultura, Paris, 1969] : being merely bad, unjustified bourgeois curi- Another measure of RYE'S impact is to be "Communism's monopoly of information osity . , ." found in the reaction of Communist regimes makes for a situation, I'm ashamed to admit, [from a Slovak trade union delegate's Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S3372 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -- SENATE March 6, 1972 speech as reported by Radio Bratislava Do- mestic, November 30, 1968] : "[our press must] remain linked with the people, be truthful, open, and objective so our. people need ? not depend on foreign in- formation sources. [from Monitor, Polish Television Program, December 26, 19701: "And too often, as we all know, the adult and critical people of Poland were talked to as if they were kindergarten pupils being lec- tured to instead of informed ... information certainly is needed--we're all convinced of that-especially when we face a difficult sit- uation. When inforniation is lacking or de- layed too long, the people get it from other sources and, what is worse, lose confidence in their own media ... RFE's 'summary of the pattern of recent regime propaganda attacks on its activities during the period July-September 1071, to- gether with a compendium of Western press commentary is attached at Annex W. Diplomatic Although there is scant information avail- able as to the extent to which Communist regimes have made formal diplomatic repre- sentations in protest of RFE activities; a few aspects of such diplomatic activity have come to light. On May 26, 1971, for example, the Polish Government delivered written protests to the German Federal Republic and the United States of America. A PPA (Polish Press Agency) dispatch of May 29 stated: "The Government of the Polish Peoples Republic has addressed an aide-memoire to the Government of the U.S., expressing the conviction to liquidate sources of irritation in Polish-American relations, will put an end to the Cold War activity of RFE, which is directed against Poland. "On May 26 this document was handed to the Ambassador of the U.S. to Poland, Walter Stoessel, by Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jozef Winiewicz. "At the same time the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski, has sent a letter on the same matter to the Min- ister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG, Dr. Wal "The Polish side has been informed of our has been employed from time to time against opinion on this question for a long time ... RFE in varying degrees. At the present time The authority of the Federal Republic of the situation is as follows: Germany over radio stations located on Its Bulgaria: Both domestic and foreign trans- territory is limited constitutionally . . : This mittens are used to jam western broadcasts. applies to German radio stations as well as Czechoslovakia: All RFE programs are to Radio Free Europe. This station as well jammed by domestic and foreign transmit- is protected by the right to freedom of opin- ters. ion. We have, however, declared ourselves Hungary: No domestic jamming since 1964. willing to accept justified complaints about Some weak interference comes from a Soviet programs from Radio Free Europe and to jammer believed located in a Hungarian- discuss these with the authorities at the speaking area of the USSR. Munich Station .8 Poland: In March 1971 Poland resumed On Jun 4, 1971, PAP reported that at Polish jamming of RFE Polish programs. They had Foreign Minister Jedrychowski's press con- stopped in 1956 and had started again briefly ference in Helsinki, he had answered a Ger- during the 1970 unrest. Also jammed from man correspondent's question about RFE's the USSR. status in Germany as follow: Rumania: No jamming since 1963. 'The activity of RFE does not belong to In view of the existence of jamming, one the internal affairs of the FRO because the might wonder whether the scope of effort station interferes in the internal affairs of put into RFE research and programming is Poland and other socialist countries for at justified, if broadcasts can be denied an least 18 hours a day. That is why it is an audience because of jamming. The answer from being a sure i f international problem and is also of interest.' for us. Besides, it is commonly known that Free Europe Radio is a spying agency of the U.S. Intelligence service. This Is a problem which can properly be the subject of an ex- change. of views between us and the FRO Government. "I would like to add that we have also made a demarche on this subject to the U.S. Government and the governments of states in which there are offices of the FE Radio. We consider that ]RFE's] usurpation of the right to supplement our point of view. If the Americans say that the Polish so- ciety is not sufficiently informed on politi- cal matters, we are ready to suggest a public competition; selecting on the basis of static- - tics (i.e., representative sampling) several score citizens in each country to compete as to who is better informed on problems of world and Internal politics." RFE reports that in 1908 the Rumanian Ambassador in Bonn lodged a formal protest that RFE was "interfering in internal Ru- manian affairs In a most massive and crude way." There is nothing in the public record indicating an official German reply, and RFE internal memoranda indicate that the ter Scheel. The letter emphasizes the respon- sibility of the FRG Government for permit- lack of specificity of the Rumanian com- ting the American station to carry out hos- plaints resulted in the German Government's tile activity, inter alia against Poland, from failing to pay serious attention to them. the territory of the FRG, and expressed the There is nothing in the public record to hope that the FRO Government will avail it- indicate whether Poland or any other Com- f - --.4-, state munist government has presented official .- _-._- :.._ s o th it -- - t -- --- o and will put an end e --- foreign radio station which disturbs the other governments where RFE maintains the intended destination by controlling the process of normalization of relations between news bureaus or audience and public- opin- angle at which signals are beamed and by the two countries." ion research activities, taking advantage of the varying permeability According to the U.S. Department of State,- The implication of what is known about and altitude of the ionosphere. The short no reply to this aide-memoire was expected Communist diplomatic representations wave jammer has precisely the same propaga- and none given. Comments were passed in- about RFE is that since most Western gov- tion problems, but his differing purpose in- formally to Polish officials to the effect that, ernments have been accustomed to the "no- troduces severe complications. In the case of since every major nation engages in inter- tion of objective Information," -Communist short wave jamining, the jammer can count national broadcasting, it, is not, surprising objections have been largely ignored. The on the effectiveness of his ground wave that almost any program broadcast will of- regimes have not offered objective substan- signal for only a few miles, and must beam fend someone, somewhere.' ttation-other than in terms of their own the jamming signal so as to be reflected into Germany's formal reply, if any, has not ideclogical preoccupation with controlling the intended area by the ionosphere. been made public. On June 9, 1971, however, sources of public information-to accusa- Since the RFE transmitters are much fur- a statement was issued in response to .a tions against RFE. ther west than jamming transmitters in East parliamentary interpellation from Werner No further evaluation is made here of the Europe and the USSR, RFE can take advan- Marx, Chairman of the. Foreign Policy Work- significance of such diplomatic activity since tage of a period of several hours each day the present purpose is merely to indicate in which there is still sunlight in the west ring Committee Marx the Christian Demo- audience impact rather than to assess effects but darkness in the east to beam its pro- Marx asked whether her the Ger- upon diplomatic relations or U.S. foreign grams into East Europe. Potential jammers cratic Union man lea to'the t had "made unmistak- it cannot usefully employ sky wave jamming regards the demand by the he Polish Foreign ably clear the Polish Polish that at n Policy- Jamming during this period, and must rely on local Minister to proceed against Radio Free Jamming is another technique sometimes ground wave jammers which are effective only Europe as an inadmissable interference in our used by the USSR and the Communist re- within a relatively short radius around the affairs and as a net helpful contribution to- gimes in East Europe to hinder the receptiv- jamming station. ward German-Polish understanding, and that ity of RFE broadcasts. In a unique way, jam- In the case of the very high frequencies, it continues to be interested in letting the ming by the regimes is a compliment to for example, the waves tend to tilt forward mentioned station broadcast news and com- RFE's effectiveness. It is an admission that and disappear into the earth within a radius mentaries for the peoples of Eastern Europe the regimes feel an inability to compete on of less than ten miles. Since ground wave freely and without interference?" Karl logical or ideological grounds with foreign jammers are located in the cities for optimum Moersch, State Secretary, Ministry of For- broadcasts. It is also a signal to the audience, utilization, jamming can often be avoided eign Affairs, replied that a reply would be that there is something on the air which by a determined listener simply by taking his given the Poles -in due course. He added the government does not want them to hear- portable radio - outside the city, beyond the that- _ an added incentive for listening. Jamming range of the ground wave jammers. ar s is that jamming way to keep RFE programs from being heard by an audience-even quite a large audience. The explanation lies in the nature of short- wave propagation. Jamming is the propagation of a competing radio signal on the same frequency as the signal being jammed. The jamming signal can be merely another "normal" radio pro- gram or it can be pure noise. The intent of the jammer is to drown out all other signals on that frequency. The characteristic be- havior of different wave-lengths of radio signals is a determinant of both jamming 'techniques and appropriate counter-meas- ures. Medium wave signals-the standard AM broadcast band-tend to follow the curvature of the earth. Such signals constitute what - is known as a "ground wave." Short wave signals tend to- travel in a straight line, moving out into space after a relatively short ground wave. These "sky wave" signals are then reflected back to earth by the iono- sphere--a layer of ionized particles ranging from 60 to 300 miles above the earth's sur- face. Exactly where these signals return to earth is a function of the angle of incidence at which they hit the ionosphere and the permeability of - the ionosphere. The sun's rays insensify the density of the ionized particles, and the layer is therefore an ef- ficient reflector during daylight hours and an Inefficient one at night. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 1Wamlz 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 3373 Transmitters of sufficiently high power are effective against all but short range ground wave jammers. Another effective counter- jamming technique is to broadcast on many frequencies simultaneously, thus multiply- ing both the technical and the financial' problems of the jammer. And, at least one RFE channel is always left unjammed by the regimes in order to permit their own monitoring of RFE broadcasts. The astute listener is aware of this and, he can usually scan the frequencies quickly and find the clear channel. The result is that jamming is never fully effective. It merely makes listening more dif- ficult for some people some of the time. And the expense to the jammer is considerable. The RFE Engineering Department recently estimated, on the basis of known technical data, that to jam RFE's. Czechoslovak broad- casting, Czechoslovakia jammers alone ex- pend some 182,000,000 kilowatt hours of power annually, compared to only 12,471,900 kilowatt hours needed to beam RFE pro- grams Into Czechoslovakia. This calculation did not take into account the approximately 1yz times as many jamming stations in- side the USSR and elsewhere which also are used to jam RFE programming to Czecho- slovakia (sky wave jammers must be located as far away from the target areas as the original broadcaster's transmitters in, order to bounce the jamming signal, Into the in- tended destination), Total jamming costs for RFE's Czechoslovak broadcasts alone are roughly estimated at $6,000,000 annually. Yet, the evidence from Audience and Public Opinion Research and from letters from listeners to RFE is that RFE broadcasts con- tinue to be heard by large audiences in spite of jamming. When the shortages of electric power in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere in East Europe are taken into account, It can be seen that the governments concerned do not hesitate to deprive their own economies of much-needed, power in order to divert it to the totally destructive, but not fully effec- tive, purpose of jamming foreign broadcasts. This is an impressive indicator of how im- portant these governments consider it politi-, cally to deny their people access to RFE broadcasts. It also suggests something of what their attitude might be toward govern. ments which sponsor such broadcasts. Policy Changes by Communist Regivies A third method of assessment of RFE'q Impact is to see what policy changes, if any, may be made by the government of an au- dience country following an extended pe- riod of RFE broadcasts which advocate cer- tain courses of action based upon the anal- ysis of social, political, and economic cir- cumstances. The accuhnniaffon of scripts and of re- search data based upon the analysis of Com- inunist media at RFE contains rich infor- mation upon which to base many case stud- ies of this nature. However, time factors precluded the possibility of independent an- alysis of this voluminous material. But, as a case in point, Radio Free Europe's re- search and analysis staff has prepared a complete and fully documented study of one of the most recent and most Important examples of regime policy elhan4es Which followed an RFE broadcasting campaign. Poland-a case in point The Ri'E study in question deals with the events which led up;to and followed the up- heavals in Poland wi}ich began in Decem- ber 1970, and resulted in the replacement of Gomulka by Edward Gierek As leader of the Polish United Workers' Party and thus of the regime. In this study, RFE analysts examine the issued which produced tensions leading toward change in Gomulka's Poland, and described the various concessions sub- sequently made by the Gierek regime in or der to avoid further explosions and to re- viva economic life. The result of this anal- ysis is a list of fourteen major issues in- volved in Poland's internal tensions, RFE broadcasts, and concessions by the Giorek regime: 1, .Incomes Policy 2. Price Increases S. Housing 4, Problems of Women Workers G Animal Husbandry 6. The Polish Peasant 7. Economic Reform 8. Responsibility of the Leadership 9. Normalization of Church-State Re- lations 10. The Trade Council 11. "Dialogue" 12. The Media .13. Cultural Policy 14. National Sentiment: in Warsaw adopted reform measures desired by their publics' and supported by RFE. In other cases, they have not. Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated what reforms East European governments might or might not have adopted if RFD had not existed. Diplomatic protests have not received affirmative re- sponses by the U.S. or West German Govern- ments. FOOTNOTES I An undated memorandum submitted by Mr. Henry O. Hart, Director of RFE's Audi- ence and Public Opinion Research Depart- ment. 2 Durkee, op. cit., Annex XI, p. 3. 8 The Quayle report, contained as Annex XII to the Durkee statement previously cited, was extremely general in nature. 4It might be said parenthetically that the information gap in Eastern Europe is accen- Castle tuated by a similar but still wider lnforma- The RFD paper, Fourteen Polish Points, makes the following comments in the intro- duction: "From these sources-workers' demands and public agitation and discussion-and from the concessions made by the new lead- ership, the major issues of life in Poland today, as experienced and felt by the vast majority of the population, and as recog- nized by the leadership in the need for con- cessions, can be identified, The question then becomes: What had Radio Free Eu- rope to say on these issues before Polish popular feelings about them were so pub- licly and unequivocally revealed? That is to say, before the changes in Poland which began on December 1070?, The answer to these questions affords grounds for an ob- jective judgment of the extent to which RFE broadcasters to Poland reflected, or failed to reflect, the vital interests of their audience. "This inquiry seeks to provide those an- swers. The chapters which follow examine the principal issues which came to the fore within Poland during the December up- heaval and the six months that followed. The positions espoused by RFE on these various issues before December 20 are set out, by means of excerpts from RFE's Polish broadcasts. These positions are then fol- lowed, in each case, by an account of de- velopments subsequent to December 20, 1970, with emphasis on the concessions made by the new leadership to restore political sta- bility and economic productivity." The analysis which followed, based on sources in the public domain, demonstrates a high degree of correlation between RFE broadcasts and Polish public opinion as manifested in the verbalization of the issues within the Polish society as the events pro- gressed after December 1970. An equally posi- tive correlation is shown between RFE's position on these "fourteen points" as ex- pressed in broadcasts, and subsequent ac- tions taken by the Gierek regime. Although no precise cause-and-effect relationship be- tween these broadcasts and subsequent ac- tions can be proven by the more juxtaposi- tion of scripts and events, the circumstances certainly support a presumption that the broadcasts had a significant Impact. The full text of the RFE paper, Fourteen .Polish Points, has been included in Annex T. CONCLUSIONS The weight of the evidence is that RFE has a substantial and growing popular audience in five East European countries, and that considerable rapport has been established with this audience. RFE is ranuced high by the popular audience in terms of objectivity and credibility. It is fiercely resented by the regimes whose systems of censorship it pene- trates. The intensity of regime propaganda attacks on RFE strongly suggests that RFE broadcasts are a significant factor in the public information process in East Europe. In some cases, regimes have grudgingly tion gap-a nearly complete lack of solid so- cial science research data on the Soviet so- ciety,,on the Soviet citizen-his attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and world outlook. See Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, The Soviet Citi- zen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). See also the testimony of Dr. Edward T. Hall in U.S.. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy, Hearings Before the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 5, 19, and 20, 1969. pp. 19-20. ? Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, The So- viet Citizen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1901). ? Durkee, op. Pit., Annex XX, p. 7. According to monitoring records main- tained by RFE, the total number of hours devoted each day, to officially-acknowledged international broadcasting by Communist countries exceeds 900 hours daily. Projection of present trends in such broadcasting indi- cates that the total figure will surpass 1000 hours daily by the end of 1972. In addition, Communist countries (the USSR, East Euro- pean, and Asian countries) are known to op- erate at least 19 "illegal" or "clandestine" stations which broadcast internationally about 80 hours per day. The importance of such broadcasting to the Communist regimes is highlighted by a comparison of interna- tional broadcasting schedules of West Ger- many and Albania, West Germany, one of Europe's more affluent nations, broadcasts .611/2 hours daily to five continents. Albania, small and relatively poor country (which is held by many to be the European voice of Peking), broadcasts 741/2 hours daily to 4 continents, See Durkee, op. cit., Annex XIV). 8 Durkee, op. cit., p. 16, ? Interview with Perry W Esten, Director of Engineering, Radio Free Europe, In Munich, November 4, 1971. CHAPTER VII: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS It has been suggested- that the nature, scope, and effectiveness of RFD, activities is only one of the several factors leading to a decision regarding its future. It could be argued that even if RFE were extraordi- narily well-managed, efficient and accurate In its research, impeccable in its news re- porting and analysis, balanced in its com- mentaries, and well-received by its audience, the U.S. national intern t might yet require a change in control or the liquidation of the Radio. Such a requirement might be based upon an appraisal of RFE's net impact as one of embarrassment to U.S. foreign policy objectives, There are numerous political and other factors that enter into national policy to- ward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that are beyond the purvie* of this study. This study does not reach any conclusions as to what role, if any, RFE might play 'Within the broad context of foreign policy. This study does, however, address itself to two general observations about RFE. With regard to the observation that RFE seeks to Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3374 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March,6, 1972 "cold audiences erving tifily the have keep all hich thatrtermiwasiused in the toward he sUn t d bStatesile tiltng from tion n edspandlwhose audiespe ecreactionsific are sense inn w 1950'x, the results of this study indicate that the events of W.W. II and the fact that many not directly available to the radio station RFE does not now operate in this manner. East Europeans have relatives living in the operating from abroad. This uncommon re-ewed nshi press forlreformiwithin tthe prevailing Com- many in this and entesas tangible vievide ce dl ience presen s a situ tiosta n which is delicate munist system in East Europe and to avoid of American interest in East European peo- politically, complex and demanding from petty or personal attack or criticism for its pies. The rationale for. creating this inter- the angle of the communication task. This own sake. Examination of hundreds of action assumes that all governmental elites situation accounts for certain distinctive character scripts of RFE broadcasts reveals that, al- are transitory and, even inno authoritarian eral and istics foRadio Free Europ in en- thouyhthere are occasional violations, RFE regimes, po pinion; the people remain and public opinion research in particular. assign the cast and research staff supported by the broad- and the domestic public p cast and research staff and is effectively car- ceptions, images andsviews t are ofti constant various stages during the past until recently tied. out. The evaluation of RI~E's probable impact Importance. The evidence that RFE is an it reached its present scope and orientation. present form the Audience and Public upon progress toward better U.S. relations effective communicator of news and con- In its pro- with the Soviet Union and the Communist cepts to the East European people is per- Opinion Resave and ep rtm b (APOR) y nterviews, These d timely Information cconducted countries of Eastern Europe will be consid- suasive. duces ered in a separate report being prepared by Within this frame of reference, it would in large samples ointerviews ( are cation 1,000) cted the Congressional Research Service. There appear that the positive values resulting resenting Czech-Slovak, Hungarian, Perish, are, however,. some factors brought out In from RFE's rapport with mass audiences In and Rumanian audiences and alr on Polish, this study which beau in part upon the s ntwiitti~ he costs of East European govern- samples (N=800) of Bulgarian audiences. overall problem. The first of these is the fact that RFE mental hostility to foreign broadcasts in the The survey data contain generally three categories of information: Listenership broadcasts to two distinct but overlapping context of evolving, overall East-West majdata, or program evaluation, and attitude audiences. These are comprised of govern- affairs. ment and Communist Party officials of five There has been a general lack of public studies. East European countries on the one hand, knowledge and understanding. of RFE's pur- Comparable information is generally avail- and five corresponding general populations poses and the means by which it seeks to able to Western broadcasting from a variety on the other. achieve them. The public has,.however, and of different sources. However, the RFE au- The results of the examination of Radio unwittingly in most cases, been supporting dience research performs an important pio- Free Europe suggest that RIPE as an effective these activities financially since their incep- neering service as the scope of the audience mechanism for the widespread dissemina- tion. Had the public been kept regularly and and public opinion research in these five lion of political, economic, and cultural in accurately informed about RFE, it is doubt- Eastern European countries is modest and formation to the peoples of Eastern Europe. ful that many misconceptions about RFE's the publication of opinion results Is selective. There is considerable evidence that the peo- role deriving, among other things, from the In the social and political field, the validity pie of East Europe are thirsty for news, in- murky situation which surrounded the 1056 of the officially released data is frequently formation, and lively discussion, and that rebellion in Hungary, could have arisen. This questionable. great numbers of them listen to RFE broad- report is an effort to help illuminate the This explains why the relevance of the RFE casts. There is no doubt, however, that the situation and problem and to assist the Con- research is substantive not only In connec- dissemination of such Information, however gross in resolving the problems of future immediate use of these data program with planning the e Immediate and euse ofion but also objective, is viewed with. extreme hostility financing and control in a manner that will ti on by most of the East European governments best serve United States interests. in the bader context a luation b g and concerned. These governments generally in the oadel context research d this area. applying soci to share the views of the Chairman of the ANNEX A RFE research traces and evaluates social and Polish Government's Radio and TeleViSiOn AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC OPINION political trends in the five Comttnulst-eon- services: t RESEAttCII-RADIO FREE EUROPE trailed Eastern European countries an which conditionsefforts are one must not forget that the very (Review and Comments by Lorand B. Szalay) objective public opinion a research oration . practer . . ." of ideological strugole ptesuppooe- BACKGROUND seriously hampered by political " the notion of objective infer- Radio Free Europe's audience research has The resulting information gap on Eastern Europe is accentuated by a similar but still There is little evidence that many East developed as a direct response to conditions wider information gap-a nearly complete European governments will become more and situational characteristics which are lack of solid social science research data on friendly to the "notion of objective informa- fairly exceptional in broadcasting. Three of the Soviet society, on the Soviet citizen-his tion" in the near future. The evidence of these conditions appear to be especially attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and world out- deeds, however, lends some credence to the significant. look x thesis that none of the East European gov- a. The broadcasting is directed toward the Against this background RFE audience solid, objective crnments is likely to allow arguments about people of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, analysis attempts co background "propaganda" to Interfere with objectives Poland, and Rumania. These distant audi- information flarge audience sgenuinely sought by them. For instance, de- enter are not readily accessible because Of which represent information from ro wide roaudi etce samples, and the h e tspite the intense protests against RFE in the strong social and political controls that populations. Based wide cross-sections personally accumulated in ob Communist media and in diplomatic than- block, most of the common `means of feed- populations. may eels, the East European governments, after back: free reporting, public opinion of Surveys, and in Va fgeneral accumulated in Munich report short, the threats to do so, have not withdrawn their free political elections. The people and in Vienna, ie a. few keep general participation in the 1972 Olympic Games in Central and Eastern European countries live ual procedures, the ethnical and Munich. The Polish Government was not in- under political systems which maintain a bethues p oc details, designs, the the technical and situational hibited from negotiation of a normalization fairly close monopoly over all channels of limitations pfessional elaborated in separate ap- treaty with West Germany. Other negotia- mass and public communications Operated limitatioare tions on the questions of Berlin and abroga- on the basis of Communist ideology. TILE INTERVIEW tion of the Hitlerite Munich treaty, involving b. The people of these countries genet- present form audience analysis on- East Germany and Czechoslovakia, continue ally feel poorly informed; they express a In ducted its b resRent Audience and Public Opin- despite years of activity by RFE and by a deep interest an receiving information that ductIon ed Research Division is a most blic Opin- host of both overt and clandestine Commis- is timely and unbiased. Thus, there are large, undertaking. on Rrepresents a ost sigcale set nist operations targeted at West Germany. highly receptive audiences in Eastern Eu- It Thus the evidence suggests that although rope, and they are distinguished by certain search effort in to real life p oni sur re w 'the activities of REE probably have some characteristics which deserve interest. s n real ife adjustment situations, phi hie re- adverse effects upon the quality of govern- o. In respect to their frames of reference, quires scientific criteria to given of ocial, political, mint-to-government relationships between beliefs, and opinions, these audiences can- riteria conditions. After decades the United States, West Germany, the USSR, not simply be identified with the ideological psychological and the five East European governments blueprints of the governments or official lofsa e nearly complete information blackout of media. Nor can they be treated as of the valid, empirical survey data, at the present concerned, at least In the instances about experiences level of operation nearly 7,000 Eastern Euro- which have there is nstiir, knowledge these effects have ay fl the last three decades did not can nationals are interviewed every year. have not yet constituted significant obstacles have any influence. Although in many' as- Enational sample (with the exception of to meaningful negotiations and agreements. pirations the people of Eastern Europe a're Each ac includes over (w1,000 ith t cases. The In- popular interaction between RFE and its similar to people in the free neighboring Bulgaria) popular audience has been of a different countries, they cannot simply be equated. terviews are conducted in various large Eu- nature. Mail to RFE from its listeners and For example, they cannot be compared with ropean cities-Vienna, London, Paris-where other substantive evidence. indicates that Austria, on which public opinion survey Eastern Europeans travel as tourists, visitors, RFE broadcasts . have contributed substan- data : and free election results are .readily businessmen, or sportsmen. available, - The fieldwork of interviewing is contracted I See page 78; supra Thus, Radio Free Europe has as its major out by Radio Free Europe to independent na- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972'' - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 3375 tional public opinion and market research organizations, which employ interviewers who speak the respective languages. The rules and quotas, as well as the guidelines for the interviewers, are specified by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research De- partment, Radio Free Europe also provides the questionnaire used by the interviewers In the process of the interview. The use of in- dependent local organizations is an espe- cially sound decision on more than one ac- count. First, it makes the outcome of inter- views and the research results independent of RFE, which is especially desirable because the results tell a great deal about RFE, its popularity, its impact, and its effectiveness. Assigning this task to local public opinion research organizations is also important in that it makes It clear that the research In- volves open public opinion surveys of the typo widely used in all democratic, open societies and therefore has nothing to do with clandestine intelligence work--an ac- cusation frequently voiced by the Commu- locations and using more than one inter- viewing organization give ample opportuni- ties for internal control, for testing the in- ternal consistency of the results. The actual Interviewing procedure is do scribed in Appendix 1. This description elab- orates on a few technical questions such as the procedure for contacting visitors, their cooperativeness, the frequency with which interviews are refused, and other details which were considered important from the viewpoint of effectiveness of the method and the quality of the results. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLES The quality and information value of pub- lic opinion surveys are Inseparable from the question of how generalizable are the re- - sults and how representative are the samples interviewed. This question of generalizability and representativeness acquires special im- portance in a situation where the parent population-the audiences at home--cannot be directly surveyed and inferences must be based on subpopuiations such as the samples of travelers. As elaborated in Appendix 2 in more de- tail, RFE's use of large samples, numerous Independent subsamples, and its attempts to reach visitors randomly to reduce the biases of selectivity are all- sound measures which help to fight the odds of a complex research task. The designers of the survey work are un- questionably correct In asserting that de- velopments in Eastern Europe during the last decade have produced certain welcome changes, such as extensive travel to the West and reduced anxiety to expressing personal opinions. The Rl Audience and Public Opinion Research Department is prompt and effective in the use of these changes for better obtaining research of higher quality and. generalizable results. Although the op- timism and confidence in the representa- tiveness of the samples may not be readily proven merely by the adapted design or re- search method and some of the statistical assumptions may be questioned, a consider- able body of empirical evidence suggests that this confidence in the samples is not unfounded. The research findings show that the samples include not only people from all walks of life but also from a broad and varied. spectrum of political opinions (Ap. pendix 2). SCOPE AND UTILIZATION OF AUDIENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED The information obtained by the Audience, and Public Opinion Research Department covers a wide variety of topics and may be conveniently subdivided into three major problem areas: 1. Listenership data. This covers such technical information as listening habits, preferrid listening times, wave length, re- ceptivity, and jamming. The data . are col- lected with regard to the technical planning and scheduling of broadcastings. 2. Program evaluation. This portion of the survey aims to determine the popularity and use of existing programs. It involves assess- ing what is liked, what is not liked, why, and what would people like to have more of. These and similar questions produce feed- back necessary for timely, audience-oriented programming, which is the aim of every broadcast. 3. Attitude research and special studies. These studies deal with diverse socially and politically relevant attitudes, opinions, and images. They constitute fairly extensive sur- vey work focusing on important paramenters of public opinions relevant to programming and broadcasting. The main process of data collection in- volves the administration of the basic ques- tionnaire which includes questions related to all three problem areas. Each year it is ad- ministered to new samples. The question- naire is also updated yearly: some questions are kept to allow for comparability over time and others are substituted by new ones to reflect more timely concerns. In addition to this basic questionnaire, some special questionnaires are used to cover unanticipated timely events such as Prague in the spring of 1968 and the Polish uprisings in 1970. Some additional "special studies" are occasionally conducted in order to provide timely audience information: for example, the Eastern European interpreta- tion of some key concepts (socialism, capi- talism) using new research techniques such as the Semantic Differential. The use of audience analysis data within Radio Free Europe is institutionally or- ganized, The various country desks show a general and fairly uniform appreciation of the value of the listonership data. The pro- gram evaluation results are received occa- sionally with mixed feelings. This can be explained by the fact that when the evalua- tion indicates a decline in program popular- ity, the feedback, while useful and necessary, is not flattering. The attitude data and spe- cial studies information is of more recent origin and up to now has been used on a more sporadic basis. I feel this area deserves more special attention (Appendix 3). Generally, the relationship of the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department and the Country Broadcasting Departments cannot be entirely free from the common problems which naturally arise in those in- stances when people with different profes- sional frames of reference must work out common solutions. The quantitatively oriented social scientist and the talented country expert charged with heavy respon. sibilities of daily output of high quality are naturally predisposed to look at the same problem 'from different angles. In the case of Radio Free Europe, however, there. are clear signs of mutual appreciation and recognition of the complementary nature and shared in- terests of these two roles (Appendix 3) . The scope and results of audience research with its nearly 400 publications are broad and varied, and their discussion would go beyond the scope of the present report. However, some data on the role and image of Radio Free Europe may be of interest at this time of conflicting opinions, when the reactions of Eastern Europeans deserve special atten- tion. AUDIEICE DATA ON THE ROLE AND IMAGE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE There are numerous categories of audience data which are 'informative on the role of Radio Free Europe. Perhaps the most sig- nificant are those data which estimate the size of its leadership. According to earlier (1967) and more recent findings (1971), about 60% of the populations listen to Radio Free Europe. The figures are somewhat higher for Poles and Rumanians and lower for Hun- garians and more recently for Czechs. In all the Eastern European countries Radio Free Europe was found to be the most listened-to foreign station, preceded only by the local national station. Although these local sta- tions-Radio Budapest for Hungarians, Ra- dio Prague for Czechs-generally show the highest number of listeners, the importance of Radio Free Europe is frequently rated higher than the domestic station in particu- lar contexts, especially on foreign news (Po- land, 1971; CSR, 1971). A trend analysis (No. 221, No. 304) has found a slowly brat generally Increasing lis- tenership for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Po- land, and Rumania. This trend is occasion- ally interrupted, as in the case of Czecho- slovakia, by strict measures of control and heavy jamming in the post-invasion period (No. 304), but in the long range they usually prevail. While the figures on listening are high (Appendix 4, Table 1), the additional percentage of those who receive RFE news indirectly by word of mouth is hard to esti- mate. The censorship of news media and the desire to receive reliable information produce a favorable climate for spreading information by word of mouth. The importance of these private channels in controlled societies has been emphasized by numerous accounts? Although Radio Free Europe is right be- low the domestic station on the level of listening, in respect to such characteristics as reliability, truth value, and timeliness of Information, Radio, Free Europe is consist- ently in first place (No. 292, No. 292a, No. 182, No. 168, No. 177). In contrast to the image of domestic broad- casting, which is generally criticized for sup- pression and distortion of information and described as "'biased," "cold," and "obscure," Radio Free Europe is described primarily as "interesting," "skillful," "pleasant," "wide," and "quick" (No. 283, No. 284, No. 287, No. 288). This emphasis on reliability and informa- tion value is consistent with the main task or function that Eastern European audiences assign to Radio Free Europe. To the ques- tion "Which do you consider the most im- portant tasks of Radio Free Europe?" the most frequently chosen functions were "to inform about events," "to explain ," and "to entertain." The ambiguous function of "encouragement," which could simply mean to have faith that the situation will improve, or with more forcefulness might be inter- preted to mean encouragement to revolt, figures only as a low choice of 103% (Appendix 4, Table 2). The most frequently given rea- sons for liking Radio Free Europe by Czech, Hungarian, and Polish listeners were that the programs were "interesting" and "informa- tive" and that it provided information other- wise not available (Appendix 4, Table 3). RECOMMENDATIONS Despite the full cooperation of the RFE/ APOR Department, the time available for this study was too short to pursue a broader variety of alternatives with all the desired circumspection and to arrive at recommenda- tions-in a categorical sense. Thus, the follow- ing suggestions are tentative, presenting alternatives for further thought and con- sidoration. Personally, I would welcome a closer co- operation between the APOR Department and the Broadcasting Departments. This could be promoted by offering the DB's greater oppor- tunities for formulating requests and sug- gesting research topics. With more oppor- tunity for initiating research, the Broadcast- ing Departments will increasingly recognize APOR as a unique source for obtaining highly 2 Alex Inkeles and Raymond Baum, The Soviet Citizen (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1961); Klaus Mehnert, Der Soviet- mensck (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1968), pp. 13-14. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3376 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 desirable information, for updating their own search-with special focus on the needs and avoid hardcore party members, secret police, area expertise, and for protecting themselves priorities suggested by the Broadcasting Do- _ and the like. There are no safe controls against criticism of getting outdated or partn'ients. against this type of bias. Nonetheless, the losing touch. APPENDIX 1 breakdown of the samples by occupation and To meet the more specific and detailed In- party affiliation suggest that the effects of formation needs articulated by individual na- TIIE INTERVIEW this selectivity are probably not too serious, tion Broadcasting Departments requires a The experience of being questioned by an or that they may be partially cancelled out faster return since the present method of independent research organization as a part by conflicting trends (for example, the above data collection on large (N-1,000) national of a public opinion survey is generally an average of party favorites In samples takes about a year. It also requires uncommon, novel experience for Eastern foreign travel). Contacting a research activity of wider scope that ad- Europeans. Questioning about attitudes and Contact vei and Rejection Itu.te dresses a broader variety of themes and opinions related to official, governmental in- _ the prospective interviewee is naturally an topics. terests, which might have undesirable per- important and delicate step since Eastern Accelerating the returns and widening the sonal consequences, may be a more com- Europeans are not used to polls and have scope may be possible, even at the present monly shared expectation. Furthermore, developed considerable suspicions. The ad- funding level, by adopting a somewhat differ- Communist authorities are heavily engaged verse effects of these understandable reserva- ent research strategy. in campaigns to discredit Western public tions are apparently reduced by the fact It seems to be desirable to subdivide the opinion research in general and the polls that the interviewers are compatriots of the data into two main categories: (1) informa- conducted by Radio Free Europe in par- travellers who speak the same language. The tion with long-range policy implications (for ticular. interviewers also understand that they must example, size and parameters of listenership) . There are numerous indications that dur- first establish a rapport on the basis of and (2) Information on timely audience re- lug recent years the adverse effects of this neutral topics (finding places, articles, shop- actions (Nixon's trip to Peking, different preconditioning have considerably decreased, plug). Next, the Interviewers explains his cur- Images of the Soviet and Chinese commun- that Eastern Europeans are less hampered vey and asks for cooperation. ism, etc.). Accordingly, thr process of data by fear, and that they talk more freely. None- As was stated by both the interviewers and collection can be split. Everyone will be theless, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss Intora, the -average rate of refusal is about asked the first smaller part of. the question- the potential Impact of unfamiliarity, anx- 20%. This rate differs from nation to nation Haire, aiming at long-range information; it iety, and various misconceptions of the in- as well as over time. Presently, the rate of would address only a few important prob- 'terview, which could produce biased results, refusal . is the highest from Czechs and lems on which the large sample size is really In respect to the objectivity and informa- Slovaks (about 35%) wlxile Rumanians were necessary and useful. The second and longer tion value of the results of RFE audience re- characterized as the most readily communi- part of the questionnaire can include Chang- search interviews, the following steps ap- cative (15%). The 20-25% refusal rate is ing sets of timely questions. This second peared to be especially critical : surprisingly low and requires repeated veri- part will be used only on smaller samples a. Selection of the Interviewee. fication. of 200 to 300 people who can be tested within . b. Contacting the interviewee; his coop- To maintain control over the work of the a shorter one or two month period. In the erativeness. interviewers, the Audience and Public following periods the second part would be c. Interview procedure. Opinion Research Department has set the replaced by new batteries of timely questions. To examine the procedure I questioned condition that the interviewers are obliged Administered to the total national sample about a dozen INTORA (Vienna) interview- to call in by phone in 80% of the time. They (N-1000-1500). ers about their w9rk and experiences. I also must state that they have an interview in Part I: Stable 20 questions/Part II: Chang- had the opportunity to observe interviews progress and give the location and a brief Ing 40 questions. in progress and to talk with the people in- description of the interviewee.'i'hese calls are Each battery administered to new subsam- terviewed. Based on these various impres- then used for local spot checks. pies of 200-300 subjects. sions, I have come to the following general C. The .Interview Procedure Such a strategy may be recommended on conclusions: the basis of the following rationale: a._ Selection of the Interviewee-Ideally, received the inter an an affi affixrmatialivve e as anssweer c in ooperate, respect the o o 1. It offers information on a much broad- the interviewer would interview every travel- the in vi wec' ins to c foe and posse the que ti. The e and poses er variety of topics as a fast response to time- ler he happens to meet on an entirely ran one giereser t s after ly questions raised by broadcasters. don basis, and these people, by their char- reads from the questionnaire and notes the 2. It allows a broader and faster audience acteristics as a subsample, would approximate answers or places the checkmarks in the case analysis without increasing the scope of the the parent populations (nontravellers In the of multiple choice items. The interviewee is data collection and without a substantial country). There is naturally a discrepancy fully award that his responsibilities are being reduction in the reliability of information between the composition of the samples and lyta aware his this procedure being produced. the parent populations. In actuality, we know feg arouse some fears, the fear may be counter- also With some adaptation, this strategy may that the samples are not entirely represen- acted by certain other factors. Namely, the also allow for a heavier focusing of the coal- tative, that the more educated strata are interviewee recognizes that the nature Namely, this nation on important individual social groups overrepresented, that peasants are generally inquiry ichmaic and mechanical, and such as the intelligentsia, workers, or farm- underrepresented, and so on. the questions do not convey the idea of ers, which have specific audience character- To help correct. this discrepancy, quotas searching for personal or confidential ea- of istics, interests, program preferences ad- . are calculated. The director of INTORA ox- searchi g for rmona o has been tial ii nfor-m. , he dressed presently by specialized programs.. plained that two complementary measures assured that his identity will not he retained 4. It offers effective and economical use of have been developed. One is based on previ- and that the evaluation of the information the research money. It preserves the advan- out experiences with the interviewers, which will be group-oriented and statistical. tage of large samples in contexts where docu- give an idea about their characteristic pref- The questions group-oriented to three major cite- mentation is an essential objective and at erences, what type of people they are pre- Drhe: ue ions belong and opinions on ti ate- the same time multiplies the scope and in- disposed to contact. Taking these predisposi- and political topics, (b) information creases the timeliness of the information on tions into consideration, INTORA selects in- social, and program nice pb) ceon n a still sufficiently solid foundation. terviewers whose predispositions largely bal- on listening a ad on the roaprof sociodeand . Perhaps is no time in RFE's history has it ance each other. graphic data on boon the r Part U it administered been more essential that the dimensions of . As a second measure INTORA issues guide- only to who have administered its actual listenership and the parameters of lines on which category of traveller to focus p listen to Radio its effective roles be documented on the on-young, less educated, etc. The combs- ously s that respondents they regularly who ree Europe. The administration of the basis of empirical facts. Evidence based on nation of these two measures was described -Free Europe. requires on the aeon 40 he many thousands of systematically sampled as generally effective in -obtaining sizable, q mustis. opinions Is naturally more weighty than un- fairly proportionate representation for the have stated that the in- controllable responses obtained from a few. expected quotas. As a means of reducing the The no problem in This Information 1s essential for RFE op- discrepancy between the composition of the terviewees interviewers s generally have the problem in orations as well as for sound policy decisions. samples interviewed and the parent pop- understanding uask hae far answering questions. on the Radio Free Europe has invested a great deal ulation, weighting scores are calculated, Occasionally, clarification rsocation on the the terms of ingenuity in planning and supervising based on the relationship of the actual pro- use of ceertttain they esire to such c ass" oci more quaarty this research effort. It undertook extensive portions of people interviewed and the de- and exp ehan ewe fchoice alternatives a general tendency alternatives research work to test the representativeness sirable quota calculated on the basis of the answers . There forced of the samples and to validate procedures. ? national sample, provide more for. elaborate on details en n yon I feel that the strategy of using tourist and A second source of discrepancy may be tell the scope the aorate o questionnaire. visitor samples has proven itself to be sound the result of a more or less conscientious and generally dependable. avoidance of the unpleasant experiences of The interviewees are not paid for the In- Thus,. presently Radio Free Europe may rejection. Especially the more experienced terview but it is a common practice for the have reached the point when the "documen- Interviewers may be suspected of having de- interviewer to offer coffee or beer to the tative" portion of the research effort may veloped a certain sense for detecting those interviewee if the questionnaire is admin- be reduced in order, to allow an increase in who may be cooperative and those who may istered in a coffeehouse or restaurant. The the "public opinion" portion of ' the re- not. For instance, they may have learned to interviewers state that the interviewees gen- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3377 erally desire to talk and like that their opin- ions are asked. The interviewers I met were mostly men; there were only two. women in a group of twelve. Both male and female interviewers appeared well qualified and interested in the work, They usually have other full-time oc- cupations and do the interviewing only on a part-time basis. They receive about a $5.00 equivalent in Austrian schillings (135) for each questionnaire. - Since a large portion of the questionnaire deals with RFE performance, the claim that neither the interviewers nor the interviewee knows about the source of interest is some- what doubtful. It is true only in the sense that they are not told this explicitly. The official explanation states that radio stations involved in broadcasting toward their coun- try are being evaluated. APPEND}; 2 TIIE SAMPLES To derive up-to-date information on au- dience characteristics such as listening hab- its, program preferences, and attitudes of the people in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hun- gary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, travelers (visi- tors, tourists) arriving in Western European capitals are interviewed. The institutes listed below are being used to conduct the field work. Not all of them will always work with all five national samples as there may. be only a few travelers of a certain nationality in a certain area. INTORA Opinion Research Institute, Vienna, Austria. A.T.M. Market Research Institute, Copan. hagen, Denmark. A.I.M. Market Research Institute, Stock- holm, Sweden. FIFE sample Popula- tion White-collar workers -------- 23 29.8 Tech nocrats--.---------- - 16 ---------- Professionals- 6 -------- Artists, Writers ---------- 4 .......... Students---------------- 7 .......... Workers___________________ 31 59.7 William Schlackman Psychological Re- this deviation in turn may show significant search, London, England. correlation with attitudes and opinions ex- Sales Research Services, London, England. pressed in.the interview. To mention only a SOFRES Opinion Research Institute, Paris, single example, let us take mobility. Mobility, France. the motivation and interest in travel, is not COFREMCA Opinion Research Institute, Paris, France. Vandoros, Athens, Greece. Since the native populations of these countries cannot be reached by Western sur- veys, the interviewing of visitors to the West from these otherwise inaccessible popula- tions appears to be the best alternative for obtaining useful, generalizable information. Since the early 1960s travel restrictions have been considerably reduced and now several hundred thousand Eastern Europeans travel to the West every year, While the size of the travelling groups is unquestionably large. enough to warrant sampling on a sufficient- ly broad foundation, the composition of the samples presents a more complex problem. The ideal objective would be to-use sam- ples that precisely match the composition of home audiences in the respective Eastern Eu- ropean countries. However, a more realistic expectation is to approximate the composi- tion of parent populations within acceptable limits, and there are indications that a fairly good approximation is reached. Before elabo- rating on these data, we should discuss the extent to which we can expect the samples of visitors to be representative of the parent population. Even if they closely approximate each other In the distribution of certain demographic variables (age, sex), this is not necessarily an Indication that the visitor sample does not deviate from the parent population on some other parameters-poll- tical beliefs, level of politicalization, con- formity, extroversion. If it does deviate, then TABLE 1.-THE COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY OCCUPATION [In percents RFE sample The disparity in categorization complicates direct comparisons. As an RFE publication on the "Occupational Background of the East European Populations" observes: The statistical yearbooks, published under strictest regime supervision, tend to cover this area in summary fashion and, often, even this summary information is incomplete, or contradictory. Furthermore, employment fig- ures are frequently presented for entire sec- tors of production (e.g., "transport" or "wood processing industry") but these figures in- elude everybody from the enterprise man- agers and chief engineers to unskilled mes- sengers inside the plant and cleaning person- nel. - Another problem relates to the semantic ambiguity of certain categories, a confusion' probably resulting from both practical'and ideological differences. In a Socialist country everybody is a worker by definition. None- theless, as a second meaning worker is.fre- Popula- RFE Popula- tion sample tion the same for those who travel and those who do not. To what extent mobility, on which travelers and non-travelers differ, actually interferes with the distribution of responses Is in no way clear. If we assume that this mobility correlates with the level of interest in the external world, in international affairs, then It could produce biased results as a fac- tor of selectivity. If this selectivity is as- sumed to be more apolitical in nature, then its effects on politically oriented questions is likely to be negliigble. Since we cannot clearly identify those factors which actually differentiate those Who travel from those who do not, demographic quotas (educational, occupational) provided for sampling may not solve the problem. Nor is this problem resolved by the method of "independent sampling." The rationale of interviewing independent samples of travel- ers in various European capitals in undoubt- edly sound, and it provides a solid basis for testing the internal consistency of the rem suits. Nonetheless, if there is a selectivity factor which differentiates travelers from non-travelers, the effects of this factor can- not be eleminated by this sampling proced- ure because in this sense the samples are not independent, Nonetheless, there are research findings which suggest that the samples have a broad, and varied composition which includes not only sizable groups of the main social and educational strata but also sizable percent- ages of people with diverse political orienta- tions,. Table 1 shows the composition of sam- ples on the basis of occupation. Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland RFE Popula- RFE Popula- RFE Popula- sample tion sample tion sample tion Full-time housewives---_- 6 ---------- 9 .......... 10 __..----.- Shopkeepers......... ......... ..'_.......... 4 .......... 3 .......... Others- 2 ---------- 2 ---------- 2 Fanners_________________ 5 .10.5 9 26.1 4 31, 0 Average-----------------N-I,499 ---------- N=1,525 ---------- N=1,316 .... _._... quently used in reference to "manual work- er" as in the dichotomy of "workers" and "intelligentsia." In the summary statistics shown above, worker is used apparently in this second sense and the white collar cate- gory is largely conterminous with Intelligent- sla. Where the division line is drawn is impos- sible to tell. The demarcation between workers and farmers is perhaps even more ambiguous, Ag- ricultural workers-for example, peasants working on state farms-are frequently cate- gorized as "workers" while peasants doing practically the same work on private or par- tially collec tivized land are identified as farm. ers. The "Population" ' columns of the above table rely on official statistics. The data on CSR from. the statistical yearbook (1970), which contained a table on "the Social Struc- ture of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." The Hungarian data are based on a publica- tion of the Bureau of Statistics in a volume entitled "Employment and Income Ratios (1969 data), which shows the breakdown of the "vocationally active population" (4.46 million). On Poland RFE has used the information provided by the State Telegraphic Agency (PAP) dated September 29, 1969-as the Sta- tistical Yearbook did not provide this infor- mation. Discounting the apparent disparities between the. social-occupational categories, 'the white collar stratum is somewhat over- presented and the agricultural population underrepresented in the RFE sample. The comparison between the RFE sample and the parent population is easier in terms of such demographic variables as sex, age, and education, as shown in Table 2. Again, as a general trend,, males, middle-aged peo- ple, and the more educated strata are some- what overrepresented in the RFE samples. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3378 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE TABLE 2,-COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY SEX, AGE, AND EDUCATION [In percent] Hungary Poland RFE Papule- sample RFE Papule- tion sample RFE Popula- sample Sex: Male----------------- Female---- -- -------_ - 59 41 49.0 51.0 50 50 48 52. 57.5 42.5 50 50 36 to 50 years......... Over Si years---------- Education: Elementary------------ - Age: to 25 years ----- U 21 22.0 18 20 18 27.0 9 29 Secondary_____________ University------------- ---- p 2 6 to 35 years-. -------- 28 16.0 22 . Finally, the following table 3 shows the tion requires more than learning the for- etrate that Eastern European audiences do a vat on hasf farthe tics- coh ncelns,interests, concepts, imagess- political orientation of the i arty pY feren e, uage; It requiobsres knowledge poliles by expressed essed political party p reaching implications for broadcasting to which differentiate them from other audi- A +,,,,a ,.on?i,'A frill recognition and TABLE 3,-PARTY PREFERENCES IN A HYPOTHETICAL ELECTION, PARTY ALLEGIANCE, BY PERCENTAGES (1970) CSR Hun' gory Pe- land Ru- mania -____- Communist Party 5 3 11 7 --_ mocralic Socialist Party_ D 40 35 3 o Christian Democratic Party_ 27 36 23 8 ----- asant Party P 13 '6 ------- e National Conservative Party 2 5 13 8 Other and no answer-.---- 13 15 APPENDix 3 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GEARED TO THE AUDIENCE'S FRAME OF REFERENCE The modern discipline of intercultural communication is based on the realization that effective Communication between vari- p r ous people and_ nations requires more than - oriented, independent program development accurate translation. People and nations not but actually demands it. This unique fea- only speak their own language but they have ure, which is supported by a corresponding also their own characteristic concerns, prior- ture, e, which is structure, differentiates rresp nding fries, concepts, and values=their cultural Free Europe from all other known broadcast- isamea of reference. This fctordf reference ing stations aiming at foreign audiences. It whether really the critical factor determinning is probably the main factor responsible for whether a communication c whpted or is c ted, mucch h the strong identification Eastern Europeans- more it is aeca n or rejected, the pro Czechs, Hungarians, Poles-develop with the name or the oute grammaticalness that is the s station and is also primarily responsible more vinciation of than the language o for of a sentence. Warne the wide popularity. f a seThe audience research has an important ro e tions --.------ In this role the following to-date audience information and feedback *H ons, s before the Committee on Foreign quire special recognition. 120 million Eastern Euro- cal States Senate, Psychohologi- First of all, the audience research provides on approximately knowledge presently not available pea cal Aspects of Foreign Policy Govern- the based and iconvincing en ugh tosdemon- f om any other source, meat t Printing Office, June, , 1969). Y TABLE 1.-RADIO LISTENING TRENDS OF RFE'S 5 MAIN EASTERN EUROPEAN AUDIENCES Survey year 1963 r----------------------------- 1964------------------------------- 1965--------- ---- 1966------------=------- -------?- 1967----------?-------------------- 1968 -----_----------------------- 1968 s________________________------ 1969 ? ------ 1969?----- ----------------------- 1970---------------------------1 Size of audience in percentage of total population CSR Hungary Poland Rumania Bulgaria CSR and to update their approach, the broad- casters, script writers, and commentators can safely rely on the findings of audience analy- sis. To take full advantage of its potential, it is important that audience analysis be treated not as a threatening authority exert- ing criticism but as an important source of authentic information which can help to adjust to the latest changes and provide a basis for timely decisions not by speculations and arbitrariness but by empirical evidence. Finally and most importantly, RFE audi- ence analysis has the organizational, mate- Size of sample interviewed Hungary Poland Rumania Bulgaria 33 49 50 ---------------------------- 1324 11,144 38 50 53 ----'------47------- --- 425 1,570 51 57 ------------- 38 465 1, 673 43 - 5 38 326 1,247 4 58 ---- -- --------- 51 ao . 668 ------------- - 37 ----------- ----------- ------ -- - 55 63 60 42 1,129 1,106 1,375 -- ...----- 65 66. 52 59 63 --------- 1,706 1,106 1,371 ---1,026----- - _ ___ _.___ _____. ___ 57 -----------?-- 45 1,499 1,525 1, 316 1,192 399 557 0 ....... ---55-------------- 59 __- ______ 1 Previous samples included many refugees, providing less solid basis for generalizations. " iod of Prague Spring , per 2 Period preceding Soviet invasion of CSR- r P0stinvasion period. 4 Spring-early summer period. r Early fall period, resumption of heavy jamming. -- - TABLE 2.-"WHICH OF THE Note: The percentage figures refer to respondents who stated explicitly that they listen to RFE. Subsequent questions on frequency of listening showed in 1970, for instance,that 52 to 98 percent listened once a week or more and 2 to 27 percent listened less freqquently. The data are based on 157 230 175,f222238, 263 300; Poland: 07,11411311174 2164 19 237, 269, 325 30' 01; Rumania:1x32, 04, 2 3 4 , 270 FOLLOWING DO YOU CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT TASKS OF RFE7" In percent] Poland Hungary CSR - Rumania Bulgaria To inform about events..... 71 10 explain causes ---------- 46 To educate .......... ...-..- 15 To entertain ................ To encourage ....... ....--.. 13 As Edward Hall elaborated on this topic at In this performance, even if this role l 68 67 55 29 35 33 2 19 16 4 12 7 11 for U.S.- audiences into the language. of a particular foreign audience. Such a transla- tion may be understood word by word and March 6, 1972 Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Popula- Popula- Popula- tion tion Lion RFE sample RFE sample RFE sample 31 25.0 29 25 26.3 27 20 37.0 . 31 37 16.8 29 37 66.5 42 70 31.7 70 47 27.0 43 25 46.3 25 16 6.5 15 5 22.0 5 citizen these findings should speak clearly enough to show the necessity of differentiated treatment of selective, audience-adjusted sentence by sentence, but this does not mean - broadcasting. research of Radio that it will be grasped in its full meaning, Secondly, it will relate to the experiences and in- Free Europe is an important Instrument, terests of the local audiences. which enables the members of the national Adjusting programs to the interests of a broadcasting staffs to keep up to date, to pre- particular foreign audience constitutes an serve the impression of timeliness, and to especially demanding task for which Radio keep apace with the changes. Whether the Free Europe, with its national desks, pro- . statS members are new or old emigrants, they ? grams, and first class staff recruited from are in danger of getting more and more de- the literary and intellectual elites of the tached and losing contact with recent respective countries, has developed out- changes in the home audiences. Concerns riorities change, new slogans and con- and p potential.standing The institutional policy of Radio Free Eu- cepts develop (e.g., new economic mecha- e not only allows for individual country- nisms), and new social phenomena emerge o (hinnies). To keep apace with the changes Other tasks ................ No answer ................: Number of cases..--. Poland Hungary CSR Rumania Bulgaria , 11,675 ------------------?-- 859 1 576 -------------- 1,366 -------`----- 1584 1, 794 -------------- 407 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S337 . 9 TADLE 3: "Why do you like Radio Free 222. Listening to Western Radio In Hun- between the Moslem foundation and all non- Europe?" gary 1967-1908, November 1968. Moslem governmental and private organiza- Percent 221. Radio Free Europe's Listenership tions. He traveled extensively in Europe, Most interesting and varied programs 36 , Trends, 1962-1968, October 1908, North Africa, and the Middle East, conduct- Best information, on the own country 19 219. Listening to Western Radio in Po- ing negotiations with private, governmental, Supplies information otherwise not land, October 1968. and United Nations agencies relative to the available _ -______._-_-___--_----- 11 218. RFE's Audience In Czechoslovakia establishment of programs for refugee relief Broadcasts all day -------------------- 10 After the Invasion (A Preliminary Report) and rehabilitation in Austria, Germany, Italy, Best informed Western station -------- 10 (Strictly Confidential), October 1968. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the United Most objective and truthful ----------- 9 206. RFE's Audience in Czechoslovakia Arab Republic. He supervised negotiation of Has the best entertainment programs _ 7 (1963-1968), April 1968. contracts between Jani'at al Islam, Inc. 204. Rumania Listening Patterns 1967, and the U.S. Department of State and the APPENDIx 5 March 1968. United Nations High Commissioner for RADIO FREE EUROPE PUBLICATIONS USED 186. Listening to Western Radio in Bul- Refugees. 318. The Major Information Sources of garia, September 1967. In May of 1959, he was transferred from Polish Respondents on Important Foreign 185. The Image of RFE in Bulgaria, Sep- Europe to Washington, D.C., to serve as the and Domestic Issues, October 1971. tember 1967. foundation's representative on the Eastern 315. TMajor Information Sources of 181. The Image of RFE In Poland, August coast of the United States. His duties in- Hu 15. The n Res o Info on Important s of 1967. eluded the supervision of contractual rela- eign and Domestic Issues, September 1971. 177. The Image of RFE in Hungary, July tionships with the U.S. Government, main- 314. An Audience Evaluation of RFE's 1967. tenance of liaison with the Moslem diplo- Czechoslovak Programs, September 1971. 175. Listening to Western Radio in Hun- matic corps in Washington and New York, 313. An Audience Evaluation of RFE's gary, 1966/1967, July 1967. and general liaison with legislative and ex- Rumanian Programs,, S1971. 174. Listening to Western Radio in Po- ecutive branches of the U.S. Government. 312. An o rams September ptemb on 7 RFE's land, July 1907.. From 1957 through December of 1962, he Polish Angrams August Evaluation The Image of RFE in Czechoslovakia, was Washington, D.C. Representative and 311. Ao Audience Evaluation 1971. of RFE's February 1967. Executive Director, Jami'at al Islam, Inc., Hungarian Audience .164. Listening to Western Radio Stations P.O. Box 347, San Francisco, California. (An 309. Party Programs, TAugust ID71. rends in Hypotheti- In Czechoslovakia, February 1967: international Moslem humanitarian and cal Free rty Prefe in East Trends in ypo 1eti 157. Hungarian Listening Patterns, 1065/ educational foundation.) 305. Listening t WsteE Radio July Bul- 1966, August 1966. From December 1962, to October 1970, he garla Before and After the "Polish Events" 156. Bulgarian Listening Patterns, 1964/ was Manager, Cultural Information Analysis (April 1970-March 1971), May "Polish 1966, August 1966. Center, Center for Research in Social Sys- 303. Rumanian Listening 71), y 1971. Before 151. Listening to Western Stations in .tems (CRESS) of the American Institutes for said After the "Polish Events" (April 1970 Czechoslovakia III, June 1966. Research, Kensington, Maryland, where he March 1971), May 1971. 133. Listening to Western Radio In Po- was responsible for the development, admin- 304. ATrends in Czechoslovakia land, December 1965. istration, and supervision of an organization (1304. Audience udi M132. Rumanian Listening Patterns III, De- of 29 professional social science research and . 970), May 1 Western Radio In Hun- camber 1965. information specialists and related person- 301. Listening to Before and After the "Polish n Hun- 122. Hungarian Listening Patterns 1964- nel. The organization developed and main- efore 1971), April lash Events" 1966, August 1965. tallied an information storage and re- (May 300. 970-Mad After 1970-March to Western Radi1971. o in Poland 118. The Audience of Western Broadcasters trieval activity in the fields of cross- Before and After the "December Evoland to Czechoslovakia-II, March 1965, cultural information and cominunica- (May 1970-March 1971), April 1971. 116. Radio Listening Patterns and Pro- tion and internal defense and development. 292. The Reliability of Radio Free Europe, gram Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE CINFAC also provided a rapid response in- December 1970. (With Special Reference to Certain Age and formation analysis service to government 288. The Images of Radio Free Europe and Occupation Factors), January 1965. agencies and to private research and aca Radio Bucharest Among Ro Free E os pond, 116. Hungarian Attitudes Toward Other demic organizations performing government- ents, November 1970. p Nations, December 1964, sponsored work. Mr. Price also served as ce- 287. The Images of Radio Free Europe 07. Radio Listening Patterns and Program chairman of a social science research team Among of Hungarians, ovels- and Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE, Au- preparing an intercultural communications Radio Budapest Ima s gust 1964. study of the Republic her 1970. 104. Hungarian Listening Patterns Prior to From October 1970, to April 1971, he was 284. The Image of Radio Free Europe and the Cessation of Jamming, April 1964. technical director, National Media Analysis, of the Domestic Station Among Poles, Oe- 92. Agitation or Information? East Euro- Inc., 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Wash- tober 1070, peans Mistrust Their Mass Media (An I1- ington, D.C. National Media Ansylsis pro- 283. The Image Among. Czechs and Slovaks lustrative Report), August 1903. vides, for a private clientele, research reports of Radio Free Europe and the Domestics Radio Stations, October 1.970. on public opinion in the United States. As is + v===G with n adio Free Europe, August 1970. James Robert Price, presently a member reports are based upon a specialized content 270. Rumanian Listening Patterns, May of the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional analysis of U.S. mass media according to 1909-March 1970, May 19 70. Research Service, Library of Congress, was techniques developed in collaboration with 269. Listening to Western Radio in Poland- born on January 3, 1927, in Montgomery, the late Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger of the 1969, May 1970. Alabama, and educated in the public schools Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Price has 263. Listening to Western Radio Stations there and at the University of Alabama and served as a consultant Technical Director of in Hungary In 1969, February 1970. the Johns Hopkins University's. School of this firm since 1960 and continues to serve 259. Listening to RFE in Czechoslovakia in Advanced International Studies. He holds a in this capacity on a part-time basis. 1969 (A Preliminary Report), December 1969. bachelor's degree In political science and his- Mr. Price was appointed an analyst In Na- 256. Attitudes Toward Key Political con. tory from the University of Alabama (1949) tional Defense, Congressional Research Serv- cepts In East Europe (An Exercise in the and a master's degree from Johns Hopkins ice, Library of Congress, in April of 1971. Measurement of Meaning), BOUND STUDY, 1960)_ His academic record won him mem- Some of Mr. Price's published studies are Europe (Joints.), BOUND STUDY, July 1969. "'"' Department of State and the Central Response in Internal Conflict (by D. M. Con- 239. Listening to RFE Programs In Czechs- Intelligence Agency. He served on the Indo- dit, et al.). CRESS, 1968. slovalcia Before and After August 21, April nesian Desk until October 1951. From October ' 2. Attitudes of Selected Audiences in the 1969, 1951 through November 1953, he was assigned Republic of Vietnam (U) (S) (with W. C. 237. Listening to Western Radio in. "ties' and economic reporting, as well as ad- graphic Essay (with Skaidrite Fallah). Polaaid-1068, April 1969. ministrative supervision of local Chinese and CRESS, 1968. 235. Audience Mail in 1968, March 1909. Indonesian employees. He then returned to 4. Giving Credit to the Republic of Viet- 234. Rumanian Listening Patterns 1968-69, the Indonesian Desk In Washington. In ad- nam (U) (C). CRESS, 1904. March 1969, dition to his other duties, he served on the 5. Intercultural Communications Guide 230. Listening to Western. Broadcasts in Indonesian working group of the National for the Republic of Vietnam (U) (C) (with Cze30 Lis eni Before and After the Is In Security Council's Operations Coordinating F. A. Munson, at al.). CRESS, 1967. oslovakin Sion, January 1Bef Board. 6. Irrigation as a Factor in the Economic . In March he assigned 223? The Program Preferences- of RFE's. Spain, asgeneral ass s anttothe t president Development sea Research Notesaon Communist Strategy Hungarian Listeners (A Technical Report), of Jani'at al Islam, Inc., Mr. Ahmed Kamal, and Tactics in Negotiating Situations (J. R. December 1968. and to supervise and develop relationships Price, et al,). CRESS, 1968. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S3380 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE . March 6, 1972 8. Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic, and Other of Intercultural Communication;' paper read formational gaps and misconceptions, and psychological Phenomena and Their Inlplica- at he . annual meeting of the- American provide useful data for those concerned with tlons on Military and Paramilitary Operations Psychological Association, Los Angeles, Calif., assessing its purposes and Impact. The im- ical .S. foreign n the i) ' Congo. (co-author, with Paul A. Jurei- September in National Defense Today,dLorand leyeandsconsiderationsoon the orgft nizational i diH S CRESS, 1964. l HIS linguistic ic attainments are a fair ' B. Szalay. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Be- aspects of RL will be examined in separate knowledge of spoken Japanese and of written havioral Science Research Laboratory, 1907. reports to be prepared in the future, Cultural and spoken ian Spanish, an acquaintance Through AnalyVerbalsis Ass ci tions, "Journal ni ationally for in 1 the coStatenceived of aDt el warergo a. with Indonesian Malay. of Social Psychology, Lorand B. Szalay, January 18, 1051, with the incorporation of the "American Committee for Freedom of LORAND Br?.nrnLAN SZALAY /LXXII (1967), 161-187. Lorand Bertalan Sza]ay was born in Buda- Persuasion Overseas, senior author with the Peoples of the USSR, Inc." This orga- pest, Hungary, on June 28, 1921. Hegradu- R. Walker, G. Schuoller, J. Brent. Washing- nization was the forerunner of the present aced from the Academy for Foreign Trade ton, D.C.: SORO, The American University, Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. One of the 1965. 120 pp. purposes of the committee was to sponsor , awith secured two "Use of Word Associations in Foreign Area shortwave broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Lan in For, gndLang in degrees . FPsychology gfro t and n University Proceedings, 75th Annual Conven- by former Soviet citizens. Broadcasts began of Ph.D. In I. He from the d In. post- tion, Lorand B. Szalay, American Psycholog- on March 1, 1953, on a very small scale. of Vienna to e01 has engaged In. post- ical Association, 1067, pp. 373-374. Basic policy of the committee called for the Psychol Studies in Social Psychology of of Ills- 111- Variables Affecting Cultural Meanings "liberation" of Soviet Russia from the Psych ban a,Ills s the University . by Associative Group Analysis, "tyranny of Bolshevism." This policy re- noia, Urbana, Illinois. Lorand B. Szalay, with C. Windlo and J. flected the theme of "liberation" in American Frown. 1959 in the to eof Dr, Szalay performed Brent. Washington, D.C.: Center for Re- foreign policy during the early years of thP communication, eisl tfield l content social psychology and search in Social Systems (CRESS), The Eisenhower Administration. However, in the and of mass American University, 1968. later years RL policy changed from "libera- media output, , erti analysis measurements, assertion analysis, and In- "Relative Influence of Linguistic Versus tion" to "liberalization" as conditions within tic c of the the Vienna, Austria. a. Cultural Factors on Free Verbal Associa- the Soviet Untofi improved under the im- stitute e University of Vienna, Austria, tione," Psychological Reports, Lorand B. pact of de-Stalinization. Ever since the late In 1961-1962 he concentrated oil small- with C. Windle, XXII (1968) 43-b1. 1950's RL has been committed to a policy group research, infra- and inter-group com- Szalay "The Use of Word Associations for Value of peaceful liberalization of Soviet society, munication, and group creativity u acturerune Analysis," Proceedings, 75th Annual Con- and its broadcasts have been structured tics task and coni.municatioil structure, at volition, Lorand B. Szalay, with J. Brent and accordingly. ness Research University of Library. Illinois He , served Group as an Effective in- D. A. Lynne. American Psychological Associa- Administrative headquarters for RL are - structor at the University of Vienna, from tics, 1968, pp. 634-644, in New York City. caMr. d Howard Sargeant Attitude Measurement and Value Is President. In addition, RL maintains ad- 61 ministrative offices, broadcast headquarters 1051 to 1 19 . the next p irf r Illinois from by the Method of Associative Group Analysis, and research facilities in Munich, Germany. 1 sear to 186o. He next performed field re- Lorand B. Szalay, D. A. Lysne, and J. E. Thailand, as word-of-mouth coforORO.n in Brent, Kensington, Md.: American Institutes Offices, studios and other facilities are lo- Thailand, as a University co-investigator b for 8 , D.C. In for Research, 1970. cated in Barcelona, Lampertheim (Ger- American University of Washington, D.C. n "Attitude Measurement by Free Verbal many), London, Madrid, Paris, Playa del 1904-1966, he was principal investigator in Associations," Journal of Social Psychology, Pals (Spain), and Taipei. All of these facili- tho development of a research technique Lorand B. Szalay, Charles Windle, and Dale ties together with the U.S. Division in New (Associative Group Analysis) designed for the A. Lysne, LXXXII (1070) pp. 43-56. York come under the administrative direc- quautitative analysis of group or culture- "Attitude Research in Intercultural tion of Mr. W. Kenneth Scott, RL's Executive munication," Journal of Communication, Director in Munich. Operations at Munich specific memory content. He also served in Com- 1965 as an instructor at Prince George's Com- Lorand B. Szalay, XX (1970) , pp. 180-200. are broken down into four major subdivl- 196 lions: the Program Policy Division, the Net- 5-1y966College. As a project director, in "The Impact of the American Environment 1966-1, he conducted research in intercul- on Foreign Students: The Case of the South work Division, the Administrative Division . tural communication, s influencing with special emphasis Koreans," a paper prepared for the 66th An- and An the important Program aspect to Operations the Divisionorganizational c oil e factors. Foreign audiences, in thee nual Meeting of the American Political side of RL is the prevailing administrative matter with Fatu measurement er, especially value Science Association, Rita M. Kelly and style. This style encourages flexibility and matter . During the same period, and he vl was Lorand B. Szalay, Los Angeles, California, informality, and fosters a type of fluidity analysis. bearch in September 1970. To be printed in Studies in that allows the widest permissible range of employed by the CeAmr for Research and nternational Political Communication, ed: individual creativity and initiative, yet alai SystetTherien University y aUnl- d R. L. Merrit, University of Illinois Press, Chi- within a closely administered and ve carefully ve an instructor b y They George Washington 1971. structured system of policy. Such flexibility, rsity, Washington, D.C. "Verbal Associations in the Analysis of From 1967 to 1969, Dr. Szalay was engaged Subjective Culture," Current Anthropology however, creates certain organizational risks. be- What specific relations have existed as project director Ili a comparative study of Lorand B. Salty and Bela C. Maday, in press, tween RL and the Executive Branch and the cultural ultural ural groups, analyzing payer o-mld i A Lexicon of Selected U.S.-Korean Com- variables. Field service was performed in munication Themes, senior author. Kensitlg_ extent of BL's independence were matters Korea. Since 1970, he has engaged in a com- ton, Md.: American Institutes for Research, that could not be fully explored during this parative study of the American and Yugo- 1971. 220 pp. study. However, as an outsider viewing RL's nice psycho-cultures, in collaboration with Communication Lexicon on Three South current operations through documentation, Professor Pecjak of the University of Ljubli- Audiences-Social, National and Mo- extensive interviews, and actual on-site visits anal Domains, senior author. Kenning- to facilities, certain aspects of RL's activities Jana. The study is supported by the Ameri- Korean can Philosophical Society. Dr. Szalay also is are apparent and it is possible to make the ton, Md.: American Institutes for Research, following generalizations: (1) that IiL is serving at the present time In the capacity Senior Research Scientist, American In- in press. clearly a United States Government opera- st _ ltutea for Research, Kensington, Maryland. RADIO LIDERTY-A STUDY of ITS ORIGINS, tion and an integral part of this Nation's Dr. Szalay is a member of the American STRUCTURE, POLICY PROGRAMING AND foreign policy apparatus; (2) that it seems Psychological Association, the American to have a wide range of independence from op- EFFECTIVENESS SUMMARY OF STUDY the Executive Branch in its broadcasting op- Acade the Am my ersican can Political Sociological Social Sciences, Association. . ion and 'His (By Joseph G. Whelan, Specialist in Soviet erations; and (3) that its operating policies the publications are listed below: and East European Affairs, Foreign Affairs seem to be generated within the organiza- Doctoral Dissertation: "Fine psyehologisch- Division, February 29, 1972) tint and not necessarily dictated by an out- semantlsche Untersuchung von Zietworten". r. BASIC INFORMATION ON RADIO LIBERTY (aL) side authority. Vienna, 1961. The operations of Radio Liberty (RL) have Staff of RL has numbered around 1000 an "The Semantic Structure of Verbs," Zeit- - remained almost completely unpublicized recent years, As a surrogate "Home Service" schrift fur Experimentelle and Angerwandte since its inception nearly two decades ago. for the Soviet people, the staff, In keeping Psychologie, IX. (1962), 140-163. Except for Soviet specialists, relatively few with the multinational character of the So- The Study of Communication in Thailand, Americans know of RL's existence. The pur- viet Union, is itself multinational. However, with co-author, M. Jacobs. Washington, D.C.: pose of this study is to examine the liisl ory; the major broadcasting effort of RL is di- SORO, the American University, 1904. 150 organization, administration, and operations rected at the Russian-speaking audience. The PP. of RL. It is hoped that this study will assist " top administrative posts in policy making, Cultural Meanings and Values: A Method in an evaluation of BL's activities in the policy control, and in key operations are of Empirical Assessment, Lorand B. Szalay_ context of United States foreign policy and - held by Americans. The staff Is regarded as with J, Brent. Washington, D.C.: Special Op- how it relates to currently declared purposes being highly professional. It as multifunc- erations Research Office (8ORO) [now Cen- of that policy,. It as also hoped that an in- tional, and ideally, RL strives for a staff that ter -for Research In Social Systems (CRESS) ], depth research effort of this organization represents the combined skills of a scholar, The American University, 1965. will assist a broader understanding of its writer, journalist and radio performer. In- "Research Requirements Posed by Tasks purposes ar{d functions, dispel possible in- house training for RL is an organizational Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 .iliavcit 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3381 function created by necessity. Staff attrition Loninism, and the virtue of cultural diversity prospects for democratization are not bright, due to advancing age and retirements, along and political pluralism. still over a long period the climate could be with difficulties in recruiting newopQmers To achieve its objectives, RL seeks to pro- propitious; RL. perceive in this situation a from the Slavic areas of the Soviet Union, mote public opinion formation in the So- . "challenging opportunity" for stimulating in- pose a potentially serious presonnel problem viet Union, and it does this principally ternal pressures for positive change. The RL for the future. The professionalism of staff through its radio broadcasting operations. RL statement, essentially cautious and well-rea- is apparent in the quality of their research oprates on the principle of the right of a soned, seems to reflect the consensus of lead- product, their multilingual facility, the uni- free press; it "upholds the right of the whole lug Western scholars in Soviet studies on the que combination of American and Western Soviet public to know the whole truth about current Soviet reality and what the prospects scholarship with the native talents of former any question"; it is committed to the prln- are for the future. However, some scholars, Soviet citizens, and finally the existence of ciple, affirmed in the United Nations Declare- who have a realist's cast to their thought, an organizational spirit that seems to arise tion of Human Rights of 1948, that the So- would probably be less sanguine about the from a conviction of participating In creating vlet people, like all other peoples, have a ultimate achievement of democracy. positive change within the Soviet Union. In universal right to be informed. The third area of assumptions concerns addition, RL maintains close connections The general philosophical approach of RL RL's Soviet audience. In general, RL's with the Western scholarly community as a is one that appeals to rationalism. It at- approach is elitist, in that It directs its complementing force to their research and tempts to "substitute reason for emotion, attention mainly to the power elite, either broadcasting operations, and a calm voice for stridency." It begins existing or in potential. RL believes that this On the technical side of its operations, from the premise that "the most convincing group will more likely influence political de- RL has transmitters at Lampertheim, Ger- presentation is one that tells all sides of a cisions in the future. Moreover, persons in many, Pals, Spain, and Taipei, Taiwan. A story." In resorting to the rational approach, this group are more likely to have access to total of 1,350,000 watts of power enables RL RL strives to break the monopoly over corn- shortwave radio and thus receive RL's signal. to transmit its signal to the Soviet audience, munications which the regime tries to im- On the basis of-the foregoing assumptions, Jamming is serious but by no means an in- pose in the expectation that the first step RL proceeds toward its long-range goal and surmountable obstacle. Frequencies are allo- in the erosion of a totalitarian dictatorship Immediate objectives by maintaining an ef- cated according to regulations of the Inter- Is the development of individual thought. fective overall image. It does this by apply- nationalo Telecommunications Union, and In general, RL's policy guidelines are a ing certain basic radio broadcasting methods, transmitters are licensed by host countries reflection of a moderate, rational approach to utilizing a number of basic themes in all its upon whose territories RL's facilities are in-; the politics of the Soviet Union. presentations, and maintaining a style that stalled. Continuation of such licenses rests These guidelines and the philosophy that Is both 'appealing and effective. The guide solely upon the will of the :host country, thus produced them are contained in RL's Policy words in this effort are friendliness, enlight- Injecting a precarious quality of dependency Manual. The Manual Is RL's operating char- enment and dignity. In brief, RL takes the on others in RL's operations. ter. It is "the mainspring for all other policy stance of a "patriotic internal communi- RL's broadcasting operations are supported determinations, the central authority deter- cator":- it seeks to adapt itself to the inter- by a research effort that is impressive in mining audience priorities, program content ests and style, the feelings and sensitivities both quality and in quantity. To keep abreast, and the nature of Radio Liberty's approaches of the Soviet citizen; it envisions itself as a of internal developments in the Soviet Union in program structure, style and tone." genuine uncensored "Home Service", thus and to know what gaps to fill in their pro- In formulating broadcast policy and de- making it essential that the tone of broad- gramnling, RL staff in New York and Munich signing radio programming, RL makes certain casting and style of presentation convey the have at their disposal a vast Collection of general assumptions about its own role, the, feeling to the listener that RL is really one newspapers, journals, books, microfilms, situation in the Soviet Union and Its Soviet of them. In its basic methods, RL provides along with monitored reports of Soviet radio,. audience. The function of these assumptions facts, balanced discussion in the style of a access to wire services of the world, and the is to give some rational direction to thought democratic system, genuine criticism, and daily output of Radio Free Europe's (RFE) and planning. ' a portrayal of the Soviet reality, based on news budget. With regard to its role, RL'perceives it in its own research facilities; in contrast to the The research effort is further backed up general as that of a participant in bringing regime mgdia's, propaganda image of that by RL's library facilities and the extensive about- positive evolutionary changes within reality. resources of The Institute for the Study the Soviet Union; It adheres to the principle In pursuing Its objectives RL lays down a of the USSR, also in Munich. Owing to b?udg- of self-determination to the extent that the set of specific guiding principles. By and etary restrictions, the Institute was terms- Soviet people themselves are to bring about large the principles are commonsense: they nated at the end of 1971. RL's research faeil- changes from within and according to their appeal to reason, moderation and good judg- itics are open to scholars, and RL makes own interests and 'requirements; it acts as a ment. many of its research products available to conduit for the flow of objective information Other policy requirements are imposed specialists in academia, the government, and into the Soviet Union and acts also as a forum upon RL that arise from the fact that its the mass media who are concerned with con- 'for debate of views that are denied by the transmitters are located on territories of for- temporary Soviet affairs. The quality of re- regime; it rejects violence as a political solu- eign governments. Material cannot be used search done by RL, which has been highly tion and is committed to the belief in a long in broadcasts, therefore, that would harm commended by leading Western scholars, is term process of change for the better; it the interests of the host governments and vital, to its broadcasting operations since It denies, support for individuals or groups, but embarrass RL's relation with them. must fill the gaps of knowledge and Infer- gives general support to democratic principles - The Policy Manual is RL's charter for oper- mation created within its Soviet audience by and to those who exercise their human and ations. In an effort to keep the Manual cur- regime censorship. constitutional rights; it is convinced, finally, rent, RL periodically reconsiders certain role- 11. RL's COALS, POLICIES, AND POLICY that the process of democratization will con- vant questions and synthesizes its conclu- FORMULATIONS tinue despite momentary setbacks. sions into more current formal policy state- The primary objective of EL is to encourage RL's second assumption is based upon an ments and guidances, namely, Broadcast Po- those forces of liberalizationwithin Soviet -objective analysis of the situation in the So- sition Statements, Broadcast Guidances, society that will bring an eventual peaceful viet Union. In general, RL perceives the situ- Monthly Guidelines and Daily Guidance evolution of the USSR from Communist to- ation as follows: the Soviet Union is a great Notes. talitarfanism to a genuine democratic form power but suffers from serious institutional The primary function of RL policy is to of government. The ultimate goal is democ- and ideological inadequacies; positive make sure that programming provides the ratization of Soviet society in the expecta- changes have occurred but totalitarianism - Soviet audience with objective, accurate and tion that within such internal forces of lib- has - become institutionalized and its con- meaningful information; that it reflects the eralization lies the greatest hope of world tinuation is insured still further by the ex- growth and plurality of views outside the peace. istence of a phlegmatic, Stalinist-bred lead- Soviet Union; and that it corrects significant RL's is a commitment to peaceful change ership; serious economic problems, arising omissions and distortions in Soviet media. from within. It rejects confrontation as an from contending forces of modernization and All members of RL staff contribute to policy- instrumentality in achieving its goals. RL orthodoxy, plague the nation, the most sort- 'making and policy application, but the main encourages Soviet peoples to work together qua being the allocation of resources; prob- role is played by President Sargeant and Ex- as a first step in instilling the habit of de- loins of defense and foreign policy press upon ecutive Director Scott. They direct and re- mocracy. It broadcasts truthful information; the ruling elite, dividing it into competing view the formation of all policy and oversee to enable the Soviet peoples to make their forces-those seeking coperation and those policy operations at all levels. own judgments on developments in the So- adhering to a hardline stances; forces of dis- The next level of responsibility lies within. viet Union, to fill in the gaps of missing in- sent and reformism continue to divided the the Program Policy Division (PPD) and rests formation caused by Soviet censorship,-and country into polar opposites, one seeking re- . upon its Director in Munich. Through his to correct distortions of propaganda. form while the other is committed to a static policy staff, the Director exercises the chief Within the larger framework of goals and ' society and is resistant to change; the dis- operational responsibility for policy formu- purposes RL pursues Immediate objectives sident movement is, reformist and not re- lation and application, In New York, the that focus on such practical themes as dem-, volutionary; a trend toward conservatism, as Polley Coordinator actively participates in ocratie political alternatives, economic re- understaood in the Soviet context and not in the formulation of current policy. Respon- form, peaceful intentions of the- democratic the Western sense, is perceived within the sibility for `carrying out all policy by the world, ideological irrelevance of Marxism- current leadership, and while immediate U,S. Division rests upon him. A Special Ad- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3382 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 19 2 oal visor assists the President In the formulation tion; many find this in International radio hinverte ive sdli y of idi e err she this a the niewss yrami whe the first and coordination of basic policy. A final or, broadcasters. with the expectation of a declining listener ganizational mechanism in the policy process IV, RL's PROGRAMING: AUDIENCE CHARACTERIS- interest for the rest of the hour. News is the is the Council of Editors in Munich. TICS, PROCEDURES SUMMARIZED, AND PIrE- most important attraction for listeners, and When a fully agreed policy draft is finally NOMENON OF 6AMIZDAT It is programmed every hour on the hour for concurred in by the Council, it is passed an A Mfirst principle in effective communica- 24 hours. Thus, in RL's four-part concept in to the Executive Director for his approval Lions is to know one's audience. RL has to , news takes first priority, news and then to the President. - make certain assumptions about its audi- progr programm sminng, when, es remainder of the Policy formulations are divided into two ence, and in so doing it takes into account hfeatures d. e our contains internal Soviet subject matter, major categories, those dealing with long- the attitudes not only of social, occupational, for hour contain s a Internal Soviet sub, and finally term with short-term guidances. The Pol- and intellectual groups in all the republics for callow directed finally icy Manual, National Language Annexes, 'and oblasts of the Soviet Union, but also a a more spec or cultural ult audience. The key organ- Guidances Position Statements and Broadcast those of the various nationalities to which iz morea elements in programming are the Guidances are long-term. These are supple- RL broadcasts and certain differing psycho- Central News Service, Russian Service, and Nationalities Service. RL has extensive merited by short-term Monthly Guidelines logical categories within these groups. ernat and external environmental aids to and Daily Guidance Notes which are in- RL tries to reaph as broad an audience as the tended to relate larger policy to specific possible, but its approach is essentially eli- support psi current developments. On occasion an im- List: it aims at the top. Accordingly, RL re- Policy envgramming. elopes RL's operations, and its mediate policy guidance 1s given in the fan" garde its audience priorities in this descend- the writers; the next of a Special Memorandum. All statements of ing Order. Within the social, occupational, application Uegins with for policy ie the epolicy, along with the Policy Manual and and Intellectual groups fall the younger gen- screen its is the editors. care National Language Annexes, are inserted in eration, CPSU members, the scientific intelli- What enables RL to tune sequence screallowed programs In s care- book. Y gentsia, the literary-artistic intelligentsia, fully is the p a loose-leaf notebook called, the Policy Hand- tion. It takes approximately three to ten lower-level party and government officials days for the oodu reduction of a show, Tape makes RL Is, therefore, it policy-oriented organi- and elected members of legislative organs, it s for pe careful screening pakes nation, and its staff is policy-minded. While skilled workers and their Immediate super- urea. There are pre-broadcast auditions, ,.-__..,__-,. ,... _ __.......the ?~'`T?o o super. t titans are no doe h ness of risks of too loose it policy structure followed by special psychological categories in dealing with a configuration of power of that include "regime patriots" (ardent sup- such awesomeness as the Soviet Union. Yet, porters) and the committed opponents; the the policy structure is there for achieving "seekers" (loyalists who seek improvement); the proper balance if indeed this is a relevant and the ''reformers" (committed to the regime but seek positive changes), RL all- uestion y . q by RL has many instrumentalities for policy ill. CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE RECEPTION OF encouraging these internaleg transforinatlont RL'i Ds.oexcnsTS peaceful means. control, but policy control cannot be total; CeUnion c that affect that affece the het reception ewithin the LSO- S pIn structuring its programming as a policy violations are always possible; at best, vest Unio of R' "Home Service", RL must begin with an control mechanisms can only reduce the reccal capa- bility awareness that its audience's perception is probabilit)es. The heart of the matter is, broadcasts. The first is the technical sha of eive the Soviet l; people second Is like a fragmented mosaic An which many therefore, trust and rationality: trust in the ortws radio Signal; the second is their hei important pieces are missing. RL program- individual, for policy control must begin and willingness to listen n to to RL's message._-,- tilers must know what those pieces arYe; they end with the individual; and rationality in + ...,..a..,,, .,r +.i,,, noliav constructed and of radios in the Soviet Union; between t correct the d-- 'tea images created In million of these were believed to be short- - In'-'s mof the Soviet audience by props- wave receivers. At the same time RL has the he mind In communicating with the opa-. transmission facilities to cover the vast So- auganda. dience, RL assumes a "patriotic stance"; riot Less exactinn, . it regards itself as "a Guest in the Home"; number of Less tape exacting recorders. are Tape recorders the can be used and it speaks in the many languages of the Soviet peoples. for program propagation and for producing reach its audience, RL has established s1ident athat the. this, e. sesix lf--year period of 1057- die- practical procedures in programming. What 1962, material. 0 tape d r y were produced. is significant in these procedures Is the ex- A pr ctednpe 'ero'de's were some 800,- tentto which policy is integrated into pro- projected annual production of some been- operations. In the programming min g ram 000 by 1973 not taking into account certain process there are four daily morning meet- g qualifications, would indicate a toInl ac- pis: the Research Meeting, News Meeting, Tape ation of over 4.5 million in use in 1973. Nationalities Service Meeting, and the Rue- Tape recorders are, therefore, available, per. Sian Service Meeting. The morning meetings baTs en imor net rk,that take on the character of academic seminars. means Key personnel are invited to comment on The repo' etwcatithat is, person-to-per" son of ioral a come caton, is the d theimportant problems in their areas of com- of Ti.Tla nternal f EL'Scatioli that a audience broadens appeal. the This petence. These morning conferences provide . _ eeting ground for policy and program m _ GI -V -- -V broadcast" check made at the transmitters as the programs are being aired. What errors and policy violations are caught in this screening (except at the transmitters) are corrected Immediately by deletions and the actual "pulling" of shows. Policy violations A test of RL's ability to maintain control over its broadcasting operations in crisis con- - ditions through the mechanism of policy is the case of the Czechoslovak crisis of August 1908. A review of selected materials (Appen- dix 23) during the crisis has revealed that RL exercised a great deal of caution, mod- eration and restraint. Policy control and quality control overlap to a considerable extent. Pre-broadcast and post-broadcast auditioning provide in-house evaluations on both the quality of program- ming as well as judgments on policy mat- ters. Beyond this, no other formal institu- tional mechanism for quality control seems to exist, except for the important tasks per- formed by Mr. Will Klumpf, administrative assistant to the Executive Director. His main responsibility is to check programming in pre-broadcast auditioning for quality, effec- overall excellence in policy dueness , , _ , .P?w????,.-o, ________________ __ fv,.aa_ al- Stalin, Stalin, still plays a, very imporitant part in process is the actual production of news, production. As a means of maintaining qu- the transmission of oftlcialiy unsponsored features and other programs. ity, RL has a grading system on ratings of Rnea.kers are There seems little aouoc t mu u' ?_ w menus in recent years WIuuuu u..o -- ? ?-- ---- "n"?? u?= -?-- -- wide appeal among a very specialized and has been the emergence of samizdat, that is, ratings dip below 3.0 (A theoretically perfect potentially powerful audience in-the dissent- the private publication and circulation of score is 5.0.) ing Soviet intellectuals. Dissent within this one's own works. RL has become a main fit's Audience Research Division plays an elite sector can be explained mainly by the - depository for samizdat, and, accordingly, Important role in quality control. On the fact that they are the most affected by the samizdat has made a major contribution to basis of extensive testing of opinions through regime's restrictions on intellectual freedom, RL's programming. What is most significant postbroadcast audition panel of substitute freedom of speech, freedom of the press and about samizdat for RL is that it comes from listeners and outside specialists in addition other democratic rights. What makes their within the Soviet people themselves. As the to direct interviews with Soviet citizens, it role so important in the Soviet setting 1s principal source for disseminating samizdat, prepares reports evaluating programs. These that they represent a quasi-political force RL acts as an "echo chamber" or "sounding reports are circulated throughout RL for the contesting the monopoly of power by- the board", sending back to the Soviet Union information and guidance of staff. Panel regime. The growth of a full-scale movement the ideas generated by its own intellectual evaluations have shortcomings but they seem of Intellectual dissent has created for RL a . elite. As a result, RL has become a means of to have the virtue of at least providing some a~ttrib- internalizing samizdat and also a means of evidence of probable listener response and very special audience that has in turn uted to the radio a very special appeal. communication among all Soviet peoples. reaction without which there would be none. What creates RL'S greatest potential ap- V. aL'S PROGRAMING: PREPARATION AND OPERA- However narrow the sampling for evaluating no - peal, and this opportunity, Is of doubt the TIONS, POLICY AND QUALITY CONTROL programs, the panel approach, nevertheless, era- role of censorship. The totality of Soviet cen- com Program the iet citizen rovides eellsewhere foralternativveevsources of infarma- titans Division perates on the principles of an at least aQmeasures of upon qua ity hichconto of into n Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 19 72 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 3383 VI. RL'S AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS pendently and to contemplate alternative so- RL operates at a serious disadvantage as lutions to problems on the basis- of more a "Home Service" to the Soviet population: complete information. it has only very limited access to the Soviet The frame of reference for evaluating ef- people and, therefore, has great difficulty in fectiveness could be broadened to include evaluating in any systematic or scientific way comments in Soviet literature (not regime its impact on the Soviet audience or its attacks) on RL and other foreign broad- overall effectiveness as a broadcaster. The casters, and also to include general evalua- Soviet Union is a closed society; it is not tions bn RL's activities by Western authori- possible to take public opinion polls or en- ties either private scholars or government of- gage in public opinion research procedures ficials. There has been a steady growth of normal to an open society, evidence to demonstrate the value of RL in Despite known disadvantages, RL attempts the eyes of many Soviet listeners. Frequent to establish some positive basis for judging audience impact. It does this by collecting evidence on audience reaction: (1) in inter- views with Soviet listeners in such categories as visitors to the West, legal Soviet expatri- ates, and Soviet defectors; and (2) from letters received from Soviet listeners through the indirect method of a mail drop in the West. Through these efforts RL's Audience Research Division (ARD) attempts to fill the gap between speaker and audience, to get an accurate image of the listener, and the listener's image of RL, and to build the foundations for a continuing dialogue. Interviews are regarded as a prime indicator of audience response. During FY 1971 inter- views were conducted with hundreds of Soviet citizens, of whom well over one-half were foreign radio listeners. But interviews are very difficult to conduct, owing to native suspicion of polling as Instruments. of the KGB said to the climate of suspicion that impedes a free exchange of views. RL ap- proaches analysis of audience research data conservatively. ARD does not claim to have enough data from interviews to speak about a "sample" in the statistical sense; rather it claims to have only "bits and pieces of samples" that even then could be indicative of only certain groups. Yet, the accumulated data can give RL programmers some perception of their audi- ences' image, scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness, preferences for listening time, age spread, and class distribution. The intellectual professions dominate among RL's listeners. Thus, ARD data, though lim- ited, by and large confirms RL's judgment on audience structure, policy content and pro- gram design. Despite ARD's admittedly limited success in these matters, the question arises whether or not it has been too cautious. On the basis of an examination of audience research op- erations in both RFE and RL, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay, an American specialist in the field of communications research and psycho-lin- guistics, has made the tentative judgment that RL could perhaps do more with its au- dience research data drawn from interviews, . and he suggests alternative methods in measuring impact. . Interviews are supplemented by letters from Soviet listeners. Such letters are re- garded as documentary evidence upon which judgments can be made on. Soviet listening behavior and on Soviet attitudes toward RL programming. According to RL, audience feedback tllrougn mail has increased con- siderably in the past decade. Except for a momentary decline in early 1971, appar- ently, the general trend continues upward. Actual numbers of letters received are not available for publication; percentages are. In an attempt to flesh out its profile of lis- teners, RL categorizes listener mail accord- ing to "friendly" and "hostile/critical"; lan- references have been made to Western broadcasts in Soviet literature, particularly in samizdat, and appeals have been voiced urging that such broadcasts be continued. The upper echelons of the Soviet ruling elite also draw upon foreign broadcasters like RL as sources of information. It has long been known that the Soviet leadership has avail- able for review daily monitored news from abroad. Former Soviet citizens now living in Israel and the West who had been listeners and also Western authorities who have spe- cialized knowledge of the area have expressed favorable judgments on RL's effectiveness, RL also determines impact and effective- ness in essentially a negative way, namely, by the number of attacks in regime media and Soviet persistency in jamming. Regime attacks have increased "immeasurably" in recent years. The peak period was recorded between January and the end of September 1971 when 357 attacks were made in printed matter with an estimated circulation of 174 million. This acceleration of attacks was designed to force RL out of West Germany, It coincided with the buildup of Soviet pres- sure on West Germany at a time when prep- arations were being made for the Olympic Games in Munich, when the renewal of li- censes for both RL and RIPE were being negotiated, and when Congress was recon- sidering not only funding and new .sponsor- ship but even the existence of the radios. The convergence of all these developments, created an inviting opportunity for the So- viets. Moscow found in the license renewal issue a pressure point that could be used against West Germany to terminate the radios. But, the Soviets failed; the West Germans resisted Soviet pressures and re- newed the radio licenses. An equally important measurement of RL's impact and effectiveness is the Soviet practice of jamming RL's signal. RL is jammed round-the-clock. Soviet jammers use two methods: sky-wave jamming and groundwave jamming; the former covers large geographic areas, the latter covers re- stricted areas within urban communities. Jamming impedes audibility of RL's signal, and while it lessens RL's impact, it can also frustrate listeners and build up a greater desire to hear the denied signal. But Soviet jamming is only partially suc- cessful. By taking advantage of the pheno- menon called twilight immunity, listeners can hear RL from 2 to 3 hours daily at sunrise and sundown. Jamming can also be penetrated by increasing RL's output; this is done in times of crises by combining the power of two or three transmitters. More- over, there are other anti-jamming measures: listeners can build an efficient selector that refines the process of tuning; they can avoid groundwave jamming by going to the sub- urbs and listening; they can patiently wait for "lulls" in jamming. It is not possible to determine the effec- guage; substantive or inconsequential; gco- tiveness of Soviet jamming, but responsible graphical distribution ' (RSFSR predomi- , observers believe that a significant proportion nates) ; repeat or first-time writers; and sex. ' of RL's broadcasts penetrate jamming. How- Thus, listener mail, despite acknowledged ever, what is most important in correlating imperfections, provides RL with another im- jamming with RL's effectiveness is the high portant input of data to give some percep- value the Soviet Union places on RL by in- tion of its audience and to measure its effec- vesting millions of dollars in resources need- tiveness. Whether pro or con, listener mail ed elsewhere into preventing RL's signal from represents an affirmation of RL's purposes in reaching the Soviet audience, This is a real at least one sense, namely, to provoke the measure not' only of regime reaction but of Soviet people to think critically and Inds- the value that Moscow places on RL's effec- tiveness as a competing "Home Service" and a "loyal opposition" in the tradition of a free press. Assessment of regime media attacks and calculations of Soviet investment in time, resources, and energy into jamming provide essentially negative inputs in judging RL's audience impact and effectiveness. Yet, they, at least, have the virtue of creating greater certainty in a very uncertain area: of human judgment. Commonsense seems to dictate that the positive inputs of interviews and listener mail can at best give RL only a hazy image of its audience and an uncertain estimate of its effectiveness. However, this judgment might possibly be modified by the following factors: (1) the increase in the number of interviews, especially from the scientific intelligentsia; and (2) the expertise of RL's staff, the qual- ity of research, and particularly the emer- gence of samizdat which provides new in- sights into Soviet society enabling RL to assess its audience, programming needs, and probable effectiveness perhaps with somewhat greater, but still far from sufficient, clarity. VII: SOME GENERAL ODSERVATIONS ON RL There seems little doubt that RL is what it claims to be, namely, a surrogate "Home Service" to the Soviet people, but its effec- tiveness in the Soviet environment can only be a matter of conjecture. To achieve its goal of liberalization of Soviet society it has estab- lished an impressive and, apparently, effec- tive organization. Yet, it has organizational imperfections. It is caught in a scissors of an aging staff and an inability to recruit young, new blood in the Slavic areas. The non-Rus- elan nationalities are allotted perhaps an unfair disproportion of the organization's resources, though the situation appears to be improving. It also appears that RL's Board of Trustees has failed in its organizational responsibilities by playing a passive role. If RL is to continue, particularly under pro- posals now being discussed, the Board will have to be strengthened and its role as an active participant more sharply defined, The reality of RL conflicts with its popular image: it is neither a "Cold War operation" nor is its staff "a group of cold warriors" In the sense that the terms were used in the 1950's. On the contrary, as a matter of policy RL accepts all Soviet institutions, though not its ideology, and seeks to bring about peace- ful democratic change from within. Nor does RL slander the Soviet Union, its people or its leaders. To do so would be to defeat its main purpose as a "Home Service" broadcaster, In brief, RL acts as a responsible instru- mentality of the United. States Government and operates within a larger and generally acceptable consensus of ? American national interests. CHAPTER I: BASIC INFORMATION ON RADIO LIBERTY (RL) (NOTE.-Figures referred to are not printed in the RECORD.) [Footnotes at end of each chapter] I. INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE STUDY, FRAME REFERENCE, AND SOURCES . A. Purpose of study 1. RL's Isolation From American Environment The operations of Radio Liberty (RL) have remained almost completely unpublicized since its inception nearly two decades ago. Except for specialists in Soviet affairs who use RL's research products and often partici- pate as consultants on program evaluation panels and in conferences on specialized sub- jects for programming, few people in the United States outside the government have been aware of RL's existence. Thus, the American people have not been familiar with the operations of RL. Nor has the Congress. Owing to indirect financing within the Executive Branch, it did not have normal opportunities to pass on appropria= Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3384 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1.972 tions. As SenatorCl.ifford P. Case -(R,-N.J.) in Munich, West Germany, and their staff duced as illustrative examples of procedures said, "at no time was Congress asked to or. have been very cooperative In providing not and performance. permitted to carry-out its traditional Con- . only requested material but also in respond- Review of hundreds of thousands of hours stitutional role of approving the expends- ing to requests that they exercise their Judg- of RL's multi-lingual broadcasting (assum- ture." 1 ment in providing additional relevant dock Ing it were physically possible), might Con. That so little has been known about RL umentation? ceivably reveal certain discrepancies that in the United States stems largely from three Only in the area of audience research was were missed in editing, pre-broadcast re- factors, TA the first place, RL has been iso- there any reticence manifested on the part views and spotchecks; but, given the strictly later physically from the American environ- of ILL staff. The documentary material in enforced policy requirements in programming ment. As a surrogate "Home Service" for audience research is based on direct person- and broadcasting and the policy orientation the Soviet people located in West Germany, to-person interviews, which discloses the of Its staff, the marg n of error would, in all it has been geared to satisfy the listening names and professions of persons still living probability, be slight. requirements of its Soviet audience. Since in the Soviet Union. Many of these inter- This is a common ;case judgment that RL's broadcasts were not directed at an audi- viewees are highly placed scientists and cannot be proved with absolute certainty. ence In the United States, the latter knew scholars within the Soviet academic com- Nevertheless, the qualitative random selec- little about it. Secondly, RL was protected munity; others are university students; still tion of some materials is a rational approach, from the, public limelight by avoiding the others are ordinary Soviet citizens. Audience and the analysis of there materials within normal Congressional procedures for fund- research staff was especially concerned that the context of RL's policies creates a reason- ing. And finally, RL had long ago purposely these persons might be endangered by an able basis for measuring performance. Again, adopted a low profile in matters of public inadvertent revelation of their names in a what makes this approach possible is RL's exposure and only recently decided to meet public document. Even with this under- strict policy structure,3 public criticism openly. - standablo restriction sufficient material was II. CONCEPTION OF [cL' made available for the purposes of this study. A. In the Beginning: - "Liberation" 2. Purpose of Study: Examine History, Or- documentation was illuminating and ganization, Administration and Operations This vital for this study: it revealed the inner 1. Founding of American Committee The purpose of this study is to examine .workings of RL, its basic policies and policy What is now called Radio Liberty was the history, organization, administration, procedures; it contained actual scripts (and formally conceived, at least organizationally, some tapes) In the original languages and in the State of Delaware on January 18, and operations of Radio Liberty. It does riot examine the various alternatives for possible in translation; it contained also examples 1951, with the incorporation of the "Ameri-. administration of RL in the future as these of reports on research activities, broadcast- can Committee for Freedom of the Peoples have been proposed in the Congress and the ing, and policy maintenance, and, among of the USSR, Inc." This organization was a Executive Branch or which might otherwise other things, materials on audience research. forerunner of the present Radio Liberty Com- be considered. Nor does it analyze what kind All of this documenation was examined; mittee, Inc. One of the purposes of. this of role, if any, RL might fulfill in the broad- much of it was actually used in the prepara- committee was to sp^+nsor shortwave broad- cast context. of American foreign policy. tion of this study; some has been inserted casts to the Soviet Union by former Soviet These are being examined in separate reports in the appendix. ciitzens living in the West. But, two years to be submitted to the Senate Foreign Rela- were to pass before actual broadcasts to the tions Committee in the future. Original documentation was supplemented Soviet Union were initiated,' and both RE's Munich New headquarters k head- An anti-Communist organization called BY illuminating c in a factual way the his- qu aarters field (2 days) 2r tory and present organization, purposes, and (2 weeks) for a first-hand view of oper- the "Coordinating Center of the Anti-Bol- operations of RL, it is hoped that this study ations, at which time further valuable in- shevist Struggle" was apparently the semi- will assist in an evaluation of its activities formation was gathered from interviews nil force in early broadcast planning. The in the context of United States foreign policy with top executives, leading administrators, ideological coloration of the entire orga- and how it relates to currently declared pur- and key staff personnel. These interviews nization and its operation was "liberation." poses of that policy. It is also hoped that were both extensive and intensive, and the In November 1952, a draft policy statement an in-depth research effort on this organiza- voluminous notes that resulted have been was issued, declaring that the organ of the tion will assist a broader understanding integrated into this study. Coordinating Center charged with radio mat- of its purposes and functions; that it will tars would have "overall responsibility for close possible informational gaps and dispel In providing documentation and in the setting the political and propaganda line misconceptions; and that it will provide use- interviews, RL staff from the President in se se only limitation ful data for those concerned with assessing New' York and the Executive Director in the imposed Radio the Statibonon.." " The broadcasts of the Coord Munich to lower echelon personnel was ex-on . its purposes and impact, nating Center was i+nsistence.on broad ad- B, cooperative and most generous. herence to a "Joint Agreement on Principles B, Fran of reference 3. Certain Assumptions 1. Basic Approach adopted by the Coordinating Center and the The frame of reference for this study had In this research effort certain assumptions -American Committee. to be designed in such a way so that a single had to be made. The first is that the docu- But this agreement was hardly restric- researcher could find out maximum informs- mentation represents an authentic basis tlve. In fact, the permissible limits of poli- upon which to judge RL. On the other hand, tical action appear in retrospect to have tion on RL within a minimum period of no documentation of any extent was avail- been very broadly drawn. The basic- political time. With economy of time and efficiency ? able from any other source. line of the radio was to be identical with of research method in mind, the basic ap- The second assumption is that the best the political platform of the Coordinating preach, therefoorganizational e, was to take abroad over- way to determine RL's performance as a sur- Center, namely: "Implacable struggle against sieve g, its research its re facilities, structure, opera- - rogate "Home Service" broadcaster to the the Communist dictatorship until its coln- tails In ffnaeyyand its ing Soviet Union and to determine whether or plete destruction. " According to this bons n Munich; to analyze RL's operating not this performance falls within the larger declaration of principles, the "radio's main policito examine e processes of policy forma- limits of American foreign policy interests theme will be liberation--liberation from tion; procedures for policy licy execu- tion and policy maintenance in program- was through a study of RL's policy, that is, a the tyranny of Bolshevism and one party Irving and production; to observe actual oper- study of organizational policy, policy forma- rule, from poverty and suffering forced upon ations in policy-making, programming, and tion, policy procedures, and policy control. the people by the Bolshevist regime, and broadcasting; and to evaluate overall audi- The third assumption is that RL personnel from the threat of war imposed 'by Bol- shevist foreign policy and Ideology. . m ence impact and effectiveness.. The time- who provided documentation and interviews frame for the study is the period 1970-71, ' upon which this study is based (and could 2. RL's Political Line: "Liberation" except for the ease study of RL policy execu- only be based) attempted to give a reason- Broadcasts of "Radio Liberation from tian and broadcasting behavior during the ably objective and fair-minded appraisal of Bolshevism" began on March 1, 1953, just 5 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. their organization, its policies, its oper- days before Stalin's death. The name was 2. Sources ations, its effectiveness. A pledge of full co- changed to simply Radio Liberation in Octo- operation was given by President Sargeant ber 1956, and to Radio Liberty in December In pursuing this research task, it was to Dr. L. Quincy Mumford, the Librarian of , 1963. necessary to rely heavily on documentation ' Congress in his letter of July 26, 1971, on A small-scale operation, it had in the be- furnished by RL. Published sources oil RL the occasion of the public announcement of ginning only two antennas and two 10,000- are virtually 'non-existent. No books have the 4enate requested study. There is no watt transmitters located in Lampertheim, ever been written on its operations, and the evidence that full cooperation was not given, few articels in the periodical literature are West Germany. By this time the Coordinat- few and large flavored with excessive praise 4. Selectivity of Research Materials ing Center had collapsed from internal on one side or equally excessive criticism on By necessity, some of the research mate= stresses. Hopes of reviving it, however, per the other. Except for recent Congressional rials for this study had to be selective: the sisted. Nonetheless, the commitment of the hearings and reports, information for this criterion was qualitative, not quantitative. radio to the principles of the now defunct study has necessarily had to come from RL Thus, randomly selected translated scripts, "Joint Agreement," that is to say, "libera- itself. Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, President policy guidances, pre-broadcast and post- tion," was implicit in the initial broadcasts. of the Radio Liberty Committee, Mr. W. K.- broadcast review auditions, and audience The same general line of "implacable strug- Scott, Executive Director of RL's operations research reports were used and some repro- gle against Communist dictatorship until its Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE S 3385 complete destruction" was perpetuated in Ra- tial memorandum to his executive staff de- as a "guest" in the home of each individual dio Liberation Basic Guidance #1 of Decem- fining the overall purposes of the Commit- listener.u her 10, 1953 and Radio Liberation Basle Guid- tee in, more moderate terms. Such positive RL's policy underwent another transfor- ance #2 of January 8, 1954.6 concepts as these were cited in the "Operat- mation with the publication of a new Policy 3, "Liberation": Reflected Theme of ing Objectives" of the memorandum: "En- Manual in March 1971. The commitment to American Foreign Policy courage reliance on traditional indigenous evolutionary liberalization was further deep- In an article appearing in The New Leader spiritual concepts; stimulate independent ened and guidelines for encouraging those on Oail 1968-an article The New sympathetic thinking and a spirit of free inquiry; pre- positive forces of change within Soviet so- on the purposes of n tide Rof sent specific democratic political, economic, ciety were spelled out. This Policy Manual, Life Magazine referred lL RL as a ob Robbing i wax and social processes as an attainable and setting forth the aims, principles and poIi- Life Magazine Mr. IIorredg did not use tterm attractive alternative to the communist die- cies of RL, will be discussed in Chapter II operati a pejr Mr sense, bb for did not was use RL's this raison term tatorship; develop basic concepts of justice of the study. d'etre: o was s "said war ocon and human rights for the protection of the 3. Significance of RL's policy change cotre amid dangerously a "c ld e East-West individual against the power of the State; tensions and calating opera " one scholar Put present realistic and practical alternatives Two points seem most significant about p to passive submission to the Soviet sys- the changes In RL's basic policy from "Lib- it, "Liberation," 7 This term seemed quite ap- tem." n eration" to "Liberalization." One is the fact propriate at that time since it reflected the RL's policy was further moderated with that this change has been recognized by foreign policy coloration of the first years of the publication of its first Policy Manual offlicals in the United States Government the Eisenhower Administration.' on June 29, 1956. The goal of "implacable and by the Soviets themselves. For over five years after World War II it struggle" was reiterated, but no longer was In 1971. Senate hearings, Senator John seemed to the West that Soviet Russia had there insistence on the "complete destruc- Sparkman (D.-Ala.) asked about the policy been committed to a policy of political and tion" of the Communist dictatorship. In- orientation of RFE/RL. "Has their policy even military aggression. Its foreign policy, croasingly the direction of RL's policy was orientation changed over the years? Has it, in Western eyes, admitted no genuine accom- toward presenting a democratic alternative shall I say, mellowed? What is their objec- modation of interests, Stalin's policy seemed for internal progress by stimulating rode- tive?" he asked. to conform completely to the ideological prin- pendent political thought among the So- Assistant Secretary of State for European ciple of unremitting conflict with world cap- viet people?" Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand replied: "I italism. Thrust had to be met with counter- Restraint and moderation in policy were think one can say looking over. the broad. thrust, it was believed in the West. The Com- apparently reflected in RL's programming casts over the years, that there has been a Ini.urist invasion of South Korea in June,. during the critical months of 1966. For RL gradual shift away from the intensity of 1950 was universally regarded among the was not subjected to the controversy that the confrontation which existed during the Western powers as the most serious manifes- surrounded RFE after the Hungarian Revo- height of the cold war period to a more, let us tation of Moscow's outward. thrust since it lution of 1956. (RFE had been charged with say, equable facing of the news on a day-to- directly challenged the world position of the unnecessarily raising the hopes of Western day basis. This we anticipate would continue United States and its Western allies. This intervention in the revolution.)u In fact, on into the future." "I would anticipate that threat to vital interests and the response to during these years RL had been criticized the dissemination of accurate information it inevitably quickened the pace of the Cold- for broadcasting material far too bland and abouttconditions in Eastern Europe and else- War, raising the level of East-West tension to moderate in political content 1' where," he added, would continue to be new and dangerous heights. By 1958, the pace of de-Stalinization and the primary function of the radios in the This was the climate within which RL was other changes in Soviet society had made it future." 10 conceived, It was a creation Of the Cold War,. necessary to revise RL's basic Policy Man- The Soviets have also admitted a basic designed to satisfy U.S. foreign policy re- ual. The new document, issued on Novem- change in the policies and approach of both quirements of that time. RL was one of the her 15, of that year, made it' clear that radios. Speaking generally of the changing many weapons Qf psychological warfare in evolution, not revolution, was the main di- character of all American radio broadcasting tended to moot Soviet Russia and its Commu- rection of political change within the So- to the Soviet bloc, Artem R. Panfiov observed nisi allies on their terms. viet Union. The now Policy Manual placed in his book entitled, "U.S. Radio in Psycho- 11. From "Liberation" to "liberalization" special emphasis on the need for adjusting logical Warfare": to the changing Soviet reality. The princi- "In practice, propaganda for the overthrow 1. The Changing Soviet Reality pie of freely elected government as a means of the "Communist regime" has almost dis- In the first year and a half after its In. for -political transformation in the Soviet appeared from all American broadcasts to the ception, RL remained committed to the basic Union was asserted. Such change was to be socialist countries of Europe. Even "Radio policy of "implaccable struggle against the achieved "through the will and endeavors Free Europe" no longer broadcasts such Communist dictatorship until its complete of the peoples of the Soviet Union them- propaganda, or in any event restricts itself to destruction." But Stalin had died and in the selves." sentences which allege that "in your coup- next three years powerful forces of change According to the Manual, RL would nei- try Communism is an experiment con- were unleashed within the Soviet Union that ther directly nor indirectly attempt to urge domned to failure." The tone of the radio were in the course of time to transform the any particular political platform or promote broadcasts has changed significantly: the Soviet state and society from Its Stalinist directly any line of action. RL would make it crude insinuations and profanities have dis- form to one of modified Soviet totalitarian- clear that the democratic West did not seek appeared. Direct interference in the internal ism. "Peaceful coexistence," defined to suit to impose any particular form of government affairs country or another in the form Soviet ideological needs but differently un- on the Soviet peoples. Moderation and re- of all sorts of advice to radio listeners has derstood in the West, was the all-embracing straint were restated as principles to be fol- almost ceased, and undercover propaganda term used by the leadership that seemed best lowed in broadcasting.a has left the scene." Y7 to describe what was to take place in the What seemed most significant in this new The other significant point in the changes next few years. Policy Manual was a commitment to a policy in RL's style, policies and general approach On the international scene tensions were of peaceful liberalization of Soviet society, from "Liberation" to "Liberalization" is the momentarily eased as the Soviet Union ad- Moreover, it seemed clear by the implica- character of the Policy Manual Itself. This vocated something of a peaceful respite in tions of this Policy Manual that RL was will be discussed in more detail below; but world tensions: the Korean, war Was brought seeking to complement its basic image-as a suffice it to say that the Policy Manual is not to an end; the Stalinist policy of continen- station of former Soviet citizens with the a static document but rather a "living" talism was replaced by a broader and more highest standards of professional journalistic document which in the form of supplement- politically oriented commitment to global- objectivity.14 ary guidances is updated and thus undergoes ism; an era of negotiation was launched with Not until May 1965 did RL issue another continuing changes as Policy Planning Staff the West in which a measure of success was Policy Manual. Issued as a guideline for contemplate future developments in the to be achieved. radio programing in the post-Khrushchev Soviet Union. The Policy Manual seeks there- Internally, winds of change were admitted period, the new Manual was even more ex-. fore a continuing adjustment of policy and to the Soviet Union as the post-Stalinist plicit than its predecessor in stressing the operations to the ever-changing Soviet real- leadership under Khrushchev attempted to principle of evolutionary change. As a "free ity. But it should be remembered that this replace Stalinism and ease internal tensions voice of former Soviet citizens," RL at- manual is based on RL assumptions and by reconciling the political system of Soviet tempted "to express, encourage, and develop reflects its own perception of the Soviet totalitarianism with the human needs of a tendencies within the Soviet Union that can Union. much deprived Soviet people. contribute to the fulfillment of the best aspirations and needs of all the peoples of III. PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 2. RL Adjusts to Changing Soviet Reality, the USSR." RL was dedicated, it said, "to A. Administrative Headquarters in New York RL adjusted to these changes within the helping all citizens of the USSR achieve When RL began broadcasting in March 'Soviet Union. The basic policy of "implac- freedom and responsible government...." RL . 1963, it did so with only modest facilities able struggle" and "liberation" came to. be defined its role as seeking "to stimulate in- and limited power output. However, in the increasingly questioned . on practical dividual thinking, not to incite group ac- next 18 years its resources for broadcasting grounds. As early as September 1, 1954, Ad- tion." Friendliness of tone was given particu- and research have multiplied many fold. Ad- miral Leslie 0. Stevens, President of the lar emphasis in the 1966 Policy Manual, and ministrative headquarters' for RL are in New American Committee, circulated a conflden- programers were encouraged to think of RL York City at 30 East 42nd Street. Mr. How- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700130022-5 S 3386 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 1972 land H. Sargeant, V. former Under. Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, is president. (See Appendix I for biographic. sketch), Represented on the Board oS Trustees are leaders in the American busi- ness community, former government officials and military leaders, educators and pub- licists.'v . Fortner President Barry S, Truman is an Honorary Chairman. Former Presidents Her- bert H. Hoover and Dwight D. Eisenhower had served in a similar capacity before their deaths In 1984 and 1969 respectively. By its charter the Board of Trustees has consider- able power, but over the years It has played a passive role towards its responsibilities. Consequently, by default the President, for- mally the leading executive, has assured a far more predominant position within the organization than what seems to have been initially intended. In this respect RL's Board of Trustees has failed in its responsibilities to the organiza- tion.. In contrast to RFE's Board ff Directors which has actively participated in the affairs of the Radio, RL's Board of Trustees has played a very passive role, seeming to defer to the President. Apparently, the strength of Mr. Sargeant as an administrator has com- pensated for any organizational deficiencies that might have resulted. The chart reproduced on the adjoining page (see Figure 1) describes the overall or- gautzational structure of .RL. Staff of Radio Liberty Committee are located in New York. These include the Office of the President, In- formation Division, Comptroller and Ad- ministration. The Audience Research Divi- rion and Program Evaluation In Paris and 1\iunich, along with the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, respond di- rectly to the President. Their functions will be described in other parts of this study. The operations of the U.S. Division and those of Munich, (which constitute the heart of RL's activities) fall within the administrative purview of the Executive Director located in Munich. B: ilL's Operations in Munich In addition to its'New York headquarters, RL maintains administrative offices, broad- cast headquarters and research facilities Ili, Munich, Germany. Offices, studios and other facilities are located in Barcelona, Lamper- theim . (Germany), London, Madrid, Paris, Play del Pals (Spain), and Taipel.a All of these facilities together with the U.S. Dlvi- sion come under the administrative direction of RL's Executive Director Ili Munich. RL's Munich headquarters is located at Arabellastrasse 18, on the fringe of the old city of Munich and in the area of extensive new construction of modern buildings. (?RL had to abandon its former site to make way for the Olympic grounds,) This is a new building, constructed less than five years ago. R.L occupies about one-half of the site, highly functional and with generally-modest interior appointments, it provides ideal facil- ities for carrying on research and broad- casting operations. 'The chart produced on the adjoining page (see Figure 2) describes the major subdivi- sions of RL's operations in Munich. Mr. Wal- ter Ir. Scott, a former State Department ofli= cial, is Executive Director of RL's Munich headquarters. His deputy is Francis'S. Ron- alds, formerly of USIA and a RL staffman of some years ago. (See Appendix I for bio- graphic sketches:) In their hands rests over- all executive atuho:rity and responsibility in Munich. Operations at Munich are broken down into four major subdivisions; the Program Policy Division; the Network Division; the Administrative Division; and the Program Operations Division. All four divisions are closely interrelated. The Program Policy Division (PPD) plays a vital role in RL's operation: It is respon- sible for the formulation of policy and, along with other components, the oversight of its execution. The extent to which the-so func- tions are efficiently carried out determines in large measure the effectiveness of RL's oper- ations. The Research Department operates directly under PPD, the purpose being to integrate as closely as possible research with policy, The Program Operations Division (POD) is responsible for the production of programs that are to he beamed to the Soviet Union. The Central News Service, drawing from the major wire services in the world and having daily access to RFE's news budget, provides the source of news for the other major sub- units within POD, namely the Russian Serv- ice and the Nationalities Service. Since Russians constitute the dominant ethnic group within the USSR and since their language is the lingua franca of the Soviet state, the major thrust of RL's effort In programming is in the Russian Service; it broadcasts 24 hours a clay. The Nationali- ties Service is broken down into subunits representing the various languages, that is, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Belorussian, Geor- gian, North Caucasian, Tatar-Bashkir, Turk. estani, and Ukrainian. Over the years its programming effort has been placed at a much lower priority than that of the Rus- sian, even though the non-Russian peoples now- constitute nearly one-half the total population. However, this imbalance is, apparently, now being somewhat corrected. RL's bureau in-London, Paris, Taipei, are important sources of news inflow and other forms of programming; they fall operationally under the administrative direction of the Director, POD. The Production Department within POD has, the responsibility for getting the pro- grams on the air. This is both a creative and a technical task; creative in that it is con- cerned with the style and form of produc- tion, that is, the staging, the voicing by per- formers, and in general the theatrics of a show; and technical In that it actually tapes the programs for later transmission. Tied closely to the production end of the operation is the Director of the Network Division who has the responsibility of getting the program on the air and transmitted to the Soviet Union. 'His task is made exceed- ingly difficult by the Soviet practice of jam- ming RL broadcasts 24 hours a day. Finally, the Director of the Administration Division has responsibility for the function- ing of the strictly administrative side of RL's operations in Munich. C. U.S. Division The U.S. Division of RL, though housed in New York headquarters of the Radio Liberty Committee, falls administratively under the 'direction of the Executive Director in Mu- nich. (See Figure 3.) This seeming orga- nizational anomaly was more or less a crea- ture of necessity and accident. For safety's sake many RL employees in Munich - who were former Soviet citizens wanted to live in the United States, far away from the Communist border which was only some 80 miles to the east. Accommodations were accordingly made to resolve this prob- lem in the form of the U.S, Division, Moreover, large-scale migration of refu- gees to New York from the Soviet Unionand Eastern Europe in the ,postwar period had already created in this country a potential source of talent for RL. Accordingly, efforts were made to recruit staff from among them. As early as 1352 scripts were being prepared in Now York, and by 1955 a Radio Program- mining Support Division was being organized in the United States; this was the beginning of the U.B. Division. Ili the next decade and a half the U.S. Division developed into a programming op- eration for Russian and 10 other Soviet lan- guages, utilizing talent available in the United States either on a fulltime or "free lance" basis. Presently, the U.S. Division complements the Munich operations by pro- ducing programming which is planned, re- searched, written, edited, recorded on tape in the three New York studios, timed, dubbed and shipped by air to Munich in finished form ready to go on the air. However, the Munich headquarters exercises the final word on policy and program structure. By and large the U.S. Division focuses on reporting on the American scene, not from the Ameri- can point of view but rather from the point of view of former Soviet citizens who are aware of their fellow countrymen's interests. RL has benefited by the existence of this U.S. Division, It has been able, first of all, to draw upon the multiple talents of former Soviet citizens living in the United States. It has also had the advantage of close prox- imity to such news producing centers as the United Nations, New York, and Washington. Moreover, it has been able to draw upon tal- ent within the American scholarly cammu- ality, especially fromthose who specialize in Soviet affairs. Finally, through the U.S. Di- vision, RL has been in a position to main- tain productive connections with the com- munity of former Soviet citizens in the United States and Canada. 20 D. Adniinistrative style of RL An important aspect of the organization of RL is what might be called administrative style. In briefs the administrative style of RL seems to be one that encourages flexibility and informality, and fosters a type of or- ganizational fluidity that allows the widest permissible, range of individual creativity and initiative, yet within a closely adminis- tered and carefully structured system of pol- icy. This style radiates from the top executive echelon through the lower levels of the or- ganization, Mr. Sargeant observed that he believed in the principle of organizational autonomy. He explained this in terns of, (1) having a staff of experts and profession- als of the highest caliber, then (2) laying out effective guidelines of policy for the or- ganization, and (3) allowing the staff to in- terpret policy and function within a wide range of latitude. This style. emanates not only from a personal preference, but also from the practical necessity of administering an essentially news-oriented, deadline-eon- sciops radio operation under conditions of a ?6-hour time lag between New York head- quarters and Munich. In Munich, Mr. Scott reflected the same administrative style. He said that RL oper- "the peak of allowable creative free- dom" within the context of carefully defined policy, and that he sees this development as a continuing organizational trend, There was, he said, a remarkable degree of agree- ment within the organization on this larger administrative style; however, he stressed - that control was tighter at the closer oper- ating level. Other members of R.L staff voiced similar views; particularly the script writers, re- garding autonomy and allowance of Individ- ual creativity at the lower working level. At the strictly operational level, notably 'in the Production Department, the require- ments are essentially technical and thus the exercise of administrative control is by nec- essity tight. But this is not the case in programming, script writing, research, and in news processing. In the last-named func- tion the concept of administrative autonomy is especially relevant. News processing re- quires a climate of freedom and less depen- dency among staff. New emergencies do occur, and an effective functioning of staff requires not only a high sense of journalistic profes- sionalism but also a feeling of self-confidence, Independence and self-reliance that is fos- tered by the concept of administrative au- tonomy. This administrative style helps to foster a spirit of intellectual creativity and the exer- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE .. S 3387 case of initiative within fairly wide parame- ters of policy. For an organization like RL this is perhaps vital if it is to achieve its purposes for, it is not just a radio per so, In the American conception, but rather an institution combining many functions and requiring above all Intellectualism, linguistic skill, professional journalism, and a sense of theatrics, all of which can only thrive with- in a climate of allowable creativity. On the other hand; administrative flex- ibility, too widely conceived, can create con- T/p Actual dittons for mistakes. This is an important directly with one of the world's superpowers. E. EL's position in executive branch The specific relations which have existed between RL and the CIA or other agencies in the Executive Branch and the extent of RL's independence on or freedom from di- rection by the Executive Branch could not be fully explored during this study. Thus, it cannot be said categorically that it is not free -from direction. However, as an outsider viewing RL's current operations through documentation, extensive interviews with staff, and actual on-site visits to facilities, certain aspects of RL's activities are appar- ent, and it is possible to make some reason- able generalizations. First of all, RL is clearly a United States Government operation, It is, indeed, an in- tegral part of this Nation's foreign policy apparatus. Secondly, the organization seems to have a wide range of independence from the Executive Branch in its broadcasting op- erations. This is apparent in its policy struc- ture and policy content. And thirdly, RL's organizational policies, as set forth in the Policy Manual and augmented by periodic guidances, seem to be generated within the organization itself and not necessarily dic- tated by an outside authority. A careful study of RL's policies in the past few years Indicates that they seem to be fairly "com- monsense statements" that fall within and observe the larger consensus of American for- eign policy, The reader can judge for him= self by reviewing the material presented in Chapter II on policy formation and other materials reproduced in the Appendix. IV. STAFFING A. Size of staff In recent years RL's staff has numbered around 1,000. According to figures published in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on RFE/RL, there were 953 employees in 1970, 902 in 1971 and 967 projected for 1972.2t According to information provided from the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1971, RL has a total of 1,087 employees. In its T/O, RL numbers Its employees at 1,004,. but the actual number on board, is 932, Personnel within RL are allocated in accordance with the Strength Report of June 1971 reproduced as Figure 4. B. National Characteristics. of Staff The unique purposes of RL as a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people require staffing that is multi-national, for if RL is to communicate effectively it must do so in the many languages of the Soviet peoples. The Soviet Union is a multi-national state, hav-' ing in its population of 241,784,000 ethnic languages, Crimean-Tatar, Karakalpak, Ka- zakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uighur, and, Uzbek- Staff requirements are high in mat- ters of linguistic skills, for the broadcaster, speaking as a friend and fellow countryman from abroad, must do so in the language, the accent, and the style of his audience. FIG. 4.-RADIO LIBERTY COMMITTEE STRENGTH REPORT, General management: Office of the president_____________ - " 11 Information division______________ 7 Administration division, N.Y------- 16 Comptroller's office_______________ 11 Total ............. RL management: Office of executive director------..- 17 Administration, Munich ............ 129 RL programing: Program policy division------...... 54 Program operations division ........ 261 U.S. division--------------------- 69 London bureau___________________ 5 Paris bureau________________ 7 Audience research division_________ Total ------------ ....... RL network: New York office ------- __......... Munich office____________________ Lampertheim Transmitter Station ___ Pals Transmitter Station ........... Pa Li Transmitter Station _:__:__:?_ Total-------?--- A review of the biographic sketches in Ap- pendix 1 provides some indication of the pro- fessionalism of RL's staff. A total of 19 RL staffers hold doctoral degrees, 41 have other advanced degrees, while many others are currently working for post-graduate degrees 25 Years of research experience in the Soviet field and experience in the practical world of journalism and network broadcasting have further strengthened RL staff capabilities. Ideally, an RL staffer must have a combi- nation of expertise; he must have substan- tive knowledge in Soviet affairs; he must be knowledgeable in communications techni- que; he must have complete competence in Russian and in the case of other nationali- ties, their particular languages; he must be trained in the American requirements of scholarly research; he must have, in brief, the combined skills of a scholar, writer, Journalist, and radio performer. When any of these requirements are lacking, RL seeks to correct the deficiency through training. 47 435 68 5 7 16 113 412 375 Institute division_________________ 9 German corporation_______________ 41 11 15 12 57 65 193 16 343 An asset in RL is the multi-functional roles that staff often plays. It is not excep- tional that one staffman will do the research for a program, prepare the script for broad- cast, produce the program, and finally par- ticipato In the actual broadcasting. Every effort is made in the Program Operations Division to have staff deliver their own scripts. As one RL staffer said, RL tries to overcome the "one man for one job ap- proach" and attempts to develop a staff that has multiple-functional capabilities. To enhance the professionalism of staff, RL maintains an in-house training program. A staffman schooled in the American legitimate theater will work with raw newcomers from the Soviet Union training their voices and preparing them to be effective announcers,. The Production Department is constantly en- gaged in developin and t i i g ra n ng new TotaL_______________________50 44 talent-,persons, for example, who have ex- r ARD: 1 London; 3 Paris; 9 Munich. Thug, the overwhelming majority of RL's programmers are former Soviet citizens. Most of the remainder have common roots and native identity with RL's audience because either they or their parents were born on the territories that now comprise the USSR. Of the 182 writers, editors, producers and broad- casters, 1.1 percent are from the prerevolu- tionary emigration; 13,2 percent are second generation; 4.4 percent fall in other cate- gories; while 81.3 percent are former Soviet citizens?a Newcomers from the Soviet Union do augment RL's staff, infusing it with new blood and providing a fresh Soviet perspec- tive. But their number, especially from among the Slavic peoples of European Rus- sia, is nowhere sufficient to insure stable staff conditions in the future. Owing to the uniqueness of RL's role in broadcasting, native Soviet peoples by and large hold many of the operational posts in the organization, such as area desks 'for broadcasting and script writing. However, as an examination of Appendix 1 end Figure 2 will reveal, top administrative posts In RL policymaking, policy control, and in key op- erations are held by Americans. groups numbering more than 170, speaking C. Professionalism of staff some 125 different languages and dialects, When In the spring of 1971 David Binder and practicing 40 different religions that of The New York Times visited both RL and embrace in substantial numbers the major RFE headquarters in Munich, he found that faiths of the world. - both organizations "are staffed by specialists Within RL (as within the Soviet Union), who take pride in their professionalism." Russian Is the lingua franca, but broadcasts Analysts like Keith Bush of RL and James are made in as many as 20 languages. In the Brown of RFE, he continued, "are well re- Slavic languages there are broadcasts in Rus- garded among historians and other profes- scan, Ukrainian and Belorussian. And in the sional students of Soviet-bloc affairs." 21 non-Slavic languages there are broadcasts Leading Western scholars on Soviet affairs In Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian; in have commented favorably on the high qual- the North Caucasian languages, that is Ity of work produced by RL's staff. (For ex- Adhige, Aver, Chechen, Karachal, Ossetian, amples of RL's research products, see Ap- and Tatar-Bashkir; and in the Tarkestant . pendix 22.) . rauio reonniques. The Central News Depart- ment trains personnel from the inside. "Where do you find a Russian journalist?" one staffman said. In some instances RL will finance further study for personnel, as in the case of a young, talented Soviet seaman who had defected and is now studying at the University of Glasgow under a special ar- rangement with RL.20 D. Continuity and change in staff In-house training for RL is a necessity. For RL faces the difficult problem of adequate staffing In an enterprise where the inflow of new personnel is extraordinarily limited. Being a "Home Service" for the Soviet Union Imposes, among other things, special lin- guistic requirements that are filled only by 'newcomers from the.Soviet Union. (Nothing will "turn off a Soviet listener quicker," said one staffman, "than a broadcaster speaking heavily accented and poorly articu- lated Russian.") But in recent years such newcomers have been few. More often than not RL cannot compete with offers coming from other quarters, such as the universities and government services. However, Turkey has offered some opportunities for recruiting for Soviet Central Asians, some going there directly from the Soviet Union, others being first and second generation Tatars, Kazakhs or other nationalities. Personnel replacement is thus a potentially serious problem facing RL; for, it is caught in a scissors of an aging staff and difficulties in recruitment, The reservoir of former So- viet citizens that was once available in Ger- many and upon whose skills RL was con- structed is no longer available. And those staffmen who have been with RL since its beginning are approaching (and some have passed) retirement age. Efforts are made to continue staff, normally reaching retirement, in a status of "extended" service. Presently, there are 17 Russians, two Ukrainians and one Georgian (in the category of "prime language") that are in that status. Under the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---- SENATE March 6, 1972 coIt this Wa: te ntribution-of the aoutside Soviet audience. Four ofs he llarge transmit- normal by 1976, retirement, and creative put dvice- trans there will be a total of 62 anticipat fall within the Russian category sr academic Specialists in Soviet affairs and tors have been combined to provide two aig- Though the average age of RL's staff is communications have played a major part" nahS f 500 0001watts,each or one signal 1,000,- lower than RFE's average of 45, still RL can- in BL's work.* 000 not escape the reality of staff attrition by re- Perhaps, one of the most recent illustra- In addition, the Pals transmitter has the tiremont and difficulties in recruiting. The Lions of this practice was the panel broadcast advantage of "over-the-water reflection." age factor would seem to be important both discussion held in London, England on April With tits antennas located directly on. the in terms of organizational efilolenty and con- 23, 1971. Participants on this panel were some beach, the Mediterranean Sea provides the tinuity, and in dealing with the universal of the Western world's leading Soviet special- nearly perfect flat reflecting surface so im- problem of the generation gap. Effective corn- fists, namely: Leonard Schapiro and Peter portant in overcoming jamming through sky- munication between the Soviet people and Secldaway of the London School of Eco- wave shortwave transmissions. The geograph- former Soviet citizens is not only a matter of nomics; Max Hayward, St. Anthony's College, teal placement of the Pals site also allows linguistic facility but also one of speaking Oxford University; Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, maximum benefit from the phenomenon of the language of the generation that will be Director, Center for the Study of Religion and twilight immunity. Thus, BL's megawatt et specialis the dominant force in Soviet Russia's future. f rnthruni don Daily Floyd,aSoviMartin Dewt ftra illnshorter is be dio t ato be nsm tterl iosinter ea- F,.. Organization eattitutrnent and general hirst, Faculty of Slavonic Studies at Glasgow tional broadcasting: it can deliver a signal, attitude University; Leo Labedz, editor of Survey, effective in the presence of jamming, to most A final point to be made in the matter of one of the leading scholarly journals in the areas in European USSR from its Western staff concerns the rather intangible, yet im- West on Soviet bloc affairs; and Abe Brum- borders to the Urals and from the Baltic to portant, idea of organizational commitment berg, long-time editor of Problems of Com- the Black Seas. (For commentary on the and general attitude towards the goals and munism, the publication of USIA. Edward range of coverage, and estimated population purposes of RL. Van Der Rhoer, Policy Director of RL, and in the areas covered, see Chapter III, pp. The positive assessment of David Binder Albert Bolter, head of RL's Research Depart- 122-123.) on the sense of professionalism pervading meat, were the only representatives of RL on BL's transmitter station on Taiwan was RL's staff appears justified. Adherence to the the panel. made more efficient in two ways: first, by general rubrics of scholarly research and The discussion centered on the practical modernizing and strengthening its technical writings are reflected not only in published matter of BL's policy on the use of samizdat plant, and, secondly, by relocating it in an works and in other research efforts but also (that is, self-publishing of material not ail- area free from obstruction and providing in staff papers and memoranda intended for thorized by the Soviet regime) in its broad- over- the-water reflection for its signals. Broad strictly internal use. (This was not the case, casting. The printed text of this stimulating casts emanating from BL's Taiwan station go however, in BL's public presentation to Con- and authoritative discussion amounted 'to out over three 50,000 watt transmitters and gress in 1971 which had more the flavor of a approximately 30,000 words, that is to say, a are directed to the Soviet Far East. public small book. . The maps reproduced in Figure 5-8 show tsch relations effort than a serious attempt at scholarship.) Even to the casual observer An example of the type of subject matter the coverage contours of RL's main trans- the care taken in policy formulation, pro- discussed for future RL policy formulation mitters. gramming, production., policy control, and was the suggestion of Prof. Schapiro to use The main studio facilities for RL are lo- program evaluation, indicates a high sense samtzdat material relating to civil rights in sated in Munic, Germany. The studio and of professional concern. The multilingual the Soviet Union. Prof. Schapiro, a tradned master control complex (8 studios in all) are facility of staff reveals, moreover, a level of lawyer and one of England's leading Soviet among the most modern in the shortwave linguistic professionalism that is impressive specialists who is widely known In the United field. The master control function is respon- to the outsider. States and throughout the West, discounted sible for feeding program material in 17 lan- Evident also in RL's staff, especially in re- appeals on the international level, but urged, guages to the Pals and Lampertheim trans- search, is the unique combination of Ameri- the use of material that would be of practical mitter sites on an around-the-clock basis. can and Western scholarship with that of use to the Soviet citizen. He cited the "re- In adidtion' to this coverage, it reproduces ram the native talents of former Soviet citizens markable" Yesenin-Volpin document which these pro agind for materials f dissemior trans- who are deeply immersed in their own native told what to do when being interrogated by Soviet environment both through the writ- Soviet authorities, and urged: "There is a Taipei station, as well as for distribution to ten word and their own experience. In the thing to broadcast again and again. It is area experts for analysis and criticism. Live view of one senior American analyst in RL wonderful, practical information. This tells newscasts are transmitted to Taipei via satel- tgr ms t are flown toinadei in this combination has resulted in a good re- what you legally can do and what you cannot lice; tapes of timeprog search product; while to a senior commen- do," 10 taton?, a R Russian by birth, t h, the he combination This panel discussion provided the basis lines. RL also maintains bureaus with studios . Tile London Idtnia heacipeartere provided the possibility in broadcasting of for the adoption of future policy on the use New e , enables the bridging the gap of misunderstanding be- of satnizdat. use use of tape to maintain and coordination quality a viet pe West and imparting the values and traditions A. Broadcasting Facilities 2. Frequency Allocation and Transmitter of the West into the Soviet environment. 1. Power and Transmitter Locations Licensing Wait seems most significann however, It is is In the beginning RL had only one trans- RL has an average of 33 internationally the rit t t spirit of the seg an inner mitter station; it was located at Lamper- approved frequencies used in the 75, 49, 41, a spirit that seems to arise g if from rom theim, Germany, and had a very low power 31, 30, 25, 19 and 16 meter bands. As a mem- positiveon change icthininn some form of output (10,000 watts.)st But the Soviets ini- her of the International Telecommunications One s Union in Geneva, it is assigned its broadcast- ositsveenior programming withinofficial, Soivet Morris Union. Dia= tiated around-the-clock jamming of RL, RL'6 kowski, an American of Ukrainian-Cana- signal was, therefore, able to penetrate Soviet ing frequencies on a seasonal basis, To avoid dian extraction, described the feeling of staff sky-wave jamming only at times when iorio- inadvertent interference or duplication of as one of being caught up in an important spheric condiitons were favorable. Such con- broadcasting frequencies, RL participates in ditions occurred in the transition hours dur- regularly scheduled international conferences activity and being deeply involved intitud ing the morning and evening twilight-the designed to coordinate the various broad- ofly as an arrive participant. An attitude condition was called "twilight immunity." casting schedules'- total commitment anizati i , being (This phenomenon will be discussed in detail R.L. operates in Gernnany, Spain and "nits within re osense, o ra he said- e 14 Chapter VI.) BL's technical effectiveness sens io an extreme sense, but rather inth as reduced in this period because it had Taiwan under a franchise issued by the host pale of doing ringing about positive by for mod- lower power and because the Soviets aug- governments. This franchise is, in fact, a li- e orlon in thierSoviet Union. "The accent,ohe inented their jamming activities during RL cense to operate certain facilities and to during twilight. To increase its effectiveness, conduct certain broadcasting operations. The said, is on the positive in this work, and the to increase its power. The Limper- franchise contains conditions relating to the prevailing spirit is one of idealistic expects- RL began their station was improved by adding modern material to be broadcast. Spain, for example, teen of a hopefully better world. "If not;' 150,O00 watt transmitters and by redesigning requires summaries of broadcast materials on he declared, "one would be lost as an indle and rebuilding its completment of antennas. specified subjects. reg u al "ualit es an Soviet cie y, the Presently, RL has two other transmitter But the franchise becomes extremely spe- would lose his of lanesociety, one bases besides the Lampertheim complex: one chic when dealing with the technical op- at Olll 109C iS mental balance." Pals, Spain, and one on Taiwan. The most orations. Jurisdiction over the operations of F. Connections with western scholarly significant increase. in power was accom- the technical facilities is established by the community plished at the Costa Brava station in Spain. telecommunications authority of the host The professionalism of BL's staff is given Five modern and extremely efficient 250,000 government. This authority is concerned further support by the practice of seeking watt and one 100,000 watt transmitters were with such matters as power and frequency advice from outside specialists in such mat- installed during the years 1959-1964. Four assignment and technical performance of the ters as programming, policy, and program groups of high gain antenna curtains were facilities. Do they, for example, conform to evaluation. Outside specialists even partici- designed, engineered and constructed during good engineering practice, that is, harmon- pate in actual broadcasting. BL's formal the same period in order to carry the total its? RL Is obliged to file its frequency re- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S3389 quirements for broadcasting through the RP- 2. Research Resources at RL's Munich have been dictated by the special require- propirate telecommunications authority in Headquarters ments of the various departments in research the host country for notification to the ITU. Both New Stork and Munich maintain sep- and programming. As a result, the library What is important about this arrangement arate research facilities to support their own seems to have taken on the form of an archi- is that the frequencies are registered with individual programming operations. The val center rather than that a of a nerve cen- the ITU in the name of the epuntry filing the main research effort is, however, in Munich. ter for a research organization, at least in the A notification, that is, the host country. This There, the division of labor and allocation American sense. Whether or not disper- action neither confers nor implies any vested of research resources seen to be structured sal or centralization of research resources in- rights to the individual franchised user of generally to suit the particular needs of the to a central library is the most effective and that frequency but only priority rights organization as it has taken shape over the efficient mechanism of organizing RL's infor- granted by the country of notification, that years. Dispersion, therefore, characterizes the mational data may well be a question for is, the host country.30 Dependency of RL on informational side, of RL's operations. future consideration. the host country for its license to transmit Formally, the primary research base within 3. The Institute for the Study of the USSR is, therefore, great, and as RL's network chief RL Is the Research. Department. Efforts have The Institute for the Study of the USSR George Herrick said in commenting on the been made to integrate policy and research was, until recently,' another support serv- precarious nature of licensing and frequency so that policy can have the assurance and ico available for RL staff in research and allocation, "the loss of frequency and license support of solid underpinnings of data and programming. The Institute was an entirely is an irreversible loss; it can't be negotiated analysis. Thus, the Research Department separate operation from RL's broadcasting as an economic matter; the right to operate falls administratively within the responsi- functions, and administratively it was re- and the right to frequencies can't be bility of the Director of the Program Policy sponsible directly to the President of the bought." The matter of licensing became a Division. The Research Department also acts RL Committee. However, the Institute was serious question for RL in the spring of as an informational conduit for programmers located in Munich, and its research resources 1971 when its license to transmit in Germany through which up-to-date information is were available to RL. carne up for renewal. The Soviet bloc exerted channeled. In brief, the Research Depart- The Institute's library of 75,000 volumes great pressure on the West German Govern- ment seeks to establish an inter-relationship constituted one of the richest specialized ment not to renew the license, but the West with both policy and programming. collections on the Soviet Union in Europe. Germans resisted, and RL was given a new In large measure it is one of the principal it concentrated on the acquisition of Soviet lease on life in Munich and Lamperth_eim.- support units of RL's broadcasting opera- materials, particularly current periodicals B. Research, facilities tions. Research staff maintain individual and newspapers. It also contained a large sources of information. A remarkable bank number of hooks and periodicals not now 1. Overview of Resources of data on the Soviet Union called "the Red available. Such basic research materials as RL's broadcasting operations are support- Archives" is at their disposal. Since the Re- the complete sets of Pravda and Izvestia ed by a research effort that is impressive both search Department has become the primary since 1917 were available on microfilm. In in quality and in quantity. To keep abreast depository in RL for the processing of sarniz- addition, the Institute maintained an ox- of internal developments in the Soviet Un- dat and feeding it into programming, re- tensive biographic file of more than 130,000 ion and to know what gaps to fill in their searchers have this wealth of new material leading Soviet personalities. One of its many programming, RL researchers, programmers to enrich their research product. publications was the standard reference and other staff read and process more than The library acts as a broad base archival work, "Who's Who in the USSR." 30 250 Soviet newspapers and journals in addi- support for RL's operations. In addition to The main effort of the Institute was in tion to an equal number from the West. The the general services that a library renders to the realm of publications, notably of peri- annotated bibliographic notes prepared on a research organization, library staff provides odical literature which focused" mainly on the basis of this press screening have fur- RL researchers and programmers with bibli- Soviet interest in the underdeveloped areas niched vast and unique archives containing ographic information on such matter as new of the world. However, the Institute also more than one million separate items of in- acquisitions. and on projected subjects for published books based on conferences and formation. broadcasting set forth in the Monthly Guid- symposia in which leading Soviet specialists In addition to this, RL monitors listen to, ance. - Library staff also maintain' a close in the West participated. A recent book in tape, and partially or fully reproduce the "inter-library loan" relationship with the this series is, "The Military-Technical Rev- texts of from 50 to 120 hours of Soviet Bavarian State Library in Munich where they olution", published by Praeger, edited by broadcasting a day, including the gist of the - can draw on its highly commended "East John Erickson, and containing chapters on columns which Soviet citizens are reading in European "Collection." Soviet defense matters by leading specialists their daily newspapers u Programmers also have their own rode- in the West. In addition, the Institute spon- Moreover, RL libraries in New York and pendent sources of information, in addition gored a 6-week Soviet Area and Russian Munich provide extensive coverage of recent to what is available in the Research Depart- Language Summer School conducted by the periods of Soviet history and up-to-date in- ment. This is especially the case with the University of Oklahoma.40 formation on current Soviet affairs. The Nationalities Service. Owing to their special- Thus, the Institute served various pur- library collection in New York consists of ized interest in the non-Russian Soviet na- poses for RL staff: it provided library ma- 14,000 books, subscriptions to 200 Western -tionalities and to the heavy emphasis on terials that supplemented collections in their and 220 Soviet periodicals and dailies, 2,500 strictly Russian materials in RL's research own library, it brought together specialists microfilms, and extensive files of archival resources, staff of the Nationalities Service on Soviet affairs in conferences and sym- material as well as a record and tape library. have had to develop their own sources of in- posia, thus enabling RL staff through con- In Munich, researchers and programmers formation. In fact, the programmers in "both sultations and informal associations to gain have available a library collection of 65,000 the Russian and Nationalities Services, spe. other perspectives on the Soviet reality; and books, subscriptions to 291 Soviet periodicals, cialists themselves in their own fields, have finally it published data that was available including 59 newspapers and 232 magazines acquired a finger-tip sensitivity to develop- for immediate staff use in research. and scholarly journals. The library also con- ing events and thus often rely upon their 4, Availability of RL's Research Resources tams documents, reports, pamphlets and own resources rather than the lengthy, and Output to Scholars microfilms. Published materials are supple- scholarly-oriented studies from the Research merited by a large achive of in-house mimeo- Department, sometimes too indigestible to - RL's research facilities are open to scholars graphed research materials dating back to suit their immediate needs. The program- and researchers. Moreover, RL makes many 1951 a0 ming effort is essentially a- journalistic oper- of its research products available to a wide Presently, RL has under consideration the ation; it is "history in a hurry", as one senior range of specialists on Soviet affairs. Thus, problem of maintaining a vast samizdat col-- staffman said; it is an "integrating process" RL is able to serve two functions: it is able lection which' increases with each passing of past knowledge with unfolding contempo- to maintain its important connection with week. Scholars regard RL as the largest racy history in which speed is vital. Hence, specialists in the scholarly community in archive for this valuable raw research mate- the need for this special source of informa- the West to whom it often turns for advice ria190 In collecting samizdat, and in repro- tion within immediate reach and in -a read- and counsel on programming and policy ducing an extra copy for broadcasters, RL fly uneasable form. it is also able to infuse up-to-datc.informa- has found itself performing a major -service Other sources of data are available in the tion and important emerging ideas into the to a small circle of Western specialists; but Information Center and Music Library mainstream of Western thought on devel- now it is faced with the problem of whether which are administratively under the Pro- opments in the Soviet Union. a similar service should be performed for a grain Operations Division. The Information A major effort is made by RL to keep So- larger outside circle .37 Recently a decision Center maintains ready-reference material viet specialists informed on current hap- was reached on releasing samizdat, and the such as reviews and periodical literature, penings in the USSR. It does this by dis- mechanism for making it available to the along with a 10-day deposit of RFE daily tributing free-of-charge its publication to scholarly world is now being explored. Ne- news budgets. The Music Library maintains 650 specialists in North America who have gotiations are underway to have duplicate an extensive record and tape collection. regularly asked to receive the material. copies of the material deposited in the Li- TUB, RL has substantial resources of in- RL publications include RL Dispatches on brary of Congress so that scholars will have formation and research data available for current affairs analysis, issued several times a ready access to this. rich-bank of research staff; but it is widely dispersed throughout week; R.L Research Papers, providing more material. the organization. This development seems to, extensive background information; and RL Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3390 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE March 6, 1972 uprising of significant articles froin the FOOTNOTES ng in 1956 by Soviet armor also led to Soviet press. (For examples of RL's publics- 1 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on For- the crushing of cold-war agitation by Radio Lions, see Appendix 22.) The latter two pub- eign Relqtlons. Public financing of Radio Free Europe and, in less dramatic forth, at lications are issued on an ad hoc basis S1 Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Bearings. the Munich station aimed at the Soviet Union RL research facilities have, therefore, not Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971, p. and then called Radio Liberation. At Radio Free Europe only provided support for RL programmers 5. Hereafter cited as, "SFRC, RFE/RL,Iiear- commentators and policy ad- viseTs were dismissed or shifted to innocuous and broadcasters, but, as a spin-off of its pri- i Inge.:' jobs. Radio Liberation changed its namo to many activity, namely, broadcasting, it has 2 When the press reported that the Library Radio Liberty and gradually toned down its also provided an important service to spa- of Congress and General Accounting office aggressive commentators." (Binder, cl.alists in academia, the government, and the were going to prepare studies on R?FE/RL for more ggressive free Europe defends mass media who are concerned with con- the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,, Mr. David. aThe New York RadTimes, io die Free March 15, 1tompary Soviet affairs. Howland H. Sargeant, President of Radio A measure of the value of RL's research Liberty Committee, wrote Dr. L. Quincy 10;, Ibid., 4-5. materials to Western Scholarship can. be seen Mumford, the Librarian of Congress: "Radio pp. in the appraisal Prof. Leonard Schapiro Liberty is now completing its second decade 14 "Ibid. lbid., , p 5. 5-7. The moderation of RL and of the London Sch chool of Economics: Prof. of uninterrupted broadcasting to the So- con ., pp. t to the principle of evolu- Schapiro wrote that he has followed the work viet Union, I would like to assure you that its honor liberalization were evidene io the - of RL "very closely" for over 15 years and Radio Liberty programs and documentation tiona y sib "immo were evident i cited l thrtt "the products of the research in 'which relating to these broadcasts are freely avail- lowing Policy. edual: it engages, and on which it broadcasts are able to the Library of Congress in carrying the e1, 1905 Manual: democratic po- founded, have been closely studied by me, out its assignment from the Foreign?Rela- to encourage Soviet practices; democratic and by my colleagues In my department for tions Committee. I offer our fullest coopera- litical is alternatives encourage to more vapid social and eco- many years." "I have no hesitation in stat- tion and look forward to, hearing from those 2. t t are rapids of more eeo- for the tone of of more ceo- ing," Prof. Schapiro went on, "that the qual- . in charge of the studies as to how we may nonomic resources reforms and ity of this research has been consistently be most helpful." (Sargeant to Mumford, consumes; high and that it has proved of inestimable Radio Liberty Committee, July 26, 1971.) that democratic value to those who, like ourselves, are con- 'Documentary material provided by RL is 3ew, t to want reassure oca and listeners eschew thademocratic cernod with the study of the Soviet Union." 42 deposited temporarily in the Foreign Affairs pat will at p ce and against ession, The tone of this endorsement of RL's re Division, Congressional Research Service, sion; search products along with others reproduced Library of Congress. Citations to sources re- to encourage the view that the Soviet in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hear- her to particular documents as filed accord- "4. Government should abandon world h rSoviet ings and in RL's statement to Congress have ing to volume. For the most part material Government and work more rre for actively the flavor of excessive testimonials; but this drawn from interviews is not cited in the peace ana international cooperation; judgment must be balanced by an awareness footnotes. "5. a undermine Communist ideology, that the writers are eminent scholars in the ' Radio Liberty: An Historical Sketch, Sep- tember 2, 1971, p. 1. (PL, v. IV, pt. 1) showing that it does not promote the wel- field r Soviet studies, and speak with some 5 Evolution of Radio Liberty Policy: 1952- fare of the peoples of the USSR, and to show authority. 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. IV, pt. 2) that history points toward progress in free- s. Importance of Research in RL's Operations 0Ibid., p. 2. dom of all diversity and The quality dI research done by RL, v Robbing, Enno. Radio Liberation Speaks IT. of encourage e cultural ideas and tewhether it be in the Research Department or for the Silent. The New Leader, V. 41, Oct. freedom o exchange f ideas n 2 r among programmers, and the availability of 6, 1958: 21-22, and Petrov, Vladimir. Radio 10 OPEC, l E/RL Hearings, arilasRadio 7. psycho- form material, whether it be in the Liberation. The Russian Review, v. 17, April logical warfare. Moscow, International Rad n ps ho- form of books, periodical literature, the press, 1958: 110. House, Re radio monitoring or even word of mouth, is ' In a critical appraisal of RL, Erik Barnouw lations and bibliography Publishing trHouse 90 Radio rot- Li- the to BUS broadcasting operations. For 'observed in his history of American broad- arty) the quality of information derived from re- casting that RL had begun broadcasting two recent pamphlet published by RL search sources, along with the daily Input of months after the inauguration of President to A following pubis hf the Board Trustees: the tees: , members Dean, news (which is essentially part of the re- Eisenhower, and he went on to say: "Al- listed d search process), determines, in large measure though plans for it had been made earlier, Yale College Henry iLaw; V Ho Pooror, Assof t H. Sergeant, the degree to which RL is achieving its stated Radio Liberation became the epitome of the reeident, Radio Liberty Committee and goals and purposes as a surrogate "Home foreign policy of the following years, a pot- former Assistant Libertyy o State; Wand Service" for the Soviet people. By the nature icy dominated by John Foster Dulles of the Seymour, Ch Secretary of the Board - of things RL must operate from the premise Department of State and Allen W. Dulles of nay former that its audience suffers from large informs- Carnegie Endowment and former President, the Central Intelligence Agency-two re- American Bar Association; John W. Stude- tional gaps which it seeks to fill, markable and complex men, differing yet baker, former U.S. Commissioner of Educa- RL tries to give the Soviet audience a rea- . working in harmony. They made a fateful Lion; Reginald T. Townsend, Vice President, tenably complete picture of reality as any impress not only on American diplomacy but Radio Liberty Committee; William L. White, Soviet citizen would perceive it had he access also on its broadcasting--at home and Editor and Publisher, Emporia Gazette, and to free information as in the West. And this abroad." (The Image Empire: a History of Philip L. Willkie, Attorney; Mrs. Oscar Ahl- can be done only by research, analysis, and Broadcasting in the United States. Now gran, former President, General Federation a highly rational selection of news-in brief, York, Oxford University Press, 1970, v. III, of Women's Clubs; John R. Burton, Chair- only by hard intellectual effort. p. 92) man of the Board, National Bank of Far VT. FUNDING: SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY "Evolution of Radio Liberty Policy; 1952- Rockaway; J. Peter Grace, President, W. R. In recent years RL's annual budget, has 1971, p. 2-3. (RL, V. IV, pt. 2) Grace & Company; Allen Grover, former ranged between $12 to $14 million. According 10-1bid., p. 4. Vice President, Time-Life, Inc.; Gen. Alfred to Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), the op- 11 Dr. Petrov made these observations on M. Gruentlter, U.S.A. (Rot.), former Allied orating cost of RL for FY 1969 was $12,887,- RL's conduct during this critical time: "This Commander in Europe (NATO) ; Hon. John 401.19 According to a GAO estimate, RL's lack of clarity in political maatters.[in RL's S. Hays, Communications Specialist and bud-get for 1971 was about $13,700,000.41 - polio ] Is an demonstrated bvio Shortcoming. eHungarian t as f rmer U.S IT, Cmbasisado of the Boardn d; J. IT. Formally, those funds were apparently sup- clearly posed to have been provided by private Crisis in November 1056, when RL didn't Heinz Company; Isaac Don Levine, Author sources in RFE/RL's capacity, in the State know what to say. Actually, some foolish and Specialist on Soviet Affairs. Department's words, as "private broadeeam. things were said. For example, appeals were 19 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Por- ters." 11 However, according to the SFRC re- made to the Soviet soldiers not to shoot the eign Relations. Radio Free Europe and Radio port, the "gap between private contributions Hungarians because they also were building Liberty. Report. 92d Congress, 1st Session. and actual budget expenditures ... has been socialism; regrets were expressed because 9 s i Report n, U.S. fl2--3 Govt. Print. Off., Julycited 10, filled by funds from the Central Intelligence ' 'our' brave soldiers - murdered Hungarian as ?SFRC, RFE/. RAgency ..."'" According to the State Depart- women and children;, appeals were made to The special of ort. New York opera- ment, RL has no program for corporate fund- the members of the Communist Party and to P ing, such as that for RFE. 41 (During the de- the 'politrabotniki' of the Army to stop the tion, Oct. 1~FE pp. 1-3. (EL,p. 2 II, pt. 3) code 1962-1971, RL received about $20,000 in mass slaughter of the population." (Petrov, ' SPRadio EC Liberty. Guests po to the Soviet home, unsolicited funds.) The SFRC report stated op. cit., pp. 112-113) that the ". , Executive Branch officials re- 17 Writing in 1958, Dr. Petrov commented: 1970, p. 10. And, RL letter and telex, Nov. 12, fuse publicly to acknowledge the - [Central "Since most of the policies of RL consist of 1971. Intelligence] Agency's participation or role 'don'ts' and since the writers and editors are 23 Radio Liberty Visual Exhibits, Illustra- in maintaining and operating the two reduced to platitudes, ItL suffers from a die- ti Binder, 4. RL, V. V. pt. E battled Radio Free Radios." tint lack of character." (Petrov, op. cit., pp. Accordingly, "the Department declined to 110-111). However, in a commentary on the Europe Defends Role. The New York Times, supply additional financial data for this re- effects of the Hungarian crisis on RFE/RL, March 15. ffl p. 10. port on, Government funding of RFE and David Binder of The New York Times recet- tiu Radio l iberty: $An unce sons, J !omia- " to - ' ly observed. "The crushing of the Hungarian Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1971, p. 11. (RL, v. I.) Hereafter cited as, Radio Liberty Statement, June 14, 1971. 80 In FY 1971, RL expended $60,900 for training purposes. (Chart XVIi, Training Ex- penditures. RL, V. V, pt. 12, p. 16) 27 RL: Programming-language personnel, Total staff by prime language vs. current ex- tended personnel plus retirement 1972-76, October 1971. The present strength of the Russians is 168; Ukrainians, 20, Belorussians, 12; Armenians, 7; Azerbaijanians, 7; Geor- gians, 8; Karachay, 1; and Tatar-Bashkir, 8. The anticipated percentage loss from retire- ment during the period 1972-76 is 27.9 per- cent for the Russians; 20.0 percent, Ukrai- nians; 33.3 percent, Belourussians; 14. 3 per- cent Armenians; 14.3 percent Azerbaipanians; 37.6 percent, Georginas; -1.00 percent, Ka- rachay; and 12.5 percent, Tatar-Bashkir. 28 According to David Binder, "the average age of the Radio Free Europe employees is 45. It is perhaps a bit lower at Radio Liberty, where the director, Kenneth Scott, has re- cently hired several colorful Soviet defectors." (The New York Times, March 15, 1971, p. 10) 2D Radio Liberty Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 11. (RL, v. I) 80 The future of Samizdat; Significance and Prospects, p. 29. (RL, v. II, DI) 21 This section of the study is based upon, RL's technical facilities, pp. 1-3. (RL, v. III, pt. K) 82 RL Basic briefing outline, p. 7. (RL, v. V, pt. 10) 22 Frequency usage and facility occupation, Aug. 6, 1971. (RL, v. XI, pt. 8). 84 RL, Guest in the Soviet home, p. 9. A? RL Statement, Juno 14, 1971, pp. 17-18. (RL, v. I). 20 The future of samizdat, pp. 37-38. (RL, v. II, Dl). NIbid, p. 19. M Because of a sharp budget cut RL ter- minated the Institute at end of 1971. 2D Institute for the Study of the USSR. Munich, Germany, Carl Gerber, 1969. 9 p. 40 Ibid. u RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 17-18. (R.L, v. I.) See also part L, RL Research Bul- letin, 1970 Index. 42 Ibid., p. 25. Dr. Frederick C. Barghoorn, a leading American specialist on Soviet af- fairs and a Professor of Political Science at Yale University, commented: "As a scholar I have long admired and I: have found most useful the research and publication activities of Radio Liberty. These information activi- ties are very important to scholars, journal- ists, and other communicators not only in the United States but in Europe, Asia, South Africa, and other parts of the world." (SFRC, RFE/RL Hearings, p. 172.) 42 SFRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 9. 44 Figures, provided by GAO. w SPRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 2. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 11. S 3391 from its present form of Communist totals- linking their past to the present and future tarianism to a more tolerable and humane in an effort 'to maintain the vigor of their form of democracy. The ultimate goal is historical and cultural legacies in the face democratization of Soviet society in the ex- of regime attempts to exploit them for prop- pectation that within such liberalization Iles aganda purposes. Attuned to the require- the greatest hope for world peace. ments of history, RL thus relates the past Perhaps, this general objective was most to the present and future while concentrat- succinctly and yet comprehensively set forth ing on contemporary problems in Soviet so- in RL's formal statement to Congress. It said: "Radio Liberty is a communications channel for Soviet citizens concerned about their country's future, and its place in the world community. It is dedicated to human to peaceful evolution of Soviet society rights , and to harmony in international relations." 1 As an ultimate goal in broadcasting, RL directs its energies towards achieving the democratization of Soviet society. The Policy Manual of 1971 defined RL's ultimate goal in these terms: "to see all the peoples of the USSR acquire the opportunity to live In freedom with truly democratic political in- stitutions, based on free election processes and guaranteed observance of human rights, and which represent the best interests of all citizens and assure for their country a nor- mal, cooperative and constructive role with- in the comity of modern states." s B. Commitment to peaceful change RL's is, however, a commitment to peaceful change from within. It seeks to encourage liberal and progressive elements within So- viet society, seeing in these forces the greatest possibility for a Soviet Russia regenerated by the liberating spirit of genuine democracy. It rejects confrontation as an instrumental- ity in achieving its goals and fosters an ap- proach to policy formulation and policy ex- ecution that is essentially benign in spirit, positive in direction, and pacifistic in its rejection of solutions by force. Thus, RL is not now a Cold War opera- tion in the sense that this term was used and understood in the 1950s and which well de- scribed its functions at that time. On the contrary, RL accepts Soviet institutions, though not its ideology, and seeks to bring about peaceful transformation within the system as it now exists. C. RL's purposes In seeking its ultimate goal of dernocrati- zation, RL has a rather precise perception of how this should be done. It encourages the Soviet peoples to work together as a first step in instilling the habit of democracy. The expectation is that by mutual cooperation the Soviet peoples themselves can establish a democratic system that will not only be representative of and responsible to the will and aspirations of all, but also will be cap- able of sustaining their national interests and maintaining a viable economic struc- ture? - In assisting the Soviet people to achieve this goal, RL broadcasts to its listeners truthful Information which will enable them to make up their own minds, form their own judgments, and reach their own independent conclusions on developments within their country. RL seeks, therefore, to relieve the Soviet people from their total dependency upon the regime as a source of Information. Having monopolistic control aver informa- Within this larger framework of goals and purposes, RL pursues immediate objectives that focus on such practical and positive themes as democratic political alternatives, economic reform, peaceful intentions of the democratic world, ideological irrelevance of Marxism-Leninism, and the virtue of cul- tural diversity and political pluralism. As a primary immediate objective, RL tries to convince Soviet listeners that practical,. democratic political alternatives to their present system do exist. It encourages them to work toward these alternatives in their own interest by asking questions, by seeking more information, by finding practical solu- tions to specific problems, and by uniting in common efforts to create internal pressures for change.0 In brief, RL seeks to destroy the prevailing, officially- induced myth of a politi- cal system preordained by history and sug- gest pragmatic means for transformation. RL also encourages among its listeners the belief that more rapid and equitable solu- tions are possible to their domestic economic and social problems, and to the problems of the nationalities. RL persuades them to press for basic economic reform and allocation of more economic resources for the benefit of the consumer. It also persuades the Soviet listener to press for the cultural needs of the various nationalities, including the Rus- sian? In the realm of international relations, RL assures its listeners that the democratic powers of the world are pursuing foreign policies that are designed to achieve world peace and stability. It tries to convince the listener that, notwithstanding the constant claims of Soviet propaganda, none of these states has any intention of committing armed aggression against the USSR. Defense establishments are maintained, RL points out, in order to resist aggression by other world powers .8 Moreover, RL tries to convince Its listeners that by abandoning world revolutionary aspirations, moderating its aggressive foreign policies, and instituting a policy of more active International cooperation within the United Nations, the Soviet Government would do much to lessen the danger of thermonuclear war and to assure world peace9 Or said another way, adherence to the ideological principle of "struggle" and the advocacy of the conquest of power that flows from this belief, enhance the possibility of thermonuclear war, and only through So- viet moderation and cooperation in the United Nations will peace be assured. In ideological matters, RL challenges the faith of Communist believers-both sincere 48 Ibid., p. 2. The refusal of the Executive Branch to acknowledge publicly its role in funding RFE/RL was revealed in David Binder's report on both radios. Asked about the disclosure that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were financed by CIA, Mr. Binder said that Mr. Ralph Walter, the Munich director of RFP., declared: "Our broadcasting policies are made here in this house and are not guided by anyone in Wash- ington. We are nobody's mouthpiece." An RL official concurred. (The New York Times; March 15, 1971, p. 10.) CHAPTER II: RL'S GOALS, POLICIES, AND POLICY FORMULATION _ 1. RL'S OBJECTIVES A. Ultimate goal: Democratization of Soviet Society The primary objective of RL is very simply to encourage those forces of liberalization within Soviet society that will bring about ^n eventual peaceful evolution of the USSR Lion and publicly expressed opinion, the rul- tains the seeds of Soviet dictatorship. It log elite deprives Soviet citizens of access tries to convince believers that Marxist to information that would give them a more philosophy as it has taken shape in the USSR complete and truthful picture of reality. RL has been perverted and in the course of time seeks to fill in these blank spaces of cal- reduced to a collection of primitive dogmas. eulated omissions and correct distortions of RL tries to show believers that the "revolu- official Soviet propaganda. Finally, RL urges tionary struggle" in the world today, so the Soviet people to develop a sense of coin- seminal to the concepts of Marxism-Lenin- mon cause and recognize that their concerns ism, does not coincide with their views or and vital interests are shared concerns and their interests. These would be better served, interests of many other Soviet citizens .4 RL stresses, by the peaceful pluralistic devel- In speaking for the genuine needs and best opment of societies under the rule of law, aspirations of Its listeners, both Russian and and in freedom for all peoples everywhere, non-Russian, RL emphasizes the importance including the peoples of the USSR 10 In brief, of both historical continuity and the rele- RL challenges the faith of Marxist-Leninists vance of contemporary problems. For all So- as being outdated, irrelevant and contrary Viet peoples it assumes the obligation of to the-real interests of the Soviet people; it Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 CONGRESSIONAL 1tECORD - SENA'1 i3 ro-affirms the principle of democratic plu- ra)isnn and rule of law. ting the concepts of societal pluralism and rule of law to the Soviet scene, PL tries to encourage trends toward cultural diversity and freedom among all peoples of the Soviet Union. It encourages also trends toward a truly free exchange of information and ideas, and freedom to travel between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries. In pursuing this immediate objective, RL tries to gain the attention of Soviet listeners by showing in its full dimension the range of political and cultural diversity and freedom of thought in the non-Communist world 12 In international affairs, therefore, RL en- courages detente, amelioration of differences through diplomacy, strengthening the United Nations as an instrument of peace, and crea- tion of a world system based on political pluralism and the rile of law. RL represents an ideological challenge to the regime and thus may be an irritant in East-West rela- tions, and accordingly may adversely affect the modalities of relations. But it is unlikely that it would impair East-West detente which rests upon more deeply rooted power reali- ties. RI, directs its energies mainly toward the Soviet people; it attempts to establish a dialogue with them; it assumes that by en- couraging the forces of internal liberaliza- tion, natural and Soviet-generated pressures exerted from below upon the regime will make it more responsible to the interests of the people and accordingly create more favor- able conditions for continuing peace. IT. GENERAL PIIILOSOPIIICAL APPROACH. OF RI, A. Basic operating principle: Rights of free press To achieve Its objectives, RL seeks to pro- mote opinion formation in the Soviet Union, and it does this principally through its radio broadcasting operations. As a surrogate "Ifome Service," it attempts to communicate directly to the Soviet people and establish the basis for a lasting dialogue. RL operates on the belief that the Soviet leaders, if con- fronted by a truly'informed public opinion, "will tend to behave more moderately and sensible." 12 RL claims that the validity of its rights as an international broadcaster rests upon the principle set forth in Article 19 of the.Uni- versal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration, adopted unanimously In the United Nations General Assembly on Decem- ber 10, 1948, provides that, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 13 B. Basic philc ophical assumptions of RL: Appeals to rationalism The general philosophical approach of RL in seeking its goals and purposes is one which appeals to rationalism. It is au approach that attempts to "substitute reason for emo- tion, and a calm voice for stridency." It is an approach that begins from the premise of objective rationalism, namely, that "the most convincing presentation is one that tells all sides of the story." 10 Accordingly, RL "has fie built-in commitment to con- tinued tension"; rather it thrives on an im- proving environment that will increase the opportunities for dialogue and the interplay of ideas?' Rejecting the politics of confrontation and "appeals for action," RL directs its energies toward developing rational thought among its listeners. Essentially cerebral rather than visceral, "it seeks merely to help in forming an enlightened Soviet public opinion." 11 It is RL's expectation, in the word of Dr. Gene Sosin, one of its leading staffmen in New York, that "in time ... through an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process, the So- viet people may not only think about how to fulfill their deep desire for peace, a more abundant life and greater freedom of self- expression-they may begin to act" 10 RL op- erates on the assumption that given truth- ful Information about developments in the Soviet Union and the world beyond its fron- tiers the Soviet citizen has within himself the natural capability of eventually shaping his country's destiny. III. GENERAL POLICY GUIDELINES A. RL's policy manual: Its function RL's policy guidelines in general are a reflection of a moderate approach to the politics of the Soviet Union. These guidelines and the philosophy that produced them are contained in RL's Policy Manual. The Policy Manual is the key element in RL's policy formation and policy guidance. It is RL's operating charter. It sets forth the basic rationale and purpose of RL's ac- tivities, defines RL's specific role in relation to its audience, contains estimates of, the situation and direction of trends in the So- viet Union, projects long-range and immedi- ate informational objectives, and sets forth the essential methods and techniques by which these goals are to be achieved. In brief, the Policy Manual ie, in the words of RL's policyinakers, "the mainspring for all other policy determinations, the central authority determining audience priorities, program content and the nature of Radio Liberty's approaches in program structure, style and tone." 20 B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF RL 1. Formulation of assumptions 1k/arch 6, 191' evolutionary changes within the Soviet Un- ion. Since its main concern is for the general welfare of the Soviet peoples, It places "basic emphasis", not so much on being anti-Sovict or anti-Communist (though disagreeing with Communist ideology), but on "promoting constructive change." 22 b. Soviet Generated Change In seeking this goal of constructive chau[;C'. RL does not claim to advocate any specific system of ideology In the USSR. RL believes its role is to stimulate independent think- ing, to provide the Soviet peoples with in- formation and ideas which will enable them, individually or collectively, to solve their common problems and ultimately assist them in "achieving a democratic transformation of the present regime." 21 Peaceful change can only come about, RL feels, when the Soviet people themselves, having access to solid objective information, seek solutions to the broad problems of Soviet society. In- creasingly, the Soviet people are becoming more actively concerned about correcting abuses and improving their system. RL en- courages Independent thinking by such peo- ple and supplies them with specific and relevant information and ideas as a basis for finding their own solutions."' Thus, RL sees its main function as serv- ing "as an Independent and reliable source of foreign and domestic news and informR- tion on matters of specific concern to the Soviet citizens, in their own language." Ac- cordingly, RL gives Soviet listeners access to "impartial and objective information"; it assists them in trying to understand more clearly the events at home and abroad, and the effect of current developments on their lives. RL also fills in gaps of knowledge by providing less current materials of sig- nificance and interest.24 c. RL's Impact ' In its role as an uncensored "I3ome Serv- ice," RL believes that it exerts political in- fluence affecting "to some degree" the evolu- tion of Soviet society. It seeks to exert this Influence "responsibility" and, accordingly, "does not espouse any specific political pro- posals or any concrete program." RL does, however, strive to aid those elements working for positive improvement by "serving as a channel of communication, providing a free forum for discussion and exchange of ideas, and encouraging listeners to recognize that their concerns are shared by many other Soviet citizens." RL attempts to keep Soviet citizens informed on important domestic developments which are unpublicized. dis- torted or inadequately discussed by fficial media. In its role of broadcasting texts of documents and literary works written in the Soviet Union but denied publication (that is, samizdat), RL serves "as an important means of disseminating and cross-fertilizing non-conformist and unorthodox views." W d. Rejection of Violent and Illegal Actions According to RL's estimate, the evolution of Soviet society will be a "long-term proc- ess." In seeking to promote peaceful pro- gressive change, RL "scrupulously avoids in- citing, or appearing to incite, actions which could bring reprisals, Including particularly illegal and violent actions, since they are likely, to bring harm to their perpetrators without serving a constructive purpose." RL believes that specific methods, programs and proposals for peaceful change must be worked out within Soviet society and must be determined by the Soviet citizens then- selvcs.U In matters of human rights and con- stitutional rights, RL upholds the right of all Soviet citizens to achieve their human rights as defined in the United Nations Dec- laration and to exercise constitutional rights guaranteed under the Soviet Constitution. RL gives general support to citizens choos- ing to exercise these rights, consistent, how- ever, with Constitutional guarantees. Whil'-. RL provides information that would develop RL operates, therefore, on the principle of the right of it free press, as sanctioned by the United Nations and imbedded in the larger American belief in the inalienable rights of man. RL "upholds the basic right of the whole Soviet public to know the whole truth about any question?4 It is committed to the principle, affirmed in the United National Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, that the Soviet people have a right to be informed, that is to say, to have the democratic right of free press; it operates on the further as- sumption that the exercise of this right will encourage peaceful political evolution in the Soviet Union. As RL policgmakere have vgttten: "Radio Liberty is founded on the premise that freedom of Information and discussion are essential to the processes of democracy and the creation of a peaceful and cooperative world." 11 Assumed in this liberterian view held by RL is the belief that all man have, among certain inalienable rights, a right to freedom of individual and collective expression. As- sumed also is the further belief that those enjoying such a right have the obligation to assist those denied in correcting the In- equities. In formulating broadcast policy and de- signing radio programming, RL makes cer- tain general assumptions about its own role, the situation in the Soviet Union, and its Soviet audience. These assumptions are based on continuing research and analysis, (1) on available evidence revealing the basio outlook and attitudes of RL's Soviet listen- ers, and (2), on objectively assessed long- term developments inside the Soviet Union and in the world at large, as well as the So- viet listener's knowledge and ideas about these developments, and their perception of the Soviet reality. Some of these assumptions are up-dated and changed; they are included in such special guidances as Broadcast Posi- tion Statements.2i The function of these aseurnptions is to give some rational direction to thought and planning. They are intended to establish a reasonably solid foundation upon which policy can be structured and programming operations designed. 2. RL'S ROLE - a. Catalyst for Peaceful Democratic Change In general, RL perceives its role as that of. a participant in bringing about positive, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE understanding and implementation of dem- ocratic principles and concepts, it does not specifically endorse individuals, groups, or proposals, This would create difficulties for those involved, RL believes. The ultimate judgments, it maintains, must be made by the Soviet citizens themselves. RL's approach to this difficult problem is to report on and discuss all political developments and pro- posals in the Soviet Union in terms of dem- ocratic principles and concepts and from the point of view of their potential effect on So- viet society a, e. Hopes for democratization despite setbacks Finally, RL asumes that the demands,of a technological society can lead the Soviet Union to greater democratization and that the leaders may be able to delay, but not stop, this process. Though recognizing pres-' ent setbacks in democratization, RL does not, however, permit this to obscure "the very real possibility" of a long term reversal of those trends of repression. To do other- wise, RL concludes, "would be to deprive many listeners of whatever hopes they have for the future." 52 f. Summing up To sum up, RL perceives itself as a catalyst for constructive peaceful change in the So- viet Union; it adheres to the principle of self-determination to'the extent that the Soviet people themselves are to bring about changes from within and according to their own Interest and requirements; it acts as a conduit for the flow of objective information into the Soviet Union and acts also as a forum for debate of views that are denied by the regime; it rejects violence as a polit- ical solution, and is committed to the belief in a long term process of change for the better; it denies support for individuals or groups, but gives general support to dem- ocratic principles and to those who exercise their human and constitutional rights; it is convinced, finally, that the process of dem- ocratization will continue despite momen- tary setbacks. 3. SITUATION IN THE tlSSR: RL'S ASSESSMENT SUMMARIZED a. Realities of power, institutional inadequacy, outdated ideology In a dispassionate, tightly reasoned and compressed analytical commentary, RL has set forth in the Manual its perception of the situation in the Soviet Union as a second assumption upon which policy is based and programs are designed so According to RL's analysis, two primary features condition the Soviet outlook for the future, one a source of strength, the other a source of weakness. It i$ an acknowledged fact that the Soviet Union has become the world's. second largest power, having an enormous industrial and military capacity and the capability of solving the most com- plex technological and scientific problems. Yet, despite this power, serious institutional inadequacies exist, for the political and eco- nomic institutions of the Soviet state are ill-suited to cope with future economic and technological developments and the innum- erable complex problems inherent in a mod- ern industrial society. These inttitutions, moreover, depend for their legitimacy upon an outdated ideology, one that had been designed originally as a response to the needs of the 10th Century and whose basic pre- mises have been eroded by rapid economic, political, social and technological changes of the 20th Century.-" b. Totalitarianism Institutionalized and Phlegmatic Leadership Significant changes have occured in the Soviet Union, some positive; but, the RL analysis continues, the, totalitarian system created by Stalin has not changed in any essential aspect, and none of, the changes that have occurred guarantee Soviet society against a resurgence of Stalinism, The ap- paa'atus of police power is maintained, and no institutional safeguards have been in- troduced to check the rise of one-meai rule. Moreover, the future prospects of the So- viet Union are affected by the phlegmatic character of the present leadership, a group of aging apparatchiks, products of the party bureaucracy that matured in and survived the Stalin era, who no doubt find it difficult to cope with some of the more sophis- ticated aspects of contemporary problems. Their actions betray a collective lack of deci- siveness, a tendency to temporize, and final- ly a habit of making decisions, agonizing and full of compromise 32 c. Problems in the Economic Sector In the economic sphere, the RL anaylsis states, the most fundamental problems exist. Lagging growth rates, the need to incorporate technological and scientific advances and close the widening gap in technology between the Soviet Union and the advanced capital- ist countries, involve questions of moderniz- ing the command economy, centralized vs. decentralized planning and management, choices in use of resources among regions, price reform, improving labor productivity and providing management incentives. Prob- lems in agriculture and increasing pressures for a decent standard of living and a higher level of social welfare add to the regime's problems in the economic sector. The main area of acute conflict, however, is in the al- location of resources.' d. Problems of Defense and Foreign Policy Interrelated with the economic problems and dependent on their successful resolution, the RL analysis continues, are problems of defense and foreign policy. These problems turn oil such matters as how the USSR can best maintain its control over Eastern Eu- rope, regain its leadership over the interna- tional Communist Movement, and cope with the centrifugal forces of disunity; the extent of Soviet commitments abroad, especially in the Middle East, the degree of rapprochement with the United States and,Europo, the level of disarmament needed to maintain adequate defense. These problems in international rela- tions and those related to China and Ger- many present choices to competing forces within the Soviet elite, those advocating a hard-line, aggressive stance and those more flexible who seek cooperation in international affairs and assurances of stability that will enable concentration on domestic develop- ment 14 C. Emergency Forces of Dissent and forniisnx S 3393 pects of policy and structure and calling for democratization of party procedures. How- ever, no clear-cut factions within Soviet so- ciety and the establishment have emerged, either progressive or reactionary in nature, but in general alignments of groups and in- dividuals have shifted issue to issue. a # ? M P Sympathy for the reform movement is spread among many of the Soviet intellec- tuals, especially the scientific intelligentsia and the youth. RL states that the most salient charac- teristic of the dissident movement is that it is a reformist and not a revolutionary move- ment. Individuals cast themselves by and large in the role of a "loyal" opposition, whether seeking limited or extensive changes. Even the more radical in the movement re- ject violent revolution and advocate gradual transition to more democratic forms through peaceful evolution. Between these poles of potential power is a third group that seeks modernization of Soviet society without political liberaliza- tion ar g. Future prospects for democratization According to RL, the future prospects for progress toward more democratic forms would seem to depend on the top CPSU leadership. The initiative of any extensive process of liberalization would have to come from the Politburo so long as it retains the monopoly of power and a capacity to destroy any opposition. The leaders can be expected to continue as a reasonably stable collective, RL believes. Individual shifts would not af- fect the character of that body since new leaders would be products of the same ap- paratus. Whatever its composition,' the leadership continues to be confronted by the same central dilemma which RL defines in these words: maximum use of resources re- quires major economic and social reform with the attendant risk of losing control (to a greater or lesser degree), yet to go on with- out change, for fear of losing control, means to brake social and economic progress and to lag further and further behind the level of development in the rest of the industrialized world.n In general, RL perceives a trend toward conservatism in the current leadership. Moreover, the present essentially static situa- tion has been hardened by adherence to an outdated ideology and by the nature of the decision-making apparatus. Collective deci- slon-Inakine? tends to prevent formulation of On the domestic'scene, according to the RL analysis, the limited steps taken toward removing the excesses of the Stalin era have prepared the ground for emerging new issues and the evolution of additional pres- sures for greater liberalization both within and outside the Soviet establishment. This has created new dilemmas for the leadership. Initially, the issues involved setting the boundaries of social criticism and freedom of artistic expression, but they have expanded to encompass freedom of inquiry, freedom of information, observance of legality, aboli- tion of censorship, and openness In policy- making and reporting on administrative ac- tions. Various specific reforms have been pro- posed and discussed. Dissent has arisen among religious groups, notably the Ortho- dox and Baptist churches, and the national question is reemerging in a more acute form .16 f. Alignment and Character of Dissenting Forces The Communist Party (CPSU) is one of the most central and sensitive areas in the need of reform, according to RL. Various party issues have emerged as a result of revela- tions in the destalinization period and the need.for management reforms. Voices within the party have been raised, questioning as- Soviet dilemmas and Introduce comprehen- sive reforms. Thus, the present leadership is caught between competing pressures of re- formism and conservatism, and it attempts to avoid open confrontation or extremes in either direction. Immediate prospects for democratization of the Soviet Union are not bright, according to ItL's analysis; yet it is conceivable that over a long period the climate could become more propitious. Decentralization and flexi- bility needed to operate a more complex so- ciety and economy, emergence of a new gen- eration of leaders not schooled in the Stalin- ist tradition, the cumulative effect of various decisions taken to resolve issues on the do- mestic and international scene-all could possibly, but not necessarily, work toward .creating an environment in which peaceful change toward democratic reform could take place 3n h. RL's perceived role: A "challenging opportunity" The RL analysis concludes with a restate- ment of RL's commitment to basic policy on the expectation of a peaceful evolution of So- viet society and on its conviction that the development toward a democratic order must come `from within the dynamics of Soviet society Itself and from the combined effort of the Soviet peoples. Soviet society, it said, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 33 34 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March- 6, 1972 has undergone signfcant changes that can- toward its long-range goals and immediate Scott said, of a "patriotic internal connnu- not be completely nullified In the present objectives by maintaining an effective over- nicator"; it must adapt itself to the inter- period of retrogression without endangering all image. It does this by applying certain ests and style, the feelings and sensitivities the leaders themselves, basic themes in all its presentations, and of the Soviet citizen; it must envision itself Accordingly, RL sees here a "challenging trying to maintain a style that is both ap- as a genuine uncensored "Home Service," opportunity" to continue to stimulate more pealing and effective. The guide words in not as a foreign broadcaster, thus making internal pressure for change, expand an this effort are friendliness, enlightenment it essential, even vital, that the tone of awareness of alternatives to the present sys- and dignity, broadcasting and the style of presentation tem, assist in the growth of a democratic RL's Policy Manual takes the position that convey the feeling to the Soviet listener climate of opinion, promote wider under- if R1', is to attain its immediate objectives, it that RL is really one of them. standing of democratic concepts, facilitate is "vital" that a "tone of goodwill" be main- 2. BL's Basic Methods: Provide Facts, emergence of pluralism, spur decentralize- tanned at all times. Bluntness is sometimes Balanced Discussion, Genuine Criticism., tion, and encourage cooperation among re- required in speaking about Soviet matters, Soviet Reality formist elementsAO - but no doubt should be left in the minds of RL's effectiveness as as a communicator de- l. Validity and Quality of RL's Estimate the listeners that RL is on their side. Expres- pends largely upon the extent to which it h 1 t b ersonall in- e y it t What makes RL's assessment of the situ- ation in the USSR significant is that it.repre- senta RL's perception of the Soviet reality and accordingly provides the fundamental assumptions upon which future policy and thus future programming will be based. The most important question that arises is the matter of validity and. quality of this assessment. In general, this can be judged only by analogy, that is, by comparisons with parallel evaluations of current Soviet devel- opmerits by specialists in the field of Soviet bloc studies. Surveys of such evaluations of the Soviet scene made in recent years will. probably reveal no siua:rp variations between the judgments contained in RL's statement and those generally accepted within the academic community of the West and in the confraternity of Soviet bloc specialists in the United States Government. The RL statement, essentially cautious, conservative, well reasoned, and carefully qualified, seems to reflect the consensus of leading Western scholars in Soviet studies on the current Soviet reality and what the prospects are for the future. However, some scholars, who have a realist's cast to their thought, would prob- ably be less sanguine than RL about, the ulti- mate achievement of democracy. 4. RL'S AUDIENCE The third area of assumptions in RL's policy formation and programming concerns the Soviet audience. As a broadcaster to an au- dience that generally cannot be measured and analyzed with the precision that is possible in a free Western society, RL must make certain assumptions not only about social, occupational and intellectual groups in all the republics and oblasts of the USSR, but also those of the various nationalities to which RL broadcasts and certain differing psychological categories' within these groups, This matter, along with RL's policy relat- ing, to the nationalities, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. on programming, Suffice it to say at this point, however, that Rh directs its attention mainly to the power elite within the Soviet Union, either existing or in potential. As a broadcaster with cer- tain clearly defined political purposes, it must direct its energies primarily to those ele- ments in Soviet society which now or in the future may exercise political influence and pressure. They represent the opinion makers and opinion leaders In the country and thus are more likely to influence the broad base of mass opinion in Soviet society. These "po- litically alert". groups of listeners and poten- tial decision-makers are also more likely to possess or have access to shortwave radio sets capable of receiving RL's signal than are the masses of unskilled workers and collective farm peasants. Thus, RL must make certain assumptions about the structure and char- acteristics of its audience, hoping that through correct analysis based upon these assumptions, it can achieve maximum effectiveness.41 0. Accomplishing RL's objectives 1. RL's Broadcasting Style: Friendliness, Enlightenment, Dignity On the basis of the foregoing assumptions taro an attitude of goodwill toward the au- -but,. RL was to refrain from giving the run- about the situation in the Soviet Union and dience and thus hopefully win its confi- pression that it seeks to exploit positive in- about its variegated, multi-national, com= dente and insure the radio's effectiveness 44 ternal developments for its own purposes by plexly structured audience, M_ proceeds in brief, RL must take the stance, as Mr. portraying them as essentially anti-Soviet, to p sions of such views s ou d no 11 can maintain its identification w insulting" to the listener, the Policy Man- terests of the listeners. To maintain a high ual warns, and it should be made clear that level of sustained interest, RL seeks to make criticism is directed at the regime and the the content of its broadcasts, in the words of system, not the Soviet peoples" the Policy Manual, "consistently dynamic, RL also avoids generalized, vituperative interesting, .arid competitive with all other and undocumented attacks against the radio stations broadcasting to the USSR, in- Soviet leaders and "wholesale condemnation" side the Soviet Union and from abroad." 45 of Soviet policies, domestic and interns- In an effort to build a wider audience, RL tional. Rather, it concentrates on what it be- lieves to be well-reasoned critiques of spe- cific problems and weaknesses. These are ac- companfed by discussions of various positive recommendations and possible solutions. RL wants the listener to make up his own mind and reach his own conclusions about problems In Soviet life. Thus, RL relies pri- marily on factual information, suggestion in- ferred through the presentation of material, and on indirection as a means of stimulating thought. In discussions on Soviet affairs and .world politics, RL provides factual- informa- tion., interpretation and constructive ideas, but it furnishes no conclusions, preferring to leave this to the listener. In order to pro- vide listeners with a comparative basis on Which to judge their own society, RL informs its audience of political, economic, social and cultural developments in other countries, es- pecially, Communist dominated countries of Eastern Europe, This technique is called cross-reporting. Moreover, RL passes along to its audience any positive social and political programs or proposals devised by Soviet citizens (for ex- ample, protest samtzdat documents) and evaluates them in terms of RL's goals end principles 4? - In broadcasting RL tries to avoid adopting a condescending tone or presenting material that implies on assumption of political nai- vete. According to the Policy Manual, RL also avoids 'conveying any impression that it encourages listeners to undertake specific overt actions or acts of terror or violence against the regime. In matters of peaceful group actions, RL takes the position that within the structure of law the Soviet citi- zens themselves. must decide what forms such actions should take. In covering world events, RL tries to take the stance of "an enlightened native of the Soviet Union concerned primarily with the interests of his fellow countrymen at home," Since RL may imply support for institutions and efforts of non-Communist governments, care must be taken, the Manual warns, to avoid creating, the impression that RL rep- resents the interests of Western countries or is the voice of any foreign government or interest. Moreover, RL never takes the position of speaking for any political or- ganization of former Soviet citizens; the believes that it has to make its. criticism of the Soviet system mbre constructive and ef- fective and help the listeners more effectively work together for constructive change. Accordingly, the Policy Manual establishes 5 basic methods for achieving RL's goals. The main offering to the Soviet listener, it says, is "accurate, reliable and interesting information." This is vital for the station in order to achieve credibility. Program struc- ture is to be designed to provide a maximum number of cogent, factual news stories, re- views of the world press, and features which provide broad coverage in depth of domestic and foreign trends that would be helpful to listeners?O Issues are also to be discussed in a bal- anced manner, thus enabling the audience to become familiar with the techniques of a free discussion of basic issues, Having a broad spectrum of conflicting ideas pre- sented to them (which is denied in the So- viet Union), the listeners would be exposed to the give-and-take of debate that could be learned and used in discussions with their fellow citizens A7 According to the Policy Manual, stress is - to be placed on internal Soviet affairs and the "internalization" of democratic alterna- tives in broadcasting. By staying abreast of domestic affairs, RL can report and com- ment regularly and constructively for its lis- teners on development inside the Soviet Union. Because of the strict limitations on freedom of speech in the Soviet Union, it is RL's duty, the Manual declared, to "serve as a free voice from abroad." A major function of this is to induce the Soviet leaders to pro- vide Soviet citizens with more and objective information about developments of Soviet interest. In addition, RL "internalizes" de- velopments in other countries for its Soviet audiences, that is, it engages in cross-repott- ing of internal - developments elsewhere, especially in Eastern Europe, and shows how common problems are being solved there. Trends toward cultural freedom, economic decentralization, and political democratiza- tion in Eastern Europe, being more relevant and having ' greater possibilities of being carried out in the Soviet Union, imposes upon RL, the Policy Manual declares, a spe- cial necessity for cross-reporting "at every opportunity." 49 Manual warns against the identification of - Another basic method RL uses in seeking RL with any such groups. its objectives is criticism of Soviet policy in A final point made by the Policy Manual the interests of.the Soviet citizens. The Pol- is the tone of broadcasting and choice of _icy Manual states that RL's criticism must words. Broadcasting must be maintained on be, directed always toward constructive a dignified level, according to RL. "Sensa- change and not simply consisting of re- tionalismn, frivolous or vulgar satire or hu- counting the negative aspects of Soviet life. mor, flamboyant language, are therefore to Weaknesses organically connected with the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Finally, RL should discuss Soviet reality ent defense of its positions, it says, and faith itself rather than the Soviet media's pro- must be maintained in the ability of Soviet jection of that reality. Accordingly, RL is to listeners to discriminate between Soviet exploit its own "formidable research capa- propaganda and truth, and to perceive un- bilities," the Manual said, in order to create derlying realities and motivations. RL main- a more reliable picture of Soviet reality than. tains strict policy control over replies to what is portrayed in Soviet media, Every.ef- attack. Such replies must have approval6a fort should be made, it said, to utilize RL re- Finally, RL avoids using terms or phrase- search to discuss conditions existing in So- . ology in a pejorative manner that are con- vict society: they become more meaningful sidered acceptable to the Soviet listeners; it against the background of the system's also avoids obsolete terminology. Large num- structural defects.4" hers of Soviet listeners maintain a positive Thus, RL tries to convey to staff through view toward the distant goals of "Commu- the guidelines of its Policy Manual, the im- ' nism" and similarly regard the "October portance of building a :reputation of credi- Revolution" as a progressive event. Pejorative bility with its listeners and projecting an use of such terms could antagonize certain image of a constructive critic of the Soviet listeners, RL feels, and thus ruin an other- system. It attempts also to convey to the wise effective script. RL, therefore, avoids Soviet people themselves through its basic such terms or carefully and factually explains methods the value of free speech as a prin- their usage. Outmoded words are also avoid- ciple in political life. ed-words such as "Communist monolith" 3. RL'S ]BASIC TECHNIQUES: APPEALS TO REA- (which no longer exists), "Communist Satel- SON, MODERATION, GOOD JUDGMENT lite countries (the East European states are l i t h a s sa elli e? ), and such Am- In pursuing its objectives RL lays down a 1-16- s pecise, ill- . Commdnist," .. East expressions.. as "capitalism set of specific guiding principles that are in- vs tended to assist staff in script writing, pro- World" all of t," which, RL East feels, "Free gra.mming and broadcasting. By and large, Wdv ail t take the principles are common sense: they ap- Into ld" (all of " o accaount the e extent ft of diversity i n the peal to reason, moderation, and good judg- world). ment6o What RL is presenting in these basic "The truth, hard fact and cold analysis" techniques is essentially common sense rules analysis" of good salesmanship. RL has a special "prod- are hthe e first requirement, the RL Polley and Manual states, in effective broadcasting, that must be a low pressure, es consumer": its appeal must reasonable, non-offen- has certain political goals in view. Facts of sive, constructive; and its stance must be any political event, economic or cultural de- that of a helpful, tolerant, solicitous friend. velopment must be "cogently and skillfully" organized, moreover, so that they lead to a D. Other policy considerations reasoned conclusion. This technique is more ? 1. Policy requirements relating to host effective than personal. opinion, unsup- countries ported assertions or statements questionable RL has transmitting installations in West on grounds of accuracy. Germany, Spain, and Taiwan. This is vital RL also attempts to make the listener reach for RL in order to transmit its signal to the his own conclusions after the facts are pre- Soviet Union. But, this technical necessity sented. Seeking to stimulate thought, RL imposes certain policy obligations on RL in finds it effective technique to end scripts with its relationships with the host countries. One a question mark, 'challenging, thereby, the primary requirement is the assurance that listeners to think for themselves. RL will not include material in its broad- Direct comparisons, especially in areas casts which could be harmful to the interests of wages, goods and service, in RL's judg- of the host governments and might embarrass went, can only be counterproductive, and RL in the conduct of its relations with are, therefore, avoided However, selective those governments. comparisons in areas not normally known iii As a special requirement, RL also provides the Soviet Union, especially industrial out-. Spain with summaries of scripts on certain put and general economic indicators, foreign stipulated subject matter; it also maintains economic and military aid, are essential in for a specified number of weeks tapes of conveying RL's message,, General compari- broadcasts as they were actually being trans- sons, using the technique of cross-reporting, witted. This enables RL to maintain its own are also useful in areas dealing with every- post-broadcast check but also to have tapes day economic matters, discussion of human available for review by a host government. 54 rights, individual freedom of travel, exchange 2. Policy guidances on specific issues of information and ideas, and the welfare of RL's Policy Manual is the organization's citizens in democratic countries 6I basic statement of policy; it is RL's charter RL also believes in the principle of respond- for operations. As such, it is a "living" docu- ing to situations in inverse proportion to the ment in that it attempts to capture a cer- seriousness of the issue, or, as RL succinctly tain time-frame of the Soviet reality and put it, "'rho more brutal the facts, the less then proceeds to address itself to the prob- emotional should be the presentation." lems existing within that reality. In attempt- Understatement is the most effective tech- ing to make this charter a continuing "living" nique, RL believes; excessive emotionalism , document, RL periodically reconsiders cer- must be depressed in writing and voicing, twin relevant questions from a policy point especially in treating situations of hardship of view and synthesizes its conclusions into and oppression, lest the sympathetic listener more current formal policy statements and detect a spirit of anti-Sovietism-this is self- guidances. For longer range guidances, the defeating. Respect for officials is also urged end product takes on the form of Broad. on grounds that they may have the respect cast Position Statements; for others more of certain categories of listeners which RIJ immediate in nature they take. the form of would not want to alienate. Broadcast Guidelines and Daily Guidance A corollary to this advice on understate- Notes. These important policy documents meat is the principal urging staff to avoid will be discussed in the next section on polemics with Soviet media. Such polemics policymaking; their importance will be made are counterproductive; they divert attention further evident in Chapter IV on program- from the central issue. Good technique, RL ming. believes, requires discussion of problems on IV. Process of policy formulation their own merits and focusing the attention A. Responsibility for RL policy of listeners on intrinsic ma.tCara n.nA enn- structive solutions or proposals. Replies to 1. hole ox President and Executive attacks on RL from Soviet media should Director be kept at- a minimum, RL feels; this too, is -The primary function of RL policy is to a diversion from essential broadcasting pur- make sure that the programming produced poses. RL's regular output should be sufflol- , by the radio systematically provides the So-, S3395 viet audience with objective, accurate and meaningful information in areas of impor- tance to them; that it reflects the growth and plurality of .views outside the Soviet Union; and that it corrects significant omis- sions and distortions in Soviet media nn All members of RL staff contribute to pol- icymaking and policy application, but the main role is played by President Sargeant and Executive Director. Scott. From their of- fices in New York and Munich respectively they direct and review the formation of all policy and oversee policy operations on all levels. Both executives continually review the functioning of the policy process and ex- amine RL's needs in a ever changing Soviet reality and world environment. On the basis of this review they provide whatever direc- tion is needed to assure that RL is equipped with sound and comprehensive policy guid- ance ?? In exercising their executive responsibili- ties, Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Scott are kept regularly informed and systematically par- ticipate in the formulation of policy docu- ments, reviewing draft documents at each stage of development, and maintaining close contacts with policy staff. A variety of regu- lar reporting systems also serve to keep them informed of different aspects of the policy process and matters affecting it: daily tel- exed reports on RL programming produc- tion and Soviet media output pre-broadcast and post-broadcast auditions, policy reviews, reviews by individuals and Soviet defectors, memoranda, schedules and other materials relating to RL's program planning, post- broadcast studies of program output and spe- ` cial reports prepared as circumstances war- rant. In this way, therefore, Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Scott are able to give substantive di- rection to policy operations wherever indi- cated67 As the principal officers exercising executive authority over RL, they assume full responsibility for policy formation, policy execution, programming and overall effective- ness of RL's operations. 2. Policy staff The next level of responsibility in policy formulation lies within the Program Policy Division (PP) in Munich. This division in- cludes a policy staff under Director Edward Van der Rhoer, the Research Department under Assistant Director Dr. Albert Bolter, the Library under Roy de Lon, and other sup- porting facilities. The rationale underlying this organizational structure is to integrate research and policy as closely as possible, the purpose being to enrich policy and insure its validity with continuing input of new re- search data. (For biographic sketches of Mr. Van der Rhoer and Dr. Bolter, see Ap- pendix 1.) In Munich, the Director of PPD, through his policy staff of about 10, exercises the chief operational responsibility for policy formulation and application. In New York, the Policy Coordinator actively participates In the formulation of current policy. Re- sponsibility for carrying out all policy by the U.S. Division rests upon hire. A Spe- cial Advisor assists the President in the formulation and coordination of basic policy. They act as the President's representatives for immediate and long-range policies, re- spectively. RL's policy staff is made up of profes- sionals, trained in Soviet affairs and general- ly having long experience in the field of inter- national communication with the Soviet Union68 (See Appendix 1 for biographic sketches.) The importance of this staff in trying to realize the purposes of RL cannot be underestimated, for they must combine knowledge of Soviet affairs with an under- standing of communications and an ability to project into the future policy and pro- gramming requirements of RL. Upon this group rests the responsibility not only of policy formation but policy maintenance, that is, to Insure the creativeness and role. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3396 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 vance of policy so that its viability as a com- son momorandum reveals the extent to which formulation by providing observations and posits of living ideas will continue and not RL's policy staff are consciously aware of the suggestions for improving the draft clocu- fall into a state of static immobility. need for a constant rethinking of their as- ment. (For biographic sketch, see Appendix A case in point are the suggestions Jon sumptlons and their formally stated policy 1.) Lodeesen, a Policy Ocer ral in Munich, made Positions. If the policy statement under consideration i nformally to Director Van der Rhoer on D. POLICY FORMULATION relates to West Germany, as in the case of RL's recent policy on West German-Soviet September 27, 1971. Ili a length internal 1. Role of Director PPD relations, then Mr. Robert Redlich, RL's In- meurorandurn discussing revisions of the , The primary operational responsibility for formation Advisor, will play an important Policy Manual, Mr. Lodeesen suggested that policy formulation rests upon Mr. Van der role since one of his prime functions con- RL get rid of its "vocabulary of various bits Rhoer in his capacity as Director of PPD. The corns RL's relations with the Bonn Govern- of combative terminology." He proposed that Director plays a vital role in the formulation meat and the West German press. RL respond to a new incarnation with a dif- and application of policy. His primary respon- And then, if policy deals with a specialized ferent philosophy "which will draw attention sibility in RL is to formulate and initiate subject in the nationalities area, that staff, to our positive value without making us seem policy, and oversee its implementation in under the direction of Mr. Zbigniew S. more of an irritant than necessary." Accord- prograrmning and broadcasting, He must Sztumpf, will play a key operational role. lug to Mr. Lodeesen, this shift in policy em- draw on many sources in policy formation: (For biographic sketch, sea Appendix 1.) As phasis required that RL get away from pres- the Research Department, RL staff, outside Mr. Sztumpf remarked, policy development Is ent cause and effect reasoning and descrip- specialists and many other available sources in large measure one of an interlocking re- tion of its role and switch to one more nearly of expertise. He is essentially the synthesizer lationship between PPD and staff specialists. accurate in which "we describe change with Of all policy developed within RL from the Points of view are sought In the .process of all its random chance and problematical fee- larger long-range policy of the Policy Manual policy formation, he said, and in this way tors as the normal situation in the Soviet to the Monthly and Daily Guidances. knowledgeable specialists have an oppor- Union as elsewhere and our role not as a * * a * * tunity to influence the shape and direction causative but as an influence on- the param- The role of RL should not be interred as of policy. eters and probabilities of that change." In "causing" change, Mr. Lodeescn concluded, Among other areas of lateral intake in the refining this point Mr. Lodeesen declared but rather in abetting the forces of change0? policy process is the Audience Research De- that RL should "seek to enhance the pr on another occasion, the Policy Director partment, According to Mr. Max Rails, head ability that change in the Soviet Union wi ll ll intervened to raise a question of policy at a of ARD, and Mr. George Perry, his assistant in move toward something compatible with the meeting of the Nationalities Services. The Munich, ARD feeds data into the mainstream interests" of the Soviet audience and those issue concerned a feature commemorating the of RL thinking by circulating its audience of RL's supporters "and we seek to reduce the Hungarian Revolution of 1958. The script, as research reports and program evaluations. probability that changes can be introduced described, did not take into account the posi- (This will be discussed in Chapter VI.) In ,in the Soviet Union which would work tive changes made in Hungary in recent this way ARD provides one means for meas- against those interests," MT. Lodeesen cau- years. The Director instructed the Nationals- using audience feedback and programming cousin that RL should avoid the image to ties Service Program Manager to have the effectiveness. Accordingly, they too contribute causing pre or doing things oesy to script re-written, giving it this positive em- indirectly to the complex process of policy convince the sue Soviet people that RL d does not phasis in keeping with RL policy, formation. understand. On the occasion of the Russian Services Moreover, many informal means exist in The Director of PPD operates at all levels, meeting a question was raised about inac- which stair enters into the policy process. In- This enables him to keep in close touch with curacies and possible policy, violations in a formality Is a marked characteristic of RL's policy as it takes shape and proceeds through script. The Director considered pulling the administrative style. This stimulates initia- the final broadcasting operations. He main- script, but with the aid of the Russian Serv- tives and fosters exchanges of ideals and in- tains a continuing close rapport with pro- ices Program Manager, he made sufficient formation on an unstructured basis. As Mr. gra,nsmers, writers, news personnel and pro- editorial changes to satisfy policy require- Diakowskl, Program Manager of the Russian ducers. The Director is present at all morn- thents and permit its use. Services, observed, some policy guidances ing meetings, that is to say, the Research These few instances are cited merely to come from informal conversations with the Meeting (which he chairs), the News Meet- demonstrate the all-encompassing authority PPD Director. (See Appendix 1 for biographic lug, the Nationalities and Russian Services of the Director of PPD, for his is a key role sketch.) Often times, Mr. Diakowski re- Meetings. At all meetings the Director plays not only in fdrnmlating policy but in intro- counted, he will see a problem arising, then an active policy role, for he has the authority ducing it in programming and ultimately talk it over Informally with Mr. Van der to introduce policy guidances and raise goes- broadcasting operations. Moreover, the morn- Rhoor, and from this informal exchange of tsars of policy on the subject matter of pro- ing meetings (to be discussed In detail in views, a policy change will eventually take gramming under discussion. Chapter IV), take on a special importance in place and a guidance issued. Occasions for An example of policy formulation in a the policy process: they provide the Director policy guidances usually occur, he said, In the news-breaking situation was the occasion of of PPD with the opportunity to draw upon usage of words in a policy area and the treat- Communist China's admission to the United multiple sources of expertise for information meat of a particular subject, for example, ad Nations on October 26, 1971 and the expul- and insights having a bearing on policy. mission of Poking to the U.N. Sion of Taiwan. The Director and his staff These meetings, especially the Research Meet- Policy advice is seriously sought from had already formulated a working paper of a ings, create an occasion for the generation of staff; this not a matter of top policymakers policy guidance in a rough draft handwrit- seminal thought and for its flow through the and executive staff appeasing personnel by ten copy on the basis of early news reports Director into policy and programming. This giving them an opportunity to speak with and prior to the Research Meeting, The Di- Is a vital step in the policy process: it is no intention on their part of listening much rector introduced it at the Research Meeting, creative, intellectual and essential for sound less acting. According to Mr. Victor Frank, and it was formally adopted as a Daily Quid- formation and effective programming, one of RL's senior Russian commentators, were times when &1taff did not agree ance of policy. Notification of the guidance 2. Role of RL Staff there was made by the Director at subsequent shared ac- with policy, took issue, and in some instances Morning meetings and copies were circulated Policy planning is an integrated, sh won. (See Appendix 1 for biographic sketch.) to all writers, programmers and other inter- tivity; it is a continuing process in which all He cited the case of a samizdat document cited staff. Briefly, the position taken by RL areas of RL are utilized and to which all from multiple groups in the Soviet Union was one of expressing approval of Peking's major staff make a contribution. The central that had a strong fascist flavor. PPD felt admission as a step toward ending its iso- focus of operational authority may be the that this document should be broadcast, lotion and improving conditions for peace, Director of PPD and his policy staff, but in keeping with RL's principle of giving all yet deploring the expulsion of Taiwan, a others in RL have roles to play and pressure views. However, some RL staff argued against faithful and responsible member, as a via- to exert in the policy process. Such roles can using it because of the profound negative latton of the universality principle upon be either formal or Informal. feelings among the Soviet people arising which the United Nations Is based. (For a When the Director of PPD initiates a pol- from their wartime experiences. To broadcast copy of this policy guidance, see Appendix icy (usually of a longer range variety), a draft such extremist views, they felt, would be 5,) of the policy document is circulated for com- counterproductive 01 PPD conceded, and the To the outside observer, Mr. Lodeesen's ments and criticism throughout RL to all key idea of using the document was shelved. concern seems somewhat exaggerated. Claims staff, namely, the heads of departments, so- A final organizational mechanism in the for credit in bringing about internal changes nior researchers, and programmers. They all policy process Is the Council of Editors in within the Soviet Union are only modestly participate in policy formation; the extent of Munich, Constituting the chief editors of stated in the Manual09 To disctussions with participation and influence depends upon the the 11 desks, the Council confers every week leading RL staff bath in New York and subject under consideration. or so in a formal meeting and reviews and Mu n.ich, the response to questions on the ex If, for example, a policy bears on the func- discusses drafts of policy declarations. When tent of RL's impact on these changes was tions of news operations, then Mr. Lennart L. a fully agreed draft Is finally concurred in one of more identification with other larger. Savemark, head of the Central News Service, by the Council of Editors, it is passed on to internal forces of change., Still, the impor- will, in consultation with his senior news the Executive Director for his approval and tent point to be made here is that the Lodee- staffmen, play an important role in the final then to the President in New York, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1.972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3397 C. TYPES OFPOLICY FORMULATIONS menian Service is on the right of the Ar- 1. Long-Term Guidance menian people to use and develop their lan- a. Policy Manual and National Language guage. The Armenian people themselves Annexes must, through changes in accepted usage, determine the kind of Armenian language The basic framework of RL program policy they prefer 01 is sot forth and recorded in a series of dif- ferent types of policy statements and on suc- cessive levels of significance. They are de- In a series of thematic papers RL tries to signed to assure consistency in program out- make more specific the central elements, in- put, to provide broad approaches which give tentions and appraisals spelled out in the RL the initiative in projecting information Policy Manual. Where the Manual is general- to the audience beyond just responding to ized, these papers are more specific. Called Soviet India and world development on a Broadcast Position Statements, they provide daily basis, and to give staff direct and per- a general overview of the major issues within sonal guidance as they pursue their efforts the Soviet Union, the world at large and to achieve the purposes of RL. specific areas of the world where RL has some Policy formulations are divided into two concern in its programming output, major categories, those dealing with long- The formulation of these statements are term guidance, and those that focus on im- preceded by the preparation of background mediate or short-term guidance. In the realm studies on each topic by an authority or of long-term guidance, the RL Policy Manual competent specialist on the subject. In these is the major . policy document. As noted studies the specialist deals with the basic above, the Policy Manual Is RL's operational trends and salient factors regarding the given charter. It sets forth the basic rationale and issue which should be taken into account in purpose of RL's broadcasting activities and designing RL broadcasts: defines RL's specific role in relation to the Upon these background studies are based audience, its long-range and immediate in- RL Broadcast Position Statements. They formational objectives, and further sets determine RL's position on each Issue, the forth the essential methods and techniques broadcasting objectives and the significant by which these goals are to be achieved. The approaches and treatment for RL program- Policy Manual is, in brief, the mainspring ming output. They take into account the for all policy formulation, the central au- needs of the Soviet audience and their under- thortty determining audience priorities, pro- standing of the subject matter; they deter- gram content, and the nature of RL's ap- mine what informational gaps are to he filled, proaches in program structure, style and distortions corrected and new information toile.", and ideas providedPs Appended to the Policy Manual is a series of National Language Annexes for each lan- guage service. They supplement the Policy Manual with specific commentaries on the unique aspects of broadcasts in the given language. These annexes determine for each nationality any special goals or emphasis, specific policy lines, and distinctive audience characteristics. The annexes also state RL's policy lines on any territorial questions and historical topics of particular importance only to the given national audience's The following excerpt from the National Language Annex relating to Armenian broad- casts suggests the special value of these an- nexes in dealing with all the nationalities. Linguistic Russification is one device the So- viets have used In attempting to erode the sense of national consciousness among the Soviet nationalities. This statement sets forth RL policy on this issue: "RL's Armenian broadcasts recognize that language is a strong indicator of national sentiment and that the language question constitutes one of the principal grievances of many Armenians concerning Soviet policy to- ward Armenia. These broadcasts are aimed alt encouraging the Armenian people to preserve their language as a prime element of their culture and to evolve their own language patterns and expand the use of Armenian, while resisting Soviet attempts to assimilate them. The Armenian Service attempts to en- courage and sustain indigenous pressures on behalf of the Armenian language by report- ing back and cross-reporting significant or parallel developments affecting language and policies, and by Its own broadcasts of Ar- menian literary texts. While following closely any evolutionary trends in the Armenian language, the Armenian Service does not at- tempt to set itself up as arbiter of good Ar- menian language or to lead the campaign for purification of the Armenian language. It does not support Russification and sym- pathizes with indigenous efforts for purifi- cation of the language, but at the same time it recognizes that all languages incorporate words from other languages as part of a na- tural process. By its own output, the Ar- menian Service reflects an awareness of this distinction between such natural changes and unnatural, arbitrary consequences of of- ficial policies. The main emphasis of the Ar- On April 5, 1971, an important RL Broad- cast Position Statement was prepared on the issue of, "European Security." This paper is appended to this study as Appendix 2?" c. Broadcast Guidances A third category of long-term guidances is the Broadcast Guidances. These policy papers treat certain major but more lllmted topics which have particularly immediate import- ance to programming. They signal opportu- nities to RL staff, provide a basic stance, and determine objectives and treatment on current broadcast subjects. Among the recent issues for such treat- ment are the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Anti-Semitism in the USSR, Rule of Law, Landing on the Moon, Sino-Soviet Conflict, United Nations Human Rights Documents, and certain special contingencies such as on the occasion of Khrushchov's death. Broad- cast Guidances are also produced on opera- tional questions where consistency of prac- tice is required, for example, in programs dealing with listener mail or the use of samizdat ?1 On May 27, 1969, RL produced a Broadcast Guidance relating to the "Landing on the Moon" that was to occur on or about July 18, 1069. Two of the main points emphasized in this guidance were: (1) that the success- ful landing was an achievement for all man- kind not just for the United States; and (2) that the landing pointed out again the neces- sity of space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union as a step forward creating mutual understanding, improving relations, and lessening the dangers of war. This Broadcast Guidance is appended to this study as Appendix 3.18 2. Immediate guidance a. Monthly guidelines Long-term guidances are supplemented by current policy guidance on a day-to-day basis. They take the form of Monthly Guide- lines and Daily Guidance Notes. Both are in- tended to relate larger policy to specific cur- rent developments and provide policy guid- ance to meet the operational requirements of RL staff. Monthly .Guidelines are based on an as- sessment of major news trends and are pre- pared in Munich, with contributions from New York. They represent an effort to apply existing long-range guidance by incorporat- ing it into programming suggestions. They are based on research about events likely to be suitable for broadcast treatment during the coming month. An outgrowth of regular discussions with desk chiefs and program- mers, these guidelines form the basis for specific plans for feature programs.- An example of RL's Monthly Guidelines for November 1971 Is appended to the study as Appendix 4. This Guideline is divided into three major parts. Part I deals with general matters such as the 35th Anniversary of the "Stalin Constitution"; the first anniversary since the trial of Valentin Moroz, the Ukran- ian historian and author of several samizdat works; the first anniversary on November 15 when the Committee on Rights of Man was established by Sakharov, Chalidze, and Tver- dokhelebov; the 150th Anniversary of Dos- toyevsky's Birth: and finally the first anni- versary (November 12th) of Rostropovich's letter in defense of Solzhenitsyn. Part II of the Guidelines deals particularly with the Nationalities Services and calls attention to staff of significant developments and anni- versaries. Part III of the Guidelines Is a Bib- liographical Supplement prepared by RL's Library Staff, citing numerous sources in the Library's collection on the "Stalin Con- stitution." The purpose of this biblograph- ical effort is to assist researchers, writers and porgrammers In the preparation of materials for broadcast dealing with this anniversary 7? b. Daily guidance notes The second form of short-terms guidance is the Daily Guidance Notes. This guidance is formulated in Munich, usually on a daily basis, or whenever the need arises, and pro- vides policy guidance on current, fast-break- Ing news topics. This guidance is based on an assessment of current news and Soviet media output as interpreted within RL's objectives. Its purpose is to identify areas of immediate interest or importance to RL programming and make suggestions for treatment. Daily Guidance Notes are telexed in time for a re- view at the opening of business In the New York headquarters, New York staff forward any comments, suggestions or contributions by telex for inclusion in the next day's guid- ance?x An example of RL's use of a Daily Guidance Note is that of October 26, 1971, concerning the admission of Peking to the U.N. Ap- pended to this study as Appendix 5 is a copy of Daily Guidance Note #18, giving the guideline on China's admission to the United Nations and a script in the original Russian and translated into English, showing the form in which the guideline was incor- porated into a script and broadcast to the Soviet Union. c. Special memoranda A final form of immediate policy guid- ance is the Special Memoranda. Whenever specific aspects of policy implementations suggest a need, the Director of PPD issues memoranda dealing with general matters of tone, treatment or balance affecting news operations and the preparation of program features 72 D. RL: A POLICY-ORIENTED ORGANIZATION 1. RL's Policy Handbook RL's Policy Handbook is at once the or- ganization's "bible" and "biblical commen- tary": it provides the visible structure for policy within which the organization oper- ates; it contains the final word on what can be done and not done, written and not writ- ten, said and not said, in RL's broadcast- ing operations. A covering memorandum by Director of PPD Van der Phoer introduces the reader to the Handbook, giving instructions on Its use. A prominent place is set aside at the beginning for the Policy Manual, followed by the Nationalities Annexes, Broadcast Po- sition Statements and Broadcast Guidances. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 339 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Ill arch G, 19;';J be Ivey executive staff have personal copies of 20 Ibid., p. 4. an improvement for the citizens of the the handbook; a floating copy is made avail- "Ibid., pp. 4--6. Soviet union and for other nations. Willy- 28 Ibid., 5. Hilly the various forces trying for controlled oleic for staff consultation. p 2. RL Polio Surfeit or Sufficiency? 29 Ibid., p. 6. change, spontaneous, change, regrezeive y' BB RL Policy Manual, March 1971 , p. 7 (RL change, violent change, peaceful change, however, the si hrn ily of what really exists in represents a V. IV pt. 4.) change through compromise will continue to only the physical real ity o 61 Ibid function in the Soviet Union. RL will not less tangible form throughout RL, and that es Ibid be the court of the changes which finally is, or ani spirit of policy that permeates the 2a Ibid., pp. 7-8. result. Our role-and it is a very important nization tion. RL which, is a as one policy- n oriented put cage it-, 64 Ibid, p 8 one-is to contribute to the chances that staff absorbs ou gh osmosis-its Ibid., pp. 8-9. those seeking democratic solutions to the staff policy operations from script a? Ibid., p. 9. problems facing the USSR will be able to mandate and e and rules for o 61 Ibid., pp. 10-11. exert a beneficial influence. To this end we writing through not escape policy; patina 36 Ibid., p. 11. seek to popularize the ideas and contribute vita. staff cannot escape l a 81 Ibid., pp. 11-12. to discussion on the issues which confront vital part of their organizational livelihood. 4? Ibid., p. 12. those who arc interested or could become policy generates c, iut consultative and ac RL Policy Manual, March 1971, p. 13. Interested in democratic solutions." Totao dependence coop policy generates a nsultative and (RL, v. IV, pt. 4.) 01 An incipient issue began to emerge in coopeeratrati ve spirit that permeates the en- 42 Ibid., p. 35. October over the handling of Solzhenitsyn's tire organization. For, policy formulation, 4? Ibid., p. 34. new novel, "August 1914." Some staff did not as shown above, is a shared experience of 44 Ibid. share the enthusiasm of sonic Western ob- staff, and this in turn generates what Di- ?' Ibid., p. 35. servers over the high literary quality of this rector Van der " and referred to as a "cone 46 Ibid. work compared with the brilliance of his dlem ntawithi and a "genuine cooperative 41 Ibid., p. 36. earlier works. At an informal discussion the .III large measure, has 48 Ibid., p. 36. issue arose in the form of a question as to developed within the organization the existence over the years. In large measure, 4? Ibid., p. 38. how RL should report these mixed views. One the eiof this positive attitude juste- 6? Ibid., p. 39. group felt that negative observations should fees faith in an administrative style that ai Ibid., pp. 39-40, be reported; another group, including a Rus- fosters individual independence and stresses 52lbdd., p. 40. scan who only recently emigrated to the reliance upon staff professionalism in policy c2 Ibid, pp. 40-41. West, felt this would be unfair to Solze- farmulation'and policy execution. 6+Ibid., p. 43. nitzyn since this new work constitutes only Thus, RL staffers are policy-minded; the 66 RL policy formulation, June 8, 1071, p. 1. one piece of a much larger historical mosaic habit is deeply engrained. And no doubt poi- (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) that he is preparing and to judge the work icy imparts an inner organizational disci- c? Ibid., p. 3. on the basis of this one piece would be un- pline that insures effective programming and m Ibid., pp. 3-4. fair. Moreover, it was pointed out that it protects against error. Yet, the question must Ibid., p. 4. would be counterproductive to RL's purposes always be present: Is there too much policy? In defining RL's role, the Manual states: to report sharp criticism of -a man of Sol- Are the controls too tight? Is it not possible . Radio Liberty exerts a political influ- zhenitzyn's statutre in the eyes of the Soviet that creativity and staff initiative are road- ence affecting to some degree the evolu- people when the evidence upon which a just vertently being stifled? Is it not possible, as tion of Soviet society .. . 11 (Policy Manual, judgment can be made is still inconclusive. one senior staflman suggested, that the time March 1971, p. 4. XL, v. IV, pt. 4.) 02 RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 5. has come for a loosening up of policy con- ?o Lodeesen to Van der Rhoer, RL memos- (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) trol and allowing even greater individual andum, September 27, 1971. Mr. Lodcesen 13 Ibid., p. 6. independence? urged that RL refrain from giving the simple 04 RL Policy Manual, Annex., Armenian These are important, perhaps vital ques- answer to the simple question: "What are broadcasts, January 19, 1970, p. 6 tions, but no doubt they are counterbal- you trying to do?"; but rather should re,- XIII, pt. 2.) anced by an awareness of the inherent risks apond along the following line: 06 RL policy formulation, June 1071, p. 6. of too loose a policy structure in dealing "The Soviet Union's, efforts to compete (RL, V. IV, pt. 7.) with a configuration of power of such awe- with the West have led to a great many 06 RL Program Policy Division. European somoness as the Soviet Union. Yet, the pol- changes in the structure of their society. A security, Broadcast Position Statement, April icy structure is there for achieving the prop- higher level of education, professional re- 6, 1971, 6 p. (RL, v. XIII, pt, 3.) er balance if indeed this is a relevant ques- quirements for scientists to maintain con- 61 RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. vita. tact with developments in the West, a higher 7.(RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) o FOOTNOTES RL Program policy Division. Landing on priority on the capacity for original thinking 0 1 RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 2. (R.L,, are some of the more obvious factors. In the the Moon. Broadcast Guidance, May 27, 1969. V. I.) West we deal with such changes through a 2 p. (RL, v. XIII, pt. 4.) 2 Radio Liberty Policy . Manual, March 1971, variety of institutions guaranteed to us by 06 RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. p. 29. (RL, v. IV, pt. 4.) law or which crop up in response s g ing 7' RRL RL V. IV, pt, 7Monthly.) - Guidelines for November -,0 2lbid, p: 29, situations. Press, courts, demonstrations, 4 community clubs are all part of this. Some- 1971, Parts I, TI, and III. 6Ibid. times they work well and sometimes they 71 RL Daily Guidance Note #10, October ? Ibid., p. 30. - - - don't. In the Soviet Union the regime denies 26, 1971, with script in Russian and English, 7 Ibid. - the populace access to these instruments of "The Acceptance of the Chinese Peoples Re- g Ibid. change so that compared with our mixed rec- public in the formulation, N 11 (RL, XIII ISt 9) 71, p. 0 Ibid., pp. 30-31. ord they have virtually no record of intro- 72 RL policy 10 Ibid. duoing change as a result of spontaneous 3. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) 11 Ibid. - reaction. In the past the system survived be- CHAPTER III: CONDITIONS ArrEGTING THE 02 RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 11. (RL' cause the regime exercised a total monopoly RECEPTION of RL's BROADCASTS y I.) over all institutions and could resort to ran- Quoted X. COMMUNICATIONS FACTORS of its 1:{ in, RL Statement, June 14, 1971, redom. solve. Told yrtheregime lstill holdsrttightly A. Number of shortwave sets p. 21. . (RL (RL, V. L) conditiong exist within the Soviet 14 Ibid. to all the instruments within its reach. The Certain, affect the reception of RL's broad- Y RL policy, June 8, 1971, p. 1. (RL, V. IV, combination no longer works, however, since Union that a pt 7) at least one instrument is now beyond their casts. These conditions include, first of all, 10 RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 11. '(RL, reach, the dissemination of information. the technical capability of the Soviet people V. I.) Terror cannot be secret. People cannot be to receive RL's shortwave radio signal, and, made to believe. secondly, their willingness to lisLen to RL's 23. r; Ibid., p. - "RL's function is to assure the maximum message. 10 Ibid., p. 3 3. . possible effectiveness of this instrument for . The number of radios available to the So-of Liberty. In, r? P Propaganda The de the role cold d war: Radio a Prince- p change by preventing it from again becom- vict people is considerable. In 1969, there receivers ton University symposium, John Boardman lug in any the roleonopol raof the tio al a oes in were an e t-I ate n0 million radio shortwave Whitton, ed. Washington, D.C., Public Al- go beyond the Soviet U. tics on fairs press, , 1963. p. 96. such as VOA or BBC which introduce in- receivers are net published by the Govern- 20 RL` policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. formation from the outside and do every- ment, but.between 28-30 million of the 50 5. ('RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) thing we can to disseminate that informa- million were believed to be shortwave receiv- 21 RL policy Manual, March 1971, p. 2 (RL, lion which a free press or free radio would ers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Census, T. IV, pt. 4.) disseminate, discuss, debate within the So- there are approximately 65 million house- U2 Ibid., p. 2. 1 viet Union if such institution existed there. holds in the USSR. (The total population is 20 Ibid. We believe that if such institutions did exist nearly 244 million.) Thus, RL calculates that 2{ Ibid., p. 3.' in the Soviet Union the resultant political - roughly one out of every two Soviet house- 20 Ibid, developments, whatever they might be, would holds has a sliortWave receiver? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3399 In the Soviet Union, unlike in the United nomenon in the Soviet dissident movement States where shortwave is not widely used will be discussed in Chapter IV, but suffice it I. public broadcasting, shortwave transinis- to say at this point that it is a technique of sion is a necessity to cover vast distances in tape recording of protest songs and other domestic broadcasting. Moreover, the broad- dissident material and circulating it within casting system is state operated. There are a circle of friends. Magnitizdat has reached no local stations in the sense that they exist the West, and RL broadcasts it back to the in the United States, Hence, the utility and Soviet Union, thus expanding the potential popularity of shortwave transmission, range of its audience. But, equally iinpor- Apparently, purchasing a radio in the So- taut, tape recorders could be used to record viet Union offers no great problem. In 1907, RL's programs for later listening and circu- an RL staffer reported at a conference, "... lation among friends. Conceivably, RL's read- our information suggests that anyone in the ing of Solzhonitsyn's "First Circle" would be Soviet Union who wants a shortwave set the type of program that would be taped. can get it.", A recent newcomer from the So- In this way, therefore, tape recording con- vict Union commented in Munich that there 'tributes to conditions broadening the poten- are many transistor radios available that are tial audience for RL's broadcasts. But, unfor- imported from Japan and West Germany. tunately, the potential of RL's influence They are expensive, and they can be pur- through the use of tape recorders cannot chased on the open market. be accurately measured because recent stm,- Radios with a shortwave capability are tistics on Soviet production figures are not much in demand, and the few models of available. The 1964 edition of Promyshlen- transistor sets receiving shortwave, the Spi- nest SSSR: statistichesky sbornik gives the Bola and the Transistor-10, quickly disappear following gross production figures: 1957, from the stores8 The Spidola is the most pop- 59,000 units; 1958, 70,800; 1959, 99,700; 1960, ular receiver in the Soviet Union today. De- 127,600; 1061, 149,300; and 1962, 195,000.7 mands for this set are considerable; it has 7 This amounts to a total gross production of hands, long wave, medium wave and 5 short- 701,400 during the six-year period, 1957- wave bands, boing down to 25 meters. So- viet domestic broadcasts go as low as the 25 meter band, but sets on the market go no lower than that. This is sufficient, however, for international reception, though the best reception is from still shorter waves. Since 1958, the production of commercially avail- able short-wave ranges below 25 meters has been discontinued-presumably, in an effort to curb listening to foreign broadcasts. So- viet citizens wanting to listen to foreign radio broadcasts, get around this restriction by "doctoring" their sets. It is a common prac- tice to buy a radio with a wave length down to 25 meters and rewind the condenser to make it capable of receiving shorter waves! RL has, therefore, a sizeable potential au- dience in the Soviet Union that has the tech- nical capability of getting its signal. Lewis S. Feuer, Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, observed that, "Even allowing for exaggeration and defective equipment, we may still estimate that millions of Russians have access to Western broadcasts." 5 Equally important as the availability of shortwave receivers in the Soviet Union is the capability of RL transmitters to reach those receivers. Since the Soviet population is not uniformly distributed over its more than 8 million square miles of land mass but is predominately concentrated in the Western portions, RL's task of reaching its listening audience from its European transmitter bases is made considerably easier, The Lam- pertholm station, because of its relatively close proximity to Soviet borders, is best suited for covering the areas deep within European Russia, while the Pals station is best suited for covering the more westerly regions, The transmitter at Taiwan covers the population centers of the Soviet Far East. It is estimated that audible signals reaching the Soviet Union from the Spanish site at Pals cover areas containing 200 million Sov- iet Inhabitants. (For the coverage of the Pals transmitters, see figures 6 and 7.) Trans- missions from the Lampertheim base are audible to an estimated 140 million Soviet Inhabitants. (See Figure 5.) RL's transmit- ter on:Taiwan covers the extreme eastern por- tions of the Soviet Union, producing audible signals in areas containing approximately three million Soviet Inhabitants. (See Figure 8.) u B. Tape Recorders for Magnitizdat and Pro- production figures for 1057-1062 and their growth trend, a level of annual production of approximately 500,000 units would be reached by 1973. This projection would indi- cate a total accumulation of over 4.5 million units in use in 1973. However, this projec- tion does not take into consideration a range of essentially unaccountable factors among which are, the rate of depreciation of the units which are low in industrial priority and low in quality, the level of Soviet exports, the number of tape recorders imported, and the durability of those produced .8 That the Soviet Government has been aware of the need to improve production of tape recorders was indicated in an Izvestia article of April 4, 1867. The article referred to a resolution accepted by the Soviet Minis- ters of the USSR, calling attention to the fact that the volume of production of tape record- ers "does not satisfy the growing population needs"; that the quality of those manufac- tured was "inferior to those from abroad"; that the assortment was "inadequate"; that there were none available for foreign lan- guage study; that there were no miniature tape recorders; and finally, that the produc- tion of tapes was "in very poor condition." The article went on to say that the Govern- ment instructed the interested ministries to prepare and approve before May 1, 1967, a plan for the improvement of tape recorders. It declared that the responsible lninisteries "must take action to satisfy the needs of sales organizations and repair shops for spare parts for tape recorders." The Ministry of Chemical Industry, it concluded, "is urgently respon- sible for preparing a plan to increase the pro- duction of tapes and the improvement of their quality." D Apparently, Improvements in the Soviet supply of tape recorders have occurred dur- ing the insuing years. A recent newcomer from the Soviet Union observed that there was no problem in getting a tape recorder in the USSR, though they are expensive. It is just a matter of going to a store and buying one. Many are Imported from Germany and Japan. What is difficult to get, however, is the tape 10 Another imponderable in estimating the number of tape recorders in the Soviet Union is the extent to which Soviet citizens gram. Propagation themselves build their own sets. Skilled Less exact than estimates of shortwave technicians in the broadcasting field could radios in the Soviet Union are estimates on build it serviceable set, despite the difficulty the number of tape recorders. The impor. of constructing a good recording head. That the Soviet people engage in this type of ac- tance of tape recorders in RL's broadcasting tivity is indicated by the fact that Soviet operations arises from the new form of sam- hobby magazines like Radio (circulation, izdat called, "magnitizdat." This new phe- how to build a bonne tape recorder,) 11 It is apparent, therefore, that while it may be difficult to ascertain the number of tape recorders in the Soviet Union, it is reason- able to assume, nonetheless, that recorders are available, perhaps even in increasing numbers, and accordingly contributes a small but significant part to those internal Soviet conditions that are favorable to RL's broadcasting operations. C. Rumor Network The rumor network, that is, person-to- person word-of-mouth communication, is the third means of internal communication within the Soviet Union that broadens the potential of RL's audience. To a great extent the existence of an un- official network of oral communication has been the result of the Soviet regime's com- munications policy and its principles of popaganda. Thus, the regime itself is respon- sible for elevating what would ordinarily be an incidental source of information to the status of a parallel system of conununica- tions beyond official control. According to Raymond A. Bauer and David B. Gleicher, long time specialists on Soviet public opinion and communications policy, thanks to this independent system, apparently well estab- lished over the years, "the initial audience or readership gets multiplied much more rapidly than it would in another society." What makes this especially relevant to the goals and purposes of RL, which dirocts its energies at the nation's elite as a prime audience, is that in the judgment of these scholars, "the most highly placed groups in the system are most convinced of the relia- bility of word-of-mouth information." They concluded, therefore, that unofficial word-of- mouth communication must be considered "a major channel" for the transmission of news and other information In the Soviet Union?3 During the Stalinist period the rumor net- work was especially strong, effective, and re- liable. The classic illustration to prove this point is the report of M; Kasenkina's so- called "leap to freedom" in 1948 through the window of the Soviet consulate in New York. No Soviet media carried the story, yet it was known by alert people throughout the Soviet Union in 48 hours'3 According to Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool, a leading American specialist on Soviet communications and audience research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the rumor network is still an important means of interpersonal communications. Writing in 1965 and commenting particularly on the diffusive and self-corrective aspects of the rumor network, he said: "In the pres- ent situation where one person in two or three has access to direct foreign news, in any small circle of friends or co-workers there will typically be several who have heard any major item, can diffuse, discuss, or correct it." 1, A current appraisal, similarly positive in its judgment on the value of word-of-mouth communication, was made by Max Ralis, RL's Director of Audience Research. (For a bio- graphic sketch, see Appendix 1.) He expressed the view that the Soviet rumor network is still a "vigorous operation." "It works," he said; it is a "personal type of cominunica- tion, and this is important." He described a typical situation in which unsponsored news and information are transmitted in the So- viet Union: "When people get together at work in what is the equivalent of the Amer- ican coffee break, they ask each other, 'What's new?' and from there the transmis- sion of information begins." Mr. Ralis left no doubt that this type of interpersonal ex- change continues to be a valuable means of communicating officially unsponsored infor- mation within the Soviet Union. For foreign broadcasters like RL, the net- work of "word-of-mouth" communication performs an important service: it Is an ef- fective instrumentality for multiple trans- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3400 March G 1972 CONGRESSIONAL IiLCO~ 'i7 - SI;NA''L ' leave De, :10 quoted , RL, ment, June and thus Ma -the rtractd news sand i information the So iet citizen with of mental i a~ of re- 14c, 1971,1970p. 6a. (RL, v.I I.)) Prof.tFeuer writes mission, of ilitally enables e Soviet ality that tisLics there are citizen l toe find out dthintgr and form opinions half the pieceis a e (missing. Perhaps, thelto- 86,500,0 0r radio setsin thetSoviet Union and that the regime does not want circulated. It tality of Soviet censorship was best de- of these an estimated 27,000,000 are believed is, therefore, at once an addition to, a sub- scribed by the formed Soviet journalist Leo- to be capable of receiving shortwave lbroad- stitute for and a corrective of the official nid Viadimirov, now a full-time RL staffer: casts from abroad. media. Moreover, the experience of RL re- Not a single thing can be printed in the 0 The Soviet shortwave audience, p. 1. (RL, infotpes the Judgments of Bauer and Gleicher Soviet Union, whether it be a book or a v. III, Annex J.) The i tape that the Soviet "populace values the bottleeam gazine orsaacandy-wrapper,,un-. reco dersllwas prtovia d b y Mr RoylDo Lou of txnol cia Less it has been approved by the censor. No RL. (Do Lon to Klwnp, Interoffice Memoran- . r network highly:' II. DISSENTING SOVIET INTELLECTUALS radio transmission is beamed, no public ex- dum, RL, Munich Office, Oct. 14, 1971, with A. Demands for freedom of thought hibition is opened for public view until an appendices. In, RL, v. XVII, pt. 2.) Judging by the content of samizdat (to official stamp has approved it)9 IIbid. be discussed in Chapter IV) and the testa- Censorship is more than strictly an admire- ' Ibid. mony of former Soviet citizens and Western istrative technique in running the Soviet 10 An indication of the problem of getting scholars close to the Soviet scene, there seems state; it is an all-pervading force of Intel- tape at an earlier time was evident in the little doubt that RL has a wide audience loctual oppression. As one of the principal report in Elcoromicheskaya Gaeeta of De- among a very specialized but potentially weapons of the Soviet regime in maintaining comber 1966 (p. 33) which said in part: "It powerful Soviet group, namely, the disent- its monopoly of power, it has far-reaching is rumored that magnetic tape recorders *111 ing Soviet intellectuals, political and ideological ramification. The soon be sold in furniture stores. Magnetic The reason for dissent within this elite survival of the party and preservation of the tape is very hard to got; without It, however, sector of Soviet society can be explained political position of the ruling elite depend the tape recorder is only useful as a piece of largely by the fact that many Soviet Intel- upon success in maintaining this monopoly furniture. At present, statistics indicate that lectuals, that is, the writers, scientists and of power and information; and it is the the distribution of tapes in relation to ma- other professionals among the creative in- primary instrumentality for ideological con- chines is one half a reel per recorder. Even telligentsia, are most affected by the regime's trol over the Soviet people. Censorship repro- this small amount of magnetic tape available effective methods of thought control. Intel- sente a determined effort by the regime to for purchase cannot be bought just like lectuals thrive on the exchange of ideas. Isolate the Soviet people from independent that." The article continues with a satirical Their creative nature, and the practical nec- sources of knowledge and information. It at- commentary on the shortage of tape. (Quoted essity, especially in the sciences, of build- tempts thereby to mold the Soviet citizen in, Do Lon Memorandum, Oct. 14, 1971.) ing upon efforts and achievements of others, according to the requirements of Soviet ? Bader, Raymond A. and David B. Gleich- the compelis them 'to seek other sources of ideology. thought and data. When frustrated in these In describing the elaborate system of Soviet er. otord- Unio of-mouth Comm visc Bonn o in and "In efforts, they dissent and as their frustration censorship, the RL statement declares: grows, their attention is directed progres- the Soviet Union words are the chief articles David n orations. New le, Soc eety, e Pand sively to other areas of inequity within Soviet of contraband.." 20 Indeed they are, for op- Ma CoinGlencoe,muSic, io and York, society, namely, shortcomings of the regime positional messages are banned; only sp-pp. 426 417. in economic affairs, abuse of civil rights, proved ideas are permitted to flow into the '2 Poole, Opportunities for Change: Corn- and the oppression of national minorities public domain; deviations, ever so slight, munications with the U.S.S.R., p. 3. Dr. Poole and religious freedom. And so, the move- are not tolerated. Communist communsma- made this comment on the essence of rumor went of dissent, feeding upon an accumula- tions theory places a higher value on the and its plausibility: "Rumor may thus be a tion of grievances, grows and spreads social function of communication than it reasonably reliable source as Russians them- throughout Soviet society. "It is no acci- does 'on trio value of truth. 2' In a closed selves rated it in Bauer's study." dent," says the RL statement describing this society like the Soviet Union's, those in power 1 Ibid., p.-9. p 426. (RL, process of evolving dissent, that the Intel- invariably try to limit ideas and information la Baleratnd Ol i June p. 1cit 97.,p lectuals "have been in forefront of the So- that reach its citizens and pass on only as viet Union's burgeoning movement for hu- much outside information through the dis- V. 1.) Pool, p pith for change: conunu- man rights." 16 torting prism of Communist ideology as they nications 1, O tph the ,ties or change: orninu- B. Appeals of RL for Soviet intellectuals believe Soviet suitable for their purposes. censorship is so intense that the once, 1965, p. 10. The growth of a full-scale movement of regime attempts not only to determine what 18 Niklta Struve, Professor of Russian Liter- intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union information and ideas shall pass through ature at Nanterre, wrote: "That Radio Lib- has created for RL an audience of importance regime media but also determine who shall erty is listened to by many, many people in which it has cultivated in a special way. RL have access to what information and ideas. the Soviet Union, and especially the intellec- has become the prime broadcaster. of works And as Bauer and Gleicher wrote: "It even tuals, is proved by the reactions that I myself by these intellectual dissenters. Acting as makes serious efforts to deprive the Soviet have always had from any interview which f a public forum of free discussion, RL broad- citizen of the sacred privilege of not reading have given to this station. Those reactions casts their thoughts and their works back and not listening.3 are not only numerous, but also perceptive to the Soviet Union, thus enlarging in geo- In brief, communications in the Soviet and well reasoned." Other scholars have metric proportions the potential area of in- Union is an adjunct of political organization made similar statements, (RL statement, ternal circulation and enlarging aswell the and censorship the principal instrumentality June 14, 1971, p. 35, v. I). potential appeal of RL among the Soviet for control. 10 RL statement, June 14, 1971, p. 6. (RL, audience. . Effects of censorship on RL's appeal v. I.) For a full discussion of Soviet censor- "No longer do the devices of a police state B ship, see the symposium, The Soviet ensot?- successfully keep the Soviet citizens in the No doubt RL's appeal, and that of other ship. Studies on the Soviet Union. Institute dark," wrote Dr. Pool a few years ago 14 And foreign broadcasts, is magnified by the total- for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Ger- Hop- today, this is especially true for the creative ity of Soviet censorship; for in seeking to See also, intelligentsia. The appeal of RL is evident give an alternative view of reality, RL offers m maann,y, v. Mass 11, Media no. 2, iri 1971, the 148 p. Soviet Union, pp. In observations by audience research special- an opportunity that is denied the Soviet 123-133. ists who affirm that many Soviet university people, namely, to exercise and to satisfy 21 Ibid., p. 10. educators are known to listen regularly to , the human instinct for knowledge and in- 21 Pool, Ithiel do Sola. The NGtisc Media and Russian language foreign broadcasts. And formation?" Their Interpersonal Social Functions in the within the intelligentsia, RL's commitment rOOTNOTES Process of Modernization. In, Dexter and to political gradualism within the Soviet The shortwave audience, p. 1. (RL, v. III, White, People, Society, and mass communi- Union has struck a responsive chord. This Annex J.) cations, p. 433. was apparent in an appraisal of foreign radio a RL, Communicating with Soviet Youth. A 22 Ibid., p. 414. , broadcasting by a member of the Soviet sci- Conference Sponsored Jointly by New York 23 Quotations from Samiadat, p. 10. (RL, v. entific Intelligentsia who regarded foreign University and Radio Liberty, March 10-11, II, pit. D 4.) Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assist- broadcasts as necessary to pave the way for 1967, New York, RL Information Division, ant Secretary of State for European Affairs, changes in Soviet society. Many things have 1967, p. 3. gave the following explanation of censorship yet to be changed, he observed, but it is a n Ithiel do Sola Pool. Opportunities for in the Soviet bloc and its effect on public slow process, and at this juncture the Soviet change: communications with the U.S.S.R. policy: "Domestic media in the USSR and people are not yet politically mature 18 Paper delivered at the Workshop on Coin- Eastern Europe speak with a single voice, III. SOVIET CENSORSun': RL+s OPPORTUNITY munications with the Peoples of the U.S.S.R. commonly omitting or distorting coverage of A. Totality of Censorship ' . Radio Liberty-New York University, Novenr- events about which the public has every her 20, 1065, p, 6. need to know. In place of full news accounts, RL's What poaa, and t greatest potential suds- a Ibid. questioning editorials, and independent cotrt- dou atea and cepssorship i opportunity, the the is no Soviet o Feuer, Lewis S. The intelligentsia in op- mentary, the daily fare never challenges poli- oubt the role of censorship Union. Soviet censorship is near total; Its position, Problems of communism, V. 10, Nov,- pies or goals set by the governments nor asks Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S Match 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1140f how wisely the public's money is being spent. crats belonging to the permanent party ap- strictions on Intellectual freedom that pre- A public so deprived of essential information paratus are not excluded in this audience vent the exchange of ideas and their access leas difficulty in finding ways to promote category, but it is assumed that their per- to new Information. This is the principal its own interests with respect either to do- serial stake In the system and the desire to motivating factor in explaining their lead- Imestic or to foreign issues." The support- maintain the status quo outweigh their in- ership in opposing opprey ession and i eeking tem. ere of RFE/RL argue' that these radios fill - terests in reform and liberalization. reform sysre- information gap created 1d by censorship. is the creates a special more than half the tmember- fu sal to recog ize the as it st ccmeritTio 1 Stheir (SI'RC, RFE/RL Report, , p p. 19.) ship entered the party after Stalin's death, work because it falls to meet the stultifying CHAPTER IV: RL'S PROGRAMING: AUDIENCE and thus their attitudes and outlook have ideological requireriients of "socialist real- CHARACTERISTICS, PnocrnuRES SUMMARIZED, presumably not been warped by the Stalinist ism," the regime's measure of literary and AND PHENOMENON of "AMIZDAT experience. By virtue of their middle-level artistic merit. I. AUDIENCE CHARACTERISTICS positions, it is further assumed that they Harboring these grievances, the literary- A. RL's Assumptions Regarding Its Audience represent the aging party bureaucrats who artistic intelligentsia strives toward a goal cling to power at the upper echelons. As of freedom of expression and seeks to extend 1.. Elitist Approach to Public Opinion members of the ruling elite at various levels the scope of what Soviet society feels and Formation of Soviet society, it is also assumed that they thinks about itself and the purposes and In trying to communicate by the spoken could play a constructive political role if goals of Soviet life. It actively seeks infor- word with the near 244 million Soviet people motivated by appeals to their own self-in- mation and ideas from the non-Communist who themselves speak some 107 separate terest or to their sense of moral obligation world, such as that provided by international languages, RL has an especially difficult tails, as a "leading force" in Soviet society, should radio broadcasts. It also wields a moral in- and expectations of success must be fraught future developments in the party make this fluence in Soviet society disproportionate to with uncertainty, even with the knowledege possible, its small numbers. Increasingly, this group that its signal can reach 82% of the total RL regards this group as atop priority. has been able to rely on support from the Soviet population.' In rationalizing its tasks As an objective, it seeks to facilitate the scientific and other groups within the in- in, order to maximize its effectiveness, RL evolution of democratic attitudes among telligentsia among which there exists an makes certain assumptions about its audi- thinking members of the CPSU. It encourages Interchange of Influence. the literary-ar- ence. These assumptions take into account this elite group, therefore, to demand polit- Accordingly, RL regards e lime audterar and the attitudes not only of social, occupational, ical democracy and decentralization, of de- tistic c Intelligentsia source for a primecler influence and intellectual groups in all the republics clsion-making processes within the CPSU. throughout a s Soviet society. oa believes that and oblasts of the Soviet 'Union, but also the RL operates on the assumption that as this it sprovide iaithat attitudes of the various nationalities to is increasingly achieved, then it will be pos- to p useful and deal a broader that will basis information which RL broadcasts and certain differing sible for democratic practices to spread more to seeks ee to this paththeful in e stab- psychological categories within these groups. rapidly into government and throughout the lishing a group regime's for repressive mef-the RL tries to reach as broad an audience as nation's social institutions h fret forts . against broadening its focus, RL attmeas- passible, but as a communicator with politi- c. The scientific intelligentsia to interest this group in the problems of the cal purposes in mind (and having limitedg N Probably the most influential group among workers and others in Soviet society, includ- energiees) , it mist direct its bents in in' Soviet Russia's intellectuals is the scientific ing the nationalities, and conversely at- vi eot t society whin at those elements in So- intelligentsia. Though numerically small tempts to win more support and understand- ise political now or.nthe future may (about one million), they offer the greatest ing for them among fellow citizens, espe- the to a porders of influence. society More these likely polit- than possibility, in RL's opinion, for influencing cially among students and workers.i the lower orders S will be Soviet, the potential de- the whole of Soviet society. e. Other groups of the intelligentsia icon- alert grouts future and more likely It Is the Soviet scientific intelligentsia, The remaining groups of the intelligentsia wet- makers of the lionized ithe Soviet press, that is the pace- lll also have access to shortwave radios.ims setter of Soviet trends, sponsoring the more in which RL has varying degrees of interests at the top. liberal elements of the literary-artistic in, embrace other educated elements in Soviet RL's approach is, therefore, elitist: it a society, including, social, economic, tech- 2. Social, Occupational, and intellectual telligontsia, Influencing those within their meal, rural, military, party and police in- Groups fields of specialization, even beyond into the telligentsia. Some are essential to running managerial areas, university thinking, and the country; others, like the military, party a. The younger generation student life. The regime has granted great and police intelligentsia, are 'fpillars of the On the basis of political and sociological privileges to this group, yet many within It, regime" and, accordingly, continuation of the studies and audience research data, RL vis- like Saklrarov, have a strong sense of respon- regime's stability depends upon their unim- ualizes its potential audience as being di- sibility for the future direction of Soviet so- paired loyalty. Some within these groups, vided into three major categories: (1) social, ciety and hence are consciously aware of the however, have made common cause with the Occupational and intellectual groups; (2) regime's narrowness and inflexibility in cop- dissenters, the Nationalities; and (3) a psycohlogical ing with pressing social and political 'prob- Owing to their importance In Soviet so- category of listeners. lems. Having inquiring minds, the scientific ciety, RL believes that they should be con- Of primary importance in the first sate intelligentsia tends to take the long per- sidered within their audience spectrum, to gory is the youth.' This group matured after spective, recognizing the need for a broad be differentiated according to their special the Stalin era. Many will eventually achieve programmatic approach to social and politi- interests and their susceptibility to influ- posiions of responsibility. Many are now cal problems in answer to present and future ence in the direction of liberalization of seeking greater freedom, demanding a better needs. Many are engaged in important work Soviet society.7 life for the Soviet people. They are skeptical for the regime, and as a group, though not f Lower-level party and government officials about Marxist-Leninist ideology and its necessarily individually, they are lndispensa- and elected members of legislative organs promises of a future "good life" and Corn- ble to the regime. RL's interest e this politically elite audi- Inunism. A generational conflict plagues this RL looks upon this scientific elite as a fer- ence a Ines from in the expectation that i group, disenchanted with their parents who tile field for the propagation of unorthodox Soviet rises be democratized, xp to ion that atIf in part crit ust were cowed by Stalinist terror: here is one ideas and dissemination of officially unspon- Soviet about ie to of the chief problems of the post-Stalin Bored Information. As a prime elite group forces of de-centralization at the grass roots. regimes, within the country, they are one of the gate- In effect, it is an attempt to apply the demo- The younger generation is divided, how-..; keepers" through whom influence flows as it inherent in the "New Eng- ever, between the political activists, those filters down from the top hopefully to per- erotic land town principles iinh re the Soviet e sng- careerists taking the Komsomol-CPSU route, meate the whole of Soviet society c lent wherein the local officials will be made and the political passivists, those who are . - d. The literary-artistic intelligentsia to feel a greater sense of responsibility to profes disinterested in politics and seek safe gives to- The literary-artistic Intelligentsia, though their "constituency" than to the upper echo- tear and material well-being. li gives top small -numerically, numbering probably less lons of authority in Moscow, and conversely priority genuine to thirst the for k kinowwledledg,ge about bout zin t thhe their out. than one million plays, nonetheless, a key that the people will increasingly look upon get role in Soviet communications. In this group local officials as their representatives hav- side world their desire to know about s that the writers, journalists, posts, artists, ing certain responsibilities to them. could a fill nd u the V va relegicuuandm left other by the concepts insole- e- sculptors,? actors, directors and many others RL believes that officials of the party and col active in the Soviet film industry. Owing to government at the Oblast, city, and rayon resents of ment at the Communist regime's ideology, and their their on the character of their professional careers, level, including Sovhoz and kolhoz chairmen, resent they are especially vulnerable to reprisals are in the difficult position of carrying out freedom cat of information of listener n and ideas. RL regards from the regime-a writer, for example, has the will of the centralized regime In their this rp of lisfoas a ores and not the built-in bargaining power with the areas and at the same time having to bear long-term om priority for r R :EtL programmers s."? regime as does the much needed scientists. the brunt of popular resentment resulting b. CPSU members As shown in a preceding chapter, the lit- from political arbitrariness and economic Thinking members of the CPSU, especially erary-artistic intelligentsia are sensitive to shortages. Though admittedly they are not those under 40; constitute another elite the abuses and shortcomings of the regime, inclined to oppose regime policies directly, group that RL seeks to Influence. Bureau- but more Importantly, they resent the re- still they do at times have some latitude in Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S3402 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 carrying out decisions and in establishing thetic, and especially meaningful for RL's stitutlonal rights. It has prevented the n-- local policies, notably when disagreement ex- purposes, lack access to shortwave radio, tionalities from making common cause with ?ists at the top or a vacuum envelopes the de-. RL does not, however, regard this group as each other outside the framework of official cision-making process. unimportant. Indications exist of anti-re- Soviet policy. It has attempted to impose the RL sees a great potentiality in this audi- gime feelings and even outright political ac- Russian language on the non-Russian na- ence and regards it a special task to persuade tivity involving direct participation. More- tionalities at the expense of their own fan- these officials to exercise their responsibility over, owing to ignorance in foreign languages guage and culture. It has in general attempt- in such a way so as to .represent their "con- and thus access to foreign broadcasts, books, ed to denationalize all nationalities and unite stituency" and to defend their interests and publications, and the near total inability them by creating a single "Soviet people." against the centralized regime (including na- of this group to travel abroad, RL provides a The non-Russian nationalities have . rc- tional and local interests versus the all-union unique channel of comprehensive informs- sisted the regime's do-nationalization pol- regime). RL's expectation is that this will tion about realities and actual development icy; and at times even some Russians with- strengthen their own position within the both inside and outside of the U.S.S.R. The in the intelligentsia have expressed syn'i- population. Moreover, RL believes that lower youth within this category are known to pathy for the interests of the nationalities, level officials should be encouraged to work have a great interest in the outside world recognizing the connection between their for human rights and individual freedom, and and are enthusiastic radio listeners. More- desire for human rights and those rights of conversely, RL encourages Soviet citizens to over, they are less apathetic and less re- the other Soviet peoples. view these officials, for whom they are re- signed than older workers and farmers. Ac- In broadcasting, RL supports and attempts quired to vote in local and government "dies- cordingly the youth within this substantial to spread such sympathies among the Rus- tions", as being responsible to them and at. subgroup represent a unique opportunity, scan listeners, while at the same time stress- tempt to influence those officials to fulfill in RL's estimation. ing the need for common cause with Russian their responsibilities8 . RL assumes that the bulk of ordinary dissenters and other oppositional elements in g. Skilled workers and their immediate workers and peasants have less opportu- its non-Russian broadcasts. All Soviet na- supervisors nity and interest in listening to foreign tionalities, Russians included, share many broadcasts. But, owing to their great num- problems uncommon, such as, the erosion of RL operates on the further assumption that bers, RL includes them among its listener- customs, traditions and cultures, under the skilled workers and their immediate super- ship and believes that it reaches many more impact of Communist ideology, and the pres- visors represent a potential audience. Griev- indirectly through word-of-mouth comma- sure of overcentralization of state power at ances in the economic sphere are the bond nications. RL realizes, furthermore, that at- the expense of the regions. of unity within this group, that is, common titude formation within his group is most in its broadcasts RL, as a matter of policy, concern for poor housing, economic shortages, likely to be affected by views of individuals avoids taking positions on the pre-determi- special privileges to the party and govern- whom they regard as informed and authors- nation of the Soviet Union's future regard- ment hierarchy, and mutual awareness of the tative, that is, local intelligentsia such an ing the nationalities, Rather, it concentrates true nature of Soviet trade unionism as an teachers, librarians, and specialists, known to on the immediate task of encouraging the instrumentality of regime control. RL be- be motived to get outside information. Ac- nationalities separately and all Soviet peo- lieves that the immediate supervisors are cordingly, RL looks upon such intermediar- ples collectively to work for freedom by law- bound to be influenced by the grievances of fee as a significant sub-audience, along with ful and constitutional means against the the workers, since production depends on young people, for conveying its message. centralized regime and for the right of self- high worker morale, and, accordingly, when- RL's message to these groups is directed determination for all peoples, inside the So- ever possible they try to improve the. situa- to their local situation, living and working viet Union and throughout the world. Un- tion. conditions, as well as material possibilities. derstanding the correlation between decen- Moreover, RL tries to establish a bond of Abstract and political discussions are related tralization and the development of grass- understanding between the worker and the to concrete effects where possible in terms of roots democracy, RL encourages rational Intelligentsia. In broadcasting about the in- whether proposals under review will yield ad- steps to increase local authority in all telligentsia, RL tries to give the workers a vantages and improvements to the popula- spheres. Moreover, it avoids stimulating an- better understanding of their motives and tion. Comparisons are made with economic tagonism among the Soviet peoples whatever aims, and similarly in broadcasting about situations in highly developed countries. the nationality, advocates intra-national co- working conditions, attempts to make the Emphasis on material describing democracy operation, and encourages those inner-di- intelligentsia aware of the problems and at- at work and life of similarly situated persons rested forces striving for self-determination titudes of the workers. In this way RL at- elsewhere is believed to stimulate Soviet by peaceful, conlotuntiaist m is no wmmm tempts to unite all groups who are trying to listeners to make demands on their leaders by peaceful, constitutional means 11 improve the system rather than allowing for similar improvements. Information of this 4, Psychological Categories of Listeners them to remain atomized as presently is the nature, RL believes, will increasingly activate The third and final segment of RL's audi- ease. "comparative thinking" among the various ence structure are those listeners that fall Finally, RL believes a real opportunity ex-. classes within Soviet society. The workers within various psychological categories. One - ists in giving information and ideas to work- - and peasants are aware of the great eco- of the characteristics of this segment is that ing class listeners especially on material re- nomic vulnerabilities in the Soviet system it represents a commingling and overlapping lating to their needs, for example, descrip- and the great economic advantages in West- of the social, occupational, intellectual and tions of workers councils in Yugoslavia, free ern democratic forms. Moreover, the gap be- national groups." unionism, economic strikes, working and liv- tween Soviet economic promise and reality is The psychological categories are defined ing conditions in other countries.9 a decisive factor in shaping attitudes of the broadly in terms of commitment to the re- h. Soviet personnel abroad Soviet urban and rural working class as well ime. The "regime patriots" are at one ex- as the local and rural intelligentsia and other g A specialized audience that RL regards as touch with them .u There- Creme. For reasons largely of their own vest- "important" is Soviet overseas personnel, - groups in close ed interests and personal involvement or that is, troops stationed in Eastern Europe, fore, while RL's major effort may be directed , their primitive political concepts, they de- and crews on Soviet ships at sea. What makes at the upper strata intelligentsia, still it fend the system against any criticism, espe- this audience attractive is the fact that they does not ignore the lower orders of Soviet cially external. Identifying the present re- are often in good locations for receiving RL's society. gime with the nation as an historic unity, signal and that the information and ideas 3. The Soviet Nationalities the "regime patriots" become "super-patri- transmitted by RL coupled with their own The second major category in RL's audi- otic." At the other extreme are the committed observations overseas (for example, seeing ence structure are the various nations and opponents. They are equally patriotic in their better economic conditions in the West, ob- nationalities of the Soviet Union. RL regards allegiance to the nation, but are disen- serving firsthand reformism in Eastern Eur- the nationality question as one that "is and chanted with the regime and see no solution ope, and witnessing Soviet repressive policies will continue to be a critical and potentially short of its complete overthrow. as in Czechoslovakia) can be an important divisive problem of the Soviet system until According to RL's estimate, the bulk of the force for future changes in the Soviet Un- all the peoples of the USSR have an oppor- Soviet population falls between these ex- ion?". tunity to exercise their democratic right of tremes. A large number are apathetic and I. Collective farmers and unskilled workers self-determination." 12 Eruption of the Sino- indifferent to political problems. But, RL be- At the base of the pyramid in RL's con- Soviet conflict involving the border regions lieves that there are many, which it describes ception of its Soviet audience are the masses, and peoples of Turkestan, as well as the gen- as "seekers," who are loyal to the system, that is, the collective farmers and unskilled eral historical trend toward de-colonization have political concerns, are aware of existing workers. Representing the largest part of the in the non-Communist world, has under- strong dissatisfactions, and have serious res- Soviet population, they are the most subju- scored the importance of this problem for the ervations about the many policies and ac- gated by the regime and least enjoy any eco- Soviet regime. tlons of the regime. But, they have not yet nomic benefits or political rights. Wide- Officially, Soviet nationality policy purports formulated distinct views on what changes spread passivity is the main characteristic of to give the nationalities certain rights, such are needed, and how they are to be achieved. this group. Unlike the upper strata intelli- as the right of succession, and a genuine Then, there is-a smaller group that RL calls geutsia, their political influence is not norm- form of republican government. But in prat- reformers," They have a strong personal ally direct and active. The majority is educa- ties the regime has denied the peoples the commitment against certain aspects of the tionally and intellectually backward, spa- exercise of their proclaimed political and con- regime, and they have begun to develop views Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1'972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3403 and approaches on how to bring about changes. They do not seek to overthrow the system, but rather act as a loyal opposition which could promote progressive change within the system and avoid revolutionary' chaos. In selecting the most desirable audience within this pattern, RL operates on the prin- ciple that it wants to expand its audience as much as possible and to increase the flow of information and ideas. Accordingly, it downgrades the Importance of reaching the committed opponents of the regime, who probably are listening anyway, and the "re- gime patriots", who would be least receptive. Rather, the audience RL is most anxious to reach are the "apathetic", the "seekers" and the "reformers." From Its point of view, the "apathetic" must be stimulated to become erceiv involved and p e social improvement. The "seekers" must be ence"` 11" `~,,ug with the uovlet and" -social sales- more conscious of new ideas and alter- nce. Good d se sense and adopting the s a ,patriotic aaa at an - natives for changing the Soviet system in in sdictate goals and purposes. s. RL ce their interests and ultimately in the inter- gr must, seeking eeki therefore, es. a ests of all Soviet citizens. The "reformers" lasting g ting dialogue on essentially try to establish must be sustained In their search for these so, they must m Soviet et terms. teTo do so, they mbe immersed in the new instrumentalities. Soviet milieu to the extent that they can RL refines this category still further, not provide corrective insights into Soviet probes wishing to give up on the "irreconcilables." lems and do so with credibility and under- The committed opponents, it says, must he standing. This Is a most delicate operation, encouraged to work in their own interests one requiring great care, sophistication and and to work with the system to change it, toleration. not exposing themselves in any vain attempt But the burden of communication for RL to overthrow It by force. "Moreover. RL be- programmers is lessened considerably by the lieves the "regime patriots". should be en- fact that RL broadcasts to the bulk of the coura.ged. to question the system and the acts Soviet peoples in their own native languages of the regime, and try to gain their recep- (20 in all). For RL, the lingua franca is Rus- tivity to ideas and practical alternatives scan. Not only are broadcasts for the Rus- which RL might suggest. clan Service made in Russian but equally However, EL?views its main effort as being important the scripts are actually written directed not toward convincing the already in the Russian language. Some foreign broad- convinced, but to influence "the large middle casters, as in the case of RFE, first write the group which comprises the majority of Soviet scripts in the. language of the broadcaster citizens to think independently and con- and then translate them into the language sider alternatives to present principles and of the audience. In translation much can be practices with the Soviet system." r., lost, and the, connecting link to the audience C. On relating to the Soviet audience can be defective. RL program chiefs are of 1. AUDIENCE PERCEPTIVE; A FRAGMENTED MOSAIC One mind oil the value of writing in the It is one thing to structure an audience in original language. Mr. Direcowski described - RL's approach as, a direct um of a rational and efficient way to insure effe o writer tiven.ess; it is quite another to relate to communication from the , writer's mind, that audience. For EL, this is a special prob- through the structure of words, to the ear of rem, mainly because it seeks to be a surro- the listener." "The subtleties and nuances, gate "Home Service" for the Soviet listener, often lost in translation," he said, remain It must, therefore, structure its programming in Mr. ' not only so that it will appeal to its audience, in the Russian Service, Alexander ervie, took Managing Editor but more importantly, so that the audience , a strong view . on will understand what is being conveyed. see this question. a biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) ) Quoting uoting the Italian proverb, This is not easy to do. The difficulty stems -"Traduttori, trad'itori" (equating translators front the fact that RL must deal with vast, with treason), he said that in translations lacunae of information on the Soviet side.- one puts a heavy screen, not just a veil or It must conceive of its audience's perception scrim, between the writer and the audience. of reality as that of a fragmented mosaic in This was especially true of Russian. He told which many important pieces are missing. of a leading British scholar who had just RL' programmers must know what pieces " prepared a script on the 150th anniversary are there; they must also know what pieces of Dostoevsky that had to be translated into are missing and need to be provided. Russian, but according to Mr. Backerac, This problem was very acutely posed by "English just doesn't go into Russian, much a Soviet scientist who recently said that of the essence of the meaning is lost, all the "nobody would want to listen to for- tastes, the nuances. One can't maintain opti- eign broadcasts if they were sure that our mum effectiveness," he said, "by using the own information is complete; but as it is, translation process. Russian is essential; it half of what happens in the world is simply is vital." concealed from us, facts, not comments or The Nationalities Service also has the ad- opinions." 16 vantage of writing scripts In the original Thus, one of the great problems EL faces language without resorting to translations. is the need for a constant awareness of the Only In the case of newscasts is the material extent to which their audience does not share translated from the Russian; but even in a common informational frame of refer- this instance, according to the Nationalities ence. The programmer and broadcaster can Program Manager Z. Sztumpf, the script never be absolutely sure that his listener will writers and programmers work from original have sufficient knowledge of other facts and source materials in the native languages, information to understand what is being adapt the news by using these sources, with presented 17 the result that nothing is lost In the process. Still another problem of perception arises Moreover, newscasts are ordinarily straight from the warped image Soviet propaganda declarative statements without the nuances creates within the Soviet public mind. Upon and shadings in feature writing. the EL programmer and researcher rests the That broadcasting in the native language responsibility of knowing not only that dis- by native speaking broadcasters has a par- torted image but how to correct it. In seek- titular appeal and effectiveness with the lag to portray the truth of living reality, at audience is evident by reports from the aan- least to a degree that is humanly possible, dience area. One member of the Soviet scien- RL must correct the refracted light of. Coln- tific intelligentsia expressed the view that munist propaganda, adding substance to other foreign broadcasters did not understand shadows and giving a fuller picture of the how to communicate effectively to the Soviet Soviet reality and international life around listener, "They speak to us the same way it. they would to an Italian or an .Englishman," 2. Style, Content, Language he said, "and that's wrong because we have Success in communications of the sort that a different life." Another listener, a former RL programmers are engaged in depends Soviet citizen, put it more succinctly, He to a great extent upon style, content and said of Vladimirov, RL's coanmena'tor in the language--style in the sense of, projecting a London Bureau: "The Soviet listener will say positive and dignified image; content, in that he is talking about us, this 1s for us shaping programs to -meet the unique re- and he is our own." i8 quirements of the audience and to achieve Developing a capacity to communicate to the goals sought; language, in perfecting this particular audience and do so on Its the only available mechanism for conlmunl- terms and within its perception of the world eating by the spoken word. is clearly an important asset in RL's opera- R.I. policy IT. PROCEDURES IN PROGRAMING SUMMARrZTD A. Policy in program planning process To reach its audience, RL has established practical procedures in programming. What is significant in these procedures is the ex- tent to which policy is integrated into pro- gramming operations. Indeed, the ma=in im- pulse of RL policy operations rests upon the necessity of designing policy into program- ming. The function of policy guidance is to establish a foundation which determines the total design of programming, and to set forth a set of criteria for all programmers, writers, editors, and desk chiefs in the selection of themes and subject matter, and in prescrib- ing the treatment and tone of programs. Still, despite this appearance of close super- vision, considerable latitude is allowed for initiatives in developing program design and selecting materials and specific subject matter 5 The starting point for developing general program themes and broad program plan- ning is, as noted above, the definition of thematic and audience priorities in the Policy Manual. These guide the distribution of at- tention to various subjects and the types of treatment In the programs. In working out specific program series, programmers begin from a "show plan" which defines the spe- cific purposes of the series and its compo- nent programs in relation to RL's objec- tives as expressed in the Manual and other policy papers, Conferences for reviewing over- all direction, structure of programming, The Monthly Guidelines, weekly schedules and memoranda reflecting advance program plan- ning-all provide further recurring occa- sions to formulate, review and improve plans for the constructive execution of policy.20 B. Daily morning meetings 1. Research meeting In a sense programming formally begins at the morning meetings held daily front Monday through Friday. It is here where policy and programming merge. The Research Meeting at 0946 CET is the first in a series of four morning meetings. The Director of PPD is the chairman of this meeting. Par- ticipants include the Assistant Director for Research, a policy officer, senior research analysts in economics, politics, sociology, foreign affairs, and cultural affairs, along with the Media Analyst, the Head of Sainiz- dat, the Head Librarian, and the Head of the Information Center. At the opening of the meeting a "News List," citing all important developments up to that time, is passed around. Then, all par- ticipants give an oral report on the most sig- nificant developments affecting their fields, This Is based on a review of the press and other information sources, notably their own accumulated knowledge. The first to speak, however, Is the Soviet Media Analyst who reports on Soviet media output, presumably for the previous twenty-four hour period. This report enables researchers and pro- grammers to identify areas of interest and importance.'It also lets them know the gaps and distortions in Soviet news coverage that Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3404 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 have to be filled and corrected in program- news and news features; and (2) it provides ment, Mr. Sztumpf noted that a commemora- ming. A Daily Policy Guidance Note is is- a formal occasion for the Director of PPD tion ra ynof Ttirkesta was der Rhoer sued at this meeting if `warranted. The first to, introduce policy guidance. being scheduled. a policy violation in the item on the Gul~lanee Note, which is circu- 3. Nationalities service meeting the form of sce ibilit statement in the script onling for ation of a united Turkestan. (RL mated among stall, is the report on Soviet The,next morning meeting is that of the the restora media output. Usually at this meeting if any Nationalities Service which begins daily at adheres strictly to a policy of no predeter-Import is judant event emerges in discussion that 1045 CET in the same general conference urination.) Mr. Sztumpf assured the Director significance, Is judged ant have upt with the the ark as room. (A brief meeting is held on Saturdays that there were no such intimations but ro- of PPD will interrupt with tremark, as between the Director of POD and the Pro- dicated that the division of Turkestan had was the case on October 27, 1971, "let's pro- gram Manager.) Chairman of this meeting is generated deep feelings of local nationalism gram this," and immediately arrange to have Mr. Sztumpf, Program Manager of the Na-In the area. Mr. Van der niaocr underscored the Pro- t should have n Tatar- ri t t th p o s a e sc the policy point that the information passed along tionalities Service, who also repor ram Department with recommendations for Turkestani programs Dr. David Nissman, As- no suggestion of political reunification, but g its use. sistant Program Manager of the Caucasian should stress the growth of national feeling What makes the Research Meeting import Department, is present and reports on the and the sense of common concern-in brief, taut is the fact that it represents the point Caucasian programs, Also attending is Mr. to stress the positive. in RL's operations where, except for long- Mykola Herus, Assistant Program Manager At the same meeting Mr. Van der Rhoer term research, the results of research can of the Ukrainian-Belorussian Department, raised a policy question In a discussion of the be formally and immediately brought into who reports on the Ukrainian-Belorussian Ukrainian program. Mr. Herus described a the programming and policy process. Staff programs. Other participants at this meet- script that was going to be used that dealt at this meeting conveyed to this outside ob- In are Mr. Robert Tuck, Director of the with developments In Hungary, focusing on server the impression that they are "on top of Program Operations Division, Mr. Van der . the anniversary of the 1956 revolution and the news," and possessing analytical skills, Rhoer, Director of PPD,' and the Chief Edi- Soviet intervention. Both Mr. Van der Rhoer are able to Interpret it within a larger frame- tors and Commentators from the various and Mr. Tuck urged that the script be work of accumulated knowledge. Thus, it desks of different departments in the Na- brought up to date, accenting positive devel- is here where the discipline of scholarship tionalities Service on an ad hoc basis. (For opments in Hungary under Radar as well as is brought to bear on the rapidly unfolding biographic sketches of these staffinen, sec the intervention of 1956. Mr. Van der Rhoer events of contemporary :history, Appendix 1.) directed that the script be reconsidered. At 2. News meeting The purpose of this meeting is, (1) to give the meeting on November 3, Mr. Sztumpf re- At 1030 CET the daily morning News Meet= the heads of the various departments in the ported that the script was revised to include lug is convened. Chairman of the meeting is Nationalities Service an opportunity to re- the positive- side of developments since the Lennart Savemark, Program Manager, Cen- port on what they intend to cover in their revolution as directed and that it was accep- tral News Service (CNS). Also present from daily programming; and also at the same - table to the editor. CNS are the News Evaluator on duty and time, (2) to provide the Directors of the Pro- Again, the Important point to be observed the Chief Editor. Other participants in this gram Operations and Program Policy Divi- here is the review character of the meeting meeting are: the Director of -PPD, Director soons an opportunity to give counsel and by leading programming and policy staff. Both of Program Operations Division, Program guidance on program content and on policy the Directors of programming and policy Manager of the Nationalities Service, Assist-- as it is integrated into programming. have formally the opportunity of advising ant Program Managers of the Nationalities The procedure operates this way. The varl- and giving directions on program content as Service's Caucasian Department and Ukrain- ous department heads review the content and well as checking for policy. The accent is on ian-Belorussian Department, Senior Staff form of programs within their respective re- . policy adherence and program quality. The Commentator, Staff Commentators of CNS sponsibilities. For example, in the meeting on meetings also give the heads of the various and Russian Features, Policy Coordinators -October 26, Mr. Herus of the Ukrainian- departments within the Nationalities Service from PPD, and a representative from RL's Belorussian Department discussed the gen- opportunities to exchange Ideas on policy and Information Office. eral content of programs within his respon- programming with those to whom they are The main purpose of the News Meeting, sibility, indicating that two main themes directly responsible. Is to review the important events occurring would be stressed, namely, Brezhnev's visit to 4. Russian Service Meeting in the world and in the Soviet Union up to France, and a script that would point out fourth and final morning meeting Is that of the and final morning meeting that time, discuss the treatment of certain how the regime has allowed pre-1917 national The CET, of these items, and introduce any policy re- monuments in Belorussia to fall into disre- The meeting takes lance Service toffice of the quirements if appropriate. The morning News pair, while allocating resources into preserv- Director e meeting Chairman the the meeting Serv- List, a compilation of priority news events, Ing those of the Bolshevik period. Samizdat Program eting Is circulated among participants of the meet- would also be included in the day's program- the Program Manager the the Russian Senior trie r of the Managing gor Comr ing. (For an example of a News List, see Ap- ming, Mr. Bolshevik said, ist of Russian Participants Include pendix 6.) At the meeting on October 26, At this point in the programming proce- of Russian Features, the Russian Edit itorsures De-from 1971, Mr. Savemark went down the list of dure the Director of Program Operations Mr. amentators rtment on an ho hoc basis, Director - news Items, and the participants discussed Robert Tuck is formally and directly brought POD, and the Director of PPD. key items. - into contact with his top programming staff Dthe ct r ofsian Service meeting At these meetings the Director of PPD, as and, accordingly, is able to introduce both in parallel Discussions ic form those at the meeting a the the guardian of policy, plays a key role. At a general and detailed way programming Service. In the meeting meeting on the October 26 meeting, the world press, in guidance, At the meeting on the 26th, Mr. Nios f or ties Mr. De, In the the Program reporting on Kosygin's trip to Cuba, indi- Tuck called attention to a number of items October Manager, and Mr. iakwsk, the Managing cated that there was a rumor of Castro's ill- from previous meetings and noted in partlc- Manof and Mr. Featurs, discussed Ma their ness. Immediately, Mr. Van der Rhoer indi- ular those dealing with Ukrainian affairs that Editor plans for F the da cated that RL could not report this because appeared in the press review, material In programing ng pans came to the fore at this it was speculation and might prove to be Ukrainian-Russian samizdat . publications, meeting, relating not to the program incorrect. Castro might appear at the air- and items in Russian samizdat., He urged then under dtunotn but rather m the port to meet Kosygin, he said, and thus em- upon the programmers the importance of thmizdat works of the dissident Medvedev barrass RL. (The implication was clear that creating an environment of cross-fertilization bwhich were about id be published such an unsubstantiated report might have in using samizdat. Matters of specific interest brothers r the West, and the manner oP be published a negative effect on RL's credibility with Its in Russian samizdat, he noted, had also spe- in the West, andt m d of broad sftillg audience. But, more importantly, broadcast- cial interest for the nationalities and should book-size s RL tried the contents of Ing a rumor of this nature runs counter to be used. At the meeting on October 27, Mr. to the get the MedvrigIts to books bcas to the Sts of RL'e policy of reporting only truthful, fac- Tuck, performing the same advisory func- of policy, RL does not tual news information.) Mr. Van der Rhoer tion, called Dr. Nissman'a attention to a re- Union, published matter books moles it Introduced the guidance on how RL would cent report of an old Georgian Bolshevik who use pAs blis d copyrighted Even having this out treat Peking's admission to the U.N. At this had just died, and who, having been released has specific authority. point there was an interplay of discussion from prison, had been brought before Stalin thority, it carefully indicates that the broad- on this question, with staff reaffirming Mr. still dressed In his prison clothes. Stalin put writers done without the knowledge of e Van der Rhoer's Judgment. him in the foreign ministry, and eventually policy is designed protect As the meeting progressed, the Chairman he became an ambassador. Mr. Tuck directed the writers of samizdat from reprisals of the commented an the scheduling for the day,- that this story be used in a script for a regime. indicating the news features that were going Georgian broadcast. The other issue for discussion revolved to be treated, notably commentary on Pe- The Policy Director also plays an Important around the manner of presenting samizdat king's admission to the U.N. After discussion role in this meeting. As the various program- over RL. In commenting on the problem of of other matters of RL interest, the meeting ming plans are being presented, he must in- broadcasting the Medvedev books, Mr. Tuck adjourned. troduce into the discussion any considera- suggested that books of this nature should In programming procedures, the morning tions on policy. This occurred twice at the be analized, discussed and reviewed exten- News Meeting is important, and for two rea- meeting on October 27. In reporting on pro- sively in broadcasts rather than being read sons: (1) it alerts staff on the priorities in gramming for the Tatar-Turkestant Depart- in toto. He emphasized that production-wise Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE. this would be useful, especially owing to the overwhelming amount of samizdat now available for Russian programming. Among all present there was particular stress on the importance of the book-review approach now that Western commercial publishers are pub- lishing samizdat. Policy questions did not arise at this meet- ing. In the meeting on the 27th, however, the question of policy violations in a script did come up for discussion. The violation was one involving language. The question arose on whether the script should be scrapped. After reviewing the script, Mr. Van der Rhoor felt that with further editorial changes the script could be used. Accordingly, the script was turned over to Mr. Diakowski for further work. Again, what is Important about meetings such as this is not so much what took place on a particular day but rather that the mechanism itself exists, providing opportuni- ties for discussion, exchange of ideas, policy and programming guidance. 5. Observations on the Morning Meetings RL's morning meetings are models of in- formality. Administratively, they are effi- cient, tightly scheduled, and well organized; but in format, style and mood, they are simple, hiformal, relaxed. This overly casual environment produces a mood that allows the fullest exchange of ideas and no doubt would encourage even the most difficult per- son to engage the most articulate and over- conildent in heated discussion. Yet beneath this patena of informality there lies an awareness of being involved in a very serious business, and no doubt these meet- ings are scenes of hard-hitting verbal combat' as the dialetic of interacting ideas come into conflict. In many respects the morning meetings take on the character of academic seminars within a restricted time-frame. Key person- nel are invited to comment on Important problems in their areas of competence. Ex- changes of views and ideas and an integrat- ing process of news-gathering, research and policy are allowed to take place. The morning meetings provide staff from researchers to programmers the oppprtunlty for cross-re- porting each other's knowledge. They provide a point of contact in a formally structured way for all key staff to come together in formal, but personal, communication. The entire process is creative and is vital to the effective operations of the organiza- tion. Perhaps, Dr. David Nissman, an Ameri- can Orientalist and Assistant Program Manager of RL's Caucasian Department, best described the morning meetings when he said, "The morning meeting is a market- place where ideas are bought, sold, and re- jected. It is a free interacting mechanism allowing for maximum exchange of views." Yet, for the purposes of this study, perhaps the most important aspect of the morning meetings is the role played by the Director of PPD. By his presence and that of other policy staff at every level of formal discussion, he is able to give policy guidance and inject into the entire programming process an aware- ness of policy in an authoritative and com- manding way. But, what is most significant about his role, in addition to this, is the authority he has to establish the permissible limits of what can and, what cannot be pro- grain ned. C. Production In Programming Process The final step in the programming process is the actual production of news, features and other programs. RL's broadcasting day begins at 1700 Moscow time, two hours be- hind Munich. Thus, decisions taken at the morning meetings have sufficient time to be integrated into programming. Edward F. Noelter Is Chief of the Produc- tion Department. (For a biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) It is his prime responsibility, working with procbucers, broadcasting staff, script writers, engineers and others, to sea ,that RL's output gets into its final form for transmission to the Soviet audience. One of the key links in this process is the Con- tinuity Team which ties the programs to- gether for presentation to the listener. At this essentially technical level the strictest obedience to procedures Is required, and the degree of personal initiative is severely re- stricted. RL has impressive studio facilities, far better, one senior staffman said, than VOA, In the taping process, the producer of the program is in one room with the engineer, the performer is In another sound-proof studio. On signal from the producer, the pro- grain begins and is taped. If error occurs, the process can be terminated and redone until the tape is satisfactory. In some shows the producer is also the speaker, and thus he has multiple functions to perform. From the view of an uninitiated outside observer, the operation appears to be technically impres- sive, highly professional, and most efficient. Usually there is a 2-to-3 day spread be- tween the time when a script has been ap- proved and when it is aired. Except for news- casts which are initially given "live," pro- grams are taped? and the 2-to-3 day lag be- fore actual broadcast provides an abundance of opportunity for a careful prebroadcast review. However, a bulletin can be aired at any time, merely by pulling out a time-slot of one feature and replacing it at a moment's notice. Thus, RL can be kept up-to-date if events change the content of taped programs. Taped program material to be used at the Taiwan transmitter is packaged and sent via air mail to Taiwan in sufficient time for airing. Newscasts go to Taiwan via telex and satellite. III. PnrNOMENON OF SAMIZDAT A. Development of Samizdat 1. Beginning of Samizdat I One of the most extraordinary develop- ments In recent years within the Soviet Union has been the emergence of samizdat, that is, the private publication and circu- lation of one's own works. To circumvent censorship, dissenting Soviet intellectuals have resorted to this device. As a new pheno- menon in Soviet intellectual and political protest, though a long and revered tradition in Russian 'history, it has provided RL with a wealth of material varying in quality for programming. As far as can be judged by spe- cialists in the field, samizdat has an assured future, and will no doubt increase in quan- tity and improve in quality. Samizdat, as an embryonic expression of freely expressed public opinion in the Soviet Union, had its Inception within the move- ment of political dissent that emerged in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization pol- icies: t The establishment of safeguards against the resurgence of police terror and administrative arbitrariness, and the decline of fear and the feeling of political impotence nurtured by Stalinism? led to a type of in- ternal emancipation, especially among the younger Soviet Intelligentsia who had been untainted by the guilt of the past. The official exposure of the "cult of personality" also led to an erosion of faith in the party's collec- tive infallability and in the efficacy of Its ideology. Failure of the de-Stalinization proc- ess to proceed further than criticism of the past and the Inability of Khrushchev's pol- icies to satisfy the expected promise they held out at first, intensified among the young a growing feeling of alienation, and it stintu- fated a search for political alternatives to policies, and for some, alternatives to the political system and its ideology. A powerful stimulus to this rising dissent came from the return of survivors from the slave labor camps. It was these survivors, the Solzhe- nitzyn's, that gave courage to, the younger members of the intelligentsia in their search S 3405 for wider political freedom and more genuine forms of legality. Taking advantage of the relaxation in con- trol over literature, the literary intelligentsia began to circulate among themselves and to foreign channels of communication (the press and radio), copies of manuscripts, ap- peals, open letters, and other protest litera- ture. These channels of communication helped to disseminate this uncensored infor- mation and accordingly contributed to mold- ing critical opinions into a nascent public opinion that frustrated the regime's attempts to suppress or distort facts about the grow- ing unity among the dissenting intelligent- sia. The shift to these unofficial vehicles of communication became more pronounced as the regime began to tighten, censorship, es- pecially since 9964. Politization of dissent, as it emerged, cen- tered on demands for civil liberties guaran- teed by the Soviet Constitution and those guaranteed under the U.N. Universal Dee- laration of Human Rights. However, it spread to the spheres of political and cul- tural-linguistic rights of the non-Russian .nationalities, and then to the area of re- ligious freedom. This had been sot off by Krushchev's anti-religious campaign of 1959- 1964 which generated a believer's protest movement, especially among the Evangeli- cal Christian Baptists. By the late 1960's, spe- cifically in the summer of 1968, the param- eters of dissent expanded as the movement entered a new phase with the. publication of critcisms by Sakharov. This was the first pro- grammatic document that brought into question some of the basic tenets of the Soviet system. Thus, the protest movement now enveloped not only the creative and lit- erary intelligentsia, many within the na- tionalities and among believers, but also the scientific intelligentsia, 2, Spreading Influence of Samizdat RL, as prime beneficiary of samizdat, has called it "an exciting collection of painstak- ingly copied, unpublished manuscripts. '122 Much of it is reproduced on a typewriter, with multiple carbons. It Is known to be typed sometimes even in large Soviet offices. The first two copies are often destroyed to. prevent the possibility of a typewriter being traced. Samizdat participants risk arrest and imprisonment, Their material is circulated through a network of like-minded persons Other samizdat material is handwritten. Samizdat Items reaching the West is fast ap- proaching 1,000 and include everything from book length works to articles, appeals and protests consisting of only a page or two. Contents of samizdat vary: there are major literary writings, some by noted Soviet au- thors; thoughtful essays by leading special- ists dealing with political, social and eco- nomic problems; "transcripts" of courtroom trials from which the public is barred (for example, the proceedings of the Siniavsky- Daniel trials and the recent Leningrad trials) ; individual or group petitions by So- viet citizens seeking redress of grievances or demanding respect for constitutional rights? Samizdat Is also emerging with consider- able force among the nationalities, notably the Ukrainians who have been becoming pro- gressively aware of the erosion of the Ukrain- ian language and culture under the impact of Russification. Religious samizdat has been given a strong impetus under the re- gime's campaigns of persecution. The West- ern press has recorded in the past year numerous protests by Soviet Jews on vari- ous forms of religious discrimination. In- cluded in this study as Appendix 7 is a hand- written appeal from a Jewish father to the 25th Party Congress, seeking freedom for his daughter and two sons 24 According to Peter Reddaway, a Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics and an expert on samiz- dat, the Roman Catholics in Lithuania, the Meskhetians in Georgia, and the Uniates in Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S3406 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ' March 6, 1972 the Ukraine, and many others are becom- ing active participants in samizdat. Rev. Michael Bordeaux, Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Communism, and a specialist on Soviet affairs, particularly religion in the Soviet Union, observed that religious samizdat is widespread over the whole of the Soviet Union, notably among the Baptists 26 Appendix 8 of this study con- tains a few pages of Baptist samizdat. It is from a hand-printed book of 400 pages, do-. posited in RL's samizdat collection, contain- Ing documentation of a 4-year unsuccessful effort by the Baptists to convoke an All- Union Congress of their church 20 Denied a printing press by the regime (they have since constructed their own), the Soviet Baptists. resorted to the practice of the Medieval monks who carefully and patiently trans- cribed by hand the Bible and other liturgi- cal manuscripts. Samizdat also produces an unofficial free press, the typewritten Chronicle of Events. Already 19 issues have appeared in monthly Intervals. Very little of samizdat Is revolu- tionary in tone; by and large the stress is on reform, the tone nearly always is re- strained, responsible and serious minded 2T Geographically, the "mainstream" of sa- mizdat is confined, with few exceptions like Solzhenitsyn's work, to a relatively few areas within the country's urban, intellectual, sci- entific centers-cities like Moscow, Lenin- grad, and the large cities in the Ukraine and Baltic, and scientific centers like those at Obninsk, Pushchino and Kaluga. "These are. the places," said Peter Reddaway, "that origi- nate it and where samizdat is widely used."38 Yet, according to Mr. Reddaway, who has de- voted great scholarly attention to this prob- lem, caution should temper thoughts about the widespread circulation of samizdat doc- uments. Usually, the people reading samiz- dat are in a particular network where cer- tain types of material are passed around 2? As Martin Dewhirst, another British special- ist on Soviet affairs who '1s on the Faculty of Slavonic Studies at Glasgow University, remarked on the matter of religious samiz- dat, "Arkady Belinkov, a widely read man if ever there was one, did not seem even to have heard of it, let alone to have read it."30 Yet, Mr. Dewhirst belleved that in potential, the "dissent movement Is much bigger than it might appear to be" from samizdat litera- ture, but "the hard core of the dissent move- seems to be assured. Peter Reddaway sees the production of samizdat getting stronger In the, future, though weakening in the short term. This weakness arises from arrests of participants, emigration (for example, Jew- ish intellectuals to Israel), and pressure on foreign correspondents, which, he said, "threatens one of the major channels of the flbw." The factors in favor are, however, impressive. Many engaged in samizdat are scientists, especially the physicists and mathematicians. Having a feeling of "cor- porate identity" and being "quick to engage in mutual self-defense," they cannot be taken lightly by the regime. They are the "back- bone" of this movement, he said. Secondly, during the past three years, a "remarkable network obviously has grown up" of correspondents.. This network is "a strong one" and made up of people who are willing to run "great risks" to keep the network operating. Finally, he believed the present leadership in the Soviet Union did not have "the resolve to crack down hard enough to seriously stamp It out." This is a movement that is "extremely difficult to control .. . under any circumstances." A. resort to Stalin- ist measures, he observed, would involve "the arrest of one or two thousand people, includ- ing some of the leading scientists, and I don't see the present leadership or any leadership in the foreseeable future doing that."8? Indeed, what seemed most Impressive, was the judgment of other specialists that samiz- dat, "in a curious way," as Mr. Hayward put it, "has been almost legitimized in recent years .. .. sr Abe Brumberg, former editor of USIA's Problems of Communism and now a specialist in samizdat, recalled a conversa- tion in Brussels with Svetchensky who said, In Mr. Brumberg's words, "every small step becomes somehow legitimized. Every small achievement is considered legitimized, whereas three years ago the very existence of samizdat was considered to be subversive. Now the authorities make distinctions be- tween what kind of samizdat, ' some is ac- ceptable, some is not 88 B. ilL's Use of Samizdat 1. Main depository of samizdat ship and itself a short history of samizdat- at-a-glance. Normally, samlzdat comes to RL from di- verse sources; documents are not sent spec- ifically to RL from the Soviet Union. RL' staffers, knowledgeable in their field, know what is available through their own reading and by other means of communications. Most documents have been publicized elsewhere before RL gets them. Some documents are acquired through private sources. Perhaps one of the most famous pieces of samizdat is Andrei Sakharov's, "Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" A full text of Sakharov's essay was published in The New York Times on July 22, 1968. RL draws heav- ily from the publications of Sakharov in its programming. (Excerpts from his, "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom", are reproduced in Appendix 28.) RL's greatest problem in dealing with sam- izdat has centered on the organization of this mass of enormously important primary source material on contemporary Soviet his- tory; the matter of sharing this bounty with others in the Western scholarly community; the task of integrating samizdat into RL's programming; and finally, the need to estab- lish internal policy governing its use in or- der to protect the authors, preserve RL's organizational principles, and maximize the use of the documents in achieving RL's goals grid purposes. 2. London Conference on Samizdat In an effort to get further guidance from Western scholars, RL held a conference in London in April 1971 and gave it the title, "The Future of Samizdat: Significance and Prospect." 41 Attending this conference were leading British and American scholars In Soviet studies, most of whom have already been Identified in this study, The agenda of the conference andthe subsequent discussion centered on the matter of samizdat's future in the next two to five years and the proper role for RL, other foreign broadcasters, and publishers in regard to samizdat. Among the points discussed at this conference were: the need for broadcasting without delay documents relating to specific abuses, spe- cific trials, and especially forth-coming trials; 43 the importance of broadcasting legal material of practical use such as the Yesen- in-Volpin document advising what can be legally done and not done when being in- terrogated;'8 the importance of broadcast- ing all documenns, whatever their points of advocacy; 14 the inherent shortcomings of self-censorship; 4G and the need for tolerance in dealing with conflicting points of view ex- pressed In samizdat 4" The problem of estab- lishing a modus operandi for making the documents available to scholars was also discussed, Mr. Brumberg expressed the view that copies should be deposited in the Library of Congress for use by American scholars 47 Arrangements were subsequently made to do this 28 3. Broadcast Guidance on Samizdat One of the important results of the samiz- dat conference was the final formulation of an RL Broadcast Guidance on the use of samizdat documents. (A_ draft copy of. the guidance had been circulated at the con- ference.) The text of the policy guidance is reproduced in Appendix 9. In spelling out principles and procedures in reporting on samizdat documents, the guidance made the following general points: RL will not know- ingly broadcast a fabrication; it will not knowingly broadcast genuine works, or ver- sions of them, distributed in the West by agencies of the regime with the intention of harming the authors; RL will exert every effort to assure that its broadcasts of genuine - texts or excerpts are Identified or attributed - on the air to reputable Western media. For RL, samlzdat is the beginning of a harvest after years of labor sowing the seeds of democracy In the Soviet Union. Though it claims no special credit beyond that of being one of the many forces contributing to in- ment seems to me limited. ..."31 ternal changes toward liberalization within 3. On the qu:illty of samizdat the Soviet Union, still there seems little doubt that RL's role has been most slgnifi- According to the judgment of leading cant. According to Mr, Van der Rhoer, Western specialists on Soviet affairs, the "samizdat has opened up a new dimension to quality of samizdat is mixed. A lot of it is RL's activity. It represents as welling up of "very mediocre", said Leonard Schapiro, a generation of new ideas from within the "some if It has been rather outstanding"; but country." "RL has always believed," he con- it "Is clean; it's decent; it's honest." 32 tinued, "that it could not Impose views of According to Max Hayward of St. Anthony's one country upon another. Now It sees these College, Oxford, "A lot of samizdat is very now ideas coming forth and see also the need unsophisticated, particularly when it is re, to disseminate them among the Soviet produced outside Its context. But on the people." other hand I think it lot of it is of very high RL has the largest deposit of samizdat in class and the percentage of high class mate- the world to draw upon for its programming, rial has noticeably increased in recent and its archives are growing daily. In its years."33 After commenting on the high value central registry, it has listed over 600 docu- of works by Pomerants, Medvedev, Chaldize, meats, according to an estimate published in Tsukcrman, Ivanov, and Volpin, he said by June 1971.39 Six months later Mr, Van der way of generalizing: "We are beginning to Rhoer indicated that on the basis of 600 get longer, more solid works on [economics] pages representing a standard volume, there sociological and political matters as well. So I were at that time 16 volumes. in April 1971, think the value, the worth, the Intellectual 'RL's Research Department prepared a biblio- level Is already higher than one might graphic reference handbook entitled, "Five think." 31 Years of Samizdat," a companion volume to Not only is the quality improving, but the an earlier RL "Register of Samizdat." This quantity is increasing. According to David latest reference work, according to Dr. Bolter, Floyd, Soviet specialist on the London Daily its compiler, "attempts to catalog all the Telegraph, "I would have thought that the documents which have come into our pos- important. thing that one could say with session in thematic categories for purposes certainty . . . is that it Is almost certainly - of speedy retrieval and reference." 10 Sub- going to increase in quantity, in variety and divided into 18 major categories, ranging in the size of particular documents."" from Stalinism, through law, anti-Semitism, 4. Future of samizdat to science and the nationalities, and arranged Moreover, judging by the estimates of these chronologically within each, category, the Western specialists, the future of samizdat handbook is an impressive effort In librarian- In planning broadcasts on samizdat, RL set down the following principles: RL will relay the direct verbatim text in full when- ever possible; it will always disassociate the Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 I -CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE author from RL's use of his text of excerpts; RL's presentation of readings will reflect views of the author and his text and not those of RL; commentary is to be made only after the text or excerpts have been broadcast; RL will not by timing or content of its broadcasts endanger aii author whose position seems precarious; and, finally, the guidance reemphasized the point that RL broadcasts in all languages the appearance of genuine documents in any language of the USSR, employing the technique of cross- reporting 4? 4. Internalizing Samizdat RL has gone to great lengths to internal- ize the texts of samizdat documents, and in the past two years the amount of pro- gramming devoted to samizdat has increased substantially. In April 1971, RL reported that its Russian language services devoted 6 hours per week of its 36 hours of original program time to readings and discussion of samizdat materials. During the first quarter of 1969, these readings and discussions, in- cluding repeats, averaged 4 hours per month; in the first quarter of 1971, the average increased to 58 hours per month "0 According to Mr. Van der Rhoer, RL broadcasted nearly 80 hours in March 1971.64 . Some broadcasts are made at dictation speed to enable the listener to record what is being said for later reading and dissemination. Since the fall of 1968, RL has been broad- casting straight readings without comment of samizdat materials in a show entitled, "Letters and Documents." These materials are mainly on political and social themes. "Unpublished Works of Soviet Authors" is another show which brings the listener straight readings of belles-lettres materials. This series, running since May 1969, has In- eluded works by Marchenko, Buigakov, Pla- tanov, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and N. Ya. Mandelshtain. One day a week the "Samiz- dat Review" show discusses a samizdat docu- ment or some aspect of the dissent move- ment in the USSR. The objective of the show is to demonstrate to listeners that their fel- low citizens who contribute to samizdat have many constructive ideas and alternatives to regime : practices and should be supported actively in their efforts to bring about posi- tive institutional changes. Other RL shows which sometimes use samizdat material and related topics are, "Soviet Daily Commen- tary," "CPSU Affairs," "USSR This Week," "Contemporary Thought," and "From the Other Shore." Perhaps most illustrative of RL's efforts to make unpublished works of noted Soviet au- thors known within their own country, are the broadcast of works most familiar to Americans. During February 19-24, RL read in six parts Andrei Amalrik's, "Will the So- viet Union Survive until 1984?" From March to July 1970, it read in 16 parts Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago." From July to December 1,970, it read in 62 parts Solzhenitsyn's "The First Circle." ?3 In recent months, Solzhent- syn's, "August 1914" has been aired. In addition to broadcasting the works of Russia's Nobel prize whining authors, RL also transmits to Its Soviet audience letters, protests, and other documents from religious groups and those relating to the national- ities. In the last year protests and appeals by Soviet Jews have been programmed. Increased attention has been given to'the broadcasting of samizdat materials in the Nationalities Service. In August 1971, for example, the Ukrainian Service broadcast virtually daily materials from Ulcrainslciy Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald), the organ of Ukrainian samizdat. From August 23-31, it broadcast "Chronicle of Resistance" by Val- entin Moroz. Another example is the broad- cast in the North Caucasian Service of Sak- harov's pamphlet, "Reflections on Progress, Coexistense and Intellectual Freedom," from August 5-13 in the Russian, Karachai, Osse- tian and Avar 6, Magnitlzdat, Another Form of Samizdat Another form of samizdat that has ap- peared in the Soviet Union is called, "mag- nitizdat," that is "tape publishing." The tape .recorder ' now in fairly common use, enables the listener to preserve samizdat broadcasts on tape for later listening and circulation. Magnitlzdat has even appeared on the black market, According to one RL listener, RL's broadcasts of Svetlana Alliluyeva's (Stalin's daughter) book, "Twenty Letters to a Friend," were selling from 70 to 120 rubles ($77 to $132), the price depending upon re- ceptionla RL is able to benefit from magnitizdat in other ways than by the multiple dissennina- tion of its broadcasts, and that is by broad- casting directly to the Soviet Union magnit- izdat of songs not played over the state radio or released in record form by the state pressing plants. These are songs by the minstrels" or "troubadours," as they have come to be known, that is, 'professional sing- ers or amateurs whose songs express their personal feelings and concerns and not the sterile official optimism sponsored by the regime. Since these songs, coming from with- in the Soviet people themselves, express what the Soviet people think and feel, RL believes that its listeners will be interested in hearing them. Accordingly on July 1, 1971, RL established a new show entitled, "To the Sound of Gui- tars," to be hosted by Galina Zotova, The songs of the "troubadours" were to speak for themselves; there would be no RL com- mentary beyond an introduction.0 Appended to this study as Appendix 10 Is the text and translation of an'example of magnitizdat. It is a song based on a poem entitled, "Francois Villon" and sung by Bur- lat Okudzhava who had sung this song for the first time when in Paris a few years ago. Expressing themes of humanity and God, the song is sung in the style of traditional American folk music yet with a Russian flavor; and while it cannot be fully appreciat- ed unless heard, still it can be a movnig ex- perience to the listener, especially to young people who in recent years have regenerated this form of American folk art c0 C. Significance of Samizdat for RL 1. Soviet Generated Thoughts and Ideas What is most significant about samizdat for RL is that it comes from within the Soviet people themeslves. It is not some- thing imposed from outside; it is rather their own response to their own internal problems, formulated according to.their own require- ments, capabilities, and experience. Samizdat is a form of self-liberalization whose major function is, as Leopold Labedz said, "to call a spade a spade, to break the taboos which otherwise permeate the horizon of think- ing." 67 Samizdat encourages rational thought, the enemy of Stalinism, and ex- tending the "horizon of thinking," represents the maturation of democratic ideas within the context of the Soviet system, As a stimulant to Independent thinking, samizdat is the nascent expression of a genuine democratically formed public opin- ion, however diverse and unstructured. It must be loked upon, therefore, in the words of Mr. Labedz, as "preparing the ground for some future possible trans-substantiation, so to say"-possibly a long-term expectation of internal reform in the tradition of the Decembrists of 1825G' In samizdat, basic questions are being asked; its momentum is forward; and according to Dmltri Pospolev- sky of RL, evidence is gathering that it is even entering a new phase of development with the emergency of different ideological camps (for example, resumption of the his- toric conflict between the Slavophiles and Westornizer's), suggesting that many people are, indeed,' thinking about political alterna= tives. S 3407 2. Permanence of Samizdat The permanence of samizdat is another significant element for RL. Samizdat has an assured future by virtue of the prestige and power of many of its participants and by the unwillingness or inability of the regime to stamp it out. In an expanding environ- ment where fear has diminished, participants will and do take their chances. And as the body of samizdat magnifies in number and subject matter, embracing the multi-con- cerns of this multi-national people, the regime has found Itself inferentially legitimizing it, giving in to pressure on the one hand to discriminate between degrees and kinds, and being paralyzed by a sense of inaction on the other not wishing to revert to Stalinism. Caught between these pressures and in- fluenced by other deep-rooted forces, the re- gime has had to acquiesce in many demands by the dissenters and, perforce, has had to moderate in some respects its arbitrary style of administration. This is another significant aspect of samizdat where the role of RL, as a prime disseminator of samizdat, has been most important. Publication of samizdat material spelling out the legal rights of the Soviet citizens, according to a recent arrival from the Soviet Union, has contributed to moderating the arbitrary conduct of the KGB and making them act more responsibly. Knowledge and respect for the procedures of arrest and law -enforcement are growing. More conscious of their rights under law, the Soviet people are increasingly insisting that these rights be recognized. As Mr. Van der Rhoer remarked, "the Soviet people do not regard law as a mockery; they see it as an important element in Soviet life and insist upon its enforcement," What RL is engaged in, he said, "is a- law and order campaign for human rights," L? 8, From the Intelligentsia For the most part, samizdat is produced by the intellectual elite of the nation, the prime audience that RL seeks to influence. This is u fact of greatest significance for RL. Among Western specialists in Soviet affairs, RL has been called an "echo chamber" and a "sounding board" which, according to Mr. Labedz, "makes it possible to have samizdat bouncing back and providing, in effect a means of communication between Soviet citizens."'* "If it does no more than that," according to Max Hayward, "it will perform an invaluable bistorieal role;" for its role - "is defined by what has happened in Russia. It is part of the process, in fact, and is there providentially to transmit this material back and give it wider dissemination." OL 4. RL as a "Voice of the Soviet People" This sums up the Importance of samizdat for RL; for RL has become the principal source for disseminating samizdat through- out the Soviet Union. And it does so with- out risk to the individual. As a recent new- coiner-from the Soviet Union said, "If one listens over the radio, it is a beautiful thing," and. "there are no documents, that could cause trouble." What RL -does is to magnify the audience from what would ordinarily be a small net- work to embrace a national constituency, In so doing, RL has become a prime source for uniting the disparate elements of Soviet samizdat producers. As a disseminator of all forms of samizdat from both the Russians and the nationalities, it has given national currency to ideas and concepts that would have been restricted regionally and within a small group. Thus, by becoming a prime transmitter of samizdat RL has contributed substantially to this self-generating pheno- menon within the Soviet Union. According to Mr. Francis S. Ronald.,!, Deputy to the Executive Director, there is "no question that RL is playing as essen- tial role in giving the publicity that samizdat needs and that the democratic forces need." Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3408 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 1972 "What Is happening," he said "is that themes is hushed up in the USSR, and young people 1? Ibid., p. 8. plugged for the past 3 years are now turn- have a very hazy idea of it." He concluded: '7 Ibid., p. 38. ing up in samizdat. The process continues; "One should approach this period with great 'e In October 1971, a conference was held Ontario and what takes place is a process of increase' caution," (RL, Special Program Evaluation chaster Unia versity, on conference by geometric proportions." Report # 1-71, March 29, 1971, p. 2.) an samizdat. In report 5. Enrichment of RL's Research and Anyone who has had an opportunity to giving his general Impressions, Dr. Gene Sosin Programming discuss international relations and history indicated that the conference acknowledged , samizdat has had the effect of with even knowledgeable Communists will that dissent and samizdat are a fact of cur- Finally, RL's research resources and its have probably experienced this problem of rent Soviet life worth taking seriously. Those communications. Often times some of the academicians present agreed that it would rogram researchers and. materials most common knowledge about recent his- have been unthinkable to call such a confer- programming programmers min " now staff", have for original m tory is unknown. The effect is that a prom- once even a few years ago and anticipate the from which to draw in designing made ising dialogue can collapse despite good in- convening of another one in the near future. e and they have, in nffece, ready-Undo scripts tentions on both sides. Stress was placed on foreign radio broad-from wr EL cneflt ters within the Soviet Union itseln is Quality Control Report, # 16-71, August casting as a major factor in amplifying voices enrichment s, of f Its its research not only from materials, a but an 20, 1971. of dissent, encouraging this or that group to enn 19 RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 12. emulate others more bold and acting as a perhaps even more oiceo, speak g having (RL, V. IV, pt. 7.) partial restraint on regime repression. Re-most toe the Soviet pli'thehough directly 20 Ibid., pp. 12-13. spect was evident for RL research on samiz- S the Sovet people the and,ntt having ng 21 For a comprehensive aiinlysis of the dis- dab combined with urgent requests from the minds sent movement in the Soviet Union and ex- many participants that RL provide them with eeiet people themyet and, through not been filtered essentially ela amples of samizdat, see Bociurkiw, Bohdan material. (Sosin to Boite- nnd Van der Rhoer, of ou. , The purity" re ecton an the ver e p of e s there- R Political dissent in the Soviet Union. RL Telex from New York, October 28, 1971.) fore, , preyanervedt. he Soviet; experience is, there- Studies in comparative communism, April (RL, V. XIX.) fore, preserved. 1970: 74-148. 1" RL. Program Policy Division. Broadcast FOOTNOTES 22 RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 6 (RL, Guidance. The Use of Documents from the 1 RL Basic Briefing Outline, July 2, 1971, v. I.) USSR, June 9, 1971, 7 p. (RL, v. IV, pt. 8b.) 60 RL, Radio Liberty's Russian Service sami- th1 is ( des s v.criptti V, pt. 10.) de on n of f t theIi;unnc uncertainty in Pool deter- gave 2 24 EL RL, , v. XI 6X, 6-7. pt. B. dat programming, Munich, April 1971, t mining one's audience: "The mass media 26 RL, Future of samizdat, April 23, 1971, 1-6. (EL, v.11, Futurept. samizdat, April 1971, p. 5. RL, represent a peculiar mode of communication pp. 20-21. (RL, v. II, pt. Dl.) (RL, v.II, pt. 1.) in which one does not know to whom one is 29 RL, v. XIX, pt. A. talking. Broadcasting or writing for the press 27 RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 0-7. 62 S "Ibid.u to Van der Rhoer, Coverage of pro- is like dropping a note in a bottle over the (RL, v. I.) side of a boat. The man who receives it may be 20 RL, Future of samizdat, p. 21. (RL, v. II, rams, t material ing us197120, 1971 ctoP. r 0,, .) king or pauper, relative or stranger, friend or pt. Dl.) grams, foe." (Pool, Mass Media and Their Inter- 20 Ibid., pp. 21-22. Statement, JMemorandum, F5 RL. Show plan. June the 1971, 7. Guitars, personal Social Functions in the Process of 20 Ibid., P. 21. July 1, 197o. (pl To Sound I.) Modernization, P. 435.) 81 Ibid., pp. 25-26. G The writer played this tape to four 13- approach Justification and the rationale for this 22 Ibid., p. 12. Mr. Schapiro added: "I would old American girls, and while only know - approach were explained by Dr. Pool in these go so far as to say that, if my American year g' woods, words. "For a few writers, scientists, and high friends will forgive me, when I read some lug the general message of the son officials direct foreign contact is a major of the things that are published by Ameri- they were, nonetheless, deeply moved by the source of information." As "elite persons," can intellectuals, or English intellectuals style e and incerit of the s April 1971, p. 27. they are "domestic communicators as well as for that matter (except they write less), but important men in their own right." As per- when I read some of the stuff that is pub- (RLG8, Iv. II, pt. Dl.) p. 10-11. sons "well-informed about and possibly well- lashed by them I turn with a certain feeling Ibid., p nt of the So- disposed toward the West, they can be an in- of refreshment to the naive, but neverthe- 69 vi 02 UAccording nion, the to a r resetecent citizen resideeside who is So- fluential force for liberalization of the so- less honest and moral writing. What is finterrogation by the pdoes to t does ciety." And he went on with this perceptive naivete? The naivete of these great demo- not havreached e o automatically y the police and relevant observation: "They are also cratic societies of ours, where nonsense cot have If the police Kaye es ondr o their gatekeepers through whom information flows streams out of the public press, from Intel- questions. p to the average Soviet citizen, who himself lectuals of one sort or another, at least you tin ng , thone s em itor of rr god tt inform out tiers. rarerly sees foreigners," ,(Pool, Opportunities do not get that from the Soviet Union. You lia for Change: Communications with the get the official claptrap, but the stuff of loss refusing of a i ce titall, he w uldf pay ovlerta sire U.S.S.R., p. 12.) samizdat is clean; it's decant it's honest." pk 0 RL PV, pt. manual, March 1971, pp. 13-14. 06 Ibid., p. month period, thus avoiding the moral bur-14. . 16-17. den of Incriminating a friend. (RI, IV, p 4 ) 20 Ibid., p 0011L. Future of samizdat, April 1971, p. 9. . Floyd noted the extensive 4 Ibid., p. 15. . OOIbidlbid., p. . 5. . M Mr. 0 Ibid. p. 16. bibliography prepared by RL on samizdat (RL, v. II, pt. Dl). 6 Ibid., p. 17. and observed: 'These chaps write a lot and 81 Ibid., p. 15. 7Ibid., p. 18. - the feeling is that they are not getting more CIIAPTER V: RL's PROGRAMMING: PREPARA- I Ibid., p. 18. economical with words and one would imag- TIONS AND OPERATIONS, POLICY AND QUAL- 0 Ibid., p. 19. ine that this process is going to continue. It ITY CONTROL NEWS, 30 Ibid., p. 19. is especially apparent with the output of doc- I GENERAL PROGRAMMING: N11 Ibid., pp. 20-21. uments concerned with the question of.Jew- COMMENTARY, FEATURES 12 Ibid., p. 23. ash emigration and anti-Semitism." A. RL's ~T ENT operations FEATUs division 12 Ibid., pp. 23-25. 16 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 34 For a Soviet comment on the rational- 27 Ibid., p. 27. 1. Theory of Programming ization of audiences, see, U.S. Radio in Psy- 58 ibid., p. 27. RL'S business is broadcasting; program- chological Warfare, pp. 21-24. 30 RL Policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 10. ming is, therefore, its chief function. Mr. 3 Ibid., pp. 26-28, (RL, v.IV, pt. 7.) Tuck, RL's Chief of POD, put it this way: '"The scientist went on to say that the 10 RL, Future of samizdat, April 23, 1971, p, "The key to RL's operations is program- Soviet people learn more about their own 4. (RL, v.II, pt. Dl.) ming. This is the end product, the raison spaceflights from foreign radio than Soviet 41 Ibid. d'etre of the whole operation. Programming media, not to speak of American spacefights 42 Ibid., p. 30. is the point of contact with the Soviet au- which, he said, interest "the Soviet people as 90 Ibid., p. 29. dience." Therefore, one of the most conn- indeed all humanity." 11 Ibid., P. 33. Leonard Schapiro observed: mending responsibilities of POD is to know 17 This problem was brought out by a for- "I might interpose this. To my mind it is a what the Soviet audience wants and to de- mer Leningrad student who had reviewed hundred times more important to demon- termine how RL can satisfy these wants. As some of RL's output in December 1970. In the strata to these people what objectives liberal Mr. Tuck said, "Our business is psyching. show, "From Cheka to KGB, #12," he pointed reporting is, than It is to pursue any par- ourselves to psyche the audience." out the danger inherent in broadcasting ticular opinion. Lot them see that they get In program planning POD operates, at about World War II "'in which so many peo- absolutely everything. If it is something that least theoretically, on the principle of an ply suffered." He explained the difficulty of a You dislike intensely, well, you say that you inverted pyramid, as Mr. Scott described it,. Soviet audience trying to understand some of dislike it and you say why. 'Nevertheless, this where the first appeal is to universality of the observations about the Nazi-Soviet pact is part of the Intellectual produce of the interest, and this is the news, with expects- of 1989 presented in the program when country and therefore we broadcast it.' And tion of a declining listener interest for the their knowledge of the incident is incom- for Radio Liberty to depart from that would rest of the hour. News is the most impor- plate. Explanations were needed, he said, in ,be disastrous." tant attraction for listener interest. Thus, such references. "The agreement with Hitler. 'O Ibid., pp. 31-32. in RL's four-part concept of programming, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S3409 news takes first priority, news features sec- ond. Then, the remainder of the hour con- tains internal Soviet subject matter, for ex- ample, a review of samizdat, and finally a political or cultural show directed toward a more specialized audience. Hopefully, the listener who turns on his radio to listen to the news will be attracted by subsequent features and continue to listen. What makes programming so important for RL is that it can lose its audience with the turn of the knob. 2. Administrative Style in POD, Mr. Tuck operates on the Sar- geant principle of devolution of responsi- bility. He believes in giving a man respon- sibility and the authority to go with it. In essentially a creative operation such as POD, he feels that this is the way to generate creativity within staff, Moreover, it tends to keep morale up, because it gives the indi- vidual a feeling of involvement from which is derived a sense of personal worth. Accord- ingly, the various.Chief Editors and Program Managers are given a great deal of individual authority and responsibility. Moreover, Mr. Tuck stressed the impor- tance of maintaining In POD a division of labor between the administrators and sub-' stantive staff. It is important, he declared,' to keep a creative professional staff, that Is, the writers and commentators, free from burdensome supervisory duties. "The orga- nization would suffer," Mr. Tuck said, "if top commentators were burdened with su- pervisory responsibilities." Thus, the administrative style in POD, tends to bear out the general tendency in' RL toward administrative flexibility and au- tonomy, allowing the greatest possibility for initiative and creativity. For POD this is important, because it Is here where crea- tivity in programming begins. B. Central News Service 1. Administrative Aspects Given RL's priority on news, the Central News Service plays a vital role in program- ming. For CNS, the key factor is profes- sional journalism, and Its chief, Mr. Lennart Savemark, does not doubt that his depart- ment is "grounded on the professionalism of the trade." A commitment of staff to a "high sense of professionalism," he said, "is the key to the operation." Many of RL's ONS sta(finen were professional journalists in the Soviet Union. Some' were on the staff of leading provincial newspapers. Mr. Savemark singled out Mr. Peransky, a seasoned journal- ist, as a staffman who. "has a high degree of professionalism.." The concept of administrative autonomy under policy guidance is also present in CNS. Here the principle has the special value of encouraging personal initiative, especially since It is the individual's responsibility to keep up with the flow of information; it has the added value of fostering' an attitude of Ica., dependency on administrative direction. The latter point has particular relevance to CNS in times of a news emergency. "These people can work competently without my in- terference," said Mr. Savemark, noting how- ever, that lie would be "in touch with the whole operation and it would fuxction effec- tively," The reason for this, he said, as "the sense of professionalism among staff; inde- pendence, and the degree of administrative autonomy." However, CNS has its personnel problems, The department, apparently is understaffed, and, as Mr. Savemark commented, "there are no reserves." The average age is said to be too high, creating special problems in' emergencies. Moreover, the diffleulty in re- cruiting is considerable. As Mr. Savemark said, "Where do you find a Russian jour- nalist?" Accordingly, people have to be trained from the Inside, and this means using journalistic resources for personnel training. What makes CNS staff problems more pressing Is the special linguistic require- ments, particularly in the every important presentation of news. "An accent would turn a listener off," said Mr: Savemark, who pointed out the value of news announcers being able to speak as a "fellow country- man" to another "follow countryman." "Every language is developing phenomenon," said Mr. Savemark, "words are added, expres- sions and other words are dropped; It is a living thing." The need to keep up with a changing language appears to be vital for RL, especially for news commentators. This is done partly by listening to tapes of Tass output. As Mr. Savemark said, "a whole show can, go down the drain with mispro- nunciation." 2. News Resources CNS has extensive resources for bringing world news into RL's newsroom. First of all, it has access to the monitoring reports made by Mr. Schilling, RL's media analyst. As a specialist in Soviet propaganda, Mr. Schil- ling and his staff monitor all Soviet broad- casts daily and evaluate the adequacy of its coverage, Monitored tape is auditioned and edited for parts to be transcribed. Straight news items are typed and other features hav- Ing direct interest to RL staff are done in full or in precise form. Typed materials are sent to CNS, relevant programmers and pre- sumably the Research Department. Moreover, CNS has access to the major wire services. The Tass service provides RL with complete coverage in both Russian and English, not just that going to Its domestic service. CNS also has access to the wire serv- ices of the Chinese News Agency (la Eng- lish), UPI, and Reuters. It also has a com- mercial telex for getting in touch with its own correspondents in the field, CNS has correspondents in Washington, New York at U.N. headquarters, London, Paris, Bonn, Milan, Tel Aviv, Copenhagen, and one in Taipei who covers the Far East. Another formal source of news input is RFE's wire service. In addition to tits, RL gets RFE's daily News Budget delivered by hand every day which it keeps for reference purposes In Its Information Center for 10 days. RL has many other channels for the Input of news. Using their own radios, RL staff has access to some 4 or 5 Soviet radio sta- tions. (For a survey of environmental aids to programmers, see Appendix 13.) Some staffmen have speakers in their homes and special devices on telephones for listening to Soviet radio broadcasts at any time. All supervisors have radio receivers in their of- fices. And then RL has access to broadcasts by West German and Austrian television, in addition to radio broadcasts from other for- eign stations. Since most RL staffers have a multi-lingual capability, they have access to foreign news sources that would ordinarily he closed to those knowing, for example, only English. A final point in the matter of news re- sources is the difference in time zones be- tween Munich and the United States. From Its headquarters in Munich, RL.Is close to Moscow; there is only a 2 hour time differ- ence. Thus, RL has a leadtime of some 6 hours ahead of the United States. In the news-processing and newscasting business, this time difference is an Important factor. The difference is made more meaningful by an awareness of the fact that half of the working day Is over in Munich by the time New Yorkers begin their working day. 3. Objectives and Policies A basic operating principle for RL is to tell the truth as correctly and objectively as possible. This is the vital center of the entire operation. Without the credibility that comes from truth and objectivity, the radio .could not be effective in achieving its pur- poses. For CNS this requirement carries with it a special burden because of the nature of its tasks. News is made virtually every min- ute of the day; and, th.e quantity of news is overwhelming. This imposes upon CNS the need for a special skill In the selectivity of news. Given the unique operational and policy requirements of RL as a "Home Serv- ice" for the Soviet people, this function is especially Important. Then, there is the mat- ter of speed. "One should have time to think," said Mr; Savemark, "hut in the news' business everything is done in a rush, finish- ing one project and then starting to work on another." Speed, therefore, imposts an- other special burden on RL's newsmen. Yet, despite these built-in, occupational hazards, CNS, "has no problems in the field of policy," according to Mr. Savemark. "CNS staff have different views; they have strong feelings, especially those who had suffered first hand from the regime," Mr. Savemark observed, "but there are nq conflicts with the policy people." The basic, reason for this he said, is that "the essentials of policy as set forth In the Policy Manual and policy guidances are in harmony with the profes- sional standards of journalism, for example, in matters of objectivity and factual report- ing." "RL's goal Is unique," Saverrnark went on, "we would not be efficient If we did not apply the whole register of profes- . sional methods that are universal." To this extent, he said, CNS, though having a special audience with special requirements, "does not differ from operations of any professional news agency." In a sense, strict adherence to the rubrics of professional journalism acts as protective insulation against policy 'vio- lations. For, as Mr. Savemark pointed out, "If an RL newsman lowered his standards or insulted Soviet listeners, this would be self- defeating-it would he counter-productive and a violation of professional standards and policy as well." (In striving for objectivity,' RL carries news items not particularly favor- able to the United States.) Moreover, CNS, like other departments of RL, is policy-oriented, and it plays a role in policymaking, particularly when news opera- tions are involved. 4. Role in progranuning RL has very limited options as a commu- nicator; people can turn off the radio at any time. Thus, if it is to communicate, it must do so effectively, and quickly. One single program area that units all audiences is news and news analysis. This is the center of RL's broadcast schedule and the most important element in its daily program in all languages, The preparation of news programs is the pri- mary responsibility of CNS. (For an example of a week's broadcast schedule in the Russian Service showing of the news schedules, see Appendix 11.) Newscasts are heard every hour around the clock in a full time effort to keep the Soviet listener informed. Each hourly newscast is followed by a "News Feature," lasting 10-20 minutes. The "Review of the World Press" contains what Is determined to be the "big news story" of the day and may last about 41/i minutes. This is following by an article from the world press, for example, something from the New York Times or LeMonde of spe- cial interest to the Soviet Union and lasts usually 41/2 minutes. The "Background to News," prepared in CNS, varies in its com- mentary. There is also "Special Correspond- ents," a news show which consists of reports from the various RL overseas bureaus and are either telexed or voiced. These reports, like the one in October 1071 on Britain's entry Into the Common Market, give local reactions and general commentary on an important news story as seen from the correspondent's station. CNS also has available what are called "actualities" for its newscasts. These are taped recordings of statements by the various persons featured in the news. The actual procedure in news-processing seems to be fairly simple. A key person in Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 53410 , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE March 6, 1972 the process is the News Evaluator. He comes to work at 0800, selects information from the wire services and other sources, estab- lishes with the Duty Editor a priority for "news," and prepares a News List for the morning News Meeting. Policy guidance can be introduced at this morning meeting; the day's broadcasts do not begin until 1445 CET. The News Evaluator and Duty Editor co- ordinate the work of the CNS. They decide "what is news," applying universal prin- ciples on requirements and also RL policy. They are the primary determiners of "news." If any question arises on a particular item, they confer with the Chief Editor or Mr. Savemark. If they are In doubt on a policy matter, then they in turn confer with staff of PPD. Staff of CNS knew each morning the gaps of news that are tobbe filled and distortions corrected. Saturated In Soviet media over a prolonged period and having available an extensive monitoring service, they can pre. diet almost 100%, according to Mr. Save. mark, how Soviet news will be treated. After the selection of news has been made and priorities established, the individual news item goes to a news writer who checks it for correct names and whether there were any previous stories. ONS has its own ready- ,reference collection of standard references (for example, Deadline Data on World Af- fairs, Facts on File, Kecsings Contemporary Archives, Great Soviet Encyclopedia, stand- ard dictionaries, etc.), and staff has access to the library's resources. The script, having been written, goes to the news editor for review. The Duty Editor assembles the news- cast and goes to the studio where he reads it "live" It is also taped for repeat broad- casts. The newscast is written in the. Russian language and copies are sent to the Na- tionalities Service where it Is translated into their own specific languages for delivery, The Nationalities Service also broadcasts news and prepares its own material, draw- ing from CNS and its own research resources, By and large, the news is oriented' toward international coverage In an effort to give the Soviet listener a fuller picture of the world scene. Internal developments may just be mentioned, and not treated in detail, except when there is an International re- action to an internal Soviet development. A case in point is the Jsvestia article in Oc- tober, asserting that the Soviet Government did not put dissenters in psychiatric hos- pitals. GNS reported this news item but did so from the reactions of the interna- tional press, thus internalizing the story through reports from other sources. The key point in RL's newscasts, as in that of other programs, is the essential criteria of reporting and commenting from the poiz7t of view and perspective of the Soviet lis- tener, not from that of the outsider. C. Russian service programs 1. Proportion and Thematic Mix of Programs RL's greatest programming effort goes into the Russian Service, The rationale for this is very simple: approximately one-half of the Soviet population are Great Russians, and they constitute the dominant ethnic elite; the Russian language, as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, is spoken and understood not only by the Great Russians but also by many of the other nationalities. Programs in the Russian language are broadcast 24 hours a day. A day's broadcast in the Russian Service consists of approxi- mately 5 hours of original feature program- ming, in addition to 20 minutes of news and commentary each hour provided by CNS,.A feature program is re-played on an average of 6 to 8 times in, a 24-hour period in order to reach the broadest possible audience. It must be remembered that the Soviet Union covers approximately 11 time -zones. (For comparisons purposes, continental United States covers only 4.) Most programs in the Russian Service run 10 to 15 minutes in length except for read- ings from samizdat in the program series, "Documents from the USSR," and presenta- tions of Western literature in the series, "From the Outer Shore." Another show that would fall into this category Is, "Unpub- lished Works of Soviet Authors," which has been running since May 1969. These are 30- minute shows, continued from day to day until the full text is completed. Soiz- henitzyn's "First Circle," for example, was read over a 5-month period, 8 days a week. (For example of a week's programming in the Russian Service, see Appendix 10.)1 RL's programming, prepared for both gen- eral and specialized audiences, is divided Into two major categories with a balance of about half and half: one part is responsive, containing news, press reviews, press articles, correspondents reports, commentaries of the day (that is, the product of CNS); the other Is assertive, containing material planned in advance to carry out RL's policy objectives. In the area of Soviet internal coverage, ap- proximately 38% of RL's total Russian lan- guage time on the air Is used by features pertaining specifically to Soviet domestic af- fairs. Of these features, 50% analyze both present and past political events. The other 50%n concentrate on social and cultural af- fairs with a particular emphasis on "hereti- cal works" which the regime does not allow to be published or broadcast but have been acclaimed in the West. Out of 36 hours of Russian weekly original programming 6 hours consists of samizdat. Regular series in the Russian Service include: "Letters and Documents," "Unpublished Works of Soviet Authors," and "Samizdat Review." "Russia Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" fills in gaps of official history created by regime censorship, Economig developments in the Soviet Union absorb about 4% of total air time. On the world scene, RL's coverage is some- what less than that on domestic affairs. Of .its total Russian language time on the air about 30% is taken up by features relating to developments outside the Soviet Union. The proportion is divided roughly as follows: the United States 4%; Soviet bloc countries 3%, and other countries 23%. Coverage of developments in areas outside the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc and the United States is almost 50% concerned with current politi- cal developments. Current cultural events occupy about 35% of this sector with remain- ing shows devoted primarily to economic 'development, scientific and social topics. Sixty-five percent of air time coverage on the United States relates to current social developments, while the remander deals with scientific and cultural themes; only a small proportion is specifically allotted to political matters. Most of the programming about other Soviet bloc countries analyze political developments with about 30% covering eco- nomic and cultural topics. RL internalizes scripts on external affairs, relating them specifically to Soviet internal concerns. This is done by suggesting prac- tical alternatives in the daily life and work of Soviet citizens. For example, "Across the Ocean," produced in the U.S. Division, Illus- trates to listeners how problems they face in their own society are solved in the Ameri- can society; "East European Notes" describes constructive institutional changes in East Europe. To repeat, in dealing with external themes, RL, in its role as a "Home Service," attempts to present the point of view and perspective of an interested Soviet citizen? 2. Summary of Program Content Examination of Appendix 10 provides at a glance the general picture of program con- tent for a week's programming in the Rus- sian Service. "Billboard" is just what it says: it is a voiced run-down, of the programs be- ing scheduled for the day. Since Soviet lis- teners do not have available published time schedules of programming, "Billboard" takes care of that requirement. News and news features take the first 20 minutes of every hour, followed by the various features from the Russian Service. A typical day's programming in, the Rus- sian Service, oriented to the special inter- ests of a Soviet audience, might include, in addition to news coverage, the following items: a Soviet engineer's samizdat essay on economic reforms; a samizdat text of an appeal to the Soviet Government on behalf of imprisoned Jewish dissenters; details of changes in the Communist hierarchy of Soviet Azerbaijan; a foreign traveler's Im- pressions of a visit to Soviet Central Asia; a British agricultural specialist's views on In- creasing farm output; a French journalist's analysis of recent political developments In Moscow; a discussion by scholars of prob- lems faced by the individual in the-Twen- tieth Century; a review of measuresto reduce the role of the Communist Party in Yugos- lavia; a report on social legislation in Canada; a reviewer's synopsis of a Polish film not shown in the Soviet Union; a talk on labor productivity in the United States; a documentary on the New Economic Policy (NEP) during the period of the 1920's; a reading from the work of the purged, and never rehabilitated, Soviet writer, Boris Plinyak; a dramatization in Russian trans- lation of scenes from a new American play; and a message from an American writer to his colleagues in the Soviet Union 8 In the show "Meetings with Listeners," RL tries to establish a direct dialogue with the Soviet people. On this program it answers letters and airs the reactions of listeners. St also discusses the goals and purposes of the station, along with commenting on plans for programming. In addition, it provides a plat- form for individual authors to air their views on the shows they dot RL? uses cross-reporting in Its programs. This is a device that enables RL to dissemi- nate information on developments through- out the whole of the Communist world. For example, a broadcast on June 16-17, 1971 called, "Yugoslav Workers," discussed free- dom of Yugoslav workers to travel abroad, their earnings and the extent of their sav- ings, as well as their changed approach to work in their own country upon return. This program proved to be of great interest to the outside panelists of Soviet citizens (some former, others still living in the USSR) who reviewed the program in a post-broadcast au- dition. They commended the fact that the statistics were allowed to speak for them- selves. A young Soviet professor commented that this is "a real eye-opener for the So- viet listener." 5 RL also tries to provide the lighter touch in some of Its programming. In a post-broad- cast audition of "Wide Wide World," a news presentation, one senior RL staffer referred to the presentation as being, "livery and light- hearted, using good radio technique and is a welcome change of pace." Among the items broadcast was this: "Los Angeles swimming pool requests patrons not to disturb life- guards unless their lives are really in danger." RI, does not program music, except of a very select nature-for example, "'trouba- dours," singing samizdat songs on "Sound of Guitars." It does have a transitional theme, played in various rhythmns and styles de- pending on the show, that identifies the sta- tion. This theme is taken from "Hymn to Free Russia" written by Grechaniov during the period of evolving democracy between the March democratic revolution and the No- vember Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. RL uses this theme as a reminder to the Soviet people that Russia has a tradition of democracy. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S3411 RL has limited music programming be- style, and policy-though it is not likely cause it is felt that Soviet listeners have good that policy questions .would arise suite the coverage over their own systems and from script deals with cultural and political af- other foreign broadcasters, and hence has no fairs. There is also a final check for facts. significant appeal for RL's purposes, Music At this point the script is in rough draft. programming, such as it is, focuses mainly It is then typed on a final master copy; it on theoretical discussions in which musical goes to the editor for final review, and then illustrations are used. The program is in the to the Schedule Coordinator, who knows the form of a musical analysis or commentary, assigned deadline and is responsible for the the sort of thing that Boris Goldovsky used flow of scripts from the typists to the Pro- to do on the Saturday afternoon broadcasts duction Department. This process may take of the Metropoltan Opera. For example, the as much as ten days. program for October 14-15, 1570 aired a show The Production Department prepares the called, "This is Jazz" (13:30 minutes). It was script for airing. Usually it takes 2-to-3 days it discussion of jazz guitar and guitarists from the time of script removal to airing. based on a book by Barney Kessel with three Each show is produced by the same Continu- 3. Policy and Procedures "Scriptwriting is a creative work; one must have flexibility administratively; there must be allowances for give-arid-take in express- 'ing one's views; there must.also be a sense of compromise over wording"-these are sonro of tho views that Victor Frank, RL's veteran Senior Commentator in the Russian Service, expressed on the importance of al- lowing the writer a wide range of independ- ence within the structure of policy. And, apparently, the writer has a wide range within which to exercise personal inita- tive. But, within certain definable limits; for as Mr. Diakowski said, "the writer does not have free rein; someone has to say yes or no." And he cited the example of a writer who has a book show and wants to program a show on opera. Ile would not be permitted to do so. The assignment would go to the person cov- ering music. But what is important, Mr. Diakowski ob- served, is "the way things are treated." And in this area where policy and substance converge the Russian Service strives to main- tain the proper balance between creative independence and policy direction. Accord- ing to Mr. Diakowski, writers in the Russian Service have a "finger-tip sensitivity" on policy matters, "They are deeply involved in their craft, in their subject, and in policy. It is a matter of osmosis," lie explained; "they know instinctively what not to do.", Accordingly, the writers establish the parameters of a show, and by and large de- termine its contents in consultation with the editor. They prepare the original script which is the major effort. In writing they must be aware of the "sound quality" of what they write. As Mr. Diakowski described the technique of script-writing: "one must write for the ear." Every effort is made in the Russian Service, as indicated in another part of this study, to develop a multi-func- tional capability among writers; that is, to have research expertise, writing ability and good voicing technique for broadcasting their own scripts. The ideal is to develop and com- bine the qualities of skilled technical and substantive specialist with those of an ef- fective radio communicator. Mr. Frank falls into this category.of a mul- ti-functional specialist. (For his biography, see Appendix 1.) He has a program once a week called, Heart of the Matter." (He also participates on panel shows on samizdat.) Ile has complete independence in designing this show. If he sees a particular develop- ment, say in samizdat, he will analyze it and discuss it on his program, all the while preserving the independence of this work. ity Team. This team has its own producers and other staff who schedule production time, arrange for speakers, and other per- formers if needed. After the taping process is completed, one copy of the tape goes to the Russian Service and another to pre- broadcast review in PPD. These final reviews provide a last minute check for possible vio- lations and error before actual airing. Mr. Diakowski has in his office a massive master chart of a week's programing divided into blocks of 24 hours. It is a wall-size en- largement of the Russian Service program schedule reproduced in Appendix 10. On this chart slots are available for inserting ref- erence cards for a particular show that is being scheduled for airing. At one glance, the observer can see the status of programing in the Russian Service. The U.S. Division in New York contributes to programing in the Russian Service. Slots are available for its programs which are re- corded on tape in New York and sent to Munich headquarters, Sometimes changes are required in Munich, owing to new devel- opments in subject matter being treated and possibly for other reasons. But tape cannot be edited very easily; sometimes a last min- ute decision has to be made to accept or re- ject it. Munich checks out the output from New York and has the final word on where their program contribution will fit in. A final point on the matter of policy and procedure is the daily morning Russian Service meeting. Briefly, this meeting pro- vides both the mechanism and the occasion for upper level review by the Chiefs of POD and PPD of feature programing and also for discussion of policy matters and the issuance of a daily guidance. D. Nationalities service 1. Disproportion in programing RL's programing is structured not only to serve the Great Russians but also to meet the needs of millions of other Soviet na- tionalities. For, the Soviet Union is a multi- national state, having in its population of 241,784,000 ethnic groups numbering more than 170 (the Great Russians constitute barely one half), speaking some 125 differ- ent languages and dialects, and practicing 40 different religions that embrace in sub- stantial numbers the major faiths of the world. It comes as a surprise to many Amer- icans when told that in this complex na- tionality structure within Soviet society there are more Turks than in Turkey and more Moslems than in the United Arab Republic, To reach these diverse peoples of the So- viet Union, RL broadcasts in some 20 lan- guages. From Its Nationalities Service broad- casts are aired in Ukrainian and Belor us- Yet, he has this "finger-tip sensitivity" in sian, both Slavic languages; and in the fol- policy, Thus, the end result represents the lowing, non-Slavic languages:. Armenian, individual effort of an intelligent man who Azerbaijani, and Georgian; the North Cau- is able to analyze, write and comment orally casion languages, that is, Adighe, Avar, on matters of consequence, Chechen, Karachi, Ossetian, Tatar-Bashkir Programming procedures in the Russian and Crimean Tartar; and the Turkestani lan- Service, like those of CNS, are fairly simple. guages, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, For example. If in consultation with Munich Uighur, and Uzbek. Recently, the Nation- an RL free-lance writer in Geneva prepares a alities Service began broadcasts in Karakal- script on French cultural affairs, it will go- pak. to Mr. Backerac, the Chief Editor, for his RL directs. a portion of its broadcasting review. He will check it out for language, energies and resources to the non-Russian peoples because they too are denied, among other rights, the right of a free press, and owing to their own. unique historic colonial experience, they hae added reason for listen- ing to RL's message. A panel of 21 specialists at a conference sponsored by Now York Uni- versity and RL believed that "there was no question of the fact that a considerable au- dience existed among the Soviet nationali- ties who would be receptive to Radio Lib- erty broadcasts." 8 By and large Russifcation of the nation- alities, a policy dating far hack to the history of Tsarist Russia, has fallen far short of Soviet goals so that.the languages, religions, traditions, histories, and cultures of these non-Russian peoples remain vigorous and intact. For example, 30 million Soviet Mos- lems (one Soviet citizen in 8) are success- fully, resisting assimilation. More than 98?a of those inhabiting their own Union Repub- lics (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Kirghiz) are listed in the cen- sus as having retained their own mother ton- gue. (Among demographers language is re- garded as the key indicator of assimilation.) They have resisted suppression of their Is- lamic faith, and in defiance of Soviet au- thorities have established illegal mosques, trained mullahs, and, in general, have car- ried on their ancient religious practices, Moreover, Soviet Moslems are part of the Is- lamic community with its distinct way of life much of which continues despite educa- tion and modernization. Scholars have noted a marked tendency for them to identify more with traditions of Asia and Islamic values and with their own Islamic neighbors than with the alien cultures of the Russians and other Europeans.' What is said of Soviet Moslems can also be said of the other major non-Russian na- tionalities, the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, and Armenians-all have rich na- tional cultures and unique historical heri- tages which set them apart from the Great Russian experience. Under the impact of the spirit of nationalism that has been envelop- ing the modern world, these nations and na- tionalities have been experiencing a new sense of national identity, albeit within the Soviet structure, but, nonetheless, one of a special appreciation of their own cultures, languages, and histories. As Walter Lippman said some six years ago in commenting on the power of modern nationalism: "In East- ern Europe,, including the Soviet Union it- self, nationalism is the strongest force work- ing against global revolutionary commu- nism." io In programming, the Nationalities Service has from the beginning been assigned a dis- proportion of RL's broadcasting resources. By and large, the nationalities were con- sidered to be outsiders when RL was first established. Organized under Great Russian influence, the Great Russian point of view predominated, and only after great pressure from the other nationalities in the emigra- tion were they given a place in the organiza- tion's structure. Accordingly, RL reflected the old Great Russian view, and no doubt in the early years this had a detrimental effect on getting across the point of view of the nationalities. As one RL stafl"man in the Na- tionalities Service put it, "the nationalities were not taken seriously." This attitude af- fected prioriies in programming, development of resource material for research, and the allocation of manpower. Only in recent years, perhaps in the early 1900's, has there developed in RL a greater appreciation of the nationalities and a grow- ing awareness of their importance in the larger framework of international relations. What generated this reassessment was pri- marily the growing strife between China and the Soviet Union. This emerging conflict created an internal situation of particular interest to the goals and purposes of RL, for it centered geographically on areas in Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3412 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 6, 1,972 Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Sinkiang, as Mr. Herus, manager of the Ukrainian Feature programming in the Nationalities both of which share a common historical Belorussian programs, said, "to give a feel- Service is designed to satisfy the particular and ethnic heritage. Also with the grow- lag of continuity in the national past needs of its audience; and so is its coverage ing prominence of the developing areas of through culture." of news. CNS sends news items to the Na- Asia and Africa, and the emergence of seri- In the Soviet context culture has distinc- tionalities Service in the Russian language. ous problems in the Middle East, RL began tive political implications that are not clearly Drawing upon their own vast research ve- to re-evaluate the role of the Soviet nation- understood in this country. To Americans, sources in their own languages, the men alities, especially in view of their sharing culture is identified with American litera- within the various subdivisions of the Na- with these areas of the world a common ture, art, and an appreciation of the nation's tionalities Service recast the news, integrat- Islamic heritage and a unique colonial ex- UIstorIcal past as a diverse but unifying lag coverage from the various nationality perience. All of these forces converged in shared experience. The Soviet nationalities, areas. Then, they compose their own scripts the early 1960's to make the nationalities a like ourselves, have their own national litera- in their own national languages to be broad- subject of higher priority in RL. Accord- ture, language, art, and historical traditions, cast to their own audience. The Ukrainian ingly, after 1965 the situation of the Na- Among Soviet Moslems, Islamic culture has Service, for example, will focus on Ukrainian tionalities Service improved markedly, and in addition a strong religious Ingredient. concerns, sometimes even Including material this tendency seems tto be continuing. Sovietization, however, is a long-term from the Ukrainian-American press in New Presently, the breakdown in programming process that seeks to destroy these cultural York, Developments in the Middle East relat- for each day is as follows: Russian, 24 hours; values-this is the goal of Soviet nationality ing to the Moslem peoples-the Kurdish Ukrainian, 13; Belorussian, 10; and the policy, and, in effect, to establish a sort of problem in Turkey, for example-will be in- others, 4; that is, Armenian Azerbaijani, homogenized culture-"rapprochement" the eluded in the newscasts of the Turkestani Georgian, North Caucasian languages, Tatar- Soviets call it-based on what amounts to Service. News from the developing countries Bashkir and the Turkestani languagesu Soviet Russian norms. Culture, therefore, has is also given wider coverage in the Soviet A breakdown in new programming calou- a political meaning. Hence, for the various Moslem areas. This is the direction of their lated on the average time per day in each nationalities to assert their own national cal- interest, and the news, as the first priority language is as follows: - tural values carries with it strong political of RL programming, is structured accord- Russian, 4 hours 11 minutes. overtones. ingly. Ukrainian, 73 minutes. Samizdat has provided the Nationalities 3. Policy and Procedures Belorussian, 41 minutes. Service with a unique opportunity in their Like the other departments of RL, the ha- Turlcestani A: Uzbek and Uighur, 21 programming for appealing to the sense of tionalities Service plays a contributing role minutes. national traditions and to the desire for In the formation of policy. On policy ,lues- Turkestani B: Kazakh and Kirghiz, 19 respect of universal and Constitutional rights tions PPD counsels with stair having special- minutes. among the non-Russian peoples. While much ized knowledge in the nationalities area. Staff Turkestani C: Turkmen and Tajik, 16 of samizdat is concentrated in RSFSR proper, has the opportunity on such occai ions to minutes. especially in the major cities, still the move- present their point of view in the process of Tatar: Crimean Tatar and Tatar Bashkir, ment is spanning out into the outlying na- policy formation. Specialists therefore, can 50 minutes. tionality areas, particularly in the Ukraine and do influence the shape and direction of Armenian., 40 minutes. where it has been especially powerful. Peter policy. Inclusion of the special annexes to Azerbaijani, 36 minutes. Reddaway said, . the mainstream of the Policy Manual covering the various coun- Georgian, 44 minutes. samizdat is limited to certain areas, but once tries in the Nationalities Service is a concrete North Caucasian: Adyge, Avar, Chechen- you look into the minorities, samizdat is all manifestation of the Service'; participation Ingush, Karachi-Bal]car, Ossetian, Russian, over the country." ?4 RL has responded to this in the policy process. Examination of any of 44 minutes? development. In commenting on expanding these annexes will reveal that it could have The criteria adopted by RL for determin- its broadcasts into the nationality areas, Mr. been prepared only in participation with ing broadcasts in a specific language and the Van Der Rhoer declared that RL's non-Rus- area specialists who also have a feel for RL proportion of broadcasts in a given language- sian broadcasters "are only just beginning to policy. - are: (1) the population or population den- realize that samizdat is not just a specific- Moreover, the morning meeting of the Na- city; (2) the existence of a developed, or ally Russian or Ukrainian phenomenon but tionalities Service, attended by the Director 115 developing, national self-awareness;- (3) does go much wider." of PPD, provides the occasion for a daily ox- strategic location of the language group; Accordingly, the Nationalities Service fea- change of views whenever a policy question (4) RL's transmitting capabilities for reach- tures a great deal of samizdat literature, and arises on a show to he programmed. Finally, ing the audience; and (5) the availability of - its coverage is expanding. A work by a Uk- members'?ip of upper echelon staff from the data on a nationality and of speakers in the rainian writer that was given special cover- Nationalities Service (that is, Mr. Sztumpf) emigration. age was Ivan Dziuba's, "Internationalism or and the other departments on the Counsel of The Baltic States meet this criteria, but Russification?" A broadcast review of this Editors provides still another level of par- RL has been unable to get the necessary book is included in the study as Appendix 12. ticipation in the policy process. approval to broadcast to the area. Also, The full text was programmed and read 10 For the Nationalities Service the policy broadcasts in Moldavian are not contem- In August 1971, the Ukrainian Service gave question of transcending importance is RL's plated since Moldavian is a dialect. of Ru extensive coverage to readings from Ukrain- manian, a language covered in RFE broad sky Visnyk, the journal of Ukrainian dissent- tion of f the insistence on a Soviet stance of RL holds s to tion nationalities. liti to casts. ers. In practice, therefore, RL broadcasts in it is in this area of RL's effort where the the view that only the Soviet people hem- times selves can determine what institutions and some 18-20 languages, and broadcast technique of cross-reporting has special rel- status their nationalities shall have. This are alloted to them roughly according to evance: cross-reporting universalizes principle is spelled out in the Policy Manual their status within the USSR. Daily pro- samizdat and broadens its impact. In the and other policy guidances. gra.mmin.g is conducted in Russian, Ukrain- Turkestani Service I and II, for example, Broadcast Position Statement ent on the fan, Uzbek, Belorussian, Tatar, Uighur, material from the RSFSR and Ukraine was The n gives this one the r it Queslocalti Lioon gives this guidanc Azeri, Georgian, and Armenian. Every other broadcast in August 1971. Included in this Nationality sc on day programs are transmitted in languages broadcast and those in the Tatar-Bashkir appeals of other nationalities, that is, Kazakh, Kir- Service were Solzhenitsyn's letter to KGB to nurture and develop nationalist feelings ghiz, Tajik and Turkmen. Approximately Chief Andropov protesting the search of his which recognize the democratic rights of all, twice a week broadcasts are made in differ- apartment and the physical beating given to and to stress the humanistic potentialities exit languages of the North Caucasus which a friend by KGB Investigators. The North of nationalism while discouraging its chau- rotate with each other, that is, Karachi, Caucasian Service carried a broadcast of vinistlc, paranoid or arrogant forms." Ossetian, Chechen-Ingush, Avar and Ady- - Sakharov's pamphlet, "Reflections on Prog- A recent show from RL's Tatar Program gel?? - - - - ress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Free- given on October 1, 1971 and entitled, "Let 2. Program Content dom"; it was aired in the Russian, Karachia, the Tatars of Central Asia be given a na- In its programming the Nationalities Serv- Ossetian and Avar languages?7 tional press!" demonstrates how such a pol- ice places great stress on themes that appeal Moreover, special attention has been given icy statement is applied. In the beginning to the growing awareness of nationality in, the Nationalities Service to airing protests it is pointed out that close to a million Volga among the non-Russian peoples. Emphasis is by Soviet Jews against various forms of viola- Tatars live in Central Asia, of whom 600,000 given to certain ,aspects of human and civil - tions of human and civil rights. In August, are in Uzbekistan and 300,000 in Kazakhstan. rights, but the main thrust is, apparently, the Georgian Service broadcasted a letter by The script goes on: in the cultural area. "Culture is a political - 24 Jews from the North Caucasus to Golda "Neither a newspaper nor a magazine in weapon that is legal in the Soviet Union," Moir; they also broadcasted a letter by 7 . their native language is put out for the said Mr. Sztumpf. Accordingly, programming Leningrad Jews to UN Secretary General ,U Volga-Ural Tatars living in Uzbekistan. It is such as the Tartar's program, "Our Nation- Thant x? . true that a newspaper "Banner of Lenin" is al Heritage," is designed to acquaint the iis- Again, the significance of cross-reporting issued for the Crimean Tatars living there in tener with his national cultural past and to samizdat by the Nationalities Service is that exile, but this comes out in the Crimean bring to his, attention contemporary works of it universalizes pleas for the fulfillment of dialect. As for the absolute majority of Ta- native authors who have appeal for today human and civil rights and broadens the tars living in Uzbekistan, these are Volga but are banned. The underlying purpose is, movement for internal reform. Tartas. They are people who were sent from Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Harcda 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Tatars tan and Bashkiria. On the basis of data compiled by the Ethnographic Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, more than 90% of the Tatars living in the Central Asian republics consider Tatar to be their native language. According to letters sent to Tatar- stan, there is great interest In a native lan- guage press. It is also true that some of the Tartars of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan re- ceive periodicals published in Tatarstan. But it is clear from the letters written to Kazan publications that there are serious problems connected with receiving publications from Tatarstan in Central Asia. For one thing, despite the fact that the circulation of Tatar periodicals has grown recently, there are still not enough to cover the needs of the people in the republic itself. As a result, the Tatars in Nzbekistan and- Kazakhstan are pining Tor publications in their mother ton- gue." It is then pointed out that the Russians- the largest minority population of Uzbekis- tan--do have their schools and periodicals, whereas the Tatars from the Volga (the 2nd largest minority) have nothing. In the clta- tion above, it is also mentioned that the Ta- tars in exile from Crimea also have their own publication despite the fact that they are much smaller in number than the Volga Tatars. In summary, the Tatar program called for publication facilities for their minority equal to that of, the dominant Russian minority of Central Asia, or equal to that of the small minority of the Crimean Tatars (also dis- criminated against). In this way, Tatar na- tional pride and aspirations are summoned in support of the establishing publications in the mother tongue equal to that received by two other nationalities, but in no way detri- mental to these nationalities?? Policy and procedure are closely integrated In the Nationalities Service, and as elsewhere in RL creativity is encouraged by allowing considerable organizational autonomy with- in the structure of policy. A good deal of autonomy within a structure of policy exists within tile Nationalities Service along the lines of the Sargeant principle. Mr. Sztumpf recalled an incident when an RL staffman stimulated policy formation at the top. He had been on vacation in Turkey and heard of clashes along the Sinkiang border before they had been reported in the West or else- where. Upon returning, the matter was brought up as a policy question since it in- volved Turkestan and RL's position in this dispute. Subsequently, a policy guidance was formulated. According to Mr. Sztumpf, "the essence of autonomy is with the writers." He explained it this way. If a staff writer wants to prepare a particular script, he merely gets the ap- proval of the Chief Editor. This relationship is linked by a feeling of good faith in the organization, and all are bound, Mr. Sztumpf said, "by a community of common respon- sibility." Specialists in the area, he went on, have a "ticker-tape knowledge and aware- ness of developments," owing to their knowl- edge of sources and various connections. They are saturated by the influx of news and information. Thus, they can pass judgment on how to treat developing problems in an authoritative manner. Many matters, he went on, were strictly routine, for example, the cotton problem in Uzbekistan. Special- lzed staff know the developments there, Thus, he said, by way of summing up, the routine is done at the desk level by the writer and the Chief Editor. The upper levels of au- thority deal with larger organizational and policy questions. They can and do assert their authority; but "the range of autonomy at the lower level is considerable," Mr. Sztumpf said, adding, "this allows for maxi- inal creativity by staff," In general, the procedure for preparing scripts and producing programs appears, to be similar to that of the Russian Service. Again, what seems most significant is the multi- functions of stall as researchers, writers, producers and performers. The Program Sup- port Unit of PPD reviews programming orig- inated by the Nationalities Service 20 E. Support functions in programming 1. Environmental Aids: Internal Undoubtedly, RL's formal research faoll- itles, described above in Chapter 1, are the strongest internal environmental aid in pro- gramming. (For a summary of environmental aids to RL programmers, sec Appendix 13.) Research is the underpinning of the entire operation; it is formally integrated into pro- gramming; its function is, therefore, vital for RL's purposes, What makes the support functions of research so important derives from the fact that RL as a "Home Service" that seeks to report truthfully must have In- formational resources available that can be used to correct the distortions and fill in the gaps of official Soviet media. Research pro- vides the missing pieces of the fragmented mosaic that constitutes the Soviet citizen's view of reality. Only through research can RL expect to project a reasonably reliable pic- ture of reality in its programming. From what has been said thus far it seems fairly clear that RL's research resources are essentially two-dimensional: the main source of research energy comes from the Research Department; but this is augmented by numerous informal sources coming from the individual facilities built up by RL's pro- grammers and specialized commentators in the Russian Service, and notably by the staff- men of the Nationalities Service who by the special requirements of their tasks have con- structed their own unique informational re- sources. Moreover, staffinen in all depart- ments have developed over the years a spe- cialized knowledge of the Soviet area and of RL's operations which in less direct ways constitute an input into its programming support. The rxsulti-functional utility of staff adds further support to programming as well as efficiency in the radio's operations. Not only does Dimitri Pospolevsky, for example, head a research section and prepare background research studies, he also prepares scripts, pro- duces shows, and broadcasts his own mate- rial, (For his biographic sketch, see Appen- dix 1,) This total unity of functions epito- mizes program support In its most complete form. And then there are the morning meetings. They are more than an integrating process of policy, research, news and feature pro- gramming; as an organizational entity they perform a vital support function of the entire programming operations. At these meetings the collective judgment and wisdom of the organization is brought to bear on current developments and problems, and directed to- ward the ultimate purpose of the radio, namely, to air programs that will appeal to the Soviet audience. Another organizational unit that plays an important internal role in program support is the Audience Research Division (ARD). As the audience research arm of RL, ARD provides listening evidence that fills the gap between the speaker and the audience. It tries to find out such information as clarity of signal and audience preference in pro- grammning, times of listening and preference among foreign broadcasters. Special program evaluations are also made by ARD, drawing upon the views of simulated listener panels of former and present Soviet citizens. Reports on Interviews and post-auditioning panels are circulated for the information and gold- ance of RL programmers. In general, ARD reports have affirmed the judgment of CNS staffers on the Importance of "hard news" in Its programming. Others have benefited from suggestions of listeners. Actual programs have been structured in response to audience requests. A change was 8 Oki) made in one program called, "Do You Re- ?inember," because some listeners said they wore too young to remember. And, "Yester- day, Today and Tomorrow," was programmed on the suggestion of a young Soviet listener who wanted to have more perspective on the Soviet reality. , However, the Nationalities Service has not benefited from ARD reports to the extent of tile Russian Service. ARD is geared more to the Russian audience because of the special linguistic requirements for dealing with the nationalities and also because of the fre- quency of Russian visitors to the West. Con- tra! Asians, for example, are rarely permitted to go abroad so that the opportunity for in- terviews is virtually non-existent. Filially, Mr. Scott, as the top administrator at Munich Headquarters, has apparently played an important part in strengthening RL's programming. According to one senior RL staffman, Mr. Scott has been "most effec- tive" in getting all staff to work together- which is no mean accomplishment in an or- ganization with staff of so diverse national backgrounds. But, more importantly, he has been "most effective in perceiving the needs of programming." In this area, his role has been described as being "imaginative" and "effective," 2, Environmental Aids: External In addition to in-house resources, RL draws upon the expertise of specialists on the out- side for counsel in programming and policy formulation. The samizdat conference held in London in April 1971 and referred to above is an example of this sort of effort. The purpose of this conference was to get some guidance from these specialists on how RL could most effectively use samizdat material in its broad- casting, to get their assessment of the future of samizdat, and to ascertain what role RL should play in making this important doc- umentary material available to outside scholars. Another earlier example of drawing upon outside expertise In a conference format was the conference held in March 1967 sponsored jointly by New York University and Radio Liberty on, "Communicating with Soviet Youth." Over 21 specialists participated in this conference Including some scholars of first rank in the United States-for example, Prof. Philip E. Mosely, Director of the Eu- ropean Institute of Columbia University, and Prof. Alfred Rieber of the University of Penn sylvania. The purpose of the conference was to deliberate on three questions: "Why do Soviet young young people listen to a station like Radio Liberty and what do they expect from it? To what particular segment of the young audience should Radio Liberty give priority. In what ways has the youth audience changed In the 14 years since Radio Liberty began broadcasting?" 21 rib also arranges for special consultations with noted scholars in the field of Soviet studies and communications. Among the vis- iting consultants and lecturers during 1971 were such noted scholars as, Prof. Frederick Baaghoorn of Yale University, Prof. Harold Berman of Harvard University, Prof. Ithiel do Sola Pool, Chairman of the Political Science Department of NIT, Prof. Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics, and Nikita Struve of Sorbonne University, Paris. (For a complete list of visitors and lecturers, along with a list of outside consultants and participants in RL programming, see Ap- pendix 13 and 27.) A final resource in programming support is the use of free-lance specialists in Soviet area studies. The U.S. Division In New York, owing to its central metropolitan location, is able to drawupon a pool of specialists for re- search, consultation, and programming. And the headquarters in Munich through its bureaus in London and Paris is also able to draw upon the knowledge of specialists resid- ing in West European countries. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3414 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 6, 1972 It. INSTRUMENTALITIF5 FOR POLICY CONTROL B. Final review in production process in the reports go into a system of ratings, A. Script Writer, Editor, Morning Meetings 1. Time Sequence in Production as Buffer that is to say, repeat ratings, trend ratings, Against Error voice evaluations, authors' productivity, au- Policy envelops RL's operations, and its thors' latest direct familiarity with Soviet application begins with the writers, for what Time is on RL's side in its production reality. This system has been established they prepare is RL's initial product and is process, except in initial newscasts: they are quality with co t?' treport on errors apolicy odt policy expected, therefore, to be taped, voiced and delivered live; it is only a matter of a few compare transmitted to the Soviet audience. "Finger- hours separating the script writer from the violations picked up inn errors and tip sensitivity to policy" is an expression that broadcaster. The risks are present and the checks and riis compiled ad Vitaspot- seasoned RL staffers use to define their con- potentiality for violation is there. Still, care- checks a, d reviews evew co Director of PPD and tern for policy adherence at this level. Here, ful writing and editing can eliminate viola- sent to the Director. A copy is forwarded di- then, is the first filter screening out pos- tions, and the straight declarative technique rectly to the Executive Director of RL. This sible policy violations; it is a self-filtering in news-writing is a built-in protection report includes discrepancies revealed in process and occurs when the writer, re- against extravagances that creep into feature PD spending almost automatically to years of in- writing. Moreover, subsequent newscasts daily daily preas-well asbroadcast errors spot-ccheccks ks by in PPD duced behavior in policy obedience, for- made during the broadcast day are taped, bstaffers roadcast pevaluation reports. programs pot June mulates his thoughts according to what can and, therefore, are subject to review and cor- o do report program o tevaluation and should be said. rective action, if needed. 19A e oron the in the study pr as Appendix for J ne speaks for itself as as ail pendixr 14. "Policy violations are no real problem," said However, the production process in fea- This is included sin and the care Alexander Backerac. "All writers have a sen- ture programs. takes a great deal of time, the rep RLfor itself sitivity to the problems; they have an un- perhaps from three to ten days. There is tervigoo of of screening pt cism and Follow-up derstanding of them and of policy." However, ample time, therefore, for both review of procedures are also recorded-deletions are ho qualified this sweeping generalization tapes and scripts. As Mr. Dakowski exclaimed, m ade; shows are "pulled." extreme when referring to newcomers from the Soviet "Thank God for tape l"-meaning that the' The repose reveals clearly RL's extreme Union. "Some have been profoundly repressed taping process permits a careful screening of sensitivity rr the Soviet environment. Several during their lives in Russia," he declared, shows as well as scripts in pre-broadcast re- cuts were effected, for vironm t. Soviet "and they feel RTC s approach is too soft." views. Commentary of June 23/24 because of vier "But sooner or later," he went on, "they 2. Pre-broadcast auditions erences to "escape abroad," "escape from the understand no one is impressed by the 'hard Two checks take place at the pre-broadcast homeland," and "comparisons between the approach' and see the need for policy and for level. Programmers responsible for the show USSR and a prison cell." In a talk on June a rational approach to the problem." audition the taped program, checking for 30/1 July, four paragraphs were eliminated Editors such as Mr. Backerac are primarily policy, performance, and continuity. Mein- because "the tone and sarcastic expressions responsible for seeing that the immoderate bers of PPD also make daily pre-broadcast about Brezhnev contravene policy." are restrained, and that RL policy prevails: spot-checks of individual shows. report also rhow RL's sensitivity thow 's of a thew. to policy can lead reveals this 1s the second level of screening. "The job Another screening is done by a special The re of editor," said Victor Frank, "is to act as a panel drawn from PPD, the Research Be- For licy can lead to the h "Harvest" on Soviet was "puedet brake on the writers and to restrain the vigor partment, and from other qualified staff Commentary x mle t show of those who may sometimes let their emo- members outside of POD. This screening con- June ne 4, "this script pull was l - ing. Why object to efforts bring tn- tions. run away." But, he said, "it is extremely stitutes an in-house evaluation of an entire cording the fv rare if any excess in language slips through broadcast day made with time allowed to better point would have been the many processes of screening." correct minor policy violations or to "pull" harvest to show in? the A hidden cosoint wastes i have been Mr. Diakowski estimated that perhaps three a show with major deficiencies and to substi- to the way it is brought an 24 policy violations occur in a week that must be tute another for it while the show "pulled" i pre-broadcast evaluation in.. n of nationality choice of corrected. By words, and he large, said it is a matter of a is being rewritten, either in shore-brin part programming takes place on a daily basis. The . At worst, the offense for- later programming. p responsible organ fsuch evaluation is is a "venial si.n, " and transgressions are auditions provide a regular check on the D Unbar organ for circumstances, POD tcaught by the editors. He gave this example. quality of the broadcast day making certain PP. Under certain cis Pan does not takes have Writers steeped in the Western press my in. that it is in accord with RL's standards par- responsibility, rt especially s for a given script. have advertently refer to samizdat as "illegal" or titularly on policy, content, tone, and basin the language e c ca artecilities o given the script "underground" literature. This is an RL techniques outlined in the Policy Manual. After unsatisfactory from the point of iew of quality nsa sf ctoryy, tthe is dif policy violation: samizdat is not illegal; it is Two people are assigned to each broadcast found bnsa a legitimate expression of -free thought, from day One auditions the newscast and a part view o the writer and the his after is die editor. RL's point of view. Or, reference to a "stupid of the feature programs. The auditfonera are If the script can writer nd hhi the necessary cliche" or a "stupid act" might be used in supplied with scripts and tapes of the pro- If the s are made and the script is then commenting on a particular Soviet response, grams. broadcast .25 or action by Brezhnev. The editor would blue- Each auditioner- on the panel prepares a rts and display lay pencil "stupid," and as Mr. Savemark ob- written report on the program segments as- Pro the the same-broadcast vigorous self- evaluation cr reports served, the writer would be urged to explain signed for evaluation in which brief general veal very clearly the organization's selfrii e- why such a response or action by Brezhnev comments are supplemented by a standard habit r clearly screening. nes enand gr such are inserted as Appendix 15. The such was "stupid" without giving the act that checklist for the auditioner's specific judg- habit brash negative description. ment. The categories for evaluation are as ping excerpts inserted a a Appendix 15. The f 1- Senior staff in both New York and Munich follows: (1) policy violations in content, lowing give tflom and random of are convinced that no serious policy viola- tone, or presentation (2) suitability for a rr ep severity the stay criticism of indication pro- of their tions have slipped through, at least in recent general audience (3) suitability for any ad- tramming: years. "Rarely is a script rejected for policy," ditional specific category or categories of lit- ?1 Almost all of today's program and said Mr. Diakowski, "rejection is for sloppy tenors (4) constructiveness of approach (6) writing or not having sufficient interest." Mr. factual mistakes (6) delivery (7) correc- news featuries were inter sting ayditell tr t- Diakowski summed up what is probably a tions suggested and (8) action taken as a fair statement of policy control at the writer- result of suggestions. In addition, each audi- noted that this evaluator had fewer objec- editor level when. he said: "The writer is tioner is asked: (1) to recommend whether tions to make, as regards factual or policy sophisticated enough not to write such things or not each program segments should be re- mistakes, than ever before (as far as he re- that would violate policy, and the editor is peated, with five recommendations. possible, calls) on a single day's output. sophisticated enough not to let them get namely, strongly recommended, recom- "Only one intervention seemed to be called through." ss - mended, perhaps, not recommended, under for in a news feature on a 'New Round of the Another level of screening, of a sort, enters no circumstances; and (2) to give each pro- Arms Race in the Middle East,' which attrib- in at this point, though less directly, in the gram segments a numerical rating on a five- uted exaggerated performance character- forin of the daily morning meetings. At the point scale--6 meaning excellent; 4, good; istics to the MIG-23 interceptor aircraft, Research Meeting the Director of PPD raises 3, fair; 2, poor; 1, bad. The auditioner's re- notably claiming that it is 'extremely effec- policy questions and gives direction and, port is sent directly to Mr. Scott and dis- tive at both high and low altitudes.' Even . counsel on particular subjects being referred tributed among certain designated staff. technologically, this is nonsense because the to programmers. Similarly, at the News Meet- Errors, policy violations, or major deft- MIG-23 would have to have variable wings ing he raises policy questions in the news ciencies spelled out in the written pre-broad- to be 'extremely effective' at both high and coverage for the day, if warranted, calling at- cast evaluation reports go into the monthly low altitudes. This is obviously not the al similar notes from the daily case. . . . The author of the script would _ r_ no ...i+h +7~n made,". MI -- the meetings of the Nationalities Service and about the results or hose pie-, the Russian Service both Directors of PPD evaluations, which, in addition to screening variable geometry of its wings. (Action was and POD give direction and counsel on scripts. possible violations and errors, constitute a taken.) then being prepared for, feature program- body of instruction for future guidance. "2. Across the Ocean, Rigerman's account ming. Moreover, the other information contained of his impressions of the United States. His Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 111arch 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3415 focus on free press as the most remarkable thing about America is just what we need... . "It would have been much more effective to have the script read in the author's own voice although the announcer did an out- tanding job. An attempt to avoid the prob- lem of Rigerman's being American from the beginning and thus not a "former Soviet citizen" was unsuccessful. The term 'former Soviet man' evokes the whole ideological concept of 'Soviet man' that qualitatively different creation-to-be of communism. It was recommended that the phase be dropped. (Action was taken,) "Meetings with Listeners. , Delivery re- mains the author-announcer's weak point?? 3. Meetings with Listerners. Comparing hu- manitarian aspects of the monarchy of old Russia and the Soviet regime., the author has touched on a very delicate subject, RL should not play the role of defender of monarchy even if the old regime appears angelic in comparison with Stalinism. (Action was taken and appropriate changes In the text were effected prior to broadcast)". P S R ? 9 "KVN. It is very sad that e, show of this nature is aired. It is in no way entertaining. The conscientious participants tried to save the bad texts. It is regrettable that pleasant and melodious songs performed by L. Pylayev are wasted. His manner of singing, which re- calls that of Utessov and Mark Berens should find response among Soviet listeners. Out of several sketches only 'Vassik i Mussik' which contains some satire, deserves attention. Without the selection of good texts, KVN will never be a success, (No immediate action was taken) .1 "4. Check Iist, 'American Journalist's Im- pressions of Albania.' In response to the questions, 'Do content, tone or presentation violate RL policy?' the evalutor indicated, 'Yes,' but no further action was taken?0 "ti. This was a 'wide, wide world' program today. The spotlight from. script to script kept shifting from one part of the globe to' another. Unfortunately, except for some of the news features, it was not always clear Just why RI, had a claim on the listener's attention with these fast changes of pace, I would have to rate the overall program as mediocre to poor. "Most disappointing to me was the Samiz- clot Review which wa s a roundtable discus- sion on the Czechoslovak invasion as seen in sanizdat, but the discussion seemed un- oble to decide between focusing on Czecho- slovakia in 1068, Rumania in 1971 or samiz- dat and the result was a blurred focus. "Best script reviewed was one on 'Conver- gence Revisited' . , . which was informative . and judiciously argued, The voices on this script were also the most convincing of the day. "I failed to see any good point at all in a repeat in Far East series of a year-old script on a correspondent's impressions of a visit to the capital city of Cambodia,. "News features continue to give more at- tention to the Middle East and Israel than Is warranted by the course of events or of our Soviet listeners' interest.., ," ou 3. "As broadcast" check at transmitters A final step in the review process is the "as broadcast" cheek made at the transmitters. For many years R,L has maintained a strict regulation that all material "as broadcast" over its transmitters had, to conform in de- tail to the material prepared and voiced from its studios. The purpose of this procedure is threefold: (1) to meet the requirement of the West Cerinan Government that . material broadcast he retained for a three-month pe- riod for reference purposes if needed (no re- quest for such information has ever been received); (2) to provide the Spanish Govern- ment with summaries of material transmitted' from Pals on certain designated subject mat- ter; and finally (3) to enable RL to make sure that what has been written, approved and taped at Munich headquarters conforms to the material that Is actually being trans- mitted to the Soviet audience. Each transmitter station automatically re- cords RL material as it is actually being broadcast, This material is retained for six months and is reviewed by selected, qualified personnel for comparison with original scripts to insure that there were no dovia- tions from prepared material and that no un- authorized material has been added. Record- ings in West Germany, made at the Lamper- theim transmitter station, are made on an "Assmann" recorder. Similar equipment is used at the Pals and Taipei stations. Hard and fast procedures relating to record- ing and review of tapes are contained in Staff Memorandum No, 6 of February 1, 1068, which remains cutrent, The memorandum spells out in detail the methods of recording, the review procedure at all three stations, and the minimum review requirements for all languages broadcast (for example, from the Taipei station, an average of 2 hours of broad- cast material in the Russian language is to be chocked weekly.) It also provides for re- ports on personnel assigned to content con- trol activities and for reports on deviations, The directive states that the chiefs of the Production Department and POD will report to the Executive Director all deviations in "as broadcast" material from program scripts, "together with a statement of the cause of the deviation if known, a statement of Cor- rective action taken, and a recommendation for action to preclude recurrence if appropri- ate." Similarly; the Executive Director is directed to report all deviations to the Pres- ident of RL.i Apparently, this check at the transmitters has been effective as a last-minute, final screening. According to Mr, Van Der Rhoer, "problems very seldom' arise," and an RL statement on policy procedures declared in a discussion of content control at the trans- mitters and the incidence of deviations,' . it should be noted that none had been ob- served in at least the past two years." u C. Post-Broadcast Auditions At this point in RL's operations the pro- grams have been transmitted, and It is, of course, too late now to recall the signal. If policy violations have sliped through or er- rors in fact or faulty producing techniques occurred, then it is just too late to do any- thing about it. The damage, if any, has been done. The spoken word, more than the writ- ten word, is irretrievable, and the damage done is long amending, However, RL has a system of post-broadcast auditions, a sort of review after the fact, but, nonetheless, it is another important input into the review process, protecting the organization against factual error, policy violations, and produc- tion shortcomings. This post-audit review of RL's programs Is done by executive personnel in the U.S. Division at New York, Staff takes turns au- ditioning a day's broadcast. They review pro- gram content and evaluate its effectiveness from every point of view relating to such key points as how successfully RL communicates with its audience, identifies with its listeners' interests, and provides them with solid in- formation and thoughtful stimulating mate- rial. This post-audit review informs the Pres- ident in detail about program content and stimulates the development of substantive suggestions for policy formulation and more effective execution.'., What makes these re- views especially meaningful is that they are done by veteran RL staffers who over the years have been totally immersed in policy requirements and the goals and purposes of the organization. In brief, the post-broadcast auditioners summarize each show within a day's program- ming and evaluate it, generally using RL's policies and objectives as a criteria. They grade each show according to suitability for a general audience and specific categories of listeners most likely to he interested in the particular broadcast, that is, the creative in- telligentsia, managing personnel in the Soviet economy, military personnel, party and gov- ernment functionaries, workers, rural popu- lation and youth. They also grade the show on the same scale as noted above for pre- broadcast reviews, that is, bad-1 to excel- lent-8, and according to four sub-categories, that is, presentation and format, pertinency of subject and treatment to audience or spe- cialized audiences, voices, and overall im- pressions of the show. RL's sharp internal criticism is carried into the post-broadcast evaluation. Yet, charac- teristically, the evaluators appear to strive for fairness and a balanced appraisal. An ex- ceptional example of a post-broadcast audi- tioning report is attached to the study as Appendix 16. In P. random selection of post- broadcast auditions it is possible to find such judgments as these found in the audition of a Russian program for Friday/Saturday, October 30-31, 1970: "1. General Appraisal: I Was very favorably impressed with the professionalism, cogency, and timeliness of the day's programming. "2. Countries and Continents: Informative and interesting subject matter but a dull format. Why have three speakers if you are not going to capitalize on the liveliness of a round-table discussion? The results of this is just three people taking turns providing in- formation. No sense of give-and-take; al- most no sense of personality on the part of the speakers. "3. Pelting and Its Politics: Informative and authoritative, but a presentation that often borders on tediousness: one voice rapidly reading a very long piece of text. "4. Signal (military affairs show) : Good, solidly-informative content and an excellent presentation: spontaneous, warm lively. "6. Commentary on Soviet Themes. Show title, 'Heroic Minority': The anonymous commentator pays tribute to those Soviet citizens bravo enough to compile and dis- tribute samizdat literature and declares that more of this kind of courageous activism is needed. He comments that it is the political passivity of the majority which enables the injustice and inefficiency and general viciousness of the Soviet system to continue. "This was the most explicitly agitational of the day's features. I personally agreed with the commentator's view. I am not sure how it would affect a Soviet listening audi- ence," 3+ RL also conducts a post-broadcast evalua- tion of scripts in the Nationalities Service. It Is made primarily as a means for developing new ideas and discarding outmoded con- cepts in programming. The evaluator's com- ments also provide a kind of interfacing mechanism whereby policy and research can contribute to the improvement of program- ming. Reports on post-broadcast evaluation of scripts in the Nationalities Service are made in memoranda to Mr. Van Der Rhoer. A copy of an extensive report on 27 North Caucasian scripts is included in the study as Appendix 24.-5 D. Rationality and trust in policy control RL has many instrumentalities for policy control, extending all the way from the script writer and upper echelon of editors and policy controllers in Munich, to the "as broadcast" content controllers at the trans- mitters in West Germany,. Spain and Tai- wan, and, in declining importance, to the post-broadcast auditioners in New York. The checks are there, and as far as can be Judged by the outsider, they are used in.a reason- able and judicious way. After all, there are limits to which any organization can impose a regime of internal control without ex- hausting its resources, both human and physical. Policy control cannot be total; pol- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3416 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. March 6, 1972 ley violations are always .possible: at best, III. QUALITY CONTROL IN PROGRAMMING wdoesn't need oman speaker to [ialt one better. this the bet n the control mechanisms can only reduce the A. Internal instrumentalities for quality world. probabilities. The alternative is "1984" control 'The voice sounds too bombastic. which is not only impossible but self- 1. Will Klumpf, Quality Controller "He has something wrong with his teeth. defeating. Policy control and quality control overlap This elderly voice is not suitable for radio. The heart of the matter, therefore, is trust Y sounds slightly archaic, emigre. and rationality: trust in the individual, for to a considerable extent. Pre-broadcast and Moreover it policy control must begin and end with the post-broadcast auditioning provide in-house "I think this is an alien, emigre voice... . individual; and rationality in the wisdom of evaluations on both the quality- of pro- This Is the kind of voice to avoid, it is too the policy constructed and of the people who gram ping as well as judgments on policy remote from the listener. are to carry it out. Trust in the integrity of matters. Beyond this, no other formal insti- "This is one of Liberty's best voices, abso- the individual combined with the exercise of tutional mechanism for quality control seems lutely contemporary, intelligent and remark- his intelligence and the rationality required to exist, except for the important tasks per- ably soft and natural. This is, the kind of in policy formulation would seem to be the formed by Mr. Will Klumpf, administrative voice sound on which to build Liberty. Per- greatest safeguard. For, RL must assume a assistant to the Executive Director. baps the voice is not young, but there is no bond of trust in its staff men that is based on In general, Mr. Klumpf acts as Mr. Scott's emigre sound here; for the Soviet listener it shared beliefs in commonly held goals and personal deputy for programming and pro- is 'one of ours'." 16 purposes, and based also on a shared Intel- duction-a sort of right-hand-man who Careful records are kept on grading of lectual and moral commitment to a policy oversees , program auditioning, checks for voices. When a speaker's quality dips below structure that is believed to represent the quality effectiveness, policy and overall ex- a certain level, then he or she is taken off the only rational and realistic means for achiev- cellence in production. In addition, he is air. A theoretically perfect score is 5.0; below responsible for giving Mr. Scott full knowl- 3.0 Is regarded as poor. In July 1971, one ing B. a common goal. edge of what goes on the air and how it speaker, receiving a 2.9 rating, was taken off E. T Czechoslovak crisis, August 1968, A goes on the the air AO case e study of f RL's policy operating in n crisis Perhaps, the ultimate effectiveness in the S. Ratings on Shows co~Lditions 'eat of broadcasting lies largely in what Stan- EL also maintains a type of "Neilsen rat- Perhaps, one of the best tests for RL's islavski said of a play and the theater, ing" on its shows as a means of quality con- ability to maintain control over its broad- namely, that there are various "planes" of a trol. Evaluations are made periodically, and casting operations through the mechanism play. one of which is on the "aesthetic plane, records are kept. A theoretically perfect rat- of policy is the case of the Czechoslovak with the sublayers of all that is theatrical, ing is 5.0, below 3.0 is poor, and the lowest crisis in August 1068. At the request of the artistic having to do with scenery and pro- possible rating is 0.0. A report on 22 shows writer RL staff in Munich prepared a report duction." .n Mr. Klumpf, a long-time student that were given "trend ratings" at the start entitled, "Radio Liberty Coverage of 1968 of the theater, at one time an actor, and of FY 1971 and 1972 contained this spread of Czechoslovak Crisis." This report Is included now a specialist in Soviet affairs, attempts to ratings for FY 1972: Memory Calendar, 4.7; In this study as Appendix 23. The report con- fulfill this task for RL. He tries to introduce Vladimirov Talks, 4.6; Samizdat Review, 4.3; tains documentation on basic general and into programming a sense of theatriclsm, Across the Ocean, 3.8; Collector's Corner, 3.1; specific policy guidances from the President, that is to say, the skills and techniques of and Philosophic Talk, 2.5. After 17 individual Executive Director and the policy staff. It radio theater in order to make the broad- evaluations, Philosophic Talk was taken off also summarizes RL coverage in translation casts more effective. This entails good stag- the air tit from the Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar pro- ing, good voicing, good taping, and skillful B. External instrumentalities for quality grains for selected days during the build-up continuity in production. By imparting a control of the crisis in mid-June, to the peak of sense of theatrical style in programming, Mr. ARD in Quality Control crisis with the Soviet bloc invasion on Au- Klumpf attempts to achieve quality per- 1 's Audience in Research Division an gust 21, and during the immediate post- forma-,ice and quality production. An im- RL plays invasion period. Appended to the report are portant aspect of this effort is to make sure important role in quality control. Drawing translations of extracts from RL programs. that the day's broadcast has a proper mix upon evaluations both within and outside the On the basis of a review of this material it of discussion, interviews, straight reporting, Soviet Union, ARD attempts to provide all- is possible to generalize that RL exercised a music, and human interest features. He con- other input into the process of improving great deal of caution, moderation and re- stantly reviews taped shows in pre-broadcast programing for the purpose of appealing to straint during this period of crisis. auditions to make sure that the final prod- a wider audience. According to George Perry, Assistant Director of ARD, ARD "acts as Guidances were planned and formulated net has quality. as the crisis gathered momentum. In the - That RL should have special concern for something of an inspector general for RL pro- spring, monthly and daily guidelines pro- staging its programs derives from both a grammers." They respect ARD's evaluations, vicled continuing ad hoc guidance with cau- common sense judgment and a deeper knowl- Mr. Perry said, since they help programmers tion the key word ?" Contingency plans for edge of the Russian reality. Russia is the na- better accomplish their tasks. As Mr. Perry programming were made on July 30,. well in tion of Chekhov, Stanislavski, and the Mos- put it, "ARD helps relieve the programmer of advance of the resting of the crisis on Au- cow Art Theater, and Russians are a people the feeling that he is shouting down a tube gust 21, the day of invasion. These plans who have appreciated theatricism as a part but rather is functioning as successfully as were published on August 21, as Daily Guid- of their life style. It is understandable, there- possible." ante Note No. 14. Supplemented by daily fore why programming should be structured on the basis of extensive. testing of opin- guidelines throughout the period, these with a critical eye toward staging which for ions through post-broadcast audition panels formed the basis for RL's programming dur- the Russian people has a special appeal. as well as by direct interviews with Soviet tog the crisis. Themes In RL's programming 2. Ratings on Voicing citizens, ARD prepares reports evaluating for the infer n Lion circandulguidaated out in the contingency were to be: the back- One important aspect of in-house quality programs. ing facts; th situation, loss obvious al, et misread- control is the matter of voicing. RL auditions RL of staff. In brief, ARD's business is feedback, and ing of facts; the loss the moral, ethical total and ro rams under simulated jamming condi- practical positions for thSoviet Union; pons. The purpose is to seek guidance in though working under serious handicaps- failure of CPSU policies which led to action obviously, it cannot conduct Gallup-type against what were basically new ideas; the casting, that is, to find out which voices polls . and Neilsen-type surveys Inside the penetrate jamming the best. It is ironic that Soviet Union-ARD tries, nonetheless, within "tragic irony" of using Warsaw Pact forces pie finest quality of speaking voice under these strict limitations to give programmers against a long-standing socialist ally and normal conditions will not be always be the some idea of their impact and influence. Pro- to the country; the intervention as a blow most intelligible under jamming conditions. grammers in turn can judge for themselves see to the desire of the ft population -, tto dam. - Oftentimes a voice poorly rated normally the quality of their efforts and improve them abettet and more e peaceful world-, the h age to the cause of socialism and liberal- will be most effective under jamming. accordingly. izatiort at home; and the Irreparable le split split in Voices can also be evaluated by outside 2. Quality Control Reports the world Communist movement. panels of former and present Soviet citizens is such quOne form Lro1 rlL's ev Taluan here co st comes the effall ectiveness. appraisal On August 21 and immediately thereafter, in order to obtain Cramming g co conecentrht panel reviews is broken down Into 12 sate- judgments of a simulated Soviet audience. regular concentrated was mainly d open New straight quality news coverage reported over the major inter- gories that are designed to elicit evaluations Mr. Max Ralis, ARD's Director, gave this gen- national wire services. Emphasis was placed of the speaker's delivery and voice quality. A oral discription on how these panels are set particularly on developments in Czeehoslo- random selection of reports on these evalua- velop the bestattem availablepts tastitutsaaadietce. have vakia and world reaction to the crisis, espe- tions "The eaker's tone is too cold which is not To create such a substitute audience, ARD dally reaction within the Communist mover the same p. inent. S procedures Were leringtall news features and coammenta ies reads ratherlikejacSoviet judge porsbureaucrat arrived in theiWest and persons temporarily through PPD as soon as written and before "I have listened to this voice twice al- out of the Soviet Union who are studying in broadcast and distribution to the desks, ready-it hasn't gotten any worse, and the West. A random selection is made from Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3417 this group which would constitute a better than average approximation of a Soviet audi- ence. Persons on the panel, Mr. Ralis said, must give their honest reactions and evalua- tions, and they must be articulate. Among those now available for such panels are a So- viet student, a former actor, a linguist, and other recent arrivals. Sailors and workers have not proved too effective on such panels. All panels have instructions on listening. They are directed to forget all their Western influence and try to react to the program as if they were a Soviet listener inside the So- viet Union. Then each panel member rates each broadcast on probable impact. Ordi- narily, the panel listens to two programs a month of 11/2 hours of broadcasting. They do not sit together, but audition individually. Tapes and scripts are sent to them to their homes in Western Europe and the United States. ARD conducts about 24 such panels a year. They focus only on Russian language broadcasts, mainly because non-Russians are not available. An example of a Quality Control report is included in the study as Appendix 17. A gen- eral appraisal is given of the day's broad- cast at the beginning of the report, each segment of the broadcast is briefly summar- ized; and a capsuled evaluation of each is recorded. The summary of the panelists' ratings are included in a check-list appended to the report. The check-last cities each pro- gram being evaluated, and this list is cor- related with major categories under the headings, program content; effectiveness; credibility; discretion; delivery; format and presentation; language and style; sufficiency of auxiliary, historical and other data; and a question as to whether the program should be repeated. The final category deals with audience and is broken down into 9 major categories according to the particular audi- ence of RL's concern. Within all categories there are six choices for grading. Review of a random selection of Quality Control reports gives the impression that the, panels are, indeed, very their com- mentary and appraisals. Criticism is very sharp; yet the reports are generally balanced, pointing out both the strong and weak points of a program. By and large the panels are made up of largely educated and professional people, and thus their criticism would have to be taken seriously since they constitute RI's prime Soviet audience. Here are a few examples of comments made in one of these reports: - '1. Russian Art and Literature's theme, the respect accorded Russian art abroad, was welcomed, but tine script fell down, perhaps, because of the odd voice and intonation. "2. One low paint was his by the Washing- ton Observer's Note about U.S. politicians' travels, which did not concern the listener in the least. "3. One of the new panelists . . was struck by one quality of the Newscast which enhanced its effectiveness, namely the utter lack of propaganda or anything which could be construed as subjectivity. Other panel- ists . also stressed this point .. . "4. Three. panelists concentrated on the speaker. JFS and RFS regarded him if not as a foreign reader, then at least as one from the old emigration. BFS went into detail on this: "Though Mr.. . has an authoritative and pleasing voice, it does not stand up to the requirements of contemporary Russian pronunciation. "5. Report from USA . heavily criti- cized . . . just simply boring. "G. Report front Bonn, This talk about the vacations of German workers drew a varied and vehement response. For EFS it was 'witty and live,' for UFS 'it offered an indirect, im- plied refutation of the Soviet claim that only in the USSR is labor highly valued and vaca- tions are paid.' "At- the. other end of the settle HSC and OFS found it 'gray, banal and superficial.' AFS and XFS were bored, JFS and GFS complained at the 'dry, official recitation of facts: "7. Russian Art and Literature . . Cer- tain panelists, however, were more than de- terred by the presentation and delivery. JFS thought the terminology too 'Western' and unfamiliar, but, above all, the 'Intonation illogical, hindering perception' . For XFS it was 'a 'caricature' and, as UFS put'it, 'this is the kind of voice put on by Soviet actors when they want to imitate pre-revolutionary conservatives and bureaucrats.' RFS, to be fair, thought this might possibly be an ad- vantage, contrasting favorably with the 'robust, over-cheerful voices of Soviet art .critics.' "8. University of the Air . . 'This has got to be a parody. This professor, or, whoever he is, obviously an all-out supporter of capitalism, starts by philosophizing about high matters, how people in the West are free to join societies, etc. And then he gives as an example a French society of animal lovers-which really is what the talk consists of. This must be a joke .. .' " 42 3. Special Program Evaluation Reports Another type of audience reaction to pro- gramming quality is the Special Program Evaluation Report. "When a unique person comes along," said Max Rails, "we try to get him to participate in a special listening ses- sion and report on it." Evaluations by this "unique person" are put into the Special Program Evaluation Report. An example of this type of report is included in the study as Appendix 18. The value of such reports again depends upon the auditioner's perceptiveness, general intelligence, and ability to articulate his' views. One such session with a group of So- viet seamen was clearly unproductive when the subjects could not identify some notable cultural figures on the Soviet scene men- tioned in an RL broadcast being auditioned, though they were acquainted' with Paster- nak and Solzhenitzyn!8 4. Target Area Listener Reports Another input into evaluating the quality of RL's programming are reports directly from the Soviet listening audience, usually from visitors in the West. An example of this type of report is included in the study as Appendix 19. Though reports of this nature are very limited in number, still they do provide some indication of the quality of RL's pro- gramming. For example, the wife of a Rus- sian scientist who was an Uzbek regretted that so little of RL's broadcasts were on med- ical research. Also, while RL's programs were "varied and rich," still she found some of them "a bit heavy." Both husband and wife declared that they followed with in- terest programs on samizdat and "all kinds of literature-both Soviet and foreign." 41 Another listener, a university professor, rated RL first among foreign broadcasters for its "courageous, high quality programs (especially of late) on themes which are not discussed elsewhere," that is to say, samiz- dat 40 5. Evaluation by Outside Specialists Another form of quality control is eval- uations by outside specialists in Soviet af- fairs. Leading authorities in the West are asked to audition a block of programming and give their judgments. An example of this .type of included in the study as Appendix 20. RL staff is by no means of one mind on the'value of these reports. On the one hand, such auditions were said to have not worked out too well, owing to individual prejudices of these specialists; and on the other, the view was expressed that their evaluations must be taken seriously. A review of randomly selected evaluations by outside specialists indicates that they can be very frank, even tough, in their ap- praisals, yet balanced and seemingly fair- minded. 6. On the Value of ARD Reports on Quality Control That ARD evaluation panels play a role in determining the quality of RL's program- ming cannot be denied. Yet, it would be extraordinarily difficult to ascertain just how great a role that is. It is known that programs have been affected by direct lis- tener response through ARD. And while some RL staffers feel that panel reports may have no direct impact on programming, neverthe- less, it is believed by others that they have the value of re-affirming in the long-run judgments made in the past-for example, the value of heavy emphasis on factual re- porting In newscasts. Improvements have been made in pro- gramming, it is asserted by ARD staffers, by passing on information derived from panels .of auditors. Leading supervisors get these report, it is said, and the feedback, though simulated, Is ground back into the system as a new input. Yet, as one person said criti- cally, except for reports from outside spec- ialists, panels of simulated Soviet listeners had "to be taken with a grain of salt." Pre- sumably, what limits the value of these re- ports is the fact that many criticisms, how- ever valid they may be, call for remedies that are in violation of policy; and this is unknown by the outside auditors. Admitting these shortcomings of panel evaluations, nevertheless, to this outside ob- server, they seem to have the value of at least providing some evidence of probable listener response and reaction without which ,there would be none. and thus provide RL with at least a measure of quality control, however slight. Despite known imperfections, auditioning panels, especially of substitute Soviet listeners, are at least a beginning of a much more demanding (and what is now a virtually impossible) task of knowing the Soviet audience, and, accordingly, on the basis of this limited knowledge, of improving program quality. FOOTNOTES. 1 RL program schedule-Russian Service, p. 1. (RL, v. VIII, pt. E.) 2 RL basic briefing outline, July 2, 1971, pp. 5-6. a RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 12-13. (RL, v. I.) `RL basic briefing outline, July 2, 1971, p. 6. (RL, v. V, pt. 10.) a Quality Control Report #16-17, August 20, 1971, p. 12. a RL Audition Report, Russian Program, October 14-15, 1970, November 13, 1970,,p. 9. 7 Ibid., p. 9. 8 NYU-RL Conference, Communicating with Soviet youth, 1967, p. 20. a RL Statement, June 1971, p. 15. (RL, v. I.) to The Washington Post, May 11, 1965, p. A21. 11 SFRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 20. 12 RL, Breakdown of RL's new program- ming in each of its languages, April 30, 1971. (RL, v. III, pt. H.) 13 RL, Policy in determining the proportion of broadcasts in particular languages. (RL, V. VIII, pt. 5a.) 14 RL, Future of samizdat, April 23, 1971, p. 21. (RL, v. II, pt. Dl.) 15 I bid., p. 31. 50 Introduction to Ivan Dziuba's "Interna- .tionalism or Russification7" (RL, v. III, pt. F.) 17 Sakouta to Van Der Rhoer, RL Memo- randum, October 20, 1071, "Coverage of Samizdat material in August 1971 RL pro- grams." (RL, v. IX, pt. C.) 18 Ibid. 10 Ibid., pt. b. 20 Rd,, Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 15. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 S 3418 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEN ATE 19,12 NYU-RL Conference, Communicating clearer. More 'Soviet' expressions are used, with Soviet youth, 1967, p. ix. which makes the programs more pleasant In New York, the Policy Coordinator of and easy to understand. She was rather cri- tlle U.S. Division regularly reviews before tical of the quality of Radio Liberty's male broadcast the scripts of all U.S. Division speakers" voices, however." (RL, TALR news features and replies to listener mail, #225-71, Sept. 14, 1971. In, RL, v. XVI, pt, and auditions or screens the script of any 4A.) other shows whose content, treatment or 41RL, Auditioning and Evaluation, October tone is of special concern, Policy questions 1971. (Rh, v. VIII, pts. 6 and 7.) are usually brought to the Policy Coordina- 12 RL, Quality Control Report No. 17-71, tor's attention by the desk managers, and Review of the Russian Program Broadcast the issue settled either' through them or on July 3/4, 1971, August 26, 1971. (RL, directly with the writer concerned. (RL, Pol- Quality Control Reports file.) icy formulation, June 1971, p. 15. In, RL,, 43 RL, Special Program Evaluation Report v. IV, Pt. 7.) No. 4-71. Four Soviet seamen listen to tape Procedures used in improving quality recording of Radio Liberty Broadcast of Jan- through pre-broadcast spot-checks and eval- uary 26/27, 1971, May -b, 1971. (RI, Special uations. (RL, V. XVI, pt. 2A.) Program. Evaluation Reports file,) a~ Sakouta to Van Der Rhoer, Interoffice ; -ds RL, TALR, October 11, 1971. Menihoranduln, Errors in June 1971 Russian ( an RL, TALR, No. 234-71, September 24, Shows Revealed by Pre-broadcast Spot- 1971. (RL, v. XVII, pt. 4.) checks, July 16, 1971. (RL, v.. XVI, pt. 2G.) CHAPTER VI: ity programming. (RL, v. XX, pt. 2A.) '' Pro-broadcast evaluation of Russian Program Features and New Featules for 13/ 14 May 1971, May 14, 1971. zr Pre-broadcast evaluation of Russian Program Features and Newscast for 6/7 July 1971, July 7, 1971. w Pre-broadcast Evaluation of Russian Program Features and CND Features for An-- gust 11/12, August 16, 1971. 8A Pre-hroadcast Evaluation of Russian Program Features and CND Features for August 11/12, 1971, August 16, 1971. "' Pre-broadcast Evaluation of Russian ____IENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS 1. DIFFICULTIES IN EVALUATING RL'S EFFECTIVENESS A. Limited access to Soviet population RL operates at a serious disadvantage as a "Home Service" to the Soviet population. It has only very limited direct access to the Soviet people and, therefore, has great diifn- culty In evaluating, in any systematic or sci- entific way, its impact on the Soviet audience and its overall effectiveness as a broadcaster. The Soviet Union is a closed society; it is not possible to take public opinion polls as 19/20, August 1071, August 23, 1971. :;l RL, Program content control, October 1971. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 3A and # SB). n RL, Policy formulation, June 1971, pp: 16-17. (Rh, v. IV, pt. 7.) R.L, Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 17. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.) 11 RL Memorandum to HHS, Audition of RL Russian Program for Friday/ Saturday. 10/30-10/31, 1070, Feb. 3, 1971, (RL, Post- Broadcast Auditioning file.) 1i Memorandum to Mr. Van Der Rhoer, Jan. L8, 1971. North Caucasian Scripts, 13 p. (RL. v. XX, pt. 2C.) ~11 Donohoe to Critchlow, RL Policy and Planning for the Czech Crisis in Brief, Sep- tember 29, 1971, p. 2. RL published a staff report entitled, "Czechoslovakia and the So- viet Public," August 1.968, 152 p. The report compared RL coverage of the crisis with that of Soviet media. It was prepared by Olivia L. Gilliam and Edward W. Pell, 17 Stanislavski, Constantin. Creating a-role, (Translated by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood.) London, The New English Library, Mentor, 1068, p. 19. 01 Quality and quantity controls on au- thors, performers, producers, and on train- ing and production format and techniques, October 1971. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 4K,) 5`13,L, Auditioning and evaluation, October 1971. (RL, V. XVI, pt. IA.) I"Ibid. (RL, V. XVI, pt: 1B.) That RL has :achieved a fair measure of success in voice training of its speakers is revealed by an appraisal of a Soviet university professor, A synopsis of her observations are as follows: "It seemed apparent to her that RL has made a considerable effort to give its staff profes- sional training. The quality of the programs has been much higher. in recent years, she commented. "The programs made by recent emigres were easily distinguishable from those made by the older emigres; she found the latter to be of 'Iow quality, difficult to comprehend and filled with out-dated ex- pressions.' The style of the program and the voice of the speaker readily indicate whether the author was an older or a recent emigre, whether he was cultured or uncultured. The female voices used by Radio Liberty have im- proved greatly over the past five years, the soiree said; now they sound younger and countries in the world. RL must rely on Inter- views with a very limited number of Soviet visitors abroad, and listeners in other cate- gories, such as defectors and legal expatriates. What is perfectly normal public opinion pro- cedures in an open democratic society such as the American, boarders on treason in the Soviet society. Citizens run great risks as It is in listening to foreign broadcasters. They run even greater risks If they expose themselves to detailed interviews on foreign broadcast- ing listening habits In the manner of surveys customarily conducted by professional pollers in this country. Moreover, foreign poll-takers would he looked upon as espionage agents by the regime, and, accordingly, they too would be accepting great personal risks by engaging in poll-taking on Soviet territory. Closed societies of the Soviet type over- protect their citizens against the "contam- ination" of foreign ideas and ideologies that could threaten the regime's security. This is one dimension of people-to-regincre relation- ships in political totalitarianism of which censorship is only' one part; another part is the prevention of direct physical access to the people by outside sources. Both censor- ship and this denial of access are segments of the larger political and ideological effort to maintain both ideological purity and the re- gime's monopoly over the input of infor- mation into Soviet society. The purpose is to control what the Soviet citizens can and cannot listen to as well as to deny them the right not to listen. Without the normal techniques for testing audiences, RL faces a serious problem, there- fore, in attempting to judge the effectiveness of its operations. George Perry, ARD's Assist- ant Director, summed it up very succinctly when he said: "We have no access to the pop- ulation. This Is the main obstacle." Mr. Sar- geant expanded on the implications of this problem: "Many of the techniques and tools that are available to a radio attempting to communi- cate with an open society are completely un- usable so far as the Soviet Union is con- cerned. If you can't take public opinion polls or Conduct audience research surveys, or, in- deed, even provide for the monitoring of your radio's short wave signal so as to determine whether It is reaching the areas and audi- ences you intend to reach, you are indeed flying, if not blind, at least In a pba-soup fog." I . B. Resulting problems for EL This constricting condition on evaluating audience impact creates a set of special problems for RL, namely: (1) without a rea- sonably accurate accounting of audience impact and effectiveness, how can RL know it is accomplishing its objectives? and (2) not knowing audience impact, and thus audience preferences, how is it possible to structure programs that' will have the great- est appeal and effectiveness? II, POSITIVE MEANS FOR EVALUATING RL'S EFFECTIVENRSs A. Interviews with Soviet citizens 1. Some ' Sources for Judging - Audience Response Despite known disadvantages which by the nature of things cannot be easily cor- rected, ' RL attempts, nonetheless, to es- tablish some positive basis for judging audi- ence impact, however imprecise it may seem compared with the reasonably aecutate tech- niques In American public opinion research. It does this by collecting evidence on audi- ence reaction, (1) in interviews with Soviet visitors to the West, legal Soviet expatri- ates, Soviet defectors, and with'.some Soviet: listeners actually living in the Soviet Uoiio i Itself; and (2) from letters received from Soviet listeners through the indirect method of a mail drop in the West. The substitute audience panel and the special program audi- tions panel, discussed in Chapter IV, provide another input, though limited, into assess- ing possible audience response. Through these efforts ARD attempts to fill the gap between the speaker and the audience, to determine an accurate Image of the listener and the listener's image of RL (both essentials for success in communica- tions), and to. build the foundations for a continuing dialogue with the audience. The Director of ARD files a quarterly report con- taining an analysis of and references to listener, mail, reactions to RL emanating from the media of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, conversations with Soviet listeners at home and abroad, and related backgrqund material on atti- tudes and conditions in the Soviet Union.' 2. Difficulties in Interviewing Interviews, or "conversations" as RL pre- fers to term them, presumably since they lack the formal structure and statistically- workable ingredients of professional poll- taking known in the United States, are regarded as a prune indicator of audience response. During FY 1971 interviews were conducted with hundreds of Soviet citizens, of whom well over one-half were foreign radio listeners. But, interviews are very difficult to conduct. Polling by Soviet Gov- ernment agencies has only begun in recent years in the Soviet Union, aucl the people do not regard them as scholarly efforts but rather as instruments of the KGB. The, problem is especially acute in the Soviet Union where the climate of suspicion im- pedes a genuine exchange of views, especially with it foreigner. Even interviews conducted with Soviet visitors in the West are carried out with difficulty. It is estimated that only one out of eight contacts will yield a fruit- ful interview., The results of interviews are sent to RL headquarters in Munich by field correspond- ents where they are compiled in a final Tar- get Area I,lstenere Report that is prepared by ARD and distributed throughout the or- ganization. These reports describe the in- terviewee, his occupation, nationality, age, and language facility. They include such de- tails as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming effectiveness, and specific programs of interest. In addition, the conversation is summarized, and this may include statements about public reac- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE - S 3419 tions, comments on recent events and ex- pectations about future developments. An example of a TAL report Is included in the study as Appendix 19. 3. Analysis and Use of Interview Data RL approaches analysis of audience re- search data conservatively. ARD does not. claim to have enough data at its disposal from interviews to speak about a "sample"- that is, an interpreted in a statistical sense! It does not go beyond the claim of having only "bits and pieces of samples that could be Indicative of sonic certain groups," as Mr. Perry said. Yet, Mr. Sargent has written that such interviews have been collected and properly coded, transferred to cards and can be processed by machines to show "an In- creasingly accurate picture of the listeners, and of potential listeners." 6 Accordingly, ARD is able to give RL pro- grammers some perception of their audi- ence's image and scattered evidence of im- pact and effectiveness. In recent years this perception and measure of effectiveness have no doubt become more reliable because the percentage of ARD interviews has been pro- gressively increasing from 17% in 1909 to 23% In 1970 and up to 41% during the first quarter of 19718 The ages of RL's listeners were estimated in mid-1971 to be 36% In their 20s; 31% in their 30s; and 10% in their 40s.7 The preferred listening time was cited at 2001-2400 for 57% of listeners with the next highest percentage preference at 16% from midnight to 0400.8 The distribution of audience occupation in 1970 was concen- trated heavily among the intellectuals, in- cluding university students: 72% of the listeners were said to be from the Intellectual professions8 Clearly, audience research data of this nature confirms RL's judgment on audience structure, policy content, and program de- sign. This is especially true of ARD studies on audience reaction to samizdat, presently the main staple of RL's programming. Again, RL's judgment was reaffirmed. During the first quarter of 1971, 87% of the interviewees mentioned samizdat favorably, 3%a with mixed or neutral reaetign, 10% hostile re- action. During the 4th quarter of 1970, 100% of the interviewees mentioned samizdat in a friendly manner; for the 3rd quarter of 1970, there was 90% with 10% mixed or neutral. The total overall percentage for this nine- month time-frame from July 1, 1970 to March 31, 1971 was 85% friendly, 4% mixed or neutral, and 11% hostile. Moreover, RL's focus on the intelligentsia was reaffirmed. The majority of listeners mentioning sam izdat (70%) belonged to various segments of the intelligentsia 10 Undoubtly the most comprehensive assess- ment of empirical evidence of RL's effective- ness drawn from interviews is contained in ARD's quarterly reports. The report for the second quarter of 1971 generalized on the data collected in an effort to determine lis- toner profile, effects of jamming, specific pro- grain interests, programming suggestions, RL's impact and image in the eyes of its listeners, attitudes on specific problems such as samizdat and Jewish emigration, criticism of RL, and responses from the nationality areas. On the basis of empirical evidence the lis- tener profile for the second quarter of 1971 looks like this: RL respondents came from all walks of life, although the number of those holding positions in. the technological, scientific, and cultural fields outweighed those In other professions. Many listeners were under 40 and an "overwhelming major- ity" supported RL and Its aims. Listening tool. 'place mainly in large' industrial cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev and their surroundings, though a sizeable num- ber In Siberia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia, to Georgia and Armenia in the South. Most listeners whose national- ity was ascertainable were Russians, followed by Ukrainians, Belorussians, Karellans, Geor- gians, Kazahs, Latvians, Estonians, Lithua- nians, Tatars, Bashirs, and others from East- ern Europe .u Other categories within the report either directly or indirectly provide some indica- tion of RL's effectiveness, but perhaps nano so much as "Radio Liberty's Impact and Im- age in the Eyes of Its Listeners." Under this category numerous comments were made about reasons for listening to RL and what its impact was judged to be. For a scientist, RL had become a "most Important source of information and a link between our more free-thinking intelligent. sia and the Soviet working people." A musi- cian considered that "normalization" of Soviet life could only come through the crea- tion of a public opinion which would exert pressures for change. Since there was no freedom of Information at home, the ini- tiative had to come from abroad-and RL, he said, was the only possible source. "Thanks to Radio Liberty's broadcasts," said a Mos- cow engineer, "I have learned to think and develop a 'free relationship' with the out- side world." This theme was reiterated by a Soviet musician who said that "free voices from abroad, especially the voice of Radio Liberty, are the only forces which can wake people up and, open their eyes." Listeners were aware of regime attacks on RL and expressed concern for the radio's future. According to a Moscow engineer, rum- ors were being circulated to the effect that the station would soon cease broadcasting. RL was of special interest to a Leningrad scientist since, in his words, It is what a Rus- sian radio station would have been like if we had had freedom of speech in our country." A traveler from Sverdlovsk considered RL to be a free and international" station, not gov- ernment operated like the BBC or VOA, and this enabled it to devote so much time to Soviet problems. He appreciated this, A Kiev Intellectual who previously thought RL was an "American propaganda station" had changed his opinion when he became more familiar with its broadcasts. He now felt that, although financially supported by the United States, it was working for the good of Russia. Whenever an official announcement was made in Soviet media, said one engineer, It was very common to hear people remark: 'That's what 'ours' said. But we will have to know that 'they' will say." "They" was RL 12 Scattered evidence of impact and effective- ness like this and other evidence included in the quarterly report cannot constitute a "sample" according to the statistical require- ments of public opinion research. RL is the first to acknowledge this limitation. Yet, it would seem to be a commonsense judgment that comments by opinion leaders such as scientists, engineers and others within the intelligentsia could be reflective of important preferences and predilections of others with- in the Soviet intelligentsia and perhaps even in broader segments of Soviet society. 4. Alternative Methods In Measuring Impact: Szalay Report To the outside lay observer it does indeed seem that RL has a narrow base upon which to judge audience response and that within this economy of means it attempts to make the most of the data in order to structure its programming according to the interests of its listenership and its own political goals 'as a broadcaster. Accumulation of data over the years presumably has provided RL with substantial material upon which to make reasonable assessments of its impact and ef- fectiveness. And this it seems to have done, within the limits of available data. . Still, the question arises whether or not more could be done with the data that is available. "Caution Is ARD's virtue," said one senior RL staff man; yet, is it too cau- tious? ' (b) Szalay report on alternative methods This writer has no specialized knowledge for making such a determination. However, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay accompanied the CR5 research group to Munich as a special con- sultant in audience research where he ob- served and analyzed the audience research operations of both RFE and 11L. Dr. Szalay is an American specialist in the field of com- munication research, Intercultural communi- cation, and psycho-linguistics, trained at the University of Vienna and the University of Illinois, and in recent years engaged In spe- cial contract work for the United States Do- -partment of Defense at the American Insti- tutes for Research, Kensington, Maryland. RFE attempts to do more than 11L in the field of audience' research, owing to the unique characteristics of its audience area In contrast to those of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, RIPE has made greater claims for the results of its broadcasting efforts than has RL. For this reason, Dr. Szalay spent a greater portion of his efforts in ob- serving and analyzing RFE's audience re- search department. On the basis of his ex- amination of both audience research opera- tions, Dr. Szalay has made the tentative judgment that RL could perhaps do more with its audience research data drawn from interviews than what is now the case. Dr. - Szalay's full report is included at the end of this study in a "Special Addendum." B. Letters jr97n Soviet listeners - (1) Techniques for Eliciting Listener Response Interviews as a means of evaluating audi- ence response are supplemented by letters from Soviet listeners. Such letters are regard- ed as documentary evidence upon which judgments can be made on Soviet listening behavior and on Soviet attitudes toward RL programming. There are two ways in which letters are received from the Soviet Union. One is by establishing give-away accommodation ad- dresses In the West. Under this system the listener is asked to write a particular box number In a designated West European city, and he will receive in return certain give- away material, such as books and records. A popular give-away book of particular interest to radio enthusiasts is the World Radio TV Handbook. This is merely a standard radio handbook available in any major reference library in the West. The other system of eliciting listener cor- respondence is to urge the listener to com- municate with the RL speaker at an address given In the West. In both cases, the mail is forwarded to RL where it is categorized according to favorable and unfavorable let- ters, location of sender, etc. Such letters-to- the-editor type of correspondence and give- away offers to listeners are common practice in a free society such as that In the United States. 2. Statistics on Listener Mail According to RL, audience feedback through mail has increased considerably in the past decade" Except for a momentary decline in early 1971, apparently, the general trend continues upward. Actual numbers of letters received are not available for publica- tion; percentages are. This may not be en- tirely satisfactory, but it does serve the pur- pose of giving some Indication of listener response through mail, and at the same time denying important information to the Soviet censor. Increasingly, more listener mail has origi- nated from the Soviet Union than from the countries of the Soviet bloc. In 1968, 31% came from USSR; 69% from the bloc. In 1969, 56% from the Soviet Union; 44% from the bloc, In 1970, 62% from the Soviet Union; 38% from the bloc. And for the first three months of 1971, 87% came from the Soviet Union; 13% from the bloc 1" Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 .S3420 , COJ, GAESS{ONtl ~Vt~~ ~1.~`?111\l..L lr~t't~ 1~1 / V' 1"i- fu the second quarter of 1971, listener mail decreased in number. Aside from the seasonal factor (the second and third quarters of the year usually have less mail than the fall and winter quarters), the decrease in listener retail in the second quarter was ascribed to RL's discontinuance of give-away offers and to the hostile and systematic campaign which Soviet media have been waging against RL during the past three quarters. In fact, only one letter was a response to a former give- away oiler, while most of the other mail items contained comments, both friendly and criti- cal, to problems and questions raised in RL's programming. It was during the first quarter of 1971 that 105 attacks against RI. in Soviet and orbit media were recorded, a figure sur- passed only during the previous quarter when 156 attacks were recorded?' Audience mail does serve the useful pur- pose of giving RL some perception of its lis- teuership. In the first quarter of 1971, 96% of the mail was regarded as substantive in content; 4% without substantive content. In the second quarter, the percentages were 95% and 5% respectively'' Russian is the language in which most of the broadcasts were heard. In the first quar- ter of 1.971, the percentages were 85% Rus- sian, 13% Ukrainian, and 2% Georgian. In the second quarter, the percentages were 74% Russian, 16% Ukrainian, 5% each for Belo- russian and Bashkir 17 As for geographical distribution of audi- ence mail, in the first quarter of 1971, 56% came from the RSFSR, 30 % from the Ukrain- ian SSR, 4% from the Georgian SSR, and 2% each from the Latvian, Estonian, and Moldavian SSRs. Those addresses that could not be ascertained were placed at 4% for the entire USSR. For the second quarter the percentages. were 50% RSFSR, 31% Ukrain- ian, 63% Belorussian, 6% each for the Latvian and Lithuanian SS's. From the other Com- munist countries in Eastern Europe the per- centages were as follows: 30% Rumania, 30% Poland, 20% Czechoslovakia, and 10% each for East Germany and Bulgariale In 1967, RI repented that "an extremely high propor- tion" of its mail comes from Moscow: 0 RL also categories its mail according to "repeat writers" and "first-tine writers," In the first quarter of 1971, .the letters from repeat writers were 6% from the Soviet Union and 71% from the bloc countries. Letters from first-time writers were 94% front the USSR and 29% from the bloc coun, tries. In the second, quarter of 1971, the percentages were 6% repeat writers from the USSR, 67% from bloc countries; and 04% first-time letters from the USSR, and 33 from the bloc countries 20 Moreover, RL records the sex of its corre- spondents. In the first quarter of 1971, 81 % of the correspondence was from males, 19% from females. In the second quarter, 68% was from males, 16%n from females, with 165, unascertainable2t 3. Content of Letters RL also categorizes the content of its mail according to "friendly" letters and "hostile/ critical" letters. The report for the second quarters of 1971 stated that the proportion of hostile to friendly letters was not as high as in the previous quarter, but was "still substantial." "Some of the hostile letters," the report said, "indicated that their au- thors were acquainted with the official re- actions to Radio Liberty's activities," u In general, friendly listeners praise RL's operations and criticize their own Soviet media. Judgments are made within the con- text of comparisons between Soviet "democ- racy" and genuine democracy in the West. RL is also praised for providing information to the Soviet listener in the tradition of a free press. One listener from the Ukraine commented favorably on RI. for its "regular and accurate information." In turn, he criti- oized the Soviet leaders who "maintain a cowardly silence and wish to -hide a pig in a poke from their very own people The writer continued: ,,In so doing, of course, to our shame and regret we have to learn the truth not from the voice of the public, but from abroad. And all this only serves to undermine more and more their authority in the eyes of their own people . , . Let me express over and over to you my acknowledgment that you have been able to open my eyes and broaden my horizon." Taking issue with RL's question on the 24th Congress of the CPST/, the writer con- tinues: "I only regret that I am a Russian and still live in this wretched Russia and have to write in shameful block letters like an illiterate at a time of freedom of the press and speech. And I am not sure whether my letter will reach you and whether I will find out about it in your broadcasts. If you receive it, may I ask you strongly to put over its message in several programs; for, because of the strong jamming, I may not hear my own voice . , ." 23 Another writer from Stravropol Kray, RSFSR, a woman listener, made the sweep- ing ,judgment that "everybody [in the USSR] listens to Radio Liberty." In the buses, she said, people exchange comments about its broadcasts. She praised RL's Women's Show series devoted to the Soviet working woman but added this critical comment: "You in the West have no idea what . , . [the life of a Soviet woman is like], but you are not to blame for that." 2" RL also receives and records in its files letters that are hostile and critical, A worker at the Zaporozhstal factory, claiming to speak for his comrades, denied both the persecution of Jews and the restrictions on the freedom for Soviet writers. Seemingly well Informed about the activities and works of a number of Soviet dissidents, he compared the virtues and achievements of the Soviet constitution with the "freedom" in America where "in broad daylight" a President is murdered. A letter in a similar vein from a listener in Moscow Oblast dismissed the "slanderers" whose "cast-iron throats will be silenced," and concluded: "The day will come when there will be no more West Germany, US, or any other capitalist country." as Another letter from a group of Tatars and Bashkirs charged that RL presented their life "in a distorted way;" that they "have got enough of everything;" and expressed com- passion for the lot of former Soviet citizens living in the West in these words: "We are sorry for you, brothers," -17 RL categorizes responses from listeners ac- cording to "friendly" and "hostile/critical" reactions and attempts to measure the re- sponse in percentages. During the first quar- ter of 1971, the category "friendly" response recorded 43% for letters and 85% for inter- views; the category "hostile/ critical" re- corded 57% for letters and 15% for inter- views. For the second quarter, the precen- tages for the "friendly" category were 74% for letters, and 88% .for interviews; and for the "hostile/critical" category, 26% for let- ters and 120A for interviews. The total per- centages for both quarters and for both let-' tors and interviews were 81% for "friendly" and 19 % for "hostile /critical." 28 4. Significance of Listener Mail Listener mall provides RL with another im- portant input of data, despite acknowledged imperfections, to flesh out its perception of the Soviet audience and to measure its effectiveness in broadcasting. It provides fur- ther documentary evidence, though mini- mal, of audience reaction. What Is impor- tant to bear in mind in measuring the value of listener mail was pointed out by George Perry, namely, that "People write when they are really motivated, either pro or con"- meaning that listener mail reflects a signift- cant reaction to programing and thus takes on a special value of its own in determining audience reaction. On the other hand, the value of this re- action may be somewhat diminished by the fact that, apparently, RL strongly encourages listener response by mail; in fact, the prac- tice may be overdone. As one senior itL staffer said In a post-broadcast audition on the matter of soliciting listener mail: "Perhaps we are unwittingly giving it more cmpha- sls than is advisable." "a Nevertheless, this does not devalue listener mail per so as an important input factor in measuring audience Impact; for, listener mail, whether pro or con, is an affirmation of RL's purposes, namely to provoke the So- viet people to think critically and independ- ently and to contemplate alternative solu- tions to problems on the basis of more com- plete information. Dr. Sosin inferred as much In a statement evaluating the evidence on RL's listenership. The evidence that RL is heard it the Soviet Union, he said, comes from hundreds of interviews with Soviet tourists, members of delegations in the West, conversations with Soviet citizens held by Western tourists, guides and students, and "perhaps most important," he said, "from letters which slip through the not of Soviet censorship and reach Radio Liberty's mail drops in the free world," "The great majority of this audience mail is favorable," he con- tinued, "and encourages Radio Liberty in the conviction that its basic premise is sound, namely, that in all walks of Soviet life people are thirsty for Information and Ideas denied them by the official media; that in the cur- rent era of ferment after de-Stalinization they seek a deeper understanding of their own society." 30 0. Other bases for evaluating effectiveness 1. References to RL in Soviet literature For internal organizational purposes RL relies wholly on Interviews and listener mail as positive means for evaluating its effec- tiveness. Still, the frame of reference for au- dience reaction could be broadened to in- clude comments. in Soviet literature (not regime attacks) on RL and other foreign broadcasters, and also to include general evaluations on RL's activities made by West- ern: authorities,, private scholars or officials in government. With regard to the first point, that is, refer- ences in Soviet literature, there has been a steady growth of evidence to demonstrate the value of RL in the eyes of many Soviet listeners. Frequent references have been made to Western broadcasts in Soviet literature, particularly in samizdat, and appeals have been voiced, urging' that such broadcasts be continued?' Yuri Galanskov, author of the samizdat, "Organizational Problems of the Movement for Full and Universal Disarma- ment," made this reference in an appeal on behalf of inl risoned dissenters: "The Western press, and especially Western radios in the Russian languuage, give wide currency to facts of arbitrary judiclal actions and administrative perversion, poinpoint their social nature, and force the state organs and officialdom to take urgent meastires. This overcomes the natural Inertia and conserv, atism of the bureaucracy . . . In function- ing like this, Western press and radio per- form the task of an organized opposition which is presently lacking in Russia, and thus stimulate our national development." 12 A recent example of this sort evaluation by indirection was the revelation in New York Timse in August 1971 of the existence of a publication in the Soviet Union called, "Po- litical Diary." It was described as an excep- tional example of political samizdat. Typical of the disquiet evident in this publication was a letter dated February 1966 and sent by an educator to Premier Kosygin. Of particu- lar importance for this study Is the writer's reference to Western radio broadcasts. The letter, printed in the Diary, said that people Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 March 6. m72 rnVI^~RRCStnWAT, lllomRnL -` cr1iTA't?it S 3421 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700130022-5 had n g19nW 1114491;y yuva>:eune so wiucu' TQaoy course) special acapters for soviet made re- III, RAi1IM;'ATP4CBfi AND JA'i+