WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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review(s) completed.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETT mN T!t
AGENCY A :. C 1JLr;,
43.
6 September 1968
No. 0036/68
66 -7z ' `9.c-
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(Information as of noon EDT, 5 September 1968)
Europe
TENSION EASES AS OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUES
Moscow has reduced somewhat the more blatant signs
of its presence in Czechoslovakia and has toned
down its press attacks on Czechoslovak leaders.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the
occupation will soon be ended.
EASTERN EUROPE REACTS ADVERSELY TO SOVIET INVASION
The USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia has suspended
the movement toward liberalization and freer national
expression in Communist Eastern Europe.
NATO RE-EVALUATES DEFENSE CONCEPTS IN A NEW CLIMATE
The rapid occupation of Czechoslovakia has produced
a new climate of apprehension in the Atlantic Alli-
ance. Reviews of NATO force levels and of the warn-
ing time concept will be key elements in the ambi-
tious September work program for Alliance committees.
SWEDISH VOTERS TO CHOOSE NEXT GOVERNMENT
The Swedish electorate on 15 September will deter-
mine whether the Social Democrats, who have ruled
the country for more than 35 years, will continue
in power. The alternative is a centrist coalition
made up of the Liberal, Conservative, and Center
parties.
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Far East
VIETNAM
Enemy forces last week sustained pressure on second-
ary targets, while other Communist units continued
to maneuver in the vicinity of key urban centers.
Allied sweeps and air strikes appear to have dis-
located enemy attack plans in several areas.
THAI OPPOSITION PARTY WINS INITIAL ELECTORAL SKIRMISH
The government has lost the opening round in its
electoral test of strength with opposition elements,
but the setback may cause complacent Thai leaders to
step-up preparations for next year's legislative
elections.
SUPPRESSION OF CHINA'S RED GUARDS GAINS SPEED
The recent shift to the right in China's internal
politics has brought terror to millions of Red Guard
students as local authorities--mainly military men--
are now going considerably beyond the disciplinary
measures called for in Peking's recent propaganda.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 17
ARAB STATES REMAIN WARY OF NEW ISRAELI COUNTERRAID
Jordan and Egypt are both still fearful that the
Israelis will mount a heavy attack on their terri-
tory. The Arab League foreign ministers have assem-
bled in Cairo to discuss their various problems, but
the meetings will probably bring nothing more than
the usual Arab squabbling.
INTERNAL DISSENSION SPARKS RENEWED FIGHTING IN YEMEN
The recent renewal of royalist attacks on Sana was
encouraged by violent, armed dissension within the
republican ranks. Disunity is endemic among the
republicans, and even though it has been damped down
again, this latest manifestation may impel the re-
publican government to renew efforts for a settlement
of some sort with the royalists.
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ARMY TIGHTENS GRIP ON CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)
Army leaders have extended their control by replac-
ing President Massamba-Debat with one of their own,
but the tenuous peace in Braz2:aville appears in-
creasingly threatened by splits within the army and
a resurgence of tribalism.
FIFTH OAU SUMMIT SHAPING UP IN ALGIERS
The Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Council
of Ministers began meeting in Algiers this week to
determine the agenda for the fifth OAU summit which
opens on 13 September. This year's session promises
to be one of the liveliest and most divisive of re-
cent years.
Western Hemisphere
GUATEMALAN TERRORISTS THREATEN MORE VIOLENCE
Although only relatively minor incidents have occur-
red since the Communist Rebel Armed Forces assas-
sinated Ambassador Mein last week, the possibility
of significant and even large-scale violence remains
strong.
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ARGENTINA'S TOP GENERAL PROTESTS HIS OUSTER
Former army commander in chief Alsogaray has strongly
denounced President Ongania and his policies. He
stressed the seriousness of removing from positions
of power those who sought a return to democratic
institutions.
ECUADOR'S PRESIDENT VELASCO TAKES OFFICE
President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra has indicated
that a major goal of his administration will be a
shift in Ecuador's foreign policy toward a restora-
tion of normal relations with the United States.
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Pravda and other authoritative Soviet newspapers warned during the
week that a "counterrevolutionary" threat remained in Czechoslovakia and
that the situation there was not yet "normalized." Moscow now claims its
invasion was necessary to head off an "imperialist" plot aimed at disrupting
the socialist world.
The Czechoslovaks wondered how much Moscow will restrict their
freedoms but nevertheless seemed of a mind to test the limits of acceptable
behavior. There is, in particular, deep disquiet among journalists and intel-
lectuals as censorship is reimposed and rumors circulate of plans to purge
them.
Rumania and Yugoslavia-particularly the former-are still worried that
they are next on Moscow's list of victims. Both regimes are preparing their
populations psychologically for such a possibility. Both also continue to
maintain their military and security forces on an alert status, and the
Yugoslavs are reported to be improving defenses along their borders with
Bulgaria and Hungary.
In Hungary, party leader Kadar is reported to be showing signs of
strain. He is said to be deeply concerned about the negative effect of the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on his own image and on dissension
within the party.
The Czechoslovak affair has also deepened the factional splits within
the Polish party. Gomulka's nationalist opponents, who were against Polish
participation in the invasion, are probably intimidated by Moscow's show of
strength. Gomulka's position has thus been bolstered for now, but at the
cost of further isolating him within the leadership. The Soviet politburo-
almost totally immersed in the Czechoslovak situation since the invasion-
has begun to resume its normal activities. There is still no confirmation of
the rumored central committee plenum on 2 September, and the activities
announced for various politburo members and party secretaries durine that
day make it seem unlikely that one actually took place.
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EASTERN EUROPE
HE LOMUSSIAN
MIL. DIST.
~~...r....,... / MIL.
DIST.
VILITARY DISTRICT L}
1
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TENSION EASES AS OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUES
Moscow has reduced some-
what the more blatant signs of
its presence in Czechoslovakia
and has toned down its press at-
tacks on Czechoslovak leaders.
Although this suggests that the
Soviets are relatively satisfied
with the present conduct of the
Dubcek-Svoboda leadership., Pravda
and other authoritative newspa-
pers warned throughout the week
that a "counterrevolutionary"
threat remained and that the
situation in Czechoslovakia had
not "normalized." As long as
Moscow continues to insist that
this is the situation, no sub-
stantial reduction of the mas-
sive military presence can be
expected.
In its press and in an ex-
tensive series of diplomatic
justifications of the invasion,
Moscow has almost entirely
dropped the fig leaf it used
in the first days--that it had
been invited in by unspecified
Czechoslovak leaders. Now, Mos-
cow claims that it moved to head
off an "imperialist" plot which,
under the guise of "bridge-build-
ing," aimed at disrupting the
socialist world. This line has
the advantage of carrying a warn-
ing to the other Eastern European
countries that they too must be
wary of improving relations with
the West.
Premier Cernik early this
week reportedly expressed the
view that the situation in Czech-
Page 3
osl.ovakia was still uncertain.
It apparently remained unclear
to him just how much the USSR in-
tended to restrict the govern-
ment's freedom of action. By
week's end, this ambiguity still
seemed to exist in Czechoslovak
minds.
The Czechoslovaks, past
masters at passive resistance,
have apparently chosen to accom-
modate themselves to the USSR's
demands as slowly and ineffectu-
ally as possible. Some even
seem to be of a mind to test the
limits of acceptable comradely
behavior. Lidova Demokracie,
the People's Party paper, sum-
marized the situation by point-
ing to the vicious circle argu-
ment that the Soviet troops will
not leave until the situation
normalizes and the situation
will not normalize until the
troops leave.
Party leader Dubcek con-
tinued his quest for national
acquiescence in the Moscow agree-
ment. In addresses to the cen-
tral committee on 31 August--
with its preintervention com-
position--he and President
Svoboda indicated that the coun-
try's liberalization would be
severely curtailed. Dubcek also
said that he considered void
the party congress held during
the first week of the invasion.
At the central committee
meeting, action was taken to
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enlarge that body and also its
presidium. The changes resulted
in both bodies retaining a pro-
gressive majority, although politi-
cal labels may now be somewhat
meaningless. Several pro-Soviet
conservatives were dropped from
the presidium. In a separate but
related action, Interior Minister
Pavel, a strong Dubcek supporter,
resigned, probably because of
his difficulties with the Russian
security forces. His replace-
ment, Jan Pelnar, seems to be
something of an opportunist.
During the week, the Rus-
sians gradually turned back con-
trol of various key buildings,
such as party central committee
headquarters, to the Czechoslo-
vaks. Other ministries, such as
interior and defense, remained
in Soviet hands.
The occupying forces have
also begun to return control of
radio, TV, and the press to the
Czechoslovaks. The Russian ex-
periment in producing occupation
newspapers was short-lived be-
cause of a public boycott. Re-
portedly the Czechoslovaks
quickly perceived that at least
one paper had been put together
and printed in East Germany.
Subsequently, the Czechoslovak
regime's new censorship bureau
issued broad guidelines that
no "negative information and
comment" concerning Moscow and
its allies, or critical cor?unent
on the party police, worker's
militia, or army will be toler-
ated.
Although there have been re-
ports that the USSR has a list of
40,000 people to be deported, it
does not seem to have acted on
it. Premier Cernik has reported
that the government knew of only
five persons--high-ranking secu-
rity officials--who have been
arrested.
It is too early to put a
price tag on the disruption to
the Czechoslovak economy, but
one estimate places the cost for
the first ten days at about $25
million per day. The interrup-
tion of transportation produced
the greatest strain on the econ-
omy, interfering with food sup-
plies to the population, supplies
of materials to industry and
agriculture, and foreign trade.
The Czechoslovak economy may re-
quire as long as two years to
recover from these economic dis-
locations.
One anticipated effect will
be to tie Czechoslovakia's ex-
ternal economic relations more
closely than ever to the USSR and
other Communist nations. Pravda
on 2 September warned the Czec-
slovaks against seeking hard-cur-
rency credits in the West and
pointed out the advantages to
Czechoslovakia of its relations
with CEMA. Economic negotiations
reportedly will be held in Moscow
the second week in September.
Rumania and Yugoslavia con-
tinued during the week to show
fear that they might be the next
target of a Soviet invasion.
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Rumanian leader Ceausescu,
having previously made it clear
in typical rhetoric that Rumania
would forcibly resist foreign
armies, then soft-pedaled his
remarks in the face of continued
Soviet pressure tactics. This
"soft response" followed, how-
ever, a Rumanian party resolu-
tion condemning the Czechoslovak
invasion and reasserting the right
of national sovereignty. Ceau-
sescu thereby apparently hoped to
preclude any future Soviet asser-
tions that dissatisfied Rumanian
officials had called in Soviet
troops.
On the internal scene, Ceau-
sescu acted to prepare the Ru-
manian population psychologically
for any eventuality, including
invasion. He and other high-
level party officials made speeches
in different sections of the
country, carefully chosen so that
each speaker, by reason of ex-
perience or by ethnic background,
could make the maximum impact in
uniting the traditionally Russo-
phobic population behind the re-
gime.
Despite pressure from Moscow
and some Eastern European coun-
tries that it moderate its posi-
tion, Yugoslavia continues to
push its highly critical view of
the occupation. The Belgrade lead-
ership, nevertheless, is plainly
concerned by its inability to get
a clear reading of Soviet inten-
tions. 25X1
Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations
have taken a decided turn for the
worse and the bitterly contested,
nationalistic Macedonian issue has
been revived in a vicious polem-
ical exchange. President Tito may
take advantage of the situation to
move against hard-line remnants in
Yugoslavia whom he believes are
capable of collusion with the USSR.
There has been little change
in the status of the occupation
troops in Czechoslovakia. US at-
taches in the USSR, Hungary, and
Bulgaria reported they could find
no evidence of a Soviet build-up
along the Rumanian borders in these
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EASTERN EUROPE REACTS ADVERSELY TO SOVIET INVASION
The USSR's invasion of Czech-
oslovakia has suspended the move-
ment toward liberalization and
freer national expression in Com-
munist Eastern Europe. Even as
the Russians were suppressing
the Czechoslovaks, however, they
were also dramatizing for all
Eastern Europeans the power and
appeal of the Czech movement.
Eastern European leaders who sup-
ported Moscow's move now face the
delicate task of justifying to
nationalist elements within their
own regime and to their own peo-
ple an unacceptable premise--the
necessity of subjugating national
interests to those of Moscow.
In the past year, a revolu-
tion of expectation, reinforced
by increasing signs of freedom
in Czechoslovakia, has been under
way in Eastern Europe. Unlike
the previous generation, which
accepted authoritarianism with a
resigned cynicism, the present
generation expects a better life.
This is especially true among
the rebellious youth who will
return to classes this month in
a hostile mood following the
events of August.
The crisis has intensified
differences within the polish
leadership, and rifts in other
Eastern European party hierarchies
are expected. Conservative ele-
ments, emboldened by the display
of Soviet force, may decide that
the time is ripe to oust liberal
reformists from their positions.
In contrast, the unity of
the Yugoslav and Rumanian leader-
ships has been strengthened by
their vocal opposition to the
occupation of Czechoslovakia
and by rumors--possibly self-
inspired--that they might be
next. Although Tito and
Ceausescu have aroused unprece-
dented patriotic support, their
realistic appraisals probably
will lead them to less vigorous
resistance to some Soviet
foreign policy goals.
Until Moscow signals how far
it is prepared to go to impose
its will, the atmosphere in East-
ern Europe will remain tense and
permeated with distrust, and
policy making will be erratic.
Most Eastern Europeans, leaders
as well as led, while they may
not for a time be able to ad-
vance toward national independ-
ence, have nevertheless developed
more powerful anti-Soviet feel-
ings as a consequence of Moscow's
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NATO RE-EVALUATES DEFENSE CONCEPTS IN A NEW CLIMATE
The rapid occupation of
Czechoslovakia has produced a
new climate of apprehension
within the Atlantic Alliance.
The present NATO concept of warn-
ing time, which presupposes a mil-
itary build-up by a prospective
attacker during which time the
Allies would engage in political
consultation, is being re-evalu-
ate d.
The West Germans are partic-
ularly insistent on this, con-
tending that the demonstration of
Soviet mobilization efficiency
and speed makes the present NATO
concept not only of doubtful va-
lidity but also dangerous. They
point to the massive number of
Warsaw Pact troops near the Ba-
varian frontier and to the suc-
cessful jamming of the early warn-
ing radar system there. The re-
view of the warning time concept
will be part of the September work
program developed by NATO Secre-
tary General Brosio in the wake
of the Czechoslovak crisis.
The Alliance's Military Com-
mittee has recommended that any
plans for reductions in troop
strength should be held in abey-
ance and that withdrawal of forces
should be postponed. Reactions to
this proposal in the Defense Plan-
ning Committee--which does not in-
clude France, a nonparticipant in
the integrated military command--
revealed much disagreement.
The Danes saw the proposal
as merely an example of the "em-
peror's new clothes." Belgium
and Canada opposed any decision
that would require them to change
their force reduction and rede-
ployment plans. West Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the Neth-
erlands wanted a strong public
statement on the maintenance of
Alliance force levels. The dis-
pute was apparently resolved by
a statement of the committee on
4 September which reaffirmed that
NATO's military capability should
not be reduced except as part of
a pattern of mutual East-West
force reductions balanced in
scope and timing.
National responses to Chan-
cellor Kiesinger's vague reference
to the need for a NATO summit con-
ference have been universally un-
favorable, but there is some in-
terest in accelerating ministe-
rial consideration of this month's
re-evaluation program. The United
Kingdom is proposing that the De-
fense Planning Committee and North
Atlantic Council ministerial meet-
ings, scheduled for December, be 25X1
held in October or November; pre-
liminary reactions have been fav-
orable.
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SWEDISH VOTERS TO CHOOSE NEXT GOVERNMENT
The Swedish electorate on
15 September will determine
whether the Social Democrats,
who have ruled the country for
more than 35 years, will continue
in power. The alternative is a
centrist coalition made up of the
Liberal, Conservative, and Center
parties.
Early opinion polls showed
the combined opposition in a
slight lead in the race for con-
trol of the parliament's lower
chamber. The Czechoslovak drama,
however, has muddied the political
waters.
The small but vigorous Com-
munist party has matched Sweden's
other parties in condemning the
Soviet action. It has been cul-
tivating an image of liberalism
and independence from Moscow for
the past several years, but Swed-
ish political analysts believe
it will nevertheless suffer from
the Czechoslovak affair.
The Social Democrats have
seen a small but steady erosion
of their voter strength since
1962. In the last general elec-
tion in 1964, they won 113 seats,
the bourgeois parties 112, and the
Communists eight.
Facing the prospect of los-
ing control--as have sister par-
ties in Norway and Denmark--the
Social Democrats have been scrap-
ing around for popular issues.
In particular, they have drummed
away at the US involvement in
Vietnam in an effort to win over
radical youth elements, who ap-
pear to be looking further to the
left for political fulfillment.
If the results are close,
as is normally the case in Sweden,
the Social Democrats may turn to
some form of cooperation with the
Communists to maintain their grip
on the government. A government
formed by the bourgeois parties prob-
ably would bring new changes in domes-
tic policy but it might mute neu-
tral Sweden's voice in interna-
tional affairs.
For the Social Democrats'
Tage Erlander, prime minister for
well over21 years, this appar-
ently will be the last election,
and for Sweden it will likely be
the last nationwide balloting un-
der a bicameral parliamentary sys-
tem. Constitutional reform pro-
vides for a popularly elected uni-
cameral legislature in 1970. Min-
ister of Education Olof Palme,
who has bitterly attacked the US
role in Vietnam, is generally con-
sidered a leading candidate to
succeed Erlander as head of the
party.
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There was fresh evidence during the week that the Vietnamese Commu-
nists intend to stretch out their current phase of military activity over a
prolonged period. Newly captured documents tend to support other indica-
tions that the enemy is carefully husbanding his capabilities by using econ-
omy-of-force tactics to keep losses considerably below the high levels sus-
tained during the all-out Tet push.
Allied spoiling operations and air strikes have almost certainly upset the
enemy's timing in some areas. Nevertheless, the Communists can be expected
to punctuate their wide-ranging campaign of mortar and rocket harassment
and ground probes in outlying areas with strikes against urban centers when
they calculate that this can be done at relatively low cost.
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in an otherwise unexcep-
tional National Day speech, surfaced another variation in Hanoi's formula-
tion of the role of the Liberation Front. He said that the US has to
"recognize and talk" with the Front, but he omitted earlier demands that
any postwar settlement must be in accordance with the program of the
Front, or that the South Vietnamese had to be left alone to settle their own
affairs. This is the second time in two months that Hanoi has tried at an
authoritative level to signal some flexibility in its position on the Front.
In China the drive against the Red Guards in the provinces continued to
gain momentum and scope. The full weight of the mushrooming campaign,
carried out mainly by local military commanders, is now being felt by
millions of students who once were in the vanguard of Mao's Cultural
Revolution.
The long-ensconced military oligarchy in Thailand received a jolt last
weekend when the opposition Democratic Party scored a resounding victory
against government-sponsored candidates in municipal elections held in
Bangkok. Even though the Democratic Party is Thailand's only truly na-
tional party, its strength is largely centered in the Bangkok area; it is unlikely
to do nearly as well in legislative elections next year. The overwhelming
nature of the Democrats' Bangkok success, however, suggests more antigov-
ernment sentiment than the Thanom government had bargained for when it
finally unveiled Thailand's new constitution last June.
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C A M B O D I A
VWORTH
VIETNAM
Ouc Lap
Special Forces Camp
SOUTH VIETNAM
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VIETNAM
Enemy forces last week sus-
tained pressure on secondary tar-
gets with a number of mortar and
rocket attacks and ground assaults.
Strong Communist units meanwhile
continued to maneuver in the
vicinity of many key urban cen-
ters. Despite widespread indica-
tions that major attacks might
occur against some of the primary
urban targets during the week,
however, no such attacks were
forthcoming.
There is considerable evi-
dence that extensive allied pa-
trolling, sweeps, and air strikes
have thwarted enemy attacks plans
in several key areas, notably
around the Demilitarized Zone and
in the Da Nang - southern I Corps
sector. An estimated 1,200 Com-
munists have been killed in the
outlying areas around Da Nang,
for example,
In III Corps, the extent to
which allied sweeps have pre-
vented Communist movements into
attack positions near Sal on is
not wholly clear.
l
an attack on the city has been
delayed--suggesting that the
enemy's attempt to screen move-
ments along the infiltration cor-
ridors from northwest III Corps
have been hampered by allied
sweeps and air strikes. In the
delta,)
tallied
sweep operations
disrupted enemy
25X1
;preparations
ponement of
and forced the
strong Viet Cong
post-
at-
tacks against Cai Lay and Can Tho
cities.
Except in a few areas--cen-
tral I Corps, Duc Lap, and north-
west III Corps--the Communists
have withheld most of their main
force regiments from the fighting.
This has resulted in lower enemy
casualties than in the Tet and
May offensives. Some 12,000 enemy
troops were reportedly killed in
the first 12 days of the May of-
fensive, while enemy losses for
the first 12 days of the recent
fighting stand at about 8,500.
There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the Communists intend
to press their offensive into
key urban areas wherever their
forces can get organized for
strong attacks. Sizable, and
in many cases fresh, enemy units
continue to threaten other known
Communist objectives such as Ban
Me Thuot and coastal cities in
I Corps. Based on the evidence 25X1
now available, the Communists
intend to wage a protracted of-
fensive characterized by wide-
spread shellings and attempts
at ground assaults in and around
key urban targets.
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Hanoi's National Day Celebrations
Free of the threat of air
attack, Hanoi this year cele-
brated its national day more
elaborately. Public meetings
were held over a three-day pe-
riod, Ho Chi Minh made a cere-
monial appearance, a special MIG-
21 fly-by was staged, and Premier
Pham Van Dong issued a strong na-
tionalistic appeal for continued
prosecution of the war.
At overseas receptions the
holiday was marred by intemperate
speeches by Chinese representa-
tives. In Peking and Paris the
Chinese belabored the North Viet-
namese not only for the Paris
peace talks but also for their
support of Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia. Hanoi was not
intimidated. The premier di-
gressed from his theme of Viet-
namese nationalism to publicly
reiterate the regime's support
of the Soviet move.
In other developments, the
Vietnamese Communists are
strongly pressing their claims
to political control of the
South Vietnamese countryside.
A series of Hanoi broadcasts in
the past week claimed that "lib-
eration committees" and "rev-
olutionary administrations" had
been elected in the past few
months throughout rural areas in
the South. Most of these ad-
ministrative organs were said
to be at the village and hamlet
level, but the Communists also
claimed to have established three
provincial committees. Generally,
the new administrations are por-
trayed as spontaneous develop-
ments of the ongoing "general
uprising" but, in some cases,
Liberation Front participation
is acknowledged.
Beyond this propaganda, re-
ports from South Vietnam indi-
cate that strenuous Communist ef-
forts to create and to maintain
such new administrative organiza-
tions have been under way for
several months. In addition to
serving more immediate purposes,
these bodies will provide the
foundations at the grass-roots
level for the eventual surfacing
of a national political-legis-
lative apparatus laying claim
to extensive territorial control.
Such an apparatus is a funda-
mental part of Communist strategy
for a future period of increased
political competition with the
Saigon government.
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THAI OPPOSITION PARTY WINS INITIAL ELECTORAL SKIRMISH
The government has lost the
opening round in its electoral
test of strength with opposition
elements, but the setback may
cause complacent Thai leaders to
step up preparations for next
year's legislative elections.
The opposition Democratic
Party took 22 of 24 seats in the
voting on 1 September for the
Bangkok municipal assembly. Three
recognized government slates man-
aged to elect only one progovern-
ment candidate. The election,
the first meaningful one in Thai-
land in ten years, was orderly
and relatively clean, although
some cases of government chican-
ery were reported.
Widely interpreted as an im-
portant political barometer, the
results could have a significant
impact on key legislative elec-
tions scheduled for early next
year. The Democrats, the only
nationwide opposition party cur-
rently active, came out of the
election substantially strength-
ened. Out of the limelight for
ten years and weakened by the
recent death of their leading
public figure, the Democrats
needed the psychological boost
that the Bangkok victory gave
them.
Although the Democrats' show-
ing may also attract some other
antigovernment elements to rally
behind their banner, they have a
long way to go before they can
expect to challenge the govern-
ment with any chance of success
next year. The party does not
appear to have much following in
the countryside, and it is clear
that the Bangkok vote reflects the
indecisiveness and complacency of
progovernment forces as much as
it does Democratic strength.
The election is a major dis-
appointment to those elements
within the government who had hoped
that a Democratic Party defeat in
Bangkok, its traditional area of
strength, would clear the way for
an easy government victory in the
legislative elections. Moreover,
the setback in Bangkok represents
a repudiation of the municipal
leadership that has been asso-
ciated with Deputy Prime Minister
Praphat and hence is a particu-
larly bitter pill for the govern-
ment faction centered around
Praphat.
One consequence of the elec-
tion will be to strengthen the
hand of Prime Minister Thanom in
the factional wrangling with Praphat.
The deputy prime minister is the
only Thai leader actively organ-
izing a political apparatus in the
countryside, however, and he will
have to play a key role in estab-
lishing a unified government party.
Although the turnout in the
Bangkok election was low and local
issues were important, the voting
does suggest that there may be
more antigovernment sentiment
in the country than has been recog-
nized heretofore. The election
results indicate that the govern-
ment will have to put aside its
squabbling and marshal its con-
s=Lderable resources to guarantee
a clearcut victory in next year's
legislative elections.
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SUPPRESSION OF CHINA'S RED GUARDS GAINS SPEED
The recent shift to the
right in China's internal poli-
tics has brought terror to mil-
lions of Red Guard students, who
just a short time ago were the
apple of Mao's eye and a mili-
tant instrument of the Cultural
Revolution. Local authorities--
mainly military men who have long
suffered verbal abuse at the
hands of Red Guards--are appar-
ently being given a mandate to
deal harshly with them, and are
exercising this prerogative with
enthusiasm.
Ithe first
moves against radical Red Guard
groups began early last spring.
According to a Red Guard tabloid,
military officials in Swatow or-
dered "rebel" organizations to
"lower their flags" on 6 April.
One officer reportedly ordered
his men to flog the radicals
with leather whips, exclaiming,
"Ever since March last year I
have been humiliated by you.
Now is the time for me to let
off steam."
Treatment of "1966 and 1967
graduates"--older Red Guards who
were kept in school so they could
participate in the Cultural Revolu-
tion--seems to be particularly
rough, probably because they
tended to be leaders of militant
groups. Aside from those who are
specifically charged, many others
are being treated as political
criminals and sent to prison mines
or military-run state farms under
the pretext that they are bein
iven " 'ob assi "
Iso-called "worker-
propaganda teams," supervised di-
rectly by municipal revolutionary
committees, have been formed to
occupy schools and to subdue re-
maining Red Guard organizations.
Army troops apparently are to
lead the teams. Teams as large
as 10,000 have been formed in
Harbin and Sian.
In this emotional atmosphere,
it is evident that plans tenta-
tively considered in July to try
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to resume meaningful education
soon in colleges are now in abey-
ance.
The process of forming new
provincial governments, renewed
last month after several months
of indecision, apparently is to
be completed this weekend. On
3 September, the New China News
Agency broadcast "situation re-
ports" about both regions of the
kind that have preceded other
recently established local gov-
ernments. The new leaders are
expected to be the old-line mili-
tary and party officials who
appeared with Mao Tse-tung at
]large turnouts of officials in
Peking in mid-August.
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Jordan and Egypt are both still fearful that Israel will launch another
major reprisal raid against them, and the terrorist bombings in Tel Aviv on
Wednesday seem likely to provoke one. The Israelis are easily capable of
mounting such an attack at any time, but at the moment are embroiled at
the UN with their protest over Egypt's cross-canal raid. Firefights continue
to occur daily, including a new series of exchanges along the previously quiet
Syrian frontier.
Libyan Prime Minister Bakkush resigned on 4 September and was
replaced by Wanis Qaddafi after King Idris refused to accept Bakkush's
suggestions for cabinet changes. Political power continues to reside in the
King.
The Organization of African Unity's (OAU) summit meeting in Algiers
next week seems certain to have a number of sharply divisive issues on the
agenda, foremost among them the Nigerian war, which the OAU is pledged
to resolve.
Nigerian federal authorities were finally persuaded this week to permit
daytime relief flights to Biafra's starving refugees, although disagreement
over which airfield to use may continue to delay the operation. The negotia-
tions in Addis Ababa, however, are dwindling to an inconclusive end because
the participants are preparing for the OAU summit conference. Federal
troops are trying hard to complete the capture of remaining Biafran-held
towns and airfields before the conference closes, but the determined Biafran
defense makes this an unlikely prospect.
Congolese Army leaders in Brazzaville have deposed President Mas-
samba-Debat and installed one of their own number, but he in turn may be
threatened by increasing dissension in the army and among tribal elements.
South Africa's low-key and low-cost political and economic efforts with
neighboring Black African ministates are paying off. On 31 August, Lesotho
ordered South African political refugees out of the country, and last week
Malawi laid out the red carpet for the visiting South African foreign minister.
In Izmir, Turkey, the routine visit of several ships from the US Sixth
Fleet is continuing without serious incident. Most of the ships are due to
leave on 7 September. A leftist demonstration scheduled in Izmir this
weekend could result in a new clash between rightist and leftist students, but
the reinforced police should be able to prevent an major dis-
turbance. 25X1
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ARAB STATES REMAIN WARY OF NEW ISRAELI COUNTERRAID
Both Egypt and Jordan re-
main fearful of Israeli repris-
als in the wake of a new wave of
Arab terrorist activity last
month.
Israeli Defense Minister
Dayan threatened severe repris-
als against the Egyptians last
week after an Egyptian patrol
crossed the Suez Canal, killed
two Israeli soldiers, and kid-
naped a third. Dayan told a
UN official that Israel consid-
ered the incident the most se-
rious "in any area" since the
Egyptian sinking of an Israeli
destroyer late last year. He
called on Cairo to fulfill a
number of clearly impossible
conditions by way of apology,
a demand to which the Egyptians
predictably failed to respond.
Subsequently, Israel called
for a meeting of the Security
Council to protest the incursion.
The Israeli airliner im-
pounded by Algeria in late July
was released on 1 September.
If Israel is in fact planning a
repris-al raid, this might remove
a slight deterrent, but the Is-
raelis would probably be inclined
to wait until after the Security
Council meeting before making a
major assault. Whenever it comes,
the blow could fall with equal
likelihood on Egypt or Jordan or
both.
The Jordanians continue
to believe that Israeli forces
are poised to strike along the
northern cease-fire lines and fear
that Israel may push on to take
the strategic heights in northern
Jordan. A new element was added
when, for the first time in months,
Syrian and Israeli units exchanged
fire across their cease-fire lines
twice during the past week.
Meanwhile, the Arab League
foreign ministers began their
scheduled meeting in Cairo on 1
September. The Tunisian delega-
tion immediately walked out, pro-
testing that other representatives
were trying to muzzle their views,
The meeting is unlikely to pro-
duce anything but the usual Arab
pyrotechnics.
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INTERNAL DISSENSION SPARKS RENEWED FIGHTING IN YEMEN
Factional fighting among the
Yemeni republicans in Sana has
encouraged increased royalist
pressure against them.
A long-standing cleavage be-
tween supporters of Prime Minis-
ter al-Amri and his group of sen-
ior army officers on the one hand
and those of the more radical,
junior army officers--many be-
longing to a minority religious
sect--was renewed by open rebel-
lion last week. The violence
was triggered by al-Amri's de-
cision to replace the army's
chief of staff and three battal-
ion commanders with his own sup-
porters.
The three dismissed command-
ers believed that al-Amri was
plotting to take over complete
control of the army, and they
ordered their troops to surround
Sana airport, block the main roads
leading out of the city, and seize
army headquarters. Fighting
lasted three days before al-Amri
brought it under control. Mean-
while, the royalists reportedly
exploited the situation by shell-
ing Sana severely with artillery.
The republican factions
have come to blows before, but
this incident was by far the
most serious. Continued inter-
nal difficulties may eventually
persuade the republicans to in-
tensify their efforts to reach
some kind of accommodation with
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ARMY TIGHTENS GRIP ON
The dominant military men
in Congo (Brazzaville), among
whom opportunistic army chief
Ngouabi is currently pre-eminent,
have replaced President Massamba-
Debat with one of their own num-
ber and have promised changes in
the country's institutions. The
army leadership is torn by per-
sonal and tribal splits, however,
and these moves may not have full
approval from all top military
leaders.
Massamba's removal was pre-
cipitated by the armed clashes
that occurred last weekend when
the army moved to disarm dissident
youths in Camp Meteo, a paramili-
tary installation near Brazza-
ville. The army overran the camp
on 31 August after two days of
bloody fighting. The 23 Cuban
military advisers in the camp
apparently played no direct role
in the fracas. At the request of
the army, they were transferred to
the Cuban Embassy after the fight-
ing and are scheduled to be sent
home.
Evidence is accumulating that
the Meteo incident was rooted in
ethnic animosities, and many of
the dissidents apparently were
tribal partisans of Massamba, who
last month lost most of his au-
thority to Ngouabi. Massamba, who
at first maintained an ambivalent
attitude toward the clash, was
placed under virtual arrest soon
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)
after the fighting began. A com-
munique issued on 4 August by the
Ngouabi-dominated National Council
of the Revolution (CNR) "accepted"
his resignation, blaming him for
the fighting. Capt. Raoul, a
mulatto who became prime minister
only last month, was designated
acting president.
Ngouabi, operating in the
CNR and increasingly the para-
mount power broker, has also de-
creed major changes in civilian
and military institutions. He
has revived a scheme to merge
army and civil defense forces
and has announced the restruc-
turing of the single political
party. Executive organs of the
party's ancillary youth, labor,
and women's groups were sum-
marily abolished.
Ngouabi's ability to follow
through on these changes and even
to remain the Congo's predomi-
nant leader hinges on the ten-
uous cohesion of the army lead-
ership. There are indications
that he is even now being chal-
lenged by other army leaders,
especially Defense Minister
Poignet, to whom Massamba tried
to turn over the presidency. With
Massamba out and some type of
army-led regime seemingly unavoid-
able, Poignet is apparently the
man most acceptable to the French,,
who continue to monitor Brazzaville
developments closely.
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FIFTH OAU SUMMIT SHAPING UP IN ALGIERS
The Organization of African
Unity's (OAU) Council of Ministers
began meeting in Algiers this
week to determine the agenda for
the fifth OAU summit which opens
on 13 September. In contrast to
last year's meeting at Kinshasa,
where the Africans purposefully
achieved an image of unity and
cooperation, this year's session
promises to be one of the liveli-
est and most divisive of recent
years.
The central issue of this
conference--and the most divi-
sive--is the question of the un-
resolved Nigerian war, which the
OAU last September took upon it-
self to try to solve. Despite
strenuous efforts by Ethiopia's
Emperor Haile Selassie as head of
the OAU's six-nation Consultative
Committee on Nigeria, he will have
little progress to report. The
Emperor has been able to get the
disputants to talk to each other--
both at Niamey and at Addis Ababa--
but no meaningful agreement has
been achieved, even on relief meas-
ures. The Emperor, in his report,
may well suggest that his commit-
tee be dissolved and that a new
OAU body take over.
The solid line-up of the OAU
last year with the Nigerian Gov-
ernment's position against Bi-
afran secession has broken down.
Four African states have recognized
Biafra, others are wavering, Paris
has "decreed" Biafra's right to
self-determination, and world
sympathy for Biafra has risen
sharply. The Biafrans, who have
been working hard diplomatically,
have enlisted Tunisia to carry
their banner at Algiers. Tunisian
officials reportedly plan to get
the issue on the summit agenda for
"in depth" consideration and to
insist that rebel leader Ojukwu
be given a full hearing.
The Nigerian federal govern-
ment is working equally hard to
keep the issue off the agenda and
to prevent the appearance of the
Biafrans.
however,[:I_j a Biafran delegation
will appear at Algiers and be ac-
corded observer or similir status.
The problem could be further in-
flamed if any other African states
recognize Biafra or if, as the
French ambassador in Addis Ababa
speculated recently, Paris decided
to recognize Biafra before the con-
ference convenes. The issue may
well provoke a walkout by the
federal government delegation.
The OAU will of course again
laud the efforts of the libera-
tion fighters of southern Africa
and condemn the policies of the
white-dominated states of Rhodesia,
South Africa, and the Portuguese
territories. This is the one
main issue the Africans can unite
on. This year, however, there may
be a battle shaping up over control
of the 11-member Tanzania-based
African Liberation Committee (ALC),
the OAU committee charged with
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handing out funds and arms to
the fighters.
Several states would like to
see the ALC out from under Tan-
zania's wing, and to put further
controls on the committee's ac-
tivities. Morocco, for one, has
proposed that ALC membership be
enlarged and that the chairmanship
be a revolving one. A further
squabble may arise over recommenda-
tions that the OAU withdraw its
recognition of Holden Roberto's
Angolan government-in-exile, a
manifestation of the rising frus-
tration many African leaders have
with the debilitating effects of
the several competing and quarrel-
ing nationalist movements.
Another issue, of lesser
significance but perhaps no less
divisive, may be a battle over
the election of a new secretary
general. The incumbent--the con-
troversial, free-wheeling Guinean,
Diallo Telli--is running hard
for re-election, but he has ir-
ritated many states during his
five-year tenure. Many former
French and British colonies are
clearly opposed to him but, as far
as is known, there is no consensus
on a successor and he may be recon-
firmed by default.
The Arab-Israeli issue also
seems likely to be raised. This
is always a difficult issue for
many African states, both those
who are sympathetic to Israel and
receive Israeli technical assist-
ance, and those who resent Arab
interference in African affairs.
African-Arab tensions have risen
over the continued detention of
former Congolese premier Moise
Tshombe in Algiers, and the re-
cent Algerian involvement in the
Palestinian highjacking of an Is-
raeli commercial aircraft.
The OAU generally tries to
steer clear of commenting on
international issues not directly
pertaining to Africa, and may
still do so this time. There is,
however, some sentiment for a
condemnation of Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia, and
also of US actions in Vietnam.
The Afro-Asian Solidarity Con-
ference on Vietnam, being held
in Cairo from 7 to 9 September,
may well spill over to the Algiers
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Repercussions from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia continued to
dominate hemisphere events this week.
The Chilean Radical Party, which issued only a lukewarm condemna-
tion of the Soviet action, is coming under criticism from many political
sectors. Two of its moderate candidates for the congressional elections
scheduled for next year have withdrawn in protest over the party's absten-
tion on the Chamber of Deputies' resolution expressing solidarity with
Czechoslovakia. The party has since tried to retreat slightly from its first
position.
In Venezuela, Communist Party expressions of outright support and
encouragement of the Soviet action have been muted by an apparent
divergence within the party leadership over this issue and the possible
adverse effect it might have on the electoral expectation of its front, the
Union for Advancement. Some party leaders are fearful that too public and
vocal a stance in support of the Soviets could seriously backfire against the
party's chances in the December congressional and presidential elections.
Non-Communist parties are already exploiting the Communists' dilemma. If
the Communists criticize the Soviets, they risk losing their main source of
financial support, but failing to do so could cost them a sizable portion of
the 150,000 votes they expect to pull in December.
In other developments, the military trial of David Knox, a British
citizen charged with complicity in the invasion of Haiti last May, ended with
a death sentence. President Duvalier, who had used the trial as a propaganda
vehicle, has hinted that he will grant clemency.
Argentine President Ongania's removal of General Julio Alsogaray as
army commander-in-chief last week finally provoked a strong public reaction
from the general. His statements stressed the seriousness of leaving Ongania
on his own and removing from positions of power those who sought a return
to democratic processes. Also ara 's protest Poses no th o the regime,
however.
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GUATEMALAN TERRORISTS THREATEN MORE VIOLENCE
Only relatively minor inci-
dents have occurred since the Com-
munist Rebel Armed Forces as-
sassinated Ambassador Mein last
week, but the possibility of sig-
nificant and even large-scale
violence is strong. The group
has threatened continuing acts
of reprisal until the government
frees guerrilla leader Carlos
Francisco Ordonez, alias "Camilo
Sanchez," whose capture continues
to be denied by officials.
During the past week, sev-
eral Guatemalan soldiers were
injured when a mine exploded under
their truck, and a firefight took
place between police and suspects
in the capital. A fire at the
army's central barracks and am-
munition dump may have been sabo-
tage, but there is as yet no clear
evidence. These and other events,
however, become the source of many
rumors which serve in turn to keep
tension high.
All parties represented in
congress have joined in calling
for the formation of a "national
front against violence." In mid-
August, the ruling Revolutionary
Party had invited "all sectors of
society" to discuss the creation
of such a front. The target of
that proposal, however, was right-
wing terrorism, to which substan-
tial numbers of the party's con-
stituency had fallen victim. The
nominal support of the right-wing
parties for such a front now,
therefore, seems certain to founder
upon the parties' deep antagonisms.
The search for the ambas-
sador's assassins continues with-
out significant developments.
Guatemalan authorities are con-
sidering posting large rewards for
information leading to the capture
of any of the six suspects, whose
pictures have been widely pub-
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ARGENTINA'S TOP GENERAL PROTESTS HIS OUSTER
General Julio Alsogaray, in
his first public statement since
his removal as commander in chief
of the Argentine Army on 26 Au-
gust, strongly denounced Presi-
dent Ongania and his policies.
Alsogaray had been a focal
point for a so-called "liberal"
faction that had been urging the
President to return the country
to more representative govern-
ment. He failed to get support
that he expected from other mil-
itary critics of the government,
however, and thus was unable to
prevent his ouster.
Three days after his removal,
Alsogaray called in the press and
issued a strong denunciation of
Ongania and his policies. He
charged that the takeover was
cause for "deep concern about the
future course of the government"
and that his replacement only a
month before he was slated to re-
tire as commander in chief con-
stituted almost an affront toward
the army as an institution. He
stressed the seriousness of re-
moving from positions of power
those who sought a return to dem-
ocratic processes.
Alsogaray's protest presents
little real threat to Ongania, but
the President has been known to
overreact to personal criticism.
In this case, however, he is
aware that many in the army agree
with Alsogaray's statements, and
he realizes that disciplinary ac-
tion against the retired general--
especially imprisonment, even for
a short time--would cause a divi-
sion in the military and ultimately
enhance Alsogaray's image. Fail-
ure to discipline Alsogaray, on
the other hand, might be inter-
preted as a weakness on the part
of Ongania. In any event, Also-
garay's open criticism of the Pres-
ident will make it more difficult
for the liberals still in the serv-
ice to influence Ongania.
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ECUADOR'S PRESIDENT VELASCO TAKES OFFICE
President Jose Maria Ve-
lasco Ibarra announced the forma-
tion of his fifth government on
1 September. He has indicated
that a major goal of his admin-
istration will be a shift in
Ecuador's foreign policy toward
a restoration of normal rela-
tions with the United States.
reportedly well qualified for
the job, the appointees who head
the crucial ministries of For-
eign Affairs, Government, and
Finance appear relatively in-
experienced to cope with the
difficult problems that now con-
front Ecuador.
Velasco's new cabinet of
"national concentration" con-
tains a disparate collection of
rather young ministers--average
age about 42--whose main charac-
teristic is professed loyalty to
the President and his as yet
poorly defined program. Ideo-
logically, the new cabinet ap-
pears nationalistic and left of
center. In addition to hard-
core Velasquista ministers such
as Agriculture Minister Pedro
Menendez Gilbert, Guayaquil po-
litical leader, it has one Lib-
eral, Minister of Government
Blasco Penaherrera Padilla, one
ex-Conservative, Foreign Minister
Rogelio Valdivieso Eguiguren,
and three identifiable leftists.
The US Embassy comments that
as problems arise, some further
cabinet changes may occur over
the coming months, particularly
if Velasco follows his past
practice of ignoring or over-
riding ministerial advice when
making important policy decisions.
Many of the new government's
designees have already met with
US officials to consider Ecuador's
economic needs and to discuss
differences over aid policies
and seizures of US fishing ves-
sels. Velasco has indicated he
hopes to improve US-Ecuadorean
relations.
Except for Defense Minister
Rafael Andrade Ochoa, who is
SECRET
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Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/05/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06600060001-5