Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8.pdf1.07 MB
i I ~ I Ji. I I I 'ELI ~! 1~ ~ ~~ * E ease 20071 J1/19 ?`GiA RIC P7 0 2 004 ;OAS 10002 _ rL* ?I r N? OCI No 0286/65A g, ~ . ~~ Copy No : 5 4 TI .L. I NTELLIG...`.EIN 11AIG:E~ Q F C U, F2 SR c N JP I E IU ~ ~m aEr#ornal~'',i I~rai~ ng,and ecIassifi4aPfon Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004 110002-8 1-00 HE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED S' OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO sent MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN iMENTS, If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of [DID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the limitation so imposed. Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8 SECRET 23 April 1965 2:5X1 I CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA The burden of evidence accumulated in recent months indicates that "export of the revolution" continues to be a key policy of the Castro regime despite important Communist reverses in Brazil, Chile, and British Guiana last year. Indeed,one of the chief purposes of a meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in Havana last November was to add impetus to militant Communist activity in the hemisphere. As before, responsi- bility for administering Cuban support of revolu- tionary groups in Latin America rests with the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). The Cuban leadership seems to be concentrat- ing its subversive efforts on three countries-- Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where guer- rilla and terrorist organizations have been operat- ing for some time. This does not mean that Cuba is cutting out other subversive efforts. Rather, it seems to be concentrating largely on targets of opportunity in other Latin American countries. The Cuban Subversive Effort versive activity in Latin America Funds for the promotion of sub- come out of the over-all DGI budget, rather than from any single DGI department. The money is usually in US dollar currency. Payments are made only when the revolutionary groups have submitted an accept- able plan for armed struggle. The department that directs guerrilla warfare operations has a budgeted account to pro- vide food, clothing, and pocket 25X1 money for Latin American train- ees in Cuba. SE CRE T the DGI in 1963 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 SECRET disbursed about $250,000 to var- ious Guatemalan revolutionary groups. Of this money, some $200,000 went to Marco Antonio Yon Sosa's group--the most mili- tant activist outfit operating in the country. Another $50,000 was given to revolutionary groups in EL Salvador, $30,000 to a pro-Castro political organiza- tion in Panama, and $15,000 to pro-Castro subversives in Nica- ragua. DGI gave more than $1 million to Venezuelan guerrillas between 1964. 'In addition to money, there is the question of Cuban arms assistance to revolutionary groups on the continent. The three-ton Cuban arms cache found in Venezuela in November 1963 showed that Havana is both will- ing and a service. thIs cache was only part of "an un- known amount of arms" sent to Venezuela during the 1960-64 period. ALso, one of the rifles found in a guerrilla arms cache in Argentina. last year had the same specifica- tions as the Cuban rifles found in Venezuela. In general prac- tice, though, Havana. prefers to provide insurgent groups with funds to purchase arms so that the arms themselves cannot be traced to Cuban origins. Cuban Propaganda Providing guerrilla warfare training, political indoctrina- tion, and some financial assist- -ance remain the major forms of Cuban support for Latin Ameri- can revolutionaries. Propa- ganda, however, also is an im- portant means by which Havana :reaches and gives direction to pro-Cuban groups on the continent. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-07A004800110002-8 SECRET Havana radio broadcasts some 143 hours a week to Latin Amer- ica in Spanish, French, Creole (to Haiti), and in the Indian dialects of Aymara and Guarani. ALthough priority attention is presently being given to the sugar harvest campaign, Cuba's press service and world-wide radio facilities continue to de- vote much time and space to La- tin American "national libera- tion" movements. Prominently featured in recent days have been the activities of Colombian and Venezuelan guerrillas and the "repressive" government ac- tions taken against them. In late 1964 and early 1965 Fidel Castro and Che Gue- vara made several notable refer- ences to Cuba's role in foster- ing the "anti-imperialist strug- gle" in Latin America. Castro told a Western correspondent in Havana in late October that the continuance of the Cuban revolution depends on "other Cubas" succeeding on the conti- nent. Castro expressed this thought again in a public ad- dress on 2 January 1965 in which he said that the US would ulti- mately be forced to come to terms with Cuba when it has to deal simultaneously with "sev- eral" other revolutionary re- gimes. On 19 April, Castro said the guerrilla movements in Colom- bia, Venezuela, and Guatemala "cannot be crushed." On 30 November 1964, Che Guevara made the most militant public statement on armed revo- lution in Latin America to be delivered by a ranking Cuban official for some months. He hailed what he called the grow- ing strength of the Latin Ameri- can "liberation movement," and called for greater efforts by the revolutionaries in the hemi- sphere. Guevara made special reference to the progress of the revolution in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia. On 13 December, while in New York to address the UN General As- sembly session, Guevara said that "bullets not ballots" will bring revolution to Latin Amer- ica. He candidly admitted that Cuba has helped the "freedom fighters" of Venezuela "acquire military knowledge," and again singled out revolutionaries in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colom- bia for special praise. Several times during his recent three-month tour of Africa, Guevara praised the fighting efforts of the pro- Castro militants in these three countries. He also spoke of the need to form a Latin Ameri- can "international" to coordi- nate the "national liberation movement" in this hemisphere. There are good indications that steps are now being taken to set up such hemisphere-wide machinery. Another example of inciting to revolution by propaganda was a series of lectures on "The Tactics of Revolutionary Strug- gle in Latin America" delivered in Havana in late February by German Lairet, the so-called "head of mission" representing the Communist-dominated Vene- zuelan National Liberation Front. Lairet hewed closely SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 SECRET to the Cuban line in saying that the only way to establish a Marxist-Leninist government in Latin America is through armed struggle. He argued there was no other way to defeat the es- tablished military forces which he described as the greatest bulwark against Communism. Lairet declared that the armed struggle must be combined with the political struggle, and that broad "national patri- otic fronts" must be established, in order, for example, to at- tract the direct participation of discontented military offi- cers. All political action, he asserted, must be aimed at fomenting maximum political and economic instability. In pursuing this object, Lairet urged that Communists spare no effort to gain the support of the middle classes. After vic- tory, these elements will be discarded, according to Lairet. These tactics have long been advocated by Fidel Castro and are well spelled out in Che Guevara's pamphlet on guerrilla. warfare. The Havana, Meeting The meeting of Latin Ameri- can Communist leaders in Havana. last November had as one of its main purposes the strengthening of militant Communist activity throughout the hemisphere. The meeting's communique specifically called for the Communists to give "active aid" to the "free- dom fighters" in Venezuela,Guate- mala, Colombia, Honduras, Haiti, and Paraguay. All Communists in the hemisphere were also urged to "intensify solidarity" with the "anti-imperialist struggle of the Panamanian people." Representatives at the Havana meeting also accepted the need to overcome the internal fac- tionalism that is plaguing many Latin American parties, and to promote their "solidarity with Cuba." Cuba, for its part, is reli- ably reported to have promised to withhold assistance from any group that is not endorsed by the local orthodox Communist party. This is a sharp depa.r ture from past Cuban practice. Havana, formerly preferred to work with revolutionary groups not controlled by the local Com- munist parties. The regular Communist parties were considered to be lacking in revolutionary militancy. The change may par- tially be the result of a cer- tain Cuban disillusionment over the failures of the Castro-style guerrilla, organizations, and the recognition of a, need to repair relations with the old- line Communist parties. In any case, the impact of decisions taken in Havana. are now becoming evident. There has, for instance, been a marked change in the policy of the Guatemalan Communist party. It .has shifted emphasis from tac- tics to increasingly close co- operation with Yon Sosa's Cuban- supported guerrillas. Similarly, the Venezuelan Communist Party Is trying to entice some left- ist-extremist groups into a Na- tiona.l Liberation Front to serve as a political umbrella for the SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-07A004800110002-8 SECRET Cuban-backed Armed Forces of Na- tional Liberation (FALN). In Brazil, leaders of the regular Communist party (PCB) and the small pro-Chinese Com- munist party (CPB) reportedly are conferring on possibilities for conducting joint activities for the first time since the two groups split in 1962. This may well be partially the result of the Havana meeting, and is in line with Cuba's repeated call for increased militancy on the part of the hemisphere's regular Communist parties. In Colombia, the Cuban-sup- ported Army of National Libera- tion (ELN) is reliably reported to be planning a "Latin Ameri- can guerrilla movement" to be coordinated in Havana and to include guerrilla groups from the Andean countries, and Guate- mala. The Colombian Communist Party, heretofore an advocate of gaining power by peaceful means, is now reported to have decided to switch over to a pro- gram aimed at encouraging armed rebellion. The Uruguayan Communists have begun preparations for a Latin American "solidarity with Cuba congress" to be convened in Montevideo this summer. This is in line with a proposal to convene multilateral meetings at regular intervals to provide more effective coordination among Latin American Communist parties. In addition, a source of proven reliability has re- ported that a Latin American Communist "politburo" has been established to coordinate the implementation of the agree- ments reached at Havana. It is composed of repre- sentatives of Castro's party and the Communist parties of Bolivia and Uruguay. This group recently held its first meeting in Havana. The following survey discusses Cuban-supported subver- sive activities in some of the countries singled out for spe- cial attention at the Havana meeting. Havana, impressed by the fact that the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) is a well-established Communist-terrorist apparatus, continues to place Venezuela at the top of its subversion list. The FALN can draw upon some 2,000 supporters--several hundred of whom are full-time activists who have received training in Cuba--spread through- out the country. Beginning in late September 1964, the FALN stepped up its activity, pri- marily in the countryside. 25X1 Recent reports indicate that the 25X1 Venezuelan Communists are pre- paring a comprehensive plan of political action throughout the country to complement the FALN's guerrilla operations. German Lairet, in his recent Havana. lectures, said that the FALN is currently seeking to incor- porate more peasants into its guerrilla units and has stopped recruiting in the cities. He said that as a consequence of this policy, the number of SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/1St E(&R 9-00927A0 800110002-8 Principal Targets of Cuban Subversion in Latin America EL SALVADOR .-, NICAIRACUA PANAMA COSTA RICA . s t %% - CUBAN SUPPORTED GUERRILLA LEADERS DOMINICAN ---, REPUBLIC HAIT1;1 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved F2elease 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00A004800110002-8 SECRET 25X1 peasant guerrillas in Falcon State, one of the principal areas of guerrilla operation, had increased from 14 to 44 per- cent. Lairet declared that never again would the FALN make the mistake of trying for a "quick victory" by means of ur- ban terrorism--a tactic which failed miserably in late 1963 in trying to bring down the govern- ment of former President Betan- court. There may have been a Cuban angle in the recent intercep- tion in Caracas of more than $300,000 destined for the Vene- zuelan Communist Party (PCV). The fact that the couriers had connections with the Italian Communist Part (PCI ties in with h last December a the Cubans intended to use the PCI as a secure communica- tions link to the Venezuelan Communists. It also fits with another report that Cuba had promised FALN leader Alberto Lovera that it would extend considerable financial assist- ance to his organization this year. The Cubans will certainly continue to give priority to the training of Venezuelans in guerrilla warfare tactics. I1 It is pos- sible the Cubans may also have one or more guerrilla advisers in the field with the Venezuelan insurgents. Castro's chosen instrument for carrying out antigovernment activities in Guatemala is the guerrilla movement led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. He was the recipient of $200,000 in DGI funds in 1963 alone. Yon Sosa was reported to be in Mexico City in early April making ar- rangements with the Cuban Em- bassy there for more weapons. Yon Sosa's group probably has a hard core strength of from 75 to 300. Since the end of 1964, these insurgents have specialized in terrorist activ- ity in and around the capital, Guatemala City. On 31 December, terrorists destroyed the US AID mission garage in Guatemala City along with 23 vehicles. On 20 February, ten soldiers were killed or wounded by gre- nades thrown by Yon Sosa's ter- rorists during a parade in the capital. The terrorists also initiated a series of bombings during the 31 March celebration marking the anniversary of the Peralta coup, even though a state of siege had been in force by the government. Despite this emphasis on urban terrorism, the country- side has not been neglected. There, the Communists and SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approved For Releaassee..2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 SECRET pro-Castro guerrillas have har- assed military outposts, assas- sinated certain military offi- cers or persons unpopular with the peasants, and raided small businesses. The outlook more- over, is for more rather than less rural violence along these lines. The central committee of the Guatemalan Communist party is reliably reported to be mak- ing preparations for beginning the "armed struggle" throughout the country. The party also is trying to form a "national front of resistance," including Yon Sosa's guerrillas. Cuban-supported, "national liberation"-type insurgency ap- pears to be just getting under way in Colombia. Havana regards a newly formed, pro-Castro or- ganization called the Army of National Liberation (ELN) as the country's number one terror- ist group. Fabio Vasquez, the group's chief of guerrilla opera- tions, returned to Colombia in late November after having gone to Cuba the previous month seek- ing funds. Havana had earlier given the ELN $25,000 to set up uerrilla one onsIr _J This group-- which numbers about 50--is the one which attacked the small town of Simacota in Santander Department on 7 January. Recent information indicates the ELN has been perfecting its organization and building strength for future actions- I sev- a echelons of protective cover separate one leader from the action group in Santander Department. This is an indica- tion of the professional tech- niques being employed by the .ELN in the face of persistent efforts on the part of the Colombian authorities to arrest :ELN members. Other Cuban Targets There are increasing re- ports of Cuban cooperation with perennial antigovernment plot- ters in Panama. A number of Panamanians have recently re- turned to Cuba, for a, refresher course in guerrilla warfare techniques. More are expected to leave for Cuba, soon. Serious Cuban involvement in plotting against the Robles government apparently had its origin late last year when the militant Panamanian revolution- ary leader, Lelis Amadeo Rodri- guez, submitted a report urging Havana to exploit Arnulfo Arias' Panamenista Party. He quite correctly described this party as the only Panamanian political party with genuine mass support. His report aroused Castro's interest and reportedly led to an investigation in Panama, by a personal representative sent by Che Guevara. Lelis Amadeo Rodriguez departed for Cuba on 23 March reportedly to collect the aid Cuba had offered. lover 40 leftists. lextremists and Communists have returned to that country from exile, since October. All had been involved in an abortive SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8 Approvedr Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-QW7A004800110002-8 OWN SECRET guerrilla campaign in December 1963, and many spent their exile in Cuba undergoing addi- tional training in guerrilla warfare techniques. 7n Ecuadorl a "hard-line" leader recently returned from Cuba with about $100,000 to finance antigovernment activ- ities. the Cubans requestea m e cuadoreans to supply them with certain official government forms and passports. These are intended for use as false docu- informed that Guevara's whole book has been translated into the Creole idiom. The Paraguayn minister of interior announced in January that 62 Paraguayans living in exile in Montevideo had recently left for Cuba to receive train- ing in subversive activities. There is also good evidence of continued Cuban contact with Paraguayan exile guerrilla bands operating in Argentina near the Paraguayan border. mentation to enable Latin Ameri- cans to travel to Cuba clandes- tinely and to enter other La- tin American countries at will. The Honduran Communist Party (PCH) is preparing to launch guerrilla operations along the north coast. The party calculates that the anti- regime sentiment which is build- ing up in Honduras can be turned to its advantage. Approximately 70 PCH members and other left- ists-extremists are reliably reported to have received guer- rilla training in Cuba. Recent Havana radiobroad- casts have emphasized the need to form a united revolutionary front in Haiti. The most re- cent Creole broadcasts have featured selections on how to make preparations for the "first stage" of revolution. The Haitian listeners have been Cuba probably will continue its pattern of concentrating support on those Latin American revolutionaries who have some prospects for success, rather than taking a "shotgun" approach to revolution in the hemisphere. Guerrilla organizations in Vene- zuela, Guatemala, and Colombia probably will continue to re- ceive the bulk of Cuba's sup- port. Nevertheless, Cuba's lead- ers may now be less confident about the early emergence of "new Cubes" in Latin America. Castro's regime has been in power for over six years and the appeal of Castroism today is probably less than at any previous time among the masses in Latin America. Castro's ap- peal seems to have gone down- hill steadily since the October 1962 missile crisis. Moreover, SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8 Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8 SECRET nowhere in Latin America are political, social, and economic conditions as unstable as they were in Cuba. at the end of the Batista. era.. It may also be that the Cuban leaders them- selves are becoming more pre- occupied with making their own politico-economic "'system" work, and realistically appraise their chances of bringing down another government in this hemisphere in the short run as slim at best. SECRET However, the existence of Cuba's highly professional es- pionage and subversion agency, the DGI, and developments stem- ming from the Havana. meeting of Latin American Communists in November, serve to illustrate that "export of the revolution" continues to be an immutable feature of Castro's policy. I;SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8 Approved F ,,Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00 7AO04800110002-8 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800110002-8