WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Navy review
completed.
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
45,-
State Dept. review
16 May 1969
completed
No. 0370/69.
~ S37~1
~/-7 7
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(Information as of noon EDT, 15 May 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Communists are playing up their new ten-point
peace proposal as a major peace initiative but are
not clarifying the ambiguities of the plan. The
proposal was followed with a Communist show of force
by means of widespread shellings and ground attacks
throughout South Vietnam. In Saigon, President Thieu
and his National Social Democratic Front reached at
least temporary agreement on the role of this front
in the government.
PEKING AND MOSCOW MANEUVER ON BORDER QUESTION
Peking has accepted a Soviet proposal for border
river navigation talks, presumably in hopes of using
this forum to revive its claims to disputed islands
in the Ussuri River.
COMMUNISTS REMAIN ON OFFENSIVE FOOTING IN LAOS
The military situation is generally quiet but there
are new signs that Communist forces are preparing to
move against government positions in the northeast.
MALAYSIA FACES INCREASED INSTABILITY
Postelection developments in Malaysia have resulted
in serious communal rioting and threaten an already
weakened government.
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Europe
POHER GAINING IN FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST
The interim president is benefiting from the rising
anti-Gaullist tide which first appeared in last
month's referendum vote.
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS ACT TO GAIN CONFIDENCE OF SOVIETS 12
By taking steps to appease Moscow, the Husak regime
hopes to gain more leeway in domestic affairs,.
THE SOVIET MILITARY--THE QUICK AND THE DEAD
Various Soviet marshals, writing on the anniversary
of VE Day, called for vigilance but gave no indica-
tion of dissatisfaction with current military poli-
cies. The recent high death rate of Soviet generals
appears to have no political significance.
SOVIET FARM CHARTER BREAKS LITTLE NEW GROUND
The draft of a new collective farm charter, produced
after three years' work by a high-level committee,
differs substantially from the 1935 statutes but
primarily codifies existing legislation and prac-
tices.
YUGOSLAVS COMPLETE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Under a new and complicated electoral procedure,
voters chose more than 43,000 legislators for fed-
eral, republic, provincial, and communal assemblies.
SECRET
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EAST GERMANS PRESS FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BONN
A recently published speech by party boss Ulbricht
appears to confirm a shift in East Germany's tactics
toward Bonn.
SOVIETS MAINTAIN NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN
A new group of Soviet warships has arrived in the
Indian Ocean to continue the USSR's naval presence
in this area.
Middle East - Africa
NIGERIAN ARMY COMMAND RESHUFFLED
Federal leader Gowon has made major changes in his
military command in an effort to get his forces go-
ing again.
STAGE SET FOR NEW ARMY-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON 24
The crisis in Lebanon continues as government and
fedayeen leaders have been unable to reach any agree-
ment on the question of guerrilla operations in Leb-
anon.
DAHOMEY GOVERNMENT ENDANGERED BY GROWING UNREST
A wave of student and labor protest has been added
to a long list of serious domestic problems that are
beginning to threaten the life of the fragile govern-
ment of President Zinsou.
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Western Hemisphere
PERU AGAIN UPS THE ANTE FOR IPC
Peru now claims that the International Petroleum
Company owes it an additional $55 million, but it
is just barely possible that this may be a back-up
position in case Peru wishes to yield on its ear-
lier claims.
DISARRAY IN THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
During the past week several members of congress as
well as youth, student, and peasant leaders have re-
signed from President Frei's Christian Democratic
Party.
BOLIVIA ENTERS A PERIOD OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
Bolivian President Siles is settling into office fol-
lowing the death of President Barrientos. His success
will be determined by the extent to which he can work
with armed forces Commander in Chief Ovando.
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President Nixon's address on Vietnam has received no immediate offi-
cial Communist reaction. Last week's upsurge in country-wide shellings by
Communist forces in South Vietnam, reflects the Communists' concern to
forestall any impression that their new ten-point proposal for a settlement
represents a sign of weakness or retreat. Most of the 240 Communist rocket
and mortar attacks were aimed at allied military positions and installations,
but there was also a flurry of sabotage and terrorist activity in Saigon.
South Vietnamese reaction to the President's speech was generally
favorable. President Thieu endorsed President Nixon's proposals in a state-
ment emphasizing that they do not conflict with his own six-point peace
plan, which he offered on 7 May.
Peking's acceptance of a Soviet proposal for renewed border river
navigation talks next month suggests that the Chinese may seek to use this
forum to revive their claim to disputed islands in the Ussuri River. Recent
virulent propaganda concerning the border underscores the preoccupation of
both Peking and Moscow with political warfare maneuvers in the weeks prior
to the world Communist conference in Moscow. It is particularly doubtful
that Peking has a serious interest in even a limited accommodation on
navigation problems. Rumors were rife among foreign journalists in Moscow
this week concerning hostilities in the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border region.
Both sides have denied that any such incidents took place, however, and
they remain unsubstantiated.
Serious postelection rioting in Malaysia threatens an already weakened
government. Communal disorders broke out on 13 May in Kuala Kumpur
when an aggressive Malay election victory demonstration was staged in
answer to celebrations held the previous day by heavily Chinese opposition
parties. Discontent within the Chinese community over Malay predominance
has been accumulating for some time. Malay resentment was triggered by the
heavy losses the governing tri-party Alliance, particularly its Chinese com-
ponent, suffered in the election on 10 May. Despite the imposition of stiff
emergency measures, violence continued in Kuala Lumpur on 15 Ma
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VIETNAM
The Communists are giving
extensive propaganda play to
their new ten-point proposal as
a major peace initiative. They
are not providing any clarifica-
tion of the ambiguities in the
proposal, however.
The proposal appears pri-
marily designed to engage the
allies in a discussion of Com-
munist demands for a political
settlement. The language is con-
ciliatory, but few of the old
hard-line Communist demands
have been eliminated. It is
still focused on a complete US
disengagement from Vietnam and
a significant Communist toehold
in a coalition government. Abu-
sive language demanding the im-
mediate overthrow of the Thieu
government and a settlement in
accordance with the program of
the Liberation Front, has been
dropped, however.
The Communists are proposing
that their new ten points be dis-
cussed initially in the formal
weekly sessions in Paris rather
than in the private bilateral
talks sought by Saigon. They
insist on acceptance of the pro-
posals as a package, but they
have tried to rule the US out of
discussions on many vital issues,
restricting the US role to such
subjects as unilateral US troop
withdrawal, US reparations for
war damage in both North and
South Vietnam, and prisoners of
war. Other issues, including
North Vietnamese withdrawal and
a coalition government are the
prerogative of Vietnamese only,
according to the Front proposal.
Although deliberately couched
in ambiguous and negotiable lan-
guage, the ten points do contain
some new elements. One new aspect
is the hint that the Communists
would consider a cease-fire while
political negotiations are in
progress and while US troops are
still in the country. Point five
proposes negotiations in two
stages, the first to achieve a
provisional coalition government
whose principal duties would be
to oversee US troop withdrawal,
guarantee the Communists the
right to unrestricted political
activities, and arrange elections
for a new constitutional assembly.
The second stage envisages the
creation of a new constitution
and the establishment of a perma-
nent "coalition" government.
The Communists have not de-
clared a willingness to engage
in direct talks with Saigon, but
they left the door slightly ajar
by saying that "all political
forces which endorse peace, in-
dependence, and neutrality" should
participate in the first round of
negotiations. This language is
probably intended to leave the
way open for Saigon's participa-
tion, but only if it makes the
fundamental concession of agree-
ing to political cooperation with
the National Liberation Front.
Military Developments in
South Vietnam
The new Communist political
initiative was immediately fol-
lowed by a major show of military
force. Following their estab-
lished "fight-talk" strategy,
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the Communists launched a country-
the attacks on
at least partly
wide series t of hat rocket
emphasize that their
11-l 2d to
design e was not a sign
ten-point proposal unwilling or
that they were either fighting.
unable to continue the
The Communists opened their
shellings through
attack with 240 followed up by
tnam,
-
i
e
round as
out South V
four battalion-sized Sized ground
aults, five company- roun
d
d 31 lesser g
s
an
attacks,
Page 3
ources have
probes. Several "May Action
this the
unitt offensive
called
Co
phase" of exceptions'
plans and with few
directed
the attacks were osi-
against allied military P
outposts, and installa-
tions, Saigon, Da Nang- Hue,
and the and Tan Son
and the Da were, however,
Nhut air tseos of wlarge-caliber
also targets ardments.
enemy rocket bomb
of the attacks during
Com-
Many
the week were conducted by
local force and guer-
muni The major excep-
central high
rilla st units. the ts
were in Vietnamese uni
tions North 3
lands where of the -
under the direction 0f in on
Front continued owestern Kontum
allied targets in and in north-
and pleiku provicehere regi
III Corps of
western the North
mental Subordinates? of divisions
Vietnamese Sever and al remote allied
went after
artillery positions.
SECRET
16 May 69
week south o and in the
central highlands,Saigo Com-
ringing heavy in this
provinces were
munist losses because of
fighting primarily directed at
large-unit assaults ositions?
heavily defended allied p
anying the attacks
Accomp
was an appreciable upsurge in
enemy sabotage and terrorist
in Saigon. Aimed pri-
activit at police, gove tsrnmentthe
marily utility targe,
and public caused rela-
numerous incidents casualties.
tivelY light civilian
nd day the level
By the second
ered off sharply
of shellings tap round
but several large-scale 9h the
took place throug
battles
f Da Nang, in the
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There is increasing evidence
that many of the Communist first-
line combat units which pulled
back into relatively secure base
areas and border sanctuaries in
late March following the enemy's
"spring" offensive are about set
for another round of fighting.
Although most of these forces
have not completely relocated
back into forward positions held
during February and March, sev-
eral strategic areas are threat-
ened by the general reposition-
ing of enemy forces. These areas
include the northeastern Quang
Tri Province, much of Quang Ngai
Province including the vulner-
able provincial capital, certain
key areas to the northwest and
east of Saigon, and selected tar-
gets in the delta provinces. There
have also been reports that stepped-
up rocketing of Saigon and wide-
spread shellings will accompany
any new offensive thrust.
The Communists retain the
capability to stage impressive
country-wide shelling attacks.
It is still unclear, however,
whether the enemy intends major
combat units to battle on a coun-
try-wide basis. With most of the
enemy force having completed a
brief period of refurbishment,
many could be ready to attack
soon if the Communists elect to
begin their annual summer cam-
paign in the near future. Num-
erous intelligence reports, how-
ever, point to larger efforts
in June or even as late as July.
This "May Action Phase" could
continue through the rest of the
month but it may be typically
cyclical with short periods of
relative inactivity.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
President Thieu's political
confederation, the National So-
cial Democratic Front, may have
resolved, but perhaps only tempo-
rarily, the touchy problem of
the role the new front will play
in the government. After a meet-
ing with Thi.eu on 12 May, Senator
Nguyen Van Ngai, a Revolutionary
Dai Viet Party leader, said the
participating parties had elic-
ited Thieu's agreement that they
could "participate in formulating
and executing national policy."
The six participating politi-
cal organizations--the Vietnam
National Party (VNQDD) seems
finally to have decided to join--
apparently believe that Thieu's
agreement on that point paves the
way for their selected repre-
sentatives to join the cabinet,
hopefully in the near future.
Thieu, however,, is not anxious
to appoint these politicians to
the cabinet and. may hold that the
formulation means only presiden-
tial consultation on policy mat-
ters with the leadership of the
new confederation. He may yet
have to guarantee cabinet posi-
tions as the sine qua non for
participation of the parties, but
he is trying to avoid specific
timing. The parties are scheduled
to hold further working sessions
with Thieu to hammer out other
confederation matters. All the
parties have agreed to hold their
own conventions prior to the
confederation's, now scheduled
for 25 May.
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While attention has been
focused on the formulation of
the National Social Democratic
Front, the government has con-
tinued its heavy-handed treatment
of the press. On 12 May the
Information Ministry temporarily
closed down a newspaper and be-
gan preparing to prosecute its
publisher for printing a criti-
cal article about IR-8 "miracle"
rice. The government argues that
the story "destructively criti-
cizes" national policy and dis-
courages farmers from planting
the new rice.
The government's cavalier
attitude toward the press was
also spotlighted when Prime
Minister Huong denied a news-
paper report that he was about
to retire and then announced that
any paper which in the future
prints untruthful reports about
his resignation will be closed
immediately.
A government spokesman has
noted that since the lifting of
press censorship last year the
government has permanently closed
down four publications, indefi-
nitely closed down five newspapers,
and temporarily suspended 24
others. Nineteen of the 24 sus-
pensions have been lifted, in-
cluding that of the prestigious
Chinh Luan, published by influ-
ential Senator Dang Van Sung, 25X1
whom Thieu hopes will actively
participate in his confederation.
PEKING AND MOSCOW MANEUVER ON BORDER QUESTION
Peking's acceptance of a
Soviet proposal for renewed border
river navigation talks next month
suggests that the Chinese hope to
use this forum to revive their
claims to disputed islands in the
Ussuri River. The Soviet offer
to renew the talks on river navi-
gation was made on 26 April and
the Chinese replied on 11 May.
As part of their continuing
political and propaganda war with
Moscow, the Chinese will probably
try to manipulate the talks in
order to undercut the Soviet case
on the general issue of border
demarcation. The Soviets are
likely to reject this approach,
as they did in 1967 when they
charged that the Chinese "wrecked"
the last navigation meeting by
introducing border demarcation
problems which the Soviets said
were not within the competence
of the river navigation negotiators.
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Moscow has not yet commented on
the Chinese acceptance or the
alternate date proposed by Pe-
king, but it would probably wel-
come an agreement on practical
measures to lessen the risk of
incidents in the course of normal
river navigation.
During the navigation talks,
the Chinese will probably press
their claim that under existing
treaties and "established princi-
ples of international law" Chen
Pao (Damansky) and the other
disputed islands in the Ussuri
River are legally Chinese. Pe-
king appears to have a strong case
in regard to Chen Pao, mainly
because the main river channel
passes between the island and
the Soviet shore.
The Chinese have not yet re-
sponded to two earlier Soviet
proposals to renew talks on border
demarcation which had broken down
in 1.964. The Soviets had publi-
cized these offers as well as
the one on river navigation with
the apparent aim of cultivating
.an image as the more responsible
and moderate of the disputants.
During his report to the ninth
party congress in Peking on 1
April, Vice Chairman Lin Piao
stated that the Chinese were con-
sidering a reply to the Soviet
initiatives, but Peking has not
yet made a statement.
Although the Chinese may
eventually respond to the Soviet
offers, and may even issue a
counterproposal for border ne-
gotiations, the statement is
likely to be unacceptable to
Moscow. Peking has consistently
maintained that the Soviets must
recognize the 19th century trea-
ties which established the pres-
ent boundaries as "unequal trea-
ties" before any substantive bor-
der negotiations can begin. Mos-
cow has refused to grant the Chi-
nese this opening, which is ob-
viously intended to legitimize
China's cl-aims to vast terri-
tories in Siberia.
The recent upsurge of viru-
lent Sino-Soviet propaganda at-
tacks concerning the border dis-
pute has underscored a continuing
hostile attitude in both Moscow
and Peking. After a month-long
hiatus, Chinese propaganda media
renewed their coverage of the bor-
der dispute by releasing a full
length documentary film on 18
April which portrayed the history
of recent Soviet "atrocities"
along the Chinese border. The
Soviets, whose propaganda on the
issue had also diminished, have
responded with equally harsh at-
tacks.
Rumors were rife among for-
eign journalists in Moscow this
week concerning hostilities in
the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border
region. Both sides have denied
knowledge of such incidents, how-
ever, and they remain unsubstan-
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COMMUNISTS REMAIN ON OFFENSIVE FOOTING IN LAOS
The military situation is
generally quiet, but there are
new signs that Communist forces
are preparing to move against
government positions in the north-
east.
North Vietnamese forces con-
tinue to threaten guerrilla out-
posts north of the Plaine des
Jarres, and fresh enemy troops
have been observed moving into
the area in recent days. Al-
though heavy air strikes have ap-
parently kept the enemy off bal-
ance, an all-out assault against
these sites cannot be ruled out
prior to the monsoon rains that
C] Communist controlled
territory
Contested territory
Phu
Cum
Plaint des i.
fors-o .f
Xieng
Khouangville `^`
Page 7
should begin in early June. Ac-
many as five Pathet Lao and North
Vietnamese battalions--including
the 148th Regiment of the North
Vietnamese Army 316th Division--
are being moved into position for
an all-out attack on the govern-
ment outposts at Bouam Long and
Phu Cum. told
interrogators that the North Viet-
namese hope to take these posi-
tions in order to prevent govern-
ment guerrillas from using them
as a base for moving back into
Samneua Province during the rainy
season.
General Vang Pao's capture
of Xieng Khouangville and large
enemy storage facilities does not
appear to have disrupted enemy
operations in other areas; there
are indications that the Commu-
nists may soon attempt to recover
some of these positions south of
the Plaine. A buildup of North
Vietnamese in the hills northeast
of Xieng Khouangville may be
under way.
In the northwest, Communist
forces have once again captured
the village of Pak Beng but gov-
ernment forces are attempting to
hold outlying defense positions.
The continued enemy pressure
against government forces in the
Pak Beng area may be related to
increased government efforts to
disrupt the infiltration of men
and supplies into Thailand from
this area.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 May 6 9
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MALAYSIA FACES INCREASED INSTABILITY
Postelection developments in
Malaysia have resulted in serious
communal rioting and threaten an
already weakened government. The
government has imposed emergency
decrees tantamount to martial law
in an effort to bring the violence
under control.
The tri-party Alliance, com-
posed of Malay, Chinese, and Indian
parties, which has governed Malaysia
in the 12 years since independence
may be in danger of dissolution.
The Chinese component--the Malaysian
Chinese Association--which suffered
the greatest proportional loss of
Alliance seats in the election on
10 May, announced on 13 May that
it will withdraw from the cabinet.
It will continue to support the gov-
ernment in parliament, however,
thereby ensuring for the time be-
ing a slim parliamentary majority
for the Alliance.
Discontent within the Chinese
community with Alliance policies
has been accumulating for some time.
Chinese resent the government's
preferential treatment of the Malays
and what they regard as the imposi-
tion of a Malay cultural and politi-
cal hegemony.
The Chinese community looks
upon the Chinese Association as
having been too deferential to the
Malays and as failing to defend Chi-
nese interests. The association's
strategy of withdrawing from the
cabinet is an acknowledgment of its
weakened political position, and
may be a first step in an attempt
to retrieve respect within its own
community.
As the situation now stands,
the next government will be based
Page 8
essentially on the United Malays Na-
tionalist organization, the major
component of the Alliance. It rep-
resents the larger part of the na-
tion's Malay community, about half
of the population. The Chinese
community, comprising 37 percent
of the population and economically
the most important element, appar-
ently will be unrepresented in the
cabinet, but will actually have an
increased representation in parlia-
ment because of gains made by pro-
Chinese opposition parties. The
government's entire program of
balancing communal interests, push-
ing economic development, and forging
a national identity appear to be
in jeopardy.
Staggered. elections in the two
remote Borneo (East Malaysia) states
of Sarawak and Sabah, originally to
have been completed by early June,
apparently have been suspended under
the emergency decrees. This will
confuse further the already com-
plicated political situation in
Sarawak and could lead to disorders
sparked by resentment of the opposi-
tion parties.
The savage rioting between
Malays and Chinese which erupted
in Kuala Lumpur in the aftermath
of the election underscores the
racial tensions in Malaysia that
have surfaced oh other occasions.
In the current disturbances, which
have caused scores of deaths and
widespread property damage, pent-
up emotions and frustrations on
both sides were fanned by the
unexpected Alliance election
losses particularly to heavily
Chinese opposition parties, and
the subsequent Chinese Associa-
tion's withdrawal from the cabi-
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 May 69
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With all the candidates now declared in France's presidential election, a
tough contest is shaping up between interim President Poher and Georges
Pompidou. Poher appears to be riding the anti-Gaullist tide which appeared
in last month's referendum vote. Pompidou will probably try to regain lost
ground by disengaging himself from some of De Gaulle's less popular
policies.
Soviet leaders were busy on a variety of fronts. Brezhnev reportedly
was planning an informal visit to Rumania in an effort to display "warm and
comradely" relations between the two countries before the final preparatory
session of the International Communist Conference on 23 May and the
conference itself on 5 June. Kosygin scheduled a meeting with Finland's
President Kekkonen for 19 May at which a European security conference
will probably be high on the agenda.
The other member of the top three, President Podgorny, spent most of
the week in North Korea, where he made public statements pledging Soviet
support for the North Koreans while reminding them of the need for
coordinated action-something not in evidence at the time of the EC- 121
shootdown. Next week Podgorny will fly to Ulan Bator. The general ques-
tion of how to deal with China will surely dominate Podgorny's stop in
Mongolia.
In Czechoslovakia, Husak has taken a number of steps designed to
improve his standing with the Soviet leaders. In a Pravda article last week he
came close to admitting that the invasion last summer had been necessary.
He has set the stage to bring in more of his supporters to key posts in the
party later this month. He also has introduced the first of needed economic
stabilization measures-price increases and a ceiling on wages.
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POHER GAINING IN FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST
With all the candidates for
the presidency announced, a tough
race is shaping up between in-
terim president Alain Poher and
former prime minister Georges
Pompidou. Although early polls
gave Pompidou a wide lead, more
recent testing shows Poher, a
centrist, now running ahead.
Even before Poher formally
declared on 12 May, a strong
trend had begun to develop in his
favor. In the week immediately
following De Gaulle's resigna-
tion, Poher polled a mere 12 per-
cent against Pompidou's 44 per-
cent in a first ballot survey;
by the end of last week, however,
it was Poher 35 percent and Pom-
pidou 42 percent. A poll re-
leased on 13 May indicated that
in a second ballot runoff, Poher
would gain 45 percent and Pompi-
dou 36 percent, with 19 percent
undecided.
What French observers are
now calling the "Poher phenome-
non" appears to be a continuation
of the rising anti-Gaullist tide
which first showed itself in the
referendum vote. The left has
been unable to capitalize on
this trend both because of its
internal divisions, and because
it was tarnished by its bungling
response to last May's domestic
crisis. Poher's strong position
at present is in part a result
of his lack of involvement in
the political conflicts of the
last few years, and in part a
reflection of a widespread desire
for tranquility after a decade
of Gaullist gloire. Poher's
electoral support cuts across
party lines from the Communist
left well into the normally Gaul-
list constituency.
In the campaign which offi-
cially opens on 16 May, Pompidou
will probably wage a vigorous
offensive in order to regain the
lead. He has already attacked
Poher for failing to follow
through with earlier promises to
resign as interim president if
he became a candidate. On policy
issues, Pompidou will probably
try to place some distance be-
tween himself and De Gaulle in
an effort to woo the center and
undecided votes. In addition,
Pompidou and his army of sup-
porters in the Gaullist party
will charge that a vote for Poher
is a vote for the institutional
instability and weak governments
of the Fourth Republic, a tactic
that has worked well in the past.
More specifically, Pompidou
supporters will argue that because
the Gaullists control almost
three fourths of the seats in
parliament, Poher would dissolve
the National Assembly and call
new legislative elections soon
after he took office. Poher,
however, is already on record as
saying he would not do so unless
the Gaullists voted a motion of
censure. It is possible that he
thinks he could avoid new elec-
tions by forming a broad-based
coalition that would include
moderate Gaullists and garner
Gaullist votes in crucial legis
lative tests.
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS ACT TO
The Husak regime has taken
several steps to appease Moscow,
hoping in turn for more leeway
.in its conduct of domestic af-
fairs.
In an article that Pravda
published in Moscow last week,
Husak came close to conceding
that the Soviet intervention had
been necessary. He charged that
some liberal Communists, in col-
lusion with nonparty "antisocial-
ist forces," had precipitated a
crisis in an effort to overthrow
the party leadership. Husak's
article probably was intended
exclusively for Soviet readers,
but it was the strongest attack
to date by any Czechoslovak
leader on the liberals, and by
implication on the Dubcek leader-
ship for its failure to curb the
threat.
Husak apparently intends to
consolidate his power by bringing
more of his supporters into top
posts in the party and government.
There is considerable infighting
over the proposed shifts, and
conservative Czech party first
secretary Strougal, who is seeking
the elevation of his own followers
to high positions, is reported
to have insisted that the next
plenum deal exclusively with per-
sonnel changes. Government shifts
may be announced at a joint meet-
ing of the federal, Czech, and
Slovak cabinets on 19 May and
party shifts at a central com-
mittee lenum now set for 29
Ma .
Husak wil go to
e ore the plenum in order
to brief the Russians on the
GAIN CONFIDENCE OF SOVIETS
proposed changes and to discuss
bilateral economic matters.
The government on 14 May
introduced long-delayed price
increases as th first step in
its program to burb inflation
and to stabilize the economy.
The measure included a ceiling
on wages which he trade unions
claimed had notibeen cleared with
them, and there:raay be trouble
from some union, The regime
may be hoping that its adherence
to an earlier a
the trade union
prices on certa
reement with
not to raise
n basic foods
and consumer goods will be enough
to forestall the workers' dis-
sidence.
There have been recurrent
but unsubstantiated reports that
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko
and Deputy Premier Baybakov will
visit Prague shortly and that
the discussions might include
the withdrawal of some Soviet
troops and a hard currency loan
from the USSR. One press report
suggested that the Russians are
"likely" to begin troop with-
drawal by 1 June:,, allegedly to
demonstrate Moscow's confidence
in Husak and as is "goodwill
gesture" before the international
Communist conference.
These accoupts may reflect
a Czechoslovak effort to press
the Soviets into'at least a token
withdrawal. Nevertheless, the
withdrawal of sothe occupation
forces at this time is within the
realm of possibility. A smaller
Soviet force would probably be
adequate to maintain order. In
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any case, the Soviets could move
troops in and out of the CSSR as
needed.
Moreover, a token withdrawal
would gain Husak some popular
support and might strengthen his
hand within the leadership.
While the Soviets have reserva-
tions about Husak's motives, they
have lauded his initial moves and
may now be willing to make some
concessions that will help him
consolidate his position.
The Soviets, for example,
have already stopped publication
of the occupation forces' news-
paper, Zpravy, which had carried
conservative diatribes since
shortly after the invasion. Mos-
cow may have terminated Zpravy
in recognition of Husak's success
in largely silencing the mass
media.
In conjunction with last
week's anniversary of the Soviet
liberation of Czechoslovakia, the
press of the invasion powers--
except for East Germany--gave
extensive and favorable coverage
to the Husak leadership. The
main theme of Soviet media was
that Prague is now on the right
path toward "normalization"?
despite recent anti-Soviet demon-
strations--as shown by Czechoslovak
self-criticism, Husak's firmer
leadership, and Prague's emphasis
on the importance of the Soviet
Union to Czechoslovakia's future.
The Soviet press lauded Pres-
ident Svoboda, and also, to a
lesser degree, Husak, who was
characterized as "a wise and
farsighted leader" and "a true
friend of the Soviet Union."
The private comments of various
bloc officials, however, suggest
that the regimes which took part
in the invasion, especially the
East Germans, remain suspicious
of the Husak leadership. Aware
of this, Husak traveled to Buda-
pest on 15 May for talks with
Hungarian party chief Kadar in
what may be the first of a series
of visits to the invading coun-
tries in an attempt to win the
confidence of their leaders.
Moscow's skepticism may re-
flect the belief held in many
quarters that Husak, as a nation-
alist and a former victim of
Stalinism, will serve Czechoslo-
vakia's interests well, rather
than merely function as a Russian
puppet. The Soviets may also be
wary because many liberals and
moderates are now supporting
Husak, hoping that once he shapes
things to Soviet specifications,
he will move toward reform.
THE SOVIET MILITARY--THE QUICK AND THE DEAD
The Soviet marshals, deprived
of their customary military parade
on May Day, marked the anniversary
on 9 May of the victory over Ger-
many in their usual manner with
articles in most of the major So-
viet newspapers. The marshals ex-
pressed concern about external
threats and emphasized the need to
be vigilant, but nonetheless gave
the impression of satisfaction
with current military policies.
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The most authoritative ar-
ticle, by Defense Minister Grechko
in Pravda, was moderate. Grechko
emphasized the role of the party
in defense policy and noted the
special attention the party and
government are paying to a "rea-
sonable combination of nuclear-
rocket weapons with the perfec-
tion of usual classical armament."
He outlined the postwar appearance
of "new imperialist forces" in-
cluding "neo-fascism" and "re-
vanchism" in West Germany, and
urged the need for ideological
and military unity of the social-
ist states.
While Grechko referred spe-
cifically to the US only once--
as encouraging West Germany--First
Deputy Defense Minister Zakharov
in Izvestia launched an anti-US
diatribe. He catalogued "aggres-
sive" US acts since 1945, including
the establishment of NATO and its
members' instigation of "more
than 100 military provocations,"
most recently in Czechoslovakia.
Citing figures to "prove" the
vast scale of the Western threat,
he called for military prepared-
ness but gave assurance that the
party and government are doing
all that is necessary.
Grechko attacked the "ad-
venturist" policies of the "Mao
Tse-tung group." Zakharov on
the other hand did not mention
the Chinese threat. It did re-
ceive attention, however, from
his fellow first deputy defense
ministers, Sokolov in Red Star
and particularly Yakubovsky--who
commands the Warsaw Pact forces--
in Sovetskaya Rossi a. Sokolov,
like ZakharoV, underlined the
NATO threat posed by an arms
buildup and a ring of bases
around the USSR. He too called
for continued strengthening of
Soviet defenses, at the same
time noting that the Soviet Army
is equipped with the "newest mili-
tary technology and weapons, in-
cluding nuclear weapons of all
calibers, and missiles of various
operational ranges, from tactical
to intercontinental."
The death rate among Soviet
generals, which has attracted the
attention of the Western press,
continues to be high, but not
dramatically so, and seems to have
no political significance. The
impact of last winter's severe
Asian flu epidemic on an over-age
military hierarchy probably ac-
counts for some of the increase
in the year's mortality rate among
the generals as compared with last
years. Most of the recent deaths
seem to have had. natural causes,
with two exceptions. General Popov--
believed to have been posted to
the Defense Ministry's Chief In-
spectorate--and Lt. Gen. Kadomtsev--
who commanded air defense avia-
tion--were described as having
perished "tragically," which
usually denotes a violent death.
These two may have died in a
single accident.. Because of the
dissimilarities in the status and
professional position of the other
generals who have died recently,
there is little reason to sup-
pose that their deaths were linked.
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SOVIET FARM CHARTER BREAKS LITTLE NEW GROUND
The newly published draft of
the Soviet Union's collective
farm charter primarily codifies
legislation and practices that
have evolved since publication of
the outmoded 1935 charter and
does not appear to signal signif-
icant change for the USSR's
36,000 collective farms. The new
charter will serve as a model to
govern all major aspects of col-
lective farm management and life.
A high-level committee
chaired by Brezhnev began work on
the draft early in 1966, but de-
bate on controversial issues pre-
sumably has delayed publication
until now. The draft will be
submitted in November to a na-
tional conference of collective
farmers for final approval. Sharp
debate in the press has already
begun, suggesting continued dif-
ferences in,the leadership over
agricultural policies.
The draft reaffirms the col-
lective farm as an integral part
of Soviet society and enumerates
rights as well as responsibilities
of the collective and its members.
The most important rights granted
the farmer are guaranteed pay in
cash and farm products, partici-
pation in farm administration and
election of its officers, and
maintenance of private plots and
livestock.
Guaranteed annual wages were
established by a 1966 decree. Al-
though the right to elect farm
administrators and other provi-
sions of self-government suppos-
edly were insured by the 1935
charter, local government and
party officials actually usurped
most of these rights. The new
draft allows, but does not require,
the secret ballot in farm elec-
tions and calls for general farm
meetings four times a year. These
provisions, if implemented, may
give the farm worker a voice in
farm administration. The present
draft, however, does not preclude
a continuation of direct state
supervision over the selection of
farm management.
The area allotted to private
plots and the number of livestock
permitted by the draft charter are
less than in 1935, but are higher
than current actual levels. The
provision to make plot size and
number of livestock partially de-
pendent upon the amount of labor
participation in the collectivized
sector, a potential loophole for
restricting private activity, has
already come under attack in the
press.
Many of the provisions which
grant rights to the farm appear
to be compromise solutions on par-
ticularly sensitive issues. The
draft allows, for example, the
farm to choose the form of labor
organization, reaffirms the right
to establish subsidiary farm en-
terprises, and allows participa-
tion in interfarm activities and
organizations. Regulations gov-
erning some of these activities
are contained in existing decrees
or may yet be formulated.
Formation of a collective
farm union, an idea debated for a
number of years, is not mentioned
in the charter, but further dis-
cussion on the subject can be ex-
pected. Such a union, in theory,
would be independent from the
Ministry of Agriculture and would
administer the affairs of all col-
lective farms.
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tions, which began in early April,
ended on 12 May after placing
over 43,000 legislators in the
federal, republic, provincial,
and communal assemblies. Under
a law adopted last January, vot-
ers had a wide choice for a rec-
ord number of posts in an un-
precedented number of constitu-
encies. To protect the Communist
Pa:rty's foundations, the candi-
dates had been thoroughly screened
in the nominating process.
On the average there were
twice as many candidates as
seats; approximately 87 percent
of the electorate voted. As in
previous elections not all can-
didates were party members, but
no figures are available on how
many nonparty candidates ran or
were elected. Candidates were
allowed to criticize and debate
alternative proposals on how
best to achieve the regime's
goals. Many of the local elec-
tions were hotly contested on a
personal basis, and the election
procedures seem to have been de-
signed to promote the selection
of the candidate most capable of
implementing the regime's pro-
grams. The elections incidentally
provided the authorities with
clues as to who is popular among
the electorate and why.
Widespread dissatisfaction
remains among authorities and
the voters with the complicated
electoral mechanism. Post-elec-
tion assessments are virtually
unanimous in calling for another
revamping. Voters were confused
by the intricacies of the system
Page 16
v17CTn-_ 1 atT4 = I c rem- - -. 9 _ I _ _
YUGOSLAVS COMPLETE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
-__~ ~_?_ .iCaut=,i6[1lp concerned by
-its lack of control over "elec-
tion excesses." One communal as-
sembly re-elected its president
two days after he had been expelled
from the party, and in another
commune a candidate was elected
on his advocacy of denationaliza-
tion of peasant property. In many
cases run-off elections will be
held because no candidate received
a majority.
The current system provides
for the direct election by secret
ballot of the upper house in each
assembly except the Federal As-
sembly's Chamber of Nationalities.
Delegates to the Chamber of Na-
tionalities, composed of 20 rep-
resentatives from each republic
and 10 from each province, are
elected by the republic and pro-
vincial assemblies. A recent
constitutional amendment provides
that the Chamber of Nationalities
must approve each bill before it
becomes law.
Yugoslavia's 501 communal
assemblies also are elected by
direct secret ballot, and they
elect most of the ',remaining
chambers at all levels of par-
liament. These chambers are
less influential, however, and
their legislative function is
restricted to specific economic-
social areas. The :Final step in
the formation of the government
takes place on 16 May when the
newly elected Federal Assembly
convenes to approve the 20-mem-
ber Federal Executive Council
(cabinet) of premi.er.-designate
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 May 69
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501 BICAMERAL COMMUNAL
ASSEMBLIES
SOCIALIST ALLIANCE
NOMINATION MEETINGS
? COMMUNAL CHAMBERS
(20,0621
? CORPORATE CHAMBERS
(20,2171
? Elected directly by secret ballot
Elected indirectly by the Communal Assemblies
Numbers in parentheses represent number of Deputies
BOSNIA (4061
? REPUBLIC CHAMBER (120)
SOCIOPOLITICAL CHAMBER (70)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER (70)
EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (70)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (701
CROATIA 1440)
? REPUBLIC CHAMBER (1201
ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (B0)
? ECONOMIC CHAMBER (80)
? EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (80)
? SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (SO)
MACEDONIA (340)
? REPUBLIC CHAMBER (100)
CHAMBER OF COMMUNES (60)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER (60)
EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (60)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (60)
MONTENEGRO (254)
? REPUBLIC CHAMBER (701
CHAMBER OF COMMUNES 146)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER 146)
EDUCATIONAL CULTURAL CHAMBER (46)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER 146)
SERBIA (440)
*REPUBLIC CHAMBER 1120)
ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (80)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER (801
EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (80)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER 001
SLOVENIA 1285)
?REPUBLIC CHAMBER (90)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER (75)
EDUCATIONAL- CULTURAL CHAMBER (60)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER 160)
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE ASSEMBLIES
KOSOVO (2701
? PROVINCIAL CHAMBER (70)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER (561
EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (50)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (501
ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (50)
VOJVODINA 1350)
? PROVINCIAL CHAMBER (90)
ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (65)
ECONOMIC CHAMBER (65)
EDUCATIONAL CULTURAL CHAMBER (65)
SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (65)
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CHAMBER OF
NATIONALITIES (140)
SOCIOPOLITICAL
CHAMBER (120)
EDUC-CULTURAL
CHAMBER (120)
ECONOMIC
CHAMBER (1201
? SOCIAL-HEALTH
CHAMBER (120)
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EAST GERMANS PRESS FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BONN
A belatedly published speech
made by party boss Ulbricht at a
meeting of the central committee
on 30 April appears to confirm that
the East Germans have decided to
press Bonn to establish diplomatic
relations.
Ulbricht scored Bonn for re-
jecting East German proposals to
negotiate various issues and for
attempting to mislead "public opin-
ion" by referring to East Germany
as a "foreign state." He then said
that Bonn's full recognition of Pan-
kow was a condition to "normalizing"
relations.
East German officials have in
the past demanded that Bonn estab-
lish diplomatic relations and have
referred to West Germany as a "for-
eign state." They have, however,
quickly backtracked when these de-
mands caused an uproar in West Ger-
many and probably also in East Ger-
many.
Ulbricht made a long and
rather tortured explanation of how
Pankow can demand that Bonn recog-
nize East Germany as a sovereign
state while insisting at the same
time that the states remain part of
the "German nation." His remarks
suggest that he was rebutting in
advance arguments on this apparently
controversial issue from West Ger-
mans, and perhaps East Germans. He
stated that "history" teaches that
"it is possible that relations un-
der international law exist between
sovereign states of the same nation,"
and cited as an example the "exist-
ence of a number of sovereign
states...of the Arab nation."
Two factors may account for the
East Germans' shift in tactics to-
ward Bonn. On one hand, they are
encouraged by the recent decisions
of Iraq and Cambodia to recognize
their regime, and probably by the
fact that some West Germans, includ-
ing two Social Democratic Party re-
gional organizations, have advo-
cated recognition. They presum-
ably:believe that time is now on
their side in their attempt to gain
recognition.
On the other hand, Pankow
which apparently has reservations
about the Budapest Appeal for a Eu-
ropean security conference, may be
attempting to preclude negotiations
or compromises at a conference on
issues they consider to be non-ne-
gotiable. In this connection, U1-
bricht remarked that the East Ger-
mans will pose no conditions for a
security conference, but immediately
added that European security is tied
to the establishment of "normal re-
lations" between the two Germanies.
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SOVIETS MAINTAIN NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN
A guided-missile destroyer
and an oiler from the Pacific
entered the Indian Ocean on 6
May to continue the Soviet naval
presence there.
This is the third group of
Soviet warships to sail these
waters in the past year. Two
guided-missile ships which had
been there since November left
for Vladivostok in late April.
The Soviet warships make official
visits to Indian Ocean ports,
but spend a good part of their
time at anchor in the areas of
Mauritius and the Seychelles.
Two Soviet mooring buoys recently
were installed in international
waters on Fortune Bank east of
Coetivy Island. In addition to
the warships, Soviet oceanographic
INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS
Dar es Salaam
flEVL'IlLIC~
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AE. UARRA
J'!
,fi NDa 04MCL ":C O'.~HAF
r. ~_6Ri7ll r " uv / `AC A4 EGA
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
and space support ships frequent
this area of the Indian Ocean.
The USSR probably will seek
use of Indian Ocean port facili-
ties to support the warships,
space support and research ships
operating there. In this con-
text, the Soviets may hope even-
tually to gain regular use of
facilities in Port Louis in
Mauritius. Two guided-missile
Hoi^+x ~VC~
Port Louis
Nb
\i MAl3 Ri71U ~:
16 May 69
95$38 S?L9
DIEGD
GAPCtA
(eiaF. u n /
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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA
Action along the Israeli-Jordanian border remained at the same high
level that has characterized the past few weeks, and clashes along the Suez
Canal also continued on a daily basis. Attempts by the Lebanese Govern-
ment to negotiate an understanding with the fedayeen groups operating in
southern Lebanon proved futile this past week in Beirut.
The Iranian Government and the Western oil consortium reached a
compromise on revenues for the year that began on 21 March. Through a
combination of increased oil production and advance payments, the consor-
tium probably will more than meet the Shah's demands for $1 billion in
revenue. Although the Shah may not be happy about the necessity for
advance payments, he has accepted the offer as a realistic compromise.
The three-week-old strike of Turkish contract workers at American
installations has now spread to facilities at Incirlik Air Base. Mediation
efforts have made little headway, and the tense atmosphere at some sites
could lead to serious incidents. The situation is apparently delaying conclu-
sion of the important Turkish-American bilateral agreement, under negotia-
tion for over two years, which the Turks are especially anxious to sign before
parliament adjourns on 1 June.
In Africa, Guinean President Toure's exploitation of the alleged revolu-
tionary plot first announced in February has led to death sentences for nine
principal plotters. Toure's announcement that "radicalization" of the revolu-
tion would continue and that those not for it would lose their jobs suggests
that the purge is not yet over. In Dahomey, a wave of student and labor
protest has been added to the long list of serious domestic problems that are
beginning to threaten the life of the fragile government of President Zinsou.
Along the vital Benguela Railroad, in Angola, a spate of sabotage by
insurgents based in the Congo (Kinshasa) and Zambia has prompted Portugal
to suspend all international traffic over the line, a tactic that has been
effective in the past to force Kinshasa and Lusaka to rein in the guerrillas.
Numerous actual or would-be Pakistani political leaders are keeping up
low-level maneuvering in anticipation of an eventual return to non-military
rule. The martial law administration, meanwhile, appears increasingly con-
cerned over reports that the small, pro-Peking faction of the Communist
Party is collecting weapons for a Dossible "peasants' revolt" in East Pakistan
during the summer monsoon.
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NIGERIAN ARMY COMMAND RESHUFFLED
Federal leader Gowon has
made major changes in his mili-
tary command in an effort to get
federal forces back on the offen-
sive in the civil war that is now
in its 23d month. Meanwhile, Ni-
gerian oil production reached a
record high in April, but Biafran
units still pose a serious threat
to oil installations.
General Gowon has replaced
all. three of his division command-
ers and his quartermaster general
in a shake-up that may include
still further changes. There seems
to be no significant opposition to
the changes made thus far; Gowon
has paid due regard to trival sen-
sitivities and the officers re-
placed have all been given other
assignments.
Despite the reshuffle, fed-
eral forces do not appear likely
to mount any successful offensive
activity for some time. The 1st
Division, which captured Umuahia
last month, has been bogged down
there ever since and faces seri-
ous supply problems. The largely
ineffectual 2d Division has been
on the defensive for months, and
the 3d Division reportedly has
become seriously disorganized fol-
lowing the Biafran recapture of
Owerri last month.
Nigeria's two oil-producing
companies, Shell-BP and Gulf, re-
corded nearly 600,000 barrels per
day in April, making Nigeria the
11th largest oil-producing coun-
try. Biafran forces are close to
several oil fields, however, as
well as to the Trans-Niger Pipe-
line. On 9 May, a secessionist
raiding party captured two drill-
ing camps near Kwale, and more
raids are expected. The seces-
sionists have not sabotaged any
of the very vulnerable oil instal-
lations still in federal hands,
probably in the hope of eventually
recapturing them intact.
Meanwhile, eight Soviet eco-
nomic technicians arrived in Lagos
on 9 May, probably under the terms
of an economic cooperation agree-
ment signed by the USSR and Ni-
geria last November, Some of the
technicians are to ',advise the fed-
eral government on the establish-
ment of a state construction or-
ganization, while the others, who
are geological survey experts, may
be involved with Soviet assistance
to a proposed Nigeran steel mill.
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Biafrans Still Pose Serious Threat to Nigerian Oil Installations
A IAI RA
Benin City
2nd Federal
Division
Enugu
tst Federak
Divisipn .
Afikpo
bOwerrl ?Umuahia
Okigwi
rLf
Oilfield
(Shell-BP)
3rd F*deral Aba~.
Tkot Ekpene
Division
Calabar
' ort Harcourt
field
Frans}Njger Pipeline
L~he1/-?Pf~- ~ ~,
Bonny Oil Evacuation Terminal
EQUATORIAL GUWNEA
FERNANDO p0;
CAMEROON.
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4ECRET
STAGE SET FOR NEW ARMY-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON
Another confrontation is pos-
sible between the Lebanese Gov-
ernment and the fedayeen,follow-
ing the collapse of negotiations
early this week.
Fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat
came to Beirut last week to confer
with President Hilu and President
Nasir's emissary, Sabri al-Khuli,
in an attempt to arrive at an
understanding on the problem of
fedayeen activities in Lebanon.
Arafat demanded complete freedom
of action for guerrilla groups in
Lebanese territory without any
coordination or control by the
military. He further insisted on
the right to bring fedayeen troops
into the country.
President Hilu, who has re-
mained adamantly opposed to any
concession that would encroach
upon his country's sovereignty,
rejected these demands. He is
convinced that Beirut must have
a showdown with the fedayeen
eventually, and that it should
not allow them to pick the time.
The continued firmness of Hilu's
stand depends, however, on the
support he receives from the mili-
tary and from influential Muslim
and Christian political leaders.
In the short term, the support
that the Lebanese Army will give
to Hilu matters most. General
Bustani, the army's commander,
has been vacillating, and Hilu
presently has doubts of Bustani's
complete support. The politi-
cians, motivated by personal po-
litical considerations, have also
been wavering in their stand to-
ward the fedayeen.
taker Prime Minister Ras i Karami
may be willing to form a new
cabinet, Lebanon remained with-
out a viable cabinet during the
past week. It is unlikely, more-
over, that Karami or any other
Muslim politician would be will-
ing to form a cabinet without a
broad consensus of support on
the fedayeen issue.
Israeli leaders are, of
course, watching developments in
Lebanon very closely. They have
made it abundantly clear that if
Beirut permits the fedayeen to
open a "third front" in Lebanon,
they will react quickly and
strongly. :Months ago, they sug-
gested that if the Arab guer-
rillas are permitted freedom of
action in southern Lebanon, they
might have to take up a defen-
sive position north of the pres-
ent Israeli--Lebanese border.
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SECRET
DAHOMEY GOVERNMENT ENDANGERED BY GROWING UNREST
The government of Dahomey's
President Zinsou, already belea-
guered by obstinate financial
problems, a split within the
army, and incessant coup plot-
ting by an assortment of ci-
vilian opponents, is now beset
by a wave of discontent among
students and workers.
A strike by secondary stu-
dents, backed by some teachers,
erupted late last week and quick-
ly developed into an attack on
the government for its alleged
sellout to "French imperialism."
Zinsou reacted by closing the
struck schools. They reportedly
were reopened on 13 May, but
most students remain out of school,
with the result that Dahomey's
two major cities are now burdened
with a large number of foot-loose,
disgruntled young people ripe
for the organizational talents
of opposition leaders.
Long-simmering labor dis-
content has also increased re-
cently. Desperately trying to
meet Paris' demands that budg-
etary retrenchment precede fur-
ther French subsidies, Zinsou
earlier this month proposed
drastic cuts in some of the
fringe benefits for government
employees. The proposal im-
mediately brought forth predict-
able complaints and strike
threats. Under pressure, Zinsou
reduced the size of the proposed
cuts, but without appreciable
effect on the aroused government
workers, who have now garnered
considerable sympathy from angry
teachers and other workers. A
walkout by government workers
called for 16 May could easily
trigger a general strike and
widespread street demonstrations.
Zinsou also continues to be
dogged by the problem of former
chief of state Lt. Col. Alley.
Alley would like to be returned
to a top army job, but is unac-
ceptable to the present chief of
staff and his associates, who
installed Zinsou as president
last August. Following Alley's
refusal to be shelved in a for-
eign assignment, Zinsou has
turned the problem over to a
military disciplinary committee,
despite indications that Alley
retains considerable support in
the army.
The division within the
army over Alley, at the very
least, decreases the chances
that it would act effectively
to control any large-scale dem-
onstrations against ZinsOU's
regime. Zinsou himself recog-
nizes the vulnerability of his
position. In a conversation
with the US ambassador on 13
May, he acknowledged that there
is a growing danger he may be
overthrown, but he insisted
that he will not back away
the stands he has taken.
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SECRET
Governor Rockefeller's fact-finding mission to Mexico, Central Ame:
ica, and Panama dominated events in Latin America this week.
For the most part, the Latins have given the governor a warm an
enthusiastic welcome. The accidental death of a Honduran student during
demonstration on 14 May is the only incident to have marred Rockefeller
visits so far. The first phase of the trip will end on 18 May in Panama Cit)
the second leg will begin in Venezuela on 27 May.
Tension between Costa Rica and Panama over repeated incursions b)
the Panamanian National Guard in search of anti-junta insurgents has sub-
sided. Costa Rica is still waiting for a satisfactory reply to its protest note;
but has not as yet asked the Organization of American States to take any
action on the matter.
Foreign and economic ministers or their representatives from all Latin
American nations except Cuba are meeting in Chile this weekend to approve
and coordinate a new plan to improve economic relations with the US. The
ministers, who are meeting within the framework of the Latin American
Special Coordinating Committee (CECLA), will be studying recommenda-
tions drafted by technical-level experts this week. The new formula report-
edly includes a request for more favorable credit terms, technological assist-
ance, and a bigger share of US markets. The whole package will be forwarded
for President Nixon's perusal and will be discussed again next month with
the US at the meeting of the Organization of American States' Inter-Amer-
ican Economic and Social Council in Trinia.
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SECRET
PERU AGAIN UPS THE ANTE FOR IPC
The Peruvian minister of
mines and energy, General Fernan-
dez Maldonado, announced on 13
May that a special investiga-
tions committee had found that
the International Petroleum Com-
pany (IPC) owes the state an ad-
ditional $54,848,306.10. Fer-
nandez Maldonado stated that the
results of the investigation
would be given to Peru's attorney
general for initiation of appro-
priate legal actions against IPC.
This new debt is in addition
to the $690 million IPC allegedly
owes the state for the oil it is
charged with illegally extracting
and marketing since 1924 and ap-
proximately $15 million the state
oil company claims as payment for
petroleum products supplied to
IPC following the expropriation.
The nearly $55 million the govern-
ment is now adding to IPC's "debt"
stems from the company's alleged
failure to comply with a supreme
decree of 1959 obligating IPC to
re-invest part of its profits in
Peru in return for a raise in
fuel prices. The large size of
the previously established "debt"
makes this new finding almost ir-
relevant, except as a possible
fallback position in the event
that the military government
should decide to give up its
claim to the $690 million in an
effort to resolve its dispute
with the US.
The Peruvians may feel that
they can make a much better legal.
case for ;this new-found debt than
for the $00 million and through
this method offset any compensa-
tion to IPC for its expropriated
assets in the country. They may
also believe there is a better
possibility that the US Govern-
ment would view this as a legiti-
mate claim. The US Embassy, how-
ever, notes that the Peruvian
Government: never lived up to its
obligations under the decree of
1959 and that, therefore, the
provisions regarding IPC obliga-
tions carried no force.
The Peruvian negotiating
team in Washington held a press
conference': this week in which
optimism was expressed, despite
the absence of any real progress
thus far. Alberto Ruiz Eldredge,
a member of the team and one of
President c7elasco's chief ad-
visers on the IPC issue, stated
that talks were taking place in
an atmosphere of "great cordialty
and frankness" and that he was
"optimistic" that the two coun-
tries would resolve their differ-
ences. Thus far, however, Presi-
dent Velasco has maintained his
adamant position in IPC's "debt,"
the major point of difference
between the.two governments.
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SECRET
DISARRAY IN THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
During the past week several
members of the Chilean Congress
as well as youth, student, and
peasant leaders have resigned
from President Frei's Christian
Democratic Party (PDC).
The resignations occurred
following a dispute over whether
the PDC should run its own candi-
date in the presidential elec-
tion in 1970 or should try to
run a "popular unity" candidate
with Communist and Socialist sup-
port. A party assembly two weeks
ago decided by a vote of 233 to
215 to run a PDC candidate with-
out other backing. Senator Rafael
Gumucio, who had hoped to be a
joint candidate, resigned, taking
several other leftists with him.
This group does not plan to form
a new political party but will
start a "movement" open to the
Marxist left. They hope that a
candidate from their group could
obtain Communist and Socialist
backing.
The bulk of the party, how-
ever, remains committed to the
position adopted two weeks ago.
Even Radomiro Tomic, a leading
candidate who had said he would
not run without Communist and
Socialist support, has remained
in the party and has had no com-
ment on the resignations. The
Communists and Socialists have
repeatedly rebuffed Tomic's over-
tures. Perhaps to avoid comment-
ing he quietly left Chile early
this week for his planned trip
to Eastern Europe, the USSR and
possibly to countries of the Com-
munist Far East.
A major issue in the presi-
dential campaign will be President
Frei's economic and social reform
program. Those leftists who have
resigned from the PDC are dissat-
isfied with the pace of reform and
believe that a more radical ap-
proach to Chile's problems is
necessary. Most Christian Demo-
crats, however, believe that Frei
has done as well as could be ex-
pected and are willing to stand
on his record. Nevertheless,
the defection of important leftist
leaders will reduce the party's
appeal to a broad spectrum of
voters.
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SECRET
BOLIVIA ENTERS A PERIOD OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
Bolivian President Sites is
settling into office three weeks
after the death of President Bar-
rientos. He has not yet enunciated
any specific policies, however,
and his leeway for putting his
own stamp on the government has
been restricted by the influence
of armed forces Commander in Chief
Ovando, who is functioning in ef-
fect as a co-president. Siles
has stressed his willingness to
work with Ovando, but he refuses
to be treated as a "lackey."
In a press interview last
week, Ovando emphasized his com-
mitment to constitutionalism and
reminded the public that he had
"constitutionalized the country
in 1966"--a reference to the demo-
cratic elections held when he was
junta president. He added that
despite this commitment he would
intervene in the government, and
even overthrow Siles, if such ac-
tion became necessary "to save
the Bolivian revolution." He
hedged on his future political
activities, saying only that he
would not run for president in
uniform and that he would not ac-
cept Siles' support in the presi-
dential election scheduled for
May 1970.
Sites, in a separate inter-
view, described himself as the
"defender of the constitution."
He said that although he could be
thrown out of office by a group
of "five armed men," he believed
that students, labor, and the armed
forces would defend him because
he represented constitutional suc-
cession.
Although Ovando told US Am-
bassador Castro that Siles was a
"trial" to him and otherwise
conveyed mistrust of the presi-
dent, the two men probably will
manage to work together unless
some crisis hits the country or
Sites tries to assert too much
independence. An outbreak of
guerrilla warfare, serious eco-
nomic difficulties, or significant
agitation by miners, teachers,
students, or other special in-
terest groups could cause the
military to move against Siles.
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Secret
Secret
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