WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
43
17 July 1970
No. 0379/70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
ar L4nr 1
Page
FAR EAST
Cambodia: Planning for a Protracted Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laos: Communists Prepare Peace Ploy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Thailand: A Storm Weathered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Malaysia: Elections Leave Same Old Problems . . . . . . . . . . 7
KOMEITO: REACHING TOO HIGH?
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0379/70A)
EUROPE
France: Pompidou Has a Successful First Year . . . . . . . . . . . 8
IAEA-EURATOM: Safeguards Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
USSR: Party and Government Organs Have Busy Week . . . . . . 10
European Communities: Enlargement Negotiations Begin . . . . . 11
Page i
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
'or- b1 IJKL 1
Jordan: Agreement to Disagree? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Arab-Israeli Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
MOBUTU'S NEW CONGO
(Published separately as Special Report No. 0379/70B)
The Sudan: Revolution Takes a Radical Turn . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Lebanon: The Making of the President 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . 18
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Cuba: Preparation for 26 July Celebration . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Bolivia: Political Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Brazil: Gubernatorial Candidates Chosen . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
SECRET
Cambodia: Planning For A Protracted Struggle
More than a month has passed since the
North Vietnamese moved deep into western
Cambodia to attack Siem Reap city. It appeared
then as if Hanoi might have decided on an early
showdown in Cambodia, but in the ensuing weeks
the war bogged down with the onset of the
summer monsoons.
The cities of Siem Reap, Kompong Thom,
and Kompong Speu have been harassed almost
every night, but ground assaults have been few
and widely spaced. The Communists are maintain-
ing enough pressure to keep the Cambodians tied
down to defensive positions in the major popula-
tion centers. An occasional ground attack, such as
the one this week against the mountain resort
town of Kirirom or the district capital of Saang
last week, probably were made for tactical or
psychological reasons.
The evidence suggests that the Communists
are going through a period of retrenchment and
consolidation. The loss of materiel from the
sanctuaries undoubtedly is one important factor;
the sheer magnitude of the task in Cambodia is
another. Approximately 260 miles of rugged ter-
rain separates Communist main force units along
the South Vietnamese border from the small
groups far to the west that have pushed the
Cambodians into Thailand. A campaign of swift
strikes, much of it by small bands living off the
countryside, has given the Communists loose
control over more than half of Cambodia's ter-
ritory. It is doubtful that the Communists intend
to fight for every square mile of this territory, but
they almost certainly intend to do as much with
it as they can. This will require more troops, more
cadre, and more help from the indigenous Cam-
bodian, Lao, and tribal people who live in the
area.
The situation in the countryside is confused
and no clear picture of what is happening there
has emerged. It is apparent, however, that the
Communists are making a strong effort to build a
Cambodian Communist movement. They have
brought in Khmer-speaking cadre from South
Vietnam to help out, and they are using Viet-
namese and Cambodian Communists to set up an
administrative apparatus. It will not be an easy
job. The Cambodian Communist movement-the
so-called Khmer Rouge-is weak. The Vietnamese
are racially distinct from the Khmer; they speak a
different language, and they must overcome the
burden of long-standing Khmer animosity. The
Communist threat cannot be written off on these
grounds, however.
The Communists are superb organizers, and
they know how to use terrorism to get what they
cannot get otherwise. The Communists are relying
heavily for support on the personal popularity
Sihanouk enjoys among many peasants. In addi-
tion, as long as North Vietnamese units are avail-
able to impose discipline, such indigenous forces
can be useful to the enemy.
CAMBODIA
Communist-controlled
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
SEGRET
Hanoi probably now recognizes that to cause
the early downfall of the Lon Nol government
would require an all-out military operation, in-
cluding a direct attack on Phnom Penh itself.
Hanoi may yet decide to 'try this route, but more
likely will proceed with its present course of
solidifying Communist control over northeast
Cambodia and concentrate on building a viable
NORTH KOREA: Government changes an-
nounced last weekend do not portend any
marked changes in North Korea's policies. The
foreign minister, perhaps as a reward for the re-
cent improvement in Pyongyang's relations with
Peking, was elevated to the post of second vice
premier. He was replaced by his former deputy, a
Cambodian Communist movement in the rest of
the country. The Communists will undoubtedly
also attempt to keep up the pressure on the Lon
Nol government, hoping it will become more
amenable to Communist demands or actual)
collapse under the strain.
widely traveled specialist in African and Arab
affairs. Other announced changes in agricultural
and labor assignments may represent little more
than window dressing in lieu of any progress by
the regime in overcoming the perennial problems
Vietnam
Militant Buddhists in Saigon have taken an-
other step in their developing peace campaign.
Thich Thien Minh, leader of the more activist
group within the An Quang faction, has proposed
a cease-fire and regrouprnent of troops of both
sides in designated areas, and the establishment of
a provisional government over both North and
South Vietnam. This would be followed by inter-
nationally supervised elections in both sections of
the country. Minh also announced that a new
committee including major religious and political
groups would be established this summer to "in-
vestigate" the restoration of peace in Vietnam.
Although the government has issued re-
peated warnings against political activity that
tends to undermine the war effort, it has per-
mitted some coverage of Minh's proposals in the
press. It seems likely, however, that a more vig-
orous publicity campaign by the Buddhists could
provoke a government crackdown.
Militant South Vietnamese students con-
tinued their peace and anti-US agitations with a
small demonstration in Saigon last weekend. In
accordance with President Thieu's recent warning
that agitation threatening public order would not
be tolerated, the police used unusually firm meas-
ures to disperse the 300-400 protesting students.
Symptomatic of the government's tougher
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
attitude for the first time since the student pro-
test movement began, police pursued the demon-
strators after they retreated into the university
grounds.
The abortive demonstration followed a stu-
dent meeting attended by American and other
foreign antiwar groups. The meeting focused on
attacks on the Thieu government and on the US,
1: e demonstration that fol-
lowed was arge y e result of encouragement
given to the Vietnamese students by the Ameri-
can peace group. Although there has been some
contact between Vietnamese student leaders and
antiwar students in the US for some time, this
was the first instance of active collaboration be-
tween the two groups in a demonstration.
There is no evidence that further demon-
strations with American participation are being
planned. Saigon will probably bar American stu-
dent agitators, and collaboration between South
Vietnamese and US students will probably remain
limited. Moreover, the Vietnamese students re-
main divided, with only a relatively small extrem-
ist element attempting to promote further agita-
tion. Although the extremists apparently hope
the harsh police measures will create additional
sympathy for their cause, so far strong measures
seem mainly to have discouraged more moderate
students from joining with them.
The newly announced line-up of candidates
for the Senate indicates that the government is
likely to do fairly well in the 30 August elections.
With 30 of the 60 Senate seats being contested,
18 slates of 10 candidates each, totaling 180
candidates, have filed to run. Under the South
Vietnamese constitutional system, candidates do
not run as individuals; the 30 candidates belong-
ing to the three lists getting the most votes will
win seats.
Page 3
The slate with the strongest chance for elec-
tion appears to be the one headed by the present
chairman of the Upper House, Nguyen Van
Huyen, and including former prime minister Tran
Van Huong. Although these men and their asso-
ciates are not controlled by the government, Pres-
ident Thieu respects them as responsible inde-
pendents and would welcome their election. An-
other strong slate, more closely tied to the gov-
ernment, is headed by Senator Huynh Van Cao
and is being backed by the Vietnamese Confeder-
ation of Labor.
Of the 18 slates, four are unambiguously
oppositionist. The strongest of these is headed by
Vu Van Mau and is backed by a relatively mod-
erate group within the militant An Quang Bud-
dhist faction. The decision not to run by Senator
Don, who once aspired to become the chief
spokesman of the opposition, will probably be
interpreted as a sign of government strength.
The personal prestige of the candidates is
often of significantly greater importance than the
issues in attracting votes in South Vietnamese
elections, and an initial reading suggests that gov-
ernment-supported slates will do well. Many local
government officials, particularly at the district
level, are also likely to have an appreciable pro-
government influence among villagers going to the
polls even without resorting to such crude meas-
ures as ballot box stuffing.
A number of slates have included candidates
from many major voting groups in an effort to
broaden their appeal. This will tend to divide the
support for some of the more prestigious candi-
dates and makes the outcome of the election
somewhat uncertain.
Enemy Summer Campaign Delayed
The Communists annual "summer" cam-
paign has been delayed, and in some areas dis-
rupted. Communist forces in the southern half of
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
SEGRE'1
South Vietnam have been frustrated by recent
developments in Cambodia, and some enemy
units are having trouble deploying for attack in
the northern provinces. Consequently, enemy
military activity is still at a low level.
This is further reflected in weekly casualty
statistics. Sixty-one Americans were killed during
the week ending 4 July-the lowest weekly total
since December 1966. Claimed enemy losses for
the same week were below 1,400 for the first
time in nearly two years.
Although Communist local force, sapper,
and guerrilla units can stage small-scale attacks
and harassments throughout South Vietnam at
any time, the main force threat is centered mainly
in the northernmost provinces of I Corps. Recent
North Vietnamese troop movements in the Lao-
tian panhandle have included the remaining two
regiments of the North Vietnamese 304th Divi-
sion. One of these newly arrived regiments suf-
fered heavy losses in the Khe Sanh area in action
that began late last week. Some of these units
appear to be engaged at the moment in road
building and logistical activities, but the sudden
appearance of at least two regiments of fresh
combat troops in western Quang Tri Province
adds greatly to the enemy threat just below the
DMZ.
Just to the south, some enemy forces have
moved east from their A Shau Valley base area
and are engaging allied units in central Thua
Thien Province. These forces have also been en-
gaged in supply activities for some time and are
probably now ready for battle.
To counter this growing enemy threat, Sai-
gon has dispatched a 3,000-man Marine brigade to
Da Nang. Improving weather conditions, a re-
duced US presence, and the long refitting period
enjoyed by most of their main force units may
tempt the Communists to engage a South Viet-
namese unit in northern I Corps soon. The Com-
munists may be hoping that a resounding victory
on the battlefield would shake the growing confi-
dence of the South Vietnamese forces and justify
the expense of men and materiel required for
such an attempt.
SECRET
Page - 4 - WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
S.EuKh 1 ,
Laos: Communists Prepare Peace Ploy
There is new activity on the diplomatic
front. On 12 July the Pathet Lao representative in
Vientiane informed Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma that a letter will be arriving shortly from
Laotian Communist leader Souphanouvong. The
letter reportedly will be delivered by a representa-
tive empowered to "examine the arrangements"
for an "eventual meeting" between the "inter-
ested parties." This initiative apparently is at least
in part a response to Souvanna's offer late last
month to open exploratory talks at a site in
Pathet Lao territory.
Signs of increased Communist diplomatic
activity relating to Laos have been accumulating
during the past two weeks. On 3 July the Polish
ICC representatives for Laos and Vietnam were
reported to have arrived in Hanoi.
On the following day, Soviet Deputy For-
eign Minister Firyubin also arrived in the North
Vietnamese capital. This was Firyubin's second
unpublicized trip to Hanoi this year. The first, in
late February, preceded by a few days the Com-
munists' 6 March peace proposal for Laos.
In Vientiane on Ei July the Polish ambassa-
dor paid a visit to Souvanna and informed him
that negotiations between the Communists and
the Lao Government would soon be "possible."
The next clay the ICC for Laos issued an unprece-
dented statement-made possible after months of
stalling by the sudden acquiescence of the Polish
representative-that all parties appeared to be
willing to abide by the Geneva Accords and that
the ICC stands ready to facilitate negotiations on
this basis. On 10 July it was learned that the
French Government had issued visas for a five-
man Pathet Lao delegation to travel to Paris at an
undetermined date.
The outlines of the latest Communist diplo-
matic ploy are not yet clear. The anticipated
letter from Souphanouvong could accept Sou-
vanna's offer to open preliminary talks in Pathet
Lao territory and suggest that the ICC guarantee
Souvanna's safety. Souvanna has said that he is
ready to discuss any subject, including the US air
operations which Hanoi has insisted must stop
before any formal negotiations can begin. The
North Vietnamese may be willing to begin con-
versations that they can portray as exploratory
talks rather than negotiations in order to press
Souvanna further on the bombing issue. In 1968
Hanoi engaged the US in talks restricted solely to
Allied air operations and may reason that the
Communists' recent gains in south Laos may
make this an opportune time to undertake a simi-
lar exchange with Vientiane.
The Communists appear to be increasingly
prepared to use the threat of further military
moves in southern Laos to force Souvanna to the
negotiating table. Although the level of fighting
has been relatively low in recent weeks, the North
Vietnamese capability for major combat in south-
ern Laos has been growing.
propaganda
have reported frequently in
recen wee s that the North Vietnamese intend to
strike hard in southern Laos during the rainy
season. Inasmuch as the Communists already
seem to control enough of the panhandle to sup-
port their operations in Cambodia and South
Vietnam, such attacks would appear to be aimed
chiefly at inducing Vientiane to negotiate on
Page 5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
SE RE'l' ww
Thailand: A Storm Weathered
The government last week skirted the closest
thing to a constitutional crisis since parliament
was established last year. At issue was a bill be-
fore the House of Representatives that raised
taxes. Increased revenues, the government argued,
were necessary to help the country meet in-
creasing security obligations.
The depth of the opposition in Bangkok evi-
dently came as a surprise to government leaders.
Almost overnight they were faced with the pros-
pect of defeat in the house at the hands of a
coalition of opposition MPs and wayward mem-
bers of their own Saha Pracha Thai (SPT) party.
There were also reports that students from the
major universities in the city would publicly
demonstrate against higher taxes.
Defeat on an issue that had become a major
test of strength would clearly have meant a con-
siderable loss of prestige for the government. The
powers of parliament are carefully circumscribed
under Thailand's constitution, however, and re-
buff on the tax bill would not have forced the
government either to resign or dissolve parlia-
ment. Some Thai leaders opposed dissolution on
the grounds that the SPT would likely fare badly
in new elections. Nonetheless, there was a wide-
spread expectation that dissolution was the least
the government could do if it lost in the house.
It is a commentary on the fragility of Thai
constitutionalism that the debate on the tax bill
raised fears that the government might take care
of the opposition by suspending the constitution.
Army leaders have taken pains to keep such fears
alive, and the promulgation of an army "alert"
during the controversy may have been designed to
cow opposition elements.
In the end, the government managed to whip
enough of its supporters into line to eke out a
one-vote victory, but its troubles clearly are not
over. To gain its victory, Prime Minister Thanom
had to promise to rescind two of the more
onerous tax measures as soon as possible. The
concession was not much, but symbolically it
demonstrated that the opposition can exert
leverage on a leadership that for years had been
running things more or less as it saw fit.
The tax bill hassle took place against the
backdrop of developments in Cambodia. For the
first time in recent memory, a foreign policy
question-namely whether Thailand should
commit troops into Cambodia-has become a
matter of public debate in Bangkok. Foreign Min-
ister Thanat and Deputy Prime Minister Praphat
participated in an unusual discussion on Cam-
bodia before 3,000 students on 13 July. The
students reportedly were unenthusiastic about
Praphat's depiction of the Communist threat to
Thailand.
The public display of differences among top
Thai leaders on what to do about Cambodia may
harden existing divisions within the Thai lead-
ership. The emergence of Cambodia as a major
public issue will also make it more difficult to
conceal certain Thai activities in support of
Cambodia and will serve to limit the government's
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
`. SECRET
Malaysia: Elections Leave Same Old Problems
The results of the long-delayed elections in
East Malaysia may influence the Kuala Lumpur
government to change its mind about restoring
parliamentary democracy, which has been in
abeyance since the communal riots of mid-May
1969. The ruling Alliance Party swept the Sabah
elections and did fairly well in the Sarawak state
vote, but failed to bring home enough federal
parliamentary seats to make up the two thirds
majority it had hoped to attain. Such a majority
would have enabled the Malays who now dom-
inate the Kuala Lumpur government to push
through constitutional changes aimed at ensuring
Malay pre-eminence in the country.
The "ultra" Malays-the extremists who pro-
vide the muscle in communal riots and to whose
wishes a Malay-dominated government must
defer-are not likely to accept a government that
the Malays cannot fully control. Despite public
pledges that the emergency rule will be lifted this
year, the government can easily use the possible
threat of renewed racial violence as an excuse to
continue the reign of the National Operations
Council and further delay the convening of
parliament.
The final decision will probably be up to
Prime Minister Rahman. He has been adamant,
however, that his long-postponed retirement will
not take place until civil order is assured and he
could easily be influenced by his Malay colleagues
to insist on the retention of emergency law. Al-
though many Malaysian politicians of various
races feel that Rahman should follow through
with his retirement plans, Rahman's personal
prestige still gives him the authority to make
major decisions regarding the nation's future, and
those "ultras" who would like to prolong emer-
gency rule will probably try to delay his re-
tirement.
In Sarawak, where the Malays make up only
18 percent of the population compared to 32
percent for the Chinese and 50 percent for tribal
groups, the Alliance captured only nine of 24
federal parliamentary seats. The Malay component
of the Alliance, however, took almost all of the
Muslim vote in the state assembly elections, and
last week formed a coalition with the Chinese-
dominated Sarawak United People's Party
(SUPP). SUPP, which has a large leftist com-
ponent, had at first planned to ally itself with the
Iban-led Sarawak National Party as an opposition
coalition, and its alliance with the Alliance came
as a general surprise.
SUPP's motives for joining the Alliance are
still unclear. The decision was made by a handful
of party leaders who apparently believe that the
formation of an Iban-Chinese government in Sara-
wak would bring down the wrath of the federal
government and would negatively influence Kuala
Lumpur on whether to reconvene the federal par-
liament. Before concluding the merger, however,
SUPP leaders did extract a written agreement
from their Malay partners that various measures
protective of Chinese interests will be taken and
that the SUPP deputy chief minister in the state
will have full veto power over all state govern-
ment decisions.
The main problem confronting the new state
council now is how the (bans will react to being
virtually cut out of the government. Although
two (bans are in the state cabinet, politically
active Iban leaders may look on SUPP's alliance
with the Malays as inimical to Iban interests. The
new government will certainly have a hard time
building up local confidence and will probably
meet with at least equal difficulties in dealing
with federal authorities in Kuala Lumpur.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
SECRET N"Of
COMMUNIST CHINA: The freeing of Bishop
Walsh last week appears primarily designed to
cover China's embarrassment over the death last
April of another US prisoner, Hugh Redmond,
which was announced in conjunction with the
Bishop's release. The Chinese are sensitive to
charges of "inhumane" treatment of foreign
prisoners in China, and probably hoped that
favorable world commentary on the Bishop's re-
lease would outweigh any adverse reactions to the
Redmond "suicide." The release of Walsh, who
still had 10 years to serve of a 20-year sentence
for "espionage," represents one of the rare cases
in which the Chinese have commuted a previously
specified sentence for a foreign prisoner. Al-
though this abrupt action brings to an end a
long-standing source of contention between Wash-
ington and Peking, its immediate implications for
current Sino-US relations remain unclear. 25X1
France: Pompidou Has A Successful First Year
Since France's executive team, headed by
President Pompidou and Prime Minister Chaban-
Delmas, came to power just over a year ago it has
made progress toward establishing the "New
Society" proclaimed as their goal for France, and
avoided the chaos that Gaullists long predicted
would follow the General's departure. There have
been some anxious moments, but by staying on
top of events, the government has succeeded in
preventing incidents from becoming crises,
thereby maintaining a relative degree of social and
political stability. Given the strains imposed on
the French economy, society, and political
machinery by the succession of crises that even-
tually led to De Gaulle's resignation, this was no
mean accomplishment.
On the economic front, Pompidou and his
finance minister, Giscard d'Estaing, skillfully
managed the August 1969 devaluation and then
implemented an economic stabilization plan that
has restored confidence in the franc and slowed
inflation. Rising wages and prices, however, con-
tinue to be a problem. In labor relations, Chaban-
Delmas has maintained pressureon both employers
and organized labor to modernize their attitudes
toward each other. Often through last-minute
government intervention, major labor unrest has
been averted.
On the student front, disturbances this year
at Nanterre in March and in Paris in May marred a
school year that was, however, less chaotic than
those in recent years. By proposing and gaining
National Assembly approval of stiff antidemon-
stration legislation, the government made a start
toward a short-term solution to the "youth prob-
lem" in France.
Apparently pleased with the government's
efforts to maintain stability, the public has shown
in recent opinion polls satisfaction with its new
leaders. Almost 60 percent of Frenchmen believe
that Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas have done a
good job, a high percentage when measured
against the less than 40 percent of the electorate
that put Pompidou in office last June.
The election to the National Assembly in
late June of the dynamic anti-Gaullist writer and
publisher, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, was a
warning of sorts to the Pompidou team. The
government's massive majority in the National
Assembly, however, remains cohesive despite
some dissension, and it is capable of resisting any
challenge to Gaullist dominance for the foresee-
able future. The next major political contest is
not likely to come until the 1973 legislative elec-
tions. Unless the government becomes com-
placent or bungles a crisis badly, the chances are
good that the Gaullists will retain a majority in
support of Pompidou.
Page 8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
-%,,,r SECRET Nwi
IAEA-EURATOM: Safeguards Problem
The prospective negotiations on the safe-
guards agreements required by the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) continue to pose prob-
lems for both the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM). The safeguards are in-
tended to prevent the diversion of fissionable
material from peaceful uses. How the IAEA will
finance the safeguards has become a serious issue.
French intransigence has continued to prevent
agreement among the EURATOM members on a
mandate to begin negotiations that will decide the
respective roles of the two organizations.
The anticipated large increase in inspections
of nuclear facilities required of the IAEA has
sharply divided its membership on how to cover
the costs-estimated to total $15.4 million by
1980. Nonadherents to the NPT as well as the less
developed countries have indicated that they will
push hard for a financing formula putting the
greatest burden on the NPT's nuclear cosponsors,
the US, the UK, and the USSR. The US and UK
have voluntarily offered to open certain facilities
to inspection-not required by the NPT, but de-
signed to make the treaty more palatable to the
nonnuclear weapon states for whom the safe-
guards are mandatory. Several IAEA members
have responded by insisting that the Americans
and the British cover at least the bulk of these
additional costs.
To date, the work of the IAEA's safeguards
committee in developing plans for the future in-
ARMS CONTROL: The Argentine delegate at
the Geneva talks has indicated his country will
support the US-USSR draft treaty limiting the use
of the seabeds for millitary purposes if a few
changes are made in the text. Argentine ac-
ceptance of the treaty would go far toward coun-
tering the attitude of Brazil, which last week
Page 9
spection procedures has proceeded amicably, but
the continued impasse in EURATOM remains a
major problem. The main stumbling block is
France's insistence that it would no longer feel
bound by EURATOM's safeguards system if it is
made subject to IAEA supervision. Some of the
six member states are reportedly ready to agree to
a "minor amendment" to the EURATOM treaty.
This would have the effect of further loosening
controls on the French but would at least enable
negotiations with the IAEA to open. The Dutch,
among others, would have trouble agreeing to
such an amendment. Some sources have said that
if no agreement is reached at the 20 July Council
meeting, the member states, other than France,
and the Commission may decide to open negotia-
tions with the IAEA outside the framework of
the EURATOM treaty.
Most of the 26 membersof the IAEA's pol-
icy-making Board of Governors want to expand
the board as one means of making the institution
of safeguards more palatable. The Soviets oppose
a privileged position for EURATOM on inspec-
tions and thus are trying to block an Italian
scheme to increase the board membership in such
a way as to give itself and West Germany, both
EURATOM states, permanent seats. The board
has not been able to resolve this impasse over
expansion, and the issue will be on the agenda of
the annual conference of all IAEA members in
September.
again voiced strong objection to the treaty. If
Argentina should, however, join Brazil in oppo-
sition, the Latin Americans-already aroused by
US and Soviet views on other maritime issues-
may as a bloc withhold approval of the treaty at
the fall session of the UN General Assem-
bly.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
SECRET
USSR: Party and Government Organs Have Busy Week
The Soviet party central committee met on
13 July and in a surprise move delayed the 24th
Party Congress until March 1971. The two-day
Supreme Soviet session which followed was, by
contrast, uneventful. The formation of a new
government produced no new faces and the two
brief foreign policy statements on Indochina and
the Middle East were relatively routine.
The central committee, which met to discuss
the work of the Supreme Soviet prior to its open-
ing, also heard a report by General Secretary
Brezhnev on the scheduling of the long overdue
congress. According to the party rules it should
have been held by March 1970. An agreement was
finally reached this spring to hold it by the end of
the year. There may have been some dissenters at
the time among the politburo members, but most
of them, including Brezhnev, noted in their elec-
tion speeches in early June that the 24th Party
Congress would be held in 1970. Brezhnev pub-
licly reiterated this commitment as recently as 2
July.
The decision to postpone the congress once
again may not have been made until the central
committee met on Monday. Pointed reminders of
the importance of holding congresses on a regular
basis have appeared in the press. The leadership is
clearly sensitive on this point, and may, therefore,
have wished to spread more widely the responsi-
bility for a further postponement. In fact the
regional party officials attending the plenum
could be expected to argue that there was no
longer sufficient time left this year to hold all the
required pre-congress local level party con-
ferences.
Brezhnev may have provided some explana-
tion for the shift in plans but his report probably
will not be made public. One of the main reasons
for the delay could be the continuing problem of
working out guidelines for the next five-year plan.
Approval of the plan (1971-1975) is slated to be a
major item for the congress. At an earlier central
committee plenum in July, the agricultural sec-
tion of the plan was approved, but agreement has
apparently still not been reached on what priori-
ties to establish in allocating resources to the
other sectors of the economy. The leadership may
hope that by March these difficulties can be
worked out.
Although political maneuvering among vari-
ous groupings in the leadership may have been a
factor in the postponement, the naming of
Brezhnev and Kosygin as the main speakers at the
congress serves notice to party functionaries and
government bureaucrats that they can expect rela-
tive continuity at the top for the next half year.
This would seem to be aimed at discouraging
further jockeying for position.
The legislative session which followed the
plenum was anticlimactic. Nikolay Podgorny was
returned as president of the presidium of the
Supreme Soviet. Aleksey Kosygin was re-elected
to a new term as premier, and all members of his
cabinet were reconfirmed.
The statement on the Middle East, read by
party secretary Boris Ponomarev, was generally a
mild one. One formulation, that "only the peo-
ples and the governments of the Middle East
states should be masters of the situation in the
Middle East," may have been aimed at allaying
international concern over a possible great power
confrontation in the area. A statement on Indo-
china, read by politburo veteran Mikhail Suslov,
was noisily anti-US, but consistent with previous
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
,%W SECRET `%W
European Communities: Enlargement Negotiations Begin
Britain and the European Communities (EC)
begin hard negotiating on the question of British
entry next Tuesday in Brussels. The formal open-
ing of talks on 30 June highlighted the prob-
lems-the upcoming session will try to determine
the procedures to be used in solving them.
The most contentious issue will be Britain's
contribution to the financing of the Communi-
ties. The EC believes applicants must accept both
the treaties that founded the Communities and
the decisions taken since then. Among the most
important is the one made last December on how
the EC should be permanently financed.
The British long ago indicated they are ready
to accept the treaties and the decisions, provided
some of their problems are solved. Their chief
negotiator, Anthony Barber, implied on 30 June
that the financing decision would have to be
altered if Britain is not to bear a disproportionate
burden. Although EC officials think that London
may eventually settle for high costs in financing
in return for gains in other areas, hard bargaining
is clearly ahead.
The financing issue itself is closely related to
the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
which accounts for well over 90 percent of com-
munity expenditures. EC Agriculture Commis-
sioner Mansholt stated publicly last week that the
CAP "mess" might be cleaned up at the negotia-
tions. Nevertheless, the Six have generally agreed
that there be no tampering with the basic prin-
ciples of the CAP. If they were, Britain might be
caught in a tug of war between the conflicting
ideas of the present EC members on how the CAP
should be reformed.
There are a number of other significant
problems. At the opening session, Barber em-
phasized the complications caused by Britain's
commitments to the Commonwealth. The other
candidates for EC membership-Denmark, Ire-
land, and Norway-also have several particular
problems that the EC thinks will have to be
solved before Britain's accession can occur.
In preparation for the negotiating session on
21 July, discussions have already begun on when
these subjects are to be taken up `
Although the negotiations could become
bogged down unless there is early agreement on
such "facts" the British approach involves the risk
of overemphasizing problems and playing down
the larger potential significance of a coalescence
of much of Western Europe around the Com-
munities. Perhaps to counter this danger, London
has spoken of the need for effective institutions
in the enlarged Communities. It also continues to
allude to the prospect of closer coordination of
European defense policies, including Anglo-
French nuclear coo eration.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
_ SECRET i1w
ITALY: Premier-designate Giulio Andreotti, a
Christian Democratic traditionalist and an
opponent of the center-left alignment when it
began, is facing considerable difficulty trying to
reconstitute the coalition. The divisions over the
limits of acceptable cooperation with the Com-
munists are hard to paper over because regional
governments are now being established in
Tuscany and Umbria where Socialist-Communist
cooperation is almost a foregone conclusion. On
the other hand, the disagreement over economic
policy, which has also been a major hurdle in the
negotiations, may be eased. The Communist
leadership issued a statement on 9 July implying a
sharp turn in party policy away from demanding
instant government action on expensive reforms.
Left-wing leaders will now find it easier to agree
with their coalition partners on a satisfactory
pace for reforms.
UN-SOUTH AFRICA: The Africans in the UN
this week requested an urgent meeting of the
Security Council to deal with the controversy
over arms for South Africa. The request is clearly
designed to head off London's intention to
resume sales of defensive military equipment to
Page 12
the government in Pretoria. The English-speaking
African representatives at the UN want to link the
Council meeting with the raucous World Youth
Assembly currently under way, hoping to put
added pressure on the UK. London plans a polic
statement early next week.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
Nw~ SECRET _NW
Jordan: Agreement to Disagree?
The latest accord between the government
and the fedayeen, as finally approved by the
King, eliminated most of the provisions of the
first draft that Husayn had found particularly
objectionable.
The Central Committee of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, speaking on behalf of all the
fedayeen organizations, dropped its demand for
the withdrawal of military reinforcements from
around Jordanian towns. The final version of the
agreement merely called on the government to
"cancel all arrangements and extraordinary meas-
ures that were taken during the crisis." This
phrase could be interpreted to include the addi-
tional troops ringing Amman, but it is also less
likely to antagonize the army. Similarly, the ear-
lier draft had called for the dissolution of any
organization, and the deposition of any indi-
vidual, hostile to the fedayeen; the new language
only requires the government to "ensure that no
organization, machinery, or element will act
against the Palestinian revolution."
Page 14
For their part, the fedayeen have agreed to
submit to disciplinary regulations similar to those
supposedly agreed on last February but never
enforced. The latest accord makes it clear, how-
ever, that enforcement is to be left to the
fedayeen themselves-and it is by no means
certain that they will be able or willing to follow
through, particularly with respect to the more
radical organizations.
King Husayn is said to doubt that the new
agreement will work out any better than revious
arrangements.
Alt ough King Husayn
seems to have come out better than might
have been expected, his acquiescence in con-
cessions that previously would have seemed im-
possible-such as yielding the fedayeen the right
of self-discipline-again points up the continuing
erosion of his authority.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
' SEGKE'1' tow
Arab-Israeli Situation
President Nasir's visit to Moscow was further
extended for additional meetings between the
leaders of the two countries, suggesting that some
differences have arisen, probably related at least
in part to the recent US diplomatic initiative.
Foreign ministers Riad and Gromyko subse-
quently met on 12 July in an unusual Sunday
session. Cairo press reports indicated that political
and military discussions at the ministerial level
would be resumed. Egypt's semiofficial news-
paper al-Ahram has reported that high Egyptian
officials will stay in Moscow with Nasir until his
return to Cairo, now set for early next week
an gyp ian reply to the US peace initiative will
be sent to Washington following Riad's return to
Cairo and after consultations with other Arab
states, particularly Jordan and Syria.
Israelis Denounce Foes,
Profess Interest in Peace
The extended tallks in Moscow and the
USSR's floating in London of an allegedly new
"peace plan," combined with the deployment of
the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system a step
closer to the Suez Canal, gave Israeli leaders an-
other opportunity to sharpen their attacks on
both the Egyptians and Russians while continuing
to profess their own abiding desire for a peace
settlement.
sians. Eban charged that the Soviet inroads had
upset the military balance in the Mediterranean,
and that the recent Soviet "peace plan" was
aimed at undermining the existence of Israel.
The USSR's so-called "peace plan"-the
terms of which actually were first published in
Pravda 18 months ago-was characterized by an
Israeli Foreign Ministry official as a "smokes-
creen" to disguise the Soviet Union's military
support for the Arabs. The official insisted that it
was not up to the Soviet Union, (nor, apparently,
to any other outside power) to formulate the
conditions for peace. Foreign Minister Eban re-
flected this view by calling for Egyptian and Is-
raeli representatives to meet in "a very unofficial
manner" to prepare for actual talks.
Although the Israelis are clearly concerned
by recent developments, they remain opposed to
US efforts to "do business" with Moscow. The
Israelis are convinced that the Soviets want per-
manent turmoil in the Middle East, not peace. Tel
Aviv realizes that it probably cannot now separate
the USSR from the Arabs, but believes it must try
to keep a wedge between Moscow and Washing-
ton if it is to avoid an unfavorable settlement.
Israeli leaders and the press have lately con-
centrated on the theme that the Russians will
move as far in the Middle East as the US lets
them, and that it is now time for Washington to
take a firm stand, i.e., in solid support of Israel.
Prime Minister Golda Meir used a press inter-
view to scorch the Russians as "the worst kind of
imperialists" whose aim is to infiltrate the whole
Middle East. Claiming that Israel "had not missed
a single opportunity for peace," she said that
repeated overtures had been made for secret talks
with Cairo.
In a speech to the IKnesset, Foreign Minister
Eban also took up the cudgel, accusing Nasir of
opening the gates of the Middle East to the Rus-
Military Developments
On the military front, Israeli aircraft con-
tinue their regular pounding of the Soviet-Egyp-
tian air defense system along the west bank of the
Suez Canal. Their approach has apparently been
somewhat more cautious, however, and no Israeli
aircraft have been lost since 2 July. A Tel
Aviv spokesman said that fewer missiles are being
fired; the Israelis are also using evasive tactics and
are making extensive use of electronic counter-
measures. Air Force chief General Hod remains
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
confident that the Israelis will "find the answer"
to the integrated Soviet-Egyptian system, and
claims that the missile network still does not deny
freedom of action over the canal.
Along the other cease-fire lines, Arab feda-
yeen stepped up their attacks, apparently in an
effort to keep the Israelis busy on these borders
as well. Last week, Jordan-based fedayeen repeat-
edly fired Katusha rockets into the Beit Shean
Valley settlements. In response, Israeli aircraft
struck into northern Jordan at least four times,
and on 13 July an Israeli commando force moved
across the river to knock out a Jordanian Army
post. Farther south in the Jordan valley, four
Arab guerrillas were killed by Israeli troops fol-
lowing a rocket attack on a small town to the
north of Elat. Meanwhile, Lebanese-based feda-
yeen continued to lob rockets and mortar shells
into Israeli settlements near the border; in two
instances, they also attacked Israeli resorts on the
Mediterranean. On 13 July, the Israelis moved an
armored force into Lebanon from northern Gali-
lee to strike at guerrillas in the area.
The Sudan: Revolution Takes a Radical Turn
In the three months since the quashing of
the Ansar sect's uprising in early April, the Suda-
nese Government has accelerated its pace toward
the establishment of a radical socialist economy
and a police state.
The Numayri regime's confiscation in early
July of privately owned agricultural lands marks
the latest move in what may be the most compre-
hensive nationalization program in Africa or the
Middle East. Having disposed of their conservative
Ansar enemies, the young revolutionary leaders
apparently estimated that they could socialize the
conomy without serious domestic opposition. To
this end, the government in late May launched a
sweeping nationalization of Sudanese and for-
eign-owned banks, insurance companies, indus-
trial firms, and farm lands-a program that may
not yet have ended. The seizure of some 100
industrial companies has virtually ended private
enterprise in the country. Although a few firms
were left untouched, including the US Mobil Oil
Company, their prospects seem dim.
Page 16
The wholesale nationalization of private cap-
ital reveals the considerable leverage the Commu-
nists have in policy-making positions of the gov-
ernment. Three Sudan Communist Party members
in the ruling Revolutionary Command Council
and the cabinet are credited with planning the
moves and influencing council decisions for their
implementation. Minister of State Abu-Isa and
Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Sulay-
man, both Communists, have been charged with
carrying out the program. The wave of national-
izations shows that the moderates within the re-
gime have been at least temporarily eclipsed in
the formulation of economic policy by the Com-
munists, who have apparently won the ear of the
dominant radical nationalist faction led by Presi-
dent Numayri.
The rapid expansion of the public sector
foreshadows a protracted period of economic dis-
location. The initial chaos resulting from such an
abrupt reorientation of the economy and from
the halt in foreign and domestic investment is
already apparent. Furthermore, the dismissal of
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
,1 SECRET
experienced Sudanese staff members from banks
and firms, and their replacement by retired army
officers and other unqualified personnel, has se-
riously reduced managerial efficiency.
Most Sudanese outside the business com-
munity generally accepted the regime's new eco-
nomic policies without comment. However, the
promulgation in late April of Republic Order No.
4, which contains the legal and administrative
tools of repression, generated widespread public
shock and fear. This new order spells out a long
list of political and economic crimes, and ex-
plicitly decrees the death penalty as the only
punishment for many of the offenses. By clearly
exposing Numayri's harsh reaction to any antire-
gime sentiment, the edict has dissolved much of
the popular good will he has been cultivating.
While no organized resistance has materialized
since the crushing of the Ansar, the full enforce-
ment of the order could serve to stimulate the
growth of opposition to the regime and swell the
ranks of right-wing dissident elements./
Page 17
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
.% SECRET VOW
Lebanon: The Making of the President 1970
Sometime in the month preceding 23
August, Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies will
meet and by secret ballot will elect a president to
succeed Charles Hilu. Under the terms of the
National Covenant of 1943, which apportions
political offices to the various religious com-
munities in the country, the new president should
be a Maronite Christian.
To date, there has been little open cam-
paigning; activity has centered largely on a
behind-the-scenes search for financial support
from foreign powers. Of the dozen or so potential
candidates, the front gunner at this juncture
appears to be former president Fuad Shihab.
Public support for Shihab has been announced by
the Parliamentary Democratic Front, which won
control of the Chamber of Deputies in 1969 and
presently has a theoretical majority. In the past,
the Egyptians have also supported Shihab, a
valuable asset because of Nasir's influence with
the Muslim masses; unless Cairo has recently been
alienated, this support should be forthcoming
again.
Because Shihab is regarded as pro-Muslim,
however, he is anathema to many Christian dep-
uties-particularly the Nlaronites. These deputies,
who form the major opposition grouping, are
likely to throw their support behind the nominee
of one or another of their three parties. Two of
these parties, which form a parliamentary bloc
known as the Chamounists, indicated on 9 July
that they would support the third party's leader,
Pierre Jumayyil. This may prove to be only a
temporary decision, however, and Chamoun him-
self-who served as president from 1952 to
1958-may eventually end up as the major oppo-
sition candidate.
The basic issue in the election centers on
what course the new president would follow in
relations with other Arab countries. Generally
speaking, Shihab and his supporters view Lebanon
as an integral part of a greater Arab nation. They
see their country's involvement in the Arab-Israeli
conflict and in the fedayeen movement as not
only unavoidable but in fact desirable. In inter-
Arab politics, they have been pro-Nasirist and
sympathetic toward other radical states. The op-
position sees Lebanon as a unique state with both
its character and its interests distinct from that of
other Arab countries. They are against either a
fedayeen presence in the country or any involve-
ment in the battle against Israel.
Virtually the only other major influence in
the election will be confessional ism, or religious
identification. Although political parties exist in
Lebanon, the country's unique political process
does not operate on the basis of conventionally
organized groups. Rather, the parties are col-
lections of personalities and their followers, and
tend to represent the parochial interests of their
constituents. To a great extent, these interests
arise from Lebanon's religious divisions: each
community wants to safeguard what political
prerogatives it already has while seeking to
enlarge them at the expense of the other fac-
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 7n
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
SECRET
Cu ba: Preparation for 26 July Celebration
Fidel Castro probably will use his traditional
speech on 26 July to announce new measures
intended to boost flagging morale and restore
vitality to the Cuban revolution.
The frenetic activity during the sugar harvest
has decreased, leaving the population weary.
Moreover, public disappointment over continued
shortages and the failure to achieve the coveted
and much-publicized goal of ten million tons has
been offset only partially by Castro's calculated
strong reaction to armed exile attacks this spring
and by his multifaceted campaign to aid Peruvian
earthquake victims. To renew enthusiasm, Castro
probably will employ a combination of tactics
including the removal of a few high-ranking in-
competents, a temporary relaxation of certain
austerity measures, and promises for a better
future.
Two cabinet members have already been
changed, and a few more ministers and mass or-
ganiztion leaders may meet the same fate. Edu-
cation Minister Jose Llanusa presumably lost his
post because he failed to provide the facilities and
teachers to cope with Cuba's mushrooming stu-
dent population; Sugar Industry Minister
Francisco Padron was reassigned as a natural re-
sult of the harvest shortfall. If more changes oc-
cur, the new appointees probably will be similar
to the replacements for Llanusa and Patron-com-
petent military officers or respected technocrats.
In addition, Foreign Minister Raul Roa may
be replaced by Minister without Portfolio Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez. Roa is little more than a
mouthpiece for Fidel and has been in poor health.
Rodriguez is an internationally respected repre-
sentative who could tactfully manage Cuba's ef-
forts to re-establish commercial and diplomatic
ties with the rest of Latin America.
To stem the flow of trained personnel
abroad, Castro may announce the initiation of
new travel curbs and may even offer assistance to
those skilled emigrees who want to return to
Cuba. Havana recently said that applications for
permission to emigrate by air to Madrid and
Mexico City received after 31 May 1970 would
not be approved. A similar move against the
Varadero-Miami refugee flights may be in the
offing. The travel restrictions coincide with recent
efforts to halt the exodus of refugees into the US
naval base at Guantanamo Bay by erecting phys-
ical barriers around the base.
Castro may also proclaim a new law that
makes education up to the university level com-
pulsory. Because all schools at the secondary level
are gradually coming under military control and
the time spent in such institutions is credited
against a student's military service obligation, the
law would in effect lower the draft age from 17
to 12 or 13.
Fidel may also be planning to resurrect the
topic of "sectarianism"-his term for "old Com-
munists" of the pre-Castro era who dare to criti-
cize his methods and goals. The issue was last
raised in 1967 and culminated in a purge in early
1968 of several dozen members of a "microfac-
tion." Their worst crime seemed to be challenging
Castro's policy of "exporting the revolution"
instead of concentrating on improving domestic
economic conditions.
The anniversary celebrations should give the
population much-needed relaxation. Two weeks
have been set aside for the festivities and efforts
have been made to improve the lot of the Cuban
consumer by increasing food supplies. The oc-
casion will also be marked by the inauguration of
various projects such as public parks and newly
constructed apartments and housing develop-
ments.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
VMW SECRET -qw
USSR-PERU: After several delays the Soviet re-
lief airlift appears to be moving ahead. The lead
flight encountered several equipment difficulties
and weather problems and did not arrive in Lima
until 13 July, two days behind schedule. Five
subsequent flights have been completed on time,
however. Each Soviet aircraft has delivered about
six tons of cargo, including medical supplies,
food, housing and road equipment as well as
technicians and medical personnel.
The official government newspaper gave the
most dramatic coverage to the arrival of the first
plane, using such phrases as the "most spectacular
airlift of all times." Prior to the actual inaugu-
ration of the airlift two major Lima newspapers
used political cartoons that served to embarrass
the USSR. As the Soviet relief effort progresses,
news coverage will probably increase and for the
most part depict the Soviets in a more positive
light. The US Embassy in Lima comments, how-
ever, that so far the limited press treatment and
talks with the man-in-the-street indicate that
Peruvians see Soviet aid as primarily a grandstand
play undertaken for political gain.
He didn't want to miss the streetcar. (El Comercio - Lima, Peru)
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Jul 70
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
SL~,l~1C C, 1
V*W
Bolivia: Political Developments
President Ovando and army commander
General Miranda have squared off but have not
yet come to blows. Miranda has emerged as the
military strong man through the ouster of armed
forces chief General Torres
General Torres was removed from his posi-
tion on 9 July through a reorganization of the
military high command. The reorganization abol-
ished Torres' position as armed forces commander
in chief and established an Armed Forces Su-
preme Council composed of the three service
chiefs.
On 10 July Miranda expressed the fear that
Ovando was trying to remove him, and a com-
mittee of his supporters went to the President in
an attempt to avert further problems. Ovando
finally agreed to issue a statement reiterating his
confidence in Miranda and the other service com-
manders. This appeared to satisfy Miranda and
calmed tensions, at least temporarily.
General Miranda does not appear to have
any driving political ambitions, although he has
been concerned over the leftward drift of the
Ovando government. A confrontation between
Miranda and Ovando can probably be averted if
the President publicly reaffirms his faith in the
army commander.
even if Ovando chooses
to avoid a showdown at this time, the moderates
in the military who support General Miranda are
likely to use their advantage to press Ovando for
further governmental changes in the near future.
The President has so far refused to remove the
remaining leftists from his government and, even
if he decides to forfeit the first round to Miranda
and the moderates, it is only a matter of time
until this issue provokes a new confronta-
tion.
GUATEMALA: Terrorism directed at partisans of
President Arana has broken a month-long lull. In
the last week, two of Arana's supporters have
been assassinated, including the mayor of Zacapa.
In addition, a wealthy plantation owner has been
kidnaped for ransom by the Rebel Armed Forces.
President Arana, who won office promising to
end political violence, is yet to be challenged by a
major terrorist act. He will, however, be under
strong pressure to react if a prominent figure
becomes a victim of the violence. Arana's deter-
mination to resist using illegal methods against
the leftist terrorists may cause him difficulty with
his extremist supporters. Right-wing thug and
congressman Oliverio Castaneda is leaving the
country for three months to avoid a confronta-
tion with Arana over how to deal with the secu-
rity situation.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
1..r SEUKE"l IM0
CHILE: Marxist presidential candidate Salvador
Allende promises that his government would join
Fidel Castro to launch a "Latin American revolu-
tion." As his fourth presidential campaign has
gained momentum in recent weeks, Allende has
made less effort to play down his Marxist policies.
In recent speeches Allende has also called "Ameri-
can imperialism" the one enemy of Latin America
and said his government would respect the prin-
ciple of nonintervention only to the extent that it
judged other governments "reflect the will of the
majority." He has also reiterated his promise to
establish relations with all countries, including
Cuba, Communist China, East Germany, and
North Vietnam.
Brazil: Gubernatorial Candidates Chosen
President Medici has completed the selection
of candidates he favors for the gubernatorial elec-
tions to be held in all 22 states in October. There
is little doubt that the state legislatures will elect
the men Medici wants as governors, probably in
the hope that he will permit a slightly greater
display of democracy in the congressional ballot-
ing scheduled for November.
The majority of the future governors are
technicians; among them are at least three retired
military men, but no active duty officers. Loyalty
to the 1964 "Revolution," as verified by the
National Intelligence Service and local army com-
manders, appears to have been the overriding
criterion in their selection, although demon-
strated administrative competence was usually
also a factor. Personal political prestige seems to
have been a secondary consideration; a number of
the prospective governors have not previously
held any elective office. All are political con-
servatives, and, with one exception, they belong
to the progovernment National Renewal Alliance.
The lone designate from the opposition Brazilian
Democratic Movement will govern the only state
where his party has a majority in the legisla-
ture-Guanabara, which encompasses the city of
Rio de Janeiro.
By hand picking the men he wants to col-
laborate with him on the state level in the coun-
try's administration, Medici has demonstrated
that he intends to continue to control tightly the
limited reactivation of Brazil's political institu-
tions.
SECRET
Page 22 WEEK!_Y SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Secret Ift*
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Komeito: Reaching Too High?
Secret
Na 43
17 July 1970
No. 0379/70A
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
'`P'" 3r,&T1C1r. 1 ter.
Komeito: Reaching Too High?
In the five and a half
years since its inception, the
Komeito, (Clan Government
Party) political arm of the mil-
itant Buddhist Soka Gakkai
organization, has continued to
surprise observers with its
rapid growth. The aggressive,
opportunistic party reached a
new peak last December by
winning 47 seats in the
486-man Diet and becoming
"A A +
A. 0.4 1,
Japan's second most impor- Komeito leaders give "banzai" cheers after the party nearly
tant opposition party. It is doubled its pre-election strength
now planning to run candidates in all 123 electoral districts in the next Lower
House elections, hoping to close the gap between itself and its rival in the
opposition, the debilitated but still formidable Japan Socialist Party.
The party has a history of confounding its skeptics, but legitimate ques-
tions are now being raised concerning Komeito's ability to sustain its past rate of
growth. The Komeito has benefited greatly from circumstances, particularly the
void in opposition politics that has been created by the decline of the Japan
Socialists. Notwithstanding its capabilities, however, future advances will prob-
ably come with greater difficulty. Right now the eyes of its leaders are probably
riveted on the highly fluid state of affairs among the leftist opposition parties
and the labor unions. At stake is the party's chance to surpass the Socialists as
the most important opposition force in Japan.
Komeito was established by the Soka
Gakkai, a lay religious organization, in late 1964
as the successor to a more informally organized
political grouping that had run candidates in local
elections and for the Upper House of the Diet for
almost a decade, inheriting 15 seats in the Upper
House and over 1,000 seats in local assemblies
from its predecessor. The establishment of a polit-
ical arm marked Soka Gakkai's plunge into Lower
House politics, where the real legislative power in
Japan lies.
Special Report - 1 -
Soka Gakkai's decision to enlarge the scope
of its participation in Japanese politics probably
was motivated by a desire to extend its influence,
rather than to "translate religious principles into
daily life," as claimed by Soka Gakkai leaders.
The formation of a political party served to pro-
vide Soka Gakkai's zealous membership with an
added goal to strive for, as well as to win prestige
and popular attention for the group. In addition,
the Buddhist organization probably wanted to
broaden its base of support by attracting small
17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
low SECRET
businessmen and others interested in securing the
patronage of Soka Gakkai's numerous, highly dis-
ciplined followers. The Soka Gakkai claims 7.5
million households, nearly one sixth of the eligi-
ble voters in Japan, as members. The actual num-
ber may be considerably less.
The Komeito's success has in large measure
been a result of young and able leadership. This
has given it a clear advantage over the Japan
Socialist Party, the largest opposition group
party, which has been handicapped by its pre-
dominantly older and less flexible leadership.
Most of Komeito's leaders have long been mem-
bers of the Soka Gakkai and advanced to their
present positions on the basis of their talents at
organizing and gaining members for the new polit-
ical group. These leaders are dedicated believers in
their militant brand of Buddhism, but are not so
dogmatic that they are insensitive to changes in
the Japanese political climate.
"The Generation Gap Hardly Shows in Japan's Youngest
Party"
Special Report
The leadership also differs from that of the
Socialists and other major parties in that it does
not visibly suffer from factionalism. This unity
has accounted for the party's ability to adjust its
policies to shifts in Japanese public opinion, while
the Socialists, because of bitter factional infight-
ing among the top hierarchy, remained incapable
of responding to even the most obvious changes
in popular attitudes. The impressive gains made at
the expense of the Socialists in the December
general elections testify to the sharply contrasting
leadership situations in the two parties.
Legality of Komeito
The intimate ties between the Komeito's
leadership and that of the Soka Gakkai, a lay
religious organization founded on the teachings of
the militant Nichiren Buddhist sect, raise a basic
question concerning the party's constitutionality.
Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution states
that no religious organization "shall receive any
privileges from the State, nor exercise any politi-
cal authority." This was included in the US-
authored document to prevent a revival of the
pre-World War II type of ultranationalistic state
religion that was so effectively manipulated by
the militarist government. Soka Gakkai's ad-
herence to Nichiren's philosophy of meshing reli-
gion with national life, its highly aggressive con-
version techniques, and its intolerance of other
religions, all arouse fears in the minds of many
Japanese that a reversion to a prewar type of
fascist government could occur if the Soka
Gakkai were eventually to reach power through
the Komeito.
Komeito leaders defend their party's con-
stitutionality by insisting that its activities are
strictly political and that it does not pursue any
religious objectives. They also cite a long series of
constitutional arguments relating to freedom of
speech and political association. Nevertheless,
they took a positive step to dissociate themselves
from their parent organization in the public eye
last January by announcing that Komeito's party
leaders were resigning their executive positions in
17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
1W SECRET 14W
the Soka Gakkai, although they would be re-
tained as "advisers." In all likelihood, Soka
Gakkai's operational control over the party will
not be diminished very much, if at all, by this
move. However, the ruling conservatives, who see
the Komeito as a useful tactical ally on certain
issues, have not challenged its constitutionality,
and are unlikely to do so as long as the Komeito
is not an immediate threat.
Komeito's policy apparently is determined
by only four or five men dominated by Soka
Gakkai president Daisaku Ikeda. The party's
policies, unlike those of Soka Gakkai, however,
are not determined on the basis of a broad moral
or religious philosophy.
On the contrary, Soka Gakkai is highly ma-
terialistic, placing great emphasis on the satisfac-
tion of material wants as the path to human
happiness and fulfillment. A new "third world,"
based on a vaguely defined, "humanitarian social-
ism" in which the welfare of the entire people,
not just one class, is the ultimate goal. The Soka
Gakkai contends that neither Communism nor
capitalism can achieve true happiness and eternal
peace. Under capitalism, the rich get richer and
the poor get poorer, while under Communism the
government controls all of the capital and natural
resources in a totalitarian fashion, seeking "ef-
ficiency" at the price of individual freedom. Con-
siderable emphasis is placed on fulfillment of
material desires during a person's own lifetime,
rather than on sacrificing in this world in order to
be rewarded in the hereafter. Based on this
philosophy, Komeito's policies have an obvious
appeal to those elements of Japanese society that
have not fully shared in the postwar prosperity.
In the day to day political arena, Komeito's
policies generally are more reflective of trends in
public opinion than of the doctrines of Nichiren
Buddhism. The leadership has shown a deft
ability to identify the broadest possible consensus
on each issue and then to fashion its position
Special Report - 3 -
accordingly. Functioning as an accurate ba-
rometer of prevailing public concerns over the
past year or so, the party has hit hard on prag-
matic, bread-and-butter domestic issues like
moderately priced housing, pollution, traffic con-
gestion, inflation, and misuse of public funds.
These important nonideological areas have been
neglected by Japanese opposition parties, par-
ticularly the ideologically hidebound Socialists.
These are areas, furthermore, where the ruling
conservatives have done an inadequate job of pub-
licizing their achievements.
Komeito's view of foreign policy generally
tends to support a posture of "complete neutral-
ity" for Japan; building bridges to the antagonis-
tic world champs in a spirit of Buddhist pacifism.
Consistent with this outlook, a readjustment in
the US-Japan security relationship is considered
necessary. This would entail phasing out the
mutual security treaty during the next decade and
a concurrent reduction in the number of US bases
in Japan. The Komeito maintains that the treaty
subordinates Japan to the US, exacerbates ten-
sions in Asia, and pits one Japanese against an-
other. The party has been reserved, however,
about participating in "joint struggles" with other
opposition parties, and Komeito leaders made it
clear many months in advance that they would
not allow participation in violent and irresponsi-
ble political actions directed against the treaty.
Komeito's attitude toward American policy
in Vietnam is a carefully developed reflection of
what the party estimates to be the general con-
sensus in Japan. It has avoided branding the US as
"aggressor," but has criticized Washington for a
lack of understanding of Asians. In recent months
the leadership has been relatively quiet on the
Vietnam issue, probably reflecting the Japanese
public's growing disinterest since the cessation of
US bombing of North Vietnam. As the Vietnam
war has subsided as a political issue, the party has
devoted less attention to the theme that the
mutual security treaty could drag Japan into a
Far Eastern conflict against her will.
17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
SECRET
Japan's relations with China have been a
major preoccupation of the Komeito during the
last year, as the Cultural Revolution ebbed.
Clearly aware of traditional and widespread
Japanese sentiment for improving relations with
China, the party has focused on the theme of
Japan as a bridge builder between China and the
US. From time to time, it has expressed an inter-
est in sending a delegation to China, but its over-
tures apparently have brought no response from
the Chinese. The Komeito apparently is again
preparing a secret letter to Peking soliciting an
invitation for a visit, which it hopes could occur
in the summer or fall of this year. In the mean-
time, party officials periodically call on the ruling
conservatives to recognize Communist China, to
promote Peking's admission to the UN, and to
liberalize restrictions on trade with China.
The Soviet Union has not received so much
attention, probably because the party stands to
gain considerably less lpolitical benefit from
"building bridges" to the USSR. Japanese gen-
erally are far more suspicious of the Soviets than
they are of the Chinese.
he Komeito, however, will probably con-
attract Soviet attention because of its
growing importance in Japanese politics and
because the Soviets no longer have good relations
with the major leftist opposition parties.
The party's impressive gains in last Decem-
ber's Lower House elections-it practically
doubled its representation by winning 47 seats in
the 486-man house-vaulted the Komeito into the
position of second largest opposition party in the
Diet. The party doubled the proportion of the
vote it won in the 1967 Lower House election,
garnering almost 11 percent of the national vote,
and averaging 15 percent of the vote in the dis-
tricts in which it ran candidates.
In contrast to previous elections, candidates
were posted for the first time in districts where
the party was not a sure winner. I n the past,
accurate predictions were made on the number of
highly disciplined Soka Gakkai members who
would be voting in each district, thereby enabling
the party to avoid contesting "risky" elections.
As a result, the party built up an image of "in-
vincibility" that, on the district level, was
somewhat tarnished in the December election.
The principal motivations for venturing into
Lower House Election 1967 & 1969 - (Diet-486 Seats)
,Democratic Socialist Party 7.4%
30 Seats
277`Seats
Special Report
Democratic Socialist Party 7.7%
31 Seats
-4- 17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
%W' SLCJKL1 W
districts where the chances were limited were
probably to build up a base for future elections,
as well as to reduce the victory prospects of other
parties-particularly the Democratic Socialist
Party (DSP), which the Komeito hoped to replace
as the second largest opposition party.
The Komeito depended heavily on the ranks
of the Soka Gakkai for organizational support
and for votes. Its zealouis campaign workers, as
usual, were guilty of more election violations than
those of the other parties, and in many areas
aggressive tactics alienated many potential non -
Soka Gakkai supporters. Soka Gakkai's alleged
tactic of moving adherents from one district to
another to support weak candidates,, however,
was apparently not very heavily employed in this
election, probably because the large number of
candidates (75) made it impractical.
The Komeito in the past has had considera-
ble difficulty in appealing to the non - Soka
Gakkai voter, partially because of the authoritar-
ian, fanatical image that the Soka Gakkai has in
the eyes of many Japanese. It has had only mixed
success in attracting the highly important "float-
ing votes," of the continually swelling urban-
centered group of voters who are largely uncom-
mitted. There is evidence, for example, that in
some areas where candidates attracted as much as
a third or more of their votes from uncommitted
voters, this happened because a particularly at-
tractive candidate was put up or because the
other parties' political fortunes were at a low ebb.
The near doubling of the Komeito represen-
tation in the Diet came largely at the expense of
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), who lost 40 seats
to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the
Komeito, and the Communists. Several seats were
also picked up from the conservatives and from
the rival Democratic Socialists. Inasmuch as all
parties gained at the expense of the JSP and
Komeito gained at the expense of most of its
competitors, it is difficult to determine which
parties have been or will be hurt the most.
Special Report
Efforts To Broaden Support
Leaders of the Soka Gakkai and the
Komeito are clearly aware that their base of sup-
port must be significantly broadened beyond the
ranks of Soka Gakkai believers if they are ever to
achieve a successful mass party. Countering the
unfavorable image of the Soka Gakkai held by
many Japanese has occupied much of the energy
of the party's leaders, who have worked as-
siduously at cultivating a moderate, pragmatic
image. Downplaying Soka Gakkai's professed ob-
jective of bringing a Buddhist theocracy to Japan,
Komeito leaders instead have succeeded in taking
perhaps greater advantage of growing Japanese
nationalistic sentiment than any other party.
Organizational genius and efforts to identify
with the interests of the average Japanese have
resulted in a number of new Komeito-sponsored
mass organizations. The most significant efforts
have been in the labor and student areas, but a
variety of women's and cultural groups have also
been set up.
These organizations offer an acceptable com-
promise to those Japanese who want to be po-
litically involved but also want to avoid the
stigma possibly attached to involvement with the
Soka Gakkai. Furthermore, these organizations
give individuals a chance to gain recognition and
to participate in public affairs on a scale normally
inaccessible to most Japanese. A most attractive
feature is that members can advance to top posi-
tions regardless of their social background, highly
appealing in Japan's status-conscious society.
The formation last year of Minro, Komeito's
labor union, so far has produced only limited
results. Potentially, however, the new union of-
fers an opportunity to make significant inroads
into the largely unorganized mass of workers in
small and medium-sized enterprises. This large
and important source of support has long been
neglected by Sohyo and Domei, Japan's two prin-
cipal labor federations. Komeito's effort has
-5- 17July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
w
SECRET
brought belated expressions of interest in these
workers from the two labor giants. Nevertheless,
the party's leaders seem to be moving leisurely
toward getting the new union fully functioning,
consistent with their forecast that formation of
the union would take "considerable time."
In late October of last year the Soka Gakkai
launched a new national student organization,
Shingakudo, with a claimed membership of
70,000. Unlike the other major student organiza-
tions in Japan, this one at the outset foreswore
the use of violence to achieve its objectives. The
new student union was intended, according to its
sponsors, to provide a "third road," between left
and right, in the politically important student
movement. The new group, of course, could pro-
vide an important source of young, energetic sup-
port, while at the same time drawing off po-
tentially active adherents to Socialist and
Communist party youth arms.
Komeito and Soka Gakkai leaders may be
having second thoughts about their ability fully
to control their student arm, which has exhibited
strong overtones of radicalism. The Japanese
media, fully aware of the mobilization potential
of the highly disciplined Soka Gakkai, quickly
dubbed Shingakudo as the "third Zengakuren," a
reference to Japan's largest student federation
and its smaller competitor, Zenkyoto. Both
Zengakuren and Zenkyot.o, which play a radical
and occasionally influential role in national
politics, view the new Soka Gakkai group more as
a rival than an ally. The radical tendencies of
Shingakudo have already developed into a source
of friction with Soka Gakkai/Komeito leaders.
This situation is unusual, because dissent within
the Soka Gakkai, if it does exist at significant
levels, almost never comes to the attention of
outsiders. Soka Gakkai leaders are exerting maxi-
mum efforts to bring their maverick student army
into line, and can be expected to be reserved in
their support until these efforts are successful.
Special Report
The Komeito (and the Soka Gakkai) until
recently, enjoyed a virtual immunity from public
criticism, largely because of Komeito's religious
overtones, its relatively virtuous conduct in pub-
lic, and the image of "invincibility" it had built
up in elections before the one last December. This
immunity, however, has been gradually evapo-
rating since December, when the Japan Commu-
nist Party alleged that Komeito officials tried to
squelch publication of a book highly critical of
the Soka Gakkai,written by a well-known political
commentator. The media latched on to the dis-
closure, and the opposition parties, seeing an un-
precedented opportunity to embarrass the
Komeito, jumped into the fray. Komeito officials
denied charges that they had "suppressed
freedom of speech," but the issue continued to
heat up with the disclosure that ruling con-
servative party officials had aided Komeito efforts
to stop publication of the book, apparently in
return for past favors. Much to the dismay of
many of the rank and file, party leaders at-
tempted to stay out of the limelight, vainly
hoping that the issue would not assume serious
proportions. Because it did, however, Soka
Gakkai President Ikeda issued a public apology
for the incident. Both the chairman and secretary
general of the Komeito subsequently announced
their intention to resign, apparently over the
book incident and over the results of a recent
gubernatorial election in which the Komeito,
allied with the ruling conservatives, fared poorly.
Because of the importance to the party of
these two able leaders, their resignations were
refused. The scandal, however, is likely to have an
important impact on the Komeito. Most impor-
tant, the scandal has sounded the death knell for
cooperation with other opposition parties. The
Communists and the Komeito, already competing
vigorously for support from the same lower class
elements, will be further apart than ever. The
Communists, for their "vigilance" in defense of
-6- 17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
Nftw SECRET
individual freedoms, may well gain in respecta-
bility from the episode, while popular suspicions
of the Komeito will probably increase. Komeito
and Soka Gakkai activities will now be subjected
to much greater scrutiny by the media and op-
position.
The scandal may also have some repercus-
sions within the ruling LDP as well as on
Komeito-LDP party relations. Kakuei Tanaka,
secretary general of the LDP, who apparently is
responsible for liaison with the Komeito, will be
blamed for involving the ruling party in a distaste-
ful scandal. Tanaka had been mentioned prom-
inontly as possible successor to Prime Minister
Seto.
Rougher Sledding Ahead
At each stage of Komeito's rapid growth,
many observers claimed that the party had
reached a "plateau," and that there would be
little, if any further growth. Undismayed, the
party continued to confound its detractors, cul-
minating with December's impressive gains in the
Diet. It now seems likely, however, that future
gains won't come as easily. Plans have been an-
nounced to run candidates in all 123 Japanese
electoral districts in the next Lower House elec-
tions, a move that will confront the party with far
more challenging conditions than it has encoun-
tered thus far. In the past, candidates have been
entered almost exclusively in densely populated
urban areas where Soka Gakkai supporters are
concentrated. If the new plan is implemented,
however, candidates would be running in a variety
of rural and less populated urban areas where
known supporters are fewer in number. Par-
ticularly in the rural areas, suspicion of the Soka
Gakkai runs high, and aggressive tactics tend to be
counterproductive when viewed in the context of
traditional rural norms.
The! Komeito, unlike the LDP and the JSP,
gains an advantage from not running too many
candidates in the same district; it thus avoids
splitting the vote and hurting the election chances
Special Report
of all of the party's candidates. Furthermore, the
seats already won are probably held more firmly
than is perhaps the case with any of the other
parties. Only three of the 47 candidates elected in
December were "squeakers," that is, elected by
razor-thin margins.
The Komeito's rate of growth will be af-
fected significantly by the ability of the Socialists
to pull themselves together and stem the steady
erosion of voter support. Clearly the Socialist
debacle in the December election aided Komeito
gains, and continued deterioration of the Socialist
party could "open up" districts where the
Komeito previously could not muster enough
votes to elect a candidate. Movement toward a
realignment of the left, however, with the crea-
tion of a new, moderate leftist grouping, would
present serious obstacles to future advances.
There is a very large number of voters in Japan
who at one time or another have been sufficiently
dissatisfied with the ruling conservatives to cast
their lot with an effective alternative-if there
were one. For a number of years, however, no
Japanese opposition party has been able to inspire
confidence in its ability to get things done on
pragmatic, nonideological issues, and, thus most
of these dissatisfied have stuck with the LDP.
Since the December elections, speculation in
the media on the possibilities for a realignment of
the left has increased. For example, an announce-
ment by the Democratic Socialists set 1972 as a
"target date" for bringing the moderate wing of
the Japan Socialists into a new leftist political
alliance.
Growing discussion about a possible realign-
ment of the highly politicized Japanese labor
-7- 17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
- 7r l~i~r 1
movement, potentially an important ingredient in
a political shift, has also added to the speculation.
Domei, a major labor federation loosely affiliated
with the moderate Democratic Socalist Party, has
been calling for a new mass labor union federa-
tion, oriented more toward pragmatic economic
issues than political "struggles." In late May,
Japan's largest labor federation, Sohyo, an-
nounced that it would be willing to meet with the
other important labor groups to discuss unifica-
tion of Japan's labor unions. In the announce-
ment Sohyo acknowledged that a realignment
would not be possible if it continued to support
the Japan Socialist Party and Domei continued to
support the Democratic. Socialists. A loss of ex-
clusive labor union support by the Socialist par-
ties would be a strong stimulus for efforts to put
together a new moderate leftist political grouping
which could present an important threat to
Komeito growth.
How vigorously the Komeito and the Soka
Gakkai carry through on their professed aim of
"separating" themselves from each other could
also have an important impact on longer term
President Daisaku Ikeda
"Can He Keep his Party and his Church Separate?"
Special Report
prospects. This goal could prove to be a double-
edged sword. If the Komeito does not put on a
good show of "divorcing" itself from the Soka
Gakkai, many Japanese will retain their old sus-
picions that the party is merely an arm of a
fanatical authoritarian religious group. On the
other hand, serious attempts to reduce ties with
the Soka Gakkai would risk some of the impor-
tant organizational and electoral support provided
by the dependable, well-disciplined ranks of Soka
Gakkai. At this stage it seems unlikely that the
Soka Gakkai leadership would permit the party to
drift away. Nor do the Komeito leaders seem
confident enough of the party's ability to appeal
to the all important "floating vote" to venture
out on their own.
Success in broadening the base of support
will depend to some extent on the success of the
multitude of "front" organizations, particularly
the labor union and the student associations. The
seemingly slow pace of efforts thus far to stimu-
late the development of these organizations does
not give much of an indication as to the depth of
the party's commitment to ensuring their success.
For the near future the party can be ex-
pected to concentrate on overcoming the bad
publicity generated by efforts to suppress publica-
tion of the book critical of the Soka Gakkai. In
particular, Komeito will probably move more vig-
orously to exploit growing popular concern over
the government's traditional preoccupation with
economic growth at the expense of badly needed
investment in Japan's social infrastructure. Carry-
ing forward the trend in the December electoral
campaign, party leaders, in all likelihood, will hit
harder on issues like pollution, inadequate public
housing, and inflation, while the Japan Socialist
Party sinks further into a morass of ideological
bickering and factional infighting. The Komeito
will be keeping a close eye on developments in
the Socialist and labor camps, for therein may lie
the key to future growth.
17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Mobutu s New Congo
Secret
N4 43
17 July 1970
No. 0379/70B
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
NWIII SLI.K.r,1 v
MOBUTU'S NEW CONGO
Joseph Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo
Kinshasa), assumed control of the government in 1965, and has given his country
better internal security and political stability than it had known since gaining
independence from Belgium in 1960. He has gone far toward remaking an unruly
army into a fairly effective counterinsurgency force, and the once-formidable rebel
bands have been whittled down to small groups of fugitives. Still, Mobutu's hold on
power depends on his constant manipulation of key army officers; military disci-
pline remains dubious, and the army is the prime power base.
So far, Mobutu has merely made a
good start toward transforming the Congo
into a modern national state, drawing
power from a reasonably effective admin-
istrative structure and a popular political
party as well as a loyal army. Presidential
and legislative elections scheduled for late
1970 will offer a good measure of Mo-
butu's attempts to develop broad popular
support for his government, but they will
not give voters a real choice of candidates.
Moreover, his ability to achieve mass sup-
port probably depends ultimately on com-
pleting the hitherto uneven recovery of
the economy, which at the time of inde-
pendence was among the most advanced
in black Africa.
President Mobutu will make his first President Joseph Mobutu
state visit to Washington in early August.
Side-stepping the Army
Although Mobutu has held command of the
Congolese Army since early 1961, he derived a
nonmilitary outlook from his early experience as
a student and journalist in Belgium. Although he
believes that his people need and expect an au-
thoritarian leader, he also recognizes the army's
well-earned reputation for brutality toward civil-
ians. Accordingly, he has cultivated an image that
dissociates him from the army and embodies the
African traditions of chieftainship.
Special Report - 1 -
Underlying the flamboyant posturing for
which Mobutu is well known is a starkly prag-
matic concern for power, particularly for those
additional levers of authority that lessen his de-
pendence on the army. Retaining a grudging re-
spect for the Belgian colonial administration, he
gave first priority in 1966 to reasserting the su-
preme authority of the national government over
the numerous semiautonomous provinces. He has
largely succeeded in restoring a centralized admin-
istrative structure, staffed almost exclusively with
civilians. His undisputed power to appoint, rotate,
17 July 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A008000060001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO08000060001-8
R