WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

nCI No, 0315/66
Copy No.
WEEKLY SUMMARY '
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
~~CF2ET
GRVIJP i Excluded from automotic
n'pwnyiacl~g and ci~gcassi fi ca2i on
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(Information as of noon EST, 9 November 1966)
VIETNAM
Major attacks this week by Communist forces'in Tay Ninh
Province were probably aimed at protecting their War
Zone "C" stronghold along the Cambodian border. ~
Pre-
mier Ky is taking steps--put off until after the Manila
Conference and the US elections--to stabilize his cabinet.
Cambodia's Sihanouk plans a "summit meeting" with Viet-
namese Communist leaders.
RED GUARD VIOLENCE MOUNTING IN PEKING
Several high-level officials, including propaganda chief
Tao Chu and economic planner Li Fu-chun, have come under
criticism for the first time.
ARMED INCIDENTS ALONG KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Since mid-October North Korean infiltrators have ambushed
South Korean and US troops along the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) on several occasions. The upsurge of violence sug-
gests a temporary shift in the emphasis of their missions
from intelligence collection and subversion to harassment
of the UN forces.
Europe
SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
The 49th anniversary celebration of the Russian revolu-
tion produced no surprises. The main speaker ritualis-
tically read the standard themes on major international
issues, and only one new item, of limited interest, was
displayed in the military parade.
SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE AND PURCHASE OF NATURAL GAS
The USSR, moving rapidly to secure a share of the develop-
ing market for natural gas, has negotiated for sales to
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Western Europe and Japan. It also has arranged to import
natural gas from Afghanistan and Iran for its gas-deficit
areas.
Middle East - Africa
UNREST IN INDIA FORCES CABINET CHANGE
Discredited Home Minister Nanda has been forced to resign
following criticism of his handling of recent disorders.
Prime Minister Gandhi has assumed the portfolio for the
time being, possibly hoping to avoid further internal
difficulties in the ruling Congress Party.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISPUTE
The conclusion of the UN debate on Israel's complaint of
Syrian-supported terrorism and the signing of a joint de-
fense pact between Syria and Egypt offer some prospect
that a major clash on the border will be averted. How-
ever, another serious terrorist attack almost certainly
would precipitate a large-scale Israeli reprisal.
25X1
THE GHANA-GUINEA ROW
Despite Ghana's release on 5 November of the Guinean dele-
gation to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meet-
ings in Addis Ababa, the dispute continues to have serious
repercussions. It has further weakened the ailing OAU and
precipitated a new crisis in US-Guinea relations.
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Western Hemisphere
ARMS PURCHASES IN LATIN AMERICA
Recent announcements of jet aircraft purchases by Argen-
tina and Chile have led to unwarranted fears of an arms
race. There is no major political significance to these
acquisitions, which reflect pressure by military leaders
for modernization of existing armed forces establishments.
KEY CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN BRAZIL
The Castello Branco government is expected to retain a
majority in the 15 November election of a new Chamber of
Deputies and part of the Senate. However, popular dis-
satisfaction may lead to substantial opposition gains in
urban areas.
PERUVIAiJ ELECTION CAMPAIGN LARGELY FREE OF NATIONAL ISSUES 17
The 13 November elections, mainly for local governments,
are not expected to provide a clear expression of public
opinion on the administration of President Belaunde, who
has remained aloof from the campaign. The results, how-
ever, may speed realignments affecting the two national
party coalitions, both of which have been experiencing
internal strains.
ANTIGUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN GUATEMALA
The Mendez regime has regained the initiative and appears
determined to continue to press the insurgents.
United Nations
UN ABOUT TO VOTE AGAIN ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE 19
On 18 November the General Assembly will open its annual
debate on the issue of China's seat in the UN. The pro-
cedural device of the "important question" seems likely
once more to prevent Communist China's admission.
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R E ST
VIETNAM
There has been a series of
major engagements this week be-
tween US and Viet Cong/North
Vietnamese forces in Tay Ninh
Province, 60 miles northwest of
Saigon.
The action began on 4 Novem-
ber when the Communists launched
several attacks against allied
and South Vietnamese installa-
tions in the vicinity of Tay
Ninh city. The base camps of
the US 196th Infantry Brigade
and the Philippine Civic Action
Group west of the provincial
capital were hit by over a hun-
dred rounds of mortar fire. Two
Americans were killed and 54
wounded. A South Vietnamese dis-
trict headquarters southeast of
Tay Ninh city also was attacked
on 4 November by an estimated
800 Viet Cong.
After losing 50 killed, the
attacking force broke contact
and withdrew to positions north-
east of the city. Later in the
day, elements of the 196th In-
fantry (attached to Operation
ATTLEBORO) and Vietnamese Spe-
cial Force units re-established
heavy contact with the enemy in
this area.
Thirteen US battalions from
the 1st and 25th Infantry Divi-
sions, the 196th Infantry Bri-
gade, and the 173rd Airborne
Brigade were subsequently com-
mitted to the action. After sev-
eral days of sustained contact
with large-scale Communist forces
entrenched in heavily fortified
bunkers and caves in this area,
which borders on the southern
periphery of the War Zone "C,"
the allies claimed that more than
850 of the enemy had been killed.
US casualties stood at 85 killed,
340 wounded, and five missing.
t e ,600-man Viet Cong 9th Light
Infantry Division, possibly re-
inforced by the 101st North Viet-
namese Army Regiment, may have
been deployed to counter US forces
participating in Operation ATTLE-
BORO. The Communists probably
view this operatian, which has
already destroyed numerous base
camps and seized enough rice to
feed an entire division for a
year, as a serious threat to their
War Zone "C" stronghold, includ-
ing COSVN--the highest Viet Cong
political and military headquar-
ters in South Vietnam.
Communist intentions in the
current battle are
clear.
large truck
convoys at several points along
the Cambodian border in northern
Tay Ninh Province could indicate
either an intensive enemy effort
to resupply and reinforce War
Zone "C" or an attempt to provide
retreating Communist regulars
transportation to sanctuary in
Cambodia.
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10 NOVEMBER 1D06
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The Indochina -South China Area
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~..
SE CRE T
There was little signifi-
cant military action elsewhere
in South Vietnam during the week.
25X1
Political Developments 25X1
In South Vietnam
With bath the Manila Con-
ference and the US elections
completed, Premier Ky plans to
act on the resignations of six
cabinet ministers pending since
early October.
In addition to Economy Min-
ister Thanh, who resigned on 27
October, Youth Minister Trieu
and Education Minister Truong
will definitely be leaving the
cabinet. Deputy Premier Nguyen
Luu Vien, Labor Minister Hung,
and Transport Minister Thuan,
however, have agreed to remain.
The status of Social Affairs
Minister Lieng has not been fi-
nally settled. According to his
political adviser, Premier Ky
plans to replace the southern-
oriented ministers leaving the
cabinet with other southerners,
but his specific choices are not
yet known. These-steps may sta-
bilize the cabinet somewhat, but
they are unlikely to eliminate
southern concern about the con-
centration of real government
power in the hands of a few
northerners.
There is some indication
that Premier Ky may appoint a
southerner to the position of
police director currently held
by General Loan, whose arrest of
a southern subcabinet official
in late September ignited the
north-south regional tensions.
Loan would retain his post as di-
rector of the military security
SE CRE T
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Constituent Assembly Debate
Prior to beginning work on
the constitution, the Constituent
Assembly has begun formal discus-
sion of the government's partial
veto power over the assembly's
draft. Delegates appear united
in their opposition to the veto
provision as it now stands, but
vary in their willingness to pro-
voke or confront the government
over the issue.
The debate is continuing,
but US officials in Saigon believe
the assembly will seek a com ro-
mise solution.
Cambodia Calls for "Summit"
Meeting With Vietnamese Communists
Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk
announced on 3 November that he
will hold a "summit meeting" in
Phnom Penh in a "few" weeks with
North Vietnamese Premier Pham
Van Dong and Liberation Front
chief Nguyen Huu Tho. Sihanouk
did not indicate the purpose of
the meeting, but the implication
is that it would be portrayed as
the "Indochinese peoples "' re-
sponse to the Manila Conference.
Although it is possible that the.
Vietnamese Communists would par-
ticipate in such a meeting if
they believed that it could be
turned to their political advan-
tage, the North Vietnamese charge
in Vientiane told the US ambas-
sador on 7 November that there was
no need for "special personalities"
to travel to Cambodia.
Latest Air Engagement
Two North Vietnamese MIG-21s
were shot down on 5 November by
USAF F4C jets near Yen Bai. The
Communist jets were attempting
for the third time in four days
to down US electronics and recon-
naissance planes which regularly
operate in the Yen Bai area in
support of US strike missions.
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,SE C'RE T _
RED GUARD VIOLENCE P~OUNTING IN PEKING
Disorderly and startling
events continue to mark the
political scene in Peking, where
Red Guard demonstrations and
attacks against important of-
ficials are becoming more vio-
lent.
The month-long drive against
Li Hsueh-feng, who replaced the
fallen Peng Chen as head of the
Peking city party committee in
May, may be comin to a head
on 6 November, thou-
san s o Red Guards angrily dem-
onstrated for hours outside the
city headquarters building, then
broke in and occupied it. They
gave the impression they intended
Press correspondents re-
port that early this month wall
newspapers began to appear in
front of the State Council of-
fice denouncing propaganda chief
Tao Chu for being a "dedicated
agent of the bourgeoisie" and
for "taking a revisionist line."
Later, however, posters defend-
ing Tao went up alongside those
criticizing liim. Both types of
posters were reportedly still
being displayed on 8 November.
Tao ranks fourth in the present
hierarchy.
Since 5 November, wall news-
papers and huge black characters
denouncing economic planner Li
Fu-chun have been prominently
displayed near the ones on Tao
Chu. Li was charged with being
an "eclectic who compromises
with the bourgeois line." Spe-
cifically, he was blamed for
"oppressing" revolutionary for-
ces in the 7th Ministry of Ma-
chine Building, believed to be
the organization responsible for
producing guided-missile compo-
nents. Top officials in this
ministry have been repeatedly
attacked in wall posters since
late October.
The standing of Premier
Chou En-lai has come into ques-
tion, although he has not yet
been criticized by name. Ac-
cording to a press report, Red
Guards were milling around in
front of the State Council build-
ing on 8 November, displaying
a large banner demanding that
Chou give them an audience im-
mediately. Chou, who spoke
after Lin Piao at each of the
first three Red Guard rallies
has not made a public state-
ment since 30 September.
Some decline in his status
may be reflected in the attacks
on officia s in 21 ministries
and four g,~vernment staff of-
fices since the abortive 18
October rally. At the 3 Novem-
ber Red Guard rally, Lin Piao
for the first time indicated
that government agencies, as
well as party organizations,
would be targets of the "cul-
tural revolution."
SE CRE T
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KOREA: Armed Incidents 13 Oct - 2 Nov 1966
Unb-
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0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 Kilometers
m
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ARMED INCIDENTS ALONG KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Since mid-October North
Korean infiltrators have on sev-
eral occasions ambushed South
Korean (ROK} and US troops along
Korea's Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
The upsurge of violence suggests
a temporary shift in the emphasis
of their missions from intelli-
gence co_Llection and subversion
to harassment of the UN forces.
In the past, infiltrating
agents usually avoided firefights
unless challenged. by the ROK mil-
itary or security services. How-
ever, the larger and more heavily
armed infiltration teams noted
since mid-October have deliber-
ately sought out and attacked ROK
forces.
Beginning on 13 October,
North Korean units carried out
seven surprise attacks against
ROK troops in a five-day period.
By 2 November, when uniformed
North Korean troops killed six
Americans and one South Korean
in an eight-man patrol unit, ROK
and US forces had suffered some
36 fatalities in 40 incidents
this year. The comparable fig-
ures for 1965 were 20 South Ko-
reans ki:Lled in 55 incidents and
for 1964, four South Koreans
killed in 32 incidents--with no
US fatalities in either year.
The marked increase in armed
incidents along the DMZ during
the past few weeks probably does
not reflect a North Korean deci-
sion to engage in wholesale vio-
lations of the armistice agree-
ment, no:r is there any evidence
that Pyongyang intends to open
a "second front" in the Vietnam
war. It may believe, however,
that the heightened tensions
along the Korean DMZ will serve
as a warning to both the South
Koreans and the US against fur-
ther deployments of ROK troops
to Vietnam and demonstrate North
Korean support of Hanoi to other
Communist states.
North Korean agent opera-
tions along the DMZ have been
conducted with varying intensity
since the armistice agreement
in 1953. This year, concentrated
operations began in May and have
continued to the present with
some interruptions due to heavy
rains and agent losses. The
normally heavy autumnal agent
activity along the DMZ usually
tapers off in November when the
foliage disappears and snow be-
gins to fall. Operations then
are infrequent for several months.
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EURO -E
SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
The 49th anniversary celebra-
tion of the Russian revolution pro-
duced no surprises. The speeches
were overshadowed by earlier state-
ments on major domestic and foreign
policies by Brezhnev and Kosygin,
and only one new item, of limited
interest, was displayed in the mili-
tary parade.
The celebration was attended by
all the Moscow-based members of the
politburo except Kirill Mazurov and
candidate member Petr Demichev, who
may have been ill. The position of
the leaders on the reviewing stand
in Red Square underscored the con-
tinued ranking status of Brezhnev,
Kosygin,- Podgorny, and Suslov. Old
Bolsheviks Mikoyan and Voroshilov
were also given prominent places.
The traditional speech on the
eve of the 7 November celebration
was delivered by Latvia's Arvid
Pelshe, the most recent addition to
the politburo and the only present
top leader who was in the party be-
fore the 1917 revolution. On domes-
tic affairs Pelshe restated standard
themes aimed at justifying post-Khru-
shchev policies. He balanced praise
of Soviet achievements, particularly
in agriculture, with an acknowledge-
ment of problems still unsolved.
The anniversary speeches broke
no new ground on foreign policy.
Pelshe condemned the Chinese for
rendering--by their repeated rejec-
tion of joint Communist action--
"enormous services" to US "aggres-
sion" in Vietnam. He also denounced
the "so-called cultural revolution,"
claiming it "has nothing in common
either with revolution or culture
or with Marxism." The handful of
Chinese diplomats present during
this speech walked out, as they did
the next day during Defense Minis-
ter Malinovsky's address.
Pelshe reiterated Moscow's
long-standing pledge to provide con-
tinuing aid to the Vietnamese Commu-
nists, and reaffirmed Soviet en-
dorsement of Hanoi's tough terms for
a Vietnam settlement. He deprecated
recent US expressions of readiness
to improve relations with the USSR
and Eastern Europe, and asked rhe-
torically what value such state-
ments can have while the US "fur-
ther extends its aggression in Viet-
nam." He stressed Moscow's adher-
ence to the principles of "peaceful.
coexistence" and cited improved re-
lations with France, Italy, Canada,
Japan, and other non-Communist
states as proof of the correctness
of this line.
The military parade was essen-
tially the same in composition as
the last two except for the appear-
ance of a turreted reconnaissance
vehicle first displayed in Warsaw
this year.
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SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE AND PURCHASE OF NATURAL GAS
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The USSR has been moving
rapidly to secure a share of
the developing market for na-
tural gas, of increasing impor-
tance not only as an energy
source but also as a raw mate-
rial for the petrochemical in-
dustry. Europe's trade in na-
tural gars--with large reserves
located in the North Sea, the
Netherlands, Algeria, and Libya
--promises to be extremely com-
petitive, and the USSR is attempt-
ing to protect its. position as
a supplier through long-term
agreements.
The Soviets have expanded
deliveries of natural gas to East-
ern Europe, and they are nego-
tiating sales to Italy, Austria,
Finland, ,and Japan. Initial de-
liveries entail large investments
in pipelines or liquefaction fa-
cilities, port terminals, and
specially constructed ships. Mos-
cow is taking a long view, how-
ever, that natural gas deliveries
may in the future earn large
amounts of foreign exchange. It
is looking wherever possible for
arrangements that will minimize
the. current impact on its own
financial resources.
As it has in Eastern Europe,
the USSR is proposing the use of
pipelines to supply prospective
customers in Western Euro e.~
Page 9
Negotiations with Tokyo are
aimed at achieving sizable Japa-
nese investments in Siberian gas
fields and facilities for lique-
faction and delivery of methane
gas. The Soviets hope for long-
term contracts, which they prob-
ably will get in the absence of
other competitive suppliers in
the Far East.
In a reverse procedure, the
USSR has made arrangements with.
Afghanistan and Iran to import
natural gas to its own gas-def-
icit areas and has extended about
$100 million in credits to ex-
ploit gasfields and build trans-
mission lines. The first Soviet
imports of natural gas will take
place next year when the pipe-
line from Afghanistan is com-
pleted. As much as $425 million
worth of natural gas may flow
through this line to the USSR by
1985.
function by 1970.
Arrangements with Iran were
concluded this year. They call
for Soviet imports of up to $850
million worth of gas over a
15-year period. The USSR is
helping to build a 600-mile
pipeline which should begin to
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
UNREST IN INDIA FORCES CABINET CHANGE
The increasing tempo of pub-
1ic disorders that have erupted
sporadically throughout India
during the past few months forced
the resignation of Home Minister
Nanda on 8 November. Prime Minis-
ter Gandhi--possibly hoping to
avoid further internal diffi-
culties in the ruling Congress
Party--has assumed the Home port-
folio her. self. The office in-
cludes over-all responsibility
for security and law enforcement.
Nancla's ouster followed a
mammoth riot in New Delhi on 7 No-
vember, which started when a dem-
onstration by more than 100,000
Hindu. extremists favoring a ban
on the slaughter of cows got out
of hand. Police gunfire resulted
in six or more deaths and scores
of injuries, and the rampaging
mobs caused extensive damage. The
fact that thousands of Hindu holy
men (sadhus) were in the vanguard
of t~m'o~was particularly dam-
aging to Nanda in view of-his
close association with some sadhu
organizations.
The decision to fire Nanda
may have serious repercussions
within several Congress Party
state governments, where factional
feuds have barely been kept in
check by a firm party edict against
state cabinet changes prior to the
general elections next February.
Some of these strains may be
brought into the open again if
state party-units no longer feel
bound by New Delhi's injunction.
Meanwhile, there is every
prospect that the spate of riot-
ing over diverse issues will con-
tinue and possibly intensify as
elections draw near. Many of
the disorders over the past sev-
eral months have been created by
students agitating over purely
local and often petty issues,
but politicians--including some
within the Congress Party--have
begun to channel such agitation
toward specific political objec-
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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISPUTE
On 4 November the UN Secu-
rity Council concluded its con-
sideration of Israel's complaint
about Syrian-supported terror-
ism and Syria and Egypt signed
a joint defense agreement. These
two developments offer some pros-
pect that a major clash between
Israel and Syria will be averted
for the time being. Israel, how-
ever, probably considers that it
has exhausted diplomatic means
for stopping the terrorism, and
another serious incident almost
certainly would precipitate a
large-scale Israeli reprisal.
A Security Council resolu-
tion which "invited" Syria to
strengthen its measure-s for pre-
venting incidents was vetoed by
the USSR.. The Israelis, never-
theless, are interpreting as a
victory the 10-4-vote, with one
abstention, in-favor of the re-
solution.. With thistoken of
international support they may
exercise restraint in the face
of minor incidents which do not
result in Israeli fatalities,
which is frequently the case in
the occasional exchanges of fire
between regular armed forces
along the border.
However, there were ten
sabotage incidents during the
four-week period when the ques-
tion was before the Security
Council. If these continue--
demonstrating that Syria either
cannot or will not control the
terr-orists operating from its
territory--Prime Minister Eshkol's
government will be inclined to
retaliate and will also be under
strong domes-tic pressure to do
so. The present attitude in Is-
rael appears to be one of "wait
and see."
-One thing Israeli officials
will watch closely is the effect
the joint Syrian-Egyptian defense
pact may have on the border sit-
uation. Article One of the agree-
ment stipulates that each signa-
tory will aid the other if it is
attacked,-but Article Two-calls
for "consultations" if interna-
tional events seem to be endanger-
ing the security of either coun-
try. Nasir, who would not wel-
come a fight with Israel at this
time, probably hopes he can_re-
strain the Syrians from further
actions which would provoke the
Israelis.
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THE GHANA-GUINEA ROW
Ghana's detention of Guinea's
delegation to the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) meetings in
Addis Ababa has continued to
have serious repercussions, de-
spite the release of the group
on 5 November. The episode has
further weakened the ailing OAU
and precipitated a new crisis in
US-Guinean relations.
Although the OAU summit ses-
sion convened as scheduled on
5 November and managed to avert
the ignominy of a formal break-
up, the latest flare-up between
Ghana and Guinea turned the con-
ference into a shambles. The
two West African states have
been feuding since ousted Ghana-
ian president Nkrumah was wel-
comed in Conakry last March. The
final blow to the summit was
Guinean President Tour's boy-
cott even after Emperor Haile
Selassie and Presidents Nasir
and Tubman--three of Africa's
most prestigious leaders--had
prevailed on Ghana's General An-
krah to release the Guineans.
Tours sent word that he still
could not come to Addis Ababa
while Ankrah was there. Three
of the leaders most concerned
about keeping Tour's friend-
ship--Nasir, Tubman, and Al-
geria's Boumediene--thereupon
found pretexts to return home
early.
Even before Toure finally
turned down Nasir's entreaties
to come, it had become evident
that this year's summit would
not fulfill the hopes of Haile
Selassie and other OAU boosters
who had hoped to revive the or-
ganization's flagging fortunes
by focusing attention on non-
divisive southern African prob-
1-ems. The disillusionment with
the OAU already felt in many
quarters was reflected in the ap-
pearance of only 18 heads of
state or government from a total
OAU membership of 38 states. Had
Tours arrived, personal participa-
tion by African leaders would
still have been the smallest
since the OAU was founded in 1963.
Much time was taken up at
the recent gathering--especially
during the preliminary foreign
ministers' meeting--with attacks
on the stewardship of the or-
ganization's freewheeling secre-
tary general. Africa's elusive
"unity" was marred by the sur-
facing of some of the other pro-
liferating bilateral disputes.
The continued failure of the OAU's
Liberation Committee to produce
results in white-ruled southern
Africa generated additional pro-
longed wrangling. A formal move
to kill the committee outright
finally failed, but its budget
was extended only for three months.
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Guinea, meanwhile, has
launched a full-scale campaign
against the US as Toure con-
tinues his allegations of US re-
sponsibility for Ghana's deten-
tion of the delegation headed by
his foreign minister. On 8 No-
vember, Toure announced extensive
punitive measures against US op-
erations in Guinea, including
the expulsion of all Peace Corps
Volunteers and other personnel.
Toure-may be trying to shore
up his domestic popularity at
a time when the balance of power
within his regime is shifting.
His attacks on the US appear to
reflect increased pressures from
party militants, radical youth
and labor leaders, and some po-
litical figures, includin For-
eign Minister Beavo ui.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ARMS PURCHASES IN LATIN AMERICA
Although recent purchases
of jet aircraft by Argentina
and Chile have triggered a wave
of criticism and aroused fears
of a Latin American arms rac-e,
no abnormal increase in arms
procurement appears in prospect.
The larger Latin American
air forces have been using jets
for ten years, but most are
obsolete trainers or fighters
of Korean war vintage such as
the F-80 and F-86. Some coun-
tries still regularly use World
War II fighters, although spare
parts for them are no longer avail-
able and they are unsafe and
costly to maintain.
The latest controversy
seems to have begun over Argen-
tina's purchase from the US of
25 A4Bs which could be used on
Argentina's only aircraft car-
rier. The A4B is a subsonic,
lightweight jet attack aircraft
still being us-ed in Vietnam.
An additional 25 of these air-
craft were originally slated
for Argentina, but transports
and ancillary equipment will
probably be supplied instead.
The Argentine Air Force has had
maintenance problems with its
F-86s and British Meteors and
has been using French MS-760
four-seat trainers for attack
aircraft. The purchase arrange-
ment for the A4Bs was concluded
late in 1965, but they have not
yet been delivered.
Soon after the Argentine
purchase became known, Chile
revealed that it had bought 21
Hawker Hunter fighters from the
British at a reported cost of
$11.2 million to be paid over a
five-year period. The Hunter,
heavier and larger than the
A4B but of about equal perform-
ance, will replace older jets
and propeller-driven aircraft.
The foreign criticism which
greeted this purchase apparently
surprised the Chilean Government,
which had for some time budgeted
for the replacement of the older
planes.
Peru, which has had Hawker
Hunters since 1957 and also uses
F-86s and British Canberra jet
light bombers, has been shopping
for more modern equipment.
President Belaunde
recently rejected a US offer of
additional F-86s
Although other arms deals
have been mentioned--such as
Brazil's purchase of new tanks
and Venezuela's search for new
naval ships--there has actually
been no unusual increase in arms
purchases in Latin America this
year. Those governments such as
Argentina, Chile, and Peru which
are seeking fo modernize their
inventories are probably react-
ing to pressure from militar
leaders.
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KEY CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN BRAZIL
On 15 November Brazilians
will go to the polls to elect all
409 members of the Chamber of
Deputies and 23 of the 66 sena-
tors.-:These will be the first
direct national elections to be
held since the 1964 revolution
which ousted leftist President
Goulart. The state legislatures
have already elected new governors
and the outgoing Congress has
named retired Marshal Arthur da
Costa e Silva to succeed Presi-
dent Castello Branco.
The progovernment National
Renewal Alliance (ARENA) is ex-
pected to retain its majority,
although the only legal opposition
party, the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (MDB), may make substan-
tial gains. Leaders of ARENA be-
lieve that it will retain its
control in rural areas, but many
party candidates fear that their
prospects have been damaged by
recent government-:acts unseating
"undesirable" congressmen and
recessing Congress until 22 No-
vember.
The Castello Branco govern-
ment has taken a number of other
steps to facilitate the election
of progovernment candidates, in-
cluding refusing to certify some
candidates proposed by the MDB
and changing ballot requirements.
In addition, rumors that the re-
gime will remove still more con-
gressmen have added to electoral
tensions and to some extent in-
hibited opposition campaigning.
Nonetheless, the MDB stands to
pick up seats in important urban
areas such as Sao Paulo, Recife,
Guanabara, and Porto Alegre,
where there is widespread dis-like
of the government.
The ARENA's Senate majority
is not threatened. However, should
the MDB gain some 50 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies--which many
believe it is likely to do--the
two parties would be almost
evenly matched there. Under these
circumstances government legisla-
tive:proposals favored by Castello
Branco, such as a new constitu-
tion, could be in trouble.
PERUVIAN ELECTION CA~9PAIGN LARGELY FREE OF NATIONAL ISSUES
Peruvians on 13 November
will elect provincial and munici-
pal:councils, three national dep-
uties, and the mayor of Lima. In
recent weeks there has been a
strong-shift of emphasis in the
campaign, which initially seemed
to be interpreted as a plebiscite
on President Belaunde's adminis-
tration but now is concentrating
on local issues. Members of both
major political groupings, how-
ever, may try to use the elec-
tion results to demonstrate
voter opinion of the government,
now entering the second half of
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its six-year term. This may in
turn lead to party realignments
affecting the government and op-
position camps, both of which
have been experiencing internal
strains.
Although 88 percent of the
electorate is expected to vote,
the campaign has failed to stir
much interest among the voters.
There have been sporadic clashes
between supporters of rival can-
didates.
The most signifi-cant contest
will be for the vacant Chamber of
Deputies seat in Lima Department
where nearly 40 percent of a na-
tional electorate is concentrated.
Two other congressional by-elec-
tions are also occurring. The
contest for mayor of Lima is at-
tracting more than local attention
partly because it is widely be-
lieved that the winner will be a
strong contender for the presi-
dency in 1969. Except in one or
two localities, candidates not
affiliated with the two major
political groups--including Com-
munists and Communist sympathiz-
ers--are not expected to play a
major role.
The opposition coalition
has adopted the position that
the municipal elections are
purely local in nature and do
not reflect on the Congress or
on Belaunde's administration.
Although most government candi-
dates hope to benefit from Be-
launde's record, the President
has remained aloof and failed to
enter the electoral arena on be-
half of his followers. ~
ANTIGUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN GUATEMALA
Antiguerrilla operations
continue in the hinterlands of
Guatemala. Thus far, at least
two major encounters have taken
place. According to the govern-
ment, guerrilla losses and ar-
rests amount to some 26 men, and
several soldiers have also been
killed or wounded. The govern-
ment is also pressing an offen-
sive in Guatemala City where
Page 18
there has been a step-up in ter-
rorist activity.
Although the government
cannot claim broad success in
the current operations, it has
wrested the initiative from the
extremists and it has evidently
become increasingly aware that
a soft approach to the guerrilla
problem would-not be successful.
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UNITED NATIONS
UN ABOUT TO VOTE AGAIN OPT CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE
On 18 November the UN General
Assembly will open its annual debate
on the issue of Chinese representa-
tion.
The members will vote again
this year on the procedural ruling
that the issue is an "important
question" under Article 18 of the
charter, and thus needs a two-thirds
vote for approval, A resolution to
adopt this ruling was first intro-
duced by the US and four others in
1961 when the risk that Peking
might obtain a simple majority be-
came more pronounced. Since then
the "import ant question" issue has
been reintroduced annually and voted
upon before the vote on the substan-
tive question. The ruling itself
requires only a simple majority for
approval. Each year support for it
has dwindled. While it is expected
that the ruling will again be up-
held, the margin will be slim. Last
year, 56 favored the procedural rul-
ing, 49 opposed, and 11 abstained,
Since 1961, the substantive de-
bate has centered on the so-called
"hostile" resolution which calls for
the expulsion of the Chinese Nation-
alists and the admittance of Peking.
Resolutions to this effect were de-
feated by margins of from 11 to 16
votes until last year when the vote
was 47 to 47 with 20 abstentions.
This year Peking stands a chance of
gaining a simple majority. Although
far short of the two thirds required
for entry under the present proce-
dural ruling, it would nevertheless
be a significant psychological vic-
tory.
The large number of variables
make prediction of the voting dif-
ficult. One important considera-
tion is Peking's unfavorable inter-
national image, further tarnished
by the excesses of its "cultural
revolution." China's leaders, more-
over, have shown no interest in
joining the UN and have put forward
conditions for entry clearly unac-
ceptable to a majority of the UN
members. These are the cancella-
tion of the UN 1950 resolution con-
demning China and North Korea as
aggressors, adoption of a resolu-
tion condemning the US as the ag-
gressor in Korea, revision of the
UN Charter,. inclusion of all "in-
dependent states," and exclusion
of all "imperialist puppets."
Nonetheless, many members ar-
gue that China might "behave better"
if it were in the UN where it could
be "reprimanded." Others contend
that no significant progress can be
made on disarmament until China is
a member. Secretary General Thant
himself holds this position and his
view could affect the vote of some
members.
The only thing that prevents
the UN from issuing an invitation
to Peking to join is the reluctance
of most members to vote at the
same time for expulsion of the
Chinese Nationalists. In fact,
most members favor a "two China"
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resolution. If one were introduced,
it would undoubtedly receive a ma-
jority and perhaps even a two-thirds
vote. Canada in particular has
shown an interest in introducing
such a resolution.
If, as remains more likely, the
assembly again votes on a "hostile"
resolution, it appears on the basis
of present information that 48 mem-
bers ar_e prepared to vote for it,
49 are opposed, 24 will abstain,
and Laos will not participate. How-
ever, the position of at least 16
of these countries is still in doubt
(see table).
The matter is further compli-
cated by the proclivity of certain
delegations to disregard or inter-
pret liberall their instructions
from home.
elegations are situp y avoi ing any
firm decisions until they see which
way the wind is blowing.
Estimated UN Vote on Seating Communist China
Opposed Abstain
Afghanistan
Mauritania
Argentina Lu
xembour
g
Austria
Albania
Mongolia
Australia M
adagasca
r
Barbados
Algeria
Morocco
Bolivia M
alaysia
*Belgium
Bulgaria
Nepal
Brazil M
alawi
'Botswana
Burma
Nigeria
Central African Republic M
alta
Cameroon
Burundi
Norway
China M
exico
*Candda
Byelorussia
Pakistan
Colombia N
ew Zeala
nd
*Chad
Cambodia
Poland
Congo (Kinshasa) Ni
caragua
*Chile
Ceylon
Rumania
Costa Rica Ni
ger
Cyprus
Congo (Brazzaville)
Senegal
*Dahomey Pa
nama
*Ghana
Cuba
Singapore
Dominican Republic Pa
raguay
Guyana
Czechoslovakia
Somali Republic
Ecuador Pe
ru
Iceland
Denmark
Sudan
EI Salvador Ph
ilippines
*Italy
Ethiopia
Sweden
Gabon Si
erra Leon
e
Jamaica-
Finland
Syria
*Gambia Sp
ain
Kuwait
France
Tanzania
Greece Th
ailand
Lebanon
Guinea
Uganda
*Guatemala To
go
Libya
Hungary
Ukraine
Haiti Tu
rkey
Maldiveasldnds
India
USSR
Honduras Re
public of
South Africa
Netherlands
* Indonesia
UAR
Ireland US
Portugal
*Iran
UK
*Israel Up
per Voit
a
*Rwando
Iraq
Yemen
Ivory Coast Ur
uguay
Saudi Arabia
Kenya
Yugoslavia
Japan Ve
nezuela
Trinidad
Mali
Zambia
*Jordan
Tunisia
*Lesotho
Liberia
Tot
l
Nonparticipating
a
*These members have not yet made
a firm decision
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In favor 48
Opposed 49
Abstain 24
Nonparticipating 1
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