(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007600010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 16, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Nyerere's Plans for Tanzania
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
N2 16
16 January 1970
No. 0353/70A
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SEUKE1'
Although many African states avow socialist aims, Tanzania is one of the few to move
from rhetoric to practice. With his Declaration at Arusha in 1967, President Nyerere
committed his ruling party to mitigating social and economic inequalities between urban
and rural inhabitants and between the governing elite and the masses. Since then he has
proposed radical changes in the school system to make it more relevant for the country's
overwhelmingly rural population and has adopted a rural development program based on
communalized farming.
A slow but determined effort is being made to carry out Nyerere's ideas. Several
ujamaa (socialist) villages-the backbone of his approach to socialism and rural develop-
ment-have been set up, and major revisions in the curriculum and organization of primary
and secondary schools are now in the planning or experimental stage. Because the govern-
ment has very limited funds and few trained people, progress will continue to be slow and
uncertain, but political leaders are under little popular pressure to move faster. In fact, one
of the main problems is to try to convince the deeply conservative and tradition-minded
peasantry of the need for change.
Of almost equal importance to Nyerere is the liberation struggle against the white-ruled
states of southern Africa. As his government has become more deeply involved in supporting
the African insurgent movements, he has grown fearful that the white governments will
eventually retaliate militarily. Consequently, Tanzania is planning to expand its defense
forces and acquire more sophisticated weapons. Unable to obtain modern arms cheaply
from either the Soviet Union or the West, Nyerere has turned increasingly to Communist
China, which has been willing to provide military and economic aid on unusually favorable
terms.
UJAMAA: THE BASIS OF TANZANIAN
SOCIALISM
Socialism, like democracy, is an attitude of mind.
-Julius K. Nyerere
Tanzania's socialist experiment cannot be
understood apart from the ideas and personality
of President Julius Nyerere. Central to his think-
ing is the concept of ujamaa. Nyerere rejects both
capitalism and "scientific" socialism as unsuitable
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and alien to Africa. Instead, he maintains that
Africa's traditional society, which he considers
intrinsically egalitarian and democratic, can serve
as a guide to building a new society. Work, co-
operation, sharing, equality, and communal
democracy, which he asserts are part of tradi-
tional life, must also be part of socialist life.
From independence in 1961 to the Arusha
Declaration in 1967, however, Nyerere's plans to
build socialism were ill-defined. He tried to in-
volve the ruling party, the Tanganyika African
National Union (TANU), and through TANU, the
peasantry in such cooperative efforts as road and
school construction and in setting up communal
farming villages. In 1961 his government also
embarked on a crash program to expand and
diversify the country's already thriving coopera-
tive marketing movement.
These efforts, however, were not very suc-
cessful. Although some peasants benefited from
the government's economic development efforts
and a few began to increase their individual hold-
ings and to hire labor, the vast majority of farm-
ers continued to eke out a living near subsistence
level. By 1966, moreover, the problem of urban
unemployment, already severe in some West
African states, had begun to emerge in Tanzania.
These trends toward social stratification rather
than equitable development in both urban and
rural areas deeply disturbed Nyerere.
Nyerere was equally upset about the spread
of elite attitudes among the educated. Although
he had tried to imbue these people with his own
dedication to frugality and honesty in public serv-
ice, he saw them becoming a privileged and self-
serving class. This was sharply brought home to
him in October 1966 when the students at Uni-
versity College in Dar es Salaam demonstrated
against the terms of national service. They had
been asked to give six months to military training
and subsequently to serve 18 months in govern-
ment jobs they would have occupied anyway-but
at only 40 percent of the established salary. Even
though their education had been paid for by the
state, they protested.
Shocked and angered, Nyerere dismissed the
protestors from the school. Then in quick succes-
sion he cut his own salary and that of other high
government and party officials, civil servants, and
army officers to emphasize the importance of
national service. Although these measures were
strictly aimed at the elite, they also set the stage
for the Arusha Declaration.
16 January 1970
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THE ARUSHA DECLARATION
TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression
in our country; this struggle is aimed at moving the people
of Tanzania from a state of poverty to a state of
prosperity.
We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been ex-
ploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great
deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being op-
pressed, exploited, and disregarded. Now we want a revo-
lution-a revolution which brings to an end our weak-
ness-so that we never again are exploited, oppressed, or
humiliated.
--The Arusha Declaration
5 February 1967
In late January 1967 Nyerere met with other
TANU leaders at Arusha, a small town in north-
ern Tanzania. The outcome of their deliberations
was the Arusha Declaration, a statement of
TANU's policy of socialism and self-reliance. Over
the next several months Nyerere issued two more
policy papers-Education for Self-Reliance and
Socialism and Rural Development-which, with
the Arusha Declaration, set forth the core of
present policies.
The declaration called on the government to
take several steps: 1) to consolidate control over
the "major means of production"; 2) to prepare
development plans the country could carry out
without being overly dependent on foreign loans
and grants; 3) to ensure that incomes in the
private and public sectors were on a par; and 4) to
improve the living standards of the peasantry.
TANU was called on to make sure that party
members, and particularly the leaders, adhered to
TANU's socialist principles; the party was to set
up a program to train its leaders to carry out the
government's policies.
The first of these objectives was accom-
plished easily. The day after the declaration was
announced, Nyerere nationalized foreign-owned
commercial banks, import-export firms, and in-
surance companies, and took over the largest
industries and agricultural estates. Although there
were some short-term dislocations, the govern-
ment has managed these enterprises fairly well.
More important politically, the government
set down strict conflict-of-interest rules for politi-
cal leaders. Not only are the leaders expected to
promote socialism, they must also set a personal
example. To ensure that they do, they are re-
quired by law to divest themselves of all outside
business interests-shares and directorships in
privately owned companies, rental properties, and
extra salaries-or resign. Nearly 13,000 elected
officials and civil servants have had to comply
with these rules. Although many of them are
unhappy, party leaders have strongly supported
Nyerere on this point, and the few party members
that have been openly critical have either resigned
or been ousted from TANU.
Since Arusha, the government has also tried
to exert greater control over the distribution of
income, particularly between urban and rural
areas. It has put into effect price and wage guide-
lines, reformed the tax structure, and abolished
several local levies. As a result, the tax burden is
being shifted away from the largely subsistence-
level rural sector and onto those in urban areas
who are better able to pay the costs of develop-
ment. Moreover, the major emphasis of the new
five-year plan (1969-74) is on rural development.
The government intends to allocate almost three
times as much of total development funds to
agriculture in this plan as it did in the last one, or
about $76 million.
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Others try to reach the moon. We try to reach the villages.
--Julius K. Nyerere
In line with renewed emphasis on rural de-
velopment, Nyerere has called for major reforms
in education. Tanzania, like other African states,
inherited from the colonial authorities a school
system that catered essentially to the elite. Al-
though some modifications have been made, the
system has retained its elite character. Only about
a fifth of the children now entering school, for
example, can expect to go beyond the primary
level, and the curriculum is tailored mainly to
preparing a few for university or technical train-
ing. Most students, therefore, have received a
largely irrelevant education.
I n Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere
argued that the schools should promote equality
and help improve rural life rather than alienate
the students from it. He has proposed changes
that will prepare most students for rural living. He
has told them to grow their own food, to produce
some for market, and to help in other ways to
maintain their schools. He has encouraged the
teachers to let the students plan and run their
own experimental farm plots. He has also recom-
mended that the examination system be de-em-
phasized to make cooperation, not competition,
the basis of education.
A determined effort is being made to carry
out these ideas. Agricultural courses have been
introduced in all primary schools; and civic
courses stressing the Arusha Declaration are being
given to secondary students. Some schools have
also set up experimental farm plots. Because of
the lack of funds and trained personnel, however,
many of the Ministry of Education's plans are still
Special Report
in the discussion or experimental stage. Provisions
for in-service training for teachers are being made
because few of them have had any agricultural
training; and during the next five years, the min-
istry intends to revise the primary school curricu-
lum completely. Major changes in the secondary
schools, however, will not begin before 1976.
Along with school reform, Nyerere has
called for a more broadly based, concerted effort
to increase cooperative and communal village
farming. Regional party leaders are now setting
up ujamaa villages, and TANU is running "social-
ist seminars" for grass-roots and middle-level
party leaders, civil servants, teachers, national
servicemen, villagers, and others to show them
how to carry out the Arusha Declaration. The
government at the same time is focusing its agri-
cultural extension efforts and rural development
funds on these villages to try to make them work.
The success of this program, however, de-
pends largely on local leaders below the regional
level, where the governing structure is still weak.
Local party and government officials simply lack
the training, financial resources, and staff to do
an effective job, and the government in Dar es
Salaam is capable of giving only limited help.
Most peasants, moreover, stubbornly resist efforts
to change their traditional way of life.
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SEUxt;l'
r.oao r
_Nui~asha
Biharamulo~-
?i3ukoha
DEM. REP. OF
THE CONGO
DEM. REP.
OF THE
CONGO
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ANZANIA
Projected route of
Tan-Zam Railroad
KEN
Magadi.(.
y.- 4?
r' Arusha
Ifakara
Mtwara ?
16 January 1970
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The most successful socialist villages to date
are concerned with cattle and tobacco growing in
northwest Tanzania. Many other such villages re-
portedly exist throughout the country; one for-
eign adviser has said there are as many as 500 of
them. The actual number of cooperative farming
ventures is difficult to determine, however, be-
cause the term "ujamaa village" is used loosely to
cover all kinds of experimental farming projects,
old and new. Nearly 300 of these villages, more-
over, have been organized by the Tanzanian Army
along the Mozambique border. Basically strategic
hamlets, they are modeled somewhat after the
Israeli kibbutz as a first line of defense in case
Portuguese forces should try to retaliate against
Tanzania for supporting Mozambique insurgents.
their ?struggle against white-ruled states
Nyerere's view just behind social and
developmeit at home. Although he
a peaceful e'bQlution of majority
these areas, heras become con
white domination.
Because Nyerere
mitted to the liberati
become deeply invol
insurgency. Tanzani
Liberation Commi
African aid to t
government is p
staging bases, a
tion with Za
supporting guerrilla
s head the African
ain conduit for
insurgents;
viding arms,
d the Nyerere
ney, training,
In conjunc-
d logistical suppor
ia, Tanzania is also
build the W00-mile Tan-Zam railr
Lusaka to r es Salaam in order to free
from its h avy dependence on the railway s
of Rhdesia, Portuguese Mozambique,
Angol Fearful of military retaliation from th
state, both countries are currently planning
bolster their defense forces.
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s in
nks in
conomic
uld prefer
rican rule in
ced that only
bring an end to
ncompromisingly com-
struggle, Tanzania has
anning to
d from
ambia
items
nd
More than any other foreign power, Corn--
munist C1iinaY '?`ia`s Veen ? willing to support Tan-
zania in these efforts. The Chinese have provided
substantial quantities of small arms and ammuni-
tion and some guerrilla training to the insurgent4'
In addition, Peking has provided consideral(e
economic aid, which has been funneled into
building a $J-million textile mill as well a/ an
experimental farm, a farm implements factory, a
dam project, two radio stations, and a join ship-
ping line. When ' lyerere was unable to ob-Vain aid
for the Tan-Zam'xailroad from Western sources,
Peking quickly offered to build it under, an inter-
est-free loan. The fgvorable terms and the speed
with which the Chiricse have completd prelimi-
nary work on the project have deeply' impressed
the Tanzanians. Consfvuction of tlxle rail line,
which is expected to bey n shortly, Could eventu-
ally bring as many as 5, 00 Chin "se technicians
and workers into Tanzania'nd Zaxhbia.
The Chinese have also ` ivn the Tanzanian
Army and police large quaff ities of arms and
materiel, largely free of cot: This aid has in-
cluded trucks, antiaircraft guns medium tanks,
engineering equipment, patrol beats, and landing
craft, and enough small arms for 2,000 men. The
Chinese have also built in arms repair facility in
Dar es Salaam and a 1-million police training
A Canadian to In had handled first of the
army's basic train lg and staff work' until re-
cently. Nyerere, however, told the Cana ns they
had done their fib so well that they ere no
longer needed. The Tanzanians apparently 'ntend
to do their ow,d staff work and most of them, own
training. As tie country's defense forces expnd,
however tl' training role of the Chinese will
increase. At the moment, they are involved o
in traini . a couple of tank and engineering
compan sand instructing the police in weapon
hand li and guerrilla warfare tactics. Peking has
alread% agreed, however, to help build a naval
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force and naval facilities_AL-IhzF.po* f Baf-' es
Sa as o rain naval recruits; it has offered
to provide an air defense system as well: If a
formal agreement is reached, it will almost cer-
tainly be asked to train Tanzanian pilots.
The Chinese have been discreet,as well as
generous. They have engaged in 1'" tle of the
blatant propagandizing and none f the heavy
handedness that have often characterized their aid
elsewhere. As a result, they have njither offended
nor alarmed anyone but instead ave made some
influential friends, particularly jfi_ the Tanzanian
Defense Ministry. Officials there have argued
strongly in favor of Chinese a.. Nyerere himself
apparently believes that Chirjese aid is vital, per-
haps even indispensable, to to liberation struggle.
The Chinese probably/hope to erode, and if
possible to eliminate, Western and Soviet in-
fluence in Tanzania and.'''to gain paramount in-
fluence in the southern liberation movements. If
these presently ineffective groups should become
a serious threat to the white governments, the
Chinese would then be in a position to extend
their influence southward. They have already
made some significa4't inroads in Tanzania. With
the Tan-Zam railroaY project, they have become
the country's largest aid donor, and, with the
departure of the ymnadians, the way is left open
for them to gain` predominance in the army as
well.
One of th main obstacles in the path of the
Chinese, howe er, is Nyerere himself. So far, his
interests and heirs have dovetailed nicely, but his
desire to kpp Tanzania nonaligned is genuine.
Although is is grateful to the Chinese for their
aid and scares some of their ideological views, he
clearly < does not want them influencing his poli-
cies. Apt times, he has gone out of his way to warn
theru'that Tanzania makes its own policy and that
he;'will tolerate no t ter re oe. B the
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same token_:,.--has .xminded>,l Ise ..fn-the Wept
who have expressed alarm over his close relatidns
with Peking that it is China, and not tlie4est,
that has been willing to help him.
Because the Chinese have' a near monopoly
on military aid, however,-and because their role in
the military seems certain to grow, they could
eventually pose: a' serious threat to Nyerere's hold
on power or his use of it. Nyerere seems aware of
this danger, and willing to take the risk to obtain
the ,lain
The Arusha Declaration is a declaration of intent. [It]
lays down a policy of revolution by evolution.
--Julius K. Nyerere
It is too soon to judge whether the Nyerere
government will succeed or fail in its efforts to
build socialism in Tanzania. It faces enormous
problems of inertia and underdevelopment. With
the Arusha Declaration and the policies that have
stemmed from it, a beginning has been made.
Progress, however, will be extremely slow and
uncertain. The successful implementation of these
policies will, to a great extent, depend on the
leaders' ability to instill in party members and
civil servants a strong sense of commitment to
present policies. TANU's ability to mobilize the
peasantry is also a crucial factor.
Much will depend on the continuing leader-
ship of Nyerere himself, because he is the driving
force behind Tanzania's socialist effort. Although
party leaders strongly support him, it is question-
able whether they are as firmly committed to his
reforms and would carry them out as vigorously if
something happened to him. Although his most
likely successor, Vice President Kawawa, is a good
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administrator and a tough politician, he is not as
capable intellectually, nor does he have Nyerere's
prestige and popularity. It is doubtful that he
would move as strongly against corruption and
the elite as has Nyerere or that he could effec-
tively carry on Nyerere's programs.
How Nyerere handles the Chinese will also
be important. Thus far, Tanzania has obtained
much from Peking for little in return. A crucial
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challenge to Nyerere could come if the Chinese
gain a strong foothold in the military, such as the
staff and training positions that the Canadians
held. Nyerere probably wants to keep them out
of these slots, and many army officers, who are
Western trained, certainly feel the same way. If
the Tanzanians are unable to manage their mili-
tary forces, however, the Chinese may well be
called on to help.
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Secret
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
19
16 January 1970
No. 0353/70
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bi ( Kr I
nformation as of noon EST, 15 January 1970)
\1
I
Far East
COMMUNISTS IN LAOS SE'TING STAGE FOR HEAVIER ACTION
Communist military,ctivity is beginning to pick up
momentum.
Military action in South~~Vietnam has tapered off but
probably will pick up in oming weeks. The politi-
cians in South Vietnam are lining up candidates for
the senatorial elections lar this year.
SUBVERSIVES IN INDONESIAN MILITARY GET THE TREATMENT
President Suharto has purged mo\e Communists and fol-
lowers of Sukarno from the milit\ry.
PEKING TALKS ON TWO FRONTS
Already in the midst of difficult n otiations with
the USSR, the Chinese Communists lastweek began to
set the stage for talks with the US.
Europe
US-SOVIET BILATERAL TALKS INCREASE
The Soviets have indicated interest in negotiag on
a number of secondary subjects, but there is no n-
dication that they are more disposed than previo Vly
to agree on important issues under discussion, su
as the Middle East.
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t Germany's effort to obtain diplomatic recogni--
from non-Communist states is having limited
MOSCOW MAINTAINS`ZCTIVE ROLE IN EGYPT
Work will move\ahead on several economic development
projects, but t,e USSR continues to exercise tight
control over the supply of military equipment.
POLAND AND FRANCE INCRSE ECONOMIC TIES
Warsaw now will seek\,favorable trade concessions and
development credits from its other major Western
trading partners. k;
HOXHA REGIME PRESSES CULTURA.REVOLUTION
The Hoxha regime has adopd more stringent tactics
to ensure the success of itN so-called cultural rev-
olution.
Middle East - 'Africa
BIAFRA SUCCUMBS TO FEDERAL NIGERIAN PRESSURES
Federal authorities have moved quick by to re-estab-
lish Lagos' writ throughout the forme secessionist
enclave following the sudden collapse IVst weekend
of Biafra's bid for sovereignty. Direc talks be-
tween federal authorities and secession leaders
have begun in Lagos as a first step toward national
UN FORCE IN CYPRUS PLANS CUTBACK
Pressures to lessen the costs of the UN force '\n
Cyprus have led to plans to reduce the peacekee ing
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Lebanon's attempts to restrict fedayeen activi es
against Israel may cause another flare-up bet en
Beirut and the terrorists. Meanwhile, the vern-
ment is again apprehensive about Israel's signs on
southern Lebanon.
INDIAN NAVY HAVING PROBLEMS WITH SOVIET-BURT SHIPS
New Delhi has protested to the USSR out the quality
and performance of the ships.
CROP OUTLOOK AND PEASANT DISCONTENT INDIA
India expects a record 1969-70 odgrain crop, but
not all segments of society ar sharing in the bene-
fits. The widening gap betw n the rich and the
poor is easily exploitable Communists and leftists.
Since 1967, President N
have initiated a serie
educational reforms i
ities in Tanzanian
opment. At the sa
deeply involved i
against the whit
a result, has s
Rather than c
Nyerere has
which has b
as militar
rere and his ruling party
of political, economic, and
an effort to reduce inequal-
ciety and promote economic devel-
time, Tanzania has become more
supporting African insurgency
`-ruled states to the south and, as
ught to bolter its defense forces.
development funds to pay for defense,
rued increasingly to Communist China,
n willing to provide economic as well
aid either free or on easy credit terms.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEED' IN PERSPECTIVE
FOUR ITIN COUNTRIES ENTERING HARD-CONTESTED ELECTIONS
the next three months Colombia, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Costa Rica will hold important elec-
tions. The military might intervene in three of
the countries under certain circumstances.
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DOMICAN PRESIDENT PURGES DISSIDENTS
P sident Balaguer has expelled high-ranking dissi-
deen from the governing party and apparently is
bent c cementing his control before announcing
whether will seek re-election in May.
CHILEAN LEFTIST FIND UNITY ELUSIVE
The divisions ithin the Communist-leftist electoral
front are widen g because of the impasse over the
selection of a pr idential candidate.
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The Chinese Communists, already in the midst of difficult border talks
with the Soviet Union, last week began to set the stage for talks with their
other major antagonist, the US. The Chinese probably hope to be able to
exploit the talks with the US in order to bring pressure on the USSR. The
Sino-Soviet talks in Peking are not going well, and the two Communist
nations have been engaging in an increasingly shrill polemical debate. It
seems doubtful that either set of talks will produce any concrete results for a
long time.
Political maneuvering.in Saigon has quickened since members of the
Upper House drew lots to determine who would have to run for re-election
later this year. Several candidates planning to oppose the incumbents are
scurrying around lining up support and seeking advice from leading inde-
pendents and opposition figures. The militant Buddhists, who also plan to
field candidates, intend to spread thenj around on slates of other groups.
Although military activity in the south has been fairly light so far this
year, a number of indications portend an_ upswing in over-all Communist
activity in South Vietnam over the next few`-weeks and perhaps months, but
a major offensive such as occurred in 1968 seeiis unlikely.
The Communists in Laos also appear to be g ting ready for increased
offensive activity. Already a certain momentum ms under way in the
Plaine des Jarres area, where North Vietnamese trop finally managed to
take a key hilltop with the help of poor weather, whit revented close air
support for the Laotian defenders. The Communists appe to have enough
men and supplies in place to embark on a major offensiv but they have
been concentrating on securing their supply lines from gove ment harass-
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jan 70
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/12: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07600010001-9
COMMUNISTS IN LAOS SETTING STAGE FOR HEAVIER ACTION
On 12 January the North Viet-
namese finally sucbgeded in push-
ing government guerrillas off Phou
Nok Nok, an important hilltop
northeast of the Plaine Iles Jar-
res. Extremely poor weathier con-
ditions, which ruled out any close
air support, probably contributed
heavily to the government's in-`_
ability to hold this key position-,
Although it appears that the
Communists have the necessary
troops and supplies in place for
a major thrust against government
positions around the Plaine, the
enemy has shown a reluctance to
launch such an operation until
confident that major supply lines
are secure from government harass-
ment. With this in mind, North
Vietnamese forces concentrated
most of their military activity
during the past week east of
Xieng Khouangville, where they
overran a number of bases from
which guerrillas had disrupted
pack horse - coolie caravans mov-
ing along a trail network that
originates in North Vietnam. Ac-
cording to local villagers, the
North Vietnamese now plan to move
against Muong Moc, the main guer-
rilla support base in this area.
There are some signs that
the North Vietnamese may have
moved another combat re invent
into Lao
large
numbers of troops, who stated
Vey were headed for the Plaine
de's Jarres area, crossed the bor-
derpon foot in late December.
In
country,
a limited
the Pakse a
The barrage
with a ground
This suggests t
smarting from th
field on 9 January.
s not followed up
ssault, however.
at the Communists,
Plaine des Jarres
son, were more int
r loss of the
his rainy sea-
ical impact
time in the psychold
of the rocket attack
tional territorial gai
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
the southern part of the
ommunist forces launched
ocket attack against
s.
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7LlIS1 1
aos: Current Situation
Limit of area claimed under
Communist and Neutralist
control, June 1962
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VIETNAM
Military Action Off, But
Only Temporarily
The level of enemy military
action prevalent in the northern
provinces last week has tapered
off somewhat, but there are nu-
merous indications that further
upsurges of activity are sched-
uled throughout much of South
Vietnam in the coming weeks.
Some fighting continues in
Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Binh
Dinh provinces, although of less-
er magnitude this week than last.
Allied forces largely initiated
the actions. Battles were also
fought this week in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince and in scattered sectors
of Mekong Delta provinces as al-
lied forces continue to seek out
enemy troops massing for offen-
sive operations.
there will be
pries of intensified enemy ac-
tion preceding and following the
Tet lunar new year holidays in
early February-
a "highpoint"
will come during the three-day
Tet holiday in violation of the
cease-fire, as occurred in 1968.
claimed that all enemy units in
Quang Nam Province will partici-
pate in a general attack and up-
rising and that all units are to
remefore 25 January.
Evidence on the present
state of enemy preparedness sug-
gests, however, that many main-
force combat units will not be
ready for large-scale operations
before late February or early
March.
manders in the northern pro
~ s rtfly?"``
inces expect the Communis
spring campaign to featu pe-
riodic surges of she11iJ s and
small-scale ground at cks over
a wide front. Most f them es-
timate that the Co unists will
continue to stag hese "high-
points" for psy ological ef-
fect, while t buckle down
for a long s uggle. The com-
manders po' out that Viet Cong
local for and guerrilla troops
in I Co s have been seriously
weake d during the past two
year , and the cost in manpower
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Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 1.6 Jan 70
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SECRET
o f" ~-tt '-m&jor o fensive
would
be prohibitive.
I Corps Commander General
Lam is concerned, however, about
the large North Vietnamese con-
centrations that:.-remain just north
of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
and in Laos-'west of the A Shau
Valley. .,Be believes that enemy
attacksthis spring from those
areas night force his units to
give-ground initially, but is
confident that,_st.ck,emy thrusts
canbe contained.
Political maneuvering in/ai-
gon has quickened since Upper
month to determine which se
? 119 CORPS
#'apital Sperio Banc
(1 5U
l..
MILES
Page 5
ment
the current situation in
pears to be ge yeraTly
I Corps
realistic
probably re
bitious attad
ain froverly am-
region, but th
danger from t
enemy regim
could b
of the -E
that
res
the northern
is a potential
nea
y in North
e forces
rased to test
outh Vietnamese u
Ave taken over defensi
will be contested in elect'eons
later this year to fill h f of
the House seats.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jan 70
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UBVERSIVES IN INDONESIAN MILITARY GET THE TREATMENT
Presid t Suharto's con-
tinuing campy=gn to purge both
Communist symphizers and fol-
lowers of former".~? resident Su-
karno from the miI'Jtary picked
up steam again recently with the
arrest and interrogat' of sev-
eral senior army and n%a l of-
ficers. These officers h&d been
under suspicion for some time,
but government security prio
ties have been such that only
recently has there been time to
investigate them thoroughly.
The navy now is a particu
target because it did not un
the exhaustive investigati
experienced by the army
a much more limited ext
air force following th
abortive coup in 196
past four years a
Sukarnoists, pro-
d, to
t, the
Communists
For the
er of pro-
mmunists, and
touched becaus 'of unaggressive
naval leaders )f'ip. The replace-
ment of the dormer navy chief
and a numk r of his staff of-
ficers 'last November's mili-
tary organization removed the
chi obstacle to a thorough
even party membe
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Jan 70
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PEKING TALKS ON Two FRONTS
Already '&n the midst of dif-
ficult negotiations with the USSR,
the Chinese Communists last week
began to set the stage for talks
with Peking's other,major antag-
onist, the US. This unprecedented
development does not appear to
signal any loss of nerve,on the
part of the Chinese, who in fact
have stepped up the pace iri